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Title: Mexican letters written during the progress of the late war between the United States and Mexico
Author: Brackenridge, Henry Marie
Language: English
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*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Mexican letters written during the progress of the late war between the United States and Mexico" ***
DURING THE PROGRESS OF THE LATE WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
MEXICO ***
No. I.
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MEXICAN LETTERS
WRITTEN
DURING THE PROGRESS OF THE LATE WAR
BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES
AND
MEXICO,
BY
B. H. M. BRACKENRIDGE:
NOW COLLECTED AND REPUBLISHED, WITH NOTES AND CORRECTIONS, TO BE
COMPLETED IN TWO NUMBERS.
────────
_Genus audax Japeti._
────────
WASHINGTON:
PRINTED BY ROBERT A. WATERS.
1850.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PREFACE.
----------
One who thinks for himself, is very apt to think alone, or with a
minority, especially in our free republic, where there is such proneness
in opinion to run into party. The individual is restrained by party
trammels from asserting his independence, and he must adopt all the
articles of political, as well as religious creeds, or be expelled from
the church. Although agreeing with the whigs generally, I could not
agree with them in our late war with Mexico, that justice was on the
side of that republic; still less could I approve of the constant
condemnation of the war in which we were engaged. I applied the same
principle to that war that I did to the late war with Great Britain,
that is to say, that it becomes every citizen to sustain his country
against the common enemy, both by word and deed.
The letters now collected and submitted to the public, were written in
this spirit. The author has endeavored to treat with respect the
opinions of those who differed from him. He does not think he can be
justly censured by any one for attempting to prove by fair and honest
reasoning, that his country was in the right, and the enemy in the
wrong. He may be condemned by his party at the present day, but at a
future day the judgment may be reversed. These letters may serve as
materials for history. There will be no difficulty in finding the
records of the arguments of the administration party, which promoted and
defended the war; or of the opposition, which denounced it. But before
making up a verdict, the voice of the small number dissenting from the
latter ought also to be heard. It is with this view chiefly, that these
letters are collected and preserved. There is, besides, usually a
freshness in the commentaries on contemporary or passing events, which
cannot be attained by historical compilation, however elegant and
philosophic, while the former, may be but rude and unpolished.
The author, although desirous of the annexation of Texas, was fearful of
the consequences of any acquisition of territory on our southern
borders, for the single reason, that it might endanger the harmony of
the Union. He foresaw great evils and dangers arising from the _quasi_
independence of Texas, and from the certainty of the occupation of Upper
California by Great Britain, in case it did not fall into our hands.
Looking into the future, both of these points presented the probability
of fearful collisions with that power. We had a Scylla and Charybdis
before us; our bark could not strike upon both; but whether it will
escape both, the Almighty, who has thus far favored us in a peculiar
manner, can alone determine. As to Mexico, I have long been of opinion,
that we could never have a peace on a lasting foundation, without a war.
If that neighboring and jealous people had still remained united to the
Spanish monarchy, it would have been the same thing. This event was but
removed farther off, or postponed by the acquisition of Louisiana and
the Mississippi, but soon or late, a collision was inevitable; and
nothing else would determine the terms on which we should live in
future, as neighbors. To other persons, all this may appear visionary
and idle, the mere dreams of the closet. Be it so—let my opinions pass
for what they are worth; they are, at least, those of a thinker, an
observer, and an actor on the scene.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 1.
_Justice on the side of Texas in her war with Mexico._
JUNE, 1846.
_To the Editor of the Commercial Journal_:
We continually meet with the phrases in newspapers, English and
American, and especially in Mexican documents, “the robbery and
plunder of Mexico, of her province of Texas,” and of the
“ingratitude of the people of Texas.” These expressions, from
frequent use, have come to have some meaning attached to them
with those who are not acquainted with the true history of the
case. Now what is Mexico, and what particular right had she ever
to Texas? She was once a vice-royalty of Spain, composed of
various Intendencies, or local and subordinate Governments.
These Intendencies, taking advantage of the troubles of old
Spain, set up for themselves, and endeavored to throw off the
Spanish dominion, practising the same thing that Texas has done
as respects Mexico; and if Texas has been ungrateful to Mexico,
for the same reason Mexico has been ungrateful to Spain. But the
struggle for independence was carried on by them separately, and
independently of each other; not united like the British
Colonies in the Revolutionary War. It may be new to some to be
told that Texas not only achieved her own independence without
the aid of any Mexican Province or Intendency, but was actually
the means, through the Americans then inhabiting the country,
with the aid of citizens of the United States, of enabling the
other Mexican Provinces to gain _their_ independence. Before I
am done this will be demonstrated. Mexico owes a debt to the
American people of Texas and of the United States, for her
independence, _if it be worth anything_, and, consequently, the
ingratitude is on her side. But her efforts were finally
successful through the treachery of Iturbide. He was a traitor
to Spain, in whose employment he was, and by one of those
military revolts, since of daily recurrence in the mis-named
Republic of Mexico, overturned the Spanish authority, and
proclaimed himself Emperor! The empire was soon after overturned
by something approaching nearer to a popular revolution in the
Intendencies or Provinces. An attempt at something like a
Republic, followed the downfall of the Emperor. States were
formed out of the Intendencies, and a confederated Republic, in
imitation of the United States, was established in form, but in
form only. Texas, with parts of two other Intendencies, was
constituted one of these States. The confederated Republic was
not long lived. It fell to pieces or was overturned by the
military chiefs, and then each State, was again compelled to
look out for itself. Some submitted, some were subdued by this
military power, the only real power; and others still retain
their preference for the federative system, although compelled
to submit to the central authority. The only one which _did not
submit to the overthrow of the Constitution by a military
usurper, was ungrateful Texas_.
Santa Anna, after having expelled Iturbide, next overturned the
federative system, restored the central power of the city of
Mexico, and at the same time grasped the substance of absolute
power, prudently avoiding the name of Emperor. Troops were sent
to Texas, and these _ungrateful_ people were generously called
upon, _to give up their religion and surrender their rifles_!
The consequence was, that Coss and his fourteen hundred men were
driven over the Rio Grande. People talk of the Texans having no
cause of war, now I ask any one, who has a drop of American
blood in his veins, to say, what he would think of an order by a
military despot, to the people of Alleghany county for instance,
_to give up their religion and their arms_? But then did not
Mexico make grants of land to these ungrateful American
settlers, and did not that entitle her to call upon those
settlers to comply with her moderate requests?[1] It is true,
Mexico did make grants of land in Texas; yes, of land which did
not belong to her, for they were won from Spain by the Texan
Americans themselves, who constituted nine tenths of the people
of that part of the country. And what was the next movement on
the part of Mexico? These grants were made during the federative
system—Americans were invited on account of their valuable
assistance in contending against the Spanish monarchy, and
guarding the frontier against hostile Indians—but when they were
no longer needed, when the lands improved by them, tempted the
cupidity of the military despots, and when their sturdy habits
of independence and love of liberty stood in the way of the
despotic schemes of the military aspirants and plunderers of
Mexico, the next thing was to expel, or exterminate, the
ungrateful and hated North Americans. Santa Anna marched at the
head of ten thousand men for this holy purpose. We may judge of
the humane and civilized spirit of these barbarians, (for whom
so much sympathy is ignorantly felt by some of our fellow
citizens,) by the murder of Fanning and four hundred American
Texans in cold blood, after a surrender as prisoners of war!
This more than diabolical atrocity, is scarcely equalled by the
murder of the Huguenots by the fanatical ruffian, Pedro
Menendez.
Footnote 1:
Terms of reproach like these have been applied to the Texans,
even from the pulpit, by learned divines, who are better
theologians, than jurists or statesmen. As moral men, they
ought to beware how they cast reproach on their neighbors,
without being sure of their facts; and even then, tempered by
charity. If the allusion is to the grants of land made by
Mexico, those grants were made from the most interested
motives. Texas contained but two small towns, San Antonio and
Nacogdoches; all the rest was a wilderness, wandered over by
the Camanches and Lipans, and other hostile Indians, with the
exception of the few American settlements formed by hardy
American pioneers, and maintained by the rifle, at the
constant risk of life. The object of the Mexican Government
was to cover their frontier from Indian depredations by
placing an advanced guard of our countrymen between them and
their savage enemies. The lands of Texas were worse than
useless and worthless to Mexico, because they merely served as
the place of refuge for her savage enemies; she, in fact, gave
nothing that was of any value to her; on the contrary, the
grants were intended for her own advantage and security. But
for these settlements, her whole frontier would have been laid
waste; and many a bloody battle was fought, and many a Texan
life was lost in the border war of which the Mexican Provinces
reaped the benefit. But for the Texans, it is difficult to
say, what would have been the condition of the internal
provinces at this day. After expending millions in money and
labor—after opening farms, building towns, and rearing vast
herds of cattle, the Mexicans begin to discover its value, and
conceived the idea of placing their peon slaves on the
improved lands, which were to be parcelled out among military
chiefs. Besides, the sturdy republican predilections of the
Americans settled in Texas, and their intelligence, were
annoying to the leaders of the military despotism of Mexico.
It was conceived, that the purpose for which they were invited
to take possession of the dangerous post of frontier settlers,
was now accomplished, and that their further services could be
dispensed with; and, at the same time, gratify the cupidity of
their military chieftains. It was they who were frustrated in
the _attempt to steal the Texan lands_, while the Texans did
nothing more than defend their own—that which they had
created, _and which had never been the property of Mexico_.
I am disgusted when I hear persons talk of the injured Mexicans,
when such butcheries as these are passed _in almost approving
silence_. But Santa Anna met, not indeed _with the fate he
deserved_, but such an overthrow, as every true lover of liberty
and political justice ought to desire. His forces were driven
across the Rio Grande; Texas declared her independence; she
successfully maintained it, and proclaimed the Rio Grande as her
boundary, and has devolved that _claim_ upon us. Upon this mere
outline of facts, I appeal to every just and unprejudiced,
unbigoted man, to say, how has Texas been ungrateful to Mexico,
and how have we, or Texas, been guilty of robbing Mexico of an
independent State, which has fairly united her fate with ours?
Mr. Webster says, Mexico is “the most ill-governed country on
earth;” and I will add, that her Government is the most
faithless, unprincipled, and cruel. For the honor of humanity,
there are noble exceptions, doubtless, among the people and her
public officers, nevertheless, such, with too much truth, is the
general character of both.
In 1812, a young man of the name of Magee, who had been a
Lieutenant in the United States service, after resigning for the
purpose, assembled a force of American riflemen between the
Sabine and the Trinity Rivers, and raised the standard of revolt
against Spain, ostensibly under a native named Bernardo. At this
time, the different attempts at revolution throughout the
vice-royalty, had been completely put down, and the last rebel,
Hidalgo, publicly executed. Magee took Nacogdoches, then marched
to La Bahia, where, with four hundred Americans, he withstood a
siege of three months, the American riflemen making such havoc
among the Spanish soldiers in their occasional sorties, that
their commander was compelled to raise the siege and retreat to
St. Antonio; Magee, in the meantime died, not more than
twenty-two years of age. The Americans, in all, about three
hundred, and one hundred Indians, pursued the royal troops until
within twelve miles of St. Antonio. Here they were drawn up
twelve hundred strong, with six pieces of artillery. A charge
was made by the American riflemen, the artillery taken; and on
the same day they took possession of the town. About six months
after this, General Elisondo, with sixteen hundred men, who had
approached the place, was attacked by the Americans with about
nine hundred, (three or four hundred of them native Texans,) and
completely routed. Two Spanish armies were thus entirely
destroyed. A third, under Arredondo, would have shared the same
fate, but for the desertion of Manchaco who led the Texan
Spaniards.
It thus appears, that the revolutionary fire was kept alive in
Texas when every where else extinguished. It was the means of
exciting other revolutionary attempts in different parts of
Mexico. Even after Texas was reduced by the Spanish troops, new
attempts were continually made by Americans, and with partial
success, to regain it. It was, through the medium of Texas, that
supplies were continually obtained to aid the Mexicans in all
their struggles for independence. Hundreds of Americans
sacrificed their lives in every part of Mexico in support of the
cause. In the unfortunate expedition of General Mina, not less
than three hundred Americans embarked, few of whom ever
returned. I am well convinced that without the aid of the
ungrateful Texans, in the supply of men, arms, and means of war,
Mexico could not have gained her independence. And what was the
return made to the citizens of the United States for this, and
for being first to take her by the hand, and recognize her as an
independent Republic? It was natural for Americans to sympathize
with their countrymen in Texas when oppressed by Mexico, and a
determination avowed to exterminate them; and hence, the
principal cause of offence to Mexico, which instigated the
shocking treatment of American citizens engaged in their lawful
pursuits in that country, under the faith of treaties. Nothing
was more common than the imprisonment of Americans in the horrid
prisons of Mexico; for personal liberty, which to us, is the
dearest thing on earth; with them, is the cheapest. Our trade
with Mexico was almost annihilated. In every instance in which
American vessels were seized under some frivolous pretext as an
excuse for plunder, every one on board was thrown into prison
among the vilest malefactors, and compelled, for an indefinite
period, to undergo every kind of suffering, under which a large
proportion actually perished. A stupid and barbarous prejudice—a
fiendish hostility, seems to prevail among the great body of
that people where no opportunity has been afforded of becoming
personally acquainted with us. It reminds one of the ignorant
self-conceit and arrogance of the Chinese, and there seems to be
no way of securing their esteem and respect, but by adopting the
course pursued by the English with the “Celestials.” Our long
forbearance has doubtless tended to encourage this insolence.
They received a timely check from the French when the castle of
Ulloa was battered down with so little ceremony, and the
authorities required to pay on the deck of Admiral Baurin’s
vessel, a million of dollars, as the estimated value of their
plunder of French subjects. They now entertain a high opinion of
French civilization and politeness. England has always held them
under her thumb, by loans, investments, and cajolery, and they
now look to her for aid, support, and sympathy. England has a
deep stake in Mexico; it is to be expected therefore, that she
will sympathize with _her own interests_; that she will do all
she can to excite against us the prejudices of the Mexicans,
exhibiting our conduct through a jaundiced medium, both to
Mexicans and Europeans. No pains will be spared to place us
before the world as in the wrong in this contest. American
editors ought to be on their guard against such partial and
interested representations as that of J. D. Powell’s, “Chairman
of the South American and Mexican Association,” as well as
against the low and scurrilous slanders of the British presses
of Montreal.
H. M. BRACKENRIDGE.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 2.
_The first blow of the War—Fortunate result—Reflections._
JULY, 1846.
Never was a country more suddenly raised up from a state of
depression, to the most enthusiastic rejoicing and gladness,
than we have been since the late glorious intelligence from the
Rio Grande! We may talk about the justice of the war, and there
may be fanatics who would rejoice in the defeat of our armies,
but the people, true to patriotic feeling, rejoice with one
heart over the glorious achievements of our countrymen. We are
the same people that we were at the capture of Cornwallis, and
at the defeat of the British at New Orleans.
There was a gloom settling over the public mind, and fears began
to be entertained of news like that from Detroit, at the opening
of that unfortunate campaign. To all appearance, General Taylor
and his gallant army were shut up in Fort Brown, and suddenly
cut off by an overwhelming force of Mexicans, from his military
depot at Point Isabel. If that depot, defended by less than a
thousand men, its fortifications incomplete, should be assailed
by the whole force of Arista and Ampudia, its safety appeared to
be hopeless. If taken, the army of General Taylor, shut up in
Fort Brown, with supplies only for a few weeks, would be either
compelled to surrender, or attempt to retreat to Corpus Christi.
The consequences, in either case, would be a triumph for the
Mexican arms, fatal to all hope of peace.
I passed some sleepless nights in revolving the subject in my
mind. The idea constantly recurred to me, as a sort of waking
dream, that General Taylor would leave a force in Fort Brown and
with the main body of his army cut his way to Point Isabel. I
was disposed to blame him for suffering himself to be separated
from his depot of supplies; but the war itself came on him
suddenly, and he was obliged to _wait the first blow_. In this
feverish state of mind, a friend came to my house early one
morning with two newspaper slips containing the accounts of the
two battles of Palo Alto, and Resaca. Never was the anxiety of a
people more suddenly and joyfully relieved! It was like the
anxiety felt by a family for the fate of those nearest and
dearest to it. We are peculiarly a national people; for every
man has a share in the Government; feels an interest in it, as a
part owner, and he feels his own safety and honor embarked in
the same bottom with the safety and honor of the nation.
Thank God, we are safe! They must be very short sighted men who
could wish success to the Mexicans. We should have had scenes of
bloodshed and devastation unparalleled. Our preparations for war
would have had to be renewed on a vast and expensive scale; the
most extravagant hopes in the presumptuous and barbarous enemy
would have been encouraged; while even the Sabine, for a
boundary, would not have contented them. Their demands would
have known no bounds, and the prospects of peace, would have
been remote indeed. Now, humbled and broken, their country
exposed to invasion and conquest, if we only will it; undeceived
in their fancied military pre-eminence, they must be insane if
they do not hasten to sue for peace. I confess, I did not look
for such decided success in the first blow, which, in wars and
battles, is often so important; and that, over a people who have
been continually practising the art of war, and who ought to
excel in it, if they can excel in any thing. If the history of
nations be a history of battles, (as it is said to be) Mexico
will claim a conspicuous page in that history. European nations,
who have been in the habit of judging others, chiefly by their
military prowess, will open their eyes when they receive the
news; for they have already prognosticated according to their
wishes, that we must be disgraced in the trial of arms with
Mexico.
I have no doubt, that President Polk will lay hold of this
occasion to offer terms of peace. I am not one of those whigs
who believe, that it was the predetermined plan of this
administration to involve the country in a war with Mexico. I
rather accuse them of a want of foresight, as to the inevitable
result of the annexation of Texas. If they had been convinced,
that war would have been the consequence of that measure, I
honestly think, there would have been no annexation. The
repeated declarations, that it would not be followed by war, I
believe, were made in sincerity. For my part, I thought
differently; the issue seemed to me to be this—shall we take
Texas, _and war_, or leave the numerous questions of policy
arising out of the independence of Texas, to take care of
themselves, and our relations with Mexico to remain in the same
embroiled state for an indefinite period? There is a providence
in the affairs of men, which shapes their fortunes, “rough hew
them as they will.”
I neither approve nor condemn the course of the administration
in relation to this war. I am convinced it would not,
intentionally, endanger its popularity on such rocks and shoals,
as the expense and casualty of war necessarily present. A
demonstration was thought to be sufficient to secure the
advantages of a treaty of peace and limits, settling all our
differences, and gratifying the nation, by a great acquisition
of territory. A small share of the glory and popularity which
may attend this war, will be reaped by the administration! These
will be bestowed on those who are immediately engaged on the
scene of action. Our friends are doing all they can to make it
Mr. Polk’s war; but the people will persist in looking upon it,
as General Scott’s and General Taylor’s war; so far, at least,
as the glory is concerned; if it should prove disastrous, then,
indeed, the administration will come in for a share.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 3.
_The annexation of Texas, the unavoidable cause of war—The
energetic prosecution of the war the only way to obtain
peace._
SEPTEMBER, 1846.
SIR: If the editor of the “Commercial Journal,” will look over
his files he will find, that two years ago I gave my opinion,
that the annexation of Texas would not merely _lead_ to war, but
would be war—that it would be a long war, and that if we carried
the war into Mexico, would require an addition to our regular
force of at least thirty thousand men, and an annual expenditure
of thirty millions of dollars. I ask you whether my prediction
has not been fulfilled? Yet, you must suppose, that I say this
from friendship to Mexico; I have no sympathy with either her
people or her military despotism. I feel interested in the honor
of my own country, and all my hopes and wishes are for the
success of her arms.
I do, moreover, honestly believe, that as respects Mexico, our
cause is just. Whether it was within the scope of possibility
for the Government, (I mean the whole Government, not the
Executive branch alone,) by prudent measures, and by
forbearance, to avoid hostilities, is a question which I do not
choose to discuss at present. But I contend, that Texas had a
right to annex herself to the United States, if she chose; that
we neither violated any right of Mexico nor any treaty
stipulation in accepting the offer, although, there is no doubt
that, looking at things as they actually exist, the joint
resolution of Congress annexing Texas would, inevitably be
followed by war.
Mexico has rejected, and continues to reject, all overtures of
peace, excepting on the condition of our retiring beyond the
Sabine, and making compensation for the wrong alleged to have
been done her, by the annexation and military occupation of her
province of Texas. Having thus got into war in consequence of
this step, the war has become the act of the nation, and there
is no hope of peace without concessions, which we cannot make.
It is useless for highly sublimated moralists, and highly
honorable statesman, to propose such concessions—every one
knows, as a matter of mere fact, that the nation will not
consent to them. We are in for the war, and must fight it out.
Judging of nations and men as they are, and not, perhaps, as
they ought to be, there is no other course.
Besides, there are points in which we are bound by positive
obligations, not by mere abstract morality. We are bound to
maintain the right of Texas to the boundary of the Rio Grande,
and we are bound to secure the amount of spoliations due by the
Mexican Government to our own citizens. As we are now at war,
(and it is not material as to this, whether by our act, or that
of Mexico,) the payment of that debt must be secured by
sequestration of California or other territory, and at the same
time, there must be indemnity for the expenses of the war. As to
the prospects ahead, that is, as to the results of the war, they
do not appear to me encouraging, and as to the prospects of
peace, they are still more gloomy.
I believe there is no nation on the Globe more powerful for
defence, than we are. But our power for warlike conquest, is an
idea which ought not to be encouraged, and no people had ever
less necessity for it. In order to be conquerors, we must have
regular standing armies; we must have tributary provinces as
Rome had, and, consequently, a system incompatible with our
simple democratic republican institutions. Unoccupied countries,
like California, may be conquered by our settlements, as Texas
and some of our States were conquered. In the course of time,
the whole of North America, and, perhaps South America, will
gradually and imperceptibly, yield to this kind of conquest. But
at present, the countries beyond the Rio Grande are inhabited by
a different race of people, too numerous to be at once absorbed
or displaced, and whose habits and character do not fit them to
become integral portions of our confederacy. Mere dependencies
and colonies do not suit the spirit of our free institutions.
The western side of the Rio Grande presents a very different
case from that of Texas, settled by our own people, and which
but a few years ago was little better than a wilderness, a
frontier to Mexico, as well as to us. The States of New Leon,
Coawilla, and Tamaulipas, contain half a million of people, have
been settled two hundred years, and contain ancient cities and
towns. They are spread over a surface as large as Virginia and
the Carolinas, and backed by other more extensive States towards
Mexico. If the struggle lay only between the Mexican military
and our armies, a few decisive battles might end the contest.
But we have to overcome the prejudices, ignorance, and
antipathies of the population, a conquest a thousand times more
difficult than that of arms. And are we certain that the people
of those States will remain perfectly passive, and that their
countrymen beyond the Sierra Madre, cannot be rendered
formidable as guerrillas? Our estimate of them may be too low.
In case of some severe reverse, their numbers, should they rise
_en masse_, may overwhelm detached bodies of our troops. The
proclamation of Ampudia, denouncing as traitors, all who will
hold intercourse with our people, has had its effect. The people
will become exasperated at the outrages which will, in all
probability, be committed by our irregular troops, and the
guerrilla warfare will bristle over the whole country. Few among
us are aware of its vast extent. It is for the greater part
composed of barren mountains and arid plains, interspersed with
fertile valleys, and entirely unlike our western States. We will
have to guard a frontier of two thousand miles, from Santa Fee
to Matamoras, without mentioning California. We will have to
garrison all the principal towns between the Rio Grande and the
Sierra Madre. If we attempt to advance beyond Monterey, we must
force our way through a population of several millions, after
crossing a desert of several hundred miles. Conquests are easy
enough, when people are willing to be conquered, but when they
determine to resist, it is a very different matter. When
Napoleon attempted the conquest of Spain, after the manner that
Edward I undertook that of Scotland, he had possession of Madrid
and all the principal cities, with five hundred thousand of the
best troops in the world, and yet, in less than three years, his
Generals were driven out with a remnant of thirty thousand men!
The capture of Burgoyne and of Cornwallis, show what a critical
thing it is for an invading army to penetrate an enemy’s
country, with the wave of an unconquered people closing behind
them. Our armies are about to operate in a country without
roads, without supplies or resources, through defiles, over
deserts without water, and under a burning sun. I have great
confidence in them, and I believe that whatever can be done,
they will do, but shall not expect impossibilities of them. They
may reach and take Monterey, after hard fighting and much
suffering, and then be compelled, by superior numbers, to fall
back on the Rio Grande, and fortifying themselves, carry on a
war of detachments with little prospect of any definitive
result. There is no hope of bringing the war to a speedy close
without putting in the field at least twenty thousand regulars
and thirty thousand volunteers, and their advancing from
Monterey and Vera Cruz, after taking those places. The advance
on the capital ought to be made at the same time, so as to
compel Santa Anna to divide his force.
A good deal has been said about the extension of slavery beyond
the Rio Grande. My design in these letters is simply to state
facts and give honest opinions. I am not an abolitionist, nor
interested in the question of slavery, nor will I suffer my
party feelings to bias my judgment in relation to Mr. Polk and
the democratic administration. The idea of negro slavery beyond
the Rio Grande, is, in my opinion, erroneous. The climate is
doubtless, adapted to the culture of sugar and cotton; but then
negro slaves cannot be retained on the Mexican frontier longer
than they shall think proper to remain in slavery. They would
escape into Mexican territory when they pleased; and there being
but few negroes in that country, and none having been held in
slavery, they would enjoy a consideration there, unknown even in
the free States of the Union. The wealthy Mexicans would not
want their services, as they have already a cheaper kind of
servitude in their peons, or half indian laborers. Negro slavery
was once attempted to be introduced into Mexico for the culture
and manufacture of the sugar cane, but failed, and the slaves
set free. The peons, with a nominal freedom, are actually
slaves. They receive trifling wages, scarcely sufficient to
provide them with the bare necessaries of life. It is even
doubtful, whether a slave population can be placed nearer than
the Nueces, on account of their facilities for escape. A large
proportion of Southern Texas presents the same objection to the
removal of the Southern planter. These Mexican acquisitions, or
proposed acquisitions, are greatly overrated in the slave
holding States, and the danger is equally magnified in the minds
of those who are opposed to the further extension of slavery.
Neither of these parties are disposed to view the subject in a
practical light; it is like the dispute in the fable about the
color of the Chameleon—one asserted that it was black, and the
other that it was white, but when exposed to view, it proved to
be green!
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 4.
_Victory of Monterey.—The prospects of peace._
SEPTEMBER, 1846.
SIR: Another glorious victory has been achieved by our gallant
army! I begin to think that there is scarcely any thing
impossible for such men, with such leaders as Taylor and Worth.
The incidents of the taking of Monterey would afford materials
not merely for a chapter, but a volume.
Surely Mexico will now embrace our offer of peace. The inability
of the Mexicans to cope with us is now placed beyond a doubt. We
have beaten them in the field two to one, they attacking us; and
we have taken one of their strongest cities in spite of
fortifications and barricades, and superior numbers. The
magnanimity and generosity of the conquerors surely must have
some effect on them, unless they are absolutely mad.
The distance of our army from Saltillo is about eighty miles,
the way lying through mountain gorges and narrow defiles capable
of complete defence in the hands of a brave and determined
people. It seems there is something wanting in these people,
which puzzles me. It must be, either want of skill and courage
in the officers, or a want of patriotism and bravery in the
soldiery and inhabitants.
Saltillo may be regarded as the pass of the Sierra Madre, rather
than Monterey; because, from Saltillo there is a road to
Presidio on the Rio Grande, and thence to San Antonio of Texas.
There should be another division, or rather army, to take this
road, and form a junction with General Taylor at Saltillo.
Perhaps, that under General Wool, instead of proceeding to
Chewawa, may take that course.[2] The range of mountains called
the Sierra Madre, forms an impenetrable barrier between the
States west of the Rio Grande and the other Mexican States.
There are said to be but three passes: the first, from Tampico,
by following the Panuco river from the head of its navigation,
but affording only a mule track; the second, that of Saltillo;
and the third, by the Rio Conchas to Chewawa. The distance from
Saltillo to Tampico, is not less than six hundred miles; and
after ascending the mountains to the table land, there is
nothing but a dreary desert for at least three hundred miles.
This, at once suggests the difficulty of the march to Mexico;
and, also, the difficulty on the part of Mexico of sending
armies to recover the country between the mountains and the Rio
Grande. If the war should continue, which I hope may not be the
case, these, and other passes (for I have no doubt there are
others) should be seized and fortified, instead of making the
Rio Grande the line of defence; establishing fifty assailable
points, instead of three, for an enemy’s concentrated force to
strike wherever that enemy may choose. If conquest be intended,
or result from the war, this line of defence along the Sierra
Madre would be absolutely necessary to the planting States, as
slavery could not be maintained with the Rio Grande as the
boundary. In my opinion, the only real advantage which will be
gained by this extension of our territory, will be the
navigation of the Rio Grande, which will open a trade with the
Internal Provinces capable of vast extension. Few southern
planters would run the risk of taking their slaves west of the
Rio Grande, even with the Sierra Madre as the boundary. They
would, of course, migrate in single families, and their negroes
could escape, if they thought proper, as fast as they came. I
have no doubt, many of them would remain of choice, with their
owners; but they would be insecure as property, and that would
discourage the importation. The navigation of the Rio Grande is
capable of great improvement, and it is ascertained that there
is an abundance of coal on its banks. These banks will, some
day, be crowded with towns and cities, and their fertile soil
will support as large a population as the Nile.
Footnote 2:
General Wool marched from Paras to Saltillo.
There are but two roads by which the city of Mexico can be
approached by our invading armies. The first is, from Saltillo,
through the populous States of Zacatecas, Guadalajara,
Guanahwato, San Louis, and Queretaro, containing near four
millions. Now, is it probable, that these States will offer no
resistance to the long march of General Taylor at the head of a
handful of men? I do not doubt, but that in the open field, at
the head of ten thousand men, he would beat three times that
number; but the heavy loss sustained at Monterey must satisfy us
that such victories will be dearly bought. It cannot be said
that the Mexican soldiers have not fought, and on some
occasions, have not fought well, and they may learn to fight
better. But let us consider again, what an immense commissariat
must accompany an army on such a march, to afford the necessary
supplies. Those who are urging the march of General Taylor on
Mexico, are, perhaps, not as well acquainted as he is with what
is necessary for such an undertaking. The second road is from
Vera Cruz, the distance of three hundred miles, through a
thickly settled country, but with numerous defiles, and where
there must be fighting at every step. Vera Cruz may be taken,
and will be taken, and then the Castle will fall. Here will be a
depot to supply the invading army as it shall advance, step by
step; and is it likely we can land an invading army of
sufficient strength to crush the forces of the Republic under
Santa Anna? If the Mexicans make but an indifferent use of the
means in their power, it would seem to me impossible for us to
reach their capital! The province of Mexico alone, not as large
as one of our counties, contains a million and a half of people.
If they are like our countrymen, I should say it would be
impossible for an invading army of thirty thousand men to
penetrate three hundred miles through a country so well
fortified by nature. We must expect to fight our way through
fifty thousand men at least, which Santa Anna could bring into
the field. The country is now united against us, under his sway,
by every consideration of hatred and religious feeling, if not
of patriotism. I consider it madness to undertake such a march
with twenty thousand men, regulars and volunteers, however
chivalrous they may be, if Santa Anna should throw himself
between Vera Cruz and Mexico, with the army he has been
collecting and training, with so much industry at San Louis
Potosi.
We may hold the other side of the Rio Grande; and as soon as our
people crowd into it, and bear some proportion to the population
already there, it may be regarded as conquered. As to
California, it is already ours, and we must soon be complete
masters of it, for it will be occupied by our people. The Texan
side of the Rio Grande will be ours in consequence of the towns,
garrisons, and settlements which will be rapidly established
there. We may take Tampico, and hold it; and we may also take
Vera Cruz, and retain it until Mexico comes to terms; and it
seems to me impossible that she will not do this in order to
regain her only seaport, while we, at the same time, cut off all
her foreign trade! Nothing but the most stupid, blind, and
ignorant obstinacy would prevent her from treating with us under
such circumstances. I approve the taking California, and New
Mexico, for the purpose of holding them under sequestration,
until Mexico shall be willing to make peace on just and
reasonable terms. Since the armistice, on the surrender of
Monterey, two months must elapse before any further steps can be
taken by General Taylor. He was in no condition to advance
further than Saltillo; at any rate; and, perhaps, without
completing his conquests of the country east of him, towards the
gulf, it would have been unwise to have moved beyond Monterey.
He had important preparations to make, of a very different
character from those of his forced march on that city. And,
besides, he entertained hopes, as we all did, that during the
breathing spell, some means might be found to put an end to the
war. In the capitulation of Monterey, he has shown himself as
humane as he is brave.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 5.
_Capitulation of Monterey—Ideas of conquests in Mexico._
OCTOBER 26, 1846
SIR: When I wrote my last letter I had not seen the capitulation
of Monterey, at least the official report. It appears, that the
terms were conditional, and allow no more time than is
absolutely requisite for Gen. Taylor to make his arrangements
for ulterior movements. The city was taken by a forced march,
with only a part of the troops. The attempt to cast censure, by
indirection, on this meritorious officer, betrays a jealousy of
his growing popularity. The capture of Monterey is of immense
importance, as well on account of its being one of the keys of
Mexico, as on account of the vast amount of public property, in
arms and munitions captured, which Mexico is in no condition to
replace. That city was a stronghold under the Spaniards before
the Mexican revolution, and contained a great quantity of
cannon, transported with immense difficulty and expense, from
the city of Mexico. It was in fact, the metropolis of the
provinces of the Rio Grande; and if a new confederacy should be
formed by those States, it would be the seat of the federal
Government. In a few weeks, the sickly season will be over; the
surviving sick will be again fit for duty, the commissariat will
be enabled to complete its supplies, and transportation for the
army, considerable reinforcements will reach the seat of war,
and then we may expect an onward movement.
General Taylor having now gained a safe footing, must go to work
to consolidate his occupation, or if you will, his conquest of
the country between the Rio Grande, the mountains, and the Gulf.
This extensive tract of country, as large as Italy, and
resembling it in scenery, climate, and soil, is now cut off by
our arms and by its natural boundary, from the rest of Mexico.
It ought to be completely occupied, by fortifying the principal
points on the Rio Grande, the mountain passes of the Sierra
Madre, and also by the occupation of the chief towns of New
Leon, Coawilla, and Tamaulipas. Tampico, of course, must be
taken by a combined land and naval attack. It has a shallow sea
coast from Tampico to the mouth of the Rio Grande, of four
hundred miles, whilst it stretches east and west, between the
mountains and the river, nearly double that distance. Here is an
extent of surface equal to that from the Potomac to the Savannah
and east of the Appalachian chain. It is capable of containing
four millions of souls, and in the hands of Americans, would be
rapidly filled up by them and European emigrants. The climate is
said to be delightful, and much more temperate than might be
expected from its latitude. I have rated its population at five
hundred thousand; this estimate may be too high; but it is
possible, that the common estimate may be too low. The following
is that given by a recent pamphlet, including Chewawa:
New Leon, 100,000 Monterey, 15,000
Tamaulipas, 150,000 Tampico, 6,000
Coawilla, 125,000 Monclova, 3,000
Chewawa, 112,000 Chewawa, 30,000
──────
487,000
This population, it is true, is scattered over a very large
space, and more occupied in pastoral, than in agricultural
pursuits, with little trade or manufactures. Their flocks of
sheep and horned cattle, are immense, while they raise vast
numbers of horses and mules. Being shut out from all
communication with the Southern provinces, they can be conquered
by our arms, and made to stay conquered, by the American
emigrants who will immediately pour into every habitable
district. A small, well appointed regular army of five thousand
men, with an equal number of volunteers, replacing each other at
intervals, will be sufficient for the purpose.
The occupation of this important country, should be complete
before attempting any thing further. By grasping at too much, we
may fail to realize any thing. If our object be _conquest_, it
will be one of the greatest (even thus circumscribed) ever
effected by the same numerical force. After consolidating this
splendid acquisition, instead of marching on the city of Mexico,
I would take the course to Durango, and thence to Mazatlan, on
the Pacific, thus cutting off one half of the mine district, and
giving us a direct communication with that ocean, of such
immense importance to us in a commercial as well as political
point of view. If, however, the object be merely to _conquer a
peace_ with Mexico, the fear of losing at least one half of the
territory of the Republic, and the hope of regaining possession
of it, would be an inducement to treat, which nothing but the
most brutish stupidity can resist. I fear she will persist in
the same arrogant folly which induced her to declare, _that she_
_would be satisfied with no boundary short of the Sabine_. She
will not consent to receive back her territory by treaty, to the
Rio Grand—her wounded pride must be appeased by regaining it by
arms—and she will not consent under any circumstances, to yield
up California and Santa Fee! We shall be compelled, if she
persists in the determination, to hold to the line of the Sierra
Madre, and make our boundary from Tampico to Mazatlan. There is
no doubt that the administration would now gladly treat for the
boundary of the Rio Grand and a portion of Upper California. But
if Mexico persists in her obstinacy, we cannot retreat with
safety or honor; we may possibly be compelled to adopt the
tropic of Cancer, as the line from ocean to ocean, and thus add
to our confederacy a region as extensive as Europe.
But will England and France look with indifference on this vast
acquisition of territory? And suppose they shall be displeased,
what can they allege against us? The necessity of the conquest
will have been forced upon us by the refusal of Mexico to treat.
It is probable, that to the boundary of the Rio Grand, and to
the acquisition of a portion of California, with the barren
mountains and plains of New Mexico, they may be, comparatively,
indifferent. Not so with respect to the wholesale acquisition
just mentioned. But what can they say—what can they do? They
must address themselves to Mexico, and compel her to negotiate
with us, which she still persists in refusing, except on terms
which she knows it is impossible for us to concede. In the
meantime, let us not follow the example of our proud and
arrogant enemy, and refuse all friendly mediation which may lead
to an amicable adjustment on reasonable terms.
If, for the next three months, there should be no treaty of
peace with Mexico, I shall begin to fear we have entered upon an
experiment which may be attended with momentous consequences. It
will be a new and fearful career of conquest. I cannot agree
with those who propose a retreat; and I know that the American
people will never consent to it! Yet, I am well aware of the
danger to our confederacy, from such a conquest as that of all
Mexico. We must follow the war wherever it may lead; and if it
lead to victory it must end in conquest or a magnanimous peace,
when Mexico shall be at our feet.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 6.
_Difficulties of the conquest of Mexico. The acquisition of
California._
NOVEMBER 2, 1846.
SIR: The conquest of Mexico is talked of as a thing settled, and
yet, how few have examined the nature of the undertaking and the
difficulties to be encountered and overcome! To form some idea
of these, we must take into consideration the number of the
inhabitants and the extent of the country to be conquered. It is
true, the warlike character and resources of such a country, may
not be in proportion, as is the case with the Chinese, from
unwillingness to keep pace with other nations in the arts of
peace and war. The Mexicans are not in this condition; they
either have adopted or may adopt all the improvements in war, at
least, of modern European nations. Their military strength ought
to bear some proportion to their numbers and resources. If the
Indian population is destitute of patriotism, their religious
feelings and the influence of the priesthood, over them, ought,
in some measure, to supply the deficiency. Let us now consider,
what we may expect to encounter in the invasion of Mexico.
The population is estimated at eight millions; of these, five
millions are contained in a comparatively small space, of which
the capital is the centre. Four fifths of this number are Indian
peasantry; the others, either of the pure Spanish race or mixed
with the Indian. The whole Mexican territory is said to be a
million and a half of square miles—the whole of the portion
containing the five millions does not exceed three hundred
thousand square miles. The two roads, as already mentioned, are
from Saltillo and from Vera Cruz. Let us see what States and
population General Taylor would have to pass through, and then
we may form some idea of the kind of resistance he may meet, if
any defence at all be attempted:
_States._ _Chief
Cities._
Zacatecas, 272,000 Zacatecas, 40,000
Guanawhato, 500,000 Guanawhato, 60,000
San Louis, 250,000 San Louis, 25,000
Queretaro, 200,000 Queretaro, 30,000
Guadelahara, 800,000 Guadelahara, 90,000
Mexico, 1,500,000 Mexico, 200,000
──────
3,522,000
All the above States must be traversed or passed through—they
must be occupied in such a manner as to keep open the line of
march of the army. We must not think that our marches will be
similar to an insurrectionary movement among themselves. A
Mexican General, at the head of a column, approaches the city
of Mexico, or Guadelahara, a _pronunciamento_ takes places
among the soldiers and citizens, and they invite the insurgent
army to enter as friends and countrymen. If we look for such
_pronunciamentos_ in favor of an American invading army,
especially of heretics, we will be disappointed. There was
nothing of this at Monterey, and the further we penetrate to
the interior, the less there will be, of this kind of
fraternization.
But did not Cortez take the city of Mexico with only nine
hundred men? Not exactly; Cortez had, as his allies, two hundred
thousand Indian warriors, twenty thousand of whom were
Tlascalans, the bravest of that region. The taking the city
occupied seventy days, after a terrific slaughter. He divided
his army into four divisions, of fifty thousand each, entering
the city at different points, and leveling the houses in the
way, until the different armies met in the great square. Even if
the Mexican armies should avoid pitched battles, they can
fortify strong natural positions, and being well provided with
artillery, and having good engineers, it would be strange if
they did not avail themselves of these advantages. We must
expect hard fighting in the mountain passes which abound and
also in taking towns entirely constructed of brick or stone, and
incombustible. General Whitlock attempted to take the city of
Buenos Ayres, which had little to no defence, except the
barricades across the streets and the flat roofs of the houses;
his army was twelve thousand strong, and was repulsed with great
loss. The Texan mode of burrowing through the houses had not
then been invented. I do not say, that General Taylor would not
be able to reach Mexico, but it would be very hard fighting.
Let us now consider what it is to be overcome on the Vera Cruz
line of march.
_States._ _Chief
Cities._
Mexico, 1,500,000 Mexico, 200,000
[!]Michuacan, 450,000 Valladolid, 25,000
[!]Wahaca, 600,000 Wahaca, 40,000
Puebla, 900,000 Puebla, 60,000
Vera Cruz, 200,000 Vera Cruz, 15,000
Chiapa, 100,000 Chiapa, 3,000
Tobasco, 75,000 Tobasco, 5,000
──────
4,347,000
! I have endeavored to accommodate the spelling to the
pronunciation.
The army, by way of Vera Cruz, would have to pass through four
millions, and would meet with greater difficulties on the way
than that from Saltillo. I am supposing that while the invading
army advances from this latter place, the States along the other
road will remain passive; and so of the army taking its march
from Vera Cruz, that the northern States will not take part. But
this will not be the case. It will, therefore, be necessary to
take both roads at once, and advance with two armies
simultaneously, at an enormous expense and loss of life. It is
true, we may find efficient allies in the discords among the
Mexicans themselves, which may prevent them from uniting against
us. The Indians may remain perfectly passive; the men of
property, tired of internal revolutions, and despairing of ever
seeing a settled government in their country, may desire to seek
security and peace under the wings of the American eagle. These
dissensions and jealousies, although of a different kind from
those which favored the conquest by Cortez, may lead to the same
result. If they were a patriotic and united people, the attempt
to conquer them would seem to me hopeless. Yet, when we consider
the force they can bring into the field in defence of their
homes, and as they believe, of their altars, instigated by
hatred towards us, and that sense of degradation, which even the
dullest of the human race must feel at the idea of subjugation
by a foreign enemy, we cannot but expect a powerful resistance.
They ought to be able to arm and embody two hundred thousand men
for defence. This is a very different affair from marching an
army a thousand miles to attack Texas. They would be called out
to defend the very soil on which they exist, and it seems
incredible, that they would not respond to the call.
And should we make ourselves masters of the capital, will this
be the conquest of the whole country? When Cortez took the city,
he, at the same time, overturned the dynasty and Empire of
Montezuma, which had become odious to the surrounding nations.
It was, in fact, those nations which overthrew that empire,
under the guidance and with the aid of the Spaniards, little
thinking, that they were only fighting for a change of masters.
And suppose, that notwithstanding our signal success in taking
the Metropolis, the Mexican Congress retiring to some other city
should still persist in refusing to make peace on our terms, or
on any terms, what are we then to do? We must go on to conquer,
and hold each separate State, or we must retire, without either
conquering the country or conquering a peace. We should bring
back laurels and glory, but foiled and baffled in the objects
for which we made such mighty efforts. And I confess, I should
be sorry to annex such a population, incapable of defending
themselves, incapable of self-government, and who must be our
dependants, or rather bondsmen. The conquests and annexation of
nations on the soil of Italy, gave strength to Rome, but when
she acquired distant provinces as dependencies, and established
colonies, the government became hopelessly corrupt, and the
empire fell by its own weight. It is not so much the annexation
of territory, as of people unfitted for republican government,
that I dread. If it be necessary to govern them as dependencies,
a degree of corruption will be so rapidly introduced into our
Government, that its whole character will be changed, and
republican virtue will hardly be a name among us.
These, after all, are but speculations, and may prove to be
visionary. Our scope of vision into the future is very limited.
The great event of the war, in my estimation, is the taking of
California. As respects Mexico, it was a mere waif or derelict,
liable to be seized by the first comer; and, in fact, we were
only about a week before the British squadron, who were utterly
astonished to see our flag flying at Monterey and San Francisco,
when it was their design to place St. George’s Cross there. It
was merely a question as to who should occupy the country, and
surely, in such an alternative, no American can hesitate to say,
that possession should be taken by us. It was lost to Mexico, at
any rate; and, in the hands of Great Britain, would have been an
endless source of vexation to us, and, perhaps, lead to ultimate
rupture with that country. We have now a sea coast on the
Pacific corresponding to that on the Atlantic. Our republic
stretches from sea to sea, and in time, a land communication
will be established between the two, reducing the distance more
and more every day. The Republic thus fronts Europe on the east,
and Asia on the west, with an ocean boundary, beyond which we
cannot go. Here let our proud progress be stayed! Let us be
content with filling up the vast space, and improving our
condition and the condition of our fellow men. An immense
commerce must spring up in less than half a century, from our
Pacific coast, with the five hundred millions of people, who
inhabit the shores washed by the western and Indian oceans!
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 7.
_The War will make us better acquainted with each other._
DECEMBER 5, 1846.
There is one advantage we shall derive from the war: we shall
become better acquainted with our southern neighbor, and she
will become better acquainted with us. Even in a geographical
point of view, in spite of all the writers, from Humboldt down
to the latest, and in spite of all the map makers, the American
public, is very imperfectly acquainted with Mexico. In nothing
is this more remarkable than in the extent of surface, distance
of places, and in the amount of population, of which we have no
adequate conception. The ignorance of the Mexicans respecting
the United States is, of course, still greater. When Santa Anna
invaded Texas he actually spoke of marching to Washington in
case our Government interfered! We have very little idea of the
distance from the Rio Grande to the capital of Mexico; but the
thousands who have marched over it in various directions, and
the numerous publications giving accounts of military
expeditions, will render the country more familiar to our people
than it could be in the usual course of things, in fifty years.
In our imaginations, it has been a region of romance, associated
with gold and silver, with a climate and beauty of an earthly
paradise. Our soldiers and volunteers will return with very
different impressions; taken as a whole, it is vastly inferior
to the United States, in natural wealth, in fertility of soil,
in climate, and in everything calculated to minister to human
happiness. That incessant craving for the delights of the land
of Montezuma, will be effectually cured, and with it, that wild
spirit of conquest, which has prevailed until now, in the
southern and western portions of the confederacy. It will be
effectually cured, and nothing else would have cured it. We
shall rest satisfied that our own is, incomparably, a finer
country, and, in fact, one of the most favored portions of the
Globe. We have no _tierras calientes_, where the vegetable
growth is, indeed, most luxuriant, but man looses all his
energy, and becomes little better than a vegetable. Their
_tierras templadas_, or temperate lands, in general, are barren
rocks or dry plains, which cannot be cultivated without
irrigation. And when we look at the population, their want of
well ordered government, the barbarous ignorance and indolence
of the masses, their religious, or rather superstitious bigotry,
their robberies and assassinations in cold blood, where is the
American who would not prefer his own country? We have, no
doubt, many things among us to deplore and to amend; but what
are these in comparison to the state of things continually
presented in those countries which are said to be “blessed of
God and cursed of man?” I do not assent to the first part of
this expression, for, I believe, there is no portion of the
earth, of the same extent, “so blessed of God,” as these United
States.
In one thing we have been undeceived; we supposed that the
Mexicans are a rich people; that is, possessed abundant stores
of the necessaries and luxuries of life. So far from it, that we
have been compelled to draw nearly all of our supplies for our
armies from the States. There are, doubtless, rich individuals
among them, but the mass of the people are miserably poor. They
lay up no stores, and have little beyond what is required by
their immediate wants. The very abundance of the productions of
nature may be one of the causes of this general poverty. As a
people, they are sunk in sloth, in vice and ignorance. I speak
in general, for there are, no doubt, numerous exceptions. Their
opinions of the “Yankees,” as they call us, in contempt and
derision, is likely to undergo an entire change. They will
entertain a different opinion of us; they will look upon us with
fear and respect, and will be as anxious to cultivate a good
understanding as they were to insult us and ill treat our
citizens. Hereafter, their Government will take a second thought
before it countenances the plunder and murder of Americans.
Treaties of peace will be respected, and we may venture into the
country without danger to person or property, provided we
conduct ourselves with propriety.
There are many of the geographical features of so vast a
country, especially as to its mountains, table lands, and
rivers, differing entirely from our portion of the continent.
For instance, the character of the table lands beyond Monterey
would not be understood without the explanation, that the
Mexican mountains are not in regular ranges or ridges like the
Alleghanies, with intervening valleys, but present, on the
eastern side, the appearance of giant ramparts of naked rock,
through which fissures have been made by torrents; while on
their summit, a vast plain, six or seven thousand feet above the
sea, like a table raised above the floor, stretches out for
hundreds of miles, with occasional depressions and peaks piled
up to the height of five or six thousand feet more, and covered
with perpetual snow. We have no such mountains. The sides of our
mountains are nearly all fertile, at least, east of the
Mississippi. The precipitous sides of the _Sierra Madre_ are
broken through by several rivers, which, in the course of a
hundred miles, descend six or seven thousand feet, and in
consequence of this, excepting a short distance from their
mouths in the Gulf of Mexico, are not fit for navigation. It is
along the courses of these rivers, that the passes are found:
such as that of the Panuco from Tampico; that of the Tula, near
Victoria; that of the San Juan, from Monterey to Saltillo, and
the Conchas, towards Chewawa. The want of good roads from the
interior, and good harbors on the Gulf, essentially render the
eastern portion of Mexico, an inland country. The Alvarado,
Guasacualco, and Tobasco, are almost the only exceptions. The
States north and east of the Sierra Madre, comprising those
which we now hold, although not yet completely subdued, have no
water transportation to the coast, excepting by means of the Rio
Grande. The want of a carriage road is exemplified by the fact,
that the British company engaged in working the mines of
Catorce, which are not more than three hundred miles in a direct
line from Tampico, having landed their engines at that place,
could not transport them direct to San Luis, but were obliged to
go north towards Matamoras, and then take the direction of
Monterey and Saltillo. From the latter place, after ascending to
the table land, they proceed to San Louis, making a circuit of
more than twelve hundred miles, and which consumed four months.
The delightful country which I have described, as the States of
New Leon, Coawilla, and Tamaulipas, is equal in extent to the
eastern parts of Virginia and North and South Carolina, and
large enough for a kingdom. It is, in general a plain, but not
flat; on the contrary, picturesque, with a fine soil, admirably
adapted to all the productions of the temperate climates, but
free from frosts. This country we shall be compelled to hold,
even if our conquests should extend no further. We cannot
abandon it _without a treaty of peace and boundaries_, and to
which, from present appearances, Mexico will not agree. We shall
not give it up unless for a complete cession of California and
New Mexico, with the boundary of the Rio Grande. The population
of those States is, now, perhaps, equal to that of our Southern
States during our revolutionary war, and would easily contain
four or five millions. For defence, it ought now to bring
fifteen or twenty thousand fighting men into the field, in
guerrilla parties, and poorly armed. If supported by some
regular troops, the rancheros might give us trouble. But cut off
from all supplies, with no rallying points or fortified places,
we could by pushing the war vigorously, effectually subdue them.
If we fall back on the Rio Grande, we leave the whole country
west of it, open to the operations of Santa Anna; and we shall
be compelled to establish a chain of fortifications along the
great river, for at least two thousand miles. On the other hand,
the table land of the Sierra Madre, and on the west, towards the
Pacific, being only accessible by a few passes, the inhabitants
once completely subdued, must remain so. That mountain boundary
is, infinitely, more easy to defend, than the line of the river;
a river, which would be bordered in its whole length by an
enemy, who might send detachments at any moment to make
destructive inroads. It would be necessary to have both sides of
the river, without which, it would be a bad boundary. If we
confine ourselves to the east side of it, the inhabitants on the
other bank, in case of hostilities, can at any time call in the
aid of the Mexican Government. Collisions will be unavoidable,
and Texas will be continually threatened, unless we keep up, at
great expense, a permanent force along the line. But taking the
mountains as the boundary, we could keep Mexico in her shell,
until the valley shall be filled by American and European
population. There is, no doubt, unappropriated land; but, even
supposing the whole to be claimed under grants to the church,
and to individuals, these might justly be subjected to
forfeitures and confiscations, partial or total, in case of
refusal to own allegiance. The tenures of all these lands are,
in their nature, feudal; that is, the fee is in the sovereign,
whoever that may be, and subject to be resumed and regranted at
the pleasure of the sovereign. The tenure or holding, is not
allodial as with us; it is rather political or military, if I
may so express myself, than legal.[3] This subject is not
generally understood among us, and it would occupy too much
space to explain it more fully. If Mexico compels us to conquer
the country described, we must annex it, but cannot do this
without republicanizing it first; and this, again, cannot be
done without abolishing the feudal system, and changing the
tenure of the lands. Still, I am no advocate of conquest; I
would rather take the boundary of the Rio Grande by fair treaty,
than hold the States bordering on that river, by the rights of
war, which are regarded by all barbarous nations, and by Mexico
herself, is the highest, and most glorious of all titles.
Footnote 3:
I speak of the large grants, the smaller are allodial, as
also, the grants on condition of settlement.
The policy of Santa Anna, at present, is to act on the
defensive, preparatory to taking the offensive. He is now at
work at San Luis, in collecting and organizing a powerful army,
the most formidable ever yet seen in the republic. He will
address himself to the Mexicans, with such appeals as may rouse
them to a sense of their danger, and will, perhaps, attempt to
lay hold of the immense riches of the church, to sustain the
national cause. In the latter, he will probably fail; it is the
greater power in Mexico, for power does not centre exclusively
in the army, and but a small portion of it in the people, if
there can be said to be a people at all. His object is, no
doubt, to make himself a _dictator_, or an absolute despot; and
this he cannot accomplish, without, in the first instance,
having the support of the church. When sufficiently strong by
means of the army, he can then use the church as a part of his
machinery. Every thing depends on his success in this war. If he
succeeds in repelling the invasion, he will, in all probability,
be able to establish his power on a permanent footing of
hereditary despotism. To conquer the country, our shortest
course is, to deal at once with the church and the great land
holders, and make them responsible for their peons; for the
proprietors not only own the land, with but few exceptions, but
also own the population, just as the Russian noble owns the
serfs of his estate.
Since the Mexican revolution, the States and territories north
and west of the line from Tampico to Mazatlan, and even the
States which I have mentioned, directly west of the great river,
have been rapidly returning to their original state of
barbarism. Contrary to the usual course of things on this
continent, the indian tribes have here been, for years,
encroaching on the whites, instead of being encroached upon and
driven back. In the States of Durango, Chewawa, Sonora, Sinaloa,
and in Lower California, the Apaches and Camanches, are
continually laying waste, robbing, plundering, and murdering,
and each succeeding year, their ravages are becoming more and
more extensive. Under the royal government, posts were
established every where, troops were kept up, and the
inhabitants protected, by pursuing the marauding parties, the
only way in which a country can be protected from savages. But
they did not arm the inhabitants, and require them to assist in
defending themselves. There was no militia, and consequently,
when left to themselves, they are perfectly helpless. There
could be no greater blessing to them, than to be placed under
the protection of the United States. I repeat, that my object is
not to encourage a spirit of conquest. In indulging in these
speculations, I endeavor to be guided by the spirit of truth.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 8.
_Slight hopes of peace—State of the war—The situation of General
Taylor._
JANUARY, 1847.
SIR: When Santa Anna declares, that there can be no negotiations
for peace until the _national_ territory shall have been
evacuated by the troops of the United States, he means by the
_national_ territory, from the Rio Grande to the Sabine, as well
as those portions of Mexico, which we now hold by invasion. Not
a single official declaration on the part of the Mexican
Government can be produced, in which any other boundary than the
Sabine is even supposed. In the last proclamation of Almonte,
this is the only boundary acknowledged by him. As long as this
is maintained by Mexico, peace is impossible. The Rio Grande was
the boundary of the Province of Texas, under the Spanish
Government, and as such, was claimed, both by France and the
United States, as part of Louisiana, under the treaty of
Ildefonso, when ceded by Spain. It is the boundary claimed by
Texas after her separation from Tamaulipas and Coawilla, with
which Texas had, for a time, been united, to form a State of the
Mexican confederacy; and on separating from that confederacy,
she returned to the ancient limits. It is this ancient Texas we
claim, and not the Texas arranged in connection with Tamaulipas
and Coawilla. But Santa Anna and Almonte now acknowledge no
boundary but the Sabine, notwithstanding their treaty with
Texas, expressly establishing the Rio Grande.
Persons not reflecting on our present position, as respects our
enemy, exclaim, “let us make peace—let us put an end to this
unfortunate war”. This supposes, that it is _in our power_ at
any moment, to make peace, when, from the very declarations of
Mexico, she is unwilling to treat with us, unless we first
acknowledge ourselves vanquished, and agree to retire, yielding
every thing we have been contending for! ONE may make war, but
it takes TWO or more, to make peace. We may, indeed, fall back
on the Rio Grande, and then to the Sabine, thus exposing
ourselves to the contempt and derision of the world; and there
are well meaning people, who propose this course. But, judging
from a knowledge of human nature, it is not difficult to
perceive, that the great majority of the people of the United
States will never consent to such a degrading submission, even
if it were prudent, as a mere matter of interest, which it is
plainly not, however it may be recommended by abstract
considerations of moral or religious duty, or rather of sickly
sentimentality.
Let us consider what are the steps to be taken to bring about
negotiations for peace. The olive branch ought to be continually
held out to the enemy; and our agents should not be prevented by
pride or offended dignity, from renewing at every moment, the
offer to treat. It would be magnanimous on our part, and also
continue us in the right. Suppose the proposition come from
Mexico, what will it be, and how made? It is not probable that
commissioners will be sent direct to Washington, or invited from
us, to Mexico. A communication may be addressed to our
Government declaring a willingness to treat, in all probability,
clogged with conditions of the withdrawal of our naval and
military forces, and proposing an armistice pending
negotiations. To the latter, we cannot accede, without giving
decided advantage to the enemy. The evacuation of the country we
now hold would not be listened to for a moment; it would at once
be yielding all the advantages we have gained at so much cost,
as the _means of coercing Mexico to treat of peace_. The attempt
at negotiation may thus fail at various stages, and it may fail
entirely; at all events, there will be unavoidable delay. There
is nothing before us, at present, but as a vigorous prosecution
of the war, _and at the same time, preparations on a much larger
scale than we have hitherto made_.
What is the state of the war at this moment? We have made
wonderful progress, if not towards conquest, at least, towards
bringing the enemy to terms. But we are obliged to keep up three
very extensive lines, without speaking of California and New
Mexico. The first, is along the Rio Grande, from Presidio to
Matamoras, of seven hundred miles; the next, that from Comargo
to Monterey; and the third, from Tampico to the same place, a
distance of nearly six hundred. It is absolutely necessary to
keep up the two first, in order to furnish supplies for our
troops in all their operations; although, since the occupation
of Tampico, a portion of these may be obtained from that
quarter. But, between the mountains and the river, there is an
enemy’s country, which, although thinly inhabited, is capable of
interrupting our communications by their rancheros, aided by
Mexican troops, and led by Mexican officers, even if they cannot
bring a sufficient force at any point, to meet ours in the
field. We hear of large bodies of irregular cavalry, which may
prove formidable in case the war be prolonged. This kind of
force, thus far, appears to have been much overrated, but it may
take lessons from us, and improve. Their horses, although small,
may be better trained, and their riders, equal to any in the
world, may be provided with better arms—the sabre, and pistol,
and carbine, instead of the lance and lasso.
It was supposed that there were but two passes through the
mountains to the table land; but a third, that of Tula, near
Victoria, is now spoken of. This river, appears to penetrate the
great barrier between Tampico and Monterey, and takes its rise
in the table land, between San Luis, and Zacatecas. It is
possible, that the army of Santa Anna may, by this route, keep
open a communication with the valley of the Rio Grande, and even
send large reinforcements of cavalry and infantry through this
pass, so as to threaten our lines on the Rio Grande and Tampico.
According to the last accounts, our troops were marching towards
Victoria. I should think it all important to take possession of
that pass, and close it completely.
There are still paragraphs in the papers, speaking of the
intended march from Monterey, or Tampico, to San Luis. I think
this highly improbable. It will be unsafe for us to move until
we are completely masters of the whole country between the river
and the mountains, and of all the passes to the table land. It
would not do to leave this country in our rear, with all our
military depots, but weakly guarded. Of one thing I will speak
with confidence; that we shall need all the troops we have on
the present scene of operations, and all we shall be able to
send for some time. The descent on Vera Cruz, which is said to
be in preparation, under the immediate direction of the
commander in chief, General Scott, will require, at least,
twenty thousand men, and if any considerable proportion be
withdrawn from General Taylor, it will leave him in a very
perilous situation. What is to prevent Santa Anna from making
his head quarters at Victoria? It is said, that cannon cannot be
transported by the Tula pass. This may, or may not be. Things
deemed impossible have been accomplished by men of bold and
enterprising spirit, as he is said to be. Napoleon crossed the
Alps in spite of impossibilities, and appeared suddenly in the
plains of Lombardy; and I should think the difficulties a
hundred times greater than would be encountered by the Mexican
Napoleon. I confess, I entertain serious apprehensions for our
troops, although of the best materials, and admirably commanded.
Santa Anna has, at this moment, a great advantage; he is posted
at San Luis with an army of twenty-five or thirty thousand men.
Thus concentrated at one point, he will be enabled to strike,
with his whole force, or the greater part of it, at Tampico,
Saltillo, or Victoria, while our forces, are necessarily divided
into comparatively small bodies. He can act with perfect
secrecy, in a friendly country, and with a perfect knowledge of
all our movements, while we are ignorant of his. If he should
attack us with his whole force at any one point, he may roll
back the tide of war, and drive us beyond the Rio Grande. Under
present circumstances, instead of weakening our lines, prudence
requires that we should strengthen them.
Looking to the hazzards of war, and the _dangers_ following on
conquests, the idea has suggested itself, of inviting the States
of the lower Rio Grande to establish a separate confederacy,
under our protection; and if Mexico persists in refusing to
treat, then, to enter into a treaty of peace, alliance, and
limits with this new confederacy, thus indemnifying ourselves
for Mexican spoliations, by taking California and New Mexico,
with the right of way to Mazatlan, and leaving Mexico to repent
of her folly at leisure.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 9.
_Present advantageous position of our army—The necessity for
greater efforts—Our present force insufficient to march from
Vera Cruz to Mexico._
FEBRUARY 13TH, 1847.
SIR: The last intelligence from the seat of war has given much
relief to those who were beginning to feel uneasy about the
situation of our troops. Generals Taylor and Patterson have
taken Victoria or New Santander, and the line is therefore
established from Saltillo to Tampico. The line of the Sierra
Madre has already been described; it is certainly of a very
peculiar character; it now presents only three points of attack,
and that of Saltillo, the only one practicable for wheel
carriages, and consequently, for the advance of an army with its
parks of artillery. It is from this quarter, alone, that General
Taylor need fear the march of Santa Anna; but he will have to
cross at least three hundred miles of arid plains; and it is
said, that the water tanks have been destroyed by his order,
which looks as if he intended to prevent the march of General
Taylor on San Luis, rather than undertake the march to Saltillo.
It appears, that he has a large force at Tula, about
equi-distant from Saltillo and Victoria.
By guarding this line, the valley can be cut off from all
supplies from Mexico; with the exception of a small quantity of
indian corn, and the herds of the ranchos, very little can be
procured in it for the support of an army. Our own safety
requires, that we should take possession of all the principal
towns as soon as possible, and garrison them with a sufficient
force. It will, also, be necessary to establish civil authority,
for the country thus cut off from the central Government. Its
head must necessarily be military, as also the local superior
authorities, although using the machinery of Alcaldes &c., for
the purpose of carrying it on. The political Government, must be
suspended, as the consequence of being cut off from both the
State and federal authorities of Mexico.
It would now seem to be the general impression, that nothing
effectual can be done to bring Mexico to terms without taking
Vera Cruz, and marching to the capital; and this appears to be
the opinion of General Taylor at least, that if the march be
resolved upon, then Vera Cruz, is the proper point to start from
and not from Saltillo. A short time will determine.
We have, thus far, been operating at vast expense, with an army
of fifteen thousand men, about one half regulars, and the other
half, volunteers, on the remote, thinly inhabited, northern
frontier of Mexico; and we talk of marching through a densely
peopled country with numerous defiles! If there be any thing
like the resistance made by us during the revolutionary war,
thirty thousand men, at least, will be required for the march
from Vera Cruz to Mexico. A part of the force under General
Taylor may now be spared, but not so as to weaken and disable
him from repelling a part of the army of Santa Anna, if he
should think proper to detach it, for the purpose of attacking
Saltillo. It would be presumptuous in me to venture an opinion
on military movements; but considering the formidable army now
organized by Santa Anna, and the uncertainty as to the point
which he means to attack, I should think, that it would not be
safe to draw off any very considerable portion of General
Taylor’s force from the defence of the lines they at present
occupy.
It is in our power to seize all her ports, and cut off all the
trade of Mexico; and then, holding the lines we now occupy, it
will be strange, if she persists in refusing to make peace. The
fear of the loss of the interior and northern provinces, and the
interruption in her trade, thus shut up in her shell, may have
that effect, if any thing can. We have for the present, given
stability to her Government by outward pressure. Our only
security is to retain the hold we have; and perhaps, it may be
necessary to attempt something on a still larger scale; but for
this, we are not yet prepared. General Scott may take Vera Cruz,
and then block up the road to Mexico, but I have seen no force
yet, even on paper, sufficient to undertake the march to that
capital. If, by withdrawing a large portion of General Taylor’s
force, the line he now occupies be too much weakened, Santa
Anna, will at once, take advantage of it, and regain the country
on that side of the Rio Grande. In doing this, he will compel
the army which may be landed at Vera Cruz, to return in all
haste to Tampico, or Point Isabel. The crisis is now fast
approaching, when it will become a question of national
prowess—shall we cry, “hold, enough!” or make a mighty effort to
obtain the victory? I wish to see my country do right, and
justice to all nations; at the same time, I should be sorry to
see our flag humbled, under any circumstances, and in a war with
any nation on the Globe! I wish to see that flag wave proudly,
and respected, wherever it may be carried, not tarnished and
humbled, by defeat—insulted, scorned, treated with contempt,
instead of affording a shelter and protection to our citizens,
wherever they may be. But, firmly convinced, as I am, that our
country is in the right, and our enemy in the wrong, I should
feel the mortification ten fold, if we failed to obtain a just
and honorable peace by the only means left us, _after our enemy
has repeatedly spurned the olive branch_.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 10.
_Annexation of Texas—The suspension of diplomatic relations, the
immediate causes of the war._
FEBRUARY, 1847.
SIR: In these letters, I have endeavored to repress all party
feeling, thinking it a duty, in a contest with a foreign nation,
in time of actual war, to take the side of my country, unless so
grossly and palpably in the wrong, as to admit of no
justification or defence. I repeat, that it is my sincere
conviction, that justice is on our side, and this after as full,
and dispassionate an examination of the subject as I am able to
bestow. The contrary, is generally assumed, or taken for
granted, by the party to which I belong; and yet the speech of
Mr. Webster, at Philadelphia, which expresses the same opinion,
is highly applauded. He condemns the administration of Mr. Polk,
(not the cause of the country,) solely on the ground of bringing
on a state of actual hostilities, without the previous
approbation of Congress, while he admits, that Mexico is in the
wrong in the causes which led to it the annexation of Texas. But
the act of the President, is a domestic question between him and
American people. The causes previously existing, and which would
have justified Congress in making war, constitute a different
question from that of expediency, or of the distribution of
powers, under the Constitution. He concedes, that if the
constituted authorities of the Union had thought proper to
resort to this course, there was ample cause to justify it. To
this, I assent, and will endeavor to give the reasons on which
my opinion is founded, according to my view of the subject;
professing, at the same time, a sincere respect for the opinion
of those who may differ from me. I admit that the march from the
Nueces to the Rio Grande, had the effect of _hastening_
hostilities; but, in my opinion, it did do more than hasten, for
the appeal of arms was inevitable on the annexation of Texas,
unless Mexico receded entirely from the ground she had taken; of
which, I did not see the slightest probability, unless compelled
to do so, by the consequences of war, whether begun by her or by
us.
Mexico denounces the war as being aggressive on our part, but in
all the official State Papers of the high functionaries of that
Republic, (I do not refer to subordinate officers or generals,)
in all their manifestos, that aggression is distinctly declared
to _be the annexation of Texas_. It was on this ground, that she
put an end to all diplomatic intercourse, after having
previously announced that she would consider annexation as
equivalent to a declaration of war, on our part. It was on this
ground, that she refused to _resume_ a diplomatic intercourse,
and enter into negotiation for a peaceful adjustment of existing
differences, until satisfaction should first be made for the
alleged wrong. She has not limited her complaints of alleged
aggression to the march of our troops to the Rio Grande; her
complaint is, the being deprived of her province of Texas, which
she will never renounce; and she declares her determination
never to listen to overtures of peace, until that province shall
be evacuated by us. Has she, on any occasion, shown a
willingness to accept any other boundary than the Sabine? I have
seen no intimation of this kind, emanating from her President or
Congress. The contrary is unchangeably persisted in.[4] In fact,
it could not occur while she persists in her right to the whole
of Texas. The annexation is the _casus belli_ on the part of
Mexico—the paramount consideration—every thing else, is but
incidental, or subordinate. The very idea of fixing any other
boundary, would imply a relinquishment of her claim.
Footnote 4:
There is no distinct assertion of boundary in any of her
official papers down to the _war proclamation_ of the 23d of
April, 1846.
Now, that great statesman, Mr. Webster, has proved on various
occasions, and especially in his Philadelphia speech, that
annexation of Texas to the United States was no cause of war,
because Texas was as much an independent State as Mexico. The
act was no more a cause of war on the part of Mexico, than her
annexation to the United States would have been a cause of war
on the part of Texas. If Mr. Webster be correct, and I think
his argument unanswerable, was Mexico justifiable in the
course pursued by her towards us on account of that act? Was
she justifiable in withdrawing her minister, and ordering away
the minister of the United States? These were very high handed
and insulting measures, and attended, necessarily, with the
serious consequence of putting an end to all peaceful modes of
adjusting differences, and leaving the only alternatives of,
submission, or war, on our part. But, under the circumstances
in which Mexico was placed towards us, it was an act of gross
injustice, as well as insult. _She had a treaty obligation to
fulfil, in the payment of several millions, as the indemnity
for wrongs done to American citizens, and demands had been
made upon her for several millions more, which remained
unadjusted._ There was, also, a question of boundary to
settle—all these matters must be settled either peaceably, or
by war—if peaceably, the continuance, or re-establishment of
diplomatic intercourse, was indispensable. Her conduct was
like that of the debtor who cuts the acquaintance of his
creditor, and thinks by that means, to avoid fulfilling his
obligations. Let me ask, what would have been the course
pursued, (if placed in our situation,) by England or France,
or any other high minded Government? I ask any candid man to
say, whether they would have borne it as patiently as we have
done? I would ask whether there was as much forbearance shown
by us with Louis Philippe, on the subject of the French
indemnity, or with England in the Northern boundary, and
Oregon question? That nation assumes an awful responsibility,
which, like Mexico, puts an end to the peaceable ways of
diplomacy, leaving no alternative but horrid war, or base
submission. Mexico should have paid her debt before she put an
end to peaceful intercourse, and she could not do it without
injustice, while there were claims still depending. All
arguments drawn from considerations of forbearance, humanity,
generosity, expediency, are for ourselves—Mexico is entitled
to no part in them. In my estimation, the great _error_ of
Mexico, if so mild a term can be applied, consists in her
having terminated all peaceful modes of settling differences;
for, as there is no common arbiter between independent
nations, their differences in that case, must be settled by
war, or not at all.
I am again sustained, by the opinion of Mr. Webster, in respect
of the refusal of Mexico to the re-establishment of diplomatic
relations proposed by us; and again, in her refusal to meet the
more recent overtures for negotiation. The first improper
conduct of Mexico has been greatly aggravated by these acts. It
has been urged, that Mexico was willing to receive a
_commissioner_, to treat in relation to Texas. It is surprising
to me, that any one should not see the folly of this
proposition. It was only saying, “as you have wronged us, in the
annexation of Texas, we will permit you to offer us suitable
reparation, and this must precede all other matters between us.”
The ignorance and presumption of such an idea, is truly Mexican.
[5]If they were sincere in their desire to discuss the subject,
what objection could there be to receiving an ambassador,
clothed with full powers to settle all matters in dispute? What
right had Mexico to require us to _admit_, that annexation was
an aggression on her rights? There was no proposition to discuss
the question of _boundary_, as is frequently asserted, which
would be inconsistent with her pretensions. But even that could
be more fully settled by one having full authority, than by a
mere special commissioner, with limited powers. The whole was
but a diplomatic quibble—a deceitful evasion. In the opinion of
Mr. Webster, Mexico was wrong in putting an end to diplomatic
relations; she was wrong in rejecting our minister under a
frivolous pretext, and she continues in the wrong in rejecting
overtures of peace, after the commencement of hostilities. Here
was a direct advance on our part, superseding the necessity of
mediation, a measure only adopted to save the pride of either
party, in being the _first_ to propose a peace. In all this,
Mexico is in the wrong; and here is the whole question, as
between her and the United States. The degree of forbearance to
be shown, is a question for ourselves alone. The first blow was
struck by Mexico, unless the provocation of our march to the Rio
Grande, _be considered the first blow_. There is nothing left
for us, but to prosecute the war until Mexico shall be willing
to enter into peaceable negotiation. Some appear to think that
she would be most likely to re-establish diplomatic relations,
by our withdrawing our fleets and armies. But this would only be
an experiment, and might fail; and if it should fail, our work
would have to begin again. This was done when Mr. Slidell landed
at Vera Cruz, but without success. Can we place sufficient
confidence in Mexico, even after the most positive and distinct
assurances, and still less without any such assurances? For my
part, I have no confidence either in the good faith of her
present rulers, or in the stability of her Government. What,
then, is to be done? I see no way but to retain the advantages
we already possess, and to prosecute the war on her territory,
as other wars, under like circumstances, would be prosecuted by
other nations. What is there to prevent her from entering into
negotiations at once? Pride—folly—but we were not too proud to
negotiate with England, at the moment when the war was hottest.
At the very moment of signing the treaty of Ghent, the British
Commissioner supposed, and ours also, that the British troops
were in possession of Louisiana, and one of them observed to the
American Commissioner. “You have reason to be satisfied, for you
have now regained New Orleans.” The idea of falling back on the
Rio Grande, in the visionary hope of coaxing Mexico to make
peace, and then in case of her refusal, retaking Monterey and
Tampico, and the valley of the Rio Grande, would be like the
fisherman, who after having one good haul, throws back the best
fish into the sea, for the pleasure of retaking them!
Footnote 5:
Mr. Gallatin makes a strange mistake, when he says, that the
refusal, was to receiving a _resident minister_. The refusal
was on account of his not being a mere Commissioner on the
_single subject of Texas_! What reasonable objection could
there be to a resident minister, after a treaty of peace? And
if no such treaty were made, then the minister clothed with
those powers would take his _departure_, as a matter of
course. Mr. Gallatin speaks very _lightly_ of a _suspension_
of diplomatic intercourse! I regard this, under the
circumstance, as most serious. But there was more than
suspension; Mexico declared _all negotiations_ at an end, and
war was, therefore, the only alternative.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 11.
_The causes of the war.—The complaints on either side._
FEBRUARY, 1847.
SIR: The tendency of public opinion throughout the civilized
world, and especially in the United States, against all wars,
may be justly set down as an evidence of the progress of
civilization. There are many who regard all war, defensive as
well as offensive, as wicked and inexcusable. Others, justify
defensive wars only, as if it were possible for one to defend
himself by merely warding off the blows of the assailant. Some
regard wars made for conquest merely, as unlawful, and no sound
moralist can approve of a war instigated by a motive so unjust
and dishonest. But when war is once begun, it unavoidably
becomes offensive, as well as defensive, in order to bring the
opposite party to terms—it necessarily becomes a war of conquest
by holding the enemy’s territory as a lawful acquisition, until
restored by treaty of peace, if restored at all. No one nation
has yet abandoned the practice of war, and I cannot well
understand how it can do so, while it is continued by others. In
the present unregenerated state of the world, wars are therefore
regarded by practical men, as sometimes unavoidable, and even
necessary and just. It was the opinion of Washington, that the
best security for peace, is in being well prepared for war; and
it may be added, to impress other nations with respect or fear
of our military prowess. I am convinced, that our last three
years war with Great Britain, ensured us a long peace, not only
with that power, but with others. I am equally certain, that but
for our seven years of revolutionary war, we should have been
neither a free nor an independent nation—our magnificent country
would not have been “the land of the free, and the home of the
brave.” If all wars are “murders and robberies,” as some
philanthropists contend, there must be a revolution in our
sentiments towards Washington and his brave companions in arms,
who offered up their lives for the blessings of freedom and
self-government, and of peace, which we have enjoyed.
But I am free to admit, that a civilized nation cannot, without
just reproach, engage in a war that is unjust, and that is not,
in a certain sense, unavoidable. The nation ought to go beyond,
rather than fall short of the strict measure of justice, and she
ought to exhaust every means of maintaining peace, before
resorting to the _ultimate ratio_.
It is my intention in this letter to took into the causes which
have led to the war in which we are now engaged with Mexico. I
must premise, that we must take the world as we find it, and we
must decide according to the ethicks and practice of the most
civilized nations, and not according to standards of morality,
which, although perfect in themselves, are inapplicable to the
present imperfect state of mankind. It is again to be observed,
that among nations, there is no common judge, to whom they are
willing to submit their differences, and to obey the decision.
Each is the judge in its own case, and if one should be disposed
to do even more than justice, the demands of the other may be
out of all reason. It is a rare thing in modern times, for two
powerful civilized nations to be involved in hostilities,
without previous differences, misunderstandings, or mutual
aggressions, and without, also, previous unsuccessful attempts
to adjust their differences in a peaceful way. Let us first
consider the complaints of Mexico.
These consisted, in the first instance, in the aid afforded by
citizens of the United States in the struggle of Texas with
Mexico for her independence. But this did not begin with that
struggle, but with the efforts of Mexico herself to throw off
the allegiance of Spain, in which she was so materially aided by
the Americans of Texas, and who continued to be invited into
that country for the purpose of giving strength to the Mexican
cause. Serious offence was given to Spain in consequence of this
volunteer aid of our citizens to her revolted provinces, but,
certainly, there was no complaint on the part of those
provinces. Their situation changed as soon as they won their
independence, and when Texas revolted in consequence of alleged
oppression, Mexico assumed the position before occupied by
Spain, and complained of the aid afforded by citizens of the
United States to Texas. Here is, no doubt, the ground of the
ill-feeling on the part of Mexico towards us. How far we are
responsible for the acts of our citizens, beyond our
jurisdiction, is a question which opens a wide field for
discussion, and is one which cannot be discussed in these
cursory letters. All I shall say, is, that Mexico had the same
right to complain that Spain had, and no more and even less, for
it was the consequence of her own act, in calling in our
countrymen to help her against Spain. I avoid saying any thing
here, as to the merits of the quarrel between Texas and Mexico.
In the contest which ensued between these belligerents, Mexico
put forth her whole strength—she entered Texas with a powerful
army, commanded by her Chief Magistrate in person, who was at
the same time her most distinguished military leader—a leader,
who had put down the constitution of 1824, and concentrated the
whole power of the State in his own person, and in the person of
his own military subordinates. The invasion was followed by the
signal defeat at San Jacinto, by General Houston, and a treaty,
_acknowledging the independence of Texas, and recognizing the
Rio Grande as the Southern boundary_. I do not mean to discuss
the diplomatic question involved in this treaty, my object being
in this place, merely to state facts.[6] Subsequently, with the
exception of some inroads on either side, the war ceased—the
cause of Mexico became hopeless—the independence of Texas was
not only recognized by us, but also by other neutral nations.
Her inability to re-conquer Texas, was confessed by Mexico
herself; she was even willing to acknowledge her independence on
the condition that Texas would not unite herself to the United
States—condition which no nation in our place would fail to
regard as offensive. Next follows the act on our part in which
was merged all other offences, and was, before-hand, declared by
Mexico, not only as a cause of war, but equivalent to a
declaration of war—the annexation of Texas with its consent. The
act has been generally condemned by the whig press, and yet, it
is sustained by very high authority: Mr. Webster, as Secretary
of State, holds this language: “Mexico may have chosen to
consider Texas as having been at all times since 1835, and still
continuing, a rebellious province, but the world has been
obliged to take a different view of the matter. From the time of
the battle of San Jacinto to the present moment, Texas has
continued to exhibit the same internal signs of national
independence as Mexico herself, and with quite as much stability
of government.” Again he repeats, “since 1837, the United States
have regarded Texas as an independent sovereignty as much as
Mexico.” He says further, “the constitution, public treaties,
and laws, oblige the President to regard Texas as an independent
State, _and its territory no part of the territory of Mexico_.”
In a late public speech at Springfield, Mr. Webster uses the
following language, “I do not admit that it was a just ground of
complaint on the part of Mexico, that the United States annexed
Texas to themselves.” From my own unassisted reasoning, I had
arrived at the same conclusion with Mr. Webster. The ground
taken by the great statesman against the war, was not on account
of the annexation of Texas, but of the march of Gen. Taylor, by
the order, or sanction of Mr. Polk, whose practical result was
inevitable hostilities, which ought not to have been brought on
without the express sanction of Congress, and while there was
still a possibility of negotiating. The first, is a question
between Mr. Polk and his country, with which Mexico has nothing
to do; the other, is a mere question of probability, depending
on the willingness on our side to negotiate, and the
willingness, or the contrary, on this part of Mexico, to meet
us. I will add, that the taking of California and New Mexico are
acts arising out of the war, and not causes leading to it.
Footnote 6:
The able speech of Mr. Kauffman in Congress on this subject is
not easily refuted. As a jurist, I do not hesitate to
pronounce the treaty valid.
Let us now consider the provocations and complaints on our side;
these commenced before any of the alleged grievances on the part
of Mexico. They may be placed under two heads; first, the
refusal to pay American citizens the debts contracted by their
government for the means of carrying on their war of
independence; and secondly, for outrages committed on the
persons of our people while in the pursuit of their lawful
business, and for the illegal seizure and confiscation of their
property. The second head covers much the largest amount of
injuries complained of: they consist of seizure of vessels in
port on false or frivolous pretexts; of goods and merchandise
for public use; of forced loans and civil injuries to persons,
and wanton confinement to loathsome prisons, where many perished
or lost their health. There were beside, anomalous cases,
[7]some of them involving immense losses, breaking up mercantile
establishments, producing ruin, and irreparable injury.
Footnote 7:
Such as that of Aaron Ligett, who introduced steamboats on the
Tobasco river, according to a contract with the government;
his boats were seized for public use, his merchandize
confiscated, and business and credit destroyed. There is the
case of Dr. Baldwin, who was induced to establish saw mills,
which were seized when they became profitable, and the lands
purchased by him confiscated. There is the case of the
empressario contracts in Texas, where lands were granted by
Mexico, on condition of colonizing, and when the company
brought out colonies at great expense, they were forcibly
prevented from taking possession—colonists driven off or
imprisoned, and the goods and effects of the company seized.
We find as early as the first term of Gen. Jackson, the most
ruinous complaints on the part of our fellow-citizens of the
wrongs inflicted on them by Mexico. They are such, says he, “as
cannot be tolerated by any government endued with a just
self-respect, with a proper regard for the opinions of other
nations, or with enlightened concern for the permanent welfare
of those portions of its people who may be interested in foreign
commerce.” After enumerating the various classes of outrages, he
adds, “citizens of the United States have been imprisoned for
long periods of time, without being informed of the offences
with which they were charged. Others have been murdered and
robbed on the high seas by Mexican officers, without any attempt
to bring the guilty to justice.” In a subsequent message to
Congress, he declares, “that such conduct _would justify
immediate war, in the eyes of all nations_.” The same language
was repeated by the subsequent administration, in still stronger
terms. All this was previous to the alleged wrongs on our part,
in respect to Texas, and the only excuse was the revolutionary
state, and the consequent disorders under which Mexico was then
a sufferer; and this plea, untenable as it is, was respected to
such a degree, as to amount to a denial of justice to our own
citizens. The American sufferings were aggravated by seeing the
prompt and decisive measures of the French to redress similar
outrages, when Admiral Baudin blew up the castle of San Juan de
Ulloa, and compelled the Mexican government to pay a million of
dollars on the deck of his vessel. How is it possible, after
these facts, to say, that our complaints against Mexico were
fictitious or exaggerated? Under the commission extorted from
her, without which, an open rupture must have followed, after
ascertaining three millions of just claims, an amount much
larger was left unadjusted, in consequence of the expiration of
the time limited for the duration of the commission, and even
that time shortened one half by the delays of the Mexican
commissioners. Instead of exacting payment at once, of the debt
thus ascertained and admitted to be due, we showed her every
indulgence, by consulting her convenience as to the time and
mode of payment. That debt still remains unpaid, and the
remaining claim unadjusted. Now, I would ask, whether, under the
circumstances, she was not bound to keep open diplomatic
relations for the purpose of providing payment for the amount
due, and for a proper adjudication of the remainder? She has
thought proper to take offence at the annexation of Texas, and
to put an end to diplomatic relations, and of course, of
peaceful negotiation on that, as well as on other subjects. The
act of recalling a minister, and sending passports to the
foreign plenipotentiary, according to the modern law of nations,
is equivalent to an express declaration of war, and hostilities
might be expected to follow as a matter of course.[8] It looks
very much as if the annexation was merely laid hold of as a
pretext to avoid paying her debts, and making compensation for
the wrongs she had perpetrated on our citizens. The closing of
diplomatic relations was itself a great outrage, considering the
relation in which she stood towards us. There was, certainly, no
obligation on our part to take any step towards a renewal of
those relations—we might have proceeded according to the usages
of nations to take the law on our own hands, and compel her to
give, what we might consider, a just indemnity. But unlike other
nations, we pursued a humane and moderate course; we attempted
again and again, to negotiate, but without success; and perhaps,
at the expense of national dignity. And even after the
commencement of hostilities, after every success obtained by our
army, the olive branch was held forth, and as often rejected.
Footnote 8:
See _Kent’s Commentaries._—“Since the time of Binkershock, it
has been settled by the practice of Europe, that war may
lawfully exist by a declaration which is unilateral only, _or
without any declaration on either side_.”
In the war between England and France in 1778, the first
public act on the part of the English government, was
recalling its minister, and that single act was considered by
France as the breach of the peace between the two countries.
There was no other declaration of war, though each government
afterwards published a manifesto in vindication of its claim
and conduct. The same things may be said of the war which
broke out in 1793, and again in 1803.
The act of withdrawing a minister, is one of a most decisive
character, for _actual hostilities_ may exist without a state
of war, as in the war of 1756 between France and England, and
between us and France in 1798. The act of taking the fort of
Mobile under Mr. Madison’s administration in 1812, was an act
of hostility, and yet our diplomatic relations still
continued—it was made the subject of complaint by Spain, and
defended or excused by our government. If diplomatic relations
had been discontinued, there would have been no redress for
Spain, but in returning the blow. Hence, I contend, that the
party which closes these relations, and prevents the peaceful
adjustment of injuries, is responsible for all the
consequences.
It has been said, that the annexation of Texas by us was virtual
war, that is, equivalent to an express declaration. If so, it
was in consequence of the declaration of Mexico, that she would
so consider it, but not as in its very nature precluding
negotiation. On the contrary, the administration has been blamed
for not negotiating, and that too, _whether Mexico would or
not_. No—the act of war, was in closing the door to peaceful
settlement, by means of plenipotentiaries, authorized to adjust
not a single isolated question, _but all matters in dispute_.
A minister, clothed with full powers, was sent by us to Mexico
after the hasty and inconsiderate step taken by her, a piece of
condescension, which can only be ascribed to an extreme desire
on our part to preserve peace. Our plenipotentiary was not
received, and for what reason? Was it because he was not
accredited, or not clothed with sufficient power to adjust _all_
existing differences, the only grounds which could be fairly
assigned? No—the objection was, that these powers were _too
full_, instead of being confined to one topic, the annexation of
Texas. He was told, that a commissioner with powers to settle
that single question, would be received, but without power to
discuss any other, and consequently, without power to discuss
even that, which was necessarily complicated with others. The
representative, of course, could not divest himself of his
powers—he went not only to do justice to Mexico, but demand
justice of her. But, this is but a very imperfect view of the
case. The willingness to receive _a commissioner_, went on the
assumption, that we were in the wrong in the question of
annexation, notwithstanding the ground taken by Mr. Webster, as
Secretary of State, in his letter to Bocanega. Let us look at
the letter of Pena y Pena, of the 15th October, 1845:
“In answer, I have to say to you, that although the Mexican
nation is _deeply injured_ by the United States, through the
acts _committed by them in the department of Texas_, which
belongs to this nation, my government is disposed to receive the
commissioner _to settle the present dispute_, in a peaceful,
reasonable, and honorable manner, thus giving a new proof, that
even in the midst of its injuries, and of its firm decision to
_exact adequate reparation_ for them, it does not _repel_ with
_contumely_, the measure of reason and peace to which it is
uninvited by its adversary.”
It seems then that Mexico does not _repel with contumely_, the
commissioners sent to make _ample reparation_ for the wrong done
her in the department of Texas! The wrong done, _is to be taken
for granted_, not to be discussed; the _measure of reparation_
only, is to be debated. It is impossible to conceive of any
thing more humiliating and insulting, whether it proceed from
design or stupidity. A high minded nation could not brook such
arrogance for a moment, and this from a power which admitted
herself to be our debtor to the amount of millions which she is
unable to pay! It would have been much more in place, for our
minister to say, that the payment of that debt ought to precede
any demand for _reparation_, on account of the alleged injury
from annexation of Texas. I verily believe, that Mexico is the
only power in the world to whom we should permit such language.
At her instance, we had previously withdrawn our squadron from
her coast; and now, forsooth, she condescends to permit us to
ask her forgiveness, and make ample reparation for what she
pleases to consider the injuries done her in her department of
Texas.[9]
Footnote 9:
The battles afterwards fought, appear to have enlarged the
vision of our enemy. No objections in the subsequent attempts
at negotiation with Mr. Trist, were alleged against his too
ample powers. She was willing to yield California for a
consideration, and Texas, with the boundary of the Nuesees,
then mentioned for the first time; and provided, slavery was
not introduced in the ceded territories, and provided, also,
that _religious toleration_ were secured! No one, after this,
will deny, that the war has been productive of something to
compensate for its horrors.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 12.
_Struggle between Santa Anna and General Taylor.—The turning
point of the War._
MARCH, 1847.
The accounts from the seat of war in the States of the Rio
Grande, are becoming every day more serious; perhaps, I should
say, alarming. It is now placed beyond all doubt, that Santa
Anna, instead of throwing himself between the city of Mexico and
the expected march of General Scott, has suddenly advanced on
General Taylor at Saltillo. We now see the effect of weakening
the army of the Rio Grande, under the supposition, that the
Mexican Commander could make no other military movement than
that of covering the national capital. The American General, by
extraordinary exertion, has collected all his disposable force
at the point where he can most advantageously arrest the march
of Santa Anna; but his division does not exceed five thousand
men, not more than half of them regulars, while the Mexican army
is not short of twenty thousand, and by far the most formidable
ever yet embodied in that country. We have every confidence in
General Taylor and his gallant officers and soldiers; he is one
of those, whose resources of mind have always been brought out
by emergencies, and always found equal to them; but it must be
confessed, the odds, at present, are fearfully against him.
It is said, that General Taylor has received orders (perhaps
discretionary) both from the war department, and the commander
in chief, to retreat to Monterey. This, I am confident, he will
never do. He must meet Santa Anna on the edge of the desert of
three hundred miles, which he is compelled to cross, and he will
make his stand at the admirably chosen battle field of Buena
Vista, which, according to the description of Captain Hughes, is
a defile just suited for an army like that of General Taylor to
defend, and to withstand the shock of an attacking force, four
times its numbers. Here is exactly one of those cases, where
every thing must be put to “the hazzard of the dye,” or every
thing must be lost.
Let us for a moment consider the consequences of the retreat of
General Taylor to Monterey or of his defeat at Buena Vista.
Santa Anna once at Saltillo, will find every thing necessary to
refresh his troops, after the sufferings and fatigues of their
march. The retreat of the American General will be regarded as a
victory for Santa Anna, and it will cause the rancheros of New
Leon, Coawilla, and Tamaulipas, to rise _en mass_. General
Urrea, it is said, is at the head of ten thousand men near
Victoria, so that our army will be shut up in Monterey, and all
communications cut off with the Rio Grande. It is true, a
portion of General Taylor’s force may be detached to defend some
narrow pass between Monterey and Saltillo, and attempt to oppose
the advance of Santa Anna. But may not Monterey be turned by
Urrea, and thus place himself in the rear of that detachment,
while a portion of the Mexican army shall advance in front?
Although Santa Anna may not be able to transport his artillery,
is it impossible for him to enter the valley of the Rio Grande
with his infantry and cavalry, by some circuitous way? I set up
no pretensions to being a military critic; my suggestions are
merely thrown out for what they are worth, and they may be worth
nothing. But I can conceive it possible, for Santa Anna, with
his whole army, to enter New Leon and Tamaulipas, and the
necessary consequence must be, that all our military stores at
Comargo and Matamoras, must fall into his hands. He will sweep
the whole valley of the Rio Grande, and in all probability, will
not stop there, but cross into Texas, now almost defenceless,
there being no force at any point capable of opposing his
progress. Admit that these are bare possibilities, these may
become probabilities, and probabilities, may become realities.
The supposed retreat, or defeat of our army, will change the
whole face of the war. Should either of these events take place,
(and such is my confidence in General Taylor, that I firmly
believe they will not) then the descent on Vera Cruz, and the
march to Mexico, under the commander in chief, will have to be
abandoned, and a retrograde movement undertaken to the Rio
Grande, which cannot be effected without great difficulty and
delay.
Very serious charges have been made against the administration
for aiding the return of Santa Anna to Mexico. I look upon this
as an error on the part of Mr. Polk, and as a proof of his
extreme desire for the restoration of peace. The favor shown to
the Mexican President, it was thought, would be followed by
treaty; but the suspicious position in which he would be placed
before his own countrymen, would compel him to prosecute the war
with extraordinary vigor. It would only be, after a series of
glorious victories, and the expulsion of the invaders by force
of arms, that he could venture to talk of peace.
Our whole country waits with breathless anxiety, the issue of
the conflict between General Taylor and Santa Anna. It is the
turning point of this war—if our arms prove successful, there
will be every thing to hope, and peace will have been conquered;
but if we fail, the prospect before us will be dark and gloomy
indeed.[10]
Footnote 10:
This letter was not published in the series—after being
transcribed for publication, the copy was thrown into the
fire, as presenting too discouraging a picture.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 13.
_The battle of Buena Vista, and its results._
APRIL, 1847.
SIR: We have at length authentic accounts of the great battle
fought at Buena Vista; it is certainly one of the most
extraordinary on record, and its consequences are even more
important than the event itself. These are of such magnitude,
that Santa Anna never would have made his daring movement if he
had not been certain of success. Who could have supposed that
twenty thousand men, under a high state of discipline, and
perfectly provided with every thing necessary to constitute an
army, cavalry, artillery, and infantry, should be totally
defeated by two thousand five hundred regulars, and an equal
number of volunteers? Such an idea certainly never entered the
mind of any Mexican, at least. It appears that his army is
entirely disorganized, and it is doubtful, whether he will ever
be able to reach San Louis with the fourth of those who marched
from that place. But the moral influence throughout Mexico must
be incalculable—the Mexicans may now say as the subjects of
Montezuma said of the Spaniards: “the gods of the strangers are
stronger than our gods.”
The reliance of the Mexicans for the defence of the Capital is
destroyed and gone. Had Santa Anna been successful against
Taylor, no other defence of the Capital would have been
necessary; the descent on Vera Cruz would have been at once
abandoned, and our troops recalled for the purpose of covering
our own frontier. Instead of being broken and dispirited, the
Mexicans every where, would have risen up in arms, and, perhaps,
would for the first time, have exhibited a national spirit—the
contrary of this effect has been produced. It will require a
prodigious effort, and much time, to organize another army; and
the greater part will be new conscripts, if they can be
dignified even with that name, where there is no voluntary
enlistment, or fair and regular draft, but where the poor
peasant is seized by force, and driven, tied with ropes, to the
places of rendezvous, like a brute beast, to be beaten, and
broken into the trade of war. And now from Tampico to Saltillo,
from the Sierra Madre to the Sabine, the war is over—_all that
is necessary is to consolidate the conquest of the beautiful
country west of the Rio Grande_.
I can readily conceive the effect of this uninterrupted series
of successful military events, and extraordinary battles, both
on the Mexican and the European mind. The slumbering military
might existing in our republic, ready to be called forth by
events, must strike Europeans with amazement; and its secret
lies in the freedom of our institutions, the same which gave to
Greece and Rome their pre-eminence. One trait has been
exhibited, in even a higher degree, than in Greece—the emulation
or rivalry of States; and even of a higher kind than that which
was displayed at Platea and Marathon; Kentucky has vied with
South Carolina, and Massachusetts with Mississippi—MAY THE
CHERISHED REMEMBRANCE, LONG SERVE TO BIND THEM TOGETHER IN
FRATERNAL AFFECTION! The battles of Palo Alto and Resaca, were
decisive as to the superiority of our arms, especially of our
artillery, and of the inferiority of the enemy in cavalry, whose
efficiency was so much overrated. At Monterey, with every
advantage of numbers, walls, and fortresses, they were literally
crushed; and then, to crown all, at Buena Vista, in spite of the
immense disparity, and the enemy attacking, their army was
annihilated in the open field. Can it be possible that Mexico
will not now sue for peace, and accept any terms we may choose
to dictate? I have no doubt we shall soon hear of General Scott
making good his landing at Vera Cruz, and taking the Castle of
San Juan. We shall then hear of Mexican plenipotentiaries
advancing towards him with the olive branch, before he takes up
his line of march for the capital of the Astecs. Surely they
will not invite him, “to revel in the halls of the Montezumas.”
It must be admitted, that Santa Anna, however detestable his
character, has displayed great military talent. He led his
troops to battle under circumstances, he was well aware, would
cause them to fight with desperation. They were not only filled
with confidence from their immense superiority of numbers, but
rendered desperate by hunger and the hope of booty, which he had
promised them, and which supplied the want of higher motives of
action, such as inspired the superior race with which they had
to contend. In the words of Byron:
“Th’Assyrian came down like a wolf on the plain,”
but the shepherd was prepared to receive him, and drive him back
howling to the desert. The sudden retreat of General Taylor from
his advanced position to his chosen battle ground, no doubt
unexpected, must have had the effect of disconcerting the enemy.
By thus meeting him at the edge of the desert, he availed
himself, like a skilful commander, of all the advantages of
circumstances. What events the war may bring forth, if it should
continue, it is impossible to foretell, but it is certain, that
the series of victories which have been thus far achieved by
him, have not been surpassed in our military history, while that
of Buena Vista, stands unequalled.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 14.
_Shall we organize Territorial Governments in the conquered
Territories._
MARCH, 1847.
Both political parties seem to take it for granted, that
annexation must immediately follow the conquest of the whole or
any portion of Mexico, by which is meant, the formation of new
States to be added to the confederacy. But this is by no means a
necessary consequence. Louisiana was not brought within the pale
of the Constitution for eight years, Missouri for a longer time,
and Florida for sixteen. They were placed under a first, and
then a second grade of territorial government, over which the
Constitution was not extended; rather their Courts, executive,
judicial, or legislative branches, were not constitutional
authorities, but depending on Congress for their being and
power. It has been argued, that the acquisition of territory,
either by purchase or conquest, (to which the same reason
applies,) is not constitutional; and of this opinion, were Mr.
Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, and I think I may add, Mr.
Madison. But public opinion, and public necessity, have
overruled them, not by fair reasoning, but by “jumping to the
conclusion.”
Under the territorial government, the territory has no vote in
Congress, and no representation in the Senate, although allowed
a delegate on the floor of the House of Representatives, with
the liberty of speech, but without the right to vote. The
territories of Louisiana, Missouri, and Florida, had their own
legislatures, retained their own laws, and enacted new ones, but
in this case, subject to the repealing power of Congress. They
had also their own judiciary, with the exception of the Judges
of the Superior Court, who, together with the Executive, were
appointed under the organic law by the President of the United
States; that organic law, emanating from Congress, and which was
for the territories, what State and United States constitutions,
were for the States, might have given the power to the
territories to elect their Governors and Judges, as well as
their Legislators. This was in the pleasure of Congress, which
had acquired the rights of the former sovereign, and might
exercise it under the _limitations_ of the Constitution, not
because it was extended to the acquired territories, but as a
restraint on Congress in its own sphere of action; and whatever
Congress was expressly forbidden to do generally, it was
forbidden to do in any case, unless the exception was express.
The organic law or territorial constitution, extended the great
prerogative writs of _habeas corpus_, _mandamus_, and _quo
warranto_, for the benefit and safe guard of persons, property,
and religion of every citizen. The Government of each territory,
as to all local subjects of legislation, was as completely at
their own hands, as any of the States. But has not Congress
power of regulation over local subjects? I do not find it in the
Constitution, excepting over its real or moveable property. The
District of Columbia stands on an anomalous principle; and
besides, in respect to that district, Congress acts in two
distinct capacities: first, in its general character of a
legislature for the whole Union; and secondly, as a local
legislature for the district; and in this respect, the other
States, have no more right to interfere, than they have a right
to interfere with each other. Its local legislation, must be
directed by its local wants, with which the people of
Massachusetts or New York, have no concern.
The only acts of Congress extended to the territories are always
expressly named, and they are those relating to the revenue, the
slave trade, those regulating commerce and the public lands;
while the great body of the acts of Congress, have application
only to the members of the confederacy. The general Government,
in virtue of its sovereignty, had the control over all foreign
intercourse, and undertook the military defence and protection.
Having lived under these protective Governments, I must candidly
confess, that they possess many advantages. They are entirely
unlike the condition of colonies and conquered provinces,
subject to onerous exactions, or restrictions. Their burthens
were even lighter than those of the citizens of the States, in
consequence of not being represented in Congress, as it would be
against a fundamental principle to bind them by laws, which they
had no share in enacting. Many of the territorial inhabitants
regret the change from the quiet of their territorial
Government, to the turbulence and expense of the State
constitution. They preferred this state of things to the
ambition of being able to disturb the balance of power among the
States, by a voice in the Senate, or even in the House of
Representatives. But the admission into the Union (or admission
as States,) “as soon as consistent with the principles of the
Constitution,” was an express stipulation, under the treaties
which ceded those territories; and in the case of Texas,
immediate annexation as a State, was the principal consideration
of the compact. Where there is no such stipulation, as in the
case of countries acquired by conquest, like those of the Rio
Grande, the acquisition is unconditional, and the territorial
state may be continued indefinitely, or the admission of the
whole or part, be determined at our pleasure. According to the
laws of nations, their local laws remain in force; and according
to our Constitution, Congress has no power to legislate in local
matters for them, although it may create a local legislature for
that purpose; for, in my opinion, it cannot constitute itself a
local legislature for the purpose, as in the anomalous case of
the District of Columbia.
The Supreme Court is often regarded as the sole arbiter in all
constitutional questions. This is to be understood with some
comitations. For instance, it would not consider itself at
liberty to decide the question, whether the acquisition of
foreign territory is constitutional or not; the other branches
of the Government, the Legislation, the treaty making power, the
Executive, having determined the high political question
involved, the Supreme Court conforms to that decision. It,
therefore, moves in a groove, and is not Supreme over all. Yet
it has decided, in the case of Cairter, that the Courts of the
territory are not constitutional Courts, and the Judges not
constitutional Judges; consequently its inferior Courts not
inferior Courts of the United States.
We must distinguish between Political, and Municipal or local
laws; the former are abrogated _ipso facto_, by the charge of
sovereignty, the later continue in force until repealed. For
instance the whole body of the Spanish law was repealed in
Louisiana, by an edict of Governor O’Reilly, and in Missouri,
the Spanish code, continue to Paris and we, were abrogated by
the Governor and Judges, under the first grade of Government,
and the common law with the statutes of one of the States,
substituted in their place. One of the earliest decisions of the
Supreme Court, was that the United States had no code of
municipal law, but must resort to the municipal law of the State
in which it happened to sit.
Let us suppose the whole of Mexico conquered by our arms, it may
be divided, in the first instance, into four or five
territories, which may be retained in that form of government at
least as long as Florida, and be, afterwards, admitted as
States, or be permitted to establish independent governments,
bound to us by treaties of alliance, offensive and defensive. I
hold it as a settled principle, that we cannot hold conquered
countries like ancient or modern nations; and we cannot, without
violating the spirit of our institutions, deny them the right of
self-government, or at least, of representation. The conquests
we may make, cannot fail to better the condition of the
conquered, by affording them better political institutions than
those they before possessed. Surely, nothing can be worse than
the present military anarchy of Mexico. They would obtain
security for their rights, and obtain new ones, which they never
enjoyed before; they would have peace within their borders, and
safety from without. We should repel with indignation, the terms
of reproach heaped upon us by the “tory” paper of England, the
“Times.” Our free governments carry blessings with them wherever
they appear. Plunder and devastation, form no part of the
American character, as is proved by the progress of our arms,
marked by a degree of humanity unexampled in the annals of war
and conquest. The affectation of concern for their religion,
manifested by the Mexicans, is truly ridiculous in those who
tolerate no religion but that of the State.
The subject of slavery is one of local, that is, of State or
territorial legislation, except as to the foreign slave trade,
which belongs to Congress in the regulation of foreign commerce.
In the territory Northwest of the Ohio, there could not be said
to be any system of law, it being uninhabited, or at least, the
population was so inconsiderable, that it was not taken into
consideration in establishing the ordinance of 1787, before the
adoption of the present Constitution. It is in the nature of a
compact between the States, and is not a case in point. But in
Louisiana, the institution of slavery was already there, and
could not be destroyed without interfering with a subject of
local regulation of those territories, together with other
subjects of domestic concern. Congress reserved to itself only a
right to repeal, resembling a veto, except that the laws enacted
continued in force until repealed; but, in no instance did
Congress take the initiative in this local legislation. We may
often discover the best expositions of the power of the
Government, or any branch of it, by strict enquiry into the
history of its practical operation.
Suppose the laws of Mexico _prohibit_ slavery, would the simple
repeal of the laws _establish_ it? I do not see by what
reasoning it would do so. Is it probable, I would almost say
possible, that slavery will be introduced by positive enactment?
This would not only be local legislation, and on that account
objectionable, even if it were possible, _as Congress is at
present constituted_. It is said to be carried there by the
Constitution. How can this be, if the Constitution does not
extend there? A part cannot be extended without extending the
whole. Congress is forbidden by the Constitution to legislate on
certain subjects. This is true, but it is a limitation on its
own powers, the effects of which are felt by the territories, as
well as the States, but is no argument to prove, that the
Constitution extends to the former as well as to the latter. I
cannot see by what reasoning the Constitution is extended to
them, and yet, I can readily see many curious, inconvenient, and
unjust consequences arising from this view of the subject. It is
impossible to avoid such consequences, when we attempt to reason
from false premises. We have started wrong in acquiring
territory, when such acquisition was not contemplated by the
Constitution; and that error is the cause of other errors. I see
no way of surmounting these difficulties, but by mutual
forbearance, reciprocal respect for each others feelings and
interests.[11]
Footnote 11:
The claim of the right to go to the acquired, or conquered
territories with their slave property, is insisted on by the
South. The attempted exclusion creates strong feelings, as it
is regarded as offensive and unjust. If, according to my view
of the subject, the conquered or acquired territory, is
neither a part of any State, nor a part of the Union, the
sovereignty is either in Congress, or in the inhabitants.
According to European reasoning the sovereignty is in the
Government; according to ours it is in the inhabitants;
because with us, power travels upwards from the people, but
according to the old reasoning, instead of ascending, it
descends. But, if it be _assumed_, that the Constitution
follows our flag, even if it be to the Typce(TN) Islands, then
it would appear to me, that no citizen can be directly, or
indirectly, excluded, on account of his carrying with him,
persons _bound to service_, for that is a condition, or
relation recognized by the Constitution. Such servants are
recognized if not as _property_, for taxation, yet as
_persons_ for representation. If the Constitution comes in
conflict with the local laws, the latter must give way; this
is the necessary consequence it is contended of extending the
Constitution to the territories. Laying aside all this fine
spun reasoning, there is a common sense ground of justice and
equal right, in the claim to equal participation in the
property acquired by common means, and even the appearance of
the denial, must be offensive. The party thus denied, might
exclaim “if it be arsenic, I will have my share.”
The necessity of some legislation for the new territories, is
evident, even if the first, or second grade of government, be
not given to them. They are but _fragments_ of other
governments, depending on their superior, and their
organization incomplete, when cut off from that superior. The
jurisdiction of their courts was limited, or subject to
appeal; their political, and military offices, acted under the
order of their chief. The President of the United States as
commander in chief, would command the military; but the United
States judiciary could not entertain appeals, without
authority of Congress; and neither could the President
exercise civil control, without the same authority. The
organic law, provides for the trial by jury, for the security
of person, and conscience, not provided for in despotic
countries. The laws regulating intercourse with the indians,
the Post office, and many and on other subjects require to be
specially extended. It is possible that by some indispensable
legislation of this kind, the new acquisition, may get along
for a while, by supplying the deficiency out of that original
stock of power, which men possess in a state of nature, when
compelled to do so by necessity. The attempt was made in
Florida during a short interval, and it gave rise to much
animadversion. I admit, that it may be in some manner
obviated, by special legislation on the part of Congress, if
_from any cause_, it should be deemed inexpedient to establish
territorial governments, even of the first grade. In Louisiana
as in Florida, a Governor was appointed, clothed with the
powers of the late Captain General, until Congress could act.
Much has been said on the subject of the laws of Mexico
abolishing slavery, and no little merit is ascribed to her for
her course on this head. When her pretensions are examined, it
will be seen, that she is entitled to no credit whatever.
African slavery was not introduced into that country, because
the native indians, who had been reduced to a real bondage,
already formed a cheaper slavery, than the African. In the time
of the conquerors, _villages_ and _districts_ were granted to
them, the soil being only of secondary consideration. Their
inhabitants were condemned to the severest labor, and were, in
fact, slaves. The Spanish monarchs struggled with the wealthy
proprietors to alleviate the condition of the unfortunate
indians, and with success, so far as to rescue them from their
original servitude; but, they are, at this day, little better
off. Under the system of peonage, and the authority exercised by
the alcaldes, their freedom is but nominal. This kind of slavery
_is not abolished_; and as to abolishing negro slavery, it
scarcely existed there. According to Mr. Ward, a few negroes
were introduced about thirty years ago, but on finding the
Indian labor much cheaper, they were suffered to go where they
pleased. The only slavery in Mexico, except peonage, was in
Texas.[12] This system is founded on a law of the _Siete
Partidas_, which exempts females, ecclesiastics, military
persons, scholars, and _gentlemen_, (hidalgos) from
imprisonment, or liability of person, for debt! The poor Indian
is, therefore, the only subject for the law to operate on. This
kind of slavery commands the labor of the adult laborer, without
the burthen of the aged and helpless, as is the case of negro
slavery, which is not only a _relation_, but a _community_,
where the able-bodied provide for the helpless. This pretention
to merit on account of the abolition of slavery, is only an
after thought arising out of the hostility to Texas. It was a
subject of State legislation as with us, until the Mexicans
found that they could make capital out of it with our
abolitionists, and their English coadjutors. I detest hypocrisy,
and never was there any thing of this kind more palpable, than
the affectation of hostility to slavery by _Mexican
philanthropists_! In enumerating the causes of difference
between Mexico and Texas, I passed this topic in silence,
because I know it to be hollow and insincere, when put forth by
a country where human rights are held so cheap.
Footnote 12:
It is not long, since a list of the peons who had escaped from the
other side of the Rio Grande was published, and bitter complaints made
by their masters to the Mexican Government, which was petitioned for
redress! It is said that some proprietors own thousands, and they are
a part of their estates. It is probable that neither slavery nor
peonage can continue on the borders of the Rio Grande. During our
military operations a large number of persons were freed by earning
the means of paying the debts for which they were bound.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX.
[_From the Republic._]
MESSRS. EDITORS: Some time last Spring, I published in the
“Commercial Journal,” of Pittsburgh, some views on the subject
of the California gold region, which have been confirmed by
observations on the spot, published in the “_Alta California_,”
and by accounts still more recent from that country.
In order to understand the views referred to, it is necessary,
in the first place, to give a sketch of the geological features
of the country. A valley of six hundred miles in length, and
from fifty to a hundred in width, is formed by the Sierra
Nevada, or Snowy range on the east, and by the coast range on
the west. This valley is watered by two rivers, the Sacramento
and the San Joachim; one rising due north, the other due south,
and running towards each other; after uniting their waters they
enter the bay of San Francisco, which partly bounds the western
side of the valley. These rivers may be said to wash the base of
the Sierra Nevada, their waters being supplied, almost
exclusively, by streams which take their rise in that range of
mountains. In this manner they form a continued line although
coming from opposite directions, receiving the drainings and
detritus brought down by the innumerable torrents which cut the
sides of the Sierra. The alluvial and diluvial deposites are,
therefore, almost exclusively on the eastern side; and this
accounts, also, for the overflow of the river on that side. On
looking at the map of Colonel Fremont, I was struck with the
extraordinary number of these ravines. They look like so many
streaks on the map, or, rather, lines drawn by artificial
agency; but that agency is the sudden melting of the snows, and
heavy rains of that climate. One cause of this great quantity of
water discharged by the short mountain torrents, is the want of
sufficient elevation of the mountain, in that latitude, to
retain the snows until they can melt gradually, as is the case
of the Andes of Peru and Chili; and yet sufficiently elevated to
receive a great depth of snow. This, when melted by the rains,
rushes down with great force, carrying detritus along with it,
and cutting through all the incumbent strata, until it reaches
the level of the rivers, although still above the trap, or
granite, which forms the nucleus of the mountain.
As this detritus is carried down, it becomes more and more
disintegrated, until its further progress is arrested by the
course of the rivers before mentioned, and is at last deposited
in fine sand and gravel. The metallic threads are found,
probably, not less than one-third of the way up the mountain;
and if a shaft were sunk at the base of the mountain, it would
have to go a depth before reaching the vein, corresponding with
its present elevation above the original level. The metal,
therefore, will only be found in these alluvial deposites, not
beyond twenty or thirty feet in depth, formed in the course of
time by the descending torrents. The nearer the river, and the
farther from the seam, the finer will be the particles of gold;
and the higher up the coarser, and less separated from the
quartz in which it is detained. The most expensive part of
mining, reducing the quartz to sand by stamping, the amalgation
with quicksilver, and the separation of these by distillation,
is thus saved, and the gold obtained with comparatively little
expense. The stamping, or breaking up of the quartz, is
performed by the natural agency of the water, and by the rocks
falling upon each other in the course of their descent. Until
these deposites shall be partially exhausted, although a much
more precarious pursuit than regular mining, the latter will not
be generally resorted to. There is no doubt, also, that others,
with more perfect machines for washing and amalgamation, will
follow those pioneers, and wash the same earth and sand over
again, to as great profit as at the first operation. When I
examined the lead mines of Missouri, I found that those who came
after the regular smelters, took their scoria and leavings, and
extracted, by means of the ash furnace, about twenty-five per
cent., in addition to the fifty already obtained, but without
the expense and uncertainty of mining, which rendered it a sort
of gambling pursuit.
Having giving this brief description, I will now proceed to what
may be called theory—that is, _facts derived from induction_.
Let us suppose a series of horizontal strata, one above another,
but of unequal depth, incumbent on the original unstratified
mass, which forms the nucleus of the globe. According to
geologists, this was the natural position. Now, in consequence
of some powerful volcanic agency, the lower mass is thrown up
from below, and becomes the nucleus of a mountain, and that
which was before the lowest, now appears at the top, while the
various strata which lay flat upon it are tilted up on its
sides. These being cut through, in the manner described, there
is exposed to view in these cuts, the various strata and their
contents, in the same manner as if a shaft had been sunk through
them in their horizontal position. If there be any metallic
seams to the right or left of these cuts, they will be seen like
threads, and running lengthwise with the range of mountains. The
metals contained in the now vacant spaces of these ravines, have
been carried away and deposited below. The masses, thus broken
and separated, have been still further reduced in the manner
before stated, greatly diminishing the labor of mining. The
deposits of detritus intermixed with gold may be the work of
thousands of years; but the quantity may be estimated by the
number and width of the natural cuttings through the gold seams
now disconnected. It is certain that the amount of gold at the
bottom cannot exceed the amount carried down from these original
deposites. Without assuming that the amount of gold deposited in
the Sierra Nevada is actually greater than in the same range
further south, its peculiar geological and geographical
character, may be a reason why gold may be _found_ in California
in greater abundance than in any other part of the world. It is
found along this whole range from Sonora to Chili, although in
greater or less abundance; and there is no doubt that a variety
of other metals will be met with, perhaps as valuable, when the
passion for gold washing shall have somewhat abated. It is
remarkable that gold has been found almost invariably on the
western or Pacific side of the great range, while silver,
copper, and lead are discovered on the eastern side, and at a
much greater elevation. It is probable that, instead of gold;
silver and copper exist on the eastern side of the Sierra
Nevada, towards the great Basin. What a field for the
mineralogist!
But, by what process, or operation of nature, came these seams,
or veins of gold or other metals, to be thus deposited? Was it
by the agency of fire, or by water and alluvion? I think it
probable that both may have been at work, being the two greatest
solvents in nature, and, at the same time, the greatest
chrystalizers. Perhaps metallic _ores_ may be the work of
alluvion, and the production of pure _metallic_ substances—that
of heat. With respect to gold, I think the latter theory is the
more reasonable, as it is always found in a pure state, while
the quartz (or pure silex) in which it is contained may be
alluvial, and one pf the earliest deposites from the
decomposition of the ancient unstratified mass. But where shall
we seek for the original supply of the precious metal? How is it
formed, or whence has it been extracted by the agency of heat?
It is not enough to say that, like other metals, it is found
diffused throughout all nature, for an appreciable quantity of
gold has been extracted from violets. In my opinion, it exists
on the original unstratified mass, in imperceptible proportions;
but those proportions varying a different places, other metals
being more or less abundant. The greater proportion of our
soils, according to Sir Humphrey Davy, is formed by the
decomposition of the original granite; and this accounts for
diffusion of gold in minute particles, which may be taken up by
plants, and enter into the composition of organized bodies. If
then, the unstratified rock is the original seat of the metal,
but in particles infinitely minute, it may have been separated
by a very high degree of heat, by which it would be sublimated
or volatilized, and thus carried upwards by chemicoelectric
force, by a process resembling distillation. In this way, it
would penetrate the quartz rock, or be condensed in the spaces
of the laminated strata, such as the talc, schist, or mica
slate. Such is the theory of Trimmer, Buchland, and other modern
mineralogists. Lyall says—“granite, syenite, and those
porphyries, which have a granite form structure, in short all
plutonic rocks (rocks having undergone the action of heat) are
frequently observed to contain metals, at or near their junction
with stratified formations. On the other hand, the veins which
traverse stratified rocks are, as a genera] law, more
metalliferous near such junctions, than in other portions. Hence
it has been inferred that these metals may have been spread in a
_gaseous form_, through the fused mass, and that the contact of
another rock, of a different state of temperature or sometimes
the existence of rents in other rocks in the vicinity, may have
caused the sublimation of the metals.”
One thing is certain, as may be at once seen by those who have
examined the larger masses of gold brought from California, that
the finer particles of gold have been run together, by a second
operation of heat, sufficient only to fuse them and separate
them from the quartz. The first was distillation, the second
smelting, or rather simple fusion. It is possible that these
great operations of nature have been repeated at different
intervals, and different seams of quartz and gold, may be found
in ascending the ravines; the lower, more completely scattered
(but in finer particles) through the quartz, and the higher
having afterwards undergone simple fusion.
I think it premature to offer any conjecture as to the amount of
gold which may be expected from California; but I cannot but
think that it will be sufficient to produce a perceptible effect
on its commercial value. According to Mr. PRESCOTT, the sudden
influx of gold from Mexico and Peru reduced its value, as
compared to commodities, about two-thirds in the course of
twenty years. A new stimulus has been given to the pursuit of
gold mining throughout the world, in consequence of the
discoveries of our enterprising countrymen in California. The
extraordinary increase of gold in the Bank of England may be an
indication that its value is decreasing as compared to silver,
and therefore less desirable for hoarding. It it certain that it
is a less perfect standard of value than silver, the latter
being also a scarce metal, compared to other metals, but a
better representative than gold, of the labor and capital
expended in its production, while gold has been repeatedly
thrown into circulation in sudden and unlooked-for quantities, I
would instance the amount of gold found in Calcutta on its
capture by Clive—an amount, although imperfectly known, admitted
to have been immense. We may expect that the gold mines of
Siberia, of Brazil, of Mexico and Southern America, of the
eastern and even western parts of Europe, Hungary, Transylvania,
Silesia, of Spain, and even of Norway and Sweden, as well as of
the Appalachian, in our southern States, will awaken new efforts
of combined skill, labor, and capital.
H. M. BRACKENRIDGE.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE EARLY DISCOVERIES OF THE SPANIARDS IN NEW MEXICO.
MESSRS. EDITORS: One of the most difficult things I ever
undertook has been to trace the different journeys of discovery
of the Spaniards, in the country to which they gave the name of
New Mexico; and it would have been impossible to have
accomplished this undertaking, but for the assistance of that
extraordinary and invaluable collection of maps and books on the
subject of America, made with great expense and labor, by Mr.
Force, of Washington. Of these difficulties no one can form a
just idea who has not made the attempt. It may be proper to
state, that the whole country, from the mountains east of the
Rio Grande to the Pacific—from about 32° south to 37° north—in
consequence of these discoveries, and on account of its great
cities, and its numerous and civilized population, was called
New Mexico in reference to old Mexico, as New Spain was named in
reference to Old Spain. My principal source of information is
the work of Gomara, and Hackluyt’s collection of voyages; but I
was obliged to consult many other works.
In some of the oldest maps, the Colorado of California is called
the _Rio Grande del Norte_, and is represented as taking its
rise in a great lake to the north east; while the _Rio Grande of
the Gulf_, or, as it was called, the North Sea, does not appear.
It will be readily seen that this was sufficient to account for
much of the confusion and mistakes of the early writers, and of
the fruitless attempts to trace the early journeys of discovery.
The first journey was that of Marco de Nicia, a friar,
accompanied by a small party. He set out from Pitatlan, on the
Gulf of California, in latitude 24°, in the year 1539, about
twelve years after the conquest. I shall not enter into details.
After some days’ travel to the north, through populous
countries, he came to Vacupa, where he first heard of populous
countries to the north, of the province of Cibola, and of the
seven great cities. After reaching, as he supposed, latitude
26°, he found Indians who had no knowledge of christians. He was
then about fifty leagues from the Gulf of California. He was
informed by these indians of a great plain, about thirty days’
further travel to the north, inhabited by people living in large
towns, built of stone and lime, who wore cotton garments, and
possessing abundance of gold and turquoises, sometimes called
_emeralds_, from the affinity to that precious stone.
Advancing still further, he sent a negro and some indians to see
and report to him on their return, while he followed them
slowly. Some of these indians returned, and informed him that
they had reached Cibola, but had been badly treated, and the
negro killed. Nicia, on his return, wrote his account which is,
in many respects, exaggerated and fabulous; it gave rise,
however, to an expedition under Vasques de Coronado, in 1540.
Coronado was greatly disappointed, and freely gives the lie to
the accounts of Nicia. He went as far as the cities of Cibola,
which he described as consisting of five small towns, of five
hundred houses each, well-built of stone, He heard of populous
provinces to the north, and of cities on a great salt lake, to
the northwest, where there was an abundance of gold. The lake
was probably the Pacific Ocean. It is remarkable that nearly all
the tribes on the Atlantic slope had a vague notion of the
Pacific, and supposed it to be at a short distance from them. He
returned with the intention of making another expedition, but
which he never accomplished. The towns which he saw, were, no
doubt, near the Gila, and south of that river, while the great
province of Cibola lay to the north between that river and the
Colorado. The unfavorable report of Coronado, and the failure of
Cortez in his northern explorations, had the effect, no doubt,
of discouraging further discoveries in this direction.
No further attempts were made to explore the country for nearly
forty years. In the mean time, the Spanish settlements had
advanced from Guadelahara to New Biscay, and the valley of St.
Bartholomew, or Chiwawa. In the year 1583, a well prepared
exploring expedition was set on foot, under the command of
Antonio de Espejo. It proceeded north to the Conchas and
Pasaguetas, numerous tribes, who had no previous knowledge of
the christians. Their course was along the Conchas.
They followed the river to the Tobosos and Jumanos, where they
found large towns, with flat roofs, built of stone and lime, and
regularly laid out in streets. They now reached the _Rio Grande
of the Gulf of Mexico_—here is a point of departure about which
there can be no mistake. They proceeded about twelve days up the
river, and came to another great nation. The inhabitants wore
mantles of cotton with blue stripes, of handsome fabric. I have
no doubt this was the present _Paso del Norte_. After leaving
this, they travelled fifteen days up the river, through a
country not admitting of population, and this is its present
character, until they came to what may be called the valley of
Santa Fe. They found towns with houses four and five stories
high, warmed by stoves, and ladders to ascend from one story to
the other. They proceeded thence to Tiguasi, where they found
sixteen towns. Here they learned that the eastern part of Cibola
bordered on this province, the western border of which had been
visited by Coronado. They speak of eleven other towns containing
forty thousand inhabitants. Whether they meant families
(vicinos) or _souls_, I am unable to say. They proceeded up the
Rio Grande to Cia, or Zia, the largest town they had seen,
containing twenty thousand inhabitants and eight market-houses.
The houses were plastered and handsomely painted, and the people
civilized. At this place, hearing of a great province to the
northwest, they took that direction. They heard of seven large
towns, but did not go to see them. Fifteen leagues further,
still going west, they came to a great town called Acoma,
situated on a high rock, accessible only by a way cut in the
rock. The inhabitants were supplied with water by cisterns.
Twenty-four leagues further, they came to the province of Zuni,
called by the Spaniards Cibola, where the inhabitants had
information of the visit of Coronado. They were informed that,
at the distance of eighty leagues, there was a great lake, many
large towns, and plenty of gold—probably California. The main
party now returned towards the Rio Grande, while Espejo and nine
companions went further west. After travelling twenty-eight
leagues, they found a great province, containing fifty thousand
inhabitants, called Zaguato. They heard much of the cities of
the Great Salt Lake, the Pacific and their wealth, gold, &c.
Espejo made an excursion of forty five leagues to the northwest,
where it was said there were silver mines, and which he found
very rich. This was near two rivers of _reasonable_ size,
probably the Colorado and the Jaguisita. I am satisfied that the
country thus explored lay between the Gila and the Colorado.
On the return of Espejo, the main party determined to return to
New Biscay, or Chiwawa, but he resolved to ascend higher up the
river. The only mention of degrees of latitude is on one
occasion, when they speak of having reached the 37th degree; but
this was probably mere guess-work.
Espejo now ascended the river sixty leagues to Quires; thence,
going east, he came to Hubites, containing twenty-five thousand
inhabitants, and he heard of the Tamas, containing forty
thousand. Whether these were towns or provinces is not stated.
All the places visited had gold, and turquoises, and
manufactured fine cotton cloths. The myriads of buffalo, or
crooked backed oxen, which covered the whole face of the country
were mistaken for domestic herds; no country on the globe was
ever so abundantly supplied with the means of subsistence
through this animal, as were the aborigines of the interior of
North America. So that particular districts might be most
thickly populated, while vast unoccupied regions lay around
them, swarming with the buffalo, or rather the bison, which is
the true name of that animal. Their skins were elegantly dressed
by them; and, for the finer kinds, the mountain sheep, or goat,
or chamois, as the Spaniards called it, furnished an abundant
supply. Espejo resolved to return by a different course, and was
conducted by the Indians down the _Rio de las Vacas_, which he
followed 120 leagues, meeting with no inhabitants, but vast
numbers of _cattle_. But without seeing any habitations, the
herdsmen appearing to live among their herds. The use of
fire-arms has no doubt rendered them more shy, and at one time
they literally blackened the face of the western prairies. Their
range was limited both to the south and north. He then struck
across to the Rio Grande, and came to the Conchas, by which he
returned to New Biscay. The Rio de las Vacas is evidently the
Rio Puerco, or Pecos. Here closes the expedition. Having the
point of departure fixed, and at the same time the point of
termination equally ascertained, I think the whole mystery of
these expeditions has been cleared up.
The question will naturally present itself, what has become of
the millions of civilized people who occupied New Mexico? I will
ask, what has become of the millions of Yucatan, of Chiapas, and
of Old Mexico? The reduction to slavery, their wars, and other
causes, are not sufficient to account for the disappearance of
the great nations of the west, or of the Atlantic slope. In
looking for a cause, I have found one fully adequate, in that
horrid plague and scourge, the small-pox. Let any one read the
accounts of McKenzie, Carver, and Catlin, and I think he will
seek no further for it. To the indian it is peculiarly fatal,
not only from his want of skill in treating it, but from his
physical organization; his skin is so remarkably thick that the
pustules cannot break through it, and the disease is almost
always fatal. When among the Arikaras, I was informed by them
that they were but the remnant of seventeen towns lower down the
river, and I traced their former abode for seven miles. The
Arikaras and Mandans have since disappeared from the earth.
After the greater part had been carried off by the small-pox,
the survivors abandoned these towns and fled, covering their
trails as they went, as if pursued by an enemy; but that mortal
foe still followed them to annihilation. I have not been able to
find any account of the nations of New Mexico from the year 1583
until 1698; and it is perhaps during that interval, that the
rapid destruction of the American tribes and nations took place,
while there was no one to record the desolation of the provinces
of Cibola, or the country of the Buffaloe, which is the meaning
of the word. The ruins, of cities on the Gila, and between it
and the Colorado, remain to prove the fact that they once
existed. Yet, there are some remnants of their former
civilization in the Nabahoes, and the Pumas one on the Gila, the
other on the heads of the Colorado, who still live in well-built
houses, and manufacture their beautiful blankets. The suggestion
I have made might be extended to the old world, and its ruined
cities of Asia and Africa.
The only recent account of the country between the Gila and the
Colorado which I have been able to meet with, is in Pattie’s
Narrative, a hunter of Kentucky, who trapped on the Gila and
Colorado twenty-five years ago, whose journal is done into
readable English by the geographer, Flint. Pattie saw many of
these ruins; saw much fine land heavily timbered; and by the
friendship of the Nabahoes, was directed through a pass at the
head of the Colorado which carried him to the Platt of the
Missouri. This is, possibly, the pass sought for by Colonel
Fremont. Pattie went through it in May; if it was bad then, what
must it have been in the depth of winter! I am of opinion, that
between 32° and 37° there is sufficient land to make two States,
without going east of the Rio Grande del Norte. Yet, it was but
partially seen by Pattie. It appears to be a mountainous
country, well watered, and no doubt abounding in minerals, and
having many rich valleys adapted to cultivation. The Colorado is
a fine river, navigable eight hundred or a thousand miles with
steamboats, unless there be obstructions that we do not know of.
In extent, it is equal to Pennsylvania or Virginia. It will not
be long before it will be thoroughly explored by our countrymen.
Pattie says that it contains numerous bands of the most savage
and ferocious Indians, armed with bows and arrows pointed with
flint, who have had no intercourse or knowledge of the whites.
He says that the country in some respects reminded him of parts
of Kentucky, his native State.
H. M. BRACKENRIDGE.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DESTRUCTION OF THE INDIANS BY SMALL-POX.
I could bring together numerous separate accounts of the fatal
ravages of this disease among the Indians in different portions
of the continent. Bernal Dias, _incidentally_ mentions, that it
carried off a _million_ shortly after the conquest, but how many
more we are not told. The disease, no doubt, appeared at
different intervals. A sermon by a New England divine, (in the
collection of Mr. Force) of 1621, mentions that not more than
one in twenty of the natives then remained, the rest having been
carried off by the small-pox. In a Jesuit account which I found
in the same collection, it appears that it broke out among the
Indians in Chiwawa in 1617, and carried off whole tribes of
Indians. There was no escape from it, for as long as two
remained together the contagion might be there; it was,
therefore, more fatal than an atmospheric epidemic, which might
be checked by change of place or season. The Indian fled from
his village or town, and never returned to it; he never dared to
approach it afterwards, believing it to be haunted by evil
spirits. In many places, this superstitious dread prevails to
this day.
McKenzie gives the following account of the destruction of the
Knistenew and Chippowyen tribes in 1780: “This was the small pox
which spread its destructive and desolating power, as the fire
consumes the dry grass of the field. The fatal infection spread
round with a baneful rapidity which no flight could escape, and
with a fatal effect that nothing could resist. It destroyed with
its pestilential breath whole families and tribes; and the
horrid scene presented to those who had the melancholy and
afflicting opportunity of beholding it, a combination of the
dead, the dying, and such, as to avoid the horrid fate their
friends around them, prepared to disappoint the plague of its
prey, by terminating their own existence.
“The habits and lives of those devoted people, which provided
not to-day for the wants of to-morrow, must have heightened the
pains of such an affliction, by leaving them not only without
remedy; but even without alleviation. Nought was left to those
but to submit in agony and despair.”
“To aggravate the picture, if aggravation were possible, may be
added, the putrid carcasses which the wolves, with a furious
voracity, dragged from the huts, or which were mangled within
them by the dogs, whose hunger was satisfied with the disfigured
remains of their masters. Nor was it uncommon for the father of
a family whom the infection had not reached, to call them around
him, to represent the cruel sufferings and horrid fate of their
relations, from the influence of some evil spirit who was
preparing to exterpate their race, and to invite them to baffle
death with all its horrors, by their own poignards. At the same
time, if their hearts failed them in this necessary act, he was
himself ready to perform the deed of mercy with his own hand, as
the last act of his affection; and instantly follow them to the
common place of rest and repose from human evil.
“It was never satisfactorily ascertained by what means this
malignant disorder was introduced, but it was generally supposed
to be from Missouri by a war party.”
------------------------------------------------------------------------
● Transcriber’s Notes:
○ This might be the Spice Islands.
○ Missing or obscured punctuation was silently corrected.
○ Typographical errors were silently corrected.
○ Inconsistent spelling and hyphenation were made consistent
only when a predominant form was found in this book.
○ Text that:
was in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_).
*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Mexican letters written during the progress of the late war between the United States and Mexico" ***
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