The Trial of Jesus from a Lawyer's Standpoint, Vol. I (of II)

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Title: The Trial of Jesus from a Lawyer's Standpoint, Vol. I (of II) - The Hebrew Trial
Author: Chandler, Walter M.
Language: English
As this book started as an ASCII text book there are no pictures available.

*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Trial of Jesus from a Lawyer's Standpoint, Vol. I (of II) - The Hebrew Trial" ***

Transcriber's notes

Variable spelling has been retained. Minor punctuation inconsistencies
have been silently corrected. A list of other corrections can be found
at the end of the book. Footnotes were sequentially numbered and placed
at the end of the text. In the original, the "The Gospel Narratives" are
printed side by side across the page spread. In this e-book version they
are presented individually. The Index was copied from Volume II.

Mark up: _italics_

THE TRIAL OF JESUS

[Illustration: JESUS BOUND (MUNKACSY)]

THE TRIAL OF JESUS

FROM A LAWYER'S STANDPOINT

WALTER M. CHANDLER

OF THE NEW YORK BAR

VOLUME I

THE HEBREW TRIAL

THE EMPIRE PUBLISHING CO.

60 WALL STREET, NEW YORK CITY

1908

_All rights reserved_

TO MY MOTHER WITH SENTIMENTS OF LOVE AND VENERATION WHICH NO WORDS
CAN EXPRESS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FACING PAGE

JESUS BOUND (Munkacsy) _Frontispiece_

ST. MATTHEW (Rembrandt) 2

ST. MARK AND ST. PAUL (Dürer) 28

ST. JOHN AND ST. PETER (Dürer) 52

MOSES AND THE LAW (Michael Angelo) 72

THE LAST SUPPER (da Vinci) 174

JESUS IN GETHSEMANE (Hoffman) 240

THE BETRAYING KISS (Scheffer) 282

THE ARREST OF JESUS (Hoffman) 284

CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE

PAGE

PREFACE TO VOLUME ONE xiii

THE GOSPEL NARRATIVES xxx

PART I

_THE RECORD OF FACT_

AUTHENTICITY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT NARRATIVES, JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED 3

CREDIBILITY OF THE GOSPEL WRITERS, LEGALLY TESTED 9

PART II

_HEBREW CRIMINAL LAW_

CHAPTER

I. THE MOSAIC CODE AND THE TALMUD 73

II. HEBREW CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 91

III. HEBREW COURTS AND JUDGES 102

IV. HEBREW WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE 127

V. MODE OF TRIAL AND EXECUTION IN HEBREW CAPITAL CASES 153

PART III

_THE BRIEF_

WHETHER OR NOT THE GREAT SANHEDRIN EXISTED AT THE TIME OF CHRIST 175

CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION OF THE GREAT SANHEDRIN, WITH REFERENCE
TO ROMAN AUTHORITY, TO TRY CAPITAL OFFENSES AT THE DATE OF THE
CRUCIFIXION 181

CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION OF THE GREAT SANHEDRIN, UNDER HEBREW LAW,
TO TRY THE PARTICULAR OFFENSE WITH WHICH JESUS WAS CHARGED 183

WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A REGULAR LEGAL TRIAL OF JESUS BEFORE THE
GREAT SANHEDRIN 183

WHETHER OR NOT THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED IN THE
MISHNA WERE IN EXISTENCE AND ACTIVELY IN FORCE IN JUDEA AT THE
TIME OF THE TRIAL OF JESUS 186

THE NATURE OF THE CHARGE BROUGHT AGAINST JESUS AT THE TRIAL BEFORE
THE GREAT SANHEDRIN; AND HIS GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITH REFERENCE
THERETO 187

POINT I: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF THE ARREST OF JESUS IN
GETHSEMANE 219

POINT II: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF THE PRIVATE EXAMINATION OF
JESUS BY ANNAS (OR CAIAPHAS) BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE REGULAR
TRIAL 238

POINT III: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF THE INDICTMENT AGAINST
JESUS 248

POINT IV: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF TRYING JESUS AT NIGHT 255

POINT V: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF TRYING JESUS BEFORE THE MORNING
SACRIFICE HAD BEEN OFFERED 260

POINT VI: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF TRYING JESUS ON THE EVE OF A
JEWISH SABBATH AND AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
PASSOVER FEAST 263

POINT VII: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF CONCLUDING THE TRIAL OF JESUS
WITHIN ONE DAY 267

POINT VIII: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF CONVICTING JESUS UPON HIS
UNCORROBORATED CONFESSION 271

POINT IX: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF A UNANIMOUS VERDICT AGAINST
JESUS 279

POINT X: CONCERNING CERTAIN IRREGULARITIES OF FORM IN TRYING AND
CONDEMNING JESUS 287

POINT XI: CONCERNING THE LEGAL DISQUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE
GREAT SANHEDRIN, TO TRY JESUS 295

POINT XII: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF THE REFUSAL OF THE GREAT
SANHEDRIN TO CONSIDER THE MERITS OF THE DEFENSE OF JESUS 309

PREFACE TO VOLUME ONE

Many remarkable trials have characterized the judicial history of
mankind.

The trial of Socrates before the dicastery of Athens, charged with
corrupting Athenian youth, with blaspheming the Olympic gods, and with
seeking to destroy the constitution of the Attic Republic, is still a
sublime and thrilling chapter in the history of a wonderful people,
among the ruins and wrecks of whose genius the modern world still
wanders to contemplate, admire, and study the pride of every master and
the perfection of every model.

The trial and execution of Charles the First of England sealed with
royal blood a new covenant of British freedom, and erected upon the
highway of national progress an enduring landmark to civil liberty. The
entire civilized world stood aghast at the solemn and awful spectacle of
the deliberate beheading of a king. And yet, to-day, the sober, serious
judgment of mankind stamps the act with approval, and deems it a
legitimate and righteous step in the heroic march of a brave and
splendid people toward a complete realization of the inalienable rights
of man. The philosopher of history declares these condemnatory and
executory proceedings against a Stuart king worthy of all the epoch
making movements that have glorified the centuries of English
constitutional growth, and have given to mankind the imperishable
parchments of Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, the Petition of Rights,
and Habeas Corpus.

The trial of Warren Hastings in the hall of William Rufus has been
immortalized by Lord Macaulay. This trial is a virtual reproduction in
English history of the ancient Roman trial of Verres. England is
substituted for Rome; Sicily becomes India; Hastings takes the place of
Verres; and Burke is the orator instead of Cicero. The indictments are
identical: Maladministration in the government of a province. In the
impeachment of Hastings, England served notice upon her colonial
governors and made proclamation to the world that English conquest was
not intended to despoil and enslave, but was designed to carry to the
inhabitants of distant lands her language, her literature, and her laws.
This message to humanity was framed but not inspired by England. It was
prompted by the success of the American Revolution, in which Washington
and his Continentals had established the immortal principle, that the
consent of the governed is the true source of all just powers of
government.

The trial of Aaron Burr, omitting Arnold's treason, is the blackest
chapter in the annals of our republic. Burr was the most extraordinary
man of the first half century of American national history. His powerful
and fascinating personality conquered men and enslaved women. He was
the finest scholar of the Revolution excepting Thomas Jefferson. He was
the greatest orator of the Revolution excepting Patrick Henry. His
farewell address to the United States Senate caused his inveterate
enemies to weep. His arraignment at the bar of public justice on the
charge of high treason--that he had sought to destroy the Country of
Washington, the Republic of Jefferson, which is to-day the Union of
Lincoln--was the sad and melancholy close of a long and lofty life.

The trial of Alfred Dreyfus is still fresh in the minds and memories of
men. Troubled political seas still surge and roll in France because of
the hatred, prejudice, and passion that envelope the mysterious
_bordereau_. The French Republic is still rent by two contending
factions: Dreyfus and anti-Dreyfus. His friends still say that Dreyfus
was a Prometheus who was chained to an ocean-girt rock while the vulture
of exile preyed upon his heart. His enemies still assert that he was a
Judas who betrayed not God or Christ, but France and the Fatherland. His
banishment to the Island of the Devil; his wife's deathless devotion;
the implacable hatred of his enemies; the undying loyalty of friends;
and his own sufferings and woes are the warp and woof of the most
splendid and pathetic epoch of a century.

Other trials--of Mary Stuart, the beautiful and brilliant Scottish
queen; of Robert Emmet, the grand and gifted Irish patriot
martyr--thrilled the world in their day.

But these trials, one and all, were tame and commonplace, compared with
the trial and crucifixion of the Galilean peasant, Jesus of Nazareth.
These were earthly trials, on earthly issues, before earthly courts. The
trial of the Nazarene was before the high tribunals of both Heaven and
earth; before the Great Sanhedrin, whose judges were the master-spirits
of a divinely commissioned race; before the court of the Roman Empire
that controlled the legal and political rights of men throughout the
known world, from Scotland to Judea and from Dacia to Abyssinia.

The trial of Jesus was twofold: Hebrew and Roman; or Ecclesiastical and
Civil. The Hebrew trial took place before the Great Sanhedrin,
consisting of seventy-one members. The Roman trial was held before
Pontius Pilate, Roman governor of Judea, and afterwards before Herod,
Tetrarch of Galilee. These trials all made one, were links in a chain,
and took place within a space of time variously estimated from ten to
twenty hours.

The general order of events may be thus briefly described:

(1) About eleven o'clock on the evening of April 6th, A.D. 30, Jesus and
eleven of the Apostles left the scene of the Last Supper, which had been
celebrated (probably in the home of Mark) on the outskirts of Jerusalem,
to go to the Garden of Gethsemane.

(2) Jesus was arrested about midnight in Gethsemane by a band of Temple
officers and Roman soldiers guided by Judas.

(3) He was first taken to Annas, and was afterwards sent by Annas to
Caiaphas. A private preliminary examination of Jesus was then had before
one of these church dignitaries. St. John describes this examination,
but does not tell us clearly whether it was Annas or Caiaphas who
conducted it.

(4) After His preliminary examination, Jesus was arraigned about two
o'clock in the morning before the Sanhedrin, which had convened in the
palace of Caiaphas, and was formally tried and condemned to death on the
charge of blasphemy against Jehovah.

(5) After a temporary adjournment of the first session, the Sanhedrin
reassembled at the break of day to retry Jesus, and to determine how He
should be brought before Pilate.

(6) In the early morning of April 7th, Jesus was led before Pontius
Pilate, who was then stopping in the palace of Herod on the hill of
Zion, his customary residence when he came up from Cæsarea to Jerusalem
to attend the Jewish national festivals. A brief trial of Jesus by
Pilate, on the charge of high treason against Cæsar, was then had in
front of and within the palace of Herod. The result was an acquittal of
the prisoner by the Roman procurator, who expressed his verdict in these
words: "I find in him no fault at all."

(7) Instead of releasing Jesus after having found Him not guilty,
Pilate, being intimidated by the rabble, sent the prisoner away to
Herod, Tetrarch of Galilee, who was then in attendance upon the Passover
Feast, and was at that moment residing in the ancient palace of the
Asmoneans in the immediate neighborhood of the residence of Pilate. A
brief, informal hearing was had before Herod, who, having mocked and
brutalized the prisoner, sent Him back to the Roman governor.

(8) After the return of Jesus from the Court of Herod, Pilate assembled
the priests and elders, announced to them that Herod had found no fault
with the prisoner in their midst, reminded them that he himself had
acquitted Him, and offered to scourge and then release Him. This
compromise and subterfuge were scornfully rejected by the Jews who had
demanded the crucifixion of Jesus. Pilate, after much vacillation,
finally yielded to the demands of the mob and ordered the prisoner to be
crucified.

From this brief outline of the proceedings against Jesus, the reader
will readily perceive that there were two distinct trials: a Hebrew and
a Roman. He will notice further that each trial was marked by three
distinct features or appearances. The Hebrew trial was characterized by:

(1) The appearance before Annas.

(2) The trial at the night session of the Sanhedrin.

(3) The examination at the morning sitting of the same court.

The Roman trial was marked by:

(1) The appearance of Jesus before Pilate.

(2) His arraignment before Herod.

(3) His reappearance before Pilate.

The first volume of this work has been devoted to the Hebrew trial of
Jesus, and a distinctively Hebrew impress has been given to all its
pages. The second volume has been devoted to the Roman trial, and a
distinctively Roman impress has been given it. Each exhibits a distinct
view of the subject. Taken together, they comprehend the most important
and famous judicial transaction in history.

It is not the purpose of the author of these volumes to usurp the
functions or the privileges of the ecclesiastic. To priests and
preachers have been left the discussion and solution of theological
problems: the divinity of Jesus, the immortality of the soul and kindred
religious dogmas. "The Trial of Jesus from a _Lawyer's_ Standpoint" is
the expanded title of this work. A strict adherence to a secular
discussion of the theme proclaimed has been studiously observed in the
preparation of these pages. The legal rights of the _man_ Jesus at the
bar of _human_ justice under Jewish and Roman laws have marked the
limitations of the argument. Any digression from this plan has been
temporary and necessary.

A thorough understanding of any case, judicially considered, involves a
complete analysis of the cardinal legal elements of the case: the
element called Fact and the element called Law. Whether in ancient or
modern times, in a Jewish or Gentile court, of civil or criminal
jurisdiction, these elements have always entered into the legal
conception of a case. Whether the advocate is preparing a pleading at
his desk, is summing up before the jury, or addressing himself to the
court, these elements are working forever in his brain. He is constantly
asking himself these questions: What are the facts of this case? What
is the law applicable to the facts? Do the facts and law meet and
harmonize judicially? Do they blend in legal unison according to the
latest decision of the court of last resort? If so, a case is made;
otherwise, not.

Now many sermons might be differently preached; many books might be
differently written. But an intelligent discussion of the trial and
crucifixion of Jesus from a lawyer's point of view must be had upon the
basis of an analytical review of the agreement or nonagreement of law
and fact in the case sought to be made against the Christ.

The first question that naturally suggests itself to the inquiring mind,
in investigating this theme, is this: Upon what facts was the complaint
against Jesus based? A second question then logically follows: What were
the rules and regulations of Hebrew and Roman law directly applicable to
those facts in the trials of Jesus before the Sanhedrin and before
Pilate? It is respectfully submitted that no clear and comprehensive
treatment of the subject can be had without proper answers to these
questions.

Having learned the facts of any case, and having determined what rules
of law are applicable to them in regard to the controversy in hand, a
third step in the proceedings, in all matters of review on appeal, is
this: To analyze the record from the viewpoint of the juristic agreement
or nonagreement of law and fact; and to determine by a process of
judicial dissection and reformation the presence or absence of essential
legal elements in the proceedings, with a view to affirmance in case of
absence, or reversal of the verdict in the event of the discovery of the
presence of error.

In obedience to this natural intellectual tendency and to the usual mode
of legal procedure in reviewing and revising matters on appeal, the
contents of Volume I have been divided into three parts, corresponding,
in a general way, to the successive steps heretofore mentioned.

In Part I, the Record of Fact in the trial of Jesus has been
authenticated; not, indeed, according to the strict provisions of modern
statutes which regulate the authentication of legal documents, but in
the popular sense of the word "authentication." Nevertheless, the
authenticity of the Gospel narratives, which form the record of fact in
the trial of Jesus, and the credibility of the Evangelists who wrote and
published these narratives, have been subjected to the rigorous tests of
rules of evidence laid down by Greenleaf and by Starkie. Such an
authentication has been deemed necessary in a treatise of this kind.

Two main methods may be employed in investigating and proving the
alleged occurrences of Sacred History: (1) The method which is based
upon the evidence of spiritual consciousness and experience, derived
from religious conversion and from communion with God; (2) the method
that rests upon the application of historic facts and legal rules to the
testimony of those who have asserted the existence of such occurrences.

It has been contended by many that the first of these methods is the
supreme test, and the only proper one, in solving religious problems and
in reaching full and final assurance of the existence of spiritual
truths. It is confidently asserted by such persons that the true
Christian who has accepted Jesus as his personal Redeemer and has
thereby found peace with God, needs no assurance from Matthew that the
Christ was the Heaven-begotten and Virgin-born. Such a Christian, it is
said, has positive proof from within that Jesus was divine. It is
further contended that all forms of religious truth are susceptible of
the same kind of proof. It is argued that from despairing hope, born of
the longing and the tears of a mother who, grief-stricken and
broken-hearted, kneels in prayer beside the coffin of her firstborn,
springs stronger evidence of a future life and of an everlasting reunion
with loved ones, than comes from all the assurances of immortality
handed down by saints and sages. The advocates of this theory contend
that the fact of the Resurrection of Jesus should be proved mainly by
the method of spiritual consciousness and experience, and only
incidentally by the historical testimony of the sacred writers. They
boldly maintain that the Resurrection was a spiritual fact born of a
spiritual truth; and that within the soul of each true believer is the
image of the risen Jesus, reflected from Heaven in as perfect form as
that seen by Paul while journeying to Damascus.

It would be decidedly ungenerous and unjust to deny the force of the
contention that spiritual consciousness and religious experience are
convincing forms of proof. To do so would be to offer gratuitous insult
to the intelligence and sincerity of millions of consecrated men and
women who have repeatedly proclaimed and are still proclaiming that the
Spirit of God and Christ within them attests the reality of religion.

But on the other hand the doctrine of religions consciousness, as a mode
of proof, certainly has its limitations. Spiritual proofs are obviously
the very best means of establishing purely spiritual truths. But not
many truths of religion are purely spiritual. The most of them are
encased within historic facts which may themselves be separately
considered as historic truths. In a sense, all spiritual truth is born
of historic truth; that is, historic truths, in the order of our
acquisition of a knowledge of them, antedate and create spiritual
truths. The religious consciousness of the Resurrection of Jesus would
never have been born in our hearts if we had never read the historical
records of the physical Resurrection. Nor could we have ever had a
religious experience of the divinity of Jesus if we had never read the
historical accounts of His miracles, of His Virgin birth, His
fulfillment of prophecy, and His Resurrection from the dead, unless
Jesus had personally communicated to us evidences of His divinity. These
separate and historic facts, of which spiritual truths are born, cannot
be proved by religious consciousness and experience.

The distinctions herein suggested are very aptly and beautifully
expressed by Professor Inge in his Bampton Lectures on Christian
Mysticism, in which he says: "The inner light can only testify to
spiritual truths. It always speaks in the present tense; it cannot
guarantee any historical event, past or future. It cannot guarantee
either the Gospel history or a future judgment. It can tell us that
Christ is risen, and He is alive for evermore, but not that He rose
again the third day."

From the foregoing, then, it is clear that in dealing with the
historical facts and circumstances of the trial and crucifixion of
Jesus, we cannot remotely employ the method of proof which is based upon
religious consciousness and experience, since these events are matters
of the past and not of the present. We have been compelled, therefore,
to resort to the legal and historical method of proof; since we could
not assume the correctness of the record, as such an assumption would
have been lacking in legal requirement and judicial fitness.

It has also been thought not to be within the scope of this treatise, or
consistent with the purpose of the author of these volumes, to enter
into a discussion of the question of inspiration in the matter of the
origin of the New Testament Gospels, as the record of fact in the trial
of Jesus. As secular historians, rather than as inspired writers, must
the Evangelists be regarded in this connection; since the title of this
work suggests and demands a strictly legal treatment of the theme
proclaimed. The author would respectfully suggest, however, that the day
is past for complete reliance upon the theory of inspiration and a total
rejection of all analysis and investigation. That the Scriptures are
sacred and inspired, and neither need nor permit questions involving
doubt and speculation as to origin and authenticity will no longer meet
the challenge or dissipate the fears of the intellectual leaders of the
human race. The Christianity of the future must be a religion of reason
as well as of faith, else it cannot and will not endure the shocks of
time, or survive the onward march of the soul. If the teachings of the
Nazarene are a faithful portrayal and a truthful expression of all the
verities of Heaven and earth, then Christianity has nothing to fear from
the discoveries of Science, from Roman catacombs, Arabian hieroglyphics,
the sands of Egypt, or the ruins of Nineveh and Babylon. Science is the
High Priestess of Nature and Nature's oracles, and no single revelation
of Science can disprove or contradict the simplest truth of Nature's
God.

If, on the other hand, Christianity be fundamentally and essentially
false, ignorance and bigotry will not preserve and perpetuate it; all
the prayers of the faithful, all the martyrdom of the centuries, will
not suffice to save it from death and annihilation.

But the Christian need have no fear of the results of scientific
investigation or historic revelation. Assyriology, archæology, and
paleontology, interpreted and applied by the finest scholarship and the
most superb intellects of earth, have spent all their stupendous and
concentrated forces in the direction of the discovery of natural and
historic facts that would confirm or destroy the Christian theory of
things. And yet not one natural or historic fact has been discovered
that seriously disturbs the testimony of the Evangelists or impairs the
evidence of Christianity. A few unlettered fisherman, casting nets for a
livelihood in the waters of Gennesaret, framed a message to humanity
based upon the life and martyrdom of a Galilean peasant, their spiritual
Lord and Master, and proclaimed it to the world; and all the succeeding
centuries of scientific research and skeptical criticism have not shaken
mankind's confidence in its truthfulness and its potency. If eighteen
hundred years of scientific investigation have resulted only in proof
and vindication of the historic asseverations of the Sacred Scriptures,
and further investigation gives promise of still further proof and
vindication, tending to remove all doubts and destroy all fears, nothing
but rank stupidity and crass ignorance will place obstacles in the way
of ultimate analysis and complete revelation.

In Part II of this volume, following the plan heretofore suggested, the
element of Law has been considered. Hebrew criminal jurisprudence, based
upon the Mosaic Code and upon the Talmud, has been outlined and
discussed. A more exhaustive treatment has been given than the subject
would seem to justify, but the writer is convinced that the Criminal
Code of the Jews must be of surpassing interest to the general reader,
regardless of whether certain peculiar rules therein contained have
reference to the trial of Jesus or not. The bulk of this Code has been
inserted in this work because it is felt that a comprehensive view of
any system enables the student of a particular trial under that system
to grasp more fully and to appreciate more keenly the merits of the
proceedings.

In Part III the legal aspects of the trial of Jesus have been reviewed.
The elements of Law and Fact have been combined in the form of a
"Brief," in which "Points" have been made and errors have been
discussed.

During the past decade, the author of this work has delivered
occasionally, in the United States and in the Dominion of Canada, a
lecture upon the subject, "The Trial of Jesus from a Lawyer's
Standpoint." Numerous requests have been made, from time to time, for
the lecture in printed form. To supply this demand is the purpose of the
publication of these volumes. The voluminous treatment given has been in
response to the demands of those who have asked for a topical treatment
of the subject. Many auditors in his lecture audiences have asked for
special treatment, from a lawyer's standpoint, of the New Testament
Gospels. Many have requested an exhaustive handling of Hebrew criminal
law. Others have asked for the insertion in this work of the Apocryphal
Acts of Pilate. And still others have expressed a desire to have
Græco-Roman Paganism dealt with in its relationship to the trial of
Jesus. In obedience to these various demands, certain chapters have been
incorporated in the general work that may not seem to the average reader
to have any direct bearing upon the subject treated. It is felt,
however, that in every case at least a partial relevancy exists, and
that in a large majority of cases the relevancy is perfect.

The writer wishes, at this time and place, to acknowledge his
indebtedness and to express his thanks, for valuable assistance
rendered, to all those authors mentioned under the title "Bibliography"
at the end of Volume II.

WALTER M. CHANDLER.

NEW YORK CITY, July 1, 1908.

THE GOSPEL NARRATIVES

MATTHEW

xxvi. 47-68; xxvii. 1-26

And while he yet spake, lo, Judas, one of the twelve, came, and
with him a great multitude with swords and staves, from the chief
priests and elders of the people.... Then came they, and laid hands
on Jesus, and took him.... And they that had laid hold on Jesus led
him away to Caiaphas the high priest, where the scribes and the
elders were assembled.... Now the chief priests, and elders, and
all the council, sought false witness against Jesus, to put him to
death; But found none: yea, though many false witnesses came, yet
found they none. At the last came two false witnesses, And said,
This fellow said, I am able to destroy the temple of God, and to
build it in three days. And the high priest arose, and said unto
him, Answerest thou nothing? what is it which these witness against
thee? But Jesus held his peace. And the high priest answered and
said unto him, I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us
whether thou be the Christ, the Son of God. Jesus saith unto him,
Thou has said: nevertheless I say unto you, Hereafter shall ye see
the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in
the clouds of heaven. Then the high priest rent his clothes,
saying, He hath spoken blasphemy; what further need have we of
witnesses? behold, now ye have heard his blasphemy. What think ye?
They answered and said, He is guilty of death. Then did they spit
in his face, and buffeted him; and others smote him with the palms
of their hands, Saying, Prophesy unto us, thou Christ, Who is he
that smote thee?

When the morning was come, all the chief priests and elders of the
people took counsel against Jesus to put him to death: And when
they had bound him, they led him away, and delivered him to Pontius
Pilate the governor.... And Jesus stood before the governor: and
the governor asked him, saying, Art thou the King of the Jews? And
Jesus said unto him, Thou sayest. And when he was accused of the
chief priests and elders, he answered nothing. Then said Pilate
unto him, Hearest thou not how many things they witness against
thee? And he answered him to never a word; insomuch that the
governor marvelled greatly. Now at the feast the governor was wont
to release unto the people a prisoner, whom they would. And they
had then a notable prisoner, called Barabbas. Therefore when they
were gathered together, Pilate said unto them, Whom will ye that I
release unto you? Barabbas, or Jesus which is called Christ? For he
knew that for envy they had delivered him. When he was set down on
the judgement seat, his wife sent unto him, saying, Have thou
nothing to do with that just man: for I have suffered many things
this day in a dream because of him. But the chief priests and
elders persuaded the multitude that they should ask Barabbas, and
destroy Jesus. The governor answered and said unto them, Whether of
the twain will ye that I release unto you? They said, Barabbas.
Pilate saith unto them, What shall I do then with Jesus which is
called Christ? They all say unto him, Let him be crucified. And the
governor said, Why, what evil hath he done? But they cried out the
more, saying, Let him be crucified. When Pilate saw that he could
prevail nothing, but that rather a tumult was made, he took water,
and washed his hands before the multitude, saying, I am innocent of
the blood of this just person: see ye to it. Then answered all the
people, and said, His blood be on us, and on our children. Then
released he Barabbas unto them: and when he had scourged Jesus, he
delivered him to be crucified.

MARK

xiv. 43-65; xv. 1-15.

And immediately, while he yet spake, cometh Judas, one of the
twelve, and with him a great multitude with swords and staves, from
the chief priests and the scribes and the elders. And he that
betrayed him had given them a token, saying, Whomsoever I shall
kiss, that same is he; take him, and lead him away safely. And as
soon as he was come, he goeth straightway to him, and saith,
Master, Master; and kissed him. And they laid hands on him, and
took him. And one of them that stood by drew a sword, and smote a
servant of the high priest, and cut off his ear. And Jesus answered
and said unto them, Are ye come out, as against a thief, with
swords and staves to take me? I was daily with you in the temple
teaching, and ye took me not; but the scriptures must be fulfilled.
And they all forsook him, and fled. And there followed him a
certain young man, having a linen cloth cast about his naked body;
and the young man laid hold on him: And he left the linen cloth,
and fled from them naked. And they led Jesus away to the high
priest: and with him were assembled all the chief priests and the
elders and the scribes.... And the chief priests and all the
council sought for witness against Jesus to put him to death; and
found none. For many bare false witness against him, but their
witness agreed not together. And there arose certain, and bare
false witness against him, saying, We heard him say, I will destroy
this temple that is made with hands, and within three days I will
build another made without hands. But neither so did their witness
agree together. And the high priest stood up in the midst, and
asked Jesus, saying, Answerest thou nothing? what is it which these
witness against thee? But he held his peace, and answered nothing.
Again the high priest asked him, and said unto him, Art thou the
Christ, the Son of the Blessed? And Jesus said, I am: and ye shall
see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming
in the clouds of heaven. Then the high priest rent his clothes, and
saith, What need we any further witnesses? Ye have heard the
blasphemy: what think ye? And they all condemned him to be guilty
of death. And some began to spit on him, and to cover his face, and
to buffet him, and to say unto him, Prophesy: and the servants did
strike him with the palms of their hands.

And straightway in the morning the chief priests held a
consultation with the elders and scribes and the whole council, and
bound Jesus, and carried him away, and delivered him to Pilate. And
Pilate asked him, Art thou the King of the Jews? And he answering
said unto him, Thou sayest it. And the chief priests accused him of
many things: but he answered nothing. And Pilate asked him again,
saying, Answerest thou nothing? behold how many things they witness
against thee. But Jesus yet answered nothing; so that Pilate
marvelled. Now at that feast he released unto them one prisoner,
whomsoever they desired. And there was one named Barabbas, which
lay bound with them that had made insurrection with him, who had
committed murder in the insurrection. And the multitude crying
aloud began to desire him to do as he had ever done unto them. But
Pilate answered them, saying, Will ye that I release unto you the
King of the Jews? For he knew that the chief priests had delivered
him for envy. But the chief priests moved the people, that he
should rather release Barabbas unto them. And Pilate answered and
said again unto them, What will ye then that I shall do unto him
whom ye call the King of the Jews? And they cried out again,
Crucify him. Then Pilate said unto them, Why, what evil hath he
done? And they cried out the more exceedingly, Crucify him. And so
Pilate, willing to content the people, released Barabbas unto them,
and delivered Jesus, when he had scourged him, to be crucified.

LUKE

xxii. 47-71; xxiii. 1-24.

And while he yet spake, behold a multitude, and he that was called
Judas, one of the twelve, went before them, and drew near unto
Jesus to kiss him. But Jesus said unto him, Judas, betrayest thou
the Son of man with a kiss? When they which were about him saw what
would follow, they said unto him, Lord, shall we smite with the
sword? And one of them smote the servant of the high priest, and
cut off his right ear. And Jesus answered and said, Suffer ye thus
far. And he touched his ear, and healed him. Then Jesus said unto
the chief priests, and captains of the temple, and the elders,
which were come to him, Be ye come out, as against a thief, with
swords and staves? When I was daily with you in the temple, ye
stretched forth no hands against me; but this is your hour, and the
power of darkness. Then took they him, and led him, and brought him
into the high priest's house. And Peter followed afar off.... And
as soon as it was day, the elders of the people and the chief
priests and the scribes came together, and led him into their
council, saying, Art thou the Christ? tell us. And he said unto
them, If I tell you, ye will not believe: And if I also ask you, ye
will not answer me, nor let me go. Hereafter shall the Son of man
sit on the right hand of the power of God. Then said they all, Art
thou then the Son of God? And he said unto them, Ye say that I am.
And they said, What need we any further witness? for we ourselves
have heard of his own mouth.

And the whole multitude of them arose, and led him unto Pilate. And
they began to accuse him, saying, We found this fellow perverting
the nation, and forbidding to give tribute to Cæsar, saying that he
himself is Christ a King. And Pilate asked him, saying, Art thou
the King of the Jews? And he answered him and said, Thou sayest it.
Then said Pilate to the chief priests and to the people, I find no
fault in this man. And they were the more fierce, saying, He
stirreth up the people, teaching throughout all Jewry, beginning
from Galilee to this place. When Pilate heard of Galilee, he asked
whether the man were a Galilæan. And as soon as he knew that he
belonged unto Herod's jurisdiction, he sent him to Herod, who
himself also was at Jerusalem at that time. And when Herod saw
Jesus, he was exceeding glad: for he was desirous to see him of a
long season, because he had heard many things of him; and he hoped
to have seen some miracle done by him. Then he questioned with him
in many words; but he answered him nothing. And the chief priests
and scribes stood and vehemently accused him. And Herod with his
men of war set him at nought, and mocked him, and arrayed him in a
gorgeous robe, and sent him again to Pilate. And the same day
Pilate and Herod were made friends together: for before they were
at enmity between themselves. And Pilate, when he had called
together the chief priests and the rulers and the people, Said unto
them, Ye have brought this man unto me, as one that perverteth the
people: and, behold, I, having examined him before you, have found
no fault in this man touching those things whereof ye accuse him:
No, nor yet Herod: for I sent you to him; and, lo, nothing worthy
of death is done unto him. I will therefore chastise him, and
release him.... And they cried out all at once, saying, Away with
this man, and release unto us Barabbas.... Pilate therefore,
willing to release Jesus, spake again to them. But they cried,
saying, Crucify him, crucify him. And he said unto them the third
time, Why, what evil hath he done? I have found no cause of death
in him: I will therefore chastise him, and let him go. And they
were instant with loud voices, requiring that he might be
crucified. And the voices of them and of the chief priests
prevailed. And Pilate gave sentence that it should be as they
required.

JOHN

xviii. 3-38; xix. 1-16.

Judas then, having received a band of men and officers from the
chief priests and Pharisees, cometh thither with lanterns and
torches and weapons.... Then the band and the captain and officers
of the Jews took Jesus, and bound him, And led him away to Annas
first; for he was father in law to Caiaphas, which was the high
priest that same year.... The high priest then asked Jesus of his
disciples, and of his doctrine. Jesus answered him, I spake openly
to the world; I ever taught in the synagogue, and in the temple,
whither the Jews always resort; and in secret have I said nothing.
Why askest thou me? ask them which heard me, what I have said unto
them: behold, they know what I said. And when he had thus spoken,
one of the officers which stood by struck Jesus with the palm of
his hand, saying, Answerest thou the high priest so? Jesus answered
him, If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil: but if well,
why smitest thou me? Now Annas had sent him bound unto Caiaphas the
high priest.... Then led they Jesus from Caiaphas unto the hall of
judgment: and it was early; and they themselves went not into the
judgment hall, lest they should be defiled; but that they might eat
the passover. Pilate then went out unto them, and said, What
accusation bring ye against this man? They answered and said unto
him, If he were not a malefactor, we would not have delivered him
up unto thee. Then said Pilate unto them, Take ye him, and judge
him according to your law. The Jews therefore said unto him, It is
not lawful for us to put any man to death.... Then Pilate entered
into the judgment hall again, and called Jesus, and said unto him,
Art thou the King of the Jews? Jesus answered him, Sayest thou this
thing of thyself, or did others tell it thee of me? Pilate
answered, Am I a Jew? Thine own nation and the chief priests have
delivered thee unto me: what hast thou done? Jesus answered, My
kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world,
then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the
Jews: but now is my kingdom not from hence. Pilate therefore said
unto him, Art thou a king then? Jesus answered, Thou sayest that I
am a king. To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into
the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Everyone that
is of the truth heareth my voice. Pilate saith unto him, What is
truth? And when he had said this, he went out again unto the Jews,
and saith unto them, I find in him no fault at all.

Then Pilate therefore took Jesus, and scourged him. And the
soldiers platted a crown of thorns, and put it on his head, and
they put on him a purple robe, And said, Hail, King of the Jews!
and they smote him with their hands. Pilate therefore went forth
again, and saith unto them, Behold, I bring him forth to you, that
ye may know that I find no fault in him.... The Jews answered
him, We have a law, and by our law he ought to die, because he made
himself the Son of God. When Pilate therefore heard that saying, he
was the more afraid; And went again into the judgment hall, and
saith unto Jesus, Whence art thou? But Jesus gave him no answer....
And from thenceforth Pilate sought to release him: but the Jews
cried out, saying, If thou let this man go, thou art not Cæsar's
friend: whosoever maketh himself a king speaketh against Cæsar.
When Pilate therefore heard that saying, he brought Jesus forth,
and sat down in the judgment seat in a place that is called the
Pavement, but in the Hebrew, Gabbatha. And it was the preparation
of the passover, and about the sixth hour: and he saith unto the
Jews, Behold your King! But they cried out, Away with him, away
with him, crucify him. Pilate saith unto them, Shall I crucify your
King? The chief priests answered, We have no king but Cæsar. Then
delivered he him therefore unto them to be crucified. And they took
Jesus, and led him away.

PART I

_THE RECORD OF FACT_

[Illustration: ST. MATTHEW (REMBRANDT)]

CHAPTER I

THE RECORD OF FACT

The Gospels of the New Testament form the record of fact in the trial of
Jesus. There is not a line of authentic history in the literature of the
world, sacred or profane, dealing originally and authoritatively with
the facts and circumstances of the trial and crucifixion of the Christ,
excepting these Gospels. A line from Philo--a dubious passage from
Josephus--a mere mention by Tacitus--a few scattering fragments from the
Talmud--all else is darkness, save the light that streams down through
the centuries from Calvary and the Cross through the books of the
Evangelists.

In dealing with the record of fact contained in the Gospels, in the
trial of Jesus two questions naturally suggest themselves: (1) Are the
Gospel narratives, such as we have them to-day, identical with those
that were given to the world by the Evangelists in Apostolic times? That
is, have these biographies of the Christ by the Evangelical writers been
handed down to us through all the ages substantially uncorrupted and
unimpaired?

(2) Are the Gospel writers--Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John--credible
witnesses of the facts and circumstances recorded by them in the Gospel
histories? That is, did they tell the truth when they wrote and
published these narratives to the world? Satisfactory affirmative
answers to these questions will establish and authenticate a perfect
record of fact. The pages of Part I of this volume will be devoted to
giving affirmative and satisfactory answers to these questions. And, in
accomplishing this purpose, academic reasoning and metaphysical
speculation will be rejected. Well-established rules of evidence, as
employed in modern courts of law, will be rigorously applied. So-called
"Higher Criticism" has no place in a treatise of this kind, since the
critical niceties and dialectic quibbles of men like Strauss, Renan, and
Baur would not be seriously considered in a modern judicial proceeding.
Reasonable probability, and not mathematical certainty, is the legal
test of adequacy in weighing human testimony with a view to a judicial
determination.

The reader may ask: Why should not a Christian writer, in a Christian
country, assume, without argument, that the testimony of Christian
sacred writers is true? The answer is that such conduct would convert a
purely legal treatise into a religious one, and substitute faith for
logic. The writer of these volumes, as a Christian, believes that the
Gospels relate the truth. As a lawyer, he is compelled to respect the
opinions of a large proportion of mankind who differ with him, and to
employ judicial methods in treating a legal theme.

The two questions above mentioned involve two distinct principles or
features in the Law of Evidence: (1) Admissibility or relevancy of
evidence; (2) Credibility of witnesses who have rendered testimony. All
the pages of Part I will be devoted to a consideration of these features
in their relationship to the testimony of the Evangelists.

The first question that naturally arises is this: Is there a
well-established rule of the modern Law of Evidence under which the
Gospels could be introduced as evidence in a modern judicial proceeding?
Suppose that the question of the Resurrection of Jesus--that is, the
fact of the truthfulness or falsity of the Resurrection--should become a
material fact in issue in a suit in a modern court of law; could the
testimony of the Evangelists relating to the Resurrection be introduced
in evidence? It would probably be objected that their testimony was
hearsay; that they had not been properly subjected to the cardinal tests
of truth: an oath, a cross-examination, and personal demeanor while
testifying. These objections might prevail if another rule of law could
not be successfully invoked. Such a rule exists, and with it we have now
to deal.

The author can conceive of no more satisfactory way of establishing the
principle of the admissibility of the Gospels in evidence under modern
law than by quoting at length from the celebrated treatise on the
"Testimony of the Evangelists," by Mr. Simon Greenleaf, the greatest of
all writers on the Law of Evidence. The opinion of Greenleaf on a
subject of this kind is somewhat in the nature of a decision of a court
of last resort, and his authority in matters of this import is
unquestioned in every land where English law is practiced. _The London
Law Magazine_, a few years ago, paid him the following splendid tribute:
"It is no mean honor to America that her schools of jurisprudence have
produced two of the first writers and best esteemed legal authorities of
this century--the great and good man, Judge Story, and his worthy and
eminent associate, Professor Greenleaf. Upon the existing Law of
Evidence (by Greenleaf) more light has shone from the New World than
from all the lawyers who adorn the courts of Europe."

Concerning the authenticity of the Sacred Scriptures and their
admissibility in evidence, Greenleaf has thus written:

That the books of the Old Testament, as we now have them, are
genuine; that they existed in the time of our Saviour, and were
commonly received and referred to among the Jews as the sacred
books of their religion; and that the text of the Four Evangelists
has been handed down to us in the state in which it was originally
written, that is, without having been materially corrupted or
falsified, either by heretics or Christians, are facts which we are
entitled to assume as true, until the contrary is shown.

The genuineness of these writings really admits of as little doubt,
and is susceptible of as ready proof, as that of any ancient
writings whatever. The rule of municipal law on this subject is
familiar, and applies with equal force to all ancient writings,
whether documentary or otherwise; and as it comes first in order,
in the prosecution of these inquiries, it may, for the sake of mere
convenience, be designated as our first rule.

_Every document, apparently ancient, coming from the proper
repository or custody, and bearing on its face no evident marks of
forgery, the law presumes to be genuine, and devolves on the
opposing party the burden of proving it to be otherwise._

An ancient document, offered in evidence in our courts, is said to
come from the proper repository, when it is found in the place
where, and under the care of persons with whom, such writings might
naturally and reasonably be expected to be found; for it is this
custody which gives authenticity to documents found within it. If
they come from such a place, and bear no evident marks of forgery,
the law presumes that they are genuine, and they are permitted to
be read in evidence, unless the opposing party is able successfully
to impeach them. The burden of showing them to be false and
unworthy of credit is devolved on the party who makes that
objection. The presumption of law is the judgment of charity. It
presumes that every man is innocent until he is proved guilty; that
everything has been done fairly and legally until it is proved to
have been otherwise; and that every document found in its proper
repository, and not bearing marks of forgery, is genuine. Now this
is precisely the case with the Sacred Writings. They have been used
in the church from time immemorial, and are thus found in the place
where alone they ought to be looked for. They come to us, and
challenge our reception of them as genuine writings, precisely as
Domesday Book, the Ancient Statutes of Wales, or any other of the
ancient documents which have recently been published under the
British Record Commission are received. They are found in familiar
use in all the churches of Christendom, as the sacred books to
which all denominations of Christians refer, as the standard of
their faith. There is no pretense that they were engraven on plates
of gold and discovered in a cave, nor that they were brought from
heaven by angels; but they are received as the plain narratives and
writings of the men whose names they respectively bear, made public
at the time they were written; and though there are some slight
discrepancies among the copies subsequently made, there is no
pretense that the originals were anywhere corrupted. If it be
objected that the originals are lost, and that copies alone are now
produced, the principles of the municipal law here also afford a
satisfactory answer. For the multiplication of copies was a public
fact, in the faithfulness of which all the Christian community had
an interest; and it is a rule of law that

_In matters of public and general interest, all persons must be
presumed to be conversant, on the principle that individuals are
presumed to be conversant with their own affairs._

Therefore it is that, in such matters, the prevailing current of
assertion is resorted to as evidence, for it is to this that every
member of the community is supposed to be privy. The persons,
moreover, who multiplied these copies may be regarded, in some
manner, as the agents of the Christian public, for whose use and
benefit the copies were made; and on the ground of the credit due
to such agents, and of the public nature of the facts themselves,
the copies thus made are entitled to an extraordinary degree of
confidence, and, as in the case of official registers and other
public books, it is not necessary that they should be confirmed and
sanctioned by the ordinary tests of truth. If any ancient document
concerning our public rights were lost, copies which had been as
universally received and acted upon as the Four Gospels have been,
would have been received in evidence in any of our courts of
justice, without the slightest hesitation. The entire text of the
Corpus Juris Civilis is received as authority in all the courts of
continental Europe, upon much weaker evidence of its genuineness;
for the integrity of the Sacred Text has been preserved by the
jealousy of opposing sects, beyond any moral possibility of
corruption; while that of the Roman Civil Law has been preserved by
tacit consent, without the interest of any opposing school, to
watch over and preserve it from alteration.

These copies of the Holy Scriptures having thus been in familiar
use in the churches from the time when the text was committed to
writing; having been watched with vigilance by so many sects,
opposed to each other in doctrine, yet all appealing to these
Scriptures for the correctness of their faith; and having in all
ages, down to this day, been respected as the authoritative source
of all ecclesiastical power and government, and submitted to, and
acted under in regard to so many claims of right, on the one hand,
and so many obligations of duty, on the other; it is quite
erroneous to suppose that the Christian is bound to offer any
further proof of their genuineness or authenticity. It is for the
objector to show them spurious; for on him, by the plainest rules
of law, lies the burden of proof. If it were the case of a claim to
a franchise, and a copy of an ancient deed or charter were produced
in support of the title, under parallel circumstances on which to
presume its genuineness, no lawyer, it is believed, would venture
to deny either its admissibility in evidence or the satisfactory
character of the proof. In a recent case in the House of Lords,
precisely such a document, being an old manuscript copy, purporting
to have been extracted from ancient Journals of the House, which
were lost, and to have been made by an officer whose duty it was to
prepare lists of the peers, was held admissible in a claim of
peerage.[1]

Having secured the Gospel writings to be admitted in evidence under the
rule laid down by Mr. Greenleaf, we are now ready to consider more at
length the question of the credibility of the witnesses. The reader
should bear in mind that there is a very important difference between
the admission of testimony in evidence and belief in its truthfulness by
the court or jury. Evidence is frequently deemed relevant and
admissible, and goes to the jury for what it is worth. They may or may
not believe it.

We are now ready to consider the credit that should be accorded the
testimony of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John concerning the trial and
crucifixion of Jesus. And at the outset it should be borne in mind that
there is a legal presumption that they told the truth. This presumption
operates in their favor from the very moment that their testimony is
admitted in evidence. Here, again, the opinion of Greenleaf--with all
the weight and authority that such an opinion carries--is directly in
point. In the "Testimony of the Evangelists" he says:

Proceeding further, to inquire whether the facts related by the
Four Evangelists are proved by competent and satisfactory evidence,
we are led, first, to consider on which side lies the burden of
establishing the credibility of the witnesses. On this point the
municipal law furnishes a rule which is of constant application in
all trials by jury, and is indeed the dictate of that charity which
thinketh no evil.

_In the absence of circumstances which generate suspicion, every
witness is to be presumed credible, until the contrary is shown,
the burden of impeaching his credibility lying on the objector._

This rule serves to show the injustice with which the writers of
the Gospels have ever been treated by infidels; an injustice
silently acquiesced in even by Christians; in requiring the
Christian affirmatively, and by positive evidence, _aliunde_ to
establish the credibility of his witnesses above all others, before
their testimony is entitled to be considered, and in permitting the
testimony of a single profane writer, alone and uncorroborated, to
outweigh that of any single Christian. This is not the course in
courts of chancery, where the testimony of a single witness is
never permitted to outweigh the oath even of the defendant himself,
interested as he is in the case; but, on the contrary, if the
plaintiff, after having required the oath of his adversary, cannot
overthrow it by something more than the oath of one witness,
however credible, it must stand as evidence against him. But the
Christian writer seems, by the usual course of the argument, to
have been deprived of the common presumption of charity in his
favor; and reversing the ordinary rule of administering justice in
human tribunals, his testimony is unjustly presumed to be false,
until it is proved to be true. This treatment, moreover, has been
applied to them all in a body; and without due regard to the fact,
that, being independent historians, writing at different periods,
they are entitled to the support of each other; they have been
treated, in the argument, almost as if the New Testament were the
entire production, at once, of a body of men, conspiring by a joint
fabrication, to impose a false religion upon the world. It is time
that this injustice should cease; that the testimony of the
evangelists should be admitted to be true, until it can be
disproved by those who would impugn it; that the silence of one
sacred writer on any point should no more detract from his own
veracity or that of other historians, that the like circumstance is
permitted to do among profane writers; and that the Four
Evangelists should be admitted in corroboration of each other, as
readily as Josephus and Tacitus, or Polybius and Livy.[2]

The reader will notice from the last extract that the eminent writer
quoted has sought to establish the credibility of the Evangelists by a
legal presumption in favor of their veracity. But it should be borne in
mind that this presumption is a disputable one, and may be overturned by
opposing evidence; that objections may be raised which will destroy the
force of the presumption and shift the burden again to him who asserts
the credibility of the witnesses. Now, let us suppose that such
objections have been made, and that sufficient opposing evidence has
been offered to accomplish this result; what has the Christian then to
say in support of the credibility of the first historians of his faith?
What proofs has he to offer, independent of legal presumption, that the
first biographers of the Master were truthful men? Can he show that the
application of legal tests to their credibility will save them in the
eyes of a critical and unbelieving world? The writer believes that the
Christian can do it, and will at once assume the task.

In "Starkie on Evidence" we find elaborated a rule of municipal law, at
once concise and comprehensive, which furnishes a complete test of the
credibility of witnesses. The various elements of this rule are
constantly operating in the mind of the successful cross-examiner in the
course of any extensive cross-examination.

_The credit due to the testimony of witnesses depends upon,
firstly, their honesty; secondly, their ability; thirdly, their
number and the consistency of their testimony; fourthly, the
conformity of their testimony with experience; and fifthly, the
coincidence of their testimony with collateral circumstances._[3]

Let us apply these successive tests, in the order above enumerated, to
the Evangelists.

(1) In the first place, let us consider the question of their _honesty_.

The meaning of the word "honesty," used in this connection, is peculiar.
It relates rather to personal sincerity than to personal integrity, and
suggests the idea of perjury rather than theft in criminal law. Were the
witnesses honest? That is, were they sincere? Did they intend to tell
the truth? That is, did they themselves believe what they testified? If
so, they were honest witnesses, though their testimony was false, as a
result of error in judgment or mistake of fact.

In the sense, then, of _sincerity_ is the test of honesty to be applied
to the Evangelists as witnesses of the facts which they relate in the
New Testament narratives. And in making this test let us bear in mind
the nature and scope of this work; that it is not a religious treatise,
and that the question of inspiration must not be allowed to confuse a
purely legal and historical discussion. As secular historians, and not
as inspired writers, must the Evangelists be considered. And in testing
their credibility, the customary standards employed in analyzing the
motives and conduct of ordinary men in the usual experiences and
everyday affairs of life must be applied. To regard them as strange or
supernatural beings, subject to some awful influence, and acting under
the guidance and protection of some god or hero, is decidedly foreign to
the present purpose.

It is felt that only two considerations are needed in applying the test
of sincerity to the Evangelists: (1) Character; (2) Motive. And this for
the reason that honest character and righteous motive are the legitimate
parentage of perfect sincerity. Then, as a primary consideration, in
discussing their sincerity, it may be reasonably contended that the
Gospel writers were either good men or bad. A middle ground is not
possible in their case, since the issues joined and the results attained
were too terrible and stupendous to have been produced by negative or
indifferent forces. Were they good men, then they believed what they
taught and wrote, and were sincere, else they deliberately palmed off
an imposture on the world, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis
that they were good. Were they bad men, then their lives and teachings
furnish a contradiction in principle and an inversion in the nature and
order of cause and effect which history has not elsewhere recorded,
either before or since; for, in their discourses and their writings,
they portrayed the divinest character and proclaimed the sublimest
truths known to the children of men. Every serious, thoughtful mind at
once inquires: Could bad men, conspirators and hypocrites, have painted
such a character--one whose perfect purity and sinless beauty mock and
shame the mental and spiritual attributes of every false prophet and of
all heathen gods? The Olympian Zeus, the sovereign creation of the
superb Greek intellect, was a fierce and vindictive deity--at times a
faithless spouse and a drunken debauchee. Mahomet, whom two hundred
millions of the human race worship as the Inspired of Allah, was cruel
and treacherous in warfare, and base and sensual in private life. The
Great Spirit of the Indian granted immortality to dogs, but denied it to
women. Other hideous and monstrous attributes deformed the images and
blurred the characters of pagan prophets and heathen divinities. But
Jesus of Nazareth was a pure and perfect being who claimed to be
sinless,[4] and whose claims have been admitted by all the world,
believers and unbelievers alike. The great truths taught by the gentle
Nazarene and transmitted by the Evangelists have brought balm and
healing to the nations, have proclaimed and established universal
brotherhood among men. Is it probable that such a character was painted
and such truths proclaimed by dishonest and insincere men? Can Vice be
the mother of Virtue? "Do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of
thistles?" If Jesus was not really the pure and holy being portrayed by
the Gospels, then the Evangelists have created a sublime character in a
superb fiction which surpasses anything to be found in profane
literature, and that evil-minded men could neither have conceived nor
executed. It is impossible to derive from these reflections any other
conclusion than the absolute honesty and perfect sincerity of the
Evangelists. Besides, the mere perusal of their writings leaves a deep
impression that they were pure and pious men.

Again, a second and more serious consideration than that of character,
as affecting the sincerity of the Gospel writers, is the question of
motive. If the Evangelists were insincere and did not believe their own
story, what motive prompted them to tell it, to preach it and to die for
it? It is not believed that all men are now or have ever been wholly
selfish, but it is contended that desire for compensation is the main
inducement to human action, mental and manual. Reward is the great
golden key that opens the door of the Temple of Labor, and some form of
recompense, here or hereafter, explains all the bustling activity of
men. The Apostles themselves acted in obedience to this law, for we find
them quarreling among themselves as to place and precedence in the New
Kingdom. They even demanded of the Master the exact nature of their
reward for labors performed and sacrifices endured. To which reply was
made that they should sit on twelve thrones and judge the Twelve Tribes
of Israel.

Now let us apply this principle of expectation of reward to the conduct
of the Evangelists in preaching and publishing the Gospel of the
Nazarene, and let us note particularly the result as it affects the
question of motive in human conduct. But first let us review, for a
moment, the political and religious situation at the beginning of the
Apostolic ministry. The Master and Savior of the first Christians had
just perished as a malefactor on the cross. The religion which the
Apostles began to preach was founded in the doctrine of repentance from
sins, faith in the Crucified One, and belief in His resurrection from
the dead. Christianity, of which these elements were the essentials,
sought to destroy and supplant all other religions. No compromises were
proposed, no treaties were concluded. The followers of the Nazarene
raised a black flag against paganism and every heathen god. No quarter
was asked and none was given. This strange faith not only defied all
other religions, but mocked all earthly government not built upon it.
The small, but devoted, band, thus arrayed against themselves in the
very beginning all the opposing religious and secular forces of the
earth. Judaism branded the new creed as a disobedient and rebellious
daughter. Paganism denounced it as a sham and a fraud, because its
doctrines were unknown to the Portico and the Academy, and because its
teachings were ridiculed by both Stoics and Epicureans. The Roman State
cast a jealous and watchful eye upon the haughty pretensions of a
religious system that taught the impotence of kings and sought to
degrade earthly royalty.

In seeking, then, to establish the new faith and to inculcate its
doctrines, what could and did the Evangelists expect but the bitter
opposition which they met? Did they seriously hope to see the proud and
haughty Sadducee, who despised the common people, or the kingly
aristocracy of Rome, that vaunted a superhuman excellence, complacently
accept a religion that taught the absolute equality and the universal
brotherhood of men? Did they not expect what they actually
received--bitter persecution, horrible torture, and cruel death? Then we
are led to ask: Was this the recompense which they sought? Again, we
pose the question: What was the motive of these men in thus acting, if
they were dishonest and insincere? If they knew that they were preaching
a falsehood, what reward did they expect? Was it of an earthly or a
heavenly kind? It is unreasonable to suppose that they looked forward to
earthly recompense when their teachings arrayed against them every
spiritual and temporal potentate who had honors to grant or favors to
confer. Were they looking for heavenly reward? It is ridiculous to
imagine that they hoped to gain this by preaching a falsehood in this
world. Nothing could be, therefore, more absurd than the proposition
that a number of men banded themselves together, repudiated the ancient
faith of their fathers, changed completely their mode of life, became
austere in professing and practicing principles of virtue, spent their
entire lives proclaiming certain truths to mankind, and then suffered
the deaths of martyrs--all for the sake of a religion which they knew to
be false. If they did not believe it to be false, they were sincere, and
one element of their credibility is established. It is not a question at
this time as to the absolute correctness of their statements. These
statements might have been false, though their authors believed them to
be true--it is a question of sincerity at this point; and the test of
sincerity, as an element of credibility, rests upon the simple basis
that men are more disposed to believe the statement of a witness if it
is thought that the witness himself believes it.

(2) In the second place, let us consider the _ability_ of the
Evangelists as a test of their credibility as witnesses.

The text writers on the Law of Evidence are generally agreed that the
ability of a witness to speak truthfully and accurately depends upon two
considerations: (1) His natural powers of observation, which enable him
to clearly perceive, and his strength of memory, which enables him to
fully retain the matters of fact to which his testimony relates; (2) his
opportunities for observing the things about which he testifies.

To what extent the Gospel writers possessed the first of these
qualifications--that is, power of observation and strength of memory--we
are not informed by either history or tradition. But we are certainly
justified in assuming to be true what the law actually presumes: that
they were at least men of sound mind and average intelligence. This
presumption, it may be remarked, continues to exist in favor of the
witness until an objector appears who proves the contrary by competent
and satisfactory evidence. It is not believed that this proof has ever
been or can ever be successfully established in the case of the
Evangelists.

Aside from this legal presumption in their favor, there are certain
considerations which lead us to believe that they were well qualified to
speak truthfully and authoritatively about the matters relating to
Gospel history. In the first place, the writings themselves indicate
extraordinary mental vigor, as well as cultivated intelligence. The
Gospels of Luke and John, moreover, reveal that the elegance of style
and lofty imagery which are the invariable characteristics of
intellectual depth and culture. The "ignorant fishermen" idea is
certainly not applicable to the Gospel writers. If they were ever very
ignorant, at the time of the composition of the Evangelical writings
they had outgrown the affliction. The fact that the Gospels were written
in Greek by Hebrews indicates that they were not entirely illiterate.

Again, the occupations of two of them are very suggestive. Matthew was a
collector at the seat of customs,[5] and Luke was a physician.[6] Both
these callings required more than ordinary knowledge of men, as well as
accurate powers of observation, discrimination, and analysis.

But it has been frequently urged that, regardless of their natural
endowments, the Evangelists were biased in favor of Jesus and His
teachings, and bitterly prejudiced against all opposing faiths. In other
words, they were at the same moment both enthusiasts and fanatics. For
this reason, it is contended, their testimony is unreliable. This is
without doubt the weakest assault ever made upon the trustworthiness of
the Gospel narratives. That the Gospel writers were neither fanatics nor
enthusiasts is evident from the very tone and style of the Sacred
Writings themselves. The language of fanaticism and enthusiasm is the
language of rant and rage, of vituperation and of censure, on the one
hand, and of eulogy and adulation on the other. The enthusiast knows no
limit to the praise of those whose cause he advocates. The fanatic
places no bounds to his denunciation of those whom he opposes. Now, the
most remarkable characteristic of the New Testament histories is the
spirit of quiet dignity and simple candor which everywhere pervades
them. There is nowhere the slightest trace of bitterness or resentment.
There is enthusiasm everywhere in the sense of religious fervor, but
nowhere in the sense of unbecoming heat or impatient caviling. The three
eventful years of the ministry of Jesus afforded many opportunities for
the display of temper and for the use of invective in the Evangelical
writings. The murder of the Baptist by Herod; his cunning designs
against Jesus; the constant dogging of the footsteps of the Master by
the spies of the Sanhedrin; and His crucifixion by the order of Pontius
Pilate--what more could be desired to make the heart rage and the blood
boil? But nowhere is there the slightest exhibition of violent feeling
or extravagant emotion. A gentle forbearance, a mild equanimity, a
becoming dignity, mark every thought and utterance. The character of
Pilate, as portrayed in the New Testament, is a supreme illustration of
the fairness and magnanimity of the Gospel writers. Philo and Josephus
describe the Roman procurator as stubborn, cruel, and vindictive. The
only kindly suggestion touching the character of Pilate that has come
down from the ancient world, is that contained in the writings of men
who, above all others, would have been justified in describing him as
cowardly and craven. Instead of painting him as a monster, they have
linked conscience to his character and stored mercy in his heart, by
their accounts of his repeated attempts to release Jesus. Fanatics and
enthusiasts would not have done this.

Again, the absence of both bias and prejudice in the minds and hearts of
the Evangelists is shown by the fact that they did not hesitate to
record their own ludicrous foibles and blunders, and to proclaim them to
the world. A disposition to do this is one of the surest indications of
a truthful mind. It is in the nature of "a declaration against
interest," in the phraseology of the law; and such declarations are
believed because it has been universally observed that "men are not
likely to invent anecdotes to their own discredit." "When we find them
in any author," says Professor Fisher in his "Grounds of Theistic and
Christian Belief," "a strong presumption is raised in favor of his
general truthfulness." Many passages of New Testament Scriptures place
Jesus and the Apostles in a most unfavorable light before the world. The
denial of the Master by Peter[7] and His betrayal by Judas;[8] the
flight of the Eleven from the Garden at the time of the arrest;[9] the
ridiculous attempt of Peter to walk upon the sea and his failure because
of lack of faith;[10] the frequent childish contentions among the
disciples for place and precedence in the affections of Jesus and in the
New Kingdom;[11] the embassy from John the Baptist to Jesus asking if
He, Jesus, was the Messiah, after the latter had already visited the
former, and had been baptized by him;[12] the belief of the family of
Jesus that He was mad;[13] and the fact that His neighbors at Nazareth
threatened to kill Him by hurling Him from a cliff[14]--these various
recitals have furnished a handle to skeptical criticism in every age.
They might as well have been omitted from the Gospel histories; and they
would have been omitted by designing and untruthful men.

Again, touching the question of bias and prejudice, it is worthy of
observation that skeptics fail to apply the same rules of criticism to
sacred that they employ in profane literature. It is contended by them
that the Evangelists are unworthy of belief because their writings
record the words and deeds of their own Lord and Master. It is asserted
that this sacred and tender relationship warped and blinded their
Judgment, and disqualified them to write truthfully the facts and
circumstances connected with the life and ministry of the founder of
their faith. But these same critics do not apply the same tests of
credibility to secular writers sustaining similar relationships. The
Commentaries of Cæsar and the Anabasis of Xenophon record the mighty
deeds and brilliant achievements of their authors; but this fact does
not destroy their reliability as historical records in the estimation of
those who insist that the Gospel writers shall be rejected on grounds of
bias and partiality. The Memorabilia of Xenophon, "Recollections of
Socrates," is the tribute of an affectionate and admiring disciple; and
yet, all the colleges and universities of the world employ this work as
a text-book in teaching the life and style of conversation of the great
Athenian philosopher. It is never argued that the intimate relationship
existing between Xenophon and Socrates should affect the credibility of
the author of the Memorabilia. The best biography in the English
language is Boswell's "Life of Johnson." Boswell's admiration for Dr.
Johnson was idolatrous. At times, his servile flattery of the great
Englishman amounted to disgusting sycophancy. In spite of this, his work
is a monumental contribution to historical literature. The "Encyclopedia
Britannica" says that "Boswell has produced the best biography the world
has yet seen"; but why not reject this book because of its author's
spaniel-like devotion to the man whose life he has written? If Matthew,
Mark, Luke, and John are to be repudiated on the ground of bias, why not
repudiate Cæsar, Xenophon, and Boswell? It is respectfully submitted
that there is no real difference in logic between the tests of
credibility applicable to sacred, and those required in the case of
profane writers. A just and exact criticism will apply the same rules to
both.

As to the second qualification above mentioned, under the second legal
test of credibility laid down by Starkie, that is, the opportunity of
observing facts and circumstances about which testimony is given, it may
safely be said that the majority of the Evangelists possessed it in the
highest degree. The most convincing testimony that can possibly be
offered in a court of law is that of an eyewitness who has seen or heard
what he testifies. Now, it is reasonably certain that all of the Gospel
writers were eyewitnesses of most of the events recorded by them in the
Gospel histories. Both Matthew and John were numbered among the Twelve
who constantly attended the Master in all His wanderings, heard His
discourses, witnessed the performance of His miracles, and proclaimed
His faith after He was gone. It is very probable that Mark was another
eyewitness of the events in the life and ministry of the Savior. It is
now very generally agreed that the author of the Second Gospel was the
young man who threw away his garment and fled at the time of the arrest
in the Garden.[15] If Mark was actually present at midnight in
Gethsemane peering through the shadows to see what would be done to the
Nazarene by the mob, it is more than probable that he was also a witness
of many other events in the life and ministry of the great Teacher.
But, whether this be true or not, it is very well settled that the
Second Gospel was dictated to Mark by Peter, who was as familiar with
all the acts and words of Jesus as was Matthew or John. The Christian
writers of antiquity unanimously testify that Mark wrote the Gospel
ascribed to him, at the dictation of Peter. If their testimony is true,
Peter is the real author of the Second Gospel. That the Gospel of Mark
was written by an eyewitness is the opinion of Renan, the skeptic, who
says: "In Mark, the facts are related with a clearness for which we seek
in vain amongst the other Evangelists. He likes to report certain words
of Jesus in Syro-Chaldean. He is full of minute observations, coming
doubtless from an eye-witness. There is nothing to prevent our agreeing
with Papias in regarding this eye-witness, who evidently had followed
Jesus, who had loved Him and observed Him very closely, and who had
preserved a lively image of Him, as the Apostle Peter himself."[16] The
same writer declares Matthew to have been an eyewitness of the events
described by him. He says: "On the whole, I admit as authentic the four
canonical Gospels. All, in my opinion, date from the first century, and
the authors are, generally speaking, those to whom they are attributed;
but their historic value is diverse. Matthew evidently merits an
unlimited confidence as to the discourses; they are the Logia, the
identical notes taken from a clear and lively remembrance of the
teachings of Jesus."[16]

That Luke was an eyewitness of many of the things recorded by him, and
that the others were related to him by eyewitnesses, is perfectly clear
from the introductory verses of his Gospel. In addressing his royal
patron, Theophilus, he assures him that those who communicated the
information contained in the Gospel to him were eyewitnesses; and
follows by saying that he himself had had "perfect understanding of all
things from the very first."[17] The evident meaning of this is that,
desiring full information for Theophilus, he had supplemented his own
personal knowledge by additional facts secured from eyewitnesses to
those things which, not being of the Twelve, he himself had not seen.

St. John was peculiarly well qualified to record the sayings and doings
of the Christ. He was called "the disciple whom Jesus loved." He was
admitted into the presence of the Savior, at all times, on terms of the
utmost intimacy and friendship. At the Last Supper, his head reposed
confidingly and lovingly upon the bosom of the Master. Together with
Peter and James, he witnessed the resurrection of Jairus' daughter; was
present at the Transfiguration on the Mount, and at the agony of the
Savior in the Garden. From the cross, Jesus placed upon him the tender
and pathetic burden of caring for His mother; and, running ahead of
Peter, he was the first among the Twelve to arrive at the open
sepulcher. By means of a favorable acquaintanceship with the High
Priest, he was enabled to gain access to the palace and to be present at
the trial of Jesus, as well as to introduce Peter, his friend.

It is thus clearly evident that the Evangelists were amply able, from
any point of view, to truthfully and accurately record the events
narrated in the Gospel histories. As eyewitnesses, being on the ground
and having the situation well in hand, they were certainly better
qualified to write truthful history of the events then occurring than
historians and critics who lived centuries afterwards.

But it is frequently contended that, if the Evangelists were
eyewitnesses of the leading events which they recorded, they committed
them to writing so long afterwards that they had forgotten them, or had
confused them with various traditions that had in the meantime grown up.
There may be some little truth in this contention, but not enough to
destroy the credibility of the witnesses as to events such as the
Crucifixion and Resurrection of Jesus. These are not matters to be
easily forgotten or confused with other things. The date of the
composition and publication of the different Gospels is not known. But
Professor Holtzmann, of Heidelberg (a man who cannot be said to be
favorable to Christianity, since he was for several years the leader of
the freethinkers in the Grand Duchy of Baden), after many years of
careful study of the subject, declared that the Synoptic Gospels, the
first three, were committed to writing between the years 60 and 80 of
our era.[18] This was only from thirty to fifty years after the death of
Jesus. Could men of average memory and intelligence who had been almost
daily preaching the life and deeds of Jesus during these thirty or
fifty years have forgotten them? The testimony of Principal Drummond, of
Oxford, is very pertinent at this point. He says: "If we suppose that
the Synoptic Gospels were written from forty to sixty years after the
time of Christ, still they were based on earlier material, and even
after forty years the memory of characteristic sayings may be perfectly
clear.... I have not a particularly good memory, but I can recall many
sayings that were uttered forty, or even fifty, years ago, and in some
cases can vividly recollect the scene."[19]

If the Evangelists were eyewitnesses, which the records seem clearly to
indicate, they possessed one of the strongest tests of credibility.

(3) In the third place, as to their _number_ and the _consistency_ of
their testimony.

The credibility of a witness is greatly strengthened if his testimony is
corroborated by other witnesses who testify to substantially the same
thing. The greater the number of supporting witnesses, fraud and
collusion being barred, the greater the credibility of the witness
corroborated. But corroboration implies the presence in evidence of due
and reasonable consistency between the testimony of the witness
testifying and that of those corroborating. A radical discrepancy on a
material point not only fails to strengthen, but tends to destroy the
credibility of one or both the witnesses.

Now, the fierce fire of skeptical criticism during all the ages has been
centered upon the so-called discrepancies of the Gospel narratives. It
is asserted by many critics that these inconsistencies are so
numerous and so palpable, that the Gospel records are worthless, even as
secular histories. The authors of these writings, according to the
skeptics, mutually destroy each other.

[Illustration: ST. MARK AND ST. PAUL (DÜRER)]

In considering this phase of the credibility of the Gospel writers, it
must again be remembered that the question of inspiration has no place
in this discussion; and that Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John must be
regarded simply as secular historians. The reader is urged to consider
the biographers of the Christ as he would consider ordinary witnesses in
a court of law; to apply to them the same tests of credibility; to sift
and weigh their testimony in the same manner; and to subject them to the
same rules of cross-examination. If this is done, it is felt that the
result will be entirely favorable to the veracity and integrity of the
sacred writers.

In considering the subject of discrepancies it should be constantly kept
in mind that contradictions in testimony do not necessarily mean that
there has been falsehood or bad faith on the part of the witnesses.
Every lawyer of experience and every adult citizen of average
intelligence knows that this is true. Men of unquestioned veracity and
incorruptible integrity are frequently arrayed against each other in
both civil and criminal trials, and the record reveals irreconcilable
contradictions in their testimony. Not only do prosecutions for perjury
not follow, but, in many instances, the witnesses are not even suspected
of bad faith or an intention to falsify. Defects in sight, hearing, or
memory; superior advantage in the matter of observation; or a sudden
change in the position of one or both the parties, causing distraction
of attention, at the time of the occurrence of the events involved in
litigation--all or any of these conditions, as well as many others, may
create discrepancies and contradictions where there is a total absence
of any intention to misrepresent. A thorough appreciation of this fact
will greatly aid in a clear understanding of this phase of the
discussion.

Again, an investigation of the charge of discrepancy against the Gospel
writers shows that the critics and skeptics have classified mere
_omissions_ as contradictions. Nothing could be more absurd than to
consider an omission a contradiction, unless the requirements of the
case show that the facts and circumstances omitted were essential to be
stated, or that the omission was evidently intended to mislead or
deceive. Any other contention would turn historical literature
topsy-turvy and load it down with contradictions. Dion Cassius, Tacitus,
and Suetonius have all written elaborately of the reign of Tiberius.
Many things are mentioned by each that are not recorded by the other
two. Are we to reject all three as unreliable historians because of this
fact? Abbott, Hazlitt, Bourrienne, and Walter Scott have written
biographies of Napoleon Bonaparte. No one of them has recited all the
facts recorded by the others. Are these omissions to destroy the merits
of all these writers and cause them to be suspected and rejected?
Grafton's Chronicles rank high in English historical literature. They
comprise the reign of King John; and yet make no mention of the granting
of Magna Charta. This is as if the life of Jefferson had been written
without mention of the Declaration of Independence; or a biography of
Lincoln without calling attention to the Emancipation Proclamation.
Notwithstanding this strange omission, Englishmen still preserve
Grafton's Chronicles as valuable records among their archives. And the
same spirit of generous criticism is everywhere displayed in matters of
profane literature. The opponents of Christianity are never embarrassed
in excusing or explaining away omissions or contradictions, provided the
writer is a layman and his subject secular. But let the theme be a
sacred one, and the author an ecclesiastic--preacher, priest, or
prophet--and immediately incredulity rises to high tide, engulfs the
reason, and destroys all dispassionate criticism. Could it be forgotten
for a moment that Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John were biographers of the
Christ, a sacred person, no difficulties would arise in the matter of
inconsistencies, no objections would be made to their credibility. The
slight discrepancies that undoubtedly exist would pass unnoticed, or be
forever buried under the weight of an overwhelming conviction that they
are, in the main, accurate and truthful.

But the Evangelists were guided by inspiration, the skeptics say; and
discrepancies are inconsistent with the theory of inspiration. God would
not have inspired them to write contradictory stories. But the
assumption is false that they claimed to be guided by inspiration; for,
as Marcus Dods truthfully says, "none of our Gospels pretends to be
infallible or even _inspired_. Only one of them tells us how its writer
obtained his information, and that was by careful inquiry at the proper
sources."[20]

But whether the Gospel writers were inspired or not is immaterial so far
as the purpose of this chapter is concerned. The rules of evidence
testing their credibility would be the same in either case.

A more pertinent observation upon the Gospel discrepancies has not been
made than that by Paley in his "Evidences of Christianity," where he
says:

I know not a more rash or more unphilosophical conduct of the
understanding than to reject the substance of a story by reason of
some diversity in the circumstances with which it is related. The
usual character of human testimony is substantial truth under
circumstantial variety. This is what the daily experience of courts
of justice teaches. When accounts of a transaction come from the
mouths of different witnesses it is seldom that it is not possible
to pick out apparent or real inconsistencies between them. These
inconsistencies are studiously displayed by an adverse pleader, but
oftentimes with little impression upon the minds of the judges. On
the contrary, a close and minute agreement induces the suspicion of
confederacy and fraud. When written histories touch upon the same
scenes of action, the comparison almost always affords ground for a
like reflection. Numerous, and sometimes important, variations
present themselves; not seldom, also, absolute and final
contradictions; yet neither one nor the other are deemed sufficient
to shake the credibility of the main fact. The embassy of the Jews
to deprecate the execution of Claudian's order to place his statue
in their temple, Philo places in the harvest, Josephus in seed-time;
both contemporary writers. No reader is led by this inconsistency to
doubt whether such an embassy was sent, or whether such an order was
given. Our own history supplies examples of the same kind. In the
account of the Marquis of Argyll's death, in the reign of Charles
II, we have very remarkable contradiction. Lord Clarendon relates
that he was condemned to be hanged, which was performed the same
day; on the contrary, Burnet, Woodrow, Heath, Echard, concur in
stating that he was condemned upon the Saturday and executed upon a
Monday. Was any reader of English history ever skeptic enough to
raise from hence a question, whether the Marquis of Argyll was
executed or not? Yet this ought to be left in uncertainty, according
to the principles upon which the Christian history has sometimes
been attacked.[21]

The reader should most carefully consider the useful as well as the
damaging effect of Gospel inconsistencies in the matter of the
credibility of the Evangelists. A certain class of persons have imagined
the Gospel writers to be common conspirators who met together at the
same time and place to devise ways and means of publishing a false
report to the world. This is a silly supposition, since it is positively
known that the authors of the Evangelical narratives wrote and published
them at different times and places. Moreover, the style and contents of
the books themselves negative the idea of a concerted purpose to
deceive. And, besides, the very inconsistencies themselves show that
there was no "confederacy and fraud"; since intelligent conspirators
would have fabricated exactly the same story in substantially the same
language.

Furthermore, a just and impartial criticism will consider not only the
discrepant but also the corroborative elements in the New Testament
histories. It should not be forgotten that the authors of the Gospels
were independent historians who wrote at different times and places.
Then, in all matters of fact in which there is a common agreement, they
may be said to fully corroborate each other. And it may be contended
without fear of successful contradiction that, when so considered, there
will be found numerous cases of corroboration where there is one of
discord or inconsistency.

The corroborative elements or features in the Evangelical narratives may
be classified under three headings: (1) Instances in which certain
historical events related by one of the Gospel writers are also told by
one or more of the others. These are cases of ordinary corroboration.
(2) Instances in which the recital of a certain fact by one of the
Evangelists would be obscure or meaningless unless explained or
supplemented by another. These may be regarded as examples of internal
confirmation. (3) Instances in which the fact related by one Evangelist
must be true from the nature of the case, regardless of what the others
have said. This is the simple confirmation of logic or reason.

A few illustrations will serve to make clear this classification.

Under the first heading of "ordinary corroboration" may be mentioned the
accounts of the miracle of feeding the five thousand. All the
Evangelists tell us of this event, and each records the fact that the
fragments taken up were _twelve baskets full_.[22]

Under the second heading of "internal confirmation" the following
instances may be cited:

Matt. xxvi. 67, 68: "And others smote him with the palms of their
hands, saying, Prophesy unto us, thou Christ, Who is he that smote
thee?"

A caviling criticism would demand: Why ask of the Christ to _prophesy_
to those in His presence? And the obscurity would be damaging, were it
not for an additional sentence in Luke, who records the same
circumstance. "_And when they had blindfolded him_, they struck him on
the face, and asked him, saying, Prophesy, Who is it that smote
thee?"[23] The fact that Jesus was blindfolded, which is told by Luke,
explains the use of the word "prophesy" by Matthew, which would
otherwise be absurd.

Again, Matt. xiii. 2: "And great multitudes were gathered together with
him, so that he went into the ship, and sat." Here, the definite article
points to a particular ship which Matthew fails to mention. But Mark
comes to his aid and clearly explains the statement: "And he spake to
his disciples, that a small vessel should wait upon him because of the
multitude, lest they should throng him." These two passages taken
together identify the ship.

Again, John vi. 5: "When Jesus lifted up his eyes, and saw a great
company come to him, he saith unto Philip, Whence shall we buy bread
that these may eat?" This is one of the only two places in the Gospel
where Jesus addressed this Apostle. But why ask Philip instead of one of
the others? Two other passages, one from John and one from Luke, furnish
an explanation. In John i. 44 we read that "Philip was of Bethsaida." In
Luke ix. 10 we learn that the scene of the event, the miracle of
feeding the five thousand, was "a desert place belonging to the city
called Bethsaida." The reason, then, for addressing Philip, instead of
one of the other Apostles, is clear. Bethsaida was the home of Philip;
and he would naturally, therefore, be more familiar with the location of
the bread shops than the others. In John vi., where the question is
asked, neither the place of the feeding nor the apostle questioned is
even remotely connected with the city of Bethsaida; and in Luke the
account of the miracle says nothing of Philip or the question put to
him. But when the passages are connected the striking coincidence
appears, and the explanation is complete.

Again, John xviii. 10: "Then Simon Peter, having a sword, drew it and
smote the high priest's servant, and cut off his right ear. The
servant's name was Malchus." It has been objected that there is nowhere
an account of the arrest or punishment of Peter for this assault and
resistance to armed authority; and that, therefore, there was no such
occurrence. A passage from Luke explains the failure to arrest. "And
Jesus answered and said, Suffer ye thus far, and he touched his ear and
healed him."[24] The healing of the ear explains why no arrest followed;
for, if charges had been made, there would have been no evidence of the
gravity of the offense. Indeed, witnesses against Peter would have been
completely confounded and humiliated by the result of the miracle; and
might have been driven from court as malicious accusers. Then, the
failure to arrest is a silent corroboration of the statement that the
event occurred and that the miracle was performed.

Under the third heading, of the "confirmation of logic or reason," a
single instance will suffice.

John xx. 4: "And the other disciple did outrun Peter and came first to
the sepulchre." The "other disciple" was St. John, who is generally
conceded to have been the youngest of the Apostles. And St. Peter, we
may judge from John xxi. 18, was already past the meridian of life. What
could be more natural than that the younger man should outrun the older
and arrive first at the sepulcher? What better proof could be expected
of the fact of the existence of that sweetness and modesty in youth
which respects old age, and that endeared John to Jesus above all
others, than we have here, where the younger man awaits the arrival of
the older before beginning to explore the deserted tomb?

Examples similar to these might be multiplied at length, since the
Gospel histories are filled with them; but those above mentioned are
deemed sufficient to illustrate the theory of corroboration. The
instances of internal confirmation in the New Testament narratives are
especially convincing. They are arguments and proofs in the nature of
undesigned coincidences which, from the very nature of the case, shut
out all possibility of collusion or fraud. In most cases they are
expressed in a single phrase and represent an isolated thought
corroborative of some other elsewhere expressed. Though small, detached,
and fragmentary, like particles of dynamite, they operate with
resistless force when collected and combined.

Once more attention is called to the fact that these discrepancies
negative completely the idea that the Gospel writers were conspirators,
bent upon the common purpose of deceiving mankind by publishing a false
history to the world. Nothing could be more absurd than to suppose that
men conspiring to perpetrate a fraud, would neglect a fundamental
principle underlying all successful conspiracy; that is, the creation
and maintenance of a due and reasonable consistency between the words
and deeds of the conspirators in formulating plans for carrying out the
common purpose. Then, if there was no previous concert, the fact that
four men, writing at different times and places, concurred in framing
substantially the same history, is one of the strongest proofs of the
credibility of the writers and the truthfulness of their narratives. And
on this point the testimony of a very great writer may be quoted: that
"in a number of concurrent testimonies, where there has been no previous
concert, there is a probability distinct from that which may be termed
the sum of the probabilities resulting from the testimonies of the
witnesses; a probability which would remain, even though the witnesses
were of such a character as to merit no faith at all. This probability
arises from the concurrence itself. That such a concurrence should
spring from chance is as one to infinite; that is, in other words,
morally impossible. If, therefore, concert be excluded, there remains no
cause but the reality of the fact."[25]

Apply the theory of probability, arising from concurrent testimonies,
where there has been no previous concert, to the case of the
Evangelists, and we are at once convinced that they were truthful and
that their histories are true.

(4) Let us now consider the _conformity of the testimony of the
Evangelists with human experience_. This is the fourth legal test of the
credibility of witnesses prescribed by Starkie.

The conformity of testimony with experience is one of the most potent
and universally applied tests of the credibility of witnesses. And it
may be remarked that its application is not confined to judicial
proceedings or to courts of law. It requires no professional attainments
to make it effective. The blacksmith and carpenter, as well as the judge
and jury, employ it in every mental operation where the statements of
others are submitted to analysis and investigation. A new theory being
proposed, the correctness of which is questioned, the test of experience
is at once applied. If it is not in harmony with what we have seen and
heard and felt, we usually reject it; or, at least, doubt it. If an
explorer should return from the Arctic regions and tell us that he had
seen oranges, such as we import from Florida, growing on trees near the
North Pole, we would not believe him. Neither would we credit the
statement of a traveler from South America that he had seen Polar bears
browsing on the banks of the Amazon. These representations would be
utterly inconsistent with what we know to be the essential conditions of
orange culture, and with the well-known habits and climatic nature of
the Polar bear. An ancient document, purporting to date from the time
of Washington and the Revolution, and containing recitals about
railways, telegraphs, telephones, and electric lights, would be
recognized at once as spurious, because our own experience as well as
facts of history would tell us that there were no such things in the
days of Washington and the American Revolution. These are simple
illustrations of the application of the test of experience in the mental
processes of weighing and sifting the testimony of others.

Now, no serious objection to the credibility of the Gospel writers has
been made under the test of the conformity of their statements with
experience, except in the matter of miracles. It is generally admitted,
even by skeptics, that the facts stated in the New Testament narratives
might have happened in the due course of nature and in harmony with
human experience, except where miracles are related.

A few skeptics have declared that a miracle is an impossibility and that
the Evangelists were either deceivers or deceived when they wrote their
accounts of the miraculous performances of the Christ; and that, whether
deceivers or deceived, they are unworthy of belief. The great antagonist
of the theory of miracles among those who assert their impossibility is
Spinoza, who has thus written: "A miracle, whether contrary to or above
nature, is a sheer absurdity. Nothing happens in nature which does not
follow from its laws; these laws extend to all which enters the Divine
mind; and, lastly, nature proceeds in a fixed and changeless
course--whence it follows that the word 'miracle' can only be
understood in relation to the opinions of mankind, and signifies nothing
more than an event, a phenomenon, the cause of which cannot be explained
by another familiar instance.... I might say, indeed, that a miracle was
_that_, the cause of which cannot be explained by our _natural
understanding from the known principles of natural things_."

The radical antagonism of Spinoza to the doctrine of miracles, as taught
in the New Testament scriptures, was the legitimate offspring of his
peculiar philosophy. He was a pantheist and identified God with nature.
He did not believe in a personal God, separate from and superior to
nature. He repudiated the theory of a spiritual kingdom having a
spiritual sovereign to whom earth and nature are subject and obedient.
Therefore, every manifestation of power which he could not identify with
a natural force he believed was unreal, if not actually deceptive and
fraudulent; since he could not imagine anything superior to nature that
could have created the phenomenon. His denial of miracles was, then,
really nothing less than a denial of the existence of a personal God who
spoke the earth into being in the very beginning; and has since, with a
watchful paternal eye, followed its movements and controlled its
destiny.

The question of miracles is really a matter of faith and not a problem
of science. It is impossible to either prove or disprove the nature of a
miracle by physical demonstration. In other words, it is impossible to
analyze a miracle from the standpoint of chemistry or physics. The
performance of a miracle, nevertheless, may be proved by ordinary human
testimony, as any other event may be proved. We may testify to the fact
without being able to understand or to demonstrate the cause.

Those who believe that there are distinct spiritual as well as physical
forces in the universe; that there is somewhere an omniscient and
omnipotent Spiritual Being who has but to will the creation of a planet
or the destruction of matter in order to accomplish the result desired,
can easily believe in the exercise of miraculous power. Those who
believe the Bible account of the creation, that God said in the
beginning, "Let there be light: and there was light"--such persons find
no difficulty in believing that Jesus converted water into wine or
caused the lame to walk, if they believe that He was this same God
"manifest in the flesh." A divinity who, in the morning of creation,
spoke something out of nothing, would certainly not be impotent to
restore life to Lazarus or sight to the blind Bartimeus.

The trouble with the philosophy of Spinoza is that his own high
priestess--Nature--seems to be constantly working miracles under his own
definition; and miracles, too, that very closely resemble the wonders
said to have been wrought by the Christ. Milk is taken into the stomach,
subjected to various processes of digestion, is then thrown into the
blood and finally becomes flesh and bone. The ultimate step in this
process of transformation is unknown and, perhaps, unknowable to
scientists. No deeper mystery is suggested by the New Testament
scriptures. The conversion of water into wine is no stranger, no more
incomprehensible than the transformation of milk into flesh and bone. It
may be admitted that the chemical elements are the same throughout in
one process and different in the other. Nevertheless, the results of
both are perfectly described by Spinoza's definition, "that a miracle
was _that_, the cause of which cannot be explained by our _natural
understanding from the known principles of natural things_."

It may be truthfully remarked that nature is everywhere and at all times
working wonders in harmony with and parallel to the miracles wrought by
the spiritual forces of the universe. God's sovereign miracle may be
described as the changing of a man, with all his sins and imperfections,
into a winged spirit, thus fitting him to leave the coarse and vulgar
earth for life among the stars. Nature, in her feeble way, tries to
imitate the wonder by transforming the caterpillar into a butterfly,
thus fitting it to leave the dunghill for life among the flowers.

Spinoza insists that miracles are impossible because "nature proceeds in
a fixed and changeless course." But is this really true? Are the laws of
nature invariably uniform? Does not nature seem at times tired of
uniformity and resolved to rise to liberty by the creation of what we
call a miracle, or more vulgarly, a "freak"? Moving in what Spinoza is
pleased to call a "fixed and changeless course," nature ordinarily
provides a chicken with two legs and a snake with one head. But what
about chickens with three legs and snakes with two heads, such as are
frequently seen? Was nature moving in a fixed and changeless course when
these things were created? Could Spinoza have explained such phenomena
by his "natural understanding from the known principles of natural
things"? Would he have contented himself with calling them natural
"accidents" or "freaks"? Nevertheless, they are miracles under his
definition; and the entire subject must be discussed and debated with
reference to some standard or definition of a miracle. If nature
occasionally, in moments of sportiveness or digression, upsets her own
laws and creates what we call "freaks," why is it unreasonable to
suppose that the great God who created nature should not, at times,
temporarily suspend the laws which He has made for the government of the
universe, or even devote them to strange and novel purposes in the
creation of those noble phenomena which we call miracles?

Other skeptics, like Renan, do not deny the possibility of miracles, but
simply content themselves with asserting that there is no sufficient
proof that such things ever happened. They thus repudiate the testimony
of the Evangelists in this regard. "It is not," says Renan, "then, in
the name of this or that philosophy, but in the name of universal
experience, that we banish miracle from history. We do not say that
miracles are impossible. We do say that up to this time a miracle has
never been proved." Then the Breton biographer and philosopher gives us
his idea of the tests that should be made in order to furnish adequate
proof that a miracle has been performed. "If to-morrow," he says, "a
thaumaturgus presents himself with credentials sufficiently important to
be discussed and announces himself as able, say, to raise the dead, what
would be done? A commission composed of physiologists, physicists,
chemists, persons accustomed to historical criticism would be named.
This commission would choose a corpse, would assure itself that the
death was real, would select a room in which the experiment should be
made, would arrange the whole system of precautions, so as to leave no
chance of doubt. If, under such conditions, the resurrection were
effected, a probability almost equal to certainty would be established.
As, however, it ought to be possible always to repeat an experiment--to
do over again that which has been done once; and as, in the order of
miracle, there can be no question of ease or difficulty, the
thaumaturgus would be invited to reproduce his marvelous act under other
circumstances, upon other corpses, in another place. If the miracle
should succeed each time, two things would be proved: first, that
supernatural events happen in the world; second, that the power of
producing them belongs or is delegated in certain persons. But who does
not see that no miracle ever took place under these conditions? But that
always hitherto the thaumaturgus has chosen the subject of the
experiment, chosen the spot, chosen the public?"[26]

This is an extract from the celebrated "Life of Jesus" by Renan, and is
intended to demolish the Gospel account of the miracles of the Christ.
It is not too much to say that the great skeptic has failed to exhibit
his usual fairness in argument. He has indirectly compared Jesus to a
thaumaturgus, and has inferentially stated that in the performance of
His miracles He "chose the subject of his experiment, chose the spot,
chose the public." Every student of New Testament history knows that
this is not true of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
performance of miracles by Christ. It is true that vulgar curiosity and
caviling incredulity were not gratified by the presence of specially
summoned "physiologists, physicists, and chemists." But it is equally
true that such persons were not prevented from being present; that there
was no attempt at secrecy or concealment; and that no subject of
experiment, particular spot, or special audience was ever chosen. The
New Testament miracles were wrought, as a general thing, under the open
sky, in the street, by the wayside, on the mountain slope, and in the
presence of many people, both friends and enemies of Jesus. There was no
searching or advertising for subjects for experiment. Far from choosing
the subject, the spot, and the public, Jesus exercised His miraculous
powers upon those who came voluntarily to Him suffering with some
dreadful malady and asking to be cured. In some instances, the case of
affliction was of long standing and well known to the community. The
healing was done publicly and witnessed by many people.

Renan suggests that the thaumaturgus mentioned in his illustration would
be required to repeat his performance in the matter of raising the dead
before he would be fully believed. This reminds us that Jesus wrought
many miracles. More than forty are recorded in the Gospel narratives;
and in the closing verse of St. John, there is a strong intimation that
He performed many that were never recorded. These, it is respectfully
submitted, were amply sufficient to demonstrate His miraculous powers.

Whatever form infidelity may assume in its antagonism to the doctrine of
miracles, it will be found that the central idea is that such things are
not founded in experience; and that this test of credibility fails in
the case of the Gospel writers, because they knowingly recorded
impossible events. It would be idle to attempt to depreciate the value
of this particular test; but it must be observed that nothing is more
fallacious, unless properly defined and limited. It must be remembered
that the experience of one man, nation, or generation is not necessarily
that of another man, nation, or generation. The exact mechanical
processes employed by the Egyptians in raising the pyramids are as much
a mystery to modern scientists as a Marconigram would be to a savage of
New Guinea. The Orient and the Occident present to each other almost
miraculous forms of diversity in manners, habits, and customs, in modes
of thought and life. "The Frenchman says, 'I am the best dyer in Europe:
nobody can equal me, and nobody can surpass Lyons.' Yet in Cashmere,
where the girls make shawls worth $30,000, they will show him three
hundred distinct colors, which he not only cannot make, but cannot even
distinguish." Sir Walter Scott, in his "Tales of the Crusaders,"
thrillingly describes a meeting between the Turkish Saladin and the
English Richard Coeur-de-Lion. Saladin asked Richard to give him an
exhibition of his marvelous strength. The Norman monarch picked up an
iron bar from the floor of the tent and severed it. The Mahometan
crusader was amazed. Richard then asked him what he could do. Saladin
replied that he could not pull iron apart like that, but that he could
do something equally as wonderful. Thereupon, he took an eider-down
pillow from the sofa, and drew his keen, Damascus-tempered blade across
it, which caused it to fall into two pieces. Richard cried in
astonishment: "This is the black art; it is magic; it is the devil: you
cannot cut that which has no resistance!" Here Occidental strength and
Oriental magic met and wrought seeming miracles in the presence of each
other. In his great lecture on "The Lost Arts," Wendell Phillips says
that one George Thompson told him that he saw a man in Calcutta throw a
handful of floss silk into the air, and that a Hindoo severed it into
pieces with his saber. A Western swordsman could not do this.

Objectors to miracles frequently ask why they are not performed to-day,
why we never see them. To which reply may be made that, under Spinoza's
definition, miracles are being wrought every day not only by nature, but
by man. Why call Edison "the magician" and "the wizard," unless the
public believes this? But is it any argument against the miracles of
Jesus that similar ones are not seen to-day? Have things not been done
in the past that will never be repeated? We have referred to the
pyramids of Egypt and to the lost art involved in their construction. A
further illustration may be found in the origin of man. One of two
theories is undoubtedly true: that the first man and woman came into the
world without being born; or that man and woman are the products of
evolution from lower orders of animals. No other theories have ever been
advanced as to the origin of the human race. Now, it is certain that
modern generations have never experienced either of these things, for
all the human beings of to-day were undoubtedly born of other human
beings, and it is certain that the process of evolution stopped long
ago, since men and women were as perfect physically and mentally four
thousand years ago as they are to-day. In other words, the processes
which originated man are things of the past, since we have no Garden of
Eden experiences to-day, nor is there any universal metamorphosis of
monkeys going on. Therefore, to argue that the miracles of Jesus did not
happen, because we do not see such things to-day, is to deny the
undoubted occurrences of history and developments of human life, because
such occurrences and developments are no longer familiar to us and our
generation.

To denounce everything as false that we have not individually seen,
heard, and felt, would be to limit most painfully the range of the
mental vision. The intellectual horizon would not be greatly extended
should we join with our own the experience of others that we have seen
and known. Much information is reported by telegraphic despatch and
many things are told us by travelers that we should accept as true;
although such matters may have no relation to what we have ever seen or
heard. Else, we should be as foolish as the king of Siam who rejected
the story of the Dutch ambassador, that in Holland water was frequently
frozen into a solid mass. In the warm climate of the East Indian tropics
the king had never seen water so congealed and, therefore, he refused to
believe that such a thing had ever happened anywhere.

Experience is a most logical and reasonable test if it is sufficiently
extended to touch all the material phases of the subject under
investigation. It is a most dangerous one if we insist upon judging the
material and spiritual universe, with its infinite variety of forms and
changes, by the limited experience of a simple and isolated life, or by
the particular standards of any one age or race. A progressive
civilization, under such an application of the test, would be
impossible, since each generation of men would have to begin _de novo_,
and be restricted to the results of its own experience. The enforcement
of such a doctrine would prevent, furthermore, the acceptance of the
truths of nature discovered by inventive genius or developed by physical
or chemical research, until such truths had become matters of universal
experience. Every man would then be in the position of the incredulous
citizen who, having been told that a message had been sent by wire from
Baltimore to Washington announcing the nomination of James K. Polk for
the presidency, refused to believe in telegraphic messages until he
could be at both ends of the line at once. The art of telegraphy was a
reality, nevertheless, in spite of his incredulity and inexperience. The
American savages who first beheld the ships of Columbus are said to have
regarded them as huge birds from heaven and to have refused to believe
that they were boats, because, in their experience, they had never seen
such immense canoes with wings. Herodotus tells us of some daring
sailors who crept along the coast of Africa beyond the limits usually
visited at that time. They came back home with a wonderful account of
their trip and told the story that they had actually reached a country
where their shadows fell toward the south at midday. They were not
believed, and their report was rejected with scorn and incredulity by
the inhabitants of the Mediterranean coasts, because their only
experience was that a man's shadow always pointed toward the north; and
they did not believe it possible that shadows could be cast otherwise.
But the report of the sailors was true, nevertheless.[27]

These simple illustrations teach us that beings other than ourselves
have had experiences which are not only different from any that we have
ever had, but are also either temporarily or permanently beyond our
comprehension. And the moral of this truth, when applied to the
statements of the Evangelists regarding miracles, is that the fortunate
subjects and witnesses of the miraculous powers of Jesus might have had
experiences which we have never had and that we cannot now clearly
comprehend.

(5) In the fifth and last place, as to the _coincidence of their
testimony with collateral circumstances_.

This is the chief test of credibility in all those cases where the
witness, whose testimony has been reduced to writing, is dead, absent,
or insane. Under such circumstances it is impossible to apply what may
be termed personal tests on cross-examination; that is, to develop the
impeaching or corroborating features of bias, prejudice, and personal
demeanor to the same extent as when the witness is still living and
testifies orally. When a written narrative is all that we have, its
reliability can only be ascertained by a close inspection of its parts,
comparing them with each other, and then with collateral and
contemporaneous facts and circumstances. The value of this test cannot
be over-estimated, and Greenleaf has stated very fully and concisely the
basis upon which it rests. "Every event," he says, "which actually
transpires, has its appropriate relation and place in the vast
complication of circumstances of which the affairs of men consist; it
owes its origin to the events which have preceded it, is intimately
connected with all others which occur at the same time and place, and
often with those of remote regions, and in its turn gives birth to
numberless others which succeed. In all this almost inconceivable
contexture and seeming discord, there is perfect harmony; and while the
fact which really happened tallies exactly with every other
contemporaneous incident related to it in the remotest degree, it is not
possible for the wit of man to invent a story, which, if closely
compared with the actual occurrences of the same time and place, may
not be shown to be false."[28]

[Illustration: ST. JOHN AND ST. PETER (DÜRER)]

This principle offers a wide field to the skill of the cross-examiner,
and enables him frequently to elicit truth or establish falsehood when
all other tests have failed. It is a principle also perfectly well known
to the perjurer and to the suborner of witnesses. Multiplicity of
details is studiously avoided by the false witness, who dreads
particularity and feels that safety lies in confining his testimony as
nearly as possible to a single fact, whose attendant facts and
circumstances are few and simple. When the witness is too ignorant to
understand the principle and appreciate the danger, his attorney, if he
consents to dishonor his profession and pollute the waters of justice
with corrupt testimony, may be depended upon to administer proper
warning. The witness will be told to know as few things and to remember
as little as possible concerning matters about which he has not been
previously instructed. The result will be that his testimony, especially
in matters in which he is compelled by the court to testify, will be
hesitating, restrained, unequal, and unnatural. He will be served at
every turn by a most convenient memory which will enable him to forget
many important and to remember many unimportant facts and circumstances.
He will betray a painful hesitancy in the matter of committing himself
upon any particular point upon which he has not been already drilled.
The truthful witness, on the other hand, is usually candid, ingenuous,
and copious in his statements. He shows a willingness to answer all
questions, even those involving the minutest details, and seems totally
indifferent to the question of verification or contradiction. The
texture of his testimony is, therefore, equal, natural, and
unrestrained.

Now these latter characteristics mark every page of the New Testament
histories. The Gospel writers wrote with the utmost freedom, and
recorded in detail and with the utmost particularity, the manners,
customs, habits, and historic facts contemporaneous with their lives.
The naturalness and ingenuousness of their writings are simply
marvelous. There is nowhere any evidence of an attempt to conceal, patch
up, or reconcile. No introductory exclamations or subsequent
explanations which usually characterize false testimony appear anywhere
in their writings. They were seemingly absolutely indifferent to whether
they were believed or not. Their narratives seem to say: These are
records of truth; and if the world rejects them it rejects the facts of
history. Such candor and assurance are always overwhelmingly impressive;
and in every forum of debate are regarded as unmistakable signs of
truth.

The Evangelists, it must be assumed, were fully aware of the danger of
too great particularity in the matter of false testimony, and would have
hesitated to commit themselves on so many points if their statements had
been untrue. We have already noted the opinion of Professor Holtzmann,
of Heidelberg, that the Synoptic Gospels were committed to writing
between the years 60 and 80 of our era. At that time it is certain that
there were still living many persons who were familiar with the events
in the life and teachings of the Savior, as well as with the numerous
other facts and circumstances related by the sacred writers. St. Paul,
in I Cor. xv. 6, speaks of five hundred brethren to whom the risen Jesus
appeared at one time; and he adds, "_of whom the greater part remain
unto this present, but some are fallen asleep_." And it must be
remembered that this particular group of two hundred and fifty or more
were certainly not the only persons then living who had a distinct
remembrance of the Master, His teachings, and His miracles. Many who had
been healed by Him, children who had sat upon His knee and been blessed
by Him, and many members of the Pharisaic party and of the Sadducean
aristocracy who had persecuted Him and had then slain Him, were
doubtless still living and had a lively recollection of the events of
the ministry of the Nazarene. Such persons were in a position to
disprove from their personal knowledge false statements made by the
Evangelists. A consciousness of this fact would have been, within
itself, a strong inducement to tell the truth.

But not only are the Gospels not contradicted by contemporaneous
writers; they are also not impeached or disproved by later scientific
research and historical investigation. And at this point we come to make
a direct application of the test of the coincidence of their testimony
with collateral and contemporaneous history. For this purpose, as a
matter of illustration, only facts in profane history corroborative of
the circumstances attending the trial and crucifixion of the Master
will be cited.

In the first place, the Evangelists tell us that Pontius Pilate sat in
judgment on the Christ. Both Josephus and Tacitus tell us that Pilate
was governor of Judea at that time.[29]

In John xviii. 31 we read: "Then said Pilate unto them, Take ye him, and
judge him according to your law. The Jews therefore said unto him, _It
is not lawful for us to put any man to death._" From many profane
historians, ancient and modern, we learn that the power of life and
death had been taken from the Jews and vested in the Roman governor.[30]

In John xix. 16, 17 occurs this passage: "And they took Jesus, and led
him away; and he, _bearing his cross_, went forth." This corroborative
sentence is found in Plutarch: "Every kind of wickedness produces its
own particular torment; just as every malefactor, when he is brought
forth to execution, _carries his own cross_."[31]

In Matthew xxvii. 26 we read: "When he had scourged Jesus, he delivered
him to be crucified." That scourging was a preliminary to crucifixion
among the Romans is attested by many ancient writers, among whom may be
mentioned Josephus and Livy. The following passages are taken from
Josephus:

Whom, having _first scourged with whips_, he crucified.[32]

Being _beaten_, they were crucified opposite to the citadel.[33]

He was burned alive, _having been first beaten_.[34]

From Livy, a single sentence will suffice:

All were led out, _beaten with rods_, and beheaded.[35]

In John xix. 19, 20 we read: "And Pilate wrote a title and put it on the
cross; and it was written in Hebrew, and Greek, and Latin." That it was
a custom among the Romans to affix the accusation against the criminal
to the instrument of his punishment appears from several ancient
writers, among them Suetonius and Dion Cassius. In Suetonius occurs this
sentence: "He exposed the father of the family to the dogs, with this
_title_, 'A gladiator, impious in speech.'"[36] And in Dion Cassius
occurs the following: "Having led him through the midst of the court or
assembly, _with a writing signifying the cause of his death, and
afterwards crucifying him_."[37]

And finally, we read in John xix. 32: "Then came the soldiers and _brake
the legs_ of the first, and of the other which was crucified with him."
By an edict of Constantine, the punishment of crucifixion was abolished.
Speaking in commendation of this edict, a celebrated heathen writer
mentions the circumstances of _breaking the legs_. "He was pious to such
a degree," says this writer, "that he was the first to set aside that
very ancient punishment, the cross, with the _breaking of legs_."[38]

If we leave the narrow circle of facts attendant upon the trial and
crucifixion of Jesus with its corroborative features of contemporary
history, and consider the Gospel narratives as a whole, we shall find
that they are confirmed and corroborated by the facts and teachings of
universal history and experience. An examination of these narratives
will also reveal a divine element in them which furnishes conclusive
proof of their truthfulness and reliability. A discussion of the divine
or spiritual element in the Gospel histories would be foreign to the
purpose of this treatise. The closing pages of Part I will be devoted to
a consideration of the human element in the New Testament narratives.
This will be nothing more than an elaboration of the fifth legal test of
credibility mentioned by Starkie.

By the human or historical element of credibility in the Gospel
histories is meant that likeness or resemblance in matters of
representation of fact to other matters of representation of fact which
we find recorded in secular histories of standard authority whose
statements we are accustomed to accept as true. The relations of
historic facts to each other, and the connections and coincidences of
things known or believed to be true with still others sought to be
proved, form a fundamental ground of belief, and are, therefore,
reliable modes of proof. The most casual perusal of the New Testament
narratives suggests certain striking resemblances between the events
therein narrated and well-known historical occurrences related by
secular historians whose statements are implicitly believed. Let us
draw a few parallels and call attention to a few of these resemblances.

Describing the anguish of the Savior in the Garden, St. Luke says: "And
being in an agony, He prayed more earnestly: And his sweat was as it
were great drops of blood falling down to the ground."[39]

This strange phenomenon of the "bloody sweat" has been of such rare
occurrence in the history of the world that its happening in Gethsemane
has been frequently denied. The account of it has been ascribed to the
overwrought imagination of the third Evangelist in recording the errors
of tradition. And yet similar cases are well authenticated in the works
of secular writers. Tissot reports a case of "a sailor who was so
alarmed by a storm, that through fear he fell down, and his face sweated
blood which, during the whole continuance of the storm, returned like
ordinary sweat, as fast as it was wiped away."[40] Schenck cites the
case of "a nun who fell into the hands of soldiers; and, on seeing
herself encompassed with swords and daggers threatening instant death,
was so terrified and agitated that she discharged blood from every part
of her body, and died of hemorrhage in the sight of her assailants."[41]
Writing of the death of Charles IX of France, Voltaire says: "The
disease which carried him off is very uncommon; his blood flowed from
all his pores. This malady, of which there are some examples, is the
result either of excessive fear, furious passion, or of a violent and
melancholic temperament."[42] The same event is thus graphically
described by the old French historian, De Mezeray: "After the vigor of
his youth and the energy of his courage had long struggled against his
disease, he was at length reduced by it to his bed at the castle of
Vincennes, about the 8th of May, 1574. During the last two weeks of his
life his constitution made strange efforts. He was affected with spasms
and convulsions of extreme violence. He tossed and agitated himself
continually and his blood gushed from all the outlets of his body, even
from the pores of his skin, so that on one occasion he was found bathed
in a bloody sweat."[43]

If the sailor, the nun, and the king of France were afflicted with the
"bloody sweat," why should it seem incredible that the man Jesus, the
carpenter of Nazareth, should have been similarly afflicted? If Tissot,
Schenck, and Voltaire are to be believed, why should we refuse to
believe St. Luke? If St. Luke told the truth in this regard, why should
we doubt his statements concerning other matters relating to the life,
death, and resurrection of the Son of God? Does not Voltaire, the most
brilliant and powerful skeptic that ever lived, corroborate in this
particular the biographer of the Christ?

Let us pass to another instance of resemblance and corroboration. While
describing the crucifixion, St. John wrote the following: "But one of
the soldiers with a spear pierced his side, and forthwith came there
out _blood and water_."[44] Early skeptical criticism denied the account
of the flowing of blood and water from the side of the Savior because,
in the first place, the other Evangelists did not mention the
circumstance; and, in the second place, it was an unscientific fact
stated. But modern medical science has very cleverly demonstrated that
Jesus, according to the Gospel accounts, died of rupture of the heart.
About the middle of the last century, a celebrated English physician and
surgeon, Dr. Stroud, wrote a treatise entitled, "Physical Cause of the
Death of Christ." In this book, he proved very clearly that cardiac
rupture was the immediate cause of the death of Jesus on the cross. Many
arguments were adduced to establish this fact. Among others, it was
urged that the shortness of time during which the sufferer remained upon
the cross and His loud cry just before "He gave up the ghost," tended to
prove that a broken heart was the cause of the death of the Man of
Sorrows. But the strongest proof, according to the author of this work,
was the fact that blood and water flowed from the dead man when a spear
was thrust into His side. This, says Dr. Stroud, has happened frequently
when the heart was suddenly and violently perforated after death from
cardiac rupture. Within a few hours after death from this cause, he
says, the blood frequently separates into its constituent parts or
essential elements: _crassamentum_, a soft clotted substance of deep-red
color, and _serum_, a pale, watery liquid--popularly called blood and
water, which will flow out separately, if the pericardium and heart be
violently torn or punctured. In this treatise numerous medical
authorities are cited and the finished work is indorsed by several of
the most famous physicians and surgeons of England.

It is very probable that St. John did not know the physical cause of the
strange flow of blood and water from the side of Jesus. It seems that he
was afraid that he would not be believed; for, in the following verse,
he was careful to tell the world that he himself had personally seen it.
"And he that _saw it_ bare record, and his record is true: And he
knoweth that he saith true that ye might believe."[45]

Here again modern medical science has corroborated, in the matter of the
flowing of blood and water from the side of Jesus, the simple narrative
of the gentle and loving Evangelist.

Still another illustration of resemblance, coincidence, and
corroboration is furnished by the incident of the arrest of Jesus in the
Garden. St. John says: "As soon, then, as he had said unto them, I am
he, they went backward and fell to the ground."[46]

This is only one of several cases mentioned in history where ordinary
men have been dazed and paralyzed in the presence of illustrious men
against whom they were designing evil. When a Gallic trooper was sent by
Sulla to Minturnæ to put Marius to death, the old Roman lion, his great
eyes flashing fire, arose and advanced toward the slave, who fled in
utter terror from the place, exclaiming, "I cannot kill Caius
Marius!"[47]

Again, we learn from St. Matthew that at the moment of the arrest in
the Garden, "all the disciples forsook him and fled."

This is no isolated case of cowardice and desertion. It is merely an
illustration of a universal truth: that the multitude will follow
blindly and adore insanely the hero or prophet in his hour of triumph
and coronation, but will desert and destroy him at the moment of his
humiliation and crucifixion.

Note the burning of Savonarola. The patriot-priest of the Florentine
Republic believed himself inspired of God; his heroic life and martyr
death seemed to justify his claim. From the pulpit of St. Mark's he
became the herald and evangel of the Reformation, and his devoted
followers hung upon his words as if inspiration clothed them with
messages from the skies. And yet when a wicked Inquisition had nailed
him to the cross and fagots were flaming about him, this same multitude
who adored him, now reviled him and jeered and mocked his martyrdom.

Note the career of Napoleon. When the sun of Austerlitz rose upon the
world the whole French nation grew delirious with love and homage for
their emperor, who was once a subaltern of Corsica. But when the Allies
entered Paris after the battle of Leipsic, this same French nation
repudiated their imperial idol, cast down his images, canceled his
decrees, and united with all Europe in demanding his eternal banishment
from France. The voyage to Elba followed. But the historic melodrama of
popular fidelity and fickleness was not yet completely played. When this
same Napoleon, a few months later, escaped from his islet prison in the
Mediterranean and landed on the shores of France, this same French
nation again grew delirious, welcomed the royal exile with open arms,
showered him with his eagles, and almost smothered him with kisses. A
hundred days passed. On the frightful field of Waterloo, "Chance and
Fate combined to wreck the fortunes of their former king." Again the
fickle French multitude heaped execrations upon their fallen monarch,
declared the Napoleonic dynasty at an end and welcomed with acclamations
of joy the return of the exiled Bourbon Louis XVIII.

And when the Evangelist wrote these words: "All the disciples forsook
him and fled," he simply gave expression to a form of truth which all
history reflects and corroborates.

Again, the parallels and resemblances of sacred and profane history do
not seem to stop with mere narratives of facts. Secular history seems to
have produced at times characters in the exact likeness of those in
sacred history. The resemblance is often so striking as to create
astonishment. For instance, who was St. Peter but Marshal Ney by
anticipation? Peter was the leader of the Apostolic Twelve; Ney was the
chief of the Twelve Marshals of Napoleon. Peter was impulsive and
impetuous; so was Ney. Peter was the first to speak and act in all the
emergencies of the Apostolic ministry; Ney, so Dumas tells us, was
always impatient to open the battle and lead the first charge. Peter was
probably the last to leave the garden in which the great tragedy of his
Master had begun; Ney was the last to leave the horrors of a Russian
winter in which the beginning of the end of the career of his monarch
was plainly seen. Peter denied Jesus; Ney repudiated Napoleon, and even
offered to bring him, at the time of his escape from Elba, in a cage to
Louis XVIII. Peter was afterwards crucified for his devotion to Jesus
whom he had denied; Ney was afterwards shot for loyalty to Napoleon whom
he had once repudiated.

The examples heretofore given involve the idea of comparison and are
based upon resemblance. These illustrations could be greatly extended,
but it is believed that enough has been said in this connection.
However, in closing this brief discussion of the human element in the
sacred writings as evidenced by the coincidences and resemblances of
their narratives to those of profane history, slight mention may be made
of another test of truth which may be applied to the histories of the
Evangelists. This test is not derived from a comparison which is focused
upon any particular group of historic facts. It springs from an
instantaneously recognized and inseparable connection between the
statements made by the Gospel writers and the experience of the human
race. A single illustration will suffice to elucidate this point. When
Jesus was nailed upon the cross, the sad and pathetic spectacle was
presented of the absence of the Apostolic band, with the exception of
St. John, who was the only Apostle present at the crucifixion. The male
members of the following of the Nazarene did not sustain and soothe
their Master in the supreme moment of His anguish. But the women of His
company were with Him to the end. Mary, his mother, Mary Magdalene,
Mary, the wife of Cleophas, Salome, the mother of St. John the
Evangelist, and others, doubtless among "the women that followed him
from Galilee," ministered to His sufferings and consoled Him with their
presence. They were the last to cling to His cross and the first to
greet Him on the morning of the third day; for when the resurrection
morn dawned upon the world, these same women were seen hastening toward
the sepulcher bearing spices--fragrant offerings of deathless love. What
a contrast between the loyalty and devotion of the women and the fickle,
faltering adherence of the men who attended the footsteps of the Man of
Sorrows in His last days! One of His Apostles denied Him, another
betrayed Him, and all, excepting one, deserted Him in His death
struggle. His countrymen crucified Him ignominiously. But "not one woman
mentioned in the New Testament ever lifted her voice against the Son of
God."

This revelation from the sacred pages of the devotion of woman is
reflected in universal history and experience. It is needless to give
examples. Suffice it to say that when Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John tell
us of this devotion, we simply answer: yes, this has been ever true in
all countries and in every age. We have learned it not only from history
but from our own experience in all the affairs of life, extending from
the cradle to the grave. The night of sorrow never grows so dark that a
mother's love will not irradiate the gloom. The criminal guilt of a
wayward son can never become so black that her arms will not be found
about him. If we pass from loving loyalty to the individual, to
patriotic devotion to the causes of the nations, woman's fidelity is
still undying. The women of France are said to have paid the German war
debt. The message of the Spartan mother to her soldier son is too well
known to be repeated. When the legions of Scipio engirdled the walls of
Carthage and desperation seized the inhabitants of the Punic city,
Carthaginian women cut their long black hair to furnish bowstrings to
the Carthaginian archers. Illustrations might be multiplied; but these
will suffice to show that Mary and Martha and Salome, the women of the
Gospels, are simply types of the consecrated women of the world.

When we come to summarize, we are led to declare that if the Gospel
historians be not worthy of belief we are without foundation for
rational faith in the secular annals of the human race. No other
literature bears historic scrutiny so well as the New Testament
biographies. Not by a single chain, but by three great chains can we
link our Bible of to-day with the Apostolic Bible. The great
manuscripts: the Vatican, the Alexandrian, and the Sinaitic, dating from
the middle of the fourth and fifth centuries, must have been copies of
originals, or at least of first copies. The Bible is complete in these
manuscripts to-day.

The Versions, translations of the original Scriptures from the language
in which they were first written into other languages, form a perfect
connection between the days of the Apostles and our own. The Vulgate,
the celebrated Latin version of St. Jerome, was completed A.D. 385. In
making this translation the great scholar has himself said that he used
"ancient (Greek) copies." Manuscripts that were ancient, A.D. 385, must
have been the original writings, or, at least, first copies. The
Vulgate, then, is alone a perfect historic connection between the Bible
that we read to-day and that studied by the first Christians.

Again, the Writings of the Church Fathers furnish a chain, without a
single missing link, between the Bible of this generation and that of
the first generation of the followers of the Christ. It has been
truthfully said that if all the Bibles in the world were destroyed an
almost perfect Bible could be reconstructed from quotations from these
writings, so numerous and so exact are they. Beginning with Barnabas and
Clement, companions of St. Paul, and coming down through the ages, there
is not a single generation in which some prince or potentate of the
Church has not left convincing evidence in writing that the Books of the
Old and New Testament which we read to-day are identical with those read
by the first propagators of our faith. The chain of proof forged from
the Writings of the early Fathers is made up of a hundred links, each
perfect within itself and yet relinked and welded with a hundred others
that make each and all doubly strong. If these various testimonies, the
Manuscripts, the Versions, and the Writings of the Church Fathers, be
taken, not singly, but collectively, in support and corroboration of
each other, we have, then, not merely a chain but rather a huge
spiritual cable of many wires, stretching across the great sea of time
and linking our Bible of to-day inseparably with that of the Apostolic
Age.

If it be objected that these various writings might have been and
probably were corrupted in coming down to us through the centuries,
reply may be made that the facts of history repel such suggestions. As
Mr. Greenleaf has suggested, the jealousy of opposing sects preserved
them from forgery and mutilation. Besides these sects, it may be added,
there were, even in the earliest times, open and avowed infidels who
assaulted the cardinal tenets of the Christian faith and made the Gospel
histories the targets for their attacks. They, too, would have detected
and denounced any attempt from any source to corrupt these writings.

Another and final, and probably the most cogent reason for the
remarkable preservation of the books of the Bible, is the reverential
care bestowed upon them by their custodians in every age. It is
difficult for the modern world to fully appreciate the meaning and
extent of this reverence and care. Before the age of printing, it must
be remembered, the masses of the people could not and did not possess
Bibles. In the Middle Ages it required a small fortune to own a single
copy. The extreme scarcity enhanced not only the commercial value but
added to the awful sanctity that attached to the precious volume; on the
principle that the person of a king becomes more sacred and mysterious
when least seen in public. Synagogues and monasteries were, for many
centuries, the sole repositories of the Holy Books, and the deliberate
mutilation of any portion of the Bible would have been regarded like
the blaspheming of the Deity or the desecration of a shrine. These
considerations alone are sufficient reason why the Holy Scriptures have
come down to us uncorrupted and unimpaired.

These various considerations are the logical basis of that rule of law
laid down by Mr. Greenleaf, under which the Gospel histories would be
admitted into a modern court of law in a modern judicial proceeding.

Under legal tests laid down by Starkie, we have seen that the
Evangelists should be believed, because: (1) They were honest and
sincere, that is, they believed that they were telling the truth; (2)
they were undoubtedly men of good intelligence and were eyewitnesses of
the facts narrated by them in the New Testament histories; (3) they were
independent historians, who wrote at different times and places and, in
all essential details, fully corroborate each other; (4) excepting in
the matter of miracles, which skepticism has never been able to fully
disprove, their testimony is in full conformity with human experience;
(5) their testimony coincides fully and accurately with all the
collateral, social, historical, and religious circumstances of their
time, as well as with the teachings and experience of universal history
in every age.

Having received from antiquity an uncorrupted message, born of truth, we
have, it is believed, a perfect record of fact with which to discuss the
trial of Jesus.

PART II

_HEBREW CRIMINAL LAW_

[Illustration: MOSES AND THE LAW (MICHAEL ANGELO)]

CHAPTER I

HEBREW CRIMINAL LAW--MOSAIC AND TALMUDIC

The Pentateuch and the Talmud form the double basis of Hebrew
jurisprudence. "The wisdom of the lawgiver," says Bacon, "consists not
only in a platform of justice, but in the application thereof." The
Mosaic Code, embodied in the Pentateuch, furnished to the children of
Israel the necessary platform of justice; ancient tradition and Rabbinic
interpretation contained in the Talmud, supplied needed rules of
practical application. Employing classic terminology, it may be said
that the ordinances of Moses were the substantive and the provisions of
the Talmud were the adjective laws of the ancient Hebrews. These terms
are not strictly accurate, however, since many absolute rights are
declared and defined in the Talmud as well as in the Pentateuch. Another
definition, following the classification of Roman legists, describes
Mosaic injunction as the _lex scripta_ and Talmudic provision as the
_lex non scripta_ of the Commonwealth of Israel. In other words, the
Pentateuch was the foundation, the cornerstone; the Talmud was the
superstructure, the gilded dome of the great temple of Hebrew justice.

Bible students throughout the world are familiar with the provisions of
the Mosaic Code; but the contents of the Talmud are known to few, even
among scholars and literary men. The most appalling ignorance has
existed in every age among the Gentile uninitiated as to the nature and
identity of this gigantic literary compilation. Henricus Segnensis, a
pious monk of the Middle Ages, having heard and read many things about
the despised heretical Talmud, conceived it to be a person and, in a
transport of religious frenzy, declared that he would sooner or later
have _him, the Talmud_, put to death by the hangman![48]

For the benefit of the average reader as well as to illuminate the
general subject, a short description of the Talmud will be given.

_Definition._--Many attempts have been made to define the Talmud, but
all definition of this monumental literary production is necessarily
inaccurate and incomplete because of the vastness and peculiarity of the
matter treated. To describe it as an encyclopedia of the life and
literature, law and religion, art and science of the Hebrew people
during a thousand years would convey only an approximately correct idea
of its true meaning, for it is even more than the foregoing descriptive
terms would indicate. Emanuel Deutsch in his brilliant essay on the
Talmud defines it as "a Corpus Juris, an encyclopedia of law, civil and
penal, ecclesiastical and international, human and divine. It is a
microcosm, embracing, even as does the Bible, heaven and earth. It is as
if all the prose and poetry, the science, the faith and speculation of
the Old World were, though only in faint reflections, bound up in it _in
nuce_."

Benny describes it as "the Talmud--that much maligned and even more
misunderstood compilation of the rabbins; that digest of what Carlyle
would term _allerlei-wissenschaften_; which is at once the compendium of
their literature, the storehouse of their tradition, the exponent of
their faith, the record of their acquirements, the handbook of their
ceremonials and the summary of their legal code, civil and penal."

To speak of the Talmud as a book would be inaccurate. It is a small
library, or collection of books. "Modern editions of the Talmud,
including the most important commentaries, consist of about 3,000 folio
sheets, or 12,000 folio pages of closely printed matter, generally
divided into twelve or twenty volumes. One page of Talmudic Hebrew
intelligibly translated into English would cover three pages; the
translation of the whole Talmud with its commentaries would accordingly
make a library of 400 volumes, each numbering 360 octavo pages."[49]

It would be well to bear in mind that the contents of the Talmud were
not proclaimed to the world by any executive, legislative, or judicial
body; that they were not the result of any resolution or mandate of any
congregation, college, or Sanhedrin; that they were not, in any case,
formal or statutory. They were simply a great mass of traditionary
matter and commentary transmitted orally through many centuries before
being finally reduced to writing. Rabbinism claims for these traditions
a remote antiquity, declaring them to be coeval with the proclamation of
the Decalogue. Many learned doctors among the Jews ascribe this
antiquity to the whole mass of traditional laws. Others maintain that
only the principles upon which Rabbinic interpretation and discussion
are based, can be traced back so far. But it is certain that distinct
traditions are to be found at a very early period in the history of the
children of Israel, and that on their return from Babylonian captivity
these traditions were delivered to them by Ezra and his coadjutors of
the Great Assembly.

This development of Hebrew jurisprudence along lines of written and oral
law, Pentateuch and Talmud, Mosaic ordinance and time-honored tradition,
seems to have followed in obedience to a general principle of juristic
growth. _Lex scripta_ and _lex non scripta_ are classical Roman terms of
universal application in systems of enlightened jurisprudence. A
charter, a parchment, a marble column, a table of stone, a sacred book,
containing written maxims defining legal rights and wrongs are the
beginnings of all civilized schemes of justice. Around these written,
fundamental laws grow and cluster the race traditions of a people which
attach themselves to and become inseparable from the prime organic
structure. These oral traditions are the natural and necessary products
of a nation's growth and progress. The laws of the Medes and Persians,
at once unalterable and irrevocable, represent a strange and painful
anomaly in the jurisprudence of mankind. No written constitution,
incapable of amendment and subject to strict construction, can long
survive the growth and expansion of a great and progressive people. The
ever-changing, perpetually evolving forms of social, commercial,
political, and religious life of a restless, marching, ambitious race,
necessitate corresponding changes and evolutions in laws and
constitutions. These necessary legal supplements are as varied in origin
as are the nations that produce them. Magna Charta, wrung from John at
Runnymede, became the written basis of English law and freedom, and
around it grew up those customs and traditions that--born on the shores
of the German Ocean, transplanted to the Isles of Britain, nurtured and
developed through a thousand years of judicial interpretation and
application--became the great basic structure of the Common Law of
England.

What the Mosaic Code was to the ancient Hebrews, what Magna Charta is to
Englishmen, the Koran is to Mahometans: the written charter of their
faith and law. Surrounding the Koran are many volumes of tradition, made
up of the sayings of Mahomet, which are regarded as equally sacred and
authoritative as the Koran itself. These volumes of Mahometan tradition
are called the Sonna and correspond to the Talmud of the Hebrews. An
analysis of any great system of jurisprudence will reveal the same
natural arrangement of written and oral law as that represented by the
Pentateuch and the Talmud of the Jews.

The word "Talmud" has various meanings, as it appears in Hebrew
traditional literature. It is an old scholastic term, and "is a noun
formed from the verb 'limmed'='to teach.' It therefore means, primarily,
'teaching,' although it denotes also 'learning'; it is employed in this
latter sense with special reference to the Torah, the terms 'Talmud' and
'Torah' being usually combined to indicate the study of the Law, both in
its wider and its more restricted sense."[50] It is thus frequently used
in the sense of the word "exegesis," meaning Biblical exposition or
interpretation. But with the etymological and restricted, we are not so
much interested as with the popular and general signification of the
term "Talmud." Popularly used, it means simply a small collection of
books represented by two distinct editions handed down to posterity by
the Palestinian and Babylonian schools during the early centuries of the
Christian era.

_Divisions of the Talmud._--The Talmud is divided into two component
parts: the Mishna, which may be described as the _text_; and the Gemara,
which may be termed the _commentary_.[51] The Mishna, meaning tradition,
is almost wholly law. It was, indeed, of old, translated as the Second
or Oral Law--the [Greek: deuterôsis]--to distinguish it from the Written
Law delivered by God to Moses. The relationship between the Mishna,
meaning oral law, and the Gemara, meaning commentary, may be illustrated
by a bill introduced into Congress and the debates which follow. In a
general way, the bill corresponds to the Mishna, and the debates to the
Gemara. The distinction, however, is that the law resulting from the
passage of the bill is the effect and culmination of the debate; while
the Mishna was already law when the Gemara or commentary was made.

As we have seen above, Hebrew jurisprudence in its principles and in the
manner of their interpretation was chiefly transmitted by the living
voice of tradition. These laws were easily and safely handed down from
father to son through successive generations as long as Jewish
nationality continued and the Temple at Jerusalem still stood. But, with
the destruction of the Temple and the banishment of the Jews from
Palestine (A.D. 70), the danger became imminent that in the loss of
their nationality would also be buried the remembrance of their laws.
Moved with pity and compassion for the sad condition of his people,
Judah the Holy, called Rabbi for preëminence, resolved to collect and
perpetuate for them in writing their time-honored traditions. His work
received the name Mishna, the same which we have discussed above. But it
must not be imagined that this work was the sudden or exclusive effort
of Rabbi Judah. His achievement was merely the sum total and culmination
of the labors of a long line of celebrated Hebrew sages. "The Oral Law
had been recognized by Ezra; had become important in the days of the
Maccabees; had been supported by Pharisaism; narrowed by the school of
Shammai, codified by the school of Hillel, systematized by R. Akiba,
placed on a logical basis by R. Ishmael, exegetically amplified by R.
Eliezer, and constantly enriched by successive rabbis and their
schools. Rabbi Judah put the coping-stone to the immense structure."[52]

Emanuel Deutsch gives the following subdivisions of the Mishna:

The Mishna is divided into six sections. These are subdivided again
into 11, 12, 7, 9 (or 10), 11, and 12 chapters, respectively, which
are further broken up into 524 paragraphs. We shall briefly
describe their contents:

Section I. Seeds: of Agrarian Laws, commencing with a chapter on
Prayers. In this section, the various tithes and donations due to
the Priests, the Levites, and the poor, from the products of the
lands, and further the Sabbatical year and the prohibited mixtures
in plants, animals, garments, are treated of.

Section II. Feasts: of Sabbaths, Feast, and Fast days, the work
prohibited, the ceremonies ordained, the sacrifices to be offered,
on them. Special chapters are devoted to the Feast of the Exodus
from Egypt, to the New Year's Day, to the Day of Atonement (one of
the most impressive portions of the whole book), to the Feast of
Tabernacles and to that of Haman.

Section III. Women: of betrothal, marriage, divorce, etc., also of
vows.

Section IV. Damages: including a great part of the civil and
criminal law. It treats of the law of trover, of buying and
selling, and the ordinary monetary transactions. Further, of the
greatest crime known to the law, viz., idolatry. Next of witnesses,
of oaths, of legal punishments, and of the Sanhedrin itself. This
section concludes with the so-called "Sentences of the Fathers,"
containing some of the sublimest ethical dicta known in the history
of religious philosophy.

Section V. Sacred Things: of sacrifices, the first-born, etc.; also
of the measurements of the Temple (Middoth).

Section VI. Purifications: of the various levitical and other
hygienic laws, of impure things and persons, their purification,
etc.[53]

_Recensions._--The Talmud exists in two recensions: the Jerusalem and
the Babylonian. These two editions represent a double Gemara; the first
(Jerusalem) being an expression of the schools in Palestine and redacted
at Tiberias about 390 A.D.; the second (Babylonian) being an expression
of the schools in Babylonia and redacted about 365-427 A.D.

The Mishna, having been formed into a code, became in its turn what the
Pentateuch had been before it, a basis of discussion and development.
The Gemara of the Jerusalem Talmud embodies the critical discussions and
disquisitions on the Mishna by hundreds of learned doctors who lived in
Palestine, chiefly in Galilee, from the end of the second till about the
middle of the fifth century of the Christian era. The Gemara of the
Babylonian Talmud embodies the criticisms and dissertations on the same
Mishna of numerous learned doctors living in various places in
Babylonia, but chiefly those of the two great schools of Sura and
Pumbaditha.[54] The Babylonian Talmud is written in "West Aramæan," is
the product of six or seven generations of constant development, and is
about four times as large as that of the Jerusalem Talmud, which is
written in "East Aramæan."[55] It should be kept clearly before the mind
that the only difference between these two recensions is in the matter
of commentary. The two sets of doctors whose different commentaries
distinguish the two Talmuds dealt with the same Mishna as a basis of
criticism. But decided differences are noticeable in the subject matter
and style of the two Gemaras represented by the two recensions of the
Talmud. The discussions and commentaries in the Jerusalem Talmud are
simple, brief, and pointed; while those of the Babylonian Talmud are
generally subtle, abstruse, and prolix. The dissertations in the
Jerusalem Talmud are filled to overflowing with archæology, geography,
and history, while the Babylonian Talmud is more marked by legal and
religious development.

But the reader should not form a wrong impression of the contents of the
Talmud. They are a blending of the oral law of the Mishna and the notes
and comments of the sages. The characteristics of both the editions are
legal and religious, but a multitude of references are made in each to
things that have no connection with either religion or law. "The Talmud
does, indeed, offer us a perfect picture of the cosmopolitanism and
luxury of those final days of Rome, such as but few classical or
postclassical writings contain. We find mention made of Spanish fish, of
Cretan apples, Bithynian cheese, Egyptian lentils and beans, Greek and
Egyptian pumpkins, Italian wine, Median beer, Egyptian Zyphus; garments
imported from Pelusium and India, shirts from Cilicia, and veils from
Arabia. To the Arabic, Persian, and Indian materials contained, in
addition to these, in the Gemara, a bare allusion may suffice. So much
we venture to predict, that when once archæological and linguistic
science shall turn to this field, they will not leave it again soon."

_Relation of Talmud to Mishna._--The relation of the Talmud, used in the
popular sense, to the Mishna, raises the question of the relation of the
whole to one of its parts. The varying meanings of Mishna, Gemara, and
Talmud very easily confuse the ordinary reader. If these terms are
considered separately in the order in which they appear in the preceding
sentence, simple mathematical addition will greatly aid in elucidating
matters. The Mishna is a vast mass of tradition or oral law which was
finally reduced to writing about the close of the second century of the
Christian era. The Gemara is the Rabbinical exposition of the meaning of
the Mishna. The Talmud is the sum of the Mishna plus the Gemara. In
other words, the Talmud is the elaboration or amplification of the
Mishna by manifold commentaries, designated as the Gemara. It frequently
happens that the Talmud and the Mishna appear in the same sentence as
terms designating entirely different things. This association in a
different sense inevitably breeds confusion, unless we pause to consider
that the Mishna has a separate existence from the Talmud and a distinct
recension of its own. In this state it is simply a naked code of laws.
But when the Gemara has been added to it the Talmud is the result,
which, in its turn, becomes a distinct entity and may be referred to as
such in the same sentence with the Mishna.

_Relation of Talmud to Pentateuch._--As before suggested, the
Pentateuch, or Mosaic Code, was the Written Law and the very foundation
of ancient Hebrew jurisprudence. The Talmud, composed of the Mishna,
i.e., Tradition, and the Gemara, i.e., Commentary, was the Oral Law,
connected with, derived from, and built upon the Written Law. It must be
remembered that the commonwealth of the Jews was a pure theocracy and
that all law as well as all religion emanated directly or indirectly
from Jehovah. This was as true of Talmudic tradition as of Mosaic
ordinance. Hillel, who interpreted tradition, was as much inspired of
God as was Moses when he received the Written Law on Sinai. Emanuel
Deutsch is of the opinion that from the very beginning of the Mosaic law
there must have existed a number of corollary laws which were used to
interpret and explain the written rules; that, besides, there were
certain enactments of the primitive Council of the Desert, and certain
verdicts issued by the later "judges within the gates"--all of which
entered into the general body of the Oral Law and were transmitted side
by side with the Written Law through the ages.[56] The fourth book of
Ezra, as well as other Apocryphal writings, together with Philo and
certain of the Church Fathers, tells us of great numbers of books that
were given to Moses at the same time that he received the Pentateuch.
These writings are doubtless the source of the popular belief among the
Jews that the traditional laws of the Mishna had existed from time
immemorial and were of divine origin. "Jewish tradition traces the bulk
of the oral injunctions, through a chain of distinctly named
authorities, to 'Sinai itself.' It mentions in detail how Moses
communicated those minutiæ of his legislation, in which he had been
instructed during the mysterious forty days and nights on the Mount, to
the chosen guides of the people, in such a manner that they should
forever remain engraven on the tablets of their hearts."[57] This direct
descent of the Oral Law from the Sacred Mount itself would indicate an
independent character and authority. Nevertheless, Talmudic
interpretation of tradition professed to remain always subject to the
Mosaic Code; to be built upon, and to derive its highest inspiration
from it. But, as a matter of fact, while claiming theoretically to be
subordinate to it, the Talmud finally superseded and virtually displaced
the Pentateuch as a legal and administrative code. This was the
inevitable consequence and effect of the laws of growth and progress in
national existence. Altered conditions of life, at home and in exile,
necessitated new rules of action in the government of the Jewish
commonwealth. The Mosaic Code was found inadequate to the ever-changing
exigencies of Hebrew life. As a matter of fact, Moses laid down only
general principles for the guidance of Hebrew judges. He furnished the
body of the law, but a system of legal procedure was wholly wanting. The
Talmud supplied the deficiency and completed a perfect whole. While yet
in the Wilderness, Moses commanded the Israelites to establish courts
and appoint judges for the administration of justice as soon as they
were settled in Palestine.[58] This clearly indicates that the great
lawgiver did not intend his ordinances and injunctions to be final and
exclusive. Having furnished a foundation for the scheme, he anticipated
that the piety, judgment, and learning of subsequent ages would do the
rest. His expectations were fulfilled in the development of the
traditions afterwards embodied in the Mishna, which is the principal
component part of the Talmud.

As before suggested, with the growth in population and the
ever-increasing complications in social, political, and religious life,
and with the general advance in Hebrew civilization, Mosaic injunction
began to prove entirely inadequate to the national wants. In the time
intervening between the destruction of the first and second Temples, a
number of Mosaic laws had become utter anachronisms; others were
perfectly impracticable, and several were no longer even understood. The
exigencies of an altered mode of life and the changed conditions and
circumstances of the people rendered imperative the enactment of new
laws unknown to the Pentateuch. But the divine origin of the Hebrew
system of law was never for a moment forgotten, whatever the change and
wherever made. The Rabbins never formally repealed or abolished any
Mosaic enactment. They simply declared that it had fallen into
desuetude. And, in devising new laws rendered necessary by changed
conditions of life they invariably invoked some principle or
interpretation of the Written Law.

In the declining years of Jewish nationality, many characteristic laws
of the Pentateuch had become obsolete. The ordinance which determined
the punishment of a stubborn and rebellious son; the enactment which
commanded the destruction of a city given to idolatry; and, above all,
the _lex talionis_ had become purely matters of legend. On the other
hand, many new laws appear in the Talmud of which no trace whatever can
be discovered in the Pentateuch. "The Pharisees," says Josephus, "have
imposed upon the people many laws taken from the tradition of the
Fathers, which are not written in the law of Moses."[59] The most
significant of these is the one providing for Antecedent Warning in
criminal prosecutions, the meaning and purpose of which will be fully
discussed in another chapter.

_Vicissitudes of the Talmud._--An old Latin adage runs: "Habent sua fata
libelli."[60] (Even books are victims of fate). This saying is
peculiarly applicable to the Talmud, which has had, in a general way,
the same fateful history as the race that created it. Proscription,
exile, imprisonment, confiscation, and burning was its lot throughout
the Middle Ages. During a thousand years, popes and kings vied with each
other in pronouncing edicts and hurling anathemas against it. During the
latter half of the sixteenth century it was burned not fewer than six
different times by royal or papal decree. Whole wagonloads were
consigned to the flames at a single burning. In 1286, in a letter to the
Archbishop of Canterbury, Honorius IV described the Talmud as a
"damnable book" (liber damnabilis), and vehemently urged that nobody in
England be permitted to read it, since "all other evils flow out of
it."[61] On New Year's day, 1553, numerous copies of the Talmud were
burned at Rome in compliance with a decree of the Inquisition. And, as
late as 1757, in Poland, Bishop Dembowski, at the instigation of the
Frankists, convened a public assembly at Kamenetz-Podolsk, which decreed
that all copies of the Talmud found in the bishopric should be
confiscated and burned by the hangman.[62]

Of the two recensions, the Babylonian Talmud bore the brunt of
persecution during all the ages. This resulted from the fact that the
Jerusalem Talmud was little read after the closing of the Jewish
academies in Palestine, while the Babylonian Talmud was the popular
edition of eminent Jewish scholars throughout the world.

It is needless to say that the treatment accorded the venerable literary
compilation was due to bitter prejudice and crass ignorance. This is
well illustrated by the circumstance that when, in 1307, Clement V was
asked to issue a bull against the Talmud, he declined to do so, until he
had learned something about it. To his amazement and chagrin, he could
find no one who could throw any light upon the subject. Those who wished
it condemned and burned were totally ignorant of its meaning and
contents. The surprise and disgust of Clement were so great that he
resolved to found three chairs in Hebrew, Arabic, and Chaldee, the
three tongues nearest the idiom of the Talmud. He designated the
Universities of Paris, Salamanca, Bologna, and Oxford as places where
these languages should be taught, and expressed the hope that, in time,
one of these universities might be able to produce a translation of
"this mysterious book."[63] It may be added that these plans of the Pope
were never consummated.

_The Message and Mission of the Talmud._--To appreciate the message and
mission of the Talmud, its contents must be viewed and contemplated in
the light of both literature and history. As a literary production it is
a masterpiece--strange, weird, and unique--but a masterpiece,
nevertheless. It is a sort of spiritual and intellectual cosmos in which
the brain growth and soul burst of a great race found expression during
a thousand years. As an encyclopedia of faith and scholarship it reveals
the noblest thoughts and highest aspirations of a divinely commissioned
race. Whatever the master spirits of Judaism in Palestine and Babylon
esteemed worthy of thought and devotion was devoted to its pages. It
thus became a great twin messenger, with the Bible, of Hebrew
civilization to all the races of mankind and to all the centuries yet to
come. To Hebrews it is still the great storehouse of information
touching the legal, political, and religious traditions of their fathers
in many lands and ages. To the Biblical critic of any faith it is an
invaluable help to Bible exegesis. And to all the world who care for
the sacred and the solemn it is a priceless literary treasure.

As an historical factor the Talmud has only remotely affected the great
currents of Gentile history. But to Judaism it has been the cementing
bond in every time of persecution and threatened dissolution. It was
carried from Babylon to Egypt, northern Africa, Spain, Italy, France,
Germany, and Poland. And when threatened with national and race
destruction, the children of Abraham in every land bowed themselves
above its sacred pages and caught therefrom inspiration to renewed life
and higher effort. The Hebrews of every age have held the Talmud in
extravagant reverence as the greatest sacred heirloom of their race.
Their supreme affection for it has placed it above even the Bible. It is
an adage with them that, "The Bible is salt, the Mischna pepper, the
Gemara balmy spice," and Rabbi Solomon ben Joseph sings:

"The Kabbala and Talmud hoar
Than all the Prophets prize I more;
For water is all Bible lore,
But Mischna is pure wine."

More than any other human agency has the Talmud been instrumental in
creating that strangest of all political phenomena--a nation without a
country, a race without a fatherland.

CHAPTER II

HEBREW CRIMINAL LAW--CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS

Capital crimes, under Hebrew law, were classified by Maimonides
according to their respective penalties. His arrangement will be
followed in this chapter.[64]

Hebrew jurisprudence provided four methods of capital punishment: (1)
Beheading; (2) Strangling; (3) Burning; (4) Stoning.

Crucifixion was unknown to Hebrew law. This cruel and loathsome form of
punishment will be fully discussed in the second volume of this work.

Thirty-six capital crimes are mentioned by the Pentateuch and the
Talmud.

_Beheading_ was the punishment for only two crimes:

(1) Murder.
(2) Communal apostasy from Judaism to idolatry.

_Strangling_ was prescribed for six offenses:

(1) Adultery.
(2) Kidnaping.
(3) False prophecy.
(4) Bruising a parent.
(5) Prophesying in the name of heathen deities.
(6) Maladministration (the "Rebellious Elder").

_Burning_ was the death penalty for ten forms of incest--criminal
commerce:

(1) With one's own daughter.
(2) With one's own son's daughter.
(3) With one's own daughter's daughter.
(4) With one's own stepdaughter.
(5) With one's own stepson's daughter.
(6) With one's own stepdaughter's daughter.
(7) With one's own mother-in-law.
(8) With one's own mother-in-law's mother.
(9) With one's own father-in-law's mother.
(10) With a priest's daughter.[65]

_Stoning_ was the penalty for eighteen capital offenses:

(1) Magic.
(2) Idolatry.
(3) Blasphemy.
(4) Pythonism.
(5) Pederasty.
(6) Necromancy.
(7) Cursing a parent.
(8) Violating the Sabbath.
(9) Bestiality, practiced by a man.
(10) Bestiality, practiced by a woman.
(11) Sacrificing one's own children to Moloch.
(12) Instigating individuals to embrace idolatry.
(13) Instigating communities to embrace idolatry.
(14) Criminal conversation with one's own mother.
(15) Criminal conversation with a betrothed virgin.
(16) Criminal conversation with one's own stepmother.
(17) Criminal conversation with one's own daughter-in-law.
(18) Violation of filial duty (making the "Prodigal Son").[66]

The crime of _false swearing_ requires special notice. This offense
could not be classified under any of the above subdivisions because of
its peculiar nature. The Mosaic Code ordains in Deut. xix. 16-21: "If a
false witness rise up against any man to testify against him that which
is wrong ... and, behold, if the witness be a false witness, and hath
testified falsely against his brother; then shall ye do unto him, as he
had thought to have done unto his brother ... and thine eye shall not
pity, but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for
hand, foot for foot." Talmudic construction of this law awarded the same
kind of death to him who had sworn falsely against his brother that
would have been meted out to the alleged criminal, if the testimony of
the false swearer had been true.

_Imprisonment_, as a method of punishment, was unknown to the Mosaic
Code. Leviticus xxiv. 12 and Numbers xv. 34 seem to indicate the
contrary; but the imprisonment therein mentioned undoubtedly refers to
the mere detention of the prisoner until sentence could be pronounced
against him. Imprisonment as a form of punishment was a creation of the
Talmudists who legalized its application among the Hebrews. According to
Mendelsohn, five different classes of offenders were punished by
_imprisonment_:

(1) Homicides; whose crime could not be legally punished with death,
because some condition or other, necessary to produce a legal
conviction, had not been complied with.

(2) Instigators to or procurers of murder; such, for instance, as had
the deed committed by the hands of a hireling.

(3) Accessories to loss of life, as, for instance, when several persons
had clubbed one to death, and the court could not determine the one who
gave the death blow.

(4) Persons who having been twice duly condemned to and punished with
flagellation for as many transgressions of one and the same negative
precept, committed it a third time.

(5) Incorrigible offenders, who, on each of three occasions, had failed
to acknowledge as many warnings antecedent to the commission of one and
the same crime, the original penalty for which was excision.[67]

_Flagellation_ is the only corporal punishment mentioned by the
Pentateuch. The number of stripes administered were not to exceed forty
and were to be imposed in the presence of the judges.[68] Wherever the
Mosaic Code forbade an act, or, in the language of the sages, said "Thou
shalt not," and prescribed no other punishment or alternative, a Court
of Three might impose stripes as the penalty for wrongdoing. Mendelsohn
gives the following classification:

Flagellation is the penalty of three classes of offenses:

(1) The violation of a negative precept, deadly in the sight of heaven.

(2) The violation of any negative precept, when accomplished by means of
a positive act.

(3) The violation of any one of the prohibitive ordinances punishable,
according to the Mosaic law with _excision_, to which, however, no
capital punishment at the instance of a human tribunal is attached.[69]

The Mishna enumerates fifty offenses punishable by stripes, but this
enumeration is evidently incomplete. Maimonides gives a full
classification of all the offenses punishable by flagellation, the
number of which he estimates to be two hundred and seven. The last three
in his list are cases in which the king takes too many wives,
accumulates too much silver or gold, or collects too many horses.[70]

_Slavery_ was the penalty for _theft_ under ancient Hebrew law. This is
the only case where the Mosaic law imposed slavery upon the culprit as a
punishment for his crime; and a loss of liberty followed only where the
thief was unable to make the prescribed restitution. Exodus xxii. 1-3
says:

If a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it, he
shall restore five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep ...
if he have nothing, then he shall be sold for his theft.

Penal servitude, or slavery, was imposed only on men, never on women.
Slavery, as a penalty for theft, was limited to a period of six years in
obedience to the Mosaic ordinance laid down in Exodus xxi. 2.

If thou buy a Hebrew servant, six years he shall serve: and in the
seventh, he shall go free for nothing.

It should be remarked, in this connection, that slavery, as a punishment
for crime, carried with it none of the odium and hardship usually borne
by the slave. The humanity of Hebrew law provided that the culprit,
thief though he was, should not be degraded or humiliated. He could be
compelled to do work for his master, such as he had been accustomed to
do while free, but was relieved by the law from all degrading
employment, such as "attending the master to the bath, fastening or
unfastening his sandals, washing his feet, or any other labor usually
performed by the regular slave." Hebrew law required such kindly
treatment of the convict thief by his master that this maxim was the
result: "He who buys a Hebrew slave, buys himself a master."

_Internment_ in a city of refuge was the punishment for accidental
homicide. Mischance or misadventure, resulting in the slaying of a
fellow-man, was not, properly speaking, a crime; nor was exile in a city
of refuge considered by the Talmudists a form of punishment. But they
are so classified by most writers on Hebrew criminal law. Among nearly
all ancient nations there was a place of refuge for the unfortunate and
downtrodden of the earth; debtors, slaves, criminals, and political
offenders; some sacred spot--an altar, a grave, or a sanctuary dedicated
and devoted to some divinity who threw about the hallowed place divine
protection and inviolability. Such was at Athens the Temple of Theseus,
the sanctuary of slaves. It will be remembered that the orator
Demosthenes took refuge in the Temple of Poseidon as a sanctuary, when
pursued by emissaries of Antipater and the Macedonians.[71] Among the
ancient Hebrews, there were six cities of refuge; three on either side
of the Jordan. They were so located as to be nearly opposite each other.
Bezer in Reuben was opposite Hebron in Judah; Schechem in Ephraim was
opposite to Ramoth in Gad; and Golan in Manasseh was opposite to Kedesh
in Naphtali.[72] Highways in excellent condition led from one to the
other. Signposts were placed at regular intervals to indicate the way to
the nearest city of refuge. These cities were designated by the law as
asylums or sanctuaries for the protection of innocent slayers of their
fellow-men from the "avenger of blood." Among nearly all primitive
peoples of crude political development, such as the early Germans, the
ancient Greeks and Slavs, certain North American savage tribes and the
modern Arabs, Corsicans and Sicilians, the right of private vengeance
was and is taught and tolerated. Upon the "next of kin," the "avenger of
blood," devolved the duty of hunting down and slaying the guilty man.
Cities of refuge were provided by Mosaic law for such an emergency
among the Hebrews. This provision of the Mosaic Code doubtless sprang
from a personal experience of its founder. Bible students will remember
that Moses slew an Egyptian and was compelled to flee in
consequence.[73] Remembering his dire distress on this occasion, the
great lawgiver was naturally disposed to provide sanctuaries for others
similarly distressed. But the popular notion of the rights of sanctuary
under the Mosaic law is far from right. That a common murderer could, by
precipitate flight, reach one of the designated places and be safe from
his pursuers and the vengeance of the law, is thought by many. The
observation of Benny on this point is apt and lucid:

Internment in one of the cities of refuge was not the scampering
process depicted in the popular engraving: a man in the last stage
of exhaustion at the gate of an Eastern town; his pursuers close
upon him, arrows fixed and bows drawn; his arms stretched
imploringly towards a fair Jewish damsel, with a pitcher gracefully
poised upon her head. This may be extremely picturesque, but it is
miserably unlike the custom in vogue among the later Hebrews.
Internment in a city of refuge was a sober and judicial proceeding.
He who claimed the privilege was tried before the Sanhedrin like
any ordinary criminal. He was required to undergo examination; to
confront witnesses, to produce evidence, precisely as in the case
of other offenders. He had to prove that the homicide was purely
accidental; that he had borne no malice against his neighbor; that
he had not lain in wait for him to slay him. Only when the judges
were convinced that the crime was homicide by misadventure was the
culprit adjudged to be interned in one of the sheltering cities.
There was no scurrying in the matter; no abrupt flight; no hot
pursuit, and no appeal for shelter. As soon as judgment was
pronounced the criminal was conducted to one of the appointed
places. He was accompanied the whole distance by two
talmide-chachamin-disciples of the Rabbins. The avengers of the
blood dared not interfere with the offender on the way. To slay him
would have been murder, punishable with death.

_Execution of Capital Sentences._ (1) _Beheading._--The Hebrews
considered beheading the most awful and ignominious of all forms of
punishment. It was the penalty for deliberate murder and for communal
apostasy from Judaism to idolatry, the most heinous offenses against the
Hebrew theocracy. Beheading was accomplished by fastening the culprit
securely to a post and then severing his head from his body by a stroke
with a sword.[74]

(2) _Strangling._--The capital punishment of strangling was effected by
burying the culprit to his waist in soft mud, and then tightening a cord
_wrapped in a soft cloth_ around his neck, until suffocation ensued.[75]

(3) _Burning._--The execution of criminals by burning was not done by
consuming the living person with fire, as was practiced in the case of
heretics by prelates in the Middle Ages and in the case of white
captives by savages in colonial days in America. Indeed, the term
"burning" seems to be a misnomer in this connection, for the culprit was
not really burned to death. He was simply suffocated by strangling. As
in the case of strangling, the condemned man was placed in a pit dug in
the ground. Soft dirt was then thrown in and battered down, until
nothing but his head and chest protruded. A cord, wrapped in a soft
cloth, was then passed once around his neck. Two strong men came
forward, grasped each an end, and drew the cord so hard that suffocation
immediately followed. As the lower jaw dropped from insensibility and
relaxation, a lighted wick was quickly thrown into his mouth. This
constituted the burning.[76] There is authority for the statement that
instead of a lighted wick, molten lead was poured down the culprit's
throat.[77]

(4) _Stoning._--Death by stoning was accomplished in the following
manner: The culprit was taken to some lofty hill or eminence, made to
undress completely, if a man, and was then precipitated violently to the
ground beneath. The fall usually broke the neck or dislocated the spinal
cord. If death did not follow instantaneously the witnesses hurled upon
his prostrate body heavy stones until he was dead. If the first stone,
so heavy as to require two persons to carry it, did not produce death,
then bystanders threw stones upon him until death ensued. Here, again,
"stoning" to death is not strictly accurate. Death usually resulted from
the fall of the man from the platform, scaffold, hill, or other
elevation from which he was hurled. It was really a process of
neck-breaking, instead of stoning, as burning was a process of
suffocation, instead of consuming with fire.

These four methods of execution--beheading, strangling, burning, and
stoning--were the only forms of capital punishment known to the ancient
Hebrews. Crucifixion was never practiced by them; but a posthumous
indignity, resembling crucifixion, was employed as an insult to the
criminal, in the crimes of idolatry and blasphemy. In addition to being
stoned to death, as a punishment for either of these crimes, the dead
body of the culprit was then hanged in public view as a means of
rendering the offense more hideous and the death more ignominious. This
_hanging_ to a tree was in obedience to a Mosaic ordinance contained in
Deut. xxi. 22. The corpse was not permitted, however, to remain hanging
during the night.

The burial of the dead body of the criminal immediately followed
execution, but interment could not take place in the family burial
ground. Near each town in ancient Palestine were two cemeteries; in one
of them were buried those criminals who had been executed by beheading
or strangling; in the other were interred those who had been put to
death by stoning or burning. The bodies were required to remain, thus
buried, until the flesh had completely decayed and fallen from the bone.
The relatives were then permitted to dig up the skeletons and place them
in the family sepulchers.

CHAPTER III

HEBREW CRIMINAL LAW--COURTS AND JUDGES

The Hebrew tribunals were three in kind: the Great Sanhedrin; the Minor
Sanhedrin; and the Lower Tribunal, or the Court of Three.

The Great Sanhedrin, or Grand Council, was the high court of justice and
the supreme tribunal of the Jews. It sat at Jerusalem. It numbered
seventy-one members. Its powers were legislative, executive, and
judicial. It exercised all the functions of education, of government,
and of religion. It was the national parliament of the Hebrew Theocracy,
the human administrator of the divine will. It was the most august
tribunal that ever interpreted or administered religion to man.

_The Name._--The word "Sanhedrin" is derived from the Greek ([Greek:
synedrion]) and denotes a legislative assembly or an ecclesiastical
council deliberating in a sitting posture. It suggests also the gravity
and solemnity of an Oriental synod, transacting business of great
importance. The etymology of the word indicates that it was first used
in the later years of Jewish nationality. Several other names are also
found in history to designate the Great Sanhedrin of the Jews. The
Council of Ancients is a familiar designation of early Jewish writers.
It is called Gerusia, or Senate, in the second book of Maccabees.[78]
Concilium, or Grand Council, is the name found in the Vulgate.[79] The
Talmud designates it sometimes as the Tribunal of the Maccabees, but
usually terms it Sanhedrin, the name most frequently employed in the
Greek text of the Gospels, in the writings of the Rabbins, and in the
works of Josephus.[80]

_Origin of the Great Sanhedrin._--The historians are at loggerheads as
to the origin of the Great Sanhedrin. Many contend that it was
established in the Wilderness by Moses, who acted under divine
commission recorded in Numbers xi. 16, 17: "Gather unto me seventy of
the elders of Israel, whom thou knowest to be the elders of the people,
and officers of them; and bring them unto the tabernacle of the
congregation, that they may stand with thee; and I will take of the
Spirit that is upon thee and will put it upon them; and they shall bear
the burden of the people with thee, that thou bearest it not alone."
Over the seventy elders, Moses is said to have presided, making
seventy-one, the historic number of the Great Sanhedrin. Several
Christian historians, among them Grotius and Selden, have entertained
this view; others equally celebrated have maintained contrary opinions.
These latter contend that the council of seventy ordained by Moses
existed only a short time, having been established to assist the great
lawgiver in the administration of justice; and that, upon the entrance
of the children of Israel into the Promised Land, it disappeared
altogether. The writers who hold this view contend that if the great
assembly organized in the Wilderness was perpetuated side by side with
the royal power, throughout the ages, as the Rabbis maintained, some
mention of this fact would, in reason, have been made by the Bible,
Josephus, or Philo.

The pages of Jewish history disclose the greatest diversity of opinion
as to the origin of the Great Sanhedrin. The Maccabean era is thought by
some to be the time of its first appearance. Others contend that the
reign of John Hyrcanus, and still others that the days of Judas
Maccabeus, marked its birth and beginning. Raphall, having studied with
care its origin and progress, wrote: "We have thus traced the existence
of a council of Zekenim or Elders founded by Moses, existing in the days
of Ezekiel, restored under the name of Sabay Yehoudai, or Elders of the
Jews, under Persian dominion; Gerusia, under the supremacy of the
Greeks; and Sanhedrin under the Asmonean kings and under the
Romans."[81]

Brushing aside mere theory and speculation, one historical fact is clear
and uncontradicted, that the first Sanhedrin Council clothed with the
general judicial and religious attributes of the Great Sanhedrin of the
times of Jesus, was established at Jerusalem between 170 and 106 B.C.

_Organization of the Great Sanhedrin._--The seventy-one members
composing the Great Sanhedrin were divided into three chambers:

The chamber of priests;
The chamber of scribes;
The chamber of elders.

The first of these orders represented the religious or sacerdotal; the
second, the literary or legal; the third, the patriarchal, the
democratic or popular element of the Hebrew population. Thus the
principal Estates of the Commonwealth of Israel were present, by
representation, in the great court and parliament of the nation.

Matthew refers to these three orders and identifies the tribunal that
passed judgment upon Christ: "From that time forth, began Jesus to shew
unto his disciples, how that he must go unto Jerusalem, and suffer many
things of the elders and chief priests and scribes, and be killed and
raised again the third day."[82]

Theoretically, under the Hebrew constitution, the "seventy-one" of the
three chambers were to be equally divided:

Twenty-three in the chamber of priests,
Twenty-three in the chamber of scribes,
Twenty-three in the chamber of elders.

A total of sixty-nine, together with the two presiding officers, would
constitute the requisite number, seventy-one. But, practically, this
arrangement was rarely ever observed. The theocratic structure of the
government of Israel and the pious regard of the people for the
guardians of the Temple, gave the priestly element a predominating
influence from time to time. The scribes, too, were a most vigorous and
aggressive sect and frequently encroached upon the rights and privileges
of the other orders. Abarbanel, one of the greatest of the Hebrew
writers, has offered this explanation: "The priests and scribes
naturally predominated in the Sanhedrin because, not having like the
other Israelites received lands to cultivate and improve, they had
abundant time to consecrate to the study of law and justice, and thus
became better qualified to act as judges."[83]

_Qualifications of Members of the Great Sanhedrin._--The following
qualifications were requisite to entitle an applicant to membership in
the Great Sanhedrin:

(1) _He must have been a Hebrew and a lineal descendant of Hebrew
parents._[84]

(2) _He must have been "learned in the law"; both written and
unwritten._

His legal attainment must have included an intimate acquaintance with
all the enactments of the Mosaic Code, with traditional practices, with
the precepts and precedents of the colleges, with the adjudications of
former courts and the opinions of former judges. He must have been
familiar not only with the laws then actively in force, but also with
those that had become obsolete.[85]

(3) _He must have had judicial experience; that is, he must have
already filled three offices of gradually increasing dignity, beginning
with one of the local courts, and passing successively through two
magistracies at Jerusalem._[86]

(4) _He must have been thoroughly proficient in scientific knowledge._

The ancient Sanhedrists were required to be especially well grounded in
astronomy and medicine. They were also expected to be familiar with the
arts of the necromancer.[87] We are also led to believe from the
revelations of the Talmud that the judges of Israel were well versed in
the principles of physiology and chemistry, as far as these sciences
were developed and understood in those days. History records that Rabbi
Ismael and his disciples once engaged in experimental dissection in
order to learn the anatomy of the human frame. On one occasion a
deceitful witness tried to impose upon a Hebrew court by representing
spermatic fluid to be the albumen of an egg. Baba bar Boutah was
enabled, from his knowledge of the elements of chemistry, to demonstrate
the fact of fraud in the testimony of the witness. Eighty disciples of
the famous Academy of Hillel are said to have been acquainted with every
branch of science known in those days.[88]

(5) _He must have been an accomplished linguist; that is, he must have
been thoroughly familiar with the languages of the surrounding nations._

Interpreters were not allowed in Hebrew courts. A knowledge of several
languages was, therefore, indispensable to the candidate who sought
membership in the Great Sanhedrin. "In the case of a foreigner being
called as a witness before a tribunal, it was absolutely necessary that
two members should understand the language in which the stranger's
evidence was given; that two others should speak to him; while another
was required to be both able to understand and to converse with the
witness. A majority of three judges could always be obtained on any
doubtful point in the interpretation of the testimony submitted to the
court. At Bither there were three Rabbins acquainted with every language
then known, while at Jabneh there were said to be four similarly endowed
with the gift of 'all the tongues.'"[89]

(6) _He must have been modest, popular, of good appearance, and free
from haughtiness._[90]

The Hebrew mind conceived modesty to be the natural result of that
learning, dignity, and piety which every judge was supposed to possess.
The qualification of "popularity" did not convey the notion of
electioneering, hobnobbing and familiarity. It meant simply that the
reputation of the applicant for judicial honors was so far above
reproach that his countrymen could and would willingly commit all their
interests of life, liberty, and property to his keeping. By "good
appearance" was meant that freedom from physical blemishes and defects,
and that possession of physical endowments that would inspire respect
and reverence in the beholder. The haughty judge was supposed to be
lacking in the elements of piety and humility which qualified him for
communion with God. Haughtiness, therefore, disqualified for admission
to the Great Sanhedrin.

(7) _He must have been pious, strong, and courageous._[91]

Piety was the preëminent qualification of a judge of Israel. Impiety was
the negation of everything Israelitish. Strength and courage are
attributes that all judges in all ages and among all races have been
supposed to possess in order to be just and righteous in their
judgments.

_Disqualifications._--Disqualifications of applicants for membership in
the Great Sanhedrin are not less interesting than qualifications. They
are in the main mere negatives of affirmatives which have already been
given, and would seem, therefore, to be superfluous. But they are
strongly accentuated in Hebrew law, and are therefore repeated here.

(1) _A man was disqualified to act as judge who had not, or had never
had, any regular trade, occupation, or profession by which he gained his
livelihood._

The reason for this disqualification was based upon a stringent maxim of
the Rabbins: "He who neglects to teach his son a trade, is as though he
taught him to steal!" A man who did not work and had never labored in
the sweat of his brow for an honest livelihood, was not qualified,
reasoned the Hebrew people, to give proper consideration or extend due
sympathy to the cause of litigants whose differences arose out of the
struggles of everyday life.

(2) _In trials where the death penalty might be inflicted, an aged man,
a person who had never had any children of his own, and a bastard were
disqualified to act as judge._

A person of advanced years was disqualified because according to the
Rabbins old age is frequently marked by bad temper; and "because his
years and infirmities were likely to render him harsh, perhaps obstinate
and unyielding." On the other hand, youth was also a disqualification to
sit in the Sanhedrin. According to the Rabbis, twenty-five years was the
age which entitled a person to be called a Man;[92] but no one was
eligible to a seat in the Sanhedrin until he had reached the age of
forty years.[93] The ancient Hebrews regarded that period as the
beginning of discretion and understanding.

A person without children was not supposed to possess those tender
paternal feelings "which should warm him on behalf of the son of Israel
who was in peril of his life."

The stain of birth and the degradation in character of a bastard were
wholly inconsistent with the high ideals of the qualifications of a
Hebrew judge.

(3) _Gamblers, dice players, bettors on pigeon matches, usurers, and
slave dealers were disqualified to act as judges._

The Hebrews regarded gambling, dice playing, betting on pigeon matches,
and other such practices as forms of thievery; and thieves were not
eligible to sit as judges in their courts. No man who was in the habit
of lending money in an usurious manner could be a judge. It was
immaterial whether the money was lent to a countryman or a stranger.
Slave dealers were disqualified to act as judges because they were
regarded as inhuman and unsympathetic.

(4) _No man was qualified to be a judge who had dealt in the fruits of
the seventh year._

Such a person was deemed lacking in conscience and unfitted to perform
judicial functions.

(5) _No man who was concerned or interested in a matter to be
adjudicated was qualified to sit in judgment thereon._

This is a universal disqualification of judges under all enlightened
systems of justice. The weakness and selfishness of human nature are
such that few men are qualified to judge impartially where their own
interests are involved.

(6) _All relatives of the accused man, of whatever degree of
consanguinity, were disqualified from sitting in judgment on his case._

This is only a variation of the disqualification of interest.

(7) _No person who would be benefited, as heir, or otherwise, by the
death or condemnation of an accused man, was qualified to be his judge._

This, too, is a variation of the disqualification of interest.

(8) _The king could not be a member of the Sanhedrin._

Royalty disqualified from holding the place of judge because of the
high station of the king and because his exercising judicial functions
might hamper the administration of justice.

And, finally, in closing the enumeration of disqualifications, it may be
added that an election to a seat obtained by fraud or any unfair means
was null and void. No respect was shown for the piety or learning of
such a judge; his judicial mantle was spat upon with scorn, and his
fellow judges fled from him as from a plague or pest. Hebrew contempt
for such a judge was expressed in the maxim: "The robe of the unfairly
elected judge is to be respected not more than the blanket of an ass."

_Officers of the Great Sanhedrin._--Two presiding officers directed the
proceedings of the Great Sanhedrin. One of these, styled _prince_
(nasi), was the chief and the president of the court. The other, known
as the _father of the Tribunal_ (ab-beth-din), was the vice-president.

There has been much discussion among the historians as to the particular
chamber from which the president was chosen. Some have contended that
the presidency of the Sanhedrin belonged by right to the high priest.
But the facts of history do not sustain this contention. Aaron was high
priest at the time when Moses was president of the first Sanhedrin in
the Wilderness; and, besides, the list of presidents preserved by the
Talmud reveals the names of many who did not belong to the priesthood.
Maimonides has made the following very apt observation on the subject:
"Whoever surpassed his colleagues in wisdom was made by them chief of
the Sanhedrin."[94]

According to most Jewish writers, there were two scribes or secretaries
of the Sanhedrin. But several others contend that there were three.
Benny says: "Three scribes were present; one was seated on the right,
one on the left, the third in the center of the hall. The first recorded
the names of the judges who voted for the acquittal of the accused, and
the arguments upon which the acquittal was grounded. The second noted
the names of such as decided to condemn the prisoner and the reasons
upon which the conviction was based. The third kept an account of both
the preceding so as to be able at any time to supply omissions or check
inaccuracies in the memoranda of his brother reporters."[95]

In addition to these officers, there were still others who executed
sentences and attended to all the police work of legal procedure. They
were called _shoterim_.[96]

There was no such officer as a public prosecutor or State's attorney
known to the laws of the ancient Hebrews. The witnesses to the crime
were the only prosecutors recognized by Hebrew criminal jurisprudence;
and in capital cases they were the legal executioners as well.

There was also no such body as the modern Grand Jury known to ancient
Hebrew criminal law. And no similar body of committee of the Sanhedrin
performed the accusatory functions of the modern Grand Jury. The
witnesses were the only accusers, and their testimony was both the
indictment and the evidence. Until they testified, the man suspected was
deemed not only innocent but unaccused.

The profession of the law, in the modern sense of the term, was no part
of the judicial system of the ancient Hebrews. There were no advocates
as we know them. There were, indeed, men learned in the law--Pharisees
and Sadducees--who knew all the law. There were doctors of the law: men
whom Jesus confounded when a youth in the Temple at the age of
twelve.[97] But there were no lawyers in the modern sense: professional
characters who accept fees and prosecute cases. The judges and disciples
performed all the duties of the modern attorney and counselor-at-law.
The prophets were the sole orators of Hebrew life, but they were never
allowed to appear as defendants of accused persons. Indeed, they
themselves were at times compelled to play the role of defendants.
Jeremiah is an illustrious example.[98] Both Keim[99] and Geikie[100]
speak of a Baal Rib, a counsel appointed to see that everything possible
was done to secure the rights of an accused person at a Hebrew criminal
trial. But these statements are not in accord with standard works on
ancient Hebrew jurisprudence. Indeed, Friedlieb emphatically denies that
there was any such person as a Baal Rib or Dominus Litis among the
ancient Hebrews.[101] It seems that in the closing years of Jewish
nationality, specially retained advocates were known, for St. Luke tells
us that the Jews employed Tertullus, a certain orator, to prosecute St.
Paul.[102] But this was certainly an exceptional case. It is
historically certain that in the early ages of the Jewish Commonwealth
litigants pleaded their own causes. This we learn from the case of the
two women who appeared before King Solomon, and laid before him their
respective claims to a child.[103]

_Compensation of Officers._--The judges of Israel were originally not
paid anything for their services. The honor of the office itself was
considered sufficient emolument for labors performed. Indeed, the office
of teacher and judge in Israel was so highly prized that the struggles
and sacrifices of a lifetime were not considered too great to pay for a
place in the Great Sanhedrin. Such high station was regarded as a sacred
sphere into which the idea of material gain should not enter. The
regular court days were, therefore, spent by the judge on the bench,
without any expectation of reward for his services. The other days of
the week he spent in earning a livelihood. But in later years of the
national life a change seems to have taken place. The ancient rule was
so far modified that when the services of the judge were required on
days when he was engaged in his private pursuits, custom and the law
gave him the right to claim a substitute during the time he was occupied
on the bench; or, in default of a substitute, to claim remuneration for
the time which he had lost. Another modification was that if his legal
duties required his entire time, the judge in Israel was entitled to
support from the communal treasury, and was even permitted to accept
fees from litigants. This practice was discouraged, however, by the
Rabbis, who looked with disfavor upon the appointment of judges who were
not entirely able to support themselves.

The secretaries and other officers of subordinate dignity were paid for
their services.[104]

_Sessions of the Courts._--In the early days of the Hebrew Commonwealth
the laws provided for no regular court days. The Sanhedrin convened as
occasion required, to transact such business and dispose of such cases
as came before it. But this practice was oftentimes found to be
expensive and annoying to litigants who came into Jerusalem from the
country and found no courts in session. To accommodate the country folk,
the farmers, and shepherds, Ezra and his coadjutors of the Great
Assembly designated Mondays and Thursdays as regular court days. This
enactment was not prohibitive, however. Court might be held on any day
of the week that necessity required. The reason assigned by the Rabbins
for the selection of Mondays and Thursdays as court days was that on
those days people from the country usually congregated in populous
places, in their houses of worship, to hear the law read and
interpreted. While in attendance upon these sacred services, it was
thought that the time was both convenient and propitious for the
settlement of their legal difficulties.[105]

The authorities are divided as to the exact official hours of the day
for holding court. "The Sanhedrin sat from the close of the morning
sacrifice to the time of the evening sacrifice," is the language of the
Jerusalem Talmud.[106] Mendelsohn says: "The official hours for holding
court were between the morning service and noon; but a suit entered upon
during the legal hours could be carried on until evening, and civil
cases could be continued even after nightfall."[107] But in no case of a
criminal nature could the court continue its session during the
night.[108]

The Minor Sanhedrins in the provinces, as well as the local Courts of
Three, usually held their sessions in the most public place, that is, at
the city gate. The two Minor Sanhedrins of Jerusalem held their sessions
at the entrance to the Temple-mound and to the woman's department
respectively. The Great Sanhedrin convened in an apartment of the
national temple at Jerusalem, known as the _Lishkath haggazith_. This
apartment was the celebrated "Hall of Hewn Stones."[109]

_Recruitments._--The young Hebrew disciple who possessed the necessary
mental, spiritual, and personal qualifications for judicial honors was
styled Haber, which means associate, fellow.[110] Such a disciple was
first solemnly ordained and received the title of Zaken (elder) or
Rabbi. This title rendered him eligible to membership in the different
courts. But that he might acquire necessary experience for membership in
the Great Sanhedrin and became a sage worthy of Israel, he was required
to begin at the lowest rung of the judicial ladder and work gradually to
the top. He was first appointed by the Great Sanhedrin to a place in one
of the local courts, consisting of three members; he then served as a
member of one of the provincial Sanhedrins; was then promoted to the
first, and afterwards to the second Minor Sanhedrin at Jerusalem; and
was elevated finally to the Great Sanhedrin itself.[111] After this
manner, all the courts of the ancient Hebrews were recruited and
replenished from time to time; the young aspirant to judicial favors
beginning in the local Court of Three and rising by successive steps to
the Great Sanhedrin at Jerusalem.

The exact method of filling vacancies and thus replenishing the
membership of the Great Sanhedrin is not certainly known.[112] The
following extract from the Talmud, however, is thought to be
authoritative:

In front of them (the judges of the Great Sanhedrin) sat three rows
of learned disciples; each of them had his own special place.
Should it be necessary to promote one of them to the office of
judge, one of those in the foremost row was selected. His place was
then supplied by one in the second row, while one from the third
was in turn advanced to the second. This being done, someone was
then chosen from the congregation to supply the vacancy thus
created in the third row. But the person so appointed did not step
directly into the place occupied by the one last promoted from the
third row, but into the place that beseemed one who was only newly
admitted.[113]

_Quorum of the Great Sanhedrin._--Twenty-three members constituted a
quorum of the Great Sanhedrin. This was the full number of the
membership of a Minor Sanhedrin.

_Number of Votes Required to Convict._--"In criminal trials a majority
of one vote is sufficient for an acquittal; but for a condemnation a
majority of two is necessary," is the language of the Mishna.[114] The
full membership of the Great Sanhedrin was seventy-one. A condemnation
by thirty-five acquitted the accused; a condemnation by thirty-six also
acquitted. At least thirty-seven votes were needed to convict. If a bare
quorum was present, at least thirteen votes were necessary to condemn.

A very peculiar rule of Hebrew law provided that "a simultaneous and
unanimous verdict of guilty rendered on the day of trial, had the effect
of an acquittal."[115] Such a verdict was considered to be lacking in
the element of mercy, and was thought to result more from conspiracy and
mob violence than from mature judicial deliberation.

_Jurisdiction of the Great Sanhedrin._--The jurisdiction of the Great
Sanhedrin is briefly and concisely stated in the Mishna:

_The judgement of the seventy-one is besought when the affair
concerns a whole tribe or is regarding a false prophet or the
high-priest; when it is a question whether war shall be declared or
not; when it has for its object the enlargement of Jerusalem or its
suburbs; whether tribunals of twenty-three shall be instituted in
the provinces, or to declare that a town has become defiled, and to
place it under ban of excommunication.[116]_

Edward Gibbon has also defined the jurisdiction of the same court as
follows:

_With regard to civil objects, it was the supreme court of appeal;
with regard to criminal matters, a tribunal constituted for the
trial of all offences that were committed by men in any public
station, or that affected the peace and majesty of the people. Its
most frequent and serious occupation was the exercise of judicial
power. As a council of state and as a court of justice, it
possessed many prerogatives. Every power was derived from its
authority, every law was ratified by its sanction._

The Great Sanhedrin possessed all the powers and attributes of a
national parliament and a supreme court of judicature. It corresponded
to the Areopagus of Athens and to the senate of Rome. It took cognizance
of the misconduct of priests and kings. Josephus tells us that Herod the
Great was arraigned as a criminal before its judges, and that King
Hyrcanus himself obeyed its mandates and decrees.

_Appeals._--Appeals were allowed from a Minor Sanhedrin to the Great
Sanhedrin. But there was no appeal from a mandate, judgment, or decree
of the Great Sanhedrin. "Its authority was supreme in all matters; civil
and political, social, religious, and criminal."

It is believed that enough has been said touching the character,
organization, and jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal of the ancient
Hebrews to satisfy the average reader. Indeed, it may be that this limit
has been exceeded. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a
short review of the Minor Sanhedrins and the Courts of Three.

_Minor Sanhedrins._--There was no fixed number of Minor Sanhedrins for
the administration of Justice in the Hebrew Commonwealth. Wherever and
whenever, in any town or city inhabited by at least one hundred and
twenty families, the people desired a Sanhedrin of three-and-twenty
members, such a tribunal was established. For this purpose, an
application was made to the Great Sanhedrin at Jerusalem, which
dispatched a mandate to the town ordering the residents to assemble and
to nominate from among themselves persons qualified to act as judges.
The electors were expected to bear in mind the qualifications that would
fit a judge for membership in the Great Sanhedrin, to which all local
judges might eventually be elevated. Accordingly, only "good men and
true" were chosen at the town mass meeting. Immediately upon receipt of
the return to the mandate, an authorization was sent back from Jerusalem
to the town or city which confirmed the election and constituted the
judges selected a Sanhedrin of three-and-twenty members.[117]

_Jurisdiction of the Minor Sanhedrins._--The jurisdiction of the Minor
Sanhedrins extended to nearly all criminal cases involving imprisonment
or seclusion for life, internment in a city of refuge, and capital
punishment. Adultery, seduction, blasphemy, incest, manslaughter, and
murder belonged to these different classes. This court condemned an ox
to be butchered that had gored a man to death. The condemnation
proceedings were something in the nature of a trial of the beast; and
the owner was severely fined where the evidence proved that he knew the
vicious disposition and habits of the animal. The deliberations at the
trial of the bull were most careful and solemn, since the value of a
human life was involved in the proceedings and had to be estimated in
the judgment.

Besides jurisdiction in criminal matters, the Sanhedrins of
three-and-twenty members performed certain civil functions. They were
the tax boards of the various provinces. They constituted the regular
agencies of government for the distribution of public charity. The
management and administration of public elementary schools were under
their control. The legal standards of weights and measures were
inspected by them and received their seals. Sanitary regulations,
repairing the defenses of walled cities, and maintaining the public
highways in good condition, were among the duties of the Minor
Sanhedrins.

The qualifications of judges of these courts were the same as those
required for membership in the Great Sanhedrin. This was true because
the judges of the provincial courts might be promoted to the supreme
tribunal at Jerusalem. The Minor Sanhedrins might be very aptly
described as the _nisi prius_ courts of the Commonwealth of Israel. It
was in these courts of three-and-twenty members that the bulk of Hebrew
litigation was disposed of. It seems that, though equal in number, they
were not all regarded as equal in learning or authority. It is
distinctly stated that appeals could be taken from one Minor Sanhedrin
to another "deemed of superior authority."[118] The difference was
probably due to the fact that in the larger towns were located colleges
and schools, some of whose professors were doubtless either advisers or
members of the local Sanhedrin. At any rate, when a difficult question,
civil or criminal, could not be determined, for want of an authoritative
and registered decision, by an ordinary Sanhedrin of three-and-twenty
judges, the matter was referred to the nearest neighboring Sanhedrin
thought to be of greater repute. If no authentic tradition offering a
solution of the litigated question was in the possession of the
Sanhedrin to which appeal had been taken, the matter was then referred
to the first Minor Sanhedrin in Jerusalem which sat in the Har-habaith.
If the judges of this court were themselves without precedent touching
upon the litigated proposition, it was still further referred to the
second Minor Sanhedrin of Jerusalem, located in the Azarah. If, again,
this Court was without the necessary tradition that would enable it to
decide the question, the matter was finally brought before the Great
Sanhedrin. If this august tribunal was without precedent and tradition
that would enable its members to dispose of the question according to
adjudicated cases, they then decided, nevertheless, in accordance with
the sentiments and principles of natural justice.

It should be remembered that of the Minor Sanhedrins to which every town
of one hundred and twenty families was entitled, two sat at Jerusalem.
It was left optional with a litigant from the provinces to appeal to the
local Sanhedrin or to one of the Minor Sanhedrins in Jerusalem. Local
bias or prejudice was thus avoided.

_Lower Tribunals._--The lowest order of Hebrew tribunal was the Court of
Three, composed of judges selected by the litigants themselves. The
plaintiff chose one member, the defendant selected another, and these
two chose a third. A majority opinion decided all questions. In the
later years of Jewish nationality, it was thought best to have at least
one authorized jurist (mumcha) in the Court of Three. This particular
judge was probably an appointee of the Great Sanhedrin from among the
young disciples (Zaken or Rabbis). This appointment was doubtless
intended to give repute to the local court and experience to the legal
aspirant, as well as to furnish a possible recruit to the Great
Sanhedrin.[119]

These courts corresponded very nearly to the modern courts of Justices
of the Peace. Their jurisdiction extended to civil matters of small
importance and to petty criminal offenses. They were not permanent,
being more in the nature of referees or arbitrators, and sat only when
occasion required. Their sessions were public and were held in the open
air under trees, or at the city gate.

Thus much for the judicial system of courts and judges among the ancient
Hebrews. It was simple in the extreme, democratic to the core, and seems
to have been thoroughly reliable and effective. It was founded upon
universal suffrage, subject only to the general supervision and
occasional appointments of the Great Sanhedrin. The judges were ever in
touch with the sympathies and the best interests of the people.

_Peculiarities of the Hebrew System._--Certain very striking
peculiarities marked the Hebrew system:

(1) There were no lawyers or advocates. These judicial disputants have
been known to every other system of enlightened jurisprudence. But there
were no Ciceros, Erskines, Choates among the ancient Hebrews. The judges
were the defenders as well as the judges of the accused. It may be
easily read between the lines that the framers and builders of the
Hebrew judicial system regarded paid advocates as an abomination and a
nuisance. King Ferdinand, of Spain, seems to have had the Hebrew notion
when, more than a thousand years after Jerusalem fell, he sent out
colonists to the West Indies, with special instructions "that no lawyers
should be carried along, lest lawsuits should become ordinary
occurrences in the New World."[120] Ferdinand evidently agreed with
Plato that lawyers are the plague of the community.[121]

(2) There was no secret body, with the accusatory functions of the
modern Grand Jury, connected with the ancient Hebrew judicial system.
The witnesses were the accusers, and their testimony constituted both
the indictment and the evidence.

(3) There were no public prosecutors or State's attorneys known to the
Hebrew system. Here, again, the witnesses were the informants,
prosecutors, and, in capital cases, executioners of the accused.

(4) No court, among the ancient Hebrews, could consist of a single
judge. Three was the number of the lowest court; three-and-twenty, of
the next highest; and seventy-one, of the Great Sanhedrin at Jerusalem.
A single intelligence acting judicially would have been regarded as a
usurpation of divine prerogative. The basis of this peculiar Hebrew
notion is a single sentence from the Pirke Aboth, iv. 8: "Be not a sole
judge, for there is no sole judge but One."[122]

CHAPTER IV

HEBREW CRIMINAL LAW--WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE

_Competency.--The qualifications of a competent witness, under Hebrew
law, were almost identical with those of a qualified judge, mentioned in
a previous chapter. Self-evidently, all persons who were not
incompetent, were competent._

_Incompetency.--The following persons were incompetent to be witnesses:
Gentiles, women,[123] minors, slaves,[124] idiots and lunatics, deaf
mutes, blind men, gamblers, usurers, illiterate or immodest persons,
persons who had been convicted of irreligion or immorality, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, and all persons directly interested in the
case._

The witness must have been a Hebrew, though the Talmud mentions cases in
which certain facts were allowed to stand proved upon statements "made
innocently" by a Gentile; that is, not as a witness in court.

Women were not permitted to be witnesses ordinarily, because of the
"levity and boldness of the sex."[125] In capital cases, they were not
allowed to testify against the accused, because the law required the
witnesses to become the executioners of the condemned man, and it was
not deemed proper to impose this solemn and awful duty upon the weaker
sex.

Puberty or adolescence marked the age which qualified a person to be a
witness in criminal cases; that is, the thirteenth year must have been
passed.

Immoral and irreligious persons were incompetent to testify. Such men
were termed "wicked" in reference to the law as laid down in Exodus
xxiii. 1: "Thou shalt not raise a false report: put not thine hand with
the wicked to be an unrighteous witness." Under the stigma of the
immoral and irreligious came dicers, usurers, pigeon fliers, and those
who traded in the fruits of the Sabbatical year. Maimonides also
mentions as incompetent "men who showed lack of self-respect by eating
on the street, walking about naked at their work, or living openly on
the charity of Gentiles."[126] Publicans--tax-gatherers--were usually
classed with heathens and sinners as being among the immoral and
irreligious. This class of persons were suspected by the Jews, not only
because they were regarded as the official representatives of the Roman
oppressors of Judea, but also because extortion and cruelty were
frequently practiced by them. Theocritus being asked which was the most
cruel of all beasts, replied: "Among the beasts of the wilderness, the
bear and the lion are the most cruel, but among the beasts of the city,
the Publican and the Parasite."[127]

The doctrine of interest as a disqualification to testify was carried to
the limit of declaring a person incompetent to be a witness when he was
the citizen of a town where claim of title to the public bath house or
the square was made, until he had first divested himself of all share in
the title to the litigated property.[128]

_Number Required to Convict.--Under Hebrew law, both Mosaic and
Talmudic, at least two witnesses were required to convict an accused
person. The prosecuting witness being included, three were necessary._

Concerning capital punishment, the Mosaic ordinance, referring to this
rule, runs thus:

At the mouth of _two_ witnesses, or _three_ witnesses, shall he
that is worthy of death be put to death; but at the mouth of _one_
witness he shall not be put to death.[129]

Whoso killeth any person, the murderer shall be put to death by the
mouth of witnesses; but _one_ witness shall not testify against any
person to cause him to die.[130]

From the Talmud we learn that this Mosaic provision was maintained with
scrupulous fidelity in the administration of justice throughout all the
years of Jewish nationality. It was a requirement of prudence and safety
which commends itself to every logician and legist. It is not necessary
to be a criminal lawyer of large experience to know that the blackest
falsehood can almost always secure at least one champion. Pliny, the
historian, knew this when he wrote: "_Nullum tam impudens mendacium est
quod teste careat._"[131]

The requirement of two witnesses was not, however, peculiar to the
jurisprudence of the Hebrews. Nearly every ancient code contained a
similar enactment. It was especially prominent in Roman law.[132] But it
can scarcely be found to-day in any modern legislation. In prosecutions
for the crimes of treason and perjury under the Common Law of England,
two witnesses were required; in almost all other cases, one positive
witness was sufficient.[133]

The American Constitution requires two witnesses to the same overt act,
to convict of treason.[134] And the penal laws of the majority of the
American States have provisions requiring at least two witnesses, or one
witness corroborated by circumstantial evidence, to establish guilt in
the prosecution of certain crimes; notably, the sexual crimes of rape
and seduction, the crime of perjury, as well as all crimes where it is
sought to convict upon the testimony of an accomplice.

More than one hundred years ago, Montesquieu boasted of such a
requirement in French law and declared that those laws which condemn a
man to death on the testimony of a single witness are fatal to
liberty.[135] The reason of the rule proclaimed by the great French
writer is the same as that put forth by the ancient Rabbins. It was
assumed that the defendant in a criminal case would plead not guilty and
deny the facts of the crime. His plea and denial would simply
counterbalance and destroy the testimony of a single witness swearing
for the commonwealth. The testimony of a third witness was, therefore,
indispensable to a decision. It may be objected that this rule was
absurd, since a conviction was impossible unless the State could produce
more witnesses than the accused. But we shall learn later that the
doctrine of sifting testimony and weighing the credibility of witnesses
did not obtain so strictly among the ancient Hebrew judges as it does in
cases of modern trial by jury under English and American law.

_Agreement of Witnesses.--The witnesses were required to agree in all
essential details; else, their testimony was invalid and had to be
rejected._

The Talmudic provision is: "If one witness contradicts another, the
testimony is not accepted."[136]

The illustration of the rule given by Maimonides, in his commentary on
this provision, is: "For instance, if one witness were to testify to
having seen an Israelite in the act of worshiping the sun, and another
to having seen the same man worshiping the moon, yet, although each of
the two facts proves clearly that the man had committed the horrible
crime of idolatry, the discrepancy in the statements of the witnesses
invalidates their testimony and the accused is free."[137]

This rule of strict agreement, it is supposed, extended, at first, only
to criminal cases, but it was undoubtedly afterwards applied to civil
causes as well. An eminent contributor to the "Jewish Encyclopedia"
says:

In civil cases, however, it is not necessary that the two witnesses
should agree very closely as to the time and place. Thus, if of two
witnesses to a loan one should say, "A lent B a jar of oil," the
other, "He lent him a jar of wine"; or, if one should say, "I was
present when the money was paid at Jerusalem," the other, "I saw it
paid at Hebron"; or, if one should say, "I saw it paid in the month
of Nisan," the other, "I saw it paid in Iyyar," their testimony
would be void. But if one says he saw it paid in the upper and the
other in the lower story; or if he says on the first of the month
and the other on the second of the month, such evidence is within
the limit of fair mistake and the testimony stands. Even less does
a disagreement as to circumstances other than time and place affect
the testimony; for instance, if one say the money is black from
usage, the other that it was new, this would be regarded as an
immaterial circumstance, and the testimony would stand. Where the
two witnesses vary only in the matter of quantity, the lesser
quantity is sufficiently proved.[138]

One of the strangest provisions of Hebrew law was the requirement that
the testimony of each witness to the transaction should cover the entire
case. This was a Talmudic rule resulting from Rabbinic construction of
the Mosaic ordinance, requiring at least two witnesses to establish a
crime. The doctors of the law construed the rule to mean that the
testimony of each witness was to be complete within itself and to extend
to the whole case. Hebrew law did not permit the use of circumstantial
evidence in criminal prosecutions. Only eyewitnesses of the crime were
competent. Under English and American law a crime may be proven by any
number of witnesses, each of whom testifies to a separate fact which
constitutes a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence. But this
method of proof was forbidden by both the Pentateuch and the Talmud.
Under Hebrew law the capital crime of kidnaping was made up of the two
elements of Abduction and Selling. The testimony of two witnesses--one
to the fact of Abduction, the other to the fact of Selling--was
insufficient to convict. Each had to testify to the facts of both
Abduction and Selling. This Talmudic rule of criminal procedure was
undoubtedly based upon a supreme regard for the sanctity of human life
and upon the fact that the Hebrews rejected circumstantial evidence
altogether in proving crime. The extreme of the rule is declared by
Mendelsohn when he says: "And even where there appeared a legal number
of duly qualified witnesses, the testimony was insufficient to convict,
unless they agreed not only with regard to the prisoner's offense, but
also with regard to the mode of committing it. Rabbinic law does not
subject a person to capital, nor even to corporal punishment, unless all
witnesses charge him with one and the same criminal act, their
statements fully agreeing in the main circumstances, and declaring that
they saw one another, while seeing him engaged in the crime."[139]

_No Oath Required.--An oath, in the modern sense, was never administered
to a Hebrew witness._

Testimony was given under the sanction of the Ninth Commandment: "Thou
shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor." This solemn
prohibition of bearing false witness was regarded by both Moses and the
Talmudists as a sufficient safeguard against perjury. It was a settled
maxim of Talmudic law that: "Whosoever will not tell the truth without
an oath, would not scruple to assert falsehood with an oath." The
doctrine was carried still further by some of the Jewish philosophers
who declared that swearing was injurious in itself; and that he who
consents to swear should _ipso facto_ be suspected of lacking
credibility.[140]

In the place of an oath, the following solemn warning or adjuration was
administered to each witness in the presence of the entire court:

Forget not, O witness, that it is one thing to give evidence in a
trial as to money and another in a trial for life. In a money suit,
if thy witness-bearing shall do wrong, money may repair that wrong.
But in this trial for life, if thou sinnest, the blood of the
accused and the blood of his seed to the end of time shall be
imputed unto thee.... Therefore was Adam created one man and alone,
to teach thee that if any witness shall destroy one soul out of
Israel, he is held by the Scripture to be as if he had destroyed
the world; and he who saves one such soul to be as if he had saved
the world.... For a man from one signet ring may strike off many
impressions, and all of them shall be exactly alike. But He, the
King of the kings of kings, He the Holy and the Blessed, has struck
off from His type of the first man the forms of all men that shall
live, yet so that no one human being is wholly alike to any other.
Wherefore let us think and believe that the whole world is created
for a man such as he whose life hangs on thy words. But these ideas
must not deter thee from testifying to what thou actually knowest.
Scripture declares: "The witness who hath seen or known, and doth
not tell, shall bear his iniquity." Nor must ye scruple about
becoming the instrument of the alleged criminal's death. Remember
the Scriptural maxim: "In the destruction of the wicked, there is
joy."[141]

It will be observed that the two elements of this preliminary caution
were, first, a solemn warning against injustice to the accused through
false swearing and a reminder of the inevitable retribution of Heaven
upon the perjured swearer and his remote descendants; second, a pointed
admonition against timidity or fear in testifying.

Bound by this tremendous sanction, the Hebrew witness was prepared to
testify. The method was unique, but seems to have been thoroughly
effective. Students of law will not be struck by its peculiarity. They
are well aware that any plan or mode is legal and effective that binds
the conscience of the witness. Even under modern codes that impose an
oath, no fixed form is imperatively demanded. In King _v._ Morgan, I
Leach C. L. 54, a Mahometan was sworn upon the Koran; in Omychund _v._
Baker, I Atk. 21, a Gentoo was sworn by touching the foot of a Brahmin;
in Reg. _v._ Entrehman, I Car. & M. 248, a Chinese witness took an oath
by kneeling down and breaking a saucer, the oath being administered
through an interpreter in these words: "You shall tell the truth, the
whole truth; the saucer is cracked, and if you do not tell the truth,
your soul will be cracked like the saucer."

_Examination of Witnesses._--As an act of caution against the admission
of irrelevant testimony, and as a means of placing before the entire
court, in the first instance, only such evidence as was deemed strictly
legal, a preliminary examination of witnesses was conducted in private
by a special committee of the Sanhedrin appointed for that purpose. All
irrelevant testimony developed at this private examination was
immediately declared inadmissible and was cast aside. The necessary
result of this most sensible proceeding was the discovery, in advance,
of discrepancies in the statements of witnesses and the eradication of
all illegal testimony. The full court sitting in regular session were
not, therefore, exposed to the danger of being prejudiced by the recital
of facts that had no legal connection with the case. Modern jurists
might easily learn something from the ancient Hebrews in this regard.
Every sensible lawyer is perfectly well aware of the absurdity and
injustice of the modern method of criminal procedure in allowing skilled
and designing attorneys to propose certain kinds of irrelevant testimony
in the presence of the jury, knowing very well that it will be overruled
by the court. These attorneys frequently deliberately draw out such
testimony from the witness with the expectation and understanding that
it will be ordered stricken out. The rule of practice that allows
incompetent testimony to be temporarily introduced upon a promise that a
foundation will be laid or relevancy shown, is abortive instead of
productive of justice. The mere clerical act of striking out incompetent
testimony does not, as a matter of fact, remove the impression of
prejudice from the brain of the judge or juror. The ancient Sanhedrists
were men of brilliant education and superior natural endowments. They
were trained in powers of logical analysis, and yet they were unwilling
to trust themselves with the possession of prejudicial facts arising
from incompetent testimony. It is respectfully submitted that the modern
average juror, whose mind is usually undisciplined in logic and legal
matters, is not able to sift and disentangle the relevant from the
irrelevant in the record of a civil or criminal trial of two or more
weeks' duration. Theoretically, he is; but practically, he is not. Every
impression, good or bad, legal or illegal, received at the trial,
affects his judgment and enters into the general summary of the case in
reaching a verdict.

_Separation of Witnesses.--The witnesses were required to give their
testimony separately and always in the presence of the accused._

Daniel said to the people concerning the two old men who testified
against Susanna: "_Separate_ them, and I will examine them."[142]

By this was meant that witnesses could not be examined until they had
been separated in conformity with law. Under modern practice in most
jurisdictions, witnesses may be separated and examined one at a time out
of the presence of each other. The rule of separation is, however,
generally optional with the litigant and discretionary with the court;
the ruling of the court being usually reversed only in case of abuse of
discretion. But among the Hebrews the requirement was mandatory and
imperative. It had to be observed in every case.

_Mode of Examination of Witnesses._--The mode employed by the Hebrew
judges in examining witnesses is without a precedent or parallel in the
jurisprudence of the world. Two distinct sets of questions constituted
the examination. The first set consisted of a series of interrogations
relating to the _time_ and _place_ of the alleged crime. These questions
were prescribed by law and could not be varied in the slightest. The
technical name applied to the first set of questions was Hakiroth. The
second set was termed Bedikoth[143] and included all interrogations
touching the investigation of relevant circumstances and corroborative
facts surrounding the case. The following seven questions, constituting
the Hakiroth, the first set of questions, were propounded to each
witness: "Was it during a year of jubilee? Was it in an ordinary year?
In what month? On what day of the month? At what hour? In what place? Do
you identify this person?"[144]

These seven questions were framed and applied in conformity with a
fundamental principle of the Hebrew law of evidence that the testimony
of any witness, if false, should admit of being impeached and
overthrown by proof of an _alibi_ against the witness. It seems, indeed,
that proof of an _alibi_ against the witness was the only method of
impeachment known to Hebrew law. It may be readily seen that the only
statements capable of being thus contradicted were confined to those
relating to the details of _time_ and _place_. To illustrate: Suppose
that two witnesses had testified that the alleged crime was committed in
a certain town at a certain hour; suppose that it subsequently appeared
in evidence that, at the stated time, one or both these witnesses were
in a neighboring town. In such a case, the witness or witnesses stood
impeached, their testimony was overthrown and they, themselves, became
subject to the pains and penalties of perjury.

The failure of any witness to answer satisfactorily any of the seven
questions above mentioned entitled the accused to immediate acquittal.
Any material disagreement between two or more witnesses required by the
law in answer to any one of these questions, likewise entitled the
prisoner to immediate discharge. These seven questions seem to have been
framed not so much to develop truthful testimony and to promote the ends
of justice from the standpoint of the State as to enable the defendant
to attack and destroy the testimony of hostile witnesses. The rule and
the reason thereof are thus clearly and succinctly stated by Mendelsohn:

The several particulars referring to time and place must be
furnished with the greatest possible precision and certainty, and
that by the whole party of witnesses. The slightest disagreement
on the part of the witnesses in regard to any one of these
particulars invalidates the entire testimony. Even where a number
of witnesses greater than that required by law, as three, appear,
and two agree on every point, but the third differs from them as to
more than one day, or more than one hour in the day, the whole
testimony is invalidated. For time and place are the only points
which affect the person of the witness himself; he not being able
to be at more than one spot at any one time; time and place are,
accordingly, the only grounds on which the witness may be confuted
and duly punished.

The second set of questions, termed the Bedikoth, embraced all matters
not brought out by the Hakiroth, such as would form the basis of
legitimate modern direct or cross examination. The following kinds of
evidence, however, were not admissible under either set of questions:
Evidence of character, good or bad; previous convictions of the accused;
and evidence as to the prisoner's antecedents. Such matters were not
relevant, under Hebrew law, and could not be urged against the
prisoner.[145]

_False Witnesses.--Hebrew law provided that false witnesses should
suffer the penalty provided for the commission of the crime which they
sought by their testimony to fix upon the accused._

The Scriptural authority for this rule is the following:

"And the judges shall make diligent inquisition; and, behold, if
the witness be a false witness and hath testified falsely against
his brother, then shall ye do unto him as he had thought to do unto
his brother.

... And thine eye shall not pity, but life shall go for life, eye
for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot."[146]

"And they arose against the two elders, for Daniel had convicted
them of false witness, by their own mouth; and according to the law
of Moses, they did unto them in such a sort as they maliciously
intended to do their neighbor; and they put them to death."[147]

_The Accused as Witness.--The accused was never compelled, under
Hebrew law, to testify against himself; but was permitted and
encouraged to offer testimony in his own behalf. His confession of
guilt was accepted in evidence and considered in connection with
other facts of the case, but was never permitted, standing alone,
to form the basis of a conviction._

The following is the commentary of Maimonides on this rule of law:

We have it as a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that no
one can bring an accusation against himself. Should a man make a
confession of guilt before a legally constituted tribunal, such
confession is not to be used against him, unless properly attested
by two other witnesses. It is, however, well to remark that the
death sentence issued against Achan was an exceptional case,
brought about by the nature of the circumstances attending it, for
our law never condemns on the single confession of an accused
party.[148]

It is needless to suggest that the accused was never put under oath. His
position in this regard was exactly the same as that of any other Hebrew
witness. A special reason assigned for not swearing the accused is that
offered in the celebrated maxim: "In most men religion is silent when
interest speaks." Again, the inducement to perjury was so great that it
was thought imprudent to allow the accused to confess under the
solemnity of an oath.

The principle of law which rejects a bare confession of guilt as a basis
of criminal conviction is one of the most merciful and benign known to
jurisprudence. It is intended to protect the commonwealth against
perjury and deception on the part of the accused. It is also intended to
protect the prisoner against ignorance and rashness. It is a well-known
fact that the masses of mankind are ignorant of law, both civil and
criminal. Not one in a thousand in the most enlightened commonwealths
can define successfully the elements of the crimes of the state of which
he is a citizen. By refusing to allow an uncorroborated confession to be
made the basis of a conviction, the State simply throws the mantle of
charity and protection around the ignorance of the prisoner who
confesses. It is also well known that men will frequently confess guilt
when they are not guilty; sometimes, when they are even ignorant of the
facts constituting the offense. This is one of the strangest things
known to psychology and mental philosophy.[149] It is derived from the
well-known and universally recognized weakness of the human will when
confronted with a charge that threatens to blight and destroy life and
character at a single blow. A celebrated modern writer, while
discussing this rule of Hebrew law, wrote the following observations
upon the origin and motive of confession of guilt under criminal
charges:

The confession of the accused made no exception to the rule,
showing how a confession could be made the result of weakness, or
folly, or of interest--yes, even of interest. Some homicide on one
occasion confessed himself to be guilty of robbery or arson in
order to obtain proof of his innocence of some greater crime which
he had committed at the same time; a husband persisted in declaring
himself guilty of outrage upon a woman, really committed by some
unknown person, in order that, by being sentenced on this account,
he might prove his marital efficiency, which had been disputed by
his wife, who was contemplating steps to annul her marriage. Some
weak-minded people, unable to support the torture of a harassing
examination, and eager to regain their liberty, make a full
confession, accusing themselves in order not to be indicted, like
those persons who, crossing a river on a plank bridge, throw
themselves, through nervousness, into the rushing water, in order
not to fall in. Fools, from want of responsibility, or through a
boastful nature, accept, affirm, or confess everything of which
they know nothing.[150]

The reasons above stated lie at the foundation of all modern provisions
framed for the protection of the accused against precipitate
self-condemnation. But, strange to say, these reasons were not urged by
the framers or interpreters of Hebrew law. The explanation offered by
the Talmud was simply this: "He is his own kin"; and, as we have seen,
relatives were never permitted to be witnesses. A modern Jewish writer
has assigned the following reason for the rule forbidding a confession
to form the basis of a conviction: that, if the prisoner were innocent,
he should not be permitted to incriminate himself by a false confession;
if he were guilty, he was a wicked person, and, therefore, incompetent
to testify under Hebrew law.[151] This rule was not enforced, however,
against the defendant when testifying in his own behalf; an additional
proof of the merciful regard of Hebrew law for the unfortunate position
of a human being charged with crime. His testimony, though self-serving,
was given due weight when urged in his own defense. Little attention was
paid to it when he testified against himself.

_Relevancy of Hebrew Evidence.--Hearsay evidence was irrelevant under
Hebrew law._ "Hearsay evidence was barred equally in civil as in
criminal cases, no matter how strongly the witness might believe in what
he heard and however worthy and numerous were his informants."[152]

_Circumstantial evidence was irrelevant under Hebrew law._ "The sages
had very little more confidence in circumstantial evidence given for the
purpose of 'taking money out of' the defendant's pocket, than in that
given for the purpose of inflicting the penalty of death or stripes.
Ket. ii. 10 has been cited, according to which a witness may testify
that, when a boy, he saw a woman walk about in maidenly attire; the
object being to prove that she married as a maiden, not as a widow, and
is therefore entitled to a greater sum for her jointure. In discussing
this clause, the Talmud remarks that this is only arguing from the
majority of cases; for though in most cases those wearing maidens'
attire are not widows, occasionally they are; and money ought not to be
taken out of a man's pocket on reasoning from the greater number of
cases. In fact, circumstantial evidence was generally rejected."[153]

There were occasional exceptions to the rule in the administration of
Hebrew civil law, but none in criminal law. In criminal cases no Hebrew
prisoner could be convicted upon circumstantial evidence. Every link in
the chain of testimony had to be forged by the direct evidence of at
least two competent witnesses; else the accused was acquitted and
discharged.

_Written, or documentary evidence, was not relevant, under Hebrew law,
in criminal prosecution._ The reason of this rule was derived from a
literal interpretation of the Mosaic ordinance: "Whoso killeth any
person, the murderer shall be put to death by the _mouth of
witnesses_."[154] The expression, "mouth of witnesses," was construed by
the interpreters of the law to require oral testimony and to exclude
writing in all criminal prosecutions.

_Kinds of Oral Testimony._--Hebrew oral testimony is divided by the
Mishna into three leading classes:[155]

(1) Vain testimony.
(2) Standing testimony.
(3) Adequate testimony.

"Vain testimony" seems to have been wholly immaterial and irrelevant. It
was not even conditionally admitted, but was instantly and permanently
rejected. The New Testament seems to indicate that such testimony was
rendered against Jesus by the "many false witnesses" who first came, and
that testimony was rejected.

"Standing testimony" seems to have been conditionally admitted and to
have been allowed to remain in evidence until it was properly confirmed
by and joined to other evidence which the law required. It was not
valid, however, until so connected and confirmed. We must remember that
at least two witnesses, agreeing in all essential details, were needed,
under Hebrew law, to convict a prisoner. It is evident then that the
testimony of the first witness against the accused was necessarily
regarded as "standing testimony," until the second or confirming
witness, which the law required, had testified. This testimony is also
referred to in the New Testament when it is said that: "At the last,
came two false witnesses, And said, This fellow said, I am able to
destroy the temple of God and to build it in three days."[156] The
testimony of the first of these witnesses was doubtless allowed to stand
until it was shown that the second witness did not render testimony in
agreement with it. Contradictory testimony was thrown out under Hebrew
criminal procedure; and this was done regardless of the number of
witnesses who testified against the accused. It seems that a rigid
application of the principle of exclusion based upon contradictory
statements would have shut out the testimony of any number of agreeing
witnesses, if said testimony had been contradicted in a radical and
material way by even a single witness. The sifting of evidence and the
weighing of the credibility of witnesses, which is the peculiar
prerogative of the modern jury, were no part of the duties of the
ancient Sanhedrists. The testimony of all the witnesses against the
accused had to agree in all material respects, else it was wholly
rejected. Now it necessarily follows that all testimony against a
prisoner was of the "standing" or provisional kind until the last
witness had testified, and it was found that the evidence in its
entirety was in legal agreement. Mark, using the almost exact technical
expression of the law, tells us, concerning the false testimony against
Jesus, that "their witness agreed not together."[157] This disagreement
caused the "standing testimony" of the first witness to fall and the
charge of threatening or attempting to destroy the Temple was abandoned,
as we shall see in a later part of this work.

"Adequate testimony," under Hebrew criminal procedure, was evidence that
was competent, material, and in legal agreement. When two or more
witnesses, being the entire number, against the accused agreed in all
essential details, their testimony was considered adequate, and if the
judges believed it to be true they based a conviction upon it.

_Antecedent Warning._--It is deemed appropriate in this chapter to call
attention to and briefly discuss a very striking peculiarity of the law
of evidence under Hebrew criminal procedure. In the chapter on Mosaic
and Talmudic law, reference was made to the celebrated proviso, called
"Antecedent Warning." This proviso was unknown to the Mosaic Code, being
a creation of Talmudic law, and is without a parallel in the
jurisprudence of the world. Briefly stated, Antecedent Warning, under
Hebrew law, meant simply this: That no person charged with crime
involving life and death, or even corporal punishment, could be
convicted, unless it was shown by competent testimony that immediately
before the commission of the crime the offender was warned that what he
was about to do was a crime, and that a certain penalty was attached
thereto. The warning was not effective if any time elapsed between the
admonition and the commission of the offense. Furthermore, the warning
was of no force unless it was shown that the alleged criminal had duly
acknowledged it and had expressed a willingness to suffer corporal
punishment or to die for the act. It must have been shown that, having
received the warning, the would-be offender turned to his monitor and
said, "I am very well aware of the nature of the act I am about to
commit, of the rules of law applicable thereto, and of the inevitable
consequences of my misdeed"--else the court could not consider the
condition complied with.

This peculiar proviso seems to have been intended to serve three
distinct purposes: (1) To protect the would-be offender against his own
ignorance and rashness and to prevent the commission of crime by a
timely warning; (2) to aid in establishing guilty intention, that is,
criminal intent, at the trial of the prisoner, after the commission of
the offense; (3) to enable the judges to determine the exact penalty to
assess. The first two purposes are self-evident. The third merits a
brief consideration. To complete the warning, it was essential that the
offender be told the exact penalty attached to the crime which he was
about to commit; whether the punishment was capital or corporal, and the
exact kind, if capital; that is, whether beheading, burning, stoning, or
strangling. Now, it often happened that two crimes were committed by the
same person in one day; the penalty for one of which being flagellation
and the other death. And it sometimes happened that two different crimes
were the result of one criminal transaction. In such a case, the nature
of the Antecedent Warning would guide the judges in decreeing
punishment. To illustrate: The Mosaic Code forbids the killing of either
a cow or a ewe "and her young both in one day";[158] and a violation of
this prohibition, according to Rabbinic law, entails the punishment of
flagellation. Another Mosaic ordinance imposes the penalty of death on
the Jewish idolater.[159] Now, it might have happened that the last two
offenses mentioned were committed by the same person at the same time,
as when an Israelite slaughtered a ewe and her young and sacrificed them
as an offering to an idol. The question would at once arise: Which
penalty should be assessed, death for idolatry, or flagellation for
killing the ewe and her young both on the same day? Here, the nature of
the Warning would determine. If the prisoner had been told that
flagellation would be the punishment, then stripes were administered. If
he had been warned that death was the penalty, then capital punishment
was meted out to him. If the caution had included both death and
flagellation, then death would have been administered, because of the
enormity of the crime of idolatry and for the reason that all lesser
punishments are merged in death.

Another illustration of the third purpose above mentioned, that is, to
enable the judges to determine the exact punishment to administer, is
this: The ancient Nazarites made solemn vows of abstemiousness.[160] And
when any Israelite took the Nazarite vow and violated it, he subjected
himself to the penalty of flagellation if he drank a certain measure (¼
log) of wine. If he drank several such measures in succession, the
question would arise how he was to be punished. Again, the antecedent
caution would decide. If the testimony showed that he had received due
warning before each drink, then he was punished for each drink
separately. If he had been admonished only once, he was punished only
once for the whole debauch.[161]

The enforcement of this proviso established a rule of criminal procedure
peculiar to the Hebrews, and recognized by no other nation. Such a
requirement seems to be utterly subversive of the celebrated maxim that
has found place in every other enlightened system of law: _Ignorantia
juris, quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem excusat_. Among modern
civilized nations, ignorance or mistake of fact in criminal law, as
well as ignorance or mistake of the meaning and effect of civil or
private law, has sometimes been permitted to operate as an excuse in
favor of the victim of the ignorance or mistake; but ignorance of the
criminal or public law has never been permitted to be pleaded as a
defense to an indictment for crime. Such a plea would threaten the very
existence of the state by rendering the proof of crime and the
conviction of criminals impossible.

Other reasons besides those assigned above have been advanced to explain
the invention of such a proviso by the Talmudists. None of them is
entirely satisfactory. Rabbinowicz has urged with great force that the
enactment was the offspring of a constantly increasing tendency on the
part of the framers of the Talmud to mitigate the rigors of the Mosaic
Code, and to abolish altogether the punishment of death by making the
conviction of criminals practically impossible.[162] But this view has
been ably and probably successfully combated by Benny and others. To say
the least, it was a senseless provision when viewed from the standpoint
of the state in maintaining order and preserving the commonwealth. The
Rabbins framed several exceptions to its operation which were doubtless
designed to stay the progress of certain forms of crime and to preserve
the state. The false witness was excluded from the benefit of this
proviso, as were also the instigator to idolatry and the burglar. The
false witness was denied the benefit because of the impossibility of
foreseeing that he would swear falsely and of forewarning him; the
idolater was excepted because of the heinousness of the crime of
idolatry under a theocratic commonwealth; and the burglar was denied the
benefit of the caution for the very peculiar reason that the "breaking
in," while committing the crime of burglary, was sufficient
warning.[163]

Such a rule is utterly without foundation in logic or reason from the
simple fact that crime in every age has been committed with every
circumstance of caution and concealment that criminal ingenuity could
devise; usually under the cover of night, often with a mask, frequently
by the aid of accomplices to give notice of the appearance of the
officers of the law, and nearly always with subsequent attempts to wipe
out evidences of the commission of the offense. To require a preliminary
caution, such as the Antecedent Warning of the Jews, was to handicap the
state most seriously and to render almost impossible the apprehension
and punishment of public malefactors.

CHAPTER V

HEBREW CRIMINAL LAW--MODE OF TRIAL AND EXECUTION IN CAPITAL CASES

The administration of Hebrew criminal law was marked by lofty conception
of right and wrong, and was pervaded by a noble sentiment of justice and
humanity. From the framing of the Decalogue to the latest years of
Jewish nationality, each succeeding generation witnessed some humane and
merciful modification of existing rules. Talmudic interpretation
invented a series or collection of sayings that gave form and character
to the whole body of later Hebrew law. These maxims were intended to
mitigate the rigors of the Mosaic Code and to establish safeguards
against negligence or injustice to the defendant in criminal trials.
Indeed, every possible precaution was taken to render impossible the
wrongful conviction of an accused person. The student of Hebrew law is
at times astonished by the excessive caution inculcated in criminal
procedure. Certain cautionary rules are no less than pedantic, and may
be justly and aptly styled Judaical. The judges leaned always to the
side of the defendant and gave him the advantage of every possible
doubt. They went a step farther and sought pretext after pretext that
would result in an acquittal. A sense of awful responsibility weighed
upon the hearts and consciences of the judges. The services of the
synagogue were not conducted with deeper fervor or greater religious
solemnity than were the proceedings of a capital trial in the great
Judgment Hall of the Sanhedrin. Certain sacred maxims flamed forever
like beacon lights along the pathway of the members of the court during
the solemn deliberations. "A judge," says the Talmud, "should always
consider that a sword threatens him from above, and destruction yawns at
his feet." The ancient adage, "the pen of the law fears the thunder of
Heaven," though of Chinese origin, is Hebraic in spirit. "Thou shalt do
no unrighteousness in judgment" was the leading aphorism of Hebrew
jurisprudence. Among the earliest traditions of the Fathers, we read
this maxim: "When a judge decides not according to truth, he makes the
majesty of God to depart from Israel. But if he judges according to the
truth, were it only for one hour, it is as if he established the whole
world, for it is in judgment that the divine presence in Israel has its
habitation." Hebrew horror of capital punishment and dread of taking
human life are well expressed in the celebrated maxim of the Mishna:
"The Sanhedrin, which so often as once in seven years, condemns a man to
death, is a slaughter-house."[164] And more striking and startling still
is the terrible sentence of Rabbi Meir: "What doth God say (if one may
speak of God after the manner of men) when a malefactor suffers the
anguish due to his crime? He says, _My head and my limbs are pained_.
And if he so speaks of the suffering even of the guilty, what must he
utter when the righteous is condemned?" The whole spirit of Talmudic
caution is well illustrated by the principal rule of the Pirke Aboth,
which says: "Be cautious and slow in judgment, send forth many
disciples, and _make a fence round the law_."[165]

In addition to the maxims above mentioned, which were more religious
than legal, four cardinal rules of criminal procedure--"strictness in
the accusation, publicity in the discussion, full freedom granted
to the accused, and assurance against all dangers or errors of
testimony"[166]--molded the judgment and guided the consciences of
Hebrew judges. These sayings of the Fathers and maxims of the law were
the touchstones of all their judicial inquiries and meditations at the
trial of capital cases. With prayer in their hearts and these maxims
upon their lips, they applied themselves to the solemn duties of their
office.

A most interesting passage in the Mishna draws a striking contrast
between capital trials and those involving questions of money only. The
relevancy of the passage to this chapter is so great that it is deemed
best to quote it entire:

Money trials and trials for life have the same rule of inquiry and
investigation. But they differ in procedure in the following
points: The former require only three, the latter three-and-twenty
judges.

In the former it matters not on which side the judges speak who
give the first opinions; in the latter, those who are in favor of
acquittal must speak first.

In the former, a majority of one is always enough; in the latter, a
majority of one is enough to acquit, but it requires a majority of
two to condemn.

In the former, a decision may be quashed on review (for error), no
matter which way it has gone; in the latter, a condemnation may be
quashed, but not an acquittal.

In the former, disciples of the law present in the court may speak
(as assessors) on either side; in the latter, they may speak in
favor of the accused, but not against him.

In the former, a judge who has indicated his opinion, no matter on
which side, may change his mind; in the latter, he who has given
his voice for acquittal may not change.

The former (money trials) are commenced only in the daytime, but
may be concluded after nightfall; the latter (capital trials) are
commenced only in the daytime, and must also be concluded during
the day.

The former may be concluded by acquittal or condemnation on the day
on which they have begun; the latter may be concluded on that day
if there is a sentence of acquittal, but must be postponed to a
second day if there is to be a condemnation. And for this reason
capital trials are not held on the day before a Sabbath or a feast
day.[167]

The principal features of a Hebrew capital trial before the Great
Sanhedrin were: (1) The Morning Sacrifice; (2) the Assembling of the
Judges in the Lishkath haggazith, or the Hall of Hewn Stones; (3) the
Examination of Witnesses; (4) the Debates and Balloting of the Judges on
the guilt or the innocence of the accused. These successive steps will
be briefly considered in this chapter.

_The Morning Sacrifice._--It is not positively known what legal
connection, if any, the morning sacrifice had with the trial of a
capital case before the Great Sanhedrin at Jerusalem. Several writers
contend that there was no essential legal connection; that the sacrifice
was offered at the break of day whether a capital case was to be tried
or not; and that the court was not dependent upon this religious
observance for jurisdiction in the trial of criminal cases. Other
writers hold opposite views, and contend that the morning sacrifice was
essential to give jurisdiction to the court. MM. Lémann consider it an
error in the trial of Jesus that the morning sacrifice was not offered
before the commencement of proceedings.[168] Certain passages from the
Mishna very strongly support this second view: that the court could not
legally convene until the morning sacrifice had been offered. "The
Sanhedrin sat from the close of the morning sacrifice to the time of the
evening sacrifice."[169] ... "Since the morning sacrifice was offered at
the break of day, it was hardly possible for the Sanhedrin to assemble
until an hour after that time."[170] These passages seem to indicate
that the morning sacrifice was necessary before the court could legally
convene. This question will be found more fully discussed under Point V
of the Brief in this volume. The method of offering the morning
sacrifice was as judicial in its precision as it was religious in its
solemnity.

_The Assembling of the Judges._--At the close of the morning sacrifice,
the members of the court entered the judgment hall in solemn procession.
They took their seats, "turbaned, on cushions or pillows, in oriental
fashion, with crossed legs, and unshod feet, in a half-circle."[171] The
high priest sat in the center with the other members of the court to the
right and left of him. "His head was crowned with a turban of blue
inwrought with gold. On his bosom hung the priestly breastplate, in
which glittered twelve precious stones, emblems of the twelve tribes of
Israel. A flowing robe of blue, gathered about his waist by a girdle of
purple, scarlet, and gold embroidery, enveloped his person and set off
the pure white linen of his capacious sleeves. The buttons of this
costly robe were onyx stones. His slippered feet were half concealed
beneath the long fringe of his pontifical vestments, which were
curiously embroidered with pomegranates in gold and scarlet and crimson.
No Roman Catholic pontiff ever wore robes more resplendent than those in
which the high priest was attired on public and state occasions.
Immediately before him sat the scribes or clerks of the court. The one
on his left hand wrote down whatever testimony was adduced against the
accused; what votes were cast for his condemnation. The one on the right
transcribed what appeared in his favor."[172]

According to most writers, including Dr. Lyman Abbott, only two scribes
were present having seats at each end of the semicircle. According to
Benny, however, "three scribes were present; one was seated on the
right, one on the left, the third in the center of the hall. The first
recorded the names of the judges who voted for the acquittal of the
accused and the arguments upon which the acquittal was grounded. The
second noted the names of such as decided to condemn the prisoner and
the reasons upon which the conviction was based. The third kept an
account of both the preceding, so as to be able at any time to supply
omissions or check inaccuracies in the memoranda of his brother
reporters."

The prisoner was placed in front of the high priest, in a conspicuous
position, where he could see all and could be seen by all.

Thus organized and arranged, the Sanhedrin began the work of the day.

_Examination of Witnesses._--The examination of witnesses, who were also
accusers, marked the beginning of proceedings. It is doubtful if the
indictment against criminals was in writing. The first witness who was
to testify was led into an adjoining room and solemnly warned. He was
asked questions similar to the following: Is it not probable that your
belief in the prisoner's guilt is derived from hearsay or circumstantial
evidence? In forming your opinions concerning the guilt of the accused,
have you or not been influenced by the remarks of persons whom you
regard as reputable and trustworthy? Are you aware that you will be
submitted to a most searching examination? Are you acquainted with the
penalty attached to the crime of perjury?

After this preliminary warning, conveyed in these questions, had been
given, the most learned and venerable of the judges administered to the
witness the following impressive adjuration:

Forget not, O witness, that it is one thing to give evidence in a
trial as to money, and another in a trial for life. In a money
suit, if thy witness-bearing shall do wrong, money may repair that
wrong. But in this trial for life, if thou sinnest, the blood of
the accused, and the blood of his seed to the end of time, shall be
imputed unto thee.... Therefore was Adam created one man and alone,
to teach thee that if any witness shall destroy one soul out of
Israel, he is held by the Scripture to be as if he had destroyed
the world; and he who saves one such soul to be as if he had saved
the world.... For a man from one signet-ring may strike off many
impressions, and all of them shall be exactly alike. But He, the
King of the kings of kings, He the Holy and the Blessed, has struck
off from His type of the first man the forms of all men that shall
live; yet so, that no one human being is wholly alike to any other.
Wherefore let us think and believe that the whole world is created
for a man such as he whose life hangs on thy words. But these ideas
must not deter you from testifying from what you actually know.
Scripture declares: "The witness who hath seen or known, and doth
not tell, shall bear his iniquity." Nor must ye scruple about
becoming the instrument of the alleged criminal's death. Remember
the Scriptural maxim: "In the destruction of the wicked, there is
joy."

At the close of this solemn exhortation, the examination of the witness
commenced. The Hakiroth, seven questions prescribed by law, touching the
identity of the prisoner and fixing the elements of time and place, were
asked. They were as follows: Was it during a year of jubilee? Was it an
ordinary year? In what month? On what day of the month? At what hour?
In what place? Do you identify this person?

These questions being satisfactorily answered, the next step was a rigid
examination into the facts and circumstances attending the commission of
the crime and the connection of the accused therewith. This process of
examination and cross-examination was termed the Bedikoth and embraced
all questions not included in the Hakiroth which tended to establish the
guilt or innocence of the prisoner at the bar.

When the witnesses for the Commonwealth of Israel had been examined,
witnesses for the defendant were heard. The accused was also urged to
say anything he wished in his own behalf. As we have before pointed out,
the Hakiroth questions as to time and place could be rebutted only by
establishing an alibi against the witnesses for the state. If such an
alibi was proved, the defendant was acquitted and at once discharged. A
contributor to the "Jewish Encyclopedia," discussing this point of
procedure, says: "It has been shown under Alibi how a 'set' of witnesses
may be convicted as 'plotters' by another set or sets proving an alibi
on them. But the opposite party may prove an alibi on the convicting set
or in some other way show that the facts testified to by the first set
were impossible or untrue. Under such circumstances, a modern judge or
jury would weigh the credibility of the witnesses and the probability of
their stories and decide between them accordingly. The sages did not
trust themselves or their successors with this discretion. If there were
no indicia or fraud, they held that as some one was evidently lying
they could not decide which of them it was, and that there was no
evidence on the point."[173] The result was an acquittal.

If material contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses were shown
by the Bedikoth, the trial was at once terminated and the accused was
free. The failure of any witness to answer satisfactorily any of the
seven questions above mentioned entitled the accused to immediate
acquittal. Any material disagreement between the two or more witnesses
required by the law in answer to any of these questions likewise
entitled the prisoner to an immediate discharge. If the prosecuting
witnesses relied upon documentary, circumstantial or hearsay evidence to
convict, their testimony was at once rejected and the defendant was
released.

But if the accused failed to establish an alibi against the prosecuting
witnesses in the matter of the Hakiroth; and if the Bedikoth developed
evidence fairly consistent and uncontradictory; and if the testimony of
the witnesses was purely oral, that is, was not documentary, hearsay or
circumstantial, then there was legally admissible evidence to lay before
the Sanhedrin. The competent witnesses who could render relevant
testimony were then led, one at a time, before the general body and
required to testify.

_The Debates and Balloting of the Judges._--All the evidence, pro and
con, having been adduced, the tribunal began a full discussion of the
case, preliminary to casting ballots. Arguments could be begun only on
behalf of the accused. Nothing was permitted to be said against him
until one of the judges had urged something in his behalf, and had said:
"As I view the matter, and according to such and such evidence, it seems
to me that the prisoner should be acquitted." The discussion became
general for and against the accused. The entire record was then
overhauled. Each item of evidence was carefully considered and subjected
to the minutest criticism. Contradictions were noted and extenuating
facts pleaded. If one of the disciples occupying one of the three rows
of seats could offer any cogent or valid reason why the prisoner should
not be convicted, he was invited to take his seat among the judges, and
was regarded as a member of the court during the remainder of the day.
If his argument resulted in the acquittal of the accused and saved a
human life he was made a permanent member of the court. On the other
hand, if one of the disciples had anything to say that would tend to
injure the defendant he was not permitted to raise his voice.

When the entire case had been exhaustively discussed, the argument was
closed and the balloting on the guilt or innocence of the accused
commenced. The scribes were in readiness to record the votes and note
the reasons assigned therefor. The youngest members of the tribunal were
required to vote first, in order that they might not be unduly
influenced by the example of their seniors in age and authority. The
high priest, who was generally president of the Sanhedrin, addressed a
gentle admonition to the youngest member, who was never less than forty
years of age, to render a free and untrammeled verdict, and not to be
awed or influenced by the patriarchs of the court. This admonition was
repeated in the case of each youthful member of the tribunal. When the
balloting commenced, each judge arose in his place and voted; at the
same time making a short speech explanatory of his ballot. To secure a
conviction it was not necessary that the members of the Sanhedrin should
be unanimous. Indeed a peculiar rule of Hebrew law provided that if the
verdict was instantaneous and unanimous it was invalid and could not
stand. If the prisoner had not a single friend in court, the element of
mercy was wanting in the verdict, said the ancient Hebrews, and the
proceedings were regarded in the light of conspiracy and mob violence. A
majority vote of at least two members was necessary to convict. A
majority vote of one in his favor would acquit. Any majority amounting
to two or more that did not reach unanimity was sufficient to condemn.
If the accused was tried before a Minor Sanhedrin of three-and-twenty
members or before the Great Sanhedrin with a bare quorum (twenty-three
members, the same number as the full membership of a Minor Sanhedrin), a
vote of thirteen members was necessary, in either case, to convict. If
eleven judges were for conviction and twelve for acquittal, the prisoner
was discharged at once; a majority of one vote being sufficient for that
purpose. If twelve were in favor of conviction and eleven for acquittal,
the condemnation of the accused was impossible; a majority of at least
two being required to condemn. According to some writers, an acquittal
was the result in such a case. According to others, in such a
contingency the following novel expedient was employed to reach a
verdict: From the first row of disciples two additional judges were
selected and added to the original twenty-three members. Balloting then
commenced anew. If the vote resulted in a majority of at least two
against the prisoner, he stood convicted. If not, two more disciples
were added from the first row in front and this process of increasing by
twos the number of the Sanhedrin was continued until the requisite
majority was secured. If it happened that the constant additions finally
raised the number to seventy-one, the membership of the Great Sanhedrin,
the process of increasing by twos was discontinued, and final balloting
then began. If thirty-six voted for conviction and thirty-five for
acquittal, the whole case was reargued for a reasonable time until one
of the thirty-six yielded and declared in favor of acquittal. In case
the thirty-six members persevered in their determination to convict, the
prisoner was discharged.

At any stage of the trial, from the beginning with the three-and-twenty
judges through all the successive additions of new members, a majority
vote of one or more in favor of the accused would acquit; a majority of
two or more, not amounting to unanimity, would convict.

In case of an acquittal the prisoner was immediately released and the
trial was closed. In the event of conviction sentence could not be
pronounced until the next afternoon and the session of the court was
accordingly adjourned until the following day. Upon adjournment the
members of the Sanhedrin with measured step and solemn mien left the
chamber in which the trial had been conducted. Outside the judgment
hall, in the open street, the judges formed themselves into groups or
knots of five or six to discuss the trial and to lament the awful
misfortune impending over Jerusalem; for such was the Hebrew conception
of the execution of a son of Israel. The nucleus of each group was
formed of elders of the Sanhedrin; the younger members came up from
behind, leaned over between the shoulders of the patriarchs, and
listened attentively and devoutly to what they were saying about the
case. Gradually the groups broke up and the judges linked arm in arm, by
twos, walked slowly homeward, still discussing the facts and arguments
adduced at the trial. Finally they parted and retired to their
respective homes. No heavy food, like meat, and no intoxicating
beverage, were taken for the remainder of the day or during the night.
Nothing was done that would incapacitate them for correct thinking. At
sunset they began to make calls upon each other for the purpose of
examining more carefully and debating more fully the issues of the case.
When these visits were concluded, in the early evening, each judge
retired to the privacy of his own home to sleep, meditate, and pray. At
the dawn of day, they arose and prepared to resume again the solemn
responsibilities of their office. The morning sacrifice was offered and
the judges again assembled at sunrise in the hall of justice. They
reseated themselves in the form of a semicircle; the prisoner was again
led to the bar of the court; the witnesses were again produced; and the
scribes, bringing with them the minutes of the former meeting, again
took seats in their accustomed places.

The second part of the trial then began. It must be remembered that
there were two trials of every Hebrew capital case. The second day was
not a trial _de novo_; but was a proceeding in the nature of an appeal
and was intended to accomplish a review of the proceedings of the
previous day. Additional testimony, however, which had been discovered
after the close of the first trial, might be introduced. But the record
of facts seems not to have been considered so important as the question
of the fixed opinions of the judges. Each member of the Sanhedrin was
required, on the second day, to vote again and to declare anew his
notions concerning the guilt or innocence of the accused. The statements
of each judge were carefully noted by the scribes and compared with his
statements at the previous day. If any judge voted for conviction at the
second trial and founded his judgment on reasons and arguments radically
different from those of the first day, his verdict was rejected. A
member who had voted for acquittal on the first day was not permitted to
change his vote for conviction on the second day. But one who had voted
for condemnation at the first trial, might, by giving valid reasons,
vote on the second day for acquittal.[174]

A most striking peculiarity of Hebrew law is to be noted in their method
of counting votes and arriving at sums total in favor of or against the
accused. Certain peculiar rules were to be strictly applied in
determining the ultimate result. When upon examination of the record it
was discovered that two or more judges had advanced identical arguments,
though each supported his contention by different Biblical citations,
their collective opinions were regarded as the common expression of a
single mind and all their votes were counted only as one. Father and
son, teacher and pupil, being members of the same court, counted also as
one, provided their votes and opinions were arrayed on the same side,
but not when they were placed in antagonism.[175]

When the balloting was complete the number for and against the prisoner
was again announced. If a majority of at least two votes were registered
against him he stood convicted a second time. But the humane and
indulgent spirit of Hebrew law continued to operate and deferred
immediate sentence. The judges continued to deliberate. No one thought
of quitting the judgment hall on the second day of the trial. No one ate
anything, no one drank anything on this second day; for the day that was
to condemn an Israelite to death was to be a fast day for those who
condemned him. It was to be a day of prayerful meditation. Ancient
maxims of the Fathers, framed for the protection of the accused, were
reconsidered. All the merciful tendencies of Talmudic interpretation
were invoked and pleaded by the judges, the defenders of the accused. It
was hoped that a few hours' time would discover facts favorable to the
doomed man. New arguments, it was thought, might be offered and new
witnesses might be forthcoming in his behalf. As they continued to
deliberate, the fatal hour approached. There was to be no thirty or
sixty days, as in America, between sentence and execution, during which
time the condemned man could make peace with God. The moment that saw
the judgment finally pronounced witnessed the beginning of its
execution. Sunset, Nature's symbol of the extinguishment of the light of
life, was the time fixed for both.

The death march and the final circumstances attending the execution of a
Hebrew prisoner are without parallel in the jurisprudence of the world.
As the culprit was led away to his doom, a man, carrying in his hand a
flag, was stationed at the entrance of the Sanhedrin Hall. A mounted
officer of the court followed the procession at a convenient distance
and kept his eyes constantly turned in the direction of the flag bearer
on the hill. A herald, carrying aloft a staff from which fluttered a
crimson banner, made proclamation to the gazing multitude along the way
that a human being was about to be executed. He cried aloud: "AB is to
be put to death on the testimony of CD and XY, on such and such a
charge. If any man knows anything favorable to the accused, in the name
of God let him come forth and speak, in order that the prisoner may be
led back to the Sanhedrin Hall to be again confronted and tried by his
judges."

If any witness, friend or stranger, came forth to furnish new evidence
in favor of the condemned man, the procession was halted and the
accused was led back to the Sanhedrin Chamber. If any member of the
court still sitting in the hall of judgment bethought himself of any new
argument in behalf of the accused that had not been offered at the
trial, he arose quickly in his place and stated it to his fellow-judges.
The flag at the gate was then waved and the mounted messenger, chosen
for such an emergency, saw it waving and galloped forward to stop the
execution.

The culprit himself could delay or prevent the accomplishment of the
death sentence if he could give to the Rabbins who escorted him any
valid reason why he should not be put to death. He was led back as often
as he gave any good excuse, not exceeding five times, the number
prescribed by law. If no new witnesses appeared and if the prisoner made
no further plea for life, the procession proceeded to within a short
distance of the place of execution. The convict was then exhorted to
declare himself guilty of the crime of which he was charged and to make
full confession of all his sins. He was told that a full confession
would entitle him to a happy existence beyond this life, since the flood
of death would wash away all stains of sin and cleanse the soul of all
the iniquities of existence in this world. If the condemned man still
refused to confess that he was guilty of the crime with which he was
charged, he was then urged to say: "May my death prove an atonement for
all my transgressions."

He was then led to the ground of execution. The death draught,
consisting of a mixture of frankincense and myrrh, poured into a cup of
vinegar or light wine, was then given him. Stupefaction followed,
rendering the culprit unconscious of his impending doom and insensible
to the agonies of death. In Jerusalem, this benumbing and stupefying
mixture was furnished by the Hebrew women, whose tender and merciful
regard for the wretched and unfortunate of earth has in all ages been a
striking characteristic of the sex. As soon as the draught had been
administered the execution took place. The prisoner was either stoned,
strangled, burned, or beheaded, according to the nature of his crime. In
case of blasphemy or idolatry the dead body was afterwards hung upon a
gallows until dusk. But ordinarily the corpse was immediately interred
after execution. On the outskirts of every town there were two
graveyards for criminals; in one of these those who had been burned or
stoned were buried; in the other were interred those who had been hanged
or beheaded. As soon as decomposition had taken place--that is, when the
flesh had decayed and fallen from the bones--the relatives were allowed
to remove the skeleton and to deposit it in the family burial ground.

Soon after the execution the friends and relatives of the dead man made
friendly calls upon the judges who had tried and sentenced him. These
visits were intended to show that the visitors harbored no feelings of
bitterness or revenge against those who, in condemning one of their
loved ones to death, had only performed the high and righteous duties of
just and honorable judges of Israel.

PART III

_THE BRIEF_

[Illustration: THE LAST SUPPER (DA VINCI)]

THE BRIEF

A number of difficult and confusing questions present themselves at the
very beginning of any extensive and impartial investigation of the trial
of Jesus.

Did the Great Sanhedrin exist at the time of Christ? If it existed, was
it still a legally constituted court, having jurisdiction to try capital
offenses? Did it have jurisdiction of the particular offense with which
Jesus was charged? If the Great Sanhedrin was actually in existence, had
criminal jurisdiction in capital cases, and was judicially empowered to
try the offense with which Jesus was charged, did it actually try Him?
Were the rules of criminal procedure, prescribed in the Mishna and cited
in this Brief, in existence and actively in force in Judea at the time
of the trial of Jesus? What was the nature of the charge brought against
the Christ? Was He guilty as charged? Were forms of law duly observed in
the trial of the accusation against Him? Answers to these questions,
which will be considered in the Brief in the order above enumerated,
will cover the legal aspects of the Hebrew trial of Jesus.

_Did the Great Sanhedrin exist at the time of Christ?_ The answer to
this question is of prime importance, since the existence of a court
having jurisdiction of the person and subject matter of the suit is a
fundamental consideration in all litigation. It is generally supposed
that the Hebrew trial of Jesus took place before the Great Sanhedrin in
Jerusalem. But many able writers, both Jewish and Gentile, deny that
this court had any existence at the time of Christ. In the "Martyrdom of
Jesus," Rabbi Wise says: "But this body did positively not exist at the
time when Jesus was crucified, having been dissolved 30 A.C. In nowise,
then, any passages of the Gospels must be understood to refer to the
Great Sanhedrin." Many Jewish and several eminent Gentile authors agree
with this contention, which is founded upon a passage in Josephus in
which it is declared that King Herod had all the members of the
Sanhedrin put to death.[176] It is contended by these writers that the
supreme tribunal of the Jews was then abolished and was not restored
until subsequent to the crucifixion. Opposed to this assertion, however,
is the weight of both reason and authority. Schürer is of the opinion
that Josephus did not mean literally "all" ([Greek: pantas]) when he
wrote that Herod had destroyed all the members of the Great Sanhedrin;
since in the following book he relates that the same king caused to be
put to death the forty-five most prominent members of the party of
Antigonus, who must themselves have been members of this court; and
forty-five are twenty-six fewer than seventy-one, the full membership of
the Great Sanhedrin.[177] The same author asserts the existence and
discusses the jurisdiction of this court in the following language: "As
regards the area over which the jurisdiction of the Great Sanhedrin
extended, it has already been remarked above that its civil authority
was restricted, in the time of Christ, to the eleven toparchies of Judea
proper. And, accordingly, for this reason it had no judicial authority
over Jesus Christ so long as He remained in Galilee. It was only as soon
as He entered Judea that He came directly under its jurisdiction."[178]

Again, Salvador, who may be justly styled the Jewish Blackstone, wrote
concerning the condemnation of Jesus: "The _senate_ declared that Jesus,
son of Joseph, born at Bethlehem, had profaned the name of God in
usurping it for himself, a simple citizen. The capital sentence was then
pronounced." Now, the word "senate" is properly applied nowhere in
literature to any other Hebrew court than the Great Sanhedrin. This High
Court of the Jews has been frequently compared to the senate of Rome, to
the Areopagus of the Greek and to the parliament of England. It should
be noted in this connection that the great Jewish writer not only styled
the body that tried Jesus "senate" (Great Sanhedrin) but stated that it
pronounced a capital sentence, thus declaring that the supreme tribunal
of the Jews not only existed at the time of Jesus but had the right to
decree capital punishment.

Edersheim, discussing the alleged abolition of the Sanhedrin by Herod,
says: "The Sanhedrin did exist during his reign, though it must have
been shorn of all real power, and its activity confined to
ecclesiastical or semi-ecclesiastical causes. We can well believe that
neither Herod nor the procurators would wish to _abolish_ the Sanhedrin,
but would leave to them the administration of justice, especially in all
that might in any way be connected with purely religious questions. In
short, the Sanhedrin would be accorded full jurisdiction in inferior and
in religious matters; with the greatest show, but with the least amount
of real rule or of supreme authority."[179] This is a powerful voice in
favor of the existence of the supreme tribunal of the Jews at the time
of Christ; for Edersheim's "Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah" is the
best and most reliable biography of the Savior in any language.

Keim bases his advocacy of the existence of the Sanhedrin at the time of
Christ on New Testament authority. "Not only," he says, "does the New
Testament speak of Synedria in the time of Jesus and the Apostles, but
Jesus Himself, in a well-established utterance, mentions the Synedrion
(Sanhedrin) as the highest legally constituted tribunal and as having
the right to pass the sentence of death."[180]

The strongest passage in the New Testament supporting the contention of
the existence of the Great Sanhedrin at the time of the crucifixion is
contained in Acts v. 21: "But the high priest came, and they that were
with him, and called the _council_ together, and all the _senate_ of the
children of Israel, and sent to the prison to have them brought." Here,
the use of the words "high priest," "council," and "senate" in the same
connection, strongly suggests, almost accurately describes, the
president and members of the Great Sanhedrin; and besides, the words,
"sent to the prison to have them brought," indicate that this body was
exercising judicial functions.

Again, the utterance of Jesus above referred to by Keim is found in two
passages of Matthew. The first is in Chap. xvi. 21: "From that time
forth began Jesus to shew unto His disciples, how that He must go unto
Jerusalem, and suffer many things of the _elders_ and _chief priests_
and _scribes_, and be killed and be raised again the third day." The
second is in Chap. xx. 18: "Behold, we go up to Jerusalem; and the Son
of man shall be betrayed unto the chief priests and unto the scribes,
and they shall condemn him to death." The "elders" and "chief priests"
and "scribes" were the characteristic constituent elements of the Great
Sanhedrin; and the prophecy, "they shall condemn him to death," ascribed
to them the highest judicial prerogative, the right of passing the death
sentence. In his brilliant essay on the Talmud, Emanuel Deutsch
emphatically says: "Whenever the New Testament mentions the 'Priests,
the Elders, and the Scribes' together, it means the Great
Sanhedrin."[181] It is impossible to refrain from contrasting this
statement of a most eminent and learned Jewish writer with that of Rabbi
Wise, also very scholarly and pious, "In no wise, then, any passages of
the Gospels must be considered to refer to the Great Sanhedrin." Suffice
it to say that the weight of authority is with Emanuel Deutsch. And
that which seems to conclusively disprove the whole theory of the
nonexistence of the Great Sanhedrin at the date of the crucifixion, is
the fact that Josephus--whose account of the alleged killing of all the
members of the Sanhedrin by Herod is the very basis of the theory--in a
subsequent chapter, relating to a subsequent event, describes the
summoning of Hyrcanus, former king and high priest, before the Sanhedrin
to be tried by them. As a result of the trial, Hyrcanus was put to
death.[182] Such a personage could have been tried and condemned only by
the Great Sanhedrin, which was in existence subsequent to the alleged
destruction of all its members by Herod.

It is believed that enough has been said to show that the contention
that the Great Sanhedrin did not exist at the time of Christ is not well
founded. As a matter of reason, the mere destruction of the members of
the court by Herod did not, of necessity, abolish the court itself. From
what we know of the character and policy of Herod, he simply had the
members of an old and unfriendly aristocracy put to death in order that
he might make room in the court for an entirely new body friendly to him
and devoted to his interests. Again, it is entirely improbable that the
Roman masters, of whom Herod was but a subject prince and tool, would
have permitted the destruction of the most important local institution
of a conquered state. The policy of the Romans in this regard is well
known. Whenever it was consistent with the dignity and safety of the
Roman empire, local institutions were allowed to remain intact and
undisturbed. We are not aware of any good historical reason why the
Great Sanhedrin, the national parliament, and the supreme tribunal of
the Jews, should have been abolished thirty years before Christ, as
Rabbi Wise and other eminent scholars and theologians have contended.
After all, it seems to be more a matter of dogma than of history. The
majority of Jewish writers rest their case upon Josephus, with their
peculiar construction of the passage; the majority of Christian writers
quite naturally prefer the New Testament. But the line is not closely
drawn. Dr. Geikie, the eminent Gentile author, supports the Jewish
opinion, without reference, however, to the passage in Josephus. On the
other hand, Salvador, Edersheim, and Deutsch, all writers of Jewish
blood, support the Christian contention.

The assertion of Graetz that Jesus was arraigned before one of the Minor
Sanhedrins,[183] of which there were two in Jerusalem, is not to be
taken seriously, since these minor courts had no jurisdiction of the
crime with which Jesus was charged.[184] It is very evident from the
weight of authority that Jesus was tried before the Great Sanhedrin, and
that this court had authority to pass sentence of death. Upon this
theory, the author will proceed in framing the Brief.

_Did the Great Sanhedrin have jurisdiction to try capital offenses at
the time of the crucifixion?_ This question, involving great difficulty
and much confusion in discussing the trial of Jesus, arises from the
divergent opinions of Bible scholars as to the exact legal and political
status of the Jews at the time of Christ. Many concede the existence of
the Great Sanhedrin at this time, but insist that it had been shorn of
its most important judicial attributes; that the right to try capital
cases had been wholly taken from it; and that it retained the legal
right to try only petty crimes and religious offenses not involving the
death penalty. The Jews contend, and indeed the Talmud states that
"forty years before the destruction of the Temple the judgment of
capital causes was taken away from Israel." The great weight of
authority, however, is registered against this view. The New Testament
teachings on the subject have just been discussed in the beginning of
the Brief. The opinion generally held by Bible scholars is that the
Great Sanhedrin continued to exist after the Roman conquest of Judea and
after the time of Herod; that its legislative, executive, and judicial
powers remained substantially unimpaired in local matters pertaining to
the internal affairs of the Jews; and that the Roman representatives
intervened only when Roman interests required and the sovereignty of the
Roman State demanded. The question of sovereignty presented itself,
indeed, whenever the question of life and death arose; and Rome reserved
to herself, in such cases, the prerogative of final judicial
determination. Both Renan and Salvador hold the view that the Sanhedrin
had the right of initiative, the _cognitio causæ_; that is, the right to
try the case. In the event of the acquittal of the accused the matter
was finally ended without Roman interference, but in case of conviction
the Roman legate or procurator certainly might review and probably was
required to review the matter, and either affirm or reverse the
sentence. This is the prevalent opinion among the best writers; and is
plausible because it is at once consistent with the idea of the
maintenance of Roman sovereignty and of the preservation of the local
government of the Jews. However, many able writers, among them Rosadi
and Dupin, assert that the Jews had lost the right, by virtue of Roman
conquest, even to try capital cases. And it must be admitted that the
logic of law is in their favor, though the facts of history and the
weight of authority are against them.

_Did the Great Sanhedrin have jurisdiction of the particular offense
with which Jesus was charged?_ Admitting the existence of the Great
Sanhedrin at the time of Christ, and its right to initiate and try
proceedings in capital cases with reference to Roman authority, had it
jurisdiction, under Hebrew law, of the special accusation against
Christ? On this point there is little difference of opinion. Jesus was
brought before the Sanhedrin on the charges of sedition and blasphemy,
both of which crimes came within the cognizance of the supreme tribunal
of the Jews.[185]

_Was there a regular legal trial of Jesus before the Great Sanhedrin?_
Admitting that this court was in existence at the time of Christ, that
it had competence, with reference to Roman authority, to try capital
cases, and that it had jurisdiction under Hebrew law of the crime with
which Jesus was charged, did it actually conduct a regular, formal trial
of the Christ? Many able critics give a negative answer to this inquiry.
Jost, one of the greatest and most impartial of Jewish historians,
designates the crucifixion of Jesus "a private murder (Privat-Mord)
committed by burning enemies, not the sentence of a regularly
constituted Sanhedrin."[186] Edersheim supports this view as to the
nature of the trial.[187]

A certain class of writers base their objection to a regular trial on
the ground of the nonexistence of the Great Sanhedrin at the time of
Christ. If this court did not exist, they say, there could not have been
any regular judicial proceeding, since this body was the only Hebrew
tribunal that had jurisdiction to try the offense with which Jesus was
charged. Others, who hold similar views, maintain that the errors were
so numerous and the proceedings so flagrant, according to the Gospel
account, that there could have been no trial at all, and that it was
simply the action of a mob. These writers contend that the members of
the Sanhedrin acted more like a vigilance committee than a regularly
organized tribunal. Of this opinion is Dr. Cunningham Geikie.

Still another class of critics insist that the Hebrew judges exercised
only accusatory functions, and that the examination of Jesus at night
was merely preparatory to charges to be presented to Pilate.

Others still apparently reverse the order, and insist that the Hebrew
trial was the only one; that the duty of Pilate was merely to review,
sanction, and countersign the verdict of the Sanhedrin. Of this class is
Renan, who says: "The course which the priests had resolved to pursue in
regard to Jesus was quite in conformity with the established law. The
plan of the enemies of Jesus was to convict him, by the testimony of
witnesses and by his own avowals, of blasphemy and of outrage against
the Mosaic religion, to condemn him to death according to law, and then
to get the condemnation sanctioned by Pilate."[188] Salvador and Stapfer
agree with Renan that the Hebrew trial was regular and that the
proceedings were legal. On the other hand, Rosadi, Dupin, Keim and many
others denounce the proceedings in the trial of Jesus as outrageously
illegal.

As to the number of trials, the authorities above cited seem to be
exceptions to the rule. By far the greater number contend that there
were two distinct trials: a Hebrew and a Roman, separate and yet
dependent. The opinion of this class of writers is most clearly
expressed by Innes, who says: "Whether it was legitimate or not for the
Jews to condemn for a capital crime on this occasion, they did so.
Whether it was legitimate or not for Pilate to try over again an accused
whom they had condemned, on this occasion, he did so. There were
certainly two trials."[189] This is the view of the writer of these
pages; and he has, accordingly, divided the general subject into two
trials, devoting a volume of the work to each. It may be answered, then,
that there was a regular trial of Jesus before the Great Sanhedrin. The
relation of this trial to the Roman proceeding will be more fully
discussed in the second volume of this treatise.

_Were the rules of criminal procedure prescribed in the Mishna and cited
in this Brief, in existence and actively in force in Judea at the time
of the trial of Jesus?_ This question has been answered in the negative
by several writers of repute. Others have answered that the matter is in
doubt. But it is very generally agreed that an affirmative answer is the
proper one. Out of this question, two others arise: (1) Were the rules
of criminal law, herein cited, obsolete at the time of the crucifixion?
(2) Were they the legal developments of an age subsequent to that great
event? In either case, their citation, in this connection, is without
reason or justification.

It is a sufficient answer to the first of these questions that none of
the standard works on Hebrew criminal law classes any of the rules
herein stated as obsolete at the time of Christ. In support of a
negative answer to this question, it may be urged that all of the
aforesaid rules were the essential elements of an enlightened and humane
criminal procedure in capital cases at the date of the crucifixion.

The answer to the second question above suggested is a more serious
matter. It is historically true that the Mishna was not reduced to
writing until two hundred years after the beginning of our era. The
Jerusalem Talmud was not redacted until 390 A.D.; and the Babylonian
Talmud, about 365-427 A.D. The question at once arises: Were the rules
of criminal procedure, which we have herein invoked in the discussion of
this case, the growth of the periods intervening between the crucifixion
of Jesus and these dates? Two valid reasons give a negative answer to
this question. In the first place, the criminal rules applied in the
Brief are in nearly every case traceable to Mosaic provisions which were
framed more than a thousand years before the trial of Jesus. In the
second place, they could not have been the developments of a time
subsequent to the crucifixion, because less than forty years, a single
generation, intervened between that event and the fall of Jerusalem,
which was followed by the destruction of Jewish nationality and the
dispersion of the Jews. This short interval was a period of national
decay and disintegration of the Jewish people and could not have been,
under Roman domination, a formative period in legal matters. After the
fall of Jerusalem, the additions and developments in Hebrew law were
more a matter of commentary than of organic formation--more of Gemara
than of Mosaic or Mishnic growth. The decided weight of authority, then,
as well as the greater reason, is in favor of the proposition that the
Hebrew criminal law had reached its full development and was still in
active force at the time of which we write.

_What was the nature of the charge brought against Christ at the trial
before the Sanhedrin? Was He guilty as charged?_ The questions
preceding these were secondary, though important. If the Great Sanhedrin
did not exist at the time of Christ, we are forced to believe and admit
that the men who arrested and examined Jesus at night were nothing more
than an irresponsible rabble, acting without judicial authority or legal
excuse. If it was without criminal jurisdiction, though in existence, we
have erroneously spoken of a Hebrew trial. If the rules of criminal
procedure which we have invoked were not in existence at the time of the
crucifixion, we have proceeded upon a false hypothesis. Fortunately, the
weight of authority, in every case, is so overwhelmingly in our favor,
and our contention is, in each case, so well founded in reason, that we
feel justified in now proceeding to a discussion of the real merits of
the case, involved in answers to the questions: What was the nature of
the charge or charges brought against Jesus at the Hebrew trial? Was He
guilty as charged?

The accusations against Christ were numerous, both in and out of court;
and it will help to simplify matters and to arrive at a clear
understanding, if, in the very beginning, the distinction be made and
held in mind between _judicial_ and _extra-judicial_ charges. By
judicial charges are meant those made at the time of the examination of
Jesus by the Sanhedrin, assembled at night in the palace of Caiaphas. By
extra-judicial charges are meant those made out of court at divers times
and places in Jerusalem, Galilee, and elsewhere by the accusers of the
Christ, and especially by the spies who dogged His footsteps during the
last days of His ministry on earth. Ordinarily, it would be proper, in
a work of this kind, to consider only charges made after the trial of
the accused had begun, and jeopardy had attached. All others are
extra-judicial and are entitled to only passing notice. It would be
proper to omit them altogether, if they did not serve to throw much
light upon the specific charges at the trial. An excellent summary of
the extra-judicial charges brought against Jesus at various times in His
career, is given in Abbott's "Jesus of Nazareth," p. 448: "It was
charged that He was a preacher of turbulence and faction; that He
flattered the poor and inveighed against the rich; that He denounced
whole cities, as Capernaum, Bethsaida, Chorazin; that He gathered about
Him a rabble of publicans, harlots, and drunkards, under a mere pretense
of reforming them; that He subverted the laws and institutions of the
Mosaic commonwealth, and substituted an unauthorized legislation of His
own; that He disregarded not only all distinctions of society, but even
those of religion, and commended the idolatrous Samaritan as of greater
worth than the holy priest and pious Levite; that, though He pretended
to work miracles, He had invariably refused to perform them in the
presence and at the request of the Rabbis of the Church; that He had
contemned the solemn sanctions of their holy religion, had sat down to
eat with publicans and sinners with unwashen hands, had disregarded the
obligations of the Sabbath, had attended the Jewish feasts with great
irregularity or not at all, had declared that God could be worshiped in
any other place as well as in His Holy Temple, had openly and violently
interfered with its sacred services by driving away the cattle gathered
there for sacrifice."

These different charges were doubtless present in the minds and hearts
of the members of the Sanhedrin at the time of the trial, and probably
influenced their conduct and entered into their verdict. But only one or
two of these accusations can be said to have any direct connection with
the record in this case, and, consequently, can be only indirectly
considered in discussing its merits.

We come now to examine the actual charges made at the night trial before
the Sanhedrin. The subsequent charges before Pilate have no place in
this volume. A review of the proceedings at the time of the examination
in the palace of Caiaphas reveals two distinct charges: one preferred by
witnesses who had been summoned by the Sanhedrin, the other preferred by
Caiaphas himself.

First, according to Matthew, "At the last came two false witnesses, and
said, This fellow said, I am able to destroy the temple of God, and to
build it in three days."[190] The same testimony is thus reported by
Mark: "And there arose certain, and bare false witness against him,
saying, We heard him say, I will destroy this temple that is made with
hands, and within three days, I will build another made without
hands."[191] Luke and John do not discuss the night trial before the
Sanhedrin, and therefore make no reference to the charges brought
forward by the false witnesses. The second accusation made against
Jesus is that by Caiaphas himself, who embodies his charge in the form
of an oath or adjuration which he administered to the accused: "I adjure
thee by the living God that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ, the
Son of God." Then came the confession and condemnation. "Jesus said unto
him, Thou hast said: nevertheless I say unto you, Hereafter shall ye see
the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the
clouds of heaven. Then the high priest rent his clothes, saying, He hath
spoken _blasphemy_; what further need have we of witnesses? behold, now
ye have heard his blasphemy. What think ye? They answered and said, He
is guilty of death."[192]

These few words of Scripture are the essential parts of the record of
fact of the most awful trial in the history of the universe. An analysis
of the evidence shows the existence of two distinct charges: that
preferred by the false witnesses, accusing Jesus of sedition; and that
of blasphemy made by Caiaphas himself.

Concerning the testimony adduced in support of the first charge, Mark
says: "For many bare false witness against him, but their witness agreed
not together."[193] Now, we have seen that the concurrent testimony of
at least two witnesses, agreeing in all essential details, was necessary
to sustain a conviction under Hebrew law. If one witness against the
accused contradicted any other witness against the accused, all were
rejected. Under this rule of law, when "their witness agreed not
together," according to Mark, the charge of sedition was abandoned, and
the accusation of blasphemy then followed, which resulted in a
confession and condemnation. Later on, in another place, we shall
discuss the illegality of a double accusation, in the same breath and at
the same trial. But at this point we have no further interest in the
abandoned charge, except to say that the false witnesses, in their
ignorance and blindness, failed to grasp the Master's allegorical
language in reference to the destruction of the Temple. Their
worldly-mindedness and purely physical conception of things centered
their thoughts upon the Temple at Jerusalem, and gave a purely temporal
and material interpretation to His words. "Forty and six years was this
temple in building, and wilt thou rear it again in three days?"[194]
This question asked by the original auditors, shows a total
misconception of the true meaning of the language of Jesus. The
spiritual allusion to the resurrection of His own body seems never to
have penetrated their thoughts. Then, again, their general statement
was, in effect, an absolute misrepresentation. By perverting His
language, He was made to utter a deliberate threat against a national
institution, around which clustered all the power, sanctity, and glory
of the Hebrew people. He was made to threaten the destruction of the
Temple at Jerusalem. But it is most reasonable to infer from the entire
evidence as contained in the Sacred Writings that the words imputed to
Jesus by the false witnesses were not those which He actually used. In
reality, He did not say: "I _can destroy_," or "I _will destroy_"; but,
simply, "_Destroy_." "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will
raise it up."[195] This is evidently a purely hypothetical expression
and is equivalent to "_Supposing you destroy this temple_." St. John, in
whose presence, it seems, this language was used, correctly interprets
the Savior's meaning when he says: "He spake of the temple of his
body."[196]

The evidence of the false witnesses was so contradictory that even
wicked judges were forced to reject it and to conduct the prosecution on
another charge.

We come now to consider more closely the real accusation upon which
Jesus was condemned to death. At first glance, there seems to be no
difficulty in determining what this accusation was, since the Gospel
record specifically mentions the crime of blasphemy. It was for this
offense that Caiaphas pronounced judgment against Jesus with the
unanimous approval of his fellow-judges. "Then the high priest rent his
clothes and saith, What need we any further witnesses? ye have heard the
_blasphemy_: what think ye? and they all condemned him to be guilty of
death." But what had they heard that constituted blasphemy? Nothing more
than His own confession that He was "the Christ, the Son of God." This
seems simple enough upon its face; but a vast mass of acrimonious
discussion has resulted from these few passages of the Scripture. The
main difficulty turns upon the meaning of the word "blasphemy," as used
by the high priest in passing condemnation upon Jesus. The facts
adduced at the trial, or rather the facts suggested by the oath or
adjuration addressed to Jesus, as to whether or not He was "Christ, the
Son of God," did not, in the opinion of many, constitute blasphemy under
the definition of that term given in the Mosaic Code and interpreted by
the Rabbinic writers whose opinions have been embodied in commentaries
upon the Mishna. Eminent Jewish writers have ridiculed the idea of
attempting to make a case of blasphemy out of a mere claim of being a
"Son of God." Rabbi Wise, in "The Martyrdom of Jesus," has very tersely
stated the Jewish position on the subject. "Had Jesus maintained," he
says, "before a body of Jewish lawyers to be the Son of God, they could
not have found him guilty of blasphemy, because every Israelite had a
perfect right to call himself a son of God, the law (Deut. xiv. 1)
stating in unmistakable words, 'Ye are sons of the Lord, your God.' When
Rabbi Judah advanced the opinion, 'If ye conduct yourselves like the
sons of God, ye are; if not, not,' there was Rabbi Mair on hand to
contradict him: 'In this or in that case, ye are the sons of the Lord
your God.' No law, no precedent, and no fictitious case in the Bible or
the rabbinical literature can be cited to make of this expression a case
of blasphemy. The blasphemy law is in Leviticus (xxiv. 15-20), which
ordains, 'If any man shall curse his God (i.e., by whatever name he may
call his God), he shall bear his sin,' but the law has nothing to do
with it, dictates no punishment, takes no cognizance thereof. 'But he
who shall curse the name of Jehovah, he shall surely be put to death,'
be the curser native or alien. Another blasphemy law exists not in the
Pentateuch. The ancient Hebrews expounded this law, that none is guilty
of blasphemy in the first degree, unless he curses God himself by the
name of Jehovah; or, as Maimonides maintains, by the name Adonai. The
penalty of death is only threatened in the first degree. The Mishna
states expressly as the general law, 'The blasphemer is not guilty,
unless he (in cursing the Deity) has mentioned the name itself' (of
Jehovah or Adonai), so that there can be no doubt whatever that such was
the law in Israel. It is clear that the statements made by Mark, in the
name of Jesus, had nothing in the world to do with the blasphemy laws of
the Jews."[197]

Rabbi Wise was concededly an able and accomplished theologian; and in a
general way the above extract states the truth. But it does not state
the whole truth, and in one or two places is certainly erroneous.
Leviticus xxiv. 15-20 is undoubtedly the blasphemy statute of the Mosaic
Code. But Mr. Wise was assuredly wrong when he stated that "another
blasphemy Law exists not in the Pentateuch." For, if this were a correct
statement, other eminent Jewish authorities, as well as many Gentile
authors, would be all at sea. Besides, the New Testament use of the word
"blasphemy," in many places, would only serve to illustrate the dense
ignorance of the Jews of the time of Jesus as to the meaning of the
term, if the author of "The Martyrdom of Jesus" were right.

In this connection, let us now consider another Jewish authority, as
able and even more famous than the one just cited. In Salvador's
celebrated treatise entitled "Histoire des Institutions de Moïse," he
devotes a chapter to the question of the judgment and condemnation of
Jesus. Touching the nature of the charge against Christ and the real
cause of His conviction, he says: "But Jesus, in presenting new theories
and in giving new forms to those already promulgated, speaks of himself
as God; his disciples repeat it; and the subsequent events prove in the
most satisfactory manner that they thus understood him. This was
_shocking blasphemy_ in the eyes of the citizens: the law commands them
to follow Jehovah alone, the only true God; not to believe in gods of
flesh and bones, resembling men or women; neither to spare or listen to
a prophet who, even doing miracles, should proclaim a new god, a god
neither they nor their fathers had known. The question already raised
among the people was this: Has Jesus become God? But the Senate having
adjudged that Jesus, son of Joseph, born in Bethlehem, had profaned the
name of God by usurping it to himself, a mere citizen, applied to him
the law in the 13th Chapter of Deuteronomy and the 20th verse in Chapter
18, according to which every prophet, even he who works miracles, must
be punished when he speaks of a god unknown to the Jews and their
fathers: the capital sentence was pronounced."

Here we have the doctors divided; Wise saying that "another blasphemy
law exists not in the Pentateuch," and Salvador contending that Jesus
was legally convicted of blasphemy under the Mosaic Law as it was laid
down, not in Leviticus xxiv. 15-20, but in Deuteronomy xiii.

The law in Deuteronomy is peculiarly impressive in its relationship to
the charges against Jesus.

"If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth
thee a sign or a wonder, And the sign or the wonder come to pass,
whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, which
thou hast not known, and let us serve them; Thou shalt not hearken unto
the words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams: for the Lord your
God proveth you, to know whether ye love the Lord your God with all your
heart and with all your soul. Ye shall walk after the Lord your God, and
fear Him, and keep His commandments, and obey His voice, and ye shall
serve Him, and cleave unto Him. And that prophet, or that dreamer of
dreams, shall be put to death; because he hath spoken to turn you away
from the Lord your God, which brought you out of the land of Egypt and
redeemed you out of the house of bondage, to thrust thee out of the way
which the Lord thy God commanded thee to walk in."[198]

The position of Rabbi Wise cannot be defended by trying to identify this
passage with the one in Leviticus. The law in Deuteronomy has reference
to that form of blasphemy which is nearly identical with idolatry, that
is, seducing the people from their allegiance to Jehovah, and inducing
them to go off after strange gods. The law in Leviticus applies
peculiarly to profane epithets and to curses hurled at Jehovah Himself.

Again, Rabbi Wise ridicules the notion that Caiaphas and the Sanhedrists
attempted to twist the use of the words "Son of God" into a crime. He is
right when, quoting Deuteronomy xiv. 1, he says that "every Israelite
had a perfect right to call himself a son of God." But here again the
eminent theologian has stopped short of the entire truth. It is not at
all probable that he would have contended that "every Israelite had a
perfect right to call himself the son of God" in the sense of being
equal with God Himself. Should reply be made that such would be an
unwarranted construction of Christ's confession that he was "the Christ,
the Son of God," then the opinion of Salvador would be again invoked. In
a note to the "Jugement de Jesus," he says: "I repeat that the
expression 'Son of God' includes here the idea of God Himself."

We are not in a position, nearly two thousand years after the event
occurred, to tell exactly what was in the mind of Caiaphas at the time.
But, in view of the condemnation which he passed, and of the language
which he used in passing it, we are certainly justified in supposing
that he deliberately and designedly connected the two titles--"the
Christ" and "the Son of God"--to see if Jesus would assume
responsibility for both, or if He would content himself with the simple
appellation, "son of God," to which every pious Israelite was entitled.
The reply of Jesus, "Thou hast said," meaning "I am" the Christ, the Son
of God, was an affirmation of His identity with the Father. The
condemnation for blasphemy immediately followed. Such a sentence would
have been inconsistent with any other theory than the assumption that
Jesus had claimed equality with God, or had arrogated to Himself power
and authority which belonged alone to Jehovah. This definition of
blasphemy is certainly different from that laid down in Leviticus xxiv.
15-20.

As a matter of history, it is really true that both the Old and New
Testaments reveal not only the existence of more than one blasphemy
statute in the Mosaic Code, but also more than one conception and
definition of blasphemy at different periods in the development of the
Hebrew people.

In II Samuel xii. 14 the word "blaspheme" is used in the sense "to
despise Judaism." In I Macc. ii. 6 blasphemy means "idolatry." In Job
ii. 5; II Kings xix. 4-6; Hosea vii. 16, the term indicates "reproach,"
"derision."

Not only might God be blasphemed, but the king also, as his
representative. The indictment against Naboth was: "Thou didst blaspheme
God and the king."[199] The people of Jehovah and his Holy Land might
also become victims of blasphemy.[200]

The New Testament writers frequently charge the Jews with blaspheming
Jesus, when they use insulting language toward Him, or deny to Him the
credit that is His due.[201]

In Revelation, St. John tells that he "saw a beast rise up out of the
sea, having seven heads and ten horns, and upon his horns ten crowns,
and upon his heads the name of blasphemy. And he opened his mouth in
blasphemy against God, to blaspheme his name, and his tabernacles, and
them that dwell in heaven."[202] This beast was the symbolical
Antichrist, and his blasphemy was simply the treasonable opposition of
the antichristian world to God and His kingdom.

A comprehensive meaning of "blasphemy," in the various senses above
suggested, is conveyed by the definition of the term "treason" under the
governments of Gentile commonwealths. A single statute, 25 Edw. iii. c.
2, defines seven different ways of committing treason against the king
of England.[203] The _lex Julia majestatis_, promulgated by Augustus
Cæsar, was a single statute which comprehended all the ancient laws that
had previously been enacted to punish transgressors against the Roman
State.[204] There was no particular statute, as Rabbi Wise would have us
believe, among the ancient Hebrews, that defined all forms of blasphemy
against Jehovah. But a very clear notion of the various phases of
blasphemy may be had if we will keep in mind the various definitions of
treason under modern law.

It should not be forgotten that the ancient Hebrew Commonwealth was a
pure theocracy; that Jehovah was king; that priests, prophets, and
people were merely the subjects and servants of this king; that its
government and its institutions were the products of his brain; and
that the destinies of the people of Israel, the "chosen seed," were
absolutely in his keeping and subject to his divine direction and
control. It should also be remembered that the God of Israel was a most
jealous God; that the greatest irritant of His wrath was any
encroachment upon His rights as ruler of men and creator of the
universe; that for the protection of His sovereignty, He had proclaimed
to His people through His servant Moses the most stringent statutes
against any profanation of His name or disloyalty to His person. The
Decalogue was the great charter of Jehovah for the government of His
children. The first three commandments were special statutes intended to
excite their gratitude and insure their attachment. He reminds them of
the circumstances of their deliverance, and warns them, under severe
penalty, against going off after strange gods.

But, not content with these, He had still other statutes proclaimed,
furnishing safeguards against idolatry and insuring loyalty to His
person.[205] At the time of the establishment of the Hebrew theocracy,
idolatry was everywhere to be found. Not only were the neighboring
peoples worshipers of idols, but the Israelites themselves were prone to
idolatry and to running off after strange gods. The worship of the
Golden Calf is a familiar illustration of this truth. Thus the
Commonwealth of Jehovah was threatened not only with idolatrous invasion
from without but with idolatrous insurrection from within. Hence the
severity of the measures adopted for the protection of His kingdom, His
person, and His name, not only against idolaters but against
necromancers, witches, sorcerers, and all persons who pretended to
supernatural powers that did not proceed directly from Jehovah Himself.
The enforcement of and obedience to these various statutes required an
acknowledgment of the power and authority of Jehovah in every case where
prophecies were foretold, wonders worked, and supernatural powers of any
kind exhibited. And throughout the Sacred Scriptures, in both the Old
and New Testaments, we find traces of the operation of this law.
Sometimes it is an instance of obedience, as when Pharaoh wanted to
credit Joseph with the power of interpreting dreams. "And Joseph
answered Pharaoh, saying, It is not in _me_: God shall give Pharaoh an
answer of peace."[206] At other times, it is an act of disobedience. To
satisfy the thirsty multitude Moses smote the rock and brought forth
water at Meribah. But instead of giving the Lord credit for the act,
Moses claimed it for Aaron and himself, saying, "Hear now, ye rebels:
must _we_ fetch you water out of this rock?" Whereupon Jehovah grew very
angry and said to Moses and Aaron: "Because ye believe me not, to
sanctify _me_ in the eyes of the children of Israel, therefore ye shall
not bring this congregation into the land which I have given them."[207]
As punishment for this blasphemous conduct, neither Moses nor Aaron was
permitted to enter the Promised Land.[208] And that this omission to
give due acknowledgment to the Lord for the miraculous flow of water was
treasonable or blasphemous under the wider interpretation of the term,
cannot be doubted.

From the foregoing remarks it is clear that blasphemy among the ancient
Hebrews was subject to a twofold classification: (1) A verbal
renunciation and profane speaking of the name of Jehovah. To this kind
of blasphemy the provision in Leviticus xxiv. 15-20 was applicable. This
was blasphemy in its generally accepted but narrower and more restricted
sense. This kind of blasphemy indicated a most depraved and malignant
state of mind, and to secure a conviction it was necessary to show that
the word "Jehovah" or "Adonai" had been pronounced. (2) "Every word or
act, directly in derogation of the sovereignty of Jehovah, such as
speaking in the name of another god, or omitting, on any occasion that
required it, to give to Jehovah the honor due to His own name."[209]
This form of blasphemy was nearly the same as treason under modern
governments, and included all offenses that threatened the usurpation of
the throne of Jehovah, the destruction of His institutions, and that
withheld from Him due acknowledgment of His authority and authorship in
all matters of miracle and prophecy.

Returning to the trial in the palace of Caiaphas, let us again consider
the question: Was Jesus guilty of blasphemy under any of the definitions
above given? Had He ever cursed the name of Jehovah and thereby brought
Himself within the condemnation of the law, as laid down in Leviticus
xxiv. 15-20? Certainly not. Every word uttered by Him at the trial, as
well as every other expression elsewhere uttered at any time or place,
was said with reverence and awe and love in praise and glorification of
the name and person of Jehovah. Rabbi Wise ridicules the notion that
Jesus was ever tried upon the charge of blasphemy, because it is not
recorded anywhere that He ever used any but tender and affectionate
language in speaking of the Heavenly Father.

Had Jesus blasphemed, in the sense of "despising Judaism," and thereby
brought Himself within the purview of the rule as exemplified in II Sam.
xii. 14? Certainly not. There is no record anywhere that He despised
Judaism. Jesus revered both the Law and the Prophets. He claimed that He
came to fulfill, not to destroy them.[210] He frequently denounced
Pharisaic formalism and hypocrisy, but at the same time He was a most
loyal Jew and a devoted son of Israel.

Had He blasphemed by working wonders in His own name, and omitting to
give Jehovah credit for them; and did He thereby bring Himself within
the condemnation of the rule exemplified by Moses and Aaron in the
matter of striking water from the rock at Meribah? We are forced to
answer this question in the affirmative. If we regard Jesus as a mere
man, a plain citizen, like Moses, the New Testament discloses many
infractions of the Law in His prophecies and miracles. It is true that
in John v. 19 it is said, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, The Son can
do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do." Here He
affirmed that the power was from God and not from Himself. Again, having
raised Lazarus from the dead, Jesus said, "Father, I thank thee that
thou hast heard me,"[211] thus acknowledging the intervention of Jehovah
in the performance of the miracle. In several other places He gave the
Father credit for the act of the Son. But these were exceptions,
isolated cases. The law required an express acknowledgment in every case
of prophesy or miracle working. "Thus saith the Lord" was either the
prologue or epilogue of every wonder-working performance. In all the
miracles wrought by him in Egypt Moses had given due credit to Jehovah.
But this was not enough. He was made an example for all time when he
failed to make acknowledgment in the matter of striking the water from
the rock. Now Jesus worked many miracles in no other name than His own,
and in so doing brought Himself within the operation of the rule and of
the precedent established in the case of Moses and Aaron. The curing of
the bloody issue,[212] the stilling of the tempest,[213] the chasing of
the devils into the sea,[214] the raising of Jairus' daughter,[215] and
of the son of the widow of Nain[216] from the dead, were done without
any mention of the power and guidance of Jehovah.

But these transgressions were extra-judicial offenses and have been
discussed merely as an introduction throwing light upon the specific
charge at the trial, that Jesus had claimed to be "the Christ, the Son
of God." The question of the high priest is meaningless, unless
interpreted in the light of knowledge which we know the members of the
Sanhedrin had regarding the wonder-working performances of the Christ.
The failure of Jesus to acknowledge the power of Jehovah in working
miracles might be interpreted as a tacit avowal that He Himself was
Jehovah, and that therefore no acknowledgments were necessary. The
silence itself was a proclamation of the divinity that was in Him, which
placed Him above a law intended to govern the conduct of men like Moses
and Aaron.

We are now prepared to consider the final question: Had Jesus
blasphemed, when He confessed to the high priest that He was "the
Christ, the Son of God"? Had He blasphemed in that wider sense which
Salvador has interpreted as being the Jewish notion of blasphemy at the
time of Christ; that is, by claiming at once the attributes of the
Messiah and the Son of God? Had He asserted an equality with God which
looked to a usurpation of His power and the destruction of His throne;
that is, did the confession of Jesus that He was "Christ, the Son of
God," suggest a rivalry between Him and Jehovah which might result in
the dethronement of the latter and the substitution of the former as the
Lord and King and Ruler of Israel? Regarding Jesus as a mere man, a
plain citizen, an affirmative answer to any one of these questions would
convict Him of blasphemy, according to the Jewish interpretation of that
term at the time of Christ; for the Hebrew Jehovah had repeatedly
proclaimed that He was a jealous God, and that He would brook neither
rivals nor associates in the government of His kingdom.

That Jesus had more than once identified Himself with Jehovah, and had
claimed divine attributes and powers; and that the Jews regarded all
these pretenses as blasphemous, is evident, and can be ascertained from
more than one passage of New Testament Scripture. On one occasion the
Savior said to one sick of palsy: "Son, be of good cheer; thy sins be
forgiven thee. And, behold, certain of the Scribes said within
themselves, This _man_ blasphemeth."[217] According to Luke, they said:
"Who is this man which speaketh blasphemies? Who can forgive sins but
God alone?"[218] Here, according to the Scribes and Pharisees, Jesus had
blasphemed by claiming the power which alone belonged to Jehovah, that
of forgiving sins; or, at least, by exercising a supernatural power
without acknowledging the authorship and guidance of the Almighty. It
should be remembered that in this instance of alleged blasphemy Jesus
had not remotely cursed or profaned the name of Jehovah; but, according
to Jewish notions of the times, had exercised a prerogative, that of
forgiving sins, which belonged solely to Jehovah, without giving credit.

Again, we read this passage in the New Testament: "Therefore Jews sought
the more to kill him, because he not only had broken the Sabbath, but
said also that God was his father, making himself equal with God."[219]
Here we see that the Jews of the days of Jesus, as well as Salvador in
our own day, construed the claims of Jesus to be "the Christ, the Son of
God," as an assertion of equality with Jehovah.

Again, on another occasion, Jesus said emphatically: "I and my Father
are one. Then the Jews took up stones again to stone him. Jesus answered
them, Many good works have I shewed you from my Father; for which of
those works do ye stone me? The Jews answered him, saying, For a good
work, we stone thee not; but for blasphemy; and because that thou, being
a man, makest thyself God."[220] Even before this bold declaration of
His identity with Jehovah, He had intimated that He was of Heavenly
origin and had enjoyed a divine preëxistence. He had declared that He
was the "Bread which came down from Heaven,"[221] and that "Before
Abraham was, I am."[222] The Jews regarded His statement that He had
lived before Abraham as blasphemy, and "took up stones to cast at him,"
this being the usual punishment for blasphemous conduct.

We have said enough to emphasize the point that there was another kind
of blasphemy known to the Jews of the days of Jesus than that prescribed
in Leviticus; and that the confession of being "Christ, the Son of God,"
as the Jews and Caiaphas interpreted the term, brought Jesus within the
meaning of blasphemy, in its wider signification--that of assuming
equality with God. The numerous illustrations above furnished were
given to provide means of clear interpretation of the term blasphemy, as
used in the condemnatory sentence of the high priest. For it is clearly
evident that he and the other judges must have had many charges against
Jesus in mind other than those that appear in the record of the trial.
But we repeat, these extra-judicial charges must be considered only for
purposes of correct interpretation and as a means of throwing light upon
the actual proceedings in the night trial before the Sanhedrin. We
further repeat that the New Testament furnishes abundant evidence that
Jesus the man, the Jewish citizen, had, at divers times and places,
committed blasphemy against Jehovah, under a strict interpretation of
the law of God.

Mr. Simon Greenleaf, the great Christian writer on the Law of Evidence
and the Harmony of the Gospels, has thus tersely and admirably
summarized the matter from the lawyer's point of view: "If we regard
Jesus simply as a Jewish citizen, and with no higher character, this
conviction seems substantially right in point of law, though the trial
were not legal in all its forms. For, whether the accusation were
founded on the first or the second command in the Decalogue, or on the
law laid down in the thirteenth chapter of Deuteronomy, or on that in
the eighteenth chapter and the twentieth verse, he had violated them all
by assuming to himself powers belonging alone to Jehovah. It is not easy
to perceive on what ground his conduct could have been defended before
any tribunal, unless upon that of his superhuman character. No lawyer,
it is conceived, would think of placing his defense upon any other
basis."[223]

But, at this point, the reader would do well to discriminate very
carefully between certain matters touching the most vital features of
the controversy. Certain well-defined distinctions must be observed,
else an erroneous conclusion will inevitably follow.

In the first place, proper limitations must be applied to the person and
character of Jesus before it can be truthfully said that His conviction
by the Sanhedrin was "substantially right in point of law." It must be
remembered that, in this connection, Jesus is regarded merely as a man,
"a Jewish citizen," to use Greenleaf's phrase. His divine character, as
the only-begotten Son of God, as the Second Person of the Trinity, as
the Savior of the human race, is not considered. But the reader may
object, and with reason, that this is begging the question; and is
therefore an inexcusable evasion; since the real issue before the
Sanhedrin was this: Is Jesus God? And to strike the Godhead of Jesus
from the discussion is to destroy the real issue, and to place the
judgment of the Sanhedrin upon an irrelevant and immaterial basis. There
is much truth in this contention, since it is clearly evident that if
Jesus was actually God, "manifest in the flesh," He was not guilty; if
He was not God, He was guilty.

Fortunately for the purposes of this treatise, the legality or the
illegality of the proceedings in the trial of Christ is not so much
related to the question of substance as to that of form. Whether Jesus
were God or not is a question involving His divinity, and is a problem
peculiarly within the domain of the theologian. Whether legal rules were
duly observed in the trial of Christ, were He man or God, is a question
involving His civil rights, and belongs to the domain of the lawyer.
Unless this distinction be recognized and held in mind, the treatment of
this theme from a legal standpoint has no justification. This contention
is all the more certainly true, since proof of the divinity of Jesus, a
spiritual problem, would rest more upon the basis of religious
consciousness and experience, than upon historical facts and logical
inferences.

The author of these volumes believes that Jesus was divine, and that if
He was not divine, Divinity has not touched this globe. The writer bases
his conviction of this fact upon the perfect purity, beauty, and
sinlessness of Jesus; upon the overwhelming historical evidence of His
resurrection from the dead, which event "may unhesitatingly be
pronounced that best established in history";[224] as well as upon the
evident impress of a divine hand upon genuine Christian civilization in
every age.

But the historic proofs of the divinity of Christ that have come down to
us through twenty centuries were not before the Sanhedrin. A charitable
Christian criticism will be slow in passing unmerciful judgment upon the
members of that court for denying the claims of Jesus to identify with
God, when His own disciples evidently failed to recognize them. The
incidents of the Last Supper clearly prove that those who had been
intimately associated with Him during three eventful years did not, at
the close of His ministry, fully comprehend His character and appreciate
His message and His mission.[225] Were comparative strangers to Him and
His teachings expected to be more keenly discerning? After John had
baptized Jesus in the Jordan and the Spirit of God, in the form of a
dove, had descended upon Him, the Baptist seems to have had some doubts
of the Messiahship of Christ and sent an embassy to Him to ask, "Art
thou he that should come, or do we look for another?"[226] If the
Forerunner of the Messiah did not know, are we justified in demanding
perfect prescience and absolute infallibility of Caiaphas?

The most perfect proof of the divinity of Jesus is the fact of His
resurrection from the dead, attested by Matthew, Mark, Luke, John,
Peter, James, and Paul. And yet, although He had frequently foretold to
them that He would rise again, Jesus had to personally appear before
them and submit to physical tests before they would believe that His
prophecies had been fulfilled.[227] And it must be remembered that the
great proof of His divinity, His resurrection from the dead, was not
before Caiaphas and his colleagues at the time of the trial.

The preceding suggestions and observations have not been made in order
to excuse or palliate the conduct of the members of the Sanhedrin for
their illegal conduct of the proceedings against Jesus. Under Point XI
of the Brief we shall prove by Jewish testimony alone the utterly wicked
and worthless character of these judges. Under Point XII we shall
elaborate the proofs in favor of the Messiahship of Jesus and of His
divine Sonship of the Father, as far as the scope of this work will
permit. We have suggested above the perplexity of the members of the
Sanhedrin and of the disciples of Jesus, concerning the divinity of the
Nazarene, to illustrate to the reader how futile would be the task of
attempting in a treatise of this kind to settle the question of the
identity of Jesus with God, and thereby fix upon His judges in the
palace of Caiaphas the odium of an unrighteous judgment. The question,
after all, is one to be settled in the forum of conscience, illuminated
by the light of history, and not at the bar of legal justice.

But whether Jesus were man or God, or man-God, we are justified in
passing upon the question of the violation of forms of law which He was
entitled to have observed in the trial of His claims. And at this point
we return to a consideration of the phrase, "substantially right in
point of law." This language is not intended to convey the notion that
Jesus was legally convicted. It means simply that the claim of equality
with God by a plain Jewish citizen was, under Hebrew law, blasphemy; the
crime which Caiaphas and the Sanhedrin believed that Jesus had
confessed, and for which they condemned Him.

Another distinction that must be made is that relating to the kind of
law that is meant, when it is said that the conviction of Jesus was
"substantially right in point of law." Ancient Hebrew law is meant, and
as that law was interpreted from the standpoint of ancient Judaism. The
policy and precepts of the New Dispensation inaugurated by Jesus can
hardly be considered, in a legal sense, to have been binding upon
Caiaphas and the Sanhedrin, since the very claims of Jesus to
Messiahship and identity with God were to be tested by the provisions of
the Mosaic Code and in the light of Hebrew prophecy. The Pentateuch, the
Prophets, and the Talmud were the legal guides, then, of the judges of
Israel in judicial proceedings at this time, and furnished rules for
determining the genuineness of His pretensions.

Mr. Greenleaf, the author of the phrase, "substantially right in point
of law," asserts that the trial was not legal in all its forms, but he
fails to enumerate the errors. The purpose of the Brief in this work is
to name and discuss the errors and irregularities of the Hebrew trial,
that is, the trial before the Sanhedrin.

But the question may be asked: Why be guilty of the inconsistency of
discussing illegalities, when admission has already been made that the
decision was "substantially right in point of law"? The answer is that a
distinction must be made between that which is popularly and
historically known or believed to be true, and that which has not been
or cannot be proved in a court of law. Every lawyer is familiar with
this distinction. The court may know that the accused is guilty, the
jury may know it, the attorneys may be perfectly sure of it, but if the
verdict of guilt returned by the jury into court is not based upon
testimony that came from the witness stand from witnesses who were
under oath, and that had submitted to cross-examination, such verdict
would hardly be sustained on appeal. In other words, the lives and
liberties of alleged criminals must not be endangered by extra-judicial
and incompetent testimony. A legal verdict can be rendered only when a
regular trial has been had before a competent court, having jurisdiction
of the crime charged, and after all legal rules have been observed which
the constitution and the laws have provided as safeguards for the
protection of the rights of both the people and the prisoner. However
heinous the offense committed, no man is, legally speaking, a criminal,
until he has been legally tried and declared a criminal. The presumption
of innocence, a substantial legal right, is thrown around him from the
very beginning, and continues in his favor until it is overthrown by
competent and satisfactory evidence. Unless such evidence is furnished,
under legal forms, no man, however morally guilty, can be denominated a
criminal, in a juristic sense, in the face of the perpetual continuance
of this presumption of innocence.

If these rules and principles be applied to the trial of Jesus, either
before the Sanhedrin or before Pilate, it can be easily demonstrated
that while He might have been abstractly and historically guilty of the
crime of blasphemy, in the wider acceptation of that term, He was not
remotely a criminal, because He was never legally tried and convicted.
In other words, his condemnation was not based upon a legal procedure
that was in harmony with either the Mosaic Code or the Mishna. The
pages of human history present no stronger case of judicial murder than
the trial and crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth, for the simple reason
that all forms of law were outraged and trampled under foot in the
proceedings instituted against Him. The errors were so numerous and the
proceedings so flagrant that many have doubted the existence of a trial.
Others have sought to attack the authenticity of the Gospel narratives
and the veracity of the Gospel writers by pointing to the number of
errors committed as evidence that no such proceedings ever took place.
As Renan would say, this is a species of "naïve impudence," to assert
that a trial was not had, because numerous errors are alleged; as if a
Hebrew court could not either intentionally or unintentionally commit
blunders and many of them. Every lawyer of extensive practice anywhere
knows from experience that judges of great ability and exalted character
conduct lengthy trials, in both civil and criminal cases, with the most
painstaking care, and are aided by eminent counsel and good and honest
jurors; the whole purpose of the proceedings being to reach a just and
righteous verdict; and yet, on appeal, it is frequently held that not
one but many errors have been committed.

At this point, a few preliminary observations are necessary as a means
of introduction to the discussion of errors. Certain elementary
principles should be clearly understood at the outset. In the first
place, an analysis of the word "case," used in a juristic sense, shows
the existence of two cardinal judicial elements: the element called
Fact, and the element called Law. And whether the advocate is preparing
a pleading at his desk, is making a speech to the jury, or addressing
himself to the court, these elements are ever present in his mind. He is
continually asking these questions: What are the facts of this case?
What is the law applicable to these facts? Do the facts and law meet,
harmonize, blend, according to the latest decision of the court of last
resort? If so, a case is made; otherwise, not.

It is impossible to frame any legal argument upon any other basis than
that of the agreement or nonagreement of law and fact, in a juristic
sense; and upon this plan errors will be discussed and the Brief will be
framed.

In the second place, it must not be forgotten that, in matters of review
on appeal, errors will not be presumed; that is, errors will not be
considered that do not appeal affirmatively upon the record. The law
will rather presume and the court will assume that what should have been
done, has been done. In conformity with this principle, only such errors
will be discussed in these pages that affirmatively appear in the New
Testament Gospels which form the record in this case. By "affirmatively
appear" is meant that the error is clearly apparent or may be reasonably
inferred.

In Part II of the preceding pages of this volume, Hebrew criminal law,
which was actively in force at the time of Christ, was outlined and
discussed. In Part I the Record of Fact was reviewed in the light of
judicial rules. It is the present purpose, in Part III, to enumerate,
in the form of a Brief, the errors committed by the Hebrew judges of
Jesus, as the result of their failure to make the facts of their trial
conform with the legal rules by which they were bound in all criminal
proceedings where human life was at stake. The plan proposed is to
announce successive errors in brief statements which will be designated
"Points," in imitation of the New York method on appeal. Following the
statement of error will be given a short synopsis of the law applicable
to the point suggested. Then, finally, will follow the fact and argument
necessary to elaboration and proof. Accordingly, in pursuance of this
method, let us consider the points in order.

POINT I

THE ARREST OF JESUS WAS ILLEGAL

LAW

"Now the Jewish law prohibited _all proceedings by night_."--DUPIN,
"Jesus Devant Caïphe et Pilate."

"The testimony of an accomplice is not permissible by Rabbinic law
both _propter affectum_ and _propter delictum_, and no man's
_life_, nor his _liberty_, nor his _reputation_ can be endangered
by the malice of one who has confessed himself a
criminal."--MENDELSOHN, "Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient
Hebrews," n. 274.

"Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer among thy people:
neither shalt thou stand against the blood of thy neighbor. Thou
shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart: Thou shalt not avenge
or bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."--LEVITICUS xix. 17, 18.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

The Bible record discloses three distinct elements of illegality in the
arrest of Jesus: (1) The arrest took place at night in violation of
Hebrew law; (2) it was effected through the agency of a traitor and
informer, in violation of a provision in the Mosaic Code and of a
Rabbinic rule based thereon; (3) it was not the result of a legal
mandate from a court whose intentions were to conduct a legal trial for
the purpose of reaching a righteous judgment. These elements of
illegality will be apparent when the facts of the arrest are briefly
stated.

It was the 14th Nisan, according to the Jewish calendar; or April 6th,
A.D. 30, according to our calendar. The Paschal Feast was at hand. The
eyes of all Israel were centered upon the Metropolis of Judaism. From
Judea, from Samaria, from Galilee and Perea, from all parts of the world
where Jews were resident, pilgrims came streaming into the Holy City to
be present at the great national festival. It was to be an occasion of
prayer and thanksgiving, of sweet memories and happy reunions. Then and
there offerings would be made and purifications obtained. In the great
Temple, with its gorgeous ritual, Judaism was to offer its soul to
Jehovah. The national and religious feelings of a divinely commissioned
race were to be deeply stirred by memories that reminded them of the
first, and by hopes that looked forward to the final great deliverance.

It was probably in the home of Mark, on the outskirts of Jerusalem, that
Jesus gathered with the Twelve, on the evening of this day, to eat the
Paschal lamb. In the Upper Room, the sacred feast was spread and the
little band were gathered. Only the genius of a da Vinci could do
justice to that scene. There was Peter, hot-headed, impetuous,
bravado-like. There was John, as gentle, pure-minded, and loving as a
woman. There was Judas, mercenary, low-browed, and craven-hearted.
There were others who, with Peter and John, were to have temples
dedicated in their names. In their midst was the Master of them all,
"God manifest in the flesh," who "with His pierced hands was to lift
empires off their hinges, and turn the stream of centuries from its
channel." No moment of history was so fraught with tragic interest for
the human race. There the seal of the New Covenant was affixed, the bond
of the new human spiritual alliance was made. The great law of love was
proclaimed which was to regenerate and sanctify the world. "These things
I command you, that ye love one another. And I have declared unto them
thy name, and will declare it; that the love wherewith thou hast loved
me, may be in them, and I in them." Thus the great law of love was to be
the binding tie, not only among the little brotherhood there assembled
but was to be the cementing bond between the regenerate of earth, the
Mediator, and the great Father of love, Himself. There, too, was given
the great example of humility which was to characterize true Christian
piety throughout the ages. The pages of history record no other
spectacle so thrilling and sublime, and at the same time tender and
pathetic, as that afforded by the Paschal Meal, when Jesus, the Savior
of men, the Son of God, the Maker of all the shining worlds, sank upon
His knees to wash the feet of ignorant, simple-minded Galilean
fishermen, in order that future ages might have at once a lesson and an
example of that genuine humility which is the very life and soul of true
religion.

During the evening, a bitter anxiety, an awful melancholy, seized the
devoted band, whose number, thirteen, even to-day inspires superstitious
dread. In the midst of the apprehension the heart of the Master was so
deeply wrung with agony that He turned to those about Him and said:
"Verily, verily, I say unto you that one of you shall betray me." This
prediction only intensified the sadness that had already begun to fall
over the Sacred Meal and the loving disciples began to ask: "Lord, is it
I?" Even the betrayer himself joined with the others, and, with
inconceivable heartlessness and effrontery, asked: "Lord, is it I?" At
the moment of greatest dread and consternation, Peter, bolder than the
rest, leaned across the table and whispered to John, who was resting
upon the bosom of Jesus, and suggested that he ask the Master who it
was. Accordingly, John whispered and asked the Savior: "Lord, who is
it?" "Jesus answered, He it is, to whom I shall give a sop, when I have
dipped it. And when he had dipped the sop, he gave it to Judas Iscariot,
the son of Simon. And after the sop Satan entered into him. Then said
Jesus unto him, That thou doest, do quickly." Judas then arose from the
feast and vanished from the room. When he was gone, the Master began to
deliver to His "little children,"[228] to those who had loved and
followed Him, those farewell words which St. John alone records, and
that are so "rarely mixed of sadness and joys, and studded with
mysteries as with emeralds."

There, too, doubts and fears began to burst from the hearts and lips of
the members of the little company. The knowledge that the gentle Jesus,
whose ministry had thrilled and glorified their simple peasant lives,
and promised to them crowns of glory in the world to come, was about to
leave them, and in a most tragic way, filled them with solicitude and
dread. Their anxiety manifested itself by frequent questioning which
excites our wonder that men who had been with Him so long in the
Apostolic ministry should have been so simple-minded and incredulous.
"They said, therefore, What is this that he saith, A little while? We
cannot tell what he saith." This verse is a simple illustration of the
continued misapprehension, on this night, upon the part of the Apostles,
of everything said by the Master. Peter was anxious to know why he could
not follow the Lord. Thomas wanted to know the exact way, evidently
failing to comprehend the figurative language of the Christ. Judas
Lebbæus also had his doubts. He became muddled by mixing the purely
spiritual with the physical powers of sight. "Lord, how is it," he
asked, "that thou wilt manifest thyself to us and not to the world?"
Philip of Bethsaida desired to see the Father. "Lord, show us the
Father," he said, "and it sufficeth us." Philip seems to have been so
dense that he had no appreciation of the spiritual attributes and
invisible existence of the Father.

It was thus that several hours were spent in celebrating the great
Feast; in drinking wine; in eating the Paschal lamb, the unleavened
bread, and the bitter herbs; in singing hymns, offering prayers, and
performing the sacred rites; in delivering discourses which in every
age have been the most precious treasures of Christians, and in
expressing doubts and fears that have excited the astonishment and even
the ridicule of the exacting and supercilious of all the centuries.

At the approach of midnight, Jesus and the Eleven left the Upper Chamber
of the little house and stepped out into the moonlight of a solemn
Passover night. They began to wend their way toward the Kedron that
separated them from the olive orchard on the Mount. Less than an hour's
journey brought them to the Garden of Gethsemane. The word "Gethsemane"
means "oil press." And this place doubtless derived its name from the
fact that in it was located an oil press which was used to crush olives
that grew abundantly on the trees that crowned the slopes. Whether it
was a public garden or belonged to some friend of Jesus, we do not know,
but certain it is that it was a holy place, a sanctuary of prayer, where
the Man of Sorrows frequently retired to pray and commune with His
Heavenly Father. At the gateway Jesus left eight of the Apostles and
took with Him the other three: Peter, James, and John. These men seem to
have been the best beloved of the Master. They were with Him at the
raising of Jairus' daughter, at the Transfiguration on the Mount, and
were now selected to be nearest Him in the hour of His agony. Proceeding
with them a short distance, He suddenly stopped and exclaimed: "My soul
is exceedingly sorrowful, even unto death: tarry ye here, and watch with
me." Then, withdrawing Himself from them a stone's cast, He sank upon
His knees and prayed; and in the agony of prayer great drops of sweat
resembling blood rolled from His face and fell upon the ground. Rising
from prayer, He returned to His disciples to find them asleep. Sorrow
had overcame them and they were mercifully spared the tortures of the
place and hour. Three times did He go away to pray, and as many times,
upon His return, they were found asleep. The last time He came He said
to them: "Rise, let us be going; behold he is at hand that doth betray
me." At this moment were heard the noise and tramp of an advancing
multitude. "Judas then, having received a band of men and officers from
the chief priests and Pharisees, cometh thither with lanterns and
torches and weapons." This midnight mob, led by Judas, was made up of
Roman soldiers, the Temple guard, and stragglers from along the way. It
is probable that the traitor walked ahead of the mob by several paces.
"And forthwith he came to Jesus, and said, Hail, master, and kissed him
and Jesus said unto him, Friend, wherefore art thou come? Then came they
and laid hands on Jesus and took him." But the arrest was not
accomplished without incidents of pathos and of passion. "Whom seek ye?"
asked the Master. "Jesus of Nazareth," they answered. "I am he," replied
the Savior. Then, dazed and bewildered, they fell backward upon the
ground. "Then asked he them again, whom seek ye? and they said, Jesus of
Nazareth. Jesus answered, I have told you that I am he: if, therefore,
ye seek me, let these go their way." John says that this intercession
for the disciples was to the end that prophecy might be fulfilled.[229]
Doubtless so; but this was not all. Nowhere in sacred literature do we
find such pointed testimony to the courage and manliness of Jesus. His
tender solicitude for the members of the little band, for those who had
quit their homes and callings to link their destinies with His, was here
superbly illustrated. He knew that He was going to immediate
condemnation and then to death, but He ardently desired that they should
be spared to live. And for them He threw Himself into the breach.

The furious and the passionate, as well as the tender and pathetic, mark
the arrest in the garden. "Then Simon Peter having a sword drew it, and
smote the high priest's servant, and cut off his right ear. The
servant's name was Malchus." This was bloody proof of that fidelity
which Peter loudly proclaimed at the banquet board, but which was soon
to be swallowed up in craven flight and pusillanimous denial.

"Then the band and the captain and officers of the Jews took Jesus, and
bound him."

At this point the arrest was complete, and we now return to the
discussion of the illegalities connected with it.

It was a well-established and inflexible rule of Hebrew law that
proceedings in capital trials could not be had at night. This provision
did not apply simply to the proceedings of the trial after the prisoner
had been arraigned and the examination had been begun. We have it upon
the authority of Dupin that it applied to the entire proceedings, from
the arrest to the execution. The great French advocate explicitly states
that the arrest was illegal because it was made at night.[230] Deference
to this rule seems to have been shown in the arrest of Peter and John on
another occasion. "And they laid hands upon them and put them in hold
unto the next day: for it was now _eventide_."[231] That Jesus was
arrested at night is clearly evident from the fact that those who
captured Him bore "_lanterns_ and _torches_ and _weapons_."

The employment of Judas by the Sanhedrin authorities constitutes the
second element of illegality in the arrest. This wretched creature had
been numbered among the Twelve, had been blessed and honored, not merely
with discipleship but with apostleship, had himself been sent on holy
missions by the Master, had been given the power to cast out devils, had
been appointed by his Lord the keeper of the moneys of the Apostolic
company, and, if Edersheim is to be believed, had occupied the seat of
honor by the Master at the Last Supper.[232] This craven and cowardly
Apostate was employed by the Sanhedrin Council to betray the Christ. It
is clearly evident from the Scriptures that the arrest of Jesus would
not have taken place on the occasion of the Passover, and therefore
probably not at all, if Judas had not deserted and betrayed Him. The
Savior had appeared and preached daily in the Temple, and every
opportunity was offered to effect a legal arrest on legal charges with
a view to a legal determination. But the enemies of Jesus did not want
this. They were waiting to effect His capture in some out-of-the-way
place, at the dead of night, when His friends could not defend Him and
their murderous proceedings would not reach the eye and ear of the
public. This could not be accomplished as long as His intimates were
faithful to Him. It was, then, a joyful surprise to the members of the
Sanhedrin when they learned that Judas was willing to betray his Master.
"And when they heard it, they were glad, and promised to give him
money."

In modern jurisdictions, accomplice testimony has been and is allowed.
The judicial authorities, however, have always regarded it with
distrust, and we might say with deep-seated suspicion. At the common law
in England a conviction for crime might rest upon the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice, after the jury had been warned that such
testimony was to be closely scrutinized. In the American States the
testimony of an accomplice is admissible, but must be corroborated in
order to sustain a conviction. This is the general rule. The weakness of
such evidence is shown by the nature of the corroboration required by
several states. In some of them the corroborating testimony must not
only tend to prove the commission of the crime but must also tend to
connect the defendant with such commission. Another evidence of the
untrustworthiness of such testimony is that in several states an
accomplice is not permitted to corroborate another accomplice, so as to
satisfy the statutes.[233] The admission of such testimony seems to
rest, in great measure, upon the supreme necessity of the preservation
of the state, which is only possible when the punishment of crime is
possible; and in very many instances it would be impossible to punish
crime if guilty confederates were not allowed and even encouraged to
give state's evidence.

But notwithstanding this supreme consideration of the necessity of the
preservation of the state, the ancient Hebrews forbade the use of
accomplice testimony, as we have seen from the extract from "The
Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews," by Mendelsohn, cited on
page 219.

The arrest of Jesus was ordered upon the supposition that He was a
criminal; this same supposition would have made Judas, who had aided,
encouraged, and abetted Jesus in the propagation of His faith, an
accomplice. If Judas was not an accomplice, Jesus was innocent, and His
arrest was an outrage, and therefore illegal.

The Hebrew law against accomplice testimony must have been derived, in
part at least, from the following rule laid down in Leviticus xix.
16-18: "Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer among thy people:
neither shall thou stand against the blood of thy neighbor. Thou shalt
not hate thy brother in thine heart: Thou shalt not avenge, or bear any
grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself." It may be objected that this is only a moral
injunction and not a legal rule; to which reply must be made that there
was no difference between morality and law among the ancient Hebrews.
Their religion was founded upon law, and their law upon religion. The
two ideas of morality and law were inseparable. The ancient Hebrew
religion was founded upon a contract of the strictest legal kind. The
Abrahamic covenant, when properly interpreted, meant simply that Jehovah
had agreed with the children of Israel that if they would obey the law
as He gave it, they would be rewarded by Him. The force of this
contention will be readily perceived when it is reflected that the
Decalogue is nothing but ten moral injunctions, which are nevertheless
said to be the law which God gave to Moses.

Every provision in the rule laid down in Leviticus is, moreover,
directly applicable to the character and conduct of Judas, and seems to
have been intended as a prophetic warning to him. Let us consider the
different elements of this rule in order.

"Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer among thy people."

Was not Judas a talebearer among his people? Did he not go to the chief
priests to betray his Master unto them? Was he not a "talebearer" if he
did nothing more than communicate to the chief priests the whereabouts
of the Savior, that Gethsemane was His accustomed place of prayer and
that He might be found and arrested there at midnight? Are we not
justified in supposing that Judas told the enemies of Jesus much more
than this? Is it not reasonable to infer that the blood-money was paid
to secure more evidence than that which would merely lead to the arrest
of the Nazarene? Is it not probable that Judas detailed to the chief
priests many events in the ministry of Jesus which, it is known, He
communicated only to the Twelve? If he did these things, was he not a
"talebearer" within the meaning of the rule?

"Neither shalt thou stand against the blood of thy neighbor."

Did not Judas stand against the blood of his nearest and dearest
neighbor when he consented to be the chief instrument of an arrest which
he knew would result in death?

"Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart."

Is it possible to suppose that anything less than hatred could have
induced Judas to betray the Christ? This question is important, for it
involves a consideration of the real character of the betrayer and the
main motive for the betrayal. Judas was from Kerioth in Judea and was
the only Judean among the Twelve. Why Judas was selected as a member of
the Apostolic company is too deep a mystery to be solved by the author
of these pages. Besides, the consideration of the elements of
predestination in his case is foreign to the purpose of this work. His
character as a purely human agency is sufficient to answer the present
design. Judas had undoubtedly demonstrated business capacity in some way
before his appointment to the treasury portfolio of the little band. It
cannot be doubted that greed was his besetting sin. This trait, coupled
with political ambition, undoubtedly accounts for his downfall and
destruction. He was one of those simple-minded, short-sighted
individuals of his day who believed that a political upheaval was at
hand which would result in the restoration of the independence of Israel
as a separate kingdom. He believed that this result would be brought
about through the agency of a temporal Messiah, an earthly deliverer of
almost divine qualities. He thought at first that he saw in Jesus the
person of the Messiah, and in the Apostolic band the nucleus of a
revolution. He was gratified beyond measure at his appointment to the
treasury position, for he felt sure that from it promotion was in sight.
He was perfectly contented to carry for a while the "little bag,"
provided there was reasonable assurance that later on he would be
permitted to carry a larger one.

As the months and years rolled by, heavy scales began to fall from his
stupid eyes and he began to be deceived not by but in Jesus. We are
justified in believing that Judas never even remotely appreciated the
spiritual grandeur of the Christ. He probably had intellect and soul
enough to be charmed and fascinated by the lofty bearing and eloquent
discourse of Jesus, but after all he perceived only the necessary
qualifications of a great republican leader and successful
revolutionist. And after a while he doubtless began to tire of all this
when he saw that the revolution was not progressing and that there was
no possibility of actual and solid results. It is probable that
disaffection and treachery were born and began to grow in his mind and
heart at Capernaum, when Jesus was deserted by many of His followers and
was forced to effect a realignment along spiritual lines. Judas was not
equal to the spiritual test, and it was doubtless then that the
disintegration of his moral nature began, which stopped only with
betrayal, infamy, and death.

But by what process, we may ask, was the mercenary disposition of Judas
converted into hatred against Jesus? The process was that of
disappointment. When Judas became convinced that all the years of his
connection with the Apostolic company had been lost, his will became
embittered and his resentment was aroused. In the denseness of his
ignorance and in the baseness of his soul he probably thought that Jesus
had deceived His followers as to His true mission and he felt enraged
because he had been duped. He had looked forward to worldly promotion
and success. He had fondly hoped that the eloquence of Jesus would
finally call around Him an invincible host of enthusiastic adherents who
would raise the standard of revolt, drive the Romans from Judea, and
establish the long-looked-for kingdom of the Jews. He had noted with
deep disappointment and unutterable chagrin the failure of Jesus to
proclaim Himself king when, at Bethphage, the multitude had greeted His
entrance into Jerusalem with Hosannas and acclamations. And now, at the
Last Supper, he became convinced from the conduct and discourses of the
Master that his worst fears were true, that Jesus was sincere in His
resolution to offer Himself as a sacrifice for the sake of a principle
which he, Judas, did not approve because he could not understand. In
other words, he witnessed in the resolve of Jesus to die at once the
shipwreck of his hopes, and he made haste to vent his wrath upon the
author of his disappointment.

The writer agrees with Renan that the thirty pieces of silver were not
the real or leading inducement to this black and monumental betrayal.
Having taken the fatal step, by leaving the Upper Room in the home of
Mark, to deliver his Lord and Master into the hands of enemies, a bitter
hatred was formed at once against the innocent victim of his foul
designs, on the well-known principle of human nature that we hate those
who have induced us to do that which causes us to despise and hate
ourselves.

"Thou shalt not avenge or bear any grudge against the children of thy
people."

Where, in the annals of the universe, do we find another such case of
vengeance and grudge as this of Judas against Jesus?

"But thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

This commandment of the Mosaic law was also the great commandment of the
Master of Galilee, and in violating it by consenting to betray and
sacrifice Jesus, Judas assaulted and destroyed in his own soul the
cardinal principle of the two great religious dispensations of his race.

And yet this informer, conspirator, and malefactor was employed by the
chief priests in effecting the arrest of Jesus. Was not a fundamental
rule of Mosaic law violated? Will it be urged that the rule operated
against Judas but not against the chief priests? If so, it must be
remembered that no wicked instrument could be used in promoting Hebrew
justice. Officers of the law were not permitted to require a citizen to
do an act which was forbidden by law. If Jesus was innocent, then the
arrest was illegal. If He was guilty, then Judas, his Apostle and
fellow-worker, was an accomplice; and no accomplice could be utilized in
furtherance of justice, under Hebrew law, either in the matter of arrest
or in the establishment of guilt as a witness at the trial.

According to the Talmud, there was at least one seeming exception to
this rule. Renan describes it with peculiar clearness and succinctness.
"The procedure," he says, "against the 'corrupter' (mesith), who sought
to attaint the purity of religion, is explained in the Talmud, with
details, the naïve impudence of which provokes a smile. A judicial
ambush is therein erected into an essential part of the examination of
criminals. When a man was accused of being a 'corrupter,' two witnesses
were suborned who were concealed behind a partition. It was arranged to
bring the accused into a contiguous room, where he could be heard by
these two witnesses without his perceiving them. Two candles were
lighted near him, in order that it might be satisfactorily proved that
the witnesses 'saw him.' (In criminal matters, eyewitnesses alone were
admitted. Mishna, Sanhedrin VI, 5.) He was then made to repeat his
blasphemy; next urged to retract it. If he persisted, the witnesses who
had heard him conducted him to the Tribunal and he was stoned to death.
The Talmud adds that this was the manner in which they treated Jesus;
that he was condemned on the faith of two witnesses who had been
suborned, and that the crime of 'corruption' is, moreover, the only one
for which the witnesses are thus prepared."[234]

Most Gentile writers ridicule this statement of the Talmud, and maintain
that it was a Rabbinic invention of post-Apostolic days, and was
intended to offer an excuse for the outrageous proceedings against the
Christ. Schürer dismisses the whole proposition with contempt. Many
Jewish scholars also refuse it the sanction of their authority. But even
if it was a Talmudic rule of law in force at the time of Christ, its
constitutionality, so to speak, might be questioned, in the first place;
since it was, in spirit at least, repugnant to and subversive of the
Mosaic provision in Leviticus cited above. It must not be forgotten that
the Mosaic Code was the constitution, the fundamental law of Judaism, by
which every Rabbinic interpretation and every legal innovation was to be
tested.

Again, such a law would have been no protection to the chief priests and
to Judas against the operation of this Mosaic injunction. If such a rule
of procedure could be justified upon any ground, it would require
disinterested men acting from honorable motives, in promoting the
maintenance of law and order. Officers of the law have sometimes, as
pretended accomplices, acted in concert with criminals in order to
secure and furnish evidence against them. But they were officers of the
law, and the courts have held that their evidence was not accomplice
testimony requiring corroboration. It is very clear that Judas was not
such a disinterested witness, acting in the interest of public justice.
He was a fugitive from the Last Supper of his Master, a talebearer
within the meaning of the provision in Leviticus; and his employment by
the Sanhedrin was a violation of a fundamental provision in the Mosaic
Code.

The third illegality in the arrest of Jesus was that His capture was not
the result of a legal mandate from a court whose intentions were to
conduct a legal trial for the purpose of reaching a righteous judgment.
"This arrest," says Rosadi, "effected in the night between Thursday and
Friday, the last day of the life of Jesus, on Nisan 14, according to the
Hebrew calendar, was the execution of an illegal and factious resolution
of the Sanhedrin. There was no idea of apprehending a citizen in order
to try him upon a charge which after sincere and regular judgment might
be found just or unfounded; the intention was simply to seize a man and
do away with him. The arrest was not a preventive measure such as might
lawfully precede trial and condemnation; it was an executive act,
accomplished in view of a sentence to be pronounced without legal
justification."

POINT II

THE PRIVATE EXAMINATION OF JESUS BEFORE ANNAS (OR CAIAPHAS) WAS ILLEGAL

LAW

"Now the Jewish law prohibited _all proceedings by night_."--DUPIN,
"Jesus Devant Caïphe et Pilate."

"Be not a sole judge, for there is no sole judge but One."--MISHNA,
Pirke Aboth IV. 8.

"A principle perpetually reproduced in the Hebrew scriptures relates
to the two conditions of _publicity_ and liberty. An accused man
was never subjected to private or secret examination, lest, in his
perplexity, he furnish damaging testimony against
himself."--SALVADOR, "Institutions de Moïse," pp. 365, 366.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

The private examination before Annas (or Caiaphas) was illegal for the
following reasons: (1) The examination was conducted at night in
violation of Hebrew law; (2) no judge or magistrate, sitting alone,
could interrogate an accused judicially or sit in judgment upon his
legal rights; (3) private preliminary examinations of accused persons
were not allowed by Hebrew law.

The general order of events following the arrest in the garden was
this: (1) Jesus was first taken to the house of Annas; (2) after a brief
delay He was sent by Annas to Caiaphas, the high priest, in whose palace
the Sanhedrin, or a part thereof, had already assembled; (3) He was then
brought before this body, tried and condemned; (4) He remained, during
the rest of the night, in the high priest's palace, exposed to the
insults and outrages of His keepers; and was finally and formally
sentenced to death by the Sanhedrin which reconvened at the break of
day.

That Jesus was privately examined before His regular trial by the
Sanhedrin is quite clear. But whether this preliminary examination took
place before Annas or Caiaphas is not certainly known. John alone
records the private interrogation of Jesus and he alone refers to Annas
in a way to connect him with it. This Evangelist mentions that they "led
him away to Annas first."[235] Matthew says that after the arrest of
Jesus, they "led him away to Caiaphas the high priest,"[236] without
mentioning the name of Annas. Mark tells us that "they led Jesus away to
the high priest";[237] but he does not mention either Annas or Caiaphas.
Luke records that they "took him, and led him, and brought him into the
high priest's house,"[238] without telling us the name of the high
priest.

"The high priest then asked Jesus of his disciples and of his
doctrine."[239] This was the beginning of the examination. But who was
the examiner--Annas or Caiaphas? At first view we are inclined to
declare that Caiaphas is meant, because he was undoubtedly high priest
in that year. But Annas is also designated as high priest by Luke in
several places.[240] In Acts iv. 6 he mentions Caiaphas without an
official title, but calls Annas high priest. It is therefore not known
to whom John refers when he says that the "high priest asked Jesus of
his disciples and of his doctrine." For a lengthy discussion of this
point, the reader is referred to Andrews's "Life of Our Lord," pp.
505-510.

But it is absolutely immaterial, from a legal point of view, whether it
was Annas or Caiaphas who examined Jesus, as the proceedings would be
illegal in either case. For whether it was the one or the other, neither
had the right to sit alone as judge; neither had the right to conduct
any judicial proceeding at night; neither had the right to institute a
secret preliminary examination by day or night.

Attention has been called to the matter as involving a question of
historical rather than of legal consequence. A knowledge of the true
facts of the case might, however, throw light upon the order and
connection of the proceedings which followed the same night. For if the
private examination recorded by John was had before Annas, it was
doubtless separated by a certain interval of place and time from the
later proceedings before Caiaphas. Then it is reasonable to suppose that
the examination of witnesses, the confession and condemnation which took
place at the regular trial before the Sanhedrin over which Caiaphas
presided, happened later in the night, or even toward morning, and
were of the nature of a regular public trial. If, on the other hand,
Annas sent Jesus without delay to Caiaphas, who examined Him, it is
reasonable to conclude that witnesses were at once produced, and that
the adjuration and condemnation immediately followed. If such were the
case, a considerable interval of time must have intervened between these
proceedings and the meeting of the Sanhedrin which was had in the
morning to confirm the judgment which had been pronounced at the night
session. But these considerations are really foreign to the question of
legal errors involved, which we come now to discuss.

[Illustration: JESUS IN GETHSEMANE (HOFFMAN)]

In the first place, the private examination of Jesus, whether by Annas
or Caiaphas, took place at night; and we have learned from Dupin that
_all proceedings at night in capital cases_ were forbidden.

In the second place, no judge or magistrate, sitting alone, could
interrogate an accused person judicially or sit in judgment upon his
legal rights. We have seen in Part II of this volume that the Hebrew
system of courts and judges provided no single magistrates who, sitting
alone, could adjudicate causes. The lowest Hebrew court consisted of
three judges, sometimes called the Court of Three. The next highest
tribunal was the Minor Sanhedrin of three-and-twenty members. The
supreme tribunal of the Jews was the Great Sanhedrin of seventy-one
members. There was no such thing among the ancient Hebrews as a court
with a single judge. "Be not a sole judge, for there is no sole judge
but One," is one of the most famous aphorisms of the Pirke Aboth. The
reason of this rule is founded not only in a religious exaction born of
the jealousy of Jehovah, but in the principle of publicity which
provides for the accused, in the very number of judges, a public
hearing. The same principle is suggested by the number of witnesses
required by both the Mishna and Mosaic Code for the conviction of a
prisoner. At least "two or three witnesses" were required to appear
publicly and give testimony against the accused, else a conviction could
not follow.

Again, preliminary examinations of accused persons were not allowed by
Hebrew law. In the American states and in some other countries, a man
suspected of crime and against whom an information or complaint has been
lodged, is frequently taken before an examining magistrate to determine
whether he should be discharged, admitted to bail, or sent to prison to
await the action of a Grand Jury. At such hearing, the prisoner is
usually notified that he is at liberty to make a statement regarding the
charge against him; that he need not do so unless he desires; but that
if he does, his testimony may be subsequently used against him at the
regular trial of the case. But such proceedings, according to Salvador,
were forbidden by ancient Hebrew law. The preliminary examination,
therefore, by Annas or Caiaphas was illegal. The reason of the rule, as
above stated, was to protect the prisoner against furnishing evidence
that might be used against him at the regular trial of his case. The
private examination of Jesus illustrates the justice of the rule and the
necessity of its existence, for it was undoubtedly the purpose of Annas
or Caiaphas to gather material in advance to lay before the regularly
assembled Sanhedrin and thereby expedite the proceedings at the expense
of justice.

If it be contended that the leading of Jesus to Annas first, which St.
John alone relates, was merely intended to give the aged Sanhedrist an
opportunity to see the prisoner who had been causing such commotion in
the land for several years; and that there was no examination of Jesus
before Annas--the interrogation by the high priest concerning the
disciples and the doctrine of Jesus being construed to refer to an
examination by Caiaphas, and being identical with the night trial
referred to by Matthew and Mark--reply may be made that, under any
construction of the case, there was at least an illegal appearance
before Annas, as mere vulgar curiosity to see a celebrated prisoner was
no excuse for the violation of the spirit if not the letter of the law.
It is inconceivable, however, to suppose that Annas did not actually
interrogate Jesus concerning His disciples, His doctrine, and His
personal pretensions. To suppose that he demanded to see Jesus for no
other reason than to get an impression of His looks, is to insult common
sense. If Annas examined the prisoner, though only slightly, concerning
matters affecting the charges against Him that might endanger His life
or liberty, he had violated a very important rule of Hebrew criminal
procedure. The question of the amount of examination of the accused is
immaterial.

It is not known whether Annas at this time sat in the Great Sanhedrin
as a judge. He had been deposed from the high priesthood nearly twenty
years before by the procurator Valerius Gratus, for imposing and
executing capital sentences. But he was, nevertheless, still
all-powerful in the great Council of the Jews. Edersheim says that
though "deprived of the Pontificate, he still continued to preside over
the Sanhedrin."[241] Andrews is of the opinion that "he did in fact hold
some high official position, and this probably in connection with the
Sanhedrin, perhaps as occasional president."[242] Basing his criticism
upon the words in Luke, "Annas and Caiaphus being the high
priests,"[243] Dr. Plummer believes "that between them they discharged
the duties, or that each of them in different senses was regarded high
priest, Annas _de jure_, and Caiaphas _de facto_."[244] This is a mere
supposition, however, since there is no historical evidence that Annas
was restored to the pontificate after his deposition by Valerius Gratus,
A.D. 14.[245] The phrase, "Annas and Caiaphas being high priests,"
refers to the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Cæsar, which was
A.D. 26.

After all, it is here again an historical more than a legal question,
whether Annas was an official or not at the time of the appearance of
Jesus before him. In either case his preliminary examination of the
Christ was illegal. If he was a member of the Sanhedrin, the law forbade
him to hold an informal preliminary examination at night. He certainly
could not do this while sitting alone. If he was not a magistrate, as
Dupin very properly contends, this fact only added to the seriousness of
the illegality of subjecting a prisoner to the whimsical examination of
a private citizen.

Whether a member of the Sanhedrin or not, Annas was at the time of
Christ and had been for many years its dominating spirit. He himself had
been high priest. Caiaphas was his son-in-law, and was succeeded in the
high priesthood by four sons of Annas. The writer does not believe that
Annas had any legal connection with the Sanhedrin, but, like many
American political bosses, exercised more authority than the man that
held the office. He was simply the political tool of the Roman masters
of Judea, and the members of the Sanhedrin were simply figureheads under
his control.

Again, the private examination of Jesus was marked by an act of
brutality which Hebrew jurisprudence did not tolerate. This was not
enumerated above as an error, because it was not probably a violation of
any specific rule of law. But it was an outrage upon the Hebrew sense of
justice and humanity which in its normal state was very pure and lofty.

"The high priest then asked Jesus of his disciples and of his doctrine.
Jesus answered him, I spake openly to the world; I ever taught in the
Synagogue, and in the Temple, whither the Jews always resort; and in
secret have I said nothing. Why askest thou me? ask them which heard me,
what I have said unto them: behold, they know what I said." In this
reply Jesus planted Himself squarely upon His legal rights as a Jewish
citizen. "It was in every word the voice of pure Hebrew justice, founded
upon the broad principle of their judicial procedure and recalling an
unjust judge to the first duty of his great office."

"And when he had thus spoken, one of the officers which stood by struck
Jesus with the palm of his hand, saying, Answerest thou the high priest
so?" Again the Nazarene appealed for protection to the procedure
designed to safeguard the rights of the Hebrew prisoner. "Jesus answered
him, If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil: but if well, why
smitest thou me?"[246]

We have seen that, under Hebrew law, the witnesses were the accusers,
and their testimony was at once the indictment and the evidence. We have
also seen that a Hebrew prisoner could not be compelled to testify
against himself, and that his uncorroborated confession could not be
made the basis of a conviction. "_Why askest thou me? ask them that
heard me_, what I have said unto them." This was equivalent to asking:
Do you demand that I incriminate myself when our law forbids such a
thing? Why not call witnesses as the law requires? If I am an evil-doer,
bear witness of the evil, that is, let witnesses testify to the
wrongdoing, that I may be legally convicted. If I am not guilty of a
crime, why am I thus maltreated?

Is it possible to imagine a more pointed and pathetic appeal for justice
and for the protection of the law against illegality and brutal
treatment? This appeal for the production of legal testimony was not
without its effect. Witnesses were soon forthcoming--not truthful
witnesses, indeed--but witnesses nevertheless. And with the coming of
these witnesses began the formal trial of the Christ, and a formal
trial, under Hebrew law, could be commenced only by witnesses.

POINT III

THE INDICTMENT AGAINST JESUS WAS, IN FORM, ILLEGAL

LAW

"The entire criminal procedure of the Mosaic Code rests upon four
rules: _certainty in the indictment_; publicity in the discussion;
full freedom granted to the accused; and assurance against all
dangers or errors of testimony."--SALVADOR, "Institutions de
Moïse," p. 365.

"_The Sanhedrin did not and could not originate charges_; it only
investigated those brought before it."--EDERSHEIM, "Life and Times
of Jesus the Messiah," vol. i. p. 309.

"_The evidence of the leading witnesses constituted the charge._
There was no other charge: no more formal indictment. Until they
spoke, and spoke in the public assembly, the prisoner was scarcely
an accused man. When they spoke, and the evidence of the two
agreed together, it formed the legal charge, libel, or indictment,
as well as the evidence for its truth."--INNES, "The Trial of
Jesus Christ," p. 41.

"The only _prosecutors_ known to Talmudic criminal jurisprudence are
the witnesses to the crime. Their duty is to bring the matter to
the cognizance of the court, and to bear witness against the
criminal. In capital cases, they are the legal executioners also.
Of an official accuser or prosecutor there is nowhere any trace in
the laws of the ancient Hebrews."--MENDELSOHN, "The Criminal
Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews," p. 110.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

The Gospel records disclose two distinct elements of illegality in the
indictment against Jesus: (1) The accusation, at the trial, was twofold,
vague, and indefinite, which Mosaic law forbade; (2) it was made, in
part, by Caiaphas, the high priest, who was one of the judges of Jesus;
while Hebrew law forbade any but leading witnesses to present the
charge.

A thorough understanding of Point III depends upon keeping clearly in
mind certain well-defined elementary principles of law. In the first
place, it should be remembered that in most modern jurisdictions an
indictment is simply an accusation, carries with it no presumption of
guilt, and has no evidentiary force. Its only function is to bring the
charge against the prisoner before the court and jury, and to notify the
accused of the nature of the accusation against him. But not so under
the ancient Hebrew scheme of justice. Under that system there was no
such body as the modern Grand Jury, and no committee of the Sanhedrin
exercised similar accusatory functions. The leading witnesses, and they
alone, presented charges. It follows then, of necessity, that the
ancient Hebrew indictment, unlike the modern indictment, carried with it
a certain presumption of guilt and had certain evidentiary force. This
could not be otherwise, since the testimony of the leading witnesses
was at once the indictment and the evidence offered to prove it.

Again, in the very nature of things an indictment should, and under any
enlightened system of jurisprudence, does clearly advise the accused of
the exact nature of the charge against him. Under no other conditions
would it be possible for a prisoner to prepare his defense. Most modern
codes have sought to promote clearness and certainty in indictments by
requiring the charging of only one crime in one indictment, and in
language so clear and simple that the nature of the offense charged may
be easily understood.

Now Salvador says that "certainty in the indictment" was one of the
cardinal rules upon which rested the entire criminal procedure of the
Mosaic Code. Was this rule observed in framing the accusation against
Jesus at the night trial before the Sanhedrin? If so, the Gospel records
do not disclose the fact. It is very certain, indeed, that the learned
of no age of the world since the crucifixion have been able to agree
among themselves as to the exact nature of the indictment against the
Christ. This subject was too exhaustively discussed in the beginning of
the Brief to warrant lengthy treatment here. Suffice it to say that the
record of the night trial before Caiaphas discloses two distinct
charges: the charge of sedition--the threat to destroy a national
institution and to seduce the people from their ancient allegiance, in
the matter of the destruction of the Temple; and the charge of blasphemy
preferred by Caiaphas himself in the adjuration which he administered to
Jesus. When the false witnesses failed to agree, their contradictory
testimony was rejected and the charge of sedition was abandoned. And
before Jesus had time to answer the question concerning sedition,
another distinct charge, that of blasphemy, was made in almost the same
breath.[247] Did this procedure tend to promote "certainty in the
indictment"? Did it not result in the complete destruction of all
clearness and certainty? Are we not justified in supposing that the
silence of Jesus in the presence of His accusers was at least partially
attributable to His failure to comprehend the exact nature of the
charges against Him?

Again, the accusation was, in part, by Caiaphas, the high priest, who
was also one of the judges of Jesus;[248] while Hebrew law forbade any
but leading witnesses to present the charge. Edersheim tells us that
"the Sanhedrin did not and could not originate charges; it only
investigated those brought before it." If the Sanhedrin as a whole could
not originate charges, because its members were judges, neither could
any individual Sanhedrist do so. When the witnesses "agreed not
together" in the matter of the charge of sedition, this accusation was
abandoned. Caiaphas then deliberately assumed the rôle of accuser, in
violation of the law, and charged Jesus, in the form of an adjuration,
with blasphemy, in claiming to be "the Christ, the Son of God."
Confession and condemnation then followed. Only leading witnesses could
prefer criminal charges under Hebrew law. Caiaphas, being a judge, could
not possibly be a witness; and could not, therefore, be an accuser.
Therefore, the indictment against Jesus was illegally presented.

The writer believes that the above is a correct interpretation of the
nature and number of the charges brought against the Christ, and that
the legal aspects of the case are as above stated. But candor and
impartiality require consideration of another view. Several excellent
writers have contended that there were, in fact, not two charges
preferred against Jesus but only one under different forms. These
writers contend that Caiaphas and his colleagues understood that Jesus
claimed supernatural power and identity with God when He declared that
He was _able_ to destroy the Temple and to build it again in three
days,[249] and that the question of the high priest, "I adjure thee by
the living God, that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ, the Son of
God," flowed naturally from and had direct reference to the charge of
being able to destroy the Temple. The advocates of this view appeal to
the language of the original auditors to sustain their contention.
"Forty-and-six years was this temple in building, and wilt thou rear it
again in three days?" It is insisted that these words convey the idea
that those who heard Jesus understood Him to mean that He had
supernatural power. There is certainly much force in the contention but
it fails to meet other difficulties. In the first place, it is not clear
that a threat to destroy the Temple implied a claim to supernatural
power; in which case there would be no connection between the first
charge and that in which it was suggested that Jesus had claimed to be
the Christ, the Son of God. In the second place, the contention that the
two charges are substantially the same ignores the language of Mark,
"But neither so did their witness agree together,"[250] which was
certainly not injected by the author of the second Gospel as a matter of
mere caprice or pastime. This language, legally interpreted, means that
the testimony of the false witnesses, being contradictory, was thrown
aside, and that the charge concerning the destruction of the Temple was
abandoned. This is the opinion of Signor Rosadi and is very weighty.

Those writers who maintain that there was only one charge, that of
blasphemy, under different forms, rely upon the passage in Matthew, "I
am _able_ to destroy the temple of God and to build it again in three
days," and interpret it as a claim to supernatural power in the light of
the language used by those who heard it: "Forty-and-six years was this
temple in building, and wilt thou rear it again in three days?" Those
who hold the opposite view, that there were two distinct charges, rely
upon the passage in Mark, "I _will_ destroy this temple that is made
with hands, and within three days I will build another made without
hands," and interpret it in the light of a similar accusation against
Stephen a few months afterwards: "For we have heard him say, that this
Jesus of Nazareth _shall destroy this place_, and _shall change the
customs_ which Moses delivered us."[251] This second interpretation,
which we believe to be the better, establishes the existence at the
trial of Christ of two distinct charges: that of sedition, based upon a
threat to assault existing institutions; and that of blasphemy, founded
upon the claim of equality with God. And, in the light of this
interpretation, the illegality in the form of the indictment against
Jesus has been urged.

If the first construction be the true one, then the error alleged in
Point III is not well founded, since the accusation was presented by
witnesses, as the law required; unless it could be successfully urged
that the witnesses, being _false_ witnesses, were no more competent to
accuse a prisoner than to convict him upon their false testimony. In
such a case the substance as well as the form of the indictment would be
worthless, and the whole case would fall, through failure not only of
competent testimony to convict but also of a legal indictment under
which to prosecute.

Neither the Mishna nor the Gemara mentions written indictments among the
ancient Hebrews. "The Jewish Encyclopedia" says that accusations were
probably in writing, but that it is not certain.[252] A passage in
Salvador seems to indicate that they were in writing. "The papers in the
case," he says, "were read, and the accusing witnesses were then
called." "The papers" were probably none other than the indictment. But
of this we are not sure, and cannot, therefore, predicate the allegation
of an error upon it. From the whole context of the Scriptures, however,
we are led to believe that only oral charges were preferred against
Jesus.

POINT IV

THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SANHEDRIN AGAINST JESUS WERE ILLEGAL BECAUSE THEY
WERE CONDUCTED AT NIGHT

LAW

"Let a capital offence be tried during the day, but suspend it at
night."--MISHNA, Sanhedrin IV. 1.

"Criminal cases can be acted upon by the various courts during day
time only, by the Lesser Synhedrions from the close of the morning
service till noon, and by the Great Synhedrion till
evening."--MENDELSOHN, "Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient
Hebrews," p. 112.

"The reason why the trial of a capital offense could not be held at
night is because, as oral tradition says, the examination of such
a charge is like the diagnosing of a wound--in either case a more
thorough and searching examination can be made by
daylight."--MAIMONIDES, Sanhedrin III.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

HEBREW jurisprudence positively forbade the trial of a capital case at
night. The infraction of this rule involves the question of
jurisdiction. A court without jurisdiction can pronounce no valid
verdict or judgment. A court has no jurisdiction if it convenes and
acts at a time forbidden by law.

One is naturally disposed to deride the reason assigned by Maimonides
for the existence of the law against criminal proceedings at night. But
it should not be forgotten that in the olden days surgery had no such
aids as are at hand to-day. Modern surgical apparatus had not been
invented and electric lights and the Roentgen Rays were unknown. In the
light of this explanation of the great Jewish philosopher the curious
inquirer after the real meaning of things naturally asks why the
Areopagus of Athens always held its sessions in the night and in the
dark.[253]

We have seen that Jesus was arrested in Gethsemane about midnight and
that His first ecclesiastical trial took place between two and three
o'clock in the morning.[254] St. Luke tells us that there was a daybreak
meeting,[255] which was evidently intended to give a semblance of
legality and regularity to that rule of Hebrew law that required two
trials of the case.

The exact time of the beginning of the night session of the Sanhedrin is
not known. It is generally supposed that the arrest took place in the
garden between midnight and one o'clock. The journey to the house of
Annas must have required some little time. Where this house was located
nobody knows. According to one tradition Annas owned a house on the
Mount of Olives close to the booths or bazaars under the "Two Cedars."
Stapfer believes that Jesus was taken to that place. According to
another tradition the house of Annas was located on the "Hill of Evil
Counsel." Barclay believes that this was the place to which Jesus was
conducted. But the tradition which is most generally accepted is that
which places the palace of Annas on Mount Zion near the palace of
Caiaphas. It is believed by many that these two men, who were related,
Annas being the father-in-law of Caiaphas, occupied different apartments
in the same place. But these questions are mere matters of conjecture
and have no real bearing upon the present discussion, except to show, in
a general way, the length of time probably required to conduct Jesus
from Gethsemane to Annas; from Annas to Caiaphas, if the latter was the
one who privately examined Jesus; and thence to the meeting of the
Sanhedrin. It is reasonable to suppose that at least two hours were thus
consumed, which would bring Jesus to the palace of Caiaphas between two
and three o'clock, if the arrest in the garden took place between twelve
and one o'clock. But here, again, a difference of one or two hours would
not affect the merit of the proposition stated in Point IV. For it is
beyond dispute that the first trial before the Sanhedrin was had at
night, which was forbidden by law.

The question has been frequently asked: Why did the Sanhedrin meet at
night in violation of law? The answer to this is referable to the
treachery of Judas, to the fact that he "sought opportunity to betray
him unto them in the absence of the multitude," and to the thought of
the Master: "But this is your hour, and the power of God." Luke tells us
that the members of the Sanhedrin "feared the people."[256] Mark informs
us that they had resolved not to attempt the arrest and execution of
Jesus at the time of the Passover, "lest there be an uproar of the
people."[257]

Jesus had taught daily in the Temple, and had furnished ample
opportunity for a legal arrest with a view to a legal trial. But His
enemies did not desire this. "The chief priests and scribes sought how
they might take him by craft, and put him to death."[258] The arrival of
Judas from the scene of the Last Supper with a proposition of immediate
betrayal of the Christ was a glad surprise to Caiaphas and his friends.
Immediate and decisive action was necessary. Not only the arrest but the
trial and execution of Jesus must be accomplished with secrecy and
dispatch. The greatest festival of the Jews had just commenced. Pilgrims
to the feast were arriving from all parts of the Jewish kingdom. The
friends and followers of Jesus were among them. His enemies had
witnessed the remarkable demonstration in His honor which marked His
entrance into Jerusalem only a few days before. It is not strange, then,
that they "feared the people" in the matter of the summary and illegal
proceedings which they had resolved to institute against Him. They knew
that the daylight trial, under proper legal forms, with the friends of
Jesus as witnesses, would upset their plans by resulting in His
acquittal. They resolved, therefore, to act at once, even at the expense
of all forms of justice. And it will be seen that this determination to
arrest and try Jesus at night, in violation of law, became the parent of
nearly every legal outrage that was committed against Him. The selection
of the midnight hour for such a purpose resulted not merely in a
technical infraction of law, but rendered it impossible to do justice
either formally or substantially under rules of Hebrew criminal
procedure.

POINT V

THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SANHEDRIN AGAINST JESUS WERE ILLEGAL BECAUSE THE
COURT CONVENED BEFORE THE OFFERING OF THE MORNING SACRIFICE

LAW

"The Sanhedrin sat from the close of the morning sacrifice to the
time of the evening sacrifice."--TALMUD, Jerus., Sanhedrin I. fol.
19.

"No session of the court could take place before the offering of the
morning sacrifice."--MM. LÉMANN, "Jesus Before the Sanhedrin," p.
109.

"Since the morning sacrifice was offered at the dawn of day, it was
hardly possible for the Sanhedrin to assemble until the hour after
that time."--MISHNA, "Tamid, or of the Perpetual Sacrifice," C.
III.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

THE fact that the Sanhedrin convened before the offering of the morning
sacrifice constitutes the fifth illegality. This error is alleged upon
the authority of MM. Lémann, who, in their admirable little work
entitled "Jesus Before the Sanhedrin," have called attention to it. It
is very difficult, however, to determine whether this was a mere
irregularity, or was what modern jurists would call a material error.
From one point of view it seems to be merely a repetition of the rule
forbidding the Sanhedrin to meet at night. The morning sacrifice was
offered at the break of day and lasted about an hour. A session of the
court before the morning sacrifice would, therefore, have been a meeting
at night, which would have been an infringement of the law. But this was
probably not the real reason of the rule. Its true meaning is doubtless
to be found in the close connection that existed between the Hebrew law
and the Hebrew religion. The constitution of the Hebrew Commonwealth was
an emanation of the mind of Jehovah, the Temple in which the court met
was His residence on earth, and the judges who formed the Great
Sanhedrin were the administrators of His will. It is most reasonable,
then, to suppose that an invocation, in sacrifice and prayer, of His
guidance and authority would be the first step in any judicial
proceedings conducted in His name.

It is historically true that a session of the Sanhedrin in the palmiest
days of the Jewish Commonwealth was characterized by all the religious
solemnity of a service in the synagogue or the Temple. It is entirely
probable, therefore, that the morning sacrifice was made by law an
indispensable prerequisite to the assembling of the supreme tribunal of
the Jews for the transaction of any serious business. On any other
supposition the rules of law cited above would have no meaning. We have
reason to believe, then, that the offering of the morning sacrifice was
a condition precedent to the attachment of jurisdiction, and without
jurisdiction the court had no authority to act. That the morning
sacrifice was offered each day, whether the court assembled or not, as a
religious requirement, does not alter the principle of law above
enunciated.

But it may be asked: How do we know that the morning sacrifice was not
offered? The answer is that the whole context of the Scriptures relating
to the trial shows that it could not have been offered. Furthermore, a
simple and specific reason is that the time prescribed by law for
conducting the morning service was between the dawn of day and sunrise.
Then, if the court convened between two and three o'clock in the
morning, it is very certain that the sacrifice had not been offered. It
is true that there was a morning session of the Sanhedrin. But this was
held simply to confirm the action of the night session at which Jesus
had been condemned. In other words, the real trial was at night and was
held before the performance of the religious ceremony, which was, in all
probability, a prerequisite to the attachment of jurisdiction.

POINT VI

THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST JESUS WERE ILLEGAL BECAUSE THEY WERE CONDUCTED
ON THE DAY PRECEDING A JEWISH SABBATH; ALSO ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE
FEAST OF UNLEAVENED BREAD AND THE EVE OF THE PASSOVER

LAW

"Court must not be held on the Sabbath, or any holy day."--"Betza,
or of the Egg," Chap. V. No. 2.

"They shall not judge on the eve of the Sabbath, nor on that of any
festival."--MISHNA, Sanhedrin IV. 1.

"No court of justice in Israel was permitted to hold sessions on the
Sabbath or any of the seven Biblical holidays. In cases of capital
crime, no trial could be commenced on Friday or the day previous
to any holiday, because it was not lawful either to adjourn such
cases longer than over night, or to continue them on the Sabbath
or holiday."--RABBI WISE, "Martyrdom of Jesus," p. 67.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

NO Hebrew court could lawfully meet on a Sabbath or a feast day, or on a
day preceding a Sabbath or a feast day.

Concerning the Sabbath day provision Maimonides offers the following
reason for the rule: "As it is required to execute the criminal
immediately after the passing of the sentence, it would sometimes happen
that the kindling of a fire would be necessary, as in the case of one
condemned to be burned; and this act would be a violation of the law of
the Sabbath, for it is written 'Ye shall kindle no fire in your
habitations on the Sabbath day.'"[259] (Exodus xxxv. 3.)

Under modern practice, sessions of court may be adjourned from day to
day, or, if need be, from week to week. But under the Hebrew system of
criminal procedure the court could not adjourn for a longer time than a
single night. Its proceedings were, so to speak, continuous until final
judgment. As the law forbade sessions of court on Sabbath and feast
days, it became necessary to provide that courts should not convene on
the day preceding a Sabbath or a feast day, in order to avoid either an
illegal adjournment or an infringement of the rule relating to the
Sabbath and feast days.

Now Jesus was tried by the Sanhedrin on both a feast day and a day
preceding the Sabbath. And, at this point, a clear conception of the
ancient Jewish mode of reckoning time should be had. The Jewish day of
twenty-four hours began at one sunset and ended with the next. But this
interval was not divided into twenty-four parts or hours of equal and
invariable length. Their day proper was an integral part of time and was
reckoned from sunrise to sunset. Their night proper was likewise a
distinct division of time and was measured from sunset to sunrise. An
hour of time, according to modern reckoning, is invariably sixty
minutes. But the ancient Jewish hour was not a fixed measure of time. It
varied in length as each successive day and night varied in theirs at
different seasons of the year. Neither did the Jews begin their days and
nights as we do. Our day of twenty-four hours always begins at midnight.
Their day of twenty-four hours always began at one sunset and ended with
the next.

Now Jesus was tried by the Sanhedrin on the 14th Nisan, according to the
Jewish calendar; or between the evening of Thursday, April 6th, and the
afternoon of Friday, April 7th, A.D. 30, according to our calendar. The
14th Nisan began at sunset on April 6th and lasted until sunset on April
7th. This was a single Jewish day, and within this time Jesus was tried
and executed. According to our calendar, the trial and execution of
Jesus took place on Friday, April 7th. This was the day preceding the
Jewish Sabbath, which came on Saturday, according to our reckoning. And
on a day preceding the Sabbath no Jewish court could lawfully convene.
This is the first error suggested under Point VI.

Again, it is beyond dispute that the Feast of Unleavened Bread had begun
and that the Passover was at hand when Jesus was tried by the
Sanhedrin.[260] This was in violation of a specific provision of Hebrew
law, and constitutes the second error alleged under Point VI.

There seems to be some conflict among the authorities as to whether
Jesus was tried on the first day of the celebration of the feast of the
Passover or on the day preceding. But the question is immaterial from a
legal point of view, as the law forbade a trial either on a feast day or
on the day preceding, for reasons above stated.

This violation of the law relating to the Sabbaths and feast days, like
that relating to night sessions of the Sanhedrin, resulted in still
other errors. It is necessary to mention only one of these at this
point. The proceedings of the Sanhedrin were recorded by two scribes or
clerks. Their records were to be used on the second day of the trial in
reviewing the proceedings of the first. But Hebrew law forbade any
writing on a Sabbath or a holy day. How was it possible, then, to keep a
record of the proceedings, if Jesus was tried on a Sabbath and also on a
feast day, without violating a rule of law? If no minutes of the meeting
were kept, a most glaring irregularity is apparent.

POINT VII

THE TRIAL OF JESUS WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE IT WAS CONCLUDED WITHIN ONE DAY

LAW

"A criminal case resulting in the acquittal of the accused may
terminate the same day on which the trial began. But if a sentence
of death is to be pronounced, it can not be concluded before the
following day."--MISHNA, Sanhedrin IV. 1.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

CARE and conservatism, precaution and delay, were the characteristic
features of the criminal procedure of the ancient Hebrews. The principal
aphorism of the Pirke Aboth is this: "_Be cautious and slow in
judgment_, send forth many disciples, and _make a fence around the
law._"[261] The length and seriousness of their deliberations in
criminal proceedings of a capital nature were due to their supreme
regard for human life. "Man's life belongs to God, and only according to
the law of God may it be disposed of." "Whosoever preserves one worthy
life is as meritorious as if he had preserved the world." These and
similar maxims guided and controlled Hebrew judges in every capital
trial. Their horror of death as the result of a judicial decree is shown
by the celebrated saying: "The Sanhedrin which so often as once in seven
years condemns a man to death, is a slaughter-house."[262]

To assure due deliberation and reflection in a case where a human life
was at stake, Hebrew law required that the trial should last at least
two days, in case of the conviction of the accused. In case of an
acquittal the trial might terminate within a single day. Before
condemnation could be finally decreed a night had to intervene, during
which time the judges could sleep, fast, meditate, and pray. At the
close of the first day's trial they left the judgment hall and walked
homeward, arm in arm, discussing the merits of the case. At sunset they
began to make calls upon each other, again reviewing among themselves
the facts in evidence. They then retired to their homes for further
meditation. During the intervening night they abstained from eating
heavy food and from drinking wine. They carefully avoided doing anything
that would incapacitate them for correct thinking. On the following day
they returned to the judgment hall and retried the case. The second
trial was in the nature of a review and was intended to detect errors,
if there were any, in the first trial.[263] It was not until the
afternoon of this day that a final decree could be made and that a
capital sentence could follow.

Now the Gospel record very clearly discloses the fact that Jesus was
arrested, tried, and executed within the limits of a single day. Neither
the exact hour of His arrest, nor of His trial, nor of His execution is
known. But it is positively certain that all took place between sunset,
the beginning of Nisan 14, and sunset, the beginning of Nisan 15. This
was the interval of a single Jewish day, Nisan 14. And within such an
interval of time it was illegal to finally condemn a man to death under
Hebrew law. Even Stapfer, who contends that the trial was legal and that
forms of law were generally observed, admits this error. He asserts that
the precipitate conduct of the members of the Sanhedrin was not only
opposed to the spirit of Hebrew conservatism in the matter of criminal
procedure but was a breach of a specific provision of the criminal
code.[264]

It is true that there were two distinct trials: one between 2 and 3
A.M., Friday, April 7th, which is recorded by Matthew[265] and
Mark,[266] and a second about daybreak of the same day, recorded by
Matthew,[267] Mark,[268] and Luke.[269] But both these trials were had
within one day--indeed, within six hours of each other. The judges did
not try the case and then retire to their homes for sleep, prayer, and
meditation until the following day, as the law required. Even if they
had done so, they would not have avoided an illegal procedure, inasmuch
as the trial had been illegally begun on a feast day and the eve of the
Sabbath, and it would have been impossible to avoid the error alleged in
Point VII. For if they had deferred the sentencing and execution of
Jesus until the following day it would still have been illegal, since
the next day was both a Sabbath and a holy day (the Passover).

Several writers who contend that there was a regular trial of Jesus
assert that the morning meeting of the Sanhedrin was intended to give a
semblance of legality and regularity to that rule of Hebrew law which
required at least two trials. But it will readily be seen that this was
a subterfuge and evasion, since both trials were had on the same day,
whereas the law required them to be held on different days.

POINT VIII

THE SENTENCE OF CONDEMNATION PRONOUNCED AGAINST JESUS BY THE SANHEDRIN
WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE IT WAS FOUNDED UPON HIS UNCORROBORATED CONFESSION

LAW

"We have it as a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that no
one can bring an accusation against himself. Should a man make
confession of guilt before a legally constituted tribunal, such
confession is not to be used against him unless properly attested
by two other witnesses."--MAIMONIDES, Sanhedrin IV. 2.

"Not only is self-condemnation never extorted from the defendant by
means of torture, but no attempt is ever made to lead him on to
self-incrimination. Moreover, a voluntary confession on his part
is not admitted in evidence, and therefore not competent to
convict him, unless a legal number of witnesses minutely
corroborate his self-accusation."--MENDELSOHN, "Criminal
Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews," p. 133.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

MORE than one system of jurisprudence has refused to permit a conviction
for crime to rest upon an uncorroborated confession. But it remained for
the ancient Hebrews to discover the peculiar reason for the rule, that
the witness who confessed was "his own relative"; and relatives were not
competent witnesses under Hebrew law. Modern Jewish writers, however,
have assigned other reasons for the rule. Rabbi Wise says:
"Self-accusation in cases of capital crime was worthless. For if not
guilty he accuses himself of a falsehood; if guilty he is a wicked man,
and no wicked man, according to Hebrew law, is permitted to testify,
especially not in penal cases."[270] Mendelsohn says that "the reason
assigned for this enactment is the wish to avoid the possibility of
permitting judicial homicide on self-accusing lunatics, or on persons
who, in desperation, wish to cut short their earthly existence, and to
effect this falsely accuse themselves of some capital crime."[271]

Modern jurists have assigned still other reasons for the rule as it has
existed in modern law.[272] Men have been known to confess that they
were guilty of one crime to avoid punishment for another. Morbid and
vulgar sentimentality, such as love of newspaper notoriety, have induced
persons of inferior intelligence, who were innocent, to assume
responsibility for criminal acts.

But whatever the reason of the rule, Jesus was condemned to death upon
His uncorroborated confession, in violation of Hebrew law.

"For many bare false witness against him, but their witness agreed not
together. And there arose certain, and bare false witness against him,
saying, We heard him say, I will destroy this temple that is made with
hands, and within three days I will build another made without hands.
But neither so did their witness agree together. And the high priest
stood up in the midst, and asked Jesus, saying, Answerest thou nothing?
what is it which these witness against thee? But he held his peace, and
answered nothing. Again the high priest asked him, and said unto him,
Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed? And Jesus said, I am: and
ye shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of power, and
coming in the clouds of Heaven. Then the high priest rent his clothes,
and saith, What need we any further witnesses? ye have heard the
blasphemy: what think ye? And they all condemned him to be guilty of
death. And some began to spit on him, and to cover his face, and to
buffet him, and to say unto him, Prophesy."[273]

It will be seen from a perusal of this report of the trial that it was
sought to condemn Jesus first on the charge of sedition, that is, that
He had threatened the destruction of the Temple and thereby endeavored
to seduce the people from their national allegiance. "But their witness
agreed not together"; and under Hebrew law they were required to reject
contradictory testimony and discharge the prisoner, if the state was
unable to prove its case. This is what should have been done at this
point in the trial of Jesus. But, instead, the judges, in their total
disregard at law, turned to the accused and said: "Answerest thou
nothing? what is it which these witness against thee?" "But he held his
peace, and answered nothing." By remaining silent, Jesus only exercised
the ordinary privilege of a Jewish prisoner to refuse to incriminate
himself. The modern rule that the accused cannot be made to testify
against himself, unless he first voluntarily takes the witness stand in
his own behalf, was substantially true among the ancient Hebrews. But
here we find Caiaphas insisting that Jesus incriminate Himself. And he
continues to insist in the matter of the second charge, that of
blasphemy. "And the high priest asked him, and said unto him, Art thou
the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?" That question was illegal, because
it involved an irregular mode of criminal procedure, and because it
asked for a confession of guilt to be made the basis of a conviction.
The false witnesses had failed to agree and had evidently been rejected
and dismissed. The judges were then without witnesses to formulate a
charge and furnish proof of its truth. They were thus forced to the
despicable and illegal method of asking the accused to condemn Himself,
when they knew that no confession could be made the basis of a
conviction. They were also guilty of the illegality of formulating a
charge without witnesses. We have seen that only leading witnesses could
present an indictment, but here the judges became the accusers, in
violation of law.

In answer to the high priest's question, Jesus, feeling that He could
not afford at such an hour and in such a place to longer conceal His
Messiahship, answered boldly and emphatically: "I am."[274] "And they
all condemned him to be guilty of death." It will thus be seen that upon
His own confession and not upon the testimony of at least two competent
witnesses agreeing in all essential details, as the law required, was
the Nazarene condemned to death.

If it be argued, as it has been, that the two charges of threatening to
destroy the Temple and of pretending to be the "Christ, the Son of God,"
were in fact but different phases of the same charge of blasphemy, and
that the two witnesses were the corroborators of the confession of
Jesus, then reply must be made that the witnesses were not competent,
being false witnesses, nor was their testimony legally corroborated,
because it was false and contradictory.

Again, it was the rule of Hebrew law that both witnesses had to testify
to all the essential elements of a complete crime. One could not furnish
one link, and another another link, in order to construct a chain of
evidence. Each had to testify to all the essential elements necessary to
constitute the legal definition of a crime. But the false witnesses did
not do this. Under any view of the case, then, the testimony of these
witnesses was wholly worthless, and the confession of Jesus was the
solitary and illegal basis of His conviction.

The failure of the Sanhedrin to secure sufficient and competent evidence
to convict Jesus must not be regarded as accidental, or as attributable
to the hour and to the surroundings. The popularity of the Nazarene,
outside the narrow circle of the Temple authorities, was immense. The
friendship of Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea is proof that He had
standing even in the Sanhedrin itself. It was therefore difficult to
find witnesses who were willing to testify against Him. Besides, the
acts of His ministry, while in no sense cowardly or hypocritical, had
been, in general, very cautious and diplomatic. He seems to have
retired, at times, into the desert or the wilderness to avoid
disagreeable and even dangerous complications with the civil and
ecclesiastical authorities.[275] Jesus was in no sense a politician, but
He was not lacking in mother wit and practical resources. He saw through
the designs of Herod Antipas, who wished to get Him out of his
dominions. It will be remembered that certain Pharisees, pretending
friendship for Him, warned Him to flee from Galilee to avoid being
killed by Herod. The courage and manliness of Jesus are shown by the
fact that He remained in His native province, and even sent a
contemptuous message to the Tetrarch, whom He styled "that fox."[276]

At other times, Christ was compelled to defend Himself against the swarm
of spies that hovered over His pathway through Samaria, along the
Jordan, and around the Sea of Galilee. In His discussions with His
enemies who sought to entrap Him, He displayed consummate skill in
debate. His pithy sayings and incomparable illustrations usually left
His questioners defenseless and chagrined. Oftentimes in these
encounters He proclaimed eternal and universal truths which other
nations and later ages were to develop and enjoy. When, holding in His
hand a penny with Cæsar's image upon it, He said, "Render therefore unto
Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are
God's," he foretold and stamped with approval the immortal principle
that was to be embodied in the American constitution and to remain the
cornerstone of the American Commonwealth; a truth repeated by Roger
Williams when in the forests of Rhode Island he declared that the
magistrate should rule in civil matters only and that man was answerable
for his religious faith to God alone. This declaration of the Nazarene
is the spiritual and intellectual basis of the sublime doctrine of civil
liberty and religious freedom that finds its highest expression in that
separation of the Church and State which enables men of different creeds
and different parties to live side by side as patriots and religionists
and as comrades, though antagonists.

The replies of Jesus to those who came to "entangle him in his talk"
usually left them disconcerted and defeated, and little disposed to
renew their attacks upon Him.[277] The efforts of the Pharisees to
entrap Him seem to have resulted in failure everywhere and at all times.
And at the trial the Sanhedrin found itself in possession of a prisoner
but with no competent evidence to establish His guilt. It was least of
all prepared to convict Him of the crime of blasphemy as founded upon
the claim of Messiahship, for Jesus had been exceedingly cautious,
during His ministry, in declaring Himself to be the Messiah. Except in
the presence of the woman of Samaria, who came to draw water from the
well, there is no recorded instance of an avowal of His Messiahship
outside the immediate circle of the disciples.[278] He forbade the
devils whom He had cast out, and that recognized Him, to proclaim His
Messiahship.[279] When the Jews said to Him, "How long dost thou make us
doubt? if thou be the Christ, tell us plainly," Jesus simply referred
them to His works, and made no further answer that could be used as
testimony against Him.[280] He revealed Himself to His followers as the
Messiah, and permitted them to confess Him as such, but forbade them to
make the matter public. "Then charged he his disciples that they should
tell no man that he was Jesus, the Christ."[281]

It will thus be seen that probably no two witnesses who were legally
competent to testify could have been secured to condemn Jesus upon the
charge preferred at the trial. In their desperation, then, the members
of the Sanhedrin were compelled to employ false testimony and a
confession which was equally illegal.

POINT IX

THE CONDEMNATION OF JESUS WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE THE VERDICT OF THE
SANHEDRIN WAS UNANIMOUS

LAW

"A simultaneous and unanimous verdict of guilt rendered on the day
of the trial has the effect of an acquittal."--MENDELSOHN,
"Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews," p. 141.

"If none of the judges defend the culprit, i.e., all pronounce him
guilty, having no defender in the court, the verdict of guilty was
invalid and the sentence of death could not be executed."--RABBI
WISE, "Martyrdom of Jesus," p. 74.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

FEW stranger rules can be found in the jurisprudence of the world than
that provision of Hebrew law which forbade a conviction to rest upon the
unanimous vote of the judges. A comparison instantaneously and almost
inevitably arises in the mind between the Saxon and Hebrew requirement
in the matter of unanimity in the verdict. The finest form of mind of
antiquity, with the possible exception of the Greek and Roman, was the
Hebrew. One of the finest types of intellect of the modern world is that
of the Anglo-Saxon. The Hebrew organized the Sanhedrin, and, under God,
endowed it with judicial and spiritual attributes. The Anglo-Saxon, on
the shores of the German Ocean, originated the modern jury and invested
it with its distinctive legal traits. With the Anglo-Saxon jury a
unanimous verdict is necessary to convict, but with the Hebrew Sanhedrin
unanimity was fatal, and resulted in an acquittal. A great modern
writer[282] has declared that law is the perfection of reason. But when
we contemplate the differences in Hebrew and Saxon laws we are inclined
to ask, in seeking the degree of perfection, whose law and whose reason?

But, after all, the Jewish rule is not so unreasonable as it first
appears, when we come to consider the reason of its origin. In the first
place, as we have seen in Part II, there were no lawyers or advocates,
in the modern sense, among the ancient Hebrews. The judges were his
defenders. Now if the verdict was unanimous in favor of condemnation it
was evident that the prisoner had had no friend or defender in court. To
the Jewish mind this was almost equivalent to mob violence. It argued
conspiracy, at least. The element of mercy, which was required to enter
into every Hebrew verdict, was absent in such a case.

Again, this rule of unanimity was only another form or statement of the
requirement that the court defer final action, in case of conviction, to
the next day in order that time for deliberation and reflection might
intervene. In other words, Hebrew law forbade precipitancy in capital
proceedings. And what could be more precipitate than an instantaneous
and unanimous verdict? "But where all suddenly agree on conviction, does
it not seem," asks a modern Jewish writer, "that the convict is a victim
of conspiracy and that the verdict is not the result of sober reason and
calm deliberation?"

But how did they convict under Hebrew law? By a majority vote of at
least two. A majority of one would acquit. A majority of two, or any
majority less than unanimity, would convict.[283] If the accused had one
friend in court, the verdict of condemnation would stand, since the
element of mercy was present and the spirit of conspiracy or mob
violence was absent. Seventy-one constituted the membership of the Great
Sanhedrin. If all the members were present and voted, at least
thirty-seven were required to convict. Thirty-six would acquit. If a
bare quorum, twenty-three members, was present, at least thirteen were
required to convict. Twelve would acquit.

This rule seems ridiculous and absurd, when viewed in the light of a
brutal and undeniable crime. If the facts constituting such a crime had
been proved against a Jewish prisoner beyond any possibility of doubt,
if such facts were apparent to everybody, still it seems that the rule
above stated required that the defendant have at least one advocate and
one vote among the judges; else, the verdict was invalid and could not
stand. Such a procedure could be justified on no other ground than that
exceptional cases should not be permitted to destroy a rule of action
that in its general operation had been found to be both generous and
just.

Now the condemnation of Jesus was illegal because the verdict of the
Sanhedrin was unanimous. We learn this from Mark, who says: "Then the
high priest rent his clothes and saith, What need we any further
witnesses? ye have heard the blasphemy: what think ye? And they _all_
condemned him to be guilty of death."[284] If they _all_ condemned Him,
the verdict was unanimous and therefore illegal. The other Evangelists
do not tell us that the verdict was unanimous; neither do they deny it.
Mark's testimony stands alone and uncontradicted; therefore we must
assume that it is true.

Rabbi Wise[285] and Signor Rosadi[286] call attention to the fact that
the verdict was unanimous. The former seeks to ridicule Mark as an
authority because a unanimous verdict was illegal under Hebrew law, and
the distinguished Hebrew writer does not conceive that Hebrew judges
could have made such a mistake. Such argument, reduced to ultimate
analysis, means, according to Rabbi Wise, that there were certain rules
of Hebrew law that could not be and were never violated.

In this connection, it has been frequently asked: Was the entire
Sanhedrin present at the night trial of Jesus? Were Nicodemus and Joseph
of Arimathea present? If they were present, did they vote against Jesus?
These questions can be answered only in the light of the authorities.
Only two of the Gospel writers, Matthew and Mark, tell us of the night
trial. Both declare that "all the council" were present.[287] The
"council" (concilium) is the Vulgate, the Latin New Testament
designation of the Great Sanhedrin. Then, if all the "council" were
present, the Great Sanhedrin were all present.

[Illustration: THE BETRAYING KISS (SCHEFFER)]

Concerning the number of judges at the second or daybreak meeting of the
Sanhedrin, both Matthew and Mark again declare that the full membership
was present. Matthew says: "When the morning was come, _all_ the chief
priests and elders of the people took counsel against Jesus to put him
to death."[288] Mark says: "And straightway in the morning the chief
priests held a consultation with the elders and scribes and the _whole
council_, and bound Jesus, and carried him away, and delivered him to
Pilate."[289] It should be remembered that neither Luke nor John
contradicts even remotely the statements of Matthew and Mark concerning
the full attendance of the members of the Sanhedrin at either the night
or morning trial. The first and second Gospel writers therefore
corroborate each other, and the presumption of the law is that each told
the truth.

And yet most commentators and writers seem to be of the opinion that all
the members of the Sanhedrin were not present at the night trial of
Jesus. They insist that both Matthew and Mark were employing a figure of
speech, synecdoche, when they said that "all the council" were present.
But these same writers seem to think that these same Evangelists were in
earnest and speaking literally when they declared that "_all_ the chief
priests and elders" and the "_whole_ council" were present at the
morning trial. We shall not attempt to settle the question but will
leave it to the reader to draw his own inferences. Suffice it to say
that as far as the rule stated in connection with Point IX is concerned,
it was immaterial whether the full council was present at either
meeting. The rule against unanimity applied to a bare quorum or to any
number less than the full Sanhedrin. It was the unanimity itself, of
however few members, that carried with it the spirit and suggestion of
mob violence and conspiracy against which Hebrew law protested.

The question of the number of members that were present at the different
meetings of the Sanhedrin has been discussed in the light of history,
and as bearing upon the conduct of Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea,
who were friends of Jesus. Nicodemus was certainly a member of the Great
Sanhedrin. This we learn from two passages of New Testament
scripture.[290] It is also believed that Joseph of Arimathea was a
member from a mere suggestion in another passage.[291] Did these friends
of the Christ vote against Him? If they were members of the court; if
Matthew and Mark wrote literally when they said that "all the council"
were present; and if Mark wrote literally and truthfully when he said
that "they _all_ condemned him to be guilty of death"; then it naturally
and inevitably follows that both Nicodemus and Joseph voted against
Jesus.

[Illustration: THE ARREST OF JESUS (HOFFMAN)]

A number of arguments have been offered against this contention. In the
first place, it is said that at a previous meeting of the Sanhedrin
Nicodemus defended Jesus by asking his fellow-judges this question:
"Doth our law judge any man before it hear him and know what he
doeth?"[292] It is asserted that there is no good reason to believe that
Nicodemus defended Jesus at this meeting and turned against Him at a
subsequent one, that there is a presumption of a continuance of
fidelity. But is this good reasoning? Did not Peter cut off the ear of
the high priest's servant, Malchus, in defense of Jesus at midnight, in
the garden, and then within three hours afterwards deny that he knew
Jesus? There is no good reason to believe that Nicodemus was braver or
more constant than Peter, for the former seems to have been either
ashamed or afraid to express his affection for the Master during the
daytime, but preferred to do it at night.[293]

Concerning the part taken by Nicodemus in the final proceedings, Rosadi
says: "The verdict was unanimous. The members of the Sanhedrin who were
secretly favorable to the Accused were either absent or else they voted
against him. Nicodemus was amongst the absentees, or amongst those that
voted against him. At all events, he did not raise his voice against the
pronouncement expressed by acclamation."

If Joseph of Arimathea was a member of the Great Sanhedrin, it seems
that he "had not consented to the counsel and the deed of them."[294]
But it is impossible to tell certainly to which one of the three
meetings of the Sanhedrin, held within the six months preceding the
crucifixion, this language refers. The defense of Jesus offered by
Nicodemus was certainly not at the final meeting which condemned Jesus.
It may be that the reference to the protest of Joseph of Arimathea also
referred to a prior meeting. Its connection in Luke seems to make it
refer to the last trial, but this is not certain. Neither is it certain
that Joseph was a member of the Great Sanhedrin, and his failure to
consent, if he were not a member, would not disturb the contention made
in Point IX of the Brief. Even if he were a member, his failure to
consent would not destroy the contention, since ancient Hebrew judges,
like modern American jurors, could have first protested against their
action and then have voted with them. The polling of the jury, under
modern law, has reference, among other things, to this state of affairs.

But we may admit that both Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea, as well as
many others, were absent, as Rosadi suggests, and still contend that the
verdict against Jesus was illegal because it was unanimous, as Mark
assures us, since the number of judges present was immaterial, provided
there was a quorum of at least twenty-three and their verdict was
unanimous against the accused. According to the second Gospel writer,
there seems to be no doubt that this was the case in the judgment
pronounced against Jesus.

POINT X

THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST JESUS WERE ILLEGAL IN THAT: (1) THE SENTENCE OF
CONDEMNATION WAS PRONOUNCED IN A PLACE FORBIDDEN BY LAW; (2) THE HIGH
PRIEST RENT HIS CLOTHES; (3) THE BALLOTING WAS IRREGULAR

LAW

"After leaving the hall Gazith no sentence of death can be passed
upon anyone soever."--TALMUD, Bab., Abodah Zarah, or of Idolatry,
Chap. I. fol. 8.

"A sentence of death can be pronounced only so long as the Sanhedrin
holds its sessions in the appointed place."--MAIMONIDES, Sanhedrin
XIV.

"And he that is the high priest among his brethren, upon whose head
the anointing oil was poured, and that is consecrated to put on
the garments, shall not uncover his head, nor rend his
clothes."--LEVITICUS xxi. 10.

"And Moses said unto Aaron, and unto Eleazar, and unto Ithamar, his
sons, Uncover not your heads, neither rend your clothes; lest ye
die, and lest wrath come upon all the people."--LEVITICUS x. 6.

"Let the judges each in his turn absolve or condemn."--MISHNA,
Sanhedrin XV. 5.

"The members of the Sanhedrin were seated in the form of a
semicircle at the extremity of which a secretary was placed, whose
business it was to record the votes. One of these secretaries
recorded the votes in favor of the accused, the other those
against him."--MISHNA, Sanhedrin IV. 3.

"In ordinary cases the judges voted according to seniority, the
oldest commencing; in a capital trial, the reverse order was
followed. That the younger members of the Sanhedrin should not be
influenced by the views or arguments of their more mature, more
experienced colleagues, the junior judge was in these cases always
the first to pronounce for or against a conviction."--BENNY,
"Criminal Code of the Jews," pp. 73, 74.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

IN the trial of capital cases, the Great Sanhedrin was required to meet
in an apartment of the National Temple at Jerusalem, known as the Hall
of Hewn Stones (Lishkhath haggazith). Outside of this hall no capital
trial could be conducted and no capital sentence could be
pronounced.[295] This place was selected in obedience to Mosaic
injunction: "Thou shalt do according to the tenor of the sentence, which
they may point out to thee _from the place which the Lord shall
choose_."[296] The Rabbis argued that the Great Council could not try a
capital case or pronounce a death sentence, unless it met and remained
in the place chosen by God, which, they contended, should be an
apartment of the Great Temple. The Lishkhath haggazith was chosen, and
continued for many years to be the meeting place of the supreme
tribunal.

But Jesus was not tried or condemned to death in the Hall of Hewn
Stones, as Hebrew law required. It is clearly evident, from the Gospels,
that He was tried and sentenced in the palace of Caiaphas, probably on
Mount Zion. It is contended by the Jews, however, that soon after the
Roman conquest of Judea the Great Sanhedrin removed from the sacred
place to Bethany, and from there to other places, as occasion required.
And there is a Jewish tradition that the court returned to the
accustomed place on the occasion of the trial and condemnation of
Jesus.[297]

In opposition to this, Edersheim says: "There is truly not a tittle of
evidence for the assumption of commentators that Christ was led from the
palace of Caiaphas into the Council Chamber (Lishkhath haggazith). The
whole proceedings took place in the former, and from it Christ was
brought to Pilate."[298] St. John emphatically declares: "Then led they
Jesus from Caiaphas into the hall of judgment."[299] This Hall of
Judgment was the Prætorium of Pilate.

The first irregularity, then, noted under Point X is that Jesus was
tried and condemned in the palace of Caiaphas instead of the Hall of
Hewn Stones, the regular legal meeting place of the Great Sanhedrin.

The second error noted under Point X is that which relates to the
rending of garments by the high priest. "An ordinary Israelite could, as
an emblem of bereavement, tear his garments, but to the high priest it
was forbidden, because his vestments, being made after the express
orders of God, were figurative of his office."[300]

When Jesus confessed that He was Christ the Son of God, Caiaphas seems
to have lost his balance and to have committed errors with all the
rapidity of speech. "Then the high priest rent his clothes, and saith,
What need we any further witnesses? ye have heard the blasphemy: what
think ye? And they all condemned him to be guilty of death."[301] In
this language and conduct of the son-in-law of Annas there were several
irregularities in procedure. The first was the rending of garments
reported by Matthew and Mark, which act was forbidden by the provisions
of the Mosaic Code, recorded in Leviticus and cited above.

But it is only fair to state the dissenting opinion on this point. In
the times of Christ it seems to have been the custom among the Jews to
rend the garments as a sign of horror and execration, whenever
blasphemous language was heard. Edersheim states the rule: "They all
heard it--and, as the law directed, when blasphemy was spoken, the high
priest rent both his outer and inner garment, with a rent that might
never be repaired."[302] The law here referred to, however, is the
Rabbinic or Talmudic and not the Mosaic law. It should be remembered
that the Mosaic Code was the constitution or fundamental law of the
ancient Hebrews. The Talmudic law embodied in the Mishna was, in a
sense, a mere commentary upon the Mosaic law. We have seen in Chapter I
of Part II of this volume that the traditional law was based upon,
derived from, and inspired by the written law contained in the
Pentateuch. It is true that the Talmud, while professing subordination
to the Pentateuch, finally virtually superseded it as an administrative
code. But the doctors never repealed a Mosaic injunction, since it was
an emanation of the mind of Jehovah and could not be abrogated by human
intelligence. When an ancient ordinance ceased to be of practical value
the Jewish legists simply declared that it had fallen into desuetude.
And whenever a new law was proclaimed to meet an emergency in the life
of the Hebrew people the Rabbins declared that it was derived from and
inspired by some decree which God had handed down to Moses for the
benefit of the nation. In other words, the Mosaic Code was Israel's
divine constitution which was to serve as a standard for all future
legislation. And as the Jewish lawmakers were not permitted to repeal a
Mosaic ordinance, neither were they allowed to establish a rule in
contravention of it. Now the Pentateuch forbade the rending of garments.
Then did the Talmudists have a right to declare that the law might be
changed or broken in the case of blasphemy? That they did is denied by
many writers.

But admitting the validity of the Talmudic rule, it is nevertheless
beyond dispute that the high priest was forbidden to rend his clothes on
Sabbaths and holidays. And as Jesus was condemned on both a Sabbath and
a festival day, the high priest's action in rending his clothes on that
day was illegal.[303]

Again, the proceedings against Jesus were illegal because the balloting
was irregular. This is the third error noted under Point X.

The Hebrew law required that each judge, when his time came to vote upon
the guilt or innocence of the accused, should rise in his place, declare
his vote, and state his reasons for so voting. In capital cases the
youngest judge was required to vote first, in order that he might not be
unduly influenced by the example of his seniors in age and authority.
The balloting continued in this manner from the youngest member to the
high priest, who was generally among the oldest. Two scribes--according
to some writers, three--were present to record the votes and to note the
reasons stated. These records were to be used on the second day of the
trial in comparing the arguments of the judges on that day with those
offered on the first day. Judges who had voted for acquittal on the
first day could not change their votes on the second day. Those who had
voted for conviction on the first day might change their votes on the
second day, by assigning good reasons. Those who had voted for
conviction on the first day could not vote for conviction on the second
day, if the reasons assigned on the second day were radically different
from those assigned on the first day.[304] It will thus be seen how very
essential were the records of the scribes and how important it was that
they should be correctly kept. Hence the necessity, according to Benny,
of a third scribe whose notes might be used to correct any discrepancies
in the reports of the other two.

Now are we justified in assuming that this was the method employed in
counting votes at the trial of Jesus? The law will not permit us to
presume errors. We must rather assume that this was the method employed,
unless the Gospel record indicates, either by plain statement or by
reasonable construction, that it was not the method used.

In this connection, let us review the language of the Scriptures. "Ye
have heard the blasphemy: what think ye? And they all condemned him to
be guilty of death." Is it not clearly evident, from this passage, that
the balloting was not done singly, the youngest voting first, as Hebrew
law required? Can it not be seen at a glance that the judges voted _en
masse_? If they did, was it possible for the scribes to record the votes
and make a note of the reasons assigned, as the law required? If these
things were not done, were the proceedings regular?

According to Matthew, Caiaphas, before calling for the votes exclaimed:
"He hath spoken blasphemy."[305] Instead of doing this should he not,
under the law, have carefully concealed his opinion until the younger
members of the court had voted? Is it not a matter of history that the
opinion of the high priest was regarded as almost infallible authority
among the ancient Hebrews? Did not this premature declaration of guilt
on the part of the high priest rob the subordinate judges of freedom of
suffrage?

The conduct of the case at the close, when the balloting took place,
seems to justify the view of those writers who assert that there was no
regular trial of Jesus, but rather the action of a mob.

POINT XI

THE MEMBERS OF THE GREAT SANHEDRIN WERE LEGALLY DISQUALIFIED TO TRY
JESUS

LAW

"The robe of the unfairly elected judge is to be respected not more
than the blanket of the ass."--MENDELSOHN, "Hebrew Maxims and
Rules," p. 182.

"As Moses sat in judgment without the expectation of material
reward, so also must every judge act from a sense of duty
only."--MENDELSOHN, "Hebrew Maxims and Rules," p. 177.

"Nor must there be on the judicial bench either a relation, or a
particular friend, or an enemy of either the accused or of the
accuser."--MENDELSOHN, "Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient
Hebrews," p. 108.

"He (the Hebrew judge) was, in the first instance, to be modest, of
good repute among his neighbors, and generally liked."--BENNY,
"Criminal Code of the Jews," p. 38.

"Nor under any circumstances, was a man known to be _at enmity with
the accused person_ permitted to occupy a position among his
judges."--BENNY, "Criminal Code of the Jews," p. 37.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

THE Gospel records disclose the fact that the members of the Great
Sanhedrin were legally disqualified to try Jesus. This disqualification
was of two kinds: (1) A general disqualification, under Hebrew law, to
act as judges in any case; (2) a special disqualification to sit in
judgment upon the life of Jesus.

Among all the great systems of jurisprudence of the world the ancient
Hebrew system was the most exacting in the matter of judicial fitness.
In the palmiest days of the Hebrew Commonwealth the members of the Great
Sanhedrin represented the most perfect mental, moral, and physical
development of the Hebrew people. A man could not be a member of this
court who had any serious mental, moral, or physical defect. He must
have been "learned in the law," both written and unwritten. He must have
had judicial experience; that is, he must have filled three offices of
gradually increasing dignity, beginning with one of the local courts and
passing successively through two magistracies at Jerusalem. He must have
been an accomplished linguist; that is, he must have been thoroughly
familiar with the languages of the surrounding nations. He must have
been modest, popular, of good appearance, and free from haughtiness. He
must have been pious, strong, and courageous. And above all, he must
have been friendly in his attitude toward the accused.[306]

These were the qualifications of Israel's judges before Roman politics
had corrupted them. But at the time of Christ they had grown to be
time-serving, degenerate, and corrupt. Judea was then passing through a
period of religious and political revolution. At such a time in any
state, as all history teaches us, the worst elements of society
generally get the upper hand and control the political currents of the
day. Many members of the Sanhedrin had themselves been guilty of
criminal acts in both public and private life. Many of them held office
by purchase--they had bought their seats. They were thus unfitted to be
judges in any case; especially in one involving the great question of
life and death.

In order to show the general disqualification, under the test of Hebrew
law, of the members of the Great Sanhedrin, at the time of Christ, to
exercise judicial functions, it is necessary to quote only Jewish
authorities. In "The Martyrdom of Jesus," Rabbi Wise says: "The chief
priests, under the iron rule of Pilate and his wicked master, Sejan,
were the tools of the Roman soldiers who held Judea and Samaria in
subjection. Like the high priest, they were appointed to and removed
from office by the Roman governor of the country, either directly or
indirectly. They purchased their commissions for high prices and, like
almost all Roman appointees, used them for mercenary purposes. They were
considered wicked men by the ancient writers and must have stood very
low in the estimation of the people over whom they tyrannized. The
patriots must have looked upon them as hirelings of the foreign despot
whose rule was abhorred. Although there was, here and there, a good,
pious and patriotic man among them, he was an exception. As a general
thing, and under the rule of Pilate, especially, they were the corrupt
tools of a military despotism which Rome imposed upon enslaved
Palestine."

Again, the Talmud, in which we never look for slurs upon the Hebrew
people, where slurs are not deserved, contains this bitter denunciation
of the high-priestly families of the times of Christ: "What a plague is
the family of Simon Boethus; cursed be their lances! What a plague is
the family of Ananos; cursed be their hissing of vipers! What a plague
is the family of Cantharus; cursed be their pens! What a plague is the
family of Ismael ben Phabi; cursed be their fists! They are high priests
themselves, their sons are treasurers, their sons-in-law are commanders,
and their servants strike the people with staves."

In like manner the Talmud, in withering rebuke and sarcasm, again
declares that "The porch of the sanctuary cried out four times. The
first time, Depart from here, descendants of Eli; ye pollute the Temple
of the Eternal! The second time, Let Issachar ben Keifar Barchi depart
from here, who polluted himself and profaneth the victims consecrated to
God! The third time, Widen yourselves, ye gates of the sanctuary and let
Israel ben Phabi, the wilful, enter that he may discharge the functions
of the priesthood! Yet another cry was heard, Widen yourselves, ye
gates, and let Ananias ben Nebedeus, the gourmand, enter, that he may
glut himself on the victims."[307]

It should be borne in mind that the high-priestly families so
scathingly dealt with by the Talmud were the controlling spirits in the
Great Sanhedrin at the time of Christ. Were they legally qualified,
then, under the ancient and honorable tests of Hebrew law, to be members
of the highest court in the land? If they bought their offices and used
them for mercenary purposes, as Wise asserts, were they worthy of the
great exemplar, Moses, who "sat in judgment without the expectation of
material reward"? If they thus secured their places and prostituted them
to selfish purposes, were their robes to be respected any more than the
blanket of the ass?

The ancient Hebrew judges, in the days of Israel's purity and glory,
submitted their claims to judicial preferment to the suffrage of a
loving and confiding people.[308] They climbed the rungs of the judicial
ladder by slow and painful degrees. Integrity and ability marked each
advance toward the top. Was this the process of promotion in the case of
Caiaphas and his fellow-judges? Did their bought and corrupted places
not brand them with the anathema of the law?

We come now to consider the special disqualifications of members of the
Sanhedrin to sit in judgment upon the life of Jesus. The reasons for
these disqualifications were two: (1) The members of this court were, in
the language of Jost, "burning enemies" of Jesus, and were therefore
disqualified, under Hebrew law, to act as His judges; (2) they had
determined upon His guilt, and had sentenced Him to death before the
trial began; and had thus outraged not only a specific provision of
Hebrew law but also a principle of universal justice.

The various causes of the hatred of the members of the Sanhedrin for
Jesus are too numerous and profound to admit of exhaustive treatment
here. A thorough analysis of these causes would necessitate a review of
the life of Christ from the manger to the sepulcher. A few reasons will
suffice.

But at this point a distinction should be made between that personal
hatred which disqualifies and the hatred and loathing of the crime that
do not disqualify. Every just and righteous judge should loathe and hate
the crime itself; and a certain amount of loathing and dislike for the
criminal is most natural and almost inevitable. But no judge is
qualified to sit in judgment upon the rights of life, liberty, or
property of another whom he hates as the result of a personal grudge,
born of personal experience with the prisoner at the bar. The hatred
that disqualified the members of the Sanhedrin, under Hebrew law, was
that kind of hatred that had been generated by personal interest and
experience. The most merciless invective, barbed with incomparable wit,
ridicule, and satire, had been daily hurled at them by Jesus with
withering effect. With a touch more potent than that of Ithuriel's spear
He had unmasked their wicked hypocrisy and had blazoned it to the skies.
Every day of His active ministry, which lasted about three years, had
been spent in denouncing their shameless practices and their guilty
lives. The Scribes and Pharisees were proud, haughty, and conceited
beyond description. They believed implicitly in the infallibility of
their authority and in the perfection of their souls. How galling, then,
to such men must have been this declaration of an obscure and lowly
Nazarene: "Verily, I say unto you, That the publicans and the harlots go
into the kingdom of God before you."[309] What impetuous invective this:
"Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye devour widows'
houses, and for a pretense make long prayer: therefore ye shall receive
the greater damnation. Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites!
for ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte, and when he is made,
ye make him twofold more the child of hell than yourselves."[310] We can
well imagine how these fiery darts pierced and tore the vanity of a
haughty and contemptuous priesthood.

Consider for a moment the difference in the spheres of Jesus and of His
enemies. He, an obscure prophet from Nazareth in Galilee; they, the
leaders of Israel and the guardians of the Temple at Jerusalem. He, the
single advocate of the New Dispensation; they, the manifold upholders of
the Old. He, without earthly authority in the propagation of His faith;
they, clothed with the sanction of the law and the prestige of a mighty
past. Imagine, then, if you can, the intensity of the hatred engendered
by the language and the conduct of Jesus.

That we may fully appreciate the tension of the situation let us cast a
single glance at the character of the Scribes. Edersheim has written
these wonderfully graphic lines about them:

He pushes to the front, the crowd respectfully giving way, and
eagerly hanging on his utterances, as those of a recognized
authority. He has been solemnly ordained by the laying on of hands;
and is the Rabbi, "my great one," Master, amplitudo. Indeed, his
hyper-ingenuity in questioning has become a proverb. There is not
measure of his dignity, nor yet limit to his importance. He is the
"lawyer," the "well-plastered pit," filled with the water of
knowledge, "out of which not a drop can escape," in opposition to
the "weeds of untilled soil" of ignorance. He is the divine
aristocrat, among the vulgar herd of rude and profane "country
people," who "know not the law," and are "cursed." Each scribe
outweighed all the common people, who must accordingly pay him
every honor.... Such was to be the respect paid to their sayings
that they were to be absolutely believed, even if they were to
declare that to be at the right hand which was at the left, or
vice-versa.[311]

What could, then, be more terrific than the hatred of such a character
for an unlettered Galilean who descended from the mountains of His
native province to rebuke and instruct the "divine aristocrats" in
religious matters and heavenly affairs? Imagine his rage and chagrin
when he heard these words: "Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees,
hypocrites! for ye are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear
beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and all
uncleanness.... Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because
ye build the tombs of the prophets, and garnish the sepulchres of the
righteous, And say, If we had been in the days of our fathers, we would
not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets.
Wherefore ye be witnesses unto yourselves, that ye are the children of
them which killed the prophets. Fill ye up then the measure of your
fathers. Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, how can ye escape the
damnation of hell?"[312]

"His exquisite irony," says Renan, "His stinging remarks, always went to
the heart. They were everlasting stings, and have remained festering in
the wound. This Nessus-shirt of ridicule which the Jew, son of the
Pharisees, has dragged in tatters after him during eighteen centuries,
was woven by Jesus with a divine skill. Masterpieces of fine raillery,
their features are written in lines of fire upon the flesh of the
hypocrite and the false devotee. Incomparable traits worthy of a Son of
God! A god alone knows how to kill in this way. Socrates and Molière
only grazed the skin. The former carried fire and rage to the very
marrow."[313]

Are we not now justified in asserting, with Jost, that the members of
the Sanhedrin, who were none other than the Scribes and Pharisees above
described by Jesus, were the "burning enemies" of the prisoner at the
bar? If they were, were they legally qualified to be His judges?

But it may be argued that their hatred was simply a form of righteous
indignation provoked by His repeated assaults upon the national religion
and the national institutions; that it was their duty as guardians of
both to both hate and try Him; and that they would have been derelict in
duty if they had not done so. But it is apparent from the record and is
evident to any fair-minded reader that the enmity of the judges toward
Jesus was more personal than political, more a private than a public
affair. In support of this contention, in addition to the withering
language addressed to them, the matter of the purification of the Temple
may be mentioned. It will be remembered how Jesus, with a scorpion lash,
scourged the money-changers and traders from the Sanctuary. Now it is
historically true that Annas and Caiaphas and their friends owned and
controlled the stalls, booths, and bazaars connected with the Temple and
from which flowed a most lucrative trade. The profits from the sale of
lambs and doves, sold for sacrifice, alone were enormous. When Jesus
threatened the destruction of this trade He assaulted the interests of
Annas and his associates in the Sanhedrin in a vital place. This
grievance was certainly not so religious as it was personal. The driving
of the cattle from the stalls was probably more effective in compassing
the destruction of the Christ than any miracle that He performed or any
discourse that He delivered. But whatever the cause the fact is historic
and indisputable that the Sanhedrists were enemies of Jesus, and
therefore disqualified under Hebrew law to try Him.

A second reason for the special disqualification of the members of the
Sanhedrin to sit as judges at the trial of Christ was the fact that they
had determined upon His guilt and had sentenced Him to death before the
trial began. This point needs no extensive argument or illustration.
Under every enlightened system of justice the first great qualification
of judges has been that they should be unbiased and unprejudiced.
Judicial proceedings are murderous and no better than mob violence when
judges and jurors enter upon the trial of the case with a determination
to convict the accused, regardless of the testimony. The principles
underlying this proposition are fundamental and self-evident.

Now the Gospel narratives disclose the fact that three different
meetings of the Sanhedrin were held in the six months preceding the
crucifixion, to discuss the miracles and discourses of Jesus, and to
devise ways and means to entrap Him and put Him to death.

The first meeting was held in the latter part of the month of September,
A.D. 29, about six months before the night trial in the palace of
Caiaphas. This meeting is recorded by St. John in Chap. vii., verses
37-53. The occasion was the Feast of Tabernacles, when Jesus made many
converts by His preaching, and at the same time caused much apprehension
among the Pharisees, who assembled the Sanhedrin to adopt plans to check
His career. It was on this occasion that Nicodemus defended Christ and
asked the question that shows the nature of the proceedings at that
time. "Doth our law judge any man before it hear him and know what he
doeth?" This was the voice, not only of Hebrew but of universal justice
demanding a hearing before a condemnation. Nothing definite seems to
have been accomplished at this meeting.

The second session of the Sanhedrin took place in the month of
February, A.D. 30, about six weeks before the crucifixion. The occasion
of this meeting was the resurrection of Lazarus, an account of which is
given in John xi. 41-53. The chief priests and Pharisees seem to have
been seized with consternation by the reports of the progress of the
propaganda of Jesus. They had often listened contemptuously and in
sullen silence to the accounts of His miraculous performances. But when
He began to raise the dead to life, they decided that it was about time
to act. At this meeting Caiaphas appealed to his associates in the name
of the common weal. "Ye know nothing at all," he said, "nor consider
that it is expedient for us, that one man should die for the people, and
that the whole nation perish not."[314] This seems to have been a form
of condemnation in which the other judges joined. "Then from that day
forth they took counsel together for to put him to death."[315] At this
second session of the Sanhedrin the death of Jesus seems to have been
decreed in an informal way and an opportunity was awaited for its
accomplishment.

The third meeting of the Sanhedrin took place just a few days before the
Paschal Feast.

"Now the feast of unleavened bread drew nigh, which is called the
Passover. And the chief priests and scribes sought how they might kill
him; for they feared the people."[316] "Then assembled together the
chief priests, and the scribes, and the elders of the people, unto the
palace of the high priest, who was called Caiaphas, and consulted that
they might take Jesus by subtilty, and kill him. But they said, Not on
the feast day, lest there be an uproar among the people."[317]

At this third session of the court it was agreed that the arrest and
execution of Jesus should be accomplished at the earliest possible date.

It will be seen that at these different sessions of the Sanhedrin in the
six months preceding the regular trial the judges had resolved that
Jesus should be done away with at the first convenient opportunity. In
short, and in fact, their hatred was formed and their determination
fixed in the matter of the proceedings to be instituted against Him.
Were they, then, legally qualified to act as His judges?

Again, besides prejudging Him to death had they not demonstrated their
total unfitness for any righteous administration of justice by seeking
false witnesses against Him? Hebrew law forbade them to seek for
witnesses of any kind. They were the defenders of the accused and, under
the Hebrew system, were required to search for pretexts to acquit and
not for witnesses to condemn.[318] It was a maxim that "the Sanhedrin
was to save, not to destroy life."[319] Much more were they forbidden to
seek for false witnesses. Hebrew law denounced false witnesses and
condemned them to the very punishment prescribed for those whom they
sought to convict.

"And the judges shall make diligent inquisition; and, behold, if the
witness be a false witness, and hath testified falsely against his
brother; then shall ye do unto him, as he had thought to do unto his
brother.... And thine eye shall not pity; but life shall go for life,
eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot."[320]

But here we find the judges actually seeking testimony which the law
pointedly prohibited. This matter alone establishes their utter
unfitness to try Jesus, and is explicable only on the ground of the
degradation into which they had fallen at the time of Christ and on the
hypothesis that their burning hatred had overwhelmed their judgment and
sense of justice.

If it be objected that the points of disqualification above alleged were
not applicable to all the judges, a single sentence of Scripture meets
the objection: "And the chief priests and _all the council_ sought for
witness against Jesus to put Him to death."[321] The fact that "all the
council" were willing to outrage a provision of the fundamental law is
sufficient proof that they were all disqualified to try Christ.

Another conclusive proof of the total unfitness of the members of the
Sanhedrin to try Jesus is the fact that they so far forgot themselves
that they abandoned all sense of self-respect and judicial dignity by
brutally striking Him and spitting in His face. We would like to believe
that this outrageous conduct was limited to the servants of the priests,
but the Gospel of St. Mark, Chap. xiv., verse 65, clearly indicates that
the judges themselves were also guilty.

POINT XII

THE CONDEMNATION OF JESUS WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE THE MERITS OF THE DEFENSE
WERE NOT CONSIDERED

LAW

"Then shalt thou inquire, and make search, and ask
diligently."--DEUTERONOMY xiii. 14.

"The judges shall weigh the matter in the sincerity of their
conscience."--MISHNA, Sanhedrin IV. 5.

"The primary object of the Hebrew judicial system was to render the
conviction of an innocent person impossible. All the ingenuity of
the Jewish legists was directed to the attainment of this
end."--BENNY, "Criminal Code of the Jews," p. 56.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

THE actual trial of any criminal case shows, upon the record, two
essential parts: (1) The accusation; (2) the defense. The absence of the
elements of defense makes the proceeding _ex parte_; and there is really
no trial. And it is impossible to conceive a proper administration of
justice where a defense is not allowed, since the right to combat the
allegations of the indictment is the essential principle of liberty
under the law. The destruction of this right is the annihilation of
freedom by subjecting the individual citizen to the whims and caprices
of the governing power. An ideal code of criminal procedure would embody
rules of evidence and practice perfectly adapted to establish truth in
the matter at issue between the commonwealth and the prisoner. Neither
the people nor the accused would be favored or prejudiced by the
admission or exclusion of any kind of evidence. An exact interpretation
and administration of this code would result in a perfect intellectual
balance between the rights of the state and the defendant. But such a
code has never been framed, and if one were in existence, it would be
impossible to enforce it, as long as certain judges insisted on aiding
the prosecution and others on helping the accused, in violation of
standard rules of evidence.

Now, the ancient Hebrew system of criminal procedure was no such ideal
one as that above described. It should be remembered that there was no
body, under that system, corresponding to our modern Grand Jury, to
present indictments. There were no prosecuting officers and no
counselors-at-law, in the modern sense. The leading witnesses preferred
charges and the judges did the rest. They examined and cross-examined
witnesses, did the summing up and were, above all, the defenders of the
accused. The rights of the defendant seem to have alone been seriously
considered. This startling maxim was a constant menace to the integrity
of the government and to the rights of the commonwealth: "The Sanhedrin
which so often as once in seven years condemns a man to death, is a
slaughter-house."[322] Lightfoot is of the opinion that the Jews did not
lose the power of capital punishment as the result of the Roman
conquest, but that they voluntarily abandoned it because the rules of
criminal procedure which they had from time to time adopted finally
became wholly unfitted for convicting anyone. This view is unsupported
by historic fact, but it is nevertheless true that the legal safeguards
for the protection of the rights of the accused had, in the later years
of Jewish nationality, become so numerous and stringent that a
condemnation was practically impossible. The astonishing provision of
Hebrew law to which we have referred in Part II known as Antecedent
Warning had the effect of securing an acquittal in nearly every case. It
is contended by many that this peculiar provision was intended to
abolish capital punishment by rendering conviction impossible.

In the light of the principles above suggested let us review the action
of the Sanhedrin in condemning Jesus to death upon His uncorroborated
confession. The standard of thoroughness in investigating criminal
matters is thus prescribed in the Mosaic Code: "Then shalt thou inquire,
and make search, and ask diligently." The Mishna supplements the
fundamental law by this direction: "The judges shall weigh the matter in
the sincerity of their conscience." From what we know of the peculiar
tendency of the Hebrew system to favor the accused we are justified in
assuming that the two rules just cited were framed for the protection
of the prisoner more than for the security of the commonwealth.

Now at this point we are led to ask: Were these rules applied in the
trial of Jesus in any sense either for or against the accused? Did
Caiaphas and the other members of the Sanhedrin "inquire, and make
search and ask diligently" concerning the facts involved in the issue
between Jesus and the Hebrew people? Did they weigh the whole matter "in
the sincerity of their conscience?" Is it not clearly evident from the
record that the false witnesses contradicted themselves, were rejected
and dismissed, and that Jesus was then condemned upon His uncorroborated
confession that He was the Christ, the Son of God? The usual and natural
proceeding in a Jewish criminal trial was to call witnesses for the
defendant, after the leading witnesses had testified for the people. Was
this done in the case of Jesus? His own apostles deserted Him in the
garden, although two of them seem to have returned to the scene of the
trial. Is it probable, in the light of the record, that witnesses were
called for the defendant? We have seen that they could not legally
convict Him upon His own confession. And there is nowhere the faintest
suggestion that witnesses other than the false ones were called to
testify against Him. The record is clear and unequivocal that the
conviction of Jesus was upon His uncorroborated confession. This was
illegal. When Caiaphas said, "I adjure thee by the living God that thou
tell us whether thou be the Christ, the Son of God," Jesus answered,
"Thou hast said"; that is, "I am," according to Mark. Here was an issue
squarely joined between the Commonwealth of Israel and Jesus of
Nazareth. It was incumbent upon the state to establish His guilt by two
competent witnesses who agreed in all essential details. If these
witnesses were not present, or could not be secured, it was the duty of
the court to discharge Christ at once. This the law provided and
demanded. But this was not done.

If, as has been contended, the false witnesses were relied upon by the
Sanhedrin to corroborate the confession of Jesus, then under Hebrew law
the judges should at least have sought witnesses in His behalf, or
should have allowed His friends time to find them and bring them in. In
other words, His defense should have been considered. However
overwhelming the conviction of the judges of the Sanhedrin that the
claims of Jesus were false and blasphemous, they were not justified in
refusing to consider the merits of His pretensions. If a midnight
assassin should stealthily creep into the room of a sleeping man and
shoot him to death, a judge would not be legally justified in
instructing the jury, at the close of the people's case, to bring in a
verdict of guilty, on the ground that nothing that the defendant could
prove would help his case. However weak and ridiculous his defense, the
prisoner should at least be heard; and a failure to accord him a hearing
would certainly result in reversal on appeal. A refusal to consider the
defense of a prisoner under ancient Hebrew law was nothing less than an
abrogation of the forms of government and a proclamation of mob
violence in the particular case, for it must be remembered that Hebrew
criminal law was framed especially for the protection of the accused.

It should also be kept in mind that it would not have been incumbent
upon Caiaphas and his fellow-judges to acquit Jesus simply because a
defense had been made. In other words, they were not bound to accept His
explanations and arguments. If they had heard Him and His witnesses,
they could have rejected His pretensions as false and blasphemous,
although they were truthful and righteous, without incurring the censure
of mankind and the curse of Heaven, for it would be preposterous to
require infallible judgment of judicial officers. All that can be
demanded of judges of the law is that they act conscientiously with the
lights that are in front of them. The maledictions of the human race
have been hurled at Caiaphas and his colleagues during nineteen
centuries, not because they pronounced an illegal judgment, but because
they outraged rules of law in their treatment of the Christ; not because
they misinterpreted His defense, but because they denied Him all
defense.

We should constantly keep in mind that Jesus was entitled to have the
two requirements, "Then shalt thou inquire, and make search, and ask
diligently," and "The judges shall weigh the matter in the sincerity of
their conscience," applied not only for but against Him. That is, before
the Hebrew Commonwealth rested its case against Him, He had a right to
demand that a _prima facie_ case be made, or in case of failure to do
so, that He be at once discharged. This rule was as pointed and
imperative under ancient as under modern law, and before the merits of
the defense were required to be considered the state had to close its
case against the defendant, with a presumption of guilt against Him, as
a result of the introduction of competent and satisfactory evidence.

If rules of law had been properly observed in the trial of Jesus the
question of the merits of His defense would never have been raised; for
it was practically impossible to convict Him under the circumstances
surrounding the night trial in the palace of Caiaphas. As has been
before suggested, Jesus was very popular outside the circle of the
Temple authorities. So great was His popularity that it is almost
certain that two competent witnesses could not have been secured to
convict Him of blasphemy in the sense that He had claimed to be the
Messiah. We have seen, under Point VIII, that Jesus had confessed His
Messiahship to no one excepting the Samaritan woman, outside the
Apostolic company. Judas, then, was probably the only witness who had
heard Him declare Himself to be the Messiah that could have been
secured; and his testimony was incompetent, under Hebrew law, because,
under the supposition that Jesus was a criminal, Judas, His apostle, was
an accomplice. As to the charge of blasphemy in the broader sense of
having claimed equality with God, upon which, according to Salvador,
Jesus was convicted, it seems from the Gospel record that there would
have been no difficulty in legally convicting Him, if the Sanhedrin had
met regularly and had taken time to summon witnesses in legal manner.
For on many occasions Jesus had said and done things in the presence of
both friends and enemies that the Jews regarded as blasphemous; such as
claiming that He and His Father were one; that He had existed before
Abraham; and that He had power to forgive sins. But these charges were
not made at the trial, and we have no right to consider them except as
means of interpreting the mind of Caiaphas in connection with the
meaning of the claim of Jesus that He was the Christ, the Son of God. If
Caiaphas was justified in construing these words to mean that Jesus
claimed identity with Jehovah, then he was justified in inferring that
Jesus had spoken blasphemy, for from the standpoint of ancient Judaism
and considering Jesus simply as a Jewish citizen, blasphemy was the
crime that resulted from such a claim. But even from this point of view
Caiaphas was not justified in refusing Jesus ample opportunity to prove
His equality with Jehovah, or at least that He was gifted with divine
power. This was all the more true because the claim of Jesus was that of
Messiahship, and according to one line of authorities in Hebrew
Messianic theology the Messiah was to be clothed with divine authority
and power as the messenger and vicegerent of Jehovah on earth.

But it is clearly certain that a _prima facie_ case of guilt was not
made by the Sanhedrin against Jesus; and, as a matter of law, He was not
called upon to make any defense. He could have refused to say a word in
answer to the accusation. He could have asserted His legal rights by
objecting that a case against Him had not been made, by demanding that
the charges against Him be dismissed and that He be set at liberty at
once. But Jesus did not do this. He simply confessed His Messiahship and
Sonship of the Father. This confession was not legal evidence upon which
He could have been convicted, but it did help to create an issue, the
truth or falsity of which should have been investigated by the court.

Now, let us suppose, for argument's sake, that a _prima facie_ case of
guilt against Jesus was made before the Sanhedrin. What was the next
legal step under Hebrew law? What should the judges have done after
hearing the witnesses against Him? It is beyond dispute that they should
have begun at once to "inquire, and make search, and ask diligently"
concerning all matters pertaining to the truthfulness and righteousness
of His claims to Messiahship. They should have assisted Him in securing
witnesses whose testimony would have helped to establish those claims.
Having secured such testimony, they should have weighed it "in the
sincerity of their conscience." But this they did not do.

It may be asked: What proofs could have been offered that Jesus was "the
Christ, the Son of God," if complete rights of defense had been
accorded? That question is difficult to answer, nearly two thousand
years after the trial. But if a _prima facie_ case of guilt had been
made against Him, shifting the burden of proof, and requiring that His
claims be proved, it may be reasonably contended that a complete defense
would have necessitated proofs: (1) That Jesus was the Christ, that is,
that He was the Messiah; (2) that He was also the Son of God, that is,
that He was identical with God Himself. Let us consider these two phases
of the subject and their attendant proofs in order.

And first, what evidence could have been offered that Jesus was the
Christ, that is, the Messiah? What method of procedure should have been
employed by the Sanhedrin in investigating His claims? Let us suppose
that Caiaphas understood that Jesus claimed to be the long-looked-for
Messiah who had come from Jehovah with divine authority to redeem
mankind and to regenerate and rule the world. Let us not forget that the
Jews were expecting a Messiah, and that the mere claim of Messiahship
was not illegal. Such a claim merely raised an issue as to its truth or
falsity which was to be investigated like any other proposition of
theology or law. It was not one to be either accepted or rejected
without demonstration. Then when Jesus acknowledged His Messiahship in
answer to the high priest's question it was the duty of the court either
to admit His claim and discharge Him at once, or to summon competent
witnesses, by daylight, to prove that His pretensions were false and
blasphemous. Having rested their case, it was their duty to aid the
prisoner in securing witnesses to substantiate His claims, and according
to the spirit of Hebrew law to view rather favorably than unfavorably
such claims. It was also incumbent upon them to apply to Jesus all the
Messianic tests of each and every school. It should be remembered that
at the time of Christ there were radically different views of the
attributes of the expected Messiah. No two schools agreed upon all the
signs by which the future Deliverer would be recognized. Only one sign
was agreed upon by all--that He would be a scion of the House of David.
The followers of Judas of Galilee believed that the Messiah would be an
earthly hero of giant stature--a William Tell, a Robert Bruce, an
Abraham Lincoln--who would emancipate the Jews by driving out the Romans
and permanently restoring the kingdom of David on the earth. The school
of Shammai believed that he would be not only a great statesman and
warrior, but a religious zealot as well; and that to splendid victories
on the battlefield, he would add the glorious triumphs of religion.
Radically different from both these views, were the teachings of the
gentle Hillel and his disciples. According to these, the Messiah was to
be a prince of peace whose sublime and holy spirit would impress itself
upon all flesh, would banish all wars, and make of Jerusalem the grand
center of international brotherhood and love. But even these conceptions
were not exhaustive of the various Messianic ideas that were prevalent
in Palestine in the days of Jesus. Some of the Messianic notions were
not only contradictory but diametrically opposite in meaning. A "prince
of peace" and a "gigantic warrior" could not well be one and the same
person. And for this reason it is apparent that, had an examination been
made, the claims of Jesus to the Messiahship could not have been
rejected by Caiaphas and the Sanhedrin, simply because this or that
attribute did not meet the approval of this or that sect or school.

Instead of condemning Him to death for blasphemy, when Jesus answered
that He was the Christ, the Son of God, Caiaphas should have asked a
second question: "What sign shewest thou then, that we may see and
believe thee?" It has been contended by Jewish writers that, far from
denying Jesus the privilege of proving His Messiahship, He was
frequently asked to give signs and perform wonders. The reply to this is
that as far as the legal merits of the case are concerned Jesus was not
invited at the trial in the palace of Caiaphas to show signs or give
proofs of His Messiahship. And as to the chances afforded Him at other
times and places, they were extra-judicial and were mere street affairs
in which Jesus probably refused to gratify vulgar curiosity and by which
He was not remotely bound legally or religiously. It is only when
properly arraigned and accused that a citizen under modern law can be
compelled to answer a charge of crime. The rule was more stringent under
the ancient Hebrew dispensation. Private preliminary examinations, even
by judicial officers, were not permitted by Hebrew law, as Salvador
explicitly states. It was only when confronted by proper charges before
a legally constituted tribunal in regular session, that a Hebrew
prisoner was compelled to answer. And at the regular trial before the
full Sanhedrin Jesus was not asked to give evidence that would serve to
exculpate Him. What Caiaphas should have done was to notify Jesus, at
the time of the arraignment in his own house, that His life was at
stake and that now was the time to produce testimony in His own behalf.
It was the duty, furthermore, of the high priest and his associates to
consult the sacred books to see if the Messianic prophecies therein
contained were fulfilled in the birth, life, and performances of Jesus,
as these matters were developed at the trial by witnesses duly summoned
in His behalf.

It was a matter personally within the knowledge of the judges that the
time was ripe for the appearance of the Deliverer. Not only the people
of Israel, but all the surrounding nations were expecting the coming of
a great renovator of the world. Of such an arrival Virgil had already
sung at Rome.[323]

A great national misfortune had already foreshadowed the day of the
Messiah more potently than had any individual event in the life of
Jesus. When Jacob lay dying upon his deathbed, he called around him his
twelve sons and began to pronounce upon each in turn the paternal and
prophetic blessing. When the turn of Judah came, the accents of the
dying patriarch became more clear and animated, as he said: "Judah, thou
art he whom thy brethren shall praise: thy hand shall be in the neck of
thine enemies; thy father's children shall bow down before thee. Judah
is a lion's whelp: from the prey, my son, thou art gone up: he stooped
down, he couched as a lion, and as an old lion; who shall rouse him up?
The _sceptre_ shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver from between
his feet, until Shiloh come; and unto him shall the gathering of the
people be."[324] The Jewish Rabbinical commentators of antiquity were
unanimously of the opinion that this prophecy of Jacob referred to the
day of the Messiah. And for ages the people had been told to watch for
two special signs which would herald the coming of the great Deliverer:
(1) The departure of the scepter from Judah; (2) the loss of the
judicial power.

The Talmudists, commenting on the above passage from Genesis, say: "The
son of David shall not come unless the royal power has been taken from
Judah"; and in another passage: "The son of David shall not come unless
the judges have ceased in Israel."[325] Now both these signs had
appeared at the time of the Roman conquest, shortly before the birth of
Christ. At the deposition of Archelaus, A.D. 6, Judea became a Roman
province with a Roman procurator as governor. Sovereignty then passed
away forever from the Jews. And not only was sovereignty taken from
them, but its chief attribute, the power of life and death in judicial
matters, was destroyed. Thus the legal and historical situation was
produced that had been prophesied by Jacob. The _scepter_ had passed
from Judah and the _lawgiver_ from between his feet, when Jesus stood
before the Sanhedrin claiming to be the Messiah.

A fair trial in full daylight, it is believed, would have called before
His judges a host of witnesses friendly to Jesus, whose testimony would
have established an exact fulfilment of ancient Messianic prophecy in
His birth, life, arrest, and trial. A judicial record would have been
made of which the following might be regarded as an approximately
correct transcript:

(1) _That the Messiah was to be born in Bethlehem_:

PROPHECY--But thou, Beth-lehem Ephratah, though thou be little among
the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall he come forth unto
me that is to be ruler in Israel; whose goings forth have been
from of old, from everlasting.--MICAH v. 2.

FULFILLMENT--Now when Jesus was _born in Bethlehem_ of Judea in the
days of Herod the king, behold, there came wise men from the east
to Jerusalem.--MATT. ii. 1.

And Joseph also went up from Galilee, out of the city of Nazareth,
into Judea, unto the city of David, which is called Bethlehem
(because he was of the house and lineage of David), To be taxed
with Mary his espoused wife, being great with child. And so it
was, that, while they were there, the days were accomplished that
she should be delivered. And she brought forth her firstborn son,
and wrapped him in swaddling clothes, and laid him in a manger;
because there was no room for them in the inn.--LUKE ii. 4-7.

(2) _That the Messiah was to be born of a virgin_:

PROPHECY--Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign; Behold,
a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name
Immanuel.--ISA. vii. 14.

FULFILLMENT--And in the sixth month the angel Gabriel was sent from
God unto a city of Galilee, named Nazareth, To a virgin espoused
to a man whose name was Joseph, of the house of David; and the
virgin's name was Mary.... And the angel said unto her, Fear not,
Mary: for thou hast found favor with God. And, behold, thou shalt
conceive in thy womb, and bring forth a son, and shalt call his
name Jesus.--LUKE i. 26-30.

Then Joseph being raised from sleep did as the angel of the Lord
had bidden him, and took unto him his wife: and knew her not till
she had brought forth her firstborn son: and he called his name
Jesus--MATT. i. 24, 25.

(3) _That the Messiah was to spring from the house of David_:

PROPHECY--Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise
unto David a righteous Branch, and a King shall reign and prosper,
and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth. In his days
Judah shall be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely: and this is
his name whereby he shall be called, THE LORD OUR
RIGHTEOUSNESS.--JER. xxiii. 5, 6.

FULFILLMENT--He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the
Highest; and the Lord God shall give unto him the throne of his
father David.--LUKE i. 32.

But while he thought on these things, behold, the angel of the
Lord appeared unto him in a dream, saying, Joseph, thou son of
David, fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife: for that which is
conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost.--MATT. i. 20.

(4) _That the Messiah should not come until the scepter had departed
from Judah and the lawgiver from between his feet_:

PROPHECY--The Sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver
from between his feet, until Shiloh come.--GEN. xlix. 10.

FULFILLMENT--And he saith unto them, Whose is this image and
superscription? They say unto him, Cæsar's. Then saith he unto
them, Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's;
and unto God the things that are God's.--MATT. xxii. 20, 21.

Then said Pilate unto them, Take ye him, and judge him according
to your law. The Jews therefore said unto him, It is not lawful
for us to put any man to death.--JOHN xviii. 31.

(5) _That a forerunner like unto Elijah should prepare the way of the
Messiah_:

PROPHECY--Behold, I will send my messenger, and he shall prepare the
way before me: and the Lord, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to
his temple, even the messenger of the covenant, whom ye delight
in: behold, he shall come, saith the Lord of hosts.--MAL. iii. 1.

The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way
of the Lord, make straight in the desert a highway for our
God.--ISA. xl. 3.

FULFILLMENT--In those days came John the Baptist, preaching in the
wilderness of Judea, And saying, Repent ye: for the kingdom of
heaven is at hand. For this is he that was spoken of by the
prophet Esaias, saying, The voice of one crying in the wilderness,
Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight.--MATT.
iii. 1-3.

This is he, of whom it is written, Behold, I send my messenger
before thy face, which shall prepare thy way before thee. For I
say unto you, Among those that are born of women there is not a
greater prophet than John the Baptist.--LUKE vii. 27, 28.

(6) _That the Messiah should begin to preach in Galilee_:

PROPHECY--In Galilee of the nations, the people that walked in
darkness have seen a great light.--ISA. ix. 1, 2.

FULFILLMENT--Now when Jesus had heard that John was cast into
prison, He departed into Galilee.... The people which sat in
darkness, saw great light; and to them which sat in the region and
shadow of death light is sprung up. From that time, Jesus began to
preach, and to say, Repent: for the kingdom of heaven is at
hand.--MATT. iv. 12-17.

(7) _That the Messiah should perform many miracles:_

PROPHECY--Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the
ears of the deaf shall be unstopped. Then shall the lame man leap
as a hart, and the tongue of the dumb sing: for in the wilderness
shall waters break out, and streams in the desert.--ISA. xxxv. 5,
6.

FULFILLMENT--Then was brought unto him one possessed with a devil,
blind, and dumb, and he healed him, insomuch that the blind and
dumb both spake and saw.--MATT. xii. 22.

But that ye may know that the Son of man hath power upon earth to
forgive sins (he said unto the sick of the palsy), I say unto thee,
Arise, and take up thy couch, and go into thine house. And
immediately he rose up before them, and took up that whereon he
lay, and departed to his own house, glorifying God.--LUKE v. 24,
25.

Jesus answered and said unto them, Go and shew John again those
things which ye do hear and see: The blind receive their sight,
and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear,
the dead are raised up, and the poor have the gospel preached to
them.--MATT. xi. 4, 5.

(8) _That the Messiah should make his public entry into Jerusalem riding
upon an ass:_

PROPHECY--Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion; shout, O daughter
of Jerusalem: behold, thy King cometh unto thee: he is just, and
having salvation; lowly, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt
the foal of an ass.--ZECH. ix. 9.

FULFILLMENT--And the disciples went, and did as Jesus commanded
them, And brought the ass, and the colt, and put on them their
clothes, and they set him thereon. And a very great multitude
spread their garments in the way; others cut down branches from
the trees, and strewed them in the way. And the multitudes that
went before, and that followed, cried, saying, Hosanna to the Son
of David: Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord;
Hosanna in the highest.--MATT. xxi. 6-9.

(9) _That the Messiah should be betrayed by one of his followers for
thirty pieces of silver which would finally be thrown into the potter's
field:_

PROPHECY--Yea, mine own familiar friend, in whom I trusted, which
did eat of my bread, hath lifted up his heel against me.--PSA.
xli. 9.

And I said unto them, If ye think good, give me my price; and if
not, forbear. So they weighed for my price thirty pieces of
silver. And the Lord said unto me, Cast it unto the potter: a
goodly price that I was prized at of them. And I took the thirty
pieces of silver, and cast them to the potter in the house of the
Lord.--ZECH. xi. 12, 13.

FULFILLMENT--Then one of the twelve, called Judas Iscariot, went
unto the chief priests, And said unto them, What will ye give me,
and I will deliver him unto you? And they covenanted with him for
thirty pieces of silver.--MATT. xxvi. 14, 15.

Then Judas, which had betrayed him, when he saw that he was
condemned, repented himself, and brought again the thirty pieces
of silver to the chief priests and elders, Saying, I have sinned in
that I have betrayed the innocent blood. And they said, What is
that to us? see thou to that. And he cast down the pieces of silver
in the temple, and departed, and went and hanged himself. And the
chief priests took the silver pieces, and said, It is not lawful
for to put them into the treasury, because it is the price of
blood. And they took counsel, and bought with them the potter's
field, to bury strangers in.--MATT. xxvii. 3-8.

(10) _That the Messiah should be a man of poverty and of suffering; and
should be despised and rejected of men:_

PROPHECY--He is despised and rejected of men; a man of sorrows, and
acquainted with grief: and we hid as it were our faces from him;
he was despised, and we esteemed him not.--ISA. liii. 3.

FULFILLMENT--And Jesus said unto him, Foxes have holes, and birds of
the air have nests; but the Son of man hath not where to lay his
head.--LUKE ix. 58.

And they smote him on the head with a reed, and did spit upon him,
and bowing their knees worshipped him. And when they had mocked
him, they took off the purple from him, and put his own clothes on
him, and led him out to crucify him.--MARK xv. 19, 20.

Through reasonable diligence, witnesses might have been secured to
testify to a majority, at least, of the points above enumerated,
touching Messianic prophecy and fulfillment. Besides these are many
others too numerous to mention in a treatise of this kind.

The question then arises at once: Admitting that all the evidence above
suggested, marked "Prophecy" and "Fulfillment," could have been
introduced in evidence at the trial before the Sanhedrin; were the
judges morally and legally bound to acquit and release Jesus, if they
believed this testimony to be true? We answer unhesitatingly, yes; as
far as the count in the accusation relating to Messiahship was
concerned. But we must remember that the charge against Jesus was not
limited to His claims to Messiahship. The indictment against Him was
that He claimed to be "the Christ, the Son of God." "Christ" is the
English form of the Greek translation of the word meaning "Messiah." The
real nature of the charge against the prisoner, then, was that He
claimed to be not only the Messiah but also the Son of God. We have seen
that "Son of God" conveyed to the Sanhedrin the notion of divine origin
and of equality with Jehovah. Even to-day there is no dispute between
Jews and Christians in regard to this construction. Jews charge that
Jesus made such a claim and Christians agree with them. They are
compelled to do so, indeed, or else abjure the fundamental dogma of
their faith--the doctrine of the Trinity.

Now we approach the consideration of a phase of the subject where
theology and law meet and blend. It has been sought to ridicule the
contention that Jesus should have been heard on the charge of being the
Son of God, in the sense that He was God Himself, because such a claim
was not only ridiculous and frivolous as a plea, but because it was
blasphemous upon its face; as being opposed, by bare assertion, to the
most fundamental and sacred precept of the Mosaic Code and of the
teachings of the Prophets: that God was purely and wholly spiritual;
that He was not only incorporeal but invisible, indivisible, and
incomprehensible. The advocates of this theory declare that Jesus
asserted, in the face of this primary belief of the Hebrews, a plurality
of gods of which He was a member, and that this assertion destroyed the
very cornerstone of Judaism, founded in the teaching of the celebrated
passage: "Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord." They further
declare that when Jesus presented Himself in the flesh, and declared
that He was God, He insulted both the intelligence and religious
consciousness of His judges by a complete anthropomorphism; and that
when He did this, He was not entitled to be heard.

One of the most radical of this class is Rabbi Wise who, in "The
Martyrdom of Jesus," says: "Had Jesus maintained before a Jewish court
to be the Son of God, in the trinitarian sense of the terms, viz., that
He was part, person, or incarnation of the Deity, He must have said it
in terms to be understood to that effect, as ambiguous words amount to
nothing. But if even clearly understood, the court could only have found
Him insane, but not guilty of any crime." This is strong language,
indeed, and deserves serious consideration. It means nothing less than
that Jesus, upon His confession of equality and identity with God,
should have been committed as a lunatic, and not tried as a criminal.
And the real meaning of this too extreme view is that the claims of
Jesus, being a man in the flesh, to membership in a plurality of gods
was such an outrageous and unheard-of thing that it amounted to
insanity; and that an insane person was not one to be listened to, but
to be committed and protected. The purpose of the distinguished Hebrew
theologian was to show by the absurdity of the thing that Jesus was
never tried before a Hebrew court; that He never claimed to be the Son
of God, and that the Evangelical narratives are simply false. The same
writer thus continues in the same connection: "Mark reports furthermore,
that Jesus did not simply affirm the high priest's question but added:
'And ye shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of power, and
coming in the clouds of heaven.' Jesus cannot have said these words. Our
reasons are: they are not true; none of the judges and witnesses present
ever did see him either sitting on the right hand of power or coming in
the clouds of heaven. These words could have originated only after the
death of Jesus, when the Jewish Christians expected his immediate return
as the Messiah and restorer of the kingdom of heaven, so that those very
men could see him coming in the clouds of heaven. Besides, Jesus, the
Pharisean Jew, could not have entertained the anthropomorphism that God
had a _right hand_."[326] It is only necessary to add that Rabbi Wise
may be right, if the Gospel writers were untruthful men. Suffice it to
say that we have said enough in support of the veracity of the
Evangelists in Part I of this volume. If we are right that they were
truthful historians when they published these biographies to the world,
Rabbi Wise is wrong; for according to these writers the Sanhedrin did
not take the view that Jesus was a crazy man, but that He was a
criminal. They accordingly tried Him to the extent of bringing an
accusation against Him and of supporting it with a certain kind and
amount of testimony, and by then leading Him away to be crucified by the
Romans. Our contention is that the trial was not complete, in that His
judges did not consider the merits of the defense of Jesus in the
proceedings which they conducted against Him.

It would be entirely consistent with the plan of this treatise and of
the special treatment of this theme to ignore completely the question of
the divinity of Jesus; since we have announced a legal and not a
theological consideration of the subject. But we repeat that the
theological and the legal are inseparably interwoven in a proper
handling of Point XII. If Rabbi Wise and others are right that the
anthropomorphic pretensions of Jesus robbed Him of the protection of the
law, in the sense that His claims to be God in the flesh were not worthy
of consideration by a Hebrew court, then we are wrong in making the
point that the merits of His defense should have been considered.

Our contention is that the claims of Jesus were not so strange and
shocking as to place Him without the pale of the law and to deny Him its
ordinary protection; that His pretensions were not those of an insane
man; that if He was not the Son of God He was guilty of blasphemy; and
that if He was the Son of God He was innocent. We further contend that
all these things were subjects of legitimate judicial examination by
Hebrew judges under Hebrew law, and that Jesus should have had His day
in court.

A very brief examination of the question of anthropomorphism in its
connection with the claims of Jesus will demonstrate the fallacy of the
arguments of Rabbi Wise and of those who agree with him. Candor compels
us to admit that the Jewish conception of Jehovah at the time of the
crucifixion was very foreign to the notion of a God of flesh and bone.
Hebrew monotheism taught the doctrine of one God who was purely
spiritual, and therefore invisible, intangible, and unapproachable.
Judaism delighted to lift its deity above the sensual, material, and
corporeal things of earth, and to represent Him as a pure and sinless
spirit in a state of awful and supreme transcendence. Our first
impression, then, is that this dogma of divine unity and spirituality
must have received a dreadful shock when Jesus, a carpenter of Nazareth,
whose mother, father, brothers, and sisters were known, confronted the
high priest and declared to him that He was God. But the shock was
certainly not so great that Caiaphas and his colleagues, after a
moment's composure and reflection, could not have concluded that the
pretensions of Jesus were not wholly at variance with the revelations of
Hebrew theology in the earlier years of the Commonwealth of Israel. They
might have judged His claims to be unfounded, but they were certainly
not justified in pronouncing Him insane, or in ignoring His rights under
the law to be heard and to have His defense considered. Their arrest and
trial of the prisoner was the consummation of a number of secret
meetings in which the astounding personality and marvelous performances
of Jesus were debated and discussed with fear and trembling. The
raising of Lazarus from the dead had created a frightful panic among the
Sadducean oligarchy. Far from regarding Him as an obscure person whose
claims were ridiculous and whose mind was unbalanced, the priests feared
lest all men might believe on Him, and boldly declared that such was the
influence of His deeds that His single life might be balanced against
the existence of a whole nation.[327]

What the judges of the Sanhedrin should have done in examining the
merits of the defense of Jesus was: (1) To consider whether, in the
light of Hebrew scripture and tradition, a god of flesh and bone,
representing the second person of a Duality or a Trinity of gods, was
possible; (2) to weigh thoroughly the claims of Jesus, in the light of
testimony properly adduced at the trial, that He was this second person
of a Duality or Trinity of gods.

In making this examination, let us bear in mind, the members of the
court were not to look forward, but backward. They were to examine the
past, not the future, in reference to the present. Furthermore, they
were not to consider so much a Trinity as a Duality of gods; for it must
be remembered that the Holy Ghost was not a feature of the trial. The
Athanasian creed and the proceedings of the Nicene Council were not
binding upon Caiaphas and his fellow-judges. Nor were the teachings of
the New Testament scriptures published to the world more than a
generation after the trial. They were to consider the divine pretensions
of Jesus in the light of the teachings and revelations of the Law and
the Prophets. They were to measure His claims by these standards in the
light of the evidence adduced before them.

With a view to a thorough and systematic examination of the merits of
the defense of Jesus, Caiaphas, as presiding officer of the Sanhedrin,
should have propounded to his fellow-judges the following initial
questions: (1) Do the Law and the Prophets reveal the doctrine of a
plurality of gods among the Israelites? That is, has Jehovah ever
begotten, or has He ever promised to beget, a Son of equal divinity with
Himself? Was this Son to be, or is He to be born of a woman; and to
have, therefore, the form of a man and the attributes of a human being?
Was this Son to be, or is He to be at any time identical with the
Father? Do the Law and the Prophets tell us unmistakably that Jehovah
ever appeared upon the earth in human form and exhibited human
attributes? Do they contain a promise from the Father that He would send
His Son to the earth to be the Redeemer of men and the Regenerator of
the world? (2) Do the credentials of Jesus, the prisoner at the bar, in
the light of the evidence before us, entitle Him to be considered this
Son and Ambassador of God, sent from the Father to redeem mankind?

It follows logically and necessarily that if affirmative answers were
not given to the first set of questions an examination of the second
would be useless. Let us conceive, then, that the judges of the
Sanhedrin had employed this method. What answers, we may ask, would
they have developed to these questions from the Sacred Books?

At the outset it is safe to say that negative answers would have been
given, if the judges had considered the claims of Jesus with reference
alone to the prevailing Pharisaic teachings of the days of Jesus. And in
this connection let us note that the Hebrew conception of Jehovah had
materially changed in the time intervening between the Mosaic
dispensation and the coming of the Christ. The spiritual growth of the
nation had been characterized at every step by marked aversion to
anthropomorphism--the ascription to God of human form and attributes. In
the Pentateuch there is a prevailing anthropomorphic idea of Jehovah. He
is frequently talked about as if He were a man. Human passions and
emotions are repeatedly ascribed to Him. This was inevitable among a
primitive people whose crude religious consciousness sought to frame
from the analogy of human nature a visible symbol of the Deity and a
sensible emblem of religious faith. All early religions have manifested
the same anthropomorphic tendencies. Both Judaism and Christianity have
long since planted themselves upon the fundamental proposition that God
is a spirit. But both these systems of religion have in all ages been
compelled to run the gantlet of two opposing tendencies: one of which
sought by a living, personal communion with God through Moses and
through Christ, by means of human attributes and symbols, an intimate
knowledge and immediate benefit of the divine nature; the other, from a
horror of anthropomorphism, tending to make God purely passionless and
impersonal, thus reducing Him to a bare conception without form or
quality, thus making Him a blank negation.

The successive steps in the progress of weeding out anthropomorphisms
from the Pentateuch may be clearly traced in later Hebrew literature.
The Prophets themselves were at times repelled by the sensuous
conceptions of God revealed by the writings of Moses. The great lawgiver
had attributed to Jehovah the quality of repentance, a human attribute.
"And it _repented_ the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it
grieved him at his heart," says Genesis vi. 6. But a later writer, the
prophet Samuel, denied that God had such a quality. "And also the
Strength of Israel will not lie nor repent: for he is not a man, that he
should repent."[328] And the prophet Hosea affirms this declaration when
he places in the mouth of Jehovah the affirmation: "For I am God and not
man."[329]

At a still later age, when the notion of the supreme transcendence of
Jehovah had become prevalent, it was considered objectionable to make
God say, "I will dwell in your midst"; as a substitute, "I shall cause
you to dwell" was adopted. "To behold the face of God" was not a
repulsive phrase in the ancient days of Hebrew plainness and simplicity,
but later times sought to eradicate the anthropomorphism by saying
instead, "to appear before God."

The Septuagint, the Greek version of the Bible in use at the time of
Christ, reveals the same tendency toward paraphrasing or spiritualizing
the anthropomorphic phrases of the older Bible. In this translation the
"image of God" of the older Hebrew literature becomes "the glory of
God," and "the mouth of God" is expressed by "the voice of the Lord."

The Septuagint was written more than a century before the birth of
Jesus, and we may safely assert that at the beginning of our era the
Jews not only affirmatively proclaimed the doctrine of divine unity and
pure spirituality, in relation to the person and character of Jehovah,
but that they boldly and indignantly denied and denounced any attempt to
make of God a man or to attribute to Him human qualities. But when we
say "the Jews," we mean the dominant religious sect of the nation, the
Pharisees. We should not forget, in this connection, that the primary
difference between the Sadducees and the Pharisees was in the varying
intensity with which they loved the Law of Moses and adhered to its
teachings. We have seen in Part II of this volume that the Mishna, the
oral law, was really more highly esteemed by the Pharisaic Jews than was
the Mosaic Code. But the Sadducees planted themselves squarely upon the
Pentateuch and denied that the traditions of the Scribes were of binding
force. "The Sadducees were a body of aristocrats opposed to the oral law
and the later developments of Judaism."

Now what views, we may ask, did the Sadducees entertain of the
possibility of God appearing to men in the flesh? In other words, what
was their notion, at the time of Christ, of the anthropomorphisms of the
Pentateuch, which was their ultimate guide and standard in all matters
of legal and religious interpretation? These questions are important in
this connection, since Caiaphas and the large majority of his colleagues
in the Great Sanhedrin were Sadducees and held the fate of Jesus in
their hands. Candor compels us to admit that we believe that the
Sadducees agreed with the Pharisees that Jehovah was a pure and sinless
spirit. But we feel equally sure that their knowledge of the Pentateuch,
in which at times anthropomorphism is strongly accentuated, taught them
that Jehovah had not only appeared in the flesh among men in olden
times, but that it was not at all impossible or unreasonable that He
should come again in the same form. But this much is certain: that in
determining whether Jesus could be both man and God the Sadducees would
be disposed to ignore the traditions of the Pharisees and "the later
developments of Judaism," and appeal direct to the law of Moses. Jesus
Himself, if He had been disposed to make a defense of His claims, and
His judges had been disposed to hear Him, would have appealed to the
same legal standard. Christ more than once manifested a disposition to
appeal to the Mosaic Code, as a modern citizen would appeal from mere
statutes and the decisions of the courts, to the constitution, as the
fundamental law of the land. Mark tells us that in denouncing the
Pharisees, He used this language: "And he said unto them, Full well ye
reject the commandment of God, that ye may keep your own tradition....
Making the word of God of none effect through your tradition, which ye
have delivered: and many such like things do ye."[330] Hebrew sacred
literature is filled with anecdotes, often characterized by raillery and
jests, of how the Sadducces denounced the Pharisees for their attempts
to nullify Mosaic injunction by their peculiar interpretation.

Now in view of what we have just said, are we not justified in assuming
that if the judges had accorded Jesus full liberty of defense He would
have appealed to the Pentateuch, with the approbation of His judges, to
show that God had appeared among men in the flesh, and that a plurality
in the Godhead was plainly taught? Would He not then have appealed to
the Prophets to show that Jehovah had spoken of a begotten Son who was
none other than Almighty God Himself? Would He not have shown from both
the Law and the Prophets that the angel of Jehovah, who was none other
than Himself, had frequently, in ages past, acted as the ambassador of
God in numerous visits to the earth, on missions of love and mercy among
men? Would He not have proved to them that this angel of Jehovah had
been at certain times in the past none other than Jehovah Himself? Could
He not have pointed out to them that their whole sacred literature was
filled with prophecies foretelling the coming of this Son and Ambassador
of God to the earth to redeem fallen man? Could He not then have
summoned a hundred witnesses to prove His own connection with these
prophecies, to show His virgin birth, and to give an account of the
numerous miracles which He had wrought, and that were the best evidence
of His divine character?

Let us imagine that Caiaphas, as judge, had demanded of Jesus, the
prisoner, to produce Biblical evidence that God had ever begotten or had
promised to beget a Son who was equal with Himself. The following
passages might have been produced:

Psa. ii. 7: Thou art my son; this day have I begotten thee.

Isa. ix. 6: For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given: and
the government shall be upon his shoulder: and his name shall be
called Wonderful, Counselor, The mighty God, The everlasting
Father, The Prince of Peace.

What closer identity, we may ask, could be demanded between the Father
and the Son than is revealed by this language of Isaiah, "and his (the
son's) name shall be called The mighty God, The everlasting Father?"
What more exact equality could be asked than the same words suggest?
What stronger proof of plurality in the Godhead could be demanded?

Again, let us suppose that His judges had demanded of Jesus scriptural
proof that the divine Son of God was to be born of a woman, and was to
have, therefore, the form of a man and the attributes of a human being.
The following passages might have been produced:

Isa. vii. 14: Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign;
Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and shall call his
name Immanuel.

Gen. iii. 15: And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and
between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou
shalt bruise his heel.

Enoch lxii. 5: And one Portion of them will look on the other, and
they will be terrified, and their countenance will fall, and they
will seize them when they see _that Son of Woman_ sitting on the
throne of his glory.

The first of these passages needs no comment. It is perfectly clear and
speaks for itself. Regarding the second, it may be observed that after
the fall of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden it was announced that the
seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head. This announcement
contained, when viewed in the light of subsequent revelations, both a
promise and a prophecy; a promise of a Redeemer of fallen man, and a
prophecy that He would finally triumph over all the powers of sin and
darkness whose father was Satan, who had entered into the serpent. The
"seed of the woman" foretold that the Redeemer would have a human
nature; His triumph over Satan suggested His divine origin and power.

Again, continuing the examination, let us suppose that Caiaphas had
informed Jesus that His pretensions to be God in the flesh were not only
not sanctioned by but were offensive to the current teachings of Judaism
in relation to the person and character of Jehovah. Let us suppose,
further, that the high priest had informed the prisoner that he and his
fellow-judges, who were Sadducees in faith and a majority in number of
the Sanhedrin, did not feel themselves bound by Pharisaic tradition and
"the later developments of Judaism"; that they preferred the Mosaic Code
as a standard of legal and religious judgment; that the anthropomorphisms
of the Pentateuch were not particularly offensive to them, for the
reason that they had not been to Moses; and that if He, the prisoner at
the bar, could cite instances related by Moses where Jehovah had
appeared among men, having the form of a human being, His case would be
greatly strengthened; on the ground that if God had ever appeared in the
flesh on one occasion it was not unreasonable, or at least impossible,
that He should so appear again.

In proof that God had appeared in the flesh, or at least in human form,
among men, the following passages might have been adduced:

Gen. xviii. 1-8: And the Lord appeared unto him in the plains of
Mamre: and he sat in the tent door in the heat of the day; And he
lifted up his eyes and looked, and, lo, three men stood by him:
and when he saw them, he ran to meet them from the tent door, and
bowed himself toward the ground, And said, My Lord, if now I have
found favour in thy sight, pass not away, I pray thee, from thy
servant: ... And Abraham ran unto the herd, and fetched a calf
tender and good, and gave it unto a young man; and he hasted to
dress it. And he took butter, and milk, and the calf which he had
dressed, and set it before them; and he stood by them under the
tree, and they did eat.

Gen. xvi. 10-13: And the angel of the Lord said unto her, I will
multiply thy seed exceedingly, that it shall not be numbered for
multitude. And the angel of the Lord said unto her, Behold, thou
art with child, and shalt bear a son, and shalt call his name
Ishmael; because the Lord hath heard thy affliction.... And she
called the name of the Lord that spake unto her, Thou God seest
me: for she said, Have I also here looked after him that seeth me?

Gen. xxii. 11, 12: And the angel of the Lord called unto him out of
heaven, and said, Abraham, Abraham: and he said, Here am I. And he
said, Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou any thing
unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast
not withheld thy son, thine only son, from me.

Ex. iii. 2-6: And the Angel of the Lord appeared unto him in a flame
of fire out of the midst of a bush: and he looked, and, behold,
the bush burned with fire, and the bush was not consumed. And
Moses said, I will not turn aside, and see this great sight, why
the bush is not burnt. And when the Lord saw that he turned aside
to see, God called unto him out of the midst of the bush, and
said, Moses, Moses. And he said, Here am I. And he said, Draw not
nigh hither: put off thy shoes from off thy feet; for the place
whereon thou standest is holy ground. Moreover he said, I am the
God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the
God of Jacob. And Moses hid his face; for he was afraid to look
upon God.

From the first passage above cited it is clear that Jehovah, in the form
of a man, appeared to Abraham in the plains of Mamre. A contributor to
"The Jewish Encyclopedia" declares that these three men were angels in
the shape of human beings of extraordinary beauty but that they were not
at once recognized as angels.[331] The Christian commentators are
generally agreed that it was Jehovah who was present in human form.[332]
The other members of the company are declared by some of them to be the
second and third persons of the Trinity. Plausibility is given to this
contention by the fact that Abraham first saw one person, the Lord;
then he looked up and saw three; he then advanced to meet the three,
and, addressing them, used a singular epithet, "My Lord." The form of
the address, together with the movements of Abraham, seem to suggest
three in one and one in three. But with this theory we are not seriously
concerned, as our present purpose is to show that Jehovah occasionally
appeared in human form upon the earth in the olden days. A plurality of
gods is suggested, however, by the passage, if Christian interpretation
be applied; for if one of these men was Jehovah, as Abraham's language
seems to indicate, and as modern Christian interpretation generally
maintains, why could not the other two men have also been gods in the
form of the Son and the Holy Spirit? If the Jewish commentator's
opinion, to which we have referred heretofore, be plausible--that the
three men were angels in human form--why is it not equally as plausible
to suppose that a god or gods should also appear in human form? But at
all events these three men were not ordinary human beings. He who
maintains that they were assaults the intelligence of either the
translators of the Bible or of Abraham, or both; for the Hebrew
patriarch believed that Jehovah was present as a guest in his house, and
he spread a hospitable meal for him. The language of Genesis very
clearly indicates as much. And the question may be asked: If Abraham
could not recognize Jehovah, who could or can?

In the second of the above extracts from Genesis the angel of the Lord
appeared unto Hagar and said to her: "I will multiply thy seed
exceedingly, that it shall not be numbered for multitude." And Hagar
made reply: "And she called the name of the Lord that spake unto her,
Thou God seest me." This passage plainly teaches that the angel of the
Lord and Jehovah were sometimes identical.

The third passage heretofore cited from Genesis also teaches the
identity of the angel of the Lord and of God Himself, in the matter of
the attempted sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham. It was the same voice, that
of the angel of the Lord, that said: "For now I know that thou fearest
God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son from me."

Again, the identity of the angel of the Lord and of Jehovah is
unmistakably shown from the account of the voice that cried from the
burning bush: "I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God
of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. And Moses hid his face, for he was
afraid to look upon God."

Concerning the manifestation of Jehovah to men in angelic and human form
a modern writer says: "Much has been written concerning a certain
Mal'akh Yaweh (messenger of Jehovah) who appears in the Old Testament. I
say 'a certain' Mal'akh Yaweh, because it is not every Mal'akh Yaweh
that appears to which I refer. In most passages the Mal'akh Yaweh is
simply an angel sent by the Almighty to communicate his will or purposes
to men. These angels are distinctly apprehended as created
intelligences, wholly separate and diverse from God. But there is a
class of passages in which the Mal'akh Yaweh appears as a
self-manifestation of God. He appears indeed in human form and speaks
of God in the third person. But those to whom he appears are oppressed
by the consciousness that they have seen God and must die. They see in
him an impersonation of Deity such as is found in no other angel. He is
to their minds not merely a messenger from God but the revelation of the
being of God. The Christian fathers for the most part identify him with
the Logos of the New Testament. But there is as much reason to adopt the
opinion of many modern writers who hold that he is Jehovah himself
appearing in human form, for he is explicitly addressed as Jehovah
(Judges vi. 11-24)."[333]

The identity of the angel of Jehovah and of Jehovah Himself could not be
more conclusively proved than in the appearance to Gideon, related in
the passage above cited, Judges vi. 11-24. The absolute identity is
revealed in verses 22, 23: "And when Gideon perceived that he was an
angel of the Lord, Gideon said, Alas, O Lord God! for because I have
seen an angel of the Lord face to face. And the Lord said unto him,
Peace be unto thee; fear not: thou shalt not die."

Now let us suppose that Caiaphas and the Sanhedrin had received these
passages favorably; that they had become convinced that Jehovah had
appeared in the olden days in the form of angels and of men; that at one
time He was identical with a man, and at another with an angel whom He
had sent. Let us suppose further that the judges of Jesus had demanded
of Him a passage of ancient Scriptures connecting Him even remotely
with this messenger of God. The following passage might have been
produced:

Ex. xxiii. 20, 21: Behold, I send an Angel before thee, to keep
thee in the way, and to bring thee into the place which I have
prepared. Beware of him, and obey his voice, provoke him not; for
he will not pardon your transgressions: for my name is in him.

The concluding paragraph of the last cited passage, "My name is in him,"
is equivalent to "I am in him." The mere name of God is often used to
denote God Himself as manifested. For instance, in I Kings viii. 29 is
contained the statement, "My name shall be there"; that is, "There will
I dwell." And when it is said that the name of Jehovah would be in the
angel of Jehovah it is equivalent to saying that Jehovah Himself would
be present in His messenger which He had sent before Him. The passage
further teaches that the messenger of Jehovah to the earth bore a
commission to pardon sin, or not to, according to his pleasure. The
Sanhedrin were undoubtedly aware that Jesus claimed the same power by
virtue of authority vested in Him by His Father.

But it may be imagined that Caiaphas was perfectly willing to concede
that Jehovah had appeared in human form upon the earth, but was not
inclined to believe that He had ever manifested human passions and
emotions, as Jesus had done when He denounced on several occasions the
hypocrisy of the Pharisees; and, above all, when He overthrew the tables
in the Temple, and, applying a lash to their backs, drove out the
money-changers.[334] Let us imagine that the high priest demanded of the
prisoner proof from the ancient Scriptures that Jehovah was possessed of
ordinary human attributes; and particularly that He was at times
disposed to fight. Jesus might have produced the following passages to
show that Jehovah, His Father, had manifested in times past the ordinary
human passions and emotions of repentance, grief, jealousy, anger,
graciousness, love, and hate:

Ex. xv. 3, 6: The Lord is a man of war.... Thy right hand, O
Lord, is become glorious in power: thy right hand, O Lord, hath
dashed in pieces the enemy.

Gen. vi. 6: And it _repented_ the Lord that he had made man on the
earth, and it grieved him at his heart.

Deut. vi. 15: For the Lord thy God is a _jealous_ God among you,
lest the anger of the Lord thy God be kindled against thee, and
destroy thee from off the face of the earth.

Psa. cxi. 4: He hath made his wonderful works to be remembered: the
Lord is _gracious_ and full of _compassion_.

I Kings x. 9: Because the Lord _loved_ Israel forever, therefore
made he thee king, to do judgment and justice.

Prov. vi. 16: These six things doth the Lord _hate_: yea, seven are
an abomination unto him.

And as a final step in the examination let us imagine that Caiaphas and
his colleagues had stated to Jesus that they were satisfied, from the
authorities cited, that Jehovah had, in ancient days, appeared upon the
earth in human form and had exhibited human attributes; that Jehovah had
begotten a Son who was equal in power and majesty with Himself; that
this Son had been begotten of a woman and possessed, therefore, human
form and attributes; that this Jehovah had sent an angel messenger to
the earth with a commission to pardon sins. Let us imagine further that
the judges had demanded of the prisoner that He present and prove His
credentials as the divine ambassador of God from heaven to men on earth;
that He conform His personal claims to heavenly Messiahship to ancient
prophecy by producing evidence before them in court. What facts, we may
ask, could Jesus have shown to establish His claims to Messiahship and
to Sonship of the Father?

To attempt to originate a defense for Jesus would be unnecessary, if not
actually impertinent and sacrilegious. We are fully justified, however,
in assuming that if called upon to prove His claims to Messiahship He
would have made the same reply to the Sanhedrin that He had already made
to the Jews out of court who asked Him: "What sign shewest thou, then,
that we may see, and believe thee? what dost thou work?"[335] "How long
dost thou make us to doubt? If thou be the Christ, tell us plainly.
Jesus answered them, I told you, and ye believed not: _the works that I
do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me_."[336] Again, He would
have doubtless made the same reply to Caiaphas that He did to the
embassy from John the Baptist who came to inquire if He was really the
Messiah. "Jesus answered and said unto them, Go and shew John again
those things which ye do hear and see: The blind receive their sight,
and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead
are raised up, and the poor have the gospel preached to them."[337]

Under a fair trial, in daylight, with full freedom of defense to the
accused, abundant evidence could have been secured of the miraculous
powers of Jesus and of the truthfulness of His pretensions to a divine
origin. Testimony could have been introduced that would have been not
only competent but entirely satisfactory. The New Testament narratives
tell us of about forty miracles that Jesus performed during His life.
The closing verse of St. John intimates that He performed many that were
never reported. The circumstances surrounding the working of these
wonders were such as to make them peculiarly competent as evidence and
to carry conviction of their genuineness, when they were once
introduced.

In the first place, miracles were entirely capable of being proved by
testimony. If those persons who had known Lazarus intimately during his
lifetime saw him dead on one day, and on the fourth day afterwards saw
him alive and walking the streets, the senses would be perfectly
competent to decide and the fact that a miracle had been performed would
be conclusively proved. And it may be added that a dozen witnesses who
were entirely competent to testify could have been summoned to the
defense of Jesus in the matter of raising Lazarus from the dead.

Again, we must remember that the miracles of Jesus were performed in the
most public manner, in the street, on the highway, in far-away Galilee,
and at the very gates of Jerusalem. Both His friends and enemies, men
and women, were witnesses of their performance. The number and publicity
of these wonder-working performances rendered it possible for the
Sanhedrin to call before them hundreds and thousands of competent
witnesses who had seen and felt the manifestation of the divine power of
the prisoner in their presence.

Again, the miracles of Jesus were such as to render them subject to the
test of the senses, when submitted to examination. If Caiaphas and his
fellow-judges had decided that there was fraud in the matter of the
alleged raising of Lazarus from the dead, because the brother of Martha
and Mary was not really dead, but simply swooned or slept; if they had
decided that the man sick of the palsy was not cured by miracle, but by
faith; nevertheless, they could not have charged fraud and faith cure in
the matter of the stilling of the tempest or the feeding of the five
thousand or the walking on the sea. They would have been forced to
conclude that the witnesses had lied or that miracles had been wrought.
In the case of the feeding of the five thousand, the witnesses would
have been too numerous to brand with falsehood.

But, we may ask, was the performance of miracles by Jesus, if believed
by the Sanhedrin, sufficient evidence of the divine origin of Jesus?
This question we are not prepared to answer positively, either yes or
no. We can only venture the personal opinion that the act of raising a
person indisputably dead, to life again, would be an astounding
miracle, an achievement that could be wrought by the hand of a God
alone. The trouble with the question is that men like Elijah raised the
dead.[338] It is true that there is no pretension that Elijah was divine
or that he wrought the miracle by virtue of any peculiar power within
himself. The Scriptures plainly state that he asked God to raise the
dead to life through him. The same is true of the raising of Lazarus by
Jesus.[339] But Christ seems to have raised the daughter of Jairus[340]
and the son of the widow of Nain[341] from the dead by virtue of the
strength of His own divinity; for there is no suggestion that the power
of God was either previously invoked or subsequently acknowledged.

As to the weight which the testimony of the miracles of Jesus should
have had with Caiaphas and the other members of the court, we have a
valuable indication in the opinion expressed by Nicodemus, who was
himself a member of the Sanhedrin, when he said to Jesus: "We know that
thou art a teacher come from God: for no man can do these miracles that
thou doest, except God be with him."[342] If Nicodemus, "a ruler of the
Jews" and one of the leading members of their highest tribunal, believed
that Jesus was divine because of the wonders that He had wrought, why
should not a knowledge of these miracles by the other members of the
Sanhedrin have produced the same impression? Nicodemus, it is true, was
a friend of Jesus, but he was not a disciple. And the very timidity
with which he expressed his friendship, having come at night to pay his
compliments to the Master, demonstrates the deep impression that the
miraculous powers of the Christ had made upon him.

But the judges of Jesus were not limited to the evidence of miracles as
a proof of the divinity of the prisoner in their midst. They should have
weighed "in the sincerity of their conscience" the fact that Jesus was
born in Bethlehem in fulfillment of the prophecy contained in Micah v.
2; that He was sprung from the House of David in conformity with the
teachings in Jeremiah xxiii. 5, 6; that John the Baptist was His
forerunner like unto Elijah, who had come to prepare the way according
to the prophecy in Malachi iii. 1; that He had begun to preach in
Galilee, as foretold in Isaiah ix. 1, 2; that the scepter had departed
from Judah and the lawgiver from between his feet, as prophesied in
Genesis xlix. 10, which fact it was believed would herald the approach
of the Messiah; that He had made His public entry into Jerusalem riding
upon an ass, as foretold in Zechariah ix. 9; and that He had been
betrayed into their hands by one of His own friends, in fulfillment of
prophecies contained in Psalms xli. 9 and Zechariah xi. 12, 13.

This cumulative evidence, this collective proof, must have carried
overwhelming conviction to the minds and the hearts of fair and
impartial judges. More than one Nicodemus would have arisen to plead the
cause of Jesus if this testimony had been adduced before a free-minded,
open-hearted, disinterested tribunal. More than one Joseph of Arimathea
would have refused assent in a hostile verdict against a prisoner in
whose favor the record of fact was so pronounced.

In determining the weight that this evidence should have had in
affecting the decision of the judges we must not forget that a Jewish
prisoner was not required to prove his innocence. It was incumbent upon
the Commonwealth of Israel to establish guilt beyond all doubt. We
should also remember that the peculiar tendency of the Hebrew system of
criminal procedure was in the direction of complete protection to the
accused. Not reasonable doubt merely, but all doubt was resolved in his
favor. It was a maxim of the Hebrew law that "the Sanhedrin was to save,
not to destroy life." Pretext after pretext was sought to acquit. "The
primary object of the Hebrew judicial system," says Benny, "was to
render the conviction of an innocent person impossible. All the
ingenuity of the Jewish legists was directed to the attainment of this
end." If this generous and merciful tendency of Hebrew law had been duly
observed, would not the production of the evidence above noted have
resulted in the acquittal of Jesus?

But, at this point, let us return to the consideration of the real
meaning of the objection urged in Point XII. The irregularity therein
alleged is that the Sanhedrin paid no attention whatever to the defense
of Jesus. And herein was the real error. The members of that court might
have rejected as false the claims of the Nazarene to Messiahship. They
might have denounced as fraudulent his pretensions to miraculous
powers. They could not for this reason have been charged with judicial
unfairness, if they had first heard his defense and had then "weighed it
in the sincerity of their conscience." Infallibility of judgment cannot
be demanded of judicial officers.

In closing the discussion of errors committed at the night trial in the
palace of Caiaphas, the reader should be reminded that the twelve Points
above mentioned are not exhaustive of the irregularities. Others might
be mentioned. It seems that Jesus, being the accused, should not have
been put under oath.[343] On the days on which capital verdicts were
pronounced Hebrew judges were required to mourn and fast.[344] But there
was evidently no mourning and fasting by Caiaphas and his colleagues at
the time of the condemnation of Jesus. Again, there is no evidence that
Antecedent Warning was properly administered. Still other errors might
be noted, if a legal presumption in favor of the correctness of the
record did not prevent. The irregularities which we have heretofore
discussed, it is believed, exhaust all the material errors committed at
the first session of the Sanhedrin. At least, no others are revealed by
the Gospel records.

_The Morning Session of the Sanhedrin._--About three hours after the
close of the night session in the palace of Caiaphas, that is about six
o'clock in the morning, the Sanhedrin reconvened in a second session.
In the interval between these sittings Jesus was brutalized by His
keepers. Exactly what the priests were doing we do not know. They were
probably busily engaged in perfecting plans for the destruction of the
prisoner in their charge.

The daylight meeting is thus reported in Matthew xxvii. 1: "When the
morning was come, all the chief priests and elders of the people took
counsel against Jesus to put him to death." In Mark xv. 1 the same
session is thus recorded: "And straightway in the morning the chief
priests held a consultation with the elders and scribes and the whole
council, and bound Jesus, and carried him away, and delivered him to
Pilate."

The exact nature of this morning sitting, whether a regular trial or an
informal gathering, is not certainly known. Meyer, Ellicott, and
Lichtenstein maintain that this second session was nothing more than a
prolongation of the night trial, perhaps with a brief recess, and that
its special object was to convene for consultation concerning the
carrying out of the sentence which had already been pronounced against
Jesus.[345] But this view is entirely exceptional. It is maintained by
the greater number of reputable authorities that the second sitting was
in the nature of a second trial. The solution of the difficulty seems to
turn upon the account given by St. Luke, for St. John records the
details of neither the night nor the morning session. St. Luke describes
a regular trial, but it is not positively known whether his account
refers to the night or to the morning meeting. If his report refers to
the same trial as that described in Matthew xxvi. 57-68 and in Mark xiv.
53-65, then we have only the brief notices in Matthew xxvii. 1 and in
Mark xv. 1 concerning the morning session, which indicate only a very
brief and informal meeting of the Sanhedrin at daybreak. On the other
hand, if the report of St. Luke refers to the daylight meeting of the
Sanhedrin referred to by St. Matthew and St. Mark then we have received
from the third Evangelist a description of a regular trial at the second
session of the Sanhedrin. Andrews has thus expressed himself very
cogently concerning this matter:

Our decision as to a second and distinct session of the Sanhedrin
will mainly depend upon the place we give to the account in Luke
xxii. 66-71. Is this examination of Jesus identical with that first
session of Matthew xxvi. 57-68, and of Mark xiv. 53-65? Against
this identity are some strong objections: First, The mention of
time by Luke: "As soon as it was day." This corresponds well to the
time of the morning session of Matthew and Mark, but not to the
time when Jesus was first led before the Sanhedrin, which must have
been two or three hours before day. Second, The place of the
meeting: "They led Him into their council," [Greek: anêgagon auton
eis to synedrion heautôn]. This is rendered by some: "They led Him
up into their council chamber," or the place where they usually
held their sessions. Whether this council chamber was the room
Gazith at the east corner of the court of the temple, is not
certain. Lightfoot (on Matthew xxvi. 3) conjectures that the
Sanhedrin was driven from this its accustomed seat half a year or
thereabout before the death of Christ. But if this were so, still
the "Tabernæ," where it established its sessions, were shops near
the gate Shusan, and so connected with the temple. They went up to
that room where they usually met. Third, The dissimilarity of the
proceedings, as stated by Luke, which shows that this was no formal
trial. There is here no mention of witnesses--no charges brought to
be proved against Him. He is simply asked to tell them if He is the
Christ ("If thou art the Christ, tell us," R. V.); and this seems
plainly to point to the result of the former session. Then, having
confessed Himself to be the Christ, the Son of God, He was
condemned to death for blasphemy. It was only necessary now that He
repeat His confession, and hence this question is put directly to
Him: "Art thou the Christ? tell us." His reply, "If I tell you, ye
will not believe; and if I also ask you, ye will not answer me, nor
let me go," points backward to his former confession. To His reply
they only answer by asking, "Art thou then the Son of God?" The
renewed avowal that He is the Son of God, heard by them all from
His own lips, opens the way for His immediate delivery into
Pilate's hands. Fourth, The position which Luke gives (xxii. 63-65)
to the insults and abuse heaped upon Jesus. There can be no doubt
that they are the same mentioned by Matthew and Mark as occurring
immediately after the sentence had been first pronounced.

From all this it is a probable, though not a certain conclusion,
that Luke (xxii. 66-71) refers to the same meeting of the Sanhedrin
mentioned by Matthew (xxvii. 1) and Mark (xv. 1), and relates, in
part, what then took place. (Alford thinks that Luke has confused
things and relates as happening at the second session what really
happened at the first.) This meeting was, then, a morning session
convened to ratify formally what had been done before with haste
and informality. The circumstances under which its members had been
earlier convened, at the palace of Caiaphas, sufficiently show that
the legal forms, which they were so scrupulous in observing, had
not been complied with.[346]

If then the second session of the Sanhedrin was in the nature of a
regular trial, what were the facts of the proceedings? St. Luke says:
"And as soon as it was day, the elders of the people and the chief
priests and the scribes came together, and led him into their council,
saying, Art thou the Christ? tell us. And he said unto them, If I tell
you, ye will not believe: And if I also ask you, ye will not answer me,
nor let me go. Hereafter shall the Son of man sit on the right hand of
the power of God. Then said they all, Art thou then the Son of God? And
he said unto them, Ye say that I am. And they said, What need we any
further witness? for we ourselves have heard of his own mouth."[347]

The reader will readily perceive the source of the difficulty which we
have just discussed. This report of St. Luke points both ways, toward
both the night and morning sessions. "_And as soon as it was day_"
clearly indicates a daybreak meeting, but the remainder of the account
bears a most striking resemblance to the reports of the night trial
given by St. Matthew and St. Mark. This seeming discrepancy is very
easily reconciled, however, when we reflect that the second trial
required by Hebrew law to be held in every case where a verdict of guilt
had been pronounced, was virtually a repetition of the first trial.
Benny tells us that the second trial was a critical examination of the
trial of the first day, in which the questions and answers originally
asked and made were carefully reviewed and reëxamined.[348] Is it very
strange, then, that at the morning trial described by St. Luke
substantially the same questions are asked and answers given as are
found in the reports of the night trial by St. Matthew and St. Mark?

We may now ask: What was the purpose of this second trial? Why did not
the first trial suffice? According to the most reliable authorities, the
answer to this question is to be found in that provision of the Hebrew
law which required two trials instead of one, in every case where the
prisoner had been found guilty at the first trial. Not only were there
to be two trials, but they were to be held on different days. The
morning session of the Sanhedrin was intended, therefore, to give a
semblance of legality and regularity to this requirement of Hebrew law.
But we shall see how completely the Sanhedrin failed in this design.
"What legitimacy," says Keim, "might be lacking in the proceedings of
the nocturnal sitting of the Sanhedrin, was to be completely made up by
the morning sitting, without prejudice to the authority and the--in the
main point--decisive action of the former.... There nevertheless was no
lack of illegality. The most striking instance of this was the fact that
though they wished to bring about an extension of the procedure over two
days they had in fact only two sittings, and not two separate days. But
contempt of the legal ordinances was much more seriously shown by the
absence of any investigation into the circumstances of the case at the
second sitting, although _both law and tradition demanded such an
investigation_."[349]

If "both law and tradition demanded such an investigation," that is, if
the second trial of the case on the second day of the proceedings was
required to be formal and in the nature of an action _de novo_; if the
second trial was required by law to be characterized by all the
formality, solemnity, and legality of the first trial; what errors, we
may ask, are disclosed by the reports of St. Luke, St. Matthew, and St.
Mark in the proceedings against Jesus conducted by the Sanhedrin at the
morning session? To be brief, reply may be made that the irregularities
were virtually the same as those that occurred at the night trial. The
same precipitancy that was forbidden by Hebrew law is apparent. This
haste prevented, of course, that careful deliberation and painstaking
investigation of the case which the Mosaic Code as well as the rules of
the Mishna imperatively demanded. It is true that the second trial was
not conducted at night. But the Passover Feast was still in progress,
and no court could legally sit at such a time. The Sanhedrin at the
second session seems to have been still sitting in the palace of
Caiaphas instead of the Hall of Hewn Stones, the legal meeting place of
the court. This we learn from a passage in St. John.[350] Again, no
witnesses seem to have been summoned, and the accused was convicted upon
his uncorroborated confession.

And finally, the verdict at the second trial, as was the case in that of
the first, seems to have been unanimous, and therefore illegal. This
unanimity is indicated by the combined reports of St. Matthew, St. Mark,
and St. Luke. St. Matthew says: "When the morning was come, _all_ the
chief priests and elders of the people took counsel against Jesus to put
Him to death." St. Mark says: "And straightway in the morning, the chief
priests held a consultation with the elders and scribes and the _whole
council_, and bound Jesus, and carried him away, and delivered him to
Pilate." These accounts of the first two Evangelists very clearly state
that the full Sanhedrin was present at the morning trial. Then St. Luke
very explicitly explains the nature and manner of the verdict: "Then
said they _all_, Art thou then the Son of God? And he said unto them, Ye
say that I am. And they said, What need we any further witness? for we
ourselves have heard of his own mouth."

It may be objected that no formal verdict was pronounced at the second
trial. Such a verdict would have been expressed in these words: "Thou,
Jesus, art guilty."[351] While such words are not expressly reported by
the Evangelists, the account of St. Luke taken in connection with the
report of St. Mark of the night trial, which the morning session was
intended to confirm, clearly indicates that such a verdict must have
been pronounced. A reasonable inference from the whole context of the
synoptic writers in describing both trials certainly justifies such a
conclusion.

The question again arises: If the full Sanhedrin was present at the
morning session and if all the members condemned Jesus, either with or
without a formal verdict, is it not true that both Nicodemus and Joseph
of Arimathea, who were doubtless members of the court, were arrayed
against the Christ? If they were hostile in their attitude toward Him,
either openly or by acquiescence at the morning session, does this fact
not help to support the contention made under Point IX that they voted
against Him at the night trial? We are well aware that there is much
opposition to this view, but we are, nevertheless, compelled to agree
rather reluctantly with Keim that "it is a pure supposition that members
of the council who were secret friends of Jesus--whose existence,
moreover, cannot be established--either raised an opposition in one of
the sessions, or abstained from voting, or were not present."[352] The
plain language of the Scriptures indicates: (1) That both Nicodemus[353]
and Joseph of Arimathea[354] were members of the Great Sanhedrin; (2)
that they were both present at both trials;[355] and (3) that they both
either voted against Him or tacitly acquiesced in the judgments
pronounced against Him.[356] We have already discussed under Point IX
the passage in Luke xxiii. 51 referring to the fact that Joseph of
Arimathea "had not consented to the counsel and deed of them," which
seems to furnish refutation of the contention which we have made, as far
as such contention relates to Joseph of Arimathea. Suffice it to note
the opinion of Keim that "the passage in itself can be held to refer to
absence or to dissent in voting."[357]

"And the whole multitude of them arose, and led him unto Pilate."

The reader may ask: Why did the Jews lead Jesus away to Pilate? When
they had condemned Him to death on the charge of blasphemy, why did they
themselves not put Him to death? Why did they invoke Roman interference
in the matter? Why did they not stone Jesus to death, as Hebrew law
required in the case of culprits convicted of blasphemy? Stephen was
stoned to death for blasphemy.[358] What was the difference between his
case and that of Jesus? Why was Jesus crucified instead of being put to
death by stoning?

The stoning of Stephen as a blasphemer by the Jews has been explained as
an irregular outbreak of fanatical priests, a sort of mob violence. It
has also been contended that the case of Stephen was one of the rare
instances in which Roman procurators permitted the Jews to execute the
death sentence. In any event it was an exceptional proceeding. At the
time of the crucifixion of Jesus and of the martyrdom of Stephen the
Jews had lost the right of enforcing the death penalty. Judea was a
subject province of the Roman empire. The Jews were permitted by the
Romans to try capital cases. If an acquittal was the result, the Romans
did not interfere. If a verdict of guilty was found, the Jews were
compelled to lead the prisoner away to the Roman governor, who reviewed
or retried the case as he saw fit. Accordingly, having condemned Him to
death themselves, the Jews were compelled to lead Jesus away to the
palace of Herod on the hill of Zion in which Pilate was stopping on the
occasion of the Paschal Feast, to see what he had to say about the
matter, whether he would reverse or affirm the sentence which they had
pronounced.

The Roman trial of Jesus will be treated in the second volume of this
work.

END OF VOL. I

FOOTNOTES:

[1] "Testimony of the Evangelists," pp. 7-11.

[2] "Testimony of the Evangelists," pp. 25, 26.

[3] I "Starkie on Evidence," pp. 480-545.

[4] John x. 30: "I and my Father are one."

[5] Matt. ix. 9.

[6] Col. iv. 14: "Luke, the beloved physician."

[7] Matt. xxvi. 70-72.

[8] Matt. xxvi. 46-50.

[9] Matt. xxvi. 56.

[10] Matt. xiv. 28-31.

[11] Mark x. 35-42; Matt. xx. 20-25.

[12] Matt. xi. 2, 3.

[13] Mark iii. 21.

[14] Luke iv. 28, 29.

[15] Mark xiv. 51, 52.

[16] "Intro. Vie de Jesus."

[17] Luke i. 2, 3.

[18] "Die synoptischen Evangelien," pp. 412-14.

[19] Marcus Dods, "The Bible, Its Origin and Nature," p. 184.

[20] An opposite doctrine seems to be taught in Luke xii. 11, 12; xxiv.
48, 49.

[21] "Evidences of Christianity," p. 319.

[22] Matt. xiv. 12-20; Mark vi. 34-43; Luke ix. 12-17; John vi. 5-13.

[23] Luke xxii. 64.

[24] Luke xxii. 51.

[25] Campbell's "Philosophy of Rhetoric," c. v. b. 1, Part III, p. 125.

[26] "Intro. Vie de Jesus," p. 62.

[27] D. L. Moody, "Sermon on the Resurrection of Jesus."

[28] See also I "Starkie on Evidence," pp. 496-99.

[29] "Ant.," XVIII. 3, I.

[30] See authorities cited in "The Brief."

[31] "De iis qui sero puniuntur," p. 554.

[32] P. 1080, edit. 45.

[33] P. 1247, edit. 24, Huds.

[34] P. 1327, edit. 43.

[35] "Productique omnes, virgisque cæsi, ac securi percussi," Lib. XI.
c. 5.

[36] Domit. Cap. X. "Patremfamilias--canibus objecit, cum hoc _titulo_,
Impie locutus, parmularius."

[37] Book LIV.

[38] "Aur. Vict. Ces.," Cap. XLI. "Eo pius, ut etiam vetus veterrimumque
supplicium, patibulum, et cruribus suffringendis, primus removerit."
Also see Paley's "Evidences of Christianity," pp. 266-68.

[39] Luke xxii. 44.

[40] Tissot, "Traité des Nerfs," pp. 279, 280.

[41] Joannes Schenck à Grafenberg, "Observ. Medic.," Lib. III. p. 458.

[42] Voltaire, "Oeuvres complètes," vol. xviii. pp. 531, 532.

[43] De Mezeray, "Histoire de France," vol. iii. p. 306.

[44] John xix. 34.

[45] John xix. 35.

[46] John xviii. 6.

[47] "Encyc. Brit.," vol. xv. p. 550.

[48] Mendelsohn, "Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews," p.
191.

[49] Mendelsohn, p. 189, n. 1.

[50] "Jewish Encyc.," vol. xii. p. 1.

[51] Emanuel Deutsch, "The Talmud," p. 26.

[52] Farrar, "Hist. of Interpretation."

[53] Emanuel Deutsch, "The Talmud," p. 47.

[54] "Encyc. Brit.," vol. xxiii. p. 35.

[55] Emanuel Deutsch, "The Talmud," p. 58.

[56] Emanuel Deutsch, "The Talmud," p. 27.

[57] Emanuel Deutsch, "The Talmud," p. 27.

[58] Deut. xvi. 18.

[59] "Ant.," XIII. 10, 6.

[60] Horace.

[61] Emanuel Deutsch, "The Talmud," p. 12.

[62] "Jewish Encyc.," vol. xii. p. 22.

[63] Emanuel Deutsch, "Talmud," p. 12.

[64] Maimon., "H. Sanh." xv. 10-13.

[65] Mendelsohn, "Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews," pp.
45-50.

[66] Mendelsohn, "Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews," pp.
45-50.

[67] Mendelsohn, p. 43.

[68] Mendelsohn, pp. 39, 40.

[69] Mendelsohn, pp. 39, 40.

[70] Maimonides ("Yad"), "Sanhedrin" xix.

[71] Dr. Smith's "Hist. of Greece," p. 557.

[72] "Jewish Encyc.," vol. ii. p. 257.

[73] Ex. ii. 12-16.

[74] "Sanh." 52b; Maim., "H. Sanh." xv. 4.

[75] "H. Sanh." xv. 5.

[76] Benny, "Crim. Code of the Jews," p. 90.

[77] Mendelsohn, p. 159.

[78] Chap. I. 10; X. i, 2.

[79] Matt. xxvi. 59.

[80] "Ant.," XIV. Chap. V. 4; "Wars of the Jews," I. VIII. 5; "Talmud,"
"Sanhedrin."

[81] "Post Bibl. Hist.," vol. i. p. 106.

[82] Matt. xvi. 21.

[83] "Commentary on the Law," vol. ccclxvi. recto.

[84] "Sanhedrin" 32.

[85] Benny.

[86] Jose b. Halafta, I. c.

[87] R. Johanan, "Sanhedrin" 19a.

[88] Benny.

[89] Benny.

[90] "Sanhedrin" 17a; "Menahoth" 65a.

[91] Sifre, Num. 92 (ed. Friedmann, p. 25b).

[92] Yalkut, "Exodus," Sec. 167.

[93] Sotah 22b.

[94] "Const. of the Sanhedrin," Chap. I.

[95] Benny, "The Criminal Code of the Jews," p. 71.

[96] Saalschütz, "Das Mosaische Recht," p. 58; Deut. xx. 5, 6.

[97] Luke ii. 46-51.

[98] Jer. xxxvii., xxxviii.

[99] "Jesus of Nazara," vol. vi. p. 45.

[100] "The Life and Words of Christ," vol. ii. p. 517.

[101] "Archæol." 87.

[102] Acts xxiv. 1, 2.

[103] I Kings iii. 16-28.

[104] Mendelsohn, "Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews," pp.
102, 103.

[105] Mendelsohn, pp. 96-98.

[106] "Sanhedrin," Chap. I. fol. 19.

[107] Mendelsohn, p. 97.

[108] Mishna, "Sanhedrin," Chap. IV. 1.

[109] Mendelsohn, p. 98.

[110] "Sanhedrin," 8b, 41a, _et al._

[111] Mendelsohn, p. 101.

[112] Schürer, "The Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ," 2d Div.,
1.

[113] "Sanhedrin," IV. 4.

[114] "Sanhedrin," IV. 1.

[115] "Sanhedrin," 17a, p. 176.

[116] "Sanhedrin," Chap. I. 5.

[117] Benny.

[118] Benny.

[119] Benny.

[120] Mendelsohn, p. 140, n. 327.

[121] Montaigne, "Essays," III. C. XIII.

[122] "Un homme ne jugera jamais seul; cela n'appartient qu'a Dieu."

"Ne sis judex unus; non est enim unicus judex, nisi unus."--Salvador,
"Institutions de Moïse," L. IV. Chap. II. p. 357.

[123] "But let not the testimony of women be admitted, on account of the
levity and boldness of their sex."--Josephus, "Ant.," IV. 8, 15.

[124] "Nor let servants be admitted to give testimony, on account of the
ignobility of their souls."--"Ant.," IV. 8, 15.

[125] "Ant.," IV. 8, 15.

[126] Maimonides, I. C. XI. 6, based on "Sanh." 26b.

[127] Mendelsohn, p. 118.

[128] "Talmud," B. B. 43a.

[129] Deut. xvii. 6.

[130] Num. xxxv. 30.

[131] "Hist. Nat.," Lib. VIII. Cap. XXII.

[132] L. 20, Dig. De quæstionibus, xlviii. 18.

[133] Blackstone, iv. 357.

[134] Con. U. S., Art. III, Sec. 3.

[135] "Les lois qui font périr un homme sur la déposition d'un seul
témoin, sont fatales à la liberté. La raison en exige deux; parce qu'un
témoin qui affirme, et un accusé qui nie, font un partage; et il faut un
tiers pour le vider. Les Grecs and les Romains exigeaient une voix de
plus pour condamner. Nos lois françaises en demandent deux. Les Grecs
prétendaient que leur usage avait été établi par les dieux; mais c'est
le notre."--"De L'Esprit Des Lois," L. XII. C. III.

[136] Mishna, "Sanhedrin," C. V. 2.

[137] Maimonides, "Sanhedrin," Chap. XX.

[138] "Jewish Encyc.," vol. v. p. 277.

[139] "Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews," p. 29.

[140] Philo Judæus, "De Decalogo," III.

[141] Prov. xi. 10; Mishna, "Sanhedrin," IV. 5.

[142] Apocrypha.

[143] Benny.

[144] Mishna, "Sanhedrin," Chap. V. 1.

[145] Benny.

[146] Deut. xix. 18-21.

[147] Apocrypha.

[148] Maimonides, Mishna, "Sanhedrin," Chap. IV. 2.

[149] Münsterberg, "On the Witness Stand," "Untrue Confessions," pp.
137-171.

[150] Rosadi.

[151] Rabbi Wise, "Martyrdom of Jesus."

[152] "Yad," Edut, xvii. 1.

[153] "Jewish Encyc.," vol. v. p. 279.

[154] Num. xxxv. 30.

[155] Mishna, "Sanhedrin" V. 3, 4.

[156] Matt. xxvi. 60.

[157] Mark xiv. 56.

[158] Lev. xxii. 28.

[159] Deut. xvii. 5; "Sanhedrin" VII. 4.

[160] Num. vi. 2-4.

[161] "Jewish Encyc.," vol. vi. p. 260.

[162] "Einleitung in der Gesetzgebung," p. 4.

[163] "Jewish Encyc.," vol. vi. p. 260; Benny, "Criminal Code of the
Jews," p. 97; Saalschütz, "Das Mosaische Recht," n. 560.

[164] Mishna, treatise Makhoth.

[165] Mishna, "Capita Patrum," I. 1.

[166] Salvador, "Institutions de Moïse."

[167] Mishna, "Sanhedrin," IV. 1.

[168] "Jesus Before the Sanhedrin," p. 109.

[169] "Talmud," Jerus., Sanh., C. I. fol. 19.

[170] Mishna, "Tamid," C. III.

[171] Geikie, vol. ii. p. 517.

[172] Lyman Abbott, "Jesus of Nazareth," pp. 446, 447.

[173] "Jewish Encyc.," vol. v. pp. 279, 280.

[174] Benny.

[175] Mendelsohn, p. 144.

[176] Josephus, "Ant.," XIV. 9, 4.

[177] Schürer, 2d div., vol. i. p. 175.

[178] Schürer, 2d div., vol. i. p. 184.

[179] "Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah," vol. ii. p. 556.

[180] "Jesus of Nazara," vol. vi. p. 37.

[181] "The Talmud," p. 32.

[182] "Ant.," xv. 6, 2.

[183] "History of the Jews," vol. ii. p. 163.

[184] "Tribus, pseudo-propheta, sacerdos magnus, non nisi a septuaginta
et unius judicum consessu judicantur."--"Mishna, De Synedriis," i. 5.

[185] "Among the offenses of which it took cognizance were false claims
to prophetic inspiration and blasphemy."--Andrews, "The Life of Our
Lord," p. 510.

[186] "Gesch. d. Judenth." vol. i. pp. 402-409.

[187] "Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah," vol. ii. p. 553.

[188] "Vie de Jesus," pp. 303, 304.

[189] "Trial of Jesus Christ," p. 81.

[190] Matt. xxvi. 60, 61.

[191] Mark xiv. 57, 58.

[192] Matt. xxvi. 64-66.

[193] Mark xiv. 56.

[194] John ii. 20.

[195] John ii. 19.

[196] John ii. 21.

[197] "The Martyrdom of Jesus," pp. 75-77.

[198] Deut. xiii. 1-5.

[199] I Kings xxi. 10.

[200] Isa. lii, 5; Ezek. xxxv. 12.

[201] Luke xxii. 65; Acts xiii. 45; xviii. 6.

[202] Revelation xiii. 1-6.

[203] "Blackstone," vol. ii. pp. 75-84.

[204] Greenidge, "Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time," pp. 427, 507, 518.

[205] Deut. iv. 15, 16; Deut. xiii.

[206] Gen. xli. 16.

[207] Num. xx. 10-12.

[208] Num. xx. 20-24.

[209] Greenleaf, "Testimony of the Evangelists," p. 555.

[210] Matt. v. 17.

[211] John xi. 41.

[212] Matt. ix. 20-22; Mark v. 25-34; Luke viii. 43-48.

[213] Matt. viii. 24-26; Mark iv. 37-39; Luke viii. 23-25.

[214] Matt. viii. 28-32; Mark v. 1-13; Luke viii. 26-33.

[215] Matt. ix. 18-26; Mark v. 22-42; Luke viii. 41-55.

[216] Luke vii. 12-15.

[217] Matt. ix. 2, 3.

[218] Luke v. 21.

[219] John v. 18.

[220] John x. 30-33.

[221] John vi. 41.

[222] John viii. 58.

[223] "Testimony of the Evangelists," p. 562.

[224] Edersheim, "Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah," vol. ii. p. 629.

[225] John xiii.-xvii.

[226] Matt. xi. 3.

[227] Luke xxiv. 39-43; John xx. 24-28.

[228] John xiii. 33.

[229] John xviii. 9.

[230] "Jesus Devant Caïphe et Pilate."

[231] Acts iv. 3.

[232] "Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah," vol. ii. p. 494.

[233] See Cooley's "Blackstone," vol. ii. p. 330, n. 6; also Greenleaf,
"On Evidence," vol. i. pp. 531-35 (10th edition).

[234] "Vie de Jesus," p. 303.

[235] John xviii. 13.

[236] Matt. xxvi. 57.

[237] Mark xiv. 53.

[238] Luke xxii. 54.

[239] John xviii. 19.

[240] Luke iii. 2; Acts iv. 6.

[241] "Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah," vol. i. p. 264.

[242] "The Life of Our Lord," p. 142.

[243] Luke iii. 2.

[244] Plummer, St. Luke, in "International Critical Commentary," pp. 84,
515.

[245] Josephus, "Ant.," XVIII. chap. ii. 2.

[246] John xviii. 19-23.

[247] Mark xiv. 58-61.

[248] Matt. xxvi. 60-63.

[249] Matt. xxvi. 63.

[250] Mark xiv. 59.

[251] Acts vi. 14.

[252] "Jewish Encyc.," vol. i. p. 163.

[253] Fiske, "Manual of Classical Literature," iii. Sec. 108; Smith,
"Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities," 89a.

[254] See discussion of Point I.

[255] Luke xxii. 66.

[256] Luke xxii. 2.

[257] Mark xiv. 2.

[258] Mark xiv. i; Matt. xxvi. 4 (Consilium fecerunt ut Jesum dolo
tenerent et occiderent).

[259] Maimonides, "Sanhedrin" II.

[260] John xviii. 28; Luke xxii. 1; Mark xiv. 1; Matt. xxvi. 2.

[261] Mishna, "Capita Patrum," I, 1.

[262] Mishna, "Treatise Makhoth."

[263] See Part II, Chap. V.

[264] Edmund Stapfer, "Life of Jesus."

[265] Matt. xxvi. 57-66.

[266] Mark xiv. 55-64.

[267] Matt. xxvii. 1.

[268] Mark xv. 1.

[269] Luke xxii. 66-71.

[270] "Martyrdom of Jesus," p. 74.

[271] "Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews," p. 133, n. 311.

[272] See Part II, Chap. IV.

[273] Mark xiv. 56-65.

[274] Mark xiv. 62.

[275] Matt. xii. 14-16; Mark iii. 7; ix. 29, 30.

[276] Luke xiii. 31, 32.

[277] Matt. xxii. 15.

[278] John iv. 26.

[279] Mark i. 34.

[280] John x. 24.

[281] Matt. xvi. 20.

[282] Blackstone.

[283] Mendelsohn, p. 143.

[284] Mark xiv. 63, 64.

[285] "Martyrdom of Jesus," p. 74.

[286] "The Trial of Jesus," p. 200.

[287] Matt. xxvi. 59; Mark xiv. 55.

[288] Matt. xxvii. 1.

[289] Mark xv. 1.

[290] John iii. 1; vii. 50.

[291] Luke xxiii. 51.

[292] John vii. 51.

[293] John vii. 50; xix. 39.

[294] Luke xxiii. 51.

[295] Mendelsohn, p. 98.

[296] Deut. xvii. 7, 8.

[297] "It is important to notice that every time the necessities of the
case required the Sanhedrin returned to the Hall Gazith, or of Hewn
Stones, as in the case of Jesus and others."--"Thosephthoth, or
Additions to the Talmud," Bab., "Sanhedrin," C. IV. fol. 37, recto.

[298] Edersheim, "Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah," vol. ii. p. 556,
n. 1.

[299] John xviii. 28.

[300] MM. Lémann, "Jesus Before the Sanhedrin," p. 140.

[301] Mark xiv. 63, 64.

[302] Edersheim, "Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah," vol. ii. p. 561.

[303] Rabbi Wise, "Martyrdom of Jesus," p. 74.

[304] Benny, "Criminal Code of the Jews," p. 81.

[305] Matt. xxvi. 65.

[306] See Part II, Qualifications of Judges.

[307] "Talmud, Pesachim, or the Passover," fol. 57, verso; see also
"Jesus Before the Sanhedrin," pp. 54, 55.

[308] Benny, "Criminal Code of the Jews," pp. 28-41.

[309] Matt. xxi. 31.

[310] Matt. xxiii. 14, 15.

[311] "Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah," vol. i. pp. 93, 94.

[312] Matt. xxiii. 27, 29-33.

[313] "Vie de Jesus," p. 267.

[314] John xi. 49, 50.

[315] John xi. 53.

[316] Luke xxii. 1-3.

[317] Matt. xxvi. 3-5.

[318] Benny, "Criminal Code of the Jews," p. 56.

[319] Geikie, "The Life and Words of Christ," vol. ii. p. 517.

[320] Deut. xix. 18-21.

[321] Mark xiv. 55.

[322] Mishna, Treatise "Makhoth."

[323]

"Afresh the mighty line of years unroll'd,
The Virgin now, now Saturn's sway returns;
Now the blest globe a heaven-sprung Child adorns,
Whose genial power shall whelm earth's iron race,
And plant once more the golden in its place."--Virgil, Eclogue IV.

[324] Gen. xlix. 8-10.

[325] "Sanhedrin," fol. 97, verso.

[326] "Martyrdom of Jesus," p. 76.

[327] John xi. 48-50.

[328] I Sam. xv. 29.

[329] Hosea xi. 9.

[330] Mark vii. 9-13.

[331] "Jewish Encyc.," vol. i. p. 583.

[332] Hodge, "Systematic Theology," vol. i. p. 485.

[333] Steenstra, "The Being of God as Unity and Trinity," pp. 192, 193.

[334] John ii. 15.

[335] John vi. 30.

[336] John x. 24, 25.

[337] Matt. xi. 4, 5.

[338] I Kings xvii. 17-22.

[339] John xi. 41.

[340] Matt. ix. 18-26; Mark v. 22-42; Luke viii. 41-55.

[341] Luke vii. 12-15.

[342] John iii. 2.

[343] See Friedlieb, Archæol., 87; Dupin, 75; Keim, vol. iii. 327.

[344] Bab. Sanh. f. 63, 1: "Cum synedrium quemquam moti adjudicavit, ne
quidquam degustent illi isto die."

[345] Andrews, "The Life of Our Lord," p. 522.

[346] "The Life of Our Lord," pp. 523, 524.

[347] Luke xxii. 66-71.

[348] See Part II, Chap. V.; also Benny, "Crim. Code of the Jews," pp.
81-83.

[349] Keim, "Jesus of Nazara," vol. vi. pp. 63, 64.

[350] John xviii. 28.

[351] "Thou, Reuben, art guilty! Thou, Simon, art acquitted, art not
guilty!" were stereotyped forms of verdicts under Hebrew criminal
procedure. Sanh. in Friedl., p. 89.

[352] Keim, "Jesus of Nazara," vol. vi. p. 74.

[353] John iii. 1; vii. 50.

[354] Luke xxiii. 50, 51.

[355] Matt. xxvi. 59; Mark xiv. 55; Matt. xxvii. 1; Mark xv. 1.

[356] Mark xiv. 63, 64; Luke xxii. 70, 71.

[357] Keim, "Jesus of Nazara," vol. vi. p. 74, n. 2.

[358] Acts vi. 11; vii. 59.

INDEX

Abarbanel, Isaac, on the Sanhedrin, I, 106

Ab-beth-din, vice-president of the Sanhedrin, I, 112

Abbott, Lyman, on the scribes of the Sanhedrin, I, 158

Acts of Pilate, the Apocryphal,
modern criticism of, II, 327
discovery of, II, 327
Lardner on the authenticity of, II, 328 _seq._
Tischendorf on the authenticity of, II, 345 _seq._
antiquity of, II, 351
text of, II, 351 _seq._

Æbutius, Publius, part of, in the exposure of Bacchanalian orgies, II,
271 _seq._

Ædile, Roman, judicial powers of, II, 36

Æsculapius, Græco-Roman divinity, II, 198

Akiba, Jewish rabbi, Mishna systematized by, I, 79

Albanus, Roman governor, his deposition of Albanus, II, 296

Alcmene, myth of Zeus and, II, 265

Alexander, Jewish Alabarch, biographical note on, II, 299

Alexander III, pope, genuineness of "true cross" attested by bull of,
II, 63

Alexandrian MS. of the Bible, I, 67

Ananias ben Nebedeus, Jewish priest,
biographical note on, II, 299
family of, cursed in Talmud, II, 302

Ananos. See Annas

Ananus, son of Annas, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II, 296

Anathemas, Jewish, against the Christians, II, 307, 308

Anaxagoras, Greek philosopher,
on the deification of natural forces, II, 225
his exposure of the divination of Lampon, II, 226

Annanias, author of "Acts of Pilate," II, 351

Annas (Ananos), Jewish high priest,
examination of Christ before, I, 238-247
deposition of, by Gratus, I, 244; II, 20
Christ examined in house of, I, 256
biographical note on, II, 295
legendary examination of Joseph of Arimathea, II, 374, 376

Antecedent Warning, peculiar provision of Hebrew Criminal Law
regarding, I, 147-152

Antistius, L., Roman tribune, impeachment of Julius Cæsar by, II, 46

Antoninus Pius, Roman emperor, persecution of Christians by, II, 78

Aphrodisia, rites of, II, 265

Aphrodite, Greek divinity, patroness of prostitutes, II, 265

Aquillius, Manlius, Roman governor, trial of, before the Comitia, II, 40

Antonius, Marcus, Roman advocate, defense of, of Manlius Aquillius, II,
40

Aristotle, Greek philosopher, on the licentiousness of Sparta, II, 241

Arnold, Matthew, on despair of Roman people, II, 286

Arnobius, Numidian writer,
on the familiar treatment of Roman gods, II, 218
on the lewdness of the Roman drama, II, 267

Art, effect of, in corruption of Roman and Greek morals, II, 268

Aspasia, mistress of Pericles, II, 242

Athens, domestic licentiousness of, II, 240, 241

Athronges, Jewish peasant, revolt of, II, 110

Atticus, Numerius, Roman senator, attests ascent of Augustus to heaven,
II, 234

Atys, myth of, represented on Greek and Roman stage, II, 267

Augurs,
Roman priests, II, 204
spectators at licentious dramas, II, 267

Augury, modes of, II, 211

Augustus Cæsar, Roman emperor,
reign and policy of, II, 25, 26
care of profligate daughter Julia, II, 83
belief of, in omens, II, 215
his chastisement of Neptune, II, 222
deification of, II, 233

Aurelius Antoninus, Marcus, Roman emperor and philosopher,
persecution of Christianity by, II, 78
adoration of Serapis by, II, 217
on suicide, II, 232

Bacchanalian orgies, Livy's account of, II, 270-283

Bacchus, Roman deity, licentious festivals of, II, 265

Barabbas (Bar Abbas) released by Pilate, II, 131, 138, 363

Baring-Gould, S., on the symbolism of the Cross, II, 66

Baths, Roman, splendor of, II, 247

Beheading of criminals under Hebrew Law, I, 91, 99

Benny,
on the Talmud, I, 75
on internment in Jewish Cities of Refuge, I, 98, 99

Bernhardt, Sarah, insulted in Quebec, II, 182

Bernice (Berenice), Jewish queen, a suppliant before Florus, II, 100

Bible,
the manuscripts of, I, 67
purity of text of, I, 69
anthropomorphism of, I, 336-338
influence of, II, 4, 5
"Birchath Hamminim" Jewish imprecation against Christians, II, 308

Blasphemy,
discussion of charge against Christ of, I, 193-209
Hebrew definition of, I, 199-201
classification of, I, 203

Boethus, family of, cursed in Talmud, II, 301. See also Simon

Bossuet, Jacques B., French divine, on the citizenship of Christ, II,
108

Brothels, Roman, dedication of, to Venus, II, 265

Burning of criminals under Hebrew Law, I, 92, 99

Cæsar, Caius Julius,
10th legion cowed by, II, 169
superstition of, II, 205
disbelief of, in immortality, II, 229
deification of, II, 233
divorces of, II, 238
profligacy of, II, 238, 239
unnatural practices attributed to, II, 263

Caiaphas, Jewish high priest,
accusation of, against Christ, before Sanhedrin, I, 190
erratic conduct of, at trial of Christ, I, 290
rôle of, in trial of Jesus before Pilate, II, 101
biographical note on, II, 295
legendary examination of Joseph of Arimathea by, II, 374, 376

Caligula, Roman emperor,
deifies his sister Drusilla, II, 234
depravity of, II, 234

Cantharus, family of, cursed in Talmud, II, 301

Capital Crimes under Hebrew Criminal Law, classification and
punishments of, I, 91-101

Carlyle, Thomas, on the life of Christ, II, 187

Cassius, Dion, on the labeling of Roman criminals, I, 57

Cato, Marcus Porcius,
contempt of, for the haruspices, II, 228
suicide of, II, 232
divorces of, II, 237
contempt of, for Lucullus, II, 246
merciless treatment of slaves, II, 251

Catulus, Quintus, dream of, presaging accession of Augustus, II, 214

Chanania, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 314

Chanania ben Chiskia, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 309

Charles IX, king of France, bloody sweat of, I, 59, 60

Christianity, conflict of, with Roman paganism, I, 16; II, 76-79

Chrysostom, St. John, on the legendary desire of Tiberius to deify
Christ, II, 344

Cicero, Marcus Tullius,
dream of, presaging accession of Augustus, II, 215
on Roman superstition, II, 221
on Roman skepticism, II, 227
his divorce of his wife, II, 237
witticism of, upon Cæsar's gallantries, II, 239

Cities of Refuge, Jewish, internment in, I, 96-99

Claudia, granddaughter of Augustus,
marriage of, to Pilate, II, 82
dream of, regarding Jesus, II, 133, 355

Claudius, Roman commander, throws sacred pullets into the sea, II, 222

Clement V, pope, and the Talmud, I, 88, 89

Coliseum, the, description of, II, 260

Comitia Centuriata,
public criminal trials in, II, 37-43
miscarriage of justice in, II, 38-42

Commodus, Roman emperor, deification of, II, 234

Consul, Roman, judicial powers of, II, 36

Coke, Sir Edward, contrast between Pilate and, II, 170-172

Cornelius, son of Ceron, the elder, biographical note on, II, 321

Cross, Roman instrument of death,
erroneous representations of, II, 56
forms of, II, 62
use of, by various races as religious symbol, II, 64-67

"Cross, the True," legends of, II, 62, 63

Crucifixion,
Plutarch on, I, 56
history of, II, 54, 55
mode of, II, 55
pathology of, II, 58, 59
Roman citizens exempt from, II, 54
of Jesus, II, 365

Cybele, Roman deity, importation of, from Phrygia, II, 199

Deification of Roman emperors, ceremony of, II, 234

Dembowski, Bishop, and the Talmud, I, 88

Demosthenes, on the women of Athens, II, 242

Dérembourg, Joseph, on the Jewish priestly families, II, 294

Deutsch, Emanuel,
on the Talmud, I, 74, 80
on the existence of the Great Sanhedrin at the time of Christ, I,
179, 181

Diocletian, Roman emperor, deification of, II, 233

Divination, Roman modes of, II, 211

Divorce,
among the Romans, II, 236-239
trivial pretexts for, II, 237, 238

Döllinger,
on the Roman view of Christianity and high treason, II, 77
on divorce, and the profligacy of Roman matrons, II, 236
on the effect of art in corrupting Greek and Roman manners, II, 268

Domitian, Roman emperor, self-deification of, II, 235

Doras, Jewish elder, biographical note on, II, 321

Dorotheas, son of Nathanael, Jewish elder, biographical note on, II,
321

Drama, the, licentiousness of, among Greeks and Romans, II, 266

Dreams, interpretation of, among Romans and Greeks, II, 213, 214

Druidism, annihilation of, II, 73

Drusilla, deified by Caligula, II, 234

Dysmas, legendary name of one of the thieves crucified with Jesus, II,
364

Edersheim, Alfred, on the existence of the Great Sanhedrin at the time
of Christ, I, 177

Elders, Jewish chamber of. See Sanhedrin

Eleazar ben Partah, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 314

Eleazar, son of Annas, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II,
295

Eleazar, son of Simon Boethus, Jewish high priest, biographical note
on, II, 297

Eliezer, Jewish rabbi, Mishna amplified by, I, 79

Ellicott, Dr., on the character of Pilate, II, 91

Epicurus, Greek philosopher, II, 229

Epicureanism, degradation of, among Romans, II, 230

Epitaphs, irreligious Roman, II, 222, 285

Epulos, Roman priests, II, 204

Etruria, importation of haruspices from, II, 210

Eusebius, reference of, to the "Acts of Pilate," II, 329, 333, 344

Evhemere, on the Greek gods, II, 225

Evangelists,
honesty of, I, 12
character of, I, 13, 14
motives of, I, 15
ability of, I, 18
candor of, I, 20-24
discrepancies of, I, 29-33
corroborative elements of narrative of, I, 34-39
impossibility of collusion among, I, 38
conformity of narrative of, with human experience, I, 39
coincidence of testimony of, with collateral circumstances, I, 52-67
narrative of, confirmed by profane historians, I, 56, 57

Evidence, rules of, under Hebrew Law, I, 144, 145

False swearing under Hebrew Criminal Law, I, 93

Fathers, Church, writings of the, I, 68

Fecenia, Hispala, part of, in exposure of Bacchanalian orgies, II,
271 _seq._

Felix, Minucius, Christian father, controversy of, with pagans on
adoration of the cross, II, 64

Flagellation, under Hebrew Criminal, I, 94

Flamens,
Roman priests, II, 204
spectators at licentious dramas, II, 267

Gallio, pro-consul of Achaia, attitude of, toward Jewish clamors, II,
107

Gamaliel, Jewish rabbi, biographical note on, II, 304

Ganymede, depraving influence of myth of rape of, II, 262

Gavazzi, Alessandro, sermons of, in Coliseum, II, 262

Geib, on the status of Judea, II, 16 on the courts of the Roman
Provinces, II, 32

Geikie, Cunningham,
on the non-existence of the Sanhedrin at the time of Christ, I, 181
on the character of the trial of Jesus before Sanhedrin, I, 184

Gemara,
the Jerusalem and Babylonian recensions of, I, 81
relation of, to Mishna, I, 83. See also Talmud and Mishna

Germanicus,
Cæsar temples profaned on death of, II, 222
exposure of children born on day of death of, II, 254

Gestas, legendary name of one of thieves crucified with Jesus, II, 364

Golden House of Nero, II, 246

Gibbon, Edward,
on the jurisdiction of the great Sanhedrin, I, 120
on the laws of the Twelve Tables, II, 53
on the extent of the Roman Empire, II, 196

Gladiatorial games,
origin of, II, 256
gigantic scale of, in Rome, II, 256, 257
conduct of, II, 258

Gospels, the, admissibility of, as legal evidence, I, 5-12

Governors, Roman,
powers of, II, 24, 27, 28, 29
forbidden to take wives to their provinces, II, 84, 85

Graetz, Heinrich, on the existence of the Sanhedrin at the time of
Christ, I, 181

Greeks,
superstition of, II, 223
philosophy of, II, 229
depraving effect on Romans of art, literature, and manners of, II,
240-244, 268, 284
Bacchanalian orgies introduced by, II, 270
invective of Juvenal against, II, 284

Greenidge, on the interpretation of native law by Roman proprætors, II,
31

Greenleaf, Simon, American jurist,
on the admissibility of the Scriptures as legal evidence, I, 6-9
on the testimony of the Evangelists, I, 10, 11
on the legal justice of the conviction of Christ for blasphemy, I,
209

Hacksab ben Tzitzith, Jewish elder, biographical note on, II, 320

"Hall of Hewn Stones," sessions of Sanhedrin in, I, 117

Haruspices, Roman, account of, II, 210

Helcias, Jewish treasurer, biographical note on, II, 300

Helena, Empress, legendary discovery of "true cross" by, II, 62

Hercules, Greek divinity, burning of, represented on Greek and Roman
stage, II, 267

Herder, Johann, on the character of Christ, II, 187

Herod Antipas,
character of, II, 120
his treatment of Jesus, II, 122-127

Herod I, the Great,
last will of, II, 119, 120
arbitrary changes of, in high priesthood, II, 293

Hetairai, status of, in Athens, II, 242, 243

High priest, Jewish,
vestments of, I, 158
abuses in appointment of, II, 293

Hillel, Jewish doctor, inspiration of, I, 84

Hillel, School of,
and the Mishna, I, 79
dissensions of, with School of Shammai, II, 309

Homer, the bible of the Greeks, II, 264

Honorius IV, pope, and the Talmud, I, 87

Horatius, trial of, before the Comitia Centuriata, II, 40

Ignatius, St., martyrdom of, in Coliseum, II, 261

Impalement, death by, II, 61

Infanticide, among Romans, II, 254

Inkerman, story of soldier killed at battle of, II, 191

Innes,
on the trials of Jesus before the Sanhedrin, I, 185; II, 10
on the cowardice of Pilate, II, 138

Interpreters, not allowed in Jewish courts, I, 107

Imprisonment. See Law, Hebrew Criminal, I, 93

Ishmael, Jewish rabbi, and the Mishna, I, 79

Ismael ben Eliza, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 309

Ismael ben Phabi, Jewish high priest,
biographical note on, II, 298
family of, cursed in Talmud, II, 301

Isis, Egyptian deity,
rites of, established in Rome, II, 217
Roman temples of, a resort of vice, II, 269

Issachar ben Keifar Barchi, Jewish priest, cursed in Talmud, II, 302

James, brother of Jesus, condemnation of, by Ananus, II, 296

Janus, Roman god, invocations of, II, 207

Jehovah, appearances of, in human form, I, 343-349

Jerome, St., on the Jewish anathema against Christians, II, 308

Jesus, the Christ,
human perfection of, I, 14; II, 186
scourging of, I, 56, 57
breaking of legs of, by soldiers, I, 57
bloody sweat of, I, 59, 60
physical cause of death of, I, 61, 62
watery issue of, I, 60-62
devotion of women to, I, 66
resurrection of, I, 211; II, 368
divinity of, I, 211, 212
celebrates the Paschal feast, I, 220-224
at Gethsemane, I, 224-226
arrest of, I, 225
private examination of, before high priest, I, 238-247
charged with sedition and blasphemy I, 250
annnounces his Messiahship before Sanhedrin, I, 273, 274
Messianic prophecies fulfilled in Him, I, 323-328, 341, 342
miracles of, I, 350-355
at morning session of Sanhedrin, I, 356-362
condemned to death by Sanhedrin, I, 365
His teachings treasonable under Roman law, II, 72
before Pilate, II, 96 _seq._
charged with high treason before Pilate, II, 106, 352
indictment of, before Pilate, II, 107-109
acquitted by Pilate, II, 116
sent by Pilate to Herod, II, 118
before Herod, II, 119 _seq._
mocked, and sent back to Pilate by Herod, II, 127
second appearance of, before Pilate, II, 129 _seq._
delivered to Jews by Pilate, II, 138
mocked by mob, II, 139
tributes of skeptics to, II, 187
Napoleon's tribute to, II, 189, 190
charged by Jews with illegitimacy, II, 356
crucifixion of, II, 365
See also trial of Jesus, Hebrew, and trial of Jesus, Roman

Jesus ben Sie, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II, 298

Jews, the political state of,
at time of Jesus, II, 11-23
discussion of their responsibility for Christ's death, II, 174-180
prejudices against, II, 180-187
distinguished, II, 185, 186

Joazar, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II, 296

Jochanan ben Zakai, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 311

John, St.,
at the sepulcher, I, 37
at the crucifixion of Christ, I, 65

John, St., Gospel of, style of, I, 19

John, Jewish priest, biographical note on, II, 299

Jonathan, son of Annas, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II,
295

Jonathan ben Uziel, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 306

John, son of John, Jewish elder, biographical note on, II, 321

Joseph of Arimathea,
presence of, at trials of Christ, I, 282-286, 364
biographical note on, II, 318
receives body of Jesus from Pilate, II, 366
apocryphal account of escape of, from Jews, II, 367, 373-376

Josephus, Flavius,
on the character of Pilate, I, 21
on scourging I, 56
on the Pharisees, I, 87
on the existence of the great Sanhedrin at time of Christ, I, 176
on the loss, by Jews, of power of life and death, II, 19
on the rapacity of the high priests, II, 301

Jowett, Benjamin, upon the corruption of Rome, II, 240

Judah, the Holy, Jewish rabbi, and the composition of the Mishna, I, 79,
80

Judas, son of Hezekiah, Jewish rebel, put to death by Herod, II, 109

Judas Iscariot, his betrayal of Christ, I, 227-235

Julia, daughter of Augustus,
profligacy of, II, 82
marriages of, II, 83

Julian, Roman emperor, his defiance of Mars, II, 222

Juno, Roman divinity, sacrifices to, II, 208

Jupiter, Roman deity,
multitudinous forms of, II, 203
sacrifices to, II, 208

Justin Martyr, reference of, to "Acts of Pilate," II, 331, 346, 348

Juvenal, Satires of, on Roman social depravity, II, 240, 244, 248

Keim, Theodor,
on the existence of the Great Sanhedrin at the time of Christ, I,
178
on the character of Christ, II, 188, 189

Knight, R. P., on the symbolism of the Cross, II, 65

Koran, the, I, 77

Lamartine, Alphonse, on the death of Christ, II, 3

Lampon, Greek diviner, exposed by Anaxagoras, II, 226

Lardner, on the authenticity of the "Acts of Pilate," II, 328 _seq._

Law, Hebrew Criminal,
administration of, I, 153, 154
basis of, I, 73, 84, 85
burial of bodies after execution under, I, 101, 171
capital punishments under, I, 91-93, 99-101
circumstantial evidence under, I, 144
Cities of Refuge under, I, 96
courts and judges, I, 102-126
execution under, I, 170, 171
false swearing under, I, 93
flagellation under, I, 94
imprisonment under, I, 93
peculiarities of, I, 125, 132, 147, 167, 168
slavery under, I, 95
tenderness of, for human life, I, 154, 155, 310
testimony under, I, 144-147
witnesses under, I, 127-144
written and documentary evidence irrelevant, I, 133, 145

Laws, Roman,
lex Appuleia, II, 69
Cornelia, II, 69
Julia Majestatis, II, 69, 80
Memmia, II, 46
Porcia, II, 54
Remmia, II, 49
Talionis, II, 53
Valeria, II, 37, 54
Varia, II, 69

Lazarus, raising of, from the dead, I, 352

Lectisternia, Roman banquets to the gods,
slaves released at, II, 130
indecencies of, II, 218

Lémann, extract from work of, on Sanhedrin, II, 291

Lepidus, Marcus, Roman patrician, magnificence of, II, 246

Livy,
on scourging, I, 57
account of Bacchanalian orgies, II, 270-283

Longinus, legendary name of soldier who pierced Christ, II, 379

Lucullus, Roman patrician, luxury of, II, 244

Luke, St., occupation of, I, 19

Luke, St., Gospel of, style of, I, 19

Lupercals, Roman priests, II, 204

Luxury of the Romans, II, 244

Lycurgus, code of, II, 241

Macarius, identification of "true cross" by, II, 63

Macaulay, Lord, speech of, on Jewish disabilities, II, 184

Mahomet, character of, I, 14

Malchus, ear of, cut off by Peter, I, 36, 226

Magath, Julius, extract from work of, II, 291

Maimonides,
on Hebrew Capital Crimes, I, 91
on the prohibition of nocturnal trials, I, 255, 256

Manlius, Marcus, trial of, before the Comitia Centuriata, II, 40

Marius, Caius, assassin cowed by, I, 62

Mark, St., Jesus arrested at home of, I, 220

Marriage,
among the Romans, II, 236
among the Greeks, II, 240-243

Marcius, Quintus, Roman consul, motion of, on the suppression of the
Bacchanalian orgies, II, 282

Mars, Roman deity, II, 208

Messiah, the,
prophecies regarding, and their fulfillment in Jesus, I, 322-328
varying expectations of Jews regarding, I, 319-322; II, 110
conception of Pharisees of, II, 324
conception of Sadducees of, II, 325

Matthew, St., occupation of, I, 19

Matthias, son of Annas, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II,
296

Mendelssohn, on the Talmud, I, 75

Messalina, Roman empress, lewdness of, II, 244

Messalinus, Cotta, prosecuted for treason, II, 70

Metrodorus on the Greek gods, II, 226

Mezeray, de, on the bloody sweat of Charles IX, I, 60

Minerva, Roman deity, II, 208

Miracles,
probability of, I, 40-51
Spinoza on, I, 40-43
Renan on, I, 44
of Christ, I, 351-354

Mishna, the,
E. Deutsch on, I, 80
subdivisions of, I, 80
relation of Talmud to, I, 83
traditional view of, I, 84
on capital and pecuniary cases, I, 155, 156. See also Gemara and
Talmud.

Mommsen, Theodor,
on the jurisdiction of native courts of Roman subject peoples, II,
15
on Roman marital looseness, II, 243
on Roman extravagance, II, 247

Montefiore, Sir Moses, anecdote of, II, 180

Mosaic Code, the, a basis of Hebrew Criminal Law, I, 73, 84, 85

Müller, Johannes, explodes legend of Pilate and Lake Lucerne, II, 95

Nachum Halbalar, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 314

Nævius, Marcus, accusation of Scipio Africanus by, II, 41

Napoleon I,
fickleness of populace toward, I, 63, 64
tribute of, to Jesus, II, 189
religious faith of, II, 190, 191

Nasi, prince of the Sanhedrin, I, 112

Nathan, Jewish rabbi, note on, II, 315, note

Neptune, Roman deity, II, 208

Nero, Roman emperor,
deification of, II, 234
Golden House of, II, 246

Ney, Michel, French marshal, compared with St. Peter, I, 64

Nicodemus, Jewish elder,
presence of, at trial of Christ, I, 282-286
defense of Christ before Sanhedrin, I, 305
presence and conduct of, at second trial of Jesus by Sanhedrin, I,
364
biographical note on, II, 319
apocryphal account of pleading of, for Jesus before Pilate, II, 360
Gospel of. See "Acts of Pilate"

Nordau, Max, on Jewish pride in Jesus, II, 188

Oaths, not administered to witnesses, under Jewish law, I, 134

Octavian. See Augustus

Omens, belief of Romans in, II, 215

Onkelos, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 305

Oracle, Delphic, consulted by Romans, II, 210

Osiris, Egyptian deity, the cross a symbol of, II, 66

Ovid, Roman poet, on unnatural practices in temples, II, 269

Paganism, Græco-Roman,
conflict of, with Christianity, I, 16; II, 76-79
Hellenization of Roman religion, II, 199
importation of foreign gods, II, 200
origin and multiplicity of Roman gods, II, 198-204
Roman priesthood, II, 204, 205
Roman forms of worship, II, 205-209
perplexity of worshipers regarding deities, II, 207
prayer, II, 207, 208-210
augury and divination, II, 210-215
omens, II, 215, 216
decay of Roman faith, II, 217-220
Roman skepticism, II, 220-229
sacrilege among Romans, II, 221
disbelief of Romans in immortality, II, 228, 229
Epicureanism among the Romans, II, 229-231
stoicism, II, 231-233
deification of Roman emperors, II, 233-235
base deities of Romans, II, 265
effect of religion in Greek and Roman social corruption, II, 269

Palace of Herod, description of, II, 96, 97

Paley, William, on the discrepancies of the Gospels, I, 32, 33

Pan, Græco-Roman divinity, feasts of, II, 265

Paul, St.,
on the depravity of Rome, II, 284
delivery of, to Felix, II, 299

Pericles, Greek tyrant, and the divination of Lampon, II, 226

Pentateuch, the, a basis of Hebrew jurisprudence, I, 73

Permanent Tribunals (quæstiones perpetuæ), mode of trials before, at
Rome, II, 43-52

Peter, St.,
at the sepulcher, I, 37
compared with Marshal Ney, I, 64
and Malchus, I, 36, 226

Pharisees,
and the Talmud, I, 87
attitude of, toward the law, I, 338
dominant in priestly order, II, 302
their conception of the Messiah, II, 324
characteristics of, II, 324

Philip, St., and the feeding of the five thousand, I, 35

Phillips, Wendell, on Hindu swordsmanship, I, 48

Philo, Jewish philosopher, on the character of Pilate, I, 21; II, 89-91

Phryne, mistress of Praxiteles anecdote of, II, 242

Pilate, Pontius,
powers of, as procurator of Judea, II, 27-31
name and origin of, II, 81, 82
marriage of, II, 82
becomes procurator of Judea, II, 84
provokes the Jews, II, 85
appropriates funds from Corban, II, 86
hangs shields in Herod's palace, II, 88
slays Galileans, II, 88
character of, I, 21; II, 88
canonization of, II, 89
ordered to Rome by Vitellius, II, 92
legends regarding death of, II, 92-94
interrogation of Jesus, II, 112-115
talents of, II, 115
his opinion of Jesus, II, 115
acquits Jesus, II, 116
sends Jesus to Herod, II, 117
reconciled with Herod, II, 128
offers to release Barabbas, II, 130
warned by wife's dream of Jesus, II, 133, 355
washes his hands of Christ's death, II, 137, 364
releases Barabbas, II, 138, 363
summary of his conduct of Christ's trial, II, 168
conduct of, compared with Cæsar, II, 169; with Sir Edward Coke, II,
170-172

Pindar, Greek poet, denunciation of, of vulgar superstitions, II, 224

Plato, Greek philosopher,
unnatural love of, II, 263
reprobation of Homeric myths, II, 264

Pliny, the Younger,
correspondence of, with Trajan, II, 78
disbelief of, in immortality, II, 229
on slavery, II, 203

Plutarch,
on crucifixion, I, 56
anecdotes of Lucullus, II, 244-246

Polybius, on Roman pederasty, II, 263

Pompeia divorced by Cæsar, II, 238

Pompey, Cneius, the Great,
conquest of Palestine by, II, 11
defeated at Pharsalia, II, 25
divorce of his wife Mucia, II, 238

Pontiffs, Roman, II, 204

Poppæa, wife of Nero, deification of, II, 77

Postumius, Spurius, Roman consul, suppression of Bacchanalians by, II,
270-283

Prætor, Roman, judicial powers of, II, 36

Priesthood, Roman. See Roman religion

Priests, Jewish Chamber of. See Sanhedrin

Procurator, Roman, jurisdiction of, II, 27, 28

Provinces, Roman, classification of, by Augustus, II, 27

Quetzalcoatle, crucified Savior, worshiped by Mexicans, II, 66

Rabbi, origin of Jewish title of, II, 315

Rabbis, Jewish, arrogance of, II, 316

Raphall, Morris, on the origin of the Sanhedrin, I, 104

Rawlinson, George, on the political state of Judea at the time of
Christ, II, 11

Religions, policy of Romans toward foreign, and of conquered peoples,
II, 72-74

Renan, Ernest,
on miracles, I, 44-47
on the "judicial ambush" of blasphemers, I, 235
on the character of Pilate, II, 90
on the character of Christ, II, 187, 188

Richard III, King of England, contest of, with Saladin, I, 48

Richter on the pathology of crucifixion, II, 58, 59

Rosadi,
on the confession of the accused under Hebrew law, I, 143
on the hatred of Pilate toward the Jews, II, 98
on the order of criminal trials in Roman provinces, II, 32

Rousseau, Jean Jacques, on the death of Christ, II, 187

Romans,
laws of, the basis of modern jurisprudence, II, 5
policy of, toward subject peoples, II, 13-15
responsibility of, for Christ's death, II, 174-176
religion of. See Paganism

Ruga, Carvilius, first Roman to procure a divorce, II, 236

Sacrifice, human, among the Romans, II, 209

Sadducees,
attitude of, toward the law, I, 338
attitude of, toward anthropomorphism of Pentateuch, I, 338
dominant in the Sanhedrin, I, 339
disbelief of, in immortality, II, 322
wealth and rank of, II, 322

Saladin, Saracen Sultan, contest of, with Richard III, I, 48

Salians, Roman priests, II, 204

Sallust, Roman historian, on the conspiracy of Cataline, II, 229

Salvador, Joseph, on the existence of the Great Sanhedrin at the time of
Christ, I, 177

Samuel, Hakaton, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 307

Sanctuary, right of, among ancient peoples, I, 96

Sanhedrin, the Great,
origin of, I, 103
history of, I, 104
organization of, I, 105
chamber of scribes, I, 105; II, 303
chamber of elders, I, 105; II, 318
chamber of priests, I, 105; II, 292
qualifications of members of, I, 106
disqualifications of judges of, I, 109
officers of, I, 112
compensation of officers of, I, 115
sessions of, I, 116
recruitment of personnel of, I, 117
quorum of, I, 119
jurisdiction of, I, 119
appeals to, from minor Sanhedrins, I, 120
morning sacrifice of, I, 157
assembling of judges of, I, 158
scribes of, I, 158, 159
examination of witnesses by, I, 159-162
debates and balloting of judges of, I, 162
procedure of, in cases of condemnation of accused, I, 165-167
method of counting votes, I, 167, 168
death march of, I, 169, 170
question of existence of, at time of Christ, I, 175-181
jurisdiction of, in capital cases at the time of Christ, I, 181-183
discussion of trial of Christ before, I, 183-186
procedure of, in trial of Christ before, I, 186
illegality of proceedings of, against Christ, I, 255-259, 260-262,
263-266, 267-270, 287-294
illegality of sentence of, against Christ, I, 271-278, 279-286
disqualifications of members of, who condemned Christ, I, 296-308
morning session of, at trial of Christ, I, 356-364
three sessions of, to discuss Christ, I, 305, 306
authority of, after Roman conquest, II, 12, 16, 21
deprived by Romans of power of capital punishment, II, 19, 20
biographical sketches of members of, who tried Jesus, II, 291-326

Sanhedrins, minor,
appeals from, to Great Sanhedrin, I, 120
establishment of, I, 121
jurisdiction of, I, 121
superior rank of those of Jerusalem, I, 123, 124

Saul, Abba, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 313

Savonarola, Girolamo, Florentine reformer, burning of, I, 63

Scaurus, Manercus, prosecuted for treason, II, 70

Sceva, Jewish priest, biographical note on, II, 300

Schenck, account of, of the bloody sweat of a nun, I, 59

Schürer,
on the existence of the Sanhedrin at the time of Christ, I, 176
on the jurisdiction of the Sanhedrin, II, 18
on the administration of civil law by Sanhedrin, II, 30

Scipio Africanus, trial of, before Comitia Centuriata, II, 41

Scott, Sir Walter, on the contest between Richard III and Saladin, I,
47, 48

Scourging,
of Jesus, I, 56
mode of, among Romans, II, 55

Scribes, Jewish, Edersheim on, I, 302

Scribes, Jewish Chamber of. See Sanhedrin

Segnensis, Henricus, anecdote of, illustrative of mediæval ignorance
regarding Talmud, II, 74

Semiramis, Assyrian queen, origin of crucifixion imputed to, II, 54

Seneca,
anecdote from, regarding political informers, II, 71
on the patriotic observance of the national religion, II, 226
on suicide, II, 232
on slavery, II, 252
on Roman myths, II, 265

Septuagint, version of the Bible, paraphrasing of anthropomorphic
passages in, I, 237

Sepulture, of crucified criminals forbidden, II, 58

Serapis, Egyptian deity,
images of thrown down, II, 73
Marcus Aurelius an adorer of, II, 217

Servilia, mistress of Julius Cæsar, II, 239

Shammai, School of,
and the Mishna, I, 79
dissensions of, with School of Hillel, II, 309

Shevuah ben Kalba, Jewish elder, biographical note on, II, 319

Shoterim of the Sanhedrin, I, 113

Sibylline Books, II, 199, 204

Sibyl, Erythræan, Virgil inspired by, II, 287

Simon, Jewish rebel, revolt of, II, 110

Simon, Jewish elder, biographical note on, II, 320

Simon Boethus, made high priest by Herod I, II, 296

Simon ben Camithus, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II, 298

Simon Cantharus, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II, 297

Simon, son of Gamaliel, Jewish elder, biographical note on, II, 305

Simon Hamizpah, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 314

Sinaitic MS. of the Bible, I, 67

Slavery,
under Hebrew law, I, 95
account of, among Romans, II, 250, 251

Social life, Græco-Roman,
marriage and divorce, II, 236-240
prostitution, II, 242-244
luxury and extravagance, II, 244-249
poverty of Roman masses, II, 249
slavery, II, 249-253
infanticide, II, 254
gladiatorial games, II, 255-262
depravity of, traceable to corrupt myths, II, 262-270
practice of Bacchanalian rites, II, 270-283
hopeless state of, at time of Christ, II, 284-287

Socrates, Greek philosopher,
resemblance of charges against, to those against Jesus, II, 181
counsel of, to Hetairai, II, 243

Sodomy, prevalence of,
among Greeks and Romans, II, 262-264
practiced in Roman temples, II, 269

Solomon ben Joseph, Jewish rabbi, on the Talmud, I, 90

Sonnenthal, Adolf von, Jewish actor, refused freedom of Vienna, II, 182

Sparta, licentiousness of, II, 241

Spartacus, Roman gladiator, revolt of, II, 259, 260

Spartans, marital looseness of, II, 241

Spinoza, Jewish philosopher, on miracles, I, 40-44

Standards, apocryphal miracle of, at trial of Christ, II, 354 _seq._

Starkie on the credibility of testimony, I, 12

Stephen, St., stoning of, I, 365

Stephen, Sir James F. J.,
on the Roman treatment of Christianity, II, 76
on Pilate's trial of Jesus, II, 159-164

Stoicism,
among the Romans, II, 231
resemblance of, to Christian precepts, II, 331

Stoning of criminals under Hebrew law, I, 92, 99

Strangling of criminals under Hebrew law, I, 91, 99

Strauss, David,
on the behavior of Jesus before Herod, II, 126
on the character of Christ, II, 187

Stroud on the physical cause of death of Christ, I, 61, 62

Suetonius, Roman historian,
on the labeling of criminals before execution, I, 57
on divination, II, 213
narrative of, of dreams presaging reign of Augustus, II, 214
account of, of belief of Augustus in omens, II, 215

Suicide, attitude of Stoics toward, II, 232

Suspension, death by, II, 61, 62

Sweat, bloody, historical instances of, I, 59, 60

Tacitus, Roman historian, on slavery, II, 253

Talmud, the,
definition of, I, 74
recensions of, I, 81
contents of, I, 82
relation of Mishna to, I, 83, to Gemara, I, 83; to Pentateuch, I,
83; to Mosaic Code, I, 84, 85
efforts of Christians to extirpate, I, 87, 88
message and mission of, I, 89
See also Gemara and Mishna

Telemachus, St., death of, in arena, II, 261

Temples, a resort of immorality in Rome, II, 269

Tertullian, Latin father,
on the character of Pilate, II, 89
on the resort of vice to temple precincts, II, 269
reference of, to the "Acts of Pilate," II, 329, 333 _seq._, 347, 348

Tertullus, his prosecution of Paul, II, 299

Testimony, under Hebrew Criminal Law,
of each witness required to cover entire case, I, 132
vain, I, 145
standing, I, 146
adequate, I, 147
of accomplices, I, 228-230, 235, 236

Theodota, the courtesan, counseled by Socrates, II, 243

Theophilus, son of Annas, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II,
296

Theresa, Maria, Austrian empress, codex of, II, 54

Three, Jewish Courts of, jurisdiction of, I, 124

Tiberius Cæsar, Roman emperor,
sway of, II, 27
character of, II, 70
prosecutions of, for treason, II, 70, 71
marriage of, to Julia, II, 83
legendary desire of, to deify Christ, II, 329, 330 _seq._

Tischendorf, Constantine, on the authenticity of the "Acts of
Pilate," II, 345 _seq._

Tissot, account of, of the bloody sweat of a sailor, I, 59

Trajan, Roman emperor, correspondence of, with Pliny, II, 78

Trials, Roman criminal,
right of appeal, II, 28
during the regal period, II, 35
Roman, mode of, in the Comitia Centuriata, II, 37-43
mode of, in the Permanent Tribunals, II, 43-52
prosecutor, rôle and selection of, II, 43, 44, 49

Trial of Jesus, Hebrew,
nature of charge against Jesus before Sanhedrin, I, 187
procedure of, before Sanhedrin, I, 188
discussion of charge of blasphemy against Jesus, I, 193-209
illegality of arrest of Jesus, I, 219-237
illegality of private examination of Jesus before high priest, I,
238-247
illegality of indictment of Jesus, I, 248-254
illegality of nocturnal proceedings against Jesus, I, 255-259
illegality of the meeting of the Sanhedrin before morning sacrifice,
I, 260-262
illegality of proceedings against Christ, because held on the eve
of the Sabbath, and of a feast, I, 263-266
illegality of trial, because concluded in one day, I, 267-270
condemnation of Jesus founded on uncorroborated evidence, I, 271-278
Jesus illegally condemned by unanimous verdict, I, 279-286
condemnation of Jesus pronounced in place forbidden by law, I, 288-292
irregular balloting of judges of Jesus, I, 292-294
condemnation of Jesus illegal, because of unlawful conduct of high
priest, I, 290, 291
disqualifications of judges of Jesus, I, 296-308
Jesus condemned without defense, I, 309
second trial of Jesus by Sanhedrin, I, 356-366

Trial of Jesus, Roman,
discussion of Roman and Hebrew jurisdiction, II, 3-23
Roman law applicable to, II, 68-80
as conducted by Pilate, II, 96-118, 129-139
legal analysis of, II, 141-168

Tribune, Roman, judicial powers of, II, 36

Tryphon, son of Theudion, Jewish elder; biographical note on, II, 321

Twelve Tables, laws of the, II, 53, 208

Ulpian, Roman jurist, his definition of treason, II, 69

Vatican, MS. of the Bible, I, 67

Venus, Roman deity,
sacrifices to, II, 208
impersonated by Phryne, II, 243
worshiped by harlots, II, 266

Veronica, St., legend of, II, 93

Vestals, Roman priestesses,
guardians of sacred fire, II, 204
spectators at licentious dramas, II, 267

Vinicius, Lucius, Roman patrician, letter of Augustus to, II, 83

Virgil, poem of, on advent of heaven-born child, I, 321; II, 287

Virginia, legend of, II, 236

Vitellius, legate of Syria,
spares Jewish prejudices, II, 85
orders Pilate to Rome, II, 92

Vitia, Roman matron, executed for treason, II, 71

Voltaire, François de,
account of, of the bloody sweat of Charles IX, I, 59
on character of Christ, II, 187

Vulgate, version of the Bible, I, 68

Witnesses, under Hebrew Criminal Law,
competency and incompetency of, I, 127-129
number of, required to convict, I, 129
agreement of, I, 131
adjuration to, I, 134
examination of, I, 136, 138
false, I, 140
the accused as, I, 141
separation of, I, 137

Wise, Rabbi,
on the non-existence of the Great Sanhedrin at time of Christ, I,
175, 179
on the "martyrdom of Jesus," I, 330

Xenophanes, ridicule of, of Greek religion, II, 224

Zadok, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 310

Zeno, Greek philosopher, originator of Stoicism, II, 229

Zeus, Greek divinity,
character of, I, 14
myth of rape of Ganymede by, II, 262

Corrections

The first line indicates the original, the second the correction:

p. 24: in the life and minstry
in the life and ministry

p. 189: that he flattered
that He flattered

God could be worshiped in any other place as well as in his
God could be worshiped in any other place as well as in His

p. 206: that he was "the Christ, the Son of God"
that He was "the Christ, the Son of God"

Index:

Dysmas, legendary name of one of thieves crucified with Jesus, II, 364
Dysmas, legendary name of one of the thieves crucified with Jesus, II,
364

Derembourg, Joseph, on the Jewish priestly families, II, 294
Dérembourg, Joseph, on the Jewish priestly families, II, 294

Lemann, extract from work of, on Sanhedrin, II, 291
Lémann, extract from work of, on Sanhedrin, II, 291

Scipio Africanus, trial of, before Comitia Centuriata
Scipio Africanus, trial of, before Comitia Centuriata, II, 41

Footnote 135: sont fatales a la liberté.
sont fatales à la liberté.

*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Trial of Jesus from a Lawyer's Standpoint, Vol. I (of II) - The Hebrew Trial" ***

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