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Title: The Philosophic Grammar of American Languages, as Set Forth by Wilhelm von Humboldt - With the Translation of an Unpublished Memoir by Him on - the American Verb
Author: Brinton, Daniel Garrison, 1837-1899
Language: English
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Transcriber’s Note
A number of typographical errors have been maintained in this version
of this book. They have been marked with a [TN-#], which refers to a
description in the complete list found at the end of the text.
The following codes for less common characters were used:
ā a with macron
ū u with macron
† dagger
‡ double dagger
‖ double vertical line
THE
PHILOSOPHIC GRAMMAR
--OF--
AMERICAN LANGUAGES,
As Set Forth by Wilhelm von Humboldt;
WITH THE TRANSLATION OF AN UNPUBLISHED MEMOIR BY
HIM ON THE AMERICAN VERB.
--BY--
DANIEL G. BRINTON, A.M., M.D.,
PROFESSOR OF ETHNOLOGY AND ARCHÆOLOGY AT THE ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES,
PHILADELPHIA.
President of the Numismatic and Antiquarian Society of Philadelphia;
Member of the American Philosophical Society, the American Antiquarian
Society, the Pennsylvania Historical Society, etc.; Membre de la
Société Royale des Antiquaires du Nord; de la Société Américaine
de France; Délégué Général de l'Institution Ethnographique;
Vice-Président du Congrès International des Américanistes;
Corresponding Member of the Anthropological
Society of Washington, etc.
(_Read before the American Philosophical Society, March 20, 1885._)
PHILADELPHIA:
PRESS OF MCCALLA & STAVELY, 237-9 DOCK STREET.
1885.
CONTENTS.
_The Philosophic Grammar of American Languages._
§1. Introduction, p. 3. §2. Humboldt’s Studies in American Languages,
p. 4. §3. The Final Purpose of the Philosophy of Language, p. 7.
§4. Historical, Comparative and Philosophic Grammar, p. 9. §5.
Definition and Psychological Origin of Language, p. 10. §6.
Primitive Roots and Grammatical Categories, p. 11. §7. Formal and
Material Elements of Language, p. 13. §8. The Development of
Languages, p. 14. §9. Internal Form of Languages, p. 16. §10.
Criteria of Rank in Languages, p. 17. §11. Classification of
Languages, p. 21. §12. Nature of Incorporation, p. 22. §13.
Psychological Origin of Incorporation, p. 24. §14. Effect of
Incorporation on Compound Sentences, p. 25. §15. The Dual in
American Languages, p. 27. §16. Humboldt’s Essay on the American
Verb, p. 28.
_On the Verb in American Languages. By Wilhelm von Humboldt, p. 29._
Verbal forms classified as they indicate the notion of Being:
I. When the notion of Being is expressed independently, p. 31.
1. When the notion of Being is understood, p. 32. 2. When the notion
of Being is expressed by a special word, but without a phonetic
radical, p. 35.
II. The notion of Being is incorporated with the verb as an auxiliary,
p. 37.
Analysis of the Maya Verb, p. 38. Other Examples. The idea of past
time as related to death and negation, p. 40.
III. The notion of Being is present in the verbal form only in idea,
p. 41.
Case 1st. When the person, tense and mode signs are separable, p. 41.
Case 2d. When either the person, or the tense and mode signs, are
attached to the verb, p. 41. Case 3d. When both person and tense
and mode signs are attached to the verb. 1. Approach toward a Fixed
Form, p. 44. 2. Divisibility of Verbal Forms to allow the insertion
of governed parts of speech, p. 47. General Conclusions on the
organism of American Languages, p. 48.
Notes (by the Translator) on the various American Tribes and
Languages mentioned by Humboldt in the preceding Memoir, p. 49.
The Philosophic Grammar of American Languages.
§ 1. INTRODUCTORY.
The foundations of the Philosophy of Language were laid by Wilhelm von
Humboldt (b. June 22, 1767, d. April 8, 1835). The principles he
advocated have frequently been misunderstood, and some of them have
been modified, or even controverted, by more extended research; but a
careful survey of the tendencies of modern thought in this field will
show that the philosophic scheme of the nature and growth of
languages, which he set forth, is gradually reasserting its sway,
after having been neglected and denied through the preponderance of
the so-called naturalistic school during the last quarter of a
century.
The time seems ripe, therefore, to bring the general principles of his
philosophy to the knowledge of American scholars, especially as
applied by himself to the analysis of American languages.
Any one at all acquainted with Humboldt’s writings, and the literature
to which they have given rise, will recognize that this is a serious
task. I have felt it such, and have prepared myself for it not only by
a careful perusal of his own published writings, but also by a
comparison of the conflicting interpretations put upon them by Dr. Max
Schasler,[3-*] Prof. H. Steinthal,[3-†] Prof. C. J. Adler,[3-‡] and
others, as well as by obtaining a copy of an entirely unpublished
memoir by Humboldt on the “American Verb,” a translation of which
accompanies this paper. But my chief reliance in solving the
obscurities of Humboldt’s presentation of his doctrines has been a
close comparison of allied passages in his various essays, memoirs and
letters. Of these I need scarcely say that I have attached the
greatest weight to his latest and monumental work sometimes referred
to as his “Introduction to the Kawi Language,” but whose proper title
is “On Differences in Linguistic Structure, and their Influence on the
Mental Development of the Human Race.”[4-*]
I would not have it understood that I am presenting a complete
analysis of Humboldt’s linguistic philosophy. This is far beyond the
scope of the present paper. It aims to set forth merely enough of his
general theories to explain his applications of them to the languages
of the American race.
What I have to present can best be characterized as a series of notes
on Humboldt’s writings, indicating their bearing on the problems of
American philology, introducing his theories to students of this
branch, and serving as a preface to the hitherto unpublished essay by
him on the American Verb, to which I have referred.
§ 2. HUMBOLDT’S STUDIES IN AMERICAN LANGUAGES.
The American languages occupied Humboldt’s attention earnestly and for
many years. He was first led to their study by his brother Alexander,
who presented him with the large linguistic collection he had amassed
during his travels in South and North America.
While Prussian Minister in Rome (1802-08), he ransacked the library of
the _Collegio Romano_ for rare or unpublished works on American
tongues; he obtained from the ex-Jesuit Forneri all the information
the latter could give about the Yurari, a tongue spoken on the Meta
river, New Granada;[4-†] and he secured accurate copies of all the
manuscript material on these idioms left by the diligent collector
and linguist, the Abbé Hervas.
A few years later, in 1812, we find him writing to his friend Baron
Alexander von Rennenkampff, then in St. Petersburg: “I have selected
the American languages as the special subject of my investigations.
They have the closest relationship of any with the tongues of
north-eastern Asia; and I beg you therefore to obtain for me all the
dictionaries and grammars of the latter which you can.”[5-*]
It is probable from this extract that Humboldt was then studying these
languages from that limited, ethnographic point of view, from which he
wrote his essay on the Basque tongue, the announcement of which
appeared, indeed, in that year, 1812, although the work itself was not
issued until 1821.
Ten years more of study and reflection taught him a far loftier
flight. He came to look upon each language as an organism, all its
parts bearing harmonious relations to each other, and standing in a
definite connection with the intellectual and emotional development of
the nation speaking it. Each language again bears the relation to
language in general that the species does to the genus, or the genus
to the order, and by a comprehensive process of analysis he hoped to
arrive at those fundamental laws of articulate speech which form the
Philosophy of Language, and which, as they are also the laws of human
thought, at a certain point coincide, he believed, with those of the
Philosophy of History.
In the completion of this vast scheme, he continued to attach the
utmost importance to the American languages. His illustrations were
constantly drawn from them, and they were ever the subject of his
earnest studies. He prized them as in certain respects the most
valuable of all to the philosophic student of human speech.
Thus, in 1826, he announced before the Berlin Academy that he was
preparing an exhaustive work on the “Organism of Language,” for which
he had selected the American languages exclusively, as best suited for
this purpose. “The languages of a great continent,” he writes,
“peopled by numerous nationalities, probably never subject to foreign
influence, offer for this branch of linguistic study specially
favorable material. There are in America as many as thirty little
known languages for which we have means of study, each of which is
like a new natural species, besides many others whose data are less
ample.”[6-*]
In his memoir, read two years later, “On the Origin of Grammatical
Forms, and their Influence on the Development of Ideas,” he chose most
of his examples from the idioms of the New World;[6-†] and the year
following, he read the monograph on the Verb in American languages,
which is printed for the first time with the present essay.
In a later paper, he announced his special study of this group as
still in preparation. It was, however, never completed. His earnest
desire to reach the fundamental laws of language led him first into a
long series of investigations into the systems of recorded speech,
phonetic hieroglyphics and alphabetic writing, on which he read
memoirs of great acuteness.
In one of these he again mentions his studies of the American tongues,
and takes occasion to vindicate them from the current charge of being
of a low grade in the linguistic scale. “It is certainly unjust,” he
writes, “to call the American languages rude or savage, although their
structure is widely different from those perfectly formed.”[6-‡]
In 1828, there is a published letter from him making an appointment
with the Abbé Thavenet, missionary to the Canadian Algonkins, then in
Paris, “to enjoy the pleasure of conversing with him on his
interesting studies of the Algonkin language.”[6-‖] And a private
letter tells us that in 1831 he applied himself with new zeal to
mastering the intricacies of Mexican grammar.[6-§]
About 1827, he found it indispensable to subject to a critical
scrutiny the languages of the great island world of the Pacific and
Indian oceans. This resulted at last in his selecting the Kawi
language, a learned idiom of the island of Java, Malayan in origin but
with marked traces of Hindu influence, as the point of departure for
his generalizations. His conclusions were set forth in the
introductory essay above referred to.
The avowed purpose of this essay was to demonstrate the thesis that
the _diversity of structure in languages is the necessary condition of
the evolution of the human mind_.[7-*]
In the establishment of this thesis he begins with a profound analysis
of the nature of speech in general, and then proceeds to define the
reciprocal influences which thought exerts upon it, it upon thought.
Portions of this work are extremely obscure even to those who are most
familiar with his theories and style. This arises partly from the
difficulty of the subject; partly because his anxiety to avoid
dogmatic statements led him into vagueness of expression; and partly
because in some cases he was uncertain of his ground. In spite of
these blemishes, this essay remains the most suggestive work ever
written on the philosophy of language.
§ 3. THE FINAL PURPOSE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.
Humboldt has been accused of being a metaphysician, and a scientific
idealist.
It is true that he believed in an ideal perfection of language, to
wit: that form of expression which would correspond throughout to the
highest and clearest thinking. But it is evident from this simple
statement that he did not expect to find it in any known or possible
tongue. He distinctly says, that this ideal is too hypothetical to be
used otherwise than as a stimulus to investigation; but as such it is
indispensable to the linguist in the pursuit of his loftiest task--the
estimate of the efforts of man to realize perfection of
expression.[7-†]
There is nothing teleological in his philosophy; he even declines to
admit that either the historian or the linguist has a right to set up
a theory of progress or evolution; the duty of both is confined to
deriving the completed meaning from the facts before them.[8-*] He
merely insists that as the object of language is the expression of
thought, certain forms of language are better adapted to this than
others. What these are, why they are so, and how they react on the
minds of the nations speaking them, are the questions he undertakes to
answer, and which constitute the subject-matter with which the
philosophy of language has to do.
Humboldt taught that in its highest sense this philosophy of language
is one with the philosophy of history. The science of language misses
its purpose unless it seeks its chief end in explaining the
intellectual growth of the race.[8-†]
Each separate tongue is “a thought-world in tones” established between
the minds of those who speak it and the objective world without.[8-‡]
Each mirrors in itself the spirit of the nation to which it belongs.
But it has also an earlier and independent origin; it is the product
of the conceptions of antecedent generations, and thus exerts a
formative and directive influence on the national mind, an influence,
not slight, but more potent than that which the national mind exerts
upon it.[8-‖]
So also every word has a double character, the one derived from its
origin, the other from its history. The former is single, the latter
is manifold.[8-§]
Were the gigantic task possible to gather from every language the full
record of every word and the complete explanation of each grammatical
peculiarity, we should have an infallible, the only infallible and
exhaustive, picture of human progress.
§ 4. HISTORICAL, COMPARATIVE AND PHILOSOPHIC GRAMMAR.
The Science of Grammar has three branches, which differ more in the
methods they pursue than in the ends at which they aim. These are
Historic, Comparative and Philosophic Grammar. Historic Grammar
occupies itself with tracing the forms of a language back in time to
their earlier expression, and exhibits their development through the
archaic specimens of the tongue. Comparative Grammar extends this
investigation by including in the survey the similar development of a
number of dialects of the same stock or character, and explains the
laws of speech, which account for the similarities and diversities
observed.
Both of these, it will be observed, begin with the language and its
forms, and are confined to these. Philosophic Grammar, on the other
hand, proceeds from the universal constructive principles of language,
from the abstract formulæ of grammatical relations, and investigates
their application in various languages. It looks upon articulate
speech as the more or less faithful expression of certain logical
procedures, and analyzes tongues in order to exhibit the success, be
it greater or less, which attends this effort. The grammatical
principles with which it deals are universals, they exist in all
minds, although it often happens that they are not portrayed with
corresponding clearness in language.[9-*]
Philosophic Grammar, therefore, includes in its horizon all languages
spoken by men; it essays to analyze their inmost nature with reference
to the laws of thought; it weighs the relations they bear to the
character and destiny of those who speak them; and it ascends to the
psychological needs and impulses which first gave them existence.
It was grammar in this highest sense, it was the study of languages
for such lofty purposes as these, with which Humboldt occupied himself
with untiring zeal for the last fifteen years of his life, when he had
laid aside the cares of the elevated and responsible political
positions which he had long filled with distinguished credit.
§ 5. DEFINITION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE.
Humboldt remarks that the first hundred pages or so of his celebrated
“Introduction” are little more than an expansion of his definition of
language. He gives this definition in its most condensed form as
follows: “Language is the ever-recurring effort of the mind to make
the articulate sound capable of expressing thought.”[10-*]
According to this definition, language is not a dead thing, a completed
product, but it is an ever-living, active function, an energy of the
soul, which will perish only when intelligence itself, in its highest
sense, is extinguished. As he expresses it, language is not an εργον,
but an ενεργεια. It is the proof and the product of a mind _consciously_
working to a definite end.
Hence, in Humboldt’s theory the psychological element of
_self-consciousness_ lies at the root of all linguistic expression. No
mere physical difference between the lower animals and man explains
the latter’s possession of articulate speech. His self-consciousness
alone is that trait which has rendered such a possession
possible.[10-†]
The idea of Self necessarily implies the idea of Other. A thought is
never separate, never isolated, but ever in relation to another
thought, suggested by one, leading on to another. Hence, Humboldt
says: “The mind can only be conceived as in action, and _as action_.”
As Prof. Adler, in his comments on Humboldt’s philosophy, admirably
observes: “Man does not possess any such thing as an absolutely
isolated individuality; the ‘I’ and the ‘thou’ are the essential
complements of each other, and would, in their last analysis, be found
identical.”[11-*]
On these two fundamental conceptions, those of Identity and Relation,
or, as they may be expressed more correctly, those of Being and
Action, Humboldt builds his doctrines concerning the primitive
radicals of language and the fundamental categories of grammar.
§ 6. PRIMITIVE ROOTS AND GRAMMATICAL CATEGORIES.
The roots of a language are classified by Humboldt as either
_objective_ or _subjective_, although he considers this far from an
exhaustive scheme.[11-†]
The objective roots are usually descriptive, and indicate an origin
from a process of mental analysis. They bear the impress of those two
attributes which characterize every thought, Being and Action. Every
complete objective word must express these two notions. Upon them are
founded the fundamental grammatical categories of the Noun and the
Verb; or to speak more accurately, they lead to the distinction of
nominal and verbal themes.
The characteristic of the Noun is that it expresses Being; of the Verb
that it expresses Action. This distinction is far from absolute in the
word itself; in many languages, especially in Chinese and some
American languages, there is in the word no discrimination between its
verbal and nominal forms; but the verbal or nominal _value_ of the
word is clearly fixed by other means.[11-‡]
Another class of objective root-words are the adjective words, or
Determinatives. They are a later accession to the list, and by their
addition bring the three chief grammatical categories, the Noun, the
Verb and the Adjective, into correlation with the three logical
categories of Substance, Action and Quality.
By the subjective roots, Humboldt meant the personal pronouns. To
these he attributed great importance in the development of language,
and especially of American languages. They carry with them the mark of
sharp individuality, and express in its highest reality the notion of
Being.
It is not easy to understand Humboldt’s theory of the evolution of the
personal pronouns. In his various essays he seems to offer conflicting
statements. In one of his later papers, he argues that the origin of
such subjective nominals is often, perhaps generally, locative. By
comparing the personal pronouns with the adverbs of place in a series
of languages, he showed that their demonstrative antedated their
personal meaning.[12-*] With regard to their relative development, he
says, in his celebrated “Introduction”:
“The first person expresses the individuality of the speaker, who is
in immediate contact with external nature, and must distinguish
himself from it in his speech. But in the ‘I’ the ‘Thou’ is assumed;
and from the antithesis thus formed is developed the third
person.”[12-†]
But in his “Notice of the Japanese Grammar of Father Oyanguren,”
published in 1826, he points out that infants begin by speaking of
themselves in the third person, showing that this comes first in the
order of knowledge. It is followed by the second person, which
separates one object from others; but as it does so by putting it in
conscious antithesis to the speaker, it finally develops the
“I.”[12-‡]
The latter is unquestionably the correct statement so far as the
history of language is concerned and the progress of knowledge. I can
know myself only through knowing others.
The explanation which reconciles these theories is that the one refers
to the order of thought, or logical precedence, the other to the order
of expression. Professor Ferrier, in his “Institutes of Metaphysics,”
has established with much acuteness the thesis that, “What is first in
the order of nature is last in the order of knowledge,” and this is an
instance of that philosophical principle.
§ 7. FORMAL AND MATERIAL ELEMENTS OF LANGUAGE.
A fundamental distinction in philosophic grammar is that which divides
the _formal_ from the _material_ element of speech. This division
arises from the original double nature of each radical, as expressing
both Being and Action.
On the one hand, Action involves Relation; it assumes an object and a
subject, an agent, a direction of effort, a result of effort; usually
also limitations of effort, time and space, and qualifications as to
the manner of the effort. In other words, Action is capable of
increase or decrease both in extension and intension.
On the other hand, Being is a conception of fixed conditions, and is
capable of few or no modifications.
The _formal_ elements of a language are those which express Action, or
the relation of the ideas; they make up the affixes of conjugations
and declensions, the inflections of words; they indicate the parts of
speech, the so-called “grammatical categories,” found in developed
tongues. The _material_ elements are the roots or stems expressing the
naked ideas, the conceptions of existence apart from relation.
Using the terms in this sense, Humboldt presents the following terse
formula, as his definition of Inflection: “_Inflection is the
expression of the category in contrast to the definition of the
idea._”[13-*] Nothing could be more definitive and lucid than this
concise phrase.
The inflectional or formal elements of language are usually derived
from words expressing accessory ideas. Generally, they are worn down
to single letters or a single syllable, and they usually may be traced
back to auxiliary verbs and pronouns.
Often various accessories are found which are not required by the main
proposition. This is a common fault in the narratives of ignorant men
and in languages and dialects of a lower grade. It is seen in the
multiplication of auxiliaries and qualifying particles observed in
many American languages, where a vast number of needless accessories
are brought into every sentence.
The nature of the relations expressed by inflections may be manifold,
and it is one of the tasks of philosophic grammar to analyze and
classify them with reference to the direction of mental action they
imply.
It is evident that where these relations are varied and numerous, the
language gains greatly in picturesqueness and force, and thus reacts
with a more stimulating effect on the mind.
§ 8. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGES.
Humboldt believed that in this respect languages could be divided into
three classes, each representing a stage in progressive development.
In the first and lowest stage all the elements are material and
significant, and there are no true formal parts of speech.
Next above this is where the elements of relation lose their
independent significance _where so used_, but retain it elsewhere. The
words are not yet fixed in grammatical categories. There is no
distinction between verbs and nouns except in use. The plural conveys
the idea of many, but the singular not strictly that of unity.
Highest of all is that condition of language where every word is
subject to grammatical law and shows by its form what category it
comes under; and where the relational or formal elements convey no
hint of anything but this relation. Here, only, does language attain
to that specialization of parts where each element subserves its own
purpose and no other, and here only does it correspond with clear and
connected thinking.
These expressions, however, must not be understood in a genetic sense,
as if historically one linguistic class had preceded the other, and
led up to it. Humboldt entertained no such view. He distinctly
repudiated it. He did not believe in the evolution of languages. The
differences of these classes are far more radical than that of sounds
and signs; they reach down to the fundamental notions of things. His
teaching was that a language without a passive voice, or without a
grammatical gender can never acquire one, and consequently it can
never perfectly express the conceptions corresponding to these
features.[14-*]
In defining and appraising these inherent and inalienable qualities of
languages lies the highest end and aim of linguistic science. This is
its true philosophic character, its mission which lifts it above the
mere collecting of words and formulating of rules.
If the higher languages did not develop from the lower, how did they
arise? Humboldt answered this question fairly, so far as he was
concerned. He said, he did not know. Individuals vary exceedingly in
their talent for language, and so do nations. He was willing to call
it an innate creative genius which endowed our Aryan forefathers with
a richly inflected speech; but it was so contrary to the results of
his prolonged and profound study of languages to believe, for
instance, that a tongue like the Sanscrit could ever be developed from
one like the Chinese, that he frankly said that he would rather accept
at once the doctrine of those who attribute the different idioms of
men to an immediate revelation from God.[15-*]
He fully recognized, however, a progress, an organic growth, in human
speech, and he expressly names this as a special branch of linguistic
investigation.[15-†] He lays down that this growth may be from two
sources, one the cultivation of a tongue within the nation by
enriching its vocabulary, separating and classifying its elements,
fixing its expressions, and thus adapting it to wider uses; the
second, by forcible amalgamation with another tongue.
The latter exerts always a more profound and often a more beneficial
influence. The organism of both tongues may be destroyed, but the
dissolvent force is also an organic and vital one, and from the ruins
of both constructs a speech of grander plans and with wider views.
“The seemingly aimless and confused interminglings of primitive tribes
sowed the seed for the flowers of speech and song which flourished in
centuries long posterior.”
The immediate causes of the improvement of a language through forcible
admixture with another, are: that it is obliged to drop all
unneccessary[TN-1] accessory elements in a proposition; that the
relations of ideas must be expressed by conventional and not
significant syllables; and that the limitations of thought imposed by
the genius of the language are violently broken down, and the mind is
thus given wider play for its faculties.
Such influences, however, do not act in accordance with fixed laws of
growth. There are no such laws, which are of universal application.
The development of the Mongolian or Aryan tongues is not at all that
of the American. The goal is one and the same, but the paths to it are
infinite. For this reason each group or class of languages must be
studied by itself, and its own peculiar developmental laws be
ascertained by searching its history.[16-*]
With reference to the growth of American languages, it was Humboldt’s
view that they manifest the utmost refractoriness both to external
influence and to internal modifications. They reveal a marvellous
tenacity of traditional words and forms, not only in dialects, but
even in particular classes of the community, men having different
expressions from women, the old from the young, the higher from the
lower classes. These are maintained with scrupulous exactitude through
generations, and except by the introduction of words, three centuries
of daily commingling with the white race, have not at all altered the
grammer[TN-2] and scarcely the phonetics of many of their languages.
Nor is this referable to the contrast between an Aryan and an American
language. The same immiscibility is shown between themselves. “Even
where many radically different languages are located closely together,
as in Mexico, I have not found a single example where one exercised a
constructive or formative influence on the other. But it is by the
encounter of great and contrasted differences that languages gain
strength, riches, and completeness. Only thus are the perceptive
powers, the imagination and the feelings impelled to enrich and extend
the means of expression, which, if left to the labors of the
understanding alone, are liable to be but meagre and arid.”[16-†]
§ 9. INTERNAL FORM OF LANGUAGES.
Besides the grammatical form of a language, Humboldt recognized
another which he called its _internal form_. This is that subtle
something not expressed in words, which even more than the formal
parts of speech, reveals the linguistic genius of a nation. It may be
defined as the impression which the language bears of the clearness of
the conceptions of those speaking it, and of their native gift of
speech. He illustrates it by instancing the absence of a developed
mode in Sanscrit, and maintains that in the creators of that tongue
the conception of modality was never truly felt and distinguished from
tense. In this respect its inner form was greatly inferior to the
Greek, in the mind of which nation the ideally perfect construction of
the verb unfolded itself with far more clearness.
The study of this inner form of a language belongs to the highest
realm of linguistic investigation, and is that which throws the most
light on the national character and capacities.[17-*]
§ 10. CRITERIA OF RANK IN LANGUAGES.
Humboldt’s one criterion of a language was its tendncy[TN-3] to
_quicken and stimulate mental action_. He maintained that this is
secured just in proportion as the grammatical structure favors clear
definition of the individual idea apart from its relations, in other
words, as it separates the material from the inflectional elements of
speech. Clear thinking, he argued, means progressive thinking.
Therefore he assigned a lower position both to those tongues which
inseparably connect the idea with its relations, as the American
languages, and to those which, like the Chinese and in a less degree
the modern English, have scarcely any formal elements at all, but
depend upon the position of words (placement) to signify their
relations.
But he greatly modified this unfavorable judgment by several
extenuating considerations.
Thus he warns us that it is of importance to recognize fully “that
grammatical principles dwell rather in the mind of the speaker than in
the material and mechanism of his language.”[17-†]
This led him to establish a distinction between _explicit_ grammar,
where the relations are fully expressed in speech, and _implicit_
grammar, where they are wholly or in part left to be understood by the
mind.
He expressly and repeatedly states that an intelligent thinker,
trained in the grammatical distinctions of a higher language, can
express any thought he has in the grammar of any other tongue which he
masters, no matter how rude it is. This adaptability lies in the
nature of speech in general. A language is an instrument, the use of
which depends entirely on the skill of him who handles it. It is
doubtful whether such imported forms and thoughts appeal in any direct
sense to those who are native to the tongue. But the fact remains that
the forms of the most barbarous languages are such that they may be
developed to admit the expression of any kind of idea.
But the meaning of this must not be misconstrued. If languages were
merely dead instruments which we use to work with, then one would be
as good as another to him who had learned it. But this is not the
case. Speech is a living, physiological function, and, like any other
function, is most invigorating and vitalizing when it works in the
utmost harmony with the other functions. Its special relationship is
to that brain-action which we call thinking; and entire harmony
between the two is only present when the form, structure and sounds of
speech correspond accurately to the logical procedure of thought. This
he considered “an undeniable fact.”
The measure of the excellence of a language, therefore, is the
clearness, definiteness and energy of the ideas which it awakes in the
nation. Does it inspire and incite their mind? Has it positive and
clear tones, and do these define sharply the ideas they represent,
without needless accessories? Does its structure present the leading
elements of the proposition in their simplicity, and permit the
secondary elements to be grouped around them in subordinate positions,
with a correct sense of linguistic perspective? The answers to these
queries decide its position in the hierarchy of tongues.[18-*]
As its capacity for expression is no criterion of a language, still
less is the abundance or regularity of its forms. For this very
multiplicity, this excessive superfluity, is a burden and a drawback,
and obscures the integration of the thought by attaching to it a
quantity of needless qualifications. Thus, in the language of the
Abipones, the pronoun is different as the person spoken of is
conceived as present, absent, sitting, walking, lying, or running, all
quite unnecessary specifications.[19-*]
In some languages much appears as form which, on close scrutiny, is
nothing of the kind.
This misunderstanding has reigned almost universally in the treatment
of American tongues. The grammars which have been written upon them
proceed generally on the principles of Latin, and apply a series of
grammatical names to the forms explained, entirely inappropriate to
them and misleading. Our first duty in taking up such a grammar as,
for instance, that of an American language, is to dismiss the whole of
the arrangement of the “parts of speech,” and, by an analysis of words
and phrases, to ascertain by what arrangement of elements they express
logical, significant relations.[19-†]
For example, in the Carib tongue, the grammars give _aveiridaco_ as
the second person singular, subjunctive imperfect, “if thou wert.”
Analyze this, and we discover that _a_ is the possessive pronoun
“thy;” _veiri_ is “to be” or “being” (in a place); and _daco_ is a
particle of definite time. Hence, the literal rendering is “on the day
of thy being.” The so-called imperfect subjunctive turns out to be a
verbal noun with a preposition. In many American languages the
hypothetical supposition expressed in the Latin subjunctive is
indicated by the same circumlocution.
Again, the infinitive, in its classical sense, is unknown in most,
probably in all, American languages. In the Tupi of Brazil and
frequently elsewhere it is simply a noun; _caru_ is both “to eat” and
“food;” _che caru ai-pota_, “I wish to eat,” literally “my food I
wish.”
In the Mexican, the infinitive is incorporated in the verb as an
accusative, and the verb is put in the future of the person spoken of.
Many writers continue to maintain that a criterion of rank of a
language is its lexicographical richness--the number of words it
possesses. Even very recently, Prof. Max Müller has applied such a
test to American languages, and, finding that one of the Fuegian
dialects is reported to have nearly thirty thousand words, he
maintains that this is a proof that these savages are a degenerate
remnant of some much more highly developed ancestry. Founding his
opinion largely on similar facts, Alexander von Humboldt applied the
expression to the American nations that they are “des débris échappés
à un naufrage commun.”
Such, however, was not the opinion of his brother Wilhelm. He sounded
the depths of linguistic philosophy far more deeply than to accept
mere abundance of words as proof of richness in a language. Many
savage languages have twenty words signifying to eat particular
things, but no word meaning “to eat” in general; the Eskimo language
has different words for fishing for each kind of fish, but no word “to
fish,” in a general sense. Such apparent richness is, in fact, actual
poverty.
Humboldt taught that the quality, not merely the quantity, of words
was the decisive measure of verbal wealth. Such quality depends on the
relations of concrete words, on the one hand, to the primitive
objective perceptions at their root, and, on the other, to the
abstract general ideas of which they are particular representatives;
and besides this, on the relations which the spoken word, the
articulate sound, bears to the philosophic laws of the formation of
language in general.[20-*]
In his letter to Abel-Remusat he discusses the theory that the
American languages point to a once higher condition of civilization,
and are the corrupted idioms of deteriorated races. He denies that
there is linguistic evidence of any such theory. These languages, he
says, possess a remarkable regularity of structure, and very few
anomalies. Their grammar does not present any visible traces of
corrupting intermixtures.[21-*]
In a later work he returns to the subject when speaking of the Lenape
(Algonkin Delaware) dialect, and asks whether the rich imaginative
power, of which it bears the evident impress, does not point to some
youthful, supple and vigorous era in the life of language in
general?[21-†] But he leaves the question unanswered.
§ 11. CLASSIFICATION OF LANGUAGES.
The lower unit of language is the Word; the higher is the Sentence.
The plans on which languages combine words into sentences are a basic
character of their structure, and divide them into classes as distinct
and as decisive of their future, as those of vertebrate and
invertebrate animals in natural history.
These plans are four in number:
1. By Isolation.
The words are placed in juxtaposition, without change. Their relations
are expressed by their location only (placement). The typical example
of this is the Chinese.
2. By Agglutination.
The sentence is formed by suffixing to the word expressive of the main
idea a number of others, more or less altered, expressing the
relations. Examples of this are the Eskimo of North America, and the
Northern Asiatic dialects.
3. By Incorporation.
The leading word of the sentence is divided and the accessory words
either included in it or attached to it with abbreviated forms, so
that the whole sentence assumes the form and sound of one word.
4. By Inflection.
Each word of the sentence indicates by its own form the character and
relation to the main proposition of the idea it represents. Sanscrit,
Greek and Latin are familiar examples of inflected tongues.
It is possible to suppose that all four of these forms were developed
from some primitive condition of utterance unknown to us, just as
naturalists believe that all organic species were developed out of a
homogeneous protoplasmic mass; but it is as hard to see how any one of
them in its present form could pass over into another, as to
understand how a radiate could change into a mollusk.
§ 12. NATURE OF INCORPORATION.
Of the four plans mentioned, Incorporation is that characteristic of,
though not confined to, American tongues.
It may appear in a higher or a lower grade, but its intention is
everywhere the effort to convey in one word the whole proposition. The
Verb, as that part of speech which especially conveys the synthetic
action of the mental operation, is that which is selected as the stem
of this word-sentence; all the other parts are subordinate
accessories, devoid of syntactic value.
The higher grade of incorporation includes both subject, object and
verb in one word, and if for any reason the object is not included,
the scheme of the sentence is still maintained in the verb, and the
object is placed outside, as in apposition, without case ending, and
under a form different from its original and simple one.
This will readily be understood from the following examples from the
Mexican language.
The sentence _ni-naca-qua_, is one word and means “I, flesh, eat.” If
it is desired to express the object independently, the expression
becomes _ni-c-qua-in-nacatl_, “I it eat, the flesh.” The termination
_tl_ does not belong to the root of the noun, but is added to show
that it is in an external, and, as it were, unnatural position. Both
the direct and remote object can thus be incorporated, and if they are
not, but separately appended, the scheme of the sentence is still
preserved; as _ni-te-tla-maca_, literally, “I, something, to somebody,
give.” How closely these accessories are incorporated is illustrated
by the fact that the tense augments are not added to the stem, but to
the whole word; _o-ni-c-te-maca-e_, “I have given it to somebody;”
when the _o_ is the prefix of the perfect.
In these languages, every element in the sentence, which is not
incorporated in the verb, has, in fact, no syntax at all. The verbal
exhausts all the formal portion of the language. The relations of the
other words are intimated by their position. Thus _ni-tlagotlaz-nequia_,
I wished to love, is literally “I, I shall love, I wished.” _Tlagotlaz_,
is the first person singular of the future, _ni-nequia_, I wished, which
is divided, and the future form inserted. The same expression may stand
thus: _ni-c-nequia-tlagotlaz_, where the _c_ is an intercalated relative
pronoun, and the literal rendering is, “I it wished, I shall love.”
In the Lule language the construction with an infinitive is simply
that the two verbs follow each other in the same person, as _caic
tucuec_, “I am accustomed to eat,” literally, “I am acustomed,[TN-4] I
eat.”
None of these devices fullfils[TN-5] all the uses of the infinitive,
and hence they are all inferior to it.
In languages which lack formal elements, the deficiency must be
supplied by the mind. Words are merely placed in juxtaposition, and
their relationship guessed at. Thus, when a language constructs its
cases merely by prefixing prepositions to the unaltered noun, there is
no grammatical form; in the Mbaya language _e-tiboa_ is translated
“through me,” but it is really “I, through;” _l’emani_, is rendered
“he wishes,” but it is strictly “he, wish.”
In such languages the same collocation of words often corresponds to
quite different meanings, as the precise relation of the thoughts is
not defined by any formal elements. This is well illustrated in the
Tupi tongue. The word _uba_ is “father;” with the pronoun of the third
person prefixed it is _tuba_, literally “he, father.” This may mean
either “his father,” or “he is a father,” or “he has a father,” just
as the sense of the rest of the sentence requires.
Certainly a language which thus leaves confounded together ideas so
distinct as these, is inferior to one which discriminates them; and
this is why the formal elements of a tongue are so important to
intellectual growth. The Tupis may be an energetic and skillful
people, but with their language they can never take a position as
masters in the realm of ideas.
The absence of the passive in most, if not all, American tongues is
supplied by similar inadequate collocations of words. In Huasteca, for
example, _nana tanin tahjal_, is translated “I am treated by him;”
actually it is, “I, me, treats he.” This is not a passive, but simply
the idea of the Ego connected with the idea of another acting upon it.
This is vastly below the level of inflected speech; for it cannot be
too strenuously maintained that the grammatical relations of spoken
language are the more perfect and favorable to intellectual growth,
the more closely they correspond to the logical relations of thought.
Sometimes what appears as inflection turns out on examination to be
merely adjunction. Thus in the Mbaya tongue there are such verbal
forms as _daladi_, thou wilt throw, _nilabuite_, he has spun, when the
_d_ is the sign of the future, and the _n_ of the perfect. These look
like inflections; but in fact _d_, is simply a relic of _quide_,
hereafter, later, and _n_ stands in the same relation to _quine_,
which means “and also.”
To become true formal elements, all such adjuncts must have completely
lost their independent signification; because if they retain it, their
material content requires qualification and relation just as any other
stem word.
A few American languages may have reached this stage. In the Mexican
there are the terminals _ya_ or _a_ in the imperfect, the augment _o_
in the preterit, and others in the future. In the Tamanaca the present
ends in _a_, the preterit in _e_, the future in _c_. “There is nothing
in either of these tongues to show that these tense signs have
independent meaning, and therefore there is no reason why they should
not be classed with those of the Greek and Sanscrit as true
inflectional elements.”[24-*]
§ 13. PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF INCORPORATION.
This Incorporative plan, which may be considered as distinctive of the
American stock of languages, is explained in its psychological origin
by Humboldt, as the result of an _exaltation of the imaginative over
the intellectual elements of mind_. By this method, the linguistic
faculty strives to present to the understanding the whole thought in
the most compact form possible, thus to facilitate its comprehension;
and this it does, because a thought presented in one word is more
vivid and stimulating to the imagination, more individual and
picturesque, than when narrated in a number of words.[25-*]
But the mistake must not be made of supposing that Incorporation is a
_creative act_ of the language-sense, or that its products, the
compounds that it builds, are real words. Humboldt was careful to
impress this distinction, and calls such incorporated compounds
examples of _collocation_ (Zusammensetzung), not of _synthesis_
(Zusammenfassung). On this ground, he doubted, and with justice, the
assertion of Duponceau, that the long words of the Lenape (Delaware)
dialect are formed by an arbitrary selection of the phonetic parts of
a number of words, without reference to the radical syllables.[25-†]
He insisted, as is really the case, that in all instances the
significant syllable or syllables are retained.
§ 14. EFFECT OF INCORPORATION ON COMPOUND SENTENCES.
As has been seen, the theory of Incorporation is to express the whole
proposition, as nearly as possible, in one word; and what part of it
cannot be thus expressed, is left without any syntax whatever. Not
only does this apply to individual words in a sentence, but it extends
to the various clauses of a compound sentence, such as in Aryan
languages show their relation to the leading clauses by means of
prepositions, conjunctions and relative pronouns.
When the methods are analyzed by which the major and minor clauses are
assigned their respective values in these tongues, it is very plain
what difficulties of expression the system of Incorporation involves.
Few of them have any true connecting word of either of the three
classes above mentioned. They depend on scarcely veiled material
words, simply placed in juxtaposition.
It is probable that the prepositions and conjunctions of all
languages were at first significant words, and the degree to which
they have lost their primary significations and have become purely
formal elements expressing relation, is one of the measures of the
grammatical evolution of a tongue. In most American idioms their
origin from substantives is readily recognizable. Frequently these
substantives refer to parts of the body, and this, in passing,
suggests the antiquity of this class of words and their value in
comparison.
In Maya _tan_ means in, toward, among; but it is also the breast or
front of the body. The Mexican has three classes of prepositions--the
first, whose origin from a substantive cannot be detected; the second,
where an unknown and a known element are combined; the third, where
the substantive is perfectly clear. An example of the last mentioned
is _itic_, in, compounded of _ite_, belly, and the locative particle
_c_; the phrase _ilhuicatl itic_, in heaven, is literally “in the
belly of heaven.” Precisely the same is the Cakchiquel _pamcah_,
literally, “belly, heaven”=in heaven. In Mexican, _notepotzco_ is
“behind me,” literally, “my back, at;” this corresponds again to the
Cakchiquel _chuih_, behind me, from _chi_, at, _u_, my, _vih_,
shoulder-blades. The Mixteca prepositions present the crude nature of
their origin without disguise, _chisi huahi_, belly, house--that is,
in front of the house; _sata huahi_, back, house--behind the house.
The conjunctions are equally transparent. “And” in Maya is _yetel_, in
Mexican _ihuan_. One would suppose that such an indispensable
connective would long since have been worn down to an insoluble
entity. On the contrary, both these words retain their perfect
material meaning. _Yetel_ is a compound of _y_, his, _et_, companion,
and _el_, the definite termination of nouns. _Ihuan_ is the
possessive, _i_, and _huan_, associate, companion, used also as a
termination to form a certain class of plurals.
The deficiency in true conjunctions and relative pronouns is met in
many American languages by a reversal of the plan of expression with
us. The relative clause becomes the principal one. There is a certain
logical justice in this; for, if we reflect, it will appear evident
that the major proposition is, in our construction, presented as one
of the conditions of the minor. “I shall drown, if I fall in the
water,” means that, of the various results of my falling in the water,
one of them will be that I shall drown. “I followed the road which
you described,” means that you described a road, and one of the
results of this act of yours was that I followed it.
This explains the plan of constructing compound sentences in Qquichua.
Instead of saying “I shall follow the road which you describe,” the
construction is “You describe, this road I shall follow;” and instead
of “I shall drown if I fall in the water,” it would be, “I fall in the
water, I shall drown.”
The Mexican language introduces the relative clause by the word _in_,
which is an article and demonstrative pronoun, or, if the proposition
is a conditional one, by _intla_, which really signifies “within
this,” and conveys the sense that the major is included within the
conditions of the minor clause. The Cakchiquel conditional particle is
_vue_, if, which appears to be simply the particle of affirmation
“yes,” employed to give extension to the minor clause, which, as a
rule, is placed first.
Or a conventional arrangement of words may be adopted which will
convey the idea of certain dependent clauses, as those expressing
similitude, as is often the case in Mexican.
§ 15. THE DUAL IN AMERICAN LANGUAGES.
In his admirable philosophical examination of the dual number in
language, Humboldt laid the foundation of a linguistic theory of
numerals which has not yet received the development it merits. Here he
brings into view the dual and plural endings of a list of American
languages, and explains the motives on which they base the inclusive
and exclusive plurals so common among them. It is, in fact, a species
of pronominal dual confined to the first person in the plural.
This, he goes on to say, is by no means the only dual in these
tongues. Some of them express both the other classes of duals which he
names. Thus, the Totonaca has duals for all objects which appear as
pairs in nature, as the eyes, the ears, the hands, etc.; while the
Araucanian equals the Sanscrit in extending the grammatical expression
of the dual through all parts of speech where it can find proper
application.[27-*]
§ 16. HUMBOLDT’S ESSAY ON THE AMERICAN VERB.
The essay on the American verb translated in the following pages has
never previously appeared in print, either in German or English. The
original MS. is in the Royal Library at Berlin, whence I obtained a
transcript. The author alludes to this essay in several passages of
his printed works, most fully in his “Letter to M. Abel-Remusat”
(1826), in which he says:
“A few years ago, I read before the Berlin Academy a memoir, which has
not been printed, in which I compared a number of American languages
with each other, solely with regard to the manner in which they
express the verb as uniting the subject with the attribute in the
proposition, and from this point of view I assigned them to various
classes. As this trait proves to what degree a language possesses
grammatical forms, or is near to possessing them, it is decisive of
the whole grammar of a tongue.”
On reading the memoir, I was so much impressed with the acuteness and
justness of its analysis of American verbal forms that I prepared the
translation which I now submit.
In the more recent studies of the American verb which have appeared
from the pens of Friedrich Müller, J. Hammond Trumbull and Lucien
Adam, we have the same central element of speech subjected to critical
investigation at able hands. But it seems to me that none of them has
approached the topic with the broad, philosophic conceptions which
impress the reader in this essay of Humboldt’s. Although sixty years
and more have elapsed since it was written, I am confident that it
will provide ample food for thought to the earnest student of
language.
_On the Verb in American Languages. By Wilhelm von Humboldt[TN-6]
Translated from the unpublished original. By D. G. Brinton, M.D._
You recently had the goodness to give an appreciative hearing to my
essay on The Origin of Grammatical Forms.
I desire to-day to apply the principles which I then stated in general
to a particular grammatical point through a series of languages. I
choose those of America as best suited to such a purpose, and select
the Verb as the most important part of speech, and the central point
of every language. Without entering into an analysis of the different
parts of the verb, I shall confine myself to that which constitutes
its peculiar verbal character--the union of the subject and predicate
of the sentence by means of the notion of Being. This alone forms the
essence of the verb; all other relations, as of persons, tenses, modes
and classes, are merely secondary properties.
The question to be answered is therefore:--
Through what form of grammatical notation do the languages under
consideration indicate that subject and predicate are to be united by
means of the notion of Being?
I believe I have shown with sufficient clearness that a language may
have a great diversity of apparent forms, and may express all
grammatical relations with definiteness, and yet when taken as a whole
it may lack true grammatical form. From this arises an essential and
real graduated difference between languages. This difference, however,
has nothing to do with the question whether particular languages
employ exclusively agglutination or inflection, as all began with
agglutination; but in the languages of the higher class, it became in
its effects on the mind, identical with inflection.
As languages of the higher class, one has but to name the cultivated
idioms of Asia and Europe, Sanscrit, Greek and Latin, in order to
apply to them the above statement. It is still more necessary,
however, to understand thoroughly the structure of those languages
which are on a lower plane, partly because this will convince us of
the correctness of the classification, partly because these tongues
are less generally known.
It is enough to take up some single leading grammatical relation. I
select for this purpose the verb as the most important part of speech,
with which most of the others come into relation, and which completes
the formation of the sentence, the grammatical purpose of all
language--and often embraces it wholly in itself. But I shall confine
myself solely to that which makes the verb a verb, the characteristic
notation of its peculiar verbal nature. In every language this point
is the most important and the most difficult, and cannot be made too
clear to throw light upon the whole of the language. Linguistic
character can be ascertained through this point in the shortest and
most certain manner.
The verb is the union of the subject and predicate of the sentence by
means of the notion of Being; yet not of every predicate. The
attribute which is united to the substance by the verb must be an
energic one, a participial. The substance is represented in the verb
as in motion, as connecting the Being with the energic attribute. By
means of this representation, and the peculiar nature of the
attribute, the verb is distinguished from the mere logical copula,
with which it is liable to be confounded if these ideas are not
understood. If the verb is explained merely as a synthesis of Being
with any other attribute, then the origin of the tenses cannot be
wholly derived from one idea, for the idea of time alone would allow
only a three-fold distinction. Moreover, in such case the true and
efficient nature of the verb is misunderstood. In the sentence, “The
man is good,” the verb is not a synthesis of the adjective “good” with
the substantive, but it is a participial of the energic attribute “to
be good,” which contains a condition, having beginning, middle and
end, and consequently resembles an action. Fully analyzed, the
sentence would be, “He is being good.” Where the substantive verb
stands without a visible predicate, as in the sentence, “I am,” then
the verb “to be” has itself as the object of a synthesis, “I am
being.” But as rude nations would find this difficult to comprehend,
the verb “to be” is either entirely lacking, as in many American
languages, or else it has an original material sense, and is
confounded with “to stand,” “to give,” “to eat,” etc., and thus
indicates Being as identical with the most familiar occupations.
The subject, the substance represented as in action, may be one
independent of the speakers, or it may be identical with one of them,
and this identity is expressed by the pronouns. From this arises the
persons. The energic attribute may exert its action in various manners
in the substance or between two substances; this gives rise to the
forms or classes of verbs. Their action must be confined to a given
point or period of time. The Being may be understood as definite or
indefinite, etc., and in this is the origin of modes. Being is
inseparably connected with the notation of time. This, united with the
fixation of the point or period of time of an action, forms the
tenses. No verb, therefore, can be conceived as without persons and
tenses, modes and classes; yet these qualities do not constitute its
essence, but arise from the latter, which itself is the synthesis
brought about by the notion of Being. The signs of these qualities
must be made to appear in the grammatical notation of the verb, but in
such a manner that they appear dependent on its nature, making one
with it.
The energic attribute, which aids in forming the verb, may be a real
movement or action, as going, coming, living, working, etc., or merely
a qualitative Being, as a being beautiful, good, mortal, or immortal.
In the former case, we have a real attributive verb, in the latter a
substantive verb, in which an attribute is considered as at rest,
hence as an adjective. Although in both cases the nature of the verb
is the same, yet in many languages this difference leads to a
corresponding variety in grammatical notation.
In accordance with these ideas culled from universal grammar, the
forms of the conjugations in the various languages will now be
considered.
I have taken as a basis for this investigation as many American
languages as I thought sufficient for the purpose, and as would not make
the survey oppressive by their number; but as I do not name all of them,
and pay still less attention to pointing out in what other groups of
languages the peculiarities named occur, it must be understood that what
is here said is not intended as a characterization of American
languages. This is reserved for another study.
In order to judge how closely these languages approach grammatical
perfection in this point, we must take as our criterion that condition
of speech where there is a class of words, which possess verbal power,
and are at the same time separated by a definite form from all other
parts of speech. With reference to this condition as the highest, we
must arrange in various grades all other structural forms or
paraphrases of the verb.
The notion of Being, which constitutes the basis and the essence of
the verb, can be indicated either,
1. As expressed independently.
2. As incorporated in the verbal form as an auxiliary verb.
3. As included in the verbal form merely as an idea.
The differences of the languages under comparison can be appreciated
most correctly by means of these three headings; but it must not be
forgotten that any language may use the first and one of the last two
methods, and that in languages which have a substantive verb
conjugated with and without auxiliary verbs, all three may be
employed.
I.
WHEN THE NOTION OF BEING IS EXPRESSED INDEPENDENTLY.
I must except from this class all instances where the substantive verb
is formed from a radical, inasmuch as this root, like any other, must
assume the verbal form, and thus come under one of the two other
divisions. In such case it expresses the notion of Being, either by an
auxiliary, as in the German _Ich bin gewesen_, or simply in the form,
as, _I am_. When it is remembered that the substantive verbs of all
languages are derived from concrete conceptions and impart to these
merely the general notion of Being, the above becomes still more
obvious.
Now if there is no root-form for the substantive verb, and yet it is
expressed independently, and not by another verbal form, this can only
be done either by the position of the governing and governed words, or
by linguistic elements which are not properly verbs, but only become
so by this use. In the former case the substantive verb is merely
understood, in the latter it appears in a definite word, but without a
fixed radical.
1. _When the notion of Being is understood._
One of the most common forms of sentences in American languages is to
bring together an adjective and a substantive, the substantive verb
being omitted.
Mexican: _in Pedro qualli_, the Peter (is) good.
Totonaca: _aquit chixco_, I (am) a man.
Huasteca: _naxe uxum ibaua tzichniel_, this woman (is) not thy
servant.
In the Mixteca language such expressions have a peculiar arrangement.
The adjective must precede the substantive, or rather the predicate
must precede the subject, as in the reverse case the words are
understood separately, and are not connected into a sentence: _quadza
ñaha_, the woman is bad; _ñaha quadza_, the bad woman.
In the language of the Mbayas, a sentence can be made with any verb by
dropping the verbal affixes, by transposing a letter characterizing
the nouns as such, appending an adjective suffix, and uniting this
with an independent pronoun. The grammars of this language call this
form a passive, but it is just as much a neuter, and is not a verb but
a phrase. From _iigaichini_, to teach, we have _n-iigaichin-igi_,
taught, and as first person _e n-iigaichin-igi_, I am taught. The
initial _n_ which accompanies all nouns in this language, is merely
the possessive pronoun of the third person, added according to the
usage of many of these tongues to leave no noun without a possessive;
the termination _igi_ is a particle which indicates the place where
anything remains. Literally, therefore, _eniigaichinigi_ means, I (am)
the stopping-place of his teaching, _i. e._, one who is taught. All
affixes of mode and tense, however, may be united to this phrase, so
that thus it approaches a verb.
Regarded apart from the changes through tenses and modes, the union of
the subject and predicate with the substantive verb omitted, is
admirably adapted to express the conjunction of two words in one idea,
and as the languages which make use of it also possess the ordinary
forms of conjugation, they thus possess a special expression for both
the forms of verbs above referred to. We shall note this particularly
in the Beto language.
When the subject is not an independent part of speech, but an affixed
pronoun, the analogy of this method of notation to a verbal form
increases. For this is present even when no characteristic of a tense
is added, simply by the union of an attribute and a pronoun. It should
be remarked once for all, however, that too much weight must not be
attached to whether these elements form one word or not, as this is
not an infallible criterion.
The verb cannot be considered to be present as a separate part of
speech, when a verb can thus be made out of any word, not merely those
stamped as verbs, but also out of those which bear the express
characteristics of nouns; and therefore I include all these cases in
the class under consideration. For in all these languages there is in
fact no verb, but only separate elements of speech with the verb
omitted. Such cases are, however, interesting, as showing the gradual
approach to the verb, and the effort of the instinct of language to
arrive at grammatical form.
The independent personal pronoun rarely makes an element of verbal
form, as in speaking it is generally worn down to an affix. When it is
used to form a verbal expression, the difference of the elements is
1 3 3 1
apparent. Thus, in the Carib, _anaiaca puin au_--I (am) not a divider.
In that tongue, however, this placement is not applicable to every noun,
but only after certain definite verbal forms, especially in negative
expressions.
The Lule language confines this notation to participials, and expresses
by it the condition of the action and also its time; [TN-7]_mil quis
1 2 3
amaiciton_, you (are) me loving.
The affixed pronouns are either special, confined to these
expressions, or if elsewhere in the tongue, are not employed with
verbs, or not in this manner; or they are the pronominal affixes of
the verb itself.
The Maya or Yucatecan language has a special pronoun which added to
any noun forms a sentence with it, and possesses the power to add the
idea of the verb; _Pedro en_, I am Pedro. But when it stands alone,
without a predicate, it loses this power, as _en_ alone does not mean,
“I am.”
In the Beto language there is, indeed, no special pronoun of this
kind, as the one used is also a possessive. Its position, however,
makes the difference. When it is prefixed, it is the possessive, but
when suffixed it carries with it the power of the verb: _humani rru_,
man I (am); _fofei rru_, bad I (am). In a similar manner this tongue
forms a substantive verb, _ajoi rru_. The meaning of the root is not
given, but it seems to mean something present, at hand. It is
suggestive that in these phrases the accent is always on the pronoun,
as if to signify that that is the important element.
It is very common in American languages to find the noun and the verb
using the same pronouns, with the former to indicate possession, with
the latter the subject. This might be explained by supposing that the
action is regarded as the possession of the agent. But it is simpler
to suppose that in each case the connection of the person with the
noun and the verb is in the thoughts, and this relation is recognized
in expression.
In this way the Mbaya language has a sort of descriptive conjugation;
connecting the participles with possessive pronouns; _i-iligodi_, I
(am) explaining; but no doubt less definitely, “my explaining,” “I to
explain.”
The language of the Abipones slightly alters the possessive pronouns
in some persons and uses them in a similar manner: _ri-aal_, I am
lazy; _yo-amkata_, he is good.
When the verbal pronoun is used in such expressions, it is entirely
identical with the verb.
This is the case with the Mexican, where the verbal pronoun united to
the participle forms a sentence: _ni-tlaçotlani_, I (am) a lover. This
expression differs from the present indicative only in the form of the
root-word, _ni-tlaçotla_; but it cannot form another tense or mode.
The grammarians call such an expression a tense indicating habit.
This, however, would not be a tense but a mode, and, in fact, the term
rests on a misunderstanding. That such expressions indicate habit is
shown by the fact that they do not apply, like the present of the
verb, to the temporary action, but convey that it is a custom, or a
business; not that I am loving just now, but that I am habitually a
lover.
An entirely similar instance occurs in the North Guaranay language,
which also permits, besides the regular conjugation, a union of the
root of the verb with a pronoun, the verb being omitted. The
grammarians of that tongue say that this adds extension and emphasis
to the sense of the verb. The real difference, however, is that this
procedure treats the verb as a noun, and the extension comes from
considering the action expressed by the verb to have become a
permanent quality; _a poro iuca_, I kill men (ordinary conjugation);
_xe poro iuca_, I (am) a man-killer (form with the possessive
pronoun); I kill men as my business.
In both these languages, therefore, what have been represented as
peculiar and separated forms, tenses indicating habit, or forms of
extension, are simply erroneous explanations of quite simple
constructions. In Mexican the correctness of this explanation is
confirmed by the forms of the vocative, which are identical with this
supposed tense, _in ti tlatlacoani_, O thou sinner; literally, thou
who (art) a sinner.
In the above examples the verbal power lies in the pronouns. But the
Mbaya language constructs verbal sentences by adding the sign of the
future to any adjective without a pronoun. This sign is _de_, or
before a vowel _d_: _de liidi_, it will be pleasant to the taste; _d
otiya_, he will be fat. I do not find other examples, and am uncertain
whether other tenses and modes are thus formed. In that case the
pronouns would have to be added, and the expression would lose its
peculiarity, which is that the tense sign alone carries with it the
notion of Being.
The Othomi language makes use in such expressions not only of the
pronouns but of all the affixes of the verb, and conjugates a noun
together with its article, treating it as a verbal radical:
_qui-no-munti-maha_, Thou wert the enriched. Here _no-munti_ is “the
enriched,” and all the remaining syllables are verbal inflections.
Sandoval, who wrote a grammar of the language, explains _no_ as an
auxiliary verb; but with the noun he calls it an article, as it is,
and he evidently misunderstood the expression. It is wholly a verbal,
but as this procedure can be applied to any noun whatever, such an
expression is far removed from a real, well-defined verbal form.
The same language has another peculiar form with the possessive, which
can only be explained by supplying an omitted verb. _Na nuhti_ means
“my property;” but if to this is added the abbreviated pronoun used as
a verbal affix, _na-nuhti-gā_, the words mean, “this property
belongs to me,” or, “my property is it, mine.”
In the grammatically obscure consciousness of these people, the ideas
of verbal and merely pronominal expression are confounded, as also in
the Brazilian language, where “my father” and “I have a father” are
expressed by the same word.
The advantages which these languages derive from the formation of
sentences with the verb omitted are two.
They can change any noun into a verb, or at least they can treat it as
such. It is true that this can also be done by a substantive verb when
one is found, but as the languages in question unite the noun to the
verbal flexions, their freedom is much greater.
The second advantage is, that when it is desirable to discriminate
clearly between the two kinds of verbs, the one which has at base an
energic attribute, the other which merely expresses the relation of
predicate to subject, a thing to its qualities, this end can be much
better reached by the process described than even by the substantive
verb, which, by its full verbal form, always recalls the action of an
energic attribute.
Many of the languages named include in these expressions particles of
time, thereby obscuring the distinction referred to. But in others
this is not the case. Thus in the Maya and Beto there are two
conjugations, one with the pronoun without time particles, and one
with them; and as in both these tongues the present of the true
conjugation has a characteristic tense sign, a separate aorist of the
present is formed by the other conjugation, which our cultivated
tongues cannot express so conveniently.
2. _When the notion of Being is expressed by a special word, but
without a phonetic radical._
Although the assumption here expressed sounds at first rather
enigmatical, yet one can soon see that if the notion of Being is to be
conveyed without a phonetic radical, it can only be done through the
sign of the person, that is, in the pronoun, with or without a tense
sign. This is actually the case in two languages, the Maya and the
Yaruri.
We have already seen that in the Maya there is a special pronoun
which unites a predicate to the idea of person into one sentence.
There is also another which by itself conveys the idea of the verb,
and of which each person has the signification both of the pronoun and
the substantive verb, “I” and “I am,” “thou” and “thou art,” etc. Not
only is it so used in the present, but it can take the signs of the
tenses. It is distinguished from the pronouns previously referred to
in the first and second persons of both numbers only by a prefixed
_t_, as follows:
Pronouns which, with a predicate, Pronouns which, by themselves,
convey a verbal idea. possess verbal power.
Singular.
1. en ten
2. ech tech
3. lai lo lai
Plural.
1. on toon
2. ex teex
3. ob loob
This similarity leads to the thought that a true phonetic radical may
exist in this _t_, and may induce us to consider this word not as a
pronoun but as a substantive verb. But this makes no difference. The
fact remains that the word is used both as a simple pronoun and also
as a substantive verb. In the translation of the Lord’s Prayer, the
word _toon_ is a simple pronoun. If _t_ is a radical, it may just as
well come from the pronoun. Some languages offer clear examples of
this. In the Maipure the expression for the third person singular
recurs with all the other persons, as if this sound meant the person,
the man generally, and the first and second persons were denoted as
the “I-person,” “thou-person,” etc. In the Achagua language the same
radical occurs in all the pronouns, but does not, as in the Maipure,
stand alone for the third person singular, but in it, as in the other
persons, appears as an affix.
At any rate, this pronoun answers, in the Maya, all the purposes of
the substantive verb, and there is no other in the language.
It is quite intelligible that in the conceptions of rude nations the
idea of an object, and especially of a person, cannot be separated
from the idea of his existence. This may be applied to the forms of
expression above mentioned. What seems a violent and ungrammatical
omission of the verb, is probably in those people an obscure
association of thoughts, a non-separation of the object from its
being. Probably it is from the same source that in some American
languages every adjective is so considered that it includes not the
idea alone, but the expression, “it is thus, and thus constituted.”
In the Yaruri language the absence of a phonetic radical meaning “to
be” is yet more apparent. Each person of the pronoun is a different
word, and they have no single letter in common. The pronoun which has
verbal power is almost identical with the independent personal
pronoun. The tense signs are prefixed to it. Thus, _que_, I am; _ri
que_, I was, &c. This _ri_, however, is merely a particle which
expresses that something is remote, and corresponds with our “from.”
_Ui-ri-di_, there was water there, literally “water far is” (from us
is). The subjunctive of this substantive verb is given as _ri_, “if I
were.” This means, however, “in,” and is a particle. The notion of
Being is added, as in the pronoun; and the ideas, “in the being,” and
“if I were,” pass into each other.
Strictly speaking, both the verbal notations here expressed are
identical with those already mentioned. Here also the verb is supplied
by the mind. The difference is that in the latter case the pronouns
alone signify being, and contain this notion in themselves, whereas in
the other cases this notion arises from the conjunction of subject and
predicate. Then also in the Maya language there is a special pronoun for
this sole purpose. As far as the forms go, they entirely resemble those
of a true verb, and if _que_ and _ten_ are regarded as mere verbs
substantive, one who did not examine their elements would take them to
be true verbs like the Sanscrit _bhū_, the Greek ειμι, and the Latin
_sum_. The example of these languages thus teaches that in the analysis
of the substantive verbs of other tongues it is not necessary that a
common phonetic radical need be employed.
In the Huasteca language the substantive verb is replaced by affixing
a tense sign to the independent pronouns; _naua itz_, I was, _tata
itz_, thou wert, etc. But the case is not the same. The pronoun
receives the verbal power by the suffix _itz_, and this appears only
in later times to have become a sign of the preterit, and in an
earlier period to have had a general sense. The mountaineers who seem
to have retained the older forms of the tongue use the _itz_, not only
in the preterit, but in the present and future. It was doubtless the
expression of some general verbal idea, as, to be, to do, etc.
II.
THE NOTION OF BEING IS INCORPORATED WITH THE VERB AS AN AUXILIARY.
Auxiliary verbs are used only for certain tenses, or form the entire
conjugation. The former arises from accidental causes having relation
only to these tenses, not to the verb in general. The latter readily
arises when a substantive verb offers an easy means of conjugation by
uniting with another verb. Sometimes the conjugation by means of an
auxiliary shows that the linguistic sense of a notion sought something
beyond the person and tense signs to express the verbal power itself,
and therefore had recourse to a general verb. This can, indeed, only
be constituted of those elements and a radical; but the want in the
language is thus supplied, once for all, and does not return with
every verb.
An excellent example of this is furnished by the Maya conjugation. In
an analysis of it we find an element that neither belongs to the root,
nor is a person, tense or mode sign, and when their varieties and
changes are compared, there is evident throughout a marked anxiety to
express the peculiar verbal power in the form of the verb.
The conjugation in the Maya language is formed by affixing the
pronouns and mode and tense signs to the stem. The pronoun is,
according to a distinction to be noted hereafter, either the
possessive pronoun or that one which, without verbal power in itself,
yet receives it when a predicate is attached to it to form a sentence.
Besides this, the suffix _cah_ accompanies all verbs in the present
and imperfect; and the suffix _ah_ accompanies all transitive verbs
through the remaining tenses, except the future. Present, 1st person,
sing., _canan-in-cah_, I guard; imperf. 1st pers. sing., _canan-in cah
cuchi_; perf., 1st pers. sing., _in canan-t-ah_. _In_ is the
possessive pronoun, _cuchi_ the sign of the imperfect, _t_ in the
perfect is a euphonic letter.
The idea of transitive verbs is here taken somewhat narrower than usual.
Only those are included which govern a word outside of themselves. All
others are considered intransitive, even those which of themselves are
active, but either have no expressed object (as, I love, I hate, etc.),
or the word which they govern is in the verb itself, as in the Greek
οικοδομεο, οικουρεω. As these can govern a second accusative, the object
incorporated in the verb is included in the idea they express.
The tenses of the intransitive verbs, except the present and
imperfect, while they drop _ah_ and the possessive pronoun, are formed
with that pronoun which forms sentences with a predicate.
There are cases where not only the present omits _cah_, but where the
stem, if it ends in _ah_ as is often the case, drops it, and
substitutes _ic_. The signification then alters, and indicates an
habitual action or quality. As _ic_ is the sign of the gerund, this
change appears to be the transformation of the verb into a verbal, and
to effect this, it must be united to that pronoun which serves as the
substantive verb; _ten yacunic_, I love, properly, I am loving
(habitually).
What _cah_ and _ah_ mean by themselves, we are not informed. Where
_cah_ is attached to the stem of some verbs it signifies intensity.
_Ah_ is as a prefix the sign of the male sex, of the inhabitant of a
place, and of names derived from active verbs. Hence it seems to have
meant at first person, man, and later to have become a pronoun, and
finally an affix. It is noteworthy that the same difference exists
between _ah_ and _cah_, as between _en_ and _ten_. The _c_ may
therefore be a radical sound. In the conjugation, _cah_ is treated
wholly as a verb. For in this the possessive pronoun is always
prefixed; and as in the present and imperfect it is placed after the
stem of the verb and before _cah_, it is evident from the difference
between the two forms _canan-in-cah_ and _in-canan-t-ah_, that in the
former _cah_, and in the latter _canan_, are regarded as the verbs.
_Canan-in-cah_ is precisely as the English “I do guard.”
_Cah_ is consequently a true auxiliary verb; _ten_, when it appears in
conjunction with _en_ must have the notion of Being understood: _ah_
appears to be of similar nature, but as it appears only in the
conjugation of transitive verbs, it is a verbal sign, and thus
receives its verbal power. That _cah_ and _ah_ do really possess this
powever[TN-8] is evident from the fact that they are never used
whenever either of the pronouns which are always associated with the
notion of Being is present.
Except in the future of transitive verbs, there is no instance in the
conjugation where the stem of the verb is not accompanied by one of
these four syllables, all of which indicate Being, and all of which
have the force of auxiliary verbs.
The future of transitive verbs not only does not take any of these
syllables, but even rejects _ah_ when it is the terminal syllable of
the stem. In this case no other termination replaces it. On the
contrary, all other verbs receive a new suffix in their future,
varying as they are of one or many syllables. The nature of these
suffixes has not been explained.
The definite results of this analysis are as follows:
1. The Maya language possesses in its conjugation, besides the
inflection syllables of the persons and tenses, another element,
which, except in the simple future of transitive verbs, distinctly
carries with it the notion of Being; in the future of most verbs there
is such an element, but of unknown origin, and it only fails in the
future of one class of verbs.
2. This language displays an effort to express, besides the other
purposes of the verb, particularly its synthetic power, which is all
the more apparent as it uses different means in different cases, but
all designed to accomplish the same purpose.
The Yaruri language constructs the whole of its conjugation in a yet
simpler manner by means of an auxiliary verb.
The union of the pronoun and the tense sign which, as we have already
seen, forms the substantive verb, affixed to the stem, completes the
inflections of the one and only conjugation of attributive verbs,
except that the independent pronouns are prefixed. Neither the stem
nor the auxiliary words suffer any changes, except the insertion of an
_n_ in one person. The union remains, however, a loose one, and when
person and tense are manifest by the connection, the auxiliary verb is
omitted. This happens in certain verbs ending in _pa_. These, contrary
to the usual rule, change in the perfect this termination to _pea_, by
which the tense is made apparent, and as the person is evident from
the prefixed personal pronoun, the auxiliary can be dropped without
danger of obscurity.
The formation of certain tenses by means of auxiliaries is also
frequent in American languages.
An optative of this nature in the Lule language has already been
mentioned.
In the Mixteca tongue the imperfect is thus formed from the present,
which carries with it the personal sign, and the perfect without its
personal sign, a proceeding which, however rude and awkward it may be,
shows a just appreciation of the peculiarity of this past tense, which
expresses an action as going on, and therefore present in past time.
The expression of continuous action is placed first, “I sin,” then
this is more precisely defined by the mark of past time, “this was
so;” _Yo-dzatevain-di-ni-cuvui_. _Yo_ is the sign of the present, _ni_
of the preterit, _di_ is the pronoun; the other two words, _to sin_
and _to be_: “I was sinning.”
The sign of the present, _yo_, is probably an abbreviation of the verb
_yodzo_, I stand upon or over something, and so there is a second
auxiliary in the sentence. This may often be a means of discovering
the origin of tense signs, as, especially in American tongues, tenses
are often formed by the union of verbs, as also occurs in Sanscrit and
Greek.
The Othomi distinguishes certain past tenses, which, however, are
separated by other characteristics, by a prefixed _xa_, which is
called the third person singular of a substantive verb. As these
tenses are precisely those in which the action must be completed, the
perfect, pluperfect and future perfect, not, however, the imperfect
and past aorist, such a connection is very suitable. Of this verb we
have only _xa_, and there is another substantive verb _gui_, which
itself takes _oca_ in its conjugation.
The Totonaca language unites the perfect, in the person spoken of,
with the third person singular of the future of the substantive verb,
to form a future perfect. This is no completed form, but only an
awkward sequence of two verbs; _yc-paxquilh-na-huan_, literally, “I
have loved, it will be,”=“I shall have loved.”
In similar manner the substantive verb is used to form a tense of the
subjunctive.
The sign of both the perfects in this tongue is the syllable _nit_,
and _niy_ means “to die.” It is not improbable that this affix is
derived from this verb. Death and destruction are suitable ideas to
express the past, and some languages employ negative particles as
signs of the preterit. In the Tamanaca this is not exactly the case,
but the negative particle _puni_ added to a word which signifies an
animate thing, intimates that it has died; _papa puni_, the deceased
father, literally, “father not.” In the Omagua tongue the same word
signifies old, dead, and not present.
In the Maipure and Carib tongues the negative particles _ma_ and _spa_
are also the signs of the preterit. Bopp’s suggestion that the Sanscrit
augment was originally _a_ privative finds support in this analogy. Yet
I would not speak conclusively on this point, as probably that, the
Greek augment ε, and the Mexican _o_, are only lengthened sounds,
intended to represent concretely the length of the past time. At any
rate one must regard the negation as an actual destruction, a “been, and
no longer being,” not as simply a negation of the present.
III.
THE NOTION OF BEING IS PRESENT IN THE VERBAL FORM ONLY IN IDEA.
In this case the verb consists only of the stem, and the person,
tense, and mode signs. The former are originally pronouns, the latter
particles. Before they are worn down by use to mere affixes, the three
following cases may arise:
1. That all three of these elements are equally separable and loosely
connected.
2. That one of the two, the person or the tense and mode signs,
obtains a closer connection with the stem, and becomes formal, while
the other remains loosely attached.
3. That both these are incorporated with the stem, and the whole
approaches a true grammatical form, although it does not fully
represent it.
_Case 1st._
The only language I can instance here is that of the Omaguas, as I
know no other with such a decided absence of all true grammatical
forms in the verb. The independent pronouns, the stem words of the
verbs, and the particles of tense and mode are merely placed together
without any change, without internal connection, and apparently
without fixed order; _usu_, to go; 1st pers. sing. pres. _ta usu_; 2d
pers. sing. perf. _avi ene usu_ (_ene_ is the pronoun, _avi_ the sign
of the perfect). Subjunctive, 1st pers. sing. pres. _ta usu mia_; 2d
pers. sing. perf. _avi epe usu mia_.
Sometimes, when a misunderstanding is not feared, the verbal stem is
employed without these qualifying particles, and cannot then be
distinguished from a noun. _Paolo amai amano_. The last word means “to
die,” but grammatically the sentence can as well be rendered, “Paul
only die” (_i. e._ has died), as “Paul only dead.”
It is true that the suffix _ta_ changes nouns to verbs: _zhiru_,
clothes, _zhiru-ta_, to clothe; but it also changes verbs to nouns,
_yasai_, to cover, _yasai-ta_, a cover. This may be explained by the
theory that this suffix conveys the idea _to make_, which is taken
sometimes actively, sometimes passively.
According to the above, the Omagua conjugation falls in the class
where an attributive is united to a pronoun and the verb is omitted;
only that here definite tense syllables appear, and this brings the
construction nearer to the idea of a conjugation.
_Case 2d._
1. The Maipure, Abipone, Mbaya and Mocobi languages place only the
personal sign in intimate connection with the verb, and allow the tense
and mode signs to be loosely attached. They have therefore but one type
of personal forms to be applied in every tense and mode by means of the
particles or the affixes formed from them. This type, taken alone,
usually forms the present; but, accurately speaking, this name cannot be
assigned it; because the signs of the other tenses are also dropped when
this can be done without obscurity. _Ya-chaguani-me-yaladi._ Here the
first word is in the indefinite form, though it is not the present but
the perfect. The _me_ is really the preposition “in;” but usage has
adopted it for the subjunctive sign, and so the Spanish grammarians call
it; or rather, the verb is considered to be introduced by a conjunction,
“if,” “as,” so that it is usually not in the present but a past tense.
If this is the case with the last verb, the first one must have the same
tense, and so the whole phrase, without any tense sign, means, “I had
helped him when I said it.”
One would scarcely expect to find anything like this in cultivated
languages. Yet it does occur in both Sanscrit and Greek. The now
meaningless particle _sma_ in Sanscrit when it follows the present
changes it into a past, and in Greek αν alters the indicative into a
subjunctive.
To form this general type, the Maipure makes use of the unchanged
possessive pronoun, and treats nouns and verbs in the same manner. The
noun must always be united to a possessive pronoun, a trait common to
all the Orinoco tongues and many other American languages. In the 3d
person sing., however, neither the verb nor the noun has such a
pronoun, but it is to be understood; _nuani_, my son; _ani_, alone,
not son, but “his son.” The 3d pers. sing. of the verb is often the
mere stem, without a personal sign, but that this peculiarity should
also extend to the noun I have met only in this tongue. It is evident
that a pronoun is considered as essential to a noun as to a verb, and
although a similar usage is found in many tongues, yet it appears in
none so binding. There are, indeed, some nouns which are free from the
necessity of thinking them in connection with a person, but these have
the suffix _ti_, which is dropped when the possessive pronoun is
added; _java ti_, a hatchet, _nu java_, my hatchet. From this it is
evident that _ti_ does not belong to the stem, and is incompatible
with the use of a possessive, hence it is the sign of the substantive,
in its independent condition. The same occurs in Mexican, and the
chief termination of substantives, _tli_, is almost identical in sound
with that in the Maipure.
In this respect the verbal, conjugated with the personal signs,
differs nothing from the noun united to its possessive pronouns.
Grammatically, the form first becomes a verbal one by the added
particles of tense and mode. The signification of these can generally
be clearly ascertained, and thus are united closely to the stem.
The particles which the language of the Abipones uses to form the
general verbal type are quite different from the possessives. The
tense and mode particles have elsewhere in the tongue independent
meanings. Thus _kan_, the sign of the perfect, means a thing which has
been, time that has past.
In the language of the Mocobis the personal signs consist merely in
letters, prefixed and suffixed, and have no apparent relationship to
the pronouns. By affixing these letters, phonetic changes take place
so that the stem is combined with them into one form.
Among the tense signs, a prefixed _l_ indicates a past time, a
suffixed _o_, the future; but the others are independent particles,
loosely attached to the stem.
I have already shown how the Mbaya language conjugates adjectives with
the independent pronoun, and participles with the possessive pronoun.
The signs used in the conjugation proper of the attributive verb, do
not appear elsewhere in the tongue, and must have descended from an
older period of its existence.
In the tense and mode signs it is easily perceived how descriptive
phrases pass into true forms. For the imperfect and pluperfect the
speaker can choose among a number of particles, all of which indicate
past time. The modes have definite signs, but these are merely
appended, and some have separate significations. The future and
perfect have not merely fixed particles, but these are worn down to
one letter, so that the stem is actually incorporated with them.
2. In the languages heretofore considered the personal signs added to
the word make up the conjugation, and the other signs are attached
loosely and externally. The reverse of this, though not perfectly so,
appears in the Lule language. The tense and mode signs, often of but
one letter, are immediately and firmly attached to the stem, and the
pronouns are affixed to this to complete the conjugation. These
pronouns are, however, the ordinary possessives, so that noun and verb
become in a measure identical; thus, _camc_ means both “I eat” and “my
food;” _cumuee_, “I marry” and “my wife;” only in a few examples are
the verbal pronouns distinct from the possessives.
In this case, therefore, the personal signs are independent elements,
occurring elsewhere in the language, while the tense and mode signs
are true affixes.
The inflection-syllables form with the stem real verbal forms, and so
far the conjugation of this language belongs to the third case. But
each of the elements has its fixed position, and as soon as one has
the key to the combination, he can recognize and separate them at
once.
Reasons which it would require too much space to set forth render it
probable that all the tense signs are really auxiliary verbs or come
from them. This is evident of the optative, as has already been shown.
The present only is simple, as it has no tense sign.
Slight differences are found between the personal signs of some
tenses, so that these tenses can be distinguished by them, a trait
usually seen only in tongues so far cultivated that the grammatical
forms have undergone such changes as no longer to present simple and
uniform combinations. Equally curious is the regular omission of the
tense sign of past time in the third person plural only. Although,
except in this case and that of the present, each tense has its
definite sign, inserted between the stem and the personal sign, yet
there are, besides these, various particles expressing past time,
which can accompany the usual tense form, so that there is a double
sign of time, one in the word itself and one loosely attached to it.
The languages of the Mbayas, Abipones, Mocobis and Lules are closely
allied both in words and in some grammatical forms. It is all the more
extraordinary, therefore, to find the last-mentioned pursuing a method
in the structure of its verb which is almost totally opposed to that
in the other three tongues.
_Case 3d._
The languages of this class approach in their conjugations those of
the more cultivated tongues, in which each verbal inflection has a
fixed and independent form. Both the person, the tense and the mode
signs are united to the stem, in such a manner that none of the three
can be said to be either less or more loosely attached than the
others.
All the conjugations about to be discussed lack, however, that fixity
of form which grammatically satisfies the mind.
The elements are placed definitely and regularly one by the other, but
are not incorporated into each other, and are therefore readily
recognizable.
They are found, moreover, outside of the verb elsewhere in the
language either without any change or with slight differences of
sound; the personal signs as pronouns, the other affixes as particles.
The composition of the verb is separable, and may receive into itself
other parts of speech.
No American language is free from these drawbacks to perfection of
form in the conjugations. In some all three are found; in most the
first and last. In really grammatically developed tongues, as in the
Sanscrit, Greek, Latin and German, none of these imperfections exists.
The verb includes in itself no part of its object, the affixes
modifying the stem have lost all independent life, and the analysis of
the formal elements becomes a difficult philological task, which often
fails and only rarely can be fully proved.
I shall discriminate in regard to the conjugations about to be
considered that which is an approach toward a fixed form from the
intentional separation of the form to insert a governed word.
_1. Approach toward a Fixed Form._
In the Mixteca language, the personal sign is the unchanged possessive
pronoun. If the verb is governed by a noun in the third person, the
possessive is dropped. It is left to the speaker to choose whether he
designates the person, either by prefixing the personal pronoun or
suffixing the possessive. The tense signs are prefixed syllables, but
the perfect and future signs are altogether different from those of
the present, and materially alter the verbal stem.
The Beto language prefixes the personal signs and also the possessive
pronouns to the nouns. As the latter are not fully known, we cannot
judge of their identity with the verbal pronouns. The latter do not
seem to differ much from the personal pronouns. The tense signs are
easily recognized suffixes.
Another conjugation of the same language, by the suffixed pronoun
without tense signs, and with the verb omitted, has been mentioned
above (I, 1), as forming a substantive verb.
A second substantive verb arises from the conjugation above explained,
with the tense signs.
These two forms may also be combined, and this illustrates with what
superfluous fullness grammatical forms spring up even among rude
nations. The conjugation with the tense sign is changed by a
participial suffix into a verbal, and then the pronoun is suffixed, as
in the conjugation without the tense sign. The latter, therefore,
stands twice in the form. The pronoun used in the conjugation with
tense signs may also be prefixed to a simple adjective, and the
pronoun used in the conjugation without tense sign is suffixed to
this, and the participial ending is then added. This is treated as a
verb with the substantive verb understood. But sometimes the verb “to
be” in the form without tense signs is added, and then the whole form
contains the pronoun three times, without gaining thereby any
additional meaning.
The Carib conjugation seems to have arisen from the forms of many
dialects or epochs, and is therefore more complicated and formal, and
less easy to analyze.
The personal signs are prefixed. In the substantive verb there are two
classes, of which only one is also common to attributive verbs. The
other indicates in the verb “to be” also the connection of persons
with the infinitive and gerund, and is therefore of the nature of a
possessive. It may also be that when it is combined with other tenses,
the notion among these nations is altogether a substantial one, as we
have already seen with the subjunctive.
The stem often receives the addition _r_ or _ri_, the meaning of which
is not known.
The structure of the Tamanaca conjugation also reveals a combination
of at least two separate structures. Some tenses use as their personal
signs entire pronouns, almost identical with the personals. Other
tenses merely change the initial letter of the verb, while there is
little similarity between these affixes and the pronouns. In the
plural some of the persons insert a syllable between the verb and the
tense sign.
The tense signs are suffixed, and consist merely of terminal letters
or syllables, except two true particles, which distinguish the
continued present from the present aorist.
There are an initial _y_ and a _t_ occasionally appearing in all
persons, of which we can only say that they are not radicals.
The conjugation of this language, therefore, consists of elements not
readily analyzed.
The Huasteca language prefixes the possessive pronouns as personal
signs. It may also drop them, and use in their stead the independent
pronouns; or may combine both; or may use abbreviated personals; so
that there is a prevailing arbitrariness in this part of the verbal
form.
The tense signs are usually suffixes; but in the future they are
prefixes, which are incorporated with the personal sign placed between
them and the stem. They consist of simple sounds, of no independent
signification. But the particles of the imperative are so separable
that when this mode is preceded by an adverb, they attach themselves
to it.
The Othomi language does not make use of the possessive pronouns in
the conjugation, but suffixes abbreviated forms of the personals, or
else prefixes others of special form, but identical in many letters
and syllables with the personals. In the present condition of the
language the suffixes are used only with the substantive verb; in the
attributive verb, however, they may have been driven forward by the
governed pronouns suffixed. Every verbal inflection may also take,
besides its pronominal prefix, also the unabreviated[TN-9] personal
pronoun in front, or the abbreviated one after it.
The tense signs consist principally of single vowels, by means of
which the pronominal prefixes are attached to the stem. The imperfect
and pluperfect alone have besides this a loosely attached particle.
The past tenses possess a prefix, which we have already seen appears
to have been derived from an auxiliary verb.
In the third person of some tenses in certain verbs the stem undergoes
a change of its initial letters, which appears to transform these
inflections into verbal adjectives, an instance of the confusion of
the ideas of noun and verb common in all these languages.
The Mexican language possesses a peculiar class of verbal pronouns
which form the personal signs. This pronoun is similar to the personal
in its consonants, but has a vowel of its own. It is a prefix. The
plural is marked by the accent, or by a special termination. This
personal sign is inseparable from the verb, but the speaker may also
prefix the independent personal pronoun.
The tense signs are all without signification, being single letters or
syllables. The perfect is marked not so much by an affix, as by
changing, the termination of the verb in various ways, but chiefly by
shortening and strengthening the sound. All tense designations are
placed at the end of the word, except the augment for past time. If by
augment we mean a vowel sound prefixed to the verb in certain tenses
in addition to their usual signs, then the Mexican is the only
American language which possesses one.
The modes are designated by loosely attached particles, also by a
different structure of the tenses, and in the second person a peculiar
pronoun.
Thus the Mexican conjugation consists of true verbal forms, not of
separate parts of speech of independent significance; but the elements
of these forms are easily recognizable, and can be reached without
difficulty.
The most difficult to analyze, and hence the most nearly approaching
our conjugations, is that of the Totonaca language.
The personal signs differ from the pronouns. That of the 2d pers.
sing. is not easily recognized, and several forms of it must be
assumed. Its position as a prefix or suffix differs, and it is
variously located with reference to the other verbal signs. Still more
difficult is it to distinguish the tense signs. There are three
different systems of prefixes and suffixes in the conjugation, and the
plan on which these are combined with each other serves to distinguish
the tense. But only a few of these affixes really appear to designate
tense; of the others this may be suspected at best, and of others
again it is improbable.
Thus there are verbal affixes which cannot be considered to designate
either persons, modes or tenses.
The stem undergoes little change, but the attaching of the affixes to
it renders it impossible to apply the same scheme to all verbs, and
hence leads to a division of them into three conjugations.
Some tenses have two different forms, without any change in
signification.
_2. Divisibility of Verbal Forms to allow the insertion of governed
parts of speech._
Of the Mixteca tongue it cannot exactly be said that it divides the
essential parts of the verbal form to allow the insertion of the
governed object. As a rule, the object is merely appended, and where
it appears in the form itself, it is inserted between the stem and the
suffixed pronoun. The latter is, however, no necessary part of the
form, as it is dropped when the verb is governed by a noun, and can
always be replaced by prefixing the indefinite pronoun.
Nor is it mentioned that the Beto language includes the object in the
verb.
The Carib tongue unites the governed pronoun with the verbal form, and
in some cases the personal sign is thus displaced. But here the object
is not inserted in the middle, but is prefixed or suffixed.
Our information about the Tamanaca language discloses nothing on this
point.
In the Huasteca, the governed pronoun separates sometimes the last,
sometimes the first syllable of the inflectional form from the stem.
The Othomi merely attaches the governed words closely to the verbal
form, in this resembling the Mixteca.
The Mexican language is that which has developed this peculiarity to
the greatest degree. The governed noun is placed in the middle of the
verb; or, if this is not done, a pronoun representing it is inserted.
If there are two objects, an accusative and a dative, then two
corresponding pronouns are inserted; and if no object is named, but
the verb is of that class which is followed by an immediate or remote
object, or both, then two indefinite pronouns appear in the verb. The
Mexican verb therefore, expresses either a complete sentence, or else
a complete scheme of one, which merely requires to be filled out. It
says, in one word, “I give something to somebody,” _nititlamaca_, and
then defines what it is and to whom.
It follows necessarily that a part of the verbal form is fluctuating
according to the sense and connection of the sentence, and that the
governing pronoun stands sometimes immediately before the verb, and
sometimes is separated from it by indefinite pronouns or even nouns.
In the Totonaca language, the prefixes and suffixes make room for the
governed words between themselves and the stem.
This examination of the languages whose conjugations approach a fixed
form, shows clearly that this fixedness is seriously shaken precisely
where it is most important, through this insertion of the governed
words.
------
Now if we reflect on the structure of the various verbal forms here
analyzed, certain general conclusions are reached, which are
calculated to throw light upon the whole organism of these languages.
The leading and governing part of speech in them is the Pronoun; every
subject of discourse is connected with the idea of Personality.
Noun and Verb are not separated; they first become so through the
pronouns attached to them.
The employment of the Pronoun is two-fold, one applying to the Noun,
the second to the Verb. Both, however, convey the idea of belonging to
a person; in the noun appearing as Possession, in the verb as Energy.
But it is on this point, on whether these ideas are confused and
obscure, or whether they are defined and clear, that the grammatical
perfection of a language depends. The just discrimination of the kinds
of pronouns is therefore conclusive, and in this respect we must yield
the decided pre-eminence to the Mexican.
It follows that the speaker must constantly make up his verbs, instead
of using those already on hand; and also that the structure of the
verb must be identical throughout the language, that there must be
only one conjugation, and that the verbs, except a few irregular ones,
can possess no peculiarities.
This is different in the Greek, Latin and ancient Indian. In those
tongues many verbs must be studied separately, as they have numerous
exceptions, phonetic changes, deficiencies, etc., and in other
respects carry with them a marked individuality.
The difference between these cultivated and those rude languages is
chiefly merely one of time, and of the more or less fortunate mixture
of dialects; though it certainly also depends in a measure on the
original mental powers of the nations.
Those whose languages we have here analyzed are, in speaking,
constantly putting together elementary parts; they connect nothing
firmly, because they follow the changing requirements of the moment,
joining together only what these requirements demand, and often leave
connected through habit, that which clear thinking would necessarily
divide.
Hence no just division of words can arise, such as is demanded by
accurate and appropriate thought, which requires that each word must
have a fixed and certain content and a defined grammatical form, and
as is also demanded by the highest phonetic laws.
Nations richly endowed in mind and sense will have an instinct for
such correct divisions; the incessant moving to and fro of elementary
parts of speech will be distasteful to them; they will seek true
individuality in the words they use; therefore they will connect them
firmly, they will not accumulate too much in one, and they will only
leave that connected which is so in thought, and not merely in usage
or habit.
------------
_Notes (by the translator) on the various American Tribes and
Languages mentioned by Humboldt in the preceding Memoir._
_Abipones._--A tribe formerly residing on the broad grassy plains
known as _El Gran Chaco_, west of the Parana river and on the right
bank of the Rio Vermejo. They are a nomadic, hunting people, and are
related by language closely to the Mocobis and Tobas, more remotely to
the Mbayas. The Jesuit, Father Jose Brigniel, wrote an _Arte y
Vocabulario de la Lengua Abipona_, which has not been published.
_Achaguas._--A small tribe formerly living in Venezuela, between the
Apure and Meta rivers. They are mentioned by Piedrahita as an
intelligent people. Aristides Rojas says they are now extinct
(_Estudios Indigenas_, p. 214. Caracas, 1878).
_Beto._--Usually spelled _Betoi or Betoya_. They live on the upper
waters of the Meta river in Colombia and are related to the Yaruris.
_Caribs._--This widely extended stock occupied much of the northern
coast of South America and had planted colonies on many of the
Antilles. It is believed that they are distantly connected with the
Tupis and Guaranis.
_Guaranis._--The name of a number of affiliated tribes in Southern
Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and the Argentine Republic. The Tupis of
Brazil are a branch of the Guaranis.
_Huastecas._--A northern colony of the great Maya stock of Yucatan,
dwelling in the province of Tampico on the river Panuco. At the time
of the discovery they were an important and cultured nation.
_Lule._--One of the nations of _El Gran Chaco_, west of the Parana
river. The _Arte y Vocabulario de la Lengua Lule y Tonocote_, by
Father Antonio Machoni de Cerdeña (Madrid, 1732), was republished with
a careful ethnographic introduction by J. M. Larsen, at Buenos Ayres,
1877.
_Maipures._--Tribes of various dialects who live on both sides of the
Orinoco river where it forms the boundary between Venezuela and New
Granada, about 5° N. lat.
_Mayas._--Natives of Yucatan, and the most highly developed of any of
the American nations. Related dialects are spoken in Guatemala, in
Tabasco, and by the Huastecas.
_Mbayas._--A people of the _Gran Chaco_ in the northern part of the
Argentine Republic, and distantly related to the Abipones.
_Mexican._--Otherwise called the Nahuatl or Aztec language. Spoken in
the greatest purity in the valley of Mexico, it extended from the Gulf
of Mexico to the Pacific, and along the latter from Sonora to
Guatemala, with few interruptions.
_Mixtecas._--A tribe speaking several dialects living in the State of
Oaxaca, Mexico.
_Mocobis._--One of the four principal nations who formerly occupied
_El Gran Chaco_, west of the Parana river. By some the name is spelled
_Mbocoby_.
_Omaguas._--Once a nation of considerable extent and culture between
the Marañon and the Orinoco.
_Othomis._--A tribe resident near San Louis Potosi, Mexico, and
neighboring parts. Their proper name is said to be _Hiā-hiū_.
Their language is monosyllabic and nasal.
_Tamanacas._--These dwell on the right bank of the Upper Orinoco, and
are connected by dialect with the Carib stock on the one hand and the
Guaranay on the other.
_Totonacas._--A nation asserted by Pimentel to speak a mixed language
(Nahuatl and Maya) dwelling in the southern portion of the Province of
Vera Cruz, Mexico, and parts adjacent.
_Tupis._--The natives of the eastern area of Brazil, related to the
Guaranis of the south and perhaps to the Caribs of the north. The
_Lingoa Geral_ of Brazil is a corrupt Tupi.
_Yaruris._--Residents on the upper streams of the Meta river in New
Granada, related to the Betoi.
FOOTNOTES:
[3-*] _Die Elemente der Philosophischen Sprachwissenschaft Wilhelm von
Humboldt’s. In systematischer Entwicklung dargestellt und kritisch
erläutert_, von Dr. Max Schasler, Berlin, 1847.
[3-†] _Die Sprachwissenschaft Wilhelm von Humboldt’s und die Hegel’sche
Philosophie_, von H. Steinthal, Dr., Berlin, 1848. The same eminent
linguist treats especially of Humboldt’s teachings in _Grammatik, Logik
und Psychologie, ihre Principien und ihr Verhältniss zu einander_, pp.
123-135 (Berlin, 1855); in his well-known volume _Characteristik[TN-10]
der Hauptsächlichsten Typen des Sprachbaues_, pp. 20-70 (Berlin, 1860);
in his recent oration _Ueber Wilhelm von Humboldt_ (Berlin, 1883); and
elsewhere.
[3-‡] _Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Linguistical Studies._ By C. J. Adler,
A.M. (New York, 1866). This is the only attempt, so far as I know, to
present Humboldt’s philosophy of language to English readers. It is
meritorious, but certainly in some passages Prof. Adler failed to catch
Humboldt’s meaning.
[4-*] _Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren
Einfluss auf die geistige Entwickelung des Menschengeschlechts._ Prof.
Adler translates this “The Structural Differences of Human Speech and
their Influence on the Intellectual Development of the Human Race.” The
word _geistige_, however, includes emotional as well as intellectual
things.
[4-†] _Ueber die Verschiedenheit_, etc., Bd. vi, s. 271, note. I may
say, once for all, that my references, unless otherwise stated, are to
the edition of Humboldt’s _Gesammelte Werke_, edited by his brother,
Berlin, 1841-1852.
[5-*] _Aus Wilhelm von Humboldt’s letzien Lebensjahren. Eine Mütheilung
bisher unbekannter Briefe._ Von Theodor Distel, p. 19 (Leipzig, 1883).
[6-*] From his memoir _Ueber das vergleichende Sprachtstudium[TN-11] in
Beziehung auf die verschiedenen Epochen der Sprachentwicklung_, Bd. iii,
s. 249.
[6-†] He draws examples from the Carib, Lule, Tupi, Mbaya, Huasteca,
Nahuatl, Tamanaca, Abipone, and Mixteca; _Ueber das Entstehen der
grammatischen Formen, und ihren Einfluss auf die Ideenentwicklung_, Bd.
iii, ss. 269-306.
[6-‡] _Ueber die Buchstabenschrift und ihren Zusummenhang[TN-12] mit dem
Sprachbau_, Bd. vi, s. 526
[6-‖] This letter is printed in the memoir of Prof. E. Teza, _Intorno
agli Studi del Thavenet sulla Lingua Algonchina_, in the _Annali delle
Università toscane_, Tomo xviii (Pisa, 1880).
[6-§] Compare Prof. Adler’s Essay, above mentioned, p. 11.
[7-*] This is found expressed nowhere else so clearly as at the
beginning of § 13, where the author writes: “Der Zweck dieser
Einleitung, die Sprachen, in der Verschiedenartigkeit ihres Baues, als
die nothwendige Grundlage der Fortbildung des menschlichen Geistes
darzustellen, und den wechsel seitigen Einfluss des Einen auf das Andre
zu erörtern, hat mich genöthigt, in die Natur der Sprache überhaupt
einzugehen.” Bd. vi, s. 106.
[7-†] “Der Idee der Sprachvollendung Dasein in der Wirklichkeit zu
gewinnen.” _Ueber die Verschiedenheit_, ss. 10 and 11. The objection
which may be urged that a true philosophy of language must deal in
universals and not confine itself to mere differentiations (particulars)
is neatly met by Dr. Schasler, _Die Elemente der Philosophischen
Sprachwissenschaft_, etc., p. 21, note.
[8-*] In his remarkable essay “On the Mission of the Historian,” which
Prof. Adler justly describes as “scarcely anything more than a
preliminary to his linguistical researches,” Humboldt writes: “Die
Philosophie schreibt den Begebenheiten ein Ziel vor: dies Suchen nach
Endursachen, man mag sie auch aus dem Wesen des Menschen und der Natur
selbst ableiten wollen, stört und verfalscht alle freie Ansicht des
eigenthümlichen Wirkens der Kräfte.” _Ueber die Aufgabe des
Geschichtschreibers_, Bd. i, s. 13.
[8-†] “Das Studium der verschiedenen Sprachen des Erdbodens verfehlt
seine Bestimmung, wenn es nicht immer den Gang der geistigen Bildung im
Auge behält, und darin seinen eigentlichen Zweck sucht.” _Ueber den
Zusammenhang der Schrift mit der Sprache_, Bd. vi, s. 428.
[8-‡] “Eine Gedankenwelt an Töne geheftet.” _Ueber die Buchstabenschrift
und ihre Zusammenhang mit dem Sprachbau_, Bd. vi, s. 530.
[8-‖] This cardinal point in Humboldt’s philosophy is very clearly set
forth in his essay, “_Ueber die Aufgabe des Geschichtschreibers_,” Bd.
i, s. 23, and elsewhere.
[8-§] See _Ueber die Buchstabenschrift_, etc., Bd. vi, s. 530.
[9-*] “Les notions grammaticales resident bien plutôt dans l’esprit de
celui qui parle que dans le matériel du language.” Humboldt, _Lettre à
M. Abel-Remusat Werke_, Bd. vii, s. 396. On the realms of the three
varieties of grammar, see also Dr. M. Schasler, _Die Elemente der
Philosophischen Sprachwissenschaft_, etc., s. 35, 36, and Friedrich
Müller, _Grundriss der Sprachwissenschaft_, Band 1, ss. 8-10 (Wien,
1876). Schasler observes that a main object in philosophic grammar is an
investigation of “die genetisch-qualitativen Unterschiede der
Redetheile,” that is, of the fundamental psychological differences of
the parts of speech, as, what is the ultimate distinction between noun
and adjective, etc.?
[10-*] Steinthal does not like Humboldt’s expression “to make capable”
(fähig zu machen). He objects that the “capacity” to express thought is
already in the articulate sounds. But what Humboldt wishes to convey is
precisely that this capacity is only derived from the ceaseless,
energizing effort of the intellect. Steinthal, _Die Sprachwissenschaft
Wilhelm von Humboldt’s_, s. 91, note. The words in the original are:
“Die sich ewig wiederholende Arbeit des Geistes, den articulirten Laut
zum Ausdruck des Gedanken fähig zu machen.”
[10-†] “Nur die Stärke des Selbstbewusstseins nöthigt der körperlichen
Natur die scharfe Theilung und feste Begrenzung der Laute ab, die wir
Artikulation nennen.” _Ueber das Vergleichende Sprachstudium in
Beziehung auf die Verschiedenen Epochen der Sprachentwicklung_, Bd. iii,
s. 244.
[11-*] Ubi suprá, p. 17. Compare Humboldt’s words, “Im Ich aber ist von
selbst auch das Du gegeben.” _Ueber die Verschiedenheit_, etc., Bd. vi,
s. 115.
[11-†] _Ueber die Verschiedenheit_, etc., Bd. vi, s. 116; and compare
Dr. Schasler’s discussion of this subject (which is one of the best
parts of his book), _Die Elemente der Phil. Sprachwissenschaft_, etc.,
ss. 202-14.
[11-‡] Expressed in detail by Humboldt in his _Lettre à M. Abel-Remusat
sur la nature des formes grammaticules_, etc., Bd. vii, ss. 300-303.
[12-*] _Ueber die Verwandtschaft der Ortsadverbia mit dem Pronomen in
einigen Sprachen_, in the _Abhandlungen der hist.-phil. Classe der
Berliner Akad. der Wiss._ 1829.
[12-†] _Ueber die Verschiedenheit_, etc., Bd. vi, s. 115.
[12-‡] _Gesammelte Werke_, Bd. vii, ss. 392-6.
[13-*] His explanation of inflection is most fully given in his
Introductory Essay, _Ueber die Verschiedenheit_, etc., § 14, _Gesammelte
Werke_, s. 121, sqq. A sharp, but friendly criticism of this central
point of his linguistic philosophy may be found in Steinthal,
_Charakteristik der Hauptsächlichsten Typen des Sprachbones_,[TN-13] ss.
58-61. Humboldt certainly appears not only obscure in parts but
contradictory.
[14-*] See these teachings clearly set forth in his Essay, _Ueber das
vergleichende Sprachstudium in Beziehung auf die verschiedenen Epochen
der Sprachentwicklung, Werke_, Bd. iii, especially, s. 255 and s. 262.
[15-*] The eloquent and extraordinary passage in which these opinions
are expressed is in his _Lettre à M. Abel-Remusat, Gesammelte Werke_,
Bd. vii, ss. 336-7.
[15-†] _Gesammelte Werke_, Bd. iii, ss. 248, 257.
[16-*] This reasoning is developed in the essay, _Ueber das
Vergleichende Sprachstudium_, etc., _Gesammelte Werke_, Bd. iii, ss.
241-268; and see ibid, s. 270.
[16-†] See the essay _Ueber die Buchstabenschrift und ihren Zusammenhang
mit dem Sprachbau, Ges. Werke_, Bd. vi, ss. 551-2.
[17-*] On this subtle point, which has been by no means the least
difficult to his commentators, see Humboldt’s Introduction _Ueber die
Verschiedenheit_, etc., _Ges. Werke_, Bd. vi, ss. 45-6, 92-5, 254-5, by
a careful comparison of which passages his real intent will become
apparent.
[17-†] _Lettre à M. Abbe-Remusat,[TN-14] Ges. Werke_, Bd. vii, s. 396.
[18-*] “Nicht was in einer Sprache ausgedrückt zu werden vermag, sondern
das, wozu sie aus eigner, innerer Kraft anfeuert und begeistert,
entscheidet über ihre Vorzüge oder Mängel.” _Ueber das Entstehen der
Grammatischen Formen_, etc[TN-15], _Werke_, Bd. iii, s. 272. Compare with
this the expression in his celebrated _Einleitung_: “Die Sprache ist das
bildende Organ des Gedanken,” _Werke_, Bd. vi, s. 51. A perfected
language will “allseitig und harmonisch durch sich selbst auf den Geist
einwirken.” Ibid, s. 311.
[19-*] [TN-16]_Ueber das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen_,“ etc.,
_Werke_, Bd. iii, s. 292.
[19-†] Speaking of such “imperfect” languages, he gives the following
wise suggestion for their study: “Ihr einfaches Geheimniss, welches den
Weg anzeigt, auf welchem man sie, mit gänzlicher Vergessenheit unserer
Grammatik, immer zuerst zu enträthseln versuchen muss, ist, das in sich
Bedeutende unmittelbar an einander zu reihen.” _Ueber das Vergleichende
Sprachstudium_, etc., _Werke_, Bd. iii, s. 255; and for a practical
illustration of his method, see the essay, _Ueber das Entstehen der
grammatischen Formen_, etc., Bd. iii, s. 274.
[20-*] His teachings on this point, of which I give the barest outline,
are developed in sections 12 and 13 of his Introduction, _Ueber die
Verschiedenheit_, etc. Steinthal’s critical remarks on these sections
(in his _Charakteristik der haupt. Typen des Sprachbaues_) seem to me
unsatisfactory, and he even does not appear to grasp the chain of
Humboldt’s reasoning.
[21-*] _Lettre à M. Abel-Remusat, Werke_, Bd. vii, ss. 353-4.
[21-†] _Ueber die Verschiedenheit_, etc., Sec. 23, _Werke_, Bd. vi, s.
329.
[24-*] “Der Mexikanischen kann man am Verbum, in welchem die Zeiten
durch einzelne Endbuchstaben und zum Theil offenbar symbolisch
bezeichnet werden, Flexionen und ein gewisses Streben nach
Sanskritischer Worteinheit nicht absprechen.” _Ueber die
Verschiedenheit_, etc., _Werke_, Bd. vi, s. 176.
[25-*] “Daher ist das Einschliessen in Ein Wort mehr Sache der
Einbildungskraft, die Trennung mehr die des Verstandes.” _Ueber die
Verschiedenheit_, etc., s. 327. Compare also, s. 326 and 166. Steinthal
points out the disadvantages of the incorporative plan and puts it lower
than the isolating system of the Chinese; but fails to recognize its
many and striking advantages. See his remarks, “Ueber das Wesen und
Werth der Einverleibungsmethode,” in his _Charakteristik der haupt.
Typen des Sprachbaues_, s. 214.
[25-†] _Ueber die Verschiedenheit_, etc., in _Werke_, Bd. vi, ss. 323
sqq.
[27-*] See the essay, _Ueber den Dualis, Gesammelte Werke_, Bd. vi, ss.
562-596.
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Transcriber’s Note
The following typographical errors were maintained in this version of the
book.
Page Error
TN-1 15 unneccessary should read unnecessary
TN-2 16 grammer should read grammar
TN-3 17 tendncy should read tendency
TN-4 23 acustomed, should read accustomed
TN-5 23 fullfils should read fulfils
TN-6 29 Humboldt should read Humboldt.
TN-7 33 _mil quis amaiciton_, should have numbers over the words
in to match numbers on the next line
TN-8 39 powever should read power
TN-9 46 unabreviated should read unabbreviated
TN-10 fn 3-† Characteristik should read Charakteristik
TN-11 fn 6-* Sprachtstudium should read Sprachstudium
TN-12 fn 6-‡ Zusummenhang should read Zusammenhang
TN-13 fn 13-* _Sprachbones_, should read Sprachbaues
TN-14 fn 17-† Abbe-Remusat, should read Abel-Remusat
TN-15 fn 18-* etc should read etc.
TN-16 fn 19-* _Ueber_ should read “_Ueber_
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