Title: The Life of Nelson, Volume 2 (of 2) - The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain
Author: Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer), 1840-1914
Language: English
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THE LIFE OF NELSON

THE EMBODIMENT OF THE SEA POWER OF GREAT BRITAIN

BY

CAPTAIN A.T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.
UNITED STATES NAVY

AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783,"
"THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE,"
AND OF A "LIFE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT"

IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. II.

LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, & COMPANY, _LIMITED_
1897



CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

CHAPTER XIV.

NELSON TEMPORARILY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.--RELIEVED
BY LORD KEITH.--APPLIES TO RETURN TO ENGLAND ON ACCOUNT OF ILL HEALTH.

AUGUST, 1799--JUNE, 1800.

Nelson left in temporary command
His disposition of the squadron
Made Duke of Bronté in Sicily
His hopes of remaining in command disappointed
His discontent
Energy and tact in exercising command
Affairs in Rome and Naples
Nelson visits Minorca
His anxiety about Malta
Portuguese squadron recalled to Lisbon.--Nelson's action
Characteristics of his intercourse with foreign officials
Urgency with army to support blockade of La Valetta
Partial success in this
Successes on the Continent of the Coalition against France
Subsequent blunders and disasters
Nelson's mortification at Bonaparte's escape to France
The French defeat the Turks at Aboukir
Nelson peremptorily forbids Sidney Smith to allow any French
to leave Egypt
Smith nevertheless countenances the Convention of El Arish
His action disallowed by Keith and Nelson
Nelson's vivid expressions of disapproval
Nelson joins Keith at Leghorn
They visit Palermo and Malta together
Capture of "Le Généreux," 74, by Nelson's division
Nelson's relations with Keith, and bearing towards him
Keith orders Nelson to take personal charge off Malta
Nelson's annoyance and remonstrance
His restiveness under Keith's command
He returns from Malta to Palermo
The "Guillaume Tell," 80, captured in his absence
Displeasure of the Admiralty at his quitting his station
Letters of the First Lord
Nelson's soreness under them
He applies for leave to return to England


CHAPTER XV.

NELSON LEAVES THE MEDITERRANEAN.--THE JOURNEY OVERLAND
THROUGH GERMANY.--ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND.--SEPARATION
FROM LADY NELSON.--HOISTS HIS FLAG IN THE CHANNEL
FLEET, UNDER LORD ST. VINCENT.

JUNE, 1800--JANUARY, 1801.

Nelson escorts the Queen of Naples to Leghorn with two British
ships-of-the-line
Keith's displeasure
Nelson at Leghorn
Austrians defeated at Marengo
Nelson and the Hamiltons leave Leghorn for Ancona
Journey to Trieste and Vienna
Enthusiasm shown towards Nelson by the people
Mention of him and Lady Hamilton by eye-witnesses
Anecdotes of him
His meeting with the Archduke Charles at Prague
Mrs. St. George's account of him at Dresden
Her disparaging mention of Lady Hamilton
Arrival of the party in England
Lady Nelson's attitude at this time
Her letters to Nelson
His reception and conduct in London
Growing estrangement between him and Lady Nelson
Anecdote of his visit to Fonthill
Final breach with Lady Nelson
Her blameless character, and subsequent life
Nelson's testimony to her conduct
Hoists his flag on board the "San Josef" at Plymouth
Birth of the child Horatia
Nelson's care to conceal his relations with Lady Hamilton


CHAPTER XVI.

THE EXPEDITION TO THE BALTIC AND BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN.--NELSON
RETURNS TO ENGLAND.

FEBRUARY--JUNE, 1801.

Origin of the trouble between Great Britain and Denmark
The entrance of the Czar Paul into the quarrel
Renewal of the Armed Neutrality of 1780
Relations of Bonaparte to this event
Nelson joins the fleet under Sir Hyde Parker, at Yarmouth
Relations between him and Parker
Nelson's disapproval of the plans for the expedition
Evident change in his general disposition
Anecdote of Nelson and the turbot
The fleet collected off the Skaw
Parker's slowness and Nelson's impatience
Alarming reports of the Danes' preparations
Nelson's attitude and counsels
Accuracy of his judgment of the conditions
Tact and discretion in his dealings with Parker
His letter to Parker upon the general situation
Parker's indecision
Nelson's plans adopted
The fleet passes the Sound
Detail and discussion of Nelson's plan of operations
His feelings and speech in the Council of War
Nelson's division anchors south of Copenhagen
Nelson on the night before the battle
The Danish dispositions for defence
Nelson's Plan of Attack--Detail and discussion
The Battle of Copenhagen
Parker makes the signal to leave off action
Nelson refuses to repeat it
Discussion of this incident
Incidents of the battle
Nelson addresses a letter to the Crown Prince under a flag of
truce
Characteristic anecdote
Discussion of the sending of the flag of truce
The battle discontinued
Nelson removes his ships
Completeness of his success
Merit of his conduct throughout
He is advanced in the peerage to be a Viscount
No other rewards, or medals, bestowed for this action
Negotiations intrusted to Nelson by Parker
The murder of the Czar Paul
Armistice for fourteen weeks concluded with Denmark
Qualified approval of the British Government
The British fleet enters the Baltic
Nelson's ardor and personal recklessness.--Anecdote
Parker's sluggishness of action.--Nelson's impatience
Russia intimates her purpose to abstain from hostilities
Nelson's controversy with the Danish Commodore Fischer
Parker ordered home, and Nelson left in command
Dissatisfaction of the latter
His longing to return to Lady Hamilton
He insists upon being relieved, on account of his health
He starts at once with the fleet for Revel
Displeasure manifested by the Czar Alexander
Nelson withdraws from Revel to Rostock
The Czar thereupon raises the embargo on British merchant
ships
Nelson's elation over this result of his conduct
Details of his life on board
His avoidance of social relations outside the ship
Relieved by Admiral Pole, and returns to England


CHAPTER XVII.

NELSON COMMANDS THE "SQUADRON ON A PARTICULAR SERVICE,"
FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE COAST OF ENGLAND AGAINST INVASION.--SIGNATURE
OF PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE WITH
FRANCE.

JULY-OCTOBER, 1801.

Nelson's longing for repose
His services immediately required again
His reluctant consent
Bonaparte's threats of invasion
Inadequacy of British preparations for coast-defence
Nature of British apprehensions in 1801
Nelson's Memoranda for the Defence of the Thames
Analysis and discussion of this paper
St. Vincent's sagacious views on national defence
Apparent divergence between him and Nelson
Nelson hoists his flag again
His tact and courtesy towards others
Activity of his movements
Satisfied that there can be no invasion
Boat attack upon the vessels before Boulogne
Its disastrous failure
Nelson's distress
His exasperation at being kept afloat
His alienation from Troubridge
Annoyances of his situation
Death of Commander Parker.--Nelson's grief
His liberality in money matters
Pecuniary embarrassments
Signature of the preliminaries of peace
Nelson's satisfaction at the prospect of release
His indignation at the excessive elation of others
Receives leave of absence and goes home


CHAPTER XVIII.

RELEASE FROM ACTIVE SERVICE DURING THE PEACE OF AMIENS.--HOME
LIFE AT MERTON.--PUBLIC INCIDENTS.

OCTOBER, 1801--MAY, 1803.

Nelson makes his home with the Hamiltons
His letter of final severance to his wife
His relations to his stepson, Josiah Nisbet
Desire to have a home of his own
Lady Hamilton selects Merton for him
The purchase effected, and the Hamiltons reside with him
Position of Sir William and of Lady Hamilton in the house
Differences between them
Minto's account of the household at Merton
Reminiscence of the same by Nelson's nephew
Incident narrated by Lieutenant Layman
Recollections of Nelson by the vicar's daughter
Nelson's strong religious sense of Divine Providence
Takes his place in the House of Lords
His controversy about rewards for the Battle of Copenhagen
His action justified
Nelson's warm and avowed sympathy with his followers
His consistent maintenance of the ground assumed
His interest in public questions
Dissatisfaction with the general conduct of the Admiralty
His sense of neglect
Embarrassment in money matters
Inadequacy of his pension to his services
His doubts as to the continuance of peace
His antagonism to Bonaparte illustrated
Speech in seconding the address to the throne
Designated for the Mediterranean in case of war
Volunteers his services
Hoists his flag in the "Victory," and sails
Breaks in his home-ties during this period
Death of his father
Death of Sir William Hamilton
Hamilton's expressed confidence in Nelson
Relations of Nelson's family to Lady Nelson and to Lady Hamilton


CHAPTER XIX.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.--THE LONG
WATCH OFF TOULON.--OCCUPATIONS OF A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

MAY, 1803--JANUARY, 1805.

Changed political conditions in the Mediterranean
Attitude of the Great Powers
Situation of Spain and Portugal
Policy of the Italian States
Nelson's sense of the importance of the Mediterranean
Bonaparte's policy
The course advocated by Nelson
Accuracy of his general forecast
Impatience to reach his station
Unwilling detention off Ushant
Quits the "Victory," and proceeds in a frigate
Momentary stop in Gibraltar
Arrival at Malta
Extensive correspondence
Policy as regards the Two Sicilies
His impatience with blind observance of orders
Departure from Malta for Toulon
Emotions at the sight of Naples
Opinion on Malta's value to England
Strategic importance of Malta and Gibraltar
Nelson joins the fleet before Toulon
Bad condition of the ships
His skilful administration of the fleet
Difficulty of obtaining supplies
His attitude towards Spain
Importance of Sardinia in Nelson's eyes
The valuable anchorage at Madalena
Station taken by him off Toulon
Fears loss of Sardinia, and serious consequences
Significance of Napoleon's inactivity in the Mediterranean
The winter rendezvous of the fleet.--Number
Seamanlike care of ships and spars
Preserves health of seamen by constant activity
Sanitary conditions of the fleet
His personal health, and anxieties
Fears a break-down
Speculations as to French intentions
Characteristic distrust of Frenchmen
Increasing perplexities
Firmness of his resolution
The French manoeuvre outside Toulon
Nelson's tactical conclusions and arrangements
His care to impart his ideas to his officers
Methods of intercourse with them
Exasperation at a statement of Latouche Tréville
Endeavors to force or to lure the French to sea
Effect of worry upon his mind
His last promotion.--Vice-Admiral of the White
Wearing effect of protracted monotony
Refuses to let Lady Hamilton join him
The daily life on board
Account of Nelson's health and habits
Occupations in business hours
Diplomatic ability and conciliatory temper
Sharp reply to remonstrance about blockades
Difficulties with Algiers
Nelson's diligent pursuit of information
Interest in listening to conversations
Examination of foreign journals and captured letters
Kindliness in intercourse with others
Exercise of official patronage
Protection of British trade
Want of frigates and small cruisers
Collection and protection of convoys
Nelson applies for sick leave
Desire to return to the station afterwards
Leave is granted by the Admiralty
The Mediterranean Station divided
Sir John Orde given the portion west of Gibraltar
Nelson's dissatisfaction and complaints
His change of mind about going home
Learns Cornwallis's order to seize Spanish treasure-ships
Directs captains under his orders not to obey
Letter illustrative of the characteristics of his orders
Adequacy of his measures to the requirements of the case
Determines not to use his leave of absence
Orde arrives off Cadiz
Indications of the French fleet leaving Toulon
Nelson receives word of the seizure of Spanish ships
Promptness of his measures.--Reasons therefor
Rumors of French departure
Annoyances caused Nelson by Orde
The mission of the frigate "Amazon"
Nelson's hope of meeting the French fleet
Opinions on general subjects
Sympathetic insight into Bonaparte's purposes
The French fleet sails from Toulon


CHAPTER XX.

THE ESCAPE AND PURSUIT OF THE TOULON FLEET.--NELSON'S
RETURN TO ENGLAND.

JANUARY-AUGUST, 1805.

Object of Napoleon's combinations in 1805
Details of his plan
Nelson's share in thwarting it
The difficulties of one dealing with Napoleon
Nelson's guiding principle
The sailing of the Toulon fleet
Nelson's movements and perplexities
Goes to Alexandria
Returns to Gulf of Palmas, Sardinia
British disasters in Western Mediterranean
Characteristic letter of Nelson in behalf of an officer
Explanations to the Admiralty about his own course
Makes a round off Toulon and Barcelona to deceive the enemy
Returns to the Gulf of Palmas
The Toulon fleet sails again
Its movements and those of Nelson
Distress and misfortunes of the latter
Learns that the French fleet has passed the Straits
Thoroughness and sagacity of his measures
Continued head winds and distress of mind
The excitement in London
Gloom at the Admiralty
Nelson's constancy against bad fortune
Hears that the French and Spaniards are gone to the West
  Indies
Determines to follow them there
Sails in pursuit
Incidents of the voyage
Arrives in Barbadoes
Misled by false information
Rapid measures to retrieve the mis-step
Infers that the enemy have returned to Europe
He starts back immediately for Gibraltar
His judgments rapid, but not precipitate
Strength of his convictions
Relief from the anxiety previously felt
Movements of the allies and of Nelson
Precautions of the latter
His own explanation of his reasons
Discussion of this utterance
Indecisive engagement between the allies and Sir Robert Calder
Alarm in London at the failure of the latter
Nelson's protracted pursuit and mental depression
Reaches the Straits again
Appreciation of his action by others
Exchange of views between Nelson and Collingwood
Movements of Villeneuve, Calder, and Nelson
Nelson's arrival in Gibraltar
Subsequent rapid movements
Learns the news brought by the "Curieux"
Starts at once for the northward
Joins the Channel Fleet off Ushant
Leaves his squadron with Cornwallis, and proceeds to England
Anchors at Spithead
His sympathy with Calder
Tenacity of his opinions


CHAPTER XXI.

NELSON'S LAST STAY IN ENGLAND.

AUGUST 19--SEPTEMBER 15, 1805.

Nelson hauls down his flag and goes to Merton
Interviews with the Admiralty
His one meeting with Wellington
Interview with Lord Castlereagh
Popular demonstrations of affection
Home life at Merton
Presentiments
Intimations of early summons into service
News arrives that the combined fleets are in Cadiz
Determination of the British Government
Nelson's opinion on the License System
His services requested by the Government
Lady Hamilton's part in his decision
It is settled that he return to the Mediterranean
His health and spirits
His insistence upon the need for numbers
Final departure from home
Flag re-hoisted on board the "Victory"
Anecdote of Nelson and the gypsy


CHAPTER XXII.

THE ANTECEDENTS OF TRAFALGAR.

SEPTEMBER--OCTOBER 19, 1805.

Popular demonstrations when Nelson embarked
The passage to Cadiz
Precautions to deceive the enemy
His reception by the officers of the fleet
The "Plan of Attack" of May, 1805
The "Nelson Touch"
Discussion and comparison of these two papers
Comparison between the second and the Battle of Trafalgar, as
  fought
Nelson and Sir Robert Calder
Nelson's concession to Calder, and his own comments upon it
His disposition of the fleet before Cadiz
His fear lest the enemy should evade him
Growing presentiments, and cheerful calmness
Anecdote showing his considerateness
Necessity for sending away a detachment
Numbers of the British, and of the allies in Cadiz
Nelson's general intentions, made known to his subordinates
The enemy begins to leave Cadiz


CHAPTER XXIII.

TRAFALGAR.--THE DEATH OF NELSON.

OCTOBER 19-21, 1805.

Numbers and composition of the opposing fleets
Difficulties of the allies in leaving port
Respective movements of the two fleets
Nelson's last letter to Lady Hamilton
His last letter to his child
Events and incidents of October 20
Relative positions of the fleets at midnight
Conditions at daybreak of the 21st
The manoeuvres of the two fleets
Nelson's intercourse with Blackwood on the 21st
He bequeaths Lady Hamilton and Horatia to the care of his
  Country
The hostile fleets forming for battle
Nelson's impatience to close the enemy
The anxiety of others for his personal safety
The order of the allies while awaiting attack
Nelson's last prayer as entered in his journal
The origin and development of his famous signal
The battle opens
The "Victory" comes under fire
Nelson bids Blackwood a final farewell
Exposure and loss of life on board the "Victory"
The "Victory" breaks the enemy's line
Her duel with the "Redoutable"
Nelson falls, mortally wounded
The death-scene in the cockpit
The decisive hour of the battle
The second and closing phase of the battle
Nelson's anxiety about Hardy
Hardy's first visit to his death-bed
The final exchange of shots
Hardy's second visit and Nelson's farewell
The last moments
The death of Nelson
The close of the fight
The significance of Nelson's life
The perfect fulfilment of his life's work


INDEX



CHAPTER XIV.

NELSON TEMPORARILY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.--RELIEVED
BY LORD KEITH.--APPLIES TO RETURN TO ENGLAND ON ACCOUNT OF ILL HEALTH.

AUGUST, August 1799--JUNE, 1800. AGE, 41.


Upon Keith's departure, the command in the Mediterranean devolved upon
Nelson, who for some time remained in doubt of the fact, but with his
usual promptitude acted as if all depended upon himself. "I am
venturing certainly out of my line of duty, but as the
commander-in-chief may not even be on the station, I must do the best
which my judgment points out during his temporary absence." Six
sail-of-the-line, under Admiral Duckworth, were sufficient for service
at Gibraltar and Cadiz, if the latter port was deserted. Four of the
line were about Minorca, constantly, though inefficiently, threatened
from the adjacent coasts of Spain. Three were blockading Malta,
conjointly with the Portuguese vessels. Sidney Smith with his division
remained in the Levant. Troubridge was operating with a few ships on
the coast of Italy, against Civita Vecchia, still in the hands of the
French. A small squadron was maintained on the Riviera of Genoa,
disturbing the communications of the French, and keeping touch with
the advance of the Austro-Russians; but it was expected that the
Russian fleet, as was natural and proper, would soon assume the duty
of co-operating with their general, Suwarrow. The smaller British
cruisers were distributed among these various duties. The flagship
"Foudroyant" was at Palermo, whither the King returned from Naples on
the 8th of August, and there the headquarters of the squadron remained
during Nelson's command. Soon after this arrival in Palermo the King
conferred upon him the title of Duke of Bronté, with an estate of the
same name in Sicily, valued at £3,000 per annum. After this the
admiral for a time signed his papers as Bronté Nelson,[1] changed
subsequently to Bronté Nelson of the Nile, and finally settled down to
Nelson and Bronté, which was his form of signature for the last four
years of his life. He placed upon his new estate an annual charge of
£500 in favor of his father for the term of the latter's life.
"Receive this small tribute, my honoured father," he wrote, "as a mark
of gratitude to the best of parents from his most dutiful son."

On the 20th of September he received letters from the Admiralty,
investing him with the chief command, "till the return of Lord Keith
or some other your superior officer." He was not, however, allowed the
appointments of a commander-in-chief, and often complained of the
inadequacy of his staff to the extent of his duties. Nelson naturally
hoped that his long and eminent services in that particular field, and
the conspicuous ability he had shown on so many occasions, would lead
to the station remaining permanently in his hands, and that Lord
Keith, who was now in England, would succeed in due course to the
Channel Fleet, whose commander, Lord Bridport, soon after retired. The
Mediterranean was naturally attributed to a vice-admiral, and one of
some seniority; but Nelson was now a rear-admiral of the Red, the
highest color, not far, therefore, from promotion, and it would not be
an unreasonable conclusion that the same ministry which had been
fortunate enough to choose him for the campaign of the Nile, might now
prefer to entrust to such able and enterprising hands the great
interests of the Mediterranean at large.

It was not, however, to be so. Whether moved only by routine
considerations of rank, as afterwards at Copenhagen, or whether his
relations with the Sicilian Court, his conduct of affairs at Naples,
and his collisions with Keith, had excited doubt of the normal balance
of his mind, the Admiralty decided to send Keith back, and Nelson,
greatly to his mortification, was kept in charge only till the end of
the year. As St. Vincent had always left him practically independent,
he had known no superior since he entered the Straits, except during
Keith's brief period of succession, when leagues of sheltering
distance left him free, as has been seen, to defy orders when not in
accordance with his views; and he found it impossible now to bow his
will to the second place on the very field of his glory. To this
feeling, natural in any man, and doubly so to one of Nelson's quick
susceptibilities, at once stimulated and soothed by the lavish
adulation of the past year, was added personal dislike to his new
superior, aggravated, if not originated, by the clash of judgment over
the relative importance of Naples and Minorca. "I have serious
thoughts of giving up active service," he wrote to Minto; "Greenwich
Hospital seems a fit retreat for me after being _evidently_ thought
unfit to command in the Mediterranean." Complaints of Keith's lack of
consideration then abound, nor does he seem to be conscious that there
was anything in his mode of life, in current rumor, or in his past
relations with his new commander-in-chief, which might make the latter
unwilling to give him the loose rein St. Vincent had done.

From the time that Keith left the Mediterranean in July, 1799, to
Nelson's own departure a year later, there was little to be done in
the naval way except to maintain and press existing advantages, and
wait until the fruit was ready to drop. The absolute supremacy of the
British squadrons, challenged for a moment by the incursion of Admiral
Bruix, had reverted, in even greater degree than before, by the
absence of the Spanish ships which had accompanied him to Brest.
Impeded by their own numbers, and paralyzed by the insufficiency of
the resources of the port, they remained there a huge, inert mass,
whose impotence was only partially understood by the British; a fact
which conduced to prolong Keith's presence in the Channel. The year
under consideration was therefore devoid of stirring events at sea.

In the Mediterranean, it is true, Nelson's unwearying mental energy,
and keen sense of the necessity of seizing opportunity, did not allow
things to lapse into indolence. Whether or not he was well advised to
settle himself at Palermo, aware as he must have been of the actual
temptation, and of the serious injury that scandal was doing to his
reputation, both professional and personal, may admit of doubt. With
numerous detached and minor services carrying on at the same moment,
there was much to be said for the commander-in-chief remaining in a
fixed position, near the centre of affairs; and in his apprehension
everything then revolved about the Kingdom of Naples. There can be no
question, however, that all his faculties were constantly on the
alert; and that his administration of the station until Keith's return
was characterized by the same zeal, sagacity, and politic tact that he
had shown in earlier days. It is admirable to note the patience,
courtesy, and adroit compliment, he brings into play, to kindle, in
those over whom he has no direct control, the ardor for the general
good, and the fearlessness of responsibility, which actuate himself;
and at the same time to observe how severe the strain was upon his
nervous and irritable temper, as betrayed in comments upon these very
persons, made in private letters which he never expected would see the
light.

The points of principal importance were the consolidation of the
royal power in the continental territory of the Two Sicilies, the
reduction of Malta, and the retention of the French army in Egypt in
entire isolation from France. For the first, Nelson entirely failed in
his efforts to induce the King to trust himself again in Naples, as
the Hamiltons and he had expected when they came back to Palermo. "My
situation here is indeed an uncomfortable one," he said to Earl
Spencer; "for plain common sense points out that the King should
return to Naples, but nothing can move him." "Our joint exertions have
been used to get the King to go to Naples," he wrote to Troubridge,
"but of no avail; the Austrians will be there before him." Although
the French had been expelled from all the Neapolitan dominions, the
presence of fifteen hundred in Rome and Civita Vecchia served then as
an excuse. Nelson implored the commander of the British troops at
Minorca to spare twelve hundred of his men, to aid Troubridge on the
Roman coast. "Sir Charles Stuart," he tells him flatteringly, "by his
timely exertion saved this Kingdom [Sicily] from anarchy and
confusion, and perhaps from rebellion. So it is now, my dear Sir, I
trust, in your power (and I have assured the good King and Queen of
your readiness to serve them and the good cause as much as Sir
Charles) to send for the taking possession of Civita Vecchia and Rome;
this done, and with my life, I will answer for the success of the
expedition. All would be quiet and happy; and their Sicilian Majesties
might return to their throne without any alarm from mobs.... I am sure
I need not venture to say more on the subject. Your Excellency's
judgment and heart will point out the necessity of the measure if it
can be accomplished." "Our King would be much gratified that _Britain_
not _Austria_ should reinstate the Pope."

Sir James Erskine, thus importuned, did not see his way to sending the
troops. Naturally, as a soldier, he did not rely as much upon the
navy preventing a landing in his island, as upon his own powers of
resistance after it was effected, and was therefore unwilling to spare
from the latter. The point of view of a seaman was, and is, different.
He complained, too, that Duckworth had taken a great many ships to
Gibraltar. Nelson admits the mistake, and expresses his regret, but no
word of dissatisfaction with Erskine transpires through his evident
disappointment. He only says, "Pardon what I am going to repeat, that
either in Malta or on the Continent, a field of glory is open."
"Minorca," he wrote to Spencer, "I have never yet considered in the
smallest danger, but it has been a misfortune that others have thought
differently from me on that point." Towards the end of September,
Troubridge, without the aid of British troops, but supported by the
arrival of a division sent by Suwarrow, reported the evacuation of
Rome and Civita Vecchia. "How happy you have made us!" wrote Nelson to
him. "My pen will not say what I feel." The King, however, would not
return to Naples, now that this obstacle was withdrawn. "The Queen has
a noble generous disposition," said Nelson two months later.
"Unfortunately the King and her Majesty do not at this moment draw
exactly the same way; therefore, his Majesty will not go at this
moment to Naples, where his presence is much wanted." "We do but waste
our breath," he avowed afterwards.

In the beginning of October, a visit which he had intended making to
Minorca was hastened by a report that thirteen hostile
ships-of-the-line had been seen off Cape Finisterre, and it was
thought they might be destined for the Mediterranean. Nelson hoped to
assemble ten to meet them; but the news proved to be false. He left
Palermo for this trip on the 5th of October, and returned again on the
22d, having remained five days in Port Mahon. The arrangements for the
naval force, depending entirely upon himself, were soon settled; but
he was disappointed in obtaining, as he had hoped to do from a
personal interview with Erskine, a detachment of two thousand troops
for Malta. About that island he was, to use his own words, almost in
despair. For over a year La Valetta had been blockaded by land and
sea. For the latter he could with difficulty find ships; for the
former he could obtain no men to aid the islanders, who, half
starving, dependent for food chiefly upon Sicily, were sustained in
their resistance mainly by hatred of the invaders, and by the tactful
appeals and encouragement of Captain Ball, who lived ashore among
them. The Barbary pirates, by virtue of their war with Naples,
captured many of the vessels laden with supplies, despite Nelson's
passports; while the Sicilian Court, though well disposed, lacked the
energy and the propelling force necessary to compel the collection and
despatch of the needed grain. On one occasion Troubridge or Ball,
desperate at the sight of the famine around them, sent a ship of war
into Girgenti, a Sicilian port, seized, and brought away two
corn-laden vessels. "The measure was strong," said Nelson, but he
refrained from censuring; and, while apologizing to the Government,
added he hoped it "would not again force officers to so unpleasant an
alternative." He feared that in their misery the Maltese would abandon
the struggle, particularly if they got wind of the purpose of Great
Britain to restore the hated Order of Knights, in deference to the
wishes of the Czar. "The moment the French flag is struck," he had
been obliged to write to Ball, "the colours of the Order must be
hoisted and no other; when it was settled otherwise, the orders from
England were not so strong."

About this time came information that several ships were fitting out
at Toulon, with supplies for the besieged. This increased Nelson's
anxieties, and at the same time emphasized the necessity which he had
always urged of using speedier and surer means to reduce the place,
while the undisputed mastery of the sea gave the opportunity. "What
might not Bruix have done, had he done his duty?" was his own comment
upon that recent incursion; and who could tell how soon as great a
force might appear again under an abler man? He turned in every
direction, and was instant in his appeals for aid. He wrote to Acton
that he had positive information that seven ships were loaded in
Toulon. "I therefore beg leave to propose to your Excellency, whether
under our present circumstances, it would not be right for his
Sicilian Majesty to desire that the English garrison at Messina should
instantly go to Malta, for I am clear, that if Malta is relieved, that
our forces got together could not take it, and the commencement of a
new blockade would be useless. All the Barbary cruisers would there
have their rendezvous, and not a vessel of his Sicilian Majesty's
could put to sea." He exhorts the minister also to apply to the
Russians for immediate help at Malta.

At the same time, to augment his embarrassments, orders came from
Lisbon recalling the Portuguese squadron, which formed the larger part
of the sea blockade. Nelson forgot how often he had abused them as
useless, and grappled with that part of the difficulty with
characteristic boldness. He peremptorily forbade the admiral to obey
his orders. "As the reduction of the Island of Malta is of the
greatest consequence to the interests of the allied Powers at war with
France, and the withdrawing of the squadron under your command, at
this time, from the blockade of that island, will be of the most
ruinous consequences to their interests ... you are hereby required
and directed, in consideration of the above circumstances, and
notwithstanding the orders you may have received from your Court to
return to Lisbon, not on any consideration whatsoever to withdraw one
man from that island, which may have been landed from the squadron
under your Excellency's command, or detach one ship down the
Mediterranean, until further orders from me for that purpose." Your
orders, he tells Niza in a private letter, were founded upon the
belief that your presence was no longer necessary; "but the contrary
is the fact--for your services were never more wanted than at this
moment, when every exertion is wanting to get more troops of English
and Russians to Malta." He is evidently thinking of his difference
with Keith; but now he is within the limits of his commission as
Commander-in-chief. Doubting, however, whether his official authority
will prevail with Niza to disobey his recall, he plies him skilfully
with appeals to those sentiments of honor which had received such
illustration in his own noble career. "If you quit your most important
station till I can get" reliefs for you, "depend upon it, your
illustrious Prince will disapprove of (in this instance) your
punctilious execution of orders." "We shall soon get more troops from
Messina and Minorca; and I am not a little anxious for the honour of
Portugal and your Excellency, that you should be present at the
surrender. I hold myself responsible." "You was the first at the
blockade. Your Excellency's conduct has gained you the love and esteem
of Governor Ball, all the British officers and men, and the whole
Maltese people; and give me leave to add the name of Nelson as one of
your warmest admirers, as an officer and a friend."

As he dealt with the Portuguese admiral, so, in due measure, he
conducted his intercourse with all others who came within the scope of
his widely ranging activities. Already more Neapolitan than the King,
to the Russian he became as a Russian, to the Turk as a Turk, all
things to all men, if he could by any means promote the interest of
the Allied cause and save Malta. Amid the diverse and conflicting
motives of a coalition, Nelson played a steady hand, his attention
unified, and his sight cleared, by an unwavering regard to the single
object which he compressed into the words, "Down, down, with the
French!" In that sense, he asserts truthfully enough to each and all
of his correspondents that the advantage of their country and their
monarch is as dear to him as that of Great Britain. He touches with
artful skill upon the evident interests of each nation, appeals to the
officer's sense of the cherished desires of his sovereign, and, while
frankly setting forth the truths necessary to be spoken, as to the
comparative claims upon himself of the various portions of the field,
he insinuates, rather than suggests, what the person immediately
addressed ought to be doing in furtherance of the one great aim.
Withal, despite the uneasiness to which he is constantly a prey on
account of the failures of others, no lack of confidence in the one to
whom he is writing is suffered to appear. Each is not only exhorted
and cheered, but patted on the back with an implied approbation, which
in his own service constituted much of his well-deserved influence. He
is as hearty and generous in his praises to Sir Sidney Smith, whom he
never fully trusted, for his services at Acre, as he is to the valued
friend, and pattern of all naval efficiency, Troubridge. To the
Emperor of Russia he paid the politic attention of sending a detailed
report of all that had been done about Malta, made to him as Grand
Master of the Order,--a delicate and adroit flattery at the moment,
for the Czar then valued himself more as the restorer of an ancient
order of chivalry than as the inheritor of a great Sovereignty; and
his position was further recognized by asking of him the insignia of
the Order for Captain Ball and Lady Hamilton.

This immense load of correspondence and anxiety was additional to the
numerous unrecorded cares and interviews, relating to the routine work
and maintenance of a great squadron, often left bare of resources from
home, and to the support of the destitute population of Malta,--sixty
thousand souls; and all was carried on amid the constant going and
coming of the ambassador's house, kept open to naval officers and
others. This public sort of life and excitement involved considerable
expense, and was little to the taste of either Nelson or Hamilton,
the latter of whom was now approaching his seventieth year; but in it
Lady Hamilton was in all her glory, overwhelmed with compliments, the
victor of the Nile at her feet, and "making a great figure in our
political line," to use her husband's words. "Except to the Court,"
wrote Nelson, replying to a censure from the Admiralty for failing to
send a letter by a certain channel, when he had sent duplicates by two
other conveyances,--"except to the Court, till after eight o'clock at
night I never relax from business. I have had hitherto, the Board
knows, no one emolument--no one advantage of a Commander-in-chief." It
was in reference to this captious rebuff, received when immersed in
cares, that he wrote to Spencer: "Do not, my dear Lord, let the
Admiralty write harshly to me--my generous soul cannot bear it, being
conscious it is entirely unmerited."

While he was striving to gain assistance for the Maltese, he does not
forget to sustain them with hopes, not always too well founded. He
tells Ball he trusts the Messina troops will soon be with him. "You
may depend, in October, I will get 2,000 men on shore at Malta. Niza
is ordered to Lisbon, but I have directed his stay off Malta." He
appeals personally to the British commander at Messina, and to the
Russian minister at Palermo, reminding the latter how dear Malta and
its Order were to his sovereign. "Malta, my dear Sir, is in my
thoughts sleeping or waking." The Portuguese, he tells him, are
ordered home; but, wishing Russian assistance, he does not say that he
has stopped them,--as to which, indeed, he could not feel sure.

The same object pressed upon him while in Port Mahon, and he
succeeded, by his personal enthusiasm, in arousing Erskine's interest
in the matter; but the latter was loaded to the muzzle with
objections. "Sir James," said Nelson to Troubridge, with the amusing
professional prejudice they both entertained, "enters upon the
difficulty of the undertaking in a true soldier way." "I am just come
from Sir James," he wrote to Hamilton on the 13th of October. "He sees
all the difficulty of taking Malta in the clearest point of views, and
therefore it became an arduous task to make him think that with God's
blessing the thing was possible." He has, however, consented to
prepare fifteen hundred men with stores and equipments, but only on
condition that the Russians will also give a thousand,--a further
draft on Nelson's diplomacy,--and a thousand be landed from the
squadron, etc. Besides, there is the further difficulty that a
superior officer is expected from England, and what will he say? And
will Erskine be justified in sending men before his entirely uncertain
arrival? It may be imagined what such proceedings were to Nelson's
nervous, ardent, unhesitating temperament, and they elicited the
characteristic comment, "This has been my first conference. It has
cost me four hours hard labour, and may be upset by a fool." "My heart
is, I assure you, almost broke with this and other things," he wrote
to Spencer. "If the enemy gets supplies in, we may bid adieu to Malta.
This would complete my misery; for I am afraid I take all services too
much to heart. The accomplishing of them is my study, night and day."

"My dear Sir James," he writes to Erskine after returning to Palermo,
"I am in desperation about Malta--we shall lose it, I am afraid, past
redemption. I send you copies of Niza's and Ball's letters, also
General Acton's, so you will see I have not been idle." As it is, Ball
can hardly keep the inhabitants in hope of relief; what then will it
be if the Portuguese withdraw? "If the islanders are forced again to
join the French, we may not find even landing a very easy task, much
less to get again our present advantageous position. I therefore
entreat for the honour of our King, that whether General Fox is
arrived or not, at least the garrison of Messina may be ordered to
hold post in Malta until a sufficient force can be collected to
attack it.... I know well enough of what officers in your situation
can do; the delicacy of your feelings on the near approach of General
Fox I can readily conceive; but the time you know nothing about; this
is a great and important moment, and the only thing to be considered,
_is his Majesty's service to stand still for an instant?_ ... Was the
call for these troops known at home, would they not order them to
proceed when the service near at hand loudly calls for them? _this is
the only thing in my opinion for consideration_. If we lose this
opportunity it will be impossible to recall it." From this desperate
appeal he turns to Ball, with words of encouragement for his
islanders. "We shall soon hear to a certainty of at least 5,000
Russian troops for the service of Malta. Within a month I hope to see
10,000 men in arms against La Valetta. I have sent for Troubridge and
Martin, that I may get a force to relieve Niza. I trust he will not go
till I can get not only a proper force to relieve his ships, but those
of his people who are on shore." "The great order of all," he writes
Erskine three weeks later, "is to destroy the power of the French. Two
regiments for two months would probably, with the assistance of the
Russians, give us Malta, liberate us from an enemy close to our doors,
gratify the Emperor of Russia, protect our Levant trade, relieve a
large squadron of ships from this service, and enable me the better to
afford naval protection to the island of Minorca, and assist our
allies on the northern coast of Italy, and to annoy the enemy on the
coast of France."

Nelson's entreaties and efforts met with success, sufficient at least
to stay the ebbing tide. General Fox arrived in Minorca, gave
permission for the garrison of Messina to go to Malta, and on the 25th
of November Troubridge, bringing this news, arrived off Palermo.
Nelson's haste did not permit the "Culloden" to anchor. Shifting his
flag to a transport, he sent out the "Foudroyant" to meet her, with
orders for both to go to Messina, embark the garrison, and get off
Malta as soon as possible. The "Northumberland," seventy-four, was
also to join off Malta, forming a division to replace the Portuguese
squadron. The latter quitted the blockade in December, Nelson
notifying Niza on the 18th of the month that he no longer considered
him under his command. The Messina troops landed at Malta on the 10th.
The British then had fifteen hundred men on the island, supported by
two thousand Maltese, well disciplined and armed, besides a number of
native irregulars upon whom only partial dependence could be placed.
The Russians never came to take part. They got as far as Messina, but
there received orders to go to Corfu, both ships and men. This was in
pursuance of a change of policy in the Czar, who, being enraged at the
conduct of his allies, particularly of the Austrians, in the late
campaign, intended withdrawing from the Coalition, and was
concentrating troops at Corfu. This revived Nelson's fears for Malta.
"I trust Graham will not think of giving the island to the French by
withdrawing, till he receives orders from General Fox." The troops
remained, but in numbers too small to admit active operations. The
result was left perforce to the slow pressure of blockade; and final
success, insured mainly by Nelson's untiring efforts, was not attained
until after he had left the Mediterranean.

The six months of his independent command, though unmarked by striking
incidents at sea, were crowded with events, important in themselves,
but far more important as pregnant of great and portentous changes in
the political and military conditions of Europe. When Keith passed the
Straits in pursuit of the Franco-Spanish fleet, on the 30th of July,
the forces of the Coalition in Upper Italy were in the full tide of
repeated victories and unchecked success. On that same day the
fortress of Mantua, the siege of which in 1796 had stayed for nine
months the triumphal progress of Bonaparte, was surrendered by the
French, whose armies in the field, driven far to the westward, were
maintaining a difficult position on the crests of the Apennines.
Seeking to descend from there into the fields of Piedmont, they were
met by Suwarrow, and on the 15th of August, at Novi, received once
more a ruinous defeat, in which their commander-in-chief was slain.

At this moment of success, instead of pressing onward to drive the
enemy out of Italy, and possibly to pursue him into France, it was
decided that the Russians should be sent across the Alps into
Switzerland, to take the place of a number of Austrians. The latter,
in turn, were to move farther north, on the lower Rhine, to favor by a
diversion an intended invasion of Holland by a combined force of
Russians and British. This gigantic flank movement and change of plan
resulted most disastrously. In the midst of it the French general
Masséna, commanding in Switzerland, the centre of the great hostile
front which extended from the Mediterranean to the North Sea, made a
vehement and sustained attack upon the Austro-Russians at Zurich, on
the 25th of September. Gaining a complete victory, he drove the enemy
back beyond the point where Suwarrow expected to make his junction.
The veteran marshal, who had left Italy on the 11th of September,
arrived two days after the Battle of Zurich was fought. Isolated in
insufficient numbers from the friends he expected to meet, it was only
after severe hardships and superhuman efforts, extending over ten
days, that he at length, on the 9th of October, reached a place of
safety at Ilanz. Declining further co-operation with the Austrians,
and alleging the need of rest for his troops after their frightful
exposure in the mountains, he withdrew into winter quarters in Bavaria
at the end of the month. Thus Switzerland remained in possession of
the French, inactivity continued in Italy, and the Czar, furious at
the turn events had taken, was rapidly passing into hatred of both
Austria and Great Britain.

On the 9th of October, also, Bonaparte landed in France, after a six
weeks' voyage from Alexandria. The immense consequences involved in
this single event could not then be foreseen; but it none the less
caused mortification and regret to Nelson. It was a cardinal principle
with him, vehemently and frequently uttered, that not a single
Frenchman should be allowed to return from Egypt; and here their
commander-in-chief had passed successfully from end to end of the
station, unseen by any British cruiser. He did not, however, consider
himself at fault, and his judgment may be allowed, although in his own
case. "If I could have had any cruisers, as was my plan, off Cape Bon,
in Africa, and between Corsica and Toulon, Mr. Buonaparte could not
probably have got to France." This he said to Earl Spencer. Elsewhere
he wrote: "I have regretted sincerely the escape of Buonaparte; but
those ships which were destined by me for the two places where he
would certainly have been intercepted, were, from the Admiralty
thinking, doubtless, that the Russians would do something at sea,
obliged to be at Malta, and other services which I thought the Russian
Admiral would have assisted me in--therefore, no blame lies at my
door." He took some comfort in contrasting the stealthy return of the
French general, with the great armada that accompanied his departure.
"No Crusader ever returned with more humility--contrast his going in
L'Orient, &c. &c."

A report that Bonaparte had passed Corsica reached Nelson on October
24th. The same day came despatches from Sir Sidney Smith, narrating a
disastrous defeat sustained by the Turks on the shores of Aboukir Bay.
Smith's period of command in the Levant had been chiefly, and
brilliantly, distinguished by the successful defence of Acre against
Bonaparte. The latter, threatened by simultaneous attacks by the Turks
from Syria and from the sea, had determined to anticipate such a
combination by going himself against the enemy on the land side,
before the weather conditions made it possible to disembark any
formidable body of men on the shores of Egypt. Starting with this
purpose in February, he had proceeded with slight resistance until the
18th of March, when his army appeared before Acre. Smith was then
lying in the roads with two ships-of-the-line. The siege which ensued
lasted for sixty-two days, so great was Bonaparte's pertinacity, and
anxiety to possess the place; and in its course Smith displayed, not
only courage and activity, which had never been doubted, but a degree
of conduct and sound judgment that few expected of him. His division
was fortunate enough to capture the French siege train, which had to
be sent by water, and he very much disturbed the enemy's coastwise
communications, besides contributing materially to the direction of
the defence, to which the Turks, though brave enough, were not
adequate. After several desperate assaults the siege was raised on the
20th of May, and Bonaparte retreated to Egypt, regaining Cairo on the
14th of June.

Following up the success at Acre, a Turkish fleet of thirteen
ships-of-the-line anchored in Aboukir Bay on the 11th of July,
attended by a body of transports carrying troops, variously estimated
at from ten to thirty thousand. Smith with his ships accompanied the
expedition. The Turks landed, and stormed the castle of Aboukir; but
on the 25th Bonaparte, having concentrated his forces rapidly, fell
upon them and totally defeated them. All who had landed were either
killed, driven into the sea and drowned, or taken prisoners; the
commander-in-chief being among the latter. Four weeks later, as is
already known, Bonaparte embarked for France.

It was thus conclusively demonstrated that for the present at least,
and until the French numbers were further diminished by the inevitable
losses of disease and battle, the Turks could not regain control of
Egypt. On the other hand, it was equally evident, and was admitted by
both Bonaparte and his able successor, Kleber, that without
reinforcements, which could not be sent while the British controlled
the sea, the end of the French occupation was only a question of time.
After Bonaparte's departure, Kleber wrote home strongly to this
effect. His letters, being addressed to the Government, fell upon
arrival into Bonaparte's hands; but, with these convictions, he was
ready to enter into an arrangement for the evacuation of the country,
upon condition of being allowed to return freely to Europe.

Such also appears to have been the disposition of the British
representatives in the East. Immediately after taking over the command
in the Levant from Troubridge, Smith gave him, among other papers, a
form of passport which he intended to use, permitting individual
Frenchmen to go to Europe by sea. This Troubridge handed to Nelson,
telling him also that it was Smith's intention to send word into
Alexandria, that all French ships might pass to France. This passport,
adopted after Smith had been to Constantinople, had doubtless the
sanction of the joint minister, his brother, and was signed by himself
both as plenipotentiary and naval officer. Nelson had by this time
been instructed that Smith was under his command, and he at once sent
him an order, couched in the most explicit, positive, and peremptory
terms, which merit especial attention because Smith disobeyed them.
"_As this is in direct opposition to my opinion_, which is, _never to
suffer any one individual Frenchman to quit Egypt_--I must therefore
_strictly charge and command you_,[2] never to give any French ship or
man leave to quit Egypt. And I must also desire that _you will oppose
by every means in your power, any permission which may he attempted to
be given by any foreigner_, Admiral, General, or other person; and you
will acquaint those persons, that I shall not pay the smallest
attention to any such passport after your notification; and _you are
to put my orders in force, not on any pretence to permit a single_
_Frenchman to leave Egypt_." It seems clear from these expressions
that Nelson had gathered, through Troubridge, that it was the policy
of the Sultan and of the British representatives to get the French out
of Egypt at any cost,--to look, in short, to local interests rather
than to the general policy of the Allies. This he was determined to
prevent by instructions so comprehensive, yet so precise, as to leave
no loophole for evasion.

Here matters seem to have rested for a time. Smith could scarcely dare
to disregard such orders at once, and Bonaparte was not yet disposed
openly to confess failure by seeking terms. In the autumn of 1799,
however, the Earl of Elgin went to Constantinople as ambassador,
Spencer Smith dropping to secretary of embassy, and his brother
remaining on the Egyptian coast. Elgin was far from being in accord
with Smith's general line of conduct, which was marked with
presumption and self-sufficiency, and in the end he greatly deplored
the terms "granted to the French, so far beyond our expectation;" but
he shared the belief that to rid Egypt of the French was an end for
which considerable sacrifices should be made, and his correspondence
with Smith expressed this conviction. When prepossessions such as this
exist among a number of men associated with one another, they are apt,
as in the case of Admiral Man consulting with his captains, to result
in some ill-advised step, bearing commonly the stamp of concern for
local interests, and forgetfulness of general considerations. The
upshot in this particular instance was the conclusion of a Convention,
known as that of El Arish, between the Turks and the French, signed on
board Smith's ship on the 24th of January, 1800, by which this army of
veterans was to be permitted to return to France unmolested, and free
at once to take the field against the allies of Turkey and Great
Britain, at the moment when Bonaparte's unrivalled powers of
administration were straining every nerve, to restore the French
forces from the disorganization into which they had fallen, and to
prepare for the spring campaign.

Smith, though present, did not sign this precious paper, which, in a
letter to Hamilton, he called "the gratifying termination of his
labours;" but he had in his hand the orders of his immediate superior,
and temporary commander-in-chief, to notify any "foreigner, general,
or admiral," that the execution of such an agreement would not be
permitted by the British Navy, and it would have been his own duty to
stop any ships attempting to carry it out, until other orders were
received. His powers as joint plenipotentiary having ceased, he was
now simply the naval officer. As it happened, Keith, who by this time
had relieved Nelson, brought out from England clear directions from
the Government not to allow any transaction of this kind; and although
he personally favored the policy of evacuation, feeling perhaps the
inconvenience of detaching ships so far from his centre of operations,
he was not a man to trifle with orders. Rumors of what was going on
had evidently reached him, for on the 8th of January, a fortnight
before the convention was signed, he wrote to Kleber a letter, which
he directed Smith to deliver, thus placing it out of the power of that
very independent officer to leave any mistake as to actual conditions
in the mind of the French general. To the latter he said: "I have
positive orders not to consent to any capitulation with the French
troops, at least unless they lay down their arms, surrender themselves
prisoners of war, and deliver up all the ships and stores of the port
of Alexandria to the Allied Powers." Even in such case they would not
be allowed to leave Egypt until exchanged. Any persons that attempted
to return, pursuant to an arrangement with one of the Allies,
exclusive of the others, as the El-Arish Convention was, would be made
prisoners of war.

Nelson's opinions in this matter had never wavered. As rumors of what
was brewing got about, he wrote to the Earl of Elgin, on the 21st of
December, 1800: "I own my hope yet is, that the Sublime Porte will
never permit a single Frenchman to quit Egypt; and I own myself wicked
enough to wish them all to die in that country they chose to invade.
We have scoundrels of French enough in Europe without them." "I never
would consent to one of them returning to the Continent of Europe
during the war," he tells Spencer Smith. "I wish them to _perish_ in
Egypt, and give a great lesson to the world of the justice of the
Almighty." When Elgin, thinking him still commander-in-chief, sent him
the Convention, he replied formally: "I shall forward the papers to
Lord Keith, who will answer your Excellency. But I cannot help most
sincerely regretting that ever any countenance was given to the Turks
to enter into such a treaty with the French; for I ever held it to be
impossible to permit that army to return to Europe, but as prisoners
of war, and in that case, not to France. And was I commander-in-chief,
even when the thing was done, I should have refused to ratify any
consent or approbation of Sir Sidney Smith, and have wrote to both the
Grand Vizir and the French General, the impossibility of permitting a
vanquished army to be placed by one Ally in a position to attack
another Ally." The last phrase put the facts in a nutshell, and
illustrates well Nelson's power of going straight to the root of a
matter, disregardful of confusing side-issues, of policy or timidity.
To Hamilton he wrote passionately concerning the manifold difficulties
caused to all, except the Turks and the Smiths. "If all the wise heads
had left them to God Almighty, after the bridge was broke, all would
have ended well. For I differ entirely with my commander-in-chief, in
wishing they were permitted to return to France; and, likewise, with
Lord Elgin on the great importance of removing them from Egypt."

"I have wrote to Lord Keith, and home," said Nelson to Sir Sidney
Smith on the 15th of January, "that I did not give credit that it was
possible for you to give any passport for a single Frenchman, much
less the Army, after my positive order of March 18th, 1799." The words
show what reports had already got about of the general trend of
policy, on the part of the Porte and the British representatives; but
the irony of the matter as regards Nelson is, that Smith disobeyed his
orders, as he himself, six months before, had disobeyed Keith's; and
for the same reason, that he on the spot was a better judge of local
conditions and recent developments than one at a distance. To one,
Naples was more important than Minorca, more important than a
half-dozen ships in a possible fleet action; to the other, Egypt was
more important than the presence of sixteen thousand veterans, more or
less, on a European battle-field. It is impossible and bootless, to
weigh the comparative degree of culpability involved in breaches of
orders which cannot be justified. It is perhaps safe to say that while
a subordinate has necessarily a large amount of discretion in the
particular matter intrusted to him, the burden of proof rests wholly
upon him when he presumes to depart from orders affecting the general
field of war, which is the attribute of the commander-in-chief. What
in the former case may be simply an error of judgment, in the latter
becomes a military crime.

On the 16th of January, 1800, Nelson, who some days before had been
notified by Keith of his approach, and directed to place himself under
his command, left Palermo for Leghorn, arriving on the 20th. The
commander-in-chief was already there in the "Queen Charlotte." On the
25th they sailed together for Palermo, and after nine days' stay in
that port went on again for Malta, which they reached on the 15th of
February. No incident of particular interest occurred during these
three weeks, but Nelson's letters to the Hamiltons show that he was
chafing under any act in his superior which could be construed into a
slight. "I feel all, and notwithstanding my desire to be as humble as
the lowest midshipman, perhaps, I cannot submit to be much lower, I am
used to have attention paid me from his superiors." "To say how I miss
your house and company would be saying little; but in truth you and
Sir William have so spoiled me, that I am not happy anywhere else but
with you, nor have I an idea that I ever can be." Keith's comment--the
other point of view--is worth quoting. "Anything absurd coming from
the quarter you mention does not surprise me," he wrote to Paget, who
succeeded Hamilton as minister. "The whole was a scene of fulsome
vanity and absurdity all the _long_ eight days I was at Palermo."[3]

When Keith returned, the capture of Malta, and of the two
ships-of-the-line which had escaped from the Battle of the Nile, were,
by common consent, all that remained to do, in order to round off and
bring to a triumphant conclusion Nelson's Mediterranean career.
Fortune strove hard against his own weakness to add all these jewels
to his crown, but she strove in vain. "We may truly call him a
_heaven_-born Admiral, upon whom fortune smiles wherever he goes." So
wrote Ball to Lady Hamilton, alluding to the first of the favors flung
at his head. "We have been carrying on the blockade of Malta sixteen
months, during which time the enemy never attempted to throw in great
succours. His Lordship arrived off here the day they were within a few
leagues of the island, captured the principal ships, and dispersed the
rest, so that not one has reached the port." It was indeed a
marvellous piece of what men call luck. Nelson had never gone near
Malta since October, 1798, till Keith took him there on the 15th of
February, 1800. The division had no sooner arrived at the island, than
a frigate brought word of a French squadron having been seen off the
west end of Sicily. It was then blowing strong from southeast, and
raining. Keith took his own station off the mouth of the harbor,
placed other ships where he thought best, and signalled Nelson to
chase to windward with three ships-of-the-line, which were afterwards
joined by a fourth, then cruising on the southeast of the island. The
next day the wind shifted to northwest, but it was not until the
morning of the 18th that the enemy were discovered. Guns were then
heard to the northward, by those on board the "Foudroyant," which made
all sail in pursuit, and soon sighted the "Alexander" chasing four
French sail. "Pray God we may get alongside of them," wrote Nelson in
his journal; "the event I leave to Providence. I think if I can take
one 74 by myself, I would retire, and give the staff to more able
hands." "I feel anxious to get up with these ships," he wrote to Lady
Hamilton, "and shall be unhappy not to take them myself, for first my
greatest happiness is to serve my gracious King and Country, and I am
envious only of glory; for if it be a sin to covet glory, I am the
most offending soul alive. _But here I am_ in a heavy sea and thick
fog--Oh, God! the wind subsided--but I trust to Providence I shall
have them. 18th in the evening, I have got her--Le Généreux--thank
God! 12 out of 13, onely the Guillaume Telle remaining; I am after the
others." The enemy's division had consisted of this seventy-four, a
large transport, also captured, and three corvettes which escaped.

An account of Nelson on the quarter-deck on this occasion has been
transmitted by an eye-witness, whose recollections, committed to paper
nearly forty years later, are in many points evidently faulty, but in
the present instance reflect a frame of mind in the great admiral in
perfect keeping with the words last quoted from his own letter. The
writer was then a midshipman of the "Foudroyant;" and the scene as
described opens with a hail from a lieutenant at the masthead, with
his telescope on the chase.

"'Deck there! the stranger is evidently a man of war--she is a
line-of-battle-ship, my lord, and going large on the starboard tack.'

"'Ah! an enemy, Mr. Stains. I pray God it may be Le Généreux. The
signal for a general chase, Sir Ed'ard, (the Nelsonian pronunciation
of Edward,) make the Foudroyant fly!'

"Thus spoke the heroic Nelson; and every exertion that emulation could
inspire was used to crowd the squadron with canvas, the Northumberland
taking the lead, with the flag-ship close on her quarter.

"'This will not do, Sir Ed'ard; it is certainly Le Généreux, and to my
flag-ship she can alone surrender. Sir Ed'ard, we must and shall beat
the Northumberland.'

"'I will do the utmost, my lord; get the engine to work on the
sails--hang butts of water to the stays--pipe the hammocks down, and
each man place shot in them--slack the stays, knock up the wedges, and
give the masts play--start off the water, Mr. James, and pump the
ship.' The Foudroyant is drawing a-head, and at last takes the lead in
the chase. 'The admiral is working his fin, (the stump of his right
arm,) do not cross his hawse, I advise you.'

"The advice was good, for at that moment Nelson opened furiously on
the quarter-master at the conn. 'I'll knock you off your perch, you
rascal, if you are so inattentive.--Sir Ed'ard, send your best
quarter-master to the weather wheel.'

"'A strange sail a-head of the chase!' called the look-out man.

"'Youngster, to the mast-head. What! going without your glass, and be
d----d to you? Let me know what she is immediately.'

"'A sloop of war, or frigate, my lord," shouted the young
signal-midshipman.

"'Demand her number.'

"'The Success, my lord.'

"'Captain Peard; signal to cut off the flying enemy--great odds,
though--thirty-two small guns to eighty large ones.'

"'The Success has hove-to athwart-hawse of the Généreux, and is firing
her larboard broadside. The Frenchman has hoisted his tri-colour, with
a rear-admiral's flag.'

"'Bravo--Success, at her again!'

"'She has wore round, my lord, and firing her starboard broadside. It
has winged her, my lord--her flying kites are flying away all
together.' The enemy is close on the Success, who must receive her
tremendous broadside. The Généreux opens her fire on her little enemy,
and every person stands aghast, afraid of the consequences. The smoke
clears away, and there is the Success, crippled, it is true, but,
bull-dog like, bearing up after the enemy.

"'The signal for the Success to discontinue the action, and come under
my stern,' said Lord Nelson; 'she has done well, for her size. Try a
shot from the lower-deck at her, Sir Ed'ard.'

"'It goes over her.'

"'Beat to quarters, and fire coolly and deliberately at her masts and
yards.'

"Le Généreux at this moment opened her fire on us; and, as a shot
passed through the mizen stay-sail, Lord Nelson, patting one of the
youngsters on the head, asked him jocularly how he relished the music;
and observing something like alarm depicted on his countenance,
consoled him with the information, that Charles XII. ran away from the
first shot he heard, though afterwards he was called 'The Great,' and
deservedly, from his bravery. 'I, therefore,' said Lord Nelson, 'hope
much from you in future.'

"Here the Northumberland opened her fire, and down came the
tri-colored ensign, amidst the thunder of our united cannon."[4]

According to Keith, Nelson "on this occasion, as on all others,
conducted himself with skill, and great address, in comprehending my
signals, which the state of the weather led me greatly to suspect."
Nelson's account to Hamilton was, "By leaving my admiral without
signal, for which _I may be broke_, I took these French villains." "I
have wrote to Lord Spencer," he tells his eldest brother, "and have
sent him my journal, to show that the Généreux was taken by me, and my
plan--that my quitting Lord Keith was at my own risk, and for which,
if I had not succeeded, I might have been broke. The way he went, the
Généreux never could have been taken." In a letter to Lord Minto he
attributed his success to his knowledge of all the local conditions,
acquired by seven years' experience. In his anxiety to make this
instance prove his case, in the previous disobedience to Keith, for
which the Admiralty had censured him, Nelson overreached himself and
certainly fell into an ungenerous action. His vaunt of success by the
road of disobedience rested only on the fact that he had failed to see
Keith's signal. This the latter did not know, and evidently considered
he had complied with its spirit. The signal to chase to windward was
not strained to disobedience in being construed to search a fairly
wide area for the enemy, keeping the rendezvous, which was also the
enemy's destination, to leeward, so as to be readily regained. The
"Queen Charlotte," Keith's flagship, covered the inner line, and,
being a first-rate, was competent to handle any force that could come
out of Toulon. There is a good deal of human nature in this captious
unofficial attack on a superior, whose chief fault, as towards
himself, was that he had been the victim of disobedience; but it is
not pleasant to see in a man so truly great.

The "Généreux" carried the flag of a rear-admiral, who was killed in
the action. Nelson seized the opportunity of further conciliating the
Czar, by sending the sword of this officer to him, as Grand Master of
the Order of Malta. Upon rejoining Keith, he reported in person, as
custom demands. "Lord Keith received my account and myself like a
philosopher (but very unlike you)," he wrote to Hamilton; "it did not,
that I could perceive, cause a pleasing muscle in his face." "Had you
seen the Peer receive me," he wrote to Lady Hamilton the same day, "I
know not what you would have done; but I can guess. But never mind. I
told him that I had made a vow, if I took the Généreux by myself, it
was my intention to strike my flag. To which he made no answer." What
could he very well say, if a man chose to throw away his chances,
especially when that man was a subordinate who a short time before had
flatly refused to obey his orders. Soreness and testiness had full
swing in Nelson at this time; at some fancied neglect, he wrote
Troubridge a letter which reduced that gallant officer to tears.

Between Palermo and Malta Keith had received letters from General
Mélas, commanding the Austrian army in Piedmont, giving the plan of
the approaching campaign, in which, as the Austrians were to besiege
Genoa, and advance to the Riviera, much depended upon naval
co-operation. Rightly judging that to be the quarter calling for the
naval commander-in-chief, he was anxious to get away. On the 24th of
February he issued an order to Nelson to take charge of the blockade,
and "to adopt and prosecute the necessary measures for contributing to
the complete reduction of Malta." Short of the chief command, which he
coveted and grudged, Nelson himself could not have contrived a
position better fitted to crown his work in the Mediterranean. Within
the harbor of La Valetta, concentrating there the two objects that yet
remained to be attained,--- Valetta itself being one,--was the
"Guillaume Tell," the thirteenth ship, which alone was lacking now to
complete the tale of the trophies of the Nile. Yet the fair prospect
of success, inevitable since the capture of the "Généreux" had
destroyed the French hopes of relief, brought to Nelson nothing but
dismay. "My Lord," he replied the same day, "my state of health is
such, that it is impossible I can much longer remain here. Without
some rest, I am gone. I must, therefore, whenever I find the service
will admit of it, request your permission to go to my friends, at
Palermo, for a few weeks, and leave the command here to Commodore
Troubridge. Nothing but absolute necessity obliges me to write this
letter." "I could no more stay fourteen days longer here, than
fourteen years," he said in a private letter to Keith of the same
date.

By the next day he had recognized that even he could not leave at once
the task appointed him, without discredit. "My situation," he then
wrote to Hamilton, "is to me very irksome, but how at this moment to
get rid of it is a great difficulty. The French ships here ["Guillaume
Tell" and others] are preparing for sea; the Brest fleet, Lord Keith
says, may be daily expected, and with all this I am very unwell....
The first moment which offers with credit to myself I shall assuredly
give you my company.... Lord Keith is commander-in-chief, and I have
not been kindly treated." His tried friends, Troubridge and Ball,
realized the false step he was about to take, but they could not
change his purpose. "Remember, my Lord," wrote the former, "the
prospects are rather good at present of reducing this place, and that
William Tell, Diane,[1] and Justice,[5] are the only three ships left
from the Nile fleet. I beseech you hear the entreaties of a sincere
friend, and do not go to Sicily for the present. Cruizing may be
unpleasant. Leave the Foudroyant outside, and hoist your flag in the
Culloden, to carry on operations with the General. Everything shall be
done to make it comfortable and pleasing to you: a month will do all.
If you comply with my request, I shall be happy, as I shall then be
convinced I have not forfeited your friendship." "I dined with his
Lordship yesterday, who is apparently in good health," wrote Ball to
Lady Hamilton, "but he complains of indisposition and the necessity of
repose. I do not think a short stay here will hurt his health,
particularly as his ship is at anchor, and his mind not harassed.
Troubridge and I are extremely anxious that the French ships, and the
French garrison of La Valetta, shall surrender to him. I would not
urge it if I were not convinced that it will ultimately add both to
his honour and happiness."

The fear of his friends that he would lose honor, by not resisting
inclination, is evident--undisguised; but they could not prevail. On
the 4th of March he wrote to Lady Hamilton: "My health is in such a
state, and to say the truth, an uneasy mind at being taught my lesson
like a school boy, that my DETERMINATION is made to leave Malta on the
15th morning of this month, on the first moment after the wind comes
favourable; unless I am SURE that I shall get hold of the French
ships." Keith's directions had been full and explicit on details, and
this Nelson seems to have resented. Among the particular orders was
one that Palermo, being so distant from Malta, should be discontinued
as the rendezvous, and Syracuse substituted for it; Nelson was,
however, at liberty to use Messina or Augusta, both also on the west
coast of Sicily, if he preferred. It will be remembered that Nelson
himself, before he fell under the influence of Naples, had expressed
his intention to make Syracuse the base of his operations. Coming as
this change did, as one of the first acts of a new commander-in-chief,
coinciding with his own former judgment, it readily took the color of
an implied censure upon his prolonged stay at Palermo--an echo of the
increasing scandal that attended it.

On the 10th of March he left Malta for Palermo in the "Foudroyant,"
sending the ship back, however, to take her place in the blockade, and
hoisting his own flag on board a transport. His mind was now rapidly
turning towards a final retirement from the station, a decision which
was accelerated by the capture of the "Guillaume Tell." This
eighty-gun ship started on the night of March 29th to run out from La
Valetta, to relieve the famished garrison from feeding the twelve
hundred men she carried. Fortunately, the "Foudroyant" had resumed her
station off the island; and it was a singular illustration of the good
fortune of the "heaven-born" admiral, to repeat Ball's expression,
that she arrived barely in time, only a few hours before the event,
her absence from which might have resulted in the escape of the enemy,
and a just censure upon Nelson. The French ship was sighted first by a
frigate, the "Penelope," Captain Blackwood, which hung gallantly upon
her quarters, as Nelson in former days had dogged the "Ça Ira" with
the "Agamemnon," until the heavier ships could gather round the
quarry. The "Guillaume Tell," necessarily intent only on escape from
overpowering numbers, could not turn aside to crush the small
antagonist, which one of her broadsides might have swept out of
existence; yet even so, the frigate decided the issue, for she shot
away the main and mizzen topmasts of the French vessel, permitting the
remainder of the British to come up. No ship was ever more gallantly
fought than the "Guillaume Tell;" the scene would have been well
worthy even of Nelson's presence. More could not be said, but Nelson
was not there. She had shaken off the "Penelope" and the "Lion,"
sixty-four, when the "Foudroyant" drew up at six in the morning. "At
half-past six," says the latter's log, "shot away the [French] main
and mizen-masts: saw a man nail the French ensign to the stump of the
mizen-mast. Five minutes past eight, shot away the enemy's foremast.
Ten minutes past eight, all her masts being gone by the board, the
enemy struck his colours, and ceased firing." The last of the fleet in
Aboukir Bay had surrendered to Nelson's ship, but not to Nelson's
flag.

"I am sensible," he wrote from Palermo to Sir Edward Berry, the
captain of the "Foudroyant," "of your kindness in wishing my presence
at the finish of the Egyptian fleet, but I have no cause for sorrow.
The thing could not be better done, and I would not for all the world
rob you of one particle of your well-earned laurels." In the matter of
glory Nelson might well yield much to another, nor miss what he gave;
but there is a fitness in things, and it was not fitting that the
commander of the division should have been away from his post when
such an event was likely to happen. "My task is done, my health is
lost, and the orders of the great Earl St. Vincent are completely
fulfilled." "I have wrote to Lord Keith," he tells Spencer, "for
permission to return to England, when you will see a broken-hearted
man. My spirit cannot submit patiently." But by this time, if the
forbearance of the First Lord was not exhausted, his patience very
nearly was, and a letter had already been sent, which, while couched
in terms of delicate consideration, nevertheless betrayed the profound
disappointment that had succeeded to admiration for services so
eminent, and for a spirit once so indomitable: "To your letter of the
20th of March, all I shall say is, to express my extreme regret that
your health should be such as to oblige you to quit your station off
Malta, at a time when I should suppose there must be the finest
prospect of its reduction. I should be very sorry that you did not
accomplish that business in person, as the Guillaume Tell is your due,
and that ship ought not to strike to any other. If the enemy should
come into the Mediterranean, and whenever they do, it will be
suddenly, I should be much concerned to hear that you learnt of their
arrival in that sea, either on shore or in a transport at Palermo."

A nearer approach to censure was soon to follow. On the 9th of May,
apparently before Nelson's application for leave to return to England
had been received, the Admiralty sent orders to Keith, that if his
health rendered him incapable of doing his duty, he was to be
permitted to return home by sea when opportunity offered, or by land
if he preferred. Earl Spencer wrote him at the same time a private
letter, in which disapprobation was too thinly masked by carefully
chosen words to escape attention: "It is by no means my wish or
intention to call you away from service, but having observed that you
have been under the necessity of quitting your station off Malta, on
account of your health, which I am persuaded you could not have
thought of doing without such necessity, it appeared to me much more
advisable for you to come home at once, than to be obliged to remain
inactive at Palermo, while active service was going on in other parts
of the station. I should still much prefer your remaining to complete
the reduction of Malta, which I flatter myself cannot be very far
distant, and I still look with anxious expectation to the Guillaume
Tell striking to your flag. But if, unfortunately, these agreeable
events are to be prevented, by your having too much exhausted yourself
in the service to be equal to follow them up, I am quite clear, and I
believe I am joined in opinion by all your friends here, that you will
be more likely to recover your health and strength in England than in
an inactive situation at a Foreign Court, however pleasing the respect
and gratitude shown to you for your services may be, and no
testimonies of respect and gratitude from that Court to you can be, I
am convinced, too great for the very essential services you have
rendered it. I trust that you will take in good part what I have
taken the liberty to write to you as a friend."

Both these letters reached Nelson in June, at Leghorn, on his way
home. The underlying censure did not escape him,--"your two letters
gave me much pain," he replied,--but he showed no traces of
self-condemnation, or of regret for the past. Lord Minto, who was now
ambassador at Vienna, wrote thence in March of this year, before the
question of going home was decided: "I have letters from Nelson and
Lady Hamilton. It does not seem clear whether he will go home. I hope
he will not for his own sake, and he will at least, I hope, take Malta
first. He does not seem at all conscious of the sort of discredit he
has fallen into, or the cause of it, for he still writes, not wisely,
about Lady H. and all that. But it is hard to condemn and use ill a
hero, as he is in his own element, for being foolish about a woman who
has art enough to make fools of many wiser than an admiral." Many
years later, immediately after the parting which he did not then know
was the last, Minto said of him, "He is in many points a really great
man, in others a baby." Nelson himself, conscious of the diligence
which he had used in the administration of his wide command and its
varied interests, put out of court all other considerations of
propriety. "I trust you and all my friends will believe," he told
Spencer, "that mine cannot be an inactive life, although it may not
carry all the outward parade of _much ado about nothing_."

Had the Hamiltons remained in Palermo, Nelson would have been forced
to a choice between leaving her and the Mediterranean, or yielding a
submission to orders which to the last he never gave, when fairly out
of signal distance. But the Foreign Office had decided that Sir
William should not return after the leave for which he had applied;
and in the beginning of March it was known at Palermo that his
successor had been appointed. This Nelson also learned, at the latest,
when he came back there on the 16th. To one correspondent he wrote,
on the 28th, "Most probably my health will force me to retire in
April, for I am worn out with fatigue of body and mind," and his
application was sent in on the 6th of the latter month, after news of
the "Guillaume Tell's" capture. On the 22d Hamilton presented his
letters of recall, and on the 24th he and Lady Hamilton, with a party,
embarked on board the "Foudroyant" for a trip to Syracuse and Malta,
from which they all returned to Palermo on the first of June. Against
this renewed departure Troubridge again remonstrated, in words which
showed that he and others saw, in Nelson's determination to abandon
the field, the results of infatuation rather than of illness. "Your
friends, my Lord, absolutely, as far as they dare, insist on your
staying to sign the capitulation. Be on your guard." Keith also wrote
him in generous and unexceptionable terms: "I am very sorry, my dear
Nelson, for the contents of your letter, and I hope you will not be
obliged to go: strictly speaking, I ought to write to the Admiralty
before I let a flag-officer go off the station; particularly as I am
directed to send you, if you like it, to Egypt; but when a man's
health is concerned, there is an end of all, and I will send you the
first frigate I can lay hold of."

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The title of Bronté was assumed in Sicily only, until he received the
consent of George III. to accept it.

[2] The italics to this point are Nelson's; afterwards the author's.

[3] The Paget Papers, London, 1896, vol. i. p. 200.

[4] Nelsonian Reminiscences, by Lieutenant G.S. Parsons. The author has
been able to test Parsons' stories sufficiently to assure himself that they
cannot be quoted to establish historical fact; but such scenes as here
given, or how many glasses of wine Nelson drank at dinner, or that the
writer himself was out of clean shirts, when asked to dine at the admiral's
table, are trivialities which memory retains.

[5] Frigates.



CHAPTER XV.

NELSON LEAVES THE MEDITERRANEAN.--THE JOURNEY OVERLAND THROUGH
GERMANY.--ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND.--SEPARATION FROM LADY NELSON.--HOISTS
HIS FLAG IN THE CHANNEL FLEET, UNDER LORD ST. VINCENT.

JUNE, 1800--JANUARY, 1801. AGE, 42.


At the time Nelson and the Hamiltons returned to Palermo, the Queen of
Naples was wishing, for political reasons, to visit Vienna. To meet
this wish Nelson took the "Foudroyant" and "Alexander" off the
blockade of Malta, that they might carry herself and suite to Leghorn,
together with the Hamiltons. He clung also to the hope that Keith
would give him his powerful flagship to return to England, in which
case the Hamiltons would go with him. "I go with our dear friends Sir
William and Lady Hamilton," he wrote to Lord Minto; "but whether by
water or land depends on the will of Lord Keith. May all orders be as
punctually obeyed," alluding to the completion of the destruction of
the Nile fleet by the capture of the "Guillaume Tell," "but never
again an officer at the close of what I must, without being thought
vain (for such I am represented by enemies), call a glorious career,
be so treated!"

Keith's opinion of Nelson's obedience was probably somewhat different.
The latter had written him on the 12th of May, that, being under an
old promise to carry the Queen to the Continent, he proposed to take
the two ships-of-the-line for that purpose, and Keith sent him a
letter forbidding him to do so, and directing them to be sent back at
once to Malta. Nelson, it is true, did not receive this; but it is
impossible to reconcile with attention to orders the diversion of two
ships of their force from the singularly important station appointed
them by the commander-in-chief, without reference to him, and using
them to carry about foreign sovereigns. On arriving in Leghorn, on the
14th of June, Nelson announced the fact to Keith, with apparent
perfect unconsciousness that the latter could be other than charmed.
"I was obliged to bring the Alexander, or the party never could have
been accommodated: I therefore trust you will approve of it." "I was
so displeased by the withdrawing of the ships from before Malta,"
wrote Keith to Paget, "and with other proceedings, that her Majesty
did not take any notice of me latterly." It would seem also that some
harm had come of it. "What a clamour, too, letting in the ships to
Malta will occasion. I assure you nothing has given me more real
concern, it was so near exhausted." "Had not Nelson quitted the
blockade," he wrote a week later, "and taken the ships off the
station, it might have fallen about this time."[6]

Lord Keith had been engaged for six weeks past in the famous blockade
and siege of Genoa, the garrison of which, spent with famine and
disease, marched out on the 5th of June, 1800. On the 14th--the day
Nelson reached Leghorn--was fought the Battle of Marengo, in which the
Austrians were totally defeated, the French army under Bonaparte
remaining victorious across their line of retreat to Mantua. The next
day Mélas signed a convention, abandoning Northern Italy, as far as
the Mincio, to the French, to whom were given up all the fortified
places, Genoa included. At midnight of June 18, Nelson received an
order from Keith to take all the ships at Leghorn to Spezia, for
certain minor military purposes. Nelson sent the "Alexander" and a
frigate, but remained himself in Leghorn with the "Foudroyant," ready,
he wrote the admiral, "to receive the queen and royal family, should
such an event be necessary." Keith rejoined with a peremptory order
that no ships-of-the-line should be used for such purpose; the Queen,
he said, had better get to Vienna as fast as she could, and not think
of going back to Palermo. "If the French fleet gets the start of ours
a day, Sicily cannot hold out even that one day." "Lord Keith,"
commented Nelson, "believes reports of the Brest fleet, which I give
not the smallest credit to." "I own I do not believe the Brest fleet
will return to sea," he told Keith; "and if they do, the Lord have
mercy on them, for our fleet will not, I am sure." It was not the
least of his conspicuous merits that he was blind to imaginative or
exaggerated alarms. Keith saw too vividly all that might happen in
consequence of recent reverses--much more than could happen.

On the 24th of June the latter reached Leghorn in person. "I must go
to Leghorn," he complained, "to land the fugitives, and to be bored by
Lord Nelson for permission to take the Queen to Palermo, and princes
and princesses to all parts of the globe." The Queen was in a panic,
and besought him with tears to give her the "Foudroyant," but Keith
was obdurate. "Mr. Wyndham[7] arrived here yesterday from Florence,"
wrote Lady Minto on the 6th of July to her sister. "He left the Queen
of Naples, Sir William and Lady Hamilton, and Nelson, at Leghorn. The
Queen has given up all thoughts of coming here. She asked Lord Keith
in her own proper person for the Foudroyant to take her back. He
refused positively giving her such a ship. The Queen wept, concluding
that royal tears were irresistible; but he remained unmoved, and would
grant nothing but a frigate to convoy her own frigates[8] to Trieste.
He told her Lady Hamilton had had command of the fleet long enough.
The Queen is very ill with a sort of convulsive fit, and Nelson is
staying there to nurse her; he does not intend going home till he has
escorted her back to Palermo. His zeal for the public service seems
entirely lost in his love and vanity, and they all sit and flatter
each other all day long." It is only fair to say that there are
indications, in the correspondence, of bad terms between the Hamiltons
and Wyndham, who, therefore, was probably not a sympathetic observer.
He had also before this written unpleasantly to Nelson, insinuating,
apparently, a lack of attention to duty; for the latter in a letter to
Troubridge says, "I send you an extract of Mr. Wyndham's unhandsome
mode of expressing himself towards me." Towards Keith her Majesty
manifested her displeasure by omitting him in the public leave she
took of all the officials.

The Queen finally resolved to continue her journey, but the victories
of the French introduced into the political future an element of
uncertainty, which caused her to delay a month in Leghorn, undecided
whether to go by sea or land; and Nelson had vowed not to forsake her.
Keith, after some days, relented so far as to authorize the
"Alexander" taking the royal family to Trieste, but many of the party
were averse to the sea voyage. There had been for some time living
with the Hamiltons a Miss Knight, an English lady already in middle
life, whose journal gives the chief particulars that have been
preserved of this period. "The Queen," she wrote, "wishes, if
possible, to prosecute her journey. Lady Hamilton cannot bear the
thought of going by sea; and therefore nothing but impracticability
will prevent our going to Vienna." When it was at last fixed, after
many vacillations, that they should go to Ancona, and there take small
Austrian vessels for Trieste, she exclaims, "to avoid the danger of
being on board an English man-of-war, where everything is commodious,
and equally well arranged for defence and comfort! But the die is
cast, and go we must." She mentions that Lord Nelson was well, and
kept up his spirits amazingly, but Sir William appeared broken,
distressed, and harassed.

On the 11th the travellers started for Florence, passing within two
miles of the French advanced posts. At Ancona they embarked on board
some Russian frigates, and in them reached Trieste safely on the 2d of
August. Nelson was received with acclamations in all the towns of the
Pope's states. A party in which were not only the queen of a reigning
sovereign, but an English minister and his wife, was sure of receiving
attention wherever it passed or stopped; but in the present case it
was the naval officer who carried off the lion's share of homage, so
widely had his fame spread throughout the Continent. At Trieste, says
Miss Knight, "he is followed by thousands when he goes out, and for
the illumination which is to take place this evening, there are many
_Viva Nelsons_ prepared."

The same enthusiasm was shown at Vienna, where they arrived on the
21st or 22d of August. "You can have no notion of the anxiety and
curiosity to see him," wrote Lady Minto.[9] "The door of his house is
always crowded with people, and even the street when his carriage is
at the door; and when he went to the play he was applauded, a thing
which rarely happens here." "Whenever he appeared in public," records
Miss Knight, "a crowd was collected, and his portrait was hung up as a
sign over many shops--even the milliners giving his name to particular
dresses, but it did not appear to me that the English nation was at
all popular." At a dinner at Prince Esterhazy's, where he spent some
days, his health was drunk with a flourish of trumpets and firing of
cannon. "I don't think him altered in the least," continued Lady
Minto, who remembered him from the old days in Corsica. "He has the
same shock head and the same honest simple manners; but he is devoted
to _Emma_, he thinks her quite an _angel_, and talks of her as such to
her face and behind her back, and she leads him about like a keeper
with a bear. She must sit by him at dinner to cut his meat, and he
carries her pocket-handkerchief. He is a gig from ribands, orders and
stars, but he is just the same with us as ever he was;" and she
mentions his outspoken gratitude to Minto for the substantial service
he had done him, and the guidance he had imparted to his political
thought,--an acknowledgment he frequently renewed up to the last days
of his life.

Lady Minto's nephew, Lord Fitzharris, the son of the Earl of
Malmesbury, was then in Vienna, apparently as an attaché. He speaks in
the same way of Nelson himself, but with less forbearance for Lady
Hamilton; and he confirms the impression that Nelson at this time had
lost interest in the service. Writing to his father, he says: "Nelson
personally is not changed; open and honest, not the least vanity about
him. He looks very well, but seems to be in no hurry to sail again. He
told me he had no thoughts of serving again." "Lord Nelson and the
Hamiltons dined here the other day; it is really disgusting to see her
with him." A few days later there was a ball at Prince Esterhazy's,
where Fitzharris was present. "Lady Hamilton is without exception the
most coarse, ill-mannered, disagreeable woman I ever met with. The
Princess had with great kindness got a number of musicians, and the
famous Haydn, who is in their service, to play, knowing Lady Hamilton
was fond of music. Instead of attending to them she sat down to the
Faro table, played Nelson's cards for him, and won between £300 and
£400. In short, I could not disguise my feeling, and joined in the
general abuse of her."[10] The impression that Nelson would decline
further service had been conveyed to other friends. Troubridge, who
had meanwhile returned to England, wrote two months later to a young
lieutenant who wished to get on board the admiral's next ship: "Lord
Nelson is not yet arrived in England, and between ourselves I do not
think he will serve again."

Both Lady Minto and Fitzharris have recorded an account given them by
Nelson, of his motives for action at the Battle of the Nile. "He
speaks in the highest terms of all the captains he had with him off
the coast of Egypt," writes the former, "adding that without knowing
the men he had to trust to, he would not have hazarded the attack,
that there was little room, but he was sure each would find a hole to
creep in at." In place of this summary, her nephew gives words
evidently quite fresh from the speaker's lips. "He says, 'When I saw
them, I could not help popping my head every now and then out of the
window, (although I had a d----d toothache), and once as I was
observing their position I heard two seamen quartered at a gun near
me, talking, and one said to the other, 'D----n them, look at them,
there they are, Jack, if we don't beat them, they will beat us.' He
says, 'I knew what stuff I had under me, so I went into the attack
with only a few ships, perfectly sure the others would follow me,
although it was nearly dark and they might have had every excuse for
not doing it, yet they all in the course of two hours found a hole to
poke in at. If,' he added, 'I had taken a fleet of the same force from
Spithead, I would sooner have thought of flying than attacking the
French in their position, but I knew my captains, nor could I say
which distinguished himself most.'" Yet to Lady Minto he revealed the
spirit he was of. "I told him I wished he had the command of the
Emperor's army. He said, 'I'll tell you what. If I had, I would only
use one word--_advance_, and never say _retreat_.'"

After a month's stop at Vienna, during which Sir William Hamilton's
health continued to cause anxiety, the party started north for Prague,
Dresden, and Hamburg, following the course of the Elbe. On the 28th
of September, Prague was reached, and there Nelson was met by
arrangement by the Archduke Charles, the first in ability of the
Austrian generals, approved as no unworthy antagonist by Bonaparte
himself, but rarely employed, except in moments of emergency, because
of his pronounced opposition to the Court policy. The next day,
September 29th, was Nelson's birthday, and the Archduke gave a grand
entertainment in his honor. Continuing thence, the travellers on
October 2d reached Dresden, to which Court the British minister was
Hugh Elliot, the brother of Lord Minto. It was here that they came
under the eye of Mrs. St. George, a young Irish widow, who by a second
marriage, some years later, became Mrs. Trench, and the mother of the
late Archbishop of Dublin. Her description and comments have been
considered severe, and even prejudiced; but they do not differ
essentially from those of the Mintos and Fitzharris, except in saying
that on one occasion, after dinner, Nelson took too much champagne,
and showed the effects. Such a thing has happened on isolated
occasions to many a good man and true, and, however much to be
deplored, is not so impossible an occurrence, even in a man of
Nelson's well-established habitual abstemiousness, which indeed his
health necessitated, as to invalidate the testimony of an eye-witness.

Mrs. St. George's journal was not written for publication, and did not
see the light till thirty-odd years after her death. "October 3d.
Dined at Mr. Elliot's with only the Nelson party. It is plain that
Lord Nelson thinks of nothing but Lady Hamilton,[11] who is totally
occupied by the same object. Lord Nelson is a little man, without any
dignity; who, I suppose, must resemble what Suwarrow was in his youth,
as he is like all the pictures I have seen of that General. Lady
Hamilton takes possession of him, and he is a willing captive, the
most submissive and devoted I have ever seen. Sir William is old,
infirm, all admiration of his wife, and never spoke to-day but to
applaud her. Miss Cornelia Knight seems the decided flatterer of the
two, and never opens her mouth but to show forth their praise; and
Mrs. Cadogan, Lady Hamilton's mother, is--what one might expect. After
dinner we had several songs in honour of Lord Nelson, written by Miss
Knight, and sung by Lady Hamilton.[12] She puffs the incense full in
his face; but he receives it with pleasure, and snuffs it up very
cordially." Lord Minto, whose friendship for Nelson was of proof,
wrote eighteen months after this to his wife: "She goes on cramming
Nelson with trowelfuls of flattery, which he goes on taking as quietly
as a child does pap."[13]

"Lady Hamilton," wrote Mrs. St. George on succeeding days, "paid me
those kinds of compliments which prove she thinks mere exterior alone
of any consequence ... She loads me with all marks of friendship at
first sight, which I always think more extraordinary than love of the
same kind, pays me many compliments both when I am absent and present,
and said many fine things about my accompanying her at sight. Still
she does not gain upon me ... Mr. Elliot says, 'She will captivate the
Prince of Wales, whose mind is as vulgar as her own, and play a great
part in England,'"--a remark which showed shrewd judgment of
character, as Nelson afterwards found to his intense disturbance. At
Vienna the whole party had been presented at Court, but at Dresden the
Electress refused to receive Lady Hamilton, on account of her former
dissolute life. "She wished to go to Court," says Mrs. St. George, "on
which a pretext was made to avoid receiving company last Sunday, and I
understand there will be no Court while she stays." Nelson felt
resentment at this exclusion, though powerless, of course, to express
it; but he declined an invitation to a private house which had not
been extended to her. This incident naturally raised the question,
what prospect there was of the lady being accepted at the Court of her
own sovereign. "She talked to me a great deal of her doubts whether
the Queen would receive her, adding, 'I care little about it. I had
much rather she would settle half Sir William's pension on me,'"--a
remark which showed more philosophy than self-esteem.

A week's visit in Dresden ended by the party taking boats for Hamburg,
which they reached on the 21st of October, the journey being prolonged
by stopping every night. They there remained ten days, of which no
very noteworthy incidents have been recorded, although the general
interest of all classes of people in the renowned warrior, of whom
they had heard so much, continued to be manifested, sometimes in
quaint and touching expression. On the 31st of October they embarked
on board the mail-packet for England, and after a stormy passage
landed at Yarmouth on the 6th of November, 1800. Two years and eight
months had passed since Nelson sailed from Spithead, on a cruise
destined to have so marked an influence on his professional reputation
and private happiness. He was received on his landing with every
evidence of popular enthusiasm, and of official respect from all
authorities, civil and military. With the unvarying devout spirit
which characterized him in all the greater events of his life, he
asked that public service might be held, to enable him to give thanks
in church for his safe return to his native country, and for the many
blessings which he had experienced. The whole party then went on to
town, arriving on the 8th.

From those who welcomed Nelson when he first put his foot on shore
there was one conspicuously missing. Lady Nelson had not thought well
to go to Yarmouth to await her husband. Under ordinary conditions
there would have been little to challenge remark, in the decision not
to leave the feeble old man, her husband's father, who depended much
upon her, for the period of uncertain duration during which she might
have to wait at Yarmouth, in those days of sailing-vessels and head
winds. Coining as her husband did, hand in hand with the woman whose
name had been scandalously linked with his for nearly two years, the
absence easily took on the appearance of cold and reserved censure.
Unquestionably, if Lady Nelson wished above all things to win her
husband back, and cared more for that than for her own humiliation,
more or less, the best fighting chance would have been to meet him at
once, with a smile on her face and words of love on her lips.
Considering the flagrancy of the affair throughout Europe, and the
antecedents of Lady Hamilton, it may be permitted to doubt whether,
regarded as a struggle for possession, many women would have thought
the game worth the candle; although Lady Nelson did not then know that
her husband expected soon to be a father, by the woman whom he at once
brought to her apartments and presented to her.

In the scanty details that have been transmitted to us concerning Lady
Nelson, there is little to appeal to the imagination, or to impress
one strongly with her attractions; but candor to her surely compels
the admission that, to await her husband in their own home, to greet
him alone, without the observation even of beloved outsiders, was no
singular impulse in a tender and reserved woman. A seaside hotel and
the inevitable clamor of the multitude do not fit in well with the
emotions that would naturally stir her, and a very little tact, a very
little sympathy, would have induced Nelson to let the Hamiltons go
their way for one evening, while he went directly and alone to her and
his father. She had been sorely tried, and as far as is known had
restrained herself patiently in her letters. The latest one that is
now accessible is dated the 29th of March, 1800, seven months
therefore before they now met, and is lacking neither in dignity,
affection, nor pathos.

"I have this instant received a note from Admiral Young, who tells me
if I can send him a letter for you in an hour, he will send it,
therefore, I have only time to say I have at last had the pleasure of
receiving two letters from you, dated January 20th and 25th. I rejoice
exceedingly I did not follow the advice of the physician and our good
father to change the climate, and I hope my health will be established
by hot sea-bathing and the warmth of the summer.

"I can with safety put my hand on my heart and say it has been my
study to please and make you happy, and I still flatter myself we
shall meet before very long. I feel most sensibly all your kindnesses
to my dear son, and I hope he will add much to our comfort. Our good
father has been in good spirits ever since we heard from you; indeed,
my spirits were quite worn out, the time had been so long. I thank God
for the preservation of my dear husband, and your recent success off
Malta. The taking of the Généreux seems to give great spirits to all.
God bless you, my dear husband, and grant us a happy meeting, and
believe me," etc.[14]

From the difficulties attendant upon the mails in those days, this
letter would not be likely to reach Nelson till towards the end of
May, when he was on the point of leaving Palermo finally; and, having
regard to the uncertainties of his movements before quitting Leghorn,
it is not improbable that it was among the last, if not the very last,
he received before landing in England. If so, it represented fairly
the attitude of Lady Nelson, as far as known to him,--free from
reproach, affectionate, yet evidently saddened by a silence on his
part, which tended to corroborate the rumors rife, not only in society
but in the press. It is possible that, like many men, though it would
not be in the least characteristic of himself, he, during his journey
home, simply put aside all consideration of the evil day when the two
women would be in the same city, and trusted to the chapter of
accidents to settle the terms on which they might live; but, from his
actions, he seems to have entertained the idea that he could still
maintain in London, with the cheerful acquiescence of his wife, the
public relations towards Lady Hamilton which were tolerated by the
easy tone of Neapolitan society. Miss Knight relates that, while at
Leghorn, he said he hoped Lady Nelson and himself would be much with
Sir William and Lady Hamilton, that they all would dine together very
often, and that when the latter went to their musical parties, he and
Lady Nelson would go to bed. In accordance with this programme, he
took his two friends to dine with his wife and father, immediately
upon his arrival in town. Miss Knight went to another hotel with Lady
Hamilton's mother, and was that evening visited by Troubridge. He
advised her to go and stop with a friend; and, although no reason is
given, it is probable that he, who knew as much as any one of the
past, saw that the position of residence with the Hamiltons would be
socially untenable for a woman. Miss Knight accordingly went to live
with Mrs. Nepean, the wife of the Secretary to the Admiralty.

A few days later there was again a dinner at the house taken by the
Hamiltons in Grosvenor Square. The Nelsons were there, as was Miss
Knight. The next day several of the party attended the theatre, and
Lady Nelson, it is said, fainted in the box, overcome by feeling, many
thought, at her husband's marked attentions to Lady Hamilton. The
latter being in her way a character as well known as Nelson himself,
the affair necessarily became more than usually a matter of comment,
especially as the scene now provided for London gossipers was a
re-presentation of that so long enacted at Palermo, and notorious
throughout Europe; but it was received with little toleration. "Most
of my friends," wrote Miss Knight, "were urgent with me to drop the
acquaintance, but, circumstanced as I had been, I feared the charge of
ingratitude, though greatly embarrassed as to what to do, for things
became very unpleasant." Had it been a new development, it would have
presented little difficulty; but as she had quietly lived many months
in the minister's house under the same conditions, only in the more
congenial atmosphere of Palermo, it was not easy now to join in the
disapproval shown by much of London society.

Lady Hamilton, of course, could not have any social acceptance, but
even towards Nelson himself, in all his glory, a marked coldness was
shown in significant quarters. "The Lady of the Admiralty," wrote he
to his friend Davison, "never had any just cause for being cool to
me;" an allusion probably to Lady Spencer, the wife of the First Lord.
Coldness from her must have been the more marked, for after the Nile
she had written him a wildly enthusiastic letter, recognizing with
gratitude the distinction conferred upon her husband's administration
by the lustre of that battle. "Either as a public or private man," he
continued, "I wish nothing undone which I have done,"--a remark
entirely ambiguous and misleading as regards his actual relations to
Lady Hamilton. He told Collingwood, at this same time, that he had not
been well received by the King. "He gave me an account of his
reception at Court," his old comrade writes, "which was not very
flattering, after having been the adoration of that of Naples. His
Majesty merely asked him if he had recovered his health; and then,
without waiting for an answer, turned to General----, and talked to
him near half an hour in great good humour. It could not be about his
successes." This slight was not a revival of the old prejudice
entertained by the King before the war, which had been wholly removed
by the distinguished services Nelson had rendered afterwards. Eighteen
months before this Davison had written to him: "I waited upon the King
early last Sunday morning, and was _alone_ with him a full hour, when
much of the conversation was about you. It is impossible to express
how warmly he spoke of you, and asked me a thousand questions about
you ... I have been again at the Queen's house, and have given the
King a copy of your last letter to me, giving an account of your
health, which he read twice over, with great attention, and with
apparent emotion of concern. His Majesty speaks of you with the
tenderness of a father." Samuel Rogers has an incidental mention of
the effect produced upon Nelson by the treatment now experienced. "I
heard him once during dinner utter many bitter complaints (which Lady
Hamilton vainly attempted to check) of the way he had been treated at
Court that forenoon: the Queen had not condescended to take the
slightest notice of him. In truth, Nelson was hated at Court; they
were jealous of his fame."[15] People, however, are rarely jealous of
those who are not rivals.

The position which Nelson had proposed to himself to establish was of
course impossible. The world was no more disposed to worry about any
private immoralities of his than it did about those of other men, but
it was not prepared to have them brandished in its face, and it would
have none of Lady Hamilton,--nor would Lady Nelson. The general public
opinion at the time receives, probably, accurate expression from Sir
William Hotham, a man then in London society. "His vanity, excusable
as such a foible is in such a man, led him to unpardonable excesses,
and blinded him to the advantages of being respected in society....
His conduct to Lady Nelson was the very extreme of unjustifiable
weakness, for he should at least have attempted to conceal his
infirmities, without publicly wounding the feelings of a woman whose
own conduct he well knew was irreproachable."[16] On the other hand,
Nelson could not forget the kindnesses he had accepted from Lady
Hamilton, nor was he either able or willing to lessen an intimacy
which, unless diminished, left the scandal unabated. He was not able,
for a man of his temperament could not recede before opposition, or
slight a woman now compromised by his name; and he was not willing,
for he was madly in love. Being daily with her for seven months after
leaving Palermo, there occurs a break in their correspondence; but
when it was resumed in the latter part of January, 1801, every
particle of the reticence which a possible struggle with conscience
had imposed disappears. He has accepted the new situation, cast aside
all restraints, and his language at times falls little short of
frenzy, while belying the respect for her which he asserts continually
and aggressively, as though against his convictions.

The breach with Lady Nelson had in this short time become final. We
have not the means--happily--to trace through its successive stages a
rapid process of estrangement, of which Nelson said a few months
afterwards: "Sooner than live the unhappy life I did when last I came
to England, I would stay abroad forever." A highly colored account is
given in Harrison's Life of Nelson, emanating apparently from Lady
Hamilton, of the wretchedness the hero experienced from the temper of
his wife; while in the "Memoirs of Lady Hamilton," published shortly
after her death, another side of the case is brought forward, and Lady
Nelson appears as rebutting with quiet dignity the reproaches of her
husband for heartlessness, displayed in her unsympathetic attitude
towards her rival, when suffering from indisposition. Into these
recriminations it is needless to enter; those who wish can read for
themselves in the works mentioned. A marked symptom of growing
alienation was afforded by his leaving her on the 19th of December, in
company with the Hamiltons, to spend the Christmas holidays at
Fonthill, the seat of William Beckford.

During this visit occurred a curious incident, which shows that the
exultant delight unquestionably felt by Nelson in battle did not
indicate insensibility to danger, or to its customary effects upon
men, but resulted from the pleasurable predominance of other emotions,
which accepted danger and the startling tokens of its presence as the
accompaniments, that only enhanced the majesty of the part he was
called upon to play. Beckford tells the story as follows: "I offered
to show him what had been done by planting in the course of years.
Nelson mounted by my side in a phaeton, drawn by four well-trained
horses, which I drove. There was not the least danger, the horses
being perfectly under my command, long driven by myself. Singular to
say, we had not gone far before I observed a peculiar anxiety in his
countenance, and presently he said: 'This is too much for me, you must
set me down.' I assured him that the horses were continually driven by
me, and that they were perfectly under command. All would not do. He
would descend, and I walked the vehicle back again."[17] Nelson, of
course, never claimed for himself the blind ignorance of fear which
has been asserted of him; on the contrary, the son of his old friend
Locker tells us, "The bravest man (so we have heard Lord Nelson
himself declare) feels an anxiety '_circa præcordia_' as he enters the
battle; but he dreads disgrace yet more."[18] In battle, like a great
actor in a great drama, he knew himself the master of an invisible
concourse, whose homage he commanded, whose plaudits he craved, and
whom, by the sight of deeds raised above the common ground of earth,
he drew to sympathy with heroism and self-devotion. There, too, he
rejoiced in the noblest exercise of power, in the sensation of
energies and faculties roused to full exertion, contending with mighty
obstacles, and acting amid surroundings worthy of their grandeur; like
Masséna, of whom it was said that he only found his greatest self
when the balls flew thick about him, and things began to look their
worst.

After his return from Fonthill Lady Nelson and himself lived together
again for a time in their London lodgings, in Arlington Street, and
there, according to the story told forty-five years afterwards by Mr.
William Haslewood, Nelson's solicitor, the crisis of their troubles
was reached. "In the winter of 1800, 1801, I was breakfasting with
Lord and Lady Nelson, at their lodgings in Arlington Street, and a
cheerful conversation was passing on indifferent subjects, when Lord
Nelson spoke of something which had been done or said by 'dear Lady
Hamilton;' upon which Lady Nelson rose from her chair, and exclaimed,
with much vehemence, 'I am sick of hearing of dear Lady Hamilton, and
am resolved that you shall give up either her or me.' Lord Nelson,
with perfect calmness, said: 'Take care, Fanny, what you say. I love
you sincerely; but I cannot forget my obligations to Lady Hamilton, or
speak of her otherwise than with affection and admiration.' Without
one soothing word or gesture, but muttering something about her mind
being made up, Lady Nelson left the room, and shortly after drove from
the house. They never lived together afterwards." Though committed to
paper so many years later, the incident is just one of those that
sticks to the memory, and probably occurred substantially as told.
Lady Nelson's ultimatum will probably be differently regarded by
different persons; it shows that she was at least living human flesh
and blood. In later life, we are told by Hotham, who was in the habit
of frequently seeing her, up to her death, in 1831, "she continually
talked of him, and always attempted to palliate his conduct towards
her, was warm and enthusiastic in her praises of his public
achievements, and bowed down with dignified submission to the errors
of his domestic life."

The same testimony is borne by a lady, of whom Nicolas speaks as "the
personal and intimate friend both of Lord and Lady Nelson, and the
widow of one of his most distinguished followers," but whose name he
does not give.[19] "I am aware of your intention not to touch upon
this delicate subject: I only allude to it in order to assure you,
from my personal knowledge, in a long and intimate acquaintance, that
Lady Nelson's conduct was not only affectionate, wise, and prudent,
but admirable, throughout her married life, and that she had not a
single reproach to make herself. I say not this to cast unnecessary
blame upon _one_ whose memory I delight to honour, but only in justice
to that truly good and amiable woman.... If mildness, forbearance, and
indulgence to the weaknesses of human nature could have availed, her
fate would have been very different. No reproach ever passed her lips;
and when she parted from her Lord, on his hoisting his flag again, it
was without the most distant suspicion that he meant it to be final,
and that in this life they were never to meet again. I am desirous
that you should know the worth of her who has so often been
misrepresented, from the wish of many to cast the blame anywhere, but
on him who was so deservedly dear to the Nation."

The latter years of Lady Nelson's life were passed partly in Paris,
where she lived with her son and his family. Her eldest grandchild, a
girl, was eight or ten years old at the time of her death. She
remembers the great sweetness of her grandmother's temper, and tells
that she often saw her take from a casket a miniature of Nelson, look
at it affectionately, kiss it, and then replace it gently; after which
she would turn to her and say, "When you are older, little Fan, you
too may know what it is to have a broken heart." This trifling
incident, transpiring as it now does for the first time, after nearly
seventy years, from the intimate privacies of family life, bears its
mute evidence to the truth of the last two witnesses, that Lady Nelson
neither reproached her husband, nor was towards him unforgiving.[20]
Nelson's early friend, the Duke of Clarence, who had given her away at
the wedding, maintained his kindly relations with her to the end, and
continued his interest to her descendants after his accession to the
throne.

Thus abruptly and sadly ended an attachment which, if never ardent,
had for many years run undisturbed its tender course, and apparently
had satisfied Nelson's heart, until the wave of a great passion swept
him off his feet. "I remember," writes Miss Knight, "that, shortly
after the Battle of the Nile, when my mother said to him that no doubt
he considered the day of that victory as the happiest in his life, he
answered, 'No; the happiest was that on which I married Lady Nelson.'"
On the 13th of January, 1801, Nelson took formal and final leave of
her before hoisting his flag at Torbay. "I call God to witness," he
then said, "there is nothing in you, or your conduct, that I wish
otherwise." His alienation from her was shared by most of his family,
except his father, who said to him frankly, that gratitude required he
should spend part of his time with Lady Nelson. Two years before, he
had written of her: "During the whole war [since 1793] I have been
with Lady Nelson, a good woman, and attentive to an infirm old man,"
and they had continued to live together. The old man persuaded himself
that there was nothing criminal in relations, the result of which, as
regarded his son and daughter-in-law, he could not but deplore; but
his letters to Lady Hamilton go little beyond the civility that was
necessary to avoid giving offence to Nelson. Nelson's two married
sisters, Mrs. Bolton and Mrs. Matcham, evidently shared their father's
belief. They and their children maintained with Lady Hamilton a
friendly and even affectionate correspondence, long after Trafalgar,
and until the death of the parties put an end to it.

Immediately upon landing at Yarmouth, Nelson had written to the
Admiralty that his health was perfectly restored, and that he wished
to resume service immediately. He was soon designated to a command in
the Channel fleet, under Earl St. Vincent, who had been
commander-in-chief since the spring of 1800. The "San Josef," the
three-decker boarded by him at Cape St. Vincent, was named to receive
his flag, and on the 17th of January it was hoisted on board her, at
Plymouth,--blue at the fore, he having been promoted Vice-Admiral of
the Blue on New Year's Day. An arrangement, however, had already been
made, that, if the impending difficulties with Denmark threatened to
lead to hostilities, he should accompany the fleet sent to the Baltic,
as second to Sir Hyde Parker, selected for the chief command. While he
was officially reporting to St. Vincent, on the 16th, at Torbay,
preparatory to hoisting his flag, a letter from Parker informed him
that the armament was decided upon. This he showed at once to St.
Vincent, who acquiesced of course in the disappointment, but expressed
a hope that after a brief absence he would rejoin him.

By the first of February the "San Josef" had gone round to Torbay, the
rendezvous of the Channel fleet under St. Vincent's command, and there
it was that Nelson received the news of the birth, on the 29th or 30th
of January, of the child Horatia, whose parentage for a long time gave
rise to much discussion, and is even yet considered by some a matter
of doubt. Fortunately, that question requires no investigation here;
as regards the Life of Nelson, and his character as involved in this
matter, the fact is beyond dispute that he believed himself the
father, and Lady Hamilton the mother, of the girl, whose origin he
sought to conceal by an elaborate though clumsy system of
mystification. This might possibly have left the subject covered with
clouds, though not greatly in doubt, had not Lady Hamilton, after
wildly unnecessary lying on her own part, recklessly preserved her
holdings of a correspondence which Nelson scrupulously destroyed, and
enjoined her to destroy.

The sedulous care on his side to conceal the nature of their
relations, and the reckless disregard of his wishes shown by her, is
singularly illustrated by the method he took to bring the child into
her charge, from that of the nurse to whom it had been intrusted. When
it was somewhat over three years old, on the 13th of August, 1804, he
wrote Lady Hamilton a letter, evidently to be used, where necessary,
to account for its presence under his roof. "I am now going to state a
thing to you and to request your kind assistance, which, from my dear
Emma's goodness of heart, I am sure of her acquiescence in. Before we
left Italy I told you of the extraordinary circumstance of a child
being left to my care and protection. On your first coming to England
I presented you the child, dear Horatia. You became, to my comfort,
attached to it, so did Sir William, thinking her the finest child he
had ever seen. She is become of that age when it is necessary to
remove her from a mere nurse and to think of educating her.... I shall
tell you, my dear Emma, more of this matter when I come to England,
but I am now anxious for the child's being placed under your
protecting wing." With this letter (or, possibly, with another written
the same day) was found an enclosure, undated and unsigned, but in
Nelson's handwriting. "My beloved, how I feel for your situation and
that of our dear Horatia, our dear child...."[21]

The indifference to incidental consequences which was shown by Nelson,
when once he had decided upon a course of action, was part of his
natural, as well as of his more distinctively military character; but
in this connection with Lady Hamilton he must have felt intuitively
that not only her reputation--which probably was his first care--was
involved, but his own also. The hospitality, the attention, the
friendship, extended to him at Naples and Palermo, were not from Lady
Hamilton only but from her husband also, in whose house he lived, and
who to the end, so far as the records show, professed for him
unbounded esteem and confidence. This confidence had been betrayed,
and the strongest line of argument formerly advanced, by those who
disputed Lady Hamilton's being the mother of the child, has become now
Nelson's severest condemnation.

"However great was Nelson's infatuation," says Sir Harris Nicolas,
"his nice sense of honour, his feelings of propriety, and his love of
truth, were unquestionable. Hence, though during a long separation
from his wife on the public service in the Mediterranean, he so far
yielded to temptation as to become the father of a child, it is
nevertheless difficult to believe that he should for years have had a
criminal intercourse with the wife of a man of his own rank, whom he
considered as his dearest friend, who placed the greatest confidence
in his honour and virtue, and in whose house he was living. Still more
difficult is it to believe, even if this had been the case, that he
should not only have permitted every one of his relations, male and
female,--his wife, his father, his brothers, his brothers-in-law, his
two sisters, and all their daughters,--to visit and correspond with
her, but even have allowed three of his nieces to live for a
considerable time with her; have ostentatiously and frequently written
and spoken of her 'virtuous and religious' character,--holding her up
as an example to his family; have appointed her the sole guardian of
his child; have avowedly intended to make her his wife; have acted
upon every occasion as if the purity of their intimacy was altogether
free from suspicion; and in the last written act of his life have
solemnly called upon his country to reward and support her. An
honourable and conscientious man rarely acts thus towards his
mistress.... Moreover, Nelson's most intimate friends, including the
Earl of St. Vincent, who called them 'a pair of sentimental fools,'
Dr. Scott, his Chaplain, and Mr. Haslewood, were of the same
opinion; and Southey says, 'there is no reason to believe that this
most unfortunate attachment was criminal.'"

This complicated and difficult path of deception had to be trod,
because the offence was not one of common error, readily pardoned if
discovered, but because the man betrayed, whatever his faults
otherwise, had shown both the culprits unbounded confidence and
kindness, and upon the woman, at least, had been led by his love to
confer a benefit which neither should have forgotten.

FOOTNOTES:

[6] The Paget Papers, vol. i. pp. 253, 257.

[7] British minister to Tuscany.

[8] There were some Neapolitan frigates in Leghorn, but the royal family
were never willing to trust them.

[9] Life of Lord Minto, vol. iii. pp. 147-150.

[10] Malmesbury's Memoirs, vol, ii. p. 24.

[11] Mrs. St. George's description of Lady Hamilton has already been given,
_ante_, vol. i. p. 380.

[12] Miss Knight mentions the same ceremony occurring in Vienna.

[13] Life of Lord Minto, vol. iii. pp. 242-243.

[14] This letter, with another, appears in the Alfred Morrison "Collection
of Autograph Letters" (Nos. 472, 473). It is purposely given entire, except
immaterial postscripts.

[15] Table-Talk of Samuel Rogers.

[16] The author is indebted to Prof. J. Knox Laughton for some extracts
from Hotham's diary.

[17] Beckford's Memoirs, London, 1859, vol. ii. p. 127.

[18] Locker's Greenwich Gallery, article "Torrington."

[19] Nicolas, vol. ii. p. 353. The present writer believes this lady to
have been Lady Berry, wife of Nelson's flag-captain, who gave Nicolas much
of his information.

[20] The author is indebted for this anecdote to Mrs. F.H.B. Eccles, of
Sherwell House, Plymouth, the daughter of the "little Fan" who told it.

[21] Morrison. The Hamilton and Nelson Papers, Nos. 777, 778, 779.



CHAPTER XVI.

THE EXPEDITION TO THE BALTIC AND BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN.--NELSON RETURNS
TO ENGLAND.

FEBRUARY--JUNE, 1801. AGE, 42.


The trouble between Great Britain and Denmark, which now called Nelson
again to the front, leading to the most difficult of his undertakings,
and, consequently, to the most distinguished of his achievements,
arose about the maritime rights of neutrals and belligerents. The
contention was not new. In 1780 the Baltic States, Russia, Sweden, and
Denmark, being neutrals in the war then raging, had combined to
assert, by arms, if necessary, certain claims advanced by them to
immunity from practices which international law had hitherto
sanctioned, or concerning which it had spoken ambiguously. These
claims Great Britain had rejected, as contrary to her rights and
interests; but, being then greatly outnumbered, she temporized until
the end of the war, which left her in possession of the principles at
stake, although she had forborne to enforce them offensively. The
coalition of the Baltic States, at that time, received the name of the
Armed Neutrality.

From 1793 to 1800 Sweden and Denmark had again succeeded in
maintaining their neutrality, and, as most other maritime states were
at war, their freedom of navigation had thrown into their hands a
large carrying trade. But, while their profit was thus great, it would
be much greater, if their ships could be saved the interruptions to
their voyages arising from the right of belligerents to stop, to
search, and, if necessary, to send into port, a vessel on board which
were found enemy's goods, or articles considered "contraband of war."
The uncertainty hanging round the definitions of the latter phrase
greatly increased the annoyance to neutrals; and serious disputes
existed on certain points, as, for example, whether materials for
shipbuilding, going to an enemy's port, were liable to capture. Great
Britain maintained that they were, the neutrals that they were not;
and, as the Baltic was one of the chief regions from which such
supplies came, a principal line of trade for the Northern States was
much curtailed.

Sweden and Denmark were too weak to support their contention against
the sea-power of Great Britain. Where there is lack of force, there
will always be found the tendency to resort to evasion to accomplish
an end; and Denmark, in 1799, endeavored to secure for her merchant
ships immunity from search by belligerent cruisers--which
International Law has always conceded, and still concedes, to be
within the rights of a belligerent--by sending them on their voyages
in large convoys, protected by ships of war. It was claimed that the
statement of the senior naval officer, that there were not in the
convoy any articles subject to capture, was sufficient; and that the
belligerent would in that case have no right to search. Great Britain
replied that the right of search rested upon longstanding common
consent, and precedent, and that it could not be taken from her
against her will by any process instituted by another state. The
Danish ships of war being instructed to use force against search, two
hostile collisions followed, in one of which several men were killed
and wounded, and the Danish frigate was taken into a British
port--though afterwards released.

The latter of these conflicts occurred in July, 1800. Great Britain
then sent an ambassador to Denmark, backing him with a fleet of nine
ships-of-the-line, with bomb-vessels; and at the end of August a
convention was signed, by which the general subject was referred to
future discussion, but Denmark agreed for the time to discontinue her
convoys. The importance of the subject to Great Britain was twofold.
First, by having the right to seize enemy's property in neutral ships,
she suppressed a great part of the commerce which France could carry
on, thus crippling her financially; and, second, by capturing articles
of shipbuilding as contraband of war, she kept from the French
materials essential to the maintenance of their navy, which their own
country did not produce. British statesmen of all parties maintained
that in these contentions there was at stake, not an empty and
offensive privilege, but a right vital to self-defence, to the
effective maintenance of which the power to search was fundamentally
necessary.

In 1800 the Czar Paul I. had become bitterly hostile to Austria and
Great Britain. This feeling had its origin in the disasters of the
campaign of 1799, and was brought to a climax by the refusal of Great
Britain to yield Malta to him, as Grand Master of the Order, after its
capture from the French in September, 1800. It had been the full
purpose of the British ministry to surrender it, and Nelson, much to
his distaste, had received specific orders to that effect; but,
besides the fact that the Russians had contributed nothing directly to
the reduction of the island, the attitude of the Czar had become so
doubtful, that common prudence forbade putting into the hands of a
probable future enemy the prize so hardly won from a present foe. Paul
had already announced his intention of reviving the Armed Neutrality
of 1780; and when, in November, he learned the fall of Malta, he
seized three hundred British vessels lying in Russian ports, marched
their crews into the interior, and at the same time placed seals on
all British warehoused property,--a measure intended to support his
demand for the restitution of the island to him.

On the 16th of December a treaty was signed at St. Petersburg by
Russia and Sweden, to which Denmark and Prussia promptly adhered,
renewing the Armed Neutrality, for the support of their various
claims. The consenting states bound themselves to maintain their
demands by force, if necessary; but no declaration of war was issued.
Great Britain, in accepting the challenge, equally abstained from acts
which would constitute a state of war; but she armed at once to
shatter the coalition, before it attained coherence in aught but
words. From first to last, until the Armed Neutrality again dissolved,
though there was hard fighting, there was not formal war.

The relation of these occurrences to the life of Nelson will not be
fully understood, unless the general state of Europe be recalled, and
the master hand of Bonaparte be recognized, underlying and controlling
previous changes and present conditions. After the Battle of the Nile,
and up to a year before this, Austria, Russia, and Great Britain had
been united in arms against France; and, in addition to the undisputed
control of the sea by the British Navy, they were pressing in
overpowering numbers upon her eastern frontiers, from the North Sea to
the Mediterranean. Blunders of their own had arrested the full tide of
success, and the return of Bonaparte from Egypt reversed the current.
Russia withdrew in anger, and Austria, beaten upon field after field,
in Italy and Germany, by Bonaparte and Moreau, had finally consented
to peace after the disastrous defeat of Hohenlinden, on the 3d of
December, 1800. Great Britain was left without an ally; and Russia was
added to the list of her active enemies by the skilful political
manipulation of Bonaparte, who played upon the impulses and weaknesses
of the half-mad Czar, releasing with distinguished marks of respect
all Russian prisoners, and offering the vain gift of Malta, the French
garrison of which was even then clutched by the throat in the iron
grip of the British sea-power.

The renewal of the Armed Neutrality was thus, primarily, the work of
Bonaparte. He alone had the keenness to see all the possibilities in
favor of France that were to be found in the immense combination, and
he alone possessed the skill and the power to touch the various
chords, whose concert was necessary to its harmonious action. Although
it was true, as Nelson said, that Paul was the trunk of the
many-limbed tree, it was yet more true that Bonaparte's deft cajoling
of the Czar, and the inducements astutely suggested by him to Prussia,
were the vitalizing forces which animated the two principal parties in
the coalition, in whose wake the weaker states were dragged. Through
the former he hoped to effect a combination of the Baltic navies
against the British; through the latter he looked to exclude Great
Britain from her important commerce with the Continent, which was
carried on mainly by the ports of Prussia, or by those of North
Germany, which she could control. Thus, by the concerted and
simultaneous action of direct weight of arms on the one hand, and of
commercial embarrassment on the other, Bonaparte hoped to overbear the
power of his chief enemy; and here, as on other occasions, both before
and after, Nelson was at once the quickening spirit of the enterprise,
and the direct agent of the blow, which brought down his plans, in
ruins, about his ears.

Relaxing none of her efforts in other quarters of the world, Great
Britain drew together, to confront the new danger, everything in the
home waters that could float, till she had gathered a fleet of twenty
sail-of-the-line, with smaller cruisers in due proportion. "Under the
present impending storm from the north of Europe," wrote St. Vincent,
from his perch above the waters of Torbay, "to enable us to meet such
a host of foes, no ship under my command must have anything done to
her at Plymouth or Portsmouth that can be done at this anchorage." "We
are now arrived at that period," wrote Nelson, "what we have often
heard of, but must now execute--that of fighting for our dear Country;
and I trust that, although we may not be able to subdue our host of
enemies, yet we may make them ashamed of themselves, and prove that
they cannot injure us." "I have only to say," he wrote to Earl
Spencer, who must have rejoiced to see the old spirit flaming again in
undiminished vigor, "what you, my dear Lord, are fully satisfied of,
that the service of my King and Country is the object nearest my
heart; and that a first-rate, or sloop of war, is a matter of perfect
indifference to your most faithful and obliged Nelson."

The "San Josef" being considered too heavy a ship for the Baltic
service, Nelson's flag was shifted on the 12th of February to the "St.
George," a three-decker of lighter draft. Hardy accompanied him as
captain, and on the 17th Nelson received orders to place himself under
the command of Sir Hyde Parker. A few days afterwards, the "St.
George" went to Spithead, where she received on board six hundred
troops, under the command of Colonel William Stewart, to whom we owe
the fullest and most interesting account of the expedition in general,
and of the Battle of Copenhagen in particular, that has been
transmitted by an eye-witness. The ship sailed again on the 2d of
March for Yarmouth, where she arrived on the 6th. The next day Nelson
went to call on the commander-in-chief, who was living on shore, his
flag flying on board a vessel in the roads. "I remember," says Colonel
Stewart, "that Lord Nelson regretted Sir Hyde being on shore. We
breakfasted that morning as usual, soon after six o'clock, for we were
always up before daylight. We went on shore, so as to be at Sir Hyde's
door at eight o'clock, Lord Nelson choosing to be amusingly exact to
that hour, which he considered as a very late one for business."

At this, his first official visit, the commander-in-chief, it is
said, scarcely noticed him, and Nelson, as will be seen, complained
freely of the treatment he at the beginning received. Parker was now
verging on old age, but he had recently married a young wife, who was
in Yarmouth with him, and the two had arranged to give a great ball on
the 13th of March; altogether a bad combination for a military
undertaking. Nelson, who was in haste to get away,--chiefly because of
his sound martial instinct that this was peculiarly a case for
celerity, but partly, also, because of anxiety to get the thing over
and done, and to return to his home comforts,--appears to have
represented matters unofficially to the Admiralty, a step for which
his personal intimacy with St. Vincent and Troubridge afforded easy
opportunity; and an express quickly arrived, ordering the fleet to sea
at once.[22] "The signal is made to prepare to unmoor at twelve
o'clock," wrote Nelson to Troubridge on the 11th. "Now we can have no
desire for staying, for her ladyship is gone, and the _Ball_ for
Friday knocked up by yours and the Earl's unpoliteness, to send
gentlemen to sea instead of dancing with white gloves. I will only
say," he continues, "as yet I know not that we are even going to the
Baltic, except from the newspapers, and at sea I cannot go out of my
ship but with serious inconvenience,"--owing to the loss of his arm.
What was not told him before starting, therefore, could not be told by
mouth till after arrival.

It will be remembered that Sir Hyde Parker had succeeded Hotham in the
chief command of the Mediterranean, for a brief but critical month in
1795,[23] and that Nelson had then complained of his action as regards
the general conduct of the campaign, and specifically for having
reduced to the point of inefficiency the small squadron under Nelson's
own direction, upon which the most important issues hinged. Possibly
Parker had heard this, possibly the notorious disregard of Keith's
orders a few months before influenced him to keep his renowned, but
independent, subordinate at a distance in official matters. It was not
well advised; though probably the great blunderers were the Admiralty,
in sending as second a man who had shown himself so exceptionally and
uniquely capable of supreme command, and so apt to make trouble for
mediocre superiors. If Lord St. Vincent's surmise was correct, Parker,
who was a very respectable officer, had been chosen for his present
place because in possession of all the information acquired during the
last preparation for a Russian war; while Nelson fancied that St.
Vincent himself, as commander of the Channel fleet, had recommended
him, in order to get rid of a second in command who did not carry out
satisfactorily the methods of his superior. If that were so, the
mistake recoiled upon his own head; for, while the appointment was
made by Earl Spencer, St. Vincent succeeded him as First Lord before
the expedition sailed, and the old seaman would much have preferred to
see Nelson at the helm. He was quite sure of the latter, he said, and
should have been in no apprehension if he had been of rank to take the
chief command; but he could not feel so sure about Sir Hyde, as he had
never been tried. Whatever the truth, Lady Malmesbury's comment after
the event was indisputable: "I feel very sorry for Sir Hyde; but no
wise man would ever have gone with Nelson, or over him, as he was sure
to be in the background in every case."

"I declare solemnly," wrote Nelson to Davison four days after
reporting, "that I do not know"--officially, of course--"that I am
going to the Baltic, and much worse than that I could tell you. Sir
Hyde is on board sulky. Stewart tells me, his treatment of me is now
noticed. Dickson came on board to-day to say all were scandalized at
his gross neglect. Burn this letter: then it can never appear, and you
can speak as if your knowledge came from another quarter." That day
the orders came from the Admiralty to go to sea; and the next, March
12, the ships then present sailed,--fifteen ships-of-the-line and two
fifties, besides frigates, sloops of war, brigs, cutters, fireships,
and seven bomb-vessels,--for, if the Danes were obstinate, Copenhagen
was to be bombarded. On the 16th of March Nelson wrote both to Davison
and Lady Hamilton that he as yet knew nothing, except by common
report. "Sir Hyde has not told me officially a thing. I am sorry
enough to be sent on such an expedition, but nothing can, I trust,
degrade, do what they will." His mind was in a condition to see the
worst motives in what befell him. "I know, I see, that I am not to be
supported in the way I ought, but the St. George is beginning to
prepare this day for battle, and she shall be true to herself....
Captain Murray sees, as do every one, what is meant to disgrace me,
but that is impossible. Even the Captain of the Fleet [Parker's Chief
of Staff] sent me word that it was not his doing, for that Sir Hyde
Parker had run his pen through all that could do me credit, or give me
support; but never mind, Nelson will be first if he lives, and you
shall partake of all his glory. So it shall be my study to distinguish
myself, that your heart shall leap for joy when my name is
mentioned."[24]

Enough reached his ears to draw forth unqualified expressions of
dissent from the plans proposed, and equally clear statements as to
what should be done,--all stamped unmistakably with the "Nelson
touch," to use an apt phrase of his own. "Reports say," he tells Lady
Hamilton, "we are to anchor before we get to Cronenburg Castle, that
our minister at Copenhagen may negotiate. What nonsense! How much
better could we negotiate was our fleet off Copenhagen, and the Danish
minister would seriously reflect how he brought the fire of England on
his Master's fleet and capital; but to keep us out of sight is to
seduce Denmark into a war.... If they are the plans of Ministers, they
are weak in the extreme, and very different to what I understood from
Mr. Pitt.[25] If they originate with Sir Hyde, it makes him, in my
mind, as--but never mind, your Nelson's plans are bold and
decisive--all on the great scale. I hate your pen and ink men; a fleet
of British ships of war are the best negotiators in Europe." While the
greatness and decision of his character remain unimpaired, perhaps
even heightened, it will be noticed that self-reliance, never in any
man more justified, has tended to degenerate into boastfulness, and
restlessness under displeasing orders to become suspicion of the
motives prompting them. "They all hate me and treat me ill," he says,
speaking of Spencer's and St. Vincent's administrations. "I cannot, my
dear friend, recall to mind any one real act of kindness, but all of
unkindness." It must, of course, be remembered that, while such
expressions portray faithfully the working of the inner spirit, and
serve, by contrast, to measure the Nelson of 1801 against the Nelson
of 1796, they were addressed to the most intimate of friends, and do
not necessarily imply a corresponding bearing before the eyes of the
world.

An amusing story is told of a shrewd stratagem resorted to by Nelson,
on the passage to the Baltic, to thaw the barrier of frigidity in his
superior, which not only was unpleasant to him personally, as well as
injurious to the interests of the state, but threatened also to
prevent his due share in the planning and execution of the enterprise
in hand, thus diminishing the glory he ever coveted. The narrator,
Lieutenant Layman, was serving on board the "St. George," and happened
to mention, in Nelson's presence, that some years before he had seen
caught a very fine turbot on the Dogger Bank, over which the fleet
must pass on its way.

"This being a mere casual remark, nothing more would have been
thought of it, had not Nelson, after showing great anxiety in his
inquiries when they should be on the Dogger Bank, significantly said
to Mr. Layman, 'Do you think we could catch a turbot?' After a try or
two, a small turbot was caught. Lord Nelson appeared delighted, and
called out, 'Send it to Sir Hyde.' Something being said about the risk
of sending a boat, from the great sea, lowering weather, and its being
dark, his Lordship said with much meaning, 'I know the Chief is fond
of good living, and he shall have the turbot.' That his Lordship was
right appeared by the result, as the boat returned with a note of
compliment and thanks from Parker. The turbot having opened a
communication, the effect was wonderful. At Merton Mr. Layman told
Lord Nelson that a man eminent in the naval profession had said to
him, 'Do tell me how Parker came to take the laurel from his own brow,
and place it on Nelson's?' 'What did you say?' asked Nelson. 'That it
was not a gift,' replied Layman, 'as your Lordship had gained the
victory by a turbot.' 'A turbot!' 'Yes, my lord, I well recollect your
great desire to catch a turbot, and your astonishing many, by
insisting upon its being immediately sent to Sir Hyde, who
condescended to return a civil note; without which opening your
Lordship would not have been consulted in the Cattegat, and without
such intercourse your Lordship would not have got the detached
squadron; without which there would not have been any engagement, and
consequently no victory.' Lord Nelson smilingly said, 'You are
right.'"[26]

On the 19th of March the fleet was collected off the northern point of
Denmark, known as the Skaw. From there the broad channel, called the
Kattegat, extends southward, between Sweden and the northern part of
the Danish peninsula, until it reaches the large Island of Zealand,
upon the eastern shore of which Copenhagen lies. The two principal
entrances into the Baltic are on either side of Zealand. The eastern
one, separating it from Sweden, is called the Sound, that to the west
is known as the Great Belt; each, from the military point of view,
possessed its particular advantages and particular drawbacks. "We are
slow in our motions as ever," wrote Nelson, whose impatient and
decided character would have used the fair wind that was blowing to
enter the Kattegat, and to proceed at once to Copenhagen, "but I hope
all for the best. I have not yet seen Sir Hyde, but I purpose going
this morning; for no attention shall be wanting on my part." The next
day he reports the result of the interview to his friend Davison: "I
staid an hour, and ground out something, but there was not that degree
of openness which I should have shown to my second in command." The
fleet advanced deliberately, a frigate being sent ahead to land the
British envoy, Mr. Vansittart, whose instructions were that only
forty-eight hours were to be allowed the Danes to accept the demands
of Great Britain, and to withdraw from the coalition. The slowness
here, like every other delay, chafed Nelson, whose wish from the
beginning was to proceed at the utmost speed, not merely from the
Skaw, but from England, with whatever ships could be collected; for he
reasoned perfectly accurately upon the safe general principle that
delay favors the defence more than the offence. "I only now long to be
gone," he wrote before leaving Yarmouth; "time is precious, and every
hour makes more resistance; strike quick, and home." It was
particularly true in this case, for Denmark, long used to peace, had
not thought war possible, and every day was precious to her in
restoring and increasing the neglected protection of Copenhagen.

On the evening of March 20 the fleet anchored in the Kattegat,
eighteen miles from Cronenburg Castle and the town of Elsinore, at
which the Sound narrows to three miles. Both shores being hostile,
Parker would not attempt to force the passage until he learned the
result of the British mission to Copenhagen; meanwhile the Danes were
working busily at the blockships and batteries of the city. On the 23d
Mr. Vansittart returned with the terms rejected; and he brought, also,
alarming reports of the state of the batteries at Elsinore and
Copenhagen, which were much stronger than the previous information of
the British Cabinet had shown, proving, as Nelson urged, that each
day's delay increased the enemy's relative power. Sir Hyde called a
council. "Now we are sure of fighting," wrote Nelson to Lady Hamilton.
"I am sent for. When it was a joke I was kept in the background;
to-morrow will I hope be a proud day for England--to have it so, no
exertion shall be wanting from your most attached and affectionate
friend."

He was accompanied to Parker's flagship by Lieutenant Layman, who went
in the boat to steer for him. "On board the London," according to
Layman, "the heads appeared very gloomy. Mr. Vansittart, who arrived
at the same moment Nelson did, said that if the fleet proceeded to
attack, it would be beaten, and the attempt was in danger of being
relinquished. The Captain of the Fleet said to Layman that the Danes
were too strong to attack, and a torpor verging to despondency
prevailed in the councils. While others were dismayed, however, Lord
Nelson questioned those just arrived from Copenhagen not only as to
the force, but as to the position of the enemy. Such interrogatories
he called 'bringing people to the post.' Having learned that the great
strength of the enemy was at the head of the line, supported by the
Crown Battery, his Lordship emphatically observed that to begin the
attack there would be like taking a bull by the horns, and he
therefore suggested the attempt by the tail."[27] In order to avoid
the formidable works at Cronenburg, and yet come up in rear of
Copenhagen, according to this proposition of Nelson's, it was proposed
in the council to go by the Great Belt. That passage is more
intricate, and therefore, from the pilot's point of view, more
hazardous than the Sound. Nelson was not much deterred by the alarming
reports. "Go by the Sound, or by the Belt, or anyhow," he said, "only
lose not an hour."

The minutes of the council have not been transmitted, but it is
evident from Nelson's own letter of the following day, soon to be
quoted in full, and also from one written to him by Mr. Vansittart,
after the latter reached London, that he urged upon Parker, and
prevailed with him, to throw aside the instructions of the Government,
under the changed conditions, and to adopt boldly the plan which,
according to his present knowledge, should seem most certain to crush
Denmark at once. After that, he would shatter the coalition by
immediate steps against Russia. Only such a bold spirit, with the
prestige of a Nelson, can dominate a council of war, or extort
decisive action from a commander-in-chief who calls one. "The
difficulty," wrote Nelson some time afterwards, "was to get our
commander-in-chief to either go past Cronenburg or through the Belt
[that is, by any passage], because, what Sir Hyde thought best, and
what I believe was settled before I came on board the London, was to
stay in the Cattegat, and there wait the time when the whole naval
force of the Baltic might choose to come out and fight--a measure, in
my opinion, disgraceful to our Country. I wanted to get at an enemy as
soon as possible to strike a _home_ stroke, and Paul was the enemy
most vulnerable, and of the greatest consequence for us to humble." So
pressing, daring, and outspoken were his counsels, so freely did he
now, as at former times, advocate setting aside the orders of distant
superiors, that he thought advisable to ask Vansittart, who was to
sail immediately for England, to explain to the Admiralty all the
conditions and reasons, which Vansittart did. St. Vincent, as First
Lord, gave unhesitating approval to what his former lieutenant had
advised.

Nelson's understanding of the situation was, in truth, acute,
profound, and decisive. In the northern combination against Great
Britain, Paul was the trunk, Denmark and Sweden the branches. Could he
get at the trunk and hew it down, the branches fell with it; but
should time and strength first be spent lopping off the branches, the
trunk would remain, and "my power must be weaker when its greatest
strength is required." As things then were, the Russian Navy was
divided, part being in Cronstadt, and a large fraction, twelve
ships-of-the-line, in Revel, an advanced and exposed port, where it
was detained fettered by the winter's ice. Get at that and smite it,
and the Russian Navy is disabled; all falls together. This would be
his own course, if independent. As Parker, however, was obstinately
resolved not to leave Denmark hostile in his rear, Nelson had to bend
to the will of his superior. He did so, without forsaking his own
purpose. As in the diverse objects of his care in the Mediterranean,
where he could not compel, he sought diligently to compass his object
by persuasion, by clear and full explanation of his lofty views, by
stirring appeals to duty and opportunity, striving to impart to
another his own insight, and to arouse in him his own single-minded
and dauntless activity. Conceding, perforce, that Denmark was not to
be left hostile in the rear,--although he indicates that this object
might be attained by masking her power with a detachment, while the
main effort was immediately directed against Revel,--his suggestions
to Parker for reducing Denmark speedily are dominated by the same
conception. Strategic and tactical considerations unite to dictate,
that the fleet, whether it go by the Sound or the Belt, must quickly
reach and hold a position beyond--and therefore in the rear
of--Copenhagen. There it interposed between Denmark and Russia; from
there it approached Copenhagen where its defences were weakest. This
comprehensive exposition went, with Nelson's customary directness,
straight to the root of the matter.

Next day, after returning to his own ship, Nelson drew up the
following paper, which is at once so characteristic of his temperament
and genius, and so lucid and masterly a review of the political and
military conditions, that, contrary to the author's usual practice, it
is given entire. Being devoted to a single subject, and inspired by
the spirit of the writer when in a state of more than usual
exaltation, it possesses a unity of purpose and demonstration,
necessarily absent from most of his letters, in which many and diverse
matters have to be treated.

    24th March, 1801.

    MY DEAR SIR HYDE,--The conversation we had yesterday has
    naturally, from its importance, been the subject of my thoughts;
    and the more I have reflected, the more I am confirmed in
    opinion, that not a moment should be lost in attacking the
    enemy: they will every day and hour be stronger; we never shall
    be so good a match for them as at this moment. The only
    consideration in my mind is, how to get at them with the least
    risk to our ships. By Mr. Vansittart's account, the Danes have
    taken every means in their power to prevent our getting to
    attack Copenhagen by the passage of the Sound. Cronenburg has
    been strengthened, the Crown Islands fortified, on the outermost
    of which are twenty guns, pointing mostly downwards, and only
    eight hundred yards from very formidable batteries placed under
    the Citadel, supported by five Sail of the Line, seven Floating
    batteries of fifty guns each, besides Small-craft, Gun-boats,
    &c. &c.; and that the Revel Squadron of twelve or fourteen Sail
    of the Line are soon expected, as also five Sail of Swedes. It
    would appear by what you have told me of your instructions, that
    Government took for granted you would find no difficulty in
    getting off Copenhagen, and in the event of a failure of
    negotiation, you might instantly attack; and that there would be
    scarcely a doubt but the Danish Fleet would be destroyed, and
    the Capital made so hot that Denmark would listen to reason and
    its true interest. By Mr. Vansittart's account, their state of
    preparation exceeds what he conceives our Government thought
    possible, and that the Danish Government is hostile to us in
    the greatest possible degree. Therefore here you are, with
    almost the safety, certainly with the honour of England more
    intrusted to you, than ever yet fell to the lot of any British
    Officer. On your decision depends, whether our Country shall be
    degraded in the eyes of Europe, or whether she shall rear her
    head higher than ever; again do I repeat, never did our Country
    depend so much on the success of any Fleet as on this. How best
    to honour our Country and abate the pride of her Enemies, by
    defeating their schemes, must be the subject of your deepest
    consideration as Commander-in-Chief; and if what I have to offer
    can be the least useful in forming your decision, you are most
    heartily welcome.

    I shall begin with supposing you are determined to enter by the
    Passage of the Sound, as there are those who think, if you leave
    that passage open, that the Danish Fleet may sail from Copenhagen,
    and join the Dutch or French. I own I have no fears on that
    subject; for it is not likely that whilst their Capital is menaced
    with an attack, 9,000 of her best men should be sent out of the
    Kingdom. I suppose that some damage may arise amongst our masts and
    yards; yet perhaps there will not be one of them but could be made
    serviceable again. You are now about Cronenburg: if the wind be
    fair, and you determine to attack the Ships and Crown Islands, you
    must expect the natural issue of such a battle--Ships crippled, and
    perhaps one or two lost; for the wind which carries you in, will
    most probably not bring out a crippled Ship. This mode I call
    taking the bull by the horns. It, however, will not prevent the
    Revel Ships, or Swedes, from joining the Danes; and to prevent this
    from taking effect, is, in my humble opinion, a measure absolutely
    necessary--and still to attack Copenhagen. Two modes are in my
    view; one to pass Cronenburg, taking the risk of damage, and to
    pass up[28] the deepest and straightest Channel above the Middle
    Grounds; and coming down the Garbar or King's Channel, to attack
    their Floating batteries, &c. &c, as we find it convenient. It must
    have the effect of preventing a junction between the Russians,
    Swedes, and Danes, and may give us an opportunity of bombarding
    Copenhagen. I am also pretty certain that a passage could be found
    to the northward of Southolm for all our Ships; perhaps it might be
    necessary to warp a short distance in the very narrow part. Should
    this mode of attack be ineligible, the passage of the Belt, I have
    no doubt, would be accomplished in four or five days, and then the
    attack by Draco could be carried into effect, and the junction of
    the Russians prevented, with every probability of success against
    the Danish Floating batteries. What effect a bombardment might
    have, I am not called upon to give an opinion; but think the way
    would be cleared for the trial. Supposing us through the Belt with
    the wind first westerly, would it not be possible to either go with
    the Fleet, or detach ten Ships of three and two decks, with one
    Bomb and two Fire-ships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian Squadron
    at that place? I do not see the great risk of such a detachment,
    and with the remainder to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The
    measure may be thought bold, but I am of opinion the boldest
    measures are the safest; and our Country demands a most vigorous
    exertion of her force, directed with judgment. In supporting you,
    my dear Sir Hyde, through the arduous and important task you have
    undertaken, no exertion of head or heart shall be wanting from your
    most obedient and faithful servant,

    NELSON AND BRONTE.

On the 25th the wind was too strong to allow the ships to lift their
anchors. On the 26th the fleet weighed, and proceeded for a few hours
in the direction of the Great Belt, which Parker had decided to
follow. Captain Otway of the "London," Sir Hyde's flagship, chanced to
have local knowledge of that passage, which had not come before the
council, because he was not a member. When he ascertained the
intention, he explained the difficulties and risks to the admiral,
upon which the latter concluded that the batteries of Cronenburg and
Elsinore presented fewer dangers. He accordingly directed the fleet to
return toward the Sound, and sent Otway to tell Nelson he should take
that route. "I don't care a d--n by which passage we go," replied the
latter, "so that we fight them." "Sir Hyde Parker," he wrote the same
day to Lady Hamilton, "has by this time found out the worth of your
Nelson, and that he is a useful sort of man on a pinch; therefore, if
he ever has thought unkindly of me, I freely forgive him. Nelson must
stand among the first, or he must fall." Side by side with such
expressions of dauntless resolve and unfailing self-confidence stand
words of deepest tenderness, their union under one cover typifying
aptly the twin emotions of heroic aspiration and passionate devotion,
which at this time held within him alternate, yet not conflicting,
sway. In the same letter he tells her fondly, "You know I am more
bigoted to your picture--the faithful representation of you I have
with me--than ever a Neapolitan was to St. Januarius, and look upon
you as my guardian angel, and God, I trust, will make you so to me.
His will be done." From the time of leaving he wrote to her
practically every day. "Mr. S. is quite right," he says to her on one
occasion, "that through the medium of your influence is the surest way
to get my interest. It is true, and it will ever be, whilst you hold
your present conduct, for you never ask anything that does not do
honour to your feelings, as the best woman, as far as my knowledge
goes, that ever lived, and it must do me honour the complying with
them."

The fleet anchored again on the evening of the 26th of March, six
miles from Cronenburg, and was there detained three days by head winds
and calms. In this interval, Nelson's general plan of operations
having been adopted, he shifted his flag to a lighter ship, the
"Elephant," seventy-four, commanded by Captain Foley, the same who had
led the fleet inside the French line in Aboukir Bay. On the 30th, the
wind coming fair from northwest, the ships weighed and passed
Cronenburg Castle. It had been expected that the Swedish batteries
would open upon them, but, finding they remained silent, the column
inclined to that side, thus going clear of the Danish guns. "More
powder and shot, I believe, never were thrown away," wrote Nelson,
"for not one shot struck a single ship of the British fleet. Some of
our ships fired; but the Elephant did not return a single shot. I hope
to reserve them for a better occasion."

That afternoon they anchored again, about five miles below Copenhagen.
Parker and Nelson, accompanied by several senior officers, went at
once in a schooner to view the defences of the town. "We soon
perceived," wrote Stewart, "that our delay had been of important
advantage to the enemy, who had lined the northern edge of the shoals
near the Crown batteries, and the front of the harbour and arsenal,
with a formidable flotilla. The Trekroner (Three Crowns) Battery"--a
strong work established on piles, whose position will be
given--"appeared, in particular, to have been strengthened, and all
the buoys of the Northern, and of the King's Channels had been
removed." Nelson, however, was, or feigned to be, less impressed. "I
have just been reconnoitring the Danish line of defence," he wrote to
Lady Hamilton. "It looks formidable to those who are children at war,
but to my judgment, with ten sail-of-the-line I think I can annihilate
them; at all events, I hope to be allowed to try." This is again the
same spirit of the seaman "determined to attack" at Aboukir; the same
resolution as before Bastia, where he kept shut in his own breast the
knowledge of the odds, feeling that to do nothing was as bad as
failure--and worse. A like eagerness does not seem to have prevailed
on board the flagship. Parker had allowed himself to be stiffened to
the fighting-point by the junior he had before disregarded, but that
he looked to the issue with more than doubt may be inferred from the
words of his private secretary, the Rev. Mr. Scott, who afterwards
held the same relation to Nelson. "I fear," he wrote on the day of
the council, "there is a great deal of Quixotism in this business;
there is no getting any positive information of their strength."

Nelson's general plan of attack is set forth in main outlines in the
letter already given, but it is desirable to give a somewhat more
detailed description. It will be seen, by the annexed chart, that
there are before Copenhagen two channels by which the city can be
passed. Between the two lies a shoal, called the Middle Ground. The
inner, known as the King's Channel, lay under the guns of the defences
which had been hurriedly improvised for the present emergency. These
consisted of a line of hulks, mostly mastless, ranged along the inner
side of the King's Channel, close to the flats which bordered it,
flanked at the northern end by the permanent work, called the
Trekroner[29] Battery. Westward of the latter lay, across the mouth of
the harbor proper, two more hulks, and a small squadron consisting of
two ships-of-the-line and a frigate, masted, and in commission. This
division was not seriously engaged, and, as a factor in the battle,
may be disregarded.

The northern part of this defence was decisively the stronger. To
attack there, Nelson called "taking the bull by the horns." The
southern wing was much more exposed. Nor was this all. An advance from
the north must be made with a northerly wind. If unsuccessful, or
even, in case of success, if ships were badly crippled, they could not
return to the north, where the fleet was. On the other hand, attack
from the south presupposed a southerly wind, with which, after an
action, the engaged ships could rejoin the fleet, if they threaded
safely the difficult navigation. In any event there was risk, but none
knew better than Nelson that without risks war is not made. To the
considerations above given he added that, when south of the city, the
British would be interposed between the other Baltic navies and
Denmark. The latter, in that case, could not receive reinforcements,
unless the English squadron were first defeated. He therefore proposed
that ten ships-of-the-line, of the lighter draughts, which he offered
himself to lead, should pass through the outer, or northern channel,
gain the southern flank of the defence, and thence make the principal
attack, while the rest of the fleet supported them by a demonstration
against the northern end. The sagacity of this scheme is best attested
from the enemy himself. "We have been deceived in the plan of attack,"
wrote the historian Niebuhr, then residing in the city; "and," now
that the right wing of the defence is destroyed, "all is at stake."
The nights of the 30th and 31st were employed in surveying the waters,
laying down buoys to replace those removed by the Danes, and in
further reconnoissance of the enemy's position. The artillery officers
who were to supervise the bombardment satisfied themselves that, if
the floating defences south of the Trekroner were destroyed, the
bomb-vessels could be placed in such a position as to shell the city,
without being themselves exposed to undue peril.

Parker gave Nelson twelve ships-of-the-line, two more than he had
asked; a judicious addition, for the main part of the fighting was to
fall to him, and the difficulties of pilotage might, and actually did,
deprive him of several ships. Moreover, while it was proposed that the
vessels remaining with Parker should approach and engage the northern
defences, yet the time of attack depended upon a fair wind for Nelson;
and as that would necessarily be foul for the other body, the
diversion made by it might be, and proved to be, ineffective. Sound
judgment dictated giving Nelson all that could be spared.

On the afternoon of the 31st another council was held, in which
Nelson's plan was finally ratified; he again volunteered his
services, which were accepted and his force detailed. As usual, the
council was prolific in suggestions of danger. Stewart, who seems to
have been present, writes: "During this Council of War, the energy of
Lord Nelson's character was remarked: certain difficulties had been
started by some of the members, relative to each of the three Powers
we should either have to engage, in succession or united, in those
seas. The number of the Russians was, in particular, represented as
formidable. Lord Nelson kept pacing the cabin, mortified at everything
that savoured either of alarm or irresolution. When the above remark
was applied to the Swedes, he sharply observed, 'The more numerous the
better;' and when to the Russians, he repeatedly said, 'So much the
better, I wish they were twice as many, the easier the victory, depend
on it.' He alluded, as he afterwards explained in private, to the
total want of tactique among the Northern fleets; and to his
intention, whenever he should bring either the Swedes or Russians to
action, of attacking the head of their line, and confusing their
movements as much as possible. He used to say, 'Close with a
Frenchman, but out-manoeuvre a Russian.'"

Nelson gave personal supervision to the general work of buoying the
Northern Channel. On the morning of April 1st he made a final
examination of the ground in the frigate "Amazon," commanded by
Captain Riou, who fell in the next day's battle. Returning at about
one in the afternoon, he signalled his division to weigh, and, the
wind favoring, the whole passed without accident, the "Amazon"
leading. By nightfall they were again anchored, south of the Middle
Ground, not over two miles from that end of the Danish line. As the
anchor dropped, Nelson called out emphatically, "I will fight them the
moment I have a fair wind." As there were in all thirty-three ships of
war, they were crowded together, and, being within shelling distance
of the mortars on Amag Island, might have received much harm; but the
Danes were too preoccupied with their yet incomplete defences to note
that the few shells thrown dropped among their enemies.

"On board the Elephant," writes Stewart, who with his soldiers had
followed Nelson from the "St. George," "the night of the 1st of April
was an important one. As soon as the fleet was at anchor, the gallant
Nelson sat down to table with a large party of his comrades in arms.
He was in the highest spirits, and drank to a leading wind and to the
success of the ensuing day. Captains Foley, Hardy, Freemantle, Riou,
Inman, Admiral Graves, his Lordship's second in command, and a few
others to whom he was particularly attached, were of this interesting
party; from which every man separated with feelings of admiration for
their great leader, and with anxious impatience to follow him to the
approaching battle. The signal to prepare for action had been made
early in the evening. All the captains retired to their respective
ships, Riou excepted, who with Lord Nelson and Foley arranged the
Order of Battle, and those instructions that were to be issued to each
ship on the succeeding day. These three officers retired between nine
and ten to the after-cabin, and drew up those Orders that have been
generally published, and which ought to be referred to as the best
proof of the arduous nature of the enterprise in which the fleet was
about to be engaged.

"From the previous fatigue of this day, and of the two preceding, Lord
Nelson was so much exhausted while dictating his instructions, that it
was recommended to him by us all, and, indeed, insisted upon by his
old servant, Allen, who assumed much command on these occasions, that
he should go to his cot. It was placed on the floor, but from it he
still continued to dictate. Captain Hardy returned about eleven. He
had rowed as far as the leading ship of the enemy; sounding round her,
and using a pole when he was apprehensive of being heard. He reported
the practicability of the Channel, and the depth of water up to the
ships of the enemy's line. Had we abided by this report, in lieu of
confiding in our Masters and Pilots, we should have acted better. The
Orders were completed about one o'clock, when half a dozen clerks in
the foremost cabin proceeded to transcribe them. Lord Nelson's
impatience again showed itself; for instead of sleeping undisturbedly,
as he might have done, he was every half hour calling from his cot to
these clerks to hasten their work, for that the wind was becoming
fair: he was constantly receiving a report of this during the night."
It was characteristic of the fortune of the "heaven-born" admiral,
that the wind which had been fair the day before to take him south,
changed by the hour of battle to fair to take him north; but it is
only just to notice also that he himself never trifled with a fair
wind, nor with time.

The Orders for Battle, the process of framing which Stewart narrates,
have been preserved in full;[30] but they require a little study and
analysis to detect Nelson's thought, and their tactical merit, which
in matters of detail is unique among his works. At the Nile and
Trafalgar he contented himself with general plans, to meet cases which
he could only foresee in broad outlines; the method of application he
reserved to the moment of battle, when again he signified the general
direction of the attack, and left the details to his subordinates.
Here at Copenhagen he had been able to study the hostile dispositions.
Consequently, although he could not mark with precision the situations
of the smaller floating batteries, those of the principal blockships
were known, and upon that knowledge lie based very particular
instructions for the position each ship-of-the-line was to occupy. The
smaller British vessels also had specific orders.

Taking the Trekroner as a point of reference for the Danish order,
there were north of it, on the Danish left flank, two blockships.
South of it were seven blockships, with a number of miscellaneous
floating batteries, which raised that wing of the defence to
eighteen--the grand total being therefore twenty. This was also
Nelson's count, except that he put one small vessel on the north wing,
reducing the southern to seventeen--an immaterial difference. South of
the Trekroner, the Danes had disposed their seven blockships--which
were mastless ships-of-the-line--as follows. Two were on the right
flank, supporting each other, two on the left, the three others spaced
between these extremes; the distance from the Trekroner to the
southernmost ship being about a mile and a half. The intervals were
filled with the floating batteries. It will be recognized that the
Danes treated this southern wing as an entity by itself, of which they
strengthened the flanks, relying for the protection of the centre upon
the nearness to shoal water, which would prevent the line being
pierced.

As thus described, the southern wing covered the front of the city
against bombardment. The two northern blockships and the Trekroner did
not conduce materially to that; they protected chiefly the entrance of
the harbor. It was therefore only necessary to reduce the southern
wing; but Nelson preferred to engage at once the whole line of vessels
and the Trekroner. It is difficult entirely to approve this refusal to
concentrate upon a part of the enemy's order,--an advantage to which
Nelson was fully alive,--but it was probably due to underestimating
the value of the Danish gunnery, knowing as he did how long they had
been at peace. He may, also, have hoped something from Parker's
division. Be this as it may, he spread his ships-of-the-line, in the
arrangement he prescribed, from one end to the other of the enemy's
order.

Having done this, however, he adopted measures well calculated to
crush the southern flank speedily, and then to accumulate superior
numbers on the northern. The British were arranged in a column of
attack, and the directions were that the three leading ships should
pass along the hostile line, engaging as they went, until the headmost
reached the fifth Dane, a blockship inferior to itself, abreast which
it was to anchor by the stern, as all the British ships were to do.
Numbers two and three were then to pass number one, and anchor
successively ahead of her, supporting her there against the other
enemy's batteries, while four and five were to anchor astern of her,
engaging the two flank blockships, which would have received already
the full broadsides of the three leading vessels. Nelson hoped that
the two southern Danes, by this concentration of fire upon them, would
be speedily silenced; and their immediate antagonists had orders, when
that was done, to cut their cables and go north, to reinforce the
fight in that quarter. The sooner to attain this end, a frigate and
some smaller vessels were told off to take position across the bows of
the two blockships, and to keep a raking fire upon them.

The dispositions for the other British vessels were more simple. They
were to follow along the outer side of their own engaged ships, each
one anchoring as it cleared the headmost ship already in
action,--number six ahead of number five, number seven of number
six,--so that the twelfth would be abreast the twentieth Dane. One
ship-of-the-line was of course thought equivalent to two or three
floating batteries, if opposed to them in an interval. By this
arrangement, each of the British was covered in its advance, until it
reached its prescribed antagonist as nearly fresh as possible, and the
order of the British column was reversed from end to end.[31] A
division of frigates and fireships, under Captain Riou, was held ready
for any special service. The bomb-vessels were to anchor in the King's
Channel, but well outside the line of battle, from which position
they threw some bombs. Alongside each ship-of-the-line was towed a
flat-boat, intended to carry soldiers in an attempt to storm the
Trekroner, if circumstances favored; and other boats were sent for
that purpose from Parker's division.

These orders were copied, and ready for distribution, by six in the
morning. Nelson, who was already up and had breakfasted, signalled at
seven for all captains, and by eight these had their instructions. The
wind had become so fair that ships anchoring by the stern would lie
perfectly well for using their broadsides at once. At this instant
indecision appeared among the pilots, who were mostly men of only a
little local experience, and that gained in vessels much smaller than
those they were now to conduct. Nelson, reverting afterwards to these
moments, said: "I experienced in the Sound the misery of having the
honour of our Country intrusted to pilots, who have no other thought
than to keep the ship clear of danger, and their own silly heads clear
of shot. At eight in the morning of the 2d of April, not one pilot
would take charge of a ship." There is in these words scarcely fair
allowance for the men's ignorance. At length one of the Masters of the
fleet, a Mr. Brierley, undertook to lead the column, and the signal to
weigh in succession was made. The leading ship got off handsomely, but
difficulties soon arose. Nelson's old "Agamemnon" was so anchored that
she could not weather the Middle Ground; she consequently did not get
into action at all. Two other ships, the "Bellona" and "Russell,"
seventy-fours, grounded on the east side of the Middle Ground, where
they remained fast. Although they could use their guns, and did use
them against those southern ships which Nelson particularly wanted
crushed, the disadvantages of distance, of position, and of general
helplessness, detracted exceedingly from their usefulness. The valid
British force was thus reduced by one-fourth,--to nine vessels.

Nelson's ship, the "Elephant," was following the "Bellona" and
"Russell," and he saw them ground. "His agitation during these moments
was extreme," says an eye-witness. "I shall never forget the
impression it made on me. It was not, however, the agitation of
indecision, but of ardent, animated patriotism panting for glory,
which had appeared within his reach, and was vanishing from his
grasp." He doubtless well knew the thinly veiled reproaches of
rashness, cast by timid counsels upon the daring, which even under
these disadvantages was to cover with confusion their prophecies of
disaster; but, as on many another day, and in that more famous
incident, a few hours later, in this same battle, his tenacious
purpose harbored no side-thought of retreat. "Before you receive
this," he had written to Lady Hamilton, "all will be over with
Denmark,--either your Nelson will be safe, and Sir Hyde Parker a
victor, or he, your own Nelson, will be laid low." The signal to
advance was kept flying, but new dispositions had to be made to meet
the new and adverse conditions.[32] The remaining ships were made to
close to the rear, as they anchored. The "Elephant" had been
originally assigned as antagonist to the biggest Danish ship, the
"Sjaelland," seventy-four; but, the "Bellona" having grounded, she now
dropped into the latter's berth immediately ahead of the "Glatton;"
and Nelson hailed the "Ganges," as she was passing, to place herself
as close as possible ahead of the "Elephant." This movement was
imitated by the "Monarch," which thus got the "Elephant's" position
abreast the "Sjaelland." Here, according to Danish accounts, the
contest stood for some time, until the "Defiance," Graves's flagship,
arriving, anchored ahead of the "Monarch," completing the line of nine
British ships. Captain Riou with his light division engaged the
Trekroner, and the Danish blockship next south of it, which was by him
terribly battered. From this moment, and for some time, to use
subsequent words of Nelson, "Here was no manoeuvring: it was downright
fighting."

Meanwhile Parker's division, which had weighed as agreed, was some
four miles off, beating up against Nelson's fair wind. It had not yet
come into action, and the anxious chief, ever doubtful of the result
of a step into which he had been persuaded, contrary, not, perhaps, to
his will, but certainly to his bent, watched the indecisive progress
of the strife with a mind unoccupied by any fighting of his own. Two
things were evident: that Nelson had met with some mishaps, and that
the Danish resistance was more prolonged and sturdier than he had
argued in the Council that it would be. Parker began to talk about
making the signal to leave off action, and the matter was discussed
between himself, his fleet-captain, and Otway, the captain of the
ship. The latter opposed the idea strongly, and at last, as a stay,
obtained the admiral's authority to go on board the "Elephant" and
learn how things were. He shoved off accordingly, but before he
reached Nelson the signal was made.

Nelson at the moment was walking the quarter-deck of the "Elephant,"
which was anchored on the bow of the Danish flagship "Dannebroge,"
engaging her and some floating batteries ahead of her. At this time,
Stewart says, "Few, if any, of the enemy's heavy ships and praams had
ceased to fire;" and, after mentioning various disappointments that
had befallen the smaller British vessels, besides the failure of three
heavy ships to reach their stations, he continues: "The contest, in
general, although from the relaxed state of the enemy's fire, it
might not have given much room for apprehension as to the result, had
certainly not declared itself in favour of either side. Nelson was
sometimes much animated, and at others heroically fine in his
observations. A shot through the mainmast knocked a few splinters
about us. He observed to me, with a smile, 'It is warm work, and this
day may be the last to any of us at a moment;' and then, stopping
short at the gangway, he used an expression never to be erased from my
memory, and said with emotion, 'but mark you, I would not be elsewhere
for thousands.'

"When the signal, No. 39, was made, the Signal Lieutenant reported it
to him. He continued his walk, and did not appear to take notice of
it. The lieutenant meeting his Lordship at the next turn asked,
'whether he should repeat it?' Lord Nelson answered, 'No, acknowledge
it.'[33] On the officer returning to the poop, his Lordship called
after him, 'Is No. 16 [For Close Action] still hoisted?' The
lieutenant answering in the affirmative, Lord Nelson said, 'Mind you
keep it so.' He now walked the deck considerably agitated, which was
always known by his moving the stump of his right arm. After a turn or
two, he said to me, in a quick manner, 'Do you know what's shown on
board the Commander-in-Chief, No. 39?' On asking him what that meant,
he answered, 'Why, to leave off action.' 'Leave off action!' he
repeated, and then added, with a shrug, 'Now damn me if I do.' He also
observed, I believe, to Captain Foley, 'You know, Foley, I have only
one eye--I have a right to be blind sometimes;' and then with an
archness peculiar to his character, putting the glass to his blind
eye, he exclaimed, 'I really do not see the signal.' This remarkable
signal was, therefore, only acknowledged on board the Elephant, not
repeated. Admiral Graves did the latter, not being able to
distinguish the Elephant's conduct: either by a fortunate accident, or
intentionally, No. 16 was not displaced.

"The squadron of frigates obeyed the signal, and hauled off. That
brave officer, Captain Riou, was killed by a raking shot, when the
Amazon showed her stern to the Trekroner. He was sitting on a gun, was
encouraging his men, and had been wounded in the head by a splinter.
He had expressed himself grieved at being thus obliged to retreat, and
nobly observed, 'What will Nelson think of us?' His clerk was killed
by his side; and by another shot, several of the marines, while
hauling on the main-brace, shared the same fate. Riou then exclaimed,
'Come then, my boys, let us all die together!' The words were scarcely
uttered, when the fatal shot severed him in two. Thus, and in an
instant, was the British service deprived of one of its greatest
ornaments, and society of a character of singular worth, resembling
the heroes of romance." Fortunately for the British, not a
ship-of-the-line budged. Graves had indeed transmitted the order by
repeating it, but as he kept that for close action also flying, and
did not move himself, the line remained entire throughout a period
when the departure of a single ship would have ruined all, and
probably caused its own destruction.

This incident of refusing to see the signal has become as hackneyed as
a popular ballad, and in its superficial aspect, showing Nelson as the
mere fighting man, who, like a plucky dog, could not be dragged off
his antagonist, might well now have been dismissed with the shortest
and most summary mention. Of late years doubt has been cast over the
reality of Nelson's disobedience, for the reason that Otway, whose
mission has already been noted, carried a verbal message that the
order was to be understood as permissive, leaving Nelson the liberty
to obey or not. From Otway's biography, however, it appears that the
signal was hoisted before he reached the "Elephant." Parker's
Secretary, Mr. Scott, has also stated distinctly, that "it was
arranged between the admirals, that, should it appear the ships which
were engaged were suffering too severely, the signal for retreat would
be made, to give Lord Nelson the option of retiring, if he thought
fit."[34]

On the other hand, without affirming positively, it should be said
that Nelson's own impressions do not seem to have agreed with Scott's.
Not only did he say, some hours after the fight, "Well, I have fought
contrary to orders, and I shall perhaps be hanged; never mind, let
them,"--which might pass as a continuation of the quarter-deck drama,
if such it was,--but his account of the matter to Lord Minto is not
consistent with any clear understanding, on his part, that he had such
liberty of action. Nearly a year later, in March, 1802, Minto writes:
"Lord Nelson explained to me a little, on Saturday last, the sort of
blame which had been imputed to Sir Hyde Parker for Copenhagen; in the
first place, for not commanding the attack in person, and in the next
place for making signals to recall the fleet during the action; and
everything would have been lost if these signals had been obeyed." If
Nelson understood that the signal was to be construed as permissive
only, it was extremely ungenerous, and most unlike Nelson, to have
withheld an explanation which extenuated, if it did not excuse, one of
the most dangerous and ill-judged orders that ever was conveyed by
flags; nor is it probable that Parker, if the understanding had been
explicit, would not have insisted with the Admiralty upon the fact,
when he was smarting under the general censure, which had led to talk
of an inquiry. It seems, also, unlikely that Nelson, having such a
contingency in view, would have failed to give explicit instructions
that his ships should not withdraw (as Riou's frigates did) unless he
repeated; nor is it easy to reconcile the agitation noted by Stewart
with a previous arrangement of the kind asserted.

What Parker said was, probably, simply one of those by-remarks, with
which an apprehensive man consoles himself that he reserves a chance
to change his mind. Such provision rarely entered Nelson's head when
embarking upon an enterprise in which "do or die" was the only order
for success. The man who went into the Copenhagen fight with an eye
upon withdrawing from action would have been beaten before he began.
It is upon the clear perception of this truth, and his tenacious grip
of it, that the vast merit of Nelson in this incident depends, and not
upon the disobedience; though never was disobedience more justified,
more imperative, more glorious. To retire, with crippled ships and
mangled crews, through difficult channels, under the guns of the
half-beaten foe, who would renew his strength when he saw the
movement, would be to court destruction,--to convert probable victory
into certain, and perhaps overwhelming, disaster. It was not, however,
only in superiority of judgment or of fighting quality that Nelson in
this one act towered like a giant above his superior; it was in that
supreme moral characteristic which enabled him to shut his eyes to the
perils and doubts surrounding the only path by which he could achieve
success, and save his command from a defeat verging on annihilation.
The pantomime of putting the glass to his blind eye was, however
unintentionally, a profound allegory. There is a time to be blind as
well as a time to see. And if in it there was a little bit of
conscious drama, it was one of those touches that not only provoke the
plaudits of the spectators, but stir and raise their hearts, giving
them both an example of heroic steadfastness, and also the assurance
that there is one standing by upon whom their confidence can repose to
the bitter end,--no small thing in the hour of hard and doubtful
battle. It had its counterpart in the rebuke addressed by him on this
very occasion to a lieutenant, who uttered some desponding words on
the same quarter-deck: "At such a moment, the delivery of a
desponding opinion, unasked, was highly reprehensible, and deserved
much more censure than Captain Foley gave you."

At two o'clock, an hour after the signal was made, the resistance of
the Danes had perceptibly slackened; the greater part of their line,
Stewart says, had ceased to reply. The flagship "Dannebroge" had been
on fire as early as half-past eleven, and the commander-in-chief,
Commodore Fischer, had felt necessary to shift his broad pendant to
the "Holstein," the second ship from the north flank. The "Dannebroge"
continued to fight bravely, losing two hundred and seventy killed and
wounded out of a total of three hundred and thirty-six, but at length
she was driven out of the line in flames, and grounded near the
Trekroner, where she blew up after the action. The "Sjaelland,"
seventy-four, next north of her, was likewise carried out of the line
by her cables being cut; while the "Holstein," and the northernmost
ship of all, the "Indfödsretten," were so shattered, the latter mainly
by Riou's frigates, that Fischer again shifted his flag, this time to
the Trekroner. The two southern flank ships, upon whom the most
concentrated attack was made, had also met with tremendous losses.
Their flags were shot away many times, till at the last, by a Danish
account, no one had time to raise them again, whence the impression
arose amongst the British that these vessels, as well as some others,
fought after having surrendered.

This incident, occurring in several cases, was the immediate cause of
Nelson's taking a step which both then and since has been blamed as an
unjustifiable stratagem. So much of the Danish fire south of the
Trekroner had ceased, that that wing could be looked upon as subdued;
some vessels were helpless, some had their flags down. Between himself
and the Trekroner, Nelson alleged, there was a group of four Danes,
unresisting and unmanageable, across and through which the battery was
firing, and the British replying. Ships which had struck repelled
boats sent to board them, and the batteries on Amag Island also fired
upon those boats, and over the surrendered Danes. That there was some
ground for the complaints made by him appears from the Danish
admission just quoted, as well as from several British statements;
Stewart's being explicit. Nelson accordingly sent a message ashore,
under a flag of truce, to the Crown Prince, who was in general
command, saying that if he were not allowed to take possession of his
prizes, he would have to burn them. The message ran:--

    TO THE BROTHERS OF ENGLISHMEN, THE DANES.

    Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark, when no longer
    resisting; but if the firing is continued on the part of
    Denmark, Lord Nelson will be obliged to set on fire all the
    floating batteries he has taken, without having the power of
    saving the brave Danes who have defended them.

    NELSON AND BRONTE.

It was in the preparation and despatch of this note that Nelson gave
another illustration, often quoted, of his cool consideration of all
the circumstances surrounding him, and of the politic regard to effect
which he ever observed in his official intercourse with men. It was
written by his own hand, a secretary copying as he wrote. When
finished, the original was put into an envelope, which the secretary
was about to seal with a wafer; but this Nelson would not permit,
directing that taper and wax should be brought. The man sent was
killed before he could return. When this was reported to the admiral,
his only reply was, "Send another messenger;" and he waited until the
wax came, and then saw that particular care was exercised to make a
full and perfect impression of the seal, which bore his own arms.
Stewart said to him, "May I take the liberty of asking why, under so
hot a fire, and after so lamentable an accident, you have attached so
much importance to a circumstance apparently so trifling?" Nelson
replied, "Had I made use of the wafer, it would still have been wet
when presented to the Crown Prince; he would have inferred that the
letter was sent off in a hurry, and that we had some very pressing
reasons for being in a hurry. The wax told no tales."

A flag of truce in a boat asks no cessation of hostilities, except so
far as the boat itself is concerned. As for the message sent, it
simply insisted that the Danes should cease firing; failing which,
Nelson would resort to the perfectly regular, warlike measure of
burning their ships. As the ships were beaten, this might not be
humane; but between it and leaving them under the guns of both
parties, the question of humanity was only one of degree. If Nelson
could extort from the Danes a cessation of hostilities by such a
threat, he had a perfect right to do it, and his claim that what he
demanded was required by humanity, is at least colorable. It must be
observed, however, that he makes no suggestion of truce or
armistice,--he demands that firing shall be discontinued, or he will
resort to certain steps.

The Crown Prince at once sent back his principal aid-de-camp, with a
verbal message, which the latter reduced to writing, as follows:--

    "His Royal Highness, the Prince Royal of Denmark, has sent me,
    General Adjutant Lindholm, on board to his Britannic Majesty's
    Vice-Admiral, the Right Honourable Lord Nelson, to ask the
    particular object of sending the flag of truce."

To this Nelson replied in writing:--

    "Lord Nelson's object in sending on shore a flag of truce is
    humanity; he, therefore, consents that hostilities shall cease
    till Lord Nelson can take his prisoners out of the prizes, and
    he consents to land all the wounded Danes, and to burn or remove
    his prizes."

This message concluded with a complimentary expression of hope that
good relations would be restored between the two nations, whom Nelson
always carefully spoke of as natural friends. It will be observed that
he again alludes only to the flag of truce sent by the boat, and, as
at first he demanded, so now he consents to a cessation of
hostilities, until he can secure his prisoners and remove his prizes.
If he could rightly remove his prizes, which he avowed as part of his
demand, then still more he could his own ships. This part of the
negotiation he took upon himself to settle; for discussion of any
further matters he referred Lindholm to Sir Hyde Parker, and the
Danish officer started for the "London" at the same time that the
English officer pushed off to carry Nelson's second message to the
Crown Prince. The latter had already sent orders to the batteries to
cease firing. The battle then ended, and both sides hoisted flags of
truce.

Nelson at once began to remove his ships, which had sufered more than
in any other battle he had ever fought. That he was fully aware of the
imminent necessity for some of them to withdraw, and of the advantage
the Danes had yielded him by accepting his terms, is indisputable, and
his own opinion was confirmed by that of two of his leading captains,
whom he consulted. This he never denied; but he did deny that he had
used a _ruse de guerre_, or taken unfair advantage of a truce. On the
score of humanity he had consented to a cessation of hostilities,
conditional upon his freedom to take out of the surrendered ships the
unwounded prisoners, and to remove the prizes. If the bargain was more
to his advantage than to that of the Danes--which is a matter of
opinion--it was none the less a bargain, of which he had full right to
reap the benefit. The Danes did not then charge him with taking an
unfair advantage. On the contrary, Lindholm, who was closely cognizant
of all that passed in relation to these negotiations, wrote to him:
"Your Lordship's motives for sending a flag of truce to our
Government can never be misconstrued, and your subsequent conduct has
sufficiently shown that humanity is always the companion of true
valour." The truce that then began was prolonged from day to day till
April 9th. During it both parties went on with their preparations for
war. "These few days," wrote Niebuhr, on the 6th, "have certainly been
employed in repairing the evil [of faulty preparation] as far as
possible." It is clear that the Danes understood, what Nelson's
message specified, a cessation of direct hostilities, not of other
movements. The British during the same days were putting bomb-vessels
in place, a perfectly overt act.

Nelson's success at Copenhagen was secured by address, as it had been
won by force. But it had been thoroughly won. "We cannot deny it,"
wrote Niebuhr, "we are quite beaten. Our line of defence is destroyed.
We cannot do much injury to the enemy, as long as he contents himself
with bombarding the city, docks, and fleet. The worst is the Crown
Batteries can be held no longer." Two or three days later he says
again: "The truce has been prolonged. The remaining half of our
defences are useless, now that the right wing is broken,--a defect
over which I have meditated uselessly many a time since last summer."
The result was due to Nelson's sagacious and emphatic advice as to the
direction and manner of the attack, by which the strong points of the
Danish positions were completely and unexpectedly turned. This plan,
it is credibly stated, he had formed before leaving England, although
he was not formally consulted by Parker until the 23d of March.

Having regard to the general political conditions, and especially to
the great combination of the North at this time directed against Great
Britain, the victory of Copenhagen was second in importance to none
that Nelson ever gained; while in the severity of the resistance, and
in the attendant difficulties to be overcome, the battle itself was
the most critical of all in which he was engaged. So conspicuous were
the energy and sagacity shown by him, that most seamen will agree in
the opinion of Jurien de la Gravière: "They will always be in the eyes
of seamen his fairest title to glory. He alone was capable of
displaying such boldness and perseverance; he alone could confront the
immense difficulties of that enterprise and overcome them."
Notwithstanding this, and notwithstanding that the valor of the
squadron, as manifested in its losses, was never excelled, no medals
were ever issued for the battle, nor were any individual rewards
bestowed, except upon Nelson himself, who was advanced in the peerage
to be a Viscount, and upon his immediate second, Rear-Admiral Graves,
who was made a Knight of the Bath. The cause for this action--it was
not a case of oversight--has never been explained; nor did Nelson
consider the reasons for it, which the Prime Minister advanced to him
in a private interview, at all satisfactory. If it was because a
formal state of war did not exist between Great Britain and Denmark,
the obvious reply of those engaged would be that they had hazarded
their lives, and won an exceptionally hard-fought fight, in obedience
to the orders of their Government. If, on the other hand, the Ministry
felt the difficulty of making an invidious distinction between ships
engaged and those not engaged, as between Nelson's detachment and the
main body under Parker, it can only be said that that was shirking the
duty of a government to reward the deserving, for fear lest those who
had been less fortunate should cry out. The last administration had
not hesitated to draw a line at the Battle of the Nile, even though
the mishap of so great an officer as Troubridge left him on the wrong
side. St. Vincent, positive as he was, had shrunk from distinguishing
by name even Nelson at the battle which had won for himself his title.
This naturally suggests the speculation whether the joint presence of
St. Vincent and Troubridge at the Admiralty was not the cause of this
futility; but nothing can be affirmed.

"First secure the victory, then make the most of it," had been
avowedly Nelson's motto before the Nile. In the Battle of Copenhagen
he had followed much the same rule. After beating the force
immediately opposed to him, he obtained the safe removal of his
detachment from the critical position in which it lay, by the shrewd
use made of the advantage then in his hands. This achieved, and his
ships having rejoined the main body, after various mishaps from
grounding, under the enemy's guns, which emphasized over and over the
adroit presence of mind he had displayed, it next fell to him to make
the most of what the British had so far gained; having regard not
merely to Denmark and Copenhagen, but to the whole question of British
interests involved in the Coalition of the Baltic States. Parker
intrusted to him the direct management of the negotiations, just as he
had given him the immediate command of the fighting.

One circumstance, which completely changed the political complexion of
affairs, was as yet unknown to him. On the night of March 24th the
Czar Paul had been murdered, and with him fell the main motive force
and support of the Armed Neutrality. Ignorant of this fact, Nelson's
one object, the most to be made of the victory, was to get at the
detachment of the Russian fleet--twelve ships--lying in the harbor of
Revel, before the breaking up of the ice allowed it to join the main
body at Cronstadt. The difficulty in the way lay not in Nelson's
hesitation to act instantly, nor in the power of the British fleet to
do so; it lay in the conflicting views and purposes of other persons,
of the Crown Prince and of Parker, the representatives of Denmark and
of Great Britain. Parker was resolved, so Nelson has told us, not to
leave Denmark hostile in his rear, flanking his line of communications
if he proceeded up the Baltic; and Nelson admits, although with his
sagacious daring he would have disregarded, that the batteries which
commanded the shoal ground above Copenhagen might have seriously
interrupted the passage. He was ready to run risks again for the very
adequate object mentioned. On the other hand the Crown Prince, while
recognizing the exposure of Copenhagen, feared to yield even to the
menace of bombardment, lest he should incur the vengeance of the Czar.
It was to find a middle term between these opposing motives that
Nelson's diplomacy was exerted.

On the 3d of April he went ashore to visit the Crown Prince, by whom
he was received with all possible attention. "The populace," says
Stewart, "showed a mixture of admiration, curiosity, and displeasure.
A strong guard secured his safety, and appeared necessary to keep off
the mob, whose rage, although mixed with admiration at his thus
trusting himself amongst them, was naturally to be expected. It
perhaps savored of rashness in him thus early to risk himself among
them; but with him his Country's cause was paramount to all personal
considerations." Nelson himself did not note these threatening
indications. Fond of observation, with vanity easily touched, and
indifferent to danger, he heard only homage in the murmurs about him.
"The people received me as they always have done; and even the stairs
of the palace were crowded, huzzaing, and saying, 'God bless Lord
Nelson.'"

His interview with the Crown Prince was private, only Lindholm being
present. It ranged, according to his private letter to Addington, over
the whole subject of the existing differences with Great Britain, and
the respective interests of the two states. The most important points
to be noticed in this personal discussion, which was preliminary to
the actual negotiation, are, first, Nelson's statement of the cause
for the presence of the British fleet, and, second, the basis of
agreement he proposed. As regards the former, to a question of the
Prince he replied categorically: The fleet is here "to crush a most
formidable and unprovoked Coalition against Great Britain." For the
second, he said that the only foundation, upon which Sir Hyde Parker
could rest his justification for not proceeding to bombardment, would
be the total suspension of the treaties with Russia for a fixed time,
and the free use of Danish ports and supplies by the British fleet.
These two concessions, it will be observed, by neutralizing Denmark,
would remove the threat to British communications, and convert Denmark
into an advanced base of operations for the fleet. Nelson did not have
great hope of success in negotiating, for he observed that fear of
Russia, not desire for war, was controlling the Prince. Therefore, had
he been commander-in-chief, he would at all risks have pushed on to
Revel, and struck the coalition to the heart there. "I make no
scruple," he wrote to St. Vincent after he had procured the armistice,
"in saying that I would have been at Revel fourteen days ago. No man
but those on the spot can tell what I have gone through, and do
suffer. I wanted Sir Hyde to let me at least go and cruise off
Carlscrona, [where the Swedish fleet was,] to prevent the Revel ships
getting in. Think of me, my dear Lord, and if I have deserved well,
let me retire; if ill, for heaven's sake supersede me, for I cannot
exist in this state." Pegasus was indeed shackled.

The truce was continued from day to day, both sides preparing to renew
hostilities, while the negotiators sat. Discussing thus, sword in
hand, Nelson frankly told the other side that he wanted an armistice
for sixteen weeks, to give him time to act against the Russian fleet,
and then to return to Denmark. On the likely supposition that the
latter would not greatly grieve over a Russian disaster, this openness
was probably discreet. In the wrangling that preceded consent, one of
the Danes hinted, in French, at a renewal of hostilities. "Renew
hostilities!" said Nelson, who understood the language, but could not
speak it, "tell him that we are ready at this moment; ready to bombard
this very night." But, while he thus could use on occasion the
haughty language of one at whose back stood a victorious fleet of
twenty ships-of-the-line, "the best negotiators in Europe," to repeat
his own words, his general bearing was eminently conciliatory, as
became one who really longed for peace in the particular instance, and
was alive to the mingled horror and inutility of the next move open to
Great Britain, under Parker's policy,--the bombardment of Copenhagen.
"Whoever may be the respective Ministers who shall sign the peace,"
wrote to him Count Waltersdorff, who with Lindholm conducted the
Danish case and signed the armistice, "I shall always consider your
lordship as the Pacificator of the North, and I am sure that your
heart will be as much flattered by that title, as by any other which
your grateful Country has bestowed upon you."

Had Paul lived, the issue might have been doubtful, and in that case
England might well have rued the choice of a commander-in-chief whose
chief function was to hamstring her greatest seaman; but the Danes
received word of the murder, and on the 9th of April an agreement was
reached. There was to be a cessation of hostilities for fourteen
weeks, during which Denmark suspended her part in the Armed
Neutrality, and would leave her ships of war in the same state of
unpreparedness as they then were. The British fleet was at liberty to
get supplies in all Danish ports. In return, it was merely stipulated
that no attacks should be made on any part of the coast of Denmark
proper. Norway[35] and the Danish colonies were not included, nor was
Holstein. In a letter to Addington, Nelson pointed out that as a
military measure, which it was, the result was that the hands of
Denmark were tied, those of the fleet loosed, its communications
secured, its base of supplies advanced, and last, but far from least,
the timid counsels of its commander-in-chief disconcerted; no excuse
for not advancing being left. Besides, as he said, to extort these
concessions he had nothing in his hand but the threat of bombardment,
which done, "we had done our worst, and not much nearer being
friends." Sir Hyde would not have advanced.

As a military negotiation it is difficult to conceive one more
adroitly managed, more perfectly conducive to the ends in view, or, it
may be added, more clearly explained. The Government, with
extraordinary dulness, replied in that patronizing official tone of
superior wisdom, which is probably one of the most exasperating things
that can be encountered by a man of such insight and action as Nelson
had displayed. "Upon a consideration of all the circumstances, His
Majesty has thought fit to approve." "I am sorry," replied Nelson,
"that the Armistice is only approved under _all_ considerations. Now I
own myself of opinion that every part of the _all_ was to the
advantage of our King and Country." As First Lord of the Admiralty,
old St. Vincent had to transmit this qualified approval; but he wrote
afterwards to Nelson: "Your Lordship's whole conduct, from your first
appointment to this hour, is the subject of our constant admiration.
It does not become me to make comparisons: all agree there is but one
Nelson."

The armistice being signed and ratified, the fleet on the 12th of
April entered the Baltic; the heavy ships having to remove their guns,
in order to cross the "Grounds," between the islands of Amager and
Saltholm. Nelson was left behind in the "St. George," which, for some
reason, was not ready. "My commander-in-chief has left me," he wrote
to Lady Hamilton, "but if there is any work to do, I dare say they
will wait for me. _Nelson will be first_. Who can stop him?" "We have
reports," he says again, "that the Swedish fleet is above the
Shallows, distant five or six leagues. All our fellows are longing to
be at them, and so do I, as great a boy as any of them, for I consider
this as being at school, and going to England as going home for the
holidays, therefore I really long to finish my task." His confidence
in himself and in his fortune was growing apace at this time, as was
both natural and justifiable. "This day, twenty-two years," he writes
soon after, on the 11th of June, "I was made a Post-Captain by Sir
Peter Parker. If you meet him again, say that I shall drink his health
in a bumper, for I do not forget that I owe my present exalted rank to
his partiality, although I feel, if I had even been in an humbler
sphere, that Nelson would have been Nelson still." Although always
reverently thankful to the Almighty for a favorable issue to events,
there does not seem to have been in him any keen consciousness of
personal dependence, such as led Moltke to mark the text, "My strength
is made perfect in weakness."

While thus lying, about twenty-four miles from the main body, a report
came that the Swedish squadron had put to sea. Alarmed lest a battle
might take place in his absence, Nelson jumped into a boat alongside,
and started for a six hours' pull against wind and current to join the
fleet, in haste so great that he refused even to wait for a boat
cloak. "His anxiety lest the fleet should have sailed before he got on
board one of them," tells the officer who was with him, "is beyond all
conception. I will quote some expressions in his own words. It was
extremely cold, and I wished him to put on a great coat of mine which
was in the boat: 'No, I am not cold; my anxiety for my Country will
keep me warm. Do you not think the fleet has sailed?' 'I should
suppose not, my Lord.' 'If they are, we shall follow then to
Carlscrona in the boat, by G--d!'--I merely state this to show how his
thoughts must have been employed. The idea of going in a small boat,
rowing six oars, without a single morsel of anything to eat or drink,
the distance of about fifty leagues, must convince the world that
every other earthly consideration than that of serving his Country,
was totally banished from his thoughts." Such preoccupation with one
idea, and that idea so fine, brings back to us the old Nelson, who
has found himself again amid the storm and stress of danger and of
action, for which he was created.

About midnight he reached the "Elephant," where his flag was again
hoisted; but he did not escape unharmed from the exposure he had too
carelessly undergone. "Since April 15," he wrote several weeks
afterwards to Lady Hamilton, "I have been rapidly in a decline, but am
now, thank God, I firmly believe, past all danger. At that time I
rowed five hours in a bitter cold night. A cold struck me to the
heart. On the 27th I had one of my terrible spasms of heart-stroke,
which had near carried me off, and the severe disappointment of being
kept in a situation where there can be nothing to do before August,
almost killed me. From that time to the end of May I brought up what
every one thought was my lungs, and I was emaciated more than you can
conceive."

The fleet proceeded in a leisurely manner toward Carlscrona, Nelson
chafing and fretting, none the less for his illness, under the
indecision and dilatoriness that continued to characterize Parker's
movements. "My dear friend," he had written to Lady Hamilton, "we are
very lazy. We Mediterranean people are not used to it." "Lord St.
Vincent," he tells his brother, "will either take this late business
up with a very high hand, or he will depress it; but how they will
manage about Sir Hyde I cannot guess. I am afraid much will be said
about him in the public papers; but not a word shall be drawn from me,
for God knows they may make him Lord Copenhagen if they please, it
will not offend me." But now that Denmark has been quieted, he cannot
understand nor tolerate the delay in going to Revel, where the
appearance of the fleet would checkmate, not only Russia, but all the
allied squadrons; for it would occupy an interior and commanding
position between the detachments at Revel, Cronstadt, and Carlscrona,
in force superior to any one of them. "On the 19th of April," he
afterwards wrote bitterly to St. Vincent, "we had eighteen ships of
the line and a fair wind. Count Pahlen [the Russian Cabinet Minister]
came and resided at Revel, evidently to endeavour to prevent any
hostilities against the Russian fleet there, which was, I decidedly
say, at our mercy. Nothing, if it had been right to make the attack,
could have saved one ship of them in two hours after our entering the
bay; and to prevent their destruction, Sir Hyde Parker had a great
latitude for asking for various things for the suspension of his
orders." That is, Parker having the fleet at his mercy could have
exacted terms, just as Nelson himself had exacted them from Denmark
when Copenhagen was laid open; the advantage, indeed, was far greater,
as the destruction of an organized force is a greater military evil
than that of an unarmed town. This letter was written after Nelson had
been to Revel, and seen the conditions on which he based his opinion.

So far from taking this course,--which it may be said would have
conformed to instructions from his Government then on their way, and
issued after knowing Paul's death,--Parker appeared off Carlscrona on
April 20th. Two days afterwards he received a letter from the Russian
minister at Copenhagen, saying that the Emperor had ordered his fleet
to abstain from all hostilities. Parker apparently forgot that he was
first a naval officer, and only incidentally a diplomatist; for,
instead of exacting guarantees which would have insured the military
situation remaining unchanged until definite agreements had been
reached, he returned to Kioge Bay, near Copenhagen, but within the
Shallows, leaving the Revel squadron untrammelled, either by force or
pledge, free to go out when the ice allowed, and to join either the
Swedes or its own main body. Accordingly, it did come out a fortnight
later, went to Cronstadt, and so escaped the British fleet.

While on this cruise towards Carlscrona, Nelson became involved in a
pen-and-ink controversy about Commodore Fischer, who had commanded the
Danish line at the Battle of Copenhagen,--one of two or three rare
occasions which illustrate the vehemence and insolence that could be
aroused in him when his vanity was touched, or when he conceived his
reputation to be assailed. Fischer, in his official report of the
action, had comforted himself and his nation, as most beaten men do,
by dwelling upon--and unquestionably exaggerating--the significance of
certain incidents, either actual, or imagined by the Danes; for
instance, that towards the end of the battle, Nelson's own ship had
fired only single guns, and that two British ships had struck,--the
latter being an error, and the former readily accounted for by the
fact that the "Elephant" then had no enemy within easy range. What
particularly stung Nelson, however, seems to have been the assertion
that the British force was superior, and that his sending a flag of
truce indicated the injury done his squadron. Some of his friends had
thought, erroneously in the opinion of the author, that the flag was
an unjustifiable _ruse de guerre_, which made him specially sensitive
on this point.

His retort, addressed to his Danish friend, Lindholm, was written and
sent in such heat that it is somewhat incoherent in form, and more
full of abuse than of argument, besides involving him in
contradictions. That the British squadron was numerically superior in
guns seems certain; it would have been even culpable, having ships
enough, not to have employed them in any case, and especially when the
attacking force had to come into action amid dangerous shoals, and
against vessels already carefully placed and moored. In his official
report he had stated that the "Bellona" and "Russell" had grounded;
"but although not in the situation assigned them, yet so placed as to
be of great service." In the present dispute he claimed that they
should be left out of the reckoning, and he was at variance with the
Danish accounts as to the effect of Riou's frigates. But such errors,
he afterwards admitted to Lindholm, may creep into any official
report, and to measure credit merely by counting guns is wholly
illusory; for, as he confessed, with exaggerated humility, some months
later, "if any merit attaches itself to me, it was in combating the
dangers of the shallows in defiance of the pilots."

He chose, however, to consider that Fischer's letter had thrown
ridicule upon his character, and he resented it in terms as violent as
he afterwards used of the French admiral, Latouche Tréville, who
asserted that he had retired before a superior force; as though
Nelson, by any flight of imagination, could have been suspected of
over-caution. Fischer had twice shifted his broad pendant--that is,
his own position--in the battle; therefore he was a coward. "In his
letter he states that, after he quitted the Dannebrog, she long
contested the battle. If so, more shame for him to quit so many brave
fellows. _Here_ was no manoeuvring: _it was_ downright fighting, and
it was his duty to have shown an example of firmness becoming the high
trust reposed in him." This was probably a just comment, but not a
fair implication of cowardice. "He went in such a hurry, if he went
before she struck, which but for his own declaration I can hardly
believe, that he forgot to take his broad pendant with him." This
Lindholm showed was a mistake. "He seems to exult that I sent on shore
a flag of truce. Men of his description, if they ever are victorious,
know not the feeling of humanity.... Mr. Fischer's carcase was safe,
and he regarded not the sacred call of humanity." This letter was sent
to Lindholm, to be communicated to the Crown Prince; for, had not
Fischer addressed the latter as an eye-witness, Nelson "would have
treated his official letter with the contempt it deserved." Lindholm
kept it from Fischer, made a temperate reply defending the latter, and
the subject there dropped.

On the 25th of April the fleet was at anchor in Kioge Bay, and there
remained until the 5th of May, when orders arrived relieving Parker,
and placing Nelson in chief command. The latter was utterly dismayed.
Side by side with the unquenchable zeal for glory and for his
Country's service had been running the equally unquenchable passion
for Lady Hamilton; and, with the noble impulses that bore him up in
battle, sickness, and exposure, had mingled soft dreams of flight from
the world, of days spent upon the sunny slopes of Sicily, on his
estate of Bronté, amid scenes closely resembling those associated with
his past delights, and with the life of the woman whom he loved. To
this he several times alludes in the almost daily letters which he
wrote her. But, whether to be realized there or in England, he panted
for the charms of home which he had never known. "I am fixed," he
tells her, "to live a country life, and to have many (I hope) years of
comfort, which God knows, I never yet had--only moments of
happiness,"--a pathetic admission of the price he had paid for the
glory which could not satisfy him, yet which, by the law of his being,
he could not cease to crave. "I wish for happiness to be my reward,
and not titles or money;" and happiness means being with her whom he
repeatedly calls Santa Emma, and his "guardian angel,"--a fond
imagining, the sincerity of which checks the ready smile, but elicits
no tenderness for a delusion too gross for sympathy.

Whatever sacrifices he might be ready to make for his country's
service, he was not willing to give up all he held dear when the real
occasion for his exceptional powers had passed away; and the
assurances that the service absolutely required his presence in the
Baltic made no impression upon him. He knew better. "Had the command
been given me in February," he said, "many lives would have been
saved, and we should have been in a very different situation; but the
wiseheads at home know everything." Now it means expense and
suffering, and nothing to do beyond the powers of an average officer.
"Any other man can as well look about him as Nelson." "Sir Thomas
Troubridge," he complains, after enumerating his grievances, "had the
nonsense to say, now I was a Commander-in-Chief I must be pleased.
Does he take me for a greater fool than I am?" It was indeed shaving
pretty close to insult to send out a man like Nelson as second, when
great work was in hand, and then, after he had done all his superior
had permitted, and there was nothing left to do, to tell him that he
was indispensable; but to be congratulated upon the fact by a Lord of
the Admiralty, which Troubridge then was, was rather too much. He
could not refuse to accept the command, but he demanded his relief in
terms which could not be disregarded. His health, he said, made him
unequal to the service. For three weeks he could not leave his cabin.
"The keen air of the North kills me." "I did not come to the Baltic
with the design of dying a natural death."

Parker had no sooner departed than Nelson made the signal for the
fleet to weigh, and started at once for Revel. He did not know whether
or not the Russian ships were still there, and he felt that the change
of sovereigns probably implied a radical change of policy; but he
understood, also, that the part of a commander-in-chief was to see
that the military situation was maintained, from day to day, as
favorable as possible to his own country. He anticipated, therefore,
by his personal judgment, the instructions of the Cabinet, not to
enter upon hostilities if certain conditions could be obtained, but to
exact of the Russian Government, pending its decision, that the Revel
ships should remain where they were. "My object," he said, writing the
same day he took command, "_was_ to get at Revel before the frost
broke up at Cronstadt, that the twelve sail of the line might be
destroyed. I shall _now_ go there as a friend, _but the two fleets
shall not form a junction_, if not already accomplished, unless my
orders permit it." For the same reason, he wrote to the Swedish
admiral that he had no orders to abstain from hostilities if he met
his fleet at sea. He hoped, therefore, that he would see the wisdom of
remaining in port.

His visit to Revel, consequently, was to wear the external appearance
of a compliment to a sovereign whose friendly intentions were assumed.
To give it that color, he took with him only twelve ships-of-the-line,
leaving the others, with the small vessels of distinctly hostile
character, bombs, fireships, etc., anchored off Bornholm Island, a
Danish possession. The resolution to prevent a junction was contingent
and concealed. On the 12th the squadron arrived in the outer bay of
Revel, and a complimentary letter, announcing the purpose of his
coming, was sent to St. Petersburg. The next day he paid an official
visit to the authorities, when his vanity and love of attention
received fresh gratification. "Except to you, my own friend, I should
not mention it, 'tis so much like vanity; but hundreds come to look at
Nelson, '_that is him, that is him_,' in short, 'tis the same as in
Italy and Germany, and I now feel that a good name is better than
riches, not amongst our great folks in England; but it has its fine
feelings to an honest heart. All the Russians have taken it into their
heads that I am like _Suwaroff, Le jeune Suwaroff_;" thus confirming
the impression made upon Mrs. St. George at Dresden.

On the 16th of May a letter arrived from Count Pahlen, the Russian
minister. The Czar declined to see a compliment in the appearance in
Russian waters of so formidable a force, commanded by a seaman whose
name stood foremost, not merely for professional ability, but for
sudden, resolute, and aggressive action. "Nelson's presence," Niebuhr
had written, "leads us to think, judging of him by his past conduct,
that a furious attack will be made upon our harbor;" and he himself
had recorded with complacency that a Danish officer, visiting the
"London," upon learning that he was with the fleet in the Kattegat,
had said, "Is he here? Then I suppose it is no joke, if he is come."
"The Baltic folks will never fight me, if it is to be avoided." "The
Emperor, my Master," wrote Pahlen, "does not consider this step
compatible with the lively desire manifested by His Britannic Majesty,
to re-establish the good intelligence so long existing between the two
Monarchies. The only guarantee of the loyalty of your intentions that
His Majesty can accept, is the prompt withdrawal of the fleet under
your command, and no negotiation with your Court can take place, so
long as a naval force is in sight of his ports."

Nelson had of course recognized that the game was lost, as soon as he
saw that the Russian fleet was gone. The conditions which had mainly
prompted his visit were changed, and the Russian Government was in a
position to take a high tone, without fear of consequences. "After
such an answer," he wrote indignantly to St. Vincent, "I had no
business here. Time will show; but I do not believe he would have
written such a letter, if the Russian fleet had been in Revel." "Lord
Nelson received the letter a few minutes before dinner-time," wrote
Stewart. "He appeared to be a good deal agitated by it, but said
little, and did not return an immediate reply. During dinner, however,
he left the table, and in less than a quarter of an hour sent for his
secretary to peruse a letter which, in that short absence, he had
composed. The signal for preparing to weigh was immediately made; the
answer above-mentioned was sent on shore; and his Lordship caused the
fleet to weigh, and to stand as far to sea as was safe for that
evening."

Nelson took hold of Pahlen's expression, that he had come "with his
whole fleet" to Revel. Confining himself to that, he pointed out the
mistake the minister had made, for he had brought "not one-seventh of
his fleet in point of numbers." He mentioned also the deference that
he had paid to the Revel authorities. "My conduct, I feel, is so
entirely different to what your Excellency has expressed in your
letter, that I have only to regret, that my desire to pay a marked
attention to His Imperial Majesty has been so entirely misunderstood.
That being the case, I shall sail immediately into the Baltic."
Retiring thus in good order, if defeated, he had the satisfaction of
knowing that it was not his own blunder, but the wretched dilatoriness
of his predecessor, that had made the Czar, instead of the British
admiral, master of the situation.

Stopping for twenty-four hours at Bornholm on the way down, Nelson on
the 24th anchored in Rostock Bay, on the German coast of the Baltic,
and there awaited the relief he confidently expected. He had scarcely
arrived when a second letter from Pahlen overtook him. The minister
expressed his regret for any misunderstanding that had arisen as to
the purpose of his first visit, and continued, "I cannot give your
excellency a more striking proof of the confidence which the Emperor
my Master reposes in you, than by announcing the effect produced by
your letter of the 16th of this month. His Imperial Majesty has
ordered the immediate raising of the embargo placed upon the English
merchant ships." Nelson plumed himself greatly upon this result of his
diplomacy. "Our diplomatic men are so slow. Lord St. Helens told me
that he hoped in a month he should be able to tell me something
decisive. Now, what can take two hours I cannot even guess, but
Ministers must do something for their diamond boxes. I gained the
unconditional release of our ships, which neither Ministers nor Sir
Hyde Parker could accomplish, by showing my fleet. Then they became
alarmed, begged I would go away, or it would be considered as warlike.
On my complying, it pleased the Emperor and his ministers so much,
that the whole of the British shipping were given up." There is
nothing like the point of view; but it must be admitted that Nelson
extricated himself from an unpleasant position with great good temper
and sound judgment.

He remained in his flagship between Rostock and Kioge Bay, until
relieved by Vice-Admiral Pole on the 19th of June. Nothing of official
importance occurred during these three weeks; for the naval part of
the Baltic entanglement was ended, as he had foreseen. A pleasant
picture of his daily life on board the "St. George" at this time has
been preserved for us by Colonel Stewart: "His hour of rising was four
or five o'clock, and of going to rest about ten; breakfast was never
later than six, and generally nearer to five o'clock. A midshipman or
two were always of the party; and I have known him send during the
middle watch[36] to invite the little fellows to breakfast with him,
when relieved. At table with them, he would enter into their boyish
jokes, and be the most youthful of the party. At dinner he invariably
had every officer of the ship in their turn, and was both a polite and
hospitable host. The whole ordinary business of the fleet was
invariably despatched, as it had been by Earl St. Vincent, before
eight o'clock. The great command of time which Lord Nelson thus gave
himself, and the alertness which this example imparted throughout the
fleet, can only be understood by those who witnessed it, or who know
the value of early hours.... He did not again land whilst in the
Baltic; his health was not good, and his mind was not at ease; with
him, mind and health invariably sympathized."

While thus generally pleasant on board ship, he resolutely refused
intercourse with the outside world when not compelled by duty. In this
there appears to have been something self-imposed, in deference to
Lady Hamilton. There are indications that she felt, or feigned, some
jealousy of his relations with others, especially with women,
corresponding to the frenzied agitation he manifested at the
association of her name with that of any other man, and especially
with that of the then Prince of Wales. Whatever her real depth of
attachment to him, her best hope for the future was in his constancy,
and that he would eventually marry her; for Sir William's death could
not be far distant, and matters might otherwise favor the hope that
both he and she cherished. Her approaching widowhood would in fact
leave her, unless her husband's will was exceptionally generous, in a
condition as precarious, her acquired tastes considered, as that from
which her marriage had rescued her; and her uneasiness would naturally
arouse an uncertain and exacting temper, as in the old days at Naples,
when Hamilton could not make up his mind. The condition of Nelson's
health furnished him an excuse for declining all civilities or calls,
even from a reigning prince, on the ground that he was not well enough
to go ashore and return them. Soon after this, however, he was able to
write Lady Hamilton that he was perfectly recovered. "As far as
relates to health, I don't think I ever was stronger or in better
health. It is odd, but after severe illness I feel much better." Thus
he was, when definitely informed that his relief was on the way. "To
find a proper successor," said Lord St. Vincent, when announcing the
fact to him, "your lordship knows is no easy task; for I never saw the
man in our profession, excepting yourself and Troubridge, who
possessed the magic art of infusing the same spirit into others, which
inspired their own actions; exclusive of other talents and habits of
business, not common to naval characters." "I was so overcome
yesterday," wrote Nelson to Lady Hamilton, "with the good and happy
news that came about my going home, that I believe I was in truth
scarcely myself. The thoughts of going do me good, yet all night I was
so restless that I could not sleep. It is nearly calm, therefore
Admiral Pole cannot get on. If he was not to come, I believe it would
kill me. I am ready to start the moment I have talked with him one
hour."

On the 19th of June Nelson left the Baltic in the brig "Kite," and on
the 1st of July landed at Yarmouth.

FOOTNOTES:

[22] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxvii. p. 445.

[23] _Ante_, vol. i. pp. 199-202.

[24] Nelson to Lady Hamilton. Pettigrew, vol. i. pp. 442-444.

[25] Pitt had resigned from office since then.

[26] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxvii. p. 446.

[27] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxvii., art. "Layman."

[28] That is, from north to south. It may be well to notice that to go from
the Kattegat to the Baltic is _up_, although from north to south.

[29] Trekroner, which was then a favorite military name in Denmark, refers
to the three Crowns of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, once united.

[30] They are to be found in Nicolas's "Despatches and Letters of Lord
Nelson," vol. iv. p. 304.

[31] Except numbers 4 and 5, whose stations, as has been said, were abreast
the two southernmost Danes.

[32] The following is the order of the ships in the column of attack, as
originally prescribed:--

1. Edgar, 74. 2. Ardent, 64. 3. Glatton, 54. 4. Isis, 50. 5. Agamemnon, 64.
6. Bellona, 74. 7. Elephant, 74. 8. Ganges, 74. 9. Monarch, 74. 10.
Defiance, 74. 11. Russell, 74. 12. Polyphemus, 64.



[33] To acknowledge a signal is simply to hoist a flag, showing that it has
been seen and understood. To repeat is to hoist the signal yourself, thus
transmitting it as an order to those concerned.

[34] Life of Rev. Dr. A.J. Scott, p. 70

[35] Norway was then attached to the Danish Crown, as now to that of
Sweden.

[36] Midnight to four A.M.



CHAPTER XVII.

NELSON COMMANDS THE "SQUADRON ON A PARTICULAR SERVICE," FOR THE
DEFENCE OF THE COAST OF ENGLAND AGAINST INVASION.--SIGNATURE OF
PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE WITH FRANCE.

JULY-OCTOBER, 1801. AGE, 43.


Before sailing for the Baltic, and throughout his service in that sea,
the longing for repose and for a lover's paradise had disputed with
the love of glory for the empire in Nelson's heart, and signs were not
wanting that the latter was making a doubtful, if not a losing, fight.
Shortly before his departure for the North, he wrote to St. Vincent,
"Although, I own, I have met with much more honours and rewards than
ever my most sanguine ideas led me to expect, yet I am so
circumstanced that probably this Expedition will be the last service
ever performed by your obliged and affectionate friend." His old
commander was naturally perturbed at the thought that the illustrious
career, which he had done so much to foster, was to have the ignoble
termination to be inferred from these words and the notorious facts.
"Be assured, my dear Lord," he replied, "that every _public_[37] act
of your life has been the subject of my admiration, which I should
have sooner declared, but that I was appalled by the last sentence of
your letter: for God's sake, do not suffer yourself to be carried away
by any sudden impulse."

During his absence, the uncertain deferment of his desires had worked
together with the perverse indolence of Sir Hyde Parker, the fretting
sight of opportunities wasted, the constant chafing against the curb,
to keep both body and mind in perpetual unrest, to which the severe
climate contributed by undermining his health. This unceasing
discomfort had given enhanced charm to his caressing dreams of
reposeful happiness, soothed and stimulated by the companionship which
he so far had found to fulfil all his power of admiration, and all his
demands for sympathy. Released at last, he landed in England
confidently expecting to realize his hopes, only to find that they
must again be postponed. Reputation such as his bears its own penalty.
There was no other man in whose name England could find the calm
certainty of safety, which popular apprehension demanded in the new
emergency, that had arisen while he was upholding her cause in the
northern seas. Nelson repined, but he submitted. Within four weeks his
flag was flying again, and himself immersed in professional anxieties.

War on the continent of Europe had ceased definitively with the treaty
of Lunéville, between France and Austria, signed February 9, 1801.
Over four years were to elapse before it should recommence. But, as
Great Britain was to be the first to take up arms again to resist the
encroachments of Bonaparte, so now she was the last to consent to
peace, eager as her people were to have it. Malta had fallen, the
Armed Neutrality of the North had dissolved, the French occupation of
Egypt was at its last gasp. Foiled in these three directions by the
sea-power of Great Britain, unable, with all his manipulation of the
prostrate continent, to inflict a deadly wound, Bonaparte now resorted
to the threat of invasion, well aware that, under existing conditions,
it could be but a threat, yet hoping that its influence upon a people
accustomed to sleep securely might further his designs. But, though
the enchanter wove his spells to rouse the demon of fear, their one
effect was to bring up once more, over against him, the defiant form
of his arch-subverter. Both the Prime Minister, Addington, and the
First Lord of the Admiralty assured Nelson that his presence in charge
of the dispositions for defence, and that only, could quiet the public
mind. "I have seen Lord St. Vincent," he wrote the former, "and submit
to your and his partiality. Whilst my health will allow, I can only
say, that every exertion of mine shall be used to merit the
continuance of your esteem." St. Vincent, writing to him a fortnight
later, avowed frankly the weight attached to his very name by both
friend and foe. "Our negotiation is drawing near its close, and must
terminate one way or another in a few days, and, I need not add, how
very important it is that the enemy should know that _you_ are
constantly opposed to him."

The purpose of Bonaparte in 1801 is not to be gauged by the same
measure as that of 1803-1805. In 1798 he had told the then government
of France that to make a descent upon England, without being master of
the sea, would be the boldest and most difficult operation ever
attempted. Conditions had not changed since then, nor had he now the
time or the money to embark in the extensive preparations, which
afterwards gave assurance that he was in earnest in his threats. An
adept in making false demonstrations, perfectly appreciative of the
power of a great name, he counted upon his own renown, and his amazing
achievement of the apparently impossible in the past, to overawe the
imagination of a nation, whose will, rather than whose strength, he
hoped to subdue. Boulogne and the small neighboring ports, whose
nearness clearly indicated them as the only suitable base from which
an invasion could start, were in that year in no state to receive the
boats necessary to carry an army. This the British could see with
their own eyes; but who could be sure that the paper flotilla at
Boulogne, like the paper Army of Reserve at Dijon a year before, had
not elsewhere a substantial counterpart, whose sudden appearance might
yet work a catastrophe as unexpected and total as that of Marengo? And
who more apt than Bonaparte to spread the impression that some such
surprise was brewing? "I can venture to assure you that no embarkation
of troops can take place at Boulogne," wrote Nelson, immediately after
his first reconnoissance; but he says at the same time, "I have now
more than ever reason to believe that the ports of Flushing and
Flanders are much more likely places to embark men from, than Calais,
Boulogne, or Dieppe; for in Flanders we cannot tell by our eyes what
means they have collected for carrying an army." "Great preparations
at Ostend," he notes a week later; "Augereau commands that part of the
Army. I hope to let him feel the bottom of the Goodwin Sand." It was
just this sort of apprehension, specific in direction, yet vague and
elusive in details, that Bonaparte was skilled in disseminating.

St. Vincent, and the Government generally, agreed with Nelson's
opinion. "We are to look to Flanders for the great effort," wrote the
Earl to him. Neither of them had, nor was it possible for clear-headed
naval officers to have, any substantial, rational, fear of a descent
in force; yet the vague possibility did, for the moment, impress even
them, and the liability of the populace, and of the commercial
interests, to panic, was a consideration not to be overlooked.
Besides, in a certain way, there was no adequate preparation for
resistance. The British Navy, indeed, was an overwhelming force as
compared to the French; but its hands were fully occupied, and the
fleet Nelson had just left in the Baltic could not yet be recalled. It
was, however, in purely defensive measures, in the possession of a
force similar to that by which the proposed attack was to be made, and
in dispositions analogous to coast defences, that the means were
singularly defective, both in material and men. "Everything, my dear
Lord," wrote Nelson, the day after he hoisted his flag at Sheerness,
"must have a beginning, and we are literally at the foundation of our
fabric of defence;" but, he continues, reverting to his own and St.
Vincent's clear and accurate military intuitions, "I agree perfectly
with you, that we must keep the enemy as far from our own coasts as
possible, and be able to attack them the moment they come out of their
ports."

"Our first defence," he writes a fortnight later, showing the gradual
maturing of the views which he, in common with St. Vincent, held with
such illustrious firmness in the succeeding years, "is close to the
enemy's ports. When that is broke, others will come forth on our own
coasts." It was in the latter that the unexpected anxieties of 1801
found the Government deficient, and these it was to be Nelson's first
care to organize and dispose. By the time his duties were completed,
and the problems connected with them had been two months under his
consideration, he had reached the conclusion which Napoleon also held,
and upon which he acted. "This boat business may be a part of a great
plan of Invasion, but can never be the only one." From the first he
had contemplated the possibility of the French fleets in Brest and
elsewhere attempting diversions, such as Napoleon planned in support
of his later great projects. "Although I feel confident that the
fleets of the enemy will meet the same fate which has always attended
them, yet their sailing will facilitate the coming over of their
flotilla, as they will naturally suppose our attention will be called
only to the fleets."

What was feared in 1801 was not a grand military operation, in the
nature of an attempt at conquest, or, at the least, at injury so
serious as to be disabling, but rather something in the nature of a
great raid, of which the most probable object was the city of London,
the chief commercial centre. It was upon this supposition that the
instructions of the Admiralty to Nelson were framed, and upon this
also the memorandum as to methods, submitted by him to it, on the 25th
of July, 1801. "It is certainly proper to believe that the French are
coming to attack London. I will suppose that 40,000 men are destined
for this attack, or rather surprise." His plan is given first in his
own words, as due to a matter of so much importance; and to them the
writer appends a summary of the principal features, as understood by
him. These are not always easily to be seen on the face of the paper,
owing to the small time for its preparation, and the consequent
haste--off-hand almost--with which it was drawn up, as is further
indicated from the copy in the Admiralty being in his own writing.

    MEMORANDA BY LORD NELSON, ON THE DEFENCE OF THE THAMES, ETC.

    25th July, 1801.

    Besides the stationed Ships at the different posts between the
    North Foreland and Orfordness, as many Gun-vessels as can be
    spared from the very necessary protection of the Coast of Sussex
    and of Kent to the westward of Dover, should be collected, for
    this part of the Coast must be seriously attended to; for
    supposing London the object of surprise, I am of opinion that
    the Enemy's object _ought_ to be the getting on shore as
    speedily as possible, for the dangers of a navigation of
    forty-eight hours, appear to me to be an insurmountable
    objection to the rowing from Boulogne to the Coast of Essex. It
    is therefore most probable (for it is certainly proper to
    believe the French are coming to attack London, and therefore to
    be prepared) that from Boulogne, Calais, and even Havre, that
    the enemy will try and land in Sussex, or the lower part of
    Kent, and from Dunkirk, Ostend, and the other Ports of Flanders,
    to land on the Coast of Essex or Suffolk; for I own myself of
    opinion that, the object being to get on shore somewhere within
    100 miles of London, as speedily as possible, that the Flats in
    the mouth of the Thames will not be the only place necessary to
    attend to; added to this, the Enemy will create a powerful
    diversion by the sailing of the Combined Fleet, and the either
    sailing, or creating such an appearance of sailing, of the Dutch
    Fleet, as will prevent Admiral Dickson from sending anything
    from off the great Dutch Ports, whilst the smaller Ports will
    spew forth its Flotilla,--viz., Flushing, &c. &c. It must be
    pretty well ascertained what number of small Vessels are in each
    Port.

    "I will suppose that 40,000 men are destined for this attack, or
    rather surprise, of London; 20,000 will land on the west side of
    Dover, sixty or seventy miles from London, and the same number
    on the east side: they are too knowing to let us have but one
    point of alarm for London. Supposing 200 craft, or 250,
    collected at Boulogne &c, they are supposed equal to carry
    20,000 men. In very calm weather, they might row over, supposing
    no impediment, in twelve hours; at the same instant, by
    telegraph, the same number of troops would be rowed out of
    Dunkirk, Ostend, &c. &c. These are the two great objects to
    attend to from Dover and the Downs, and perhaps one of the small
    Ports to the westward. Boulogne (which I call the central point
    of the Western attack) must be attended to. If it is calm when
    the Enemy row out, all our Vessels and Boats appointed to watch
    them, must get into the Channel, and meet them as soon as
    possible: if not strong enough for the attack, they must watch,
    and keep them company till a favourable opportunity offers. If a
    breeze springs up, our Ships are to deal _destruction_; no
    delicacy can be observed on this great occasion. But should it
    remain calm, and our Flotilla not fancy itself strong enough to
    attack the Enemy on their passage, the moment that they begin to
    touch our shore, strong or weak, our Flotilla of Boats must
    attack as much of the Enemy's Flotilla as they are able--say
    only one-half or two-thirds; it will create a most powerful
    diversion, for the bows of our Flotilla will be opposed to their
    unarmed sterns, and the courage of Britons will never, I
    believe, allow one Frenchman to leave the beach. A great number
    of Deal and Dover Boats to be on board our vessels off the Port
    of Boulogne, to give notice of the direction taken by the Enemy.
    If it is calm, Vessels in the Channel can make signals of
    intelligence to our shores, from the North Foreland to
    Orfordness, and even as far as Solebay, not an improbable
    place, about seventy or eighty miles from London.

    "A Flotilla to be kept near Margate and Ramsgate, to consist of
    Gun-boats and Flat-boats; another Squadron to be stationed near
    the centre, between Orfordness and North Foreland, and the third
    in Hoseley Bay.[38] The Floating Batteries are stationed in all
    proper positions for defending the different Channels, and the
    smaller Vessels will always have a resort in the support of the
    stationed ships. The moment of the Enemy's movement from
    Boulogne, is to be considered as the movement of the Enemy from
    Dunkirk. Supposing it calm, the Flotillas are to be rowed, and
    the heavy ones towed, (except the stationed Ships), those near
    Margate, three or four leagues to the north of the North
    Foreland; those from Hoseley Bay, a little approaching the
    Centre Division, but always keeping an eye towards Solebay; the
    Centre Division to advance half-way between the two. The more
    fast Rowing boats, called Thames Galleys, which can be procured
    the better, to carry orders, information, &c. &c.

    "Whenever the Enemy's Flotilla can be seen, our Divisions are to
    unite, but not intermix, and to be ready to execute such orders
    as may be deemed necessary, or as the indispensable
    circumstances may require. For this purpose, men of such
    confidence in each other should be looked for, that (as far as
    human foresight can go,) no little jealousy may creep into any
    man's mind, but to be all animated with the same desire of
    preventing the descent of the Enemy on our Coasts. Stationary
    Floating Batteries are not, from any apparent advantage, to be
    moved, for the tide may prevent their resuming the very
    important stations assigned them; they are on no account to be
    supposed neglected, even should the Enemy surround them, for
    they may rely on support, and reflect that perhaps their gallant
    conduct may prevent the mischievous designs of the Enemy.
    Whatever plans may be adopted, the moment the Enemy touch our
    Coast, be it where it may, they are to be attacked by every man
    afloat and on shore: this must be perfectly understood. _Never
    fear the event_. The Flat Boats can probably be manned (partly,
    at least,) with the Sea Fencibles, (the numbers or fixed places
    of whom I am entirely ignorant of,) but the Flat Boats they may
    man to be in grand and sub-divisions, commanded by their own
    Captains and Lieutenants, as far as is possible. The number of
    Flat Boats is unknown to me, as also the other means of defence
    in Small Craft; but I am clearly of opinion that a proportion of
    the small force should be kept to watch the Flat-Boats from
    Boulogne, and the others in the way I have presumed to suggest.
    These are offered as merely the rude ideas of the moment, and
    are only meant as a Sea plan of defence for the City of London;
    but I believe other parts may likewise be menaced, if the Brest
    fleet, and those from Rochfort and Holland put to sea; although
    I feel confident that the Fleets of the Enemy will meet the same
    fate which has always attended them, yet their sailing will
    facilitate the coming over of their Flotilla, as they will
    naturally suppose our attention will be called only to the
    Fleets."

Coming by water, the expectation seems to have been that the enemy
might proceed up the river, or to a landing on some of the flats at
the mouth of the Thames. Nelson says expressly that he does not think
those alone are the points to be guarded; but he characterizes his
paper as being "only meant as a sea plan of defence for the city of
London," and the suggestion already noticed, that the enemy's fleet
will support the attack by diversions, is merely mentioned casually.
London being the supposed object, and the Thames the highway, the
purely defensive force is to be concentrated there; the Channel
coasts, though not excluded, are secondary. "As many gun-vessels as
can be spared from the very necessary protection of the coast of
Sussex, and of Kent to the westward of Dover, should be collected
between the North Foreland and Orfordness, for this part of the coast
must be seriously attended to."

The attack is expected in this quarter, because from Flanders and
Flushing it is the most accessible. The object, Nelson thinks, will be
to get on shore as speedily as possible, and therefore somewhere
within one hundred miles of London. Anywhere from the westward of
Dover round to Solebay--"not an improbable place"--must be looked upon
as a possible landing. If there are forty thousand men coming, he
regards it as certain that they will come in two principal bodies, of
twenty thousand each--"they are too knowing to let us have but one
point of alarm for London." "From Boulogne, Calais, and even Havre,
the enemy will try and land in Sussex, or the lower part of Kent; and
from Dunkirk, Ostend, and the other ports of Flanders, to land on the
coast of Essex or Suffolk." "In very calm weather, they might row over
from Boulogne, supposing no impediment, in twelve hours; at the same
instant, by telegraph, the same number of troops would be rowed out of
Dunkirk, Ostend, &c. &c. Added to this, the enemy will create a
powerful diversion by the sailing of the combined fleet, and either
the sailing, or creating such an appearance of sailing, of the Dutch
fleet, as will prevent Admiral Dickson [commander-in-chief in the
North Sea] from sending anything from off the great Dutch ports,
whilst the smaller ports will spew forth its flotilla--viz, Flushing
&c. &c."

To frustrate that part of this combined effort which is supposed to be
directed against the Channel coast, Nelson proposes that, "if it is
calm when the enemy row out, all our vessels and boats appointed to
watch them, must get into the Channel, and meet them as soon as
possible; if not strong enough for the attack, they must watch, and
keep them company till a favourable opportunity offers. Should it
remain calm," so that the cruising ships cannot assist, "the moment
that they begin to touch our shore, strong or weak, our flotilla of
boats must attack as much of the enemy's flotilla as they are
able--say only one half or two thirds--it will create a most powerful
diversion, for the bows of our flotilla will be opposed to their
unarmed sterns."

The dispositions to defend the entrance of the Thames, being
considered the more important, are the more minute. Blockships are
stationed in the principal channels, as floating fortifications,
commanding absolutely the water around them, and forming strong points
of support for the flotilla. It is sagaciously ordered that these "are
not, from any apparent advantage, to be moved, for the tide may
prevent their resuming the very important stations assigned them."
Nelson was evidently alive to that advantage in permanent works, which
puts it out of the power of panic to stampede them; tide is not the
only factor that prevents retrieving a false step. The eastern
flotilla is organized into three bodies, the right wing being near
Margate, the left in Hollesley Bay near Harwich, the centre, vaguely,
between Orfordness and the North Foreland. When the alarm is given,
they are to draw together towards the centre, but not to emphasize
their movement sufficiently to uncover either flank, until the enemy's
flotilla can be seen; then they are "to unite, but not intermix."

To both divisions--that in the Channel and that on' the East
Coast--the commander-in-chief, in concluding, renews his charge, with
one of those "Nelson touches" which electrified his followers:
"Whatever plans may be adopted, the moment the enemy touch our coast,
be it where it may, they are to be attacked by every man afloat and on
shore: this must be perfectly understood. _Never fear the event_."

This plan for the defence of London against an attack by surprise,
drawn up by Nelson on the spur of the moment, was based simply upon
his general ideas, and without specific information yet as to either
the character or extent of the enemy's preparations, or of the means
of resistance available on his own side. It has, therefore, something
of an abstract character, embodying broad views unmodified by special
circumstances, and possessing, consequently, a somewhat peculiar
value in indicating the tendency of Nelson's military conceptions. He
assumes, implicitly, a certain freedom of movement on the part of the
two opponents, unrestricted by the friction and uncertainty which in
practice fetter action; and the use which, under these conditions, he
imagines either will make of his powers, may not unfairly be assumed
to show what he thought the correct course in such a general case.

Prominent among his ideas, and continuous in all his speculations as
to the movements of an enemy, from 1795 onward, is the certainty that,
for the sake of diversion, Bonaparte will divide his force into two
great equal fragments, which may land at points so far apart, and
separated by such serious obstacles, as were Solebay and Dover. Those
who will be at the trouble to recall his guesses as to the future
movements of the French in the Riviera, Piedmont, and Tuscany, in 1795
and 1796, as well as his own propositions to the Austrians at the same
period, will recognize here the recurrence, unchastened by experience
or thought, of a theory of warfare it is almost impossible to approve.
That Bonaparte,--supposed to be master of his first movements,--if he
meant to land in person at Dover, would put half his army ashore at
Solebay, is as incredible as that he would have landed one half at
Leghorn, meaning to act with the other from the Riviera. If this
criticism be sound, it would show that Nelson, genius as he was,
suffered from the lack of that study which reinforces its own
conclusions by the experience of others; and that his experience,
resting upon service in a navy so superior in quality to its enemies,
that great inferiority in number or position could be accepted, had
not supplied the necessary corrective to an ill-conceived readiness to
sub-divide.

The resultant error is clearly traceable, in the author's opinion, in
his dispositions at Copenhagen, and in a general tendency to allow
himself too narrow a margin, based upon an under-valuation of the
enemy not far removed from contempt. It was most fortunate for him, in
the Baltic, that Parker increased to twelve the detachment he himself
had fixed at ten. The last utterances of his life, however, show a
distinct advance and ripening of the judgment, without the slightest
decrease of the heroic resolution that so characterized him. "I have
twenty-three sail with me," he wrote a fortnight before Trafalgar,
"and should they come out I will immediately bring them to battle; ...
but I am _very, very, very_ anxious for the arrival of the force which
is intended. It is, as Mr. Pitt knows, annihilation that the country
wants, and not merely a splendid victory of twenty-three to
thirty-six. Numbers only can annihilate."

The assumption that Bonaparte's plan would be such as he mentioned,
naturally controlled Nelson in the dispositions he sketched for the
local defence of the shore lines. The invasion being in two bodies,
the defence was to be in two bodies also; nor is there any suggestion
of a possibility that these two might be united against one of the
enemy's. The whole scheme is dual; yet, although the chance of either
division of the British being largely inferior to the enemy opposed to
it is recognized, the adoption of a central position, or concentration
upon either of the enemy's flotillas, apparently is not contemplated.
Such uncertainty of touch, when not corrected by training, is the
natural characteristic of a defence essentially passive; that is, of a
defence which proposes to await the approach of the enemy to its own
frontier, be that land or water. Yet it scarcely could have failed
soon to occur to men of Nelson's and St. Vincent's martial capacities,
that a different disposition, which would clearly enable them to unite
and intercept either one of the enemy's divisions, must wreck the
entire project; for the other twenty thousand men alone could not do
serious or lasting injury. The mere taking a position favorable to
such concentration would be an adequate check. The trouble for them
undoubtedly was that which overloads, and so nullifies, all schemes
for coast defence resting upon popular outcry, which demands outward
and visible protection for every point, and assurance that people at
war shall be guarded, not only against broken bones, but against even
scratches of the skin.

This uneducated and weak idea, that protection is only adequate when
co-extensive with the frontier line threatened, finds its natural
outcome in a system of defence by very small vessels, in great
numbers, capable of minute subdivision and wide dispersal, to which an
equal tonnage locked up in larger ships cannot be subjected. Although
St. Vincent was at the head of the Admiralty which in 1801 ordered
that Nelson should first organize such a flotilla, and only after that
proceed to offensive measures, the results of his experience now were
to form--or at the least to confirm in him--the conclusion which he
enunciated, and to which he persistently held, during the later truly
formidable preparations of Napoleon. "Our great reliance is on the
vigilance and activity of our cruisers at sea, any reduction in the
number of which, by applying them to guard our ports, inlets, and
beaches, would in my judgment tend to our destruction." Very
strangely, so far as the author's opinion goes, Nelson afterwards
expressed an apparently contrary view, and sustained Mr. Pitt in his
attack upon St. Vincent's administration on this very point; an
attack, in its tendency and in the moment chosen, among the most
dangerous to his country ever attempted by a great and sagacious
statesman. Nelson, however, writing in May, 1804, says: "I had wrote a
memoir, many months ago, upon the propriety of a flotilla. I had that
command at the end of the last war, and I know the necessity of it,
even had you, and which you ought to have, thirty or forty sail of the
line in the Downs and North Sea, besides frigates &c.; but having
failed so entirely in submitting my mind upon three points I was
disheartened." This Memoir has not been preserved, but it will be
noticed that, in expressing his difference from St. Vincent in the
words quoted, he assumes, what did not at any time exist, thirty or
forty sail-of-the-line for the North Sea and the Downs. St. Vincent's
stand was taken on the position that the flotilla could not be manned
without diminishing the cruisers in commission, which were far short
of the ideal number named by Nelson. It may be believed, or at least
hoped, that if forced to choose between the two, as St. Vincent was,
his choice would have been that of the great Earl. It seems clear,
however, that in 1804 he believed it possible that the Army of
Invasion _might_ get as far as the shores of England--a question which
has been much argued. "I am very uneasy," he then wrote to Lady
Hamilton, "at your and Horatia being on the coast: for you cannot
move, if the French make the attempt."

Whatever weight may be attributed to this criticism on Nelson's
hastily sketched scheme, there can scarcely be any discord in the note
of admiration for the fire that begins to glow, the instant he in
thought draws near the enemy. There, assuredly, is no uncertain sound.
They must be met as soon as possible; if not strong enough to attack,
they must be watched, and company kept, till a favorable opportunity
offers. If none occur till they draw near the beach, then, "Whatever
plans may be adopted, the moment they touch our coast, be it where it
may, they are to be attacked by every man afloat and on shore: this
must be perfectly understood. Never fear the event." The resolution
shown by such words is not born of carelessness; and the man who
approaches his work in their spirit will wring success out of many
mistakes of calculation--unless indeed he stumble on an enemy of equal
determination. The insistence upon keeping the enemy under
observation, "keeping company" with them, however superior in
numbers, may also be profitably noted. This inspired his whole
purpose, four years later, in the pursuit of the French to the West
Indies--if the odds are too great for immediate attack, "We won't part
without a battle." It was the failure to hold the same principle of
action, applicable to such diverse cases, that ruined Calder in the
same campaign.

With the general views that have been outlined, Nelson hastened to his
task. His commission for the new service was dated July 24, three
weeks after his return from the Baltic. On the 25th he presented the
memorandum of operations which has been discussed, on the 26th the
Admiralty issued their instructions, and on the 27th he hoisted his
flag upon the "Unité" frigate at Sheerness. "I shall go on board this
day," he said, "in order to show we must all get to our posts as
speedily as possible." His orders, after mentioning the general reason
for creating the "Squadron on a Particular Service," as his command
was officially styled, designated the limits of his charge, coastwise,
as from Orfordness, on the Suffolk shore, round to Beachy Head, on the
Channel. On the enemy's side of the water, it extended from end to end
of the line of ports from which the especial danger of an invasion by
troops might be supposed to issue--from Dieppe to Ostend; but the
mouth of the Scheldt was implicitly included.

The district thus assigned to him was taken out of the commands
hitherto held by some very reputable admirals, senior to himself, who
otherwise retained their previous charges, surrounding and touching
his own; while at the Scheldt he trenched closely upon the province of
the commander-in-chief in the North Sea. Such circumstances are
extremely liable to cause friction and bad blood, and St. Vincent, who
with all his despotism was keenly alive to the just susceptibilities
of meritorious officers, was very careful to explain to them that he
had with the greatest reluctance yielded to the necessity of
combining the preparations for defence under a single flag-officer,
who should have no other care. The innate tact, courtesy, and
thoughtful consideration which distinguished Nelson, when in normal
conditions, removed all other misunderstandings. "The delicacy you
have always shown to senior officers," wrote St. Vincent to him, "is a
sure presage of your avoiding by every means in your power to give
umbrage to Admiral Dickson, who seems disposed to judge favourably of
the intentions of us all: it is, in truth, the most difficult card we
have to play." "Happy should I be," he said at another time, "to place
the whole of our offensive and defensive war under your auspices, but
you are well aware of the difficulties on that head." From first to
last there is no trace of a serious jar, and Nelson's instructions to
his subordinates were such as to obviate the probability of any. "I
feel myself, my dear Lord," he wrote St. Vincent, relative to a
projected undertaking on the Dutch coast, "as anxious to get a medal,
or a step in the peerage as if I had never got either. If I succeeded,
and burnt the Dutch fleet, probably medals and an earldom. I must have
had every desire to try the matter, regardless of the feelings of
others; but I should not have been your Nelson, that wants not to take
honours or rewards from any man; and if ever I feel great, it is, my
dear Lord, in never having, in thought, word, or deed, robbed any man
of his fair fame."

He was accompanied from London by a young commander, Edward Parker,
who seems first to have become known to him in the Baltic, and who now
acted as an additional aide. The latter was filled with the
admiration, felt by most of those thrown into contact with Nelson, for
the rapidity with which he transacted business, and set all about him
in movement. "He is the cleverest and quickest man, and the most
zealous in the world. In the short time we were in Sheerness, he
regulated and gave orders for thirty of the ships under his command,
made every one pleased, filled them with emulation, and set them all
on the _qui vive_." In forty-eight hours he was off again for the
Downs, by land, having to make some inquiries on the way as to the
organization, and readiness to serve, of the Sea Fencibles, a large
body of naval reserves, who were exempt from impressment upon the
understanding that they would come forward for coast defence, in case
of threatened invasion. Concerning their dispositions he received
fairly flattering assurances, which in the event were not realized. If
the men were certified that they would not be detained after the
danger was over, it was said, they certainly would go on board. "This
service, my dear Lord," he wrote to St. Vincent, "above all others,
would be terrible for me: to get up and harangue like a recruiting
sergeant; but as I am come forth, I feel that I ought to do this
disagreeable service as well as any other, if judged necessary."

Three days more, and he was off Boulogne in a frigate with some
bomb-vessels. The French admiral, Latouche Tréville, had moored in
front of the pier a line of gun-vessels, twenty-four in number,
fastened together from end to end. At these, and at the shipping in
the small port, some bombs were thrown. Not much injury was done on
either side. Prevented by an easterly wind from going on to Flushing,
as he had intended, Nelson returned to Margate on the 6th of August,
issued a proclamation to the Fencibles, assuring them that the French
undoubtedly intended an invasion, that their services were absolutely
required at once on board the defence-ships, and that they could rely
upon being returned to their homes as soon as the danger was over. Out
of twenty-six hundred, only three hundred and eighty-five volunteered
to this urgent call. "They are no more willing to give up their
occupations than their superiors," wrote Nelson, with
characteristically shrewd insight into a frame of mind wholly alien
to his own self-sacrificing love of Country and of glory.

Hurrying from station to station, on the shores, and in the channels
of the Thames, he was on the 12th of August back at Margate, evidently
disappointed in the prospects for coast-defence, and more and more
inclining to the deep-sea cruising, and to action on the enemy's
coast, recommended by the Admiralty, and consonant to his own temper,
always disdainful of mere defensive measures. "Our active force is
perfect," he wrote to St. Vincent, "and possesses so much zeal that I
only want to catch that Buonaparte on the water." He has satisfied
himself that the French preparations were greatly exaggerated;
Boulogne in fact could not harbor the needed vessels, unless enlarged,
as afterwards by Napoleon. "Where is our invasion to come from? The
_time_ is gone." Nevertheless, he favors an attack of some sort,
suggests an expedition against Flushing, with five thousand troops,
and proposes a consultation. St. Vincent replied that he did not
believe in consultations, and had always avoided them. "I disapprove
of unnecessary consultations as much as any man," retorted Nelson,
"yet being close to the Admiralty, I should not feel myself justified
in risking our ships through the channels of Flushing without buoys
and pilots, without a consultation with such men as your Lordship, and
also I believe you would think an order absolutely necessary." "Lord
St. Vincent tells me he hates councils," he writes rather sorely to
Addington. "So do I between military men; for if a man consults
whether he is to fight, when he has the power in his own hands, _it is
certain that his opinion is against fighting_; but that is not the
case at present, and I own I do want good council. Lord St. Vincent is
for keeping the enemy closely blockaded; but I see they get alongshore
inside their sand banks, and under their guns, which line the coast of
France. Lord Hood is for keeping our squadrons of defence stationary
on our own shore (except light cutters to give information of every
movement of the enemy).... When men of such good sense, such great
sea-officers, differ so widely, is it not natural that I should wish
the mode of defence to be well arranged by the mature consideration of
men of judgment?"

Meanwhile he had again gone off Boulogne, and directed an attack in
boats upon the line of vessels moored outside. He took great care in
the arrangements for this hazardous expedition, giving personal
supervision to all details. "As you may believe, my dear Emma," he
wrote to her who had his closest confidence, "my mind feels at what is
going forward this night; it is one thing to order and arrange an
attack, and another to execute it; but I assure you I have taken much
more precaution for others, than if I was to go myself--then my mind
would be perfectly at ease." He professed, and probably felt, entire
confidence in the result. Fifty-seven boats were detailed for the
attack. They were in four divisions, each under a commander; Edward
Parker having one. Each division was to advance in two columns, the
boats of which were secured one to another by tow-ropes; a precaution
invaluable to keep them together, though rendering progress slower.
The points in the enemy's line which each division was to make for
were clearly specified, and special boats told off and fitted to tow
out any vessels that were captured. Simultaneous with this onslaught,
a division of howitzer flatboats was to throw shot into the port.

At half-past eleven on the night of August 15th, the boats, which had
assembled alongside the flag-frigate "Medusa," shoved off together;
but the distance which they had to pull, with the strong, uncertain
currents, separated them; and, as so often happens in concerted
movements, attacks intended to be simultaneous were made
disconnectedly, while the French were fully prepared. The first
division of the British arrived at half-past twelve, and after a
desperate struggle was beaten off, Commander Parker being mortally
wounded. Two other divisions came up later, while the fourth lost its
way altogether. The affair was an entire failure, except so far as to
show that the enemy would be met on their own shores, rather than on
those of Great Britain. The British loss was forty-four killed, and
one hundred and twenty-eight wounded.

Nelson returned to the Downs, bitterly grieved, but not greatly
discouraged. The mishap, he said, was due to the boats not arriving at
the same moment; and that, he knew, was caused by conditions of
currents, which would ever prevent the dull flatboats of the enemy
moving in a concert that the cutters of ships of war had not attained.
"The craft which I have seen," he wrote, "I do not think it possible
to _row_ to England; and sail they cannot." As yet, however, he had
not visited Flushing, and he felt it necessary to satisfy himself on
that point. On the 24th of August, taking some pilots with him, he
went across and inspected the ground, where the officer in charge of
the British observing squadron was confident something might be
effected. Nelson, however, decided otherwise. "I cannot but admire
Captain Owen's zeal in his anxious desire to get at the enemy, but I
am afraid it has made him overleap sand-banks and tides, and laid him
aboard the enemy. I could join most heartily in his desire; but we
cannot do impossibilities, and I am as little used to find out the
impossibles as most folks; and I think I can discriminate between the
impracticable and the fair prospect of success." By the 27th of August
he had returned to the Downs, where, with a brief and unimportant
intermission, he remained until the cessation of hostilities with
France in October.

Satisfied that invasion was, for that year at least, an empty menace,
Nelson fell again into the tone of angry and fretful complaint which
was so conspicuous in the last weeks of his stay in the Baltic. To
borrow the words of a French admirer, "He filled the Admiralty with
his caprices and Europe with his fame." Almost from his first contact
with this duty, it had been distasteful to him. "There is nothing to
be done on the great scale," he said. "I own, my dear Lord," he told
St. Vincent, "that this boat warfare is not exactly congenial to my
feelings, and I find I get laughed at for my puny mode of attack." As
usual, he threw himself with all his might into what he had to do, but
the inward friction remained. "Whilst I serve, I will do it actively,
and to the very best of my abilities. I have all night had a fever,
which is very little abated this morning; my mind carries me beyond my
strength, and will do me up; but such is my nature. I require nursing
like a child."

That he was far from well is as unquestionable as that his distemper
proceeded largely from his mind, if it did not originate there. "Our
separation is terrible," he writes to Lady Hamilton; "my heart is
ready to flow out of my eyes. I am not unwell, but I am very low. I
can only account for it by my absence from all I hold dear in this
world." From the first he had told St. Vincent that he could not stay
longer than September 14th, that it was beyond his strength to stand
the equinoctial weather. The veteran seaman showed towards him the
same delicate consideration that he always had, using the flattering
urgency which Nelson himself knew so well how to employ, in eliciting
the hearty co-operation of others. "The public mind is so much
tranquillised by your being at your post, it is extremely desirable
that you should continue there: in this opinion all His Majesty's
servants, with Sir Thomas Troubridge, agree. Let me entreat your
Lordship to persevere in the measures you are so advantageously
employed in, and give up, at least for the present, your intention of
returning to town, which would have the worst possible effect at this
critical juncture. The dispositions you have made, and are making,
appear to us all as the most judicious possible." "I hope you will
not relinquish your situation at a moment when the services of every
man are called for by the circumstances the Country is placed in, so
imperiously that, upon reflection, I persuade myself you will think as
I, and every friend you have, do on this subject." Nelson admitted, in
a calmer moment, that "although my whole soul is devoted to get rid of
this command, yet I do not blame the Earl for wishing to keep me here
a little longer." "Pray take care of your health," the latter says
again, "than which nothing is of so much consequence to the Country at
large, more particularly so to your very affectionate St. Vincent."
"Your health is so precious at all times, more particularly so at this
crisis."

St. Vincent tried in vain to conjure with the once beloved name of
Troubridge, whom Nelson used to style the "Nonpareil," whose merits he
had been never weary of extolling, and whose cause he had pleaded so
vehemently, when the accident of his ship's grounding deprived him of
his share in the Battle of the Nile. From the moment that he was
chosen by St. Vincent, who called him the ablest adviser and best
executive officer in the British Navy, to assist in the administration
of the Admiralty, Nelson began to view him jealously. "Our friend
Troubridge is to be a Lord of the Admiralty, and I have a sharp eye,
and almost think I see it. No, poor fellow, I hope I do him injustice;
he cannot surely forget my kindness to him." But when the single eye
has become double, suspicion thrives, and when tortured by his desire
to return to Lady Hamilton, Nelson saw in every obstacle and every
delay the secret hand of Troubridge. "I believe it is all the plan of
Troubridge," he wrote in one such instance, "but I have wrote both him
and the Earl my mind." To St. Vincent, habit and professional
admiration enabled him to submit, if grudgingly, and with constant
complaints to his _confidante_; but Troubridge, though now one of the
Board that issued his orders, was his inferior in grade, and he
resented the imagined condition of being baffled in his wishes by a
junior. The latter, quick-tempered and rough of speech, but true as
his sword, to use St. Vincent's simile, must have found himself put to
it to uphold the respect due to his present position, without wronging
the affection and reverence which he undoubtedly felt for his old
comrade, and which in the past he had shown by the moral courage that
even ventured to utter a remonstrance, against the infatuation that
threatened to stain his professional honor.

Such straining of personal relations constantly accompanies accession
to office; many are the friendships, if they can be called such, which
cannot endure the experience that official action may not always be
controlled by them. If such is to be noted in Nelson, it is because he
was no exception to the common rule, and it is sad that a man so great
should not in this have been greater than he was. St. Vincent felt it
necessary to tell him, with reference to the difficulty of granting
some requests for promotion, "Encompassed as I am by applications and
presumptuous claims, I have nothing for it but to act upon the
defensive, as your Lordship will be compelled to do, whenever you are
placed in the situation I at present fill." This Nelson contents
himself with quoting; but of Troubridge he says: "Troubridge has so
completely prevented my mentioning any body's service, that I am
become a cypher, and he has gained a victory over Nelson's spirit.
Captain Somerville has been begging me to intercede with the Admiralty
again; but I have been so _rebuffed_, that my spirits are gone, and
the _great_ Troubridge has what we call _cowed_ the spirits of Nelson;
but I shall never forget it. He told me if I asked anything more that
I should get nothing. No wonder I am not well."

The refusal of the Admiralty to give him leave to come to London,
though founded on alleged motives of state, he thinks absurd. "They
are beasts for their pains," he says; "it was only depriving me of one
day's comfort and happiness, for which they have my hearty prayers."
His spleen breaks out in oddly comical ways. "I have a letter from
Troubridge, recommending me to wear flannel shirts. Does he care for
me? _No_; but never mind." "Troubridge writes me, that as the weather
is set in fine again, he hopes I shall get walks on shore. He is, I
suppose, laughing at me; but, never mind." Petulant words, such as
quoted, and others much more harsh, used to an intimate friend, are of
course to be allowed for as indicating mental exasperation and the
excitement of baffled longings, rather than expressing permanent
feeling; but still they illustrate mental conditions more faithfully
than do the guarded utterances of formal correspondence. Friendship
rarely regains the ground lost in them. The situation did undoubtedly
become exasperating towards the end, for no one pretended that any
active service could be expected, or that his function was other than
that of a signal displayed, indicating that Great Britain, though
negotiating for peace, was yet on her guard. Lying in an open
roadstead, with a heavy surf pouring in on the beach many days of the
week, a man with one arm and one eye could not easily or safely get
back and forth; and, being in a small frigate pitching and tugging at
her anchors, he was constantly seasick, so much so "that I cannot hold
up my head," afflicted with cold and toothache,--"but none of them
cares a d--n for me and my sufferings."

In September the Hamiltons came to Deal, off which the ship was lying,
and remained for a fortnight, during which he was happy; but the
reaction was all the more severe when they returned to town on the
20th. "I came on board, but no Emma. No, no, my heart will break. I am
in silent distraction.... My dearest wife, how can I bear our
separation? Good God, what a change! I am so low that I cannot hold up
my head." His depression was increased by the condition of Parker,
the young commander, who had been wounded off Boulogne, and had since
then hovered between life and death. The thigh had been shattered too
far up for amputation, and the only faint hope had been that the bones
might reunite. The day that the Hamiltons left, the great artery
burst, and, after a brief deceitful rally, he died on the 27th of
September. Nelson, who was tenderly attached to him, followed him to
the grave with emotion so deep as to be noticeable to the bystanders.
"Thank God," he wrote that afternoon, "the dreadful scene is past. I
scarcely know how I got over it. I could not suffer much more and be
alive." "I own," he had written to St. Vincent immediately after the
repulse, "I shall never bring myself again to allow any attack to go
forward, where I am not personally concerned; my mind suffers much
more than if I had a leg shot off in this late business."

The Admiralty refusing any allowances, much of the expense of Parker's
illness and of his funeral fell upon Nelson, who assumed all his
debts. It was but one instance among many of a liberality in money
matters, which kept him constantly embarrassed. To the surgeon who had
attended the wounded, and to the captain of the "Medusa," a much
richer man than he was, but who had shown him kindness, he gave
handsome remembrances of the favors which he was pleased to consider
done to himself personally. In a like spirit he wrote some months
afterwards, concerning a proposed monument to Captain Ralph Willett
Miller, who had fought under his flag. "I much doubt if all the
admirals and captains will subscribe to poor dear Miller's monument;
but I have told Davison, that whatever is wanted to make up the sum, I
shall pay. I thought of Lord St. Vincent and myself paying,£50 each;
some other admirals may give something, and I thought about £12 each
for the captains who had served with him in the actions off Cape St.
Vincent and the Nile. The spirit of liberality seems declining; but
when I forget an old and dear friend, may I cease to be your
affectionate Nelson and Bronté." Yet at this period he felt it
advisable to sell the diamonds from the presents given him by foreign
sovereigns. He was during these weeks particularly pressed, because in
treaty for a house which he bought at Merton in Surrey, and for which
he had difficulty in raising funds. In this his friend Davison helped
him by a generous and unlimited offer of a loan. "The Baltic
expedition," wrote Nelson in his letter of thanks, "cost me full
£2,000. Since I left London it has cost me, for Nelson cannot be like
others, near £1,000 in six weeks. If I am continued here, ruin to my
finances must be the consequence."

On the 1st of October the Preliminaries of Peace with France were
signed, and on the 9th news of their ratification reached Nelson on
board his ship. "Thank God! it is peace," he exclaimed. Yet, while
delighted beyond measure at the prospect of release from his present
duties, and in general for the repose he now expected, he was most
impatient at the exuberant demonstrations of the London populace, and
of some military and naval men. "Let the rejoicings be proper to our
several stations--the manufacturer, because he will have more markets
for his goods,--but seamen and soldiers ought to say, 'Well, as it is
peace, we lay down our arms; and are ready again to take them up, if
the French are insolent.' There is no person in the world rejoices
more in the peace than I do, but I would burst sooner than let a d--d
Frenchman know it. We have made peace with the French despotism, and
we will, I hope, adhere to it whilst the French continue in due
bounds; but whenever they overstep that, and usurp a power which would
degrade Europe, then I trust we shall join Europe in crushing her
ambition; then I would with pleasure go forth and risk my life for to
pull down the overgrown detestable power of France." When the mob in
London dragged the carriage of the French ambassador, his wrath quite
boiled over. "Can you cure madness?" he wrote to his physician; "for I
am mad to read that our d--d scoundrels dragged a Frenchman's
carriage. I am ashamed for our Country." "I hope never more to be
dragged by such a degenerate set of people," he tells Lady Hamilton.
"Would our ancestors have done it? So, the villains would have drawn
Buonaparte if he had been able to get to London to cut off the King's
head, and yet all our Royal Family will employ Frenchmen. Thanks to
the navy, they could not." Nelson's soul was disturbed without cause.
Under the ephemeral effervescence of a crowd lay a purpose as set as
his own, and of which his present emotions were a dim and unconscious
prophecy.

On the 15th of October he received official notification for the
cessation of hostilities with the French Republic, the precise date at
which they were to be considered formally at an end having been fixed
at the 22d of the month. The Admiralty declined to allow him to leave
his station until that day arrived. Then he had their permission to
take leave of absence, but not to haul down his flag. "I heartily hope
a little rest will soon set you up," wrote St. Vincent, "but until the
definitive treaty is signed, your Lordship must continue in pay,
although we may not have occasion to require your personal services at
the head of the squadron under your orders." In accordance with this
decision, Nelson's flag continued to fly as Commander-in-Chief of a
Squadron of ships "on a particular service," throughout the anxious
period of doubt and suspicion which preceded the signing of the treaty
of Amiens, on the 25th of March, 1802. It was not till the 10th of the
following April that he received the formal orders, to strike his flag
and come on shore.

On the 22d of October, 1801, he left the flagship and set off for his
new home in Surrey.

FOOTNOTES:

[37] These suggestive italics are in the letter as printed by Clarke and
M'Arthur, and reproduced by Nicolas.

[38] Hollesley Bay.



CHAPTER XVIII.

RELEASE FROM ACTIVE SERVICE DURING THE PEACE OF AMIENS.--HOME LIFE AT
MERTON.--PUBLIC INCIDENTS.

OCTOBER, 1801--MAY, 1803. AGE, 43-44.


During the brief interval between his return from the Baltic, July
I,1801, and his taking command of the Squadron on a Particular
Service, on the 27th of the same month, Nelson had made his home in
England with the Hamiltons, to whose house in Piccadilly he went
immediately upon his arrival in London. Whatever doubt may have
remained in his wife's mind, as to the finality of their parting in
the previous January, or whatever trace of hesitation may then have
existed in his own, had been definitively removed by letters during
his absence. To her he wrote on the 4th of March, immediately before
the expedition sailed from Yarmouth: "Josiah[39] is to have another
ship and to go abroad, if the Thalia cannot soon be got ready. I have
done _all_ for him, and he may again, as he has often done before,
wish me to break my neck, and be abetted in it by his friends, who are
likewise my enemies; but I have done my duty as an honest, generous
man, and I neither want or wish for anybody to care what becomes of
me, whether I return, or am left in the Baltic. Living, I have done
all in my power for you, and if dead, you will find I have done the
same; therefore my only wish is, to be left to myself: and wishing you
every happiness, believe that I am, your affectionate Nelson and
Bronté." Upon this letter Lady Nelson endorsed: "This is My Lord
Nelson's Letter of dismissal, which so astonished me that I
immediately sent it to Mr. Maurice Nelson,[40] who was sincerely
attached to me, for his advice. He desired me not to take the least
notice of it, as his brother seemed to have forgot himself."

A separation preceded and caused by such circumstances as this was,
could not fail to be attended with bitterness on both sides; yet one
could have wished to see in a letter which is believed, and probably
was intended, to be the last ever addressed by him to her, some
recollection, not only of what he himself had done for his stepson,
but that once, to use his own expression, "the boy" had "saved his
life;" and that, after all, if he was under obligations to Nelson, he
would have been more than youth, had no intemperance of expression
mingled with the resentment he felt for the slights offered his mother
in the face of the world. With Nelson's natural temperament and
previous habits of thought, however, it was imperative, for his peace
of mind, to justify his course of action to himself; and this he could
do only by dwelling upon the wrong done him by those who, in the eyes
of men generally, seemed, and must still seem, the wronged. Of what
passed between himself and Lady Nelson, we know too little to
apportion the blame of a transaction in which she appears chiefly as
the sufferer. Nisbet, except in the gallantry and coolness shown by
him at Teneriffe, has not the same claim to consideration, and his
career had undoubtedly occasioned great and legitimate anxiety to
Nelson, whose urgency with St. Vincent was primarily the cause of a
premature promotion, which spoiled the future of an officer, otherwise
fairly promising.[41] If the relations between the two had not been
so soon strained by Nelson's attentions to Lady Hamilton, things might
have turned out better, through the influence of one who rarely failed
to make the most of those under his command.

The annual allowance made to Lady Nelson by her husband, after their
separation, was £1,800; which, by a statement he gave to the Prime
Minister, two years later, when asking an increase of pension, appears
to have been about half of his total income. On the 23d of April,
1801, when daily expecting to leave the Baltic for England, he sent
her a message through their mutual friend Davison: "You will, at a
proper time, and before my arrival in England, signify to Lady N. that
I expect, and for which I have made such a very liberal allowance to
her, to be left to myself, and without any inquiries from her; for
sooner than live the unhappy life I did when last I came to England, I
would stay abroad for ever. My mind is fixed as fate: therefore you
will send my determination in any way you may judge proper."[42] To
Lady Hamilton he wrote about the same time, assuring her, under the
assumption of mystery with which he sought to guard their relations
against discovery through the postal uncertainties of the day, that he
had no communication with his wife: "Thomson[43] desires me to say he
has never wrote his aunt[44] since he sailed, and all the parade about
a house is nonsense. He has wrote to his father, but not a word or
message to her. He does not, nor cannot, care about her; he believes
she has a most unfeeling heart."[45]

His stay with the Hamiltons in Piccadilly, though broken by several
trips to the country, convinced Nelson that if they were to live
together, as he wished to do, it must be, for his own satisfaction, in
a house belonging to him. It is clear that the matter was talked over
between Lady Hamilton and himself; for, immediately upon joining his
command in the Downs, he began writing about the search for a house,
as a matter already decided, in which she was to act for him. "Have
you heard of any house? I am very anxious to have a home where my
friends might be made welcome." As usual, in undertakings of every
kind, he chafed under delays, and he was ready to take the first that
seemed suitable. "I really wish you would buy the house at Turnham
Green," he writes her within a week. The raising of the money, it is
true, presents some difficulty, for he has in hand but £3,000. "It is,
my dear friend," he moralizes, "extraordinary, but true, that the man
who is pushed forward to defend his country, has not from that country
a place to lay his head in; but never mind, happy, truly happy, in the
estimation of such friends as you, I care for nothing."

Lady Hamilton, however, was a better business-man than himself, and
went about his purchase with the deliberation of a woman shopping. At
the end of three weeks he was still regretting that he could not "find
a house and a little ece of ground, for if I go on much longer with
my present command, I must be ruined. I think your perseverance and
management will at last get me a home." By the 20th of August she was
suited, for on that date he writes to her, "I approve of the house at
Merton;" and, as the Admiralty would not consent to his leaving his
station even for a few days, all the details of the bargain were left
in her hands. "I entreat, my good friend, manage the affair of the
house for me." He stipulates only that everything in it shall be his,
"to a book or a cook," or even "to a pair of sheets, towels, &c." "I
entreat I may never hear about the expenses again. If you live in
Piccadilly or Merton it makes no difference, and if I was to live at
Merton I must keep a table, and nothing can cost me one-sixth part
which it does at present." "You are to be, recollect, Lady Paramount
of all the territories and waters of Merton, and we are all to be your
guests, and to obey, all lawful commands."

In this way were conducted the purchase and preparation of the only
home of his own on English ground that Nelson ever possessed, where he
passed his happiest hours, and from which he set out to fight his last
battle. The negotiation was concluded three days before the rumors of
the peace got abroad, therefore about the 27th of September, 1801; and
in consequence, so Sir William Hamilton thought, the property was
acquired a thousand pounds cheaper than it otherwise might have
been--a piece of financial good luck rare in Nelson's experience. "We
have now inhabited your Lordship's premises some days," continued the
old knight, "and I can now speak with some certainty. I have lived
with our dear Emma several years. I know her merit, have a great
opinion of the head and heart that God Almighty has been pleased to
give her; but a seaman alone could have given a fine woman full power
to chuse and fit up a residence for him without seeing it himself. You
are in luck, for in my conscience I verily believe that a place so
suitable to your views could not have been found, and at so cheap a
rate. The proximity to the capital,"--Nelson found it an hour's drive
from Hyde Park--"and the perfect retirement of this place, are, for
your Lordship, two points beyond estimation; but the house is so
comfortable, the furniture clean and good, and I never saw so many
conveniences united in so small a compass. You have nothing but to
come and enjoy immediately; you have a good mile of pleasant dry walk
around your own farm. It would make you laugh to see Emma and her
mother fitting up pig-sties and hencoops, and already the Canal is
enlivened with ducks, and the cock is strutting with his hens about
the walks."

As time passed, Sir William did not realize the comfort he had
anticipated from surroundings so pleasant as those he described. He
was troubled in money matters, fearing lest he might be distressed to
meet the current expenses of the house. "If we had given up the house
in Piccadilly," he lamented to Greville, "the living here would indeed
be a great saving; but, as it is, we spend neither more nor less than
we did." Why he did not give it up does not appear. As Lady Paramount
over the owner of the place, Lady Hamilton insisted upon entertaining
to a degree consonant to the taste neither of Lord Nelson, who was
only too pleased to humor her whims, nor of her husband, who had an
old man's longing for quiet, and, besides, was not pleased to find
himself relegated to a place in her consideration quite secondary to
that of his host. "It is but reasonable," he wrote to Greville, in
January, 1802, "after having fagged all my life, that my last days
should pass off comfortably and quietly. Nothing at present disturbs
me but my debt, and the nonsense I am obliged to submit to here to
avoid coming to an explosion, which would be attended with many
disagreeable effects, and would totally destroy the comfort of the
best man and the best friend I have in the world. However, I am
determined that my quiet shall not be disturbed, let the nonsensical
world go on as it will."

Neither the phlegm on which he prided himself, nor his resolutions,
were sufficient, however, to keep the peace, or to avoid undignified
contentions with his wife. Some months later he addressed her a
letter, which, although bearing no date, was evidently written after a
prolonged experience of the conditions entailed upon himself by this
odd partnership; for partnership it was, in form at least, the living
expenses being divided between the two.[46] In their quiet
reasonableness, his words are not without a certain dignified pathos,
and they have the additional interest of proving, as far as words can
prove, that, battered man of the world though he was, he had no
suspicion, within a year of his death, that the relations between his
host and his wife were guilty towards himself.


"I have passed the last 40 years of my life in the hurry & bustle that
must necessarily be attendant on a publick character. I am arrived at
the age when some repose is really necessary, & I promised myself a
quiet home, & altho' I was sensible, & said so when I married, that I
shou'd be superannuated when my wife wou'd be in her full beauty and
vigour of youth. That time is arrived, and we must make the best of it
for the comfort of both parties. Unfortunately our tastes as to the
manner of living are very different. I by no means wish to live in
solitary retreat, but to have seldom less than 12 or 14 at table, and
those varying continually, is coming back to what was become so
irksome to me in Italy during the latter years of my residence in that
country. I have no connections out of my own family. I have no
complaint to make, but I feel that the whole attention of my wife is
given to Ld. N. and his interest at Merton. I well know the purity of
Ld. N.'s friendship for Emma and me, and I know how very uncomfortable
it wou'd make his Lp, our best friend, if a separation shou'd take
place, & am therefore determined to do all in my power to prevent
such an extremity, which wou'd be _essentially detrimental_ to all
parties, but wou'd be more sensibly felt by our dear friend than by
us. Provided that our expences in housekeeping do not encrease beyond
measure (of which I must own I see some danger), I am willing to go on
upon our present footing; but as I cannot expect to live many years,
every moment to me is precious, & I hope I may be allow'd sometimes to
be my own master, & pass my time according to my own inclination,
either by going my fishing parties on the Thames or by going to London
to attend the Museum, R. Society, the Tuesday Club, & Auctions of
pictures. I mean to have a light chariot or post chaise by the month,
that I may make use of it in London and run backwards and forwards to
Merton or to Shepperton, &c. This is my plan, and we might go on very
well, but I am fully determined not to have more of the very silly
altercations that happen but too often between us and embitter the
present moments exceedingly. If realy one cannot live comfortably
together, a _wise_ and well _concerted separation_ is preferable; but
I think, considering the probability of my not troubling any party
long in this world, the best for us all wou'd be to bear those ills we
have rather than flie to those we know not of. I have fairly stated
what I have on my mind. There is no time for nonsense or trifling. I
know and admire your talents & many excellent qualities, but I am not
blind to your defects, and confess having many myself; therefore let
us bear and forbear for God's sake."[47]


There are other accounts by eye-witnesses of the home life at Merton,
in which participated, from time to time, not only the many outside
guests, of whose burden Hamilton complained, but also most of the
members of the Nelson family. Lord Minto, who had returned to England
from Vienna, and whose personal friendship to Nelson never slackened,
wrote to his wife, in March, 1802: "I went to Lord Nelson's on
Saturday to dinner, and returned to-day in the forenoon. The whole
establishment and way of life are such as to make me angry, as well as
melancholy; but I cannot alter it, and I do not think myself obliged,
or at liberty, to quarrel with him for his weakness, though nothing
shall ever induce me to give the smallest countenance to Lady
Hamilton. She looks ultimately to the chance of marriage, as Sir
William will not be long in her way, and she probably indulges a hope
that she may survive Lady Nelson; in the meanwhile she and Sir
William, and the whole set of them, are living with him at his
expense. She is in high looks, but more immense than ever. The love
she makes to Nelson is not only ridiculous, but disgusting: not only
the rooms, but the whole house, staircase and all, are covered with
nothing but pictures of her and him, of all sizes and sorts, and
representations of his naval actions, coats-of-arms, pieces of plate
in his honour, the flag-staff of L'Orient, &c.--an excess of vanity
which counteracts its own purpose. If it was Lady Hamilton's house
there might be a pretence for it; to make his own house a mere
looking-glass to view himself all day is bad taste. Braham, the
celebrated Jew singer, performed with Lady Hamilton. She is horrid,
but he entertained me in spite of her." Of this same period, but a
year later, at the time of Hamilton's death, Minto wrote: "Lady
Hamilton talked very freely [to me] of her situation with Nelson, and
the construction the world may have put upon it, but protested that
their attachment had been perfectly pure, which I declare I can
believe, though I am sure it is of no consequence whether it be so or
not. The shocking injury done to Lady Nelson is not made less or
greater, by anything that may or may not have occurred between him and
Lady Hamilton."

On the 6th of November, 1861, Mr. Matcham, a nephew of Lord Nelson,
wrote for the "Times" some reminiscences of the great admiral, as he
had known him in private life, both at this period, and three years
later, just before Trafalgar. His letter was elicited by the
publication of the "Remains of Mrs. Trench." In this had appeared
extracts from her journal, when Mrs. St. George, containing statements
derogatory to Nelson's conduct in Dresden, when on the journey from
Trieste to Hamburg in the year 1800; some of which have been quoted
already in this work.[48] Mr. Matcham's words, so far as they relate
to Nelson himself, are here given in full[49]:--

    I too Sir, as well as "the Lady," had some knowledge of that
    person, so much honoured and so much maligned; and although I do
    not defend his one great error (though in that, with some
    palliation, there were united elements of a generous and noble
    nature), I venture to say that whoever forms a notion of his
    manners and deportment in private life from this account of him,
    will labour under a very great delusion.

    I visited my uncle twice during the short periods in which he
    was on shore--once in 1802, during his journey to Wales, when he
    was received at Oxford and other places; and the second time at
    his house at Merton, in 1805, for three weeks preceding the 15th
    of September, when he left to embark at Portsmouth to return no
    more; and I can assert with truth that a more complete contrast
    between this lady's portrait and my thorough recollection of him
    could not be forced on my mind. Lord Nelson in private life was
    remarkable for a demeanour quiet, sedate, and unobtrusive,
    anxious to give pleasure to every one about him, distinguishing
    each in turn by some act of kindness, and chiefly those who
    seemed to require it most.

    During his few intervals of leisure, in a little knot of
    relations and friends, he delighted in quiet conversation,
    through which occasionally ran an undercurrent of pleasantry,
    not unmixed with caustic wit. At his table he was the least
    heard among the company, and so far from being the hero of his
    own tale, I never heard him voluntarily refer to any of the
    great actions of his life.

    I have known him lauded by the great and wise; but he seemed to
    me to waive the homage with as little attention as was
    consistent with civility. Nevertheless, a mind like his was
    necessarily won by attention from those who could best estimate
    his value.

    On his return from his last interview with Mr. Pitt, being asked
    in what manner he had been received, he replied that he had
    reason to be gratified with his reception, and concluded with
    animation, "Mr. Pitt, when I rose to go, left the room with me,
    and attended me to the carriage"--a spontaneous mark of respect
    and admiration from the great statesman, of which, indeed, he
    might well be proud.

    It would have formed an amusement to the circle at Merton, if
    intemperance were set down to the master of the house, who
    always so prematurely cut short the _sederunt_ of the gentlemen
    after dinner.

    A man of more temperate habits could not, I am persuaded, have
    been found. It appears that the person of Lord Nelson (although
    he was not as described, a little man, but of the middle height
    and of a frame adapted to activity and exertion) did not find
    favour with the lady; and I presume not to dispute her taste,
    but in his plain suit of black, in which he alone recurs to my
    memory, he always looked what he was--a gentleman. Whatever
    expletives of an objectionable kind may be ascribed to him, I
    feel persuaded that such rarely entered into his conversation.
    He was, it is true, a sailor, and one of a warm and generous
    disposition; yet I can safely affirm that I never heard a coarse
    expression issue from his lips, nor do I recollect one word or
    action of his to which even a disciple of Chesterfield could
    reasonably object. If such did arise, it would be drawn forth
    when a friend was attacked, or even an enemy unjustly accused;
    for his disposition was so truly noble, that it revolted against
    all wrong and oppression. His heart, indeed, was as tender as it
    was courageous. Nor do I think, Sir, that it is a necessary
    concession to truth that you or others should lower your
    conception of this popular personage, on account of the
    exaggerated colours in which he is here drawn. Those who best
    knew the man the most estimated his value, and many who like
    myself could not appreciate his professional superiority, would
    yet bear witness to his gentleness, kindness, good-breeding, and
    courtesy.

    He was not "a rude and boisterous captain of the sea." From his
    early years, by the introduction of his uncle, the Comptroller
    of the Navy, he was associated with the _élite_ of his own
    profession; and the influences of his own paternal home, and his
    acquaintance with the first families of his native county, to
    many of whom he was related, would not allow a man of his
    intelligence and proper pride to foster coarseness beyond the
    habits of his age.

    It appears to me that, however flattering or consolatory the
    recital of the follies or foibles of great men may be to that
    mediocrity which forms the mass of mankind, the person who
    undertakes to cater for mere amusement withdraws something from
    the common stock of his country. The glory of Great Britain
    depends as much on the heroes she has produced, as on her
    wealth, her influence, and her possessions; and the true patriot
    and honourable man, if he cannot add to their lustre, will at
    least refrain from any premeditated act which may dim their
    fame, and diminish that high estimation of them which
    expedience, nationality, and gratitude should alike contribute
    to sustain.

    A NEPHEW OF ADMIRAL LORD NELSON.

A glimpse of the family life at Merton, and of the society which
gathered there, has been casually preserved for us. It presents not
only an interesting group of the admiral's associates, but also the
record of a conversation concerning him, under his own roof,
transmitted by one of the parties to it; particularly instructive,
because showing the contradictory traits which illustrated his
character, and the impression made by him upon his contemporaries and
intimates,--men who had seen him upon all kinds of occasions, both
great and small. It corroborates, too, the report of these superficial
inconsistencies made by the Duke of Wellington on a later occasion.
The narrator, Lieutenant Layman, was the same who had recently been
with Nelson in the Baltic, and who has before been quoted in
connection with that expedition. Sir Alexander Ball will be remembered
as one of his chief supports during the long chase that preceded the
Battle of the Nile, as well as in the action, and afterwards during
the protracted operations around Malta. Hood was also a Nile captain.

"During the temporary peace, Mr. Layman spent some days at Merton,
with Sir Alexander Ball and Sir Samuel Hood. One day, after tea in the
drawing-room, Lord Nelson was earnestly engaged in conversation with
Sir Samuel. Mr. Layman observed to Sir Alexander, that Lord Nelson was
at work by his countenance and mouth, that he was a most extraordinary
man, possessing opposite points of character; little in little things,
but by far the greatest man in great things he ever saw: that he had
seen him petulant in trifles, and as cool and collected as a
philosopher when surrounded by dangers, in which men of common minds,
with clouded countenance, would say, 'Ah! what is to be done?' It was
a treat to see his animated and collected countenance in the heat of
action. Sir Alexander remarked this seeming inconsistency, and
mentioned that, after the Battle of the Nile, the captains of the
squadron were desirous to have a good likeness of their heroic chief
taken, and for that purpose employed one of the most eminent painters
in Italy. The plan was to ask the painter to breakfast, and get him to
begin immediately after. Breakfast being over, and no preparation
being made by the painter, Sir Alexander was selected by the other
captains to ask him when he intended to begin; to which the answer
was, 'Never.' Sir Alexander said, he stared, and they all stared, but
the artist continued: 'There is such a mixture of humility with
ambition in Lord Nelson's countenance, that I dare not risk the
attempt.'"[50]

There is yet another casual mention of the Merton home life,
illustrative of more than one feature of Nelson's native character.
Many years later the daughter of the Vicar of the parish, when
transmitting a letter to Sir Harris Nicolas, added: "In revered
affection for the memory of that dear man, I cannot refrain from
informing you of his unlimited charity and goodness during his
residence at Merton. His frequently expressed desire was, that none in
that place should want or suffer affliction that he could alleviate;
and this I know he did with a most liberal hand, always desiring that
it should not be known from whence it came. His residence at Merton
was a continued course of charity and goodness, setting such an
example of propriety and regularity that there are few who would not
be benefited by following it." His thoughtfulness and generosity to
those about him was equally shown in his charges to his agents at
Bronté, for the welfare of the Sicilian peasantry upon his estate. In
the regularity and propriety of observance which impressed the
clergyman's daughter, he carried out the ideal he had proposed to Lady
Hamilton. "Have we a nice church at Merton? We will set an example of
goodness to the under parishioners."

Whatever of censure or of allowance may be pronounced upon the life he
was living, there was in the intention just quoted no effort to
conciliate the opinion of society, which he was resolute in braving;
nor was it inconsistent with the general tenor of his thoughts. In the
sense of profound recognition of the dependence of events upon God,
and of the obligation to manifest gratitude in outward act, Nelson was
from first to last a strongly religious man. To his sin he had
contrived to reconcile his conscience by fallacies, analogies to which
will be supplied by the inward experience of many, if they will be
honest with themselves. The outcome upon character of such dealings
with one's self is, in the individual case, a matter to which man's
judgment is not competent. During the last two years and a half of
Nelson's life, the chaplain of the "Victory" was associated with him
in close intimacy as confidential secretary, with whom he talked
freely on many matters. "He was," said this gentleman, "a thorough
clergyman's son--I should think he never went to bed or got up without
kneeling down to say his prayers." He often expressed his attachment
to the church in which he had been brought up, and showed the
sincerity of his words by the regularity and respect with which he
always had divine service performed on board the "Victory," whenever
the weather permitted. After the service he had generally a few words
with the chaplain on the subject of the sermon, either thanking him
for its being a good one, or remarking that it was not so well adapted
as usual to the crew. More than once, on such occasions, he took down
a volume of sermons in his own cabin, with the page already marked at
some discourse which he thought well suited to such a congregation,
and requested Dr. Scott to preach it on the following Sunday.[51]

On the 29th of October, 1801, just one week after he left the Downs,
Nelson took his seat in the House of Lords as a Viscount, his former
commander-in-chief, Hood, who was of the same rank in the peerage,
being one of those to present him. While in England he spoke from time
to time on professional subjects, or those connected with the external
policy of the country, on which he held clear and decided opinions,
based, naturally, upon naval exigencies. His first speech was a warm
and generous eulogy of Sir James Saumarez, once second to himself at
the Battle of the Nile, an officer with whom it is not too much to say
he was not in close personal sympathy, as he had been with Troubridge,
but who had just fought two desperate squadron actions under
conditions of singular difficulty, out of which he had wrenched a
success that was both signal and, in the then state of the war and
negotiations, most opportune. "Sir James Saumarez's action," said
Lord St. Vincent, "has put us upon velvet."

Nelson's own thirst for glory made him keenly appreciative of the
necessity to be just and liberal, in distributing to those who had
achieved great deeds the outward tokens of distinguished service,
which often are the sole recompense for dangers run and hardships
borne. Scarcely had he retired from his active command in the Channel
when he felt impelled to enter upon a painful and humiliating
controversy, on behalf of those who had shared with him all the perils
of the desperate Battle of Copenhagen; for which, unlike himself, they
had received no reward, but from whom he refused to be dissociated in
the national esteem and gratitude.

On the 19th of November, 1801, the City of London voted its thanks to
the divisions of the Army and the Navy, whose joint operations during
the previous summer had brought to an end the French occupation of
Egypt, begun by Bonaparte in 1798. Nelson had for some time been
uneasy that no such notice had been taken of the Battle of Copenhagen,
for the custom of the Corporation of the chief city of the Empire,
thus to honor the great achievements of their armed forces, was, he
asserted, invariable in his experience; consequently, the omission in
the case of Copenhagen was a deliberate slight, the implication of
which, he thought, could not be disregarded. Delay, up to the time
then present, might be attributed to other causes, not necessarily
offensive, although, from a letter to his friend Davison, he seems to
have feared neglect; but the vote of thanks to the two Services for
their successes in Egypt left no room to doubt, that the failure to
take similar action in the case of Copenhagen was intentional.

This Nelson regarded, and justly, as an imputation upon the
transactions there. Where a practice is invariable, omission is as
significant as commission can be. Either the victory was doubtful, or
of small consequence, or, for some other reason, not creditable to
the victors. He wrote at once to the Lord Mayor. After recalling the
facts, he said: "If I were only personally concerned, I should bear
the stigma, now first attempted to be placed upon my brow, with
humility. But, my Lord, I am the natural guardian of the characters of
the Officers of the Navy, Army, and Marines, who fought, and so
profusely bled, under my command on that day.... When I am called upon
to speak of the merits of the Captains of his Majesty's ships, and of
the officers and men, whether seamen, marines, or soldiers, I that day
had the happiness to command, _I say_, that never was the glory of
this country upheld with more determined bravery than upon that
occasion, and more important service was never rendered to our King
and Country. It is my duty to prove to the brave fellows, my
companions in dangers, that _I_ have not failed, at every proper
place, to represent, as well as I am able, their bravery and
meritorious services."

This matter was the occasion, possibly the cause, of bringing him into
collision with the Admiralty and the Government on the same subject.
Although his private representations, soon after his return to
England, had obtained from Lord St. Vincent, as he thought, a promise
that medals should be issued for the battle, no steps thereto had been
taken. He now enclosed to the Prime Minister and to the First Lord a
copy of his letter to the Lord Mayor; and to both he alluded to the
assurance he believed had been made him. "I have," he said, "been
expecting the medals daily since the King's return from Weymouth." St.
Vincent's reply was prompt as himself. With reference to the former
matter, he confined himself to drily thanking Nelson, without comment,
"for communicating the letter you have judged fit to write to the Lord
Mayor;" but as to the medals, he wrote a separate note, telling him
that he had "given no encouragement, but on the contrary had explained
to your Lordship, and to Mr. Addington, the impropriety of such a
measure being recommended to the King."

Nelson, to use his own word, was "thunder-struck" by this statement.
"I own," he said, "I considered the words your Lordship used as
conveying an assurance. It was an apology for their not being given
before, which, I understood you, they would have been, but for the
difficulty of fixing who was to have them;" an allusion particularly
valuable as indicating, in this case of flat contradiction between two
honorable men, what was the probable cause of withholding the marks of
hard-won distinction. "I have never failed assuring the Captains, that
I have seen and communicated with, that they might depend on receiving
them. I could not, my dear Lord, have had any interest in
misunderstanding you, and representing that as an intended Honour from
the King which you considered as so improper to be recommended to the
King: therefore I must beg that your Lordship will reconsider our
conversation--to me of the very highest concern, and think that I
could not but believe that we would have medals. I am truly made ill
by your letter." St. Vincent replied briefly, "That you have perfectly
mistaken all that passed between us in the conversation you allude to,
is most certain. At the same time I am extremely concerned that it
should have had so material an effect upon your health," etc. "Either
Lord St. Vincent or myself are liars," wrote Nelson to Davison; a
conclusion not inevitable to those who have had experience of human
misunderstandings.

The Prime Minister took a week to reply. When he did, he deprecated
the sending of any letter to the Mayor, for reasons, he said, "not
merely of a public nature, but connected with the interest I shall
ever take in your well-earned fame." These reasons, he added, he would
be ready to give him in a private interview. Nelson had asked his
opinion upon the terms of the letter; but, impatient after waiting
three days, had already sent it in when this answer came. It seems
probable that, with his usual promptness, he called at once; for on
the same day, November 28, that he received Addington's letter he
withdrew that to the Mayor.[52] "By the advice of a friend," he said,
"I have now to request that your Lordship will consider my letter as
withdrawn, _as the discussion of the question may bring forward
characters which had better rest quiet_."[53] There seems, therefore,
little reason to doubt that the honors, due to those who fought, were
withheld out of consideration to those who did not fight. Nelson
himself recognized the difficulty. "They are not Sir Hyde Parker's
real friends who wish for an inquiry," he had written confidentially
to Davison before leaving the Baltic. "His friends in the fleet wish
everything of this fleet to be forgot, for we all respect and love Sir
Hyde; but the dearer his friends, the more uneasy they have been at
his _idleness_, for that is the truth--no criminality." But, as he
vigorously and characteristically said of another matter occurring
about this time, "I was told the difficulties were insurmountable. My
answer was, 'As the thing is necessary to be done, the more
difficulties, the more necessary to try to remove them.'"

As regards the soundness of Nelson's grounds, and the propriety of his
action in this matter, it must, first, be kept in mind, that, before
the City voted its thanks to the Navy engaged in Egypt, he had spoken
in the House of Lords in favor of the thanks of the Government to the
same force, although, as a whole, it had there played a subordinate
part; and also, that, although deprived of the medal which he hoped to
get in common with others, he had himself been rewarded for Copenhagen
by promotion in the peerage.[54] This separation between himself and
the mass of those who fought under him, necessarily intensified the
feeling of one always profusely generous, in praise as in money; but
his point otherwise was well taken. The task was ungracious and
unpleasant, it may almost be called dirty work to have thus to solicit
honors and distinction for deeds in which one has borne the principal
part; but dirty work must at times be done, with hands or words, and
the humiliation then rests, not with him who does it, but with them
who make it necessary. Had the victors at Copenhagen fought a
desperate fight, and were they neglected? If so, and the outside world
looked indifferently on, who from among them should first come forth
to defend their glory from implication of some undefined stain, if not
their Commander-in-Chief, one whose great renown could well spare the
additional ray of lustre which he demanded for them. Whether
underneath lay some spot of self-seeking, of the secondary motive from
which so few of us are free, matters little or nothing. The thing was
right to be done, and he did it. If the Government and the City of
London, by calculated omission, proclaimed, as they did, that these
men had not deserved well of their country, it became him to say, as
he did, openly to the City, subordinately to his superiors, that they
had done men's work and deserved men's reward.

"If Lord Nelson could forget the services of those who have fought
under his command, he would ill deserve to be so supported as he
always has been." Thus he closed his last letter to the Lord Mayor on
this subject, a year after the correspondence began. It was this noble
sympathy with all beneath him, the lack of which has been charged
against the great Commander of the British Army of this period, that
won for Nelson the enthusiastic affection which, in all parts of his
command, however remote from his own eyes, aroused the ardent desire
to please him. No good service done him escaped his hearty
acknowledgment, and he was unwearied in upholding the just claims of
others to consideration. In the matter of Copenhagen, up to the time
he left the country, eighteen months later, he refused any
compromise. He recognized, of course, that he was powerless in the
face of St. Vincent's opposition; but, he wrote to one of the captains
engaged, "I am fixed never to abandon the fair fame of my companions
in dangers. I have had a meeting with Mr. Addington on the subject; I
don't expect we shall get much by it, except having had a full
opportunity of speaking my mind." The Premier's arguments had been to
him wholly inconclusive. Oddly enough, as things were, the Sultan sent
him a decoration for Copenhagen. Coming from a foreign sovereign,
there was, in accepting it, no inconsistency with his general
attitude; but in referring the question to the Government, as was
necessary, he told the Prime Minister, "If I can judge the feelings of
others by myself, there can be no honours bestowed upon me by
foreigners that do not reflect ten times on our Sovereign and
Country."[55]

In conformity with this general stand, when it was proposed in June,
1802, to give him the thanks of the City, for taking command of the
force destined to defend it against invasion, he wrote to request that
the motion might be withdrawn, on the express ground that no thanks
had been given those engaged at Copenhagen. "I should feel much
mortified, when I reflected on the noble support I that day received,
at any honour which could separate me from them." He alleged the same
reason, in the following September, for refusing to dine with the
Corporation. "Never, till the City of London think justly of the
merits of my brave companions of the 2d of April, can I, their
commander, receive any attention from the City of London." A like
refusal was sent to his invitation for Lord Mayor's day.

After the interview with Mr. Addington, the question of medals was
dropped. He had explained his position fully, and felt that it was
hopeless to attempt more, so long as the Admiralty was against him;
but when the Administration changed, in May, 1804, he wrote to Lord
Melville, the new First-Lord, enclosing a statement of facts,
including his correspondence with St. Vincent, and requesting a
reconsideration of the matter. "The medal," he said, is withheld, "for
what reason Lord St. Vincent best knows. I hope," he concluded, "for
your recommendation to his Majesty, that he may be pleased to bestow
that mark of honour on the Battle of Copenhagen, which his goodness
has given to the Battle of St. Vincent, the First of June, of
Camperdown, and the Nile." Melville, in a very sympathetic and
courteous letter, declined, for a reason whose weight must be
admitted: "When badges of triumph are bestowed in the heat and
conflict of war, they do not rankle in the minds even of the enemy, at
whose expense they are bestowed; but the feeling, I suspect, would be
very different in Denmark, if the present moment was to be chosen for
opening afresh wounds which are, I trust, now healed, or in the daily
progress of being so." So it resulted that for some reason, only dimly
outlined, no mark of public recognition ever was conferred upon the
most difficult, the most hazardous, and, at the moment, perhaps the
most critically important of Nelson's victories; that which he himself
considered the greatest of his achievements.

This unfortunate and embittering controversy was the most marked and
characteristic incident of his residence at Merton, between October,
1801, when he first went there, and May, 1803, when he departed for
the Mediterranean, upon the renewal of war with France. Living always
with the Hamiltons, the most copious stream of private correspondence
was cut off; and being unemployed after April, 1802, his official
letters are confined to subjects connected rather with the past than
with the then present time. Upon general naval questions he had,
however, something to say. A trip to Wales suggests a memorandum to
the Prime Minister concerning the cultivation and preservation of oak
timber in the Forest of Dean. He submits to him also his views as to
the disposition of Malta, in case the provision of the Treaty of
Amiens, which re-established there the Order of the Knights under the
guarantee of the six great Powers, should fail, owing to the refusal
of Russia to join in the proposed guarantee. At the time he
wrote,--December, 1802,--the question was become burning, threatening
the rupture of the existing peace between France and Great Britain; a
result which, in fact, soon followed, and turned mainly upon this
point. The essential aim in the provision, he observed, was that
neither of the two countries should have the island. If the Order
could not be restored, then it ought to go to Naples, again under the
guarantee of the Powers. It was useless to England, for operations
against France; and in the hands of the latter was a direct menace to
Sicily. This arrangement would accord with the spirit of the treaty;
but if it also was impracticable, Great Britain had no choice but to
keep Malta herself. It would cost £300,000 annually, but anything was
better than to chance its falling again into the hands of France.

In like manner he submitted to the Admiralty plans for the more
certain manning of the Navy, and for the prevention of desertion. The
material conditions of seamen while in the service, the pay and
provisions, were, he considered, all that could be desired; but still
there was great indisposition to enlist, and the desertions in the
last war, 1793-1801, rose to the enormous figure of forty-two
thousand. The remedy he outlined was a Registration of seamen, and of
certificates to be given them, bearing a personal description by
which they could be identified, and on which their character and
services would appear. For lack of such papers, seamen by hundreds
were in London in distress, although large amounts of money were due
them at prize agencies, where the agent feared to pay for want of
identification. A certificate showing five years' faithful service
should entitle the holder to an annual bounty of two guineas, to be
increased by further periods. Such provisions were well calculated to
appeal to men accustomed to entertain prudential considerations, and
to create gradually a class with whom they would weigh, and who would
by them be retained in permanent employment. In meeting the case of
desertions, caused by the heedlessness and weakness of seamen, Nelson
became more vague. The nature of the trouble he recognized clearly
enough, but there is a lack of definiteness in the remedy he proposed
to meet an evil which still exists. "The mainspring of all my plan is,
that of Certificates fully descriptive of the persons; the very
greatest good must result from it. Something should be attempted at
these times to make our seamen, at the din of war, fly to our Navy,
instead of flying from it." His plan is substantially that now
adopted.

Closely connected with the discontent of seamen was the subject of
prize-money, in the receipt and distribution of which great
irregularities and abuses existed among the agents, to remove which
also he made particular and detailed suggestions; and he strongly
supported, though with discriminating criticism, the Bill for an
Inquiry into Naval Abuses, which embodied the most prominent of St.
Vincent's administrative measures while at the head of the Admiralty.
But, though thus supporting the Earl in his policy of investigation,
and retaining his respect for him as a sea-officer, he was utterly
dissatisfied with the general conduct of the Admiralty and with its
attitude towards himself in particular. "I attribute none of the
tyrannical conduct of the late Board to Lord St. Vincent," he wrote
two years later. "For the Earl I have a sincere regard, but he was
dreadfully ill-advised, and I fear the Service has suffered much from
their conduct." It would seem as if he did not, after the first
moments of annoyance, forget the irritation he felt against Troubridge
at being retained in the Downs against his will, and, as he thought,
without necessity. "I thank you," he wrote to Captain Murray, "for
taking the trouble of driving seven miles to make me a visit; for,
could you believe it, there are those who I thought were my firm
friends, some of near thirty years' standing--who have never taken
that trouble!" This may not refer to Troubridge, but the description
answers to him, and it appears that in the Nelson-Hamilton circle his
name now stood as a type of ingratitude.[56]

Writing to Davison in September, 1802, after a trip of six weeks made
to Wales, in company with the Hamiltons, he says: "Our tour has been
very fine and interesting, and the way in which I have been everywhere
received most flattering to my feelings; and although some of the
higher powers may wish to keep me down, yet the reward of the general
approbation and gratitude for my services is an ample reward for all I
have done; but it makes a _comparison_ fly up to my mind, not much to
the credit of some in the higher Offices of the State." He seems to
have felt that neither in his influence with the Admiralty, nor in
reference to his opinions on foreign topics, did he receive the
recognition that his distinguished services, abilities, and experience
claimed. "Having failed entirely in submitting my thoughts on three
points"--those just cited, manning, desertion, and prize-money--"I was
disheartened;" and to this he attributes his not sending in a memoir
which he had prepared upon the subject of the Flotilla for Coast
Defence.

But, while he resented this neglect, it did not greatly interfere with
his happiness, which was at this time well-nigh complete. He
complains of ill health, it is true, from time to time, and his means
were insufficient duly to keep up the two establishments--Lady
Nelson's and Merton--for which he was pecuniarily responsible. Under
this embarrassment he chafed, and with a sense of injustice which was
not unfounded; for, if reward be proportioned to merit and to the
importance of services rendered, Nelson had been most inadequately
repaid. For the single victories of St. Vincent and Camperdown, each
commander-in-chief had received a pension of £3,000. The Nile and
Copenhagen together had brought him no more than £2,000; indeed, as he
had already been granted £1,000 a year for St. Vincent, another
thousand may be said to have been all he got for two of the greatest
victories of the war. In submitting a request for an increase, he
asked pertinently, "Was it, or not, the intention of his Majesty's
Government to place my rewards for services lower than Lord St.
Vincent or Lord Duncan?" There was, of course, the damaging
circumstance that the conditions under which he chose to live made him
poorer than he needed to be; but with this the Government had no
concern. Its only care should have been that its recompense was
commensurate with his deserts, and it is revolting to see a man like
Nelson, naturally high-toned and always liberal, forced to the
undignified position of urging--and in vain--for the equal
remuneration that should have been granted spontaneously long before.

In his criticisms of the Admiralty's general course, it does not
appear whether Nelson, who was hereafter to be the greatest sufferer
from St. Vincent's excessive economies, realized as yet the particular
injury being done by them to the material of the Navy. In his passion
for reform, the veteran seaman obstinately shut his eyes to the
threatening condition of the political atmosphere, and refused to
recognize the imminent danger of a renewal of the war, because it
necessarily would postpone his projected innovations. Assuming the
continuance of peace with all the violence of a prejudice, he
permitted the strength and resources of the Navy to deteriorate
rapidly, both by direct action and by omission to act. "Lord St.
Vincent," wrote Minto in November, 1802, "is more violent than anybody
against the war, and has declared that he will resign if ministers
dare go to war. His principal reason is, I believe, that the ships are
so much out of repair as to be unfit for service." "Lord Nelson," he
says at the same period, "has been with me a long time to-day. He
seems much of my mind on material points, but especially on the
necessity of being better prepared than we now are." The admiral's own
letters at this time make little allusion to the measures, or the
neglects, which were rapidly undermining the efficiency of the fleet;
but a year after leaving England he wrote, "With all my personal
regard for Lord St. Vincent, I am sorry to see that he has been led
astray by the opinion of ignorant people. There is scarcely a thing he
has done since he has been at the Admiralty that I have not heard him
reprobate before he came to the Board."

Much as he enjoyed his home and desired peace, Nelson had never felt
assured of its continuance. Like Great Britain herself during this
repose, he rested with his arms at his side, ready for a call. The
Prime Minister, Addington, has transmitted a curious story of the
manner in which he exemplified his ideas of the proper mode of
negotiating with Bonaparte. "It matters not at all," he said, taking
up a poker, "in what way I lay this poker on the floor. But if
Bonaparte should say it _must_ be placed in this direction," suiting
the action to the word, "we must instantly insist upon its being laid
in some other one." At the same time Bonaparte, across the Channel,
was illustrating in almost identical phrase the indomitable energy
that was common to these two men, the exponents of the two opposing
and irreconcilable tendencies of their age. "If the British ministry
should intimate that there was anything the First Consul had not done,
because he was prevented from doing it, that instant he would do it."
"You have proved yourself too true a prophet," wrote an occasional
correspondent to Nelson, "for you have said ever since the peace that
it could not be of long duration." Jar after jar, as Bonaparte drove
his triumphal chariot over the prostrate continent, announced the
instability of existing conditions; and the speech from the throne on
the 16th of November, 1802, was distinctly ominous, if vague. Nelson
then seconded the address in the House of Peers, in words so
characteristic of his own temper, and of that then prevailing in the
nation, that they serve to explain the strong accord between him and
it, and to show why he was so readily and affectionately distinguished
as its representative hero. They are thus reported:--

    "I, my Lords, have in different countries, seen much of the
    miseries of war. I am, therefore, in my inmost soul, a man of
    peace. Yet I would not, for the sake of any peace, however
    fortunate, consent to sacrifice one jot of England's honour. Our
    honour is inseparably combined with our genuine interest.
    Hitherto there has been nothing greater known on the Continent
    than the faith, the untainted honour, the generous public
    sympathies, the high diplomatic influence, the commerce, the
    grandeur, the resistless power, the unconquerable valour of the
    British nation. Wherever I have served in foreign countries, I
    have witnessed these to be sentiments with which Britons were
    regarded. The advantages of such a reputation are not to be
    lightly brought into hazard. I, for one, rejoice that his
    Majesty has signified his intention to pay due regard to the
    connection between the interests of this country and the
    preservation of the liberties of Europe. It is satisfactory to
    know, that the preparations to maintain our dignity in peace,
    are not to be neglected. Those supplies which his Majesty shall
    for such purposes demand, his people will most earnestly grant.
    The nation is satisfied that the Government seeks in peace or
    war no interest separate from that of the people at large; and
    as the nation was pleased with that sincere spirit of peace
    with which the late treaty was negotiated, so, now that a
    restless and unjust ambition in those with whom we desired
    sincere amity has given a new alarm, the country will rather
    prompt the Government to assert its honour, than need to be
    roused to such measures of vigorous defence as the exigency of
    the times may require."

During the winter, Bonaparte, resentful of Great Britain's claim to a
voice in the politics of the Continent, became more and more
distinctly menacing in deed and word. On the 20th of February, 1803,
in a message to the legislature, he made the imprudent, because
useless, vaunt, "This government says with just pride, England, alone,
cannot to-day contend against France." Two days later Minto, who was
in opposition, was told by Nelson, "in strict confidence," that for
some time back there had been great doubts between peace and war in
the ministry. "One measure in contemplation has been to send him to
the Mediterranean, by way of watching the armament and being ready if
wanted. He says that he is thought the fitter for that delicate
service, as on the one hand he wishes the continuance of peace, and
therefore is not likely to precipitate matters, and on the other hand
Bonaparte knows that if he hoists his flag it will not be in joke." It
had for some time been arranged that, if war came, he was to have the
Mediterranean command.

On the 8th of March, 1803, the King sent a message to Parliament,
that, in consequence of military preparations going on in the ports of
France and Holland, he judged expedient to adopt additional measures
of precaution for the security of his dominions. While this was under
discussion in the Upper House, Nelson, impressed with the idea that
war must come, left his seat, and wrote to the Prime Minister the
following line: "Whenever it is necessary, I am _your_ Admiral." Yet
he felt the tug at his heartstrings as he never had before. "War or
Peace?" he writes to his old flag-captain, Berry. "Every person has a
different opinion. I fear perhaps the former, as I hope so much the
latter." Only with large reservations would he now have repeated the
rule Codrington tells us he inculcated,--"that every man became a
bachelor after passing the Rock of Gibraltar, and he was not very
tardy in showing that he practised what he preached. Honour, glory and
distinction were the whole object of his life, and that dear domestic
happiness never abstracted his attention." He did, indeed, rail at
marriage[57] during his last cruise, now fast approaching; but his
passionate devotion to Lady Hamilton, and his yearning for home, knew
no abatement. Yet, through all and over all, the love of glory and the
sense of honor continued to the last to reign supreme. "Government
cannot be more anxious for my departure," he tells St. Vincent, "than
I am, if a war, to go."

Meantime the necessary preparations were quietly progressing, while
the diplomatic discussions with France became more and more bitter and
hopeless, turning mainly on the question of Malta, though the root of
the trouble lay far deeper. The "Victory," of a hundred guns, was
named for Nelson's flag, her officers appointed, and the ship
commissioned. On the 6th of May he received orders to prepare for
departure. On the 12th the British ambassador left Paris, having
handed in the Government's ultimatum and demanded his passports. On
the 16th Great Britain declared war against France, and the same day
Nelson at the Admiralty received his commission as commander-in-chief
in the Mediterranean. Within forty-eight hours he joined the "Victory"
at Portsmouth, and on the 20th sailed for his station.

Thus ended the longest period of retirement enjoyed by Nelson, from
the opening of the war with France, in 1793, until his death in 1805.
During it, besides the separation from Lady Nelson, two great breaks
occurred in his personal ties and surroundings. His father died at
Bath on the 26th of April, 1802, at the age of seventy-nine. There had
been no breach in the love between the two, but it seems to the author
impossible to overlook, in the guarded letters of the old man to his
famous son, a tinge of regret and disapproval for the singular
circumstances under which he saw fit to live. That he gladly accepted
the opinion professed by many friends, naval and others, and carefully
fostered by the admiral, that his relations with Lady Hamilton were
perfectly innocent, is wholly probable; but, despite the usual silence
concerning his own views, observed by himself and Nelson, two clues to
his thought and action appear in his letters. One is the remark,
already quoted, that gratitude required him to spend some of his time
with Lady Nelson. The other, singular and suggestive, is the casual
mention to Nelson that he had received an anonymous letter, containing
"severe reproaches for my conduct to you, which is such, it seems, as
will totally separate us."[58] There is no record that he permitted
himself to use direct expostulation, and it seems equally clear that
he would not, by any implication, manifest approval or acquiescence.
It has been said, indeed, but only upon the authority of Lady
Hamilton, that it was his intention to take up his residence entirely
at Merton, with the admiral and the Hamiltons; an act which would have
given express countenance to the existing arrangements, and disavowed,
more strongly than any words, the bearing imputed to him by the
anonymous letter. In whose interest would such a letter most likely be
penned? Nelson mourned him sincerely, but was prevented by illness
from being present at the funeral. He is a man known to us only by his
letters, which are marked by none of the originality that
distinguishes the professional utterances of the admiral, and cannot
be said to rise much above the commonplace; but they show a strong
and unaffected piety, and particularly a cheerful, resolute,
acceptance of the infirmities of protracted old age, which possesses
charm and inspires respect. There is also a clear indication of the
firmness that characterized Nelson himself, in the determination, amid
all the feebleness of age, and notwithstanding his pride and love for
his famous son, upon whom, too, he was partially dependent, that he
would not join in the general abandonment of the wife by the husband's
family. His attitude in this regard, as far as can be inferred from
his letters, commands sympathy and admiration.

A year later, on the 6th of April, 1803, Sir William Hamilton also
died, "in Lady Hamilton's and my arms," wrote Nelson, "without a sigh
or a struggle. The world never lost a more upright and accomplished
gentleman." Lady Hamilton, with ready tears, recorded: "Unhappy day
for the forlorn Emma. Ten minutes past ten dear blessed Sir William
left me." The grouping of figures and emotions at that death-bed was
odd almost beyond comprehension; one of the most singular studies
which human nature has presented to itself of its powers of
self-cajolement. A man systematically deceived, yet apparently
sincerely regarded, and affectionately tended to the last by his
betrayers, one of whom at least prided himself, and for the most part
not unjustly, upon his fidelity to his friends. Hamilton, alone among
the three, seems to have been single-minded--to have viewed their
mutual relations to the end, not with cynical indifference, but with a
simplicity of confidence hard to be understood in a man of his
antecedents. It may have been, however, that he recognized the
inevitable in the disparity of years and in his wife's early training,
and that he chose to cover her failings with a self-abnegation that
was not without nobility. Upon such a tacit affirmation he set a final
seal in a codicil to his will, well calculated to silence those who
saw scandal in the association between his wife and his friend. "The
copy of Madam Le Brunn's picture of Emma, in enamel, by Bone, I give
to my dearest friend Lord Nelson, Duke of Bronté, a very small token
of the great regard I have for his Lordship, the most virtuous, loyal,
and truly brave character I ever met with. God bless him, and shame
fall on those who do not say amen."

Sir William's death, by withdrawing the husband's countenance to
Nelson's remaining under the same roof, might have complicated matters
for the two lovers, but the outbreak of war necessitated the admiral's
departure a month later. When he returned to England for the last
time, in August, 1805, he was, deservedly, the object of such
widespread popular devotion, and his stay was so short, that the voice
of censure was hushed amid the general murmur of affectionate
admiration. The noble qualities of the man, the exalted spirit of
self-sacrifice and heroic aspiration that breathed in his utterances,
and was embodied, not only in his brilliant deeds, but in the obscure,
patient endurance of the last two years, evoked a sentiment which
spread over him and her a haze of tender sympathy that still survives.
In the glory of Trafalgar, in his last touching commendation of her
and his child to the British Government, in the general grief of the
nation, there was justly no room to remember their fault; both
acquaintance and strangers saw in her only the woman whom he loved to
the end. The sisters of Nelson, women of mature years and
irreproachable character, maintained a correspondence with Lady
Hamilton during their lives; long after his death, and the departure
of his influence, removed any interested motive for courting her
friendship. Between them and Lady Nelson, on the other hand, the
breach was final. Their occasional mention of her is unfriendly, and
upon the whole contemptuous; while she, as far as can be judged from
their letters, returned to them an equal measure of disdain.

FOOTNOTES:

[39] Josiah Nisbet, her son.

[40] Nelson's eldest brother. There appear to have been two copies of this
letter in Nelson's hand. One, of which the latter half only remains, is in
the British Museum. It bears the endorsement of Lady Nelson, as given. The
other copy, entire, is in the Alfred Morrison collection--Number 536.
Nelson probably sent a copy to Lady Hamilton to satisfy her exigencies that
the breach was final. The two correspond, word for word,--as far, that is,
as the former remains. Maurice Nelson died in April, 1801.

[41] Nelson several times spoke of Nisbet's early promise. The author is
indebted to Mrs. F.H.B. Eccles, Nisbet's granddaughter, for a copy of the
following letter from St. Vincent to his sister Mrs. Ricketts:--

LONDON, January 22, 1807.

My dear sister,--Upon reflexion it appears best to send you the only
letters I can find relative to Captain Nisbet, and to authorize you to
assert in my name that Lord Nelson assured me that he owed his life to the
resolution and admirable conduct of his stepson, when wounded at Teneriffe,
and that he had witnessed many instances of his courage and enterprise.
Yours most affectionately,

ST. VINCENT.

This letter explains how St. Vincent, feeling the value of Nelson's life to
the country, granted, in the still warm memories of Teneriffe, a promotion
which must have been sorely against his judgment.

[42] Nicolas, vol. vii. Addenda, p. ccix. In a letter to Lady Hamilton of
the same date, Nelson says: "Read the enclosed, and send it if you approve.
Who should I consult but my friends?" (Morrison, vol. ii. p. 142.) Whether
the enclosed was this letter to Davison cannot be said; but it is likely.
Compare foot-note, preceding page.

[43] Nelson.

[44] Lady Nelson.

[45] Morrison, vol. ii. p. 137.

[46] On the 21st of September, 1802, six months before Hamilton's death, he
was still £1,200 in Nelson's debt. (Morrison, vol. ii. p. 404.)

[47] Morrison, No. 684.

[48] _Ante_, p. 43.

[49] From Mr. G. Lathora Browne's "Nelson: His Public and Private Life,"
London, 1891, p. 412.

[50] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxvii. p. 445.

[51] Life of Rev. A.J. Scott, D.D., p. 191.

[52] Nicolas, vol. iv. p. 533.

[53] Ibid., vol. vii. p. ccx. Author's italics.

[54] Ibid., vol. v. p. 60.

[55] It is possible that Nelson here used the word "reflect" in the primary
sense of reflecting honor; but in the secondary sense of being a reflection
upon those who had denied a just claim, the phrase, ambiguous as it stands,
represented accurately his feelings. "I own, my dear Sir," he said again to
the Premier, with reference to this decoration, "great as this honour will
be, it will have its alloy, if I cannot at the same time wear the medal for
the Battle of Copenhagen, the greatest and most honourable reward in the
power of our Sovereign to bestow, as it marks my personal services."

[56] See Pettigrew, vol. ii. p. 225; Morrison, vol. ii. p. 176.

[57] This habit is mentioned by Captain James Hillyar, for extracts from
whose journals the author is indebted to Admiral Sir W.R. Mends, G.C.B.

[58] Morrison Collection, No. 632, October 8, 1801.



CHAPTER XIX.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.--THE LONG WATCH OFF
TOULON.--OCCUPATIONS OF A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

MAY, 1803--JANUARY, 1805. AGE, 45-46.


When Nelson, after a three years' absence, returned to the
Mediterranean in 1803, he found the conditions, upon which the
military balance of power there depended, greatly altered from those
he had known during the period of his previous service. He had been
present, indeed, almost an eye-witness, at the tremendous reverse
associated with the name of Marengo, for that battle, it will be
remembered, was fought while he was at Leghorn on his return to
England; but Marengo, and the conventions following it, were at the
moment only the beginning of an end which then could not be foreseen.

The most significant token of the entire change of conditions--of the
predominant, far-reaching, and firmly fastened grip of France on the
land--was the presence of an army corps of fifteen thousand men in the
extreme southeast of Italy, occupying the Kingdom of Naples from the
river Ofanto, on the Adriatic coast, round to the Bradano on the Gulf
of Taranto, and including the useful ports of Brindisi and Taranto.
This distant and ex-centric extension of the arms of the Republic
bespoke Bonaparte's confidence in the solidity of his situation in the
South of Europe; for under previous circumstances, even after his
victorious campaign of 1796, he had always deprecated an occupation of
Naples, and relied upon threats and a display of force to insure the
quiescence of that state. That one of his first steps, upon the
renewal of war with Great Britain, should have been to place a large
body of troops in a position he once considered so exposed, shows the
fulness of his conviction that upon the Continent he had, for the
moment, nothing to fear from the other Great Powers. Strongly stirred
as they had been by his highhanded aggressions, none as yet ventured
to call him directly to account. Great Britain, the least immediately
affected, had stepped into the lists, and demanded not only that
aggression should cease, but that the state of the Continent should be
restored as it existed when she signed the treaty of Amiens. With this
requirement she maintained the war, single-handed, from May, 1803, to
the autumn of 1805.

It was not without reason that Bonaparte reckoned upon the inaction of
the Continent. Austria, although profoundly discontented by much he
had done since the peace of Lunéville, in 1801, was too thoroughly
disheartened and exhausted by the unsuccessful and protracted struggle
which preceded it, to be ready to renew the strife. Limited as she now
was, by the treaty, to the eastern bank of the Adige, there was in
Northern Italy no force to threaten the French communications, between
their divisions in the valley of the Po and the one at the heel of the
peninsula. Prussia, playing a double part for years back, seeking from
day to day the favor of the most powerful, was wholly committed for
the time to the First Consul; while Russia, although her youthful
sovereign had abandoned the anti-British policy of his predecessor,
remained undecided as to the general course she should pursue amid the
ever-shifting perplexities of the day. Less fantastic in imagination
than his insane father, Alexander I. inherited a visionary tendency,
which hindered practical action, and showed itself in plans too vast
and complicated for realization, even when two rulers of the
overwhelming power of himself and Napoleon, at a later date, set their
hands to the task. Swayed, alternately, by sympathy with the ancient
order of things, which Great Britain for the moment represented, and
by prospects of Russian aggrandizement, which Bonaparte dangled before
his eyes, the Czar halted between two opinions, pleasing himself,
meanwhile, in weaving, with associates of his own age, schemes for a
general reorganization of Europe. In these the interests of Russia
naturally, and quite properly, had a leading part, and not least in
those seas and regions that fell within the limits of Nelson's
command.

The power of the great states which lay to the northward and eastward
of him being thus neutralized, Bonaparte found upon the land nothing
to oppose his will, or to contest his influence, in the smaller and
weaker nations to the southward and westward, close to his own doors,
but isolated from the rest of Europe, except by sea--a weighty
exception. Spain, reduced to virtual vassalage in the previous war, no
longer even pretended to dispute his orders. She was not engaged in
the present hostilities, simply because it suited him better to take a
money tribute from her, and to enjoy for French ships the benevolent
neutrality of Spanish ports, more necessary to them than to the
British. Moreover, if Spain joined in the war, Minorca, restored to
her at the peace, would be at the mercy of Great Britain, and Port
Mahon, the fine haven of that island, was always a menace to Toulon.
The harbors of remote Portugal, where Lisbon formerly had given
powerful support to the British fleet, were now closed to it for
offensive operations; and Nelson, within whose command its seaboard
lay, was strictly enjoined to refrain from any such use of them, even
from sending in prizes, except under stress of weather. In Italy,
Piedmont had been incorporated with France, while the Italian and
Ligurian (Genoa) Republics in the North were so identified with her in
action, and so submissive to her, that the capture of the latter's
ships was at once ordered by Nelson; and he recommended to his
Government that a formal blockade should be proclaimed of her ports,
as well as of Leghorn, where the French flag was flown on the same
staff as the Tuscan. The States of the Pope, intermediate between
these tributaries of Bonaparte in the North and his garrisoned
province in Naples, enjoyed only such precarious independence as he
from day to day allowed. But, mighty as was the growth of French
ascendency, as shown by these changes, the very advantages accruing to
France from her advanced maritime positions laid her further open to
the Sea Power of Great Britain. The neutrality of Genoa and Tuscany
could no longer embarrass the British admiral, as it had Nelson in
1795 and 1796. Offensive operations against them were now merely a
question of adequate force, and the South of France depended greatly
upon free access to their ports. Taking Piedmont from the King of
Sardinia, too, relieved any scruples the British might have concerning
their use of the island of Sardinia injuring a friendly monarch, a
consideration which kept them away from Sicily.

Nelson, instructed by the experience and observation of the recent
past, and by a certain prescient sagacity which was at once native and
cultivated in him, recognized that the Mediterranean, with its immense
indented coast line, its positions of critical importance,--such as
the Straits of Gibraltar and the Bosphorus, Egypt and Malta,--and its
comparatively short water distances, was the field of operations to
which the maritime ambitions of Bonaparte, debarred a wider flight by
the sea-power of Great Britain, must inevitably incline. To this
contributed also its remoteness from England, as well as its nearness
to France and to the ports subject to her influence in Italy and
Spain; while the traditional ambitions of French rulers, for three
centuries back, had aspired to control in the Levant, and had regarded
Turkey for that reason as a natural ally. It was, therefore, not
merely as magnifying his own office, nor yet as the outcome of natural
bias, resulting from long service in its waters, that Nelson saw in
the Mediterranean the region at once for defence and offence against
Bonaparte; where he might be most fatally checked, and where also he
might be induced most surely to steps exhaustive to his strength. This
conviction was, indeed, rather an instance of accurate intuition than
of formulated reasoning. Clear, ample, and repeated, as are his
demonstrations of the importance of the various positions at stake,
and of the measures necessary to be taken, they rather apply to the
necessities of the moment than indicate a wide scheme of policy, which
should divert the energies of the enemy to the South of Europe, and so
provide the best of defences against his projected invasion of
England. Yet even of such broader view tokens are not wanting. "To say
the truth," he writes to the Queen of Naples, "I do not believe we had
in the last war, and, according to all appearance, we shall not have
in the present one either, plans of a sufficiently grand scale to
force France to keep within her proper limits. Small measures produce
only small results. The intelligent mind of your Majesty will readily
comprehend the great things which might be effected in the
Mediterranean. On this side Buonaparte is the most vulnerable. It is
from here that it would be the most easy to mortify his pride, and so
far humble him, as to make him accept reasonable conditions of peace."

It cannot be claimed, however, that there entered into Nelson's
thoughts, for Italy, any such diversion as that by which the Spanish
Peninsular War some years later drained the life blood of France. The
time, indeed, was not yet ripe, nor would the scene have been in any
way as favorable to Great Britain; and, moreover, so far from being
ready to threaten, her energies were effectually constrained to her
own defence, by the superior audacity and direct threats of Bonaparte.
Even the limited suggestions for the employment of troops in the
Mediterranean, made by Nelson from time to time, failed to receive
attention, and he himself was left to struggle on as best he might,
with inadequate means and upon a bare defensive, even in naval
matters. Great Britain, in short, had stripped herself, incautiously,
so bare, and was so alarmed by the French demonstrations of invasion,
that she for the moment could think only of the safety of her
territory and of her home waters, and her offensive operations were
confined to the sea.

Bonaparte understood as fully as Nelson the importance of the
Mediterranean to him. His mind was set upon the extension of France's
dominion therein,--in its islands, upon its northern and southern
shores, and in the East; nor was he troubled with scruples as to the
means by which that object might be attained. During the short peace
of Amiens, Lord Keith had felt it necessary to take precautions
against the re-occupation of Corfu by the French troops; and again at
a later date had stationed a ship for the same purpose at the Madalena
Islands, belonging to Sardinia, which Nelson afterwards made a
rendezvous for his fleet. Algiers, too, had attracted the First
Consul's attention. "Algiers will be French in one year after a
peace," wrote Nelson in August, 1804. "You see it, and a man may run
and read; that is the plan of Buonaparte." "The Ministers of the Dey
must know, that an armament at Toulon, and a large army, after the
peace with Great Britain, was intended to land and plunder Algiers,
which they doubtless would have effected, had not a British fleet been
placed in Oristan Bay [Sardinia] to watch their motions." These and
similar reasons had led the British Government to maintain the
Mediterranean Squadron nearly upon a war footing during the peace.
But, if Bonaparte's purpose was fixed to control the Mediterranean
some day, it now was set also upon the invasion of England; and
although he looked and plotted in many directions, taking long views,
and neglecting no opportunity to secure advanced footholds for future
uses, he had not yet reached the stage in his development when he
would divide his energies between two gigantic undertakings. One at a
time, and with an accumulation of force abundantly adequate to the end
in view, was his policy all the days of Nelson. The Mediterranean with
its varied interests was to him at this time one of several means, by
which he hoped to distract British counsels and to dissever British
strength; but it was no part of his design to provoke Great Britain to
measures which would convert her alarm for the Mediterranean
peninsulas into open war with them, or in them, compelling France
either to recede from thence, or to divert thither a force that might
weaken his main effort. His aim was to keep anxiety keenly alive, and
to cut short the resources of his enemy, by diplomatic pressure upon
neutral states, up to the last extreme that could be borne without war
against them being declared, as the lesser evil; and the nearer he
could approach this delicate boundary line, without crossing it, the
greater his success. "I do not think a Spanish war [that is, a
declaration by Spain] so near," wrote Nelson in November, 1803. "We
are more likely to go to war with Spain for her complaisance to the
French; but the French can gain nothing, but be great losers, by
forcing Spain to go to war with us; therefore, I never expect that the
Spaniards will begin, unless Buonaparte is absolutely mad, as many say
he is. I never can believe that he or his counsellors are such fools
as to force Spain to begin."

The course instinctively advocated by Nelson, transpiring through
occasional utterances, was directly contrary to Bonaparte's aims and
would have marred his game. "We never wanted ten thousand troops more
than at this moment," Nelson wrote shortly after he had reached the
station and become acquainted with the state of affairs. "They might
save Naples, Sicily, the Morea and Egypt, by assisting and giving
confidence to the inhabitants." "It has been my plan to have 10,000
disposable troops in the Mediterranean," he wrote to Acton; and he
regretted to the Ministry that they should have withdrawn all the fine
army which had regained Egypt in 1801. "The sending them home," he
remarked to an occasional correspondent, "was a very inconsiderate
measure, to say nothing further of it." His idea was to garrison Gaeta
and Naples on the coast of the mainland, and Messina in Sicily; and to
throw a force into the mountains of Calabria, which should sustain and
give cohesion to the insurrection that he confidently expected would
follow. With the British fleet covering the approaches by water, and
sustaining and reinforcing garrisons in the ports, there would be
imposed upon the enemy, unless he chose to abandon Southern Italy, a
scene of operations in a distant, difficult country, with a long and
narrow line of communications, flanked throughout by the sea, and
particularly by the two fortified harbors which he proposed to occupy.
"The peasantry would, I believe, defend their mountains, and at least
it would give a check to the movements of the French, and give us time
to get a fleet into the Mediterranean." That the attempt would have
been ultimately successful, against such power as Napoleon then
wielded, cannot be affirmed; but, until put down, it necessarily would
have engaged a force very disproportionate to its own numbers, drawing
off in great part the army destined against England, as it was
diverted two years later by Austria, and giving opportunity for
changes in the political conditions, even to the formation of a new
Coalition.

Nelson, therefore, was not far from right in reasoning that the
Mediterranean should, and therefore would, be the chief scene of
operations. In Bonaparte's eyes, to invade Britain was, justly, the
greatest of all ends, the compassing of which would cause all the rest
to fall. Nelson, weighing the difficulties of that enterprise more
accurately than could be done by one unaccustomed to the sea, doubted
the reality of the intention, and thought it more consonant to the
true policy of France to seize control of the Mediterranean, by a
sudden concentration of her fleets, and then to transport her troops
by water to the heel of Italy, to the Ionian Islands, to the Morea, to
Egypt. So stationed, with fortified stepping-stones rising at short
intervals from the deep, future movements of troops and supplies from
point to point would be but an affair of coasters, slipping from
battery to battery, such as he had experienced to his cost in the
Riviera. In this project he thought it likely that France could secure
the co-operation of Russia, by allowing the latter her share of the
spoils of Turkey, especially in Constantinople. He saw, indeed, that
the partition would involve some difficulty between the two partners,
and in his correspondence he attributes the Morea and the islands, now
to one, now to the other; but the prediction, elicited piece-meal from
his letters, received a close fulfilment four years later in the
general tenor of the agreements of Tilsit, nor was it less accurate in
its dim prophecy of a disagreement.

Such, in broad outline, were the prepossessions and views Nelson took
with him from England in 1803, as modified by the information he
received upon reaching the station; and such the counter-projects of
Bonaparte, to whom belonged, as the privilege of the offensive, the
choice of direction for his attack. The essential difference between
the two was, that one believed the invasion of England, however
difficult, to be possible, and therefore to be the true and first
object of his efforts; while the other, without pronouncing that
attempt impossible, saw its difficulties so clearly, that he conceived
his enemy must be aiming for the Mediterranean from the beginning. It
is permissible to remark that Bonaparte, after the failure of the
invasion, first busied himself in reducing Austria, Prussia, and
Russia, successively, to the state of inaction in which they were in
1803; next came to an understanding with the latter, such as Nelson
had foreseen; and then turned to the Mediterranean, where he
established his own rule in Naples, in the Ionian Islands, on the
eastern shore of the Adriatic, and finally in the Spanish peninsula.
Beyond that his advance was stayed by the Sea Power of Great Britain,
which at last wrought his ruin. Thus in the event the predictions of
the British admiral were postponed, but not falsified.

Nelson's characteristic impatience and energy hurried him on from the
moment he took up his command. "I cannot sail before to-morrow," he
said repeatedly in Portsmouth, "and that's an age." "If the Devil
stands at the door," he tells St. Vincent, "we shall sail to-morrow
forenoon." The Admiralty, in its primary anxiety about Brest, imposed
upon him a delay under which he chafed angrily. He was directed to
meet off that port the squadron of Admiral Cornwallis, in order that,
if the latter wanted the "Victory," she might be left there, and an
intimation was even given that he was "on no account to pass Admiral
Cornwallis, so as to run any chance of his being deprived of the
services of the Victory, if he should judge it necessary to detain
her." Nelson resented the implication that he was capable of evading
an order, like a frigate-captain parting company to better his chance
of prize-money. "I beg to assure you that I hold it impossible for any
officer, under such orders as their Lordships' to me, to designedly
miss Admiral Cornwallis off Brest."

On the 22d of May he was off Ushant, between which and Cornwallis's
rendezvous he passed twenty-four hours, fuming and fretting over a
delay that was losing him a fresh, fair, northerly wind; the more so,
that he was satisfied Cornwallis neither needed nor wanted the ship.
"From his conduct,"--not being on his rendezvous,--"I am clear there
can be nothing in Brest to demand his attention." On the 23d, however,
he could stand it no longer. "What a wind we are losing!" "If the
wisdom of my superiors had not prevented me," he growled, "at this
moment I should have been off the coast of Portugal. I am aware of the
importance of my getting to the Mediterranean, and think I might
safely have been allowed to proceed in the Victory." At 6 P.M. of that
day, Cornwallis not turning up, he tumbled himself and his suite on
board the frigate "Amphion," which was in company, and continued his
voyage, going out in all the discomfort of "a convict," to use St.
Vincent's expression; "seven or eight sleeping in one cabin," as
Nelson himself described it. "It is against my own judgment but in
obedience to orders," he told the Earl; while to the Prime Minister,
with whom he was in personal correspondence, he lamented the loss,
"for I well know the weight of the Victory in the Mediterranean." As
he anticipated, Cornwallis did not want the ship, and she joined
Nelson two months afterwards off Toulon.

Late in the evening of June 3d, the "Amphion" anchored at Gibraltar,
whither she brought the first certain news of the war, though it had
been declared nearly three weeks before. The next day was actively
employed in giving necessary instructions to the yard officials, and
detailing cruisers to guard the entrance to the Straits, and to
maintain the communications with the Barbary coast, upon which the
Rock depended for supplies of fresh provisions. At 4 P.M. the ship
again sailed for Malta, accompanied by the frigate "Maidstone," to
which, on the 11th of June, was transferred, for direct passage to
Naples by the north of Sicily, the new British minister to the Two
Sicilies, Mr. Elliot, who had embarked with Nelson on board the
"Victory," and afterwards gone with him to the "Amphion." Throughout
the following two years an active correspondence, personal and
diplomatic, was maintained with this gentleman, who, like his brother,
Lord Minto, placed the utmost dependence upon the political sagacity
and tact of the admiral. When the latter, a year later, spoke of
leaving the station on account of his health, Elliot wrote to him:
"Where such great interests are concerned, I shall not presume to
dwell upon my own feelings, although I cannot but recall to your
Lordship that I only consented to depart as abruptly as I did from
England, to undertake this arduous and ruinous mission, from the
expectation that my efforts to direct the councils of this Kingdom
would have been seconded by your pre-eminent talents and judgment."
After the two frigates parted, the "Amphion" kept on to Malta, where
she arrived on the 15th of June.

With the separation of the "Maidstone" Nelson began the extensive
diplomatic correspondence, which employed so much of his time during
this command, and through which we are made familiar with the workings
of his mind on the general political conditions of the Mediterranean.
She carried from him letters to the King and Queen of the Sicilies, to
their Prime Minister, Acton, and to the British minister to the Court
of Sardinia. To these succeeded, upon his arrival in Malta,--as a
better point of departure for the farther East, now that the French
held the west coast of the Adriatic,--despatches to the British
minister to the Porte, to the Grand Vizier and the Capitan Pacha, to
the Republic of the Seven Islands, as the group of Corfu and its
sisters was now styled, and to the British representative to their
government.

All these communications were, of course, tentative, based upon a yet
imperfect knowledge of conditions. For the most part they conveyed,
besides the notification of his having taken the command, chiefly
general assurances of the good-will of the writer's government, and an
undefined intimation that all had best be on their guard against
French scheming and aggressions. To Naples he spoke more definitely,
and indicated at once the considerations that would dictate his
course, and, he intimated, should control theirs also. He had been
instructed, he said, to consider the welfare of the Two Sicilies as
one of the first of British objects, and his Government was convinced
of the advantages that would accrue both to Sicily and Naples, if
their neutrality could be maintained. They had to do, however, with an
enemy that was not only powerful, but wily and unscrupulous; one whose
action would be governed wholly by considerations of interest and
expediency, not by those of right. Great Britain could not, probably,
keep the French out of Naples, but she could out of Sicily, provided,
and only provided, Messina was adequately garrisoned and held. If,
however, there was any hasty overt action taken, looking to the
security of Sicily, it might merely precipitate the seizure of Naples
and the entire conquest of the King's continental dominions; or, "ten
times more humiliating," leave him "an odious commissary to raise
contributions from his unhappy subjects for the French." On the other
hand, if, to avert suspicion, there was too much slackness in the
measures to guard Sicily, Messina might be suddenly seized, the gates
of the island thus thrown open, and, Sicily once lost, "_Naples falls
of course_." "It is a most important point," he wrote to Elliot soon
after, "to decide when Sicily ought to be placed in a state of
security. For the present, I am content to say that Messina need not
be taken possession of; but the strictest watch must be kept by Sir
John Acton that we are not lulled into a fatal security, and thus lose
both Kingdoms. To save for the moment Naples, we risk the two
Kingdoms, and General Acton must join me in this heavy
responsibility." "My whole opinion rests in these few words--_that we
must not risk Sicily too far in trying to save Naples; therefore,
General Acton, yourself and myself must keep a good lookout_."

This summed up the conditions for Naples during the long two years of
watching and waiting, while Bonaparte, concentrating his purposes upon
his invasion scheme, was content to leave things quiet in the South.
To check, as far as might be, the designs of the French towards Morea
or towards Sicily, on either side of the central position they held at
the heel of Italy, Nelson employed a proportionately large number of
cruisers--five--between Messina and the mouth of the Adriatic; while,
to provide for the safety of the royal family, he kept always a
ship-of-the-line in the Bay of Naples, the British minister holding
orders for her captain to embark them at a moment's notice, and take
them to Sicily. "I have kept everything here to save Italy, if in my
power," he wrote Elliot two months later, "and you know I was ordered
to send a squadron outside the Straits. Fourteen days ago, a French
seventy-four got into Cadiz from Santo Domingo, and two French
frigates, with some merchant ships. What will they say at home?
However, I feel I have done right, and care not." "I must place a
squadron between Elba and Genoa," he says again, "to prevent that
expedition from moving, and also send some ships to the Straits'
mouth, and keep enough to watch the ships in Toulon. These are all
important objects, but nothing when compared to the security of the
Sicilies."

Nelson's anxiety for Sicily threw him again into contact with an
instance of that rigid and blind conformity to orders which always
exasperated him. He had brought out directions to the general
commanding in Malta, to hold a detachment of two thousand British
troops in readiness to go at once to Messina, on the appearance of
danger, and to garrison the works there, if he thought they could be
spared from the defence of Malta. Nelson told the Prime Minister that
discretion, as to such a step, was a responsibility greater than the
average officer could bear, and would certainly defeat the object in
view; for he would never feel his charge secure enough to permit such
a diminution. There was at this time in Malta a body of Neapolitan
soldiers, which had been sent there during the peace of Amiens, in
accordance with a stipulation of the treaty. The general received an
order to send them to Messina. Nelson had pointed out to him that if
he did so, in the divided state of feeling in the Neapolitan
dominions, and with the general character of Neapolitan officers, for
both efficiency and fidelity, the citadel would not be safe from
betrayal at their hands. "I have requested him to keep the orders
secret, and not to send them; for if they got into Messina, they would
certainly not keep the French out one moment, and it would give a good
excuse for not asking us to secure Messina." "If General Acton sends
for them we must submit; but at present we need not find means of
sending them away." The British general, however, sent them over, and
then the Neapolitan governor, as Nelson foretold, said it was quite
unnecessary for any British to come. "I must apprise you," wrote
Nelson to Addington, "that General Villettes, although a most
excellent officer, will do nothing but what he receives, 'You are
hereby required and directed;' for to obey, is with him the very acme
of discipline. With respect to Sicily, I have no doubt but that the
French will have it. My former reasons for inducing General Villettes
to keep the Neapolitan troops in Malta, was to prevent what has
happened; but, in a month after my back was turned, Villettes obeyed
his orders, and now the Governor of Messina says, 'We can defend it,
and want no assistance.' His whole conduct, I am bold to say, is
either that of a traitor or a fool."[59]

Upon his own subordinates Nelson laid a distinct charge, that he
should expect them to use their judgment and act upon it with
independence, sure of his generous construction and support of their
action. "We must all in our several stations," he tells one of them,
"exert ourselves to the utmost, and not be nonsensical in saying, 'I
have an order for this, that, and the other,' if the King's service
clearly marks what ought to be done. I am well convinced of your
zeal." In accordance with this, he was emphatic in his expressions of
commendation for action rightly taken; a bare, cold approval was not
adequate reward for deeds which he expected to reproduce his own
spirit and temper, vivifying the whole of his command, and making his
presence virtually co-extensive with its utmost limits. No severer
condemnation, perhaps, was ever implied by him, than when he wrote to
Sidney Smith, unqualifiedly, "I strictly charge and command you never
to give any French ship or man leave to quit Egypt." To deny an
officer discretion was as scathing an expression of dissatisfaction as
Nelson could utter; and as he sowed, so he reaped, in a devotion and
vigor of service few have elicited equally.

In Malta Nelson remained but thirty-six hours. Arriving at 4 P.M. on
the evening of June 15th, he sailed again at 4 A.M. of the 17th. He
had expected partly to find the fleet there; but by an odd
coincidence, on the same day that he hoisted his flag in Portsmouth,
it had sailed, although in ignorance of the war, to cruise between
Sicily and Naples; whence, on the day he left Gibraltar, the
commanding officer, Sir Richard Bickerton, had started for
Toulon,--"very judiciously," said Nelson,--the instant he heard of the
renewal of hostilities.

The "Amphion" passed through the Straits of Messina, and within sight
of Naples, carrying Nelson once more over well-known seas, and in
sight of fondly remembered places. "I am looking at _dear_ Naples, if
it is what it was," he wrote to Elliot from off Capri. "Close to
Capri," he tells Lady Hamilton, "the view of Vesuvius calls so many
circumstances to my mind, that it almost overpowers my feelings." "I
am using force upon myself to keep away," he had already said to
Acton; "for I think it likely, was I to fly to Naples, which I am much
inclined to do, that the French might turn it to some plea against
those good sovereigns." In his anxiety to join the fleet, and get in
touch of the French, the length of the passage, three weeks, caused
him great vexation, and deepened his convictions of the uselessness of
the island to his squadron off Toulon. "My opinion of Malta, as a
naval station for watching the French in Toulon, is well known; and my
present experience of what will be a three weeks' passage, most fully
confirms me in it. The fleet can never go there, if I can find any
other corner to put them in; but having said this, I now declare, that
I consider Malta as a most important outwork to India, that it will
ever give us great influence in the Levant, and indeed all the
southern parts of Italy. In this view, I hope we shall never give it
up." "Malta and Toulon are entirely different services. It takes upon
an average seven weeks to get an answer to a letter. When I am forced
to send a ship there, I never see her under two months."

With Gibraltar, however, Malta gave the British two impregnable and
secure bases of operations, within reasonable distance of one another,
and each in close proximity to points most essential to control.
During Nelson's entire command, the three chief centres of interest
and of danger were the Straits of Gibraltar, the heel of Italy, and
Toulon. The narrowing of the trade routes near the two former rendered
them points of particular exposure for merchant shipping. Around them,
therefore, and in dependence upon them, gathered the largest bodies of
the cruisers which kept down privateering, and convoyed the merchant
ships, whose protection was not the least exacting of the many cares
that fell upon Nelson. Upon the Malta division depended also the watch
over the mouth of the Adriatic and the Straits of Messina, by which
Nelson hoped to prevent the passage of the French, in small bodies, to
either Sicily, the Morea, or the Ionian Islands. Malta in truth, even
in Nelson's time, was the base for operations only less important
than the destruction of the Toulon fleet. The latter he rightly
considered his principal mission, success in which would solve most
other maritime difficulties. "My first object must ever be to keep the
French fleet in check; and, if they put to sea, to have force enough
with me to _annihilate_ them. That would keep the Two Sicilies free
from any attack from sea."

On the 8th of July the "Amphion" joined the fleet off Toulon. It
numbered then nine ships-of-the-line, with three smaller cruisers. "As
far as outside show goes," he reported to St. Vincent, "the ships look
very well; but they complain of their bottoms, and are very short of
men." The fact was, as he afterwards explained, that before the war
came they had been expecting every day to go to England, and
consequently had been allowed to run down gradually, a result which
doubtless had been hastened by St. Vincent's stringent economies.
Gibraltar and Malta were both bare, Nelson wrote six months later, and
it was not the fault of the naval storekeepers. The ships, everywhere,
were "distressed for almost every article. They have entirely eat up
their stores, and their real wants not half complied with. I have
applications from the different line-of-battle-ships for surveys on
most of their sails and running rigging, which cannot be complied
with, as there is neither cordage nor sails to replace the
unserviceable stores, and, therefore, the evil must be combated in the
best manner possible." As the whole Navy had suffered from the same
cause, there was no reserve of ships at home to replace those in the
Mediterranean, which, besides lacking everything, were between eight
and nine hundred men short of their complement, or about one hundred
for each ship-of-the-line. "We can send you neither ships nor men,"
wrote St. Vincent as winter drew on; and even a year later, the
administration which followed his found it impossible to replace the
"crazy" vessels, of which Nelson said only four were fit for winter
cruising. "It is not a storeship a week," he declared, "that would
keep them in repair." The trouble was greater because, when leaving
Malta, they had anticipated only a cruise of three weeks, which for
many of them became two years.

Despite the difficulties, he determined that the fleet as a body
should not go into port; nor should the individual ships-of-the-line,
except when absolutely necessary, and then to Gibraltar, not Malta. "I
have made up my mind never to go into port till after the battle, if
they make me wait a year, provided the Admiralty change the ships who
cannot keep the sea in winter;" nor did the failure of the Admiralty
to meet this proviso alter his resolution. It was the carrying out of
this decision, with ships in such condition, in a region where winds
and seas were of exceptional violence, and supplies of food and water
most difficult to be obtained, because surrounded in all directions by
countries either directly hostile, or under the overmastering
influence of Bonaparte, that made the exercise of Nelson's command
during this period a triumph of naval administration and prevision. It
does not necessarily follow that an officer of distinguished ability
for handling a force in the face of an enemy, will possess also the
faculty which foresees and provides for the many contingencies, upon
which depend the constant efficiency and readiness of a great
organized body; though both qualities are doubtless essential to
constitute a great general officer. For twenty-two months Nelson's
fleet never went into a port, other than an open roadstead on a
neutral coast, destitute of supplies; at the end of that time, when
the need arose to pursue an enemy for four thousand miles, it was
found massed, and in all respects perfectly prepared for so distant
and sudden a call. To quote his own words, written a year before this
summons in reply to an intimation from the Admiralty to be on his
guard against Spain, "I have the pleasure to acquaint you that the
squadron under my command is all collected, except the Gibraltar,[60]
complete in their provisions and stores to near five months, and in a
perfect state of readiness to act as the exigency of the moment may
determine." "With the resources of your mind," wrote St. Vincent, when
unable to reinforce him, "you will do very well;" and Nelson, when he
put off his harness, might have boasted himself that the prediction
was more than fulfilled.

Provisions, water, and supplies of all sorts were brought to the ships
on their station, either at sea, or in unfrequented roadsteads within
the limits of the cruising ground. "I never could have spared the
ships to go to Gibraltar for them," he wrote to St. Vincent, to whom
he expressed his satisfaction with the way the plan worked. He soon
abandoned, in fact, the method of sending individual ships for water,
because of the long absence thus entailed. When water could not be
brought in transports, or rather could not easily be transhipped owing
to the badness of the season, he thought it better to take the whole
fleet to the nearest watering-place than to divide its strength. Fresh
provisions, absolutely indispensable to the health of the ships'
companies, constituted the greatest of difficulties. Opposition to
furnishing them must be expected wherever French influence could be
felt. "The great distance from Malta or Gibraltar renders the getting
such refreshments from those places, in a regular manner, absolutely
impossible;" and from the Spanish ports, Barcelona or Rosas, which
were near his cruising ground, they could be had only "clandestinely."
Government Bills would not be taken there, nor in Barbary or Sardinia,
where bullocks might be got. Hard money must be paid, and about this
there was some routine bureau difficulty. "I certainly hate to have
anything to do with the management of money," he wrote, "but I submit
the propriety of lodging public money on board the fleet, for the
purpose of paying for fresh beef and vegetables, provided, but on _no
account otherwise_, that the simple receipt from the captain of the
ship may be a sufficient voucher for the disbursement of such money."
Absolutely disposed as he was to assume political or military
responsibilities, he was not willing, even for the health of the
fleet, to incur the risk of pecuniary imputations for himself or his
captains.

Great dexterity of management was required to obtain these supplies,
without drawing, upon those who gave them, such tokens of displeasure
from Bonaparte as might result in their discontinuance. Towards Spain,
although he felt for her perplexities, Nelson took a firm tone. She
was nominally neutral, and enjoyed privileges as such; he insisted
therefore that she should deal equal measure to both belligerents. "I
am ready to make large allowances for the miserable situation Spain
has placed herself in; but there is a certain line beyond which I
cannot submit to be treated with disrespect." That line of forbearance
was dictated, of course, less by indulgence towards Spain than by the
necessities of Great Britain, which Nelson, however indignant, was too
good a diplomatist to drop out of sight; but he kept up a pressure
which secured very substantial assistance, though grudgingly given.
"Refreshments we have a right to as long as we remain at peace, and if
this goes on"--the refusal, that is, to allow provisions to be bought
in quantities--"you may acquaint them that I will anchor in Rosas with
the squadron, and receive our daily supplies, which will offend the
French much more than our staying at sea."

Towards Naples, as secretly friendly to Great Britain, he was of
course far more tender; and, while he rejected no suggestion without
consideration, he regarded the distance as too great to render such a
means of subsistence certain. The numerous privateers that haunted
every port would intercept the transports and render convoys
necessary; it was not worth while, for so small an advantage, to
involve Naples, in its already critical state, in a dispute with
France. An occasional purchase, however, seems to have been made
there; and even France herself was at times brought to contribute,
indirectly, to the support of the squadron which was watching one of
her principal ports. "Latterly our cattle and onions have been
procured from France," wrote Nelson; "but from the apparent
incivilities of the Spaniards, I suppose we are on the eve of being
shut out." To escape the notice of the French agents, it was obviously
desirable to distribute as widely as possible the sources of supply,
so as not to concentrate observation upon any one, or upon the general
fact.

It was, however, upon Sardinia that Nelson in the end chiefly
depended. The importance of this island, both in fact and in his
estimation, was so great, that it may be said to have constituted the
chief object of his thought and anxiety, after his own squadron and
the French, which also he at times prophetically spoke of as his own.
"I do not mean to use the shells you have sent me at sea," he writes
to General Villettes, "for that I hope to consider burning _our own_
ships; but in case they run ashore, then a few put into their sides
will do their business." In addition to its extremely favorable
central position, Sardinia, as compared to Sicily, did not entail the
perplexity that its use by the British might cause a friendly
sovereign the loss of his continental dominions. Those of the King of
Sardinia had passed already nearly, if not wholly, out of his hands.
The island itself was so wild, poor, and neglected, that, even if
seized by the enemy, the King would lose little. The net revenue
derived from it was only £5,000.

During the previous war Nelson's attention had not been called much to
Sardinia. Up to the withdrawal from the Mediterranean in 1796, Corsica
had been a sufficient, and more suitable, base for the operations of
the fleet, which until then had been upon the Riviera and the
northern coast of Italy. When he returned in 1798, even after the
Battle of the Nile and the disasters of the French in 1799, the
unsettled condition of Naples, the blockade of Malta, and the affairs
of Egypt, had combined to keep him in the South; while the tenure of
the Allies in Northern Italy, up to the Battle of Marengo, was
apparently so secure as to require no great support from the fleet.
Irrespective of any personal influences that may have swayed him,
Sicily was better suited then to be the centre from which to
superintend the varied duties of his wide command.

When he returned in 1803, the old prepossessions naturally remained.
In a survey of the political conditions written for the Prime Minister
when on the passage to Toulon, much is said of Malta, Sicily, and
Naples, but Sardinia is dismissed with a passing hope that the French
would not seize it. After joining the fleet off Toulon, however, he
had to realize that, if it was to remain at sea, as he purposed and
effected, and yet be kept fully provisioned and watered, it must at
times make an anchorage, which should be so far convenient as to keep
it, practically, as much on its station as when under way. In this
dilemma his attention was called to the Madalena Islands, a group off
the northeast end of Sardinia, where wood and water could be obtained.
Between them and the main island there was a good harbor, having the
decisive advantage of two entrances, by one or other of which it could
be left in winds from any quarter. A survey had been made a year
before, during the peace, by a Captain Ryves, now commanding a ship in
the fleet. As winter approached, Nelson decided to examine the spot
himself, which he did in the last days of October, taking advantage of
a moonlight week when the enemy would be less likely to leave port. He
found it admirably adapted for his purposes, and that fresh
provisions, though not of the best quality, could be had. "It is
certainly one of the best anchorages I have met with for a fleet," he
wrote, "but I suppose the French will take it now we have used it."
This they did not attempt, and the British fleet continued to resort
to it from time to time, obtaining water and bullocks.

Such a roadstead as an occasional rendezvous, where transports could
discharge their stores to the vessels, and ships be refitted and
supplied, would make the fleet as secure of holding its position as
were the cruisers that depended upon Malta and Gibraltar. Its being
two hundred miles from Toulon was not a serious drawback, for it was
no part of Nelson's plan to keep the fleet close to Toulon. When he
took command, he found it so stationed, but he soon removed to a
position thirty to forty miles west of the harbor's mouth, which seems
to have been his general summer rendezvous. "Lord Nelson," wrote a
young officer of the fleet,[61] "pursues a very different plan from
Sir Richard Bickerton. The latter kept close to the harbour, but Lord
Nelson is scarce ever in sight of the land, and there is but one
frigate inshore." "I chose this position," Nelson said, "to answer two
important purposes: one to prevent the junction of a Spanish fleet
from the westward; and the other, to be to windward, so as to enable
me, if the northerly gale came on to the N.N.W., to take shelter in a
few hours under the Hières Islands, or if N.N.E., under Cape San
Sebastian." "It is not my intention to close-watch Toulon, even with
frigates," he wrote, and his dispositions were taken rather with a
view to encourage the enemy to come out; although, of course, he took
every precaution that they should not get far without being observed,
and assured himself by frequent reconnoitring that they had not left
port. "My system is the very contrary of blockading," he told Admiral
Pole. "Every opportunity has been offered the enemy to put to sea,"
he says again, "for it is there we hope to realize the hopes and
expectations of our Country." There was also the obvious advantage
that, if habitually out of sight, the enemy could not know his
movements, nor profit by his occasional absences in any direction.

From Madalena he extended his observations over the whole island of
Sardinia, upon the holding of which he thenceforth laid the greatest
stress, and entertained most anxious fears lest the French should
snatch it out of his hands. "If we could possess Sardinia, we should
want neither Malta nor any other. It is the most important island, as
a naval and military station, in the Mediterranean. It possesses at
the northern end the finest harbour in the world [Madalena]. It is
twenty-four hours' sail from Toulon; it covers Italy; it is a position
that the wind which carries the French to the westward is fair for you
to follow. In passing to the southward they go close to you. In short,
it covers Egypt, Italy, and Turkey." He was anxious that the British
Government should buy it. "If we, from delicacy, or commiseration of
the unfortunate king of Sardinia, do not get possession of that
island, the French will. If I lose Sardinia, I lose the French fleet."

His apprehensions were not verified; as also they were not during his
command, either in the Morea, in Naples, or in Sicily. Napoleon took
no active steps against Sardinia, although the proceedings there did
not escape the sharp eyes of the French agents, but elicited from them
vivacious remonstrances. "The government of the Republic," wrote one,
"has a right to complain of this excessive complaisance. To give
regular support to a squadron blockading a port, to revictual it, in
one word, periodically, is to tread under foot the neutrality which is
professed. I shall notify my government of a fact which demands all
its attention, and in which it is painful to me to see a cause of
misunderstanding between France and his Sardinian Majesty." It is
singularly confirmatory of the reality of Bonaparte's intention to
attempt the invasion of England, that he confined his efforts in the
South--in the Mediterranean--to feints and demonstrations. What he did
there looked to the future, not to the present; although, doubtless,
he stood always so ready that no opportunity offering advantage would
have passed neglected. The active mind of Nelson, condemned to the
uncertainties of the defensive and to military idleness, however it
may have been burdened with administrative routine and official
correspondence, found ample time to speculate on the designs of
Bonaparte, and the latter took care that he should have matter enough
to occupy him--and if possible mislead him--in rumor and in movements.
"At Marseilles they are fitting, as reports say, eighty or ninety
gunboats, and intend sending them, by the canal of Languedoc to
Bordeaux; but I am sure this is not true. They are to go alongshore to
the Heel of Italy, and to embark and protect their army either to
Sicily or the Morea, or to both; and the Navy of Europe can hardly
prevent these alongshore voyages." In this will be noticed the
recurrence of ideas familiar to him in the Riviera eight years before;
the expectation of ex-centric operations into which Bonaparte was
rarely betrayed.

Frequent stories also reach him of projects to invade and seize
Sardinia. Vessels are fitting for that purpose, now at Marseilles, now
at Villefranche; now the expedition is to come from Corsica only. "A
light linen jacket, trowsers, red cap, and a pair of shoes, is the
whole expense of Government; the plunder of the Sardinian Anglo-Sardes
is held out as the reward." To prevent it he seeks the authority of
his Government and of the King of Sardinia to garrison Madalena. The
straits of Bonifacio are but ten miles wide; it is impossible
therefore for a cruiser to prevent boats passing. If the attempt is
made, no scruples about the neutrality of Sardinia shall tie his
hands. "I have directed the frigates to pursue them, even should they
chase into Sardinia, and to take or destroy them, and also the
Corsican troops; for if I wait till the island is taken I should feel
deserving of reprobation. Of course, they will say we have broken the
neutrality, if we attack them in the ports of Sardinia before their
conquest, and if we do not I shall be laughed at for a fool.
_Prevention is better than cure_." With his usual long-headed
circumspection, however, even when most bent on an extreme step, he
warns the Prime Minister, to whom he is writing, to mention his
purpose to the Russian ambassador--that the latter may understand the
apparent breach of neutrality; for Russia has constituted herself a
champion of the Sardinian monarch. "I mention my intention that idle
reports may not be attended to."

As the winter of 1803-4 approached, and it became evident that Spain
was to persevere in her neutrality, Nelson removed his fleet to a
rendezvous about thirty miles south of Cape San Sebastian, on the
Spanish coast--the Number 97 continually mentioned in his official
letters to captains. There the highlands of Spain afford some shelter
from the furious northerly gales, which, sweeping over France from the
Atlantic, are compressed as in a funnel between the Pyrenees and the
Alps, to fall with redoubled violence on the Gulf of Lyons. Only the
utmost care and the most skilful seamanship could preserve the rickety
ships, upon whose efficiency so much depended, and which, if damaged,
there was none to replace. I "bear up for every gale," wrote Nelson.
"I must not in our present state quarrel with the northwesters--with
crazy masts and no port or spars near us." Even in September, he
writes, there are "three days' gale of severe blowing weather out of
the seven, which frequently comes on suddenly, and thereby exposes the
topmasts, topsail yards and sails, to great hazard, under every care
and attention; and there are no topmasts or topsail yards in store,
either at Gibraltar or Malta." "The French fleet keep us waiting; and
such a place as all the Gulf of Lyons, for gales of wind from the N.W.
to N.E., I never saw; but by always going away large, we generally
lose much of their force and the heavy sea. By the great care and
attention of every captain, we have suffered much less than could have
been expected. I do not believe Lord St. Vincent would have kept the
sea with such ships. However, with nursing our ships, we have roughed
it out better than could have been expected. We either run to the
southward, or furl all the sails and make the ships as easy as
possible." Under such circumstances, it was no small nor unworthy
boast he made near the close of the cruise, when the first ineffectual
attempt of the French to leave Toulon ended in numerous accidents.
"These gentlemen are not accustomed to a Gulf of Lyons gale, which we
have buffeted for twenty-one months, and not carried away a spar."
Nelson himself, though reckless to desperation when an adequate object
was at stake, in the moments of repose husbanded his means, and looked
to the efficiency of his instruments, with the diligence of a miser.
With his own hand he noted the weather indications, including the
barometer, at least three times every twenty-four hours, and
occasionally even more often.

A rendezvous, however advantageous, was not permitted by Nelson to
become a permanent station, or a long-continued resting-place for the
fleet. In the inevitable monotony of a watch protracted so far beyond
his original expectations, his sleepless solicitude for the health and
contentment of the ships' companies warned him that lack of mental
interest saps the spirit, and wears away the strength, beyond the
power of mere bodily comfort to prevent. On Number 97 was kept always
a ship--frigate or smaller cruiser--with word where the admiral was to
be found at any time; and thither resorted the vessels returning from
their missions to all parts of the station, or coming out from
England. "Rejoin me at Number 97," their instructions ran, "where you
will find me, or orders for your further proceedings." Other
rendezvous there were, of course, each with its own number, and with a
cruiser if at sea; but in the anchorages occasionally resorted to, as
Madalena, or the Gulf of Palmas in the south of Sardinia,
communications were left on shore. With the threads thus reaching from
these centres to the different parts of his command, Nelson's habit
was to keep his fleet in motion from point to point, in the stretch of
sea bounded on the one side by the coast of Spain, as far south as the
Balearics, and on the east by the islands of Sardinia and Corsica.
Through this hunting-ground, from end to end of which he roamed in
unceasing restlessness, like a lion roaring for his prey, the Toulon
fleet must pass, wherever bound; and by the judicious distribution of
the cruisers--all too few--allowed him by St. Vincent's economies, he
hoped to get timely and sufficient information of its leaving port.

"The great thing in all military service is health," he wrote to his
old friend, Dr. Moseley, who had been with him in the far-back Central
American expedition in 1780; "and you will agree with me, that it is
easier for an officer to keep men healthy, than for a physician to
cure them. Situated as this fleet has been, without a friendly port,
where we could get all the things so necessary for us, yet I have, by
changing the cruizing ground, not allowed the sameness of prospect to
satiate the mind--sometimes by looking at Toulon, Ville Franche,
Barcelona, and Rosas; then running round Minorca, Majorca; Sardinia
and Corsica; and two or three times anchoring for a few days, and
sending a ship to the last place for _onions_, which I find the best
thing that can be given to seamen; having always good mutton for the
sick, cattle when we can get them, and plenty of fresh water. In the
winter it is the best plan to give half the allowance of grog, instead
of all wine. These things are for the commander-in-chief to look to;
but shut very nearly out from Spain, and only getting refreshments by
stealth from other places, my command has been an arduous one." "Our
men's minds," he added, "are always kept up with the daily hopes of
meeting the enemy." An order indicating one of the squadron movements,
of which he here speaks, may be worth quoting. "Whereas it is my
intention," he writes at Number 97 to the captain there stationed, "to
proceed with the squadron, the first westerly wind, off Toulon, for
the purpose of reconnoitring the enemy at that port, and from thence
pass through Rendezvous No. 102, to secure any information the ships
there may have obtained of them, you are hereby required and directed
to keep on your station and inform any of his Majesty's ships arriving
on said rendezvous," etc.

The health of the crews, thus carefully watched, remained excellent
throughout, and is mentioned by him continually with evident pride as
well as satisfaction. Occasional slight outbursts of scurvy are noted,
despite his efforts for fresh food, and he mentions hectic
complaints--"of the few men we have lost, nine in ten are dead of
consumption "--but upon the whole, the general condition is
unparalleled in his experience. "We are healthy beyond example, and in
great good humour with ourselves," he writes in October, 1803, "and so
sharp-set, that I would not be a French Admiral in the way of any of
our ships for something." It would be tedious to quote the numerous
assertions to the same effect scattered up and down his correspondence
at this time; but in December, 1804, when near the end of this long
period of suspense, and after eighteen months at sea, he writes to the
Admiralty: "The Fleet is in perfect good health and good humour,
unequalled by anything which has ever come within my knowledge, and
equal to the most active service which the times may call for." Dr.
Gillespie, who joined the "Victory" as physician to the fleet in
January, 1805, wrote immediately afterwards that out of her eight
hundred and forty men, but one was confined to his bed by sickness,
and that the other ships, though upwards of twenty months off Toulon,
were in a like condition of health.

The same could not then, nor for long before, be said of Nelson
himself. The first flush of excitement in leaving England and taking
command, the expectation and change of scene in going out, affected
him favorably. "As to my health," he says, immediately after joining
the fleet, "thank God, I have not had a finger ache since I left
England;" but this, unfortunately, did not endure. It was his first
experience of the weightier anxieties of a commander-in-chief; for
when he had succeeded to that position, temporarily, in the
Mediterranean and the Baltic, he had found either a squadron in good
running order, or at the least no serious hitch about necessary
maintenance. Now all this was different. The difficulties about
supplies and the condition of his ships have been mentioned, as have
also his fears for Naples, Sicily, and the Morea,--all of which, in
his belief, might possibly be conquered, even without the
interposition of the Toulon fleet. The latter, however, kept him most
uneasy; for he could get no certain knowledge as to its destination,
or the probable time of its moving; and the wide field for injury open
to it, if his vigilance were eluded, kept his eager, unquiet mind
continually on the strain of speculation and anticipation. "I hope
they will come out and let us settle the matter. You know I hate being
kept in suspense." The nervous excitability--irritability--that often
overlay the usually cordial kindliness and gracious bearing of the
man, was an easy prey to such harassment. It breaks out at times in
his letters, but was only occasionally visible to those around him. By
the first of December he already foresees that he cannot last long.
"Next Christmas, please God, I shall be at Merton; for, by that time,
with all the anxiety attendant on such a command as this, I shall be
done up. The mind and body both wear out."

As autumn drew towards winter, the bitter cold went through his feeble
frame, and in the wild weather he was "always tossed about, and always
sea-sick." "We have had a most terrible winter," he writes, even
before the New Year. "It has almost knocked me up. I have been very
ill, and am now far from recovered; but I hope to hold out till the
battle is over, when I must recruit." "My heart, my Lord, is warm," he
tells Lord Hobart, the Secretary of State for War, "my head is firm,
but my body is unequal to my wishes. I am visibly shook; but as long
as I can hold out, I shall never abandon my truly honourable post." He
feared also blindness. "My eyesight fails me most dreadfully," he
writes to his old friend Davison. "I firmly believe that, in a very
few years, I shall be stone-blind. It is this only, of all my
maladies, that makes me unhappy; but God's will be done." The first
winter was unusually severe, and during it was added, to his official
cares and personal suffering, an extreme anxiety about Lady Hamilton,
for he was expecting the birth of a second child in January. This
child, a girl, lived but a short time; he never saw her. The effect of
these various causes upon his health was so great, that the
physicians, as early as January, 1804, were advising his return. "The
medical gentlemen are wanting to survey me, and to send me to Bristol
for the re-establishment of my health," he tells Minto; but he adds,
"do not mention it (it is my concern) I beg of you." Reports were then
unusually persistent that the enemy was about to put to sea. "_I_ must
not be sick until after the French fleet is taken."

To the last moment the destination of the French and the purposes of
Bonaparte remained unknown to him, a fruitful source of guessing and
worry. "It is at best but a guess," he wrote to Ball, after a year's
pondering, "and the world attaches wisdom to him that guesses right."
Yet his conclusions, however reached, though subject to temporary
variations, were in the main correct. Strongly impressed though he was
with the importance and exposure of Egypt, he inclined upon the whole
to the belief that the French were bound to the westward, out of the
Straits and into the Atlantic. This confirmed him in taking his
general summer rendezvous to the westward, where he was to windward of
such a movement, as well as interposed between Toulon and any Spanish
fleet attempting to go there. "My station to the westward of Toulon,
an unusual one," he writes to Addington in August, 1803, "has been
taken upon an idea that the French fleet is bound out of the Straits
and probably to Ireland. I shall follow them to the Antipodes." Two
months later he says: "Plausible reasons may certainly be given for
every one of the plans" suggested by his various correspondents; but
he thinks that either Alexandria or outside the Mediterranean is the
most probable. "To those two points my whole attention is turned."
"Their destination, is it Ireland or the Levant? That is what I want
to know;" but in December he still holds to his first impression: "My
opinion is, certainly, out of the Mediterranean."

In this perplexity Elliot suggested to him to receive on board the
fleet some good Frenchmen, who could land from time to time and get
information in Toulon,--a proposition which drew from Nelson a
characteristic and amusing explosion. "Mr. Elliot wanted to send me
some _good_ Frenchmen, to go ashore and get me information. My answer
to all these offers is 'No.' I can be told nothing of any consequence
to me; but a copy of the French admiral's orders, when he is to put to
sea, and where he is destined to, is the only useful information I can
care about. I can see the number and force at Toulon any day I please,
and as for the names of the Captains or Admirals I care not what they
are called; therefore, as you may suppose, I have none of these 'good
Frenchmen' about me." "I put no confidence in them," he tells Elliot.
"You think yours good: the Queen thinks hers the same: I believe they
are all alike. Whatever information you can get me, I shall be very
thankful for; but not a Frenchman comes here. Forgive me, but my
mother hated the French." "I never trust a Corsican or a Frenchman. I
would give the devil ALL the good ones to take the remainder."

As winter advanced, his perplexities increased, for each
correspondent, by long dwelling on his particular concern, saw its
danger and importance growing in his own eyes, and dwelt upon them
with greater emphasis in his letters. "Ball is sure they are going to
Egypt; the Turks are sure they are going to the Morea; Mr. Elliot at
Naples, to Sicily; and the King of Sardinia, to his only spot. Every
power thinks they are destined against them; but whatever the French
may intend to do," he concludes, with a quaint humor occasional with
him, "I trust, and with confidence, they are destined for _Spithead_."
He recognized, too, that Bonaparte himself was not wholly master of
his own projects when contending with such uncertain elements; and the
great master of War, in this instance as in many others, had placed
his force so centrally, in the heel of Italy, that he threatened with
equal facility in two opposite directions, to his own advantage and
his enemies' perplexity. "Circumstances may even make it necessary to
alter its destination by Buonaparte; Egypt or Ireland, and I rather
lean to the latter destination." Anything, indeed, is possible; for,
as winter approaches, "we can be sure of nothing in so short a
run,"--as to Sardinia or Sicily.

For a little while during February, 1804, he was further stirred up by
reports that the French were about to concentrate their naval forces,
from Brest and Ferrol, in the Mediterranean; and this he was inclined
to believe, unfavorable as the season would be for maritime operations
in that stormy sea, with the inexperienced crews of the enemy. In the
summer his conviction of the importance of the Mediterranean had fully
prepared him for such an attempt. "Naples, the Morea, and ultimately
Egypt, are in Buonaparte's view," he had then written. "With this
idea, I fully expect that the French fleet from Brest will assuredly
come into the Mediterranean, to protect this army across the water. I
shall try and fight one party or the other, before they form a
junction." "Much may be done before British reinforcements arrive," he
reminded St. Vincent. "Your Lordship knows what Admiral Bruix might
have done, had he done his duty, and they may buy their experience."
Now he says to Ball, "The Admiralty tells me nothing, they know
nothing; but my private letters say, that the Brest squadron, as well
as Ferrol,[62] is bound here--if so, we shall have work enough upon
our hands." Thirty thousand troops, also, were ready to embark in
Marseilles and Nice. The conclusion, in view of so great a force
assembling, was natural: "Egypt, I have no doubt is the favourite and
ultimate object of the Corsican tyrant." Nelson's spirit rises with
the occasion. "I shall try to intercept them, but I cannot go so far
to the westward as is necessary; for I will not lose sight of the
Toulon fleet. What a most zealous man can do to meet all points of
difficulty, shall be done. My squadron is the finest for its numbers
in the world, and much may be expected of it. Should superior numbers
join, we must look it in the face. _Nil desperandum!_ God is good, and
our cause is just."

This alarm passed away like others. Bonaparte had no idea of pushing
ships into the Mediterranean, or embarking his naval forces on any
doubtful experiments, until he had first tested the possibility of
that supreme adventure, the invasion of England. When that mighty
imagination passed away like a dream that leaves no trace, he ordered
his fleets into the Mediterranean, as Nelson had expected, and the
result was Trafalgar.

As the spring of 1804 opened, the French admiral at Toulon began to
exercise his ships outside the harbor, singly or in small groups, like
half-fledged birds learning to fly; or, to use Nelson's expression,
"My friend Monsieur La Touche sometimes plays bo-peep in and out of
Toulon, like a mouse at the edge of her hole." The only drill-ground
for fleets, the open sea, being closed to him, he could do no better
than these furtive excursions, to prepare for the eagle's flight
Napoleon had prescribed to him. "Last week, at different times, two
sail of the line put their heads out of Toulon, and on Thursday, the
5th [April], in the afternoon, they all came out." "Yesterday [the
9th] a rear-admiral and seven sail, including frigates, put their nose
outside the harbour. If they go on playing this game, some day we
shall lay salt upon their tails, and so end the campaign."

These outings--"capers," Nelson called them--naturally became more
venturesome by little and little, as the British suffered them to
proceed without serious attempt at molestation, or near approach on
their part. Nelson veiled the keenness of his watch, as he crouched
for a spring, with a drowsy appearance of caution and indifference.
The French admiral, Latouche Tréville, was he who had commanded at
Boulogne when Nelson's boats were repelled with slaughter; and it was
also he who in 1792 had sent a grenadier to the King of Naples, with a
peremptory summons to diplomatic apology in one hand, and a threat of
bombardment in the other. For both these affairs Nelson considered he
had a personal score to settle. "I rather believe my antagonist at
Toulon begins to be angry with me: at least, I am trying to make him
so; and then, he may come out, and beat me, as he says he did off
Boulogne. He is the Admiral that went to Naples in December, 1792,
who landed the grenadier. I owe him something for that."

The French having eight sail-of-the-line certainly ready for sea, and
two or three more nearly so--how nearly Nelson was not sure--he now
endeavored to lure them out. "I have taken a method of making Mr. La
Touche Tréville angry. I have left Sir Richard Bickerton, with part of
the fleet, twenty leagues from hence, and, with five of the line, am
preventing his cutting capers, which he has done for some time past,
off Cape Sicie." "He seems inclined to try his hand with us," he
writes a week later, "and by my keeping so great an inferiority close
to him, perhaps he may some day be tempted." Nelson had near Toulon at
the time nine ships-of-the-line. Had he succeeded in bringing Latouche
Tréville to attack his five, he would have hoped, even with such odds,
for a decisive victory; but, failing that, he was assured that the
Toulon fleet would be out of the game for that summer. It was
important to bring matters to an issue, for, as he wrote Elliot, his
force was diminishing daily through the deterioration of ships never
from the first fit for their work. Measured by the standard of the
ships in the Channel, "I have but four sail fit to keep the sea. I
absolutely keep them out by management." Except the four, all needed
docking, and there was not a dock open to the British west of
Constantinople.

But, while thus keenly anxious to force an action, he was wary to
obtain tactical conditions that should insure a success, adequate both
to the risk he ran, and to the object at which he aimed. "I think
their fleet will be ordered out to fight close to Toulon, that they
may get their crippled ships in again, and that we must then quit the
coast to repair our damages, and thus leave the coast clear; but my
mind is fixed not to fight them, unless with a westerly wind, outside
the Hières, and with an easterly wind, to the westward of Sicie."
Crippled there, to leeward of their port, the other British division
coming up fresh, as a reserve, from the southward, where it lay
concealed, would both cut them off, and rescue any of their own fleet
that might have been overpowered. Bickerton's orders were to remain
due south from Port Cros, one of the Hyères, at a distance such that,
with the upper canvas furled, his ships could not be seen from the
islands, but could keep the main division in sight from their
mastheads. In all cases of anticipated battle, Nelson not only took
his measures thus thoughtfully, but was careful to put his
subordinates in possession both of his general plans, and, as far as
possible, of the underlying ideas. Thus, in a memorandum issued about
this time to the captains, he says: "As it is my determination to
attack the French fleet in any place where there is a reasonable
prospect of getting fairly alongside of them, I recommend that every
captain will make himself, by inquiries, as fully acquainted as
possible with the following places, viz., Hières Bay, [with its three
entrances], Gourjean Bay, (of which I send a chart from the latest
surveys made,) Port Especia, and, in particular the northern Passage
into Leghorn Roads, from which side it is only, in my opinion,
possible to attack an enemy's fleet to advantage; and with the Gulf of
Ajaccio." To these instructions he adds some details of practical
preparation for anchoring under fire, and the reasons therefor. In the
same spirit, when expecting the Brest fleet in the Mediterranean, he
says: "I am perfectly prepared how to act with either a superior or an
inferior force. My mind is firm as a rock, and my plans for every
event fixed in my mind." No man ever was served better than Nelson by
the inspiration of the moment; no man ever counted on it less.

In communicating his ideas to his subordinates Nelson did not confine
himself to official intercourse; on the contrary, his natural
disposition impelled him rather to familiar conversation with them on
service subjects. "Even for debating the most important naval
business," we learn through his confidential secretary at this period,
"he preferred a turn on the quarter-deck with his captains, whom he
led by his own frankness to express themselves freely, to all the
stiffness and formality of a council of war."[63] An interesting
instance of these occasional counsels has been transmitted to us by
one of his captains, then little more than a youth, but the last to
survive of those who commanded ships under him. "Throughout the month
of October, 1804, Toulon was frequently reconnoitred, and the Phoebe
and Amazon were ordered to cruize together. Previous to their going
away Lord Nelson gave to Captains Capel and Parker several
injunctions, in case they should get an opportunity of attacking two
of the French frigates, which now got under weigh more frequently. The
principal one was, that they should not each single out and attack an
opponent, but 'that both should endeavour together to take _one
frigate_; if successful, chase the other: but if you do not take the
second, still you have won a victory, and your country will gain a
frigate.' Then, half laughing, and half snappishly, said kindly to
them as he wished them good-bye, 'I daresay you consider yourselves a
couple of fine fellows, and when you get away from me you will do
nothing of the sort, but think yourselves wiser than I am!'"[64]

The game of cat and mouse, off Toulon, occasioned one incident which
greatly upset Nelson's composure, and led to a somewhat amusing
display of ire, excited by a statement of the French admiral,
published throughout Europe, that his renowned antagonist had run away
from him. On the 13th of June, two French frigates and a brig were
seen under the Hyères Islands, where they had been sent by Latouche
Tréville, upon the report that some enemy's cruisers were in the
neighborhood. Nelson despatched two frigates after them, which, owing
to light winds, did not get near until the next day. The French
vessels being then seen from the "Victory" to be close in with the
batteries, the "Excellent," 74, was sent to support the frigates, and
some time afterwards the other four ships also bore up for the main
entrance to the islands. Upon this, Latouche Tréville got under way,
and at about 5 P.M. came out of the harbor with his eight
sail-of-the-line. Nelson's division reduced their canvas, hauling to
the wind in line of battle, on the starboard tack, which, with the
then wind, was with their heads off shore, and the "Excellent" was
recalled, although she could not rejoin till midnight. In this order
they hove-to (stopped), with two reefs in the topsails and the main
yards square, at 7.30 P.M., which at that time of the year was broad
daylight, and in this general position remained till next morning.

As the distance between the hostile bodies was apparently from twelve
to fifteen miles, the French admiral's observations may have failed to
recognize that the enemy, by backing his topsails, had offered a fair
challenge; else, in his report of this very commonplace occurrence, he
could scarcely have used, concerning the movement of heading south,
the expression, _prit chasse_, which, whether rendered "retired," or
"retreated," or, as Nelson did, "ran away," was a misrepresentation of
the facts, and heightened by the assertion that he pursued till
nightfall, and next morning could not see the enemy. Writing to Elliot
four days after the affair happened, Nelson mentioned casually his
view of the matter. "Monsieur La Touche came out with eight sail of
the line and six frigates, cut a caper off Sepet, and went in again. I
brought-to for his attack, although I did not believe anything was
meant serious, but merely a gasconade." "On the morning of the 15th,"
he tells Acton on the same day, "I believe I may call it, we chased
him into Toulon." His purpose evidently was, as has been shown, to
fight, if the enemy meant business, to leeward of the port, and far
enough off to give Bickerton a chance to come up. Great was his wrath,
two months later, when Latouche's statement reached him, and he found
that not only no mention was made of the relative numbers, but that
the offensive expression quoted had been used. "I do assure you," he
wrote to the Admiralty, enclosing a copy of the day's log, "I know not
what to say, except by a flat contradiction; for if my character is
not established by this time for not being apt to run away, it is not
worth my time to attempt to put the world right." He might well have
rested there,--an imputation that might have injured an untried man
could provoke only a smile when levelled at his impregnable renown;
but his ruffled mind would not let him keep quiet, and in private
correspondence he vented his rage in terms similar to those used of
the Danish commodore after Copenhagen. "You will have seen Monsieur La
Touche's letter of how he chased me and how I _ran_. I keep it; and,
by G--d, if I take him, he shall _eat_ it." He is a "poltroon," a
"liar," and a "miscreant." It may be added that no admiral, whether a
Nelson or not, could have abandoned the "Excellent" under the
conditions.

Immediately after this abortive affair, Nelson, convinced by it that
something more than a taunt was needed to bring his enemy under his
guns, stationed frigates at the Hyères, and to cruise thence to the
eastward as far as Cape Taillat, to intercept the commerce between
Italy and Toulon and Marseilles. For this purpose he had recommended,
and the Government had ordered, a blockade of all Genoese ports
including Spezia; Genoa, now the Ligurian Republic, being considered
as much France as Toulon. Nothing, he said, could distress France
more. This blockade had been but feebly enforced, owing to the lack
of small cruisers; but he hoped to attain the same end by the frigates
off the Hyères. "I really am of opinion," he told their commander,
"that it will force La Touche out." In the latter, however, he had to
do with an opponent of skill as well as of resolution. Firmly imbued
with the French tradition, and with Bonaparte's instructions, which
subordinated his local action entirely to the great scheme in which
the Toulon fleet had its appointed part, Latouche Tréville was neither
to be provoked nor betrayed into an action, by which, however tempting
the promise, his fleet might be made unfit for their intended service.
Nelson did him no more than justice, when he said, "I am confident,
when he is ordered for any service, that he will risk falling in with
us, and the event of a battle, to try and accomplish his orders;" but,
short of the appointed time, nothing else could entice him. In vain
did the British admiral bait his trap by exposing frigates, without
visible support, to draw him to leeward, while the hostile fleet
hovered out of sight to windward. The shrewd Frenchman doubtless felt
the temptation, but he distrusted the gifts too plausibly tendered.

Besides the interest of the public service, Nelson had the strongest
personal motives for bringing matters to an issue. The prolonged
suspense and the anxiety were exhausting him, the steady tension even
of the normal conditions fretted him beyond endurance; but when a
crisis became accentuated by an appearance that the enemy had eluded
him, his feelings of distress, acting upon an enfeebled organization,
and a nervous temperament so sensitive that he started at the mere
dropping of a rope beside him, drove him almost to distraction. On
such an occasion he wrote: "I am absolutely beginning this letter in a
fever of the mind. It is thick as butter-milk, and blowing a Levanter;
and the Narcissus has just spoke me to say, 'she boarded a vessel,
and they understood that the men had seen, a few days before, twelve
sail of ships of war off Minorca. It was in the dusk, and he did not
know which way they were steering.' This is the whole story, and a
lame one. You will imagine my feelings, although I cannot bring my
mind to believe. To miss them, God forbid.... If I should miss these
fellows, my heart will break: I am actually only now recovering the
shock of missing them in 1798. God knows I only serve to fight those
scoundrels; and if I cannot do that, I should be better on shore."
When the weather cleared, and a reconnoissance showed the news was
false, his intense relief found expression in the words: "I believe
this is the only time in my life, that I was glad to hear the French
were in port." "The French ships," he says at another time, "have
either altered their anchorage, or some of them have got to sea in the
late gales: the idea has given me half a fever. If that admiral were
to cheat me out of my hopes of meeting him, it would kill me much
easier than one of his balls. Since we sat down to dinner Captain
Moubray has made the signal, but I am very far from being easy."

On the 12th of May, 1804, there was a change of administration in
England. Earl St. Vincent left the Admiralty, as First Lord, and was
succeeded by Lord Melville. A few days before this Nelson, by a
general promotion, had become Vice-Admiral of the White, the rank in
which he died eighteen months later.

The return of summer had improved his health from the low condition
into which it had fallen during the winter, but he did not flatter
himself as to the future. The combination of colorless monotony with
constant racking anxiety slackened the springs of moral energy, which,
and which alone, responding joyously to a call to action, afforded the
stimulus capable of triumphing over his bodily weakness, and causing
it for the moment to disappear. "This is an odd war," he said, "not a
battle!" Tying himself to the ship, in profound sympathy with the
crews, he never went ashore from the time he left Malta in June, 1803,
until he reached Gibraltar in July, 1805; nor was he ever outside of
the "Victory" from July 30, 1803, the day he went on board her from
the "Amphion." "Always shut up in the Victory's cabin," as he himself
wrote, "cannot be very good for the constitution. I think you will
find me grown thin, but never mind." Other officers, especially of the
frigates, got their occasional runs ashore; but his slight figure was
continually in view, walking the front of the poop, to the unconscious
contentment of the men, thus reminded ever that their admiral shared
their deprivations. This profound seclusion to the narrow circle of
the flagship, although often broken by the presence of officers from
the other vessels, who, whether cruising in company with the fleet, or
arriving with tidings from different ports, were daily partakers of
the admiral's hospitable table, could not but depress him; and there
was with him the constant sense of loss, by absence from those he held
most dear. "I have not a thought except on you and the French fleet,"
he tells Lady Hamilton; "all my thoughts, plans, and toils tend to
those two objects. Don't laugh at my putting you and the French fleet
together, but you cannot be separated."

Yet even towards her his mind is fixed as of old, that she must take a
place second to duty. She had, it appears, insisted upon her wish to
come out to the station to be near him. Malta and Italy were both, he
said, out of the question. His place was off Toulon, as long as the
French fleet was there; therefore he could not go into harbor; nay, "I
might absolutely miss you, by leaving the Mediterranean without
warning. The other day we had a report the French were out, and seen
steering to the westward. We were as far as Minorca when the alarm
proved false." As for coming on board the "Victory" to live, which
she seems to have suggested, "Imagine what a cruize off Toulon is;
even in summer time we have a hard gale every week, and two days'
heavy swell. It would kill you; and myself to see you. Much less
possible to have Charlotte, Horatia, &c., on board ship! And I, that
have given orders to carry no women to sea in the Victory, to be the
first to break them! I know, my own dear Emma, if she will let her
reason have fair play, will say I am right; but she is like Horatia,
very angry if she cannot have her own way." "Horatia is like her
mother; will have her own way, or kick up a devil of a dust,"--an
observation both Greville and Hamilton had had to make. "Your Nelson,"
he concludes, "is called upon, in the most honourable manner, to
defend his country. Absence to us is equally painful: but, if I had
either stayed at home, or neglected my duty abroad, would not my Emma
have blushed for me? She could never have heard my praises, and how
the country looks up." "The call of our country," he says again,
"makes it indispensable for both our honours--the country looks up to
the services of the poorest individual, much more to me, and are you
not a sharer of my glory?"

Of his daily life on board, and intercourse with others, we have
intimations, fragmentary yet sufficient. "Our days," he himself says,
"pass so much alike that, having described one, you have them all. We
now [October] breakfast by candle light; and all retire, at eight
o'clock, to bed." "We cruise, cruise, and one day so like another that
they are hardly distinguishable, but _hopes_, blessed _hopes_, keeps
us up, that some happy day the French may come out, then I shall
consider my duty to my country fulfilled." Of one of these monotonous
days we have received a description from an officer,[65] a member of
the admiral's mess, who had then too lately entered upon them to feel
the full weight of their deadly sameness.

"At 6 o'clock my servant brings a light and informs me of the hour,
wind, weather, and course of the ship, when I immediately dress and
generally repair to the deck, the dawn of day at this season and
latitude being apparent at about half or three-quarters of an hour
past six. Breakfast is announced in the Admiral's cabin, where Lord
Nelson, Rear Admiral Murray, (the Captain of the Fleet,) Captain
Hardy, commander of the Victory, the chaplain, secretary, one or two
officers of the ship, and your humble servant assemble and breakfast
on tea, hot rolls, toast, cold tongue, &c, which when finished we
repair upon deck to enjoy the majestic sight of the rising sun
(scarcely ever obscured by clouds in this fine climate) surmounting
the smooth and placid waves of the Mediterranean, which supports the
lofty and tremendous bulwarks of Britain, following in regular train
their admiral in the Victory. Between the hours of 7 and 2 there is
plenty of time for business, study, writing, and exercise, which
different occupations I endeavour to vary in such a manner as to
afford me sufficient employment. At 2 o'clock a band of music plays
till within a quarter of 3, when the drum beats the tune called, 'The
Roast Beef of Old England' to announce the Admiral's dinner, which is
served up exactly at 3 o'clock, and which generally consists of three
courses and a dessert of the choicest fruit [a fact which bespeaks the
frequency of communications with the land], together with three or
four of the best wines, champagne and claret not excepted. If a person
does not feel himself perfectly at his ease it must be his own fault,
such is the urbanity and hospitality which reign here, notwithstanding
the numerous titles, the four orders of Knighthood, worn by Lord
Nelson,[66] and the well earned laurels which he has acquired. Coffee
and liqueurs close the dinner about half-past 4 or 5 o'clock, after
which the company generally walk the deck, where the band of music
plays for nearly an hour.[67] A 6 o'clock tea is announced, when the
company again assemble in the Admiral's cabin, where tea is served up
before 7 o'clock, and, as we are inclined, the party continue to
converse with his lordship, who at this time generally unbends
himself, though he is at all times as free from stiffness and pomp as
a regard to proper dignity will admit, and is very communicative. At 8
o'clock a rummer of punch with cake or biscuit is served up, soon
after which we wish the Admiral a good night (who is generally in bed
before 9 o'clock). Such is the journal of a day at sea in fine or at
least moderate weather, in which this floating castle goes through the
water with the greatest imaginable steadiness."

Another medical officer, who served on board the "Victory" soon after
the writer of the lines just quoted, has transmitted some other
interesting particulars of Nelson's personal habits and health, which
relate to the general period now under narration.

"An opinion has been very generally entertained, that Lord Nelson's
state of health, and supposed infirmities arising from his former
wounds and hard services, precluded the probability of his long
surviving the battle of Trafalgar, had he fortunately escaped the
Enemy's shot: but the writer of this can assert that his Lordship's
health was uniformly good, with the exception of some slight attacks
of indisposition arising from accidental causes; and which never
continued above two or three days, nor confined him in any degree with
respect to either exercise or regimen: and during the last twelve
months of his life, he complained only three times in this way. It is
true, that his Lordship, about the meridian of life, had been subject
to frequent fits of the gout; which disease, however, as well as his
constitutional tendency to it, he totally overcame by abstaining for
the space of nearly two years from animal food, and wine, and all
other fermented drink; confining his diet to vegetables, and commonly
milk and water. And it is also a fact, that early in life, when he
first went to sea, he left off the use of salt, which he then believed
to be the sole cause of scurvy, and never took it afterwards with his
food.

"His Lordship used a great deal of exercise, generally walking on deck
six or seven hours in the day. He always rose early, for the most part
shortly after daybreak. He breakfasted in summer about six, and at
seven in winter: and if not occupied in reading or writing despatches,
or examining into the details of the Fleet, he walked on the
quarter-deck the greater part of the forenoon; going down to his cabin
occasionally to commit to paper such incidents or reflections as
occurred to him during that time, and as might be hereafter useful to
the service of his country. He dined generally about half-past two
o'clock. At his table there were seldom less than eight or nine
persons, consisting of the different Officers of the Ship: and when
the weather and the service permitted, he very often had several of
the Admirals and Captains in the Fleet to dine with him; who were
mostly invited by signal, the rotation of seniority being commonly
observed by his Lordship in these invitations. At dinner he was alike
affable and attentive to every one: he ate very sparingly himself; the
liver and wing of a fowl, and a small plate of macaroni, in general
composing his meal, during which he occasionally took a glass of
champagne. He never exceeded four glasses of wine after dinner, and
seldom drank three; and even those were diluted with either Bristol or
common water.

"Few men subject to the vicissitudes of a Naval life, equalled his
Lordship in an habitual systematic mode of living. He possessed such a
wonderful activity of mind, as even prevented him from taking ordinary
repose, seldom enjoying two hours of uninterrupted sleep; and on
several occasions he did not quit the deck during the whole night. At
these times he took no pains to protect himself from the effects of
wet, or the night air; wearing only a thin great coat: and he has
frequently, after having his clothes wet through with rain, refused to
have them changed, saying that the leather waistcoat which he wore
over his flannel one would secure him from complaint. He seldom wore
boots, and was consequently very liable to have his feet wet. When
this occurred he has often been known to go down to his cabin, throw
off his shoes, and walk on the carpet in his stockings for the purpose
of drying the feet of them. He chose rather to adopt this
uncomfortable expedient, than to give his servants the trouble of
assisting him to put on fresh stockings; which, from his having only
one hand, he could not himself conveniently effect.

"From these circumstances it may be inferred, that though Lord
Nelson's constitution was not of that kind which is generally
denominated strong, yet it was not very susceptible of complaint from
the common occasional causes of disease necessarily attending a Naval
life. The only bodily pain which his Lordship felt in consequence of
his many wounds, was a slight rheumatic affection of the stump of his
amputated arm on any sudden variation in the state of the weather;
which is generally experienced by those who have the misfortune to
lose a limb after the middle age. His Lordship usually predicted an
alteration in the weather with as much certainty from feeling
transient pains in his stump, as he could by his marine barometer;
from the indications of which latter he kept a diary of the
atmospheric changes, which was written with his own hand.

"His Lordship had lost his right eye by a contusion which he received
at the siege of Calvi, in the island of Corsica. The vision of the
other was likewise considerably impaired: he always therefore wore a
green shade over his forehead, to defend this eye from the effect of
strong light; but as he was in the habit of looking much through a
glass while on deck, there is little doubt that had he lived a few
years longer, and continued at sea, he would have lost his sight
totally."[68]

The business hours of the day from seven to two were spent by Nelson
largely with his secretaries. We know from Colonel Stewart that in the
Baltic, where his command was more numerous than in the Mediterranean,
his habit was to get through the ordinary business of the squadron
before eight o'clock; for the rest, the greater part of the detail
work would fall upon the Captain of the Fleet, then Rear-Admiral
George Murray, who would require only general instructions and little
interference for carrying on the laborious internal administration of
the fleet. The admiral's energies were sufficiently taxed in
considering and meeting, so far as his resources would permit, the
numerous and complicated demands for external services in the
different quarters of his wide command--the ingenious effort to induce
two and two to make five, in which so much of the puzzle of life
consists. His position necessarily involved extensive diplomatic
relations. Each British Minister around the shores of the
Mediterranean had his own particular care; the British admiral was in
confidential communication with all, and in every movement had to
consider the consequences, both of what he did and of what he left
undone. It was a day when force ruled, and all the nations of Europe,
whether they wished or not, had to put their chief trust in the sword,
and in those who bore it. Not the least of Nelson's qualifications for
his post was that he possessed intimate knowledge and experience of
political conditions in the Mediterranean, knew the peoples and the
rulers well, and to great sagacity and sound judgment added a temper
at once firm and conciliatory. "He had in a great degree," said a
contemporary who knew him well,[69] "the valuable but rare quality of
conciliating the most opposite tempers, and forwarding the public
service with unanimity amongst men not of themselves disposed to
accord;" and although the remark referred primarily to his conduct in
the naval service, it will readily be seen that this aptitude is
nowhere more useful than in the tangled maze of conflicting national
interests. "My line of conduct," he wrote to Hobart, a year after
taking his command, "in obedience to the spirit of his Majesty's
instructions communicated through your Lordship, has been simply
this,--to conciliate all, to protect all from French rapacity. I have
been honoured with your letter of January 7th, and it has given me
most sincere pleasure that my whole conduct in my command here has
been such as to meet his Majesty's approbation." The new Ministry,
upon assuming office, requested him in the most flattering terms to
continue his direct correspondence on political subjects with them, as
with their predecessors.

Yet, while conciliatory, he could at times be curt and arbitrary
enough. Fault was found with the blockade of Genoa on the ground that
it did not comply with the requirements of international law; the
complaint resting, apparently, on the statement that the blockaders
could not be seen from Genoa. Nelson replied that the proof of evident
danger to vessels seeking to enter or leave, rested on the fact that
captures were made; and it is, on the face of it, absurd to say that
there can be no danger to a vessel seeking to enter a blockaded port,
because the blockading vessels are not visible from the latter. Much
more depends upon their number, disposition, and speed. "From my
knowledge of Genoa and its Gulf," said Nelson, "I assert without fear
of contradiction, that the nearer ships cruise to Genoa, the more
certain is the escape of vessels from that port, or their entrance
into it insured. I am blockading Genoa, according to the orders of the
Admiralty, and in the way I think most proper. Whether modern law or
ancient law makes my mode right, I cannot judge; and surely of the
mode of disposing of a fleet, I must, if I am fit for my post, be a
better judge than any landsman, however learned he may appear. It
would be the act of a fool to tell Europe where I intend to place the
ships, for the purpose of effectually obeying my orders; not a captain
can know it, and their positions will vary, according to the
information I may receive.... I endeavour, as well as I am able, to
obey my orders, without entering into the nice distinctions of
lawyers. I will not further take up your time on a subject which,
without being a lawyer, merely as a man, could have admitted of no
dispute." Along with much truth, there was in this a certain amount of
special pleading, as appeared when he took the further position that,
to intercept ships from Genoa, bound to the Atlantic, there was no
better place than the Gut of Gibraltar. When a definition of
international law is stretched as far as that, it will have little
elastic force left.

A petty, yet harassing, diplomatic difficulty, curiously illustrative
of maritime conditions at that day, ran unsettled through almost the
whole of his command. Malta, under the Knights, had been always at war
with the Barbary Powers; and there was trouble in impressing upon the
rulers of the latter that, when it passed into British hands, its
people and ships were under British protection. Several Maltese
vessels had been taken by Algerine cruisers, and their crews enslaved.
When Nelson came out in 1803, he found pending these cases, and also
the question of compelling, or inducing, the Dey to receive back the
British consul, whom he had expelled with insult. In the absence of a
British representative, the negotiations were intrusted wholly to the
admiral.

Nelson's feelings were strongly excited. He was tenacious of
everything he conceived to touch his country's honor, and long service
in the Mediterranean had made him familiar with the outrages on its
defenceless coasts practised by these barbarians, under the pretence
of war with the weaker states. Even in the remote and impoverished
north of Sardinia, the shepherds near the beaches watched their flocks
with arms beside them, day and night, to repel the attacks of
marauders from the sea. Not only were trading-vessels seized, but
descents were made upon the shore, and the inhabitants swept off into
slavery. Speaking of one such case in 1799, he had said: "My blood
boils that I cannot chastise these pirates. They could not show
themselves in the Mediterranean did not our Country permit. Never let
us talk of the cruelty of the African slave trade, while we permit
such a horrid war." But he knew, both then and afterwards, that Great
Britain, with the great contest on her hands, could not spare the
ships which might be crippled in knocking the barbarians' strongholds
about their ears, and that no British admiral would be sustained in a
course that provoked these pirates to cast aside the fears that
restrained them, and to declare war on British commerce, which, as it
was, he had difficulty to protect. He estimated ten ships-of-the-line
as the force necessary, in case the batteries at Algiers were to be
attacked. Exmouth, twelve years later, with fuller information,
thought and found five to be sufficient.

Nelson's conduct and self-control were sorely tested by the necessity
of temporizing with this petty foe, who reckoned securely on the
embarrassments of Great Britain. He acted with great judgment,
however, holding a high tone, and implying much in the way of menace,
without at any time involving himself in a definite threat, from
which he could not recede without humiliation; careful and precise in
his demands, but never receding from them, or allowing them to be
evaded, when once made; sensible of the difficulties in his way, as
well those raised by his own Government as those dependent upon his
opponent, but equally aware that he held in his hands, if authorized
to use it, the power to suppress the career of depredation, upon which
the Dey relied to support his revenue, and to content his officers.
Personally, he favored a short and summary proceeding, accordant to
his own decided character. The Dey proving immovable when first
summoned, he proposed to the British Government "that on the 28th of
April next, when, if he means to send his cruisers to sea, they will
be out, that, on that day, every ship under my command should have
strict orders (to open on that day) to take, sink, burn, and destroy
every Algerine, and that on that day the port of Algiers should be
declared in a state of blockade. Thus the Dey could get neither
commerce, presents, or plunder; and, although the other Powers may
rejoice at the war with us, yet I am firmly persuaded that it will be
most advantageous to us for the next hundred years." At the same time,
with his usual circumspection, he issued a general direction to all
commanders of convoys to carry their charges well clear of the
Algerine coast, until matters were settled. In the end, the British
Ministry yielded much more than Nelson approved, but, however sorely
against the grain, he carried out all his instructions with scrupulous
subordination. It was only three days before the active campaign began
with the sortie of the French fleet, that he was rejoined by the ship
to whose captain were intrusted the final arrangements with Algiers.

For his diplomatic and naval correspondence, Nelson had two principal
secretaries, public and private, both, awkwardly enough, named Scott;
but the latter, being a clergyman and chaplain of the ship, was
colloquially brevetted Doctor, a distinction which, for convenience,
will be observed when it is necessary to mention him. He had become
known to Nelson while serving in the same capacity with Sir Hyde
Parker, and had been found very useful in the negotiations at
Copenhagen. An accomplished linguist and an omnivorous reader, Dr.
Scott was doubly useful. Upon him devolved the translating of all
despatches and letters, not only from, but to, foreign courts and
officials; for Nelson made a point of sending with all such papers a
copy in the language of the person addressed, and an apology for
failing to do so sometimes appears, on account of his secretary's
absence. The latter was also a man of wide information, acquired, not
as his superior's chiefly was, by mingling among men and dealing with
affairs, but from books; and the admiral, while rightly valuing the
teachings of experience above all, was duly sensible that one's own
experience is susceptible of further extension through that of others,
imparted either by word or pen. Nelson entertained a persuasion, so
Scott has told us, that no man ever put his hand to paper without
having some information or theory to deliver, which he fancied was not
generally known, and that this was worth looking after through all the
encumbering rubbish. For the same reason, besides being naturally
sociable, he liked to draw others into conversation, and to start
subjects for discussion, from which, when fairly under way, he would
withdraw himself into silence and allow the company to do the talking,
both in order to gather ideas that might be useful to himself, and
also to observe character transpiring in conversation. Bourrienne has
told us that Bonaparte took pleasure in provoking similar debates.
Scott himself, a man essentially unpractical, afforded Nelson
amusement as well as interest, and was the object of a good deal of
innocent chaffing. He would, in those after-dinner gatherings which
Gillespie mentions, lead the doctor into arguments on literature,
politics, Spanish and even naval affairs, and would occasionally
provoke from him a lecture on navigation itself, to the great
entertainment of Murray, Hardy, and the other officers present.[70]
"Ah, my dear Doctor!" he would say chaffingly, "give me knowledge
practically acquired--experience! experience! experience! and
practical men!"

Nelson, however, was too big and too broad a man not to know that,
while by doing the same thing, or bearing the same thing, many
times,--by experience, that is,--one acquires a facility not otherwise
communicable, in a novel situation a man is abler to act, the more he
has availed himself of the knowledge and the suggestions of others.
Absorbed with the duties of his station, it was of the first
importance that he should possess every information, and ponder every
idea, small and great, bearing upon its conditions, as well as upon
the general political state of Europe in that period of ominous
waiting, wherein great events were evidently coming to birth. Day
after day, Dr. Scott's biographer tells us, was passed by the two
together, sitting in two black leathern arm-chairs with roomy pockets,
stuffed with papers, written and printed, journals and pamphlets,
gathered from every source--from prizes, from passing neutral vessels,
from cruisers returning from neutral or friendly ports, or picked up
by the doctor himself in the not infrequent trips on which he was
sent, ostensibly for pleasure, but with a keen eye also to the
collection of intelligence. Marked externally by the abstraction of a
book-worm, entirely unpractical and heedless in the common affairs of
life, and subject to an occasional flightiness of action, the result
in part of an injury to his head while in the service, Scott gave
those who saw him going about an impression of guilelessness, which
covered him from the suspicion of having a mission. He had, says his
biographer, "in union with a capacity for very difficult services, a
simplicity that often put him at disadvantage in worldly matters, and
it became a common joke with the Admiral, that 'the doctor would
always want somebody to take care of him.'"

Nelson had everything read to him; first of all, newspapers, which
were sent regularly to the fleet by British agents in various
quarters. Upon them chiefly, and not upon England, he depended for
knowledge of what was happening; in Great Britain itself, as well as
on the Continent. From ten to twelve weeks was no uncommon length of
time for him to be without word from home. "I never hear from
England," he wrote to Elliot in the summer of 1804, "but as we manage
to get the Paris papers regularly through Spain. From ten days to a
fortnight we get them from their date at Paris: therefore we know the
very great events which are passing in Europe--at least as much as the
French people;" a shrewd limitation. These, therefore, together with
Spanish, Italian, and other sheets, it was Scott's daily task to read
aloud to his chief, who found therein not only information but
amusement. He insisted also upon hearing the numerous ephemeral
pamphlets, of which the age was prolific, and which found their way to
him. His quickness in detecting the drift of an author was marvellous.
Two or three pages of a pamphlet were generally sufficient to put him
in complete possession of the writer's object, while nothing was too
trivial for his attention where there existed a possibility of its
contributing a clue to the problems of his command. Not the least
onerous of the doctor's duties was the deciphering of private letters
found in prizes, a channel by which important public interests are
often betrayed. Nelson's quickness to see the bearing and value of an
apparently trifling mention, dropped by the way by a careless pen,
rendered such an exercise of his ingenuity at once a pleasure and a
profit. The public secretary, Mr. Scott, was equally struck with the
alertness and sagacity of his employer's mind. "I have heard much of
Lord Nelson's abilities as an officer and statesman, but the account
of the latter is infinitely short. In my travels through the service I
have met with no character in any degree equal to his Lordship; his
penetration is quick, judgment clear, wisdom great, and his decisions
correct and decided: nor does he in company appear to bear any weight
on his mind." It was with difficulty, after a prolonged session, that
the doctor could at times beg off, and leave, stuffed in the arm-chair
pockets, for another day's work, a dozen or two of such letters,
sealed to Nelson by his imperfect eyesight and inadequate mastery of
other tongues. The arm-chairs, lashed together, formed at times a
couch upon which the admiral "slept those brief slumbers for which he
was remarkable;" in those moments, doubtless, when anxiety about the
enemy's movements did not permit him to go regularly to bed.

In common with all those closely associated with Nelson, Dr. Scott was
particularly struck with the kindliness and cordiality of his bearing
and actions; which is the more to be noted, because no one, probably,
had more occasion to see the movements of irritability, of impatience,
which lay very near the surface, than did his secretaries, through
whom his most vexatious work must be done. That he was vehement to
express annoyance has appeared frequently in these pages. The first
Lord Radstock, who was senior to him in the service, and knew him
well, writing to his son, then a midshipman in the "Victory," is
constant and extreme in his admiration of Nelson; but he gives the
caution to be careful of impressions made upon a chief upon whom
advancement depends. Quick in all his ways, a moment's heedlessness,
possibly misunderstood or misrepresented, may produce lasting injury.
"Lord Nelson is of so hasty a temper, that in spite of all his natural
goodness, I should fear that he would too readily give ear to those
in whom he had placed his confidence. He is a man of strong passions,
and his prejudices are proportionate." "On many occasions," says
another writer, "Lord Nelson evinced an impatience that has been
considered as irreconcileable with magnanimity; but the secret
workings of his soul have not been received into the account or
analysis of character, for we find the same individual, while employed
in watching the French fleet off Toulon, display the most unexampled
patience and forbearance, and never betray the smallest symptom of
inquietude or disappointment."[71] Murray, the Captain of the Fleet,
when first offered his appointment, had hesitated to accept. Upon
Nelson urging him, he gave as his reason that the nature of the duties
often led to disagreements between the admiral and his chief of staff,
and that he was unwilling to risk any diminution of the regard
existing between him and his Lordship; a remark true enough in the
general, but clearly of somewhat special application. Nelson assured
him that, should anything go contrary to his wishes, he would waive
his rank and explain or expostulate with him as his friend, and when,
after two years' service, Murray had to leave the ship, he refused to
replace him,--he would have Murray or none. In truth, such readiness
to flare up must needs be the defect of that quality of promptness,
that instant succession of deed to thought, which was a distinguishing
feature of Nelson's genius and actions. Captain Hillyar more than once
alludes to this trait as characteristic of the fleet, to which its
chief had transmitted his own spirit. "I have had to-day to lament,"
he says, speaking of some trifling disappointment, "the extreme
promptitude with which we all move when near his lordship."

But, while traces of this failing may be detected here and there by
the watchful reader, as Nelson himself gleaned useful indications
amid the rubbishy mass of captured correspondence, there survives,
among the remains left by those in daily contact with him, only the
record of a frank, open bearing, and unfailing active kindness.
"Setting aside his heroism," wrote Dr. Scott after Trafalgar, "when I
think what an affectionate, fascinating little fellow he was, how
dignified and pure his mind, how kind and condescending his manners, I
become stupid with grief for what I have lost." "He is so cheerful and
pleasant," wrote the public secretary, Mr. Scott, "that it is a
happiness to be about his hand." Dr. Gillespie notes "his noble
frankness of manners, freedom from vain formality and pomp (so
necessary to the decoration of empty little great men), which can only
be equalled by the unexampled glory of his naval career, and the
watchful and persevering diligence with which he commands this fleet."
"Nelson was the man to _love_" said Captain Pulteney Malcolm, who knew
intimately both him and Wellington. "I received Captain Leake," Nelson
himself says, speaking of an army officer on a special mission to the
Mediterranean, "with that openness which was necessary to make myself
as well acquainted with him in three days, as others might do in as
many years. I have given him all the knowledge of the men, their
views, &c. &c., as far as I have been able to form a judgment." The
remark is valuable, for it shows that frankness and cordiality were
recognized by him as the wisest and most politic method of dealing
with men. "Our friend, Sir Alexander," he says testily, "is a very
great diplomatic character, and even an admiral must not know what he
is negotiating about. You shall judge, viz., 'The Tunisian envoy is
still here, negotiating. He is a moderate man; and, apparently, the
best disposed of any I ever did business with.' Could even the oldest
diplomatic character be drier? I hate such parade and nonsense."

Captain Hillyar, who commanded one of the frigates that were ever
coming and going, writes in his journal: "If extreme kindness and
attention could render me happy, I have this day experienced both from
our revered and good commander-in-chief. How can I repay his kindness?
By obeying his injunctions 'not to be in a hurry to get married,'[72]
or by a continued perseverance in discharging those duties with
alacrity and honour, which he is more immediately concerned in?" "Lord
Nelson talked a great deal against matrimony yesterday, and I feel
will not trust me at Malta, while we are capable of remaining at sea.
It was all, however, in a good natured way. He is going to charge me
with two of his boys [midshipmen], I am pleased that an opportunity is
offered for showing my gratitude in a small degree for his almost
fatherly kindness. I wish you knew him; if he has failings,
reflections on his virtues cause them to be forgotten, and the mind
dwells with pleasure on a character where bravery, generosity, and
good nature, are joined to a heart that can feel for the woes of
others, and delights in endeavouring to alleviate them." Hillyar was
experiencing what Radstock had remarked: "Gain his esteem, and there
is nothing he will not dash through to put you forward." "Gain his
esteem, and you will have nothing to fear, for I know not a more
honourable man existing, or one who would more readily do you justice
in all respects." "I am well aware," wrote another young captain to
Nelson himself, "of the good construction which your Lordship has ever
been in the habit of putting on circumstances, although wearing the
most unfavourable appearances.... Your Lordship's good opinion
constitutes the summit of my ambition, and the most effective spur to
my endeavours."

Nelson loved to bestow promotion, when deserved, on the spot, to give
a man his spurs, if it might be, on the field of battle; but vacancies
would not always offer at the happy moment. A brother of Hillyar's was
a midshipman in one of two boats, sent to visit a suspicious vessel.
A sudden and staggering fire killed the lieutenant in command,
besides disabling a number of the boats' crews. The men hesitated; but
the lad, left in charge, cheered them on and carried the vessel by
boarding. Although he was but a couple of months over fifteen, Nelson
gave him at once his commission into the vacancy made by the
lieutenant. One very dark night, the "Victory" being under way, a
midshipman, at the imminent risk of his life, leaped into the sea to
save a seaman who had fallen overboard, and otherwise would have been
drowned. Nelson gave him, too, his commission the following morning;
but, seeing the jubilation among the young man's messmates, and
thinking the act might be a dangerous precedent, he leaned over the
poop and said, smiling good-naturedly, "Stop, young gentlemen! Mr.
Flin has done a gallant thing today, and he has done many gallant
things before, for which he has now got his reward. But mind, I'll
have no more making lieutenants for men falling overboard."

The power thus to reward at discretion, and speedily, though liable to
abuse, was, he claimed, essential to the due influence of a
commander-in-chief; his subordinates must feel that it was in his
power to make their future, to distinguish them, and that they were in
so far dependent upon him. Nevertheless, with him as with others,
personal interest had a weight which qualified his argument. The
premature[73] and disastrous promotion of his stepson, at his request,
by St. Vincent, was a practical abuse which in most minds would
outweigh theoretical advantages. Writing to Sir Peter Parker about
this time, he said, "You may be assured I will lose no time in making
your grandson a postcaptain. It is the only opportunity ever offered
me, of showing that my feelings of gratitude to you are as warm and
alive as when you first took me by the hand: I owe all my honours to
you, and I am proud to acknowledge it to all the world." Such
enduring gratitude is charming to see, and tends to show that Nelson
recognized some other reason for Parker's favor to himself than
deference to Suckling's position; but it is scarcely a good working
principle for the distribution of official patronage, although the
younger Parker was a good and gallant officer.

Among the military duties that weighed upon Nelson, not the least was
the protection of British trade. The narrow waters of the
Mediterranean favored the operations of privateers, which did not have
to go far from their ports, and found shelter everywhere; for the
littoral states, in their weakness and insecurity, could but feebly
enforce neutrality either in their continental or insular territories.
In fact, both parties to the war, Great Britain and France, derived
from the infringement of neutrality advantages which checked their
remonstrances, and gave the feebler nations an apt retort, when taken
to task in their painful efforts to preserve an attitude that was
rather double-faced than neutral. If France, on the one hand, was
deriving a considerable revenue from Spanish subsidies, and subsisting
an army corps upon Neapolitan territory, Great Britain, on the other,
could scarcely have maintained her fleet in the Gulf of Lyons, if
unable to get fresh provisions and water from neutral ports; for, save
Gibraltar and Malta, she had none that was her own or allied. Under
these conditions, small privateers, often mere rowboats, but under the
colors of France or the Italian Republic, swarmed in every port and
inlet; in the Adriatic,--a deep, secluded pocket, particularly
favorable to marauding,--in the Ionian Islands, along the Barbary
coast, upon the shores of Spain, and especially in Sicily, whose
central position and extensive seaboard commanded every trade-route
east of the Balearics.

Nelson's correspondence is full of remonstrances addressed to the
various neutral states--including even Austria, whose shore-line on
the Adriatic was extensive--for their toleration of these abuses,
which rested ultimately upon the fear of Bonaparte. He has, also,
constant explanations to make to his own Government, or to British
ministers at the different Courts, of the acts of his cruisers in
destroying the depredators within neutral limits, when found
red-handed. He makes no apologies, but stands firmly by his officers,
who, when right, could always count upon his support in trouble. He
never left a man in the lurch, or damned him with faint approval. "The
protection afforded the enemy's privateers and rowboats in the
different neutral ports of these seas, so contrary to every known law
of neutrality, is extremely destructive of our commerce.... Although
their conduct is infamous, yet their doing wrong is no rule why we
should. There is a general principle which I have laid down for the
regulation of the officers' conduct under my command--which is never
to break the neutrality of any port or place; but never to consider as
neutral any place from whence an attack is allowed to be made. It is
certainly justifiable to attack any vessel in a place from whence she
makes an attack." "I very fully approve every part of Captain ----'s
conduct on the above occasion," he writes to the Admiralty in such a
case.

The supplying of convoys, therefore, was ceaseless, for the
depredations of the marauders were unending. "I am pulled to pieces by
the demands of merchants for convoys," Nelson said; and he recognized
that it must be so, for he entirely disapproved of even a fast-sailing
vessel attempting to make a passage unprotected. "I wrote to the
Admiralty for more cruisers until I was tired," he told Ball, "and
they left off answering those parts of my letters. The late Admiralty
thought I kept too many to the eastward of Sicily; the Smyrna folks
complain of me, so do the Adriatic, so they do between Cape de Gatte
and Gibraltar. If I had the vessels, I do assure you not one of them
should go prize-hunting: that I never have done, I am a poorer man
than the day I was ordered to the Mediterranean command, by upwards of
£1,000; but money I despise except as it is useful, and I expect my
prize money is embarked in the Toulon fleet." "I am distressed for
frigates," was his continual cry. "From Cape St. Vincent to the head
of the Adriatic I have only eight; which, with the service of watching
Toulon, and the necessary frigates with the fleet, are absolutely not
one half enough." For military duties, "frigates are the eyes of a
fleet. I want ten more than I have in order to watch that the French
should not escape me, and ten sloops besides, to do all duties." For
nine stations which ought to be filled, "I have but two frigates;
therefore, my dear Ball, have a little mercy, and do not think I have
neglected the protection of the trade of Malta." This was written soon
after joining the station, and he represents the number as diminishing
as time passed. "It is shameful!" he cries in a moment of intense
anxiety.

In this fewness of cruisers he was forced to keep his vessels
constantly on the go,--to the Levant, to the Adriatic, to Sicily, to
Italy,--scouring the coasts for privateers, gathering merchant ships
by driblets, picking up information, and at the end of the round
returning to Malta with their fractions of the large convoy. When this
was assembled, a frigate or a ship-of-the-line, with one or two
smaller ships of war, sailed with it for Gibraltar at a date fixed,
approximately, months before. Meanwhile, at the latter place a similar
process of collection had been going on from the ports of the western
Mediterranean, and, after the Malta convoy arrived, the whole started
together in charge of a division, composed usually of vessels of war
that had to return to England for repairs.

To arrange and maintain this complicated process, and to dovetail it
with the other necessary cruising duties, having in consideration
which ships should first go home, required careful study and long
foresight--infinite management, in fact. "The going on in the routine
of a station," he tells Ball, who seems to have trod on his toes, "if
interrupted, is like stopping a watch--the whole machine gets wrong.
If the Maidstone takes the convoy, and, when Agincourt arrives, there
is none for her or Thisbe, it puzzles me to know what orders to give
them. If they chace the convoy to Gibraltar, the Maidstone may have
gone on with it to England, and in that case, two ships, unless I
begin to give a new arrangement, will either go home without convoy,
or they must return [to Malta] in contradiction to the Admiralty's
orders to send them home; I am sure you see it in its true point of
view." "I dare not send a frigate home without a convoy," he says
later. "Not an officer in the service bows with more respect to the
orders of the Admiralty than myself," he writes St. Vincent; "but I am
sure you will agree with me, that if I form plans for the sending home
our convoys, and the clearing the different parts of the station from
privateers, and the other services requisite, and that the Admiralty
in some respects makes their arrangements, we must clash." Then he
points out how the Admiralty diverting a ship, unknown to him, has
tumbled over a whole train of services, like a child's row of blocks.

An extremely critical point in the homeward voyage was the first
hundred miles west of Gibraltar; and it was a greater thorn in
Nelson's side, because of a French seventy-four, the "Aigle," which
had succeeded in entering Cadiz just after he got off Toulon. For the
ordinary policing of that locality he assigned a division of three
frigates, under a Captain Gore, who possessed his confidence. "The
enemy's privateers and cruisers," he tells him, "are particularly
destructive to our trade passing the skirts of the station."
Privateering was thus reduced; but when a convoy sailed, he tried
always to have it accompanied through that stage by a ship of size
sufficient to grapple with the "Aigle." For a while, indeed, he placed
there an eighty-gun ship, but the gradual deterioration of his
squadron and the increase of Latouche Tréville's obliged him to recall
her, and at times his anxiety was great; not the less because Gore,
like other frigate captains, entertained the fancy that his three
frigates might contend with a ship-of-the-line. "Your intentions of
attacking that ship with the small squadron under your command are
certainly very laudable; but I do not consider your force by any means
equal to it." The question of two or three small ships against one
large involves more considerations than number and weight of guns.
Unity of direction and thickness of sides--defensive strength, that
is--enter into the problem. As Hawke said, "Big ships take a good deal
of drubbing." Howe's opinion was the same as Nelson's; and Hardy,
Nelson's captain, said, "After what I have seen at Trafalgar, I am
satisfied it would be mere folly, and ought never to succeed."[74]
What Hardy saw at Trafalgar, however, was not frigates against
ships-of-the-line, but vessels of the latter class opposed, smaller
against greater.

It seems singular, with such a weak link in the chain of communication
from the Mediterranean to England, that the Admiralty, on the outbreak
of the war with Spain, in the latter part of 1804, should have divided
Nelson's command at this very point, leaving as a somewhat debatable
ground, for mutual jealousy, that through which valuable interests
must pass, and where they must be transferred. The reason and manner
of this division, impolitic and inopportune as it was, and bitterly as
Nelson resented it, seem to have been misunderstood. Convinced that he
could not endure another winter such as the last, he made a formal
application, about the middle of August, 1804, for permission to go
home for a while. "I consider the state of my health to be such as to
make it absolutely necessary that I should return to England to
re-establish it. Another winter such as the last, I feel myself unable
to stand against. A few months of quiet may enable me to serve again
next spring; and I believe that no officer is more anxious to serve
than myself." In accordance with this last intimation, which speaks
his whole heart, he wrote privately to the First Lord that he would
like to come back in the spring, if his health were restored, as he
believed it would be; and he assured him that his second, Bickerton,
whose rank did not entitle him to the chief command under ordinary
conditions, was perfectly fitted to hold it during his absence--in
short, to keep the place warm for his return.

Nelson knew that the Admiralty was besieged with admirals, many senior
to himself, seeking for employment, and that it would be very
difficult for it to resist the pressure for the vacancy in "my
favourite command," to resume which he was impelled by both his sense
of duty and his love of glory. He wrote therefore to Elliot, and to
the King of the Two Sicilies, in the same sense as he had to Melville,
recalling his well-tried devotion to the interests of that Court,
which a successor might not equally show, and suggesting that his
cause would be strengthened by an application for his return on the
part of the King. The latter consequently intimated to the British
Government that he hoped Lord Nelson would be sent back. He was, in
truth, so much agitated over the prospect of his going, that he
offered him a house in either Palermo or Naples, if he wished to
remain in the South to recruit; an offer which Elliot, equally uneasy,
urged him to accept.

The Government did exactly what was asked. Nelson received permission
to go to England, when he felt it necessary, leaving the command in
the hands of Bickerton; but at the same time the Admiralty had to meet
the rush of claimants for the vacancy, all the more pressing because
rumors were afloat of a Spanish war, which would make the
Mediterranean not only the most important, but, in prize-money, the
most lucrative command. Among the applicants was Sir John Orde, who
had been nursing a technical grievance ever since he had been passed
over, in Nelson's favor, for the command of the detachment with which
the Battle of the Nile was fought. Nelson's leave was issued on the
6th of October, and on the 26th Orde was given a small squadron--five
ships-of-the-line--to blockade Cadiz. Being senior to Nelson, and of
course to Bickerton, he could only have this position by reducing the
latter's station, which had extended to Cape Finisterre. The line
between the two commands was drawn at the Straits' mouth, a rather
vague phrase, but Gibraltar was left with Nelson. Orde thus got the
station for prize-money, and Nelson that for honor, which from youth
until now he most valued. "The arrangement," wrote his friend, Lord
Radstock, "will be a death-stroke to his hopes of the galleons; but as
your chief has ever showed himself to be as great a despiser of riches
as he is a lover of glory, I am fully convinced in my own mind that he
would sooner defeat the French fleet than capture fifty galleons."

Nevertheless, Nelson was sorely aggrieved, and complained bitterly to
his correspondents. "I have learnt not to be surprised at anything;
but the sending an officer to such a point, to take, if it is a
Spanish war, the whole harvest, after all my trials (God knows
unprofitable enough! for I am a much poorer man than when we started
in the Amphion,) seems a little hard: but _patienza_." "He is sent off
Cadiz to reap the golden harvest, as Campbell was to reap my sugar
harvest. It's very odd, two Admiralties to treat me so: surely I have
dreamt that I have 'done the State some service.' But never mind; I am
superior to those who could treat me so." His contempt for money,
however acquired, except as a secondary consideration, remained
unchanged. "I believe I attend more to the French fleet than making
captures; but what I have, I can say as old Haddock said, 'it never
cost a sailor a tear, nor the nation a farthing.' This thought is far
better than prize-money;--not that I despise money--quite the
contrary, I wish I had one hundred thousand pounds this moment." "I am
keeping as many frigates as possible round me," he wrote to his friend
Ball, "for I know the value of them on the day of battle: and compared
with that day, what signifies any prizes they might take?"[75] Nor did
such utterances stand alone. "I hope war with Spain may be avoided,"
he wrote. "I want not riches at such a dreadful price. Peace for our
Country is all I wish to fight for,--I mean, of course, an honourable
one, without which it cannot be a secure one." But his outlays were
very heavy. Besides the £1,800 annually paid to Lady Nelson, he gave
Lady Hamilton £1,200 a year, exclusive of what was spent on the house
and grounds at Merton; and it may be inferred from Dr. Gillespie that
the cost of the cabin mess, beyond the table money allowed by the
Government, was assumed by him. He himself said, early in the cruise,
"Unless we have a Spanish war, I shall live here at a great expense,
although Mr. Chevalier [his steward] takes every care." "God knows, in
my own person, I spend as little money as any man; but you[76] know I
love to give away."

That he was thus sore was most natural; but it was also natural that
the Government should expect, in view of his strong representations
about his health, that the three weeks between the issuing his leave
and Orde's orders would have insured his being on his way home, before
the latter reached his station. Had things fallen out so, it would not
have been Nelson, the exceptional hero of exceptional services, but
Bickerton, a man with no peculiar claims as yet, who would have lost
the prize-money; for Nelson himself had just won a suit against St.
Vincent, which established that the moment a commander-in-chief left
his station, his right lapsed, and that of the next flag-officer
commenced. Nor was the division of the station an unprecedented
measure. It had been extended from the Straits to Cape Finisterre at
the time St. Vincent withdrew from the Mediterranean, in 1796; and in
1802, when Lord Keith asked for additional aids, on account of the
enormous administrative work, the Admiralty made of the request a
pretext for restricting his field to the Mediterranean, a step which
Keith successfully resisted.

Before Nelson received his leave he had begun to change his mind about
going home. This was due, partly, to a slight betterment in his
health, which he at this time mentions; chiefly, it would seem, to the
prospects of a Spanish war. This, by doubling the number of his
enemies and the quarters whence they might come, contributed to the
pleasurable excitement that was always a tonic to his physical frame,
and roused the eager desire for conspicuous action, which was his most
prominent passion. Indications also assured him that the expectation
of the French coming out, in which appearances had so often deceived
him, was now on the point of being realized; that Bonaparte's
projects, whatever they were, were approaching maturity. His "guess,"
founded on the reports before him, was wonderfully penetrative. He did
not see all the way through the French mill-stone, but he saw very
deep into it; his inference, indeed, was one in which intuition and
sagacity bore equal shares. "If the Russians continue increasing their
naval force in this country [that is, in the eastern Mediterranean], I
do not think the French will venture to the eastward; therefore, I
rather expect they will, as the year advances, try to get out of the
straits; and should they accomplish it with 7,000 troops on board, I
am sure we should lose half our West India Islands, for I think they
would go there, and not to Ireland. Whatever may be their destination,
I shall certainly follow, be it even to the East Indies." The last
allusion is interesting, for it shows the wide flight of his
speculations, which had found utterance before in the casual remark
that his ships were provisioned for a voyage to Madras; and, even as a
guess, it struck perilously near one of Bonaparte's purposes. The
splendid decision, formulated so long before the case arose, to follow
wherever they went, held in its womb the germ of the great campaign of
Trafalgar; while in the surmise that the Toulon fleet was bound to the
West Indies, the arrow of conjecture had gone straight to the
bull's-eye.

In this same letter, addressed to General Villettes, at Malta,
formerly his coadjutor at the siege of Bastia, Nelson, in the intimacy
of friendship, reveals what was to him at once the secret of health
and the fulfilment of desire; the congenial atmosphere in which his
being throve, and expanded to fulfil the limits of his genius. "Such a
pursuit would do more, perhaps, towards restoring me to health than
all the doctors; but I fear" (his application for leave having gone
in) "this is reserved for some happier man. Not that I complain; I
have had a good race of glory, but we are never satisfied, although I
hope I am duly thankful for the past; but one cannot help, being at
sea, longing for a little more." "I hope," he had written a few months
earlier to Lord Minto, "some day, very soon, to fulfil the warmest
wishes of my Country and expectations of my friends. I hope you may be
able, at some debate, to say, as your partiality has said before,
'Nelson has done more than he has done before;' I can assure you it
shall be a stimulus to my exertion on the day of battle.... Whatever
happens, I have run a glorious race."

On the 12th of October Nelson received a piece of news which elicited
instantaneously a flash of action, illustrative at once of the
promptness of his decisions and of the briskness of temper that has
been noted already. A letter arrived from Captain Gore, commanding the
detachment outside of the Straits, that two frigates, sent from the
Brest squadron by Admiral Cornwallis, had arrived, with a captain
senior to himself, who had taken him under his orders, and carried two
of Nelson's frigates off Cadiz to intercept the Spanish treasure-fleet
expected there from America. Cornwallis's action had been taken by
orders from England, but no communication to that effect, either from
him or from the Admiralty, reached Nelson at this moment. Astounded by
a measure which could scarcely fail to cause war, and convinced, as he
said, that Spain had no wish to go to war with Great Britain, he gave
himself a night to pause; but early next day he wrote to the
Admiralty, intimating pretty plainly that, if done by its direction,
this was not the way the commander of the Mediterranean fleet should
receive word of so momentous a step taken in his district, while to
Gore he sent emphatic orders to disobey Cornwallis, although the
latter was Nelson's senior. Summing up with admirable lucidity the
facts before him, and thereby proving that the impression under which
Cornwallis's action probably was taken was erroneous, he said: "Unless
you have much weightier reasons than the order of Admiral Cornwallis,
or that you receive orders from the Admiralty, it is my most positive
directions that neither you, or any ship under your orders, do molest
or interrupt in any manner the lawful commerce of Spain, with whom we
are at perfect peace and amity."

It is permissible, because instructive, to note that in this order,
while Nelson amply provides for discretion on the part of his
subordinate, he throws the full weight of his authority on the
difficult horn of a possible dilemma, the act--so momentous to an
officer--of disobedience to a present superior; in this case the
captain sent by Cornwallis. Contrast this with the Government's orders
to the commander of the troops at Malta, when it wished him to send a
garrison to Messina.[77] Instead of saying, "You will send so many
men, _unless_ you think you _cannot_ spare them," its orders ran:
"You will send, _if_ you think you _can_ spare them." Of course, as
Nelson invariably experienced, an officer addressed in the latter
style found always a lion in his path. So his orders to Gore were not,
"Obey, _if_" but "Disobey, _unless_;" and Gore knew, as every man in
the Mediterranean knew by long trial, that, if he disobeyed, he would
have at his back, through thick and thin, the first sea-officer in
Great Britain. But Nelson's orders were always stamped with the
positive, daring, lucid character of his genius and its conceptions;
and so, except in unworthy hands, they were fulfilled in spirit as
well as in letter.

An interesting illustration of this trenchant clearness is to be found
in instructions given to the captain of the "Donegal," an eighty-gun
ship, sent under very critical circumstances to cruise off Cadiz, in
September, 1803. It appears to the author not only characteristic of
Nelson, but a perfect example of the kind of directions a junior would
wish to have in a difficult case, when desirous to carry out the
spirit of his superior's orders. It explains itself.

    26th September, 1803.

    TO CAPTAIN SIR RICHARD JOHN STRACHAN, BART., H.M. SHIP DONEGAL.

    The occurrences which pass every day in Spain forbode, I fancy,
    a speedy War with England; therefore it becomes proper for me to
    put you on your guard, and advise you how to act under
    particular circumstances. By looking at the former line of
    conduct on the part of Spain, which she followed just before the
    commencement of the last War, we may naturally expect the same
    events to happen. The French Admiral Richery was in Cadiz,
    blocked up by Admiral Man; on August the 22nd, they came to sea,
    attended by the Spanish Fleet, which saw the French safe beyond
    St. Vincent, and returned into Cadiz. Admiral Man very properly
    did not choose to attack Admiral Richery under such an escort.
    This is a prelude to what I must request your strict attention
    to; at the same time, I am fully aware that you must be guided,
    in some measure, by actual circumstances.

    I think it very probable, even before Spain breaks with us,
    that they may send a Ship or two of the Line to see L'Aigle
    round Cape St. Vincent; and that if you attack her in their
    presence, they may attack you; and giving them possession of the
    Donegal, would be more than either you or I should wish,
    therefore I am certain it must be very comfortable for you to
    know my sentiments. From what you hear in Cadiz, you will judge
    how far you may venture yourself in company with a Spanish
    Squadron; but if you are of opinion that you may trust yourself
    near them, keeping certainly out of gun-shot, send your Boat
    with a letter to the Spanish Commodore, and desire to know
    whether he means to defend the French Ships; and get his answer
    in writing, and have it as plain as possible. If it be 'yes,
    that he will fire at you if you attack the French under his
    protection,' then, if you have force enough, make your attack on
    the whole body, and take them all if you can; for I should
    consider such an answer as a perfect Declaration of War. If you
    are too weak for such an attack, you must desist; but you
    certainly are fully authorized to take the Ships of Spain
    whenever you meet them. Should the answer be ambiguous, you must
    then act as your judgment may direct you, and I am sure that
    will be very proper. Only recollect, that it would be much
    better to let the French Ships escape, than to run too great a
    risk of losing the Donegal, yourself, and the Ship's company.

    I am, &c.

    NELSON AND BRONTE.

This letter fulfils his own request to the Admiralty: "All I wish and
submit to their Lordships is, that if the business is left to me, my
orders may be decisive."

Later in the same day that Nelson received Gore's letter, the
Admiralty's orders arrived, sent, as despatches too often were, by a
vessel so small and slow that it would seem they counted upon her
insignificance to elude an enemy's notice. The delay served, as has
been said, to give proof of the rapidity of Nelson's action; the
receipt of the orders enabled him also to show how much clearer were
his conceptions of adequacy than those of ordinary men. To stop
treasure-ships, or to embargo merchant-ships, when difficulty was
threatening, was no new idea to the British Government. The latter had
been done with Baltic merchantmen at the time of the Armed Neutrality.
In the case of Spain, it was a measure particularly efficacious, for
the financial solvency and belligerent capacity of that country
depended upon the galleons, which brought to her the tribute of her
colonies; and her relations and dealings with France at this time were
so partial and suspicious as to justify precautions. Evidently,
however, such a step, being avowedly preventive and not offensive,
should be taken in such a way as to avert all chance of possible
disaster. Several Spanish frigates being expected, the British
Government charged four vessels of the same rate with the task of
arresting them. Nelson, the instant he got his orders, detached to the
spot an eighty-gun ship, to which he added four other cruisers,
thinking, as he said in his orders to the captain selected, that "this
is a service of the highest importance, and that an officer of your
rank and experience should be employed therein." With such odds
against him, the Spanish commander would need no military
justification for submission. As it was, he resisted, necessitating a
fight, which under the circumstances was barbarous and brutal, and
ended in one of the Spanish vessels blowing up with several women on
board; a result due wholly to the blundering lack of foresight which
sent a corporal's guard to do the work of a sheriff's posse.

This incident, of the order to arrest the treasure-ships, which was
made general for all vessels of that class, was probably the
determining occasion of Nelson's decision to remain in the
Mediterranean. War with Spain, with consequent increased activity on
the part of France, though not certain, became probable. There was at
that time on board the "Victory" a Dr. Lambton Este, who had gone to
the Mediterranean in a civil capacity, and was on his way home.
Nelson, hoping to return soon himself, asked Este to remain until he
started, and to accompany him in a worn-out seventy-four, the
"Superb," which he was holding for that purpose. It seems that, in
looking forward to the resumption of his command, he expected it would
be the scene of a more wide-spread political activity, especially in
the far East where Este had been employed, and that, for this purpose,
he wished to attach the latter to his person. "There may be more
occupation there for us all, hereafter, than we just now foresee, or
may expect."

In confirmation of this general forecast, we are told by Dr. Scott
that, when the admiral left England before Trafalgar, arrangements had
been made with the Foreign Office for Este with six clerks to be
attached to the flagship, to conduct the diplomatic correspondence.
The fact is doubly interesting. It shows, on the one hand, the
accuracy of Nelson's foresight as to the vast importance the
Mediterranean was about to assume, to meet which he thus was making
provision in a general way; although neither he nor any other man
could have anticipated the extraordinary, complicated snarl of the
political threads in Napoleon's later years. The cares from these, it
may be said in passing, were by Nelson's death devolved upon
Collingwood; who, though a strong man, was killed by them, through
general debility resulting from confinement, and through organic
injury produced by bending over his desk. On the other hand, it cannot
but be grateful to those who admire the hero, to see that Nelson
looked forward to no inglorious ease, but to a life of strenuous work,
as well as, if it might be so, of military honor. Had he lived, we may
hope, the days after Trafalgar would not have been the grave of his
renown.

On the first of November his decision was taken. He sent for Este and
said, "Oh, my good fellow! I have abandoned the idea of going to
England, at present. I shall not go yet, and when I may go is quite
uncertain--must depend upon events, and upon my own precarious health;
at the same time, I am doing you an evident injustice, by detaining
you here so long in uncertainty." Este of course expressed his
willingness to remain while needed, but Nelson interrupted him,
saying, "No, _my_ wish is that you should go,--I am anxious that you
should go, and go without further delay. To tell you the truth, I am
not entirely disinterested. Go home; get confirmed in your
appointment, according to my desire, and return to me as soon
afterwards as you can. Should I retain my command in the
Mediterranean, with the powers already conceded to me, I shall require
your assistance." It seems probable that he was anxious to get some
one home as rapidly as possible, to forestall, if time permitted, a
final recall, which the appointment of a successor would be. "Long
before this time," he had written Lady Hamilton, "I expect, another
admiral is far on his way to supersede me. I should for your sake, and
for many of our friends, have liked an odd hundred thousand pounds [by
a Spanish war]; but, never mind. If they give me the choice of staying
a few months longer, it will be very handsome; and, for the sake of
others, we would give up very much of our own felicity."

The despatches and routine papers were got ready rapidly, and placed
in charge of Este, who sailed for Lisbon, in a sloop-of-war, on the
6th of November, furnished with orders to all officials to expedite
him on his way, and particularly to captains not to communicate with
the ship, because the plague, then raging in Gibraltar, would involve
her, if visited, in the delays of quarantine. On the 18th of November,
off Cape St. Vincent, Este met the "Swiftsure," seventy-four, bringing
Orde out. It has been charged that the latter discourteously delayed
to notify Nelson of his taking over part of the station.[78] It
appears, however, from this encounter, that his letter to that
effect, dated the 17th,[79] though headed "off Cadiz," was actually
prepared before he reached his position there. It was forwarded to
Nelson by the "Anson," whose captain was senior officer of the
division till then blockading the port, whom Orde relieved and sent on
with his despatch. The "Anson" joined Nelson on the 15th of December.
The "Swiftsure," which was also destined to his squadron, did not
reach him until the 25th. It seems, therefore, fair to acquit Orde of
a discourtesy as aimless as it would be reprehensible.

Just before Este's departure Nelson had reconnoitred Toulon. A new
vice-admiral had hoisted his flag in place of Latouche Tréville, who
had died on the 20th of August. "He has given me the slip," wrote
Nelson, who felt himself balked of his vengeance. "The French papers
say he died of walking so often up to the signal-post, upon Sepet, to
watch us: I always pronounced that would be his death." His successor
was Villeneuve, the predestined victim of Trafalgar. "They now amuse
themselves with night-signals," Nelson informed the First Lord; "and
by the quantity of rockets and blue lights they show with every
signal, they plainly mark their position. These gentlemen must soon be
so perfect in theory, that they will come to sea to put their
knowledge into practice. Could I see that day, it would make me
happy." The time was now not far distant. The weariness of waiting was
soon to give way to the anxious fever of doubtful and protracted
pursuit, of prolonged uncertainty and steadfast endurance, through
which he advanced to his final triumph, just as he had to those of the
past.

The seizure of the Spanish treasure-ships, with its lamentable
catastrophe, took place on the 5th of October. Nelson had the news on
the 8th of November, which, extraordinary as it may appear, was before
the fact was known in Madrid. On the 10th of November, when the
British minister received his passports upon his own demand, no word
had reached there. On the 15th, Nelson was informed that a British
vessel had been fired upon by the batteries of Barcelona, which was an
error; but receiving at the same time a letter from the minister,
probably to the effect that he would break off relations on the 10th,
he inferred that war existed, and issued orders for a general seizure
of Spanish vessels of war and commerce throughout the station. This
was done on his own responsibility, but he guarded himself by
stringent provisions against any injury beyond detention being
inflicted; and he alleged, very reasonably, that a commander-in-chief
who never got letters from home less than two months old must act upon
his own motion. "I am completely in the dark. It is now more than two
months since the John Bull [the last despatch boat] sailed." "I have
set the whole Mediterranean to work," he tells Lady Hamilton on the
23d; "and if I had had the spare troops at Malta at my disposal,
Minorca would at this moment have had English colours flying." A
Swedish ship, carrying a Spanish regiment from Barcelona to the latter
island, was among the first captures.

"With respect to my making war upon Spain, and Sir John Orde not
having done it," so he wrote to Elliot, "I believe you will think I
have acted not precipitately, but consistent with the firmness of John
Bull. I can't tell what schemes ministers may have; but when I am
without orders, and unexpected occurrences arise, I shall always act
as I think the honour and glory of my King and Country demand. Upon
the most mature and serious consideration I can give the subject, the
present lays within the compass of a nutshell. Our Ministers demand
certain points to be conceded to them; they, to give a spur, detain
the Spanish treasure. Spain, the moment she hears of it, kicks your
minister out of Madrid; a plain proof they had not acceded to our
propositions. Indeed, Mr. Frere,[80] you will see by his letter, did
not believe it would have a favourable termination, even had not the
frigates been detained. I send your Excellency his letters. I feel I
have done perfectly right. No desire of wealth could influence my
conduct; for I had nothing to take worth two-pence to me. Sir John
Orde was sent, if it was a Spanish war, to take the money; but until
he saw my orders, he did not act. I suppose he was fearful of that
responsibility which I am ever ready to take upon me; and now he is to
wallow in wealth, whilst I am left a beggar. But such things are. I
receive the kindest letters from Lord Melville and the Secretary of
State, but they think the French fleet is prize enough for me." No
wonder Nelson found that diplomatists were slow, measured by himself
as a standard; but what a wonderful instinct it shows in him, that,
with action ever prompt to the verge of precipitancy, he made so few
blunders in deed. There are several errors of fact in his summary of
reasons, but his action was absolutely well-timed--to the very hour.

Meanwhile, and up to the 15th of December, when Orde's letter was
received, no reply had come to his application for leave, and no
intimation of a successor. A fresh complication here arose by the
entire break-down of one of his two junior admirals--Rear-Admiral
Campbell--whose health became so affected that it was necessary to
send him immediately home. He quitted the fleet on the 4th of
December. Nelson rightly felt that he himself could not go, leaving
Bickerton without any assistant. He went further; for, when a rumor
came that Orde was to relieve him, he determined that he would offer
his services to him, as second, until a successor to Campbell should
arrive. As there was friction between himself and Orde, who had,
besides, a not very pleasant official reputation, this intention, to
take a lower place where he had been chief, was not only
self-sacrificing, but extremely magnanimous; it was, however,
disfigured by too much self-consciousness. "I have wrote to Lord
Melville that I should make such an offer, and that I entreated him to
send out a flag-officer as soon as possible, but I dare say Sir John
Orde is too great a man to want my poor services, and that he will
reject them; be that as it may, you will, I am sure, agree with me,
that I shall show my superiority to him by such an offer, and the
world will see what a sacrifice I am ready to make for the service of
my King and Country, for what greater sacrifice could I make, than
serving for a moment under Sir John Orde, and giving up for that
moment the society of all I hold most dear in this world?"

Orde's letter reached Nelson in Pula Roads, in the Gulf of Cagliari,
at the southern extremity of Sardinia; an out-of-the-way position
which probably accounts for much of its delay. He remained there, or
in the Gulf of Palmas, a little to the westward, for about a week, and
on the 19th of December left for his station off Cape San Sebastian.
At the latter place, on Christmas Day, he was joined by the
"Swiftsure," which brought him a great batch of official mail that had
come out with Orde. He thus received at one and the same time his
leave to go home and the Admiralty's order reducing his station.
Unluckily, the latter step, though taken much later than the issuing
of his leave, had become known to him first, through Orde; and the
impression upon his mind remained with that firmness of prejudice
which Radstock had noted in him. He does not appear at any time to
have made allowance for the fact that his command was cut down under a
reasonable impression that he was about to quit it.

Immediately after the "Swiftsure" joined at Rendezvous 97, he took the
fleet off Toulon. The enemy was found to be still in port, but the
rumors of an approaching movement, and of the embarkation of troops,
were becoming more specific. He remained off the harbor for at least
a week, and thence went to Madalena, where he anchored on the 11th of
January, 1805. This was, though he knew it not, the end of the long
watch off Toulon.

Short as the time was, Nelson had already experienced the
inconvenience of a senior admiral, lying, like an enemy, on the flank
of his communications with Great Britain, and dealing as he pleased
with his vessels. One frigate at least had been sent already to
England, without his knowledge and consent. "I have in a former
letter," he tells the First Lord, "stated my opinion freely upon the
stations of Gibraltar and Cadiz being given to the same officer; for
without that is done, our convoys can never be considered safe. There
is also another consideration, why the Officer at Gibraltar should be
under the orders of the Admiral commanding the Mediterranean
fleet--which is, that any admiral independent of that station, takes
all the stores he chooses, or fancies he wants, for the service of his
fleet; thereby placing the fleet in the Gulf of Lyons in great
distress for many articles."

Off Toulon, having a large official mail to make up in reply to that
brought by the "Swiftsure," he thought it both quicker and safer,
under all the conditions of the time, to send it to Lisbon. He
therefore called on board the "Victory" a smart young frigate-captain,
William Parker, a nephew of Lord St. Vincent, gave him orders to take
the despatches to Lisbon, and added, "Sir John Orde takes my frigates
from me, and sends them away in some other direction from what I wish.
I cannot even get my despatches home. You must contrive to get to the
westward and go into Lisbon, and avoid his ships. I have not signed
your orders," alluding to memorandum instructions separate from the
formal orders, "because Sir John Orde is my senior officer; but, if it
should come to a Court Martial, Hardy can swear to my handwriting, and
you shall not be broke. Take your orders, and good bye; and remember,
Parker, if you cannot weather _that fellow_, I shall think you have
not a drop of your old uncle's blood in your veins." The memorandum
directed him to pass Cape Spartel in the night, steering to the
southward and westward to avoid Orde, and ended thus: "Bring-to [stop]
for nothing, if you can help it. Hoist the signal for quarantine, and
that you are charged with dispatches. If you are forced to speak by a
superior officer, show him only my order for not interfering with you;
and unless he is an admiral, superior to me, you will obey my orders
instead of any pretended ones from him, from my superior officer."

Parker executed his commission successfully, but in doing so met with
a curious adventure. Leaving Gibraltar with a north wind, favorable
for his purpose, he passed Spartel as directed, and, the night being
moonlight, saw in the distance Orde's squadron cruising under easy
sail. Unluckily, one of the outlying lookout frigates discovered him,
gave chase, and overtook him. Her captain himself came on board, and
was about to give Parker orders not to proceed to the westward, Orde
jealously objecting to any apparent intrusion upon his domain. Parker
stopped him hastily from speaking on the quarter-deck, within earshot
of others, and took him into the cabin. The stranger had been one of
Nelson's old midshipmen and a favorite; had started with him in the
"Agamemnon," and by him had been made a commander after the Nile.
"Captain Hoste," said Parker, "I believe you owe all your advancement
in the service to my uncle, Lord St. Vincent, and to Lord Nelson. I am
avoiding Sir John Orde's squadron by desire of Lord Nelson; you know
his handwriting; _I must go on_."[81] (Parker being senior to Hoste,
the latter could not detain him by his own authority; and he
understood from this avowal that Orde's orders, if produced, would
become a matter of record, would be disobeyed, and a court-martial
must follow.) "The question of a court-martial would be very
mischievous. Do you not think it would be better if you were not to
meet the 'Amazon' this night?" Captain Hoste, after a little
reflection, left the ship without giving his admiral's orders to
Parker.[82]

Having determined not to leave Bickerton alone, Nelson decided to keep
secret his own leave to return to England. "I am much obliged by their
Lordships' kind compliance with my request, which is absolutely
necessary from the present state of my health," he writes on the 30th
of December; "and I shall avail myself of their Lordships' permission,
the moment another admiral, in the room of Admiral Campbell, joins the
fleet, unless the enemy's fleet should be at sea, when I should not
think of quitting my command until after the battle." "I shall never
quit my post," he tells a friend, "when the French fleet is at sea, as
a commander-in-chief of great celebrity once did,"--a not very
generous fling at St. Vincent. "I would sooner die at my post, than
have such a stigma upon my memory." "Nothing has kept me here," he
writes Elliot, "but the fear for the escape of the French fleet, and
that they should get to either Naples or Sicily in the short days.
Nothing but gratitude to those good Sovereigns could have induced me
to stay one moment after Sir John Orde's extraordinary command, for
his general conduct towards me is not such as I had a right to
expect."

During this last month of monotonous routine, while off Toulon and at
Madalena, he had occasion to express opinions on current general
topics, which found little room in his mind after the French fleet
began to move. There was then a report of a large expedition for
foreign service forming in England, and rumor, as usual, had a
thousand tongues as to its destination. "A blow struck in Europe,"
Nelson wrote to Lord Moira, "would do more towards making us
respected, and of course facilitate a peace, than the possession of
Mexico or Peru,"--a direction towards which the commercial ambitions
of Great Britain had a traditional inclination, fostered by some
military men and statesmen, who foresaw the break-up of the Spanish
colonial system. "Above all, I hope we shall have no buccaneering
expeditions. Such services fritter away our troops and ships, when
they are so much wanted for more important occasions, and are of no
use beyond enriching a few individuals. I know not, if these
sentiments coincide with yours; but as glory, and not money, has
through life been your pursuit, I should rather think that you will
agree with me, that in Europe, and not abroad, is the place for us to
strike a blow." "I like the idea of English troops getting into the
Kingdom of Naples," he tells Elliot at this same time; whence it may
be inferred that that was the quarter he would now, as upon his first
arrival, choose for British effort. "If they are well commanded, I am
sure they will do well. They will have more wants than us sailors."
The expedition, which sailed the following spring, was destined for
the Mediterranean, and reinforced the garrisons of Gibraltar and Malta
to an extent that made the latter a factor to be considered in the
strategy of the inland sea; but when it arrived, Nelson had left the
Mediterranean, not to return.

As regards general politics, Nelson, writing to the Queen of Naples,
took a gloomy view of the future. The Prime Minister of the Two
Sicilies, Sir John Acton, had some time before been forced out of
office and had retired to Palermo, an event produced by the pressure
of French influence, which Nelson regarded now as absolutely dominant
in that kingdom, and menacing to Europe at large. "Never, perhaps, was
Europe more critically situated than at this moment, and never was the
probability of universal Monarchy more nearly being realized, than in
the person of the Corsican. I can see but little difference between
the name of Emperor, King, or Prefect, if they perfectly obey his
despotic orders. Prussia is trying to be destroyed last--Spain is
little better than a province of France--Russia does nothing on the
grand scale. Would to God these great Powers reflected, that the
boldest measures are the safest! They allow small states to fall, and
to serve the enormous power of France, without appearing to reflect
that every kingdom which is annexed to France, makes their own
existence, as independent states, more precarious." How shrewd a
prophecy this was as regards Prussia and Spain, those two countries
were to learn by bitter experience; and remote Russia herself, though
she escaped the last humiliation, saw in the gigantic hosts whose
onset a few years later shook her to her centre, the armed subjects of
the many smaller states, in whose subjugation she had acquiesced
during the period of the Czar's moral subservience to Napoleon.

Nelson's essentially military genius had in political matters a keenly
sensitive intuition of the probable action of his fellow-warrior,
Bonaparte. "Russia's going to war in the way I am sure she will, will
cause the loss of Naples and Sardinia; for that Court will not send
100,000 men into Italy, and less are useless for any grand purpose."
"Your Excellency's summary account of the situation of Naples since
the negotiations with Russia," he wrote to Elliot in October, "are
perfectly clear; but the times are such that kingdoms must not be
played with. So far from Russia assisting Naples, it may involve her,
without the greatest care and circumspection, in total ruin. Naples
must not be hastily involved in war with France. Sicily must be saved.
The Calabrians must be kept from the entrance of French troops. If we
are consulted, we must assist Naples in keeping off the blow as long
as possible." That Napoleon's action would have been as here surmised,
had his purposes then tended towards the Mediterranean instead of the
English Channel, we have his own assertion. "At the solicitation of
your ambassador at St. Petersburg," wrote he to the Queen of Naples,
three months later, referring to the same subject, "ten thousand
Russians have been sent to Corfu.... If it had entered into my plans
to make war upon the King of Naples, I should have done it on the
entrance of the first Russian in Corfu, but I wish for peace with
Naples, with Europe entire, with England even." Napoleon's wishes for
peace, except on the condition of having his own way, are scarcely to
be taken seriously; but his care to keep things quiet in the South
corroborates the other indications of his firm purpose to invade
England. He was too astute to precipitate troubles elsewhere while
that was pending. The appearance of the Russians in Corfu, although
unwise in Nelson's view, relieved his fears for the islands and the
Morea, and enabled him to reduce a little his detachment about the
heel of Italy.

Towards the middle of December Nelson had received information, which
was substantially correct, "from various places, and amongst others,
from the King of Sardinia [then in Gaeta], that the French were
assembling troops near Toulon, and had taken some of the best troops
and a corps of cavalry from the Riviera of Genoa. Every seaman was
pressed and sent to Toulon. On the 16th the Active spoke a vessel from
Marseilles, who reported that seven thousand troops had embarked on
board the French fleet."

It was in Madalena Roads that the long-expected summons came at last.
In the afternoon of January 19, 1805, blowing a heavy gale of wind
from the northwest, the two lookout frigates from off Toulon came in
sight, with the signal flying that the French fleet was at sea. At 3
P.M. they anchored near the "Victory." Three hours later Nelson had
left Madalena forever.

FOOTNOTES:

[59] This sentence refers to the governor; not to Villettes, as the
construction might indicate.

[60] Unfit for sea, and kept at Naples for political reasons.

[61] The Honourable Mr. Waldegrave, afterwards Admiral Lord Eadstock.

[62] Five French ships-of-the-line, returning from the West Indies, had
taken refuge in Ferrol.

[63] Life of Rev. A.J. Scott, p. 124.

[64] Phillimore's Last of Nelson's Captains, p. 122. A portion of this
incident has before been quoted, in another connection (vol. i. p. 355,
note). It is repeated, because again applicable, to illustrate a different
trait of Nelson's character.

[65] The letter of this gentleman, Dr. Gillespie, from which a quotation
has already been made, was published in the London "Times" of October 6,
1894.

[66] This incidental remark may be noted, as bearing upon the statement,
now rejected, that his orders were put on especially for battle.

[67] There is here no mention of smoking; nor has any allusion to it, or to
tobacco, caught the author's eye in Nelson's letters.

[68] Dr. Beatty's Narrative of the Death of Lord Nelson. Nicolas, vol. vii.
p. 259.

[69] Sir William Hotham.

[70] Many of these details are taken with little alteration from the "Life
of Rev. A.J. Scott."

[71] Memoir of Sir Thomas Hardy, in Clarke and M'Arthur's Life of Nelson
vol. iii. p. 234.

[72] Hillyar was then engaged to a lady in Malta.

[73] As Lady Nelson's first marriage was in 1779, Josiah Nisbet could not
have been eighteen when made a commander, in 1797.

[74] Phillimore's "The Last of Nelson's Captains," p. 146.

[75] Flag-officers had a share in all prizes taken by vessels of their
squadrons.

[76] Davison.

[77] _Ante_, p. 192.

[78] Pettigrew, vol. ii. p. 444.

[79] Nicolas, vol. vi. p. 288.

[80] Late British minister to Spain.

[81] Author's italics.

[82] The whole of this account is taken from the Life of Sir William
Parker. Phillimore's Last of Nelson's Captains, pp. 125-129.



CHAPTER XX.

THE ESCAPE AND PURSUIT OF THE TOULON FLEET.--NELSON'S RETURN TO
ENGLAND.

JANUARY-AUGUST, 1805. AGE, 46.


To understand rightly the movements of Nelson during the first months
of 1805, up to his return to England in August, and to appreciate
fully the influence of this closing period of his career upon the
plans and fortunes of Napoleon, it is necessary to state briefly the
projects of the latter, as formulated in his correspondence.

The great object of the Emperor was to invade England, crossing the
Channel with the army, 150,000 strong, which for two years past he had
been assembling and drilling in the neighborhood of Boulogne. To this
end all his plans were subsidiary--to it all movements at this moment
were intended to conduce. He had no illusions as to the difficulties
of the enterprise; he recognized fully that the odds were against
success, but he had too often achieved the apparently impossible to
permit the word to stop him in an attempt, which, if accomplished,
would cause all other obstacles to disappear from his path of
conquest. There were chances in his favor. Warily and steadfastly he
advanced, step by step, determined to take no risk that could by the
utmost care be changed into security, but equally resolved to dare the
hazard, if by the military movements set in action by his unsurpassed
genius, he could for a moment obtain the particular combination which
would, to use his own phrase, make him master of the world. What if
the soldiers of the Grand Army never returned from England? There were
still in France men enough, as good as they were before his energizing
spirit wrought them into the force which in its might trod the
Continent under foot. Like Nelson dying at Trafalgar, it too would
have laid down its life, leaving its work finished. Neither man nor
army could have a prouder memorial.

The particular combination upon which Napoleon was willing to stake
everything was a naval control of the Straits of Dover for a very few
days, coincident with the presence there of an army ready and equipped
to cross at once. The latter condition was merely a question of
preparation--long, tedious, and expensive, but perfectly feasible. In
the early months of 1805 it was realized. The army, a substantial,
absolute fact, was there, awaiting only the throwing of the bridge.
The naval part of the problem was far more difficult. In the face of
the naval supremacy of Great Britain, the sought-for control could
only be casual and transient--a fleeting opportunity to be seized,
utilized, and so to disappear. Its realization must be effected by
stratagem, by successful deception and evasion. The coveted
superiority would be not actual, but local,--the French fleet in force
there, the British fleet, though the greater in force, elsewhere; the
weight of the former concentrated at one point by simultaneous
movements of its different detachments, which movements had been so
calculated and directed that they had misled the British divisions,
and, of themselves, diverted them from the decisive centre. Subsidiary
to this main effort, Napoleon also contemplated a simultaneous landing
of some twenty thousand men in Ireland, which, like the naval
movements, would distract and tend to divide the unity of the British
resistance. The British admirals considered this project to be easier
than the invasion of Great Britain, and it engaged their much more
serious attention.

There were three principal French detachments to be united,--in Brest
twenty ships, in Toulon ten, in Rochefort five. To these the outbreak
of the war between Great Britain and Spain added the forces of the
latter kingdom, in Ferrol and Cadiz, aggregating fifteen serviceable
ships; but this was not until March, 1805. Of the three French
contingents, the one from Rochefort was small; and, as a factor,
although important, it was not essential. Its failure might weaken or
impede the progress of the general movement, without entirely
destroying it; but it was of necessity that the Toulon and Brest
divisions both should fulfil their missions, accurately and on time,
if the great combination, of which they were parts, was to advance to
a triumphant conclusion. This emphasized to the British the
importance, which Nelson always so keenly felt, of meeting the enemy
immediately after they left port. Once away, and their destination in
doubt, the chances in favor of any scheme were multiplied. In their
greatest and final effort, Cornwallis, off Brest, was fortunate, in
that the plans of the Emperor first, and afterwards unusual weather
conditions, retained the French fleet there in harbor; a result to
which the material efficiency of his own ships, and their nearness to
their base, much contributed.

Upon Nelson, with his crazy ships, on the other hand, fell the burden
of counteracting a successful evasion of the Toulon fleet, of foiling,
by sagacious and untiring pursuit, through immense and protracted
discouragements, the efforts of the one division which had been
committed to his watch. Although it became much superior to his own
force, he drove it out of the position in the West Indies first
appointed for the meeting, followed it back to Europe, arrived before
it, and then, finding it had gone to Ferrol, carried his squadron,
without orders, counselled simply by his own genius, to the aid of
Cornwallis; by which act the British navy, to the number of
thirty-five ships-of-the-line, was massed in a central position,
separating the two enemy's bodies, and able to act decisively against
a foe approaching from either direction. Thus a second time he
prevented the enemy from forming a junction, unless they fought for
it--an alternative Napoleon wished to avoid. To him fell all the
strain of uncertainty, all the doubtful and complicated mental effort,
all the active strategic movement, of the campaign, and to him
consequently has been attributed justly the greater meed of glory;
though care must be taken not to ignore or undervalue the well-played
parts of other admirals, which were essential to the success of the
great defensive campaign comprehended under the name Trafalgar.

The point selected by the Emperor for the meeting of his naval
divisions, in both the unsuccessful attempts made in 1805, was the
West Indies. There was the most powerful foreign arsenal, Martinique,
left in the hands of France, and there the greatest single interest of
the wide-spread commerce upon which depended the life of Great
Britain. The latter, therefore, was specially sensitive to anything
threatening the safety of the West India Islands. "I should think the
West Indies the more likely place for the French to succeed in," wrote
Nelson to Ball, on the 6th of September, 1804. "Suppose the Toulon
fleet escapes, and gets out of the Straits, I rather think I should
bend my course to the westward; for if they carry 7,000 men--with what
they have at Martinico and Guadaloupe--St. Lucia, Grenada, St.
Vincent, Antigua, and St. Kitts would fall, and, in that case, England
would be so clamorous for peace that we should humble ourselves." This
is a noteworthy passage, for it shows great sagacity of prediction,
and, in announcing beforehand his resolve,--of which this is not the
sole previous mention,--it dispels entirely the idea that he was
decoyed to the West Indies. It explains, also, the remarkable outburst
of gratitude that hailed him on his return from a chase which had
been wholly unsuccessful as regards his own chief object--the
annihilation of the French fleet. He had failed to find it, but he had
driven the enemy out of the West Indies before they could do any
serious injury to the vital interests of the country. A man cannot be
said to be decoyed, because, in pursuance of a judgment deliberately
formed beforehand, he does the thing which the moment demands; unless
it can be shown that he has thereby uncovered greater interests. This
Nelson did not do. He saved the West Indies, and returned in time to
protect Great Britain and Ireland from invasion.

It is through the perplexities of this momentous period that we have
now to follow him, and we shall do so to most advantage by taking as
our clue his own avowed primary motive of action, the finding and
destroying of the French fleet. A man dealing with Napoleon was bound
to meet perplexities innumerable, to thread a winding and devious
track, branching out often into false trails that led nowhere, and
confused by cross-lights which glittered only to mislead. In such a
case, as in the doubtful paths of common life, the only sure guide to
a man's feet is principle; and Nelson's principle was the destruction
of the French fleet. No other interest, his own least of all, could
divert him from it. For it he was willing not only to sacrifice
fortune, but to risk renown; and so, amid troubles manifold, he walked
steadfastly in the light of the single eye.

While Napoleon's object remained the same throughout, his methods
received various modifications, as all plans must do when
circumstances change. In his original intention the execution of the
main effort was intrusted to Latouche Tréville, by far and away the
best admiral he had. Upon his death, the Toulon fleet was committed to
Villeneuve. Its sailing was to take place as nearly as possible at the
same time as that of the Rochefort division. They were to go to the
West Indies, proceed at once, independently, to offensive operations,
then to unite and return together to Rochefort. Napoleon's calculation
was that the British, impressed by this simultaneous departure, and
uncertain about the enemy's purpose, must send at once thirty
ships-of-the-line in pursuit, in order to secure all the different
quarters they would think endangered. This diversion, if realized,
would facilitate the operations of the Brest fleet, which was to land
an army corps in Ireland, and then to cover the crossing of the main
body at Boulogne into England; the precise character of its movements
depending necessarily upon conditions of wind at the moment of
execution.

The Rochefort ships sailed on the 11th of January. For a week before
and a week after that date the winds at Toulon hung between northeast
and southeast, favorable, therefore, for a voyage to the Straits of
Gibraltar; but Villeneuve argued, judiciously, that a fleet intent on
evasion only, and to avoid fighting, should move with great speed
until lost to sight--that is, should start with a very fresh breeze,
the direction of which was of secondary moment. This view of the
matter escaped Nelson's attention, and therefore contributed seriously
to mislead him in his reasoning as to the enemy's probable object.

On the 17th of January the wind at Toulon shifted to north-northwest,
with signs of an approaching gale, such as the Gulf of Lyons is noted
for. The next morning Villeneuve sent a division to drive away
Nelson's lookouts. This duty was imperfectly performed. It should have
been done by a frigate squadron strong enough to force them out of
sight of the main body, and having orders to rejoin the latter at a
distant rendezvous. As it was, the British frigates did not lose touch
of the hostile fleet, which sailed that evening. They dogged it late
into the night, going at times thirteen knots before the blast of the
storm, in order to keep clear of the enemy; and at two in the morning
of January 19th, being then in the latitude of Ajaccio, satisfied that
the French were steering steadily south-southwest, and under a press
of sail, which indicated a mission of importance, they parted company
and hastened to Nelson, whom they joined twelve hours later, as
already stated.

Nelson needed no time to deliberate. His mind was long before fixed to
follow, and there was but one way to do so. The enemy's course, as
reported, led to the southern end of Sardinia, after reaching which
the wind was fair for Naples, Sicily, and the East. The British ships
were moored--two anchors down. At half-past four they were under way,
standing in single column for the narrow passage between Biche and
Sardinia, the "Victory" leading, each vessel steering by the stern
lights of the one ahead of her. At seven P.M. all were clear, and the
fleet hauled up along the east coast of Sardinia, which made a lee for
them. "At midnight," Nelson notes in his journal, "moderate breezes
and clear." During the same hours the untrained squadron of Villeneuve
was losing topmasts in the fury of the gale.

The following afternoon,[83] as the British drew out from under the
lee of Sardinia, they found the wind blowing a hard gale from
south-southwest, which lasted all that night. The fleet could make no
way against it, but neither could the French utilize it, unless, which
was unlikely, they had got much farther to the southward than Nelson
had. When he left Madalena, he had sent a frigate ahead, with orders
to round Sardinia by the south and try to get sight or word of the
enemy. On the morning of the 22d she rejoined, the fleet having then
drifted to fifty miles east of Cape Carbonara, the southeastern point
of Sardinia. At 11 A.M. her captain informed Nelson that the
afternoon before he had seen a French frigate standing into the Gulf
of Cagliari, but, the weather being thick, giving an horizon of only
three miles, nothing more had been discovered. The admiral had sent
word of the French sailing to Acton at Palermo, and through him to
Naples and Malta, Ball being requested to seek for information in
every practicable direction. Naples was for the moment safe, as the
British squadron stood across any possible road by which the French
could approach it.

The gale, hauling gradually to the westward, lasted in its force until
the morning of January 25th. During these three days Nelson received
no news, but he did much thinking and had made up his mind. The French
might be intending to land in Cagliari, to windward of which they had
been during these four days that he had been to leeward. With
Cagliari, therefore, he must communicate; the Viceroy of Sardinia
would know if any landing had been attempted or threatened. If
Sardinia was safe, he would next go or send to Palermo for news, and
thence push for the Faro of Messina, where he would cover both that
important fortress and the approaches to Naples from either side of
Sicily. "You will believe my anxiety," he wrote to Acton in Palermo,
on the 25th. "I have neither ate, drank, or slept with any comfort
since last Sunday" (the 20th). "I am naturally very anxious," he tells
Ball, "therefore you must forgive my short letter. We have a dead foul
wind and heavy sea. I cannot, for want of frigates, send off this
letter." The lack of small cruisers; so often lamented in quieter
days, now embarrassed him cruelly. The few he had were dispersed in
all directions in search of news, and to communicate with Acton he had
to detach one of his fastest ships-of-the-line, the "Leviathan,"
intending himself to follow her with the fleet to Palermo. At the
latter point he could obtain all the intelligence of the common enemy
which might have reached any Sicilian port, before he carried out his
already formed purpose of chasing to leeward, to the Morea and Egypt.
With firm grip, though in agony of mind, he held himself in hand,
determined, burning as he was to pursue somewhere, not to yield the
advantage of the wind till he had reached a reasonable certainty--as
in 1798--that the circumstances justified it. "I hope," he says to
Acton, "that the governor of Augusta[84] will not give up the post to
the French fleet; but if he does, I shall go in and attack them; for I
consider the destruction of the enemy's fleet of so much consequence,
that I would gladly have half of mine burnt to effect their
destruction. I am in a fever. God send I may find them!" Throughout
the long chase which followed, all, so to say, slept on their arms. On
the 11th of March he wrote: "Ever since January 21st we have been
prepared for battle: not a bulkhead[85] up in the fleet. Night or day,
it is my determination not to lose one moment in attacking them."

On the 26th Nelson communicated with Cagliari, and learned that no
landing had been attempted in Sardinia. The same day the frigate
"Phoebe" rejoined, with information that a French eighty-gun ship had
anchored in Ajaccio on the evening of the 19th, dismasted and
crippled. Putting these facts together, and in connection with his own
movements, he inferred conclusively that either the French had gone
back to Toulon in consequence of injuries, or that they had given him
the slip, had got round Sicily, and proceeded to the eastward. The
latter was improbable, because the westerly gales, as he had noted,
could scarcely have allowed them to weather Maritimo[86]; it was not,
however, impossible. A return to Toulon was, antecedently, equally
improbable, although it proved to be the alternative adopted by
Villeneuve. "Although I knew one of the French ships was crippled,
yet I considered the character of Bonaparte; and that the orders given
by him, on the banks of the Seine, would not take into consideration
winds or weather; nor indeed could the accident of three or four ships
alter, _in my opinion_,[87] a destination of importance: therefore
such an accident did not weigh in my mind, and I went first to the
Morea and then to Egypt." This quotation is especially interesting, as
it proves how closely Nelson scanned every known element in a problem,
even to the temperament of his opponent; and it also shows the
substantial agreement in judgment between him and Napoleon. The
latter, Thiers writes, "was sensibly displeased on hearing of this
resultless sortie. 'What is to be done,' he said, 'with admirals who
allow their spirits to sink, and determine to hasten home at the first
damage they receive? All the captains ought to have had sealed orders
to meet off the Canary Islands. The damages should have been repaired
_en route_. A few topmasts carried away, some casualties in a gale of
wind, were every-day occurrences. But the great evil of our Navy is,
that the men who command it are unused to all the risks of command.'"

Still without definite tidings, compelled to act upon his own
inferences--for merely doing nothing was action under such
circumstances--Nelson reasoned that, if the French had returned, he
could not overtake them, and if they had gone east, he had no time to
lose before following. He fell back therefore from his windward
position to the Straits of Messina, through which the whole squadron
beat on the 31st of January--"a thing unprecedented in nautical
history," he wrote to the Admiralty, "but although the danger from the
rapidity of the current was great, yet so was the object of my
pursuit; and I relied with confidence on the zeal and ability of the
fleet under my command." The same day, knowing now that Sicily and
Naples were not threatened, he despatched six cruisers for
intelligence, "in all directions from Tunis to Toulon;" three of them
being frigates, which were to rendezvous off the latter port and
resume the watch of the French, if found there. A seventh vessel was
sent ahead of the squadron to Koron, off which he appeared on the 2d
of February, and, still getting no news, went on to Alexandria, where
he communicated with the British consul on the 7th. "I beg the boat
may not be detained, nor must any communication be had with the
officer, so as to put the ship in quarantine. The officer is ordered
not to wait more than thirty minutes; for you will readily believe my
anxiety to find out the enemy's fleet." No news was to be had; but it
was ascertained that Egypt was practically defenceless against any
renewed attempts of the French.

Nelson at once started back to the westward. On the 19th of February,
twelve days after leaving Alexandria, he was off Malta, and there for
the first time received information that the enemy had returned to
Toulon in a very crippled state. It was now necessary to regain his
station as speedily as possible, and also to resume the operation of
victualling the squadron, which had been interrupted at Madalena by
the news of the enemy's sailing. The captain left there in charge of
the transports had taken them for safety to Malta, in pursuance of the
orders left with him, and they would have to be convoyed again to the
Gulf of Palmas, which was appointed for their joining. The incident
shows at once the forehandedness of Nelson, in that he was able
immediately to go on so long a chase, and also the difficulties
attendant upon the administration of the fleet. Against the prevailing
winds the convoy did not reach Palmas until the 14th of March. The
fleet had preceded it there by a week. After a tedious beat, in which
eight days were consumed to make the three hundred and fifty miles to
windward, Nelson anchored on the 27th of February in Pula Roads, Gulf
of Cagliari, just to hold on. "What weather!" wrote he to Bickerton,
when the anchor dropped. "Did you ever see such in almost any country?
It has forced me to anchor here, in order to prevent being drove to
leeward, but I shall go to sea the moment it moderates." Palmas is
only forty miles to windward of Pula, but it was not till the 8th of
March, after three or four ineffectual efforts, that the squadron got
there. "From the 19th of February to this day," wrote Nelson to Ball,
"have we been beating, and only now going to anchor here as it blows a
gale of wind at northwest. It has been without exception, the very
worst weather I have ever seen." Bad as it was, it was but a sample of
that he was to meet a month later, in the most wearing episode of his
anxious life.

Besides the weary struggle with foul winds and weather, other great
disappointments and vexations met Nelson at Palmas. During his absence
to the eastward, one despatch vessel had been wrecked off Cadiz and
fallen into the hands of the Spaniards, another had been intercepted
by the battered French fleet as it approached Toulon, and a convoy,
homeward-bound from Malta, had been waylaid, the two small ships of
war which formed the escort had been taken, and the merchant ships
dispersed. This last misfortune he ascribed unhesitatingly to the
division of the command. "It would not have happened, could I have
ordered the officer off Cadiz to send ships to protect them." The
incident was not without its compensations to one who valued honor
above loss, for his two petty cruisers had honored themselves and him
by such a desperate resistance, before surrendering to superior force,
that the convoy had time to scatter, and most of it escaped. There was
reason to fear that the despatch vessel taken off Toulon had mistaken
the French fleet for the British, which it had expected to find
outside, and that her commander might have had to haul down his flag
before getting opportunity to throw the mail-bags overboard. In that
case, both public and private letters had gone into the enemy's
possession. "I do assure you, my dearest Emma," he wrote Lady
Hamilton, "that nothing can be more miserable, or unhappy, than your
poor Nelson." Besides the failure to find the French, "You will
conceive my disappointment! It is now[88] from November 2nd that I
have had a line from England."

A characteristic letter was elicited from Nelson by the loss of the
despatch-vessel off Cadiz, the brig "Raven," whose commander, Captain
Layman, had gained his cordial professional esteem in the Copenhagen
expedition, in connection with which he has already been mentioned. As
usual in the case of a wreck, a court-martial was held. This censured
the captain, much to Nelson's vexation; the more so because, at his
request, Layman had not produced before the court certain orders for
the night given by him, the proved neglect of which would have brought
a very heavy punishment upon the officer of the watch. In weighing the
admiral's words, therefore, allowance may be made for a sense of
personal responsibility for the finding of the court; but the letter,
which was addressed to the First Lord, contains expressions that are
most worthy of attention, not only because illustrative of Nelson's
temperament and mode of thought, but also for a point of view too
rarely taken in the modern practice, which has grown up in peace.

    MY DEAR LORD,--Give me leave to recommend Captain Layman to your
    kind protection; for, notwithstanding the Court Martial has
    thought him deserving of censure for his running in with the
    land, yet, my Lord, allow me to say, that Captain Layman's
    misfortune was, perhaps, conceiving other people's abilities
    were equal to his own, which, indeed, very few people's are.

    I own myself one of those who do not fear the shore, for hardly
    any great things are done in a small ship by a man that is;
    therefore, I make very great allowances for him. Indeed, his
    station was intended never to be from the shore in the straits:
    and if he did not every day risk his sloop, he would he useless
    upon that station. Captain Layman has served with me in three
    ships, and I am well acquainted with his bravery, zeal,
    judgment, and activity; _nor do I regret the loss of the Raven
    compared to the value of Captain Layman's services, which are a
    national loss_.[89]

    You must, my dear Lord, forgive the warmth which I express for
    Captain Layman; but he is in adversity, and, therefore, has the
    more claim to my attention and regard. If I had been censured
    every time I have run my ship, or fleets under my command, into
    great danger, I should long ago have been _out_ of the Service,
    and never _in_ the House of Peers.

    I am, my dear Lord, most faithfully, your obedient servant,

    NELSON AND BRONTE.

It is something to meet with the clear recognition that a man may be
of more value than a ship. As Clarendon said, it is not all of an
officer's duty to bring his ship safe home again.

On the voyage back from Alexandria be had busied himself with
vindications of his course in going there, manifesting again that
over-sensitiveness to the judgment of others, which contrasts so
singularly with his high resolve and self-dependence when assuming the
greatest responsibilities. To Ball, to the Admiralty, and to the First
Lord privately, he sent explanations of his action, accompanied by a
summary of his reasons. As the latter have been given, one by one, as
each step was taken, it is not necessary here to say more than that,
in the author's judgment, each successive movement was made upon good;
grounds, and rightly timed. This is true, although Nelson was entirely
misled as to Bonaparte's object. The ruse of the latter, as put into
effect by Villeneuve, not only deceived the British admiral, but, in
its issue, confounded the French. The critical moment of decision, for
the whole fruitless campaign, was when Nelson determined to go first
off Messina, then to the Morea, and finally to Egypt, upon the
inference that by this time one of three things must have happened.
Either (1) he must have met the French fleet, personally or by his
lookouts, or (2) it had returned to Toulon, or (3) it had gone on to
Egypt. The first being eliminated, the choice he made between the
others, wide as was the flight for which it called, was perfectly
accurate. It is difficult to know which most to admire,--the sagacity
which divined the actual, though not the intended, movements of the
enemy, the fiery eagerness which gave assurance of a fierce and
decisive battle, or the great self-restraint which, in all his fever
of impatience, withheld him from precipitating action before every
means of information was exhausted. There will be occasion to note
again the same traits in the yet sharper trial he was soon to undergo.

His conclusion upon the whole matter, therefore, though erroneous as
to the fact, may be accepted as entirely justified by all the
indications; and it must be added that, with the dispositions he took,
nothing could have saved the French fleet but its prompt retreat to
Toulon. "Had they not been crippled," he wrote Davison, "nothing could
have hindered our meeting them on January 21st, off the south end of
Sardinia." "I have not the smallest doubt," he concluded his letter to
the Admiralty, "but that the destination of the French armament which
left the coast of France on the 18th of January, was Alexandria; and,
under all the circumstances which I have stated, I trust their
Lordships will approve my having gone to Egypt in search of the French
fleet." There was, however, no occasion for him to be forward in
suggesting the sacrifice of himself, as he did to Melville. "At this
moment of sorrow I still feel that I have acted right. The result of
my inquiries at Coron and Alexandria confirm me in my former opinion;
and therefore, my Lord, if my obstinacy or ignorance is so gross, I
should be the first to recommend your superseding me." It may be noted
here that Nelson never realized--he did not live long enough to
realize--how thoroughly Bonaparte had learned from Egypt his lesson as
to the control of the sea by sea-power, and what it meant to a
maritime expedition which left it out of the account. To the end of
his reign, and in the height of his sway, he made no serious attempt
to occupy Sardinia or even Sicily, narrow as was the water separating
the latter from Naples, become practically a French state, over which
his brother and brother-in-law reigned for six years. Nelson to the
last made light of the difficulties of which Bonaparte had had bitter
experience. "France," he wrote to the Secretary for War, "will have
both Sardinia and Sicily very soon, if we do not prevent it, and Egypt
besides." "We know," he said in a letter to Ball, "there would be no
difficulty for single polaccas to sail from the shores of Italy with
300 or 400 men in each, (single ships;) and that, in the northerly
winds, they would have a fair chance of not being seen, and even if
seen, not to be overtaken by the Russian ships. Thus, 20,000 men would
be fixed again in Egypt, with the whole people in their favour. Who
would turn them out?"

Nelson left the Gulf of Palmas as soon as the wind served, which was
on the 9th of March. It was necessary to revictual; but, as the time
of the storeships' arrival was uncertain, he thought best to make a
round off Toulon and Barcelona, to renew the impression of the French
that his fleet was to the westward. This intention he carried out,
"showing myself," to use his own words, "off Barcelona and the coast
of Spain, and the islands of Majorca and Minorca, until the 21st of
March." "I shall, if possible," he wrote to a captain on detached
service, "make my appearance off Barcelona, in order to induce the
enemy to believe that I am fixed upon the coast of Spain, when I have
every reason to believe they will put to sea, as I am told the troops
are still embarked. From Barcelona I shall proceed direct to
Rendezvous 98."[90] Accordingly, on the 26th of March he anchored at
Palmas, and began at once to clear the transports. "By the report of
the Fleet Captain, I trust [it will be evident that] it could not with
propriety be longer deferred." Still satisfied that the French were
bound to Egypt, he would here be close to their necessary route, and
with a lookout ship thirty miles to the westward felt assured they
would not escape him. Four days after he anchored, Villeneuve started
on his second venture, and thinking, as Nelson had plotted, that the
British fleet was off Cape San Sebastian, he again shaped his course
to pass east of the Balearics, between them and Sardinia. The news of
his sailing reached Nelson five days later, on April 4th, at 10 A.M.
He had left Palmas the morning before, and was then twenty miles west
of it, beating against a head wind. The weary work of doubt,
inference, and speculation was about to begin once more, and to be
protracted for over three months.

In the present gigantic combination of Napoleon, the Brest squadron,
as well as those of Rochefort and Toulon, was to go to the West
Indies, whence the three should return in mass to the English Channel,
to the number of thirty-five French ships-of-the-line. To these it was
hoped to add a number of Spanish ships, from Cartagena and Cadiz. If
the movements were successful, this great force would overpower, or
hold in check, the British Channel Fleet, and secure control of the
Straits of Dover long enough for the army to cross. It is with the
Toulon squadron that we are immediately concerned, as it alone for the
present touches the fortunes of Nelson. Villeneuve's orders were to
make the best of his way to the Straits of Gibraltar, evading the
British fleet, but calling off Cartagena, to pick up any Spanish ships
there that might be perfectly ready to join him. He was not, however,
to delay for them on any account, but to push on at once to Cadiz.
This port he was not to enter, but to anchor outside, and there be
joined by the "Aigle," the ship that had so long worried Nelson, and
also by six or eight Spanish ships believed to be ready. As soon as
these came out, he was to sail with all speed for Martinique, and
there wait forty days for the Brest squadron, if the latter, whose
admiral was to be commander-in-chief of the allied fleets, did not
appear sooner. Villeneuve had other contingent instructions, which
became inoperative through the persistent pursuit of Nelson.

The French fleet sailed during the night of March 30, with a light
northeast wind, and steered a course approaching due south, in
accordance with Villeneuve's plan of going east of Minorca. The
British lookout frigates, "Active" and "Phoebe," saw it at eight
o'clock the next morning, and kept company with its slow progress till
eight P.M., when, being then sixty miles south by west, true, from
Toulon, the "Phoebe" was sent off to Nelson. During the day the wind
shifted for a time to the northwest. The French then hauled up to
southwest, and were heading so when darkness concealed them from the
British frigates, which were not near enough for night observations.
After the "Phoebe's" departure, the "Active" continued to steer as the
enemy had been doing when last seen, but at daybreak they were no
longer in sight. Just what Villeneuve did that night does not appear;
but no vessel of Nelson's knew anything more about him till April
18th, when information was received from a chance passer that he had
been seen on the 7th off Cape de Gata, on the coast of Spain, with a
fresh easterly wind steering to the westward.

Villeneuve doubtless had used the night's breeze, which was fresh, to
fetch a long circuit, throw off the "Active," and resume his course to
the southward. It was not till next day, April 1st, that he spoke a
neutral, which had seen Nelson near Palmas. Undeceived thus as to the
British being off Cape San Sebastian, and the wind having then come
again easterly, the French admiral kept away at once to the westward,
passed north of the Balearic Islands, and on the 6th appeared off
Cartagena. The Spanish ships there refusing to join him, he pressed
on, went by Gibraltar on the 8th, and on the 9th anchored off Cadiz,
whence he drove away Orde's squadron. The "Aigle," with six Spanish
ships, joined at once, and that night the combined force, eighteen
ships-of-the-line, sailed for Martinique, where it arrived on the 14th
of May. By Villeneuve's instructions it was to remain in the West
Indies till the 23d of June.

When the captain of the "Active" found he had lost sight of the
French, he kept away for Nelson's rendezvous, and joined him at 2 P.M.
of April 4th, five or six hours after the "Phoebe." Prepossessed with
the opinion that Naples, Sicily, or Egypt was the enemy's aim, an
opinion which the frigate's news tended to confirm, Nelson at once
took the fleet midway between Sardinia and the Barbary coast,
spreading lookouts on either side. Thus, without yielding ground to
leeward, he covered all avenues leading to the eastward. He summed up
his purpose in words which showed an entire grasp of the essentials of
his perplexing situation. "I shall neither go to the eastward of
Sicily, or to the westward of Sardinia, until I know something
positive." Amid the diverse objects demanding his care, this choice of
the strategic position was perfectly correct; but as day followed day
without tidings, the distress of uncertainty, and the strain of
adhering to his resolve not to move without information to guide him,
became almost unbearable--a condition not hard to be realized by
those who have known, in suspense, the overpowering impulse to do
something, little matter what. It is an interesting illustration of
the administrative difficulties of the fleet, that three supply-ships
joined him on the 5th of April, and their stores were transferred at
sea while momentarily expecting the enemy's appearance; one at least
being completely discharged by the night of the 6th.

On this date, Nelson, having waited forty-eight hours to windward of
Sicily, decided to fall back on Palermo; reckoning that if any attempt
had been made upon Naples or Sicily, he should there hear of it. The
lookouts which were scattered in all directions were ordered to join
him there, and a frigate was sent to Naples. On the 9th and 10th he
was off Palermo, and, though he got no word of the French, received
two pieces of news from which his quick perceptions jumped to the
conclusion that he had been deceived, and that the enemy had gone
west. "April 10, 7 A.M. Hallowell is just arrived from Palermo. He
brings accounts that the great Expedition is sailed,[91] and that
seven Russian sail-of-the-line are expected in the Mediterranean;
therefore I may suppose the French fleet are bound to the westward. I
must do my best. God bless you. I am very, very miserable, but ever,
my dear Ball," etc.

A week more was to elapse before this dreadfully harassing surmise was
converted into a certainty. On the 9th he started back from Palermo,
intending to go towards Toulon, to make sure that the French had not
returned again. Meeting a constant strong head wind, he was nine days
getting again to the south of Sardinia, a distance of less than two
hundred miles. There, on the 18th, the vessel was spoken which
informed him that she had seen the French off Cape de Gata, three
hundred miles to the westward, ten days before. "If this account is
true," he wrote to Elliot, "much mischief may be apprehended. It
kills me, the very thought." Yet, now that the call for decision
sounds, he knows no faltering, nor does he, as in hours of reaction,
fret himself about the opinions of others. "I am going out of the
Mediterranean," he says in farewell. "It may be thought that I have
protected too well Sardinia, Naples, Sicily, the Morea, and Egypt; but
I feel I have done right, and am, therefore, easy about any fate which
may await me for having missed the French fleet."

The following day a vessel joined from Gibraltar, with certain
information that the enemy had passed the Straits. Nelson had no need
to ponder the next step. His resolve had been taken long before to
follow to the Antipodes. He comforted himself, mistakenly, that his
watchfulness was the cause that the French had abandoned the attempt
against Egypt in force. "Under the severe affliction which I feel at
the escape of the French fleet out of the Mediterranean," he wrote the
Admiralty, "I hope that their Lordships will not impute it to any want
of due attention on my part; but, on the contrary, that by my
vigilance the enemy found it was impossible to undertake any
expedition in the Mediterranean." Mindful, also, that Bonaparte's
great attempt of 1798 had depended upon the absence of the British
fleet, he left a squadron of five frigates to cruise together to the
windward of Sicily, lest the French even now might try to send
transports with troops to the eastward, under the protection of small
armed vessels.

The number of letters written on the 18th and 19th of April show how
thoroughly his mind was prepared for contingencies. Despatched, in all
directions, they outline his own intended course, for the information
of those who might have to co-operate, as well as that which he wished
to be pursued by the officers under his orders. They are issued neat
and complete, at one cast, and no other follows for a week. He
surmises, from the fact of the Spanish ships accompanying the
movement, that it is directed, not against the West Indies, but for
either Ireland or Brest; not a bad "guess," which is all he would have
claimed for it, for the West Indies were actually only a
rallying-point on the roundabout road to the Channel prescribed by
Napoleon. "Therefore," he wrote to the Admiralty, "if I receive no
intelligence to do away my present belief, I shall proceed from Cape
St. Vincent, and take my position fifty leagues west from Scilly,
approaching that island slowly, that I may not miss any vessels sent
in search of the squadron with orders. My reason for this position is,
that it is equally easy to get to either the fleet off Brest, or to go
to Ireland, should the fleet be wanted at either station." The
suitableness of this position to any emergency arising about the
British Islands can be realized at a glance, bearing in mind that
westerly winds prevail there. A copy of the letter was sent to
Ireland, and another to the commander of the Channel fleet off Brest.
"I have the pleasure to say," he concludes, "that I shall bring with
me eleven as fine ships of war, as ably commanded, and in as perfect
order, and in health, as ever went to sea."

It will be interesting to support even Nelson's opinion of his own
squadron by that of an unbiassed and competent witness. Sir Edward
Codrington was associated with it, still nearly entire, some three
months later, after the return from the West Indies; the "Orion,"
which he commanded, being one of a detachment of eighteen
ships-of-the-line sent off from Brest by Admiral Cornwallis. "Lord
Nelson's squadron (of which we have now eight with us) seems to be in
very high order indeed; and although their ships do not look so
handsome as objects, they look so very warlike and show such high
condition, that when once I can think Orion fit to manoeuvre with
them, I shall probably paint her in the same manner." There was, it
would seem, a Nelson pattern for painting ships, as well as a "Nelson
touch" in Orders for Battle. "I have been employed this week past,"
wrote Captain Duff of the "Mars," "to paint the ship _à la Nelson_,
which most of the fleet are doing." This, according to the admiral's
biographers, was with two yellow streaks, but the portholes black,
which gave the sides an appearance of being chequered.

The frigate "Amazon," sent ahead with the letters, was ordered to go
on to Lisbon, get all the news she could, and rejoin at Cape St.
Vincent. She passed Gibraltar on the 29th, and, getting decisive
information just outside the Straits, held on there. It was not till
the 6th that Nelson reached Gibraltar, where he anchored for only four
hours. This gain of a week by a frigate, in traversing ground for
which the fleet took seventeen days, may well be borne in mind by
those unfamiliar with the delays attending concerted movements, that
have to be timed with reference to the slowest units taking part in
the combination.

The days of chase, over which we have hurried in a few lines, passed
for Nelson not only wearily, but in agony of soul. Justified as his
action was to his own mind, and as it must be by the dispassionate
review of military criticism, he could not but be tormented by the
thought of what might have been, and by his temper, which lacked
equanimity and fretted uncontrollably to get alongside the enemy--to
do the duty and to reap the glory that he rightly conceived to be his
own. "I am entirely adrift," he complained, "by my frigates losing
sight of the French fleet so soon after their coming out of port." His
purpose never faltered, nor did the light that led him grow dim. His
action left nothing to be desired, but the chafing of his spirit
approached fury. Lord Radstock, writing from London to his son, says:
"I met a person yesterday, who told me that he had seen a letter from
Lord Nelson, concluding in these words: 'O French fleet, French fleet,
if I can but once get up with you, I'll make you pay dearly for all
that you have made me suffer!' Another told me that he had seen a
letter from an officer on board the Victory, describing his chief 'as
almost raving with anger and vexation.' This," continues Radstock,
who knew him very well, "I can readily credit, so much so, indeed,
that I much fear that he will either undertake some desperate measure
to retrieve his ground, or, should not such an opportunity offer, that
he will never suffer us to behold him more."

Being in London, the writer just quoted was in close touch with the
popular feeling of anxiety, a suspicion of which he could well imagine
Nelson also had, and which added to his burden. "It is believed here,"
he says on the 21st of May, "that the combined fleet from Cadiz is
bound to the West Indies. This is by no means improbable.... The City
people are crying out against Sir J.O.,[92] and, as usual, are equally
absurd and unjust. Some are so ridiculous as to say that he ought to
have captured some of the Toulon squadron, whilst others, more
moderate, think that he might at all events, have so crippled the
enemy as to have checked the expedition.[93] You may readily guess
that your chief is not out of our thoughts at this critical moment.
Should Providence once more favour him, he will be considered our
guardian angel; but, on the other hand, should he unfortunately take a
wrong scent, and the Toulon fleet attain their object, the hero of the
14th of February and of Aboukir will be--I will not say what, but the
ingratitude of the world is but too well known on these occasions."

A week before, on the 13th of May, the same officer had written:
"Where are you all this time?[94] for that is a point justly agitating
the whole country more than I can describe. I fear that your gallant
and worthy chief will have much injustice done him on this occasion,
for the cry is stirring up fast against him, and the loss of Jamaica
would at once sink all his past services into oblivion. All I know for
certain is that we ought never to judge rashly on these occasions, and
never merely by the result. Lord Barham[95] told me this morning that
the Board had no tidings of your squadron. This is truly melancholy,
for certainly no man's zeal and activity ever surpassed those of your
chief.... The world is at once anxious for news and dreading its
arrival." The Admiralty itself, perplexed and harassed by the hazards
of the situation, were dissatisfied because they received no word from
him, being ignorant of the weather conditions which had retarded even
his frigates so far beyond the time of Villeneuve's arrival at Cadiz.
Radstock, whose rank enabled him to see much of the members of the
Board, drew shrewd inferences as to their feelings, though mistaken as
to Nelson's action. "I fear that he has been so much soured by the
appointment of Sir John Orde, that he has had the imprudence to vent
his spleen on the Admiralty by a long, and, to the Board, painful
silence. I am sure that they are out of humour with him, and I have my
doubts whether they would risk much for him, were he to meet with any
serious misfortune."

Through such difficulties in front, and such clamor in the rear,
Nelson pursued his steadfast way, in anguish of spirit, but constant
still in mind. "I am not made to despair," he said to Melville, "what
man can do shall be done. I have marked out for myself a decided line
of conduct, and I shall follow it well up; although I have now before
me a letter from the physician of the fleet, enforcing my return to
England before the hot months." "Brokenhearted as I am, at the escape
of the Toulon fleet," he tells the governor of Gibraltar, "yet it
cannot prevent my thinking of all the points intrusted to my care,
amongst which Gibraltar stands prominent." "My good fortune seems
flown away," he cries out to Ball. "I cannot get a fair wind, or even
a side wind. Dead foul!--dead foul! But my mind is fully made up what
to do when I leave the Straits, supposing there is no certain
information of the enemy's destination. I believe this ill-luck will
go near to kill me; but as these are times for exertions, I must not
be cast down, whatever I feel." A week later, on the 26th of April, he
complains: "From the 9th I have been using every effort to get down
the Mediterranean, but to this day we are very little advanced. From
March 26th, we have had nothing like a Levanter,[96] except for the
French fleet. I have never been one week without one, until this very
important moment. It has half killed me; but fretting is of no use."
On the 1st of May he wrote to the Admiralty, "I have as yet heard
nothing of the enemy;" beyond, of course, the fact of their having
passed the Straits.

On the 4th of May the squadron was off Tetuan, on the African coast, a
little east of Gibraltar, and, as the wind was too foul for progress,
Nelson, ever watchful over supplies, determined to stop for water and
fresh beef, which the place afforded. There he was joined by the
frigate "Decade" from Gibraltar, and for the first time, apparently,
received a rumor that the allied fleets had gone to the West Indies.
He complains, certainly not unreasonably, and apparently not unjustly,
that Sir John Orde, who had seen the French arrive off Cadiz, had not
dogged their track and ascertained their route; a feat certainly not
beyond British seamanship and daring, under the management of a dozen
men that could be named off-hand. "I believe my ill luck is to go on
for a longer time, and I now much fear that Sir John Orde has not sent
his small ships to watch the enemy's fleet, and ordered them to return
to the Straits mouth, to give me information, that I might know how to
direct my proceedings: for I cannot very properly run to the West
Indies, without something beyond mere surmise; and if I defer my
departure, Jamaica may be lost. Indeed, as they have a month's start
of me, I see no prospect of getting out time enough to prevent much
mischief from being done. However, I shall take all matters into my
most serious consideration, and shall do that which seemeth best under
all circumstances." "I am like to have a West India trip," he wrote to
Keats, one of his favorite captains; "but that I don't mind, if I can
but get at them."

The wind hauling somewhat to the southward on the 5th, allowed the
fleet to lay a course for Gibraltar. The operation of getting bullocks
was stopped at once, and the ships weighed. In this brief stay, the
water of the fleet had been completed and another transport cleared.
Next day Gibraltar was reached. The wind, westerly still, though fair
for this stretch, remained foul for beating out of the Straits against
a current which ever sets to the eastward; and many of the officers,
presuming on a continuance of the weather that had so long baffled
them, hurried their washing ashore. Nelson, however, keenly vigilant
and with long experience, saw indications of a change. "Off went a gun
from the Victory, and up went the Blue Peter,[97] whilst the Admiral
paced the deck in a hurry, with anxious steps, and impatient of a
moment's delay. The officers said, 'Here is one of Nelson's mad
pranks.' But he was right."[98] The wind came fair, a condition with
which the great admiral never trifled. Five hours after the anchors
dropped they were again at the bows, and the fleet at last standing
out of the Mediterranean; the transports in tow of the ships of war.
Nelson's resolve was fast forming to go to the West Indies. In fact,
at Tetuan, acting upon this possibility, he had given conditional
orders to Bickerton to remain in command of the Mediterranean
squadron, assigning to that service half a dozen frigates and double
that number of smaller cruisers, and had transferred to him all
station papers necessary for his guidance,--a promptness of decision
which sufficiently shows one of the chief secrets of his greatness.
"If I fail," said he to Dr. Scott, "if they are not gone to the West
Indies, I shall be blamed: to be burnt in effigy or Westminster Abbey
is my alternative." Evidently he was not unmindful of the fickle
breath of popular favor, whose fluctuations Radstock was noting. Dr.
Scott, who witnessed his chief's bearing at this time, always
considered that he never exhibited greater magnanimity than in this
resolution, which Jurien de la Gravière also has called one of his
finest inspirations.

Great, indeed, was his promptitude, alike in decision and in act; but
he was no less great in his delays, in the curb he placed on his
natural impetuosity. "God only knows, my dear friend," he wrote at
this moment to Davison, "what I have suffered by not getting at the
enemy's fleet;" but, in all his impatience, he would not start on that
long voyage until he had exhausted every possibility of further
enlightenment. "Perseverance _and_ patience," he said, "may do much;"
but he did not separate the one from the other, in deed or in word.
Circumspection was in him as marked a trait as ardor. "I was in great
hopes," he wrote the Admiralty, "that some of Sir John Orde's frigates
would have arrived at Gibraltar, from watching the destination of the
enemy, from whom I should have derived information of the route the
enemy had taken, but none had arrived." Up to April 27th nothing had
been heard of them at Lisbon. "I am now pushing off Cape St. Vincent,
and hope that is the station to which Sir John Orde may have directed
his frigates to return from watching the route of the enemy. If
nothing is heard there, I shall probably think the rumours which are
spread are true, that their destination is the West Indies, and in
that case think it my duty to follow them." "I am as much in the dark
as ever," he wrote on the same date, May 7th, to Nepean, one of the
puisne lords. "If I hear nothing, I shall proceed to the West Indies."

The wind continued fair for nearly forty-eight hours, when it again
became westerly; but the fleet was now in the Atlantic. On the 9th of
May the "Amazon" rejoined, bringing a letter from another ship of war,
which enclosed a report gathered from an American brig that had left
Cadiz on the 2d. According to this, while there were in Cadiz diverse
rumors as to the destination of the allied fleets, the one most
generally accepted was that they were bound to the West Indies. That
night the fleet anchored in Lagos Bay, to the eastward of Cape St.
Vincent, and the unending work of discharging transports was again
resumed. Nelson, shortly before leaving Gibraltar, had received
official notification that a convoy carrying five thousand troops was
on its way to the Mediterranean, and would depend upon him for
protection. He felt it necessary to await this in his present
position, and he utilized the time by preparing for a very long chase.

At Lagos, Rear-Admiral Campbell of the Portuguese Navy, who had served
with the British in the Mediterranean six years before, visited the
"Victory," and certain intelligence that Villeneuve was gone to the
West Indies was by him given to Nelson. The latter had now all the
confirmation needed, by such an one as he, to decide upon his line of
action. "My lot is cast, my dear Ball, and I am going to the West
Indies, where, although I am late, yet chance may have given them a
bad passage, and me a good one: I must hope the best." "Disappointment
has worn me to a skeleton," he writes to his late junior in the
Mediterranean, Campbell, "and I am in good truth, very, very far from
well." "If I had not been in pursuit of the enemy's fleet, I should
have been at this moment in England, but my health, or even my life,
must not come into consideration at this important crisis; for,
however I may be called unfortunate, it never shall be said that I
have been neglectful of my duty, or spared myself." "It will not be
supposed I am on a party of pleasure," he wrote to the Secretary of
the Admiralty, "running after eighteen sail of the line with ten, and
that to the West Indies;" but, he summed up his feelings to Davison,
"Salt beef and the French fleet, is far preferable to roast beef and
champagne without them."

On the 10th of May only was his purpose finally and absolutely formed,
for on that day he sent a sloop to Barbadoes, his intended point of
arrival, to announce his coming; requesting that an embargo might be
laid at once on all vessels in port, to prevent the news reaching the
enemy at Martinique or elsewhere. In the morning of the 11th the fleet
weighed, and at 4 P.M. the expedition from England arrived. It was
accompanied by two ships-of-the-line, to which Nelson joined a third,
the "Royal Sovereign," which sailed so badly, from the state of her
bottom, that she would retard a movement already too long delayed. At
seven that evening the fleet was under full sail for the West Indies.

The voyage across was uneventful; the ships, as customary for this
passage, stood to the southward and westward into the trade winds,
under whose steady impulse they advanced at a daily average speed of
one hundred and thirty-five miles, or between five and six miles an
hour. This rate, however, was a mean between considerable extremes,--a
rate of nine miles being at times attained. The slackest winds, which
brought down the average, are found before reaching the trades, and
Nelson utilized this period to transmit to the fleet his general plan
for action, in case he found the allies at sea. The manner in which
this was conveyed to the individual ships is an interesting incident.
The speed of the fleet is necessarily that of its slowest member; the
faster ships, therefore, have continually a reserve, which they may at
any moment bring into play. The orders being prepared, a frigate
captain was called on board the "Victory" and received them. Returning
to his own vessel, he made all sail until on the bow[99] of one of the
ships-of-the-line. Deadening the way of the frigate, a boat was
dropped in the water and had only to pull alongside the other vessel
as it came up. The frigate remained slowed until passed, and the boat,
having delivered its letter, came easily alongside again,--the whole
operation being thus conducted with the least expenditure of time and
exertion.[100]

There was in the fleet one ship that had been steadily in commission
since 1801, and was now in very shaky condition. This was the
"Superb," seventy-four. She had only been kept out by the extreme
exertions of her commander, Keats, one of the most distinguished
captains of the day, and he had entreated that he should not be sent
away now, when the moment of battle seemed near. By a singular irony
of fate, this zealous insistence caused him to miss Trafalgar, at
which the "Royal Sovereign," that parted at Lagos, was present,
repaired and recoppered,--a new ship. Keats, whose energy and
readiness made him a great favorite with Nelson, obtained permission
not to stop when other ships did, but always to carry a press of sail;
and he lashed his studding-sail booms to the yards, as the constant
direction of the trade-winds allows them to be carried steadily.
Notwithstanding all that could be done, the "Superb" seems to have set
the pace, and slower than could have been wished; which drew from
Nelson's customary kindly thoughtfulness a few lines too
characteristic to be omitted.

    MY DEAR KEATS,--I am fearful that you may think that the Superb
    does not go so fast as I could wish. However that may be, (for
    if we all went ten knots, I should not think it fast enough,)
    yet I would have you be assured that I know and feel that the
    Superb does all which is possible for a ship to accomplish; and
    I desire that you will not fret upon the occasion.... Whatever
    may happen, believe me ever, my dear Keats, your most obliged
    and sincere friend,

    NELSON AND BRONTE.

A week seems to have elapsed before he could get a suitable
opportunity for sending this, and he then, on the 27th of May, added:
"Our passage, although not very quick, has been far from a bad one;"
and he thought that they would gain fourteen days upon the allies. The
actual gain was ten, the latter being thirty-four days from Cadiz to
Martinique, the British twenty-four to Barbadoes. The enemy were
therefore three weeks in the West Indies before Nelson arrived; but in
that time they neither accomplished nor undertook anything but the
recapture of Diamond Rock, a precipitous islet off the south end of
Martinique, which the British had held for some time, to the great
annoyance of the main island.

Reaching Barbadoes on the afternoon of June 4th, Nelson found that the
day before information had been received from General Brereton,
commanding the troops at Santa Lucia, that the allied fleets had
passed there, going south, during the night of May 28-29. The
intelligence was so circumstantial that it compelled respect, coming
from the quarter it did. "There is not a doubt in any of the Admirals'
or Generals' minds," wrote Nelson to the Admiralty, in the despatch
announcing his arrival, "but that Tobago and Trinidada are the enemy's
objects." Nelson himself was sceptical,--the improbability seemed
great to his sound military perceptions; but, confident as he was in
his own conclusions in dilemmas, his mind was too sane and well
balanced to refuse direct and credible evidence. Summing up the
situation with lamentations, six weeks later, he said to Davison:
"When I follow my own head, I am, in general, much more correct in my
judgment, than following the opinion of others. I resisted the opinion
of General Brereton's information till it would have been the height
of presumption to have carried my disbelief further. I could not, in
the face of generals and admirals, go N.W., when it was _apparently_
clear that the enemy had gone south." His purpose had been not to
anchor, but to pick up such ships-of-the-line as he found there,--two
seventy-fours,[101] as it turned out,--and to proceed with them to
Martinique, which he naturally assumed to be the enemy's headquarters.
As it was, receiving a pressing request from the commanding general at
Barbadoes to let him accompany the fleet with two thousand troops, he
anchored in Carlisle Bay at 5 P.M. At half-past nine the next morning
he was again under way for Trinidad. Some curious misunderstandings
maintained this mistaken impression as to the enemy's actions, until
communication with Trinidad was had on the evening of June 7th. It was
found then that no hostile force had appeared, although the British
fleet for a moment had been believed to be such.

Nelson at once started north again. A report reached him that a second
squadron, of fourteen French and Spanish ships from Ferrol, had
arrived at Martinique. He said frankly that he thought this very
doubtful, but added proudly: "Powerful as their force may be, they
shall not with impunity make any great attacks. Mine is compact,
theirs must be unwieldy, and although a very pretty fiddle, I don't
believe that either Gravina or Villeneuve know how to play upon it."
On the 9th he for the first time got accurate information. An official
letter from Dominica[102] announced that eighteen ships-of-the-line,
with smaller vessels, had passed there on the 6th of June. But for the
false tidings which on the 4th had led him, first to pause, and then
to take a wrong direction, Nelson argued, and not unjustly, that he
would have overtaken them at this point, a bare hundred miles from
Barbadoes. "But for wrong information, I should have fought the battle
on June 6th where Rodney fought his." The famous victory of the latter
was immediately north of Dominica, by which name it is known in French
naval history. "There would have been no occasion for opinions," wrote
Nelson wrathfully, as he thought of his long anxieties, and the narrow
margin by which he failed, "had not General Brereton sent his damned
intelligence from St. Lucia; nor would I have received it to have
acted by it, but that I was assured that his information was very
correct. It has almost broke my heart, but I must not despair." It was
hard to have borne so much, and then to miss success from such a
cause. "Brereton's wrong information could not be doubted," he told
his intimates, "and by following it, I lost the opportunity of
fighting the enemy." "What a race I have run after these fellows; but
God is just, and I may be repaid for all my moments of anxiety."

When Villeneuve, with his ill-trained and sickly[103] fleet, left
Martinique on the 4th of June, he had, of course, no knowledge of
Nelson's approach. Nearly up to that date it was not known, even in
London, where the latter had gone. A frigate had reached the French
admiral on the 29th of May, with orders from Napoleon to make some
attempts against the British islands during the time he was awaiting
the Brest squadron. For this reason he sailed, and just outside the
harbor was joined by two ships from France, raising his force to
twenty of the line. He steered north, intending to gain to windward,
and thence return upon Barbadoes, his first proposed conquest. On the
8th of June, off Antigua, were captured fourteen British
merchant-ships, which had imprudently put to sea from that island.
From these Villeneuve got a report that Nelson had arrived with
fourteen ships-of-the-line, to which his imagination added five he
believed to be at Barbadoes. He decided at once to return to Europe,
abandoning all his projects against the British possessions.
Transferring hastily a number of troops to frigates, as garrisons for
the French islands, he sailed the next day for the northward to gain
the westerly winds which prevail in the higher latitudes. Of the forty
days he was to remain in the West Indies--reduced to thirty-five by
subsequent instructions--only twenty-six had passed. Whatever else
might result in the future, Nelson was justified in claiming that his
pursuit, effected under such discouragements, had driven the enemy out
of the West Indies, saved the islands, and, as he added, two hundred
sail of sugar ships. Only extreme imprudence, he fairly maintained,
was responsible for the loss of the fourteen from Antigua.

Nelson himself was off Antigua on the 12th of June, exactly one week
after he left Barbadoes. There he received all the information that
has just been mentioned as to the enemy's movements. A rapid decision
was necessary, if he might hope yet to overtake his fortune, and to
baffle finally the objects of the allies, whatever they might be. "I
must be satisfied they have bent their course for Europe before I push
after them, which will be to the Straits' mouth;" but later in the
same day he has learned that they were standing to the northward when
last seen, and had sent back their troops to Guadaloupe, therefore, "I
hope to sail in the morning after them for the Straits' mouth." That
night the troops were landed, and a brig of war, the "Curieux," was
despatched to England with word of his intentions. At the same time,
while believing the allies were bound back to the Mediterranean, he
recognized that it was possible they might be going farther north, to
one of the Biscay ports, and consequently took measures to notify the
commanding officer off Ferrol to be on his guard. The frigate charged
with this communication was kept with the fleet until the 19th, by
which time he had obtained at sea additional and more precise
knowledge of Villeneuve's direction. This important warning was duly
received, and in advance of the enemy's appearance, by the admiral for
whom it was intended.

In taking this second decision, to abandon the West Indies once more
to themselves, as a month before he had abandoned the Mediterranean,
Nelson had to rely only upon his own natural sagacity and practised
judgment. "I hear all, and even feel obliged, for all is meant as
kindness to me, that I should get at them. In this diversity of
opinions I may as well follow my own, which is, that the Spaniards are
gone to the Havannah, and that the French will either stand for Cadiz
or Toulon--I feel most inclined to the latter place; and then they may
fancy that they will get to Egypt without any interruption." "So far
from being infallible, like the Pope, I believe my opinions to be very
fallible, and therefore I may be mistaken that the enemy's fleet has
gone to Europe; but I cannot bring myself to think otherwise,
notwithstanding the variety of opinions which different people of good
judgment form."

Still, as before, his judgments, if rapid, are not precipitate. Though
characterized by even more of insight than of reasoning, no conditions
are left out of sight, nor, as he declared, was a deaf ear turned to
any suggestion. Upon the whole, one is more struck by the accuracy of
the inferences than by the antecedent processes as summarized by
himself; yet the weight of evidence will be found on the side he
espouses. Erroneous in particulars, the general conclusions upon which
he bases his future course are justified, not only by the results now
known to us, but to impartial review of their probability at the
moment. Most impressive of all, however, is the strength of
conviction, which lifts him from the plane of doubt, where unaided
reason alone would leave him, to that of unhesitating action,
incapable of looking backward. In the most complete presentation of
all his views, the one he wished brought before the Prime Minister, if
his conduct on this momentous occasion were called in question, he
ends thus: "My opinion is firm as a rock, that some cause, _orders_,
or _inability_ to perform any service in these seas, has made them
resolve to proceed direct for Europe, sending the Spanish ships to the
Havannah." It is such conviction, in which opinion rather possesses a
man than is possessed by him, that exalts genius above talent, and
imbues faith with a power which reason has not in her gift.

There were among his conclusions certain ones which placed Nelson's
mind, however fretted by disappointment, at ease concerning any future
harm the enemy might be able to do. Another wreath of laurel, which
seemed almost within his grasp, had indeed evaded him, and no man felt
more keenly such a loss; but he was reasonably sure that, if
Villeneuve were gone to Europe, he could not outstrip pursuit by long
enough to do much harm. The harassing fear, which he had borne through
the long beat down the Mediterranean and the retarded voyage to
Martinique, had now disappeared. Going out he had gained ten days upon
the allies; they had only five days' start of him in the return. He
recognized, moreover, the great significance of their inactivity
during the three weeks they had the Windward Islands, if not all the
West Indies, defenceless before them. "If they were not able to make
an attack for three weeks after their arrival, they could not hope for
greater success after our means of resistance increased, and their
means of offence were diminished." If this consideration, on the one
hand, showed the improbability of their proceeding against Jamaica,
after Nelson's coming, when they had not ventured before, it gave also
an inkling of their probable efficiency for immediate action in
Europe. "They will not give me credit for quitting the West Indies for
a month to come;" therefore it was unlikely that they would think it
necessary to proceed at once upon their next enterprise, after
reaching port. "I must not despair of getting up with them before they
enter the Straits," he writes Elliot. "At least, they will have no
time to carry any of their future plans into execution, and do harm to
any of the countries under my charge." If his thirst for glory was
unslaked, his fears of disaster had disappeared.

Villeneuve, guided by instructions recently received from Napoleon, to
meet the case of the Brest squadron not getting away, had gone
actually for Ferrol, where he was to join a squadron of five French
and nine Spanish ships, which would raise his own force to thirty-four
of the line; but Nelson, unable to know this, argued correctly that,
in the uncertainty, he must leave this chance to the Biscay ships, and
that for himself the Mediterranean possessed the first claim. At noon
of June 13th, nine days after reaching Barbadoes, he got away from
Antigua. The necessity for gaining the westerly winds made his course
for some time the same as that of Villeneuve, and left him not without
hopes that he might yet fall in with the allies, especially if, as he
thought, they were destined to the Straits. On the 17th an American
schooner was spoken, which had seen the combined squadron two days
before, steering also to the northward. This report, wrote Nelson to
the Admiralty, "can leave me no room to doubt but that I am hard upon
the heels of the enemy's fleet. I think we cannot be more than eighty
leagues from them at this moment, and by carrying every sail, and
using my utmost efforts, I shall hope to close with them before they
get to either Cadiz or Toulon." The news was sent ahead by two
vessels, which parted from the fleet on the 19th of June,--one for
Gibraltar, with despatches and letters for the admiral and ministers
in the Mediterranean; one for Lisbon, whence this important
intelligence would be forwarded to England and to the commanding
officer off Ferrol. Still believing them bound for the Straits, Nelson
expressed in the fleet the opinion that they would keep well to the
southward of the Azores, so as not to be seen by British cruisers
centred there. In this he was mistaken, as he was in their final
destination; both fleets sighted the islands,--- the French on the
30th of June to the northward of the group, while the British passed
through it on the 8th of July. He admitted, however, that he was
doubtful in the matter. "It is very uncertain whether they will go to
Ferrol or Cadiz;" and nothing can indicate more clearly his
perplexity, and his sense of the urgency of the case, than his parting
on the same day with two of the four small cruisers he had with him,
in order to insure that Ferrol as well as Gibraltar should have prompt
warning.

It was at about this time that Nelson expressed, to one or more of his
captains, his views as to what he had so far effected, what he had
proposed to do if he had met the hostile fleets, and what his future
course would be if they were yet found. "I am thankful that the enemy
have been driven from the West India Islands with so little loss to
our Country. I had made up my mind to great sacrifices; for I had
determined, notwithstanding his vast superiority, to stop his career,
and to put it out of his power to do any further mischief. Yet do not
imagine I am one of those hot brained people, who fight at an immense
disadvantage, _without an adequate object_.[1] My object is partly
gained," that is, the allies had been forced out of the West Indies."
If we meet them, we shall find them not less than eighteen, I rather
think twenty sail of the line, and therefore do not be surprised if I
should not fall on them immediately: _we won't part without a
battle_.[104] I think they will be glad to leave me alone, if I will
let them alone; which I will do, either till we approach the shores
of Europe, or they give me an advantage too tempting to be resisted."

It is rare to find so much sagacious appreciation of conditions,
combined with so much exalted resolution and sound discretion, as in
this compact utterance. Among the external interests of Great Britain,
the West Indies were the greatest. They were critically threatened by
the force he was pursuing; therefore at all costs that force should be
so disabled, that it could do nothing effective against the defences
with which the scattered islands were provided. For this end he was
prepared to risk the destruction of his squadron. The West Indies were
now delivered; but the enemy's force remained, and other British
interests. Three months before, he had said, "I had rather see half my
squadron burnt than risk what the French fleet may do in the
Mediterranean." In the same spirit he now repeats: "Though we are but
eleven to eighteen or twenty, we won't part without a battle." Why
fight such odds? He himself has told us a little later. "By the time
the enemy has beat our fleet soundly, they will do us no harm this
year." Granting this conclusion,--the reasonableness of which was
substantiated at Trafalgar,--it cannot be denied that the sacrifice
would be justified, the enemy's combinations being disconcerted. Yet
there shall be no headlong, reckless attack. "I will leave them alone
till they offer me an opportunity too tempting to be resisted,"--that
speaks for itself,--or, "until we approach the shores of Europe," when
the matter can no longer be deferred, and the twenty ships must be
taken out of Napoleon's hosts, even though eleven be destroyed to
effect this. The preparedness of mind is to be noted, and yet more the
firmness of the conviction, in the strength of which alone such deeds
are done. It is the man of faith who is ever the man of works.

Singularly enough, his plans were quickly to receive the best of
illustrations by the failure of contrary methods. Scarcely a month
later fifteen British ships, under another admiral, met these twenty,
which Nelson with eleven now sought in vain. They did not part without
a battle, but they did part without a decisive battle; they were not
kept in sight afterwards; they joined and were incorporated with
Napoleon's great armada; they had further wide opportunities of
mischief; and there followed for the people of Great Britain a period
of bitter suspense and wide-spread panic. "What a game had Villeneuve
to play!" said Napoleon of those moments. "Does not the thought of the
possibilities remaining to Villeneuve," wrote Lord Radstock of
Calder's fruitless battle, "make your blood boil when you reflect on
the never to be forgotten 22d of July? Notwithstanding the inferiority
of Lord Nelson's numbers," he says at the same time, with keen
appreciation of the man he knew so well, "should he be so lucky as to
fall in with the enemy, I have no doubt that _he would never quit
them_[105] until he should have destroyed or taken some of the French
ships; and that he himself would seek the French admiral's ship, if
possible, I would pledge my life on it." "There is such an universal
bustle and cry about invasion, that no other subject will be listened
to at present by those in power. I found London almost a desert, and
no good news stirring to animate it; on the contrary, the few faces I
saw at the Admiralty at once confirmed the truth of the report of the
combined squadron having safely arrived at Ferrol." This was after
Calder had met and fought them, and let them get out of his sight.

Lord Minto, speaking of the same crisis, says: "There has been the
greatest alarm ever known in the city of London, since the combined
fleet [Villeneuve's] sailed from Ferrol. If they had captured our
homeward-bound convoys, it is said the India Company and half the city
must have been bankrupt." These gleams of the feelings of the times,
reflected by two men in close contact with the popular apprehensions,
show what Nelson was among British admirals to the men of his day, and
why he was so. "Great and important as the victory is," wrote Minto,
three months later, after the news of Trafalgar, "it is bought too
dearly, even for our interest, by the death of Nelson. We shall want
more victories yet, and to whom can we look for them? The navy is
certainly full of the bravest men, but they are mostly below the rank
of admiral; and brave as they almost all are, there was a sort of
heroic cast about Nelson that I never saw in any other man, and which
seems wanting to the achievement of _impossible things_ which became
easy to him, and on which the maintenance of our superiority at sea
seems to depend against the growing navy of the enemy." "The clamour
against poor Sir Robert Calder is gaining ground daily," wrote
Radstock, condemnatory yet pitiful towards the admiral who had failed
duly to utilize the opportunity Nelson then was seeking in vain, "and
there is a general cry against him from all quarters. Thus much one
may venture to say, that had your old chief commanded our squadron,
the enemy would have had but little room for lying or vapouring, as I
have not a shadow of a doubt but that he would either have taken or
destroyed the French admiral."

But there was but one Nelson, and he meantime, faint yet pursuing,
toiled fruitlessly on, bearing still the sickness of hope deferred and
suspense protracted. "Midnight," he notes in his private diary of June
21st. "Nearly calm, saw three planks which I think came from the
French fleet. Very miserable, which is very foolish." "We crawled
thirty-three miles the last twenty-four hours," he enters on the 8th
of July. "My only hope is, that the enemy's fleet are near us, and in
the same situation. All night light breezes, standing to the eastward,
to go to the northward of St. Michael's.[106] At times squally with
rain." Amid these unavoidable delays, he was forecasting and
preparing that no time should be lost when he reached the Straits and
once more came within the range of intelligence. The light winds, when
boats could pass without retarding the ships, were utilized in
preparing letters to the officials at Gibraltar and Tangiers, to have
ready the stores necessary for the fleet upon arrival. These papers
were already on board the two frigates remaining with him, with the
necessary instructions for their captains, so that they might part at
any moment judged fitting, irrespective of weather conditions. Again
he cautions the authorities to keep his approach a profound secret. No
private letters for Gibraltar were permitted in the mail-bags, lest
they should unwittingly betray counsel. The vessels were directed to
rejoin him forty miles west of Cape Spartel, giving him thus time to
decide upon his course before he reached Gibraltar; for it was quite
on the cards that he might find it imperative to hurry north without
anchoring. On the 13th of July, five hundred miles from Cape St.
Vincent, one of these ships left him, probably the last to go.

On the 18th of July, Cape Spartel was sighted. "No French fleet,"
wrote the admiral in his diary, "nor any information about them: how
sorrowful this makes me, but I cannot help myself!" "I am, my dear Mr.
Marsden," he wrote to the Secretary of the Admiralty, "as completely
miserable as my greatest enemy could wish me; but I blame neither
fortune or my own judgment. Oh, General Brereton! General Brereton!"
To his friend Davison he revealed yet more frankly the bitterness of
his spirit, now that the last hope was dashed, and it was even
possible that the mis-step of going to Trinidad had caused him to
incur a further mistake, by leaving the allies in the West Indies.
"But for General Brereton's damned information, Nelson," he said, half
prophetically, "would have been, living or dead, the greatest man in
his profession that England ever saw. Now alas! I am nothing--perhaps
shall incur censure for misfortunes which may happen, and have
happened."

But if he himself were disappointed, and foreboded the discontent of
others, the greatness of what he had done was quickly apparent, and
received due recognition from thoughtful men. "Either the distances
between the different quarters of the globe are diminished," wrote Mr.
Elliot from Naples, "or you have extended the powers of human action.
After an unremitting cruise of two long years in the stormy Gulf of
Lyons, to have proceeded without going into port to Alexandria, from
Alexandria to the West Indies, from the West Indies back again to
Gibraltar; to have kept your ships afloat, your rigging standing, and
your crews in health and spirits--is an effort such as never was
realised in former times, nor, I doubt, will ever again be repeated by
any other admiral. You have protected us for two long years, and you
saved the West Indies by only a few days." Thus truly summarized, such
achievements are seen to possess claims to admiration, not to be
exceeded even by the glory of Trafalgar.

Although no French fleet was visible, as Nelson approached the
Straits, there were a half-dozen British ships-of-the-line, under the
command of his old friend Collingwood, blockading Cadiz. When Orde was
driven off that station by Villeneuve on the 9th of April, and retired
upon Brest, he had already sent in an application to be relieved from
a duty which he himself had sought, and had held for so short a time;
alleging a bundle of grievances which show clearly enough the
impracticable touchiness of the man. His request was at once granted.
Early in May, Collingwood was sent from England with eight
sail-of-the-line for the West Indies; but learning on the way that
Nelson had gone thither, he detached to him two of his swiftest
seventy-fours, and, with great good judgment, himself took position
off Cadiz, where he covered the entrance of the Mediterranean, and
effectually prevented any ships from either Cartagena or Ferrol
concentrating in the neighborhood of the Straits.

Nelson received word from some of his lookouts appointed to meet him
here, that nothing had been heard of the allied squadrons. The anxiety
which had never ceased to attend him was increased by this prolonged
silence. He had no certainty that the enemy might not have doubled
back, and gone to Jamaica. He would not stop now to exchange with
Collingwood speculations about the enemy's course. "My dear
Collingwood, I am, as you may suppose, miserable at not having fallen
in with the enemy's fleet; and I am almost increased in sorrow by not
finding them [here]. The name of General Brereton will not soon be
forgot. I must now only hope that the enemy have not tricked me, and
gone to Jamaica; but if the account,[107] of which I send you a copy,
is correct, it is more than probable that they are either gone to the
northward, or, if bound to the Mediterranean, not yet arrived." His
surmise remains accurate. He then continues, with that delicate and
respectful recognition of the position and ability of others, which
won him so much love: "The moment the fleet is watered, and got some
refreshments, of which we are in great want, I shall come out and make
you a visit; not, my dear friend, to take your command from you, (for
I may probably add mine to you,) but to consult how we can best serve
our Country, by detaching a part of this large force." Circumstances
prevented his neighborly intention from taking effect. A week later
Nelson returned north with his squadron, and the friends did not meet
until shortly before Trafalgar.

In reply to Nelson's letter, Collingwood summed up his view of the
situation as so far developed. "I have always had an idea that Ireland
alone was the object they had in view, and still believe that to be
their ultimate destination--that they will now liberate the Ferrol
squadron from Calder, make the round of the Bay,[108] and, taking the
Rochefort people with them, appear off Ushant--perhaps with
thirty-four sail, there to be joined by twenty more. Admiral
Cornwallis collecting his out squadrons may have thirty and upwards.
This appears to be a probable plan; for unless it is to bring their
great fleets and armies to some point of service--some rash attempt at
conquest--they have been only subjecting them to chance of loss, which
I do not believe the Corsican would do, without the hope of an
adequate reward."

It is upon this letter, the sagacious and well-ordered inferences of
which must be candidly admitted, that a claim for superiority of
discernment over Nelson has been made for its writer. It must be
remembered, however, not as a matter of invidious detraction from one
man, but in simple justice to the other, whose insight and belief had
taken form in such wonderful work, that Nelson also had fully believed
that the enemy, if they left the Mediterranean, would proceed to
Ireland; and further, and yet more particularly, Collingwood's views
had been confirmed to him by the fact, as yet unknown to Nelson, that
the Rochefort squadron, which sailed at the time Villeneuve first
escaped in January, had since returned to Europe on the 26th of May.
"The flight to the West Indies," Collingwood said, in a letter dated
the day after the one just quoted, "was to take off our naval force,
which is the great impediment to their undertaking. The Rochefort
Squadron's return confirmed me." "I well know what your lordship's
disappointment is," he wrote, with generous sympathy; "and I share the
mortification of it. It would have been a happy day for England, could
you have met them; small as your force was, I trust it would have been
found enough. This summer is big with events. Sincerely I wish your
Lordship strength of body to go through--_and to all others, your
strength of mind_." Testy even to petulance as these two great seamen
were at times in small matters, when overwrought with their manifold
anxieties, they nowhere betray any egotistic concern as to the value
attached by others to their respective speculations, the uncertainties
of which none knew better than they, who had to act upon their
conclusions.

Meantime, at the very moment they were exchanging letters, pregnant
movements were taking place, unknown to either. The brig "Curieux,"
despatched to England by Nelson the night before he left Antigua, had
fallen in with the allied squadrons, nine hundred miles
north-northeast from Antigua, on the 19th of June--just a week after
she sailed. Keeping company with them long enough to ascertain their
course and approximate numbers, the captain then hastened on,
anchoring in Plymouth on the 7th of July. "I am sorry," wrote Nelson
when he heard of this meeting, "that Captain Bettesworth did not stand
back and try to find us out;" but grateful as the word would have been
to him, the captain was better advised to make for a fixed and certain
destination. At daylight of the 9th the news was in the hands of the
First Lord, who issued instant orders for the blockading squadrons off
Rochefort and Ferrol to unite, and to take post one hundred miles west
of Cape Finisterre. On the 19th of July Admiral Calder was in this
position, with fifteen ships-of-the-line, and received through Lisbon
the information of the French movements, which Nelson had forwarded
thither an exact month before. On the 20th Nelson's fleet anchored at
Gibraltar, and he went ashore, "for the first time since the 16th of
June, 1803." On the 22d Calder and Villeneuve met and fought. Two
Spanish ships-of-the-line were captured, but the battle was otherwise
indecisive. Calder hesitated to attack again, and on the 26th lost
sight of the enemy, who, on the 28th, put into Vigo Bay; whence, by a
lucky slant of wind, they reached Ferrol on the first of August with
fifteen ships, having left three in Vigo. Calder sent five of his
fleet to resume the blockade of Rochefort, and himself with nine
joined Cornwallis off Brest, raising the force there to twenty-six.
This junction was made August 14th. The next day appeared there the
indefatigable Nelson, with his unwearied and ever ready squadron of
eleven ships--veterans in the highest sense of the word, in
organization, practice, and endurance; alert, and solid as men of
iron.

This important and most opportune arrival came about as follows.
Anchoring on the 19th of July at Gibraltar, Nelson found everything
ready for the re-equipment of his ships, owing to his foresight in
directing it. All set to work at once to prepare for immediate
departure. When I have "completed the fleet to four months'
provisions, and with stores for Channel service," he wrote to the
Admiralty, "I shall get outside the Mediterranean, leaving a
sufficient force to watch Carthagena, and proceed as upon a due
consideration, (on reading Vice-Admiral Collingwood's orders, and
those which Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton may have received
during my absence,) may suggest to be most proper. Should I hear that
the enemy are gone to some of the ports in the Bay, I shall join the
squadron off Ferrol, or off Ushant, as I think the case requires."
There will be observed here the same striking combination of rapidity,
circumspection, and purpose prepared by reflection for instant action
in emergencies, that characterized him usually, and especially in
these four months of chase. "The squadron is in the most perfect
health," he continues, "except some symptoms of scurvy, which I hope
to eradicate by bullocks and refreshments from Tetuan, to which I will
proceed to-morrow." The getting fresh beef at Tetuan, it will be
remembered, had been stopped by a fair wind on the 5th of May. Since
then, and in fact since a month earlier, no opportunity of obtaining
fresh provisions had offered during his rapid movements. "The fleet
received not the smallest refreshment, not even a cup of water in the
West Indies," he told the Queen of Naples. The admiral himself got
only a few sheep, in the nine days' round.

Even now, the intention to go to Tetuan, advisable as the step was,
was contingent upon the opportunity offering of reaching a position
whence he could move with facility. Nelson did not mean to be
back-strapped again within the Mediterranean, with a west wind, and a
current setting to leeward, if the enemy turned up in the Atlantic.
"If the wind is westerly," he wrote on the early morning of the 22d,
"I shall go to Tetuan: if easterly, out of the straits." At half-past
nine that day the fleet weighed, and at half-past seven in the evening
anchored at Tetuan, whither orders had already gone to prepare
bullocks and fresh vegetables for delivery. At noon of the 23d the
ships again lifted their anchors, and started. "The fleet is
complete," he wrote the First Lord that day, "and the first easterly
wind, I shall pass the Straits." Fortune apparently had made up her
mind now to balk him no more. Thirty-six hours later, at 3.30 A.M. of
July 25th, being then off Tarifa, a little west of Gibraltar, the
sloop-of-war "Termagant," one of his own Mediterranean cruisers, came
alongside, and brought him a newspaper, received from Lisbon,
containing an account of the report carried to England by the
"Curieux." "I know it's true," he wrote to the Admiralty, "from my
words being repeated, therefore I shall not lose a moment, after I
have communicated with Admiral Collingwood, in getting to the
northward to either Ferrol, Ireland, or Ushant; as information or
circumstances may point out to be proper." In his haste to proceed,
and wishing to summon the "Amazon" frigate to rejoin him, he sent the
"Termagant" at once to Gibraltar, without understanding that she was
just from there and had on board his clothes left for washing; in
consequence of which precipitancy she "carried all my things, even to
my last shirt, back again." "As I fancied he came from Lisbon," he
explained, "I would not allow him to stop." "My dear Parker," he wrote
the frigate-captain, "make haste and join me. If all places fail you
will find me at Spithead." Parker, who was a favorite of the
admiral's, followed out the careful detailed instructions which
accompanied this note, but could not overtake the fleet, and from
incidents of the service never met Nelson again.

With a fresh easterly gale the squadron pressed again into the
Atlantic. As it went on for Cape St. Vincent, Collingwood's division
was seen some distance to leeward, but, as not infrequently happens in
and near the Mediterranean, the wind with it came from the opposite
quarter to that which Nelson had. The latter, therefore, would not
stop, nor lose a mile of the ground over which his fair breeze was
carrying him. "My dear Collingwood," he wrote, "We are in a fresh
Levanter. You have a westerly wind, therefore I must forego the
pleasure of taking you by the hand until October next, when, if I am
well enough, I shall (if the Admiralty please) resume the command. I
am very far from well; but I am anxious that not a moment of the
services of this fleet should be lost." Matters therefore were left
standing much as they were when he passed in a week before. He had
taken upon himself, however, with a discretion he could now assume
freely, to change the Admiralty's orders, issued during his absence,
withdrawing most of the small cruisers from about Malta, to reinforce
Collingwood's division. When he first learned of this step, he said it
was a mistake, for double the number he had left there were needed;
"but the orders of the Admiralty must be obeyed. I only hope officers
will not be blamed for the events which it is not difficult to foresee
will happen." With the crowd of enemy's privateers in those waters,
Malta, he was assured, would be cut off from all communication. He
soon made up his mind that he would use his own discretion and modify
the dispositions taken. "Malta cannot more than exist, and our troops
would be placed in a position of great distress," he told the
Admiralty. "I transmit a statement of the force I think necessary to
the eastward of Carthagena for performing the services intrusted to my
care, and when I get the lists I shall apportion them as far as their
number will allow, and my judgment will admit." "I hope the Board will
consider this as not wishing to alter any arrangement of theirs, but
as a measure absolutely necessary." Within his own field Nelson was
now, by proved professional genius, above the restraint of Boards; and
when he reached England the new First Lord had the wisdom to admit it,
in this supreme crisis, by giving him full control, within the
resources of the country, over the constitution of the fleet with
which he fought Trafalgar.

Letters left for Bickerton and Collingwood placed them in possession
of his ideas, including the revocation of the Admiralty's order; and,
in an official letter, he earnestly recommended the latter officer to
adhere to his arrangements. Word was also sent forward to Cornwallis,
and to the commander-in-chief at Cork, as well as to the Admiralty, to
notify them of his approach. To the northward of Cape St. Vincent he
met the northerly winds that prevail on the Portuguese coast. Delayed
by these, he was three full weeks making the passage from Gibraltar to
the Channel Fleet, which he joined at 3 P.M. of August 15th,
twenty-five miles west of Ushant. To this point his movements were
finally determined by a frigate, which was spoken on the 12th of
August, and informed him that up to three days before no intelligence
had been received of the enemy's arrival in the Bay of Biscay, or on
the Irish coast. Cornwallis excused him from the customary personal
visit, and authorized him to proceed at once to Portsmouth with the
"Victory," in pursuance of the Admiralty's leave which he so long had
had in his hands. On the morning of August 18th, the long and
fruitless chase of the allied fleet was brought to an end by the
dropping of the "Victory's" anchor at Spithead. To Davison Nelson
summed up his disappointment in the exasperated expression, "--n
General Brereton."[109]

From newspapers received off Ushant he first learned of Calder's
battle, and the public dissatisfaction with the results. He had
undergone too much frustration and anxiety himself not to feel for an
officer who had made a mistake, although it may safely be said that
Calder's mistake was not only one Nelson could not have made, but was
the exact opposite of the course which Nelson by anticipation had said
he would adopt. He expressed himself in words of generous sympathy. "I
was bewildered by the account of Sir Robert Calder's victory, and the
joy of the event; together with the hearing that _John Bull_ was not
content, which I am sorry for. Who can, my dear Freemantle, command
all the success which our Country may wish? We have fought together,
and therefore well know what it is. I have had the best disposed fleet
of friends, but who can say what will be the event of a battle? and it
most sincerely grieves me, that in any of the papers it should be
insinuated, that Lord Nelson could have done better. I should have
fought the enemy, so did my friend Calder; but who can say that he
will be more successful than another? I only wish to stand upon my own
merits, and not by comparison, one way or the other, upon the conduct
of a brother officer. You will forgive this dissertation, but I feel
upon the occasion." These words, which spoke the whole of his honest
heart, were the more generous, because he believed Calder to be one of
the few professional enemies that he had.

From the place where Villeneuve was met, Nelson reasoned, again, that
the primary intention of the allies, returning from the West Indies,
had been to enter the Straits. "By all accounts I am satisfied their
original destination was the Mediterranean, but they heard frequently
of our track." This persistence in his first view was partly due to
the confidence with which he held to his own convictions,--the defect
of a strong quality,--partly, doubtless, to the fact that Villeneuve
had blundered in his homeward course, and fetched unnecessarily to
leeward of his port, with reference to winds perfectly understood by
seamen of that day. In fact he had no business to be where he brought
up, except on the supposition that he was making for the Straits.

FOOTNOTES:

[83] At noon, January 20, "Mount Santo bore N.W., distant six
leagues."--"_Victory's" Log_. Cape Monte Santo is sixty miles north of the
southern extremity of Sardinia.

[84] On the east coast of Sicily.

[85] Bulkheads are the light partitions which divide cabins, offices, etc.
from the rest of the decks. For battle they are removed to allow freer
communication, and to lessen the risk of fire and splinters.

[86] An island twenty miles west of Sicily.

[87] Author's italics.

[88] March 9th.

[89] Author's italics.

[90] Apparently Gulf of Palmas.

[91] From England.

[92] Sir John Orde.

[93] Orde's squadron never exceeded six ships-of-the-line, while
Villeneuve's numbered eleven without the Spaniards. It will be seen further
on that Nelson blamed Orde for not keeping track of the enemy's movements,
and sending word to him at Gibraltar, and elsewhere, of the direction
taken. As far as the author's information goes, he agrees with this
censure. To fight eleven ships with six could only be justified by extreme
circumstances; but to lose sight of them in spring weather infers even
worse judgment than fighting would. It was of the first importance to learn
the destination of so large a body, considering that the interests of Great
Britain were threatened in directions so diverse as the Channel, the East
Indies, and the West Indies.

[94] Lord Radstock's son had been transferred before this from the
"Victory" to the "Hydra"; but his father did not yet know the fact, and
supposed him with Nelson.

[95] First Lord of the Admiralty, who had very lately succeeded Melville.

[96] An east wind.

[97] The signal flag for a vessel about to sail.

[98] Life of the Rev. A.J. Scott, p. 171.

[99] Ahead, but a little to one side.

[100] Phillimore's Last of Nelson's Captains.

[101] The "Northumberland" and the "Spartiate."

[102] The island immediately north of Martinique.

[103] "The Trench and Spaniards landed 1,000 sick when they arrived at
Martinico, and buried full that number during their stay." Nicolas, vol.
vi. p. 480.

[104] Author's italics.

[105] Author's italics.

[106] One of the easternmost of the Azores.

[107] The report of the American schooner, which saw the allied fleet, June
15th.

[108] Of Biscay.

[109] The extent of Brereton's fault (if at fault) depended, probably, upon
the character and responsibility of the man he had on lookout at so
critical a moment, and the care with which he tested the report made to
him. Brereton did not know of Nelson's arrival, possibly not of his
approach. At the same time men must take the blame of carelessness, when
harm comes of it. Ball, commenting to Nelson upon the incident, said: "I
think orders should be given, that when a fleet is discovered, an officer
should be sent for to witness it, and that one should be at the signal hill
at the rising and setting of the sun. I have often reflected on these
circumstances, and on the little attention generally paid them." As it
stands, the whole affair is a warning to officers, of what results may flow
from errors small in themselves.



CHAPTER XXI.

NELSON'S LAST STAY IN ENGLAND.

AUGUST 19--SEPTEMBER 15, 1805. AGE, 46.


The "Victory" was delayed in quarantine twenty-four hours, when orders
from London directed her release. At 9 P.M. of the 19th of August,
Nelson's flag was hauled down, and he left the ship for Merton, thus
ending an absence of two years and three months. His home being but an
hour's drive from the heart of London, the anxieties of the time, and
his own eagerness to communicate his views and experience, carried him
necessarily and at once to the public offices--to the Admiralty first,
but also to the Secretaries for Foreign Affairs and for War, both of
whom had occasion for the knowledge and suggestions of so competent
and practised an observer. The present head of the Admiralty, Lord
Barham, had succeeded to the office, unexpectedly, upon the sudden
retirement of Melville the previous May. He was a naval officer,
eighty years of age, who since middle life had exchanged the active
sea-going of the profession, for civil duties connected with it. He
had thus been out of touch with it on the military side; and although
Nelson was of course well known to him by reputation and achievement,
he had not that intimate personal experience of his character and
habit of thought, upon which was based the absolute confidence felt by
St. Vincent, and by all others who had seen the great warrior in
active service. "Lord Barham is an almost entire stranger to me,"
wrote Nelson; but after their interview he left with him the journals
in which were embodied the information obtained during his recent
command, with his comments upon the affairs of the Mediterranean in
particular, and, as incidental thereto, of Europe in general. Barham,
who gave proof of great military capacity during his short term of
office, was so much impressed by the sagacity and power of Nelson's
remarks, that he assured the Cabinet he ought by all means to go back
to the Mediterranean; and it may be assumed that the latter's wish so
to do would have been gratified, at the time of his own choosing, had
not other events interposed to carry him away earlier, and to end his
career.

It was upon one of these visits to Ministers that Nelson and
Wellington met for the only time in their lives. The latter had just
returned from a long service in India, reaching England in September,
1805. His account of the interview, transmitted to us by Croker, is as
follows:--

    WALMER, October 1st, 1834. We were talking of Lord Nelson, and
    some instances were mentioned of the egotism and vanity that
    derogated from his character. "Why," said the Duke, "I am not
    surprised at such instances, for Lord Nelson was, in different
    circumstances, two quite different men, as I myself can vouch,
    though I only saw him once in my life, and for, perhaps, an
    hour. It was soon after I returned from India. I went to the
    Colonial Office[110] in Downing Street, and there I was shown
    into the little waiting-room on the right hand, where I found,
    also waiting to see the Secretary of State, a gentleman, whom,
    from his likeness to his pictures and the loss of an arm, I
    immediately recognised as Lord Nelson. He could not know who I
    was, but he entered at once into conversation with me, if I can
    call it conversation, for it was almost all on his side and all
    about himself, and in, really, a style so vain and so silly as
    to surprise and almost disgust me. I suppose something that I
    happened to say may have made him guess that I was _somebody_,
    and he went out of the room for a moment, I have no doubt to ask
    the office-keeper who I was, for when he came back he was
    altogether a different man, both in manner and matter. All that
    I had thought a charlatan style had vanished, and he talked of
    the state of this country and of the aspect and probabilities of
    affairs on the Continent with a good sense, and a knowledge of
    subjects both at home and abroad, that surprised me equally and
    more agreeably than the first part of our interview had done; in
    fact, he talked like an officer and a statesman. The Secretary
    of State kept us long waiting, and certainly, for the last half
    or three quarters of an hour, I don't know that I ever had a
    conversation that interested me more. Now, if the Secretary of
    State had been punctual, and admitted Lord Nelson in the first
    quarter of an hour, I should have had the same impression of a
    light and trivial character that other people have had; but
    luckily I saw enough to be satisfied that he was really a very
    superior man; but certainly a more sudden and complete
    metamorphosis I never saw."[111]

This is not the only record that remains to us of those interesting
interviews with Cabinet Ministers, although the most have passed away
unnoted. It was in one of them that he uttered a military opinion, for
whose preservation we are indebted to his own mention of it in a
private letter; an opinion so characteristic of his habits of thought,
his reasoned motives of action, that, although it has before been
quoted, it is fitting to repeat it in his own words and in full.

When he reached England, the naval situation, as far as then known,
was that Napoleon had twenty-one French ships-of-the-line in Brest,
and twenty-eight or nine, French and Spanish, in Ferrol; while
Cornwallis had thirty-five British off Brest. This was the condition
on the 15th of August, when Nelson parted from the fleet off Ushant.
Very soon after his arrival in town, news was received that Villeneuve
had gone to sea from Ferrol, and that Cornwallis, when informed of the
fact, had divided his fleet, with great lack of judgment, keeping
himself seventeen ships to confront the Brest squadron, while eighteen
were sent to look for Villeneuve under the command of Admiral Calder.
In the public discontent with the latter, it was not reassuring to
know that, at a moment when every one's nerves were on the rack, he
was again intrusted with the always difficult task of coping with a
much superior force. While this state of excitement prevailed, Nelson
called upon the Secretary of State, Lord Castlereagh, on the 23d of
August. "Yesterday," he wrote to Captain Keats, "the Secretary of
State, which is a man who has only sat one solitary day in his office,
and of course knows but little of what is passed, and indeed the
Minister,[112] were all full of the enemy's fleet, and as I am now set
up for a _Conjuror_, and God knows they will very soon find out I am
far from being one, I was asked my opinion, against my inclination,
for if I make one wrong guess the charm will be broken; but this I
ventured without any fear, that if Calder got close alongside their
twenty-seven or twenty-eight sail, that by the time the enemy had beat
our fleet soundly, they would do us no harm this year."

This acute perception of the reason why it was at times desirable and
proper to hurl a smaller though more efficient force against superior
numbers, content that the latter, as a factor, were for the campaign
annihilated,--this realization of the possible fruitfulness of a
defeat, or rather, of a battle wisely lost, as contrasted with what
Jomini calls the sterile glory of fighting battles merely to win
them,--is one of the most marked and decisive features of Nelson's
genius as a general officer. It recurs over and over again, and at all
periods, in his correspondence, this clear and full appreciation of
the relation of the parts to the whole.[113] It underlay his sustained
purpose during the long pursuit of the preceding months, that, if he
found the allied squadron, "they would not part without a battle."
Whatever else the result, that particular division would do no harm
that year, and with it necessarily fell the great combination,
whatever that might be, of which it was an essential factor. "The
event would have been in the hands of Providence," he wrote to Barham;
"but we may without, I hope, vanity, believe that the enemy would have
been fit for no active service after such a battle." There is wanting
to the completeness of this admirable impulse only the steadying
resolve that he would bide his time, so as, to use Napoleon's phrase,
to have the most of the chances on his side when he attacked. This
also we know he meant to do. "I will _wait_, till they give me an
opportunity too tempting to be resisted, or till they draw near the
shores of Europe." In such qualification is to be seen the equipoise
of the highest order of ability. This union of desperate energy with
calculating wariness was in him not so much a matter of reasoning,
though reason fully endorses it, as it was the gift of
nature,--genius, in short. Reasoning of a very high order illuminates
Nelson's mental processes and justifies his conclusions, but it is not
in the power of reason, when face to face with emergency, to bridge
the chasm that separates perception, however clear, from the inward
conviction which alone sustains the loftiest action. "Responsibility,"
said St. Vincent, "is the test of a man's courage." Emergency, it may
be said, is the test of his faith in his beliefs.

While those at the head of the State thus hung upon his counsels, and
drew encouragement from his indomitable confidence, the people in the
streets looked up to him with that wistful and reverent dependence
which does not wholly understand, but centres all its trust upon a
tried name. They knew what he had done in the now distant past, and
they had heard lately that he had been to the West Indies, and had
returned, having saved the chief jewel among the colonies of the
empire. They knew, also, that their rulers were fearful about
invasion, and that in some undefined way Nelson had stood, and would
yet stand, between them and harm. The rapidity of his movements left
little interval between the news of his being back at Gibraltar and
the announcement of his arrival at Portsmouth, which was not generally
expected. On the 19th of August, a day after the "Victory" anchored at
Spithead, Lord Radstock wrote: "'T is extraordinary no official
accounts have been received from Lord Nelson since the 27th of July.
He then hinted that he might perhaps go to Ireland; nevertheless, we
have had no tidings of him on that coast. I confess I begin to be
fearful that he has worried his mind up to that pitch, that he cannot
bear the idea of showing himself again to the world, until he shall
have struck some blow, and that it is this hope that is now making him
run about, half-frantic, in quest of adventures. That such
unparalleled perseverance and true valor should thus evaporate in air
is truly melancholy."

If any doubt of the approval of his countrymen mingled with the
distress Nelson unquestionably felt at having missed the enemy, he was
touchingly undeceived. As soon as the "Victory" and his flag were made
out, the people flocked to Portsmouth, collecting on the ramparts of
the town and other points of view, in inaudible testimony of welcome.
As the barge pulled to the shore, and upon landing, he was greeted
with loud and long-continued cheering. In London the same
demonstrations continued whenever he was recognized in public. "Lord
Nelson arrived a few days ago," wrote Radstock. "He was received in
town almost as a conqueror, and was followed round by the people with
huzzas. So much for a great and good name most nobly and deservedly
acquired." "I met Nelson in a mob in Piccadilly," wrote Minto at the
same time, "and got hold of his arm, so that I was mobbed too. It is
really quite affecting to see the wonder and admiration, and love and
respect of the whole world; and the genuine expression of all these
sentiments at once, from gentle and simple, the moment he is seen. It
is beyond anything represented in a play or in a poem of fame." In
these few days was concentrated the outward reward of a life spent in
the service of his country. During them, Nelson was conspicuously the
first man in England,--first alike in the love of the people and in
importance to the State.

On the private side, also, his life for this brief respite was
eminently happy, marred only by the prospect of a speedy departure,
the signal for which sounded even sooner than was expected. By his own
account, he was only four times in London, and all the moments that
could be spared from external calls he spent at Merton, where there
gathered a large family party, including all his surviving brothers
and sisters, with several of their children. "I cannot move at
present," he writes on the 31st of August, in declining an invitation,
"as all my family are with me, and my stay is very uncertain; and,
besides, I have refused for the present all invitations." "I went to
Merton on Saturday" (August 24th), wrote Minto, "and found Nelson just
sitting down to dinner, surrounded by a family party, of his brother
the Dean, Mrs. Nelson, their children, and the children of a sister.
Lady Hamilton at the head of the table, and Mother Cadogan[114] at the
bottom. I had a hearty welcome. He looks remarkably well and full of
spirits. His conversation is a cordial in these low times. Lady
Hamilton has improved and added to the house and the place extremely
well, without his knowing she was about it. He found it already done.
She is a clever being, after all: the passion is as hot as ever."

Over all hung, unseen, the sword of Damocles. Nelson himself seems to
have been possessed already by vague premonitions of the coming end,
which deepened and darkened around him as he went forward to his fate.
The story told of his saying to the upholsterer, who had in charge the
coffin made from the mast of the "Orient," that a certificate of its
identity should be engraved on the lid, because he thought it highly
probable that he might want it on his return, is, indeed, but a
commonplace, light-hearted remark, which derives what significance it
has purely from the event; but it is easy to recognize in his writings
the recurrent, though intermittent, strain of unusual foreboding. Life
then held much for him; and it is when richest that the possibility of
approaching loss possesses the consciousness with the sense of
probability. Upon a soul of his heroic temper, however, such
presentiments, though they might solemnize and consecrate the passing
moments, had no power to appall, nor to convert cheerfulness into
gloom. The light that led him never burned more brightly, nor did he
ever follow with more unfaltering step.

Fixed in his mind to return to his command in October, he soon felt
that, in the uncertainties of the French movements, a call might come
at any moment. Although he nowhere says so, his mind was doubtless
made up that, if Villeneuve's twenty-nine sail went to, or near, the
Mediterranean, he would go out at once. "Every ship," he writes on the
31st of August, "even the Victory, is ordered out, for there is an
entire ignorance whether the Ferrol fleet is coming to the northward,
gone to the Mediterranean, or cruizing for our valuable homeward-bound
fleet." "Mr. Pitt," he tells a friend as early as the 29th, "is
pleased to think that my services may be wanted. I hope Calder's
victory (which I am most anxiously expecting) will render my going
forth unnecessary." "I hold myself ready," he writes again on the 3d
of September, "to go forth whenever I am desired, although God knows
I want rest; but self is entirely out of the question."[115]

It was not, therefore, to a mind or will unprepared that the sudden
intimation came on the 2d of September--just a fortnight after he left
the "Victory." That morning there arrived in town Captain Blackwood of
the frigate "Euryalus," which had been despatched by Collingwood to
notify the Admiralty that the missing Villeneuve had turned up with
his squadron at Cadiz, on the 20th of August. Blackwood was an old
friend and follower. It was he who had commanded the "Penelope" in
March, 1800, and more than any one present had insured the capture of
the "Guillaume Tell," when she ran out from Malta,[116]--the greatest
service, probably, rendered to Nelson's reputation by any man who ever
sailed under his orders. He stopped first at Merton at five o'clock in
the morning, and found Nelson already up and dressed. The latter said
at once, "I am sure you bring me news of the French and Spanish
fleets, and I think I shall yet have to beat them." Later in the day
he called at the Admiralty, and there saw Blackwood again. In the
course of conversation, which turned chiefly upon future operations in
the Mediterranean, he frequently repeated, "Depend on it, Blackwood, I
shall yet give Mr. Villeneuve a drubbing," an expression whose wording
evinces animation and resolve,--far removed from the troubled
indecision from which, by her own account, Lady Hamilton freed him.

It was speedily determined by the Government that the combined fleets
in Cadiz should be held there, or forced to fight if they left; the
country had passed through a fortnight of too great anxiety, to risk
any chance of its repetition by a renewed evasion. Ignorant of the
reasons which dictated Villeneuve's course, and that it was not
accordant but contrary to his orders, it was natural to suppose that
there was some further object indicated by the position now taken, and
that that object was the Mediterranean. Moreover, so large a body of
commissioned ships--nearly forty--as were now assembled, could not
fail to tax severely the resources of a port like Cadiz, and distress
would tend to drive them out soon. Thirty thousand able-bodied men are
a heavy additional load on the markets of a small city, blockaded by
sea, and with primitive communications by land. Upon this rested
Nelson's principal hope of obliging them to come forth, if Napoleon
himself did not compel them. Their position, he wrote the Secretary
for War soon after he joined the fleet, seemed to favor an attack by
rockets; "but I think we have a better chance of forcing them out by
want of provisions: it is said hunger will break through stone
walls,--ours is only a wall of wood." "It is said that there is a
great scarcity of provisions in Cadiz." He then mentioned that the
allies were endeavoring to meet this difficulty by sending neutral
vessels, loaded with food-stuffs, from French ports to all the small
harbors on either side of Cadiz, whence the stores carried by them
could be transferred by coasting-boats,--a process which ships were
powerless to stop. Collingwood, therefore, had seized the neutrals,
and sent them into Gibraltar, a step which Nelson had approved and
continued. For it he then demanded the authority of his government.
"Should it be thought proper to allow the enemy's fleet to be
victualled, I request that I may be informed as soon as possible."

In connection with this subject Nelson made an allusion to a policy
with which Castlereagh, the minister he was addressing, was afterwards
identified,--that of the celebrated Orders in Council of 1807, and the
license system connected with it. This is one of the few intimations
we have of the wide range of subjects upon which he conversed with
members of the Cabinet while in England; and it is interesting, not
only as showing how far back those measures originated, but also as
illustrating his own prophetic intuition of the construction which
would be placed upon such proceedings. "I can have nothing, as an
Admiral, to say upon the propriety of granting licences; but from what
your Lordship told me of the intention of Ministers respecting the
neutral trade, it strikes me, some day it may be urged that it was not
for the sake of blockade, but for the purpose of taking all the trade
into her own hands, that Great Britain excluded the Neutrals. Your
Lordship's wisdom will readily conceive all that Neutral Courts may
urge at this apparent injustice, and of might overcoming right."[117]
This shrewdly accurate forecast of a contention which was not to arise
till after his death is but one instance among many of Nelson's
clearness of judgment, in political as well as in military matters.

Nelson's services, upon this, his final departure from England, were
rather requested by the Government than by him volunteered--in the
ordinary sense of the word. He went willingly enough, doubtless, but
in obedience, proud and glad, to the summons, not only of the popular
cry, but of the Cabinet's wish. "I own I want much more rest," he
wrote to Elliot, immediately after joining the fleet off Cadiz; "but
it was thought right to desire me to come forth, and I obeyed." "I
expected to lay my weary bones quiet for the winter," he told another
friend in Naples, "but I ought, perhaps, to be proud of the general
call which has made me to go forth." The popularly received account,
therefore, derived from Lady Hamilton, of her controlling influence in
the matter, may be dismissed as being--if not apocryphal--merely one
side of the dealing by which he had to reconcile the claims of
patriotic duty with the appeals of the affections. As told by
Southey, her part in his decision was as follows: "When Blackwood had
left him, he wanted resolution to declare his wishes to Lady Hamilton
and his sisters, and endeavoured to drive away the thought. He had
done enough, he said: 'Let the man trudge it who has lost his budget!'
His countenance belied his lips; and as he was pacing one of the walks
in the garden, which he used to call the quarter-deck, Lady Hamilton
came up to him, and said she saw he was uneasy. He smiled, and said:
'No, he was as happy as possible; he was surrounded by his family, his
health was better since he had been on shore, and he would not give
sixpence to call the king his uncle.' She replied, that she did not
believe him, that she knew he was longing to get at the combined
fleets, that he considered them as his own property, that he would be
miserable if any man but himself did the business, and that he ought
to have them, as the price and reward of his two years' long watching,
and his hard chase. 'Nelson,' said she, 'however we may lament your
absence, offer your services; they will be accepted, and you will gain
a quiet heart by it; you will have a glorious victory, and then you
may return here, and be happy.' He looked at her with tears in his
eyes: 'Brave Emma! Good Emma! If there were more Emmas, there would be
more Nelsons.' His services were as willingly accepted as they were
offered."

The fidelity with which Nelson destroyed Lady Hamilton's letters
prevents our knowing just what was her attitude towards his
aspirations for glory, and her acquiescence in his perils, in view of
the entire dependence of her future upon his life; a dependence such
as an honored wife could by no means feel, for the widow of Nelson
could rely safely upon the love of the nation. Certain it is that his
letters to her contain enough appeals to the sense she should have of
his honor, to show that he stood in need of no strengthening at her
hands; and it seems legible enough, between the lines, that he had
rather to resist the pull of her weakness, or her interest, than to
look for encouragement in the path of hardship and self-denial. It is
certain, too, that some days before Blackwood arrived, Nelson
understood that he might be wanted soon, and avowed his entire
willingness to go, while not affecting to conceal his hope that
circumstances might permit him to remain until October, the time he
had fixed to Collingwood for his return. Whatever the inside history,
the matter was quickly settled. On September 3d, the day after
Blackwood's arrival, he writes to Rose: "I shall rejoice to see you on
board the Victory, if only for a moment; but I shall certainly not be
an advocate for being at Portsmouth till one of the Victory's anchors
are at the bows."[118] The next day, the 4th, Lord Minto writes: "Lord
Nelson has been here to-day. He is going to resume the command of the
Mediterranean as soon as the Victory is ready, which will be within a
week." On the 5th he himself tells a friend, "_All my things_ are this
day going off for Portsmouth."

The ten days that followed were for him, necessarily, very busy; but
mental preoccupation--definiteness of object--was always beneficial to
him. Even the harassing run to and from the West Indies had done him
good. "I am but so-so," he had written to his brother upon arrival;
"yet, what is very odd, the better for going to the West Indies, even
with the anxiety." To this had succeeded the delightful fortnight at
home, and now the animation and stir of expected active service. Minto
had already noted his exhilaration amid the general public gloom, and
after his death, speaking of these last days, said, "He was remarkably
well and fresh, and full of hope and spirit." The care of providing
him with adequate force he threw off upon the Admiralty. There was, of
course, a consultation between him and it as to the numbers and kind
of vessels he thought necessary, but his estimate was accepted
without question, and the ships were promised, as far as the resources
went. When Lord Barham asked him to select his own officers, he is
said to have replied, "Choose yourself, my lord, the same spirit
actuates the whole profession; you cannot choose wrong." He did,
nevertheless, indicate his wishes in individual cases; and the
expression, though characteristic enough of his proud confidence in
the officers of the navy, must be taken rather as a resolve not to be
burdened with invidious distinctions, than as an unqualified assertion
of fact.

Nelson, however, gave one general admonition to the Cabinet which is
worthy to be borne in mind, as a broad principle of unvarying
application, more valuable than much labored detail. What is wanted,
he said, is the annihilation of the enemy--"Only numbers can
annihilate."[119] It is brilliant and inspiring, indeed, to see skill
and heroism bearing up against enormous odds, and even wrenching
victory therefrom; but it is the business of governments to insure
that such skill and heroism be more profitably employed, in utterly
destroying, with superior forces, the power of the foe, and so
compelling peace. No general has won more striking successes over
superior numbers than did Napoleon; no ruler has been more careful to
see that adequate superiority for his own forces was provided from
the beginning. Nelson believed that he had fully impressed the Prime
Minister that what was needed now, after two and a half years of
colorless war, was not a brilliant victory for the British Navy, but a
crushing defeat for the foe. "I hope my absence will not be long," he
wrote to Davison, "and that I shall soon meet the combined fleets with
a force sufficient to do the job well: for half a victory would but
half content me. But I do not believe the Admiralty can give me a
force within fifteen or sixteen sail-of-the-line of the enemy; and
therefore, if every ship took her opponent, we should have to contend
with a fresh fleet of fifteen or sixteen sail-of-the-line. But I will
do my best; and I hope God Almighty will go with me. I have much to
lose, but little to gain; and I go because it's right, and I will
serve the Country faithfully." He doubtless did not know then that
Calder, finding Villeneuve had gone to Cadiz, had taken thither the
eighteen ships detached with him from the Brest blockade, and that
Bickerton had also joined from within the Mediterranean, so that
Collingwood, at the moment he was writing, had with him twenty-six of
the line. His anticipation, however, was substantially correct.
Despite every effort, the Admiralty up to a fortnight before Trafalgar
had not given him the number of ships he thought necessary, to insure
certain watching, and crushing defeat. He was particularly short of
the smaller cruisers wanted.

On the 12th of September Minto took his leave of him. "I went
yesterday to Merton," he wrote on the 13th, "in a great hurry, as Lord
Nelson said he was to be at home all day, and he dines at half-past
three. But I found he had been sent for to Carleton House, and he and
Lady Hamilton did not return till half-past five." The Prince of Wales
had sent an urgent command that he particularly wished to see him
before he left England. "I stayed till ten at night," continues Minto,
"and I took a final leave of him. He goes to Portsmouth to-night.
Lady Hamilton was in tears all day yesterday, could not eat, and
hardly drink, and near swooning, and all at table. It is a strange
picture. She tells me nothing can be more pure and ardent than this
flame." Lady Hamilton may have had the self-control of an actress, but
clearly not the reticence of a well-bred woman.

On the following night Nelson left home finally. His last act before
leaving the house, it is said, was to visit the bed where his child,
then between four and five, was sleeping, and pray over her. The
solemn anticipation of death, which from this time forward deepened
more and more over his fearless spirit, as the hour of battle
approached, is apparent in the record of his departure made in his
private diary:--

    Friday Night, September 13th.

    At half-past ten drove from dear dear Merton, where I left all
    which I hold dear in this world, to go to serve my King and
    Country. May the great God whom I adore enable me to fulfil the
    expectations of my Country; and if it is His good pleasure that
    I should return, my thanks will never cease being offered up to
    the Throne of His Mercy. If it is His good Providence to cut
    short my days upon earth, I bow with the greatest submission,
    relying that He will protect those so dear to me, that I may
    leave behind. His will be done: Amen, Amen, Amen.

At six o'clock on the morning of the 14th Nelson arrived at
Portsmouth. At half-past eleven his flag was again hoisted on board
the "Victory," and at 2 P.M. he embarked. His youngest and favorite
sister, Mrs. Matcham, with her husband, had gone to Portsmouth to see
him off. As they were parting, he said to her: "Oh, Katty! that
gypsy;" referring to his fortune told by a gypsy in the West Indies
many years before, that he should arrive at the head of his profession
by the time he was forty. "What then?" he had asked at the moment; but
she replied, "I can tell you no more; the book is closed."[120] The
Battle of the Nile, preceding closely the completion of his fortieth
year, not unnaturally recalled the prediction to mind, where the
singularity of the coincidence left it impressed; and now, standing as
he did on the brink of great events, with half-acknowledged foreboding
weighing on his heart, he well may have yearned to know what lay
beyond that silence, within the closed covers of the book of fate.

FOOTNOTES:

[110] In a letter to the Earl of Mornington, dated December 21st, 1805,
Wellington, then Wellesley, said, "I arrived in England about September
10th." The margin of time for meeting Nelson, who left Merton on the 13th,
was therefore small, and fixes very closely the date of this interesting
interview. The Colonial and War Offices seem then to have been under one
head.

[111] Correspondence and Diaries of John Wilson Croker, vol. ii. p. 233.

[112] The Prime Minister Pitt.

[113] Compare for example, _ante_, vol. i. p. 421.

[114] Lady Hamilton's mother.

[115] Nelson to Right Hon. George Rose, August 29 and September 3, 1805:
Nicolas, vol. vii. pp. 18, 19, 29.

[116] _Ante_, p. 31.

[117] This is the earliest intimation that has come under the author's eye
of the formulation (as distinguished from the development) of the groups of
Orders in Council of 1807, bearing upon the Neutral Trade, which were
issued and carried out by a Ministry other than the one which Nelson knew.
The measure was clearly under consideration before Trafalgar.

[118] That is, the ship ready to sail in half an hour, one of the two
anchors which moor a ship being lifted.

[119] The author wishes to guard himself from seeming to share the
perversion, as he thinks it, of this saying, into an argument against heavy
ships, because the heavier the ships, the smaller the number. Without here
expressing any opinion upon this controverted subject, he would simply
quote on the other side the view attributed to Nelson during the chase to
the West Indies. "He knew that the French had no three-decked ships in
their fleet, and he reckoned on the great superiority in close action of
three batteries of guns over two." (Last of Nelson's Captains, p. 137.)
With this may be joined a quotation from himself involving implicitly the
same idea: "Two [two-deckers] alongside an enemy are better than
three-deckers _a great way off_." This evidently suggests the idea that one
three-decker was better than two seventy-fours, conditions being similar.
In truth, numbers should be read "numbers of guns"--or, better still,
"numbers, other things being equal."

[120] The author has to thank the present Earl Nelson for this anecdote.



CHAPTER XXII.

THE ANTECEDENTS OF TRAFALGAR.

SEPTEMBER 15--OCTOBER 19, 1805. AGE, 47.


The crowds that had assembled to greet Nelson's arrival at Portsmouth,
four weeks before, now clustered again around his footsteps to bid him
a loving farewell. Although, to avoid such demonstrations, he had
chosen for his embarkation another than the usual landing-place, the
multitude collected and followed him to the boat. "They pressed
forward to obtain sight of his face," says Southey; "Many were in
tears, and many knelt down before him, and blessed him as he passed.
England has had many heroes, but never one," he justly adds, "who so
entirely possessed the love of his fellow countrymen as Nelson." There
attached to him not only the memory of many brilliant deeds, nor yet
only the knowledge that more than any other he stood between them and
harm,--his very name a tower of strength over against their enemies.
The deep human sympathy which won its way to the affections of those
under his command, in immediate contact with his person, seamen as
well as officers, had spread from them with quick contagion throughout
all ranks of men; and heart answered to heart in profound trust, among
those who never had seen his face. "I had their huzzas before," he
said to Captain Hardy, who sat beside him in the boat. "Now I have
their hearts."

He was accompanied to the ship by Mr. Canning and Mr. Rose, intimate
associates of Mr. Pitt, and they remained on board to dine. Nelson
noted that just twenty-five days had been passed ashore, "from dinner
to dinner." The next morning, Sunday, September 15th, at 8 A.M., the
"Victory" got under way and left St. Helen's, where she had been lying
at single anchor, waiting to start. Three other line-of-battle ships
belonging to his fleet, and which followed him in time for Trafalgar,
were then at Spithead, but not yet ready. The "Victory" therefore
sailed without them, accompanied only by Blackwood's frigate, the
"Euryalus." The wind outside, being west-southwest, was dead foul, and
it was not till the 17th that the ship was off Plymouth. There it fell
nearly calm, and she was joined by two seventy-fours from the harbor.
The little squadron continued its course, the wind still ahead, until
the 20th of the month, when it had not yet gained a hundred miles
southwest from Scilly. Here Nelson met his former long-tried second in
the Mediterranean, Sir Richard Bickerton, going home ill; having
endured the protracted drudgery off Toulon only to lose, by a hair's
breadth, his share in the approaching triumph.

On the 25th the "Victory" was off Lisbon. "We have had only one day's
real fair wind," wrote Nelson to Lady Hamilton, "but by perseverance
we have done much." The admiral sent in letters to the British consul
and naval officers, urging them to secure as many men as possible for
the fleet, but enjoining profound secrecy about his coming, conscious
that his presence would be a deterrent to the enemy and might prevent
the attempt to leave Cadiz, upon which he based his hopes of a speedy
issue, and a speedy return home for needed repose. His departure from
England, indeed, could not remain long unknown in Paris; but
communications by land were slow in those times, and a few days'
ignorance of his arrival, and of the reinforcement he brought, might
induce Villeneuve to dare the hazard which he otherwise might fear.
"Day by day," he wrote to Davison, "I am expecting the allied fleet to
put to sea--every day, hour, and moment." "I am convinced," he tells
Blackwood, who took charge of the inshore lookout, "that you estimate,
as I do, the importance of not letting these rogues escape us without
a fair fight, which I pant for by day, and dream of by night." For the
same reasons of secrecy he sent a frigate ahead to Collingwood, with
orders that, when the "Victory" appeared, not only should no salutes
be fired, but no colors should be shown, if in sight of the port. The
like precautions were continued when any new ship joined. Every care
was taken to lull the enemy into confidence, and to lure him out of
port.

At 6 P.M. of Saturday, September 28th, the "Victory" reached the
fleet, then numbering twenty-nine of the line; the main body being
fifteen to twenty miles west of Cadiz, with six ships close in with
the port. The next day was Nelson's birthday--forty-seven years old.
The junior admirals and the captains visited the commander-in chief,
as customary, but with demonstrations of gladness and confidence that
few leaders have elicited in equal measure from their followers. "The
reception I met with on joining the fleet caused the sweetest
sensation of my life. The officers who came on board to welcome my
return, forgot my rank as commander-in-chief in the enthusiasm with
which they greeted me. As soon as these emotions were past, I laid
before them the plan I had previously arranged for attacking the
enemy; and it was not only my pleasure to find it generally approved,
but clearly perceived and understood." To Lady Hamilton he gave an
account of this scene which differs little from the above, except in
its greater vividness. "I believe my arrival was most welcome, not
only to the Commander of the fleet, but also to every individual in
it; and, when I came to explain to them the '_Nelson touch_,' it was
like an electric shock. Some shed tears, all approved--'It was
new--it was singular--it was simple!' and, from admirals downwards,
it was repeated--'It must succeed, if ever they will allow us to get
at them! You are, my Lord, surrounded by friends whom you inspire with
confidence.' Some may be Judas's: but the majority are certainly much
pleased with my commanding them." No more joyful birthday levee was
ever held than that of this little naval court. Besides the adoration
for Nelson personally, which they shared with their countrymen in
general, there mingled with the delight of the captains the sentiment
of professional appreciation and confidence, and a certain relief,
noticed by Codrington, from the dry, unsympathetic rule of
Collingwood, a man just, conscientious, highly trained, and efficient,
but self-centred, rigid, uncommunicative; one who fostered, if he did
not impose, restrictions upon the intercourse between the ships,
against which he had inveighed bitterly when himself one of St.
Vincent's captains. Nelson, on the contrary, at once invited cordial
social relations with the commanding officers. Half of the thirty-odd
were summoned to dine on board the flagship the first day, and half
the second. Not till the third did he permit himself the luxury of a
quiet dinner chat with his old chum, the second in command, whose
sterling merits, under a crusty exterior, he knew and appreciated.
Codrington mentions also an incident, trivial in itself, but
illustrative of that outward graciousness of manner, which, in a man
of Nelson's temperament and position, is rarely the result of careful
cultivation, but bespeaks rather the inner graciousness of the heart
that he abundantly possessed. They had never met before, and the
admiral, greeting him with his usual easy courtesy, handed him a
letter from his wife, saying that being intrusted with it by a lady,
he made a point of delivering it himself, instead of sending it by
another.

The "Nelson touch," or Plan of Attack, expounded to his captains at
the first meeting, was afterwards formulated in an Order, copies of
which were issued to the fleet on the 9th of October. In this
"Memorandum," which was doubtless sufficient for those who had
listened to the vivid oral explanation of its framer, the writer finds
the simplicity, but not the absolute clearness, that they recognized.
It embodies, however, the essential ideas, though not the precise
method of execution, actually followed at Trafalgar, under conditions
considerably different from those which Nelson probably anticipated;
and it is not the least of its merits as a military conception that it
could thus, with few signals and without confusion, adapt itself at a
moment's notice to diverse circumstances. This great order not only
reflects the ripened experience of its author, but contains also the
proof of constant mental activity and development in his thought; for
it differs materially in detail from the one issued a few months
before to the fleet, when in pursuit of Villeneuve to the West Indies.
As the final, and in the main consecutive, illustrations of his
military views, the two are presented here together.

    PLAN OF ATTACK.[121]

    The business of an English Commander-in-Chief being first to
    bring an Enemy's Fleet to Battle, on the most advantageous terms
    to himself, (I mean that of laying his Ships close on board the
    Enemy, as expeditiously as possible;) and secondly, to continue
    them there, without separating, until the business is decided; I
    am sensible beyond this object it is not necessary that I should
    say a word, being fully assured that the Admirals and Captains
    of the Fleet I have the honour to command, will, knowing my
    precise object, that of a close and decisive Battle, supply any
    deficiency in my not making signals; which may, if extended
    beyond these objects, either be misunderstood, or, if waited
    for, very probably, from various causes, be impossible for the
    Commander-in-Chief to make: therefore, it will only be requisite
    for me to state, in as few words as possible, the various modes
    in which it may be necessary for me to obtain my object, on
    which depends, not only the honour and glory of our Country, but
    possibly its safety, and with it that of all Europe, from French
    tyranny and oppression.

    If the two Fleets are both willing to fight, but little
    manoeuvring is necessary; the less the better;--a day is soon
    lost in that business: therefore I will only suppose that the
    Enemy's Fleet being to leeward, standing close upon a wind on
    the starboard tack, and that I am nearly ahead of them, standing
    on the larboard tack, of course I should weather them. The
    weather must be supposed to be moderate; for if it be a gale of
    wind, the manoeuvring of both Fleets is but of little avail, and
    probably no decisive Action would take place with the whole
    Fleet. Two modes present themselves: one to stand on, just out
    of gunshot, until the Van-Ship of my Line would be about the
    centre Ship of the Enemy, then make the signal to wear together,
    then bear up, engage with all our force the six or five
    Van-Ships of the Enemy, passing, certainly, if opportunity
    offered, through their Line. This would prevent their bearing
    up, and the Action, from the known bravery and conduct of the
    Admirals and Captains, would certainly be decisive: the second
    or third Rear-Ships of the Enemy would act as they please, and
    our Ships would give a good account of them, should they persist
    in mixing with our Ships. The other mode would be, to stand
    under an easy but commanding sail, directly for their headmost
    Ship, so as to prevent the Enemy from knowing whether I should
    pass to leeward or windward of him. In that situation, I would
    make the signal to engage the Enemy to leeward, and to cut
    through their Fleet about the sixth Ship from the Van, passing
    very close; they being on a wind, and you going large, could cut
    their Line when you please. The Van-Ships of the Enemy would, by
    the time our Rear came abreast of the Van-Ship, be severely cut
    up, and our Van could not expect to escape damage. I would then
    have our _Rear_ Ship, and every Ship in succession, wear,
    continue the Action with either the Van-Ship, or second Ship, as
    it might appear most eligible from her crippled state; and this
    mode pursued, I see nothing to prevent the capture of the five
    or six Ships of the Enemy's Van. The two or three Ships of the
    Enemy's Rear[122] must either bear up, or wear; and, in either
    case, although they would be in a better plight probably than
    our two Van-Ships (now in the Rear) yet they would be separated,
    and at a distance to leeward, so as to give our Ships time to
    refit; and by that time, I believe, the Battle would, from the
    judgment of the Admiral and Captains, be over with the rest of
    them. Signals from these moments are useless, when every man is
    disposed to do his duty. The great object is for us to support
    each other, and to keep close to the Enemy, and to leeward of
    him.

    If the Enemy are running away, then the only signals necessary
    will be, to engage the Enemy as arriving up with them; and the
    other ships to pass on for the second, third, &c., giving, if
    possible, a close fire into the Enemy in passing, taking care to
    give our Ships engaged notice of your intention.


    MEMORANDUM.

    (Secret)

    Victory, off CADIZ, 9th October, 1805.

    [Sidenote: General Considerations.] Thinking it almost
    impossible to bring a Fleet of forty Sail of the Line into a
    Line of Battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other
    circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that
    the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the Enemy to
    Battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive, I have
    therefore made up my mind to keep the Fleet in that position of
    sailing (with the exception of the First and Second in Command)
    that the Order of Sailing is to be the Order of Battle, placing
    the Fleet in two Lines of sixteen Ships each, with an Advanced
    Squadron of eight of the fastest sailing Two-decked Ships, which
    will always make, if wanted, a Line of twenty-four Sail, on
    whichever Line the Commander-in-Chief may direct.

    [Sidenote: Powers of Second in Command.] The Second in Command
    will, after my intentions are made known to him, have the entire
    direction of his Line to make the attack upon the Enemy, and to
    follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.

    [Sidenote: The Attack from to Leeward.] If the Enemy's Fleet
    should be seen to windward in Line of Battle, and that the two
    Lines and the Advanced Squadron can fetch them, they will
    probably be so extended that their Van could not succour their
    Rear.

    I should therefore probably make the Second in Command's signal
    to lead through, about their twelfth Ship from their Rear, (or
    wherever he could fetch, if not able to get so far advanced); my
    Line would lead through about their Centre, and the Advanced
    Squadron to cut two or three or four Ships a-head of their
    Centre, so as to ensure getting at their Commander-in-Chief, on
    whom every effort must be made to capture.

    [Sidenote: The General Controlling Idea, under all Conditions.]
    The whole impression of the British Fleet must be to overpower
    from two or three Ships a-head of their Commander-in-Chief
    supposed to be in the Centre, to the Rear of their Fleet. I will
    suppose twenty Sail of the Enemy's Line to be untouched, it must
    be some time before they could perform a manoeuvre to bring
    their force compact to attack any part of the British Fleet
    engaged, or to succour their own Ships, which indeed would be
    impossible without mixing with the Ships engaged.

    Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a Sea Fight
    beyond all others. Shot will carry away the masts and yards of
    friends as well as foes; but I look with confidence to a Victory
    before the Van of the Enemy could succour their Rear, and then
    that the British Fleet would most of them be ready to receive
    their twenty Sail of the Line, or to pursue them, should they
    endeavour to make off.

    If the Van of the Enemy tacks, the Captured Ships must run to
    leeward of the British Fleet; if the Enemy wears, the British
    must place themselves between the Enemy and the Captured, and
    disabled British Ships; and should the Enemy close, I have no
    fears as to the result.

    [Sidenote: Duties of Subordinate.] The Second in Command will in
    all possible things direct the movements of his Line, by keeping
    them as compact as the nature of the circumstances will admit.
    Captains are to look to their particular Line as their rallying
    point. But, in case Signals can neither be seen or perfectly
    understood, no Captain can do very wrong if he places his Ship
    alongside that of an Enemy.

    Of the intended attack from to windward, the Enemy in Line of
    Battle ready to receive an attack,

    [Illustration][123]

    [Sidenote: The Attack from to Windward.] The divisions of the
    British Fleet will be brought nearly within gun shot of the
    Enemy's Centre. The signal will most probably then be made for
    the Lee Line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even
    steering sails, in order to get as quickly as possible to the
    Enemy's Line, and to cut through, beginning from the 12 Ship
    from the Enemy's Rear. Some Ships may not get through their
    exact place, but they will always be at hand to assist their
    friends; and if any are thrown round the Rear of the Enemy, they
    will effectually complete the business of twelve Sail of the
    Enemy.

    Should the Enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still
    the twelve Ships composing, in the first position, the Enemy's
    Rear, are to be the object of attack of the Lee Line, unless
    otherwise directed from the Commander-in-Chief, which is
    scarcely to be expected, as the entire management of the Lee
    Line, after the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, is
    signified, is intended to be left to the judgment of the Admiral
    commanding that Line.

    [Sidenote: Special Charge of the Commander-in-Chief.] The
    remainder of the Enemy's Fleet, 34 Sail, are to be left to the
    management of the Commander-in-Chief, who will endeavour to take
    care that the movements of the Second in Command are as little
    interrupted as is possible.

    NELSON AND BRONTE.

It will be borne in mind that the first of these instructions was
issued for the handling of a small body of ships--ten--expecting to
meet fifteen to eighteen enemies; whereas the second contemplated the
wielding of a great mass of vessels, as many as forty British,
directed against a possible combination of forty-six French and
Spanish. In the former case, however, although the aggregate numbers
were smaller, the disproportion of force was much greater, even after
allowance made for the British three-deckers; and we know, from other
contemporary remarks of Nelson, that his object here was not so much a
crushing defeat of the enemy--"only numbers can annihilate"--as the
disorganization and neutralization of a particular detachment, as the
result of which the greater combination of the enemy would fall to
pieces. "After they have beaten our fleet soundly, they will do us no
more harm this summer."[124] Consequently, he relies much upon the
confusion introduced into the enemy's movements by an attack, which,
though of much inferior force, should be sudden in character,
developing only at the last moment, into which the enemy should be
precipitated unawares, while the British should encounter it, or
rather should enter it, with minds fully prepared,--not only for the
immediate manoeuvre, but for all probable consequences.

In accordance with the same general object--confusion--he directs his
assault upon the van, instead of, as at Trafalgar, upon the rear;
according to his saying in the Baltic, recorded by Stewart,[125]
"Close with a Frenchman, but out-manoeuvre a Russian," for which
purpose he would throw his own force, preferably, upon the van of the
latter. The reason is obvious, upon reflection; for in attacking and
cutting off the head--van and centre--of a column of ships, the rear,
coming up under full way, has _immediate_ action forced upon it. There
is no time for deliberation. The van is already engaged, and access to
it more or less impeded, by the hostile dispositions. The decision
must be instant--to the right hand, or to the left, to windward, or to
leeward--and there is at least an even chance that the wrong thing
will be done, as well as a probability, falling little short of
certainty, that all the ships of the rear will _not_ do the same
thing; that is, they will be thrown into confusion with all its dire
train of evils, doubt, hesitancy, faltering, and inconsequent action.
It is hard work to knit again a shattered line under the unremittent
assault of hardened veterans, such as Nelson's Mediterranean ships.

The method employed in the second of these instructions, the
celebrated Memorandum, differs essentially from that of the Plan of
Attack, though both are simply developments of the one idea of
concentration. It is unfortunate for us that Nelson, like most men of
action, reveals his reasoning processes, not in ordered discussion,
but by stray gleams of expression, too often unrecorded, from which we
can infer only the general tenor of his thought. It is in the chance
phrase, transmitted by Stewart, coupled with the change of object, so
definitely announced in the second instance,--the crushing, namely, of
the enemy's great fleet, and not the mere crippling of a detachment
such as went to the West Indies,--that the author thinks to find the
clew to the difference of dispositions, in the first case, from those
prescribed and followed for Trafalgar--the "Nelson touch" that
thrilled the captains. There is again, indeed, in the latter, the
distinct reliance upon confusion, for the line of the foe is to be
broken in two places; but now the confusion introduced is in the part
of the enemy that is assailed, not, as before, in that which is left
out of action. Confusion, in short, is now imposed by external force,
rather than induced by internal perplexity,--a condition surer, and
therefore more liable to result in a crushing victory, for it depends
upon the vigor of the offensive, and not on the weakness of the
defensive, which may prove a deceitful reliance. Moreover, effectual
crushing requires time, even when, as in the final memorandum, a great
concentration of superiority is intended on part of an enemy's order.
Now, when the van and centre are attacked, the rear is pointed fair,
and, if it does not lose its head, comes quickly up to the rescue; but
when, in the contrary case, the centre and rear receive the assault,
the van, being left out of action, not only has to turn round, but
naturally stands away, for an interval dependent upon the initiative
of its immediate commander, as occurred to an extreme degree at
Trafalgar. Thus time, the invaluable five minutes or half hour, is
gained for the offensive to bring its first concentration to a
successful issue, as well as to prepare to repel the van of the
defensive, if it countermarches, as it should. "I look with confidence
to a victory before the van of the enemy could succour their rear, and
then that the British fleet would most of them be ready to receive
their twenty sail of the line, or to pursue them, should they
endeavour to make off."

The organization of a distinct body of eight fast-sailing
ships-of-the-line, to be carried to such part of the field as might
appear necessary to the commander-in-chief in a particular emergency,
resulted inevitably, perhaps, from the considerations presented by
Nelson in the opening sentences of the Memorandum, and from the great
number of ships he then hoped to have. There were precedents for such
a formation, in the practice of the day; but, as far as recalled by
the author, they were the advanced guards, the skirmish line, of the
fleet, not, as in this case, essentially a reserve. In Nelson's
present thought, the employment of this force would be, not antecedent
to, but consequent upon, the particular indications of the day.
Probably they would not be held back as long--for as distinct
indications--as in the case of an army's reserve; but nevertheless,
the chief object of their separate organization was to redress, at the
moment, the unforeseen developments of a battle, whether at the
instant of engagement or during its subsequent progress. The
unfortunate Villeneuve, who commanded the allies, an accomplished
though irresolute seaman, had adopted a similar arrangement, placing
twelve detached ships under his colleague Gravina; but, with sailing
vessels, the effective use of such a force depended largely upon the
windward position, which the allies did not have. If placed to leeward
of a lee line, it was in the power of the assailant to throw them out
of action altogether; if to windward, to attack them separately;
therefore at Trafalgar Villeneuve ordered them back into the line.
Nelson likewise then embodied his reserve in the two columns of
attack, because he had fewer vessels than he expected, and because the
light wind forbade the wasting of time in evolutionary refinements.
The incident of the simultaneous adoption of the same provision by the
two opposing admirals, however, is interesting as indicative of the
progress of naval thought, though still hampered by the uncertainties
of the motive power.

The second of these Orders, that of October 9, is memorable, not only
for the sagacity and comprehensiveness of its general dispositions,
but even more for the magnanimous confidence with which the details of
execution were freely intrusted to those upon whom they had to fall.
It was evidently drawn up in the first instance for Collingwood only;
the word "your" in the original draught having been struck out, and
"second in command" substituted. The comparison already made between
it and its predecessor of May, may not uninstructively be followed by
a study of the difference in details between itself and the execution
it actually received at the Battle of Trafalgar. To aid this purpose
the author has traced, in marginal notes, the succession of the
leading ideas.

After a statement of General Considerations, and a frank attribution
of full powers to the second in command for carrying out his part,
Nelson lays down the manner of Attack from to Leeward. This condition
not obtaining at Trafalgar, the plan cannot be contrasted with the
performance of that day. Upon this follows a luminous enunciation of
the general idea, namely, Collingwood's engaging the twelve rear
ships, which underlies the method prescribed for each attack--from to
leeward and to windward. Of the latter Nelson fortunately gives an
outline diagram, which illustrates the picture before his own mind,
facilitating our comprehension of his probable expectations, and
allowing a comparison between them and the event as it actually
occurred. It is not to the discredit, but greatly to the credit, of
his conception, that it was susceptible of large modification in
practice while retaining its characteristic idea.

Looking at his diagram,[126] and following his words, it will be seen
that the British lines are not formed perpendicularly to that of the
enemy (as they were at Trafalgar), but parallel to it. Starting from
this disposition, near the enemy and abreast his centre, the lee line
of sixteen ships was to bear up _together_, and advance in line, not
in column (as happened at Trafalgar); their object being the twelve
rear ships of the enemy. This first move stands by itself; the action
of the weather line, and of the reserve squadron still farther to
windward, are held in suspense under the eye of the
commander-in-chief, to take the direction which the latter shall
prescribe as the struggle develops. The mere menace of such a force,
just out of gunshot to windward, would be sufficient to prevent any
extensive manoeuvre of the unengaged enemies. Nelson doubtless had in
mind the dispositions, more than a century old, of Tourville and De
Ruyter, by which a few ships, spaced to windward of an enemy's van,
could check its tacking, because of the raking fire to which they
would subject it. Unquestionably, he would not have kept long in idle
expectancy twenty-four ships, the number he had in mind; but clearly
also he proposed to hold them until he saw how things went with
Collingwood. Thus much time would allow, granting the position he
assumed and a reasonable breeze. His twenty-four to windward held an
absolute check over the supposed thirty-four unengaged, of the enemy.

The attack as planned, therefore, differed from that executed (1) in
that the lee line was not to advance in column, but in line, thereby
dispersing the enemy's fire, and avoiding the terrific concentration
which crushed the leaders at Trafalgar; and (2) in that the weather
squadrons were not to attack simultaneously with the lee, but after it
had engaged, in order to permit the remedying of any mishap that might
arise in delivering the crucial blow. In both these matters of detail
the plan was better than the modification; but the latter was forced
upon Nelson by conditions beyond his control.

It will be observed that, when considering attacking from to leeward,
he orders a simultaneous movement of the three British
divisions,--lee, weather, and reserve; for the obvious reason that if
he held his own divisions in reserve to leeward he could not at all
count upon bringing them into action at will; and, moreover, such an
attack would probably have to be in columns, and, if simultaneous,
would be less liable to disaster than in succession, mutual support
diverting the enemies' fire. In fact, the highest order of offensive
combination was only possible when having the advantage of the
wind--fair, and enough of it.

The plan upon which Trafalgar was to be fought, as above described and
analyzed, was formed some time before leaving England, and it is not
unreasonable to suppose that it was in fact a modification of the
earlier idea, laid down during the chase to the West Indies. On the
10th of September, three days only before quitting Merton, Nelson
called upon his old friend, Lord Sidmouth,[127] who until recently had
been Prime Minister. In the course of the interview he explained his
intentions as regards the attack. "Rodney," he said, "broke the
enemy's line in one place,[128] I will break it in two;" and with his
finger he indicated upon a table the general character of the assault,
to be made in two lines, led by himself and Collingwood. He felt
confident, according to Sidmouth's narration, that he should capture
either their van and centre or their centre and rear. It was of course
out of his power to prevent the enemy inverting their order, by the
simultaneous turning round of every ship, at the time of engagement,
so that the attack intended for the rear should fall upon it become
the van. Against this contingency he provided by the words, "should
the enemy wear together, still the twelve ships composing, _in the
first position_, the enemy's rear, are to be the object of attack of
the lee line." Sidmouth did not commit his recollection of this
incident to writing until many years later, and, not being a seaman,
very likely failed to comprehend some of the details--there seems to
the author to be in the story a confusion of what Nelson planned with
what Nelson did; but a great conception is largely independent of
details, and the essential features of Trafalgar are in Sidmouth's
account. The idea was doubtless imparted also to the family circle at
Merton, where probably the expression, "Nelson touch," originated. It
occurs chiefly, if not wholly, in his letters to Lady Hamilton, to
whom, some days before reaching the fleet, he wrote, "I am anxious to
join, for it would add to my grief if any other man was to give them
the Nelson touch, which WE say is warranted never to fail;" but there
may be a quaint allusion to it in the motto he told Rose he had
adopted: "Touch and Take."

When Nelson left England, he was intrusted by the First Lord with the
delicate and unpleasant mission of communicating to Sir Robert Calder
the dissatisfaction of the Government with his conduct, in the
encounter with the allied fleets the previous July; especially for
failing to keep touch with them and bring them again to action. The
national outcry was too strong to be disregarded, nor is it probable
that the Admiralty took a more lenient view of the matter. At all
events, an inquiry was inevitable, and the authorities seem to have
felt that it was a favor to Calder to permit him to ask for the Court
which in any case must be ordered. "I did not fail," wrote Nelson to
Barham, "immediately on my arrival, to deliver your message to Sir
Robert Calder; and it will give your Lordship pleasure to find, as it
has me, that an inquiry is what the Vice-Admiral wishes, and that he
had written to you by the Nautilus, which I detained, to say so. Sir
Robert thinks that he can clearly prove, that it was not in his power
to bring the combined squadrons again to battle."

Nelson felt a profound sympathy for the unfortunate officer, pursued
by the undiscriminating and ignorant fury of popular clamor, the
extent and intensity of which he had had opportunity to realize when
in England. While he probably did not look for so tragic an issue, the
execution of Byng under a similar odium and a similar charge, although
expressly cleared of cowardice and disaffection, was still fresh in
the naval mind. "Sir Robert has an ordeal to pass through," he wrote
Collingwood, "which he little expects." His own opinion upon the case
seems to have undergone some modification, since the generous outburst
with which he at first deprecated the prejudgment of a disappointed
and frightened people; nor could it well fail, as details became known
to him, that he should pass a silent censure upon proceedings, which
contravened alike his inward professional convictions, and his
expressed purposes of action for a similar contingency. "I have had,
as you will believe, a very distressing scene with poor Sir Robert
Calder," he told Lady Hamilton. "He has wrote home to beg an inquiry,
feeling confident that he can fully justify himself. I sincerely hope
he may, but--I have given him the advice as to my dearest friend. He
is in adversity, and if he ever has been my enemy, he now feels the
pang of it, and finds me one of his best friends." "Sir Robert
Calder," he wrote to another correspondent, "has just left us to stand
his trial, which I think of a very serious nature." Nelson was obliged
to detain him until reinforcements arrived from England, because
Calder was unwilling to undergo the apparent humiliation of leaving
his flagship under charges, and she could not yet be spared. It was
not the least of this unlucky man's misfortunes that he left the fleet
just a week before the battle, where his conduct would undoubtedly
have redeemed whatever of errors he may have committed. One of the
last remarks Nelson made before the action began, was, "Hardy, what
would poor Sir Robert Calder give to be with us now!"

Calder's reluctance to quit his flagship, and the keen sensitiveness
with which he expressed his feelings, drew from Nelson a concession he
knew to be wrong, but which is too characteristic, both in the act
itself and in his own account of it, to be omitted. "Sir Robert felt
so much," he wrote to the First Lord, "even at the idea of being
removed from his own ship which he commanded, in the face of the
fleet, that I much fear I shall incur the censure of the Board of
Admiralty, without your Lordship's influence with the members of it. I
may be thought wrong, as an officer, to disobey the orders of the
Admiralty, by not insisting on Sir Robert Calder's quitting the Prince
of Wales for the Dreadnought, and for parting with a 90-gun ship,
before the force arrives which their Lordships have judged necessary;
but I trust that I shall be considered to have done right as a man,
and to a brother officer in affliction--my heart could not stand it,
and so the thing must rest. I shall submit to the wisdom of the Board
to censure me or not, as to them may seem best for the Service; I
shall bow with all due respect to their decision."

From the military point of view this step was indefensible, but it is
in singular keeping with Nelson's kindness of heart, his generosity of
temper, and with a certain recklessness of consequences,--when
supported by inward conviction of right, or swayed by natural
impulses,--which formed no small part of his greatness as a warrior.
"Numbers only can annihilate;" yet to spare the feelings of an unhappy
man, whom he believed to have been his enemy, he parted with one of
the best units from his numbers, although, even with her present, he
was inferior to the allies. He felt keenly, however, the
responsibility he assumed, not only towards the Admiralty, but towards
his own success and reputation. At one time he seems, with unusual
vacillation, even to have returned upon his decision, and to have
notified Calder that the ship could not be spared; for on the 12th of
October the latter wrote him: "The contents of your Lordship's letter
have cut me to the soul. If I am to be turned out of my ship, after
all that has passed, I have only to request I may be allowed to take
my Captain, and such officers as I find necessary for the
justification of my conduct as an officer, and that I may be permitted
to go without a moment's further loss of time. My heart is broken."
This appeal broke down all Nelson's power of resistance. He deprived
himself on the eve of battle of a first-rate ship, taking only the
precaution of sending his entire correspondence with Calder, public
and private, to explain his course, though scarcely to justify it. The
significance of this act is enhanced by the known importance which he
himself attached to the presence or absence of even a third-rate
ship-of-the-line. When the expedition to the Baltic was on the eve of
starting, a seventy-four went aground, in leaving the Downs.
Lieutenant Layman having been conspicuously instrumental in getting
her off, Nelson told him that he had in consequence written in his
favor to the Admiralty; and upon Layman's remarking that what he had
done scarcely deserved so much, the admiral replied, "I think
differently, the loss of one line-of-battle ship might be the loss of
a victory."

When Nelson joined the fleet, he found it stationed some fifteen to
twenty miles from Cadiz. He soon moved the main body to fifty miles
west of the port. "It is desirable," he admitted, "to be well up in
easterly winds, but I must guard against being caught with a westerly
wind near Cadiz, as a fleet of ships with so many three-deckers would
inevitably be forced into the Straits, and then Cadiz would be
perfectly free for the enemy to come out with a westerly wind, as they
served Lord Keith in the late war." The memory of his weary beat out
of the Mediterranean the previous April, against wind and current,
remained vividly in his mind; and he feared also that the willingness
of the enemy to come out, which was his great object, would be much
cooled by the certainty that his fleet could not be avoided, and by
seeing such additions as it might receive. "I think we are near
enough," he wrote Colling wood, "for the weather if it is fine, the
wind serves, and we are in sight, they will never move." "I rely on
you," he tells Blackwood, "that we can't miss getting hold of them,
and I will give them such a shaking as they never yet experienced; at
least I will lay down my life in the attempt." An advanced squadron of
fast-sailing seventy-fours was thrown out ten or twelve miles east of
the fleet, through which daily signals could be exchanged with
Blackwood's squadron of frigates, that cruised day and night close to
the harbor's mouth. This disposition received a farther development
after the 10th of October, when the combined fleets shifted from the
inner harbor to the Bay of Cadiz, and gave other tokens of a speedy
start. On the 14th of the month he made the following entry in his
diary: "Enemy at the harbour's mouth. Placed Defence and Agamemnon
from seven to ten leagues west of Cadiz, and Mars and Colossus five
leagues east of fleet [that is, under way between the fleet and the
former group], whose station is from fifteen to twenty leagues west of
Cadiz; and by this chain I hope to have constant communication with
the frigates off Cadiz." To the captain of the "Defence" he wrote that
it was possible the enemy might try to drive off the frigate squadron,
in order to facilitate their own evasion; in which case the inner
ships-of-the-line would be at hand to resist the attempt.

Despite these careful dispositions, his mind was still ill at ease
lest the enemy might escape undetected. He never had frigates enough
to make the result as sure as it ought to be, where such vast issues
were at stake. While eight at least were needed to be always with the
fleet before Cadiz, he had but five; and to maintain even so many it
was necessary to cut short other services and essential stations. This
deficiency he urged upon the Government still more than he did the
inadequacy of the line-of-battle force; for his fear of the enemy
eluding him was greater than that of a conflict with superior numbers.
As regards the latter contingency, he wrote to Lord Barham that, if
the enemy came out, he would immediately bring them to battle; "but,
although I should not doubt of spoiling any voyage they might attempt,
yet I hope for the arrival of the ships from England, that as an
enemy's fleet they may be annihilated." On the other hand, "the last
fleet was lost to me for want of frigates." Besides his own direct
representations, he pressed Rose to obtain an intimation to the
Admiralty from the Prime Minister, that the latter was personally
solicitous that more small cruisers should be supplied. Both
Collingwood and Nelson believed the allies bound to the Mediterranean;
but in this they might be mistaken, and as the real object might be
again the West Indies, lookouts should be placed off Cape Blanco on
the coast of Africa, and off the Salvages,[129] both which he knew had
been sighted by Villeneuve, in the outward voyage of the previous
spring.

To his concern about the immediate situation before Cadiz were added
the universal cares of the Mediterranean, with all parts of which he
renewed his correspondence, occupying his active mind with provisions
for forwarding the cause of Great Britain and her allies. Under his
many anxieties, however, he preserved his buoyant, resolute temper,
not worrying over possible happenings against which he was unable to
provide. "The force is at present not so large as might be wished," he
writes to Ball, "but I will do my best with it; they will give me more
when they can, and I am not come forth to find difficulties, but to
remove them." "Your Lordship may depend upon my exertions," he tells
Barham. The possibility that he himself might fall was, as always,
present to his thoughts, and never did life mean more to him than it
now did; yet, as the twilight deepened, and the realization of danger
passed gradually into a presentiment of death, he faced the prospect
without gloom--steadfast still in mind. "Let the battle be when it
may, it will never have been surpassed. My shattered frame, if I
survive that day, will require rest, and that is all I shall ask for.
If I fall on such a glorious occasion, it shall be my pride to take
care that my friends shall not blush for me. These things are in the
hands of a wise and just Providence, and His will be done! I have got
some trifle, thank God, to leave those I hold most dear, and I have
taken care not to neglect it. Do not think I am low-spirited on this
account, or fancy anything is to happen to me; quite the contrary--my
mind is calm, and I have only to think of destroying our inveterate
foe."

Of these days of preoccupation, while in hourly expectation of the
issue, overcharged with official anxieties, and facing, however
fearlessly, a growing impression that he himself would not survive the
conflict for which he longed, an anecdote has been transmitted that
shows again how to the end, and whatever his personal cares, his quick
sympathy went out to men of all classes. Word had been passed through
the fleet that a mail was about to start for England, which would not
improbably be the last opportunity of writing home before the enemy
came forth. The letters had been collected as usual, the bags were all
on board the departing vessel, and she herself, under full sail, had
got already some distance away, when Nelson saw a midshipman come up
and speak to Lieutenant Pasco, the signal officer, who, upon hearing
what was said, stamped his foot in evident vexation, and uttered an
exclamation. The admiral, of whose nearness Pasco was not aware,
called him, and asked what was the matter. "Nothing that need trouble
your Lordship," was the reply. "You are not the man to lose your
temper for nothing," rejoined Nelson. "What was it?" "Well, if you
must know, my Lord, I will tell you. You see that cockswain," pointing
to one of the most active of the petty officers; "we have not a better
man on board the Victory and the message which put me out was this. I
was told that he was so busy receiving and getting off the mail-bags,
that he forgot to drop his own letter to his wife into one of them,
and he has just discovered it in his pocket." "Hoist a signal to bring
her back," was Nelson's instant command; "who knows that he may not
fall in action to-morrow. His letter shall go with the rest,"--and the
despatch vessel was brought back for that alone.[130] In telling the
story, Pasco used to say it was no wonder that the common sailors
idolized Nelson, since he was always thinking about them, and won
their hearts by showing his own.

In addition to the combined fleets in Cadiz, which numbered thirty-six
of the line, besides frigates, the enemy had a half-dozen of the line
in Cartagena, which showed signs of moving, and whose junction must be
prevented, if possible. Partly for this reason, partly because it was
necessary to renew the water of the ships, Nelson sent a detachment of
six of the line to Gibraltar and Tetuan, immediately after he took
charge. To the junior admiral who commanded it, and who lamented that
they might lose their share in the expected battle, he replied: "I
have no other means of keeping my fleet complete in provisions and
water. The enemy _will_ come out, and we shall fight them; but there
will be time for you to get back first." They did not, however, return
as thus expected, a misadventure which was chiefly due to their having
to guard a convoy past Cartagena,--a potent illustration of the
influence exerted by a powerful squadron, judiciously placed on the
flank of an important trade route, or line of communication; but even
had they rejoined, six others were told off to leave at once in turn.
Nelson did not dare to take the fleet in mass to Tetuan, as he used to
Madalena; for he could never be sure of getting out of the Straits
when he wished, or when the enemy moved. Thus his fleet was reduced,
by both administrative and strategic exigencies, to twenty-three
ships-of-the-line. Fortunately, four more joined before the battle,
raising the numbers actually engaged to twenty-seven. It will be
recognized that Calder's ninety-gun ship was no small loss.

Such were the general dispositions in which the sailing of the enemy
was awaited. A main body of eighteen to twenty, fifty miles west of
Cadiz, a frigate squadron close in to the harbor, and two groups of
ships-of-the-line extended between these extremes. With a westerly
wind, approach to the port would be easy for all; with an easterly,
Nelson wrote to Blackwood, he would habitually beat up for Cadiz,
never going north of the port. His whereabouts in case of thick
weather was thus always known. He notified Collingwood and his other
subordinates, that if the enemy came out, he should stand for Cape
Spartel, the African outpost of the Straits, to bar the entrance of
the allies to the Mediterranean. Signals were arranged, precise, yet
not so elaborate as to tend to confusion, by which the departure and
general direction of the enemy could be continually transmitted, from
the furthest lookouts to the main body, by night as by day.

On the 13th of October his old ship, the "Agamemnon," joined the
fleet. She was commanded by Sir Edward Berry, who had been first
lieutenant in her with Nelson, had accompanied him in boarding the
"San Nicolas" and "San Josef" at St. Vincent, and was afterwards his
flag-captain at the Nile. When her approach was reported to the
admiral, he exclaimed gleefully, "Here comes Berry! Now we shall have
a battle;" for Berry, having been in more fleet actions than any
captain in the British Navy,[131] had a proverbial reputation for such
luck. The event did not belie the prediction. Five days later, on the
18th of the month, Nelson noted in his diary: "Fine weather, wind
easterly; the combined fleets cannot have finer weather to put to
sea;" and the following morning, at half-past nine, the signal,
repeated from masthead to masthead, from the inshore frigates to their
commander-in-chief fifty miles at sea, announced that the
long-expected battle was at hand--for "The Enemy are coming out of
port."

FOOTNOTES:

[121] May, 1805.

[122] The author does not here understand the speaking of "two or three"
rear ships, when the van is supposed to be five or six--making a total of
not over nine or ten enemies. If this order of attack was issued, as
expressly stated by Clarke and M'Arthur, on the chase to the West Indies,
Nelson then was fully aware that he with ten ships was in pursuit of
eighteen. (See _ante_, p. 296) It appears to the author more probable that
it was issued to the fleet when off Toulon, in anticipation of a possible
meeting with the French squadron there, when the disparity of force was
less--say, eight to ten. This impression is confirmed by the "Plan of
Attack" speaking of the junior "Admirals"--in the plural. There was but one
such in the pursuit to the West Indies. It is quite possible, however, that
the same order was re-issued upon the later occasion, re-copied without
change of words. In any event, it confirms other statements and actions of
Nelson's, that an enemy should not be fought ship to ship, but by a
concentration on part of his order.

[123] Inserted by author.

[124] _Ante_, pp. 306, 323.

[125] _Ante_, p. 82.

[126] The author has introduced an arrow to show the direction of the wind
as viewed by Nelson; the arrow flying _with_ the wind.

[127] Formerly Mr. Addington, who was at the head of the Government during
the Copenhagen expedition.

[128] This was a mistake on Nelson's part. Rodney's fleet actually, though
accidentally, broke through De Grasse's order in two (if not three) places.

[129] A desert group of small islands between Madeira and the Canaries.

[130] The author is indebted for this reminiscence to Mr. Stuart J. Reid,
who received it from Pasco's son, also an officer in the Navy.

[131] Besides three of the battles associated with Nelson's name--St.
Vincent, the Nile, and Trafalgar--Berry as a midshipman had been in the
five fleet actions between Suffren and Hughes, in the East Indies, in 1782
and 1783. ("The Nelson Memorial," by John Knox Laughton, pp. 83, 284.)



CHAPTER XXIII.

TRAFALGAR.--THE DEATH OF NELSON.

OCTOBER 19-21, 1805. AGE, 47.


Contrary to the general policy that for many years had governed the
naval undertakings of France and Spain, the combined fleets put to sea
on the 19th of October, 1805, with the fixed purpose of daring the
hazard of battle, which they could scarcely expect to avoid. They
numbered thirty-three ships-of-the-line, eighteen French and fifteen
Spanish, and were accompanied by five frigates and two brigs, all of
which were French. This great force in its aggregate was one. There
were not two separate entities, a French fleet and a Spanish fleet,
acting in concert, as is often the case in alliances. Whatever the
administrative arrangements, for cruising and for battle the vessels
of the two nations were blended in a single mass, at the head of which
was the French admiral, just as the general direction of the naval
campaign was in the hands of the French Emperor alone. The
commander-in-chief was Vice-Admiral Villeneuve, the same that Nelson
recently had pursued to the West Indies and back to Europe. The
commander of the Spanish contingent, Vice-Admiral Gravina, was less
his colleague than his subordinate. There were also flying in the
combined fleet the flags of four junior admirals, two French and two
Spanish, and the broad pendants of several commodores.

In the allied force there were four three-decked ships, of from one
hundred to one hundred and thirty guns, all Spanish, of which one,
the "Santísima Trinidad," was the largest vessel then afloat. Among
Nelson's twenty-seven there were seven three-deckers, of ninety-eight
to one hundred guns; but in the lower rates the British were at a
disadvantage, having but one eighty-gun ship and three sixty-fours,
whereas the allies had six of the former and only one of the latter.
All the other vessels of the line-of-battle were seventy-fours, the
normal medium type, upon which the experience of most navies of that
day had fixed, as best fitted for the general purposes of fleet
warfare. Where more tonnage and heavier batteries were put into single
ships, it was simply for the purpose of reinforcing the critical
points of an order of battle; an aim that could not be as effectively
attained by the combination of two ships, under two captains.

As Nelson said in his celebrated order, so large a body as
thirty-three heavy vessels is not easily handled, even at sea; and
leaving port with them is an operation yet more difficult.
Consequently, the movement which began soon after daylight on the 19th
was not completed that day. Owing to the falling of the wind, only
twelve ships got fairly clear of the bay, outside of which they lay
becalmed. The following morning the attempt was resumed, and by two or
three o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th the whole combined fleet
was united, and standing with a fresh southwest wind to the northward
and westward, to gain room to windward for entering the Straits.

As has been said, the movement that Blackwood recognized at 7 A.M. of
the 19th was communicated to the admiral at half-past nine. According
to his announced plan, to cut the enemy off from the Mediterranean, he
at once made signal for a General Chase to the southeast,--towards
Cape Spartel,--and the fleet moved off in that direction with a light
southerly wind. At noon Nelson sat down in his cabin to begin his last
letter to Lady Hamilton. The words then written he signed, as though
conscious that no opportunity to continue might offer; nor is it
difficult to trace that some such thought was then uppermost in his
mind, and sought expression in the tenderness of farewell. The
following day, however, he added a few lines, in which the dominant
note was fear that the enemy might again elude him, by returning into
port; an apprehension that expelled the previous haunting sense of
finality. There he laid down the pen, never again to address her
directly. The letter, thus abruptly closed by death, was found open
and unsigned upon his desk after the battle.

    Victory, October 19th, 1805, Noon. CADIZ, E.S.E., 16 Leagues.

    MY DEAREST BELOVED EMMA, the dear friend of my bosom. The signal
    has been made that the Enemy's Combined Fleet are coming out of
    Port. We have very little wind, so that I have no hopes of
    seeing them before to-morrow. May the God of Battles crown my
    endeavours with success; at all events, I will take care that my
    name shall ever be most dear to you and Horatia, both of whom I
    love as much as my own life. And as my last writing before the
    Battle will be to you, so I hope in God that I shall live to
    finish my letter after the Battle. May Heaven bless you prays
    your

    NELSON AND BRONTE.


    October 20th.

    In the morning, we were close to the Mouth of the Straits, but
    the wind had not come far enough to the Westward to allow the
    Combined Fleets to weather the Shoals off Trafalgar; but they
    were counted as far as forty Sail of Ships of War, which I
    suppose to be thirty-four of the Line, and six Frigates. A group
    of them was seen off the Lighthouse of Cadiz this morning, but
    it blows so very fresh and thick weather, that I rather believe
    they will go into the Harbour before night. May God Almighty
    give us success over these fellows, and enable us to get a
    Peace.

He wrote the same day to his daughter, addressing the letter to Miss
Horatia Nelson Thompson,[132] by which name she had hitherto been
known. In the Codicil to his Will, signed on the morning of the 21st,
a few hours before the battle, he called her his adopted daughter, and
desired that she would in future use the name of Nelson only.

    Victory, October 19th, 1805.

    MY DEAREST ANGEL,--I was made happy by the pleasure of receiving
    your letter of September 19th, and I rejoice to hear that you
    are so very good a girl, and love my dear Lady Hamilton, who
    most dearly loves you. Give her a kiss for me. The Combined
    Fleets of the Enemy are now reported to be coming out of Cadiz;
    and therefore I answer your letter, my dearest Horatia, to mark
    to you that you are ever uppermost in my thoughts. I shall be
    sure of your prayers for my safety, conquest, and speedy return
    to dear Merton, and our dearest good Lady Hamilton. Be a good
    girl, mind what Miss Connor says to you. Receive, my dearest
    Horatia, the affectionate parental blessing of your Father,


    NELSON AND BRONTE.

The 20th of October opened with fresh breezes from south-southwest and
heavy rains. At daybreak the British fleet was near the Straits'
mouth, between Capes Trafalgar and Spartel, unable to see anything,
but certain that, with the existing winds, the enemy could not have
anticipated it there. Blackwood's frigates, out of sight to the
northward, were dogging the path of the allies, of whose general
position they were certain, although the thick weather hid them from
observation. At 7 A.M. the frigate "Phoebe" signalled to Nelson that
the enemy bore north. With the wind as it was, and considering the
position of the land, they must be standing to the northwest, so that
the British fleet wore and steered the same course, keeping parallel
to the enemy and spreading lookouts in their direction. Soon after
noon, the weather clearing, Blackwood saw the combined fleets where he
believed them to be, under low sail, and so close that the "Euryalus"
went about immediately. At 1 P.M. he left the squadron in temporary
charge of a junior captain, and with his own ship kept away south to
speak the admiral. At two he sighted the main body, and at 3.20 was
near enough to send the telegraphic message, "The enemy appears
determined to push to the westward." "That," wrote Nelson in his
diary, "they shall _not_ do, if in the power of Nelson and Bronté to
prevent them," and he telegraphed back, "I rely upon your keeping
sight of the enemy." The frigates and lookout ships, he noted in his
journal, had so far discharged their duties most admirably, informing
him promptly of all the hostile movements; he was justified therefore
in the confidence that they would do as well in the night now
approaching.

While Blackwood was communicating, Nelson himself was much of the time
on the "Victory's" poop. Seeing there a number of midshipmen
assembled, he observed to them, "This day or to-morrow will be a
fortunate one for you, young gentlemen," alluding to their prospect of
promotion after a successful battle. The same day at dinner, he said
to some of the company, "To-morrow I will do that which will give you
younger gentlemen something to talk and think about for the rest of
your lives, but I shall not live to know about it myself;" and he
added that he expected to capture twenty to twenty-two of the hostile
fleet.[133] It may be inferred from this remark that by the dinner
hour, between three and five, he had become satisfied that the enemy
either would not, or could not, return into port, according to the
fear he had expressed to Lady Hamilton, and that a battle therefore
was certain. The letter to her, from its mention of the weather as
thick, must have been written in the forenoon. His expectation that
the morrow would prove the decisive day was reinforced by one of those
prepossessions for coincidences, half jesting, half serious, which are
natural to men, but fall too far short of conviction to be called
superstitious. On the 21st of October, 1757, his uncle Maurice
Suckling had commanded one of three ships-of-the-line which had beaten
off a superior force. Nelson had several times said to Captain Hardy
and Dr. Scott, "The 21st will be our day;" and on the morning of the
battle, when the prediction was approaching fulfilment, he again
remarked that the 21st of October was the happiest day in the year for
his family; but he mentioned no reason other than that just given.

The main bodies of the contending navies did not come in sight of each
other during the 20th; the British lookout frigates, between the two,
and three or four miles from the allied line, could see their own
fleet only from the masthead. At about 2 P.M., soon after the weather
cleared, the wind shifted to west-northwest, taking the ships aback.
After filling their sails again to the new wind, as this was now fair
for their approach to the Straits' mouth, the combined fleets wore,
and headed to the southward. The British remaining on the same tack as
before,--the port,--stood to the northward until 8 P.M., when they
also wore to the southwest; but this interval of steering in nearly
opposite directions changed the relative bearings. At midnight, by the
log of Blackwood's frigates, the enemy stretched along the eastern
horizon, while the British bore southwest; the space between the two
being ten miles. The "Euryalus," three miles from the allies, saw the
loom of the lights of her own fleet. Still fearful lest the view of
his ships should shake the enemy's purpose, Nelson was careful not to
lessen this distance; the more so because the British, having the
wind, could attack when they pleased, provided the enemy by continuing
to the southward deprived themselves of the power to regain Cadiz. Two
British frigates were directed to keep them in sight during the night,
reporting their movements to two others who were stationed a little
farther from them, whence a chain of line-of-battle ships communicated
with the "Victory." Thus, throughout the dark hours, signal lights and
guns flashed across the waters to Nelson instantaneous information of
every noteworthy occurrence in the hostile order.

Since the morning of the 19th, the weather, fine for some days
previous, had become unsettled, working up for the southwest gale
which wrought so much damage among the victims of the fight. As the
night of the 20th advanced, the wind fell, and at midnight there were
only light westerly breezes, inclining to calm. The same conditions
continued at dawn, and throughout the day of the 21st until after the
battle; but there was also a great swell from the westward, the
precursor of a storm. At 4 A.M. the British fleet again wore, and was
standing northeast when the day broke.

After leaving Cadiz, in order to avoid separations during the night,
or in thick weather, the combined fleets had been disposed in five
columns, a formation whose compactness, though not suited to an
engagement, was less liable to straggling than a single long line, and
brought all parts more directly under the control of the
commander-in-chief at the centre. Of the five, the two to windward, of
six ships each, constituted a reserve, similar to Nelson's proposed
detachment of eight. It was commanded by Admiral Gravina, and was
intended to reinforce such part of the battle as should appear to
require it; an object for which the windward position was of the
utmost moment, as it was for all naval initiative in that day. This
advantage the allies did not have on the morning of Trafalgar. When
Villeneuve, therefore, formed the line of battle, these twelve ships
were at once incorporated with it, taking the lead of their order as
it stood to the southward, with the wind at west-northwest,--a long
column stretching over five miles of sea from end to end.

In a general sense, then, it may be said that, when daylight showed
the enemies to each other, the British fleet was heading to the
northward, and that of the allies to the southward; the latter being
ten or twelve miles east of their opponents. In the far distance, Cape
Trafalgar, from which the battle takes its name, was just visible
against the eastern sky. At twenty minutes before seven Nelson made in
quick succession the signals, "To form the order of sailing,"--which
by his previous instructions was to be the order of battle,--and "To
prepare for battle." Ten minutes later followed the command to "Bear
up," the "Victory" setting the example by at once altering her course
for the enemy. Collingwood did the same, and the ships of the two
divisions fell into the wake of their leaders as best they could, for
the light wind afforded neither the means nor the time for refinements
in manoeuvring. Fourteen ships followed the "Royal Sovereign," which
bore Collingwood's flag, while the remaining twelve gathered in
Nelson's division behind the "Victory."[134] The two columns steered
east, about a mile apart, that of Nelson being to the northward; from
which circumstance, the wind being west-northwest, it has been called
commonly the weather line.

Thus, as Ivanhoe, at the instant of encounter in the lists, shifted
his lance from the shield to the casque of the Templar, Nelson, at the
moment of engaging, changed the details of his plan, and substituted
an attack in two columns, simultaneously made, for the charge of
Collingwood's division, in line and in superior numbers, upon the
enemy's flank; to be followed, more or less quickly, according to
indications, by such movement of his own division as might seem
advisable. It will be observed, however, that the order of sailing
remained the order of battle,--probably, although it is not so stated,
the fleet was already thus disposed when the signal was made, needing
only rectification after the derangements incident to darkness,--and
further, that the general direction of attack continued the same,
Collingwood guiding his column upon the enemy's southern flank, while
Nelson pointed a few ships north of their centre. In this way was
preserved the comprehensive aim which underlay the particular
dispositions of his famous order: "The whole impression of the British
fleet must be to overpower from two or three ships ahead of their
commander-in-chief, supposed to be in the Centre, to the Rear of their
fleet." The northern flank of the allies--ten or a dozen ships--was
consequently left unengaged, unless by their own initiative they came
promptly into action; which, it may be added, they did not do until
after the battle was decided.

When the development of the British movement was recognized by
Villeneuve, he saw that fighting was inevitable; and, wishing to keep
Cadiz, then twenty miles to the northward and eastward, under his lee,
he ordered the combined fleets to wear together.[135] The scanty wind
which embarrassed the British impeded this manoeuvre also, so that it
was not completed till near ten o'clock. Nelson, however, noted its
beginning at seven, and with grave concern; for not only would it put
the allies nearer their port, as it was intended to do, but it would
cause vessels crippled in the action to find to leeward of them,
during the gale which he foresaw, the dangerous shoals off Trafalgar
instead of the open refuge of the Straits. The appreciation of the
peril thus entailed led him to make a signal for all the ships to be
prepared to anchor after the battle, for it was not to be hoped that
the spars of many of them would be in a condition to bear sail. The
result of the allied movement was to invert their order. Their ships,
which had been steering south, now all headed north; the van became
the rear; Gravina, who had been leading the column, was in the rear
ship; and it was upon this rear, but still the southern flank of the
hostile array, that the weight of Collingwood's attack was to fall.

Soon after daylight Nelson, who, according to his custom, was already
up and dressed, had gone on deck. He wore as usual his admiral's frock
coat, on the left breast of which were stitched the stars of four
different Orders that he always bore. It was noticed that he did not
wear his sword at Trafalgar, although it lay ready for him on the
cabin table; and it is supposed he forgot to call for it, as this was
the only instance in which he was known not to carry it when engaged.
At about six o'clock he summoned Captain Blackwood on board the
"Victory." This officer had had a hard fag during the past forty-eight
hours, dogging the enemy's movements through darkness and mist; but
that task was over, and his ambition now was to get command of one of
two seventy-fours, whose captains had gone home with Calder to give
evidence at his trial. "My signal just made on board the Victory," he
wrote to his wife. "I hope to order me to a vacant line-of-battle
ship." Nelson's purpose, however, as far as stated by Blackwood, was
simply to thank him for the successful efforts of the past two days,
and to have him by his side till the flagship came under fire, in
order to receive final and precise instructions, as the situation
developed, for the conduct of the frigates during and after the
battle. To Blackwood's congratulations upon the approach of the moment
that he had, to use his own word, panted for, he replied: "I mean
to-day to bleed the captains of the frigates, as I shall keep you on
board to the very last moment."

Blackwood found him in good but very calm spirits, preoccupied with
the movements of the allies, and the probable results of his own plan
of attack. He frequently asked, "What would you consider a victory?"
Blackwood answered: "Considering the handsome way in which the battle
is offered by the enemy, their apparent determination for a fair trial
of strength, and the proximity of the land, I think if fourteen ships
are captured, it will be a glorious result." Nelson's constant reply
was that he would not be satisfied with anything short of twenty. He
admitted, however, that the nearness of the land might make it
difficult to preserve the prizes, and he was emphatic in directing
that, if the shattered enemies had any chance of returning to Cadiz,
the frigates were to be actively employed in destroying them, and were
not to be diverted from that single aim in order to save either ships
or men. Annihilation, he repeated, was his aim, and nothing short of
it; and he must have regretted the absence of the six of the line in
the Mediterranean, imperative as that had been. Word had been sent for
them to Gibraltar by Blackwood the moment the enemy moved, but they
were still away with the convoy.

Blackwood, being a great personal friend of the admiral, took the
liberty, after exchanging greetings, of submitting to him the
expediency of shifting his flag to the "Euryalus," and conducting the
battle from her. Nelson made no reply, but immediately ordered more
sail to be made upon the "Victory." Finding himself foiled in this,
Blackwood then made a direct request for the command of one of the
two vacant seventy-fours. This would give him a chance to share in
the fight, which in a frigate he probably would not have, but it would
also displace the first lieutenant of the ship from the position to
which he had succeeded temporarily. Nelson replied instantly, "No,
Blackwood, it is those men's birthright, and they shall have it."[136]
The incident shows vividly the lively sympathy and sense of justice
which ever distinguished Nelson; for it must have pained him to deny a
request so consonant to his own temper, coming from one whom he had
long known and valued, both as a friend and as an officer, and of
whose recent service such orders would have been a graceful and
appropriate acknowledgment. It may be desirable to explain to
unprofessional readers what was the claim of the lieutenants which
Nelson refused to ignore. The efficiency of the ships for the coming
day's work was due to them scarcely less than to the absent captains,
and if they survived the battle, having been in command through it,
they would reap not only the honor but also their confirmation in the
rank of post-captain, through having exercised it in actual battle.
This succession the admiral aptly called their birthright.

Nelson availed himself of Blackwood's presence to have him, together
with Hardy, witness his signature to a paper, in which he bequeathed
Lady Hamilton and the child Horatia to the care of the nation, and
which consequently has been styled a Codicil to his Will. Unless
Blackwood's memory a few years later was at fault, in stating that his
signal was made at six o'clock,[137] it is likely enough that this
early summons was for the special purpose of giving formal
completeness, by the attestation of two of his closest friends, to a
private duty which was the last to engage Nelson's attention and
affections; for, in addition to the date, the place and hour of his
writing are fixed by the words, "In sight of the Combined Fleets of
France and Spain, distant about ten miles." This was the common
estimate of the relative positions, made by the British fleet at large
at daybreak, and coincides fairly well with the inferences to be
drawn, from the slow rate of speed at which the wind permitted the
British to advance, and from the hour the conflict began. Nor was
there time, nor convenient room, for further delay. A freshening
breeze might readily have brought the fleet into action in a couple of
hours, and it is the custom in preparing for battle--the signal for
which was made at 6.40--to remove most of the conveniences, and
arrangements for privacy, from the living spaces of the officers;
partly to provide against their destruction, chiefly to clear away all
impediments to fighting the guns, and to moving about the ship. In the
case of the admiral, of course, much might be postponed to the last
moment, but in fact his cabin was cleared of fixtures immediately
after he went on the poop in the early morning; for it is distinctly
mentioned that while there he gave particular directions in the
matter, and enjoined great care in handling the portrait of Lady
Hamilton, saying, "Take care of my guardian angel."

It seems, therefore, probable that this so-called Codicil was written
in the quiet minutes of the morning, while the fleet was forming its
order of sailing and bearing up for the enemy, but before the
admiral's cabin was cleared for battle. In it Nelson first recounted,
briefly but specifically, "the eminent services of Emma Hamilton" to
the state, on two occasions, as believed by himself to have been
rendered. Into the actuality of these services it is not necessary
here to inquire;[138] it is sufficient to say that Nelson's knowledge
of them could not have been at first hand, and that the credence he
unquestionably gave to them must have depended upon the evidence of
others,--probably of Lady Hamilton herself, in whom he felt, and
always expressed, the most unbounded confidence. "Could I have
rewarded these services," the paper concludes, "I would not now call
upon my Country; but as that has not been in my power, I leave Emma
Lady Hamilton, therefore, a legacy to my King and Country, that they
will give her an ample provision to maintain her rank in life. I also
leave to the beneficence of my Country my adopted daughter, Horatia
Nelson Thompson; and I desire she will use in future the name of
Nelson only. These are the only favours I ask of my King and Country
at this moment when I am going to fight their battle. May God bless my
King and Country, and all those who I hold dear. My relations it is
needless to mention: they will of course be amply provided for."

At seven o'clock Nelson had returned from the poop to the cabin, for
at that hour was made in his private journal the last entry of
occurrences,--"At seven the combined fleets wearing in succession."
Here it seems likely that he laid down the pen, for, when he was found
writing again, some hours later, it was to complete the long record of
experiences and of duties, with words that summed up, in fit and most
touching expression, the self-devotion of a life already entering the
shadow of death.

Between eight and nine o'clock the other frigate commanders came on
board the "Victory;" aides-de-camp, as it were, waiting to the last
moment to receive such orders as might require more extensive wording,
or precise explanation, than is supplied by the sententious phrases of
the signal-book. Blackwood himself, a captain of long standing and of
tried ability, was in fact intrusted contingently with no small share
of the power and discretion of the commander-in-chief. "He not only
gave me command of all the frigates, but he also gave me a latitude,
seldom or ever given, that of making any use I pleased of his name, in
ordering any of the sternmost line-of-battle ships to do what struck
me as best." While thus waiting, the captains accompanied the admiral
in an inspection which he made of the decks and batteries of the
flagship. He addressed the crew at their several quarters, cautioned
them against firing a single shot without being sure of their object,
and to the officers he expressed himself as highly satisfied with the
arrangements made.

Meanwhile the two fleets were forming, as best they could with the
scanty breeze, the order in which each meant to meet the shock of
battle. The British could not range themselves in regular columns
without loss of time that was not to be thrown away. They advanced
rather in two elongated groups, all under full sail, even to
studding-sails on both sides, the place of each ship being determined
chiefly by her speed, or, perhaps, by some fortuitous advantage of
position when the movement began. The great point was to get the heads
of the columns into action as soon as possible, to break up the
enemy's order. That done, those which followed could be trusted to
complete the business on the general lines prescribed by Nelson.
Collingwood's ship, the "Royal Sovereign," being but a few days out
from home, and freshly coppered, easily took the lead in her own
division. After her came the "Belleisle," also a recent arrival off
Cadiz, but an old Mediterranean cruiser which had accompanied Nelson
in the recent chase to the West Indies. Upon these two ships, as upon
the heads of all columns, fell the weight of destruction from the
enemy's resistance.

The "Victory," always a fast ship, had likewise little difficulty in
keeping her place at the front. Blackwood, having failed to get Nelson
on board his own frigate, and realizing the exposure inseparable from
the position of leader, ventured, at about half-past nine, when still
six miles from the enemy, to urge that one or two ships should be
permitted to precede the "Victory." Nelson gave a conditional
assent--"Let them go," if they can. The "Téméraire," a three-decker,
being close behind, was hailed to go ahead, and endeavored to do so;
but at the same moment the admiral gave an indication of how little
disposed he was to yield either time or position. The lee lower
studding-sail happening to be badly set, the lieutenant of the
forecastle had it taken in, meaning to reset it; which Nelson
observing, ran forward and rated him severely for delaying the ship's
progress. Anything much less useful than a lee lower studding-sail is
hard to imagine, but by this time the admiral was getting very
restive. "About ten o'clock," says Blackwood, "Lord Nelson's anxiety
to close with the enemy became very apparent: he frequently remarked
that they put a good face upon it; but always quickly added: 'I'll
give them such a dressing as they never had before.'"

Seeing that the "Téméraire" could not pass the "Victory" in time to
lead into the hostile order, unless the flagship gave way, Blackwood,
feeling perhaps that he might wear out his own privilege, told Hardy
he ought to say to the admiral that, unless the "Victory" shortened
sail, the other ships could not get into place; but Hardy naturally
demurred. In any event, it was not just the sort of proposition that
the captain of the ship would wish to make, and it was very doubtful
how Nelson might take it. This the latter soon showed, however; for,
as the "Téméraire" painfully crawled up, and her bows doubled on the
"Victory's" quarter, he hailed her, and speaking as he always did with
a slight nasal intonation, said: "I'll thank you, Captain Harvey, to
keep in your proper station, which is astern of the Victory." The same
concern for the admiral's personal safety led the assembled officers
to comment anxiously upon the conspicuous mark offered by his blaze of
decorations, knowing as they did that the enemy's ships swarmed with
soldiers, that among them were many sharpshooters, and that the action
would be close. None, however, liked to approach him with the
suggestion that he should take any precaution. At length the surgeon,
whose painful duty it was a few hours later to watch over the sad
fulfilment of his apprehensions, said that he would run the risk of
his Lordship's displeasure; but before he could find a fitting
opportunity to speak, a shot flew over the "Victory," and the admiral
directed all not stationed on deck to go to their quarters. No remark
therefore was made; but it is more likely that Nelson would have
resented the warning than that he would have heeded it.

The French and Spanish fleets, being neither a homogeneous nor a
well-exercised mass, experienced even greater difficulty than the
British in forming their array; and the matter was to them of more
consequence, for, as the defensive has an advantage in the careful
preparations he may make, so, if he fail to accomplish them, he has
little to compensate for the loss of the initiative, which he has
yielded his opponent. The formation at which they aimed, the customary
order of battle in that day, was a long, straight, single column,
presenting from end to end an unbroken succession of batteries, close
to one another and clear towards the foe, so that all the ships should
sweep with their guns the sea over which, nearly at right angles, the
hostile columns were advancing. Instead of this, embarrassed by both
lack of wind and lack of skill, their manoeuvres resulted in a curved
line, concave to the enemy's approach; the horns of the crescent thus
formed being nearer to the latter. Collingwood noted that this
disposition facilitated a convergent fire upon the assailants, the
heads of whose columns were bearing down on the allied centre; it does
not seem to have been remarked that the two horns, or wings, being to
windward of the centre, also had it more in their power to support the
latter--a consideration of very great importance. Neither of these
advantages, however, was due to contrivance. The order of the combined
fleets was the result merely of an unsuccessful effort to assume the
usual line of battle. The ships distributed along the crescent lay
irregularly, sometimes two and three abreast, masking each other's
fire. On the other hand, even this irregularity had some
compensations, for a British vessel, attempting to pass through at
such a place, fell at once into a swarm of enemies. From horn to horn
was about five miles. Owing to the lightness of the breeze, the allies
carried a good deal of sail, a departure from the usual battle
practice. This was necessary in order to enable them to keep their
places at all, but it also had the effect of bringing them
continually, though very gradually, nearer to Cadiz. Seeing this,
Nelson signalled to Collingwood, "I intend to pass through the van of
the enemy's line, to prevent him from getting into Cadiz," and the
course of the "Victory," for this purpose, was changed a little to the
northward.

After this, towards eleven o'clock, Nelson went below to the cabin. It
was his habit, when an engagement was expected, to have all the
bulkheads[139] upon the fighting decks taken down, and those of his
own apartments doubtless had been removed at least as soon as the
enemy's sailing was signalled; but it was possible to obtain some
degree of privacy by hanging screens, which could be hurried out of
the way at the last moment. The "Victory" did not come under fire till
12.30, so that at eleven she would yet be three miles or more distant
from the enemy,[140] and screens could still remain. Shortly, after he
entered, the signal-lieutenant, who had been by his side all the
morning, followed him, partly to make an official report, partly to
prefer a personal request. He was the ranking lieutenant on board, but
had not been permitted to exercise the duties of first lieutenant,
because Nelson some time before, to avoid constant changes in that
important station, had ordered that the person then occupying it
should so continue, notwithstanding the seniority of any who might
afterwards join. Now that battle was at hand, the oldest in rank
wished to claim the position, and to gain the reward that it insured
after a victory,--a request natural and not improper, but more suited
for the retirement of the cabin than for the publicity of the deck.

Whatever the original injustice,--or rather hardship,--it is scarcely
likely, remembering the refusal encountered by Blackwood, that Nelson
would have consented now to deprive of his "birthright" the man who so
far had been doing the work; but the petition was never preferred.
Entering the cabin, the officer paused at the threshold, for Nelson
was on his knees writing. The words, the last that he ever penned,
were written in the private diary he habitually kept, in which were
noted observations and reflections upon passing occurrences, mingled
with occasional self-communings. They followed now, without break of
space, or paragraph, upon the last incident recorded--"At seven the
enemy wearing in succession"--and they ran thus:--

"May the Great God, whom I worship, grant to my Country, and for the
benefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory; and may no
misconduct in any one tarnish it; and may humanity after victory be
the predominant feature in the British fleet. For myself,
individually, I commit my life to Him who made me, and may His
blessing light upon my endeavours for serving my Country faithfully.
To Him I resign myself and the just cause which is entrusted to me to
defend. Amen. Amen. Amen."

The officer, Lieutenant Pasco, waited quietly till Nelson rose from
his knees, and then made his necessary report; but, although his
future prospects hung upon the wish he had to express, he refrained
with singular delicacy from intruding it upon the preoccupation of
mind evidenced by the attitude in which he had found his commander.
The latter soon afterwards followed him to the poop, where Blackwood
was still awaiting his final instructions. To him Nelson said, "I will
now amuse the fleet with a signal;" and he asked if he did not think
there was one yet wanting. Blackwood replied that the whole fleet
seemed very clearly to understand what they were about, and were vying
with each other to get as near as possible to the leaders of the
columns. Upon this succeeded the celebrated signal, the development of
which to its final wording is a little uncertain. Comparing the
various accounts of witnesses, it seems probably to have been as
follows. Nelson mused for a little while, as one who phrases a thought
in his own mind before uttering it, and then said, "Suppose we
telegraph 'Nelson confides that every man will do his duty.'" In this
form it was the call of the leader to the followers, the personal
appeal of one who trusts to those in whom he trusts, a feeling
particularly characteristic of the speaker, whose strong hold over
others lay above all in the transparent and unswerving faith he showed
in their loyal support; and to arouse it now in full force he used the
watchword "duty," sure that the chord it struck in him would find its
quick response in every man of the same blood. The officer to whom the
remark was made, suggested "England" instead of "Nelson." To the fleet
it could have made no difference,--to them the two names meant the
same thing; but Nelson accepted the change with delight. "Mr. Pasco,"
he called to the signal officer, "I wish to say to the fleet, 'England
confides that every man will do his duty;'" and he added, "You must be
quick, for I have one more to make, which is for close action." This
remark shows that the columns, and particularly Collingwood's ship,
were already nearing the enemy. Pasco answered, "If your Lordship will
permit me to substitute 'expects' for 'confides,' it will be sooner
completed, because 'expects' is in the vocabulary,[141] and 'confides'
must be spelt." Nelson replied hastily, but apparently satisfied,
"That will do, Pasco, make it directly;" but the slightly mandatory
"expects" is less representative of the author of this renowned
sentence than the cordial and sympathetic "confides." It is "Allez,"
rather than "Allons;" yet even so, become now the voice of the distant
motherland, it carries with it the shade of reverence, as well as of
affection, which patriotism exacts.

It is said that Collingwood, frequently testy, and at the moment
preoccupied with the approaching collision with the Spanish
three-decker he had marked for his opponent, exclaimed impatiently
when the first number went aloft, "I wish Nelson would stop
signalling, as we know well enough what we have to do." But the two
life-long friends, who were not again to look each other in the face,
soon passed to other thoughts, such as men gladly recall when death
has parted them. When the whole signal was reported to him, and cheers
resounded along the lines, Collingwood cordially expressed his own
satisfaction. A few moments later, just at noon, the French ship
"Fougueux," the second astern of the "Santa Ana," for which the "Royal
Sovereign" was steering, fired at the latter the first gun of the
battle. As by a common impulse the ships of all the nations engaged
hoisted their colors, and the admirals their flags,--a courteous and
chivalrous salute preceding the mortal encounter. For ten minutes the
"Royal Sovereign" advanced in silence, the one centre of the hostile
fire, upon which were fixed all eyes, as yet without danger of their
own to distract. As she drew near the two ships between which she
intended to pass, Nelson exclaimed admiringly, "See how that noble
fellow Collingwood carries his ship into action." At about the same
instant Collingwood was saying to his flag-captain, "Rotherham, what
would Nelson give to be here!"

These things being done, Nelson said to Blackwood, "Now I can do no
more. We must trust to the great Disposer of all events, and to the
justice of our cause. I thank God for this great opportunity of doing
my duty." When his last signal had been acknowledged by a few ships in
the van, the admiral directed Pasco to make that for close action, and
to keep it up. This was accordingly hoisted on board the flagship,
where it was flying still as she disappeared into the smoke of the
battle, and so remained till shot away. The "Victory" was about two
miles from the "Royal Sovereign" when the latter, at ten minutes past
twelve, broke through the allied order, and she had still a mile and a
half to go before she herself could reach it. At twenty minutes past
twelve Villeneuve's flagship, the "Bucentaure," of eighty guns, fired
a shot at her, to try the range. It fell short. A few minutes later a
second was fired, which dropped alongside. The distance then was a
mile and a quarter. Two or three followed in rapid succession and
passed over the "Victory." Nelson then turned to Blackwood, and
directed him and Captain Prowse of the "Sirius" to return to their
ships, but in so doing to pass along the column and tell the captains
he depended upon their exertions to get into action as quickly as
possible. He then bade them again to go away. Blackwood, who was
standing by him at the forward end of the poop, took his hand, and
said, "I trust, my Lord, that on my return to the Victory, which will
be as soon as possible, I shall find your Lordship well and in
possession of twenty prizes." Nelson replied, "God bless you,
Blackwood, I shall never speak to you again."

The "Victory" was all the time advancing, the feeble breeze urging her
progress, which was helped also by her lurching through the heavy
following swell that prevailed. Before Blackwood could leave her, a
shot passed through the main-topgallantsail, and the rent proclaimed
to the eager eyes of the foes that the ship was fairly under their
guns. Thereupon everything about the "Bucentaure," some seven or eight
ships, at least, opened upon this single enemy, as the allied rear and
centre had upon the "Royal Sovereign;" for it was imperative to stop
her way, if possible, or at least to deaden it, and so to delay as
long as might be the moment when she could bring her broadside to bear
effectively. During the forty minutes that followed, the "Victory" was
an unresisting target to her enemies, and her speed, slow enough at
the first, decreased continually as the hail of shot riddled the
sails, or stripped them from the yards. Every studding-sail boom was
shot away close to the yard arms, and this light canvas, invaluable in
so faint a wind, fell helplessly into the water. During these trying
moments, Mr. Scott, the admiral's public secretary, was struck by a
round shot while talking with Captain Hardy, and instantly killed.
Those standing by sought to remove the body without drawing Nelson's
attention to the loss of one so closely associated with him; but the
admiral had noticed the fall. "Is that poor Scott," he said, "who is
gone?" The clerk who took the dead man's place was killed a few
moments later by the wind of a ball, though his person was untouched.

The "Victory" continuing to forge slowly ahead, despite her injuries,
and pointing evidently for the flagship of the hostile
commander-in-chief, the ships round the latter, to use James's
striking phrase, now "closed like a forest." The nearer the British
vessel drew, the better necessarily became the enemies' aim. Just as
she got within about five hundred yards--quarter of a mile--from the
"Bucentaure's" beam, the mizzen topmast was shot away. At the same
time the wheel was hit and shattered, so that the ship had to be
steered from below, a matter that soon became of little importance. A
couple of minutes more, eight marines were carried off by a single
projectile, while standing drawn up on the poop, whereupon Nelson
ordered the survivors to be dispersed about the deck. Presently a shot
coming in through the ship's side ranged aft on the quarter-deck
towards the admiral and Captain Hardy, between whom it passed. On its
way it struck the fore-brace bitts--a heavy block of timber--carrying
thence a shower of splinters, one of which bruised Hardy's foot. The
two officers, who were walking together, stopped, and looked
inquiringly at each other. Seeing that no harm was done, Nelson
smiled, but said, "This is too warm work, Hardy, to last long." He
then praised the cool resolution of the seamen around him, compelled
to endure this murderous fire without present reply. He had never, he
said, seen better conduct. Twenty men had so far been killed and
thirty wounded, with not a shot fired from their own guns.

Still the ship closed the "Bucentaure." It had been Nelson's purpose
and desire to make her his special antagonist, because of Villeneuve's
flag; but to do so required room for the "Victory" to turn under the
French vessel's stern, and to come up alongside. As she drew near,
Hardy, scanning the hostile array, saw three ships crowded together
behind and beyond the "Bucentaure." He reported to Nelson that he
could go close under her stern, but could not round-to alongside, nor
pass through the line, without running on board one of these. The
admiral replied, "I cannot help it, it does not signify which we run
on board of. Go on board which you please: take your choice." At one
o'clock the bows of the "Victory" crossed the wake of the
"Bucentaure," by whose stern she passed within thirty feet, the
projecting yard arms grazing the enemy's rigging. One after another,
as they bore, the double-shotted guns tore through the woodwork of the
French ship, the smoke, driven back, filling the lower decks of the
"Victory," while persons on the upper deck, including Nelson himself,
were covered with the dust which rose in clouds from the wreck. From
the relative positions of the two vessels, the shot ranged from end to
end of the "Bucentaure," and the injury was tremendous. Twenty guns
were at once dismounted, and the loss by that single discharge was
estimated, by the French, at four hundred men. Leaving the further
care of the enemy's flagship to her followers, secure that they would
give due heed to the admiral's order, that "every effort must be made
to capture the hostile commander-in-chief," the "Victory" put her helm
up, inclining to the right, and ran on board a French seventy-four,
the "Redoutable," whose guns, as well as those of the French
"Neptune," had been busily playing upon her hitherto. At 1.10 she lay
along the port side of the "Redoutable," the two ships falling off
with their heads to the eastward, and moving slowly before the wind to
the east-southeast.

In the duel which ensued between these two, in which Nelson fell, the
disparity, so far as weight of battery was concerned, was all against
the French ship; but the latter, while greatly overmatched at the
guns, much the greater part of which were below deck, was markedly
superior to her antagonist in small-arm fire on the upper deck, and
especially aloft, where she had many musketeers stationed. Nelson
himself was averse to the employment of men in that position, thinking
the danger of fire greater than the gain, but the result on this day
was fatal to very many of the "Victory's" men as well as to himself.
As the ship's place in the battle was fixed for the moment, nothing
now remained to be done, except for the crews to ply their weapons
till the end was reached. The admiral and the captain, their parts of
direction and guidance being finished, walked back and forth together
on the quarter-deck, on the side farthest from the "Redoutable," where
there was a clear space of a little over twenty feet in length, fore
and aft, from the wheel to the hatch ladder leading down to the cabin.
The mizzen-top of the "Redoutable," garnished with sharpshooters, was
about fifty feet above them. Fifteen minutes after the vessels came
together, as the two officers were walking forward, and had nearly
reached the usual place of turning, Nelson, who was on Hardy's left,
suddenly faced left about. Hardy, after taking a step farther, turned
also, and saw the admiral in the act of falling--on his knees, with
his left hand touching the deck; then, the arm giving way, he fell on
his left side. It was in the exact spot where Scott, the secretary,
had been killed an hour before. To Hardy's natural exclamation that he
hoped he was not badly hurt, he replied, "They have done for me at
last;" and when the expression of hope was repeated, he said again,
"Yes, my back-bone is shot through." "I felt it break my back," he
told the surgeon, a few minutes later. The ball had struck him on the
left shoulder, on the forward part of the epaulette, piercing the
lung, where it severed a large artery, and then passed through the
spine from left to right, lodging finally in the muscles of the back.
Although there was more than one mortal injury, the immediate and
merciful cause of his speedy death was the internal bleeding from the
artery. Within a few moments of his wounding some forty officers and
men were cut down by the same murderous fire from the tops of the
enemy. Indeed so stripped of men was the upper deck of the "Victory"
that the French made a movement to board, which was repulsed, though
with heavy loss.

The stricken hero was at once carried below, himself covering his face
and the decorations of his coat with his handkerchief, that the sight
of their loss might not affect the ship's company at this critical
instant. The cockpit was already cumbered with the wounded and dying,
but the handkerchief falling from his face, the surgeon recognized
him, and came at once to him. "You can do nothing for me, Beatty," he
said; "I have but a short time to live." The surgeon also uttered the
involuntary exclamation of encouragement, which rises inevitably to
the lips at such a moment; but a short examination, and the sufferer's
statement of his sensations, especially the gushing of blood within
the breast, which was vividly felt, convinced him that there was
indeed no hope. "Doctor, I am gone," he said to the Rev. Mr. Scott,
the chaplain, who knelt beside him; and then added in a low voice, "I
have to leave Lady Hamilton, and my adopted daughter Horatia, as a
legacy to my Country."

After the necessary examination had been made, nothing further could
be done, nor was attempted, than to obtain the utmost possible relief
from suffering. Dr. Scott and the purser of the "Victory" sustained
the bed under his shoulders, raising him into a semi-recumbent
posture, the only one that was supportable to him, and fanned him;
while others gave him the cooling drink--lemonade--which he
continually demanded. Those about did not speak to him, except when
addressed; but the chaplain, to whom Nelson frequently said, "Pray for
me, Doctor," ejaculated with him short prayers from time to time. The
agony of mortal pain wrung from him repeated utterance, though no
unmanly complaint; and his thoughts dwelt more upon home and the
battle than upon his own suffering and approaching death. His mind
remained clear until he became speechless, about fifteen minutes
before he passed away, and he took frequent notice of what occurred
near him, as well as of sounds on deck.

The hour that succeeded his wounding was the decisive one of the
fight; not that the issue admitted of much doubt, after once Nelson's
plans had received fulfilment, and the battle joined,--unless the
delinquent van of the allies had acted promptly,--but in those moments
the work was done which was thenceforth, for the enemy, beyond repair.
Overhead, therefore, the strife went on incessantly, the seamen
toiling steadily at their guns, and cheering repeatedly. Near the
admiral lay Lieutenant Pasco, severely but not fatally wounded. At one
burst of hurrahs, Nelson asked eagerly what it was about; and Pasco
replying that another ship had struck, he expressed his satisfaction.
Soon he became very anxious for further and more exact information of
the course of the battle, and about the safety of Captain Hardy, upon
whom now was devolved such guidance as the fleet, until the action was
over, must continue to receive from the flagship of the
commander-in-chief. In accordance with his wishes many messages were
sent to Hardy to come to him, but for some time it was not possible
for that officer to leave the deck. During this period, up to between
half-past two and three, the ships of the two British divisions, that
followed the leaders, were breaking successively into the enemy's
order, and carrying out with intelligent precision the broad outlines
of Nelson's instructions. The heads of the columns had dashed
themselves to pieces, like a forlorn hope, against the overpowering
number of foes which opposed their passage--an analysis of the returns
shows that upon the four ships which led, the "Victory" and
"Téméraire," the "Royal Sovereign" and "Belleisle," fell one-third of
the entire loss in a fleet of twenty-seven sail. But they had forced
their way through, and by the sacrifice of themselves had shattered
and pulverized the local resistance, destroyed the coherence of the
hostile line, and opened the road for the successful action of their
followers. With the appearance of the latter upon the scene, succeeded
shortly by the approach of the allied van, though too late and in
disorder, began what may be called the second and final phase of the
battle.

While such things were happening the deck could not be left by Hardy,
who, for the time being, was commander-in-chief as well as captain.
Shortly after Nelson fell, the "Téméraire" had run on board the
"Redoutable" on the other side, and the French "Fougueux" upon the
"Téméraire," so that for a few minutes the four ships were fast
together, in the heat of the fight. About quarter past two, the
"Victory" was shoved clear, and lay with her head to the northward,
though scarcely with steerage way. The three others remained in
contact with their heads to the southward. While this _mêlée_ was in
progress, the French flagship "Bucentaure" surrendered, at five
minutes past two; but, before hauling down the flag, Villeneuve made a
signal to his recreant van,--"The ships that are not engaged, take
positions which will bring them most rapidly under fire." Thus
summoned, the ten vessels which constituted the van began to go about,
as they should have done before; and, although retarded by the slack
wind, they had got their heads to the southward by half-past two. Five
stood to leeward of the line of battle, but five to windward. The
latter would pass not far to the westward of the "Victory," and to
meet this fresh attack demanded the captain's further care, and
postponed his going to the death-bed of his chief. The latter had
become very agitated at the delay, thinking that Hardy might be dead
and the news kept from him. "Will nobody bring Hardy to me?" he
frequently exclaimed. "He must be killed; he is surely destroyed." At
last a midshipman came down with the message that "circumstances
respecting the fleet required the captain's presence on deck, but that
he would take the first favourable moment to visit his Lordship."
Nelson, hearing the voice, asked who it was that spoke. The lad,
Bulkeley, who later in the day was wounded also, was the son of a
former shipmate in the far back days of the San Juan expedition, and
the dying admiral charged the lad with a remembrance to his father.

Two ships of Nelson's column, as yet not engaged,--the "Spartiate" and
the "Minotaur,"--were then just reaching the scene. Being in the
extreme rear, the lightness of the breeze had so far delayed them.
Arriving thus opportunely, they hauled to the wind so as to interpose
between the "Victory" and the approaching van of the allies. Covered
now by two wholly fresh ships, the captain felt at liberty to quit the
deck, in accordance with Nelson's desire. The two tried friends--Hardy
had been everywhere with him since the day of St. Vincent, and was
faithful enough to speak to Lady Hamilton more freely than she
liked--shook hands affectionately. "Well, Hardy," said Nelson, "how
goes the battle? How goes the day with us?" "Very well, my Lord,"
replied Hardy. "We have got twelve or fourteen of the enemy's ships in
our possession, but five of their van have tacked, and show an
intention of bearing down upon the Victory. I have therefore called
two or three of our fresh ships round us, and have no doubt of giving
them a drubbing." "I hope none of _our_ ships have struck, Hardy."
"No, my Lord," was the answer, "there is no fear of that." Nelson then
said, "I am a dead man, Hardy. I am going fast: it will be all over
with me soon. Come nearer to me. Pray let my dear Lady Hamilton have
my hair, and all other things belonging to me." Hardy observed that he
hoped Mr. Beatty could yet hold out some prospect of life. "Oh no!"
replied Nelson; "it is impossible. My back is shot through. Beatty
will tell you so." Hardy then returned to the deck, shaking hands
again before parting.

Nelson now desired the surgeons to leave him to the attendants, as one
for whom nothing could be done, and to give their professional care
where it would be of some avail. In a few moments he recalled the
chief surgeon, and said, "I forgot to tell you that all power of
motion and feeling below my breast are gone; and _you_ very well
_know_ I can live but a short time." From the emphasis he placed on
his words, the surgeon saw he was thinking of a case of spinal injury
to a seaman some months before, which had proved mortal after many
days' suffering; yet it would seem that, despite the conviction that
rested on his mind, the love of life, and of all it meant to him, yet
clung to the hope that possibly there might be a reprieve. "One would
like to live a little longer," he murmured; and added, "What would
become of poor Lady Hamilton if she knew my situation!" "Beatty," he
said again, "_you know_ I am gone." "My Lord," replied the surgeon,
with a noble and courteous simplicity, "unhappily for our country,
nothing can be done for you;" and he turned away to conceal the
emotion which he could not at once control. "I know it," said Nelson.
"I feel something rising in my breast," putting his hand on his left
side, "which tells me I am gone. God be praised, I have done my duty."
To this latter thought he continually recurred.

At about three o'clock, the five ships of the enemy's van, passing
within gunshot to windward,[142] opened fire upon the British ships
and their prizes. The "Victory" with her consorts replied. "Oh,
Victory! Victory!" cried the sufferer, "how you distract my poor
brain!" and after a pause added, "How dear life is to all men!" This
distant exchange of shots was ineffectual, except to kill or wound a
few more people, but while it continued Hardy had to be on deck, for
the flag of the commander-in-chief still vested his authority in that
ship. During this period an officer was sent to Collingwood to inform
him of the admiral's condition, and to bear a personal message of
farewell from the latter; but Nelson had no idea of transferring any
portion of his duty until he parted with his life also.

A short hour elapsed between Hardy's leaving the cockpit and his
returning to it, which brings the time to four o'clock. Strength had
ebbed fast meanwhile, and the end was now very near; but Nelson was
still conscious. The friends again shook hands, and the captain,
before releasing his grasp, congratulated the dying hero upon the
brilliancy of the victory. It was complete, he said. How many were
captured, it was impossible to see, but he was certain fourteen or
fifteen. The exact number proved to be eighteen. "That is well," said
Nelson, but added, faithful to his exhaustive ideas of sufficiency, "I
bargained for twenty." Then he exclaimed, "_Anchor_, Hardy, _anchor_!"
Hardy felt the embarrassment of issuing orders now that Collingwood
knew that his chief was in the very arms of death; but Nelson was
clearly within his rights. "I suppose, my Lord," said the captain,
"Admiral Collingwood will now take upon himself the direction of
affairs." "Not while I live, I hope, Hardy," cried Nelson, and for a
moment endeavored, ineffectually, to raise himself from the bed. "No.
Do _you_ anchor, Hardy." Captain Hardy then said, "Shall we make the
signal, Sir?" "Yes," answered the admiral, "for if I live, I'll
anchor." These words he repeated several times, even after Hardy had
left him, and the energy of his manner showed that for the moment the
sense of duty and of responsibility had triumphed over his increasing
weakness.

Reaction of course followed, and he told Hardy he felt that in a few
minutes he should be no more. "Don't throw me overboard," he added;
"you know what to do." Hardy having given assurance that these wishes
should be attended to, Nelson then said, "Take care of my dear Lady
Hamilton, Hardy: take care of poor Lady Hamilton. Kiss me, Hardy." The
captain knelt down and kissed his cheek. "Now I am satisfied. Thank
God, I have done my duty." Hardy rose and stood looking silently at
him for an instant or two, then knelt down again and kissed his
forehead. "Who is that?" asked Nelson. The captain answered, "It is
Hardy;" to which his Lordship replied, "God bless you, Hardy!" The
latter then returned to the quarter-deck, having passed about eight
minutes in this final interview.

Nelson now desired his steward, who was in attendance throughout, to
turn him on his right side. "I wish I had not left the deck," he
murmured; "for I shall soon be gone." Thenceforth he sank rapidly; his
breathing became oppressed and his voice faint. To Dr. Scott he said,
"Doctor, I have _not_ been a _great_ sinner," and after a short pause,
"_Remember_, that I leave Lady Hamilton and my daughter Horatia as a
legacy to my country--never forget Horatia." This injunction, with
remembrances to Lady Hamilton and the child, he frequently repeated;
and he charged Scott to see Mr. Rose, and tell him--but here pain
interrupted his utterance, and after an interval he simply said, "Mr.
Rose will remember," alluding to a letter which he had written him,
but which as yet could not have been received. His thirst now
increased; and he called for "drink, drink," "fan, fan," and "rub,
rub," addressing himself in this last case to Dr. Scott, who had been
rubbing his breast with his hand, by which some relief was given.
These words he spoke in a very rapid manner, which rendered his
articulation difficult; but he every now and then, with evident
increase of pain, made a greater effort, and said distinctly, "Thank
God, I have done my duty." This he repeated at intervals as long as
the power of speech remained. The last words caught by Dr. Scott, who
was bending closely over him, were, "God and my Country."

Fifteen minutes after Hardy left him for the second time, the admiral
became speechless; and when this had continued five minutes, the
surgeon, who was busied among the other wounded, was summoned again.
He found him upon the verge of dissolution, the hands cold and the
pulse gone; but upon laying his hand upon his forehead, Nelson opened
his eyes, looked up, and then closed them forever. Five minutes later
he was dead. The passing was so quiet that Dr. Scott, still rubbing
his breast, did not perceive it, until the surgeon announced that all
was over. It was half-past four o'clock, just three hours after the
fatal wound was received. Not till an hour later did the last of the
eighteen prizes strike, and firing cease altogether; but the
substantial results were known to Nelson before consciousness left
him. To quote the rugged words of the "Victory's" log, "Partial firing
continued until 4.30, when a victory having been reported to the Right
Honourable Lord Viscount Nelson, K.B., he died of his wound."

Of the five ships of the allied van which passed to windward of the
"Victory," one was cut off and captured by the "Minotaur" and
"Spartiate." The other four continued on the wind to the southwest,
and escaped to sea. By the surrender of Villeneuve the chief command
of the combined fleets remained with the Spanish admiral Gravina. The
latter, at quarter before five, fifteen minutes after Nelson breathed
his last, retreated upon Cadiz, making signal for the vessels which
had not struck to rally round his flag. Ten other ships, five French
and five Spanish,--in all eleven sail-of-the-line,--made good their
escape into the port.

"Before sunset," wrote an eye-witness on board the "Belleisle," "all
firing had ceased. The view of the fleet at this period was highly
interesting, and would have formed a beautiful subject for a painter.
Just under the setting rays were five or six dismantled prizes; on one
hand lay the Victory with part of our fleet and prizes, and on the
left hand the Royal Sovereign and a similar cluster of ships. To the
northward, the remnant of the combined fleets was making for Cadiz.
The Achille, with the tricoloured ensign still displayed, had burnt to
the water's edge about a mile from us, and our tenders and boats were
using every effort to save the brave fellows who had so gloriously
defended her; but only two hundred and fifty were rescued, and she
blew up with a tremendous explosion."

There, surrounded by the companions of his triumph, and by the
trophies of his prowess, we leave our hero with his glory. Sharer of
our mortal weakness, he has bequeathed to us a type of single-minded
self-devotion that can never perish. As his funeral anthem proclaimed,
while a nation mourned, "His body is buried in peace, but his Name
liveth for evermore." Wars may cease, but the need for heroism shall
not depart from the earth, while man remains man and evil exists to be
redressed. Wherever danger has to be faced or duty to be done, at cost
to self, men will draw inspiration from the name and deeds of Nelson.

Happy he who lives to finish all his task. The words, "I have done my
duty," sealed the closed book of Nelson's story with a truth broader
and deeper than he himself could suspect. His duty was done, and its
fruit perfected. Other men have died in the hour of victory, but for
no other has victory so singular and so signal graced the fulfilment
and ending of a great life's work. "Finis coronat opus" has of no man
been more true than of Nelson. There were, indeed, consequences
momentous and stupendous yet to flow from the decisive supremacy of
Great Britain's sea-power, the establishment of which, beyond all
question or competition, was Nelson's great achievement; but his part
was done when Trafalgar was fought. The coincidence of his death with
the moment of completed success has impressed upon that superb battle
a stamp of finality, an immortality of fame, which even its own
grandeur scarcely could have insured. He needed, and he left, no
successor. To use again St. Vincent's words, "There is but one
Nelson."

FOOTNOTES:

[132] The name Thompson was spelled by Nelson indifferently with or without
the "p", which, as Nicolas observes, confirms the belief that it was
fictitious. The fact is singular; for, from a chance remark of his, it
appears that he meant it to be Thomson. (Morrison, Letter No. 569.)

[133] The author is indebted for this anecdote to Mr. Edgar Goble, of
Fareham, Hants, whose father, Thomas Goble, then secretary to Captain
Hardy, was present at the table.

[134] One sixty-four, the "Africa," had separated to the northward during
the night, and joined in the battle by passing alone along the enemy's
line, much of the time under fire. She belonged, therefore, to Nelson's
column, and cooperated with it during the day.

[135] Nelson in his journal wrote: "The enemy wearing _in succession_." As
the allies' order was reversed, however, it is evident that he meant merely
that the ships wore one after the other, from rear to van, but in their
respective stations, each waiting till the one astern had, to use the old
phrase, "marked her manoeuvre,"--a precaution intended to prevent
collisions, though it necessarily extended the line.

[136] The author is indebted for these incidents to Admiral Sir W.R. Mends,
G.C.B., who received them from the second baronet, Sir Henry M. Blackwood,
when serving with him as first lieutenant.

[137] The "Euryalus's" log gives eight o'clock as the hour of the captain's
going on board the "Victory;" but Blackwood not only says six, but also
mentions that his stay on board lasted five and a half hours, which gives
about the same time for going on board. The other frigate captains did not
go till eight. Blackwood, as the senior, might need a fuller and longer
continued interview, because the general direction of the frigate squadron
would be in his hands; or Nelson might particularly desire the presence of
a close professional friend, the captains of the ships-of-the-line having
their hands now full of preparations.

[138] The question of Lady Hamilton's services on the occasions mentioned
by Nelson, vigorously asserted by herself, has been exhaustively discussed
by Professor John Knox Laughton, in the "United Service Magazine" for April
and May, 1889. His conclusions are decisively adverse to her claims.

[139] See _ante_, p. 275.

[140] That is, with a one and a half knot breeze.

[141] The vocabulary of the telegraphic signal book provides certain words
which can be signalled by a single number. Words not in this vocabulary
must be spelled letter by letter,--each letter of the alphabet having its
own number.

[142] That is, to the westward.



INDEX.


Aboukir, Bay, Island, Promontory, and Castle, i. 342, 343, 345-347, 365;
  ii. 16, 17, 32.

Aboukir, Battle of, ii. 17.

Acton, Sir John, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies,
  i. 328, 329, 340, 342, 383, 428, 430, 443;
  ii. 8, 190, 191, 193, 194, 219, 264, 274, 275.

Addington (afterwards Lord Sidmouth), Prime Minister of Great Britain,
  1801-1804, Nelson's intercourse with, i. 383; ii. 101, 103, 120, 136,
  162-164, 166, 167, 172, 174, 189, 193, 205, 211, 352.

Adriatic,
  importance to the communications of the Austrians in Italy, i. 247, 405;
  British concern in, 369, ii. 192, 195, 243;
  Napoleon's interest in, 188, 195, 266;
  resort of privateers, 241, 242.

"Agamemnon," British ship-of-the-line,
  Nelson ordered to command her, i. 95;
  relation to his career, 97-99;
  action with four French frigates, 113, 115;
  engages the batteries at Bastia, 120, 121;
  action with the "Ça Ira," French 80-gun ship, 163-166;
  engagement of March 14, 1795, 168;
  engagement of July 13, 178-180;
  services at Genoa, 200-202;
  on the opening of Bonaparte's campaign, 1796, 220-223;
  Nelson leaves her for the "Captain," seventy-four, 229, 230;
  she sails for England, 230;
  subsequent history, 230;
  misfortune at the Battle of Copenhagen, ii. 87;
  joins the fleet shortly before Trafalgar, 361.

"Albemarle," British frigate commanded by Nelson, i. 31-41.

Alexandria, Nelson's first voyage to, i. 332-339;
  second voyage, 342, 343;
  blockaded, 366;
  Nelson's third voyage to, ii. 276, 277.

Algiers, Bonaparte's designs upon, ii. 184;
  Nelson's difficulties with, 230-232.

"Amazon," British frigate,
  services at Copenhagen, ii. 82, 86, 89, 91;
  subsequent mention, 217, 261-263, 289, 295, 315.

Amiens, Peace of, signature of, ii. 146;
  Nelson's home life during, 150-178;
  rupture of, 175.

"Amphion," British frigate,
  Nelson's passage to Mediterranean in, ii. 189-196;
  leaves her for the "Victory," 222.

Archduke Charles, Nelson's meeting with, at Prague, ii. 43.

Austria and Austrians,
  result of campaign of 1794 in Holland and Germany, 155;
  in Italy, 156;
  delay in opening campaign of 1795 in Italy, 177;
  their advance to Vado Bay, on the Riviera, 178;
  Nelson ordered to co-operate with, 178, 184;
  their disregard of Genoese neutrality, 184;
  position of, in summer of 1795, 186;
  inability, or unwillingness to advance, 188, 189, 194;
  their attitude towards the British, 197, 202, 213;
  growing insecurity of their position, 196, 200, 201, 212;
  attacked and defeated by French at Battle of Loano, 201;
  retreat across the Apennines, 202;
  urged by Nelson to reoccupy Vado in 1796, 218, 219;
  their advance under Beaulieu, 220-223;
  Nelson's assurances to, 221;
  defeat by Bonaparte, 220, 223;
  driven into the Tyrol, and behind the Adige, 232;
  besieged in Mantua, 232;
  advance under Wurmser to relieve Mantua, 238;
  Nelson's hopes therefrom, 238-241;
  hears of their defeat again, 241, 244;
  the peace of Campo Formio between Austria and France, 317, 318;
  dissatisfaction of Austria with France, 319, 322;
  effect of their position in upper Italy upon French operations, 391;
  attitude towards France and Naples, 1798, 392;
  Nelson's judgment on, 399, 400;
  alliance with Russia, 1799, 400;
  successes in 1799, 400, 415, 416, ii. 1, 14, 15;
  reverses, 15;
  capture of Genoa, 1800, 37;
  defeat at Marengo, 37;
  abandon Northern Italy, 37;
  Nelson's visit to, 40-43;
  peace with France, 1801, 63, 119;
  exhaustion of, 1801-1805, 180;
  Nelson's remonstrance with, on failure to enforce her neutrality, 242.


Ball, Sir Alexander J., British captain, letter to Nelson, i. 211;
  joins Nelson's division at Gibraltar, 316;
  services in saving the flagship, 324;
  advice asked by Nelson, 333;
  at the Battle of the Nile, 347, 352-354;
  accompanies Nelson to Naples, 366;
  gallantry towards Lady Hamilton, 386;
  serves ashore at Malta, 392, 406-409, ii. 7, 9, 11, 12, 13;
  mentions with unbelief reports about Nelson and Lady Hamilton, i. 396;
  summoned to join Nelson upon the incursion of Admiral Bruix,
  419-421, 426;
  ordered to resume duties at Malta, 423;
  mention of Nelson in letters to Lady Hamilton, ii. 23, 30;
  visits Nelson at Merton, 158;
  anecdote of Nelson told by him, 158;
  letters from Nelson to, 211, 213, 242-244, 270, 274, 278, 280, 286, 292;
  opinion as to French objects in 1804, 212;
  Nelson's testy vexation with, 238;
  opinion as to the management of coast lookout stations, 318, note.

Barbary States. _See_ Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis.

Barham, Lord, Nelson's interview with, as Comptroller of the Navy, i. 85;
  First Lord of the Admiralty, ii. 291 and note, 317, 320, 321;
  Nelson's interviews with, 320, 333;
  Nelson's letters to, 324, 353, 355, 358.

Bastia, town in Corsica, in possession of French, i. 116;
  blockade of, by Nelson, 120, 122;
  engagement with batteries of, 120;
  description of, 121;
  Nelson's opinion as to besieging, 121-124, 126;
  siege of, 127-131;
  capitulation of, 129;
  Nelson's estimate as to his own services at, 132, 133, 152;
  Nelson directed to superintend evacuation of, by British, 247;
  evacuation of, 251-253.

Battles, land, mentioned:
  Aboukir, ii. 17;
  Castiglione, i. 241, 244;
  Hohenlinden, ii. 63;
  Loano, i. 201;
  Marengo, ii. 37;
  Novi, 15.

Battles, naval, mentioned:
  Calder's action, ii. 307, 313, 318, 323;
  Camperdown, i. 309;
  Copenhagen, ii. 79-97, 98, 161-167;
  First of June (Lord Howe's), i. 150, 176;
  July 13, 1795, i. 178-182;
  March 14, 1795, i. 166-173;
  the Nile, i. 343-358;
  St. Vincent, i. 268-277;
  Trafalgar, ii. 377-397.

Beatty, Dr., surgeon of the "Victory,"
  account of Nelson's habits and health, ii. 225-228 and note;
  present at Nelson's death, 388, 389, 392, 393, 396.

Beaulieu, Austrian general, commands the army in Italy, 1796, i. 219;
  defeated by Bonaparte, and driven into the Tyrol, 220-223, 232.

Beckford, William, opinion of Lady Hamilton, i. 381;
  visited by Nelson at Fonthill, ii. 51-53;
  anecdote of Nelson, 52.

Berry, Sir Edward, British captain,
  accompanies Nelson in boarding the "San Nicolas" and "San Josef,"
  i. 273-275, 279;
  commands Nelson's flagship, the "Vanguard," 309;
  account of the campaign of the Nile (quoted), 332, 339, 344, 355, 359;
  at the Battle of the Nile, 351, 354, 363;
  sent to England with despatches, 360;
  commands the "Foudroyant" at the capture of the "Généreux," ii. 24-27;
  at the capture of the "Guillaume Tell," 31, 32;
  commands the "Agamemnon" at Trafalgar, 361;
  numerous services of, 362.

Bickerton, Sir Richard, British admiral,
  commands in the "Mediterranean" when war with France begins, 1803,
  ii. 194;
  second in command to Nelson, 1803-1805, 202, 215, 219, 246, 248, 259,
  263, 278;
  left in command by Nelson, upon his departure for the West Indies,
  294, 314, 317;
  joins Collingwood before Cadiz, 334;
  returns to England, ill, just before Trafalgar, 338.

Blackwood, Sir Henry, British captain, distinguished part taken in the
  capture of the "Guillaume Tell," ii. 31, 328;
  arrives in London with news that the combined fleets are in Cadiz, 328;
  interviews with Nelson, 328;
  commands advanced squadron of frigates off Cadiz, 339, 357, 361,
  364-369;
  last day spent with Nelson, 372-379, 382-385;
  witnesses the "Codicil" to Nelson's will, 374, 375;
  special mark of confidence shown him by Nelson, 377;
  Nelson's farewell to him, 385.

Bolton, Susannah, Nelson's sister, relations of,
  with Lady Nelson and Lady Hamilton, ii. 55, 178.

Bonaparte, Napoleon, decisive influence of Nelson upon the career of,
  i. 96, 97, 220, ii. 63, 64, 119, 120, 267-270, 283, 284, 301, 310, 314;
  indicates the key of the defences of Toulon, i. 117;
  opinions upon operations in Italy, 186, 187, 193, 194, 197, 208,
  214-216, 219, 391, 394;
  command of Army of Italy, 220;
  defeats Beaulieu, advances to the Adige, and establishes the French
  position in Northern Italy, 220-223, 228, 229, 232;
  fortifies the coastline of the Riviera, 223, 224, 227;
  seizes Leghorn, 231-233, 236;
  contrasted with Nelson, 234-236, 258, ii. 129, 130, 172;
  overthrows Wurmser, i. 238, 240, 241;
  effect of his campaign in Italy upon the career of Nelson, 242, 243,
  318;
  forces Genoa to close her ports to Great Britain, 245;
  sails on the Egyptian Expedition, 323, 325, 328, 329, 331-334, 336-339;
  landing in Egypt, 339;
  Nelson's appreciation of the effect upon, by the Battle of the Nile,
  366, 369, 370, 406, ii. 18-22;
  expedition into Syria, 17;
  escape from Egypt to France, 16, 17,
    after defeating a Turkish army in Aboukir Bay, 17;
  defeats Austrians at Marengo, 37;
  influence upon the formation of the Baltic Coalition, 63, 64;
  threats of invading England, 1801, 119-122;
  his dominant situation on the Continent in 1803, 179-187;
  firmness of intention to invade England, 1803-1805, 184-188, 191,
  204, 213;
  his policy and Nelson's counter projects, 182-187;
  Nelson's singularly accurate prediction of future of, 188, 265;
  Nelson's intuitive recognition of probable action of, 265, 270;
  vast combinations for invasion of England, 267-272, 283, 284;
  his understanding of the value of sea-power evidenced, 282.

"Boreas," British frigate, commanded by Nelson, 1784-1787, i. 44-80.

Brereton, British general, erroneous information sent to Nelson,
  ii. 298-300;
  Nelson's expressions of annoyance, 300, 309, 311, 318;
  comment upon his mistake, 318, note.

Bronté, Duke of, Sicilian title and estate conferred upon Nelson, ii. 2;
  his form of signature afterwards, 2 and note.

Brueys, French admiral, commander-in-chief at the Battle of the Nile,
  i. 345;
  his dispositions for action, 345-347.

Bruix, French admiral, commander-in-chief of a French fleet entering
  the Mediterranean from Brest, i. 417, 422, 425, 428, 432;
  effect of his approach upon proceedings in Naples, 432, 437, 441;
  his return to Brest, 446, 448;
  Nelson's comment upon his conduct, ii. 213.

"Bucentaure," French flagship at Trafalgar, Nelson's encounter with,
  ii. 384-387;
  surrender of, 391.


Cadiz, Nelson's visit to, i. 103-104;
  his operations before, under Jervis, 286-288, 289-294;
  his watch before, prior to Trafalgar, ii. 339, 356-361;
  effect of position of, upon the Battle of Trafalgar, 369, 371, 372, 380.

"Ça Ira," French ship-of-the-line, Nelson's action with,
  in the "Agamemnon," i. 163-166;
  his credit for, 172.

Calder, Sir Robert, British admiral, captain of the fleet at the
  Battle of St. Vincent, i. 281, 282;
  his indecisive action with the allied fleets, in 1805, ii. 307, 313;
  popular outcry against, 308, 315, 323, 353;
  Nelson's relations with, 318, 319, 323, 327, 353-356;
  recalled to England for trial, 353.

Calvi, town in Corsica, Nelson at the siege of, i. 136-148;
  loses there his right eye, 139, 140.

Canary Islands. _See_ Teneriffe.

Capel, Thomas B., British captain, bearer of despatches after the
  Battle of the Nile, i. 361, 371;
  mentioned, 355, note, ii. 217.

"Captain," British ship-of-the-line, carries Nelson's
  broad pendant as commodore, i. 230;
  at the Battle of St. Vincent, 270-276;
  injuries received there, 285;
  Nelson quits her for the "Theseus," 285, 289.

Caracciolo, Francesco, commodore in the Neapolitan navy,
  wounded feelings at the distrust of his Court, i. 390;
  accompanies the flight to Palermo, obtains leave to return
  to Naples, and joins the insurgents there, 437;
  apprehension, trial, and execution of, 438;
  comments upon Nelson's part in this transaction, 439-443.

Castlereagh, Lord, British Minister, Nelson's shrewd
  prediction to him of the results of the Orders in Council affecting
  neutral flags, and of the License System, ii. 330.

Clarence, Duke of. _See_ William Henry.

Codrington, Edward, British captain, expressions quoted:
  about Nelson's seamanship, i. 15;
  his family ties and love of glory, 72, ii. 175;
  appearance of Nelson's ships, 288;
  graciousness of Nelson's bearing, 340.

Collingwood, Cuthbert, British admiral, close connection between his
  career and that of Nelson, i. 21, 22;
  strong expression of regard for Nelson, 24;
  association with Nelson in the West Indies, 54 and note, 55, 63;
  at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 269, 273, 276, 281, 282;
  strong expression upon the credit due to Nelson, 272;
  his account of Nelson's cold reception at Court, in 1800, ii. 49;
  sent from England to West Indies in 1805, 310;
  hearing that Nelson is gone thither, takes position off
  Cadiz instead, 311;
  correspondence with Nelson on his return, 311-313;
  left by Nelson in charge off Cadiz, 316, 317;
  force collected under, when allies enter Cadiz, 334;
  characteristics, 340;
  part assigned to, by Nelson, for Trafalgar, 350-352;
  his part at Trafalgar, 370-372, 377, 380, 383, 384;
  Nelson's praise of, 384;
  his sympathy with Nelson, 384;
  notified of Nelson's fatal wound, 394.

Convoys, Nelson's comments on the behavior of, i. 33;
  gives one to American merchant ships against French privateers, 289;
  difficulty of providing in the Mediterranean, ii. 241-244.

Copenhagen, defences of, in 1801, ii. 72, 80, 81, 84, 85;
  Battle of, Nelson's plans for, 84-87;
  the battle, 87-97;
  importance and difficulty of the achievement, 98, 99;
  failure of the British Government to reward, 99, 162;
  silence of the city of London, 161;
  Nelson's action, 161-167.

Corfu, transferred, with the other Ionian Islands,
  from Venice to France, i. 318;
  Nelson's concern for, after the Battle of the Nile, 368, 405, 406;
  taken by Russo-Turkish forces, 405;
  British precautions against re-occupation by French, ii. 184;
  concern of Nelson for, while commander-in-chief in the
  Mediterranean, 1803-1805, 187, 190, 195, 266;
  resort of privateers, 241;
  Napoleon's estimate of, 206.

Cornwallis, William, British admiral, kindness to Nelson in
  early life, i. 30 and note, 45;
  Nelson directed to communicate with, off Brest in 1803, ii. 188, 189;
  orders seizure of Spanish treasure-ships, 251;
  Nelson directs that the order be disobeyed, 251;
  services of, off Brest, 269;
  Nelson joins, off Brest, on return from West Indies, 314, 317;
  authorizes Nelson to return to England, 317.

Correspondence, Nelson's extensive, while in the Mediterranean, ii. 190;
  his manner of conducting, 232-236.

Corsica, Island of, Nelson ordered to coast of, i. 115, 116;
  Nelson's connection with operations there in 1794, 118-148;
  strategic value of, to British, 155-159;
  government as a British dependency, 159;
  dissatisfaction of natives with British rule, 231;
  tenure of, dependent on support of the natives, 234;
  abandonment of, by the British, 247, 251-254;
  threatened invasion of Sardinia from, ii. 204.

"Curieux," British brig of war, sent by Nelson to England
  from West Indies with news of his movements, ii. 301;
  falls in with combined fleets, 313;
  Nelson's comment on hearing the fact, 313, 315.


Davison, Alexander, intimate friend of Nelson, Nelson expresses
  despondency to, i. 412;
  tells him circumstances of surrender of castles at Naples, 431, 432;
  the "Lady of the Admiralty's" coolness, ii. 49;
  account given by, of George III. speaking of Nelson, 49, 50;
  Nelson's mention of Sir Hyde Parker to, 67, 68, 71, 164;
  aids Nelson pecuniarily, 144;
  charged by Nelson with a final message to Lady Nelson, 148;
  Nelson's expressions to, about St. Vincent, 163;
  about treatment of himself by the government, 170;
  "Salt beef and the French fleet," 296;
  about General Brereton, 318.

De Vins, Austrian general, commands on the Riviera in 1795, i. 187;
  Nelson's association with, 187, 193-197, and opinion of, 197.

Dresden, Nelson's visit to, in 1800, ii. 43-45.

Drinkwater, Colonel, returns from Elba in frigate
  with Nelson, 1797, i. 262;
  incidents narrated of the voyage, 266-268;
  witnesses the Battle of St. Vincent, 281;
  interview with Nelson after the battle, 283;
  characteristic anecdote of Nelson, 309.

Duckworth, Sir J.T., British admiral, association with
  Nelson during operations in the Mediterranean, 1799,
  i. 418, 419, 420, 421, 423, 442, ii. 1, 6.

Dundas, British general, commanding troops in Corsica, i. 121;
  controversy with Lord Hood, 121, 122;
  Nelson's opinion, 121.


Egypt, Bonaparte's expedition to, in 1798, i. 323-339;
  Nelson's pursuit, 327-329, 331-338;
  Nelson's constant attention to, 369, 404, 406,
  ii. 182, 185, 201, 203, 211, 212, 213, 255, 270, 277,
  280-282, 287, 302;
  his urgency that the French army be not permitted to leave, 18-22.

El Arish, Convention of, signed, ii. 19.

Elba, island of, Nelson's opinion of importance of, i. 237;
  his seizure of, 237;
  evacuation of, 259-263, 287, 288.

"Elephant," British ship-of-the-line, Nelson's flagship
  at Copenhagen, ii. 78, 83, 88-97.

Elgin, Earl of, British ambassador to Turkey, opinion  upon the state
  of things at Palermo during Nelson's residence there, i. 397;
  Nelson's divergence of opinion from, concerning the French
  quitting Egypt, ii. 19-21.

Elliot, Sir Gilbert, afterwards Lord Minto,
  British representative in Corsica, 1794, i. 119;
  Viceroy of Corsica, 154;
  friendship between him and Nelson, 154, 275, 281, 283, 284,
  ii. 153, 250, 325;
  Nelson's correspondence with, i. 172, 203, 237, 239, 275, 281, 356,
  ii. 3, 27, 36, 210, 250;
  directs the seizure of Elba by Nelson, i. 237;
  present at the evacuation of Corsica, 252, 253, and of Elba. 262;
  passage with Nelson to Gibraltar, 262-268;
  witnesses the Battle of St. Vincent, 275, 281;
  advocacy of Nelson's claims to distinction, 284, 403;
  incidental mention of Nelson by, i. 308,
  ii. 34, 44, 92, 154, 172, 174, 308, 326, 332, 335;
  mention of Lady Hamilton by, i. 379-382, ii. 44, 154, 320, 335;
  ambassador to Vienna, i. 396 note.

Elliot, Hugh, British minister at Dresden during Nelson's visit
  in 1800, ii. 43, 44;
  minister to the two Sicilies during Nelson's Mediterranean command,
  1803-1805, 189-310;
  takes passage out with Nelson, 189;
  correspondence between Nelson and, quoted, 191, 192, 194, 211,
  212, 215, 218, 235, 246, 258, 263, 264, 286, 304, 310, 330.

Este, Lambton, association with Nelson mentioned, ii. 254-257.


Fischer, Commodore, commander-in-chief of Danish fleet at the
  Battle of Copenhagen, ii. 94;
  Nelson's controversy with, on account of his official report
  of the battle, 107-109.

Fitzharris, Lord, British attaché at Vienna during Nelson's visit,
  1800, anecdotes of Nelson and of Lady Hamilton, ii. 41, 42.

Flag of Truce, incident of the, at Copenhagen, ii. 94-98.

"Fleet in Being," indications of Nelson's probable opinion of
  its deterrent effect, i. 135-137, 160, 182, 183, 196, 198,
  213, 214, 216, 217, 218, 227; ii. 301-306.

Freemantle, British captain, with Nelson, at Teneriffe, i. 301-304;
  at Copenhagen, ii. 83;
  letter from Nelson to, concerning Calder, 318.

Frigates, Nelson's sense of the importance of, and of small cruisers
  generally, i. 338, 340, 341; ii. 242-245, 274, 294, 334, 357, 358.


"Généreux," French ship-of-the-line, escape of, after the
  Battle of the Nile, i. 357, 358;
  capture of the "Leander" by, 361, 405;
  captured by Nelson's squadron off Malta, ii. 24-29.

Genoa, importance of, to the South of France, i. 105, 106, 107;
  difficult neutrality of, 157, 158, 184-192, 199-201, 218, 223,
  226-228, 233, 393;
  closes her ports against Great Britain, 1796, 244-246;
  siege of city, in 1800, ii. 28;
  surrender of, by Masséna, 37;
  identified with France as the Ligurian Republic, 181, 182;
  ports of, blockaded by Nelson, 219, 229, 230.

George III., King of Great Britain, prejudice of, against Nelson
  in early life, i. 88, 89, 284;
  subsequent approbation, 177, 284, 308;
  interest in Nelson manifested by, ii. 49, 50;
  subsequent coldness of, toward Nelson, apparently in consequence
  of his relations to Lady Hamilton, 49.

Gillespie, Dr., account of life on board Nelson's flagship by,
  ii. 223-225, 238, 248.

Goodall, Admiral, at the partial fleet action of March 14, 1795,
  i. 168, 169;
  his support of Nelson when under public censure for failure to
  find the French fleet, 334.

Gore, British captain, commands squadron of frigates under Nelson's
  orders, outside Straits of Gibraltar, ii. 244;
  letter of Nelson to, concerning three frigates attacking a
  ship-of-the-line, 245;
  ordered by Nelson to disobey orders of Admiral Cornwallis to seize
  Spanish treasure-ships, 250, 251.

Graves, Rear Admiral, second to Nelson at the Battle of Copenhagen,
  ii. 83, 90;
  made Knight of the Bath in reward for the action, 99.

Gravina, Spanish admiral, commander of the Spanish contingent,
  and second in command of the combined fleet, at Trafalgar,
  ii. 363, 369, 372, 396.

Greville, Charles, nephew to Sir William Hamilton, relations of,
  to Emma Hart, afterwards Lady Hamilton, i. 373-379.


Hallowell, British captain, under Nelson at the siege of Calvi,
  i. 139;
  commands the "Swiftsure" at the Battle of the Nile, 353.

Hamilton, Emma, Lady, Nelson's first meeting with, i. 110, 111;
  letter of Nelson to. 340;
  conduct of, in Naples, upon receipt of news of the Battle of
  the Nile, 371;
  Nelson's second meeting with, 372;
  previous history of, 373-379;
  married to Sir William Hamilton, 378;
  personal appearance and characteristics, 379-382, 384-386,
  ii. 43-45, 150, 154, 223, 326, 335;
  influence at Court of Naples, i. 383, 426, 442;
  influence upon Nelson, 385-388, 441, 442, 444, ii. 23,
  28-30, 38, 39, 41, 78, 330-332;
  intermediary between the Court and Nelson, i. 389, 426, 428;
  efficiency during the flight of the Court from Naples, 395;
  scandal concerning her relations to Nelson, 396-398, ii. 30,
  34, 35, 48-51, 154, 177, 178;
  love of play, i. 397, ii. 41;
  Nelson's infatuation for, i. 380, 422, 441, ii. 29, 30, 34,
  35, 38, 39, 41, 43, 51, 53, 78, 110, 154, 326;
  with Sir William Hamilton accompanies Nelson to Naples in
  flagship, i. 428;
  usefulness there, 444;
  Nelson asks of the Czar insignia of the Order of Malta for,
  ii. 10;
  accompanies Nelson, with her husband, on a trip to Malta, 35,
  and on the return journey to England, 36-45;
  her reception by the London world, 48-50, 154;
  Lady Nelson's attitude towards, 46-48, 51, 53;
  attitude of Nelson's father towards, 55, 176;
  of other members of Nelson's family, 55, 178, 326;
  believed by Nelson to be the mother of Horatia, 56-58;
  Nelson's letters to, during Copenhagen expedition, 68, 69,
  72, 79, 88, 104, 105, 106, 110, 111, 116, 149;
  letters to, while commanding preparations against invasion,
  137, 139, 140-143, 149, 150;
  purchases the Merton property for Nelson, 149-151;
  disturbed relations with her husband, 151-153;
  death of husband, 177;
  Nelson's letters to, during his command in the Mediterranean,
  1803-1805, 194, 222, 223, 256, 258, 279, 339, 353, 354;
  Nelson's anxiety about confinement of, 210;
  birth of a second child, 210;
  allowance made by Nelson to, 248;
  Nelson's last letter to, 365;
  bequeathed by Nelson to his Country, 376, 389, 395;
  mentioned by Nelson, when dying, 392, 393, 395.

Hamilton, Sir William, British minister to Naples, Nelson's
  first association with, i. 110;
  Nelson's correspondence with, during the Nile campaign,
  327, 329, 330, 340-342, 368, 372;
  Nelson's association with, while in command in Neapolitan
  waters, 1798-1800, 372, 387, 389, 390, 393, 395-398, 427, 428-444,
  ii. 21, 23, 27-30, 34, 35;
  relations to Amy Lyon, otherwise Emma Hart, prior to their marriage,
  375-378;
  marriage to Emma Hart, 378;
  onerous increase of diplomatic duties after the French Revolution
  began, 384;
  influence of Lady Hamilton upon, 383, 389, 397, ii. 44;
  apparent unfitness for his position, i. 383, 397, 398, 435, 436;
  accompanies Nelson to Naples in flagship, 428;
  assertion of Nelson's full powers at this time by, 430;
  official despatch of, relative to transactions at Naples,
  June-July, 1799, quoted and discussed, 432-436;
  share of, in these transactions, 444;
  recalled to England, ii. 34;
  accompanied by Nelson on return to England, 36-45;
  Nelson takes up his residence with, 146;
  with Lady Hamilton goes to live with Nelson at Merton, 150;
  disturbed relations of, with his wife, 151-153;
  death of, 177;
  his professed confidence in Nelson, 178.

Hardy, Captain Thomas M., captured in the prize "Sabina," i. 260;
  exchanged, 264, 266;
  narrow escape from recapture, 267;
  commander of the brig "Mutine," 323;
  accompanies Nelson in Baltic expedition, ii. 65, 83;
  continuous association with Nelson after St. Vincent, 392;
  presence at Nelson's death-bed, 392-395;
  incidentally mentioned, ii. 224, 234, 245, 337, 368, 374, 378,
  385-389, 391.

Hart, Emma, name assumed by Lady Hamilton, prior to marriage, i. 375.

Haslewood, anecdote of final breach between Lord and Lady Nelson,
  ii. 53.

Hillyar, Captain James, anecdotes of Nelson, ii. 175, note, 237-239.

"Hinchinbrook," British frigate, commanded by Nelson in youth,
  i. 21-30;
singular coincidence that both Nelson and Collingwood were made
  post into this ship, 21.

Hood, Admiral, Lord, opinion of Nelson in early life, i. 34;
  Nelson obtains transfer of his ship to the fleet of, 36-39;
  relations of Nelson with, prior to French Revolution, 37, 39,
  41, 45, 66, 87, 89, 108;
  appointed to command the Mediterranean fleet, 1793, 101;
  services off Toulon, 103-117;
  employs Nelson on detached service, at Naples, 108,
    at Tunis, 113,
    around Corsica, 115-120;
  reduction of Corsica, 118-148;
  return to England, 148, 149;
  removed from the Mediterranean command, 175;
  Nelson's opinion of, 119, 175, 176;
  Nelson's relations with, during his Mediterranean command,
  112, 116, 119, 122, 124, 148;
  at siege of Bastia, 130-132;
  at siege of Calvi, 142, 143;
  inadequate mention of Nelson's services in Corsica by,
  131-134, 152, 153;
  differences with Colonel Moore, 143-145;
  opinion of Nelson's merits at the Battle of the Nile, 361-363;
  presents Nelson in the House of Peers, when taking his seat as
  a viscount, ii. 160.

Hood, Captain Sir Samuel, pilots Nelson's fleet into Aboukir Bay,
  i. 348;
  share of, in the Battle of the Nile, 349, 350, 358;
  left to blockade Alexandria, 366, 392;
  incidentally mentioned, 401, 404, ii. 158.

Horatia, Nelson's daughter, birth of, ii. 56;
  mentioned, 57, 223, 335;
  Nelson's last letter to, 366;
  desired by him to use the name of "Nelson" only, 366;
  bequeathed by Nelson to his Country, 376, 389;
  mentioned by Nelson in dying, 395.

Hoste, Captain William, midshipman with Nelson from 1793 to 1797,
  i. 304;
  describes Nelson's return on board wounded, after the affair
  at Santa Cruz, 304;
  lieutenant, and commander of the "Mutine," 371;
  reception at Naples by Lady Hamilton, 371;
  curious anecdote of, ii. 262, 263.

Hotham, Vice-Admiral, second in command to Lord Hood, mistaken
  action of, i. 134, 135;
  Nelson's comment on, 135, 150;
  succeeds Hood as commander-in-chief, 149;
  encounter with French Toulon fleet, 161-170;
  Nelson's urgency with, 168,
    and criticism of his action in this case, 169-172;
  inadequate military conceptions of, 171, 182, 198;
  difficulties of, recognized by Nelson, 171;
  second encounter with the French, 178-180;
  incompetent action, and Nelson's criticism, 179-182;
  disastrous results of inefficiency of, 182, 183, 198, 203, 210;
  sends Nelson to co-operate with Austrians on the Riviera, 184;
  Nelson's opinion of his "political courage," 189;
  personal dislike to co-operation of, 191, 197 and note;
  inadequate support given to Nelson by, 197, 198, 202;
  Nelson's opinion of the consequent mishaps, 182, 199, 202;
  relieved by Sir Hyde Parker, 199.

Hotham, Sir William, criticism of Nelson's conduct towards
  Lady Nelson, ii. 50;
  mention of Lady Nelson's conduct after the separation, 53;
  Nelson's aptitude at forwarding public service, 229.

Howe, Admiral, Lord, appoints Nelson to the command of the
  "Boreas," i. 44;
  kind reception of Nelson in 1787, 82;
  victory of June 1st, 1794, Nelson's opinion of, 150;
  Nelson's expression to, about the Battle of the Nile, 356;
  opinion of, concerning the Battle of the Nile, 357, 363.

Hughes, Sir Richard, commander-in-chief of the Leeward Islands
  Station, 1784-1786, i. 45;
  Nelson's difficulties with, 49-53, and 53-58;
  his attitude towards Nelson in the matter of enforcing the
  Navigation Act, 58, 60, 63;
  Nelson's reconciliation with, 72.

Hughes, Lady, account of Nelson as a very young captain, i. 46.


Ionian Islands, Corfu, etc., objects of Nelson's solicitude,
  i. 368, 391, 405, 406, ii. 265. 266;
  Russian occupation of, i. 405, ii. 14;
  importance of, to Bonaparte, ii. 187, 188, 195, 241;
  temporary political name of Republic of the Seven Islands, 190.

Ireland, Nelson's speculations as to Bonaparte's intentions against,
  ii. 211, 212, 288, 315;
  Collingwood's, 311, 312.


Jervis, Admiral Sir John, afterwards Earl of St. Vincent, i. 34;
  commander-in-chief in the West Indies, 115;
  commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, 204, 212;
  Nelson's first meeting with, 215;
  desire of, to have Nelson remain under his command, 216, 229, 255;
  his close blockade of Toulon, 230, 242;
  Nelson's lofty opinion of, 244, 248;
  forced to concentrate his fleet owing to the attitude of Spain,
  245, 246;
  embarrassment caused to, by conduct of Admiral Man, 246, 251;
  ordered to evacuate the Mediterranean, 247;
  retires to Gibraltar, 254;
  sends Nelson back to superintend the evacuation of Elba, 259;
  his opinions of Nelson, as expressed, 261, 281, 282, 294, 299,
  306, 323, 363, 403, ii. 67, 104, 116, 118, 120, 196, 198;
  rejoined by Nelson, off Cape St. Vincent, i. 268;
  Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 268-277;
  operations after the battle, 285-288;
  blockade and bombardment of Cadiz, 288-294;
  sends Nelson to Teneriffe, 298, 299;
  sympathy with Nelson in his defeat and wound, 306;
  created Earl of St. Vincent, 306;
  rejoined by Nelson after convalescence, 310;
  expressions of satisfaction thereat, 310;
  aversion of, to extending the operations of the fleet, 320;
  sends Nelson to watch the Toulon armament, 310, 323;
  denounced for choosing so young a flag-officer, 337;
  opinion of the Battle of the Nile, 363;
  orders Nelson to return to the western Mediterranean, 366;
  the affair of Sir Sidney Smith, 401, 402;
  absolute confidence of, in Nelson, 408;
  action upon the incursion of Bruix's fleet, 420-423;
  gives up the command of the Mediterranean, 424;
  Nelson's distress and vexation, 424, ii. 263;
  succeeded in command by Lord Keith, i. 425, 428;
  takes command of Channel Fleet, 1800, ii. 56;
  Nelson joins him as subordinate, 56;
  stern resolution in face of the Baltic Coalition, 64;
  becomes First Lord of the Admiralty, 67;
  Nelson's gradual alienation from, 69, 140, 141, 142, 162, 163,
  167, 170, 172;
  full approval of Nelson's course in the Baltic by, 73, 104;
  indisposition to grant rewards for services at Copenhagen, 99,
  162, 163, 167;
  reluctance to relieve Nelson, 116;
  insists with Nelson that he must accept and retain command of
  preparations against invasion, 120, 139, 145;
  correspondence with Nelson on this subject, 120-126, 134, 135,
  136, 139, 143;
  divergence of views from Nelson's on the subject of a flotilla,
  131, 132;
  misunderstanding between Nelson and, on the subject of medals for
  Copenhagen, 162, 163, 167;
  sends Nelson to the Mediterranean as commander-in-chief, 175;
  injury to Navy from excessive economy of, 172, 196;
  correspondence of Nelson with, while commander-in-chief in the
  Mediterranean, quoted, 188, 189, 196, 198, 213;
  retires from the Admiralty, and succeeded by Lord Melville, 221.


KEATS, Captain Richard G., favorite with Nelson, ii. 293;
  letters from Nelson to, 293, 297, 298, 323.

Keith, Admiral, Lord, second in command to St. Vincent in the
  Mediterranean, i. 423;
  St. Vincent relinquishes command to, 425, 428;
  characteristics of, 425;
  friction between Nelson and, 425-427;
  advice of, to Nelson, concerning executions in Naples, 442;
  Nelson's disobedience to orders of, 445-454;
  pursues combined fleets to English Channel, 448, ii. 14;
  inferiority of, to Nelson, in military sagacity, i. 450, ii. 38;
  absence from Mediterranean prolonged, ii. 4;
  resumes command in the Mediterranean, 22;
  Nelson's resentment at his return, 3, 23;
  relations between the two, 23, 27-30, 32, 36-38;
  orders Nelson to assume personal charge of blockade of Malta, 28;
  generous letter of, to Nelson, 35;
  dissatisfaction of, with Nelson's course, 36-38;
  displeasure of Queen of Naples with, 38, 39;
  measures of, to prevent French encroachments during
  Peace of Amiens, 184;
  successful resistance of, to the Admiralty's attempt to reduce
  his station, 249.

Kleber, French general, succeeds Bonaparte in the command in Egypt,
  ii. 17;
  convinced of the hopelessness of retaining Egypt, 18;
  makes the Convention of El Arish with the Turks, 18-20.

Knight, Miss, friend and companion of the Hamiltons, ii. 39;
  accompanies them and Nelson on journey to England in 1800, 39-48;
  incidents mentioned by, relative to this period, 39, 40, 48;
  testimony to Nelson's love for his wife, prior to meeting with
  Lady Hamilton, 55.


LATOUCHE-TRÉVILLE, French admiral, in command off Boulogne, and
  successful repulse of British boats, ii. 135-138, 214;
  in command of Toulon fleet, 214;
  Nelson's attempts to lure out of port, 214-216, 219, 220;
  reports that Nelson retreated before him, and Nelson's wrath,
  217-219;
  death of, 257.

Layman, Lieutenant, and Commander, serving with Nelson on board
  the St. George, 1801, ii. 69;
  anecdotes of Nelson by, 70, 72, 158, 356;
  loses the brig "Raven" when carrying despatches, 279;
  characteristic letter of Nelson in behalf of, 279, 280.

"Leander," British fifty-gun ship, Campaign and Battle of the Nile,
  i. 327, 352, 353;
  sent with despatches to Gibraltar, 360;
  captured by the "Généreux," 361;
  recaptured by Russians, and restored to Great Britain, 405.

Leghorn, Nelson's visits to, i. 148, 151, 161, 208;
  importance of, to the French, 157, 160,
    and to the British fleet, 161, 231, 232;
  occupation of, by Bonaparte, in 1796, 233;
  blockade of, by Nelson, 236-238;
  Nelson's project for an assault of, 238-241;
  occupation of, by Neapolitans, in 1798, 393, 406;
  blockade of, recommended by Nelson, in 1803, ii. 182.

Lindholm, Danish officer, aide-de-camp to Crown Prince at the
  Battle of Copenhagen, sent to Nelson with reply to the message
  under flag of truce, ii. 96;
  association with the negotiations, 97, 101, 103;
  testimony of, to Nelson's motives in sending flag of truce, 97;
  correspondence of, with Nelson, relative to the conduct of
  Commodore Fischer, 108, 109.

Linzee, Commodore, Nelson serves under, on mission to Tunis,
  i. 113;
  Nelson's causeless dissatisfaction with conduct of, 114.

Lisbon, headquarters of British fleet after evacuation of the
  Mediterranean, i. 260, 285, 286, 310;
  forbidden to British in 1803, ii. 181.

Locker, Captain William, Nelson's early commander and life-long
  friend, i. 17-20, 21.

Louis, Captain Thomas, Nelson's expressions of obligation to,
  at the Battle of the Nile, i. 351.

"Lowestoffe," British frigate, Nelson commissioned lieutenant
  into, and incidents on board of, i. 16-20;
  his place on board of, filled by Collingwood, 21.

Lyon, Amy, maiden name of Lady Hamilton, i. 373.


Mack, Austrian general, association with Nelson before and
  after the disastrous Neapolitan campaign of 1798, i. 392-394.

Madalena Islands, situation of, and importance to Nelson's fleet,
  ii. 201-205, 207;
  Nelson there receives news of Villeneuve's first sailing, 266.

Malmesbury, Lady, mention of Lady Hamilton by, i. 379, 382;
  of Nelson and Hyde Parker, ii. 67.

Malta, seizure of, by Bonaparte, i. 329, 331;
  Nelson's estimate of the importance of, 330, 407, ii. 13, 195, 198;
  his concern for, i. 368, 369, 414, ii. 5, 7-14, 243, 316, 317;
  directs blockade of, i. 369,
    by Portuguese squadron, 371;
  blockade of, 391, 392, 409, 420, 423, ii. 1, 7-14, 23-34, 36, 37;
  Nelson's jealousy of Russian designs upon, i. 406-408;
  capture near, of the "Généreux," ii. 23-28,
    and of the "Guillaume Tell," 31;
  Nelson ordered by Keith to take personal charge of blockade of, 28;
  Nelson quits blockade of, 30, 31;
  takes ships off blockade, contrary to Keith's wishes, 36-39;
  surrender of, to the British, 62;
  effect of surrender of, upon the Czar, 62;
  Nelson's views as to the ultimate disposition of, 168;
  Nelson's visit to, in 1803, 189, 194;
  strategic importance of, 182, 195, 264.

Man, Admiral Robert, in command under Hotham, at the fleet action of
  July 13, 1795, i. 180;
  Nelson's commendation of, 180;
  subsequent mistakes of, in 1796, 240, 248, 249, 254;
  Nelson's expressions concerning, 240, 248;
  allusion to, ii. 19.

Marengo, Battle of, Nelson in Leghorn at the time of, ii. 37, 179.

Maritimo, Island of, strategic centre for a rendezvous, i. 420, 426,
  427.

Masséna, French general, defeats the combined Austrians and Russians
  near Zurich, ii. 15;
  Nelson likened to, 52.

Matcham, Mrs., Nelson's sister, attitude towards Lady Hamilton,
  ii. 55, 178;
  towards Lady Nelson, 178;
  anecdote of Nelson transmitted by, 335.

Matcham, George, Nelson's nephew, letter of, dated 1861, giving
  recollections of Nelson, ii. 155-157.

Melville, Lord, First Lord of the Admiralty, in succession to
  St. Vincent, reply to Nelson's appeal to reverse previous refusal
  of medals for Copenhagen, ii. 167;
  Nelson's letter to, about his missing the French fleet, 280-282.

Merton, Nelson's home in England, purchase of, by him, ii. 144, 149,
  150;
  life at, during Peace of Amiens, 146-178;
  final stay at, 320-336.

Messina, importance of, to the security of Sicily, Nelson's
  opinions, i. 413, 414, 417, ii. 186, 191-193.

Middleton, Sir Charles, afterwards Lord Barham, i. 85. _See_ Barham.

Miles, Commander Jeaffreson, able defence of Lord Nelson's action at
  Naples, in 1799, i. 441.

Miller, Captain Ralph W., commands Nelson's flagship at the Battle
  of St. Vincent, i. 274, 279;
  at Teneriffe, 302;
  at the Battle of the Nile, 355;
  Nelson's expressions of affection for, and anxiety for a monument
  to, ii. 143.

Minorca, Nelson ordered from Egypt for an expedition against, i. 366;
  Nelson directs his squadron upon, on receiving news of Bruix's
  incursion, 418-420;
  Nelson's difference with Keith, as to the value and danger of,
  445-451, ii. 3, 5, 6;
  Nelson's visit to, in 1799, ii. 6, 11, 12;
  restored to Spain at Peace of Amiens, 181.

Minto, Lord. _See_ Elliot, Sir Gilbert.

Minto, Lady, mention of Nelson at Palermo, in letters of,
  i. 396, 397;
  at Leghorn, ii. 38, 39;
  at Vienna, 40-42.

Moore, Colonel, afterwards Sir John, i. 119;
  friction between Lord Hood and, in Corsica, 140-145;
  Nelson's agreement, in the main, with Hood's views,
  143, 144, 145.

Morea, Nelson's anxieties about, ii. 185, 187, 195, 203, 204,
  213, 266, 276, 281, 287.

Moutray, Captain, Nelson's refusal to recognize pendant of,
  as commodore, i. 49-51;
  undisturbed friendship between Nelson and, 51.

Moutray, Mrs., Nelson's affection and admiration for, i. 51, 52;
  Collingwood writes to, after Nelson's death, 52.

Moutray, Lieutenant James, son of the above, dies before Calvi,
  while serving under Nelson, i. 52, 148;
  Nelson erects a monument to, 148.

Murray, Rear-Admiral George, Nelson's pleasure at a visit from,
  ii. 170;
  captain of the fleet to Nelson, 1803-1805, 224, 228, 234, 237.

NAPLES, city of, Nelson's first visit to, i. 108-111;
  second visit, 371, 372, 385-395;
  flight of the Court from, 395;
  the French enter, 399;
  the French evacuate, after their disasters in Upper Italy, 415;
  the royal power re-established in, 429-432, 444;
  Nelson's action in the Bay of, 430-444;
  Nelson leaves finally, for Palermo, ii. 2;
  Nelson's emotions upon distant view of, in 1803, 194.

Naples, Kingdom of. _See_ Two Sicilies.

Naples, King of, Nelson's regrets for, upon the evacuation of the
  Mediterranean, 1798, i. 248;
  gives orders that supplies be furnished Nelson's squadron before
  the Battle of the Nile, 329;
  Nelson's appeal to, to take a decided stand, 330;
  Nelson's indignation against, when difficulties about supplies
  are raised in Syracuse, 340;
  congratulates Nelson on the issue of the Battle of the Nile, 363;
  visits Nelson's flagship, 372;
  distrust of his own officers, 390, 416;
  under Nelson's influence, decides upon war with France, 391;
  Nelson promises support to, 391, 392;
  decides to advance against French in Rome, 393;
  defeat and precipitate flight of, 394;
  takes refuge at Palermo, 395;
  promises Nelson that Malta, being legitimately his territory, should
  not be transferred to any power without consent of England, 406;
  authorizes British flag to be hoisted in Malta alongside the
  Sicilian, 407;
  Nelson's devotion to, 408, 443, 450;
  personal timidity and apathy of, 416, 417, ii. 5, 6;
  requests Nelson to go to Naples and support the royalists, i. 425;
  gives Nelson full powers to act as his representative in Naples,
  429, 430;
  goes himself to Bay of Naples, but remains on board Nelson's
  flagship, 443;
  alienation of, from the queen, 444, ii. 6;
  returns to Palermo, ii. 2;
  confers upon Nelson the dukedom of Bronté, 2;
  Nelson renews correspondence with, in 1803, 190;
  Nelson's apprehensions for, 191, 195;
  Nelson keeps a ship-of-the-line always in the Bay of Naples to
  receive royal family, 192;
  application of, to the British government, to send Nelson back to
  the Mediterranean, after sick-leave, 246;
  agitation of, at the prospect of Nelson's departure, 246;
  offers him a house at Naples or at Palermo, 246.

Naples, Queen of, agitation at hearing of the Battle of the Nile,
  i. 372;
  friendship with Lady Hamilton, 378, 383, 384, 426, 444;
  characteristics of, 388, ii. 6;
  association with Nelson, i. 388-391;
  Nelson's devotion to, 392;
  distrust of her subjects, 394, 416, ii. 5;
  flight to Palermo, i. 395;
  apprehensions of, 419, 428;
  alienation of the King from, 444, ii. 6;
  wishes to visit Vienna, and is carried to Leghorn by Nelson,
  with two ships-of-the-line, ii. 36;
  refused further assistance of the same kind by Lord Keith, 38;
  her distress of mind, and anger with Keith, 39;
  proceeds to Vienna by way of Ancona, 40;
  Nelson renews correspondence with, in 1803-1805, 183, 190, 264.

Nelson, Rev. Edmund, father of Lord Nelson, i. 4;
  Nelson and his wife live with, 1788-1793, 91;
  Mrs. Nelson continues to live with, after Nelson goes to the
  Mediterranean, 207, 257, 308, ii. 48-48, 55;
  his testimony to Lady Nelson's character, ii. 55;
  attitude towards Lady Hamilton, 55, 176;
  persuaded of the absence of criminality in her relations
  with Nelson, 55, 176;
  refuses to be separated from Lady Nelson, 55, 176, 177;
  death of, 176;
  character of, 176, 177.

NELSON, HORATIO, LORD.
  _Historical Sequence of Career:_
    and birth, i. 4;
    first going to sea, 5;
    service in merchantman, 9;
    cruise to the Arctic Seas, 12;
    to the East Indies, 14;
    acting lieutenant, 15;
    lieutenant, 16;
    cruise to West Indies, 17;
    commander and post-captain, 21;
    Nicaraguan expedition, 26;
    invalided home, 30;
    command of "Albemarle," 1781, 31;
    paid off, and visits France, 41;
    cruise of the "Boreas," 1784, 44;
    refuses to obey orders of commander-in-chief,
      first, to recognize broad pendant of a captain
      "not in commission," 49,
      and, second, when directed not to enforce the
      Navigation Act, 53-64;
    engagement to Mrs. Nisbet, 69;
    marriage, 75;
    return to England, and "Boreas" paid off. 1787, 75-80;
    exposure of frauds in the West Indies, 79, 82-86;
    half-pay, 1788-1792, 90-94;
    commissions the "Agamemnon," February, 1793, 99;
    joins the Mediterranean fleet under Lord Hood, 103;
    constant detached service, 108-114;
    blockade of Corsica, 116;
    siege of Bastia, 120-133;
    siege of Calvi, 136-146;
    loss of right eye, 139;
    refitting in Leghorn, 151-160;
    action of "Agamemnon" with "Ça Ira," 163;
    partial fleet action of March 14, 1795, 166;
    partial fleet action of July 13, 1795, 178;
    command of a detached squadron on the Riviera of Genoa,
      under Hotham, 1795, 184-204,
      and under Jervis, 1796, 215-229;
    hoists broad pendant as commodore, 220;
    leaves "Agamemnon" for "Captain," 230;
    the blockade of Leghorn, 233;
    seizure of Elba, 237,
      and of Capraia, 245;
    evacuation of Corsica, 247-254;
    British fleet retires to Gibraltar, 254;
    mission to evacuate Elba, 259;
    action with Spanish frigates, 259;
    rejoins Jervis off Cape St. Vincent, 268;
    Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 1797, 268;
    made a Knight of the Bath, 284;
    promoted rear-admiral, 285;
    mission into the Mediterranean, 288;
    blockade and bombardment of Cadiz, 289-294;
    the Teneriffe expedition, 296;
    loses his right arm, 303;
    invalided home, 307;
    rejoins Mediterranean fleet in the "Vanguard," 1798, 310;
    sent to watch the Toulon armament, 316;
    Campaign of the Nile, 323-366;
    Battle of the Nile, 343-358;
    severely wounded in the head, 351;
    advanced to the peerage as Baron Nelson of the Nile, 361;
    arrives at Naples, 371;
    meeting with Lady Hamilton, 372;
    urges Naples to declare war against France, 389;
    war between Naples and France, 393;
    Neapolitan court carried to Palermo by, 395;
    residence at Palermo and contemporary events, 1799,--Sidney
    Smith and the Levant, 400;
    Ionian Islands, 404;
    Malta, 406;
    Barbary States, 409;
    about Naples, 413;
    incursion of French fleet under Admiral Bruix, 417-427;
    proceeds to Naples, 428;
    incident of the surrender of the Neapolitan insurgents,
    429-436;
    the Caracciolo incident, 437;
    refuses to obey an order of Lord Keith, 445;
    reiterated refusal, 448;
    left temporarily commander-in-chief by Keith's departure,
    ii. 1-22;
    created Duke of Bronté by King of Naples, 2;
    dissatisfaction at not being continued as commander-in-chief, 3;
    Keith's return, 1800, 22;
    superseded by Keith's return, 22;
    capture of "Le Généreux," 24;
    capture of "Le Guillaume Tell," in Nelson's absence, 31;
    returns to England through Germany, 1800, 39-45;
    breach with Lady Nelson, 45-57;
    promoted vice-admiral, 56;
    hoists flag on board "San Josef," in the Channel Fleet, under
    Lord St. Vincent, 1801, 56;
    birth of the child Horatia, 56;
    the Baltic expedition, 60-116;
    Battle of Copenhagen, 80-97;
    incident of disobeying the signal to leave off action, 89;
    incident of the flag of truce, 94;
    created a viscount, 99;
    negotiations, 100;
    return to England, 107;
    charged with defence of the coast of England against
    invasion, 118-145;
    retirement from active service during the Peace of Amiens,
    146-175;
    interest in public questions, 168-174;
    commissioned commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean,
    1803, 175;
    death of his father, 176;
    arrival in the Mediterranean, 189;
    the long watch off Toulon, 196-261;
    last promotion, Vice-Admiral of the White, 1804, 221;
    escape and pursuit of the French Toulon fleet, 1805,
    272-295;
    follows it and its Spanish auxiliaries to the West Indies, 296;
    returns to Gibraltar, 309;
    carries his squadron to Cornwallis off Brest, 315-317;
    returns himself to England, August, 1805, 315;
    last stay in England, 320-336;
    resumes command in the Mediterranean, 339;
    the Battle of Trafalgar, 363;
    mortally wounded, 388;
    death of, 396.
  _Personal Characteristics_:
    Appearance,
      in boyhood, i. 15;
      at twenty-one, 22;
      at twenty-four, 38;
      at twenty-seven, 66;
      at thirty-six, 39;
      at forty-two, ii. 40, 41, 43;
      at forty-three, 112;
      later years, 155-157, 228, 238, 321, 332;
      expression, 158.
    Health,
      inherited delicacy of constitution, i. 5;
      invalided from East Indies, 15;
      from West Indies, 29, 30, 31;
      in Baltic, 33;
      in Canada, 36;
      mentioned, 44, 75, 78, 91, 119, 146, 147, 149, 207, 236, 294,
      309, 368, 401, 413, 453, 454, ii. 29-33, 35, 56, 105, 106, 111,
      115, 119, 139, 142 (sea-sickness), 209, 210, 221, 225-228, 245,
      246, 292, 326, 332;
      influence of active employment upon, i. 77, 78, 119, 130, 207,
      236, 292, 294, ii. 332.
    Charm of manner and considerateness of action,
      i. 18, 24, 32, 46, 47, 51, 74, 93, 108, 166, 290, 291, 359;
      ii. 4, 9, 10, 40, 41, 70, 71, 103, 115, 159, 165, 226, 229,
      236-239, 298, 311, 318, 337, 339, 340, 353-356, 359, 374.
    Vanity, and occasional petulance,
      i. 138, 152, 153, 255-257, 277-281, 295, 315, 385, 388-389,
      452-453;
      ii. 3, 23, 27-29, 30, 32, 34, 39, 44, 50, 69, 78, 104-105,
      112, 138-142, 144, 236, 237, 300, 322.
    Courage, illustrated,
      i. 8, 13, 19, 145, 274, 293, 302-304, 306;
      ii. 90, 95, 101, 327, 359, 379.
    Love of glory and honor,
      i. 8, 20, 22, 25, 29, 37, 39, 40, 64, 76, 119, 124, 126, 133,
      138, 151, 152, 172, 173, 215, 241, 248, 255, 280, 283, 286, 293,
      302, 309, 359, 419;
      ii. 24, 52, 65, 90, 104, 105, 112, 134, 175, 250, 339.
    Strength and tenacity of convictions,
      i. 18, 38, 52, 57, 62, 63, 73, 74, 125, 126, 127, 136, 137, 226,
      241, 244, 312, 313, 335, 341, 344, 421, 427, 450, 451;
      ii. 18-21, 71, 73, 74, 78, 82, 93, 137, 183, 271, 273, 281, 285,
      287, 289, 294, 302, 303, 306, 314, 315, 319, 324.
    Sensitiveness to anxiety, perplexity, and censure,
      i. 61, 62, 75, 79, 81, 92, 133, 204, 210-213, 302, 306, 307,
      341, 401, 412, 419, 452-454;
      ii. 3, 11, 12, 13, 29-34, 49, 50, 68, 105, 113, 116, 119, 141,
      161-167, 170, 188, 209, 219-221, 247, 274, 280, 286, 287, 289,
      292, 296, 300, 308, 309, 378.
    Daily life, examples of, and occupations,
      i. 139-141, 146-147, 207, 289-294, 332-333, 367-369, 396-398;
      ii. 115-116, 150-159, 223-228, 232-236, 275, 326-328, 330-335,
      340.
    Religious feelings, indications of,
      i. 173, 324, 325, 352, 358-360;
      ii. 159, 160, 335, 381, 382, 384, 389, 395, 396.
  _Professional Characteristics:_
    Duty, sense of,
      i. 8, 70, 109, 133, 225, 257, 302, 419;
      ii. 65, 101, 105, 119-120, 222-223, 263, 291, 296, 382, 384,
      393-396.
    Exclusiveness and constancy of purpose,
      i. 16, 27, 34, 37, 38, 40, 62, 64, 68, 74, 86, 99, 109, 111,
      122, 126, 133, 147, 151, 169, 221, 222, 225, 236, 253, 255,
      257, 284, 309, 315, 324, 325, 326, 327, 334, 337, 339, 344,
      351, 355;
      ii. 9, 42, 65, 74, 75, 88, 93, 107, 188, 222, 234-236, 271,
      287, 291, 315, 324, 394.
    Professional courage,
      i. 35, 73, 125, 127, 163-165, 166, 221, 240, 248, 263, 265,
      266, 271-273, 292, 301, 328, 334, 344, 421, 427;
      ii. 27, 72-77, 79, 88-93, 102, 107, 111, 132, 136, 215, 270,
      280, 281, 294, 305-307, 323, 324, 334, 355.
    Fearlessness of responsibility,
      i. 11, 19, 49-52, 52-59, 63, 64, 124-126, 188-191, 221, 268,
      271, 282, 334-336, 445-453;
      ii. 8, 73, 89-93, 193, 194, 205, 242, 250-253, 258, 259,
      261-263, 270, 292-296, 302, 306, 316.
    Diplomacy,
      natural aptitude for, and tact in dealing with men,
        i. 31-33, 47, 65, 110, 140-143, 189-191, 206 and note,
        403-404;
        ii. 4-6, 8-10, 12-14, 69-70, 71, 72-73, 76, 94-97, 100-104,
        114, 133-134, 194, 199, 216-217, 229, 231-232, 237-239, 255,
        258, 264-266, 311, 337, 339-340;
      extensive cares in,
        i. 383, 405-408, 411-413;
        ii. 10, 11, 181-188, 190, 199, 228-229, 233-236.
    Fleet,
      when commander-in-chief, Administration of, ii. 4, 10, 11, 16,
      115, 116, 134-136, 168-170, 197, 198-200, 209, 228, 229,
      234-236, 237, 241-245, 277, 278, 283, 286, 292, 293, 295, 309,
      314, 315.
      Condition of, in the Mediterranean, 1803-1805, ii. 171, 196,
      205, 269, 288, 297, 310.
      Preservation and management of, ii. 195-198, 201-204, 205-207,
      210, 211, 214-216, 219-220, 229, 230, 241-245, 253-254, 282,
      283, 285, 287, 296-298, 310, 315, 316, 317, 329, 356-358, 361.
Health of, i. 109, 110; ii. 207-209,
310, 314.

Strategic ideas, indications of, i. 27,
28, 102, 105, 107, 115, 123, 135,
136, 150, 159, 160, 171, 174, 176,
182, 183, 191, 193-196, 199-200,
213-215, 216, 217-218, 231-232,
234, 239, 243-246, 247-250, 330,
332-336, 337, 342, 365, 366, 391,
407, 419-421, 427; ii. 18-21, 42,
71-73, 74-77, 106, 111, 122, 123-133,
136, 182-184, 185-188, 198,
200-203, 204, 207, 211-213, 249,
250, 269-271, 276, 281, 282, 285-288,
293, 302, 305, 306, 314-317,
323, 324, 364.

Tactical ideas, indications of, i. 34,
105, 121, 126, 135, 163, 164, 166,
180-182, 217-218, 222, 226, 240,
244, 270-272, 301, 327, 344-345,
350, 355-357, 358, 421; ii. 76, 79,
80-82, 84-87, 92, 100, 124-126,
137, 138, 215-217, 219, 220, 230,
306, 333, 341-353, 356, 357, 360,
361, 366-369, 370, 371, 373, 380.

Nelson, Frances, Lady, wife of
Lord Nelson, birth, parentage,
and first marriage to Dr. Josiah
Nisbet, i. 65; one son, Josiah
Nisbet, 65; widowhood, 65; lives
with her uncle, at Nevis, 66;
characteristics, 67-69, 71, 149,
173, 386, ii. 46, 53, 54; wooing
of, by Nelson, i. 69-71; marriage
to Nelson, and departure to England,
75; no children by Nelson,
90; resides with Nelson, in his
father's house, 91; lives with
father of Nelson, during the latter's
absences, 1793-1800, 207,
257, 308, ii. 46-48, 55; letters of
Nelson to, quoted, i. 111, 133,
139, 147, 149, 172, 173, 207, 248,
255-258, 295, 307, 325, 372, 387,
ii. 47, 146,147; continued attachment
of Nelson to, on returning
home in 1797, i. 308, 309, 316;
Nelson's message to, when thinking
himself mortally wounded at
the Nile, 351; uneasiness of, at
the reports of Nelson's intimacy
with Lady Hamilton, 396; apparent
purpose of, to go to the Mediterranean,
discouraged by Nelson,
396; growing alienation of Nelson
from, 422, ii. 45-47, 48, 51,
53; attitude of, towards Nelson,
ii. 46, 47, 50, 53, 54; letters of, to
Nelson, quoted, 47; Nelson's bearing
towards, 48, 50; attitude of,
towards Lady Hamilton, 51; final
breach between Nelson and, 53,
55, 146-149; later years of, 54,
55; testimony to, of Nelson and
of his father, 55; Nelson's "letter
of dismissal" to, and her endorsement
thereon, 146, 147; date of
death, i. 65 note.

Nelson, Maurice, Nelson's eldest
brother, quoted by Lady Nelson,
ii. 147 and note.

Niebuhr, the historian, accounts of
the Battle of Copenhagen, quoted,
ii. 81, 98, 112.

Nile, Battle of the, i. 343-358.

Nisbet, Captain Josiah, Nelson's
stepson, birth and parentage, i.
65; goes to sea with Nelson in the
"Agamemnon," 100; Lady Hamilton's
kindness to, 111; good conduct
of, at Teneriffe, 302, 303;
Nelson attributes the saving of
his life to, 306, ii. 147; St. Vincent
promotes to commander at
Nelson's request, i. 306; Nelson's
disappointment in, 412; estrangement
between Nelson and, ii.
146-148; St. Vincent's assertion
of Nelson's high opinion of, in
early life, 148 note.

Nisbet, Dr. Josiah, first husband of Lady Nelson, i. 65.

Nisbet, Mrs. Josiah, Lady Nelson's name by first marriage.
  _See_ Nelson, Lady.

Niza, Marquis de, Portuguese admiral, commanding squadron
  under Nelson's orders in the Mediterranean, 1798, 1799, i. 370;
  conducts sea blockade of Malta, 370, 392, ii. 1, 8, 9, 12, 14;
  ordered temporarily to defence of Messina, i. 413;
  co-operates at sea with Nelson, when expecting Bruix's
  fleet, 420, 425;
  limitations to Nelson's authority over, 439;
  recalled by Portuguese government, ii. 8;
  Nelson forbids him to obey, 8, 9;
  Nelson's expressions of esteem for, 9;
  final recall allowed by Nelson, 14.


Orde, Admiral Sir John, governor of Dominica, i. 59;
  difficulty with Lord St. Vincent concerning Nelson's appointment
  to command a squadron, 337, 338;
  assigned in 1804 to command part of Nelson's station, from the
  Straits of Gibraltar to Cape Finisterre, ii. 247;
  relations between Nelson and, 247, 248, 256-263, 291;
  driven from before Cadiz by combined fleets, 285;
  popular outcry against, 290;
  Nelson's complaint against, for not watching course of combined
  fleets, 290 note, 292-295;
  relieved from duty at his own request, 310.

"Orient," French flagship at the Battle of the Nile, present as the
  "Sans Culottes," in Hotham's action of March 13, 1795,
  i. 162, 164,   166;
  at the Battle of the Nile, 347, 349, 353, 354;
  blows up, 354;
  Nelson's coffin made from mainmast of, ii. 327.

Otway, Captain, commands Sir Hyde Parker's flagship at the
  Battle of Copenhagen, ii. 77;
  advises against the passage of the Great Belt, 77, 78;
  opposes the making signal to Nelson to leave off action, 89;
  message from Parker to Nelson by, 89, 91.


Paget, Sir Arthur, succeeds Hamilton as British minister
  to Naples, i. 397, ii. 34, 35;
  quotations from the "Paget Papers," i. 397, 398, ii. 23, 37.

Pahlen, Russian minister of state during Nelson's command
  in the Baltic, ii. 107;
  Nelson's correspondence with, 112-114.

Palermo, Nelson's residence in, i. 395-420; ii. 2-35.

Palmas, Gulf of, in Sardinia, rendezvous of Nelson's fleet,
  ii. 207, 277, 278,
  282, 283;
  Nelson learns there of Villeneuve's second sailing, 283.

Parker, Commander Edward, aide to Nelson, ii. 134;
  description of Nelson's celerity by, 134;
  takes part in boat-attack on the French vessels off Boulogne, 137;
  mortally wounded, 138;
  death of, and Nelson's distress, 143.

Parker, Admiral Sir Hyde, succeeds Hotham in command in the Mediterranean,
  i. 199, 200;
  Nelson's dissatisfaction with, 202;
  selected to command the Baltic expedition, ii. 56;
  Nelson joins, as second in command, 65;
  cool reception of Nelson by, 66-69;
  growing influence of Nelson with, 70-74;
  sluggish movements of, 71, 102, 106, 107;
  Nelson's comprehensive letter to, 75-77;
  authorizes Nelson's plan of attack, 79;
  the signal to leave off action, 89-93;
  intrusts negotiations to Nelson, 100-104;
  relieved from command, 110;
  Nelson's opinion of his conduct in the Baltic, 110, 164.

Parker, Admiral Sir Peter, early patron of Nelson, and chief mourner at
  his funeral, i. 20-22;
  personal kindness to Nelson of, 20, 30;
  Nelson's gratitude expressed to, ii. 105, 240.

Parker, Vice-Admiral Sir William, controversy with Nelson about
  the latter's account of the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, i. 277-282;
  remonstrates with Lord St. Vincent for Nelson's appointment to command
  a detached squadron, 337, 338.

Parker, Captain William, commander of the frigate "Amazon,"
  anecdote of Nelson, i. 337 note, ii. 217;
  anecdote of Captain Hardy, 245;
  special mission and singular orders given by Nelson to, 261-263;
  accompanies Nelson to the West Indies, 289, 295, 297;
  final letter from Nelson to, 315, 316.

Pasco, Lieutenant, Nelson's signal officer at Trafalgar, ii. 359;
  anecdotes of Nelson by, 359, 360, 381, 882;
  makes the signals "England expects," etc., 383,
    and for "close action," 384;
  wounded, 390;
  replies to a query made by Nelson while dying, 390.

Paul I., Emperor of Russia,
  congratulations to Nelson on the Battle of the Nile, i. 363;
  coalition of, with Austria and Naples, 400, 404-406;
  becomes Grand Master of Knights of Malta, and seeks the
  restoration of the Order, 406-408;
  Nelson's compliments to, ii. 10, 28;
  successes of his general, Suwarrow, 14;
  subsequent reverses, and anger of, against Austria and
  Great Britain, 15, 62;
  indignation at the refusal of Great Britain to surrender
  Malta to himself, 62;
  renews the Armed Neutrality of 1780, with Sweden, Denmark,
  and Prussia, 63;
  Bonaparte's management of, 64;
  murder of, 100.

"Penelope," British frigate, efficacious action of, in
  compelling the surrender of the "Guillaume Tell,"
  French ship-of-the-line, ii. 31, 328.

Pitt, William, Prime Minister of Great Britain, marked courtesy
  shown to Nelson when last in England by, ii. 156;
  intercourse of Nelson with, just before Trafalgar, 323, 327.

Porto Ferrajo, Island of Elba, seized by Nelson in 1796, i. 237;
  British forces retire from Bastia to, 253;
  naval evacuation of, superintended by Nelson, 259-262.


Radstock, Admiral, Lord, quotations from letters of, relating to
  Nelson, i. 152, ii. 202 and note, 236, 239, 247, 289, 290, 291,
  307, 308, 325.

"Redoutable," French ship-of-the-line, Nelson mortally wounded
  by a shot from, ii. 387-389.

Registration of seamen, Nelson's plans for, ii. 168. 169.

Revel, Nelson's desire to attack the Russian detachment of ships in,
  ii. 74, 77, 100, 102, 106, 107, 111;
  Nelson's visit to, 112-114;
  results of Nelson's visit, 114.

Riou, Captain, commands the frigate "Amazon," and a light squadron in the
  Battle of Copenhagen, ii. 82, 83, 86, 89, 91;
  obeys signal to retire, and is killed, 91.

Riviera of Genoa, operations of Nelson upon the, 1795, 1796, i. 184-236;
  importance of, to the French, 184-190.

Rochefort, the part of the French squadron at, in Napoleon's
  combinations, ii. 269, 272, 312.

Rodney, Admiral, Lord, effect of his victory upon Nelson's plans
  for Trafalgar, ii. 352.

Rogers, Samuel, anecdote of Nelson, ii. 50.

Rose, George, Nelson's interview with, in 1788, i. 82-84;
  accompanies Nelson on board ship before Trafalgar, ii. 337;
  Nelson's message to, when dying, 395.

Ruffo, Cardinal, leader of the Neapolitan "Christian Army" at
  Naples, 1799, i. 416;
  concludes with the insurgents in the castles a capitulation
  which Nelson annuls, 429 and note, 432;
  stormy interview of, with Nelson, 431.


"Sabina," Spanish frigate, captured by the "Minerve" carrying
  Nelson's broad pendant, i. 259;
  recaptured, 260.

"San Josef," Spanish three-decked ship, taken possession of by Nelson
  at Battle of St. Vincent, i. 273-276;
  flagship to Nelson in the Channel Fleet, ii. 56, 65.

"San Nicolas," Spanish eighty-gun ship, boarded by Nelson at
  Battle of St. Vincent, i. 273-276.

Santa Cruz, Canary Islands. _See_ Teneriffe.

Sardinia, Island of, importance of, in Nelson's opinion, ii. 200-205.

Saumarez, Sir James, commands the "Orion," at the Battle of
  St. Vincent, i. 276, 277;
  relieves Nelson in the blockade of Cadiz, 288;
  accompanies Nelson as second in command in the Nile campaign, 316,
  325, 332, 333 and note, 336, 345;
  at Battle of the Nile, 349, 353;
  sent to Gibraltar with the prizes, 366, 368;
  Nelson's eulogy of, in the House of Lords, ii. 160.

Scott, Rev. A.J., private secretary to Sir Hyde Parker, and afterwards
  to Nelson in the Mediterranean, ii. 80, 92;
  testimony of, to Nelson's religious feelings, 160;
  Nelson's method of transacting business with, 233-235;
  mention of Nelson's kindliness by, 236-238;
  anecdote of Nelson, 293, 294;
  remark of Nelson to, 368;
  at Nelson's death-bed, 389, 395, 396.

Scott, John, public secretary to Nelson, ii. 232;
  remarks on the quickness of Nelson's intelligence, 236,
    and on his kindliness, 238;
  killed at Trafalgar, 385.

Sicily, importance of Malta to, i. 330;
  Nelson's anxiety for,
    in 1799, 413, 414, 419, 423, 426-428, 445, 447, ii. 5;
    in 1803-5, ii. 185, 191-193, 196, 212, 282, 285-287;
  Nelson's estate of Bronté in, ii. 2, 110.

Sidmouth, Lord. _See_ Addington.

Smith, Sir Sidney, Nelson's indignation at the mission of,
  to the Levant, i. 400-402;
  Nelson's relations with, 402-404;
  successful defence of Acre by, ii. 17;
  Nelson's peremptory orders to, not to permit any Frenchman
  to quit Egypt, 18;
  nevertheless, Convention of El Arish countenanced by, 20-22;
  Nelson's distrust of, 10, 194.

Smith, Spencer, brother to Sir Sidney, minister and joint
  minister of Great Britain to Constantinople, i. 400-403;
  becomes secretary of embassy, ii. 13.

Spain, Nelson sees that Spain cannot be a true ally to Great
  Britain, i. 104;
  effect upon Nelson of declaration of war by, 243-250;
  political condition of, in 1803, ii. 181;
  Nelson's views concerning, 185, 199, 248, 251, 254, 258,
  259, 265;
  Nelson's letter of instructions to a captain contingent
  upon action of, 252.

Spencer, Earl, first Lord of the Admiralty, i. 294;
  letters to Nelson from, quoted, 285, 361, 452, ii. 32-34;
  letters of Nelson to, quoted, i. 294, 327, 362, 401, 402,
  407, 444, 445, 447, ii. 5, 6, 11, 12, 16, 27, 32, 34, 65;
  indicates to Jervis the Government's wish that Nelson
  command the squadron in the Mediterranean, i. 321, 322;
  selects Sir Hyde Parker for Baltic command, ii. 67.

St. George, Mrs., description of Lady Hamilton, i. 380, 382;
  account of meeting with Nelson and the Hamiltons at Dresden
  in 1800, ii. 43-45;
  remarks likeness of Nelson to the Russian Marshal Suwarrow, 43.

"St. George," British ship-of-the-line, Nelson's flagship in the
  Baltic expedition, ii. 65;
  Nelson quits, for the "Elephant," for the Battle of Copenhagen, 78.

St. Vincent, Battle of Cape, i. 268-277.

St. Vincent, Earl. _See_ Jervis.

Stewart, Lieutenant-Colonel, accompanies the Baltic expedition on
  board Nelson's flagship, ii. 65;
  narrative of the expedition, and anecdotes of Nelson by, quoted,
  65, 79, 82-84, 89-91, 94-96, 101, 113, 115.

Stuart, General, in command of the British troops at the siege of
  Calvi, i. 134, 136-146;
  apparent friction between Lord Hood and, 142-145;
  Nelson's high opinion of, 140, 143.

Suckling, Catherine, maiden name of Nelson's mother, i. 4.

Suckling, Captain Maurice, Nelson's maternal uncle, i. 5;
  receives Nelson on board his ship the "Raisonnable," on
  entering the navy, 6;
  care for Nelson during his early years, 9-16;
  made Comptroller of the Navy, 15;
  procures Nelson's promotion to lieutenant, 16;
  death of, 21;
  Nelson's care, when wounded at Teneriffe, to save the sword of, 303;
  successful naval engagement of, on the date of Trafalgar, and
  expectation formed therefrom by Nelson, ii. 368.

Suckling, William, Nelson's maternal uncle, Nelson appeals to, for
  aid to marry, i. 43, 69, 70;
  makes an allowance to Nelson, 70;
  letters of Nelson to, 43, 69, 133.

Suwarrow, Russian marshal, commands the combined Russian and Austrian
  troops in Italian campaign of 1799, i. 416, ii. 2, 6, 15;
  personal resemblance of Nelson to, ii. 43, 112.

Sweden, joins Russia, Denmark, and Prussia in the Armed Neutrality of
  1800, ii. 60-63.

Syracuse, Nelson refreshes his squadron in, before the Battle of the
  Nile, i. 340-342;
  Nelson's opinion of, as a base for his operations after the battle,
  368, 369;
  insecurity of, with headquarters at Palermo, 414;
  Nelson ordered by Keith to make his headquarters at, ii. 30.

"TÉMÉRAIRE," British ship-of-the-line, Nelson's supporter at Trafalgar,
  ii. 378, 391.

Teneriffe, Nelson's expedition against, i. 296-306.

Tetuan, Nelson's visits to, for water and fresh provisions,
  ii. 292-294, 314, 315;
  sends a detachment to, before Trafalgar, 360.

"Theseus," British ship-of-the-line, Nelson's flagship before Cadiz
  and at Teneriffe, 289-291, 300, 304.

Thomson, name under which Nelson speaks of himself in his
  correspondence with Lady Hamilton, ii. 149,
  and borne by his daughter prior to his own death, 366.

Toulon, delivered by its inhabitants to Lord Hood, i. 106, 107;
  retaken by the French, 117;
  Nelson reconnoitres, 198, 217;
  Jervis's efficient blockade of, 230, 242;
  Nelson's method of watching, ii. 197-199, 202, 211-217.

Trafalgar, Battle of, general plan of action, as originally
  conceived, ii. 343-346;
  discussed, 347-349;
  contrasted with the tactics of the battle as fought, 350-352;
  anecdote concerning its conception, 352;
  narrative of, 363-397.

Trench, Mrs. _See_ St. George.

Tripoli, maintains formal war with Naples and Portugal, for the
  purposes of piracy, i. 409, ii. 7;
  Nelson's diplomatic difficulties with, i. 409, 410.

Troubridge, Sir Thomas, nobly supports Nelson in his initiative
  at the Battle of St. Vincent, i. 271-273, 277-282;
  advises and accompanies Nelson in the Teneriffe expedition, 296-306;
  limitations of, 300, 301,
    and admirable qualities, 304-306, ii. 141;
  sent with a detachment of ten ships-of-the-line to join Nelson in
  the Nile campaign, i. 323, 325, 326;
  mentioned, 328, 329, 333, 340, 341, 343;
  his ship, the "Culloden," unfortunately grounds before getting into
  action at the Nile, 352;
  Nelson's praise of, 364, ii. 10;
  incidental services in the waters of Italy and Malta, i. 393, 405,
  414-416, 419, 420, 437, 444, ii. 6, 13, 29;
  remonstrates with Nelson on his life at Palermo, i. 398;
  sent by Nelson on a special mission to Alexandria, 401;
  singular anecdote of, 411;
  letters of, to Nelson, 453, ii. 29, 35;
  Nelson's petulant reproach to, ii. 28;
  strong remonstrances of, to Nelson, against quitting the blockade
  of Malta, 29, 30, 35;
  return of, to England, 41;
  impression of, that Nelson will not serve again, 42;
  advice to Miss Knight concerning the Hamiltons, 48;
  letter of Nelson to, concerning the sailing of the Baltic fleet, 66;
  beginning alienation of Nelson from, 111, 140, 141, 142, 170;
  St. Vincent's opinion of, 116, 140.

Tunis, Nelson's mission to, in 1793, i. 113-116;
  maintains formal war with Naples and Portugal, for the purposes of
  piracy, 409, ii. 7;
  Nelson's diplomatic difficulties with, i. 409, 410.

Turkey, co-operates with Russia and Great Britain in the
  Mediterranean, 1798, i. 392, 404-406, 419, 420, 429, ii. 16-18;
  Nelson's sympathy with, against Russia, i. 406, 408;
  makes separate convention of El Arish with French, regardless of
  her allies, ii. 19, 20;
  interests of, threatened in the Morea and in Egypt by the French in
1803-5, 185-188, 195, 211-213.

Tuscany, attitude of, towards France, in 1794, i. 156, 161;
  importance of ports of, to France, 157, 158;
  difficult neutrality of, 185, 233;
  Nelson imagines a French enterprise against, by sea, 214, 217,
  218, 219;
  control of, obtained by the French, 233;
  Nelson's operations on the coast of, 236;
  blockade of Leghorn and seizure of Elba, 237;
  political condition of, in 1803-5, during Nelson's Mediterranean
  command, ii. 182.

Two Sicilies, the Kingdom of the, (Naples and Sicily,) Nelson's
successful mission to, to obtain troops for the occupation of
Toulon, i. 110;
  attitude towards France, 1795, 158;
  sends flotilla to aid Nelson, but too late in the season, 192;
  makes an armistice with France, 1796, 233;
  Nelson's interest keenly excited for, 247, 248;
  makes peace with France, 1796, 251;
  dissatisfaction with course of France, in 1798, 319;
  attitude of, towards France, during the campaign of the Nile,
  329-331, 340, 341, 342;
  Nelson's anxieties for, 339;
  Nelson's extreme interest in, throughout his life, after his
  return from the Nile, 369, 388, 412, 417, 427, 442-446, 448, 450-452,
  ii. 4, 5, 6, 39, 183, 190-194, 264-266, 282, 285-287;
  joy of, upon receipt of the news of Battle of the Nile, i. 371, 372;
  strategic weight of, in the counsels of Bonaparte, 391;
  Nelson persuades, to declare war against France, 389-393;
  overwhelming defeat of, and flight of Court to Palermo, 394, 395;
  restoration of the royal authority in Naples, ii. 6;
  refusal of the king to reside in Naples, 5, 6;
  occupation of Adriatic coast of, by Bonaparte, 1803-5, 179.

Vado, Bay of, occupied by Austrians in 1795, i. 178;
  best anchorage between Nice and Genoa, 186;
  importance of, to France, 187, 214, 215;
  evacuated by Austrians after the Battle of Loano, 201, 208;
  held definitively by French, 223.

Valetta, French in Malta shut in, i. 392, 407, 409, ii. 7;
  Nelson's difficulties in maintaining the blockade, ii. 7-10, 12-14;
  urgency of Spencer and Troubridge upon Nelson to await the
  capitulation of, 28-30, 32-35.

"Vanguard," British ship-of-the-line, Nelson's flagship at the
Battle of the Nile, commissioned, i. 310;
  dismasted off Corsica, 323;
  at the Battle of the Nile, 348, 349, 350;
  arrives at Naples, 371;
  Nelson's flag shifted from, to the "Foudroyant," 423.

Vansittart, British envoy to Copenhagen in 1801, ii. 71-73;
  report of Danish defences, 73;
  explanations conveyed from Nelson to the Admiralty by, 73.

"Victory," British hundred-gun ship, Nelson's flagship at Trafalgar,
Jervis's flagship at Battle of St. Vincent, i. 275;
  Nelson sails in, for the Mediterranean, ii. 175;
  his long stay on board of, 222, 313;
  returns to England, 318;
  again sails with Nelson, 338;
  at Battle of Trafalgar, 370, 378-380, 384-389, 390-394, 397.

Villeneuve, French admiral, commands the rear at the Battle of the
  Nile, i. 357;
  escapes with two ships-of-the-line and two frigates, 357;
  indecision of, 358, ii. 349;
  commands the Toulon squadron, after the death of Latouche Tréville,
  ii. 257, 271;
  Napoleon's orders to, 271, 272;
  first sailing of, and disasters encountered by, 272, 275, 276, 277;
  second sailing of, from Toulon, 284;
  arrival at Cadiz and in the West Indies, 285;
  Nelson learns of his passing the Straits, 287,
    and of his destination to the West Indies, 292-295;
  leaves West Indies for Europe, on learning Nelson's arrival, 301;
  followed by Nelson, 302;
  engagement of, with Calder's fleet, 313;
  arrives at Ferrol, 314;
  sails from Ferrol, 323;
  arrival in Cadiz, 328;
  dispositions for battle, before Trafalgar, 349, 369, 370, 379, 380;
  commander-in-chief of the entire combined fleet, 363;
  encounter of his flagship and Nelson's, 384-387;
  surrender of, 391.

Villettes, British general, at the siege of Bastia, i. 130;
  Nelson's criticism on, when commander of the troops at Malta, 1803,
  ii. 193;
  characteristic letters of Nelson to, 200, 250.


Wellington, Nelson's one meeting with, ii. 321.

West Indies, Nelson's early service in, i. 17-30;
  called by Nelson "the station for honour," i. 37;
  Nelson enforces Navigation Act in, 53-65;
  wishes to return to, in search of more active service, 108, 115;
  conjectures destination of French Toulon fleet to, in 1804,
  ii. 249, 270;
  importance of, to Great Britain, 270;
  rendezvous fixed by Napoleon, for the concentration of his fleets,
  in 1805, 271, 283;
  Toulon squadron goes to, 284, 285;
  Nelson pursues to, 296, 297;
  Nelson's week in, in June, 1805, 298-303;
  his estimate of his services rendered by going there, 301, 305;
  Nelson returns to Europe from, 302-310.

William Henry, Prince, son of George III., and captain in the British
  navy, first meeting of Nelson with, i. 38, 39;
  description of Nelson at twenty-four, by, 39;
  accompanied by Nelson in visit to Havana, 41;
  Nelson's association with, in 1786-87, 74, 75;
  gives away the bride at Nelson's wedding, 75;
  intimacy of Nelson with, 86-88;
  returns with his ship from America, contrary to orders, 88;
  at variance with the King, 88, 89;
  made Duke of Clarence, 89;
  effect of intimacy with, upon Nelson, 89;
  subsequent correspondence between Nelson and, 239, 244, 256,
  284, 451;
  continues his friendship to Lady Nelson, after her husband's
  alienation, ii. 55.

Woolward, Frances Herbert, maiden name of Lady Nelson, i. 65.

Wurmser, Austrian marshal, succeeds Beaulieu, after the latter's
  defeat by Bonaparte, in 1796, i. 238;
  raises the siege of Mantua, 238;
  Nelson's enterprise against Leghorn dependent on the success of, 240;
  defeated by Bonaparte, at Castiglione and Lonato, 241.

Wyndham, British minister to Tuscany, mention of Nelson and the
  Hamiltons by, ii. 38, 39;
  strained relations of, towards Nelson and the Hamiltons, 39.



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THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY.

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Captain Mahan, whose name is famous all the world over as that of the
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An altogether exceptional work; there is nothing like it in the whole
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THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE.

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A book that must be read. _First_, it must be read by all
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A highly interesting and an important work, having lessons and
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We do not hesitate to assert that, in treating this theme, he has
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