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Title: The Life of Gordon, Volume I
Author: Boulger, Demetrius Charles, 1853-1928
Language: English
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THE LIFE OF GORDON
MAJOR-GENERAL, R.E., C.B.; TURKISH FIELD-MARSHAL, GRAND
CORDON MEDJIDIEH, AND PASHA; CHINESE TITU (FIELD-MARSHAL),
YELLOW JACKET ORDER.
"_'Tis a name which ne'er hath been dishonour'd,
And never will, I trust--most surely never
By such a youth as thou._"
--SWINTON ON ADAM GORDON.
by
DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER
Author of "The History of China;" "England and Russia in Central
Asia;" "Lord William Bentinck," Etc., Etc.
With Portrait
VOLUME I
London
T. Fisher Unwin
Paternoster Square
MDCCCXCVI
[All rights reserved.]
[Illustration: GENERAL GORDON
A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN SHORTLY AFTER THE CRIMEA AND LENT BY HIS NIECE,
MISS DUNLOP.]
PREFACE.
As so many books of a more or less biographical nature have been
written about General Charles Gordon, it is both appropriate and
natural that I should preface the following pages with a statement of
a personal character as to how and why I have written another.
In the year 1881 I told General Gordon that I contemplated describing
his career as soon as I had finished writing my "History of China."
His laughing reply was: "You know I shall never read it, but you can
have all my papers now in the possession of my brother, Sir Henry
Gordon." My history took a very long time to write, and the third
volume was not published until April 1884, when General Gordon was
hemmed in, to use his own words, at Khartoum.
For over two years General Gordon's papers and letters remained in my
custody, and they included the Equator and Soudan correspondence,
which was so admirably edited by Dr Birkbeck Hill in that intensely
interesting volume, "Colonel Gordon in Central Africa." The papers
relating to China and the Taeping Rebellion were freely used in my
history. To them I have the privilege of adding in the present volume
an authoritative narrative of the events that followed the execution
of the Taeping Wangs at Soochow, and of thus rendering tardy justice
to the part taken in them by Sir Halliday Macartney. Among the
contents of the large portmanteau in which all these documents were
stored, I noticed a thick bundle of letters, in somewhat faded
handwriting, and an examination of their contents showed me that they
were of the deepest interest as relating to the important events of
the Crimean War, and to the first seven years of Gordon's service in
the Army. I at once went to Sir Henry Gordon, who honoured me with his
friendship and confidence in no less a degree than his distinguished
and ever-lamented brother, and begged of him permission to publish
them. He at once gave his consent, which was ratified by the late Miss
Augusta Gordon, the hero's favourite sister. The letters appeared in
July 1884, under the title of "General Gordon's Letters from the
Crimea, the Danube, and Armenia." In the proper place I have told what
Kinglake, the historian of the war, thought of them and their author.
In the rush of books that followed the fall of Khartoum, no favourable
opportunity for carrying out my original purpose presented itself;
and, indeed, I may say that the anonymous biographical work I
performed during the course of the year 1885 would have filled a
large-sized volume. Moreover, the terrible events of the fall of
Khartoum, and the failure of the relieving expedition, were too close
at hand to allow of a just view being taken of them, and it was
necessary to defer an intention which I never abandoned. It seemed to
me that the tenth anniversary of the fall of Khartoum would be an
appropriate occasion for the appearance of a Life claiming to give a
complete view and final verdict on the remarkable career and character
of the man, with whom his own friendly inclination had made me
exceptionally well acquainted.
In 1893, therefore, I began to take steps to carry out my project, and
to the notification of my intention and the application for assistance
in regard to unpublished papers, I received from several of the
principal representatives of the Gordon family encouraging replies.
But at this time both Sir Henry Gordon and Miss Gordon were dead, and
I discovered that the latter had bound her literary executrix, Miss
Dunlop, a niece of General Gordon's, by a promise not to divulge the
bulk of the unpublished papers during her lifetime. I am happy to
say, however, that Miss Dunlop, without accepting any responsibility
for what I have written, has with the greatest possible kindness read
these pages, and assisted me to attain complete accuracy in the facts,
so far as they relate to family and personal matters, but excluding
altogether from her purview all military and political topics. For
that co-operation, unfortunately restricted by the condition of the
promise to Miss Gordon, I avail myself of this opportunity to express
my grateful thanks; and I am also indebted to Miss Dunlop for the
youthful unpublished portrait of Gordon which forms the frontispiece
of this volume, and also for that of the house in which he was born.
When I was first confronted with the difficulty that the unpublished
papers would not be accessible to me, I contemplated the abandonment
of my task; but a brief consideration made me conclude that, even
without these documents, I had special knowledge, derived from Sir
Henry Gordon and many other sources, that would enable me to deal with
all the more important passages of General Gordon's life. The result
must be judged from the Life itself; but I have not sought to make any
partisan attack on anyone, although, when I have felt compelled to
criticise and censure, I have done so with a full sense of
responsibility as well as with reluctance. I may be pardoned the
confidence I express when I say that I am sure nothing in the
unpublished documents will affect the main conclusions to which I have
come on the Khartoum mission, its inception and disastrous close.
I am permitted by the courtesy of the proprietors of _The Times_ to
reproduce in these pages the several articles and letters which
originally appeared in the columns of that paper.
It is a personal matter, of no interest except to myself, but I should
like to state that the work would have been out much sooner but for a
long and serious illness.
DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER
_29th August 1896._
CONTENTS.
VOLUME I.
CHAP. PAGE
I. BIRTH AND EARLY LIFE 1
II. THE CRIMEA, DANUBE, AND ARMENIA 16
III. THE CHINA WAR 45
IV. THE TAEPING REBELLION 61
V. THE EVER-VICTORIOUS ARMY 78
VI. GRAVESEND AND GALATZ 127
VII. THE FIRST NILE MISSION 141
ILLUSTRATIONS.
PORTRAIT OF GENERAL GORDON, TAKEN SOON AFTER THE CRIMEA _Frontispiece_
HOUSE IN WHICH GENERAL GORDON WAS BORN _To face page_ 16
THE LIFE OF GORDON.
CHAPTER I.
BIRTH AND EARLY LIFE.
Charles George Gordon was born on 28th January 1833, at No. 1 Kemp
Terrace, Woolwich Common, where his father, an officer in the Royal
Artillery, was quartered at the time. The picture given elsewhere of
this house will specially interest the reader as the birthplace of
Gordon. It still stands, as described by Gordon's father in a private
memoir, at the corner of Jackson's Lane, on Woolwich Common.
The name "Gordon" has baffled the etymologists, for there is every
reason to believe that the not inappropriate connection with the
Danish word for a spear is due to a felicitous fancy rather than to
any substantial reality. There is far more justification for the
opinion that the name comes through a French source than from a
Danish. The Gorduni were a leading clan of Cæsar's most formidable
opponents, the Nervi; a Duke Gordon charged among the peers of
Charlemagne; and the name is not unknown at the present day in the
Tyrol. The "Gordium" of Phrygia and the "Gordonia" of Macedonia are
also names that suggest an Eastern rather than a Northern origin.
History strengthens this supposition and entirely disposes of the
Danish hypothesis. The first bearer of the name Gordon appeared in
Scotland at far too near a date to the Danish descents upon that
country to encourage the view that he was a member of that most
bitterly hated race. Nowhere were the Danes more hated or less
successful than in Scotland, yet we are asked to believe that the
founder of one of the most powerful families in that kingdom belonged
to this alien and detested people. The silence itself of the
chronicler sufficiently refutes the idea that the first Gordon was a
renegade or a traitor, as he must have been if he were a Dane.
In all probability the first Gordon, who helped Malcolm Canmore, and
received in return a large grant of lands in Berwick, which became
known as the Gordon country, was one of the many Norman knights
attracted to the Court of Edward the Confessor. Accepting for the
occasion the popular legendary version of Shakespeare, rather than the
corrected account of modern historians, he may be supposed to have
found his way north to the camp of Siward, where the youthful and
exiled Scotch Prince had sought shelter from Macbeth, and it is no
undue stretch of fancy to suggest that he took his part in the
memorable overthrow of that usurper at Dunsinane, and thus obtained
the favour of his successor. The growth of the Gordon family in place
and power was rapid. To the lands on the borders was soon added the
Huntly country on Deeside, where Aboyne Castle now stands, and in a
very short period the Gordons ranked among the most powerful and
warlike clans of Scotland. As Sir Walter Scott wrote of Adam Gordon,
in words which might be appropriately applied to the subject of this
biography:
"'Tis a name which ne'er hath been dishonour'd,
And never will, I trust--most surely never
By such a youth as thou!"
Be its remote origin what it may, no name has appeared more
prominently or more honourably in the British Army Lists during the
last century and a half than that of Gordon. One of the most famous of
our regiments bears and has nobly upheld the name. In honourable and
friendly rivalry with the equally numerous and equally distinguished
clans of Grant and Cameron, the Gordons have figured on every
battlefield from Minden to Candahar, thus establishing at the same
time the political wisdom of Chatham, who first turned the Highlanders
from a cause of danger into a source of strength, and the military
ardour and genius of their own race. Thus it came to pass that the
spirit of remote warlike ages was perpetuated, and that the profession
of arms continued to be the most natural one for any bearer of the
name Gordon. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the
practice of his nearest relations, as well as the traditions of his
race, marked out Charles Gordon for a soldier's career.
Passing over an uncertain connection with the General Peter Gordon,
who rose high in the Russian service under Peter the Great, the
nearest direct ancestor of whom we can speak with absolute confidence
was Charles Gordon's great-grandfather David Gordon, who served as a
lieutenant in Lascelles' regiment of foot--afterwards the 47th
Regiment--at the battle of Prestonpans. Although the majority of the
clans were still loyal to the Stuarts, it seems from this that some of
them had entered the Hanoverian service probably in that most
distinguished regiment, the First Royal Scots, which a few years
before Culloden had fought gallantly at Fontenoy. At Prestonpans David
Gordon had the bad fortune to be made prisoner by the forces of
Charles Edward, and he found on the victorious side the whole of the
Gordon clan, under the command of Sir William Gordon of Park, a
younger son of the Earl of Huntly. As he was able to claim kindred
with Sir William, David Gordon received better treatment than he might
have expected, and in a short time was allowed to go free, either on
an exchange of prisoners or more probably on his parole. This incident
is specially interesting, because, after making every allowance for
the remoteness and vagueness of the old Highland custom of cousinship,
it seems to bring Charles Gordon's ancestry into sufficiently close
relationship with the main Gordon stem of the Huntlys. After his
release David Gordon does not appear to have taken any further part in
the war which terminated at Culloden, and he emigrated shortly
afterwards to North America, where his death is recorded as having
taken place at a comparatively early age at Halifax in the year 1752.
That he came of gentle blood is also proved by the fact that the Duke
of Cumberland stood sponsor to his son, who bore the Duke's names of
William Augustus. This second Gordon, of the particular branch that
has interest for us, also entered the army, and held a commission in
several regiments. The most memorable event in his life was his taking
part in Wolfe's decisive victory on the heights of Abraham. In 1773 he
married a lady, Miss Anna Maria Clarke, whose brother was rector of
Hexham in Northumberland, and by her had a family of four daughters
and three sons. Of the latter, two died at an early age, and only the
youngest, William Henry, born in 1786, survived to manhood. He is
especially interesting to us, because he was the father of General
Gordon.
Like his father and grandfather, William Henry Gordon chose the
profession of a soldier, and entered the Royal Artillery. He saw a
great deal of active service, being with his corps in the Peninsula
and at Maida, commanding at a later period the Artillery at Corfu and
Gibraltar, and attaining before his death in 1865 the rank of
Lieutenant-General. He was also connected with the Woolwich Arsenal as
Director of the Carriage Department. He has been described as an
excellent officer if a somewhat strict disciplinarian, and his firm
character of noble integrity lived again in his sons. He married, in
1817, Elizabeth, the daughter of Samuel Enderby, a merchant whaler,
one of those west country worthies who carried on the traditions of
Elizabeth to the age of Victoria. It would not be possible to present
a complete picture of Gordon's mother, and therefore none will be
attempted here; but all the available evidence agrees in describing
her as a paragon of women, and as having exercised an exceptional
influence over her children. Gordon himself bore the most expressive
testimony to her virtues and memory when, long years afterwards, he
closed an exordium on the filial affection due to a mother with the
outburst--"Oh! how my mother loved me!"
Such in brief were the forebears of the hero who comes next after
Nelson in national veneration. To understand him and his career, it
must be remembered that he came of a gallant race, with a quick sense
of honour, seeing clearly the obvious course of duty, and never
hesitating in its fulfilment. These qualities were not peculiar to the
man, but inherited from his race, and as they had never been
contaminated by the pursuit of wealth in any form, they retained the
pristine vigour and fire of a chivalrous and noble age. What was
personal and peculiar to Charles Gordon had to be evolved by
circumstance and the important occurrences with which it was his lot
to be associated throughout his military and public career, but his
soldierly talent and virtue must be mainly assigned to the traditions
and practice of his ancestors.
Of the five sons of General William Henry Gordon and Elizabeth
Enderby, Charles George Gordon was the fourth. His eldest brother,
Henry William Gordon, born in 1818, had entered the army, first in the
8th Regiment, and transferred in a short time to the 59th, when, at
the early age of ten, Charles Gordon was sent off to school at
Taunton. The selection of this school in the western country was due
to the head-master, Mr Rogers, being a brother of a governess in the
Gordon family. Little is known of his early childhood beyond the fact
that he had lived, before he was ten, at Corfu, where his father held
a command for some years. The Duke of Cambridge has publicly stated
that he recollects, when quartered at Corfu at this period, having
seen a bright and intelligent boy who occupied the room next to his
own, and who subsequently became General Gordon. At Taunton Gordon
remained during the greater part of five years, enjoying the
advantages of one of the most excellent grammar schools in the West of
England, and although he failed to make any special mark as a scholar,
I find that, whether on account of his later fame or for some special
characteristic that marked him out from the general run of boys, his
name is still remembered there by something more than the initials cut
upon his desk. If he distinguished himself in anything it was in
map-making and drawing, and he exhibited the same qualifications to
the end of his career. How careful and excellent the grounding at
Taunton school must have been was shown by the fact that, after one
year's special coaching at Mr Jefferies' school at Shooter's Hill,
Gordon passed direct into the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. It
is noteworthy that during the whole of the period we are now
approaching, he never showed the least tendency to extravagance, and
his main anxiety seems to have been to save his parents all possible
expense, more especially because they had a large family of daughters.
To the end of his life, and in each successive post, Gordon was the
slave of duty. At this time, and during the years that follow, down to
the Chinese campaigns, his guiding thought was how to save his family
the smallest expense on his account, and yet at the same time to hold
his head high, and to show himself worthy of his race.
Gordon entered the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich in 1848, when he
had not completed his sixteenth year, and during the four years he
remained there he gave some evidence of the qualities that
subsequently distinguished him, at the same time that he showed a
lightness of disposition which many will think at strange variance
with the gravity and even solemnity of his later years. Among his
fellow-students he was not distinguished by any special or exclusive
devotion to study. He was certainly no bookworm, and he was known
rather for his love of sport and boisterous high spirits than for
attention to his lessons or for a high place in his class. More than
once he was involved in affairs that, if excusable and natural on the
score of youth, trenched beyond the borders of discipline, and the
stories of life at the Academy that he recited for many years after he
left were not exactly in harmony with the popular idea of the ascetic
of Mount Carmel.
As the reader treasures up the boyish escapades of Nelson and Clive,
so will enduring interest be felt in those outbreaks of the boy
Gordon, which made him the terror of his superiors. They are recorded
on the unimpeachable evidence of his elder brother, and some of them
were even narrated by Gordon himself to his niece nearly thirty years
after they happened. Sir Henry is the writer.
"Charles Gordon with a brother (William Augustus) more unruly
than himself, finding the time hang heavily upon their hands
during the vacation, employed themselves in various ways. Their
father's house (at Woolwich) was opposite to that of the
Commandant of the Garrison, and was overrun with mice. These were
caught, the Commandant's door quietly opened, and the mice were
transferred to new quarters. In after life (that is in 1879, when
in the Soudan) Charles Gordon wrote to one of his nieces: 'I am
glad to hear the race of true Gordons is not extinct. Do you not
regret the Arsenal and its delights? You never, any of you, made
a proper use of the Arsenal workmen as we did. They used to
neglect their work for our orders, and turned out some splendid
squirts--articles that would wet you through in a minute. As for
the crossbows we had made, they were grand with screws. One
Sunday afternoon twenty-seven panes of glass were broken in the
large storehouses. They were found to have been perforated with a
small hole (ventilation), and Captain Soady nearly escaped a
premature death; a screw passed his head, and was as if it had
been screwed into the wall which it had entered. Servants were
kept at the door with continual bell-ringings. Your uncle Freddy
(a younger brother) was pushed into houses, the bell rung, and
the door held to prevent escape. Those were the days of the
Arsenal.'"
Sir Henry continues:
"But what Charles Gordon considered as his greatest achievement
was one that he in after years often alluded to. At this time
(1848) the senior class of Cadets, then called the Practical
Class, were located in the Royal Arsenal, and in front of their
halls of study there were earthworks upon which they were
practised from time to time in profiling and other matters. The
ins and outs of these works were thoroughly well known to Charles
Gordon and his brother, who stole out at night--but we will leave
him to tell his own story. He says: 'I forgot to tell----of how
when Colonel John Travers of the Hill Folk (he lived on Shooter's
Hill) was lecturing to the Arsenal Cadets in the evening, a crash
was heard, and every one thought every pane of glass was broken;
small shot had been thrown. However, it was a very serious
affair, for like the upsetting of a hive, the Cadets came out,
and only darkness, speed, and knowledge of the fieldworks thrown
up near the lecture-room enabled us to escape. That was before I
entered the curriculum. The culprits were known afterwards, and
for some time avoided the vicinity of the Cadets. I remember it
with horror to this day, for no mercy would have been shown by
the Pussies, as the Cadets were called.'"
After he entered the Academy the same love of fun and practical joking
characterised him. Sir Henry writes: "After he had been some time at
the Academy and earned many good-conduct badges, an occasion arose
when it became necessary to restrain the Cadets in leaving the
dining-hall, the approach to which was by a narrow staircase. At the
top of this staircase stood the senior corporal, with outstretched
arms, facing the body of Cadets. This was too much for Charlie Gordon,
who, putting his head down, butted with it, and catching the officer
in the pit of the stomach not only sent him down the stairs, but
through the glass door beyond. The officer jumped up unhurt, and
Gordon was placed in confinement and nearly dismissed.
"Upon another occasion, when he was near his commission, a great deal
of bullying was going on, and in order to repress it a number of the
last comers were questioned, when one of them said that Charlie Gordon
had on one occasion hit him on the head with a clothesbrush. The lad
admitted it was not a severe blow; nevertheless Charlie Gordon was for
this slight offence put back six months for his commission, which
turned out well in the end, since it secured for him a second
lieutenancy in the Royal Engineers in place of the Royal Artillery."
This alteration in the branch of the service to which he was attached
was due to his own act. He decided that, as his contemporaries would
be put ahead of him, he would work for the Engineers instead of the
Artillery.
Even to the end of his life there were two sides to his character.
Private grief, much disappointment, and a long solitary existence,
contributed to make him a melancholy philosopher, and a sometimes
austere critic of a selfish world, but beneath this crust were a
genial and generous disposition that did not disdain the lighter side
of human nature, a heart too full of kindness to cherish wrath for
long, and an almost boyish love of fun that could scarcely be
repressed. If this was the individual in his quieter and contemplative
moods, an energy that never tired, and a warlike spirit that only
needed the occasion to blaze forth, revealed the man of action. It may
be pronounced a paradox to say so, but to the end of his life the true
Gordon was more of the soldier than the saint.
Even in the midst of his escapades at the Academy, something of the
spirit of the future hero revealed itself. However grave the offence
or heavy the punishment, he was never backward in taking his share--or
more than his share--of the blame for any scrape into which he and his
friends were brought by their excessive high spirits. On more than one
occasion his ardour and sense of justice resulted in his being made
the scapegoat of worse offenders, and it seems probable that he
generally bore more than his proper share of the blame and punishment
for acts of insubordination. But there were limits to his capacity of
suffering and sense of guilt, and when one of his superiors declared
that he "would never make an officer," he touched a point of honour,
and Gordon's vigorous and expressive reply was to tear the epaulettes
from his shoulder and throw them at his superior's feet. In this
incident the reader will not fail to see a touch and forecast of
greatness. He was ever willing to pay the penalty of youthful
indiscretion, but he was sensitive to the reproach of honour, and his
exuberant spirits detracted in no respect from his sense of the
nobility of his profession. His earnestness saved him from the
frivolity into which a light heart and good health might have led him,
and compensated for his disinclination to devote all his spare time to
the severer studies of his college.
On June 23rd, 1852, nearly four years after he entered the Royal
Military Academy, Charles Gordon passed out with the rank of second
lieutenant in the Royal Engineers. Notwithstanding some remissness in
his work, he had passed through all his examinations--"Those terrible
examinations," as he said long years afterwards--"how I remember them!
Sometimes I dream of them,"--and in accordance with the regulations in
force he was sent to Chatham for the purpose of completing there his
technical training as an engineer officer. Chatham, as is well known,
is the Headquarters of the Royal Engineer Corps, to which it stands in
the same relation as Woolwich to the Artillery. There Gordon remained
until February 1854, constantly engaged on field work and in making
plans and surveys, at which his old skill as a draughtsman soon made
him exceptionally competent. This kind of work was also far more
congenial to him than the cramming at the Academy, and he soon gained
the reputation of being an intelligent and hard-working subaltern. In
the month named he attained the grade of full lieutenant, and on
taking his step he was at once ordered to Pembroke Dock, then one of
the busiest naval dêpots and most important military arsenals in the
country. The war clouds were already lowering over Eastern Europe, and
although all hope of maintaining peace had not been abandoned,
arrangements were in progress for the despatch, if necessary, of a
strong naval and military expedition to the Black Sea.
At Pembroke, Gordon was at once employed on the construction of the
new fortifications and batteries considered necessary for the defence
of so important a position, and in one of his letters home he wrote:
"I have been very busy in doing plans for another fort, to be built at
the entrance of the haven. I pity the officers and men who will have
to live in these forts, as they are in the most desolate places, seven
miles from any town, and fifteen from any conveyance." Seclusion and
solitude had evidently no charms for him at that period. In another
letter about this time he wrote expressing his relief at being "free
from the temptations of a line regiment," and concluded with the
self-depreciatory remark that he was "such a miserable wretch that he
was sure to be led away." In yet another letter from Pembroke, written
not many weeks after his arrival, he reveals something of the deep
religious feeling which was no doubt greatly strengthened by his
experiences in the Crimea, and which became stronger and more
pronounced as years went on. In writing to his favourite sister in the
summer of 1854, he gives the following interesting bit of biographical
information: "You know I never was confirmed. When I was a cadet I
thought it was a useless sin, as I did not intend to alter (not that
it was in my power to be converted when I chose). I, however, took my
first sacrament on Easter Day (16th April 1854) and have communed ever
since."
Charles Gordon was still occupied on the Pembroke fortifications when
war broke out with Russia on the Eastern Question. His father was at
the time stationed at Gibraltar in command of the Royal Artillery, and
was never employed nearer the scene of hostilities during the war. But
his two elder brothers were at the front--the eldest, the late Sir
Henry Gordon, at Balaclava, where he served in the Commissariat, and
the next brother, the late General Enderby Gordon, with his battery
under Lord Raglan. At the battle of the Alma, fought on 20th September
1854, Enderby Gordon specially distinguished himself, for he worked
one of the two guns of Turner's Battery, which exercised such a
decisive influence on the fortunes of the day. Readers of Kinglake's
"History" will remember that it was the flank fire of these two guns
which compelled the Russian battery of sixteen guns on the Causeway to
retire and thus expose the Russian front to our attack. It is a little
curious to find that while one brother was thus distinguishing himself
in the first battle of the war, another was writing from Pembroke Dock
as follows: "---- says there were no artillery engaged in the battle
of the Alma, so that Enderby was safe out of that." Enderby Gordon
also distinguished himself at Inkerman, where he acted as aide-de-camp
to General Strangeways. He subsequently earned the reputation of a
good officer during the Indian Mutiny, and when he died he had, like
his father, attained the rank of Lieutenant-General, and received
besides the Companionship of the Bath. One characteristic incident has
been recorded of him. As he commanded a column in India, he had only
to ask for promotion to obtain it; this he declined to do, because he
would thus have stepped over a friend.
In General Gordon's own letters from the Crimea there are frequent
references to his eldest brother, Henry Gordon, a man of whom it may
be said here that the best was never publicly known, for during a long
and varied career, first in the combative branch of the army as an
officer of the 59th Regiment, and then as a non-combative officer in
the Ordnance Department, he showed much ability, but had few
opportunities of special distinction. In several of General Gordon's
transactions Sir Henry was closely mixed up, especially with the Congo
mission; and I should like to say, of my own knowledge, that he was
thoroughly in sympathy with all his projects for the suppression of
the slave trade, had mastered the voluminous Blue Books and official
papers, from the time of Ismail to the dark days of Khartoum, in so
thorough a manner that the smallest detail was fixed in his brain, and
had so completely assimilated his brother's views that an hour's
consultation with him was almost as fertile a source of inspiration
as it would have been with the General himself. I believe that the
original cause of Sir Henry's influence over his brother was that he
disclaimed having any, and that he most carefully avoided any attempt
to force his advice on his younger brother, as so many of our elders
deem to be their right and prerogative. General Gordon was a bad
listener to advice at any time or from anyone. He acted almost
entirely on his own judgment, and still more on his own impulse. His
first thoughts were his best thoughts, or, perhaps, as Tennyson says,
"his third thoughts, which are a maturer first." Sir Henry knew the
ingrained and unalterable character of his brother, and adapted
himself to it, partly through affection and partly through admiration,
for in his eyes Charles Gordon was the truest of heroes. No man ever
possessed a truer or more solicitous friend than General Gordon found
in him. Sir Henry was thoroughly devoted to him and his interests, and
carried out all his wishes and instructions to the very letter.
Having said this much about the relations between Gordon and his
brother, it would be an inexcusable omission to pass over the still
more striking sympathy and affection that united him with his sisters.
From his first appointment into the service he corresponded on
religious and serious subjects with his elder sister, the late Miss
Gordon, who only survived her brother a few years, with remarkable
regularity, and as time went on the correspondence became more, rather
than less constant, and in his letters to her were to be found his
most secret thoughts and aspirations. Most of the letters from the
Crimea were addressed to his mother; but, in an interesting volume
published in 1888, Miss Gordon presented the world with the remainder
of her brother's letters, spread over thirty active and eventful
years. One of General Gordon's most cherished objects, resembling in
that, as in other respects, Lord Lawrence, was to add to the comfort
of his sisters, and when he left England on his last fatal mission to
Egypt, his will, made the night before he left for Brussels, provided
that all he possessed should be held in trust for the benefit of his
well-beloved sister, Mary Augusta, and that it was to pass only on her
death to the heirs he therein designated. It is not necessary to enter
into fuller particulars on this subject, but it may be proper to say
that his affection for his other sisters was not less warm or less
reciprocated. Of his six sisters, of whom two alone survive, it is
only necessary to refer here (in addition to Miss Gordon) to the
youngest, who married Dr Andrew Moffitt, who was not merely head
medical officer with the Ever Victorious Army, but Gordon's right-hand
man in China. Dr Moffitt was a man of high courage; on one occasion he
saved Gordon's life when a Taeping attempted to murder him in his
tent, and an English officer, who served with the Force, has described
him in these two lines: "He was imbued with the same spirit as his
future brother-in-law; he was a clever Chinese scholar and an A1
surgeon." Dr Moffitt, who received a gold medal and order, besides the
Red Button of a Mandarin, from the Chinese Government for his
brilliant services against the Taepings, died prematurely. To say less
about these family relations would be an omission; to say more would
be an intrusion, and they may be left with the reflection that as no
one who knew him will dispute the depth and the strength of General
Gordon's sentiments as a friend, his feelings towards the members of
his own family cannot well be impugned.
Some account of the personal appearance of General Gordon will be
deemed necessary, and may be appropriately given at this stage,
although the subject is a dangerous one, because so very few people
form the same impression about any one's appearance. There has been
much discussion as to General Gordon's exact height, and I have been
to much pains to obtain some decisive evidence on the subject.
Unfortunately no such records as to height, etc., are kept about
officers, and my search proved fruitless, more especially as the
records at Woolwich for the period required were destroyed by fire
some years ago. The best evidence I have obtained is that of General
Gordon's tailors, Messrs Batten & Sons, of Southampton, who write: "We
consider, by measurements in our books, that General Gordon was 5 ft.
9 in." As he had contracted a slight stoop, or, more correctly
speaking, carried his head thrown forward, he looked in later life
much less than his real height. The quotations at the end of this
chapter will show some difference of opinion. His figure was very
slight, but his nervous energy could never be repressed, and he was
probably stronger than his appearance suggested. The suggestion of
delicate health in his look and aspect, arising, as he was led to
believe, but erroneously, from _angina pectoris_, or some mysterious
chest pain, may have induced a belief that he was not robust, but this
seems to have been baseless, because throughout his life, whether in
the trenches of Sebastopol, the marshes of the Yangtse delta, or the
arid plains of the Soudan, he appears to have equally enjoyed
excellent health.
The only specific mention of serious illness was during his stay in
the Soudan as Governor-General, when the chest pains became acute.
These were at length traced to an enlarged liver, and perhaps the
complaint was aggravated by excessive smoking. In the desert, far
removed from medical aid, he obtained much relief from the use of
Warburg's Tincture.
In his ordinary moods there was nothing striking about the face. The
colour of the eye was too light--yet the glance was as keen as a
rapier, and, as the little Soudan boy Capsune, whom he had educated,
said, "Gordon's eyes looked you through and through"--the features
were not sufficiently marked, the carriage of the man was too
diffident and modest to arrest or detain attention, and the
explanation of the universal badness of the numerous photographs taken
of him at all stages of his career is probably to be found in the
deficiency of colouring and contrast. Everything in his appearance
depended on expression, and expression generally baffles the
photographer. Perhaps the least objectionable of all these
portraitures is the steel plate in Dr Birkbeck Hill's volume on
"Gordon in Central Africa," and that not because it is a faithful
likeness, but because it represents a bust that might well be imagined
to belong to a hero. It was only when some great idea or some subject
in which he was interested seized his imagination that one could
perceive that the square jaw denoted unshakable resolution, and that
the pale blue eye could flash with the fire of a born leader of men.
In tranquil moments no one would have been struck by a casual glance
at his face, but these were rare, for in congenial company, and with
persons he trusted, Gordon was never tranquil, pacing up and down the
room, with only brief stops to impress a point on his listener by
holding his arm for a few seconds, and looking at him intently to see
if he followed with understanding and interest the drift of his
remarks, lighting cigarette after cigarette to enable him to curb his
own impetuosity, and demonstrating in every act and phrase the truth
of his own words that "inaction was intolerable to him." Such was the
man as I recall him on the all too few occasions when it was my
privilege and good fortune to receive him during his brief visits to
London of late years, and to hear from him his confidential views on
the questions in which he took so deep an interest. One final remark
must be hazarded about the most remarkable point after all in General
Gordon's personality. I refer to his voice. It was singularly sweet,
and for a man modulated in a very low tone, but there was nothing
womanish about it, as was the case with his able contemporary Sir
Bartle Frere, whose voice was distinctly feminine in its timbre. I
know of no other way to describe it than to say that it seemed to me
to express the thorough and transparent goodness of the speaker, and
the exquisite gentleness of his nature. If angels speak with the human
voice, Gordon's tone must have borne affinity to theirs.
In completing this subject it may be appropriate to quote a few of the
more important and interesting descriptions of his personal
appearance, contributed by those who had opportunities of seeing him.
An officer, who served with General Gordon in China, describes his
first interview with him in the following words:--
"C---- introduced me to a light-built, active, wiry, middle-sized
man of about thirty-two years of age, in the undress uniform of
the Royal Engineers. The countenance bore a pleasant frank
appearance, eyes light blue, with a fearless look in them, hair
crisp and inclined to curl, conversation short and decided. This
was Major C. G. Gordon."
General Sir Gerald Graham who, to use his own words, was Gordon's
"school-fellow at Woolwich, his comrade in the Crimea and China, and
for many years past a more or less regular correspondent," has put on
record the following interesting description of the hero, and it
should not be forgotten that, excepting his companion, Colonel Donald
Stewart, and Mr Power, General Graham was the last Englishman to see
General Gordon in this world.
"Not over 5 feet 9 inches in height, but of compact build, his
figure and gait characteristically expressed resolution and
strength. His face, although in itself unpretending, was one that
in the common phrase 'grew upon you.' Time had not streaked with
grey the crisp, curly brown hair of his youth and traced lines of
care on his ample forehead and strong clear face, bronzed with
exposure to the tropical sun. His usual aspect was serene and
quiet, and although at times a ruffling wave of uncontrollable
impatience or indignation might pass over him, it did not disturb
him long. The depth and largeness of Gordon's nature, which
inspired so much confidence in others, seemed to afford him a
sense of inner repose, so that outer disturbance was to him like
the wind that ruffles the surface of the sea, but does not affect
its depths. The force and beauty of Gordon's whole expression
came from within, and as it were irradiated the man, the steady,
truthful gaze of the blue-grey eyes seeming a direct appeal from
the upright spirit within. Gordon's usual manner charmed by its
simple, unaffected courtesy, but although utterly devoid of
self-importance he had plenty of quiet dignity, or even of
imperious authority at command when required. With his friends he
had a fund of innocent gaiety that seemed to spring from his
impulsiveness, while his strong sense of humour often enabled him
to relieve his impatience or indignation by a good-natured
sarcasm."
Two further descriptions by men who served under him at Gravesend in
the interval between the Taeping War and the first mission to the
Soudan will suffice to complete the personal impressions that may help
the reader to form some idea of the appearance of General Gordon. The
first is from the pen of Mr W. E. Lilley, who brought out a special
volume on Gordon at Gravesend.
"In Colonel Gordon's appearance there was nothing particularly
striking. He was rather under the average height, of slight
proportions, and with little of the military bearing in his
carriage, so that one would hardly have imagined that this
kindly, unassuming gentleman was already one who had attracted
the notice of his superiors by his courage and zeal in the
Crimean War, and who had won lasting renown by subduing in China
one of the greatest revolts the world had ever seen. This last
exploit had gained for him the name by which he was from that
time best known, viz. "Chinese Gordon." The greatest
characteristic of his countenance was the clear blue eye, which
seemed to have a magical power over all who came within its
influence. It read you through and through; it made it impossible
for you to tell him anything but the truth, it inspired your
confidence, it kindled with compassion at any story of distress,
and it sparkled with good humour at anything really funny or
witty. From its glance you knew at once that at any risk he would
keep his promise, that you might trust him with anything and
everything, and that he would stand by you if all other friends
deserted you."
The other impression, formed under precisely the same circumstances,
is that of Mr Arthur Stannard, recorded in the _Nineteenth Century_ of
April 1885.
"The next moment I was looking into Chinese Gordon's eyes. What
eyes they were! Keen and clear, filled with the beauty of
holiness, bright with an unnatural brightness, their expression
one of settled feverishness, the colour blue-grey as is the sky
on a bitter March morning. In spite of the beautiful goodness of
his heart and the great breadth of his charity, Gordon was far
from possessing a placid temperament or from being patient over
small things. Indeed his very energy and his single-mindedness
tended to make him impatient and irritable whenever any person or
thing interfered with his intentions or desires.... For a man of
his small stature his activity was marvellous--he seemed able to
walk every one else off their legs over rough ground or
smooth.... In Gordon strength and weakness were most
fantastically mingled. There was no trace of timidity in his
composition. He had a most powerful will. When his mind was made
up on a matter it never seemed to occur to him that there could
be anything more to say about it. Such was his superb confidence
in himself!"
When Gordon had been only a few months at Pembroke Dock he received
orders to proceed to Corfu, and believing it to be due to his father's
request, he wrote: "I suspect you used your influence to have me sent
there instead of to the Crimea. It is a great shame of you." But the
Fates were to be stronger than any private influence, for four days
after he wrote those lines he received fresh orders directing him to
leave for the Crimea without delay in charge of huts. It seems that
the change in his destination was due to Sir John Burgoyne, to whom he
had expressed the strongest wish to proceed to the scene of war. On
4th December 1854, he received his orders at Pembroke, on the 6th he
reported himself at the War Office, and in the evening of the same day
he was at Portsmouth. It was at first intended that he should go out
in a collier, but he obtained permission to proceed _viâ_ Marseilles,
which he pronounced "extremely lucky, as I am such a bad sailor." This
opinion was somewhat qualified later on when he found that the
Government did not prepay his passage, and he expressed the opinion
pretty freely, in which most people would concur, that "it is very
hard not to give us anything before starting." He left London on the
14th December, Marseilles in a French hired transport on the 18th, and
reached Constantinople the day after Christmas Day. He was not much
struck with anything he saw; pronounced Athens "very ugly and dirty,"
and the country around uncommonly barren; and was disappointed with
the far-famed view on approaching Constantinople. The professional
instinct displayed itself when he declared that the forts of the
Dardanelles did not appear to be very strong, as, although numerous,
they were open at the rear and overlooked by the heights behind. On
28th December Gordon left Constantinople in the _Golden Fleece_
transport conveying the 39th Regiment to Balaclava. The important huts
had not yet arrived in the collier from Portsmouth, but they could not
be far behind, and Gordon went on in advance. The huts, it may be
added, were built to contain twenty-four men, or two captains and four
subalterns, or two field-officers or one general, and the number of
these entrusted to the charge of Gordon was 320. These reinforcements
were the first sent out to mitigate the hardships the British Army
underwent during a campaign that the genius of Todleben and the
fortitude of his courageous garrison rendered far more protracted and
costly than had been anticipated.
[Illustration: THE HOUSE IN WHICH GENERAL GORDON WAS BORN, ON
WOOLWICH COMMON.]
CHAPTER II.
THE CRIMEA, DANUBE, AND ARMENIA.
Charles Gordon reached Balaclava on New Year's Day, 1855. He found
everyone engaged in foraging expeditions, that the siege of Sebastopol
excited no interest, that the road from the bay to the hill was like a
morass, and that a railway to traverse it was being slowly laid down.
Gordon remained about three weeks at Balaclava assisting in the
erection of huts, and in the conveyance of some of them to the front.
When this task was accomplished he was himself ordered to the
trenches, where his work could not fail to be more exciting and also
more dangerous than that upon which up to this he had been engaged.
Before following him it will be useful to summarise the leading events
that had taken place in the Crimea up to this date. War between
England and France on the one side, and Russia on the other, was
finally declared in March 1854, the allied forces landed in the Crimea
early in September 1854, and the first battle was fought on the Alma
stream on the 20th of that month. In that battle 60,000 allied
troops--20,000 English, 40,000 French--attacked 120,000 Russians in a
strong and well-chosen position. The result was a brilliant victory
for the allies, and there is no doubt that it was mainly won by the
dashing attack of the English Infantry. The losses were--French, 60
killed and 500 wounded; English, 362 killed and 1620 wounded, thus
furnishing clear evidence as to the force which bore the brunt of the
engagement. The Russian loss was computed to be not less than 6000, or
double that of the allies.
As the allied forces advanced towards Sebastopol the Russian Army
assumed the offensive. The brilliant and never-to-be-forgotten Cavalry
charges on 25th October, of the Light and Heavy Brigades, under
Cardigan and Scarlett respectively, at Balaclava in the valley that
stretched at the foot of the hills overlooking the bay of that name,
had not merely vindicated the reputation of English horsemen for dash
and daring, but had done something--at excessive cost, it is true--to
clear the advance for the whole army. When the Russians, assuming in
their turn the offensive, attacked our camps on the heights of
Inkerman, they were repulsed with heavy loss on both sides, and with
the result that more than six months elapsed before they again
ventured to show any inclination to attack in the open field, and then
only to meet with fresh discomfiture on the banks of the Tchernaya.
The battle of Inkerman was fought in the early morning of 5th
November, and again the brunt of the fighting fell on the English
army. The Russian General, Todleben, subsequently stated that he
reluctantly decided to attack the English camp instead of the French,
because "the English position seemed to be so very weak." Here again
the losses give no misleading idea of the proportionate share of the
two allied armies in the struggle. While the Russian loss was put down
in all at 11,000 men, the French lost 143 killed and 786 wounded; the
English, 597 killed and 1760 wounded.
The opinion has been confidently expressed that if a rapid advance and
attack had been made on Sebastopol immediately after Inkerman, the
fortress would have been easily captured; but both before and during
the siege the Russians made the best use of every respite the Allies
gave them, and this lost opportunity, if it was one, never recurred.
It will thus be seen that some of the most interesting incidents of
the war had passed before Gordon set foot in the Crimea, but for an
engineer officer the siege and capture of the fortress created by
Todleben under the fire of his foes presented the most attractive and
instructive phase of the campaign.
At this time the French army mustered about 100,000 men, the British
about 23,000, and the Russian garrison of Sebastopol 25,000. In
addition, there was a covering army, under the Grand Dukes and General
Liprandi, which, despite its losses at Inkerman, was probably not less
than 60,000 but the successive defeats at Alma, Balaclava, and
Inkerman had broken the confidence of the troops and reduced their
leaders to inaction. The batteries were nearly completed when Gordon
reached the front, and a good deal had already been written and said
about the hardships of the soldiers. Gordon was a man of few wants,
who could stand any amount of fatigue, and throughout his life he was
always disposed to think that soldiers should never complain. Writing
as late as 12th February 1855, when the worst of the winter was over,
he says: "There are really no hardships for the officers; the men are
the sufferers, and that is partly their own fault, as they are like
children, thinking everything is to be done for them. The French
soldier looks out for himself, and consequently fares much better."
Something of the same conclusion had been forced on him when on board
the French transport between Marseilles and Athens when he wrote: "The
poor French soldiers, of whom there were 320 on board without any
shelter, must have suffered considerably from cold; they had no
covering, and in spite of the wet, cold, and bad weather, they kept up
their health however, and their high spirits also, when our men would
have mutinied." And again, later on: "We have capital rations, and all
the men have warm clothing, and more than enough of that. They of
course grumble and growl a good deal. The contrast with the French in
this respect is not to our advantage." It must in fairness be
remembered that the worst of the maladministration was over before he
reached the scene, and that he came with those reinforcements, not
merely of men, but still more especially of supplies, which ended "the
winter troubles," and converted them into the sanguine hopes and views
of the spring.
Gordon was not long in the trenches before he came under fire, and the
account of his first experience of real warfare may be given in his
own words:--
"The night of February 14th I was on duty in the trenches, and if
you look at the plan I sent you and the small sketch enclosed I
will explain what I had to do. The French that night determined
to join their sentries on their right and our sentries on our
left, in advance of their and our trenches, so as to prevent the
Russians coming up the ravine, and then turning against our
flank. They determined to make a lodgment in the ruined house
marked _B_ on the sketch, and to run a trench up the hill to the
left of this, while I was told to make a communication by
rifle-pits from the caves _C_ to the ruined house _B_. I got,
after some trouble, eight men with picks and shovels, and asked
the captain of the advance trench to give me five double sentries
to throw out in advance. It was the first time he had been on
duty here; and as for myself, I never had, although I kept that
to myself. I led forward the sentries, going at the head of the
party, and found the sentries of the advance had not held the
caves, which they ought to have done after dark, so there was
just a chance of the Russians being in them. I went on, however,
and, though I did not like it, explored the caves almost alone.
We then left two sentries on the hill above the caves, and went
back, to get round and post two sentries below the caves.
However, just as soon as we showed ourselves outside the caves
and below them, bang! bang! went two rifles, the bullets hitting
the ground close to us. The sentries with me retired in a rare
state of mind, and my working party bolted, and were stopped with
great difficulty. What had really happened was this: It was not a
Russian attack, but the two sentries whom I had placed above the
caves _had fired at us_, lost their caps, and bolted to the
trench. Nothing after this would induce the sentries to go out,
so I got the working party to go forward with me. The Russians
had, on the report of our shots, sent us a shower of bullets,
their picket not being more than 150 yards away. I set the men to
work, and then went down to the bottom of the ravine, and found
the French in strength hard at work also. Having told them who we
were, I returned to the trench, where I met Colonel ---- of the
1st Royals. I warned him if he went out he would be sure to be
hit by our own sentries or the Russians. He would go, however,
and a moment afterwards was hit in the breast, the ball going
through his coats, slightly grazing his ribs, and passing out
again without hurting him. I stayed with my working party all
night, and got home very tired."
In further illustration of the confusion prevailing in the trenches at
night, he mentions in the same letter that while trying to find the
caves he missed his way, and "very nearly walked into the town by
mistake."
This was the more surprising because Gordon's intimate knowledge of
the trenches was remarkable and well known. The following testimony
given by Sir Charles Staveley affords striking proof that this
reputation was not undeserved:--
"I happened to mention to Charlie Gordon that I was field officer
for the day for command in the trenches next day, and, having
only just returned from sick leave, that I was ignorant of the
geography of our left attack. He said at once, 'Oh! come down
with me to-night after dark, and I will show you over the
trenches.' He drew me out a very clear sketch of the lines (which
I have now), and down I went accordingly. He explained every nook
and corner, and took me along outside our most advanced trench,
the bouquets (volleys of small shells fired from mortars) and
other missiles flying about us in, to me, a very unpleasant
manner, he taking the matter remarkably coolly."
The late Sir George Chesney, a very competent and discriminating
witness, gives evidence to the same effect:--
"In his humble position as an Engineer subaltern he attracted the
notice of his superiors, not merely by his energy and activity,
but by a special aptitude for war, developing itself amid the
trench work before Sebastopol in a personal knowledge of the
enemy's movements _such as no other officer attained_. We used to
send him to find out what new move the Russians were making."
The next incident of the siege described by Gordon occurred about a
week after his _baptême de feu_ in the caves. While the French were
somewhat deliberately making at Inkerman a battery for fifteen guns,
the Russians, partly in a spirit of bravado, threw up in a single
night a battery for nearly twenty guns immediately opposite, at a
distance of not more than 600 yards from the French. As this was made
in the open ground, it was a defiance which could not be tolerated,
and the French accordingly made their arrangements to assault it.
Kinglake has graphically described the surprise of the French when
they discovered this "white circlet or loop on the ground," and the
attempt made by three battalions, with two other battalions in
reserve, to capture it. A battalion of Zouaves, under the command of
Colonel Cere, carried it in fine style, but the Russian reserves came
up in great force, and their own reserves "declining to come to the
scratch," as Gordon laconically put it, the Zouaves were in their turn
compelled to fall back, with a loss of 200 killed. Encouraged by this
success, the Russians gave the French another surprise a few days
later, throwing up a second battery 300 yards further in advance of
the first "white circlet." These two batteries, mounting between them,
according to Kinglake, twenty-two guns, were finally strengthened and
equipped by 10th March, and although the French talked much of
storming them, nothing was done, much to Gordon's disgust. It was
while these operations were in progress that Charles Gordon had a
narrow escape of being killed. A shot from one of the Russian
rifle-pits "as nearly as possible did for me," he wrote; "the bullet
was fired not 180 yards off, and passed an inch above my nut into a
bank I was passing." His only comment on this is very characteristic:
"They are very good marksmen; their bullet is large and pointed."
This was the first but not the last escape he had during the siege.
One of his brothers, writing home some three months later, a few days
before the assault on the Redan, wrote as follows: "Charlie has had a
miraculous escape. The day before yesterday he saw the smoke from an
embrasure on his left and heard a shell coming, but did not see it. It
struck the ground about five yards in front of him and burst, not
touching him. If it had not burst it would have taken his head off."
Of this later shave Gordon himself says nothing, but he describes a
somewhat similar incident, which had, however, a fatal result. "We
lost one of our captains named Craigie by a splinter of a shell. The
shell burst above him, and by what is called chance struck him in the
back, killing him at once."
During the three months March, April, and May, the siege languished,
and Gordon apologises for the stupidity of his letters with the
graphic observation: "It is not my fault, as none of the three
nations--French, English, or Russian--will do anything."
At the end of May, however, there was a renewal of activity. General
Pelissier succeeded to the French command, and, unlike his
predecessors, made it his primary object to act in cordial
co-operation with the English commander. He was also in favour of an
energetic prosecution of the siege, with the view to an early
assault. All the batteries were by this time completed, and 588 guns,
with 700 rounds in readiness for each gun, were opposed to the 1174 in
the Russian fortress. It only remained to utilise this terrific force,
and at last orders were given for the commencement of what was known
as the third bombardment. After nearly two days' incessant firing the
French stormed the Mamelon and two advance redoubts. These were
successfully carried and held, at the same time that the English
stormed a position called the Quarries, close under the formidable
Redan. Of this bombardment Gordon gives in one of his letters a very
good description:--
"On the 6th we opened fire from all our batteries. I was on duty
in the trenches. I could distinctly see the Russians in the Redan
and elsewhere running about in great haste, and bringing up their
gunners to the guns. They must have lost immensely, as our shot
and shell continued to pour in upon them for hours without a
lull. Never was our fire so successful. Before seven we had
silenced a great many of their guns, while our loss was very
small--only one man killed and four wounded. I was struck
slightly with a stone from a round shot and stunned for a second,
which old Jones has persisted in returning as wounded. [It was,
notwithstanding, a real wound.] However, I am all right, so do
not think otherwise. Our fire was continued all night, and the
next day until four o'clock, when we opened with new batteries
much nearer, and our fire then became truly terrific. Fancy 1000
guns (which is the number of ourselves, the French, and Russians
combined) firing at once shells in every direction. On our side
alone we have thirty-nine 13" mortars. At half-past five three
rockets gave the signal for the French to attack the Mamelon and
the redoubts of Selingkinsk and Volhynia. They rushed up the
slope in full view of the allied armies. The Russians fired one
or two guns when the French were in the embrasures. We then saw
the Russians cut out on the other side, and the French after
them, towards the Malakoff Tower, which they nearly reached, but
were so punished by the guns of this work that they were obliged
to retire, the Russians in their turn chasing them through the
Mamelon into their own trenches. This was dreadful, as it had to
be assaulted again. The French, however, did so immediately, and
carried it splendidly. The redoubts of Volhynia and Selingkinsk
were taken easily on our side. In front of the right attack a
work called the Quarries had to be taken, which was done at the
same time as the Mamelon. The Russians cut out and ran, while our
men made their lodgment for our fellows. We were attacked four
times in the night, but held the work. If we had liked to
assault, I am sure we should have taken the place with little
loss, some of our men being close to the Redan. The French took
twenty guns and 400 prisoners, and found the Mamelon so traversed
as to have no difficulty in making their lodgment. We were driven
from the Quarries three times in the night, the Russians having
directed all their efforts against them. Our loss is supposed to
be 1000 killed and wounded. Nearly all our working party had to
be taken for fighting purposes. The attacking columns were 200
strong; one went to the right, and the other to the left of the
Quarries. The reserve consisted of 600 men. The Russians fought
desperately."
A further week was occupied with a heavy but desultory bombardment,
but at last on 17th June what is known as "the fourth bombardment"
proper began, and after it had continued for about twenty-four hours,
orders were given for the assault to be made by the French on the
Malakoff and the English on the Redan on the 18th June, a date ever
memorable in military annals. The silence of the Russian guns induced
a belief that the allied fire had overpowered theirs, and in
consequence orders for the attack were given twenty-four hours sooner
than had been intended. Kinglake, in his exhaustive History, has shown
how this acted adversely on the chances of the assault, because the
Russian gunners had really only reserved their fire, and also
especially because the Redan, which we had to attack under the
original arrangement between Lord Raglan and General Pelissier, had
hardly suffered any damage from the bombardment. General Gordon's long
account of this memorable assault will long be referred to as a
striking individual experience:--
"I must now commence my long story of our attempted assault. To
take up my account from 14th June, which was the last letter I
wrote to you, Seeley, my fellow-subaltern at Pembroke, arrived on
the 15th, and joined the right. On the evening of the 16th it was
rumoured we were to commence firing again in the morning. I was
on duty on the morning of the 17th, and I went down at half-past
two A.M. At 3 A.M. all our batteries opened, and throughout the
day kept up a terrific fire. The Russians answered slowly, and
after a time their guns almost ceased. I mentioned in my report
that I thought they were reserving their fire. [If this view had
only been taken by the Generals, especially Pelissier, a dreadful
waste of life would have been averted, and the result might have
proved a brilliant success.] We did not lose many men. I remained
in the trenches until 7 P.M.--rather a long spell--and on coming
up dined, and found an order to be at the night attack at twelve
midnight on June 17 and 18. I was attached to Bent's column, with
Lieutenants Murray and Graham, R.E., and we were to go into the
Redan at the Russians' right flank. Another column, under Captain
de Moleyns and Lieutenants Donnelly and James, R.E., was to go
in at the angle of the salient; and another under Captain Jesse,
Lieutenants Fisher and Graves, was to go in at the Russian left
flank. We passed along in our relative positions up to the
advanced trench, which is 200 yards from the Redan, where we
halted until the signal for the attack should be given from the
eight-gun battery, where Lord Raglan, Sir G. Brown, and General
Jones were.
"About 3 A.M. the French advanced on the Malakoff Tower in three
columns, and ten minutes after this our signal was given. The
Russians then opened with a fire of grape, which was terrific.
They mowed down our men in dozens, and the trenches, being
confined, were crowded with men, who foolishly kept in them
instead of rushing over the parapet of our trenches, and by
coming forward in a mass, trusting to some of them at least being
able to pass through untouched to the Redan, where of course,
once they arrived, the artillery could not reach them, and every
yard nearer would have diminished the effect of the grape by
giving it less space for spreading. We could then have moved up
our supports and carried the place.
"Unfortunately, however, our men dribbled out of the ends of the
trenches, ten and twenty at a time, and as soon as they appeared
they were cleared away. Some hundred men, under Lieutenant
Fisher, got up to the abattis, but were not supported, and
consequently had to retire.
"About this time the French were driven from the Malakoff Tower,
which I do not think they actually entered, and Lord Raglan very
wisely would not renew the assault, as the Redan could not be
held with the Malakoff Tower in the hands of the Russians.
Murray, poor fellow, went out with the skirmishers of our
column--he in red, and they in green. He was not out a minute
when he was carried back with his arm shattered with grape.
Colonel Tylden called for me, and asked me to look after him,
which I did, and as I had a tourniquet in my pocket I put it on.
He bore it bravely, and I got a stretcher and had him taken back.
He died three hours afterwards. I am glad to say that Dr Bent
reports he did not die from loss of blood, but from the shock,
not being very strong.
"A second after Murray had gone to the rear, poor Tylden, struck
by grape in the legs, was carried back, and although very much
depressed in spirits he is doing well. Jesse was killed at the
abattis--shot through the head--and Graves was killed further in
advance than any one. We now sat still waiting for orders, and
the Russians amusing themselves by shelling us from mortars. When
we appeared, the Russians lined their parapets as thick as
possible, and seemed to be expecting us to come on. They flew two
flags on the Malakoff Tower the whole time in defiance of us.
About ten o'clock some of the regiments got orders to retire.
We, the Royal Engineers, however, stayed until twelve o'clock,
when we were told that the assault was not to be renewed, and
that we could go. Thus ended our assault, of the result of which
we felt so sure. The first plan made was that we should fire for
three hours and go in at six o'clock, but the French changed it,
and would not wait until we had silenced the enemy's artillery
fire, and so we attacked at 3 A.M. My father can tell the effect
of grape from twelve 68-pounders and 32-pounders at 200 yards
upon a column; but whatever may be the effect, I am confident
that if we had left the trenches in a mass, some of us would have
survived and reached the Redan, which, once reached, the Highland
Brigade and Guards would have carried all before them, and the
place would have fallen. General Jones was struck by a stone in
the forehead, but not much hurt. I believe it is said that the
trenches were too high to get over. As the scaling-ladders were
carried over them, this can hardly be sustained. So much for
_our_ assault.
"Now for the assault which was made from the left attack. General
Eyre had an order given him to make a feint at the head of the
creek if we were successful at the Redan; however, at five
o'clock, when we had failed at the Redan, we heard a very sharp
attack on the head of the creek. The 44th and other regiments
advanced, drove the Russians out of a rifle-pit they held near
the cemetery, and entered some houses there. The Russians then
opened a tremendous fire on the houses, and the men took shelter
in line, being under no command, their own officers not knowing
where they were to go, or anything about the place, and no
Engineer officer being with them. The men sheltered themselves in
the houses until they were knocked about their ears. They then
remained in different places--in fact, wherever they could get
any shelter, until dusk, as, if they had attempted to retire,
they would have been all destroyed. The men of General Eyre's
column found lots of drink in the houses. Our losses in the four
columns are--1400 killed and wounded, 64 officers wounded, and 16
killed. The French lost 6000 killed and wounded, they say!
Nothing has occurred since the assault, but it is determined to
work forward by sap and mine!"
In a subsequent letter he wrote: "Remember, in spite of all the absurd
reports in the papers, that our troops never once passed the abattis
in front of the Redan, which is sixty yards from it, and that we have
never spiked a gun of the Russians," and before closing his narrative
account of the Redan, the passage in which Mr Kinglake refers to
Gordon's evidence and action on this eventful day may well be quoted.
It appears from his statement that Gordon lost his temper through
excitement at the repulse, and even upbraided and used angry language
to his old friend and comrade, Lieutenant, now General Sir Gerald,
Graham, on his coming back to the trenches. Such language, it may be
pointed out, could not have been used with less justice to any soldier
taking part in the assault than to the man who had carried a ladder
farther than anyone else, and twice endeavoured to place it against
the Redan. It illustrates the perfervid zeal and energy of the young
officer, who explained in his letters home how he thought the Russian
fortress might have been carried at a rush, and appropriately
introduces the passage in which Mr Kinglake records his opinion of
Gordon:
"This impassioned lieutenant of sappers was a soldier marked out
for strange destinies, no other than Gordon--Charles Gordon--then
ripening into a hero, sublimely careless of self, and a warrior
saint of the kind that Moslems rather than Christians are fondly
expecting from God."
I cannot refrain from quoting here a letter I received from Mr
Kinglake when I sent him a copy of my edition of "General Gordon's
Letters from the Crimea," etc., as it records a somewhat more
deliberate opinion on his character and career:--
"28 HYDE PARK PLACE,
"MARBLE ARCH, W., _27th July 1884_.
"DEAR SIR,--I indeed feel greatly obliged to you for your
kindness in sending me a copy of 'General Gordon's Letters from
the Crimea.'
"Already I have read a great part of the volume, and I need
hardly say that, apart from the reasons which link me to the
Crimea, I have been greatly interested by seeing what was
thought, and felt, and expressed in his early days by this really
phenomenal man, whose romantic elevation above all that is base
and common has made him, in even these days, a sort of warlike
and heroic Redeemer.
"Your Preface well and ably expresses an opinion that is widely
entertained as to the conduct of our Government towards Gordon,
and I don't know enough of the question to be able to gainsay
your conclusion, but it would seem at first glance that,
considering the imperative reasons, the vast distances, the
changeful condition of things, and the consequent changes of
mind, the task of doing justice between the Government and this
heroic envoy would be one of some complexity. With my repeated
thanks,--I remain, dear sir, very truly yours,
"A. W. KINGLAKE."
Ten days after the repulse at the Redan, Lord Raglan, the gallant
soldier over whose bier Pelissier wept like a child, died "of wear and
tear and general debility," as Gordon put it, and the siege again
entered upon another dull and uninteresting stage. Nearly three
months were to elapse before the capture of the fortress that had
resisted so long, and the only incident of marked importance during
that period was the battle of the Tchernaya, in which the officers in
the trenches had no part. In that action the last effort of the
Russian commanders to relieve the place and extricate Todleben from
his peril was repulsed by the whole allied forces, for in this
engagement both the Italians and Turks took part, with a loss of seven
or eight thousand men. The only comment Gordon makes on the action is
that "the Sardinians behaved very well." At last, on 8th September, a
second general assault was delivered, the English again attacking the
Redan, and, more fortunate in one sense than on the earlier occasion,
effected a lodgment in the fortress, but were then driven out with
heavy loss. But the French succeeded in storming and holding the
Malakoff, which commanded the Redan, and the Russians retired to the
northern side of the harbour during the night after blowing up their
ships. The fall of Sebastopol, especially after the doubts held and
expressed in July and August as to whether the siege would not have to
be raised, caused the greatest excitement and widespread satisfaction.
General Gordon sent home the following graphic description of this
final and at last successful attack:--
"I must now endeavour to give you my idea of our operations from
the eventful 8th of September to the present 16th. We knew on the
7th that it was intended that the French should assault the
Malakoff Tower at twelve the next day, and that we and another
column of the French should attack the Redan and central bastion.
The next day proved windy and dusty, and at ten o'clock began one
of the most tremendous bombardments ever seen or heard. We had
kept up a tolerable fire for the last four days, quite warm
enough; but for two hours this tremendous fire extending six
miles was maintained. At twelve the French rushed at the
Malakoff, took it with ease, having caught the defenders in their
bomb-proof houses, where they had gone to escape from the shells,
etc. They found it difficult work to get round to the Little
Redan, as the Russians had by that time got out of their holes.
"However, the Malakoff was won, and the tricolour was hoisted as
a signal for our attack. Our men went forward well, losing
apparently few, put the ladders in the ditch, and mounted on the
salient of the Redan, but though they stayed there five minutes
or more, they did not advance, and tremendous reserves coming up
drove them out. They retired well and without disorder, losing in
all 150 officers, 2400 men killed and wounded. We should have
carried everything before us if the men had only advanced. The
French got driven back with great loss at the central bastion,
losing four general officers. They did not enter the work. Thus,
after a day of intense excitement, we had only gained the
Malakoff. It was determined that night that the Highlanders
should storm the Redan the next morning.
"I was detailed for the trenches, but during the night I heard
terrible explosions, and going down to the trenches at 4 A.M. I
saw a splendid sight--the whole town in flames, and every now and
then a terrific explosion. The rising sun shining on the scene of
destruction produced a beautiful effect. The last of the Russians
were leaving the town over the bridge. All the three-deckers,
etc., were sunk, the steamers alone remaining. Tons and tons of
powder must have been blown up.
"About eight o'clock I got an order to commence a plan of the
works, for which purpose I went to the Redan, where a dreadful
sight was presented. The dead were buried in the ditch--the
Russians with the English--Mr Wright reading the Service over
them. About ten o'clock Fort Paul was blown up--a beautiful
sight. The town was not safe to be entered on account of the fire
and the few Russians who still prowled about. The latter cut off
the hands and feet of one Frenchman. They also caught and took
away a sapper who would go _trying_ to plunder--for as to plunder
there was and is literally nothing but rubbish and fleas, the
Russians having carried off everything else. I have got the lock
and sight off a gun (which used to try and deposit its contents
very often in my carcass, in which I am grateful to say it
failed) for my father, and some other rubbish (a Russian cup,
etc.) for you and my sisters. But you would be surprised at the
extraordinary rarity of knick-knacks. They left their pictures in
the churches, which form consequently the only spoil, and which I
do not care about buying. I will do my best to get some better
things if it is possible. On the 10th we got down to the docks,
and a flag of truce came over to ask permission to take away
their wounded from the hospital, which we had only found out that
day contained 3000 wounded men. These unfortunate men had been
for a day and a half without attendance. A fourth of them were
dead, and the rest were in a bad way. I will not dwell any more
on it, but could not imagine a more dreadful sight.
"We have now got into the town, the conflagration being out, and
it seems quite strange to hear no firing. It has been a splendid
city, and the harbour is magnificent. We have taken more than
4000 guns, destroyed their fleet, immense stores of provisions,
ammunition, etc. (for from the explosions they did not appear to
be short of it), and shall destroy the dockyard, forts, quays,
barracks, storehouses, etc. For guns, Woolwich is a joke to it.
The town is strewn with our shell and shot, etc. We have traced
voltaic wires to nearly every powder magazine in the place. What
plucky troops they were! When you hear the details of the siege
you will be astonished. The length of the siege is nothing in
comparison with our gain in having destroyed the place.
"We are not certain what the Russians are doing on the north
side, and as yet do not know whether we shall follow them up or
not. We ought to, I think. It is glorious going over their horrid
batteries which used to bully us so much. Their dodges were
infinite. Most of their artillerymen, being sailors, were
necessarily handy men, and had devised several ingenious modes of
riveting, which they found very necessary. There was a vineyard
under our attack, a sort of neutral ground where no one dared to
venture, either Russian or English. We found lots of ripe grapes
there. The Russians used to fire another description of grape
into it. One night I was working with a party at this very spot,
and out of 200 men we lost 30 killed and wounded. We are engaged
in clearing the roads, burning the rubbish, and deodorizing the
town, taking account of the guns, etc. Nothing is stirring; the
Russians fire a little into the town. We hear they are
retreating, but do not believe it. The French, it seems, took the
Malakoff by surprise. They had learnt from a deserter that the
Russians used to march one relief of men out of the place before
the other came in on account of the heavy fire; whilst this was
being done the French rushed in and found the Malakoff empty. The
Russians made three attempts to retake it, the last led by a
large body of officers alone. Whenever the Russians commenced a
battery they laid down first a line of wires to the magazine with
which they could blow it up at any time."
With this final tribute to the courage of the Russian garrison,
Charles Gordon's account of the siege and fall of Sebastopol closes.
He took part in the expedition to Kimburn, when General Spencer
commanded a joint force of 9000 men intended to dislodge the Russians
from a fort they had built at that place, and also to attack a corps
of 10,000 men supposed to be stationed at the important town of
Kherson. The fort surrendered after four hours' bombardment by the
fleet--the garrison not being "the same style of soldiers as the
Sebastopol men"--but the Kherson force was never encountered, retiring
as the allies advanced, who in their turn retired for fear of being
drawn too far into the country. In one of several letters while on
this expedition Gordon says that the Czar Alexander the Second was
near Kimburn during the attack, and that he sent the Governor a
telegram, "Remember Holy Russia," which the Russian General did by
getting drunk. The expedition was then withdrawn after installing a
French garrison in the fort, and Charles Gordon returned to his old
quarters before Sebastopol. A fortnight after his arrival he was
appointed to take part in the destruction of the docks, which was to
signalise the downfall of Russia's power in the Black Sea. This
closing episode is very well described in several of his letters
written during the month of December 1855:--
"I am now, as you see, stationed in the dockyard preparing the
shafts and galleries for the demolition of the docks. The French
will destroy one half and ourselves the other. The quantity of
powder we shall use is 45,000 lbs., in charges varying from 80
lbs. to 8000 lbs. The French do not sink their shafts so deep as
we do, but use heavier charges. The docks are very well made, and
the gates alone cost £23,000. We are taking one gate to London,
and the French another to Paris. Our shafts are some of them very
deep, and in others there are from eight to ten feet of water.
There is not much prospect of the Russians leaving the north
side. We can see them hutting themselves.... Our works at the
docks approach completion, and we hope to blow up some portion of
them on Saturday. The French blew up one last Saturday. The
explosion presented a splendid appearance and succeeded
admirably, not a stone being left standing. The powder for our
demolition will be upwards of twenty-two tons. The Russians still
(27th December) hold the north forts, and do not appear to be
likely to leave this year as their huts are all built. We can see
them quite distinctly on the other side.... _January 20,
1856._--We have blown up part of our docks, and are very busy
with the remainder, which we hope to get over by the end of the
month. I do not anticipate any movement of the army until March,
when I suppose we shall go to Asia to relieve Kars, and make the
Russians retire from the Turkish territory.... _February 3,
1856._--We all of us have been extremely busy in loading and
firing our mines in the docks, which required all our time, as we
were so very short of officers, having only three, while the
French had twelve. Our force of sappers was only 150 and the
French had 600. We have now finished the demolition, which is
satisfactory as far as the effects produced are concerned; but
having used the voltaic battery instead of the old-fashioned
hose, we have found that electricity will not succeed in large
operations like this, and I do not think that anyone will use it
if there is a possibility of using hose. I am now engaged in
making plans of the docks, and have not much time to myself. The
French have done their work very well, using more powder than we,
and firing all their mines with hose. I will try and get you a
photograph of the docks as they _were_ and as they _are_, which
will tell you more than a dozen letters would. We had an alarm
down here the other night about twelve o'clock. The Russians on
the north side opened a tremendous fire throughout the whole line
on us and on the French. We were all out under arms, expecting an
attack by boats, but after being well shelled for an hour, the
Russians left off, and all was again silent; but for the time it
lasted the fire was terrific. I heard afterwards that it was
caused by a French navy captain, who pulled over to the other
side of the harbour, and tried to burn a steamer which was lying
on its side. He and his companions arrived unperceived, found the
steamer quite new, and were getting into it, when the Russian
sentinel challenged. They answered 'Russe,' but the sentry called
'To arms,' and the Russians fired into the boat, and then
continued the fire from all their guns, I suppose expecting a
grand attack. Only one man, however, was hurt by a splinter on
the arm. The French will blow up Fort Nicholas on Monday. They
only got their order the night before last, and are obliged to
make a hasty demolition of it. They will use 105,000 lbs. of
powder in the demolition. The Russians had ruined this fort, but
had not had time to put in the powder; the excavations were
complete. It certainly is a splendid fort, mounting 128 guns, and
capitally finished for barracks. It would hold 6000 men. The
Russians evidently intended this to be an exceptionally strong
place, and they appear to have been making a quay all the way
round the dockyard creek. We have seen a great deal of the French
engineers; they are older men than ours, and seem well educated.
The non-commissioned officers are much more intelligent than our
men. With us, although our men are not stupid, the officers have
to do a good deal of work which the French sapper
non-commissioned officer does. They all understand line of least
resistance, etc., and what they are about. The Russians do not
molest us much now. We can hear them call out and sing,
especially on Sundays. We can see them drill, which they do every
day. They even have the coolness to go out and fish in the
harbour. We never fire, neither do the French. I do not think
they purpose leaving the north side; in fact, it would not be at
all wise of them to do so. We had some French engineers to dine
with us the other day; they were very agreeable, and we learnt a
great deal from them about their mining. They used to hear the
Russians mining within ten feet of them, and when they did this
they used to put in their powder as quick as possible and blow in
the Russian mines. The Russians had two systems or layers of
mines, one about ten feet below the surface of the ground and the
other about forty feet. The French only knew of the higher one,
and they found out after the place was taken that their advanced
trenches were quite mined and loaded in the lower tier. In the
Bastion du Mât there were no less than thirty-six mines loaded
and tamped. I saw one myself in the upper tier when I was
surveying it. They (the Russians) worked out a strata of clay
between two layers of rock, so that no wood was required to keep
the earth from falling in."
Soon after these letters a truce was concluded with the Russians in
anticipation of the peace which was ultimately signed at Paris in
March 1856. The prospects of peace were not altogether agreeable to
the English army, which had been raised to an effective strength of
more than 40,000 men, and was never in a better condition for war than
at the end of the two years since it first landed in the Chersonese.
Gordon's correspondence contains two or three remarks, giving
characteristic evidence to the strength and extent of this sentiment.
In one passage he says: "We do not, generally speaking, like the
thought of peace until after another campaign. I shall not go to
England, but expect I shall remain abroad for three or four years,
which _individually_ I would sooner spend in war than peace. There is
something indescribably exciting in the former."
Another comment to the same effect is the following: "Suders, the
Russian General, reviewed us and the French army last week. He must
have thought our making peace odd."
Gordon did not obtain any honour or promotion for his Crimean
services. He was included in Sir Harry Jones's list of Engineer
Subalterns who had specially distinguished themselves during the
siege. The French Government, more discerning than his own, awarded
him the Legion of Honour.
The letters from the Crimea are specially interesting for the light
they throw on General Gordon's character. They illustrate better than
anything else he wrote during his career the soldierly side of his
character. The true professional spirit of the man of war peers forth
in every sentence, and his devotion to the details of his work was a
good preparatory course for that great campaign in China where his
engineering skill, not less than his military genius, was so
conspicuously shown. As a subaltern in the Crimea Gordon showed
himself zealous, daring, vigilant, and with that profound national
feeling that an army of Englishmen was the finest fighting force in
the world, combined with an inner conviction that of that army his
kindred Highlanders were the most intrepid and leading cohort. This
was a far more attractive and comprehensible personality than the
other revealed in later days, of the Biblical pedant seeking to
reconcile passing events with ancient Jewish prophecies, and to see in
the most ordinary occurrences the workings of a resistless and
unalterable fate. That was not the true Gordon, but rather the
grafting of a new character on the original stem of Spartan simplicity
and heroism. But to the very end of his career, to the last message
from Khartoum, the old Gordon--the real Gordon, the one who will never
be forgotten--revealed himself just as he was in the trenches before
Sebastopol.
Gordon's connection with the Russian War and the Eastern Question did
not terminate with the Treaty of Paris. On 10th May he received orders
to join Colonel Stanton, for the purpose of assisting in the
delimitation of the new frontier in Bessarabia. He imagined that the
work would take six months; it really took a year. A not unimportant
principle was involved in this question, and an error in a map was
nearly securing for the Russians a material advantage. At the Paris
Congress it was determined to eloin the Russians from the Danube and
its tributary lakes and streams. The Powers therefore stated that the
Russian frontier should pass south of Bolgrad, judging from the small
scale-map supplied by the Russians that Bolgrad was north of Lake
Yalpukh, which opens into the river Danube. When the Boundary
Commission came on the ground, they found that Bolgrad was on Lake
Yalpukh, and that if the frontier passed to the south of it the
Russians would have access to the Danube; and therefore, knowing the
spirit of the Treaty, the English Commissioners referred the question
to the Paris Congress. A sketch was prepared by Gordon and his
colleagues, to show the diplomatists its exact position, and led to
the frontier being laid down north of Bolgrad and Lake Yalpukh.
Austria, as well as France, Turkey, and Russia, was represented on
this Commission, and Gordon's comrade was Lieutenant, afterward
General Sir Henry, James, who had served with him in the trenches, and
who had one day lost his way and walked into the Russian lines, as
Gordon himself had so nearly done.
Gordon's letters give an interesting account of his work, and bring
out with his usual clearness all the points at issue; but it is
unnecessary to follow very closely the events of the year he passed in
the lower Danube region. How excellent his work must have been can be
judged from the fact that the Government sent him back some years
later to act as British Consul at Galatz. The delimitation work
commenced with a personal inspection of the frontier from Katamori on
the Pruth to Boma Sola on the Black Sea, a distance of 200 miles. Then
the frontier was defined on the map, and finally it had to be marked
on the ground with the usual posts and distinctive marks. Thirty-two
separate plans had to be prepared before the frontier could be
adjusted, and the frequent bickerings and quarrels gave rise to many
surmises that the negotiations might be broken off and hostilities
ensue. The main point of dispute as to Bolgrad threatened to form a
_casus belli_ with even a new arrangement of the Powers, as France
gave up the case, and thus encouraged Russia to prove more obdurate.
But England and the other Powers stood firm, and Bolgrad was included
in Moldavia.
The following extracts give a tolerably complete account of what was
done. Writing from Kichenief on 9th January 1857, Gordon said:
"We are now settled as to the frontier question. Russia has given
up Bolgrad and received a portion of territory in exchange equal
to that surrendered, both as to number of inhabitants and also as
to extent of land. This mode of compensation will give us more
than half our work to do over again. I had almost finished my
plans, and one-half of these will have to be redrawn. However, it
is a consolation to know that the thing is settled. We heard all
this by telegraph from Paris, and by the same message learnt that
we are to proceed at once to work on the frontier in order to get
it finished by 30th March, and thus allow of the ceded territory
being handed over to the Moldavians on that day. You may imagine
what a hurry they are in to get this finished. The Russians
pretend to believe that they have got the best of the dispute,
but it will be difficult to persuade the world to be of the same
opinion. Although so cold, there is not much snow, and it is
beautifully clear weather, capital for sledging. The new frontier
leaves Tobak and Bolgrad in Moldavia, and gives a piece of land
near the Pruth in exchange to Russia.... The territory will be
given over in two parts. The southern consists of Ismail, Kilia,
Reni, and Bolgrad, as well as the delta of the Danube. The
northern part consists of the land between the Pruth and
Yalpukh.... We have finished our work, everything has been
signed, and the total number of the plans we have made is upwards
of 100. For my part, I have had enough of them for my whole
life."
This wish was not to be gratified, for before Colonel Stanton's
Commission was dissolved orders came for him to hand over his officers
and men to Colonel--now Field-Marshal Sir Lintorn--Simmons, for the
purpose of settling the boundary in Armenia, where a dispute had
arisen about the course of the river Aras, the ancient Araxes. Gordon,
who had now had two and a half years of foreign service without a
break, did not relish this task, and even went to the expense of
telegraphing for permission to exchange; but this effort was in vain,
for the laconic reply of the Commander-in-Chief was: "Lieutenant
Gordon must go." If Gordon had under-estimated the time required for
the Bessarabian delimitation, he slightly over-estimated that for the
Armenian, as his anticipated two years was diminished in the result to
twenty-one months.
He left Constantinople on 1st May 1857 on board a Turkish steamer,
_Kars_, bound for Trebizonde. The ship was overcrowded with dirty
passengers, and the voyage was disagreeable, and might have been
dangerous if the weather had not proved exceptionally favourable. On
arriving at Trebizonde horses had to be engaged for the ten days'
journey across the 180 miles of difficult country separating that port
from Erzeroum, the Armenian capital. The total caravan of the English
and French Commissioners--the latter being Colonel Pelissier, a
relative of the Marshal--numbered ninety-nine horses; and the Turkish
Commissioner, being unable to obtain any money from his Government,
seized the horses necessary for his journey in a manner that first
opened Gordon's eyes to the ways of Pashas. He stopped on the road
every caravan he met, threw off their goods, put on his own, and
impounded the animals for his journey. After a brief stay at
Erzeroum--which Gordon describes as a very pretty place at a distance,
but horribly dirty when entered, and where there are eight or nine
months of very hard winter--the Commission passed on to Kars, which
became its headquarters. The heroic defence of that fortress was then
recent, and it is still of sufficient interest as a military episode
to justify the quotation of the evidence Gordon, with his
characteristic desire to be well informed, collected on the spot while
the events themselves were fresh. For convenience' sake, his remarks
on Kars and the whole campaign are strung together here, although they
appeared in several letters:--
"Kars is, as you can easily imagine, a ruined city, and may
perhaps never recover its former strength and importance. As far
as the works of defence are concerned, they are excessively badly
traced. A little pamphlet published by Kmety, a Hungarian, gives
a graphic description of the siege. One thing difficult if not
impossible to realise without seeing it, is the large extent of
the position. Kars has been twice in the hands of the Russians
during the last thirty years, Paskievitch having taken it by
assault in 1829. We passed the battlefield at Kuyukdere, where
the Russians in very small force under Bebutoff were attacked by
a very superior force of Turks, under the direction of General
Guyon, the Hungarian. By some mistake the Turkish left lost its
way during the night, and was eight miles distant from the field
when the right came into action. The battle was very hotly
contested, but the Turks had at last to retire with the loss of
several guns. Had the affair gone off as Guyon[1] intended, the
Russians would have been licked. This battle, I should add, was
fought in August 1854, before any English officer had arrived in
this country. The Russian loss was very severe: there were 3,200
wounded alone brought into Gumri for treatment. The first day
from Gumri we passed Baiandoor, where the Turks and Russians had
a small battle in 1853, and where the former lost a splendid
opportunity of taking Gumri, which was nearly denuded of troops.
My Turkish colleague, Osman Bey (I believe this officer to be
identical with Ghazi Osman, the defender of Plevna), was present,
and got into Gumri as a spy, disguised in the character of a
servant. The Russian army avenged the slight check they received
from the Turks by taking all their artillery of the right wing."
[1] Guyon was an Englishman, but one of the National Commanders
in the Hungarian Rebellion of 1848. I have given a brief
account of his adventurous career at pp. 148-49 of "General
Gordon's Letters from the Crimea," etc.
As illustrating his professional zeal and powers of scientific
examination, the following description of the fortress of Alexandropol
or Gumri is a striking production from so young an officer:--
"The fortress of Alexandropol (40° 47' N. lat., 43° long. 45' E.,
4500 feet above the sea) is situated on the left bank of the
river Arpatchai, which here forms the boundary between Russia and
Turkey. It is distant thirty-five miles from Kars and eighty-four
miles from Tiflis. The plain on which it is situated is perfectly
level and very peculiar. It has a stratum of alluvial soil for
the depth of one foot six inches on the surface, and then a
substratum of fine uniform lava, ten to fifteen feet thick,
supposed to have issued from Mount Alagos (13,450 feet), an
extinct volcano thirty miles from Alexandropol. The depth of the
earth allows the growth of grain, but entirely prevents that of
trees, which with their roots cannot penetrate into the lava. The
Russians have taken advantage of this bed of lava in the ditch of
the fortress. The fortress is well constructed and in perfect
repair. There are upwards of 200 guns (varying from 36-pounders
to 12-pounders) mounted on the works, and about 100 in reserve,
of which 30 are field-guns with their equipment wagons, etc. The
garrison would be 5000 to 6000, including artillery. There are
large supplies of ammunition and military stores. The ditch,
twelve feet deep, of the two western fronts has not been
excavated near the flanks on account of the expense. The Russians
have constructed in the centres of the two curtains a
_caponnière_ with two guns in each flank to defend the dead
angles caused by the non-excavation of the whole of the ditch. In
the centre of these two fronts is a large _caponnière_, mounting
ten guns in the upper tier and eight in the lower tier. This
_caponnière_ is on a lower level than the enceinte of the place.
The counterscarp at the north-west and south-west angles of these
two fronts is for the distance of twenty yards composed of a
crenellated wall four feet six inches thick. This was caused by
the irregularity of the ground. The bomb-proof barracks of the
northern fronts mount in casemate two tiers of fourteen guns at
the curtains. The flanks have five guns in casemates open to the
rear, in addition to the guns on the parapet above. The lunette
in the ditch is eight feet deep. The eastern front has an escarp
fourteen feet high cut in the lava, and well flanked by the
_caponnière_ defending the entrances, mounting four guns. The
bomb-proof barracks in the northern fronts have one tier of eight
guns in casemate at the curtains, and three guns in each flank in
casemates open to the rear. The two outworks are closed at the
gorge with a loopholed wall, flanked by a small guard-house. They
have no ditches, but an escarp of ten feet in the lava. The tower
marked _A_ in my plan is sixty yards in diameter, with a well in
the centre. It has its gorge closed with a ditch and loopholed
wall. It mounts fifteen guns on the top, and fifteen guns in
casemate. It is proposed to connect it by a crenellated wall with
the main work. The tower marked _B_ has a ditch and small glacis.
It mounts eight guns in casemate, and eight on the top. Its
object is to flank the long ravine which runs southward from it.
All the buildings in the interior of the fortress are bomb-proof.
The great fault of the fortress as it is constructed at present
is that it does not so much as see the town with its population
of 9310. It is now proposed, however, to make a large work on the
site marked _K_ with a view of meeting this want. During the war
in 1853, when the Turks were 35,000 strong at Baiandoor, six
miles from Alexandropol, and the Russians had only two battalions
in the fortress, the latter demolished all the houses which were
on this ground. I think that should it ever be in our power to
besiege this place (which is not likely, from the enormous
difficulty of getting a siege train there), that batteries might
be established on the hillocks between the fortress and the
river, to breach the large _caponnière_ and the tower _A_ which,
from the formation of the ground, would not be opposed by more
fire than the direct fire of the works they were intended to
breach, and which would be limited by their circular form to
about seven guns. The soil is not unfavourable on these hills.
The hill on which the cemetery of the officers killed at Kars and
Kuyukdere is situated is also favourable for batteries. The
principal well, which is sunk to a good depth, is in the
north-eastern bastion."
General Gordon's letters contain two or three interesting descriptions
that, in view of more recent events, deserve quotation. Of the Kurds
he thus speaks, and the description stands good at the present day:--
"We met on our road a great number of Kurds, who live as their
fathers did, by travelling about, robbing, etc., with their
flocks. Their children are short of clothing. In spite of the
Cossacks, etc., they are as lawless as ever, and go from Turkey
to Russia and back again as they like. They are fine-looking
people, armed to the teeth, but are decreasing in numbers. They
never live in houses, but prefer tents and caves. On the
mountains we fell in with the tribes of Kurds, who live at this
height during the summer months, quite isolated from the rest of
mankind. I paid a visit to the chief of a tribe of 2000, and he
passed a great number of compliments on the English. This Bey is
all powerful with his tribe; he settles all disputes, divides the
pasture land among the families, etc. Although living in such a
deserted spot, they read the Turkish papers, and they asked
several questions about the English war with Persia. They are
very fanatical, and are much encouraged in their religious
fervour by the Sultan's agents. Their houses consist of stone
walls covered with camel's-hair tents, which are quite
waterproof, and lined inside with capital carpets made by
themselves. We encamped near them and obtained our milk, etc.,
from them; but, in order to let us know their habits, they stole
the horse of the Russian officer's interpreter during the night.
I should not mind trusting them at all, for the Bey would not
allow them to take our horses; perhaps this was only from his
hatred to the Russians."
He gives some particulars of the Lazes, to one of whose villages he
paid a visit, and as he believed that he was the only Englishman who
had ever done so, his remarks were based on special local knowledge:--
"On one side of it was Lazistan, and this part of Lazistan is
peopled by the fiercest tribe of Lazes, who scarcely acknowledge
even the Sultan. We had an escort of forty infantry, and were not
molested. This tribe and the Kabouletians supply the
Constantinople Turks with slaves, whom they kidnap from the
Gourelians, who are on the Russian side. The Adjars (the tribe
referred to) are most daring, and even proposed to us to bring
any person we might choose out to Batoum for £40 to £120. In
consequence of these kidnappings, etc., a deadly enmity exists
between the two peoples, and whenever they get a chance they kill
one another. During the last eighteen months sixty-two people
have been kidnapped, sixteen killed, and twenty or thirty wounded
on the part of the Gourelians. The Russian guards of the frontier
are helpless against these people, for the latter are armed with
a capital rifle and are also splendid shots, while the Cossacks
have only a trumpery smooth bore. The country of the Adjars is
very mountainous indeed, and quite impracticable except on foot,
being covered with dense forests."
Of Ani, the ancient, once famous, and now deserted capital of Armenia,
he gives the following picture:--
"We passed through Ani, the ancient capital of Armenia. This city
is completely deserted, and has splendid churches still standing
in it. These churches are capitally built and preserved. Some
coloured drawings on their walls are to be seen even now. The
towers and walls are almost intact, but the most extraordinary
thing about so large a place is the singular quietness. There are
many ruined cities in the neighbourhood, and all dating from
about the eleventh century. At that period Ani itself contained
100,000 inhabitants and 500 churches, which shows that more
people went to church among them than with us. Before the end of
that century it passed into the hands of the Greeks and Saracens.
Afterwards the Mongols took it, and at last an earthquake drove
out the remaining inhabitants in 1339, since which time it has
been perfectly deserted. The churches of Ani were built with
lava, and crosses of black lava were let in very curiously into
the red lava. With the exception of the churches and the king's
palace, the city is level with the ground, the foundations of the
houses being alone discernible. These churches were covered with
Armenian inscriptions cut on the walls."
The delimitation work in itself was uninteresting, being carried on in
barren and solitary regions where there was nothing but rock, without
either grass or inhabitants. Gordon said he would not take thirty
square miles for a gift, and yet the Turks and Russians clung to it,
bringing witnesses from among the tribes who would swear whatever they
were paid for. The question at issue was where the old frontier
between the Persian province of Erivan and the Pashalik of Baizeth was
fixed. The Persians ceded the province of Erivan to Russia in 1828,
and both the Turks and Russians had their own, and necessarily
conflicting, views as to where the frontier was. General Gordon's own
belief that there had never been any real frontier at all was no doubt
the right one. The English officers, without any assistance from their
Turkish colleagues, who merely looked on when they were not keeping up
the supply of witnesses, had to effect the best arrangement they could
with the Russians. In the course of his survey of the frontier, which
he said he examined almost foot by foot, Gordon came to Mount Ararat,
which he very nearly ascended, as he tells the reader in the following
graphic narrative:--
"When we arrived at the foot of Mount Ararat we were unable to
proceed along the frontier any further because the ground becomes
extremely broken by the innumerable streams of lava which have
run down from it. The ground is black with cinders. They look as
if quite recently emitted, and no one would imagine from their
appearance that Ararat had been extinct so long. Our road went
along the northern or Russian slope of Ararat, and passed
through a very old city called Kourgai, where there are still the
remains of a church and part of an old castle. Even the Armenians
do not pretend to know its history, but some of them say that
Noah lived there. It is situated half-way up the mountain, and
there is no living person within twelve miles of it. There used
to be a populous village named Aralik, with 5000 inhabitants, a
little above it, but in 1840 an earthquake shook Mount Ararat,
and in four minutes an immense avalanche had buried this place so
completely as to leave scarcely any vestige of its site. Not a
single person escaped, which is not to be wondered at,
considering the mass that fell. Stones of twenty or thirty tons
were carried as far as fifteen to twenty miles into the plain. It
has left a tremendous cleft in Ararat itself. Other villages were
destroyed at the same time, but none so completely as this. The
village immediately below Aralik was also destroyed, but the
graveyard remained untouched, and the tombstones stand up intact
in the midst of the ruins. The common people say that it was
saved on account of a saint who was buried there. All these
places have a very lonely look. Both the Kurds and the Armenians,
if they can possibly help it, never pass near Mount Ararat, while
they think it a great sin to ascend it.
"I must now tell you of my ascent, or rather my near ascent, of
Great Ararat.
"I and my interpreter and three sappers went up to a Kurdish
encampment where an old Kurd lived who assisted five of our
countrymen to ascend about two years ago. The only assistance,
however, that he appeared able to give us was to show us where
these Englishmen had encamped the night before their ascent. We
consequently pitched our tents there, and settled ourselves for
the night. The night proved to be very stormy, with thunder and
rain, which was a bad lookout for us. However, we started at 4
A.M. the next morning, and had some very hard work up to the line
of perpetual snow. My interpreter and two of the sappers gave it
up before this, but I and the other, Corporal Fisher, held on.
"The whole of this time there was a thick fog, which now and then
cleared away, though only for brief moments, and enabled us to
get a splendid view of the country spread out as a map beneath
us, with cumuli clouds floating about. The snow which I mounted
was at a very steep slope, and quite hard, nearly ice, on the
surface. It was so steep that we could not sit down without
holding on tightly to our poles. Corporal Fisher was about half a
mile to my left, and had a better ascent as it was not quite so
steep. About two o'clock I began to get very tired, not able to
get up more than two yards without resting. This was caused by
the rarefication of the air. The mist cleared just at this time
for a minute, and I was enabled to see the summit about 1000 feet
above me, but still a further very steep ascent. Little Ararat
was also visible 3000 feet below me. It began to snow soon after
this, and became intensely cold. The two together settled me, and
I turned round, although very reluctantly, and sitting down, slid
over in a very few minutes the distance which had taken me so
many hours to clamber up. Corporal Fisher managed to get up to
the top, and describes the crater to be very shallow, although
the top is very large. The Kurd told me afterwards that the road
I took was very difficult, and that the other English explorers
went up a road which was comparatively easy. I believe, however,
that if the weather had been more favourable I should have
succeeded."
This was not his only mountaineering experience. Some weeks later he
ascended Mount Alagos--that is, the Motley Mount, from its various
colours. It is 13,480 feet above the sea, or about 3000 feet lower
than Ararat.
"We started with some Kurdish guides to the mountain, and after a
good deal of delay got to the place where the only path to the
summit commences. Here we were obliged to dismount and take to
our legs. After about two hours and a half we got to the summit,
and were extremely glad of it, for although it is not to be
compared to Mount Ararat, it is still rather difficult. Trusting
to my Ararat experience, I thought of descending in the snow, and
started. I was much astonished at finding the slope far steeper
than I expected, and consequently went down like a shot, and
reached the bottom one hour and a half before the others. A
Russian doctor tried it after me, and in trying to change his
direction was turned round, and went to the bottom sometimes head
foremost. He was not a bit hurt. There was no danger, as we had
only to keep ourselves straight. My trousers are the only
sufferers! I was the first up. None of the Russians succeeded!"
With one more quotation, Gordon's description of Etchmiazin, the
celebrated monastery where the Armenian Catholicos resides, the
extracts from these early letters may be concluded:--
"We passed through the oldest of the Armenian churches and
monasteries, a place called Etchmiazin. It professes to be 1500
years old, and certainly has the appearance of great antiquity;
it was existing during the time of the ruined city of Ani, and is
built in a similar style. The relics there are greatly esteemed.
People make pilgrimages to this monastery from all parts. There
is, firstly, an arm of St Gregory, which is enclosed in a gold
case covered with precious stones; next the piece of the ark,
which is necessarily of great antiquity; a piece of the cross and
of the spear, and a finger-nail of St Peter complete the relics.
All these are enveloped in gold cases, and richly ornamented with
every sort of precious stones. The monastery owns ten villages
and a great deal of land. The monks gave us a grand dinner, and
their feeding certainly was not bad. The monks' council chamber
was splendidly got up, all the ceiling being carved and gilded."
The concluding stages of the delimitation work were rapidly concluded,
and before the end of September 1857 Colonel Simmons and his staff had
returned to Constantinople. The illness of all the English officers
except Gordon detained them some weeks in the Turkish capital, and he
wrote home that his surveying duties had been superseded by those of
sick nurse. But before the end of October he was back again in
England, and met his father and the other members of his family after
a still longer interval. While engaged on the frontier commission, his
comrade in the trenches, Lieutenant William Christian Anderson, of his
own Corps, had married one of his sisters, but, after a very short
period of wedded happiness, he died suddenly. After his death a son
was born who bore the same name, is now an officer in the Royal
Artillery, and served on General Graham's staff at Souakim. Charles
Gordon summed up his comrade's character in these words:--
"I am extremely distressed to hear of poor Willie Anderson's
death, and every one who knew him will be so. He was a sterling
good comrade and officer, greatly liked by both officers and men,
and our Corps has sustained a great loss in him. I am so very
sorry for poor dear ----. It is such a sudden blow to her, and I
am sure they must have been so happy together during their short
married life."
Gordon, therefore, found a certain amount of gloom in the family
circle during the Christmas of 1857, and as his desire to join the
staff of the army was not immediately attainable, the orders he
suddenly received in April 1858 to again proceed to the Caucasus, in
consequence of a slight frontier dispute with Russia, were not
altogether disagreeable to him as a return to that active work which
he loved. For some reason, which was probably the wish to save a
little money by economy in travelling, with the view of carrying out
his generous plans towards others, he took his passage to
Constantinople in a slow steamer from the Thames, touching at Havre.
He described his fellow-passengers as not very select, but amusing,
and the voyage as "a yachting excursion, time being apparently no
object." He only remained ten days at Constantinople, and reached
Redout Kaleh in the Caucasus on 3rd June, visiting Sebastopol on the
way. He described it as still an utter ruin; "the grass had so
overgrown the place where the camps stood that it was with difficulty
I found my hut."
On 12th June Gordon joined his Russian colleague, Ogranovitch, at
Ozurgeth; but the Turkish representative did not arrive for a month
later, which interval Gordon employed in recording his impressions of
Russian and Georgian society in the Caucasus:--
"I dined with the Governor-General, Prince Eristaw, who left the
next day for Swaneti to overawe the subjects of the late Prince
(he was shot at Kutais for stabbing Prince Gagarin, the
predecessor of Prince Eristaw), who do not seem to have realised
his death. The Prince takes two battalions of infantry and two
guns nominally as an escort. There are some very pretty ladies at
Kutais who dance their national dances capitally. They dance
alone, and all the gentlemen beat time with their hands. I was
surprised at seeing the ladies wear a sort of bracelet of black
beads, to which they attached great value. I am sure they are
nothing more than bog oak.... I have since discovered they are
_cannel coal, not bog oak_. The ladies are very pretty, but have
not very cleanly habits in general; they prefer their nails
tipped, and do not hesitate at taking a bone and gnawing it. They
live in extremely dirty houses, or rather huts. They are
generally all princesses, and the men all princes, who, however,
do not hesitate to accept small donations. I am always in fear
and trembling lest they should give me anything, as it is
necessary to give in return. I, unfortunately, happened to notice
a certain glass letterweight with the Queen on it, and observed
that it was like Her Majesty. I was given it on the spot, and
with deep regret had to part with my soda-water machine the next
day. I admire nothing now, you may be sure. The servants of
Prince Dimitri Gouriel have made a good thing out of my visit,
for each time they bring anything--butter, fruit, etc.--orders
are given that an equivalent be given them in money. My hands get
quite sticky with shaking hands with so many princes, but I have
hitherto borne up like a martyr under my trials. On being invited
to the house of a prince, you would figure yourself invited to a
palace; but it is not the case here, and you would find it out to
your cost if you did not take something to eat in your pockets."
The work of this Commission proved exceedingly fatiguing--Gordon
breaking in characteristically with the statement: "I do not complain
when there is no occasion"--and consisted chiefly in replacing the
pyramids carefully removed by the population during the twelve months
since they were erected. The successful result of this Commission was
entirely due to Gordon's energy and untiring labour. His Russian and
Turkish colleagues were always quarrelling, and Gordon had to play the
part of peacemaker--for which, he said, "I am naturally not well
adapted"--an admission that may be commended to those who think that
Gordon was a meek and colourless individual, with more affinity to a
Methodist parson than the dauntless and resolute soldier he really
was.
Early in October the whole delimitation was concluded, and without a
hitch, much to Gordon's satisfaction. By 17th November he had reached
Constantinople on his way home, but notwithstanding the special
hardships of his work and his long absence from England, with one
brief interval, he was still anxious for work and action. In the
closing letter of his correspondence he said: "I do not feel at all
inclined to settle in England and be employed in any sedentary way,
and shall try and get employed here (Constantinople) if it is
possible."
While these letters contain a very vivid account of the striking and
remarkable events that occurred during the long military and
diplomatic struggle with Russia, they are not less interesting or
important for the many unconscious glimpses Gordon gives into his own
character. In them may be found references to habits and things which
show that the young officer was a sportsman, and by no means
indifferent to creature comforts; and as the most careful search
through all his later writings of every kind will bring no similar
discovery, these acquire a special importance as showing that the
original Gordon only differed from his comrades in being more earnest,
more active, and more enthusiastic. I take at random such statements
as "Our feeding is pretty good, but the drinking is not," "The
Russians gave a spread [vulgar] on Saturday, noisily and badly got up.
Their wine was simply execrable," and "How I wish I could get some
partridge shooting! My bag up to the present (on the Danube) is
200--not bad! eh?" Then again, on a more delicate subject, there are
numerous references to ladies, and to his appreciation of beauty. In a
chaffing passage in one of his letters, he wrote that one of his
sisters "wants me to bring home a Russian wife, I think; but I am sure
you would not admire the Russian ladies I have seen." Again, the
ladies of the Caucasus are pronounced "very pretty," and "the
Gourelians are beautiful--in fact, I never saw so many handsome women
as the peasants among them." At this time Gordon was certainly not a
misogynist, but I am assured that the rumours as to his having met
with an early disappointment in love are quite baseless of truth. From
a very early period of his life, certainly before the Crimea, Gordon
had made up his mind not to marry, and was in the habit of going even
further, and wishing himself dead. This sentiment led him to
constantly refer to himself as "the dead man"; and some years later he
wrote, "There is a Miss ---- here, the nicest girl I ever met; but
don't be afraid, the dead do not marry." His own secret opinion seems
to have been that marriage spoilt both men and women, and it will be
at least admitted that if he had married he could never have lived the
disinterested, heroic life which remains a marvel for the world.
CHAPTER III.
THE CHINA WAR.
Gordon was back in England in good time for the Christmas festivities
of 1858, and a few months later--1st April 1859--he was gazetted to
the rank of Captain. About the same time he also received the
appointment of Field-Work Instructor and Adjutant at Chatham, where
his practical knowledge gained in the Sebastopol trenches was turned
to good account in the theoretical training of future officers of his
Corps. He was thus employed when the conflict in China, which had been
in progress for some years, assumed a graver character in consequence
of the Chinese refusal to ratify the Treaty of Tientsin and Admiral
Hope's repulse in front of the Taku forts. Gordon at once volunteered
for active service, and on 22nd July 1860 he sailed for the Far East.
He did not reach Tientsin until the following 26th September, being,
as he said in his first letter home, "rather late for the amusement,
which won't vex mother." Not only had he missed the capture of the
Taku forts, but also the one battle of the war, that fought at
Chan-chia-wan on 9th September. He was, however, in time for the sack
of the Summer Palace, which he describes in the following letter:--
"On the 11th October we were sent down in a great hurry to throw
up works and batteries against the town, as the Chinese refused
to give up the gate we required them to surrender before we would
treat with them. They were also required to give up all the
prisoners. You will be sorry to hear that the treatment they have
suffered is very bad. Poor De Norman, who was with me in Asia, is
one of the victims. It appears that they were tied so tight by
the wrists that the flesh mortified, and they died in the
greatest torture. Up to the time that elapsed before they arrived
at the Summer Palace they were well treated, but then the
ill-treatment began. The Emperor is supposed to have been there
at the time.
"To go back to the work--the Chinese were given until twelve on
the 13th to give up the gate. We made a lot of batteries, and
everything was ready for the assault of the wall, which is
battlemented and 40 feet high, but of inferior masonry. At 11.30
P.M. the gate was opened, and we took possession; so our work
was of no avail. The Chinese had then until the 23rd to think
over our terms of peace, and to pay up £10,000 for each
Englishman and £500 for each native soldier who died during their
captivity. This they did, and the money was paid, and the Treaty
signed yesterday. I could not witness it, as all officers
commanding companies were obliged to remain in camp.
"Owing to the ill-treatment the prisoners experienced at the
Summer Palace, the General ordered it to be destroyed, and stuck
up proclamations to say why it was so ordered. We accordingly
went out, and, after pillaging it, burned the whole place,
destroying in a Vandal-like manner most valuable property which
would not be replaced for four millions. We got upwards of £48
a-piece prize money before we went out here; and although I have
not as much as many, I have done well. Imagine D---- giving
sixteen shillings for a string of pearls, which he sold the next
day for £500!
"The people are civil, but I think the grandees hate us, as they
must after what we did to the Palace. You can scarcely imagine
the beauty and magnificence of the places we burnt. It made one's
heart sore to burn them; in fact, these palaces were so large,
and we were so pressed for time, that we could not plunder them
carefully. Quantities of gold ornaments were burnt, considered as
brass. It was wretchedly demoralising work for an army. Everybody
was wild for plunder.
"You would scarcely conceive the magnificence of this residence,
or the tremendous devastation the French have committed. The
throne-room was lined with ebony, carved in a marvellous way.
There were huge mirrors of all shapes and kinds, clocks, watches,
musical boxes with puppets on them, magnificent china of every
description, heaps and heaps of silks of all colours, embroidery,
and as much splendour and civilization as you would see at
Windsor; carved ivory screens, coral screens, large amounts of
treasure, etc. The French have smashed everything in the most
wanton way. It was a scene of utter destruction which passes my
description."
It may be of interest to state here that Gordon bought the throne
referred to. Its supports are the Imperial Dragon's claws, and the
cushions are of yellow Imperial silk. He presented it long afterwards
to the headquarters of his Corps at Chatham, where it now stands.
On the exchange of the Treaty ratifications, which took place within
the walls of the Imperial capital, the force under Sir Hope Grant was
withdrawn to Tientsin, and after a brief space from China. But pending
the payment of the instalments of the war indemnity, a garrison of
3000 men, under General Staveley, was left at Tientsin, and Captain
Gordon was attached to this force. He had a very busy time of it at
first, for suitable quarters had to be provided for our troops, and
Gordon was fully employed in the construction of barracks and stables.
Among the other tasks that engaged his attention at the time was the
management of a fund for the benefit of the Chinese poor, and he was
much distressed by an unfortunate accident that attended its
distribution.
"We had collected about nine hundred dollars for the poor, and
had asked the mandarins to issue tickets to the most deserving.
This they would not do, so a certain day was fixed upon which to
distribute the funds. There were about 3000 beggars, and in the
crush seven women and one boy were killed. The poor women on
their little feet, on which they are never very safe, were thrown
down and trampled upon."
During the eighteen months that Gordon resided at Tientsin he took
every opportunity of seeing the country, and as often as he could he
rode from that town along the banks of the Peiho river to the Taku
forts at its mouth. The distance is about forty miles each way, and he
computed that he accomplished it not fewer than twenty times. He also
visited Peking in August 1861, and remained several days on a visit to
Sir Frederick Bruce at the British Legation. At that date rumours were
already current that the Emperor Hienfung, who never returned to
Peking after our occupation, but made Yehol his capital and place of
residence, was dead. These were true, but some time elapsed before it
was officially announced that the Emperor had died on the 22nd of that
month, the very day that Gordon reached Peking himself, and wrote the
following letter:--
"The Emperor is reported to be dead, and his coffin has been sent
for; but this is no proof, since it is the custom to send for a
man's coffin when he is seriously ill, and it is kept for him
even if he lives fifty years after."
Writing again some time after, he says on the grave event: "A great
operation relating to the funeral of Hienfung is going on: a marble
block, weighing sixty tons, is being removed from the quarries to the
west of Peking to the cemetery in the east. It is drawn along upon a
huge truck by six hundred ponies, and proceeds at the rate of four
miles per day. When it arrives it is to be set up and carved into the
shape of an elephant; several other large stones are also _en route_."
But the most interesting expedition Gordon undertook from Tientsin was
that to the Great Wall, and here I must borrow Dr Birkbeck Hill's
graphic description, which is based on a long letter from Gordon
himself:--
"In December 1861, accompanied by Lieutenant Cardew of the 67th
Regiment, he made a tour on horseback to the outer Wall of China
at Kalgan. A Chinese lad of the age of fourteen who knew a little
English acted as their servant and interpreter, while their
baggage was carried in two carts. In the course of their journey
they passed through districts which had never before been visited
by Europeans. Against the northern side of the city of Siuen-hoa
(_not_ Si_n_en-hoa, as printed in Dr Hill's book) they found that
the sand had drifted with the wind till it had formed a sloping
bank so high that it reached to the top of the walls, though they
were nearly twenty feet high. Nature had followed in the steps of
the generals of old, and had cast up a bank against the town. At
Kalgan the Great Wall was with its parapet about 22 feet high and
16 feet broad. Both of its faces were built of bricks, each of
which was three times the size of one of our bricks. The space
between was filled in with rubble. 'It is wonderful,' writes
Colonel Gordon, 'to see the long line of wall stretching over the
hills as far as the eye can reach.' From Kalgan they travelled
westwards to Taitong, where the wall was not so high. There they
saw huge caravans of camels laden with 'brick tea' going towards
Russia. Here they were forced to have the axle-trees of their
carts widened, for they had come into a part of the country where
the wheels were always set wider apart than in the province
whence they came. Their carts therefore no longer filled the deep
ruts which had been worn in the roads.
"The chief object of their journey had been to ascertain whether
there was in the inner wall any pass besides the Tchatiaou, which
on that side of the country led from the Russian territory to
Peking. They pushed along southwards, in vain trying for a long
time to find a way eastward over the mountains. It was not till
they reached Taiyuen that they struck into the road that led to
Peking or Tientsin.
"In this town, for the first time on their journey, they got into
any kind of trouble. When their bill was brought them for their
night's lodging they found that the charge was enormous. Seeing
that a dispute would arise, they sent on their carts, and waited
at the inn till they felt sure that they had got well on their
way. They then, like the three Quakers with whom Charles Lamb
travelled to Exeter, offered what they thought a reasonable sum.
It was refused. They tried to mount their horses, but the people
of the inn stopped them. Major Gordon took out his revolver, for
show more than for use, for he allowed them to take it from him.
He thereupon said, 'Let us go to the Mandarin!'
"To this they agreed, and at the same time they gave him back his
revolver. They all walked towards the Mandarin's house--the two
Englishmen alongside their horses. On the way Major Gordon said
to his companion, 'Are you ready to mount?' 'Yes,' he answered.
So they mounted quietly, and went on with the people. When they
reached the Mandarin's they turned horses, and scampered after
their carts as fast as they could. The people yelled and rushed
after them, but it was too late.
"Some way beyond Taiyuen they came upon the pass over the
mountains which led down into the country drained by the Peiho.
The descent was a terrible one. All along the cold had been
intense--so much so that raw eggs were frozen hard as if they had
been boiled. To add to their troubles, when they were on in front
their carts were attacked by robbers; but the Chinese lad--an
ugly imp--kept them off with his gun. When they drew near
Paoting-fu they sent on with the lad the two carts and their
tired horses, which had now carried them for three weeks without
the break of a single day, and they hired a fresh cart in which
they thought to ride to Tientsin. But with the boy gone they had
no interpreter, and in their impatience, 'their new driver'--to
quote our traveller's own words--'got rather crossly dealt with.'
They stopped near Paoting-fu for the night. Early next morning as
they were washing they heard the gates of the inn open and the
rumble of cartwheels. They guessed what was happening. 'Half
stripped as I was, I rushed out and saw our cart bolting away. I
ran for a mile after it, but had to come back and hire another
with which we got to Tientsin--more than fourteen days over our
leave.'"
From this pleasant but uneventful occupation Gordon was summoned to a
scene where important events were in progress, and upon which he was
destined to play what was perhaps, after all, the most brilliant part
in the long course of his remarkable career. His brother puts the
change into a single sentence:--
"On the 28th of April 1862 Captain Gordon left the Peiho and
arrived at Shanghai on 3rd of May, and at once dropped into the
command of a district with the charge of the engineer part of an
expedition about to start, with the intention of driving the
rebels out of a circuit of thirty miles from Shanghai."
By the end of March 1862 the Chinese Government had sufficiently
carried out its obligations to admit of the withdrawal of the force at
Tientsin, and General Staveley transferred the troops and his quarters
from that place to Shanghai, where the Taeping rebels were causing the
European settlement grave anxiety, and what seemed imminent peril. The
Taepings, of whose rebellion some account will be given in the next
chapter, were impelled to menace Shanghai by their own necessities.
They wanted arms, ammunition, and money, and the only means of
obtaining them was by the capture of the great emporium of foreign
trade. But such an adventure not merely implied a want of prudence and
knowledge, it could only be attempted by a breach of their own
promises. When Admiral Hope had sailed up the Yangtsekiang and visited
Nanking, he demanded and received from Tien Wang, the Taeping king or
leader, a promise that the Taeping forces should not advance within a
radius of thirty miles of Shanghai. That promise in its larger extent
had soon been broken, and an attack on Shanghai itself, although
unsuccessful, crowned the offences of the rebels, and entailed the
chastisement a more prudent course would have averted. Without
entering into the details here that will be supplied later on, it will
suffice to say that in January 1862 the Taepings advanced against
Shanghai, burning all the villages _en route_, and laid irregular
siege to it during more than six weeks. Although they suffered several
reverses, the European garrison was not in sufficient strength to
drive them away, and a general anxiety prevailed among the European
community when the arrival of General Staveley altered the posture of
affairs.
Before Gordon arrived two affairs of some importance had taken place.
At Wongkadza, a village twelve miles west of Shanghai, General
Staveley obtained a considerable success, which was, however, turned
into a disaster by the disobedience of his orders. The Taepings had
retired to some stronger stockades, and General Staveley had ordered
the postponement of the attack until the next day, when the trained
Chinese troops, carried away by their leaders' impetuosity, renewed
the assault. The result was a rude repulse, with the loss of nearly
100 men killed and wounded. The next day the stockades were evacuated,
and within another week the fortified villages of Tsipu and Kahding
were also taken. It was at this point that Gordon arrived from
Tientsin, and reached the scene of action just as the arrangements for
attacking the important village of Tsingpu were being completed.
That the Taepings were not contemptible adversaries, at least those
under their redoubtable leader Chung Wang, was shown by their
attempting to destroy Shanghai by fire, even while these operations
were in progress. The plot nearly succeeded, but its promoters were
severely punished by the summary execution of 200 of their number. The
force assembled for the attack on Tsingpu assumed almost the
dimensions of an army. General Staveley commanded 1,429 British troops
with twenty guns and mortars, in addition to a naval brigade of 380
men and five guns. There was also a French contingent of 800 men and
ten guns, under Admiral Protet. At Tsingpu Gordon specially
distinguished himself by the manner in which he reconnoitred the
place, and then placed and led the ladder parties after two breaches
had been pronounced practical. The Taepings fought well, but the place
was carried, and the Chinese auxiliaries killed every one they found
with arms in their hands. Commenting on Gordon's part in this affair,
General Staveley wrote in his official despatch:--
"Captain Gordon was of the greatest use to me when the task of
clearing the rebels from out of the country within a radius of
thirty miles from Shanghai had to be undertaken. He reconnoitred
the enemy's defences, and arranged for the ladder parties to
cross the moats, and for the escalading of the works; for we had
to attack and carry by storm several towns fortified with high
walls and deep wet ditches. He was, however, at the same time a
source of much anxiety to me from the daring manner he approached
the enemy's works to acquire information. Previous to our attack
upon Tsingpu, and when with me in a boat reconnoitring the place,
he begged to be allowed to land in order better to see the nature
of the defences; presently, to my dismay, I saw him gradually
going nearer and nearer, by rushes from cover to cover, until he
got behind a small outlying pagoda within 100 yards of the wall,
and here he was quietly making a sketch and taking notes. I, in
the meantime, was shouting myself hoarse in trying to get him
back, for not only were the rebels firing at him from the walls,
but I saw a party stealing round to cut him off."
A letter from Gordon gives an interesting account of the two
subsequent affairs at Nanjao, where Admiral Protet was killed, and at
Cholin, where the Taepings suffered a severe but, as it proved, not a
decisive defeat.
"On going through the village a Chang-mow (rebel leader) came out
of a house rubbing his eyes, evidently having been taking a
siesta; he was horrified, and bolted, but was soon caught, and
the sailors had much difficulty in saving his life from the
villagers, who flew upon and would have killed him. Poor man! he
had such a nice costume when taken, but in five minutes
afterwards you would scarcely have known him; all his finery, and
even more, had been taken from him. The small force encamped and
entrenched themselves 900 yards from Cholin, much to the surprise
and anger of the garrison. They came down in force on the next
morning with no end of banners. Upon the principle that inquiring
minds should not be balked, they were allowed to come pretty
close, but then the poor things received a check, and the
beautiful silk banners were furled up and carried back to the
town.
"The next day General Staveley sent us word to come back, since
he would attack Nanjao first, but as there were nearly 1000
villagers depending upon our protection and crowding round our
camp, I was sent back with an armed party, and Captain Willes
remained in front of the town. I went back by a different road
and came on the General four miles from Nanjao. We marched on,
and halted near the town, which was reconnoitred during the
night, and the guns placed in position by 5 P.M. On the 17th we
opened fire at seven, and attacked the place. Here Admiral Protet
was killed; he was among 500 men, and was the only one struck.
The town was a wretched affair, and a good many Chang-mows
escaped. These Chang-mows are very funny people; they always run
when attacked. They are ruthlessly cruel, and have a system of
carrying off small boys under the hope of training them up as
rebels. We always found swarms of these boys who had been taken
from their parents (whom the rebels had killed) in the provinces.
"I saved one small creature who had fallen into the ditch in
trying to escape, for which he rewarded me by destroying my coat
with his muddy paws in clinging to me. I started soon after the
attack for Cholin, and got there on the 18th. The rebels had made
a _sortie_ since my departure, and had got into a pretty mess.
Willes let them come up and then advanced on them; over sixty
were killed, and several taken prisoners. The General then came.
We got our guns in position during the night, opened fire next
morning, and assaulted at seven. The place was miserable and
poor. The Armstrong guns, which enfiladed one face, did great
execution."
The fruits of these successes were lost by the signal overthrow and
practical annihilation of a large Chinese army at Taitsan. One of
General Staveley's detachments was cut off, and with his
communications threatened he found himself compelled to abandon
Kahding, and to retire towards Shanghai. Tsingpu had also to be
abandoned, and the garrison suffered some loss in effecting its
retreat. Of the first results of General Staveley's campaign there
thus remained very little, and it was only in the autumn that these
places were retaken, and the campaign against the Taepings in the
Shanghai districts continued with varying fortune throughout the
remainder of the year 1862 and the early months of 1863.
While these military events were in progress Major Gordon, who was
raised to the rank of Major in the army in December 1862 for his
services in China, had been trusted with the congenial task, and one
for which he was pre-eminently well suited, of surveying and mapping
the whole of the region for thirty miles. This work, necessary in
itself for many reasons, proved of incalculable value to him in the
operations which he eventually undertook and carried out to a
successful issue against the rebels. His own letters show how
thoroughly he fulfilled his instructions, and how his surveys ended in
his complete mastery of the topography of the region between the Grand
Canal, the sea, and the Yangtsekiang:--
"I have been now in every town and village in the thirty miles'
radius. The country is the same everywhere--a dead flat, with
innumerable creeks and bad pathways. The people have now settled
down quiet again, and I do not anticipate the rebels will ever
come back. They are rapidly on the decline, and two years ought
to bring about the utter suppression of the revolt. I do not
write about what we saw, as it amounts to nothing. There is
nothing of any interest in China; if you have seen one village
you have seen all the country. I have really an immensity to do.
It will be a good thing if the Government support the
propositions which are made to the Chinese.
"The weather here is delightful--a fine cold, clear air which is
quite invigorating after the summer heats. There is very good
pheasant-shooting in the half-populated districts, and some quail
at uncertain times. It is extraordinary to see the quantities of
fishing cormorants there are in the creeks. These cormorants are
in flocks of forty and fifty, and the owner in a small canoe
travels about with them. They fish three or four times a day, and
are encouraged by the shouts of their owners to dive. I have
scarcely ever seen them come up without a fish in their beaks,
which they swallow, but not for any distance, for there is a ring
to prevent it going down altogether. They get such dreadful
attacks of mumps, their throats being distended by the fish,
which are alive, when the birds seem as if they were pouter
pigeons. They are hoisted into the boats and then are very
sea-sick. Would you consider the fish a dainty?"
And again he writes about the Taepings, who were not in his eyes "a
people nobly struggling to be free," but a horde of ruthless
marauders.
"We had a visit from the marauding Taepings the other day. They
came close down in small parties to the settlement and burnt
several houses, driving in thousands of inhabitants. We went
against them and drove them away, but did not kill many. They
beat us into fits in getting over the country, which is
intersected in every way with ditches, swamps, etc. You can
scarcely conceive the crowds of peasants who come into Shanghai
when the rebels are in the neighbourhood--upwards of 15,000, I
should think, and of every size and age--many strapping fellows
who could easily defend themselves come running in with old women
and children.
"The people on the confines are suffering very greatly, and are
in fact dying of starvation. It is most sad this state of
affairs, and our Government really ought to put the rebellion
down. Words could not depict the horrors these people suffer from
the rebels, or describe the utter desert they have made of this
rich province. It is all very well to talk of non-intervention,
and I am not particularly sensitive, nor are our soldiers
generally so, but certainly we are all impressed with the utter
misery and wretchedness of these poor people.... In the midst of
those terrible times the British and foreign merchants behaved
nobly and gave great relief, while the Chinese merchants did not
lag behind in acts of charity. The hardest heart would have been
touched at the utter misery of these poor harmless people, for
whatever may be said of their rulers, no one can deny but that
the Chinese peasantry are the most obedient, quiet, and
industrious people in the world."
The propositions referred to in the former of these two letters were
that the services of Major Gordon should be lent to the Chinese
Government for the suppression of the Taeping rebellion, that he
should assume the command of an Anglo-Chinese legion of which the
nucleus already existed, and that he might enlist the services of a
certain number of our own officers. Considerable delay took place in
the execution of this project, as it was necessary to send to Europe
for the necessary authority; and another explanation was given
subsequently to the effect that Gordon insisted on finishing his
survey first. But Sir Charles Staveley, who nominated Major Gordon for
the work, has effectually disposed of this latter statement by
declaring that the former was the true and only cause. At length these
propositions were sanctioned, and on 26th March 1863 Major Gordon
proceeded to Sungkiang, a town west of Shanghai and south of Tsingpu,
to take over the command of the Chinese force, which had already been
named the Ever Victorious Army, and which in his hands justified its
name.
Before closing this chapter it will be well to give some account of
the origin of this force, and of the more important events that
preceded Gordon's appointment to the command. As far back as April
1860 the Viceroy of the Two Kiang provinces had begged the English and
French representatives to lend him military assistance in dealing with
the rebels. The request was not complied with, but when some of the
richest native merchants of Shanghai, with one Takee at their head,
formed themselves into a patriotic association, and bound themselves
to provide the funds required to raise a European-led force, no
impediments were placed in their way. In July 1860 the services of two
American adventurers who had had some military experience in Central
America and elsewhere were enlisted and taken into the pay of this
merchants' guild. Their names were Ward and Burgevine, and they were
both adventurers of an unscrupulous and unattractive type. In addition
to excellent pay, they were promised handsome money rewards for the
capture of specified places, and what spoil there was to take should
be theirs. Such a prospect was very inviting to the bold spirits of a
great port like Shanghai, with its trading ships from every quarter
of the world, and they succeeded in recruiting about 100 Europeans
and 200 Manilla men or Spanish half-breeds.
In order to test the quality of this force it was decided to attack
Sungkiang; and in July, only a week or so after it was organised, Ward
led his somewhat motley band against that place. The result was
unfavourable, as his attack was repulsed with some loss. Nothing
daunted, Ward collected some more Manilla men and renewed the attack.
He succeeded in capturing one of the gates, and in holding it until an
Imperial army of 10,000 men arrived, when the town was carried by
storm. Having thus proved its mettle, Ward's force became very
popular, and it was increased by many fresh recruits, chiefly Greeks
and Italians. It also was strengthened by the addition of some
artillery, two six-pounder and later two eighteen-pounder guns.
The Chinese merchants then offered Ward and his quarter-master
Burgevine a large reward for the capture of Tsingpu; and their legion,
accompanied by a Chinese force of 10,000 men, who were, however, only
to look on while it did the fighting, accordingly marched on that
place. The attack made during the night of 2nd August resulted in a
most disastrous repulse, most of the Europeans being either killed or
wounded, Ward himself receiving a severe wound in the jaw. He renewed
the attack with fresh men and two eighteen-pounders three weeks later;
but after bombarding the place for seven days, he was attacked by the
Taeping hero Chung Wang, and routed, with the loss of his guns and
military stores. It was on this occasion that Chung Wang, following up
his success, and doubly anxious to capture Shanghai because this new
and unexpected force was organised there, attacked that town, and was
only repulsed by the English and French troops who lined its walls.
This reverse at Tsingpu destroyed the reputation of Ward's force, and
for several months he remained discredited and unemployed. In March
1861 he reappeared at Sungkiang, at the head of sixty or seventy
Europeans whom he had recruited for the Imperial cause; but at that
moment the policy of the foreign Consuls had undergone a change in
favour of the Taepings, and Ward was arrested as a disturber of the
peace. Perhaps a more serious offence was that the high pay he offered
and prospect of loot had induced nearly thirty British sailors to
desert their ships. He was released on his claiming that he was a
Chinese subject, and also on his sending orders to his colleague
Burgevine to return the troops they had enlisted. Burgevine thought he
saw in this a chance of personal distinction, and before disbanding
the men he made with them another attack on Tsingpu. This attack, like
its two predecessors, was repulsed with heavy loss, and the original
Ward force was thus finally discredited. It should be borne in mind,
to distinguish it from what followed, that it was a mercenary force of
European and Spanish half-breeds, without a single Chinese in it.
In September 1861 these two men altered their proceedings, and gave a
new turn to the whole question. As it was impossible for them to
recruit foreigners, they induced Takee and his associates to provide
the funds for a native Chinese force, which they undertook to train
and organise. In this task they made considerable progress, and with a
view to making it popular with the Chinese, and also to give the men
confidence, this new force was named, probably by Takee, the Chun Chen
Chün or Ever Victorious Army. This proud title was given long before
the claim to it was justified, but its subsequent appropriateness has
buried in oblivion the slender claim it possessed to it on its
inception.
By the end of January 1862 Ward had succeeded in training two
regiments of 1000 men each, and with these he captured Quanfuling and
200 boats in the rear of the Taeping force, which attacked Shanghai
for a third time in that month. When the English and French forces
assumed the offensive before the arrival of Sir Charles Staveley, part
of Ward's Corps accompanied them in the attack on Kachiaou. It led the
attack, and behaved extremely well, thus giving rise to very
favourable anticipations as to what a properly-trained Chinese army
might do.
In a second action at Tseedong the force maintained the reputation it
had gained. The Chinese fought with great bravery, and the difficulty,
in fact, was in keeping them back. The English general reviewed them
after this encounter, and declared himself much impressed with their
appearance. Representations were made at Peking, and on 16th March
1862 an Imperial decree gave the first public recognition of the Ever
Victorious Army.
Although reverses followed, the Corps maintained the reputation it had
gained for steadiness and discipline. Under General Staveley at
Wongkadza it acted well and lost heavily, and in all the subsequent
movements of that officer it took a prominent part. When Tsingpu was
captured, as already described, one of Ward's regiments was left in it
as a garrison, but on the evacuation of that place in consequence of
the return of Chung Wang with fresh and more numerous forces, it
narrowly escaped annihilation. It was then that the Taeping general
named them in scornful irony, "Cha-Yang-Kweitser," or "Sham Foreign
Devils," the point of the sarcasm being that these troops wore an
European costume.
During the summer of 1862, when the heat rendered active operations
impossible, everything was done to increase both the numbers and the
efficiency of the Ever Victorious Army. By the month of July its
strength had been raised to 5000 men, the commissioned officers being
all Europeans except one Chinese, named Wongepoo, who had been given a
commission for special gallantry by Admiral Hope. Ward was in chief
command, and Colonel Forrester and Burgevine were his first and second
lieutenants. When the weather became a little cooler in August, it was
determined to utilise this force for the recapture of Tsingpu, which
was taken at the second assault on the 9th of that month, although not
without heavy loss in officers and men. Six weeks later the important
Taeping position at Tseki, across the Hangchow Bay and not far distant
from Ningpo, was attacked by Ward and a party of English blue-jackets.
The operation was perfectly successful, but Ward was shot in the
stomach and died the next day. His loss was a very considerable one,
for, as Gordon said, "he managed both the force and the mandarins very
ably." Colonel Forrester should have succeeded to the command, but he
declined the post, which then devolved upon Burgevine.
After a brief space the services of Captain Holland of the Royal
Marine Light Infantry were lent to Burgevine in the capacity of Chief
of the staff, and as this was done at the suggestion of the Futai
Li--since famous to Europeans as Li Hung Chang--it did not conduce to
greater harmony between him and Burgevine, for their antagonism had
already become marked. An occasion soon offered to fan this feeling to
a flame. A Chinese army under Li and General Ching advanced to attack
a Taeping position near Tsingpu, at the same time that Burgevine at
the head of his corps assailed it from the other side. The brunt of
the fighting fell on the latter, but when Li issued his bulletin he
claimed all the credit of the victory, and totally ignored Burgevine
and his men. Burgevine did not accept this rebuff meekly, and his
peremptory manner offended the Chinese. The breach was widened by the
distrust many of the Chinese merchants as well as officials felt as to
his loyalty, and soon it was seen that the funds so freely supplied to
Ward would not be forthcoming in his case.
Burgevine's character has been described in the following sentence by
Gordon himself:--
"He was a man of large promises and few works. His popularity was
great among a certain class. He was extravagant in his
generosity, and as long as he had anything would divide it with
his so-called friends, but never was a man of any administrative
or military talent, and latterly, through the irritation caused
by his unhealed wound and other causes, he was subject to violent
paroxysms of anger, which rendered precarious the safety of any
man who tendered to him advice that might be distasteful. He was
extremely sensitive of his dignity."
The situation between the Chinese authorities and Burgevine soon
became so strained that the former presented a formal complaint to
General Staveley, and begged him to remove Burgevine. This, as the
English commander pointed out, was for obvious reasons beyond his
power, but he made representations to his Government, and suggested
that an English officer should be lent to the Chinese, and he
nominated Gordon as the best qualified for the work. Pending the
arrival of the required authority, the Chinese, assisted by
Burgevine's own impetuosity, brought their relations with him to a
climax. The merchant Takee withheld the pay of the force; Burgevine
was first ordered to proceed with his troops to Nanking, and then, on
consenting, the order was withdrawn; some weeks later a fresh order to
the same effect was issued, and Burgevine demanded the payment of all
arrears before he would move, and thus Li's object of exposing
Burgevine as a disobedient officer to the Government that employed him
was attained.
The Ever Victorious Army, excited by the absence of its pay, and
worked upon by the exhortations of its chief, was on the point of
mutiny, and Burgevine hastened to Shanghai to obtain by force rather
than persuasion the arrears. On 4th January 1863 he saw Takee, a
violent scene ensued, and Burgevine used violence. Not only did he
strike Takee, but he carried off the treasure necessary to pay his
men. Such conduct could not be upheld or excused. Li Hung Chang made
the strongest complaint. Burgevine was dismissed the Chinese service,
and General Staveley forwarded the notice to him with a quiet
intimation that it would be well to give up his command without making
a disturbance. Burgevine complied with this advice, handed over the
command to Captain Holland, and came back to Shanghai on 6th of
January. He published a defence of his conduct, and expressed his
regret for having struck Takee.
Captain Holland was thus the third commander of the Ever Victorious
Army, and a set of regulations was drawn up between Li Hung Chang and
General Staveley as to the conduct and control of the force. It was
understood that Captain Holland's appointment was only temporary until
the decision of the Government as to Gordon's nomination arrived, but
this arrangement allowed of the corps again taking the field, for
although it cost the Chinese £30,000 a month, it had done nothing
during the last three months of the year 1862. Early in February 1863,
therefore, Captain Holland, at the head of 2,300 men, including a
strong force of artillery--600 men and twenty-two guns and
mortars--was directed to attack Taitsan, an important place about
fifty miles north-east of Shanghai. An Imperialist army of nearly
10,000 men acted in conjunction with it. The affair was badly managed
and proved most disastrous.
After a short bombardment a breach was declared to be practicable, and
the ladder and storming parties were ordered to the assault.
Unfortunately, the reconnoitring of the Taeping position had been very
carelessly done, and the attacking parties were checked by a wet
ditch, twenty feet wide and six feet deep, of which nothing had been
seen. Situated only forty yards from the wall of the town, and without
any means of crossing it, although some few did by throwing across a
ladder, the storming party stood exposed to a terrific fire. Captain
Holland ordered a retreat, but it was not managed any better than the
attack. The light guns were removed too quickly, and the heavy ones
were stuck so fast in the mud that they could not be removed at all.
The Taepings attacked in their turn, and the greatest confusion
prevailed, during which the survivors of the larger half of the Ever
Victorious Army escaped in small detachments back to Sungkiang. Twenty
European officers were killed or wounded, besides 300 Chinese
privates. Captain Holland exposed himself freely, but this, his only
action in independent command, resulted in complete and unqualified
failure. Gordon himself summed up the causes of this serious and
discouraging reverse:--
"The causes of the failure were the too cheap rate at which the
rebels were held. The force had hitherto fought with the allies
with them (except at Tsingpu). They now had to bear the brunt of
the fighting themselves, the mistake of not having provided
bridges in spite of the mandarin's information, and the too close
proximity of the heavy guns to the walls, and the want of cover
they had, and finally the withdrawal of the lighter guns before
the heavy guns, whose removal they should have covered. There is
little doubt that the rebels had been warned by persons in
Shanghai of the intended attack, and that several foreigners, who
had been dismissed by Captain Holland, were with the rebels
defending the breach. As may be imagined, Burgevine's removal had
caused considerable feeling among his acquaintances, who were not
sorry to see the first expedition of the force under an English
officer fail, being in hopes that the command would again revert
to Burgevine."
This reverse occurred on 13th February, and no further steps of any
consequence were taken until the appointment of Major Gordon, which at
last was sanctioned in the latter portion of March, about a week
before ill-health compelled General Staveley to resign his command in
China. That officer was connected with the Gordon family, his sister,
a most amiable and sympathetic lady, being Lady Gordon, widow of the
late Sir Henry Gordon. As far back as May 1861--that is, prior to most
of the events described in this chapter--Gordon's sensitiveness about
his family connection with the commanding officer in China had
impelled him to write this letter:--
"I was much put out in Henry's writing, and I think hinting he
could do something for me, and I went to Staveley and told him
so. It is the bother of one's life to be trying after the honours
of the profession, and it has grown in late years into a regular
trade--everyone uses private interest."
When Gordon gave this early manifestation of his independent spirit he
was little more than twenty-eight years of age, but it should
certainly be noted as showing that in one respect he was very little
changed in his later years from what he was in his youth.
After these reverses in February nothing more was attempted until
Major Gordon arrived at Sungkiang on 25th March 1863 to take over the
command of the force. It is to be hoped that the last few pages have
made clear what that force was like. In the first place, it had been
one composed entirely of Europeans, a band somewhat resembling those
that have set up and cast down the mushroom republics that separate
the conquests of Pizarro from those of Cortes. That force achieved
nothing and had an ignominious end. It was succeeded by the larger
force of drilled Chinese, to which was given the name of the Ever
Victorious Army. Although these Chinese showed far more courage than
might have been expected of them, none of their leaders--Ward,
Burgevine, or Holland--seemed able to turn their good qualities to any
profitable purpose. They were as often defeated as successful, and at
the very moment of Gordon's assuming the command the defeat of Captain
Holland at Taitsan, and a subsidiary reverse of Major Tapp at Fushan,
had reduced their _morale_ to the lowest point, and even justified a
belief that for military purposes this force was nearly, if not quite,
worthless.
CHAPTER IV.
THE TAEPING REBELLION.
In order to bring before the reader the magnitude of Gordon's
achievements in China it is necessary to describe briefly the course
of the Taeping rebellion, and to show the kind of opponents over whom
he was destined to obtain so glorious and decisive a victory. But as
this would be to tell a thrice-told tale, I content myself with giving
in an abridged form the account I prepared from the papers of General
Gordon and other trustworthy sources, which appears in the last volume
of my "History of China."
As far back as the year 1830 there had been symptoms of disturbed
popular feeling in Kwangsi, the most southern province of China
adjacent to Tonquin. The difficulty of operating in a region which
possessed few roads, and which was only rendered at all accessible by
the West River or Sikiang, had led the Chinese authorities, much
engaged as they were about the foreign question, to postpone those
vigorous measures, which, if taken at the outset, might have speedily
restored peace and stamped out the first promptings of revolt. The
authorities were more concerned at the proceedings of the formidable
secret Association, known as the "Triads," than at the occurrences in
Kwangsi, probably because the Triads made no secret that their object
was the expulsion of the Manchus and the restoration of the old Ming
dynasty. The true origin of the Triads is not to be assigned, but
there seems reasonable ground for the suspicion that they were
connected with the discontented monks of a Buddhist monastery which
had been suppressed by the Government. Between them they seem to have
formed the inception of what became the famous Taeping rebellion.
The summer of 1850 witnessed a great accession of energy on the part
of the rebels in Kwangsi, which may perhaps have been due to the death
of the Emperor Taoukwang. The important town of Wuchow on the Sikiang,
close to the western border of Kwantung, was besieged by a force
reported to number 50,000 men. The governor was afraid to report the
occurrence, knowing that it would carry his own condemnation and
probable disgrace; and it was left for a minor official to reveal the
extent to which the insurgents had carried their depredations. Two
leaders named Chang assumed the style of royalty; other bands appeared
in the province of Hoonan as well as in the southern parts of
Kwantung, but they all collected by degrees on the Sikiang, where they
placed an embargo on merchandise, and gradually crushed out such trade
as there had been by that river. Their proceedings were not restricted
to the fair operations of war. They plundered and massacred wherever
they went. They claimed to act in the name of the Chinese people; yet
they slew all they could lay hands upon, without discrimination of age
or sex.
The confidence of the insurgents was raised by frequent success, and
by the manifest inability of the Canton Viceroy to take any effectual
military measures against them. Two hundred imperial troops were
decoyed into a defile, and slaughtered by an overwhelming force in
ambush. This reverse naturally caused considerable alarm in Canton
itself, and defensive measures were taken. Governor Yeh was sent
against them with 2000 men, and he succeeded in compelling, or as some
say in inducing, them to retreat. Any satisfaction this success may
have occasioned was soon dispelled, for at Lienchow, near the small
port of Pakhoi, the rebels not merely gained a victory, but were
joined by the troops sent to attack them. But these successes at
several different points were of far less significance than the
nomination of a single chief with the royal title of Tien Wang, or the
Heavenly King.
The man on whom their choice fell was named Hung-tsiuen. He was the
son of a small farmer, who lived in a village near the North River,
about thirty miles from Canton. If he was not a Hakka himself, he
lived in a district which was considered to belong exclusively to that
strange race, which closely resembles our gipsies. He belonged to a
degraded race, therefore, and it was held that he was not entitled to
that free entry into the body of the civil service, which is the
natural privilege of every true-born Chinese subject. His friends
declared that he came out high at each of the periodical examinations,
but their statements may have been false in this as in much else. The
fact is clear that he failed to obtain his degrees, and that he was
denied admission into the public service. Hung was therefore a
disappointed candidate, the more deeply disappointed, perhaps, that
his sense of injured merit and the ill-judging flattery of his
admirers made his rejection appear unjust.
Hung was, at all events, a shrewd observer of the weakness of the
Government, and of the popular discontent. He perceived the
opportunity of making the Manchu dynasty the scapegoat of national
weakness and apathy. He could not be the servant of the Government.
Class contempt, the prejudices of his examiners, or it may even have
been his own haughty presumption and self-sufficiency, effectually
debarred him from the enjoyment of the wealth and privileges that fall
to the lot of those in executive power in all countries, but in
Asiatic above every other. To his revengeful but astute mind it was
clear that if he could not be an official he might be the enemy of the
Government and its possible subverter.
The details of his early career have been mainly recorded by those who
sympathised with the supposed objects of his operations; and while
they have been very anxious to discover his virtues, they were always
blind to his failings. The steps of his imposture have therefore been
described with an amount of implicit belief which reflected little
credit on the judgment of those who were anxious to give their
sanction to the miracles which preceded the appearance of this
adventurer in the field. Absurd stories as to his dreams, allegorical
coincidences showing how he was summoned by a just and all-powerful
God to the supreme seat of power, were repeated with a degree of faith
so emphatic in its mode of expression as to make the challenge of its
sincerity appear extremely harsh. Hung, the defeated official
candidate, the long-deaf listener to the entreaties of Christian
missionaries, was thus in a brief time metamorphosed into Heaven's
elect for the Dragon Throne, into the iconoclastic propagator of the
worship of a single God, and the destroyer of the mass of idolatry
stored in the hearts and venerated in the temples of the Chinese
people for countless ages. Whether Hung was merely an intriguer or a
fanatic, he could not help feeling some gratitude to those who so
conveniently echoed his pretensions to the Throne at the same time
that they pleaded extenuating circumstances for acts of cruelty and
brigandage often unsurpassed in their infamy.
If he found the foreigners thus willing to accept him at his own
estimate, it would have been very strange if he had not experienced
still greater success in imposing upon the credulity of his own
countrymen. To declare that he had dreamt dreams which showed that he
was selected by a heavenly mandate for Royal honours was sufficient to
gain a small body of adherents, provided only that he was prepared to
accept the certain punishment of detection and failure. If Hung's
audacity was shown by nothing else, it was demonstrated by the lengths
to which he carried the supernatural agency that urged him to quit the
ignominious life of a Kwantung peasant for the career of a pretender
to Imperial honours. The course of training to which he subjected
himself, the ascetic deprivations, the loud prayers and invocations,
the supernatural counsels and meetings, was that adopted by every
other religious devotee or fanatic as the proper novitiate for those
honours based on the superstitious reverence of mankind, which are
sometimes no inadequate substitute for temporal power and influence,
even when they fail to pave the way to their attainment.
Yet when Hung proceeded to Kwangsi there was no room left to hope that
the seditious movement would dissolve of its own accord, for the
extent and character of his pretensions at once invested the rising
with all the importance of open and unveiled rebellion. After the
proclamation of Hung as Tien Wang, the success of the Kwangsi rebels
increased. The whole of the country south of the Sikiang, with the
strong military station of Nanning, fell into their hands, and they
prepared in the early part of the year 1851 to attack the provincial
capital Kweiling, which commanded one of the principal high roads into
the interior of China. So urgent did the peril at this place appear
that three Imperial Commissioners were sent there direct by land from
Peking, and the significance of their appointment was increased by the
fact that they were all Manchus. They were instructed to raise troops
_en route_, and to reach Kweiling as soon as possible. Their movements
were so dilatory that that place would have fallen if it had not been
for the courage and military capacity shown by Wurantai, leader of the
Canton Bannermen. This soldier fully realised the perils of the
situation. In a memorial to the Throne he spoke plainly:--
"The outer barbarians (Europeans) say that of literature China
has more than enough, of the art of war not sufficient. The whole
country swarms with the rebels. Our funds are nearly at an end,
and our troops few; our officers disagree, and the power is not
concentrated. The commander of the forces wants to extinguish a
burning wagon-load of fagots with a cupful of water. I fear we
shall hereafter have some serious affair--that the great body
will rise against us, and our own people leave us."
The growth of the rebellion proved steady if slow. Although 30,000
troops were stated to be concentrated opposite the Taeping positions,
fear or inexperience prevented action, and the numbers and courage of
the Imperialists melted away. Had the Chinese authorities only pressed
on, they must, by sheer weight, have swept the rebels into Tonquin,
and there would thus have been an end of Tien Wang and his
aspirations. They lacked the nerve, and their vacillation gave
confidence and reputation to an enemy that need never have been
allowed to become formidable.
While the Imperial authorities had been either discouraged or at the
least lethargic, the pretender Tien Wang had been busily engaged in
establishing his authority on a sound basis, and in assigning their
respective ranks to his principal followers who saw in the conferring
of titles and posts, at the moment of little meaning or value, the
recognition of their past zeal and the promise of reward for future
service. The men who rallied round Tien Wang were schoolmasters and
labourers. To these some brigands of the mountain frontier supplied
rude military knowledge, while the leaders of the Triads brought as
their share towards the realisation of what they represented as a
great cause skill in intrigue, and some knowledge of organisation.
Neither enthusiasm nor the energy of desperation was wanting; but for
those qualities which claim respect, if they cannot command success,
we must look in vain. Yet the peasants of Kwangsi and the artisans of
Kwantung assumed the title of "Wang" or prince, and divided in
anticipation the prizes that should follow the establishment of some
dynasty of their own making.
The war dragged on in the Sikiang valley during two years, but the
tide of success had certainly set in the main against the
Imperialists, as was shown by the scene of operations being
transferred to the northern side of that river. The campaign might
have continued indefinitely until one side or the other was exhausted
had not the state of the province warned Tien Wang that he could not
hope to feed much longer the numerous followers who had attached
themselves to his cause. He saw that there would very soon remain for
him no choice except to retire into Tonquin, and to settle down into
the ignominious life of a border brigand. To Tien Wang the thought was
intolerable, and in sheer desperation he came to the resolve to march
northwards into the interior of China. It was not the inspiration of
genius but the pressure of dire need that urged the Taeping leader to
issue his orders for the invasion of Hoonan. He issued a proclamation
on the eve of beginning this march, announcing that he had received
"the divine commission to exterminate the Manchus and to possess the
Empire as its true sovereign."
It was at this stage in the rebellion that the name "Taepings" came
into general use, and various accounts are given as to its origin.
Some say it was taken from the small town of that name in the
south-west of Kwangsi, where the insurrection began; others that the
characters mean "Universal Peace," and that it was the style assumed
by the new dynasty. In seeming contradiction with this is the fact
that some of the Taepings themselves declared that they never heard
the name, and did not know what it meant. At this particular juncture
the rebels were in the heart of Kwangsi, at the district capital of
Woosuen. In May 1851 they moved to Siang, a little north of that
place. They ravaged the country, making no long stay anywhere. In
August they were at Yungan, where 16,000 men were ranged under the
banner of the Heavenly King, and for a moment Tien Wang may have
thought of making a dash on Canton. Respect for Wurantai's military
capacity induced him to forego the adventure, and at Yungan, where he
remained until April 1852, the Taeping leader made his final
arrangements for his march northwards.
At Yungan a circumstance occurred which first promised to strengthen
the Taepings, and then to lead to their disruption. Tien Wang was
joined there by five influential chiefs and many members of the Triad
Society. For a time it seemed as if these allies would necessarily
bring with them a great accession of popular strength; but whether
they disapproved of Tien Wang's plans, or were offended by the
arrogant bearing of the Wangs, who, but the other day little better
than the dregs of the people, had suddenly assumed the yellow dress
and insignia of Chinese royalty, the Triad leaders took a secret and
hurried departure from his camp, and hastened to make their peace with
the Imperialists. The principal of these members of the most
formidable secret society in China--Chang Kwoliang by name--was given
a military command of some importance, and afterwards distinguished
himself among the Imperial commanders. In April 1852 the Taeping army
left its quarters at Yungan and marched direct on Kweiling, the
principal city of the province, where the Imperial commissioners sent
from Peking had long remained inactive. Tien Wang attacked them at the
end of April or the beginning of May, but he was repulsed with some
loss. Afraid of breaking his force against the walls of so strong a
place, he abandoned the attack and marched into Hoonan. Had the
Imperial generals only been as energetic in offensive measures as they
had shown themselves obstinate in defence, they might have harassed
his rear, delayed his progress, and eventually brought him to a
decisive engagement under many disadvantages. But the Imperial
Commissioners at Kweiling did nothing, being apparently well satisfied
with having rid themselves of the presence of such troublesome
neighbours.
On 12th of June the Taepings attacked the small town of Taou in Hoonan
with better success. Some resistance was offered, and one of the
Taeping Wangs, known as the "Southern King," was killed. This was a
great loss, because he was a man of some education, and had taken the
most prominent part in the organisation of the Taeping rebellion.
General Gordon inclined to the opinion that he was the real originator
of the whole rising. His loss was a severe blow to the Taepings, whose
confidence in themselves and their cause was alike rudely shaken. They
could not however turn back, for fear of the force at Kweiling, and to
halt for any time was scarcely less dangerous. Necessity compelled
them therefore to press on, and in August they captured the three
small towns of Kiaho, Ching, and Kweyang. Their next march was both
long and forced. Overrunning the whole adjacent country, they appeared
early in the month of September before the strong and important town
of Changsha, situated on the river Seang, and only fifty miles south
of the large lake Tungting.
At this town, the capital of Hoonan, some vigorous preparations had
been made to withstand them. Not merely was the usual garrison
stationed there, but it so happened that Tseng Kwofan, a man of great
ability and some considerable resolution, was residing near the town
at the time. Tseng Kwofan had held several offices in the service, and
as a member of the Hanlin enjoyed a high position and reputation; but
he was absent from the capital on one of those frequent periods of
retirement to their native province which the officials of China have
to make on the occasion of any near relative's death.
When tidings of the approach of the Taepings reached him he threw
himself with all the forces he could collect into Changsha. At the
same time he ordered the local militia to assemble as rapidly as
possible in the neighbourhood, in order to harass the movements of the
enemy. He called upon all those who had the means to show their duty
to the state and sovereign by raising recruits or by promising rewards
to those volunteers who would serve in the army against the rebels.
Had the example of Tseng Kwofan been followed generally, it is not too
much to say that the Taepings would never have got to Nanking. As it
was, he set the first example of true patriotism, and he had the
immediate satisfaction of saving Changsha.
When the Taepings reached Changsha they found the gates closed and the
walls manned. They proceeded to lay siege to it; they cut off its
supplies, and they threatened the garrison with extermination. They
even attempted to carry it by storm on three separate occasions.
During eighty days the siege went on; but the Taepings were then
compelled to admit that they were as far from success as ever. They
had suffered very considerable losses, including another of their
Wangs, the Western King, and although it was said that the loss of the
Imperialists was larger, they could better afford it. On the 1st
December they accordingly abandoned the siege and resumed their march
northwards. They crossed the Tungting Lake on boats and junks which
they had seized, and secured the town of Yochow on the Yangtsekiang
without meeting any resistance. Here they captured much war material,
including a large supply of gunpowder left by the great Chinese
Viceroy, Wou Sankwei, of the seventeenth century. From Yochow they
hastened down the river. The important city of Hankow surrendered
without a blow. The not less important town of Wouchang, on the
opposite or southern bank of the river, was then attacked, and after a
siege of a fortnight carried by storm. The third town of Hanyang,
which completes the busy human hive where the Han joins the great
river, did not attempt any resistance.
These successes raised the Taepings from the depths of despair to the
heights of hope. The capture of such wealthy places dispelled all
their doubt and discouragement. They were able to repay themselves for
the losses and hardships they had undergone, and the prize they had
thus secured furnished ground for hoping for more. But even now it was
no part of their mission to stand still. They waited at Hankow only
long enough to attach to their cause the many thousands attracted to
Tien Wang's flag by these successes. The possibility of pursuit by
Tseng Kwofan at the head of the warlike levies of Hoonan, where each
brave is considered equal to two from another province, was still
present to their minds. But he unfortunately rested content with his
laurels, while the Taepings swept like an irresistible wave or torrent
down the valley of the Yangtsekiang.
The capture of Kiukiang, a town situated on the river near the
northern extremity of the lake Poyang, and of Ganking followed in
quick succession, and on 8th March the Taepings sat down before
Nanking, the old capital of the Mings. The siege lasted only sixteen
days. Notwithstanding that there was a considerable Manchu force in
the Tartar city, which might easily have been defended apart from the
Chinese and much larger town, the resistance offered was singularly
faint-hearted. The Taepings succeeded in blowing in one of the gates.
The townspeople fraternised with the assailants, and the very Manchus,
who had looked so valiant in face of Sir Hugh Gough's force ten years
before, now surrendered their lives and their honour after a mere show
of resistance to a force which was nothing better than an armed
rabble. The Manchu colony of Nanking, to the number of some 4000
families, had evidently fallen off from its high renown. Instead of
dying at their posts, they threw themselves on the pity of the Taeping
leader. Their cowardice helped them not; of 20,000 Manchus not 100
escaped. The tale rests on irrefragable evidence. "We killed them all
to the infant in arms; we left not a root to sprout from; and the
bodies of the slain we cast into the Yangtse."
The capture of Nanking and this sweeping massacre of the dominant race
seemed to point the inevitable finger of fate at the Tatsing dynasty.
It was no longer possible to regard Tien Wang and his miscellaneous
gathering as an enemy beneath contempt. Without achieving any
remarkable success, having indeed been defeated whenever they were
opposed with the least resolution, the Taepings found themselves in
possession of the second city in the Empire. With that city they
acquired the control of the navigation of the Great River, and they
cut off the better part of the communications between the northern and
southern halves of the Empire. They abandoned Hankow, and confined
their occupation of the river banks to the part between Kiukiang and
Nanking; but they determined to secure the Grand Canal, which enters
the river east of the city. On 1st April 1853 they occupied
Chinkiangfoo, on the southern side of the river, and they held it, but
although they also captured Yangchow on the northern bank, they
evacuated it in a few days. These successes were obtained without any
loss, as all the garrisons fled at the mere approach of the dreaded
Taepings.
The Imperialist authorities seemed paralysed by the rapidity and
success of the rebels, who devoted all their efforts to strengthening
the defences of Nanking and to provisioning it in view of all
eventualities. But the thoughts of Tien Wang and his immediate
advisers were still of offensive and forward measures, and when
Nanking was equipped for defence a large part of the Taeping army was
ordered to march against Peking. At this time it was computed that the
total number of the Taepings did not fall short of 80,000 trustworthy
fighting men, while there were perhaps more than 100,000 Chinese
pressed into their service as hewers of wood and drawers of water. The
lines of Nanking and the batteries along the Yangtsekiang were the
creation of the forced labour of the population which had not fled
before the Taepings.
On the 12th of May an army, stated to consist of 200,000 men, but
probably consisting of less than half that number of combatants,
crossed the Yangtse and marched northwards. It would be uninteresting
to name the many small places they captured on their way, but on 19th
June they reached Kaifong, the capital of Honan, and once of China
itself. They had thus transferred in a few weeks their advanced posts
from the Yangtsekiang to the Hwangho, or Yellow River.
The garrison of Kaifong made a resolute defence, and repulsed the
Taepings, who at once abandoned the siege in accordance with their
usual custom, and resumed their march. They succeeded in crossing the
Yellow River under the eyes of the Kaifong garrison, and they then
attacked Hwaiking, an important prefectural town, where they
encountered a stout resistance. They besieged it for two months, and
then had to give up the attempt. Forces were gathering from different
directions, and it became necessary to baffle their opponents. They
marched westwards for some distance along the southern bank of the
Hwangho, turned suddenly north at Yuenking, and on reaching Pingyang
they again turned in an easterly direction, and secured the Lin
Limming Pass which leads into the Metropolitan province of Pechihli.
The whole of the autumn of 1853 was taken up with these manoeuvres,
and it was on 30th September that the Taepings first appeared in the
province containing the capital. They met with little or no
opposition. They had mystified their pursuers, and surprised the
inhabitants of the districts through which they passed. Having forced
the Limming Pass, the Taepings found no difficulty in occupying the
towns on the south-west border of Pechihli. The defeat of the Manchu
garrison in a pass that was considered almost impregnable gave the
Taepings the prestige of victory, and the towns opened their gates one
after another. They crossed the Hootoo River on a bridge of boats
which they constructed themselves, and then occupied the town of
Shinchow; on 21st October they reached Tsing, about twenty miles south
of Tientsin and only one hundred from Peking; but beyond this point
neither then nor at any other time did the rebels succeed in getting.
The forcing of the Limming Pass produced great confusion at Peking. It
was no longer a question of suffering subjects and disturbed
provinces. The capital of the Empire, the very person of the Emperor,
was in imminent danger of destruction at the hands of a ruthless foe.
The city was denuded of troops. Levies were hastily summoned from
Manchuria in order to defend the line of the Peiho and the approaches
to the capital. Had the Taepings shown better generalship there is no
saying but that they would have succeeded in capturing it, as the
Imperialists had left quite unguarded the approach by Chingting and
Paoting, and the capture of Peking would have sounded the knell of the
Manchu dynasty. But the Taepings did not seize the chance--if it were
one--and they were far from being in the best of spirits. They had
advanced far, but it looked as if it was into the lion's mouth. Their
march had been a remarkable one, but it had been attended with no
striking success. In their front was the Tientsin militia,
strengthened by a large if nondescript force, led by the Mongol chief
Sankolinsin. In their rear the levies of Hoonan, of the vast district
that had suffered from their exactions, were closing up, and soon they
were closely beleaguered in a hastily-fortified camp at Tsinghai. In
this they were besieged from the end of October to the beginning of
March 1854. The Imperial generals, afraid to risk an assault, hoped to
starve them out, and so they might have done had not Tien Wang sent a
fresh army to extricate this force from its peril. Then the retreat
began, but, beset by assailants from every side, it was slow and
disastrous. The struggle went on until March 1855, when Sankolinsin
was able to declare that not a Taeping remained north of the Yellow
River. Only a very small portion of the two armies sent to capture
Peking ever returned to the headquarters of Tien Wang.
While these events, and others that do not call for description as
being of minor importance, were in progress, symptoms of
disintegration were already beginning to reveal themselves in the camp
at Nanking. After its capture Tien Wang himself retired into the
interior of his palace and never afterwards appeared in public. All
his time was passed in the harem, and the opportunity was thus given
his more ambitious lieutenants to assert themselves. Tung Wang, the
"Eastern King," became principal Minister. He, too, claimed to have
communion with Heaven, and on celestial advice he began to get rid of
those of his comrades who opposed his schemes. He even summoned Tien
Wang to his presence and reproved him for his proceedings. A plot was
then formed against Tung Wang, and he was slain with three of his
brothers, in the presence of Tien Wang, by another of the Taeping
chiefs. Nor did the slaughter stop there, for it is alleged, although
the numbers must not be accepted literally, that 200,000 of his
partisans--men, women, and children--were massacred. These internal
dissensions threatened to break up the Taeping confederacy, and no
doubt they would have done so but for the appearance of the most
remarkable man associated with the movement, and one of the most
heroic figures in China's history.
A young officer, rejoicing in the innumerable Chinese name of Li, had
attracted Tung Wang's favourable notice, and was by him entrusted with
a small command. It will be more convenient to speak of him by his
subsequent title of Chung Wang, or the "Faithful King." He
distinguished himself in his first enterprise by defeating a large
Imperial army besieging Chinkiang, and in relieving the garrison when
on the point of surrender. But while engaged on this task the
Imperialists closed in on his rear and cut off his retreat back to
Nanking, whither Tien Wang hastily summoned him to return. He
endeavoured to make his way along the northern bank, but was checked
at Loohoo by the ex-Triad Chang Kwoliang, the same who deserted the
Taepings in Kwangsi. Chang had crossed the river to oppose him, and
Chung Wang, hastily conveying his army over the river, fell upon and
destroyed the weakened force that the Imperial general had left there,
under General Chi, who committed suicide. Chang Kwoliang crossed after
him, but only to suffer defeat, and Chung Wang made his way into
Nanking. He then attacked the main Imperial army before its walls,
under the Emperor's generalissimo Heang Yung, and drove it out of its
entrenchments. Heang took his defeat so much to heart that he also
committed suicide, but Chang Kwoliang made a supreme effort to
retrieve the day, and succeeded in retaking all the lost positions,
with the exception of the Yashua Gate of Nanking.
While these events were in progress in the Taeping capital, some
events that must be briefly referred to happened on a different scene.
The Triads, aided by the mob, rose in Shanghai, overcame the Emperor's
officers and garrison, and on 7th September 1853 obtained complete
mastery of the native city. The foreign settlement was placed in a
state of siege, the men-of-war covered the approaches to the
factories, and a volunteer corps was carefully organised and
constantly employed. Then an Imperial army re-appeared on the scene,
and laid siege to Shanghai, but it was conducted with no skill, and
the situation remained unchanged. After twelve months' delay the
French Admiral, Laguerre, decided to help the Imperialists, and he
began to bombard the walls in December 1854. He combined with them in
an assault, and 400 French sailors and the Imperialists attacked the
walls which had been breached. The assault ended disastrously, for the
rebels defended the houses, and at last drove back the assailants with
much loss. The pressure of famine compelled the besieged some months
later to make a _sortie_, when the Imperialists recovered the town. A
similar rising, with a similar result, occurred at Amoy. The
insurgents caused a great loss of life and property, but in the end
the authorities gained the upper hand. These events compelled the
foreign consuls and their Governments to reconsider their policy,
which had been one of sympathy towards the Taepings, and gradually the
conviction became universal that it would be well for civilization and
trade if a speedy end were put to the Taeping rebellion. But for our
own quarrel and war with the central Government these views would have
borne fruit in acts at an earlier date than they did.
During the campaign of 1858 the Taepings more than held their own
through the courage and activity shown by Chung Wang. He relieved the
town of Ganking when closely pressed by Tseng Kwofan, and although he
could not prevent a fresh beleaguerment of Nanking, it caused him no
apprehension because the Emperor's generals were well known to have no
intention of attacking. Notwithstanding this, it was clearly foreseen
that in time Nanking must fall by starvation. In these straits Chung
Wang proved the saviour of his party. The city was invested on three
sides; only one remained open for any one to carry out the news of
Tien Wang's necessities. In this moment of peril there was a general
reluctance to quit the besieged town, but unless someone did, and that
quickly, the place was doomed. In this supreme moment Chung Wang
offered to go himself. At first the proposal was received with a
chorus of disapproval, but at last, when he went to the door of Tien
Wang's palace and beat the gong which lay there for those who claimed
justice, he succeeded in overcoming the opposition to his plan, and in
impressing upon his audience the real gravity of the situation. His
request was granted, and having nominated trusty men to the command
during his absence, he left by the southern gate. A few days later and
Tseng's last levies constructed their fortified camp in front of it.
The Emperor's generals unfortunately reverted to their old dilatory
measures, because they failed to realise the importance with which the
possession of Nanking still invested the Taepings. Without that city
they would have been nothing but a band of brigands, who could easily
have been dispersed. With it they could claim the status of a separate
dynasty. Yet the capture of Nanking was put off until the last act of
all. These sapient leaders, whose military knowledge was antiquated,
acted with an indifference to the most obvious considerations, that
would have been ludicrous if it had not been a further injury to a
suffering people. In 1858 their apathy was such that it not merely
saved Nanking but played the whole game into the hands of Chung Wang.
That chief succeeded in collecting a small force, with which he at
once began to harass Tseng's army. By transferring his army rapidly
from one side of the river to the other, he succeeded in supplying his
deficiency in numbers; but with all his activity he could make no
impression on the mass of his opponents. He even got the worst of it
in several skirmishes, but by a supreme effort he succeeded in
overpowering the Imperial force north of the river at Poukou, and thus
relieved the pressure on Nanking. But this was only momentary, and
after a doubtful and wearisome campaign throughout the year 1859, the
situation again became one of great gravity for the besieged Taepings
who were now confined to Nanking and a few other towns in the Yangtse
valley.
In this extremity Chung Wang conceived a fresh plan for extricating
his cause from the difficulties that beset it. By January 1860 all
Chung Wang's arrangements were completed. He distributed considerable
sums of money among his men to put them in good humour, and then set
forth. His first movements were directed to misleading his enemy as to
his real object, and having succeeded in this he marched as rapidly as
possible towards the important harbour of Hangchow, in the bay of the
same name, south of Shanghai. On 19th March he succeeded in capturing
the Chinese city, but the Tartar portion held out, and a relieving
army compelled Chung Wang to retire. What seemed an unredeemed
calamity proved a stroke of good fortune, for the Imperialists had
sent their best troops to pursue him, and thus materially weakened the
force before Nanking. Chung Wang saw his chance, and while the
Imperialists were rejoicing in Hangchow at its recovery, he hastened
back by forced marches, and fell upon the besieging army. In the
desperate engagement that followed 5000 Imperialists were slain, and
the remainder were driven ignominiously from the field. Thus, at the
blackest moment of their fortunes, did Chung Wang succeed in
delivering his kinsmen who had so long been shut up in Nanking. This
siege had then continued with more or less interruption for seven
years.
Nor did Chung Wang's success stop here. He fought a battle at Tayan
with his old adversary Chang Kwoliang, and defeated him with a loss of
10,000 men. At the height of the engagement Chang Kwoliang was drowned
while crossing a canal, and this decided the battle. Encouraged by
these successes, and with increased forces--for most of the prisoners
he took were incorporated in his army--Chung Wang assumed the
offensive, and after winning no fewer than three regular engagements,
he succeeded in capturing the important city of Soochow, on the Grand
Canal, and this became his chief quarters during the remainder of this
long struggle. By these successes he obtained fresh supplies, and
commanded the great and hitherto little touched resources of the
wealthy province of Kiangsu. It was thus that he was brought into the
neighbourhood of Shanghai, and made those attempts to acquire
possession of the Chinese city which were set forth in the last
chapter, and which were the true cause of the inception of the
foreign, or foreign-trained force, that began with Ward.
After his repulse at Shanghai, Chung Wang was recalled to Nanking. He
went reluctantly, leaving Hoo Wang, "the Protecting King," as his
deputy at Soochow. He found there everything in confusion, and that
Tien Wang, instead of laying in rice for a fresh siege, was absorbed
in his devotion and amusements, while the other chiefs were engaged in
plundering their own subjects. Dissatisfied with what he saw at
Nanking, Chung Wang again took the field, and transferred the scene of
hostilities to the province of Kiangsi, but although he showed great
activity, and marched 800 miles, he gained little, and, indeed, was
defeated on one or two occasions. Nor could he save Ganking, which,
after being besieged for three years, surrendered to Tseng Kwotsiuen,
and thus all hope of succour from the west, or of retreat there, in
the last resort, was removed from the hard-beset garrison of Nanking.
As some set-off to this reverse, Chung Wang captured the ports of
Ningpo and Hangchow, after a gallant defence by a small Manchu
garrison. The Taepings could scarcely now hope for durable success,
but their capacity for inflicting an enormous amount of injury was
evidently not destroyed. Chung Wang's energy and military skill alone
sustained their cause, but the lovers of rapine and turbulence flocked
in their thousands to his standard.
In the Yangtse valley--in fact, wherever Chung Wang was not--the
Taepings met with many reverses that counterbalanced these successes.
Several Chinese armies approached Nanking from different sides, and
Tien Wang in a state of panic summoned Chung Wang, his only champion,
back to his side. That warrior obeyed the summons, leaving Mow Wang in
charge of Soochow, but he could do no good. He found nothing but
disorder at the Taeping capital, and no troops with which he could
venture to assume the offensive against the powerful army, in numbers
at all events, that the two Tsengs had drawn round Nanking. In this
position his troubles were increased by the suspicion of Tien Wang,
who deprived him of all his honours, and banished him to the province
of Anhui, adjacent to both Kiangsi and Kiangsu, and joined with them
in the same viceroyalty. This order to depart was a relief to Chung
Wang, who was thus able to complete his own measures for the defence
of Soochow and the other places along the Canal that had fallen to his
arms. He saw clearly that the success of the foreigners in keeping him
back at a distance of thirty miles from Shanghai, and in expelling him
from Ningpo, signified his being shut in just as effectively on the
east, as he already was on the west by the fall of every place except
Nanking, and by the miserable inefficiency of the garrison in that
place. He may have really despaired, but this Chinese Frederick was
resolved, if he could, to break his chains. Unfortunately for him, a
new and more formidable antagonist than any he had met appeared on the
scene at this juncture, in the person of Gordon.
This summary of the progress and nature of the Taeping rebellion up to
the 25th March 1863 when Gordon assumed the command will make clear
what follows to the general reader. It would be as great a mistake to
minimise the fighting military strength of the Taepings as it would be
to exaggerate it. There was a moment, years before Gordon came on the
scene, when the Imperial commanders by a little energy and promptitude
might have stamped out the rebellion; but having missed the
opportunity the military skill and daring of Chung Wang had revived
the Taeping cause, and made it more formidable than ever from a
military point of view. The blunders of the Imperial commanders
precluded any confidence as to their superior numbers and resources
effecting their natural result, and although Gordon himself declared
that the Taeping cause was a lost one before he assumed the command,
no cause could be pronounced irretrievable with a leader so expert and
resolute as Chung Wang, and opponents so incapable and craven as his
were. But another thing was certainly incontestable, and that was that
the Taepings could not in any sense be regarded as patriots. Their
regular mode of conduct stamped them at once as undiscriminating
plunderers of all, whether Chinese or Manchu, who had the misfortune
to fall into their hands, and their acts of cruelty surpassed
description and even belief. Some instances of the massacres they
perpetrated have been mentioned, but these were only a few out of the
many that stained, or rather characterised, their usual proceedings.
It will suffice to say that their ordinary way of dealing with their
prisoners was to crucify them, and there will then be no difficulty in
accepting the conclusion that the Chinese population thoroughly
detested them, and regarded them as a scourge rather than as
deliverers.
Nor does a closer examination of the system of administration set up
at Nanking by the leader Tien Wang raise one's opinion of the cause or
its promoters. The foreign missionaries long thought that the Taepings
were the agents of Christianity, and that their success would lead to
the conversion of China. That faith died hard, but at last in 1860 a
missionary had to confess that after visiting Nanking "he could find
nothing of Christianity but its name falsely applied to a system of
revolting idolatry," and out of that and other irresistible testimony
resulted the conclusion that the conversion of China by the agency of
the Taepings was a delusion. The missionaries were not alone in their
belief among foreigners. The Consuls and their Governments entertained
a hope that the Taepings might establish an administration which would
be less difficult to deal with than they had found the existing one at
Peking. They attempted to, and did in an informal manner, establish
some relations with Tien Wang. They acquainted him with the articles
of the Treaty of Tientsin, and they requested him to conform with its
conditions. On a second occasion Sir George Bonham, our head
representative in China, even honoured him with a visit; but closer
acquaintance in the case of our diplomatists, as of the missionaries,
stripped the Taepings of the character with which interested persons
would wish they had been invested. From the first feeling of
friendship and sympathy there consequently ensued a slow but steady
revulsion, until at last the general feeling was that the Taepings
were little more than marauders, and as such a scourge to the country
and a standing injury to the trade and interests of Europeans. Then
came the desire to see the rising suppressed, and finally the
disillusionment culminated in active measures being taken to assist
the Imperial Government in suppressing a rebellion which had defied
all its efforts for more than ten years. Of these measures the
appointment of Major Gordon to the command of the Ever Victorious Army
was both the last and the most effectual in producing the desired
result.
CHAPTER V.
THE EVER VICTORIOUS ARMY.
The appointment of any English officer would have led to some
improvement in the direction of the Chinese Imperial forces assembled
for the suppression of the Taeping rebellion; but the nature of the
operations to be carried out, which were exclusively the capture of a
number of towns strongly stockaded and protected by rivers and canals,
rendered it specially necessary that that officer should be an
engineer. In addition to the advantages of his scientific training,
Major Gordon enjoyed the benefit of the preliminary course he had gone
through under General Staveley. He had seen the Taepings fight, and
something also of the defence and capture of their positions. He had
also thoroughly mastered the topographical features of the region in
and beyond which he was about to conduct military operations. There is
little doubt that he assumed the command with a plan of campaign
already decided upon in his brain. The Taepings with whom he had to
deal derived their power and importance from the possession of
Soochow, and from their access to several ports whence they obtained
arms and ammunition. Therefore the capture of that city and the
cutting off of their supplies represented his principal objects. Very
much had to be accomplished before Soochow could be even approached,
and the main object of Gordon's first campaign was the capture of
Quinsan, which he saw would be far more suitable as headquarters for
him and his force than the existing one at Sungkiang. Even before that
could be attempted many matters had to be arranged. Not only had Major
Gordon to relieve more than one beleaguered loyal garrison, but he had
to establish his authority over his own force, which was on the verge
of mutiny and clamouring for the return of Burgevine. His own opinion
of that force was given in the following letter to a military
friend:--
"I hope you do not think that I have a magnificent army. You
never did see such a rabble as it was; and although I think I
have improved it, it is still sadly wanting. Now both officers
and men, although ragged and perhaps slightly disreputable, are
in capital order and well disposed."
Before entering on these matters the following letter to his mother
will be read with interest, as showing what was in Gordon's mind at
the time he assumed the command. The letter was written on 24th March
1863, the day before he rode over to Sungkiang to take up his command.
"I am afraid you will be much vexed at my having taken the
command of the Sungkiang force, and that I am now a mandarin. I
have taken the step on consideration. I think that anyone who
contributes to putting down this rebellion fulfils a humane task,
and I also think tends a great deal to open China to
civilization. I will not act rashly, and I trust to be able soon
to return to England; at the same time, I will remember your and
my father's wishes, and endeavour to remain as short a time as
possible. I can say that, if I had not accepted the command, I
believe the force would have been broken up and the rebellion
gone on in its misery for years. I trust this will not now be the
case, and that I may soon be able to comfort you on this subject.
You must not fret on this matter. I think I am doing a good
service.... I keep your likeness before me, and can assure you
and my father that I will not be rash, and that as soon as I can
conveniently, and with due regard to the object I have in view, I
will return home."
Major Gordon rode over to Sungkiang, situated on the line of the
thirty-mile radius from Shanghai, on 25th March, and the following
morning he inspected his force. He delivered a brief address, stating
that there was no intention to dismiss any of them, and that so long
as they behaved well he would carefully uphold their rights and
interests. These words had a tranquillising effect, and Major Gordon's
assumption of the command might be described as being then ratified by
the Ever Victorious Army. The good he effected was very nearly undone
two days later by the civil magistrate hanging some soldiers for
marauding. After the affair looked like becoming serious, Gordon
succeeded in pacifying his men and restoring order. In this state of
affairs it was most desirable that no time should be lost in resuming
active operations, and the Taeping successes at Taitsan and Fushan
rendered them doubly necessary.
The first task entrusted to Major Gordon was the relief of Chanzu,
which was closely assailed by the Taepings and believed to be on the
point of surrendering. Chanzu lies some distance south of Fushan and
west of Taitsan, and its garrison at this time was composed of
Taepings who had deserted their comrades and joined the Imperial
forces. Several attempts had been made to relieve it, but without
success, and Gordon was urged by his Chinese colleagues to signalise
his assumption of the command by carrying out this most desirable and
necessary task. The best means of approaching it was by the river, and
on 31st March Gordon accordingly sailed from Shanghai to the mouth of
the Fushan Creek. His force numbered about 1200 men, and included 200
artillery with four 12-pounders and one 32-pounder. The enemy had
constructed some stockades at Fushan, outside the ruined city of that
name, and Gordon attacked these on the 4th April. He began with a
heavy bombardment, and when he ordered the advance the Taepings,
disheartened by his fire, evacuated their positions and retired with
very little loss to either side. Gordon then marched on Chanzu, ten
miles south of Fushan, and reached it without further fighting. The
relief of Chanzu being thus effected, Gordon hastened back to
Sungkiang, where he arrived little more than a week after he left it.
The success and swiftness of this movement greatly impressed Li Hung
Chang, who publicly recorded his great satisfaction at the very
different manner in which the new commander transacted business from
Burgevine.
In a letter to the British Consul at Shanghai, Mr Markham, Li wrote:--
"The officer Gordon having received command of the Ever
Victorious Army, having immediately on doing so proceeded to
Fushan, working day and night, having worked harmoniously with
the other generals there, having exerted himself and attacked
with success the walled city of Fushan and relieved Chanzu, and
at once returned to Sungkiang and organised his force for further
operations to sweep out the rebels, having proved himself
valiant, able, and honest, I have congratulated myself and
memorialised his Imperial Majesty to confer on him the dignity
and office of Tsung-ping (Brigadier-General), to enable me to
consider him as part of my command. Again, since Gordon has taken
the command, he has exerted himself to organise the force, and
though he has had but one month he has got the force into shape.
As the people and place are charmed with him, as he has already
given me returns of the organisation of the force, the formation
of each regiment, and the expenses ordinary and extraordinary in
the clearest manner, wishing to drill our troops and save our
money, it is evident that he fully comprehends the state of
affairs."
On his return to Sungkiang, Major Gordon devoted himself to the
thorough reorganisation of his force. He began by abolishing the
system of rewards for the capture of towns, and he forbade plundering
on pain of death. These were strong steps to take with a force such as
that he had under him, but he succeeded in making them acceptable by
increasing the pay of the men, and by substituting on his staff
English officers--the services of a few being lent him by the
commanding officer at Shanghai--for the adventurers who had followed
Ward and Burgevine. The total strength of the force was fixed at 4000
men, and his artillery consisted of four siege and two field
batteries. The men were paid regularly by a Chinese official appointed
by Li Hung Chang, and the cost to the Chinese Government averaged
£20,000 a month. At the same time, Gordon collected a pontoon train
and practised his men in all the work of attacking fortified places
before he ventured to assume the offensive. He also organised a
flotilla of small steamers and Chinese gunboats capable of navigating
the canals and creeks which traversed the province of Kiangsu in all
directions. Of these the principal was the steamer _Hyson_--a
paddle-wheel vessel drawing 3-1/2 feet of water, armed with a
32-pounder in her bow, and a 12-pounder at her stern, and possessing
the faculty of moving over the bed of a creek on her wheels--and it
took a very active and prominent part in the subsequent operations.
The strategy on which Major Gordon at once decided, and from which he
never deviated, was to cut off the Taeping communications with the sea
and the river Yangtsekiang, whence they were able to obtain supplies
of ammunition and arms from little-scrupulous foreign traders. The
expulsion of the Taepings from the Shanghai district and from Ningpo
had done something towards the success of this project, but they still
held Hangchow and the line of the Yangtsekiang to within ten miles of
the entrance of the Woosung River on which Shanghai stands. The loss
of Fushan and Chanzu had made an indent in this territory, and in
order to complete this breach in the Taeping position, Gordon had
decided and made all his plans to attack Quinsan, when he was
compelled to defer it in consequence of the following incident.
The rude repulse at Taitsan had been, it will be recollected, the
culminating misfortune of the force before Gordon's assumption of the
command, but a Chinese army under Li Hung Chang's brother, San Tajin,
continued to remain in the neighbourhood of the place. The Taeping
commander laid a trap for him, into which he fell in what was, for a
Chinese officer fully acquainted with the fact that treachery formed
part of the usages of war in China, a very credulous manner. He
expressed a desire to come over, presents and vows were exchanged, and
at a certain hour he was to surrender one of the gates. The Imperial
troops went to take possession, and were even admitted within the
walls, when they were suddenly attacked on both flanks by the
treacherous Taepings. Fifteen hundred of San Tajin's men were killed
or captured, and he himself was severely wounded. In consequence of
this reverse, the main Chinese army, under General Ching, a brave but
inexperienced officer, could not co-operate with Gordon against
Quinsan, and it was then decided that Gordon himself should proceed
against Taitsan, and read the triumphant foe at that place a lesson.
It was computed that its garrison numbered 10,000 men, and that it had
several European deserters and renegades among its leaders, while the
total force under Gordon did not exceed 3000 men. Their recent
successes had also inspired the Taepings with confidence, and, judging
by the previous encounters, there seemed little reason to anticipate a
satisfactory, or at least a speedy issue of the affair for the
Imperialists. That the result was more favourable was entirely due to
Gordon's military capacity and genius.
Major Gordon acted with remarkable and characteristic promptitude. He
only heard of the catastrophe to San Tajin on 27th April; on 29th
April, after two forced marches across country, he appeared before
Taitsan, and captured a stockade in front of one of its gates. Bad
weather prevented operations the next day, but on 1st May, Gordon
having satisfied himself by personal examination that the western gate
offered the best point of attack, began the bombardment soon after
daybreak. Two stone stockades in front of the gate had first to be
carried, and these, after twenty minutes' firing, were evacuated on
part of Gordon's force threatening the retreat of their garrison back
to the town. The capture of these stockades began and ended the
operations on that day. The next morning Gordon stationed one regiment
in front of the north gate to cut off the retreat of the garrison in
that direction, and then resumed his main attack on the west gate. By
this time he had been joined by some of his gunboats, and their fire,
aided by the artillery he had with him, gradually made a good
impression on the wall, especially after the guns had been drawn as
near as 200 yards to it. The breach was then deemed sufficiently
practicable; the gunboats went up the creek as near the walls as
possible, and the two regiments advanced to the assault. The Taepings
fought desperately in the breach itself, and no progress was made. It
is probable that a reverse would have followed had not the howitzers
continued to throw shells over the wall, thus inflicting heavy losses
on the Taepings, who swarmed in their thousands behind. At that
critical moment Gordon directed another regiment to escalade the wall
at a point which the Taepings had left unguarded, and the appearance
of these fresh troops on their flank at once decided the day, and
induced the Taeping leaders to order a retreat. The Taepings lost
heavily, but the loss of the Ever Victorious Army was in proportion
equally great. The latter had twenty men killed and 142 wounded, one
European officer killed and six wounded. But the capture of Taitsan
under all the circumstances was an exceptionally brilliant and
decisive affair. With it may be said to have begun the military
reputation of the young commander, whose admirable dispositions had
retrieved a great disaster and inflicted a rude blow on the confidence
of a daring enemy.
From Taitsan he marched to Quinsan; but his force was not yet
thoroughly in hand, and wished to return to Sungkiang, in accordance
with their practice under Ward of spending their pay and prize-money
after any successful affair before attempting another. Gordon yielded
on this occasion the more easily because he was impressed by the
strength of Quinsan, and also because his ammunition had run short.
But his trouble with his men was not yet over, and he had to face a
serious mutiny on the part of his officers. For improved economy and
efficiency Gordon appointed an English commissariat officer, named
Cookesley, to control all the stores, and he gave him the rank of
lieutenant-colonel. This gave umbrage to the majors in command of
regiments, who presented a request that they should be allowed the
higher rank and pay of lieutenant-colonel; and when this was refused
they sent in their resignations, which were accepted. The affair was
nearly taking a serious turn, as the troops refused to march; but
Gordon's firmness overcame the difficulty. Two of the majors were
reinstated, and the others dismissed, but this incident finally
decided Gordon to change his headquarters from Sungkiang to some place
where the bad traditions of Ward and Burgevine were not in force. The
active operations now undertaken against Quinsan served to distract
the attention of the men, and to strengthen their commander's
influence over them. General Gordon's own description of this affair
is well worth quoting:--
"The force arrived at their old camping ground near the east gate
of Quinsan on the evening of 27th of May. General Ching had
established some five or six very strong stockades at this place,
and, thanks to the steamer _Hyson_, had been able to hold them
against the repeated attacks of the rebels. The line of rebel
stockades was not more than 800 yards from his position. The
force encamped near the stockades; and at daybreak of the 28th
the 4th and 5th Regiments, with the field artillery, moved to
attack them. The right stockade was attacked in front, and its
right flank turned, on seeing which the rebels retreated. They
were in large force, and had it not been for the numerous bridges
they had constructed in their rear, they would have suffered
much, as the pursuit was pressed beyond the north gate close up
to a stockade they held at the north-east angle of the city.
Captain Clayton, 99th Regiment, a very gallant officer who had
gained the goodwill and admiration of every one of the force, was
unfortunately wounded in the attack, and died some months
afterwards of his wounds. Our loss was two killed and sixteen
wounded.
"General Ching was now most anxious to get me to attack the east
gate on the following day. His object was that he had written to
the Futai Li, who had in turn passed the statement on to Peking,
to say that he had his stockades on the edge of the ditch, and
merely wanted a boat to get into the city. This he showed by a
plan. The east gate looked, if possible, more unpromising than it
did before, and I declined to attack it without reconnoitring the
other side of the city. Accordingly, the next day, 29th May, I
went in the _Hyson_ with General Ching and Li Hung Chang to
reconnoitre the west side, and after three hours' steaming came
within 1000 yards of the main canal, which runs from the west
gate of Quinsan to Soochow. At the junction of the creek we came
up with this main canal at the village of Chunye. This place is
eight miles from Quinsan, and twelve from Soochow. The only road
between these two places runs along the bank of the creek. The
rebels had here on its bank two stockades of no great strength,
and about 500 yards inland, they had, near the village of Chunye,
a very strong stone fort. About 1000 yards from the stockades the
creek was staked across. At the time of our arrival large numbers
of troops were passing towards and from Soochow with horsemen,
etc. We opened fire on them and on their boats. The rebels seemed
perfectly amazed at seeing us, and were ready for a run. General
Ching was as sulky as a bear when he was informed that I thought
it advisable to take these stockades the next day, and to attack
on this side of the city.
"At dawn on 30th May the 4th Regiment, 350 strong, with field
artillery, all in boats and _Hyson_, accompanied by some fifty
Imperial gunboats, started for Chunye. The Imperial gunboats
started some hours previous, but had contented themselves with
halting one and a half miles from the stockades. The whole
flotilla--some eighty boats, with their large white sails and
decorated with the usual amount of various-coloured flags, with
the _Hyson_ in the middle--presented a very picturesque sight,
and must have made the garrison of Quinsan feel uncomfortable, as
they could see the smallest move from the high hill inside the
city, and knew, of course, more than we did of the importance of
the stockades about to be attacked.
"At noon we came up to the stakes before alluded to, and landed
the infantry. The Imperial gunboats, now very brave, pulled up
the stakes, and a general advance with the steamer and troops
was made. The rebels stood for a minute, and then vacated the
stockades and ran. The reason of the rebels defending these
stockades so badly was on account of the ill-feeling between the
chiefs in charge of Quinsan and Chunye, and the neglect of the
former to furnish rice to the latter.
"The _Hyson_ [with Gordon on board] now steamed up towards
Soochow at a slow pace, owing to the innumerable boats that
crowded the creek, which, vacated by their owners, were drifting
about with their sails up in every direction. The rebels were in
clusters along the bank, marching in an orderly way towards
Soochow. The _Hyson_ opened fire on them and hurried their
progress, and, hanging on their rear, kept up a steady fire till
they reached Ta Edin, where a large arch bridge spanned the
creek, and where the rebels had constructed a splendid stone
fort. We expected that the rebels would make a stand here, but
they merely fired one shot, which was answered by a shell from
the _Hyson_, which went into the embrasure, and the rebels
continued their flight. It became rather hazardous to pass this
fort and leave it unoccupied, with the number of armed rebels who
were between Chunye and Ta Edin. The _Hyson_, moreover, had no
force on board of any importance. There were with me five or six
Europeans and some thirty Chinamen--gunners, etc. However, six of
us landed, and held the fort somehow till more Imperialists came
up, while the _Hyson_ pushed on towards Soochow.
"The _Hyson_ continued the pursuit, threading her way through the
boats of all descriptions which crowded the creek, and harassing
the rear of the rebel columns which extended along the road for
over a mile. About two miles from Ta Edin another stone fort was
passed without a shot being fired; this was Siaon Edin.
Everything was left in the forts by the rebels. Soon after
passing this place the steamer headed some 400 rebels, and
Captain Davidson ran her into the bank, and took 150 of them
prisoners on board the _Hyson_--rather a risk, considering the
crew of that vessel and her size. Soon after this four horsemen
were descried riding at full speed about a mile in rear of the
steamer. They came up, passed the steamer amid a storm of
bullets, and joined the rebel column. One of them was struck off
his horse, but the others coolly waited for him, and one of them
stopped and took him up behind him. They deserved to get off.
About three miles further on another stockade of stone was passed
at a broken bridge called Waiquaidong, and the pursuit was
carried on to about three-quarters of a mile from Soochow. It was
now getting late (6 P.M.), and we did not know if the rebels in
our rear might not have occupied the stockades, in which case we
should have had to find another route back. On our return we met
crowds of villagers, who burnt at our suggestion the houses in
the forts at Waiquaidong and Siaon Edin, and took the boats that
were in the creek.
"We met many boats that had appeared deserted on our passing up
sailing merrily towards Soochow, but which, when they saw the red
and green of the steamer and heard her whistle, were immediately
run into the bank and were deserted. Just before Siaon Edin was
reached we came on a large body of rebels, who opened a sharp
fire of rifles on us striking the gun twice. They had got under
cover of a bridge, which, however, after a short delay, we
managed to enfilade with a charge of grape and thus cleared them
out. We then steamed into the bank and took in more prisoners.
Four chiefs, one a Wang, galloped past on horseback; and although
not two yards from the steamer, they got away. The Wang got
shoved into the water and lost his pony. A party of rebels were
encamped in Siaon Edin, not dreaming of any further annoyance for
that night, and were accordingly astonished to hear the steamer's
whistle, and rushed out in amazement, to meet a shell at the
entrance, which killed two of them. The steamer now pushed on to
Ta Edin, and found it unoccupied; while waiting there to collect
some of the prisoners, about 200 rebels came so suddenly on the
steamer that we were obliged to whistle to keep them off till the
gun could be got ready.
"It was now 10.30 P.M., and the night was not very clear. At this
moment the most tremendous firing and cheering was heard from
Chunye, and hurried our progress to that place. Just before we
reached it a gunboat disarranged the rudder, and then we were
dodging about from side to side for some ten minutes, the firing
and cheering going on as before. At last we got up to the
junction of the creek, and steaming through the Imperial, and
other boats, we came on the scene of action. The gunboats were
drawn up in line, and were firing as fast as they could. The
stone fort at the village was sparkling with musketry, and at
times astounding yells burst forth from it. The _Hyson_ blew her
whistle, and was received with deafening cheers from the
gunboats, which were on the eve of bolting. She steamed up the
creek towards Quinsan, and at the distance of 200 yards we saw a
confused mass near a high bridge. It was too dark to distinguish
very clearly, but on the steamer blowing the whistle the mass
wavered, yelled, and turned back. It was the garrison of Quinsan
attempting to escape to Soochow, some seven or eight thousand
men.
"Matters were in too critical a state to hesitate, as the mass of
the rebels, goaded into desperation, would have swept our small
force away. We were therefore forced to fire into them, and
pursue them towards Quinsan, firing, however, very rarely, and
only when the rebels looked as if they would make a stand. The
steamer went up to about a mile from Quinsan, and then returned.
Several officers landed and took charge of the prisoners who were
extended along the bank, and at 4 A.M., 31st May, everything was
quiet. The _Hyson_ had fired some eighty or ninety rounds during
the day and night; and although humanity might have desired a
smaller destruction, it was indispensably necessary to inflict
such a blow on the garrison of Soochow as would cause them not to
risk another such engagement, and thus enable us to live in peace
during the summer--which it indeed did, for the rebels never came
on this road again. Their loss must have been from three to four
thousand killed, drowned, and prisoners. We took 800, most of
whom entered our ranks. They lost all their arms and a very large
number of boats. At 5 A.M. on 31st May the troops at Chunye and
the _Hyson_ moved towards Quinsan, and found the remainder of the
force who had been left at the east gate already in the city. The
possession of Quinsan was of immense importance in a strategical
point of view. The circumference of its walls is some five miles,
but they are very inferior. Its ditch is over forty yards wide,
and from the nature of the creeks around it would prove very
difficult to take. The high hill enclosed within its walls would
enable the slightest move to be seen, and if two or three guns
were placed on the spurs of this hill it would form a very
formidable citadel. The rebels did not know its importance till
they lost it."
Such was the capture of Quinsan, told in the simple words of its
captor. It confirmed the reputation gained by the fall of Taitsan, and
proved that the new commander was a man of extraordinary military
intuition as well as energy. There is scarcely room to doubt that if
Gordon had attacked Quinsan where the Chinese commander wished him to
do, at its very strongest point, he would have met with a rude
repulse. By attacking them on the side of Soochow, and by threatening
their communication with that place, he terrified the large garrison
so much that in the end they evacuated the place without resistance.
Gordon himself believed that if the mandarins at the head of the
Imperial army would have consented to support him in immediate
measures for an assault on Soochow, that city would have fallen in the
panic that ensued after the loss of Quinsan. The opportunity being
lost, it will be seen that many months of arduous fighting followed
before the same result was achieved.
The reasons which rendered a change in the headquarters of the force
desirable have already been mentioned, and Major Gordon at once
decided to remove them to Quinsan, a strong and advantageously-placed
position embarrassing to the Taepings, and equally encouraging to the
Imperialists. But if this removal was necessary on grounds of
discipline and policy, it was very unpopular with the men themselves,
who were attached to Sungkiang, where they could easily dispose of
their plunder. They determined to make an effort to get the offensive
order withdrawn, and a proclamation was drawn up by the most
disaffected, who were the non-commissioned officers, and sent to Major
Gordon with an intimation that the artillery would blow all the
officers to pieces unless their demands were complied with. Major
Gordon at once sent for all the non-commissioned officers, who paraded
before him. When he demanded the name of the writer of the
proclamation they were silent. At this Major Gordon announced that
unless the name was given up, he would shoot one out of every five of
them. At this statement the men groaned, when Gordon, noticing the man
who groaned loudest, and shrewdly conceiving him to be a ringleader,
seized him with his own hands, dragged him from the ranks, and ordered
two of his bodyguard to shoot the man on the spot. The order was at
once carried out, and then Gordon, turning to the rest, gave them one
hour to reflect whether they would obey orders, or compel him to shoot
one in every five. Within this time they gave way, and discipline was
restored. Gordon in his official despatch expressed regret for the
man's death, but, as he truly said, "it saved many others which must
have been lost if a stop had not been put to the independent way of
the men." But the matter did not quite end here, for more than 2000
men deserted, but Gordon found no difficulty in filling their places
from his prisoners and the villages round Quinsan. It is worthy of
note that his own bodyguard was mainly composed of Taeping prisoners,
and some of the most faithful of them had been the bearers of the
Snake banners of the rebel Wangs.
Having thus settled the differences within his own force, and having
fully established his own authority, Major Gordon would have
prosecuted the attack on Soochow with vigour, if other difficulties
had not occurred which occupied his time and attention. In the first
place, there was a serious quarrel with General Ching, who was sore
because he had not gained the credit for the capture of Quinsan, and
who did everything he could to hamper and humiliate the force. At last
he went to the length of firing on a column of Gordon's force, and as
he refused all satisfaction, that officer was on the point of marching
to attack him, when Dr--now Sir Halliday--Macartney arrived in his
camp, being sent in a fully accredited manner, and escorted by the
Futai's bodyguard, as a peace messenger from Li Hung Chang. On this
occasion Sir Halliday Macartney first gave evidence of the exceptional
diplomatic tact which he has since evinced in so many important
negotiations, when China derived much advantage from his energy,
ability, and devotion to her cause. The storm then blew over, but the
second affair was more serious. Li Hung Chang became remiss in his
payment of the force, and on 25th July Gordon sent in his formal
resignation. There is every reason to believe that at this moment
Gordon was thoroughly sick of his command, and would willingly have
returned to Europe. The difficulties with his own men, the want of
co-operation, to say nothing of appreciation on the part of the
Chinese authorities, had damped even his zeal in what he reiterated
was the good cause of restoring peace and security to a suffering
people; and in addition to these troubles he had to carry on a
correspondence with anonymous writers, who made many baseless charges
in the Shanghai and Hongkong papers of cruelty against the men under
his command. The English General at Shanghai used all his influence,
however, with the Chinese Governor to pay up the arrears, and with
Gordon to retain the command, because, as he said, there was "no other
officer who combined so many dashing qualities, let alone skill and
judgment."
But the event that really decided Gordon to withdraw his resignation
was the unexpected return of Burgevine. That adventurer had proceeded
to Peking after his dismissal from the command, and obtained some
support from the American minister in pressing his claims on the
Chinese. He had been sent back to Shanghai with letters which,
although they left some loophole of escape, might be interpreted as
ordering Li Hung Chang to reinstate him in the command. This Li,
supported by the English commanding officer at Shanghai, had
resolutely refused to do, and the feud between the men became more
bitter than ever. Burgevine remained in Shanghai and employed his time
in selling the Taepings arms and ammunition. In this way he
established secret relations with their chiefs, and seeing no chance
of Imperial employment he was not unwilling to join his fortunes to
theirs. This inclination was increased by the belief that he might be
able to form a force of his own which would give a decisive turn to
the struggle, and his vanity led him to think that he might pose on
the rebel side as no unequal adversary of Gordon, to whom all the time
he professed the greatest friendship. These feelings arose from or
were certainly strengthened by the representations made by several of
the officers and men whom Gordon had dismissed from his army. They
easily led Burgevine to think that he was not forgotten, and that he
had only to raise his standard to be joined by many of his old men.
A fortnight before Gordon's resignation Dr Macartney--who had some
time before begun his remarkable career in the Chinese service, and of
whom Gordon himself said: "He drilled troops, supervised the
manufacture of shells, gave advice, brightened the Futai's intellect
about foreigners, and made peace, in which last accomplishment his
_forte_ lay"--wrote to him, stating that he had positive information
that Burgevine was enlisting men for some enterprise, that he had
already enrolled 300, and that he had even chosen a special flag for
his force. A few days later Burgevine, probably hearing of this
communication, wrote to Gordon, begging him not to believe any rumours
about him, and stating that he was coming up to see him. Gordon
unfortunately believed in this statement, and as he wished to exhibit
special lenience towards the man whom he had displaced in the command,
he went bail for him, so that he retained his personal liberty when
the Chinese arrested Burgevine's agent Beechy, and wished to arrest
Burgevine himself. On 2nd August Burgevine threw off the mask. At the
head of a band of thirty-two rowdies, he seized the new steamer
_Kajow_ at Sungkiang, and with that vessel hastened to join the
Taepings. The very day that this happened Gordon reached Shanghai for
the purpose of resigning his command, but on the receipt of this
intelligence he at once withdrew his resignation and hastened back to
Quinsan. Apart from public considerations, he felt doubly bound to do
this because Burgevine had not been arrested on his pledged word.
The position was undoubtedly critical, for the prospect of plunder
offered by Burgevine was very attractive to mercenaries like the Ever
Victorious Army, and there was a very real risk that the force at
Quinsan, deprived of its commander, might be induced to desert _en
masse_ under the persuasive promises of Burgevine. When Gordon reached
Quinsan he was so apprehensive as to what might occur that he removed
his heavy artillery and most of his munitions of war to Taitsan, where
General Brown, in command at Shanghai, undertook to see that they were
protected. The situation at Quinsan was full of peril, for although
Burgevine had thrown away a chance, by taking a roundabout instead of
a direct route to Soochow, of striking a decisive blow before Gordon
could get back, the Taeping leader, Mow Wang, had not been so
negligent, and his operations for the recovery of several places taken
by Gordon in the last few days of his command were on the point of
success, when that officer's return arrested the course of his plans.
It must be pointed out that after this date the Taepings fought with
far more skill than before. They had a very considerable European
contingent, probably nearly 300 men, and these served not only as
leaders, but as trainers of the rebel Chinese forces. They had also
obtained some good cannon, and the steamer _Kajow_ proved of material
value on water. Gordon found on his return, therefore, that the
difficulties of the campaign were materially increased. His opponents
were far stronger and more confident, while his own resources remained
unchanged. Gordon tersely summed up the situation in an official
despatch: "There is no knowing what an immense amount of damage might
have been done if the rebels had had a more energetic man than
Burgevine, and it would be as well not to point out the line which
might have been taken."
The first engagements of this more difficult and keenly-contested
phase of the campaign took place at Kahpoo, a place on the canal some
miles south of Soochow. Gordon had taken it a week before he left for
Shanghai, as a sort of parting gift to the Chinese, but when he
arrived there on 9th August he found the garrison hard pressed,
although the _Hyson_ was stationed there--and indeed nothing but his
arrival with a third steamer, the _Cricket_, averted its recapture.
After five days' operations, that do not require description, the
neighbourhood of Kahpoo was cleared of rebels, and Gordon returned to
Quinsan, where the most essential task had to be accomplished of
restoring the discipline of his own force. As some assistance in this
difficult task General Brown lent him the services of 200 Beluches,
whose admirable conduct and splendid appearance went far to restore a
healthy spirit among his own men. At the same time these troops
ensured the safety of Quinsan and also of Gordon himself, at least
against the treachery of Burgevine's sympathisers.
The season of the year, the hottest and most trying of the long
Chinese summer, compelled inaction, and Gordon felt doubly the need of
caution now that he was brought face to face with the most arduous
undertaking of the whole war, viz. the siege and capture of Soochow.
General Ching's headquarters were at Ta Edin, and he had also occupied
in force Waiquaidong, only two miles from the eastern gate of Soochow.
Before the end of September he had pushed on still further, and
erected his stockades within half a mile of that position. At this
moment Gordon, anxious as to what might happen to his too-adventurous
colleague, advanced with his force to his aid, and took up the supreme
direction of the attack on Soochow. As usual, Gordon began by making a
careful examination of the extensive rebel positions at and round
Soochow, and the result of it was that he decided to capture the
stockades and village of Patachiaou, one mile distant from the south
wall of that city. His plan met with easy success, for the Taepings
were not expecting an attack in that quarter, and offered little
resistance.
Easily as they had been driven out of it, the Taepings made a very
determined effort to retake it a few days later, and it was only by
desperate exertions that Gordon succeeded in holding what he had won.
This was the first occasion on which Burgevine and the _Kajow_
steamer, commanded by Captain Jones, "a daring and capable officer,"
to use Gordon's words, came into action. The rebels were extremely
confident for this reason, and also because they had some heavy
artillery. Gordon had to keep to his stockades, and to send the
_Hyson_ out of action from fear of its being damaged by the enemy's
shell, but the Taepings were afraid to come to close quarters, and
eventually retreated before a well-timed _sortie_. In this engagement
Gordon had the co-operation of a French-trained Chinese regiment,
under the command of a gallant officer, Captain Bonnefoy. After this
there was a lull, but Gordon felt too weak to attempt anything serious
against Soochow, and he deprecated all operations until he could
strike an effective blow. In this respect he differed materially from
his Chinese colleague, General Ching, who was most restless and
enterprising, but his ill-directed energy produced no result, and even
assisted the enemy's plans.
At this juncture the Taeping hero Chung Wang arrived from Nanking with
reinforcements, and imparted a new vigour to the defence. But whether
on account of jealousy, or of disappointment at the poor services he
had rendered, it also resulted in the dismissal of Burgevine, an
incident of which some brief account may be given before following the
main course of the campaign. More than one ground of dispute led up to
this conclusion. In the first place, Burgevine was disappointed at
finding several of the rebel Wangs as clever and ambitious as he was,
and they were disappointed at the amount of service and help he could
give them. This feeling culminated in angry scenes, when, on being
sent into Shanghai in disguise to purchase arms with a large sum of
money, he returned to Soochow without either money or weapons. He was
apparently given, as a last chance, the opportunity of regaining his
reputation by entrapping Gordon into the rebel power, and he
thoroughly entered into the scheme, although he failed to carry it
out. On 3rd October--that is to say, two days after the failure to
retake Patachiaou--Burgevine made the first step in this plot by
addressing a letter to Gordon, thanking him for the offer of medicines
he had sent, and offering to meet him whenever he liked to discuss
matters. On the 6th he met Gordon at the stockades, and declared his
willingness to abandon the Taepings and come over with all his force,
including the _Kajow_. He and his companions were guaranteed their
lives, and the arrangement seemed complete. Two days later he had a
second interview with the English officer, when he made the
extraordinary proposition that he and Gordon should join bands,
attack both Taepings and Imperialists, and fight for their own hand.
This mad and unprincipled proposal excited Gordon's anger, but it was
only Burgevine's old filibustering idea revived under unfavourable
conditions. It was while smarting under this rebuff that Burgevine
proposed to Captain Jones a fresh plot for entrapping Gordon, while
he, unsuspecting evil, was engaged in conferences for their surrender;
but to Jones's credit, let it be stated that he refused to have any
part in such black treachery. Thereupon Burgevine attempted to take
Jones's life, either to conceal his own treachery or to enable him to
carry out his interrupted plans. Much delay occurred in carrying out
the project of Burgevine's desertion, and Gordon, rendered specially
anxious to save his and the other foreigners' lives, because one party
had escaped without Burgevine, wrote a strong letter on the subject to
Mow Wang, Chung Wang's chief lieutenant. He also sent him a present of
a pony, at which the rebel chief was so much pleased that he agreed to
release Burgevine, and on 18th October that person appeared at the
outworks of Gordon's position. His personal safety was entirely due to
Gordon's humane efforts, and to the impression that officer had made
on the Taepings as a chivalrous opponent. The American Consul at
Shanghai, Mr Seward, officially thanked Major Gordon for his "great
kindness to misguided General Burgevine and his men." Nearly two years
later this adventurer met the fate he so narrowly escaped on several
occasions. He had been forbidden by his own Consul as well as the
Chinese Government ever to return to China, but in June 1865 he broke
his parole. Before he could be arrested he met with his death by
accident, being drowned when crossing a Chinese river, but rumours
were prevalent that his death was an act of vengeance instigated by
his old enemy the Futai, Li Hung Chang.
The assumption of the supreme command by Chung Wang was soon followed
by those offensive operations which had made that dashing leader the
most famous of all the rebel generals. Gordon and the bulk of his
corps were at Patachiaou, south of Soochow--only General Ching and the
Chinese army were north of that place--and he resolved to attack them
and force his way through to Chanzu, which he wished to recover as
opening a road to the river and the outer world. Gordon divined his
intention, and for some time prevented him carrying it out by making
threatening demonstrations with his gunboats on the western side of
Soochow; but his own attention was soon diverted to another part of
the country where a new and unexpected danger threatened his own
position and communications. A large rebel force, computed to number
20,000 men, had suddenly appeared behind Major Gordon's position and
attacked the Imperial garrison stationed at Wokong, a place on the
canal twelve or thirteen miles south of Soochow. The news that reached
Gordon on 12th October from this quarter was that the garrison, having
been repulsed in a _sortie_ with a loss of several hundred men, could
not hold out many hours. Gordon at once hastened to the rescue at the
head of one of his regiments, and with the invaluable _Hyson_ steamer.
He found his allies quite cowed, afraid even to open the gates of
their stockades to admit him and his men, and the enemy drawn up in
imposing lines at a distance of about 1500 yards. He at once ordered
the attack, and during three hours the engagement was contested in the
most obstinate and spirited manner. The rebels, having their line of
retreat secure, fought bravely. Gordon had to bring up his heavy guns
to within forty yards of the wall before they would gave way, and even
then they stood at the second and third inner stockades. Gordon never
gave them a chance of recovering, but having got them on the run, kept
them at it for a distance of ten miles. This was one of Gordon's
greatest victories in the open field. The Taepings never fought
better, yet with 1000 good Chinese troops Gordon routed more than
20,000 of them.
Chung Wang had begun his march towards Chanzu, but after some slight
successes met with a rude repulse at Monding, where he also lost the
steamer _Kajow_, which was sunk by an accidental explosion. He then
established his headquarters at Wusieh, a place on the Grand Canal,
about twenty-five miles north of Soochow. Here he hoped to effect some
diversion that might relieve the increasing pressure on Soochow
itself.
In the meantime that pressure had greatly increased, owing to the
bolder measures to which Gordon resorted after the European contingent
abandoned the Taeping side. His first step was to attack and capture
the stockades at Wuliungchow, a village two miles west of Patachiaou,
which commanded a passage leading from the Taiho Lake to the south
gate of Soochow. Gordon managed to conceal the real object of his
attack from the Taepings, and to capture the stockades with little
loss. The wet weather and the unexpected nature of the attack
explained this easy success, for the stockades were strong and well
placed. Chung Wang returned from Wusieh with the special object of
retaking them, but he was repulsed with some loss, and then hurried
back to that place. A few days later part of Gordon's force, under
Major Kirkham, was sent to Wokong, which was again being threatened by
the Taepings, and obtained a brilliant success, capturing 1300
prisoners and not fewer than 1600 boats, including sixteen gunboats.
Having achieved this success on the south, Gordon proceeded with his
plans to secure an equally advantageous position on the north side. He
left two regiments at Wuliungchow, which he greatly strengthened, and
with the remainder he went to Waiquaidong, where he proposed to
deliver his attack on the Leeku stockades, only a short distance in
front of the north gate of Soochow. This operation was carried out
with complete success, and it was promptly followed up by the capture
of the rebel positions at Wanti, which enabled the forces round
Soochow to join hands with the other considerable Imperial army that
had been placed in the field by the energy of Li Hung Chang, and
entrusted to the command of his brother, San Tajin. This last force
was opposed to Chung Wang, but although numerically the stronger, the
want of the most rudimentary military knowledge in its commander
reduced this army of 20,000 men to inglorious inaction. At this stage
of the struggle it will be well to sum up in Gordon's own words the
different positions held by the contending forces:--
"We held the Taiho Lake with the steamers the _Hyson_, the
_Tsatlee_, _Firefly_, and 200 men (Imperialists), which cruised
off Moodow, and prevented supplies coming to Soochow up the creek
which leads from that village to the small West Gate, or
Shih-mün, of Soochow, and where they had many actions with the
rebel gunboats. The next great water outlet was closed to the
rebels by our possession with 1000 men (Imperialists) of
Wuliungchow. Off the Pon-mün, or South Gate, the next main water
and road communication to the south was closed to them by our
occupation by 1500 men (Imperialists) of the Patachiaou stockades
on the Grand Canal, south of the south-east angle of Soochow. The
next, which led from the east gate of Soochow to Quinsan, was
closed by Ching's force of 3000 or 4000 men, nearly two miles
from the gate. These men were well posted in strong and
well-constructed stockades. The next position held was Leeku,
where I had one regiment, and at Wanti there was another
regiment. The total force in the stockades was about 8500 men,
leaving for field operation 2500 Imperialists, 2100 of the
Quinsan Corps, and 400 Franco-Chinese. San Tajin had 20,000 to
30,000, in three separate camps. He was utterly incapable for
command of any sort.
"The rebels held Soochow with some 40,000 men in and around the
city. The city of Wusieh held some 20,000 men, and Chung Wang had
at Mahtanchow some 18,000 more. Chung Wang's position was central
between Wusieh and Soochow, some ten miles in advance of the
Grand Canal, so as to be able to give help to either city, and to
attack on the flank any advance made by us on their grand line of
communications by that canal."
The city of Soochow, now so closely beleaguered, was of imposing
appearance. An English traveller who saw it at this time thus
describes it:--
"Further than the eye could penetrate in the misty morning
stretched the grizzled walls of Soochow, a city celebrated for
ages in the history of China for its size, population, wealth,
and luxury, but now stripped of its magnificence, and held by an
army of Taeping banditti against the Imperial forces. To the
right and left, mile after mile, rose the line of lofty wall and
grey turret, while above all appeared not only the graceful
pagodas, which have been for ages the boast of Soochow and the
dense foliage of secular trees--the invariable glory of Chinese
cities--but also the shimmering roofs of newly decorated palaces
confidently occupied by the vainglorious leaders of the
rebellion. The proximity of the rebel line became apparent with
surprising suddenness, for, following their usual custom, they
greeted the rising sun with a simultaneous display of gaudy
banners above the line of their entrenchments. The mud walls they
had thrown up in advance, scarcely distinguishable before, were
now marked out by thousands of flags of every colour from black
to crimson, whilst behind them rose the jangling roll of gongs,
and the murmurs of an invisible multitude."
Had Gordon been free to act, or even if he had possessed authority
over the two Chinese commanders, his plan of campaign would have been
simple and decisive. He would have effected a junction of his forces
with San Tajin; and having overwhelmed Chung Wang and his 18,000 men
with his combined army of double that strength, he would have appeared
at the head of his victorious troops before the bewildered garrison of
Wusieh. He would probably have thus terminated the campaign at a
stroke. Even the decisive defeat of Chung Wang alone might have
entailed the collapse of the cause now tottering to its fall. But
Major Gordon had to consider not merely the military quality of his
allies, but also their jealousies and differences. General Ching hated
San Tajin on private as well as on public grounds. He desired a
monopoly of the profit and honour of the campaign. His own reputation
would be made by the capture of Soochow. It would be diminished and
cast into the shade were another Imperial commander to defeat Chung
Wang and close the line of the Grand Canal. If Gordon detached himself
from General Ching, he could not feel sure what folly that jealous and
impulsive commander might not commit. He would certainly not pursue
the vigilant defence before Soochow necessary to guard the extensive
line of stockades, and to prevent its large garrison sallying out and
assailing his own rear. Gordon had consequently for these
considerations to abandon the tempting idea of crushing Chung Wang and
capturing the towns in the rear of Nanking, and to have recourse to
safer if slower methods.
But if he had to abandon the larger plan, he still stuck tenaciously
to his main idea that the way to capture Soochow was to isolate it,
and above all to sever Chung Wang's communication with it. Several
weeks passed before Gordon could complete the necessary arrangements,
but at last, on 19th November, he left Leeku at the head of the
greater part of his own force and a large contingent of Ching's braves
to attack the stockades at Fusaiquan on the Grand Canal, about four
miles north of Leeku. The Taeping position was a strong one, including
eight separate earthworks, a stone fort, and several stockades. Gordon
said "it was far the best built and strongest position he had yet
seen," but the rebels evacuated it in the most cowardly manner without
attempting the least resistance. Gordon goes on to say: "Our loss was
none killed, and none wounded! We had expected a most desperate
defence. If ever men deserved beheading, the Taeping leaders did on
this occasion." The immediate consequence of this success was that
Chung Wang quitted his camp in face of San Tajin, and, joining the
Wusieh corps, concentrated his whole force for the defence of the
Grand Canal.
Having thus strengthened his position towards the north, Gordon, very
much to Ching's satisfaction, fell in with his views to begin a direct
attack on Soochow itself. For good reasons it was decided that the
north-east angle of Soochow was the weakest, but before it could be
attacked it was necessary to capture the strong stockades which the
rebels had erected in front of the East and North Gates. The East
Gate, or Low Mun, stockades were selected for the first attack, and as
the scene of a reverse to Ching's force on 14th October, the Chinese
commander was specially anxious to capture them. They were exceedingly
formidable, consisting of a line of breastwork, defended at intervals
with circular stockades, and the position was well chosen and strongly
fortified. After reconnoitring it, and obtaining all the information
he could from deserters, Gordon determined on a night attack; but
unfortunately not only were his plans revealed to the Taepings by
traitors in his own camp, but his arrangements miscarried. As is often
the case with night attacks, the plan of attack was not adhered to,
and much confusion followed. The breastwork was carried by a small
part of his troops, but the stockades in its rear were never reached.
Encouraged by Gordon's example, who seemed to be at every point at the
same moment, his men held on to the breastwork, but the supports would
not move up, and when he hastened to the rear to encourage them, the
Taepings under Mow Wang attacked in their turn and manned the
breastwork. There was nothing now to be done but to draw off the
troops, which was executed with comparatively slight loss; but 165
officers and men were killed or wounded--the majority being killed or
missing. This loss would have been much greater if the Taepings had
only had the courage to leave their position, but fortunately they
showed themselves unable to follow up their success. This was Gordon's
first defeat, but it was so obviously due to special causes that it
did not much dishearten his men, or diminish the high reputation he
and his force had gained by thirteen previous victories.
But the necessity to retrieve such a reverse was obvious, and Gordon
collected the whole of his corps for the purpose of capturing the Low
Mun stockades. He also placed his siege guns in position, and began a
heavy bombardment in the morning of 29th November as the preliminary
to attack. On his side, Mow Wang made all his preparations for
defence, which had been rendered the more necessary because there were
dissensions among the Taeping leaders themselves, one of whom, named
Lar Wang, had offered to surrender with his followers to General Ching
on terms. Partly on this account Chung Wang rode into Soochow with a
bodyguard of a few hundred men by the only bridle-path available, and
his presence composed for the moment the quarrels of the Taeping
leaders. But the result depended on the successful defence of the
stockades in front of the East Gate, and Gordon was equally intent on
capturing them. After a short bombardment the breastwork seemed so
knocked about that Gordon ordered a column to advance to the assault,
but it was met by a tremendous fire and compelled to turn back. Then
the bombardment was renewed, and the field-pieces were pushed forward
as far as possible. A second assault was then delivered, but the
creek--fourteen yards across--was too wide for the bridge, and things
again looked black, when the officers boldly jumped into the water,
and their men following, the whole position was captured at a rush.
Once this success was gained, the defence of the Taepings, who had
fought well, collapsed, and stockade after stockade was carried with
little or no loss. Gordon himself, with a mere handful of men,
captured three more stockades and a stone fort that he said could have
held out after all the other positions had fallen. The loss of the
corps in this severe but decisive engagement was heavy, amounting to 6
officers killed, and 3 wounded; 50 men killed, and 128 wounded,
besides 5 Europeans of the Bodyguard. But this assault was decisive,
inasmuch as it was the last that had to be made on the defences of
Soochow before the fall of that place.
At this point it will be appropriate to say something about Gordon's
relations with his own officers, many of whom contemplated, whenever
dissatisfied with their treatment or at prolonged inaction, selling
their cause and services to the Taepings. During the siege he
discovered that Captain Perry had written a letter giving the enemy
information, but Gordon agreed to look over the offence on the
condition that Perry led the next forlorn hope, which happened to be
the affair at the Leeku stockades. Gordon had forgotten the condition,
but Perry remembered it, and led the assault. He was shot in the
mouth, and fell into the arms of his commander, ever at the point of
danger. Perry was the first man killed, and Gordon's epitaph was that
he was "a very good officer." Although Gordon was a strict and even
severe disciplinarian, he was always solicitous of the interests of
the officers who worked under him, and he set apart the greater
portion of his pay in the Chinese service, which had been fixed at
£1,200 a year, for their benefit, more especially for the purchase of
medicine and comforts for the ill or wounded. There was no
exaggeration at all in the statement that he left China without any
savings and as poor as when he reached it.
From the gallant deeds of Gordon and his corps the course of the siege
passes to the intrigues and negotiations between General Ching and Lar
Wang. These had made so much progress that Lar Wang's troops abandoned
the formidable stockades in front of the North Gate, which were
occupied without the least attempt at resistance. Several interviews
took place with the Taeping leaders, and Gordon was present at some of
these, but Li Hung Chang asserts that he was not present at the most
important of them; and that he was not a signatory of the convention
of surrender. He was strongly in favour of good terms being granted to
the rebels, and impressed his views on both Li Hung Chang, who had
come up to the camp to be present at the fall of Soochow, and General
Ching. From both he received the most positive assurances that the
lives of all the Wangs would be spared, and such was no doubt their
intention, but events were too strong for them. The most interesting
of these leaders, with, of course, the exception of Chung Wang, was
Mow Wang, who would have nothing to say to a surrender, and wished to
fight to the death. He was the man who had sent back Burgevine, and
Gordon admired his courage so much that he resolved to spare no effort
to save his life. He asked Li to assign Mow Wang to him, and this
request was granted. Unfortunately all these efforts were thrown away,
for on the 4th December, during a banquet given at Mow Wang's palace,
the other Wangs had fallen upon and murdered that chief, who would
have resisted with all his force their projected surrender of the
place. The next day Lar Wang, who had taken an oath of brotherhood
with General Ching, gave up one of the gates, and his numerous
followers undertook to shave their heads in token of surrender. The
Imperialist troops occupied the gate, and prepared to take possession
of the city, but Gordon would not allow any of his men to leave the
stockades as he foresaw the impossibility of preventing them from
plundering if they were permitted to advance into the city. But he
went and represented the case to Li Hung Chang, and demanded two
months' pay for his men as a reward for their good service, and as
some compensation for the loss of loot. Li replied that he could not
grant the request, and Gordon at once resigned for the second time
during his connection with the Chinese Government. There was serious
risk of an outbreak on the part of the discontented soldiers of the
Ever Victorious Army, but on General Ching providing one month's pay
Gordon used his influence with his men to march quietly back to
Quinsan. The men at first received this order with shouts of
dissatisfaction, and even threatened to attack the Futai Li, but
Gordon succeeded in overcoming their objections, and the worst that
happened was a noisy demonstration as the troops passed Li Hung
Chang's tent, where Gordon and another officer stood on guard.
The Chinese officials were delighted to thus get rid of the Ever
Victorious Army, without which they would never have seen the inside
of Soochow. Its presence diminished their credit and interfered with
the execution of the plans which they had no doubt held throughout all
the negotiations with Lar Wang. Neither Li nor Ching wished Lar Wang
and his colleagues to be saved, and thus allowed to become rivals to
themselves in the race of official honour and wealth. There was
nothing surprising in this, and the only matter for astonishment is
that Lar Wang, well acquainted with the Punic faith of his countrymen,
and with such a black record from the Government point of view, should
have so easily placed faith in the word of his enemies. This was the
more extraordinary because Gordon himself went into the city and saw
Lar Wang at his own house before he left for Li Hung Chang's quarters,
where a banquet had been arranged, and asked him very pressingly
whether he was quite satisfied. Gordon himself seems to have had
suspicions or apprehensions, for he even offered to take him on board
his own steamer with which he was going to cruise in the Taiho Lake.
Lar Wang, however, was quite confident, and said that all was well.
This confidence was doubly unfortunate, for Gordon had excused himself
from the Futai's banquet on the ground that his presence might seem
humiliating to the Taeping leaders, whereas it was the only thing that
could have averted their fate. As Gordon was leaving the city the
Wangs passed him, laughing and talking, and riding apparently unarmed
to the Futai's quarters. The next time Gordon saw them was when he
beheld their headless bodies lying on the river bank near their host's
camp.
Gordon after this walked through the city, as some hours would elapse
before the steamer could get round to the south-west side, where he
intended to embark. While on his way he was joined by Dr Macartney.
They both proceeded to the walls near the Eastern Gate, and on looking
towards the Futai's quarters Gordon noticed a large crowd, but he did
not attach any significance to it. About half an hour later a large
number of Imperial soldiers entered the city, and set up a yell, as
was their custom, and fired off guns. Gordon represented to their
officers that this conduct was against the agreement, and might lead
to disturbance, as the city was still crowded with Taepings. At this
juncture General Ching appeared. As Gordon was supposed to be on his
steamer on his way to the lake, he seemed taken aback, and turned
pale. To Gordon's repeated inquiries as to whether all was well, he
made a rambling statement that Lar Wang had made unreasonable demands,
that he had refused to carry out the exact terms of the surrender, and
finally, that he had run away. Gordon then asked Dr Macartney, as he
knew Chinese, to go to Lar Wang's house, and reassure him if he found
him there, but this statement must be taken in conjunction with the
important narrative I give two pages further on. Gordon went a little
way with General Ching, and then decided to wait at the North Gate for
further intelligence, while the Chinese commander continued his round.
Gordon then began to question his own interpreter as to what he
thought, and on receiving the reply that "there was something
improper," he determined to proceed himself with all speed to Lar
Wang's house. On his way he passed through crowds of excited Taeping
soldiers, and he also met a band of Imperialists laden with plunder.
Lar Wang's palace had been pillaged and gutted, but an uncle of his,
named Wangchi, was there, and he begged Gordon to help him to escort
the females of Lar Wang's family to his own house. Gordon agreed to do
this, but when he reached Wangchi's house, he found five or six
hundred armed men in the courtyard. The doors were closed, and Wangchi
refused to allow either Gordon or his interpreter to leave. During the
night large bodies of excited Taepings, who knew that their chiefs had
been entrapped, although, fortunately, not aware of their murder,
rallied on this spot, and Gordon was thus placed in a position of the
greatest personal peril.
At length leave was given him to send his interpreter, escorted by two
Taepings, to summon his own bodyguard, and to take an order to
another part of his force to seize the Futai and hold him as a hostage
for the safety of the Wangs. The interpreter was attacked on the way
by Imperialists, who wounded him, and tore up Gordon's letters. When
one of the Taeping guides brought back this news Gordon was allowed to
leave himself for the same purpose; but he was arrested on the way by
some Imperialists, detained for several hours, and the morning was far
advanced before he was able to send back his bodyguard for the
protection of Wangchi's house and family. He then moved a further
force into the city, to prevent the massacre that the Imperialists
seemed to be contemplating, and in this task he was gallantly seconded
by Captain Bonnefoy and the Franco-Chinese contingent. Having taken
these steps, Gordon waited near the Eastern Gate for all his steamers,
with which he intended to seize the Futai, and make him give up the
Wangs. At this moment General Ching approached him, but before he
could begin his excuses, "he met with such a storm that he made a
precipitate retreat into the city." Ching then sent an English
officer, one of Gordon's own force, to explain matters, but he did not
know whether the chiefs were alive or dead. He went on to say,
however, that Lar Wang's son was in his tent, and on the boy being
sent for, he said that his father had been executed on the opposite
side of the creek. The steamers had still not arrived, and Gordon
asked one of his lieutenants, Prince F. von Wittgenstein, to cross the
creek in his boat and report what he saw. He returned with the
intelligence that there were nine headless bodies. Gordon then crossed
himself, and identified Lar Wang and several of his companions. There
was consequently no further doubt as to what had happened, or anything
left for Gordon to do than to secure them decent burial. Having done
this he abandoned his trip to the Taiho Lake, and hastened to Quinsan.
The exact mode of this assassination seems to have been as follows:
When the Wangs came out of the city they were met by General Ching,
who did not, however, accompany them to the Futai Li Hung Chang. That
official received them in a stockade near his boat, some conversation
ensued, and then Li left the stockade. Here again reference should be
made to the authoritative narrative that follows. A party of Imperial
troops closed the gates, seized the Wangs, and at once beheaded them.
Li Hung Chang very soon afterwards left his quarters for a different
and remote part of the Imperial camp.
This treacherous act, although quite in accordance with Chinese
traditions, was generally denounced at the time, and has excited much
discussion since. Major Gordon certainly felt it very keenly, for he
considered that his word had been pledged as much as the Chinese
commander's for the safety of the leaders who surrendered. It has been
shown how energetically he acted once he suspected that anything was
wrong, but it seems as if it were going too far to say that he thought
for a moment of exacting a summary revenge on the person of Li Hung
Chang. Sir Henry Gordon, writing with at least a sense of
responsibility, says on this point: "It is not the fact that Major
Gordon sought the Futai with the intention of shooting him. It is a
complete misrepresentation to say he did so. It is true he endeavoured
unsuccessfully to have an explanation with him, but not of the nature
asserted." But it must also be reaffirmed that as long as Gordon
thought he could save the Wangs' lives he was prepared to secure the
person of Li Hung Chang and hold him as a hostage for their safety. Of
that, at least, there can be no question.
I must now ask the reader to return to the point when Gordon and Dr
Macartney were standing on the wall near the Low Mun Gate, in order
that the following important and authoritative narrative may be
understood. General Ching entered by this gate at the head of a party
of his troops, and Gordon, somewhat uneasy at the signs of commotion
he thought he had detected across the creek, at once addressed him,
asking--"Well, how did it go off? Have the Wangs seen the Futai?"
Taken off his guard, or confused between the sudden question and his
own knowledge of what had occurred, Ching quickly replied, "They have
not seen the Futai."
"What!" replied Gordon, equally hastily; "that must be nonsense. I saw
the Wangs myself ride out of the city to the rendezvous, and spoke to
them."
Ching then corrected himself by saying, "Oh, yes, that is all right,
but they have not shaved their heads, and they want to retain half the
city," the western half, that nearest to the relieving force, still at
a considerable distance from Soochow, under the heroic Chung Wang.
To which Gordon at once responded, "That won't do. They must conform
with what has been agreed upon," and turning to Macartney, he said,
"Will you go to the Lar Wang's palace and tell him that this cannot
be, and meet me afterwards at Wuliungchow, where I am to join the
steamer _Hyson_ to go on the Taiho Lake?"
Macartney at once accepted the mission, and proceeded to the Lar
Wang's palace, but before following him thither it is necessary to
refer to two earlier passages, one known and the other up to this
moment unknown, in the relations of General Gordon and Sir Halliday
Macartney.
The passage which is known is that where Macartney, sent as the
representative of the Futai Li Hung Chang, and escorted by that
Governor's own bodyguard, healed the breach caused between Gordon and
General Ching by the latter firing on some of Gordon's troops and
treating the matter with marked levity, which so enraged Gordon that
he was on the point of attacking the Imperialist troops when Sir
Halliday Macartney arrived as peacemaker, and with equal tact and
energy averted the catastrophe. This incident has already been
referred to, and need not further detain us. I come now to the second
and more interesting matter.
Some weeks before the fall of Soochow, but at a moment when it had
become clear that the place could not hold out much longer, Gordon
approached Macartney and said: "I want to speak to you very privately,
and as I do not wish any one to hear our conversation, will you come
on board my boat?" When they were both on board, Gordon ordered his
Chinese sailors to pull out to the centre of the lake before he would
say a word. Having thus rendered secrecy assured, Gordon spoke as
follows:--
"Macartney, I have brought you out here so that nobody should
know of our conversation, and that we might speak out as man to
man. I must tell you, in the first place, that as soon as Soochow
falls I intend to resign the command and return home. With that
intention in my mind, I have been anxiously considering who was
the best man to name as my successor in the command of the Ever
Victorious Army, and, after the most careful consideration, I
have come to the conclusion that you are the best man. Will you
take the command?"
This unexpected question was the more embarrassing to Macartney,
because, long before Gordon was appointed, rumour had freely credited
him with coveting the command of the Ever Victorious Army in
succession to Burgevine, and, as a matter of fact, the Chinese
authorities had wished him to have the command. However, nothing had
come of the project, and Macartney, after his post as Burgevine's
military secretary had ceased to exist with the dismissal and treason
of that adventurer, was appointed to a separate command of a portion
of the Imperialist forces. The course of events had now, in an
unexpected but highly complimentary manner, brought the realisation of
any hopes he may have entertained on the subject within his reach. He
replied to Gordon as follows:--
"As you speak so frankly to me, I will speak equally frankly to
you, and tell you something I have never told a living person.
Rumour has credited me with having aspired to the command of this
force, but erroneously so. My ambition was to work myself up at
Court, and only to take the command if forced on me as a
provisional matter, and as a stepping-stone to my real object,
which was, when my knowledge of the language was perfected, to
acquire at Peking some such influence as that possessed by
Verbiest and the other French missionaries in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. I should never have mentioned this to you
lest you should not have believed it, but now that the command is
at my feet I may make this avowal without any hesitation as to
your accepting it. As you really think I can best succeed to the
command of the force when you resign it, I am perfectly willing
to accept the task."
To which Gordon replied: "Very well, then. That is settled." With this
private understanding, as to which nothing has been published until
this moment, the conversation closed with a final injunction from
Gordon of profound secrecy, as, should it become known, he might be
unable to get certain of his more ambitious officers to take part in
capturing the city. When Gordon therefore turned to Macartney, and
asked him to proceed to the Lar Wang's palace and inform him that the
terms of the convention must be carried out, it is necessary in order
to throw light on what follows to state what their relations were at
that moment. Gordon had selected Macartney as his successor in
preference to all his own officers.
Macartney hastened to the Lar Wang's palace, but as he had lent Gordon
his horse, his movements were slightly retarded. On reaching the
building he noticed some signs of confusion, and when he asked one of
the attendants to take him at once to his master, he received the
reply that the Lar Wang was out. Sir Halliday Macartney is not a man
to be lightly turned from his purpose, and to this vague response he
spoke in peremptory terms:
"The matter is of the first importance. I _must_ see the Lar Wang.
Take me to him."
Then the servant of the Taeping leader did a strange thing.
"You _cannot_ see my master," he said, and turning his face to the
wall, so that no one else might see, he drew his open hand in a
cutting position backwards and forwards. This is the recognised
Chinese mode of showing that a man's head has been cut off.
Being thus apprised that something tragic had happened, Macartney
hastened away to Wuliungchow to keep his appointment with Gordon, and
to acquaint him with what had taken place at the Lar Wang's palace.
But no Gordon came, and more than a day elapsed before Macartney and
he met again under dramatic circumstances at Quinsan. After waiting at
Wuliungchow some hours, Sir Halliday resolved to proceed to the
Futai's camp, and learn there what had happened. But on arriving he
was informed that the Futai was not in the camp, that no one knew
where he was, and that Gordon was in a state of furious wrath at the
massacre of the Wangs, which was no longer concealed. Macartney then
endeavoured to find Gordon, but did not succeed, which is explained by
the fact that Gordon was then hastening to Quinsan to collect his own
troops. Baffled in these attempts, Macartney returned, after a great
many hours, to his own camp near the Paotichiaou Bridge, there to
await events, and on his arrival there he at last found the Futai Li
who had come to him for security. Li put into his hands a letter,
saying, "I have received that letter from Gordon. Translate its
contents."
After perusing it, Macartney said: "This letter is written in a fit of
indignation. You and Gordon are and have been friends, and I am also
the friend of you both. The most friendly act I can do both of you is
to decline to translate it. Let me therefore return you the letter
unread."
"Very well," replied Li; "do as you think best, but as I am not to
know the contents, I do not wish to have the letter. Please keep it."
Sir Halliday Macartney kept the letter, which remained in his
possession for some time, until, in fact, he handed it, with an
explanatory account of the whole affair, to Sir Harry Parkes, as will
be explained further on.
After this point had been settled, Li Hung Chang went on to say that
he wished Macartney to go and see Gordon at Quinsan, and speak to him
as follows:--
"Tell Gordon that he is in no way, direct or indirect,
responsible in this matter, and that, if he considers his honour
involved, I will sign any proclamation he likes to draft, and
publish it far and wide that he had no part in or knowledge of
it. I accept myself the full and sole responsibility for what has
been done. But also tell Gordon that this is China, not Europe. I
wished to save the lives of the Wangs, and at first thought that
I could do so, but they came with their heads unshaved, they used
defiant language, and proposed a deviation from the convention,
and I saw that it would not be safe to show mercy to these
rebels. Therefore what was done was inevitable. But Gordon had no
part in it, and whatever he demands to clear himself shall be
done."
I do not gather that Sir Halliday Macartney had any serious misgivings
about this mission when he undertook it. His relations with Gordon
were, as has been shown, of a specially cordial and confidential
character, and even if he failed to induce Gordon to abandon the
threatening plans he had described in his letter to Li Hung Chang,
which was in his pocket, there was no reason to apprehend any
personal unpleasantness with one who had given the clearest proof of
friendship and esteem. As I cannot give the full text of the original
letter from General Gordon, I content myself by stating that its two
principal passages were that Li Hung Chang should at once resign his
post of Governor of Kiangsu, and give up the seals of office to
Gordon, so that he might put them in commission until the Emperor's
pleasure should be ascertained; or that, failing that step, Gordon
would forthwith proceed to attack the Imperialists, and to retake from
them all the places captured by the Ever Victorious Army, for the
purpose of handing them back again to the Taepings. When Gordon went
so far as to write a letter of that character, which, it must be
admitted, was far in excess of any authority he possessed, it must be
clear that the envoy, who came to put forward counsels that were
intended to restore harmony, but that by so doing might assume the
aspect of palliating the Futai's conduct, could not count on a very
cordial reception from a man of Gordon's temperament, whose sense of
honour and good faith had been deeply injured by the murder of the
rebel leaders.
Still, Sir Halliday accepted the mission without hesitation, and
hastened to carry it out without delay. It was late in the day when he
saw Li Hung Chang, but having procured a native boat with several
rowers, he set off in the evening, and reached Quinsan in the middle
of the night. Gordon was then in bed and could not be disturbed, and
while Macartney waited he drank some coffee Gordon's servant made for
him, which he much needed, as he had left Soochow without having
broken his fast during the whole day. After a short time, and before
day had really broken, Gordon sent down word that he would see him,
and Macartney went upstairs to an ill-lighted room, where he found
Gordon sitting on his bedstead. He found Gordon sobbing, and before a
word was exchanged, Gordon stooped down, and taking something from
under the bedstead, held it up in the air, exclaiming:
"Do you see that? Do you see that?"
The light through the small Chinese windows was so faint that
Macartney had at first some difficulty in recognising what it was,
when Gordon again exclaimed:
"It is the head of the Lar Wang, foully murdered!" and with that burst
into hysterical tears.
At once perceiving that any conversation under these circumstances
would do no good, Macartney said he would retire and see Gordon later.
Some hours afterwards breakfast was served in a large room downstairs,
where there were present not only many of the officers, but also
several European merchants and traders of Shanghai, who had been in
the habit of supplying the force with its commissariat requirements.
Gordon came in, and Macartney took a seat beside him. After a few
minutes' silence Gordon turned to Macartney, and said abruptly:
"You have not come for yourself. You have come on a mission from the
Futai. What is it?"
When Macartney suggested that so public a place might not be the most
suitable, Gordon said: "There are only friends here. I have no
secrets. Speak out."
There was no longer any honourable way of avoiding the challenge, and
Macartney described exactly what has been already recorded as to Li
Hung Chang having come to him with Gordon's letter, which from
friendly motives he had declined to translate, and stating that Li
took the whole responsibility on himself, and would exonerate Gordon
from the least complicity in the affair, with which the Chinese
statesman averred Gordon had had nothing to do. He went on to urge
with regard to the measures threatened by Gordon in expiation of the
massacre that they were not justifiable, and would not in the end
redound to Gordon's own credit. In conclusion, he said he felt sure
that "a little reflection would show Gordon that to carry on a
personal war with the Futai would be to undo all the good that had
been done. Moreover, you must recollect that although you, no doubt,
have at this moment the military force to carry out your threats, it
will no longer be paid by the Chinese authorities. You will only be
able to keep your men at your back by allowing them to plunder, and
how long will that prove successful, and what credit will you get by
it?"
Gordon here stamped his foot, saying he would have none of Macartney's
mild counsels. To which Macartney replied, "Mild or not, they are the
only ones your Minister at Peking and our Queen will approve. Nay,
what I advise you to do is even that you would yourself do if you
would but reflect, and not let yourself be influenced by those men
sitting at your table."
To these undoubtedly prudent representations, supported as they were
by at least one of those present, Mr Henry Dent, who got up and said
that, in his opinion, Dr Macartney's advice ought to be followed,
while the others who wished the war to go on from interested motives
remained silent, Gordon did and would not listen. The hot fit of rage
and horror at the treacherous murder of the Wangs, kept at fever-point
by the terrible memorial in his possession, was still strong upon him,
and his angry retort was--"I will have none of your tame counsels,"
and there and then ordered the _Hyson_, with a party of infantry, to
be got ready to attack the Futai, at the same time offering Macartney
a passage in the steamer.
On hearing this decisive declaration Macartney left the table, and
hastening to one of Gordon's officers, who was a personal friend, he
begged the loan of a horse and a pair of spurs. Having obtained what
he wanted, he set off riding as hard as he could by the road, which
was somewhat shorter than the canal, so that he might warn Li Hung
Chang as to what was going to happen, and also bring up his own troops
to oppose the advance of Gordon, who actually did move out of Quinsan
with the intention of carrying out his threats, but returned there
when his flotilla had proceeded half way.
By that time he had fortunately reflected on the situation, and a
sanguinary struggle was averted. Gordon came to see that his honour
was not in the slightest or most remote degree involved, and that
China was not a country to which the laws of chivalry could be
applied; but before he had reached this stage of mental equilibrium he
had penned a most regrettable and cruelly unjust despatch, not about
Li Hung Chang or any one involved in the massacre, but about Dr, now
Sir Halliday Macartney, whose sole fault had been that he wished to
make peace, and to advise Gordon to act in the very sense which he
afterwards himself adopted.
In a despatch to General Brown, commanding at Shanghai, which appears
in the Blue Book (China, No. 3, 1864, p. 198), Gordon wrote: "I then
went to his (Li's) boat and left him a note in English, informing him
of what my intention had been, and also my opinion of his treachery. I
regret to say that Mr Macartney did not think fit to have this
translated to him.... On 8th December the Futai sent Mr Macartney to
persuade me that he could not have done otherwise, and I blush to
think that he could have got an Englishman, late an officer in Her
Majesty's army, to undertake a mission of such a nature." This
statement, appearing in an official publication, has been largely
quoted, especially in Mr Egmont Hake's "Story of Chinese Gordon," and
the original injury done by Gordon, for which at the time he atoned,
was thus repeated in an offensive and altogether unjustifiable form
twenty years after Gordon had stated publicly that he was sorry for
having written this passage, and believed that Sir Halliday Macartney
was actuated by just as noble sentiments as himself.
It is not an agreeable task for any biographer to record that his hero
was in the wrong, but as General Gordon frankly and fully admitted
that in this matter he was altogether to blame, and as Mr Hake's error
shows that his retractation never obtained that publicity which he
himself desired, I conceive myself to be carrying out his wishes in
placing the following facts prominently before the reader.
When the Blue Book was published with the despatch referred to, Dr
Macartney took no notice of it. Some time afterwards he met the late
Sir Harry Parkes, then Consul-General at Shanghai, and he described
what I have set forth in the same language. Sir Harry Parkes, than
whom England never had a finer representative in the Far East, at once
said: "This is very interesting. Sir Frederick Bruce is coming down
shortly. I wish you would write out what you have told me, so that I
might show it to him." Dr Macartney wrote out his narrative, and with
it he sent Gordon's original letter to Li Hung Chang. Those documents
have never been published, but they should still exist in the Shanghai
Consulate. Sir Frederick Bruce's (brother of the ambassador Lord
Elgin, and himself the First British Minister at Peking) comment after
perusing them was: "Dr Macartney showed very great judgment and good
sense, and no blame attaches to him in this matter."
A considerable period intervened between the breakfast scene at
Quinsan and Gordon's next meeting with Macartney. In that period much
had happened. Gordon had forgiven Li Hung Chang, done everything that
Macartney had recommended as the right course in the memorable scene
at Quinsan, and by some of the most remarkable of his military
exploits had crushed the Taeping rebellion, but the two principal
actors in this affair had not crossed each other's path.
Six weeks after Gordon brought his operations in the field to an end
at Chanchufu in May he returned to Soochow, and Li Hung Chang, wishing
to do him honour, asked him to an official breakfast at his yamen. At
the same time Li Hung Chang said to Macartney: "I have asked Gordon to
breakfast. I know you and he have had some difference. How would you
meet him if you came too?"
To this question Macartney replied: "I would meet Gordon exactly as
Gordon met me. It is true that Gordon did me an injustice, but I am
quite ready to blot it out from my memory if Gordon will admit it.
Gordon acted under a strong feeling of excitement when he was not
master of himself, and I have no more thought of holding him strictly
responsible for what he wrote at such a moment than I would a madman."
Li Hung Chang said: "Very well, then. I ask you to come to breakfast
to meet him." On Macartney's return to his house he found a letter
from Gordon waiting for him. In this letter Gordon admitted that he
had done him a wrong, and was prepared to sign any paper to that
effect that Macartney might prepare.
Macartney thereupon replied to Gordon, pointing out that the mere
publication of a letter of retractation was not an adequate reparation
for an injurious statement which had been given a wide circulation,
and to a certain extent placed beyond recall by appearing in an
official publication, but that if he might publish Gordon's own
letter offering to do this in the _North China Herald_, he would be
satisfied, and the matter, as far as he was concerned, might be
considered at an end. To this course Gordon at once acquiesced,
subject to the omission of one paragraph affecting a third person, and
in no respect relating to Sir Halliday or his conduct. This letter,
which the Editor of that paper stated he "published at Colonel
Gordon's request," on 23rd July 1864, read as follows:--
"SHANGHAI, _July 5, 1864_.
"MY DEAR MACARTNEY,--It is with much regret that I perceive in
the last Blue Book issued on China affairs a Report from me to
General Brown on the occurrences at Soochow, which report
contains an injurious remark on your conduct.
"I am extremely sorry that I ever penned that remark, as I
believe you went out of your way on this occasion wholly on the
same public grounds which led eventually to my taking the field
myself, and I can only excuse my having done so by recollecting
the angry feelings with which I was actuated at that time.
"It will be my duty to rectify this error in other quarters, and
in the meantime I beg you to make what use you may think fit of
this letter.--Yours truly,
"C. G. GORDON."
On the next day Gordon and Macartney met at breakfast at the yamen of
the Futai Li Hung Chang, and Gordon at once came up to Macartney and
said:
"Do not let us talk of the past, but of the future. I am one of
those who hold that when a man has wronged another he should seek
opportunities through his life of making him redress. Now you are
founding an Arsenal at Soochow, and I am going back to England,
where I have a brother in the Arsenal at Woolwich. From him I can
get you books, plans, and useful information. I will do so."
Gordon was as good as his word. He sent Macartney expensive plans and
books, besides most valuable information. He also promised to write to
the Duke of Cambridge as Commander-in-Chief, admitting that he was not
justified in his criticism of Dr Macartney, who had acted in every way
becoming an English gentleman and officer. Thus ended the
misunderstanding between the two Englishmen who rendered China the
best service she has ever obtained from foreigners; and knowing both
these distinguished men intimately, I have much pleasure in testifying
from my own knowledge to the accuracy of the following statement of
Sir Halliday Macartney to myself that "after this, Gordon and I
remained firm friends evermore."
Gordon's indignation at this outrage did not soon subside, and three
weeks after it happened an opportunity presented itself for showing
and perhaps relieving his mind. A high Chinese officer presented
himself at his quarters at Quinsan to announce the receipt of an
Imperial decree and presents from Peking as a reward for his share in
the capture of Soochow. Gordon at once said that he would not accept
the presents, and that they were not to be brought to him. The Chinese
officer replied that they should not be brought, but that the emissary
of the Emperor ought to be received. To this Gordon assented, and on
1st January 1864 he went down to receive him at the West Gate. On
arriving there he met a procession carrying a number of open boxes,
containing 10,000 taels (then about £3000 of our money) in Sycee
shoes, laid on red cloth, also four Snake flags taken from the
Taepings--two sent by Li Hung Chang, and two by another mandarin who
had had no part in the Soochow affair. Gordon made the procession turn
about and take the whole lot back again. He wrote his reply stating
his reason on the back of the Imperial rescript itself; he rejected Li
Hung Chang's flags, but he accepted the other two as being in no sense
associated with the disgrace of the Taeping massacre. In this manner
did Gordon show the Chinese what he thought of their conduct. His
characteristic reply to the Imperial rescript read as follows:--
"Major Gordon receives the approbation of His Majesty the Emperor
with every gratification, but regrets most sincerely that, owing
to the circumstance which occurred since the capture of Soochow,
he is unable to receive any mark of H.M. the Emperor's
recognition, and therefore respectfully begs His Majesty to
receive his thanks for his intended kindness, and to allow him to
decline the same."
At this moment it will be recollected that Gordon was, strictly
speaking, no longer in command. He had resigned, because his very
reasonable demand for a gratuity to his troops had not been complied
with. But circumstances were too strong for him, and a number of
considerations, all highly creditable to his judgment and
single-mindedness, induced him to sink his private grievances, and to
resume the command on grounds of public policy and safety. The
internal condition of the Ever Victorious Army itself, which inaction
had brought to the verge of mutiny, was the determining fact that
induced Gordon to resume the command, even at the price of meeting Li
Hung Chang and sinking his differences with him. There had been much
intrigue among the officers of the force as to who should succeed
Gordon in the command, if he persisted in his resolve to give it up,
and before tranquillity was restored sixteen of the agitating officers
had to be dismissed. The force itself welcomed the formal resumption
of the command by Gordon, and not the less because it signified a
return to active operations after more than two months' inaction. The
murder of the Wangs took place on 7th December 1863; it was on 18th
February 1864 that Gordon marched out of Quinsan at the head of the
bulk of his force.
In a letter written at the time, Sir Robert Hart, whose services to
the Chinese Government, spread over the long period of forty years,
have been of the highest order and importance, said:--
"The destiny of China is at the present moment in the hands of
Gordon more than of any other man, and if he be encouraged to act
vigorously, the knotty question of Taepingdom _versus_ 'union in
the cause of law and order' will be solved before the end of May,
and quiet will at length be restored to this unfortunate and
sorely-tried country. Personally, Gordon's wish is to leave the
force as soon as he can. Now that Soochow has fallen, there is
nothing more that he can do, whether to add to his own reputation
or to retrieve that of British officers generally, tarnished by
Holland's defeat at Taitsan. He has little or nothing personally
to gain from future successes, and as he has himself to lead in
all critical moments, and is constantly exposed to danger, he has
before him the not very improbable contingency of being hit
sooner or later. But he lays aside his personal feelings, and
seeing well that if he were now to leave the force it would in
all probability go at once to the rebels or cause some other
disaster, he consents to remain with it for a time."
During that interval some minor successes had been obtained by the
Imperialists. Several towns surrendered to Li Hung Chang, and Chung
Wang evacuated Wusieh and retired to Chanchufu, also on the Grand
Canal. At the same time he hastened himself to Nanking, in the vain
hope of arousing Tien Wang to the gravity of the situation, and
inducing him to make some special effort to turn the fortune of the
war. General Ching succeeded in capturing Pingwang, and with it
another entrance into the Taiho Lake. San Tajin moved his camp close
up to Changchufu and engaged the Taepings in almost daily encounters,
during one of which the _Firefly_ steamer was retaken, and its English
captain killed. In consequence of this all the Europeans left the
service of the Taepings, and as their fleet had been almost entirely
destroyed, they were now hemmed in within a small compass, and Gordon
himself estimated that they ought to be finally overcome within two
months. In this hope he resumed the command, and his decision was
officially approved of and confirmed by the British Minister at
Peking.
The Taepings still retained possession of Hangchow and some other
towns in the province of Chekiang, but all communication between them
and Nanking had been severed by the fall of Soochow, so far at least
as the routes east of the Taiho Lake were concerned. West of that lake
they still held Yesing and Liyang, which enabled them to maintain
communication, although by a roundabout route. Gordon determined to
begin his campaign by attacking these two places, when the severance
would be complete.
Yesing, on the north-west corner of the lake, was the first object of
attack. Liyang is about fifty miles further inland than that town. The
Taepings at Yesing were not dreaming of an attack when Gordon, at the
head of his force, suddenly appeared before its walls. He found the
surrounding villages in a most appalling state of distress, the
inhabitants living on human food. The town was well surrounded by
ditches and stockades, and Gordon felt compelled to reconnoitre it
most carefully before deciding on his plan of attack. While engaged in
this work his ardour carried him away, and he was nearly captured by
the enemy. It was one of the narrowest of his many escapes during the
war, and went far to justify the reputation he had gained of having a
charmed life. A very striking instance of his narrowly escaping a
premature end had occurred during the siege of Soochow itself, when
the marvellous fifty-three-arch bridge at Patachiaou was destroyed.
One evening Gordon was seated smoking a cigar on one of the damaged
parapets of the bridge, when two shots fired by his own men struck the
stone-work close by him. He got down at the second shot, and entered
his boat. Hardly had he done so when the bridge collapsed with a
tremendous crash, nearly smashing his boat and killing two men. In all
the engagements, except when confined to his boat, Gordon always led
the attack, carrying no weapons, except a revolver which he wore
concealed in his breast, and never used except once, against one of
his own mutineers, but only a little rattan cane, which his men called
his magic wand of Victory. A graphic picture was drawn by one of his
own officers of this unarmed leader in the breach of an assaulted
position urging on his men by catching them by the sleeve of their
coats, and by standing indifferent and unresisting in the midst of the
thickest fire. Gordon long afterwards admitted that during the whole
of these scenes he was continuously praying to the Almighty that his
men should not turn tail. In the varied and voluminous annals of war
there is no more striking figure than this of human heroism combined
with spiritual fervour.
The attack on Yesing lasted several days, as, owing to the manner in
which the country was cut up by canals, all the operations had to be
conducted with great caution. The capture of the southern stockades
was followed after a day's interval by the evacuation of the latter
and the flight of the garrison, who however pillaged the town as far
as they could before leaving. Gordon would not let his men enter the
town, as he knew they would pillage, and thus get out of hand. They
were so disappointed that several cases of insubordination occurred,
and one mutineer had to be shot. The Imperialists were left to
garrison Yesing, but under strict injunctions that they were on no
account to take life; and under the threats of Li Hung Chang, who did
not wish a repetition of the Soochow affair, these were strictly
obeyed. All these arrangements having been made, Gordon resumed his
march towards Liyang on 4th March, the infantry proceeding overland,
and the artillery in the boats and _Hyson_ steamer.
At Liyang the rebels had collected a large force, and made every
preparation for a vigorous defence. But Gordon was quite confident of
success, although he was now operating in the heart of a hostile
country, and at a distance from his base. The sound flotilla which
mounted formidable artillery, and which co-operated with him on the
creek that led to the walls of Liyang, gave him sound reasons for
confidence, and additional ground of security in the event of any
accident. But his military skill and careful arrangements were not
subjected to any severe test, as a mutiny broke out among the Taepings
themselves, and the half in favour of surrender got possession of the
city, and closed the gates on those of their comrades who wished to
hold out. Major Gordon promptly accepted their surrender, and
guaranteed their personal safety to all, thus obtaining a signal
success without any loss. This was the more satisfactory because
Liyang was found to be an admirable position for defence, strongly
fortified with numerous stockades, well supplied with provisions for
several months' siege, and garrisoned by 15,000 well-armed and
well-clothed rebels. These men were disarmed, and allowed to go where
they liked after they had shaved their heads in token of surrender.
The provisions they had stored up for their own use were distributed
among the starving peasants of the surrounding country. Gordon himself
saved the lives of the female relatives of the Taeping Wang, who had
wished to hold out, not however, it should in fairness be stated, from
the official Chinese, but from the Taepings who had surrendered. After
the capitulation was over, Gordon took 1000 of the Taepings into his
own force, and he also engaged the services of another 1500 as a new
contingent, to fight under their own officers. In this unusual manner
he nearly doubled the effective strength of his own corps, and then
advanced north to attack the town of Kintang, rather more than forty
miles north of Liyang. At this point Gordon experienced his first
serious rebuff at the hands of Fortune, for the earlier reverse at the
Soochow stockades was so clearly due to a miscarriage in the attack,
and so ephemeral in its issue, that it can scarcely be counted.
Unlike the other Taeping towns, all of which were stockaded
positions, Kintang had no outer defences. It presented the appearance
of a small compact city with a stone wall. No flags were shown; the
place might have been deserted, but the complete silence seemed
ominous. Gordon selected his point of attack, and began a bombardment,
which continued during three hours, and then he ordered the assault.
As the bugles sounded the advance, the Taepings appeared for the first
time on the walls, and received the assailants with a heavy fire. At
this critical moment Gordon received a severe wound below the knee,
and had to be carried to his boat. His place was taken by Major Brown,
brother of the General commanding at Shanghai, who advanced waving
Gordon's own flag, but he too received a severe wound, and was carried
off the field. The rebels fought with great desperation, and Gordon,
who remained conscious, sent orders from his boat for the
discontinuance of the attack. The loss was heavy--two officers killed,
eleven wounded, and 115 rank and file killed and wounded. Gordon,
notwithstanding his wound, would have renewed the attack, but for the
receipt of alarming intelligence from his rear. Li Hung Chang wrote
that the Taepings had turned the flank of his brother's army, and
captured Fushan. They were at that moment besieging Chanzu, and had
carried terror into the very heart of the Imperial position. Gordon's
wound--the only one of any severity he ever received--excited much
sympathy among the Chinese, and was made the subject of an Imperial
edict ordering Li Hung Chang to call on him daily, and "requesting
Gordon to wait until he shall be perfectly restored to health and
strength."
In the extremity to which he was reduced, the brilliant idea had
occurred to Chung Wang to assume the offensive at a point most remote
from the scene where Gordon was acting in person. Hence the sudden and
successful attack on Fushan, and his strategy was rewarded by the
paralysis it produced in the Imperial plans. Gordon at once hastened
back to Liyang, where he left a strong garrison, and taking only 1000
men, half of whom were the irregular Taeping contingent raised at
Liyang itself, proceeded by forced marches to Wusieh. As the late Sir
George Chesney well said, it is impossible to decide whether the
temerity or the confidence of the young wounded commander was the more
calculated to excite wonder. On arriving here, he found that nothing
worse had happened than what had been already reported, while in the
south, beyond his sphere of operations, the important city of Hangchow
had been evacuated by the Taepings; and with this loss another avenue
for obtaining arms and ammunition was closed to them.
The relief of Kongyin, which was hard pressed, was the first task
Gordon set himself; and as he could not leave his boat on account of
his wound, the conduct of operations was attended with much
difficulty. After obtaining several minor successes, and approaching
to within a few miles of Kongyin, Gordon found it necessary to
completely alter his plans, and to attack the Taepings in their
headquarters at Waisso, before relieving the former place. He
accordingly proceeded to Waisso with his artillery on board the
flotilla, and his infantry marching by land. The latter, carried away
by some trifling successes, attacked the Waisso stockades without his
orders, and even without his knowledge; and having invited a reverse
by their rashness and disobedience, rendered it complete by an
inexcusable panic, during which the Taeping cavalry, not more than 100
strong, rode through the best regiment of the force; the rebels,
carrying a sword in each hand, cut down the fugitives right and left.
The pursuit lasted for three miles, and 7 European officers killed, 1
wounded, 252 men killed, and 62 wounded, represented the heavy loss in
this disastrous affair. The survivors, many of whom had thrown away
their arms, were so panic-stricken that Gordon had to retire, and to
summon up fresh troops.
For this disaster Gordon held the officers, and not the men, to be
blameworthy. They led the men into a false position, and then did not
make the proper movements. If the men had only formed square, Gordon
wrote, it would have been all right with them. After this Gordon
waited to allow of his wound being thoroughly cured, and on 6th April
he again appeared before Waisso. A large Imperial force also enveloped
the place on all sides but one, which had been left apparently open
and unguarded in the hope that the garrison would use it as a means of
reaching a place of safety. The Imperialists had, however, broken all
the bridges along this route, so that the Taepings would soon
encounter serious difficulties to their progress, and admit of their
being taken at a great disadvantage. Gordon approached the place with
much caution, and he found it so strongly fortified on the south side,
opposite his line of approach, that he moved round to the north in
search of a more favourable point of attack. This simple manoeuvre so
disconcerted the Taepings that they abandoned several of their
stockades, which Gordon promptly seized; and finding that these in
turn commanded others, he succeeded in carrying the whole of a most
formidable position with little or no loss. The Taeping garrison fled
in confusion and suffered heavily at the hands of the Imperial troops.
It rallied on the camp before Kongyin, and the day after this success
Gordon marched from Waisso to attack them. The Taepings were
thoroughly disorganised, and apparently amazed at the number of their
opponents, for the whole of the population rose against them in
revenge for the outrages they had perpetrated. There was only one
action, and that of an insignificant description, when the whole
Taeping force before Kongyin broke into a rout. The Imperialist plan
for retarding their retreat succeeded to admiration, and of more than
10,000 men not a tenth escaped from the sword of their pursuers.
In a letter written at this time to his mother, Gordon, who, at the
end of February had been raised to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in
the army for distinguished conduct in the field, gave a graphic
account of the condition of the region in which he was operating:--
"The rebels are very much pressed, and three months should finish
them. During the pursuit from Kongyin the Imperialists and
villagers killed in one village 3000. I will say this much--the
Imperialists did not kill the coolies and boys. The villagers
followed up and stripped the fugitives stark naked, so that all
over the country there were naked men lying down in the grass.
The cruelties these rebels had committed during their raid were
frightful; in every village there were from ten to sixty dead,
either women--frightfully mutilated--old men, or small children.
I do not regret the fate of these rebels. I have no talent for
description, but the scenes I have witnessed of misery are
something dreadful, and I must say that your wish for me to
return with the work incomplete would not be expressed if you saw
the state of these poor people. The horrible furtive looks of the
wretched inhabitants hovering around one's boat haunts me, and
the knowledge of their want of nourishment would sicken anyone.
They are like wolves. The dead lie where they fall, and are in
some cases trodden quite flat by the passers-by. I hope to get
the Shanghai people to assist, but they do not _see_ these
things, and to _read_ that there are human beings eating human
flesh produces less effect than if they saw the corpses from
which that flesh is cut. There is one thing I promise you, and
that is, that as soon as I can leave this service, I will do so;
but I will not be led to do what may cause great disasters for
the sake of getting out of the dangers, which, in my opinion, are
no greater in action than in barracks. My leg is all right; the
eleventh day after I received the wound I was up, and by the
fifteenth day I could walk well. The ball went through the thick
part of the leg, just below the knee."
Having thus cleared the district due north of Wusieh, Gordon proceeded
against the main Taeping position at Chanchufu, north-west of that
place, and on the Grand Canal. Here Chung Wang had fortified thirty
stockades, and commanded in person. On inspecting it, Gordon found it
so strong that he summoned up his troops from Liyang, and it was not
until 22nd April, ten days after Waisso, that he had collected all his
force of 4000 men for the attack. On the very day he accomplished this
the Imperialists alone attacked some stockades outside the West Gate,
and carried them by a heavy and unnecessary loss of life. Their
defenders, instead of retreating into Chanchufu, fled northwards to
their next possession, at Tayan. The same night part of the garrison
left behind made a _sortie_, but Gordon was apprised of it, and it was
easily repulsed. The next day he captured all the stockades on the
southern, or, more correctly, the western side of the Canal, but the
Taepings still held a strong stone fort on the opposite side, which
defied all the efforts of the Imperialists. Two hundred of the Liyang
corps gallantly crossed the Canal in boats, forced open the back door
of the fort, and carried it at a rush. With this success all the
outworks of Chanchufu were taken, and the town itself closely
besieged. Gordon then proceeded to plant his batteries opposite the
point he had selected for attack, but a regrettable affair happened in
the night, when the picket on guard fired into the party working at
the battery, and killed Colonel Tapp, an excellent officer who
commanded the artillery of the force. This mishap was quickly followed
by others. The Imperialists under their own generals wished to get all
the credit of the capture, and attacked several times on their own
side, but always without obtaining any advantage. Nor was Gordon
himself more fortunate. After a severe bombardment, to which the
Taepings made no reply, Gordon assaulted on 27th April. His men
succeeded in throwing two pontoons across the ditch, twenty yards
wide, and some of his officers reached the wall; but the Taepings met
them boldly with a terrific storm of fire-balls, bags of powder,
stinkpots, and even showers of bricks. Twice did Gordon lead his men
to the assault, but he had to admit his repulse with the loss of his
pontoons, and a great number of his best officers and men. Ten
officers killed and 19 wounded, 40 men killed and 260 wounded,
represented the cost of this disastrous failure.
Undaunted by this defeat, Gordon proceeded to lay siege in regular
form, and Li Hung Chang lent him the services of his own troops in
order to dig the necessary trenches. Working only at night, and with
equal celerity and secrecy, a succession of trenches were made right
up to the edge of the ditch. At the same time, proclamations in large
characters were exhibited, offering terms to all who came over, except
the Wang in command; and many desertions took place. At last, on 11th
May, the place was again assaulted, this time at mid-day; and owing to
the short distance from the advance trench to the breach, the Chinese
troops of all kinds were able to come to close fighting with the
Taepings without any preliminary loss. The Taepings fought with great
courage, even although their chief Hoo Wang was taken prisoner early
in the fight, but at last they were overwhelmed by numbers. Hoo Wang
and all the Canton and Kwangsi men--that is to say, the original
Taeping band--were executed, and the completeness of the triumph was
demonstrated by the surrender, two days later, of Tayan, the last of
the Taeping possessions on the Grand Canal. On the spur of the moment,
two hours after the successful assault, Gordon wrote a hurried few
lines to his mother, stating, to relieve her anxiety, that he would
"not again take the field," and that he was happy to say he had "got
off safe."
The capture of Chanchufu was the last achievement of the Ever
Victorious Army, which marched back to Quinsan, its headquarters, in
preparation for its disbandment, which had been decided on by the
joint conclusion of the Chinese and European authorities. It had done
its work, and the Chinese naturally regarded the presence of this
formidable and somewhat unruly force with no little apprehension. The
Taepings were now confined to Nanking, and the Viceroy, Tseng Kwofan,
felt confident that before long he would be able to capture that city.
The British Government had decided that the service of Major Gordon
under the Chinese should terminate on 1st June 1864, and some weeks
before that order was put in force the army was quietly disbanded,
without any disturbance or display. The troops themselves would have
given their commander a demonstration, but he evaded them, and escaped
quietly into Shanghai, passing without regret from the position of the
arbiter of an Empire's destiny to the routine of an English officer's
existence. At the same time a considerable part of his force was taken
into the service of Li Hung Chang.
Gordon's own opinion of his work was given in the following letter:--
"I have the satisfaction of knowing that the end of this
rebellion is at hand, while, had I continued inactive, it might
have lingered on for years. I do not care a jot about my
promotion or what people may say. I know I shall leave China as
poor as I entered it, but with the knowledge that, through my
weak instrumentality, upwards of eighty to one hundred thousand
lives have been spared. I want no further satisfaction than
this."
Having retired from the active direction of the campaign, Gordon still
retained sufficient interest in the work he had had in hand so long to
incline him to accept an invitation to visit the lines of Tseng Kwofan
before Nanking. On 26th June he visited that Viceroy's camp, and found
that his position extended over from twenty-four to thirty miles, and
that he commanded 80,000 troops, who were, however, badly armed. The
troops were well fed, but ill paid, and at last confident of success.
While Gordon was there, or only a few hours after he left, Tien Wang,
the leader of the moribund Taeping cause, seeing no chance of escape,
swallowed gold leaf in the approved regal fashion, and died. On the
19th July the Imperialists succeeded in running a gallery under the
wall of Nanking, and in charging it with 40,000 lbs. of powder. The
explosion destroyed fifty yards of the wall, and the Imperialists at
once stormed the breach. Chung Wang made a valiant defence in his own
palace, and then cut his way out, at the head of 1000 men. Very few of
these escaped, but Chung Wang and the young Tien Wang, son of the
defunct leader, were among the fortunate few. Chung Wang was soon
captured, and beheaded on 7th August, after being allowed a week's
respite to write the history of the Taeping rebellion. At least it may
be claimed for him that he was the only true hero of the rebel
movement. Gordon's own estimation of this leader is given in these
words:--
"He was the bravest, most talented, and enterprising leader the
rebels had. He had been in more engagements than any other rebel
leader, and could always be distinguished. His presence with the
Taepings was equal to a reinforcement of 5000 men, and was always
felt by the superior way in which the rebels resisted. He was the
only rebel chief whose death was to be regretted; the others, his
followers, were a ruthless set of bandit chiefs."
The young Tien Wang was eventually captured and executed. Thus
terminated, in the blood of its authors and leaders, the great
rebellion, which had inflicted an incalculable amount of misery and
loss on the Chinese people in a vain attempt to subvert the existing
dynasty. Six hundred cities were stated to have been destroyed during
its course, and sixteen out of the eighteen provinces to have
witnessed the ravages of civil war.
Having thus concluded his work as commander of the Ever Victorious
Army, it might have been thought that Gordon would be allowed to carry
out his own wish of returning home as quickly as possible, but the
English, as well as the Chinese, authorities were desirous of
organising a purely Chinese force, with the object of supplying the
Government with the means of asserting its authority over any internal
enemies. Sir Frederick Bruce came specially from Pekin to Shanghai on
the subject, and Gordon undertook to give the necessary organisation
his personal supervision until it was in fair working order. From the
end of June until the middle of November Colonel Gordon was engaged in
the Chinese camp, which was formed at a place near Sungkiang, drilling
recruits, and endeavouring to inspire the officers with the military
spirit. He describes his work in the following short note, which is
also interesting as expressing his impressions about the Chinese
people:--
"I have the manual, and platoon, and company drill in full swing,
also part of the battalion drill, and one or two men know their
gun drill very fairly. This is so far satisfactory, and I think,
if the whole country was not corrupt, they might go on well and
quickly, but really it is most irritating to see the jealousies
of the mandarins of one another. The people are first-rate,
hard-working, and fairly honest; but it seems as soon as they
rise in office they become corrupt. There is lots of vitality in
the country, and there are some good men; but these are kept down
by the leaden apathy of their equals, who hate to see reform,
knowing their own deficiencies."
By the end of November Gordon was able to think of returning home, as
he had given a start to military reform in China; but before he sailed
he had to receive a congratulatory address from the most prominent
citizens and merchants of Shanghai, expressing their "appreciation and
admiration of his conduct." They had not always been so
discriminating, and at the beginning their sympathies had been for the
Taepings, or at least for strict non-intervention. The Chinese
Government also gave exceptional signs of its gratitude to the
noble-minded soldier, who had rendered it such invaluable aid. It
again offered him a large sum of money, which was declined with as
much firmness, although less emphasis, as on the earlier occasion. But
he could not reject the promotion offered him to the high rank of
Ti-Tu, or Field Marshal in the Chinese army, or churlishly refuse to
receive the rare and high dignity of the Yellow Jacket. The English
reader has been inclined on occasion to smile and sneer at that
honour, but its origin was noble, and the very conditions on which it
was based ensured that the holders should be very few in number.
The story of its origin will admit of being retold. When the Manchus
conquered China, in the middle of the seventeenth century, they
received material aid from a Chinese soldier named Wou Sankwei. He was
rewarded with the Viceroyalty of the whole of south-western China, in
which region he became supreme. After many years the Manchus thought
he posed with too great an air of independence, and he was summoned to
Peking to give an account of his stewardship. But Wou Sankwei was too
old to be caught by so simple a ruse. He defied the Manchus, and
established his authority throughout the larger part of the country
south of the Great River. The young and afterwards illustrious Emperor
Kanghi threw himself into the struggle with ardour, and it continued
for many years, and devastated almost as large an area as did the
Taeping rebellion. Kanghi did not obtain a decisive triumph until
after the death of Wou Sankwei, when he bestowed a yellow riding
jacket and an ornament of peacock's feathers for the cap on his
principal lieutenants. He also decreed that this decoration should be
made a regular order, to be conferred only on generals who had led
victorious armies against rebel forces. Gordon was thus perfectly
qualified to receive the order founded by the famous Manchu
contemporary of the Grand Monarque.
The Chinese Government also sent him six mandarin dresses in the
correct fashion for a commanding officer of the rank of Ti-Tu, and a
book explaining how they should be worn. Gordon said very little about
it, his only comment being: "Some of the buttons on the mandarin hats
are worth thirty or forty pounds. I am sorry for it, as they cannot
afford it over well; it is, at any rate, very civil of them." The two
Empress Regents also struck a heavy gold medal in his honour, the
destination of which will be told hereafter, and Li Hung Chang did
everything possible to demonstrate the respect and regard he
entertained for his European colleague. That that was no transitory
feeling was well shown thirty-two years later, when the famous Chinese
statesman seized the occasion of his visit to London to place wreaths
on the statue and cenotaph of his old comrade in arms. General Gordon
valued the Yellow Jacket and the Gold Medal very highly. When he gave
up the medal for the cause of charity he felt its loss keenly, and it
became a phrase with him to signify the height of self-sacrifice to
say, "You must give up your medal." Prince Kung, in a special and
remarkable despatch to the British Minister, narrated in detail the
achievements of Gordon, and declared in graceful language that "not
only has he shown himself throughout both brave and energetic, but his
thorough appreciation of that important question, a friendly
understanding between China and foreign nations, is also deserving of
the highest praise." The Minister was requested to bring these facts
to the notice of the British Government, and it was even suggested by
the Chinese Prince that some reward that Gordon would appreciate at
the hands of his own Sovereign should be conferred on him, and would
be hailed with satisfaction in China. If I add to this list the sword
of Chung Wang, captured from one of his lieutenants, and presented
afterwards by Gordon to the Duke of Cambridge, the rewards of Gordon
from the Chinese are fully catalogued. At the hands of his own
Government he received for his magnificent service a brevet
lieutenant-colonelcy, and somewhat later the Companionship of the
Bath.
Gordon had kept a journal, which he sent home; but subsequently, on
finding that it was being circulated, he destroyed it. Of this fact
there is no doubt, and it is of course impossible to say whether it
contained more than the manuscript history of the Taeping war, which
he lent me in 1881 as "a trustworthy narrative" for the purposes of my
"History of China," and which was published many years later as a
separate volume. The authorship of that history is a matter of
speculation, but there seems little or no doubt that it was at least
compiled under Gordon's own direction, from the reports of his
lieutenants in China, and completed during his residence at Gravesend.
Of the true personal journal Gordon wrote in 1864: "I do not want the
same published, as I think, if my proceedings sink into oblivion, it
would be better for every one; and my reason for this is that it is a
very contested point whether we ought to have interfered or not, on
which point I am perfectly satisfied that it was the proper and humane
course to pursue, but I still do not expect people who do not know
much about it to concur in the same.... I never want anything
published. I am sure it does no good, and makes people chary of
writing."
The same feeling came out in his last letter to his mother from China,
17th November 1864: "The individual is coming home, but does not wish
it known, for it would be a signal for the disbanded to come to
Southampton, and although the waits at Christmas are bad, these others
are worse." Such a wish as this was impossible of gratification. The
public press could not be silenced by the modesty of this retiring
commander whose deeds had been so heroic and devoid of selfish
purpose. The papers became so filled with accounts of his achievements
that he gave up reading them, but _The Times_ had at least
crystallised the opinion of the day into a single sentence: "Never did
soldier of fortune deport himself with a nicer sense of military
honour, with more gallantry against the resisting, and with more mercy
towards the vanquished, with more disinterested neglect of
opportunities of personal advantage, or with more entire devotion to
the objects and desires of his own Government, than this officer who,
after all his victories, has just laid down his sword."
The more calmly and critically the deeds of the Ever Victorious Army
and Gordon's conduct during the campaign against the Taepings are
considered, the greater will be the credit awarded to the high-minded,
brave, and unselfish man who then gained the sobriquet of "Chinese"
Gordon. Among all the deeds of his varied and remarkable career he
never succeeded in quite the same degree in winning fame and in
commanding success. At Khartoum the eyes of the world were on him, but
the Mahdi was allowed to remain victorious, and the Soudan still
awaits fresh conquest. But during the two Taeping campaigns he was
completely successful, and closed his work with an unqualified
triumph. It was also the only occasion when he led an army in the
field, and proved his claims to be considered a great commander. Of
serious warfare it may be said to have been his last experience, for
his own Government was very careful to give him no active military
employment--garrison, and even consular duties being deemed more
suitable for this victorious leader than the conduct of any of those
little expeditions commencing with the Red River and Ashanti for which
he was pre-eminently qualified--and under the Khedive he controlled an
army without finding a real foe. Gordon's title to rank among skilful
military commanders rests on his conduct at the head of the Ever
Victorious Army during the Taeping war. It has earned the praise of
many competent military authorities as well as the general admiration
of the public, and Lord Wolseley must have had it in his mind when, in
vindicating his sanity, he exclaimed that he "wished other English
generals had been bitten with his madness."
Those who have thought that Gordon won his victories in China by sheer
personal gallantry, and nothing else, have taken a very shallow view
of the case, and not condescended to study the details. In his general
conception of the best way to overcome the Taepings he was necessarily
hampered by the views, wishes, jealousies, and self-seeking purposes
of his Chinese colleagues. But for them, his strategy would have been
of a very different character, as he himself often said. He had to
adjust his means to the best attainable end, and it must be allowed
that he did this with remarkable tact and patience--the very qualities
in which he was naturally most deficient. If we consider his strategy
as being thus fettered by the Chinese officials Li Hung Chang and
General Ching, whose first object was not so much the overthrow of the
Taeping Government as the expulsion of the Taepings from the province
for which they were responsible, it will be admitted that nothing
could be better than his conception of what had to be done, and how it
was to be effected. The campaign resolved itself into the cutting off
of all their sources of supply from the sea and Treaty ports, and the
shutting up of their principal force within the walls of Soochow. How
well and successfully that was accomplished has been narrated, but a
vainglorious commander could not have been held back after the fall of
Chanchufu from leading his victorious force to achieve a crowning
triumph at Nanking, which Gordon could easily have carried by assault
before the order in council withdrawing his services came into effect.
More frequent opportunity was afforded for Gordon to reveal his
tactical skill than his strategical insight, and in this respect the
only trammels he experienced were from the military value and
efficiency of his force, which had its own limitations. But still it
would be unjust to form too poor an estimate of the fighting
efficiency and courage of either Gordon's force or his Taeping
opponents from the miserable exhibition the Chinese recently made of
themselves during the war with Japan. The heavy losses incurred, the
several repulses Gordon himself experienced, would alone tell a
different tale, if there were not the obstinate resistance offered to
General Staveley and the French by the Taepings to show that they were
not altogether contemptible adversaries. Gordon himself thought that
his force could fight very well, and that his officers, if somewhat
lacking in polish, were not to be surpassed in dash and devilry. For
the Taepings, especially behind walls, and when it was impossible to
out-manoeuvre them, he had also the highest opinion, and his first
object on every occasion was to discover a weak point in their
position, and his patience and perspicuity were generally rewarded.
The very first step he took on approaching any place that he had to
attack was to reconnoitre it himself, either on foot or in one of his
steamers, and he wrote a powerful despatch pointing out the general
neglect of this precaution in the conduct of our Eastern campaigns,
with its inevitable heavy attendant loss of precious lives. As he
truly said, a careful reconnaissance generally revealed points of
weakness in the enemy's position, and the Taepings, like all Asiatics,
were easily demoralised when their line of retreat was threatened, or
when attacked at some point where their preparations had not been
perfected. Among his own personal qualifications, his untiring energy
and his exceptional promptitude in coming to a decision were the most
remarkable. No exertion relaxed his effort or diminished his ardour,
and in face of fresh perils and disappointments he was always ready
with a new plan, or prepared with some scheme for converting defeat
into victory. One of his chief characteristics was his quickness in
seeing an alternative course of action when his original plan had
either failed or been thwarted by others. Of his personal courage and
daring sufficient instances have been given to justify the assertion
that in those qualities he was unsurpassable; and if he had never done
anything else than lead the Ever Victorious Army, it would be
sufficient to secure him a place among the most remarkable of English
soldiers. In China he will be remembered for his rare self-abnegation,
for his noble disdain of money, and for the spirit of tolerance with
which he reconciled the incompatible parts of "a British officer and a
Chinese mandarin."
CHAPTER VI.
GRAVESEND AND GALATZ.
After the exciting and eventful ten years which began in the Crimea
and ended in China, the most tranquil period in Gordon's career
follows, until he was once again launched on the stormy sea of public
affairs in Africa. He used to speak of the six years following his
return from the Far East as the happiest of his life, and by a
fortunate although unusual coincidence the details of his existence
during the tranquil and uneventful period have been preserved with
great amplitude and fidelity by several witnesses associated with him
in his beneficent as well as his official work. It would be easy to
fill a small volume with these particulars, which have been already
given to the world, but here it will suffice to furnish a summary
sufficient to bring out the philanthropic side of his character, and
to explain how and why it came to be thought that Gordon was the man
to solve that ever-pressing but ever-put-off problem of diminishing
the pressure of excessive population and poverty in the eastern
districts of London.
General Gordon arrived in England early in 1865, and proceeded to join
his family at Rockstone Place, Southampton, where he was then doubly
welcomed, as his father was in declining health, and died soon
afterwards. Here Gordon passed a quiet six months, refusing all
invitations with extreme modesty, and in every way baffling the
attempts of relations, friends, and admirers to make a lion of him. He
would not permit anyone to say that his suppression of the Taeping
rebellion was a marvellous feat, and he evaded and resented all the
attempts made by those in power to bring him into prominence as a
national hero. Modesty is becoming as an abstract principle of human
conduct, but Gordon carried it to an excess that made it difficult not
so much for his fellow-men to understand him, as for them to hold
ordinary workaday relations with him. This was due mainly to two
causes--a habitual shyness, and his own perception that he could not
restrain his tongue from uttering unpalatable and unconventional
truths. He was so unworldly and self-sacrificing in his own actions
that he could not let himself become even in a passive sense
subservient to the very worldly means by which all men more or less
advance in public and private life. The desire of Ministers and War
Office authorities to bring him forward, to eulogise his Chinese
exploits, and in the end to give him worthy employment, was regarded
by him as that secret favouritism that he abhorred. He retired into
his shell at every effort made to bring him into prominence. He tore
up his diary sooner than that it should be the means of giving him
notoriety. He even refused special employment and promotion, because
it would put him over the heads of his old comrades at the Woolwich
Academy. The inevitable result followed. Those in power came to regard
him as eccentric, and when occasions arose that would have provided
him with congenial and much-desired employment on active service for
his own country, his name was passed over, and the best soldier in
England was left in inglorious and uncongenial inactivity. This was
regrettable, but natural. The most heroic cannot pose as being too
elevated above their fellows, or they will be left like Achilles
sulking in his tent.
There were moments, we have been told, when in the bosom of the family
circle he threw off the reserve in which he habitually wrapped
himself, and narrated in stirring if simple language the course of his
campaigns in China. These outbursts were few and far between. They
became still less frequent when he found that the effect of his
description was to increase the admiration his relatives never
concealed from him. His mother, whose feelings towards him were of a
specially tender nature, and whose solicitude for his personal safety
had been more than once evinced, took the greatest pride in his
achievements, and a special pleasure at their recital. But even her
admiration caused Charles Gordon as much pain as pleasure, and it is
recorded that while she was exhibiting to a circle of friends a map
drawn by him during his old term days at the Academy, he came into the
room, and seeing that it was being made a subject of admiration, took
it from his mother, tore it in half, and threw it into the fire grate.
Some little time after he repented of this act of rudeness, collected
the fragments, pasted them together, and begged his mother's
forgiveness. This damaged plan or map is still in existence. His
extraordinary diffidence and shrinking from all forms of praise or
exaltation was thus revealed at a comparatively early stage of his
career, and in connection with the first deeds that made him famous.
The incident just described shows that his way of asserting his
individuality was not always unattended with unkindness to those who
were nearest and dearest to him. His distrust of his own temper, and
of his capacity to speak and act conventionally, urged him towards a
solitary life; and when his fate took him into places and forms of
employment where solitude was the essential condition of the service,
it is not surprising that his natural shyness and humility, as well as
that habit of speaking his own mind, not only without fear or favour,
but also, it must be admitted, with considerable disregard for the
feelings of others, became intensified, and the most noticeable of his
superficial characteristics.
But although Gordon was averse to praise and any special promotion, he
was most anxious to resume the work of his profession, in which he
took a peculiar pride, and for which he felt himself so thoroughly
well suited. His temperament was naturally energetic and impulsive.
The independent command he had exercised in China had strengthened
these tendencies, and made a dull routine doubly irksome to one whose
eager spirit sought action in any form that offered. The quiet
domestic life of the family circle at Southampton soon became
intolerable to his restless spirit, and although he was entitled to
two years' leave after his long foreign service, he took steps to
return to active service as an engineer officer within a very few
months of his return to England.
On 1st September 1865 he was appointed Commanding Royal Engineer
officer at Gravesend, to superintend the erection of the new forts to
be constructed in that locality for the defence of the Thames. For
such a post his active military service, as well as his technical
training, eminently suited him; and although there was little promise
of excitement about it, the work was distinctly congenial, and offered
him a field for showing practical judgment and skill as an engineer.
He threw himself into his task with his characteristic energy and
enthusiasm. But how far the latter was damped by his prompt discovery
that the whole project of the Thames defences was faulty and unsound
it is impossible to say, but his attention to his work in all its
details certainly showed no diminution or falling off. There were five
forts in all to be constructed--three on the south or Kent side of the
river, viz., New Tavern, Shornmead, and Cliffe; and two, Coalhouse and
Tilbury, on the north or Essex side. An immense sum had been voted by
Parliament for their construction, and Gordon was as loud as an
officer dare be in his denunciation of this extravagant waste of money
as soon as he discovered by personal examination that the three
southern forts could be turned into islands, and severed from all
communication by an enemy cutting the river bank at Cooling; and also
that the northern forts were not merely unprotected in the rear, like
those of the Chinese, but completely commanded from the Essex range of
hills. Notwithstanding this important discovery, made at the very
beginning, the original scheme was prosecuted to the end, with
enormous outlay and useless result, for an entirely new system of
river defences had to be formed and carried out at a later period.
But for these errors Gordon was in no sense responsible, and they
would not have been committed if his advice and representations had
been heeded.
Mr Arthur Stannard, who was assistant to the manager of the firm which
had been intrusted with the contract for the building of these forts,
gave in the _Nineteenth Century_ for April 1885 the best account we
possess of the manner in which Colonel Gordon discharged his official
duties at Gravesend.
Colonel Gordon's headquarters were at a quaint-looking, old-fashioned
house with a good-sized garden, close to the site on which the New
Tavern fort was to be erected. He considered himself to be on official
duty from eight o'clock in the morning until two o'clock in the
afternoon; and during these six hours he not only worked himself
without intermission, but expected all those under him to work in the
same untiring spirit. He was a severe and unsparing taskmaster, and
allowed no shirking. No other officer could have got half the work out
of his men that he did. He used to keep them up to the mark by
exclaiming, whenever he saw them flag: "Another five minutes gone, and
this not done yet, my men! We shall never have them again."
Another instance of his unflagging energy and extreme activity was
furnished in connection with the boat in which he had to visit the
different parts of the defences. A two-oared, slow-moving boat was
provided for the purpose, but Gordon soon grew tired of this slow
means of locomotion, and he started a four-oared gig. He trained these
men according to his own ideas, and expected them to row with all
their might and main, and to lose not a minute in casting off their
boat on his arrival. So fond was he of rapid motion, or so impressed
with the value of time, that he would continue to urge them on,
whenever any signs of slackening appeared, with exclamations: "A
little faster, boys, a little faster!" and Mr Stannard states that he
has seen the boatmen land after such a row as this in as limp a
condition as four strong men could be. All his own movements were
carried on at the run, and his activity was such that few younger and
taller men were able to keep up with him. I well recollect myself my
first interview with General Gordon in 1881, when he roused me up by a
surprise morning visit at eight o'clock--I had not returned from a
newspaper office till four o'clock--and carried me off, walking in a
light, springy way which was half a run up to the top of Campden Hill,
to interview the late Sir Harry Parkes.
While many incidents and the general tenor of his conduct show the
natural gentleness of Gordon and his softness of heart, he was a
strict disciplinarian, and even a martinet in some of his ways. As has
been said, he came on duty at eight every morning punctually, but he
would not allow himself to be intruded upon before that hour. Mr
Stannard tells one story that furnishes striking evidence to this
effect. Early in the morning the men were brought to a standstill in
their work until Colonel Gordon arrived to decide some doubtful or
disputed matter. It was noticed that his bedroom window was wide open,
and the contractor's manager was induced to go up and knock at his
door for instructions. Gordon opened his door a little way, and
exclaimed in a testy and irritable tone, "Presently, presently." He
made his regular appearance at eight o'clock, and no one ventured to
again disturb him before the regulation hour.
With regard to his meals he was most abstemious, and at the same time
irregular. His brother describes an arrangement by which he was able
to take, at all events, his midday meal, and at the same time to carry
on his official work, especially in the matter of receiving visitors.
He had a deep drawer in his table, in which the food was deposited.
When anyone came to see him, the drawer was closed, and all signs of a
meal were concealed. At all periods of his career he was a small and
frugal eater, partly because he deprecated extravagance in living, and
partly because he considered that the _angina pectoris_ from which he
thought he suffered could be best coped with by abstention from a
sumptuous or heavy diet. Some days he would almost starve himself, and
then in the night Nature would assert herself, and he would have to
come downstairs and take whatever he found in the larder. It is
recorded that on one occasion he sucked ten or a dozen raw eggs. But
if he denied himself the luxuries and even the necessaries of a decent
table, he possessed the true spirit of hospitality, and never expected
his guests to follow any different practice than their own. For them
he was always at pains to provide dainty fare and good wine. Nor must
undue stress be laid on the isolated cases cited of his indifference
to his personal comfort. Gordon was always attentive to his dress and
appearance, never forgetting that he was a gentleman and an English
officer.
While quartered at Gravesend he received a visit from Sir William
Gordon, who had just been appointed to the command of the troops in
Scotland. Sir William was no relation, only a member of the same great
clan, and he had served with Gordon in the trenches of the Crimea. He
had a great admiration and affection for the younger officer, and
begged him to accept the post of his _aide-de-camp_ in the North. The
idea was not a pleasant one to our Gordon, but his good-nature led him
to yield to the pressing invitations of his friend; and after he had
given his assent, he was ill with nervousness and regret at having
tied himself down to an uncongenial post. In some way or other Sir
William heard of his distress, and promptly released him from his
promise, only exacting from him the condition that he should pay him a
visit at his home in Scotland. Soon afterwards Sir William Gordon
became seriously ill, and Charles Gordon hastened to the North, where
he remained some time employed in cheering up his friend, who was
suffering from hypochondria. Some time afterwards Sir William died
under sad circumstances. He had wished to benefit General Gordon by
his will, but the latter absolutely refused to have anything except a
silver tea service, which he had promised Sir William, while alive, to
accept, because "it would pay for his funeral," and save any one being
put to expense over that inevitable ceremony. The fate of this tea
service, valued at £70, cannot be traced. It had disappeared long
before Gordon's departure for Khartoum, and was probably sold for some
beneficent work.
The Sir William Gordon incident was not the only external affair that
distracted his attention from the monotonous routine work of building
forts on a set, but faulty and mistaken, plan. Glad as he was of any
work, in preference to the dull existence of a prolonged holiday in
the domestic circle, Gravesend was not, after all, the ideal of active
service to a man who had found the excitement of warfare so very
congenial to his own temperament. When, in the course of 1867 it
became evident that an expedition would have to be sent to Abyssinia
to release the prisoners, and to bring the Negus Theodore to his
senses, Gordon solicited the Horse Guards to include him in any force
despatched with this object. There is no reason to think that his wish
would not have been complied with if the expedition had been fitted
out from England, but it was very wisely decided that the task should
be entrusted to the Anglo-Indian Army. The late Lord Napier of
Magdala, then Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, was appointed to
the command. The officers of his staff, as well as the troops under
him, were all drawn from the Bombay Army, and although his connection
by marriage, Sir Charles Staveley, held a command under Napier, and
would willingly have assisted towards the gratification of his wish,
an exception in Gordon's case could not be made without that
favouritism which he most deprecated. Still, it was a great
disappointment to him, and he shut himself up for a whole day, and
would see no one.
If the six years at Gravesend, "the most peaceful and happy of any
portion of my life," as he truly said, had left no other trace than
his official work, of which the details must necessarily be meagre,
there would have been a great blank in his life, and the reader would
necessarily possess no clue to the marked change between the Gordon
of China and the Gordon of the Soudan. Not that there was any loss of
power or activity, but in the transition period philanthropy had come
to occupy the foremost place in Gordon's brain, where formerly had
reigned supreme professional zeal and a keen appreciation--I will not
say love--of warlike glory. His private life and work at Gravesend
explain and justify what was said of him at that time by one of his
brother officers: "He is the nearest approach to Jesus Christ of any
man who ever lived."
It has been written of him that his house at Gravesend bore more
resemblance to the home of a missionary than the quarters of an
English officer. His efforts to improve and soften the hard lot of the
poor in a place like Gravesend began in a small way, and developed
gradually into an extensive system of beneficence, which was only
limited by his small resources and the leisure left him by official
duty. At first he took into his house two or three boys who attracted
his attention in a more or less accidental manner. He taught them in
the evening, fed and clothed them, and in due course procured for them
employment, principally as sailors or in the colonies. For a naturally
bad sailor, he was very fond of the sea; and perhaps in his heart of
hearts he cherished the thought that he was performing a national work
in directing promising recruits to the first line of our defence, and
the main prop of this Empire. Soon his few special pupils swelled into
a class, not all boarders, but of outsiders who came in to learn
geography and hear the Colonel explain the Bible; and not only that,
but to be told of stirring deeds beyond the sea by one who had himself
contributed to the making of history. We can well believe that before
this uncritical but appreciative audience, from whose favour he had
nothing to hope, or, as he would say, to fear, Gordon threw off the
restraint and shyness habitual to him. It was very typical of the man
that, where others thought only of instructing the poor and the
ignorant, his chief wish was to amuse them and make them laugh.
By this simple means his class increased, and grew too large for his
room. Sooner than break it up or discourage new-comers, he consented
to teach in the ragged schools, where he held evening classes almost
every night. Where he had clothed two or three boys, he now
distributed several hundred suits in the year; and it is said that his
pupils became so numerous that he had to buy pairs of boots by the
gross. All this was done out of his pay. His personal expenses were
reduced to the lowest point, so that the surplus might suffice to
carry on the good work. It very often left him nearly penniless until
his next pay became due--and this was not very surprising, as he could
never turn a deaf ear to any tale of distress, and often emptied his
pockets at the recital of any specially touching misfortune. When any
outside subject of national suffering appealed to his heart or touched
his fancy, he would consequently have no means available of sending
any help, and this was specially the case during the suffering of the
Lancashire operatives after the close of the American Civil War. On
that occasion he defaced the gold medal given him by the Chinese
Empresses, and sent it anonymously to the fund, which benefited from
it to the extent of £10; but, as has been already stated, he made this
sacrifice with the greatest pain and reluctance.
Gordon's love of children, and especially of boys, was quite
remarkable. He could enter into their feelings far better than he
could into those of grown men, and the irritability which he could
scarcely suppress even among his friends was never displayed towards
them. He was always at their service, anxious to amuse them, and to
minister to their rather selfish whims. Some accidental remark led his
class to express a wish to visit the Zoo. Gordon at once seized the
idea, and said they should do so. He made all the arrangements as
carefully as if he were organising a campaign. His duties prevented
his going himself, but he saw them off at the station, under the
charge of his assistant, and well provided with baskets of food for
their dinner and refreshment on their journey. Of course he defrayed
the whole expense, and on their return he gave them a treat of tea and
strawberries. He also thought of their future, being most energetic in
procuring them employment, and anxious in watching their after-career.
For some reason that is not clear he called these boys his "kings." He
probably used it in the sense that they were his lieutenants, and he
borrowed his imagery from the "Wangs," or kings of the Taeping ruler.
I am told, however, that he really used the word in a spiritual sense,
testifying that these boys were as kings in the sight of God. He
followed the course of the first voyage of those who went to sea,
sticking pins in a map to show the whereabouts of their respective
vessels. It is not astonishing that his pupils should have felt for
him a special admiration and affection. He not merely supplied all
their wants, but he endeavoured to make them self-reliant, and to
raise them above the sordid and narrow conditions of the life to which
they were either born or reduced by the improvidence or misfortune of
their parents. Of course Gordon was often deceived, and his confidence
and charity abused; but these cases were, after all, the smaller
proportion of the great number that passed through his hands. He
sometimes met with gross ingratitude, like that of the boy whom he
found starving, in rags, and ill with disease, and whom he restored to
health, and perhaps to self-respect, and then sent back to his parents
in Norfolk. But neither from him nor from them did he ever receive
the briefest line of acknowledgment. Such experiences would have
disheartened or deterred other philanthropists, but they failed to
ruffle Gordon's serenity, or to discourage him in his work.
Perhaps the following incident is as characteristic as anything that
took place between Gordon and his "kings." A boy whom he had twice
fitted out for the world, but who always came to grief after a few
months' trial, returned for a third time in the evening. Gordon met
him at the gate, a mass of rags, in a deplorable condition, and
covered with vermin. Gordon could not turn him away, neither could he
admit him into his house, where there were several boys being brought
up for a respectable existence. After a moment's hesitation, he led
him in silence to the stable, where, after giving him some bread and a
mug of milk, he told him to sleep on a heap of clean straw, and that
he would come for him at six in the morning. At that hour Gordon
appeared with a piece of soap, some towels, and a fresh suit of
clothes, and, ordering the boy to strip, gave him a thorough washing
with his own hands from head to foot at the horse-trough. It is to be
regretted that there is no record of the after-fate of this young
prodigal, although it would be pleasant to think that he was the
unknown man who called at Sir Henry Gordon's house in 1885, after the
news of Gordon's death, and wished to contribute £25 towards a
memorial, because he was one of the youths saved by General Gordon, to
whom all his success and prosperity in life were due.
But it must not be supposed that Gordon's acts of benevolence were
restricted to boys. He was not less solicitous of the welfare of the
sick and the aged. His garden was a rather pretty and shaded one. He
had a certain number of keys made for the entrance, and distributed
them among deserving persons, chiefly elderly. They were allowed to
walk about, in the evening especially, and see the flowers,
vegetables, and fruit which Gordon's gardener carefully cultivated.
Gordon himself declared that he derived no special pleasure from the
sight of flowers, for the simple reason that he preferred to look at
the human face; and the same reason is the only one I can find he ever
gave for his somewhat remarkable reticence about dogs and other
domestic animals. It was said of him that he always had handy "a bit
o' baccy for the old men, and a screw o' tea for the old women." He
would hurry off at a moment's notice to attend to a dying person or to
read the Bible by a sick-bed. In the hospital or the workhouse he was
as well known as the visiting chaplain, and often he was requested by
the parish clergyman to take his place in visiting the sick. His
special invention for the benefit of his large number of clients was
a system of pensions, which varied from a shilling to as much as a
pound a week. Many of these payments he continued long after he left
Gravesend, and a few were even paid until the day of his death. It is
not surprising, in view of these facts, that Gordon remained a poor
man, and generally had no money at all. As he wrote very truly of
himself to his assistant Mr Lilley, "You and I will never learn wisdom
in money matters."
Many stories have been told of his tenderness of heart, and of his
reluctance to see punishment inflicted, but perhaps the following is
the most typical. A woman called on him one day with a piteous tale.
Gordon went to his bedroom to get half a sovereign for her, and while
he was away she took a fancy to a brown overcoat, which she hastened
to conceal under her skirt. Gordon returned, gave her the money, and
she left with a profusion of thanks. While on her road home the coat
slipped down, and attracted the notice of a policeman, who demanded an
explanation. She said, "I took it from the Colonel," and was marched
back for him to identify his property, and charge her with the theft.
When Gordon heard the story, he was far more distressed than the
culprit, and refused to comply with the constable's repeated requests
to charge her. At last a happy thought came to his relief. Turning to
the woman, he said, with a twinkle in his eye, "You wanted it, I
suppose?" "Yes," replied the astonished woman. Then turning to the
equally astonished policeman he said, "There, there, take her away,
and send her about her business."
Among the various economies he practised in order to indulge his
philanthropy was that of not keeping a horse, and he consequently took
a great deal of walking exercise. During his walks along the Kentish
lanes and foot-paths he distributed tracts, and at every stile he
crossed he would leave one having such an exhortation as "Take heed
that thou stumbleth not." Yet all this was done in an honest, and, as
I believe, a secretly humorous spirit of a serious nature, for Gordon
was as opposed to cant and idle protestations as any man. There is a
strikingly characteristic story preserved somewhere of what he did
when a hypocritical, canting humbug of a local religious secretary of
some Society Fund or other paid a visit to a house while he was
present. Gordon remained silent during the whole of the interview. But
when he was gone, and Gordon was asked what he thought of him, he
replied by waving his hand and drawing it across his throat, which he
explained signified in China that his head ought to be cut off as a
humbugging impostor.
Although buried, as it were, at Gravesend, Gordon could not be
altogether forgotten. The authorities at the Horse Guards could not
comply with his request to be attached to the Abyssinian expedition,
but they were willing enough to do him what in official circles was
thought to be a very good turn when they could. The English membership
of the Danubian Commission became vacant, and it was remembered that
in his early days Gordon had taken part in the delimitation
negotiations which had resulted in the formation of that body. The
post carried with it the good pay of £2000 a year, as some
compensation for the social and sanitary drawbacks and disadvantages
of life in that region, and it was offered to Gordon, who accepted it.
It cut short his philanthropical labours, but it drew him back into
that current of active work for which he was already pining. He
therefore accepted it, and having presented some of the Snake flags of
the old Taeping Wangs to the local school in which he had toiled as a
simple teacher, he left Gravesend quietly, and without any
manifestation that it had lost its principal resident. Having
mentioned the Snake flags, it is proper to add that the principal of
these, including some of his own which were shot to ribbons, were left
by General Gordon to his sister, the late Miss Gordon, who in her turn
presented them, with the Yellow Jacket and its appendages, the chief
mandarin dress, etc., to the Royal Engineers at Chatham. The Gravesend
life closed with a notice in the local journal, from which the
following extract may be made; but once a year the old flags that led
the advance or retreat of the Chinese rebels are brought out from
their cases and flaunted before the Gravesend scholars as the memorial
of a brave and unselfish leader and teacher.
The farewell article in the local paper read as follows:--
"Our readers, without exception, will learn with regret of the
departure of Lieut.-Colonel Gordon, R.E., C.B., from the town in
which he has resided for six years, gaining a name by the most
exquisite charity that will long be remembered. Nor will he be
less missed than remembered in the lowly walks of life, by the
bestowal of gifts, by attendance and administration on the sick
and dying, by the kindly giving of advice, by attendance at the
Ragged School, Workhouse, and Infirmary--in fact, by general and
continued beneficence to the poor, he has been so unwearied in
well-doing that his departure will be felt by many as a personal
calamity. There are those who even now are reaping the rewards of
his kindness. His charity was essentially charity, and had its
root in deep philanthropic feeling and goodness of heart,
shunning the light of publicity, but coming even as the rain in
the night-time, that in the morning is noted not, but only the
flowers bloom, and give a greater fragrance.... All will wish him
well in his new sphere, and we have less hesitation in penning
these lines from the fact that laudatory notice will confer but
little pleasure upon him who gave with the heart and cared not
for commendation."
Gordon left for Galatz on 1st October 1871. He had visited and
described it fourteen or fifteen years before, and he found little or
no change there. The special task intrusted to the Commission of which
he was a member was to keep open by constant and vigilant dredging the
mouth of the Sulina branch of the Danube. He discovered very soon that
the duties were light and monotonous, and in the depressing
atmosphere--social and political as well as climatic--of the Lower
Danube, he pined more than ever for bracing work, and for some task
about which he could feel in earnest. The same conclusion seems to
have forced itself upon his mind at the beginning and at the end of
his stay at Galatz. In one of his first letters he exclaims: "How I
like England when I am out of it! There is no place in the world like
it!" In another letter, written on the very day of his departure home,
he wrote: "Tell S. to thank God that he was born an Englishman."
Gordon was always intensely patriotic. His patriotism partook of the
same deep and fervid character as his religion, and these and many
other little messages in his private correspondence furnish striking
evidence to the fact.
The mention of Galatz recalls an incident, showing how long was his
memory, and how much he clung to old friendships. During the
Commune--that is to say, when he was still at Gravesend--the papers
stated that a General Bisson had been killed at the Bridge of Neuilly
on 9th April 1871. He wrote to Marshal Macmahon to inquire if he was
the same officer as his old colleague on the Danube, and received, to
his regret, an affirmative answer. General Bisson and Gordon had kept
up a correspondence, in which the former always signed himself Bisson,
C.B., being very proud of that honour, which was conferred on him for
the Crimea. He was taken prisoner early in the Franco-Prussian war,
and was shot by the Communists almost immediately on his return from
the Prussian prison. Gordon's stay at Galatz was varied by an
agreeable trip in 1872 to the Crimea, where he was sent to inspect the
cemeteries with Sir John Adye. They travelled in an English gunboat,
which proved a comfortable sea-boat, and Gordon wrote, "General Adye
is a very agreeable companion." The cemeteries were found much
neglected, and in a sad state of disrepair. The Russian officers were
pronounced civil, but nothing more. But Gordon saw clearly that,
having torn up the Black Sea Treaty, they were ready to recover
Bessarabia, and to restore Sebastopol to the rank of a first-class
naval fortress. After the Crimean tour he came to England on leave.
His time was short, but he managed to pay a flying visit to
Gravesend. He also could not resist the temptation of attending the
funeral of the Emperor Napoleon in January 1873, and he expressed his
opinion of that ill-starred ruler in his usual terse manner--"a
kind-hearted, unprincipled man." His youngest brother, to whom he was
much attached, and who had shared in the Woolwich frolics, died about
this time, and his mother was seized with paralysis, and no longer
recognised him. He felt this change most acutely, for between him and
his mother there had been a peculiar attachment, and when he was at
home she would hardly ever let him out of her sight. He used to call
his home visits doing duty as his mother's _aide-de-camp_. When he
left England for Galatz she was unconscious, and passed away some
months later while he was abroad.
It was while General Gordon was on the Danube that preparations were
made for the expedition against the Ashantees, and many persons
suggested General Gordon for the command. It would have been an
excellent occasion for intrusting him with an independent command in
his country's service; but Sir Garnet, now Lord, Wolseley had recently
gained much credit by his conduct of the Red River Expedition, and was
appointed to the command of this force. General Gordon was no doubt
disappointed at the result, but not so much as he had been in the case
of Abyssinia, and loyalty to an old Crimean colleague tempered his own
loss with satisfaction at another's success. Still, on public grounds,
it must be pronounced unfortunate that the last occasion which was
offered of employing for a national cause the services of a soldier
who added the fervour and modesty of Wolfe to the genius of Clive
should have been allowed to pass by unutilised.
A casual meeting with Nubar Pasha at Constantinople, on his way back
from the Crimea in 1872, was destined to exercise what may be styled a
determining influence on the rest of Gordon's life. At that meeting
Nubar Pasha sounded him as to his willingness to take service under
the Khedive, and Gordon, attracted by the prospect of doing good work
on a larger sphere, expressed his own readiness to take up the task of
establishing authority, and suppressing slavery in the Soudan,
provided that the permission of his own Government were granted. He
heard nothing more of the matter for twelve months, but at the end of
September 1873 he received a communication to the effect that the
Khedive wished to appoint him to succeed Sir Samuel Baker, and that
the British Government were quite willing to grant him the necessary
permission. In a letter of 8th November 1873 to the Adjutant-General
he said:--
"I have written an account of what I know of the Khedive's having
asked me to take Baker's place. It came about from a
conversation I had with Nubar Pasha at our Embassy at
Constantinople. This was twelve months ago. The next thing was a
telegram a month ago. I have not determined what to do, but the
Government have no objection."
He was not long, however, in making up his mind, and early in 1874 he
was _en route_ for Alexandria. One characteristic act in connection
with his appointment deserves mention. The Khedive fixed his salary at
£10,000 a year, but Gordon absolutely refused to accept more than
£2000 a year--the same sum as he received for his post on the Danube.
Various reasons have been given for this decision, but there is no
ground for supposing that it was due to such a very narrow-minded
prejudice as "that he would take nothing from a heathen." If he ever
used these words, they must have been intended as a joke, and are not
to be accepted seriously. A sufficient explanation of his decision is,
that he had a supreme disdain for money, and the sum offered seemed
far in excess of the post and work he had to perform. To have received
£10,000 a year would have added immensely to his worries. He would not
have known what to do with it, and the voluntary cutting of his salary
relieved him of a weight of responsibility. Perhaps also he was
far-seeing enough to realise that he would be less the mere creature
of the Egyptian ruler with the smaller than with the larger salary,
while he could gratify his own inner pride that no one should say that
any sordid motive had a part in his working for semi-civilized
potentates, whether Chinese or Mussulmen.
I am able to describe Gordon's exact feelings on this point in his own
words. "My object is to show the Khedive and his people that gold and
silver idols are not worshipped by all the world. They are very
powerful gods, but not so powerful as _our_ God. From whom does all
this money come? from poor miserable creatures who are ground down to
produce it. Of course these ideas are outrageous. Pillage the
Egyptians is still the cry."
CHAPTER VII.
THE FIRST NILE MISSION.
A brief description of the conquest by Mehemet Ali and his successors
of the Soudan--a name signifying nothing more than "the land of the
blacks"--and of the events which immediately preceded the appointment
of Gordon, is necessary to show the extent of the work intrusted to
him, and the special difficulties with which he had to contend.
It was in 1819 that the great Pasha or Viceroy Mehemet Ali, still in
name the lieutenant of the Sultan, ordered his sons Ismail and the
more famous Ibrahim to extend his authority up the Nile, and conquer
the Soudan. They do not seem to have experienced any difficulty in
carrying out their instructions. Nobody was interested in defending
the arid wastes of that region. The Egyptian yoke promised to be as
light as any other, and a few whiffs of grape-shot dispersed the only
adversaries who showed themselves. Ibrahim, who soon took the lead,
selected Khartoum as the capital of the new province, in preference to
Shendy, which had formerly been regarded as the principal place in the
country. In this he showed excellent judgment, for Khartoum occupies
an admirable position in the fork of the two branches of the Nile; and
whatever fate may yet befall the region in which the Mahdi and his
successor the Khalifa have set up their ephemeral authority, it is
destined by Nature to be the central point and capital of the vast
region between the Delta and the Equatorial Lakes.
Khartoum lies on the left bank of the Blue Nile--Bahr-el-Azrak--rather
more than three miles south of its confluence with the White
Nile--Bahr-el-Abiad--at the northern point of the Isle of Tuti. The
channel south of that island affords a slightly nearer approach to the
White Nile, coming out immediately opposite the fortified camp of
Omdurman, which the Mahdi made his headquarters and capital after the
famous siege of 1884. There was nothing attractive or imposing about
Khartoum. It contained 3000 mud houses, and one more pretentious
building in the Governor's official residence or palace, known as the
Hukumdariaha. It is surrounded by a wall and ditch, except where the
Blue Nile supplies the need; and its western wall is not more than
half a mile from the banks of the White Nile, so that with proper
artillery it commands both rivers. The Nilometer at this place used to
give the first and early intimation to the cultivators in Lower Egypt
of the quantity of water being brought down from the rivers of
Abyssinia. There seems no other conclusion possible than that sooner
or later this practical service will compel Egypt, whenever she feels
strong enough, to re-establish her power at Khartoum; already there is
evidence that the time has arrived.
Having conquered the Soudan easily, the rulers of Egypt experienced no
difficulty in retaining it for sixty years; and if other forces,
partly created by the moral pressure of England and civilized opinion
generally, had not come into action, there is every reason to suppose
that their authority would never have been assailed. Nor did the
Egyptians stand still. By the year 1853 they had conquered Darfur on
the one side, and pushed their outposts on the other 120 miles south
of Khartoum. In the rear of the Egyptian garrison came the European
trader, who took into his service bands of Arab mercenaries, so that
he pushed his way beyond the Egyptian stations into the region of the
Bahr Gazelle, where the writ of the Cairo ruler did not run. These
traders came to deal in ivory, but they soon found that, profitable as
it was, there was a greater profit in, and a far greater supply of,
"black ivory." Thus an iniquitous trade in human beings sprang up, and
the real originators of it were not black men and Mahommedans, but
white men, and in many instances Englishmen. From slave buying they
took to slave hunting, and in this way there is no exaggeration in
declaring that villages and districts were depopulated. Such
scandalous proceedings could not be carried on in the dark, and at
last the Europeans involved felt compelled, by the weight of adverse
opinion, or more probably from a sense of their own peril, to withdraw
from the business. This touch of conscience or alarm did not improve
the situation. They sold their stations to their Arab agents, who in
turn purchased immunity from the Egyptian officers. The slave trade,
by the pursuit and capture of any tribe rash enough to come within the
spring of the Arab raiders, flourished as much as ever. The only
change was that after 1860 Europeans were clear of the stigma that
attached to any direct participation in it.
The condition of the Soudan during this period has been graphically
described by Captain Speke, Dr Schweinfurth, and Sir Samuel Baker.
They all agree in their facts and their conclusions. The people were
miserably unhappy, because the dread and the reality of compulsory
slavery hung over their daily life. Those who were not already slaves
realised their impending fate. Villages were abandoned, districts
passed out of cultivation, and a large part of the population
literally vanished. Sir Samuel Baker, speaking of the difference
between a region he knew well in 1864 and in 1872, wrote in the latter
year: "It is impossible to describe the change that has taken place
since I last visited this country. It was then a perfect garden,
thickly populated, and producing all that man could desire. The
villages were numerous, groves of plantains fringed the steep cliffs
on the river's bank, and the natives were neatly dressed in the bark
cloth of the country. The scene has changed! All is wilderness. The
population has fled! Not a village is to be seen! This is the certain
result of the settlement of Khartoum traders. They kidnap the women
and children for slaves, and plunder and destroy wherever they set
their foot." How true all this was will be seen in the course of
Gordon's own experiences.
It has been stated that the Arab slave-dealers made terms with the
Egyptian officials, and they were even not without influence and the
means of gaining favourable consideration at Cairo itself. But as they
increased in numbers, wealth, and confidence in themselves and their
organisation, the Khedive began to see in them a possible danger to
his own authority. This feeling was strengthened when the slavers,
under the leadership of the since notorious Zebehr Rahama, the most
ambitious and capable of them all, refused to pay their usual tribute.
Dr Schweinfurth has given a vivid picture of this man in the heyday of
his power. Chained lions formed part of his escort, and it is recorded
that he had 25,000 dollars' worth of silver cast into bullets in order
to foil the magic of any enemy who was said to be proof against lead.
Strong as this truculent leader was in men and money, the Khedive
Ismail did not believe that he would dare to resist his power. He
therefore decided to have recourse to force, and in 1869 he sent a
small military expedition, under the command of Bellal Bey, to bring
the Bahr Gazelle into submission. Zebehr had made all his arrangements
for defence, and on the Egyptian army making its appearance he
promptly attacked and annihilated it. This success fully established
the power and reputation of Zebehr, who became the real dictator of
the Soudan south of Khartoum. The Khedive, having no available means
of bringing his rebellious dependent to reason, had to acquiesce in
the defeat of his army. Zebehr offered some lame excuse for his
boldness and success, and Ismail had to accept it, and bide the hour
of revenge.
Zebehr, encouraged by this military triumph, turned his arms against
the Sultans of Darfour, who had incurred his resentment by placing an
embargo on wheat during the course of his brief campaign with Bellal.
This offensive action still further alarmed the Khedive Ismail, who
was fully alive to the danger that might arise to his own position if
a powerful military confederacy, under a capable chief, were ever
organised in the Soudan. Instead of allying himself with the
Darfourians, as would probably have been the more politic course,
Ismail decided to invade their territory simultaneously with Zebehr.
Several battles were fought, and one after another the Sultans of
Darfour, whose dynasty had reigned for 400 years, were overthrown and
slain. Zebehr received in succession the Turkish titles of Bey and
Pasha, but he was not satisfied, for he said that as he had done all
the fighting, he ought to receive the Governor-Generalship of Darfour.
If he failed to win that title from the Khedive, he succeeded in
gratifying a more profitable desire, by leading off into slavery the
larger half of the population of Darfour. He was still engaged in this
pursuit at the time of Gordon's appearance on the scene, and the force
at his disposal was thus described by that officer: "Smart,
dapper-looking fellows, like antelopes, fierce, unsparing, the terror
of Central Africa, having a prestige far beyond that of the
Government--these are the slave-dealers' tools," and afterwards they
no doubt became the main phalanx of the Mahdi's military system.
The financial position of the Egyptian Government in the Soudan was as
bad as the military and political. The Khedive's Governor-General at
Khartoum, Ismail Yakoob Pasha, was nominally responsible for the
administration of Darfour, although Zebehr reaped all the gain. This
arrangement resulted in a drain on the Khedive's exchequer of £50,000
a year. The revenue failed to meet the expenditure in the other
departments, and this was mainly due to the fact that the slavers no
longer paid toll or tithe in the only trade that they had allowed to
exist in the Soudan. What share of the human traffic they parted with
was given in the way of bribes, and found no place in the official
returns. All the time that this drain continued the Khedive was in a
constant state of apprehension as to the danger which might arise to
him in the south. He was also in receipt of frequent remonstrances
from the English and other Governments as to the iniquities of the
slave-trade, for which he was primarily in no sense to blame. On the
other hand, he derived no benefit from the Soudan; and if he thought
he could have obtained a secure frontier at Abou Hamid, or even at
Wadi Halfa, he would have resigned all the rest without a sigh. But it
was his strong conviction that no such frontier was attainable, and
Ismail clung to his nominal and costly authority over the Soudan in
the hope that some improvement might be effected, or that, in the
chapter of accidents, the unexpected might come to his aid.
Alarmed as to his own position, in view of the ambition of Zebehr, and
harassed by the importunities of England, Ismail, acting on the
advice of his able and dexterous Minister, Nubar Pasha, one of the
most skilful diplomatists the East has ever produced, came to the
decision to relieve himself from at least the latter annoyance, by the
appointment of Gordon. This was the main object the Khedive and his
advisers had in view when they invited Gordon to accept the post of
Governor of the Equatorial Provinces in succession to Sir Samuel
Baker, who resigned what he found after many years' experience was a
hopeless and thankless task. The post was in one sense peculiar. It
was quite distinct from that of the Egyptian Governor-General at
Khartoum, who retained his separate and really superior position in
the administration of the Upper Nile region. Moreover, the finances of
the Equatorial districts were included in the general Soudan Budget,
which always showed an alarming deficit. These arrangements imparted a
special difficulty into the situation with which Gordon had to deal,
and his manner of coping with it will reveal how shrewd he was in
detecting the root-cause of any trouble, and how prompt were his
measures to eradicate the mischief. From the first he fully realised
why he was appointed, viz. "to catch the attention of the English
people"; but he also appreciated the Khedive's "terrible anxiety to
put down the slave-trade, which threatens his supremacy." With these
introductory remarks, the main thread of Gordon's career may be
resumed.
After the brief hesitation referred to in the last chapter, and the
reduction of his salary to what he deemed reasonable dimensions,
Gordon proceeded to Cairo, where he arrived early in the year 1874. As
in everything else he undertook, Gordon was in earnest about the work
he had to attempt, and no doubt he had already formed in his mind a
general plan of action, which would enable him to suppress the
slave-trade. Here it will suffice to say that his project was based on
the holding of the White Nile by a line of fortified posts, and with
the river steamers, which would result in cutting off the slave
hunters from their best source of supply. The expression of his plans
in his earnest manner showed up by contrast the hollowness of the
views and policy of those who had obtained his services. In his own
graphic and emphatic way he wrote: "I thought the thing real and found
it a sham, and felt like a Gordon who has been humbugged." He found
Cairo "a regular hot-bed of intrigues," and among not only the
Egyptian, but also the European officials. With a prophetic grasp of
the situation he wrote, "Things cannot last long like this." Had
Gordon been long detained at Cairo, where the etiquette and the advice
offered him by every one in an official position exasperated him
beyond endurance, there is no doubt that he would have thrown up his
task in disgust. He was animated by the desire to make the sham a
reality, and to convert the project with which he had been intrusted
into a beneficial scheme for the suffering population of the Soudan.
There, at least, he would be removed from the intrigues of the
capital, and at liberty to speak his own thoughts without giving
umbrage to one person and receiving worldly counsel from another.
One of the chief bones of contention during the few weeks he passed at
Cairo was the dispute as to how he should travel to the scene of his
government. He wished to go by ordinary steamer, with one servant. The
Minister insisted that he should travel by a special steamer, and
accompanied by a retinue. Gordon's plan would have saved the Khedive's
Government £400, but he had to give way to the proprieties. The affair
had an amusing issue. His special train to Suez met with an accident,
and he and the Egyptian officials sent to see him off were compelled,
after two hours' delay, to change into another train, and continue
their journey in an ordinary passenger carriage, much to the amusement
of Gordon, who wrote: "We began in glory and ended in shame!" On
arrival at Souakim, Gordon was put into quarantine for a night, in
order, as he said, that the Governor might have time to put on his
official clothes.
Soon his attention was drawn from such frivolities as these to more
serious matters. He left Cairo on 21st February, reached Souakim on
26th, left Souakim on 1st March, Berber on 9th March, and entered
Khartoum 13th March. He brought with him 200 fresh troops, and was
welcomed with considerable display and many hollow protestations of
friendship by the Governor-General, Ismail Yakoob.
A few weeks before his arrival at Khartoum an important event had
taken place, which greatly simplified his ulterior operations. The
"sudd," an accumulation of mould and aquatic plants which had formed
into a solid mass and obstructed all navigation, had suddenly given
way, and restored communication with Gondokoro and the lakes. The
importance of this event may be measured by the fact that whereas the
journey to Gondokoro, with the "sudd" in existence, took twenty months
and even two years to perform, it was reduced by its dispersal to
twenty-one days. General Gordon wrote the following very pretty
description of this grassy barrier and its origin:
"A curious little cabbage-like aquatic plant comes floating down,
having a little root ready to attach itself to anything; he meets
a friend, and they go together, and soon join roots and so on.
When they get to a lake, the current is too strong, and so, no
longer constrained to move on, they go off to the sides; others
do the same--idle and loitering, like everything up here. After a
time winds drive a whole fleet of them against the narrow outlet
of the lake and stop it up. Then no more passenger plants can
pass through the outlet, while plenty come in at the upper end of
the lake; these eventually fill up all the passages which may
have been made."
Gordon had the control of seven steamers, and in one of these he left
Khartoum on 22nd March for the Upper Nile. He had already issued his
first decree as Governor of the Equator, in which he declared the sale
of ivory to be a Government monopoly, and forbade the importation of
firearms and ammunition. It was while he was on this journey that he
heard some birds--a kind of stork--laughing on the banks of the river.
In his letters to his sister, which were to stand in the place of a
diary, he facetiously remarks that he supposes they were amused at the
idea of anyone being so foolish as to go up the Nile in "the hope of
doing anything." But Gordon was not to be discouraged. Already he
liked his work, amid the heat and mosquitoes day and night all the
year round, and already he was convinced that he could do a good deal
to ameliorate the lot of the unfortunate people. He reached Gondokoro
on 16th April, where not only was he not expected, but he found them
ignorant even of his appointment. He remained there only a few days,
as he perceived he could do nothing without his stores, still _en
route_ from Cairo, and returned to Khartoum, which he reached in
eleven days.
This brief trip satisfied him of several simple facts bearing on the
situation in the Equatorial Province which the Khedive had sent him
with such a flourish of trumpets to govern. He found very easily that
the Egyptian Government possessed no practical authority in that
region. Beyond the two forts at Gondokoro--garrison 300 men--and
Fatiko--garrison 200 men--the Khedive had no possessions, and there
was not even safety for his representatives half a mile from
their guns. As Gordon said: "The Khedive gave me a Firman as
Governor-General of the Equator, and left me to work out the rest." He
began the practical part of his task on the occasion of this return to
Khartoum by insisting that the accounts of the Equatorial Province
should be kept distinct from those of the Soudan, and also that Ragouf
Pasha, sent nominally to assist but really to hinder him, should be
withdrawn.
Having asserted his individuality after several rows with Ismail
Yakoob, he became impatient at the delayed arrival of his stores and
staff, and hastened off to Berber to hurry their progress. As he was
fond of saying, "Self is the best officer," and his visit to Berber
hastened the arrival of the supplies which were necessary for his
subsequent operations. His staff consisted of Colonel Long, of the
United States Army, who had accompanied him to Gondokoro and been left
there; Major Campbell, Egyptian Staff; Mr Kemp, an engineer; M.
Linant, a Frenchman; Mr Anson, Mr Russell, and the Italian Romulus
Gessi. Two Royal Engineer officers, Lieutenants Chippendall and
Charles Watson, joined him before the end of the year. He worked very
hard himself, and he expected those under him to do the same. The
astonished Egyptian officials looked on in amazement at one in high
rank, who examined into every detail himself, and who took his turn of
the hard work. One of Gordon's forms of recreation was to get out and
help to pull his _dahabeah_. Tucking up his trousers, he would wade
through the river fearlessly, having learnt from the natives that
crocodiles never attack a person moving.
At first Ismail Yakoob and his colleagues were filled with curiosity
and amusement at this phenomenal Englishman--so different, not merely
from themselves, but from other Europeans--then apprehension seized
them as to what he would do next in the way of exposing their neglect
of duty, and finally only the capacity for one sentiment was
left--relief whenever he turned his back on Khartoum.
Having collected his staff and supplies, he started up the Nile once
more, to begin the establishment of the line of fortified posts, which
he had resolved on as the best means of maintaining and extending his
own authority, and at the same time of curtailing the raids of the
slave-dealers. The first of these forts or stations he established at
the entrance of the Saubat river, and while there he made a discovery
which showed how the slave-trade flourished with such impunity. He
seized some letters from a slave-dealer to the Egyptian commander at
Fashoda, stating that he was bringing him the slaves he wanted for
himself and many others, besides 2000 cows. By several skilful
manoeuvres Gordon succeeded in rescuing all of them, restoring the
cows to their owners, and compelling the soldiers of the slavehunters
to return to their homes, generally in or near Khartoum. Nor was this
his only success during the first two months of his government, for he
detected one of his lieutenants in the act of letting a slave convoy
pass in return for a bribe of £70. On this occasion he had the
satisfaction of delivering 1600 human beings from slavery. This will
show that one of his principal difficulties was caused by his own
subordinates, who were hand-in-glove with the leading slavehunters.
Another of Gordon's troubles arose from the collapse of his staff
under the terrible heat. Of those enumerated as having gone up with or
to him in May, all were dead or invalided in September; and the duties
of sick-nurse at last became so excessive that Gordon had to order, in
his own quaint manner, that no one who was sick should be allowed to
come to headquarters. Only in this way was he able to obtain the time
necessary for the accomplishment, single handed, of his various
duties. Such was the strain on him that he gave positive injunctions
that no more Europeans, and especially young English officers, were to
be sent up to him.
As soon as it was realised that the new Governor was in earnest, that
he was bent on crushing the slave-trade, and that he would not permit
corruption or extortion in any form, he became the mark of general
hostility. The intrigues to mislead and discredit him were incessant.
Abou Saoud, who had been formerly banished by Sir Samuel Baker from
the Soudan, and then taken into high favour by Gordon, turned out a
fraud and a failure, while Raouf Bey, the nominee of the Khartoum
Governor-General, was sent back in disgrace. With regard to Abou Saoud
it may be said that Gordon never really trusted him, that is to say he
was not taken in by him, but believed he would be less able to do
injury in his service than at a distance. It was precisely the same
principle as led him to solicit the co-operation of Zebehr in 1884.
Gordon's method of dealing with those who caused him trouble was short
and simple. It consisted in a brief but unchallengeable order to go
back to the base. As the officials would have been murdered by the
people they had so long and so often injured if they attempted to seek
shelter among them, they had no alternative save to obey; and thus,
one after another, Gordon brushed the chief obstructionists from his
path. He served the old troublesome soldiers who would not work or
change their ways after the same fashion, by sending them to his
Botany Bay at Khartoum. In the midst of all these troubles he kept
well, although "a mere shadow," and he still retained the conviction
that he would be able to do much good work in this unpromising region.
In dealing with the natives, he endeavoured first to induce them to
cultivate the ground, providing them with seed and dhoora (_sorghum_),
and then to accustom them to the use of money. He bought their ivory
and paid for it in coin, so that in a little time he found that the
inhabitants, who had held aloof from all previous Egyptian officials,
freely brought him their ivory and produce for sale. At the same time,
he made it a point to pay scrupulously for any service the natives
rendered, and he even endeavoured, as far as he could, to put
employment in their way. The practice of the Egyptian officials had
been to lay hands on any natives that came across their path, and
compel them by force to perform any work they might deem necessary,
and then to dismiss them without reward or thanks. The result was a
deep-rooted execration of the whole Egyptian system, which found voice
in the most popular war-cry of the region: "We want no Turks here! Let
us drive them away!" But Gordon's mode was widely different. It was
based on justice and reason, and in the long-run constituted sound
policy. He paid for what he took, and when he used the natives to drag
his boats, or to clear tracks through the grassy zone fringing the
Nile, he always carefully handed over to them cows, dhoora, or money,
as an equivalent for their work. On the other hand, he was not less
prompt to punish hostile tribes by imposing taxes on them, and, when
unavoidable, inflicting punishment as well. But the system averted, as
far as possible, the necessity of extreme measures, and in this the
first period of his rule in the Soudan he had few hostile collisions
with the natives of the country. Indeed, with the exception of the
Bari tribe, who entrapped Linant, Gordon's best lieutenant after
Gessi, and slew him with a small detachment, Gordon's enemies in the
field proved few and insignificant. Even the Baris would not have
ventured to attack him but for the acquaintance with, and contempt of,
firearms they had obtained during an earlier success over an Egyptian
corps.
There is no doubt that this absence of any organised opposition was
fortunate, for the so-called troops at the disposal of the Governor of
the Equator were as miserably inefficient and contemptible, from a
fighting point of view, as any General Gordon ever commanded; and at a
later stage of his career he plaintively remarked that it had fallen
to his lot to lead a greater number of cowardly and unwarlike races
than anyone else. But it was not merely that they were such poor
fighters that Gordon declared that three natives would put a company
to flight, but they were so disinclined for any work, and so
encumbered by their women and children, that their ability to make any
military show might be as safely challenged as their combative spirit.
Well might Gordon write: "I never had less confidence in any troops in
my life." But even these shortcomings were not the worst. The Arab
soldiers provided by the Egyptian Government, and sent up over and
over again, in spite of Gordon's protests and entreaties, could not
stand the climate. They died like flies. Of one detachment of 250,
half were dead in three months, 100 of the others were invalided, and
only 25 remained fit for duty. From a further body of 150 men sent as
a reinforcement, half were reported on the sick list the day after
their arrival. The main buttress of the Khedive's authority in this
region was therefore hollow and erected on an insecure foundation. The
Egyptian soldiers possessed firearms, and the natives, in their
ignorance that they could not shoot straight, were afraid of them; but
the natural progress of knowledge would inevitably prove fatal to that
unreal supremacy, and eventually entail the collapse of the Cairo
administration in the Soudan and the remoter districts on the
Equator.
Realising the inefficiency of the Egyptian force, General Gordon set
himself to the task of providing a better; and mindful of the
contingent danger of creating a corps that might in the end prove a
peril to the system it was meant to protect, he resolved that, if
individually brave and efficient, it should be exceedingly limited in
numbers, and incapable of casting aside its allegiance to the Khedive.
He began in a small way by engaging the services of any stalwart
Soudanese native whom chance placed in his path, and thus he organised
in the first year of his rule a corps of about forty men as a sort of
bodyguard. An accident brought him into contact with a party of the
Niam Niam, a tribe of cannibals from the interior of Africa, but
possessing a martial spirit and athletic frames. Gordon looked at them
with the eye of a soldier, and on the spot enrolled fifty of them into
the small force he was organising. He armed them with spears as well
as guns, and as these spears were cutting ones, with a blade two feet
long, they were the more formidable weapon of the two. Gordon
describes the Niam Niam warriors as looking very fierce, and brave,
and fearless. They were also thick-set and sturdy, and, above all, so
indifferent to the tropical heat that they might be relied on not to
break down from the climate like the Egyptian soldiers. Before the end
of the year 1876 he had increased the numbers of these two contingents
to 500 men. It was with these black troops that Gordon humbled the
pride of the Baris, elated by their two successes, and provided for
the security of the long Nile route to the lakes.
There was another advantage besides the military in this practical
measure, one of those numerous administrative acts, in every clime and
under innumerable conditions, that established the fame and the sound
sense and judgment of General Gordon. It promoted economy, and
contributed to the sound finance which Gordon always set himself to
establish wherever he was responsible. One of Gordon's first
resolutions had been that his part of the Soudan should cease to be a
drain, like the rest, on the Cairo Exchequer. He determined that he at
least would pay his way, and on the threshold of his undertaking he
had insisted, and carried in the teeth of powerful opposition his
resolution, that the accounts of the Equatorial Province should be
kept distinct from those of the Soudan. The employment of black
soldiers was very economical as well as efficient, and contributed to
the satisfactory result which was shown in the balance-sheet of the
Equatorial Province as described by General Gordon for the year 1875.
In that year the Khedive received £48,000 from the Province which
Gordon ruled at a total cost of only £20,000, while he had also formed
a surplus or reserve fund of £60,000 more.
Having thus accomplished as much as possible towards the
strengthening of the administration and tranquillisation of the
people, some further particulars may be recorded of his measures and
success in dealing with that slave-trade, the existence of which was
the primary cause of his own appearance in the Soudan. Allusion has
already been made to the considerable number of slaves rescued by a
few grand _coups_ at the expense of his own subordinates, but during
the whole of these three years Gordon was in close contact with
slaves, and the rescue of individuals was of frequent occurrence.
Several touching incidents are recorded in the letters published from
Central Africa as to his kindness towards women and infants, to some
of whom he even gave the shelter of his own tent; and nothing could be
more effective in the way of illustration than his simple description
of the following passage with the child-wife of one of his own
soldiers:
"The night before I left this place a girl of twelve years, in
one of those leather strap girdles, came up to the fire where I
was sitting, and warmed herself. I sent for the interpreter, and
asked what she wanted. She said the soldier who owned her beat
her, and she would not stay with him; so I put her on board the
steamer. The soldier was very angry, so I said: 'If the girl
likes to stay with you, she may; if she does not, she is free.'
The girl would not go back, so she stays on the steamer."
Nor was this the only incident of the kind to show not merely the
tenderness of his heart, but the extraordinary reputation Gordon had
acquired by his high-minded action among these primitive and
down-trodden races. Here are some others that have been selected
almost at random out of his daily acts of gentleness and true
charity:--
"I took a poor old bag of bones into my camp a month ago, and
have been feeding her up, but yesterday she was quietly taken
off, and now knows all things. She had her tobacco up to the
last, and died quite quietly.... A wretched _sister_ of yours
[addressed to the late Miss Gordon] is struggling up the road,
but she is such a wisp of bones that the wind threatens to
overthrow her; so she has halted, preferring the rain to being
cast down. I have sent her some dhoora, which will produce a
spark of joy in her black and withered carcass. I told my man to
see her into one of the huts, and thought he had done so. The
night was stormy and rainy, and when I awoke I heard often a
crying of a child near my hut within the enclosure. When I got up
I went out to see what it was, and passing through the gateway, I
saw your and my sister lying dead in a pool of mud--her black
brothers had been passing and passing, and had taken no notice of
her--so I ordered her to be buried, and went on. In the midst of
the high grass was a baby, about a year or so old, left by
itself. It had been out all night in the rain, and had been left
by its mother. I carried it in, and seeing the corpse was not
moved, I sent again about it, and went with the men to have it
buried. To my surprise and astonishment, she was alive. After
considerable trouble I got the black brothers to lift her out of
the mud, poured some brandy down her throat, and got her into a
hut with a fire, having the mud washed out of her eyes. She was
not more than sixteen years of age. There she now lies. I cannot
help hoping she is floating down with the tide to the haven of
rest. The next day she was still alive, and the babe, not a year
old, seized a gourd of milk, and drank it off like a man, and is
apparently in for the pilgrimage of life. It does not seem the
worse for its night out, depraved little wretch!... The black
sister departed this life at 4 P.M., deeply lamented by me, not
so by her black brothers, who thought her a nuisance. When I went
to see her this morning I heard the 'lamentations' of something
on the other side of the hut. I went round, and found another of
our species, a visitor of ten or twelve months to this globe,
lying in a pool of mud. I said, 'Here is another foundling!' and
had it taken up. Its mother came up afterwards, and I mildly
expostulated with her, remarking, however good it might be for
the spawn of frogs, it was not good for our species. The creature
drank milk after this with avidity."
Such incidents explain the hold Gordon obtained over the indigenous
population of the Upper Nile. He made friends right and left, as he
said, and the trust of the poor people, who had never received
kindness, and whose ignorance of the first principles of justice was
so complete that he said it would take three generations of sound and
paternal government to accustom them to it, in General Gordon was
complete and touching. A chapter might be filled with evidence to this
effect, but it is unnecessary, as the facts are fully set forth in the
"Letters" from Central Africa. The result alone need be dwelt on here.
For only too brief a period, and as the outcome of his personal
effort, these primitive races saw and experienced the beneficial
results of a sound and well-balanced administration. The light was all
too quickly withdrawn; but while it lasted, General Gordon stood out
as a kind of redeemer for the Soudanese. The poor slaves, from whose
limbs the chains of their oppressors had only just been struck, would
come round him when anxious about his health, and gently touch him
with their fingers. The hostile chiefs, hearing, as Bedden did, that
he restored his cattle to and recompensed in other ways a friendly
chief who had been attacked in mistake, would lie in wait for him, and
lay their views and grievances before him. He could walk fearlessly
and unarmed through their midst, and along the river banks for miles,
when an Egyptian official would have required a regiment to guard
him, and detached soldiers would have been enticed into the long grass
and murdered. Even the hostile tribes like the Bari, who, from a
mistaken view of their own military power, would not come to terms,
showed their recognition of his merit by avoiding in their attacks the
posts in which he happened to be. Thus there grew up round Gordon in
the Soudan a sublime reputation for nobleness and goodness that will
linger on as a tradition, and that, when these remote regions along
the Equator fall under civilized authority, will simplify the task of
government, provided it be of the same pattern as that dispensed by
General Gordon.
As the subject has a permanent practical value, the following passage
embodying General Gordon's views is well worth repetition:--
"I feel sure that a series of bad governments have ruined the
people. Three generations of good government would scarcely
regenerate them. Their secretiveness is the result of the fear
that if they give, it may chance that they may want. Their
indolence is the result of experience that if they do well, or if
they do badly, the result will be _nil_ to them, therefore why
should they exert themselves? Their cowardice is the result of
the fear of responsibility. They are fallen on so heavily if
anything goes wrong. Their deceit is the result of fear and want
of moral courage, as they have no independence in their
characters. For a foreign power to take this country would be
most easy. The mass are far from fanatical. They would rejoice in
a good government, let its religion be what it might. A just
administration of law, and security of person against arbitrary
conduct, would do a great deal. It is the Government that needs
civilizing far more than the people. Mehemet Ali and his
descendants have always gone on the principle of enriching
themselves by monopolies of all sorts. None, not even the present
Khedive (Ismail), have brought in civilizing habits or customs
with any desire to benefit the country, or, at any rate, they
have subordinated this desire to that of obtaining an increased
revenue."
But while Gordon brought kindness and conciliation into play, the
settlement of the region entrusted to his care called for sterner
measures, and he was not the man, with all his nobility of character
and overflowing supply of the milk of human kindness, to refrain from
those vigorous and decisive measures that keep turbulent races in
subjection, and advance the cause of civilization, which in so many
quarters of the world must be synonymous with British supremacy. The
student of his voluminous writings will find many passages that
express philosophical doubts as to our right to coerce black races,
and to bind peoples who in their rude and primitive fashion are free
to the car of our wide-world Empire. But I am under no obligation to
save them the trouble of discovery by citing them, more especially
because I believe that they give a false impression of the man. I have
affirmed, and shall adduce copious and, as I think, convincing
evidence, at every turn of his varied experiences, that the true
Gordon was not the meek, colourless, milk-and-water, text-expounding,
theological disputant many would have us accept as a kind of Bunyan's
hero, but in action an uncompromising and resistless leader, who, when
he smote, at once struck his hardest. Gordon has supplied the answer
to his own misgivings as to our moral right to coerce and subject
tribes who advanced their natural claims to be left undisturbed: "We
cannot have them on our flank, and it is indispensable that they shall
be subjected."
Having organised his new forces, equipped all his steamers--one of
which was fitted out with machinery that had been left in Baker's time
to rust in the Korosko Desert--General Gordon set himself to the task
of systematically organising the line of posts which he had conceived
and begun to construct in the first stages of his administration. The
object of these posts was twofold. By them he would cut the slave
routes in two, and also open a road to the great Lakes of the Equator.
In the first few months of his residence he had transferred the
principal station from Gondokoro to Lardo, twelve miles lower down the
stream, and on the left instead of the right bank of the river. These
places lie a little on each side of the fifth degree of north
latitude, and Gordon fixed upon Lardo as his capital, because it was
far the healthier. Above Lardo he established at comparatively short
stages further posts at, in their order, Rageef, Beddem, Kerri,
Moogie, and Laboré, immediately beyond the last of which occur the
Fola Falls, the only obstruction to navigation between Khartoum and
the Lakes. Above those Falls Gordon established a strong post at
Duffli, and dragged some of his steamers overland, and floated them on
the short link of the Nile between that place and Lake Albert,
establishing a final post north of that lake, at Wadelai. When his
fleet commanded that lake, he despatched his lieutenant, Gessi, across
it up the Victoria Nile, connecting the two great lakes, and continued
his chain of posts along it by Magungo, Anfina, Foweira, and Mrooli,
to the very borders of Mtesa's dominion in Uganda. By means of these
twelve posts General Gordon established the security of his
communications, and he also inspired his men with fresh confidence,
for, owing to the short distances between them, they always felt sure
of a near place of refuge in the event of any sudden attack. Thus it
came to pass that whereas formerly Egyptian troops could only move
about in bodies of 100 strong, General Gordon was able to send his
boats and despatches with only two soldiers in charge of them; and
having entirely suppressed the slave-trade within his own
jurisdiction, he was left free to accomplish the two ulterior objects
of his mission, viz. the installation of the Khedive's flag on the
Lakes, and the establishment of definite relations with Mtesa, whose
truculent vassal, Kaba Rega, of Unyoro, showed open hostility and
resentment at the threatened encroachment on his preserves.
It was neither a reprehensible nor an unintelligible vanity for the
Egyptian ruler to desire the control of the whole of the great river,
whose source had been traced south of the Equator, and 2000 miles
beyond the limits of the Pharaohs' dominions. Nor was the desire
diminished when, without sharing the gratification of the Prince in
whose name he acted, General Gordon advanced cogent reasons for
establishing a line of communication from Gondokoro, across the
territory of Mtesa, with the port of Mombasa on the Indian Ocean. As
Gordon pointed out, that place was nearly 1,100 miles from Khartoum,
and only 900 from Mombasa, while the advance to the Lakes increased
the distance from the one place by nearly 300 miles, and reduced that
to the other in the same measure. This short and advantageous line of
communication with the Equatorial Province and Upper Nile was beyond
both the power and the sphere of the Khedive; but in the task of
winning one of the most important of African zones formally recognised
as lying within the British sphere of influence, the route advocated
by General Gordon in 1875 has now become of the most undoubted value
and importance.
The aversion to all forms of notoriety except that which was
inseparable from his duty led Gordon to shrink from the publicity and
congratulations sure to follow if he were the first to navigate those
inland seas on the Equator. Having made all the arrangements, and
provided for the complete security of the task, he decided to baffle
the plans in his honour of the Royal Geographical Society, by
delegating the duty of first unfurling the Khedive's flag on their
waters to his able and much-trusted lieutenant, Gessi. Although he
sometimes took hasty resolutions, in flat opposition to his declared
intentions, he would probably have adhered to this determination but
for reading in one of Dr Schweinfurth's published lectures that "it
may be that Lake Albert belongs to the Nile basin, but it is not a
settled fact, for there are seventy miles between Foweira and Lake
Albert never explored, and one is not authorised in making the Nile
leave Lake Albert. The question is very doubtful." The accidental
perusal of this passage changed General Gordon's views. He felt that
this task devolved on him as the responsible administrator of the
whole region, and that his natural shrinking from trumpery and too
often easily-earned geographical honours, which he has bluntly
asserted should only be granted by the Sovereign, did not justify his
evading a piece of work that came within his day's duty. Therefore he
resolved to ascertain the fact by personal examination, and to set at
rest the doubts expressed by the German traveller.
Expanding Dr Schweinfurth's remarks, he explained that "it was
contended that the Nile did not flow out of Lake Victoria, and thence
through Lake Albert, and so northward, but that one river flowed out
of Lake Victoria and another out of Lake Albert, and that these two
rivers united and formed the Nile. This statement could not be
positively denied, inasmuch as no one had actually gone along the
river from Foweira to Magungo. So I went along it with much suffering,
and settled the question. I also found that from Foweira or Karuma
Falls there was a series of rapids to Murchison Falls, thus _by
degrees_ getting rid of the 1000-feet difference of level between
Foweira and Magungo." While mapping this region, Gordon one day
marched eighteen miles through jungle and in pouring rain, and on each
of the four following days he also walked fifteen miles--and the month
was August, only a few miles north of the Equator, or, in other words,
the very hottest period of the year. Having established the course of
the Nile and its navigability to the Murchison Falls close to the
Victoria Nyanza, General Gordon gave what he thought was a finishing
touch to this exploring expedition by effecting an arrangement with
King Mtesa.
But in order to explain the exact significance of this step, and the
consequent disappointment when it was found that the arrangement was
illusory and destitute of practical value, it is necessary to go back
a little, and trace the course of events in the Uganda region.
The Egyptian advance towards the south brought in its train two
questions of external policy. One was with Abyssinia, of which we
shall hear much in the next chapter; and the other was with the
kingdom of Uganda and the kinglets who regarded Mtesa as their chief.
Of these the principal was Kaba Rega, chief of Unyoro, and the
recognised ruler of the territory lying between the two Lakes. He was
a man of capacity and spirit, and had raised himself to the position
he occupied by ousting kinsmen who had superior claims to the
privileges of supreme authority. In the time of Gordon's predecessor,
Sir Samuel Baker, Kaba Rega had come to the front as a native
champion, resolved to defy the Egyptians and their white leaders to do
their worst. In a spirited attack on Baker's camp at Masindi, he
endeavoured to settle the pretensions of his invaders at a blow, but
he found that numbers were no match for the superior arms of his
opponent. But defeat did not diminish his spirit. Baker decreed his
deposition as King of Unyoro, proclaiming in his stead a cousin named
Rionga, but the order had no practical effect. Kaba Rega retired a
little from the vicinity of the Egyptian forces; he retained "the
magic stool" of authority over the lands and peoples of Unyoro, and
his cousin Rionga possessed nothing beyond the empty title contained
in an Egyptian official decree. This was the position when Gordon
appeared on the scene, and his first obligation was to give something
like force and reality to the pretensions of Rionga.
If Kaba Rega had been satisfied to retain the practical marks of
authority, it is probable that Gordon would have been well content to
leave him alone, but irritated by the slight placed upon him by Sir
Samuel Baker, he assumed the offensive on every possible occasion. He
attacked Colonel Long, one of Gordon's lieutenants, on his way back
from Mtesa, just as he had Baker; he threatened the Egyptian station
at Foweira; and above all, he welcomed the thwarted slave-dealers, who
were not averse to taking their revenge in any form at Gordon's
expense. In these circumstances an active policy was forced on General
Gordon, who promptly decided that Kaba Rega was "too treacherous" to
be allowed to retain his kingdom, and that measures must be taken to
set up Rionga in his place. It was at this moment, unfortunately, that
General Gordon discovered the worthlessness of his troops, and when,
in 1876, he had organised his new force, and was ready to carry out
the policy he had decided on in 1874, he was thinking mostly of his
departure from the Soudan, and had no time to proceed to extremities
against these southern adversaries, for behind Kaba Rega stood Mtesa.
When Gordon, in January 1876, entered the territory of Unyoro,
belonging to Kaba Rega, he found it desirable to take up the cause of
Anfina, in preference to that of Rionga, as the more influential
chief; but neither proved in popularity or expertness a match for Kaba
Rega. The possession of "the magic stool," the ancestral throne or
copper seat of the family of Unyoro, believed to be identified with
the fortunes of the little kingdom, alone compensated for the few
losses in the open field, as Kaba Rega was always careful to retreat
on the approach of his most dangerous adversary. Neither of his
kinsmen was likely to prove a formidable foe. Rionga passed his hours
in native excesses, in the joy of receiving the titular rank of Vakil
to the Khedive. Anfina alienated Gordon's friendly feeling by
suggesting the wholesale assassination of Kaba Rega's officers and
followers when they came on a mission to his camp. Kaba Rega carried
off the stool to the south, or rather the west, of Victoria Nyanza,
and bided his time, while Mtesa wrote a half-defiant and
half-entreating letter to Gordon, asking him to spare Unyoro. Mtesa
had his own views of gain, and when Gordon proposed to establish a
fortified post with a garrison of 160 men at Urundogani, the Uganda
ruler begged that it might be stationed at his own capital, Dubaga,
with the view of either winning over the troops to his service or
employing them against his own enemies. Gordon saw through this
proposal and withheld his consent, but his lieutenant, Nuehr Agha,
acted on his own responsibility, and moved with his force to Dubaga.
In a few weeks Gordon learnt that they were all, practically speaking,
prisoners, and that his already heavy enough task had been increased
by the necessity of rescuing them.
Gordon accordingly advanced in person to Mrooli, the nearest point to
Mtesa's capital without actually crossing his frontier, and as he had
with him a strong force of his newly-raised black contingent, he felt
confident of his capacity to punish Mtesa for any act of treachery,
and to annex, if necessary, his kingdom. But Gordon did not wish to
force a war on Mtesa, or to increase the burdens of the Nile dominion.
All he wanted was the restoration of the men detained at Dubaga, and
he soon received assurances that his presence, and the moral effect of
the force he had brought with him, would attain this result without
any necessity for fighting. As Gordon worded his complaint, it was a
case not of his wishing to annex Mtesa, but of Mtesa annexing his
soldiers.
Having satisfied himself that Mtesa was not willing to risk a quarrel,
General Gordon sent Nuehr Agha with ninety men to bring back the 140
men detained at Dubaga, and the task was accomplished without any
hitch or delay. This was due partly to the military demonstrations,
and partly also to a clever diplomatic move by Gordon, who wrote to
Mtesa expressing his readiness to recognise by treaty the independence
of Uganda, and to provide a safe-conduct for the King's ambassadors to
Cairo. At this time the late Dr Emin, who claimed to be an Arab and a
Mahommedan, was at Dubaga, but his influence on the course of events
was _nil_, and he and Gordon never met. After the return of the troops
Gordon commenced his retirement to the Nile, and after an arduous and
dangerous march of eighty miles through a swampy jungle beset by Kaba
Rega's tribesmen, who were able to throw their spears with accurate
aim for fifty yards, he succeeded in reaching Masindi without loss.
Then Gordon drew up a plan of campaign for the effectual subjugation
of Kaba Rega, but he did not wait to see it carried out, as the first
move could not be made until the grass was dry enough to burn. As soon
as that season arrived three columns were to march against the chief
of Unyoro in the following order--one consisting of 150 black
soldiers, and 3000 of the Lango tribe, under Rionga, moving from
Mrooli to Kisoga; another of about the same strength from Keroto to
Masindi; and the third operating from the Albert Lake with the
steamer. The plan was a good one, but Kaba Rega, by having recourse to
his old Fabian tactics, again baffled it.
Although these events happened when Gordon had reached Cairo, it will
be appropriate to give here the result of this campaign. The Unyoro
chieftain retired before the Egyptians, who carried off much cattle,
and when they in turn retired, he advanced and reoccupied his country.
After a brief period the Egyptians definitely gave up their stations
at Mrooli, Foweira, and Masindi, on the left bank of the Victoria
Nile, and confined themselves to those on its right bank, and thus
finally were Mtesa and Kaba Rega left to enjoy their own rude ideas of
independence and regal power.
So far as General Gordon was concerned, the Uganda question was then,
both for this period and for his subsequent and more important
command, definitely closed. But one personal incident remains to be
chronicled. When Gordon received Mtesa's request to garrison Dubaga,
and had actually planted a station on the Victoria Lake, he
telegraphed the facts to the Khedive, who promptly replied by
conferring on him the Medjidieh Order. At the moment that Gordon
received this intimation he had decided that it would not be politic
to comply with Mtesa's request to garrison Dubaga, and he had only
just succeeded in rescuing an Egyptian force from a position of danger
in the manner described. He felt that he had obtained this decoration
"under false pretences," but the recollection of the hard and
honourable work he had performed must have soon salved his conscience.
At an early stage of his work Gordon felt disposed to throw it up, and
during the whole three years a constant struggle went on within
himself as to whether he should stay or return to England. Many causes
produced this feeling. There was, in the first place, disillusionment
on discovering that the whole thing, from the Egyptian Government
point of view, was a sham, and that his name was being made use of to
impose on Europe. But then he thought he saw an opportunity of doing
some useful and beneficial work, and, stifling his disappointment, he
went on. Arrived on the scene, he found himself thwarted by his
Egyptian colleagues, and treated with indifference by the Cairene
Government. He also discovered that his troops were worthless, and
that not one of his officers, civil and military, cared a fig for the
task in hand. Their one thought was how to do nothing at all, and
Gordon's patience and energy were monopolised, and in the end
exhausted, by attempts to extract work from his unwilling
subordinates. Even the effort to educate them up to the simple
recognition that a certain amount of work had to be done, and that
unless it were well done, it had to be done over again, resulted in
failure. To the plain instructions he gave, they would give an
interpretation of their own; and while fully admitting on explanation
that this was not the proper way of executing any task, they would
invariably repeat it after their own fashion, until at length Gordon
could see no alternative to performing the task himself. Thus were his
labours indefinitely multiplied, and only his exceptional health and
energy enabled him to cope with them at all. How much they affected
him in his own despite may be judged from the exclamation which
escaped him, after he had obtained a considerable success that would
have elated any other leader--"But the worry and trouble have taken
all the syrup out of the affair!"
The personal glimpses obtainable of Gordon during these depressing
years, while engaged on a task he foresaw would be undone by the
weakness and indifference of the Egyptian authorities as soon as he
gave it up, are very illustrative of his energy and inherent capacity
for command. The world at large was quite indifferent to the heroism
and the self-denial, amounting to self-sacrifice, which alone enabled
him to carry on his own shoulders, like a modern Atlas, the whole
administration of a scarcely conquered region, which covered ten
degrees of latitude. But we who have to consider his career in all its
bearings, and to discover, as it were, behind his public and private
acts, the true man, cannot afford to pass over so lightly passages
that are in a very special degree indicative of the man's character
and temperament. In no other period of his career did he devote
himself more strenuously to the details, in themselves monotonous and
uninteresting, of a task that brought him neither present nor
prospective satisfaction. When the tools with which he was supplied
failed him, as they did at every turn, he threw himself into the
struggle, and supplied the shortcomings of all the rest. When it was a
matter of pulling the boats up the river, he was the first at the
ropes, and the last to leave them, wading through the water with his
trousers up. If it was his steamer that had run aground, all the
active labour, as well as the organisation, fell on him. Sooner than
add to the work of those in attendance on him, he would be seen
preparing and cooking his own food; and because he could do it better
than his native servant, he would clean his duck-gun, with the whole
camp agape, until his ways were realised, at an Excellency doing his
own work. Nor did he spare himself physically. His average day's walk,
which satisfied him that he was in good health, was fourteen miles;
but he often exceeded twenty miles, and on one occasion he even walked
thirty-five miles under a tropical sun. Of the conduct of his soldiers
against an enemy, or in coping with the difficulties of river
navigation, he was always nervous, and whether for work or for
fighting he used, he said, "to pray them up as he did his men in
China"; but without his knowledge, one of his own soldiers was
vigilantly observant of his conduct, and has recorded, through the
instrumentality of Slatin Pasha, his recollections of Gordon as a
fighter and leader of soldiers:--
"Gordon was indeed a brave man. I was one of his chiefs in the
fight against the Mima and Khawabir Arabs; it was in the plain of
Fafa, and a very hot day. The enemy had charged us, and had
forced back the first line, and their spears were falling thick
around us; one came within a hair's-breadth of Gordon, but he did
not seem to mind it at all, and the victory we won was entirely
due to him and his reserve of 100 men. When the fight was at its
worst he found time to light a cigarette. Never in my life did I
see such a thing; and then the following day, when he divided the
spoil, no one was forgotten, and he kept nothing for himself. He
was very tender-hearted about women and children, and never
allowed them to be distributed, as is our custom in war, but he
fed and clothed them at his own expense, and had them sent to
their homes as soon as the war was over."
This picture of Gordon lighting a cigarette in the press of a doubtful
battle may well be coupled with that already given during the Taeping
rebellion, of his standing unarmed in the breach of an assaulted
stockade, while around him pressed on or wavered the individuals of a
forlorn hope. It will be difficult for anyone to find in all the
annals of war another instance of human courage more nearly
approaching the sublime.
In November 1875 General Gordon had fully made up his mind to resign
and return to Cairo, in consequence of the indifference with which he
was treated by the Khedive's Government, and he had actually written
the telegrams announcing this intention, and given orders to pack up
the stores for the passage down the Nile, when the receipt of a long
letter full of praise and encouragement from the Khedive Ismail
induced him to alter his plans, to tear up the telegrams, and to
continue his work. General Gordon gives his reason for changing his
mind very briefly: "The man had gone to all this expense under the
belief that I would stick to him; I could not therefore leave him." So
he stayed on for another year. In July 1876 he formally and more
deliberately resigned, but the execution of this decision had to be
postponed by the necessity he felt under, as already explained, of
solving the geographical questions connected with the Nile and the
Lakes, and also of securing the southern frontier against Kaba Rega
and Mtesa.
These tasks accomplished, or placed in the way of accomplishment,
there remained no let or hindrance to his departure; and by the end of
October he was in Khartoum. But even then he felt uncertain as to his
ultimate plans, and merely telegraphed to the Cairo authorities that
he intended to come down for a time. With his back turned on the scene
of his labours, the old desire not to leave his work half done came
over him, and all the personal inconvenience and incessant hardship
and worry of the task were forgotten in the belief that he was called
on by God "to open the country thoroughly to both Lakes." He saw very
clearly that what he had accomplished in the three years of his stay
did not provide a permanent or complete cure of the evils arising out
of the slave-trade and the other accompaniments of misgovernment, and
he did not like to be beaten, which he admitted he was if he retired
without remedying anything. These reflections explain why, even when
leaving, his thoughts were still of returning and resuming the work,
little more than commenced, in those Mussulman countries, where he
foresaw a crisis that must come about soon.
But these thoughts and considerations did not affect his desire for a
change to Lower Egypt, or even to visit home; and leaving Khartoum on
12th November he reached Cairo on 2nd December. He then formally
placed his resignation in the Khedive's hands, but it was neither
accepted nor declined; and the Khedive, in some mysterious manner,
seems to have arrived at the sound conclusion that after a brief rest
General Gordon would sicken of inaction, and that it would be no
difficult manner to lure him back to that work in the Soudan which had
already established its spell over him. Of that work, considerable as
it was as the feat of a single man, it need only be said that it would
have remained transitory in its effect and inconclusive in its results
if General Gordon had finally turned his back on it at the close of
his tenure of the post of Governor of the Equatorial Province at the
end of the year 1876. When he left Cairo in the middle of December for
England there was really very little reason to doubt that at the right
moment he would be ready to take up the work again.
END OF VOL. I.
* * * * * *
Transcriber's note:
The transcriber made the following changes to the text to
correct obvious errors:
1. p. 34, charactistic --> characteristic
2. p. 84, while sails --> white sails
3. p. 162, lieutenaut --> lieutenant
*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Life of Gordon, Volume I" ***
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