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Title: New York Times Current History: The European War, Vol 2, No. 1, April, 1915 - April-September, 1915
Author: Various
Language: English
As this book started as an ASCII text book there are no pictures available.
Copyright Status: Not copyrighted in the United States. If you live elsewhere check the laws of your country before downloading this ebook. See comments about copyright issues at end of book.

*** Start of this Doctrine Publishing Corporation Digital Book "New York Times Current History: The European War, Vol 2, No. 1, April, 1915 - April-September, 1915" ***

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The New York Times


A Monthly Magazine


April, 1915-September, 1915

With Index

Number I, April 1915

[Illustration: [logo] THE N.Y. TIMES]

New York
The New York Times Company





GERMANY'S WAR ZONE AND NEUTRAL FLAGS                                 1
  The German Decree and Interchange of Notes

GERMANY'S SUBMARINE WAR (With Map)                                  20

GERMAN PEOPLE NOT BLINDED                                           22
  By Karl Lamprecht

REVEILLE                                                            24
  By John Galsworthy

CAN GERMANY BE STARVED OUT?                                         25
  An Answer by Sixteen German Specialists

HOCH DER KAISER (Poem)                                              28
  By George Davies

THE SUBMARINE OF 1578                                               29

THE TORPEDO (Poem)                                                  30
  By Katherine D.M. Simons, Jr.

"GOD PUNISH ENGLAND, BROTHER"                                       31
  A New Hymn of Germany's Gospel of Hatred

THE GREAT HOUR (Poem)                                               32
  By Hermann Sudermann

THE PEACE OF THE WORLD                                              33
  By H.G. Wells

ZEPPELIN RAIDS ON LONDON (With Map)                                 46
  By the Naval Correspondent of The London Times

JULIUS CAESAR ON THE AISNE                                          48

SIR JOHN FRENCH'S OWN STORY (With Map)                              49
  Continuing the Famous Dispatches of the British Commander

THE CATHEDRAL OF RHEIMS                                             60
  By Emile Verhaeren

MUSIC OF WAR                                                        61
  By Rudyard Kipling

AMERICA AND A NEW WORLD STATE                                       63
  By Norman Angell

SIR CHRISTOPHER CRADOCK (Poem)                                      84
  By John E. Dolson

BATTLE OF THE SUEZ CANAL (With Map)                                 85
  First-hand Account of the Turkish Invasion

A FULL-FLEDGED SOCIALIST STATE                                      89
  By J. Laurence Laughlin

LETTERS FROM WIVES                                                  92

"WAR CHILDREN"                                                      92

NO PREMATURE PEACE FOR RUSSIA                                       93
  Proceedings at Opening of the Duma, Feb. 9

TO THE VICTOR BELONG THE SPOILS (Poem)                              96
  By Madeleine Lucette Ryley

LESSONS OF THE WAR TO MARCH NINTH                                   97
  By Charles W. Eliot

BELGIUM'S KING AND QUEEN                                           100
  By Paul Hervieu

THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS                            101

  By J. Ellis Barker

THE REDEMPTION OF EUROPE (Poem)                                    128
  By Alfred Noyes

GERMANY WILL END THE WAR                                           129
  By Maximilian Harden

LOUVAIN'S NEW STREETS                                              133

THE STATE OF HOLLAND                                               134
  By Hendrik Willem van Loon

HUNGARY AFTER THE WAR (With Map)                                   137
  By a Correspondent of The London Times

THE WATCHERS OF THE TROAD (Poem)                                   139
  By Harry Lyman Koopman

THE UNION OF CENTRAL EUROPE                                        140
  By Franz von Liszt

TWO POOR LITTLE BELGIAN FLEDGLINGS                                 143
  By Pierre Loti

WHAT THE GERMANS DESIRE                                            144
  By Gustaf Sioesteen

ADDRESS TO KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM                                  147
  By Emile Verhaeren

FORESHADOWING A NEW PHASE OF WAR                                   148
  By Lloyd George, British Chancellor of the Exchequer

BRITAIN'S UNSHEATHED SWORD                                         153
  By H.H. Asquith, England's Prime Minister

SWEDEN'S SCANDINAVIAN LEADERSHIP (With Map)                        160
  By a Swedish Political Expert

FROM ENGLAND (Poem)                                                164
  By Maurice Hewlett

WAR CORRESPONDENCE                                                 165

THE DRAGON'S TEETH (Poem)                                          181
  By Caroline Duer

THE GREATEST OF CAMPAIGNS (With Map)                               182
  The French Official Account

BY THE NORTH SEA (Poem)                                            185
  By W.L. Courtney

WHEN MARTHE CHENAL SANG THE "MARSEILLAISE"                         187
  By Wythe Williams

A WAR OF COMMERCE TO FOLLOW                                        189
  By Sir William Ramsay

BELGIUM (Poem)                                                     192
  By Edith Wharton

DESIRED PEACE TERMS FOR EUROPE                                     193
  By Proponents for the Allies and for Germany

THE BRITISH VOLUNTEERS (Poem)                                      195
  By Katherine D.M. Simons, Jr.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR                                              196

[Illustration: H.M. HUSSEIN KEMAL

The New Sultan of Egypt, Which Was Recently Declared a British


The Children of the Czar Have Inherited the Regal Beauty of Their Mother

(Photo from Paul Thompson)]

The New York Times




APRIL, 1915

Germany's War Zone and Neutral Flags

The German Decree and Interchange of Notes Answering American Protests
to Germany and Britain

_BERLIN, Feb. 4, (by wireless to Sayville, L.I.)--The German
Admiralty today issued the following communication:_

The waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English
Channel, are declared a war zone on and after Feb. 18, 1915.

Every enemy merchant ship found in this war zone will be destroyed, even
if it is impossible to avert dangers which threaten the crew and

Also neutral ships in the war zone are in danger, as in consequence of
the misuse of neutral flags ordered by the British Government on Jan.
31, and in view of the hazards of naval warfare, it cannot always be
avoided that attacks meant for enemy ships endanger neutral ships.

Shipping northward, around the Shetland Islands, in the eastern basin of
the North Sea, and a strip of at least thirty nautical miles in breadth
along the Dutch coast, is endangered in the same way.


Feb. 10, 1915.

_The Secretary of State has instructed Ambassador Gerard at Berlin to
present to the German Government a note to the following effect:_

The Government of the United States, having had its attention directed
to the proclamation of the German Admiralty, issued on the 4th of
February, that the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland,
including the whole of the English Channel, are to be considered as
comprised within the seat of war; that all enemy merchant vessels found
in those waters after the 18th inst. will be destroyed, although it may
not always be possible to save crews and passengers; and that neutral
vessels expose themselves to danger within this zone of war because, in
view of the misuse of neutral flags said to have been ordered by the
British Government on the 31st of January and of the contingencies of
maritime warfare, it may not be possible always to exempt neutral
vessels from attacks intended to strike enemy ships, feels it to be its
duty to call the attention of the Imperial German Government, with
sincere respect and the most friendly sentiments, but very candidly and
earnestly, to the very serious possibilities of the course of action
apparently contemplated under that proclamation.

The Government of the United States views those possibilities with such
grave concern that it feels it to be its privilege, and, indeed, its
duty, in the circumstances to request the Imperial German Government to
consider before action is taken the critical situation in respect of the
relation between this country and Germany which might arise were the
German naval forces, in carrying out the policy foreshadowed in the
Admiralty's proclamation, to destroy any merchant vessel of the United
States or cause the death of American citizens.

It is, of course, not necessary to remind the German Government that the
sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels on the high
seas is limited to visit and search, unless a blockade is proclaimed and
effectively maintained, which this Government does not understand to be
proposed in this case. To declare or exercise a right to attack and
destroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high seas without
first certainly determining its belligerent nationality and the
contraband character of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented in
naval warfare that this Government is reluctant to believe that the
Imperial Government of Germany in this case contemplates it as possible.

The suspicion that enemy ships are using neutral flags improperly can
create no just presumption that all ships traversing a prescribed area
are subject to the same suspicion. It is to determine exactly such
questions that this Government understands the right of visit and search
to have been recognized.

This Government has carefully noted the explanatory statement issued by
the Imperial German Government at the same time with the proclamation of
the German Admiralty, and takes this occasion to remind the Imperial
German Government very respectfully that the Government of the United
States is open to none of the criticisms for unneutral action to which
the German Government believes the Governments of certain other neutral
nations have laid themselves open; that the Government of the United
States has not consented to or acquiesced in any measures which may have
been taken by the other belligerent nations in the present war which
operate to restrain neutral trade, but has, on the contrary, taken in
all such matters a position which warrants it in holding those
Governments responsible in the proper way for any untoward effects on
American shipping which the accepted principles of international law do
not justify; and that it, therefore, regards itself as free in the
present instance to take with a clear conscience and upon accepted
principles the position indicated in this note.

If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the
presumption that the flag of the United States was not being used in
good faith and should destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the
lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of
the United States to view the act in any other light than as an
indefensible violation of neutral rights, which it would be very hard,
indeed, to reconcile with the friendly relations now happily subsisting
between the two Governments.

If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German
Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United
States would be constrained to hold the Imperial Government of Germany
to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, and
to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American
lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment
of their acknowledged rights on the high seas.

The Government of the United States, in view of these considerations,
which it urges with the greatest respect and with the sincere purpose of
making sure that no misunderstandings may arise, and no circumstances
occur, that might even cloud the intercourse of the two Governments,
expresses the confident hope and expectation that the Imperial German
Government can and will give assurance that American citizens and their
vessels will not be molested by the naval forces of Germany otherwise
than by visit and search, though their vessels may be traversing the sea
area delimited in the proclamation of the German Admiralty. It is stated
for the information of the Imperial Government that representations have
been made to his Britannic Majesty's Government in respect to the
unwarranted use of the American flag for the protection of British


Feb. 10, 1915.

_The Secretary of State has instructed Ambassador Page at London to
present to the British Government a note to the following effect:_

The department has been advised of the declaration of the German
Admiralty on Feb. 4, indicating that the British Government had on Jan.
31 explicitly authorized the use of neutral flags on British merchant
vessels, presumably for the purpose of avoiding recognition by German
naval forces. The department's attention has also been directed to
reports in the press that the Captain of the Lusitania, acting upon
orders or information received from the British authorities, raised the
American flag as his vessel approached the British coasts, in order to
escape anticipated attacks by German submarines. Today's press reports
also contain an alleged official statement of the Foreign Office
defending the use of the flag of a neutral country by a belligerent
vessel in order to escape capture or attack by an enemy.

Assuming that the foregoing reports are true, the Government of the
United States, reserving for future consideration the legality and
propriety of the deceptive use of the flag of a neutral power in any
case for the purpose of avoiding capture, desires very respectfully to
point out to his Britannic Majesty's Government the serious consequences
which may result to American vessels and American citizens if this
practice is continued.

The occasional use of the flag of a neutral or an enemy under the stress
of immediate pursuit and to deceive an approaching enemy, which appears
by the press reports to be represented as the precedent and
justification used to support this action, seems to this Government a
very different thing from an explicit sanction by a belligerent
Government for its merchant ships generally to fly the flag of a neutral
power within certain portions of the high seas which are presumed to be
frequented with hostile warships. The formal declaration of such a
policy of general misuse of a neutral's flag jeopardizes the vessels of
the neutral visiting those waters in a peculiar degree by raising the
presumption that they are of belligerent nationality regardless of the
flag which they may carry.

In view of the announced purpose of the German Admiralty to engage in
active naval operations in certain delimited sea areas adjacent to the
coasts of Great Britain and Ireland, the Government of the United States
would view with anxious solicitude any general use of the flag of the
United States by British vessels traversing those waters. A policy such
as the one which his Majesty's Government is said to intend to adopt
would, if the declaration of the German Admiralty be put in force, it
seems clear, afford no protection to British vessels, while it would be
a serious and constant menace to the lives and vessels of American

The Government of the United States, therefore, trusts that his
Majesty's Government will do all in their power to restrain vessels of
British nationality in the deceptive use of the United States flag in
the sea area defined by the German declaration, since such practice
would greatly endanger the vessels of a friendly power navigating those
waters and would even seem to impose upon the Government of Great
Britain a measure of responsibility for the loss of American lives and
vessels in case of an attack by a German naval force.

You will impress upon his Majesty's Government the grave concern which
this Government feels in the circumstances in regard to the safety of
American vessels and lives in the war zone declared by the German

You may add that this Government is making earnest representations to
the German Government in regard to the danger to American vessels and
citizens if the declaration of the German Admiralty is put into effect.


_BERLIN, (via London,) Feb. 18.--German Government's reply to the
American note follows:_

The Imperial Government has examined the communication from the United
States Government in the same spirit of good-will and friendship by
which the communication appears to have been dictated. The Imperial
Government is in accord with the United States Government that for both
parties it is in a high degree desirable to avoid misunderstandings
which might arise from measures announced by the German Admiralty and to
provide against the occurrence of incidents which might trouble the
friendly relations which so far happily exist between the two

With regard to the assuring of these friendly relations, the German
Government believes that it may all the more reckon on a full
understanding with the United States, as the procedure announced by the
German Admiralty, which was fully explained in the note of the 4th
inst., is in no way directed against legitimate commerce and legitimate
shipping of neutrals, but represents solely a measure of self-defense,
imposed on Germany by her vital interests, against England's method of
warfare, which is contrary to international law, and which so far no
protest by neutrals has succeeded in bringing back to the generally
recognized principles of law as existing before the outbreak of war.

In order to exclude all doubt regarding these cardinal points, the
German Government once more begs leave to state how things stand. Until
now Germany has scrupulously observed valid international rules
regarding naval warfare. At the very beginning of the war Germany
immediately agreed to the proposal of the American Government to ratify
the new Declaration of London, and took over its contents unaltered, and
without formal obligation, into her prize law.

The German Government has obeyed these rules, even when they were
diametrically opposed to her military interests. For instance, Germany
allowed the transportation of provisions to England from Denmark until
today, though she was well able, by her sea forces, to prevent it. In
contradistinction to this attitude, England has not even hesitated at a
second infringement of international law, if by such means she could
paralyze the peaceful commerce of Germany with neutrals. The German
Government will be the less obliged to enter into details, as these are
put down sufficiently, though not exhaustively, in the American note to
the British Government dated Dec. 29, as a result of five months'

All these encroachments have been made, as has been admitted, in order
to cut off all supplies from Germany and thereby starve her peaceful
civil population--a procedure contrary to all humanitarian principles.
Neutrals have been unable to prevent the interruption of their commerce
with Germany, which is contrary to international laws.

The American Government, as Germany readily acknowledges, has protested
against the British procedure. In spite of these protests and protests
from other neutral States, Great Britain could not be induced to depart
from the course of action she had decided upon. Thus, for instance, the
American ship Wilhelmina recently was stopped by the British, although
her cargo was destined solely for the German civil population, and,
according to the express declaration of the German Government, was to be
employed only for this purpose.

Germany is as good as cut off from her overseas supply by the silent or
protesting toleration of neutrals, not only in regard to such goods as
are absolute contraband, but also in regard to such as, according to
acknowledged law before the war, are only conditional contraband or not
contraband at all. Great Britain, on the other hand, is, with the
toleration of neutral Governments, not only supplied with such goods as
are not contraband or only conditional contraband, but with goods which
are regarded by Great Britain, if sent to Germany, as absolute
contraband, namely, provisions, industrial raw materials, &c., and even
with goods which have always indubitably been regarded as absolute

The German Government feels itself obliged to point out with the
greatest emphasis that a traffic in arms, estimated at many hundreds of
millions, is being carried on between American firms and Germany's
enemies. Germany fully comprehends that the practice of right and the
toleration of wrong on the part of neutrals are matters absolutely at
the discretion of neutrals, and involve no formal violation of
neutrality. Germany, therefore, did not complain of any formal violation
of neutrality, but the German Government, in view of complete evidence
before it, cannot help pointing out that it, together with the entire
public opinion of Germany, feels itself to be severely prejudiced by the
fact that neutrals, in safeguarding their rights in legitimate commerce
with Germany according to international law, have up to the present
achieved no, or only insignificant, results, while they are making
unlimited use of their right by carrying on contraband traffic with
Great Britain and our other enemies.

If it is a formal right of neutrals to take no steps to protect their
legitimate trade with Germany, and even to allow themselves to be
influenced in the direction of the conscious and willful restriction of
their trade, on the other hand, they have the perfect right, which they
unfortunately do not exercise, to cease contraband trade, especially in
arms, with Germany's enemies.

In view of this situation, Germany, after six months of patient
waiting, sees herself obliged to answer Great Britain's murderous method
of naval warfare with sharp counter-measures. If Great Britain in her
fight against Germany summons hunger as an ally, for the purpose of
imposing upon a civilized people of 70,000,000 the choice between
destitution and starvation or submission to Great Britain's commercial
will, then Germany today is determined to take up the gauntlet and
appeal to similar allies.

Germany trusts that the neutrals, who so far have submitted to the
disadvantageous consequences of Great Britain's hunger war in silence,
or merely in registering a protest, will display toward Germany no
smaller measure of toleration, even if German measures, like those of
Great Britain, present new terrors of naval warfare.

Moreover, the German Government is resolved to suppress with all the
means at its disposal the importation of war material to Great Britain
and her allies, and she takes it for granted that neutral Governments,
which so far have taken no steps against the traffic in arms with
Germany's enemies, will not oppose forcible suppression by Germany of
this trade.

Acting from this point of view, the German Admiralty proclaimed a naval
war zone, whose limits it exactly defined. Germany, so far as possible,
will seek to close this war zone with mines, and will also endeavor to
destroy hostile merchant vessels in every other way. While the German
Government, in taking action based upon this overpowering point of view,
keeps itself far removed from all intentional destruction of neutral
lives and property, on the other hand, it does not fail to recognize
that from the action to be taken against Great Britain dangers arise
which threaten all trade within the war zone, without distinction. This
a natural result of mine warfare, which, even under the strictest
observance of the limits of international law, endangers every ship
approaching the mine area. The German Government considers itself
entitled to hope that all neutrals will acquiesce in these measures, as
they have done in the case of the grievous damages inflicted upon them
by British measures, all the more so as Germany is resolved, for the
protection of neutral shipping even in the naval war zone, to do
everything which is at all compatible with the attainment of this

In view of the fact that Germany gave the first proof of her good-will
in fixing a time limit of not less than fourteen days before the
execution of said measures, so that neutral shipping might have an
opportunity of making arrangements to avoid threatening danger, this can
most surely be achieved by remaining away from the naval war zone.
Neutral vessels which, despite this ample notice, which greatly affects
the achievement of our aims in our war against Great Britain, enter
these closed waters will themselves bear the responsibility for any
unfortunate accidents that may occur. Germany disclaims all
responsibility for such accidents and their consequences.

Germany has further expressly announced the destruction of all enemy
merchant vessels found within the war zone, but not the destruction of
all merchant vessels, as the United States seems erroneously to have
understood. This restriction which Germany imposes upon itself is
prejudicial to the aim of our warfare, especially as in the application
of the conception of contraband practiced by Great Britain toward
Germany--which conception will now also be similarly interpreted by
Germany--the presumption will be that neutral ships have contraband
aboard. Germany naturally is unwilling to renounce its rights to
ascertain the presence of contraband in neutral vessels, and in certain
cases to draw conclusions therefrom.

Germany is ready, finally, to deliberate with the United States
concerning any measures which might secure the safety of legitimate
shipping of neutrals in the war zone. Germany cannot, however, forbear
to point out that all its efforts in this direction may be rendered very
difficult by two circumstances: First, the misuse of neutral flags by
British merchant vessels, which is indubitably known to the United
States; second, the contraband trade already mentioned, especially in
war materials, on neutral vessels.

Regarding the latter point, Germany would fain hope that the United
States, after further consideration, will come to a conclusion
corresponding to the spirit of real neutrality. Regarding the first
point, the secret order of the British Admiralty, recommending to
British merchant ships the use of neutral flags, has been communicated
by Germany to the United States and confirmed by communication with the
British Foreign Office, which designates this procedure as entirely
unobjectionable and in accordance with British law. British merchant
shipping immediately followed this advice, as doubtless is known to the
American Government from the incidents of the Lusitania and the Laertes.

Moreover, the British Government has supplied arms to British merchant
ships and instructed them forcibly to resist German submarines. In these
circumstances, it would be very difficult for submarines to recognize
neutral merchant ships, for search in most cases cannot be undertaken,
seeing that in the case of a disguised British ship from which an attack
may be expected the searching party and the submarine would be exposed
to destruction.

Great Britain, then, was in a position to make the German measures
illusory if the British merchant fleet persisted in the misuse of
neutral flags and neutral ships could not otherwise be recognized beyond
doubt. Germany, however, being in a state of necessity, wherein she was
placed by violation of law, must render effective her measures in all
circumstances, in order thereby to compel her adversary to adopt methods
of warfare corresponding with international law, and so to restore the
freedom of the seas, of which Germany at all times is the defender and
for which she today is fighting.

Germany therefore rejoices that the United States has made
representations to Great Britain concerning the illegal use of their
flag, and expresses the expectation that this procedure will force
Great Britain to respect the American flag in the future. In this
expectation, commanders of German submarines have been instructed, as
already mentioned in the note of Feb. 4, to refrain from violent action
against American merchant vessels, so far as these can be recognized.

In order to prevent in the surest manner the consequences of
confusion--though naturally not so far as mines are concerned--Germany
recommends that the United States make its ships which are conveying
peaceful cargoes through the British war zone discernible by means of

Germany believes it may act on the supposition that only such ships
would be convoyed as carried goods not regarded as contraband according
to the British interpretation made in the case of Germany.

How this method of convoy can be carried out is a question concerning
which Germany is ready to open negotiations with the United States as
soon as possible. Germany would be particularly grateful, however, if
the United States would urgently recommend to its merchant vessels to
avoid the British naval war zone, in any case until the settlement of
the flag question. Germany is inclined to the confident hope that the
United States will be able to appreciate in its entire significance the
heavy battle which Germany is waging for existence, and that from the
foregoing explanations and promises it will acquire full understanding
of the motives and the aims of the measures announced by Germany.

Germany repeats that it has now resolved upon the projected measures
only under the strongest necessity of national self-defense, such
measures having been deferred out of consideration for neutrals.

If the United States, in view of the weight which it is justified in
throwing and able to throw into the scales of the fate of peoples,
should succeed at the last moment in removing the grounds which make
that procedure an obligatory duty for Germany, and if the American
Government, in particular, should find a way to make the Declaration of
London respected--on behalf, also, of those powers which are fighting on
Germany's side--and there by make possible for Germany legitimate
importation of the necessaries of life and industrial raw material, then
the German Government could not too highly appreciate such a service,
rendered in the interests of humane methods of warfare, and would gladly
draw conclusions from the new situation.


_LONDON, Feb. 19.--The full text of Great Britain's note regarding the
flag, as handed to the American Ambassador, follows:_

The memorandum communicated on the 11th of February calls attention in
courteous and friendly terms to the action of the Captain of the British
steamer Lusitania in raising the flag of the United States of America
when approaching British waters, and says that the Government of the
United States feels certain anxiety in considering the possibility of
any general use of the flag of the United States by British vessels
traversing those waters, since the effect of such a policy might be to
bring about a menace to the lives and vessels of United States citizens.

It was understood that the German Government announced their intention
of sinking British merchant vessels at sight by torpedoes, without
giving any opportunity of making any provision for the saving of the
lives of non-combatant crews and passengers. It was in consequence of
this threat that the Lusitania raised the United States flag on her
inward voyage.

On her subsequent outward voyage a request was made by United States
passengers, who were embarking on board of her, that the United States
flag should be hoisted presumably to insure their safety. Meanwhile, the
memorandum from your Excellency had been received. His Majesty's
Government did not give any advice to the company as to how to meet this
request, and it understood that the Lusitania left Liverpool under the
British flag.

It seems unnecessary to say more as regards the Lusitania in particular.

In regard to the use of foreign flags by merchant vessels, the British
Merchant Shipping act makes it clear that the use of the British flag by
foreign merchant vessels is permitted in time of war for the purpose of
escaping capture. It is believed that in the case of some other nations
there is similar recognition of the same practice with regard to their
flag, and that none of them has forbidden it.

It would, therefore, be unreasonable to expect his Majesty's Government
to pass legislation forbidding the use of foreign flags by British
merchant vessels to avoid capture by the enemy, now that the German
Government have announced their intention to sink merchant vessels at
sight with their non-combatant crews, cargoes, and papers, a proceeding
hitherto regarded by the opinion of the world not as war, but piracy.

It is felt that the United States Government could not fairly ask the
British Government to order British merchant vessels to forgo a means,
always hitherto permitted, of escaping not only capture but the much
worse fate of sinking and destruction.

Great Britain always has, when a neutral, accorded to vessels of other
States at war the liberty to use the British flag as a means of
protection against capture, and instances are on record when United
States vessels availed themselves of this facility during the American
civil war. It would be contrary to fair expectation if now, when
conditions are reversed, the United States and neutral nations were to
grudge to British ships the liberty to take similar action.

The British Government have no intention of advising their merchant
shipping to use foreign flags as a general practice or to resort to them
otherwise than for escaping capture or destruction. The obligation upon
a belligerent warship to ascertain definitely for itself the nationality
and character of a merchant vessel before capturing it, and a fortiori
before sinking and destroying it, has been universally recognized.

If that obligation is fulfilled, the hoisting of a neutral flag on board
a British vessel cannot possibly endanger neutral shipping, and the
British Government holds that if loss to neutrals is caused by disregard
of this obligation it is upon the enemy vessel disregarding it and upon
the Government giving the orders that it should be disregarded that the
sole responsibility for injury to neutrals ought to rest.


_LONDON, March 1.--Following is the text of the statement read by
Premier Asquith in the House of Commons today and communicated at the
same time to the neutral powers in their capitals as an outline of the
Allies' policy of retaliation against Germany for her "war zone"

Germany has declared the English Channel, the north and west coasts of
France, and the waters around the British Isles a war area, and has
officially given notice that all enemy ships found in that area will be
destroyed, and that neutral vessels may be exposed to danger.

This is, in effect, a claim to torpedo at sight, without regard to the
safety of the crew or passengers, any merchant vessel under any flag. As
it is not in the power of the German Admiralty to maintain any surface
craft in these waters, the attack can only be delivered by submarine

The law and customs of nations in regard to attacks on commerce have
always presumed that the first duty of the captor of a merchant vessel
is bringing it before a prize court, where it may be tried and where
regularities of the capture may be challenged, and where neutrals may
recover their cargo.

The sinking of prizes is, in itself, a questionable act, to be resorted
to only in extraordinary circumstances, and after provision has been
made for the safety of all crews and passengers.

The responsibility of discriminating between neutral and enemy vessels
and between neutral and enemy cargoes obviously rests with the attacking
ship, whose duty it is to verify the status and character of the vessel
and cargo, and to preserve all papers before sinking or capturing the
ship. So, also, the humane duty to provide for the safety of crews of
merchant vessels, whether neutral or enemy, is an obligation on every

It is upon this basis that all previous discussions of law for
regulating warfare have proceeded. The German submarine fulfills none of
these obligations. She enjoys no local command of the waters wherein she
operates. She does not take her captures within the jurisdiction of a
prize court. She carries no prize crew which can be put aboard prizes
which she seizes. She uses no effective means of discriminating between
neutral and enemy vessels. She does not receive on board for safety the
crew of the vessel she sinks. Her methods of warfare, therefore, are
entirely outside the scope of any international instruments regulating
operations against commerce in time of war.

The German declaration substitutes indiscriminate destruction for
regulated captures. Germany has adopted this method against the peaceful
trader and the non-combatant, with the avowed object of preventing
commodities of all kinds, including food for the civilian population,
from reaching or leaving the British Isles or Northern France.

Her opponents are, therefore, driven to frame retaliatory measures in
order in their turn to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or
leaving Germany.

These measures will, however, be enforced by the British and French
Governments without risk to neutral ships or neutral or non-combatant
lives, and in strict observation of the dictates of humanity. The
British and French Governments will, therefore, hold themselves free to
detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy
destination, ownership, or origin.

It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless they
would otherwise be liable to confiscation. Vessels with cargoes which
sailed before this date will not be affected.

Britain's New and Original Blockade

American Protests Following the "War Zone" Decrees Defined

     The first definite statement of the real character of the
     measures adopted by Great Britain and her allies for
     restricting the trade of Germany was obtained at Washington on
     March 17, 1915, when Secretary Bryan made public the text of
     all the recent notes exchanged between the United States
     Government and Germany and the Allies regarding the freedom of
     legitimate American commerce in the war zones. These notes,
     six in all, show that Great Britain and France stand firm in
     their announced intention to cut off all trade with Germany.
     The communications revealed that the United States Government,
     realizing the difficulties of maintaining an effective
     blockade by a close guard of an enemy coast on account of the
     newly developed activity of submarines, asked that "a radius
     of activity" be defined. Great Britain and France replied with
     the announcement that the operations of blockade would not be
     conducted "outside of European waters, including the

     The definition of a "radius of activity" for the allied fleet
     in European waters, including the Mediterranean, is the first
     intimation of the geographical limits of the reprisal order.
     Its limits were not given more exactly, the Allies contend,
     because Germany was equally indefinite in proclaiming all the
     waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland a "war zone." The
     measures adopted are those of a blockade against all trade to
     and from Germany--not the historical kind of blockade
     recognized in international law, but a new and original form.

     The several notes between the United States and the
     belligerent Governments follow. The stars in the German note
     mean that as it came to the State Department in cipher certain
     words were omitted, probably through telegraphic error. In the
     official text of the note the State Department calls
     attention to the stars by an asterisk and a footnote saying
     "apparent omission." In the French note the same thing occurs,
     and is indicated by the footnote "undecipherable group,"
     meaning that the cipher symbols into which the French note was
     put by our Embassy in Paris could not be translated back into
     plain language by the State Department cipher experts. From
     the context it is apparent that the omitted words in the
     German note are "insist upon," or words to that effect.


_The following identic note was sent by the Secretary of State to the
American Ambassadors at London and Berlin:_

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20, 1915.

You will please deliver to Sir Edward Grey the following identic note,
which we are sending England and Germany:

In view of the correspondence which has passed between this Government
and Great Britain and Germany, respectively, relative to the declaration
of a war zone by the German Admiralty, and the use of neutral flags by
the British merchant vessels, this Government ventures to express the
hope that the two belligerent Governments may, through reciprocal
concessions, find a basis for agreement which will relieve neutral ships
engaged in peaceful commerce from the great dangers which they will
incur in the high seas adjacent to the coasts of the belligerents.

The Government of the United States respectfully suggests that an
agreement in terms like the following might be entered into. This
suggestion is not to be regarded as in any sense a proposal made by this
Government, for it of course fully recognizes that it is not its
privilege to propose terms of agreement between Great Britain and
Germany, even though the matter be one in which it and the people of the
United States are directly and deeply interested. It is merely venturing
to take the liberty, which it hopes may be accorded a sincere friend
desirous of embarrassing neither nation involved, and of serving, if it
may, the common interests of humanity. The course outlined is offered in
the hope that it may draw forth the views and elicit the suggestions of
the British and German Governments on a matter of capital interest to
the whole world.

Germany and Great Britain to agree:

First--That neither will sow any floating mines, whether upon the high
seas or in territorial waters; that neither will plant on the high seas
anchored mines, except within cannon range of harbors for defensive
purposes only; and that all mines shall bear the stamp of the Government
planting them, and be so constructed as to become harmless if separated
from their moorings.

Second--That neither will use submarines to attack merchant vessels of
any nationality, except to enforce the right of visit and search.

Third---That each will require their respective merchant vessels not to
use neutral flags for the purpose of disguise or ruse de guerre.

Germany to agree: That all importations of food or foodstuffs from the
United States (and from such other neutral countries as may ask it) into
Germany shall be consigned to agencies to be designated by the United
States Government; that these American agencies shall have entire charge
and control without interference on the part of German Government of the
receipt and distribution of such importations, and shall distribute them
solely to retail dealers bearing licenses from the German Government
entitling them to receive and furnish such food and foodstuffs to
non-combatants only; that any violation of the terms of the retailers'
licenses shall work a forfeiture of their rights to receive such food
and foodstuffs for this purpose, and that such food and foodstuffs will
not be requisitioned by the German Government for any purpose
whatsoever, or be diverted to the use of the armed forces of Germany.

Great Britain to agree: That food and foodstuffs will not be placed
upon the absolute contraband list, and that shipments of such
commodities will not be interfered with or detained by British
authorities, if consigned to agencies designated by the United States
Government in Germany for the receipt and distribution of such cargoes
to licensed German retailers for distribution solely to the
non-combatant population.

In submitting this proposed basis of agreement this Government does not
wish to be understood as admitting or denying any belligerent or neutral
right established by the principles of international law, but would
consider the agreement, if acceptable to the interested powers, a modus
vivendi based upon expediency rather than legal right, and as not
binding upon the United States either in its present form or in a
modified form until accepted by this Government.




_The German reply, handed to the American Ambassador at Berlin,

BERLIN, March 1, 1915.

The undersigned has the honor to inform his Excellency, Mr. James W.
Gerard, Ambassador of the United States of America, in reply to the note
of the 22d inst., that the Imperial German Government have taken note
with great interest of the suggestion of the American Government that
certain principles for the conduct of maritime war on the part of
Germany and England be agreed upon for the protection of neutral
shipping. They see therein new evidence of the friendly feelings of the
American Government toward the German Government, which are fully
reciprocated by Germany.

It is in accordance with Germany's wishes also to have maritime war
conducted according to rules, which, without discriminatingly
restricting one or the other of the belligerent powers in the use of
their means of warfare, are equally considerate of the interests of
neutrals and the dictates of humanity. Consequently it was intimated in
the German note of the 16th inst. that observation of the Declaration
of London on the part of Germany's adversaries would create a new
situation from which the German Government would gladly draw the proper

Proceeding from this view, the German Government have carefully examined
the suggestion of the American Government and believe that they can
actually see in it a suitable basis for the practical solution of the
questions which have arisen.

With regard to the various points of the American note, they beg to make
the following remarks:

First--With regard to the sowing of mines, the German Government would
be willing to agree, as suggested, not to use floating mines and to have
anchored mines constructed as indicated. Moreover, they agree to put the
stamp of the Government on all mines to be planted. On the other hand,
it does not appear to them to be feasible for the belligerents wholly to
for ego the use of anchored mines for offensive purposes.

Second--The German Government would undertake not to use their
submarines to attack mercantile of any flag except when necessary to
enforce the right of visit and search. Should the enemy nationality of
the vessel or the presence of contraband be ascertained, submarines
would proceed in accordance with the general rules of international law.

Third--As provided in the American note, this restriction of the use of
the submarines is contingent on the fact that enemy mercantile abstain
from the use of the neutral flag and other neutral distinctive marks. It
would appear to be a matter of course that such mercantile vessels also
abstain from arming themselves and from all resistance by force, since
such procedure contrary to international law would render impossible any
action of the submarines in accordance with international law.

Fourth--The regulation of legitimate importations of food into Germany
suggested by the American Government appears to be in general
acceptable. Such regulation would, of course, be confined to
importations by sea, but that would, on the other hand, include
indirect importations by way of neutral ports. The German Government
would, therefore, be willing to make the declarations of the nature
provided in the American note so that the use of the imported food and
foodstuffs solely by the non-combatant population would be guaranteed.
The Imperial Government must, however, in addition (* * * * *)[1] having
the importation of other raw material used by the economic system of
non-combatants, including forage, permitted. To that end the enemy
Governments would have to permit the free entry into Germany of the raw
material mentioned in the free list of the Declaration of London, and to
treat materials included in the list of conditional contraband according
to the same principles as food and foodstuffs.

[Footnote 1: Apparent omission.]

The German Government venture to hope that the agreement for which the
American Government have paved the way may be reached after due
consideration of the remarks made above, and that in this way peaceable
neutral shipping and trade will not have to suffer any more than is
absolutely necessary from the unavoidable effects of maritime war. These
effects could be still further reduced if, as was pointed out in the
German note of the 16th inst., some way could be found to exclude the
shipping of munitions of war from neutral countries to belligerents on
ships of any nationality.

The German Government must, of course, reserve a definite statement of
their position until such time as they may receive further information
from the American Government enabling them to see what obligations the
British Government are, on their part, willing to assume.

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion, &c.


Dated, Foreign Office, Berlin, Feb. 28, 1915.




_The reply of Great Britain to the American note of Feb. 20, handed to
the American Ambassador at London, was as follows:_

LONDON, March 15, 1915.

Following is the full text of a memorandum dated March 13, which Grey
handed me today:

"On the 22d of February last I received a communication from your
Excellency of the identic note addressed to his Majesty's Government and
to Germany respecting an agreement on certain points as to the conduct
of the war at sea. The reply of the German Government to this note has
been published and it is not understood from the reply that the German
Government are prepared to abandon the practice of sinking British
merchant vessels by submarines, and it is evident from their reply that
they will not abandon the use of mines for offensive purposes on the
high seas as contrasted with the use of mines for defensive purposes
only within cannon range of their own harbors, as suggested by the
Government of the United States. This being so, it might appear
unnecessary for the British Government to make any further reply than to
take note of the German answer.

"We desire, however, to take the opportunity of making a fuller
statement of the whole position and of our feeling with regard to it. We
recognize with sympathy the desire of the Government of the United
States to see the European war conducted in accordance with the
previously recognized rules of international law and the dictates of
humanity. It is thus that the British forces have conducted the war, and
we are not aware that these forces, either naval or military, can have
laid to their charge any improper proceedings, either in the conduct of
hostilities or in the treatment of prisoners or wounded. On the German
side it has been very different.

"1. The treatment of civilian inhabitants in Belgium and the North of
France has been made public by the Belgian and French Governments and by
those who have had experience of it at first hand. Modern history
affords no precedent for the sufferings that have been inflicted on the
defenseless and non-combatant population in the territory that has been
in German military occupation. Even the food of the population was
confiscated until in Belgium an international commission, largely
influenced by American generosity and conducted under American auspices,
came to the relief of the population and secured from the German
Government a promise to spare what food was still left in the country,
though the Germans still continue to make levies in money upon the
defenseless population for the support of the German Army.

"2. We have from time to time received most terrible accounts of the
barbarous treatment to which British officers and soldiers have been
exposed after they have been taken prisoner, while being conveyed to
German prison camps. One or two instances have already been given to the
United States Government founded upon authentic and first-hand evidence
which is beyond doubt. Some evidence has been received of the hardships
to which British prisoners of war are subjected in the prison camps,
contrasting, we believe, most unfavorably with the treatment of German
prisoners in this country. We have proposed, with the consent of the
United States Government, that a commission of United States officers
should be permitted in each country to inspect the treatment of
prisoners of war. The United States Government have been unable to
obtain any reply from the German Government to this proposal, and we
remain in continuing anxiety and apprehension as to the treatment of
British prisoners of war in Germany.

"3. At the very outset of the war a German mine layer was discovered
laying a mine field on the high seas. Further mine fields have been laid
from time to time without warning, and, so far as we know, are still
being laid on the high seas, and many neutral as well as British vessels
have been sunk by them.

"4. At various times during the war German submarines have stopped and
sunk British merchant vessels, thus making the sinking of merchant
vessels a general practice, though it was admitted previously, if at
all, only as an exception, the general rule to which the British
Government have adhered being that merchant vessels, if captured, must
be taken before a prize court. In one case already quoted in a note to
the United States Government a neutral vessel carrying foodstuffs to an
unfortified town in Great Britain has been sunk. Another case is now
reported in which a German armed cruiser has sunk an American vessel,
the William P. Frye, carrying a cargo of wheat from Seattle to
Queenstown. In both cases the cargoes were presumably destined for the
civil population. Even the cargoes in such circumstances should not have
been condemned without the decision of a prize court, much less should
the vessels have been sunk. It is to be noted that both these cases
occurred before the detention by the British authorities of the
Wilhelmina and her cargo of foodstuffs, which the German Government
allege is the justification for their own action.

"The Germans have announced their intention of sinking British merchant
vessels by torpedo without notice and without any provision for the
safety of the crews. They have already carried out this intention in the
case of neutral as well as of British vessels, and a number of
non-combatant and innocent lives on British vessels, unarmed and
defenseless, have been destroyed in this way.

"5. Unfortified, open, and defenseless towns, such as Scarborough,
Yarmouth, and Whitby, have been deliberately and wantonly bombarded by
German ships of war, causing in some cases considerable loss of civilian
life, including women and children.

"6. German aircraft have dropped bombs on the east coast of England,
where there were no military or strategic points to be attacked. On the
other hand, I am aware of but two criticisms that have been made on
British action in all these respects:

"1. It is said that the British naval authorities also have laid some
anchored mines on the high seas. They have done so, but the mines were
anchored and so constructed that they would be harmless if they went
adrift, and no mines whatever were laid by the British naval authorities
till many weeks after the Germans had made a regular practice of laying
mines on the high seas.

"2. It is said that the British Government have departed from the view
of international law which they had previously maintained, that
foodstuffs destined for the civil population should never be interfered
with, this charge being founded on the submission to a prize court of
the cargo of the Wilhelmina. The special considerations affecting this
cargo have already been presented in a memorandum to the United States
Government, and I need not repeat them here.

"Inasmuch as the blockade of all foodstuffs is an admitted consequence
of blockade, it is obvious that there can be no universal rule based on
considerations of morality and humanity which is contrary to this
practice. The right to stop foodstuffs destined for the civil population
must therefore in any case be admitted if an effective 'cordon'
controlling intercourse with the enemy is drawn, announced, and
maintained. Moreover, independently of rights arising from belligerent
action in the nature of blockade, some other nations, differing from the
opinion of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, have
held that to stop the food of the civil population is a natural and
legitimate method of bringing pressure to bear on an enemy country as it
is upon the defense of a besieged town. It is also upheld on the
authority of both Prince Bismarck and Count Caprivi, and therefore
presumably is not repugnant to German morality.

"The following are the quotations from Prince Bismarck and Count Caprivi
on this point. Prince Bismarck in answering, in 1885, an application
from the Kiel Chamber of Commerce for a statement of the view of the
German Government on the question of the right to declare as contraband
foodstuffs that were not intended for military forces said: 'I reply to
the Chamber of Commerce that any disadvantage our commercial and
carrying interests may suffer by the treatment of rice as contraband of
war does not justify our opposing a measure which it has been thought
fit to take in carrying on a foreign war. Every war is a calamity which
entails evil consequences not only on the combatants but also on
neutrals. These evils may easily be increased by the interference of a
neutral power with the way in which a third carries on the war to the
disadvantage of the subjects of the interfering power, and by this means
German commerce might be weighted with far heavier losses than a
transitory prohibition of the rice trade in Chinese waters. The measure
in question has for its object the shortening of the war by increasing
the difficulties of the enemy and is a justifiable step in war if
impartially enforced against all neutral ships.'

"Count Caprivi, during a discussion in the German Reichstag on the 4th
of March, 1892, on the subject of the importance of international
protection for private property at sea, made the following statements:
'A country may be dependent for her food or for her raw products upon
her trade. In fact, it may be absolutely necessary to destroy the
enemy's trade.' 'The private introduction of provisions into Paris was
prohibited during the siege, and in the same way a nation would be
justified in preventing the import of food and raw produce.'

"The Government of Great Britain have frankly declared, in concert with
the Government of France, their intention to meet the German attempt to
stop all supplies of every kind from leaving or entering British or
French ports by themselves stopping supplies going to or from Germany.
For this end, the British fleet has instituted a blockade effectively
controlling by cruiser 'cordon' all passage to and from Germany by sea.
The difference between the two policies is, however, that, while our
object is the same as that of Germany, we propose to attain it without
sacrificing neutral ships or non-combatant lives, or inflicting upon
neutrals the damage that must be entailed when a vessel and its cargo
are sunk without notice, examination, or trial.

"I must emphasize again that this measure is a natural and necessary
consequence of the unprecedented methods repugnant to all law and
morality which have been described above which Germany began to adopt at
the very outset of the war and the effects of which have been constantly

American Ambassador, London.



_The American Government on March 5 transmitted identic messages of
inquiry to the Ambassadors at London and Paris inquiring from both
England and France how the declarations in the Anglo-French note
proclaiming an embargo on all commerce between Germany and neutral
countries were to be carried into effect. The message to London was as

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1915.

In regard to the recent communications received from the British and
French Governments concerning restraints upon commerce with Germany,
please communicate with the British Foreign Office in the sense

The difficulty of determining action upon the British and French
declarations of intended retaliation upon commerce with Germany lies in
the nature of the proposed measures in their relation to commerce by

While it appears that the intention is to interfere with and take into
custody all ships, both outgoing and incoming, trading with Germany,
which is in effect a blockade of German ports, the rule of blockade that
a ship attempting to enter or leave a German port, regardless of the
character of its cargo, may be condemned is not asserted.

The language of the declaration is "the British and French Governments
will, therefore, hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships
carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin. It
is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless they would
otherwise be liable to condemnation."

The first sentence claims a right pertaining only to a state of
blockade. The last sentence proposes a treatment of ships and cargoes as
if no blockade existed. The two together present a proposed course of
action previously unknown to international law.

As a consequence neutrals have no standard by which to measure their
rights or to avoid danger to their ships and cargoes. The paradoxical
situation thus created should be changed and the declaring powers ought
to assert whether they rely upon the rules governing a blockade or the
rules applicable when no blockade exists.

The declaration presents other perplexities. The last sentence quoted
indicates that the rules of contraband are to be applied to cargoes
detained. The rules covering non-contraband articles carried in neutral
bottoms is that the cargoes shall be released and the ships allowed to

This rule cannot, under the first sentence quoted, be applied as to
destination. What, then, is to be done with a cargo of non-contraband
goods detained under the declaration? The same question may be asked as
to conditional contraband cargoes.

The foregoing comments apply to cargoes destined for Germany. Cargoes
coming out of German forts present another problem under the terms of
the declaration. Under the rules governing enemy exports only goods
owned by enemy subjects in enemy bottoms are subject to seizure and
condemnation. Yet by the declaration it is purposed to seize and take
into port all goods of enemy "ownership and origin." The word "origin"
is particularly significant. The origin of goods destined to neutral
territory on neutral ships is not, and never has been, a ground for
forfeiture, except in case a blockade is declared and maintained. What,
then, would the seizure amount to in the present case except to delay
the delivery of the goods? The declaration does not indicate what
disposition would be made of such cargoes if owned by a neutral or if
owned by an enemy subject. Would a different rule be applied according
to ownership? If so, upon what principles of international law would it
rest? And upon what rule, if no blockade is declared and maintained,
could the cargo of a neutral ship sailing out of a German port be
condemned? If it is not condemned, what other legal course is there but
to release it?

While this Government is fully alive to the possibility that the methods
of modern naval warfare, particularly in the use of submarines for both
defensive and offensive operations, may make the former means of
maintaining a blockade a physical impossibility, it feels that it can be
urged with great force that there should be also some limit to "the
radius of activity," and especially so if this action by the
belligerents can be construed to be a blockade. It would certainly
create a serious state of affairs if, for example, an American vessel
laden with a cargo of German origin should escape the British patrol in
European waters only to be held up by a cruiser off New York and taken
into Halifax.

Similar cablegrams sent to Paris.




_The reply from the British Government transmitted by the American
Ambassador at London to the Secretary of State concerning the method of
enforcing the reprisal order follows:_

LONDON, March 15, 1915.

Following is the full text of a note dated today and an Order in Council
I have just received from Grey:

"1. His Majesty's Government have had under careful consideration the
inquiries which, under instructions from your Government, your
Excellency addressed to me on the 8th inst., regarding the scope and
mode of application of the measures foreshadowed in the British and
French declarations of the 1st of March, for restricting the trade of
Germany. Your Excellency explained and illustrated by reference to
certain contingencies the difficulty of the United States Government in
adopting a definite attitude toward these measures by reason of
uncertainty regarding their bearing upon the commerce of neutral

"2. I can at once assure your Excellency that subject to the paramount
necessity of restricting German trade his Majesty's Government have made
it their first aim to minimize inconvenience to neutral commerce. From
the accompanying copy of the Order in Council, which is to be published
today, you will observe that a wide discretion is afforded to the prize
court in dealing with the trade of neutrals in such manner as may, in
the circumstances, be deemed just, and that full provision is made to
facilitate claims by persons interested in any goods placed in the
custody of the Marshal of the prize court under the order. I apprehend
that the perplexities to which your Excellency refers will for the most
part be dissipated by the perusal of this document, and that it is only
necessary for me to add certain explanatory observations.

"3. The effect of the Order in Council is to confer certain powers upon
the executive officers of his Majesty's Government. The extent to which
those powers will be actually exercised and the degree of severity with
which the measures of blockade authorized will be put into operation are
matters which will depend on the administrative orders issued by the
Government and the decisions of the authorities specially charged with
the duty of dealing with individual ships and cargoes, according to the
merits of each case. The United States Government may rest assured that
the instructions to be issued by his Majesty's Government to the fleet
and customs officials and Executive Committees concerned will impress
upon them the duty of acting with the utmost dispatch consistent with
the object in view, and of showing in every case such consideration for
neutrals as may be compatible with that object, which is, succinctly
stated, to establish a blockade to prevent vessels from carrying goods
for or coming from Germany."

[Illustration: HERR VON JAGOW

German Secretary for Foreign Affairs

_(Photo from Rogers)_]


Editor of _Die Zukunft_, Germany's Most Brilliant Journalist, Who Has
Been Severe in His Strictures Upon the United States

_(Photo from Brown Bros.)_]

"4. His Majesty's Government has felt most reluctant, at the moment of
initiating a policy of blockade, to exact from neutral ships all the
penalties attaching to a breach of blockade. In their desire to
alleviate the burden which the existence of a state of war at sea must
inevitably impose on neutral sea-borne commerce, they declare their
intention to refrain altogether from the exercise of the right to
confiscate ships or cargoes which belligerents have always claimed in
respect of breaches of blockade. They restrict their claim to the
stopping of cargoes destined for or coming from the enemy's territory.

"5. As regards cotton, full particulars of the arrangements contemplated
have already been explained. It will be admitted that every possible
regard has been had to the legitimate interests of the American cotton

"6. Finally, in reply to the penultimate paragraph of your Excellency's
note, I have the honor to state that it is not intended to interfere
with neutral vessels carrying enemy cargo of non-contraband nature
outside European waters, including the Mediterranean."

(Here follows the text of the Order in Council, which already has been

American Ambassador, London.



_The French Government transmitted the following message:_

PARIS, March 14, 1915.

French Government replies as follows:

"In a letter dated March 7 your Excellency was good enough to draw my
attention to the views of the Government of the United States regarding
the recent communications from the French and British Governments
concerning a restriction to be laid upon commerce with Germany.
According to your Excellency's letter, the declaration made by the
allied Governments presents some uncertainty as regards its application,
concerning which the Government of the United States desires to be
enlightened in order to determine what attitude it should take.

"At the same time your Excellency notified me that, while granting the
possibility of using new methods of retaliation against the new use to
which submarines have been put, the Government of the United States was
somewhat apprehensive that the allied belligerents might (if their
action is to be construed as constituting a blockade) capture in waters
near America any ships which might have escaped the cruisers patrolling
European waters. In acknowledging receipt of your Excellency's
communication I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the
republic has not failed to consider this point as presented by the
Government of the United States, and I beg to specify clearly the
conditions of application, as far as my Government is concerned of the
declaration of the allied Governments. As well set forth by the Federal
Government, the old methods of blockade cannot be entirely adhered to in
view of the use Germany has made of her submarines, and also by reason
of the geographical situation of that country. In answer to the
challenge to the neutrals as well as to its own adversaries contained in
the declaration, by which the German Imperial Government stated that it
considered the seas surrounding Great Britain and the French coast on
the Channel as a military zone, and warned neutral vessels not to enter
the same on account of the danger they would run, the allied Governments
have been obliged to examine what measures they could adopt to interrupt
all maritime communication with the German Empire and thus keep it
blockaded by the naval power of the two allies, at the same time,
however, safeguarding as much as possible the legitimate interests of
neutral powers and respecting the laws of humanity which no crime of
their enemy will induce them to violate.

"The Government of the republic, therefore, reserves to itself the right
of bringing into a French or allied port any ship carrying a cargo
presumed to be of German origin, destination, or ownership, but it will
not go to the length of seizing any neutral ship except in case of
contraband. The discharged cargo shall not be confiscated. In the event
of a neutral proving his lawful ownership of merchandise destined to
Germany, he shall be entirely free to dispose of same, subject to
certain conditions. In case the owner of the goods is a German, they
shall simply be sequestrated during the war.

"Merchandise of enemy origin shall only be sequestrated when it is at
the same time the property of an enemy. Merchandise belonging to
neutrals shall be held at the disposal of its owner to be returned to
the port of departure.

"As your Excellency will observe, these measures, while depriving the
enemy of important resources, respect the rights of neutrals and will
not in any way jeopardize private property, as even the enemy owner will
only suffer from the suspension of the enjoyment of his rights during
the term of hostilities.

"The Government of the republic, being desirous of allowing neutrals
every facility to enforce their claims, (here occurred an undecipherable
group of words,) give the prize court, an independent tribunal,
cognizance of these questions, and in order to give the neutrals as
little trouble as possible it has specified that the prize court shall
give sentence within eight days, counting from the date on which the
case shall have been brought before it.

"I do not doubt, Mr. Ambassador, that the Federal Government, comparing
on the one hand the unspeakable violence with which the German Military
Government threatens neutrals, the criminal actions unknown in maritime
annals already perpetrated against neutral property and ships, and even
against the lives of neutral subjects or citizens, and on the other hand
the measures adopted by the allied Governments of France and Great
Britain, respecting the laws of humanity and the rights of individuals,
will readily perceive that the latter have not overstepped their strict
rights as belligerents.

"Finally, I am anxious to assure you that it is not and it has never
been the intention of the Government of the republic to extend the
action of its cruisers against enemy merchandise beyond the European
seas, the Mediterranean included."


British Order in Council

Declaring a Blockade of German Ports

_LONDON, March 15.--The British Order in Council decreeing retaliatory
measures on the part of the Government to meet the declaration of the
Germans that the waters surrounding the United Kingdom are a military
area, was made public today. The text of the order follows:_

Whereas, the German Government has issued certain orders which, in
violation of the usages of war, purport to declare that the waters
surrounding the United Kingdom are a military area in which all British
and allied merchant vessels will be destroyed irrespective of the safety
and the lives of the passengers and the crews, and in which neutral
shipping will be exposed to similar danger in view of the uncertainties
of naval warfare, and

Whereas, in the memorandum accompanying the said orders, neutrals are
warned against intrusting crews, passengers, or goods to British or
allied ships, and

Whereas, such attempts on the part of the enemy give to his Majesty an
unquestionable right of retaliation; and

Whereas, his Majesty has therefore decided to adopt further measures in
order to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving
Germany, although such measures will be enforced without risk to neutral
ships or to neutral or non-combatant life and in strict observance of
the dictates of humanity; and

Whereas, the allies of his Majesty are associated with him in the steps
now to be announced for restricting further the commerce of Germany, his
Majesty is therefore pleased by and with the advice of his Privy Council
to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:

First--No merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after
March 1, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage to any German
port. Unless this vessel receives a pass enabling her to proceed to some
neutral or allied port to be named in the pass, the goods on board any
such vessel must be discharged in a British port and placed in custody
of the Marshal of the prize court. Goods so discharged, if not
contraband of war, shall, if not requisitioned for the use of his
Majesty, be restored by order of the court and upon such terms as the
court may in the circumstances deem to be just to the person entitled

Second--No merchant vessel which sailed from any German port after March
1, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage with any goods on
board laden at such port. All goods laden at such port must be
discharged in a British or allied port. Goods so discharged in a British
port shall be placed in the custody of the Marshal of the prize court,
and if not requisitioned for the use of his Majesty shall be detained or
sold under the direction of the prize court.

The proceeds of the goods so sold shall be paid into the court and dealt
with in such a manner as the court may in the circumstances deem to be
just, provided that no proceeds of the sale of such goods shall be paid
out of the court until the conclusion of peace, except on the
application of a proper officer of the Crown, unless it be shown that
the goods had become neutral property before the issue of this order,
and provided also that nothing herein shall prevent the release of
neutral property, laden at such enemy port, on the application of the
proper officer of the Crown.

Third--Every merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure
after March 1, 1915, on her way to a port other than a German port and
carrying goods with an enemy destination, or which are enemy property,
may be required to discharge such goods in a British or allied port. Any
goods so discharged in a British port shall be placed in the custody of
the Marshal of the prize court, and unless they are contraband of war
shall, if not requisitioned for the use of his Majesty, be restored by
an order of the court upon such terms as the court may in the
circumstances deem to be just to the person entitled thereto, and
provided that this article shall not apply in any case falling within
Article 2 or 4 of this order.

Fourth--Every merchant vessel which sailed from a port other than a
German port after March 1, 1915, and having on board goods which are of
enemy origin, or are enemy property, may be required to discharge such
goods in a British or allied port. Goods so discharged in a British port
shall be placed in the custody of the Marshal of the prize court, and,
if not requisitioned for the use of his Majesty, shall be detained or
sold under the direction of the prize court. The proceeds of the goods
so sold shall be paid into the court and be dealt with in such a manner
as the court may in the circumstances deem to be just, provided that no
proceeds of the sale of such goods shall be paid out of the court until
the conclusion of peace except on the application of a proper officer of
the Crown, unless it be shown that the goods had become neutral property
before the issue of this order, and provided also that nothing herein
shall prevent the release of neutral property of enemy origin on
application of the proper officer of the Crown.

Fifth--Any person claiming to be interested in or to have any claim in
respect of any goods not being contraband of war placed in the custody
of the Marshal of the prize court under this order, or in the proceeds
of such goods, may forthwith issue a writ in the prize court against the
proper officer of the Crown and apply for an order that the goods
should be restored to him, or that their proceeds should be paid to him,
or for such other order as the circumstances of the case may require.

The practice and procedure of the prize court shall, so far as
applicable, be followed mutatis mutandis in any proceedings
consequential upon this order.

Sixth--A merchant vessel which has cleared for a neutral port from a
British or allied port, or which has been allowed to pass as having an
ostensible destination to a neutral port and proceeds to an enemy port,
shall, if captured on any subsequent voyage be liable to condemnation.

Seventh--Nothing in this order shall be deemed to affect the liability
of any vessel or goods to capture or condemnation independently of this

Eighth--Nothing in this order shall prevent the relaxation of the
provisions of this order in respect of the merchant vessels of any
country which declares that no commerce intended for or originating in
Germany, or belonging to German subjects, shall enjoy the protection of
its flag.

Germany's Submarine War

LONDON, March 13.--The Admiralty announced tonight that the British
collier Invergyle was torpedoed today off Cresswell, England, and sunk.
All aboard were saved.

This brings the total British losses of merchantmen and fishing vessels,
either sunk or captured during the war, up to 137. Of these ninety were
merchant ships and forty-seven were fishing craft.

A further submarine casualty today was the torpedoing of the Swedish
steamer Halma off Scarborough, and the loss of the lives of six of her

The Admiralty announces that since March 10 seven British merchant
steamers have been torpedoed by submarines. Two of them, it is stated,
were sunk, and of two others it is said that "the sinking is not
confirmed." Three were not sunk.

The two steamers officially reported sunk were the Invergyle and the
Indian City, which was torpedoed off the Scilly Islands on March 12. The
crew of the Indian City was reported rescued.

The two steamers whose reported sinking is not yet officially confirmed
are the Florazan, which was torpedoed at the mouth of the Bristol
Channel on March 11, all of her crew being landed at Milford Haven, with
the exception of one fireman, and the Andalusian, which was attacked off
the Scilly Islands on March 12. The crew of the Andalusian is reported
to have been rescued.

The Adenwen was torpedoed in the English Channel on March 11, and has
since been towed into Cherbourg. Her crew was landed at Brisham.

The steamer Headlands was torpedoed on March 12 off the Scilly Islands.
It is reported that her crew was saved. The steamer Hartdale was
torpedoed on March 13 off South Rock, in the Irish Channel. Twenty-one
of her crew were picked up and two were lost.

Supplementary to the foregoing the Admiralty tonight issued a report
giving the total number of British merchant and fishing vessels lost
through hostile action from the outbreak of the war to March 10. The
statement says that during that period eighty-eight merchant vessels
were sunk or captured. Of these fifty-four were victims of hostile
cruisers, twelve were destroyed by mines, and twenty-two by submarines.
Their gross tonnage totaled 309,945.

In the same period the total arrivals and sailings of overseas steamers
of all nationalities of more than 300 tons net were 4,745.

Forty-seven fishing vessels were sunk or captured during this time.
Nineteen of these were blown up by mines and twenty-eight were captured
by hostile craft. Twenty-four of those captured were caught on Aug. 26,
when the Germans raided a fishing fleet.

[Illustration: Dotted portion indicates the limits of "War Zone" defined
in the German order which became effective Feb. 18, 1915.]

German People Not Blinded

By Karl Lamprecht

[Published in New York by the German Information Service, Feb. 3, 1915.]

     Denying flatly that the German people were swept blindly and
     ignorantly into the war by the headlong ambitions of their
     rulers--the view advanced by Dr. Charles W. Eliot, President
     Emeritus of Harvard University, and Dr. Nicholas Murray
     Butler, President of Columbia--Dr. Karl Lamprecht, Professor
     of History in the University of Leipsic and world-famous
     German historian, has addressed the open letter which appears
     below to the two distinguished American scholars. Dr.
     Lamprecht asserts that under the laws which govern the German
     Empire the people as citizens have a deciding will in affairs
     of state and that Germany is engaged in the present conflict
     because the sober judgment of the German people led them to
     resort to arms.

_Dr. C.W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard University; Dr. N.M.
Butler, President of Columbia University._

Gentlemen: I feel confident that you are not in ignorance of my regard
and esteem for the great American Republic and its citizens. They have
been freely expressed on many occasions and have taken definite form in
the journal of my travels through the United States, published in the
booklet "Americana," 1905.

My sentiments and my judgment have not changed since 1905. I now refer,
gentlemen, to the articles and speeches which you have published about
my country and which have aroused widespread interest. I will not
criticise your utterances one by one. If I did that I might have to
speak on occasion with a frankness that would be ungracious, considering
the fine appreciation which both of you still feel for old Germany. It
would be specially ungracious toward you, President Eliot, for in quite
recent times you honored me by your ready help in my scientific labors.
All I want to do is to remove a few fundamental errors--in fact, only
one. I feel in duty bound to do so, since many well-disposed Americans
share that error.

The gravest and perhaps most widely spread misconception about us
Germans is that we are the serfs of our Princes. (Fuerstenknechte,)
servile and dependent in political thought. That false notion has
probably been dispelled during the initial weeks of the present war.

With absolute certainty the German Nation, with one voice and
correctly, diagnosed the political situation without respect to party or
creed and unanimously and of its own free will acted.

But this misconception is so deep rooted that more extended discussion
is needed. I pass on to other matters.

The essential point is that public opinion have free scope of
development. Every American will admit that. Now, public opinion finds
its expression in the principles that govern the use of the suffrage.
The German voting system is the freest in the world, much freer than the
French, English, or American system, because not only does it operate in
accordance with the principle that every one shall have a direct and
secret vote, but the powers of the State are exercised faithfully and
conscientiously to carry out that principle in practice. The
constitutional life of the German Nation is of a thoroughly democratic

Those who know that were not surprised that our Social Democrats marched
to war with such enthusiasm. Already among their ranks many have fallen
as heroes, never to be forgotten by any German when his thoughts turn to
the noble blood which has saturated foreign soil--thank God, foreign
soil! Many of the Socialist leaders and adherents are wearing the Iron
Cross, that simple token that seems to tell you when you speak of its
bearer, "Now, this is a fearless and faithful soul."

Let it be said once and for all: He who wants to understand us must
accept our conception that constitutionally we enjoy so great a
political freedom that we would not change with any country in the
world. Everybody in America knows that our manners and customs have been
democratic for centuries, while in France and England they have been
ever aristocratic. Americans, we know, always feel at home on German

But the Kaiser, you will say, speaks of "his monarchy," therefore must
the Germans be Fuerstenknechte, (servants of Princes.)

First of all, as to the phrase "Fuerstenknechte." Does not the King of
England speak of his "subjects"? That word irritates a German, because
he is conscious that he is not a subject, but a citizen of the empire.
Yet he will not infer from the English King's use of the term in formal
utterances that an Englishman is a churl, a "servant of his King." That
would be a superficial political conception.

As to our Princes, most of us, including the Social Democrats, are glad
in our heart of hearts that we have them. As far back as our history
runs, and that is more than 2,000 years, we have had Princes. They have
never been more than their name, "Fuerst," implies, the first and
foremost of German freemen, "primi inter pares." Therefore they have
never acted independently, never without taking the people into counsel.
That would have been contrary to the most important fundamental
principles of German law; hence our people have never been "de jure"
without their representatives. Even in the times of absolute monarchy
the old "estates of the realm" had their being as a representative body,
and wherever and whenever these privileges were suppressed it was
regarded as a violation of our fundamental rights and is so still

Our princely houses are as old as our monasteries, our cities, and our
cathedrals. A thousand years ago the Guelphs were a celebrated family,
and the Wettins have ruled over their lands for eight centuries. In the
twelfth century the Wittelsbachs and Thuringians were Princes under the
great Kaisers of the Hohenstaufen dynasty. Among these great families
the Hapsburgs (thirteenth century) and the Hohenzollerns (fifteenth
century) are quite young. All have their roots in Germany and belong to
the country.

We glory in our Princes. They link our existence with the earliest
centuries of our history. They preserve for us the priceless
independence of our small home States.

We are accused of militarism. What is this new and terrible crime? Since
the years of the wars of liberation against France and Napoleon we have
had what amounts practically to universal conscription. Only two
generations later universal suffrage was introduced. The nation has been
sternly trained by its history in the ways of discipline and
self-restraint. Germans are very far from mistaking freedom for license
and independence for licentiousness.

Germany has a long past. She enjoys the inheritance of an original and
priceless civilization. She holds clearly formulated ideals. To the
future she has all this to bequeath and, in addition, the intellectual
wealth of her present stage of development. Consider Germany's
contributions to the arts, the poetical achievements of the period of
Schiller and Goethe, the music of Handel, Bach, Haydn, Mozart, and
Beethoven; the thought systems of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel!

The last decade has reawakened these great men in the consciousness of
the German Nation. Enriched by the consciousness and message of an
intellectual past, our people were moving forward to new horizons.

At that moment the war hit us. If you could only have lived these weeks
in Germany I do not doubt that what you would have seen would have led
your ripe experience to a fervent faith in a Divinely guided future of
mankind. The great spiritual movement of 1870, when I was a boy growing
up, was but a phantom compared to July and August of 1914. Germany was a
nation stirred by the most sacred emotions, humble and strong, filled
with just wrath and a firm determination to conquer--a nation
disciplined, faithful, and loving.

In that disposition we have gone to war and still fight. As for the
slanders of which we have been the victims, ask the thousands of
Frenchmen who housed German soldiers in 1870 and 1871, or ask the
Belgians of Ghent and Bruges! They will give you a different picture of
the "Furor Teutonicus." They will tell you that the "raging German"
generally is a good-natured fellow, ever ready for service and sympathy,
who, like Parsifal, gazes forth eagerly into a strange world which the
war has opened to his loyal and patriotic vision.




[From King Albert's Book.]

In my dream I saw a fertile plain, rich with the hues of Autumn.
Tranquil it was and warm. Men and women, children, and the beasts worked
and played and wandered there in peace. Under the blue sky and the white
clouds low-hanging, great trees shaded the fields; and from all the land
there arose a murmur as from bees clustering on the rose-colored
blossoms of tall clover. And, in my dream, I roamed, looking into every
face, the faces of prosperity, broad and well favored--of people living
in a land of plenty, of people drinking of the joy of life, caring
nothing for the morrow. But I could not see their eyes, that seemed ever
cast down, gazing at the ground, watching the progress of their feet
over the rich grass and the golden leaves already fallen from the trees.
The longer I walked among them the more I wondered that never was I
suffered to see the eyes of any, not even of the little children, not
even of the beasts. It was as if ordinance had gone forth that their
eyes should be banded with invisibility.

While I mused on this, the sky began to darken. A muttering of distant
winds and waters came traveling. The children stopped their play, the
beasts raised their heads; men and women halted and cried to each other:
"The River--the River is rising! If it floods, we are lost! Our beasts
will drown; we, even we, shall drown! The River!" And women stood like
things of stone, listening; and men shook their fists at the black sky
and at that traveling mutter of the winds and waters; and the beasts
sniffed at the darkening air.

Then, clear, I heard a Voice call: "Brothers! The dike is breaking! The
River comes! Link arms, brothers; with the dike of our bodies we will
save our home! Sisters, behind us, link arms! Close in the crevices,
children! The River!" And all that multitude, whom I had seen treading
quietly the grass and fallen leaves with prosperous feet, came hurrying,
their eyes no longer fixed on the rich plain, but lifted in trouble and
defiance, staring at that rushing blackness. And the Voice called:
"Hasten, brothers! The dike is broken. The River floods!"

And they answered: "Brother, we come!"

Thousands and thousands they pressed, shoulder to shoulder--men, women,
and children, and the beasts lying down behind, till the living dike was
formed. And that blackness came on, nearer, nearer, till, like the
whites of glaring eyes, the wave crests glinted in the dark rushing
flood. And the sound of the raging waters was as a roar from a million
harsh mouths.

But the Voice called: "Hold, brothers! Hold!"

And from the living dike came answer: "Brother! We hold!"

Then the sky blackened to night. And the terrible dark water broke on
that dike of life; and from all the thin living wall rose such cry of
struggle as never was heard.

But above it ever the Voice called: "Hold! My brave ones, hold!"

And ever the answer came from those drowning mouths, of men and women,
of little children and the very beasts: "Brother! We hold!" But the
black flood rolled over and on. There, down in its dark tumult, beneath
its cruel tumult, I saw men still with arms linked; women on their
knees, clinging to earth; little children drifting--dead, all dead; and
the beasts dead. And their eyes were still open facing that death. And
above them the savage water roared. But clear and high I heard the Voice
call: "Brothers! Hold! Death is not! We live!"

Can Germany Be Starved Out?

An Answer by Sixteen German Specialists[1]

[Footnote 1: Die Deutsche Volksernährung und der Englische
Aushungerungsplan. Eine Denkschrift von Friedrich Aereboe, Karl Ballod,
Franz Beyschlag, Wilhelm Caspari, Paul Eltzbacher, Hedwig Heyl, Paul
Krusch, Robert Kuczynski, Kurt Lehmann, Otto Lemmermann, Karl
Oppenheimer, Max Rubner, Kurt von Rümker, Bruno Tacke, Hermann Warmbold,
und Nathan Zuntz. Herausgegeben von Paul Eltzbacher. (Friedr. Vieweg and
Sohn. Braunschweig. 1914.)]

[From The Annalist of New York, March 1, 1915.]

BERLIN, Feb. 1, 1915.

Probably the most interesting economic problem in the world at this
moment is whether England can succeed in starving out Germany. While the
world at large is chiefly interested in the vast political issues
involved, the question interests the Germans not only from that
standpoint, but also--and how keenly!--from the mere bread-and-butter
standpoint. For if Germany cannot feed its own population during the
long war that its foes are predicting with so much assurance, her defeat
is only a question of time.

That the German Government is keenly aware of the dangers of the
situation is evident from the rigorous measures that it has taken to
conserve and economize the food supply. After having fixed maximum
prices for cereals soon after the war began, the Government last week
decided to requisition and monopolize all the wheat and rye in the
country, and allow the bakers to sell only a limited quantity of bread
(2.2 pounds per capita a week) to each family. It had previously taken
measures to restrict the consumption of cereals for other purposes than
breadmaking; the feeding of rye was prohibited and its use in producing
alcohol was restricted by 40 per cent.; a percentage of potato flour was
ordered added to rye flour, and of the latter to wheat flour in making
bread. These are but a few of the economic measures adopted by the
Government since the outbreak of the war.

The general opinion of the people in Germany is that the country cannot
be starved out, and this opinion is asserted with a great deal of
patriotic fervor, particularly by newspaper editors. The leading
scientists of the country, moreover, have taken up the question in a
thoroughgoing way and investigated it in all its bearings. A little book
("Die Deutsche Volksernährung und der Englische Aushungerungsplan") has
just been issued, giving the conclusions of sixteen specialists in
various fields, which will be briefly summarized here. Economists,
statisticians, physiologists, agricultural chemists, food specialists,
and geologists have all taken part in producing a composite view of the
whole subject; it is not a book of special contributions by individual
specialists, but is written in one cast and represents the compared and
boiled-down conclusions of the sixteen scholars.

The authors by no means regard the problem of feeding Germany without
foreign assistance as an easy and simple one; on the contrary, they say
it is a serious one, and calls for the supreme effort of the authorities
and of every individual German; and only by energetic, systematic, and
continued efforts of Government and people can they prevent a shortage
of food from negativing the success of German arms. Yet they feel bound
to grapple the problem as one calling for solution by the German people
alone, for very small imports of food products can be expected from the
neutral countries of Europe, and none at all from the United States and
other oversea countries, and the small quantities that do come in will
hardly be more than enough to make good the drain upon Germany's own
available stocks in helping to feed the people of Belgium and Poland.

The simplest statistical elements of the problem are the following:
Germany, with a population of 68,000,000, was consuming food products,
when the war broke out, equivalent to an aggregate of 90,420 billion
calories, including 2,307,000 tons of albumen; whereas the amount now
available, under unchanged methods of living and feeding, is equal to
only 67,870 billion calories, with 1,543,000 tons of albumen. Thus,
there will be an apparent deficit of 22,590 billion calories and 764,000
tons of albumen. On the other hand, the authors hold that the minimum
physiological requirements are only 56,750 billion calories, containing
1,605,000 tons of albumen, which would give a large surplus of calories
and a small deficit of albumen, but they make certain recommendations
which, if carried into effect, would bring the available supply up to
81,250 billion calories and 2,023,000 tons of albumen.

Germany raises (average for 1912-13) about 4,500,000 tons of wheat and
imports nearly 2,000,000 tons, (about 73,000,000 bushels.) On the other
hand, it exports about 530,000 tons net of the 11,900,000 tons of rye
produced. It imports nearly 3,000,000 tons of low-grade barley and about
1,000,000 of maize, both chiefly for feeding stock. Its net imports of
grain and legumes are 6,270,000 tons. Of its fruit consumption, about 30
per cent. has been imported. While Germany has been producing nearly its
entire meat supply at home, this has been accomplished only by the very
extensive use of foreign feedstuffs. The authors of this work estimate
that the imports of meats and animals, together with the product from
domestic animals fed with foreign feedstuffs, amount to not less than 33
per cent. of the total consumption. They also hold that about 58 per
cent. of the milk consumed in Germany represents imports and the product
of cows fed with foreign feedstuffs. Nearly 40 per cent. of the egg
consumption was hitherto imported. The consumption of fish has averaged
576,000 tons, of which not less than 62 per cent. was imported; and the
home fisheries are now confined, besides the internal waters, almost
wholly to the Baltic Sea--which means the loss of the catch of 142,000
tons hitherto taken from the North Sea. Even the German's favorite
beverage, beer, contains 13 per cent. of imported ingredients.

The authors assume, as already intimated, that nearly all of these
imports will be lost to Germany during the full duration of the war, and
they take up, under this big limitation, the problem of showing how
Germany can live upon its own resources and go on fighting till it wins.
They undertake to show how savings can be made in the use of the
supplies on hand, and also how production can be increased or changed so
as to keep the country supplied with food products.

In the first place, they insist that the prohibition of the export of
grain be made absolute; in other words, the small exception made in
favor of Switzerland, which has usually obtained most of its grain from
Germany, must be canceled. Savings in the present supplies of grain and
feedstuffs must be made by a considerable reduction in the live stock,
inasmuch as the grain, potatoes, turnips, and other stuffs fed to
animals will support a great many more men if consumed directly by them.
From the stock of cattle the poorer milkers must be eliminated and
converted into beef, 10 per cent. of the milch cows to be thus disposed,
of. Then swine, in particular, must be slaughtered down to 65 per cent.
of the present number, they being great consumers of material suitable
for human food. In Germany much skim milk and buttermilk is fed to
swine; the authors demand that this partial waste of very valuable
albumens be stopped. The potato crop--of which Germany produces above
50,000,000 tons a year, or much more than any other land--must be more
extensively drawn upon than hitherto for feeding the people. To this end
potato-drying establishments must be multiplied; these will turn out a
rough product for feeding animals, and a better sort for table use. It
may be added here that the Prussian Government last Autumn decided to
give financial aid to agricultural organizations for erecting drying
plants; also, that the Imperial Government has decreed that potatoes up
to a maximum of 30 per cent. may be used by the bakers in making
bread--a measure which will undoubtedly make the grain supply suffice
till the 1915 crop is harvested. It is further recommended that more
vegetables be preserved, whether directly in cold storage or by canning
or pickling. Moreover, the industrial use of fats suitable for human
food (as in making soaps, lubricating oils, &c.) must be stopped, and
people must eat less meat, less butter, and more vegetables. Grain must
not be converted into starch. People must burn coke rather than coal,
for the coking process yields the valuable by-product of sulphate of
ammonia, one of the most valuable of fertilizers, and greatly needed by
German farmers now owing to the stoppage of imports of nitrate of soda
from Chile.

In considering how the German people may keep up their production of
food, the authors find that various factors will work against such a
result. In the first place, there is a shortage of labor, nearly all the
able-bodied young and middle-aged men in the farming districts being in
the war. There is also a scarcity of horses, some 500,000 head having
already been requisitioned for army use, and the imports of about
140,000 head (chiefly from Russia) have almost wholly ceased. The people
must therefore resort more extensively to the use of motor plows, and
the State Governments must give financial assistance to insure this
wherever necessary; and such plows on hand must be kept more steadily in
use through company ownership or rental. It may be remarked here, again,
that the Prussian Government is also assisting agricultural
organizations to buy motor plows. The supply of fertilizers has also
been cut down by the war. Nitrate has just been mentioned. The authors
recommend that the Government solve this problem by having many of the
existing electrical plants turn partly to recovering nitrogen from the
atmosphere. This, they say, could be done without reducing the present
production of electricity for ordinary purposes, since only 19 per cent.
of the effective capacity of the 2,000,000 horse power producible by the
electrical plants of Germany is actually used. The supply of phosphoric
fertilizers is also endangered through the stoppage of imports of
phosphate rock (nearly 1,000,000 tons a year) as well as the material
from which to make sulphuric acid; also, through the reduction in the
production of the iron furnaces of the country, from the slag of which
over 2,000,000 tons of so-called Thomas phosphate flour was produced,
will involve a big reduction in the make of that valuable fertilizer.
Thus, there is a lack of horses, of fertilizers, and of the guiding hand
of man. This last, however, can be partly supplied by utilizing for farm
work such of the prisoners of war as come from the farm. As Germany now
holds considerably more than 600,000 prisoners, it can draw many farm
laborers from among them. Prisoners are already used in large numbers in
recovering moorland for agricultural purposes.

This latter remark suggests one of the recommendations of the authors
for increasing agricultural production--the increased recovery of
moorlands. They show that Germany has at least 52,000 square miles (more
than 33,000,000 acres) of moors convertible into good arable land,
which, with proper fertilizing, can be made at once richly productive;
they yield particularly large crops of grain and potatoes. Moreover, the
State Governments must undertake the division of large landed estates
among small proprietors wherever possible--and this is more possible
just now than ever, owing to the fact that many large owners have been
killed in battle. The reason for such a division is that the small
holder gets more out of the acre than the large proprietor.

As Germany makes a large surplus of sugar, the authors advise that the
area planted in beets be reduced and the land thus liberated be planted
in grain, potatoes, and turnips; as a matter of fact, it is reported
that the Government is now considering the question of reducing the
beetroot acreage by one-fourth. The authors also recommend that sugar be
used to some extent in feeding stock, sweeting low-grade hay and roots
with it to make them more palatable and nutritious. It is also regarded
as profitable to leave 20 per cent. of sugar in the beets, so as to
secure a more valuable feed product in the remnants. Still another
agricultural change is to increase the crops of beans, peas, and
lentils--vegetables which contain when dried as much nutrition as meat.
Germany will need to increase its home production of these crops to
replace the 300,000 tons of them hitherto imported.

Such are the principal points covered by these experts. Their conclusion
is that, if their recommendations be carried out fully, and various
economies be practiced--they could not be touched on in the limits of
this article--Germany can manage to feed its people. But they insist, in
their earnest, concluding words, that this can only be done by carrying
out thoroughly all the methods of producing and saving food products
advised by them. It is a serious problem, indeed, but one which, all
Germany is convinced, can and will be solved.



    _HOCH DER KAISER! Amen! Amen!
    We of the pulpit and bar,
    We of the engine and car;
    Hail to the Caesar who's given us men,
    Our rightful heritage back again._

    Who kicks the dancing shoes from our feet;
    Snatches our mouths from the hot forced meat;
    Drags us away from our warm padded stalls;
    From our ivory keys, our song books and balls;
    Orders man's hands from the children's go-carts;
    Closes our fool schools of "ethics" and "arts."
    Puts our ten fingers on triggers and swords,
    Marshals us into War's legions by hordes.

    _Hoch der Kaiser! Amen! Amen!
    We of the sea and the land;
    We of the clerking band;
    Hail to the Caesar who's given us men
    Our rightful heritage back again._


    These women who write of loves that are loose,
    (Those little perversionist scribes of the Deuce!)
    Laughter of lies lilting lewd at their lips,
    Their souls and brains both in a maudlin eclipse;
    Their bosoms as bare as their stories and songs;
    These coaxers of dogs with their "rights" and their wrongs.


    Strike from their shoulders the transparent mesh;
    Mark the Red Cross on the cloth for their flesh.


    Ye, men who seem women in work and at play;
    Ye, who do blindly as women may say;
    Ye, who kill life in the smug cabarets;
    Ye, all, at the beck of the little tea-tray;
    Ye, all, of the measure of daughters of clay.

    Waken to face me: be women no more;
    But fellow-men born, from top branch to the core;
    Men who must fight--who can kill, who can die,
    While women once more shall be covered and shy.

    _Hoch der Kaiser! Amen! Amen!
    We of the hills and the homes;
    We of the plows and the tomes;
    Hail to the Caesar who's given us men
    Our rightful heritage back again._

The Submarine of 1578

[From The London Times, Jan. 16, 1915.]

The earliest description of a practical under-water boat is given by
William Bourne in his book entitled "Inventions or Devices," published
in 1578. Instructions for building such a boat are given in detail, and
it has been conjectured that Cornelius van Drebbel, a Dutch physician,
used this information for the construction of the vessel with which in
the early part of the seventeenth century he carried out some
experiments on the Thames. It is doubtful, however, whether van
Drebbel's boat was ever entirely submerged, and the voyage with which he
was credited, from Westminster to Greenwich, is supposed to have been
made in an awash condition, with the head of the inventor above the
surface. More than one writer at the time referred to van Drebbel's boat
and endeavored to explain the apparatus by which his rowers were enabled
to breathe under water.

Van Drebbel died in 1634, and no illustration of his boat has been
discovered. Nineteen years later the vessel illustrated here was
constructed at Rotterdam from the designs of a Frenchman named de Son.
This is supposed to be the earliest illustration of any submarine, and
the inscription under the drawing, which was printed at Amsterdam in the
Calverstraat, (in the Three Crabs,) is in old Dutch, of which the
following is a translation:

     The inventor of this ship will undertake to destroy in a
     single day a hundred vessels, and such destruction could not
     be prevented by fire, storm, bad weather, or the force of the
     waves, saving only that the Almighty should otherwise will it.

[Illustration: The figures on the drawing refer to the following

1. The beam wherewith power shall be given to the ship.

2. The rudder of the ship, somewhat aft.

3. The keel plate.

4. The two ends of the ship, iron plated.

5. Iron bolts and screws.

6. How deep the ship goes into the water when awash.

7. The pivots on which the paddle-wheel turns.

8. Air holes.

9. Gallery along which men can move.

The inset is a drawing of the paddle-wheels which fill the centre
portion of the boat and which work upon the pivot marked 7.]

     Vain would it be for ships lying in harbor to be regarded as
     safe, for the inventor could reach anywhere unless prevented
     by betrayal. None but he could control the craft. Therefore it
     may truly be called the lightning of the sea.

     Its power shall be proven by a trip to the East Indies in six
     weeks or to France and back in a day, for as fast as a bird
     flieth can one travel in this boat.

This boat was 72 feet in length, and her greatest height was 12 feet,
while the greatest breadth was 8 feet, tapering off to points at the
end. Capt. Murray Sueter in his book on submarines gives these and other
particulars of the vessel. At either end the boat had a cabin, the air
in which remained good for about three hours, and in the middle of the
boat was a large paddlewheel rotated by clockwork mechanism, which, it
was claimed, would run for eight hours when once wound up. The iron tips
at the ends of the vessel were intended for ramming, and the inventor
was confident he could sink the biggest English ship afloat by crushing
in her hull under water. The boat was duly launched, but on trial of the
machinery being made the paddlewheel, though it revolved in air, would
not move in the water, the machinery being not powerful enough. This,
says Capt. Sueter, was apparently the only reason for de Son's failure,
for his principles were distinctly sound, and he was certainly the first
inventor of the mechanically propelled semi-submarine boat. After her
failure de Son exhibited her for a trifle to any casual passer-by.


By Katharine Drayton Mayrant Simons, Jr.

Death, our mother, gave us her three gray gifts from the sea--
  (Cherish your birthright, Brothers!)--speed, cunning, and certainty.
And mailèd Mars, he blest us--but his blessing was most to me!

For the swift gun sometimes falters, sparing the foe afar,
  And the hid mine wastes destruction on the drag's decoying spar,
But I am the wrath of the Furies' path--of the war god's avatar!

Mine is the brain of thinking steel man made to match his own,
 To guard and guide the death disks packed in the war head's hammered cone,
To drive the cask of the thin air flask as the gyroscope has shown.

My brother, the gun, shrieks o'er the sea his curse from the covered deck,
 My brother, the mine, lies sullen-dumb, agape for the dreadnought's wreck,
I glide on the breath of my mother, Death, and my goal is my only check!

More strong than the strength of armored ships is the firing pin's frail
  More sure than the helm of the mighty fleet are my rudders to their mark,
The faint foam fades from the bright screw blades--and I strike from the
    under dark!

Death, our mother, gave us her three gray gifts from the sea--
  (Cherish your birthright, Brothers!)--speed, cunning, and certainty.
And mailèd Mars, he blest us--but his blessing was most to me!

"God Punish England, Brother"

A New Hymn of Germany's Gospel of Hatred

[From Public Opinion, London, Feb. 5, 1915.]

The amazing outburst of hatred against England in Germany is responsible
for a new form of greeting which has displaced the conventional formulas
of salutation and farewell: "God punish England!" ("Gott strafe
England!") is the form of address, to which the reply is: "May God
punish her!" ("Gott mög'es strafen!")

"This extraordinary formula," says The Mail, "which is now being used
all over Germany, is celebrated in a set of verses by Herr Hochstetter
in a recent number of the well-known German weekly, Lustige Blätter. In
its way this poem is as remarkable as Herr Ernst Lissauer's famous 'Hymn
of Hate.'"

Among the prayers at Bruges Cathedral on the Kaiser's birthday was this
German chant of hate, "God Punish England!"


Translated by


    This is the German greeting
    When men their fellows meet,
    The merchants in the market-place,
    The beggars in the street.
    A pledge of bitter enmity,
    Thus runs the wingèd word:
    "God punish England, brother!--
    Yea! Punish her, O Lord!"

    With raucous voice, brass-throated,
    Our German shells shall bear
    This curse that is our greeting
    To the "cousin" in his lair.
    This be our German battle cry,
    The motto on our sword:
    "God punish England, brother!--Yea!
    Punish her, O Lord!"

    By shell from sea, by bomb from air,
    Our greeting shall be sped,
    Making each English homestead
    A mansion of the dead.
    And even Grey will tremble
    As falls each iron word:
    "God punish England, brother!--
    Yea! Punish her, O Lord!"

    This is the German greeting
    When men their fellows meet,
    The merchants in the market-place,
    The beggars in the street.
    A pledge of bitter enmity,
    Thus runs the winged word:
    "God punish England, brother!--
    Yea! Punish her, O Lord!"

"What German Lutheran pastors think of the gospel of hate that is at
present being preached throughout the Fatherland may be judged from an
article on the subject written for the Vossische Zeitung of Berlin, by
Dr. Julius Schiller of Nürnberg, who describes himself as a royal
Protestant pastor," says The Morning Post.

"Before the war, the pastor writes, it was considered immoral to hate;
now, however, Germans know that they not only may, but they must hate.
Herr Lissauer's 'Hymn of Hate' against England is, he declares, a
faithful expression of the feelings cherished in the depths of the
German soul.

"'All protests against this hate,' the pastor writes, 'fall on deaf
ears; we strike down all hands that would avert it. We cannot do
otherwise; we must hate the brood of liars. Our hate was provoked, and
the German can hate more thoroughly than any one else. A feeling that
this is the case is penetrating into England, but the fear of the German
hate is as yet hidden. There is a grain of truth in Lord Curzon's
statement that the phlegmatic temperament of his countrymen is incapable
of hating as the Germans hate.

"'We Germans do, as a matter of fact, hate differently than the sons of
Albion. We Germans hate honorably, for our hatred is based on right and
justice. England, on the other hand, hates mendaciously, being impelled
by envy, ill-will, and jealousy. It was high time that we tore the mask
from England's face, that we finally saw England as she really is.

"'We hate with a clean conscience, although religion seems to condemn as
unæsthetic everything that is included in the word hate.' The Pastor
concludes by asserting that 'we, who are fighting for truth and right
with clean hands and a clean conscience, must have Him on our side Who
is stronger than the strongest battalions. Hence our courage and our
confidence in a fortunate outcome of the world conflagration. The dawn
will soon appear that announces that the "Day of Harvest" for Germany
has broken.'"

"The avowal that the love of good Germans for Germany is inseparable
from hatred of other countries shows how deeply the aggressiveness of
German policy has sunk into the nation's mood," says The Times. "Only
by constantly viewing their own country as in a natural state of
challenge to all others can Germans have come to absorb the view that
hatred is the normal manifestation of patriotism. It is a purely
militarist conception.

"Hate is at bottom a slavish passion, and remote from that heroic spirit
of the warrior with which the Germans represent themselves as facing a
world in arms. The hater subjects his mind to the domination of what he
hates; he loses his independence and volition and becomes the prey of
the hated idea. At last he cannot free his mind from the obsession; and
the deliberate cultivation of hate in the conscientious German manner is
a kind of mental suicide."



    Whether, O Father in Heaven, we still put our trust in You,
    Whether You are but a dream of a sacred past,
    See now, we swear to You, Witness of Truth,
    Not we have wanted it--
    This murder, this world-ending murder--
    Which now, with blood-hot sighs,
    Stamps o'er the shuddering earth.
    True to the earth, the bread-giving earth,
    Happy and cheery in business and trade,
    Peaceful we sat in the oak tree's shade,
    Though we were born to the sword.

    Circled around us, for ever and ever,
    Greed, sick with envy, and nets lifted high,
    Full of inherited hatred.
    Every one saw it, and every one felt
    The secret venom, gushing forth,
    Year after year,
    Heavy and breath-bated years.
    But hearts did not quiver
    Nor hands draw the sword.

    And then it came, the hour
    Of sacred need, of pregnant Fate,
    And what it brings forth, we will shape,
    The brown gun in our mastering hand.

    Ye mothers, what ye once have borne,
      In honor or in vice,
    Bring forth to every sacred shrine--
      Your country's sacrifice.

    Ye brides, whom future happiness,
      Once kissed--it but seemed true,
    Bring back to fair Germania
      What she has given you.

    Ye women, in silks or in linen,
      Offer your husbands now.
    Bid them goodbye, with your children,
      With smiles and a blessing vow.

    Ye all are doomed to lie sleepless,
      Many a desolate night,
    And dream of approaching conquests
      And of your hero's might.

    And dream of laurel and myrtle,
      Until he shall return,
    Till he, your master and shepherd,
      Shall make the old joys burn.

    And if he fell on the Autumn heath
      And fell deep into death,
    He died for Germania's greatness,
      He died for Germania's breath.

    The Fatherland they shall let stand,
      Upon his blood-soaked loam,
    And ne'er again shall they approach
      Our sacred, peaceful home.

--Translated by Herman J. Mankiewicz.

[Illustration: H.M. GUSTAF V

King of Sweden

_(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)_]

[Illustration: H.M. HAAKON VII

King of Norway

_(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)_]

The Peace of the World

A Famous Englishman's Diagnosis of the War Disease and His Prescription
for a Permanent Cure

By H.G. Wells


(Copyrighted in Great Britain and Ireland.)


Probably there have never been before in the whole past of mankind so
many people convinced of the dreadfulness of war, nor so large a
proportion anxious to end war, to rearrange the world's affairs so that
this huge hideousness of hardship, suffering, destruction, and killing
that still continues in Europe may never again be repeated.

The present writer is one of this great majority. He wants as far as
possible to end war altogether, and contrive things so that when any
unavoidable outbreak does occur it may be as little cruel and
mischievous as it can be.

But it is one thing to desire a thing and another thing to get it. It
does not follow because this aspiration for world-peace is almost
universal that it will be realized. There may be faults in ourselves,
unsuspected influences within us and without, that may be working to
defeat our superficial sentiments. There must be not only a desire for
peace, but a will for peace, if peace is to be established forever. If
out of a hundred men ninety-nine desire peace and trouble no further,
the one man over will arm himself and set up oppression and war again.
Peace must be organized and maintained. This present monstrous
catastrophe is the outcome of forty-three years of skillful,
industrious, systematic world armament. Only by a disarmament as
systematic, as skillful, and as devoted may we hope to achieve centuries
of peace.

No apology is needed, therefore, for a discussion of the way in which
peace may be organized and established out of the settlement of this
war. I am going to set out and estimate as carefully as I can the forces
that make for a peace organization and the forces that make for war. I
am going to do my best to diagnose the war disorder. I want to find out
first for my own guidance, and then with a view to my co-operation with
other people, what has to be done to prevent the continuation and
recrudescence of warfare.

Such an inquiry is manifestly the necessary first stage in any world
pacification. So manifestly that, of course, countless others are also
setting to work upon it. It is a research. It is a research exactly like
a scientific exploration. Each of us will probably get out a lot of
truth and a considerable amount of error; the truth will be the same and
the errors will confute and disperse each other. But it is clear that
there is no simple panacea in this matter, and that only by intentness
and persistence shall we disentangle a general conception of the road
the peace-desiring multitude must follow.

Now, first be it noted that there is in every one a certain discord with
regard to war. Every man is divided against himself. On the whole, most
of us want peace. But hardly any one is without a lurking belligerence,
a lurking admiration for the vivid impacts, the imaginative appeals of
war. I am sitting down to write for the peace of the world, but
immediately before I sat down to write I was reading the morning's
paper, and particularly of the fight between the Sydney and the Emden
at Cocos Island.

I confess to the utmost satisfaction in the account of the smashing
blows delivered by the guns of the Australian. There is a sensation of
greatness, a beautiful tremendousness, in many of the crude facts of
war; they excite in one a kind of vigorous exaltation; we have that
destructive streak in us, and it is no good pretending that we have not;
the first thing we must do for the peace of the world is to control
that. And to control it one can do nothing more effective than to keep
in mind the other side of the realities of war.

As my own corrective I have at hand certain letters from a very able
woman doctor who returned last week from Calais. Lockjaw, gangrene, men
tied with filthy rags and lying bitterly cold in coaly sheds; men
unwounded, but so broken by the chill horrors of the Yser trenches as to
be near demented--such things make the substance of her picture. One
young officer talked to her rather dryly of the operations, of the
ruined towns and villages, of the stench of dead men and horses, of the
losses and wounds and mutilations among his men, of the list of pals he
had lost. "Suddenly he began to cry. He broke down just like an
overtaxed child. And he could not stop crying. He cried and cried, and I
could do nothing to help him." He was a strong man and a brave man, and
to that three months of war had brought him.

And then this again:

     There were a fair number of Belgian doctors, but no nurses
     except the usual untrained French girls, almost no equipment,
     and no place for clean surgery. We heard of a house containing
     sixty-one men with no doctor or nurses--several died without
     having received any medical aid at all. Mrs. ---- and I even
     on the following Wednesday found four men lying on straw in a
     shop with leg and foot wounds who had not been dressed since
     Friday and had never been seen by a doctor. In addition there
     were hundreds and hundreds of wounded who could walk trying to
     find shelter in some corner, besides the many unwounded French
     and Belgian soldiers quartered in the town.

     As if this inferno of misery were not enough, there were added
     the refugees! These were not Belgians, as I had imagined, but
     French. It appears that both English and French armies have
     to clear the civil population out of the whole fighting
     area--partly to prevent spying and treachery, (which has been
     a curse to both armies,) and partly because they would starve.
     They are sent to Calais, and then by boat to Havre.

     That first Sunday evening an endless procession flowed from
     the station to the quays in the drenching rain. Each family
     had a perambulator, (a surprisingly handsome one, too,) piled
     with sticks of bread, a few bundles of goods, and, when we
     peered inside, a couple of crying babies. There were few young
     people; mostly it was whimpering, frightened-looking children
     and wretched, bent old men and women. It seemed too bad to be
     true; even when they brushed past us in the rain we could not
     believe that their sodden figures were real. They were
     dematerialized by misery in some odd way.

     Some of them slept in skating rinks, trucks, some in the
     Amiral Ganteaume. (One's senses could not realize that to the
     horrors of exile these people had added those of shipwreck
     next day.) Some certainly stood in the Booking Hall outside
     our hotel all night through. This sort of thing went on all
     the week, and was going on when we left.

Nevertheless, I was stirred agreeably by the imagination of the shells
smashing the Emden and the men inside the Emden, and when I read the
other day that the naval guns had destroyed over 4,000 men in the German
trenches about Middlekirche I remarked that we were "doing well." It is
only on the whole that we who want to end war hate and condemn war; we
are constantly lapsing into fierceness, and if we forget this lurking
bellicosity and admiration for hard blows in our own nature then we
shall set about the task of making an end to it under hopelessly
disabling misconceptions. We shall underrate and misunderstand
altogether the very powerful forces that are against pacifist effort.

Let us consider first, then, the forces that are directly opposed to the
pacification of the world, the forces that will work openly and
definitely for the preservation of war as a human condition. And it has
to be remembered that the forces that are for a thing are almost always
more unified, more concentrated and effective than the forces that are
against it. We who are against war and want to stop it are against it
for a great multitude of reasons. There are other things in life that
we prefer, and war stops these other things. Some of us want to pursue
art, some want to live industrious lives in town or country, some would
pursue scientific developments, some want pleasures of this sort or
that, some would live lives of religion and kindliness, or religion and

But we all agree in fixing our minds upon something else than war. And
since we fix our minds on other things, war becomes possible and
probable through our general inattention. We do not observe it, and
meanwhile the people who really care for war and soldiering fix their
minds upon it. They scheme how it shall be done, they scheme to bring it
about. Then we discover suddenly--as the art and social development, the
industry and pleasant living, the cultivation of the civil enterprise of
England, France, Germany, and Russia have discovered--that everything
must be pushed aside when the war thinkers have decided upon their game.
And until we of the pacific majority contrive some satisfactory
organization to watch the war-makers we shall never end war, any more
than a country can end crime and robbery without a police. Specialist
must watch specialist in either case. Mere expressions of a virtuous
abhorrence of war will never end war until the crack of doom.

The people who actually want war are perhaps never at any time very
numerous. Most people sometimes want war, and a few people always want
war. It is these last who are, so to speak, the living nucleus of the
war creature that we want to destroy. That liking for an effective smash
which gleamed out in me for a moment when I heard of the naval guns is
with them a dominating motive. It is not outweighed and overcome in them
as it is in me by the sense of waste, and by pity and horror and by love
for men who can do brave deeds and yet weep bitterly for misery and the
deaths of good friends. These war-lovers are creatures of a simpler
constitution. And they seem capable of an ampler hate.

You will discover, if you talk to them skillfully, that they hold that
war "ennobles," and that when they say ennobles they mean that it is
destructive to the ten thousand things in life that they do not enjoy or
understand or tolerate, things that fill them, therefore, with envy and
perplexity--such things as pleasure, beauty, delicacy, leisure. In the
cant of modern talk you will find them call everything that is not crude
and forcible in life "degenerate." But back to the very earliest
writings, in the most bloodthirsty outpourings of the Hebrew prophets,
for example, you will find that at the base of the warrior spirit is
hate for more complicated, for more refined, for more beautiful and
happier living.

The military peoples of the world have almost always been harsh and
rather stupid peoples, full of a virtuous indignation of all they did
not understand. The modern Prussian goes to war today with as supreme a
sense of moral superiority as the Arabs when they swept down upon Egypt
and North Africa. The burning of the library of Alexandria remains
forever the symbol of the triumph of a militarist "culture" over
civilization. This easy belief of the dull and violent that war "braces"
comes out of a real instinct of self-preservation against the subtler
tests of peace. This type of person will keep on with war if it can. It
is to politics what the criminal type is to social order; it will be
resentful and hostile to every attempt to fix up a pacific order in the

This heavy envy which is the dominant characteristic of the pro-military
type is by no means confined to it. More or less it is in all of us. In
England one finds it far less frequently in professional soldiers than
among sedentary learned men. In Germany, too, the more uncompromising
and ferocious pro-militarism is to be found in the frock coats of the
professors. Just at present England is full of virtuous reprehension of
German military professors, but there is really no monopoly of such in
Germany, and before Germany England produced some of the most perfect
specimens of aggressive militarist conceivable. To read Froude upon
Ireland or Carlyle upon the Franco-German War is to savor this
hate-dripping temperament in its perfection.

Much of this literary bellicosity is pathological. Men overmuch in
studies and universities get ill in their livers and sluggish in their
circulations; they suffer from shyness, from a persuasion of excessive
and neglected merit, old maid's melancholy, and a detestation of all the
levities of life. And their suffering finds its vent in ferocious
thoughts. A vigorous daily bath, a complete stoppage of wine, beer,
spirits, and tobacco, and two hours of hockey in the afternoon would
probably make decently tolerant men of all these fermenting professional
militarists. Such a regimen would certainly have been the salvation of
both Froude and Carlyle. It would probably have saved the world from the
vituperation of the Hebrew prophets--those models for infinite mischief.

The extremist cases pass to the average case through insensible degrees.
We are all probably, as a species, a little too prone to intolerance,
and if we do in all sincerity mean to end war in the world we must
prepare ourselves for considerable exercises in restraint when strange
people look, behave, believe, and live in a manner different from our
own. The minority of permanently bitter souls who want to see
objectionable cities burning and men fleeing and dying form the real
strength in our occasional complicities.

The world has had its latest object lesson in the German abuse of
English and French as "degenerates," of the Russians as "Mongol hordes,"
of the Japanese as "yellow savages," but it is not only Germans who let
themselves slip into national vanity and these ugly hostilities to
unfamiliar life. The first line of attack against war must be an attack
upon self-righteousness and intolerance. These things are the germ of
uncompromising and incurable militarism everywhere.

Now, the attack upon self-righteousness and intolerance and the stern,
self-satisfied militarism that arises naturally out of these things is
to be made in a number of ways. The first is a sedulous propaganda of
the truth about war, a steadfast resolve to keep the pain of warfare
alive in the nerves of the careless, to keep the stench of war under the
else indifferent nose. It is only in the study of the gloomily
megalomaniac historian that aggressive war becomes a large and glorious
thing. In reality it is a filthy outrage upon life, an idiot's smashing
of the furniture of homes, a mangling, a malignant mischief, a scalding
of stokers, a disemboweling of gunners, a raping of caught women by
drunken soldiers. By book and pamphlet, by picture and cinematograph
film, the pacifist must organize wisdom in these matters.

And not only indignation and distress must come to this task. The stern,
uncompromising militarist will not be moved from his determinations by
our horror and hostility. These things will but "brace" him. He has a
more vulnerable side. The ultimate lethal weapon for every form of
stupidity is ridicule, and against the high silliness of the militarist
it is particularly effective. It is the laughter of wholesome men that
will finally end war. The stern, strong, silent man will cease to
trouble us only when we have stripped him of his last rag of pretension
and touched through to the quick of his vanity with the realization of
his apprehended foolishness. Literature will have failed humanity if it
is so blinded by the monstrous agony in Flanders as to miss the
essential triviality at the head of the present war. Not the slaughter
of ten million men can make the quality of the German Kaiser other than
theatrical and silly.

The greater part of the world is in an agony, a fever, but that does not
make the cause of that fever noble or great. A man may die of yellow
fever through the bite of a mosquito; that does not make a mosquito
anything more than a dirty little insect or an aggressive imperialist
better than a pothouse fool.

Henceforth we must recognize no heroic war but defensive war, and as the
only honorable warriors such men as those peasants of Visé who went out
with shotguns against the multitudinous overwhelming nuisance of
invasion that trampled down their fields.

Or war to aid such defensive war.


But the people who positively admire and advocate and want war for its
own sake are only a small, feverish minority of mankind. The greater
obstacle to the pacification of the world is not the war-seeker, but the
vast masses of people who for the most various motives support and
maintain all kinds of institutions and separations that make for war.
They do not want war, they do not like war, but they will not make
sacrifices, they will not exert themselves in any way to make war
difficult or impossible.

It is they who give the war maniac his opportunity. They will not lock
the gun away from him, they will not put a reasonable limit to the
disputes into which he can ultimately thrust his violent substitute for
a solution. They are like the people who dread and detest yellow fever,
but oppose that putting of petrol on the ponds which is necessary to
prevent it because of the injury to the water flowers.

Now, it is necessary, if we are to have an intelligently directed
anti-war campaign, that we should make a clear, sound classification of
these half-hearted people, these people who do not want war, but who
permit it. Their indecisions, their vagueness, these are the really
effective barriers to our desire to end war forever.

And first, there is one thing very obvious, and that is the necessity
for some controlling world authority if treaties are to be respected and
war abolished. While there are numerous sovereign States in the world
each absolutely free to do what it chooses, to arm its people or
repudiate engagements, there can be no sure peace. But great multitudes
of those who sincerely desire peace forever cannot realize this. There
are, for example, many old-fashioned English liberals who denounce
militarism and "treaty entanglements" with equal ardor; they want
Britain to stand alone, unaggressive, but free; not realizing that such
an isolation is the surest encouragement to any war-enamored power.
Exactly the same type is to be found in the United States, and is
probably even more influential there. But only by so spinning a web of
treaties that all countries are linked by general obligations to mutual
protection can a real world-pacification be achieved.

The present alliance against the insufferable militarism of Germany may
very probably be the precursor of a much wider alliance against any
aggression whatever in the future. Only through some such arrangement is
there any reasonable hope of a control and cessation of that constant
international bickering and pressure, that rivalry in finance, that
competition for influence in weak neutral countries, which has initiated
all the struggles of the last century, and which is bound to accumulate
tensions for fresh wars so long as it goes on.

Already several States, and particularly the Government of the United
States of America, have signed treaties of arbitration, and The Hague
Tribunal spins a first web of obligations, exemplary if gossamer,
between the countries of the world. But these are but the faint initial
suggestions of much greater possibilities, and it is these greater
possibilities that have now to be realized if all the talk we have had
about a war to end war is to bear any fruit. What is now with each week
of the present struggle becoming more practicable is the setting up of a
new assembly that will take the place of the various embassies and
diplomatic organizations, of a mediaeval pattern and tradition, which
have hitherto conducted international affairs.

This war must end in a public settlement, to which all of the
belligerents will set their hands; it will not be a bundle of treaties,
but one treaty binding eight or nine or more powers. This settlement
will almost certainly be attained at a conference of representatives of
the various Foreign Offices involved. Quite possibly interested neutral
powers will also send representatives. There is no reason whatever why
this conference should dissolve, why it should not become a permanent
conference upon the inter-relations of the participating powers and the
maintenance of the peace of the world. It could have a seat and
officials, a staff, and a revenue of its own; it could sit and debate
openly, publish the generally binding treaties between its constituent
powers, and claim for the support of its decisions their military and
naval resources.

The predominance of the greater powers could be secured either by the
representatives having multiple votes, according to the population
represented, or by some sort of proportional representation. Each power
could appoint its representatives through its Foreign Office or by
whatever other means it thought fit. They could as conveniently be
elected by a legislature or a nation. And such a body would not only be
of enormous authority in the statement, interpretation, and enforcement
of treaties, but it could also discharge a hundred useful functions in
relation to world hygiene, international trade and travel, the control
of the ocean, the exploration and conservation of the world's supplies
of raw material and food supply. It would be, in fact, a World Council.

Today this is an entirely practicable and hopeful proposal if only we
can overcome the opposition of those who cling to the belief that it is
possible for a country to be at the same time entirely pacific and
entirely unresponsible to and detached from the rest of mankind.

Given such a body, such a great alliance of world powers, much else in
the direction of world pacification becomes possible. Without it we may
perhaps expect a certain benefit from the improved good feeling of
mankind and the salutary overthrow of the German military culture, but
we cannot hope for any real organized establishment of peace.

I believe that a powerful support for the assembly and continuance of
such a world congress as this could be easily and rapidly developed in
North and South America, in Britain and the British Empire generally, in
France and Italy, in all the smaller States of northern, central, and
western Europe. It would probably have the personal support of the Czar,
unless he has profoundly changed the opinions with which he opened his
reign, the warm accordance of educated China and Japan, and the good
will of a renascent Germany. It would open a new era for mankind.


Now, this idea of a congress of the belligerents to arrange the peace
settlements after this war, expanding by the accession of neutral powers
into a permanent world congress for the enforcement of international law
and the maintenance of the peace of mankind, is so reasonable and
attractive and desirable that if it were properly explained it would
probably receive the support of nineteen out of every twenty intelligent

Nevertheless, its realization is, on the whole, improbable. A mere
universal disgust with war is no more likely to end war than the
universal dislike for dying has ended death. And though war, unlike
dying, seems to be an avoidable fate, it does not follow that its
present extreme unpopularity will end it unless people not only desire
but see to the accomplishment of their desire.

And here again one is likely to meet an active and influential
opposition. Though the general will and welfare may point to the future
management of international relations through a world congress, the
whole mass of those whose business has been the direction of
international relations is likely to be either skeptical or actively
hostile to such an experiment. All the foreign offices and foreign
ministers, the diplomatists universally, the politicians who have
specialized in national assertion, and the courts that have symbolized
and embodied it, all the people, in fact, who will be in control of the
settlement, are likely to be against so revolutionary a change.

For it would be an entirely revolutionary change. It would put an end to
secrecy. It would end all that is usually understood by diplomacy. It
would clear the world altogether of those private understandings and
provisional secret agreements, those intrigues, wire-pullings, and
quasi-financial operations that have been the very substance of
international relations hitherto. To these able and interested people,
for the most part highly seasoned by the present conditions, finished
and elaborated players at the old game, this is to propose a new, crude,
difficult, and unsympathetic game. They may all of them, or most of
them, hate war, but they will cling to the belief that their method of
operating may now, after a new settlement, be able to prevent or
palliate war.

All men get set in a way of living, and it is as little in human nature
to give up cheerfully in the middle of life a familiar method of dealing
with things in favor of a new and untried one as it is to change one's
language or emigrate to an entirely different land. I realize what this
proposal means to diplomatists when I try to suppose myself united to
assist in the abolition of written books and journalism in favor of the
gramophone and the cinematograph. Or united to adopt German as my means
of expression. It is only by an enormous pressure of opinion in the
world behind these monarchs, ministers, and representatives that they
will be induced even to consider the possibility of adapting themselves
to this novel style of international dealing through a permanent
congress. It is only the consideration of its enormous hopefulness for
the rest of the world that gives one the courage to advocate it.

In the question of the possible abolition of the present diplomatic
system, just as in the case of the possible abolition of war, while on
the side for abolition there must be a hugely preponderating interest
and a hugely preponderating majority, it is, nevertheless, a dispersed
interest and an unorganized, miscellaneous majority. The minority is, on
the other hand, compact, more intensively and more immediately
interested and able to resist such great changes with a maximum of
efficiency. There is a tremendous need, therefore, for a world congress
organization propaganda if this advantageously posted minority is to be

And from such countries as the American States in particular, and from
the small liberal neutrals in Europe, whose diplomacy is least developed
and least influential, liberal-minded people through the world are most
disposed to expect, and do expect, a lead in this particular matter. The
liberal forces in Britain, France, and Russia are extraordinarily
embarrassed and enslaved by the vast belligerent necessities into which
their lives have been caught. But they would take up such a lead with
the utmost vigor and enthusiasm.

No one who has followed the diplomatic history of the negotiations that
led to this war can doubt that if there had been no secret treaties, but
instead open proclamations of intentions and an open discussion of
international ambitions, the world might have been saved this
catastrophe. It is no condemnation of any person or country to say this.
The reserves and hesitations and misconceptions that led Germany to
suppose that England would wait patiently while France and Belgium were
destroyed before she herself received attention were unavoidable under
the existing diplomatic conditions. What reasonable people have to do
now is not to recriminate over the details in the working of a system
that we can now all of us perceive to be hopelessly bad, but to do our
utmost in this season of opportunity to destroy the obscurities in which
fresh mischief may fester for our children.

Let me restate this section in slightly different words. At the end of
this war there must be a congress of adjustment. The suggestion in this
section is to make this congress permanent, to use it as a clearing
house of international relationships and to abolish embassies.

Instead of there being a British Ambassador, for example, at every
sufficiently important capital, and an ambassador from every important
State in London, and a complex tangle of relationships, misstatements,
and misconceptions arising from the ill-co-ordinated activities of this
double system of agents, it is proposed to send one or several
ambassadors to some central point, such as The Hague, to meet there all
the ambassadors of all the significant States in the world and to deal
with international questions with a novel frankness in a collective

This has now become a possible way of doing the world's business because
of the development of the means of communication and information. The
embassy in a foreign country, as a watching, remonstrating, proposing
extension of its country of origin, a sort of eye and finger at the
heart of the host country, is now clumsy, unnecessary, inefficient, and
dangerous. For most routine work, for reports of all sorts, for legal
action, and so forth, on behalf of traveling nationals, the consular
service is adequate, or can easily be made adequate. What remains of the
ambassadorial apparatus might very well merge with the consular system
and the embassy become an international court civility, a ceremonial
vestige without any diplomatic value at all.


Given a permanent world congress developed out of the congress of
settlement between the belligerents, a world alliance, with as a last
resort a call upon the forces of the associated powers, for dealing with
recalcitrants, then a great number of possibilities open out to humanity
that must otherwise remain inaccessible. But before we go on to consider
these it may be wise to point out how much more likely a world congress
is to effect a satisfactory settlement at the end of this war than a
congress confined to the belligerents.

The war has progressed sufficiently to convince every one that there is
now no possibility of an overwhelming victory for Germany. It must end
in a more or less complete defeat of the German and Turkish alliance,
and in a considerable readjustment of Austrian and Turkish boundaries.
Assisted by the generosity of the doomed Austrians and Turks, the
Germans are fighting now to secure a voice as large as possible in the
final settlement, and it is conceivable that in the end that settlement
may be made quite an attractive one for Germany proper by the crowning
sacrifice of suicide on the part of her two subordinated allies.

There can be little doubt that Russia will gain the enormous advantage
of a free opening into the Mediterranean and that the battle of the
Marne turned the fortunes of France from disaster to expansion. But the
rest of the settlement is still vague and uncertain, and German
imperialism, at least, is already working hard and intelligently for a
favorable situation at the climax, a situation that will enable this
militarist empire to emerge still strong, still capable of recuperation
and of a renewal at no very remote date of the struggle for European
predominance. This is a thing as little for the good of the saner German
people as it is for the rest of the world, but it is the only way in
which militant imperialism can survive at all.

The alternative of an imperialism shorn of the glamour of aggression,
becoming constitutional and democratic--the alternative, that is to say,
of a great liberal Germany--is one that will be as distasteful almost to
the people who control the destinies of Germany today, and who will
speak and act for Germany in the final settlement, as a complete
submission to a Serbian conqueror would be.

At the final conference of settlement Germany will not be really
represented at all. The Prussian militarist empire will still be in
existence, and it will sit at the council, working primarily for its own
survival. Unless the Allies insist upon the presence of representatives
of Saxony, Bavaria, and so forth, and demand the evidence of popular
sanctions--a thing they are very unlikely to demand--that is what
"Germany" will signify at the conference. And what is true of Germany
will be true, more or less, of several other of the allied powers.

A conference confined purely to the belligerents will be, in fact, a
conference not even representative of the belligerents. And it will be
tainted with all the traditional policies, aggressions, suspicions, and
subterfuges that led up to the war. It will not be the end of the old
game, but the readjustment of the old game, the old game which is such
an abominable nuisance to the development of modern civilization. The
idealism of the great alliance will certainly be subjected to enormous
strains, and the whole energy of the Central European diplomatists will
be directed to developing and utilizing these stresses.

This, I think, must be manifest even to the foreign offices most
concerned. They must see already ahead of them a terrible puzzle of
arrangement, a puzzle their own bad traditions will certainly never
permit them to solve. "God save us," they may very well pray, "from our
own cleverness and sharp dealing," and they may even welcome the promise
of an enlarged outlook that the entry of the neutral powers would bring
with it.

Every foreign office has its ugly, evil elements, and probably every
foreign office dreads those elements. There are certainly Russian fools
who dream about India, German fools who dream about Canada and South
America, British fools who dream about Africa and the East;
aggressionists in the blood, people who can no more let nations live in
peace than kleptomaniacs can keep their hands in their own pockets. But
quite conceivably there are honest monarchs and sane foreign ministers
very ready to snatch at the chance of swamping the evil in their own

It is just here that the value of neutral participation will come in.
Whatever ambitions the neutral powers may have of their own, it may be
said generally that they are keenly interested in preventing the
settlement from degenerating into a deal in points of vantage for any
further aggressions in any direction. Both the United States of America
and China are traditionally and incurably pacific powers, professing and
practicing an unaggressive policy, and the chief outstanding minor
States are equally concerned in securing a settlement that shall settle.

And moreover, so wide reaching now are all international agreements that
they have not only a claim to intervene juridically, but they have the
much more pressing claim to participate on the ground that no sort of
readjustment of Europe, Western Asia, and Africa can leave their own
futures unaffected. They are wanted not only in the interests of the
belligerent peoples, but for their own sakes and the welfare of the
world all together.


Now a world conference, once it is assembled, can take up certain
questions that no partial treatment can ever hope to meet. The first of
the questions is disarmament. No one who has watched the politics of the
last forty years can doubt the very great share the business and finance
of armament manufacture has played in bringing about the present
horrible killing, and no one who has read accounts of the fighting can
doubt how much this industry has enhanced the torment, cruelty, and
monstrosity of war.

In the old warfare a man was either stabbed, shot, or thrust through
after an hour or so of excitement, and all the wounded on the field were
either comfortably murdered or attended to before the dawn of the next
day. One was killed by human hands, with understandable and tolerable
injuries. But in this war the bulk of the dead--of the western Allies,
at any rate--have been killed by machinery, the wounds have been often
of an inconceivable horribleness, and the fate of the wounded has been
more frightful than was ever the plight of wounded in the hands of
victorious savages. For days multitudes of men have been left mangled,
half buried in mud and filth, or soaked with water, or frozen, crying,
raving between the contending trenches. The number of men that the war,
without actual physical wounds, has shattered mentally and driven insane
because of its noise, its stresses, its strange unnaturalness, is
enormous. Horror in this war has overcome more men than did all the
arrows of Cressy.

Almost all this enhanced terribleness of war is due to the novel
machinery of destruction that science has rendered possible. The
wholesale mangling and destroying of men by implements they have never
seen, without any chance of retaliation, has been its most constant
feature. You cannot open a paper of any date since the war began without
reading of men burned, scalded, and drowned by the bursting of torpedoes
from submarines, of men falling out of the sky from shattered
aeroplanes, of women and children in Antwerp or Paris mutilated
frightfully or torn to ribbons by aerial bombs, of men smashed and
buried alive by shells. An indiscriminate, diabolical violence of
explosives resulting in cruelties for the most part ineffective from the
military point of view is the incessant refrain of this history.

The increased dreadfulness of war due to modern weapons is, however,
only one consequence of their development. The practicability of
aggressive war in settled countries now is entirely dependent on the use
of elaborate artillery on land and warships at sea. Were there only
rifles in the world, were an ordinary rifle the largest kind of gun
permitted, and were ships specifically made for war not so made, then it
would be impossible to invade any country defended by a patriotic and
spirited population with any hopes of success because of the enormous
defensive capacity of entrenched riflemen not subjected to an unhampered
artillery attack.

Modern war is entirely dependent upon equipment of the most costly and
elaborate sort. A general agreement to reduce that equipment would not
only greatly minimize the evil of any war that did break out, but it
would go a long way toward the abolition of war. A community of men
might be unwilling to renounce their right of fighting one another if
occasion arose, but they might still be willing to agree not to carry
arms or to carry arms of a not too lethal sort, to carry pistols instead
of rifles or sticks instead of swords. That, indeed, has been the
history of social amelioration in a number of communities; it has led
straight to a reduction in the number of encounters. So in the same way
the powers of the world might be willing to adopt such a limitation of
armaments, while still retaining the sovereign right of declaring war
in certain eventualities. Under the assurances of a world council
threatening a general intervention, such a partial disarmament would be
greatly facilitated.

And another aspect of disarmament which needs to be taken up and which
only a world congress can take up must be the arming of barbaric or
industrially backward powers by the industrially and artillery forces in
such countries as efficient powers, the creation of navies Turkey,
Servia, Peru, and the like. In Belgium countless Germans were blown to
pieces by German-made guns, Europe arms Mexico against the United
States; China, Africa, Arabia are full of European and American weapons.
It is only the mutual jealousies of the highly organized States that
permit this leakage of power. The tremendous warnings of our war should
serve to temper their foolish hostilities, and now, if ever, is the time
to restrain this insane arming of the less advanced communities.

But before that can be done it is necessary that the manufacture of war
material should cease to be a private industry and a source of profit to
private individuals, that all the invention and enterprise that blossoms
about business should be directed no longer to the steady improvement of
man-killing. It is a preposterous and unanticipated thing that
respectable British gentlemen should be directing magnificently
organized masses of artisans upon the Tyneside in the business of making
weapons that may ultimately smash some of those very artisans to

At the risk of being called "Utopian" I would submit that the world is
not so foolish as to allow that sort of thing to go on indefinitely. It
is, indeed, quite a recent human development. All this great business of
armament upon commercial lines is the growth of half a century. But it
has grown with the vigor of an evil weed, it has thrown out a dark
jungle of indirect advertisement, and it has compromised and corrupted
great numbers of investors and financial people. It is perhaps the most
powerful single interest of all those that will fight against the
systematic minimization and abolition of war, and rather than lose his
end it may be necessary for the pacifist to buy out all these concerns,
to insist upon the various States that have sheltered them taking them
over, lock, stock, and barrel, as going businesses.

From what we know of officialism everywhere, the mere transfer will
involve almost at once a decline in their vigor and innovating energy.
It is perhaps fortunate that the very crown of the private armaments
business is the Krupp organization and that its capture and suppression
is a matter of supreme importance to all the allied powers. Russia, with
her huge population, has not as yet developed armament works upon a very
large scale and would probably welcome proposals that minimized the
value of machinery and so enhanced that of men. Beyond this and certain
American plants for the making of rifles and machine guns only British
and French capital is very deeply involved in the armaments trade. The
problem is surely not too difficult for human art and honesty.

It is not being suggested that the making of arms should cease in the
world, but only that in every country it should become a State monopoly
and so completely under Government control. If the State can monopolize
the manufacture and sale of spirits, as Russia has done, if it can,
after the manner of Great Britain, control the making and sale of such a
small, elusive substance as saccharin, it is ridiculous to suppose that
it cannot keep itself fully informed of the existence of such elaborated
machinery as is needed to make a modern rifle barrel. And it demands a
very minimum of alertness, good faith, and good intentions for the
various manufacturing countries to keep each other and the world
generally informed upon the question of the respective military
equipments. From this state of affairs to a definition of a permissible
maximum of strength on land and sea for all the high contracting powers
is an altogether practicable step. Disarmament is not a dream; it is a
thing more practicable than a general hygienic convention and more
easily enforced than custom and excise.

Now none of this really involves the abandonment of armies or uniforms
or national service. Indeed, to a certain extent it restores the
importance of the soldier at the expense of machinery. A world
conference for the suppressing of the peace and the preservation of
armaments would neither interfere with such dear incorrigible squabbles
as that of the orange and green factions in Ireland, (though it might
deprive them of their more deadly weapons,) nor absolutely prohibit war
between adjacent States. It would, however, be a very powerful delaying
force against the outbreak of war, and it would be able to insist with a
quite novel strength upon the observation of the rules of war.

It is no good pretending that mere pacifism will end war; what will end
war, what, indeed, may be ending war at the present time, is
war--against militarism. Force respects itself and no other power. The
hope for a world of peace in the future lies in that, in the possibility
of a great alliance, so powerful that it will compel adhesions, an
alliance prepared to make war upon and destroy and replace the
Government of any State that became aggressive in its militarism. This
alliance will be in effect a world congress perpetually restraining
aggressive secession, and obviously it must regard all the No-Man's
Lands--and particularly that wild waste, the ocean--as its highway. The
fleets and marines of the allied world powers must become the police of
the wastes and waters of the earth.


Now, such a collective control of belligerence and international
relations is the obvious common sense settlement of the present world
conflict, it is so manifest, so straight-forward that were it put
plainly to them it would probably receive the assent of nineteen sane
men out of twenty in the world. This, or some such thing as this, they
would agree, is far better than isolations and the perpetual threat of
fresh warfare.

But against it there work forces, within these people and without, that
render the attainment of this generally acceptable solution far less
probable than a kind of no-solution that will only be a reopening of all
our hostilities and conflicts upon a fresh footing. Some of these forces
are vague and general, and can only be combated by a various and
abundant liberal literature, in a widely dispersed battle in which each
right-thinking man must do as his conscience directs him. There are the
vague national antagonisms, the reservations in favor of one's own
country's righteousness, harsh religious and social and moral cant of
the Carlyle type, greed, resentment, and suspicion. The greatest of
these vague oppositions is that want of faith which makes man say war
has always been and must always be, which makes them prophesy that
whatever we do will become corrupted and evil, even in the face of
intolerable present evils and corruptions.

When at the outbreak of the war I published an article headed "The War
That Will End War," at once Mr. W.L. George hastened to reprove my
dreaming impracticability. "War there has always been." Great is the
magic of a word! He was quite oblivious to the fact that war has changed
completely in its character half a dozen times in half a dozen
centuries; that the war we fought in South Africa and the present war
and the wars of mediaeval Italy and the wars of the Red Indians have
about as much in common as a cat and a man and a pair of scissors and a
motor car--namely, that they may all be the means of death.

If war can change its character as much as it has done it can change it
altogether; if peace can be kept indefinitely in India or North America,
it can be kept throughout the world. It is not I who dream, but Mr.
George and his like who are not yet fully awake, and it is their
somnolence that I dread more than anything else when I think of the
great task of settlement before the world.

It is this rather hopeless, inert, pseudo-sage mass of unbelievers who
render possible the continuation of war dangers. They give scope for
the activities of the evil minority which hates, which lives by pride
and grim satisfactions, and which is therefore anxious to have more war
and more. And it is these inert half-willed people who will obstruct the
disentanglement of the settlement from diplomatic hands. "What do we
know about the nuance of such things?" they will ask, with that laziness
that apes modesty. It is they who will complain when we seek to buy out
the armaments people. Probably all the private armament firms in the
world could be bought up for seventy million pounds, but the unbelievers
will shake their heads and say: "Then there will only be something else

Yet there are many ungauged forces on the side of the greater
settlement. Cynicism is never more than a half-truth, and because man is
imperfect it does not follow that he must be futile. Russia is a land of
strange silences, but it is manifest that whatever the innermost quality
of the Czar may be, he is no clap-trap vulgar conqueror of the
Wilhelm-Napoleon pattern. He began his reign, and he may yet crown his
reign, with an attempt to establish peace on a newer, broader
foundation. His religion, it would seem, is his master and not his
servant. There has been no Russian Bernhardi.

And there has been much in America, much said and much done, since the
war broke out that has surprised the world. I may confess for myself,
and I believe that I shall speak for many other Europeans in this
matter, that what we feared most in the United States was levity. We
expected mere excitement, violent fluctuations of opinion, a confused
irresponsibility, and possibly mischievous and disastrous interventions.
It is no good hiding an open secret. We judged America by the peace
headline. It is time we began to offer our apologies to America and
democracy. The result of reading endless various American newspapers and
articles, of following the actions of the American Government, of
talking to representative Americans, is to realize the existence of a
very clear, strong national mentality, a firm, self-controlled,
collective will, far more considerable in its totality than the world
has ever seen before.

We thought the United States would be sentimentally patriotic and
irresponsible, that they would behave as though the New World was,
indeed, a separate planet, and as though they had neither duties nor
brotherhood in Europe. It is quite clear, on the contrary, that the
people of the United States consider this war as their affair also, and
that they have the keenest sense of their responsibility for the general
welfare of mankind.

So that as a second chance, after the possibility of a broad handling of
the settlement by the Czar, and as a very much bigger probability, is
the insistence by America upon her right to a voice in the ultimate
settlement and an initiative from the Western Hemisphere that will lead
to a world congress. There are the two most hopeful sources of that
great proposal. It is the tradition of British national conduct to be
commonplace to the pitch of dullness, and all the stifled intelligence
of Great Britain will beat in vain against the national passion for the
ordinary. Britain, in the guise of Sir Edward Grey, will come to the
congress like a family solicitor among the Gods. What is the good of
shamming about this least heroic of Fatherlands? But Britain would
follow a lead; the family solicitor is honest and well-meaning. France
and Belgium and Italy are too deeply in the affair, or without
sufficient moral prestige, for a revolutionary initiative in
international relationship.

There is, however, a possible third source from which the proposal for a
world congress might come, with the support of both neutrals and
belligerents, and that is The Hague. Were there a man of force and
genius at The Hague now, a man speaking with authority and not as the
scribes, he might thrust enormous benefits upon the world.

It is from these three sources that I most hope for leading now. Of the
new Pope and his influence I know nothing. But in the present situation
of the world's affairs it behooves us ill to wait idle until leaders
clear the way for us. Every man who realizes the broad conditions of the
situation, every one who can talk or write or echo, can do his utmost to
spread his realization of the possibilities of a world congress and the
establishment of world law and world peace that lie behind the monstrous
agonies and cruelties and confusions of this catastrophic year. Given an
immense body of opinion initiatives may break out effectively anywhere;
failing it, they will be fruitless everywhere.



[From King Albert's Book.]

The women of Great Britain will never forget what Belgium has done for
all that women hold most dear.

In the days to come mothers will tell their children how a small but
great-souled nation fought to the death against overwhelming odds and
sacrificed all things to save the world from an intolerable tyranny.

The story of the Belgian people's defense of freedom will inspire
countless generations yet unborn.

Zeppelin Raids on London

By the Naval Correspondent of The London Times

[From The London Times, Jan. 22, 1915.]

Some doubt has been thrown by correspondents upon the ability of the
Zeppelins to reach London from Cuxhaven, the place from which the
raiders of Tuesday night appear to have started. The distance which the
airships traveled, including their manoeuvres over the land, must have
been quite 650 miles. This is not nearly as far as similar airships have
traveled in the past. One of the Zeppelins flew from Friedrichshafen, on
Lake Constance, to Berlin, a continuous flight of about 1,000 miles, in
thirty-one hours. Our naval officers will also recall the occasion of
the visit of the First Cruiser Squadron to Copenhagen in September,
1912, when the German passenger airship Hansa was present. The Hansa
made the run from Hamburg to Copenhagen, a distance of 198 miles, in
seven hours, and Count Zeppelin was on board her. Supposing an airship
left Cuxhaven at noon on some day when the conditions were favorable and
traveled to London, she could not get back again by noon next day if she
traveled at the half-power speed which the vessels on Tuesday appear to
have used. But if she did the run at full speed--that is to say, at
about fifty miles an hour--she could reach London by 9 o'clock the same
evening, have an hour to manoeuvre over the capital, and return by 7
o'clock next morning. With a favorable wind for her return journey, she
might make an even longer stay. Given suitable conditions, therefore, as
on Tuesday, there appears to be no reason why, as far as speed and fuel
endurance are concerned, these vessels should not reach London from

With regard also to the amount of ammunition a Zeppelin can carry, this
depends, of course, on the lifting power of the airship and the way in
which it is distributed. The later Zeppelins are said to be able to
carry a load of about 15,000 pounds, which is available for the crew,
fuel for the engines, ballast, provisions, and spare stores, a wireless
installation, and armament or ammunition. With engines of 500 horse
power, something like 360 pounds of fuel is used per hour to drive them
at full speed. Thus for a journey of twenty hours the vessel would need
at least 7200 pounds of fuel. The necessary crew would absorb 2000
pounds more, and probably another 1500 pounds would be taken up for
ballast and stores. Allowing a weight of 250 pounds for the wireless
equipment, there would remain about 4000 pounds for bombs, or something
less than two tons of explosives, for use against a target 458 miles
from the base. This amount of ammunition could be increased
proportionately as the conditions were altered by using a nearer base,
or by proceeding at a slower and therefore more economical speed, &c.

It is noteworthy that although the German airships were expected to act
as scouts in the North Sea they do not appear to have accomplished
anything in this direction. Possibly this has been due to the fear of
attack by our men-of-war or aircraft if the movements were made in
daytime, when alone they would be useful for this purpose. What happened
during the Christmas Day affair, when, as the official report said, "a
novel combat" ensued between the most modern cruisers on the one hand
and the enemy's aircraft and submarines on the other, would not tend to
lessen this apprehension. On the other hand, the greater stability of
the atmosphere at night makes navigation after dark easier, and I
believe that it has been usual in all countries for airships to make
their trial trips at night.

[Illustration: Radius of Action of a Modern Zeppelin

The above outline map, which we reproduce from "The Naval Annual," shows
in the dotted circle the comparative radius of action of a modern
Zeppelin at half-power--about 36 knots speed--with other types of air
machines, assuming her to be based on Cologne. It is estimated that
aircraft of this type, with a displacement of about 22 tons, could run
for 60 hours at half-speed, and cover a distance equivalent to about
2160 sea miles. This would represent the double voyage, out and home,
from Cologne well to the north of the British Isles, to Petrograd, to
Athens, or to Lisbon. The inner circle shows the radius of action of a
Parseval airship at half-power--about 30 knots--based on Farnborough,
and the small inner circle represents the radius of action of a
hydro-aeroplane based on the Medway.]

It is customary also for the airships to carry, in addition to
explosive and incendiary bombs, others which on being dropped throw out
a light and thereby help to indicate to the vessel above the object
which it is desired to aim at. Probably some of the bombs which were
thrown in Norfolk were of this character. It is understood that all idea
of carrying an armament on top of the Zeppelins has now been abandoned,
and it is obvious that if searchlight equipment or guns of any sort were
carried the useful weight for bombs would have to be reduced unless the
range of action was diminished. It will have been noticed that the
Zeppelins which came on Tuesday appear to have been anxious to get back
before daylight, which looks as if they expected to be attacked if they
were seen, as it is fairly certain they would have been.

Assuming the raid of Tuesday to have been in the nature of a trial trip,
it is rather curious that it was not made before. Apparently the
Zeppelins can only trust themselves to make a raid of this description
in very favorable circumstances. Strong winds, heavy rain, or even a
damp atmosphere are all hindrances to be considered. That there will be
more raids is fairly certain, but there cannot be many nights when the
Germans can hope to have a repetition of the conditions of weather and
darkness which prevailed this week. It should be possible, more or less,
to ascertain the nights in every month in which, given other suitable
circumstances, raids are likely to be made. In view of the probability
that the attacks made by British aviators on the Zeppelin bases at
Düsseldorf and Friedrichshafen caused a delay in the German plans for
making this week's attack, it would appear that the most effective
antidote would be a repetition of such legitimate operations.


[From The New Yorker Herold (Morgenblatt.)]

It has repeatedly been pointed out that 2000 years ago Julius Caesar
fought on the battlegrounds of the Aisne, which are now the location of
the fierce fighting between the Germans and the French. It is probably
less known, however, that in this present war Caesar's "Commentarii de
Bello Gallico" are used by French officers as a practical text book on
strategy. The war correspondent of the Corriere della Serra reports this
some what astonishing fact.

A few weeks ago he visited his friend, a commanding Colonel of a French
regiment, in his trench, which was furnished with bare necessities only.
In a corner on a small table lay the open volume of "Commentarii
Caesaris," which the visitor took into his hand out of curiosity in
order to see what passage the Colonel had just been reading. There he
found the description of the fight against the Remer, who, at that time,
lived in the neighborhood of the present city of Rheims. Principally
with the aid of his Numidian troops, Caesar at that time had prevented
the Remer from crossing the River Axona, today called the Aisne.

Caesar's camp was only a few kilometers from Berry-au-Bac, in the
vicinity of Pontavert, the headquarters of the division to which the
regiment of the Colonel belonged. This Colonel had received the order to
cross the River Aisne with Moroccans and Spahis, and for this purpose he
had studied the description of Caesar. To the astonished question of the
reporter, what made him occupy his mind with the study of Caesar, the
Frenchman replied:

"Caesar's battle descriptions form a book from which even in this
present day war a great deal may be learned. Caesar is by no means as
obsolete as you seem to think. I ask you to consider, for instance, that
the trenches which have gained so much importance in this war date back
to Julius Caesar."

[Illustration: H.M. CHRISTIAN X

King of Denmark

_(Photo from Paul Thompson)_]


Queen Wilhelmina with Her Little Daughter Juliana, Princess of Orange]

Sir John French's Own Story

Continuing the Famous Dispatches of the British Commander in Chief to
Lord Kitchener

     The previous dispatches, reviewing the operations of the
     British regular and territorial troops on the Continent under
     Field Marshal French's chief command, appeared in THE NEW YORK
     TIMES CURRENT HISTORY of Jan. 23, 1915, bringing the account
     of operations to Nov. 20, 1914. The official dispatch to Earl
     Kitchener presented below records the bitter experiences of
     the Winter in the trenches from the last week of November
     until Feb. 2, 1915.

_The following dispatch was received on Feb. 12, 1915, from the Field
Marshal Commanding in Chief, the British Army in the Field._

_To the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W._

_General Headquarters,_

Feb. 2, 1915.

My Lord: I have the honor to forward a further report on the operations
of the army under my command.

1. In the period under review the salient feature was the presence of
his Majesty the King in the field. His Majesty arrived at Headquarters
on Nov. 30 and left on Dec. 5.

At a time when the strength and endurance of the troops had been tried
to the utmost throughout the long and arduous battle of
Ypres-Armentières the presence of his Majesty in their midst was of the
greatest possible help and encouragement.

His Majesty visited all parts of the extensive area of operations and
held numerous inspections of the troops behind the line of trenches.

On Nov. 16 Lieutenant his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, K.G.,
Grenadier Guards, joined my staff as aide de camp.

2. Since the date of my last report the operations of the army under my
command have been subject almost entirely to the limitations of weather.

History teaches us that the course of campaigns in Europe, which have
been actively prosecuted during the months of December and January, have
been largely influenced by weather conditions. It should, however, be
thoroughly understood throughout the country that the most recent
development of armaments and the latest methods of conducting warfare
have added greatly to the difficulties and drawbacks of a vigorous
Winter campaign.

To cause anything more than a waste of ammunition long-range artillery
fire requires constant and accurate observation; but this most necessary
condition is rendered impossible of attainment in the midst of continual
fog and mist.

Again, armies have now grown accustomed to rely largely on aircraft
reconnoissance for accurate information of the enemy, but the effective
performance of this service is materially influenced by wind and

The deadly accuracy, range, and quick-firing capabilities of the modern
rifle and machine gun require that a fire-swept zone be crossed in the
shortest possible space of time by attacking troops. But if men are
detained under the enemy's fire by the difficulty of emerging from a
water-logged trench, and by the necessity of passing over ground
knee-deep in holding mud and slush, such attacks become practically
prohibitive owing to the losses they entail.

During the exigencies of the heavy fighting which ended in the last week
of November the French and British forces had become somewhat mixed up,
entailing a certain amount of difficulty in matters of supply and in
securing unity of command.

By the end of November I was able to concentrate the army under my
command in one area, and, by holding a shorter line, to establish
effective reserves.

By the beginning of December there was a considerable falling off in
the volume of artillery fire directed against our front by the enemy.
Reconnoissance and reports showed that a certain amount of artillery had
been withdrawn. We judged that the cavalry in our front, with the
exception of one division of the Guard, had disappeared.

There did not, however, appear to have been any great diminution in the
numbers of infantry holding the trenches.

3. Although both artillery and rifle fire were exchanged with the enemy
every day, and sniping went on more or less continuously during the
hours of daylight, the operations which call for special record or
comment are comparatively few.

During the last week in November some successful minor night operations
were carried out in the Fourth Corps.

On the night of Nov. 23-24 a small party of the Second Lincolnshire
Regiment, under Lieut. E.H. Impey, cleared three of the enemy's advanced
trenches opposite the Twenty-fifth Brigade, and withdrew without loss.

On the night of the 24th-25th Capt. J.R. Minshull Ford, Royal Welsh
Fusiliers, and Lieut. E.L. Morris, Royal Engineers, with fifteen men of
the Royal Engineers and Royal Welsh Fusiliers, successfully mined and
blew up a group of farms immediately in front of the German trenches on
the Touquet-Bridoux Road which had been used by German snipers.

On the night of Nov. 26-27 a small party of the Second Scots Guards,
under Lieut. Sir E.H.W. Hulse, Bart., rushed the trenches opposite the
Twentieth Brigade, and after pouring a heavy fire into them returned
with useful information as to the strength of the Germans and the
position of machine guns.

The trenches opposite the Twenty-fifth Brigade were rushed the same
night by a patrol of the Second Rifle Brigade, under Lieut. E. Durham.

On Nov. 23 the One Hundred and Twelfth Regiment of the Fourteenth German
Army Corps succeeded in capturing some 800 yards of the trenches held by
the Indian Corps, but the general officer commanding the Meerut Division
organized a powerful counter-attack, which lasted throughout the night.
At daybreak on Nov. 24 the line was entirely re-established.

The operation was a costly one, involving many casualties, but the enemy
suffered far more heavily.

We captured over 100 prisoners, including 3 officers, as well as 3
machine guns and two trench mortars.

On Dec. 7 the concentration of the Indian Corps was completed by the
arrival of the Sirhind Brigade from Egypt.

On Dec. 9 the enemy attempted to commence a strong attack against the
Third Corps, particularly in front of the trenches held by the Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders and the Middlesex Regiment.

They were driven back with heavy loss, and did not renew the attempt.
Our casualties were very slight.

During the early days of December certain indications along the whole
front of the allied line induced the French commanders and myself to
believe that the enemy had withdrawn considerable forces from the
western theatre.

Arrangements were made with the commander of the Eighth French Army for
an attack to be commenced on the morning of Dec. 14.

Operations began at 7 A.M. by a combined heavy artillery bombardment by
the two French and the Second British Corps.

The British objectives were the Petit Bois and the Maedelsteed Spur,
lying respectively to the west and the southwest of the village of

At 7:45 A.M. the Royal Scots, with great dash, rushed forward and
attacked the former, while the Gordon Highlanders attacked the latter

The Royal Scots, commanded by Major F.J. Duncan, D.S.O., in face of a
terrible machine gun and rifle fire, carried the German trench on the
west edge of the Petit Bois, capturing two machine guns and fifty-three
prisoners, including one officer.

The Gordon Highlanders, with great gallantry, advanced up the
Maedelsteed Spur, forcing the enemy to evacuate their front trench. They
were, however, losing heavily, and found themselves unable to get any
further. At nightfall they were obliged to fall back to their original

Capt. C. Boddam-Whetham and Lieut. W.F.R. Dobie showed splendid dash,
and with a few men entered the enemy's leading trenches; but they were
all either killed or captured.

Lieut. G.R.V. Hume-Gare and Lieut. W.H. Paterson also distinguished
themselves by their gallant leading.

Although not successful, the operation was most creditable to the
fighting spirit of the Gordon Highlanders, most ably commanded by Major
A.W.F. Baird, D.S.O.

As the Thirty-second French Division on the left had been unable to make
any progress, the further advance of our infantry into the Wytschaete
Wood was not practicable.

Possession of the western edge of the Petit Bois was, however, retained.

The ground was devoid of cover and so water-logged that a rapid advance
was impossible, the men sinking deep in the mud at every step they took.

The artillery throughout the day was very skillfully handled by the
C.A.R.A.'s of the Fourth and Fifth Divisions--Major Gen. F.D.V. Wing,
C.B.; Brig. Gen. G.F. Milne, C.B., D.S.O., and Brig. Gen. J.E.W.
Headlam, C.B., D.S.O.

The casualties during the day were about 17 officers and 407 other
ranks. The losses of the enemy were very considerable, large numbers of
dead being found in the Petit Bois and also in the communicating
trenches in front of the Gordon Highlanders, in one of which a hundred
were counted by a night patrol.

On this day the artillery of the Fourth Division, Third Corps, was used
in support of the attack, under orders of the General Officer Commanding
Second Corps.

The remainder of the Third Corps made demonstrations against the enemy
with a view to preventing him from detaching troops to the area of
operations of the Second Corps.

From Dec. 15 to 17 the offensive operations which were commenced on the
14th were continued, but were confined chiefly to artillery bombardment.

The infantry advance against Wytschaete Wood was not practicable until
the French on our left could make some progress to afford protection to
that flank.

On the 17th it was agreed that the plan of attack as arranged should be
modified; but I was requested to continue demonstrations along my line
in order to assist and support certain French operations which were
being conducted elsewhere.

4. In his desire to act with energy up to his instructions to
demonstrate and occupy the enemy, the General Officer Commanding the
Indian Corps decided to take the advantage of what appeared to him a
favorable opportunity to launch attacks against the advanced trenches in
his front on Dec. 18 and 19.

The attack of the Meerut Division on the left was made on the morning of
the 19th with energy and determination, and was at first attended with
considerable success, the enemy's advanced trenches being captured.
Later on, however, a counter-attack drove them back to their original
position with considerable loss.

The attack of the Lahore Division commenced at 4:30 A.M. It was carried
out by two companies each of the First Highland Light Infantry and the
First Battalion, Fourth Gurkha Rifles of the Sirhind Brigade, under
Lieut. Col. R.W.H. Ronaldson. This attack was completely successful, two
lines of the enemy's trenches being captured with little loss.

Before daylight the captured trenches were filled with as many men as
they could hold. The front was very restricted, communication to the
rear impossible.

At daybreak it was found that the position was practically untenable.
Both flanks were in the air, and a supporting attack, which was late in
starting, and, therefore, conducted during daylight, failed, although
attempted with the greatest gallantry and resolution.

Lieut. Col. Ronaldson held on till dusk, when the whole of the captured
trenches had to be evacuated, and the detachment fell back to its
original line.

By the night of Dec. 19 nearly all the ground gained during the day had
been lost.

From daylight on Dec. 20 the enemy commenced a heavy fire from artillery
and trench mortars on the whole front of the Indian Corps. This was
followed by infantry attacks, which were in especial force against
Givenchy, and between that place and La Quinque Rue.

At about 10 A.M. the enemy succeeded in driving back the Sirhind Brigade
and capturing a considerable part of Givenchy, but the Fifty-seventh
Rifles and Ninth Bhopals, north of the canal, and the Connaught Rangers,
south of it, stood firm.

The Fifteenth Sikhs of the Divisional Reserve were already supporting
the Sirhind Brigade. On the news of the retirement of the latter being
received, the Forty-seventh Sikhs were also sent up to reinforce Gen.
Brunker. The First Manchester Regiment, Fourth Suffolk Regiment, and two
battalions of French territorials under Gen. Carnegy were ordered to
launch a vigorous counter-attack to retake by a flank attack the
trenches lost by the Sirhind Brigade.

Orders were sent to Gen. Carnegy to divert his attack on Givenchy
village, and to re-establish the situation there.

A battalion of the Fifty-eighth French Division was sent to Annequin in

About 5 P.M. a gallant attack by the First Manchester Regiment and one
company of the Fourth Suffolk Regiment had captured Givenchy, and had
cleared the enemy out of the two lines of trenches to the northeast. To
the east of the village the Ninth Bhopal Infantry and Fifty-seventh
Rifles had maintained their positions, but the enemy were still in
possession of our trenches to the north of the village.

Gen. Macbean, with the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade, Second Battalion,
Eighth Gurkha Rifles, and the Forty-seventh Sikhs, was sent up to
support Gen. Brunker, who, at 2 P.M., directed Gen. Macbean to move to a
position of readiness in the second line trenches from Maris northward,
and to counter-attack vigorously if opportunity offered.

Some considerable delay appears to have occurred, and it was not until
1 A.M. on the 21st that the Forty-seventh Sikhs and the Seventh Dragoon
Guards, under the command of Lieut. Col. H.A. Lempriere, D.S.O., of the
latter regiment, were launched in counter-attack.

They reached the enemy's trenches, but were driven out by enfilade fire,
their gallant commander being killed.

The main attack by the remainder of Gen. Macbean's force, with the
remnants of Lieut. Col. Lempriere's detachment, (which had again been
rallied,) was finally rushed in at about 4:30 A.M., and also failed.

In the northern section of the defensive line the retirement of the
Second Battalion, Second Gurkha Rifles, at about 10 A.M. on the 20th,
had left the flank of the First Seaforth Highlanders, on the extreme
right of the Meerut Division line, much exposed. This battalion was left
shortly afterward completely in the air by the retirement of the Sirhind

The Fifty-eighth Rifles, therefore, were ordered to support the left of
the Seaforth Highlanders, to fill the gap created by the retirement of
the Gurkhas.

During the whole of the afternoon strenuous efforts were made by the
Seaforth Highlanders to clear the trenches to their right and left. The
First Battalion, Ninth Gurkha Rifles, reinforced the Second Gurkhas near
the orchard where the Germans were in occupation of the trenches
abandoned by the latter regiment. The Garhwal Brigade was being very
heavily attacked, and their trenches and loopholes were much damaged;
but the brigade continued to hold its front and attack, connecting with
the Sixth Jats on the left of the Dehra Dun Brigade.

No advance in force was made by the enemy, but the troops were pinned to
their ground by heavy artillery fire, the Seaforth Highlanders
especially suffering heavily.

Shortly before nightfall the Second Royal Highlanders, on the right of
the Seaforth Highlanders, had succeeded in establishing touch with the
Sirhind Brigade; and the continuous line (though dented near the
orchard) existed throughout the Meerut Division.

Early in the afternoon of Dec. 20 orders were sent to the First Corps,
which was then in general army reserve, to send an infantry brigade to
support the Indian Corps.

The First Brigade was ordered to Bethune, and reached that place at
midnight on Dec. 20-21. Later in the day Sir Douglas Haig was ordered to
move the whole of the First Division in support of the Indian Corps.

The Third Brigade reached Bethune between 8 A.M. and 9 A.M. on the 21st,
and on the same date the Second Brigade arrived at Lacon at 1 P.M.

The First Brigade was directed on Givenchy, via Pont Fixe, and the Third
Brigade, through Gorre, on the trenches evacuated by the Sirhind
Brigade. The Second Brigade was directed to support, the Dehra Dun
Brigade being placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding
Meerut Division.

At 1 P.M. the General Officer Commanding First Division directed the
First Brigade in attack from the west of Givenchy in a northeasterly
direction, and the Third Brigade from Festubert in an east-northeasterly
direction, the object being to pass the position originally held by us
and to capture the German trenches 400 yards to the east of it.

By 5 P.M. the First Brigade had obtained a hold in Givenchy, and the
ground south as far as the canal; and the Third Brigade had progressed
to a point half a mile west of Festubert.

By nightfall the First South Wales Borderers and the Second Welsh
Regiment of the Third Brigade had made a lodgment in the original
trenches to the northeast of Festubert, the First Gloucestershire
Regiment continuing the line southward along the track east of

The First Brigade had established itself on the east side of Givenchy.

By 3 P.M. the Third Brigade was concentrated at Le Touret, and was
ordered to retake the trenches which had been lost by the Dehr Dun

By 10 P.M. the support trenches west of the orchard had been carried,
but the original fire trenches had been so completely destroyed that
they could not be occupied.

This operation was performed by the First Loyal North Lancashire
Regiment and the First Northamptonshire Regiment, supported by the
Second King's Royal Rifle Corps, in reserve.

Throughout this day the units of the Indian Corps rendered all the
assistance and support they could in view of their exhausted condition.

At 1 P.M. on the 22d Sir Douglas Haig took over command from Sir James
Willcocks. The situation in the front line was then approximately as

South of the La Bassée Canal the Connaught Rangers of the Ferozepore
Brigade had not been attacked. North of the canal a short length of our
original line was still held by the Ninth Bhopals and the Fifty-seventh
Rifles of the same brigade. Connecting with the latter was the First
Brigade, holding the village of Givenchy and its eastern and northern
approaches. On the left of the First Brigade was the Third Brigade.
Tenth had been lost between the left of the former and the right of the
latter. The Third Brigade held a line along, and in places advanced to,
the east of the Festubert Road. Its left was in communication with the
right of the Meerut Division line, where troops of the Second Brigade
had just relieved the First Seaforth Highlanders. To the north, units of
the Second Brigade held an indented line west of the orchard, connecting
with half of the Second Royal Highlanders, half of the Forty-first
Dogras, and the First Battalion Ninth Gurkha Rifles. From this point to
the north the Ninth Jats and the whole of the Garhwal Brigade occupied
the original line which they had held from the commencement of the

The relief of most units of the southern sector was effected on the
night of Dec. 22. The Meerut Division remained under the orders of the
First Corps, and was not completely withdrawn until Dec. 27.

In the evening the position at Givenchy was practically re-established,
and the Third Brigade had reoccupied the old line of trenches.

During the 23d the enemy's activities ceased, and the whole position was
restored to very much its original condition.

In my last dispatch I had occasion to mention the prompt and ready help
I received from the Lahore Division, under the command of Major Gen.
H.B.B. Watkis, C.B., which was thrown into action immediately on
arrival, when the British forces were very hard pressed during the
battle of Ypres-Armentières.

The Indian troops have fought with the utmost steadfastness and
gallantry whenever they have been called upon.

Weather conditions were abnormally bad, the snow and floods precluding
any active operations during the first three weeks of January.

5. At 7:30 A.M. on Jan. 25 the enemy began to shell Bethune, and at 8
A.M. a strong hostile infantry attack developed south of the canal,
preceded by a heavy bombardment of artillery, minenwerfers, and,
possibly, the explosion of mines, though the latter is doubtful.

The British line south of the canal formed a pronounced salient from the
canal on the left, thence running forward toward the railway triangle
and back to the main La Bassée-Bethune Road, where it joined the French.
This line was occupied by half a battalion of the Scots Guards, and half
a battalion of the Coldstream Guards, of the First Infantry Brigade. The
trenches in the salient were blown in almost at once, and the enemy's
attack penetrated this line. Our troops retired to a partially prepared
second line, running approximately due north and south from the canal to
the road, some 500 yards west of the railway triangle. This second line
had been strengthened by the construction of a keep half way between the
canal and the road. Here the other two half battalions of the
above-mentioned regiments were in support.

These supports held up the enemy, who, however, managed to establish
himself in the brick stacks and some communication trenches between the
keep, the road, and the canal--and even beyond the west of the keep on
either side of it.

The London Scottish had in the meantime been sent up in support, and a
counter-attack was organized with the First Royal Highlanders, part of
the First Cameron Highlanders, and the Second King's Royal Rifle Corps,
the latter regiment having been sent forward from the Divisional

The counter-attack was delayed in order to synchronize with a
counter-attack north of the canal which was arranged for 1 P.M.

At 1 P.M. these troops moved forward, their flanks making good progress
near the road and the canal, but their centre being held up. The Second
Royal Sussex Regiment was then sent forward, late in the afternoon, to
reinforce. The result was that the Germans were driven back far enough
to enable a somewhat broken line to be taken up, running from the
culvert on the railway, almost due south to the keep, and thence
southeast to the main road.

The French left near the road had also been attacked and driven back a
little, but not to so great an extent as the British right. Consequently
the French left was in advance of the British right, and exposed to a
possible flank attack from the north.

The Germans did not, however, persevere further in their attack.

The above-mentioned line was strengthened during the night, and the
First Guards Brigade, which had suffered severely, was withdrawn into
reserve and replaced by the Second Infantry Brigade.

While this was taking place another and equally severe attack was
delivered north of the canal against the village of Givenchy.

At 8:15 A.M., after a heavy artillery bombardment with high explosive
shells, the enemy's infantry advanced under the effective fire of our
artillery, which, however, was hampered by the constant interruption of
telephonic communication between the observers and batteries.
Nevertheless, our artillery fire, combined with that of the infantry in
the fire trenches, had the effect of driving the enemy from its original
direction of advance, with the result that his troops crowded together
on the northeast corner of the village and broke through into the centre
of the village as far as the keep, which had been previously put in a
state of defense.

[Illustration: The places underlined in the above map indicate the
points around La Bassée and southward to Arras, where part of the
British Expeditionary Force was heavily engaged.]

The Germans had lost heavily, and a well-timed local counter-attack,
delivered by the reserves of the Second Welsh Regiment and First South
Wales Borderers, and by a company of the First Royal Highlanders, (lent
by the First Brigade as a working party--this company was at work on the
keep at the time,) was completely successful, with the result that after
about an hour's street fighting all who had broken into the village were
either captured or killed, and the original line around the village was
re-established by noon.

South of the village, however, and close to the canal, the right of the
Second Royal Munster Fusiliers fell back in conformity with the troops
south of the canal, but after dark that regiment moved forward and
occupied the old line.

During the course of the attack on Givenchy the enemy made five assaults
on the salient at the northeast of the village about French Farm, but
was repulsed every time with heavy loss.

6. On the morning of Jan. 29 attacks were made on the right of the First
Corps, south of the canal in the neighborhood of La Bassée.

The enemy, (part of the Fourteenth German Corps,) after a severe
shelling, made a violent attack with scaling ladders on the keep, also
to the north and south of it. In the keep and on the north side the
Sussex Regiment held the enemy off, inflicting on him serious losses. On
the south side the hostile infantry succeeded in reaching the
Northamptonshire Regiment's trenches, but were immediately
counter-attacked and all killed. Our artillery co-operated well with the
infantry in repelling the attack.

In this action our casualties were inconsiderable, but the enemy lost
severely, more than 200 of his killed alone being left in front of our

7. On Feb. 1 a fine piece of work was carried out by the Fourth Brigade
in the neighborhood of Cuinchy.

Some of the Second Coldstream Guards were driven from their trenches at
2:30 A.M., but made a stand some twenty yards east of them in a position
which they held till morning.

A counter-attack, launched at 3:15 A.M., by one company of the Irish
Guards and half a company of the Second Coldstream Guards, proved
unsuccessful, owing to heavy rifle fire from the east and south.

At 10:05 A.M., acting under orders of the First Division, a heavy
bombardment was opened on the lost ground for ten minutes; and this was
followed immediately by an assault by about fifty men of the Second
Coldstream Guards with bayonets, led by Capt. A. Leigh Bennett, followed
by thirty men of the Irish Guards, led by Second Lieut. F.F. Graham,
also with bayonets. These were followed by a party of Royal Engineers
with sand bags and wire.

All the ground which had been lost was brilliantly retaken, the Second
Coldstream Guards also taking another German trench and capturing two
machine guns.

Thirty-two prisoners fell into our hands.

The General Officer Commanding First Division describes the preparation
by the artillery as "splendid, the high explosive shells dropping in the
exact spot with absolute precision."

In forwarding his report on this engagement, the General Officer
Commanding First Army writes as follows:

     Special credit is due--

     (i) To Major Gen. Haking, commanding First Division, for the
     prompt manner in which he arranged this counter-attack and for
     the general plan of action, which was crowned with success.

     (ii) To the General Officer commanding the Fourth Brigade
     (Lord Cavan) for the thorough manner in which he carried out
     the orders of the General Officer commanding the division.

     (iii) To the regimental officers, non-commissioned officers,
     and men of the Second Coldstream Guards and Irish Guards, who,
     with indomitable pluck, stormed two sets of barricades,
     captured three German trenches, two machine guns, and killed
     or made prisoners many of the enemy.

8. During the period under report the Royal Flying Corps has again
performed splendid service.

Although the weather was almost uniformly bad and the machines suffered
from constant exposure, there have been only thirteen days on which no
actual reconnoissance has been effected. Approximately, 100,000 miles
have been flown.

In addition to the daily and constant work of reconnoissance and
co-operation with the artillery, a number of aerial combats have been
fought, raids carried out, detrainments harassed, parks and petrol
depots bombed, &c.

Various successful bomb-dropping raids have been carried out, usually
against the enemy's aircraft material. The principle of attacking
hostile aircraft whenever and wherever seen (unless highly important
information is being delivered) has been adhered to, and has resulted in
the moral fact that enemy machines invariably beat immediate retreat
when chased.

Five German aeroplanes are known to have been brought to the ground, and
it would appear probable that others, though they have managed to reach
their own lines, have done so in a considerably damaged condition.

9. In my dispatch of Nov. 20, 1914, I referred to the reinforcements of
territorial troops which I had received, and I mentioned several units
which had already been employed in the fighting line.

In the positions which I held for some years before the outbreak of this
war I was brought into close contact with the territorial force, and I
found every reason to hope and believe that, when the hour of trial
arrived, they would justify every hope and trust which was placed in

The Lords Lieutenant of Counties and the associations which worked under
them bestowed a vast amount of labor and energy on the organization of
the territorial force; and I trust it may be some recompense to them to
know that I, and the principal commanders serving under me, consider
that the territorial force has far more than justified the most sanguine
hopes that any of us ventured to entertain of their value and use in
the field. Commanders of cavalry divisions are unstinted in their praise
of the manner in which the yeomanry regiments attached to their brigades
have done their duty, both in and out of action. The service of
divisional cavalry is now almost entirely performed by yeomanry, and
divisional commanders report that they are very efficient.

Army corps commanders are loud in their praise of the territorial
battalions, which form part of nearly all the brigades at the front in
the first line, and more than one of them have told me that these
battalions are fast approaching--if they have not already reached--the
standard of efficiency of regular infantry.

I wish to add a word about the Officers' Training Corps. The presence of
the Artists' Rifles (Twenty-eighth Battalion, the London regiment) with
the army in France enabled me also to test the value of this

Having had some experience in peace of the working of the Officers'
Training Corps, I determined to turn the Artists' Rifles (which formed
part of the Officers' Training Corps in peace time) to its legitimate
use. I therefore established the battalion as a training corps for
officers in the field.

The cadets passed through a course, which includes some thoroughly
practical training, as all cadets do a tour of forty-eight hours in the
trenches, and afterward write a report on what they see and notice. They
also visit an observation post of a battery or group of batteries, and
spend some hours there.

A commandant has been appointed, and he arranges and supervises the
work, sets schemes for practice, administers the school, delivers
lectures, and reports on the candidates.

The cadets are instructed in all branches of military training suitable
for platoon commanders.

Machine-gun tactics, a knowledge of which is so necessary for all junior
officers, is a special feature of the course of instruction.

When first started, the school was able to turn out officers at the
rate of seventy-five a month. This has since been increased to 100.

Reports received from divisional and army corps commanders on officers
who have been trained at the school are most satisfactory.

10. Since the date of my last report I have been able to make a close
personal inspection of all the units in the command. I was most
favorably impressed by all I saw.

The troops composing the army in France have been subjected to as severe
a trial as it is possible to impose upon any body of men. The desperate
fighting described in my last dispatch had hardly been brought to a
conclusion when they were called upon to face the rigors and hardships
of a Winter campaign. Frost and snow have alternated with periods of
continuous rain.

The men have been called upon to stand for many hours together almost up
to their waists in bitterly cold water, only separated by one or two
hundred yards from a most vigilant enemy.

Although every measure which science and medical knowledge could suggest
to mitigate these hardships was employed, the sufferings of the men have
been very great.

In spite of all this they presented, at the inspections to which I have
referred, a most soldierlike, splendid, though somewhat war-worn,
appearance. Their spirit remains high and confident; their general
health is excellent, and their condition most satisfactory.

I regard it as most unfortunate that circumstances have prevented any
account of many splendid instances of courage and endurance, in the face
of almost unparalleled hardship and fatigue in war, coming regularly to
the knowledge of the public.

Reinforcements have arrived from England with remarkable promptitude and
rapidity. They have been speedily drafted into the ranks, and most of
the units I inspected were nearly complete when I saw them. In
appearance and quality the drafts sent out have exceeded my most
sanguine expectations, and I consider the army in France is much
indebted to the Adjutant General's Department at the War Office for the
efficient manner in which its requirements have been met in this most
essential respect.

With regard to these inspections I may mention in particular the fine
appearance presented by the Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth Divisions,
composed principally of battalions which had come from India. Included
in the former division was the Princess Patricia's Royal Canadian
Regiment. They are a magnificent set of men, and have since done
excellent work in the trenches.

It was some three weeks after the events recorded in Paragraph 4 that I
made my inspection of the Indian Corps, under Sir James Willcocks. The
appearance they presented was most satisfactory and fully confirmed my
opinion that the Indian troops only required rest and a little
acclimatizing to bring out all their fine inherent fighting qualities.

I saw the whole of the Indian Cavalry Corps, under Lieut. Gen.
Rimington, on a mounted parade soon after their arrival. They are a
magnificent body of cavalry and will, I feel sure, give the best
possible account of themselves when called upon.

In the meantime, at their own particular request, they have taken their
turn in the trenches and performed most useful and valuable service.

11. The Right Rev. Bishop Taylor Smith, C.V.O., D.D., Chaplain General
to the Forces, arrived at my headquarters on Jan. 6, on a tour of
inspection throughout the command.

The Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster has also visited most of the
Irish regiments at the front and the principal centres on the line of

In a quiet and unostentatious manner the Chaplains of all denominations
have worked with devotion and energy in their respective spheres.

The number with the forces in the field at the commencement of the war
was comparatively small, but toward the end of last year the Rev. J.M.
Simms, D.D., K.H.C., principal Chaplain, assisted by his secretary, the
Rev. W. Drury, reorganized the branch and placed the spiritual welfare
of the soldier on a more satisfactory footing. It is hoped that the
further increase of personnel may be found possible.

I cannot speak too highly of the devoted manner in which all the
Chaplains, whether with the troops in the trenches or in attendance on
the sick and wounded in casualty clearing stations and hospitals on the
line of communications, have worked throughout the campaign.

Since the commencement of hostilities the work of the Royal Army Medical
Corps has been carried out with untiring zeal, skill, and devotion.
Whether at the front under conditions such as obtained during the
fighting on the Aisne, when casualties were heavy and accommodation for
their reception had to be improvised, or on the line of communications,
where an average of some 11,000 patients have been daily under
treatment, the organization of the medical service has always been equal
to the demands made upon it.

The careful system of sanitation introduced into the army has, with the
assistance of other measures, kept the troops free from any epidemic, in
support of which it is to be noticed that since the commencement of the
war some 500 cases only of enteric have occurred.

The organization for the first time in war of motor ambulance convoys is
due to the initiative and organizing powers of Surgeon General T.J.
O'Donnell, D.S.O., ably assisted by Major P. Evans, Royal Army Medical

Two of these convoys, composed entirely of Red Cross Society personnel,
have done excellent work under the superintendence of regular medical

Twelve hospital trains ply between the front and the various bases. I
have visited several of the trains when halted in stations, and have
found them conducted with great comfort and efficiency.

During the more recent phase of the campaign the creation of rest depots
at the front has materially reduced the wastage of men to the line of

Since the latter part of October, 1914, the whole of the medical
arrangements have been in the hands of Surgeon General Sir A.T.
Sloggett, C.M.G., K.H.S., under whom Surgeon General T.P. Woodhouse and
Surgeon General T.J. O'Donnell have been responsible for the
organization on the line of communications and at the front

12. The exceptional and peculiar conditions brought about by the weather
have caused large demands to be made upon the resources and skill of the
Royal Engineers.

Every kind of expedient has had to be thought out and adopted to keep
the lines of trenches and defense work effective.

The Royal Engineers have shown themselves as capable of overcoming the
ravages caused by violent rain and floods as they have been throughout
in neutralizing the effect of the enemy's artillery.

In this connection I wish particularly to mention the excellent services
performed by my Chief Engineer, Brig. Gen. G.H. Fowke, who has been
indefatigable in supervising all such work. His ingenuity and skill have
been most valuable in the local construction of the various expedients
which experience has shown to be necessary in prolonged trench warfare.

13. I have no reason to modify in any material degree my views of the
general military situation, as expressed in my dispatch of Nov. 20,

14. I have once more gratefully to acknowledge the valuable help and
support I have received throughout this period from Gen. Foch, Gen.
D'Urbal, and Gen. Maud'huy of the French Army. I have the honor to be,
your Lordship's most obedient servant,

J.D.P. FRENCH, Field Marshal, Commanding in Chief, the British Army in
the Field.

The Cathedral of Rheims


(From Les Blés Mouvants)

Done into English verse by Joyce Kilmer.

    He who walks through the meadows of Champagne
    At noon in Fall, when leaves like gold appear,
      Sees it draw near
    Like some great mountain set upon the plain,
    From radiant dawn until the close of day,
      Nearer it grows
      To him who goes
    Across the country. When tall towers lay
      Their shadowy pall
      Upon his way,
      He enters, where
    The solid stone is hollowed deep by all
    Its centuries of beauty and of prayer.

    Ancient French temple! thou whose hundred Kings
    Watch over thee, emblazoned on thy walls,
    Tell me, within thy memory-hallowed halls
    What chant of triumph, or what war-song rings?
    Thou hast known Clovis and his Frankish train,
    Whose mighty hand Saint Remy's hand did keep
    And in thy spacious vault perhaps may sleep
    An echo of the voice of Charlemagne.
    For God thou hast known fear, when from His side
    Men wandered, seeking alien shrines and new,
    But still the sky was bountiful and blue
    And thou wast crowned with France's love and pride.
    Sacred thou art, from pinnacle to base;
    And in thy panes of gold and scarlet glass
    The setting sun sees thousandfold his face;
    Sorrow and joy, in stately silence pass
    Across thy walls, the shadow and the light;
    Around thy lofty pillars, tapers white
    Illuminate, with delicate sharp flames,
    The brows of saints with venerable names,
    And in the night erect a fiery wall,
    A great but silent fervor burns in all
    Those simple folk who kneel, pathetic, dumb,
    And know that down below, beside the Rhine--
    Cannon, horses, soldiers, flags in line--
    With blare of trumpets, mighty armies come.

    Suddenly, each knows fear:
    Swift rumors pass, that every one must hear,
    The hostile banners blaze against the sky
    And by the embassies mobs rage and cry.
    Now war has come, and peace is at an end,
    On Paris town the German troops descend.
    They turned back, and driven to Champagne.
    And now, as to so many weary men,
    The glorious temple gives them welcome, when,
    It meets them at the bottom of the plain.

    At once, they set their cannon in its way.
      There is no gable now, nor wall
      That does not suffer, night and day,
    As shot and shell in crushing torrents fall,
    The stricken tocsin quivers through the tower;
    The triple nave, the apse, the lonely choir
      Are circled, hour by hour,
      With thundering bands of fire
    And Death is scattered broadcast among men.

      And then
    That which was splendid with baptismal grace;
    The stately arches soaring into space,
    The transepts, columns, windows gray and gold,
    The organ, in whose tones the ocean rolled,
    The crypts, of mighty shades the dwelling places,
    The Virgin's gentle hands, the Saints' pure faces,
    All, even the pardoning hands of Christ the Lord
    Were struck and broken by the wanton sword
      Of sacrilegious lust.

    O beauty slain, O glory in the dust!
    Strong walls of faith, most basely overthrown!
    The crawling flames, like adders glistening
    Ate the white fabric of this lovely thing.
    Now from its soul arose a piteous moan.
    The soul that always loved the just and fair.
    Granite and marble loud their woe confessed,
    The silver monstrances that Pope has blessed.
    The chalices and lamps and crosiers rare
    Were seared and twisted by a flaming-breath;
    The horror everywhere did rage and swell,
    The guardian Saints into this furnace fell,
    Their bitter tears and screams were stilled in death.

    Around the flames armed hosts are skirmishing,
    The burning sun reflects the lurid scene;
    The German Army fighting for its life,
    Rallies its torn and terrified left wing;
      And, as they near this place
      The imperial eagles see
      Before them in their flight,
    Here, in the solemn night,
    The old cathedrals, to the years to be
      Showing, with wounded arms, their own disgrace.

Music of War

By Rudyard Kipling

     The following speech was delivered by Mr. Kipling on Jan. 27,
     1915, at a meeting in London promoted by the Recruiting Bands
     Committee, and held with the object of raising bands in the
     London district as an aid to recruiting.

The most useful thing that a civilian can do in these busy days is to
speak as little as possible, and if he feels moved to write, to confine
his efforts to his check book. [Laughter.] But this is an exception to
that very sound rule. We do not know the present strength of the new
armies. Even if we did it would not be necessary to make it public. But
we may assume that there are several battalions in Great Britain which
were not in existence at the end of last July, and some of them are in
London. Nor is it any part of our national policy to explain how far
these battalions are prepared for the work which is ahead of them. They
were born quite rightly in silence. But that is no reason why they
should continue to walk in silence for the rest of their lives.
[Cheers.] Unfortunately up to the present most of them have been obliged
to walk in silence or to no better accompaniment than whistles and
concertinas and other meritorious but inadequate instruments of music
with which they have provided themselves. In the beginning this did not
matter so much. More urgent needs had to be met; but now that the new
armies are what they are, we who cannot assist them by joining their
ranks owe it to them to provide them with more worthy music for their
help, their gratification, and their honor. [Cheers.]

I am not a musician, so if I speak as a barbarian I must ask you and
several gentlemen on the platform here to forgive me. From the lowest
point of view a few drums and fifes in the battalion mean at least five
extra miles in a route march, quite apart from the fact that they can
swing a battalion back to quarters happy and composed in its mind, no
matter how wet or tired its body may be. Even when there is no route
marching, the mere come and go, the roll and flourishing of drums and
fifes around the barracks is as warming and cheering as the sight of a
fire in a room. A band, not necessarily a full band, but a band of a
dozen brasses and wood-winds, is immensely valuable in the district
where men are billeted. It revives memories, it quickens association, it
opens and unites the hearts of men more surely than any other appeal
can, and in this respect it aids recruiting perhaps more than any other
agency. I wonder whether I should say this--the tune that it employs and
the words that go with that tune are sometimes very remote from heroism
or devotion, but the magic and the compelling power is in them, and it
makes men's souls realize certain truths that their minds might doubt.

Further, no one, not even the Adjutant, can say for certain where the
soul of the battalion lives, but the expression of that soul is most
often found in the band. [Cheers.] It stands to reason that 1,200 men
whose lives are pledged to each other must have some common means of
expression, some common means of conveying their moods and their
thoughts to themselves and their world. The band feels the moods and
interprets the thoughts. A wise and sympathetic bandmaster--and the
masters that I have met have been that--can lift a battalion out of
depression, cheer it in sickness, and steady and recall it to itself in
times of almost unendurable stress. [Cheers.] You may remember a
beautiful poem by Sir Henry Newbolt, in which he describes how a
squadron of weary big dragoons were led to renewed effort by the strains
of a penny whistle and a child's drum taken from a toyshop in a wrecked
French town. I remember in India, in a cholera camp, where the men were
suffering very badly, the band of the Tenth Lincolns started a
regimental sing-song and went on with that queer, defiant tune, "The
Lincolnshire Poacher." It was their regimental march that the men had
heard a thousand times. There was nothing in it--nothing except all
England, all the East Coast, all the fun and daring and horse play of
young men bucketing about big pastures in the moonlight. But as it was
given, very softly at that bad time in that terrible camp of death, it
was the one thing in the world that could have restored, as it did
restore, shaken men back to their pride, humor, and self-control.
[Cheers.] This may be an extreme instance, but it is not an exceptional
one. Any man who has had anything to do with the service will tell you
that the battalion is better for music at every turn, happier, more
easily handled, with greater zest in its daily routine, if that routine
is sweetened with melody and rhythm--melody for the mind and rhythm for
the body.

Our new armies have been badly served in this essential. Of all the
admirable qualities which they have shown none is more wonderful than
the spirit which has carried them through the laborious and distasteful
groundwork of their calling without one note of music, except that which
the same indomitable spirit provided out of their own heads. We have all
seen them marching through the country, through the streets of London,
in absolute silence and the crowds through which they passed as silent
as themselves for the lack of the one medium that could convey and
glorify the thoughts that are in us all today.

We are a tongue-tied brood at the best. The bands can declare on our
behalf without shame and without shyness something of what we all feel
and help us to reach a hand toward the men who have risen up to save us.
In the beginning the more urgent requirements of the new armies overrode
all other considerations. Now we can get to work on some other
essentials. The War Office has authorized the formation of bands for
some of the London battalions, and we may hope presently to see the
permission extended throughout Great Britain. We must not, however,
cherish unbridled musical ambitions, because a full band means more than
forty pieces, and on that establishment we should even now require a
rather large number of men; but I think it might be possible to provide
drums and fifes for every battalion, full bands at the depots, and a
proportion of battalion bands on half, or even one-third,

But this is not a matter to be settled by laymen; it must be discussed
seriously between bandmasters and musicians--present, past, and dug up.
[Laughter.] They may be trusted to give their services with enthusiasm.
We have had many proofs in the last six months that people only want to
know what the new army needs, and it will be gladly and cheerfully
given. The army needs music, its own music, for, more than in any other
calling, soldiers do not live by bread alone. From time immemorial the
man who offers his life for his land has been compassed at every turn of
his service with elaborate ceremonial and observance, of which music is
no small part, all carefully designed to support and uphold him. It is
not seemly and it is not expedient that any portion of that ritual
should be slurred or omitted now. [Cheers.]


America and a New World State

How the United States May Take the Lead in the Formation of a World
Confederation for the Prevention of Future Wars

By Norman Angell

     The object of this article is to show that however much
     America may attempt to hold herself free in Europe she will
     very deeply feel the effects, both material and moral, of
     upheavals like that which is now shaking the old Continent;
     that even though there be no aggressive action against her,
     the militarization of Europe will force upon America also a
     militarist development; and that she can best avoid these
     dangers and secure her own safety and free development by
     taking the lead in a new world policy which is briefly this:

     To use her position to initiate and guide a grouping of all
     the civilized powers having as its object the protection of
     any one of its members that is the victim of aggression. The
     aid to be given for such an object should not be, in the case
     of the United States, military but economic, by means of the
     definite organization of non-intercourse against the
     recalcitrant power. America's position of geographical and
     historical remoteness from European quarrels places her in a
     particularly favorable position to direct this world
     organization, and the fact of undertaking it would give her in
     some sense the moral leadership of the western world, and make
     her the centre of the World State of the future.



In the discussion of America's relation to the rest of the world we
have always assumed almost as an axiom that America has nothing to do
with Europe, is only in the faintest degree concerned with its politics
and developments, that by happy circumstance of geography and history we
are isolated and self-sufficing, able to look with calm detachment upon
the antics of the distant Europeans. When a European landed on these
shores we were pretty certain that he left Europe behind him; only quite
recently, indeed, have we realized that we were affected by what he
brought with him in the way of morals and traditions, and only now are
we beginning dimly to realize that what goes on on the other side of the
world can be any affair of ours. The famous query of a certain American
statesmen, "What has America to do with abroad?" probably represented at
bottom the feelings of most of us.

In so far as we established commercial relations with Europe at all, we
felt and still feel probably that they were relations of hostility, that
we were one commercial unit, Europe another, and that the two were in
competition. In thinking thus, of course, we merely accepted the view of
international politics common in Europe itself, the view, namely, that
nations are necessarily trade rivals--the commercial rivalry of Britain
and Germany is presumed to be one of the factors explaining the outbreak
of the present war. The idea that nations do thus compete together for
the world's trade is one of the axioms of all discussion in the field of
international politics.

Well, both these assumptions in the form in which we make them involve
very grave fallacies, the realization of which will shortly become
essential to the wise direction of this country's policy. If our policy,
in other words, is to be shrewd and enlightened, we must realize just
how both the views of international relationship that I have indicated
are wrong.

I will take first the more special one--that of the assumed necessary
rivalry of nations in trade--as its clearer understanding will help in
what is for us the larger problem of the general relationship of this
country to other civilized powers. I will therefore try and establish
first this proposition--that nations are not and can not be trade rivals
in the sense usually accepted; that, in other words, there is a
fundamental misconception in the prevailing picture of nations as
trading units--one might as well talk of red-haired people being the
trade rivals of black-haired people.

And I will then try and establish a second proposition, namely, that we
are intimately concerned with the condition of Europe, and are daily
becoming more so, owing to processes which have become an integral part
of our fight against nature, of the feeding and clothing of the world;
that we cannot much longer ignore the effects of those tendencies which
bind us to our neighbors; that the elementary consideration of
self-protection will sooner or later compel us to accept the facts and
recognize our part and lot in the struggles of Christendom; and that if
we are wise, we shall not take our part therein reluctantly, dragged at
the heels of forces we cannot resist, but will do so consciously,
anticipating events. In other words, we shall take advantage of such
measure of detachment as we do possess, to take the lead in a saner
organization of western civilization; we shall become the pivot and
centre of a new world State.

There is not the faintest hope of America taking this lead unless a push
or impetus is given to her action by a widespread public feeling, based
on the recognition of the fallacy of the two assumptions with which I
began this article. For if America really is independent of the rest of
the world, little concerned with what goes on therein, if she is in a
position to build a sort of Chinese wall about herself, and, secure in
her own strength, to develop a civilization and future of her own, still
more if the weakness and disintegration of foreign nations, however
unfortunate for them, is for America an opportunity of expanding trade
and opportunities, why then, of course, it would be the height of folly
for the United States to incur all the risks and uncertainties of an
adventure into the sea of foreign politics.

What as a matter of simple fact is the real nature of trade between
nations? If we are to have any clear notion at all as to just what truth
there is in the notion of the necessary commercial rivalry of States, we
must have some fairly clear notion of how the commercial relationship of
nations works. And that can best be illustrated by a supposititious
example. At the present time we are talking, for instance, of
"capturing" German or British or French trade.

Now, when we talk thus of "German" trade in the international field,
what do we mean? Here is the ironmaster in Essen making locomotives for
a light railway in an Argentine province, (the capital for which has
been subscribed in Paris)--which has become necessary because of the
export of wool to Bradford, where the trade has developed owing to sales
in the United States, due to high prices produced by the destruction of
sheep runs, owing to the agricultural development of the West.

But for the money found in Paris, (due, perhaps, to good crops in wine
and olives, sold mainly in London and New York,) and the wool needed by
the Bradford manufacturer, (who has found a market for blankets among
miners in Montana, who are smelting copper for a cable to China, which
is needed because the encouragement given to education by the Chinese
Republic has caused Chinese newspapers to print cable news from
Europe)--but for such factors as these, and a whole chain of equally
interdependent ones throughout the world, the ironmaster in Essen would
not have been able to sell his locomotives.

How, therefore, can you describe it as part of the trade of "Germany"
which is in competition with the trade of "Britain" or "France" or
"America"? But for the British, French, and American trade, it could not
have existed at all. You may say that if the Essen ironmaster could have
been prevented from selling his locomotives the order would have gone to
an American one.

[Illustration: H.M. PETER I

King of Servia]

[Illustration: WALTER H. PAGE

American Ambassador to Great Britain

_(Photo from Paul Thompson)_]

But this community of German workmen, called into existence by the
Argentina trade, maintains by its consumption of coffee a plantation in
Brazil, which buys its machinery in Chicago. The destruction,
therefore, of the Essen trade, while it might have given business to the
American locomotive maker, would have taken it from, say, an American
agricultural implement maker. The economic interests involved sort
themselves, irrespective of the national groupings. I have summarized
the whole process as follows, and the need for getting some of these
simple things straight is my excuse for quoting myself:

     Co-operation between nations has become essential for the very
     life of their peoples. But that co-operation does not take
     place as between States at all. A trading corporation,
     "Britain" does not buy cotton from another corporation,
     "America." A manufacturer in Manchester strikes a bargain with
     a merchant in Louisiana in order to keep a bargain with a dyer
     in Germany, and three or a much larger number of parties enter
     into virtual, or, perhaps, actual, contract, and form a
     mutually dependent economic community, (numbering, it may be,
     with the work people in the group of industries involved, some
     millions of individuals)--an economic entity, so far as one
     can exist, which does not include all organized society.

     The special interests of such a community may become hostile
     to those of another community, but it will almost certainly
     not be a "national" one, but one of a like nature, say a
     shipping ring or groups of international bankers or Stock
     Exchange speculators. The frontiers of such communities do not
     coincide with the areas in which operate the functions of the

     How could a State, say Britain, act on behalf of an economic
     entity such as that just indicated? By pressure against
     America or Germany? But the community against which the
     British manufacturer in this case wants pressure exercised is
     not "America" or "Germany"--both Americans and Germans are his
     partners in the matter. He wants it exercised against the
     shipping ring or the speculators or the bankers who are in
     part British....

     This establishes two things, therefore: The fact that the
     political and economic units do not coincide, and the fact
     which follows as a consequence--that action by political
     authorities designed to control economic activities which take
     no account of the limits of political jurisdiction is
     necessarily irrelevant and ineffective.--(From "Arms and
     Industry: A Study of the Foundations of International Polity."
     Page 28. Putnams: New York.)

The fallacy of the idea that the groups we call nations must be in
conflict because they struggle together for bread and the means of
sustenance is demonstrated immediately when we recall the simple facts
of historical development. When, in the British Islands, the men of
Wessex were fighting with the men of Sussex, far more frequently and
bitterly than today the men of Germany fight with those of France, or
either with those of Russia, the separate States which formed the island
were struggling with one another for sustenance, just as the tribes
which inhabited the North American Continent at the time of our arrival
there were struggling with one another for the game and hunting grounds.
It was in both cases ultimately a "struggle for bread."

At that time, when Britain was composed of several separate States, that
struggled thus with one another for land and food, it supported with
great difficulty anything between one and two million inhabitants, just
as the vast spaces now occupied by the United States supported about a
hundred thousand, often subject to famine, frequently suffering great
shortage of food, able to secure just the barest existence of the
simplest kind.

Today, although Britain supports anything from twenty to forty times,
and North America something like a thousand times, as large a population
in much greater comfort, with no period of famine, with the whole
population living much more largely and deriving much more from the soil
than did the men of the Heptarchy, or the Red Indians, the "struggle for
bread" does not now take the form of struggle between groups of the
population. The more they fought, the less efficiently did they support
themselves; the less they fought one another, the more efficiently did
they all support themselves.

This simple illustration is at least proof of this, that the struggle
for material things did not involve any necessary struggle between the
separate groups or States; for those material things are given in
infinitely greater abundance when the States cease to struggle.
Whatever, therefore, was the origin of those conflicts, that origin was
not any inevitable conflict in the exploitation of the earth. If those
conflicts were concerned with material things at all, they arose from a
mistake about the best means of obtaining them, exploiting the earth,
and ceased when those concerned realized the mistake.

Just as Britain supported its population better when Englishmen gave up
fighting between themselves, so the world as a whole could support its
population better if it gave up fighting.

Moreover, we have passed out of the stage when we could massacre a
conquered population to make room for us. When we conquer an inferior
people like the Filipinos, we don't exterminate them, we give them an
added chance of life. The weakest don't go to the wall.

But at this point parenthetically I want to enter a warning. You may
say, if this notion of the rivalry of nations is false, how do you
account for the fact of its playing so large a part in the present war?

Well, that is easily explained--men are not guided necessarily by their
interest even in their soberest moments, but by what they believe to be
their interest. Men do not judge from the facts, but from what they
believe to be the facts. War is the "failure of human understanding."
The religious wars were due to the belief that two religions could not
exist side by side. It was not true, but the false belief provoked the
wars. Our notions as to the relation of political power to a nation's
prosperity are just as false, and this fallacy, like the older one,
plays its part in the causation of war.

Now, let us for a moment apply the very general rule thus revealed to
the particular case of the United States at this present juncture.

American merchants may in certain cases, if they are shrewd and able, do
a very considerably increased trade, though it is just as certain that
other merchants will be losing trade, and I think there is pretty
general agreement that as a matter of simple fact the losses of the war
so far have for America very considerably and very obviously
overbalanced the gains. The loss has been felt so tangibly by the United
States Government, for instance, that a special loan had to be voted in
order to stop some of the gaps. Whole States, whose interests are bound
up with staples like cotton, were for a considerable time threatened
with something resembling commercial paralysis.

While we may admit advances and gains in certain isolated directions,
the extra burden is felt in all directions of commerce and industry. And
that extra burden is visible through finance--the increased cost of
money, the scarcity of capital, the lower negotiability of securities,
the greater uncertainty concerning the future. It is by means of the
financial reaction that America, as a whole, has felt the adverse
effects of this war. There is not a considerable village, much less a
considerable city, not a merchant, not a captain of industry in the
United States that has not so felt it. It is plainly evident that by the
progressive dearness of money, the lower standard of living that will
result in Europe, the effect on immigration, and other processes which I
will touch upon at greater length later, any temporary stimulus which a
trade here and there may receive will be more than offset by the
difficulties due to financial as apart from industrial or commercial

This war will come near to depriving America for a decade or two of its
normal share of the accumulated capital of the older peoples, whether
that capital be used in paying war indemnities or in paying off the cost
of the war or in repairing its ravages. In all cases it will make
capital much dearer, and many enterprises which with more abundant
capital might have been born and might have stimulated American industry
will not be born. For the best part of a generation perhaps the
available capital of Europe will be used to repair the ravages of war
there, to pay off the debts created by war, and to start life normally
once more. We shall suffer in two ways.

In a recent report issued by the Agricultural Department at Washington
is a paragraph to the effect that one of the main factors which have
operated against the development of the American farm is the difficulty
that the farmer has found in securing abundant capital and the high
price that he has to pay for it when he can secure it. It will in the
future be of still higher price, and still less abundant, because, of
course, the capital of the world is a common reservoir--if it is dearer
in one part, it is dearer to some extent in all parts.

So that if for many years the American farmhouse is not so well built as
it might be, the farm not so well worked, rural life in America not so
attractive as it might be, the farmer's wife burdened with a little more
labor than she might otherwise have, and if she grows old earlier than
she might otherwise, it will be in part because we are paying our share
of the war indemnities and the war costs.

But this scarcity of capital operates in another way. One of the most
promising fields for American enterprise is, of course, in the
undeveloped lands to the south of us, but in the development of those
lands we have looked and must look for the co-operation of European
capital. Millions of French and British money have poured into South
America, building docks and railroads and opening up the country, and
that development of South America has been to our advantage because
quite frequently these enterprises were under the actual management of
Americans, using to the common advantage the savings of the thrifty
Frenchman and the capital of the wealthy Englishman.

For, of course, as between the older and the newer worlds there has gone
on this very beneficent division of labor: the Old World having
developed its soil, built its cities, made its roads, has more capital
available for outside employment than have the population of newer
countries that have so much of this work before them. And now this
possibility of fruitful co-operation is, for the time being, and it may
be for many years, suspended. I say nothing of the loss of markets in
the older countries which will be occasioned by sheer loss of population
and the lower standard of living. That is one of the more obvious but
not perhaps the most important of the ways in which the war affects us

Speaking purely in terms of commercial advantage--and these, I know, do
not tell the whole story (I am not for a moment pretending they
do)--the losses that we shall suffer through this war are probably very
much more considerable than those we should suffer by the loss of the
Philippines in the event, say, of their being seized by some hostile
power; and we suffer these losses, although not a single foreign soldier
lands upon our soil. It is literally and precisely true to say that
there is not one person from Hudson Bay to Cape Horn that will not be
affected in some degree by what is now going on in Europe. And it is at
least conceivable that our children and children's children will feel
its effects more deeply still.

Nor is America escaping the military any more than she has escaped the
commercial and financial effects of this war. She may never be drawn
into active military co-operation with other nations, but she is
affected none the less. Indeed the military effects of this war are
already revealing themselves in a demand for a naval programme immensely
larger than any American could have anticipated a year ago, by plans for
an enormously enlarged army. All this is the most natural result.

Just consider, for instance, the ultimate effect of a quite possible
outcome of the present conflict--Germany victorious and the Prussian
effort next directed at, say, the conquest of India. Imagine India
Prussianized by Germany, so that, with the marvelous efficiency in
military organization which she has shown, she is able to draw on an
Asiatic population of something approaching 400,000,000.

Whether the situation then created would really constitute a menace for
us or not, this much would be certain--that the more timid and timorous
among us would believe it to be a menace, and it would furnish an
irresistible plea for a very greatly enlarged naval and military
establishment. We too, in that case would probably be led to organize
our nation on the lines on which the European military nations have
organized theirs, with compulsory military service, and so forth.

Indeed, even if Germany is not victorious the future contains
possibilities of a like result; imagine, what is quite possible, that
Russia becomes the dominant factor in Europe after this war and places
herself at the head of a great Slav confederacy of 200,000,000, with her
power extending incidentally to the Pacific coast of Asia, and, it may
be the day after tomorrow, over 100,000,000 or 200,000,000 of Asiatics.
We should thus have a militarized power of 200,000,000 or 300,000,000 or
400,000,000 souls, autocratically governed, endowed with western
technical knowledge in the manipulation of the instruments of war,
occupying the Pacific coast line directly facing our Pacific coast line.
It is quite conceivable, therefore, that as the outcome of either of the
two possible results of this war we may find ourselves embarked upon a
great era of militarization.

Our impregnability does not protect us from militarism. It is quite true
that this country, like Russia, cannot be permanently invaded; it is
quite true that hostile navies need not necessarily be resisted by
navies of our own so far as the protection of our coasts is concerned.
But there is no such thing as absolute certainty in these matters. While
personally I believe that no country in the world will ever challenge
the United States, that the chances are a hundred to one against it, it
is on just that one chance that the militarist bases his plea for
armaments and secures them.

But, unfortunately, we are already committed to a good deal more than
just mere defense of American territory; problems arising out of the
Philippines and the Panama Canal and the Monroe Doctrine have already
committed us to a measure of intervention in the political affairs of
the outside world. In brief, if the other nations of the world have
great armies and navies--and tomorrow those other nations will include a
reorganized China as they already include a westernized Japan--if there
is all that weight of military material which might be used against us,
then in the absence of those other guarantees which I shall suggest, we
shall be drawn into piling up a corresponding weight of material as
against that of the outside world.

And, of course, just as we cannot escape the economic and the military
reaction of European development, neither can we escape the moral. If
European thought and morality did, by some fatality, really develop in
the direction of a Nietzschean idealization of military force, we might
well get in the coming years a practical submergence of that morality
which we believe to be distinctively American, and get throughout the
older hemisphere a type of society based upon authority, reproducing it
may be some features of past civilizations, Mongol, Asiatic, or
Byzantine. If that were to happen, if Europe were really to become a
mere glorified form of, say, certain Asiatic conceptions that we all
thought had had their day, why, then, of course America could not escape
a like transformation of outlook, ideals, and morals.

For there is no such thing as one nation standing out and maintaining
indefinitely a social spirit, an attitude toward life and society
absolutely distinct and different from that of the surrounding world.
The character of a society is determined by the character of its ideas,
and neither tariffs nor coastal defenses are really efficient in
preventing the invasion of ideas, good or bad. The difference between
the kind of society which exists in Illinois today and that which
existed there 500 years ago is not a difference of physical vigor or of
the raw materials of nature; the Indian was as good a man physically as
the modern Chicagoan, and possessed the same soil. What makes the
difference between the two is accumulated knowledge, the mind. And there
never was yet on this planet a change of ideas which did not sooner or
later affect the whole planet.

The "nations" that inhabited this continent a couple of thousand years
ago were apparently quite unconcerned with what went on in Europe or
Asia, say, in the domain of mathematical and astronomical knowledge. But
the ultimate effect of that knowledge on navigation and discovery was
destined to affect them--and us--profoundly. But the reaction of
European thought upon this continent, which originally required twenty,
or, for that matter, two hundred or two thousand years to show itself,
now shows itself, in the industrial and commercial field, for instance,
through our banking and Stock Exchanges, in as many hours, or, for that
matter, minutes.

It is difficult, of course, for us to realize the extent to which each
nation owes its civilization to others, how we have all lived by taking
in each other's washing. As Americans, for instance, we have to make a
definite effort properly to realize that our institutions, the sanctity
of our homes and all the other things upon which we pride ourselves, are
the result of anything but the unaided efforts of a generation or two of
Americans, perhaps owing a little to certain of the traditions that we
may have taken from Britain.

One has to stop and uproot impressions that are almost instinctive, to
remember that our forefathers reached these shores by virtue of
knowledge which they owed to the astronomical researches of Egyptians
and Chaldeans, who inspired the astronomers of Greece, who inspired
those of the Renaissance in Italy, Spain, and Germany, keeping alive and
developing not merely the art of measuring space and time, but also that
conception of order in external nature without which the growth of
organized knowledge, which we call science, enabling men to carry on
their exploitation of the world, would have been impossible; that our
very alphabet comes from Rome, who owed it to others; that the
mathematical foundation of our modern mechanical science--without which
neither Newton nor Watt nor Stevenson nor Ericson nor Faraday nor Edison
could have been--is the work of Arabs, strengthened by Greeks, protected
and enlarged by Italians; that our conceptions of political
organization, which have so largely shaped our political science, come
mainly from the Scandinavian colonists of a French province; that
British intellect, to which perhaps we owe the major part of our
political impulses, has been nurtured mainly by Greek philosophy; that
our Anglo-Saxon law is principally Roman, and our religion almost
entirely Asiatic in its origins; that for those things which we deem to
be the most important in our lives, our spiritual and religious
aspirations, we go to a Jewish book interpreted by a Church Roman in
origin, reformed mainly by the efforts of Swiss and German theologians.

And this interaction of the respective elements of the various nations,
the influence of foreigners, in other words, and of foreign ideas, is
going to be far more powerful in the future than it has been in the
past. Morally, as well as materially, we are a part of Europe. The
influence which one group exercises on another need not operate through
political means at all; indeed, the strongest influences are

American life and civilization may be transformed by European
developments, though the Governments of Europe may leave us severely
alone. Luther and Calvin had certainly a greater effect in England than
Louis XIV. or Napoleon. Gutenberg created in Europe a revolution more
powerful than all the military revolutions of the last ten centuries.
Greece and Palestine did not transform the world by their political
power. Yet these simple and outstanding truths are persistently ignored
by our political and historical philosophers and theorists. For the most
part our history is written with a more sublime disregard of the simple
facts of the world than is shown perhaps in any other department of
human thought and inquiry.

You may today read histories of Europe written by men of worldwide and
pre-eminent reputation, professing to tell the story of the development
of human society, in which whole volumes will be devoted to the effect
of a particular campaign or military alliance in influencing the
destinies of a people like the French or the German. But in those
histories you will find no word as to the effect of such trifles as the
invention of the steam engine, the coming of the railroad, the
introduction of the telegraph and cheap newspapers and literature on the
destiny of those people; volumes as to the influence which Britain may
have had upon the history of France or Germany by the campaigns of
Marlborough, but absolutely not one word as to the influence which
Britain had upon the destinies of those people by the work of Watt and

A great historian philosopher laying it down that the "influence" of
England was repelled or offset by this or that military alliance,
seriously stated that "England" was losing her influence on the
Continent at a time when her influence was transforming the whole lives
of Continental people to a greater degree than they had been transformed
since the days of the Romans.

I have gone into this at some length to show mainly two things--first,
that neither morally nor materially, neither in our trade nor in our
finance, nor in our industry, nor in all those intangible things that
give value to life can there be such a thing as isolation from the rest
of Christendom. If European civilization takes a "wrong turning"--and it
has done that more than once in the past--we can by no means escape the
effects of that catastrophe. We are deeply concerned, if only because we
may have to defend ourselves against it and in so doing necessarily
transform in some degree our society and ourselves.

And I wanted to show, secondly, that not only as a simple matter of fact
as things stand are we in a very real sense dependent upon Europe, that
we want European capital and European trade, and that if we are to do
the best for American prosperity we must increase that dependence, but
that if we are effectively to protect those things that go deeper even
than trade and prosperity, we must co-operate with Europe intellectually
and morally. It is not for us a question of choice. For good or evil, we
are part of the world affected by what the rest of the world becomes and
affected by what it does. And I want to show in my next article that
only by frankly facing the fact (which we cannot deny) that we are a
part of the civilized world and must play our part in it, shall we
achieve real security for our material and moral possessions and do the
best that we know for the general betterment of American life.



In my last article I attempted to show how deeply must America feel,
sooner or later, and for good or evil, the moral and material results
of the upheavals in Europe and the new tendencies that will be generated
by them. I attempted to show, too, how impossible it is for us to escape
our part of all the costs, how we shall pay our share of the
indemnities, and how our children and children's children may be
affected even more profoundly than we ourselves.

The shells may not hit us, yet there is hardly a farmhouse in our
country that will not, however unconsciously, be affected by these
far-off events. We may not witness the trains of weary refugees trailing
over the roads, but (if we could but see the picture) there will be an
endless procession of our own farmers' wives with a hardened and
shortened life and their children with less ample opportunities.

And our ideals of the future will in some measure be twisted by the
moral and material bankruptcy of Europe. Those who consider at all
carefully the facts hinted at in my last article--too complex to be more
than hinted at in the space available--will realize that the "isolation"
of America is an illusion of the map, and is becoming more so every day;
that she is an integral part of Occidental civilization whether she
wishes it or not, and that if civilization in Europe takes the wrong
turn we Americans would suffer less directly but not less vitally than
France or Britain or Germany.

All this, of course, is no argument for departing from our traditional
isolation. Our entrance into the welter might not change things or it
might change them for the worse or the disadvantages might be such as to
outweigh the advantages. The sensible question for America is this: "Can
we affect the general course of events in Europe--in the world, that
is--to our advantage by entering in; and will the advantage of so doing
be of such extent as to offset the risks and costs?"

Before answering that question I want to indicate by very definite
proposals or propositions a course of action and a basis for estimating
the effect. I will put the proposal with reference to America's future
attitude to Europe in the form of a definite proposition thus:

     That America shall use her influence to secure the abandonment
     by the powers of Christendom of rival group alliances and the
     creation instead of an alliance of all the civilized powers
     having as its aim some common action--not necessarily
     military--which will constitute a collective guarantee of each
     against aggression.

Thus when Germany, asked by the Allies at the prospective peace to
remove the menace of her militarism by reducing her armaments, replies,
"What of my protection against Russia?" Christendom should, with
America's help, be in a position to reply: "We will all protect you
against Russia, just as we would all protect Russia against you."

The considerations which support such a policy on America's part are
mainly these: First, that if America does not lend the assistance of her
detachment from European quarrels to such an arrangement, Europe of
herself may not prove capable of it. Second, that if Europe does not
come to some such arrangement the resulting unrest, militarism, moral
and material degeneration, for the reasons above indicated and for
others to be indicated presently, will most unfavorably affect the
development of America, and expose her to dangers internal and external
much greater than those which she would incur by intervention. Third,
that if America's influence is in the manner indicated made the deciding
factor in the establishment of a new form of world society, she would
virtually take the leadership of Western civilization, and her capital
become the centre of the political organization of the new world State.
While "world domination" by military means has always proved a dangerous
diet for all nations that have eaten of it heretofore, the American form
of that ambition would have this great difference from earlier
forms--that it would be welcomed instead of being resisted by the
dominated. America would have given a new meaning to the term and found
a means of satisfying national pride, certainly more beneficial than
that which comes of military glory.

I envisage the whole problem, however, first and last in this
discussion on the basis of America's interest; and the test which I
would apply to the alternatives now presenting themselves is simply
this: What on balance is most advantageous, in the broadest and largest
sense of the term, in its moral as well as its material sense, to
American interest?

Now I know full well that there is much to be said against the step
which I think America should initiate. I suppose the weight of the
reasons against it would be in some such order as the following: First,
that it is a violation of the ancient tradition of American statecraft
and of the rule laid down by Washington concerning the avoidance of
entangling alliances. Second, that it may have the effect which he
feared of dragging this country into war on matters in which it had no
concern. Third, that it will militarize the country, and so, Fourth,
lead to the neglect of those domestic problems upon which the progress
of our nation depends.

I will take the minor points first and will deal with the major
consideration presently.

First, I would remind the reader of what I pointed out in the last
article, that there is no such thing as being unaffected by the military
policies of Europe, and there never has been. At this present moment a
campaign for greatly increased armaments is being waged on the strength
of what is taking place in the Old World, and our armaments are directly
and categorically dictated by what foreign nations do in the matter. So
that it is not a question in practice of being independent of the
policies of other nations; we are not independent of their policies.

We may refuse to co-operate with them, to have anything to do with them.
Even then our military policy will be guided by theirs, and it is at
least conceivable that in certain circumstances we should become
thoroughly militarized by the need for preparing against what our people
would regard as the menace of European military ambitions. This
tendency, if it became sufficiently acute, would cause neglect of
domestic problems hardly less mischievous than that occasioned by war.

In my last article I touched upon a quite possible turn of the alliance
groupings in Europe--the growing influence of Russia, the extension of
that influence to the Asiatic populations on her borders, (Japan and
Russia are already in alliance,) so that within the quite measurable
future we may be confronted by a military community drawing on a
population of 500,000,000 souls, autocratically governed and endowed
with all the machinery of destruction which modern science has given to
the world. A Russo-Chino-Japanese alliance might on behalf of the
interest or dignity of one of the members of such a group challenge this
country in some form or another, and a Western Europe with whom we had
refused to co-operate for a common protection might as a consequence
remain an indifferent spectator of the conflict.

Such a situation would certainly not relieve us from the burdens of
militarism merely because we declined to enter into any arrangement with
the European powers. As a matter of fact, of course, this present war
destroyed the nationalist basis of militarism itself. The militarist may
continue to talk about international agreement between nations being
impossible as a means of insuring a nation's safety, and a nation having
no security but the strength of its own arms, but when it actually comes
to the point even he is obliged to trust to agreement with other nations
and to admit that even in war a nation can no longer depend merely upon
the strength of its arms; it has to depend upon co-operation, which
means an agreement of some kind with other nations as well.

Just as the nations have by forces stronger than their own volition been
brought into industrial and commercial co-operation, so, strangely
enough, have they been brought by those same forces into military
co-operation. While the warrior and militarist have been talking the old
jargon of nationalism and holding international co-operation up to
derision as a dream, they have themselves been brought to depend upon
foreigners. War itself has become internationalist.

There is something of sardonic humor in the fact that it is the greatest
war of history which is illustrating the fact that even the most
powerful of the European nations must co-operate with foreigners for its
security. For no one of the nine or ten combatants of the present war
could have maintained its position or defended itself alone. There is
not one nation involved that would not believe itself in danger of
destruction but for the help of foreigners; there is not one whose
national safety does not depend upon some compact or arrangement with
foreign nations. France would have been helpless but for the help of
Britain and of Russia. Russia herself could not have imposed her will
upon Germany if Germany could have thrown all her forces on the eastern
frontier. Austria could certainly not have withstood the Russian flood
single handed. Quite obviously the lesser nations, Serbia, Belgium, and
the rest, would be helpless victims but for the support of their

And it should be noted that this international co-operation is not by
any means always with similar and racially allied nations. Republican
France finds itself, and has been for a generation, the ally of
autocratic Russia. Australia, that much more than any other country has
been obsessed by the yellow peril and the danger from Japan, finds
herself today fighting side by side with the Japanese. And as to the
ineradicable hostility of races preventing international co-operation,
there are fighting together on the soil of France as I write, Flemish,
Walloons, and negroes from Senegal, Turcos from Northern Africa, Gurkhas
from India, co-operating with the advance on the other frontier of
Cossacks, and Russians of all descriptions. This military and political
co-operation has brought together Mohammedan and Christian; Catholic,
Protestant, and Orthodox; negro, white and yellow; African, Indian, and
European; monarchist, republican, Socialist, reactionary--there seems
hardly a racial, religious, or political difference that has stood in
the way of rapid and effective co-operation in the common need.

Thus the soldier himself, while defending the old nationalist and
exclusive conceptions, is helping to shrink the spaces of the world and
break down old isolations and show how interests at the uttermost ends
of the earth react one upon the other.

But even apart from this influence, as already noted, America cannot
escape the military any more than she has escaped the commercial and
financial effects of this war. She may never be drawn into active
military co-operation with other nations, but she is affected none the
less--by a demand for a naval programme immensely larger than any
American could have anticipated a year since, by plans for an enormously
enlarged army.

That, it will be argued, is the one thing needed--to be stronger than
our prospective enemy. And, of course, any enemy--whether he be one
nation or a group--who really does contemplate aggression, would on his
side take care to be stronger than us. War and peace are matters of two
parties, and any principle which you may lay down for one is applicable
to the other. When we say "Si vis pacem, para bellum" we must apply it
to all parties. One eminent upholder of this principle has told us that
the only way to be sure of peace is to be so much stronger than your
enemy that he will not dare to attack you. Apply that to the two parties
and you get this result--here are two nations or two groups of nations
likely to quarrel. How shall they keep the peace? And we say quite
seriously that they will keep the peace if each is stronger than the

This principle, therefore, which looks at first blush like an axiom, is,
as a matter of fact, an attempt to achieve a physical impossibility and
always ends, as it has ended in Europe on this occasion, in explosion.
You cannot indefinitely pile up explosive material without an accident
of some sort occurring; it is bound to occur. But you will note this:
that the militarist--while avowing by his conduct that nations can no
longer in a military sense be independent, that they are obliged to
co-operate with others and consequently depend upon some sort of an
arrangement, agreement, compact, alliance with others--has adopted a
form of compact which merely perpetuates the old impossible situation on
a larger scale! He has devised the "balance of power."

For several generations Britain, which has occupied with reference to
the Continent of Europe somewhat the position which we are now coming to
occupy with regard to Europe as a whole, has acted on this
principle--that so long as the powers of the Continent were fairly
equally divided she felt she could with a fair chance of safety face
either one or the other. But if one group became so much stronger than
the other that it was in danger of dominating the whole Continent, then
Britain might find herself faced by an overwhelming power with which she
would be unable to deal. To prevent this she joined the weaker group.
Thus Britain intervened in Continental politics against Napoleon as she
has intervened today against the Kaiser.

But this policy is merely a perpetuation on a larger scale of the
principle of "each being stronger than the other." Military power, in
any case, is a thing very difficult to estimate; an apparently weaker
group or nation has often proved, in fact, to be the stronger, so that
there is a desire on the part of both sides to give the benefit of the
doubt to themselves. Thus the natural and latent effort to be strongest
is obviously fatal to any "balance." Neither side, in fact, desires a
balance; each desires to have the balance tilted in its favor. This sets
up a perpetual tendency toward rearrangement, and regroupings and
reshufflings in these international alliances sometimes take place with
extraordinary and startling rapidity, as in the case of the Balkan

It is already illustrated in the present war; Italy has broken away from
a definite and formal alliance which every one supposed would range her
on the German side. There is at least a possibility that she may finally
come down upon the Anglo-Franco-Russian side. You have Japan, which
little more than a decade ago was fighting bitterly against Russia,
today ranged upon the side of Russia.

The position of Russia is still more startling. In the struggles of the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Britain was almost always on
the side of Russia; then for two generations she was taught that any
increase of the power of Russia was a particularly dangerous menace.
That once more was a decade ago suddenly changed, and Britain is now
fighting to increase both relatively and absolutely the power of a
country which her last war on the Continent was fought to check. The war
before that which Great Britain fought upon the Continent was fought in
alliance with Germans against the power of France. As to the Austrians,
whom Britain is now fighting, they were for many years her faithful
allies. So it is very nearly true to say of nearly all the combatants
respectively that they have no enemy today that was not, historically
speaking, quite recently an ally, and not an ally today that was not in
the recent past an enemy.

These combinations, therefore, are not, never have been, and never can
be permanent. If history, even quite recent history, has any meaning at
all, the next ten or fifteen or twenty years will be bound to see among
these tan combatants now in the field rearrangements and permutations
out of which the crushed and suppressed Germany that is to follow the
war--a Germany which will embrace, nevertheless, a hundred million of
the same race, highly efficient, highly educated, trained for
co-ordination and common action--will be bound sooner or later to find
her chance.

If America should by any catastrophe join Britain or any other nation
for the purpose of maintaining a "balance of power" in the world, then
indeed would her last state be worse than her first. The essential vice
of the balance of power is that it is based upon a fundamentally false
assumption as to the real relationship of nations and as to the function
and nature of force in human affairs. The limits of the present article
preclude any analysis of most of the monstrous fallacies, but a hint
can be given of one or two.

First, of course, if you could get such a thing as a real "balance of
power"--two parties confronting one another with about equal forces--you
would probably get a situation most favorable to war. Neither being
manifestly inferior to the other, neither would be disposed to yield;
each being manifestly as good as the other, would feel in "honor" bound
to make no concession. If a power quite obviously superior to its rival
makes concessions the world may give it credit for magnanimity in
yielding, but otherwise it would always be in the position of being
compelled to vindicate its courage. Our notions of honor and valor being
what they are, no situation could be created more likely to bring about
deadlocks and precipitate fights. All the elements are there for
bringing about that position in which the only course left is "to fight
it out."

The assumption underlying the whole theory of the balance of power is
that predominant military power in a nation will necessarily--or at
least probably--be exercised against its weaker neighbors to their
disadvantage. Thus Britain has acted on the assumption that if one power
dominated the Continent, British independence, more truly perhaps
British predominance in the world would be threatened.

Now, how has a society of individuals--the community within the
frontiers of a nation--met this difficulty which now confronts the
society of nations, the difficulty that is of the danger of the power of
an individual or a group? They have met it by determining that no
individual or group shall exercise physical power or predominance over
others; that the community alone shall be predominant. How has that
predominance been secured? By determining that any one member attacked
shall be opposed by the whole weight of the community, (exercised, say,
through the policeman.) If A flies at B's throat in the street with the
evident intention of throttling him to death, the community, if it is
efficient, immediately comes to the support of B.

And you will note this: that it does not allow force to be used for the
settlement of differences by anybody. The community does not use force
as such at all; it merely cancels the force of units and determines that
nobody shall use it. It eliminates force. And it thus cancels the power
of the units to use it against other units (other than as a part of the
community) by standing ready at all times to reduce the power of any one
unit to futility. If A says that B began it, the community does not say,
"Oh, in that case you may continue to use your force; finish him off."
It says, on the contrary, "Then we'll see that B does not use his force;
we'll restrain him, we won't have either of you using force. We'll
cancel it and suppress it wherever it rears its head." For there is this
paradox at the basis of all civilized intercourse: force between men has
but one use--to see that force settles no difference between them.

And this has taken place because men--individually--have decided that
the advantage of the security of each from aggression outweighs the
advantage which each has in the possible exercise of aggression. When
nations have come to the same decision--and not a moment before--they
will protect themselves from aggression in precisely the same way--by
agreeing between them that they will cancel by their collective power
the force of any one member exercised against another.

I emphasize the fact that you must get this recognition of common
interest in a given action before you can get the common action. We have
managed it in the relations between individuals because, the numbers
being so much greater than in the case of nations, individual dissent
goes for less. The policeman, the judge, the jailer have behind them a
larger number relatively to individual exceptions than is the case with
nations. For the existence of such an arrangement by no means implies
that men shall be perfect, that each shall willingly obey all the laws
which he enforces. It merely implies that his interest in the law as a
whole is greater than his interest in its general violation.

No man for a single day of his life observes all the Ten Commandments,
yet you can always secure a majority for the support of the Ten
Commandments, for the simple reason that while there are a great many
who would like to rob, all are in favor of being protected against the
robber. While there are a great many who would like on occasion to kill,
all are in favor of being protected against being killed. The
prohibition of this act secures universal support embracing "all of the
people all of the time"; the positive impulse to it is isolated and
occasional--with some individuals perhaps all the time, but with all
individuals only some of the time, if ever.

When you come to the nations, there is less disproportion between the
strength of the unit and the society. Hence nations have been slower
than individuals in realizing their common interest. Each has placed
greater reliance on its own strength for its protection. Yet the
principle remains the same. There may be nations which desire for their
own interest to go to war, but they all want to protect themselves
against being beaten. You have there an absolutely common interest. The
other interest, the desire to beat, is not so universal; in fact, if any
value can be given whatever to the statement of the respective
statesmen, such an interest is non-existent.

There is not a single statesman in Christendom today who would admit for
a moment that it is his desire to wage war on a neighboring nation for
the purpose of conquering it. All this warfare is, each party to it
declares, merely a means of protecting itself against the aggression of
neighbors. Whatever insincerity there may be in these declarations we
can at least admit this much, that the desire to be safe is more
widespread than the desire to conquer, for the desire to be safe is

We ought to be able, therefore, to achieve, on the part of the majority,
action to that end. And on this same principle there can be no doubt
that the nations as a whole would give their support to any plan which
would help to secure them from being attacked. It is time for the
society of nations to take this first step toward the creation of a
real community; to agree, that is, that the influence of the whole shall
be thrown against the one recalcitrant member.

The immensely increased contact between nations which has set up a
greater independence (in the way hinted at in my last article) has given
weight to the interest in security and taken from the interest in
aggression. The tendency to aggression is often a blind impulse due to
the momentum of old ideas which have not yet had time to be discredited
and disintegrated by criticism. And of organization for the really
common interest--that of security against aggression--there has, in
fact, been none. If there is one thing certain it is that in Europe last
July the people did not want war; they tolerated it, passively dragged
by the momentum of old forces which they could not even formulate. The
really general desire has never been organized; any means of giving
effect to a common will--such as is given it in society within the
frontiers--has never so far been devised.

I believe that it is the mission of America in her own interest to
devise it; that the circumstances of her isolation, historical and
geographical, enable her to do for the older peoples--and herself--a
service which by reason of their circumstances, geographical and
historical, they cannot do for themselves.

The power that she exercises to this end need not be military. I do not
think that it should be military. This war has shown that the issues of
military conflict are so uncertain, depending upon all sorts of physical
accidents, that no man can possibly say which side will win. The present
war is showing daily that the advantage does not always go with numbers,
and the outcome of war is always to some extent a hazard and a gamble,
but there are certain forces that can be set in operation by nations
situated as the United States, that are not in any way a gamble and a
hazard, the effect of which will be quite certain.

I refer to the pressure of such a thing as organized non-intercourse,
the sending of a country to moral, social, economic Coventry. We are, I
know, here treading somewhat unknown ground, but we have ample evidence
to show that there do exist forces capable of organization, stronger,
and more certain in their operation than military forces. That the world
is instinctively feeling this is demonstrated by the present attitude of
all the combatants in Europe to the United States. The United States
relatively to powers like Russia, Britain, and Germany is not a great
military power, yet they are all pathetically anxious to secure the
good-will of the United States.


It can hardly be to save the shock to their moral feelings which would
come from the mere disapproval of people on the other side of the world.
If any percentage of what we have read of German methods is true, if
German ethics bear the faintest resemblance to what they are so often
represented to be, Germany must have no feeling in the political sphere
to be hurt by the moral disapproval of the people of the United States.
If German statesmen are so desperately anxious as they evidently are to
secure the approval and good-will of the United States it is because
they realize, however indistinctly, that there lie in the hands of the
United States powers which could be loosed, more portentous than those
held by the masters of many legions.

Just what these powers are and how they might be used to give America
greater security than she could achieve by arms, to place her at the
virtual head of a great world State, and to do for mankind as a whole a
service greater than any yet recorded in written history, must be left
to the third and concluding article of this series.



In the preceding article I indicated that America might undertake at
this juncture of international affairs an intervention in the politics
of the Old World which is of a kind not heretofore attempted by any
nation, an intervention, that is to say, that should not be military,
but in the first instance mediatory and moral, having in view if needs
be the employment of certain organized social and economic forces which
I will detail presently.

The suggestion that America should take any such lead is resisted first
on the ground that it is a violation of her traditional policy, and
secondly that "economic and social forces" are bound to be ineffective
unless backed by military, so that the plea would involve her in a
militarist policy. With reference to these two points, I pointed out in
the preceding article that America's isolation from a movement for world
agreement would infallibly land her in a very pronounced militarist
policy, the increase of her armaments, the militarization of her
civilization and all that that implies.

There are open to America at this present moment two courses: one which
will lead her to militarism and the indefinite increase of
armaments--that is the course of isolation from the world's life, from
the new efforts that will be made toward world organization; the other
to anticipate events and take the initiative in the leadership of world
organization, which would have the effect of rendering western
civilization, including herself, less military, less dependent upon
arms, and put the development of that civilization on a civilist rather
than a militarist basis.

I believe that it is the failure to realize that this intervention can
be non-military in character which explains the reluctance of very many
Americans to depart from their traditional policy of non-intervention.
With reference to that point it is surely germane to remember that the
America of 1914 is not the America of 1776; circumstances which made
Washington's advice sound and statesmanlike have been transformed. The
situation today is not that of a tiny power not yet solidified, remote
from the main currents of the world's life, out-matched in resources by
any one of the greater powers of Europe. America is no longer so remote
as to have little practical concern with Europe. Its contacts with
Europe are instantaneous, daily, intimate, innumerable--so much so
indeed that our own civilization will be intimately affected and
modified by certain changes which threaten in the older world.

I will put the case thus: Suppose that there are certain developments in
Europe which would profoundly threaten our own civilization and our own
security, and suppose further that we could without great cost to
ourselves so guide or direct those changes and developments as to render
them no longer a menace to this country. If such a case could be
established, would not adherence to a formula established under
eighteenth century conditions have the same relation to sound politics
that the incantations and taboos of superstitious barbarians have to
sound religion? And I think such a case can be established.

I wonder whether it has occurred to many Americans to ask why all the
belligerents in this present war are showing such remarkable deference
to American public opinion. Some Americans may, of course, believe that
it is the sheer personal fascination of individual Americans or simple
tenderness of moral feeling that makes Great Britain, France, Russia,
Germany, and Austria take definitely so much trouble at a time when they
have sufficient already, to demonstrate that they have taken the right
course, that they are obeying all the laws of war, that they are not
responsible for the war in any way, and so forth. Is it simply that our
condemnation would hurt their feelings? This hardly agrees with certain
other ideas which we hold as to the belligerents.

There is something beyond this order of motive at the bottom of the
immense respect which all the combatants alike are paying to American
opinion. It happened to the writer recently to meet a considerable
number of Belgian refugees from Brussels, all of them full of stories
(which I must admit were second or third or three-hundredth hand) of
German barbarity and ferocity. Yet all were obliged to admit that German
behavior in Brussels had on the whole been very good. But that, they
explained, was "merely because the American Consul put his foot down."
Yet one is not aware that President Wilson had authorized the American
Consul so much as to hint at the possible military intervention of
America in this war. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that these
"Huns," so little susceptible in our view for the most part to moral
considerations, were greatly influenced by the opinion of America; and
we know also that the other belligerents have shown the same respect for
the attitude of the United States.

I think we have here what so frequently happens in the development of
the attitude of men toward large general questions: the intuitive
recognition of a truth which those who recognize it are quite unable to
put into words. It is a self-protective instinct, a movement that is
made without its being necessary to think it out. (In the way that the
untaught person is able instantly to detect the false note in a tune
without knowing that such things as notes or crotchets and quavers

It is quite true that the Germans feared the bad opinion of the world
because the bad opinion of the world may be translated into an element
of resistance to the very ends which it is the object of the war to
achieve for Germany.

Those ends include the extension of German influence, material and
moral, of German commerce and culture. But a world very hostile to
Germany might quite conceivably check both. We say, rightly enough,
probably, that pride of place and power had its part--many declare the
prominent part--in the motives that led Germany into this war. But it is
quite conceivable that a universal revulsion of feeling against a power
like Germany might neutralize the influence she would gain in the world
by a mere extension of her territorial conquests.

Russia, for instance, has nearly five times the population and very many
times the area of France; but one may doubt whether even a Russian would
assert that Russian influence is five or ten times greater than that of
France; still less that the world yielded him in any sense a
proportionately greater deference than it yields the Frenchman. The
extent to which the greatest power can impose itself by bayonets is very
limited in area and depth. All the might of the Prussian Army cannot
compel the children of Poland or of Lorraine to say their prayers in
German; it cannot compel the housewives of Switzerland or Paraguay or of
any other little State that has not a battleship to its name to buy
German saucepans if so be they do not desire to. There are so many other
things necessary to render political or military force effective, and
there are so many that can offset it altogether.

We see these forces at work around us every day accomplishing miracles,
doing things which a thousand years of fighting was never able to
do--and then say serenely that they are mere "theories." Why do Catholic
powers no longer execute heretics? They have a perfect right--even in
international law--to do so. What is it that protects the heretic in
Catholic countries? The police? But the main business of the police and
the army used to be to hunt him down. What is controlling the police and
the army?

By some sort of process there has been an increasing intuitive
recognition of a certain code which we realize to be necessary for a
decent society. It has come to be a sanction much stronger than the
sanction of law, much more effective than the sanction of military
force. During the German advance on Paris in August last I happened to
be present at a French family conference. Stories of the incredible
cruelties and ferocity of the Germans were circulating in the Northern
Department, where I happened to be staying.

Every one was in a condition of panic, and two Frenchmen, fathers of
families, were seeing red at the story of all these barbarities. But
they had to decide--and the thing was discussed at a little family
conference--where they should send their wives and children. And one of
these Frenchmen, the one who had been most ferocious in his condemnation
of the German barbarian, said quite naïvely and with no sense of irony
or paradox: "Of course, if we could find an absolutely open town which
would not be defended at all the women folk and children would be all
right." His instinct, of course, was perfectly just. The German
"savage" had had three quarters of a million people in his absolute
power in Brussels, and so far as we know, not a child or a woman has
been injured.

Indeed, in normal times our security against foreigners is not based
upon physical force at all. I suppose during the last century some
hundreds of thousands of British and American tourists have traveled
through the historic cities of Germany, their children have gone to the
German educational institutions, their invalids have been attended by
German doctors and cut up by German surgeons in German sanatoria and
health resorts, and I am quite sure that it never occurred to any one of
these hundreds of thousands that their little children when in the
educational institutions of these "Huns" were in any way in danger. It
was not the guns of the American Navy or the British Navy that were
protecting them; the physical force of America or of Great Britain could
not certainly be the factor operative in, say, Switzerland or Austria,
yet every Summer tens of thousands of them trust their lives and those
of their women and children in the remote mountains of Switzerland on no
better security than the expectation that a foreign community over whom
we have no possibility of exercising force will observe a convention
which has no sanction other than the recognition that it is to their
advantage to observe it.

And we thus have the spectacle of millions of Anglo-Saxons absolutely
convinced that the sanctity of their homes and the safety of their
property are secure from the ravages of the foreigner only because they
possess a naval and military force that overawes him, yet serenely
leaving the protection of that military force, and placing life and
property alike within the absolute power of that very foreigner against
whose predatory tendencies we spend millions in protecting ourselves.

No use of military power, however complete and overwhelming, would
pretend to afford a protection anything like as complete as that
afforded by these moral forces. Sixty years ago Britain had as against
Greece a preponderance of power that made her the absolute dictator of
the latter's policy, yet all the British battleships and all the threats
of "consequences" could not prevent British travelers being murdered by
Greek brigands, though in Switzerland only moral forces--the recognition
by an astute people of the advantage of treating foreigners well--had
already made the lives and property of Britons as safe in that country
as in their own.

In the same way, no scheme of arming Protestants as against Catholics,
or Catholics as against Protestants (the method which gave us the wars
of religion and massacre of St. Bartholomew) could assure that general
security of spiritual and intellectual possessions which we now in large
measure enjoy. So indeed with the more material things, France, Great
Britain, and some of the older nations have sunk thousands of millions
in foreign investments, the real security of which is not in any
physical force which their Government could possibly exercise, but the
free recognition of foreigners that it is to their advantage to adhere
to financial obligations. Englishmen do not even pretend that the
security of their investments in a country like the United States or the
Argentine is dependent upon the coercion which the British Government is
able to exercise over these communities.

The reader will not, I think, misunderstand me. I am not pleading that
human nature has undergone or will undergo any radical transformation.
Rather am I asserting that it will not undergo any; that the intention
of the man of the tenth century in Europe was as good as that of the man
of the twentieth, that the man of the tenth century was as capable of
self-sacrifice--was, it may be, less self-seeking. But what I am trying
to hint is that the shrinking of the world by our developed
intercommunication has made us all more interdependent.

The German Government moves its troops against Belgium; a moratorium is
immediately proclaimed in Rio de Janeiro, a dozen American Stock
Exchanges are promptly closed and some hundreds of thousands of our
people are affected in their daily lives. This worldwide effect is not
a matter of some years or a generation or two. It is a matter of an
hour; we are intimately concerned with the actions of men on the other
side of the world that we have never seen and never shall see; and they
are intimately concerned with us. We know without having thought it out
that we are bound together by a compact; the very fact that we are
dependent upon one another creates as a matter of fact a partnership. We
are expecting the other man to perform his part; he has been doing so
uninterruptedly for years, and we send him our goods or we take his bill
of exchange, or our families are afloat in his ships, expecting that he
will pay for his goods, honor the bill of exchange, navigate safely his
ship--he has undertaken to do these things in the world-wide partnership
of our common labor and then he fails. He does not do these things, and
we have a very lively sense of the immorality of the doctrine which
permits him to escape doing them.

And so there are certain things that are not done, certain lengths to
which even in war time we cannot go. What will stop the war is not so
much the fighting, any more than Protestant massacres prevented Catholic
massacres. Men do not fear the enemy soldiers; they do fear the turning
of certain social and moral forces against them. The German Government
does not hesitate for a moment to send ten thousand of its own people to
certain death under enemy guns even though the military advantage of so
doing may be relatively trifling. But it dare not order the massacre of
ten thousand foreign residents in Berlin. There is some force which
makes it sometimes more scrupulous of the lives of its enemy than of the
lives of its own people.

Yet why should it care? Because of the physical force of the armies
ranged against it? But it has to meet that force in any case. It fears
that the world will be stirred. In other words, it knows that the world
at large has a very lively realization that in its own interest certain
things must not be done, that the world would not live together as we
now know it, if it permitted those things to be done. It would not so
permit them.

At the bottom of this moral hesitation is an unconscious realization of
the extent of each nation's dependence upon the world partnership. It is
not a fear of physical chastisement; any nation will go to war against
desperate odds if a foreign nation talks of chastising it. It is not
that consideration which operates, as a thousand examples in history
prove to us. There are forces outside military power more visible and
ponderable than these.

There exists, of course, already a world State which has no formal
recognition in our paper constitutions at all, and no sanction in
physical force. If you are able to send a letter to the most obscure
village of China, a telegram to any part of the planet, to travel over
most of the world in safety, to carry on trade therewith, it is because
for a generation the Post Office Departments of the world have been at
work arranging traffic and communication details, methods of keeping
their accounts; because the ship owner has been devising international
signal codes; the banker arranging conditions of international credit;
because, in fact, not merely a dozen but some hundreds of international
agreements, most of them made not between Governments at all, but
between groups and parties directly concerned, have been devised.

There is no overlord enforcing them, yet much of our daily life depends
upon their normal working. The bankers or the shipowners or the makers
of electric machinery have met in Paris or Brussels and decided that
such shall be the accepted code, such the universal measurement for the
lamp or instrument, such the conditions for the bill of exchange and
from the moment that there is an agreement you do not need any sanction.
If the instrument does not conform to the measurement it is unsalable
and that is sanction enough.


Minister of the Interior and President of the Italian Ministry

_(Photo from Bain)_]

[Illustration: JAMES W. GERARD

American Ambassador to the German Empire]

We have seen in the preceding article that the dependence of the nations
goes back a good deal further than we are apt to think; that long before
the period of fully developed intercommunication, all nations owed
their civilization to foreigners. It was to their traffic with Gaul and
the visits of the Phoenician traders that the early inhabitants of the
British Isles learned their first steps in arts and crafts and the
development of a civilized society, and even in what we know as the Dark
Ages we find Charlemagne borrowing scholars from York to assist him in
civilizing the Continent.

The civilization which our forefathers brought with them to America was
the result of centuries of exchange in ideas between Britain and the
Continent, and though in the course of time it had become something
characteristically Anglo-Saxon, its origins were Greek and Arabic and
Roman and Jewish. But the interdependence of nations today is of an
infinitely more vital and insistent kind, and despite superficial
setbacks becomes more vital every day. As late as the first quarter of
the nineteenth century, for instance, Britain was still practically
self-sufficing; her very large foreign trade was a trade in luxuries.
She could still produce her own food, her population could still live on
her own soil.

But if today by some sort of magic Britain could kill off all foreigners
the means of livelihood for quite an appreciable portion of her
population would have disappeared. Millions would be threatened by
actual starvation. For Britain's overseas trade, on which so large a
proportion of the population actually lives, is mainly with the outside
world and not with her own empire. We have seen what isolation merely
from two countries has meant for Great Britain. Britain is still
maintaining her contacts with the world as a whole, but the cessation of
relationship with two countries has precipitated the gravest financial
crisis known in all her history, has kept her Stock Exchanges closed for
months, has sent her Consols to a lower point than any known since the
worst period of the Napoleonic wars, and has compelled the Government
ruthlessly to pledge its credit for the support of banking institutions
and all the various trades that have been most seriously hit.

Nor is Germany's isolation altogether complete. She manages through
neutral countries and otherwise to maintain a considerable current of
relationship with the outside world, but how deeply and disastrously the
partial severance of contact has affected Germany we shall not at
present, probably at no time, in full measure know.

All this gives a mere hint of what the organized isolation by the entire
world would mean to any one nation. Imagine the position of a civilized
country whose ports no ship from another country would enter, whose
bills no banker would discount, a country unable to receive a telegram
or a letter from the outside world or send one thereto, whose citizens
could neither travel in other countries or maintain communications
therewith. It would have an effect in the modern world somewhat
equivalent to that of the dreadful edicts of excommunication and
interdict which the papal power was able to issue in the mediaeval

I am aware, of course, that such a measure would fall very hardly upon
certain individuals in the countries inflicting this punishment, but it
is quite within the power of the Governments of those countries to do
what the British Government has done in the case of persons like
acceptors of German bills who found themselves threatened with
bankruptcy and who threatened in consequence to create great disturbance
around them because of the impossibility of securing payment from the
German indorsers. The British Government came to the rescue of those
acceptors, used the whole national credit to sustain them. It is
expensive, if you will, but infinitely less expensive than a war, and,
finally, most of the cost of it will probably be recovered.

Now if that were done, how could a country so dealt with retaliate? She
could not attack all the world at once. Upon those neighbors more
immediately interested could be thrown the burden of taking such
defensive military measures as the circumstances might dictate. You
might have a group of powers probably taking such defensive measures and
all the powers of Christendom co-operating economically by this
suggested non-intercourse. It is possible even that the powers as a
whole might contribute to a general fund indemnifying individuals in
those States particularly hit by the fact of non-intercourse. I am
thinking, for instance, of shipping interests in a port like Amsterdam
if the decree of non-intercourse were proclaimed against a power like

We have little conception of the terror which such a policy might
constitute to a nation. It has never been tried, of course, because even
in war complete non-intercourse is not achieved. At the present time
Germany is buying and selling and trading with the outside world, cables
from Berlin are being sent almost as freely to New York as cables from
London and German merchants are making contracts, maintaining
connections of very considerable complexity. But if this machinery of
non-intercourse were organized as it might be, there would be virtually
no neutrals, and its effect in our world today would be positively

It is true that the American administration did try something resembling
a policy of non-intercourse in dealing with Mexico. But, the thing was a
fiction. While the Department of State talked of non-intercourse the
Department of the Treasury was busy clearing ships for Mexico,
facilitating the dispatch of mails, &c. And, of course, Mexico's
communication with Europe remained unimpaired; at the exact moment when
the President of the United States was threatening Huerta with all sorts
of dire penalties Huerta's Government was arranging in London for the
issue of large loans and the advertisements of these Mexican loans were
appearing in The London Times. So that the one thing that might have
moved Huerta's Government the United States Government was unable to
enforce. In order to enforce it, it needed the co-operation of other

I have spoken of the economic world State--of all those complex
international arrangements concerning Post Offices, shipping, banking,
codes, sanctions of law, criminal research, and the rest, on which so
much of our civilized life depends. This world State is unorganized,
incoherent. It has neither a centre nor a capital, nor a meeting place.
The shipowners gather in Paris, the world's bankers in Madrid or Berne,
and what is in effect some vital piece of world regulation is devised in
the smoking room of some Brussels hotel. The world State has not so much
as an office or an address, The United States should give it one. Out of
its vast resources it should endow civilization with a Central Bureau of
Organization--a Clearing House of its international activities as it
were, with the funds needed for its staff and upkeep.

If undertaken with largeness of spirit, it would become the capital of
the world. And the Old World looks to America to do this service,
because it is the one which it cannot do for itself. Its old historic
jealousies and squabbles, from which America is so happily detached,
prevent any one power taking up and putting through this work of
organization, but America could do it, and do it so effectively that
from it might well flow this organization of that common action of all
the nations against any recalcitrant member of which I have spoken as a
means of enforcing non-militarily a common decision.

It is this world State which it should be the business of America during
the next decade or two to co-ordinate, to organize. Its organization
will not come into being as the result of a week-end talk between
Ambassadors. There will be difficulties, material as well as moral,
jealousies to overcome, suspicions to surmount. But this war places
America in a more favorable position than any one European power. The
older powers would be less suspicious of her than of any one among their
number. America has infinitely greater material resources, she has a
greater gift for improvised organization, she is less hidebound by old
traditions, more disposed to make an attempt along new lines.

That is the most terrifying thing about the proposal which I make--it
has never been tried. But the very difficulties constitute for America
also an immense opportunity. We have had nations give their lives and
the blood of their children for a position of supremacy and superiority.
But we are in a position of superiority and supremacy which for the most
part would be welcomed by the world as a whole and which would not
demand of America the blood of one of her children. It would demand some
enthusiasm, some moral courage, some sustained effort, faith, patience,
and persistence. It would establish new standards in, and let us hope a
new kind of, international rivalry.

One word as to a starting point and a possible line of progress. The
first move toward the ending of this present war may come from America.
The President of the United States will probably act as mediator. The
terms of peace will probably be settled in Washington. Part of the terms
of peace to be exacted by the Allies will probably be, as I have already
hinted, some sort of assurance against future danger from German
militarist aggression.

The German, rightly or wrongly, does not believe that he has been the
aggressor--it is not a question at all of whether he is right or wrong;
it is a question of what he believes. And he believes quite honestly and
sincerely that he is merely defending himself. So what he will be mainly
concerned about in the future is his security from the victorious

Around this point much of the discussion at the conclusion of this
present war will range. If it is to be a real peace and not a truce an
attempt will have to be made to give to each party security from the
other, and the question will then arise whether America will come into
that combination or not. I have already indicated that I think she
should not come in, certainly I do not think she will come in, with the
offer of military aid. But if she stays out of it altogether she will
have withdrawn from this world congress that must sit at the end of the
war a mediating influence which may go far to render it nugatory.

And when, after it may be somewhat weary preliminaries, an international
council of conciliation is established to frame the general basis of
the new alliance between the civilized powers for mutual protection
along the lines indicated, America, if she is to play her part in
securing the peace of the world, must be ready to throw at least her
moral and economic weight into the common stock, the common moral and
economic forces which will act against the common enemy, whoever he may
happen to be.

That does not involve taking sides, as I showed in my last article. The
policeman does not decide which of two quarrelers is right; he merely
decides that the stronger shall not use his power against the weaker. He
goes to the aid of the weaker, and then later the community deals with
the one who is the real aggressor. One may admit, if you will, that at
present there is no international law, and that it may not be possible
to create one. But we can at least exact that there shall be an inquiry,
a stay; and more often than not that alone would suffice to solve the
difficulty without the application of definite law.

It is just up to that point that the United States should at this stage
be ready to commit herself in the general council of conciliation,
namely, to say this: "We shall throw our weight against any power that
refuses to give civilization an opportunity at least of examining and
finding out what the facts of the dispute are. After due examination we
may reserve the right to withdraw from any further interference between
such power and its antagonist. But, at least, we pledge ourselves to
secure that by throwing the weight of such non-military influence as we
may have on to the side of the weaker." That is the point at which a new
society of nations would begin, as it is the point at which a society of
individuals has begun. And it is for the purpose of giving effect to her
undertaking in that one regard that America should become the centre of
a definite organization of that world State which has already cut
athwart all frontiers and traversed all seas.

It is not easy without apparent hyperbole to write of the service which
America would thus render to mankind. She would have discovered a new
sanction for human justice, would have made human society a reality. She
would have done something immeasurably greater, immeasurably more
beneficent than any of the conquests recorded in the long story of man's
mostly futile struggles. The democracy of America would have done
something which the despots and the conquerors of all time, from
Alexander and Caesar to Napoleon and the Kaiser, have found to be
impossible. Dangerous as I believe national vanity to be, America would,
I think, find in the pride of this achievement--this American leadership
of the human race--a glory that would not be vain, a world victory which
the world would welcome.



    Through the fog of the fight we could dimly see,
      As ever the flame from the big guns flashed,
    That Cradock was doomed, yet his men and he,
      With their plates shot to junk, and their turrets smashed,
    Their ship heeled over, her funnels gone,
    Were fearlessly, doggedly fighting on.

    Out-speeded, out-metaled, out-ranged, out-shot
    By heavier guns, they were not out-fought.
    Those men--with the age-old British phlegm,
    That has conquered and held the seas for them,
    And the courage that causes the death-struck man
      To rise on his mangled stumps and try,
    With one last shot from his heated gun,
      To score a hit ere his spirit fly,
      Then sink in the welter of red, and die
      With the sighting squint fixed on his dead, glazed eye--
    Accepted death as part of the plan.

    So the guns belched flame till the fight had run
      Into night; and now, in the distance dim,
    We could see, by the flashes, the dull, dark loom
    Of their hull, as it bore toward the Port of Doom,
      Away on the water's misty rim--
    Cradock and his few hundred men,
    Never, in time, to be seen again.

    While into the darkness their great shells streamed,
      Little the valiant Germans dreamed
    That Cradock was teaching them how to go
      When the fate their daring, itself, had sealed,
    Waiting, as yet, o'er the ocean's verge,
      To their eyes undaunted would stand revealed;
    And, snared by a swifter, stronger foe,
    Out-classed, out-metaled, out-ranged, out-shot
    By heavier guns, but not out-fought,
    They, too, would sink in the sheltering surge.

Battle of the Suez Canal

A First-Hand Account of the Unsuccessful Turkish Invasion

[From The London Times, Feb. 19, 1915.]

ISMAILIA, Feb. 10.

Though skirmishing had taken place between the enemy's reconnoitring
parties and our outposts during the latter part of January, the main
attack was not developed until Feb. 2, when the enemy began to move
toward the Ismailia Ferry. They met a reconnoitring party of Indian
troops of all arms, and a desultory engagement ensued, to which a
violent sand storm put a sudden end about 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
The main attacking force pushed forward toward its destination after
nightfall. From twenty-five to thirty galvanized iron pontoon boats,
seven and a half meters in length, which had been dragged in carts
across the desert, were hauled by hand toward the water, with one or two
rafts made of kerosene tins in a wooden frame. All was ready for the

The first warning of the enemy's approach was given by a sentry of a
mountain battery, who heard, to him, an unknown tongue across the water.
The noise soon increased. It would seem that Mudjah Ideen ("Holy
Warriors")--said to be mostly old Tripoli fighters--accompanied the
pontoon section and regulars of the Seventy-fifth Regiment, for loud
exhortations often in Arabic of "Brothers die for the faith; we can die
but once," betrayed the enthusiastic irregular.

The Egyptians waited till the Turks were pushing their boats into the
water; then the Maxims attached to the battery suddenly spoke and the
guns opened with case at point-blank range at the men and boats crowded
under the steep bank opposite them.

Immediately, a violent fire broke out on both sides of the canal, the
enemy replying to the rifles and machine gun fire and the battery on our
bank. Around the guns it was impossible to stand up, but the gunners
stuck to the work, inflicting terrible punishment.

A little torpedo boat with a crew of thirteen patrolling the canal
dashed up and landed a party of four officers and men to the south of
Tussum, who climbed up the eastern bank and found themselves in a
Turkish trench, and escaped by a miracle with the news. Promptly the
midget dashed in between the fires and enfiladed the eastern bank amid a
hail of bullets, and destroyed several pontoon boats lying unlaunched on
the bank. It continued to harass the enemy, though two officers and two
men were wounded.

As the dark, cloudy night lightened toward dawn fresh forces came into
action. The Turks, who occupied the outer, or day, line of the Tussum
post, advanced, covered by artillery, against the Indian troops holding
the inner, or night, position, while an Arab regiment advanced against
the Indian troops at the Serapeum post.

The warships on the canal and lake joined in the fray. The enemy brought
some six batteries of field guns into action from the slopes west of
Kataib-el-Kheil. Shells admirably fused made fine practice at all the
visible targets, but failed to find the battery above mentioned, which,
with some help from a detachment of infantry, beat down the fire of the
riflemen on the opposite bank and inflicted heavy losses on the hostile
supports advancing toward the canal. A chance salvo wounded four men of
the battery, but it ran more risk from a party of about twenty of the
enemy who had crossed the canal in the dark and sniped the gunners from
the rear till they were finally rounded up by the Indian cavalry and
compelled to surrender.

Supported by land naval artillery the Indian troops took the offensive.
The Serapeum garrison, which had stopped the enemy three-quarters of a
mile from the position, cleared its front, and the Tussum garrison by a
brilliant counter-attack drove the enemy back. Two battalions of
Anatolians of the Twenty-eighth Regiment were thrown vainly into the
fight. Our artillery gave them no chance, and by 3:30 in the afternoon a
third of the enemy, with the exception of a force that lay hid in bushy
hollows on the east bank between the two posts, were in full retreat,
leaving many dead, a large proportion of whom had been killed by

Meanwhile the warships on the lake had been in action. A salvo from a
battleship woke up Ismailia early, and crowds of soldiers and some
civilians climbed every available sandhill to see what was doing till
the Turkish guns sent shells sufficiently near to convince them that it
was safer to watch from cover. A husband and wife took a carriage and
drove along the lake front, much peppered by shells, till near the old
French hospital, when they realized the danger and suddenly whisked
around and drove back full gallop to Ismailia.

But the enemy's fire did more than startle. At about 11 in the morning
two six-inch shells hit the Hardinge near the southern entrance of the
lake. The first damaged the funnel and the second burst inboard. Pilot
Carew, a gallant old merchant seaman, refused to go below when the
firing opened and lost a leg. Nine others were wounded. One or two
merchantmen were hit, but no lives were lost. A British gunboat was

Then came a dramatic duel between the Turkish big gun or guns and a
warship. The Turks fired just over and then just short of 9,000 yards.
The warship sent in a salvo of more six-inch shells than had been fired
that day.

During the morning the enemy moved toward Ismailia Ferry. The infantry
used the ground well, digging shelter pits as they advanced, and were
covered by a well-served battery. An officer, apparently a German,
exposed himself with the greatest daring, and watchers were interested
to see a yellow "pie dog," which also escaped, running about the
advancing line. Our artillery shot admirably and kept the enemy from
coming within 1,000 yards of the Indian outposts. In the afternoon the
demonstration--for it was no more--ceased but for a few shells fired as
"a nightcap." During the dark night that followed some of the enemy
approached the outpost line of the ferry position with a dog, but
nothing happened, and day found them gone.

At the same time as the fighting ceased at the ferry it died down at El
Kantara. There the Turks, after a plucky night attack, came to grief on
our wire entanglements. Another attempt to advance from the southeast
was forced back by an advance of the Indian troops. The attack, during
which it was necessary to advance on a narrow front over ground often
marshy with recent inundations against our strong position, never had a
chance. Indeed, the enemy was only engaged with our outpost line.

Late in the afternoon of the 3d there was sniping from the east bank
between Tussum and Serapeum and a man was killed in the tops of a
British battleship. Next morning the sniping was renewed, and the Indian
troops, moving out to search the ground, found several hundred of the
enemy in the hollow previously mentioned. During the fighting some of
the enemy, either by accident or design, held up their hands, while
others fired on the Punjabis, who were advancing to take the surrender,
and killed a British officer. A sharp fight with the cold steel
followed, and a British officer killed a Turkish officer with a sword
thrust in single combat. The body of a German officer with a white flag
was afterward found here, but there is no proof that the white flag was
used. Finally all the enemy were killed, captured, or put to flight.

With this the fighting ended, and the subsequent operations were
confined to "rounding up" prisoners and to the capture of a considerable
amount of military material left behind. The Turks who departed with
their guns and baggage during the night of the 3d still seemed to be
moving eastward.

So ended the battle of the Suez Canal. Our losses have been amazingly
small, totaling about 111 killed and wounded.

[Illustration: Showing the Turkish points of concentration in Palestine
and the principal routes leading thence to the Suez Canal. The
intervening desert Peninsula of Sinai constitutes a formidable obstacle
to an invading force. Inset is a map of the Ottoman Empire showing in
the northeast the Caucasus, where the Turks were routed by the Russians,
who later advanced on Erzerum and Tabriz. The British expedition in the
Persian Gulf region occupied Basra and was on Feb. 1, 1915, at Kurna,
the point of confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates.]

Our opponents have probably lost nearly 3,000 men. The Indian troops
bore the brunt of the fighting and were well supported by the British
and French warships and by the Egyptian troops. The Turks fought bravely
and their artillery shot well if unluckily, but the intentions of the
higher command are still a puzzle to British officers.

Did Djemal Pasha intend to try to break through our position under cover
of demonstrations along a front over ninety miles in length with a total
force, perhaps, of 25,000 men, or was he attempting a reconnoissance in
force? If the former is the case, he must have had a low idea of British
leadership or an amazing belief in the readiness and ability of
sympathizers in Egypt to support the Turk. Certainly he was misinformed
as to our positions, and on the 4th we buried on the eastern bank the
bodies of two men, apparently Syrians or Egyptians, who were found with
their hands tied and their eyes bandaged. Probably they were guides who
had been summarily killed, having unwittingly led the enemy astray. If,
on the other hand, Djemal Pasha was attempting a reconnoissance, it was
a costly business and gave General Wilson a very handsome victory.

Till the last week of January there had been some doubt as to the road
by which the Ottoman Commander in Chief in Syria intended to advance on
the canal. Before the end of the month it was quite clear that what was
then believed to be the Turkish advanced guard, having marched with
admirable rapidity from Beersheba via El Auja, Djebel Libni, and
Djifjaffa, was concentrating in the valleys just east of
Kataib-el-Kheil, a group of hills lying about ten miles east of the
canal, where it enters Lake Timsah. A smaller column detached from this
force was sighted in the hills east of Ismailia Ferry. Smaller bodies
had appeared in the neighborhood of El Kantara and between Suez and the
Bitter Lakes.

The attacks on our advanced posts at El Kantara on the night of Jan. 26
and 27, and at Kubri, near Suez, on the following night, were beaten
off. Hostile guns fired occasional shells, while our warships returned
the compliment at any hostile column that seemed to offer a good target,
and our aeroplanes dropped bombs when they had the chance; but in
general the enemy kept a long distance off and was tantalizing. Our
launches and boats, which were constantly patrolling the canal, could
see him methodically intrenching just out of range of the naval guns.

By the night of Feb. 1 the enemy had prepared his plan of attack. To
judge both from his movements during the next two days and the documents
found on prisoners and slain, it was proposed to attack El Kantara while
making a demonstration at El Ferdan, further south, and prevent
reinforcements at the first-named post. The demonstration at Ismailia
Ferry by the right wing of the Kataib-el-Kheil force which had been
partly refused till then in order to prevent a counter-attack from the
ferry, was designed to occupy the attention of the Ismailia garrison,
while the main attack was delivered between the Tussum post, eight miles
south of Ismailia, and the Serapeum post, some three miles further
south. Eshref Bey's highly irregular force in the meantime was to
demonstrate near Suez.

The selection of the Tussum and Serapeum section as the principal
objective was dictated both by the consideration that success here would
bring the Turks a few miles from Ismailia, and by the information
received from patrols that the west bank of the canal between the posts,
both of which may be described as bridgeheads, were unoccupied by our
troops. The west bank between the posts is steep and marked by a long,
narrow belt of trees. The east bank also falls steeply to the canal, but
behind it are numerous hollows, full of brushwood, which give good
cover. Here the enemy's advanced parties established themselves and
intrenched before the main attack was delivered.

A Full-Fledged Socialist State

While Germany's Trade and Credit Are Holding Their Breath

By J. Laurence Laughlin

[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 9, 1915.]

     Professor Laughlin, who makes the following remarkable study
     of the German financial emergency, was lecturer on political
     economy in Berlin on the invitation of the Prussian Cultur
     Ministerium in 1906, and since 1892 has been head of the
     Department of Political Economy in the University of Chicago.
     He is acknowledged to be one of the foremost American
     economists and the views here expressed are based on wide

In a great financial emergency conditions are immediately registered in
the monetary and credit mechanism. Although the German Government and
the Reichsbank had obviously been preparing for war long before, as soon
as mobilization was ordered there was a currency panic. The private
banks stopped payment in gold. Crowds then besieged the Reichsbank in
order to get its notes converted into gold. Then the Banking act was
suspended, so that the Reichsbank and private banks were freed from the
obligation to give out gold for notes. At once all notes went to a
discount in the shops as compared with gold. Thereupon, in summary
fashion, the Military Governor of Berlin declared the notes to be a full
legal tender and announced that any shop refusing to take them at par
would be punished by confiscation of goods.

In Germany, as is well known, the main currency is supplied by the
Reichsbank, covered by at least 33-1/3 per cent. in gold or silver, and
the remaining two-thirds by commercial paper. Immediately after the
outbreak of war there was a prodigious increase of loans at the
Reichsbank, in consequence of which borrowers received notes or deposit
accounts. Usually transactions are carried through by use of notes, and
not by checks, as with us. On July 23, 1914, the notes stood at
$472,500,000; deposits at $236,000,000; discounted bills and advances at
$200,000,000. On Aug. 31 notes had increased to $1,058,500,000; deposits
to $610,000,000; discounts and advances to $1,113,500,000, (by October
this amount was lowered to about $750,000,000.) On the latter date the
specie reserve stood at $409,500,000, or more than the legal one-third.
Loans had been increased 556 per cent.; notes 223 per cent., and
deposits 258 per cent. In short, $586,000,000 of notes had been issued
beyond the amount required in normal times, (July 23.) Clearly this
additional amount was not required by an increased exchange of goods,
but by those persons whose resources were tied up and who needed a means
of payment. The same was true of the large increase of deposits which
resulted from the larger loans. A liberal policy of discounting was
followed by which loans were given on the basis of securities or stocks
of goods on hand. That is, non-negotiable assets were converted into a
means of payment either in the form of notes or deposit credits.

At this juncture there was created a currency something after
the fashion of the Aldrich-Vreeland emergency notes in this
country. War credit banks were established by law to issue notes
(Darlehnskassenscheine) in denominations of 10, 15, 20, and 50 marks as
loans on stocks in trade and securities of all kinds, and were charged
6-1/2 per cent. interest. The goods on which these notes could be issued
were not removed, but stamped with a Government seal. While not a legal
tender, the notes were receivable at all imperial agencies. On
securities classed at the Reichsbank as Class I. loans could be made up
to 60 per cent. of their value as of July 31; as Class II., 40 per
cent.; on the other German securities bearing a fixed rate of return,
50 per cent.; on other German securities bearing a varying rate of
return, 40 per cent.; on Russian securities, a lower percentage. These
institutions, therefore, took up some of the burden that would otherwise
have fallen on the loan item of the Reichsbank. Hence the Reichsbank
account does not show the whole situation.

To this point the methods followed were much the same as in London. Then
came unusual happenings. In London for a few days the banks had wavered
as to maintaining gold payments, but only temporarily. In Berlin drastic
measures were undertaken to accumulate gold in the Reichsbank. Vienna
reports it to be well known that Germany had been for eighteen months
before straining every nerve to obtain gold. Whatever sums of gold were
included in the so-called "war chest" in Spandau (said to be
$30,000,000) were also deposited with the Reichsbank. Gold was even
smuggled across the borders of Holland on the persons of spies. Urgent
demands were made upon the people to turn in gold from patriotic
motives. In this way over $400,000,000 of gold was gathered by July,
1914; and by the end of the year, after five months of war, it had risen
to $523,000,000. Was Germany to maintain gold payments as well as Great

Evidently not. Gold was not given for notes on presentation. For
purposes of exchanging goods the notes were in excess. Inconvertible,
they must go to a discount with gold or with the money of outside
countries using gold. But in order to get imports from other nations,
like Holland, Scandinavia, and Denmark, Germany must either send goods,
or gold, or securities. German industries, except those making war
supplies, were not producing over 25 per cent. of capacity, and many
were closed. The Siemens-Schuckert Works, even before the Landsturm was
called out, lost 40 per cent. of their men on mobilization. The Humboldt
Steel Works, near Cologne, employing 4,000 men, were closed early in
August, as were nearly all the great iron works in the district between
Düsseldorf and Duisburg. Probably 50 to 75 per cent. of the workers
were called to the colors. The skilled artisans were in the army or in
munition factories; the railways were in the hands of the military; and
the merchant marine was shut up in home or foreign ports. There were
said to be 1,500 idle ships in Hamburg alone. Few goods could be
exported. Gold was refused for export, of course. A serious liquidation
in foreign securities had been going on long before the war. Some
foreign securities must have still remained. However that may be, a
claim to funds in Germany (i.e., a bill drawn on Germany) was not
redeemable in gold, and it fell in price. In normal times a bill could
not fall below the shipping point in gold, (par with us for 4 marks is
95-1/4 cents in gold;) but, since gold could not be sent, exchange on
Germany could fall to any figure, set only by a declining demand.
Already bills on Germany have been quoted in New York at 82, showing a
depreciation of German money in the international field of about 13 per
cent. Likewise, as early as the first week of September, the Reichsbank
notes were reported at a discount of 20 per cent., and as practically
non-negotiable in a neighboring country like Holland.

The inevitable consequence of a depreciated currency must be a rise of
prices, usually greater than the actual percentage of depreciation. To
meet this situation there came a device possible in no other commercial
country. The Government fixed prices at which goods could be sold. This
mediaeval device could be enforced only in a land where such State
interference had been habitual, and, of course, could give to the notes
the fictitious purchasing power only inside the country. After the
Christian Science fashion, one had only to believe the notes were of
value to make them so; but in the cold world outside German jurisdiction
their value would be gauged by the chances of getting gold for them.
Here, then, we find Germany in all the mazes of our ancient
"greenbackism," but still in possession of a large stock of gold. As
soon as the war ends she may be able to return to gold payments at an
early date--very much as did France after the ordeal of the
Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871.

In the present war conditions, however, largely cut off from other
countries, (except some small trade with Switzerland, Holland, Denmark,
and the like,) all ordinary relations which would influence German
credit and industry must be counted out. There is no comparison of her
prices and money with those of other countries in a free market, or with
even a limited transportation of exports and imports. All commercial
measurements are suspended for the time. Trade and credit are holding
their breath. How long can they do it? Germany may have food enough; but
how long can the stoppage of industry go on?

Moreover, attention must be called to one momentous thing. We are seeing
today, under military law, the greatest experiment in socialism ever
witnessed. All wealth, income, industry, capital, and labor are in the
direct control and use of a military State. Food, everything, may be
taken and distributed in common. I think never before in history have we
had such a gigantic, full-fledged illustration of socialism in actual

In the meanwhile, even though food may be provided, the reduction of
industry in general has cut incomes right and left. That is, fewer goods
are produced and exchanged. But goods are the basis of all credit. The
less the goods exchanged, the less the credit operations. Nevertheless,
the extraordinary issues of banknotes, the increase of deposits, as a
result of quintupling the loans, means that former commitments in goods
and securities cannot be liquidated. That is, the enormous increase of
bank liabilities, to a considerable and unknown percentage, is not
supported by liquid assets. These assets are "canned." Will they keep
sweet? There is no new business, no foreign trade, sufficient to take up
old obligations and renew those which are unpayable. Lessened incomes
mean lessened consumption and lessened demand for goods. Hence the
credit system is based on an uncertain and insecure foundation,
dependent wholly upon contingencies far in the future which may, or may
not, take the non-liquid assets out of cold storage and give them their
original value.

Moreover, apart from definite destruction of wealth and capital in the
war--which must be enormous, as represented by the national loans--the
losses from not doing business in all main industries during the whole
period of the war (except in making war supplies) must be very great. As
it affects the income and expenditure of the working classes, it may be
roughly measured by the great numbers of unemployed. If they are used on
public works, their income is made up from taxes on the wealth of
others. Luxuries will disappear, and not be produced or imported.
Incomes expressed in goods, or material satisfactions, have been
diminished--which is of no serious consequence, if they cover the
minimum of actual subsistence. The prolongation of the war will, then,
depend on the ability to provide the supplies for war.

The need for a medium of exchange is oversupplied. The lack is in the
goods to be exchanged. The enormous extension of German note issues does
not, and can not, diminish. In this country the expansion of credit and
money immediately after the war (manifested by the issue of Clearing
House certificates and emergency banknotes) has been cleared away by
liquidation. In Germany the "canned" assets behind the depreciated
currency cannot be liquidated until the end of the war. And their worth
at that time will depend much on the future course of the war and the
terms of peace. If German territory should be overrun and the tangible
forms of capital in factories and fixed capital be destroyed, much of
the liquidation might be indefinitely prolonged. Whatever of foreign
trade is permanently lost would also increase the difficulties.

In a great financial emergency nearly every country has, at one time or
another, been tempted to confuse the monetary with the fiscal functions
of the Treasury. To borrow by the issue of money seems to have a
seductive charm hard to resist. Lloyd George established a new precedent
for Great Britain by issuing nearly $200,000,000 of Government currency
notes, but this was done to provide notes for the public instead of coin
(£1 and 10s.) and made unnecessary any emergency issues by the Bank of
England, and a large gold fund has been accumulated behind them so that
they are convertible. In Germany it does not seem likely that the
Treasury notes will be largely used (having increased from $16,500,000
to about $200,000,000) as a means of borrowing, since the new loans are
being issued in terms of longer maturities.



[By Cable to The New York Tribune.]

London, March 8.--Edward Page Gaston, an American business man long
resident in London, has just returned from Belgium, and brought with him
many sad and touching relics of the battlefields in that distressful
country, chiefly from the neighborhood of Mons. These pathetic memorials
include letters from wives, sweethearts, and friends at home and letters
written by soldiers now dead and never posted.

Turning these letters over, one comes across such an expression as this:
"I congratulate you on your promotion. It seems too good to be true.
Good-bye and God bless you, dear. God keep you in health and bring you
safely back."

Alas! the soldier who got that letter came back no way at all to his
sweetheart or his friends.

"If you don't come back, what shall I do?" is the cry that comes from
another woman's heart, and he did not come back.

Mr. Gaston is going to put himself into communication with the War
Office with regard to the fate of the relics, and as far as possible,
they will be sent to the rightful owners.


[Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.]

Paris, Feb. 24.--Professor Pinard of the Academy of Medicine contributes
an article to the Matin showing that "war children" are stronger and
healthier than their predecessors, and that France is rapidly repairing
her battle losses.

An analysis of the Paris statistics for the last six months reveals a
diminution of the death rate among mothers and children and a decrease
in the number of children born dead.

Dr. Pinard further asserts that an extensive comparison of living
children with those born earlier shows that the average weight of "war
babies" is considerably higher than it used to be. This he considers due
to the giving of natural instead of artificial nourishment by the
mothers in consequence of the more serious attitude they take to their
duty to the State.

This, says the professor, is one more instance of the spirit of
regeneration animating France.

No Premature Peace For Russia

Proceedings at Opening of the Duma, Petrograd, Feb. 9, 1915

[From The London Times.]


The main impression left upon all who attended today's proceedings in
the Duma may be summed up in a few words. The war has not shaken the
determination of the Russian people to carry through the struggle to a
victorious end.

Practically the whole House had assembled--the few vacant seats were due
to death, chiefly on the field of battle--and the patriotic spirit
permeating the proceedings was just as deeply emphasized as it was six
months ago. The debates were several times interrupted by the singing of
the National anthem, thunders of applause greeted the speeches of the
President, the Premier, and the Foreign Minister, and the ovation to the
British and French Ambassadors was, if anything, warmer and more
enthusiastic than on the previous occasion.

I noticed that members applauded with special emphasis the words in
which the President expressed his firm conviction that all efforts to
disunite the Allies would prove fruitless.

In the course of his address the President eloquently and eulogistically
referred to the rôle of Russia's allies in the present war. Speaking of
England, he said:

     Noble and mighty England, with all her strength, has come
     forward to defend the right. Her services to the common cause
     are great, their value inestimable. We believe in her and
     admire her steadfastness and valor.

     The enemies of Russia have already frequently attempted to sow
     discord in these good and sincere relations, but such efforts
     are vain. The Russian truth-loving national soul, sensitive of
     any display of mendacity or insincerity, was able to sift the
     chaff from the wheat, and faith in our friends is unshaken.
     There is not a single cloud on the clear horizon of our
     lasting allied harmony. Heartfelt greetings to you, true
     friends, rulers of the waves and our companions in arms. May
     victory and glory go with you everywhere!

These remarks were constantly interrupted by outbursts of tremendous
applause and by an ovation in honor of Sir George Buchanan, who bowed
his acknowledgments.

Alluding to temperance reform, the orator fervently exclaimed:

     Accept, great monarch, the lowly reverence of thy people. Thy
     people firmly believe that an end has been put for all
     eternity to this ancient curse.

     The terrible war can not and must not end otherwise than
     victoriously for us and our allies. We will fight till our
     foes submit to the conditions and demands which the victors
     dictate to them. We are weary of the incessant brandishing of
     the sword, the menaces to Slavdom, and the obstacles to its
     natural growth. We will fight till the end, till we win a
     lasting peace worthy of the great sacrifices we have offered
     to our fatherland. In the name of our electorate, we here
     declare, "So wishes all Russia."

     And you, brave warrior knights in the cold trenches, proudly
     bearing the standard of Russian imperialism, hearken to this
     national outburst. Your task is difficult. You are surrounded
     with trials and privations, but then you are Russian, for whom
     no obstacles exist.

A scene of indescribable enthusiasm ensued, the House rising and singing
the national hymn.

The President's peroration was in part as follows:

The Premier, in the opening sentences of the speech which followed,
said: "Our heroic army, the flower and the pride of Russia, strong as
never before in its might, notwithstanding all its losses, grows and
strengthens." He did not fail to remind his hearers that the war is yet
far from ended, but he added that the Government, from the first, had
soberly looked the danger in the face and frankly warned the country of
the forthcoming sacrifices for the common cause and also for the
strengthening of the mutual gravitation of the Slavonic races. He
briefly referred to the Turkish defeat in the Caucasus as opening before
the Russians a bright historical future on the shores of the Black Sea.

The Premier alluded to the tremendous change wrought in the national
life by the abolition of the liquor traffic, which he designated a
second serfdom vanishing at the behest of the Czar. After a few years of
sober, persistent labor, we would no longer recognize Russia. The war
had further raised the question of the creation in the world's markets
of favorable conditions to the export of our agricultural products, and
a general revision of conditions calculated hereafter to guarantee to
Russia a healthy development on the principle of entire independence of
Germany in all branches of the national life. In this direction the
Government had already drafted and was preparing a series of elaborate
measures. He concluded with the expression of his conviction that, if
all fulfilled their duty in the spirit of profound devotion to the
Emperor and of deep faith in the triumph of the country, the near future
would open before us perhaps the best pages in Russian history.

The speeches of a peasant Deputy and a Polish representative were
particularly impressive and well received. The Socialist leader's demand
for peace called forth a smart rejoinder from a member of his own party.


This afternoon the session of the Duma was opened in the presence of the
whole Cabinet, the members of the Council of the Empire, the Diplomatic
Corps, and the Senators. The public galleries were filled.

M. Sazanof began his speech by recalling that six months ago in that
place he had explained why Russia, in face of the brutal attempt by
Germany and Austria upon the independence of Serbia and Belgium, had
been able to adopt no other course than to take up arms in defense of
the rights of nations. Russia, standing closely united and admirably
unanimous in her enthusiasm against an enemy which had offered
provocation, did not remain isolated, because she was immediately
supported by France and Great Britain and, soon afterward, by Japan.

Passing in review the events of the war, the Minister said that the
valiant Russian troops, standing shoulder to shoulder with their allies,
had secured fresh laurels for their crown of glory. The Russian arms
were marching steadfastly toward their goal, assured of final victory
against an enemy who, blinded by the hope of an easy victory, was making
desperate efforts, having recourse to all kinds of subterfuges, even the
distortion of the truth.

To the relations of good neighborliness, faithfully maintained by
Russia, Germany had everywhere opposed resistance, seeking to embroil
Russia with neighboring countries, especially those to which Russia was
bound by important interests.

     All this [continued M. Sazanof] is sufficient for us to judge
     the value of German statements regarding the alleged
     envelopment of Germany by the Triple Entente. Equally
     worthless are the assertions that it was not Germany who began
     the war, for irrefutable documents exist to prove the
     contrary. Among the malevolent German inventions figure
     reports of Jewish pogroms which the Russian troops are alleged
     to have organized. I seize this opportunity of speaking in the
     parliamentary tribune to deny this calumny categorically, for,
     if the Jewish population in the theatre of war is suffering,
     that is an inevitable evil, since the inhabitants of regions
     where hostilities are proceeding are always severely tried.
     Moreover, eyewitnesses are unanimous in stating that the
     greatest devastation in Poland is the work of the Germans and

     The German Ambassador in Washington has zealously spread these
     reports in the attempt to create in the United States a
     feeling hostile to us, but the good sense of the Americans has
     prevented them from falling into the clumsily laid snare. I
     hope that the good relations between Russia and America will
     not suffer from these German intrigues.

     The "Orange Book" recently published proved that the events on
     the Bosporus which preceded the war with Turkey were the
     result of German treachery toward the Ottoman Empire, which
     invited German instructors and the mission of General Liman
     von Sanders, hoping to perfect its army with the object of
     assuring its independence against the Russian danger
     insinuated by Berlin. Germany, however, took advantage of this
     penetration into the Turkish Army to make that army a weapon
     in realizing her political plans.

     All the acts of the Turks since the appearance of the Goeben
     in the Dardanelles had been committed under the pressure of
     Germany, but the efforts of the Turks to evade responsibility
     for these acts could not prevent them from falling into the
     abyss into which they were rolling. The events on the
     Russo-Turkish frontier, while covering Russian arms with fresh
     glory, will bring Russia nearer to the realization of the
     political and economic problems bound up with the question of
     Russia's access to the open sea.

Passing to the documents relating to reforms in Armenia recently
distributed among members of the Duma, M. Sazanof said:

     The Russian Government disinterestedly endeavored to alleviate
     the lot of the Armenians, and the Russo-Turkish agreement of
     Jan. 26, 1914, is a historical document in which Turkey
     recognizes the privileged position of Russia in the Armenian
     question. When the war ends this exclusive position of Russia
     will be employed by the Imperial Government in a direction
     favorable to the Armenian population. Having drawn the sword
     in the defense of Serbia, Russia is acting under the influence
     of her sentiments toward a sister nation whose grandeur of
     soul in the present war has closely riveted the two countries.

After referring with satisfaction to the gallantry of Montenegro in
fighting as she was doing in the common cause, M. Sazanof proceeded to
speak of Greece. The relations of Russia with this tried friend of
Serbia, he said, were perfectly cordial, and the tendency of the
Hellenic people to put an end to the sufferings of their co-religionists
groaning under the Ottoman yoke had the entire sympathy of the Imperial

Passing to Rumania, M. Sazanof said that the relations between Russia
and Rumania retained the friendly character which they acquired on the
occasion of the visit of the Czar to Constanza. The constant Russophile
demonstrations in Bucharest and throughout the whole country during the
Autumn had brought into relief the hostile feelings of the Rumanians
toward Austria-Hungary. He continued:

     You are probably waiting, gentlemen, for a reply to a question
     which interests the whole world, viz., the attitude of those
     non-combatant countries whose interests counsel them to
     embrace the cause of Russia and that of her allies. In effect,
     public opinion in these countries, responsive to all that is
     meant by the national ideal, has long since pronounced itself
     in this sense, but you will understand that I cannot go into
     this question very profoundly, seeing that the Governments of
     these countries, with which we enjoy friendly relations, have
     not yet taken a definite decision. Now, it is for them to
     arrive at this decision, for they alone will be responsible to
     their respective nations if they miss a favorable opportunity
     to realize their national aspirations.

     I must also mention with sincere gratitude the services
     rendered to us by Italy and Spain in protecting our
     compatriots in enemy countries. I must also emphasize the care
     lavished by Sweden on Russian travelers who were the victims
     of German brutality. I hope that this fact will strengthen the
     relations of good neighborliness between Russia and Sweden,
     which we desire to see still more cordial than they are.

Referring to Russo-Persian relations, M. Sazonof said:

     Before the war with Turkey, we succeeded in putting an end to
     the secular Turco-Persian quarrel by means of the delimitation
     of the Persian Gulf and Mount Ararat region, thanks to which
     we preserved for Persia a disputed territory with an area of
     almost 20,000 square versts, part of which the Turks had
     invaded. Since the war the Persian Government has declared its
     neutrality, but this has not prevented Germany, Austria, and
     Turkey from carrying on a propaganda with the object of
     gaining Persian sympathies. These intrigues have been
     particularly intense in Azerbaijan, where the Turks succeeded
     in attracting to their side some of the Kurds in that country.
     Afterward Ottoman troops, violating Persian neutrality,
     crossed the Persian frontier and, supported by Kurdish bands,
     penetrated the districts where our detachments were in
     cantonments and transformed Azerbaijan into a part of the
     Russo-Turkish theatre of war.

     I must say in passing that the presence of our troops in
     Persia is in no way a violation of neutrality, for they were
     sent there some years ago with the object of maintaining order
     in our frontier territory, and preventing its invasion by the
     Turks, who wished to establish there an advantageous base of
     action against the Caucasus. The Persian Government,
     powerless to take effective action against this aggression,
     protested, but without success. I must state that
     Anglo-Russian relations in regard to Persian affairs are more
     than ever based on mutual and sincere confidence and
     co-operation, which are a guarantee of the pacific settlement
     of any eventual conflict.

Passing to the Far East, M. Sazanof said the agreements signed in 1907
and 1910 with Japan had borne fruit during the present war, for Japan
was with them. She had driven the Germans from the Pacific Ocean, and
had seized the German base of Kiao-chau. Although Japan did not sign the
agreement of Aug. 23, yet, since the Anglo-Japanese alliance contained
an undertaking that a separate peace should not be concluded, therefore
the German Government could not hope for peace with Japan before she had
concluded peace with Great Britain, Russia, and France. Consequently,
their relations with Japan gave them a firm friend. The demands
addressed by Japan to China contain nothing contrary to our interests.

As for Russo-Chinese interests, he could state their constant
improvement. The _pourparlers_ in regard to Mongolia, though slow, were
friendly, and he hoped to be able to announce shortly the signature of a
triple Russo-Chinese-Mongolian treaty, which, while safeguarding the
interests of Russia, would not injure those of China.

In conclusion, M. Sazanof expressed the hope that the close union of all
Russians around the throne, which had been manifested since the
beginning of the war, would remain unchanged until the completion of the
great national task.

Speakers of the Progressist, Octobrist, and Nationalist Centre Parties
agreed that a premature peace would be a crime against their country and
humanity, and that therefore Russia was prepared to make every sacrifice
so that Germany might be definitely crushed.

At the end of the sitting the following resolution was unanimously

_The Duma, saluting the glorious exploits of our soldiers, sends to the
Russian Army and Navy a cordial greeting and to our allies an expression
of sincere esteem and sympathy. It expresses its firm conviction that
the great national and liberating objects of the present war will be
achieved, and declares the inflexible determination of the Russian
Nation to carry on the war until conditions shall have been imposed on
the enemy assuring the peace of Europe and the restoration of right and



[From King Albert's Book.]

    The Victor true is he who conquers fear,
    Who knows no time save now--no place but here.
    Who counts no cost--who only plays the game.
    To him shall go the prize--Immortal Fame!

To the illustrious ruler and his gallant little nation, whose heroism
and bravery are surely unparalleled in the whole of our world's history,
I bow my head in respectful homage.

Lessons of the War to March Ninth

By Charles W. Eliot

President Emeritus of Harvard University.

CAMBRIDGE, Mass., March 9, 1915.

_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

The observant world has now had ample opportunity to establish certain
conclusions about the new kind of war and its availability as means of
adjusting satisfactorily international relations; and it seems desirable
in the interest of durable peace in Europe that those conclusions should
be accurately stated and kept in public view.

In the first place, the destructiveness of war waged on the scale and
with the intensity which conscript armies, the new means of
transportation and communication, the new artillery, the aeroplanes, the
high explosives, and the continuity of the fighting on battle fronts of
unexampled length, by night as well as by day, and in stormy and wintry
as well as moderate weather, make possible, has proved to be beyond all
power of computation, and could not have been imagined in advance. Never
before has there been any approach to the vast killing and crippling of
men, the destruction of all sorts of man's structures--buildings,
bridges, viaducts, vessels, and docks--and the physical ruin of
countless women and children. On the seas vessels and cargoes are sunk,
instead of being carried into port as formerly.

Through the ravaging of immense areas of crop-producing lands, the
driving away of the people that lived on them, and the dislocation of
commerce, the food supplies for millions of non-combatants are so
reduced that the rising generation in several countries is impaired on a
scale never approached in any previous war.

In any country which becomes the seat of war an immense destruction of
fixed capital is wrought; and at the same time the quick capital of all
the combatants, accumulated during generations, is thrown into the
furnace of war and consumed unproductively.

In consequence of the enormous size of the national armies and the
withdrawal of the able-bodied men from productive industries, the
industries and commerce of the whole world are seriously interrupted,
whence widespread, incalculable losses to mankind.

These few months of war have emphasized the interdependence of nations
the world over with a stress never before equaled. Neutral nations far
removed from Europe have felt keenly the effects of the war on the
industries and trades by which they live. Men see in this instance that
whatever reduces the buying and consuming capacity of one nation will
probably reduce also the producing and selling capacity of other
nations; and that the gains of commerce and trade are normally mutual,
and not one-sided.

All the contending nations have issued huge loans which will impose
heavy burdens on future generations; and the yield of the first loans
has already been spent or pledged. The first loan issued by the British
Government was nearly twice the national debt of the United States; and
it is supposed that its proceeds will be all spent before next Summer.
Germany has already spent $1,600,000,000 since the war broke out--all
unproductively and most of it for destruction. She will soon have to
issue her second great loan. In short, the waste and ruin have been
without precedent, the destruction of wealth has been enormous, and the
resulting dislocations of finance, industries, and commerce will long
afflict the coming generations in all the belligerent nations.

All the belligerent nations have already demonstrated that neither urban
life, nor the factory system, nor yet corroding luxury has caused in
them any physical or moral deterioration which interferes with their
fighting capacity. The soldiers of these civilized peoples are just as
ready for hand-to-hand encounters with cold steel as any barbarians or
savages have ever been. The primitive combative instincts remain in full
force and can be brought into play by all the belligerents with
facility. The progress of the war should have removed any delusions on
this subject which Germany, Austria-Hungary, or any one of the Allies
may have entertained. The Belgians, a well-to-do town people, and the
Serbians, a poor rural population, best illustrate this continuity of
the martial qualities; for the Belgians faced overwhelming odds, and the
Serbians have twice driven back large Austrian forces, although they
have a transport by oxen only, an elementary commissariat, no medical or
surgical supplies to speak of, and scanty munitions of war. On the other
hand, the principal combatants have proved that with money enough they
can all use effectively the new methods of war administration and the
new implements for destruction. These facts suggest that the war might
be much prolonged without yielding any results more decisive than those
it has already yielded; indeed, that its most probable outcome is a
stalemate--unless new combatants enter the field.

Fear of Russian invasion seemed at first to prompt Germany to war; but
now Germany has amply demonstrated that she has no reason to look with
any keen apprehension on possible Russian aggression upon her territory,
and that her military organization is adequate for defense against any
attack from any quarter. The military experience of the last seven
months proves that the defense, by the temporary intrenchment method,
has a great advantage over the attack; so that in future wars the
aggressor will always be liable to find himself at a serious
disadvantage, even if his victim is imperfectly prepared.

These same pregnant months have also proved that armies can be assembled
and put into the field in effective condition in a much shorter time
than has heretofore been supposed to be possible; provided there be
plenty of money to meet the cost of equipment, transportation, and
supplies. Hence, the advantages of maintaining huge active armies, ready
for instant attack or defense, will hereafter be less considerable than
they have been supposed to be--if the declaration of war by surprise, as
in August last, can hereafter be prevented. These considerations, taken
in connection with the probable inefficacy against modern artillery of
elaborate fortifications, suggest the possibility of a reduction
throughout Europe of the peace-footing armies. It is conceivable that
the Swiss militia system should satisfy the future needs of most of the
European States.

Another important result of the colossal war has been achieved in these
seven months. It has been demonstrated that no single nation in any part
of the world can dominate the other nations, or, indeed, any other
nation, unless the other principal powers consent to that domination;
and, in the present state of the world, it is quite clear that no such
domination will be consented to. As soon as this proposition is accepted
by all the combatants, this war, and perhaps all war between civilized
nations, will cease. It is obvious that in the interest of mankind the
war ought not to cease until Germany is convinced that her ambition for
empire in Europe and the world cannot be gratified. _Deutschland über
alles_ can survive as a shout of patriotic enthusiasm; but as a maxim of
international policy it is dead already, and should be buried out of the
sight and memory of men.

It has, moreover, become plain that the progress in civilization of the
white race is to depend not on the supreme power of any one nation,
forcing its peculiar civilization on other nations, but on the peaceful
development of many different nationalities, each making contributions
of its own to the progress of the whole, and each developing a social,
industrial, and governmental order of its own, suited to its territory,
traditions, resources, and natural capacities.

The chronic irritations in Europe which contributed to the outbreak of
the war and the war itself have emphasized the value and the toughness
of natural national units, both large and small, and the inexpediency of
artificially dividing such units, or of forcing natural units into
unnatural associations. These principles are now firmly established in
the public opinion of Europe and America. No matter how much longer the
present war may last, no settlement will afford any prospect of lasting
peace in Europe which does not take just account of these principles.
Already the war has demonstrated that just consideration of national
feelings, racial kinship, and common commercial interests would lead to
three fresh groupings in Europe--one of the Scandinavian countries, one
of the three sections into which Poland has been divided, and one of the
Balkan States which have a strong sense of Slavic kinship. In the case
of Scandinavia and the Balkan States the bond might be nothing more than
a common tariff with common ports and harbor regulations; but Poland
needs to be reconstructed as a separate kingdom. Thoroughly to remove
political sores which have been running for more than forty years, the
people of Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine should also be allowed
to determine by free vote their national allegiance. Whether the war
ends in victory for the Allies, or in a draw or deadlock with neither
party victorious and neither humiliated, these new national adjustments
will be necessary to permanent peace in Europe. All the wars in Europe
since 1864 unite in demonstrating that necessity.

Again, the war has already demonstrated that colonies or colonial
possessions in remote parts of the world are not a source of strength to
a European nation when at war, unless that nation is strong on the
seas. Affiliated Commonwealths may be a support to the mother country,
but colonies held by force in exclusive possession are not. Great
Britain learned much in 1775 about the management of colonies, and again
she learned in India that the policy of exploitation, long pursued by
the East India Company, had become undesirable from every point of view.
As the strongest naval power in the world, Great Britain has given an
admiral example of the right use of power in making the seas and harbors
of the world free to the mercantile marine of all the nations with which
she competes. Her free-trade policy helped her to wise action on the
subject of commercial extension. Nevertheless, the other commercial
nations, watching the tremendous power in war which Great Britain
possesses through her wide, though not complete, control of the oceans,
will rejoice when British control, though limited and wisely used, is
replaced by an unlimited international control. This is one of the most
valuable lessons of the great war.

Another conviction is strongly impressed upon the commercial nations of
the world by the developments of seven months of extensive fighting by
land and sea, namely, the importance of making free to all nations the
Kiel Canal and the passage from the Black Sea to the Aegean. So long as
one nation holds the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, and another nation
holds the short route from the Baltic to the North Sea, there will be
dangerous restrictions on the commerce of the world--dangerous in the
sense of provoking to war, or of causing sores which develop into
malignant disease. Those two channels should be used for the common
benefit of mankind, just as the Panama Canal or the Suez Canal is
intended to be. Free seas, free inter-ocean canals and straits, the
"open door," and free competition in international trade are needed
securities for peace.

These lessons of the war are as plain now as they will be after six
months or six years more fighting. Can the belligerent nations--and
particularly Germany--take them to heart now, or must more millions of
men be slaughtered and more billions of human savings be consumed
before these teachings of seven fearful months be accepted?

For a great attainable object such dreadful losses and sufferings as
continuation of the war entails might perhaps be borne; but the last
seven months have proved that the objects with which Austria-Hungary and
Germany went to war are unattainable in the present state of Europe.
Austria-Hungary, even with the active aid of Germany and Turkey, cannot
prevail in Serbia against the active or passive resistance of Serbia,
Russia, Rumania, Greece, Italy, France, and Great Britain. Germany
cannot crush France supported by Great Britain and Russia, or keep
Belgium, except as a subject and hostile province, and in defiance of
the public opinion of the civilized world. In seven months Great
Britain and France have made up for their lack of preparedness and have
brought the military operations of Germany in France to a standstill. On
the other hand, Great Britain and France must already realize that they
cannot drive the German armies out of France and Belgium without a
sacrifice of blood and treasure from which the stoutest hearts may well

Has not the war already demonstrated that jealous and hostile coalitions
armed to the teeth will surely bring on Europe not peace and advancing
civilization, but savage war and an arrest of civilization? Has it not
already proved that Europe needs one comprehensive union or federation
competent to procure and keep for Europe peace through justice? There is
no alternative except more war.




Translation by Florence Simmonds.

[From King Albert's Book.]

Once upon a time there lived a King and a Queen....

Indeed, it would be the most touching and edifying fairy-tale
imaginable, this true story of H.M. Albert I. and H.M. Queen Elizabeth.

It would tell of their quiet and noble devotion to their daily tasks, of
the purity of their happy family life....

Suddenly, the devil would intervene, with his threats and his offers....

Then we should hear of the sovereigns and the people of Belgium agreeing
at once in their sense of honor and heroism.

Then the dastardly invasion, and the innumerable host of infernal
spirits breathing out sulphur, belching torrents of iron, and raining
fire; city dwellings transformed into the shattered columns of
cemeteries; innocent creatures tortured and victimized; and the King and
Queen with their kingdom reduced to a sandhill on the shore, and the
remnant of their valiant army around them.

And at last, at last! That turn of the tide which all humanity worthy of
the name desires so ardently, and which even the baser sort now sees to
be surely approaching.

At this point in the story, at this page of the legendary tale, how the
children would clap their hands, with all that love of justice innate in
children, and how the faces of worthy parents would beam with the
approval of satisfied consciences!

And in the future, those who contemplate the royal arms with the pious
admiration due to them, will see a blooming rose side by side with the
lion of Belgium, typifying the immortal share of H.M. Queen Elizabeth in
the glory of H.M. Albert I.


[German Cartoon]

The American Protest

[Illustration: _--From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin._

JOHN BULL: "Now, what's he throwing at me for? A little bit of piracy is
no reason for getting bad-tempered."]

[French Cartoon]

The Peasant and the War

[Illustration: _--From Le Rire, Paris_

"Confound their infernal shells! If a feller didn't have to work it
would be better to stay home these days."]

[German Cartoon]


[Illustration: _--From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin._

[This cartoon was published on the Kaiser's birthday, Jan. 27, 1915.]]

[English Cartoon]

"The Outcast"

[Illustration: _--From Punch, London._

A place in the shadow.]

[Italian Cartoon]

The Dream of a Madman

[Illustration: _--From L'Asino, Rome._

WILLIAM: "Attention! Forward! March! One--two...."]

[German Cartoon]

Night Scene in Trafalgar Square

[Illustration: _--From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin._

"Goddam, Mister Nelson! What are you looking for down here?"

"Well, just suppose you stay up there for a while among the Zeppelins

[English Cartoon]

The Riddle of the Sands

[Illustration: _--From Punch, London._

TURKISH CAMEL: "Where to?"


TURKISH CAMEL: "Guess again."]

[German Cartoon]

The Theatre in the Field

[Illustration: THE ENGLISH THEATRE IN THE FIELD--"With the permission of
French and Kitchener, Hicks's Operetta Company went from London to the
front and played before the British soldiers."]

[Illustration: THE GERMAN THEATRE IN THE FIELD--"Major Walter Kirchoff
(of the Royal Opera House). Lieutenant Hall Wegener (of the German
Theatre). Dispatch Rider, Carl Clewing (of the Royal Playhouse)."

_--From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin._]

[English Cartoon]

Trench Amenities

[Illustration: _--From Punch, London._

BRITISH TOMMY (returning to trench in which he has lately been fighting,
now temporarily occupied by the enemy): "Excuse me--any of you blighters
seen my pipe?"]

[Italian Cartoon]

Quo Vadis?

[Illustration: _--From L'Asino, Rome._]

[German Cartoon]

The Gutter Snipes

[Illustration: _--From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin._]

[German Cartoon]

A London Family Scene

[Illustration: _--From Meggendorfer-Blaetter, Munich._

(A favorite theme of German cartoonists is England's supposed mortal
terror of Zeppelins.)]

[English Cartoon]

The Dissemblers

[Illustration: --_From Punch, London._

EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA: "Now what do we really want to say?"

SULTAN OF TURKEY: "Well, of course we couldn't say that; not on his

[German Cartoon]

Lord Kitchener Wants You!

[Illustration: _--From Simplicissimus, Munich._

"Lord Kitchener needs recruits!"]

[English Cartoon]


[Illustration: _--From The Sketch, London._

GERMAN OFFICIAL REPORT: "Our progress is maintained."]

[German Cartoon]

A Shaky Affair

[Illustration: _--From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin._

THE TRIPLE VICTORY: "Confound it, there goes another pillar."]

[English Cartoon]

The Return of the Raider

[Illustration: _--From Punch, London._

KAISER: "Well, I _AM_ surprised!"

TIRPITZ: "So were we."]

[Italian Cartoon]

What Is There Inside?

[Illustration: _--From L'Asino, Rome._

(The words that the observer has uncovered are as follows: _Militarism,
Religious Mania, Megalomania, Loquacity, Homicidal Mania, Imperialism,

[English Cartoon]

"Sound and Fury"

[Illustration: _--From Punch, London._

KAISER: "Is all my high seas fleet safely locked up?"

ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ: "Practically all, Sire."

KAISER: "Then let the starvation of England begin!"]

[English Cartoon]

The Flight That Failed

[Illustration: _--From Punch, London._

THE EMPEROR: "What! No babes, sirrah?"

THE MURDERER: "Alas, Sire, none."

THE EMPEROR: "Well, then, no babes, no iron crosses."]

[English Cartoon]

"A Fortified Town"

[Illustration: _--From The Sketch, London._

A. Little Muddlecome, as known to its inhabitants.

B. Little Muddlecome, the fortified town--according to Germany.]

[South African Cartoon]

No Family Resemblance

[Illustration: _--From The Cape Times, Cape Town, South Africa._

THE GERMAN EAGLE (tearfully): "As bird to bird--surely _you_ won't
desert me?"

THE AMERICAN EAGLE: "Desert you! I'm an eagle, not a vulture!"]

The Chances of Peace and the Problem of Poland

By J. Ellis Barker

[_From The Nineteenth Century and After, Leonard Scott Publishing

A century ago, at the Congress of Vienna, the question of Poland proved
extremely difficult to solve. It produced dangerous friction among the
assembled powers, and threatened to lead to the break-up of the
congress. The position became so threatening that, on the 3d of January,
1815, Austria, Great Britain, and France felt compelled to conclude a
secret separate alliance directed against Prussia and Russia, the allies
of Austria and Great Britain in the war against Napoleon. Precautionary
troop movements began, and war among the allies might have broken out
had not, shortly afterward, Napoleon quitted Elba and landed in France.
Fear of the great Corsican reunited the powers.

Because of the great and conflicting interests involved, the question of
Poland may prove of similar importance and difficulty at the congress
which will conclude the present war. Hence, it seems desirable to
consider it carefully and in good time. It is true that the study of the
Polish problem does not seem to be very urgent at the present moment. In
view of the slow progress of the Allies in the east and west, it appears
that the war will be long drawn out. Still, it is quite possible that it
will come to an early and sudden end. Austria-Hungary is visibly tiring
of the hopeless struggle into which she was plunged by Germany, and
which hitherto has brought her nothing but loss, disgrace, and disaster.
After all, the war is bound to end earlier or later in an Austro-German
defeat, and if it should be fought to the bitter end Austria-Hungary
will obviously suffer far more severely than will Germany. A protracted
war, which would lead merely to the lasting impoverishment of Germany,
would bring about the economic annihilation of impecunious Austria.
Besides, while a complete defeat would cause to Germany only the loss of
territories in the east, west, and north which are largely inhabited by
disaffected Poles, Frenchmen, and Danes, and would not very greatly
reduce the purely German population of Germany, it would probably result
in the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy, which lacks a homogeneous
population, and it might lead to Austria's disappearance as a great
State. If complete disaster should overwhelm the empire of Francis
Joseph, Hungary would undoubtedly make herself independent. The Dual
Monarchy would become a heap of wreckage, and in the end the German
parts of Austria would probably become a German province, Vienna a
provincial Prussian town, the proud Hapsburgs subordinate German
princelings. If, on the other hand, Austria-Hungary should make quickly
a separate peace with her opponents, she would presumably lose only the
Polish parts of Galicia to the new kingdom of Poland, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina to Serbia; and she might receive most satisfactory
compensation for these losses by the acquisition of the German parts of
Silesia and by the adherence of the largely Roman Catholic South German
States, which have far more in common with Austria than with Protestant
Prussia. As a result of the war, Austria-Hungary might be greatly
strengthened at Germany's cost, provided the monarchy makes peace
without delay. In any case, only by an early peace can the bulk of the
lands of the Hapsburgs be preserved for the ruling house, and can
national bankruptcy be avoided. There is an excellent and most valuable
precedent for such action on Austria's part. Bismarck laid down the
essence of statesmanship in the maxim "Salus Publica Suprema Lex," and
defined in his memoirs the binding power of treaties of alliance by the
phrase "Ultra posse nemo obligatur." Referring particularly to the
Austro-German alliance, he wrote that "no nation is obliged to sacrifice
its existence on the altar of treaty fidelity." Before long the Dual
Monarchy may take advantage of Bismarck's teaching. After all, it cannot
be expected that she should go beyond her strength, and that she should
ruin herself for the sake of Germany, especially as she cannot thereby
save that country from inevitable defeat. Austria-Hungary should feel
particularly strongly impelled to ask for peace without delay, as her
recent and most disastrous defeat in Serbia has exasperated the people
and threatens to lead to risings and revolts not only in the Slavonic
parts of the monarchy but also in Hungary. Civil war may be said to be
in sight.

The Dual Monarchy is threatened besides by the dubious and expectant
attitude of Italy and Rumania. If Austria-Hungary should hesitate much
longer to make peace, Italy and Rumania may find a sufficient pretext
for war and may join the Entente powers. Italy naturally desires to
acquire the valuable Italian portions of Austria-Hungary on her borders,
and Rumania the very extensive Rumanian parts of the Dual Monarchy
adjoining that kingdom. To both powers it would be disastrous if
Austria-Hungary should make peace before they had staked out their
claims by militarily occupying the territory which they covet. Both
States may therefore be expected to abandon their neutrality and to
invade Austria-Hungary without delay as soon as they hear that that
country seriously contemplates entering upon peace negotiations; it
follows that if Austria-Hungary wishes to withdraw from the stricken
field she must open negotiations with the utmost secrecy and conclude
them with the utmost speed. It is clear that if Italy and Rumania should
be given the much desired opportunity of joining the Entente powers,
the Dual Monarchy would lose not only Polish Galicia and Serbian Bosnia
and Herzegovina but Rumanian Transylvania and the Banat, with about
5,000,000 inhabitants, and the largely Italian Trentino, Istria, and
Dalmatia, with at least 1,000,000 people, as well. These vast losses
would probably lead to the total dismemberment of the State, for the
remaining subject nationalities would also demand their freedom.
Self-preservation is the first law and the first duty of individuals and
of States. It is therefore conceivable, and is indeed only logical, that
Austria-Hungary will conclude overnight a separate peace. If she should
take that wise and necessary step, isolated Germany would either have to
give up the unequal struggle or fight on single-handed. In the latter
case, her defeat would no doubt be rapid. It seems, therefore, quite
possible that the end of the war may be as sudden as was its beginning.
Hence, the consideration of the Polish question seems not only useful
but urgent....

From the very beginning Prussia, Austria, and Russia treated Poland as a
corpus vile, and cut it up like a cake, without any regard to the
claims, the rights, and the protests of the Poles themselves. Although
history only mentions three partitions, there were in reality seven.
There were those of 1772, 1793, and 1795, already referred to; and these
were followed by a redistribution of the Polish territories in 1807,
1809, and 1815. In none of these were the inhabitants consulted or even
considered. The Congress of Vienna established the independence of
Cracow, but Austria-Hungary, asserting that she considered herself
"threatened" by the existence of that tiny State, seized it in 1846.

While Prussia, Austria, and Russia, considering that might was right,
had divided Poland among themselves, regardless of the passionate
protests of the inhabitants, England had remained a spectator, but not a
passive one, of the tragedy. She viewed the action of the allies with
strong disapproval, but although she gave frank expression to her
sentiments, she did not actively interfere. After all, no English
interests were involved in the partition. It was not her business to
intervene. Besides, she could not successfully have opposed
single-handed the joint action of the three powerful partner States,
especially as France, under the weak Louis XV., held aloof. However,
English statesmen refused to consider as valid the five partitions which
took place before and during the Napoleonic era.

The Treaty of Chaumont of 1814 created the Concert of Europe. At the
Congress of Vienna of 1815 the frontiers of Europe were fixed by general
consent. As Prussia, Austria, and Russia refused to recreate an
independent Poland, England's opposition would have broken up the
concert, and might have led to further wars. Unable to prevent the
injustice done to Poland by her opposition, and anxious to maintain the
unity of the powers and the peace of the world, England consented at
last to consider the partition of Poland as a fait accompli, and
formally recognized it, especially as the Treaty of Vienna assured the
Poles of just and fair treatment under representative institutions.
Article I. of the Treaty of Vienna stated expressly:

     Les Polonais, sujets respectifs de la Russie, de l'Autriche et
     de la Prusse, obtiendront une représentation et des
     institutions nationales réglées d'après le mode d'existence
     politique que chacun des gouvernements auxquels ils
     appartiennent jugera utile et convenable de leur accorder.

By signing the Treaty of Vienna, England recognized not explicitly, but
merely implicitly, the partition of Poland, and she did so unwillingly
and under protest. Lord Castlereagh stated in a circular note addressed
to Russia, Prussia, and Austria, that it had always been England's
desire that an independent Poland, possessing a dynasty of its own,
should be established, which, separating Austria, Russia, and Prussia,
should act as a buffer State between them; that, failing its creation,
the Poles should be reconciled to being dominated by foreigners, by just
and liberal treatment which alone would make them satisfied. His note,
which is most remarkable for its far-sightedness, wisdom, force, and
restraint, was worded as follows:

     The undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary
     of State for Foreign Affairs and Plenipotentiary to the
     Congress of Vienna, in desiring the present note concerning
     the affairs of Poland may be entered on the protocol, has no
     intention to revive controversy or to impede the progress of
     the arrangements now in contemplation. His only object is to
     avail himself of this occasion of temperately recording, by
     the express orders of his Court, the sentiments of the British
     Government upon a European question of the utmost magnitude
     and influence.

     The undersigned has had occasion in the course of the
     discussions at Vienna, for reasons that need not be gone into,
     repeatedly and earnestly to oppose himself, on the part of his
     Court, to the erection of a Polish Kingdom in union with and
     making part of the Imperial Crown of Russia.

     The desire of his Court to see an independent power, more or
     less considerable in extent, established in Poland under a
     distinct dynasty, and as an intermediate State between the
     three great monarchies, has uniformly been avowed, and if the
     undersigned has not been directed to press such a measure, it
     has only arisen from a disinclination to excite, under all the
     apparent obstacles to such an arrangement, expectations which
     might prove an unavailing source of discontent among the

     The Emperor of Russia continuing, as it is declared, still to
     adhere to his purpose of erecting that part of the Duchy of
     Warsaw which is to fall under his Imperial majesty's dominion,
     together with his other Polish provinces, either in whole or
     in part, into a kingdom under the Russian sceptre; and their
     Austrian and Prussian Majesties, the sovereigns most
     immediately interested, having ceased to oppose themselves to
     such an arrangement--the undersigned adhering, nevertheless,
     to all his former representations on this subject has only
     sincerely to hope that none of those evils may result from
     this measure to the tranquillity of the North, and to the
     general equilibrium of Europe, which it has been his painful
     duty to anticipate. But in order to obviate as far as possible
     such consequences, it is of essential importance to establish
     the public tranquillity throughout the territories which
     formerly constituted the Kingdom of Poland, upon some solid
     and liberal basis of common interest, by applying to all,
     however various may be their political institutions, a
     congenial and conciliatory system of administration.

     Experience has proved that it is not by counteracting all
     their habits and usages as a people that either the happiness
     of the Poles, or the peace of that important portion of
     Europe, can be preserved. A fruitless attempt, too long
     persevered in, by institutions foreign to their manner and
     sentiments to make them forget their existence, and even
     language, as a people, has been sufficiently tried and failed.
     It has only tended to excite a sentiment of discontent and
     self-degradation, and can never operate otherwise than to
     provoke commotion and to awaken them to a recollection of past

     [Illustration: [map]]

     The undersigned, for these reasons, and in cordial concurrence
     with the general sentiments which he has had the satisfaction
     to observe the respective Cabinets entertained on this
     subject, ardently desires that the illustrious monarchs to
     whom the destinies of the Polish Nation are confided, may be
     induced, before they depart from Vienna, to take an engagement
     with each other to treat as Poles, under whatever form of
     political institution they may think fit to govern them, the
     portions of that nation that may be placed under their
     respective sovereignties. The knowledge of such a
     determination will best tend to conciliate the general
     sentiment to their rule, and to do honor to the several
     sovereigns in the eyes of their Polish subjects. This course
     will consequently afford the surest prospect of their living
     peaceably and contentedly under their respective

This dispatch was sent on the 12th of January, 1815, exactly a century
ago. The warnings were not heeded and the past century has been filled
with sorrow for the Poles and with risings and revolutions, as Lord
Castlereagh clearly foretold....

In Western Russia, in Eastern Prussia, and in Galicia there dwell about
20,000,000 Poles. If the war should end, as it is likely to end, in a
Russian victory, a powerful kingdom of Poland will arise. According to
the carefully worded manifesto of the Grand Duke the united Poles will
receive full self-government under the protection of Russia. They will
be enabled to develop their nationality, but it seems scarcely likely
that they will receive entire and absolute independence. Their position
will probably resemble that of Quebec in Canada, or of Bavaria in
Germany, and if the Russians and Poles act wisely they will live as
harmoniously together as do the French-speaking "habitants" of Quebec
and the English-speaking men of the other provinces of Canada. Russia
need not fear that Poland will make herself entirely independent, and
only the most hot-headed and short-sighted Poles can wish for complete
independence. Poland, having developed extremely important manufacturing
industries, requires large free markets for their output. Her natural
market is Russia, for Germany has industrial centres of her own. She can
expect to have the free use of the precious Russian markets only as long
as she forms part of that great State. At present, a spirit of the
heartiest good-will prevails between Russians and Poles. The old
quarrels and grievances have been forgotten in the common struggle. The
moment is most auspicious for the resurrection of Poland.

While Prussia has been guilty of the partition of Poland, Russia is
largely to blame for the repeated revolts and insurrection of her Polish

When the peace conditions come up for discussion at the congress which
will bring the present war to an end--and that event may be nearer than
most men think--the problem of Poland will be one of the greatest
difficulty and importance. Austria-Hungary has comparatively little
interest in retaining her Poles. The Austrian Poles dwell in Galicia
outside the great rampart of the Carpathian Mountains, which form the
natural frontier of the Dual Monarchy toward the northeast. The loss of
Galicia, with its oilfields and mines, may be regrettable to
Austria-Hungary, but it will not affect her very seriously. To Germany,
on the other hand, the loss of the Polish districts will be a fearful
blow. The supreme importance which Germany attaches to the Polish
problem may be seen from this, that Bismarck thought it the only
question which could lead to an open breach between Germany and
Austria-Hungary. According to Crispi's Memoirs, Bismarck said to the
Italian statesman on the 17th of September, 1877:

     There could be but one cause for a breach in the friendship
     that unites Austria and Germany, and that would be a
     disagreement between the two Governments concerning Polish
     policy.... If a Polish rebellion should break out and Austria
     should lend it her support, we should be obliged to assert
     ourselves. We cannot permit the reconstruction of a Catholic
     kingdom so near at hand. It would be a Northern France. We
     have one France to look to already, and a second would become
     the natural ally of the first, and we should find ourselves
     entrapped between two enemies.

     The resurrection of Poland would injure us in other ways as
     well. It could not come about without the loss of a part of
     our territory. We cannot possibly relinquish either Posen or
     Dantsic, because the German Empire would remain exposed on the
     Russian frontier, and we should lose an outlet on the Baltic.

In the event of Germany's defeat a large slice of Poland, including the
wealthiest parts of Silesia, with gigantic coal mines, iron works, &c.,
would be taken away from her, and if the Poles should recover their
ancient province of West Prussia, with Dantsic, Prussia's hold upon East
Prussia, with Königsberg, would be threatened. The loss of her Polish
districts would obviously greatly reduce Germany's military strength and
economic power. It may therefore be expected that Germany will move
heaven and earth against the re-creation of the Kingdom of Poland, and
that she will strenuously endeavor to create differences between Russia
and her allies. The statesmen of Europe should therefore, in good time,
firmly make up their minds as to the future of Poland.




[From King Albert's Book.]

    _... donec templa refeceris_

    Under which banner? It was night
      Beyond all nights that ever were.
    The Cross was broken. Blood-stained might
      Moved like a tiger from its lair;
    And all that heaven had died to quell
    Awoke, and mingled earth with hell.

    For Europe, if it held a creed,
      Held it through custom, not through faith.
    Chaos returned, in dream and deed.
      Right was a legend; Love--a wraith;
    And That from which the world began
    Was less than even the best in man.

    God in the image of a Snake
      Dethroned that dream, too fond, too blind,
    The man-shaped God whose heart could break,
      Live, die, and triumph with mankind.
    A Super-snake, a Juggernaut,
    Dethroned the highest of human thought.

    The lists were set. The eternal foe
      Within us as without grew strong,
    By many a super-subtle blow
      Blurring the lines of right and wrong
    In Art and Thought, till nought seemed true
    But that soul-slaughtering cry of New!

    New wreckage of the shrines we made
      Thro' centuries of forgotten tears ...
    We knew not where their scorn had laid
      Our Master. Twice a thousand years
    Had dulled the uncapricious Sun.
    Manifold worlds obscured the One;

    Obscured the reign of Law, our stay,
      Our compass through this darking sea,
    The one sure light, the one sure way,
      The one firm base of Liberty:
    The one firm road that men have trod
    Through Chaos to the Throne of God.

    Choose ye, a hundred legions cried,
      Dishonor or the instant sword!
    Ye chose. Ye met that blood-stained tide.
      A little kingdom kept its word;
    And, dying, cried across the night,
    Hear us, O earth, we chose the Right!

    Whose is the victory? Though ye stood
      Alone against the unmeasured foe;
    By all the tears, by all the blood
      That flowed, and have not ceased to flow;
    By all the legions that ye hurled:
    Back, thro' the thunder-shaken world;

    By the old that have not where to rest,
      By the lands laid waste and hearths defiled;
    By every lacerated breast,
      And every mutilated child,
    Whose is the victory? Answer ye,
    Who, dying, smiled at tyranny?

    Under the sky's triumphal arch
      The glories of the dawn begin.
    Our dead, our shadowy armies march
      E'en now, in silence, through Berlin;
    Dumb shadows, tattered, blood-stained ghosts
    But cast by what swift following hosts?

    And answer, England! At thy side,
      Thro' seas of blood, thro' mists of tears,
    Thou that for Liberty hast died
      And livest, to the end of years!
    And answer, Earth! Far off, I hear
    The peans of a happier sphere:

    The trumpet blown at Marathon
      Resounded over earth and sea,
    But burning angel lips have blown
      The trumpets of thy Liberty;
    For who, beside thy dead, could deem
    The faith, for which they died, a dream?

    Earth has not been the same since then.
      Europe from thee received a soul,
    Whence nations moved in law, like men,
      As members of a mightier whole,
    Till wars were ended.... In that day,
    So shall our children's children say.

Germany Will End the War

Only When a Peace Treaty Shall Assure Her Power

By Maximilian Harden

     Maximilian Harden, who in the following article sets forth the
     ends which Germany is striving to accomplish in the war, is
     the George Bernard Shaw of Germany. He is considered the
     leading German editor and an expert in Germany on foreign
     politics. As editor and proprietor of Die Zukunft, his fiery,
     brooding spirit and keen insight and wit, coupled with powers
     of satire and caricature, made him a solitary and striking
     independent figure in the German press years before the other
     newspapers of Germany dared to criticise or attack the
     Government or the persons at the head of it.

     After the dismissal of Prince Bismarck by the present Kaiser,
     Harden not only saw, but constantly and audaciously
     criticised, the weaknesses in the character of the Emperor.
     For this dangerous undertaking he was three times brought to
     trial for lèse majesté, and spent a year as a prisoner in a
     Prussian fortress. In 1907 he figured in a libel suit brought
     by General Kuno von Moltke, late Military Governor of Berlin,
     who, together with Count Zu Eulenburg and Count Wilhelm von
     Hohenau, one of the Emperor's Adjutants, had been mentioned by
     Harden in his paper as members of the so-called Camarilla or
     "Round Table" that sought to influence the Emperor's political
     actions by subtle manipulations. He was sentenced to four
     months' imprisonment, but appealed the case, and was let off
     two years later with a fine of $150.

     In recently publishing the German article which is herewith
     translated the German New Vorker Revue carefully disclaimed
     any agreement with the sentiments therein expressed by Harden,
     which, it pointed out, must be regarded only as typical of
     German public opinion as is George Bernard Shaw of public
     opinion in England.

The scorners of war, the blonde, black, and gray children who have been
defiling his name with syrupy tongues of lofty humanity and with
slanderous scoldings, all have become silent. Or else they snort
soldiers' songs; annihilate in confused little essays the allied powers
arrayed against us; entreat a civilized world (Kulturwelt) juggling for
mere turkey heads, to please grant us permission to do heavy and cruel
deeds, to wage fierce and headlong war! Already they seem prepared to
answer absolutely and unqualifiedly in the affirmative Luther's question
whether "men of war also can be considered in a state of grace."

They write and talk much about the great scourge of war. That is all
quite true. But we should also bear in mind how much greater is the
scourge which is fended off by war. The sum and substance of the matter
is this: In looking upon the office of war one must not consider how it
strangles, burns, destroys. For that is what the simple eyes of children
do which do not further watch the surgeon when he chops off a hand or
saws off a leg; which do not see or perceive that it is a matter of
saving the entire body. So we must look upon the office of war and of
the sword with the eyes of men, and understand why it strangles and why
it wreaks cruel deeds. Then it will justify itself and prove of its own
accord that it is an office divine in itself, and as necessary and
useful to the world as is eating, drinking, or any other work. But that
some there are who abuse the office of war, who strangle and destroy
without need, out of sheer wantonness--that is not the fault of the
office, but of the person. Is there any office, work, or thing so good
that wicked and wanton persons will not abuse it?

The organ tone of such words as these at last rolls forth once more in
their native land.

Therefore cease the pitiful attempts to excuse Germany's action. No
longer wail to strangers, who do not care to hear you, telling them how
dear to us were the smiles of peace we had smeared like rouge upon our
lips, and how deeply we regret in our hearts that the treachery of
conspirators dragged us, unwilling, into a forced war. Cease, you
publicists, your wordy war against hostile brothers in the profession,
whose superiority you cannot scold away, and who merely smile while they
pick up, out of your laboriously stirred porridge slowly warmed over a
flame of borrowed alcohol, the crumbs on which their "selfishness" is to
choke! That national selfishness does not seem a duty to you, but a sin,
is something you must conceal from foreign eyes.

Cease, also, you popular writers, the degraded scolding of enemies that
does not emanate from passion but out of greedy hankering for the
applause of the masses, and which continually nauseates us amid the
piety of this hour! Because our statemen failed to discover and foil
shrewd plans of deception is no reason why we may hoist the flag of most
pious morality. Not as weak-willed blunderers have we undertaken the
fearful risk of this war. We wanted it. Because we had to wish it and
could wish it. May the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose pleas
for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty experience. We do
not stand, and shall not place ourselves, before the court of Europe.
Our power shall create new law in Europe. Germany strikes. If it
conquers new realms for its genius, the priesthood of all the gods will
sing songs of praise to the good war.

Only he who is specially trained for a race of troops may go along into
the field. Only the man versed in statecraft should be allowed to
participate in the talk about the results of war. Not he who has out
yonder proved an unworthy diplomat, nor the dilettante loafer sprayed
with the perfume of volatile emotions. Manhood liability to military
service requires manhood suffrage? That question may rest for the time
being; likewise the desire for equality of that right shall not be
argued today. But common sense should warn against the assumption of an
office without the slightest special preliminary training. Politics is
an art that can be mastered not in the leisure hours of the brain, but
only by the passionate, self-sacrificing devotion of a whole lifetime.
Now seek around you.

We are at the beginning of a war the development and duration of which
are incalculable, and in which up to date no foe has been brought to his
knees. To guide the sword to its goal, Tom, Dick, and Harry, Poet
Arrogance and Professor Crumb advertise their prowess in the newspaper
Advice and Assistance. Brave folk, whose knowledge concerning this new
realm of their endeavor emanates solely from that same newspaper!
Because they have for three months been busily reading their morning,
noon, and evening editions, they think they have a special call to
speak. Without knowledge of things that have transpired before, without
knowledge of the persons concerned, without a suspicion of the needs of
the situation and its possibilities, they judge the peoples of the earth
and divide the world. Stupid talk, with which irreverent officiousness
seeks to while away and shorten the period of anxious waiting for
customers; but to prepare quietly and wisely and mightily in advance for
terms of peace, that is the duty of the statesman.

We are waging this war not in order to punish those who have sinned, nor
in order to free enslaved peoples and thereafter to comfort ourselves
with the unselfish and useless consciousness of our own righteousness.
We wage it from the lofty point of view and with the conviction that
Germany, as a result of her achievements and in proportion to them, is
justified in asking, and must obtain, wider room on earth for
development and for working out the possibilities that are in her. The
powers from whom she forced her ascendency, in spite of themselves,
still live, and some of them have recovered from the weakening she gave
them. Spain and the Netherlands, Rome and Hapsburg, France and England,
possessed and settled and ruled great stretches of the most fruitful
soil. Now strikes the hour for Germany's rising power. The terms of a
peace treaty that does not insure this would leave the great effort
unrewarded. Even if it brought dozens of shining billions into the
National Treasury, the fate of Europe would be dependent upon the
United States of America.

We are waging war for ourselves alone; and still we are convinced that
all who desire the good would soon be able to rejoice in the result. For
with this war there must also end the politics that have frightened away
all the upright from entering into intimate relations with the most
powerful Continental empire. We need land, free roads into the ocean,
and for the spirit and language and wares and trade of Germany we need
the same values that are accorded such goods anywhere else.

Only four persons not residents of Essen knew about the new mortar which
the firm of Friedrich Krupp manufactured at its own expense and which
later, because its shell rapidly smashed the strongest fortifications of
reinforced concrete, our military authorities promptly acquired. Must we
be ashamed of this instrument of destruction and take from the lips of
the "cultured world" the wry reproach that from "Faust" and the Ninth
Symphony we have sunk our national pride to the 42-centimeter guns? No!
Only firm will and determination to achieve, that is to say, German
power, distinguishes the host of warriors now embattled on the five huge
fields of blood from the race of the poets and thinkers. Their brains,
too, yearn back, throbbing for the realm of the muses. Before the
remains of the Netherland Gothic, before the wonders of Flemish
painting, their eyes light up in pious adoration. From the lips of the
troops that marched from three streets into the parade plaza in Brussels
there burst, when the last man stood in the ranks--and burst
spontaneously--a German song. Out of all the trenches joyous cheers of
thanks rise for the fearless musicmaster who, amid the raging fire,
through horns and trumpets, wrapped in earth-colored gray, leads his
band in blowing marches and battle songs and songs of dancing into the
ears of the Frenchmen, harkening with pleasure.

Not only for the territories that are to feed their children and
grandchildren is this warrior host battling, but also for the
conquering triumph of the German genius, for the forces of sentiment
that rise from Goethe and Beethoven and Bismarck and Schiller and Kant
and Kleist, working on throughout time and eternity.

And never was there a war more just; never one the result of which could
bring such happiness as must this, even for the conquered. In order that
that spirit might conquer we were obliged to forge the mightiest weapons
for it. Over the meadows of the Scheldt is wafted the word of the King:

    How proud I feel my heart flame
    When in every German land
    I find such a warrior band!
    For German land, the German sword!
    Thus be the empire's strength preserved!

This strength was begotten by that spirit. The fashioning of such
weapons was possible only because millions of industrious persons, with
untiring and unremitting labors, transformed the poor Germany into the
rich Germany, which was then able to prepare and conduct the war as a
great industry. And what the spirit created once again serves the
spirit. It shall not lay waste, nor banish us free men into slavery, but
rather it shall call forth to the light of heaven a new, richer soul of
life out of the ruins of a storm-tossed civilization. It shall, it must,
it will conquer new provinces for the majesty of the noble German spirit
(Deutschheit) that never will grow chill and numb, as the Roman did.
Otherwise--and even though unnumbered billions flowed into the
Rhine--the expense of this war would be shamefully wasted.

Our army did not set out to conquer Belgian territory.

In the war against four great powers, the west front of which alone
stretched from the North Sea to the Alps, from Ghent almost to Geneva,
it seemed impossible to achieve on Europe's soil a victory that would
strengthen the roots of the conquering race. Gold cannot indemnify for
the loss of the swarming young life which we were obliged to mourn even
after ten weeks of war; and if, amid ten thousand of the fine fellows
who died, there was even a single creative mind, then thousands of
millions could not pay for its destruction.

And what stretch of land necessary for the German people, or useful in
the real sense of the word, could France or even Russia vacate for us in
Europe? To be "unassailable"--to exchange the soul of a Viking for that
of a New Yorker, that of the quick pike for that of the lazy carp whose
fat back grows moss covered in a dangerless pond--that must never become
the wish of a German. And for the securing of more comfortable frontier
protection only a madman would risk the life that is flourishing in
power and wealth. Now we know what the war is for--not for French,
Polish, Ruthenian, Esthonian, Lettish territories, nor for billions of
money; not in order to dive headlong after the war into the pool of
emotions and then allow the chilled body to rust in the twilight dusk of
the Deliverer of Races.

No! To hoist the storm flag of the empire on the narrow channel that
opens and locks the road into the ocean. I could imagine Germany's war
lord, if, after Ostend, Calais, too, is captured, sending the armies and
fleets back home from the east and front the west, and quietly saying to
our enemies:

"You now have felt what Germany's strength and determination can do, and
hereafter you will probably weigh the matter well before you venture to
attack us. Of you Germany demands nothing further. Not even
reimbursement for its expenses in this war--for those it is reimbursed
by the wholesale terror which it evoked all around in the Autumn
battles. Do you want anything of us? We shall never refuse a challenge
to a quarrel. We shall remain in the Belgian netherland, to which we
shall add the thin strip of coast up to the rear of Calais, (you
Frenchmen have enough better harbors, anyway;) we terminate, of our own
accord, this war which, now that we have safeguarded our honor, can
bring us no other gains; we now return to the joy of fruitful work, and
will grasp the sword again only if you attempt to crowd us out of that
which we have won with our blood. Of a solemn peace conference, with
haggling over terms, parchment, and seal, we have no need. The prisoners
are to be freed. You can keep your fortresses if they do not seem to you
to be worthless, if the rebuilding of them still seems worth while to
you. Tomorrow is again a common day."

Do not lapse into dreams about United States of Europe, about
mild-intentioned division of the Coburg heritage, (a bit of it to
Holland, a bit to Luxemburg, perhaps even a bit to France. Any one with
even the slightest nobility of feeling would reject the proffered dish
of poison with a gesture of disgust,) nor be lulled into delusions of
military and tax conventions that would deprive the country of its free
right of determining its own destiny.

To the Belgians we are the Arch-imp and the Tenant of the Pool of Hell!
We would remain so, even if every stone in Louvain and in Malines were
replaced by its equivalent in gold. That rage can be overcome only after
the race, praised by Schiller's fiery breath, sees its neighbors close
at hand and draws advantage from intimate relations with them. Antwerp
not pitted against, but working with, Hamburg and Bremen; Liège, side by
side with Essen's, Berlin's, and Swabia's gun factories--Cockerill in
combination with Krupp; iron, coal, woven stuff from old Germany and
Belgium, introduced into the markets of the world by one and the same
commercial spirit; our Kamerun and their Congo--such a warm blaze of
advantage has burned away many a hatred. The wise man wins as his friend
the deadly foe whose skull he cannot split, and he will rather rule and
allow to feast on exceptional dainties this still cold and shy new
friend than lose potential well-wishers of incalculable future

Only, never again a withered Reichsland! (imperial territory.) From
Calais to Antwerp, Flanders, Limburg, Brabant, to behind the line of the
Meuse forts, Prussian! (German Princes no longer haggle, German tribes
no longer envy one another;) the Southern triangle with Alsace and
Lorraine--and Luxemburg, too, if it desires--is to be an independent
federated State, intrusted to a Catholic noble house. Then Germany would
know for what it shed its blood.

We need land for our industries, a road into the ocean, an undivided
colony, the assurance of a supply of raw materials and the most fertile
well-spring of prosperity--a people industrious and efficient in its

Here they are: Ore and copper, glass and sugar, flax and wool. But here,
too, there once lived Jan and Hubert van Eyck, Rubens, the reveler
Ruysbroek, and Jordeans of the avid eyes. Here there always lived--to be
sure,-in twilight--Germania's little soul, fluttering imagination.

And is there not here, too, that which--all too stormily and, as a
rule, in all too harsh a tone of abuse--every German heart yearns for, a
victory over England? On the seas such victory cannot be quickly won,
indeed; can, indeed, never be won without great sacrifice. But with the
German Empire, whose mortars loom threatening from one coast of the
Channel, whose flag floats over the two greatest harbors of Europe and
over the Congo basin--England would have to come into a friendly
agreement as a power of equal strength, entitled to equal rights. If it
is unwilling to do so? Lion, leap! On our young soil we await thee! The
day of adventure wanes. But for the German who dares unafraid to desire
things the harvest labor of heroic warriors has quickly filled the


[By The Associated Press.]

LONDON, March 9.--The decision of the municipal authorities of Louvain,
Belgium, to give American names to certain streets of the city is set
forth in a formal resolution of thanks which was adopted on Washington's
Birthday by the Burgomaster and Aldermen of Louvain and sent to the
American Commission for Relief in Belgium. The resolution concludes as

"The cradle of a university of five centuries' standing, and today
herself partly in ruins, the City of Louvain cannot fail to associate
with the memory of Washington, one of the greatest Captains, the name of
the learned professor whose admirable precepts and high political
attainments, as also his firmness of character and dignity of life, all
contributed to carry him successively to the Presidency of Princeton
University, the Governorship of New Jersey, and finally the Presidency
of the United States.

"In order to perpetuate to future generations remembrances of these
sentiments and our ardent gratitude, the Burgomaster and Aldermen have
decided this day that in the new parts of the city, as they rise out of
the ruins, three streets or squares shall receive the illustrious names
of President Wilson, Washington, and American Nation."

The State of Holland

An Answer to H.G. Wells by Hendrik Willem van Loon

_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

My attention has been drawn to an article by H.G. Wells, published by
THE NEW YORK TIMES and by CURRENT HISTORY in its March number which
proposed that Holland give Germany the coup de grace, suddenly attack
Aix and Cologne, cut off Germany's line of supplies, and thereby help
win the war for the cause of justice. I am not writing this answer in
any official capacity, but I have reason to believe that I write what
most of my fellow-countrymen feel upon the subject.

Holland is neutral. The country is just as neutral as Belgium would have
been had she not been invaded; as neutral as Denmark and Switzerland and
the other small countries which are suffering so severely through this
war. If any power should attack Holland, Holland would no longer be
neutral, but would inundate the central part of the provinces of North
and South Holland, would occupy the very strong position around
Amsterdam, and would fight to the end. But unless attacked directly
Holland will take no part in this war.

Mr. Wells hints at the idea of the righteousness of the cause of the
Allies. All races and all colors have been brought together to beat
Germany. Now Holland ought to do the same. She is in a position to
exercise great power with her fresh troops. In the name of humanity,
which has been so grievously maltreated in Belgium, let her join. I
think that the answer of the greater part of our people would be
somewhat as follows:

No quarrel was ever made by a single person. It takes two to start a
fight. England and Germany are fighting for the supremacy of commerce.
In the course of this quarrel Belgium has been sacrificed. We are
extremely sorry. We have opened our frontiers to all of our southern
neighbors, They were welcome to flee to us with all their belongings. We
shall take care of them so long as they wish to stay. Our position is
not always easy. The Dutch and the Belgian characters are very
different. We do not always understand each other. But in the main the
Belgians know that we shall share our food with them until the last,
that in every way we shall make them as comfortable as we can. We are
not a very graceful people. We often lack a certain charm of manner. The
little potentates who are the Mayors of our small frontier towns are not
always very tactful. But these things are minor matters. Holland is the
natural place of refuge for her southern neighbors, and as long as they
suffer from the German domination they know that with us they are safe.
But should we have gone with the Allies when the Belgians suffered
through no fault of their own?

For France there is in Holland the greatest personal sympathy. But she
is far away from Holland. The direct issue is between England and
Germany. The Hollander likes England, fashions his life as much as
possible after the English pattern, prefers to do business with English
people. Yet is there any reason why Holland should make the possible
sacrifice of her own existence for the benefit of England?

Will Mr. Wells kindly glance through his history and see what we as a
nation have suffered at the hands of England?

During three centuries we fought with England about a principle laid
down by Grotius of Delft. We claimed that the sea was an open highway,
free to all navigators. England used her best legal talent to prove the
contrary. In this struggle we exhausted ourselves and we finally lost.
Incidentally we saw our richest colonies go into the possession of
England. The very colony in which I am writing this letter was taken
from us in time of peace. Of course all this is past history and no
Hollander is going to accuse an Englishman of acts committed by his
great-grandfather. But the people will remember all those things,
however vaguely, and they will distrust the nation that has constantly
done them harm. We gave England her best King, (if one is to believe Mr.
Macaulay.) William III. in order to destroy the power of Louis XIV., and
greatly for the benefit of England incidentally, did the greatest harm
to the country of his origin. After 1715, totally exhausted, we were
obliged to see how England got ahead of us.

Then there are some other small items. I take one at random. While the
Duke of Wellington danced the polka in Brussels the Prince of Orange
with a small Dutch army stopped Napoleon's progress at Quatre Bras, and
by disobeying the orders of the British commander saved the army of the
allies and made the victory of Waterloo possible. Our thanks for this
self-sacrifice was the mild abuse of Mr. Thackeray and other gentlemen
who have ever since laughed at the clumsy Dutch troops who in truth so
valiantly assisted the British and Prussians. In this matter a little
more generosity on the part of British historians would have made us
feel more cordial toward our English neighbors. It was ever thus. To
read the story of the Armada one would believe that the English
destroyed this dangerous Spanish fleet. As a matter of fact, competent
historians know that certainly one-half of the glory for that feat goes
to the Dutch sailors, who prevented the Spaniards from getting their
supplies, their pilots, and their auxiliary army. These are merely
examples. They are all small things. But there are so many of them, they
return with such persistent regularity, that we would feel very little
inclination to risk our national existence for a nation which, according
to our feeling, (rightly or wrongly, I am not debating that question,)
has never treated us with fairness, and which we had to fight for over
three centuries before it would accept those general principles of
international law which first of all were laid down by Grotius in the
beginning of the seventeenth century.

Remember, however, that this does not mean any hostility to England. Mr.
Wells undoubtedly knows that our ships have invariably done noble work
in rescuing the victims of submarine attacks. He will know that our
Government (to the great anger of Germany) has construed the articles of
several international treaties in the most liberal way and has
immediately released all such British subjects as were thrown upon our
coast through the accidents of war. He will also know, if he has read
the papers, that our entire country has turned out to do homage to the
bravery of those men. The danger to the sailor of a British man-of-war
who lands in Holland is that he will be killed by a severe attack of
nicotine poisoning caused by the cigars which the people, in their
desire to show their feelings and unable to break the strict law of
neutrality, shower upon the Englishman who is fished out of the North
Sea by our trawlers or our steamers.

But away deep under this very strong personal sympathy for England, and
with very sincere admiration for the British form of government, the
people of Holland cannot easily overcome a feeling of vague distrust
that the nation which in the past has so often abused them cannot
entirely be counted upon to treat them justly this time. Incidentally, I
may say that the bungling of Mr. Churchill in Antwerp, which we know
much better than do the people of England, is another reason why we are
a bit afraid of the island across the North Sea.

We are indeed in the position of a dog that has often been beaten
innocently and that is now smiled upon and asked to be good and attack
another person who has never done him any harm. The comparison may not
be very flattering to us, but Mr. Wells will understand what I mean. We
have had the Germans with us always. Personally, taking them by and
large, we like them not. Their ways are not our ways. Our undisciplined
race abhors their system. We have seen the misery which they caused in
Belgium more closely than any one else. The endless letters and
pamphlets with which the Germans have inundated our land to prove the
justice of their cause have made no impression whatsoever. We have with
our own eyes seen the victims of their very strict explanation of
Section 58, Article I., of the German military penal code. We have seen
the Belgians hanging by their own red handkerchiefs, and we have with
our own hands fed the multitude that had been deprived of everything. On
the other hand, Germany has up to date been most scrupulous in her
behavior toward us. In the past she has never done us any harm. We may
not like her, but she has in a very careful way avoided all friction and
has treated us with great consideration.

In view of all this, in view of the very sober attitude of our people
upon all matters of our daily life, in view of these historical
reflections, which have a very decided influence, would it be quite fair
without any provocation on the side of Germany to go forth and attack
her in the back, now that she is in such very dangerous straits? I
repeat that this may not be the exact sentiment of all of my countrymen,
but I believe that very many of us feel things that way. Perhaps we
disagree in minor details, but we agree about the main issue.

We love our country. For centuries we have fought to maintain our
individual civilization against the large neighbors who surround us. We
try to live up to our good reputation as a home for all those who
suffer. The people who are made homeless by Germany come to us and we
try to feed them on such grain as the British Government allows to pass
through the Channel. We try to continue in our duty toward all our
neighbors, even when they declare the entire North Sea (in which we also
have a certain interest) as a place of battle and blow up our ships with
their mines. We patiently destroy the mines which swim away from our
neighbors' territorial waters and land upon our shores. In short, we
perform a very difficult act of balancing as well as we can. But it
seems to us that under difficult circumstances we are following the only
correct road which can lead to the ultimate goal which we wish to
reach--the lasting respect of all those who will judge us without
prejudice and malice.

It is very kind of Mr. Wells to offer us territorial compensation, but
we respectfully decline such a reward for the sort of attack which was
popular in the days of the old Machiavelli.


New York, Feb. 26, 1915.


Hungary After the War

By a Correspondent of The London Times

[From The London Times, Jan. 20, 1915.]

The allied powers are agreed that the European resettlement must be
inspired by the principle of nationality. It will be but just if Hungary
suffers severely from its application, for during the past forty years
no European Government has sinned so deeply and persistently against
that principle as has her Magyar Government. The old Hungary, whose name
and history are surrounded by the glamour of romance, was not the modern
"Magyarland." Its boasted constitutional liberties were, indeed,
confined to the nobles, and the "Hungarian people" was composed, in the
words of Verböczy's Tripartitum Code, of "prelates, barons, and other
magnates, also all nobles, but not commoners." But the nobles of all
Hungarian races rallied to the Hungarian banner, proud of the title of
civis hungaricus. John Hunyádi, the national hero, was a Rumane; Zrinyi
was a Croat, and many another paladin of Hungarian liberty was a
non-Magyar. Latin was the common language of the educated. But with the
substitution of Magyar for Latin during the nineteenth century, and with
the growth of what is called the "Magyar State Idea," with its
accompaniment of Magyar Chauvinism, all positive recognition of the
rights and individuality of non-Magyar races gradually vanished.

The Magyar language itself is incapable of expressing the difference
between "Hungarian" and "Magyar." The difference is approximately the
same as between "British" and "English." The "Magyar State" set itself
to Magyarize education and every feature of public life. Any protest was
treated as "incitement against the Magyar State Idea" and was made
punishable by two years' imprisonment. It was as though a narrow-minded
English Administration should set itself to obliterate all traces of
Scottish, Welsh, and Irish national feeling; or as though the Government
of India should ignore the existence of all save one race and language
in our great dependency.

In comparison with the Government of "Magyarland," the Government of
Austria was a model of tolerance. In Austria, Poles and Ruthenes,
Czechs, Germans, Italians, Serbo-Croatians, and Slovenes were entitled
to the public use of their own languages and enjoyed various degrees of
provincial self-government. The Austrian side of every Austro-Hungarian
banknote bore an indication of its value in every language of the
empire, whereas the Hungarian side was printed in Magyar alone. This was
done in order to foster the belief that Hungary was entirely Magyar.

In reality, Hungary is as polyglot as Austria. Exact statistics are not
obtainable, since the Magyar census returns have long been deliberately
falsified for "Magyar State" reasons. Roughly speaking, it may, however,
be said that, in Hungary proper, i.e., exclusive of Croatia-Slavonia,
where the population is almost entirely Serbo-Croatian, there are
perhaps 8,500,000 Magyars, including nearly 1,000,000 professing and a
large number of baptized Jews. Against this total there are more than
2,000,000 Germans, including the numerous colonies on the Austrian
border, the Swabians of the south, and the Saxons of Transylvania; more
than 2,000,000 Slovaks, who inhabit chiefly the northwestern counties;
between three and four million Rumanes, living between the Theiss and
the Eastern Carpathians; some 500,000 Ruthenes, or Little Russians, who
inhabit the northeastern counties; some 600,000 Serbs and Croats in the
central southern counties; 100,000 Slovenes along the borders of Styria
and Carinthia; and some 200,000 other non-Magyars, including about
90,000 gypsies, who speak a language of their own. Taking the population
of Hungary proper at 18,000,000, the Magyars are thus in a minority,
which becomes more marked when Croatia-Slavonia with its population of
2,600,000 southern Slavs is added.

[Illustration: Distribution of Nationalities in Hungary.]

It would have been possible for the Magyars, after the restoration of
the Hungarian Constitution under the Dual Settlement of 1867, to have
built up a strong and elastic Transleithan polity based on the
recognition of race individualities and equality of political rights for
all. The non-Magyars would have accepted Magyar leadership the more
readily in that they had been dragooned and oppressed by Austria during
the period of reaction after 1849 as ruthlessly as the Magyars
themselves. Deák and Eötvös, who were the last prominent Magyar public
men with a Hungarian, as distinguished from a narrowly Magyar,
conception of the future of their country, pleaded indeed for fair
treatment of the non-Magyars, and trusted to the attractive force of the
strong Magyar nucleus to settle automatically the question of precedence
in the State. But in 1875, when Koloman Tisza, the father of Count
Stephen Tisza, took office, these wise counsels were finally and
definitely rejected in favor of what Baron Bánffy afterward defined as
"national Chauvinism." Magyarization became the watchword of the State
and persecution its means of action. Koloman Tisza concluded with the
monarch a tacit pact under which the Magyar Government was to be left
free to deal as it pleased with the non-Magyars as long as it supplied
without wincing the recruits and the money required for the joint army.
The Magyar Parliament became almost exclusively representative of the
Magyar minority of the people. Out of the 413 constituencies of Hungary
proper more than 400 were compelled, by pressure, bribery, and
gerrymandering, to return Magyar or Jewish Deputies. The press and the
banks fell entirely into Jewish hands, and the Magyarized Jews became
the most vociferous of the "national Chauvinists."

Nothing like it has been seen before or since--save the Turkish
revolution of 1908, when the Young Turks, under Jewish influence, broke
away from the relatively tolerant methods of the old régime and adopted
the system of forcible "Turkification" that led to the Albanian
insurrections of 1910-12, to the formation of the Balkan League, and to
the overthrow of Turkey in Europe.

The bitter fruits of the policy of Magyarization are now ripening. The
oppressed Rumanes look not toward Austria, as in the old days when
their great Bishop Siaguna made them a stanch prop of the Hapsburg
dynasty, but across the Carpathians to Bucharest; the Serbo-Croatians of
Hungary, Croatia-Slavonia, and Dalmatia, whose economic and political
development the Magyars have deliberately hampered, turn their eyes no
longer, as in the days of Jellatchich, toward Vienna, but await
wistfully the coming of the Serbian liberators; the Ruthenes of the
northeast hear the tramp of the Russian armies; the Slovaks of the
northwest watch with dull expectancy for the moment when, united with
their Slovak kinsmen of Moravia and their cousins, the Czechs of
Bohemia, they shall form part of an autonomous Slav province stretching
from the Elbe to the Danube. For the Magyars, who have thrown to the
winds the wisdom of the wisest men, fate may reserve the possession of
the fertile and well-watered Central Hungarian plain. There they may
thrive in modesty and rue at their leisure the folly of having
sacrificed their chance of national greatness to the vain pursuit of the
"Magyar State Idea" under the demoralizing influence of Austro-German



    Where Ilium's towers once rose and stretched her plain,
      What forms, beneath the late moon's doubtful beam,
      Half living, half of moonlit vapor, seem?
    Surely here stand apart the kingly twain,
    Here Ajax looms, and Hector grasps the rein,
      Here Helen's fatal beauty darts a gleam,
      Andromache's love here shines o'er death supreme.
    To them, while wave-borne thunders roll amain
    From Samos unto Ida, Calchas, seer
      Of all that shall be, speaks: "Not the world's end
    Is this, but end of our old world of strife,
      Which, lasting until now, shall perish here.
    Henceforth shall men strive but as friend and friend
      Out of this death to rear a new world's life."

The Union of Central Europe

An Argument in Favor of a Union of the States Now Allied With Germany

By Franz von Liszt

     Professor Franz von Liszt, author of the following article, is
     Director of the Criminal Law Seminar of the University of
     Berlin, and is regarded as one of the leading experts on
     criminal law in Germany. The article was published in the Neue
     Badische Landes-Zeitung of Mannheim, and evoked bitter
     criticism from many imperialistic quarters in the German

When new directions of development are first taken in history, it
usually requires the lapse of several decades before we understand them
in their true importance, and it takes much longer before proper terms
describing them are adopted generally. In the interim, misconceptions of
all kinds are the necessary consequence of clouded perception and
confused terminology, especially when, for purposes of party politics,
there figures in a greater or less degree a certain unwillingness to

Such misunderstandings are not devoid of danger in times of peace; they
may become pregnant with fate when, as in our day, the leading nations
of the earth stand at the threshhold of a great change in their history.
I am anxious, therefore, to defend against objections raised with more
or less intentional misunderstanding the thoughts which I expressed in
my recently published essay, "A Central European Union of States as the
Next Goal of German Foreign Policy."

Let us for once put aside the word "Imperialism." Surely we are all
agreed as one that it is an absolute essential of life for the German
Empire to carry on world-politics, (Weltpolitik.) We have been engaged
in that since the eighties of the nineteenth century. The first colonial
possessions which the German Empire obtained were the fruits of a
striving for world-politics that had not yet at that time come to full
and clear consciousness.

But, conscious of our goal, we did not attempt the paths of
world-politics until the end of the last century. At the celebration of
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the German Empire, on Jan. 18, 1896, our
Kaiser uttered the words: "The German Empire has become a world empire,
(Aus dem deutschen Reich ist ein Weltreich geworden.)" And the German
Empire's groping for its way in world-politics found its expression in
the first naval proposal of Tirpitz in the year 1898.

At that time the Imperial Chancellor Prince Hohenlohe expressly
designated the policy of the German Empire as "world politics." Thereby
a goal was sketched for the development of the German Empire. We have
not lost sight of it since then, keeping unconfused despite many an
illusion and many a failure. And today we all live in the firm faith
that the world war, which we are determined to bring to a victorious
conclusion by the exertion of all our forces as a people, will bring us
the safe guarantee for the attainment of our goal in world politics.

On that score, then, there is absolutely no difference of opinion. But
there does appear to be considerable difference of opinion as to the
conception of world politics. Under that name one may mean a policy
directed toward world domination (Weltherrschaft.) For that kind of
world politics the word "Imperialism," borrowed from the period of Roman
world domination of the second century of the Christian era, fits

Imperialism aims, directly or indirectly, through peaceful or forceful
annexation or economic exploitation, to make the whole inhabited earth
subject to its sway. Imperialistic is the policy of Great Britain, which
has subjected one-fifth of the inhabited area of the earth to its sway
and knows no bounds to the expansion of English rule. Imperialistic,
too, is the policy of Russia, which for centuries has been extending its
huge tentacles toward the Atlantic and toward the Mediterranean, the
Pacific, and the Indian Oceans, never sated.

Such world domination has never endured permanently; it can endure least
of all in our days, in which an array of mighty armed powers stand
prepared to guard their independence. World domination sooner or later
leads inevitably to an alliance of the States whose independence is
threatened; and thereby it leads to the overthrow of the disturber of
the peace. That, as we all confidently hope, will be the fate of England
as well as of Russia in the present war....

World politics, however, may mean something else; policies based upon
world value, (Weltgeltung.) The policy based on world domination differs
from that based on world value, in that the former denies the equal
rights of other States, while the latter makes that its premise. The
State that asserts its rights to world values demands for itself what it
concedes to the others: its right to expand and develop its political
and economic influence, and to have a voice in the discussion whenever
the political or economical relations of the various States at any point
in the inhabited globe approach a state of change....

In this sense has the German Empire heretofore engaged in world politics
in contrast with Russia and England. That it cannot be carried on
successfully without overseas colonies, a strong foreign fleet, naval
bases, and telegraphic connections through cable or wireless telegraph
apparatus, needs no further elucidation. For this sort of world politics
also the name "Imperialism" may be used. But such use of the word is
misleading; I shall therefore hereafter avoid it.

And herein I think I have uncovered the deeper reason for an early
misunderstanding of great consequence. It seems as though in a
certain--to be sure, not a very great or very influential--circle of our
German fellow-citizens the opinion prevails that the German Empire
should substitute its claims for world domination for those of England.
Such a view cannot be too soon or too sharply rebuked.

The claim for world domination would set the German Empire for many
years face to face with a long series of bloody wars, the issue of which
cannot be in doubt a moment to any one familiar with history. The
enforcement of this claim, moreover, would of itself be the surrender of
the German spirit to the spirit of our present opponent in the war. The
idea of world domination, imperialism in the true sense of the word, is
not a product grown on German soil; it is imported from abroad. To
maintain that view in all seriousness is treachery to the inmost spirit
of the German soul.

Perhaps I am mistaken in taking it for granted that such thoughts are
today haunting many minds. Perhaps it is merely a matter of misapplied
use of a large sounding word. In that case, however, it is absolutely
necessary to create clear thinking. I take it for granted that I am
voicing the sentiments of the souls of the vast overwhelming majority of
Germans when I say: "We shall wage the war, if need be, to the very end,
against the English and Russian lust for world domination, and for
Germany's world value (Weltgeltung.")

But forthwith there appears a further difference of opinion, to be taken
not quite so seriously, which I shall endeavor to define as objectively
as possible. The German conservative press seems to be of the opinion
that the goal for the winning of which we are waging the great war, and
concerning which we are all of one mind, will be definitely attained
immediately upon the conclusion of the war.

I, on the other hand, am convinced that in order permanently to insure
for ourselves the fruits of victory, even after a victorious conclusion
of the war, we shall need long and well planned labors of peace....

In my essay I used the statement: "England's claim for the domination
of the sea, and therein for the domination of the world, remains a great
danger to the peace of the world." To this view I adhere firmly. Let us
take it for granted that the most extravagant hopes of our most reckless
dreamers are fulfilled, that England is crowded out of Egypt,
Mesopotamia, Persia, and is involved in a long-lasting war with the
native Indians. An impossibly large dose of political naïveté is needed
in order to make us believe that England would take this loss quietly
for all time.

We may differ on the question whether we should meet England's efforts
for rehabilitation of her world dominion in warlike, or, as I take it,
in peaceful ways; but it would be an unpardonable piece of stupidity for
us to rock ourselves to sleep in the mad delusion that those efforts
would not be exerted. Even were England forced to her knees, she would
not immediately give up her claim for world domination. We must count
upon that.

And, counting upon that, we must estimate our own forces very carefully;
rather account them weaker than they really are, than the reverse. I did
that in my essay, and that is why the conservative press was so wrought
up over it. To be sure, it carefully avoided discussing my reasons.

I started from the conception of world power which is fairly well
established in the present political literature. From a point of view
taken also by conservative writers I demanded as a characteristic of
world power, in addition to the size of territories and the number of
population, above all, the economic independence that makes it possible
for a State, in a case of need, to produce, without export or import,
all foodstuffs, necessities, raw materials, and all the finished or
half-finished products it needs for its consumers in normal times, as
well as to insure the sale of its surplus.

It is patent that this economic independence is influenced by the
geographical position of the fatherland and its colonies. Now, I
defended the theory (and my opponents made no attempt to confute it)
that even after a victorious war the German Empire would not have fully
attained this economic independence; that, accordingly, after the
conclusion of peace, we must exert every effort to insure this economic
independence in one way or another.

As to the course which we must follow to attain this goal, there may be
various opinions. I proposed the establishment of a union of Central
European States. The conservative press characterized that as "utterly

If the course I have proposed is considered inadvisable, let another be
proposed. But on what colonies, forsooth, do those gentlemen count, that
could furnish us with cotton and ore, petroleum and tobacco, wood and
silk, and whatever else we need, in the quantity and quality we need?
What colonies that could offer us--do not forget that--markets for the
sale of our exporting industries? Even after the war we shall be
dependent upon exports to and imports from abroad.

And so there is no other way of safeguarding our economic independence
against England and Russia than by an economic alliance with the States
that are our allies in this war, or at least that do not make common
cause with our enemies. Aside from the fact, which I shall not discuss
here, that only such an alliance can insure a firm position for us on
the Atlantic Ocean, which in the next decades is bound to be the area of
competition for the world powers.

Politics are not a matter of emotion, but of calm, intelligent
deliberation. Let us leave emotional politics to our enemies. It is the
German method to envisage the goal steadily, and with it the roads that
lead to that goal. Our goal is not world domination. Whoever tries to
talk that belief into the mind of the German people may confuse some
heads that are already not very clear; but he cannot succeed in
substituting Napoleon I. for Bismarck as our master teacher.

Our goal can only be the establishing of our value in the world among
world powers, with equal rights to the same opportunities. And in order
to attain this goal we must, even after the conclusion of peace, exert
all our forces. A people that thinks it can rest on its laurels after
victory has been won runs the risk sooner or later of losing that for
which its sons shed their blood on the field of battle. With the
conclusion of peace there begins for us anew the unceasing peaceful
competition and the maintenance and strengthening of the world value
which we have won through the war. German imperialism is and will remain
the work of peace.



Translation by Florence Simmonds.

[From King Albert's Book.]

At evening, in one of our southern towns, a train full of Belgian
refugees ran into the station, and the poor martyrs, exhausted and
bewildered, got out slowly, one by one, on the unfamiliar platform,
where French people were waiting to receive them. Carrying a few
possessions caught up at random, they had got into the carriages without
even asking whither they were bound, urged by their anxiety to flee, to
flee desperately from horror and death, from unspeakable mutilation and
Sadic outrage--from things that seemed no longer possible in the world,
but which, it seems, were lying dormant in pietistic German brains, and
had suddenly belched forth upon their land and ours, like a belated
manifestation of original barbarism. They no longer possessed a village,
nor a home, nor a family; they arrived like jetsam cast up by the
waters, and the eyes of all were full of terrified anguish. Many
children, little girls whose parents had disappeared in the stress of
fire and battle; and aged women, now alone in the world, who had fled,
hardly knowing why, no longer caring for life, but moved by some obscure
instinct of self-preservation.

Two little creatures, lost in the pitiable throng, held each other
tightly by the hand, two little boys obviously brothers, the elder, who
may have been five years old, protecting the younger, of about three. No
one claimed them, no one knew them. How had they been able to
understand, finding themselves alone, that they, too, must get into this
train to escape death? Their clothes were decent, and their little
stockings were thick and warm; clearly they belonged to humble but
careful parents; they were, doubtless, the sons of one of those sublime
Belgian soldiers who had fallen heroically on the battlefield, and whose
last thought had perhaps been one of supreme tenderness for them. They
were not even crying, so overcome were they by fatigue and sleepiness;
they could scarcely stand. They could not answer when they were
questioned, but they seemed intent, above all, upon keeping a tight hold
of each other. Finally the elder, clasping the little one's hand
closely, as if fearing to lose him, seemed to awake to a sense of his
duty as protector, and, half asleep already, found strength to say, in a
suppliant tone, to the Red Cross lady bending over him: "Madame, are
they going to put us to bed soon?" For the moment this was all they were
capable of wishing, all that they hoped for from human pity--to be put
to bed.

They were put to bed at once, together, of course, still holding each
other tightly by the hand; and, nestling one against the other, they
fell at the same moment into the tranquil unconsciousness of childish

Once, long ago, in the China Sea, during the war, two little frightened
birds, smaller even than our wrens, arrived, I know not how, on board
our ironclad, in our Admiral's cabin, and all day long, though no one
attempted to disturb them, they fluttered from side to side, perching on
cornices and plants.

At nightfall, when I had forgotten them, the Admiral sent for me. It was
to show me, now without emotion, the two little visitors who had gone to
roost in his room, perched upon a slender silken cord above his bed.
They nestled closely together, two little balls of feathers, touching
and almost merged one in the other, and slept without the slightest
fear, sure of our pity. And those little Belgians sleeping side by side
made me think of the two little birds lost in the China Sea. There was
the same confidence and the same innocent slumber--but a greater
tenderness was about to watch over them.

What the Germans Desire

Not Conquest, but a New Economical System of Europe

By Gustaf Sioesteen

     The subjoined letter from Berlin, published originally in the
     Swedish Goteborgs Handels-Tidnung of Oct. 26, 1914, was
     immediately translated by the British Legation in
     Stockholm--this is the official English translation--and sent
     by the legation to Sir Edward Grey. THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT
     HISTORY is informed from a trustworthy source that the article
     is interpreted in London as expressing the real aims of
     Germany at the end of the war, should that power be
     successful. The founding of a commercial United States of
     Europe by means of an economical organization with new
     "buffer" States to be created between the German Empire and
     Russia, and with the other smaller European States, would be,
     according to this interpretation, the purpose of Germany at
     the conclusion of a victorious war. The passage in the Berlin
     correspondent's letter declaring that only such an enormous
     central European customs union, in the opinion of leading
     German statesmen, "could hold the United States of North
     America at bay" in order that, after this present war, the
     "world would only have to take into account two first-class
     powers, viz., Germany and the United States of America," is of
     peculiar interest to Americans.

BERLIN, Oct. 21.

Counting one's chickens before they are hatched is a pardonable failing
with nations carrying on war with the feeling that their all is at
stake. When sorrow is a guest of every household, when monetary losses
cause depression, and the cry arises time after time, "What will be the
outcome of all this?" then only the fairest illusions and the wildest
flights of fancy can sustain the courage of the masses.

These illusions are not only egotistical but, curiously enough,
altruistic, since mankind, even when bayoneting their fellow-creatures,
want to persuade themselves and others that this is done merely for the
benefit of their adversary. In accordance with this idea, in the opinion
of all parties, the war will be brought to an end with an increase of
power for their native country, as also a new Eden prevail throughout
the whole civilized world.

The enemies of Germany, though they have hitherto suffered an almost
unbroken series of reverses in the war, have already thoroughly thrashed
out the subject as to what the world will look like when Germany is
conquered. In German quarters the press has likewise painted the future,
but the following lines are not intended to increase the row of fancy
portraits, but merely to throw light on what is new in the demands

My representations are founded on special information, and I deem it
best to make them now, when the most fantastic descriptions of the
all-absorbing desire of conquest on the part of Germany have circulated
in the press of the entire world.

Among other absurdities it has been declared that Germany intends to
claim a fourth of France, making this dismembered country a vassal
State, bound to the triumphal car of the conqueror by the very heaviest
chains. It is incredible, but true, that such a statement has been made
in the press by a Frenchman, formerly President of the Council.

In direct opposition to the fictitious demands of the Germans, I can
advance a proposition which may sound paradoxical, viz., that the
leading men in Germany, the Emperor and his advisers, after bringing the
war to a victorious issue, will seriously seek expedients to _avoid_
conquests, so far as this is compatible with the indispensable demands
of order and stability for Europe.

First, as regards France. The entire world, as also the Germans, are
moved to pity by her fate. Germany has never entertained any other wish
than to be at peace with her western frontier. A considerable portion of
France is now laid waste, and in a few weeks millions of soldiers will
have been poured into still wider portions of this beautiful country. On
what are the inhabitants of these French provinces to exist when the
German and French armies have requisitioned everything eatable? Germany
cannot feed the inhabitants of the French provinces occupied, nor can
the Belgians do so, I imagine, for the provisions of Germany are simply
sufficient for their own needs, England preventing any new supply on any
large scale.

This is a totally new state of things in comparison with 1870, when
Germany was still an agrarian country and had, moreover, a free supply
on all her frontiers.

Can the French Government allow a considerable portion of their own
population actually to starve, or be obliged to emigrate to other parts
of France, there to live the life of nomads at the expense of England,
while the deserted provinces are given over to desolation?

The idea prevails here that the French will compel their Government to
enter on and conclude a separate treaty of peace when the fatal
consequences of the war begin to assume this awful guise. England does
not appear to have considered that this would be the result of her
system of blockade.

The German conditions of peace as regards France will be governed by two
principal factors with respect to their chief issues.

The first is the complete unanimity of the Emperor and the Chancellor
that _no population, not speaking German, will be incorporated in the
German Empire, or obtain representation in the Diet_. Germany already
has sufficient trouble with the foreign element now present in the Diet.
Consequently there can be no question of any considerable acquisition of
territory from France, but the demands of Germany simply extend to the
_iron-ore fields of Lorraine_, which are certainly of considerable
value. For France these mining fields are of far less consideration
than for Germany, whose immense iron trade is far more in need of the
iron mines.

The second factor is that the Germans, owing to the strong public
opinion, _will never consent to Belgium regaining her liberty_. The
Chancellor of the Empire has, as long as it was possible, been opposed
to the annexation of Belgium, having preferred, even during hostilities,
to have re-established the Belgian Kingdom. It is significant that the
military authorities have prohibited the German press from discussing
the question of the future of Belgium. It is evident that there has
prevailed a wish to leave the question open in order to insure a
solution offering various possibilities. But subsequent to the discovery
of the Anglo-Belgian plot, as previously stated, all idea of reinstating
Belgium has been discarded.

The annexation of Belgium, however, makes it possible to grant France
less stringent conditions. So long as Belgium--under some form of
self-government--is under German sway there is no hope of revenge of
France, and the conviction prevails here that after this war France will
abstain from her dreams of aggrandizement and become pacific. Germany
can then make reductions in the burdens laid on her people for military
service by land.

To arrange the position of Belgium in relation to Germany will be a very
interesting problem for German policy.

It is obvious that the annexation of Belgium cannot be defended from the
point of view of the principle of nationality. The Belgians--half of
them French, half of them Flemish--undoubtedly deem themselves but one
nation. As a mitigating circumstance in favor of the annexation it is
urged--above and beyond the intrigues carried on by Belgium with the
English--that Belgium, in days of yore, for a long time formed a portion
of the German Empire, and that the inhabitants of the little country, to
a considerable degree, gain their livelihood by its being a land of
transit for German products. Nationally, the annexation is not to be
defended, but geographically, economically, and from a military point
of view it is comprehensible.

At the east front of the central powers very different conditions
prevail. _Austria has no desire to make the conquest of any territory_;
indeed, just the contrary, would probably be willing to cede a portion
of Galicia in favor of new States. _Germany has not the slightest
inclination to incorporate new portions of Slav or Lettish regions._
Both Germans and Austrians wish to establish free _buffer States_
between themselves and the great Russian Empire.

Not even the Baltic provinces, where Germans hold almost the same
position as the Swedes in Finland, form an object for the German desire
of conquest, but her wish is to make them, as also _Finland_, an
independent State. Furthermore, the Kingdom of _Poland_ and a Kingdom of
_Ukraine_ would be the outcome of decisive victories for the central

What Germany would demand of these new States, whose very existence was
the outcome of her success at arms, would simply be an _economical
organization in common with the German Empire_, an enormous central
European "Zollverein" ("Customs Union") with Germany at its heart. It is
only such a union, in the opinion of leading German statesmen, which
could hold the United States of North America at bay, and after this
present war, moreover, the world would only have to take into account
_two_ first-class powers, viz., Germany and the United States of

A commencement of this new economical connection is being made by the
negotiations entered on by representatives of _Austria-Hungary_ and
_Germany_ concerning the proposed formation of a _Customs Union_. Since
this union would include 120,000,000 individuals, it must be evident
what an immense attraction it must exert on the surrounding smaller
nations. _Switzerland_ and _Holland_ can scarcely escape this
attraction, and the _Scandinavian countries_, it is said, would probably
find it to their advantage, together with a liberated _Finland_, to
form a _Northern Customs Union_, which later, on an independent basis,
could _enter in close union with the vast "Zollverein" of Central

This "Zollverein" would then include about 175,000,000 individuals. The
adhesion of _Italy_ to the vast union would not be inconceivable, and
then the combination of the United States of Europe, founded on a
voluntary commercial union, would be approaching its realization.

Such a commercial union, embracing various peoples, could only lead to
moderation in foreign politics, and would be the best guarantee for the
peace of the universe. A brisk interchange of commodities, a fruitful
interchange of cultural ideas would result from such a union, connecting
the polar seas with the Mediterranean, and the Netherlands with the
Steppes of Southern Russia.

All States participating in this union would gain thereby. But one
European country would be the loser, _Great Britain, the land of promise
for the middleman_; that, according to German comprehension, at present
gains a living by skimming the cream from the trade industry of other
nations by facilitating the exchange of goods, and making profits by
being the banking centre of the world.

The Germans declare that there is no reason for such a middleman's
existence in our day. The banking system is now so developed in all
civilized lands that, for example Sweden can remit direct to Australia
or the Argentine for goods obtained thence, instead of making payment
via London and there rate, by raising the exchange for sovereigns to an
unnatural height, so that, as matter of fact, England levies a tax on
all international interchange of commodities.

In opposition to this glorious vision of the days to come, which the
Germans wish to realize by their victories in war, there is the alluring
prospect of the Allies that by their victory they will deal a deathblow
to _German militarism_. While the English, with their 200,000 troops,
are good enough to promise no conquest of German territory--what says
Russia to this?--at the close of the war, in the opinion of the Britons,
there would still remain 65,000,000 Germans right in the centre of
Europe, organized as a kingdom burdened with a war indemnity to a couple
of tens of milliards in marks.

This nation, however, strengthened by 15,000,000 Germans in Austria,
would be the greatest bearers of culture in the wide world--the nation
with the best technical equipment of all others, glowing with ambition,
with military training second to none, and gifted with an immense rate
of increase as regards population. This nation would be forced to lay
down her arms, lying as it does between the overbearing gigantic realm
in the east and the warlike French to the west. The idea is
incomprehensible. The universe would behold a competition in armaments
such as it had never seen.

A victorious Germany, on the other hand, would become less and less
military, since she _would not need_ to arm herself to such an extent as
now. She is already chiefly an industrial country. Her desire is to be
wealthy, and wealth invariably smothers military instincts. Germany has
set up far greater ideals as regards social developments than other
countries, and all she asks is to be left in peace calmly to carry out
these plans in the future. _German militarism can only be conquered by
the victory being on her side, since she has no thought of military
supremacy, but simply of founding a new economical organization in




Translation by Florence Simmonds.

[From King Albert's Book.]

Sire: This request to pay my respectful homage to you has given me the
first real pleasure I have been permitted to feel since the good days of
Liège. At this moment you are the one King in the world whose subjects,
without exception, unite in loving and admiring him with all the
strength of their souls. This unique fate is yours, Sire. No leader of
men on earth has had it in the same degree as you.

In spite of the immensity of the sorrow surrounding you, I think you
have a right to rejoice, and the more so as your consort, her Majesty
the Queen, shares this rare privilege with you.

Sire, your name will be great throughout the ages to come. You are in
such perfect sympathy with your people that you will always be their
symbol. Their courage, their tenacity, their stifled grief, their pride,
their future greatness, their immortality all live in you. Our hearts
are yours to their very depths. Being yourself, you are all of us. And
this you will remain.

Later on, when you return to your recaptured and glorious Belgium, you
will only have to say the word, Sire, and all disputes will lose their
bitterness and all antagonisms fade away. After being our strength and
defender, you will become our peacemaker and reconciler. With deepest


Foreshadowing a New Phase of War

Financing the Allies and Small Nations Preparing for War

By Lloyd George, British Chancellor of the Exchequer

     That there are "also other States preparing for war," and that
     financial arrangements had been made for their participation
     against Germany by the allied Governments of Great Britain,
     France, and Russia; moreover, that Russia would be enabled
     within a few months to export considerable quantities of her
     grain and do her own financing--this statement preceded the
     bombardment of the forts in the Dardanelles, probably to clear
     the way for Russia's commerce--are the outstanding features of
     the speech by Lloyd George presented below, foreshadowing a
     new phase in the war. The speech was made in the House of
     Commons on Feb. 15, 1915, to explain the results of the
     financial conference between the allied powers to unite their
     monetary resources, held in Paris during the week of Feb. 1.
     It may be regarded as one of the most momentous utterances of
     the war.


_The Chancellor of the Exchequer, (Mr. Lloyd George,)_ who was called
upon by the Speaker, said: I shall do my best to conform to the
announcement of the Prime Minister that the statement I have to make
about the financial conference in Paris shall be a brief one, but I am
afraid my right honorable friend assumed that we are all endowed with
the extraordinary gift of compression which he himself possesses.
[Laughter.] The arrangements that were made between the three Ministers
for recommendation to their respective Governments commit us to heavy
engagements, and it is, therefore, important I should report them in
detail to the House, and find some reason why we should undertake such

This is the most expensive war which has ever been waged in material, in
men, and in money. The conference in Paris was mostly concerned with
money. For the year ending Dec. 31 next the aggregate expenditure of the
Allies will not be far short of £2,000,000,000. The British Empire will
be spending considerably more than either of our two great
allies--probably up to £100,000,000 to £150,000,000 more than the
highest figure to be spent by the other two great allies. We have
created a new army; we have to maintain a huge navy. We are paying
liberal separation allowances. We have to bring troops from the ends of
the earth; we have to wage war not merely in Europe, but in Asia, in
North, East, and South Africa. I must say just a few words as to the
relative position of the three great countries which led us to make the
arrangements on financial matters which we recommend to our respective
Governments. Britain and France are two of the richest countries in the
world. In fact, they are the great bankers of the world. We could pay
for our huge expenditure on the war for five years, allowing a
substantial sum for depreciation, out of the proceeds of our investments
abroad. France could carry on the war for two or three years at least
out of the proceeds of her investments abroad, and both countries would
still have something to spare to advance to their allies. This is a most
important consideration, for at the present moment the Allies are
fighting the whole of the mobilized strength of Germany, with perhaps
less than one-third of their own strength. The problem of the war to the
Allies is to bring the remaining two-thirds of their resources and
strength into the fighting line at the earliest possible moment. This is
largely, though by no means entirely, a question of finance.

Russia is in a different position from either Britain or France. She is
a prodigiously rich country in natural resources--about the richest
country in the world in natural resources. Food, raw material--she
produces practically every commodity. She has a great and growing
population, a virile and industrious people. Her resources are
overflowing and she has labor to develop them in abundance. By a stroke
of the pen Russia has since the war began enormously increased her
resources by suppressing the sale of all alcoholic liquors. [Cheers.] It
can hardly be realized that by that means alone she has increased the
productivity of her labor by something between 30 and 50 per cent., just
as if she had added millions of laborers to the labor reserves of Russia
without even increasing the expense of maintaining them, and whatever
the devastation of the country may be Russia has more than anticipated
its wastage by that great act of national heroism and sacrifice.
[Cheers.] The great difficulty with Russia is that, although she has
great natural resources, she has not yet been able to command the
capital within her own dominions to develop those resources even during
the times of peace. In time of war she has additional difficulties. She
cannot sell her commodities for several reasons. One is that a good deal
of what she depends upon for raising capital abroad will be absorbed by
the exigencies of the war in her own country. Beyond that the yield of
her minerals will not be quite as great, because the labor will be
absorbed in her armies.

There is not the same access to her markets. She has difficulty in
exporting her goods, and in addition to that her purchases abroad are
enormously increased in consequence of the war. Russia, therefore, has
special difficulty in the matter of financing outside purchases for the
war. Those are some of the difficulties with which we were confronted.

France has also special difficulties. I am not sure that we quite
realize the strain put upon that gallant country [cheers] up to the
present moment. For the moment she bears far and away the greatest
strain of the war in proportion to her resources. She has the largest
proportion of her men under arms. The enemy are in occupation of parts
of her richest territory. They are within fifty-five miles of her
capital, exactly as if we had a huge German army at Oxford. It is only a
few months since the bankers of Paris could hear the sound of the
enemy's guns from their counting houses, and they can hear the same
sound now, some of them, from their country houses. In those
circumstances the money markets of a country are not at their very best.
That has been one of the difficulties with which France has been
confronted in raising vast sums of money to carry on the war and helping
to finance the allied States.

There is a wonderful confidence, notwithstanding these facts, possessing
the whole nation. [Cheers.] Nothing strikes the visitor to Paris more
than that. There is a calm, a serene confidence, which is supposed to be
incompatible with the temperament of the Celt by those who do do not
know it. [Laughter.] There is a general assurance that the Germans have
lost their tide, and that now the German armies have as remote a chance
of crushing France as they have of overrunning the planet Mars.
[Cheers.] That is the feeling which pervades every class of the
community, and that is reflected in the money market there. The
difficulties of France in that respect are passing away, and the
arrangement that has now been made in France for the purpose of raising
sums of money to promote their military purposes will, I have not the
faintest doubt, be crowned with the completest success. [Cheers.]

But we have a number of small States which are compelled to look to the
greater countries in alliance for financial support. There is Belgium,
which until recently was a very rich country, devastated, desolate, and
almost entirely in the hands of the enemy, with an army and a civil
government to maintain, but with no revenue. We have to see that she
does not suffer [cheers] until the period of restoration comes to her,
and compensation. [Cheers.] Then there is Serbia, with the population of
Ireland--a people of peasants maintaining an army of 500,000 and
fighting her third great war within two years, and fighting that with
great resource, great courage, and bravery. [Cheers.] But she had no
reserve of wealth, and now no exports with which she can purchase
munitions of war outside, and she has hardly any manufactures of her
own. That is the position as far as the smaller States are concerned.

_There are also other States preparing for war, and it is obviously our
interest that they should be well equipped for that task._ They can only
borrow in the French and English markets.

But we had our own special difficulties, and I think I ought to mention
those. Two-thirds of our food supplies are purchased abroad. The
enormous quantities of raw materials for our manufactures and our
industries are largely absorbed in war equipment, and our ships in war
transport. We cannot pay as usual in exports, freights, and services;
our savings for the moment are not what they would be in the case of
peace. We cannot, therefore, pay for our imports in that way. We have to
purchase abroad. We have to increase our purchases abroad for war
purposes. In addition to that we have to create enormous credits to
enable other countries to do the same thing. The balance is, therefore,
heavily against us for the first time. There is no danger, but in a
conference of the kind we had at Paris I could not overlook the fact
that it was necessary for us to exercise great vigilance in regard to
our gold.

These were the complex problems we had to discuss and adjust, and we had
to determine how we could most effectually mobilize the financial
resources of the Allies so as to be of the greatest help to the common
cause. For the moment undoubtedly ours is still the best market in the
world. An alliance in a great war to be effective needs that each
country must bring all its resources, whatever they are, into the common
stock. An alliance for war cannot be conducted on limited liability
principles. If one country in the alliance has more trained and armed
men ready with guns, rifles, and ammunition than another she must bring
them all up against the common enemy, without regard to the fact that
the others cannot for the moment make a similar contribution. But it is
equally true that the same principle applies to the country with the
larger navy or the country with the greater resources in capital and
credit. They must be made available to the utmost for the purpose of the
alliance, whether the other countries make a similar contribution or
not. That is the principle upon which the conference determined to
recommend to their respective Governments a mobilization of our
financial resources for the war.

The first practical suggestion we had to consider was the suggestion
that has been debated very considerably in the press--the suggestion of
a joint loan. We discussed that very fully and we came to the conclusion
that it was the very worst way of utilizing our resources. It would have
frightened every Bourse and attracted none. It would have made the worst
of every national credit and the best of none. Would the interest paid
have been the interest upon which we could raise money, the rate at
which France could have raised money, or the rate at which Russia could
raise money? If we paid a high rate of interest we could never raise
more money at low rates. If instead of raising £350,000,000 a few weeks
ago for our own purposes we had floated a great joint loan of
£1,000,000,000, the House can very well imagine what the result would
have been. We decided after a good deal of discussion and reflection
that each country should raise money for its own needs within its own
markets in so far as their conditions allowed, but that if help were
needed by any country for outside purchases then those who could best
afford to render assistance for the time being should do so.

There was only one exception which we decided to recommend, and that was
in the case of borrowings by small States. We decided that each of the
great allied countries should contribute a portion of every loan made to
the small States who were either in with us now or prepared to come in
later on, that the responsibility should be divided between the three
countries, and that at an opportune moment a joint loan should be
floated to cover the advances either already made, or to be made, to
these countries outside the three great allied countries. That was the
only exception we made in respect of joint loans. Up to the present very
considerable advances have been made by Russia, by France, and by
ourselves to other countries. It is proposed that, if there is an
opportune moment on the market, these should be consolidated at some
time or other into one loan, that they should be placed upon the markets
of Russia, France, and Great Britain, but that the liability shall be
divided into three equal parts.

With regard to Russia, we have already advanced £32,000,000 for
purchases here and elsewhere outside the Russian Empire. Russia has also
shipped £8,000,000 of gold to this country, so that we have established
credits in this country for Russia to the extent of £40,000,000 already.
France has also made advances in respect of purchases in that country.
Russia estimates that she will still require to establish considerable
credits for purchases made outside her own country between now and the
end of the year. I am not sure for the moment that it would be desirable
for me to give the exact figure; I think it would be better not, because
it would give an idea of the extent to which purchases are to be made
outside by Russia. But for that purpose she must borrow. _The amount of
her borrowing depends upon what Russia can spare of her produce to sell
in outside markets and also on the access to those markets._

_If Russia is able within the course of the next few weeks or few months
to export a considerable quantity of her grain, as I hope she will be,
as in fact we have made arrangements that she should, [cheers,] then
there will not be the same need to borrow for purchases either in this
country or outside, because she can do her own financing to that

The two Governments decided to raise the first £50,000,000 in equal sums
on the French and British markets respectively. That will satisfy
Russian requirements for a considerable time. As to further advances,
the allied countries will consider when the time arrives how the money
should be raised according to the position of the money markets at that
time. I have said that we gave a guarantee to Russia that she need not
hesitate a moment in giving her orders for any purchases which are
necessary for the war on account of fear of experiencing any difficulty
in the matter of raising money for payments. We confidently anticipate
that by the time these first advances will have been exhausted the
military position will have distinctly improved both in France and in

I may say that Treasury bills to the extent of £10,000,000 on the credit
of Russia have been issued within the last few days. At 12 o'clock today
the list closed, and the House will be very glad to hear that the amount
was not merely subscribed but oversubscribed by the market, because this
country is not quite as accustomed to Russian securities as France, and,
therefore, it was an experiment. I think it is a very good omen for our
relations, not merely during the war, but for our relations with Russia
after the war, that the first great loan of that kind on Russian credit
in the market has been such a complete success.

Now we have to consider the position of this country with regard to the
possibility of our gold flitting in the event of very great credits
being established in this country. The position of the three great
allied countries as to gold is exceptionally strong. Russia and France
have accumulated great reserves which have been barely touched so far
during the war. I do not think the French reserve has been touched at
all, or has been used in the slightest degree, and I think as far as the
Russian reserve is concerned it has only been reduced by the transfer of
£8,000,000 of gold from Russia to this country. Our accumulation of gold
is larger than it has ever been in the history of this country. It has
increased enormously since the commencement of the war. It is not nearly
as large as that of Russia, France, or Germany, but it must be borne in
mind that there is this distinction in our favor; up to the present we
have had no considerable paper currency, and this is the great free
market for the gold of the world. The quantity imported every year of,
what shall I call it, raw gold, comes to something like £50,000,000, and
here I am excluding what comes here by exchanges. The collapse of the
rebellion in South Africa assures us of a large and steady supply from
that country, and, therefore, there is no real need for any

But still it would not have been prudent for us to have overlooked
certain possibilities. I have already pointed out some of them--the
diminution of exports, the increase of our imports, the absorption of
our transports for war purposes, large credits established for our own
and other countries, and a diminution in our savings for investments
abroad. There is just a possibility that this might have the effect of
inducing the export of gold to other countries. We therefore have to
husband our gold and take care lest it should take wings and swarm to
any other hive. We therefore made arrangements at this conference
whereby, if our stock of gold were to diminish beyond a certain
point--that is a fairly high point--the Banks of France and Russia
should come to our assistance.

We have also made arrangements whereby France should have access to our
markets for Treasury bills issued in francs. We have also initiated
arrangements which we hope will help to restore the exchanges in respect
of bills held in this country against Russian merchants, who, owing to
the present difficulties of exchange, cannot discharge their liabilities
in this country. They are quite ready and eager to pay, they have the
money to pay, but, owing to difficulties of exchange, they cannot pay
bills owing in this country. We therefore propose to accept Russian
Treasury bills against these bills of exchange due from Russian
merchants, Russia collecting the debts in rubles in her own country and
giving us the Treasury bills in exchange. We hope that will assist very
materially in the working of the exchanges. It will be very helpful to
business between the two countries, and incidentally it will be very
helpful to Russia herself in raising money in her own country for the
purpose of financing the war.

We also received an undertaking from the Russian Government in return
for the advances which we were prepared to make, that Russia would
facilitate the export of Russian produce of every kind that may be
required by the allied countries. This, I believe, will be one of the
most fruitful parts of the arrangements entered into. An arrangement has
also been made about the purchases by the allied countries in the
neutral countries. There was a good deal of confusion. We were all
buying in practically the same countries; we were buying against each
other; we were putting up prices; it ended not merely in confusion, but
I am afraid in a good deal of extravagance, because we were increasing
prices against each other. It was very necessary that there should be
some working arrangement that would eliminate this element of
competition and enable us to co-ordinate, as it were, these orders.
There will be less delay, there will be much more efficiency, and we
shall avoid a good deal of the extravagance which was inevitable owing
to the competition between the three countries.

I have done my best to summarize very briefly the arrangements which
have been entered into, and I would only like to say this in conclusion.
After six months of negotiation by the cable and three days of
conferring face to face we realized that better results were achieved by
means of a few hours of businesslike discussion by men anxious to come
to a workable arrangement than by reams of correspondence.
Misconceptions and misunderstandings were cleared away in a second which
otherwise might take weeks to ferment into mischief, and it was our
conclusion that these conferences might with profit to the cause of the
Allies be extended to other spheres of co-operation. [Cheers.]

Britain's Unsheathed Sword

By H.H. Asquith, England's Prime Minister

     Stating the estimated costs of the war to Great Britain,
     outlining the operations of the French and British allied
     fleets in the Dardanelles, declaring the Allies' position in
     retaliation for the German "war zone" decree against Great
     Britain, and reaffirming the chief terms of peace, stated in
     his Guildhall speech of last November, on which alone England
     would consent to sheathe the sword, the following speech,
     delivered in the House of Commons on March 1, 1915, by Prime
     Minister Asquith, is one of the most important of the war.

_In Committee of Supply._

_Mr. Asquith, who was loudly cheered on rising, moved the supplementary
vote of credit of £37,000,000 to meet the expenditure on naval and
military operations and other expenditure arising out of the war during
the year 1914-1915. He said:_

The first of the two votes which appear upon the paper, the one which
has just been read out, provides only for the financial year now
expiring, and is a supplementary vote of credit. The vote that follows
is a vote of credit for the financial year 1915-1916. I think it will
probably be convenient if in submitting the first vote to the committee
I make a general statement covering the whole matter. I may remind the
committee that on Aug. 6 last year the House voted £100,000,000 in the
first vote of credit, and that on Nov. 15 the House passed a
supplementary vote of credit for £225,000,000, thus sanctioning total
votes of credit for the now expiring financial year of £325,000,000. It
has been found that this amount will not suffice for the expenditure
which will have been incurred up to March 31, and we are therefore
asking for a further vote of £37,000,000 to carry on the public service
to that date. If the committee assents to our proposals it will raise
the total amount granted by votes of credit for the year 1914-1915 to
£362,000,000. I need not say anything as to the purposes for which this
vote is required. They are the same as upon the last occasion. But I
ought to draw attention to one feature in which the supplementary vote,
which comes first, differs from the vote to be subsequently proposed for
the services of the year 1915-1916. At the outbreak of the war the
ordinary supply on a peace basis had been voted by the House, and
consequently the votes of credit for the now current financial year,
like those on all previous occasions, were to be taken in order to
provide the amounts necessary for naval and military operations in
addition to the ordinary grants of Parliament. It consequently follows
that the expenditure charged, or chargeable, to votes of credit for this
financial year represent, broadly speaking, the difference between the
expenditure of the country on a peace footing and that expenditure upon
a war footing. The total on that basis, if this supplementary vote is
assented to, will be £362,000,000.

For reasons the validity of which the committee has recognized on
previous occasions, I do not think it desirable to give the precise
details of the items which make up the total, but without entering into
that I may roughly apportion the expenditure. For the army and the navy,
according to best estimates which can at present be framed, out of the
total given there will be required approximately £275,000,000. That is
in addition, as I have already pointed out, to the sum voted before the
war for the army and the navy, which amounted in the aggregate to a
little over £80,000,000. That leaves unaccounted for a balance of
£87,000,000, of which approximately £38,000,000 represents advances for
war expenditure made, or being made, to the self-governing dominions,
Crown colonies, and protectorates, as explained in the Treasury minute
last November, under which his Majesty's Government have undertaken to
raise the loans required by the dominions to meet the heavy expenditure
entailed upon them on the credit of the imperial exchequer. In addition
to that sum of £38,000,000 there has been an advance to Belgium of
£10,000,000, and to Serbia of £800,000. Further advances to these allies
are under consideration, the details of which it is not possible yet to
make public. The balance of, roughly, £28,000,000 is required for
miscellaneous services covered by the vote of credit which have not yet
been separately specified.

I think the committee will be interested to know what the actual cost of
the war will have been to this country as far as we can estimate on
March 31, the close of the financial year. The war will then have lasted
for 240 days and the votes of credit up to that time, assuming this vote
is carried, will amount to £362,000,000. It may be said, speaking
generally, that the average expenditure from votes of credit will have
been, roughly, £1,500,000 per day throughout the time. That, of course,
is the excess due to the war over the expenditure on a peace footing.
That represents the immediate charge to the taxpayers of this country
for this year. But, as the committee knows, a portion of the expenditure
consists of advances for the purpose of assisting or securing the food
supplies of this country and will be recoverable in whole, or to a very
large extent, in the near future. A further portion represents advances
to the dominions and to other States which will be ultimately repaid. If
these items are excluded from the account the average expenditure per
day of the war is slightly lower, but after making full allowance for
all the items which are in the nature of recoverable loans, the daily
expenditure does not work out at less than £1,200,000.

These figures are averages taken over the whole period from the outbreak
of the war, but at the outbreak of the war, after the initial
expenditure on mobilization had been incurred, the daily expenditure was
considerably below the average, as many charges had not yet matured. The
expenditure has risen steadily and is now well over the daily average
that I have given. To that figure must be added, in order to give a
complete account of the matter, something for war services other than
naval or military. At the beginning of the year these charges are not
likely to be very considerable, but it will probably be within the mark
to say that from April I we shall be spending over £1,700,000 a day
above the normal, in consequence of the war.

Perhaps now I may say something which is not strictly in order on this
vote, but concerns the vote of credit for the ensuing year, which
amounts, as appears on the paper, to £250,000,000. The committee will at
once observe an obvious distinction between the votes of credit taken
for the current financial year and that which we propose to take for the
ensuing year. As I have already pointed out, at the outbreak of war the
ordinary supply of the year had been granted by the House, and
accordingly the votes of credit for 1914-1915 were for the amounts
required beyond the ordinary grants of Parliament for the cost of
military and naval operations. When we came to frame the estimates for
the ensuing year, 1915-1916, the Treasury was confronted with the
difficulty, which amounted to an impossibility, of presenting to
Parliament estimates in the customary form for navy and army
expenditure, apart from the cost of the war. All the material
circumstances have been set out in the Treasury minute of Feb. 5, and in
principle have been approved by the House. As the committee will
remember, the total of the estimates which we have presented for the
army and the navy amount to only £15,000 for the army and £17,000 for
the navy, and the remainder of the cost of both these services will be
provided for out of votes of credit, and the vote of credit now being
proposed provides for general army and navy service in as far as
specific provision is not made for them in the small estimates already
presented. This vote of credit, therefore, has two features which I
believe are quite unique, and without precedent. In the first place, it
is the largest single vote on record in the annals of this House, and,
secondly, as I have said, it provides for the ordinary as well as for
the emergency expenditure of the army and the navy. The House may ask on
what principle or basis has this sum of £250,000,000 been arrived at. Of
course it is difficult, and indeed impossible, to give any exact
estimate, but as regards the period, so far as we can forecast it, for
which this vote is being taken, it has been thought advisable to take a
sum sufficient, so far as we can judge, to provide for all the
expenditure which will come in course of payment up to approximately the
second week in July--that is to say, a little over three months, or
something like 100 days of war expenditure.

As regards the daily rate of expenditure--I have dealt hitherto with the
expenditure up to March 31--the War Office calculates that from the
beginning of April, 1915, the total expenditure on army services will be
at the rate of £1,500,000 per day, with a tendency to increase. The
total expenditure on the navy at the commencement of April will, it is
calculated, amount to about £400,000 per day. The aggregate expenditure
on the army and the navy services at the beginning of 1915-1916 is
therefore £1,900,000 per day, with a tendency to increase, and for the
purpose of our estimate the figure we have taken is a level £2,000,000 a
day. On a peace footing the daily expenditure upon the army and the navy
on the basis of the estimates approved last year was about £220,000 per
day. So that the difference between £2,000,000 and £220,000 represents
what we estimate to be the increased expenditure due to the war during
the 100 days for which we are now providing.

There are other items belonging to the same category as those to which I
have already referred in dealing with the supplementary vote with regard
to advances to our own dominions and other States for which provision
has also had to be made, and the balance of the total of £250,000,000
for which we are now asking, beyond the actual estimated expenditure for
the army and the navy, will be applied to those and kindred or
emergency purposes. Before I pass from the purely monetary aspect of the
matter, it may be interesting to the committee to be reminded of what
has been our expenditure upon the great wars of the past. In the great
war which lasted for over twenty years, from 1793 to 1815, the total
cost as estimated by the best authorities was £831,000,000. The Crimean
war may be put down, taking everything into account, at £70,000,000. The
total cost of the war charges in South Africa from 1899 to March 31,
1903, was estimated in a return presented to Parliament at £211,000,000.
In presenting these two votes of credit the Government are making a
large pecuniary demand on the House, a demand which in itself and beyond
comparison is larger than has ever been made in the House of Commons by
any British Minister in the whole course of our history.

We make it with the full conviction that after seven months of war the
country and the whole empire are every whit as determined as they were
at the outset [cheers] if need be at the cost of all we can command both
in men and in money to bring a righteous cause to a triumphant issue.
[Cheers.] There is much to encourage and to stimulate us in what we see.
Nothing has shaken and nothing can shake our faith in the unbroken
spirit of Belgium, [cheers,] in the undefeated heroism of indomitable
Serbia, in the tenacity and resource with which our two great allies,
one in the west and the other in the east, hold their far-flung lines
and will continue to hold them till the hour comes for an irresistible
advance. [Cheers.] Our own dominions and our great dependency of India
have sent us splendid contributions of men, a large number of whom
already are at the front, and before very long, in one or another of the
actual theatres of war, the whole of them will be in the fighting line.
[Cheers.] We hear today with great gratification that the Princess
Patricia's Canadian regiment has been doing, during these last few days,
most gallant and efficient service. [Cheers.]

We have no reason to be otherwise than satisfied with the progress of
recruiting here at home. [Cheers.] The territorial divisions now fully
trained are capable--I say it advisedly--of confronting any troops in
the world, [cheers,] and the new armies, which have lately been under
the critical scrutiny of skilled observers, are fast realizing all our
most sanguine hopes. A war carried on upon this gigantic scale and under
conditions for which there is no example in history is not always or
every day a picturesque or spectacular affair. Its operations are of
necessity in appearance slow and dragging. Without entering into
strategic details, I can assure the committee that with all the
knowledge and experience which we have now gained, his Majesty's
Government have never been more confident than they are today in the
power as well as the will of the Allies to achieve ultimate and durable
victory. [Cheers.] I will not enter in further detail to what I may call
the general military situation, but I should like to call the attention
of the committee for a few moments to one or two aspects of the war
which of late have come prominently into view.

I will refer first to the operations which are now in progress in the
Dardanelles. [Cheers.] It is a good rule in war to concentrate your
forces on the main theatre and not to dissipate them in disconnected and
sporadic adventures, however promising they may appear to be. That
consideration, I need hardly say, has not been lost sight of in the
councils of the Allies. There has been and there will be no denudation
or impairment of the forces which are at work in Flanders, and both the
French and ourselves will continue to give them the fullest, and we
believe the most effective, support. Nor, what is equally important, has
there for the purpose of these operations been any weakening of the
grand fleet. [Cheers.] The enterprise which is now going on, and so far
has gone on in a manner which reflects, as I think the House will agree,
the highest credit on all concerned, was carefully considered and
conceived with very distinct and definite objects--political, strategic,
and economical. Some of these objects are so obvious as not to need
statement and others are of such a character that it is perhaps better
for the moment not to state them. [Laughter and cheers.] But I should
like to advert for a moment, without any attempt to forecast the future,
to two features in this matter. The first is, that it once more
indicates and illustrates the close co-operation of the Allies--in this
case the French and ourselves--in the new theatre and under somewhat
dissimilar conditions to those which have hitherto prevailed, and to
acknowledge what I am sure the House of Commons will be most ready to
acknowledge, that the splendid contingent from the French Navy that our
allies have supplied [cheers] is sharing to the full both the hazards
and the glory of the enterprise. [Cheers.] The other point on which I
think it is worth while to dwell for a moment is that this operation
shows in a very significant way the copiousness and the variety of our
naval resources. [Cheers.] In order to illustrate that remark, take the
names of the ships which have actually been mentioned in the published
dispatches. The Queen Elizabeth, [cheers,] the first ship to be
commissioned of the newest type of what are called superdreadnoughts,
with guns of power and range never hitherto known in naval warfare.
[Cheers.] Side by side with her is the Agamemnon, the immediate
predecessor of the dreadnought, and in association with them the
Triumph, the Cornwallis, the Irresistible, the Vengeance, and the
Albion--representing, I think I am right in saying, three or four
different types of the older predreadnought battleship which have been
so foolishly and so prematurely regarded in some quarters as obsolete or
negligible--all bringing to bear the power of their formidable
twelve-inch guns on the fortifications, with magnificent accuracy and
with deadly effects. [Cheers.] When, as I have said, these proceedings
are being conducted, so far as the navy is concerned, without
subtraction of any sort or kind from the strength and effectiveness of
the grand fleet, I think a word of congratulation is due to the
Admiralty for the way in which it has utilized all its resources.

I pass from that to another new factor in these military and naval
operations--the so-called German "blockade" of our coasts. [Cheers.] I
shall have to use some very plain language. [Cheers.] I may, perhaps,
preface what I have to say by the observation that it does not come upon
us as a surprise. [Cheers.] This war began on the part of Germany with
the cynical repudiation [cheers] of a solemn treaty on the avowed
grounds that when a nation's interests required it, right and good faith
must give way to force. ["Hear, hear!"] The war has been carried on,
therefore, with a systematic--not an impulsive or a casual--but a
systematic violation of all the conventions and practices by which
international agreements had sought to mitigate and to regularize the
clash of arms. [Cheers.] She has now, I will not say reached a climax,
for we do not know what may yet be to come, but she has taken a further
step without any precedent in history by mobilizing and organizing not
upon the surface but under the surface of the sea a campaign of piracy
and pillage. [Prolonged cheers.]

Are we--can we--here I address myself to the neutral countries of the
world--are we to or can we sit quiet as though we were still under the
protection of the restraining rules and the humanizing usages of
civilized warfare? [Cheers.] We think we cannot. [Cheers.] The enemy,
borrowing what I may, perhaps, for this purpose call a neutral flag from
the vocabulary of diplomacy, describe these newly adopted measures by a
grotesque and puerile perversion of language as a "blockade."
[Laughter.] What is a blockade? A blockade consists in sealing up the
war ports of a belligerent against sea-borne traffic by encircling their
coasts with an impenetrable ring of ships of war. [Cheers.]

Where are these ships of war? [Cheers.] Where is the German Navy?
[Cheers.] What has become of those gigantic battleships and cruisers on
which so many millions of money have been spent and in which such vast
hopes and ambitions have been invested? I think, if my memory serves
me, they have only twice during the course of these seven months been
seen upon the open sea. Their object in both cases was the same--murder,
[cheers,] civilian outrage, and wholesale destruction of property in
undefended seaside towns, and on each occasion when they caught sight of
the approach of a British force they showed a clean pair of heels, and
they hurried back at the top of their speed to the safe seclusion of
their mine fields and their closely guarded forts.

_Lord R. CECIL_--Not all. [Laughter.]

_Mr. ASQUITH_--No; some had misadventures on the way. ["Hear, hear!" and
laughter.] The plain truth is--the German fleet is not blockading,
cannot blockade, and never will blockade our coasts.

I propose now to read to the committee the statement which has been
prepared by his Majesty's Government and which will be public property
tomorrow. It declares, I hope in sufficiently plain and unmistakable
terms, the view which we take, not only of our rights, but of our duty.

Germany has declared that the English Channel, the north and west coasts
of France, and the waters around the British Isles are a "war area" and
has officially notified that all enemy ships found in that area will be
destroyed and that neutral vessels may be exposed to danger. This is, in
effect, a claim to torpedo at sight, without regard to the safety of
crew or passengers, any merchant vessel under any flag. As it is not in
the power of the German Admiralty to maintain any surface craft in these
waters, the attack can only be delivered by submarine agency. The law
and custom of nations in regard to attacks on commerce have always
presumed that the first duty of the captor of a merchant vessel is to
bring it before a prize court, where it may be tried, and where the
regularity of the capture may be challenged, and where neutrals may
recover their cargoes. The sinking of prizes is in itself a questionable
act, to be resorted to only in extraordinary circumstances and after
provision has been made for the safety of all the crew or passengers--if
there are passengers on board. The responsibility for discriminating
between neutral and enemy vessels, and between neutral and enemy cargo,
obviously rests with the attacking ship, whose duty it is to verify the
status and character of the vessel and cargo and to preserve all papers
before sinking or even capturing the ship. So, also, is the humane duty
to provide for the safety of the crews of merchant vessels, whether
neutral or enemy, an obligation on every belligerent. It is on this
basis that all previous discussions of the law for regulating warfare at
sea have proceeded.

The German submarine fulfills none of these obligations. She enjoys no
local command of the waters in which she operates. She does not take her
captures within the jurisdiction of a prize court; she carries no prize
crew which she can put on board the prize she seizes. She uses no
effective means of discriminating between a neutral and an enemy vessel;
she does not receive on board, for safety, the crew of the vessel she
sinks. Her methods of warfare are, therefore, entirely outside the scope
of any of the international instruments regulating operations against
commerce in time of war. The German declaration substitutes
indiscriminate destruction for regulated capture. [Cheers.] Germany is
adopting these methods against peaceful traders and non-combatant crews
with the avowed object of preventing commodities of all kinds, including
food for the civil population, from reaching or leaving the British
Isles and Northern France.

Her opponents are therefore driven to frame retaliatory measures [loud
cheers] in order, in their turn, to prevent commodities of any kind
[loud cheers] from reaching or leaving the German Empire. [Renewed
cheers.] These measures will, however, be enforced by the British and
French Governments, without risk to neutral ships or to neutral or
non-combatant lives, and with strict observance of the dictates of
humanity. The British and French Governments will therefore hold
themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of
presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin. It is not intended to
confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless they would be otherwise liable
to confiscation. Vessels with cargoes which have sailed before this date
will not be affected. [Loud cheers.]

That, Sir, is our reply. [Cheers.] I may say, before I comment upon it,
that the suggestion which I see is put forward from a German quarter
that we have rejected some proposal or suggestion made to the two powers
by the United States Government--I will not say anything more than that
it is quite untrue. On the contrary, all we have said to the United
States Government is that we are taking it into careful consideration
in consultation with our allies.

Now the committee will have observed that in the statement which I have
just read of the retaliatory measures we propose to adopt, the words
"blockade" and "contraband" and other technical terms of international
law do not occur. And advisedly so. In dealing with an opponent who has
openly repudiated all the principles both of law and of humanity we are
not going to allow our efforts to be strangled in a network of juridical
niceties. [Cheers.] We do not intend to put into operation any measures
which we do not think to be effective, [cheers,] and I need not say we
shall carefully avoid any measure which would violate the rules either
of humanity or of honesty. But, subject to those two conditions, I say
not only to our enemy, but I say it on behalf of the Government, and I
hope on behalf of the House of Commons, that under existing conditions
there is no form of economic pressure to which we do not consider
ourselves entitled to resort. [Loud cheers.] If, as a consequence,
neutrals suffer inconvenience and loss of trade, we regret it, but we
beg them to remember that this phase of the war was not initiated by us.
[Cheers.] We do not propose either to assassinate their seamen or to
destroy their goods. What we are doing we do solely in self-defense.

If, again, as is possible, hardship is caused to the civil and
non-combatant population of the enemy by the cutting off of supplies, we
are not doing more in this respect than was done in the days when
Germany still acknowledged the authority of the law of nations
sanctioned by the first and the greatest of her Chancellors, and as
practiced by the expressed declaration of his successor. We are quite
prepared to submit to the arbitrament of neutral opinion in this war in
the circumstances in which we have been placed. We have been moderate
and restrained, and we have abstained from things which we were provoked
and tempted to do, and we have adopted the policy which recommends
itself to reason, common sense, and to justice.

This new aspect of the war only serves to illustrate and to emphasize
the truth that the gravity and the magnitude of the task which we have
undertaken does not diminish, but increases, as the months roll by. The
call for men to join our fighting forces, which is our primary need, has
been and is being nobly responded to here at home and throughout the
empire. That call, we say with all plainness and directness, was never
more urgent or more imperious than today. For this is a war not only of
men but of material. To take only one illustration, the expenditure upon
ammunition on both sides has been on a scale and at a rate which is not
only without all precedent but is far in excess of any expert forecast.
At such a time patriotism has cast a heavy burden on the shoulders of
all who are engaged in trades or manufactures which directly or
indirectly minister to the equipment of our forces. It is a burden, let
me add, which falls, or ought to fall, with even weight on both
employers and employed. [Cheers.] Differences as to remuneration or as
to profit, as to hours and conditions of labor, which in ordinary times
might well justify a temporary cessation of work should no longer be
allowed to do so. The first duty of all concerned is to go on producing
with might and main what the safety of the State requires, [cheers,] and
if this is done I can say with perfect confidence the Government on its
part will insure a prompt and equitable settlement of disputed points,
and in cases of proved necessity will give on behalf of the State such
help as is in their power. [Cheers.] Sailors and soldiers, employers and
workmen in the industrial world are all at this moment partners and
co-operators in one great enterprise. The men in the shipyards and the
engineering shops, the workers in the textile factories, the miner who
sends the coal to the surface, the dockyard laborer who helps to load
and unload the ships, and those who employ and organize and supervise
their labors are one and all rendering to their country a service as
vital and as indispensable as the gallant men who line the trenches in
Flanders or in France or who are bombarding fortresses in the
Dardanelles. [Cheers.]

I hear sometimes whispers, hardly more than whispers, of possible terms
of peace. Peace is the greatest human good, but this is not the time to
talk of peace. Those who talk of peace, however excellent their
intentions, are in my judgment victims, I will not say of wanton, but of
grievous self-delusion. Just now we are in the stress and tumult of a
tempest which is shaking the foundations of the earth. The time to talk
of peace is when the great tasks in which we and our allies embarked on
the long and stormy voyage are within sight of accomplishment. Speaking
at the Guildhall at the Lord Mayor's banquet last November I used this
language, which has since been repeated almost in the same terms by the
Prime Minister of France, and which I believe represents the settled
sentiment and purpose of the country. I said:

     We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly
     drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than
     she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against
     the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller
     nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable
     foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is
     wholly and finally destroyed. [Cheers.]

What I said early in November, now, after four months, I repeat today.
We have not relaxed nor shall we relax in the pursuit of every one and
all of the aims which I have described. These are great purposes, and to
achieve them we must draw upon all our resources, both material and
spiritual. On the one side, the material side, the demands presented in
these votes is for men, for money, for the fullest equipment of the
purposes of war. On the other side, what I have called the spiritual
side, the appeal is to those ancient inbred qualities of our race which
have never failed us in times of stress--qualities of self-mastery,
self-sacrifice, patience, tenacity, willingness to bear one another's
burdens, a unity which springs from the dominating sense of a common
duty, unfailing faith, inflexible resolve. [Loud cheers.]

Sweden's Scandinavian Leadership

By a Swedish Political Expert

[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 4, 1915.]

In common with a majority of the other countries of Europe, Sweden has
had a full measure of experience in the difficulties confronting neutral
powers while a world struggle like the present European conflict is in
progress, and has learned that, even if it may prove effective in
averting blood-shed, neutrality does not by any means insure a nation
against the other vicissitudes of war. Aside from operations of a purely
military character, the groups of belligerent powers are carrying on a
commercial warfare of constantly increasing intensity. It is
characteristic, perhaps, that both parties to the struggle, as time goes
on, appear to become more and more indifferent to the injury
incidentally inflicted on neutral countries.

Geographically situated so that it might provide easy transit for
shipments both to Russia and to the German Empire, Sweden, as a matter
of course, has become the object of lively interest to both groups of
warring nations in their dual concern of securing advantages to
themselves and placing obstacles in the way of the enemy. From the very
beginning, however, Sweden has maintained an attitude of strictest
neutrality and of loyal impartiality toward both sides in the struggle.
It is the object of this article to set forth as briefly as possible the
manner in which the neutrality of Sweden has been made manifest.

Immediately after the war broke out in August last year the Swedish
Government proclaimed its intention to remain neutral throughout the
conflict. Simultaneous action was taken by the Government for the
strengthening of the country's defenses, in the firm conviction that
only if there was behind it the armed strength with which to enforce it
would the neutrality of Sweden be respected. A move of the most profound
significance--the first in our endeavors to create in Scandinavia a
neutral "centre" and to gird ourselves with a greater strength to make
our peaceful intentions effective--was made on Aug. 8 of last year, when
the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Norway appeared in the
representative assemblies of both peoples and delivered identically
worded explanatory communications in which was embodied a statement to
the effect that the Swedish and Norwegian Governments had agreed to
maintain their neutrality throughout the war at any cost, and that the
two Governments had exchanged mutually binding and satisfactory
assurances with a view to preventing any situation growing out of the
state of war in Europe from precipitating either country into acts of
hostility directed against the other.

In the meantime, neutral commerce and shipping during the months that
followed were exposed to most serious infringements by the warring
powers, such as the closing of ports by mines; limitations in the rights
of neutral shipping to the use of the sea (mare libre) and of other
established routes of maritime trade; arbitrary broadening in the
definition of what shall constitute contraband of war, &c. As an
instance it may be stated that England for a time treated magnetic iron
ore as contraband of war and that Germany still persists in so
regarding certain classes of manufactured wood. In both these instances
Swedish exports have suffered severely. On initiative taken by the
Swedish Government in the middle of last November the Governments of
Sweden, Denmark, and Norway lodged identically worded protests with the
envoys of certain of the powers engaged in the war against measures
taken by them which threatened serious disturbance to neutral traffic.

[Illustration: SIR PERCY SCOTT

British Admiral, Who Asserted Before the War Began That the Submarine
Had Sounded the Deathknell of the Dreadnought

_(Photo from Rogers)_]


The Famous Boer Leader, Premier of the Union of South Africa, Now
Commanding the British South African Forces

_(Photo from Paul Thompson)_]

One further step--of the utmost importance through what it accomplished
toward establishing firmly the position of the neutral States in the
north--was the meeting between the Kings of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark
at Malmö on Dec. 19 last. This meeting was especially designed to
provide an opportunity for taking counsel together regarding means which
may be resorted to for the purpose of limiting and counteracting the
economical difficulties imposed on the three countries through the war.
The meeting at Malmö served not only to give most powerful expression to
the common determination of the northern kingdoms to remain neutral, but
it became the means also of agreeing upon and adopting a modus vivendi
for continued co-operation between the three countries during the war
for the protection of interests they have in common.

In this manner Sweden has led in a movement to establish for the
northern countries a potential policy of neutrality with the practical
aim of limiting and reducing to a minimum the economical difficulties
consequent upon the existing state of war.

From what already has been said it appears clearly, too, how completely
without justification have been the accusations which have been voiced
from time to time in the press of countries that enter into either of
the belligerent groups--that Sweden, now in one respect and now in
another, had shown partiality to the adversary. Thus, suspicion has been
cast, with no justification whatever, on the circumstance that during
the last month Sweden has imported large quantities of necessaries
which would have been both valuable and helpful to the belligerents. And
yet, this increase in the Swedish imports is very readily explained on
the ground that it was necessary, partly, in order to make up for an
existing shortage in supplies due to stopped traffic during the first
months of the war, and, partly, to insure ability to fill Swedish
demands for some time to come. A country which desires to remain neutral
is not in a position to submit to dictation from any of the belligerent
nations, but this very thing is frequently interpreted by one party to a
struggle as involving an understanding with the other.

But Sweden's peaceful resolve and her fixed determination to maintain
her life as a nation against all attempts at encroachment would count
for little if behind her word there did not exist the strength to make
it good and material resources to fall back on when the demand comes.
That these exist in Sweden will be shown in the following with some data
of Sweden's economics.

With a population of 5,700,000, distributed over an area of 448,000
square kilometers, (170,977 square miles,) as compared with 9,415,000
square kilometers (3,025,600 square miles) in the United States, Sweden,
in comparison with European countries in general, is very sparsely
inhabited. The possibilities for growth and development, however, are
great owing to natural resources, which are both rich and varied. Of
Sweden's area, 40,000 square kilometers (15,266 square miles) is
cultivated land. The value of the annual production of grain is
estimated at about 340,000,000 kroner, (about $91,900,000,) offset by an
import of grain which exceeds the export by about 70,000,000 kroner,
(about $18,900,000.) From this it appears that agriculture as yet
retains its place as the principal industry of the country. With the
bigger half of the country's area timber and the rivers well adapted to
logging, Sweden quite naturally has become one of the foremost countries
in the world in the export of lumber, wood pulp, and manufactured wood.
Another natural product of Sweden, and one of the utmost importance, is
iron ore, of which there was exported in 1913 to the value of about
69,000,000 kroner, (about $18,500,000,) chiefly from the large mineral
fields in the northernmost part of the country. Besides this production
of raw material, Sweden has important manufacturing industries which
thrive as a result of the abundant supply of water power, an extensive
network of railroads, and a shipping industry which is in a state of
flourishing development.

The total output of our Swedish industries (mining not included) in 1912
was appraised at a net (manufacturing) value of 1,778,000,000 kroner,
(about $481,600,000.) Of this total, 476,000,000 kroner (about
$128,600,000) represents foodstuffs and luxuries, 353,000,000 kroner
(about $95,400,000) wood products, &c.; 222,000,000 kroner ($60,000,000)
textile products, and so on.

A few figures will illustrate Sweden's exchange of products with foreign
countries. In 1912 the foreign trade of Sweden reached a total of
1,554,000,000 kroner, (about $420,000,000.) The imports aggregated
794,000,000 kroner (about $214,600,000) and the exports 760,000,000
kroner, (about $205,400,000,) thus showing a relatively advantageous
trade balance. Of the imported values, 28 per cent. was foodstuffs and
luxuries, 45 per cent. raw materials, and 26 per cent. articles
manufactured either wholly or in part. Of the exports, 14 per cent. was
foodstuffs and luxuries, 23 per cent. raw materials, and not less than
63 per cent. articles of manufacture, finished completely or in part.

The principal industrial products represented among these exports are
enumerated here:

Wood products   1,912,000,000  $516,700,000[1]
Pulp and paper    134,000,000    36,000,000
Metal products    105,000,000    28,400,000
Machinery          56,000,000    15,400,000
Matches            16,000,000     4,300,000
Pottery products   15,000,000     4,000,000

[Footnote 1: The amounts in this column are close approximates.]

With regard to our exports, there have been especially large increases
in those of pulp and machinery. The principal types of machinery which
figure among the exports of Sweden are milk separators, oil motors,
telephone apparatus, electric engines, and ball bearings. In these
exports are plainly indicated the inventive genius of the Swedes and
their aptitude for technical and industrial pursuits.

With reference to the Swedish railroads, this fact is deserving of
mention: Sweden leads all Europe with 2.5 kilometers to each 1,000
inhabitants, (United States has 4.14 kilometers.) The mercantile marine
of Sweden has experienced powerful growth in recent years. In 1912, with
a net tonnage of 805,000, it held the sixth place among the merchant
fleets of Europe, being ahead of, among other countries, Spain, Russia,
and the Netherlands. Especially has the growth in Sweden's merchant
marine been pronounced since 1904, when the first regular ocean lines
with Swedish vessels were established. Today Swedish steamship lines are
maintaining regular traffic with all parts of the world. Thus, among
other things, Sweden has established freight lines, with steamers plying
to both the east and west coasts of North America. Quite recently,
despite the financial crisis brought on by the war, a company has been
formed with the object of establishing passenger traffic with Swedish
steamships of high speed between Gothenburg and either New York or

After scrutinizing these figures the reader ought not to be surprised at
the assertion that Sweden is exceptionally well situated from an
economical point of view, and, perhaps, is among the countries which
have been least affected by the economical crisis consequent upon the
war. The national debt of Sweden, which was created very largely with a
view to financing the construction of the Government railroads and for
other productive purposes, is at present only 720,000,000 kroner, (about
$194,500,000.) This is only 126 kroner (a small fraction above $34) for
each inhabitant, while the corresponding figure for France in 1913 was
591 kroner, (nearly $160;) the Netherlands, 282 kroner, ($70.62;) Great
Britain, 280 kroner, ($70.57;) Germany, 276 kroner, ($70.40;) Italy, 270
kroner, ($70.30,) &c. Against the national debt of 720,000,000 kroner
(about $194,500,000) Sweden has Crown assets at this time appraised at
1,761,000,000 kroner net, (nearly $476,000,000.)

Another evidence of the splendid financial condition of Sweden is
afforded in the fact that, since the war broke out and countries which
under normal conditions might be looked to for loans had closed their
markets to foreign nations, the domestic market has been able to supply
fully all, both public and private, demands for funds. Thus, when the
Swedish Government, early last October, sought a loan of 30,000,000
kroner at home, this was fully subscribed in three days. Nor have
municipalities or private banks encountered any difficulty in placing
bonds for amounts of considerable size in the domestic market. The only
loan for which the Swedish Government has contracted abroad during the
crisis was for $5,000,000, and this was placed in New York for the
purpose of facilitating payments for large purchases of American grain.

[Illustration: [map of Scandinavia]]

At least a few words with particular reference to the commercial
intercourse between Sweden and the United States. According to
statistics from the year 1912, the imports of Sweden from the United
States were of the aggregate value of 60,000,000 kroner, (about
$16,200,000,) while the exports aggregated 32,000,000 kroner, (about
$8,600,000.) The principal imports were: Cotton, 17,000,000 kroner,
(about $4,600,000;) oils, 12,000,000 kroner, (about $3,240,000;) copper,
6,200,000 kroner, (about $1,675,000;) machinery, 5,000,000 kroner,
(about $1,350,000;) grain and flour, 2,300,000 kroner, (about $621,000;)
bacon, 1,700,000 kroner, (about $460,000.) The principal articles of
export in the same year were: Pulp, 12,400,000 kroner, (about
$3,350,000;) manufactured iron and steel, 8,100,000 kroner, (about
$2,200,000;) iron ore, 3,600,000 kroner, (about $973,000;) paper,
2,100,000 kroner, (about $568,000;) elastic gum refuse, 1,900,000
kroner, (about $514,000;) matches, 1,300,000 kroner, (about $350,000.)

Since the outbreak of hostilities in August last year there has been a
tremendous increase in trade between Sweden and the United States. The
tonnage employed in this trade has been multiplied many times in order
adequately to care for the traffic. Sweden has sought to secure in the
United States a multiplicity of necessaries which under normal
conditions have been obtained from the belligerent countries. From the
United States, too, there has come an increased demand for many Swedish

It is to be hoped that a large portion of this commerce, which has been
the artificial outgrowth of unusual conditions, will continue, even
after the present world crisis shall happily have become a thing of the
past. Surely, it would be to the mutual advantage of both countries to
develop and strengthen their direct trade relations.



[From King Albert's Book.]

    O men of mickle heart and little speech,
      Slow, stubborn countrymen of heath and plain,
      Now have ye shown these insolent again
    That which to Caesar's legions ye could teach,
    That slow-provok'd is long-provok'd. May each
      Crass Caesar learn this of the Keltic grain,
      Until at last they reckon it in vain
    To browbeat us who hold the Western reach.

    For even as you are, we are, ill to rouse,
    Rooted in Custom, Order, Church, and King;
    And as you fight for their sake, so shall we,
    Doggedly inch by inch, and house by house;
    Seeing for us, too, there's a dearer thing
    Than land or blood--and that thing Liberty.

War Correspondence

The Beloved Hindenburg

A Pen Portrait of the German Commander in Chief in the East

[By a Staff Correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES.]

GERMAN GREAT HEADQUARTERS, EAST, Feb. 10.--But for the "field gray" coat
and the militant mustache, I should have taken him for a self-made
American, a big business man or captain of industry, as he sat at his
work desk, the telephone at his elbow, the electric push-buttons and
reams of neat reports adding to the illusion. Quiet, unassuming, and
democratic, he yet makes the same impression of virility and colossal
energy that Colonel Roosevelt does, but with an iron restraint of
discipline which the American never possessed, and an earnestness of
face and eye that I had only seen matched in his Commander in Chief, the
Kaiser. Here was a man whom the most neutral American could instantly
admire and honor, regardless of the merits of the controversy. It was
Hindenburg, the well beloved, the hope of Germany. He has already been
"done" by journalists and Senator Beveridge, but 70,000,000 are pinning
their faith to him, which makes him worth "doing" again--and again.

For a moment I nearly forgot that I was an American with "nerve," bent
on making him say something, preferably indiscreet; it seemed almost a
shame to bother this man whose brain was big with the fate of empire.
But, although I hadn't been specially invited, but had just "dropped in"
in informal American fashion, the Commander in Chief of all his Kaiser's
forces in the east stopped making history long enough to favor me with a
short but thought-provoking interview.

As to his past performances, the Field Marshal genially referred to the
detailed official summary; as to the future, he protested.

"I am not a prophet. But this I can say. Tell our friends in
America--and also those who do not love us--that I am looking forward
with unshakable confidence to the final victory--and a well-earned
vacation," he added whimsically. "I should like nothing better than to
visit your Panama Exposition and meet your wonderful General Goethals,
the master builder, for I imagine our jobs are spiritually much akin;
that his slogan, too, has been 'durchhalten' ('hold out') until
endurance and organization win out against heavy odds."

Then with sudden, paradoxical, terrific quiet earnest: "Great is the
task that still confronts us, but greater my faith in my brave troops."
One got indelibly the impression that he loved them all, suffered under
their hardships and sorrowed for their losses.

"For you, this war is only a titanic drama; we Germans feel it with our
hearts," he said thoughtfully.

The Field Marshal spoke warmly of the Austro-Hungarian troops, and cited
the results of the close co-operation between his forces and the
Austrian armies as striking proof of the proverb, "In union is
strength." Like all other German Generals whom I had "done," he, too,
had words of unqualified praise for the bravery of his enemies. "The
Russians fight well; but neither mere physical bravery nor numbers, nor
both together, win battles nowadays."

"How about the steam roller?"

"It hasn't improved the roads a bit, either going forward or backward,"
he said with a grim smile.

"Are you worrying over Grand Duke Nicholas's open secret?" I asked,
citing the report via Petrograd and London of a new projected Russian
offensive that was to take the form, not of a steam roller, but of a
"tidal wave of cavalry."

"It will dash against a wall of loyal flesh and blood, barbed with
steel--if it comes," he said simply.

My impression, growing increasingly stronger the more I have seen, that
German military success had been to no small extent made possible by
American inventive genius and high-speed American methods, received
interesting partial confirmation from the Field Marshal, whose keen,
restless mind, working over quite ordinary material, produced the new
suggestive combination of ideas that, while "America might possibly be
materially assisting Germany's enemies with arms, ammunition, and other
war material, certain it was that America, in the last analysis, had
helped Germany far more."

"But for America, my armies would possibly not be standing in Russia
today--without the American railroading genius that developed and made
possible for me this wonderful weapon, thanks largely to which we have
been able with comparatively small numbers to stop and beat back the
Russian millions again and again--steam engine versus steam roller. Were
it for nothing else, America has proved one of our best friends, if not
an ally.

"We are also awaiting with genuine interest the receipt of our first
American guns," the Field Marshal added. How was Germany expecting to
get guns from America? He was asked to explain the mystery.

"I read somewhere in the papers that a large shipment of heavy cannon
had left America for Russia," he said with dry humor, "in transit for
us--for if they're consigned to the Russians, we'll have them sooner or
later, I hope;" adding, with his habitual tense earnestness, "the
Americans are something more than shrewd, hard-headed business men.
Have they ever vividly pictured to themselves a German soldier smashed
by an American shell, or bored through the heart by an American bullet?
The grim realism of the battlefield--that should make also the business
man thoughtful."

"Shall you go west when you have cleaned up here in the east?" I

"I can't betray military secrets which I don't know myself, even to
interest the newspaper readers," he said. He gave me the impression,
however, that, east or west, he would be found fighting for the
Fatherland so long as the Fatherland needed him.

"Now it means work again. You must excuse me," he concluded,
courteously. "You want to go to the front. Where should you like to go?"

"To Warsaw," I suggested, modestly.

"I, too," he laughed, "but today--ausgeschlossen, ('nothing doing,' in
Americanese.) Still--that may be yet."

"May I come along, your Excellency?"

"Certainly, then you can see for yourself what sort of 'barbarians' we
Germans are."

"Dropping in on Hindenburg" yields some unimportant but interesting
by-products. The railroad Napoleon, as all the world knows, lives and
works in a palace, but this palace doesn't overawe one who has beaten
professionally at the closed portals of Fifth Avenue. It would be
considered a modest country residence in Westchester County or on Long
Island. Light in color and four stories high, including garret, it looks
very much like those memorials which soap kings and sundry millionaires
put up to themselves in their lifetime--the American college dormitory,
the modern kind that is built around three sides of a small court. The
palace is as simple as the man.

The main entrance, a big iron gateway, is flanked by two guardhouses
painted with white and black stripes, the Prussian "colors," and two
unbluffable Landsturm men mount guard, who will tell you to go around to
the back door.

The orderly who opens the front door is a Sergeant in field gray
uniform. You mount a flight of marble steps, and saunter down a marble
hall, half a block long. It is the reception hall. It is furnished with
magnificent hand-carved, high-backed chairs without upholstery, lounging
not being apparently encouraged here. They are Gothic structures backed
up against the walls. There is no Brussels or Axminster carpet on the
cold marble floor--not even Turkish rugs. Through this palace hall, up
by the ceiling, runs a thick cable containing the all-important
telephone wires. The offices open off the hall, the doors labeled with
neatly printed signs telling who and what is within. If you should come
walking down the street outside at 3 A.M. you would probably see the
lights in Hindenburg's office still burning, as I did. At 3:30 they went
out, indicating that a Field Marshal's job is not a sinecure.

Feeling of the German People

Complete Confidence in Victory and Resentment Toward England

[By a Staff Correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES.]

BERLIN, Feb. 12.--To the neutral American, intent only on finding out
the truth, the most thought-provoking feature here (overlooked by
foreign correspondents because of its very featureless obviousness) is
the fact that Germany today is more confident of winning than at any
time in the three months I have been here. This confidence must not be
confused with cocksureness; it is rather the "looking forward with quiet
confidence to ultimate victory," as General von Heeringen phrased it.
Even more important is the corollary that, while the Germans have
apparently never had any doubt that they would win out in the end, this
"ultimate victory" does not seem so far off to them today as it did
three months ago.

To one who has had an opportunity of personally sounding the
undercurrents of German public opinion, this quiet optimism that has
become noticeable only in the past few weeks (totally different in
character from the enthusiasm that followed the declaration of war) has
seemed particularly significant. Three months ago I was incessantly
asked by Germans "how the situation looked to an American," and "how
long I thought the war would last." When left to answer their own
question, they almost invariably remarked: "It may last a long while
yet." Today neutral opinion is no longer anxiously or even eagerly
sought. The temporary need for this sort of moral support seems to have
passed, and there are many indications that the well-informed layman
expects 1915 to see the wind-up of the war, while I have talked with not
a few professional men who have expressed the opinion that the war will
be over by Summer--except against England.

This unanimous exception is significant because it indicates that to the
German mind the war with Russia and France is, in prize-ring parlance, a
twenty-round affair, which can and will be won on points, whereas with
England it is a championship fight to a finish, to be settled only by a
knockout. The idea is that Russia will be eliminated as a serious factor
by late Spring at the latest, and then, Westward Ho! when France will
not prolong the agony unduly, but will seize the first psychological
moment that offers peace with honor, leaving Germany free to fight it
out with the real enemy, England, though as to how, when, and where the
end will come, there is less certainty and agreement. Some think that
the knockout will be delivered in the shadow of the Pyramids; others,
and probably the majority, believe that the winning blow must and will
be delivered on English soil itself.

Time here is no factor, for the war against England is taking on
increasingly an almost religious character; from the German point of
view, it will soon be, not a war, but a crusade. I get one clue to this
in the new phrase of leave-taking that has gained an astounding currency
in the past few weeks. Instead of saying "Good-bye" or "Auf
Wiedersehen," the German now says: "God punish England!" to which the
equally fervent rejoinder is, "May He do so!" This new, polite formula
for leave-taking originated among the officers and men in the field, but
you hear it on all sides now, uttered with a sincerity and earnestness
that is peculiarly impressive. The new style of saying "good-bye" has at
least the merit of being no longer a perfunctory piece of rhetoric.

This optimism is no nation-wide attack of insanity, for the German,
thorough even in forming his opinions, is the last person in the world
to harbor delusions, and there is a perfect realization of the titanic
task that still confronts Germany. Nor is this confidence in ultimate
victory due to lack of information or to being kept in the dark by the
"iron censorship," for the "iron censorship" is itself a myth. It is
liberal, even judged by democratic standards, and surprisingly free from
red tape. There is no embargo on the importation of foreign newspapers;
even the anti-German journals of neutral countries have free entry and
circulation, while at a number of well-known cosmopolitan cafés you can
always read The London Times and The Daily Chronicle, only three days
old, and for a small cash consideration the waiter will generally be
able to produce from his pocket a Figaro, not much older. Not only
English and French, but, even more, the Italian, Dutch, and Scandinavian
papers are widely read and digested by Germans, while the German papers
not only print prominently the French official communiqués, the Russian
communiqués when available, and interesting chunks from the British
"eyewitness" official reports, but most of their feature stories--the
vivid, detailed war news--come from allied sources via correspondents in
neutral countries. The German censor's task is here a relatively simple
one, for German war correspondents never allow professional enthusiasm
to run away with practical patriotism, and you note the--to an
American--amusing and yet suggestive spectacle of war correspondents
specializing in descriptions of sunsets and scenery.

The German was never much of a newspaper reader before the war, but now
he can challenge the American commuter as an absorbent of the printed
word. And not only has the German been suddenly educated into an avid
newspaper reader, but he has developed a tendency to think for himself,
to read between the lines, and interpret sentences. Thus, no German has
any illusions about the military prowess of Austria; but her failure has
caused no hard feelings. "The spirit is willing, but the leadership is
weak," is the kindly verdict, with the hopeful assumption that the
addition of a little German yeast will raise the standard of Austrian
efficiency and improve the quality of leadership.

The Germans, being neither mad nor misinformed, why they face a world of
foes with this new confidence becomes a question of importance to any
one who wants to understand the real situation here. The answer is
Hindenburg--not only the man himself, but all that he stands for, the
personification of the German war spirit, the greatest moral asset of
the empire today. He is idolized not only by the soldiers, but by the
populace as well; not only by the Prussians, but by the Bavarians and
even the Austrians. You cannot realize what a tremendous factor he has
become until you discover personally the Carlylean hero worship of which
he is the object.

Hindenburg woke up one morning to find himself famous; but his
subsequent speedy apotheosis was probably not entirely spontaneous. In
fact, there is reason to believe that he was carefully groomed for the
rôle of a national hero at a critical time, the process being like the
launching by American politicians of a Presidential or Gubernatorial
boom at a time when a name to conjure with is badly needed. He is a
striking answer to the Shakespearean question. His name alone is worth
many army corps for its psychological effect on the people; it has a
peculiarly heroic ring to the German ear, and part of the explanation of
its magic lies probably in the fact that the last syllable, "burg,"
means fortress or castle. He inspires the most unbounded confidence in
the German people; the Field Marshal looms larger than his Kaiser.

The cigarmakers were the first to recognize his claims to immortality
and to confer it on him; but now almost every conceivable sort of
merchandise except corsets is being trade marked Hindenburg. Babies,
fishing boats, race horses, cafés, avenues and squares, a city of
60,000, a whole county, are being named after him, and minor poets are
taking his name in vain daily, "Hindenburg Marches" are being composed
in endless procession, a younger brother is about to publish his
biography, and legends are already thickly clustering about his name. He
laid the Russian bugaboo before it had a chance to make its début; there
is not today the slightest nervousness about the possible coming of the
Cossacks, and there will not be, so long as the Commander in Chief of
all the armies in the east continues to find time to give sittings to
portrait painters, pose for the moving-picture artists, autograph
photographs, appear on balconies while school children sing patriotic
airs, answer the Kaiser's telegrams of congratulation, acknowledge
decorations, receive interminable delegations, personages, and
journalists, and perform all the other time-consuming duties incident to
having greatness thrust upon you; for things obviously cannot be in a
very bad way when the master strategist can thus take "time out" from
strategizing. But the influence of "our Hindenburg," as he is often
affectionately called, is wider than the east; the magic of his name
stiffens the deadline in the west, and the man in the street, whose
faith is great, feels sure that when he has fought his last great battle
in the east the turn of the French and English will come.

While the German in the street, thanks largely to Hindenburg, regards
the military situation with optimism, he sees no grounds for pessimism
in the present political situation. Italy and Bulgaria are regarded as

How the Germans regard the economic, industrial, and financial situation
is rather hard to estimate, because their practical patriotism keeps
them from making any public parade of their business troubles and
worries, if they have any. The oft-repeated platitude that you would
never suspect here that a war was going on if you didn't read the papers
is quite just. Conditions--on the surface--are so normal that there is
even a lively operatic fight on in Munich, where the personal friction
between Musical Director Walters and the star conductor, Otto Hess, has
caused a crisis in the affairs of the Royal Munich Opera, rivaling in
interest the fighting at the front.

There are certainly fewer "calamity howlers" here than on Broadway
during boom times, and you see no outward evidence of hard times, no
acute poverty, no misery, no derelicts, for the war-time social
organization seems as perfect as the military. In the last three months
only one beggar has stopped me on the streets and tried to touch my
heart and pocketbook--a record that seems remarkable to an American who
has run the nocturnal gauntlet of peace-time panhandlers on the Strand
or the Embankment.

Business is most certainly not going on as usual. You note many shops
and stores with few or no customers in them. About the only people who
are making any money are army contractors and the shopkeepers who sell
things available for "Liebesgaben" ("love gifts") for the troops in the
field. Those businesses hardest hit by the war are in a state of
suspended animation, embalmed by the credit of the State.

But, again, the influence of Hindenburg is wider than the east--and the
west; it permeates the business world and stiffens the economic backbone
of the nation. It is no exaggeration to say that the whole German
people, barring the inevitable though small percentage of weaklings, is
trying with terrific earnestness to live up to the homely Hindenburgian
motto, "Durchhalten!" ("Hold out,") or, in more idiomatic American, "See
the thing through."

Bombardment of the Dardanelles

First Allied Attack Described by an Onlooker

[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 8, 1915.]

Athens, Saturday, March 6, (Dispatch to The London Daily
Chronicle.)--The bombardment of the Dardanelles forts, according to the
latest news, proceeds with success and cautious thoroughness. It is now
anticipated that before another two weeks are over the allied fleet will
be in the Sea of Marmora, and Constantinople will quickly fall to the
victorious Allies.

Two features of the operations make extreme caution necessary for the
attacking battleships. In the first place, the number of mines laid in
the strait has been found to be enormous. They must all be picked up,
and the work takes considerable time, seeing that it must be done

In the second place, the larger batteries, against whom the allied fleet
is contending, are very skillfully hidden.

I have had an interesting talk with a gentleman who has just arrived
from Tenedos, where, from the height of Mount Ilios, he witnessed the
bombardment. He tells me:

"The sight was most magnificent. At first the fleet was ranged in a
semi-circle some miles out to sea from the entrance to the strait. It
afforded an inspiring spectacle as the ships came along and took up
position, and the picture became most awe-inspiring when the guns began
to boom.

"The bombardment at first was slow, shells from the various ships
screaming through the air at the rate of about one every two minutes.
Their practice was excellent, and with strong glasses I could see huge
masses of earth and stonework thrown high up into the air. The din, even
at the distance, was terrific, and when the largest ship, with the
biggest guns in the world, joined in the martial chorus, the air was
rent with ear-splitting noise.

"The Turkish batteries, however, were not to be drawn, and, seeing this,
the British Admiral sent one British ship and one French ship close
inshore toward the Sedd-el-Bahr forts.

"It was a pretty sight to see the two battleships swing rapidly away
toward the northern cape, spitting fire and smoke as they rode. They
obscured the pure atmosphere with clouds of smoke from their funnels and
guns; yet through it all I could see they were getting home with the
shots they fired.

"As they went in they sped right under the guns of the shore batteries,
which could no longer resist the temptation to see what they could do.
Puffs of white smoke dotted the landscape on the far shore, and dull
booms echoed over the placid water. Around the ships fountains of water
sprang up into the air. The enemy had been drawn, but his marksmanship
was obviously very bad. I think I am right in saying that not a single
shot directed against the ships came within a hundred yards of either."

The French Battlefront

Account of First Extended View of the Intrenchments Defending France

[By a Special Correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES.]

Paris, March 7.--I have just been permitted a sight of the French
Army--the first accorded to any correspondent in so comprehensive a
measure since the outbreak of the war. Under the escort of an officer of
General Joffre's staff, I was allowed along a great section of the
fighting line, into the trenches under fire, and also received
scientific detailed information regarding this least known of European

France has been so silent about her army and her Generals and so
indifferent to the use of journalism in the war it is scarcely realized
even in France that 450 of the 500 miles of fighting front are held by
the French and only the remaining fifty by the British and Belgians. At
the outbreak of the war no newspaper men were allowed with the army, and
those who managed to get to the front, including myself, all returned to
Paris under escort. Although we saw what a powerful machine it was and
knew it was getting stronger every day, we were permitted to say very
little about it--Germany, meanwhile, granting interviews, taking war
correspondents to trenches and up in balloons in the campaign for
neutral sympathy.

France, or, rather, General Joffre, for his is the first and last word
on the subject of war correspondents, gradually decided to combat the
German advertising.

Only he decided to go them one better, as I hope to show. There have
been several trips, all tryouts. I was informed at the Foreign Office a
month ago that when the representative of so important a paper as THE
NEW YORK TIMES was to be taken to the front it would be for a more
important trip than any up to that date--that I was to be saved up for
such an occasion as I am now privileged to describe.

I propose to give as few names of places and Generals as possible,
first, to meet the wishes of the personal censor, who is the same
officer who escorted me throughout the trip, and, second, because I
believe general facts relating to the morale of the French Army and
their prospects in the Spring campaign will be of more interest than
specific details concerning places where the lines have been established
for the past six months.

From scores of letters received from America the first question which
seems to arise in the minds of neutrals outside the war zone is, What
are the prospects of the Germans taking Paris when the second great
phase of the war is really under way? First, let me admit that a lurking
fear that the Germans might penetrate the lines had caused me to make
certain arrangements for the hasty exit of my family from Paris as soon
as the Spring fighting began. I am now willing to cancel these
arrangements, for I am convinced there is no danger to Paris.

The German Army, in my opinion, will never for a second time dictate
terms of peace in Paris. I feel that I am in a position to make the
statement, founded on an unusual knowledge of the facts, that should
German ambition again fly that high they would need at least 3,000,000
men concentrated before the fortifications of Paris--these in addition
to the enormous force to oppose the French and allied field armies.

The defenses of Paris since the city had its narrow escape before the
battle of the Marne present one of the wonders of the world. Not only
has Gallieni's army intrenched the surrounding country and barb-wired it
until the idea of any forward advance seems preposterous, but every foot
of ground is measured and the exact artillery ranges taken to every
other foot of ground.

For instance, from every single trench which also contains an artillery
observatory the exact distance is recorded to every other trench, to
every house, hillock, tree, and shrub behind which the enemy might
advance. In fact, the German organization which threatened to rule the
world seems overtaken by French organization which became effective
since the war began.

All through the trip it was this new spirit of organization that
impressed me most. I have sent you many cables on the new spirit of the
French, but never before dared to picture them in the rôle which to my
mind they never before occupied--that of organizers. I started the trip
to see the real French Army in the most open but unexpectant frame of
mind. For weeks I had read only laconic official communiqués that told
me nothing. I saw well-fed officers in beautiful limousines rolling
about Paris with an air that the war was a million miles away. The best
way now to explain my enthusiasm is to give the words of a famous
English correspondent, also just returned from a similar trip, (he is
Frederic Villiers, who began war corresponding with Archibald Forbes at
the battle of Plevna, and this is his seventeenth war,) who said:

"In all my life this trip is the biggest show I have ever had."

The first point on the trip where the French intelligence proved
superior to the German was that I was allowed to pay my own expenses.
With the exception of motor cars and a hundred courtesies extended by
the scores of French officers, I paid my own railroad fare, hotel and
food bills.

"This army has nothing to hide," said one of the greatest Generals to
me. "You see what you like, go where you desire, and if you cannot get
there, ask."

This General was de Maud'Huy, the man who with a handful of territorials
stopped the Prussian Guard before Arras shortly after the battle of the
Marne and who since then has never lost a single trench. His name is
now scarcely known, even in France, but I venture the prophecy that when
the French Army marches down the Champs Elysées after the war is over,
when the vanguard passes under the Arch de Triomph, de Maud'Huy--a
nervous little firebrand--will be right up in the front rank with

While our party did all the spectacular stunts the Germans have offered
the correspondents in such profusion, such as visiting the trenches,
where in our case a German shell burst thirty feet from us, splattering
us with mud, also where snipers sent rifle balls hissing only a few feet
away, almost our greatest treats were the scientific daily discourses
given by our Captain concerning the entire history of the first
campaign, explaining each event leading up to the present position of
the two armies. He gave the exact location of every French and allied
army corps on the entire front.

On the opposite side of the line he demonstrated the efficiency of the
French secret service by detailing the position and name of every German
regiment, also the date and the position it now holds. Thus, we were
able to know during the journey that it was the crack Prussian Guard
that was stopped by de Maud'Huy's Territorials and that the English
section under General French was opposed by Saxons.

Our Captain by these lectures gave us an insight into the second great
German blunder after the failure to occupy Paris, which was the failure
immediately to swing a line across Northern France, thus cutting off
Calais and Boulogne, where they could really have leveled a pistol at
England's head. He explained that it was the superiority of the French
cavalry that dictated that the line should instead run straight north
through the edge of Belgium to the sea. His explanations went further
than this, for he refuted many military arguments to the effect that
cavalry became obsolete with the advent of aeroplanes.

Cavalry formerly was used to screen the infantry advance and also for
shock purposes in the charges. Now that the lines are established, it
is mostly used with the infantry in the trenches; but in the great race
after the Marne to turn the western flanks it was the cavalry's ability
to outstrip the infantry that kept the Germans from practically all of
Northern France. In other words, the French chausseurs, more brilliant
than the Uhlans, kept that northern line straight until the infantry
corps had time to take up position.

My introduction to the real French Army was made at the point of
junction with the English troops, so I was thus able to make some
comparison between the types of the Allies. I did not see the Germans
except as prisoners, although on this trip I was sometimes within a few
yards of their lines. With all consideration for the statement that they
are the greatest fighting machine the world has ever seen, all I can say
is that the greatest fighting machine I have even seen is the French

To me they seem invincible from the standpoints of power, intelligence,
and humanity. This latter quality specially impressed me. I do not
believe any army with such high ideals can easily be beaten, and I judge
not only from Generals in command, but the men in the trenches. One
morning I was going through the trenches near the most important point
where the line was continually under fire.

Passing from the second line to a point less than a hundred yards from
the German rifles I came face to face with a General of division. He was
sauntering along for the morning's stroll he chose to take in the
trenches with his men rather than on the safer roads at the rear. He
smoked a cigarette and seemed careless of danger. He continually patted
his soldiers on the back as he passed and called them "his little

I could not help wondering whether the German General opposite was
setting his men the same splendid example. I inquired the French
General's name; he was General Fayolle, conceded by all the armies to be
the greatest artillery expert in the world. Comradeship between officers
and men always is well known in the French Army, but I never before
realized how the officers were so willing to accept quite the same fate.

In Paris the popular appellation for a German is "boche." Not once at
the front did I hear this word used by officers or men. They deplore it,
just as they deplore many things that happen in Paris. Every officer I
talked to declared the Germans were a brave, strong enemy; they waste no
time calling them names.

"They are wonderful, but we will beat them," was the way one officer
summed up the general feeling.

Another illustration of the French officer at the front: The City of
Vermelles of 10,000 inhabitants was captured from the Germans after
fifty-four days' fighting. It was taken literally from house to house,
the French engineers sapping and mining the Germans out of every
stronghold, destroying every single house, incidentally forever
upsetting my own one-time idea that the French are a frivolous people.
So determined were they to retake this town that they fought in the
streets with artillery at a distance of twenty-one feet, probably the
shortest range artillery duel in the history of the world.

The Germans before the final evacuation buried hundreds of their own
dead. Every yard in the city was filled with little crosses--the ground
was so trampled that the mounds of graves were crushed down level with
the ground--and on the crosses are printed the names with the number of
the German regiments. At the base of every cross there rests either a
crucifix or a statue of the Virgin or a wreath of artificial flowers,
all looted from the French graveyard.

With the German graves are French graves made afterward. I walked
through this ruined city where, aside from the soldiery, the only sign
of life I saw was a gaunt, prowling cat. With me past these hundreds of
graves walked half a dozen French officers. They did not pause to read
inscriptions; they did not comment on the loot and pillage of the
graveyard; they scarcely looked even at the graves, but they kept
constantly raising their hands to their caps in salute regardless of
whether the cross numbered a French or a German life destroyed.

We were driving along back of the advance lines. On the road before us
was a company of territorial infantry who had been eight days in the
trenches and were now to have two days of repose at the rear. Plodding
along the same road was a refugee mother and several little children in
a donkey cart; behind the cart, attached by a rope, trundled a baby
buggy with the youngest child inside. The buggy suddenly struck a rut in
the road and overturned, spilling the baby into the mud. Terrible wails
arose, and the soldiers stiffened to attention. Then, seeing the
accident, the entire company broke ranks and rescued the infant. They
wiped the dirt from its face and restored it to its mother in the cart.

So engrossing was the spectacle our motor halted, and our Captain from
Great General Headquarters in his gorgeous blue uniform climbed from the
car, discussing with the mother the safety of a baby buggy riding behind
a donkey cart, at the same time congratulating the soldier who rescued
the child.

Our trip throughout moved with that clockwork precision usually
associated only with the Germans. The schedule throughout the week never
varied from the arrangements made before we left Paris. When we arrived
at certain towns we were handed slips of paper bearing our names and the
hotel number of our room.

Amazing meals appeared at most amazing places, all the menus carefully
thought out days before. Imagine fresh trout served you with other
famous French delicacies in a little house in the battle zone, where
only a few hundred yards of barbed wire and a few feet more of air
separated you from the German trenches. During the German advance, also
after the battle of the Marne, there were many towns in the districts
where it was impossible to obtain tobacco, spirits, or food staples.
This condition has entirely abated, and the commissariat is now so well
supplied that soldiers have sufficient tobacco even in the trenches.

It was my privilege to take a brief ride at the front in an antebellum
motor bus of glorious memory--there being nothing left in Paris but the
subway. Buses are now used to carry fresh meat, although they have been
used in transporting troops and also ammunition. We trundled quite
merrily along a little country road in Northern France, the snow-white
fields on either side in strange contrast to the scenery when last I
rode in that bus. I am sure I rode in the same bus before the war in my
daily trips to the Paris office of THE NEW YORK TIMES. Its sides are
bullet riddled now, but the soldier conductor still jingles the bell to
the motorman, although he carries a revolver where he used to wear the
register for fares.

Trench life was one of the most interesting surprises of the trip. Every
night since the war began I have heard pitying remarks about "the boys
in the trenches," especially if the nights were cold. I was, therefore,
prepared to find the men standing in water to the knees, shivering,
wretched, sick, and unhappy. I found just the contrary--the trenches
were clean, large, and sanitary, although, of course, mud is mud. I
found the bottoms of the trenches in every instance corduroy-lined with
modern drains, which allowed the feet to keep perfectly dry, and also
the large dugouts where the men, except those doing sentry duty, sleep
comfortably on dry straw. There are special dugouts for officers and
artillery observers.

I also visited a large, perfectly equipped Red Cross First Aid camp, all
built underground, extending from one line of trenches to another. All
trenches, communication traverses, and observatory dugouts have received
names which are printed on shingles affixed to the trenches on little
upright posts. For instance, we entered one section of the trenches
through Boyau d'Espagne, we traversed Avenue de Bois, Avenues Wagram and
Friedland, and others commemorating Napoleonic victories. The dugouts of
officers and observers were all called villas--Villa Chambéry, Villa
Montmorency being examples. It all seemed like cozy camp life
underground except that three times the morning of our visit it was
necessary to flatten ourselves against the mud sidewalls while dead men
on crossed rifles were carried out, every head in that particular bit of
trench being bared as the sad procession disappeared.

Although the maps show the lines of fighting to be rather wavy, one must
go to the front really to appreciate the irregular zigzag, snakelike
line that it really is. The particular bit of trenches we visited cover
a front of twelve miles, but so irregular is the line, so intricate and
vast the system of intrenchments, that they measure 200 miles on that
particular twelve-mile fighting front.

When one leaves the trenches at the rear of the communication boyaux, it
is astonishing how little of the war can be seen. Ten feet after we left
our trenches we could not see even the entrance. We stood in a beautiful
open field having our pictures taken, and a few hundred yards away our
motor waited behind some trees. Suddenly we heard a "zip zip" over our
heads. German snipers were taking shots at us.

In addition to the enormous force of men constantly in the trenches
along the entire line there is an equal size reserve line directly
behind them in case of sudden attack. The artillery is posted
considerably further to the rear along with revictualing stations,
aeroplane hangars, and headquarters of the Generals, but through all
this enormous mass of men which we passed daily going to and from our
front observation posts never once did we get the impression of parade.
Three were just troops, troops, troops everywhere, every hamlet, every
village filled with them, every crossroads with their sentries. All of
them, hardened by Winter and turns in the trenches, are in splendid
condition, and as opposed to the Germans, at least to the German
prisoners I have seen, each French soldier has a clear and definite
knowledge of what the war is all about. The greatest event of his day is
when the Paris newspapers arrive.


What impressed me greatly was that in all the officers' quarters were
copies of the French "Yellow Book," the English "White Paper" and German
documents attempting to prove their innocence in causing the conflict.
It is not sufficient for French Generals or officers just to go to war;
they must know why they go to war, down to the last papers in the case.
In six months the French privates have acquired one habit from the
British Tommies--that is drinking tea. Back of every section of trenches
I found huge tea canteens, where thousands of cups are served daily to
the soldiers who have decided for the first time in their life they
really like such stuff. There one sees more soldiers at the same time
than at any other place in the fighting zone; there they sit and discuss
the future calmly and confidently, there being a distinct feeling that
the war is likely to be over next Summer.

No one knows what the Spring tactics of General Joffre will be. Along
the section of the front I visited the officers are all satisfied that
the Commander in Chief's "nibbling tactics" have forced the Germans to
retire on the average of two to three miles all along the line. The very
name of that great man is spoken with reverence, almost with awe, by his
"children at the front."

I, therefore, from the facilities given me, can only make one assertion
in summing up my opinion of the French grand army of 1915, that it is
strong, courageous, scientifically intelligent, and well trained as a
champion pugilist after months of preparation for the greatest struggle
of his career. The French Army waits eager and ready for the gong.


Dodging Shells

[From The London Morning Post, Feb. 1, 1915.]

The Echo de Paris has published today a letter that throws a
considerable amount of light upon the psychology of the French soldier,
and that shows how he behaves himself when subjected to very trying fire
and compelled to act on his own initiative. It is written by the man to
his wife, and is as follows:

I am acting as guard to a convoy, and am comfortably installed, with no
work to do, in the house of an old woman who has lent me a candle and
writing materials. I shan't be suffering from the cold in the way I have
done on previous nights, as I have a roof over me and a fire. What
luxury! It's been freezing for several nights, and you feel the frost
when you are sleeping in the open. But that is nothing to the three days
we passed in the village of ----. We were stationed in the mairie. In
front of us in the clock tower an artillery Captain was taking
observations. On the road between the church and the mairie a Sergeant
and four artillerymen were sending orders to the battery behind us.
Suddenly a shell struck. We saw the artillerymen on the ground and the
Sergeant alone left standing.

The fire was so thick that no one could think of going out. But suddenly
one of the men moved, so I got up to find out about it, taking care to
put on my knapsack. When I was among them I found that one had been hit
right in the heart; two others were dying, one with his head in a pulp
and the other with his thigh broken and the calf of his leg torn to a
jelly. I helped the Sergeant to mend the telephone wire that had been
broken by the shell, and all the time we were having shells and bits of
brick breaking around us.

Then I went back to the mairie, and asked for some one who would not be
frightened to come with me. Two of us went off to the village for a
stretcher. I found one at the old ambulance, and was just leaving it
when I heard the scream of a shell, and took cover in the chimney--just
in time. A big black brute smashed half the house in. My comrade and I
hurried off after the wounded man. Our pals were watching us from the
mairie, wondering if we should ever get back. Old Gérome, (that's me,)
they said, will get back all right, and when back at the mairie I began
to give the wounded man first aid. Another shell came along, and the
place shook, window panes rained upon us, and dust blinded us, but at
last it cleared.

Left alone with my wounded man I went on dressing him, and when the
others got back I got them to help me take him to the schoolhouse near
by. I got congratulated by my comrades and the senior Sergeant, but the
Colonel and Lieutenant said nothing, though later I heard they were
pleased with me, but suddenly the Colonel said: "We can't stop here. Go
and see if there's room in the cellars of the castle for four officers
and thirty men. If there is don't come back, as we will follow you."

We got there at last, two of us, but the owner took a long time opening.
Meanwhile scraps of roofs and walls were raining on us, but with our
knapsacks on our heads we were a bit protected. At last our knocks were
answered, and we learned that there was room for four officers, but not
for thirty men! The Colonel and the men had to be warned, so my comrade
started running back and I followed about fifteen yards behind.

We passed a gap in the houses, with no cover, nothing but gardens. A
shell came along. I dropped, while the other man hid in a doorway. The
bits of it sang about our ears. I then sang out: "As you are nearly
there, go on, and I'll see if there is room in the farm near by." I
reached the houses and waited to see that he got through, because if
he'd fallen I should have had to go back to warn the rest. As he was
going two shells burst in the courtyard of the mairie, and I thought
of the Colonel and the rest, but at last my comrade; reached the place
and went in, and I was free to try for the farm.


Youngest of British Admirals, Whose Fleet Sank the _Bluecher_, and Won
the Battle of the Bight of Heligoland

_(From the painting by Philip Alexius Laszlo de Lombos)_]


The German Naval Critic Who Has Intimated That the United States Might
Be a Divided Nation in Case of War]

On my way I met a friend and asked him to join me. At the time I was
thinking of you all, and it was not till later that I got frightened.
There were five horses at the gate of the farm. I shifted them and
showed my friend the entrance to the cellar. It was narrow, and he lost
time through his knapsack, and these are the occasions when your life
depends on seconds. I heard the scream that I know only too well, and
guessed where the beast would lodge, and called out to him "That's for
us." I shrank back with my knapsack over my head and tried to bury
myself in the corner among the coal.

I had no time, though. The shell reached, smashed down part of the
house, and burst in the basement a couple of yards from me. I heard no
more, but stone, plaster, and bricks fell all around me on the coal
heap. I was gasping, but found myself untouched. I got up and saw the
poultry struggling and the horses struck down. I ran to the cellar, with
the same luck as my friend.

My knapsack caught me. A shell screamed a second time again for us, and
it struck, wallop, on the gable, while the ruins fell around my head. I
pulled at my knapsack so vigorously that I fell into the cellar, and
some of our men who were there called "Here's a poor brute done in." Not
a bit of it. I was not touched then either.... At last the bombardment
stopped, and we all got out. I noticed about forty hens. Some were
pulped. Others had had their heads and legs cut off. In the muddle three
horses lay dead. Their saddles were in ribbons. Equipment, revolvers,
swords, all that had been left above the cellar had vanished, but there
were bits of them to be seen on the roof. My rifle, which had been torn
from my hands, was in fragments, and I was stupefied at not having been
hit. I noticed, however, that my wrappings that were rolled around my
knapsack had been pierced by a splinter of shell that had stuck an it.
Later in the evening when I started cutting at my bread the knife
stuck. I broke the bread open and found another bit of shell in it. I
don't yet know why I was not made mincemeat of that day. There were
fifty chances to one against me.

The two following days I stopped in the cellar, hearing nothing but
their big shells, while the farm and the buildings near it were smashed
in. Now it is all over. I am all right and bored to death mounting guard
over wagons ten miles from the firing line, with a crowd of countrymen
who have been commandeered with their wagons.

I ought to tell you that the two shells I saw fall on the mairie when my
comrade was going there unfortunately killed one and wounded five. It
was a bit of luck for me, as I always used to be hanging about the
courtyard. That's the sad side of it, but we have an amusing time all
the same. [The writer goes on to explain how he and his friends dressed
up some men of straw in uniform and induced the Germans to shoot at
them, and finally to charge them, while they fired at the Germans and
brought several of them down. He continues.]

But that's nothing to what they'll get, and their villages will get, and
their mairies, chateaux, and farms, and cellars, when we get there. I
will respect old men, women, and children, but let their fighting men
look out. I don't mind sacrificing my life to do my duty, and to defend
those I love and who love me, but if I've got to lose my skin I want to
lose it in Boche-land. I want the joy of getting into their dirty
Prussia to avenge our beautiful land. Bandits! Let them and their
choucroute factories look out! If you saw the countryside we are
recovering--there's nothing left but ruins. Everything burned and
smashed to bits. Cattle, more dead than alive, are bolting in all
directions, and as for our poor women, when I see them I would destroy

Our officers say: "We'll never be able to hold our men when we get into
their country." But I say that I want to go there all the same, and yet
when I say that I had a German prisoner to guard at the mairie. I gave
him half my bread and knocked walnuts off the trees for him. All the
time I saw five or more villages in flames around. Well, it all proves
that a soldier should never say what he will do tomorrow. My job is to
protect the flag, and the Boches can come on. Before they get it they'll
have to get me.... Vive la France!

Somali Volunteers

[From The London Times, Nov. 10, 1914.]

_We have received from a correspondent a copy of a petition signed by
the principal Somali chiefs in Jubaland, praying that they may be
allowed to fight for England. The terms of this interesting document are
as follows:_

To His Highness the Governor, Through the Hakim of Jubaland: Salaams,
yea, many salaams, with God's mercy, blessing, and peace. After salaams,

We, the Somali of Jubaland, both Herti and Ogaden, comprising all the
tribes and including the Maghavbul, but not including the Tulamuya
Ogaden, who live in Biskaya and Tanaland and the Marehan, desire humbly
to address you.

In former days the Somali have fought against the Government. Even
lately the Marehan have fought against the Government. Now we have heard
that the German Government have declared war on the English Government.
Behold, our "fitna" against the English Government is finished. As the
monsoon wind drives the sandhills of our coast into new forms, so does
this news of German evildoing drive our hearts and spears into the
service of the English Government. The Jubaland Somali are with the
English Government. Daily in our mosques we pray for the success of the
English armies. Day is as night and night is as day with us until we
hear that the English are victorious. God knows the right. He will help
the right. We have heard that Indian askaris have been sent to fight for
us in Europe. Humbly we ask why should not the Somali fight for England
also? We beg the Government to allow our warriors to show their loyalty.
In former days the Somali tribes made fitna against each other. Even now
it is so; it is our custom; yet, with the Government against the
Germans, we are as one, ourselves, our warriors, our women, and our
children. By God it is so. By God it is so. By God it is so.

A few days ago many troops of the military left this country to eat up
the Germans who have invaded our country in Africa. May God prosper
them. Yet, O Hakim, with all humbleness we desire to beg of the
Government to allow our sons and warriors to take part in this great war
against the German evildoers. They are ready. They are eager. Grant them
the boon. God and Mohammed are with us all.

If Government wish to take away all the troops and police from Jubaland,
it is good. We pledge ourselves to act as true Government askaris until
they return.

We humbly beg that this our letter may be placed at the feet of our King
and Emperor, who lives in England, in token of our loyalty and our

[Here follow the signatures of all the principal Somali chiefs and
elders living in Jubaland.]

When King Peter Re-Entered Belgrade

[From The New York Evening Post, Feb. 15, 1915.]

PARIS, Jan. 29.

So King Peter himself became priest; and the great cathedral was filled
with the sobbing of his people.

Everybody knows the story of the deliverance of Belgrade; how the little
Serbian Army fell back for strategic reasons as the Austrians entered
the city, but finally, after seventeen days of fighting without rest,
(for the Serbian Army has had no reserves since the Turkish war,) knit
its forces together, marched 100 miles in three days, and drove the
Austrians headlong out of the capital.

King Peter rode at the head of his army. Shrapnel from the Austrian guns
was still bursting over the city. But the people were too much overjoyed
to mind. They lined the sidewalks and threw flowers as the troops
passed. The soldiers marched in close formation; the sprays clung to
them, and they became a moving flower garden. The scream of an
occasional shell was drowned in the cheers.

They are emotional people, these Serbians. And something told them that,
even with death and desolation all about them, they had reason to be
elated. A few hours before, the Austrians had been established in
Belgrade, confident that they were there to stay for months, if not for
years. Now they were fleeing headlong over the River Save, their
commissariat jammed at the bridge, their fighting men in a rout.

So King Peter rode through the streets of the capital with his army, and
came to the cathedral. The great church was locked, because the priests
had left the city on errands of mercy. But a soldier went through a
window and undid the portals. The King and his officers and some of the
soldiers and as many of the people as could get in crowded into the
cathedral. And, lacking some one to say mass, the King became a
priest--which is an ancient function of Kings--and, as he knelt, the
officers and soldiers and people knelt. There was a vast silence for a
moment; and then, in every part of the church, a sobbing.

This account is a free translation of a woman's letter, in Serbian,
received in this city a few days ago by Miss Helen Losanich, who is here
with Mme. Slavko Grouitch to interest Americans in helping her
countrymen back to their devastated farms. Mme. Grouitch is an American
by birth; but Miss Losanich is a Serbian, with the black hair and
burning black eyes of the Slavs, and boasting twenty years perhaps. Her
sister, Mme. Marincovich, is wife of the Serbian Minister of Commerce
and Agriculture. It was Mme. Marincovich who had written the letter.

"I've just had this letter from my sister in Serbia," cried Miss
Losanich, when a friend called, and she waved in one hand a dozen sheets
closely written in a script that resembled Russian. "I've hardly had
time to read it myself. But we will sit down and translate it into
English, if you say.

"She says here that, when the Austrians had to leave Belgrade, they took
1,200 people as hostages--non-combatants, you know. When they came into
the city first they gave assurances that all non-combatants would be
safe; but for the last few days before they left, no non-combatant could
walk on the street without being taken up as a hostage.

"Just imagine, it says here that they even took a little boy. He can
fight when he is older, they say. You know, the Turks used to do that.
They came and took our boys of nine and ten years, and trained them as
soldiers in their janissaries; and when they had forgotten their own
country they sent them back to fight against it. It is terrible, isn't

"The Austrians took the furniture from our people's houses and carried
it across the River Save to the Semlin. They behaved frightfully, my
sister says; brought all kinds of people with them, including women from
the very lowest class; broke into the houses and stole the ladies'
toilettes. One lady with many beautiful dresses found them all cut to
ribbons when she got back to Belgrade.

"The Austrians brought lots of tea and crackers and conserves with them.
Some soldiers had taken a lady's evening gown and pinned strawberries
from strawberry-jam all over it, in appropriate places, and laid the
gown out for the lady to see."

A merry smile illuminated Miss Losanich's face as she read this part of
the letter.

"Our brother," she went on, "entered Belgrade with the army. He came
back to Nish on leave about Christmas, the Serbian Christmas, which is
about thirteen days later than yours. Nish is the temporary capital; and
my sister is there. He told them all about Belgrade. He had been to his
house; the whole house was upset, drawers forced, old letters opened and
thrown on the floor, papers strewn about, King Peter's picture
(autographed by the King) thrown on the floor, and King Ferdinand's
picture stamped on.

"Brother went to a private sanitarium that our uncle has in Belgrade.
The Austrians had seized this, and had begun making it over for a
hospital. They wanted the Bulgarian Red Cross installed. They had
brought quantities of biscuits and tea and conserves. But they had to
leave in such a hurry they couldn't take the things with them. 'And
now,' my sister says, 'we are eating them!'

"Across the street four of our cousins live--young men. They are all at
the front now"--Miss Losanich laughed outright as she read this
part--"their house was entered and all their clothes taken; dress suits,
smoking jackets, linen, and all those things. It makes me laugh; it's
naughty, I know. But they used to go out a good deal. I have seen them
in those clothes so often. One of them wanted to marry me. He used to go
out a great deal"--this with another merry peal of laughter.

"Mme. Grouitch's house was undisturbed; and ours. We used to know the
Austrian attaché before the war. He was rather a nice fellow. Played
tennis with us a good deal, and so on. He came into Belgrade with his
army, and he came around to our house. The servants recognized him,
because, you see, they knew him. The servants had stayed behind. He
seemed to think he would like to make my sister's house his quarters,
but after he had thought about it a while he went away.

"She says that she would like to go back to Belgrade, but the railroad
has been destroyed--a big viaduct of stone at Ralya, about 17 kilometers
from Belgrade; and they have to go from Ralya to Belgrade by carriage.
There are so many wagons of the commissariat on the road--so many
carriages have been seized by the Government--it is impossible for
private citizens to get through.

"A gibbet was put up in the square after the Austrians came into the
city and a man was hanged the first morning, in spite of the fact that
the Austrians had promised safety to the non-combatants. Dr. Edward
Ryan, the head of the American Red Cross in Belgrade, protested, and the
gibbet was taken down. But my sister says that eighteen more people were
hanged in the fortress down by the Save--she hears--where they wouldn't
be seen.

"Mr. Bisserce, a Belgian, is director of the electric lighting plant in
Belgrade. He is a nice man, and, being a Belgian, he does not like the
Austrians. He wouldn't light the town until they made him, and he
wouldn't give them a map of the system at all. He was bound in ropes and
taken away as a hostage, and they haven't heard from him since.

"The most touching thing was the entrance of King Peter--" whereupon
Miss Losanich told the story related above.

"Rubbish, straw, and dead horses were strewn through all the streets
when the King and the army came in. The shooting was still going on.
There was a jam of commissariat wagons at the bridge--you know there is
a bridge across the Save. The Austrians couldn't get across fast enough,
there was so much confusion--too many wanting to get over at one time.
The Serbian artillery was shooting at them all the time. Presently the
middle of the bridge went down. The men and the horses and the
carriages and the wagons all went down together. They were pinned down
by the masses of stone, but there were so many of them that they filled
up the river and stuck up above the water. It was so bad that our people
couldn't clear it up--so there is an awful odor all over the town.

"She says that the Austrians brought 17,000 wounded, thinking that they
were going to stay for months--and perhaps for ever. They turned over
quantities of them to Dr. Ryan at the American Red Cross Hospital.

"General Franck, the Austrian commander, made a remark--and he must have
made it to Dr. Ryan, although my sister doesn't say so. General Franck
said: 'If the Russians had fought the way the Serbians have, there
wouldn't be an Austrian soldier left!'

"That's a good deal for the head of the Austrians to say, isn't it? We
always expected victory; but even the most optimistic of us were
surprised at what our peasant soldiers did.

"In the flight, the Austrians could not take care of their wounded, she
says, and sent them back to Belgrade, many of them, as prisoners. Many
must have died during the flight, too, for they got a jolting that
wounded men can't stand.

"Our brother, who was a professor of chemistry, is a Sergeant now in
charge of two German Krupp guns, which were captured from Turkey in the
other war. He is at Banovo Brdo, a residence section outside Belgrade,
on a hill. All the villas have been destroyed by the Austrian artillery

"And," continued Miss Losanich, "she says that the toys sent by the
Americans were received in Nish and distributed to the poor children for
Christmas, and that the feeling of cordiality toward the Americans is
growing fast."



    Oh, sunny, quiet, fruitful fields of France,
      Golden and green a month ago,
    Through you the great red tides of war's advance
      Sweep raging to and fro.
        For patient toil of years,
        Blood, fire and tears
      Reward you now!

    The dragon's teeth are sown, and in a night
      There springs to life the armed host!
    And men leap forth bewildered to the fight,
      Legion for legion lost!
        "Toll for my tale of sons,"
        Roar out the guns,
      "Cost what it cost!"

    This is a "holy war"! A holy war?
      With thousand millions maimed and dead!
    To show one Power dares more than others dare--
      That higher rears one Head!
        How will you count your gain,
        Lord of the slain,
      When all is said?

    The dragon's teeth are sown, and in a night
      There springs to life the armed host!
    And men leap forth bewildered to the fight,
      Legion for legion lost!
        "Toll for my tale of sons,"
        Roar out the guns,
      "Cost what it cost!"

    Oh, tragedy of Nations! Who may see
      The outcome, or foretell the end?
    Hark men and weeping women, misery
      That none may mend.
        Ruin in peaceful marts,
        Dazed commerce, stricken arts.
        God, to the ravaged hearts
      Some mercy send!

    The dragon's teeth are sown, and in a night
      There springs to life the armed host!
    And men leap forth bewildered to the fight,
      Legion for legion lost!
        "Toll for my tale of sons,"
        Roar out the guns,
      "Cost what it cost!"

Copyright, 1914, by The New York Times Company.

The Greatest of Campaigns

The French Official Account

     The Associated Press received in London on March 5, 1915, an
     official French historical review of the operations in the
     western theatre of war from its beginning up to the end of
     January, the first six months, which in terseness and dramatic
     power will rank among the world's most important military
     documents. The first chapter of the review was released for
     publication by The Associated Press on March 16 and appears
     below. It is one of those documents, rare in military annals,
     that frankly confesses a succession of initial reverses and
     official incompetence, only retrieved by exercise of the
     utmost skill in retreat.



The first month of the campaign began with successes and finished with
defeats for the French troops. Under what circumstances did these come

Our plan of concentration had foreseen the possibility of two principal
actions, one on the right between the Vosges and the Moselle, the other
on the left to the north of Verdun-Toul line, this double possibility
involving the eventual variation of our transport. On Aug. 2, owing to
the Germans passing through Belgium, our concentration was substantially
modified by General Joffre in order that our principal effort might be
directed to the north.

From the first week in August it was apparent that the length of time
required for the British Army to begin to move would delay our action in
connection with it. This delay is one of the reasons which explain our
failures at the end of August.

Awaiting the moment when the operations in the north could begin, and to
prepare for it by retaining in Alsace the greatest possible number of
German forces, the General in Chief ordered our troops to occupy
Mulhouse, (Mülhousen,) to cut the bridges of the Rhine at Huningue and
below, and then to flank the attack of our troops, operating in

This operation was badly carried out by a leader who was at once
relieved of his command. Our troops, after having carried Mulhouse, lost
it and were thrown back on Belfort. The work had, therefore, to be
recommenced afresh, and this was done from Aug. 14 under a new command.

Mulhouse was taken on the 19th, after a brilliant fight at Dornach.
Twenty-four guns were captured from the enemy. On the 20th we held the
approaches to Colmar, both by the plain and by the Vosges. The enemy had
undergone enormous losses and abandoned great stores of shells and
forage, but from this moment what was happening in Lorraine and on our
left prevented us from carrying our successes further, for our troops in
Alsace were needed elsewhere. On Aug. 28 the Alsace army was broken up,
only a small part remaining to hold the region of Thann and the Vosges.


The purpose of the operations in Alsace was, namely, to retain a large
part of the enemy's forces far from the northern theatre of operations.
It was for our offensive in Lorraine to pursue still more directly by
holding before it the German army corps operating to the south of Metz.

This offensive began brilliantly on Aug. 14. On the 19th we had reached
the region of Saarburg and that of the Etangs, (lakes,) and we held
Dieuze, Morhange, Delme, and Château Salins.

On the 20th our success was stopped. The cause is to be found in the
strong organization of the region, in the power of the enemy's
artillery, operating over ground which had been minutely surveyed, and,
finally, in the default of certain units.

On the 22d, in spite of the splendid behavior of several of our army
corps, notably that of Nancy, our troops were brought back on to the
Grand Couronne, while on the 23d and 24th the Germans concentrated
reinforcements--three army corps, at least--in the region of Lunéville
and forced us to retire to the south.

This retreat, however, was only momentary. On the 25th, after two
vigorous counter-attacks, one from south to north and the other from
west to east, the enemy had to fall back. From that time a sort of
balance was established on this terrain between the Germans and
ourselves. Maintained for fifteen days, it was afterward, as will be
seen, modified to our advantage.


There remained the principal business, the battle of the
north--postponed owing to the necessity of waiting for the British Army.
On Aug. 20 the concentration of our lines was finished and the General
in Chief gave orders for our centre and our left to take the offensive.
Our centre comprised two armies. Our left consisted of a third army,
reinforced to the extent of two army corps, a corps of cavalry, the
reserve divisions, the British Army, and the Belgian Army, which had
already been engaged for the previous three weeks at Liège, Namur, and

[Illustration: [map]]

The German plan on that date was as follows: From seven to eight army
corps and four cavalry divisions were endeavoring to pass between Givet
and Brussels, and even to prolong their movements more to the west. Our
object was, therefore, in the first place, to hold and dispose of the
enemy's centre and afterward to throw ourselves with all available
forces on the left flank of the German grouping of troops in the north.

On Aug. 21 our offensive in the centre began with ten army corps. On
Aug. 22 it failed, and this reverse appeared serious.

The reasons for it are complex. There were in this affair individual and
collective failures, imprudences committed under the fire of the enemy,
divisions ill-engaged, rash deployments, precipitate retreats, a
premature waste of men, and, finally, the inadequacy of certain of our
troops and their leaders, both as regards the use of infantry and

In consequence of these lapses the enemy, turning to account the
difficult terrain, was able to secure the maximum of profit from the
advantages which the superiority of his subaltern complements gave him.


In spite of this defeat our manoeuvre had still a chance of success, if
our left and the British Army obtained a decisive result. This was
unfortunately not the case. On Aug. 22, at the cost of great losses, the
enemy succeeded in crossing the Sambre and our left army fell back on
the 24th upon Beaumont-Givet, being perturbed by the belief that the
enemy was threatening its right.

On the same day, (the 24th,) the British Army fell back after a German
attack upon the Maubeuge-Valenciennes line. On the 25th and 26th its
retreat became more hurried. After Landrecies and Le Cateau it fell back
southward by forced marches. It could not from this time keep its hold
until after crossing the Marne.

The rapid retreat of the English, coinciding with the defeat sustained
in Belgian Luxembourg, allowed the enemy to cross the Meuse and to
accelerate, by fortifying it, the action of his right.

The situation at this moment may be thus summed up: Either our frontier
had to be defended on the spot under conditions which the British
retreat rendered extremely perilous, or we had to execute a strategic
retirement which, while delivering up to the enemy a part of the
national soil, would permit us, on the other hand, to resume the
offensive at our own time with a favorable disposition of troops, still
intact, which we had at our command. The General in Chief determined on
the second alternative.


Henceforward the French command devoted its efforts to preparing the
offensive. To this end three conditions had to be fulfilled:

1. The retreat had to be carried out in order under a succession of
counter-attacks which would keep the enemy busy.

2. The extreme point of this retreat must be fixed in such a way that
the different armies should reach it simultaneously, ready at the moment
of occupying it to resume the offensive all together.

3. Every circumstance permitting of a resumption of the offensive before
this point should be reached must be utilized by the whole of our forces
and the British forces.


The counter-attacks, executed during the retreat, were brilliant and
often fruitful. On Aug. 20 we successfully attacked St. Quentin to
disengage the British Army. Two other corps and a reserve division
engaged the Prussian Guard and the Tenth German Army Corps, which was
debouching from Guise. By the end of the day, after various
fluctuations, the enemy was thrown back on the Oise and the British
front was freed.

On Aug. 27 we had also succeeded in throwing back upon the Meuse the
enemy, who was endeavoring to gain a foothold on the left bank. Our
successes continued on the 28th in the woods of Marfée and of Jaulnay.
Thanks to them we were able, in accordance with the orders of the
General in Chief, to fall back on the Buzancy-Le Chesne-Bouvellemont

Further to the right another army took part in the same movement and
carried out successful attacks on Aug. 25 on the Othain and in the
region of Spincourt.

On the 26th these different units recrossed the Meuse without being
disturbed and were able to join in the action of our centre. Our armies
were, therefore, again intact and available for the offensive.

On Aug. 26 a new army composed of two army corps, five reserve
divisions, and a Moorish brigade was constituted. This army was to
assemble in the region of Amiens between Aug. 27 and Sept. 1 and take
the offensive against the German right, uniting its action with that of
the British Army, operating on the line of Ham-Bray-sur-Somme.


The hope of resuming the offensive was from this moment rendered vain by
the rapidity of the march of the German right wing. This rapidity had
two consequences, which we had to parry before thinking of advancing. On
the one hand, our new army had not time to complete its detraining, and,
on the other hand, the British Army, forced back further by the enemy,
uncovered on Aug. 31 our left flank. Our line, thus modified, contained
waves which had to be redressed before we could pass to the offensive.

To understand this it is sufficient to consider the situation created by
the quick advance of the enemy on the evening of Sept. 2.

A corps of cavalry had crossed the Oise and advanced as far as Château
Thierry. The First Army, (General von Kluck,) comprising four active
army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiègne.

The Second Army, (General von Bülow,) with three active army corps and
two reserve corps, was reaching the Laon region.

The Third Army, (General von Hausen,) with two active army corps and a
reserve corps, had crossed the Aisne between the Château Porcien and

More to the east the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Armies, namely,
twelve army corps, four reserve corps, and numerous Ersatz formations,
were in contact with our troops, the Fourth and Fifth Armies between
Vouziers and Verdun and the others in the positions which have been
indicated above, from Verdun to the Vosges.

It will, therefore, be seen that our left, if we accepted battle, might
be in great peril through the British forces and the new French Army,
operating more to the westward, having given way.

A defeat in these conditions would have cut off our armies from Paris
and from the British forces and at the same time from the new army which
had been constituted to the left of the English. We should thus be
running the risk of losing by a single stroke the advantage of the
assistance which Russia later on was to furnish.

General Joffre chose resolutely for the solution which disposed of these
risks, that is to say, for postponing the offensive and the continuance
of the retreat. In this way he remained on ground which he had chosen.
He waited only until he could engage in better conditions.

In consequence, on Sept. 1, he fixed as an extreme limit for the
movement of retreat, which was still going on, the line of
Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine, Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-François, and
the region to the north of Bar-le-Duc. This line might be reached if the
troops were compelled to go back so far. They would attack before
reaching it, as soon as there was a possibility of bringing about an
offensive disposition, permitting the co-operation of the whole of our


On Sept. 5 it appeared that this desired situation existed.

The First Germany Army, carrying audacity to temerity, had continued its
endeavor to envelop our left, had crossed the Grand Morin, and reached
the region of Chauffry, to the south of Rebaix and of Esternay. It aimed
then at cutting our armies off from Paris, in order to begin the
investment of the capital.

The Second Army had its head on the line Champaubert, Etoges, Bergeres,
and Vertus.

The Third and Fourth Armies reached to Chalons-sur-Marne and
Bussy-le-Repos. The Fifth Army was advancing on one side and the other
from the Argonne as far as Triacourt-les-Islettes and Juivecourt. The
Sixth and Seventh Armies were attacking more to the east.

But--and here is a capital difference between the situation of Sept. 5
and that of Sept. 2--the envelopment of our left was no longer possible.

In the first place, our left army had been able to occupy the line of
Sézanne, Villers-St. Georges and Courchamps. Furthermore, the British
forces, gathered between the Seine and the Marne, flanked on their left
by the newly created army, were closely connected with the rest of our

This was precisely the disposition which the General in Chief had wished
to see achieved. On the 4th he decided to take advantage of it, and
ordered all the armies to hold themselves ready. He had taken from his
right two new army corps, two divisions of infantry, and two divisions
of cavalry, which were distributed between his left and his centre.

On the evening of the 5th he addressed to all the commanders of armies a
message ordering them to attack.

"The hour has come," he wrote, "to advance at all costs, and to die
where you stand rather than give way."

_(To be continued in the next issue.)_



[From King Albert's Book.]

    Death and Sorrow and Sleep:
    Here where the slow waves creep,
      This is the chant I hear,
    The chant of the measureless deep.

    What was sorrow to me
    Then, when the young life free
      Thirsted for joys of earth
    Far from the desolate sea?

    What was Sleep but a rest,
    Giving to youth the best
      Dreams from the ivory gate,
    Visions of God manifest?

    What was Death but a tale
    Told to faces grown pale,
      Worn and wasted with years--
    A meaningless thing to the bale?

    Death and Sorrow and Sleep:
    Now their sad message I keep,
      Tossed on the wet wind's breath,
    The chant of the measureless deep.

When Marthe Chenal Sang the "Marseillaise"

By Wythe Williams

[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 14, 1915.]

I went to the Opéra Comique the other day to hear Marthe Chenal sing the
"Marseillaise." For several weeks previous I had heard a story going the
rounds of what is left of Paris life to the effect that if one wanted a
regular old-fashioned thrill he really should go to the Opéra Comique on
a day when Mlle. Chenal closed the performance by singing the French
national hymn. I was told there would be difficulty in securing a seat.

I was rather skeptical. I also considered that I had had sufficient
thrills since the beginning of the war, both old fashioned and new. I
believed also that I had already heard the "Marseillaise" sung under the
best possible circumstances to produce thrills. One of the first nights
after mobilization 10,000 Frenchmen filled the street beneath the
windows of THE NEW YORK TIMES office, where I was at work. They sang the
"Marseillaise" for two hours, with a solemn hatred of their national
enemy sounding in every note. The solemnity changed to a wild passion as
the night wore on. Finally, cuirassiers of the guard rode through the
street to disperse the mob. It was a terrific scene.

So I was willing to admit that the "Marseillaise" is probably the most
thrilling and most martial national song ever written, but I was just
not keen on the subject of thrills.

Then one day a sedate friend went to the Opéra Comique and came away in
a raving condition. It was a week before his ardor subsided. He declared
that this rendition of a song was something that will be referred to in
future years. "Why," he said, "when the war is over the French will
talk about it in the way Americans still talk concerning Jenny Lind at
Castle Garden, or De Wolf Hopper reciting 'Casey at the Bat.'"

This induced me to go. I was convinced that whether I got a thrill or
not the singing of the "Marseillaise" by Chenal had become a distinct
feature of Paris life during the war.

I never want to go again. To go again might deepen my impression--might
better register the thrill. But then it might not be just the same. I
would be keyed to such expectancy that I might be disappointed. Persons
in the seats behind me might whisper. And just as Chenal got to the
"Amour sacré de la patrie" some one might cough. I am confident that
something of the sort would surely happen. I want always to remember
that ten minutes while Chenal was on the stage just as I remember it
now. So I will not go again.

The first part of the performance was Donizetti's "Daughter of the
Regiment," beautifully sung by members of the regular company. But
somehow the spectacle of a fat soprano nearing forty in the role of the
twelve-year-old vivandière, although impressive, was not sublime. A
third of the audience were soldiers. In the front row of the top balcony
were a number of wounded. Their bandaged heads rested against the rail.
Several of them yawned.

After the operetta came a "Ballet of the Nations." The "nations," of
course, represented the Allies. We had the delectable vision of the
Russian ballerina dancing with arms entwined about several maids of
Japan. The Scotch lassies wore violent blue jackets. The Belgian girls
carried large pitchers and rather wept and watered their way about the
stage. There were no thrills.

After the intermission there was not even available standing space. The
majority of the women were in black--the prevailing color in these days.
The only touches of brightness and light were in the uniforms of the
officers liberally sprinkled through the orchestra and boxes.

Then came "Le Chant du Depart," the famous song of the revolution. The
scene was a little country village. The principals were the officer, the
soldier, the wife, the mother, the daughter, and the drummer boy. There
was a magnificent soldier chorus and the fanfare of drums and trumpets.
The audience then became honestly enthusiastic. I concluded that the
best Chenal could do with the "Marseillaise," which was next on the
programme, would be an anti-climax.

The orchestra played the opening bars of the martial music. With the
first notes the vast audience rose. I looked up at the row of wounded
leaning heavily against the rail, their eyes fixed and staring on the
curtain. I noticed the officers in the boxes, their eyes glistening. I
heard a convulsive catch in the throats of persons about me. Then the
curtain lifted.

I do not remember what was the stage setting. I do not believe I saw it.
All I remember was Chenal standing at the top of a short flight of
steps, in the centre near the back drop. I indistinctly remember that
the rest of the stage was filled with the soldier chorus and that near
the footlights on either side were clusters of little children.

"Up, sons of France, the call of glory"----

Chenal swept down to the footlights. The words of the song swept over
the audience like a bugle call. The singer wore a white silk gown draped
in perfect Grecian folds. She wore the large black Alsatian head dress,
in one corner of which was pinned a small tri-colored cockade. She has
often been called the most beautiful woman in Paris. The description
was too limited. With the next lines she threw her arms apart, drawing
out the folds of the gown into the tricolor of France--heavy folds of
red silk draped over one arm and blue over the other. Her head was
thrown back. Her tall, slender figure simply vibrated with the feeling
of the words that poured forth from her lips. She was noble. She was
glorious. She was sublime. With the "March on, March on" of the chorus,
her voice arose high and fine over the full orchestra, and even above
her voice could be sensed the surging emotions of the audience that
seemed to sweep over the house in waves.

I looked up at the row of wounded. One man held his bandaged head
between his hands and was crying. An officer in a box, wearing the
gorgeous uniform of the headquarters staff, held a handkerchief over his

Through the second verse the audience alternately cheered and stamped
their feet and wept. Then came the wonderful "Amour sacré de la
patrie"--sacred love of home and country--verse. The crashing of the
orchestra ceased, dying away almost to a whisper. Chenal drew the folds
of the tricolor cloak about her. Then she bent her head and, drawing the
flag to her lips, kissed it reverently. The first words came like a sob
from her soul. From then until the end of the verse, when her voice
again rang out over the renewed efforts of the orchestra, one seemed to
live through all the glorious history of France. At the very end, when
Chenal drew a short jeweled sword from the folds of her gown and stood,
silent and superb, with the folds of the flag draped about her, while
the curtain rang slowly down, she seemed to typify both Empire and
Republic throughout all time. All the best of the past seemed
concentrated there as that glorious woman, with head raised high, looked
into the future.

And as I came out of the theatre with the silent audience I said to
myself that a nation with a song and a patriotism such as I had just
witnessed could not vanish from the earth--nor again be vanquished.

A War of Commerce to Follow

By Sir William Ramsay

     That commerce in Germany is regarded as war, that the
     "powerful mass of the German State" is projected into methods
     meant to kill off the trade of other nations, and that after
     the war between the nations the German war with British trade
     will be resumed, is the burden of this address. Sir William
     Ramsay delivered it in Manchester on Jan. 22, 1915, before
     representatives of British associations of employers and of
     leading industrial concerns in many parts of the United
     Kingdom, making up the Employers' Parliamentary Association.
     Sir William is one of the world's great chemists.

I suppose that among my audience some are convinced free traders, while
some believe that our commercial interests would be better served by a
measure of protection. This is neither the time nor the place, nor have
I the knowledge and ability for a discussion of this much-debated
question. Nor will I reveal my own private views, except in so far as to
say that I agree with the majority. But, as the question cannot be
ignored, I should like to say that I hold firmly the conviction that all
trade should be carried on for the mutual advantage of the parties
engaged. The old fable of Æsop may be quoted, which relates to a quarrel
between the different members of the body. Every one of us can be, and
should be, helpful to every other, independent of nation, country, and
creed. That is, I am sure, what lies on the conscience of each one of
us, as an ultimate end to be struggled for, although perhaps by many
considered unattainable.

For the same kind of reason, it appears to me that we all think that
peace is a blessing, and war a curse. For under peace commerce and
industry prosper; science and the arts flourish; friendships are made
and adorn the amenities of life. Moreover, our religious traditions in
all Christian countries, and in some non-Christian ones like China,
influence us to believe that war is wrong, indefensible, and, in the
present year of our Lord, an anachronism.

We imagined, perhaps not most, but many of us, that no important
European nation thought differently. Your leading Liberal paper, The
Manchester Guardian, on July 22, 1908, wrote, "Germany, though the most
military of nations, is probably the least warlike"; and this doubtless
represented the views of the majority of Englishmen. Some of us knew
better. I have, or had, many German friends; we have lived for many
years on a footing of mutual kindliness; but it was impossible to
disregard the signs of the times. The reason of this war is at bottom,
as we have now discovered, the existence of a wholly different ideal in
the Germanic mind from that which lies at the base of the Latin,
Anglo-Saxon, Dutch, or Scandinavian nations. Such a statement as this is
sweeping; it can be illustrated by a trivial tale. In 1912 an
international scientific congress met at Berlin; I was a member.
Although the conventional language was German, in compliment to our
hosts, it turned out that in the long run all discussions were conducted
in French. After such a sitting, the members separated, the German
committee remaining behind for business purposes. The question of
language was raised, I think by a Dutchman, in the corridor. Of the
representatives of the fourteen or fifteen nations present, all were
agreed on this--that they were not going to be compelled to publish in
German; some chose English; some French; Spanish was suggested as a
simple and easily understood language; but there was no love lost
between the "foreign" and the German representatives, and this not the
least on personal, but purely on national grounds. Acknowledging to the
full the existence of high-minded German gentlemen, it is a sad fact
that the character of the individuals of the nation is not acceptable
to individuals of other nations. Listen to a quotation from a letter I
have received from a very distinguished Swiss: "Une chose me frappait
aussi, dans les tendances allemandes, une incroyable inconscience.
Accaparer le bien d'autrui leur paraissait si naturel qu'ils ne
comprenaient même pas que l'on eût quelque desir de se défendre. Le
monde entier était fait pour constituer le champ d'exploitation de
l'Allemagne, et celui qui s'opposait á l'accomplissement de cette
destinée était, pour tout allemand, l'objet d'une surprise."
[Translation: "One thing has also struck me in German tendencies; that
is an unbelievable want of conscience. To grab the belongings of others
appeared to them so natural, that they did not understand that one had
some wish to defend himself. The whole world was made for the field of
German operations, and whoever placed himself in opposition to the
accomplishment of this destiny was for every German the object of
surprise."] The view is not new; the feeling of surprise at opposition
was expressed wittily by a French poet in the words:

    Cet animal est trés mechant;
    Lorsqu'on l'attaque, il se defend.

    This animal is full of spite;
    If you attack him, he will bite.

Well, gentlemen, this war has opened the eyes of some of us, and has
confirmed the fears of others. Not one of us wanted to fight. Our hand
was forced, so that we could not have abstained without national and
personal dishonor.

Now, I do not think it is even yet realized that Germany's methods in
trade have been, and are, as far as possible identical, with her methods
in war. Let me rub this in. As long ago as 1903, at a meeting of the
Society of Chemical Industry, under the Presidency of your
fellow-citizen, Mr. Levinstein, I pointed out that under the German
State there was a trade council, the object of which was to secure and
keep trade for Germany. This council had practical control of duties,
bounties, and freights; its members were representative of the different
commercial interests of the empire; and they acted, as a rule, without
control from the Reichstag. You can read what I said for yourselves, if
you think it worth while, in The Journal of the Society of Chemical
Industry for 1903.

Let me give you a simple case of the operations of that trade council.
_Ex uno disce omnes._ A certain firm had a fairly profitable monopoly in
a chemical product which it had maintained for many years. It was not a
patented article, but one for which the firm had discovered a good
process of manufacture. About six years ago this firm found that its
Liverpool custom was being transferred to German makers. On inquiry, it
transpired that the freight on this particular article from Hamburg to
Liverpool had been lowered. The firm considered its position, and by
introducing economies it found that it could still compete at a profit.
A year later German manufacturers lowered the price substantially, so
that the English firm could not sell without making a dead loss. It
transpired that the lowering of price was due to a heavy export bounty
being paid to the German manufacturers by the German State.

It is the bringing of the heavy machinery of State to bear on the
minutiæ of commerce which makes it impossible to compete with such
methods. One article after another is attacked, as opportunity offers;
British manufacture is killed; and Germany acquires a monopoly. No trade
is safe; its turn may not have come.

Much has been said about British manufacture of dyestuffs, and much
nonsense has been written about the lack of young British chemists to
help in their manufacture. There is no lack of able inventive young
British chemists. Owing to the unfairness of German competition by
methods just exemplified, a manufacturer, as a rule, does not care to
risk capital in the payment of a number of chemists for making "fine
chemicals." He finds "heavy chemicals" simpler. I do not wonder at his
decision, though I lament it. There are also other reasons. The duty on
methyl alcohol (for which no rebate is given) makes it impossible to
introduce economically methyl groups into dyes; the restrictions
incident on the use of duty-free alcohol do not commend themselves to
manufacturers; these constitute other obstacles in the way of the
British color maker. Lastly, our patent regulations are even yet not
what they might be, although an attempt has recently been made to
improve them. The British manufacturer is thus trebly handicapped.

Besides, the English competitor is at a disadvantage owing to what may
be termed systematic and fraudulent attacks, for which no redress has
been obtainable. Thus the manufacturers of Sheffield still complain, I
suppose justly, that German articles for foreign consumption bear the
words "Sheffield steel" stamped upon them. I myself have been approached
by a German swindler with the proposition that I should assist his firm
in infringing patents; he was surprised and pained to learn that I did
not consider his proposal an honorable one.

Nor are methods like these confined to business or manufacture; they
have greatly affected British shipping. Our shipping companies, in good
faith, have associated themselves with others in "conferences,"
apparently for the mutual advantage of all, forgetting that behind the
German companies lay the powerful mass of the German State. Tramp
steamers, and with them cheap freights to the East, have been
eliminated. The Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, which met some years
ago, referring to the system obtaining in Germany, and fostered by the
German Government, on charging through rates on goods from towns in the
interior to the port of destination, observed in its report: "Such rates
constitute a direct subsidy to the export trade of German manufacturers,
and an indirect subsidy to those German lines by whom alone they are
available. And as they are only rendered possible by the action of the
German Government, it appears to us that the British lines can in no way
be held responsible for the preferences which these rates afford to
German goods." Now, our Government pays large mail subsidies to many of
our shipping companies. Could these not be so utilized that it would
become impossible for Germans to capture our trade by indirect state

These are a few examples (and your greater knowledge will enable you to
supplement them with many others) of the methods which have been
employed against us by Germans with the co-operation--nay, the active
support--of their State.

Of late a new factor has appeared. The German Imperial Chancellor made
his noteworthy (or notorious) remark about a "scrap of paper." And Dr.
von Bethmann-Hollweg, speaking in the Reichstag, acknowledged openly
that the German Nation had been guilty of a "wrong" to Belgium. This
breach of faith has the approval of the whole German people. Do they
realize what it means? Are they not aware that no treaty, political or
otherwise, with the German people is worth the paper it is written on?
That the country and its inhabitants have forfeited all claims to trust?
That no one, in future, should make a bargain with a German, knowing
that he is a dishonorable and dishonored man?... Germany has made many
blunders--an almost inconceivable number of blunders; but this
blundering crime is surely the culminating point of blunder. Did any
nation ever before deliberately throw away its political, commercial,
financial, and social credit to no purpose? To gain what? England as an
adversary, and the contempt of the whole civilized world. Her treatment
of the poor Belgian civilians has added to contempt, loathing and scorn.

Now, gentlemen, you see our problem. At, the end of this war we shall
have Germans again as trade rivals; if there is a German State our
German rivals will be backed by their State. They will, as they have
done before, steal our inventions, use trickery and fraud to oust us
from world markets, and we know now that we need not expect any bargain
to be binding. I am not a commercial man; science is supposed to be
above such trickery. Yet I read a few days ago, not as a single example,
but only as the last I happen to remember, an article by a
distinguished American professor, protesting with great moderation that
an important scientific generalization which he published in 1902 had
been annexed, without acknowledgment, by a versatile and adroit
professor in the University of Berlin--an acquaintance of my own--in the
year 1906; and it was not until 1910 that the latter was made to confess
his guilt, with much subterfuge and blustering.

Commerce, indeed, is in Germany regarded as war; we now know it, and we
must meet war by war. How is that war to be waged?

I can see only two methods. One is recommended by a writer in The
Observer of the 10th inst., who acknowledges himself to have been a
lifelong free trader. His remedy is a 25 per cent. duty on all German
goods, and on German goods only, imported (or rather offered for import)
into Great Britain and her colonies, and also that German passenger
liners and freight boats should not be allowed to call at any one of the
ports of the empire. His reasons are fully stated in his letter; it is
signed "A City Merchant."

The other method is perhaps less apt to offend free trade
susceptibilities; it is to impose on what remains of our opponents at
the conclusion of this war free trade for a term of years. It remains to
be seen whether we shall be powerful enough to insist on this measure,
or to persuade our allies that it is one likely to fulfill the proposed
end. It is, so far as I see, the only other alternative.

Those who are thoroughly convinced of the benefits of free trade should
welcome this suggestion, unless, indeed, they think that such a blessing
is not deserved by Germany. On the other hand, they may comfort
themselves with the certain knowledge that no possible punishment
inflicted on the Germans could possibly be more galling and repulsive to
them. Doubtless, too, it would suit the books of our allies very well,
who could impose on German goods any duty they thought fit, and deposit
their surplus and inferior goods in Germany at a price which would defy
competition. But these are questions which I must leave to those more
conversant with the merits and demerits of free trade and protection
than I am.

Whatever view you take, you cannot but acknowledge that the situation
calls for early and anxious deliberation, and well-thought-out and firm
action; and it must be action taken as a nation--through our
Government--whatever the political complexion of the Government may be
at the close of the war. It is for you, as members of the Employers'
Parliamentary Association, to make up your minds what you wish to do;
above all, to agree, and to take steps to force the Government in power
to carry out your wishes.



[From King Albert's Book.]

    _La Belgique regrette rien._

    Not with her ruined silver spires,
      Not with her cities shamed and rent,
    Perish the imperishable fires
      That shape the homestead from the tent.

    Wherever men are stanch and free,
      There shall she keep her fearless state,
    And, homeless, to great nations be
      The home of all that makes them great.

Desired Peace Terms for Europe

Outlined by Proponents for the Allies and for Germany

_The following forecast of the terms of peace which the Allies could
enforce upon Germany and Austria is made for The New York Times Current
History by a former Minister of France, one of the leading publicists of
the French Republic:_

The Allies will decline to treat with any member of the Hohenzollern or
Hapsburg family or any delegates representing them and will insist on
dealing with delegations representing the German and Austro-Hungarian
people elected by their respective Parliaments or by direct vote of the
people, if they so desire.

The Allies will facilitate in every possible way negotiations between
Austria-Hungary and Italy with a view to the latter obtaining the
southern part of the Tyrol, known as Trentino, and the Peninsula of
Istria, known as Trieste.

The 200 miles "strait" channel (Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora, and
Bosporus,) between Turkey in Europe and Turkey in Asia, is to be
declared free to the ships of all nations, and under the direction of an
international commission, which will also administer Turkey in Europe
and form a permanent court of arbitration for all questions which may
arise among Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece. In
settling the status of Albania respect will be paid to the wishes of the

Alsace and Lorraine, after rectifications of the French boundary line in
accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, are to be annexed to
Belgium, whose permanent neutrality will be guaranteed by the powers.
Schleswig-Holstein is to be returned to Denmark and the Kiel Canal made
an international waterway, under either an international commission or a
company which will operate it as the Suez Canal is operated.

Poland is to be declared an autonomous State under the protection of
Russia, and its boundaries are to be restored as they were in 1715.

The Allies will also entertain a proposition for the restoration of the
independence of Hungary and the geographical integrity of the country as
it was in 1715.

The delegates representing the German people must pledge themselves that
military conscription shall be abolished among them for a period of
twenty-five years.

The status of all German colonies and protectorates is to be settled by
a joint commission appointed by the Governments of England, Japan, and

The ownership of Italy and Greece to the Aegean Islands, now in their
respective possessions, is to be confirmed by the powers and guarantees
shall be given that the said islands shall not be fortified.

The ownership of England to the Island of Cyprus is to be confirmed by
the powers and her protectorate over Egypt acknowledged.

The Mediterranean Sea is to be declared a "maritime area" to be policed
by England, France, and Italy.

_Here is the declaration of peace terms by the Central Committee for
National Patriotic Organization of England:_

Great Britain can never willingly make peace with Germany until the
power of Prussian militarism is completely destroyed and there is no
possibility of our children or our children's children being forced
again to fight for the national existence. As far as we are concerned,
this is a fight to a definite finish. We must either win all along the
line or we must be completely defeated and our empire destroyed. Our
allies fully share the same conviction. The thousands of lives already
lost, and, alas! still to be lost, will have been tragically wasted if
the German menace remains to terrorize Europe and to stunt the progress
of civilization. In order to convince public opinion that the only peace
worth having is a peace absolutely on our own terms, a Central Committee
for National Patriotic Organization has been formed from the members of
all the four political parties. The committee will, in addition, take
steps to lay a clear statement of the British case before neutral
countries. Both the tasks it has undertaken are of the first importance,
and it should have the support of every patriot.


_Professor Ernst Haeckel, the militant German zoologist, supplies, in an
interview in the Berliner Tagesblatt, the following summary:_

Freedom from the tyranny of England to be secured as follows:

     1. The invasion of the British piratical State by the German
     Army and Navy and the occupation of London.

     2. The partition of Belgium, the western portion as far as
     Ostend and Antwerp to become a German Federal State; the
     northern portion to fall to Holland, and the southeastern
     portion to be added to Luxemburg, which also should become a
     German Federal State.

     3. Germany to obtain the greater part of the British colonies
     and of the Congo State.

     4. France to give up a portion of her northeastern provinces.

     5. Russia to be reduced to impotency by the re-establishment
     of the Kingdom of Poland, which should be united with

     6. The Baltic Provinces of Russia to be restored to Germany.

     7. Finland to become an independent kingdom and be united with

_An article by Georges Clemenceau, in L'Homme Enchaîné, reports the
following view of the German terms accredited to Count Bernstorff,
German Ambassador at Washington:_

One of my friends in America informs me of a curious conversation
between an influential banker and the German Ambassador, Count
Bernstorff. The banker, who had just handed over a substantial check for
the German Red Cross, asked Count Bernstorff what the Kaiser would take
from France after the victory.

The Ambassador did not seem the least surprised at this somewhat
premature question. He answered it quite calmly, ticking off the various
points on his fingers as follows:

     1. All the French colonies, including the whole of Morocco,
     Algeria, and Tunis.

     2. All the country northeast of a straight line from
     Saint-Valéry to Lyons, that is to say, more than one quarter
     of French territory, including 15,000,000 inhabitants.

     3. An indemnity of 10,000,000,000 francs, ($2,000,000,000.)

     4. A tariff allowing all German goods to enter France free
     during twenty-five years, without reciprocity for French goods
     entering Germany. After this period the Treaty of Frankfurt
     will again be applied.

     5. The suppression of recruiting in France during twenty-five

     6. The destruction of all French fortresses.

     7. France to hand over 3,000,000 rifles, 2,000 cannon, and
     40,000 horses.

     8. The protection of all German patents without reciprocity.

     9. France must abandon Russia and Great Britain.

     10. A treaty of alliance with Germany for twenty-five years.

_Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, late German Colonial Secretary of State, has
published an article in The Independent, in which this forecast

1. Germany will not consider it wise to take any European territory, but
will make minor corrections of frontiers for military purposes by
occupying such frontier territory as has proved a weak spot in the
German armor.

2. Belgium belongs geographically to the German Empire. She commands the
mouth of the biggest German stream; Antwerp is essentially a German
port. That Antwerp should not belong to Germany is as much an anomaly as
if New Orleans and the Mississippi delta had been excluded from
Louisiana, or as if New York had remained English after the War of
Independence. Moreover, Belgium's present plight was her own fault. She
had become the vassal of England and France. Therefore, while "probably"
no attempt would be made to place Belgium within the German Empire
alongside Bavaria, Württemberg, and Saxony, because of her non-German
population, she will be incorporated in the German Customs Union after
the Luxemburg pattern.

3. Belgian neutrality, having been proved an impossibility, must be
abolished. Therefore the harbors of Belgium must be secured for all time
against British or French invasion.

4. Great Britain having bottled up the North Sea, a mare liberum must be
established. England's theory that the sea is her boundary, and all the
sea her territory down to the three-mile limit of other powers, cannot
be tolerated. Consequently the Channel coasts of England, Holland,
Belgium, and France must be neutralized even in times of war, and the
American and German doctrine that private property on the high seas
should enjoy the same freedom of seizure as private property does on
land must be guaranteed by all nations. This condition Herr Dernburg
accompanies by an appeal to the United States duly to note, and Britain
is making commercial war upon Germany.

5. All cables must be neutralized.

6. All Germany's colonies are to be returned. Germany, in view of her
growing population, must get extra territory capable of population by
whites. The Monroe Doctrine bars her from America, therefore she must
take Morocco, "if it is really fit for the purpose."

7. A free hand must be given to Germany in the development of her
commercial and industrial relations with Turkey "without interference."
This would mean a recognized sphere of German influence from the Persian
Gulf to the Dardanelles.

8. There must be no further development of Japanese influence in

9. All small nations, such as Finland, Poland, and the Boers in South
Africa, if they support Germany, must have the right to frame their own
destinies, while Egypt is to be returned, if she desires it, to Turkey.

These conditions, Herr Dernburg concludes, would "fulfill the peaceful
aims which Germany has had for the last forty-four years." They show, in
his opinion, that Germany has no wish for world dominion or for any
predominance in Europe incommensurate with the rights of the 122,000,000
Germans and Austrians.



    We are coming, Mother, coming
      O'er the seas--your Younger Sons!
    From the mighty-mouthed Saint Lawrence
      Or where sacred Ganges runs,
    We are coming for your blessing
      By a ritual of guns!

    We are coming, Mother, coming
      On the way our fathers came!
    For their spirits rise to beckon
      At the whisper of your name;
    And we come that you may knight us
      By your accolade of flame!

    We are coming, Mother, coming!
      For the death is less to feel
    Than to hear you call unanswered?
      'Tis the Saxon's old appeal,
    And we come to prove us worthy
      By its ordeal of steel!

Chronology of the War

Showing Progress of Campaigns on All Fronts and Collateral Events from
Jan. 31, 1915, up to and Including Feb. 28, 1915.

Continued from the last Number.


Feb. 1--Russians retake Borjimow trenches and capture men of Landsturm;
severe cold hampers operations in Galicia.

Feb. 2--Germans advance, with heavy losses, southward toward the Vistula
and eastward between Bejoun and Orezelewo.

Feb. 3--Russians again pour into Hungary as Austrians yield important
positions; German position north of the Vistula is insecure.

Feb. 4--Von Hindenburg hurls 50,000 men at Russian lines near Warsaw.

Feb. 5--Russians reported to have killed 30,000 Germans under Gen.
Mackensen; Russians recapture Gumine.

Feb. 6--General German offensive is looked for; Russians shift troops in
East Galicia and Bukowina.

Feb. 7--Germans rush reinforcements to East Prussia; second line of
trenches pierced by Russians near Borjimow; Austrians resume attacks on
Montenegrin positions on the Drina.

Feb. 8--Russian cavalry sweeps northward toward East Prussia; Russians
move their right wing forward in the Carpathians but retire in Bukowina;
Germans shift 600,000 troops from Poland to East Prussia, using motor
cars; Italians say that 15,000 Germans died in attempting to take

Feb. 9--Austro-German forces attack Russians at three points in the
Carpathians; Russians begin the evacuation of Bukowina, where Austrians
have had successes; Russians make a wedge in East Prussia across
Angorapp River.

Feb. 10--Fierce fighting in the Carpathian passes; Russians are
retreating from Bukowina.

Feb. 11--Russians fall back in Mazurian Lake district; they still hold

Feb. 12--Von Hindenburg, as a result of a several days' battle, wins a
great victory over the Tenth Russian Army in the Mazurian Lake region,
part of the operations taking place under the eyes of the Kaiser; more
than 50,000 prisoners are taken, with fifty cannon and sixty machine
guns; the Russians retreat in disorder across the frontier, their loss
in killed and wounded being estimated at 30,000; a second line of
defense is being strengthened by the Russians; Paris announces the
complete failure of German offensive in Poland.

Feb. 14--Russians check Germans in Lyck region; battle raging in
Bukowina; Albanians invade Servia and force Servians to retreat from the

Feb. 15--Russian lines hold in the north; Austrians state that Bukowina
has been entirely evacuated by the Russians; Germans retake Czernowitz.

Feb. 16--Germans occupy Plock and Bielsk; Russians fall back in North
Poland; Austrians win in Dukla Pass; Servians drive back Albanian

Feb. 17--Germans prepare for attack along whole Russian front; cholera
and typhus gain headway in Poland.

Feb. 18--Belgrade bombarded; Germans try to cut off Warsaw.

Feb. 19--Germans abandon march to Niemen; they march toward Plonsk from
two directions; they occupy Tauroggen.

Feb. 20--Germans repulsed at Ossowetz; Russians bombard Przemysl;
Germans capture French Hospital Corps in East Prussia.

Feb. 21--Russians force fighting from East Prussia to Bukowina.

Feb. 22--Russians make progress in Galicia and the Carpathians; it is
said that German and Austrian armies are being merged.

Feb. 23--Russians force Germans back along the Bobr; Germans assemble
greater forces at Przanysz; Russians destroy two Austrian brigades
between Stanislau and Wyzkow; Austrians repulsed near Krasne.

Feb. 24--Russians have successes in the Carpathians near Uzrok Pass.

Feb. 25--Germans besiege Ossowetz; Russians gain in the Carpathians and
again invade Bukowina; Russian wedge splits Austrian Army in the
Carpathians; fighting on Stanislau Heights.

Feb. 26--Fighting in progress on a 260-mile front; battle in north sways
to East Prussian frontier; Germans retire in Przanysz region; Germans
claim capture of eleven Russian Generals in Mazurian Lake battle; snow
and intense cold hinder operations in Bukowina.

Feb. 27--Germans retire in the north; Russians recapture Przanysz;
German battalion annihilated on the Bobr; Russians advance in Galicia
and claim recapture of Stanislau and Kolomea; stubborn fighting north of

Feb. 28--Russians are attacking along whole front; Germans checked in
North Poland and many taken prisoners; General Brusiloff's army is
claimed by the Russians to have thus far captured 188,000 Austrians.


Feb. 1--Germans evacuate Cernay and burn Alsatian towns as French

Feb. 3--Germans try to retake Great Dune; Allies make gains in Belgium;
fighting at Westende.

Feb. 5--Allies are making a strong offensive movement in Belgium.

Feb. 7--British take German trenches at Guinchy.

Feb. 9--Germans again bombard Rheims, Soissons, and other places;
fighting on skis is occurring in Alsace.

Feb. 14--Germans are making preparations for an offensive movement in

Feb. 16--French forces gain in Champagne and advance on a two-mile
front; fighting in La Bassée.

Feb. 18--Allies make offensive movements; Germans give up Norroy.

Feb. 23--Germans use Austrian twelve-inch howitzers for bombardment of

Feb. 26--French gain on the Meuse.

Feb. 28--Germans advance west of the Vosges, forcing French back four
miles on a thirteen-mile front; French gain in Champagne, taking many


Feb. 3--Portugal is sending reinforcements to Angola, much of which is
in German hands, although there has been no declaration of war between
Portugal and Germany; some of the anti-British rebels in South Africa

Feb. 4--Germans have evacuated Angola; some South African rebel leaders,
including "Prophet" Vankenbsburg, surrender.

Feb. 6--Germans are repulsed at Kakamas, a Cape Colony village.

Feb. 13--Germans have won a success against the British on the Orange
River; German East Africa is reported now clear of the enemy; Germans
have invaded Uganda and British East Africa.

Feb. 16--Trial of General De Wet and other South African rebel leaders
is begun.

Feb. 21--German newspaper report charges that German missionaries are
tortured by pro-British Africans.

Feb. 26--Botha heads British troops that plan invasion of German
Southwest Africa.


Feb. 1--Turks withdraw forces from Adrianople to defend Tchatalja;
Russian victories over Turks in the Caucasus and at Tabriz prove to be
of a sweeping character; Turks have been massacring Persians.

Feb. 2--American Consul, Gordon Paddock, prevented much destruction by
Turks at Tabriz.

Feb. 3--Turks, while trying to cross Suez Canal, are attacked by
British, many of them being drowned; Turks are driven back at Kurna by
British gunboats.

Feb. 4--Turks routed, with heavy loss, in two engagements on the Suez
Canal, New Zealand forces being engaged; Turks are near Armageddon.

Feb. 5--British take more Turkish prisoners.

Feb. 7--British expect Turks again to attack Suez Canal, and make plans

Feb. 8--Turks in Egypt are in full retreat; their losses in dead have
been heavy.

Feb. 13--British wipe out Turkish force at Tor.

Feb. 17--Work of Consul Paddock in saving British property at Tabriz is
praised in British House of Commons.

Feb. 22--Turks are massacring Armenians in Caucasus towns; Turks make
general retirement on Damascus.

Feb. 28--Turks have evacuated the Sinai Peninsula.


Feb. 1--German submarine seen near Liverpool; there is a new theory that
infernal machines in coal caused blowing up of the Formidable and the

Feb. 2--English shipping paper offers reward of $2,500 to first British
merchant vessel that sinks a German submarine; German submarine tries to
torpedo British hospital ship Asturias; men from a Swedish warship are
killed by a mine.

Feb. 3--German auxiliary is sunk by British cruiser Australia off
Patagonia; German destroyer reported sunk by Russians in the Baltic.

Feb. 4--British ships shell Germans at Westende.

Feb. 5--Germans deny that Russians sank a destroyer in the Baltic.

Feb. 7--Allied fleets menace the Dardanelles.

Feb. 9--Turkish cruiser bombards Yalta; Russians shell Trebizond.

Feb. 10--Germans are said to have sunk casks of petrol off the English
coast for use by their submarines; French Government, in report to
neutrals, denounces sinking of refugee ship Admiral Ganteaume.

Feb. 11--Cargo of American steamship Wilhelmina, bound for Hamburg, is
seized by British at Falmouth, and a prize court will pass upon question
whether food destined only for German civilians can go through in
neutral bottoms; it is generally understood that the Wilhelmina shipment
was made as a test case; German submarines, driven into Norwegian ports
by storm, are forced to put to sea again.

Feb. 13--Two British steamers long overdue are believed to have been
sunk by the Germans.

Feb. 14--Canada is guarding her ports more vigilantly; the Captain of
British steamer Laertes is decorated for saving his ship from a German
submarine by fast manoeuvring.

Feb. 15--British steamer Wavelet hits mine in English Channel and is
badly damaged; British submarines are in the Baltic; Austrian fleet
bombards Antivari.

Feb. 16--Captain of the German battle-cruiser Blücher dies from
pneumonia contracted when his ship went down in the North Sea fight;
British merchant collier Dulwich is torpedoed and sunk off French coast.

Feb. 17--French steamer Ville de Lille is sunk by German submarine.

Feb. 18--German auxiliary cruiser Kronprinz Wilhelm has sunk six British
ships off the coast of Brazil.

Feb. 20--Allied fleets are pounding the Dardanelles forts with great
effect; German steamer Holger interned at Buenos Aires.

Feb. 21--Berlin papers report that a British transport, loaded with
troops, has been sunk.

Feb. 22--Two German submarines are missing; Germans are building
submarines near Antwerp.

Feb. 23--Australian mail boat Maloja fired on by armed merchantman in
English Channel; operations at the Dardanelles interrupted by
unfavorable weather.

Feb. 24--British capture German steamer Gotha; British armed merchantman
Clan Macnaughton reported missing.

Feb. 25--The four principal forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles are
reduced by the allied British and French fleet; three German submarines
are sent to Austria for use in the Adriatic and Mediterranean.

Feb. 26--Inner forts of Dardanelles are being shelled; mine sweeping
begun; wreckage indicates disaster to German submarine U-9 off Norwegian
coast; French destroyer Dague hits Austrian mine off Antivari; Allies
blockade coast of German East Africa.

Feb. 27--Forty British and French warships penetrate the Dardanelles
for fourteen miles; French cruiser seizes, in the English Channel, the
American steamer Dacia, which was formerly under German registry and
belonged to the Hamburg-American Line, and takes her to Brest; a French
prize court will determine the validity of her transfer to American
registry; British skipper reports that the German converted cruiser
Prinz Eitel Friedrich sank a British ship and a French ship in December.

Feb. 28--Allied fleet prepares to engage the strongest and last of the
Dardanelles defenses; land attack in conjunction with the fleet is being
considered; English and French flags now fly over wrecked forts; London
welcomes seizure of Dacia by French.


Feb. 4--Germany proclaims the waters around Great Britain and Ireland,
except a passage north of Scotland, a war zone from and after Feb. 18,
and states that neutral ships entering the zone will be in danger, in
consequence of the misuse of neutral flags said to have been ordered by
the British Government.

Feb. 6--Decree is discussed by President Wilson and the Cabinet; dangers
of complications for the United States are foreseen; indignation is
expressed in Italy, Holland, and Denmark; text of the decree is
submitted to the United States State Department by Ambassador Gerard.

Feb. 9--Some European neutrals intend to have the names of their ships
printed in huge letters on ships' sides and the national colors painted

Feb. 11--The State Department makes public the text of the American
note, dated Feb. 10, sent to Ambassador Gerard for delivery to the
German Government; the note is firm but friendly, and tells Germany that
the United States will hold her "to a strict accountability" should
commanders of German vessels of war "destroy on the high seas an
American vessel or the lives of American citizens."

Feb. 12--Ambassador Gerard delivers the American note to the German
Foreign Secretary and has a long conference with him.

Feb. 13--The German Legation at The Hague warns neutral vessels against
entering the war zone; German Foreign Office comments on the friendly
tone of the American note; Germany has requested the United States to
advise ship owners to man vessels sailing to German ports with subjects
of neutral States.

Feb. 15--Germany communicates to the United States through Ambassador
von Bernstorff a preliminary answer to the American note; Germany would
be willing to recede from her decree if England would permit foodstuffs
to enter Germany for use by the civilian population; the preliminary
answer is cabled to Ambassador Page for presentation to the British
Foreign Office as a matter of information; Italy and Holland protest to
Germany against war zone decree; Winston Churchill, in Parliament, hints
at retaliation.

Feb. 18--Germany replies to American note; reply is friendly in tone,
but its substance causes concern in Washington; Germany still disclaims
responsibility for fate of neutral vessels in war zone; war zone decree
now in effect; ships are moving in and out of British ports as usual;
Norwegian steamer Nordcap is blown up by a mine.

Feb. 19--German submarines torpedo Norwegian tanker Belridge near
Folkestone and French steamer Denorah off Dieppe; British Government
suspends passenger travel between England and the Continent; Irish
Channel services are continued, and it is said that the ships may fly
the Irish flag.

Feb. 20--British steamer Cambank sunk by submarine in Irish Sea;
Norwegian steamer Bjarka sunk by mine off Denmark; it is reported that
hundreds of armed merchant ships are hunting for German submarines.

Feb. 21--American steamer Evelyn sunk by mine off coast of Holland,
eight men being lost; German submarine U-12 sinks British steamer
Downshire; Dutch vessels sail from Amsterdam painted with the national
colors; traffic between England and Sweden is suspended.

Feb. 22--The United States, through Ambassadors Page and Gerard,
presents notes to England and Germany proposing modifications of war
zone decree by Germany and an arrangement by which England would allow
food to enter Germany, for the use of civilians only; ships leave
Savannah with the American flag painted on their sides.

Feb. 23--American steamer Carib sunk by a mine off German coast, three
men being lost; Norwegian steamer Regin destroyed off Dover; British
collier Brankshome Chine attacked in English Channel; Swedish steamer
Specia sunk by mine in North Sea; British limit traffic in Irish
Channel; twelve ships, of which two were American, have been sunk or
damaged since the war zone decree went into effect; Germany includes
Orkney and Shetland Islands in war zone.

Feb. 24--Germany, replying to Italian protest, promises to respect
Italian flag; British steamer Harpalion torpedoed off Beachy Head;
Minister van Dyke reports that the Carib was sunk outside route
prescribed by the German instructions.

Feb. 25--British steamer Western Coast lost in English Channel; British
steamer Deptford hits a mine off Scarborough; Scandinavian conference
decides against convoying ships; sailings between Sweden and England

Feb. 26--It is reported from London that the Allies favor reprisals
against Germany by which shipment of all commodities to and from Germany
will be stopped; formal announcement from Premier Asquith expected in a
few days; German submarines allow Dutch steamer to pass; Swedish
steamship Svarton hits mine; passenger service between England and
Flushing to be resumed.


Feb. 6--Lusitania, warned of submarines, flies American flag in Irish
Sea on voyage to Liverpool.

Feb. 7--British Foreign Office issues statement upholding use of
American flag by Lusitania and declares that the practice of thus
protecting merchant ships is well established; passengers uphold Capt.
Dow's act.

Feb. 8--British Government says that Capt. Dow was not ordered by
Government officials to use neutral flag.

Feb. 11--The State Department makes public the text of the American
note, dated Feb. 10, sent to Ambassador Page for delivery to the British
Government; the note asks the British authorities to do all in their
power to prevent the deceptive use of the American flag by British ships
and suggests that responsibility might rest upon Great Britain in case
of destruction of American ships by Germans; according to passengers
arriving in New York, the Cunarder Orduna flew American flag as
precaution against submarine attack before Lusitania did.

Feb. 15--Holland sends protest to England against use by British ships
of neutral flags.

Feb. 19--England, replying to American note, says that the United States
and other neutrals should not grudge the use of their flags to avoid
danger, and that the use of neutral flags has hitherto been generally


Feb. 1--Germans drop bombs on Dunkirk; Russia threatens to treat air
raiders of unfortified towns as pirates.

Feb. 2--French airmen burn castle in Alsace where German staff officers
are housed.

Feb. 3--Swiss troops fire on German airmen; indications are that
England will not uphold Russia's threat to treat hostile aviators as

Feb. 4--Body of German aviator engaged in Christmas Day raid found in
the Thames.

Feb. 5--Allies' airmen force German General to abandon Altkirch
headquarters; Germany protests against Russian threat against aviators.

Feb. 6--British aviator sinks German submarine.

Feb. 10--Allies' aviators damaged Düsseldorf arsenal in recent raid;
bombs dropped in Adrianople; French bring down aviator who had dropped
bombs on Paris.

Feb. 11--Bomb dropped by British airmen kills thirty-five Germans in
Antwerp fort; Dunkirk repulses raid by German aviator.

Feb. 12--Thirty-four British airships raid Belgian coast seaports;
Ostend station set on fire; Grahame-White narrowly escapes drowning;
attack intended as a check for German blockade plans; French aviators
raid German aerdome in Alsace.

Feb. 13--Germany states that the British raid of yesterday caused
"regrettable damage to the civilian population"; two British airmen
killed at Brussels.

Feb. 14--Excitement in Ottawa over report of German raid; French
aeroplanes rout Zeppelin near Mülhausen.

Feb. 15--Austrian aviators fire on Montenegrin royal family at Rieka.

Feb. 16--British aviators make another raid in Belgium; French attack
aerdome at Ghistelle and attack Eichwald in Alsace.

Feb. 17--Copenhagen reports explosion of a Zeppelin off the coast of
Jutland; Allies' airmen attack network of Belgian canals, which may be
used as submarine base.

Feb. 18--Another Zeppelin wrecked off the coast of Jutland.

Feb. 19--French aviator drops bombs on Ostend; Germany apologizes to
Switzerland for aviator's flight over Swiss territory.

Feb. 20--Austrian aviator drops bombs on Cettinje; England distributes
illustrated posters showing differences between English and German

Feb. 21--German aeroplane drops bombs on Braintree, Colchester, and
Marks Tey, little damage being done.

Feb. 22--Zeppelin bombards Calais, killing five; Buckingham Palace and
other places in London are guarded against aeroplane attack.

Feb. 23--German aeroplane seen off the English coast.

Feb. 24--Three British aviators lost in raid on Belgium.

Feb. 27--French aviators bombard Metz; Germans drop bombs on Nieuport.


Feb. 2--Second contingent of troops reaches Egypt; Minister of Defense
says that Government has placed no limit on number of men to be sent.


Feb. 2--Government issues warning that Rumanian volunteers caught
serving with Russians will be shot.

Feb. 6--Two Czech newspapers suspended for comments on the war
unacceptable to the authorities; editors of papers in Styria threaten to
stop publication unless censorship is relaxed.

Feb. 9--Commercial and political organizations protest against muzzling
of the press.

Feb. 12--Czechs clamor for independence; Hungarian Deputies have been
conferring with Rumanian Deputies to try to reach an agreement about
Transylvania which would keep Rumania out of the war; the negotiations
have now been abandoned, as Rumanians wanted complete autonomy for

Feb. 13--Entire Austro-Hungarian Landsturm is called out.

Feb. 15--Church bells may be melted to supply copper.

Feb. 21--Foreign Minister Burian and German Imperial Chancellor
Bethmann-Hollweg have three long conferences in Vienna.

Feb. 22--Austrian and German troops have been concentrating for several
days along the Swiss-Italian border; miles of trenches have been dug.

Feb. 24--Germany is reported to be bringing strong pressure on Austria
to induce the latter to cede to Italy her Italian province of Trent and
a portion of the Istrian Peninsula for the purpose of keeping Italy

Feb. 28--Full text of Austro-Hungarian "Red Book" is published in THE
NEW YORK TIMES; it is estimated that the total Austrian loss, killed,
wounded and prisoners, is now 1,600,000.


Feb. 5--Government protests against annulment by Germany of exequaturs
of Consuls of neutral powers.

Feb. 8--Letter from Cardinal Mercier to the higher clergy of his diocese
protests against violation of his rights as a Belgian and as a Cardinal;
legation in Washington denounces tax imposed by Germans on refugees who
fail to return to Belgium.

Feb. 18--Germany withdraws interdiction against correspondence by
Cardinal Mercier with Belgian Bishops.

Feb. 24--Belgian women in Brussels are ordered by Germans to stop
wearing hats made after style of Belgian soldiers' caps.

Feb. 27--Committee appointed by Germans to investigate condition of
Belgian art treasures reports that the actual destruction has been
insignificant, while objects which have been damaged can be repaired.


Feb. 2--Forces have been sent to organize the naval defense of

Feb. 3--Premier Radoslavoff says that the Government is neutral, but
that the Macedonian question causes apprehension.

Feb. 10--Government plans to remain neutral despite German loan.


Feb. 3--Unusual measures taken to guard the Duke of Connaught, Governor
General, at the opening of Parliament.

Feb. 8--The first working day of Parliament; party leaders declare there
will be a political truce during the war; Government to have ample
funds; Colonial Secretary sends dispatch reviewing military operations
from British viewpoint and stating that no Canadian troops are yet on
the firing line except the Princess Patricia Light Infantry.

Feb. 10--Sixty-five Canadians have died in the encampment at Salisbury
Plain, England.

Feb. 14--Excitement in Ottawa over report of intended German air raid
from American soil.

Feb. 15--Parliament buildings, Royal Mint, and Rideau Hall, the Governor
General's residence, are darkened in fear of German air raid.

Feb. 16--Government asks United States to guard American end of
international bridges; the whole of the first contingent is now in

Feb. 19--Guards at international bridges are doubled.


Feb. 3--It is planned to devote the present session of Parliament
entirely to war measures.

Feb. 5--Official estimates place the number of effective men in the
army, exclusive of those serving in India, at 3,000,000.

Feb. 8--Premier Asquith tells Parliament that British losses to Feb. 4
are about 104,000 in killed, wounded, and missing.

Feb. 9--Admiral Lord Charles Beresford suggests public hanging of
captured German sea and air raiders.

Feb. 10--At a cost of $100,000 the Government has converted Donington
Hall, Leicestershire, one of the most beautiful old places in England,
into a rest home for captured German officers.

Feb. 11--Government plans to publish biweekly communications from Field
Marshal French.

Feb. 12--First exchanges of disabled prisoners between England and
Germany are arranged through the Papal Nuncio at Berlin.

Feb. 13--Pamphlet issued to the public gives instructions as to how to
act in case of German invasion.

Feb. 15--First troops of new armies are pouring into France; enemy
subjects denied admittance at ports.

Feb. 17--Board of Trade plans to compensate all merchant seamen who may
be injured during hostilities.

Feb. 18--Victoria Cross is conferred on twelve men, one of whom,
Corporal Leary of the Irish Guards, killed eight Germans in hand-to-hand
combat and took two Germans prisoners.

Feb. 23--Captain who was formerly in command of the super-dreadnought
Audacious, generally stated to have been sunk by a mine on Oct. 27, is
made a Rear Admiral; promotion revives rumors that the Audacious was
saved and is being repaired; British merchant shipping loss thus far is
$26,750,000, including both ships and cargoes, the Liverpool and London
War risks Association citing figures as showing the efficacy of British
Navy's protection.

Feb. 25--Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary, announces in the House of
Commons that Great Britain is in "entire accord with Russia's desire for
access to the sea."

Feb. 27--Six newspaper correspondents, including one American, are to be
permitted to go to the front under auspices of the War Office, according
to present plans.


Feb. 1--Official order has been issued that all stocks of copper and
other metals used for war purposes are to be reserved for the army.

Feb. 4--German refugees from Kiao-Chau reach New York.

Feb. 5--It is reported that a sham railroad station has been built
outside of Cologne to deceive French aviators; the Second Secretary of
the British Legation is arrested in Brussels.

Feb. 6--An Alsatian is condemned to death for fighting in French Army.

Feb. 7--French prisoner condemned to two years' imprisonment for
defacing portrait of the Kaiser.

Feb. 8--Government orders neutrals expelled from Alsace; Archbishop of
Cologne writes pastoral letter predicting victory.

Feb. 9--Cardinal von Hartman says that the motto of the day is "Trust in
God and hold out"; there is a scene in Prussian Diet, when two
Socialists protest against the war.

Feb. 10--Socialists indorse the war at a meeting in Mainz.

Feb. 11--Berlin communes suggest that all members of the Emden's crew
be authorized to add the word Emden to their names.

Feb. 12--Government warns against offering insults to Americans.

Feb. 14--Many French civilians are freed; the Kaiser is said to be fifth
in popularity among contemporary German heroes, von Hindenburg being
first and the Crown Prince second.

Feb. 15--Substitute for petrol is stated to have been found.

Feb. 16--Spaniards are expelled from Baden; Iron Crosses given to
Emden's men; German nurses and surgeons are acquitted by the French of
charges of pillage at Peronne.

Feb. 19--Passport rules are made stricter; all men of last reserve are
stated to have been called out.

Feb. 20--New submarines, airships, and two more dreadnoughts are under

Feb. 21--Afternoon entertainments are suppressed in Berlin.

Feb. 22--Boys from seventeen to twenty are, it is reported, to be called
out for Landsturm; charges of cruelty to British prisoners of war are

Feb. 24--Frankfurter Zeitung estimates that prisoners of war now held in
Germany and Austria are 1,035,000, 75 per cent. being held by the

Feb. 27--Admiral von Pohl, Chief of the Admiralty Staff, has been
selected as successor to Admiral von Ingenohl, who has been removed from
command of the battle fleet; manufacturing and agriculture enterprises
in the occupied parts of France and Belgium are being kept alive under
the management of Germans to contribute to support of the armies; high
school teachers and pupils are in the army.

Feb. 28--It is reported that Ambassador von Bernstorff is to be recalled
to Berlin and that Baron Treutler, a friend of the Kaiser, will be his
successor; the total Prussian losses are now 1,102,212, in killed,
wounded, and prisoners.


Feb. 1--Nation at large is declared to be ready to join war on behalf of

Feb. 9--The Government believes that Germany should respect Greek rights
in the naval war zone.

Feb. 14--There is danger of Greece's becoming involved in hostilities
because of the Albanian invasion of Serbia.


Feb. 2--Reservists in England warned to be ready to respond to call.

Feb. 7--Russia plans to send to Italy many Austrian prisoners of Italian

Feb. 8--Soldiers of Second Category are to remain under colors until
May; meeting in Padua is held in favor of joining the war and of
dissolving the Triple Alliance.

Feb. 9--Federation of the Italian Press condemns pro-German propaganda;
Garibaldi visits Joffre.

Feb. 10--Garibaldi, in London, says that popular feeling in Italy is
against Germans and Austrians.

Feb. 20--One million men are under arms; Premier Salandra avoids war
debate in Parliament; volunteers await arrival of Garibaldi to head
expedition to aid Allies.

Feb. 23--It is planned to call more men to the colors.

Feb. 27--Premier Salandra, addressing Chamber of Deputies, says the
nation does not desire war but is ready to make any sacrifice to realize
her aspirations.


Feb. 19--There is much uneasiness throughout the nation as Parliament
reopens after a recess.

Feb. 20--Russian Minister to Rumania reports to the Russian Foreign
Minister that, as far as he can gather, Rumania intends to continue her
policy of armed neutrality and that Russia should not rely upon Rumanian

Feb. 23--The nation is alarmed by the revival of the traditional Russian
policy of obtaining command of Constantinople and the straits; Rumania
stands for the internationalization of Constantinople, the Bosporus, and
the Dardanelles, free passage of the Dardanelles being held vital for
her existence.


Feb. 2--Six German subjects and two Russians are sentenced to prison for
collecting funds for German Navy; Government issues statement giving
instances of alleged German cruelties to Russians in Germany after
declaration of war.

Feb. 3--Girl who fought in nineteen battles is awarded the St. George's

Feb. 4--It is stated that regimental chaplains sometimes lead men in
charges after the officers are killed or wounded.

Feb. 9--Lvov (Lemberg) to be recognized as Russian; Sir Edward Grey may
send British commercial attaché there; Duma opens; Foreign Minister
Sazonof assails Germany and declares that her intrigues caused the war.

Feb. 10--Resolution is unanimously adopted by the Duma declaring that
the Russian Nation is determined to carry on the war until such
conditions have been imposed on the enemy as will insure the peace of
Europe; Prof. Paul N. Milukoff, speaking in the Duma in behalf of the
Constitutional Democrats, says that the principal task is the
acquisition of Constantinople and the straits.

Feb. 13--Duma adopts resolutions asking war relief for provinces
suffering from the war and an inquiry by commission into enemies'
alleged violations of international law; the session is suspended until
not later than the middle of December.

Feb. 20--It is planned to put war prisoners to work.

Feb. 24--Russian Ambassador at Washington presents to United States
Government a "mémoire" dealing with atrocities and violations of the
laws and usages of war alleged to have been committed by German and
Austro-Hungarian armies along the Polish and East Prussian frontiers;
the communication is also delivered to other neutral Governments, and it
is planned to bring it before all the Red Cross societies of the world.

Feb. 26--Consul in London says men living abroad will be held liable for
military service.


Feb. 15--Prince Alexine Karageorgevitch of Serbia arrives in London with
photographs in support of charges of atrocities alleged to have been
committed against Serbian women and children by Austrians during the
Austrian occupation.


Feb. 1--There is widespread suffering in Palestine and Syria.

Feb. 3--Abdul Hamid advises peace.

Feb. 6--Archives of the Porte are moved to Asia Minor; Field Marshal von
der Goltz's rule is stated to be absolute; it is reported that
able-bodied men are exempted from service on payment of money.

Feb. 13--The Russians hold a total of 49,000 Turkish prisoners of war,
according to estimates from Petrograd; a strict mail censorship prevails
in Syria.

Feb. 15--Officers who conspired to stop the war are court-martialed.

Feb. 16--French Vice Consul at Sana is freed from detention.

Feb. 20--Jerusalem authorities are ordered to guard non-Moslems as a
result of intervention of United States Ambassador Morgenthau.

Feb. 21--More reserves are called out; bitterness toward Germans is
being expressed in Syria.

Feb. 27--At a Cabinet Council in Constantinople it was decided to
transfer the seat of Government to Broussa in Asia Minor.


Feb. 2--Werner Horn, a German, tries to blow up the Canadian Pacific
Railroad bridge over the St. Croix River between Vanceboro, Me., and New
Brunswick; attempt is a failure, bridge being only slightly damaged; he
is arrested in Maine; Canada asks for his extradition.

Feb. 5--Horn sentenced to jail for thirty days on the technical charge
of injuring property, several windows in Vanceboro having been broken by
the explosion.

Feb. 24--R.P. Stegler, a German naval reservist, confesses to Federal
authorities in New York, when arrested, details of alleged passport
frauds by which German spies travel as American citizens, and charges
that Capt. Boy-Ed, German Naval Attaché at Washington, is involved;
Federal Grand Jury in Boston begins inquiry to determine whether Horn
violated law regulating interstate transportation of explosives.

Feb. 25--Capt. Boy-Ed denies the truth of statements made by Stegler
involving him; Stegler is held for alleged obtaining of a United States
passport by fraud; two other men under arrest.

Feb. 28--German Embassy at Washington issues a statement characterizing
Stegler's allegations about Capt. Boy-Ed as "false and fantastic," and
"of a pathological character," and hinting at attempted blackmail.


Feb. 2--It is planned to send a Belgian relief ship with supplies
donated wholly by the people of New York State; France facilitates entry
of tobacco sent by Americans as gift to French soldiers; organization is
formed in New York called the War Relief Clearing House for France and
Her Allies to systematize shipment of supplies.

Feb. 3--Russia permits supplies to be sent to captives, but Russian
military authorities will do the distributing.

Feb. 4--Steamer Aymeric sails with cargo of food from twelve States for

Feb. 5--Russia refuses to permit relief expeditions to minister to
German and Austrian prisoners in Siberia; the United States asks that an
American doctor be permitted to accompany Red Cross supplies to observe
their distribution; American Commission for Relief in Belgium is sending
food to some towns and villages of Northern France in hands of the
Germans, where the commission's representatives have found distressing

Feb. 7--New York women plan to equip a lying-in hospital for destitute
mothers of Belgium.

Feb. 10--Steamer Great City sails with supplies for the Belgians
estimated to be worth $530,000, this being the most valuable cargo yet
shipped; the shipment represents gifts from every State, 50,000 persons
having contributed; Rockefeller Foundation is negotiating in Rumania for
grain for people of Poland.

Feb. 12--American Girls' Aid Society sends apparel to France sufficient
to clothe 20,000 persons.

Feb. 13--Otto H. Kahn lends his London residence for the use of
soldiers and sailors who have been made blind during the war.

Feb. 14--Rockefeller Foundation reports that the situation in Belgium is
without a parallel in history; Commission for Relief announces that it
is possible to send money direct from United States to persons in

Feb. 16--Queen Mary sends letter of thanks for gifts to the
British-American War Relief Committee; American Red Cross sends a large
consignment of supplies to Russia and Poland.

Feb. 19--London Times Fund for the sick and wounded passes the
$5,000,000 mark, thought in London to be a record for a popular fund;
steamer Batiscan sails with donations from thirty States; Red Cross
ships seventeen automobile ambulances for various belligerents donated
by students of Yale and Harvard.

Feb. 22--Sienkiewicz and Paderewski appeal through Paris newspapers for
help for Poland.

Feb. 23--Rockefeller Foundation's report to Industrial Commission shows
an expenditure of $1,009,000 on war relief up to Jan. 1; food, not
clothes, is Belgium's need, so the Commission for Relief in Belgium
announces from London office.

Feb. 24--Plans are made for American children to send a ship to be known
as the "Easter Argosy--a Ship of Life and Love" with a cargo for the
children of Belgium.

Feb. 25--Queen Alexandra thanks British-American War Relief Committee.

Feb. 26--The American Belgian Relief Fund is now $946,000.

Feb. 27--Doctors and nurses sail to open the French Hospital of New York
in France.



    In my watch on deck at the turn of the night
      I saw the spindrift rise,
    And I saw by the thin moon's waning light
      The shine of dead men's eyes.
    They rose from the wave in armor bright,
      The men who never knew fear;
    They rose with their swords to their hips strapped tight,
      And stripped to their fighting gear.

    I hauled below, but to and fro
      I saw the dead men glide,
    With never a plank their bones to tow,
      As the slippery seas they ride.
    While the bale-star burned where the mists swayed low
      They clasped each hand to hand,
    And swore an oath by the winds that blow--
      They swore by the sea and land.

    They swore to fight till the Judgment Day,
      Each night ere the cock should crow,
    Where the thunders boom and the lightnings play
      In the wrack of the battle-glow.
    They swore by Drake and Plymouth Bay,
      The men of the Good Hope's crew,
    By the bones that lay in fierce Biscay,
      And they swore by Cradock, too--

    That every night, ere the dawn flamed red,
      For each man there should be twain
    Upon the ships that make their bed
      Where England rules the Main.
    They pledged--and the ghost of Nelson led--
      When the last ship's gunner fell,
    They would man the guns--these men long dead--
      And ram the charges well.

    So we'll choose the night for the Great Sea Fight
      Nor ever give chase by day,
    Our compeers rise in the white moonlight,
      In the wash of the flying spray;
    And if we fall in the battle-blight,
      The shade of a man long dead
    Fights on till dawn on the sea burns bright
      And Victory, overhead!

*** End of this Doctrine Publishing Corporation Digital Book "New York Times Current History: The European War, Vol 2, No. 1, April, 1915 - April-September, 1915" ***

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