By Author [ A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z |  Other Symbols ]
  By Title [ A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z |  Other Symbols ]
  By Language
all Classics books content using ISYS

Download this book: [ ASCII | HTML | PDF ]

Look for this book on Amazon

We have new books nearly every day.
If you would like a news letter once a week or once a month
fill out this form and we will give you a summary of the books for that week or month by email.

Title: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, Volume 16, Slice 8 - "Logarithm" to "Lord Advocate"
Author: Various
Language: English
As this book started as an ASCII text book there are no pictures available.
Copyright Status: Not copyrighted in the United States. If you live elsewhere check the laws of your country before downloading this ebook. See comments about copyright issues at end of book.

*** Start of this Doctrine Publishing Corporation Digital Book "Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, Volume 16, Slice 8 - "Logarithm" to "Lord Advocate"" ***

This book is indexed by ISYS Web Indexing system to allow the reader find any word or number within the document.

Transcriber's notes:

(1) Numbers following letters (without space) like C2 were originally
      printed in subscript. Letter subscripts are preceded by an
      underscore, like C_n.

(2) Characters following a carat (^) were printed in superscript.

(3) Side-notes were relocated to function as titles of their respective

(4) Macrons and breves above letters and dots below letters were not

(5) [root] stands for the root symbol; [alpha], [beta], etc. for greek

(6) The following typographical errors have been corrected:

    ARTICLE LOGARITHM: "... tangents and secants for every minute of
      the quadrant to 10 places; these were obtained by calculating the
      logarithms of the natural sines, &c. given in the Thesaurus
      mathematicus of Pitiscus (1613)." 'these' amended from 'there'.

    ARTICLE LOGARITHM: "The final step was made by John Newton in his
      Trigonometria Britannica (1658) ..." 'Trigonometria' amended from

    ARTICLE LOGIC: "S is not P." 'P' amended from 'M'.

    ARTICLE LOGIC: "... Jevons proceeded to confuse analytic deduction
      from consequence to ground with hypothetical deduction from ground
      to consequence under the common term 'inverse deduction.'"
      'consequence' amended from 'conseguence'.

    ARTICLE LOGIC: "But in induction the given particulars are the
      evidence by which we discover the universal, e.g. particular
      magnets attracting iron are the origin of an inference that all do
      ..." 'attracting' amended from 'attracing'.

    ARTICLE LOGIC: "... but which is to other regards deductive as
      syllogism, is set up in contrast to syllogism 906 and enumeration
      alike." 'contrast' amended from 'constrast'

    ARTICLE LOGIC: "67a 39-63." '-63'-63' amended from '-b 3'.

    ARTICLE LOIRE: "Owing to the extreme irregularity of the river in
      different seasons these canals form the only certain navigable
      way." 'extreme' amended from 'exteme'.

    ARTICLE LOLLARDS: "He summed up their doctrines under eleven heads:
      they condemn the having and using of images in the churches ..."
      added 'of'.

    ARTICLE LOMBARDY: "G. T. Rivoira in Origini dell' Architettura
      Lombarda (2 vols. Rome, 1901-1907) ..." 'Architettura' amended from

    ARTICLE LONDONDERRY: "The scenery of the Roe valley, with the
      picturesque towns of Limavady and Dungiven, is also attractive, and
      the roads from the latter place to Draperstown and to Maghera ..."
      'attractive' amended from 'atrractive'.

    ARTICLE LONGOMONTANUS: "... Problemata duo Geometrica (1638) ..."
      'Geometrica' amended from 'Goemetrica'.

    ARTICLE LOOM: "... and, as appears from Grew (Mus. Reg. Soc. p.
      69), it was formerly given to the little grebe or dabchick (P.
      fluviatilis or minor)." 'as' amended from 'ns'.



              ELEVENTH EDITION


         Logarithm to Lord Advocate


  LOGARITHM                         LONG, JOHN DAVIS
  LOGIA                             LONGCLOTH
  LOGIC                             LONG EATON
  LOGOS                             LONG FIVES
  LOGOTHETE                         LONGFORD (county of Ireland)
  LOGROÑO (province of Spain)       LONGFORD (town of Ireland)
  LOGROÑO (Spanish town)            LONGHI, PIETRO
  LOGWOOD                           LONG ISLAND
  LOHARU                            LONG ISLAND CITY
  LOHENGRIN                         LONGLEY, CHARLES THOMAS
  LOIN                              LONGMANS
  LOIRE (department of France)      LONGSTREET, JAMES
  LOIRET                            LONGUEVILLE
  LOJA                              LONGWY
  LOKEREN                           LÖNNROT, ELIAS
  LOKOJA                            LONSDALE, EARLS OF
  LOLLARDS                          LONSDALE, WILLIAM
  LOLOS                             LOO
  LOMBARD LEAGUE                    LOOE
  LOMBARDO                          LOOM (water-birds)
  LOMBARDS                          LOOM (weaving machine)
  LOMBARDY                          LOÓN
  LOMBOK                            LOOP
  LOMOND, LOCH                      LOPES, FERNÃO
  LOMZA (government of Russian)     LOPEZ DE GÓMARA, FRANCISCO
  LOMZA (town of Russia)            LOP-NOR
  LONAULI                           LOQUAT
  LONDON (Canada)                   LORAIN
  LONDON (capital of England)       LORALAI
  LONDON CLAY                       LORCA
  LONDONDERRY, EARLS OF             LORCH (Prussian town)
  LONDONDERRY, STEWART (VANE)       LORCH (town of kingdom of Württemberg)
  LONDONDERRY (county of Ireland)   LORD
  LONDONDERRY (town of Ireland)     LORD ADVOCATE

LOGARITHM (from Gr. [Greek: logos], word, ratio, and [Greek: arithmos],
number), in mathematics, a word invented by John Napier to denote a
particular class of function discovered by him, and which may be defined
as follows: if a, x, m are any three quantities satisfying the equation
a^x = m, then a is called the base, and x is said to be the logarithm of
m to the base a. This relation between x, a, m, may be expressed also by
the equation x = log(a) m.

_Properties._--The principal properties of logarithms are given by the

  log(a) (mn) = log(a)m + log(a)n,   log(a)(m/n) = log(a)m - log(a)n,
  log(a)m^(r) = r log(a)m,           log(a)[root r]m = (1/r)log(a)m,

which may be readily deduced from the definition of a logarithm. It
follows from these equations that the logarithm of the product of any
number of quantities is equal to the sum of the logarithms of the
quantities, that the logarithm of the quotient of two quantities is
equal to the logarithm of the numerator diminished by the logarithm of
the denominator, that the logarithm of the rth power of a quantity is
equal to r times the logarithm of the quantity, and that the logarithm
of the rth root of a quantity is equal to (1/r)th of the logarithm of
the quantity.

Logarithms were originally invented for the sake of abbreviating
arithmetical calculations, as by their means the operations of
multiplication and division may be replaced by those of addition and
subtraction, and the operations of raising to powers and extraction of
roots by those of multiplication and division. For the purpose of thus
simplifying the operations of arithmetic, the base is taken to be 10,
and use is made of tables of logarithms in which the values of x, the
logarithm, corresponding to values of m, the number, are tabulated. The
logarithm is also a function of frequent occurrence in analysis, being
regarded as a known and recognized function like sin x or tan x; but in
mathematical investigations the base generally employed is not 10, but a
certain quantity usually denoted by the letter e, of value 2.71828

Thus in arithmetical calculations if the base is not expressed it is
understood to be 10, so that log m denotes log10 m; but in analytical
formulae it is understood to be e.

The logarithms to base 10 of the first twelve numbers to 7 places of
decimals are

  log 1 = 0.0000000    log 5 = 0.6989700     log 9 = 0.9542425
  log 2 = 0.3010300    log 6 = 0.7781513    log 10 = 1.0000000
  log 3 = 0.4771213    log 7 = 0.8450980    log 11 = 1.0413927
  log 4 = 0.6020600    log 8 = 0.9030900    log 12 = 1.0791812

The meaning of these results is that

   1 = 10^0,     2 = 10^(0.3010300),     3 = 10^(0.4771213), ...
  10 = 10^1,    11 = 10^(1.0413927),    12 = 10^(1.0791812).

The integral part of a logarithm is called the index or characteristic,
and the fractional part the mantissa. When the base is 10, the
logarithms of all numbers in which the digits are the same, no matter
where the decimal point may be, have the same mantissa; thus, for

  log 2.5613 = 0.4084604,    log 25.613 = 1.4084604,    log 2561300 =
  6.4084604, &c.

In the case of fractional numbers (i.e. numbers in which the integral
part is 0) the mantissa is still kept positive, so that, for example,
               _                         _
  log .25613 = 1.4084604, log .0025613 = 3.4084604, &c.

the minus sign being usually written over the characteristic, and not
before it, to indicate that the characteristic only, and not the whole
expression, is negative; thus
  1.4084604 stands for -1 + .4084604.

The fact that when the base is 10 the mantissa of the logarithm is
independent of the position of the decimal point in the number affords
the chief reason for the choice of 10 as base. The explanation of this
property of the base 10 is evident, for a change in the position of the
decimal points amounts to multiplication or division by some power of
10, and this corresponds to the addition or subtraction of some integer
in the case of the logarithm, the mantissa therefore remaining intact.
It should be mentioned that in most tables of trigonometrical
functions, the number 10 is added to all the logarithms in the table in
order to avoid the use of negative characteristics, so that the
characteristic 9 denotes in reality ~1, 8 denotes ~2, 10 denotes 0, &c.
Logarithms thus increased are frequently referred to for the sake of
distinction as _tabular logarithms_, so that the tabular logarithm = the
true logarithm + 10.

In tables of logarithms of numbers to base 10 the mantissa only is in
general tabulated, as the characteristic of the logarithm of a number
can always be written down at sight, the rule being that, if the number
is greater than unity, the characteristic is less by unity than the
number of digits in the integral portion of it, and that if the number
is less than unity the characteristic is negative, and is greater by
unity than the number of ciphers between the decimal point and the first
significant figure.

It follows very simply from the definition of a logarithm that

  log(a) b × log(b) a = 1, log(b) m = log(a) m × (1/log(a) b).

The second of these relations is an important one, as it shows that from
a table of logarithms to base a, the corresponding table of logarithms
to base b may be deduced by multiplying all the logarithms in the former
by the constant multiplier 1/log(a)b, which is called the _modulus_ of
the system whose base is b with respect to the system whose base is a.

The two systems of logarithms for which extensive tables have been
calculated are the Napierian, or hyperbolic, or natural system, of which
the base is e, and the Briggian, or decimal, or common system, of which
the base is 10; and we see that the logarithms in the latter system may
be deduced from those in the former by multiplication by the constant
multiplier 1/log(e)10, which is called the modulus of the common system
of logarithms. The numerical value of this modulus is 0.43429 44819
03251 82765 11289 ..., and the value of its reciprocal, log^(e) 10 (by
multiplication by which Briggian logarithms may be converted into
Napierian logarithms) is 2.30258 50929 94045 68401 79914 ....

The quantity denoted by e is the series,

       1     1      1        1
  1 + --- + --- + ----- + ------- + ...
       1    1·2   1·2·3   1·2·3·4

the numerical value of which is,

  2.71828 18284 59045 23536 02874 ....

  _The logarithmic Function._--The mathematical function log x or log(e)
  x is one of the small group of transcendental functions, consisting
  only of the circular functions (direct and inverse) sin x, cos x, &c.,
  arc sin x or sin^{-1} x,&c., log x and e^(x) which are universally
  treated in analysis as known functions. The notation log x is
  generally employed in English and American works, but on the continent
  of Europe writers usually denote the function by lx or lg x. The
  logarithmic function is most naturally introduced into analysis by the
     / x        dt
     |  log x = ---, (x > 0).
    _/ 1         t

  This equation defines log x for positive values of x; if x <= 0 the
  formula ceases to have any meaning. Thus log x is the integral
  function of 1/x, and it can be shown that log x is a genuinely new
  transcendent, not expressible in finite terms by means of functions
  such as algebraical or circular functions. A connexion with the
  circular functions, however, appears later when the definition of log
  x is extended to complex values of x.

  A relation which is of historical interest connects the logarithmic
  function with the quadrature of the hyperbola, for, by considering the
  equation of the hyperbola in the form xy = const., it is evident that
  the area included between the arc of a hyperbola, its nearest
  asymptote, and two ordinates drawn parallel to the other asymptote
  from points on the first asymptote distant a and b from their point of
  intersection, is proportional to log b/a.

  The following fundamental properties of log x are readily deducible
  from the definition

  (i.) log xy = log x + log y.

  (ii.) Limit of (x^(h)-1)/h = log x, when h is indefinitely diminished.

  Either of these properties might be taken as itself the definition of
  log x.

  There is no series for log x proceeding either by ascending or
  descending powers of x, but there is an expansion for log (1 + x),

    log (1 + x) = x - 1/2 x^2 + 1/3 x^3 - 1/4 x^4 + ...;

  the series, however, is convergent for real values of x only when x
  lies between +1 and -1. Other formulae which are deducible from this
  equation are given in the portion of this article relating to the
  calculation of logarithms.

  The function log x as x increases from 0 towards [oo] steadily
  increases from -[oo] towards +[oo]. It has the important property that
  it tends to infinity with x, but more slowly than any power of x, i.e.
  that x^{-m} log x tends to zero as x tends to [oo] for every positive
  value of m however small.

  The _exponential function_, exp x, may be defined as the inverse of
  the logarithm: thus x = exp y if y = log x. It is positive for all
  values of y and increases steadily from 0 toward [oo] as y increases
  from -[oo] towards +[oo]. As y tends towards [oo], exp y tends towards
  [oo] more rapidly than any power of y.

  The exponential function possesses the properties

    (i.) exp (x + y) = exp x × exp y.

    (ii.) --- exp x = exp x.

    (iii.) exp x = 1 +x + x²/2! + x³/3! + ...

  From (i.) and (ii.) it may be deduced that

    exp x = (1 + 1 + 1/2! + 1/3! + ... )^x

  where the right-hand side denotes the positive xth power of the number
  1 + 1 + 1/2! + 1/3! + ... usually denoted by e. It is customary,
  therefore, to denote the exponential function by e^x and the result

    e^x = 1 + x + x²/2! + x³/3! ...

  is known as the _exponential theorem_.

  The definitions of the logarithmic and exponential functions may be
  extended to complex values of x. Thus if x = [xi] + i[eta]
            / x dt
    log x = |   ---
           _/ 1  t

  where the path of integration in the plane of the complex variable t
  is any curve which does not pass through the origin; but now log x is
  not a uniform function, that is to say, if x describes a closed curve
  it does not follow that log x also describes a closed curve: in fact
  we have

    log ([xi] + i[eta]) = log [root]([xi]² + [eta]²) + i([alpha] + 2n[pi]),

  where [alpha] is the numerically least angle whose cosine and sine are
  [xi]/[root]([xi]² + [eta]²) and [eta]/[root]([xi]² + [eta]²), and n
  denotes any integer. Thus even when the argument is real log x has an
  infinite number of values; for putting [eta] = 0 and taking [xi]
  positive, in which case [alpha] = 0, we obtain for log [xi] the
  infinite system of values log [xi] + 2n[pi]i. It follows from this
  property of the function that we cannot have for log x a series which
  shall be convergent for all values of x, as is the case with sin x and
  cos x, for such a series could only represent a uniform function, and
  in fact the equation

    log(1 + x) = x - ½x^2 + {1/3}x^3 - ¼x^4 + ...

  is true only when the analytical modulus of x is less than unity. The
  exponential function, which may still be defined as the inverse of the
  logarithmic function, is, on the other hand, a uniform function of x,
  and its fundamental properties may be stated in the same form as for
  real values of x. Also

    exp ([xi] - i[eta]) = e^{[xi]}(cos [eta] + i sin [eta]).

  An alternative method of developing the theory of the exponential
  function is to start from the definition

    exp x = 1 + x + x²/2! + x³/3! + ...,

  the series on the right-hand being convergent for all values of x and
  therefore defining an analytical function of x which is uniform and
  regular all over the plane.

_Invention and Early History of Logarithms._--The invention of
logarithms has been accorded to John Napier, baron of Merchiston in
Scotland, with a unanimity which is rare with regard to important
scientific discoveries: in fact, with the exception of the tables of
Justus Byrgius, which will be referred to further on, there seems to
have been no other mathematician of the time whose mind had conceived
the principle on which logarithms depend, and no partial anticipations
of the discovery are met with in previous writers.

The first announcement of the invention was made in Napier's _Mirifici
Logarithmorum Canonis Descriptio ..._ (Edinburgh, 1614). The work is a
small quarto containing fifty-seven pages of explanatory matter and a
table of ninety pages (see NAPIER, JOHN). The nature of logarithms is
explained by reference to the motion of points in a straight line, and
the principle upon which they are based is that of the correspondence of
a geometrical and an arithmetical series of numbers. The table gives the
logarithms of sines for every minute of seven figures; it is arranged
semi-quadrantally, so that the _differentiae_, which are the differences
of the two logarithms in the same line, are the logarithms of the
tangents. Napier's logarithms are not the logarithms now termed
Napierian or hyperbolic, that is to say, logarithms to the base e where
e = 2.7182818...; the relation between N (a sine) and L its logarithm,
as defined in the _Canonis Descriptio_, being N = 10^7e^{-L/(l0^7)}, so
that (ignoring the factors 10^7, the effect of which is to render sines
and logarithms integral to 7 figures), the base is e^{-l}. Napier's
logarithms decrease as the sines increase. If l denotes the logarithm to
base e (that is, the so-called "Napierian" or hyperbolic logarithm) and
L denotes, as above, "Napier's" logarithm, the connexion between l and L
is expressed by

  L = 10^7 log(e) 10^7 - 10^7 l or e^(l) = 10^7 e^(-L/10^7)

Napier's work (which will henceforth in this article be referred to as
the _Descriptio_) immediately on its appearance in 1614 attracted the
attention of perhaps the two most eminent English mathematicians then
living--Edward Wright and Henry Briggs. The former translated the work
into English; the latter was concerned with Napier in the change of the
logarithms from those originally invented to decimal or common
logarithms, and it is to him that the original calculation of the
logarithmic tables now in use is mainly due. Both Napier and Wright died
soon after the publication of the _Descriptio_, the date of Wright's
death being 1615 and that of Napier 1617, but Briggs lived until 1631.
Edward Wright, who was a fellow of Caius College, Cambridge, occupies a
conspicuous place in the history of navigation. In 1599 he published
_Certaine errors in Navigation detected and corrected_, and he was the
author of other works; to him also is chiefly due the invention of the
method known as Mercator's sailing. He at once saw the value of
logarithms as an aid to navigation, and lost no time in preparing a
translation, which he submitted to Napier himself. The preface to
Wright's edition consists of a translation of the preface to the
_Descriptio_, together with the addition of the following sentences
written by Napier himself: "But now some of our countreymen in this
Island well affected to these studies, and the more publique good,
procured a most learned Mathematician to translate the same into our
vulgar English tongue, who after he had finished it, sent the Coppy of
it to me, to bee seene and considered on by myselfe. I having most
willingly and gladly done the same, finde it to bee most exact and
precisely conformable to my minde and the originall. Therefore it may
please you who are inclined to these studies, to receive it from me and
the Translator, with as much good will as we recommend it unto you."
There is a short "preface to the reader" by Briggs, and a description of
a triangular diagram invented by Wright for finding the proportional
parts. The table is printed to one figure less than in the _Descriptio_.
Edward Wright died, as has been mentioned, in 1615, and his son, Samuel
Wright, in the preface states that his father "gave much commendation of
this work (and often in my hearing) as of very great use to mariners";
and with respect to the translation he says that "shortly after he had
it returned out of Scotland, it pleased God to call him away afore he
could publish it." The translation was published in 1616. It was also
reissued with a new title-page in 1618.

Henry Briggs, then professor of geometry at Gresham College, London, and
afterwards Savilian professor of geometry at Oxford, welcomed the
_Descriptio_ with enthusiasm. In a letter to Archbishop Usher, dated
Gresham House, March 10, 1615, he wrote, "Napper, lord of Markinston,
hath set my head and hands a work with his new and admirable logarithms.
I hope to see him this summer, if it please God, for I never saw book
which pleased me better, or made me more wonder.[1] I purpose to
discourse with him concerning eclipses, for what is there which we may
not hope for at his hands," and he also states "that he was wholly taken
up and employed about the noble invention of logarithms lately
discovered." Briggs accordingly visited Napier in 1615, and stayed with
him a whole month.[2] He brought with him some calculations he had
made, and suggested to Napier the advantages that would result from the
choice of 10 as a base, an improvement which he had explained in his
lectures at Gresham College, and on which he had written to Napier.
Napier said that he had already thought of the change, and pointed out a
further improvement, viz., that the characteristics of numbers greater
than unity should be positive and not negative, as suggested by Briggs.
In 1616 Briggs again visited Napier and showed him the work he had
accomplished, and, he says, he would gladly have paid him a third visit
in 1617 had Napier's life been spared.

Briggs's _Logarithmorum chilias prima_, which contains the first
published table of decimal or common logarithms, is only a small octavo
tract of sixteen pages, and gives the logarithms of numbers from unity
to 1000 to 14 places of decimals. It was published, probably privately,
in 1617, after Napier's death,[3] and there is no author's name, place
or date. The date of publication is, however, fixed as 1617 by a letter
from Sir Henry Bourchier to Usher, dated December 6, 1617, containing
the passage--"Our kind friend, Mr Briggs, hath lately published a
supplement to the most excellent tables of logarithms, which I presume
he has sent to you." Briggs's tract of 1617 is extremely rare, and has
generally been ignored or incorrectly described. Hutton erroneously
states that it contains the logarithms to 8 places, and his account has
been followed by most writers. There is a copy in the British Museum.

Briggs continued to labour assiduously at the calculation of logarithms,
and in 1624 published his _Arithmetica logarithmica_, a folio work
containing the logarithms of the numbers from l to 20,000, and from
90,000 to 100,000 (and in some copies to 101,000) to 14 places of
decimals. The table occupies 300 pages, and there is an introduction of
88 pages relating to the mode of calculation, and the applications of

There was thus left a gap between 20,000 and 90,000, which was filled up
by Adrian Vlacq (or Ulaccus), who published at Gouda, in Holland, in
1628, a table containing the logarithms of the numbers from unity to
100,000 to 10 places of decimals. Having calculated 70,000 logarithms
and copied only 30,000, Vlacq would have been quite entitled to have
called his a new work. He designates it, however, only a second edition
of Briggs's _Arithmetica logarithmica_, the title running _Arithmetica
logarithmica sive Logarithmorum Chiliades centum, ... editio secunda
aucta per Adrianum Vlacq, Goudanum_. This table of Vlacq's was
published, with an English explanation prefixed, at London in 1631 under
the title _Logarithmicall Arithmetike ... London, printed by George
Miller_, 1631. There are also copies with the title-page and
introduction in French and in Dutch (Gouda, 1628).

Briggs had himself been engaged in filling up the gap, and in a letter
to John Pell, written after the publication of Vlacq's work, and dated
October 25, 1628, he says:--

  "My desire was to have those chiliades that are wantinge betwixt 20
  and 90 calculated and printed, and I had done them all almost by my
  selfe, and by some frendes whom my rules had sufficiently informed,
  and by agreement the busines was conveniently parted amongst us; but I
  am eased of that charge and care by one Adrian Vlacque, an Hollander,
  who hathe done all the whole hundred chiliades and printed them in
  Latin, Dutche and Frenche, 1000 bookes in these 3 languages, and hathe
  sould them almost all. But he hathe cutt off 4 of my figures
  throughout; and hathe left out my dedication, and to the reader, and
  two chapters the 12 and 13, in the rest he hath not varied from me at

The original calculation of the logarithms of numbers from unity to
101,000 was thus performed by Briggs and Vlacq between 1615 and 1628.
Vlacq's table is that from which all the hundreds of tables of
logarithms that have subsequently appeared have been derived. It
contains of course many errors, which were gradually discovered and
corrected in the course of the next two hundred and fifty years.

The first calculation or publication of Briggian or common logarithms of
trigonometrical functions was made in 1620 by Edmund Gunter, who was
Briggs's colleague as professor of astronomy in Gresham College. The
title of Gunter's book, which is very scarce, is _Canon triangulorum_,
and it contains logarithmic sines and tangents for every minute of the
quadrant to 7 places of decimals.

The next publication was due to Vlacq, who appended to his logarithms of
numbers in the _Arithmetica logarithmica_ of 1628 a table giving log
sines, tangents and secants for every minute of the quadrant to 10
places; these were obtained by calculating the logarithms of the natural
sines, &c. given in the _Thesaurus mathematicus_ of Pitiscus (1613).

During the last years of his life Briggs devoted himself to the
calculation of logarithmic sines, &c. and at the time of his death in
1631 he had all but completed a logarithmic canon to every hundredth of
a degree. This work was published by Vlacq at his own expense at Gouda
in 1633, under the title _Trigonometria Britannica_. It contains log
sines (to 14 places) and tangents (to 10 places), besides natural sines,
tangents and secants, at intervals of a hundredth of a degree. In the
same year Vlacq published at Gouda his _Trigonometria artificialis_,
giving log sines and tangents to every 10 seconds of the quadrant to 10
places. This work also contains the logarithms of numbers from unity to
20,000 taken from the _Arithmetica logarithmica_ of 1628. Briggs
appreciated clearly the advantages of a centesimal division of the
quadrant, and by dividing the degree into hundredth parts instead of
into minutes, made a step towards a reformation in this respect, and but
for the appearance of Vlacq's work the decimal division of the degree
might have become recognized, as is now the case with the corresponding
division of the second. The calculation of the logarithms not only of
numbers but also of the trigonometrical functions is therefore due to
Briggs and Vlacq; and the results contained in their four fundamental
works--_Arithmetica logarithmica_ (Briggs), 1624; _Arithmetica
logarithmica_ (Vlacq), 1628; _Trigonometria Britannica_ (Briggs), 1633;
_Trigonometria artificialis_ (Vlacq), 1633--have not been superseded by
any subsequent calculations.

In the preceding paragraphs an account has been given of the actual
announcement of the invention of logarithms and of the calculation of
the tables. It now remains to refer in more detail to the invention
itself and to examine the claims of Napier and Briggs to the capital
improvement involved in the change from Napier's original logarithms to
logarithms to the base 10.

The _Descriptio_ contained only an explanation of the use of the
logarithms without any account of the manner in which the canon was
constructed. In an "Admonitio" on the seventh page Napier states that,
although in that place the mode of construction should be explained, he
proceeds at once to the use of the logarithms, "ut praelibatis prius
usu, et rei utilitate, caetera aut magis placeant posthac edenda, aut
minus saltem displiceant silentio sepulta." He awaits therefore the
judgment and censure of the learned "priusquam caetera in lucem temerè
prolata lividorum detrectationi exponantur"; and in an "Admonitio" on
the last page of the book he states that he will publish the mode of
construction of the canon "si huius inventi usum eruditis gratum fore
intellexero." Napier, however, did not live to keep this promise. In
1617 he published a small work entitled _Rabdologia_ relating to
mechanical methods of performing multiplications and divisions, and in
the same year he died.

The proposed work was published in 1619 by Robert Napier, his second son
by his second marriage, under the title _Mirifici logarithmorum canonis
constructio_.... It consists of two pages of preface followed by
sixty-seven pages of text. In the preface Robert Napier says that he has
been assured from undoubted authority that the new invention is much
thought of by the ablest mathematicians, and that nothing would delight
them more than the publication of the mode of construction of the canon.
He therefore issues the work to satisfy their desires, although, he
states, it is manifest that it would have seen the light in a far more
perfect state if his father could have put the finishing touches to it;
and he mentions that, in the opinion of the best judges, his father
possessed, among other most excellent gifts, in the highest degree the
power of explaining the most difficult matters by a certain and easy
method in the fewest possible words.

It is important to notice that in the _Constructio_ logarithms are
called artificial numbers; and Robert Napier states that the work was
composed several years (_aliquot annos_) before Napier had invented the
name logarithm. The _Constructio_ therefore may have been written a good
many years previous to the publication of the _Descriptio_ in 1614.

Passing now to the invention of common or decimal logarithms, that is,
to the transition from the logarithms originally invented by Napier to
logarithms to the base 10, the first allusion to a change of system
occurs in the "Admonitio" on the last page of the _Descriptio_ (1614),
the concluding paragraph of which is "Verùm si huius inventi usum
eruditis gratum fore intellexero, dabo fortasse brevi (Deo aspirante)
rationem ac methodum aut hunc canonem emendandi, aut emendatiorem de
novo condendi, ut ita plurium Logistarum diligentia, limatior tandem et
accuratior, quàm unius opera fieri potuit, in lucem prodeat. Nihil in
ortu perfectum." In some copies, however, this "Admonitio" is absent. In
Wright's translation of 1616 Napier has added the sentence--"But because
the addition and subtraction of these former numbers may seeme somewhat
painfull, I intend (if it shall please God) in a second Edition, to set
out such Logarithmes as shall make those numbers above written to fall
upon decimal numbers, such as 100,000,000, 200,000,000, 300,000,000,
&c., which are easie to be added or abated to or from any other number"
(p. 19); and in the dedication of the _Rabdologia_ (1617) he wrote
"Quorum quidem Logarithmorum speciem aliam multò praestantiorem nunc
etiam invenimus, & creandi methodum, unà cum eorum usu (si Deus
longiorem vitae & valetudinis usuram concesserit) evulgare statuimus;
ipsam autem novi canonis supputationem, ob infirmam corporis nostri
valetudinem, viris in hoc studii genere versatis relinquimus: imprimis
verò doctissimo viro D. Henrico Briggio Londini publico Geometriae
Professori, et amico mihi longè charissimo."

Briggs in the short preface to his _Logarithmorum chilias_ (1617) states
that the reason why his logarithms are different from those introduced
by Napier "sperandum, ejus librum posthumum, abunde nobis propediem
satisfacturum." The "liber posthumus" was the _Constructio_ (1619), in
the preface to which Robert Napier states that he has added an appendix
relating to another and more excellent species of logarithms, referred
to by the inventor himself in the _Rabdologia_, and in which the
logarithm of unity is 0. He also mentions that he has published some
remarks upon the propositions in spherical trigonometry and upon the new
species of logarithms by Henry Briggs, "qui novi hujus Canonis
supputandi laborem gravissimum, pro singulari amicitiâ quae illi cum
Patre meo L. M. intercessit, animo libentissimo in se suscepit; creandi
methodo, et usuum explanatione Inventori relictis. Nunc autem ipso ex
hâc vitâ evocato, totius negotii onus doctissimi Briggii humeris
incumbere, et Sparta haec ornanda illi sorte quadam obtigisse videtur."

In the address prefixed to the _Arithmetica logarithmica_ (1625) Briggs
bids the reader not to be surprised that these logarithms are different
from those published in the _Descriptio_:--

  "Ego enim, cum meis auditoribus Londini, publice in Collegio
  Greshamensi horum doctrinam explicarem; animadverti multo futurum
  commodius, si Logarithmus sinus totius servaretur 0 (ut in Canone
  mirifico), Logarithmus autem partis decimae ejusdem sinus totius,
  nempe sinus 5 graduum, 44, m. 21, s., esset 10000000000. atque ea de
  re scripsi statim ad ipsum authorem, et quamprimum per anni tempus, et
  vacationem a publico docendi munere licuit, profectus sum Edinburgum;
  ubi humanissime ab eo acceptus haesi per integrum mensem. Cum autem
  inter nos de horum mutatione sermo haberetur; ille se idem dudum
  sensisse, et cupivisse dicebat: veruntamen istos, quos jam paraverat
  edendos curasse, donec alios, si per negotia et valetudinem liceret,
  magis commodos confecisset. Istam autem mutationem ita faciendam
  censebat, ut 0 esset Logarithmus unitatis, et 10000000000 sinus
  totius: quod ego longe commodissimum esse non potui non agnoscere.
  Coepi igitur, ejus hortatu, rejectis illis quos anteà paraveram, de
  horum calculo serio cogitare; et sequenti aestate iterum profectus
  Edinburgum, horum quos hic exhibeo praecipuos, illi ostendi, idem
  etiam tertia aestate libentissime facturus, si Deus illum nobis tamdiu
  superstitem esse voluisset."

There is also a reference to the change of the logarithms on the
title-page of the work.

These extracts contain all the original statements made by Napier,
Robert Napier and Briggs which have reference to the origin of decimal
logarithms. It will be seen that they are all in perfect agreement.
Briggs pointed out in his lectures at Gresham College that it would be
more convenient that 0 should stand for the logarithm of the whole sine
as in the _Descriptio_, but that the logarithm of the tenth part of the
whole sine should be 10,000,000,000. He wrote also to Napier at once;
and as soon as he could he went to Edinburgh to visit him, where, as he
was most hospitably received by him, he remained for a whole month. When
they conversed about the change of system, Napier said that he had
perceived and desired the same thing, but that he had published the
tables which he had already prepared, so that they might be used until
he could construct others more convenient. But he considered that the
change ought to be so made that 0 should be the logarithm of unity and
10,000,000,000 that of the whole sine, which Briggs could not but admit
was by far the most convenient of all. Rejecting therefore, those which
he had prepared already, Briggs began, at Napier's advice, to consider
seriously the question of the calculation of new tables. In the
following summer he went to Edinburgh and showed Napier the principal
portion of the logarithms which he published in 1624. These probably
included the logarithms of the first chiliad which he published in 1617.

It has been thought necessary to give in detail the facts relating to
the conversion of the logarithms, as unfortunately Charles Hutton in his
history of logarithms, which was prefixed to the early editions of his
_Mathematical Tables_, and was also published as one of his
_Mathematical Tracts_, has charged Napier with want of candour in not
telling the world of Briggs's share in the change of system, and he
expresses the suspicion that "Napier was desirous that the world should
ascribe to him alone the merit of this very useful improvement of the
logarithms." According to Hutton's view, the words, "_it is to be hoped_
that his posthumous work" ... which occur in the preface to the
_Chilias_, were a modest hint that the share Briggs had had in changing
the logarithms should be mentioned, and that, as no attention was paid
to it, he himself gave the account which appears in the _Arithmetica_ of
1624. There seems, however, no ground whatever for supposing that Briggs
meant to express anything beyond his hope that the reason for the
alteration would be explained in the posthumous work; and in his own
account, written seven years after Napier's death and five years after
the appearance of the work itself, he shows no injured feeling whatever,
but even goes out of his way to explain that he abandoned his own
proposed alteration in favour of Napier's, and, rejecting the tables he
had already constructed, began to consider the calculation of new ones.
The facts, as stated by Napier and Briggs, are in complete accordance,
and the friendship existing between them was perfect and unbroken to the
last. Briggs assisted Robert Napier in the editing of the "posthumous
work," the _Constructio_, and in the account he gives of the alteration
of the logarithms in the _Arithmetica_ of 1624 he seems to have been
more anxious that justice should be done to Napier than to himself;
while on the other hand Napier received Briggs most hospitably and
refers to him as "amico mihi longè charissimo."

Hutton's suggestions are all the more to be regretted as they occur as a
history which is the result of a good deal of investigation and which
for years was referred to as an authority by many writers. His prejudice
against Napier naturally produced retaliation, and Mark Napier in
defending his ancestor has fallen into the opposite extreme of
attempting to reduce Briggs to the level of a mere computer. In
connexion with this controversy it should be noticed that the
"Admonitio" on the last page of the _Descriptio_, containing the
reference to the new logarithms, does not occur in all the copies. It is
printed on the back of the last page of the table itself, and so cannot
have been torn out from the copies that are without it. As there could
have been no reason for omitting it after it had once appeared, we may
assume that the copies which do not have it are those which were first
issued. It is probable, therefore, that Briggs's copy contained no
reference to the change, and it is even possible that the "Admonitio"
may have been added after Briggs had communicated with Napier. As
special attention has not been drawn to the fact that some copies have
the "Admonitio" and some have not, different writers have assumed that
Briggs did or did not know of the promise contained in the "Admonitio"
according as it was present or absent in the copies they had themselves
referred to, and this has given rise to some confusion. It may also be
remarked that the date frequently assigned to Briggs's first visit to
Napier is 1616, and not 1615 as stated above, the reason being that
Napier was generally supposed to have died in 1618 until Mark Napier
showed that the true date was 1617. When the _Descriptio_ was published
Briggs was fifty-seven years of age, and the remaining seventeen years
of his life were devoted with steady enthusiasm to extend the utility of
Napier's great invention.

The only other mathematician besides Napier who grasped the idea on
which the use of logarithm depends and applied it to the construction of
a table is Justus Byrgius (Jobst Bürgi), whose work _Arithmetische und
geometrische Progress-Tabulen_ ... was published at Prague in 1620, six
years after the publication of the _Descriptio_ of Napier. This table
distinctly involves the principle of logarithms and may be described as
a modified table of antilogarithms. It consists of two series of
numbers, the one being an arithmetical and the other a geometrical
progression: thus

    0, 1,0000 0000
   10, 1,0001 0000
   20, l,0002 0001
    .  .  .  .
  990, l,0099 4967
    .  .  .  .

In the arithmetical column the numbers increase by 10, in the
geometrical column each number is derived from its predecessor by
multiplication by 1.0001. Thus the number 10x in the arithmetical column
corresponds to 10^8 (1.0001)^x in the geometrical column; the
intermediate numbers being obtained by interpolation. If we divide the
numbers in the geometrical column by 10^8 the correspondence is between
10x and (1.0001)^x, and the table then becomes one of antilogarithms,
the base being (1.0001)^{1/10}, viz. for example (l.0001)^{1/10·990} =
1.00994967. The table extends to 230270 in the arithmetical column, and
it is shown that 230270.022 corresponds to 9.9999 9999 or 109 in the
geometrical column; this last result showing that (1.0001)^{23027.022} =
10. The first contemporary mention of Byrgius's table occurs on page 11
of the "Praecepta" prefixed to Kepler's _Tabulae Radolphinae_ (1627);
his words are: "apices logistici J. Byrgio multis annis ante editionem
Neperianam viam praeiverent ad hos ipsissimos logarithmos. Etsi homo
cunctator et secretorum suorum custos foetum in partu destituit, non ad
usus publicos educavit." Another reference to Byrgius occurs in a work
by Benjamin Bramer, the brother-in-law and pupil of Byrgius, who,
writing in 1630, says that the latter constructed his table twenty years
ago or more.[4]

As regards priority of publication, Napier has the advantage by six
years, and even fully accepting Bramer's statement, there are grounds
for believing that Napier's work dates from a still earlier period.

The power of 10, which occurs as a factor in the tables of both Napier
and Byrgius, was rendered necessary by the fact that the decimal point
was not yet in use. Omitting this factor in the case of both tables,
the connexion between N a number and L its "logarithm" is

  N = (e^-1)^L (Napier), L =(1.0001)^[(1/10)N] (Byrgius),

viz. Napier gives logarithms to base e^{-1}, Byrgius gives
antilogarithms to base (1.0001)^{1/10}.

There is indirect evidence that Napier was occupied with logarithms as
early as 1594, for in a letter to P. Crügerus from Kepler, dated
September 9, 1624 (Frisch's _Kepler_, vi. 47), there occurs the
sentence: "Nihil autem supra Neperianam rationem esse puto: etsi quidem
Scotus quidam literis ad Tychonem 1594 scriptis jam spem fecit Canonis
illius Mirifici." It is here distinctly stated that some Scotsman in the
year 1594, in a letter to Tycho Brahe, gave him some hope of the
logarithms; and as Kepler joined Tycho after his expulsion from the
island of Huen, and had been so closely associated with him in his work,
he would be likely to be correct in any assertion of this kind. In
connexion with Kepler's statement the following story, told by Anthony
wood in the _Athenae Oxonienses_, is of some importance:--

  "It must be now known, that one Dr Craig, a Scotchman ... coming out
  of Denmark into his own country, called upon Joh. Neper, Baron of
  Mercheston, near Edinburgh, and told him, among other discourses, of a
  new invention in Denmark (by Longomontanus, as 'tis said), to save the
  tedious multiplication and division in astronomical calculations.
  Neper being solicitous to know farther of him concerning this matter,
  he could give no other account of it than that it was by proportional
  numbers. Which hint Neper taking, he desired him at his return to call
  upon him again. Craig, after some weeks had passed, did so, and Neper
  then showed him a rude draught of what he called _Canon mirabilis
  logarithmorum_. which draught, with some alterations, he printing in
  1614, it came forthwith into the hands of our author Briggs, and into
  those of Will. Oughtred, from whom the relation of this matter came."

This story, though obviously untrue in some respects, gives valuable
information by connecting Dr Craig with Napier and Longomontanus, who
was Tycho Brahe's assistant. Dr Craig was John Craig, the third son of
Thomas Craig, who was one of the colleagues of Sir Archibald Napier,
John Napier's father, in the office of justice-depute. Between John
Craig and John Napier a friendship sprang up which may have been due to
their common taste for mathematics. There are extant three letters from
Dr John Craig to Tycho Brahe, which show that he was on the most
friendly terms with him. In the first letter, of which the date is not
given, Craig says that Sir William Stuart has safely delivered to him,
"about the beginning of last winter," the book which he sent him. Now
Mark Napier found in the library of the university of Edinburgh a
mathematical work bearing a sentence in Latin which he translates, "To
Doctor John Craig of Edinburgh, in Scotland, a most illustrious man,
highly gifted with various and excellent learning, professor of
medicine, and exceedingly skilled in the mathematics, Tycho Brahe hath
sent this gift, and with his own hand written this at Uraniburg, 2d
November 1588." As Sir William Stuart was sent to Denmark to arrange the
preliminaries of King James's marriage, and returned to Edinburgh on the
15th of November 1588, it would seem probable that this was the volume
referred to by Craig. It appears from Craig's letter, to which we may
therefore assign the date 1589, that, five years before, he had made an
attempt to reach Uranienburg, but had been baffled by the storms and
rocks of Norway, and that ever since then he had been longing to visit
Tycho. Now John Craig was physician to the king, and in 1590 James VI.
spent some days at Uranienburg, before returning to Scotland from his
matrimonial expedition. It seems not unlikely therefore that Craig may
have accompanied the king in his visit to Uranienburg.[5] In any case it
is certain that Craig was a friend and correspondent of Tycho's, and it
is probable that he was the "Scotus quidam."

We may infer therefore that as early as 1594 Napier had communicated to
some one, probably John Craig, his hope of being able to effect a
simplification in the processes of arithmetic. Everything tends to show
that the invention of logarithms was the result of many years of labour
and thought,[6] undertaken with this special object, and it would seem
that Napier had seen some prospect of success nearly twenty years before
the publication of the _Descriptio_. It is very evident that no mere
hint with regard to the use of proportional numbers could have been of
any service to him, but it is possible that the news brought by Craig of
the difficulties placed in the progress of astronomy by the labour of
the calculations may have stimulated him to persevere in his efforts.

The "new invention in Denmark" to which Anthony Wood refers as having
given the hint to Napier was probably the method of calculation called
prosthaphaeresis (often written in Greek letters [Greek:
prosthaphairesis]), which had its origin in the solution of spherical
triangles.[7] The method consists in the use of the formula

  sin a sin b = ½{cos (a - b) - cos (a + b)},

by means of which the multiplication of two sines is reduced to the
addition or subtraction of two tabular results taken from a table of
sines; and, as such products occur in the solution of spherical
triangles, the method affords the solution of spherical triangles in
certain cases by addition and subtraction only. It seems to be due to
Wittich of Breslau, who was assistant for a short time to Tycho Brahe;
and it was used by them in their calculations in 1582. Wittich in 1584
made known at Cassel the calculation of one case by this
prosthaphaeresis; and Justus Byrgius proved it in such a manner that
from his proof the extension to the solution of all triangles could be
deduced.[8] Clavius generalized the method in his treatise _De
astrolabio_ (1593), lib. i. lemma liii. The lemma is enunciated as

  "Quaestiones omnes, quae per sinus, tangentes, atque secantes absolvi
  solent, per solam prosthaphaeresim, id est, per solam additionem,
  subtractionem, sine laboriosa numerorum multiplicatione divisioneque

Clavius then refers to a work of Raymarus Ursus Dithmarsus as containing
an account of a particular case. The work is probably the _Fundamentum
astronomicum_ (1588). Longomontanus, in his _Astronomia Danica_ (1622),
gives an account of the method, stating that it is not to be found in
the writings of the Arabs or Regiomontanus. As Longomontanus is
mentioned in Anthony Wood's anecdote, and as Wittich as well as
Longomontanus were assistants of Tycho, we may infer that Wittich's
prosthaphaeresis is the method referred to by Wood.

It is evident that Wittich's prosthaphaeresis could not be a good method
of practically effecting multiplications unless the quantities to be
multiplied were sines, on account of the labour of the interpolations.
It satisfies the condition, however, equally with logarithms, of
enabling multiplication to be performed by the aid of a table of single
entry; and, analytically considered, it is not so different in principle
from the logarithmic method. In fact, if we put xy = [phi](X + Y), X
being a function of x only and Y a function of y only, we can show that
we must have X = Ae^(qx), y = Be^(qy); and if we put xy = [phi](X + Y) -
[phi](X - Y), the solutions are [phi](X + Y) = ¼(x + y)², and x = sin X,
y = sin Y, [phi](X + Y) = -½cos(X + Y). The former solution gives a
method known as that of quarter-squares; the latter gives the method of

An account has now been given of Napier's invention and its publication,
the transition to decimal logarithms, the calculation of the tables by
Briggs, Vlacq and Gunter, as well as of the claims of Byrgius and the
method of prosthaphaeresis. To complete the early history of logarithms
it is necessary to return to Napier's _Descriptio_ in order to describe
its reception on the continent, and to mention the other logarithmic
tables which were published while Briggs was occupied with his

John Kepler, who has been already quoted in connexion with Craig's visit
to Tycho Brahe, received the invention of logarithms almost as
enthusiastically as Briggs. His first mention of the subject occurs in a
letter to Schikhart dated the 11th of March 1618, in which he
writes-"Extitit Scotus Baro, cujus nomen mihi excidit, qui praeclari
quid praestitit, necessitate omni multiplicationum et divisionum in
meras additiones et subtractiones commutata, nec sinibus utitur; at
tamen opus est ipsi tangentium canone: et varietas, crebritas,
difficultasque additionum subtractionumque alicubi laborem multiplicandi
et dividendi superat." This erroneous estimate was formed when he had
seen the _Descriptio_ but had not read it; and his opinion was very
different when he became acquainted with the nature of logarithms. The
dedication of his _Ephemeris_ for 1620 consists of a letter to Napier
dated the 28th of July 1619, and he there congratulates him warmly on
his invention and on the benefit he has conferred upon astronomy
generally and upon Kepler's own Rudolphine tables. He says that,
although Napier's book had been published five years, he first saw it at
Prague two years before; he was then unable to read it, but last year he
had met with a little work by Benjamin Ursinus[9] containing the
substance of the method, and he at once recognized the importance of
what had been effected. He then explains how he verified the canon, and
so found that there were no essential errors in it, although there were
a few inaccuracies near the beginning of the quadrant, and he proceeds,
"Haec te obiter scire volui, ut quibus tu methodis incesseris, quas non
dubito et plurimas et ingeniosissimas tibi in promptu esse, eas publici
juris fieri, mihi saltem (puto et caeteris) scires fore gratissimum;
eoque percepto, tua promissa folio 57, in debitum cecidisse
intelligeres." This letter was written two years after Napier's death
(of which Kepler was unaware), and in the same year as that in which the
_Constructio_ was published. In the same year (1620) Napier's
_Descriptio_ (1614) and _Constructio_ (1619) were reprinted by
Bartholomew Vincent at Lyons and issued together.[10]

Napier calculated no logarithms of numbers, and, as already stated, the
logarithms invented by him were not to base e. The first logarithms to
the base e were published by John Speidell in his _New Logarithmes_
(London, 1619), which contains hyperbolic log sines, tangents and
secants for every minute of the quadrant to 5 places of decimals.

In 1624 Benjamin Ursinus published at Cologne a canon of logarithms
exactly similar to Napier's in the _Descriptio_ of 1614, only much
enlarged. The interval of the arguments is 10´´, and the results are
given to 8 places; in Napier's canon the interval is 1', and the number
of places is 7. The logarithms are strictly Napierian, and the
arrangement is identical with that in the canon of 1614. This is the
largest Napierian canon that has ever been published.

In the same year (1624) Kepler published at Marburg a table of Napierian
logarithms of sines with certain additional columns to facilitate
special calculations.

The first publication of Briggian logarithms on the continent is due to
Wingate, who published at Paris in 1625 his _Arithmétique
logarithmétique_, containing seven-figure logarithms of numbers up to
1000, and log sines and tangents from Gunter's _Canon_ (1620). In the
following year, 1626, Denis Henrion published at Paris a _Traicté des
Logarithmes_, containing Briggs's logarithms of numbers up to 20,001 to
10 places, and Gunter's log sines and tangents to 7 places for every
minute. In the same year de Decker also published at Gouda a work
entitled _Nieuwe Telkonst, inhoudende de Logarithmi voor de Ghetallen
beginnende van 1 tot 10,000_, which contained logarithms of numbers up
to 10,000 to 10 places, taken from Briggs's _Arithmetica_ of 1624, and
Gunter's log sines and tangents to 7 places for every minute.[11] Vlacq
rendered assistance in the publication of this work, and the privilege
is made out to him.

The invention of logarithms and the calculation of the earlier tables
form a very striking episode in the history of exact science, and, with
the exception of the _Principia_ of Newton, there is no mathematical
work published in the country which has produced such important
consequences, or to which so much interest attaches as to Napier's
_Descriptio_. The calculation of tables of the natural trigonometrical
functions may be said to have formed the work of the last half of the
16th century, and the great canon of natural sines for every 10 seconds
to 15 places which had been calculated by Rheticus was published by
Pitiscus only in 1613, the year before that in which the _Descriptio_
appeared. In the construction of the natural trigonometrical tables
Great Britain had taken no part, and it is remarkable that the discovery
of the principles and the formation of the tables that were to
revolutionize or supersede all the methods of calculation then in use
should have been so rapidly effected and developed in a country in which
so little attention had been previously devoted to such questions.

  For more detailed information relating to Napier, Briggs and Vlacq,
  and the invention of logarithms, the reader is referred to the life of
  Briggs in Ward's _Lives of the Professors of Gresham College_ (London,
  1740); Thomas Smith's _Vitae quorundam eruditissimorum et illustrium
  virorum_ (Vita Henrici Briggii) (London, 1707); Mark Napier's _Memoirs
  of John Napier_ already referred to, and the same author's _Naperi
  libri qui supersunt_ (1839); Hutton's _History_; de Morgan's article
  already referred to; Delambre's _Histoire de l'Astronomie moderne_;
  the report on mathematical tables in the _Report of the British
  Association_ for 1873; and the _Philosophical Magazine_ for October
  and December 1872 and May 1873. It may be remarked that the date
  usually assigned to Briggs's first visit to Napier is 1616 and not
  1615 as stated above, the reason being that Napier was generally
  supposed to have died in 1618; but it was shown by Mark Napier that
  the true date is 1617.

In the years 1791-1807 Francis Maseres published at London, in six
volumes quarto "Scriptores Logarithmici, or a collection of several
curious tracts on the nature and construction of logarithms, mentioned
in Dr Hutton's historical introduction to his new edition of Sherwin's
mathematical tables ...," which contains reprints of Napier's
_Descriptio_ of 1614, Kepler's writings on logarithms (1624-1625), &c.
In 1889 a translation of Napier's _Constructio_ of 1619 was published by
Walter Rae Macdonald. Some valuable notes are added by the translator,
in one of which he shows the accuracy of the method employed by Napier
in his calculations, and explains the origin of a small error which
occurs in Napier's table. Appended to the Catalogue is a full and
careful bibliography of all Napier's writings, with mention of the
public libraries, British and foreign, which possess copies of each. A
facsimile reproduction of Bartholomew Vincent's Lyons edition (1620) of
the _Constructio_ was issued in 1895 by A. Hermann at Paris (this
imprint occurs on page 62 after the word "Finis").

It now remains to notice briefly a few of the more important events in
the history of logarithmic tables subsequent to the original

  _Common or Briggian Logarithms of Numbers._--Nathaniel Roe's _Tabulae
  logarithmicae_ (1633) was the first complete seven-figure table that
  was published. It contains seven-figure logarithms of numbers from 1
  to 100,000, with characteristics unseparated from the mantissae, and
  was formed from Vlacq's table (1628) by leaving out the last three
  figures. All the figures of the number are given at the head of the
  columns, except the last two, which run down the extreme columns--1 to
  50 on the left-hand side, and 50 to 100 on the right-hand side. The
  first four figures of the logarithms are printed at the top of the
  columns. There is thus an advance half way towards the arrangement now
  universal in seven-figure tables. The final step was made by John
  Newton in his _Trigonometria Britannica_ (1658), a work which is also
  noticeable as being the only extensive eight-figure table that until
  recently had been published; it contains logarithms of sines, &c., as
  well as logarithms of numbers.

  In 1705 appeared the original edition of Sherwin's tables, the first
  of the series of ordinary seven-figure tables of logarithms of numbers
  and trigonometrical functions such as are in general use now. The work
  went through several editions during the 18th century, and was at
  length superseded in 1785 by Hutton's tables, which continued in
  successive editions to maintain their position for a century.

  In 1717 Abraham Sharp published in his _Geometry Improv'd_ the
  Briggian logarithms of numbers from 1 to 100, and of primes from 100
  to 1100, to 61 places; these were copied into the later editions of
  Sherwin and other works.

  In 1742 a seven-figure table was published in quarto form by Gardiner,
  which is celebrated on account of its accuracy and of the elegance of
  the printing. A French edition, which closely resembles the original,
  was published at Avignon in 1770.

  In 1783 appeared at Paris the first edition of François Callet's
  tables, which correspond to those of Hutton in England. These tables,
  which form perhaps the most complete and practically useful collection
  of logarithms for the general computer that has been published, passed
  through many editions.

  In 1794 Vega published his _Thesaurus logarithmorum completus_, a
  folio volume containing a reprint of the logarithms of numbers from
  Vlacq's _Arithmetica logarithmica_ of 1628, and _Trigonometria
  artificialis_ of 1633. The logarithms of numbers are arranged as in an
  ordinary seven-figure table. In addition to the logarithms reprinted
  from the _Trigonometria_, there are given logarithms for every second
  of the first two degrees, which were the result of an original
  calculation. Vega devoted great attention to the detection and
  correction of the errors in Vlacq's work of 1628. Vega's _Thesaurus_
  has been reproduced photographically by the Italian government. Vega
  also published in 1797, in 2 vols. 8vo, a collection of logarithmic
  and trigonometrical tables which has passed through many editions, a
  very useful one volume stereotype edition having been published in
  1840 by Hülsse. The tables in this work may be regarded as to some
  extent supplementary to those in Callet.

  If we consider only the logarithms of numbers, the main line of
  descent from the original calculation of Briggs and Vlacq is Roe, John
  Newton, Sherwin, Gardiner; there are then two branches, viz. Hutton
  founded on Sherwin and Callet on Gardiner, and the editions of Vega
  form a separate offshoot from the original tables. Among the most
  useful and accessible of modern ordinary seven-figure tables of
  logarithms of numbers and trigonometrical functions may be mentioned
  those of Bremiker, Schrön and Bruhns. For logarithms of numbers only
  perhaps Babbage's table is the most convenient.[12]

  In 1871 Edward Sang published a seven-figure table of logarithms of
  numbers from 20,000 to 200,000, the logarithms between 100,000 and
  200,000 being the result of a new calculation. By beginning the table
  at 20,000 instead of at 10,000 the differences are halved in
  magnitude, while the number of them in a page is quartered. In this
  table multiples of the differences, instead of proportional parts, are
  given.[13] John Thomson of Greenock (1782-1855) made an independent
  calculation of logarithms of numbers up to 120,000 to 12 places of
  decimals, and his table has been used to verify the errata already
  found in Vlacq and Briggs by Lefort (see _Monthly Not. R.A.S._ vol.
  34, p. 447). A table of ten-figure logarithms of numbers up to 100,009
  was calculated by W. W. Duffield and published in the _Report of the
  U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey for 1895-1896_ as Appendix 12, pp.
  395-722. The results were compared with Vega's _Thesaurus_ (1794)
  before publication.

  _Common or Briggian Logarithms of Trigonometrical Functions._--The
  next great advance on the Trigonometria artificialis took place more
  than a century and a half afterwards, when Michael Taylor published in
  1792 his seven-decimal table of log sines and tangents to every second
  of the quadrant; it was calculated by interpolation from the
  _Trigonometria_ to 10 places and then contracted to 7. On account of
  the great size of this table, and for other reasons, it never came
  into very general use, Bagay's _Nouvelles tables astronomiques_
  (1829), which also contains log sines and tangents to every second,
  being preferred; this latter work, which for many years was difficult
  to procure, has been reprinted with the original title-page and date
  unchanged. The only other logarithmic canon to every second that has
  been published forms the second volume of Shortrede's _Logarithmic
  Tables_ (1849). In 1784 the French government decided that new tables
  of sines, tangents, &c., and their logarithms, should be calculated in
  relation to the centesimal division of the quadrant. Prony was charged
  with the direction of the work, and was expressly required "non
  seulement à composer des tables qui ne laissassent rien à désirer
  quant à l'exactitude, mais à en faire le monument de calcul le plus
  vaste et le plus imposant qui eût jamais été exécuté ou même conçu."
  Those engaged upon the work were divided into three sections: the
  first consisted of five or six mathematicians, including Legendre, who
  were engaged in the purely analytical work, or the calculation of the
  fundamental numbers; the second section consisted of seven or eight
  calculators possessing some mathematical knowledge; and the third
  comprised seventy or eighty ordinary computers. The work, which was
  performed wholly in duplicate, and independently by two divisions of
  computers, occupied two years. As a consequence of the double
  calculation, there are two manuscripts, one deposited at the
  Observatory, and the other in the library of the Institute, at Paris.
  Each of the two manuscripts consists essentially of seventeen large
  folio volumes, the contents being as follows:--

    Logarithms of numbers up to 200,000                       8 vols.

    Natural sines                                             1   "

    Logarithms of the ratios of arcs to sines from 0^q.00000
      to 0^q.05000, and log sines throughout the quadrant     4   "

    Logarithms of the ratios of arcs to tangents from
      0^q.00000 to 0^q.05000, and log tangents throughout
      the quadrant                                            4   "

  The trigonometrical results are given for every hundred-thousandth of
  the quadrant (10´´ centesimal or 3´´.24 sexagesimal). The tables were
  all calculated to 14 places, with the intention that only 12 should be
  published, but the twelfth figure is not to be relied upon. The tables
  have never been published, and are generally known as the _Tables du
  Cadastre_, or, in England, as the great French manuscript tables.

  A very full account of these tables, with an explanation of the
  methods of calculation, formulae employed, &c., was published by
  Lefort in vol. iv. of the _Annales de l'observatoire de Paris_. The
  printing of the table of natural sines was once begun, and Lefort
  states that he has seen six copies, all incomplete, although including
  the last page. Babbage compared his table with the _Tables du
  Cadastre_, and Lefort has given in his paper just referred to most
  important lists of errors in Vlacq's and Briggs's logarithms of
  numbers which were obtained by comparing the manuscript tables with
  those contained in the _Arithmetica logarithmica_ of 1624 and of 1628.

  As the _Tables du Cadastre_ remained unpublished, other tables
  appeared in which the quadrant was divided centesimally, the most
  important of these being Hobert and Ideler's _Nouvelles tables
  trigonométriques_ (1799), and Borda and Delambre's _Tables
  trigonométriques décimales_ (1800-1801), both of which are
  seven-figure tables. The latter work, which was much used, being
  difficult to procure, and greater accuracy being required, the French
  government in 1891 published an eight-figure centesimal table, for
  every ten seconds, derived from the _Tables du Cadastre_.

  _Decimal or Briggian Antilogarithms._--In the ordinary tables of
  logarithms the natural numbers are all integers, while the logarithms
  tabulated are incommensurable. In an antilogarithmic table, the
  logarithms are exact quantities such as .00001, .00002, &c., and the
  numbers are incommensurable. The earliest and largest table of this
  kind that has been constructed is Dodson's _Antilogarithmic canon_
  (1742), which gives the numbers to 11 places, corresponding to the
  logarithms from .00001 to .99999 at intervals of .00001.
  Antilogarithmic tables are few in number, the only other extensive
  tables of the same kind that have been published occurring in
  Shortrede's _Logarithmic tables_ already referred to, and in
  Filipowski's _Table of antilogarithms_ (1849). Both are similar to
  Dodson's tables, from which they were derived, but they only give
  numbers to 7 places.

  _Hyperbolic or Napierian logarithms_ (i.e. to base e).--The most
  elaborate table of hyperbolic logarithms that exists is due to
  Wolfram, a Dutch lieutenant of artillery. His table gives the
  logarithms of all numbers up to 2200, and of primes (and also of a
  great many composite numbers) from 2200 to 10,009, to 48 decimal
  places. The table appeared in Schulze's _Neue und erweiterte Sammlung
  logarithmischer Tafeln_ (1778), and was reprinted in Vega's
  _Thesaurus_ (1794), already referred to. Six logarithms omitted in
  Schulze's work, and which Wolfram had been prevented from computing by
  a serious illness, were published subsequently, and the table as given
  by Vega is complete. The largest hyperbolic table as regards range was
  published by Zacharias Dase at Vienna in 1850 under the title _Tafel
  der natürlichen Logarithmen der Zahlen_.

  _Hyperbolic antilogarithms_ are simple exponentials, i.e. the
  hyperbolic antilogarithm of x is e^x. Such tables can scarcely be said
  to come under the head of logarithmic tables. See TABLES,
  MATHEMATICAL: _Exponential Functions_.

  _Logistic or Proportional Logarithms._--The old name for what are now
  called ratios or fractions are _logistic numbers_, so that a table of
  log (a/x) where x is the argument and a a constant is called a table
  of logistic or proportional logarithms; and since log (a/x) = log a -
  log x it is clear that the tabular results differ from those given in
  an ordinary table of logarithms only by the subtraction of a constant
  and a change of sign. The first table of this kind appeared in
  Kepler's work of 1624 which has been already referred to. The object
  of a table of log (a/x) is to facilitate the working out of
  proportions in which the third term is a constant quantity a. In most
  collections of tables of logarithms, and especially those intended for
  use in connexion with navigation, there occurs a small table of
  logistic logarithms in which a = 3600´´ (= 1° or 1^h), the table
  giving log 3600 - log x, and x being expressed in minutes and seconds.
  It is also common to find tables in which a = 10800´´ (= 3° or 3^h),
  and x is expressed in degrees (or hours), minutes and seconds. Such
  tables are generally given to 4 or 5 places. The usual practice in
  books seems to be to call logarithms logistic when a is 3600´´, and
  proportional when a has any other value.

  _Addition and Subtraction, or Gaussian Logarithms._--_Gaussian
  logarithms_ are intended to facilitate the finding of the logarithms
  of the sum and difference of two numbers whose logarithms are known,
  the numbers themselves being unknown; and on this account they are
  frequently called addition and subtraction logarithms. The object of
  the table is in fact to give log (a ± b) by only one entry when log a
  and log b are given. The utility of such logarithms was first pointed
  out by Leonelli in a book entitled _Supplément logarithmique_, printed
  at Bordeaux in the year XI. (1802/3); he calculated a table to 14
  places, but only a specimen of it which appeared in the _Supplément_
  was printed. The first table that was actually published is due to
  Gauss, and was printed in Zach's _Monatliche Correspondenz_, xxvi. 498
  (1812). Corresponding to the argument log x it gives the values of log
  (1 + x^-1) and log (1 + x).

  _Dual Logarithms._--This term was used by Oliver Byrne in a series of
  works published between 1860 and 1870. Dual numbers and logarithms
  depend upon the expression of a number as a product of 1.1, 1.01,
  1.001 ... or of .9, .99, .999....

  In the preceding _résumé_ only those publications have been mentioned
  which are of historic importance or interest.[14] For fuller details
  with respect to some of these works, for an account of tables
  published in the latter part of the 19th century, and for those which
  would now be used in actual calculation, reference should be made to

  _Calculation of Logarithms._--The name logarithm is derived from the
  words [Greek: logon arithmos], the number of the ratios, and the way
  of regarding a logarithm which justifies the name may be explained as
  follows. Suppose that the ratio of 10, or any other particular number,
  to 1 is compounded of a very great number of equal ratios, as, for
  example, 1,000,000, then it can be shown that the ratio of 2 to 1 is
  very nearly equal to a ratio compounded of 301,030 of these small
  ratios, or _ratiunculae_, that the ratio of 3 to 1 is very nearly
  equal to a ratio compounded of 477,121 of them, and so on. The small
  ratio, or _ratiuncula_, is in fact that of the millionth root of 10 to
  unity, and if we denote it by the ratio of a to 1, then the ratio of 2
  to 1 will be nearly the same as that of a^{301,030} to 1, and so on;
  or, in other words, if a denotes the millionth root of 10, then 2 will
  be nearly equal to a^{301,030}, 3 will be nearly equal to a^{477,121},
  and so on.

  Napier's original work, the _Descriptio Canonis_ of 1614, contained,
  not logarithms of numbers, but logarithms of sines, and the relations
  between the sines and the logarithms were explained by the motions of
  points in lines, in a manner not unlike that afterwards employed by
  Newton in the method of fluxions. An account of the processes by which
  Napier constructed his table was given in the _Constructio Canonis_ of
  1619. These methods apply, however, specially to Napier's own kind of
  logarithms, and are different from those actually used by Briggs in
  the construction of the tables in the _Arithmetica Logarithmica_,
  although some of the latter are the same in principle as the processes
  described in an appendix to the _Constructio_.

  The processes used by Briggs are explained by him in the preface to
  the _Arithmetica Logarithmica_ (1624). His method of finding the
  logarithms of the small primes, which consists in taking a great
  number of continued geometric means between unity and the given
  primes, may be described as follows. He first formed the table of
  numbers and their logarithms:--

    Numbers.         Logarithms.

    10               1
     3.162277...     0.5
     1.778279...     0.25
     1.333521...     0.125
     1.154781...     0.0625

  each quantity in the left-hand column being the square root of the one
  above it, and each quantity in the right-hand column being the half
  of the one above it. To construct this table Briggs, using about
  thirty places of decimals, extracted the square root of 10 fifty-four
  times, and thus found that the logarithm of 1.00000 00000 00000 12781
  91493 20032 35 was 0.00000 00000 00000 05551 11512 31257 82702, and
  that for numbers of this form (i.e. for numbers beginning with 1
  followed by fifteen ciphers, and then by seventeen or a less number of
  significant figures) the logarithms were proportional to these
  significant figures. He then by means of a simple proportion deduced
  that log (1.00000 00000 00000 1) = 0.00000 00000 00000 04342 94481
  90325 1804, so that, a quantity 1.00000 00000 00000 x (where x
  consists of not more than seventeen figures) having been obtained by
  repeated extraction of the square root of a given number, the
  logarithm of 1.00000 00000 00000 x could then be found by multiplying
  x by .00000 00000 00000 04342....

  To find the logarithm of 2, Briggs raised it to the tenth power, viz.
  1024, and extracted the square root of 1.024 forty-seven times, the
  result being 1.00000 00000 00000 16851 60570 53949 77. Multiplying the
  significant figures by 4342 ... he obtained the logarithm of this
  quantity, viz. 0.00000 00000 00000 07318 55936 90623 9336, which
  multiplied by 2^47 gave 0.01029 99566 39811 95265 277444, the
  logarithm of 1.024, true to 17 or 18 places. Adding the characteristic
  3, and dividing by 10, he found (since 2 is the tenth root of 1024)
  log 2 = .30102 99956 63981 195. Briggs calculated in a similar manner
  log 6, and thence deduced log 3.

  It will be observed that in the first process the value of the modulus
  is in fact calculated from the formula.

       h           1
    -------- = ---------,
    10^h - 1   log(e) 10

  the value of h being 1/2^54, and in the second process log10 2 is in
  effect calculated from the formula.

                                        1       2^47
    log(10) 2 = [2^(10/2^47) - 1] × --------- × ----.
                                    log(e) 10    10

  Briggs also gave methods of forming the mean proportionals or square
  roots by differences; and the general method of constructing
  logarithmic tables by means of differences is due to him.

  The following calculation of log 5 is given as an example of the
  application of a method of mean proportionals. The process consists in
  taking the geometric mean of numbers above and below 5, the object
  being to at length arrive at 5.000000. To every geometric mean in the
  column of numbers there corresponds the arithmetical mean in the
  column of logarithms. The numbers are denoted by A, B, C, &c., in
  order to indicate their mode of formation.

                     Numbers.    Logarithms.

    A =              1.000000     0.0000000
    B =             10.000000     1.0000000
    C = [root](AB) = 3.162277     0.5000000
    D = [root](BC) = 5.623413     0.7500000
    E = [root](CD) = 4.216964     0.6250000
    F = [root](DE) = 4.869674     0.6875000
    G = [root](DF) = 5.232991     0.7187500
    H = [root](FG) = 5.048065     0.7031250
    I = [root](FH) = 4.958069     0.6953125
    K = [root](HI) = 5.002865     0.6992187
    L = [root](IK) = 4.980416     0.6972656
    M = [root](KL) = 4.991627     0.6982421
    N = [root](KM) = 4.997242     0.6987304
    O = [root](KN) = 5.000052     0.6989745
    P = [root](NO) = 4.998647     0.6988525
    Q = [root](OP) = 4.999350     0.6989135
    R = [root](OQ) = 4.999701     0.6989440
    S = [root](OR) = 4.999876     0.6989592
    T = [root](OS) = 4.999963     0.6989668
    V = [root](OT) = 5.000008     0.6989707
    W = [root](TV) = 4.999984     0.6989687
    X = [root](WV) = 4.999997     0.6989697
    Y = [root](VX) = 5.000003     0.6989702
    Z = [root](XY) = 5.000000     0.6989700

  Great attention was devoted to the methods of calculating logarithms
  during the 17th and 18th centuries. The earlier methods proposed were,
  like those of Briggs, purely arithmetical, and for a long time
  logarithms were regarded from the point of view indicated by their
  name, that is to say, as depending on the theory of compounded ratios.
  The introduction of infinite series into mathematics effected a great
  change in the modes of calculation and the treatment of the subject.
  Besides Napier and Briggs, special reference should be made to Kepler
  (_Chilias_, 1624) and Mercator (_Logarithmotechnia_, 1668), whose
  methods were arithmetical, and to Newton, Gregory, Halley and Cotes,
  who employed series. A full and valuable account of these methods is
  given in Hutton's "Construction of Logarithms," which occurs in the
  introduction to the early editions of his _Mathematical Tables_, and
  also forms tract 21 of his _Mathematical Tracts_ (vol. i., 1812). Many
  of the early works on logarithms were reprinted in the _Scriptores
  logarithmici_ of Baron Maseres already referred to.

  In the following account only those formulae and methods will be
  referred to which would now be used in the calculation of logarithms.


    log(e)(1 + x) = x - ½x² + (1/3)x³ - ¼x^4 + &c.,

  we have, by changing the sign of x,

    log(e)(1 - x) = -x - ½x² - (1/3)x³ - ¼x^4 - &c.;


           1 + x
    log(e) ----- = 2(x + (1/3)x³ + (1/5)x^5 + &c.),
           1 - x

                                 p - q
  and, therefore, replacing x by -----,
                                 p + q
                    _                                              _
            p      |  p - q         /p - q\³         /p - q\^5      |
    log(e) --- = 2 |  ----- + (1/3)( ----- ) + (1/5)( ----- ) + &c. |,
            q      |_ p + q         \p + q/          \p + q/       _|

  in which the series is always convergent, so that the formula affords
  a method of deducing the logarithm of one number from that of another.

  As particular cases we have, by putting q = 1,
                  _                                              _
                 |  p - 1         /p - 1\³         /p - 1\^5      |
    log(e) p = 2 |  ----- + (1/3)( ----- ) + (1/5)( ----- ) + &c. |,
                 |_ p + 1         \p + 1/          \p + 1/       _|

  and by putting q = p + 1,
                                   _                                                  _
                                  |    1               1                  1            |
    log(e)(p + 1) - log(e)(p) = 2 |  ------ + (1/3)---------  + (1/5)----------- + &c. |;
                                  |_ 2p + 1        (2p + 1)³          (2p + 1)^5      _|

  the former of these equations gives a convergent series for log(e)p,
  and the latter a very convergent series by means of which the
  logarithm of any number may be deduced from the logarithm of the
  preceding number.

  From the formula for log(e)(p/q) we may deduce the following very
  convergent series for log(e)2, log(e)3 and log(e)5, viz.:--

    log(e)2 = 2( 7P +  5Q + 3R),
    log(e)3 = 2(11P +  8Q + 5R),
    log(e)5 = 2(16P + 12Q + 7R),


        1               1                1
    P = -- + (1/3) ·  ------ + (1/5) · ------ + &c.
        31            (31)^3           (31)^5

        1               1                1
    Q = -- + (1/3) ·  ------ + (1/5) · ------ + &c.
        49            (49)^3           (49)^5

         1               1                 1
    R = --- + (1/3) · ------- + (1/5) · ------- + &c.
        161           (161)^3           (161)^5

  The following still more convenient formulae for the calculation of
  log(e)2, log(e)3, &c. were given by J. Couch Adams in the _Proc. Roy.
  Soc._, 1878, 27, p. 91. If

            10         /    1  \           25         /     4  \
    a = log -- = -log ( 1 - --  ), b = log -- = -log ( 1 - ---  ),
            9          \    10 /           24         \    100 /

            81        /    1  \            50         /     2  \
    c = log -- = log ( 1 + --  ),  d = log -- = -log ( 1 - ---  ),
            80        \    80 /            49         \    100 /

            126        /     8   \
    e = log --- = log ( 1 + ----  ),
            125        \    1000 /


    log 2 = 7a - 2b + 3c, log 3 = 11a - 3b + 5c, log 5 = 16a - 4b + 7c,


    log 7 = ½(39a - 10b + 17c - d) or = 19a - 4b + 8c + e,

  and we have the equation of condition,

    a - 2b + c = d + 2e.

  By means of these formulae Adams calculated the values of log(e)2,
  log(e)3, log(e)5, and log(e)7 to 276 places of decimals, and deduced
  the value of log(e)10 and its reciprocal M, the modulus of the
  Briggian system of logarithms. The value of the modulus found by Adams

    Mo = 0.43429  44819  03251  82765  11289
           18916  60508  22943  97005  80366
           65661  14453  78316  58646  49208
           87077  47292  24949  33843  17483
           18706  10674  47663  03733  64167
           92871  58963  90656  92210  64662

           81226  58521  27086  56867  03295
           93370  86965  88266  88331  16360
           77384  90514  28443  48666  76864
           65860  85135  56148  21234  87653
           43543  43573  17253  83562  21868

  which is true certainly to 272, and probably to 273, places (_Proc.
  Roy. Soc._, 1886, 42, p. 22, where also the values of the other
  logarithms are given).

  If the logarithms are to be Briggian all the series in the preceding
  formulae must be multiplied by M, the modulus; thus,

   log(10) (1 + x) = M (x - ½x² + (1/3)x³ - ¼x^4 + &c.),

  and so on.

  As has been stated, Abraham Sharp's table contains 61-decimal
  Briggian logarithms of primes up to 1100, so that the logarithms of
  all composite numbers whose greatest prime factor does not exceed this
  number may be found by simple addition; and Wolfram's table gives
  48-decimal hyperbolic logarithms of primes up to 10,009. By means of
  these tables and of a factor table we may very readily obtain the
  Briggian logarithm of a number to 61 or a less number of places or of
  its hyperbolic logarithm to 48 or a less number of places in the
  following manner. Suppose the hyperbolic logarithm of the prime number
  43,867 required. Multiplying by 50, we have 50 × 43,867 = 2,193,350,
  and on looking in Burckhardt's _Table des diviseurs_ for a number near
  to this which shall have no prime factor greater than 10,009, it
  appears that

    2,193,349 = 23 × 47 × 2029;


    43,867 = (1/50)(23 × 47 × 2029 + 1),

  and therefore

    log(e) 43,867 = log(e) 23 + log(e) 47 + log(e) 2029 - log(e) 50

          1              1                  1
    + --------- - ½ ------------ + (1/3) ---------- - &c.
      2,193,349     (2,193,349)²         (193,349)³

  The first term of the series in the second line is

    0.00000  04559  23795  07319  6286;

  dividing this by 2 ×2,193,349 we obtain

    0.00000  00000  00103  93325  3457,

  and the third term is

    0.00000  00000  00000  00003  1590,

  so that the series =

  0.00000 04559 23691 13997 4419;

  whence, taking out the logarithms from Wolfram's table,

    log(e) 43,867 = 10.68891  76079  60568  10191  3661.

  The principle of the method is to multiply the given prime (supposed
  to consist of 4, 5 or 6 figures) by such a factor that the product may
  be a number within the range of the factor tables, and such that, when
  it is increased by 1 or 2, the prime factors may all be within the
  range of the logarithmic tables. The logarithm is then obtained by use
  of the formula

                               d      d²         d³
    log(e)(x + d) = log(e)x + --- - ½ -- + (1/3) -- - &c.,
                               x      x²         x³

  in which of course the object is to render d/x as small as possible.
  If the logarithm required is Briggian, the value of the series is to
  be multiplied by M.

  If the number is incommensurable or consists of more than seven
  figures, we can take the first seven figures of it (or multiply and
  divide the result by any factor, and take the first seven figures of
  the result) and proceed as before. An application to the hyperbolic
  logarithm of [pi] is given by Burckhardt in the introduction to his
  _Table des diviseurs_ for the second million.

  The best general method of calculating logarithms consists, in its
  simplest form, in resolving the number whose logarithm is required
  into factors of the form 1 - .1^(r)n, where n is one of the nine
  digits; and making use of subsidiary tables of logarithms of factors
  of this form. For example, suppose the logarithm of 543839 required to
  twelve places. Dividing by 10^5 and by 5 the number becomes 1.087678,
  and resolving this number into factors of the form 1 - .1^(r)n we find

    543839 = 10^5 × 5(1-.1²8)(1-.1^(4)6)(1-.1^(5)6)(1-.1^(6)3)(1-.1^(7)3)
                  × (1-.1^(8)5)(1-.1^(9)7)(1-.1^(10)9)(1-.1^(11)3)(1-.1^(12)2),

  where 1-1²8 denotes 1-.08, 1-.1^(4)6 denotes 1-.0006, &c., and so on.
  All that is required therefore in order to obtain the logarithm of any
  number is a table of logarithms, to the required number of places, of
  .n, .9n, .99n, .999n, &c., for n = 1, 2, 3, ... 9.

  The resolution of a number into factors of the above form is easily
  performed. Taking, for example, the number 1.087678, the object is to
  destroy the significant figure 8 in the second place of decimals; this
  is effected by multiplying the number by 1-.08, that is, by
  subtracting from the number eight times itself advanced two places,
  and we thus obtain 1.00066376. To destroy the first 6 multiply by 1 -
  .0006 giving 1.000063361744, and multiplying successively by 1 -
  .00006 and 1 - .000003, we obtain 1.000000357932, and it is clear that
  these last six significant figures represent without any further work
  the remaining factors required. In the corresponding antilogarithmic
  process the number is expressed as a product of factors of the form 1
  + .1^(n)x.

  This method of calculating logarithms by the resolution of numbers
  into factors of the form 1 - .1^(r)n is generally known as Weddle's
  method, having been published by him in _The Mathematician_ for
  November 1845, and the corresponding method for antilogarithms by
  means of factors of the form 1 + (.1)^(r)n is known by the name of
  Hearn, who published it in the same journal for 1847. In 1846 Peter
  Gray constructed a new table to 12 places, in which the factors were
  of the form 1-(.01)^(r)n, so that n had the values 1, 2, ... 99; and
  subsequently he constructed a similar table for factors of the form 1
  + (.01)^(r)n. He also devised a method of applying a table of Hearn's
  form (i.e. of factors of the form 1 +.1^(r)n) to the construction of
  logarithms, and calculated a table of logarithms of factors of the
  form 1 + (.001)^(r)n to 24 places. This was published in 1876 under
  the title _Tables for the formation of logarithms and antilogarithms
  to twenty-four or any less number of places_, and contains the most
  complete and useful application of the method, with many improvements
  in points of detail. Taking as an example the calculation of the
  Briggian logarithm of the number 43,867, whose hyperbolic logarithm
  has been calculated above, we multiply it by 3, giving 131,601, and
  find by Gray's process that the factors of 1.31601 are

    (1) 1.316          (5) 1.(001)^(4)002
    (2) 1.000007       (6) 1.(001)^(5)602
    (3) 1.(001)²598    (7) 1.(001)^(6)412
    (4) 1.(001)³780    (8) 1.(001)^(7)340

  Taking the logarithms from Gray's tables we obtain the required
  logarithm by addition as follows:--

      522  878  745  280  337  562  704  972 = colog 3
      119  255  889  277  936  685  553  913 = log (1)
             3  040  050  733  157  610  239 = log (2)
                259  708  022  525  453  597 = log (3)
                     338  749  695  752  424 = log (4)
                               868  588  964 = log (5)
                               261  445  278 = log (6)
                                    178  929 = log (7)
                                         148 = log (8)
    4.642  137  934  655  780  757  288  464 = log(10)43,867

  In Shortrede's _Tables_ there are tables of logarithms and factors of
  the form 1 ± (.01)^(r)n to 16 places and of the form 1 ± (.1)^(r)n to
  25 places; and in his _Tables de Logarithmes à 27 Décimales_ (Paris,
  1867) Fédor Thoman gives tables of logarithms of factors of the form 1
  ± .1^(r)n. In the _Messenger of Mathematics_, vol. iii. pp. 66-92,
  1873, Henry Wace gave a simple and clear account of both the
  logarithmic and antilogarithmic processes, with tables of both
  Briggian and hyperbolic logarithms of factors of the form 1 ± .1^(r)n
  to 20 places.

  Although the method is usually known by the names of Weddle and Hearn,
  it is really, in its essential features, due to Briggs, who gave in
  the _Arithmetica logarithmica_ of 1624 a table of the logarithms of 1
  + .1^(r)n up to r = 9 to 15 places of decimals. It was first formally
  proposed as an independent method, with great improvements, by Robert
  Flower in _The Radix_, _a new way of making Logarithms_, which was
  published in 1771; and Leonelli, in his _Supplement logarithmique_
  (1802-1803), already noticed, referred to Flower and reproduced some
  of his tables. A complete bibliography of this method has been given
  by A. J. Ellis in a paper "on the potential radix as a means of
  calculating logarithms," printed in the _Proceedings of the Royal
  Society_, vol. xxxi., 1881, pp. 401-407, and vol. xxxii., 1881, pp.
  377-379. Reference should also be made to Hoppe's _Tafeln zur
  dreissigstelligen logarithmischen Rechnung_ (Leipzig, 1876), which
  give in a somewhat modified form a table of the hyperbolic logarithm
  of 1 + .1^(r)n.

  The preceding methods are only appropriate for the calculation of
  isolated logarithms. If a complete table had to be reconstructed, or
  calculated to more places, it would undoubtedly be most convenient to
  employ the method of differences. A full account of this method as
  applied to the calculation of the _Tables du Cadastre_ is given by
  Lefort in vol. iv. of the _Annales de l'Observatoire de Paris_.
       (J. W. L. G.)


  [1] Dr Thomas Smith thus describes the ardour with which Briggs
    studied the _Descriptio_: "Hunc in deliciis habuit, in sinu, in
    manibus, in pectore gestavit, oculisque avidissimis, et mente
    attentissima, iterum iterumque perlegit,..." _Vitae quorundam
    eruditissimorum et illustrium virorum_ (London, 1707).

  [2] William Lilly's account of the meeting of Napier and Briggs at
    Merchiston is quoted in the article NAPIER.

  [3] It was certainly published after Napier's death, as Briggs
    mentions his "librum posthumum." This _liber posthumus_ was the
    _Constructio_ referred to later in this article.

  [4] Frisch's _Kepleri opera omnia_, ii. 834. Frisch thinks Bramer
    possibly relied on Kepler's statement quoted in the text ("Quibus
    forte confisus Kepleri verbis Benj. Bramer...."). See also vol. vii.
    p. 298.

    The claims of Byrgius are discussed in Kästner's _Geschichte der
    Mathematik_, ii. 375, and iii. 14; Montucla's _Histoire des
    mathématiques_, ii. 10; Delambre's _Histoire de l'astronomie
    moderne_, i. 560; de Morgan's article on "Tables" in the _English
    Cyclopaedia_; Mark Napier's _Memoirs of John Napier of Merchiston_
    (1834), p. 392, and Cantor's _Geschichte der Mathematik_, ii. (1892),
    662. See also Gieswald, _Justus Byrg als Mathematiker und dessen
    Einleitung in seine Logarithmen_ (Danzig, 1856).

  [5] See Mark Napier's _Memoirs of John Napier of Merchiston_ (1834),
    p. 362.

  [6] In the _Rabdologia_ (1617) he speaks of the canon of logarithms
    as "a me longo tempore elaboratum."

  [7] A careful examination of the history of the method is given by
    Scheibel in his _Einleitung zur mathematischen Bücherkenntniss_,
    Stück vii. (Breslau, 1775), pp. 13-20; and there is also an account
    in Kästner's _Geschichte der Mathematik_, i. 566-569 (1796); in
    Montucla's _Histoire des mathématiques_, i. 583-585 and 617-619; and
    in Klügel's _Wörterbuch_ (1808), article "Prosthaphaeresis."

  [8] Besides his connexion with logarithms and improvements in the
    method of prosthaphaeresis, Byrgius has a share in the invention of
    decimal fractions. See Cantor, _Geschichte_, ii. 567. Cantor
    attributes to him (in the use of his prosthaphaeresis) the first
    introduction of a subsidiary angle into trigonometry (vol. ii. 590).

  [9] The title of this work is--_Benjaminis Ursini_ ... _cursus
    mathematici practici volumen primum continens illustr. & generosi Dn.
    Dn. Johannis Neperi Baronis Merchistonij &c. Scoti trigonometriam
    logarithmicam usibus discentium accommodatam_ ... _Coloniae_ ...
    _CI[~C] I[~C]C XIX_. At the end, Napier's table is reprinted, but to
    two figures less. This work forms the earliest publication of
    logarithms on the continent.

  [10] The title is _Logarithmorum canonis descriptio, seu
    arithmeticarum supputationum mirabilis abbreviatio_. _Ejusque usus in
    utraque trigonometria ut etiam in omni logistica mathematica,
    amplissimi, facillimi & expeditissimi explicatio. Authore ac
    inventore Ioanne Nepero, Barone Merchistonii, &c. Scoto. Lugduni_....
    It will be seen that this title is different from that of Napier's
    work of 1614; many writers have, however, erroneously given it as the
    title of the latter.

  [11] In describing the contents of the works referred to, the
    language and notation of the present day have been adopted, so that
    for example a table to radius 10,000,000 is described as a table to 7
    places, and so on. Also, although logarithms have been spoken of as
    to the base e, &c., it is to be noticed that neither Napier nor
    Briggs, nor any of their successors till long afterwards, had any
    idea of connecting logarithms with exponents.

  [12] The smallest number of entries which are necessary in a table of
    logarithms in order that the intermediate logarithms may be
    calculable by proportional parts has been investigated by J. E. A.
    Steggall in the _Proc. Edin. Math. Soc._, 1892, 10, p. 35. This
    number is 1700 in the case of a seven-figure table extending to

  [13] Accounts of Sang's calculations are given in the _Trans. Roy.
    Soc. Edin._, 1872, 26, p. 521, and in subsequent papers in the
    _Proceedings_ of the same society.

  [14] In vol. xv. (1875) of the _Verhandelingen_ of the Amsterdam
    Academy of Sciences, Bierens de Haan has given a list of 553 tables
    of logarithms. A previous paper of the same kind, containing notices
    of some of the tables, was published by him in the _Verslagen en
    Mededeelingen_ of the same academy (Afd. Natuurkunde) deel. iv.
    (1862), p. 15.

LOGAU, FRIEDRICH, FREIHERR VON (1604-1655), German epigrammatist, was
born at Brockut, near Nimptsch, in Silesia, in June 1604. He was
educated at the gymnasium of Brieg and subsequently studied law. He then
entered the service of the duke of Brieg. In 1644 he was made "ducal
councillor." He died at Liegnitz on the 24th of July 1655. Logau's
epigrams, which appeared in two collections under the pseudonym "Salomon
von Golaw" (an anagram of his real name) in 1638 (_Erstes Hundert
Teutscher Reimensprüche_) and 1654 (_Deutscher Sinngedichte drei
Tausend_), show a marvellous range and variety of expression. He had
suffered bitterly under the adverse conditions of the time; but his
satire is not merely the outcome of personal feeling. In the turbulent
age of the Thirty Years' War he was one of the few men who preserved
intact his intellectual integrity and judged his contemporaries fairly.
He satirized with unsparing hand the court life, the useless bloodshed
of the war, the lack of national pride in the German people, and their
slavish imitation of the French in customs, dress and speech. He
belonged to the _Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft_ under the name _Der
Verkleinernde_, and regarded himself as a follower of Martin Opitz; but
he did not allow such ties to influence his independence or originality.

  Logau's _Sinngedichte_ were edited in 1759 by G. E. Lessing and K. W.
  Ramler, who first drew attention to their merits; a second edition
  appeared in 1791. A critical edition was published by G. Eitner in
  1872, who also edited a selection of Logau's epigrams for the
  _Deutsche Dichter des XVII. Jahrhunderts_ (vol. iii., 1870); there is
  also a selection by H. Oesterley in Kürschner's _Deutsche
  Nationalliteratur_, vol. xxviii. (1885). See H. Denker, _Beiträge zur
  literarischen Würdigung Logaus_ (1889); W. Heuschkel, _Untersuchungen
  über Ränders und Lessings Bearbeitung Logauscher Sinngedichte_ (1901).

LOGIA, a title used to describe a collection of the sayings of Jesus
Christ ([Greek: logia Iêsou]) and therefore generally applied to the
"Sayings of Jesus" discovered in Egypt by B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt.
There is some question as to whether the term is rightly used for this
purpose. It does not occur in the Papyri in this sense. Each "saying" is
introduced by the phrase "Jesus says" ([Greek: legei]) and the
collection is described in the introductory words of the 1903 series as
[Greek: logoi] not as [Greek: logia]. Some justification for the
employment of the term is found in early Christian literature. Several
writers speak of the [Greek: logia tou kuriou] or [Greek: ta kuriaka
logia], i.e. oracles of (or concerning) the Lord. Polycarp, for
instance, speaks of "those who pervert the oracles of the Lord."
(Philipp. 7), and Papias, as Eusebius tells us, wrote a work with the
title "Expositions of the Oracles of the Lord." The expression has been
variously interpreted. It need mean no more (Lightfoot, _Essays on
Supernatural Religion_, 172 seq.) than narratives of (or concerning) the
Lord; on the other hand, the phrase is capable of a much more definite
meaning, and there are many scholars who hold that it refers to a
document which contained a collection of the sayings of Jesus. Some such
document, we know, must lie at the base of our Synoptic Gospels, and it
is quite possible that it may have been known to and used by Papias. It
is only on this assumption that the use of the term Logia in the sense
described above can be justified.

"The Sayings," to which the term Logia is generally applied, consist of
(a) a papyrus leaf containing seven or eight sayings of Jesus discovered
in 1897, (b) a second leaf containing five more sayings discovered in
1903, (c) two fragments of unknown Gospels, the former published in
1903, the latter in 1907. All these were found amongst the great mass of
papyri acquired by the Egyptian Exploration Fund from the ruins of
Oxyrhynchus, one of the chief early Christian centres in Egypt, situated
some 120 m. S. of Cairo.

The eight "sayings" discovered in 1897 are as follows:--

  1. ... [Greek: kai tote diablepseis ekbalein to karphos to en tô
  ophthalmô tou adelphou sou].

  2. [Greek: Legei Iêsous ean mê nêsteusête ton kosmon ou mê eurête tên
  basileian tou theou. kai ean mê sabbatisête to sabbaton ouk opsesthe
  ton patera].

  3. [Greek: Legei Iêsous e[s]tên en mesô tou kosmou kai en sarki
  ôpsthên autois, kai euron pantas methuontas kai oudena euron dipsônta
  en autois, kai ponei ê psychê mou epi tois huiois tôn anthrôpôn, hoti
  typhloi eisin tê kardia autô[n] k[ai] ou ble[pousin]]....

  4. [Illegible: possibly joins on to 3] ... [Greek: [t]ên ptôcheian].

  5. [Greek: [Leg]ei [Iêsous hop]ou ean ôsin [b, ouk] e[isi]n atheoi kai
  h[o]pou e[is] estin monos, [le]gô, egô eimi met aut[ou] egei[r]on ton
  lithon kakei heurêseis me, schison to xylon kagô ekei eimi].

  6. [Greek: Legei Iêsous ouk estin dektos prophêtês en tê patridi
  aut[o]u, oude iatpos poiei therapeias eis tous ginôskontas auton].

  7. [Greek: Legei Iêsous polisoi kodomêmenê ep' akron [o]rous hypsêlou
  kai estêrigmenê oute pe[s]ein dynatai oute kry[b]ênai].

  8. [Greek: Legei Iêsous akoueis [e]is to hen ôtion sou to [de eteron

  Letters in brackets are missing in the original: letters which are
  dotted beneath are doubtful.

  1. "... and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote that is
  in thy brother's eye."

  2. "Jesus saith, Except ye fast to the world, ye shall in no wise find
  the kingdom of God; and except ye make the sabbath a real sabbath, ye
  shall not see the Father."

  3. "Jesus saith, I stood in the midst of the world and in the flesh
  was I seen of them, and I found all men drunken, and none found I
  athirst among them, and my soul grieveth over the sons of men, because
  they are blind in their heart, and see not...."

  4. "... poverty...."

  5. "Jesus saith, Wherever there are two, they are not without God, and
  wherever there is one alone, I say, I am with him. Raise the stone and
  there thou shalt find me, cleave the wood and there am I."

  6. "Jesus saith, A prophet is not acceptable in his own country,
  neither doth a physician work cures upon them that know him."

  7. "Jesus saith, A city built upon the top of a high hill and
  stablished can neither fall nor be hid."

  8. "Jesus saith, Thou hearest with one ear [but the other ear hast
  thou closed]."

The "sayings" of 1903 were prefaced by the following introductory

  [Greek: hoi toioi hoi logoi hoi [... hous elalêsen Iê(sou)s ho zôn
  k[yrios? ... kai Thôma kai eipen [autois; pas hostis an tôn logôn
  tout[ôn akousê thanatou ou mê geusêtai.]

  "These are the (wonderful?) words which Jesus the living (Lord) spake
  to ... and Thomas and he said unto (them) every one that hearkens to
  these words shall never taste of death."

The "sayings" themselves are as follows:--

  (1) [Greek: [legei Iê(sou)s· mê pausasthô ho zê[tôn...
  heôs an heurê kai hotan heurê [thambêthêsetai
  kai thambêtheis basileusei ka[i basileusas

  (2) [Greek: legei I[ê(sous ... tines ...
  hoi helkontes hêmas [eis tên basileian ei
  hê basileia en oura[nô estin;
  ta peteina tou our[anou kai tôn thêriôn ho
  ti hypo tên gên est[in ê epi tês gês kai
  hoi ichthyes tês thala[ssês houtoi hoi helkon-
  tes hymas kai hê bas[ileia tôn ouranôn
  entos hymôn [e]sti [kai hostis an heauton
  gnô tautên heurê[sei...
  heautous gnôsesthe [kai eidêsete hoti huioi
  este humeis tou patros tou t[...
  gnôs(es)the heautous en[...
  kai hu eis este êpto[]

  (3) [Greek:       [      legei      Iê(sou)s
  ouk apoknêsei anth[rôpos...
  rôn eperôtêsai pa[...
  rôn peri tou topou tê[s...
  sete hoti polloi esontai p[rôtoi eschatoi kai
  hoi eschatoi prôtoi kai [...

  (4) [Greek: legei Iê(sou)s· [pan to mê empros-
  then tês opseôs sou kai [to kekrummenon
  apo sou apokalyph(th)êset{ai soi. ou gar es-
  tin krypton ho ou phane[ron genêsetai
  kai tethammenon ho o[uk egerthêsetai.]

  (5) [Greek: [ex] etazousin auton ho[i mathêtai autou kai
  [le]gousin; pôs nêsteu[somen kai pôs...
  [ ... ] metha kai pôs [ ...
  [ ... k]ai ti paratêrês{omen...
  [ ... ]n? legei Iê(sou)s; [ ...
  [ ... ]eitai mê poeit[e...
  [ ... ]ês alêtheias an[ ...
  [ ... ]n a[p]okekr[y...
  [ ... ma] kari[os] estin [ ...
  [ ... ]ô est[i...
  [ ... ]in [ ... ]

  1. "Jesus saith, Let not him who seeks ... cease until he finds and
  when he finds he shall be astonished; astonished he shall reach the
  kingdom and having reached the kingdom he shall rest."

  2. "Jesus saith (ye ask? who are those) that draw us (to the kingdom
  if) the kingdom is in Heaven? ... the fowls of the air and all beasts
  that are under the earth or upon the earth and the fishes of the sea
  (these are they which draw) you and the kingdom of Heaven is within
  you and whosoever shall know himself shall find it. (Strive
  therefore?) to know yourselves and ye shall be aware that ye are the
  sons of the (Almighty?) Father; (and?) ye shall know that ye are in
  (the city of God?) and ye are (the city?)."

  3. "Jesus saith, A man shall not hesitate ... to ask concerning his
  place (in the kingdom. Ye shall know) that many that are first shall
  be last and the last first and (they shall have eternal life?)."

  4. "Jesus saith, Everything that is not before thy face and that which
  is hidden from thee shall be revealed to thee. For there is nothing
  hidden which shall not be made manifest nor buried which shall not be

  5. "His disciples question him and say, How shall we fast and how
  shall we (pray?) ... and what (commandment) shall we keep ... Jesus
  saith ... do not ... of truth ... blessed is he ..."

_The fragment of a lost Gospel_ which was discovered in 1903 contained
originally about fifty lines, but many of them have perished and others
are undecipherable. The translation, as far as it can be made out, is as

  1-7. "(Take no thought) from morning until even nor from evening until
  morning either for your food what ye shall eat or for your raiment
  what ye shall put on. 7-13. Ye are far better than the lilies which
  grow but spin not. Having one garment what do ye (lack)?... 13-15. Who
  could add to your stature? 15-16. He himself will give you your
  garment. 17-23. His disciples say unto him, When wilt thou be manifest
  unto us and when shall we see thee? He saith, When ye shall be
  stripped and not be ashamed ... 41-46. He said, The key of knowledge
  ye hid: ye entered not in yourselves, and to them that were entering
  in, ye opened not."

_The second Gospel fragment_ discovered in 1907 "consists of a single
vellum leaf, practically complete except at one of the lower corners and
here most of the lacunae admit of a satisfactory solution." The
translation is as follows:--

  ... before he does wrong makes all manner of subtle excuse. But give
  heed lest ye also suffer the same things as they: for the evil doers
  among men receive their reward not among the living only, but also
  await punishment and much torment. And he took them and brought them
  into the very place of purification and was walking in the temple. And
  a certain Pharisee, a chief priest, whose name was Levi, met them and
  said to the Saviour, Who gave thee leave to walk in this place of
  purification, and to see these holy vessels when thou hast not washed
  nor yet have thy disciples bathed their feet? But defiled thou hast
  walked in this temple, which is a pure place, wherein no other man
  walks except he has washed himself and changed his garments neither
  does he venture to see these holy vessels. And the Saviour straightway
  stood still with his disciples and answered him, Art thou then, being
  here in the temple, clean? He saith unto him, I am clean; for I washed
  in the pool of David and having descended by one staircase, I ascended
  by another and I put on white and clean garments, and then I came and
  looked upon these holy vessels. The Saviour answered and said unto
  him, Woe ye blind, who see not. Thou hast washed in these running
  waters wherein dogs and swine have been cast night and day and hast
  cleansed and wiped the outside skin which also the harlots and
  flute-girls anoint and wash and wipe and beautify for the lust of men;
  but within they are full of scorpions and all wickedness. But I and my
  disciples who thou sayest have not bathed have been dipped in the
  waters of eternal life which come from.... But woe unto thee....

These documents have naturally excited considerable interest and raised
many questions. The papyri of the "sayings" date from the 3rd century
and most scholars agree that the "sayings" themselves go back to the
2nd. The year A.D. 140 is generally assigned as the _terminus ad quem_.
The problem as to their origin has been keenly discussed. There are two
main types of theory. (1) Some suppose that they are excerpts from an
uncanonical Gospel. (2) Others think that they represent an independent
and original collection of sayings. The first theory has assumed three
main forms. (a) Harnack maintains that they were taken from the Gospel
according to the Egyptians. This theory, however, is based upon a
hypothetical reconstruction of the Gospel in question which has found
very few supporters. (b) Others have advocated the Gospel of the Hebrews
as the source of the "sayings," on the ground of the resemblance between
the first "saying" of the 1903 series and a well-authenticated fragment
of that Gospel. The resemblance, however, is not sufficiently clear to
support the conclusion. (c) A third view supposes that they are extracts
from the Gospel of Thomas--an apocryphal Gospel dealing with the boyhood
of Jesus. Beyond the allusion to Thomas in the introductory paragraph to
the 1903 series, there seems to be no tangible evidence in support of
this view. The second theory, which maintains that the papyri represent
an independent collection of "sayings," seems to be the opinion which
has found greatest favour. It has won the support of W. Sanday, H. B.
Swete, Rendel Harris, W. Lock, Heinrici, &c. There is a considerable
diversity of judgment, however, with regard to the value of the
collection. (a) Some scholars maintain that the collection goes back to
the 1st century and represents one of the earliest attempts to construct
an account of the teaching of Jesus. They are therefore disposed to
admit to a greater or less extent and with widely varying degrees of
confidence the presence of genuine elements in the new matter. (b)
Sanday and many others regard the sayings as originating early in the
2nd century and think that, though not "directly dependent on the
Canonical Gospels," they have "their origin under conditions of thought
which these Gospels had created." The "sayings" must be regarded as
expansions of the true tradition, and little value is therefore to be
attached to the new material.

With the knowledge at our disposal, it is impossible to reach an assured
conclusion between these two views. The real problem, to which at
present no solution has been found, is to account for the new material
in the "sayings." There seems to be no motive sufficient to explain the
additions that have been made to the text of the Gospels. It cannot be
proved that the expansions have been made in the interests of any sect
or heresy. Unless new discoveries provide the clue, or some reasonable
explanation can otherwise be found, there seems to be no reason why we
should not regard the "sayings" as containing material which ought to be
taken into account in the critical study of the teaching of Jesus.

The 1903 Gospel fragment is so mutilated in many of its parts that it is
difficult to decide upon its character and value. It appears to be
earlier than 150, and to be taken from a Gospel which followed more or
less closely the version of the teaching of Jesus given by Matthew and
Luke. The phrase "when ye shall be stripped and not be ashamed" contains
an idea which has some affinity with two passages found respectively in
the Gospel according to the Egyptians and the so-called Second Epistle
of Clement. The resemblance, however, is not sufficiently close to
warrant the deduction that either the Gospel of the Egyptians or the
Gospel from which the citation in 2 Clement is taken (if these two are
distinct) is the source from which our fragment is derived.

The second Gospel fragment (1907) seems to be of later origin than the
documents already mentioned. Grenfell and Hunt date the Gospel, from
which it is an excerpt, about 200. There is considerable difficulty with
regard to some of the details. The statement that an ordinary Jew was
required to wash and change his clothes before visiting the inner court
of the temple is quite unsupported by any other evidence. Nothing is
known about "the place of purification" ([Greek: agneutêrion]) nor "the
pool of David" ([Greek: limnê tou Daueid]). Nor does the statement that
"the sacred vessels" were visible from the place where Jesus was
standing seem at all probable. Grenfell and Hunt conclude therefore--"So
great indeed are the divergences between this account and the extant and
no doubt well-informed authorities with regard to the topography and
ritual of the Temple that it is hardly possible to avoid the conclusion
that much of the local colour is due to the imagination of the author
who was aiming chiefly at dramatic effect and was not really well
acquainted with the Temple. But if the inaccuracy of the fragment in
this important respect is admitted the historical character of the whole
episode breaks down and it is probably to be regarded as an apocryphal
elaboration of Matt. xv. 1-20 and Mark vii. 1-23."

  See the _Oxyrhynchus Papyri_, part i. (1897), part iv. (1904), part v.
  (1908).     (H. T. A.)

LOGIC ([Greek: logikê], sc. [Greek: technê], the art of reasoning), the
name given to one of the four main departments of philosophy, though its
sphere is very variously delimited. The present article is divided into
1. _The Problems of Logic_, II. _History_.

I. _The Problems of Logic._

_Introduction._--Logic is the science of the processes of inference,
what, then, is inference? It is that mental operation which proceeds by
combining two premises so as to cause a consequent conclusion. Some
suppose that we may infer from one premise by a so-called "immediate
inference." But one premise can only reproduce itself in another form,
e.g. all men are some animals; therefore some animals are men. It
requires the combination of at least two premises to infer a conclusion
different from both. There are as many kinds of inference as there are
different ways of combining premises, and in the main three types:--

1. _Analogical Inference_, from particular to particular: e.g.
border-war between Thebes and Phocis is evil; border-war between Thebes
and Athens is similar to that between Thebes and Phocis; therefore,
border-war between Thebes and Athens is evil.

2. _Inductive Inference_, from particular to universal: e.g. border-war
between Thebes and Phocis is evil; all border-war is like that between
Thebes and Phocis; therefore, all border-war is evil.

3. _Deductive or Syllogistic Inference_, from universal to particular,
e.g. all border-war is evil; border-war between Thebes and Athens is
border-war; therefore border-war between Thebes and Athens is evil.

In each of these kinds of inference there are three mental judgments
capable of being expressed as above in three linguistic propositions;
and the two first are the premises which are combined, while the third
is the conclusion which is consequent on their combination. Each
proposition consists of two terms, the subject and its predicate, united
by the copula. Each inference contains three terms. In syllogistic
inference the subject of the conclusion is the minor term, and its
predicate the major term, while between these two extremes the term
common to the two premises is the middle term, and the premise
containing the middle and major terms is the major premise, the premise
containing the middle and minor terms the minor premise. Thus in the
example of syllogism given above, "border-war between Thebes and Athens"
is the minor term, "evil" the major term, and "border-war" the middle
term. Using S for minor, P for major and M for middle, and preserving
these signs for corresponding terms in analogical and inductive
inferences, we obtain the following formula of the three inferences:--

   _Analogical._     |   _Inductive._   | _Deductive or Syllogistic._
                     |                  |
     S^1 is P        |    S is P        |       Every M is P
     S^2 is similar  |   Every M is     |             S is M
       to S^1        |     similar to S |
  :. S^2 is P.       |:. Every M is P.  |          :. S is P.

The love of unity has often made logicians attempt to resolve these
three processes into one. But each process has a peculiarity of its own;
they are similar, not the same. Analogical and inductive inference alike
begin with a particular premise containing one or more instances; but
the former adds a particular premise to draw a particular conclusion,
the latter requires a universal premise to draw a universal conclusion.
A citizen of Athens, who had known the evils of the border-war between
Thebes and Phocis, would readily perceive the analogy of a similar war
between Thebes and Athens, and conclude analogously that it would be
evil; but he would have to generalize the similarity of all border-wars
in order to draw the inductive conclusion that all alike are evil.
Induction and deduction differ still more, and are in fact opposed, as
one makes a particular premise the evidence of a universal conclusion,
the other makes a universal premise evidence of a particular conclusion.
Yet they are alike in requiring the generalization of the universal and
the belief that there are classes which are whole numbers of similars.
On this point both differ from inference by analogy, which proceeds
entirely from particular premises to a particular conclusion. Hence we
may redivide inference into particular inference by analogy and
universal inference by induction and deduction. Universal inference is
what we call reasoning; and its two species are very closely connected,
because universal conclusions of induction become universal premises of
deduction. Indeed, we often induce in order to deduce, ascending from
particular to universal and descending from universal to particular in
one act as it were; so that we may proceed either directly from
particular to particular by analogical inference, or indirectly from
particular through universal to particular by an inductive-deductive
inference which might be called "perduction." On the whole, then,
analogical, inductive and deductive inferences are not the same but
three similar and closely connected processes.

The three processes of inference, though different from one another,
rest on a common principle of similarity of which each is a different
application. Analogical inference requires that one particular is
similar to another, induction that a whole number or class is similar to
its particular instances, deduction that each particular is similar to
the whole number or class. Not that these inferences require us to
believe, or assume, or premise or formulate this principle either in
general, or in its applied forms: the premises are all that any
inference needs the mind to assume. The principle of similarity is used,
not assumed by the inferring mind, which in accordance with the
similarity of things and the parity of inference spontaneously concludes
in the form that similars are similarly determined ("similia similibus
convenire"). In applying this principle of similarity, each of the three
processes in its own way has to premise both that something is somehow
determined and that something is similar, and by combining these
premises to conclude that this is similarly determined to that. Thus the
very principle of inference by similarity requires it to be a
combination of premises in order to draw a conclusion.

The three processes, as different applications of the principle of
similarity, consisting of different combinations of premises, cause
different degrees of cogency in their several conclusions. Analogy
hardly requires as much evidence as induction. Men speculate about the
analogy between Mars and the earth, and infer that it is inhabited,
without troubling about all the planets. Induction has to consider more
instances, and the similarity of a whole number or class. Even so,
however, it starts from a particular premise which only contains many
instances, and leaves room to doubt the universality of its conclusions.
But deduction, starting from a premise about all the members of a class,
compels a conclusion about every and each of necessity. One border-war
may be similar to another, and the whole number may be similar, without
being similarly evil; but if all alike are evil, each is evil of
necessity. Deduction or syllogism is superior to analogy and induction
in combining premises so as to involve or contain the conclusion. For
this reason it has been elevated by some logicians above all other
inferences, and for this very same reason attacked by others as no
inference at all. The truth is that, though the premises contain the
conclusion, neither premise alone contains it, and a man who knows both
but does not combine them does not draw the conclusion; it is the
synthesis of the two premises which at once contains the conclusion and
advances our knowledge; and as syllogism consists, not indeed in the
discovery, but essentially in the synthesis of two premises, it is an
inference and an advance on each premise and on both taken separately.
As again the synthesis contains or involves the conclusion, syllogism
has the advantage of compelling assent to the consequences of the
premises. Inference in general is a combination of premises to cause a
conclusion; deduction is such a combination as to compel a conclusion
involved in the combination, and following from the premises of

Nevertheless, deduction or syllogism is not independent of the other
processes of inference. It is not the primary inference of its own
premises, but constantly converts analogical and inductive conclusions
into its particular and universal premises. Of itself it causes a
necessity of consequence, but only a hypothetical necessity; if these
premises are true, then this conclusion necessarily follows. To
eliminate this "if" ultimately requires other inferences before
deduction. Especially, induction to universals is the warrant and
measure of deduction from universals. So far as it is inductively true
that all border-war is evil, it is deductively true that a given
border-war is therefore evil. Now, as an inductive combination of
premises does not necessarily involve the inductive conclusion,
induction normally leads, not to a necessary, but to a probable
conclusion; and whenever its probable conclusions become deductive
premises, the deduction only involves a probable conclusion. Can we then
infer any certainty at all? In order to answer this question we must
remember that there are many degrees of probability, and that induction,
and therefore deduction, draw conclusions more or less probable, and
rise to the point at which probability becomes moral certainty, or that
high degree of probability which is sufficient to guide our lives, and
even condemn murderers to death. But can we rise still higher and infer
real necessity? This is a difficult question, which has received many
answers. Some noölogists suppose a mental power of forming necessary
principles of deduction a priori; but fail to show how we can apply
principles of mind to things beyond mind. Some empiricists, on the other
hand, suppose that induction only infers probable conclusions which are
premises of probable deductions; but they give up all exact science.
Between these extremes there is room for a third theory, empirical yet
providing a knowledge of the really necessary. In some cases of
induction concerned with objects capable of abstraction and
simplification, we have a power of identification, by which, not a
priori but in the act of inducing a conclusion, we apprehend that the
things signified by its subject and predicate are one and the same
thing which cannot exist apart from itself. Thus by combined induction
and identification we apprehend that one and one are the same as two,
that there is no difference between a triangle and a three-sided
rectilineal figure, that a whole must be greater than its part by being
the whole, that inter-resisting bodies necessarily force one another
apart, otherwise they would not be inter-resisting but occupy the same
place at the same moment. Necessary principles, discovered by this
process of induction and identification, become premises of deductive
demonstration to conclusions which are not only necessary consequents on
the premises, but also equally necessary in reality. Induction thus is
the source of deduction, of its truth, of its probability, of its moral
certainty; and induction, combined with identification, is the origin of
the necessary principles of demonstration or deduction to necessary

Analogical inference in its turn is as closely allied with induction.
Like induction, it starts from a particular premise, containing one or
more examples or instances; but, as it is easier to infer a particular
than a universal conclusion, it supplies particular conclusions which in
their turn become further particular premises of induction. Its second
premise is indeed merely a particular apprehension that one particular
is similar to another, whereas the second premise of induction is a
universal apprehension that a whole number of particulars is similar to
those from which the inference starts; but at bottom these two
apprehensions of similarity are so alike as to suggest that the
universal premise of induction has arisen as a generalized analogy. It
seems likely that man has arrived at the apprehension of a whole
individual, e.g. a whole animal including all its parts, and thence has
inferred by analogy a whole number, or class, e.g. of animals including
all individual animals; and accordingly that the particular analogy of
one individual to another has given rise to the general analogy of every
to each individual in a class, or whole number of individuals, contained
in the second premise of induction. In this case, analogical inference
has led to induction, as induction to deduction. Further, analogical
inference from particular to particular suggests inductive-deductive
inference from particular through universal to particular.

Newton, according to Dr Pemberton, thought in 1666 that the moon moves
so like a falling body that it has a similar centripetal force to the
earth, 20 years before he demonstrated this conclusion from the laws of
motion in the _Principia_. In fact, analogical, inductive and deductive
inferences, though different processes of combining premises to cause
different conclusions, are so similar and related, so united in
principle and interdependent, so consolidated into a system of
inference, that they cannot be completely investigated apart, but
together constitute a single subject of science. This science of
inference in general is logic.

Logic, however, did not begin as a science of all inference. Rather it
began as a science of reasoning ([Greek: logos]), of syllogism ([Greek:
syllogismos]), of deductive inference. Aristotle was its founder. He was
anticipated of course by many generations of spontaneous thinking
(_logica naturalis_). Many of the higher animals infer by analogy:
otherwise we cannot explain their thinking. Man so infers at first:
otherwise we cannot explain the actions of young children, who before
they begin to speak give no evidence of universal thinking. It is likely
that man began with particular inference and with particular language;
and that, gradually generalizing thought and language, he learnt at last
to think and say "all," to infer universally, to induce and deduce, to
reason, in short, and raise himself above other animals. In ancient
times, and especially in Egypt, Babylon and Greece, he went on to
develop reason into science or the systematic investigation of definite
subjects, e.g. arithmetic of number, geometry of magnitude, astronomy of
stars, politics of government, ethics of goods. In Greece he became more
and more reflective and conscious of himself, of his body and soul, his
manners and morals, his mental operations and especially his reason. One
of the characteristics of Greek philosophers is their growing tendency,
in investigating any subject, to turn round and ask themselves what
should be the method of investigation. In this way the Presocratics and
Sophists, and still more Socrates and Plato, threw out hints on sense
and reason, on inferential processes and scientific methods which may be
called anticipations of logic. But Aristotle was the first to conceive
of reasoning itself as a definite subject of a special science, which he
called analytics or analytic science, specially designed to analyse
syllogism and especially demonstrative syllogism, or science, and to be
in fact a science of sciences. He was therefore the founder of the
science of logic.

  Among the Aristotelian treatises we have the following, which together
  constitute this new science of reasoning:--

  1. The _Categories_, or names signifying things which can become

  2. The _De Interpretatione_, or the enumeration of conceptions and
  their combinations by (1) nouns and verbs (names), (2) enunciations

  3. The _Prior Analytics_, on syllogism;

  4. The _Posterior Analytics_, on demonstrative syllogism, or science;

  5. The _Topics_, on dialectical syllogism; or argument;

  6. The _Sophistical Elenchi_, on sophistical or contentious syllogism,
  or sophistical fallacies.

  So far as we know, Aristotle had no one name for all these
  investigations. "Analytics" is only applied to the _Prior_ and
  _Posterior Analytics_, and "logical," which he opposed to
  "analytical," only suits the _Topics_ and at most the _Sophistical
  Elenchi_; secondly, while he analyzed syllogism into premises, major
  and minor, and premises into terms, subject and predicate, he
  attempted no division of the whole science; thirdly, he attempted no
  order and arrangement of the treatises into a system of logic, but
  only of the _Analytics_, _Topics_ and _Sophistical Elenchi_ into a
  system of syllogisms. Nevertheless, when his followers had arranged
  the treatises into the _Organon_, as they called it to express that it
  is an instrument of science, then there gradually emerged a system of
  syllogistic logic, arranged in the triple division--terms,
  propositions and syllogisms--which has survived to this day as
  technical logic, and has been the foundation of all other logics, even
  of those which aim at its destruction.

The main problem which Aristotle set before him was the analysis of
syllogism, which he defined as "reasoning in which certain things having
been posited something different from them of necessity follows by their
being those things" (_Prior Analytics_, i. 1). What then did he mean by
reasoning, or rather by the Greek word [Greek: logos] of which
"reasoning" is an approximate rendering? It was meant (cf. _Post. An._
i. 10) to be both internal, in the soul ([Greek: ho esô logos, en tê
psychê]), and external, in language ([Greek: ho exo logos]): hence after
Aristotle the Stoics distinguished [Greek: logos endiathetos] and
[Greek: prophorikos]. It meant, then, both reason and discourse of
reason (cf. Shakespeare, _Hamlet_, i. 2). On its mental side, as reason
it meant combination of thoughts. On its linguistic side, as discourse
it was used for any combination of names to form a phrase, such as the
definition "rational animal," or a book, such as the _Iliad_. It had
also the mathematical meaning of _ratio_; and in its use for definition
it is sometimes transferred to essence as the object of definition, and
has a mixed meaning, which may be expressed by "account." In all its
uses, however, the common meaning is combination. When Aristotle called
syllogism [Greek: logos], he meant that it is a combination of premises
involving a conclusion of necessity. Moreover, he tended to confine the
term [Greek: logos] to syllogistic inference. Not that he omitted other
inferences ([Greek: pisteis]). On the contrary, to him (cf. _Prior
Analytics_, ii. 24) we owe the triple distinction into inference from
particular to particular ([Greek: paradeigma], example, or what we call
"analogy"), inference from particular to universal ([Greek: epagôgê],
induction), and inference from universal to particular ([Greek:
syllogismos], syllogism, or deduction). But he thought that inferences
other than syllogism are imperfect; that analogical inference is
rhetorical induction; and that induction, through the necessary
preliminary of syllogism and the sole process of ascent from sense,
memory and experience to the principles of science, is itself neither
reasoning nor science. To be perfect he thought that all inference must
be reduced to syllogism of the first figure, which he regarded as the
specially scientific inference. Accordingly, the syllogism appeared to
him to be the rational process ([Greek: meta logou]), and the
demonstrative syllogism from inductively discovered principles to be
science ([Greek: epistêmê]). Hence, without his saying it in so many
words, Aristotle's logic perforce became a logic of deductive reasoning,
or syllogism. As it happened this deductive tendency helped the
development of logic. The obscurer premises of analogy and induction,
together with the paucity of experience and the backward state of
physical science in Aristotle's time would have baffled even his
analytical genius. On the other hand, the demonstrations of mathematical
sciences of his time, and the logical forms of deduction evinced in
Plato's dialogues, provided him with admirable examples of deduction,
which is also the inference most capable of analysis. Aristotle's
analysis of the syllogism showed man how to advance by combining his
thoughts in trains of deductive reasoning. Nevertheless, the wider
question remained for logic: what is the nature of all inference, and
the special form of each of its three main processes?

  As then the reasoning of the syllogism was the main problem of
  Aristotle's logic, what was his analysis of it? In distinguishing
  inner and outer reason, or reasoning and discourse, he added that it
  is not to outer reason but to inner reason in the soul that
  demonstration and syllogism are directed (_Post. An._ i. 10). One
  would expect, then, an analysis of mental reasoning into mental
  judgments ([Greek: kriseis]) as premises and conclusion. In point of
  fact, he analysed it into premises, but then analysed a premise into
  terms, which he divided into subject and predicate, with the addition
  of the copula "is" or "is not." This analysis, regarded as a whole and
  as it is applied in the _Analytics_ and in the other logical
  treatises, was evidently intended as a linguistic analysis. So in the
  _Categories_, he first divided things said ([Greek: ta legomena]) into
  uncombined and combined, or names and propositions, and then divided
  the former into categories; and in the _De interpretatione_ he
  expressly excluded mental conceptions and their combinations, and
  confined himself to nouns and verbs and enunciations, or, as we should
  say, to names and propositions. Aristotle apparently intended, or at
  all events has given logicians in general the impression, that he
  intended to analyse syllogism into propositions as premises, and
  premise into names as terms. His logic therefore exhibits the curious
  paradox of being an analysis of mental reasoning into linguistic
  elements. The explanation is that outer speech is more obvious than
  inner thought, and that grammar and poetic criticism, rhetoric and
  dialectic preceded logic, and that out of those arts of language arose
  the science of reasoning. The sophist Protagoras had distinguished
  various kinds of sentences, and Plato had divided the sentence into
  noun and verb, signifying a thing and the action of a thing.
  Rhetoricians had enumerated various means of persuasion, some of which
  are logical forms, e.g. probability and sign, example and enthymeme.
  Among the dialecticians, Socrates had used inductive arguments to
  obtain definitions as data of deductive arguments against his
  opponents, and Plato had insisted on the processes of ascending to and
  descending from an unconditional principle by the power of giving and
  receiving argument. All these points about speech, eloquence and
  argument between man and man were absorbed into Aristotle's theory of
  reasoning, and in particular the grammar of the sentence consisting of
  noun and verb caused the logic of the proposition consisting of
  subject and predicate. At the same time, Aristotle was well aware that
  the science of reasoning is no art of language and must take up a
  different position towards speech as the expression of thought. In the
  _Categories_ he classified names, not, however, as a grammarian by
  their structure, but as a logician by their signification. In the _De
  interpretatione_, having distinguished the enunciation, or
  proposition, from other sentences as that in which there is truth or
  falsity, he relegated the rest to rhetoric or poetry, and founded the
  logic of the proposition, in which, however, he retained the
  grammatical analysis into noun and verb. In the _Analytics_ he took
  the final step of originating the logical analysis of the proposition
  as premise into subject and predicate as terms mediated by the copula,
  and analysed the syllogism into these elements. Thus did he become the
  founder of the logical but linguistic analysis of reasoning as
  discourse ([Greek: ho exô logos]) into propositions and terms.
  Nevertheless, the deeper question remained, what is the logical but
  mental analysis of reasoning itself ([Greek: ho esô logos]) into its
  mental premises and conclusion?

Aristotle thus was the founder of logic as a science. But he laid too
much stress on reasoning as syllogism or deduction, and on deductive
science; and he laid too much stress on the linguistic analysis of
rational discourse into proposition and terms. These two defects remain
ingrained in technical logic to this day. But in the course of the
development of the science, logicians have endeavoured to correct those
defects, and have diverged into two schools. Some have devoted
themselves to induction from sense and experience and widened logic till
it has become a general science of inference and scientific method.
Others have devoted themselves to the mental analysis of reasoning, and
have narrowed logic into a science of conception, judgment and
reasoning. The former belong to the school of empirical logic, the
latter to the school of conceptual and formal logic. Both have started
from points which Aristotle indicated without developing them. But we
shall find that his true descendants are the empirical logicians.

Aristotle was the first of the empiricists. He consistently maintained
that sense is knowledge of particulars and the origin of scientific
knowledge of universals. In his view, sense is a congenital form of
judgment ([Greek: dynamis symphytos kritikê], _Post. An._ ii. 19); a
sensation of each of the five senses is always true of its proper
object; without sense there is no science; sense is the origin of
induction, which is the origin of deduction and science. The _Analytics_
end (_Post. An._ ii. 19) with a detailed system of empiricism, according
to which sense is the primary knowledge of particulars, memory is the
retention of a sensation, experience is the sum of many memories,
induction infers universals, and intelligence is the true apprehension
of the universal principles of science, which is rational, deductive,
demonstrative, from empirical principles.

  This empirical groundwork of Aristotle's logic was accepted by the
  Epicureans, who enunciated most distinctly the fundamental doctrine
  that all sensations are true of their immediate objects, and falsity
  begins with subsequent opinions, or what the moderns call
  "interpretation." Beneath deductive logic, in the logic of Aristotle
  and the canonic of the Epicureans, there already lay the basis of
  empirical logic: sensory experience is the origin of all inference and
  science. It remained for Francis Bacon to develop these beginnings
  into a new logic of induction. He did not indeed accept the
  infallibility of sense or of any other operation unaided. He thought,
  rather, that every operation becomes infallible by method. Following
  Aristotle in this order--sense, memory, intellect--he resolved the
  whole process of induction into three ministrations:--

  1. The ministration to sense, aided by observation and experiment.

  2. The ministration to memory, aided by registering and arranging the
  data, of observation and experiment in tables of instances of
  agreement, difference and concomitant variations.

  3. The ministration to intellect or reason, aided by the negative
  elimination by means of contradictory instances of whatever in the
  instances is not always present, absent and varying with the given
  subject investigated, and finally by the positive inference that
  whatever in the instances is always present, absent and varying with
  the subject is its essential cause.

  Bacon, like Aristotle, was anticipated in this or that point; but, as
  Aristotle was the first to construct a system of deduction in the
  syllogism and its three figures, so Bacon was the first to construct a
  system of induction in three ministrations, in which the requisites of
  induction, hitherto recognized only in sporadic hints, were combined
  for the first time in one logic of induction. Bacon taught men to
  labour in inferring from particular to universal, to lay as much
  stress on induction as on deduction, and to think and speak of
  inductive reasoning, inductive science, inductive logic. Moreover,
  while Aristotle had the merit of discerning the triplicity of
  inference, to Bacon we owe the merit of distinguishing the three
  processes without reduction:--

  1. Inference from particular to particular by Experientia Literata, in

  2. Inference from particular to universal by Inductio, ascendendo;

  3. Inference from universal to particular by Syllogism, descendendo.

  In short, the comprehensive genius of Bacon widened logic into a
  general science of inference.

  On the other hand, as Aristotle over-emphasized deduction so Bacon
  over-emphasized induction by contending that it is the only process of
  discovering universals (_axiomata_), which deduction only applies to
  particulars. J. S. Mill in his _Logic_ pointed out this defect, and
  without departing from Baconian principles remedied it by quoting
  scientific examples, in which deduction, starting from inductive
  principles, applies more general to less general universals, e.g. when
  the more general law of gravitation is shown to include the less
  general laws of planetary gravitation. Mill's logic has the great
  merit of copiously exemplifying the principles of the variety of
  method according to subject-matter. It teaches us that scientific
  method is sometimes induction, sometimes deduction, and sometimes the
  consilience of both, either by the inductive verification of previous
  deductions, or by the deductive explanation of previous inductions.

  It is also most interesting to notice that Aristotle saw further than
  Bacon in this direction. The founder of logic anticipated the latest
  logic of science, when he recognized, not only the deduction of
  mathematics, but also the experience of facts followed by deductive
  explanations of their causes in physics.

The consilience of empirical and deductive processes was an Aristotelian
discovery, elaborated by Mill against Bacon. On the whole, however,
Aristotle, Bacon and Mill, purged from their errors, form one empirical
school, gradually growing by adapting itself to the advance of science;
a school in which Aristotle was most influenced by Greek deductive
Mathematics, Bacon by the rise of empirical physics at the Renaissance,
and Mill by the Newtonian combination of empirical facts and
mathematical principles in the _Principia_. From studying this
succession of empirical logicians, we cannot doubt that sense, memory
and experience are the real origin of inference, analogical, inductive
and deductive. The deepest problem of logic is the relation of sense and
inference. But we must first consider the mental analysis of inference,
and this brings us to conceptual and formal logic.

Aristotle's logic has often been called formal logic; it was really a
technical logic of syllogism analysed into linguistic elements, and of
science rested on an empirical basis. At the same time his psychology,
though maintaining his empiricism, contained some seeds of conceptual
logic, and indirectly of formal logic. Intellectual development, which
according to the logic of the _Analytics_ consists of sense, memory,
experience, induction and intellect, according to the psychology of the
_De Anima_ consists of sense, imagination and intellect, and one
division of intellect is into conception of the undivided and
combination of conceptions as one (_De An._ iii. 6). The _De
Interpretatione_ opens with a reference to this psychological
distinction, implying that names represent conceptions, propositions
represent combinations of conceptions. But the same passage relegates
conceptions and their combinations to the _De Anima_, and confines the
_De Interpretatione_ to names and propositions in conformity with the
linguistic analysis which pervades the logical treatises of Aristotle,
who neither brought his psychological distinction between conceptions
and their combinations into his logic, nor advanced the combinations of
conceptions as a definition of judgment ([Greek: krisis]), nor employed
the mental distinction between conceptions and judgments as an analysis
of inference, or reasoning, or syllogism: he was no conceptual logician.
The history of logic shows that the linguistic distinction between terms
and propositions was the sole analysis of reasoning in the logical
treatises of Aristotle; that the mental distinction between conceptions
([Greek: ennoiai]) and judgments ([Greek: axiômata] in a wide sense) was
imported into logic by the Stoics; and that this mental distinction
became the logical analysis of reasoning under the authority of St
Thomas Aquinas. In his commentary on the _De Interpretatione_, St
Thomas, after citing from the _De Anima_ Aristotle's "duplex operatio
intellectus," said, "Additur autem et tertia operatio, scilicet
ratiocinandi," and concluded that, since logic is a rational science
(_rationalis scientia_), its consideration must be directed to all these
operations of reason. Hence arose conceptual logic; according to which
conception is a simple apprehension of an idea without belief in being
or not being, e.g. the idea of man or of running; judgment is a
combination of conceptions, adding being or not being, e.g. man is
running or not running; and reasoning is a combination of judgments:
conversely, there is a mental analysis of reasoning into judgments, and
judgment into conceptions, beneath the linguistic analysis of rational
discourse into propositions, and propositions into terms. Logic,
according to this new school, which has by our time become an old
school, has to co-ordinate these three operations, direct them, and,
beginning with conceptions, combine conceptions into judgments, and
judgments into inference, which thus becomes a complex combination of
conceptions, or, in modern parlance, an extension of our ideas.
Conceptual logicians were, indeed, from the first aware that sense
supplies the data, and that judgment and therefore inference contains
belief that things are or are not. But they held, and still hold that
sensation and conception are alike mere apprehensions, and that the
belief that things are or are not arises somehow after sensation and
conception in judgment, from which it passes into inference. At first,
they were more sanguine of extracting from these unpromising beginnings
some knowledge of things beyond ideas. But at length many of them became
formal logicians, who held that logic is the investigation of formal
thinking, or consistent conception, judgment and reasoning; that it
shows how we infer formal truths of consistency without material truth
of signifying things; that, as the science of the form or process, it
must entirely abstract from the matter, or objects, of thought; and that
it does not tell us how we infer from experience. Thus has logic drifted
further and further from the real and empirical logic of Aristotle the
founder and Bacon the reformer of the science.

The great merit of conceptual logic was the demand for a mental analysis
of mental reasoning, and the direct analysis of reasoning into judgments
which are the sole premises and conclusions of reasoning and of all
mental inferences. Aristotle had fallen into the paradox of resolving a
mental act into verbal elements. The Schoolmen, however, gradually came
to realize that the result to their logic was to make it a
_sermocionalis scientia_, and to their metaphysics the danger of
nominalism. St Thomas made a great advance by making logic throughout a
_rationalis scientia_; and logicians are now agreed that reasoning
consists of judgments, discourse of propositions. This distinction is,
moreover, vital to the whole logic of inference, because we always think
all the judgments of which our inference consists, but seldom state all
the propositions by which it is expressed. We omit propositions, curtail
them, and even express a judgment by a single term, e.g. "Good!"
"Fire!". Hence the linguistic expression is not a true measure of
inference; and to say that an inference consists of two propositions
causing a third is not strictly true. But to say that it is two
judgments causing a third is always true, and the very essence of
inference, because we must think the two to conclude the third in "the
sessions of sweet silent thought." Inference, in short, consists of
actual judgments capable of being expressed in propositions.

  Inference always consists of judgments. But judgment does not always
  consist of conceptions. It is not a combination of conceptions; it
  does not arise from conceptions, nor even at first require conception.
  Sense is the origin of judgment. One who feels pained or pleased, who
  feels hot or cold or resisting in touch, who tastes the flavoured, who
  smells the odorous, who hears the sounding, who sees the coloured, or
  is conscious, already believes that something sensible exists before
  conception, before inference, and before language; and his belief is
  true of the immediate object of sense, the sensible thing, e.g. the
  hot felt in touch. But a belief in the existence of something is a
  judgment and a categorical judgment of existence. Sense, then, outer
  and inner, or sensation and consciousness, is the origin of sensory
  judgments which are true categorical beliefs in the existence of
  sensible things; and primary judgments are such true categorical
  sensory beliefs that things exist, and neither require conception nor
  are combinations of conceptions. Again, since sense is the origin of
  memory and experience, memorial and experiential judgments are
  categorical and existential judgments, which so far as they report
  sensory judgments are always true. Finally, since sense, memory and
  experience are the origin of inference, primary inference is
  categorical and existential, starting from sensory, memorial and
  experiential judgments as premises, and proceeding to inferential
  judgments as conclusions, which are categorical and existential, and
  are true, so far as they depend on sense, memory and experience.

  Sense, then, is the origin of judgment; and the consequence is that
  primary judgments are true, categorical and existential judgments of
  sense, and primary inferences are inferences from categorical and
  existential premises to categorical and existential conclusions, which
  are true so far as they arise from outer and inner sense, and proceed
  to things similar to sensible things. All other judgments and
  inferences about existing things, or ideas, or names, whether
  categorical or hypothetical, are afterthoughts, partly true and partly

  Sense, then, because it involves a true belief in existence is fitted
  to be the origin of judgment. Conception on the other hand is the
  simple apprehension of an idea, particular or universal, but without
  belief that anything is or is not, and therefore is unfitted to beget
  judgment. Nor could a combination of conceptions make a difference so
  fundamental as that between conceiving and believing. The most that it
  could do would be to cause an ideal judgment, e.g. that the idea of a
  centaur is the idea of a man-horse; and even here some further origin
  is needed for the addition of the copula "is."

  So far from being a cause, conception is not even a condition of all
  judgments; a sensation of hot is sufficient evidence that hot exists,
  before the idea of hot is either present or wanted. Conception is,
  however, a condition of a memorial judgment: in order to remember
  being hot, we require an idea of hot. Memory, however, is not that
  idea, but involves a judgment that there previously existed the hot
  now represented by the idea, which is about the sensible thing beyond
  the conceived idea; and the cause of this memorial judgment is past
  sense and present memory. So sense, memory and experience, the sum of
  sense and memory, though requiring conception, are the causes of the
  experiential judgment that there exist and have existed many similar,
  sensible things, and these sensory, memorial and experiential
  judgments about the existence of past and present sensible things
  beyond conceived ideas become the particular premises of primary
  inference. Starting from them, inference is enabled to draw
  conclusions which are inferential judgments about the existence of
  things similar to sensible things beyond conceived ideas. In rising,
  however, from particular to universal inference, induction, as we have
  seen, adds to its particular premise, S is P, a universal premise,
  every M is similar to S, in order to infer the universal conclusion,
  every M is P. This universal premise requires a universal conception
  of a class or whole number of similar particulars, as a condition. But
  the premise is not that conception; it is a belief that there is a
  whole number of particulars similar to those already experienced. The
  generalization of a class is not, as the conceptual logic assumes, the
  abstraction of a general idea, but an inference from the analogy of a
  whole individual thing, e.g. a whole man, to a whole number of similar
  individuals, e.g. the whole of men. The general idea of all men or the
  combination that the idea of all men is similar to the idea of
  particular men would not be enough; the universal premise that all men
  in fact are similar to those who have died is required to induce the
  universal conclusion that all men in fact die. Universal inference
  thus requires particular and universal conceptions as its condition;
  but, so far as it arises from sense, memory, experience, and involves
  generalization, it consists of judgments which do not consist of
  conceptions, but are beliefs in things existing beyond conception.
  Inference then, so far as it starts from categorical and existential
  premises, causes conclusions, or inferential judgments, which require
  conceptions, but are categorical and existential judgments beyond
  conception. Moreover, as it becomes more deductive, and causes
  conclusions further from sensory experience, these inferential
  judgments become causes of inferential conceptions. For example, from
  the evidence of molar changes due to the obvious parts of bodies,
  science first comes to believe in molecular changes due to
  imperceptible particles, and then tries to conceive the ideas of
  particles, molecules, atoms, electrons. The conceptual logic supposes
  that conception always precedes judgment; but the truth is that
  sensory judgment begins and inferential judgment ends by preceding
  conception. The supposed triple order--conception, judgment,
  reasoning--is defective and false. The real order is sensation and
  sensory judgment, conception, memory and memorial judgment, experience
  and experiential judgment, inference, inferential judgment,
  inferential conception. This is not all: inferential conceptions are
  inadequate, and finally fail. They are often symbolical; that is, we
  conceive one thing only by another like it, e.g. atoms by minute
  bodies not nearly small enough. Often the symbol is not like. What
  idea can the physicist form of intraspatial ether? What believer in
  God pretends to conceive Him as He really is? We believe many things
  that we cannot conceive; as Mill said, the inconceivable is not the
  incredible; and the point of science is not what we can conceive but
  what we should believe on evidence. Conception is the weakest,
  judgment the strongest power of man's mind. Sense before conception is
  the original cause of judgment; and inference from sense enables
  judgment to continue after conception ceases. Finally, as there is
  judgment without conception, so there is conception without judgment.
  We often say "I understand, but do not decide." But this suspension of
  judgment is a highly refined act, unfitted to the beginning of
  thought. Conception begins as a condition of memory, and after a long
  continuous process of inference ends in mere ideation. The conceptual
  logic has made the mistake of making ideation a stage in thought prior
  to judgment.

  It was natural enough that the originators of conceptual logic, seeing
  that judgments can be expressed by propositions, and conceptions by
  terms, should fall into the error of supposing that, as propositions
  consist of terms, so judgments consist of conceptions, and that there
  is a triple mental order--conception, judgment, reasoning--parallel to
  the triple linguistic order--term, proposition, discourse. They
  overlooked the fact that man thinks long before he speaks, makes
  judgments which he does not express at all, or expresses them by
  interjections, names and phrases, before he uses regular propositions,
  and that he does not begin by conceiving and naming, and then proceed
  to believing and proposing. Feeling and sensation, involving believing
  or judging, come before conception and language. As conceptions are
  not always present in judgment, as they are only occasional
  conditions, and as they are unfitted to cause beliefs or judgments,
  and especially judgments of existence, and as judgments both precede
  conceptions in sense and continue after them in inference, it follows
  that conceptions are not the constituents of judgment, and judgment is
  not a combination of conceptions. Is there then any analysis of
  judgment? Paradoxical as it may sound, the truth seems to be that
  primary judgment, beginning as it does with the simplest feeling and
  sensation, is not a combination of two mental elements into one, but
  is a division of one sensible thing into the thing itself and its
  existence and the belief that it is determined as existing, e.g. that
  hot exists, cold exists, the pained exists, the pleased exists. Such a
  judgment has a cause, namely sense, but no mental elements.
  Afterwards come judgments of complex sense, e.g. that the existing hot
  is burning or becoming more or less hot, &c. Thus there is a
  combination of sensations causing the judgment; but the judgment is
  still a division of the sensible thing into itself and its being, and
  a belief that it is so determined. Afterwards follow judgments arising
  from more complex causes, e.g. memory, experience, inference. But
  however complicated these mental causes, there still remain these
  points common to all judgment:--(1) The mental causes of judgment are
  sense, memory, experience and inference; while conception is a
  condition of some judgments. (2) A judgment is not a combination
  either of its causes or of its conditions, e.g. it is not a
  combination of sensations any more than of ideas. (3) A judgment is a
  unitary mental act, dividing not itself but its object into the object
  itself and itself as determined, and signifying that it is so
  determined. (4) A primary judgment is a judgment that a sensible thing
  is determined as existing; but later judgments are concerned with
  either existing things, or with ideas, or with words, and signify that
  they are determined in all sorts of ways. (5) When a judgment is
  expressed by a proposition, the proposition expresses the results of
  the division by two terms, subject and predicate, and by the copula
  that what is signified by the subject is what is signified by the
  predicate; and the proposition is a combination of the two terms; e.g.
  border war is evil. (6) A complex judgment is a combination of two
  judgments, and may be copulative, e.g. you and I are men, or
  hypothetical, or disjunctive, &c.

Empirical logic, the logic of Aristotle and Bacon, is on the right way.
It is the business of the logician to find the causes of the judgments
which form the premises and the conclusions of inference, reasoning and
science. What knowledge do we get by sense, memory and experience, the
first mental causes of judgment? What is judgment, and what its various
kinds? What is inference, how does it proceed by combining judgments as
premises to cause judgments as conclusions, and what are its various
kinds? How does inference draw conclusions more or less probable up to
moral certainty? How does it by the aid of identification convert
probable into necessary conclusions, which become necessary principles
of demonstration? How is categorical succeeded by conditional inference?
What is scientific method as a system of inferences about definite
subjects? How does inference become the source of error and fallacy? How
does the whole process from sense to inference discover the real truth
of judgments, which are true so far as they signify things known by
sense, memory, experience and inference? These are the fundamental
questions of the science of inference. Conceptual logic, on the other
hand, is false from the start. It is not the first business of logic to
direct us how to form conceptions signified by terms, because sense is a
prior cause of judgment and inference. It is not the second business of
logic to direct us how out of conceptions to form judgments signified by
propositions, because the real causes of judgments are sense, memory,
experience and inference. It is, however, the main business of logic to
direct us how out of judgments to form inferences signified by
discourse; and this is the one point which conceptual logic has
contributed to the science of inference. But why spoil the further
mental analysis of inference by supposing that conceptions are
constituents of judgment and therefore of inference, which thus becomes
merely a complex combination of conceptions, an extension of ideas? The
mistake has been to convert three operations of mind into three
processes in a fixed order--conception, judgment, inference. Conception
and judgment are decisions: inference alone is a process, from decisions
to decision, from judgments to judgment. Sense, not conception, is the
origin of judgment. Inference is the process which from judgments about
sensible things proceeds to judgments about things similar to sensible
things. Though some conceptions are its conditions and some judgments
its causes, inference itself in its conclusions causes many more
judgments and conceptions. Finally, inference is an extension, not of
ideas, but of beliefs, at first about existing things, afterwards about
ideas, and even about words; about anything in short about which we
think, in what is too fancifully called "the universe of discourse."

Formal logic has arisen out of the narrowness of conceptual logic. The
science of inference no doubt has to deal primarily with formal truth or
the consistency of premises and conclusion. But as all truth, real as
well as formal, is consistent, formal rules of consistency become real
rules of truth, when the premises are true and the consistent conclusion
is therefore true. The science of inference again rightly emphasizes the
formal thinking of the syllogism in which the combination of premises
involves the conclusion. But the combinations of premises in analogical
and inductive inference, although the combination does not involve the
conclusion, yet causes us to infer it, and in so similar a way that the
science of inference is not complete without investigating all the
combinations which characterize different kinds of inference. The
question of logic is how we infer in fact, as well as perfectly; and we
cannot understand inference unless we consider inferences of probability
of all kinds. Moreover, the study of analogical and inductive inference
is necessary to that of the syllogism itself, because they discover the
premises of syllogism. The formal thinking of syllogism alone is merely
necessary consequence; but when its premises are necessary principles,
its conclusions are not only necessary consequents but also necessary
truths. Hence the manner in which induction aided by identification
discovers necessary principles must be studied by the logician in order
to decide when the syllogism can really arrive at necessary conclusions.
Again, the science of inference has for its subject the form, or
processes, of thought, but not its matter or objects. But it does not
follow that it can investigate the former without the latter. Formal
logicians say that, if they had to consider the matter, they must either
consider all things, which would be impossible, or select some, which
would be arbitrary. But there is an intermediate alternative, which is
neither impossible nor arbitrary; namely, to consider the general
distinctions and principles of all things; and without this general
consideration of the matter the logician cannot know the form of
thought, which consists in drawing inferences about things on these
general principles. Lastly, the science of inference is not indeed the
science of sensation, memory and experience, but at the same time it is
the science of using those mental operations as data of inference; and,
if logic does not show how analogical and inductive inferences directly,
and deductive inferences indirectly, arise from experience, it becomes a
science of mere thinking without knowledge.

Logic is related to all the sciences, because it considers the common
inferences and varying methods used in investigating different subjects.
But it is most closely related to the sciences of metaphysics and
psychology, which form with it a triad of sciences. Metaphysics is the
science of being in general, and therefore of the things which become
objects apprehended by our minds. Psychology is the science of mind in
general, and therefore of the mental operations, of which inference is
one. Logic is the science of the processes of inference. These three
sciences, of the objects of mind, of the operations of mind, of the
processes used in the inferences of mind, are differently, but closely
related, so that they are constantly confused. The real point is their
interdependence, which is so intimate that one sign of great philosophy
is a consistent metaphysics, psychology and logic. If the world of
things is _known_ to be partly material and partly mental, then the mind
must have powers of sense and inference enabling it to know these
things, and there must be processes of inference carrying us from and
beyond the sensible to the insensible world of matter and mind. If the
whole world of things is matter, operations and processes of mind are
themselves material. If the whole world of things is mind, operations
and processes of mind have only to recognize their like all the world
over. It is clear then that a man's metaphysics and psychology must
colour his logic. It is accordingly necessary to the logician to know
beforehand the general distinctions and principles of things in
metaphysics, and the mental operations of sense, conception, memory and
experience in psychology, so as to discover the processes of inference
from experience about things in logic.

The interdependence of this triad of sciences has sometimes led to their
confusion. Hegel, having identified being with thought, merged
metaphysics in logic. But he divided logic into objective and
subjective, and thus practically confessed that there is one science of
the objects and another of the processes of thought. Psychologists,
seeing that inference is a mental operation, often extemporize a theory
of inference to the neglect of logic. But we have a double consciousness
of inference. We are conscious of it as one operation among many, and of
its omnipresence, so to speak, to all the rest. But we are also
conscious of the processes of the operation of inference. To a certain
extent this second consciousness applies to other operations: for
example, we are conscious of the process of association by which various
mental causes recall ideas in the imagination. But how little does the
psychologist know about the association of ideas, compared with what the
logician has discovered about the processes of inference! The fact is
that our primary consciousness of all mental operations is hardly equal
to our secondary consciousness of the processes of the one operation of
inference from premises to conclusions permeating long trains and
pervading whole sciences. This elaborate consciousness of inferential
process is the justification of logic as a distinct science, and is the
first step in its method. But it is not the whole method of logic, which
also and rightly considers the mental process necessary to language,
without substituting linguistic for mental distinctions.

Nor are consciousness and linguistic analysis all the instruments of the
logician. Logic has to consider the things we know, the minds by which
we know them from sense, memory and experience to inference, and the
sciences which systematize and extend our knowledge of things; and
having considered these facts, the logician must make such a science of
inference as will explain the power and the poverty of human knowledge.


There are several grounds for hope in the logic of our day. In the first
place, it tends to take up an intermediate position between the extremes
of Kant and Hegel. It does not, with the former, regard logic as purely
formal in the sense of abstracting thought from being, nor does it
follow the latter in amalgamating metaphysics with logic by identifying
being with thought. Secondly, it does not content itself with the mere
formulae of thinking, but pushes forward to theories of method,
knowledge and science; and it is a hopeful sign to find this
epistemological spirit, to which England was accustomed by Mill,
animating German logicians such as Lotze, Dühring, Schuppe, Sigwart and
Wundt. Thirdly, there is a determination to reveal the psychological
basis of logical processes, and not merely to describe them as they are
in adult reasoning, but to explain also how they arise from simpler
mental operations and primarily from sense. This attempt is connected
with the psychological turn given to recent philosophy by Wundt and
others, and is dangerous only so far as psychology itself is
hypothetical. Unfortunately, however, these merits are usually connected
with a less admirable characteristic--contempt for tradition, Writing
his preface to his second edition in 1888, Sigwart says: "Important
works have appeared by Lotze, Schuppe, Wundt and Bradley, to name only
the most eminent; and all start from the conception which has guided
this attempt. That is, logic is grounded by them, not upon an effete
tradition but upon a new investigation of thought as it actually is in
its psychological foundations, in its significance for knowledge, and
its actual operation in scientific methods." How strange! The spirit of
every one of the three reforms above enumerated is an unconscious return
to Aristotle's _Organon_. Aristotle's was a logic which steered, as
Trendelenburg has shown, between Kantian formalism and Hegelian
metaphysics; it was a logic which in the Analytics investigated the
syllogism as a means to understanding knowledge and science: it was a
logic which, starting from the psychological foundations of sense,
memory and experience, built up the logical structure of induction and
deduction on the profoundly Aristotelian principle that "there is no
process from universals without induction, and none by induction without
sense." Wundt's comprehensive view that logic looks backwards to
psychology and forward to epistemology was hundreds of years ago one of
the many discoveries of Aristotle.


1. _Judgment and Conception._--The emphasis now laid on judgment, the
recovery from Hume's confusion of beliefs with ideas and the association
of ideas, and the distinction of the mental act of judging from its
verbal expression in a proposition, are all healthy signs in recent
logic. The most fundamental question, before proceeding to the
investigation of inference, is not what we say but what we think in
making the judgments which, whether we express them in propositions or
not, are both the premises and the conclusion of inference; and, as this
question has been diligently studied of late, but has been variously
answered, it will be well to give a list of the more important theories
of judgment as follows:--

  a. It expresses a relation between the content of two ideas, not a
  relation of these ideas (Lotze).

  b. It is consciousness concerning the objective validity of a
  subjective combination of ideas, i.e. whether between the
  corresponding objective elements an analogous combination exists

  c. It is the synthesis of ideas into unity and consciousness of their
  objective validity, not in the sense of agreement with external
  reality but in the sense of the logical necessity of their synthesis

  d. It is the analysis of an aggregate idea (_Gesammtvorstellung_) into
  subject and predicate; based on a previous association of ideas, on
  relating and comparing, and on the apperceptive synthesis of an
  aggregate idea in consequence; but itself consisting in an
  apperceptive analysis of that aggregate idea; and requiring will in
  the form of apperception or attention (Wundt).

  e. It requires an idea, because every object is conceived as well as
  recognized or denied; but it is itself an assertion of actual fact,
  every perception counts for a judgment, and every categorical is
  changeable into an existential judgment without change of sense
  (Brentano, who derives his theory from Mill except that he denies the
  necessity of a combination of ideas, and reduces a categorical to an
  existential judgment).

  f. It is a decision of the validity of an idea requiring will
  (Bergmann, following Brentano).

  g. Judgment (_Urtheil_) expresses that two ideas belong together:
  "by-judgment" (_Beurtheilung_) is the reaction of will expressing the
  validity or invalidity of the combination of ideas (Windelband,
  following Bergmann, but distinguishing the decision of validity from
  the judgment).

  h. Judgment is consciousness of the identity or difference and of the
  causal relations of the given; naming the actual combinations of the
  data, but also requiring a priori categories of the understanding, the
  notions of identity, difference and causality, as principles of
  thought or laws, to combine the plurality of the given into a unity

  i. Judgment is the act which refers an ideal content recognized as
  such to a reality beyond the act, predicating an idea of a reality, a
  what of a that; so that the subject is reality and the predicate the
  meaning of an idea, while the judgment refers the idea to reality by
  an identity of content (Bradley and Bosanquet).

  k. Judgment is an assertion of reality, requiring comparison and ideas
  which render it directly expressible in words (Hobhouse, mainly
  following Bradley).

These theories are of varying value in proportion to their proximity to
Aristotle's point that predication is about things, and to Mill's point
that judgments and propositions are about things, not about ideas. The
essence of judgment is belief that something is (or is not) determined,
either as existing (e.g. "I am," "A centaur is not") or as something in
particular (e.g. "I am a man," "I am not a monkey"). Neither Mill,
however, nor any of the later logicians whose theories we have quoted,
has been able quite to detach judgment from conception; they all suppose
that an idea, or ideas, is a condition of all judgment. But judgment
starts from sensation (_Empfindung_) and feeling (_Gefühl_), and not
from idea (_Vorstellung_). When I feel pleased or pained, or when I use
my senses to perceive a pressure, a temperature, a flavour, an odour, a
colour, a sound, or when I am conscious of feeling and perceiving, I
cannot resist the belief that something sensible is present; and this
belief that something exists is already a judgment, a judgment of
existence, and, so far as it is limited to sense without inference, a
true judgment. It is a matter of words whether or not we should call
this sensory belief a judgment; but it is no matter of choice to the
logician, who regards all the constituents of inference as judgments;
for the fundamental constituents are sensory beliefs, which are
therefore judgments in the logical sense. Sense is the evidence of
inference; directly of analogical and inductive, directly or indirectly
of deductive, inference; and therefore, if logic refuses to include
sensory beliefs among judgments, it will omit the fundamental
constituents of inference, inference will no longer consist of judgments
but of sensory beliefs plus judgments, and the second part of logic, the
logic of judgment, the purpose of which is to investigate the
constituents of inference, will be like _Hamlet_ without the prince of
Denmark. If, on the other hand, all the constituents of inference are
judgments, there are judgments of sense; and the evidence of the senses
means that a judgment of sense is true, while a judgment of inference is
true so far as it is directly or indirectly concluded from judgments of
sense. Now a sensory judgment, e.g. that a sensible pressure is
existing, is explained by none of the foregoing theories, because it
requires nothing but sensation and belief. It requires no will, but is
usually involuntary, for the stimulus forces one's attention, which is
not always voluntary; not all judgment then requires will, as Wundt
supposes. It requires no reference to reality beyond the sensible
pressure, because it is merely a belief that this exists without
inference of the external stimulus or any inference at all: not all
judgment then requires the reference of subjective to objective supposed
by Ueberweg, or the consciousness of logical necessity supposed by
Sigwart. It requires in addition to the belief that something exists, no
consideration as to whether the belief itself be true, because a man who
feels pressure believes in the thing without further question about the
belief: not all judgment then requires a decision of validity, as
Bergmann supposes. It requires nothing beyond the sensation and belief
in the given existence of the given pressure: not all judgment then
requires categories of understanding, or notions of identity, difference
and causality, or even of existence, such as Schuppe supposes. It
requires no comparison in order to express it in words, for a judgment
need not be expressed, and a sensory judgment of pressure is an
irresistible belief that a real pressure exists, without waiting for
words, or for a comparison which is wanted not to make a sensation a
judgment, but to turn a judgment into language: not all judgment then
requires comparison with a view to its expression, as supposed by
Hobhouse. Lastly, all the authors of the above-quoted theories err in
supposing that all judgment requires conception; for even Mill thinks a
combination of ideas necessary, and Brentano, who comes still nearer to
the nature of sensory judgment when he says, "Every perception counts
for a judgment," yet thinks that an idea is necessary at the same time
in order to understand the thing judged. In reality, the sensation and
the belief are sufficient; when I feel a sensible pressure, I cannot
help believing in its reality, and therefore judging that it is real,
without any _tertium quid_--an idea of pressure, or of existence or of
pressure existing--intervening between the sensation and the belief.
Only after sensation has ceased does an idea, or representation of what
is not presented, become necessary as a substitute for a sensation and
as a condition not of the first judgment that there is, but of a second
judgment that there was, something sensible. Otherwise there would be no
judgment of sensible fact, for the first sensation would not give it,
and the idea following the sensation would be still farther off. The
sensory judgment then, which is nothing but a belief that at the moment
of sense something sensible exists, is a proof that not all judgment
requires conception, or synthesis or analysis of ideas, or decision
about the content, or about the validity, of ideas, or reference of an
ideal content to reality, as commonly, though variously, supposed in the
logic of our day.

Not, however, that all judgment is sensory: after the first judgments of
sense follow judgments of memory, and memory requires ideas. Yet memory
is not mere conception, as Aristotle, and Mill after him, have
perceived. To remember, we must have a present idea; but we must also
have a belief that the thing, of which the idea is a representation, was
(or was not) determined; and this belief is the memorial judgment.
Originally such judgments arise from sensory judgments followed by
ideas, and are judgments of memory after sense that something sensible
existed, e.g. pressure existed: afterwards come judgments of memory
after inference, e.g. Caesar was murdered. Finally, most judgments are
inferential. These are conclusions which primarily are inferred from
sensory and memorial judgments; and so far as inference starts from
sense of something sensible in the present, and from memory after sense
of something sensible in the past, and concludes similar things,
inferential judgments are indirect beliefs in being and in existence
beyond ideas. When from the sensible pressures between the parts of my
mouth, which I feel and remember and judge that they exist and have
existed, I infer another similar pressure (e.g. of the food which
presses and is pressed by my mouth in eating), the inferential judgment
with which I conclude is a belief that the latter exists as well as the
former (e.g. the pressure of food without as well as the sensible
pressures within). Inference, no doubt, is closely involved with
conception. So far as it depends on memory, an inferential judgment
presupposes memorial ideas in its data; and so far as it infers
universal classes and laws, it produces general ideas. But even so the
part played by conception is quite subordinate to that of belief. In the
first place, the remembered datum, from which an inference of pressure
starts, is not the conceived idea, but the belief that the sensible
pressure existed. Secondly, the conclusion in which it ends is not the
general idea of a class, but the belief that a class, represented by a
general idea, exists, and is (or is not) otherwise determined (e.g. that
things pressing and pressed exist and move). Two things are certain
about inferential judgment: one, that when inference is based on sense
and memory, inferential judgment starts from a combination of sensory
and memorial judgment, both of which are beliefs that things exist; the
other, that in consequence inferential judgment is a belief that similar
things exist. There are thus three primary judgments: judgments of
sense, of memory after sense, and of inference from sense. All these are
beliefs in being and existence, and this existential belief is first in
sense, and afterwards transferred to memory and inference. Moreover, it
is transferred in the same irresistible way: frequently we cannot help
either feeling pressure, or remembering it, or inferring it; and as
there are involuntary sensation and attention, so there are involuntary
memory and inference. Again, in a primary judgment existence need not be
expressed; but if expressed, it may be expressed either by the
predicate, e.g. "I exist," or by the subject, e.g. "I who exist think."
There are indeed differences between primary judgments, in that the
sensory is a belief in present, the memorial in past, and the
inferential in present, past and future existence. But these differences
in detail do not alter the main point that all these are beliefs in the
existing, in the real as opposed to the ideal, in actual things which
are not ideas. In short, a primary judgment is a belief in something
existing apart from our idea of it; and not because we have an idea of
it, or by comparing an idea with, or referring an idea to, reality; but
because we have a sensation of it, or a memory of it or an inference of
it. Sensation, not conception, is the origin of judgment.

2. _Different Significations of Being in different Kinds of
Judgment._--As Aristotle remarked both in the _De Interpretatione_ and
in the _Sophistici Elenchi_, "not-being is thinkable" does not mean
"not-being exists." In the latter treatise he added that it is a
_fallacia a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter_ to argue from the
former to the latter; "for," as he says, "it is not the same thing to be
something and to exist absolutely." Without realizing their debt to
tradition, Herbart, Mill and recently Sigwart, have repeated Aristotle's
separation of the copula from the verb of existence, as if it were a
modern discovery that "is" is not the same as "exists." It may be added
that they do not quite realize what the copula exactly signifies: it
does not signify existence, but it does signify a fact, namely, that
something is (or is not) determined, either absolutely in a categorical
judgment, or conditionally in a conditional judgment. Now we have seen
that all primary judgments signify more than this fact; they are also
beliefs in the existence of the thing signified by the subject. But, in
the first place, primary judgments signify this existence never by the
copula, but sometimes by the predicate, and sometimes by the subject;
and, secondly, it does not follow that all judgments whatever signify
existence. Besides inference of existence there is inference of
non-existence, of things inconsistent with the objects of primary
judgments. Hence secondary judgments, which no longer contain a belief
that the thing exists, e.g. the judgment, "not-being is thinkable,"
cited by Aristotle; the judgment, "A square circle is impossible," cited
by Herbart; the judgment, "A centaur is a fiction of the poets," cited
by Mill. These secondary judgments of non-existence are partly like and
partly unlike primary judgments of existence. They resemble them in that
they are beliefs in being signified by the copula. They are beliefs in
things of a sort; for, after all, ideas and names are things; their
objects, even though non-existent, are at all events things conceivable
or nameable; and therefore we are able to make judgments that things,
non-existent but conceivable or nameable, are (or are not) determined in
a particular manner. Thus the judgment about a centaur is the belief, "A
conceivable centaur is a fiction of the poets," and the judgment about a
square circle is the belief, "A so-called square circle is an
impossibility." But, though beliefs that things of some sort are (or are
not) determined, these secondary judgments fall short of primary
judgments of existence. Whereas in a primary judgment there is a further
belief, signified by subject or predicate, that the thing is an existing
thing in the sense of being a real thing (e.g. a man), different from
the idea of it as well as from the name for it; in a secondary judgment
there is no further belief that the thing has any existence beyond the
idea (e.g. a centaur), or even beyond the name (e.g. a square circle):
though the idea or name exists, there is no belief that anything
represented by idea or name exists. Starting, then, from this
fundamental distinction between judgments of existence and judgments of
non-existence, we may hope to steer our way between two extreme views
which emanate from two important thinkers, each of whom has produced a
flourishing school of psychological logic.

On the one hand, early in the 19th century Herbart started the view that
a categorical judgment is never a judgment of existence, but always
hypothetical; on the other hand, in the latter part of the century
Brentano started the view that all categorical judgments are
existential. The truth lies between these contraries. The view of
Herbart and his school is contradicted by our primary judgments of and
from sense, in which we cannot help believing existence; and it gives an
inadequate account even of our secondary judgments in which we no longer
indeed believe existence, but do frequently believe that a non-existent
thing is (or is not) somehow determined unconditionally. It is true, as
Herbart says, that the judgment, "A square circle is an impossibility,"
does not contain the belief, "A square circle is existent"; but when he
goes on to argue that it means, "If a square circle is thought, the
conception of impossibility must be added in thought," he falls into a
_non-sequitur_. To be categorical, a judgment does not require a belief
in existence, but only that something, existent or not, is (or is not)
determined; and there are two quite different attitudes of mind even to
a non-existent thing, such as a square circle, namely, unconditional and
conditional belief. The judgment, "A non-existent but so-called square
circle is an impossibility," is an unconditional, or categorical
judgment of non-existence, quite different from any hypothetical
judgment, which depends on the conditions "if it is thought," or "if it
exists," or any other "if." On the other hand, the view of Brentano and
his school is contradicted by these very categorical judgments of
non-existence; and while it applies only to categorical judgments of
existence, it does so inadequately. To begin with the latter objection,
Brentano proposed to change the four Aristotelian forms of judgment, A,
E, I, O, into the following existential forms:--

  A. "There is not an immortal man."
  E. "There is not a live stone."
  I. "There is a sick man."
  O. "There is an unlearned man."

This reconstruction, which merges subject and predicate in one
expression, in order to combine it with the verb of existence, is
repeated in similar proposals of recent English logicians. Venn, in his
_Symbolic Logic_, proposes the four forms, xy = 0, xy = 0, xy> 0, xy> 0
(where y means "not-y"), but only as alternative to the ordinary forms.
Bradley says that "'S-P is real' attributes S-P, directly or indirectly,
to the ultimate reality," and agrees with Brentano that "'is' never
stands for anything but 'exists'"; while Bosanquet, who follows Bradley,
goes so far as to define a categorical judgment as "that which affirms
the existence of its subject, or, in other words, asserts a fact." Now
it is true that our primary judgments do contain a belief in existence;
but they do not all contain it in the same way, but are beliefs
sometimes that something is determined as existing, and sometimes that
something existing is particularly determined. Brentano's forms do not
express such a judgment of existence, as "All existing men are mortal":
nor does Bradley's form, "Reality includes S-P." Metaphysically, all
realities are parts of one ultimate reality; but logically, even
philosophers think more often only of finite realities, existing men,
dogs, horses, &c.; and children know that their parents exist long
before they apprehend ultimate reality. The normal form, then, of a
judgment of existence is either "S is a real P," or "A real S is P."
Hence the reconstruction of all categorical judgments by merging subject
and predicate, either on Brentano's or on Bradley's plan, is a
misrepresentation even of normal categorical judgments of existence.
Secondly, it is much more a misrepresentation of categorical judgments
of non-existence. No existential form suits a judgment such as "A
centaur is a fiction," when we do not believe that there is a centaur,
or that reality includes a centaur. As Mill pointed out, it cannot be
implied that a centaur exists, since the very thing asserted is that the
thing has no real existence. In a correspondence with Mill, Brentano
rejoined that the centaur exists in imagination; Bradley says, "inside
our heads." According to one, then, the judgment becomes "There is an
imaginary centaur"; according to the other "Reality includes an
imaginary centaur." The rejoinder, however, though partly true, is not
to the point. The idea of the centaur does exist in our imagination, and
inside our heads, and the name of it in our mouths. But the point is
that the centaur conceived and named does not exist beyond the idea of
it and the name for it; it is not, like a man, a real thing which is
neither the idea of it nor the name for it. No amount of subtlety will
remove the difference between a categorical judgment of existence, e.g.
"An existing man is mortal," and a categorical judgment of
non-existence, e.g. "A conceivable centaur is a fiction," because in the
former we believe and mean that the thing exists beyond the idea, and in
the latter we do not. If, contrary to usage, we choose to call the
latter a judgment of existence, there is no use in quarrelling about
words; but we must insist that new terms must in that case be invented
to express so fundamental a difference as that between judgments about
real men and judgments about ideal centaurs. So long, however, as we use
words in the natural sense, and call the former judgments of existence,
and the latter judgments of non-existence, then "is" will not be, as
Bradley supposes, the same as "exists," for we use "is" in both
judgments, but "exists" only in the first kind. Bosanquet's definition
of a categorical judgment contains a similar confusion. To assert a fact
and to affirm the existence of a subject are not, as he makes out, the
same thing: a judgment often asserts a fact and denies existence in the
same breath, e.g. "Jupiter is non-existent." Here, as usual in logic,
tradition is better than innovation. All categorical judgment is an
unconditional belief in the fact, signified by the copula, that a thing
of some sort is (or is not) determined; but some categorical judgments
are also beliefs that the thing is an existing thing, signified either
by the subject or by the predicate, while others are not beliefs that
the thing exists at all, but are only beliefs in something conceivable,
or nameable, or in something or other, without particularizing what.
Judgment then always signifies being, but not always existence.

3. _Particular and Universal Judgments._--Aristotle, by distinguishing
affirmative and negative, particular and universal, made the fourfold
classification of judgments, A, E, I and O, the foundation both of
opposition and of inference. With regard to inference, he remarked that
a universal judgment means by "all," not every individual we know, but
every individual absolutely, so that, when it becomes a major premise,
we know therein every individual universally, not individually, and
often do not know a given individual individually until we add a minor
premise in a syllogism. Whereas, then, a particular judgment is a belief
that some, a universal judgment is a belief that all, the individuals of
a kind or total of similar individuals, are similarly determined,
whether they are known or unknown individuals. Now, as we have already
seen, what is signified by the subject may be existing or not, and in
either case a judgment remains categorical so long as it is a belief
without conditions. Thus, "Some existing men are poets," "All existing
men are mortal," "Some conceivable centaurs are human in their
forequarters," "All conceivable centaurs are equine in their
hindquarters," are all categorical judgments, while the two first are
also categorical judgments of existence. Nevertheless these obvious
applications of Aristotelian traditions have been recently challenged,
especially by Sigwart, who holds in his _Logic_ (secs. 27, 36) that,
while a particular is a categorical judgment of existence, a universal
is hypothetical, on the ground that it does not refer to a definite
number of individuals, or to individuals at all, but rather to general
ideas, and that the appropriate form of "all M is P" is "if anything is
M it is P." This view, which has influenced not only German but also
English logicians, such as Venn, Bradley and Bosanquet, destroys the
fabric of inference, and reduces scientific laws to mere hypotheses. In
reality, however, particular and universal judgments are too closely
connected to have such different imports. In opposition, a categorical
particular is the contradictory of a universal, which is also
categorical, not hypothetical, e.g., "not all M is P" is the
contradictory of "all M is P," not of "if anything is M it is P." In
inference, a particular is an example of a universal which in its turn
may become a particular example of a higher universal. For instance, in
the history of mechanics it was first inferred from some that all
terrestrial bodies gravitate, and then from these as some that all
ponderable bodies, terrestrial and celestial, gravitate. How absurd to
suppose that here we pass from a particular categorical to a universal
hypothetical, and then treat this very conclusion as a particular
categorical to pass to a higher universal hypothetical! Sigwart, indeed,
is deceived both about particulars and universals. On the one hand, some
particulars are not judgments of existence, e.g. "some imaginary deities
are goddesses"; on the other hand, some universals are not judgments of
non-existence, e.g. "every existing man is mortal." Neither kind is
always a judgment of existence, but each is sometimes the one and
sometimes the other. In no case is a universal hypothetical, unless we
think it under a condition; for in a universal judgment about the
non-existing, e.g. about all conceivable centaurs, we do not think, "If
anything is a centaur," because we do not believe that there are any;
and in a universal judgment about the existent, e.g. about all existing
men, we do not think, "If anything is a man," because we believe that
there is a whole class of men existing at different times and places.
The cause of Sigwart's error is his misconception of "all." So far as he
follows Aristotle in saying that "all" does not mean a definite number
of individuals he is right; but when he says that we mean no individuals
at all he deserts Aristotle and goes wrong. By "all" we mean every
individual whatever of a kind; and when from the experience of sense and
memory we start with particular judgments of existence, and infer
universal judgments of existence and scientific laws, we further mean
those existing individuals which we have experienced, and every
individual whatever of the kind which exists. We mean neither a definite
number of individuals, nor yet an infinite number, but an incalculable
number, whether experienced or inferred to exist. We do not mean
existing here and now, nor yet out of time and place, but at any time
and place (_semper et ubique_)--past, present and future being treated
as simply existing, by what logicians used to call _suppositio
naturalis_. We mean then by "all existing" every similar individual
whatever, whenever, and wherever existing. Hence Sigwart is right in
saying that "All bodies are extended" means "Whatever is a body is
extended," but wrong in identifying this form with "If anything is a
body it is extended." "Whatever" is not "if anything." For the same
reason it is erroneous to confuse "all existing" with a general idea.
Nor does the use of abstract ideas and terms make any difference. When
Bosanquet says that in "Heat is a mode of motion" there is no reference
to individual objects, but "a pure hypothetical form which absolutely
neglects the existence of objects," he falls far short of expressing the
nature of this scientific judgment, for in his _Theory of Heat_ Clerk
Maxwell describes it as "believing heat as it exists in a hot body to be
in the form of kinetic energy." As Bacon would say, it is a belief that
all individual bodies _qua_ hot are individually but similarly moving in
their particles. When, again, Bradley and Bosanquet speak of the
universal as if it always meant one ideal content referred to reality,
they forget that in universal judgments of existence, such as "All men
existing are mortal," we believe that every individually existing man
dies his own death individually, though similarly to other men; and that
we are thinking neither of ideas nor of reality; but of all existent
individual men being individually but similarly determined. A universal
is indeed one whole; but it is one whole of many similars, which are not
the same with one another. This is indeed the very essence of
distribution, that a universal is predicable, not singly or
collectively, but severally and similarly of each and every individual
of a kind, or total of similar individuals. So also the essence of a
universal judgment is that every individual of the kind is severally but
similarly determined. Finally, a universal judgment is often
existential; but whether it is so or not it remains categorical, so long
as it introduces no hypothetical antecedent about the existence of the
thing signified by the subject. It is true that even in universal
judgments of existence there is often a hypothetical element; for
example, "All men are mortal" contains a doubt whether every man
whatever, whenever and wherever existing, must die. But this is only a
doubt whether all the things signified by the subject are similarly
determined as signified by the predicate, and not a doubt whether there
are such things at all. Hence the hypothetical element is not a
hypothetical antecedent "If anything is a man," but an uncertain
conclusion that "All existing men are mortal." In other words, a
categorical universal is often problematic, but a problematic is not the
same as a hypothetical judgment.

4. _The Judgment and the Proposition._--Judgment in general is the
mental act of believing that something is (or is not) determined. A
proposition is the consequent verbal expression of such a belief, and
consists in asserting that the thing as signified by the subject is (or
is not) determined as signified by the predicate. But the expression is
not necessary. Sensation irresistibly produces a judgment of existence
without needing language. Children think long before they speak; and
indeed, as mere vocal sounds are not speech, and as the apprehension
that a word signifies a thing is a judgment, judgment is originally not
an effect, but a cause of significant language. At any rate, even when
we have learnt to speak, we do not express all we think, as we may see
not only from the fewness of words known to a child, but also from our
own adult consciousness. The principle of thought is to judge enough to
conclude. The principle of language is to speak only so far as to
understand and be understood. Hence speech is only a curtailed
expression of thought. Sometimes we express a whole judgment by one
word, e.g. "Fire!" or by a phrase, e.g. "What a fire!" and only usually
by a proposition. But even the normal proposition in the syllogistic
form _tertii adjacentis_, with subject, predicate and copula, is seldom
a complete expression of the judgment. The consequence is that the
proposition, being different from a judgment arising after a judgment,
and remaining an imperfect copy of judgment, is only a superficial
evidence of its real nature. Fortunately, we have more profound
evidences, and at least three evidences in all: the linguistic
expression of belief in the proposition; the consciousness of what we
mentally believe; and the analysis of reasoning, which shows what we
must believe, and have believed, as data for inference. In these ways we
find that a judgment is both different from, and more than, a
proposition. But recent logicians, although they perceive the
difference, nevertheless tend to make the proposition the measure of the
judgment. This makes them omit sensory judgments, and count only those
which require ideas, and even general ideas expressed in general terms.
Sigwart, for example, gives as instances of our most elementary
judgments, "This is Socrates," "This is snow"--beliefs in things
existing beyond ourselves which require considerable inferences from
many previous judgments of sense and memory. Worse still, logicians seem
unable to keep the judgment apart from the proposition. Herbart says
that the judgment "A is B" does not contain the usually added thought
that A is, because there is no statement of A's existence; as if the
statement mattered to the thought. So Sigwart, in order to reduce
universals to hypotheticals, while admitting that existence is usually
thought, argues that it is not stated in the universal judgment; so also
Bosanquet. But in the judgment the point is not what we state, but what
we think; and so long as the existence of A is added in thought, the
judgment in question must contain the thought that A exists as well as
that A is B, and therefore is a judgment that something is determined
both as existing and in a particular manner. The statement only affects
the proposition; and whenever we believe the existence of the thing, the
belief in existence is part of the judgment thought, whether it is part
of the proposition stated or not.

  Here Sir William Hamilton did a real service to logic in pointing out
  that "Logic postulates to be allowed to state explicitly in language
  all that is implicitly contained in the thought." Not that men should
  or can carry this logical postulate out in ordinary life; but it is
  necessary in the logical analysis of judgments, and yet logicians
  neglect it. This is why they confuse the categorical and the universal
  with the hypothetical. Taking the carelessly expressed propositions of
  ordinary life, they do not perceive that similar judgments are often
  differently expressed, e.g. "I, being a man, am mortal," and "If I am
  a man, I am mortal"; and conversely, that different judgments are
  often similarly expressed. In ordinary life we may say, "All men are
  mortal," "All centaurs are figments," "All square circles are
  impossibilities," "All candidates arriving five minutes late are
  fined" (the last proposition being an example of the identification of
  categorical with hypothetical in Keynes's _Formal Logic_). But of
  these universal propositions the first imperfectly expresses a
  categorical belief in existing things, the second in thinkable things,
  and the third in nameable things, while the fourth is a slipshod
  categorical expression of the hypothetical belief, "If any candidates
  arrive late they are fined." The four judgments are different, and
  therefore logically the propositions fully expressing them are also
  different. The judgment, then, is the measure of the proposition, not
  the proposition the measure of the judgment. On the other hand, we may
  go too far in the opposite direction, as Hamilton did in proposing the
  universal quantification of the predicate. If the quantity of the
  predicate were always thought, it ought logically to be always stated.
  But we only sometimes think it. Usually we leave the predicate
  indefinite, because, as long as the thing in question is (or is not)
  determined, it does not matter about other things, and it is vain for
  us to try to think all things at once. It is remarkable that in
  _Barbara_, and therefore in many scientific deductions, to think the
  quantity of the predicate is not to the point either in the premises
  or in the conclusion; so that to quantify the propositions, as
  Hamilton proposes, would be to express more than a rational man thinks
  and judges. In judgments, and therefore in propositions, indefinite
  predicates are the rule, quantified predicates the exception.
  Consequently, A E I O are the normal propositions with indefinite
  predicates; whereas propositions with quantified predicates are only
  occasional forms, which we should use whenever we require to think the
  quantity of the predicate, e.g. (1) in conversion, when we must think
  that all men are some animals, in order to judge that some animals are
  men; (2) in syllogisms of the 3rd figure, when the predicate of the
  minor premise must be particularly quantified in thought in order to
  become the particularly quantified subject of the conclusion; (3) in
  identical propositions including definitions, where we must think both
  that 1 + 1 are 2 and 2 are 1 + 1. But the normal judgment, and
  therefore the normal proposition, do not require the quantity of the
  predicate. It follows also that the normal judgment is not an
  equation. The symbol of equality (=) is not the same as the copula
  (is); it means "is equal to," where "equal to" is part of the
  predicate, leaving "is" as the copula. Now, in all judgment we think
  "is," but in few judgments predicate "equal to." In quantitative
  judgments we may think x = y, or, as Boole proposes, x = vy = (0/0)y
  or, as Jevons proposes, x = xy, or, as Venn proposes, x which is not y
  = 0; and equational symbolic logic is useful whenever we think in this
  quantitative way. But it is a byway of thought. In most judgments all
  we believe is that x is (or is not) y, that a thing is (or is not)
  determined, and that the thing signified by the subject is a thing
  signified by the predicate, but not that it is the only thing, or
  equal to everything signified by the predicate. The symbolic logic,
  which confuses "is" with "is equal to," having introduced a particular
  kind of predicate into the copula, falls into the mistake of reducing
  all predication to the one category of the quantitative; whereas it is
  more often in the substantial, e.g. "I am a man," not "I am equal to a
  man," or in the qualitative, e.g. "I am white," not "I am equal to
  white," or in the relative, e.g. "I am born in sin," not "I am equal
  to born in sin." Predication, as Aristotle saw, is as various as the
  categories of being. Finally, the great difficulty of the logic of
  judgment is to find the mental act behind the linguistic expression,
  to ascribe to it exactly what is thought, neither more nor less, and
  to apply the judgment thought to the logical proposition, without
  expecting to find it in ordinary propositions. Beneath Hamilton's
  postulate there is a deeper principle of logic--_A rational being
  thinks only to the point, and speaks only to understand and be


The nature and analysis of inference have been so fully treated in the
Introduction that here we may content ourselves with some points of

1. _False Views of Syllogism arising from False Views of Judgment._--The
false views of judgment, which we have been examining, have led to false
views of inference. On the one hand, having reduced categorical
judgments to an existential form, Brentano proposes to reform the
syllogism, with the results that it must contain four terms, of which
two are opposed and two appear twice; that, when it is negative, both
premises are negative; and that, when it is affirmative, one premise, at
least, is negative. In order to infer the universal affirmative that
every professor is mortal because he is a man, Brentano's existential
syllogism would run as follows:--

     There is not a not-mortal man.
     There is not a not-human professor.
  :. There is not a non-mortal professor.

On the other hand, if on the plan of Sigwart categorical universals were
reducible to hypothetical, the same inference would be a pure
hypothetical syllogism, thus:--

     If anything is a man it is mortal.
     If anything is a professor it is a man.
  :. If anything is a professor it is mortal.

But both these unnatural forms, which are certainly not analyses of any
conscious process of categorical reasoning, break down at once, because
they cannot explain those moods in the third figure, e.g. _Darapti_,
which reason from universal premises to a particular conclusion. Thus,
in order to infer that some wise men are good from the example of
professors, Brentano's syllogism would be the following

  There is not a not-good professor.
  There is not a not-wise professor.
  There is a wise good (_non-sequitur_).

So Sigwart's syllogism would be the following _non-sequitur_:--

  If anything is a professor, it is good.
  If anything is a professor, it is wise.
  Something wise is good (_non-sequitur_).

But as by the admission of both logicians these reconstructions of
_Darapti_ are illogical, it follows that their respective reductions of
categorical universals to existentials and hypotheticals are false,
because they do not explain an actual inference. Sigwart does not indeed
shrink from this and greater absurdities; he reduces the first figure to
the _modus ponens_ and the second to the _modus tollens_ of the
hypothetical syllogism, and then, finding no place for the third figure,
denies that it can infer necessity; whereas it really infers the
necessary consequence of particular conclusions. But the crowning
absurdity is that, if all universals were hypothetical, _Barbara_ in the
first figure would become a purely hypothetical syllogism--a consequence
which seems innocent enough until we remember that all universal
affirmative conclusions in all sciences would with their premises
dissolve into mere hypothesis. No logic can be sound which leads to the
following analysis:--

     If anything is a body it is extended.
     If anything is a planet it is a body.
  :. If anything is a planet it is extended.

Sigwart, indeed, has missed the essential difference between the
categorical and the hypothetical construction of syllogisms. In a
categorical syllogism of the first figure, the major premise, "Every M
whatever is P," is a universal, which we believe on account of previous
evidence without any condition about the thing signified by the subject
M, which we simply believe sometimes to be existent (e.g. "Every man
existent"), and sometimes not (e.g., "Every centaur conceivable"); and
the minor premise, "S is M," establishes no part of the major, but adds
the evidence of a particular not thought of in the major at all. But in
a hypothetical syllogism of the ordinary mixed type, the first or
hypothetical premise is a conditional belief, e.g. "If anything is M it
is P," containing a hypothetical antecedent, "If anything is M," which
is sometimes a hypothesis of existence (e.g. "If anything is an angel"),
and sometimes a hypothesis of fact (e.g. "If an existing man is wise");
and the second premise or assumption, "Something is M," establishes part
of the first, namely, the hypothetical antecedent, whether as regards
existence (e.g. "Something is an angel"), or as regards fact (e.g. "This
existing man is wise"). These very different relations of premises are
obliterated by Sigwart's false reduction of categorical universals to
hypotheticals. But even Sigwart's errors are outdone by Lotze, who not
only reduces "Every M is P" so "If S is M, S is P," but proceeds to
reduce this hypothetical to the disjunctive, "If S is M, S is P¹ or P²
or P³," and finds fault with the Aristotelian syllogism because it
contents itself with inferring "S is P" without showing what P. Now
there are occasions when we want to reason in this disjunctive manner,
to consider whether S is P¹ or P² or P³, and to conclude that "S is a
particular P"; but ordinarily all we want to know is that "S is P"; e.g.
in arithmetic, that 2 + 2 are 4, not any particular 4, and in life that
all our contemporaries must die, without enumerating all their
particular sorts of deaths. Lotze's mistake is the same as that of
Hamilton about the quantification of the predicate, and that of those
symbolists who held that reasoning ought always to exhaust all
alternatives by equations. It is the mistake of exaggerating exceptional
into normal forms of thought, and ignoring the principle that a rational
being thinks only to the point.

2. _Quasi-syllogisms._--Besides reconstructions of the syllogistic
fabric, we find in recent logic attempts to extend the figures of the
syllogism beyond the syllogistic rules. An old error that we may have a
valid syllogism from merely negative premises (_ex omnibus negativis_),
long ago answered by Alexander and Boethius, is now revived by Lotze,
Jevons and Bradley, who do not perceive that the supposed second
negative is really an affirmative containing a "not" which can only be
carried through the syllogism by separating it from the copula and
attaching it to one of the extremes, thus:--

     The just are not unhappy (_negative_).
     The just are not-recognized (_affirmative_).
  :. Some not-recognized are not unhappy (_negative_).

Here the minor being the infinite term "not-recognized" in the
conclusion, must be the same term also in the minor premise. Schuppe,
however, who is a fertile creator of quasi-syllogisms, has managed to
invent some examples from two negative premises of a different kind:--

         (1)          |       (2)       |      (3)
       No M is P.     |    No M is P.   |    No P is M.
       S is not P.    |    S is not M.  |    S is not M.
  :. Neither S nor M  | :. S may be P.  | :. S may be P.
       is P.          |                 |

But (1) concludes with a mere repetition, (2) and (3) with a contingent
"may be," which, as Aristotle says, also "may not be," and therefore
_nihil certo colligitur_. The same answer applies to Schuppe's supposed
syllogisms from two particular premises:--

          (1)         |        (2)
     Some M is P.     |    Some M is P.
     Some S is M.     |    Some M is S.
  :. Some S may be P. | :. Some S may be P.

The only difference between these and the previous examples (2) and (3)
is that, while those break the rule against two negative premises, these
break that against undistributed middle. Equally fallacious are two
other attempts of Schuppe to produce syllogisms from invalid moods:--

    (1) 1st Fig.  |            (2) 2nd Fig.
     All M is P.  |    P is M.
     No S is M.   |    S is M.
  :. S may be P.  | :. S is partially identical with P.

In the first the fallacy is the indifferent contingency of the
conclusion caused by the _non-sequitur_ from a negative premise to an
affirmative conclusion; while the second is either a mere repetition of
the premises if the conclusion means "S is like P in being M," or, if it
means "S is P," a _non-sequitur_ on account of the undistributed middle.
It must not be thought that this trifling with logical rules has no
effect. The last supposed syllogism, namely, that having two affirmative
premises and entailing an undistributed middle in the second figure, is
accepted by Wundt under the title "Inference by Comparison"
(_Vergleichungsschluss_), and is supposed by him to be useful for
abstraction and subsidiary to induction, and by Bosanquet to be useful
for analogy. Wundt, for example, proposes the following premises:--

  Gold is a shining, fusible, ductile, simple body.
  Metals are shining, fusible, ductile, simple bodies.

But to say from these premises, "Gold and metal are similar in what is
signified by the middle term," is a mere repetition of the premises; to
say, further, that "Gold may be a metal" is a _non-sequitur_, because,
the middle being undistributed, the logical conclusion is the contingent
"Gold may or may not be a metal," which leaves the question quite open,
and therefore there is no syllogism. Wundt, who is again followed by
Bosanquet, also supposes another syllogism in the third figure, under
the title of "Inference by Connexion" (_Verbindungsschluss_), to be
useful for induction. He proposes, for example, the following

  Gold, silver, copper, lead, are fusible.
  Gold, silver, copper, lead, are metals.

Here there is no syllogistic fallacy in the premises; but the question
is what syllogistic conclusion can be drawn, and there is only one which
follows without an illicit process of the minor, namely, "Some metals
are fusible." The moment we stir a step further with Wundt m the
direction of a more general conclusion (_ein allgemeinerer Satz_), we
cannot infer from the premises the conclusion desired by Wundt, "Metals
and fusible are connected"; nor can we infer "All metals are fusible,"
nor "Metals are fusible," nor "Metals may be fusible," nor "All metals
may be fusible," nor any assertory conclusion, determinate or
indeterminate, but the indifferent contingent, "All metals may or may
not be fusible," which leaves the question undecided, so that there is
no syllogism. We do not mean that in Wundt's supposed "inferences of
relation by comparison and connexion" the premises are of no further
use; but those of the first kind are of no syllogistic use in the second
figure, and those of the second kind of no syllogistic use beyond
particular conclusions in the third figure. What they really are in the
inferences proposed by Wundt is not premises for syllogism, but data for
induction parading as syllogism. We must pass the same sentence on
Lotze's attempt to extend the second figure of the syllogism for
inductive purposes, thus:--

     S is M.
     Q is M.
     R is M.
  :. Every [Sigma], which is common to S, Q, R, is M.

We could not have a more flagrant abuse of the rule _Ne esto plus
minusque in conclusione quam in praemissis_. As we see from Lotze's own
defence, the conclusion cannot be drawn without another premise or
premises to the effect that "S, Q, R, are [Sigma], and [Sigma] is the
one real subject of M." But how is all this to be got into the second
figure? Again, Wundt and B. Erdmann propose new moods of syllogism with
convertible premises, containing definitions and equations. Wundt's
_Logic_ has the following forms:--

    (1) 1st Fig.  | (2) 2nd Fig. | (3) 3rd Fig.
     Only M is P. |    x = y.    |    y = x.
     No S is M.   |    z = y.    |    y = z.
  :. No S is P.   | :. x = z.    | :. x = z.

Now, there is no doubt that, especially in mathematical equations,
universal conclusions are obtainable from convertible premises expressed
in these ways. But the question is how the premises must be thought, and
they must be thought in the converse way to produce a logical
conclusion. Thus, we must think in (1) "All P is M" to avoid illicit
process of the major, in (2) "All y is z" to avoid undistributed middle,
in (3) "All x is y" to avoid illicit process of the minor. Indeed, it is
the very essence of a convertible judgment to think it in both orders,
and especially to think it in the order necessary to an inference from
it. Accordingly, however expressed, the syllogisms quoted above are, as
thought, ordinary syllogisms, (1) being _Camestres_ in the second
figure, (2) and (3) _Barbara_ in the first figure. Aristotle, indeed,
was as well aware as German logicians of the force of convertible
premises; but he was also aware that they require no special syllogisms,
and made it a point that, in a syllogism from a definition, the
definition is the middle, and the _definitum_ the major in a convertible
major premise of _Barbara_ in the first figure, e.g.:--

     The interposition of an opaque body is (essentially) deprivation
       of light.
     The moon suffers the interposition of the opaque earth.
  :. The moon suffers deprivation of light.

It is the same with all the recent attempts to extend the syllogism
beyond its rules, which are not liable to exceptions, because they
follow from the nature of syllogistic inference from universal to
particular. To give the name of syllogism to inferences which infringe
the general rules against undistributed middle, illicit process, two
negative premises, _non-sequitur_ from negative to affirmative, and the
introduction of what is not in the premises into the conclusion, and
which consequently infringe the special rules against affirmative
conclusions in the second figure, and against universal conclusions in
the third figure, is to open the door to fallacy, and at best to confuse
the syllogism with other kinds of inference, without enabling us to
understand any one kind.

3. _Analytic and Synthetic Deduction._--Alexander the Commentator
defined synthesis as a progress from principles to consequences,
analysis as a regress from consequences to principles; and Latin
logicians preserved the same distinction between the _progressus a
principiis ad principiata_, and the _regressus a principiatis ad
principia_. No distinction is more vital in the logic of inference in
general and of scientific inference in particular; and yet none has been
so little understood, because, though analysis is the more usual order
of discovery, synthesis is that of instruction, and therefore, by
becoming more familiar, tends to replace and obscure the previous
analysis. The distinction, however, did not escape Aristotle, who saw
that a progressive syllogism can be reversed thus:--

   1. _Progression._ |         2. _Regression._
                     |        (1)               (2)
       All M is P.   |    All P is M.   |    All S is P.
       All S is M.   |    All S is P.   |    All M is S.
    :. All S is P.   | :. All S is M.   | :. All M is P.

Proceeding from one order to the other, by converting one of the
premises, and substituting the conclusion as premise for the other
premise, so as to deduce the latter as conclusion, is what he calls
circular inference; and he remarked that the process is fallacious
unless it contains propositions which are convertible, as in
mathematical equations. Further, he perceived that the difference
between the progressive and regressive orders extends from mathematics
to physics, and that there are two kinds of syllogism: one progressing a
priori from real ground to consequent fact ([Greek: ho tou dioti
syllogismos]), and the other regressing a posteriori from consequent
fact to real ground ([Greek: ho tou hoti syllogismos]). For example, as
he says, the sphericity of the moon is the real ground of the fact of
its light waxing; but we can deduce either from the other, as follows:--

       1. _Progression._      |      2. _Regression._
     What is spherical waxes. |    What waxes is spherical.
     The moon is spherical.   |    The moon waxes.
  :. The moon waxes.          | :. The moon is spherical.

These two kinds of syllogism are synthesis and analysis in the ancient
sense. Deduction is analysis when it is regressive from consequence to
real ground, as when we start from the proposition that the angles of a
triangle are equal to two right angles and deduce analytically that
therefore (1) they are equal to equal angles made by a straight line
standing on another straight line, and (2) such equal angles are two
right angles. Deduction is synthesis when it is progressive from real
ground to consequence, as when we start from these two results of
analysis as principles and deduce synthetically the proposition that
therefore the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, in the
order familiar to the student of Euclid. But the full value of the
ancient theory of these processes cannot be appreciated until we
recognize that as Aristotle planned them Newton used them. Much of the
_Principia_ consists of synthetical deductions from definitions and
axioms. But the discovery of the centripetal force of the planets to the
sun is an analytic deduction from the facts of their motion discovered
by Kepler to their real ground, and is so stated by Newton in the first
regressive order of Aristotle--P-M, S-P, S-M. Newton did indeed first
show synthetically what kind of motions by mechanical laws have their
ground in a centripetal force varying inversely as the square of the
distance (all P is M); but his next step was, not to deduce
synthetically the planetary motions, but to make a new start from the
planetary motions as facts established by Kepler's laws and as examples
of the kind of motions in question (all S is P); and then, by combining
these two premises, one mechanical and the other astronomical, he
analytically deduced that these facts of planetary motion have their
ground in a centripetal force varying inversely as the squares of the
distances of the planets from the sun (all S is M). (See _Principia_ I.
prop. 2; 4 coroll. 6; III. Phaenomena, 4-5; prop. 2.) What Newton did,
in short, was to prove by analysis that the planets, revolving by
Kepler's astronomical laws round the sun, have motions such as by
mechanical laws are consequences of a centripetal force to the sun. This
done, as the major is convertible, the analytic order--P-M, S-P,
S-M--was easily inverted into the synthetic order--M-P, S-M, S-P; and in
this progressive order the deduction as now taught begins with the
centripetal force of the sun as real ground, and deduces the facts of
planetary motion as consequences. Thereupon the Newtonian analysis which
preceded this synthesis, became forgotten; until at last Mill in his
_Logic_, neglecting the _Principia_, had the temerity to distort
Newton's discovery, which was really a pure example of analytic
deduction, into a mere hypothetical deduction; as if the author of the
saying "_Hypotheses non fingo_" started from the hypothesis of a
centripetal force to the sun, and thence deductively explained the facts
of planetary motion, which reciprocally verified the hypothesis. This
gross misrepresentation has made hypothesis a kind of logical fashion.
Worse still, Jevons proceeded to confuse analytic deduction from
consequence to ground with hypothetical deduction from ground to
consequence under the common term "inverse deduction." Wundt attempts,
but in vain, to make a compromise between the old and the new. He
re-defines analysis in the very opposite way to the ancients; whereas
they defined it as a regressive process from consequence to ground,
according to Wundt it is a progressive process of taking for granted a
proposition and deducing a consequence, which being true verifies the
proposition. He then divides it into two species: one categorical, the
other hypothetical. By the categorical he means the ancient analysis
from a given proposition to more general propositions. By the
hypothetical he means the new-fangled analysis from a given proposition
to more particular propositions, i.e. from a hypothesis to consequent
facts. But his account of the first is imperfect, because in ancient
analysis the more general propositions, with which it concludes, are not
mere consequences, but the real grounds of the given proposition; while
his addition of the second reduces the nature of analysis to the utmost
confusion, because hypothetical deduction is progressive from hypothesis
to consequent facts whereas analysis is regressive from consequent facts
to real ground. There is indeed a sense in which all inference is from
ground to consequence, because it is from logical ground (_principium
cognoscendi_) to logical consequence. But in the sense in which
deductive analysis is opposed to deductive synthesis, analysis is
deduction from real consequence as logical ground (_principiatum_ as
_principium cognoscendi_) to real ground (_principium essendi_), e.g.
from the consequential facts of planetary motion to their real ground,
i.e. centripetal force to the sun. Hence Sigwart is undoubtedly right in
distinguishing analysis from hypothetical deduction, for which he
proposes the name "reduction." We have only further to add that many
scientific discoveries about sound, heat, light, colour and so forth,
which it is the fashion to represent as hypotheses to explain facts, are
really analytical deductions from the facts to their real grounds in
accordance with mechanical laws. Recent logic does scant justice to
scientific analysis.

4. _Induction._--As induction is the process from particulars to
universals, it might have been thought that it would always have been
opposed to syllogism, in which one of the rules is against using
particular premises to draw universal conclusions. Yet such is the
passion for one type that from Aristotle's time till now constant
attempts have been made to reduce induction to syllogism. Aristotle
himself invented an inductive syllogism in which the major (P) is to be
referred to the middle (M) by means of the minor (S), thus:--

     A, B, C magnets (S) attract iron (P).
     A, B, C magnets (S) are all magnets whatever (M).
  :. All magnets whatever (M) attract iron (P).

As the second premise is supposed to be convertible, he reduced the
inductive to a deductive syllogism as follows:--

     Every S is P.               |    Every S is P.
     Every S is M (convertibly). |    Every M is S.
  :. Every M is P.               | :. Every M is P.

In the reduced form the inductive syllogism was described by Aldrich as
"_Syllogismus in Barbara cujus minor_ (i.e. every M is S) _reticetur_."
Whately, on the other hand, proposed an inductive syllogism with the
major suppressed, that is, instead of the minor premise above, he
supposed a major premise, "Whatever belongs to A, B, C magnets belongs
to all." Mill thereupon supposed a still more general premise, an
assumption of the uniformity of nature. Since Mill's time, however, the
logic of induction tends to revert towards syllogisms more like that of
Aristotle. Jevons supposed induction to be inverse deduction,
distinguished from direct deduction as analysis from synthesis, e.g. as
division from multiplication; but he really meant that it is a deduction
from a hypothesis of the law of a cause to particular effects which,
being true, verify the hypothesis. Sigwart declares himself in agreement
with Jevons; except that, being aware of the difference between
hypothetical deduction and mathematical analysis, and seeing that,
whereas analysis (e.g. in division) leads to certain conclusions,
hypothetical deduction is not certain of the hypothesis, he arrives at
the more definite view that induction is not analysis proper but
hypothetical deduction, or "reduction," as he proposes to call it.
Reduction he defines as "the framing of possible premises for given
propositions, or the construction of a syllogism when the conclusion and
one premise is given." On this view induction becomes a reduction in the
form: all M is P (hypothesis), S is M (given), :. S is P (given). The
views of Jevons and Sigwart are in agreement in two main points.
According to both, induction, instead of inferring from A, B, C magnets
the conclusion "Therefore all magnets attract iron," infers from the
hypothesis, "Let every magnet attract iron," to A, B, C magnets, whose
given attraction verifies the hypothesis. According to both, again, the
hypothesis of a law with which the process starts contains more than is
present in the particular data: according to Jevons, it is the
hypothesis of a law of a cause from which induction deduces particular
effects; and according to Sigwart, it is a hypothesis of the ground from
which the particular data necessarily follow according to universal
laws. Lastly, Wundt's view is an interesting piece of eclecticism, for
he supposes that induction begins in the form of Aristotle's inductive
syllogism, S-P, S-M, M-P, and becomes an inductive method in the form of
Jevons's inverse deduction, or hypothetical deduction, or analysis, M-P,
S-M, S-P. In detail, he supposes that, while an "inference by
comparison," which he erroneously calls an affirmative syllogism in the
second figure, is preliminary to induction, a second "inference by
connexion," which he erroneously calls a syllogism in the third figure
with an indeterminate conclusion, is the inductive syllogism itself.
This is like Aristotle's inductive syllogism in the arrangement of
terms; but, while on the one hand Aristotle did not, like Wundt, confuse
it with the third figure, on the other hand Wundt does not, like
Aristotle, suppose it to be practicable to get inductive data so wide as
the convertible premise, "All S is M, and all M is S," which would at
once establish the conclusion, "All M is P." Wundt's point is that the
conclusion of the inductive syllogism is neither so much as all, nor so
little as some, but rather the indeterminate "M and P are connected."
The question therefore arises, how we are to discover "All M is P," and
this question Wundt answers by adding an inductive method, which
involves inverting the inductive syllogism in the style of Aristotle
into a deductive syllogism from a hypothesis in the style of Jevons,

             (1)                   (2)
     S is P.                | Every M is P.
     S is M.                |       S is M.
  :. M and P are connected. |    :. S is P.

He agrees with Jevons in calling this second syllogism analytical
deduction, and with Jevons and Sigwart in calling it hypothetical
deduction. It is, in fact, a common point of Jevons, Sigwart and Wundt
that the universal is not really a conclusion inferred from given
particulars, but a hypothetical major premise from which given
particulars are inferred, and that this major contains presuppositions
of causation not contained in the particulars.

It is noticeable that Wundt quotes Newton's discovery of the centripetal
force of the planets to the sun as an instance of this supposed
hypothetical, analytic, inductive method; as if Newton's analysis were a
hypothesis of the centripetal force to the sun, a deduction of the given
facts of planetary motion, and a verification of the hypothesis by the
given facts, and as if such a process of hypothetical deduction could be
identical with either analysis or induction. The abuse of this instance
of Newtonian analysis betrays the whole origin of the current confusion
of induction with deduction. One confusion has led to another. Mill
confused Newton's analytical deduction with hypothetical deduction; and
thereupon Jevons confused induction with both. The result is that both
Sigwart and Wundt transform the inductive process of adducing particular
examples to induce a universal law into a deductive process of
presupposing a universal law as a ground to deduce particular
consequences. But we can easily extricate ourselves from these
confusions by comparing induction with different kinds of deduction. The
point about induction is that it starts from experience, and that,
though in most classes we can experience only some particulars
individually, yet we infer all. Hence induction cannot be reduced to
Aristotle's inductive syllogism, because experience cannot give the
convertible premise, "Every S is M, and every M is S"; that "All A, B, C
are magnets" is, but that "All magnets are A, B, C" is not, a fact of
experience. For the same reason induction cannot be reduced to
analytical deduction of the second kind in the form, S-P, M-S, :. M-P;
because, though both end in a universal conclusion, the limits of
experience prevent induction from such inference as:--

     Every experienced magnet attracts iron.
     Every magnet whatever is every experienced magnet.
  :. Every magnet whatever attracts iron.

Still less can induction be reduced to analytical deduction of the first
kind in the form--P-M, S-P, :. S-M, of which Newton has left so
conspicuous an example in his _Principia_. As the example shows, that
analytic process starts from the scientific knowledge of a universal and
convertible law (every M is P, and every P is M), e.g. a mechanical law
of all centripetal force, and ends in a particular application, e.g.
this centripetal force of planets to the sun. But induction cannot start
from a known law. Hence it is that Jevons, followed by Sigwart and
Wundt, reduces it to deduction from a hypothesis in the form "Let every
M be P, S is M, :. S is P." There is a superficial resemblance between
induction and this hypothetical deduction. Both in a way use given
particulars as evidence. But in induction the given particulars are the
evidence by which we discover the universal, e.g. particular magnets
attracting iron are the origin of an inference that all do; in
hypothetical deduction, the universal is the evidence by which we
explain the given particulars, as when we suppose undulating aether to
explain the facts of heat and light. In the former process, the given
particulars are the data from which we infer the universal; in the
latter, they are only the consequent facts by which we verify it. Or
rather, there are two uses of induction: inductive discovery before
deduction, and inductive verification after deduction. But neither use
of induction is the same as the deduction itself: the former precedes,
the latter follows it. Lastly, the theory of Mill, though frequently
adopted, e.g. by B. Erdmann, need not detain us long. Most inductions
are made without any assumption of the uniformity of nature; for,
whether it is itself induced, or a priori or postulated, this like every
assumption is a judgment, and most men are incapable of judgment on so
universal a scale, when they are quite capable of induction. The fact is
that the uniformity of nature stands to induction as the axioms of
syllogism do to syllogism; they are not premises, but conditions of
inference, which ordinary men use spontaneously, as was pointed out in
_Physical Realism_, and afterwards in Venn's _Empirical Logic_. The
axiom of contradiction is not a major premise of a judgment: the _dictum
de omni et nullo_ is not a major premise of a syllogism: the principle
of uniformity is not a major premise of an induction. Induction, in
fact, is no species of deduction; they are opposite processes, as
Aristotle regarded them except in the one passage where he was reducing
the former to the latter, and as Bacon always regarded them. But it is
easy to confuse them by mistaking examples of deduction for inductions.
Thus Whewell mistook Kepler's inference that Mars moves in an ellipse
for an induction, though it required the combination of Tycho's and
Kepler's observations, as a minor, with the laws of conic sections
discovered by the Greeks, as a major, premise. Jevons, in his
_Principles of Science_, constantly makes the same sort of mistake. For
example, the inference from the similarity between solar spectra and the
spectra of various gases on the earth to the existence of similar gases
in the sun, is called by him an induction; but it really is an
analytical deduction from effect to cause, thus:--

     Such and such spectra are effects of various gases.
     Solar spectra are such spectra.
  :. Solar spectra are effects of those gases.

In the same way, to infer a machine from hearing the regular tick of a
clock, to infer a player from finding a pack of cards arranged in suits,
to infer a human origin of stone implements, and all such inferences
from patent effects to latent causes, though they appear to Jevons to be
typical inductions, are really deductions which, besides the minor
premise stating the particular effects, require a major premise
discovered by a previous induction and stating the general kind of
effects of a general kind of cause. B. Erdmann, again, has invented an
induction from particular predicates to a totality of predicates which
he calls "ergänzende Induction," giving as an example, "This body has
the colour, extensibility and specific gravity of magnesium; therefore
it is magnesium." But this inference contains the tacit major, "What has
a given colour, &c., is magnesium," and is a syllogism of recognition. A
deduction is often like an induction, in inferring from particulars; the
difference is that deduction combines a law in the major with the
particulars in the minor premise, and infers syllogistically that the
particulars of the minor have the predicate of the major premise,
whereas induction uses the particulars simply as instances to generalize
a law. An infallible sign of an induction is that the subject and
predicate of the universal conclusion are merely those of the particular
instances generalized; e.g. "These magnets attract iron, :. all do."

This brings us to another source of error. As we have seen, Jevons,
Sigwart and Wundt all think that induction contains a belief in
causation, in a cause, or ground, which is not present in the particular
facts of experience, but is contributed by a hypothesis added as a major
premise to the particulars in order to explain them by the cause or
ground. Not so; when an induction is causal, the particular instances
are already beliefs in particular causes, e.g. "My right hand is
exerting pressure reciprocally with my left," "A, B, C magnets attract
iron"; and the problem is to generalize these causes, not to introduce
them. Induction is not introduction. It would make no difference to the
form of induction, if, as Kant thought, the notion of causality is a
priori; for even Kant thought that it is already contained in
experience. But whether Kant be right or wrong, Wundt and his school are
decidedly wrong in supposing "supplementary notions which are not
contained in experience itself, but are gained by a process of logical
treatment of this experience"; as if our behalf in causality could be
neither a posteriori nor a priori, but beyond experience wake up in a
hypothetical major premise of induction. Really, we first experience
that particular causes have particular effects; then induce that causes
similar to those have effects similar to these; finally, deduce that
when a particular cause of the kind occurs it has a particular effect of
the kind by synthetic deduction, and that when a particular effect of
the kind occurs it has a particular cause of the kind by analytic
deduction with a convertible premise, as when Newton from planetary
motions, like terrestrial motions, analytically deduced a centripetal
force to the sun like centripetal forces to the earth. Moreover, causal
induction is itself both synthetic and analytic: according as experiment
combines elements into a compound, or resolves a compound into elements,
it is the origin of a synthetic or an analytic generalization. Not,
however, that all induction is causal; but where it is not, there is
still less reason for making it a deduction from hypothesis. When from
the fact that the many crows in our experience are black, we induce the
probability that all crows whatever are black, the belief in the
particulars is quite independent of this universal. How then can this
universal be called, as Sigwart, for example, calls it, the ground from
which these particulars follow? I do not believe that the crows I have
seen are black because all crows are black, but vice versa. Sigwart
simply inverts the order of our knowledge. In all induction, as
Aristotle said, the particulars are the evidence, or ground of our
knowledge (_principium cognoscendi_), of the universal. In causal
induction, the particulars further contain the cause, or ground of the
being (_principium essendi_), of the effect, as well as the ground of
our inducing the law. In all induction the universal is the conclusion,
in none a major premise, and in none the ground of either the being or
the knowing of the particulars. Induction is generalization. It is not
syllogism in the form of Aristotle's or Wundt's inductive syllogism,
because, though starting only from some particulars, it concludes with a
universal; it is not syllogism in the form called inverse deduction by
Jevons, reduction by Sigwart, inductive method by Wundt, because it
often uses particular facts of causation to infer universal laws of
causation; it is not syllogism in the form of Mill's syllogism from a
belief in uniformity of nature, because few men have believed in
uniformity, but all have induced from particulars to universals. Bacon
alone was right in altogether opposing induction to syllogism, and in
finding inductive rules for the inductive process from particular
instances of presence, absence in similar circumstances, and comparison.

5. _Inference in General._--There are, as we have seen (_ad init._),
three types--syllogism, induction and analogy. Different as they are,
the three kinds have something in common: first, they are all processes
from similar to similar; secondly, they all consist in combining two
judgments so as to cause a third, whether expressed in so many
propositions or not; thirdly, as a judgment is a belief in being, they
all proceed from premises which are beliefs in being to a conclusion
which is a belief in being. Nevertheless, simple as this account
appears, it is opposed in every point to recent logic. In the first
place, the point of Bradley's logic is that "similarity is not a
principle which works. What operates is identity, and that identity is a
universal." This view makes inference easy: induction is all over before
it begins; for, according to Bradley, "every one of the instances is
already a universal proposition; and it is not a particular fact or
phenomenon at all," so that the moment you observe that this magnet
attracts iron, you _ipso facto_ know that every magnet does so, and all
that remains for deduction is to identify a second magnet as the same
with the first, and conclude that it attracts iron. In dealing with
Bradley's works we feel inclined to repeat what Aristotle says of the
discourses of Socrates: they all exhibit excellence, cleverness, novelty
and inquiry, but their truth is a difficult matter; and the Socratic
paradox that virtue is knowledge is not more difficult than the
Bradleian paradox that as two different things are the same, inference
is identification. The basis of Bradley's logic is the fallacious
dialectic of Hegel's metaphysics, founded on the supposition that two
things, which are different, but have something in common, are the same.
For example, according to Hegel, being and not-being are both
indeterminate and therefore the same. "If," says Bradley, "A and B, for
instance, both have lungs or gills, they are so far the same." The
answer to Hegel is that being and not-being are at most similarly
indeterminate, and to Bradley that each animal has its own different
lungs, whereby they are only similar. If they were the same, then in
descending, two things, one of which has healthy and the other diseased
lungs, would be the same; and in ascending, two things, one of which has
lungs and the other has not, but both of which have life, e.g. plants
and animals, would be so far the same. There would be no limit to
identity either downwards or upwards; so that a man would be the same as
a man-of-war, and all things would be the same thing, and not different
parts of one universe. But a thing which has healthy lungs and a thing
which has diseased lungs are only similar individuals numerically
different. Each individual thing is the same only with itself, although
related to other things; and each individual of a class has its own
individual, though similar, attributes. The consequence of this true
metaphysics to logic is twofold: on the one hand, one singular or
particular judgment, e.g. "this magnet attracts iron," is not another,
e.g. "that magnet attracts iron," and neither is universal; on the other
hand, a universal judgment, e.g. "every magnet attracts iron," means,
distributively, that each individual magnet exerts its individual
attraction, though it is similar to other magnets exerting similar
attractions. A universal is not "one identical point," but one
distributive whole. Hence in a syllogism, a middle term, e.g. magnets,
is "absolutely the same," not in the sense of "one identical point"
making each individual the same as any other, as Bradley supposes, but
only in the sense of one whole class, or total of many similar
individuals, e.g. magnets, each of which is separately though similarly
a magnet, not magnet in general. Hence also induction is a real process,
because, when we know that this individual magnet attracts iron, we are
very far from knowing that all alike do so similarly; and the question
of inductive logic, how we get from some similars to all similars,
remains, as before, a difficulty, but not to be solved by the fallacy
that inference is identification.

Secondly, a subordinate point in Bradley's logic is that there are
inferences which are not syllogisms; and this is true. But when he goes
on to propose, as a complete independent inference, "A is to the right
of B, B is to the right of C, therefore A is to the right of C," he
confuses two different operations. When A, B and C are objects of sense,
their relative positions are matters, not of inference, but of
observation; when they are not, there is an inference, but a syllogistic
inference with a major premise induced from previous observations,
"whenever of three things the first is to the right of the second, and
the second to the right of the third, the first is to the right of the
third." To reply that this universal judgment is not expressed, or that
its expression is cumbrous, is no answer, because, whether expressed or
not, it is required for the thought. As Aristotle puts it, the syllogism
is directed "not to the outer, but to the inner discourse," or as we
should say, not to the expression but to the thought, not to the
proposition but to the judgment, and to the inference not verbally but
mentally. Bradley seems to suppose that the major premise of a syllogism
must be explicit, or else is nothing at all. But it is often thought
without being expressed, and to judge the syllogism by its mere explicit
expression is to commit an _ignoratio elenchi_; for it has been known
all along that we express less than we think, and the very purpose of
syllogistic logic is to analyse the whole thought necessary to the
conclusion. In this syllogistic analysis two points must always be
considered: one, that we usually use premises in thought which we do not
express; and the other, that we sometimes use them unconsciously, and
therefore infer and reason unconsciously, in the manner excellently
described by Zeller in his _Vorträge_, iii. pp. 249-255. Inference is a
deeper thinking process from judgments to judgment, which only
occasionally and partially emerges in the linguistic process from
propositions to proposition. We may now then reassert two points about
inference against Bradley's logic: the first, that it is a process from
similar to similar, and not a process of identification, because two
different things are not at all the same thing; the second, that it is
the mental process from judgments to judgment rather than the linguistic
process from propositions to proposition, because, besides the judgments
expressed in propositions, it requires judgments which are not always
expressed, and are sometimes even unconscious.

Our third point is that, as a process of judgments, inference is a
process of concluding from two beliefs in being to another belief in
being, and not an ideal construction, because a judgment does not always
require ideas, but is always a belief about things, existing or not.
This point is challenged by all the many ideal theories of judgment
already quoted. If, for example, judgment were an analysis of an
aggregate idea as Wundt supposes, it would certainly be true with him to
conclude that "as judgment is an _immediate_, inference is a _mediate_,
reference of the members of an aggregate of ideas to one another." But
really a judgment is a belief that something, existing, or thinkable, or
nameable or what not, is (or is not) determined; and inference is a
process from and to such beliefs in being. Hence the fallacy of those
who, like Bosanquet, or like Paulsen in his _Einleitung in die
Philosophie_, represent the realistic theory of inference as if it meant
that knowledge starts from ideas and then infers that ideas are copies
of things, and who then object, rightly enough, that we could not in
that case compare the copy with the original, but only be able to infer
from idea to idea. But there is another realism which holds that
inference is a process neither from ideas to ideas, nor from ideas to
things, but from beliefs to beliefs, from judgments about things in the
premises to judgments about similar things in the conclusion. Logical
inference never goes through the impossible process of premising nothing
but ideas, and concluding that ideas are copies of things. Moreover, as
we have shown, our primary judgments of sense are beliefs founded on
sensations without requiring ideas, and are beliefs, not merely that
something is determined, but that it is determined as existing; and,
accordingly, our primary inferences from these sensory judgments of
existence are inferences that other things beyond sense are similarly
determined as existing. First press your lips together and then press a
pen between them: you will not be conscious of perceiving any ideas: you
will be conscious first of perceiving one existing lip exerting pressure
reciprocally with the other existing lip; then, on putting the pen
between your lips, of perceiving each lip similarly exerting pressure,
but not with the other; and consequently of inferring that each existing
lip is exerting pressure reciprocally with another existing body, the
pen. Inference then, though it is accompanied by ideas, is not an ideal
construction, nor a process from idea to idea, nor a process from idea
to thing, but a process from direct to indirect beliefs in things, and
originally in existing things. Logic cannot, it is true, decide what
these things are, nor what the senses know about them, without appealing
to metaphysics and psychology. But, as the science of inference, it can
make sure that inference, on the one hand, starts from sensory judgments
about sensible things and logically proceeds to inferential judgments
about similar things beyond sense, and, on the other hand, cannot
logically go beyond the similar. These are the limits within which
logical inference works, because its nature essentially consists in
proceeding from two judgments to another about similar things, existing
or not.

6. _Truth._--Finally, though sensory judgment is always true of its
sensible object, inferential judgments are not always true, but are true
so far as they are logically inferred, however indirectly, from sense;
and knowledge consists of sense, memory after sense and logical
inference from sense, which, we must remember, is not merely the outer
sense of our five senses, but also the inner sense of ourselves as
conscious thinking persons. We come then at last to the old
question--what is truth? Truth proper, as Aristotle said in the
_Metaphysics_, is in the mind: it is not being, but one's signification
of being. Its requisites are that there are things to be known and
powers of knowing things. It is an attribute of judgments and
derivatively of propositions. That judgment is true which apprehends a
thing as it is capable of being known to be; and that proposition is
true which so asserts the thing to be. Or, to combine truth in thought
and in speech, the true is what signifies a thing as it is capable of
being known. Secondarily, the thing itself is ambiguously said to be
true in the sense of being signified as it is. For example, as I am
weary and am conscious of being weary, my judgment and proposition that
I am weary are true because they signify what I am and know myself to be
by direct consciousness; and my being weary is ambiguously said to be
true because it is so signified. But it will be said that Kant has
proved that real truth, in the sense of the "agreement of knowledge with
the object," is unattainable, because we could compare knowledge with
the object only by knowing both. Sigwart, indeed, adopting Kant's
argument, concludes that we must be satisfied with consistency among the
thoughts which presuppose an existent; this, too, is the reason why he
thinks that induction is reduction, on the theory that we can show the
necessary consequence of the given particular, but that truth of fact is
unattainable. But Kant's criticism and Sigwart's corollary only derive
plausibility from a false definition of truth. Truth is not the
agreement of knowledge with an object beyond itself, and therefore _ex
hypothesi_ unknowable, but the agreement of our judgments with the
objects of our knowledge. A judgment is true whenever it is a belief
that a thing is determined as it is known to be by sense, or by memory
after sense, or by inference from sense, however indirect the inference
may be, and even when in the form of inference of non-existence it
extends consequently from primary to secondary judgments. Thus the
judgments "this sensible pressure exists," "that sensible pressure
existed," "other similar pressures exist," "a conceivable centaur does
not exist but is a figment," are all equally true, because they are in
accordance with one or other of these kinds of knowledge. Consequently,
as knowledge is attainable by sense, memory and inference, truth is also
attainable, because, though we cannot test what we know by something
else, we can test what we judge and assert by what we know. Not that all
inference is knowledge, but it is sometimes. The aim of logic in general
is to find the laws of all inference, which, so far as it obeys those
laws, is always consistent, but is true or false according to its data
as well as its consistency; and the aim of the special logic of
knowledge is to find the laws of direct and indirect inferences from
sense, because as sense produces sensory judgments which are always true
of the sensible things actually perceived, inference from sense produces
inferential judgments which, so far as they are consequent on sensory
judgments, are always true of things similar to sensible things, by the
very consistency of inference, or, as we say, by parity of reasoning.
We return then to the old view of Aristotle, that truth is believing in
being; that sense is true of its immediate objects, and reasoning from
sense true of its mediate objects; and that logic is the science of
reasoning with a view to truth, or _Logica est ars ratiocinandi, ut
discernatur verum a falso_. All we aspire to add is that, in order to
attain to real truth, we must proceed gradually from sense, memory and
experience through analogical particular inference, to inductive and
deductive universal inference or reasoning. Logic is the science of all
inference, beginning from sense and ending in reason.

In conclusion, the logic of the last quarter of the 19th century may be
said to be animated by a spirit of inquiry, marred by a love of paradox
and a corresponding hatred of tradition. But we have found, on the
whole, that logical tradition rises superior to logical innovation.
There are two old logics which still remain indispensable, Aristotle's
_Organon_ and Bacon's _Novum Organum_. If, and only if, the study of
deductive logic begins with Aristotle, and the study of inductive logic
with Aristotle and Bacon, it will be profitable to add the works of the
following recent German and English authors:--

  AUTHORITIES.--J. Bergmann, _Reine Logik_ (Berlin, 1879); _Die
  Grundprobleme der Logik_ (2nd ed., Berlin, 1895); B. Bosanquet,
  _Logic_ (Oxford, 1888); _The Essentials of Logic_ (London, 1895); F.
  H. Bradley, _The Principles of Logic_ (London, 1883); F. Brentano,
  _Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte_ (Vienna, 1874); R. F.
  Clarke, _Logic_ (London, 1889); W. L. Davidson, _The Logic of
  Definition_ (London, 1885); E. Dühring, _Logik und
  Wissenschaftstheorie_ (Leipzig, 1878); B. Erdmann, _Logik_ (Halle,
  1892); T. Fowler, _Bacon's Novum Organum_, edited, with introduction,
  notes, &c. (2nd ed., Oxford, 1889); T. H. Green, _Lectures on Logic_,
  in _Works_, vol. iii. (London, 1886); J. G. Hibben, _Inductive Logic_
  (Edinburgh and London, 1896); F. Hillebrand, _Die neuen Theorien der
  kategorischen Schlüsse_ (Vienna, 1891); L. T. Hobhouse, _The Theory of
  Knowledge_ (London, 1896); H. Hughes, _The Theory of Inference_
  (London, 1894); E. Husserl, _Logische Untersuchungen_ (Halle, 1891,
  1901); W. Jerusalem, _Die Urtheilsfunction_ (Vienna and Leipzig,
  1895); W. Stanley Jevons, _The Principles of Science_ (3rd ed.,
  London, 1879); _Studies in Deductive Logic_ (London, 1880); H. W. B.
  Joseph, _Introduction to Logic_ (1906); E. E. Constance Jones,
  _Elements of Logic_ (Edinburgh, 1890); G. H. Joyce, _Principles of
  Logic_ (1908); J. N. Keynes, _Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic_
  (2nd ed., London, 1887); F. A. Lange, _Logische Studien_ (2nd ed.,
  Leipzig, 1894); T. Lipps, _Grundzüge der Logik_ (Hamburg and Leipzig,
  1893); R. H. Lotze, _Logik_ (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1881, English
  translation edited by B. Bosanquet, Oxford, 1884); _Grundzüge der
  Logik (Diktate)_ (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1891, English translation by G. T.
  Ladd, Boston, 1887); Werner Luthe, _Beiträge zur Logik_ (Berlin, 1872,
  1877); Members of Johns Hopkins University, _Studies in Logic_ (edited
  by C. S. Peirce, Boston, 1883); J. B. Meyer, _Ueberweg's System der
  Logik_, fünfte vermehrte Auflage (Bonn, 1882); Max Müller, _Science of
  Thought_ (London, 1887); Carveth Read, _On the Theory of Logic_
  (London, 1878); _Logic, Deductive and Inductive_ (2nd ed., London,
  1901); E. Schröder, _Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik_ (Leipzig,
  1890, 1891, 1895); W. Schuppe, _Erkenntnistheoretische Logik_ (Bonn,
  1878); _Grundriss der Erkenntnistheorie und Logik_ (Berlin, 1894); R.
  Shute, _A Discourse on Truth_ (London, 1877); Alfred Sidgwick,
  _Fallacies_ (London, 1883); _The Use of Words in Reasoning_ (London,
  1901); C. Sigwart, _Logik_ (2nd ed., Freiburg-i.-Br. and Leipzig,
  1889-1893, English translation by Helen Dendy, London, 1895); K.
  Uphues, _Grundlehren der Logik_ (Breslau, 1883); J. Veitch,
  _Institutes of Logic_ (Edinburgh and London, 1885); J. Venn, _Symbolic
  Logic_ (2nd ed., London, 1894); _The Principles of Empirical or
  Inductive Logic_ (London, 1889); J. Volkelt, _Erfahren und Denken_
  (Hamburg and Leipzig, 1886); T. Welton, _A Manual of Logic_ (London,
  1891, 1896); W. Windelband, _Präludien_ (Freiburg-i.-Br., 1884); W.
  Wundt, _Logik_ (2nd ed., Stuttgart, 1893-1895). Text-books are not
  comprised in this list.     (T. Ca.)


Logic cannot dispense with the light afforded by its history so long as
counter-solutions of the same fundamental problems continue to hold the
field. A critical review of some of the chief types of logical theory,
with a view to determine development, needs no further justification.

Logic arose, at least for the Western world, in the golden age of Greek
speculation which culminated in Plato and Aristotle. There is an Indian
logic, it is true, but its priority is more than disputable. In any case
no influence upon Greek thought can be shown. The movement which ends in
the logic of Aristotle is demonstrably self-contained. When we have
shaken ourselves free of the prejudice that all stars are first seen in
the East, Oriental attempts at analysis of the structure of thought may
be treated as negligible.

It is with Aristotle that the bookish tradition begins to dominate the
evolution of logic. The technical perfection of the analysis which he
offers is, granted the circle of presuppositions within which it works,
so decisive, that what precedes, even Plato's logic, is not unnaturally
regarded as merely preliminary and subsidiary to it. What follows is
inevitably, whether directly or indirectly, by sympathy or by
antagonism, affected by the Aristotelian tradition.


i. _Before Aristotle_

  The physical philosophers.

Logic needs as its presuppositions that thought should distinguish
itself from things and from sense, that the problem of validity should
be seen to be raised in the field of thought itself, and that analysis
of the structure of thought should be recognized as the one way of
solution. Thought is somewhat late in coming to self-consciousness.
Implied in every contrast of principle and fact, of rule and
application, involved as we see after the event, most decisively when we
react correctly upon a world incorrectly perceived, thought is yet not
reflected on in the common experience. Its so-called natural logic is
only the potentiality of logic. The same thing is true of the first
stage of Greek philosophy. In seeking for a single material principle
underlying the multiplicity of phenomena, the first nature-philosophers,
Thales and the rest, did indeed raise the problem of the one and the
many, the endeavour to answer which must at last lead to logic. But it
is only from a point of view won by later speculation that it can be
said that they sought to determine the predicates of the single
subject-reality, or to establish the permanent subject of varied and
varying predicates.[1] The direction of their inquiry is persistently
outward. They hope to explain the opposed appearance and reality wholly
within the world of things, and irrespective of the thought that thinks
things. Their universal is still a material one. The level of thought on
which they move is still clearly pre-logical. It is an advance on this
when Heraclitus[2] opposes to the eyes and ears which are bad witnesses
"for such as understand not their language" a common something which we
would do well to follow; or again when in the incommensurability of the
diagonal and side of a square the Pythagoreans stumbled upon what was
clearly neither thing nor image of sense, but yet was endowed with
meaning, and henceforth were increasingly at home with symbol and
formula. So far, however, it might well be that thought,
contradistinguished from sense with its illusions, was itself
infallible. A further step, then, was necessary, and it was taken at any
rate by the Eleatics, when they opposed their thought to the thought of
others, as the way of truth in contrast to the way of opinion. If
Eleatic thought stands over against Pythagorean thought as what is valid
or grounded against what is ungrounded or invalid, we are embarked upon
dialectic, or the debate in which thought is countered by thought.
Claims to a favourable verdict must now be substantiated in this field
and in this field alone. It was Zeno, the controversialist of the
Eleatic school, who was regarded in after times as the "discoverer" of

  Zeno's amazing skill in argumentation and his paradoxical conclusions,
  particular and general, inaugurate a new era. "The philosophical
  mind," says waiter Pater,[4] "will perhaps never be quite in health,
  quite sane or natural again." The give and take of thought had by a
  swift transformation of values come by something more than its own.
  Zeno's paradoxes, notably, for example, the puzzle of Achilles and the
  Tortoise, are still capable of amusing the modern world. In his own
  age they found him imitators. And there follows the sophistic

    The Sophists.

  The sophists have other claims to consideration than their service to
  the development of logic. In the history of the origins of logic the
  sophistic age is simply the age of the free play of thought in which
  men were aware that in a sense anything can be debated and not yet
  aware of the sense in which all things cannot be so. It is the age of
  discussion used as a universal solvent, before it has been brought to
  book by a deliberate unfolding of the principles of the structure of
  thought determining and limiting the movement of thought itself. The
  sophists furthered the transition from dialectic to logic in two ways.
  In the first place they made it possible. Incessant questioning leads
  to answers. Hair-splitting, even when mischievous in intent, leads to
  distinctions of value. Paradoxical insistence on the accidents of
  speech-forms and thought-forms leads in the end to perception of the
  essentials. Secondly they made it necessary. The spirit of debate run
  riot evokes a counter-spirit to order and control it. The result is a
  self-limiting dialectic. This higher dialectic is a logic. It is no
  accident that the first of the philosophical sophists, Gorgias, on the
  one hand, is Eleatic in his affinities, and on the other raises in the
  characteristic formula of his intellectual nihilism[5] issues which
  are as much logical and epistemological as ontological. The meaning of
  the copula and the relation of thoughts to the objects of which they
  are the thoughts are as much involved as the nature of being. It is
  equally no accident that the name of Protagoras is to be connected, in
  Plato's view at least, with the rival school of Heracliteans. The
  problems raised by the relativism of Protagoras are no less
  fundamentally problems of the nature of knowledge and of the structure
  of thought. The _Theaetetus_ indeed, in which Plato essays to deal
  with them, is in the broad sense of the word logical, the first
  distinctively logical treatise that has come down to us. Other
  sophists, of course, with more practical interests, or of humbler
  attainments, were content to move on a lower plane of philosophical
  speculation. As presented to us, for example, in Plato's surely not
  altogether hostile caricature in the _Euthydemus_, they mark the
  intellectual preparation for, and the moral need for, the advance of
  the next generation.


  Among the pioneers of the sophistic age Socrates stands apart. He has
  no other instrument than the dialectic of his compeers, and he is as
  far off as the rest from a criticism of the instrument, but he uses it
  differently and with a difference of aim. He construes the give and
  take of the debate-game with extreme rigour. The rhetorical element
  must be exorcised. The set harangue of teacher to pupil, in which
  steps in argument are slurred and the semblance of co-inquiry is
  rendered nugatory, must be eliminated. The interlocutors must in truth
  render an account under the stimulus of organized heckling from their
  equals or superiors in debating ability. And the aim is heuristic,
  though often enough the search ends in no overt positive conclusion.
  Something can be found and something is found. Common names are fitted
  for use by the would-be users being first delivered from abortive
  conceptions, and thereupon enabled to bring to the birth living and
  organic notions.

  Aristotle would assign to Socrates the elaboration of two logical
  functions:--general definition and inductive method.[6] Rightly, if we
  add that he gives no theory of either, and that his practical use of
  the latter depends for its value on selection.[7] It is rather in
  virtue of his general faith in the possibility of construction, which
  he still does not undertake, and because of his consequent insistence
  on the elucidation of general concepts, which in common with some of
  his contemporaries, he may have thought of as endued with a certain
  objectivity, that he induces the controversies of what are called the
  Socratic schools as to the nature of predication. These result in the
  formulation of a new dialectic or logic by Plato. Manifestly Socrates'
  use of certain forms of argumentation, like their abuse by the
  sophists, tended to evoke their logical analysis. The use and abuse,
  confronted one with the other, could not but evoke it.


  The one in the many, the formula which lies at the base of the
  possibility of predication, is involved in the Socratic doctrine of
  general concepts or ideas. The nihilism of Gorgias from the Eleatic
  point of view of bare identity, and the speechlessness of Cratylus
  from the Heraclitean ground of absolute difference, are alike
  disowned. But the one in the many, the identity in difference, is so
  far only postulated, not established. When the personality of Socrates
  is removed, the difficulty as to the nature of the Socratic universal,
  developed in the medium of the individual processes of individual
  minds, carries disciples of diverse general sympathies, united only
  through the practical inspiration of the master's life, towards the
  identity-formula or the difference-formula of other teachers. The
  paradox of predication, that it seems to deny identity, or to deny
  difference, becomes a _pons asinorum_. Knowledge involves synthesis or
  nexus. Yet from the points of view alike of an absolute pluralism, of
  a flux, and of a formula of bare identity--and _a fortiori_ with any
  blending of these principles sufficiently within the bounds of
  plausibility to find an exponent--all knowledge, because all
  predication of unity, in difference, must be held to be impossible.
  Plato's problem was to find a way of escape from this impasse, and
  among his Socratic contemporaries he seems to have singled out
  Antisthenes[8] as most in need of refutation. Antisthenes, starting
  with the doctrine of identity without difference, recognizes as the
  only expression proper to anything its own peculiar sign, its name.
  This extreme of nominalism for which predication is impossible is,
  however, compromised by two concessions. A thing can be described as
  like something else. And a compound can have a [Greek: logos] or
  account given of it by the (literally) adequate enumeration of the
  names of its simple elements or [Greek: prôta].[9] This analytical
  [Greek: logos] he offers as his substitute for knowledge.[10] The
  simple elements still remain, sensed and named but not known. The
  expressions of them are simply the speech-signs for them. The account
  of the compound simply sets itself taken piecemeal as equivalent to
  itself taken as aggregate. The subject-predicate relation fails really
  to arise. Euclides[11] found no difficulty in fixing Antisthenes' mode
  of illustrating his simple elements by comparison, and therewith
  perhaps the "induction" of Socrates, with the dilemma; so far as the
  example is dissimilar, the comparison is invalid; so far as it is
  similar, it is useless. It is better to say what the thing is. Between
  Euclides and Antisthenes the Socratic induction and universal
  definition were alike discredited from the point of view of the
  Eleatic logic. It is with the other point of doctrine that Plato comes
  to grips, that which allows of a certainty or knowledge consisting in
  an analysis of a compound into simple elements themselves not known.
  The syllable or combination is, he shows, not known by resolution of
  it into letters or elements themselves not known. An aggregate
  analysed into its mechanical parts is as much and as little known as
  they. A whole which is more than its parts is from Antisthenes' point
  of view inconceivable. Propositions analytical of a combination in the
  sense alleged do not give knowledge. Yet knowledge is possible. The
  development of a positive theory of predication has become quite


Plato's logic supplies a theory of universals in the doctrine of ideas.
Upon this it bases a theory of predication, which, however, is
compatible with more than one reading of the metaphysical import of the
ideas. And it sets forth a dialectic with a twofold movement, towards
differentiation and integration severally, which amounts to a
formulation of inference. The more fully analysed movement, that which
proceeds downward from less determinate to more determinate universals,
is named Division. Its associations, accordingly, are to the modern ear
almost inevitably those of a doctrine of classification only. Aristotle,
however, treats it as a dialectical rival to syllogism, and it
influenced Galilei and Bacon in their views of inference after the
Renaissance. If we add to this logic of "idea," judgment and inference,
a doctrine of categories in the modern sense of the word which makes the
_Theaetetus_, in which it first occurs, a forerunner of Kant's _Critique
of Pure Reason_, we have clearly a very significant contribution to
logic even in technical regard. Its general philosophical setting may be
said to enhance its value even as logic.

  The "Idea."

(a) Of the idea we may say that whatever else it is, and apart from all
puzzles as to ideas of relations such as smallness, of negative
qualities such as injustice, or of human inventions such as beds, it is
opposed to that of which it is the idea as its intelligible formula or
law, the truth or validity--Herbart's word--of the phenomenon from the
point of view of nexus or system. The thing of sense in its relative
isolation is unstable. It is and is not. What gives stability is the
insensible principle or principles which it holds, as it were, in
solution. These are the ideas, and their mode of being is naturally
quite other than that of the sensible phenomena which they order. The
formula for an indefinite number of particular things in particular
places at particular times, and all of them presentable in sensuous
imagery of a given time and place, is not itself presentable in sensuous
imagery side by side with the individual members of the group it orders.
The law, e.g., of the equality of the radii of a circle cannot be
exhibited to sense, even if equal radii may be so exhibited. It is the
wealth of illustration with which Plato expresses his meaning, and the
range of application which he gives the idea--to the class-concepts of
natural groups objectively regarded, to categories, to aesthetic and
ethical ideals, to the concrete aims of the craftsman as well as to
scientific laws--that have obscured his doctrine, viz. that wherever
there is law, there is an idea.

  The one in the many.

(b) The paradox of the one in the many is none, if the idea may be
regarded as supplying a principle of nexus or organization to an
indefinite multiplicity of particulars. But if Antisthenes is to be
answered, a further step must be taken. The principle of difference must
be carried into the field of the ideas. Not only sense is a principle of
difference. The ideas are many. The multiplicity in unity must be
established within thought itself. Otherwise the objection stands: man
is man and good is good, but to say that man is good is clearly to say
the thing that is not. Plato replies with the doctrine of the
interpenetration of ideas, obviously not of all with all, but of some
with some, the formula of identity in difference within thought itself.
Nor can the opponent fairly refuse to admit it, if he affirms the
participation of the identical with being, and denies the participation
of difference with being, or affirms it with not-being. The _Sophistes_
shows among other things that an identity-philosophy breaks down into a
dualism of thought and expression, when it applies the predicate of
unity to the real, just as the absolute pluralism on the other hand
collapses into unity if it affirms or admits any form of relation
whatsoever. Identity and difference are all-pervasive categories, and
the speech-form and the corresponding thought-form involve both. For
proposition and judgment involve subject and predicate and exhibit what
a modern writer calls "identity of reference with diversity of
characterization." Plato proceeds to explain by his principle of
difference both privative and negative predicates, and also the
possibility of false predication. It is obvious that without the
principle of difference error is inexplicable. Even Plato, however,
perhaps scarcely shows that with it, and nothing else but it, error is


(c) Plato's Division, or the articulation of a relatively indeterminate
and generic concept into species and sub-species with resultant
determinate judgments, presumes of course the doctrine of the
interpenetration of ideas laid down in the _Sophistes_ as the basis of
predication, but its use precedes the positive development of that
formula, though not, save very vaguely, the exhibition of it,
negatively, in the antinomies of the one and the many in the
_Parmenides_. It is its use, however, not the theory of it, that
precedes. The latter is expounded in the _Politicus_ (260 sqq.) and
_Philebus_ (16c sqq.). The ideal is progressively to determine a
universe of discourse till true _infimae species_ are reached, when no
further distinction in the determinate many is possible, though there is
still the numerical difference of the indefinite plurality of
particulars. The process is to take as far as possible the form of a
continuous disjunction of contraries. We must bisect as far as may be,
but the division is after all to be into limbs, not parts. The later
examples of the _Politicus_ show that the permission of three or more
co-ordinate species is not nugatory, and that the precept of dichotomy
is merely in order to secure as little of a _saltus_ as possible; to
avoid e.g. the division of the animal world into men and brutes. It is
the middle range of the [Greek: mesa] of _Philebus_ 17a that appeals to
Bacon, not only this but their mediating quality that appeals to
Aristotle. The _media axiomata_ of the one and the _middle term_ of the
other lie in the phrase. Plato's division is nevertheless neither
syllogism nor _exclusiva_. It is not syllogism because it is based on
the disjunctive, not on the hypothetical relation, and so extends
horizontally where syllogism strikes vertically downward. Again it is
not syllogism because it is necessarily and finally dialectical. It
brings in the choice of an interlocutor at each stage, and so depends on
a concession for what it should prove.[12] Nor is it Bacon's method of
exclusions, which escapes the imputation of being dialectical, if not
that of being unduly cumbrous, in virtue of the cogency of the negative
instance. The Platonic division was, however, offered as the scientific
method of the school. A fragment of the comic poet Epicrates gives a
picture of it at work.[13] And the movement of disjunction as truly has
a place in the scientific specification of a concept in all its
differences as the linking of lower to higher in syllogism. The two are
complementary, and the reinstatement of the disjunctive judgment to the
more honourable rôle in inference has been made by so notable a modern
logician as Lotze.


(d) The correlative process of Combination is less elaborately sketched,
but in a luminous passage in the _Politicus_ (§ 278), in explaining by
means of an example the nature and use of examples, Plato represents it
as the bringing of one and the same element seen in diverse settings to
conscious realization, with the result that it is viewed as a single
truth of which the terms compared are now accepted as the differences.
The learner is to be led forward to the unknown by being made to hark
back to more familiar groupings of the alphabet of nature which he is
coming to recognize with some certainty. To lead on, [Greek: epagein],
is to refer back, [Greek: anagein],[14] to what has been correctly
divined of the same elements in clearer cases. Introduction to
unfamiliar collocations follows upon this, and, only so, is it possible
finally to gather scattered examples into a conspectus as instances of
one idea or law. This is not only of importance in the history of the
terminology of logic, but supplies a philosophy of induction.

  Mental synthesis.

(e) Back of Plato's illustration and explanation of predication and
dialectical inference there lies not only the question of their
metaphysical grounding in the interconnexion of ideas, but that of their
epistemological presuppositions. This is dealt with in the Theaetetus
(184b sqq.). The manifold affections of sense are not simply aggregated
in the individual, like the heroes in the Trojan horse. There must be
convergence in a unitary principle, soul or consciousness, which is that
which really functions in perception, the senses and their organs being
merely its instruments. It is this unity of apperception which enables
us to combine the data of more than one sense, to affirm reality,
unreality, identity, difference, unity, plurality and so forth, as also
the good, the beautiful and their contraries. Plato calls these
pervasive factors in knowledge [Greek: koina], and describes them as
developed by the soul in virtue of its own activity. They are objects of
its reflection and made explicit in the few with pains and
gradually.[15] That they are not, however, psychological or acquired
categories, due to "the workmanship of the mind" as conceived by Locke,
is obvious from their attribution to the structure of mind[16] and from
their correlation with immanent principles of the objective order.
Considered from the epistemological point of view, they are the implicit
presuppositions of the construction or [Greek: syllogismos][17] in which
knowledge consists. But as ideas,[18] though of a type quite apart,[19]
they have also a constitutive application to reality. Accordingly, of
the selected "kinds" by means of which the interpenetration of ideas is
expounded in the _Sophistes_, only motion and rest, the ultimate "kinds"
in the physical world, have no counterparts in the "categories" of the
_Theaetetus_. In his doctrine as to [Greek: en to poioun] or [Greek:
krinon], as generally in that of the activity of the [Greek: nous
apathês], Aristotle in the _de Anima_[20] is in the main but echoing the
teaching of Plato.[21]

ii. _Aristotle._

Plato's episodic use of logical distinctions[22] is frequent. His
recourse to such logical analysis as would meet the requirements of the
problem in hand[23] is not rare. In the "dialectical" dialogues the
question of method and of the justification of its postulates attains at
least a like prominence with the ostensible subject matter. There is
even formal recognition of the fact that to advance in dialectic is a
greater thing than to bring any special inquiry to a successful
issue.[24] But to the end there is a lack of interest in, and therefore
a relative immaturity of, technique as such. In the forcing atmosphere,
however, of that age of controversy, seed such as that sown in the
master's treatment of the uttered [Greek: logos][25] quickly germinated.
Plato's successors in the Academy must have developed a system of
grammatico-logical categories which Aristotle could make his own. Else
much of his criticism of Platonic doctrine[26] does, indeed, miss fire.
The gulf too, which the _Philebus_[27] apparently left unbridged between
the sensuous apprehension of particulars and the knowledge of universals
of even minimum generality led with Speusippus to a formula of knowledge
in perception ([Greek: epistêmonikê aisthêsis]). These and like
developments, which are to be divined from references in the
Aristotelian writings, jejune, and, for the most part, of probable
interpretation only, complete the material which Aristotle could utilize
when he seceded from the Platonic school and embarked upon his own
course of logical inquiry.


This is embodied in the group of treatises later known as the
_Organon_[28] and culminates in the theory of syllogism and of
demonstrative knowledge in the _Analytics_. All else is finally
subsidiary. In the well-known sentences with which the _Organon_
closes[29] Aristotle has been supposed to lay claim to the discovery of
the principle of syllogism. He at least claims to have been the first to
dissect the procedure of the debate-game, and the larger claim may be
thought to follow. In the course of inquiry into the formal
consequences from probable premises, the principle of mediation or
linking was so laid bare that the advance to the analytic determination
of the species and varieties of syllogism was natural. Once embarked
upon such an analysis, where valid process from assured principles gave
truth, Aristotle could find little difficulty in determining the formula
of demonstrative knowledge or science. It must be grounded in principles
of assured certainty and must demonstrate its conclusions with the use
of such middle or linking terms only as it is possible to equate with
the real ground or cause in the object of knowledge. Hence the account
of axioms and of definitions, both of substances and of derivative
attributes. Hence the importance of determining how first principles are
established. It is, then, a fair working hypothesis as to the structure
of the _Organon_ to place the _Topics_, which deal with dialectical
reasoning, before the _Analytics_.[30] Of the remaining treatises
nothing of fundamental import depends on their order. One, however, the
_Categories_, may be regarded with an ancient commentator,[31] as
preliminary to the dialectical inquiry in the _Topics_. The other, on
thought as expressed in language ([Greek: Peri ermêneias]) is possibly
spurious, though in any case a compilation of the Aristotelian school.
If genuine, its naïve theory that thought copies things and other
features of its contents would tend to place it among the earliest works
of the philosopher.

  The logical treatises.

Production in the form of a series of relatively self-contained
treatises accounts for the absence of a name and general definition of
their common field of inquiry. A more important lack which results is
that of any clear intimation as to the relation in which Aristotle
supposed it to stand to other disciplines. In his definite
classification of the sciences,[32] into First Philosophy, Mathematics
and Physics, it has no place. Its axioms, such as the law of
contradiction, belong to first philosophy, but the doctrine as a whole
falls neither under this head nor yet, though the thought has been
entertained, under that of mathematics, since logic orders mathematical
reasoning as well as all other. The speculative sciences, indeed, are
classified according to their relation to form, pure, abstract or
concrete, i.e. according to their objects. The logical inquiry seems to
be conceived as dealing with the thought of which the objects are
objects. It is to be regarded as a propaedeutic,[33] which, although it
is in contact with reality in and through the metaphysical import of the
axioms, or again in the fact that the categories, though primarily taken
as forms of predication, must also be regarded as kinds of being, is not
directly concerned with object-reality, but with the determination for
the thinking subject of what constitutes the knowledge correlative to
being. Logic, therefore, is not classed as one, still less as a branch
of one, among the 'ologies, ontology not excepted.

The way in which logical doctrine is developed in the Aristotelian
treatises fits in with this view. Doubtless what we have is in the main
a reflex of the heuristic character of Aristotle's own work as pioneer.
But it at least satisfies the requirement that the inquiry shall carry
the plain man along with it. Actual modes of expression are shown to
embody distinctions which average intelligence can easily recognize and
will readily acknowledge, though they may tend by progressive
rectification fundamentally to modify the assumption natural to the
level of thought from which he begins. Thus we start[34] from the point
of view of a world of separate persons and things, in which thought
mirrors these concrete realities, taken as ultimate subjects of
predicates. It is a world of communication of thought, where persons as
thinkers need to utter in language truths objectively valid for the
_mundus communis_. In these truths predicates are accepted or rejected
by subjects, and therefore depend on the reflection of fact in [Greek:
logoi] (propositions). These are combinatory of parts, attaching or
detaching predicates, and so involving subject, predicate and
copula.[35] At this stage we are as much concerned with speech-forms as
the thought-forms of which they are conventional symbols, with Plato's
analysis, for instance, into a noun and a verb, whose connotation of
time is as yet a difficulty. The universal of this stage is the
universal of fact, what is recognized as predicable of a plurality of
subjects. The dialectical doctrine of judgment as the declaration of one
member of a disjunction by contradiction, which is later so important,
is struggling with one of its initial difficulties,[36] viz. the
contingency of particular events future, the solution of which remains

  The Categories.

The doctrine of the _Categories_ is still on the same level of
thought,[38] though its grammatico-logical analysis is the more advanced
one which had probably been developed by the Academy before Aristotle
came to think of his friends there as "them" rather than "us." It is
what in one direction gave the now familiar classification of parts of
speech, in the other that of thought-categories underlying them. If we
abstract from any actual combination of subject and predicate and
proceed to determine the types of predicate asserted in simple
propositions of fact, we have on the one hand a subject which is never
object, a "first substance" or concrete thing, of which may be
predicated in the first place "second substance" expressing that it is a
member of a concrete class, and in the second place quantity, quality,
correlation, action and the like. The list follows the forms of the
Greek language so closely that a category emerges appropriated to the
use of the perfect tense of the middle voice to express the relation of
the subject to a garb that it dons. In all this the individual is the
sole self-subsistent reality. Truth and error are about the individual
and attach or detach predicates correctly and incorrectly. There is no
committal to the metaphysics in the light of which the logical inquiry
is at last to find its complete justification. The point of view is to
be modified profoundly by what follows--by the doctrine of the
class-concept behind the class, of the form or idea as the constitutive
formula of a substance, or, again, by the requirement that an essential
attribute must be grounded in the nature or essence of the substance of
which it is predicated, and that such attributes alone are admissible
predicates from the point of view of the strict ideal of science. But we
are still on the ground of common opinion, and these doctrines are not
yet laid down as fundamental to the development.

  The Topics.

Dialectic then, though it may prove to be the ultimate method of
establishing principles in philosophy,[39] starts from probable and
conceded premises,[40] and deals with them only in the light of common
principles such as may be reasonably appealed to or easily established
against challenge. To the expert, in any study which involves contingent
matter, i.e. an irreducible element of indetermination, e.g. to the
physician, there is a specific form of this, but the reflection that
this is so is something of an afterthought. We start with what is prima
facie given, to return upon it from the ground of principles clarified
by the sifting process of dialectic[41] and certified by [Greek: nous].
The _Topics_ deal with dialectic and constitute an anatomy of
argumentation, or, according to what seems to be Aristotle's own
metaphor, a survey of the tactical vantage-points ([Greek: topoi]) for
the conflict of wits in which the prize is primarily victory, though it
is a barren victory unless it is also knowledge. It is in this treatise
that what have been called "the conceptual categories"[42] emerge, viz.
the _predicables_, or heads of predication as it is analysed in relation
to the provisional theory of definition that dialectic allows and
requires. A predicate either is expressive of the essence or part of the
essence of the subject, viz. that original group of mutually underivable
attributes of which the absence of any one destroys its right to the
class-name, or it is not. Either it is convertible with the subject or
it is not. Here then judgment, though still viewed as combinatory, has
the types which belong to coherent systems of implication discriminated
from those that predicate coincidence or accident, i.e. any happening
not even derivatively essential from the point of view of the grouping
in which the subject has found a place. In the theory of dialectic any
predicate may be suggested for a subject, and if not affirmed of it,
must be denied of it, if not denied must be affirmed. The development of
a theory of the ground on which subjects claim their predicates and
disown alien predicates could not be long postponed. In practical
dialectic the unlimited possibility was reduced to manageable
proportions in virtue of the groundwork of received opinion upon which
the operation proceeded. It is in the _Topics_, further, that we clearly
have a first treatment of syllogism as formal implication, with the
suggestion that advance must be made to a view of its use for material
implication from true and necessary principles. It is in the
_Topics_,[43] again, that we have hints at the devices of an inductive
process, which, as dialectical, throw the burden of producing
contradictory instances upon the other party to the discussion. In
virtue of the common-stock of opinion among the interlocutors and their
potentially controlling audience, this process was more valuable than
appears on the face of things. Obviously tentative, and with limits and
ultimate interpretation to be determined elsewhere, it failed to bear
fruit till the Renaissance, and then by the irony of fate to the
discrediting of Aristotle. In any case, however, definition, syllogism,
induction all invited further determination, especially if they were to
take their place in a doctrine of truth or knowledge. The problem of
analytic, i.e. of the resolution of the various forms of inference into
their equivalents in that grouping of terms or premises which was most
obviously cogent, was a legacy of the _Topics_. The debate-game had
sought for diversion and found truth, and truth raised the logical
problem on a different plane.

  Class concept.

  The Prior Analytics.

At first the problem of formal analysis only. We proceed with the talk
of instances and concern ourselves first with relations of inclusion and
exclusion. The question is as to membership of a class, and the dominant
formula is the _dictum de omni et nullo_. Until the view of the
individual units with which we are so far familiar has undergone radical
revision, the primary inquiry must be into the forms of a
class-calculus. Individuals fall into groups in virtue of the possession
of certain predicates. Does one group include, or exclude, or intersect
another with which it is compared? We are clearly in the field of the
diagrams of the text-books, and much of the phraseology is based upon an
original graphic representation in extension. The middle term, though
conceived as an intermediary or linking term, gets its name as
intermediate in a homogeneous scheme of quantity, where it cannot be of
narrower extension than the subject nor wider than the predicate of the
conclusion.[44] It is also, as Aristotle adds,[45] middle in position in
the syllogism that concludes to a universal affirmative.[45] Again, so
long as we keep to the syllogism as complete in itself and without
reference to its place in the great structure of knowledge, the nerve of
proof cannot be conceived in other than a formal manner. In analytic we
work with an ethos different from that of dialectic. We presume truth
and not probability or concession, but a true conclusion can follow from
false premises, and it is only in the attempt to derive the premises in
turn from their grounds that we unmask the deception. The passage to the
conception of system is still required. The _Prior Analytics_ then are
concerned with a formal logic to be knit into a system of knowledge of
the real only in virtue of a formula which is at this stage still to
seek. The forms of syllogism, however, are tracked successfully through
their figures, i.e. through the positions of the middle term that
Aristotle recognizes as of actual employment, and all their moods, i.e.
all differences of affirmative and negative, universal and particular
within the figures, the cogent or legitimate forms are alone left
standing, and the formal doctrine of syllogism is complete. Syllogism
already defined[46] becomes through exhibition in its valid forms clear
in its principle. It is a speech-and-thought-form ([Greek: logos]) in
which certain matters being posited something other than the matters
posited necessarily results because of them, and, though it still needs
to receive a deeper meaning when presumed truth gives way to necessary
truth of premises, the notion of the class to that of the class-concept,
collective fact to universal law, its formal claim is manifest. "Certain
matters being posited." Subject and predicate not already seen to be
conjoined must be severally known to be in relation with that which
joins them, so that more than one direct conjunction must be given. "Of
necessity." If what are to be conjoined are severally in relation to a
common third it does perforce relate or conjoin them. "Something other."
The conjunction was by hypothesis not given, and is a new result by no
means to be reached, apart from direct perception save by use of at
least two given conjunctions. "Because of them," therefore. Yet so long
as the class-view is prominent, there is a suggestion of a begging of
the question. The class is either constituted by enumeration of its
members, and, passing by the difficulty involved in the thought of "its"
members, is an empirical universal of fact merely, or it is grounded in
the class-concept. In the first case it is a formal scheme which helps
knowledge and the theory of knowledge not at all. We need then to
develop the alternative, and to pass from the external aspect of
all-ness to the intrinsic ground of it in the universal [Greek: kath'
auto kai ê auto], which, whatsoever the assistance it receives from
induction in some sense of the word, in the course of its development
for the individual mind, is secured against dependence on instances by
the decisive fiat or guarantee of [Greek: nous], insight into the
systematic nexus of things. The conception of linkage needs to be
deepened by the realization of the middle term as the ground of nexus in
a real order which is also rational.

  Problem of inference.


Aristotle's solution of the paradox of inference, viz. of the fact that
in one sense to go beyond what is in the premises is fallacy, while in
another sense not to go beyond them is futility, lies in his formula of
implicit and explicit, potential and actual.[47] The real nexus
underlying the thought-process is to be articulated in the light of the
voucher by intelligence as to the truth of the principles of the various
departments of knowledge which we call sciences, and at the ideal limit
it is possible to transform syllogism into systematic presentation, so
that, differently written down, it is definition. But for human thought
sense, with its accidental setting in matter itself incognizable is
always with us. The activity of [Greek: nous] is never so perfectly
realized as to merge implication in intuition. Syllogism must indeed be
objective, i.e. valid for any thinker, but it is also a process in the
medium of individual thinking, whereby new truth is reached. A man may
know that mules are sterile and that the beast before him is a mule, and
yet believe her to be in foal "not viewing the several truths in
connexion."[48] The doctrine, then, that the universal premise contains
the conclusion not otherwise than potentially is with Aristotle
cardinal. The datum of sense is only retained through the universal.[49]
It is possible to take a universal view with some at least of the
particular instances left uninvestigated.[50] Recognition that the
class-concept is applicable may be independent of knowledge of much that
it involves. Knowledge of the implications of it does not depend on
observation of all members of the class. Syllogism as formula for the
exhibition of truth attained, and construction or what not as the
instrumental process by which we reach the truth, have with writers
since Hegel and Herbart tended to fall apart. Aristotle's view is other.
Both are syllogisms, though in different points of view. For this
reason, if for no other, the conception of movement from the potential
possession of knowledge to its actualization remains indispensable.
Whether this is explanation or description, a problem or its solution,
is of course another matter.

  Posterior Analytics.

In the _Posterior Analytics_ the syllogism is brought into decisive
connexion with the real by being set within a system in which its
function is that of material implication from principles which are
primary, immediate and necessary truths. Hitherto the assumption of the
probable as true rather than as what will be conceded in debate[51] has
been the main distinction of the standpoint of analytic from that of
dialectic. But the true is true only in reference to a coherent system
in which it is an immediate ascertainment of [Greek: nous], or to be
deduced from a ground which is such. The ideal of science or
demonstrative knowledge is to exhibit as flowing from the definitions
and postulates of a science, from its special principles, by the help
only of axioms or principles common to all knowledge, and these not as
premises but as guiding rules, all the properties of the subject-matter,
i.e. all the predicates that belong to it in its own nature. In the case
of any subject-kind, its definition and its existence being avouched by
[Greek: nous], "heavenly body" for example, the problem is, given the
fact of a non-self-subsistent characteristic of it, such as the eclipse
of the said body, to find a ground, a [Greek: meson] which expressed the
[Greek: aition], in virtue of which the adjectival concept can be
exhibited as belonging to the subject-concept [Greek: kath auto] in the
strictly adequate sense of the phrase in which it means also [Greek: hê
auto].[52] We are under the necessity then of revising the point of view
of the syllogism of all-ness. We discard the conception of the universal
as a predicate applicable to a plurality, or even to all, of the members
of a group. To know merely [Greek: kata pantos] is not to know, save
accidentally. The exhaustive judgment, if attainable, could not be known
to be exhaustive. The universal is the ground of the empirical "all" and
not conversely. A formula such as the equality of the interior angles of
a triangle to two right angles is only scientifically known when it is
not of isosceles or scalene triangle that it is known, nor even of all
the several types of triangle collectively, but as a predicate of
triangle recognized as the widest class-concept of which it is true, the
first stage in the progressive differentiation of figure at which it can
be asserted.[53]

Three points obviously need development, the nature of definition, its
connexion with the syllogism in which the middle term is cause or
ground, and the way in which we have assurance of our principles.


  The middle term.

Definition is either of the subject-kind or of the property that is
grounded in it. Of the self-subsistent definition is [Greek: ousias tis
gnôrismos][54] by exposition of genus and differentia.[55] It is
indemonstrable. It presumes the reality of its subject in a postulate of
existence. It belongs to the principles of demonstration. _Summa genera_
and groups below _infimae species_ are indefinable. The former are
susceptible of elucidation by indication of what falls under them. The
latter are only describable by their accidents. There can here be no
true differentia. The artificiality of the limit to the articulation of
species was one of the points to which the downfall of Aristotle's
influence was largely due. Of a non-self-subsistent or attributive
conception definition in its highest attainable form is a recasting of
the syllogism, in which it was shown that the attribute was grounded in
the substance or self-subsistent subject of which it is. Eclipse of the
moon, e.g. is privation of light from the moon by the interposition of
the earth between it and the sun. In the scientific syllogism the
interposition of the earth is the middle term, the cause or "because"
([Greek: dioti]), the residue of the definition is conclusion. The
difference then is in verbal expression, way of putting, inflexion.[56]
If we pluck the fruit of the conclusion, severing its nexus with the
stock from which it springs, we have an imperfect form of definition,
while, if further we abandon all idea of making it adequate by
exhibition of its ground, we have, with still the same form of words, a
definition merely nominal or lexicographical. In the aporematic
treatment of the relation of definition and syllogism identical as to
one form and in one view, distinct as to another form and in another
view, much of Aristotle's discussion consists. The rest is a
consideration of scientific inquiry as converging in [Greek: mesou
zêtêsis], the investigation of the link or "because" as ground in the
nature of things. [Greek: To men gar aition to meson][57] real ground
and thought link fall together. The advance from syllogism as formal
implication is a notable one. It is not enough to have for middle term a
_causa cognoscendi_ merely. We must have a _causa essendi_. The planets
are near, and we know it by their not twinkling,[58] but science must
conceive their nearness as the cause of their not twinkling and make the
_prius_ in the real order the middle term of its syllogism. In this
irreversible catena proceeding from ground to consequent, we have left
far behind such things as the formal parity of genus and differentia
considered as falling under the same predicable,[59] and hence justified
in part Porphyry's divergence from the scheme of predicables. We need
devices, indeed, to determine priority or superior claim to be "better
known absolutely or in the order of nature," but on the whole the
problem is fairly faced.[60]

Of science Aristotle takes for his examples sometimes celestial physics,
more often geometry or arithmetic, sometimes a concrete science, e.g.
botany.[61] In the field of pure form, free from the disconcerting
surprises of sensible matter and so of absolute necessity, no difficulty
arises as to the deducibility of the whole body of a science from its
first principles. In the sphere of abstract form, mathematics, the like
may be allowed, abstraction being treated as an elimination of matter
from the [Greek: synolon] by one act. When we take into account relative
matter, however, and traces of a conception of abstraction as admitting
of degree,[62] the question is not free from difficulty. In the sphere
of the concrete sciences where law obtains only [Greek: hôs epi to polu]
this ideal of science can clearly find only a relative satisfaction with
large reserves. In any case, however, the problem as to first principles
remains fundamental.

  Formal and scientific principles.

  Induction and dialectic.

  Knowledge and reality.

  Conclusions as to induction.

If we reject the infinite regress and the circle in proof (_circulus in
probando_) which resolves itself ultimately into proving A by B and B by
A,[63] we are confronted by the need for principles of two kinds, those
which condition all search for truth, and those which are the peculiar
or proper principles of special sciences, their "positions," viz. the
definitions of their subjects and the postulates of the existence of
these. All are indemonstrable and cannot be less sure than the body of
doctrine that flows from them. They must indeed be recognized as true,
primary, causative and the like. But[64] they are not congenitally
present in the individual in a determinate shape. The doctrine of
latency is mystical and savours of Plato's reminiscence (_anamnesis_).
Yet they must have something to develop from, and thereupon Aristotle
gives an account of a process in the psychological mechanism which he
illustrates by comparative psychology, wherein a [Greek: logos] or
meaning emerges, a "first" universal recognized by induction. Yet
[Greek: nous], intelligence, is the principle of first principles. It is
infallible, while, whatever the case with perception of the special
sensibles,[65] the process which combines particulars is not. On the
side of induction we find that experience is said to give the specific
principles,[66] "the phenomena being apprehended in sufficiency." On the
side of intuition, self-evidence of scientific principles is spoken
of.[67] Yet dialectic is auxiliary and of methodological importance in
their establishment.[68] Mutually limiting statements occur almost or
quite side by side. We cannot take first principles "as the bare
precipitate of a progressively refined analysis"[69] nor on the other as
constitutive a priori forms. The solution seems to lie in the conception
of a process that has a double aspect. On the one hand we have
confrontation with fact, in which, in virtue of the rational principle
which is the final cause of the phenomenal order, intelligence will find
satisfaction. On the other we have a stage at which the rational but as
yet not reasoned concepts developed in the medium of the psychological
mechanism are subjected to processes of reflective comparison and
analysis, and, with some modification, maintained against challenge,
till at length the ultimate universals emerge, which rational insight
can posit as certain, and the whole hierarchy of concepts from the
"first" universals to [Greek: ta amerê] are intuited in a coherent
system. Aristotle's terminology is highly technical, but, as has often
been observed, not therefore clear. Here two words at least are
ambiguous, "principle" and "induction." By the first he means any
starting-point, "that from which the matter in question is primarily to
be known,"[70] particular facts therefore, premises, and what not. What
then is meant by principles when we ask in the closing chapter of his
logic how they become known? The data of sense are clearly not the
principles in question here. The premises of scientific syllogisms may
equally be dismissed. Where they are not derivative they clearly are
definitions or immediate transcripts from definitions. There remain,
then, primary definitions and the postulates of their realization, and
the axioms or common principles, "which he must needs have who is to
reach any knowledge."[71] In the case of the former, special each to its
own science, Aristotle may be thought to hold that they are the product
of the psychological mechanism, but are ascertained only when they have
faced the fire of a critical dialectic and have been accepted from the
point of view of the integral rationality of the system of concepts.
Axioms, on the other hand, in which the sciences interconnect[72]
through the employment of them in a parity of relation, seem to be
implicit indeed in the psychological mechanism, but to come to a kind of
explicitness in the first reflective reaction upon it, and without
reference to any particular content of it. They are not to be used as
premises but as immanent laws of thought, save only when an inference
from true or admitted premises and correct in form is challenged. The
challenge must be countered in a _reductio ad impossibile_ in which the
dilemma is put. Either this conclusion or the denial of rationality.
Even these principles, however, may get a greater explicitness by
dialectical treatment.[73] The relation, then, of the two orders of
principle to the psychological mechanism is different. The kind of
warrant that intelligence can give to specific principles falls short of
infallibility. Celestial physics, with its pure forms and void of all
matter save extension, is not such an exemplary science after all.
Rationality is continuous throughout. A [Greek: logos] emerges with some
beings in direct sequence upon the persistence of impressions.[74] Sense
is of the "first" universal, the form, though not of the ultimate
universal. The rally from the rout in Aristotle's famous metaphor is of
units that already belong together, that are of the same regiment or
order. On the other hand, rationality has two stages. In the one it is
relatively immersed in sense, in the other relatively free. The same
break is to be found in the conception of the relation of receptive to
active mind in the treatise _Of the Soul_.[75] The one is impressed by
things and receives their form without their matter. The other is free
from impression. It thinks its system of concepts freely on the occasion
of the affections of the receptivity. Aristotle is fond of declaring
that knowledge is of the universal, while existence or reality is
individual. It seems to follow that the cleavage between knowledge and
reality is not bridged by the function of [Greek: nous] in relation to
"induction." What is known is not real, and what is real is not known.
The _nodus_[76] has its cause in the double sense of the word
"universal" and a possible solution in the doctrine of [Greek: eidos].
The "form" of a thing constitutes it what it is, and at the same time,
therefore, is constitutive of the group to which it belongs. It has both
individual and universal reference. The individual is known in the
[Greek: eidos], which is also the first universal in which by analysis
higher universals are discoverable. These are predicates of the object
known, ways of knowing it, rather than the object itself. The suggested
solution removes certain difficulties, but scarcely all. On seeing
Callias my perception is of man, not Callias, or even man-Callias. The
recognition of the individual is a matter of his accidents, to which
even sex belongs, and the gap from lowest universal to individual may
still be conceived as unbridged. It is in induction, which claims to
start from particulars and end in universals,[77] that we must, if
anywhere within the confines of logical inquiry, expect to find the
required bridge. The Aristotelian conception of induction, however, is
somewhat ambiguous. He had abandoned for the most part the Platonic
sense of the corresponding verb, viz. to lead forward to the as yet
unknown, and his substitute is not quite clear. It is scarcely the
military metaphor. The adducing of a witness for which he uses the
verb[78] is not an idea that covers all the uses.[79] Perhaps
confrontation with facts is the general meaning. But how does he
conceive of its operation? There is in the first place the action of the
psychological mechanism in the process from discriminative sense upwards
wherein we realize "first" universals.[80] This is clearly an
unreflective, pre-logical process, not altogether lighted up by our
retrojection upon it of our view of dialectical induction based thereon.
The immanent rationality of this first form, in virtue of which at the
stage when intelligence acts freely on the occasion of the datum
supplied it recognizes continuity with its own self-conscious process,
is what gives the dialectical type its meaning. Secondly we have this
dialectical "induction as to particulars by grouping of similars"[81]
whose liability to rebuttal by an exception has been already noted in
connexion with the limits of dialectic. This is the incomplete induction
by simple enumeration which has so often been laughed to scorn. It is a
heuristic process liable to failure, and its application by a nation of
talkers even to physics where non-expert opinion is worthless somewhat
discredited it. Yet it was the fundamental form of induction as it was
conceived throughout the scholastic period. Thirdly we have the limiting
cases of this in the inductive syllogism [Greek: dia pantôn],[82] a
syllogism in the third figure concluding universally, and yet valid
because the copula expresses equivalence, and in analogy[83] in which,
it has been well said, instances are weighed and not counted. In the
former it has been noted[84] that Aristotle's illustration does not
combine particular facts into a lowest concept, but specific concepts
into a generic concept, and[85] that in the construction of definite
inductions the ruling thought with Aristotle is already, though vaguely,
that of causal relation. It appears safer, notwithstanding, to take the
less subtle interpretation[86] that dialectical induction struggling
with instances is formally justified only at the limit, and that this,
where we have exhausted and know that we have exhausted the cases, is in
regard to individual subjects rarely and accidentally reached, so that
we perforce illustrate rather from the definite class-concepts falling
under a higher notion. After all, Aristotle must have had means by
which he reached the conclusions that horses are long-lived and lack
gall. It is only then in the rather mystical relation of [Greek: nous]
to the first type of induction as the process of the psychological
mechanism that an indication of the direction in which the bridge from
individual being to universal knowledge is to be found can be held to


Enough has been said to justify the great place assigned to Aristotle in
the history of logic. Without pressing metaphysical formulae in logic
proper, he analysed formal implication grounded implication as a mode of
knowledge in the rationality of the real, and developed a justificatory
metaphysic. He laid down the programme which the after history of logic
was to carry out. We have of course abandoned particular logical
positions. This is especially to be noted in the theory of the
proposition. The individualism with which he starts, howsoever
afterwards mitigated by his doctrine of [Greek: to ti ên einai] or
[Greek: eidos] constituting the individual in a system of intelligible
relations, confined him in an inadmissible way to the subject-attribute
formula. He could not recognize such vocables as the impersonals for
what they were, and had perforce to ignore the logical significance of
purely reciprocal judgments, such as those of equality. There was
necessarily a "sense" or direction in every proposition, with more than
the purely psychological import that the advance was from the already
mastered and familiar taken as relatively stable, to the new and
strange. Many attributes, too, were predicable, even to the end, in an
external and accidental way, not being derivable from the essence of the
subject. The thought of contingency was too easily applied to these
attributes, and an unsatisfactory treatment of modality followed. It is
indeed the doctrine of the intractability of matter to form that lies at
the base of the paradox as to the disparateness of knowledge and the
real already noted. On the one hand Aristotle by his doctrine of matter
admitted a surd into his system. On the other, he assigned to [Greek:
nous] with its insight into rationality too high a function with regard
to the concrete in which the surd was present, a power to certify the
truth of scientific principles. The example of Aristotle's view of
celestial physics as a science of pure forms exhibits both points. On
the Copernican change the heavenly bodies were recognized as concrete
and yet subject to calculable law. Intelligence had warranted false
principles. The moral is that of the story of the heel of Achilles.

To return to logic proper. The Aristotelian theory of the universal of
science as secure from dependence on its instances and the theory of
linking in syllogism remain a heritage for all later logic, whether
accepted in precisely Aristotle's formula or no. It is because the
intervening centuries had the Aristotelian basis to work on, sometimes
in reduced quantity and corrupt form, but always in some quantity and
some form, that the rest of our logical tradition is what it is. We
stand upon his shoulders.

  iii. _Later Greek Logic._

  After Aristotle we have, as regards logic, what the verdict of after
  times has rightly characterized as an age of _Epigoni_. So far as the
  Aristotelian framework is accepted we meet only minor corrections and
  extensions of a formal kind. If there is conscious and purposed
  divergence from Aristotle, inquiry moves, on the whole, within the
  circle of ideas where Aristotelianism had fought its fight and won its
  victory. Where new conceptions emerge, the imperfection of the
  instruments, mechanical and methodological, of the sciences renders
  them unfruitful, until their rediscovery in a later age. We have
  activity without advance, diversity without development. Attempts at
  comprehensiveness end in the compromises of eclecticism.

    The Peripatetics.

  Illustrations are not far to seek. Theophrastus and in general the
  elder Peripatetics, before the rise of new schools with new lines of
  cleavage and new interests had led to new antagonisms and new
  alliances, do not break away from the Aristotelian metaphysic. Their
  interests, however, lie in the sublunary sciences in which the
  substantive achievement of the school was to be found. With
  Theophrastus, accordingly, in his botanical inquiries, for example,
  the alternatives of classification, the normal sequence of such and
  such a character upon such another, the conclusion of rational
  probability, are what counts. It is perhaps not wholly fanciful to
  connect with this attitude the fact that Aristotle's pupils dealt with
  a surer hand than the master with the conclusions from premises of
  unlike modality, and that a formal advance of some significance
  attributable to Theophrastus and Eudemus is the doctrine of the
  hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms.

    The Stoics.

  The Stoics are of more importance. Despite the fact that their
  philosophic interests lay rather in ethics and physics, their activity
  in what they classified as the third department of speculation was
  enormous and has at least left ineffaceable traces on the terminology
  of philosophy. Logic is their word, and consciousness, impression and
  other technical words come to us, at least as technical words, from
  Roman Stoicism. Even inference, though apparently not a classical
  word, throws back to the Stoic name for a conclusion.[87] In the
  second place, it is in the form in which it was raised in connexion
  with the individualistic theory of perception with which the Stoics
  started, that one question of fundamental importance, viz. that of the
  criterion of truth, exercised its influence on the individualists of
  the Renaissance. Perception, in the view of the Stoics, at its highest
  both revealed and guaranteed the being of its object. Its hold upon
  the object involved the discernment that it could but be that which it
  purported to be. Such "psychological certainty" was denied by their
  agnostic opponents, and in the history of Stoicism we have apparently
  a modification of the doctrine of [Greek: phantasia katalêptikê] with
  a view to meet the critics, an approximation to a recognition that the
  primary conviction might meet with a counter-conviction, and must then
  persist undissipated in face of the challenge and in the last resort
  find verification in the haphazard instance, under varying conditions,
  in actual working. The controversy as to the self-evidence of
  perception in which the New Academy effected some sort of conversion
  of the younger Stoics, and in which the Sceptics opposed both, is one
  of the really vital issues of the decadence.

  Another doctrine of the Stoics which has interest in the light of
  certain modern developments is their insistence on the place of the
  [Greek: lekton] in knowledge. Distinct alike from thing and mental
  happening, it seems to correspond to "meaning" as it is used as a
  technical phrase now-a-days. This anticipation was apparently sterile.
  Along the same lines is their use of the hypothetical form for the
  universal judgment, and their treatment of the hypothetical form as
  the typical form of inference.

  The Stoical categories, too, have an historical significance. They are
  apparently offered in place of those of Aristotle, an acquaintance
  with whose distinctions they clearly presume. Recognizing a linguistic
  side to "logical" theory with a natural development in rhetoric, the
  Stoics endeavour to exorcise considerations of language from the
  contrasted side. They offer pure categories arising in series, each
  successive one presupposing those that have gone before. Yet the
  substance, quality, condition absolute ([Greek: pôs echon]) and
  condition relative of Stoicism have no enduring influence outside the
  school, though they recur with eclectics like Galen. The Stoics were
  too "scholastic" in their speculations.


  In Epicureanism logic is still less in honour. The practical end,
  freedom from the bondage of things with the peace it brings, is all in
  all, and even scientific inquiry is only in place as a means to this
  end. Of the apparatus of method the less the better. We are in the
  presence of a necessary evil. Yet, in falling back, with a difference,
  upon the atomism of Democritus, Epicurus had to face some questions of
  logic. In the inference from phenomena to further phenomena positive
  verification must be insisted on. In the inference from phenomena to
  their non-phenomenal causes, the atoms with their inaccessibility to
  sense, a different canon of validity obtains, that of
  non-contradiction.[88] He distinguishes too between the inference to
  combination of atoms as universal cause, and inference to special
  causes beyond the range of sense. In the latter case alternatives may
  be acquiesced in.[89] The practical aim of science is as well achieved
  if we set forth possible causes as in showing the actual cause. This
  pococurantism might easily be interpreted as an insight into the
  limitations of inverse method as such or as a belief in the plurality
  of causes in Mill's sense of the phrase. More probably it reflects the
  fact that Epicurus was, according to tradition through Nausiphanes, on
  the whole dominated by the influences that produced Pyrrhonism.
  Democritean physics without a calculus had necessarily proved sterile
  of determinate concrete results, and this was more than enough to
  ripen the naturalism of the utilitarian school into scepticism. Some
  reading between the lines of Lucretius has led the "logic" of Epicurus
  to have an effect on the modern world, but scarcely because of its

    The Sceptics.

  The school of Pyrrho has exercised a more legitimate influence. Many
  of the arguments by which the Sceptics enforced their advocacy of a
  suspense of judgment are antiquated in type, but many also are, within
  the limits of the individualistic theory of knowledge, quite
  unanswerable. Hume had constant recourse to this armoury. The major
  premise of syllogism, says the Pyrrhonist, is established inductively
  from the particular instances. If there be but one of these uncovered
  by the generalization, this cannot be sound. If the crocodile moves
  its upper, not its lower, jaw, we may not say that all animals move
  the lower jaw. The conclusion then is really used to establish the
  major premise, and if we still will infer it therefrom we fall into
  the circular proof.[90] Could Mill say more? But again. The inductive
  enumeration is either of all cases or of some only. The former is in
  an indeterminate or infinite subject-matter impossible. The latter is
  invalid.[91] Less familiar to modern ears is the contention that proof
  needs a standard or criterion, while this standard or criterion in
  turn needs proof. Or still more the dialectical device by which the
  sceptic claims to escape the riposte that his very argument presumes
  the validity of this or that principle, viz. the doctrine of the
  equipollence of counter-arguments. Of course the counter-contention is
  no less valid! So too when the reflection is made that scepticism is
  after all a medicine that purges out itself with the disease, the
  disciple of Pyrrho and Aenesidemus bows and says, Precisely! The
  sceptical suspension of judgment has its limits, however. The
  Pyrrhonist will act upon a basis of probabilities. Nay, he even treats
  the idea of cause[92] as probable enough so long as nothing more than
  action upon expectation is in question. He adds, however, that any
  attempt to establish it is involved in some sort of dilemma. That, for
  instance, cause as the correlate of effect only exists with it, and
  accordingly, cause which is come while effect is still to come is
  inconceivable.[93] From the subjectivist point of view, which is
  manifestly fundamental through most of this, such arguments suasory of
  the Pyrrhonist suspense of judgment ([Greek: epochê]) are indeed hard
  to answer. It is natural, then, that the central contribution of the
  Sceptics to the knowledge controversy lies in the modes ([Greek:
  tropoi]) in which the relativity of phenomena is made good, that these
  are elaborated with extreme care, and that they have a modern ring and
  are full of instruction even to-day. Scepticism, it must be confessed,
  was at the least well equipped to expose the bankruptcy of the
  post-Aristotelian dogmatism.

  It was only gradually that the Sceptic's art of fence was developed.
  From the time of Pyrrho overlapping Aristotle himself, who seems to
  have been well content to use the feints of more than one school among
  his predecessors, while showing that none of them could claim to get
  past his guard, down through a period in which the decadent academy
  under Carneades, otherwise dogmatic in its negations, supplied new
  thrusts and parries, to Aenesidemus in the late Ciceronian age, and
  again to Sextus Empiricus, there seems to have been something of
  plasticity and continuous progress. In this matter the dogmatic
  schools offer a marked contrast. In especial it is an outstanding
  characteristic of the younger rivals to Aristotelianism that as they
  sprang up suddenly into being to contest the claims of the
  Aristotelian system in the moment of its triumph, so they reached
  maturity very suddenly, and thereafter persisted for the most part in
  a stereotyped tradition, modified only when convicted of indefensible
  weakness. The 3rd century B.C. saw in its first half the close of
  Epicurus' activity, and the life-work of Chrysippus, the refounder of
  Stoicism, is complete before its close. And subsequent variations seem
  to have been of a negligible where not of an eclectic character. In
  the case of Epicureanism we can happily judge of the tyranny of the
  literal tradition by a comparison of Lucretius with the recorded
  doctrine of the master. But the rule apparently obtains throughout
  that stereotype and compromise offer themselves as the exhaustive
  alternative. This is perhaps fortunate for the history of doctrine,
  for it produces the commentator, your Aspasius or Alexander of
  Aphrodisias, and the substitute for the critic, your Cicero, or your
  Galen with his attempt at comprehension of the Stoic categories and
  the like while starting from Aristotelianism. Cicero in particular is
  important as showing the effect or philosophical eclecticism upon
  Roman cultivation, and as the often author and always popularizer of
  the Latin terminology of philosophy.

  The cause of the stereotyping of the systems, apart from political
  conditions, seems to have been the barrenness of science. Logic and
  theory of knowledge go together, and without living science, theory of
  knowledge loses touch with life, and logic becomes a perfunctory
  thing. Under such circumstances speculative interest fritters itself
  and sooner or later the sceptic has his way. Plato is full of the
  faith of mathematical physics. Aristotle is optimistic of achievement
  over the whole range of the sciences. But the divorce of science of
  nature from mathematics, the failure of biological inquiry to reach so
  elementary a conception as that of the nerves, the absence of
  chemistry from the circle of the sciences, disappointed the promise of
  the dawn and the relative achievement of the noon-day. There is no
  development. Physical science remains dialectical, and a physical
  experiment is as rare in the age of Lucretius as in that of
  Empedocles. The cause of eclecticism is the unsatisfying character of
  the creeds of such science, in conjunction with the familiar law that,
  in triangular or plusquam-triangular controversies a common hatred
  will produce an alliance based on compromise. A bastard Platonism
  through hostility to Stoicism may become agnostic. Stoicism through
  hostility to its sceptical critics may prefer to accept some of the
  positions of the dogmatic nihilist.


  Of the later schools the last to arise was Neoplatonism. The
  mathematical sciences, at least, had not proved disappointing. For
  those of the school of Plato who refused the apostasy of the new
  academy, there was hope either in the mathematical side of the
  Pythagoreo-Platonic tradition, or in its ritual and theological side.
  Neoplatonism is philosophy become theosophy, or it is the sermon on
  the text that God geometrizes. It is of significance in the general
  history of thought as the one great school that developed after the
  decadence had set in. In its metaphysic it showed no failure in
  dialectical constructiveness. In the history of logic it is of
  importance because of its production of a whole series of commentators
  on the Aristotelian logic. Not only the _Introduction_ of Porphyry,
  which had lasting effects on the Scholastic tradition, but the
  commentaries of Themistius, and Simplicius. It was the acceptance of
  the Aristotelian logic by Neoplatonism that determined the
  Aristotelian complexion of the logic of the next age. If Alexander is
  responsible for such doctrines as that of the _intellectus
  acquisitus_, it is to Porphyry, with his characteristically Platonist
  preference for the doctrine of universals, and for classification,
  that we owe the scholastic preoccupation with the realist controversy,
  and with the _quinque voces_, i.e. the Aristotelian predicables as
  restated by Porphyry.


The living force in the spiritual life of the Roman empire was, after
all, not philosophy, but religion, and specifically Christianity. With
the extension of Christianity to the Gentile world it at length became
necessary for it to orientate itself towards what was best in Greek
culture. There is a Stoic element in the ethic of the Pauline epistles,
but the theological affinity that the Johannine gospel, with its
background of philosophic ideas, exhibits to Platonic and Neoplatonist
teaching caused the effort at absorption to be directed rather in that
direction. Neoplatonism had accepted the Aristotelian logic with its
sharper definition than anything handed down from Plato, and, except the
logic of the Sceptics, there was no longer any rival discipline of the
like prestige. The logic of the Stoics had been discredited by the
sceptical onset, but in any case there was no organon of a fitness even
comparable to Aristotle's for the task of drawing out the implications
of dogmatic premises. Aristotelian logic secured the imprimatur of the
revived Platonism, and it was primarily because of this that it passed
into the service of Christian theology. The contact of the Church with
Platonism was on the mystical side. Orthodoxy needed to counter
heretical logic not with mysticism, itself the fruitful mother of
heresies, but with argument. Aristotelianism approved itself as the
controversial instrument, and in due course held the field alone. The
upshot is what is called Scholasticism. Scholasticism is the
Aristotelianism of medieval orthodoxy as taught in the "schools" or
universities of Western Europe. It takes form as a body of doctrine
drawing its premises from authority, sometimes in secular matters from
that of Aristotle, but normally from that of the documents and
traditions of systematic theology, while its method it draws from
Aristotle, as known in the Latin versions,[94] mainly by Boethius, of
some few treatises of the _Organon_ together with the _Isagoge_ of
Porphyry. It dominates the centres of intellectual life in the West
because, despite its claim to finality in its principles or premises,
and to universality for its method, it represents the only culture of a
philosophic kind available to the adolescent peoples of the Western
nations just becoming conscious of their ignorance. Christianity was the
one organizing principle that pulsed with spiritual life. The vocation
of the student could find fulfilment only in the religious orders.
Scholasticism embodied what the Christian community had saved from the
wreckage of Greek dialectic. Yet with all its effective manipulation of
the formal technique of its translated and mutilated Aristotle,
Scholasticism would have gone under long before it did through the
weakness intrinsic to its divorce of the form and the matter of
knowledge, but for two reasons. The first is the filtering through of
some science and some new Aristotelian learning from the Arabs. The
second is the spread of Greek scholarship and Greek manuscripts
westward, which was consequent on the Latin occupation of Constantinople
in 1204. It was respited by the opportunity which was afforded it of
fresh draughts from the Aristotle of a less partial and purer tradition,
and we have, accordingly, a golden age of revived Scholasticism
beginning in the 13th century, admitting now within itself more
differences than before. It is to the schoolmen of the two centuries
preceding the Turkish capture of Constantinople that the controversial
refinements usually associated with the name of Scholasticism are
attributable. The _Analytics_ of Aristotle now entered quite definitely
into the logical thought of Scholasticism and we have the contrast of a
_logica vetus_ and _logica nova_. That other matters, the _parva
logicalia_ and Mnemonics adapted from Psellus and possibly of Stoic
origin, entered too did not outweigh this advantage. Confrontation with
the historical Aristotle may have brought but little comfort to the
orthodox system, but it was a stimulus to dialectical activity within
the schools. It provoked the distinction of what was true _secundum
fidem_ and what was true _secundum rationem_ among even sincere
champions of orthodoxy, and their opponents accepted with a smile so
admirable a mask for that thinking for themselves to which the revival
of hope of progress had spurred them. The pioneers of the Renaissance
owe something of their strength to their training in the developments
which the system that they overthrew underwent during this period. The
respite, however, was short. The flight of Byzantine scholarship
westward in the 15th century revealed, and finally, that the philosophic
content of the Scholastic teaching was as alien from Aristotle as from
the spirit of the contemporary revolt of science, with its cry for a new
medicine, a new nautical astronomy and the like. The doom of the
Scholastic Aristotle was nevertheless not the rehabilitation of the
Greek Aristotle. Between him and the tide of feeling at the Renaissance
lay the whole achievement of Arab science. That impatience of authority
to which we owe the Renaissance, the Reformation and the birth of
Nationalism, is not stilled by the downfall of Aristotle as the _nomen
appellativum_ of the schools. The appeal is to experience, somewhat
vaguely defined, as against all authority, to the book of nature and no
other. At last the world undertakes to enlarge the circle of its ideas.


Accordingly what is in one sense the revival of classical learning is in
another a recourse to what inspired that learning, and so is a new
beginning. There is no place for a reformed Aristotelian logic, though
the genius of Zabarella was there to attempt it. Nor for revivals of the
competing systems, though all have their advocates. Scientific discovery
was in the air. The tradition of the old world was too heavily weighted
with the Ptolemaic astronomy and the like to be regarded as other than a
bar to progress. But from the new point of view its method was
inadequate too, its contentment with an induction that merely leaves an
opponent silent, when experiment and the application of a calculus were
within the possibilities. The transformation of logic lay with the man
of science, hindered though he might be by the enthusiasm of some of the
philosophers of nature. Henceforth the Aristotelian logic, the genuine
no less than the traditional, was to lie on the other side of the
Copernican change.

The demand is for a new organon, a scientific method which shall face
the facts of experience and justify itself by its achievement in the
reduction of them to control. It is a notable feature of the new
movement, that except verbally, in a certain licence of nominalist
expression, due to the swing of the pendulum away from the realist
doctrine of universals, there is little that we can characterize as
Empiricism. Facts are opposed to abstract universals. Yes. Particulars
to controlling formulae. No. Experience is appealed to as fruitful where
the formal employment of syllogism is barren. But it is not mere
induction, with its "unanalysed concretes taken as ultimate" that is set
up as the substitute for deduction. Rather a scientific process, which
as experiential may be called inductive, but which is to other regards
deductive as syllogism, is set up in contrast to syllogism and
enumeration alike. This is to be seen in Zabarella,[95] in Galilei,[96]
and in Bacon. The reformed Aristotelian logic of the first-named with
its _inductio demonstrativa_, the mathematico-physical analysis followed
by synthesis of the second, the _exclusiva_, or method of exclusions of
the last, agree at least in this, that the method of science is one and
indivisible, while containing both an inductive and a deductive moment.
That what, e.g., Bacon says of his method may run counter to this is an
accident of the tradition of the quarrel with realism. So, too, with the
scholastic universals. Aristotle's forms had been correlated, though
inadequately, with the idea of function. Divorced from this they are
fairly stigmatized as mental figments or branded as ghostly entities
that can but block the path. But consider Bacon's own doctrine of forms.
Or watch the mathematical physicist with his formulae. The faith of
science looks outward as in the dawn of Greek philosophy, and
subjectivism such as Hume's has as yet no hold. Bacon summing up the
movement so far as he understood it, in a rather belated way, has no
theory of knowledge beyond the metaphor of the mirror held up to nature.
Yet he offers an ambitious logic of science, and the case is typical.


The science of the Renaissance differs from that of the false dawn in
Greek times in the fact of fruitfulness. It had the achievement of the
old world in the field of mathematics upon which to build. It was in
reaction against a dialectic and not immediately to be again entrapped.
In scientific method, then, it could but advance, provided physics and
mathematics did not again fail of accord. Kepler and Galilei secured it
against that disaster. The _ubi materia ibi geometria_ of the one is the
battle-cry of the mathematico-physical advance. The scientific
instrument of the other, with its moments of analysis and construction,
_metodo risolutivo_ and _metodo compositivo_, engineers the road for the
advance. The new method of physics is verifiable by its fruitfulness,
and so free of any immediate danger from dialectic. Its germinal thought
may not have been new, but, if not new, it had at least needed
rediscovery from the beginning. For it was to be at once certain and
experiential. A mathematico-physical calculus that would work was in
question. The epistemological problem as such was out of the purview.
The relation of physical laws to the mind that thought them was for the
time a negligible constant. When Descartes, having faithfully and
successfully followed the mathematico-physical inquiry of his more
strictly scientific predecessors, found himself compelled to raise the
question how it was possible for him to know what in truth he seemed to
know so certainly, the problem entered on a new phase. The scientific
movement had happily been content for the time with a half which, then
and there at least, was more than the whole.


Bacon was no mathematician, and so was out of touch with the main army
of progress. By temperament he was rather with the Humanists. He was
content to voice the cry for the overthrow of the dominant system as
such, and to call for a new beginning, with no realist presuppositions.
He is with the nominalists of the later Scholasticism and the
naturalists of the early Renaissance. He echoes the cry for recourse to
nature, for induction, for experiment. He calls for a logic of
discovery. But at first sight there is little sign of any greater
contribution to the reconstruction than is to be found in Ramus or many
another dead thinker. The syllogism is ineffective, belonging to
argumentation, and constraining assent where what we want is control of
things. It is a mechanical combination of propositions as these of terms
which are counters to express concepts often ill-defined. The flight
from a cursory survey of facts to wide so-called principles must give
way to a gradual progress upward from propositions of minimum to those
of medium generality, and in these consists the fruitfulness of science.
Yet the induction of the Aristotelians, the dialectical induction of the
_Topics_, content with imperfect enumeration and with showing the burden
of disproof upon the critic, is puerile, and at the mercy of a single
instance to the contrary. In all this there is but little promise for a
new organon. It is neither novel nor instrumental. On a sudden Bacon's
conception of a new method begins to unfold itself. It is inductive only
in the sense that it is identical in purpose with the ascent from
particulars. It were better called exclusiva or elimination of the
alternative, which Bacon proposes to achieve, and thereby guarantee his
conclusion against the possibility of instance to the contrary.

    His three Methods.

  Bacon's method begins with a digest into three tables of the facts
  relevant to any inquiry. The first contains cases of the occurrence of
  the quality under investigation, colour, e.g., or heat, in varying
  combinations. The second notes its absence in combinations so allied
  to certain of these that its presence might fairly have been looked
  for. The third registers its quantitative variation according to
  quantitative changes in its concomitants. The method now proceeds on
  the basis of the first table to set forth the possible suggestions as
  to a general explanatory formula for the quality in question. In
  virtue of the remaining tables it rejects any suggestion qualitatively
  or quantitatively inadequate. If one suggestion, and one alone,
  survives the process of attempted rejection it is the explanatory
  formula required. If none, we must begin afresh. If more than one,
  recourse is to be had to certain devices of method, in the enumeration
  of which the methods of agreement, difference and concomitant
  variations[97] find a place, beside the crucial experiment, the
  glaring instance and the like. An appeal, however, to such devices,
  though a permissible "first vintage" is relatively an imperfection of
  method, and a proof that the tables need revision. The positive
  procedure by hypothesis and verification is rejected by Bacon, who
  thinks of hypothesis as the will o' the wisp of science, and prefers
  the cumbrous machinery of negative reasoning.

  Historically he appears to have been under the dominance of the
  Platonic metaphor of an alphabet of nature, with a consequent belief
  in the relatively small number of ultimate principles to be
  determined, and of Plato's conception of Division, cleared of its
  dialectical associations and used experientially in application to his
  own molecular physics. True it is that the rejection of all the
  cospecies is a long process, but what if therein their simultaneous or
  subsequent determination is helped forward? They, too, must fall to be
  determined sometime, and the ideal of science is fully to determine
  all the species of the genus. This will need co-operative effort as
  described in the account of Solomon's House in the _New Atlantis_.[98]
  But once introduce the conception of division of labour as between the
  collector of data on the one hand and the expert of method, the
  interpreter of nature at headquarters, on the other, and Bacon's
  attitude to hypothesis and to negative reasoning is at least in part
  explained. The hypothesis of the collector, the man who keeps a
  rain-gauge, or the missionary among savages, is to be discounted from
  as a source of error. The expert on the other hand may be supposed, in
  the case of facts over which he has not himself brooded in the course
  of their acquisition, to approach them without any presumption this
  way or that. He will, too, have no interest in the isolation of any
  one of several co-ordinate inquiries. That Bacon underestimates the
  importance of selective and of provisional explanatory hypotheses even
  in such fields as that of chemistry, and that technically he is open
  to some criticism from the point of view that negative judgment is
  derivate as necessarily resting on positive presuppositions, may be
  true enough. It seems, however, no less true that the greatness of his
  conception of organized common effort in science has but rarely met
  with due appreciation.


  In his doctrine of _forms_, too, the "universals" of his logic, Bacon
  must at least be held to have been on a path which led forward and not
  back. His forms are principles whose function falls entirely within
  knowledge. They are formulae for the control of the activities and the
  production of the qualities of bodies. Forms are qualities and
  activities expressed in terms of the ultimates of nature, i.e.
  normally in terms of collocations of matter or modes of motion. (The
  human soul is still an exception.) Form is bound up with the molecular
  structure and change of structure of a body, one of whose qualities or
  activities it expresses in wider relations. A mode of motion, for
  instance, of a certain definite kind, is the form of heat. It is the
  recipe for, and at the same time is, heat, much as H2O is the formula
  for and is water. Had Bacon analysed bodies into their elements,
  instead of their qualities and ways of behaviour, he would have been
  the logician of the chemical formula. Here, too, he has scarcely
  received his meed of appreciation.

  His influence on his successors has rather lain in the general
  stimulus of his enthusiasm for experience, or in the success with
  which he represents the cause of nominalism and in certain special
  devices of method handed down till, through Hume or Herschel, they
  affected the thought of Mill. For the rest he was too Aristotelian, if
  we take the word broadly enough, or, as the result of his Cambridge
  studies, too Ramist,[99] when the interest in scholastic issues was
  fading, to bring his original ideas to a successful market.

  Bacon's Logic, then, like Galilei's, intended as a contribution to
  scientific method, a systematization of discovery by which, given the
  fact of knowledge, new items of knowledge may be acquired, failed to
  convince contemporaries and successors alike of its efficiency as an
  instrument. It was an ideal that failed to embody itself and justify
  itself by its fruits. It was otherwise with the mathematical
  instrument of Galilei.


Descartes stands in the following of Galilei. It is concurrently with
signal success in the work of a pioneer in the mathematical advance that
he comes to reflect on method, generalizes the method of mathematics to
embrace knowledge as a whole, and raises the ultimate issues of its
presuppositions. In the mathematics we determine complex problems by a
construction link by link from axioms and simple data clearly and
distinctly conceived. Three moments are involved. The first is an
_induction_, i.e. an exhaustive enumeration of the simple elements in
the complex phenomenon under investigation. This resolution or analysis
into simple, because clear and distinct, elements may be brought to a
standstill again and again by obscurity and indistinctness, but patient
and repeated revision of all that is included in the problem should
bring the analytic process to fruition. It is impatience, a perversity
of will, that is the cause of error. Upon the analysis there results
_intuition_ of the simple data. With Descartes intuition does not
connote givenness, but its objects are evident at a glance when
induction has brought them to light. Lastly we have _deduction_ the
determination of the most complex phenomena by a continuous synthesis or
combination of the simple elements. Synthesis is demonstrative and
complete. It is in virtue of this view of derived or mediate knowledge
that Descartes speaks of the (subsumptive) syllogism as "of avail rather
in the communication of what we already know." Syllogism is not the
synthesis which together with analysis goes to constitute the new
instrument of science. The celebrated _Regulae_ of Descartes are
precepts directed to the achievement of the new methodological ideal in
any and every subject matter, however reluctant.

It is the paradox involved in the function of intuition, the acceptance
of the psychological characters of clearness and distinctness as
warranty of a truth presumed to be trans-subjective, that leads to
Descartes's distinctive contribution to the theory of knowledge. In
order to lay bare the ground of certainty he raises the universal doubt,
and, although, following Augustine,[100] he finds its limit in the
thought of the doubter, this of itself is not enough. _Cogito, ergo
sum._ _That_ I think may be admitted. _What_ I think may still need
validation. Descartes's guarantee of the validity of my clear and
distinct perceptions is the veracity of God.[101] Does the existence of
God in turn call for proof? An effect cannot contain more than its
cause, nor the idea of a perfect Being find adequate source save in the
actuality of such a Being. Thus the intuition of the casual axiom is
used to prove the existence of that which alone gives validity to
intuitions. Though the logical method of Descartes has a great and
enduring influence, it is the dualism and the need of God to bridge it,
the doctrine of "innate" ideas, i.e. of ideas not due to external causes
nor to volition but only to our capacity to think, our disposition to
develop them, and finally the ontological proof, that affect the thought
of the next age most deeply. That essence in the supreme case involves
existence is a thought which comes to Spinoza more easily, together with
the tradition of the _ordo geometricus_.


i. _The Logic of Empiricism_

The path followed by English thought was a different one. Hobbes
developed the nominalism which had been the hallmark of revolt against
scholastic orthodoxy, and, when he brings this into relation with the
analysis and synthesis of scientific method, it is at the expense of
the latter.[102] Locke, when Cartesianism had raised the problem of the
contents of consciousness, and the spirit of Baconian positivism could
not accept of anything that bore the ill-omened name of innate ideas,
elaborated a theory of knowledge which is psychological in the sense
that its problem is how the simple data with which the individual is in
contact in sensation are worked up into a system. Though he makes his
bow to mathematical method, he, even more than Hobbes, misses its
constructive character. The clue of mathematical certainty is discarded
in substance in the English form of "the new way of ideas."


With Hobbes logic is a calculus of marks and signs in the form of names.
Naming is what distinguishes man from the brutes. It enables him to fix
fleeting memories and to communicate with his fellows. He alone is
capable of truth in the due conjunction or disjunction of names in
propositions. Syllogism is simply summation of propositions, its
function being communication merely. Analysis is the sole way of
invention or discovery. There is more, however, in Hobbes, than the
paradox of nominalism. Spinoza could draw upon him for the notion of
genetic definition.[103] Leibnitz probably owes to him the thought of a
calculus of symbols, and the conception of demonstration as essentially
a chain of definitions.[104] His psychological account of syllogism[105]
is taken over by Locke. Hume derived from him the explanatory formula of
the association of ideas,[106] which is, however, still with Hobbes a
fact to be accounted for, not a theory to account for facts, being
grounded physically in "coherence of the matter moved." Finally Mill
took from him his definition of cause as sum of conditions,[107] which
played no small part in the applied logic of the 19th century.


Locke is of more importance, if not for his logical doctrine, at least
for the theory of knowledge from which it flows. With Locke the mind is
comparable to white paper on which the world of things records itself in
ideas of sensation. Simple ideas of sensation are the only points of
contact we have with things. They are the atomic elements which "the
workmanship of the understanding" can thereafter do no more than
systematically compound and the like. It is Locke's initial attribution
of the primary rôle in mental process to the simple ideas of sensation
that precludes him from the development of the conception of another
sort of ideas, or mental contents that he notes, which are produced by
reflection on "the operations of our own mind within us." It is in the
latter group that we have the explanation of all that marks Locke as a
forerunner of the critical philosophy. It contains in germ a doctrine of
categories discovered but not generated in the psychological processes
of the individual. Locke, however, fails to "deduce" his categories. He
has read Plato's _Theaetetus_ in the light of Baconian and individualist
preconceptions. Reflection remains a sort of "internal sense," whose
ideas are of later origin than those of the external sense. His
successors emphasize the sensationist elements, not the workmanship of
the mind. When Berkeley has eliminated the literal materialism of
Locke's metaphors of sense-perception, Hume finds no difficulty in
accepting the sensations as present virtually in their own right, any
nonsensible ground being altogether unknown. From a point of view purely
subjectivist he is prepared to explain all that is to be left standing
of what Locke ascribes to the workmanship of the mind by the principle
of association or customary conjunction of ideas, which Locke had added
a chapter to a later edition of his _Essay_ explicitly to reject as an
explanatory formula. Condillac goes a step farther, and sees no
necessity for the superstructure at all, with its need of explanation
valid or invalid. Drawing upon Gassendi for his psychological atomism
and upon Hobbes for a thoroughgoing nominalism, he reproduces, as the
logical conclusion from Locke's premises, the position of Antisthenes.
The last word is that "une science bien traitée n'est qu'une langue
bien faite."[108]

Locke's logic comprises, amid much else, a theory of general terms[109]
and of definition, a view of syllogism[110] and a declaration as to the
possibility of inference from particular to particular,[111] a
distinction between propositions which are certain but trifling, and
those which add to our knowledge though uncertain, and a doctrine of
mathematical certainty.[112] As to the first, "words become general by
being made the signs of general ideas, and ideas become general by
separating from them" all "that may determine them to this or that
particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable
of representing more individuals than one." This doctrine has found no
acceptance. Not from the point of view for which idea means image.
Berkeley, though at length the _notions_ of spirits, acts and
relations[113] give him pause, prefers the formula which Hume expresses
in the phrase that "some ideas are particular in their nature but
general in their representation,"[114] and the after-history of
"abstraction" is a discussion of the conditions under which one idea
"stands for" a group. Not from those for whom general ideas mean
schematic concepts, not imageable. The critic from this side has little
difficulty in showing that abstraction of the kind alleged still leave
the residuum particular _this_ redness, e.g. not _redness_. It is,
however, of the sorts constituted by the representation which his
abstraction makes possible that definition is given, either by
enumeration of the simple ideas combined in the significance of the
sortal name, or "to save the labour of enumerating," and "for quickness
and despatch sake," by giving the next wider general name and the
proximate difference. We define essences of course in a sense, but the
essences of which men talk are abstractions, "creatures of the
understanding." Man determines the sorts or nominal essences, nature the
similitudes. The fundamentally enumerative character of the process is
clearly not cancelled by the recognition that it is possible to
abbreviate it by means of technique. So long as the relation of the
nominal to the real essence has no other background than Locke's
doctrine of perception, the conclusion that what Kant afterwards calls
analytical judgments a priori and synthetic judgments a posteriori
exhaust the field follows inevitably, with its corollary, which Locke
himself has the courage to draw, that the natural sciences are in
strictness impossible. Mathematical knowledge is not involved in the
same condemnation, solely because of the "archetypal" character, which,
not without indebtedness to Cumberland, Locke attributes to its ideas.
The reality of mathematics, equally with that of the ideals of morals
drawn from within, does not extend to the "ectypes" of the outer world.
The view of reasoning which Locke enunciates coheres with these views.
Reasoning from particular to particular, i.e. without the necessity of a
general premise, must be possible, and the possibility finds warranty in
a consideration of the psychological order of the terms in syllogism. As
to syllogism specifically, Locke in a passage,[115] which has an
obviously Cartesian ring, lays down four stages or degrees of reasoning,
and points out that syllogism serves us in but one of these, and that
not the all-important one of finding the intermediate ideas. He is
prepared readily to "own that all right reasoning may be reduced to
Aristotle's forms of syllogism," yet holds that "a man knows first, and
then he is able to prove syllogistically." The distance from Locke to
Stuart Mill along this line of thought is obviously but small.


Apart from the adoption by Hume of the association of ideas as the
explanatory formula of the school--it had been allowed by Malebranche
within the framework of his mysticism and employed by Berkeley in his
theory of vision--there are few fresh notes struck in the logic of
sensationalism. The most notable of these are Berkeley's treatment of
"abstract" ideas and Hume's change of front as to mathematical
certainty. What, however, Hume describes as "all the _logic_ I think
proper to employ in my reasoning," viz. his "rules by which to judge
cause and effects,"[116] had, perhaps, farther-reaching historical
effects than either. In these the single method of Bacon is already
split up into separate modes. We have Mill's inductive methods in the
germ, though with an emphasis quite older than Mill's. Bacon's _form_
has already in transmission through Hobbes been transmuted into _cause_
as antecedent in the time series. It may, perhaps, be accounted to Hume
for righteousness that he declares--whether consistently or not is
another matter--that "the same effect never arises but from the same
cause," and that he still follows Bacon in the conception of _absentia
in proximo_. It is "when in any instance we find our expectation
disappointed" that the effect of one of "two resembling objects" will be
like that of the other that Hume proposes to apply his method of

No scientific discipline, however, with the doubtful exception of
descriptive psychology, stands to gain anything from a temper like that
of Hume. The whittling away of its formal or organizing rubrics, as
e.g., sameness into likeness, is disconcerting to science wherever the
significance of the process is realized. It was because the aftermath of
Newtonian science was so rich that the scientific faith of naturalism
was able to retain a place besides its epistemological creed that a
logician of the school could arise whose spirit was in some sort
Baconian, but who, unlike Bacon, had entered the modern world, and faced
the problems stated for it by Hume and by Newton.

  J. S. Mill.

Stuart Mill's _System of Logic_ marked a fresh stage in the history of
empiricism, for the reason that it made the effort to hold an even
balance between the two moments in the thought of the school. Agreement
in the use of a common watchword had masked as it seems a real
divergence of meaning and purpose. The apostles of inductive method had
preached recourse to experience, but had meant thereby nature as a
constituted order. They had devised canons for the investigation of the
concrete problems of this, but had either ignored altogether the need to
give an account of the mirroring mind, or, in the alternative had been,
with some naïveté, content to assume that their nominalist friends,
consistently their allies in the long struggle with traditionalism, had
adequately supplied or could adequately supply the need. The exponents
of psychological atomism, on the other hand, with the association of
ideas for their one principle of agglutination had come to mean by
experience the mental phantasmagoria of the individual. They had
undermined the foundations of scientific certainty, and so far as the
fecundity of contemporary science did not give them pause, were ready,
notwithstanding the difference of their starting-point, to acquiesce in
the formula as well as the temper of Pyrrhonism. They could concede the
triumphant achievement of science only with the proviso that it must be
assumed to fall within the framework of their nominalism. Mill aspired
after a doctrine of method such as should satisfy the needs of the
natural sciences, notably experimental physics and chemistry as
understood in the first half of the 19th century and, _mutatis
mutandis_, of the moral sciences naturalistically construed. In uniting
with this the Associationism which he inherited, through his father,
from Hume, he revealed at once the strength and weakness of the dual
conception of naturalism. His rare thoroughness and rarer candour made
it at once unnecessary and impossible that the work should be done

If judged by what he denies, viz. the formal logic of Hamilton and
Mansel, whose Aristotelian and scholastic learning did but accentuate
their traditionalism, and whose acquiescence in consistency constituted
in Mill's view a discouragement of research, such as men now incline to
attribute at the least equally to Hume's idealism, Mill is only
negatively justified. If judged by his positive contribution to the
theory of method he may claim to find a more than negative justification
for his teaching in its success. In the field covered by scholastic
logic Mill is frankly associationist. He aims at describing what he
finds given, without reference to insensible implications of doubtful
validity and value. The upshot is a psychological account of what from
one aspect is evidence, from the other, belief. So he explains "concepts
or general notions"[117] by an abstraction which he represents as a sort
of alt-relief operated by attention and fixed by naming, association
with the name giving to a set of attributes a unity they otherwise lack.
This is manifestly, when all is said, a particular psychological event,
a collective fact of the associative consciousness. It can exercise no
organizing or controlling function in knowledge. So again in determining
the "import" of propositions, it is no accident that in all save
existential propositions it is to the familiar rubrics of
associationism--co-existence, sequence, causation and resemblance--that
he refers for classification, while his general formula as to the
conjunctions of connotations is associationist through and through. It
follows consistently enough that inference is from particular to
particular. Mill holds even the ideas of mathematics to be hypothetical,
and in theory knows nothing of a non-enumerative or non-associative
universal. A premise that has the utmost universality consistent with
this view can clearly be of no service for the establishment of a
proposition that has gone to the making of it. Nor again of one that has
not. Its use, then, can only be as a memorandum. It is a shorthand
formula of registration. Mill's view of ratiocinative process clearly
stands and falls with the presumed impossibility of establishing the
necessity for universals of another type than his, for what may be
called principles of construction. His critics incline to press the
point that association itself is only intelligible so far as it is seen
to depend on universals of the kind that he denies.

In Mill's inductive logic, the nominalistic convention has, through his
tendency to think in relatively watertight compartments,[118] faded
somewhat into the background. Normally he thinks of what he calls
phenomena no longer as psychological groupings of sensations, as "states
of mind," but as things and events in a physical world howsoever
constituted and apprehended. His free use of relating concepts, that of
sameness, for instance, bears no impress of his theory of the general
notion, and it is possible to put out of sight the fact that, taken in
conjunction with his nominalism, it raises the whole issue of the
possibility of the equivocal generation of formative principles from the
given contents of the individual consciousness, in any manipulation of
which they are already implied. Equally, too, the deductive character,
apparently in intention as well as in actual fact, of Mill's
experimental methods fails to recall the point of theory that the
process is essentially one from particular to particular. The nerve of
proof in the processes by which he establishes causal conjunctions of
unlimited application is naturally thought to lie in the special canons
of the several processes and the axioms of universal and uniform
causation which form their background. The conclusions seem not merely
to fall within, but to depend on these organic and controlling formulae.
They follow not merely according to them but from them. The reference to
the rule is not one which may be made and normally is made as a
safeguard, but one which must be made, if thought is engaged in a
forward and constructive movement at all. Yet Mill's view of the
function of "universal" propositions had been historically suggested by
a theory--Dugald Stewart's--of the use of axioms![119] Once more, it
would be possible to forget that Mill's ultimate laws or axioms are not
in his view intuitions, nor forms constitutive of the rational order,
nor postulates of all rational construction, were it not that he has
made the endeavour to establish them on associationist lines. It is
because of the failure of this endeavour to bring the technique of
induction within the setting of his Humian psychology of belief that the
separation of his contribution to the applied logic of science from his
sensationism became necessary, as it happily was easy. Mill's device
rested special inductions of causation upon the laws that every event
has a cause, and every cause has always the same effect. It rested these
in turn upon a general induction enumerative in character of enormous
and practically infinite range and always uncontradicted. Though
obviously not exhaustive, the unique extent of this induction was held
to render it competent to give practical certainty or psychological
necessity. A vicious circle is obviously involved. It is true, of
course, that ultimate laws need discovery, that they are discovered in
some sense in the medium of the psychological mechanism, and that they
are nevertheless the grounds of all specific inferences. But that truth
is not what Mill expounds, nor is it capable of development within the
limits imposed by the associationist formula.

It is deservedly, nevertheless, that Mill's applied logic has retained
its pride of place amid what has been handed on, if in modified shape,
by writers, e.g., Sigwart, and Professor Bosanquet, whose theory of
knowledge is quite alien from his. He prescribed regulative or limiting
formulae for research as it was actually conducted in his world. His
grasp of the procedure by which the man of science manipulated his
particular concrete problems was admirable. In especial he showed clear
understanding of the functions of hypothesis and verification in the
investigations of the solitary worker, with his facts still in course of
accumulation and needing to be lighted up by the scientific imagination.
He was therefore enabled to formulate the method of what Bacon had
tended to despise as merely the "first vintage." Bacon spent his
strength upon a dream of organization for all future discovery. Mill was
content to codify. The difference between Bacon and Mill lies chiefly in
this, and it is because of this difference that Mill's contribution,
spite of its debt to the Baconian tradition, remains both characteristic
and valuable. It is of course possible to criticise even the
experimental canons with some severity. The caveats, however, which are
relevant within the circle of ideas within which Mill's lesson can be
learned and improved on,[120] seem to admit of being satisfied by
relatively slight modifications in detail, or by explanations often
supplied or easily to be supplied from points brought out amid the
wealth of illustration with which Mill accompanied his formal or
systematic exposition of method. The critic has the right of it when he
points out, for example, that the practical difficulty in the Method of
Agreement is not due to plurality of causes, as Mill states, but rather
to intermixture of effects, while, if the canon could be satisfied
exactly, the result would not be rendered uncertain in the manner or to
the extent which he supposes. Again the formula of the Joint-Method,
which contemplates the enumeration of cases "which have nothing in
common but the absence of one circumstance," is ridiculously unsound as
it stands. Or, on rather a different line of criticism, the use of
corresponding letters in the two series of antecedents and consequents
raises, it is said, a false presumption of correlation. Nay, even the
use of letters at all suggests that the sort of analysis that actually
breaks up its subject-matter is universally or all but universally
applicable in nature, and this is not the case. Finally, the conditions
of the methods are either realized or not. If they are realized, the
work of the scientist falls entirely within the field of the processes
preliminary to the satisfaction of the canon. The latter becomes a mere
memorandum or formula of registration. So is it possible "to have the
enginer hoist with his own petar." But the conditions are not realized,
and in an experiential subject-matter are not realizable. Not one
circumstance only in common but "apparently one relevant circumstance
only in common" is what we are able to assert. If we add the
qualification of relevance we destroy the cogency of the method. If we
fail to add it, we destroy the applicability.

The objections turn on two main issues. One is the exaggeration of the
possibilities of resolution into separate elements that is due to the
acceptance of the postulate of an alphabet of nature. This so soon as
noted can be allowed for. It is to the combination of this doctrine
with a tendency to think chiefly of experiment, of the controlled
addition or subtraction of these elements one at a time, that we owe the
theoretically premature linking of a as effect to _A_ as cause. This too
can be met by a modification of form. The other issue is perhaps of more
significance. It is the oscillation which Mill manifests between the
conception of his formula as it is actually applicable to concrete
problems in practice, and the conception of it as an expression of a
theoretical limit to practical procedure. Mill seems most often to think
of the former, while tending to formulate in terms of the latter. At any
rate, if relevance _in proximo_ is interpolated in the peccant clause of
the canon of the Joint-Method, the practical utility of the method is
rehabilitated. So too, if the canon of the Method of Agreement is never
more than approximately satisfied, intermixture of effects will in
practice mean that we at least often do not know the cause or antecedent
equivalent of a given effect, without the possibility of an alternative.
Finally, it is on the whole in keeping with Mill's presuppositions to
admit even in the case of the method of difference that in practice it
is approximative and instructive, while the theoretical formula, to
which it aims at approaching asymptotically as limit, if exact, is in
some sense sterile. Mill may well have himself conceived his methods as
practically fruitful and normally convincing with the limiting formula
in each case more cogent in form but therewith merely the skeleton of
the process that but now pulsed with life.

Enough has been said to show why the advance beyond the letter of Mill
was inevitable while much in the spirit of Mill must necessarily affect
deeply all later experientialism. After Mill experientialism takes
essentially new forms. In part because of what Mill had done. In part
also because of what he had left undone. After Mill means after Kant and
Hegel and Herbart, and it means after the emergence of evolutionary
naturalism. Mill, then, marks the final stage in the achievement of a
great school of thought.

ii. _The Logic of Rationalism._


A fundamental contrast to the school of Bacon and of Locke is afforded
by the great systems of reason, owning Cartesian inspiration, which are
identified with the names of Spinoza and Leibnitz. In the history of
logic the latter thinker is of the more importance. Spinoza's philosophy
is expounded _ordine geometrico_ and with Euclidean cogency from a
relatively small number of definitions, axioms and postulates. But how
we reach our assurance of the necessity of these principles is not made
specifically clear. The invaluable tractate _De Intellectus
emendatione_, in which the agreement with and divergence from Descartes
on the question of method could have been fully elucidated, is unhappily
not finished. We know that we need to pass from what Spinoza terms
_experientia vaga_,[121] where imagination with its fragmentary
apprehension is liable to error and neither necessity nor impossibility
can be predicated, right up to that which _fictionem terminat_--namely,
_intellectio_. And what Spinoza has to say of the requisites of
definition and the marks of intellection makes it clear that insight
comes with coherence, and that the work of method on the "inductive"
side is by means of the unravelling of all that makes for artificial
limitation to lay bare what can then be seen to exhibit nexus in the one
great system. When all is said, however, the geometric method as
universalized in philosophy is rather used by Spinoza than expounded.


With Leibnitz, on the other hand, the logical problem holds the foremost
place in philosophical inquiry.[122] From the purely logical thesis,
developed at quite an early stage of his thinking,[123] that in any true
proposition the predicate is contained in the subject, the main
principles of his doctrine of Monads are derivable with the minimum of
help from his philosophy of dynamics. _Praedicatum inest subjecto._ All
valid propositions express in the last resort the relation of predicate
or predicates to a subject, and this Leibnitz holds after considering
the case of relational propositions where either term may hold the
position of grammatical subject, A = B and the like. There is a subject
then, or there are subjects which must be recognized as not possible to
be predicated, but as absolute. For reasons not purely logical Leibnitz
declares for the plurality of such subjects. Each contains all its
predicates: and this is true not only in the case of truths of reason,
which are necessary, and ultimately to be exhibited as coming under the
law of contradiction, "or, what comes to the same thing, that of
identity," but also in the case of truths of fact which are contingent,
though a sufficient reason can be given for them which "inclines"
without importing necessity. The extreme case of course is the human
subject. "The individual notion of each person includes once for all
what is to befall it, world without end," and "it would not have been
our Adam but another, if he had had other events." Existent subjects,
containing eternally all their successive predicates in the time-series,
are substances, which when the problems connected with their activity,
or dynamically speaking their force, have been resolved, demand--and
supply--the metaphysic of the Monadology.

Complex truths of reason or essence raise the problem of definition,
which consists in their analysis into simpler truths and ultimately into
simple--i.e. indefinable ideas, with primary principles of another
kind--axioms, and postulates that neither need nor admit of proof. These
are identical in the sense that the opposite contains an express
contradiction.[124] In the case of non-identical truths, too, there is a
priori proof drawn from the notion of the terms, "though it is not
always in our power to arrive at this analysis,"[125] so that the
question arises, specially in connexion with the possibility of a
calculus, whether the contingent is reducible to the necessary or
identical at the ideal limit. With much that suggests an affirmative
answer, Leibnitz gives the negative. Even in the case of the Divine
will, though it be always for the best possible, the sufficient reason
will "incline without necessitating." The propositions which deal with
actual existence are still of a unique type, with whatever limitation to
the calculus.

Leibnitz's treatment of the primary principles among truths of reason as
identities, and his examples drawn _inter alia_ from the "first
principles" of mathematics, influenced Kant by antagonism. Identities
some of them manifestly were not. The formula of identity passed in
another form to Herbart and therefore to Lotze. In recognizing, further,
that the relation of an actual individual fact to its sufficient ground
was not reducible to identity, he set a problem diversely treated by
Kant and Herbart. He brought existential propositions, indeed, within a
rational system through the principle that it must be feasible to assign
a sufficient reason for them, but he refused to bring them under the
conception of identity or necessity, i.e. to treat their opposites as
formally self-contradictory. This bore interest in the Kantian age in
the treatment alike of cause and effect, and of the ontological proof of
existence from essence. Not that the Law of Sufficient Reason is quite
free from equivoque. Propositions concerning the _possible_ existence of
individuals put Leibnitz to some shifts, and the difficulty accounts for
the close connexion established in regard to our actual world between
the law of sufficient reason and the doctrine of the final cause. This
connexion is something of an afterthought to distinguish from the
potential contingency of the objectively possible the real contingency
of the actual, for which the "cause or reason" of Spinoza[126] could not
account. The law, however, is not invalidated by these considerations,
and with the degree of emphasis and the special setting that Leibnitz
gives the law, it is definitely his own.

If we may pass by the doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles, which
played a part of some importance in subsequent philosophy, and the Law
of Continuity, which as Leibnitz represents it is, if not sheer dogma,
reached by something very like a fallacy, we have as Leibnitz's
remaining legacy to later logicians the conception of _Characteristica
Universalis_ and _Ars Combinatoria_, a universal denoting by symbols and
a calculus working by substitutions and the like. The two positions that
a subject contains all its predicates and that all non-contingent
propositions--i.e. all propositions not concerned with the existence of
individual facts ultimately analyse out into identities--obviously lend
themselves to the design of this algebra of thought, though the
mathematician in Leibnitz should have been aware that a significant
equation is never an identity. Leibnitz, fresh from the battle of the
calculus in the mathematical field, and with his conception of logic, at
least in some of its aspects, as a generalized mathematic,[127] found a
fruitful inspiration, harmonizing well with his own metaphysic, in
Bacon's alphabet of nature. He, too, was prepared to offer a new
instrument. That the most important section, the list of forms of
combination, was never achieved--this too was after the Baconian example
while the mode of symbolization was crude with a = _ab_ and the
like--matters little. A new technique of manipulation--it is, of course,
no more--had been evolved.

It may be said that among Leibnitz's successors there is no Leibnitzian.
The system as a whole is something too artificial to secure
whole-hearted allegiance. Wolff's formalism is the bastard outcome of
the speculation of Leibnitz, and is related to it as remotely as
Scholasticism is to Aristotle. Wolff found a sufficient reason for
everything and embodied the results of his inquiries in systematic
treatises, sometimes in the vernacular. He also, by a transparent
_petitio principii_, brought the law of the sufficient reason under that
of non-contradiction. Wolff and his numerous followers account for the
charge of dogmatism against "the Leibnitzio-Wolffian school." They are
of importance in the history of logic for two reasons only: they
affected strongly the German vocabulary of philosophy and they
constituted the intellectual environment in which Kant grew to manhood.

A truer continuator of Leibnitz in the spirit was Herbart.

iii. _Kant's Logic._

Herbart's admitted allegiance, however, was Kantian with the
qualification, at a relatively advanced stage of his thinking, that it
was "of the year 1828"--that is, after controversy had brought out
implications of Kant's teaching not wholly contemplated by Kant himself.
The critical philosophy had indeed made it impossible to hark back to
Leibnitz or any other master otherwise than with a difference.

Yet it is not a single and unambiguous logical movement that derives
from Kant. Kant's lesson was variously understood. Different moments in
it were emphasized, with a large diversity of result. As interpreted it
was acquiesced in or revolted from and revolt ranged from a desire for
some modifications of detail or expression to the call for a radical
transformation. Grounds for a variety of developments are to be found in
the imperfect harmonization of the rationalistic heritage from the
Wolffian tradition which still dominates Kant's pure general logic with
the manifest epistemological intention of his transcendental theory. Or
again, within the latter in his admission of a duality of thought and
"the given" in knowledge, which within knowledge was apparently
irreducible, concurrently with hints as to the possibility, upon a wider
view, of the sublation of their disparateness at least hypothetically
and speculatively. The sense in which there must be a ground of the
unity of the supersensible[128] while yet the transcendent use of
Reason--i.e. its use beyond the limits of experience was denied
theoretical validity--was not unnaturally regarded as obscure.

  Formal Logic.

Kant's treatment of technical logic was wholly traditional, and in
itself is almost negligible. It is comprised[129] in an early essay on
the mistaken subtlety of the syllogistic figures, and a late compilation
by a pupil from the introductory matter and running annotations with
which the master had enriched his interleaved lecture-room copy of
Meyer's _Compendium_ of 1752. Wolff's general logic, "the best," said
Kant, "that we possess," had been abridged by Baumgarten and the
abridgment then subjected to commentation by Meyer. With this
traditional body of doctrine Kant was, save for matters of minor detail,
quite content. Logic was of necessity formal, dealing as it must with
those rules without which no exercise of the understanding would be
possible at all. Upon abstraction from all particular methods of thought
these rules were to be discerned a priori or without dependence on
experience by reflection solely upon the use of the understanding in
general. The science of the form of thought abstracted in this way from
its matter or content was regarded as of value both as propaedeutic and
as canon. It was manifestly one of the disciplines in which a position
of finality was attainable. Aristotle might be allowed, indeed, to have
omitted no essential point of the understanding, what the moderns had
achieved consisted in an advance in accuracy and methodical
completeness. "Indeed, we do not require any new discoverers in
logic,"[130] said the discoverer of a priori synthesis, "since it
contains merely the form of thought." Applied logic is merely
psychology, and not properly to be called logic at all. The technical
logic of Kant, then, justifies literally a movement among his successors
in favour of a formal conception of logic with the law of contradiction
and the doctrine of formal implication for its equipment. Unless the
doctrine of Kant's "transcendental logic" must be held to supply a point
of view from which a logical development of quite another kind is
inevitable, Kant's mantle, so far as logic is concerned, must be
regarded as having fallen upon the formal logicians.

  Definition of "Transcendental."

Kant's transcendental teaching is summarily as follows: "Transcendental"
is his epithet for what is neither empirical--i.e. to be derived from
experience--nor yet transcendent--i.e. applicable beyond the limits of
experience, the mark of experience being the implication of sense or of
something which thought contra-distinguishes from its own spontaneous
activity as in some sense "the given." Those features in our organized
experience are to be regarded as transcendentally established which are
the presuppositions of our having that experience at all. Since they are
not empirical they must be structural and belong to "the mind"--i.e. the
normal human intelligence, and to like intelligence so far as like. If
we set aside such transcendental conditions as belong to sensibility or
to the receptive phase of mind and are the presuppositions of
juxtaposition of parts, the remainder are ascribable to spontaneity or
understanding, to thought with its unifying, organizing or focussing
function, and their elucidation is the problem of transcendental
analytic. It is still logic, indeed, when we are occupied with the
transcendent objects of the discursive faculty as it is employed beyond
the limits of experience where it cannot validate its ideas. Such a
logic, however, is a dialectic of illusion, perplexed by paralogisms and
helpless in the face of antinomies. In transcendental analytic on the
other hand we concern ourselves only with the transcendental "deduction"
or vindication of the conditions of experience, and we have a logic of
cognition in which we may establish our epistemological categories with
complete validity. Categories are the forms according to which the
combining unity of self-consciousness (synthetic unity of apperception)
pluralizes itself through the various functions involved in the
constitution of objectivity in different types of the one act of
thought, viz. judgment. The clue to the discovery of transcendental
conditions Kant finds in the existence of judgments, most manifest in
mathematics and in the pure science of nature, which are certain, yet
not trifling, necessary and yet not reducible to identities, synthetic
therefore and a priori, and so accounted for neither by Locke nor by
Leibnitz. "There lies a transcendental condition at the basis of every

  Form of Matter of Thought.

Kant's mode of conceiving the activity of thought in the constitution of
objects and of their connexion in experience was thought to lie open to
an interpretation in conformity with the spirit of his logic, in the
sense that the form and the content in knowledge are not merely
distinguishable functions within an organic whole, but either separable,
or at least indifferent one to the other in such a way as to be clearly
independent. Thought as form would thus be a factor or an element in a
composite unit. It would clearly have its own laws. It would be the
whole concern of logic, which, since in it thought has itself for
object, would have no reference to the other term of the antithesis, nor
properly and immediately to the knowledge which is compact of thought in
conjunction with something which, whatever it may be, is prima facie
other than thought. There is too much textual warrant for this
interpretation of Kant's meaning. Doubtless there are passages which
make against an extreme dualistic interpretation. Even in his "logic"
Kant speaks of abstraction from all particular objects of thought rather
than of a resolution of concrete thinking into thought and its "other"
as separable co-operating factors in a joint product. He spoke
throughout, however, as if form and content were mutually indifferent,
so that the abstraction of form from content implied nothing of
falsification or mutilation. The reserve, therefore, that it was
abstraction and not a decomposing that was in question remained to the
admirers of his logic quite nugatory. They failed to realize that
permissible abstraction from specific contents or methods of knowledge
does not obliterate reference to matter or content. They passed easily
from the acceptance of a priori forms of thinking to that of forms of a
priori thinking, and could plead the example of Kant's logic.

Kant's theory of knowledge, then, needed to be pressed to other
consequences for logic which were more consonant with the spirit of the
_Critique_. The forms of thought and what gives thought its particular
content in concrete acts of thinking could not be regarded as subsisting
in a purely external and indifferent relation one to the other. "Laws
according to which the subject thinks" and "laws according to which the
object is known" cannot be the concern of separate departments of
inquiry. As soon divorce the investigation of the shape and material of
a mirror from the laws of the incidence of the rays that form images in
it, and call it a science of reflection! An important group of writers
developed the conception of an adaptation between the two sides of
Kant's antithesis, and made the endeavour to establish some kind of
correlation between logical forms and the process of "the given." There
was a tendency to fall back upon the conception of some kind of
parallelism, whether it was taken to be interpretative or rather
corrective of Kant's meaning. This device was never remote from the
constructions of writers for whom the teaching of Spinoza and Leibnitz
was an integral part of their intellectual equipment. Other modes of
correlation, however, find favour also, and in some variety. Kant is
seldom the sole source of inspiration. His unresolved antithesis[131] is
interpreted either diversely or with a difference of emphasis. And the
light that later writers bring to bear on Kant's logic and epistemology
from other sides of his speculation varies in kind and in degree.

Another logical movement springs from those whom a correlation of fact
within the unity of a system altogether failed to satisfy. There must
also be development of the correlated terms from a single principle.
Form and content must not only correspond one to the other. They must be
exhibited as distinguishable moments within a unity which can at one and
the same time be seen to be the ground from which the distinction
springs and the ground in virtue of which it is over-ruled. Along this
line of speculation we have a logic which claims that whatsoever is in
one plane or at one stage in the development of thought a residuum that
apparently defies analysis must at another stage and on a higher plane
be shown so to be absorbed as to fall altogether within thought. This is
the view of Hegel upon which logic comes to coincide with the
progressive self-unfolding of thought in that type of metaphysic which
is known as absolute, i.e. all-inclusive idealism. The exponent of logic
as metaphysic, for whom the rational is the real is necessarily in
revolt against all that is characteristically Kantian in the theory of
knowledge, against the transcendental method itself and against the
doctrine of limits which constitutes the nerve of "criticism." Stress
was to be laid upon the constructive character of the act of thought
which Kant had recognized, and without Kant's qualifications of it. In
all else the claim is made to have left the Kantian teaching behind as a
cancelled level of speculation.

  Limitation of Transcendental Method.

Transcendental method is indeed not invulnerable. A principle is
transcendentally "deduced" when it and only it can explain the validity
of some phase of experience, some order of truths. The order of truths,
the phase of experience and its certainty had to be taken for granted.
The sense, for example, in which the irreversibility of sequence which
is the more known _in ordine ad hominem_ in the case of the causal
principle differs from merely psychological conviction is not made fully
clear. Even so the inference to the a priori ground of its necessity is,
it has been often pointed out, subject to the limitation inherent in any
process of reduction, in any regress, that is, from conditionate to
condition, viz. that in theory an alternative is still possible. The
inferred principle may hold the field as explanation without obvious
competitor potential or actual. Nevertheless its claim to be the sole
possible explanation can in nowise be validated. It has been established
after all by dialectic in the Aristotelian sense of the word. But if
transcendental method has no special pride of place, Kant's conclusion
as to the limits of the competence of intellectual faculty falls with
it. Cognition manifestly needs the help of Reason even in its
theoretical use. Its speculation can no longer be stigmatized as
vaticination _in vacuo_, nor its results as illusory.

  Logic and Psychology.

Finally, to logic as metaphysic the polar antithesis is psychology as
logic. The turn of this also was to come again. If logic were treated as
merely formal, the stress of the problem of knowledge fell upon the
determination of the processes of the psychological mechanism. If
alleged a priori constituents of knowledge--such rubrics as substance,
property, relation--come to be explained psychologically, the formal
logic that has perforce to ignore all that belongs to psychology is
confined within too narrow a range to be able to maintain its place as
an independent discipline, and tends to be merged in psychology. This
tendency is to be seen in the activity of Fries and Herbart and Beneke,
and was actualized as the aftermath of their speculation. It is no
accident that it was the psychology of apperception and the voluntaryist
theory or practice of Herbart, whose logical theory was so closely
allied to that of the formal logicians proper, that contributed most to
the development of the post-Kantian psychological logic. Another
movement helped also; the exponents of naturalistic evolution were
prepared with Spencer to explain the so-called _a priori_ in knowledge
as in truth _a posteriori_, if not to the individual at any rate to the
race. It is of course a newer type of psychological logic that is in
question, one that is aware of Kant's "answer to Hume." Stuart Mill,
despite of his relation of antagonism to Hamilton and Mansel, who held
themselves to be Kantian in spirit, is still wholly pre-Kantian in his


Kant's influence, then, upon subsequent logic is least of all to be
measured by his achievement in his professed contribution to technical
logic. It may be attributed in some slight degree, perhaps, to
incidental flashes of logical insight where his thought is least of what
he himself calls logic, e.g. his exposition of the significance of
synthetic judgments _a priori_, or his explanation of the function of
imagery in relation to thought, whereby he offers a solution of the
problem of the conditions under which one member of a group unified
through a concept can be taken to stand for the rest, or again the way
in which he puts his finger on the vital issue in regard to the alleged
proof from essence to existence, and illustrations could be multiplied.
But much more it belongs to his transformation of the epistemological
problem, and to the suggestiveness of his philosophy as a whole for an
advance in the direction of a speculative construction which should be
able to cancel all Kant's surds, and in particular vindicate a "ground
of the unity of the supersensible which lies back of nature with that
which the concept of freedom implies in the sphere of practice,"[132]
which is what Kant finally asserts.

iv. _After Kant._

Starting from the obvious antithesis of thought and that of which it is
the thought, it is possible to view the ultimate relation of its term as
that of mutual indifference or, secondly, as that of a correspondence
such that while they retain their distinct character modification of the
one implies modification of the other, or thirdly and lastly, as that of
a mergence of one in the other of such a nature that the merged term,
whichever it be, is fully accounted for in a complete theory of that in
which it is merged.

  The Formal Logicians.

The first way is that of the purely formal logicians, of whom
Twesten[133] and in England H. L. Mansel may be regarded as typical.
They take thought and "the given" as self-contained units which, if not
in fact separable, are at any rate susceptible of an abstraction the one
from the other so decisive as to constitute an ideal separation. The
laws of the pure activity of thought must be independently determined,
and since the contribution of thought to knowledge is form they must be
formal only. They cannot go beyond the limits of formal consistency or
analytic correctness. They are confined to the determination of what the
truth of any matter of thought, taken for granted upon grounds
psychological or other, which are extraneous to logic, includes or
excludes. The unit for logic is the concept taken for granted. The
function of logic is to exhibit its formal implications and repulsions.
It is questionable whether even this modest task could be really
achieved without other reference to the content abstracted from than
Mansel, for example, allows. The analogy of the resolution of a chemical
compound with its elements which is often on the lips of those who would
justify the independence of thought and the real world, with an agnostic
conclusion as to non-phenomenal or trans-subjective reality, is not
really applicable. The oxygen and hydrogen, for example, into which
water may be resolved are not in strictness indifferent one to the
other, since both are members of an order regulated according to laws of
combination in definite ratios. Or, if applicable, it is double-edged.
Suppose oxygen to be found only in water. Were it to become conscious,
would it therefore follow that it could infer the laws of a separate or
independent activity of its own? Similarly forms of thinking, the law of
contradiction not excepted, have their meaning only in reference to
determinate content, even though distributively all determinate contents
are dispensable. The extreme formalist is guilty of a fallacy of
composition in regard to abstraction.

It does not follow, however, that the laws asserted by the formal
logicians are invalid or unimportant. There is a permissible
abstraction, and in general they practise this, and although they narrow
its range unduly, it is legitimately to be applied to certain characters
of thinking. As the living organism includes something of mechanism--the
skeleton, for example--so an organic logic doubtless includes
determinations of formal consistency. The skeleton is meaningless apart
from reference to its function in the life of an organism, yet there are
laws of skeleton structure which can be studied with most advantage if
other characters of the organism are relegated to the background. To
allow, however, that abstraction admits of degrees, and that it never
obliterates all reference to that from which it is abstracted, is to
take a step forward in the direction of the correlation of logical forms
with the concrete processes of actual thinking. What was true in formal
logic tended to be absorbed in the correlationist theories.

Those formal logicians of the Kantian school, then, may be summarily
dismissed, though their undertaking was a necessary one, who failed to
raise the epistemological issue at all, or who, raising it, acquiesced
in a naïve dualism agnostic of the real world as Kant's essential
lesson. They failed to develop any view which could serve either in fact
or in theory as a corrective to the effect of their formalism. What they
said with justice was said as well or better elsewhere.

Among them it is on the whole impossible not to include the names of
Hamilton and Mansel. The former, while his erudition in respect to the
history of philosophical opinion has rarely been equalled, was not a
clear thinker. His general theory of knowledge deriving from Kant and
Reid, and including among other things a _contaminatio_ of their
theories of perception,[134] in no way sustains or mitigates his narrow
view of logic. He makes no effective use of his general formula that to
think is to condition. He appeals to the direct testimony of
consciousness in the sense in which the appeal involves a fallacy. He
accepts an ultimate antinomy as to the finiteness or infinity of "the
unconditioned," yet applies the law of the excluded middle to insist
that one of the two alternatives must be true, wherefore we must make
the choice. And what is to be said of the judgment of a writer who
considers the relativity of thought demonstrated by the fact that every
judgment unites two members? Hamilton's significance for the history of
logic lies in the stimulus that he gave to the development of symbolic
logic in England by his new analytic based upon his discovery or
adoption of the principle of the quantification of the predicate.
Mansel, too, was learned, specially in matters of Aristotelian exegesis,
and much that is of value lies buried in his commentation of the dry
bones of the _Artis Logicae Rudimenta_ of Locke's contemporary Aldrich.
And he was a clearer thinker than Hamilton. Formal logic of the
extremest rigour is nowhere to be found more adequately expressed in all
its strength, and it must be added in all its weakness, than in the
writings of Mansel. But if the view maintained above that formal logic
must compromise or mitigate its rigour and so fail to maintain its
independence, be correct, the logical consistency of Mansel's logic of
consistency does but emphasize its barrenness. It contains no germ for
further development. It is the end of a movement.


The brief logic of Herbart[135] is altogether formal too. Logical forms
have for him neither psychological nor metaphysical reference, we are
concerned in logic solely with the systematic clarification of concepts
which are wholly abstract, so that they are not merely not ultimate
realities, but also in no sense actual moments of our concrete thinking.
The first task of logic is to distinguish and group such concepts
according to their marks, and from their classification there naturally
follows their connexion in judgment. It is in the logic of judgment that
Herbart inaugurates a new era. He is not, of course, the first to note
that even categorical judgments do not assert the realization of their
subject. That is a thought which lies very near the surface for formal
logic. He had been preceded too by Maimon in the attempt at a reduction
of the traditional types of judgment. He was, however, the first whose
analysis was sufficiently convincing to exorcise the tyranny of
grammatical forms. The categorical and disjunctive judgment reduce to
the hypothetical. By means of the doctrine of the quantification of the
predicate, in which with his Leibnitzian conception of identity he
anticipated Beneke and Hamilton alike, universal and particular
judgments are made to pull together. Modal, impersonal, existential
judgments are all accounted for. Only the distinction of affirmative and
negative judgments remains unresolved, and the exception is a natural
one from the point of view of a philosophy of pluralism. There was
little left to be done here save in the way of an inevitable _mutatis
mutandis_, even by Lotze and F. H. Bradley. From the judgment viewed as
hypothetical we pass by affirmation of the antecedent or denial of the
consequent to inference. This point of departure is noteworthy, as also
is the treatment of the inductive syllogism as one in which the middle
term is resoluble into a group or series (_Reihe_). In indicating
specifically, too, the case of conclusion from a copulative major
premise with a disjunctive minor, Herbart seems to have suggested the
cue for Sigwart's exposition of Bacon's method of exclusions.

That it was the formal character of Herbart's logic which was ultimately
fatal to its acceptance outside the school as an independent discipline
is not to be doubted. It stands, however, on a different footing from
that of the formal logic hitherto discussed, and is not to be condemned
upon quite the same grounds. In the first place, Herbart is quite aware
of the nature of abstraction. In the second, there is no claim that
thought at one and the same time imposes form on "the given" and is
susceptible of treatment in isolation by logic. With Herbart the forms
of common experience, and indeed all that we can regard as his
categories, are products of the psychological mechanism and destitute of
logical import. And lastly, Herbart's logic conforms to the exigencies
of his system as a whole and the principle of the bare or absolute
self-identity of the ultimate "reals" in particular. It is for this
reason that it finally lacks real affinity to the "pure logic" of Fries.
For at the basis of Herbart's speculation there lies a conception of
identity foreign to the thought of Kant with his stress on synthesis, in
his thoroughgoing metaphysical use of which Herbart goes back not merely
to Wolff but to Leibnitz. It is no mere coincidence that his treatment
of all forms of continuance and even his positive metaphysic of "reals"
show affinity to Leibnitz. It was in the pressing to its extreme
consequences of the conception of uncompromising identity which is to be
found in Leibnitz, that the contradictions took their rise which Herbart
aimed at solving, by the method of relations and his doctrine of the
ultimate plurality of "reals." The logic of relations between conceptual
units, themselves unaltered by the relation, seems a kind of reflection
of his metaphysical method. To those, of course, for whom the only real
identity is identity in difference, while identity without difference,
like difference without identity, is simply a limit or a vanishing
point, Herbart's logic and metaphysic will alike lack plausibility.

The setting of Herbart's logic in his thought as a whole might of itself
perhaps justify separate treatment. His far-reaching influence in the
development of later logic must certainly do so. Directly he affected a
school of thought which contained one logician of first-rate importance
in Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch (1802-1896), professor at Leipzig. In less
direct relation stands Lotze, who, although under other influences he
developed a different view even in logic, certainly let no point in the
doctrine of his great predecessor at Göttingen escape him. A Herbartian
strain is to be met with also in the thought of writers much further
afield, for example F. H. Bradley, far though his metaphysic is removed
from Herbart's. Herbart's influence is surely to be found too in the
evolution of what is called _Gegenstandstheorie_. Nor did he affect the
logic of his successors through his logic alone. Reference has been made
above to the effect upon the rise of the later psychological logic
produced by Herbart's psychology of apperception, when disengaged from
the background of his metaphysic taken in conjunction with his treatment
in his practical philosophy of the judgment of value or what he calls
the aesthetic judgment. Emerson's verdict upon a greater thinker--that
his was "not a mind to nestle in"--may be true of Herbart, but there can
be no doubt as to the stimulating force of this master.

  Logic as the rationale of knowledge.


The second way of interpreting the antithesis of thought to what is
thought of, was taken by a group of thinkers among whom a central and
inspiring figure was Schleiermacher. They in no sense constitute a
school and manifest radical differences among themselves. They are
agreed, however, in the rejection, on the one hand, of the subjectivist
logic with its intrinsic implication that knowledge veils rather than
reveals the real world, and, on the other hand, of the logic of the
speculative construction with its pretension to "deduce," to determine,
and finally at once to cancel and conserve any antithesis in its
all-embracing dialectic. They agree, then, in a maintenance of the
critical point of view, while all alike recognize the necessity of
bringing the thought-function in knowledge into more intimate relation
with its "other" than Kant had done, by means of some formula of
correlation or parallelism. Such an advance might have taken its cue
directly from Kant himself. As an historical fact it tended rather to
formulate itself as a reaction towards Kant in view of the course taken
by the speculative movement. Thus Schleiermacher's posthumously
published _Dialektik_ (1839) may be characterized as an appeal from the
absolutist element in Schelling's philosophy to the conception of that
correlation or parallelism which Schelling had exhibited as flowing from
and subsisting within his absolute, and therein as a return upon Kant's
doctrine of limits. Schleiermacher's conception of dialectic is to the
effect that it is concerned with the principles of the art of
philosophizing, as these are susceptible of a relatively independent
treatment by a permissible abstraction. Pure thinking or philosophizing
is with a view to philosophy or knowledge as an interconnected system of
all sciences or departmental forms of knowledge, the mark of knowledge
being its identity for all thinking minds. Dialectic then investigates
the nexus which must be held to obtain between all thoughts, but also
that agreement with the nexus in being which is the condition of the
validity of the thought-nexus. In knowing there are two functions
involved, the "organic" or animal function of sensuous experience in
virtue of which we are in touch with being, directly in inner
perception, mediately in outer experience, and the "intellectual"
function of construction. Either is indispensable, though in different
departments of knowledge the predominant rôle falls to one or other,
e.g. we are more dependent in physics, less so in ethics. The idea of a
perfect harmony of thinking and being is a presupposition that underlies
all knowing but cannot itself be realized in knowledge. In terms of the
agreement of thought and being, the logical forms of the part of
dialectic correspondent to knowledge statically considered have
parallels and analogies in being, the concept being correlated to
substance, the judgment to causal nexus. Inference, curiously enough,
falls under the technical side of dialectic concerned with knowledge in
process or becoming, a line of cleavage which Ueberweg has rightly
characterized as constituting a rift within Schleiermacher's

Schleiermacher's formula obviously ascribes a function in knowledge to
thought as such, and describes in a suggestive manner a duality of the
intellectual and organic functions, resting on a parallelism of thought
and being whose collapse into identity it is beyond human capacity to
grasp. It is rather, however, a statement of a way in which the
relations of the terms of the problem may be conceived than a system of
necessity. It may indeed be permitted to doubt whether its influence
upon subsequent theory would have been a great one apart from the
spiritual force of Schleiermacher's personality. Some sort of
correlationist conception, however, was an inevitable development, and
the list[136] of those who accepted it in something of the spirit of
Schleiermacher is a long one and contains many distinguished names,
notably those of Trendelenburg and Ueberweg. The group is loosely
constituted however. There was scope for diversity of view and there was
diversity of view, according as the vital issue of the formula was held
to lie in the relation of intellectual function to organic function or
in the not quite equivalent relation of thinking to being. Moreover, few
of the writers who, whatsoever it was that they baptized with the name
of logic, were at least earnestly engaged in an endeavour to solve the
problem of knowledge within a circle of ideas which was on the whole
Kantian, were under the dominance of a single inspiration. Beneke's
philosophy is a striking instance of this, with application to Fries and
affinity to Herbart conjoined with obligations to Schelling both
directly and through Schleiermacher. Lotze again wove together many
threads of earlier thought, though the web was assuredly his own.
Finally it must not be forgotten that the host of writers who were in
reaction against Hegelianism tended to take refuge in some formula of
correlation, as a half-way house between that and formalism or
psychologism or both, without reference to, and often perhaps without
consciousness of, the way in which historically it had taken shape to
meet the problem held to have been left unresolved by Kant.


Lotze on the one hand held the Hegelian "deduction" to be untenable, and
classed himself with those who in his own phrase "passed to the order of
the day," while on the other hand he definitely raised the question, how
an "object" could be brought into forms to which it was not in some
sense adapted. Accordingly, though he regards logic as formal, its forms
come into relation to objectivity in some sort even within the logical
field itself, while when taken in the setting of his system as a whole,
its formal character is not of a kind that ultimately excludes
psychological and metaphysical reference, at least speculatively. As a
logician Lotze stands among the masters. His _flair_ for the essentials
in his problem, his subtlety of analysis, his patient willingness to
return upon a difficulty from a fresh and still a fresh point of view,
and finally his fineness of judgment, make his logic[137] so essentially
logic of the present, and of its kind not soon to be superseded, that
nothing more than an indication of the historical significance of some
of its characteristic features need be attempted here.

In Lotze's pure logic it is the Herbartian element that tends to be
disconcerting. Logic is formal. Its unit, the logical concept, is a
manipulated product and the process of manipulation may be called
abstraction. Processes of the psychological mechanism lie below it. The
paradox of the theory of judgment is due to the ideal of identity, and
the way in which this is evaded by supplementation to produce a
non-judgmental identity, followed by translation of the introduced
accessories with conditions in the hypothetical judgment, is thoroughly
in Herbart's manner. The reduction of judgments is on lines already
familiar. Syllogism is no instrumental method by which we compose our
knowledge, but an ideal to the form of which it should be brought. It
is, as it were, a schedule to be filled in, and is connected with the
disjunctive judgment as a schematic setting forth of alternatives, not
with the hypothetical, and ultimately the apodictic judgment with their
suggestion that it is the real movement of thought that is subjected to
analysis. Yet the resultant impression left by the whole treatment is
not Herbartian. The concept is accounted for in Kantian terms. There is
no discontinuity between the pre-logical or sub-logical conversion of
impressions into "first universals" and the formation of the logical
concept. Abstraction proves to be synthesis with compensatory universal
marks in the place of the particular marks abstracted from. Synthesis as
the work of thought always supplies, beside the mere conjunction or
disjunction of ideas, a ground of their coherence or non-coherence. It
is evident that thought, even as dealt with in pure logic, has an
objectifying function. Its universals have objective validity, though
this does not involve direct real reference. The formal conception of
pure logic, then, is modified by Lotze in such a way as not only to be
compatible with a view of the structural and functional adequacy of
thought to that which at every point at which we take thinking is still
distinguishable from thought, but even inevitably to suggest it. That
the unit for logic is the concept and not the judgment has proved a
stumbling-block to those of Lotze's critics who are accustomed to think
in terms of the act of thought as unit. Lotze's procedure is, indeed,
analogous to the way in which, in his philosophy of nature, he starts
from a plurality of real beings, but by means of a reductive movement,
an application of Kant's transcendental method, arrives at the postulate
or fact of a law of their reciprocal action which calls for a monistic
and idealist interpretation. He starts, that is in logic, with
conceptual units apparently self-contained and admitting of nothing but
external relation, but proceeds to justify the intrinsic relation
between the matter of his units by an appeal to the fact of the
coherence of all contents of thought. Indeed, if thought admits
irreducible units, what can unite? Yet he is left committed to his
puzzle as to a reduction of judgment to identity, which partially
vitiates his treatment of the theory of judgment. The outstanding
feature of this is, nevertheless, not affected, viz. the attempt that he
makes, inspired clearly by Hegel, "to develop the various forms of
judgment systematically as members of a series of operations, each of
which leaves a part of its problem unmastered and thereby gives rise to
the next."[138] As to inference, finally, the ideal of the articulation
of the universe of discourse, as it is for complete knowledge, when its
disjunctions have been thoroughly followed out and it is exhaustively
determined, carried the day with him against the view that the organon
for gaining knowledge is syllogism. The Aristotelian formula is "merely
the expression, formally expanded and complete, of the truth already
embodied in disjunctive judgment, namely, that every S which is a
specific form of M possesses as its predicate a particular modification
of each of the universal predicates of M to the exclusion of the rest."
Schleiermacher's separation of inference from judgment and his
attribution of the power to knowledge in process cannot find acceptance
with Lotze. The psychologist and the formal logician do indeed join
hands in the denial of a real movement of thought in syllogism. Lotze's
logic then, is formal in a sense in which a logic which does not find
the conception of synthetic truth embarrassing is not so. It is canon
and not organon. In the one case, however, where it recognizes what is
truly synthesis, i.e. in its account of the concept, it brings the
statics of knowledge, so to speak, into integral relation with the
dynamics. And throughout, wherever the survival from 1843, the identity
bug-bear, is for the moment got rid of in what is really a more liberal
conception, the statical doctrine is developed in a brilliant and
informing manner. Yet it is in the detail of his logical investigations,
something too volatile to fix in summary, that Lotze's greatness as a
logician more especially lies.

With Lotze the ideal that at last the forms of thought shall be realized
to be adequate to that which at any stage of actual knowledge always
proves relatively intractable is an illuminating projection of faith. He
takes courage from the reflection that to accept scepticism is to
presume the competence of the thought that accepts. He will, however,
take no easy way of parallelism. Our human thought pursues devious and
circuitous methods. Its forms are not unseldom scaffolding for the house
of knowledge rather than the framework of the house itself. Our task is
not to realise correspondence with something other than thought, but to
make explicit those justificatory notions which condition the form of
our apprehension. "However much we may presuppose an original reference
of the forms of thought to that nature of things which is the goal of
knowledge, we must be prepared to find in them many elements which do
not directly reproduce the actual reality to the knowledge of which they
are to lead us."[139] The impulse of thought to reduce coincidence to
coherence reaches immediately only to objectivity or validity. The sense
in which the presupposition of a further reference is to be interpreted
and in which justificatory notions for it can be adduced is only
determinable in a philosophic system as a whole, where feeling has a
place as well as thought, value equally with validity.

Lotze's logic then represents the statical aspect of the function of
thought in knowledge, while, so far as we go in knowledge thought is
always engaged in the unification of a manifold, which remains
contradistinguished from it, though not, of course, completely alien to
and unadapted to it. The further step to the determination of the ground
of harmony is not to be taken in logic, where limits are present and

  Logic as Metaphysic.

The position of the search for truth, for which knowledge is a growing
organism in which thought needs, so to speak, to feed on something other
than itself, is conditioned in the post-Kantian period by antagonism to
the speculative movement which culminated in the dialectic of Hegel. The
radical thought of this movement was voiced in the demand of
Reinhold[140] that philosophy should "deduce" it all from a single
principle and by a single method. Kant's limits that must needs be
thought and yet cannot be thought must be thought away. An earnest
attempt to satisfy this demand was made by Fichte whose single principle
was the activity of the pure Ego, while his single method was the
assertion of a truth revealed by reflection on the content of conscious
experience, the characterization of this as a half truth and the
supplementation of it by its other, and finally the harmonization of
both. The pure ego is inferred from the fact that the non-ego is
realized only in the act of the ego in positing it. The ego posits
itself, but reflection on the given shows that we must add that it
posits also the non-ego. The two positions are to be conciliated in the
thought of reciprocal limitation of the posited ego and non-ego. And so
forth. Fichte cannot be said to have developed a logic, but this rhythm
of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, foreshadowed in part for Fichte in
Spinoza's formula, "omnis determinatio est negatio" and significantly in
Kant's triadic grouping of his categories, gave a cue to the thought of
Hegel. Schelling, too, called for a single principle and claimed to have
found it in his Absolute, "the night" said Hegel, "in which all cows are
black," but his historical influence lay, as we have seen, in the
direction of a parallelism within the unity, and he also developed no
logic. It is altogether otherwise with Hegel.


Hegel's logic,[141] though it involves inquiries which custom regards as
metaphysical, is not to be characterized as a metaphysic with a method.
It is logic or a rationale of thought by thought, with a full
development among other matters of all that the most separatist of
logicians regards as thought forms. It offers a solution of what has
throughout appeared as the logical problem. That solution lies doubtless
in the evolution of the Idea, i.e. an all-inclusive in which mere or
pure thought is cancelled in its separateness by a transfiguration,
while logic is nothing but the science of the Idea viewed in the medium
of pure thought. But, whatever else it be, this _Panlogismus_, to use
the word of J. E. Erdmann, is at least a logic. Thought in its
progressive unfolding, of which the history of philosophy taken in its
broad outline offers a pageant, necessarily cannot find anything
external to or alien from itself, though that there is something
external for it is another matter. As Fichte's Ego finds that its
_non-ego_ springs from and has its home within its very self, so with
Hegel thought finds itself in its "other," both subsisting in the Idea
which is both and neither. Either of the two is the all, as, for
example, the law of the convexity of the curve is the law of the curve
and the law of its concavity. The process of the development of the Idea
or Absolute is in one regard the immanent process of the all. Logically
regarded, i.e. "in the medium of mere thought," it is dialectical
method. Any abstract and limited point of view carries necessarily to
its contradictory. This can only be atoned with the original
determination by fresh negation in which a new thought-determination is
born, which is yet in a sense the old, though enriched, and valid on a
higher plane. The limitations of this in turn cause a contradiction to
emerge, and the process needs repetition. At last, however, no swing
into the opposite, with its primarily conflicting, if ultimately
complementary function, is any longer possible. That in which no further
contradiction is possible is the absolute Idea. Bare or indeterminate
being, for instance, the first of the determinations of Hegel's logic,
as the being of that which is not anything determinate, of Kant's
thing-in-itself, for example, positively understood, implicated at once
the notion of not-being, which negates it, and is one with it, yet with
a difference, so that we have the transition to determinate being, the
transition being baptized as becoming. And so forth. It is easy to raise
difficulties not only in regard to the detail in Hegel's development of
his categories, especially the higher ones, but also in regard to the
essential rhythm of his method. The consideration that mere double
negation leaves us precisely where we were and not upon a higher plane
where the dominant concept is richer, is, of course, fatal only to
certain verbal expressions of Hegel's intent. There is a differentiation
in type between the two negations. But if we grant this it is no longer
obviously the simple logical operation indicated. It is inferred then
that Hegel complements from the stuff of experience, and fails to make
good the pretension of his method to be by itself and of itself the
means of advance to higher and still higher concepts till it can rest in
the Absolute. He discards, as it were, and takes in from the stock while
professing to play from what he has originally in his hand. He
postulates his unity in senses and at stages in which it is
inadmissible, and so supplies only a schema of relations otherwise won,
a view supported by the way in which he injects certain determinations
in the process, e.g. the category of chemism. Has he not cooked the
process in the light of the result? In truth the Hegelian logic suffers
from the fact that the good to be reached is presupposed in the
beginning. Nature, e.g., is not deduced as real because rational, but
being real its rationality is presumed and, very imperfectly, exhibited
in a way to make it possible to conceive it as in its essence the reflex
of Reason. It is a vision rather than a construction. It is a
"theosophical logic." Consider the rational-real in the unity that must
be, and this is the way of it, or an approximation to the way of it! It
was inevitable that the epistemologists of the search for truth would
have none of it. The ideal in whatsoever sense real still needs to be
realized. It is from the human standpoint regulative and only
hypothetically or formally constitutive. We must not confuse [Greek:
ousia] with [Greek: einai], nor [Greek: einai] with [Greek: gignesthai].

Yet in a less ambitious form the fundamental contentions of Hegel's
method tend to find a qualified acceptance. In any piece of presumed
knowledge its partial or abstract character involves the presence of
loose edges which force the conviction of inadequacy and the development
of contradictions. Contradictions must be annulled by complementation,
with resultant increasing coherence in ascending stages. At each
successive stage in our progress fresh contradictions break out, but the
ideal of a station at which the thought-process and its other, if not
one, are at one, is permissible as a limiting conception. Yet if Hegel
meant only this he has indeed succeeded in concealing his meaning.

Hegel's treatment of the categories or thought determinations which
arise in the development of the immanent dialectic is rich in flashes of
insight, but most of them are in the ordinary view of logic wholly
metaphysical. In the stage, however, of his process in which he is
concerned with the notion are to be found concept, judgment, syllogism.
Of the last he declares that it "is the reasonable and everything
reasonable" (_Encyk._ § 181), and has the phantasy to speak of the
definition of the Absolute as being "at this stage" simply the
syllogism. It is, of course, the rhythm of the syllogism that attracts
him. The concept goes out from or utters itself in judgment to return to
an enhanced unity in syllogism. Ueberweg (_System_ § 101) is, on the
whole, justified in exclaiming that Hegel's rehabilitation of syllogism
"did but slight service to the Aristotelian theory of syllogism," yet
his treatment of syllogism must be regarded as an acute contribution to
logical criticism in the technical sense. He insists on its objectivity.
The transition from judgment is not brought about by our subjective
action. The syllogism of "all-ness" is convicted of a _petitio
principii_ (_Encyk._ § 190), with consequent lapse into the inductive
syllogism, and, finally, since inductive syllogism is involved in the
infinite process, into analogy. "The syllogism of necessity," on the
contrary, does not presuppose its conclusion in its premises. The
detail, too, of the whole discussion is rich in suggestion, and
subsequent logicians--Ueberweg himself perhaps, Lotze certainly in his
genetic scale of types of judgment and inference, Professor Bosanquet
notably in his systematic development of "the morphology of knowledge,"
and others--have with reason exploited it.

Hegel's logic as a whole, however, stands and falls not with his
thoughts on syllogism, but with the claim made for the dialectical
method that it exhibits logic in its integral unity with metaphysic, the
thought-process as the self-revelation of the Idea. The claim was
disallowed. To the formalist proper it was self-condemned in its
pretension to develop the content of thought and its rejection of the
formula of bare-identity. To the epistemologist it seemed to confuse
foundation and keystone, and to suppose itself to build upon the latter
in a construction illegitimately appropriative of materials otherwise
accumulated. At most it was thought to establish a schema of formal
unity which might serve as a regulative ideal. To the methodologist of
science in genesis it appeared altogether to fail to satisfy any
practical interest. Finally, to the psychologist it spelt the failure of
intellectualism, and encouraged, therefore, some form of rehabilitated

In the Hegelian school in the narrower sense the logic of the master
receives some exegesis and defence upon single points of doctrine rather
than as a whole. Its effect upon logic is rather to be seen in the
rethinking of the traditional body of logical doctrine in the light of
an absolute presupposed as ideal, with the postulate that a regulative
ideal must ultimately exhibit itself as constitutive, the justification
of the postulate being held to lie in the coherence and
all-inclusiveness of the result. In such a logic, if and so far as
coherence should be attained, would be found something akin to the
spirit of what Hegel achieves, though doubtless alien to the letter of
what it is his pretension to have achieved. There is perhaps no serious
misrepresentation involved in regarding a key-thought of this type,
though not necessarily expressed in those verbal forms, as pervading
such logic of the present as coheres with a philosophy of the absolute
conceived from a point of view that is intellectualist throughout. All
other contemporary movements may be said to be in revolt from Hegel.

v. _Logic from 1880-1910_

Logic in the present exhibits, though in characteristically modified
shapes, all the main types that have been found in its past history.
There is an intellectualist logic coalescent with an absolutist
metaphysic as aforesaid. There is an epistemological logic with sometimes
formalist, sometimes methodological leanings. There is a formal-symbolic
logic engaged with the elaboration of a relational calculus. Finally,
there is what may be termed psychological-voluntaryist logic. It is in
the rapidity of development of logical investigations of the third and
fourth types and the growing number of their exponents that the present
shows most clearly the history of logic in the making. All these
movements are logic of the present, and a very brief indication may be
added of points of historical significance.

Of intellectualist logic Francis Herbert Bradley[142] (b. 1846) and
Bernard Bosanquet[143] (1848) may be taken as typical exponents. The
philosophy of the former concludes to an Absolute by the annulment of
contradictions, though the ladder of Hegel is conspicuous by its
absence. His metaphysical method, however, is like Herbart's, not
identifiable with his logic, and the latter has for its central
characteristic its thorough restatement of the logical forms traditional
in language and the text-books, in such a way as to harmonize with the
doctrine of a reality whose organic unity is all-inclusive. The thorough
recasting that this involves, even of the thought of the masters when it
occasionally echoes them, has resulted in a phrasing uncouth to the ear
of the plain man with his world of persons and things in which the
former simply think about the latter, but it is fundamentally necessary
for Bradley's purpose. The negative judgment, for example, cannot be
held in one and the same undivided act to presuppose the unity of the
real, project an adjective as conceivably applicable to it and assert
its rejection. We need, therefore, a restatement of it. With Bradley
reality is the one subject of all judgment immediate or mediate. The act
of judgment "which refers an ideal content (recognized as such) to a
reality beyond the act" is the unit for logic. Grammatical subject and
predicate necessarily both fall under the rubric of the adjectival, that
is, within the logical idea or ideal content asserted. This is a meaning
or universal, which can have no detached or abstract self-subsistence.
As found in judgment it may exhibit differences within itself, but it is
not two, but one, an articulation of unity, not a fusion, which could
only be a confusion, of differences. With a brilliant subtlety Bradley
analyses the various types of judgment in his own way, with results that
must be taken into account by all subsequent logicians of this type. The
view of inference with which he complements it is only less satisfactory
because of a failure to distinguish the principle of nexus in syllogism
from its traditional formulation and rules, and because he is hampered
by the intractability which he finds in certain forms of relational

Bosanquet had the advantage that his logic was a work of a slightly
later date. He is, perhaps, more able than Bradley has shown himself, to
use material from alien sources and to penetrate to what is of value in
the thought of writers from whom, whether on the whole or on particular
issues, he disagrees. He treats the book-tradition, however, a debt to
which, nowadays inevitable, he is generous in acknowledging,[144] with a
judicious exercise of freedom in adaptation, i.e. constructively as
datum, never eclectically. In his fundamental theory of judgment his
obligation is to Bradley. It is to Lotze, however, that he owes most in
the characteristic feature of his logic, viz., the systematic
development of the types of judgment, and inference from less adequate
to more adequate forms. His fundamental continuity with Bradley may be
illustrated by his definition of inference. "Inference is the indirect
reference to reality of differences within a universal, by means of the
exhibition of this universal in differences directly referred to
reality."[145] Bosanquet's _Logic_ will long retain its place as an
authoritative exposition of logic of this type.

Of epistemological logic in one sense of the phrase Lotze is still to be
regarded as a typical exponent. Of another type Chr. Sigwart (q.v.) may
be named as representative. Sigwart's aim was "to reconstruct logic from
the point of view of methodology." His problem was the claim to arrive
at propositions universally valid, and so true of the object, whosoever
the individual thinker. His solution, within the Kantian circle of
ideas, was that such principles as the Kantian principle of causality
were justified as "postulates of the endeavour after complete
knowledge." "What Kant has shown is not that irregular fleeting changes
can never be the object of consciousness, but only that the ideal
consciousness of complete science would be impossible without the
knowledge of the necessity of all events."[146] "The universal
presuppositions which form the outline of our ideal of knowledge are not
so much laws which the understanding prescribes to nature ... as laws
which the understanding lays down for its own regulation in its
investigation and consideration of nature. They are a priori because no
experience is sufficient to reveal or confirm them in unconditional
universality; but they are a priori ... only in the sense of
presuppositions without which we should work with no hope of success and
merely at random and which therefore we must believe." Finally they are
akin to our ethical principles. With this coheres his dictum, with its
far-reaching consequences for the philosophy of induction, that "the
logical justification of the inductive process rests upon the fact that
it is an inevitable postulate of our effort after knowledge, that the
given is necessary, and can be known as proceeding from its grounds
according to universal laws."[147] It is characteristic of Sigwart's
point of view that he acknowledges obligation to Mill as well as to
Ueberweg. The transmutation of Mill's induction of inductions into a
postulate is an advance of which the psychological school of logicians
have not been slow to make use. The comparison of Sigwart with Lotze is
instructive, in regard both to their agreement and their divergence as
showing the range of the epistemological formula.

Of the formal-symbolic logic all that falls to be said here is, that
from the point of view of logic as a whole, it is to be regarded as a
legitimate praxis as long as it shows itself aware of the sense in which
alone form is susceptible of abstraction, and is aware that in itself it
offers no solution of the logical problem. "It is not an algebra," said
Kant[148] of his technical logic, and the kind of support lent recently
to symbolic logic by the _Gegenstandstheorie_ identified with the name
of Alexius Meinong (b. 1853)[149] is qualified by the warning that the
real activity of thought tends to fall outside the calculus of relations
and to attach rather to the subsidiary function of denoting. The future
of symbolic logic as coherent with the rest of logic, in the sense which
the word has borne throughout its history seems to be bound up with the
question of the nature of the analysis that lies behind the symbolism,
and of the way in which this is justified in the setting of a doctrine
of validity. The "theory of the object," itself, while affecting logic
alike in the formal and in the psychological conception of it very
deeply, does not claim to be regarded as logic or a logic, apart from a
setting supplied from elsewhere.

Finally we have a logic of a type fundamentally psychological, if it be
not more properly characterized as a psychology which claims to cover
the whole field of philosophy, including the logical field. The central
and organizing principle of this is that knowledge is in genesis, that
the genesis takes place in the medium of individual minds, and that this
fact implies that there is a necessary reference throughout to interests
or purposes of the subject which thinks because it wills and acts.
Historically this doctrine was formulated as the declaration of
independence of the insurgents in revolt against the pretensions of
absolutist logic. It drew for support upon the psychological movement
that begins with Fries and Herbart. It has been chiefly indebted to
writers, who were not, or were not primarily, logicians, to Avenarius,
for example, for the law of the economy of thought, to Wundt, whose
system, and therewith his logic,[150] is a pendant to his psychology,
for the volitional character of judgment, to Herbert Spencer and others.
A judgment is practical, and not to be divorced without improper
abstraction from the purpose and will that informs it. A concept is
instrumental to an end beyond itself, without any validity other than
its value for action. A situation involving a need of adaptation to
environment arises and the problem it sets must be solved that the will
may control environment and be justified by success. Truth is the
improvised machinery that is interjected, so far as this works. It is
clear that we are in the presence of what is at least an important
half-truth, which intellectuallism with its statics of the rational
order viewed as a completely articulate system has tended to ignore. It
throws light on many phases of the search for truth, upon the plain
man's claim to start with a subject which he knows whose predicate which
he does not know is still to be developed, or again upon his use of the
negative form of judgment, when the further determination of his
purposive system is served by a positive judgment from without, the
positive content of which is yet to be dropped as irrelevant to the
matter in hand. The movement has, however, scarcely developed its
logic[151] except as polemic. What seems clear is that it cannot be the
whole solution. While man must confront nature from the human and
largely the practical standpoint, yet his control is achieved only by
the increasing recognition of objective controls. He conquers by
obedience. So truth works and is economical because it is truth. Working
is proportioned to inner coherence. It is well that the view should be
developed into all its consequences. The result will be to limit it,
though perhaps also to justify it, save in its claim to reign alone.

There is, perhaps, an increasing tendency to recognize that the organism
of knowledge is a thing which from any single viewpoint must be seen in
perspective. It is of course a postulate that all truths harmonize, but
to give the harmonious whole in a projection in one plane is an
undertaking whose adequacy in one sense involves an inadequacy in
another. No human architect can hope to take up in succession all
essential points of view in regard to the form of knowledge or to logic.
"The great campanile is still to finish."

  BIBLIOGRAPHY.--Historical: No complete history of logic in the sense
  in which it is to be distinguished from theoretical philosophy in
  general has as yet been written. The history of logic is indeed so
  little intelligible apart from constant reference to tendencies in
  philosophical development as a whole, that the historian, when he has
  made the requisite preparatory studies, inclines to essay the more
  ambitious task. Yet there are, of course, works devoted to the history
  of logic proper.

  Of these Prantl's _Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande_ (4 vols.,
  1855-1870), which traces the rise, development and fortunes of the
  Aristotelian logic to the close of the middle ages, is monumental.
  Next in importance are the works of L. Rabus, _Logik und Metaphysik_,
  i. (1868) (pp. 123-242 historical, pp. 453-518 bibliographical, pp.
  514 sqq. a section on apparatus for the study of the history of
  logic), _Die neuesten Bestrebungen auf dem Gebiete der Logik bei den
  Deutschen_ (1880), _Logik_ (1895), especially for later writers § 17.
  Ueberweg's _System der Logik und Geschichte der logischen Lehren_ (4th
  ed. and last revised by the author, 1874, though it has been reissued
  later, Eng. trans., 1871) is alone to be named with these. Harms'
  posthumously published _Geschichte der Logik_ (1881) (_Die Philosophie
  in ihrer Geschichte_, ii.) was completed by the author only so far as
  Leibnitz. Blakey's _Historical Sketch of Logic_ (1851), though, like
  all this writer's works, closing with a bibliography of some
  pretensions, is now negligible. Franck, _Esquisse d'une histoire de la
  logique_ (1838) is the chief French contribution to the subject as a

  Of contributions towards the history of special periods or schools of
  logical thought the list, from the opening chapters of Ramus's
  _Scholae Dialecticae_ (1569) downwards (v. Rabus _loc. cit._) would be
  endless. What is of value in the earlier works has now been absorbed.
  The _System der Logik_ (1828) of Bachmann (a Kantian logician of
  distinction) contains a historical survey (pp. 569-644), as does the
  _Denklehre_ (1822) of van Calker (allied in thought to Fries) pp. 12
  sqq.; Eberstein's _Geschichte der Logik und Metaphysik bei den
  Deutschen von Leibniz bis auf gegenwärtige Zeit_ (latest edition,
  1799) is still of importance in regard to logicians of the school of
  Wolff and the origines of Kant's logical thought. Hoffmann, the editor
  and disciple of von Baader, published _Grundzüge einer Geschichte der
  Begriffe der Logik in Deutschland von Kant bis Baader_ (1851).
  Wallace's prolegomena and notes to his _Logic of Hegel_ (1874, revised
  and augmented 1892-1894) are of use for the history and terminology,
  as well as the theory. Riehl's article entitled _Logik in Die Kultur
  der Gegenwart_, vi. 1. _Systematische Philosophie_ (1907), is
  excellent, and touches on quite modern developments. Liard, _Les
  Logiciens Anglais Contemporains_ (5th ed., 1907), deals only with the
  19th-century inductive and formal-symbolic logicians down to Jevons,
  to whom the book was originally dedicated. Venn's _Symbolic Logic_
  (1881) gave a careful history and bibliography of that development.
  The history of the more recent changes is as yet to be found only in
  the form of unshaped material in the pages of review and
  _Jahresbericht_.     (H. W. B.*)


  [1] Cf. Heidel, "The Logic of the Pre-Socratic Philosophy," in
    Dewey's _Studies in Logical Theory_ (Chicago, 1903).

  [2] Heraclitus, _Fragmm._ 107 (Diels, _Fragmente der Vorsokratiker_)
    and 2, on which see Burnet, _Early Greek Philosophy_, p. 153 note
    (ed. 2).

  [3] e.g. Diog. Laërt. ix. 25, from the lost _Sophistes_ of Aristotle.

  [4] _Plato and Platonism_, p. 24.

  [5] Nothing is. If anything is, it cannot be known. If anything is
    known it cannot be communicated.

  [6] _Metaphys. [mu]. 1078b_ 28 sqq.

  [7] Cf. Arist. _Top. [theta]_. i. 1 _ad fin_.

  [8] For whom see Dümmler, _Antisthenica_ (1882, reprinted in his
    _Kleine Schriften_, 1901).

  [9] Aristotle, _Metaphys._ 1024b 32 sqq.

  [10] Plato, _Theaetetus_, 201 E. sqq., where, however, Antisthenes is
    not named, and the reference to him is sometimes doubted. But cf.
    Aristotle, _Met._ H 3. 1043b 24-28.

  [11] Diog. Laërt. ii. 107.

  [12] Aristotle, _An. Pr._ i. 31, 46a 32 sqq.; cf. 91b 12 sqq.

  [13] Athenaeus ii. 59c. See Usener, _Organisation der wissenschaftl.
    Arbeit_ (1884; reprinted in his _Vorträge und Aufsätze_, 1907).

  [14] Socrates' reference of a discussion to its presuppositions
    (Xenophon, _Mem._ iv. 6, 13) is not relevant for the history of the
    terminology of induction.

  [15] _Theaetetus_, 186c.

  [16] Timaeus, 37a, b (quoted in H. F. Carlill's translation of the
    _Theaetetus_, p. 60).

  [17] _Theaetetus_, 186d.

  [18] Sophistes, 253d.

  [19] _Ib. id._; cf. _Theaetetus_, 197d.

  [20] Aristotle, _de An._ 430b 5, and generally iii. 2, iii. 5.

  [21] For Plato's Logic, the controversies as to the genuineness of
    the dialogues may be treated summarily. The _Theaetetus_ labours
    under no suspicion. The _Sophistes_ is apparently matter for
    animadversion by Aristotle in the _Metaphysics_ and elsewhere, but
    derives stronger support from the testimonies to the _Politicus_
    which presumes it. The _Politicus_ and _Philebus_ are guaranteed by
    the use made of them in Aristotle's Ethics. The rejection of the
    _Parmenides_ would involve the paradox of a nameless contemporary of
    Plato and Aristotle who was inferior as a metaphysician to neither.
    No other dialogue adds anything to the _logical_ content of these.

    Granted their genuineness, the relative dating of three of them is
    given, viz. _Theaetetus_, _Sophistes_ and _Politicus_ in the order
    named. The _Philebus_ seems to presuppose _Politicus_, 283-284, but
    if this be an error, it will affect the logical theory not at all.
    There remains the _Parmenides_. It can scarcely be later than the
    _Sophistes_. The antinomies with which it concludes are more
    naturally taken as a prelude to the discussion of the _Sophistes_
    than as an unnecessary retreatment of the doctrine of the one and the
    many in a more negative form. It may well be earlier than the
    _Theaetetus_ in its present form. The stylistic argument shows the
    _Theaetetus_ relatively early. The maturity of its philosophic
    outlook tends to give it a place relatively advanced in the Platonic
    canon. To meet the problem here raised, the theory has been devised
    of an earlier and a later version. The first may have linked on to
    the series of Plato's dialogues of search, and to put the
    _Parmenides_ before it is impossible. The second, though it might
    still have preceded the _Parmenides_ might equally well have followed
    the negative criticism of that dialogue, as the beginning of
    reconstruction. For Plato's logic this question only has interest on
    account of the introduction of an [Greek: Aristotelês] in a
    non-speaking part in the _Parmenides_. If this be pressed as
    suggesting that the philosopher Aristotle was already in full
    activity at the date of writing, it is of importance to know what
    Platonic dialogues were later than the début of his critical pupil.

    On the stylistic argument as applied to Platonic controversies
    Janell's _Quaestiones Platonicae_ (1901) is important. On the whole
    question of genuineness and dates of the dialogues, H. Raeder,
    _Platons philosophische Entwickelung_ (1905), gives an excellent
    conspectus of the views held and the grounds alleged. See also PLATO.

  [22] E.g. that of essence and accident. Republic, 454.

  [23] E.g. the discussion of correlation, ib. 437 sqq.

  [24] _Politicus_, 285d.

  [25] _Sophistes_, 261c sqq.

  [26] E.g. in _Nic. Eth._ i. 6.

  [27] _Philebus_, 16d.

  [28] Principal edition still that of Waitz, with Latin commentary, (2
    vols., 1844-1846). Among the innumerable writers who have thrown
    light upon Aristotle's logical doctrine, St Hilaire, Trendelenburg,
    Ueberweg, Hamilton, Mansel, G. Grote may be named. There are,
    however, others of equal distinction. Reference to Prantl, op. cit.,
    is indispensable. Zeller, _Die philosophie der Griechen_, ii. 2,
    "Aristoteles" (3rd ed., 1879), pp. 185-257 (there is an Eng. trans.),
    and Maier, _Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles_ (2 vols., 1896, 1900)
    (some 900 pp.), are also of first-rate importance.

  [29] _Sophist. Elench._ 184, espec. b 1-3, but see Maier, _loc. cit._
    i. 1.

  [30] References such as 18b 12 are the result of subsequent editing
    and prove nothing. See, however, ARISTOTLE.

  [31] Adrastus is said to have called them [Greek: pro tôn topikôn].

  [32] _Metaphys._ E. 1.

  [33] _De Part. Animal._ A. 1, 639a 1 sqq.; cf. _Metaphys._ 1005b 2

  [34] _De Interpretatione_ 16a sqq.

  [35] _De Interpretatione_ 16a 24-25.

  [36] _Ib._ 18a 28 sqq.

  [37] _Ib._ 19a 28-29.

  [38] As shown e.g. by the way in which the relativity of sense and
    the object of sense is conceived, 7b 35-37.

  [39] _Topics_ 101a 27 and 36-b 4.

  [40] _Topics_ 100.

  [41] _Politics_ 1282a 1 sqq.

  [42] 103b 21.

  [43] _Topics_ 160a 37-b 5.

  [44] This is the explanation of the formal definition of induction,
    _Prior Analytics_, ii. 23, 68b 15 sqq.

  [45] 25b 36.

  [46] _Prior Analytics_, i. 1. 24a 18-20, [Greek: Syllogismos de esti
    logos en ô tethentôn tinôn eteron ti tôn keimenôn ex anankês
    snmbainei tô tauta einai]. The equivalent previously in _Topics_ 100a
    25 sqq.

  [47] _Prior Analytics_, ii. 21; _Posterior Analytics_, i. 1.

  [48] 67a 33-37, [Greek: mê syntheôrôn to kath' ekateron].

  [49] 67a 39-63.

  [50] 79a 4-5.

  [51] 24b 10-11.

  [52] _Posterior Analytics_, i. 4 [Greek: kath auto] means (1)
    contained in the definition of the subject; (2) having the subject
    contained in its definition, as being an alternative determination of
    the subject, crooked, e.g. is _per se_ of line; (3) self-subsistent;
    (4) connected with the subject as consequent to ground. Its needs
    stricter determination therefore.

  [53] 73b 26 sqq., 74a 37 sqq.

  [54] 90b 16.

  [55] _Metaphys. Z._ 12, H. 6 ground this formula metaphysically.

  [56] 94a 12, 75b 32.

  [57] 90a 6. Cf. Ueberweg, _System der Logik_, § 101.

  [58] 78a 30 sqq.

  [59] _Topics_, 101b 18, 19.

  [60] _Posterior Analytics_, ii. 13.

  [61] _Posterior Analytics_, ii. 16.

  [62] _Posterior Analytics_, i. 13 ad. fin., and i. 27. The form which
    a mathematical science treats as relatively self-subsistent is
    certainly not the constitutive idea.

  [63] _Posterior Analytics_, i. 3.

  [64] _Posterior Analytics_, ii. 19.

  [65] _De Anima_, 428b 18, 19.

  [66] _Prior Analytics_, i. 30, 46a 18.

  [67] _Topics_, 100b 20, 21.

  [68] _Topics_, 101a 25, 36-37, b1-4, &c.

  [69] Zeller (_loc. cit._ p. 194), who puts this formula in order to
    reject it.

  [70] _Metaphys._ [Delta] 1, 1013a 14.

  [71] _Posterior Analytics_, 72a 16 seq.

  [72] _Posterior Analytics_, 77a 26, 76a 37 sqq.

  [73] _Metaphys._ [Gamma].

  [74] _Posterior Analytics_, ii. 19.

  [75] _de Anima_, iii. 4-6.

  [76] _Metaphys._ M. 1087a 10-12; Zeller loc. cit. 304 sqq.; McLeod
    Innes, _The Universal and Particular in Aristotle's Theory of
    Knowledge_ (1886).

  [77] _Topics_, 105a 13.

  [78] _Metaphys._ 995a 8.

  [79] E.g., _Topics_, 108b 10, "to induce" the universal.

  [80] _Posterior Analytics_, ii. 19, 100b 3, 4.

  [81] _Topics_, i. 18, 108b 10.

  [82] _Prior Analytics_, ii. 23.

  [83] [Greek: Paradeigma], Prior Analytics, ii. 24.

  [84] Sigwart, _Logik_, Eng. trans. vol. ii. p. 292 and elsewhere.

  [85] Ueberweg, _System_, § 127, with a ref. to _de Partibus
    Animalium_, 667a.

  [86] See 67a 17 [Greek: ex hapantôn tôn atomôn].

  [87] [Greek: Epiphora]. [Greek: Epi] = "in" as in [Greek: epagôgê],
    inductio, and [Greek: -phora] = -ferentia, as in [Greek: diaphora],

  [88] Diog. Laërt. x. 33 seq.; Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. vii. 211.

  [89] Diog. Laërt. x. 87; cf. Lucretius, vi. 703 sq., v. 526 sqq. (ed.

  [90] Sextus Empiricus, _Pyrrhon. Hypotyp._ ii. 195, 196.

  [91] Sextus, _op. cit._ ii. 204.

  [92] _Op. cit._ iii. 17 sqq., and especially 28.

  [93] The point is raised by Aristotle, 95A.

  [94] See Jourdain, _Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des
    traductions latines d'Aristote_ (1843).

  [95] See E. Cassirer, _Das Erkenntnisproblem_, i. 134 seq., and the
    justificatory excerpts, pp. 539 sqq.

  [96] See Riehl in _Vierteljahrschr. f. wiss. Philos._ (1893).

  [97] Bacon, _Novum Organum_, ii. 22, 23; cf. also Aristotle, _Topics_
    i. 12. 13, ii. 10. 11 (Stewart, ad _Nic. Eth._ 1139b 27) and Sextus
    Empiricus, _Pyrr. Hypot._ iii. 15.

  [98] Bacon's _Works_, ed. Ellis and Spedding, iii. 164-165.

  [99] A notable formula of Bacon's _Novum Organum_ ii. 4 § 3 turns
    out, _Valerius Terminus_, cap. 11, to come from Aristotle, _Post.
    An._ i. 4 _via_ Ramus. See Ellis in Bacon's _Works_, iii. 203 sqq.

  [100] _De Civitate Dei_, xi. 26. "Certum est me esse, si fallor."

  [101] Cf. Plato, _Republic_, 381E seq.

  [102] _Elementa Philosophiæ_, i. 3. 20, i. 6. 17 seq.

  [103] Hobbes, _Elementa Philosophiæ_, i. 1. 5.

  [104] _Id. ib._ i. 6. 16.

  [105] _Id. ib._ i. 4. 8; cf. Locke's _Essay of Human Understanding_,
    iv. 17.

  [106] _Id. Leviathan_, i. 3.

  [107] _Id. Elem. Philos._ i. 6. 10.

  [108] Condillac, _Langue des Calculs_, p. 7.

  [109] Locke, _Essay_, iii. 3.

  [110] _Id. ib._ iv. 17.

  [111] _Loc. cit._ § 8.

  [112] _Id. ib._ iv. 4, §§ 6 sqq.

  [113] Berkeley, _Of the Principles of Human Knowledge_, § 142.

  [114] Hume, _Treatise of Human Nature_, i. 1. 7 (from Berkeley, _op.
    cit._, introd., §§ 15-16).

  [115] _Essay_, iv. 17, § 3.

  [116] Hume, _Treatise of Human Nature_, i. 3. 15.

  [117] Mill, _Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy_, cap.

  [118] Cf. Mill, _Autobiography_, p. 159. "I grappled at once with the
    problem of Induction, postponing that of Reasoning." _Ib._ p. 182
    (when he is preoccupied with syllogism), "I could make nothing
    satisfactory of Induction at this time."

  [119] _Autobiography_, p. 181.

  [120] The insight, for instance, of F. H. Bradley's criticism,
    _Principles of Logic_, II. ii. 3, is somewhat dimmed by a lack of
    sympathy due to extreme difference in the point of view adopted.

  [121] Bacon, _Novum organum_, i. 100.

  [122] Russell's _Philosophy of Leibnitz_, capp. 1-5.

  [123] See especially remarks on the letter of M. Arnauld (Gerhardt's
    edition of the philosophical works, ii. 37 sqq.).

  [124] Gerhardt, vi. 612, quoted by Russell, _loc. cit._, p. 19.

  [125] Ibid., ii. 62, Russell, p. 33.

  [126] Spinoza, ed. van Vloten and Land, i. 46 (_Ethica_, i. 11).

  [127] _Nouveaux essais_, iv. 2 § 9, 17 § 4 (Gerhardt v. 351, 460).

  [128] _Critique of Judgment_, Introd. § 2, _ad. fin._ (_Werke_,
    Berlin Academy edition, vol. v. p. 176, l. 10).

  [129] _Kant's Introduction to Logic and his Essay on the Mistaken
    Subtlety of the Four Figures_, trans. T. K. Abbott (1885).

  [130] _Loc. cit._, p. 11.

  [131] Or antitheses. Kant follows, for example, a different line of
    cleavage between form and content from that developed between thought
    and the "given." And these are not his only unresolved dualities,
    even in the _Critique of Pure Reason_. For the logical inquiry,
    however, it is permissible to ignore or reduce these differences.

    The determination too of the sense in which Kant's theory of
    knowledge involves an unresolved antithesis is for the logical
    purpose necessary so far only as it throws light upon his logic and
    his influence upon logical developments. Historically the question of
    the extent to which writers adopted the dualistic interpretation or
    one that had the like consequences is of greater importance.

    It may be said summarily that Kant holds the antithesis between
    thought and "the given" to be unresolved and within the limits of
    theory of knowledge irreducible. The dove of thought falls lifeless
    if the resistant atmosphere of "the given" be withdrawn (_Critique of
    Pure Reason_, ed. 2 Introd. Kant's _Werke_, ed. of the Prussian
    Academy, vol. iii. p. 32, ll. 10 sqq.). Nevertheless the
    thing-in-itself is a problematic conception and of a limiting or
    negative use merely. He "had woven," according to an often quoted
    phrase of Goethe, "a certain sly element of irony into his method;
    ... he pointed as it were with a side gesture beyond the limits which
    he himself had drawn." Thus (_loc. cit._ p. 46, ll. 8, 9) he declares
    that "there are two lineages united in human knowledge, which perhaps
    spring from a common stock, though to us unknown--namely sense and
    understanding." Some indication of the way in which he would
    hypothetically and speculatively mitigate the antithesis is perhaps
    afforded by the reflection that the distinction of the mental and
    what appears as material is an external distinction in which the one
    appears outside to the other. "Yet what as thing-in-itself lies back
    of the phenomenon may perhaps not be so wholly disparate after all"
    (ib. p. 278, ll. 26 sqq.).

  [132] _Critique of Judgment_, Introd. § 2 (_Werke_, v., 276 ll. 9
    sqq.); cf. Bernard's "Prolegomena" to his translation of this, (pp.
    xxxviii. sqq.).

  [133] _Die Logik, insbesondere die Analytik_ (Schleswig, 1825).
    August Detlev Christian Twesten (1789-1876), a Protestant theologian,
    succeeded Schleiermacher as professor in Berlin in 1835.

  [134] See _Sir William Hamilton: The Philosophy of Perception_, by J.
    Hutchison Stirling.

  [135] _Hauptpunkte der Logik_, 1808 (_Werke_, ed. Hartenstein, i. 465
    sqq.), and specially _Lehrbuch der Einleitung in die Philosophie_
    (1813), and subsequently §§ 34 sqq. (_Werke_, i. 77 sqq.).

  [136] See Ueberweg, _System of Logic and History of Logical
    Doctrines_, § 34.

  [137] _Drei Bücher der Logik_, 1874 (E.T., 1884). The Book on Pure
    Logic follows in essentials the line of thought of an earlier work

  [138] _Logic_, Eng. trans. 35 _ad. fin._

  [139] _Logic_, Introd. § ix.

  [140] For whom see Höffding, _History of Modern Philosophy_, Eng.
    trans., vol. ii. pp. 122 sqq.; invaluable for the logical methods of
    modern philosophers.

  [141] _Wissenschaft der Logik_ (1812-1816), in course of revision at
    Hegel's death in 1831 (_Werke_, vols. iii.-v.), and _Encyklopädie der
    philosophischen Wissenschaften_, i.; _Die Logik_ (1817; 3rd ed.,
    1830); _Werke_, vol. vi., Eng. trans., Wallace (2nd ed., 1892).

  [142] _The Principles of Logic_ (1883).

  [143] _Logic, or The Morphology of Thought_ (2 vols., 1888).

  [144] _Logic_, Pref. pp. 6 seq.

  [145] _Id._ vol. ii. p. 4.

  [146] _Logik_ (1873, 1889), Eng. trans. ii. 17.

  [147] _Op. cit._ ii. 289.

  [148] _Introd. to Logic._, trans. Abbott, p. 10.

  [149] _Ueber Annahmen_ (1902, &c.)

  [150] _Logik_ (1880, and in later editions).

  [151] Yet see _Studies in Logic_, by John Dewey and others (1903).

LOGOCYCLIC CURVE, STROPHOID or FOLIATE, a cubic curve generated by
increasing or diminishing the radius vector of a variable point Q on a
straight line AB by the distance QC of the point from the foot of the
perpendicular drawn from the origin to the fixed line. The polar
equation is r cos[theta] = a(1 ± sin[theta]), the upper sign referring
to the case when the vector is increased, the lower when it is
diminished. Both branches are included in the Cartesian equation (x² +
y²)(2a - x) = a²x, where a is the distance of the line from the origin.
If we take for axes the fixed line and the perpendicular through the
initial point, the equation takes the form y [root](a - x) = x [root](a
+ x). The curve resembles the folium of Descartes, and has a node
between x = 0, x = a, and two branches asymptotic to the line x = 2a.


LOGOGRAPHI ([Greek: logos], [Greek: graphô], writers of prose histories
or tales), the name given by modern scholars to the Greek
historiographers before Herodotus.[1] Thucydides, however, applies the
term to all his own predecessors, and it is therefore usual to make a
distinction between the older and the younger logographers. Their
representatives, with one exception, came from Ionia and its islands,
which from their position were most favourably situated for the
acquisition of knowledge concerning the distant countries of East and
West. They wrote in the Ionic dialect, in what was called the unperiodic
style, and preserved the poetic character of their epic model. Their
criticism amounts to nothing more than a crude attempt to rationalize
the current legends and traditions connected with the founding of
cities, the genealogies of ruling families, and the manners and customs
of individual peoples. Of scientific criticism there is no trace
whatever. The first of these historians was probably Cadmus of Miletus
(who lived, if at all, in the early part of the 6th century), the
earliest writer of prose, author of a work on the founding of his native
city and the colonization of Ionia (so Suïdas); Pherecydes of Leros, who
died about 400, is generally considered the last. Mention may also be
made of the following: Hecataeus of Miletus (550-476); Acusilaus of
Argos,[2] who paraphrased in prose (correcting the tradition where it
seemed necessary) the genealogical works of Hesiod in the Ionic dialect;
he confined his attention to the prehistoric period, and made no attempt
at a real history; Charon of Lampsacus (c. 450), author of histories of
Persia, Libya, and Ethiopia, of annals ([Greek: hôroi]) of his native
town with lists of the prytaneis and archons, and of the chronicles of
Lacedaemonian kings; Xanthus of Sardis in Lydia (c. 450), author of a
history of Lydia, one of the chief authorities used by Nicolaus of
Damascus (_fl._ during the time of Augustus); Hellanicus of Mytilene;
Stesimbrotus of Thasos, opponent of Pericles and reputed author of a
political pamphlet on Themistocles, Thucydides and Pericles; Hippys and
Glaucus, both of Rhegium, the first the author of histories of Italy and
Sicily, the second of a treatise on ancient poets and musicians, used by
Harpocration and Plutarch; Damastes of Sigeum, pupil of Hellanicus,
author of genealogies of the combatants before Troy (an ethnographic and
statistical list), of short treatises on poets, sophists, and
geographical subjects.

  On the early Greek historians, see G. Busolt, _Griechische Geschichte_
  (1893), i. 147-153; C. Wachsmuth, _Einleitung in das Studium der alten
  Geschichte_ (1895); A. Schäfer, _Abriss der Quellenkunde der
  griechischen und römischen Geschichte_ (ed. H. Nissen, 1889); J. B.
  Bury, _Ancient Greek Historians_ (1909), lecture i.; histories of
  Greek literature by Müller-Donaldson (ch. 18) and W. Mure (bk. iv. ch.
  3), where the little that is known concerning the life and writings of
  the logographers is exhaustively discussed. The fragments will be
  found, with Latin notes, translation, prolegomena, and copious
  indexes, in C. W. Müller's _Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum_

  See also GREECE: _History, Ancient_ (section, "Authorities").


  [1] The word is also used of the writers of speeches for the use of
    the contending parties in the law courts, who were forbidden to
    employ advocates.

  [2] There is some doubt as to whether this Acusilaus was of
    Peloponnesian or Boeotian Argos. Possibly there were two of the name.
    For an example of the method of Acusilaus see Bury, _op. cit._ p. 19.

LOGOS [Greek: logos], a common term in ancient philosophy and theology.
It expresses the idea of an immanent reason in the world, and, under
various modifications, is met with in Indian, Egyptian and Persian
systems of thought. But the idea was developed mainly in Hellenic and
Hebrew philosophy, and we may distinguish the following stages:

1. _The Hellenic Logos._--To the Greek mind, which saw in the world a
[Greek: kosmos] (ordered whole), it was natural to regard the world as
the product of reason, and reason as the ruling principle in the world.
So we find a Logos doctrine more or less prominent from the dawn of
Hellenic thought to its eclipse. It rises in the realm of physical
speculation, passes over into the territory of ethics and theology, and
makes its way through at least three well-defined stages. These are
marked off by the names of Heraclitus of Ephesus, the Stoics and Philo.

It acquires its first importance in the theories of Heraclitus (6th
century B.C.), who, trying to account for the aesthetic order of the
visible universe, broke away to some extent from the purely physical
conceptions of his predecessors and discerned at work in the cosmic
process a [Greek: logos] analogous to the reasoning power in man. On the
one hand the Logos is identified with [Greek: gnômê] and connected with
[Greek: dikê], which latter seems to have the function of correcting
deviations from the eternal law that rules in things. On the other hand
it is not positively distinguished either from the ethereal fire, or
from the [Greek: heimarmenê] and the [Greek: anankê] according to which
all things occur. Heraclitus holds that nothing material can be thought
of without this Logos, but he does not conceive the Logos itself to be
immaterial. Whether it is regarded as in any sense possessed of
intelligence and consciousness is a question variously answered. But
there is most to say for the negative. This Logos is not one above the
world or prior to it, but in the world and inseparable from it. Man's
soul is a part of it. It is _relation_, therefore, as Schleiermacher
expresses it, or reason, not speech or word. And it is objective, not
subjective, reason. Like a law of nature, objective in the world, it
gives order and regularity to the movement of things, and makes the
system rational.[1]

The failure of Heraclitus to free himself entirely from the physical
hypotheses of earlier times prevented his speculation from influencing
his successors. With Anaxagoras a conception entered which gradually
triumphed over that of Heraclitus, namely, the conception of a supreme,
intellectual principle, not identified with the world but independent of
it. This, however, was [Greek: nous], not Logos. In the Platonic and
Aristotelian systems, too, the theory of ideas involved an absolute
separation between the material world and the world of higher reality,
and though the term Logos is found the conception is vague and
undeveloped. With Plato the term selected for the expression of the
principle to which the order visible in the universe is due is [Greek:
nous] or [Greek: sophia], not [Greek: logos]. It is in the
pseudo-Platonic _Epinomis_ that [Greek: logos] appears as a synonym for
[Greek: nous]. In Aristotle, again, the principle which sets all nature
under the rule of thought, and directs it towards a rational end, is
[Greek: nous], or the divine spirit itself; while [Greek: logos] is a
term with many senses, used as more or less identical with a number of
phrases, [Greek: ou heneka], [Greek: energeia], [Greek: entelecheia],
[Greek: ousia], [Greek: eidos], [Greek: morphê], &c.

In the reaction from Platonic dualism, however, the Logos doctrine
reappears in great breadth. It is a capital element in the system of the
Stoics. With their teleological views of the world they naturally
predicated an active principle pervading it and determining it. This
operative principle is called both Logos and God. It is conceived of as
material, and is described in terms used equally of nature and of God.
There is at the same time the special doctrine of the [Greek: logos
spermatikos], the seminal Logos, or the law of generation in the world,
the principle of the active reason working in dead matter. This parts
into [Greek: logoi spermatikoi], which are akin, not to the Platonic
ideas, but rather to the [Greek: logoi enuloi] of Aristotle. In man,
too, there is a Logos which is his characteristic possession, and which
is [Greek: endiathetos], as long as it is a thought resident within his
breast, but [Greek: prophorikos] when it is expressed as a word. This
distinction between Logos as ratio and Logos as _oratio_, so much used
subsequently by Philo and the Christian fathers, had been so far
anticipated by Aristotle's distinction between the [Greek: exô logos]
and the [Greek: logos en tê psychê]. It forms the point of attachment by
which the Logos doctrine connected itself with Christianity. The Logos
of the Stoics (q.v.) is a reason in the world gifted with intelligence,
and analogous to the reason in man.

2. _The Hebrew Logos._--In the later Judaism the earlier anthropomorphic
conception of God and with it the sense of the divine nearness had been
succeeded by a belief which placed God at a remote distance, severed
from man and the world by a deep chasm. The old familiar name Yahweh
became a secret; its place was taken by such general expressions as the
Holy, the Almighty, the Majesty on High, the King of Kings, and also by
the simple word "Heaven." Instead of the once powerful confidence in the
immediate presence of God there grew up a mass of speculation regarding
on the one hand the distant future, on the other the distant past.
Various attempts were made to bridge the gulf between God and man,
including the angels, and a number of other hybrid forms of which it is
hard to say whether they are personal beings or abstractions. The
wisdom, the Shekinah or Glory, and the Spirit of God are intermediate
beings of this kind, and even the Law came to be regarded as an
independent spiritual entity. Among these conceptions that of the word
of God had an important place, especially the creative word of Genesis
i. Here as in the other cases we cannot always say whether the Word is
regarded as a mere attribute or activity of God, or an independent
being, though there is a clear tendency towards the latter. The
ambiguity lies in the twofold purpose of these activities: (1) to
establish communication with God; (2) to prevent direct connexion
between God and the world. The word of the God of revelation is
represented as the creative principle (e.g. Gen. i. 3; Psalm xxxiii. 6),
as the executor of the divine judgments (Hosea vi. 5), as healing (Psalm
cvii. 20), as possessed of almost personal qualities (Isaiah lv. 11;
Psalm cxlvii. 15). Along with this comes the doctrine of the angel of
Yahweh, the angel of the covenant, the angel of the presence, in whom
God manifests Himself, and who is sometimes identified with Yahweh or
Elohim (Gen. xvi. 11, 13; xxxii. 29-31; Exod. iii. 2; xiii. 21),
sometimes distinguished from Him (Gen. xxii. 15, &c.; xxiv. 7; xxviii.
12, &c.), and sometimes presented in both aspects (Judges ii., vi.;
Zech. i.). To this must be added the doctrine of Wisdom, given in the
books of Job and Proverbs. At one time it is exhibited as an attribute
of God (Prov. iii. 19). At another it is strongly personified, so as to
become rather the creative thought of God than a quality (Prov. viii.
22). Again it is described as proceeding from God as the principle of
creation and objective to Him. In these and kindred passages (Job xv. 7,
&c.) it is on the way to become hypostatized.

  The Hebrew conception is partially associated with the Greek in the
  case of Aristobulus, the predecessor of Philo, and, according to the
  fathers, the founder of the Alexandrian school. He speaks of Wisdom in
  a way reminding us of the book of Proverbs. The pseudo-Solomonic _Book
  of Wisdom_ (generally supposed to be the work of an Alexandrian
  flourishing somewhere between Aristobulus and Philo) deals both with
  the Wisdom and with the Logos. It fails to hypostatize either. But it
  represents the former as the framer of the world, as the power or
  spirit of God, active alike in the physical, the intellectual, and the
  ethical domain, and apparently objective to God. In the Targums, on
  the other hand, the three doctrines of the word, the angel, and the
  wisdom of God converge in a very definite conception. In the Jewish
  theology God is represented as purely transcendent, having no likeness
  of nature with man, and making no personal entrance into history.
  Instead of the immediate relation of God to the world the Targums
  introduce the ideas of the _Memra_ (word) and the _Shechina_ (real
  presence). This Memra (= Ma'amar) or, as it is also designated,
  _Dibbura_, is a hypostasis that takes the place of God when direct
  intercourse with man is in view. In all those passages of the Old
  Testament where anthropomorphic terms are used of God, the Memra is
  substituted for God. The Memra proceeds from God, and retains the
  creaturely relation to God. It does not seem to have been identified
  with the Messiah.[2]

3. _Philo._--In the Alexandrian philosophy, as represented by the
Hellenized Jew Philo, the Logos doctrine assumes a leading place and
shapes a new career for itself. Philo's doctrine is moulded by three
forces--Platonism, Stoicism and Hebraism. He detaches the Logos idea
from its connexion with Stoic materialism and attaches it to a
thoroughgoing Platonism. It is Plato's idea of the Good regarded as
creatively active. Hence, instead of being merely immanent in the
Cosmos, it has an independent existence. Platonic too is the doctrine of
the divine architect who seeks to realize in the visible universe the
archetypes already formed in his mind. Philo was thus able to make the
Logos theory a bridge between Judaism and Greek philosophy. It preserved
the monotheistic idea yet afforded a description of the Divine activity
in terms of Hellenic thought; the word of the Old Testament is one with
the [Greek: logos] of the Stoics. And thus in Philo's conception the
Logos is much more than "the principle of reason, informing the infinite
variety of things, and so creating the World-Order"; it is also the
divine dynamic, the energy and self-revelation of God. The Stoics indeed
sought, more or less consciously, by their doctrine of the Logos as the
Infinite Reason to escape from the belief in a divine Creator, but
Philo, Jew to the core, starts from the Jewish belief in a supreme,
self-existing God, to whom the reason of the world must be subordinated
though related. The conflict of the two conceptions (the Greek and the
Hebrew) led him into some difficulty; sometimes he represents the Logos
as an independent and even personal being, a "second God," sometimes as
merely an aspect of the divine activity. And though passages of the
first class must no doubt be explained figuratively--for Philo would not
assert the existence of two Divine agents--it remains true that the two
conceptions cannot be fused. The Alexandrian philosopher wavers between
the two theories and has to accord to the Logos of Hellas a
semi-independent position beside the supreme God of Judaea. He speaks of
the Logos (1) as the agency by which God reveals Himself, in some
measure to all men, in greater degree to chosen souls. The appearances
recorded in the Old Testament are manifestations of the Logos, and the
knowledge of God possessed by the great leaders and teachers of Israel
is due to the same source; (2) as the agency whereby man, enmeshed by
illusion, lays hold of the higher spiritual life and rising above his
partial point of view participates in the universal reason. The Logos is
thus the means of redemption; those who realize its activity being
emancipated from the tyranny of circumstance into the freedom of the

4. _The Fourth Gospel._--Among the influences that shaped the Fourth
Gospel that of the Alexandrian philosophy must be assigned a distinct,
though not an exaggerated importance. There are other books in the New
Testament that bear the same impress, the epistles to the Ephesians and
the Colossians, and to a much greater degree the epistle to the Hebrews.
The development that had thus begun in the time of Paul reaches maturity
in the Fourth Gospel, whose dependence on Philo appears (1) in the use
of the allegorical method, (2) in many coincident passages, (3) in the
dominant conception of the Logos. The writer narrates the life of Christ
from the point of view furnished him by Philo's theory. True, the Logos
doctrine is only mentioned in the prologue to the Gospel, but it is
presupposed throughout the whole book. The author's task indeed was
somewhat akin to that of Philo, "to transplant into the world of
Hellenic culture a revelation originally given through Judaism." This is
not to say that he holds the Logos doctrine in exactly the same form as
Philo. On the contrary, the fact that he starts from an actual knowledge
of the earthly life of Jesus, while Philo, even when ascribing a real
personality to the Logos, keeps within the bounds of abstract
speculation, leads him seriously to modify the Philonic doctrine. Though
the Alexandrian idea largely determines the evangelist's treatment of
the history, the history similarly reacts on the idea. The prologue is
an organic portion of the Gospel and not a preface written to conciliate
a philosophic public. It assumes that the Logos idea is familiar in
Christian theology, and vividly summarizes the main features of the
Philonic conception--the eternal existence of the Logos, its relation to
God ([Greek: pros ton theon], yet distinct), its creative, illuminative
and redemptive activity. But the adaptation of the idea to John's
account of a historical person involved at least three profound
modifications:--(1) the Logos, instead of the abstraction or
semi-personification of Philo, becomes fully personified. The word that
became flesh subsisted from all eternity as a distinct personality
within the divine nature. (2) Much greater stress is laid upon the
redemptive than upon the creative function. The latter indeed is glanced
at ("All things were made by him"), merely to provide a link with
earlier speculation, but what the writer is concerned about is not the
mode in which the world came into being but the spiritual life which
resides in the Logos and is communicated by him to men. (3) The idea of
[Greek: logos] as Reason becomes subordinated to the idea of [Greek:
logos] as Word, the expression of God's will and power, the outgoing of
the divine energy, life, love and light. Thus in its fundamental thought
the prologue of the Fourth Gospel comes nearer to the Old Testament (and
especially to Gen. i.) than to Philo. As speech goes out from a man and
reveals his character and thought, so Christ is "sent out from the
Father," and as the divine word is also, in accordance with the Hebrew
idea, the medium of God's quickening power.

What John thus does is to take the Logos idea of Philo and use it for a
practical purpose--to make more intelligible to himself and his readers
the divine nature of Jesus Christ. That this endeavour to work into the
historical tradition of the life and teaching of Jesus--a hypothesis
which had a distinctly foreign origin--led him into serious difficulties
is a consideration that must be discussed elsewhere.

  5. _The Early Church._--In many of the early Christian writers, as
  well as in the heterodox schools, the Logos doctrine is influenced by
  the Greek idea. The Syrian Gnostic Basilides held (according to
  Irenaeus i. 24) that the Logos or Word emanated from the [Greek:
  nous], or personified reason, as this latter emanated from the
  unbegotten Father. The completest type of Gnosticism, the Valentinian,
  regarded Wisdom as the last of the series of aeons that emanated from
  the original Being or Father, and the Logos as an emanation from the
  first two principles that issued from God, Reason ([Greek: nous]) and
  Truth. Justin Martyr, the first of the sub-apostolic fathers, taught
  that God produced of His own nature a rational power([Greek: dynamin
  tina logikên]), His agent in creation, who now became man in Jesus
  (_Dial. c. Tryph._ chap. 48, 60). He affirmed also the action of the
  [Greek: logos spermatikos], (_Apol._ i. 46; ii. 13, &c.). With Tatian
  (_Cohort. ad. Gr._ chap. 5, &c.) the Logos is the beginning of the
  world, the reason that comes into being as the sharer of God's
  rational power. With Athenagoras (_Suppl._ chap. 9, 10) He is the
  prototype of the world and the energizing principle ([Greek: idea kai
  energeia]) of things. Theophilus (Ad _Autolyc._ ii. 10, 24) taught
  that the Logos was in eternity with God as the [Greek: logos
  endiathetos], the counsellor of God, and that when the world was to be
  created God sent forth this counsellor ([Greek: symboulos]) from
  Himself as the [Greek: logos prophorikos], yet so that the begotten
  Logos did not cease to be a part of Himself. With Hippolytus (_Refut._
  x. 32, &c.) the Logos, produced of God's own substance, is both the
  divine intelligence that appears in the world as the Son of God, and
  the idea of the universe immanent in God. The early Sabellians (comp.
  Eusebius, _Hist. Eccl._ vi. 33; Athanasius, _Contra Arian._ iv.) held
  that the Logos was a faculty of God, the divine reason, immanent in
  God eternally, but not in distinct personality prior to the historical
  manifestation in Christ. Origen, referring the act of creation to
  eternity instead of to time, affirmed the eternal personal existence
  of the Logos. In relation to God this Logos or Son was a copy of the
  original, and as such inferior to that. In relation to the world he
  was its prototype, the [Greek: idea ideôn] and its redeeming power
  (_Contra Cels._ v. 608; _Frag. de princip._ i. 4; _De princip._ i.
  109, 324).

  In the later developments of Hellenic speculation nothing essential
  was added to the doctrine of the Logos. Philo's distinction between
  God and His rational power or Logos in contact with the world was
  generally maintained by the eclectic Platonists and Neo-Platonists. By
  some of these this distinction was carried out to the extent of
  predicating (as was done by Numenius of Apamea) three Gods:--the
  supreme God; the second God, or Demiurge or Logos; and the third God,
  or the world. Plotinus explained the logoi as constructive forces,
  proceeding from the ideas and giving form to the dead matter of
  sensible things (_Enneads_, v. 1. 8 and Richter's _Neu-Plat.

  See the histories of philosophy and theology, and works quoted under
  HERACLITUS, STOICS, PHILO, JOHN, THE GOSPEL OF, &c., and for a general
  summary of the growth of the Logos doctrine, E. Caird, _Evolution of
  Theology in the Greek Philosophers_ (1904), vol. ii.; A. Harnack,
  _History of Dogma_; E. F. Scott, _The Fourth Gospel_, ch. v. (1906);
  J. M. Heinze, _Die Lehre vom Logos in der griech. Philosophie_ (1872);
  J. Réville, _La Doctrine du Logos_ (1881); Aal, _Gesch. d. Logos-Idee_
  (1899); and the _Histories of Dogma_, by A. Harnack, F. Loofs, R.
  Seeberg.     (S. D. F. S.; A. J. G.)


  [1] Cf. Schleiermacher's _Herakleitos der Dunkle_; art. HERACLITUS
    and authorities there quoted.

  [2] Cf. the Targum of Onkelos on the Pentateuch under Gen. vii. 16,
    xvii. 2, xxi. 20; Exod. xix. 16, etc.; the Jerusalem Targum on Numb.
    vii. 89, &c. For further information regarding the Hebrew _Logos_
    see, beside Dr Kaufmann Kohler, s.v. "Memra," _Jewish Encyc._ viii.
    464-465, Bousset, _Die Religion des Judenthums_ (1903), p. 341, and
    Weber, _Jüdische Theologie_ (1897), pp. 180-184. The hypostatizing of
    the Divine word in the doctrine of the Memra was probably later than
    the time of Philo, but it was the outcome of a mode of thinking
    already common in Jewish theology. The same tendency is of course
    expressed in the "Logos" of the Fourth Gospel.

LOGOTHETE (Med. Lat. _logotheta_, Gr. [Greek: logothetês], from [Greek:
logos], word, account, calculation, and [Greek: tithenai], to set, i.e.
"one who accounts, calculates or ratiocinates"), originally the title of
a variety of administrative officials in the Byzantine Empire, e.g. the
[Greek: logothetês tou dromou], who was practically the equivalent of
the modern postmaster-general; and the [Greek: logothetês tou
stratiôtikou], the logothete of the military chest. Gibbon defines the
great Logothete as "the supreme guardian of the laws and revenues," who
"is compared with the chancellor of the Latin monarchies." From the
Eastern Empire the title was borrowed by the west, though it only became
firmly established in Sicily, where the _logotheta_ occupied the
position of chancellor elsewhere, his office being equal if not superior
to that of the _magnus cancellarius_. Thus the title was borne by Pietro
della Vigna, the all-powerful minister of the emperor Frederick II.,
king of Sicily.

  See DU CANGE, _Glossarium_, s.v. _Logotheta_.

LOGROÑO, an inland province of northern Spain, the smallest of the eight
provinces formed in 1833 out of Old Castile; bounded N. by Burgos, Álava
and Navarre, W. by Burgos, S. by Soria and E. by Navarre and Saragossa.
Pop. (1900) 189,376; area, 1946 sq. m. Logroño belongs entirely to the
basin of the river Ebro, which forms its northern boundary except for a
short distance near San Vicente; it is drained chiefly by the rivers
Tiron, Oja, Najerilla, Iregua, Leza, Cidacos and Alhama, all flowing in
a north-easterly direction. The portion skirting the Ebro forms a
spacious and for the most part fertile undulating plain, called La
Rioja, but in the south Logroño is considerably broken up by offshoots
from the sierras which separate that river from the Douro. In the west
the Cerro de San Lorenzo, the culminating point of the Sierra de la
Demanda, rises 7562 ft., and in the south the Pico de Urbion reaches
7388 ft. The products of the province are chiefly cereals, good oil and
wine (especially in the Rioja), fruit, silk, flax and honey. Wine is the
principal export, although after 1892 this industry suffered greatly
from the protective duties imposed by France. Great efforts have been
made to keep a hold upon French and English markets with light red and
white Rioja wines. No less than 128,000 acres are covered with vines,
and 21,000 with olive groves. Iron and argentiferous lead are mined in
small quantities and other ores have been discovered. The manufacturing
industries are insignificant. A railway along the right bank of the Ebro
connects the province with Saragossa, and from Miranda there is railway
communication with Madrid, Bilbao and France; but there is no railway in
the southern districts, where trade is much retarded by the lack even of
good roads. The town of Logroño (pop. 1900, 19,237) and the city of
Calahorra (9475) are separately described. The only other towns with
upwards of 5000 inhabitants are Haro (7914), Alfaro (5938) and Cervera
del Río Alhama (5930).

LOGROÑO, the capital of the Spanish province of Logroño, on the right
bank of the river Ebro and on the Saragossa-Miranda de Ebro railway.
Pop. (1900) 19,237. Logroño is an ancient walled town, finely situated
on a hill 1204 ft. high. Its bridge of twelve arches across the Ebro was
built in 1138, but has frequently been restored after partial
destruction by floods. The main street, arcaded on both sides, and the
crooked but highly picturesque alleys of the older quarters are in
striking contrast with the broad, tree-shaded avenues and squares laid
out in modern times. The chief buildings are a bull-ring which
accommodates 11,000 spectators, and a church, Santa Maria de Palacio,
called "the imperial," from the tradition that its founder was
Constantine the Great (274-337). As the commercial centre of the fertile
and well-cultivated plain of the Rioja, Logroño has an important trade
in wine.

The district of Logroño was in ancient times inhabited by the _Berones_
or _Verones_ of Strabo and Pliny, and their _Varia_ is to be identified
with the modern suburb of the city of Logroño now known as Varea of
Barea. Logroño was named by the Romans _Juliobriga_ and afterwards
_Lucronius_. It fell into the hands of the Moors in the 8th century, but
was speedily retaken by the Christians, and under the name of Lucronius
appears with frequency in medieval history. It was unsuccessfully
besieged by the French in 1521, and occupied by them from 1808 to 1813.
It was the birthplace of the dumb painter Juan Fernandez Navarrete

LOGROSCINO (or LO GROSCINO), NICOLA (1700?-1763?), Italian musical
composer, was born at Naples and was a pupil of Durante. In 1738 he
collaborated with Leo and others in the hasty production of _Demetrio_;
in the autumn of the same year he produced a comic opera _L'inganno per
inganno_, the first of a long series of comic operas, the success of
which won him the name of "il Dio dell' opera buffa." He went to
Palermo, probably in 1747, as a teacher of counterpoint; as an opera
composer he is last heard of in 1760, and is supposed to have died about
1763. Logroscino has been credited with the invention of the concerted
operatic finale, but as far as can be seen from the score of _Il
Governatore_ and the few remaining fragments of other operas, his
finales show no advance upon those of Leo. As a musical humorist,
however, he deserves remembrance, and may justly be classed alongside of

LOGWOOD (so called from the form in which it is imported), the
heart-wood of a leguminous tree, _Haematoxylon campechianum_, native of
Central America, and grown also in the West Indian Islands. The tree
attains a height not exceeding 40 ft., and is said to be ready for
felling when about ten years old. The wood, deprived of its bark and the
sap-wood, is sent into the market in the form of large blocks and
billets. It is very hard and dense, and externally has a dark
brownish-red colour; but it is less deeply coloured within. The best
qualities come from Campeachy, but it is obtained there only in small

Logwood is used in dyeing (q.v.), in microscopy, in the preparation of
ink, and to a small extent in medicine on account of the tannic acid it
contains, though it has no special medicinal value, being much inferior
to kino and catechu. The wood was introduced into Europe as a dyeing
substance soon after the discovery of America, but from 1581 to 1662 its
use in England was prohibited by legislative enactment on account of the
inferior dyes which at first were produced by its employment.

  The colouring principle of logwood exists in the timber in the form of
  a glucoside, from which it is liberated as haematoxylin by
  fermentation. Haematoxylin, C16H14O6, was isolated by M. E. Chevreul
  in 1810. It forms a crystalline hydrate, C16H14O6 + 3H2O, which is a
  colourless body very sparingly soluble in cold water, but dissolving
  freely in hot water and in alcohol. By exposure to the air, especially
  in alkaline solutions, haematoxylin is rapidly oxidized into
  haematein, C16H12O6, with the development of a fine purple colour.
  This reaction of haematoxylin is exceedingly rapid and delicate,
  rendering that body a laboratory test for alkalis. By the action of
  hydrogen and sulphurous acid, haematein is easily reduced to
  haematoxylin. It is chemically related to brazilin, found in
  brazil-wood. Haematoxylin and brazilin, and also their oxidation
  products, haematin and brazilin, have been elucidated by W. H. Perkin
  and his pupils (see _Jour. Chem. Soc._, 1908, 1909).

LOHARU, a native state of India, in the south-east corner of the Punjab,
between Hissar district and Rajputana. Area, 222 sq. m.; pop. (1901)
15,229; estimated gross revenue, £4800. The chief, whose title is nawab,
is a Mahommedan, of Afghan descent. The nawab Sir Amir-ud-din-Ahmad
Khan, K.C.I.E., who is a member of the viceroy's legislative council,
was until 1905 administrator and adviser of the state of Maler Kotla.
The town of Loharu had a population in 1901 of 2175.

LÖHE, JOHANN KONRAD WILHELM ( 1808-1872), German divine and
philanthropist, was born on the 21st of February 1808 in Fürth near
Nuremberg, and was educated at the universities of Erlangen and Berlin.
In 1831 he was appointed vicar at Kirchenlamitz, where his fervent
evangelical preaching attracted large congregations and puzzled the
ecclesiastical authorities. A similar experience ensued at Nuremberg,
where he was assistant pastor of St Egidia. In 1837 he became pastor in
Neuendettelsau, a small and unattractive place, where his life's work
was done, and which he transformed into a busy and influential
community. He was interested in the spiritual condition of Germans who
had emigrated to the United States, and built two training homes for
missionaries to them. In 1849 he founded the Lutheran Society of Home
Missions and in 1853 an institution of deaconesses. Other institutions
were added to these, including a lunatic asylum, a Magdalen refuge, and
hospitals for men and women. In theology Löhe was a strict Lutheran, but
his piety was of a most attractive kind. Originality of conception,
vividness of presentation, fertility of imagination, wide knowledge of
Scripture and a happy faculty of applying it, intense spiritual fervour,
a striking physique and a powerful voice made him a great pulpit force.
He wrote a good deal, amongst his books being _Drei Bücher von der
Kirche_ (1845), _Samenkörner des Gebetes_ (over 30 editions) and several
volumes of sermons. He died on the 2nd of January 1872.

  See his _Life_, by J. Deinzer (3 vols., Gütersloh, 1873, 3rd ed.,

LOHENGRIN, the hero of the German version of the legend of the knight of
the swan. The story of Lohengrin as we know it is based on two principal
motives common enough in folklore: the metamorphosis of human beings
into swans, and the curious wife whose question brings disaster.
Lohengrin's guide (the swan) was originally the little brother who, in
one version of "the Seven Swans," was compelled through the destruction
of his golden chain to remain in swan form and attached himself to the
fortunes of one of his brothers. The swan played a part in classical
mythology as the bird of Apollo, and in Scandinavian lore the swan
maidens, who have the gift of prophecy and are sometimes confused with
the Valkyries, reappear again and again. The wife's desire to know her
husband's origin is a parallel of the myth of Cupid and Psyche, and bore
in medieval times a similar mystical interpretation. The Lohengrin
legend is localized on the Lower Rhine, and its incidents take place at
Antwerp, Nijmwegen, Cologne and Mainz. In its application it falls into
sharp division in the hands of German and French poets. By the Germans
it was turned to mystical use by being attached loosely to the Grail
legend (see GRAIL and PERCEVAL); in France it was adapted to glorify the
family of Godfrey de Bouillon.

The German story makes its appearance in the last stanzas of Wolfram von
Eschenbach's _Parzival_, where it is related how Parzival's son,
Loherangrîn,[1] was sent from the castle of the Grail to the help of the
young duchess of Brabant. Guided by the swan he reached Antwerp, and
married the lady on condition that she should not ask his origin. On the
breach of this condition years afterwards Loherangrîn departed, leaving
sword, horn and ring behind him. Between 1283 and 1290, a Bavarian
disciple of Wolfram's[2] adopted the story and developed it into an epic
poem of nearly 8000 lines, incorporating episodes of Lohengrin's prowess
in tournament, his wars with Henry I. against the heathen Hungarians and
the Saracens,[3] and incidentally providing a detailed picture of the
everyday life of people of high condition. The epic of Lohengrin is put
by the anonymous writer into the mouth of Wolfram, who is made to relate
it during the Contest of the Singers at the Wartburg in proof of his
superiority in knowledge of sacred things over Klingsor the magician,
and the poem is thus linked on to German tradition. Its connexion with
Parzival implies a mystic application. The consecrated wafer shared by
Lohengrin and the swan on their voyage is one of the more obvious means
taken by the poet to give the tale the character of an allegory of the
relations between Christ, the Church and the human soul. The story was
followed closely in its main outlines by Richard Wagner in his opera

The French legend of the knight of the swan is attached to the house of
Bouillon, and although William of Tyre refers to it about 1170 as fable,
it was incorporated without question by later annalists. It forms part
of the cycle of the _chansons de geste_ dealing with the Crusade, and
relates how Helyas, knight of the swan, is guided by the swan to the
help of the duchess of Bouillon and marries her daughter Ida or Beatrix
in circumstances exactly parallel to the adventures of Lohengrin and
Elsa of Brabant, and with the like result. Their daughter marries
Eustache, count of Boulogne, and had three sons, the eldest of whom,
Godefroid (Godfrey), is the future king of Jerusalem. But in French
story Helyas is not the son of Parzival, but of the king and queen of
Lillefort, and the story of his birth, of himself, his five brothers and
one sister is, with variations, that of "the seven swans" persecuted by
the wicked grandmother, which figures in the pages of Grimm and Hans
Andersen. The house of Bouillon was not alone in claiming the knight of
the swan as an ancestor, and the tradition probably originally belonged
to the house of Cleves.

  _German Versions._--See _Lohengrin_, ed. Rückert (Quedlinburg and
  Leipzig, 1858); another version of the tale, _Lorengel_, is edited in
  the _Zeitschr. für deutsches Altertum_ (vol. 15); modern German
  translation of _Lohengrin_, by H. A. Junghaus (Leipzig, 1878); Conrad
  von Würzburg's fragmentary _Schwanritter_, ed. F. Roth (Frankfurt,
  1861). Cf. Elster, _Beiträge zur Kritik des Lohengrin_ (Halle, 1884),
  and R. Heinrichs, _Die Lohengrindichtung und ihre Deutung_ (Hamm i.
  West., 1905).

  _French Versions._--Baron de Reiffenberg, _Le Chevalier au cygne et
  Godfrey de Bouillon_ (Brussels, 2 vols., 1846-1848), in _Mon. pour
  servir à l'hist. de la province de Namur_; C. Hippeau, _La Chanson du
  chevalier au cygne_ (1874); H. A. Todd, _La Naissance du chevalier au
  cygne, an inedited French poem of the 12th cent._ (Mod. Lang. Assoc.,
  Baltimore, 1889); cf. the Latin tale by Jean de Haute Seille (Johannes
  de Alta Silva) in his _Dolopathos_ (ed. Oesterley, Strassburg, 1873).

  _English Versions._--In England the story first appears in a short
  poem preserved among the Cotton MSS. of the British Museum and
  entitled _Chevelere assigne_. This was edited by G. E. V. Utterson in
  1820 for the Roxburghe Club, and again by H. H. Gibbs in 1868 for the
  Early English Text Society. The E.E.T.S. edition is accompanied by a
  set of photographs of a 14th-century ivory casket, on which the story
  is depicted in 36 compartments. An English prose romance, _Helyas
  Knight of the Swan_, translated by Robert Copland, and printed by W.
  Copland about 1550, is founded on a French romance _La Génealogie ...
  de Godeffroy de Boulin_ (printed 1504) and is reprinted by W. J. Thoms
  in _Early Prose Romances_, vol. iii. It was also printed by Wynkyn de
  Worde in 1512. A modern edition was issued in 1901 from the Grolier
  Club, New York.


  [1] i.e. Garin le Loherin (q.v.), or Garin of Lorraine.

  [2] Elster (_Beiträge_) says that the poem is the work of two poets:
    the first part by a Thuringian wandering minstrel, the second--which
    differs in style and dialect--by a Bavarian official.

  [3] Based on material borrowed from the _Sächsische Weltchronik_
    (formerly called _Repgowische Chronik_ from its dubious assignment to
    Eime von Repgow), the oldest prose chronicle of the world in German
    (c. 1248 or 1260).

LOIN (through O. Fr. _loigne_ or _logne_, mod. _longe_, from Lat.
_lumbus_), that part of the body in an animal which lies between the
upper part of the hip-bone and the last of the false ribs on either side
of the back-bone, hence in the plural the general term for the lower
part of the human body at the junction with the legs, covered by the
loin-cloth, the almost universal garment among primitive peoples. There
are also figurative uses of the word, chiefly biblical, due to the loins
being the supposed seat of male vigour and power of generation. Apart
from these uses the word is a butcher's term for a joint of meat cut
from this part of the body. The upper part of a loin of beef is known as
the "surloin" (Fr. _surlonge_, i.e. upper loin). This has been commonly
corrupted into "sirloin," and a legend invented, to account for the
name, of a king, James I. or Charles II., knighting a prime joint of
beef "Sir Loin" in pleasure at its excellence. A double surloin,
undivided at the back-bone, is known as a "baron of beef," probably from
an expansion of the legend of the "Sir Loin."

LOIRE, the longest river of France, rising in the Gerbier de Jonc in the
department of Ardèche, at a height of 4500 ft. and flowing north and
west to the Atlantic. After a course of 18 m. in Ardèche it enters
Haute-Loire, in which it follows a picturesque channel along the foot
of basaltic rocks, through narrow gorges and small plains. At Vorey,
where it is joined by the Arzon, it becomes navigable for rafts. Four
miles below its entrance into the department of Loire, at La Noirie,
river navigation is officially reckoned to begin, and breaking through
the gorges of Saint Victor, the Loire enters the wide and swampy plain
of Forez, after which it again penetrates the hills and flows out into
the plain of Roanne. As in Haute-Loire, it is joined by a large number
of streams, the most important being the Coise on the right and the
Lignon du Nord or du Forez and the Aix on the left. Below Roanne the
Loire is accompanied on its left bank by a canal to Digoin (35 m.) in
Saône-et-Loire, thence by the so-called "lateral canal of the Loire" to
Briare in Loiret (122 m.). Owing to the extreme irregularity of the
river in different seasons these canals form the only certain navigable
way. At Digoin the Loire receives the Arroux, and gives off the canal du
Centre (which utilizes the valley of the Bourbince) to Chalon-sur-Saône.
At this point its northerly course begins to be interrupted by the
mountains of Morvan, and flowing north-west it enters the department of
Nièvre. Just beyond Nevers it is joined by the Allier; this river rises
30 m. S.W. of the Loire in the department of Lozère, and following an
almost parallel course has at the confluence a volume equal to
two-thirds of that of the main stream. Above Nevers the Loire is joined
by the Aron, along which the canal du Nivernais proceeds northward, and
the Nièvre, and below the confluence of the Allier gives off the canal
du Berry to Bourges and the navigable part of the Cher. About this point
the valley becomes more ample and at Briare (in Loiret) the river leaves
the highlands and flows between the plateaus of Gatinais and the Beauce
on the right and the Sologne on the left. In Loiret it gives off the
canal de Briare northward to the Seine and itself bends north-west to
Orléans, whence the canal d'Orléans, following the little river Cens,
communicates with the Briare canal. At Orléans the river changes its
north-westerly for a south-westerly course. A striking peculiarity of
the affluents of the Loire in Loiret and the three subsequent
departments is that they frequently flow in a parallel channel to the
main stream and in the same valley. Passing Blois in Loir-et-Cher, the
Loire enters Indre-et-Loire and receives on the right the Cisse, and,
after passing Tours, the three important left-hand tributaries of the
Cher, Indre and the Vienne. At the confluence of the Vienne the Loire
enters Maine-et-Loire, in its course through which department it is
frequently divided by long sandy islands fringed with osiers and
willows; while upon arriving at Les Ponts-de-Cé it is split into several
distinct branches. The principal tributaries are: left, the Thouet at
Saumur, the Layon and the Evre; right: the Authion, and, most important
tributary of all, the Maine, formed by the junction of the rivers
Mayenne, Sarthe and Loir. Through Loire-Inférieure the river is studded
with islands until below Nantes, where the largest of them, called
Belle-Ile, is found. It receives the Erdre on the right at Nantes and on
the opposite shore the Sèvre-Nantaise, and farther on the canalized
Achenau on the left and the navigable Etier de Méan on the right near
Saint Nazaire. Below Nantes, between which point and La Martinière
(below Pellerin) the channel is embanked, the river is known as the
Loire Maritime and widens out between marshy shores, passing Paimboeuf
on the left and finally Saint-Nazaire, where it is 1½ m. broad. The
length of the channel of the Loire is about 625 m.; its drainage area is
46,700 sq. m. A lateral canal (built in 1881-1892 at a cost of about
£1,000,000) known as the Maritime Canal of the Loire between Le Carnet
and La Martinière enables large ships to ascend to Nantes. It is 9½ m.
long, and 19½ (capable of being increased to 24) ft. deep. At each end
is a lock 405 ft. long by 59 ft. wide. The canal de Nantes à Brest
connects this city with Brest.

  The Loire is navigable only in a very limited sense. During the
  drought of summer thin and feeble streams thread their way between the
  sandbanks of the channel; while at other times a stupendous flood
  submerges wide reaches of land. In the middle part of its course the
  Loire traverses the western portion of the undulating Paris basin,
  with its Tertiary marls, sands and clays, and the alluvium carried
  off from these renders its lower channel inconstant; the rest of the
  drainage area is occupied by crystalline rocks, over the hard surface
  of which the water, undiminished by absorption, flows rapidly into the
  streams. When the flood waters of two or more tributaries arrive at
  the same time serious inundations result. Attempts to control the
  river must have begun at a very early date, and by the close of the
  middle ages the bed between Orléans and Angers was enclosed by dykes
  10 to 13 ft. high. In 1783 a double line of dykes or _turcies_ 23 ft.
  high was completed from Bec d'Allier downwards. The channel was,
  however, so much narrowed that the embankments are almost certain to
  give way as soon as the water rises 16 ft. (the average rise is about
  14, and in 1846 and 1856 it was more than 22). In modern times
  embankments, aided by dredging operations extending over a large
  number of years, have ensured a depth of 18 ft. in the channel between
  La Martinière and Nantes. Several towns have constructed special works
  to defend themselves against the floods; Tours, the most exposed of
  all, is surrounded by a circular dyke.

  Various schemes for the systematic regulation of the Loire have been
  discussed. It has been proposed to construct in the upper valleys of
  the several affluents a number of gigantic dams or reservoirs from
  which the water, stored during flood, could be let off into the river
  as required. A dam of this kind (built in 1711) at the village of
  Pinay, about 18 m. above Roanne, and capable of retaining from 350 to
  450 million cub. ft. of water, has greatly diminished the force of the
  floods at Roanne, and maintained the comparative equilibrium of the
  current during the dry season. Three other dams of modern construction
  are also in existence, one near Firminy, the other two near St

LOIRE, a department of central France, made up in 1793 of the old
district of Forez and portions of Beaujolais and Lyonnais, all formerly
included in the province of Lyonnais. Pop. (1906) 643,943. Area 1853 sq.
m. It is bounded N. by the department of Saône-et-Loire, E. by those of
Rhône and Isère, S. by Ardèche and Haute-Loire, and W. by Puy-de-Dôme and
Allier. From 1790 to 1793 it constituted, along with that of Rhône, a
single department (Rhône-et-Loire). It takes its name from the river
which bisects it from south to north. The Rhone skirts the S.E. of the
department, about one-eighth of which belongs to its basin. After
crossing the southern border the Loire runs through wild gorges, passing
the picturesque crag crowned by the old fortress of St Paul-en-Cornillon.
At St Rambert it issues into the broad plain of Fotez, flows north as far
as its confluence with the Aix where the plain ends, and then again
traverses gorges till it enters the less extensive plain of Roanne in the
extreme north of the department. These two plains, the beds of ancient
lakes, are enclosed east and west by chains of mountains running parallel
with the river. In the west are the Forez mountains, which separate the
Loire basin from that of the Allier; their highest point (Pierre sur
Haute, 5381 ft.) is 12 m. W. of Montbrison. They sink gradually towards
the north, and are successively called Bois Noirs (4239 ft.), from their
woods, and Monts de la Madeleine (3822 to 1640 ft.). In the east the
Rhone and Loire basins are separated, by Mont Pilat (4705 ft.) at the
north extremity of the Cévennes, and by the hills of Lyonnais, Tarare,
Beaujolais and Charolais, none of which rise higher than 3294 ft. Of the
affluents of the Loire the most important are the Lignon du Nord, the
beautiful valley of which has been called "La Suisse Forezienne," and the
Aix on the left, and on the right the Ondaine (on which stand the
industrial towns of Chambon-Feugerolles and Firminy), the Furens and the
Rhin. The Gier forms a navigable channel to the Rhone at Givors, and has
on its banks the industrial towns of St Chamond and Rive-de-Gier. From
Mont Pilat descends the Déôme, in the valley of which are the workshops
of Annonay (q.v.). The climate on the heights is cold and healthy, it is
unwholesome in the marshy plain of Forez, mild in the valley of the
Rhone. The annual rainfall varies from 39 to 48 in. on the Forez
mountains, but only reaches 20 to 24 in. in the vicinity of Montbrison.

  The plains of Forez and Roanne are the two most important agricultural
  districts, but the total production of grain within the department is
  insufficient for the requirements of the population. The pasture lands
  of the plain of Forez, the western portion of which is irrigated by
  the canal of Forez, support a large number of live stock. Good
  pasturage is also found on the higher levels of the Forez mountains,
  on the north-eastern plateaus, where oxen of the famous Charolais
  breed are raised, and on the uplands generally. Wheat and rye are the
  leading cereal crops; oats come next in importance, barley and colza
  occupying a relatively small area. The vine is cultivated in the
  valley of the Rhone, on the lower slopes of the Forez mountains and on
  the hills west of the plain of Roanne. The forests of Mont Pilat and
  the Forez chain yield good-sized pines and wood for mining purposes.
  The so-called Lyons chestnuts are to a large extent obtained from
  Forez; the woods and pasture lands of Mont Pilat yield medicinal
  plants, such as mint. Poultry-rearing and bee-keeping are considerable
  industries. The department is rich in mineral springs, the waters of
  St Galmier, Sail-sous-Couzan, St Romain-le-Puy and St Alban being
  largely exported. The chief wealth of the department lies in the coal
  deposits of the basin of St Étienne (q.v.), the second in importance
  in France, quarrying is also active. Metal-working industries are
  centred in the S.E. of the department, where are the great
  manufacturing towns of St Étienne, Rive-de-Gier, St Chamond and
  Firminy. At St Étienne there is a national factory of arms, in which
  as many as 10,000 have been employed; apart from other factories of
  the same kind carried on by private individuals, the production of
  hardware, locks, edge-tools, common cutlery, chain cables for the
  mines, files, rails, &c., occupies thousands of hands. Cast steel is
  largely manufactured, and the workshops of the department supply the
  heaviest constructions required in naval architecture, as well as war
  material and machinery of every description. The glass industry is
  carried on at Rive-de-Gier and St Galmier. St Étienne and St Chamond
  are centres for the fabrication of silk ribbons, elastic ribbons and
  laces, and the dressing of raw silks. Between 50,000 and 60,000 people
  are employed in the last-named industries. The arrondissement of
  Roanne manufactures cotton stuffs, muslins and the like. That of
  Montbrison produces table linen. The department has numerous
  dye-works, flour-mills, paper works, tanyards, brick-works,
  silk-spinning works and hat factories. It is served by the Paris-Lyon
  railway, Roanne being the junction of important lines from Paris to
  Lyons and St Étienne. Within the department the Loire is hardly used
  for commercial navigation; the chief waterways are the canal from
  Roanne to Digoin (13 m. in the department), that from Givors to
  Rive-de-Gier (7 m.) and the Rhone (7 m.).

Loire comprises three arrondissements--St Étienne, Montbrison and
Roanne--with 31 cantons and 335 communes. It falls within the region of
the XIII. army corps and the _diocèse_ and _académie_ (educational
circumscription) of Lyons, where also is its court of appeal. St Étienne
is the capital, other leading towns being Roanne, Montbrison,
Rive-de-Gier, St Chamond, Firminy and Le Chambon, all separately
noticed. St Bonnet-le-Château, besides old houses, has a church of the
15th and 16th centuries, containing paintings of the 15th century; St
Rambert and St Romain-le-Puy have priory churches of the 11th and 12th
centuries; and at Charlieu there are remains of a Benedictine abbey
founded in the 9th century, including a porch decorated with fine
Romanesque carving.

LOIRE-INFÉRIEURE, a maritime department of western France, made up in
1790 of a portion of Brittany on the right and of the district of Retz
on the left of the Loire, and bounded W. by the ocean, N. by Morbihan
and Ille-et-Vilaine, E. by Maine-et-Loire and S. by Vendée. Pop. (1906)
666,748. Area 2694 sq. m. The surface is very flat, and the highest
point, in the north on the borders of Ille-et-Vilaine, reaches only 377
ft. The line of hillocks skirting the right bank of the Loire, and known
as the _sillon de Bretagne_, scarcely exceeds 250 ft.; below Savenay
they recede from the river, and meadows give place to peat bogs. North
of St Nazaire and Grande Brière, measuring 9 m. by 6, and rising hardly
10 ft. above the sea-level, still supplies old trees which can be used
for joiners' work. A few scattered villages occur on the more elevated
spots, but communication is effected chiefly by the canals which
intersect it. The district south of the Loire lies equally low; its most
salient feature is the lake of Grandlieu, covering 27 sq. m., and
surrounded by low and marshy ground, but so shallow (6½ ft. at most)
that drainage would be comparatively easy. The Loire (q.v.) has a course
of 70 m. within the department. On the left bank a canal stretches for 9
m. between Pellerin, where the dikes which protect the Loire valley from
inundation terminate, and Paimboeuf, and vessels drawing 17 or 18 ft.
can reach Nantes. The principal towns on the river within the department
are Ancenis, Nantes and St Nazaire (one of the most important commercial
ports of France) on the right, and Paimboeuf on the left. The chief
affluents are, on the right the Erdre and on the left the Sèvre, both
debouching at Nantes. The Erdre in its lower course broadens in places
into lakes which give it the appearance of a large river. Four miles
below Nort it coalesces with the canal from Nantes to Brest. The Sèvre
is hemmed in by picturesque hills; at the point where it enters the
department it flows past the beautiful town of Clisson with its imposing
castle of the 13th century. Apart from the Loire, the only navigable
channel of importance within the department is the Nantes and Brest
canal, fed by the Isac, a tributary of the Vilaine, which separates
Loire-Inférieure from Ille-et-Vilaine and Morbihan. The climate is
humid, mild and equable. At Nantes the mean annual temperature is 54.7°
Fahr., and there are one hundred and twenty-two rainy days, the annual
rainfall being 25.6 in.

  Horse and cattle raising prospers, being carried on chiefly in the
  west of the department and in the Loire valley. Good butter and cheese
  are produced. Poultry also is reared, and there is a good deal of
  bee-keeping. Wheat, oats, buckwheat and potatoes are produced in great
  abundance; leguminous plants are also largely cultivated, especially
  near Nantes. Wine, cider and forage crops are the chief remaining
  agricultural products. The woods are of oak in the interior and pine
  on the coast. The department has deposits of tin, lead and iron. N.W.
  of Ancenis coal is obtained from a bed which is a prolongation of that
  of Anjou. The salt marshes, about 6000 acres in all, occur for the
  most part between the mouth of the Vilaine and the Loire, and on the
  Bay of Bourgneuf, and salt-refining, of which Guérande is the centre,
  is an important industry. The granite of the sea-coast and of the
  Loire up to Nantes is quarried for large blocks. Steam-engines are
  built for the government at Indret, a few miles below Nantes; the
  forges of Basse-Indre are in good repute for the quality of their
  iron; and the production of the lead-smelting works at Couëron amounts
  to several millions of francs annually. There are also considerable
  foundries at Nantes, Chantenay, close to Nantes, and St Nazaire, and
  shipbuilding yards at Nantes and St Nazaire. Among other industries
  may be mentioned the preparation of pickles and preserved meats at
  Nantes, the curing of sardines at Le Croisic and in the neighbouring
  communes, the manufacture of sugar, brushes, tobacco, macaroni and
  similar foods, soap and chemicals at Nantes, and of paper, sugar and
  soap at Chantenay. Fishing is prosecuted along the entire coast,
  particularly at Le Croisic. Among the seaside resorts Le Croisic,
  Pornichet and Pornic, where there are megalithic monuments, may be
  mentioned. The department is traversed by the railways of the state,
  the Orléans company and the Western company. The department is divided
  into five arrondissements--Nantes, Ancenis, Châteaubriant, Paimboeuf
  and St Nazaire--45 cantons and 219 communes. It has its appeal court
  at Rennes, which is also the centre of the _académie_ (educational
  division) to which it belongs.

The principal places are Nantes, the capital, St Nazaire and
Châteaubriant, which receive separate treatment. On the west coast the
town of Batz, and the neighbouring villages, situated on the peninsula
of Batz, are inhabited by a small community possessed of a distinct
costume and dialect, and claiming descent from a Saxon or Scandinavian
stock. Its members are employed for the most part in the salt marshes
N.E. of the town. Guérande has well-preserved ramparts and gates of the
15th century, a church dating from the 12th to the 16th centuries, and
other old buildings. At St Philbert-de-Grandlieu there is a church,
rebuilt in the 16th and 17th centuries, but preserving remains of a
previous edifice belonging at least to the beginning of the 11th

LOIRET, a department of central France, made up of the three districts
of the ancient province of Orléanais--Orléanais proper, Gâtinais and
Dunois--together with portions of those of Île-de-France and Berry. It
is bounded N. by Seine-et-Oise, N.E. by Seine-et-Marne, E. by Yonne, S.
by Nièvre and Cher, S.W. and W. by Loir-et-Cher and N.W. by
Eure-et-Loir. Area, 2629 sq. m. Pop. (1906) 364,999. The name is
borrowed from the Loiret, a stream which issues from the ground some
miles to the south of Orléans, and after a course of about 7 m. falls
into the Loire; its large volume gives rise to the belief that it is a
subterranean branch of that river. The Loire traverses the south of the
department by a broad valley which, though frequently devastated by
disastrous floods, is famed for its rich tilled lands, its castles, its
towns and its vine-clad slopes. To the north of the Loire are the
Gâtinais (capital Montargis) and the Beauce; the former district is so
named from its _gâtines_ or wildernesses, of which saffron is, along
with honey, the most noteworthy product; the Beauce (q.v.), a monotonous
tract of corn-fields without either tree or river, has been called the
granary of France. Between the Beauce and the Loire is the extensive
forest of Orléans, which is slowly disappearing before the advances of
agriculture. South of the Loire is the Sologne, long barren and
unhealthy from the impermeability of its subsoil, but now much improved
in both respects by means of pine plantation and draining and manuring
operations. The highest point (on the borders of Cher) is 900 ft. above
sea-level, and the lowest (on the borders of Seine-et-Marne) is 220 ft.
The watershed on the plateau of Orléans between the basins of the Seine
and Loire, which divide Loiret almost equally between them, is almost
imperceptible. The lateral canal of the Loire from Roanne stops at
Briare; from the latter town a canal (canal de Briare) connects with the
Seine by the Loing valley, which is joined by the Orléans canal below
Montargis. The only important tributary of the Loire within the
department is the Loiret; the Loing, a tributary of the Seine, has a
course of 40 m. from south to north, and is accompanied first by the
Briare canal and afterwards by that of the Loing. The Essonne, another
important affluent of the Seine, leaving Loiret below Malesherbes, takes
its rise on the plateau of Orléans, as also does its tributary the
Juine. The department has the climate of the Sequanian region, the mean
temperature being a little above that of Paris; the rainfall varies from
18.5 to 27.5 in., according to the district, that of the exposed Beauce
being lower than that of the well-wooded Sologne. Hailstorms cause much
destruction in the Loire valley and the neighbouring regions.

  The department is essentially agricultural in character. A large
  number of sheep, cattle, horses and pigs are reared; poultry,
  especially geese, and bees are plentiful. The yield of wheat and oats
  is in excess of the consumption; rye, barley, meslin, potatoes,
  beetroot, colza and forage plants are also cultivated. Wine in
  abundance, but of inferior quality, is grown on the hills of the Loire
  valley. Buckwheat supports bees by its flowers, and poultry by its
  seeds. Saffron is another source of profit. The woods consist of oak,
  elm, birch and pine; fruit trees thrive in the department, and Orléans
  is a great centre of nursery gardens. The industries are brick and
  tile making, and the manufacture of faience, for which Gien is one of
  the most important centres in France. The Briare manufacture of
  porcelain buttons and pearls employs many workmen. Flour-mills are
  very numerous. There are iron and copper foundries, which, with
  agricultural implement making, bell-founding and the manufacture of
  pins, nails and files, represent the chief metal-working industries.
  The production of hosiery, wool-spinning and various forms of wool
  manufacture are also engaged in. A large quantity of the wine grown is
  made into vinegar (vinaigre d'Orléans). The tanneries produce
  excellent leather; and paper-making, sugar-refining, wax-bleaching and
  the manufacture of caoutchouc complete the list of industries. The
  four arrondissements are those of Orléans, Gien, Montargis and
  Pithiviers, with 31 cantons and 349 communes. The department forms
  part of the _académie_ (educational division) of Paris.

Besides Orléans, the capital, the more noteworthy places, Gien,
Montargis, Beaugency, Pithiviers, Briare and St Benoît-sur-Loire, are
separately noticed. Outside these towns notable examples of architecture
are found in the churches of Cléry (15th century), of Ferrières (13th
and 14th centuries), of Puiseaux (12th and 13th centuries) and Meung
(12th century). At Germigny-des-Prés there is a church built originally
at the beginning of the 9th century and rebuilt in the 19th century, on
the old plan and to some extent with the old materials. Yèvre-le-Châtel
has an interesting château of the 13th century, and Sully-sur-Loire the
fine medieval château rebuilt at the beginning of the 17th century by
Maximilien de Béthune, duke of Sully, the famous minister of Henry IV.
There are remains of a Gallo-Roman town (perhaps the ancient
_Vellaunodunum_) at Triguères and of a Roman amphitheatre near Montbouy.

LOIR-ET-CHER, a department of central France, formed in 1790 from a
small portion of Touraine, the Perche, but chiefly from the Dunois,
Vendômois and Blésois, portions of Orléanais. It is bounded N. by
Eure-et-Loir, N.E. by Loiret, S.E. by Cher, S. by Indre, S.W. by
Indre-et-Loire and N.W. by Sarthe. Pop. (1906) 276,019. Area, 2479 sq.
m. The department takes its name from the Loir and the Cher by which it
is traversed in the north and south respectively. The Loir rises on the
eastern border of the Perche and joins the Maine after a course of 195
m.; the Cher rises on the Central Plateau near Aubusson, and reaches the
Loire after a course of 219 m. The Loire flows through the department
from north-east to south-west, and divides it into two nearly equal
portions. To the south-east is the district of the Sologne, to the
north-west the rich wheat-growing country of the Beauce (q.v.) which
stretches to the Loir. Beyond that river lies the Perche. The surface of
this region, which contains the highest altitude in the department (840
ft.), is varied by hills, valleys, hedged fields and orchards. The
Sologne was formerly a region of forests, of which those in the
neighbourhood of Chambord are the last remains. Its soil, once barren
and marshy, has been considerably improved by draining and
afforestation, though pools are still very numerous. The district is
much frequented by sportsmen. The Cher and Loir traverse pleasant
valleys, occasionally bounded by walls of tufa in which dwellings have
been excavated, as at Les Roches in the Loir valley; the stone, hardened
by exposure to the air, is also used for building purposes. The Loire
and, with the help of the Berry canal, the Cher are navigable. The chief
remaining rivers of the department are the Beuvron, which flows into the
Loire on the left, and the Sauldre, a right-hand affluent of the Cher.
The climate is temperate and mild, though that of the Beauce tends to
dryness and that of the Sologne to dampness. The mean annual temperature
is between 52° and 53° F.

  The department is primarily agricultural, yielding abundance of wheat
  and oats. Besides these the chief products are rye, wheat and
  potatoes. Vines thrive on the valley slopes, the vineyards falling
  into four groups--those of the Cher, which yield fine red wines, the
  Sologne, the Blésois and the Vendômois. In the valleys fruit-trees and
  nursery gardens are numerous; the asparagus of Romorantin and Vendôme
  is well-known. The Sologne supplies pine and birch for fuel, and there
  are extensive forests around Blois and on both sides of the Loir.
  Pasture is of good quality in the valleys. Sheep are the chief stock;
  the Perche breed of horses is much sought after for its combination of
  lightness and strength. Bee-farming is of some importance in the
  Sologne. Formerly the speciality of Loir-et-Cher was the production of
  gun-flints. Stone-quarries are numerous. The chief industries are the
  cloth-manufacture of Romorantin, and leather-dressing and glove-making
  at Vendôme; and lime-burning, flour-milling, distilling, saw-milling,
  paper-making and the manufacture of "sabots" and boots and shoes,
  hosiery and linen goods, are carried on. The department is served
  chiefly by the Orléans railway.

The arrondissements are those of Blois, Romorantin and Vendôme, with 24
cantons and 297 communes. Loir-et-Cher forms part of the educational
division (_académie_) of Paris. Its court of appeal and the headquarters
of the V. army corps, to the regions of which it belongs, are at
Orléans. Blois, the capital, Vendôme, Romorantin and Chambord are
noticed separately. In addition to those of Blois and Chambord there are
numerous fine châteaux in the department, of which that of Montrichard
with its donjon of the 11th century, that of Chaumont dating from the
15th and 16th centuries, and that of Cheverny (17th century) in the late
Renaissance style are the most important. Those at St Aignan, Lassay,
Lavardin and Cellettes may also be mentioned. Churches wholly or in part
of Romanesque architecture are found at Faverolles, Selles-sur-Cher, St
Aignan and Suèvres. The village of Trôo is built close to ancient tumuli
and has an interesting church of the 12th century, and among other
remains those of a lazar-house of the Romanesque period. At Pontlevoy
are the church, consisting of a fine choir in the Gothic style, and the
buildings of a Benedictine abbey. At La Poissonnière (near Montoire) is
a small Renaissance manor-house, in which Ronsard was born in 1524.

LOISY, ALFRED FIRMIN (1857-   ), French Catholic theologian, was born at
Ambrières in French Lorraine of parents who, descended from a long line
of resident peasantry, tilled there the soil themselves. The physically
delicate boy was put into the ecclesiastical school of St Dizier, without
any intention of a clerical career; but he decided for the priesthood,
and in 1874 entered the Grand Seminaire of Chalons-sur-Marne. Mgr
Meignan, then bishop of Chalons, afterwards cardinal and archbishop of
Tours, ordained him priest in 1879. After being _curé_ successively of
two villages in that diocese, Loisy went in May 1881, to study and take a
theological degree, to the Institut Catholique in Paris. Here he was
influenced, as to biblical languages and textual criticism, by the
learned and loyal-minded Abbé Paulin Martin, and as to a vivid
consciousness of the true nature, gravity and urgency of the biblical
problems and an Attic sense of form by the historical intuition and the
mordant irony of Abbé Louis Duchesne. At the governmental institutions,
Professors Oppert and Halévy helped further to train him. He took his
theological degree in March 1890, by the oral defence of forty Latin
scholastic theses and by a French dissertation, _Histoire du canon de
l'ancien testament_, published as his first book in that year.

Professor now at the Institut Catholique, he published successively his
lectures: _Histoire du canon du N.T._ (1891); _Histoire critique du
texte et des versions de la Bible_ (1892); and _Les Évangiles
synoptiques_ (1893, 1894). The two latter works appeared successively in
the bi-monthly _L'Enseignement biblique_, a periodical written
throughout and published by himself. But already, on the occasion of the
death of Ernest Renan, October 1892, the attempts made to clear up the
main principles and results of biblical science, first by Mgr d'Hulst,
rector of the Institut Catholique, in his article "La Question biblique"
(_Le Correspondant_, Jan. 25th, 1893), and then by Loisy himself, in his
paper "La Question biblique et l'inspiration des Écritures"
(_L'Enseignement biblique_, Nov.-Dec. 1893), promptly led to serious
trouble. The latter article was immediately followed by Loisy's
dismissal, without further explanation, from the Institut Catholique.
And a few days later Pope Leo XIII. published his encyclical
_Providentissimus Deus_, which indeed directly condemned not Abbé
Loisy's but Mgr d'Hulst's position, yet rendered the continued
publication of consistently critical work so difficult that Loisy
himself suppressed his _Enseignement_ at the end of 1893. Five further
instalments of his _Synoptiques_ were published after this, bringing the
work down to the Confession of Peter inclusively.

Loisy next became chaplain to a Dominican convent and girls' school at
Neuilly-sur-Seine (Oct. 1894-Oct. 1899), and here matured his apologetic
method, resuming in 1898 the publication of longer articles, under the
pseudonyms of Desprès and Firmin in the _Revue du clergé français_, and
of Jacques Simon in the lay _Revue d'histoire et de littérature
religieuses_. In the former review, a striking paper upon development of
doctrine (Dec. 1st, 1898) headed a series of studies apparently taken
from an already extant large apologetic work. In October 1899 he
resigned his chaplaincy for reasons of health, and settled at Bellevue,
somewhat farther away from Paris. His notable paper, "La Religion
d'Israël" (_Revue du clergé français_, Oct. 15th, 1900), the first of a
series intended to correct and replace Renan's presentation of that
great subject, was promptly censured by Cardinal Richard, archbishop of
Paris; and though scholarly and zealous ecclesiastics, such as the
Jesuit Père Durand and Monseigneur Mignot, archbishop of Albi, defended
the general method and several conclusions of the article, the aged
cardinal never rested henceforward till he had secured a papal
condemnation also. At the end of 1900 Loisy secured a government
lectureship at the École des Hautes Études Pratiques, and delivered
there in succession courses on the Babylonian myths and the first
chapters of Genesis; the Gospel parables; the narrative of the ministry
in the synoptic Gospels; and the Passion narratives in the same. The
first course was published in the _Revue d'histoire et de littérature
religieuses_; and here also appeared instalments of his commentary on St
John's Gospel, his critically important _Notes sur la Genèse_, and a
_Chronique biblique_ unmatched in its mastery of its numberless subjects
and its fearless yet delicate penetration.

It was, however, two less erudite little books that brought him a
European literary reputation and the culmination of his ecclesiastical
troubles. _L'Évangile et l'église_ appeared in November 1902 (Eng.
trans., 1903). Its introduction and six chapters present with rare
lucidity the earliest conceptions of the Kingdom of Heaven, the Son of
God, the Church, Christian dogma and Catholic worship; and together form
a severely critico-historical yet strongly Catholic answer to Harnack's
still largely pietistic _Wesen des Christentums_. It develops throughout
the principles that "what is essential in Jesus' Gospel is what occupies
the first and largest place in His authentic teaching, the ideas for
which He fought and died, and not only that idea which we may consider
to be still a living force to day"; that "it is supremely arbitrary to
decree that Christianity must be essentially what the Gospel did not
borrow from Judaism, as though what the Gospel owes to Judaism were
necessarily of secondary worth"; that "whether we trust or distrust
tradition, we know Christ only by means of, athwart and within the
Christian tradition"; that "the _essence of Christianity_ resides in the
fulness and totality of its life"; and that "the adaptation of the
Gospel to the changing conditions of humanity is to-day a more pressing
need than ever." The second edition was enlarged by a preliminary
chapter on the sources of the Gospels, and by a third section for the
Son of God chapter. The little book promptly aroused widespread
interest, some cordial sympathy and much vehement opposition; whilst its
large companion the _Études évangéliques_, containing the course on the
parables and four sections of his coming commentary on the Fourth
Gospel, passed almost unnoticed. On the 21st of January 1903 Cardinal
Richard publicly condemned the book, as not furnished with an
_imprimatur_, and as calculated gravely to trouble the faith of the
faithful in the fundamental Catholic dogmas. On the 2nd of February
Loisy wrote to the archbishop: "I condemn, as a matter of course, all
the errors which men have been able to deduce from my book, by placing
themselves in interpreting it at a point of view entirely different from
that which I had to occupy in composing it." The pope refused to
interfere directly, and the nuncio, Mgr Lorenzelli, failed in securing
more than ten public adhesions to the cardinal's condemnation from among
the eighty bishops of France.

Pope Leo had indeed, in a letter to the Franciscan minister-general
(November 1898), and in an encyclical to the French clergy (September
1899), vigorously emphasized the traditionalist principles of his
encyclical _Providentissimus_ of 1893; he had even, much to his prompt
regret, signed the unfortunate decree of the Roman Inquisition, January
1897, prohibiting all doubt as to the authenticity of the "Three
Heavenly witnesses" passage, 1 John v. 7, a text which, in the wake of a
line of scholars from Erasmus downwards, Abbé Paulin Martin had, in
1887, exhaustively shown to be no older than the end of the 4th century
A.D. Yet in October 1902 he established a "Commission for the Progress
of Biblical Studies," preponderantly composed of seriously critical
scholars; and even one month before his death he still refused to sign a
condemnation of Loisy's _Études évangéliques_.

Cardinal Sarto became Pope Pius X. on the 4th of August 1903. On the 1st
of October Loisy published three new books, _Autour d'un petit livre_,
_Le Quatrième Évangile_ and _Le Discours sur la Montagne_. _Autour_
consists of seven letters, on the origin and aim of _L'Évangile et
l'Église_; on the biblical question; the criticism of the Gospels; the
Divinity of Christ; the Church's foundation and authority; the origin
and authority of dogma, and on the institution of the sacraments. The
second and third, addressed respectively to a cardinal (Perraud) and a
bishop (Le Camus), are polemical or ironical in tone; the others are all
written to friends in a warm, expansive mood; the fourth letter
especially, appropriated to Mgr Mignot, attains a grand elevation of
thought and depth of mystical conviction. _Le Quatrième Évangile_, one
thousand large pages long, is possibly over-confident in its detailed
application of the allegorical method; yet it constitutes a rarely
perfect sympathetic reproduction of a great mystical believer's
imperishable intuitions. _Le Discours sur la Montagne_ is a fragment of
a coming enlarged commentary on the synoptic Gospels. On the 23rd of
December the pope ordered the publication of a decree of the
Congregation of the Index, incorporating a decree of the Inquisition,
condemning Loisy's _Religion d'Israël_, _L'Évangile et l'Église_,
_Études évangéliques_, _Autour d'un petit livre_ and _Le Quatrième
Évangile_. The pope's secretary of state had on the 19th December, in a
letter to Cardinal Richard, recounted the causes of the condemnation in
the identical terms used by the latter himself when condemning the
_Religion d'Israël_ three years before. On the 12th of January 1904
Loisy wrote to Cardinal Merry del Val that he received the condemnation
with respect, and condemned whatever might be reprehensible in his
books, whilst reserving the rights of his conscience and his opinions as
an historian, opinions doubtless imperfect, as no one was more ready to
admit than himself, but which were the only form under which he was able
to represent to himself the history of the Bible and of religion. Since
the Holy See was not satisfied, Loisy sent three further declarations to
Rome; the last, despatched on the 17th of March, was addressed to the
pope himself, and remained unanswered. And at the end of March Loisy
gave up his lectureship, as he declared, "on his own initiative, in view
of the pacification of minds in the Catholic Church." In the July
following he moved into a little house, built for him by his pupil and
friend, the Assyriologist François Thureau Dangin, within the latter's
park at Garnay, by Dreux. Here he continued his important reviews,
notably in the _Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuses_, and
published _Morceaux d'exégèse_ (1906), six further sections of his
synoptic commentary. In April 1907 he returned to his native Lorraine,
to Ceffonds by Montier-en-Der, and to his relatives there.

Five recent Roman decisions are doubtless aimed primarily at Loisy's
teaching. The Biblical Commission, soon enlarged so as to swamp the
original critical members, and which had become the simple mouthpiece of
its presiding cardinals, issued two decrees. The first, on the 27th of
June 1906, affirmed, with some significant but unworkable reservations,
the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch; and the second (29th of May
1907) strenuously maintained the Apostolic Zebedean authorship of the
fourth Gospel, and the strictly historical character of the events and
speeches recorded therein. The Inquisition, by its decree _Lamentabili
sane_ (2nd of July 1907), condemned sixty-five propositions concerning
the Church's _magisterium_; biblical inspiration and interpretation; the
synoptic and fourth Gospels; revelation and dogma; Christ's divinity,
human knowledge and resurrection; and the historical origin and growth
of the Sacraments, the Church and the Creed. And some forty of these
propositions represent, more or less accurately, certain sentences or
ideas of Loisy, when torn from their context and their reasons. The
encyclical _Pascendi Dominici Gregis_ (Sept. 6th, 1907), probably the
longest and most argumentative papal utterance extant, also aims
primarily at Loisy, although here the vehemently scholastic redactor's
determination to piece together a strictly coherent, complete a priori
system of "Modernism" and his self-imposed restriction to medieval
categories of thought as the vehicles for describing essentially modern
discoveries and requirements of mind, make the identification of precise
authors and passages very difficult. And on the 21st of November 1907 a
papal _motu proprio_ declared all the decisions of the Biblical
Commission, past and future, to be as binding upon the conscience as
decrees of the Roman Congregations.

Yet even all this did not deter Loisy from publishing three further
books. _Les Évangiles synoptiques_, two large 8vo volumes of 1009 and
798 pages, appeared "chez l'auteur, à Ceffonds, Montier-en-Der,
Haute-Marne," in January 1908. An incisive introduction discusses the
ecclesiastical tradition, modern criticism; the second, the first and
the third Gospels; the evangelical tradition; the career and the
teaching of Jesus; and the literary form, the tradition of the text and
the previous commentaries. The commentary gives also a careful
translation of the texts. Loisy recognizes two eye-witness documents, as
utilized by all three synoptists, while Matthew and Luke have also
incorporated Mark. His chief peculiarity consists in clearly tracing a
strong Pauline influence, especially in Mark, which there remodels
certain sayings and actions as these were first registered by the
eye-witness documents. These doctrinal interpretations introduce the
economy of blinding the Jews into the parabolic teaching; the
declaration as to the redemptive character of the Passion into the
sayings; the sacramental, institutional words into the account of the
Last Supper, originally, a solemnly simple Messianic meal; and the
formal night-trial before Caiaphas into the original Passion-story with
its informal, morning decision by Caiaphas, and its one solemn
condemnation of Jesus, by Pilate. Mark's narratives of the sepulture by
Joseph of Arimathea and of the empty tomb are taken as posterior to St
Paul; the narratives of the infancy in Matthew and Luke as later still.
Yet the great bulk of the sayings remain substantially authentic; if the
historicity of certain words and acts is here refused with unusual
assurance, that of other sayings and deeds is established with stronger
proofs; and the redemptive conception of the Passion and the sacramental
interpretation of the Last Supper are found to spring up promptly and
legitimately from our Lord's work and words, to saturate the Pauline and
Johannine writings, and even to constitute an element of all three
synoptic Gospels.

_Simples Réflexions sur le décret Lamentabili et sur l'encyclique
Pascendi_, 12mo, 277 pages, was published from Ceffonds a few days after
the commentary. Each proposition of the decree is carefully tracked to
its probable source, and is often found to modify the latter's meaning.
And the study of the encyclical concludes: "Time is the great teacher
... we would do wrong to despair either of our civilization or of the

The Church authorities were this time not slow to act. On the 14th of
February Mgr Amette, the new archbishop of Paris, prohibited his
diocesans to read or defend the two books, which "attack and deny
several fundamental dogmas of Christianity," under pain of
excommunication. The abbé again declared "it is impossible for me
honestly and sincerely to make the act of absolute retractation and
submission exacted by the sovereign pontiff." And the Holy Office, on
the 7th of March, pronounced the major excommunication against him. At
the end of March Loisy published _Quelques Lettres_ (December
1903-February 1908), which conclude: "At bottom I have remained in my
last writings on the same line as in the earlier ones. I have aimed at
establishing principally the historical position of the various
questions, and secondarily the necessity for reforming more or less the
traditional concepts."

Three chief causes appear jointly to have produced M. Loisy's very
absolute condemnation. Any frank recognition of the abbé's even general
principles involves the abandonment of the identification of theology
with scholasticism or even with specifically ancient thought in general.
The abbé's central position, that our Lord himself held the
proximateness of His second coming, involves the loss by churchmen of
the prestige of directly divine power, since Church and Sacraments,
though still the true fruits and vehicles of his life, death and spirit,
cannot thus be immediately founded by the earthly Jesus himself. And the
Church policy, as old as the times of Constantine, to crush utterly the
man who brings more problems and pressure than the bulk of traditional
Christians can, at the time, either digest or resist with a fair
discrimination, seemed to the authorities the one means to save the very
difficult situation.

  BIBLIOGRAPHY.--Autobiographical passages in M. Loisy's _Autour d'un
  petit livre_ (Paris, 1903), pp. xv. xvi. 1, 2, 157, 218. A full
  account of his literary activity and ecclesiastical troubles will be
  found in Abbé Albert Houtin's _La Question biblique au XIX^e siècle_
  (Paris, 2nd ed., 1902) and _La Question biblique au XX^e siècle_
  (Paris, 1906), but the latter especially is largely unfair to the
  conservatives and sadly lacking in religious feeling. The following
  articles and booklets concerning M. Loisy and the questions raised by
  him are specially remarkable. France: Père Durand, S.J., _Études
  religieuses_ (Paris, Nov. 1901) frankly describes the condition of
  ecclesiastical biblical studies; Monseigneur Mignot, archbishop of
  Albi, _Lettres sur les études ecclésiastiques 1900-1901_ (collected
  ed., Paris, 1908) and "Critique et tradition" in _Le Correspondant_
  (Paris, 10th January 1904), the utterances of a finely trained
  judgment; Mgr Le Camus, bishop of La Rochelle, _Fausse Exégèse,
  mauvaise théologie_ (Paris, 1902), a timid, mostly rhetorical,
  scholar's protest; Père Lagrange, a Dominican who has done much for
  the spread of Old Testament criticism, _La Méthode historique, surtout
  à propos de l'Ancien Testament_ (Paris, 1903) and _Éclaircissement_ to
  same (ibid. 1903); P. Lagrange, Mgr P. Batiffol, P. Portalié, S.J.,
  "Autour des fondements de la Foi" in the _Bulletin de litt. eccl.
  Toulouse_ (Paris, December 1903, January 1904), very suggestive
  papers; Professor Maurice Blondel's "Histoire et dogma," in _La
  Quinzaine_ (Paris January 16, February 16, 1904), F. de Hugel's "Du
  Christ éternel et des christologies successives" (ibid. June 1, 1904),
  the Abbé J. Wehrle's "Le Christ et la conscience catholique" (ibid.
  August 16, 1904) and F. de Hügel's "Correspondance" (ibid. Sept. 16,
  1904) discuss the relations between faith and the affirmation of
  phenomenal happenings; Paul Sabatier, "Les Derniers Ouvrages de l'Abbé
  Loisy," in the _Revue chrétienne_ (Dôle, 1904) and Paul Desjardins'
  _Catholicisme et critique_ (Paris, 1905), a Broad Church Protestant's
  and a moralist agnostic's delicate appreciations; a revue of _Les
  Évangiles synoptiques_ by the Abbé Mangenot, in _Revue du Clergé
  français_ (Feb. 15, 1908) containing some interesting discriminations;
  a revue by L. in the _Revue biblique_ (1908), pp. 608-620, a mixture
  of unfair insinuation, powerful criticism and discriminating
  admissions; and a paper by G. P. B. and Jacques Chevalier in the
  _Annales de philosophie chrétienne_ (Paris, Jan. 1909) seeks to trace
  and to refute certain philosophical presuppositions at work in the
  book's treatment, especially of the Miracles, the Resurrection and the
  Institution of the Church. Italy: "Lettres Romaines" in _Annales de
  philosophie chrétienne_ (Paris, January-March 1904), an Italian
  theologian's fearless defence of Loisy's main New Testament positions;
  Rev. P. Louis Billot S.J., _De sacra traditione_ (Freiburg i. Br.
  1905), the ablest of the scholastic criticisms of the historical
  method by a highly influential French professor of theology, now many
  years in Rome; _Quello che vogliamo_ (Rome, 1907, Eng. trans., What we
  want, by A. L. Lilley, London, 1907), and _Il Programma dei
  Modernisti_ (ibid. 1908), Eng. trans., _The Programme of Modernism_
  ed. by Lilley (London, eloquent 1098), pleadings by Italian priest,
  substantially on M. Loisy's lines; "L'Abate Loisy e il Problema dei
  Vangeli Sinottici," four long papers signed "H." in _Il Rinnovamento_
  (Milan, 1908, 1909) are candid and circumspect. Germany: Professor E.
  Troeltsch, "Was heisst Wesen des Christentums?" 6 arts. in _Die
  christliche Welt_ (Leipzig, autumn 1903), a profound criticism of M.
  Loisy's developmental defence of Catholicism; Professor Harnack's
  review of _L'Évangile et l'Église_ in the _Theol. Literatur-Zeitung_
  (Leipzig, 23rd January 1904) is generous and interesting; Professor H.
  J. Holtzmann's "Urchristentum u. Reform-Katholizismus," in the _Prot.
  Monatshefte_, vii. 5 (Berlin, 1903), "Der Fall Loisy," ibid. ix. 1,
  and his review of "Les Évangiles synoptiques" in _Das zwanzigste
  Jahrhundert_ (Munich, May 3, 1908) are full of facts and of deep
  thought; Fr. F. von Hummelauer, _Exegetisches zur Inspirationsfrage_
  (Freiburg i. Br. 1904) is a favourable specimen of present-day German
  Roman Catholic scholarship. America: Professor C. A. Briggs, "The Case
  of the Abbé Loisy," _Expositor_ (London, April 1905), and C. A. Briggs
  and F. von Hügel, _The Papal Commission and the Pentateuch_ (London,
  1907) discuss Rome's attitude towards biblical science. England: The
  Rev. T. A. Lacey's _Harnack and Loisy_, with introduction by Viscount
  Halifax (London, 1904); "The Encyclical and M. Loisy" (_Church Times_,
  Feb. 20, 1908); "Recent Roman Catholic Biblical Criticism" (_The Times
  Literary Supplement_ for January 15th, 22nd, 29th, 1904), and "The
  Synoptic Gospels" (review in _The Times Literary Supplement_, March
  26, 1908) are interesting pronouncements respectively of two
  Tractarian High Churchmen and of a disciple of Canon Sanday. Professor
  Percy Gardner's paper in the _Hibbert Journal_, vol. i. (1903) p. 603,
  is the work of a Puritan-minded, cultured Broad Church layman.
  (F. v. H.)

LOJA (formerly written _Loxa_), a town of southern Spain, in the
province of Granada, on the Granada-Algeciras railway. Pop. (1900)
19,143. The narrow and irregular streets of Loja wind up the sides of a
steep hill surmounted by a Moorish citadel; many of the older buildings,
including a fine Moorish bridge, were destroyed by an earthquake in
December 1884, although two churches of the early 16th century remained
intact. An iron bridge spans the river Genil, which flows past the town
on the north, forcing a passage through the mountains which encircle the
fertile and beautiful Vega of Granada. This passage would have afforded
easy access to the territory still held by the Moors in the last half of
the 15th century, had not Loja been strongly fortified; and the place
was thus of great military importance, ranking with the neighbouring
town of Alhama as one of the keys of Granada. Its manufactures consist
chiefly of coarse woollens, silk, paper and leather. Salt is obtained in
the neighbourhood.

Loja, which, has sometimes been identified with the ancient _Ilipula_,
or with the _Lacibi_ (_Lacibis_) of Pliny and Ptolemy, first clearly
emerges in the Arab chronicles of the year 890. It was taken by
Ferdinand III. in 1226, but was soon afterwards abandoned, and was not
finally recaptured until the 28th of May, 1486, when it surrendered to
Ferdinand and Isabella after a siege.

LOKEREN, an important industrial town of Belgium between Ghent and
Antwerp (in East Flanders on the Durme). Pop. (1904) 21,869. It lies at
the southern point of the district called Pays de Waes, which in the
early part of the 19th century was only sandy moorland, but is now the
most highly cultivated and thickly populated tract in Belgium. The
church of St Laurence is of some interest.

LOKOJA, a town of Nigeria, at the junction of the Niger and Benue
rivers, founded in 1860 by the British consul, W. B. Baikie, and
subsequently the military centre of the Royal Niger Company. It is in
the province of Kabba, 250 m. from the mouth of the Niger, and is of
considerable commercial importance (see NIGERIA and KABBA).

LOLLARDS, the name given to the English followers of John Wycliffe; they
were the adherents of a religious movement which was widespread in the
end of the 14th and beginning of the 15th centuries, and to some extent
maintained itself on to the Reformation. The name is of uncertain
origin; some derive it from _lolium_, tares, quoting Chaucer (_C.T._,
Shipman's Prologue):--

  "This Loller heer wil prechen us somwhat ...
   He wolde sowen som difficultee
   Or springen cokkel in our clene corn";

but the most generally received explanation derives the words from
_lollen_ or _lullen_, to sing softly. The word is much older than its
English use; there were Lollards in the Netherlands at the beginning of
the 14th century, who were akin to the Fratricelli, Beghards and other
sectaries of the recusant Franciscan type. The earliest official use of
the name in England occurs in 1387 in a mandate of the bishop of
Worcester against five "poor preachers," _nomine seu ritu Lollardorum
confoederatos_. It is probable that the name was given to the followers
of Wycliffe because they resembled those offshoots from the great
Franciscan movement which had disowned the pope's authority and set
before themselves the ideal of _Evangelical poverty_.

The 14th century, so full of varied religious life, made it manifest
that the two different ideas of a life of separation from the world
which in earlier times had lived on side by side within the medieval
church were irreconcilable. The church chose to abide by the idea of
Hildebrand and to reject that of Francis of Assisi; and the revolt of
Ockham and the Franciscans, of the Beghards and other spiritual
fraternities, of Wycliffe and the Lollards, were all protests against
that decision. Gradually there came to be facing each other a great
political Christendom, whose rulers were statesmen, with aims and policy
of a worldly type, and a religious Christendom, full of the ideas of
separation from the world by self-sacrifice and of participation in the
benefits of Christ's work by an ascetic imitation. The war between the
two ideals was fought out in almost every country in Europe in the 14th
century. In England Wycliffe's whole life was spent in the struggle, and
he bequeathed his work to the Lollards. The main practical thought with
Wycliffe was that the church, if true to her divine mission, must aid
men to live that life of evangelical poverty by which they could be
separate from the world and imitate Christ, and if the church ceased to
be true to her mission she ceased to be a church. Wycliffe was a
metaphysician and a theologian, and had to invent a metaphysical
theory--the theory of _Dominium_--to enable him to transfer, in a way
satisfactory to himself, the powers and privileges of the church to his
company of poor Christians; but his followers were content to allege
that a church which held large landed possessions, collected tithes
greedily and took money from starving peasants for baptizing, burying
and praying, could not be the church of Christ and his apostles.

Lollardy was most flourishing and most dangerous to the ecclesiastical
organization of England during the ten years after Wycliffe's death. It
had spread so rapidly and grown so popular that a hostile chronicler
could say that almost every second man was a Lollard. Wycliffe left
three intimate disciples:--Nicolas Hereford, a doctor of theology of
Oxford, who had helped his master to translate the Bible into English;
John Ashton, also a fellow of an Oxford college; and John Purvey,
Wycliffe's colleague at Lutterworth, and a co-translator of the Bible,
with these were associated more or less intimately, in the first age of
Lollardy, John Parker, the strange ascetic William Smith, the restless
fanatic Swynderly, Richard Waytstract and Crompe. Wycliffe had organized
in Lutterworth an association for sending the gospel through all
England, a company of poor preachers somewhat after the Wesleyan method
of modern times. "To be poor without mendicancy, to unite the flexible
unity, the swift obedience of an order, with free and constant mingling
among the poor, such was the ideal of Wycliffe's 'poor priests'" (cf.
Shirley, _Fasc. Ziz._ p. xl.), and, although proscribed, these "poor
preachers" with portions of their master's translation of the Bible in
their hand to guide them, preached all over England. In 1382, two years
before the death of Wycliffe, the archbishop of Canterbury got the
Lollard opinions condemned by convocation, and, having been promised
royal support, he began the long conflict of the church with the
followers of Wycliffe. He was able to coerce the authorities of the
university of Oxford, and to drive out of it the leading Wycliffite
teachers, but he was unable to stifle Oxford sympathies or to prevent
the banished teachers preaching throughout the country. Many of the
nobles, like Lords Montacute and Salisbury, supported the poor
preachers, took them as private chaplains, and protected them against
clerical interference. Country gentlemen like Sir Thomas Latimer of
Braybrooke and Sir Richard Stury protected them, while merchants and
burgesses supported them with money. When Richard II. issued an
ordinance (July 1382) ordering every bishop to arrest all Lollards, the
Commons compelled him to withdraw it. Thus protected, the "poor
preachers" won masses of the people to their opinions, and Leicester,
London and the west of England became their headquarters.

The organization must have been strong in numbers, but only those who
were seized for heresy are known by name, and it is only from the
indictments of their accusers that their opinions can be gathered. The
preachers were picturesque figures in long russet dress down to the
heels, who, staff in hand, preached in the mother tongue to the people
in churches and graveyards, in squares, streets and houses, in gardens
and pleasure grounds, and then talked privately with those who had been
impressed. The Lollard literature was very widely circulated--books by
Wycliffe and Hereford and tracts and broadsides--in spite of many edicts
proscribing it. In 1395 the Lollards grew so strong that they petitioned
parliament through Sir Thomas Latimer and Sir R. Stury to reform the
church on Lollardist methods. It is said that the Lollard Conclusions
printed by Canon Shirley (p. 360) contain the substance of this
petition. If so, parliament was told that temporal possessions ruin the
church and drive out the Christian graces of faith, hope and charity;
that the priesthood of the church in communion with Rome was not the
priesthood Christ gave to his apostles; that the monk's vow of celibacy
had for its consequence unnatural lust, and should not be imposed; that
transubstantiation was a feigned miracle, and led people to idolatry;
that prayers made over wine, bread, water, oil, salt, wax, incense,
altars of stone, church walls, vestments, mitres, crosses, staves, were
magical and should not be allowed; that kings should possess the _jus
episcopale_, and bring good government into the church; that no special
prayers should be made for the dead; that auricular confession made to
the clergy, and declared to be necessary for salvation, was the root of
clerical arrogance and the cause of indulgences and other abuses in
pardoning sin; that all wars were against the principles of the New
Testament, and were but murdering and plundering the poor to win glory
for kings; that the vows of chastity laid upon nuns led to child murder;
that many of the trades practised in the commonwealth, such as those of
goldsmiths and armourers, were unnecessary and led to luxury and waste.
These Conclusions really contain the sum of Wycliffite teaching; and, if
we add that the principal duty of priests is to preach, and that the
worship of images, the going on pilgrimages and the use of gold and
silver chalices in divine service are sinful (_The Peasants' Rising and
the Lollards_, p. 47), they include almost all the heresies charged in
the indictments against individual Lollards down to the middle of the
15th century. The king, who had hitherto seemed anxious to repress the
action of the clergy against the Lollards, spoke strongly against the
petition and its promoters, and Lollardy never again had the power in
England which it wielded up to this year.

If the formal statements of Lollard creed are to be got from these
Conclusions, the popular view of their controversy with the church may
be gathered from the ballads preserved in the _Political Poems and Songs
relating to English History_, published in 1859 by Thomas Wright for the
Master of the Rolls series, and in the Piers Ploughman poems. _Piers
Ploughman's Creed_ (see LANGLAND) was probably written about 1394, when
Lollardy was at its greatest strength; the ploughman of the _Creed_ is a
man gifted with sense enough to see through the tricks of the friars,
and with such religious knowledge as can be got from the creed, and from
Wycliffe's version of the Gospels. The poet gives us a "portrait of the
fat friar with his double chin shaking about as big as a goose's egg,
and the ploughman with his hood full of holes, his mittens made of
patches, and his poor wife going barefoot on the ice so that her blood
followed" (_Early English Text Society_, vol. xxx., pref., p. 16); and
one can easily see why farmers and peasants turned from the friars to
the poor preachers. The _Ploughman's Complaint_ tells the same tale. It
paints popes, cardinals, prelates, rectors, monks and friars, who call
themselves followers of Peter and keepers of the gates of heaven and
hell, and pale poverty-stricken people, cotless and landless, who have
to pay the fat clergy for spiritual assistance, and asks if these are
Peter's priests. "I trowe Peter took no money, for no sinners that he
sold.... Peter was never so great a fole, to leave his key with such a

In 1399 the Lancastrian Henry IV. overthrew the Plantagenet Richard II.,
and one of the most active partisans of the new monarch was Arundel,
archbishop of Canterbury and the most determined opponent of Lollardy.
Richard II. had aided the clergy to suppress Lollardy without much
success. The new dynasty supported the church in a similar way and not
more successfully. The strength of the anti-clerical party lay in the
House of Commons, in which the representatives of the shires took the
leading part. Twice the Commons petitioned the crown to seize the
temporalities of the church and apply them to such national purposes as
relief of taxation, maintenance of the poor and the support of new lords
and knights. Their anti-clerical policy was not continuous, however. The
court party and the clergy proposed statutes for the suppression of
heresy, and twice at least secured the concurrence of the Commons. One
of these was the well-known statute _De heretico comburendo_ passed in

In the earlier stages of Lollardy, when the court and the clergy managed
to bring Lollards before ecclesiastical tribunals backed by the civil
power, the accused generally recanted and showed no disposition to
endure martyrdom for their opinions. They became bolder in the beginning
of the 15th century, William Sawtrey (Chartris), caught and condemned,
refused to recant and was burnt at St Paul's Cross (March 1401), and
other martyrdoms followed. The victims usually belonged to the lower
classes. In 1410 John Badby, an artisan, was sent to the stake. His
execution was memorable from the part taken in it by the prince of
Wales, who himself tried to reason the Lollard out of his convictions.
But nothing said would make Badby confess that "Christ sitting at supper
did give to His disciples His living body to eat." The Lollards, far
from daunted, abated no effort to make good their ground, and united a
struggle for social and political liberty to the hatred felt by the
peasants towards the Romish clergy. Jak Upland (John Countryman) took
the place of Piers Ploughman, and upbraided the clergy, and especially
the friars, for their wealth and luxury. Wycliffe had published the rule
of St Francis, and had pointed out in a commentary upon the rule how far
friars had departed from the maxims of their founder, and had persecuted
the _Spirituales_ (the Fratricelli, Beghards, Lollards of the
Netherlands) for keeping them to the letter (cf. Matthews, _English
Works of Wyclif hitherto unprinted_, Early Eng. Text Soc., vol. lxxiv.,
1880). Jak Upland put all this into rude nervous English verse:

  "Freer, what charitie is this
   To fain that whoso liveth after your order
   Liveth most perfectlie,
   And next followeth the state of the Apostles
   In povertie and pennance:
   And yet the wisest and greatest clerkes of you
   Wend or send or procure to the court of Rome,
   ... and to be assoiled of the vow of povertie."

The archbishop, having the power of the throne behind him, attacked that
stronghold of Lollardy the university of Oxford. In 1406 a document
appeared purporting to be the testimony of the university in favour of
Wycliffe; its genuineness was disputed at the time, and when quoted by
Huss at the council of Constance it was repudiated by the English
delegates. The archbishop treated Oxford as if it had issued the
document, and procured the issue of severe regulations in order to purge
the university of heresy. In 1408 Arundel in convocation proposed and
carried the famous _Constitutiones Thomae Arundel_ intended to put down
Wycliffite preachers and teaching. They provided amongst other things
that no one was to be allowed to preach without a bishop's licence, that
preachers preaching to the laity were not to rebuke the sins of the
clergy, and that Lollard books and the translation of the Bible were to
be searched for and destroyed.

When Henry V. became king a more determined effort was made to crush
Lollardy. Hitherto its strength had lain among the country gentlemen who
were the representatives of the shires. The court and clergy had been
afraid to attack this powerful class. The new king determined to overawe
them, and to this end selected one who had been a personal friend and
whose life had been blameless. This was Sir John Oldcastle, in right of
his wife, Lord Cobham, "the good Lord Cobham" as the common people
called him. Henry first tried personal persuasion, and when that failed
directed trial for heresy. Oldcastle was convicted, but was imprisoned
for forty days in the Tower in hope that he might recant. He escaped,
and summoned his co-religionists to his aid. A Lollard plot was formed
to seize the king's person. In the end Oldcastle was burnt for an
obstinate heretic (Dec. 1417). These persecutions were not greatly
protested against; the wars of Henry V. with France had awakened the
martial spirit of the nation, and little sympathy was felt for men who
had declared that all war was but the murder and plundering of poor
people for the sake of kings. Mocking ballads were composed upon the
martyr Oldcastle, and this dislike to warfare was one of the chief
accusations made against him (comp. Wright's _Political Poems_, ii.
244). But Arundel could not prevent the writing and distribution of
Lollard books and pamphlets. Two appeared about the time of the
martyrdom of Oldcastle--_The Ploughman's Prayer_ and the _Lanthorne of
Light_. _The Ploughman's Prayer_ declared that true worship consists in
three things--in loving God, and dreading God and trusting in God above
all other things; and it showed how Lollards, pressed by persecution,
became further separated from the religious life of the church. "Men
maketh now great stonen houses full of glasen windows, and clepeth
thilke thine houses and churches. And they setten in these houses
mawmets of stocks and stones, to fore them they knelen privilich and
apert and maken their prayers, and all this they say is they worship....
For Lorde our belief is that thine house is man's soul." Notwithstanding
the repression, Lollardy fastened in new parts of England, and Lollards
abounded in Somerset, Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Lincoln and

The council of Constance (1414-1418) put an end to the papal schism, and
also showed its determination to put down heresy by burning John Huss.
When news of this reached England the clergy were incited to still more
vigorous proceedings against Lollard preachers and books. From this time
Lollardy appears banished from the fields and streets, and takes refuge
in houses and places of concealment. There was no more wayside
preaching, but instead there were _conventicula occulta_ in houses, in
peasants' huts, in sawpits and in field ditches, where the Bible was
read and exhortations were given, and so Lollardy continued. In 1428
Archbishop Chichele confessed that the Lollards seemed as numerous as
ever, and that their literary and preaching work went on as vigorously
as before. It was found also that many of the poorer rectors and parish
priests, and a great many chaplains and curates, were in secret
association with the Lollards, so much so that in many places
processions were never made and worship on saints' days was abandoned.
For the Lollards were hardened by persecution, and became fanatical in
the statement of their doctrines. Thomas Bagley was accused of declaring
that if in the sacrament a priest made bread into God, he made a God
that can be eaten by rats and mice; that the pharisees of the day, the
monks, and the nuns, and the friars and all other privileged persons
recognized by the church were limbs of Satan; and that auricular
confession to the priest was the will not of God but of the devil. And
others held that any priest who took salary was excommunicate; and that
boys could bless the bread as well as priests.

From England Lollardy passed into Scotland. Oxford infected St Andrews,
and we find traces of more than one vigorous search made for Lollards
among the teaching staff of the Scottish university, while the Lollards
of Kyle in Ayrshire were claimed by Knox as the forerunners of the
Scotch Reformation.

  The opinions of the later Lollards can best be gathered from the
  learned and unfortunate Pecock, who wrote his elaborate _Repressor_
  against the "Bible-men," as he calls them. He summed up their
  doctrines under eleven heads: they condemn the having and using images
  in the churches, the going on pilgrimages to the memorial or "mynde
  places" of the saints, the holding of landed possessions by the
  clergy, the various ranks of the hierarchy, the framing of
  ecclesiastical laws and ordinances by papal and episcopal authority,
  the institution of religious orders, the costliness of ecclesiastical
  decorations, the ceremonies of the mass and the sacraments, the taking
  of oaths and the maintaining that war and capital punishment are
  lawful. When these points are compared with the Lollard Conclusions of
  1395, it is plain that Lollardy had not greatly altered its opinions
  after fifty-five years of persecution. All the articles of Pecock's
  list, save that on capital punishment, are to be found in the
  Conclusions; and, although many writers have held that Wycliffe's own
  views differed greatly from what have been called the "exaggerations
  of the later and more violent Lollards," all these views may be traced
  to Wycliffe himself. Pecock's idea was that all the statements which
  he was prepared to impugn came from three false opinions or
  "trowings," viz. that no governance or ordinance is to be esteemed a
  law of God which is not founded on Scripture, that every humble-minded
  Christian man or woman is able without "fail and defaut" to find out
  the true sense of Scripture, and that having done so he ought to
  listen to no arguments to the contrary; he elsewhere adds a fourth (i.
  102), that if a man be not only meek but also keep God's law he shall
  have a true understanding of Scripture, even though "no man ellis
  teche him saue God." These statements, especially the last, show us
  the connexion between the Lollards and those mystics of the 14th
  century, such as Tauler and Ruysbroeck, who accepted the teachings of
  Nicholas of Basel, and formed themselves into the association of the
  Friends of God.

The persecutions were continued down to the reign of Henry VIII., and
when the writings of Luther began to appear in England the clergy were
not so much afraid of Lutheranism as of the increased life they gave to
men who for generations had been reading Wycliffe's _Wickette_. "It is,"
wrote Bishop Tunstall to Erasmus in 1523, "no question of pernicious
novelty, it is only that new arms are being added to the great band of
Wycliffite heretics." Lollardy, which continued down to the Reformation,
did much to shape the movement in England. The subordination of clerical
to laic jurisdiction, the reduction in ecclesiastical possessions, the
insisting on a translation of the Bible which could be read by the
"common" man were all inheritances bequeathed by the Lollards.

  LITERATURE.--_Fasciculi Zizaniorum Magistri Johannis Wyclif cum
  Tritico_, edited for the Rolls Series by W. W. Shirley (London, 1858);
  the _Chronicon Angliae, auctore monacho quodam Sancti Albani_, ed. by
  Sir E. Maunde Thompson (London, 1874); _Historia Anglicana_ of Thomas
  Walsingham, ed. by H. T. Riley, vol. iii. (London. 1869); _Chronicon_
  of Henry Knighton, ed. by J. R. Lumby (London, 1895); R. L. Poole,
  _Wycliffe and Movements for Reform_ (London, 1889); R. Pecock,
  _Repressor of overmuch Blaming of the Clergy_ (2 vols., London, 1860);
  F. D. Matthew, _The English Works of John Wyclif_ (Early English Text
  Society, London, 1880); T. Wright, _Political Poems and Songs_ (2
  vols., London, 1859); G. V. Lechler, _Johann von Wiclif_, ii. (1873);
  J. Loserth, _Hus und Wycliffe_ (Prague, 1884, English translation by
  J. Evans, London, 1884); D. Wilkins, _Concilia Magnae Britanniae et
  Hiberniae_, iii. (London, 1773); E. Powell and G. M. Trevelyan, _The
  Peasants' Rising and the Lollards, a Collection of Unpublished
  Documents_ (London, 1899); G. M. Trevelyan, _England in the Age of
  Wycliffe_ (London, 1898, 3rd ed., 1904); the publications of the
  Wiclif Society; H. S. Cronin, "The Twelve Conclusions of the
  Lollards," in the _English Historical Review_ (April 1907, pp. 292
  ff.); and J. Gairdner, _Lollardy and the Reformation in England_
  (1908).     (T. M. L.)

LOLLIUS, MARCUS, Roman general, the first governor of Galatia (25 B.C.),
consul in 21. In 16, when governor of Gaul, he was defeated by the
Sigambri (Sygambri), Usipetes and Tencteri, German tribes who had
crossed the Rhine. This defeat is coupled by Tacitus with the disaster
of Varus, but it was disgraceful rather than dangerous. Lollius was
subsequently (2 B.C.) attached in the capacity of tutor and adviser to
Gaius Caesar (Augustus's grandson) on his mission to the East. He was
accused of extortion and treachery to the state, and denounced by Gaius
to the emperor. To avoid punishment he is said to have taken poison.
According to Velleïus Paterculus and Pliny, he was a hypocrite and cared
for nothing but amassing wealth. It was formerly thought that this was
the Lollius whom Horace described as a model of integrity and superior
to avarice in _Od._ iv. 9, but it seems hardly likely that this Ode, as
well as the two Lollian epistles of Horace (i. 2 and 18), was addressed
to him. All three must have been addressed to the same individual, a
young man, probably the son of this Lollius.

  See Suetonius, _Augustus_, 23, _Tiberius_, 12; Vell. Pat. ii. 97. 102;
  Tacitus, _Annals_, i. 10, iii. 48; Pliny, _Nat. Hist._ ix. 35 (58);
  Dio Cassius, liv. 6; see also J. C. Tarver, _Tiberius the Tyrant_
  (1902), pp. 200 foll.

LOLOS, the name given by the Chinese to a large tribe of aborigines who
inhabit the greater part of southern Szechuen. Their home is in the
mountainous country called Taliang shan, which lies between the Yangtsze
river on the east and the Kien ch'ang valley on the west, in south
Szechuen, but they are found in scattered communities as far south as
the Burmese frontier, and west to the Mekong. There seems no reason to
doubt that they were, like the Miaotze, one of the aboriginal tribes of
China, driven southwards by the advancing flood of Chinese. The name is
said to be a Chinese corruption of Lulu, the name of a former chieftain
of a tribe who called themselves Nersu. Their language, like the
Chinese, is monosyllabic and probably ideographic, and the characters
bear a certain resemblance to Chinese. No literature, however, worthy of
the name is known to exist, and few can read and write. Politically they
are divided into tribes, each under the government of a hereditary
chieftain. The community consists of three classes, the "blackbones" or
nobles, the "whitebones" or plebeians, and the _watze_ or slaves. The
last are mostly Chinese captured in forays, or the descendants of such
captives. Within Lolo-land proper, which covers some 11,000 sq. m., the
Chinese government exercises no jurisdiction. The Lolos make frequent
raids on their unarmed Chinese neighbours. They cultivate wheat, barley
and millet, but little rice. They have some knowledge of metals, making
their own tools and weapons. Women are said to be held in respect, and
may become chiefs of the tribes. They do not intermarry with Chinese.

  See A. F. Legendre, "Les Lolos. Étude ethnologique et
  anthropologique," in _T'oung Pao II._, vol. x. (1909); E. C. Baber,
  _Royal Geog. Society Sup. Papers_, vol. i. (London, 1882); F. S. A.
  Bourne, _Blue Book, China, No. 1_ (1888); A. Hosie, _Three Years in
  Western China_ (London, 1897).

LOMBARD LEAGUE, the name given in general to any league of the cities of
Lombardy, but applied especially to the league founded in 1167, which
brought about the defeat of the emperor Frederick I. at Legnano, and the
consequent destruction of his plans for obtaining complete authority
over Italy.

Lacking often the protection of a strong ruler, the Lombard cities had
been accustomed to act together for mutual defence, and in 1093 Milan,
Lodi, Piacenza and Cremona formed an alliance against the emperor Henry
IV., in favour of his rebellious son Conrad. The early years of the
reign of Frederick I. were largely spent in attacks on the privileges of
the cities of Lombardy. This led to a coalition, formed in March 1167,
between the cities of Cremona, Mantua, Bergamo and Brescia to confine
Frederick to the rights which the emperors had enjoyed for the past
hundred years. This league or _concordia_ was soon joined by other
cities, among which were Milan, Parma, Padua, Verona, Piacenza and
Bologna, and the allies began to build a fortress near the confluence of
the Tanaro and the Bormida, which, in honour of Pope Alexander III.,
was called Alessandria. During the absence of Frederick from Italy from
1168 to 1174, the relations between the pope and the league became
closer, and Alexander became the leader of the alliance. Meetings of the
league were held in 1172 and 1173 to strengthen the bond, and to concert
measures against the emperor, the penalties of the church being invoked
to prevent defection. The decisive struggle began when Frederick
attacked Alessandria in 1174. The fortress was bravely defended, and the
siege was raised on the approach of succour from the allied cities.
Negotiations for peace failed, and the emperor, having marched against
Milan, suffered a severe defeat at Legnano on the 29th of May 1176.
Subsequently Pope Alexander was detached from his allies, and made peace
with Frederick, after which a truce for six years was arranged between
the emperor and the league. Further negotiations ripened into the peace
of Constance signed on the 25th of June 1183, which granted almost all
the demands of the cities, and left only a shadowy authority to the
emperor (see ITALY).

In 1226, when the emperor Frederick II. avowed his intention of
restoring the imperial authority in Italy, the league was renewed, and
at once fifteen cities, including Milan and Verona, were placed under
the ban. Frederick, however, was not in a position to fight, and the
mediation of Pope Honorius III. was successful in restoring peace. In
1231 the hostile intentions of the emperor once more stirred the cities
into activity. They held a meeting at Bologna and raised an army, but as
in 1226, the matter ended in mutual fulminations and defiances. A more
serious conflict arose in 1234. The great question at issue, the nature
and extent of the imperial authority over the Lombard cities, was still
unsettled when Frederick's rebellious son, the German king Henry VII.,
allied himself with them. Having crushed his son and rejected the
proffered mediation of Pope Gregory IX., the emperor declared war on the
Lombards in 1236; he inflicted a serious defeat upon their forces at
Cortenuova in November 1237 and met with other successes, but in 1238 he
was beaten back from before Brescia. In 1239 Pope Gregory joined the
cities and the struggle widened out into the larger one of the Empire
and the Papacy. This was still proceeding when Frederick died in
December 1250 and it was only ended by the overthrow of the Hohenstaufen
and the complete destruction of the imperial authority in Italy.

  For a full account of the Lombard League see C. Vignati, _Storia
  diplomata della Lega Lombarda_ (Milan, 1866); H. Prutz, _Kaiser
  Friedrich I._, Band ii. (Danzig, 1871-1874); W. von Giesebrecht,
  _Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit_, Band v. (Leipzig, 1888); and J.
  Ficker, _Zur Geschichte des Lombardenbundes_ (Vienna, 1868).

LOMBARDO, the name of a family of Venetian sculptors and architects;
their surname was apparently Solaro, and the name of Lombardo was given
to the earliest known, Martino, who emigrated from Lombardy to Venice in
the middle of the 15th century and became celebrated as an architect. He
had two sons, Moro and Pietro, of whom the latter (_c._ 1435-1515) was
one of the greatest sculptors and architects of his time, while his sons
Antonio (d. 1516) and Tullio (d. 1559) were hardly less celebrated.
Pietro's work as an architect is seen in numerous churches, the
Vendramini-Calargi palace (1481), the doge's palace (1498), the façade
(1485) of the _scuola_ of St Mark and the cathedral of Cividale del
Friuli (1502); but he is now more famous as a sculptor, often in
collaboration with his sons; he executed the tomb of the doge Mocenigo
(1478) in the church of San Giovanni e Paolo at Venice, and a bas-relief
for the tomb of Dante at Ravenna, and in 1483 began the beautiful
decorations in the church of Sta Maria de' Miracoli at Venice, which is
associated with his workshop (see also VENICE for numerous references to
the work of the Lombardi). Antonio's masterpiece is the marble relief of
St Anthony making a new-born child speak in defence of its mother's
honour, in the Santo at Padua (1505). Tullio's best-known works are the
four kneeling angels (1484) in the church of San Martino, Venice, a
coronation of the Virgin in San Giovanni Crisostomo and two bas-reliefs
in the Santo, Padua, besides two others formerly in the Spitzer
collection, representing Vulcan's Forge and Minerva disputing with

LOMBARDS, or LANGOBARDI, a Suevic people who appear to have inhabited
the lower basin of the Elbe and whose name is believed to survive in the
modern Bardengau to the south of Hamburg. They are first mentioned in
connexion with the year A.D. 5, at which time they were defeated by the
Romans under Tiberius, afterwards emperor. In A.D. 9, however, after the
destruction of Varus's army, the Romans gave up their attempt to extend
their frontier to the Elbe. At first, with most of the Suevic tribes,
they were subject to the hegemony of Maroboduus, king of the Marcomanni,
but they revolted from him in his war with Arminius, chief of the
Cherusci, in the year 17. We again hear of their interference in the
dynastic strife of the Cherusci some time after the year 47. From this
time they are not mentioned until the year 165, when a force of
Langobardi, in alliance with the Marcomanni, was defeated by the Romans,
apparently on the Danubian frontier. It has been inferred from this
incident that the Langobardi had already moved southwards, but the force
mentioned may very well have been sent from the old home of the tribe,
as the various Suevic peoples seem generally to have preserved some form
of political union. From this time onwards we hear no more of them until
the end of the 5th century.

In their own traditions we are told that the Langobardi were originally
called Winnili and dwelt in an island named Scadinavia (with this story
compare that of the Gothic migration, see GOTHS). Thence they set out
under the leadership of Ibor and Aio, the sons of a prophetess called
Gambara, and came into conflict with the Vandals. The leaders of the
latter prayed to Wodan for victory, while Gambara and her sons invoked
Frea. Wodan promised to give victory to those whom he should see in
front of him at sunrise. Frea directed the Winnili to bring their women
with their hair let down round their faces like beards and turned
Wodan's couch round so that he faced them. When Wodan awoke at sunrise
he saw the host of the Winnili and said, "_Qui sunt isti
Longibarbi?_"--"Who are these long-beards?"--and Frea replied, "As thou
hast given them the name, give them also the victory." They conquered in
the battle and were thenceforth known as Langobardi. After this they are
said to have wandered through regions which cannot now be identified,
apparently between the Elbe and the Oder, under legendary kings, the
first of whom was Agilmund, the son of Aio.

Shortly before the end of the 5th century the Langobardi appear to have
taken possession of the territories formerly occupied by the Rugii whom
Odoacer had overthrown in 487, a region which probably included the
present province of Lower Austria. At this time they were subject to
Rodulf, king of the Heruli, who, however, took up arms against them;
according to one story, owing to the treacherous murder of Rodulf's
brother, according to another through an irresistible desire for
fighting on the part of his men. The result was the total defeat of the
Heruli by the Langobardi under their king Tato and the death of Rodulf
at some date between 493 and 508. By this time the Langobardi are said
to have adopted Christianity in its Arian form. Tato was subsequently
killed by his nephew Waccho. The latter reigned for thirty years, though
frequent attempts were made by Ildichis, a son or grandson of Tato, to
recover the throne. Waccho is said to have conquered the Suabi, possibly
the Bavarians, and he was also involved in strife with the Gepidae, with
whom Ildichis had taken refuge. He was succeeded by his youthful son
Walthari, who reigned only seven years under the guardianship of a
certain Audoin. On Walthari's death (about 546?) Audoin succeeded. He
also was involved in hostilities with the Gepidae, whose support of
Ildichis he repaid by protecting Ustrogotthus, a rival of their king
Thorisind. In these quarrels both nations aimed at obtaining the support
of the emperor Justinian, who, in pursuance of his policy of playing off
one against the other, invited the Langobardi into Noricum and Pannonia,
where they now settled.

A large force of Lombards under Audoin fought on the imperial side at
the battle of the Apennines against the Ostrogothic king Totila in 553,
but the assistance of Justinian, though often promised, had no effect on
the relations of the two nations, which were settled for the moment
after a series of truces by the victory of the Langobardi, probably in
554. The resulting peace was sealed by the murder of Ildichis and
Ustrogotthus, and the Langobardi seem to have continued inactive until
the death of Audoin, perhaps in 565, and the accession of his son
Alboin, who had won a great reputation in the wars with the Gepidae. It
was about this time that the Avars, under their first Chagun Baian,
entered Europe, and with them, Alboin is said to have made an alliance
against the Gepidae under their new king Cunimund. The Avars, however,
did not take part in the final battle, in which the Langobardi were
completely victorious. Alboin, who had slain Cunimund in the battle, now
took Rosamund, daughter of the dead king, to be his wife.

In 568 Alboin and the Langobardi, in accordance with a compact made with
Baian, which is recorded by Menander, abandoned their old homes to the
Avars and passed southwards into Italy, were they were destined to found
a new and mighty kingdom.     (F. G. M. B.)

_The Lombard Kingdom in Italy._--In 568 Alboin, king of the Langobards,
with the women and children of the tribe and all their possessions, with
Saxon allies, with the subject tribe of the Gepidae and a mixed host of
other barbarians, descended into Italy by the great plain at the head of
the Adriatic. The war which had ended in the downfall of the Goths had
exhausted Italy; it was followed by famine and pestilence; and the
government at Constantinople made but faint efforts to retain the
province which Belisarius and Narses had recovered for it. Except in a
few fortified places, such as Ticinum or Pavia, the Italians did not
venture to encounter the new invaders; and, though Alboin was not
without generosity, the Lombards, wherever resisted, justified the
opinion of their ferocity by the savage cruelty of the invasion. In 572,
according to the Lombard chronicler, Alboin fell a victim to the revenge
of his wife Rosamund, the daughter of the king of the Gepidae, whose
skull Alboin had turned into a drinking cup, out of which he forced
Rosamund to drink. By this time the Langobards had established
themselves in the north of Italy. Chiefs were placed, or placed
themselves, first in the border cities, like Friuli and Trent, which
commanded the north-eastern passes, and then in other principal places;
and this arrangement became characteristic of the Lombard settlement.
The principal seat of the settlement was the rich plain watered by the
Po and its affluents, which was in future to receive its name from them;
but their power extended across the Apennines into Liguria and Tuscany,
and then southwards to the outlying dukedoms of Spoleto and Benevento.
The invaders failed to secure any maritime ports or any territory that
was conveniently commanded from the sea. Ticinum (Pavia), the one place
which had obstinately resisted Alboin, became the seat of their kings.

After the short and cruel reign of Cleph, the successor of Alboin, the
Lombards (as we may begin for convenience sake to call them) tried for
ten years the experiment of a national confederacy of their dukes (as,
after the Latin writers, their chiefs are styled), without any king. It
was the rule of some thirty-five or thirty-six petty tyrants, under
whose oppression and private wars even the invaders suffered. With
anarchy among themselves and so precarious a hold on the country, hated
by the Italian population and by the Catholic clergy, threatened also by
an alliance of the Greek empire with their persistent rivals the Franks
beyond the Alps, they resolved to sacrifice their independence and elect
a king. In 584 they chose Authari, the grandson of Alboin, and endowed
the royal domain with a half of their possessions. From this time till
the fall of the Lombard power before the arms of their rivals the Franks
under Charles the Great, the kingly rule continued. Authari, "the
Long-haired," with his Roman title of Flavius, marks the change from the
war king of an invading host to the permanent representative of the
unity and law of the nation, and the increased power of the crown, by
the possession of a great domain, to enforce its will. The independence
of the dukes was surrendered to the king. The dukedoms in the
neighbourhood of the seat of power were gradually absorbed, and their
holders transformed into royal officers. Those of the northern marches,
Trent and Friuli, with the important dukedom of Turin, retained longer
the kind of independence which marchlands usually give where invasion is
to be feared. The great dukedom of Benevento in the south, with its
neighbour Spoleto, threatened at one time to be a separate principality,
and even to the last resisted, with varying success, the full claims of
the royal authority at Pavia.

The kingdom of the Lombards lasted more than two hundred years, from
Alboin (568) to the fall of Desiderius (774)--much longer than the
preceding Teutonic kingdom of Theodoric and the Goths. But it differed
from the other Teutonic conquests in Gaul, in Britain, in Spain. It was
never complete in point of territory: there were always two, and almost
to the last three, capitals--the Lombard one, Pavia; the Latin one,
Rome; the Greek one, Ravenna; and the Lombards never could get access to
the sea. And it never was complete over the subject race: it profoundly
affected the Italians of the north; in its turn it was entirely
transformed by contact with them; but the Lombards never amalgamated
with the Italians till their power as a ruling race was crushed by the
victory given to the Roman element by the restored empire of the Franks.
The Langobards, German in their faults and in their strength, but
coarser, at least at first, than the Germans whom the Italians had
known, the Goths of Theodoric and Totila, found themselves continually
in the presence of a subject population very different from anything
which the other Teutonic conquerors met with among the provincials--like
them, exhausted, dispirited, unwarlike, but with the remains and memory
of a great civilization round them, intelligent, subtle, sensitive,
feeling themselves infinitely superior in experience and knowledge to
the rough barbarians whom they could not fight, and capable of hatred
such as only cultivated races can nourish. The Lombards who, after they
had occupied the lands and cities of Upper Italy, still went on sending
forth furious bands to plunder and destroy where they did not care to
stay, never were able to overcome the mingled fear and scorn and
loathing of the Italians. They adapted themselves very quickly indeed to
many Italian fashions. Within thirty years of the invasions, Authari
took the imperial title of Flavius, even while his bands were leading
Italian captives in leash like dogs under the walls of Rome, and under
the eyes of Pope Gregory; and it was retained by his successors. They
soon became Catholics; and then in all the usages of religion, in church
building, in founding monasteries, in their veneration for relics, they
vied with Italians. Authari's queen, Theodelinda, solemnly placed the
Lombard nation under the patronage of St John the Baptist, and at Monza
she built in his honour the first Lombard church, and the royal palace
near it. King Liutprand (712-744) bought the relics of St Augustine for
a large sum to be placed in his church at Pavia. Their Teutonic speech
disappeared; except in names and a few technical words all traces of it
are lost. But to the last they had the unpardonable crime of being a
ruling barbarian race or caste in Italy. To the end they are
"nefandissimi," execrable, loathsome, filthy. So wrote Gregory the Great
when they first appeared. So wrote Pope Stephen IV., at the end of their
rule, when stirring up the kings of the Franks to destroy them.

Authari's short reign (584-591) was one of renewed effort for conquest.
It brought the Langobards face to face, not merely with the emperors at
Constantinople, but with the first of the great statesmen popes, Gregory
the Great (590-604). But Lombard conquest was bungling and wasteful;
when they had spoiled a city they proceeded to tear down its walls and
raze it to the ground. Authari's chief connexion with the fortunes of
his people was an important, though an accidental one. The Lombard
chronicler tells a romantic tale of the way in which Authari sought his
bride from Garibald, duke of the Bavarians, how he went incognito in the
embassy to judge of her attractions, and how she recognized her
disguised suitor. The bride was the Christian Theodelinda, and she
became to the Langobards what Bertha was to the Anglo-Saxons and
Clotilda to the Franks. She became the mediator between the Lombards
and the Catholic Church. Authari, who had brought her to Italy, died
shortly after his marriage. But Theodelinda had so won on the Lombard
chiefs that they bid her as queen choose the one among them whom she
would have for her husband and for king. She chose Agilulf, duke of
Turin (592-615). He was not a true Langobard, but a Thuringian. It was
the beginning of peace between the Lombards and the Catholic clergy.
Agilulf could not abandon his traditional Arianism, and he was a very
uneasy neighbour, not only to the Greek exarch, but to Rome itself. But
he was favourably disposed both to peace and to the Catholic Church.
Gregory interfered to prevent a national conspiracy against the
Langobards, like that of St Brice's day in England against the Danes, or
that later uprising against the French, the Sicilian Vespers. He was
right both in point of humanity and of policy. The Arian and Catholic
bishops went on for a time side by side; but the Lombard kings and
clergy rapidly yielded to the religious influences around them, even
while the national antipathies continued unabated and vehement. Gregory,
who despaired of any serious effort on the part of the Greek emperors to
expel the Lombards, endeavoured to promote peace between the Italians
and Agilulf; and, in spite of the feeble hostility of the exarchs of
Ravenna, the pope and the king of the Lombards became the two real
powers in the north and centre of Italy. Agilulf was followed, after two
unimportant reigns, by his son-in-law, the husband of Theodelinda's
daughter, King Rothari (636-652), the Lombard legislator, still an Arian
though he favoured the Catholics. He was the first of their kings who
collected their customs under the name of laws--and he did this, not in
their own Teutonic dialect, but in Latin. The use of Latin implies that
the laws were to be not merely the personal law of the Lombards, but the
law of the land, binding on Lombards and Romans alike. But such rude
legislation could not provide for all questions arising even in the
decayed state of Roman civilization. It is probable that among
themselves the Italians kept to their old usages and legal precedents
where they were not overridden by the conquerors' law, and by degrees a
good many of the Roman civil arrangements made their way into the
Lombard code, while all ecclesiastical ones, and they were a large
class, were untouched by it.

  There must have been much change of property; but appearances are
  conflicting as to the terms on which land generally was held by the
  old possessors or the new comers, and as to the relative legal
  position of the two. Savigny held that, making allowance for the
  anomalies and usurpations of conquest, the Roman population held the
  bulk of the land as they had held it before, and were governed by an
  uninterrupted and acknowledged exercise of Roman law in their old
  municipal organization. Later inquirers, including Leo, Troya and
  Hegel, have found that the supposition does not tally with a whole
  series of facts, which point to a Lombard territorial law ignoring
  completely any parallel Roman and personal law, to a great restriction
  of full civil rights among the Romans, analogous to the condition of
  the rayah under the Turks, and to a reduction of the Roman occupiers
  to a class of half-free "aldii," holding immovable tenancies under
  lords of superior race and privilege, and subject to the sacrifice
  either of the third part of their holdings or the third part of the
  produce. The Roman losses, both of property and rights, were likely to
  be great at first; how far they continued permanent during the two
  centuries of the Lombard kingdom, or how far the legal distinctions
  between Rome and Lombard gradually passed into desuetude, is a further
  question. The legislation of the Lombard kings, in form a territorial
  and not a personal law, shows no signs of a disposition either to
  depress or to favour the Romans, but only the purpose to maintain, in
  a rough fashion, strict order and discipline impartially among all
  their subjects.

From Rothari (d. 652) to Liutprand (712-744) the Lombard kings,
succeeding one another in the irregular fashion of the time, sometimes
by descent, sometimes by election, sometimes by conspiracy and violence,
strove fitfully to enlarge their boundaries, and contended with the
aristocracy of dukes inherent in the original organization of the
nation, an element which, though much weakened, always embarrassed the
power of the crown, and checked the unity of the nation. Their old
enemies the Franks on the west, and the Slavs or Huns, ever ready to
break in on the north-east, and sometimes called in by mutinous and
traitorous dukes of Friuli and Trent, were constant and serious dangers.
By the popes, who represented Italian interests, they were always
looked upon with dislike and jealousy, even when they had become zealous
Catholics, the founders of churches and monasteries; with the Greek
empire there was chronic war. From time to time they made raids into the
unsubdued parts of Italy, and added a city or two to their dominions.
But there was no sustained effort for the complete subjugation of Italy
till Liutprand, the most powerful of the line. He tried it, and failed.
He broke up the independence of the great southern duchies, Benevento
and Spoleto. For a time, in the heat of the dispute about images, he won
the pope to his side against the Greeks. For a time, but only for a
time, he deprived the Greeks of Ravenna. Aistulf, his successor, carried
on the same policy. He even threatened Rome itself, and claimed a
capitation tax. But the popes, thoroughly irritated and alarmed, and
hopeless of aid from the East, turned to the family which was rising
into power among the Franks of the West, the mayors of the palace of
Austrasia. Pope Gregory III. applied in vain to Charles Martel. But with
his successors Pippin and Charles the popes were more successful. In
return for the transfer by the pope of the Frank crown from the decayed
line of Clovis to his own, Pippin crossed the Alps, defeated Aistulf and
gave to the pope the lands which Aistulf had torn from the empire,
Ravenna and the Pentapolis (754-756). But the angry quarrels still went
on between the popes and the Lombards. The Lombards were still to the
Italians a "foul and horrid" race. At length, invited by Pope Adrian I.,
Pippin's son Charlemagne once more descended into Italy. As the Lombard
kingdom began, so it ended, with a siege of Pavia. Desiderius, the last
king, became a prisoner (774), and the Lombard power perished.
Charlemagne, with the title of king of the Franks and Lombards, became
master of Italy, and in 800 the pope, who had crowned Pippin king of the
Franks, claimed to bestow the Roman empire, and crowned his greater son
emperor of the Romans (800).

_Effects of the Carolingian Conquest._--To Italy the overthrow of the
Lombard kings was the loss of its last chance of independence and unity.
To the Lombards the conquest was the destruction of their legal and
social supremacy. Henceforth they were equally with the Italians the
subjects of the Frank kings. The Carolingian kings expressly recognized
the Roman law, and allowed all who would be counted Romans to "profess"
it. But Latin influences were not strong enough to extinguish the
Lombard name and destroy altogether the recollections and habits of the
Lombard rule; Lombard law was still recognized, and survived in the
schools of Pavia. Lombardy remained the name of the finest province of
Italy, and for a time was the name for Italy itself. But what was
specially Lombard could not stand in the long run against the Italian
atmosphere which surrounded it. Generation after generation passed more
and more into real Italians. Antipathies, indeed, survived, and men even
in the 10th century called each other Roman or Langobard as terms of
reproach. But the altered name of Lombard also denoted henceforth some
of the proudest of Italians; and, though the Lombard speech had utterly
perished their most common names still kept up the remembrance that
their fathers had come from beyond the Alps.

But the establishment of the Frank kingdom, and still more the
re-establishment of the Christian empire as the source of law and
jurisdiction in Christendom, had momentous influence on the history of
the Italianized Lombards. The Empire was the counterweight to the local
tyrannies into which the local authorities established by the Empire
itself, the feudal powers, judicial and military, necessary for the
purposes of government, invariably tended to degenerate. When they
became intolerable, from the Empire were sought the exemptions,
privileges, immunities from that local authority, which, anomalous and
anarchical as they were in theory, yet in fact were the foundations of
all the liberties of the middle ages in the Swiss cantons, in the free
towns of Germany and the Low Countries, in the Lombard cities of Italy.
Italy was and ever has been a land of cities; and, ever since the
downfall of Rome and the decay of the municipal system, the bishops of
the cities had really been at the head of the peaceful and industrial
part of their population, and were a natural refuge for the oppressed,
and sometimes for the mutinous and the evil doers, from the military and
civil powers of the duke or count or judge, too often a rule of cruelty
or fraud. Under the Carolingian empire, a vast system grew up in the
North Italian cities of episcopal "immunities," by which a city with its
surrounding district was removed, more or less completely, from the
jurisdiction of the ordinary authority, military or civil, and placed
under that of the bishop. These "immunities" led to the temporal
sovereignty of the bishops; under it the spirit of liberty grew more
readily than under the military chief. Municipal organization, never
quite forgotten, naturally revived under new forms, and with its
"consuls" at the head of the citizens, with its "arts" and "crafts" and
"gilds," grew up secure under the shadow of the church. In due time the
city populations, free from the feudal yoke, and safe within the walls
which in many instances the bishops had built for them, became impatient
also of the bishop's government. The cities which the bishops had made
thus independent of the dukes and counts next sought to be free from the
bishops; in due time they too gained their charters of privilege and
liberty. Left to take care of themselves, islands in a sea of
turbulence, they grew in the sense of self-reliance and independence;
they grew also to be aggressive, quarrelsome and ambitious. Thus, by the
11th century, the Lombard cities had become "communes," commonalties,
republics, managing their own affairs, and ready for attack or defence.
Milan had recovered its greatness, ecclesiastically as well as
politically; it scarcely bowed to Rome, and it aspired to the position
of a sovereign city, mistress over its neighbours. At length, in the
12th century, the inevitable conflict came between the republicanism of
the Lombard cities and the German feudalism which still claimed their
allegiance in the name of the Empire. Leagues and counter-leagues were
formed; and a confederacy of cities, with Milan at its head, challenged
the strength of Germany under one of its sternest emperors, Frederick
Barbarossa. At first Frederick was victorious; Milan, except its
churches, was utterly destroyed; everything that marked municipal
independence was abolished in the "rebel" cities; and they had to
receive an imperial magistrate instead of their own (1158-1162). But the
Lombard league was again formed. Milan was rebuilt, with the help even
of its jealous rivals, and at Legnano (1176) Frederick was utterly
defeated. The Lombard cities had regained their independence; and at the
peace of Constance (1183) Frederick found himself compelled to confirm

  From the peace of Constance the history of the Lombards is merely part
  of the history of Italy. Their cities went through the ordinary
  fortunes of most Italian cities. They quarrelled and fought with one
  another. They took opposite sides in the great strife of the time
  between pope and emperor, and were Guelf and Ghibelline by old
  tradition, or as one or other faction prevailed in them. They swayed
  backwards and forwards between the power of the people and the power
  of the few; but democracy and oligarchy passed sooner or later into
  the hands of a master who veiled his lordship under various titles,
  and generally at last into the hands of a family. Then, in the larger
  political struggles and changes of Europe, they were incorporated into
  a kingdom, or principality or duchy, carved out to suit the interest
  of a foreigner, or to make a heritage for the nephew of a pope. But in
  two ways especially the energetic race which grew out of the fusion of
  Langobards and Italians between the 9th and the 12th centuries has
  left the memory of itself. In England, at least, the enterprising
  traders and bankers who found their way to the West, from the 13th to
  the 16th centuries, though they certainly did not all come from
  Lombardy, bore the name of Lombards. In the next place, the Lombards
  or the Italian builders whom they employed or followed, the "masters
  of Como," of whom so much is said in the early Lombard laws,
  introduced a manner of building, stately, solemn and elastic, to which
  their name has been attached, and which gives a character of its own
  to some of the most interesting churches in Italy.     (R. W. C.)

LOMBARDY, a territorial division of Italy, bounded N. by the Alps, S. by
Emilia, E. by Venetia and W. by Piedmont. It is divided into eight
provinces, Bergamo, Brescia, Como, Cremona, Mantua, Milan, Pavia and
Sondrio, and has an area of 9386 sq. m. Milan, the chief city, is the
greatest railway centre of Italy; it is in direct communication not only
with the other principal towns of Lombardy and the rest of Italy but
also with the larger towns of France, Germany and Switzerland, being
the nearest great town to the tunnels of the St Gothard and the Simplon.
The other railway centres of the territory are Mortara, Pavia and
Mantua, while every considerable town is situated on or within easy
reach of the railway, this being rendered comparatively easy owing to
the relative flatness of the greater part of the country. The line from
Milan to Porto Ceresio is worked in the main by electric motor driven
trains, while on that from Lecco to Colico and Chiavenna over-head wires
are adopted. The more remote districts and the immediate environs of the
larger town are served by steam tramways and electric railways. The most
important rivers are the Po, which follows, for the most part, the
southern boundary of Lombardy, and the Ticino, one of the largest
tributaries of the Po, which forms for a considerable distance the
western boundary. The majority of the Italian lakes, those of Garda,
Idro, Iseo, Como, Lugano, Varese and Maggiore, lie wholly or in part
within it. The climate of Lombardy is thoroughly continental; in summer
the heat is greater than in the south of Italy, while the winter is very
cold, and bitter winds, snow and mist are frequent. In the summer rain
is rare beyond the lower Alps, but a system of irrigation, unsurpassed
in Europe, and dating from the middle ages, prevails, so that a failure
of the crops is hardly possible. There are three zones of cultivation:
in the mountains, pasturage; the lower slopes are devoted to the culture
of the vine, fruit-trees (including chestnuts) and the silkworm; while
in the regions of the plain, large crops of maize, rice, wheat, flax,
hemp and wine are produced, and thousands of mulberry-trees are grown
for the benefit of the silkworms, the culture of which in the province
of Milan has entirely superseded the sheep-breeding for which it was
famous during the middle ages. Milan is indeed the principal silk market
in the world. In 1905 there were 490 mills reeling silk in Lombardy,
with 35,407 workers, and 276 throwing-mills with 586,000 spindles. The
chief centre of silk weaving is Como, but the silk is commercially dealt
with at Milan, and there is much exportation. A considerable amount of
cotton is manufactured, but most of the raw cotton (600,000 bales) is
imported, the cultivation being insignificant in Italy. There are 400
mills in Lombardy, 277 of which are in the province of Milan. The
largest linen and woollen mills in Italy are situated at Fara d'Adda.
Milan also manufactures motor-cars, though Turin is the principal centre
in Italy for this industry. There are copper, zinc and iron mines, and
numerous quarries of marble, alabaster and granite. In addition to the
above industries the chief manufactures are hats, rope and paper-making,
iron-casting, gun-making, printing and lithography. Lombardy is indeed
the most industrial district of Italy. In parts the peasants suffer much
from _pellagra_.

The most important towns with their communal population in the
respective provinces, according to the census of 1901, are Bergamo
(46,861), Treviglio (14,897), total of province 467,549, number of
communes 306; Brescia (69,210), Chiari (10,749), total of province
541,765, number of communes 280; Como (38,174), Varese (17,666), Cantù
(10,725), Lecco (10,352), total of province 594,304, number of communes
510; Cremona (36,848), Casalmaggiore (16,407), Soresina (10,358), total
of province 329,471, number of communes 133; Mantua (30,127), Viadana
(16,082), Quistello (11,228), Suzzara (11,502), St Benedetto Po
(10,908), total of province 315,448, number of communes 68; Milan
(490,084), Monza (42,124), Lodi (26,827), Busto Arsizio (20,005),
Legnano (18,285), Seregno (12,050), Gallarate (11,952), Codogno
(11,925), total of province 1,450,214, number of communes 297; Pavia
(33,922), Vigevano (23,560), Voghera (20,442), total of province
504,382, number of communes 221; Sondrio (7077), total of province
130,966, number of communes 78. The total population of Lombardy was
4,334,099. In most of the provinces of Lombardy there are far more
villages than in other parts of Italy except Piedmont; this is
attributable partly to their mountainous character, partly perhaps to
security from attack by sea (contrast the state of things in Apulia).

Previous to the fall of the Roman republic Lombardy formed a part of
Gallia Transpadana, and it was Lombardy, Venetia and Piedmont, the
portion of the Italian peninsula N. of the Po, that did not receive
citizenship in 89 B.C. but only Latin rights. The gift of full
citizenship in 49 B.C. made it a part of Italy proper, and Lombardy and
Piedmont formed the 11th region of Augustus (Transpadana) while Venetia
and Istria formed the 10th. It was the second of the regions of Italy in
size, but the last in number of towns; it appears, however, to have been
prosperous and peaceful, and cultivation flourished in its fertile
portions. By the end of the 4th century A.D. the name Liguria had been
extended over it, and Milan was regarded as the capital of both.
Stranger still, in the 6th century the old Liguria was separated from
it, and under the name of _Alpes Cottiae_ formed the 5th Lombard
province of Italy.

  For details of subsequent history see LOMBARDS and ITALY; and for
  architecture see ARCHITECTURE. G. T. Rivoira in _Origini dell'
  Architettura_ Lombarda (2 vols. Rome, 1901-1907), successfully
  demonstrates the classical origin of much that had hitherto been
  treated by some authorities as "Byzantine." In the development of
  Renaissance architecture and art Lombardy played a great part,
  inasmuch as both Bramante and Leonardo da Vinci resided in Milan at
  the end of the 15th century.

LOMBOK (called by the natives _Sasak_), one of the Lesser Sunda Islands,
in the Dutch East Indies, E. of Java, between 8° 12´ and 9° 1´ S. and
115° 46´ and 116° 40´ E., with an area of 3136 sq. m. It is separated
from Bali by the Strait of Lombok and from Sumbawa by the Strait of
Alas. Rising out of the sea with bold and often precipitous coasts,
Lombok is traversed by two mountain chains. The northern chain is of
volcanic formation, and contains the peak of Lombok (11,810 ft.), one of
the highest volcanoes in the Malay Archipelago. It is surrounded by a
plateau (with lower summits, and a magnificent lake, Segara Anak) 8200
ft. high. The southern chain rises a little over 3000 ft. Between the
two chains is a broad valley or terrace with a range of low volcanic
hills. Forest-clad mountains and stretches of thorny jungle alternating
with rich alluvial plains, cultivated like gardens under an ancient and
elaborate system of irrigation, make the scenery of Lombok exceedingly
attractive. The small rivers serve only for irrigation and the growing
of rice, which is of superior quality. In the plains are also grown
coffee, indigo, maize and sugar, katyang (native beans), cotton and
tobacco. All these products are exported. To the naturalist Lombok is of
particular interest as the frontier island of the Australian region,
with its cockatoos and megapods or mound-builders, its peculiar
bee-eaters and ground thrushes. The Sasaks must be considered the
aborigines, as no trace of an earlier race is found. They are
Mahommedans and distinct in many other respects from the Hindu Balinese,
who vanquished but could not convert them. The island was formerly
divided into the four states of Karang-Asam Lombok on the W. side,
Mataram in the N.W., Pagarawan in the S.W. and Pagutan in the E.
Balinese supremacy dated from the conquest by Agong Dahuran in the
beginning of the 19th century; the union under a single raja tributary
to Bali dated from 1839. In July 1894 a Dutch expedition landed at
Ampanam, and advanced towards Mataram, the capital of the Balinese
sultan, who had defied Dutch authority and refused to send the usual
delegation to Batavia. The objects of that expedition were to punish
Mataram and to redress the grievances of the Sasaks whom the Balinese
held in cruel subjection. The first Dutch expedition met with reverses,
and ultimately the invaders were forced back upon Ampanam. The Dutch at
once despatched a much stronger expedition, which landed at Ampanam in
September. Mataram was bombarded by the fleet, and the troops stormed
the sultan's stronghold, and Tjakra Negara, another chieftain's citadel,
both after a desperate resistance. The old sultan of Mataram was
captured, and he and other Balinese chiefs were exiled to different
parts of the Malay Archipelago, whilst the sultan's heir fell at the
hands of his warriors. Thus ended the Balinese domination of Lombok, and
the island was placed under direct Dutch-Indian control, an assistant
resident being appointed at Ampanam. Lombok is now administered from
Bali by the Dutch resident on that island. The people, however, are in
undisturbed exercise of their own laws, religions, customs and
institutions. Disturbances between the Sasaks and the Lombok Balinese
frequently occur. Lombok has been divided since 1898 into the West,
Middle and East Lombok. Its chief towns are Mataram, Praya and Sisi. On
the west coast the harbour of Ampanam is the most frequented, though, on
account of heavy breakers, it is often difficult of approach. The Sasaks
are estimated at 320,000, the Balinese at 50,000, Europeans number about
40, Chinese 300, and Arabs 170.

  See A. R. Wallace, _Malay Archipelago_ (London, 1869, and later
  editions). The famous "Wallace's Line" runs immediately west of
  Lombok, which therefore has an important part in the work. Captain W.
  Cool, _With the Dutch in the East_ (Amsterdam and London, 1897), in
  Dutch and English, is a narrative of the events sketched above, and
  contains many particulars about the folklore and dual religions of
  Lombok, which, with Bali, forms the last stronghold of Hinduism east
  of Java.

LOMBROSO, CESARE (1836-1909), Italian criminologist, was born on the
18th of November 1836 at Verona, of a Jewish family. He studied at
Padua, Vienna and Paris, and was in 1862 appointed professor of
psychiatry at Pavia, then director of the lunatic asylum at Pesaro, and
later professor of forensic medicine and of psychiatry at Turin, where
he eventually filled the chair of criminal anthropology. His works,
several of which have been translated into English, include _L'Uomo
delinquente_ (1889); _L'Uomo di genio_ (1888); _Genio e follia_ (1877)
and _La Donna delinquente_ (1893). In 1872 he had made the notable
discovery that the disorder known as _pellagra_ was due (but see
PELLAGRA) to a poison contained in diseased maize, eaten by the
peasants, and he returned to this subject in _La Pellagra in Italia_
(1885) and other works. Lombroso, like Giovanni Bovio (b. 1841), Enrico
Ferri (b. 1856) and Colajanni, well-known Italian criminologists, and
his sons-in-law G. Ferrero and Carrara, was strongly influenced by
Auguste Comte, and owed to him an exaggerated tendency to refer all
mental facts to biological causes. In spite of this, however, and a
serious want of accuracy and discrimination in handling evidence, his
work made an epoch in criminology; for he surpassed all his predecessors
by the wide scope and systematic character of his researches, and by the
practical conclusions he drew from them. Their net theoretical results
is that the criminal population exhibits a higher percentage of
physical, nervous and mental anomalies than non-criminals; and that
these anomalies are due partly to degeneration, partly to atavism. The
criminal is a special type of the human race, standing midway between
the lunatic and the savage. This doctrine of a "criminal type" has been
gravely criticized, but is admitted by all to contain a substratum of
truth. The practical reform to which it points is a classification of
offenders, so that the born criminal may receive a different kind of
punishment from the offender who is tempted into crime by circumstances
(see also CRIMINOLOGY). Lombroso's biological principles are much less
successful in his work on Genius, which he explains as a morbid,
degenerative condition, presenting analogies to insanity, and not
altogether alien to crime. In 1899 he published in French a book which
gives a résumé of much of his earlier work, entitled _Le Crime, causes
et remèdes_. Later works are: _Delitti vecchi e delitti nuovi_ (Turin,
1902); _Nuovi studi sul genio_ (2 vols., Palermo, 1902); and in 1908 a
work on spiritualism (Eng. trans., _After Death--What?_ 1909), to which
subject he had turned his attention during the later years of his life.
He died suddenly from a heart complaint at Turin on the 19th of October

  See Kurella, _Cesare Lombroso und die Naturgeschichte des Verbrechers_
  (Hamburg, 1892); and a biography, with an analysis of his works, and a
  short account of their general conclusions by his daughters, Paola
  Carrara and Gina Ferrero, written in 1906 on the occasion of the sixth
  congress of criminal anthropology at Turin.

LOMÉNIE DE BRIENNE, ÉTIENNE CHARLES DE (1727-1794), French politician
and ecclesiastic, was born at Paris on the 9th of October 1727. He
belonged to a Limousin family, dating from the 15th century, and after a
brilliant career as a student entered the Church, as being the best way
to attain to a distinguished position. In 1751 he became a doctor of
theology, though there were doubts as to the orthodoxy of his thesis. In
1752 he was appointed grand vicar to the archbishop of Rouen. After
visiting Rome, he was made bishop of Condom (1760), and in 1763 was
translated to the archbishopric of Toulouse. He had many famous friends,
among them A. R. J. Turgot, the Abbé A. Morellet and Voltaire, and in
1770 became an academician. He was on three occasions the head of the
_bureau de jurisdiction_ at the general assembly of the clergy; he also
took an interest in political and social questions of the day, and
addressed to Turgot a number of _mémoires_ on these subjects, one of
them, treating of pauperism, being especially remarkable. In 1787 he was
nominated as president of the Assembly of Notables, in which capacity he
attacked the fiscal policy of Calonne, whom he succeeded as head of the
_conseil des finances_ on the 1st of May 1787. Once in power, he
succeeded in making the parlement register edicts dealing with internal
free trade, the establishment of provincial assemblies and the
redemption of the _corvée_; on their refusal to register edicts on the
stamp duty and the proposed new general land-tax, he persuaded the king
to hold a _lit de justice_, to enforce their registration. To crush the
opposition to these measures, he persuaded the king to exile the
parlement to Troyes (August 15th, 1787). On the agreement of the
parlement to sanction a prolongation for two years to the tax of the two
_vingtièmes_ (a direct tax on all kinds of income), in lieu of the above
two taxes, he recalled the councillors to Paris. But a further attempt
to force the parlement to register an edict for raising a loan of 120
million _livres_ met with determined opposition. The struggle of the
parlement against the incapacity of Brienne ended on the 8th of May in
its consenting to an edict for its own abolition; but with the proviso
that the states-general should be summoned to remedy the disorders of
the state. Brienne, who had in the meantime been made archbishop of
Sens, now found himself face to face with almost universal opposition;
he was forced to suspend the _Cour plénière_ which had been set up to
take the place of the parlement, and himself to promise that the
states-general should be summoned. But even these concessions were not
able to keep him in power, and on the 29th of August he had to retire,
leaving the treasury empty. On the 15th of December following, he was
made a cardinal, and went to Italy, where he spent two years. After the
outbreak of the Revolution he returned to France, and took the oath of
the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1790 (see FRENCH REVOLUTION). He
was repudiated by the pope, and in 1791 had to give up the biretta at
the command of Pius VI. Both his past and present conduct made him an
object of suspicion to the revolutionaries; he was arrested at Sens on
the 9th of November 1793, and died in prison, either of an apoplectic
stroke or by poison, on the 16th of February 1794.

  The chief works published by Brienne are: _Oraison funèbre du Dauphin_
  (Paris, 1766); _Compte-rendu au roi_ (Paris, 1788); _Le Conciliateur_,
  in collaboration with Turgot (Rome, Paris, 1754). See also J. Perrin,
  _Le Cardinal Loménie de Brienne ... épisodes de la Révolution_ (Sens,

LOMOND, LOCH, the largest and most beautiful of Scottish lakes, situated
in the counties of Stirling and Dumbarton. It is about 23 m. long; its
width varies from 5 m. towards the south end to {1/3} m. at the narrows
to the north of the Isle of the Vow; its area is 27 sq. m., and the
greatest depth 630 ft. It is only 23 ft. above the sea, of which
doubtless it was at one time an arm. It contains 30 islands, the largest
of which is Inchmurrin, a deer park belonging to the duke of Montrose.
Among other islands are Inch Cailliach (the "Island of Women," from the
fact that a nunnery once stood there), Inchfad ("Long Island"),
Inchcruin ("Round Island"), Inchtavannach ("Monks' Isle"), Inchconnachan
("Colquhoun's Isle"), Inchlonaig ("Isle of the Yews," where Robert Bruce
caused yews to be planted to provide arms for his bowmen), Creinch,
Torrinch and Clairinch (which gave the Buchanans their war-cry). From
the west the loch receives the Inveruglas, the Douglas, the Luss, the
Finlas and the Fruin. From Balloch in the south it sends off the Leven
to the Clyde; from the east it receives the Endrick, the Blair, the
Cashell and the Arklet; and from the north the Falloch. Ben Lomond (3192
ft.), the ascent of which is made with comparative ease from
Rowardennan, dominates the landscape; but there are other majestic
hills, particularly on the west and north-west banks. The fish are
sea-trout, lake-trout, pike and perch. Part of the shore is skirted by
the West Highland railway, opened in 1894, which has stations on the
loch at Tarbet and Ardlui, and Balloch is the terminus of the lines from
Dumbarton and from Stirling via Buchlyvie. Steamers make the tour of the
loch, starting from Balloch and calling at Balmaha, Luss, Rowardennan,
Tarbet, Inversnaid and Ardlui. LUSS has a considerable population, and
there is some stone quarried near it. INVERSNAID is the point of arrival
and departure for the Trossachs coaches, and here, too, there is a
graceful waterfall, fed by the Arklet from the loch of that name, 2½ m.
to the east, commemorated in Wordsworth's poem of the "Highland Girl."
Inversnaid was in the heart of the Macgregor country, and the name of
Rob Roy is still given to his cave on the loch side a mile to the north
and to his prison 3 m. to the south. Inversnaid was the site of a fort
built in 1713 to reduce the clan to subjection. Craig Royston, a tract
lying between Inversnaid and Ben Lomond, was also associated with Rob

LOMONÓSOV, MIKHAIL VASILIEVICH (1711-1765), Russian poet and man of
science, was born in the year 1711, in the village of Denisovka (the
name of which was afterwards changed in honour of the poet), situated on
an island not far from Kholmogorî, in the government of Archangel. His
father, a fisherman, took the boy when he was ten years of age to assist
him in his calling; but the lad's eagerness for knowledge was unbounded.
The few books accessible to him he almost learned by heart; and, seeing
that there was no chance of increasing his stock of knowledge in his
native place, he resolved to betake himself to Moscow. An opportunity
occurred when he was seventeen, and by the intervention of friends he
obtained admission into the Zaikonospasski school. There his progress
was very rapid, especially in Latin, and in 1734 he was sent from Moscow
to St Petersburg. There again his proficiency, especially in physical
science, was marked, and he was one of the young Russians chosen to
complete their education in foreign countries. He accordingly commenced
the study of metallurgy at Marburg; he also began to write poetry,
imitating German authors, among whom he is said to have especially
admired Günther. His _Ode on the Taking of Khotin from the Turks_ was
composed in 1739, and attracted a great deal of attention at St
Petersburg. During his residence in Germany Lomonósov married a native
of the country, and found it difficult to maintain his increasing family
on the scanty allowance granted to him by the St Petersburg Academy,
which, moreover, was irregularly sent. His circumstances became
embarrassed, and he resolved to leave the country secretly and to return
home. On his arrival in Russia he rapidly rose to distinction, and was
made professor of chemistry in the university of St Petersburg; he
ultimately became rector, and in 1764 secretary of state. He died in

  The most valuable of the works of Lomonósov are those relating to
  physical science, and he wrote upon many branches of it. He everywhere
  shows himself a man of the most varied learning. He compiled a Russian
  grammar, which long enjoyed popularity, and did much to improve the
  rhythm of Russian verse.

LOMZA, or LOMZHA, a government of Russian Poland, bounded N. by Prussia
and the Polish government of Suwalki, E. by the Russian government of
Grodno, S. by the Polish governments of Siedlce and Warsaw and W. by
that of Plock. It covers 4666 sq. m. It is mostly flat or undulating,
with a few tracts in the north and south-west where the deeply cut
valleys give a hilly aspect to the country. Extensive marshes overspread
it, especially on the banks of the Narev, which flows from east to
south-west, joining the Bug in the south-western corner of the
government. The Bug flows along the southern border, joining the Vistula
20 m. below its confluence with the Narev. There are forests in the east
of the government. The inhabitants numbered 501,385 in 1872 and 585,033
in 1897, of whom 279,279 were women, and 69,834 lived in towns. The
estimated population in 1906 was 653,100. By religion 77½% are Roman
Catholics, 15½% Jews and 5½% members of the Orthodox Church. Agriculture
is the predominant industry, the chief crops being rye, oats, wheat,
barley, buckwheat, peas, potatoes, flax and hemp. Bees are extensively
kept, and large numbers of poultry, especially geese, are reared. Stock
raising is carried on to some extent. The wood trade is important; other
industries are the production of pottery, beer, flour, leather, bricks,
wooden wares, spirits, tobacco and sugar. There is only one railway
(between Grodno and Warsaw); the Bug is navigable, but wood only is
floated down the Narev. The government is divided into seven districts,
of which the chief towns, with their populations in 1897, are Lomza
(q.v.), Ostrolenka (8679), Mazowiec (3900), Ostrów (11,264), Maków
(7232), Kolno (4941) and Szczuczyn (5725).

LOMZA, a town of Russia, capital of the government of the same name, on
the Narew, 103 m. by rail N.E. from Warsaw. Pop. (1872), 13,860, (1900)
22,428. Lomza is an old town, one of its churches having been erected
before 1000. In the 16th century it carried on a brisk trade with
Lithuania and Prussia. It was well fortified and had two citadels, but
nevertheless often suffered from the invasions of the Germans and
Tatars, and in the 17th century it was twice plundered by the Cossacks
of the Ukraine. In 1795 it fell under the dominion of Prussia, and after
the peace of Tilsit (1807) it came under Russian rule.

LONAULI, a town of India, in the Poona district of Bombay, at the top of
the Bhor Ghat pass in the Western Ghats, by which the Great Indian
Peninsula railway climbs from Bombay to Poona. Pop. (1901), 6686. It
contains the locomotive works of the railway. Lonauli is a place of
resort from Bombay during the hot season.

LONDON, a city and port of entry of Middlesex county, Ontario, Canada,
situated 121 m. N.W. of Toronto, on the river Thames and the Grand
Trunk, Canadian Pacific and Michigan Central railways. Pop. (1901),
37,981; but several suburbs, not included in these figures, are in
reality part of the city. The local nomenclature is largely a
reproduction of that of the great city whose name it has borrowed.
Situated in a fertile agricultural district, it is a large distributing
centre. Among the industries are breweries, petroleum refineries, and
factories for the manufacture of agricultural implements and of railway
carriages. The educational institutions include the Hellmuth Ladies'
College and the Western University (founded in 1878 under the patronage
of the Church of England). London was founded in 1825-1826.

LONDON, the capital of England and of the British Empire, and the
greatest city in the world, lying on each side of the river Thames 50 m.
above its mouth.[1] The "City," so called both formally and popularly,
is a small area (673 acres) on the north bank of the river, forming the
heart of the metropolis, and constituting within its boundaries one
only, and one of the smallest, of twenty-nine municipal divisions which
make up the administrative County of London. The twenty-eight remaining
divisions are the Metropolitan Boroughs. The county thus defined has an
extreme length (E. to W.) of 16 m., an extreme breadth (N. to S.) of 11½
m., and an area of 74,839 acres or about 117 sq. m. The boroughs are as

1. _North of the Thames._--Touching the northern boundary of the county,
from W. to E.--Hammersmith, Kensington, Paddington, Hampstead, St
Pancras, Islington, Stoke Newington, Poplar.

Bounded by the Thames--Fulham, Chelsea, the City of Westminster (here
the City of London intervenes), Stepney, Poplar.

Between Westminster, the City and Stepney, and the northern boroughs--St
Marylebone (commonly Marylebone), Holborn, Finsbury, Shoreditch, Bethnal

2. _South of the Thames._--Wandsworth, Battersea, Lambeth, Southwark,
Camberwell, Bermondsey, Deptford, Lewisham, Greenwich, Woolwich (with a
small part of the north bank).

These names are all in common use, though their formal application is in
some cases extended over several districts of which the ancient names
remain familiar. Each borough is noticed in a separate article.


The County of London is bounded N. and W. by Middlesex, E. by Essex and
Kent, S. by Kent and Surrey. The Metropolitan police area, or "Greater
London," however, embraces the whole of Middlesex, with parts of the
other three counties and of Hertfordshire. Its extent is 443,419 acres
or nearly 693 sq. m., and its population is about seven millions. Only
here and there upon its fringe the identity of this great area with the
metropolis is lost to the eye, where open country remains unbroken by
streets or close-set buildings.

_Site._--North of the Thames, and west of its tributary the Lea, which
partly bounds the administrative county on the east, London is built
upon a series of slight undulations, only rarely sufficient to make the
streets noticeably steep. On the northern boundary of the county a
height of 443 ft. is found on the open Hampstead Heath. The lesser
streams which flow from this high ground to the Thames are no longer
open. Some, however, as well as other natural features effaced by the
growth of the city, retain an historical interest through the survival
of their names in streets and districts, or through their relation to
the original site of London (in the present City). South of the Thames a
broken amphitheatre of low hills, approaching the river near Greenwich
and Woolwich on the east and Putney and Richmond on the west, encloses a
tract flatter than that to the north, and rises more abruptly in the
southern districts of Streatham, Norwood and Forest Hill.

In attempting to picture the site of London in its original condition,
that is, before any building took place, it is necessary to consider (1)
the condition of the Thames unconfined between made banks, (2) the
slopes overlooking it, (3) the tributary streams which watered these
slopes. The low ground between the slight hills flanking the Thames
valley, and therefore mainly south of the present river, was originally
occupied by a shallow lagoon of estuarine character, tidal, and
interspersed with marshy tracts and certain islets of relatively firm
land. Through this the main stream of the Thames pursued an ill-defined
course. The tributary streams entered through marshy channels. The
natural process of sedimentation assisted the gradual artificial
drainage of the marshes by means of embankments confining the river. The
breadth of this low tract, from Chelsea downward, was from 2 to 3 m. The
line of the foot of the southern hills, from Putney, where it nearly
approaches the present river, lies through Stockwell and Camberwell to
Greenwich, where it again approaches the river. On the north there is a
flat tract between Chelsea and Westminster, covering Pimlico, but from
Westminster down to the Tower there is a marked slope directly up from
the river bank. Lower still, marshes formerly extended far up the valley
of the Lea. The higher slopes of the hills were densely forested (cf.
the modern district-name St John's Wood), while the lower slopes, north
of the river, were more open (cf. Moor-gate). The original city grew up
on the site of the City of London of the present day, on a slight
eminence intersected by the Wal- or Wall-brook, and flanked on the west
by the river Fleet.

[Illustration: Map of The County of LONDON.]

These and other tributary streams have been covered in and built over
(in some cases serving as sewers), but it is possible to trace their
valleys at various points by the fall and rise of streets crossing them,
and their names survive, as will be seen, in various modern
applications. The Wallbrook rose in a marsh in the modern district of
Finsbury, and joined the Thames close to the Cannon Street railway
bridge. A street named after it runs south from the Mansion House
parallel with its course. The Fleet was larger, rising in, and
collecting various small streams from, the high ground of Hampstead. It
passed Kentish Town, Camden Town and King's Cross, and followed a line
approximating to King's Cross Road. The slope of Farringdon Road, where
crossed by Holborn Viaduct, and of New Bridge Street, Blackfriars, marks
its course exactly, and that of Fleet Street and Ludgate Hill its steep
banks. The name also appears in Fleet Road, Hampstead. From King's Cross
downward the banks were so steep and high that the stream was called
Hollow or Hole-bourne, this name surviving in Holborn; and it was fed
by numerous springs (Bagnigge Well, Clerkenwell and others) in this
vicinity. It entered a creek which was navigable for a considerable
distance, and formed a subsidiary harbour for the City, but by the 14th
century this was becoming choked with refuse, and though an attempt was
made to clear it, and wharves were built in 1670, it was wholly arched
over in 1737-1765 below Holborn Bridge. Continuing westward, the most
important stream was Tyburn (q.v.), which rose at Hampstead, and joined
the Thames through branches on either side of Thorney Island, on which
grew up the great ecclesiastical foundation of St Peter, Westminster,
better known as Westminster Abbey. There is no modern survival of the
name of Tyburn, which finds, indeed, its chief historical interest as
attaching to the famous place of execution which lay near the modern
Marble Arch. The residential district in this vicinity was known at a
later date as Tyburnia. The next stream westward was the Westbourne, the
name of which is perpetuated in Westbourne Grove and elsewhere in
Paddington. It rose on the heights of Hampstead, traversed Paddington,
may be traced in the course of the Serpentine lake in Hyde Park, ran
parallel to and east of Sloane Street, and joined the Thames close to
Chelsea Bridge. The main tributaries of the Thames from the north, to
east and west of those described, are not covered, nor is any tributary
of importance from the south entirely concealed.

  _Geology._--London lies within the geological area known as the London
  basin. Within the confines of Greater London the chalk which forms the
  basement of this area appears at the surface in isolated patches about
  Greenwich, while its main line approaches within 10 m. of the City to
  the south and within 15 to the north-west. In the south and north-west
  the typical London clay is the principal formation. In the south-east,
  however, the Blackheath and Woolwich pebble-beds appear, with their
  belts of Thanet sands bordering the chalk. Valley gravel borders the
  Thames, with some interruptions, from Kingston to Greenwich, and
  extends to a wide belt, with ramifications, from Wandsworth south to
  Croydon, and in a narrower line from Greenwich towards Bromley. Brick
  earth overlies it from Kensington to Brentford and west thereof, and
  appears in Chelsea and Fulham, Hornsey and Stoke Newington, and in
  patches south of the Thames between Battersea and Richmond. The main
  deposits of alluvium occur below Lambeth and Westminster, and in the
  valley of the Wandle, which joins the Thames from the south near
  Putney. In the north and west the clay is interspersed with patches of
  plateau gravel in the direction of Finchley (where boulder clay also
  appears), Enfield and Barnet; and of Bagshot sands on Hampstead Heath
  and Harrow Hill. Gravel is found on the high ground about Richmond
  Park and Wimbledon. (See further MIDDLESEX.)

  _Climate._--The climate is equable (though excessive heat is sometimes
  felt for short periods during the summer) and moist, but healthy. Snow
  is most common in the early months of the year. The fogs of London
  have a peculiar and perhaps an exaggerated notoriety. They are apt to
  occur at all seasons, are common from September to February, and most
  common in November. The atmosphere of London is almost invariably
  misty in a greater or less degree, but the denser fogs are generally
  local and of no long duration. They sometimes cause a serious
  dislocation of railway and other traffic. Their principal cause is the
  smoke from the general domestic use of coal. The evil is of very long
  standing, for in 1306 the citizens petitioned Edward I. to prohibit
  the use of sea-coal, and he made it a capital offence. The average
  temperature of the hottest month, July, is 64°.4 F.; of the coldest,
  January, 37°.9; and the mean annual 50°.4. The mean annual rainfall
  ranges in different parts of the metropolis from about 20½ to 27½ in.


London as a whole owes nothing in appearance to the natural
configuration of its site. Moreover, the splendid building is nearly
always a unit; seldom, unless accidentally, a component part of a broad
effect. London has not grown up along formal lines; nor is any large
part of it laid out according to the conceptions of a single generation.
Yet not a few of the great thoroughfares and buildings are individually
worthy of London's preeminence as a city. The most notable of these fall
within a circumscribed area, and it is therefore necessary to preface
their consideration with a statement of the broader characteristic
divisions of the metropolis.

_Characteristic Divisions._--In London north of the Thames, the salient
distinction lies between West and East. From the western boundary of the
City proper, an area covering the greater part of the city of
Westminster, and extending into Chelsea, Kensington, Paddington and
Marylebone, is exclusively associated with the higher-class life of
London. Within the bounds of Westminster are the royal palaces, the
government offices and many other of the finest public buildings, and
the wider area specified includes the majority of the residences of the
wealthier classes, the most beautiful parks and the most fashionable
places of recreation. "Mayfair," north of Piccadilly, and "Belgravia,"
south of Knightsbridge, are common though unofficial names for the
richest residential districts. The "City" bears in the great commercial
buildings fringing its narrow streets all the marks of a centre of the
world's exchanges. East of it there is an abrupt transition to the
district commonly known as the "East End," as distinguished from the
wealthy "West End," a district of mean streets, roughly coincident with
the boroughs of Stepney and Poplar, Shoreditch and Bethnal Green, and
primarily (though by no means exclusively) associated with the problems
attaching to the life of the poor. On the Thames below London Bridge,
London appears in the aspect of one of the world's great ports, with
extensive docks and crowded shipping. North London is as a whole
residential: Hackney, Islington and St Pancras consist mainly of
dwellings of artisans and the middle classes; while in Hampstead, St
Marylebone and Paddington are many terraces and squares of handsome
houses. Throughout the better residential quarters of London the number
of large blocks of flats has greatly increased in modern times. But even
in the midst of the richest quarters, in Westminster and elsewhere,
small but well-defined areas of the poorest dwellings occur.

London south of the Thames has none of the grander characteristics of
the wealthy districts to the north. Poor quarters lie adjacent to the
river over the whole distance from Battersea to Greenwich, merging
southward into residential districts of better class. London has no
single well-defined manufacturing quarter.

  _Suburbs._--Although the boundary of the county of London does not, to
  outward appearance, enclose a city distinct from its suburbs, London
  outside that boundary may be conveniently considered as suburban.
  Large numbers of business men and others who must of necessity live in
  proximity to the metropolis have their homes aloof from its centre. It
  is estimated that upwards of a million daily enter and leave the City
  alone as the commercial heart of London, and a great proportion of
  these travel in and out by the suburban railways. In this aspect the
  principal extension of London has been into the counties of Kent and
  Surrey, to the pleasant hilly districts about Sydenham, Norwood and
  Croydon, Chislehurst and Orpington, Caterham, Redhill and Reigate,
  Epsom, Dorking and Leatherhead; and up the valley of the Thames
  through Richmond to Kingston and Surbiton, Esher and Weybridge, and
  the many townships on both the Surrey and the Middlesex shores of the
  river. On the west and north the residential suburbs immediately
  outside the county include Acton and Ealing, Willesden, Highgate,
  Finchley and Hornsey; from the last two a densely populated district
  extends north through Wood Green and Southgate to Barnet and Enfield;
  while the "residential influence" of the metropolis far exceeds these
  limits, and may be observed at Harrow and Pinner, Bushey and Boxmoor,
  St Albans, Harpenden, Stevenage and many other places. To the
  north-east the beauty of Epping Forest attracts numerous residents to
  Woodford, Chingford and Loughton. The valley of the Lea is also
  thickly populated, but chiefly by an industrial population working in
  the numerous factories along this river. The Lea separates the county
  of London from Essex, but the townships of West Ham and Stratford,
  Barking and Ilford, Leyton and Walthamstow continue the metropolis in
  this direction almost without a break. Their population is also
  largely occupied in local manufacturing establishments; while numerous
  towns on either bank of the lower Thames share in the industries of
  the port of London.

_Streets._--The principal continuous thoroughfares within the
metropolis, though each bears a succession of names, are coincident with
the main roads converging upon the capital from all parts of England. On
the north of the Thames two great thoroughfares from the west meet in
the heart of the City. The northern enters the county in Hammersmith as
Uxbridge Road, crosses Kensington and borders the north side of
Kensington Gardens and Hyde Park as Bayswater Road. It then bears
successively the names of Oxford Street, New Oxford Street and High
Holborn; enters the City, becomes known as Holborn Viaduct from the fact
that it is there carried over other streets which lie at a lower level,
and then as Newgate Street and Cheapside. The southern highway enters
Hammersmith, crosses the centre of Kensington as Kensington Road and
High Street, borders Kensington Gardens and Hyde Park as Kensington Gore
and Knightsbridge, with terraces of fine residences, and merges into
Piccadilly. This beautiful street, with its northward branches, Park
Lane, from which splendid houses overlook Hyde Park, and Bond Street,
lined with handsome shops, may be said to focus the fashionable life of
London. The direct line of the thoroughfare is interrupted after
Piccadilly Circus (the term "circus" is frequently applied to the open
space--not necessarily round--at the junction of several roads), but is
practically resumed in the Strand, with its hotels, shops and numerous
theatres, and continued through the City in Fleet Street, the centre of
the newspaper world, and Ludgate Hill, at the head of which is St Paul's
Cathedral. Thence it runs by commercial Cannon Street to the junction
with Cheapside and several other busy streets. At this junction stand
the Royal Exchange, the Mansion House (the official residence of the
Lord Mayor of London) and the Bank of England, from which this important
point in the communications of London is commonly known as "Bank." From
the east two main roads similarly converge upon the City, which they
enter by Aldgate (the suffix in this and other names indicating the
former existence of one of the City gates). The southern of these
highways, approaching through the eastern suburbs as Barking Road,
becomes East India Docks Road in Poplar and Commercial Road East in
Stepney. The continuous thoroughfare of 12 m. between Hammersmith and
the East India Docks illustrates successively every phase of London
life. The northern road enters from Stratford and is called Bow Road,
Mile End Road, Whitechapel Road and High Street, Whitechapel. From the
north of England two roads preserve communication-lines from the
earliest times. The Old North Road, entering London from the Lea valley
through Hackney and Shoreditch as Stamford Hill, Stoke Newington Road
and Kingsland Road, reaches the City by Bishopsgate. The straight
highway from the north-west which as Edgware Road joins Oxford Street at
the Marble Arch (the north-eastern entrance to Hyde Park) is coincident
with the Roman Watling Street. The Holyhead and Great North Roads,
uniting at Barnet, enter London by branches through Hampstead and
through Highgate, between the Old North and Edgware roads. South of the
Thames the thoroughfares crossing the river between Lambeth and
Bermondsey converge upon two circuses, St George's and the Elephant and
Castle. At the second of these points the majority of the chief roads
from the southern suburbs and the south of England are collected. Among
them, the Old Kent Road continues the southern section of Watling
Street, from Dover and the south-east, through Woolwich and across
Blackheath. The road through Streatham, Brixton and Kennington, taking
name from these districts successively, is the principal southern
highway. The Portsmouth Road from the south-west is well marked as far
as Lambeth, under the names of Wandsworth, High Street, St John's Hill,
Lavender Hill and Wandsworth Road.

_Thames Embankments._--The Thames follows a devious course through
London, and the fine embankments on its north side, nowhere continuing
uninterruptedly for more than 2 m., do not form important thoroughfares,
with the exception of the Victoria Embankment. Mostly they serve rather
as beautiful promenades. One of them begins over against Battersea
Bridge. Its finest portion is the Chelsea Embankment, fronting Battersea
Park across the river, shaded by a pleasant avenue and lined with
handsome houses. It continues, with some interruptions, nearly as far as
the Houses of Parliament. Below these the grandest of the embankments
extends to the City at Blackfriars. It was formed in 1864-1870, and is
named the Victoria Embankment, though its popular title is "The
Embankment" simply. Open gardens fringe it in part on the landward side,
and it is lined with fine public and private buildings. The bold sweep
of the Thames, here some 300 yds. wide, the towers of Westminster on the
one hand and the dome of St Paul's on the other, make up a fine
prospect. Below London Bridge the river is embanked for a short distance
in front of the Tower of London, and above Westminster Bridge the Albert
Embankment extends for nearly 1 m. along the south bank.

_Bridges._--Fourteen road-bridges cross the Thames within the county of
London. Of these London Bridge, connecting the City with Southwark and
Bermondsey, stands first in historical interest and in importance as a
modern highway. The old bridge, famous for many generations, bearing its
rows of houses and its chapel in the centre, was completed early in the
13th century. It was 308 yds. long and had twenty narrow arches, through
which the tides formed dangerous rapids. It stood just below the
existing bridge, which was built of granite by John Rennie and his son
Sir John Rennie, and completed in 1831. A widening to accommodate the
growth of traffic, after being frequently discussed for many years, was
completed in 1904, by means of corbels projecting on either side,
without arresting traffic during the work. There was no bridge over the
Thames below London Bridge until 1894, when the Tower Bridge was opened.
This is a suspension bridge with a central portion, between two lofty
and massive stone towers, consisting of bascules which can be raised by
hydraulic machinery to admit the passage of vessels. The bridge is both
a remarkable engineering work, and architecturally one of the finest
modern structures in London. The bridges in order above London Bridge
are as follows, railway-bridges being bracketed--Southwark, (Cannon
Street), (Blackfriars), Blackfriars, Waterloo, (Hungerford--with a
footway), Westminster, Lambeth, Vauxhall, (Grosvenor), Victoria, Albert,
Battersea, (Battersea), Wandsworth, (Putney), Putney and Hammersmith.
Waterloo Bridge, the oldest now standing within London, is the work of
John Rennie, and was opened in 1817. It is a massive stone structure of
nine arches, carrying a level roadway, and is considered one of the
finest bridges of its kind in the world. The present Westminster Bridge,
of iron on granite piers, was opened in 1862, but another preceded it,
dating from 1750; the view from which was appreciated by Wordsworth in
his sonnet beginning "Earth has not anything to show more fair." The
complete reconstruction of Vauxhall Bridge was undertaken in 1902, and
the new bridge was opened in 1906. Some of the bridges were built by
companies, and tolls were levied at their crossing until modern times;
thus Southwark Bridge was made toll-free in 1866, and Waterloo Bridge
only in 1878, on being acquired by the City Corporation and the
Metropolitan Board of Works respectively. The road-bridges mentioned
(except the City bridges) are maintained by the London County Council,
who expended for this purpose a sum of £9149 in 1907-1908. The following
table shows the capital expenditure on the more important bridges and
their cost of maintenance in 1907-1908:--

                            Net Capital    Cost of Maintenance
                            Expenditure.        1907-1908.

  Albert Bridge               £120,774            £1296
  Battersea Bridge             312,193              512
  Hammersmith Bridge           204,250              421
  Lambeth Bridge                47,555              496
  Putney Bridge                430,052              653
  Vauxhall Bridge (temporary)  270,749               73
  Vauxhall Bridge (new)        457,108             1109
  Wandsworth Bridge             65,661              410
  Waterloo Bridge              552,867             1102
  Westminster Bridge           393,189             1491

The properties entrusted to the Corporation for the upkeep of London
Bridge are managed by the Bridge House Estates Committee, the revenues
from which are also used in the maintenance of the other three City
bridges, £26,989 being thus expended in 1907, the Tower bridge absorbing
£17,735 of this amount.

_Thames Tunnels._--Some of the metropolitan railway lines cross the
river in tunnels beneath its bed. There are also several tunnels under
the river below London Bridge, namely: Tower Subway, constructed in 1870
for foot-passengers, but no longer used, Greenwich Tunnel (1902) for
foot-passengers, Blackwall Tunnel (1897), constructed by the County
Council between Greenwich and Poplar, and Woolwich Tunnel, begun in
1910. A tunnel between Rotherhithe and Ratcliff was authorized in 1897
and opened in 1908. The Thames Tunnel (1825-1843), 2 m. below London
Bridge, became a railway tunnel in 1865. The County Council maintains a
free ferry at Woolwich for passengers and vehicular traffic. The capital
expenditure on this undertaking was £185,337 and the expense of
maintenance in 1907-1908 £20,881. The Greenwich Tunnel (capital
expenditure £179,293) in the same year had expended on it for
maintenance £3725, and the Blackwall Tunnel (capital expenditure
£1,268,951) £11,420. The capital expenditure on the Rotherhithe Tunnel
was £1,414,561.

_Parks._--The administration and acreage of parks and open spaces, and
their provisions for the public recreation, fall for consideration
later, but some of them are notable features in the topography of
London. The royal parks, namely St James's, Green and Hyde Park, and
Kensington Gardens, stretch in an irregular belt for nearly 3 m. between
Whitehall (Westminster) and Kensington. St James's Park was transformed
from marshy land into a deer park, bowling green and tennis court by
Henry VIII., extended and laid out as a pleasure garden by Charles II.,
and rearranged according to the designs of John Nash in 1827-1829. Its
lake, the broad Mall leading up to Buckingham Palace, and the proximity
of the government buildings in Whitehall, combine to beautify it. Here
was established, by licence from James I., the so-called Milk Fair,
which remained, its ownership always in the same family, until 1905,
when, on alterations being made to the Mall, a new stall was erected for
the owners during their lifetime, though the cow or cows kept here were
no longer allowed. St James's Park is continued between the Mall and
Piccadilly by the Green Park. Hyde Park, to the west, belonged
originally to the manor of Hyde, which was attached to Westminster
Abbey, but was taken by Henry VIII. on the dissolution of the
monasteries. Two of its gateways are noteworthy, namely that at Hyde
Park Corner at the south-east and the Marble Arch at the north-east. The
first was built in 1828 from designs of Decimus Burton, and comprises
three arches with a frieze above the central arch copied from the Elgin
marbles in the British Museum. The Marble Arch was intended as a
monument to Nelson, and first stood in front of Buckingham Palace, being
moved to its present site in 1851. It no longer forms an entrance to the
park, as in 1908 a corner of the park was cut off and a roadway was
formed to give additional accommodation for the heavy traffic between
Oxford Street, Edgware Road and Park Lane. The Marble Arch was thus left
isolated. Hyde Park contains the Serpentine, a lake 1500 yds. in length,
from the bridge over which one of the finest prospects in London is
seen, extending to the distant towers of Westminster. Since the 17th
century this park has been one of the most favoured resorts of
fashionable society, and at the height of the "season," from May to the
end of July, its drives present a brilliant scene. In the 17th and 18th
centuries it was a favourite duelling-ground, and in the present day it
is not infrequently the scene of political and other popular
demonstrations (as is also Trafalgar Square), while the neighbourhood of
Marble Arch is the constant resort of orators on social and religious
topics. Kensington Gardens, originally attached to Kensington Palace,
were subsequently much extended; they are magnificently timbered, and
contain plantations of rare shrubs and flowering trees. Regent's Park,
mainly in the borough of Marylebone, owes its preservation to the
intention of George III. to build a palace here. The other most notable
open spaces wholly or partly within the county are Hampstead Heath in
the north-west, a wild, high-lying tract preserved to a great extent in
its natural state, and in the south-west Wimbledon Common, Putney Heath
and the royal demesne of Richmond Park, which from its higher parts
commands a wonderful view up the rich valley of the Thames. The outlying
parts of the county to east, south and north are not lacking in open
spaces, but there is an extensive inner area where at most only small
gardens and squares break the continuity of buildings, and where in some
cases old churchyards serve as public grounds.

  _Architecture._--While stone is the material used in the construction
  of the majority of great buildings of London, some modern examples
  (notably the Westminster Roman Catholic cathedral) are of red brick
  with stone dressings; and brick is in commonest use for general
  domestic building. The smoke-laden atmosphere has been found not
  infrequently to exercise a deleterious effect upon the stonework of
  important buildings; and through the same cause the appearance of
  London as a whole is by some condemned as sombre. Bright colour, in
  truth, is wanting, though attempts are made in a few important modern
  erections to supply it, a notable instance being the Savoy Hotel
  buildings (1904) in the Strand. Portland stone is frequently employed
  in the larger buildings, as in St Paul's Cathedral, and under the
  various influences of weather and atmosphere acquires strongly
  contrasting tones of light grey and black. Owing to the by-laws of the
  County Council, the method of raising commercial or residential
  buildings to an extreme height is not practised in London; the block
  known as Queen Anne's Mansions, Westminster, is an exception, though
  it cannot be called high in comparison with American high buildings.

    Ecclesiastical architecture.

  Architectural remains of earlier date than the Norman period are very
  few, and of historical rather than topographical importance. In
  architecture of the Norman and Gothic periods London must be
  considered rich, though its richness is poverty when its losses,
  particularly during the great fire of 1666, are recalled. These losses
  were confined within the City, but, to go no farther, included the
  Norman and Gothic cathedral of St Paul, perhaps a nobler monument of
  its period than any which has survived it, much as it had suffered
  from injudicious restoration. Ancient architecture in London is
  principally ecclesiastical. Westminster Abbey is pre-eminent; in part,
  it may be, owing to the reverence felt towards it in preference to the
  classical St Paul's by those whose ideal of a cathedral church is
  essentially Gothic, but mainly from the fact that it is the
  burial-place of many of the English monarchs and their greatest
  subjects, as well as the scene of their coronations (see WESTMINSTER).
  In the survey of London (1598) by John Stow, 125 churches, including
  St Paul's and Westminster Abbey, are named; of these 89 were destroyed
  by the great fire. Thirteen large conventual churches were mentioned
  by Fitzstephen in the time of Henry II., and of these there are some

  The church of St Bartholomew the Great, Smithfield, is the finest
  remnant of its period in London. It was founded in 1123 by Rahere,
  who, probably a Breton by birth, was a courtier in the reign of
  William II. He is said to have been the king's minstrel, and to have
  spent the earlier part of his life in frivolity. Subsequently he
  entered holy orders, and in _c._ 1120, being stricken with fever while
  on a pilgrimage to Rome, vowed that he would found a hospital in
  London. St Bartholomew, appearing to him in a vision, bade him add a
  church to his foundation. He became an Augustinian canon, and founded
  his hospital, which is now, as St Bartholomew's Hospital, one of the
  principal medical institutions in the metropolis. He became its first
  master. Later he erected the priory, for canons of his order, of which
  the nave and transepts of the church remain. The work is in the main
  very fine Norman, with triforium, ambulatory and apsidal eastern end.
  An eastern lady chapel dates from c. 1410, but the upper part is
  modern, for the chapel was long desecrated. There are remains of the
  cloisters north of the church,--and praiseworthy efforts have been
  made since 1903 towards their restoration. The western limit of the
  former nave of the church is marked by a fine Early English doorway,
  now forming an entrance to the churchyard. Rahere's tomb remains in
  the church; the canopy is Perpendicular work, but the effigy is
  believed to be original. He died in 1144.

  The Temple Church (see INNS OF COURT), serving for the Inner and
  Middle Temples, belonged to the Knights Templars. It is the finest of
  the four ancient round churches in England, dating from 1185, but an
  Early English choir opens from the round church. St Saviour's in
  Southwark (q.v.), the cathedral church of the modern bishopric of
  Southwark, was the church of the priory of St Mary Overy, and is a
  large cruciform building mainly Early English in style. There may be
  mentioned also an early pier in the church of St Katherine Cree or
  Christ Church, Leadenhall Street, belonging to the priory church of
  the Holy Trinity; old monuments in the vaults beneath St James's
  Church, Clerkenwell, formerly attached to a Benedictine nunnery; and
  the Perpendicular gateway and the crypt of the church of the priory of
  St John of Jerusalem (see FINSBURY). Among other ancient churches
  within the City, that of All Hallows Barking, near the Tower of
  London, is principally Perpendicular and contains some fine brasses.
  It belonged to the convent at Barking, Essex, and was the burial-place
  of many who were executed at the scaffold on Tower Hill. St Andrew
  Undershaft, so named because a Maypole used to be set up before the
  former church on May-day, is late Perpendicular (c. 1530); and
  contains a monument to John Stow the chronicler (d. 1605). The church
  of Austin Friars, originally belonging to a friary founded in 1253,
  became a Dutch church under a grant of Edward VI., and still remains
  so; its style is principally Decorated, but through various
  vicissitudes little of the original work is left. St Giles,
  Cripplegate, was founded _c._ 1090, but the existing church is late
  Perpendicular. It is the burial-place of Fox the martyrologist and
  Milton the poet, and contains some fine wood-carving by Grinling
  Gibbons. St Helen's, Bishopsgate, belonged to a priory of nuns founded
  c. 1212, but the greater part of the building is later. It has two
  naves parallel, originally for the use of the nuns and the
  parishioners respectively. The church of St Mary-le-Bow, in Cheapside,
  is built upon a Norman crypt, and that of St Olave's, Hart Street,
  which was Pepys's church and contains a modern memorial to him, is of
  the 15th century. Other ancient churches outside the City are few; but
  there may be noted St Margaret's, under the shadow of Westminster
  Abbey; and the beautiful Ely Chapel in Holborn (q.v.), the only
  remnant of a palace of the bishops of Ely, now used by the Roman
  Catholics. The Chapel Royal, Savoy, near the Strand, was rebuilt by
  Henry VII. on the site of Savoy Palace, which was erected by Peter,
  earl of Savoy and Richmond, in 1245, and destroyed in the insurrection
  of Wat Tyler in 1381. In 1505 Henry VII. endowed here a hospital of St
  John the Baptist for the poor. The chapel was used as the parish
  church of St Mary-le-Strand (1564-1717) and constituted a Chapel Royal
  in 1773; but there are no remains of the rest of the foundation.

    Sir Christopher Wren.

    Later churches.

  The architect to whom, after the great fire of 1666, the opportunity
  fell of leaving the marks of his influence upon London was Sir
  Christopher Wren. Had all his schemes been followed out, that
  influence would have extended beyond architecture alone. He, among
  others, prepared designs for laying out the City anew. But no such
  model city was destined to be built; the necessity for haste and the
  jealous guardianship of rights to old foundations resulted in the old
  lines being generally followed. It is characteristic of London that St
  Paul's Cathedral (q.v.) should be closely hemmed in by houses, and its
  majestic west front approached obliquely by a winding thoroughfare.
  The cathedral is Wren's crowning work. It is the scene from time to
  time of splendid ceremonies, and contains the tombs of many great men;
  but in this respect it cannot compete with the peculiar associations
  of Westminster Abbey. Of Wren's other churches it is to be noted that
  the necessity of economy usually led him to pay special attention to a
  single feature. He generally chose the steeple, and there are many
  fine examples of his work in this department. The steeple of St
  Mary-le-Bow, commonly called Bow Church, is one of the most
  noteworthy. This church has various points of interest besides its
  Norman crypt, from which it took the name of Bow, being the first
  church in London built on arches. The ecclesiastical Court of Arches
  sat here formerly. "Bow bells" are famous, and any person born within
  hearing of them is said to be a "Cockney," a term now applied
  particularly to the dialect of the lower classes in London. Wren
  occasionally followed the Gothic model, as in St Antholin. The classic
  style, however, was generally adopted in the period succeeding his
  own. Some fine churches belong to this period, such as St
  Martin's-in-the-Fields (1726), the Corinthian portico of which rises
  on the upper part of Trafalgar Square; but other examples are
  regrettable. While the architecture of the City churches, with the
  exceptions mentioned, is not as a rule remarkable, many are notable
  for the rich and beautiful wood-carving they contain. A Gothic style
  has been most commonly adopted in building modern churches; but of
  these the most notable, the Roman Catholic Westminster Cathedral (see
  WESTMINSTER), is Byzantine, and built principally of brick, with a
  lofty campanile. The only other ecclesiastical building to be
  specially mentioned is Lambeth Palace, opposite to the Houses of
  Parliament across the Thames. It has been a seat of the archbishops of
  Canterbury since 1197, and though the present residential portion
  dates only from the early 19th century, the chapel, hall and other
  parts are of the 13th century and later (see LAMBETH).

    Tower of London.

  Among secular buildings, there is none more venerable than the Tower
  of London (q.v.), the moated fortress which overlooks the Thames at
  the eastern boundary of the City. It presents fine examples of Norman
  architecture; its historical associations are of the highest interest,
  and its armoury and the regalia of England, which are kept here,
  attract great numbers of visitors.

    Government buildings.

  The Houses of Parliament, with Westminster Abbey and St Margaret's
  Church, complete the finest group of buildings which London possesses;
  a group essentially Gothic, for the Houses of Parliament, completed in
  1867 from the designs of Barry, are in a late Perpendicular style.
  They cover a great area, the east front giving immediately upon the
  Thames. The principal external features are the huge Victoria Tower at
  the south, and the clock tower, with its well-known chimes and the
  hour-bell "Big Ben," on the north. Some of the apartments are
  magnificently adorned within, and the building incorporates the
  ancient Westminster Hall, belonging to the former royal palace on the
  site (see WESTMINSTER). The government offices are principally in
  Whitehall, the fine thoroughfare which connects Parliament Square, in
  the angle between the Houses and the Abbey, with Trafalgar Square.
  Somerset House (1776-1786), a massive range of buildings by Sir
  William Chambers, surrounding a quadrangle, and having its front upon
  the Strand and back upon the Victoria Embankment, occupies the site of
  a palace founded by the protector Somerset, c. 1548. It contains the
  Exchequer and Audit, Inland Revenue, Probate, Registrar-General's and
  other offices, and one wing houses King's College. Other offices are
  the New Record Office, the repository of State papers and other
  records, and the Patent Office in Chancery Lane. The Heralds' College
  or College of Arms, the official authority in matters of armorial
  bearings and pedigrees, occupies a building in Queen Victoria Street,
  City, erected subsequently to the great fire (1683). The Royal Courts
  of Justice or Law Courts stand adjacent to the Inns of Court, facing
  the Strand at the point where a memorial marks the site of Old Temple
  Bar (1672), at the entrance to the City, removed in 1878 and later
  re-erected at Theobald's Park, near Cheshunt, Hertfordshire. The Law
  Courts (1882) were erected from the designs of G. E. Street, in a
  Gothic style.

  The buildings connected with local government in London are with one
  exception modern, and handsome town-halls have been erected for some
  of the boroughs. The exception is the Guildhall (q.v.) of the City
  Corporation, with its splendid hall, the scene of meetings and
  entertainments of the corporation, its council chamber, library and
  crypt (partly opened to the public in 1910). In 1906 the London County
  Council obtained parliamentary sanction for the erection of a county
  hall on the south bank of the Thames, immediately east of Westminster
  Bridge, and in 1908 a design submitted by Mr Ralph Knott was accepted
  in competition. The style prescribed was English Renaissance. Several
  of the great livery companies or gilds of the City possess fine halls,
  containing portraits and other collections of high interest and value.
  Among the more notable of these halls are those of the Mercers,
  Drapers, Fishmongers, Clothworkers, Armourers and Stationers.

    Royal palaces.

  The former royal palaces of Westminster and of Whitehall, of which the
  fine Jacobean banqueting hall remains, are described under
  WESTMINSTER. The present London residence of the sovereign is
  Buckingham Palace, on the west side of St James's Park, with beautiful
  gardens behind it. Buckingham House was built in 1705 for the duke of
  Buckinghamshire, and purchased by George III. in 1762. The existing
  palace was finished by John Nash in 1835, but did not meet with
  approval, and was considerably altered before Queen Victoria occupied
  it in 1837. As regards its exterior appearance it is one of the least
  satisfactory of London's great buildings, though the throne room and
  other state apartments are magnificent within. The picture gallery
  contains valuable works of Dutch masters and others. The front of the
  palace forms the background to the public memorial to Queen Victoria,
  at the head of the Mall. Provision was made in the design, by Sir
  Aston Webb, for the extension of the Mall to open upon Trafalgar
  Square, through gateways in a semicircular range of buildings to be
  occupied by government offices, and for a wide circular space in front
  of the Palace, with a statue of the Queen by Thomas Brock in its
  centre. St James's Palace, at the north side of St James's Park, was
  acquired and rebuilt by Henry VIII., having been formerly a hospital
  founded in the 12th century for leprous maidens. It was the royal
  residence after the destruction of Whitehall by fire in the time of
  William III. until a fire in 1809 destroyed the greater part. Only the
  gateway and certain apartments remain of the Tudor building.
  Marlborough House, adjacent to the palace, was built by the first duke
  of Marlborough in 1710 from the designs of Wren, came into possession
  of the Crown in 1817, and has been occupied since 1863 by the prince
  of Wales. In Kensington (q.v.), on the west side of Kensington
  Gardens, is the palace acquired by William III. as a country seat, and
  though no longer used by the sovereign, is in part occupied by members
  of the royal family, and possesses a deeper historical interest than
  the other royal palaces, as the birthplace of Queen Victoria and her
  residence in youth.

  There are few survivals of ancient domestic architecture in London,
  but the gabled and timbered front of Staple Inn, Holborn (q.v.) is a
  picturesque fragment. In Bishopsgate Street, City, stood Crosby Hall,
  which belonged to Crosby Place, the mansion of Sir John Crosby (d.
  1475). Richard III. occupied the mansion as duke of Gloucester and
  Lord Protector (cf. Shakespeare's _Richard III._, Act i. Sc. 3, &c.)
  The hall was removed in 1908, in spite of strong efforts to preserve
  it, which resulted in its re-erection on a site in Chelsea. The hall
  of the Middle Temple is an admirable example of a refectory of later
  date (1572).

  A fine though circumscribed group of buildings is that in the heart of
  the City which includes the Bank of England, the Royal Exchange and
  the Mansion House. The Bank is a characteristic building,
  quadrilateral, massive and low, but covering a large area, without
  external windows, and almost wholly unadorned; though the north-west
  corner is copied from the Temple of the Sibyl at Tivoli. The building
  is mainly the work of Sir John Soane (c. 1788). The first building for
  the Royal Exchange was erected and presented to the City by Sir Thomas
  Gresham (1565-1570) whose crest, a grasshopper, appears in the
  wind-vane above the present building. Gresham's Exchange was destroyed
  in the great fire of 1666; and the subsequent building was similarly
  destroyed in 1838. The present building has an imposing Corinthian
  portico, and encloses a court surrounded by an ambulatory adorned with
  historical paintings by Leighton, Seymour Lucas, Stanhope Forbes and
  others. The Mansion House was erected c. 1740.

  The only other public buildings, beyond those at Westminster, which
  fall into a great group are the modern museums, the Imperial
  Institute, London University and other institutions, and Albert Hall,
  which lie between Kensington Gore and Brompton and Cromwell Roads, and
  these, together with the National Gallery (in Trafalgar Square) and
  other art galleries, and the principal scientific, educational and
  recreative institutions, are considered in Section V.

  _Monuments and Memorials._--The Monument (1677), Fish Street Hill,
  City, erected from the designs of Wren in commemoration of the great
  fire of 1666, is a Doric column surmounted by a gilt representation of
  a flaming urn. The Nelson Column, the central feature of Trafalgar
  Square, is from the designs of William Railton (1843), crowned with a
  statue of Nelson by Baily, and has at its base four colossal lions in
  bronze, modelled by Sir Edwin Landseer. A statue of the duke of
  Cambridge, by Captain Adrian Jones, was unveiled in 1907 in front of
  the War Office, Whitehall. The duke of York's Column, Carlton House
  Terrace (1833), an Ionic pillar, is surmounted by a bronze statue by
  Sir Richard Westmacott. The Westminster Column, outside the entrance
  to Dean's Yard, was erected to the memory of the old pupils of
  Westminster School who died in the Russian and Indian wars of
  1854-1859. The Guards Memorial, Waterloo Place, commemorates the foot
  guards who died in the Crimea. The Albert Memorial, Kensington
  Gardens, was erected (1872) by "Queen Victoria and her People to the
  memory of Albert, Prince Consort," from the designs of Sir Gilbert
  Scott, with a statue of the Prince (1876) by John Henry Foley beneath
  a huge ornate Gothic canopy. At the eastern end of the Strand a
  memorial with statue by Hamo Thorneycroft of William Ewart Gladstone
  was unveiled in 1905. In Parliament Square and elsewhere are numerous
  statues, some of high merit, but it cannot be said that statuary
  occupies an important place in the adornment of streets and open
  places in London. Cleopatra's Needle, an ancient Egyptian monument,
  was presented to the government by Mehemet Ali in 1819, brought from
  Alexandria in 1878, and erected on the Victoria embankment on a
  pedestal of grey granite.

_Nomenclature._--Having regard to the destruction of visible evidences
of antiquity in London, both through accidental agencies such as the
great fire, and through inevitable modernizing influences, it is well
that historical associations in nomenclature are preserved in a great
measure unimpaired. The City naturally offers the richest field for
study in this direction. The derivations of names may here be grouped
into two classes, those having a commercial connexion, and those
associated with ancient buildings, particularly the City wall and
ecclesiastical foundations. Among examples of the first group, Cheapside
is prominent. This modern thoroughfare of shops was in early times the
Chepe (O. Eng. _ceap_, bargain), an open place occupied by a market,
having, until the 14th century, a space set apart for popular
entertainments. There was a Queen Eleanor cross here, and conduits
supplied the city with water. Modern Cheapside merges eastward into the
street called the Poultry, from the poulterers' stalls "but lately
departed from thence," according to Stow, at the close of the 16th
century. Cornhill, again, recalls the cornmarket "time out of mind there
holden" (Stow), and Gracechurch Street was corrupted from the name of
the church of St Benet Grasschurch (destroyed by the great fire,
rebuilt, and removed in 1868), which was said to be derived from a
herb-market held under its walls. The Jews had their quarter near the
commercial centre, their presence being indicated by the street named
Old Jewry, though it is probable that they did not reoccupy this
locality after their expulsion in 1290. Lombard Street similarly points
to the residence of Lombard merchants, the name existing when Edward II.
confirmed a grant to Florentine merchants in 1318, while the Lombards
maintained their position until Tudor times. Paternoster Row, still
occupied by booksellers, takes name from the sellers of prayer-books and
writers of texts who collected under the shadow of St Paul's Cathedral.
As regards names derived from ancient buildings, instances are the
streets called London Wall and Barbican, and those named after the
numerous gates. Of those associated with ecclesiastical foundations
several occur in the course of this article (Section II.,
_Ecclesiastical Architecture_, &c.). Such are Austin Friars, Crutched
Friars, Blackfriars and Whitefriars. To this last district a curious
alternative name, Alsatia, was given, probably in the 17th century, with
reference to its notoriety as a hiding-place of debtors. A derivation is
suggested from the disputed territory of Alsace, pointing the contrast
between this lawless district and the adjacent Temple, the home of the
law itself. The name Bridewell came from a well near the Fleet (New
Bridge Street), dedicated to St Bride, and was attached to a house built
by Henry VIII. (1522), but is most familiar in its application to the
house of correction instituted by Edward VI., which remained a prison
till 1863. The Minories, a street leading south from Aldgate, takes name
from an abbey of nuns of St Clare (_Sorores Minores_) founded in 1293.
Apart from the City an interesting ecclesiastical survival is the name
Broad Sanctuary, Westminster, recalling the place of sanctuary which
long survived the monastery under the protection of which it originally
existed. Covent Garden, again, took its name from a convent garden
belonging to Westminster. Among the survivals of names of
non-ecclesiastical buildings Castle Baynard may be noted; it stood in
the City on the banks of the Thames, and was held by Ralph Baynard, a
Norman, in the time of william the Conqueror; a later building being
erected in 1428 by Humphrey duke of Gloucester. Here Richard III. was
acclaimed king, and the mansion was used by Henry VII. and Henry VIII.
Its name is kept in a wharf and a ward of the City.

The survival of names of obliterated physical features or
characteristics is illustrated in Section I.; but additional instances
are found in the Strand, which originally ran close to the sloping bank
of the Thames, and in Smithfield, now the central meat market, but for
long the "smooth field" where a cattle and hay market was held, and the
scene of tournaments and games, and also of executions. Here in 1381 Wat
Tyler the rebel was killed by Sir William Walworth during the parley
with Richard II. In the West End of London the majority of important
street-names are naturally of a later derivation than those in the
ancient City, though Charing Cross (q.v.) is an instance of an
exception. The derivation commonly accepted for Piccadilly is from
_pickadil_, a stiff collar or hem in fashion in the early part of the
17th century (Span. _picca_, a spear-head). In Pall Mall and the
neighbouring Mall in St James' Park is found the title of a game
resembling croquet (Fr. _paille maille_) in favour at or before the time
of Charles I., though the Mall was laid out for the game by Charles II.
Other names pointing to the existence of pastimes now extinct are found
elsewhere in London, as in Balls Pond Road, Islington, where in the 17th
century was a proprietary pond for the sport of duck-hunting. An
entertainment of another form is recalled in the name of Spring Gardens,
St James' Park, where at the time of James I. there was a fountain or
spring so arranged as to besprinkle those who trod unwarily on the valve
which opened it. Many of the names of the rich residential streets and
squares in the west have associations with the various owners of the
properties; but Mayfair is so called from a fair held on this ground in
May as early as the reign of Charles II. Finally there are several
survivals, in street-names, of former private mansions and other
buildings. Thus the district of the Adelphi, south of Charing Cross,
takes name from the block of dwellings and offices erected in 1768 by
the brothers (Gr. _adelphi_) Robert and William Adam, Scottish
architects. In Piccadilly Clarendon House, erected in 1664 by Edward
Hyde, earl of Clarendon, became Albemarle House when acquired by the
duke of Albemarle in 1675. Northumberland House, from which is named
Northumberland Avenue, opening upon Trafalgar Square, was built _c._
1605 by Henry Howard, earl of Northampton, and was acquired by marriage
by Algernon Percy, earl of Northumberland, in 1642. It took name from
this family, and stood until 1874. Arundel House, originally a seat of
the bishops of Bath, was the residence of Thomas Howard, earl of
Arundel, whose famous collection of sculpture, the Arundel Marbles, was
housed here until presented to Oxford University in 1667. The site of
the house is marked by Arundel Street, Strand.


  _Railways._--The trunk railways leaving London, with their termini,
  are as follows: (1) _Northern_. The Great Northern, Midland and London
  & North-Western systems have adjacent termini, namely King's Cross, St
  Pancras and Euston, in Euston Road, St Pancras. The terminus of the
  Great Central railway is Marylebone, in the road of that name. (2)
  _Western_. The terminus of the Great Western railway is Paddington
  (Praed Street); and that of the London & South-Western, Waterloo,
  south of the Thames in Lambeth. (3) _Southern._ The London, Brighton &
  South Coast railway has its western terminus at Victoria, and its
  central terminus at London Bridge, on the south side of the Thames.
  The South-Eastern & Chatham railway has four terminal stations, all on
  or close to the north bank of the river--Victoria, Charing Cross,[2]
  Holborn Viaduct and Cannon Street (City). St Paul's Station on the
  Holborn branch is also terminal in part. (4) _Eastern._ The principal
  terminus of the Great Eastern Railway is in Liverpool Street (City),
  but the company also uses Fenchurch Street (City), the terminus of the
  London, Tilbury & Southend railway, and St Pancras. These lines,
  especially the southern lines, the Great Eastern, Great Northern and
  South-Western carry a very heavy suburban traffic. Systems of joint
  lines and running powers are maintained to afford communication
  between the main lines. Thus the West London Extension line carries
  local traffic between the North Western and Great Western and the
  Brighton and South-Western systems, while the Metropolitan Extension
  through the City connects the Midland and Great Northern with the
  South-Eastern & Chatham lines.

  The railways whose systems are mainly or wholly confined within the
  metropolitan area are as follows. The North London railway has a
  terminal station at Broad Street, City, and serves the parts of London
  implied by its name. The company possesses running powers over the
  lines of various other companies: thus its trains run as far north as
  Potter's Bar on the Great Northern line, while it serves Richmond on
  the west and Poplar on the east. The East London line connects
  Shoreditch with New Cross (Deptford) by way of the Thames Tunnel, a
  subway under the river originally built for foot-passengers. The
  London & India Docks line connects the city with the docks on the
  north bank of the river as far as North Woolwich. The Metropolitan
  railway has a line from Baker Street through north-west London to
  Harrow, continuing to Uxbridge, while the original main line runs on
  to Rickmansworth, Aylesbury and Verney Junction, but has been worked
  by the Metropolitan and Great Central companies jointly since 1906.
  Another line serves the western outskirts (Hammersmith, Richmond, &c.)
  from the city. Metropolitan trains also connect at New Cross with the
  south-eastern railway system. This company combines with the
  Metropolitan District to form the Inner Circle line, which has
  stations close to all the great railway termini north of the Thames.
  The Metropolitan District (commonly called the District) system serves
  Wimbledon, Richmond, Ealing and Harrow on the west, and passes
  eastward by Earl's Court, South Kensington, Victoria and Mansion House
  (City) to Whitechapel and Bow. The Metropolitan and the District lines
  within London are for the most part underground (this feature
  supplying the title of "the Underground" familiarly applied to both
  systems); the tunnels being constructed of brick. The earliest part of
  the system was opened in 1863. Although these railways, as far as
  concerns the districts they serve, form the fastest method of
  communication from point to point, their discomfort, arising mainly
  from the impossibility of proper ventilation, and various other
  disadvantages attendant upon the use of steam traction, led to a
  determination to adapt the lines to electrical working. Experiments on
  a short section of the line were made in 1900, and later schemes were
  set on foot to electrify the District system and bring under one
  general control this railway, other lines in deep level "tubes"
  between Baker Street and Waterloo, between Charing Cross, Euston and
  Hampstead, and between Hammersmith, Brompton, Piccadilly, King's Cross
  and Finsbury Park, and the London United Tramways Company. The
  Underground Electric Railways Company, which acquired a controlling
  influence over these concerns, undertook the construction of a great
  power station at Chelsea; while the Metropolitan Company, which had
  fallen into line with the District (not without dispute over the
  system of electrification to be adopted) erected a station at Neasden
  on the Aylesbury branch. Electric traction was gradually introduced on
  the Metropolitan and the District lines in 1906. The former company
  combined with the Great Western Company as regards the electrification
  of, and provision of stock for, the lines which they had previously
  worked jointly, from Edgware Road by Bishop's Road to Hammersmith, &c.
  The Baker Street & Waterloo railway (known as the "Bakerloo") was
  opened in 1906 and subsequently extended in one direction to
  Paddington and in the other to the Elephant and Castle. The Great
  Northern, Piccadilly & Brompton line, from Finsbury Park to
  Hammersmith, was opened early in 1907, and the Charing Cross, Euston &
  Hampstead line later in the same year. Deep-level electric railways
  ("tubes"), communicating with the surface by lifts, were already
  familiar in London. The first opened was the City & South London
  (1890), subsequently extended to run between Euston, the Angel,
  Islington, the Bank (City) and Clapham. Others are the Waterloo & City
  (1898) running from the terminus of the South-Western railway without
  intermediate stations to the Bank; the Central London (1900), from the
  Bank to Shepherd's Bush, Hammersmith; and the Great Northern & City
  (1904) from Finsbury Park (which is an important suburban junction on
  the Great Northern railway) to Moorgate Street.

  _Tramways._--The surface tramway system of London cannot be complete,
  as, within an area roughly represented by the boroughs of Chelsea,
  Kensington and Fulham, the city of Westminster and a considerable
  district north thereof, and the city of London, the existing streets
  could not accommodate tram lines along with other traffic over any
  great distance consecutively, and in point of fact there are few,
  beyond the embankment line from Blackfriars Bridge to Westminster
  Bridge, which connects with the southern system. Another line, running
  south from Islington, uses the shallow-level subway under Kingsway and
  connects with the embankment line. The northern, western and eastern
  outskirts and London south of the Thames are extensively served by
  trams. On the formation of the London County Council there were
  thirteen tramway companies in existence. Powers under the Tramways Act
  of 1870 were given to the council, enabling it to acquire possession
  of these undertakings, and within the county of London they have been
  for the most part so acquired, and are worked by the council. Outside
  the county both companies and local authorities own and work tramways.
  Both electric and horse traction are used; the latter, however, has
  been in great part displaced by the former. The total mileage for
  greater London is about 240.

  _Omnibuses._--The omnibus system is very extensive, embracing all the
  principal streets throughout the county and extending over a large
  part of Greater London. The two principal omnibus companies are the
  London General Omnibus and the London Road Car. The first omnibus ran
  between the Bank and Paddington in 1829. In 1905 and following years
  motor omnibuses (worked mostly by internal combustion engines) began
  to a large extent to supplant horse traction. The principal existing
  companies adopted them, and new companies were formed to work them
  exclusively. With their advantages of greater speed and carrying
  capacity over the horsed vehicles, their introduction was a most
  important development, though their working at first imposed a severe
  financial strain on many companies.

  _Cabs._--The horse-drawn cabs which ply for hire in the streets, or
  wait at authorized "cab-stands," are of two kinds, the "hansom," a
  two-wheeled vehicle so named after its inventor (1834) and the
  "four-wheeler." "Hackney coaches" for hire are first mentioned in
  1625, when they were kept at inns, and numbered 20. Until 1832 their
  numbers were restricted, in 1662 to 400, in 1694 to 700, in 1771 to
  1000. In some cases a driver owns his cab, but the majority of
  vehicles are let to drivers by owners, and the adjustment of terms
  between them has led to disputes from time to time. In 1894 a dispute
  necessitated the formulation of the "Asquith award" by the Rt. Hon. H.
  H. Asquith as home secretary, and subsequent modifications of this
  were only arrived at, as in 1904, after a strike of the drivers
  affected. A long-standing cause of complaint on the part of the public
  has been the common refusal of cab-drivers to accept their legal
  fares, but, on the other hand, several attempts to introduce cabs with
  an automatic taximeter failed, until the introduction of motor cabs,
  of which a few had already been plying for some time when in 1907 a
  large number, provided with taximeters, were put into service.
  Subsequently, as the number of "taxicabs" (see MOTOR VEHICLES)
  increased, that of horse-cabs decreased.

    Traffic commission 1903.

  _Traffic Problem._--One of the most serious administrative problems
  met with in London is that of locomotion, especially as regards the
  regulation of traffic in the principal thoroughfares and at the
  busiest crossings. The police have powers of control over vehicles and
  exercise them admirably; their work in this respect is a constant
  source of wonder to foreign visitors. But this control does not meet
  the problem of actually lessening the number of vehicles in the main
  arteries of traffic. At such crossings as that of the Strand and
  Wellington Street, Ludgate Circus and south of the Thames, the
  Elephant and Castle, as also in the narrow streets of the City,
  congestion is often exceedingly severe, and is aggravated when any
  main street is under repair, and diversion of traffic through narrow
  side streets becomes necessary. Many street improvements were carried
  out, it is true, in the last half of the 19th century, the dates of
  the principal being as follows: 1854, Cannon Street; 1864, Southwark
  Street; 1870, Holborn Viaduct; 1871, Hamilton Place, Queen Victoria
  Street; 1876, Northumberland Avenue; 1882, Tooley Street; 1883, Hyde
  Park Corner; 1884, Eastcheap; 1886, Shaftesbury Avenue; 1887, Charing
  Cross Road; 1890-1892, Rosebery Avenue. At the beginning of the 20th
  century several important local widenings of streets were put in hand,
  as for example between Sloane Street and Hyde Park Corner, in the
  Strand and at the Marble Arch (1908). At the same period a great work
  was undertaken to meet the want of a proper central communication
  between north and south, namely, the construction of a broad
  thoroughfare, called Kingsway in honour of King Edward VII., from High
  Holborn opposite Southampton Row southward to the Strand, connexion
  with which is established at two points through a crescent named
  Aldwych. The idea of such a thoroughfare is traceable back to the time
  of William IV. The magnitude of the traffic problem as a whole may be
  best appreciated by examples of the vast schemes of improvement which
  from time to time have been put forward by responsible individuals.
  Thus Sir John Wolfe Barry, as chairman of the Council of the Society
  of Arts in 1899, proposed to alleviate congestion of traffic by
  bridges over and tunnels under the streets at six points, namely--Hyde
  Park Corner, Piccadilly Circus, Ludgate Circus, Oxford Street and
  Tottenham Court Road, Strand and Wellington Street, and Southwark
  Bridge and Upper Thames Street. Another scheme seriously suggested in
  1904, to meet existing disabilities of communication between north and
  south by linking the northern and southern tramway services, involved
  the removal of the Charing Cross terminus of the South Eastern and
  Chatham railway to the south side of the river, and the construction
  of a new bridge in place of the railway bridge. The mere control of
  existing traffic, local street improvements and provision of new means
  of communication between casual points, were felt to miss the root of
  the problem, and in 1903 a Royal Commission was appointed to consider
  the whole question of locomotion and transport in London, expert
  evidence being taken from engineers, representatives of the various
  railway and other companies, of the County Council, borough councils
  and police, and others. The commission reported in 1905.[3] With
  regard to street improvements the most important recommendation was
  that of the construction of two main avenues 140 ft. wide, one running
  west and east, from Bayswater Road to Whitechapel, and passing through
  the city in the neighbourhood of London Wall, and another from
  Holloway to the Elephant and Castle, to cross the Thames by a new
  bridge above Blackfriars. Four lines of surface tramways and four
  railway lines in shallow tunnels were proposed along these avenues.
  Many widenings and other improvements of existing thoroughfares, and
  extensions of tramways were proposed, and detailed recommendations
  were made as regards urban and suburban railways, and the rehousing of
  the working population on the outskirts of London. Finally, the
  commission made the important recommendation that a traffic board
  should be established for London, to exercise a general supervision of
  traffic, and to act as a tribunal to which all schemes of railway and
  tramway construction should be referred.

  _Thames Steamers._--A local passenger steamboat service on the Thames
  suffers from the disadvantage that the river does not provide the
  shortest route between points at any great distance apart, and that
  the main thoroughfares between east and west do not touch its banks,
  so that passengers along those thoroughfares are not tempted to use it
  as a channel of communication. High pier dues, moreover, contributed
  to the decline of the traffic, and attempts to overcome the
  disinclination of passengers to use the river (at any rate in winter)
  show a record of failure. The London, Westminster and Vauxhall
  Steamboat Company established in 1840 a service of seven steamboats
  between London Bridge and Vauxhall. This company was bought up by the
  Citizen and Iron Steamboat Companies in 1865. The City Steamboat
  Company, established in 1848, began with eight boats, and by 1865 had
  increased their fleet to seventeen, running from London Bridge to
  Chelsea. This company was taken over by the London Steamboat Company
  in 1875. The sinking of the "Princess Alice" in 1878 was a serious
  blow to the London Steamboat Company, which collapsed, and was
  succeeded by the River Thames Steamboat Navigation Company, which went
  into liquidation in 1887. The fleet was bought by a syndicate and sold
  to the Victoria Steamboat Association. The Thames Steamboat Company
  then took up the service, but early in 1902 announced that it would be
  discontinued, although in 1904 it was temporarily resumed. Meanwhile,
  however, in 1902 the London County Council had promoted a bill in
  Parliament to enable them to run a service of boats on the Thames. The
  bill was thrown out on this occasion, but was revived and passed in
  1904, and on the 17th of June 1905 the service was put into operation.
  The boats, however, were worked at a loss, and the service was
  discontinued in 1909.

  _Foreign Communications._--A large pleasure traffic is maintained by
  the steamers of the New Palace Company and others in summer between
  London Bridge and Southend, Clacton and Harwich, Ramsgate, Margate and
  other resorts of the Kent coast, and Calais and Boulogne. Passenger
  steamers sail from the port of London to the principal ports of the
  British Isles and northern Europe, and to all parts of the world, but
  the most favoured passenger services to and from Europe and North
  America pass through other ports, to which the railways provide
  special services of trains from London. The principal travelling
  agency in London is that of Messrs Cook, whose head office is at
  Ludgate Circus. A number of sub-offices of large steamship lines are
  congregated in Cockspur Street, Trafalgar Square, and several of the
  principal railway companies have local offices throughout the centre
  of the metropolis for the issue of tickets and the collection and
  forwarding of luggage and parcels.

  _Post Office._--The General Post Office lies in the centre of the City
  on either side of the street called St Martin's le Grand. The oldest
  portion of the buildings, Ionic in style, was designed by Sir Robert
  Smirke and erected in 1829. Here are the central offices of the
  letter, newspaper and telegraph departments, with the office of the
  Postmaster General; but the headquarters of the parcels department are
  at Mount Pleasant, Clerkenwell; those of the Post Office Savings Bank
  at Blythe Road, West Kensington, and those of the Money Order
  department in Queen Victoria Street. The postal area is divided into
  eight districts, commonly designated by initials (which it is
  customary to employ in writing addresses)--East Central (E.C., the
  City, north to Pentonville and City Roads, west to Gray's Inn Road and
  the Law Courts); West Central (W.C., from Euston Road to the Thames,
  and west to Tottenham Court Road); West (W., from Piccadilly and Hyde
  Park north to Marylebone and Edgware Roads; the greater part of
  Paddington and Kensington, north part of Fulham and Hammersmith);
  South-west (S.W., City of Westminster south of Piccadilly, Chelsea,
  South Kensington, the greater part of Fulham, and London south of the
  Thames and west of Vauxhall Bridge); South-east (S.E., remainder of
  London south of the Thames); East (E., east of the City and Kingsland
  Road); North (N., west of Kingsland Road; Islington); North-west
  (N.W., greater part of St Pancras and St Marylebone, and Hampstead).
  The postal area excludes part of Woolwich within the county; but
  includes considerable areas outside the county in other directions, as
  West Ham, Leyton, &c., on the east; Woodford, Chingford, &c., on the
  north-east; Wood Green, Southgate and Finchley on the north; Hendon
  and Willesden on the north-west; Acton and Ealing, Barnes and
  Wimbledon on the west; and Penge and Beckenham on the south, wholly or
  in part. There are ten district head offices and about a thousand
  local offices in the metropolitan district.

  _Telephones._--The National Telephone Company, working under licence
  expiring on the 31st of December 1911, had until 1901 practically a
  monopoly of telephonic communication within London, though the Post
  Office owned all the trunk lines connecting the various telephone
  areas of the company. The company's management did not give
  satisfaction, and the use of the telephone was consequently restricted
  in the metropolis, when in 1898 a Select Committee on Telephones
  reported that "general immediate and effective" competition by either
  the government or local authority was necessary to ensure efficient
  working. The Post Office thereupon instituted a separate system of
  exchanges and lines, intercommunication between the two systems being
  arranged. Charges were reduced and efficiency benefited by this
  movement. The area covered by the local as distinct from the trunk
  service is about 630 sq. m. extending to Romford, Enfield, Harrow,
  &c., north of the Thames, and to Dartford Reigate, Epsom, &c., south
  of it. Public call offices are provided in numerous shops, railway
  stations and other public places, and at many post offices. The
  District Messengers Company affords facilities through local offices
  for the use of special messengers.


The population of Greater London by the census of 1901 was 6,581,402.

The following table gives comparisons between the figures of certain
census returns for Greater London and its chief component parts, namely,
the City, the county and the outer ring (i.e. Greater London outside the
county). All the figures before those of 1901 are adjusted to these

  | Year.|  City.  |  County.  | Outer Ring. | Greater London. |
  | 1801 | 128,129 |   831,181 |    155,334  |    1,114,644    |
  | 1841 | 123,563 | 1,825,714 |    286,067  |    2,235,344    |
  | 1881 |  50,569 | 3,779,728 |    936,364  |    4,766,661    |
  | 1901 |  26,923 | 4,509,618 |  2,044,864  |    6,581,402    |

The reason for the decrease in the resident City population is to be
found in the rapid extension of business premises, while the widening
ramifications of the outer residential areas are illustrated by the
increase in the later years of the population of the Outer Ring. The
growth and population of London previous to the 19th century is
considered under _History_, _ad. fin._


  The foreign-born population of London was 60,252 in 1881, and 135,377
  in 1901. During 1901, 27,070 aliens (excluding sailors) arrived at the
  port, and in 1902, 33,060. Of these last Russians and Poles numbered
  21,013; Germans, 3386; Austrians and Hungarians, 2197; Dutch, 1902;
  Norwegians, Swedes and Danes, 1341; and Rumanians, 1016. Other
  nationalities numbered below one thousand each. The foreign-born
  population shows a large increase in percentage to the whole, being
  1.57 in 1881 and 2.98 in 1901. Residents of Irish birth have decreased
  since 1851; those of Scottish birth have increased steadily, and
  roughly as the population. German residents are found mainly in the
  western and west central districts; French mainly in the City of
  Westminster (especially the district of Soho), St Pancras and St
  Marylebone; Italians in Holborn (Saffron Hill), Soho and Finsbury; and
  Russians and Poles in Stepney and Bethnal Green.

  _Vital Statistics._--The following table shows the average birth rate
  and death-rate per thousand at stated periods.

    |   Years.   | Births. | Deaths. |
    | 1861-1880* |   35.4  |   23.4  |
    | 1891-1900* |   30.3  |   19.2  |
    | 1901-1904* |   28.5  |   16.5  |
    |     1905   |   27.1  |   15.6  |
      * Average.

  A comparison of the death-rate of London and those of other great
  towns in England and abroad is given here:--

    |               |  Average  | 1905. |
    |               | 1895-1904.|       |
    | Leicester     |   16.7    | 13.3  |
    | Brussels      |   16.7    | 14.5  |
    | Bristol       |   16.9    | 14.6  |
    | Bradford      |   17.7    | 15.2  |
    | Leeds         |   19.1    | 15.2  |
    | LONDON        |   18.2    | 15.6  |
    | Birmingham    |   20.2    | 16.2  |
    | Nottingham    |   18.4    | 16.5  |
    | Newcastle     |   20.9    | 16.8  |
    | Sheffield     |   19.6    | 17.0  |
    | Berlin        |   17.8    | 17.2  |
    | Paris         |   19.2    | 17.4  |
    | Manchester    |   22.6    | 18.0  |
    | New York      |   20.2    | 18.3  |
    | Vienna        |   20.0    | 19.0  |
    | Liverpool     |   23.2    | 19.6  |
    | Rome          |   19.1    | 20.6  |
    | St Petersburg |   25.9    | 25.3  |

  In 1905 the lowest death-rates among the metropolitan boroughs were
  returned by Hampstead (9.3), Lewisham (11.7), Wandsworth (12.6),
  Woolwich (12.8), Stoke Newington (12.9), and the highest by Shoreditch
  (19.7), Finsbury (19.0), Bermondsey (18.7), Bethnal Green (18.6) and
  Southwark (18.5). A return of the percentage of inhabitants dwelling
  in over-crowded tenements shows 2.7 for Lewisham, 4.5 for Wandsworth,
  5.5 for Stoke Newington, and 6.4 for Hampstead, against 35.2 for
  Finsbury and 29.9 for Shoreditch.

  _Sanitation._--As regards sanitation London is under special
  regulations. When the statutes relating to public health were
  consolidated and amended in 1875 London was excluded; and the law
  applicable to it was specially consolidated and amended in 1891. The
  London County Council is a central sanitary authority; the City and
  metropolitan boroughs are sanitary districts, and the Corporation and
  borough councils are local sanitary authorities. The County Council
  deals directly with matters where uniformity of administration is
  essential, e.g. main drainage, housing of working classes, infant life
  protection, common lodging-houses and shelters, and contagious
  diseases of animals. With a further view to uniformity it has certain
  powers of supervision and control over local authorities, and can make
  by-laws respecting construction of local sewers, sanitary
  conveniences, offensive trades, slaughter-houses and dairies, and
  prevention of nuisances outside the jurisdiction of local authorities.
  A medical officer of health for the whole county is appointed by the
  Council, which also pays half the salaries of local medical officers
  and sanitary inspectors. The Council may also act in cases of default
  by the local authorities, or may make representations to the Local
  Government Board respecting such default, whereupon the Board may
  direct the Council to withhold payment due to the local authority
  under the Equalization of Rates Act 1894.


  The first act providing for a commission of sewers in London dates
  from 1531. Various works of a more or less imperfect character were
  carried out, such as the bridging over in 1637 of the river Fleet,
  which as early as 1307 had become inaccessible to shipping through the
  accumulation of filth. Scavengers were employed in early times, and
  sewage was received into wells and pumped into the kennels of the
  streets. A system of main drainage was inaugurated by the
  Commissioners of Sewers in 1849, but their work proceeded very slowly.
  It was carried on more effectively by the Metropolitan Board of Works
  (1856-1888) which expended over six-and-a-half millions sterling on
  the work. The London County Council maintained, completed and improved
  the system. The length of sewers in the main system is about 288 m.,
  and their construction has cost about eight millions. The system
  covers the county of London, West Ham, Penge, Tottenham, Wood Green,
  and parts of Beckenham, Hornsey, Croydon, Willesden, East Ham and
  Acton. There are actually two distinct systems, north and south of the
  Thames, having separate outfall works on the north and south banks of
  the river, at Barking and Crossness. The clear effluent flows into the
  Thames, and the sludge is taken 50 m. out to sea. The annual cost of
  maintenance of the system exceeds £250,000. The sanitary authorities
  are concerned only with the supervision of house drainage, and the
  construction and maintenance of local sewers discharging into the main
  system. The Thames and the Lea Conservancies have powers to guard
  against the pollution of the rivers.

    Metropolitan Asylums Board.

  _Hospitals._--The Metropolitan Asylums Board, though established in
  1867 purely as a poor-law authority for the relief of the sick, insane
  and infirm paupers, has become a central hospital authority for
  infectious diseases, with power to receive into its hospitals persons,
  who are not paupers, suffering from fever, smallpox or diphtheria.
  Both the Board and the County Council have certain powers and duties
  of sanitary authority for the purpose of epidemic regulations. The
  local sanitary authorities carry out the provisions of the Infectious
  Diseases (Notification and Prevention) Acts, which for London are
  embodied in the Public Health (London) Act 1891. The Board has asylums
  for the insane at Tooting Bec (Wandsworth), Ealing (for children);
  King's Langley, Hertfordshire; Caterham, Surrey; and Darenth, Kent.
  There are twelve fever hospitals, including northern and southern
  convalescent hospitals. For smallpox the Board maintains hospital
  ships moored in the Thames at Dartford, and a land establishment at
  the same place. There are land and river ambulance services.

  There are three regular funds in London for the support of hospitals.
  (1) King Edward's Hospital Fund (1897) founded by King Edward VII. as
  Prince of Wales in commemoration of the Diamond Jubilee of Queen
  Victoria. The League of Mercy, under royal charter, operates in
  conjunction with the Fund in the collection of small subscriptions.
  The Order of Mercy was instituted by the King as a reward for
  distinguished personal service. (2) The Metropolitan Hospital Sunday
  Fund, founded in 1873, draws the greater part of its revenue from
  collections in churches on stated occasions. (3) The Metropolitan
  Hospital Saturday Fund was founded in 1873, and is made up chiefly of
  small sums collected in places of business, &c. The following is a
  list of the principal London hospitals, with dates of foundation:--

  1. _General Hospitals with Medical Schools_ (all of which, with the
  exception of that of the Seamen's Hospital, are schools of London

    Charing Cross; Agar Street, Strand (1820).
    Guy's; St Thomas Street, Southwark (1724).
    King's College; Lincoln's Inn Fields (1839).
    London; Whitechapel (1740).
    Middlesex; Mortimer Street, Marylebone (1745).
    North London, or University College; Gower Street (1833).
    Royal Free; Gray's Inn Road (1828; on present site, 1842).
      London School of Medicine for Women.
    St Bartholomew's; Smithfield (1123; refounded 1547).
    St George's; Hyde Park Corner (1733).
    St Mary's; Paddington (1845).
    St Thomas'; Lambeth (1213; on present site, 1871).
    Seamen's Hospital Society; Greenwich (1821).
    Westminster, facing the Abbey. (1720; on present site, 1834).

  2. _General Hospitals without Schools_:--

    Great Northern Central; Islington (1856; on present site, 1887).
    Metropolitan; Hackney (1836).
    Poplar Hospital for Accidents (1854).
    West London; Hammersmith Road (1856).

  3. _Hospitals for Special Purposes_:--

    Brompton Consumption Hospital (1841).
    Cancer Hospital; Brompton (1851).
    City of London Hospital for diseases of the chest; Bethnal Green
    East London Hospital for Children and Dispensary for Women; Shadwell
    Hospital for Sick Children; Bloomsbury (1852).
    London Fever Hospital; Islington (1802).
    National Hospital for Paralysed and Epileptics; Bloomsbury (1859).
    Royal Hospital for Incurables; Putney (1854).
    Royal London Ophthalmic Hospital; City Road (1804; on present site,

  (See also separate articles on boroughs.)

  _Water Supply._--In the 12th century London was supplied with water
  from local streams and wells, of which Holy Well, Clerk's Well
  (Clerkenwell) and St Clement's Well, near St Clement's Inn, were
  examples. In 1236 the magistrates purchased the liberty to convey the
  waters of the Tyburn from Paddington to the City by leaden pipes, and
  a great conduit was erected in West Cheap in 1285. Other conduits were
  subsequently built (cf. Conduit Street off Bond Street, Lamb's Conduit
  Street, Bloomsbury); and water was also supplied by the company of
  water-bearers in leathern panniers borne by horses. In 1582 Peter
  Moris, a Dutchman, erected a "forcier" on an arch of London Bridge,
  which he rented for 10s. per annum for 500 years. His works succeeded
  and increased, and continued in his family till 1701, when a company
  took over the lease. Other forciers had been set up, and in 1609, on
  an act of 1605, Sir Hugh Myddelton undertook the task of supplying
  reservoirs at Clerkenwell through the New river from springs near
  Ware, Hertfordshire; and these were opened in 1613. In 1630 a scheme
  to bring water from Hoddesdon on the Lea was promoted by aid of a
  lottery licensed by Charles I. The Chelsea Water Company opened its
  supply from the Thames in 1721; the Lambeth waterworks were erected in
  1783; the Vauxhall Company was established in 1805, the West
  Middlesex, near Hammersmith, and the East London on the river Lea in
  1806, the Kent on the Ravensbourne (Deptford) in 1810, the Grand
  Junction in 1811, and the Southwark (which amalgamated with the
  Vauxhall) in 1822.

  Metropolitan Water Board.

  For many years proposals to amalgamate the working of the companies
  and displace them by a central public authority were put forward from
  time to time. The difficulty of administration lay in the fact that of
  the area of 620 sq. m. constituting what is known as "Water London"
  (see map in _London Statistics_, vol. xix., issued by the L.C.C.,
  1909) the London County Council has authority over little more than
  one-third, and therefore when the Council proposed to acquire the
  eight undertakings concerned its scheme was opposed not only by the
  companies but by the county councils and local authorities outside the
  County of London. The Council had a scheme of bringing water to London
  from Wales, in view of increasing demands on a stationary supply. This
  involved impounding the headwaters of the Wye, the Towey and the Usk,
  and the total cost was estimated to exceed fifteen millions sterling.
  The capacity of existing sources, however, was deemed sufficient by a
  Royal Commission under Lord Balfour of Burleigh in 1893, and this
  opinion was endorsed by a further Commission under Lord Llandaff. The
  construction of large storage reservoirs was recommended, and this
  work was put in hand jointly by the New River, West Middlesex and
  Grand Junction companies at Staines on the Thames. As regards
  administration, Lord Llandaff's Commission recommended the creation of
  a Water Trust, and in 1902 the Metropolis Water Act constituted the
  Metropolitan Water Board to purchase and carry on the undertakings of
  the eight companies, and of certain local authorities. It consists of
  66 members, appointed by the London County Council (14), the City of
  London and the City of Westminster (2 each), the other Metropolitan
  boroughs (1 each), the county councils of Middlesex, Hertfordshire,
  Essex, Kent and Surrey (l each), borough of West Ham (2), various
  groups of other boroughs and urban districts, and the Thames and the
  Lea Conservancies. The first election of the Board took place in 1903.
  The 24th of June, 1904, was the date fixed on which control passed to
  the Board, and in the meantime a Court of Arbitration adjudicated the
  claims of the companies for compensation for the acquisition of their

  "Water London" is an irregular area extending from Ware in
  Hertfordshire to Sevenoaks in Kent, and westward as far as Ealing and

  A constant supply is maintained generally throughout "Water London,"
  although a suspension between certain hours has been occasionally
  necessitated, as in 1895 and 1898, when, during summer droughts, the
  East London supply was so affected. During these periods other
  companies had a surplus of water, and in 1899 an act was passed
  providing for the interconnexion of systems. The Thames and Lea are
  the principal sources of supply, but the Kent and (partially) the New
  River Company draw supplies from springs. The systems of filtration
  employed by the different companies varied in efficacy, but both the
  Royal Commissions decided that water as supplied to the consumer was
  generally of a very high standard of purity. The expenditure of the
  Water Board for 1907-1908 amounted to £2,846,265. Debt charges
  absorbed £1,512,718 of this amount.

  Public baths and washhouses are provided by local authorities under
  various acts between 1846 and 1896, which have been adopted by all the
  borough councils.

  _Lighting._--From 1416 citizens were obliged to hang out candles
  between certain hours on dark nights to illuminate the streets. An act
  of parliament enforced this in 1661; in 1684 Edward Heming, the
  inventor of oil lamps, obtained licence to supply public lights; and
  in 1736 the corporation took the matter in hand, levying a rate.
  Gas-lighting was introduced on one side of Pall Mall in 1807, and in
  1810 the Gas Light & Coke Company received a charter, and developed
  gas-lighting in Westminster. The City of London Gas Company followed
  in 1817, and seven other companies soon after. Wasteful competition
  ensued until in 1857 an agreement was made between the companies to
  restrict their services to separate localities, and the Gas Light &
  Coke Company, by amalgamating other companies, then gradually acquired
  all the gas-lighting north of the Thames, while a considerable area in
  the south was provided for by another great gas company, the South
  Metropolitan. Various acts from 1860 onwards have laid down laws as to
  the quality and cost of gas. Gas must be supplied at 16-candle
  illuminating power, and is officially tested by the chemists'
  department of the London County Council. The amalgamations mentioned
  were effected subsequently to 1860, and there are now three principal
  companies within the county, the Gas Light & Coke, South Metropolitan
  and Commercial, though certain other companies supply some of the
  outlying districts. As regards street lighting, the extended use of
  burners with incandescent mantles has been of good effect. The
  Metropolitan Board of Works, and the commissioners of sewers in the
  City, began experiments with electric light. At the close of the 19th
  and the beginning of the 20th century a large number of electric light
  companies came into existence, and some of the metropolitan borough
  councils, and local authorities within Greater London, also undertook
  the supply. An extensive use of the light resulted in the principal
  streets and in shops, offices and private houses.

  _Fire._--In 1832 the fire insurance companies united to maintain a
  small fire brigade, and continued to do so until 1866. The brigade was
  confined to the central part of the metropolis; for the rest, the
  parochial authorities had charge of protection from fire. The central
  brigade came under the control of the Metropolitan Board of Works; and
  the County Council now manages the Metropolitan Fire Brigade, under a
  chief officer and a staff numbering about 1300. The cost of
  maintenance exceeds £200,000 annually; contributions towards this are
  made by the Treasury and the fire insurance companies. The Council
  controls the provision of fire escapes in factories employing over 40
  persons, under an act of 1901; it also compels the maintenance of
  proper precautions against fire in theatres and places of
  entertainments. A Salvage Corps is independently maintained by the
  Insurance Companies.

  _Cemeteries._--The administrative authorities of cemeteries for the
  county are the borough councils and the City Corporation and private
  companies. The large cemetery at Brompton is the property of the
  government. Kensal Green cemetery, the burial-place of many famous
  persons, is of great extent, but several large cemeteries outside the
  metropolis have come into use. Such are that of the London Necropolis
  Company at Brookwood near Woking, Surrey, and that of the parishes of
  St Mary Abbots, Kensington, and St George, Hanover Square, at Hanwell,
  Middlesex. Crematoria are provided at certain of the companies'
  cemeteries, and the Cremation Act 1902 enabled borough councils to
  provide crematoria.


    Elementary education.

    Technical education.

  _Education._--The British and Foreign School Society (1808) and the
  National Society (1811), together with the Ragged Schools Union
  (1844), were the only special organizations providing for the
  education of the poorer classes until 1870. To meet the demand for
  elementary education, increasing as it did with population, was beyond
  the powers of these societies, the churches and the various charitable
  institutions. Thus a return of 1871 showed that the schools were
  capable of accommodating only 39% of the children of school-going age.
  In 1870, however, a School Board had been created in addition, and
  this body carried out much good work during its thirty-four years of
  existence. In 1903 the Education (London) Act was passed in pursuance
  of the general system, put into operation by the Education Act (1902)
  of bringing education within the scope of municipal government. The
  County Council was created a local education authority, and given
  control of secular education in both board and voluntary schools. It
  appoints an education committee in accordance with a scheme approved
  by the Board of Education. This scheme must allow of the Council
  selecting at least a majority of the committee, and must provide for
  the inclusion of experts and women. Each school or group of schools is
  under a body of managers, in the appointment of whom the borough
  council and the County Council share in the following
  proportions:--(a) _Board or provided schools_; borough council,
  two-thirds; county council, one-third: (b) _Voluntary or non-provided
  schools_; the foundation, two-thirds; borough council and county
  council, each one-sixth. The total number of public elementary schools
  was 963 in 1905, with 752,487 scholars on the register. Other
  institutions include higher elementary schools for pupils certified to
  be able to profit by higher instruction; and schools for blind, deaf
  and defective children. Instruction for teachers is provided in pupil
  teachers' centres (preparatory), and in residential and day training
  colleges. There are about 15 such colleges. Previous to the act of
  1903 the County Council had educational powers under the Technical
  Instructions Acts which enabled it to provide technical education
  through a special board, merged by the act of 1903 in the education
  committee. The City and Guilds of London Institute, Gresham College,
  also maintains various technical institutions. The establishment of
  polytechnics was provided for by the City of London Parochial
  Charities Act 1883; the charities being administered by trustees. The
  model institution was that of Mr Quintin Hogg (1880) in Regent Street,
  where a striking statue by George Frampton (1906) commemorates him.
  The general scope of the polytechnics is to give instruction both in
  general knowledge and special crafts or trades by means of classes,
  lectures and laboratories, instructive entertainments and exhibitions,
  and facilities for bodily and mental exercise (gymnasia, libraries,
  &c.). Other similar institutions exist primarily for special purposes,
  as the St Bride Foundation Institute, near Fleet Street, in immediate
  proximity to the great newspaper offices, for the printing trade, and
  the Herolds' Institute, a branch of the Borough Polytechnic situated
  in Bermondsey, for the purposes of the leather trade. The County
  Council also aids numerous separate schools of art, both general and
  special, such as the Royal School of Art Needlework and the School of
  Art Woodcarving; the City and Guilds Institute maintains similar
  establishments at some of its colleges, and art schools are also
  generally attached to the polytechnics.

    Philanthropical institutions.

  The London County Council maintains a number of industrial schools and
  reformatories, both in London and in the country, for children who
  have shown or are likely to be misled into a tendency towards
  lawlessness. The City Corporation has separate responsibilities in the
  same direction, but has no schools of its own. The expenditure of the
  London County Council on education for 1907-1908 was £4,281,291 for
  elementary education, and £742,962 for higher education.

  The work of private philanthropists and philanthropical bodies among
  the poor of East London, Southwark and Bermondsey, and elsewhere,
  fails to be noticed at this point. The labours of the regular clergy
  here lie largely in the direction of social reform, and churches and
  missions have been established and are maintained by colleges, such as
  Christ Church, Oxford, schools and other bodies. There are, further,
  "settlements" where members of the various bodies may reside in order
  to devote themselves to philanthropical work; and these include clubs,
  recreation rooms and other institutions for the use of the poor. Such
  are the Oxford House, Bethnal Green; the Cambridge House, Camberwell
  Road; Toynbee Hall, Whitechapel; Mansfield House, Canning Town; the
  Robert Browning Settlement, Southwark; and the Passmore Edwards
  Settlement, St Pancras. There are also several women's settlements of
  a similar character. The People's Palace, Mile End Road, opened in
  1887, is both a recreative and an educational institution (called East
  London College) erected and subsequently extended mainly through the
  liberality of the Drapers' Company and of private donors.

    Public schools.

  In early times the priories and other religious houses had generally
  grammar schools attached to them. Those at St Peter's, Westminster,
  and St Paul's, attained a fame which has survived, while other similar
  foundations lapsed, such as St Anthony's (Threadneedle Street, City),
  at which Sir Thomas More, Archbishop Whitgift and many other men of
  eminence received education. Certain of the schools were re-endowed
  after the dissolution of the monasteries. St Peter's College or
  Westminster School (see WESTMINSTER) is unique among English public
  schools of the highest rank in maintaining its original situation in
  London. Other early metropolitan foundations have been moved in
  accordance with modern tendencies either into the country or to sites
  aloof from the heart of London. Thus Charterhouse school, part of the
  foundation of Sir Thomas Sutton (1611), was moved from Finsbury to
  Godalming, Surrey; St Paul's School occupies modern buildings at
  Hammersmith, and Christ's Hospital is at Horsham, Sussex. Of other
  schools, Merchant Taylors' was founded by the Company of that name in
  1561, and has occupied, since 1875, the premises vacated by
  Charterhouse School. The Mercers' School, Dowgate, was originally
  attached to the hospital of St Thomas of Acon, which was sold to the
  Mercers' Company in 1522, on condition that the company should
  maintain the school. The City of London School, founded in Milk
  Street, Cheapside, by the City Corporation in 1835, occupies modern
  buildings on the Victoria Embankment. Dulwich College originated in
  the foundation of the College of God's Gift by Edward Alleyn in 1626,
  and is now constituted as one of the principal English public schools.
  St Olave's and St Saviour's grammar school, Southwark, received its
  charter in 1571. Both classical and modern education is provided; a
  large number of scholarships are maintained out of the foundation, and
  exhibitions from the school to the universities and other higher
  educational institutions.

  _London University._--The University of London was incorporated by
  royal charter in 1836, as an examining body for conferring degrees.
  Its scope and powers were extended by subsequent charters, and in
  1900, under the University of London Act 1898, it was reorganized as
  both a teaching and an examining body. The function of the academic
  department is to control the teaching branch, internal examinations,
  &c., and that of the external department to control external
  examinations, while the university extension system occupies a third
  department. The university is governed by a senate consisting of a
  chancellor, chairman of convocation and 54 members, whose appointment
  is shared by the Crown, convocation, the Royal Colleges of Physicians
  and of Surgeons, the Inns of Court, the Law Society, the London County
  Council, City Corporation, City and Guilds Institute, University and
  King's Colleges and the faculties. The faculties are theology, arts,
  law, music, medicine, science, engineering and economics. The schools
  of the University include University College, Gower Street, and King's
  College, Somerset House (with both of which preparatory schools are
  connected), East London College and numerous institutions devoted to
  special faculties both within and without London. The university in
  part occupies buildings which formerly belonged to the Imperial

  _Other Educational Institutions._--The Board of Education directly
  administers the following educational institutions--the Victoria and
  Albert Museum, South Kensington, with its branch at Bethnal Green,
  from both of which objects are lent to various institutions for
  educational purposes; the Royal College of Science, South Kensington,
  with which is incorporated the Royal School of Mines; the Geological
  Survey of the United Kingdom and the Museum of Practical Geology,
  Jermyn Street; the Solar Physics Observatory, South Kensington; and
  the Royal College of Art, South Kensington. At Gresham College,
  Basinghall Street, City, founded in 1597 by Sir Thomas Gresham, and
  moved to its present site in 1843, lectures are given in the principal
  branches of science, law, divinity, medicine, &c.

  Some further important establishments and institutions may be
  tabulated here:--

  _Architecture._--The Royal Institute of British Architects, Conduit
  Street, conducts examinations and awards diplomas.

  _Education._--The College of Preceptors, Bloomsbury, conducts
  examinations of persons engaged in education and awards diplomas.

  _Engineering._--A School of Practical Engineering is maintained at the
  Crystal Palace, Sydenham.

  _Law._--The Inns of Court are four--Middle Temple, Inner Temple,
  Lincoln's Inn, Gray's Inn. A joint board of examiners examines
  students previous to admission. The Council of Legal Education
  superintends the education and subsequent examination of students.
  (See INNS OF COURT.) The Law Society is the superintending body for
  examination and admission in the case of solicitors.

  _Medical._--The Royal College of Physicians is in Pall Mall East, and
  the Royal College of Surgeons is in Lincoln's Inn Fields. The Society
  of Apothecaries is in Water Lane, City. The Royal College of
  Veterinary Surgeons is in Red Lion Square, and the Royal Veterinary
  College at Camden Town. (The principal hospitals having schools are
  noted in the list of hospitals, Section VII.)

  _Military and Naval._--The Royal Military College and the Ordnance
  College are at Woolwich; the Royal Naval College at Greenwich.

  _Music._--The principal educational institutions are--the Royal
  Academy of Music, Tenterden Street, Hanover Square; the Royal College
  of Music, South Kensington; Guildhall School, City, near the Victoria
  Embankment; London College, Great Marlborough Street; Trinity College,
  Manchester Square; Victoria College, Berners Street; and the Royal
  College of Organists, Bloomsbury.

  _Scientific Societies._--Numerous learned societies have their
  headquarters in London, and the following may especially be noticed
  here. Burlington House, in Piccadilly, built in 1872 on the site of a
  mansion of the earls of Burlington, houses the Royal Society, the
  Chemical, Geological, Linnaean and Royal Astronomical Societies, the
  Society of Antiquaries and the British Association for the Advancement
  of Science, of which the annual meetings take place at different
  British or colonial towns in succession. The Royal Society, the most
  dignified and influential of all, was incorporated by Charles II. in
  1663. It originally occupied rooms in Crane Court, City, and was moved
  in 1780 to Somerset House, where others of the societies named were
  also located. The Society of Arts, John Street, Adelphi, was
  established in 1754 for the encouragement of arts, manufactures and
  commerce. The Royal Institution, Albemarle Street, was founded in
  1799, maintains a library and laboratories and promotes research in
  connexion with the experimental sciences. The Royal Geographical
  Society, occupying a building close to Burlington House in Savile Row,
  maintains a map-room open to the public, holds lectures by prominent
  explorers and geographers, and takes a leading part in the promotion
  of geographical discovery. The Royal Botanic Society has private
  gardens in the midst of Regent's Park, where flower shows and general
  entertainments are held. The Royal Horticultural Society maintains
  gardens at Wisley, Surrey, and has an exhibition hall in Vincent
  Square, Westminster. The exhibitions of the Royal Agricultural Society
  are held at Park Royal, near Willesden. The Zoological Society
  maintains a magnificent collection of living specimens in the
  Zoological Gardens, Regent's Park, a popular resort.

  _Museums, Art Galleries, Libraries._--In the British Museum London
  possesses one of the most celebrated collections in the world,
  originated in 1753 by the purchase of Sir Hans Sloane's collection and
  library by the government. The great building in Bloomsbury
  (1828-1852) with its massive Ionic portico, houses the collections of
  antiquities, coins, books, manuscripts and drawings, and contains the
  reading-rooms for the use of readers. The natural history branch was
  removed to a building at South Kensington (the Natural History Museum)
  in 1881, where the zoological, botanical and mineralogical exhibits
  are kept. Close to this museum is the Victoria and Albert Museum
  (formerly South Kensington Museum, 1857) for which an extension of
  buildings, from a fine design by Sir Aston Webb, was begun in 1899 and
  completed in ten years. Here are collections of pictures and drawings,
  including the Raphael cartoons, objects of art of every description,
  mechanical and scientific collections, and Japanese, Chinese and
  Persian collections, and an Indian section. In the vicinity, also, is
  the fine building of the Imperial Institute, founded in 1887 as an
  exhibition to illustrate the resources of all parts of the Empire, as
  well as an institution for the furtherance of imperial intercourse;
  though not developed on the scale originally intended. Other museums
  are Sir John Soane's collection in Lincoln's Inn Fields and the Museum
  of Practical Geology in Jermyn Street, while the scientific societies
  have libraries and in some cases collections of a specialized
  character, such as the museums of the Royal College of Surgeons, the
  Royal Architectural Society, and the Society of Art and the Parkes
  Museum of the Sanitary Institute. Among permanent art collections the
  first place is taken by the National Gallery in Trafalgar Square. This
  magnificent collection was originated in 1824, and the building dates
  from 1838, but has been more than once enlarged. The building of the
  National Portrait Gallery, adjoining it, dates from 1896, but the
  nucleus of the collection was formed in 1858. The munificence of Sir
  Henry Tate provided the gallery, commonly named after him, by the
  Thames near Vauxhall Bridge, which contains the national collection of
  British art. The Wallace collection of paintings and objects of art,
  in Hertford House, Manchester Square, was bequeathed to the nation by
  the widow of Sir Richard Wallace in 1897. Dulwich College possesses a
  fine series of paintings, of the Dutch and other schools, bequeathed
  by Sir P. F. Bourgeois in 1811. There are also notable collections of
  pictures in several of the mansions of the nobility, government
  buildings, halls of the City Companies and elsewhere. No gallery in
  London is exclusively or especially devoted to sculpture. Of the
  periodical art exhibitions that of the Royal Academy is most
  noteworthy. It is held annually at Burlington House from the first
  Monday in May to the first Monday in August. It consists mainly of
  paintings, but includes a few drawings and examples of sculpture.
  Earlier in each year exhibitions of works by deceased British artists
  and by old masters are held, and the Gibson and Diploma Galleries are
  permanent exhibitions. At the Guildhall special exhibitions are held
  from time to time. There are a number of art galleries in and about
  Bond Street and Piccadilly, Regent Street and Pall Mall, such as the
  New Gallery, where periodical exhibitions are given by the New English
  Art Club, the Royal Society of Painters in Water-Colours, the Royal
  Institute of Painters in Water-Colours, other societies and art

  Municipal provision of public libraries under acts of 1892 and 1893 is
  general throughout London, and these institutions are exceedingly
  popular for purposes both of reference and of loan. The acts are
  extended to include the provisions of museums and art galleries, but
  the borough councils have not as a rule availed themselves of this
  extension. The London County Council administers the Horniman Museum
  at Forest Hill, Lewisham. The City Corporation maintains the fine
  Guildhall library and museum. A few free libraries are supported by
  donations and subscriptions or charities. Besides the Government
  reference libraries at the British Museum and South Kensington there
  are other such libraries, of a specialized character, as at the Patent
  Office and the Record Office. Among lending libraries should be
  noticed the London Library in St James's Square, Pall Mall.

  _Theatres and Places of Entertainment._--The principal London theatres
  lie between Piccadilly and Temple Bar, and High Holborn and Victoria
  Street, the majority being in Shaftesbury Avenue, the Haymarket, the
  neighbourhood of Charing Cross and the Strand. At these central
  theatres successful plays are allowed to "run" for protracted periods,
  but there are numerous fine houses in other parts of London which are
  generally occupied by a succession of touring companies presenting
  either revivals of popular plays or plays successful at the moment in
  the central theatres. The principal music halls (variety theatres) are
  in Shaftesbury Avenue, Piccadilly Circus, Leicester Square and the
  Strand. The Covent Garden theatre is the principal home of grand
  opera; the building, though spacious, suffers by comparison with the
  magnificence of opera houses in some other capitals, but during the
  opera season the scene within the theatre is brilliant. The chief
  halls devoted mainly to concerts are the Royal Albert Hall, close to
  the South Kensington museums, and Queen's Hall in Langham Place,
  Regent Street. For a long time St James's Hall (demolished in 1905)
  between Regent Street and Piccadilly was the chief concert hall.
  Oratorio is given usually in the Albert Hall, the vast area of which
  is especially suited for a large chorus and orchestra, and at the
  Crystal Palace (q.v.). This latter building, standing on high ground
  at Sydenham, and visible from far over the metropolis, is devoted not
  only to concerts, but to general entertainment, and the extensive
  grounds give accommodation for a variety of sports and amusements.
  Among other popular places of entertainment may be mentioned the
  exhibition grounds and buildings at Earl's Court; similar grounds at
  Shepherd's Bush, where a Franco-British Exhibition was held in 1908,
  an Imperial Exhibition in 1909, and an Anglo-Japanese in 1910; the
  great Olympia hall, West Kensington; the celebrated wax-work
  exhibition of Madame Tussaud in Marylebone Road; the Alexandra Palace,
  Muswell Hill, an institution resembling the Crystal Palace; and the
  Agricultural Hall, Islington, where agricultural and other exhibitions
  are held. The well-known Egyptian Hall in Piccadilly was taken down in
  1906, and the permanent conjuring entertainment for which (besides
  picture exhibitions) it was noted was removed elsewhere. Theatres,
  music halls, concert halls and other places of entertainment are
  licensed by the County Council, except that the licence for
  stage-plays is granted by the lord chamberlain under the Theatres Act
  1843. The council provides for inspection of places of entertainment
  in respect of precautions against fire, structural safety, &c. The
  principal clubs are in and about Piccadilly and Pall Mall (see CLUB).
  A club for soldiers, sailors and marines in London, called the Union
  Jack Club, was opened in Waterloo Road by King Edward VII. in 1907.

  _Parks and Open Spaces: Administration._--The administration of parks
  and open spaces in and round London, topographical details of the
  principal of which are given in Section I., is divided between the
  Office of Works, the London County Council, the City Corporation and
  the borough councils. The Office of Works controls the Royal parks,
  the County Council controls the larger parks and open spaces not under
  Government or City control, and the borough councils the smaller;
  while the City Corporation controls certain public grounds outside the
  County of London. There are a few other bodies controlling particular
  open spaces, as the following list of public grounds exceeding 50
  acres (in 1910) will show:--

    1. _Under the Office of Works:_--

      Green Park                         52¾ acres
      Greenwich Park                    185    "
      Hyde Park                         363¾   "
      Kensington Gardens                274½   "
      Regent's Park                     472¼   "
      St James's Park                    93    "

    2. _Under the War Office:_--

      Woolwich Common                   159    "

    3. _Under the London County Council:_--

      Avery Hill, Eltham                 80    "
      Battersea Park                    199½   "
      Blackheath                        267    "
      Bostall Heath and Woods, Woolwich 133¾   "
      Brockwell Park, Herne Hill        127¼   "
      Clapham Common                    205    "
      Clissold Park                      54½   "
      Dulwich Park                       72    "
      Finsbury Park                     115    "
      Hackney Marsh                     339    "
      Hainault Forest, Essex            805    "
      Hampstead Heath                   320½   "
      Ladywell Ground, Lewisham          51½   "
      Marble Hill, Twickenham            66    "
      Millfields, Hackney                62½   "
      Parliament Hill                   267¼   "
      Peckham Rye and Park              112¾   "
      Plumstead Common                  103    "
      Southwark Park                     63    "
      Streatham Common                   66¼   "
      Tooting Bec Common                151¾   "
      Tooting Graveney Common            66    "
      Victoria Park, East London        217    "
      Wandsworth Common                 155    "
      Wormwood Scrubbs                  193    "

    4. _Under the City Corporation:_--

      Burnham Beeches, Buckinghamshire  375    "
      Coulsdon Commons, Surrey          347    "
      Epping Forest, Essex             5559½   "
      Highgate Woods                     69    "
      West Ham Park                      77    "

  Wimbledon and Putney Commons are under a board of conservators. The
  London County Council's parks and open spaces increased in number from
  40 in 1890 to 114 in 1907, and in acreage from 2656 to 5006 in the
  same years. The expenditure in 1907-1908 was £131,582, which sum
  included £11,987 for bands. (See also separate articles on boroughs.)

  Bathing (at certain hours) and boating are permitted in the ornamental
  waters in several of the parks, music is provided and much attention
  is paid to the protection of waterfowl and other birds, while herds of
  deer are maintained in some places, and also botanical gardens.
  Surplus plants and cuttings are generally distributed without charge
  to educational or charitable institutions, and to the poor. Provision
  is made for cricket, football and other games in a number of the
  parks. Large gatherings of spectators are attracted to the first-class
  cricket matches played at Lord's ground, St John's Wood, by the
  Marylebone Club and the Middlesex County teams, Eton College against
  Harrow School, and Oxford against Cambridge University; to the
  Kennington Oval for the matches of the Surrey club, and the Leyton
  ground for those of the Essex club. In the Crystal Palace grounds the
  final match for the English Association Football cup is generally
  played, and huge crowds from both the metropolis and the provinces
  witness the game. At Queen's Club, West Kensington, the annual Oxford
  and Cambridge athletic meeting and others take place, besides football
  matches, and there is covered accommodation for tennis and other
  games. Professional association football teams are maintained locally
  in several parts of London, and much popular interest is taken in
  their matches. Rugby football is upheld by such notable teams as
  Blackheath and Richmond. Fashionable society takes its pastimes at
  such centres as the grounds of the Hurlingham and Ranelagh clubs, at
  Fulham and Barnes respectively, where polo and other games are played;
  and Rotten Row, the horse-track in Hyde Park, is the favourite resort
  of riders. In summer, boating on the lovely reaches of the Thames
  above the metropolis forms the recreation of thousands. The growth of
  popularity of the cycle, and later of the motor-car, has been a
  principal factor in the wide development of a tendency to leave London
  during the "week-end," that is to say, as a rule, for Saturday
  afternoon and Sunday. With many this is a practice at all seasons, and
  the railway companies foster the habit by means of tickets at reduced
  fares to all parts. The watering-places of the Sussex, Kent and Essex
  coasts, and pre-eminently Brighton, are specially favoured for these
  brief holidays.


_Port of London._--The extent of the Port of London has been variously
defined for different purposes, but for those of the Port Authority it
is taken to extend from Teddington Lock to a line between Yantlet Creek
in Kent and the City Stone opposite Canvey Isle and in Essex. London
Bridge is to outward appearance the up-river limit of the port. There
are wharves and a large carrying trade in barges above this point, but
below it the river is crowded with shipping, and extensive docks open on
either hand.

Towards the close of the 19th century evidence was accumulating that the
development of the Port of London was not keeping pace with that of
shipping generally. In 1900 a Royal Commission was appointed to
investigate the existing administration of the port, the alleged
inadequacy of accommodation for vessels and kindred questions, and to
advance a scheme of reform. The report, issued in 1902, showed
apprehension to be well founded. The river, it was ascertained, was not
kept sufficiently dredged; the re-export trade was noted as showing an
especially serious decline, and the administration was found to suffer
from decentralization. The recommendations of the Commission included
the creation of a single controlling authority to take over the powers
of the Thames Conservancy Watermen's Company, and Trinity House and the
docks of the companies already detailed. This authority, it was advised,
should consist of 40 members, of whom 11 should be nominated by the
London County Council and 3 by the Corporation of the City (supposing
these bodies to accept certain financial responsibilities proposed in
the direction of river improvements), 5 by the governors of the Bank of
England from the mercantile community, 2 by the London Chamber of
Commerce, and 1 each by the Admiralty, Board of Trade and Trinity House.
The remaining members should be elected by various groups, e.g.
shipowners, barge owners, the railway companies interested, &c. Rival
schemes, however, were proposed by the London County Council, which
proposed to take over the entire control through a committee, by the
City Corporation, which suggested that it should appoint 10 instead of 3
members to the new board; and by the London Chamber of Commerce, which
proposed a Harbour Trust of _ex-officio_ and elected members. The Thames
Conservancy also offered itself as the public authority. In 1902 a
Mansion House Conference was convened by the lord mayor and a deputation
was appointed which in 1903 pressed the solution of the matter upon the

  Thames barrage scheme.

A noteworthy scheme to improve the condition of the Thames, first put
forward in 1902-1903, was that of constructing a dam with four locks
across the river between Gravesend and Tilbury. The estimated cost was
between three and four millions sterling, to be met by a toll, and it
was urged that a uniform depth, independent of tides, would be ensured
above the dam, that delay of large vessels wishing to proceed up river
would thus be obviated, that the river would be relieved of pollution by
the tides, and the necessity for constant dredging would be abolished.
This "barrage scheme" was discussed at considerable length, and its
theoretical advantages were not universally admitted. The scheme
included a railway tunnel beneath the dam, for which, incidentally, a
high military importance was claimed.

  Port authorities before 1909.

In 1904 the Port of London Bill, embodying the recommendations of the
Royal Commission with certain exceptions, was brought forward, but it
was found impossible to carry it through. In 1908, however, the Port of
London Act was passed, and came into force in 1909. This act provided
for the establishment of a Port Authority, the constitution of which is
detailed below, which took over the entire control of the port, together
with the docks and other property of the several existing companies.

  The principal dock companies, with the docks owned by them, were as

  1. _London and India Company._--This company had amalgamated all the
  docks on the north side of the river except the Millwall Docks.
  Following the river down from the Tower these docks, with dates of
  original opening and existing extent, are--St Katherine's (1828; 10½
  acres), London (1805; 57½ acres), West India, covering the northern
  part of the peninsula called the Isle of Dogs (1802; 121½ acres), East
  India, Blackwall (1806; 38 acres), Royal Victoria and Albert Docks
  (1876 and 1880 respectively), parallel with the river along Bugsby's
  and Woolwich Reaches, nearly 3 m. in distance (181 acres) and Tilbury
  Docks, 25 m. below London Bridge, constructed in 1886 by the East and
  West India Docks Company (65 acres). Tilbury Docks are used by the
  largest steamers trading with the port.

  2. _Millwall Docks_ (1868), in the south part of the Isle of Dogs, are
  36 acres in extent.

  3. _Surrey Commercial Docks_, Rotherhithe (Bermondsey), occupy a
  peninsula between the Lower Pool and Limehouse Reach. There have been
  docks at Rotherhithe since the middle of the 17th century. The total
  area is 176 acres, a large new dock, the Greenland, being opened in

  The principal railways have wharves and through connexions for goods
  traffic, and huge warehouses are attached to the docks. The custom
  house stands on the north bank, a short distance from London Bridge,
  in Lower Thames Street. It dates from 1817, the body of the building
  being by Laing, but the Corinthian façade was added by Smirke. It
  includes a museum containing ancient documents and specimens of
  articles seized by the customs authorities.

  The chief authorities concerned in the government of the Port of
  London till 1909 were:--

  1. _Thames Conservancy._--For conservancy purposes, regulation of
  navigation, removal of obstruction, dredging, &c.

  2. _City Corporation._--Port sanitary purposes from Teddington Lock

  3. _Trinity House._--Pilotage, lighting and buoying from London Bridge

  4. _The Watermen's and Lightermen's Company._--The licensing authority
  for watermen and lightermen.

  Besides these authorities, the London County Council, the Board of
  Trade, the Admiralty, the Metropolitan and City Police, police of
  riparian boroughs, Kent and Essex Fisheries Commissioners, all the
  dock companies and others played some part in the government and
  public services of the port.

_Port Authority._--The Port of London Authority, as constituted by the
act of 1908, is a body corporate consisting of a chairman,
vice-chairman, 17 members elected by payers of dues, wharfingers and
owners of river craft, 1 member elected by wharfingers exclusively, and
10 members appointed by the following existing bodies--Admiralty (one);
Board of Trade (two); London County Council (two from among its own
members and two others); City Corporation (one from among its own
members and one other); Trinity House (one). The Board of Trade and the
County Council must each, under the act, consult with representatives of
labour as to the appointment of one of the members, in order that labour
may be represented on the Port Authority. The first "elected" members
were actually, under the act, appointed by the Board of Trade. The
undertakings of the three dock companies mentioned above were
transferred to and vested in the Port Authority, an equivalent amount of
port stock created under the act being issued to each. The Port
Authority has full powers to authorize construction works. All the
rights, powers and duties of the Thames Conservancy, so far as concerns
the Thames below Teddington Lock, were transferred to the Port Authority
under the act, as also were the powers of the Watermen's Company in
respect of the registration and licensing of vessels, and the regulation
of lightermen and watermen. The Port Authority fixes the port rates,
which, however, must not in any two consecutive years exceed
one-thousandth part of the value of all imports and exports, or a
three-thousandth of the value of goods discharged from or taken on board
vessels not within the premises of a dock. Preferential dock charges are
prohibited and a port fund established under the act. The authority has
powers to borrow money, but for certain purposes in this connexion, as
in other matters, it can only act subject to the approval of the Board
of Trade.

  _Commerce._--The following figures may be quoted for purposes of
  comparison at different periods:--

  _Value of Exports of Home Produce_ (1840), £11,586,037; (1874),
  £60,232,118; (1880), £52,600,929; (1902-1905 average), £60,095,294.
  Imports (1880), £141,442,907; (1902-1905), £174,059,316. These figures
  point to the fact that London is essentially a mart, and neither is
  itself, nor is the especial outlet for, a large manufacturing centre;
  hence imports greatly exceed exports.

  _Vessels entered and cleared_ (foreign and colonial trade):--

    |    Year.  |   Entered.   |  Cleared.  |
    |           |   Tonnage.   |  Tonnage.  |
    |   1694    |    135,972   |    81,148  |
    |   1750    |    511,680   |   179,860  |
    |   1800    |    796,632   |   729,554  |
    | 1841-1850 |  1,596,453   | 1,124,793  |
    | (average) |              |            |
    |   1881    |  5,810,043   | 4,478,960  |
    |   1895    |  8,435,676   | 6,110,325  |
    |   1905    | 10,814,115   | 7,913,115  |

  In the coastwise trade, in 1881, 38,953 vessels of 4,545,904 tons
  entered; in 1895, 43,704 vessels of 6,555,618 tons; but these figures
  include vessels trading within the Thames estuary (ports of London,
  Rochester, Colchester and Faversham), which later returns do not.
  Omitting such vessels, therefore, the number which entered in the
  coastwise trade in 1905 was 16,358 of 6,374,832 tons.

_Business._--The City has been indicated as the business centre of the
metropolis. Besides the Royal Exchange, in the building of which are
numerous offices, including "Lloyd's," the centre of the shipping
business and marine insurance, there are many exchanges for special
articles. Among these are the Corn Exchange in Mark Lane, where the
privilege of a fair was originally granted by Edward I.; the Wool
Exchange, Coleman Street; the Coal Exchange, Lower Thames Street; the
Shipping Exchange, Billiter Street; and the auction mart for landed
property in Tokenhouse Yard. The Hop Exchange is across the river in
Southwark. In Mincing Lane are the commercial salerooms. Besides the
Bank of England there are many banking houses; and the name of Lombard
Street, commemorating the former money dealers of Lombardy, is
especially associated with them. The majority of the banks are members
of the Clearing House, Post Office Court, where a daily exchange of
drafts representing millions of pounds sterling is effected. The Royal
Mint is on Tower Hill. The Stock Exchange is in Capel Court, and numbers
of brokers have their offices in the vicinity of the Royal Exchange and
the Bank of England.

  _Manufactures and Retail Trade._--No part of London can be pointed out
  as essentially a manufacturing quarter, and there is a strong tendency
  for manufacturing firms to establish their factories outside the
  metropolis. There are, however, several large breweries, among which
  that of Messrs Barclay & Perkins, on the riverside in Southwark, may
  be mentioned; engineering works are numerous in East London by the
  river, where there are also shipbuilding yards; the leather industry
  centres in Bermondsey, the extensive pottery works of Messrs Doulton
  are in Lambeth, there are chemical works on the Lea, and paper-mills
  on the Wandle. Certain industries (not confined to factories) have
  long been associated with particular localities. Thus, clock-makers
  and metal-workers are congregated in Finsbury, especially Clerkenwell
  and in Islington; Hatton Garden, near Holborn Viaduct, is a centre for
  diamond merchants; cabinet-making is carried on in Bethnal Green,
  Shoreditch and the vicinity; and large numbers in the East End are
  employed in the match industry. Silk-weaving is still carried on in
  the district of Spitalfields (see STEPNEY). West of the City certain
  streets are essentially connected with certain trades. The
  old-established collection of second-hand book-shops in Holywell
  Street was only abolished by the widening of the Strand, and a large
  proportion then removed to Charing Cross Road. In the Strand, and more
  especially in Fleet Street and its offshoots, are found the offices of
  the majority of the most important daily newspapers and other
  journals. Carriage and motor-car warehouses congregate in Long Acre.
  In Tottenham Court Road are the showrooms of several large
  upholstering and furnishing firms. Of the streets most frequented on
  account of their fashionable shops Bond Street, Regent Street, Oxford
  Street, Sloane Street and High Street, Kensington, may be selected. In
  the East End and other poor quarters a large trade in second-hand
  clothing, flowers and vegetables, and many other commodities is
  carried on in the streets on movable stalls by costermongers and

  _Markets._--The City Corporation exercises a control over the majority
  of the London markets, which dates from the close of the 14th century,
  when dealers were placed under the governance of the mayor and
  aldermen. The markets thus controlled are:

  _Central Markets_, Smithfield, for meat, poultry, provisions, fruit,
  vegetables, flowers and fish. These extend over a great area north of
  Newgate Street and east of Farringdon Road. Beneath them are extensive
  underground railway sidings. A market for horses and cattle existed
  here at least as early as the time of Henry II.

  _Leadenhall Market_, Leadenhall Street, City, for poultry and meat.
  This market was in existence before 1411 when it came into the
  possession of the City.

  _Billingsgate Market_, by the Thames immediately above the custom
  house, for fish. Formerly a point of anchorage for small vessels, it
  was made a free market in 1699.

  _Smithfield Hay Market._

  _Metropolitan Cattle Market_, Copenhagen Fields, Islington.

  _Deptford Cattle Market (foreign cattle)._

  _Spitalfields Market_ (fruit, vegetables and flowers).

  _Shadwell Market_ (fish).

  Of other markets, the Whitechapel Hay Market and Borough Market,
  Southwark, are under the control of trustees; and Woolwich Market is
  under the council of that borough. Covent Garden, the great mart in
  the west of London for flowers, fruit and vegetables, is in the hands
  of private owners. It appears to have been used as a market early in
  the 17th century. Scenes of remarkable activity may be witnessed here
  and at Billingsgate in the early hours of the morning when the stock
  is brought in and the wholesale distributions are carried on.



  Metropolitan Board of Works.

_Administration before 1888._--The middle of the 19th century found the
whole local administration of London still of a medieval character.
Moreover, as complete reform had always been steadily resisted,
homogeneity was entirely wanting. Outside the City itself a system of
local government can hardly be said to have existed. Greater London (in
the sense in which that name might then have been applied) was governed
by the inhabitants of each parish in vestry assembled, save that in some
instances parishes had elected select vestries under the provisions of
the Vestries Act 1831. In neither case had the vestry powers of town
management. To meet the needs of particular localities, commissioners or
trustees having such powers had been from time to time created by local
acts. The resulting chaos was remarkable. In 1855 these local acts
numbered 250, administered by not less than 300 bodies, and by a number
of persons serving on them computed at 10,448. These persons were either
self-elected, or elected for life, or both, and therefore in no degree
responsible to the ratepayers. There were two bodies having jurisdiction
over the whole metropolis except the City, namely, the officers
appointed under the Metropolitan Building Act of 1844, and the
Metropolitan Commissioners of Sewers, appointed under the Commissioners
of Sewers Act 1848. Neither body was responsible to the ratepayers. To
remedy this chaotic state of affairs, the Metropolis Management Act 1855
was passed. Under that act a vestry elected by the ratepayers of the
parish was established for each parish in the metropolis outside the
City. The vestries so elected for the twenty-two larger parishes were
constituted the local authorities. The fifty-six smaller parishes were
grouped together in fifteen districts, each under a district board, the
members of which were elected by the vestries of the constituent
parishes. A central body, styled the Metropolitan Board of Works, having
jurisdiction over the whole metropolis (including the City) was also
established, the members of which were elected by the Common Council of
the City, the vestries and district boards, and the previously
established local board of Woolwich (q.v.). Further the area of the
metropolis for local government purposes was for the first time defined,
being the same as that adopted in the Commissioners of Sewers Act, which
had been taken from the area of the weekly bills of mortality. The
Metropolitan Board of Works was also given certain powers of supervision
over the vestries and district boards, and superseded the commissioners
of sewers as authority for main drainage. By an act of the same session
it became the central authority for the administration of the Building
Acts, and subsequently had many additional powers and duties conferred
upon it. The vestries and district boards became the authorities for
local drainage, paving, lighting, repairing and maintaining streets, and
for the removal of nuisances, &c.

  London County Council.

  Metropolitan boroughs.

_Acts of 1888 and 1899._--An objection to the Metropolitan Board of
Works soon became manifest, inasmuch as the system of election was
indirect. Moreover, some of its actions were open to such suspicion that
a royal commission was appointed to inquire into certain matters
connected with the working of the board. This commission issued an
interim report in 1888 (the final report did not appear until 1891),
which disclosed the inefficiency of the board in certain respects, and
also indicated the existence of corruption. Reform followed immediately.
Already in 1884 Sir William Harcourt had attempted to constitute the
metropolis a municipal borough under the government of a single council.
But in 1888 the Local Government Act, dealing with the area of the
metropolis as a separate county, created the London County Council as
the central administrative body, possessing not only the powers of an
ordinary county council, but also extensive powers of town management,
transferred to it from the abolished Board of Works. Here, then, was the
central body, under their direct control, which inhabitants of London
had hitherto lacked. The question of subsidiary councils remained to be
settled. The wealthier metropolitan parishes became discontented with
the form of local government to which they remained subject, and in 1897
Kensington and Westminster petitioned to be created boroughs by the
grant of charters under the Municipal Corporation Acts. These, however,
were inapplicable to London, and it was realized that the bringing of
special legislation to bear on special cases (as the petition of these
two boroughs would have demanded) would be inexpedient as making against
homogeneity. Instead, the London Government Act of 1899 was evolved. It
brought into existence the twenty-eight Metropolitan boroughs enumerated
at the outset of this article. The county of London may thus be regarded
from the administrative standpoint as consisting of twenty-nine
contiguous towns, counting the City of London. As regards the
distribution of powers and duties between the County Council and the
Borough Councils, and the constitution and working of each, the
underlying principle may be briefly indicated as giving all powers and
duties which require uniformity of action throughout the whole of London
to the County Council, and powers and duties that can be locally
administered to the Borough Councils.

  _Summary of Administrative Bodies._--The administrative bodies of the
  County of London may now be summarized:

  1. _London County Council._--Consists of 118 councillors, 2 elected by
  each parliamentary division (but the City of London elects 4); and 19
  aldermen, with chairman, vice-chairman and deputy-chairman, elected in
  council. Triennial elections of councillors by householders (male and
  female) on the rate-books. Aldermen hold office for 6 years.

  2. _Metropolitan Boroughs._--Councils consist of a mayor and aldermen
  and councillors in proportion as 1 to 6. The commonest numbers, which
  cannot be exceeded, are 10 and 60 (see separate article on each
  borough). Triennial elections.

  3. _Corporation of the City of London._--The legislation of 1855, 1888
  and 1899 left the government of the small area of the City in the
  hands of an unreformed Corporation. Here at least the medieval system,
  in spite of any anomalies with respect to modern conditions, has
  resisted reform, and no other municipal body shares the traditions and
  peculiar dignity of the City Corporation. This consists of a Lord
  Mayor, 26 aldermen and 206 common councilmen, forming the Court of
  Common Council, which is the principal administrative body. Its scope
  may be briefly indicated as including (a) duties exercised elsewhere
  by the Borough Councils, and by the London County Council (although
  that body is by no means powerless within the City boundaries); and
  (b) peculiar duties such as control of markets and police. The
  election of common councilmen, whose institution dates from the reign
  of Edward I., takes place annually, the electors being the ratepayers,
  divided among the twenty-five wards of the City. An alderman (q.v.) of
  each ward (save that the wards of Cripplegate within and without,
  share one) is elected for life. The Lord Mayor (q.v.) is elected by
  the Court of Aldermen from two aldermen nominated in the Court of
  Common Hall by the Livery, an electorate drawn from the members of the
  ancient trade gilds or Livery Companies (q.v.), which, through their
  control over the several trades or manufactures, had formerly an
  influence over the government of the city which from the time of
  Edward III. was paramount.

  _Non-administrative Arrangements._--The Local Government Act of 1888
  dealt with the metropolis for non-administrative purposes as it did
  for administrative, that is to say, as a separate county. The
  arrangements of quarter-sessions, justices, coroners, sheriffs, &c.,
  were thus brought into line with other counties, except in so far as
  the ordinary organization is modified by the existence of the central
  criminal court, the metropolitan police, police courts and
  magistrates, and a paid chairman of quarter-sessions. The powers of
  the governing body of the City, moreover, are as peculiar in this
  direction as in that of municipal administration, and the act left the
  City as a county of a city practically unchanged. Thus the Lord Mayor
  and aldermen possess judicial authority, and the police of London are
  divided into two separate bodies, the Metropolitan and the City Police
  (see POLICE).


The chief courts for the trial of criminal cases are the Central
Criminal Court and the Court of Quarter-sessions. The Central Criminal
Court, taking the place of the provincial Assizes, was established by an
act of 1834. There are twelve sessions annually, under the Lord Mayor,
aldermen and judges. They were formerly held in the "Old Bailey"
sessions-house, but a fine new building from designs of E. W. Mountford
took the place of this in 1906. Quarter-sessions for the county of
London are held thirty-six times annually, for the north side of the
Thames at the Sessions-house in Clerkenwell (Finsbury) and for the south
side at that in Newington Causeway, Southwark. For judicial purposes
Westminster was merged with the county of London in 1889, and the
Liberty of the Tower was abolished in 1894. The separate court of the
Lord Mayor and Aldermen is held at the Guildhall. The Metropolitan
police courts are fourteen in number, namely--Bow Street, Covent
Garden; Clerkenwell; Great Marlborough Street (Westminster); Greenwich
and Woolwich; Lambeth; Marylebone; North London, Stoke Newington Road;
Southwark; South Western, Lavender Hill (Battersea); Thames, Arbour
Street East (Stepney); West Ham; West London, Vernon Street (Fulham);
Westminster, Vincent Square; Worship Street (Shoreditch). The police
courts of the City are held at the Mansion House, the Lord Mayor or an
alderman sitting as magistrate, and at the Guildhall, where the aldermen
preside in rotation. The prisons within the metropolis are Brixton,
Holloway, Pentonville, Wandsworth and Wormwood Scrubbs. In the county of
London there are 12 coroners' districts, 19 petty sessional divisions
(the City forming a separate one) and 13 county court districts (the
City forming a separate one). The boundaries of these divisions do not
in any way correspond with each other, or with the police divisions, or
with the borough or parish boundaries. The registration county of London
coincides with the administrative county.

_Parliamentary Representation._--The London Government Act contains a
saving clause by which "nothing in or done under this act shall be
construed as altering the limits of any parliamentary borough or
parliamentary county." The parliamentary boroughs are thus in many cases
named and bounded differently from the metropolitan boroughs. The
parliamentary arrangements of each metropolitan borough are indicated in
the separate articles on the boroughs. In the following list the
boroughs which extend outside the administrative county of London are
noted. Each division of each borough, or each borough where not divided,
returns one member, save that the City of London returns two members.

  (a) _North of the Thames._ (1) Bethnal Green--_Divs._: North-eastern,
  South-western. (2) Chelsea (detached portion in administrative county
  of Middlesex, Kensal Town). (3) Finsbury (detached portion in
  Middlesex, Muswell Hill)--_Divs._: Holborn, Central, Eastern. (5)
  Fulham. (6) Hackney--_Divs._: North, Central, South. (7) Hammersmith.
  (8) Hampstead. (9) Islington--_Divs._: Northern, Southern, Eastern,
  Western. (10) Kensington--_Divs._: Northern, Southern. (11) City of
  London. (12) Marylebone--_Divs._: Eastern, Western. (13) Paddington
  (extending into Middlesex)--_Divs._: Northern, Southern. (14) St
  George's Hanover Square. (15) St Pancras--_Divs._: Northern, Southern,
  Eastern, Western. (16) Shoreditch--_Divs._: Hoxton, Haggerston. (17)
  Strand. (18) Tower Hamlets--_Divs._: Bow and Bromley, Limehouse, Mile
  End, Poplar, St George, Stepney, Whitechapel. (19) Westminster.

  A detached portion of the parliamentary division of Hornsey,
  Middlesex, is in the metropolitan borough of Hackney. London
  University returns a member.

  (b) _South of the Thames._ (1) Battersea and Clapham--_Divs._:
  Battersea, Clapham. (2) Camberwell (extending into Kent)--_Divs._:
  Northern, Peckham, Dulwich. (3) Deptford. (4) Greenwich. (5)
  Lambeth--_Divs._: Northern, Kennington, Brixton, Norwood. (6)
  Lewisham. (7) Newington--_Divs._: Western, Walworth. (8)
  Southwark--_Divs._: Western, Rotherhithe, Bermondsey. (9) Wandsworth.
  (10) Woolwich.

  Part of the Wimbledon parliamentary division of Surrey is in the
  metropolitan borough of Wandsworth.

_Ecclesiastical Divisions and Denominations._--London north of the
Thames is within the Church of England bishopric of London, the bishop's
palace being at Fulham. In this diocese, which covers nearly the whole
of Middlesex and a very small portion of Hertfordshire, are the
suffragan bishoprics of Islington, Kensington and Stepney. The bishopric
of Southwark was created in 1904, having been previously a suffragan
bishopric in the diocese of Rochester. The county contains 612
ecclesiastical parishes. Westminster is the seat of the Roman Catholic
archbishopric in England, and Southwark is a bishopric. Among the
numerous chapels of dissenting bodies there may be mentioned the City
Temple, Congregational, on Holborn Viaduct; the Metropolitan Tabernacle,
Baptist, in Southwark, the creation of which was the outcome of the
labours of the famous preacher Charles Spurgeon (d. 1892); and Wesley's
Chapel, City Road, in the graveyard of which is the tomb of John Wesley;
his house, which adjoins the chapel, being open as a memorial museum. In
1903 the Wesleyans acquired the site of the Royal Aquarium, near
Westminster Abbey, for the erection of a central hall. The Great
Synagogue of the Jews is in St James' Place, Aldgate. The headquarters
of the Salvation Army are in Queen Victoria Street, City. There are
numerous foreign churches, among which may be mentioned the French
Protestant churches in Monmouth Road, Bayswater and Soho Square; the
Greek church of St Sophia, Moscow Road, Bayswater; and the German
Evangelical church in Montpelier Place, Brompton Road, opened in 1904.
     (O. J. R. H.)


  In addition to the provisions that have been mentioned above (Section
  VII.), the London Government Act 1899 simplified administration in two
  respects. The duties of overseers in London had been performed by most
  diverse bodies. In some parishes overseers were appointed in the
  ordinary manner; in others the vestry, by local acts and by orders
  under the Local Government Act 1894, was appointed to act as, or
  empowered to appoint, overseers, whilst in Chelsea the guardians acted
  as overseers. The act of 1899 swept away all these distinctions, and
  constituted the new borough councils in every case the overseers for
  every parish within their respective boroughs, except that the town
  clerk of each borough performs the duties of overseers with respect to
  the registration of electors.[4] Again, with regard to rates, there
  were in all cases three different rates leviable in each parish--the
  poor rate, the general rate and the sewers rate--whilst in many
  parishes in addition there was a separate lighting rate. From the
  sewers rate and lighting rate, land, as opposed to buildings, was
  entitled to certain exemptions. Under the act of 1899 all these rates
  are consolidated into a single rate, called the general rate, which is
  assessed, made, collected and levied as the poor rate, but the
  interests of persons previously entitled to exemptions are
  safeguarded. Further, every precept sent by an authority in London for
  the purpose of obtaining money (these authorities include the London
  County Council, the receiver of the Metropolitan Police, the Central
  Unemployed Body and the Boards of Guardians) which has ultimately to
  be raised out of a rate within a borough is sent direct to the council
  of the borough instead of filtering through other authorities before
  reaching the overseers. The only exceptions to this rule are: (1)
  precepts issued by the local government board for raising the sums to
  be contributed to the metropolitan common poor fund; and (2) precepts
  issued by poor law authorities representing two or more poor-law
  unions; in both these cases the precept has of necessity to be first
  sent to the guardians. The metropolitan borough councils make one
  general rate, which includes the amount necessary to meet their own
  expenditure, as well as to meet the demands of the various precepting
  authorities. There was thus raised in the year 1906-1907 a sum of
  £15,393,956 (in 1898-1899 the amount was £10,401,441); of this
  £11,012,424 was for central rates, which was subdivided into
  £7,930,275 for county services and £3,082,149 for local services,
  leaving a balance of £4,381,532, strictly local rates. The total local
  expenditure of London for the year 1906-1907 was £24,703,087 (in
  1898-1899 it was only £14,768,757), the balance of £9,761,734 being
  made up by receipts-in-aid and imperial subventions. This expenditure
  was divided among the following bodies:

    London County Council                     £9,491,271
    Metropolitan Borough Councils              5,009,982
    Boards of Guardians                        3,587,429
    Metropolitan Water Board                   2,318,618
    Metropolitan Police                        1,903,441
    City Corporation                           1,270,406
    Metropolitan Asylums Board                   934,463
    Central (Unemployed) Body                    141,284
    Overseers--City of London                     34,757
    Market Trustees (Southwark)                   10,680
    Local Government Board--Common Poor Fund         756

    |                         (1) _Rate and Debt Accounts._                            |
    |                                        |                                         |
    |           _Estimated Income._          |         _Estimated Expenditure._        |
    |                                        |                                         |
    | Balances                      £967,740 | Debt (including management)  £3,905,135 |
    | Receipts in aid of expenditure         | Grants (mostly guardians)       645,913 |
    |   (local taxation licences and         | Pensions                         75,665 |
    |   estate duty, beer and spirit         | Establishment charges           232,045 |
    |   duties, &c.)                 513,541 | Judicial expenses                52,515 |
    | Government grants in aid of            | Services--                              |
    |   education                  1,515,663 |   Main drainage      £295,650           |
    | Interest on loans advanced             |   Fire brigade        263,575           |
    |   to local authorities, &c.    586,065 |   Parks and                             |
    | Rents, &c.                     427,767 |     open spaces       140,715           |
    | Contributions from                     |   Bridges, tunnels,                     |
    |   revenue-producing                    |     ferry              49,925           |
    |   undertaking for interest             |   Embankments          14,940           |
    |   and repayment of debt        685,948 |   Pauper lunatics      78,870           |
    | Miscellaneous                    3,633 |   Inebriates Acts      14,045           |
    | Rate contributions--                   |   Coroners             30,925           |
    |   General, for other than              |   Weights and measures 14,830           |
    |     education                2,698,610 |   Gas testing          13,785           |
    |   For education              3,675,694 |   Building Acts        25,595           |
    | Special                        407,946 |   Diseases of Animals                   |
    |                                        |     Acts               19,260           |
    |                                        |   Miscellaneous        63,060           |
    |                                        |                    ----------           |
    |                                        |                    £1,025,175           |
    |                                        | Education           4,837,442           |
    |                                        | Steamboats             14,805           |
    |                                        | Works Dept.            12,100 5,889,522 |
    |                                        | Parliamentary expenses           22,675 |
    |                                        | Miscellaneous                     6,214 |
    |                                        |                              ---------- |
    |                                        |     Total expenditure        10,829,684 |
    |                                        |     Balances                    652,923 |
    |                            ----------- |                             ----------- |
    |                            £11,482,607 |                             £11,482,607 |
    |                                        |                                         |
    |                       (2) _Revenue Producing Undertakings._                      |
    |                                        |                                         |
    |           _Estimated Income._          |         _Estimated Expenditure._        |
    |                                        |                                         |
    | Balances                        £4,055 | Working expenses--                      |
    | Receipts--                             |   Working class                         |
    |   Working class                        |     dwellings        £56,060            |
    |     dwellings       £173,443           |   Tramways         1,318,620            |
    |   Tramways         2,089,955           |   Small Holdings                        |
    |   Small Holdings                       |     and Allotments       621            |
    |     and Allotments       410           |   Parks boating        2,965 £1,378,266 |
    |   Parks boating        5,100 2,268,908 | Renewals                        163,828 |
    | Transfers                        6,214 | Reserve                          44,557 |
    |                                        | Interest on and repayment of            |
    |                                        |   debts                         685,946 |
    |                                        | Transfer in relief of rates             |
    |                                        |   (parks boating)                 2,000 |
    |                                        | Balances                          4,580 |
    |                             ---------- |                              ---------- |
    |                             £2,279,177 |                              £2,279,177 |

  The total expenditure was equal to a rate in the pound of 11s. 4.4d.;
  the actual amount raised in rates was equivalent to a rate of 7s.
  1.0d., receipts-in-aid were equivalent to a rate of 3s. 2.5d., and
  imperial subventions to a rate of 1s. 3.4d. Practically the whole
  amount contributed towards the support of public local expenditure,
  and a considerable amount of that contributed to public national
  expenditure is based on the estimated annual value of the immovable
  property situated within the county of London, which in 1876 was
  £23,240,070; in 1886 £30,716,719; in 1896 £35,793,672; and in 1909
  £44,666,651. The produce of a penny rate was, in the metropolitan
  police district in 1908-1909, £226,739, and in the county of London
  (excluding the City) £161,806. A complete re-valuation of properties
  in the county of London is made every five years, valuation lists
  being prepared in duplicate by the borough councils acting as
  overseers of the parishes in their respective boroughs. They are
  revised by statutory assessment committees, who hear any objections by
  ratepayers against their valuation. These lists when revised are sent
  to the clerk of the County Council, who publishes the totals. By the
  Metropolitan Poor Act 1867, the metropolitan common poor fund, to
  which each union in London contributes in proportion to its rateable
  value, was established. Out of this fund certain expenses of guardians
  in connexion with the maintenance of indoor paupers and lunatics, the
  salaries of officers, the maintenance of children in poor-law schools,
  valuation, vaccination, registration, &c., are paid. The payments
  amounted in 1906-1907 to £1,662,942. Under the Local Government Act
  1888, the London County Council makes grants to boards of guardians,
  sanitary authorities and overseers in London in respect of certain
  services. This grant is in lieu of the grants formerly made out of the
  exchequer grant in aid of local rates, and amounted in 1906-1907 to
  £619,489. Finally, in 1894, the fund called the Equalization Fund was
  established. This fund is raised by the rate of 6d. in the pound on
  the assessable value of the county of London, and redistributed among
  the boroughs in proportion to their population. It amounted in
  1906-1907 to £1,094,946. But, in spite of attempts at equalization,
  rates remain very unequal in London, and varied in 1908 from 6s. 2d.
  in St Anne's, Westminster, to 11s. 6d. in Poplar. The London County
  Council levied in 1909-1910 to meet its estimated expenditure for the
  year a total rate of 36.75d.; 14.50d. of this was for general county
  purposes, 19.75d. for education purposes and 2.50d. for special county
  purposes. The preceding tables show the estimated income and
  expenditure of the London County Council for 1909-1910.

  Besides the annual expenditure of the various authorities large sums
  have been borrowed to defray the cost of works of a permanent nature.
  The debt of London, like that of other municipalities, has
  considerably increased and shows a tendency to go on increasing,
  although certain safeguards against too ready borrowing have been
  imposed. Every local authority has to obtain the sanction of some
  higher authority before raising a loan, and there are in addition
  certain statutory limits of borrowing. Metropolitan borough councils
  have to obtain the sanction of the Local Government Board to loans for
  baths, washhouses, public libraries, sanitary conveniences and certain
  other purposes under the Public Health Acts; for cemeteries the
  sanction of the Treasury is required, and for all other purposes that
  of the London County Council; poor law authorities, the metropolitan
  asylums board, the metropolitan water board and the central
  (unemployed) body require the sanction of the Local Government Board;
  the receiver for the metropolitan police district that of the Home
  Office, and the London County Council that of parliament and the
  Treasury. The following table gives the net loans outstanding of the
  several classes of local authorities in London at the 31st of March

    |            Local Authorities.            | Loans outstanding |
    |                                          |  31st March 1908. |
    | London County Council (excluding loans   |                   |
    |   advanced to other authorities)         |    £49,938,131    |
    | Metropolitan Asylums Board               |      3,113,612    |
    | Metropolitan Police (London's proportion)|        226,131    |
    | Metropolitan Water Board (proportion)    |     38,726,514    |
    | Central (Unemployed) Body                |         31,845    |
    | City of London Corporation               |      5,553,173    |
    | Metropolitan Borough Councils            |     12,551,204    |
    | Guardians and sick asylum managers       |      4,029,013    |
    |                                          +-------------------+
    |                                          |   £114,169,623    |

  AUTHORITIES.--Full details and figures relating to the finance of
  London will be found in the parliamentary papers _Local Taxation
  Returns_ (_England and Wales_), part iv. published annually; _Returns
  relating to the London County Council_, published annually; the annual
  report and accounts of the Metropolitan Water Board, and the
  metropolitan police accounts. The publications of the London County
  Council, especially the tramways accounts, the annual estimates,
  _London Statistics_, and the _Financial Abstract_ (10 years ended 31st
  March 1908) have much valuable information.     (T. A. I.)


1. _British and Roman to A.D. 449._--There is practically no record of
British London, and considerable difference of opinion exists among
antiquaries as to its very existence. Bishop Stillingfleet held that
London was of Roman foundation and not older than the time of Claudius
(_Origines Brit._, 1685, p. 43); and Dr Guest affirmed that the notion
of a British town having "preceded the Roman camp has no foundation to
rest upon" (_Archaeological Journal_, xxiii. 180). J. R. Green expressed
the same opinion in _The Making of England_ (p. 101). On the other side
Kemble held that it was difficult to believe that Cair Lunden was an
unimportant place even in Caesar's day (_Saxons in England_, ii. 266);
and Thomas Lewin believed that London had attained prosperity before the
Romans came; and held that it was probably the capital of
Cassivellaunus, which was taken and sacked by Julius Caesar
(_Archaeologia_, xl. 59). The origin of London will probably always
remain a subject of dispute for want of decisive facts.

The strongest reason for believing in a British London is to be found in
the name, which is undoubtedly Celtic, adopted with little alteration by
the Romans. It is also difficult to believe that Londinium had come to
be the important commercial centre described by Tacitus (A.D. 61) if it
had only been founded a few years before the conquest of Claudius.

The discovery by General Pitt Rivers in 1867 of the remains of pile
dwellings both on the north and on the south of the Thames gives ground
for an argument of some force in favour of the date of the foundation of
London having been before the Roman occupation of Britain. Of Roman
London we possess so many remains that its appearance can be conjectured
with little difficulty.

During the centuries when Britain was occupied by the Romans (A.D.
43-409) there was ample time for cities to grow up from small
beginnings, to overflow their borders and to be more than once rebuilt.
The earliest Roman London must have been a comparatively small place,
but it probably contained a military fort of some kind intended to cover
the passage of the river.

  Extent of Roman London.

The Roman general Paulinus Suetonius, after marching rapidly from Wales
to put down a serious insurrection, found Londinium unfitted for a base
of military operations, and therefore left the place to the mercy of
Boadicea, who entirely destroyed it, and killed the inhabitants. After
this the need of fortifying Londinium must have been apparent, and a
walled city of small dimensions arose soon after the defeat of the
British queen. The earliest Roman city probably extended as far as Tower
Hill on the east, and there is reason to believe that it did not include
any ground to the west of Leadenhall. The excavations at the latter
place in 1881 threw great light upon the early history of London. The
foundation walls of a basilica were discovered, and from the time when
that was built until the present day the ground has always been devoted
to public uses. How far north the first wall was placed it is difficult
to guess. One help towards a settlement of the question may be found in
the discovery of burial places. As it was illegal in Roman times to bury
within the walls, we are forced to the conclusion that the places where
these sepulchral remains have been found were at one time extramural.
Now no such remains have been found between Gracechurch Street and the
Tower. The northern wall was placed by Roach Smith somewhere along the
course of Cornhill and Leadenhall Street. The second extension of the
city westwards was probably to Wallbrook.

In the latest or third Roman enclosure the line of the wall ran straight
from the Tower to Aldgate, where it bent round somewhat to Bishopsgate.
On the east it was bordered by the district subsequently called the
Minories and Houndsditch. The line from Bishopsgate ran eastward to St
Giles's churchyard (Cripplegate), where it turned to the south as far as
Falcon square; again westerly by Aldersgate round the site of the
Greyfriars (afterwards Christ's Hospital) towards Giltspur Street, then
south by the Old Bailey to Ludgate, and then down to the Thames, where
Dr Edwin Freshfield suggests that a Roman fortress stood on the site of
Baynard's Castle. This is most probable, because the Romans naturally
required a special protection on the river at the west as well as at the
east. So in later times when William the Conqueror planned the Tower he
gave the site at the western extremity to his follower Ralph Baynard,
where was erected the stronghold known as Baynard's Castle. Roach Smith
pointed out that the enclosure indicated above gives dimensions far
greater than those of any other town in Britain. There can be no doubt
that within the walls there was originally much unoccupied space, for
with the single exception of the larger circuit south of Ludgate, up to
where the river Fleet ran, made in 1276 for the benefit of the Black
Friars, the line of the walls, planned by the later Romans, remained
complete until the Great Fire (1666). The Thames formed the natural
barrier on the south, but the Romans do not appear to have been content
with this protection, for they built a wall here in addition, which
remained for several centuries. Portions of this wall have been
discovered at various times.

It is difficult even to guess when the third wall was erected. The
emperor Theodosius came to London from Boulogne to mature his plan for
the restoration of the tranquillity of the province. As Theodosius is
said to have left Britain in a sound and secure condition it has been
suggested that to him was due the wall of the later Londinium, but there
is little or no evidence for this opinion, and according to an old
tradition Constantine the Great walled the city at the request of his
mother Helena, presumed to be a native of Britain. There is, however,
some evidence in favour of the supposition that the wall was built at a
much earlier date. It is not improbable that early in the 2nd century
the wall was finished at the west portion and enclosed a cemetery near
Newgate. Sir William Tite, in describing a tessellated pavement found in
1854 on the site of the Excise Office (Bishopsgate Street), expresses
the opinion that the finished character of the pavement points to a
period of security and wealth, and fixes on the reign of Hadrian (A.D.
117-138), to which the silver coin found on the floor belongs, as the
date of its foundation.

The historians of the Roman Empire have left us some particulars of the
visits of emperors and generals to Britain, but little or nothing about
what happened in London, and we should be more ignorant than we are of
the condition of Londinium if it had not been that a large number of
excavations have been made in various parts of the city which have
disclosed a considerable amount of its early history. From these remains
we may guess that London was a handsome city in the reign of Hadrian,
and probably then in as great a position of importance as it ever
attained. This being so, there seems to be reason in attributing the
completed walls to this period.

  Remains of Roman Wall.

The persistence of the relics of the walls of London is one of the most
remarkable facts of history. Pieces of the wall are to be seen in
various parts of the city, and are frequently found when extensive
excavations are made for new buildings. In some places where the Roman
wall is not to be seen there still exist pieces of the old wall that
stand upon Roman foundations. In Amen Court, where the residences of
canons of St Paul's and the later houses of the minor canons are
situated, there stretches such a piece of wall, dividing the gardens of
the Court from the Old Bailey. Of the few accessible fragments of the
Roman wall still existing special mention may be made of the bastion in
the churchyard of St Giles's, Cripplegate; a little farther west is a
small fragment in St Martin's Court, Ludgate Hill (opposite the Old
Bailey), but the best specimen can be seen near Tower Hill just out of
George Street, Trinity Square. Early in the 20th century a fragment
nearly 40 ft. long, together with the base of a bastion, was brought to
light in digging for the foundation of some large warehouses in Camomile
Street, at a depth of 10 ft. below the level of the present street. A
considerable portion of the old wall was laid bare by the excavations
for the new Post Office in St Martin's-le-Grand. From a comparison of
these fragments with the descriptions of Woodward, Maitland and others,
who in the early part of the 18th century examined portions of the wall
still standing, we learn that the wall was from 9 to 12 ft. thick, and
formed of a core of rough rubble cemented together with mortar
(containing much coarse gravel) of extraordinary hardness and tenacity,
and a facing for the most part of stone--Kentish rag, freestone or
ironstone--but occasionally of flints; about 2 ft. apart are double
layers of tiles or bricks which serve as bonding courses. The wall
appears to have been about 20 ft. high, the towers from 40 to 50 ft.,
but when described only the base was Roman. Upon that was raised a wall
of rough rubble rudely faced with stone and flint, evidently a medieval
work and about 2½ ft. thick; then succeeded a portion wholly of brick,
terminating in battlements topped with copings of stone.

  Gates and buildings.

Although the course of the later Roman walls is clear, we do not know
with any certainty the position of the Roman gates. They were not the
same as the medieval gates which have left the record of their names in
modern London nomenclature. It follows, therefore, that the main streets
also are not in line with the Roman ways, except perhaps in a few
instances. Many ineffectual attempts have been made to connect the
Watling street in the city with the great Roman road so named in
medieval times. The name of the small street is evidently a corruption,
and in the valuable Report of the MSS. of the Dean and Chapter of St
Paul's (_Ninth Report of the Historical MSS. Commission_, Appendix, p.
4) the original name is given as "Atheling Street," and instances of
this spelling are common in the 13th century. The form Watling Street
seems to occur first in 1307. Stow spells it Watheling Street
(Kingsford's edition of Stow's _Survey_, 1908, vol. ii. p. 352). Sir
William Tite gave reasons for believing that Bishopsgate Street was not
a Roman thoroughfare, and in the excavations at Leadenhall the basilica
to which allusion has already been made was found apparently crossing
the present thoroughfare of Gracechurch Street. Tite also agreed with Dr
Stukeley's suggestion that on the site of the Mansion House (formerly
Stocks Market) stood the Roman forum, and he states that a line drawn
from that spot as a centre would pass by the pavements found on the site
of the Excise Office. Besides the forum Stukeley suggested the sites of
seven other buildings--the _Arx Palatina_ guarding the south-eastern
angle of the city where the Tower now stands, the grove and temple of
Diana on the site of St Paul's, &c. No traces of any of these buildings
have been found, and they are therefore purely conjectural. Stukeley's
industrious researches into the history of Roman London cannot be said
to have any particular value, although at one time they enjoyed
considerable vogue. As to the Temple of Diana, Sir Christopher Wren
formed an opinion strongly adverse to the old tradition of its existence
(_Parentalia_, p. 266). Although we know that the Christian church was
established in Britain during the later period of the Roman domination,
there is little to be learnt respecting it, and the bishop Restitutus,
who is said to have attended an Ecclesiastical Council, is a somewhat
mythical character. In respect to the discovery of the position of the
Roman gates, the true date of the _Antonini Itinerarium_ (q.v.) is of
great importance, as it will be seen from it that Londinium was either a
starting-point or a terminus in nearly half the routes described in the
portion relating to Britain. This would be remarkable if the work dated
back to the 2nd century. Probably in the later, as in the earlier time,
Londinium had the usual four gates of a Roman city, with the main roads
to them. The one on the east was doubtless situated near where Aldgate
afterwards stood. On the south the entrance to Londinium must always
have been near where London Bridge was subsequently built. On the west
the gate could not have been far from the place afterwards occupied by
Newgate. As to Ludgate there is reason to believe that if there was an
opening there in Roman times it was merely a postern. On the north the
gate may have been near Bishopsgate or at Aldersgate. If we take from
the _Itinerary_ the last station before Londinium in all the routes we
shall be able to obtain some idea of the position of the gate entered
from each route by drawing a line on the map of London to the nearest
point. Ammianus Marcellinus (about A.D. 390) speaks twice of Londinium
as an ancient town to which the honourable title of Augusta had been
accorded. Some writers have been under the misapprehension that this
name for a time superseded that of Londinium. The anonymous Chorographer
of Ravenna calls the place Londinium Augusta, and doubtless this was the
form adopted.

  London Stone.

The most interesting Roman relic is "London Stone." It has generally
been supposed to be a "milliarium" or central point for measuring
distances, but Sir Christopher Wren believed it was part of some more
considerable monuments in the forum (_Parentalia_, pp. 265, 266).
Holinshed (who was followed by Shakespeare in _2 Henry VI._, act 4 sc.
6) tells us that when Cade, in 1450, forced his way into London, he
first of all proceeded to London Stone, and having struck his sword upon
it, said in reference to himself and in explanation of his own action,
"Now is Mortimer lord of this city." Mr H. C. Coote, in a paper
published in the _Trans. London and Middlesex Arch. Soc._ for 1878,
points out that this act meant something to the mob who followed the
rebel chief, and was not a piece of foolish acting. Mr Laurence Gomme
(_Primitive Folk-Moots_, pp. 155, 156) takes up the matter at this
point, and places the tradition implied by Cade's significant action as
belonging to times when the London Stone was, as other great stones
were, the place where the suitors of an open-air assembly were
accustomed to gather together and to legislate for the government of the
city. Corroborative facts have been gathered from other parts of the
country, and, although more evidence is required, such as we have is
strongly in favour of the supposition that the London Stone is a
prehistoric monument.

  The first London Bridge.

One of the most important questions in the history of London that
requires settlement is the date of the building of the first bridge,
that is whether it was constructed by Britons or by Romans. If the
Britons had not already made the bridge before the Romans arrived it
must have been one of the first Roman works. As long as there was no
bridge to join the north and south banks of the Thames the great object
of Roman rule remained unfulfilled. This object was the completion of a
system of roads connecting all parts of the Empire with Rome.

Dio Cassius, who lived in the early part of the 3rd century (_Hist.
Rom._ lib. lx. c. 20), states that there was a bridge over the Thames at
the time of the invasion of Claudius (A.D. 43), but he places it a
little above the mouth of the river ("higher up"). The position is
vague, but the mouth of the Thames in these early times may be
considered as not far from the present position of London Bridge. Sir
George Airy held that this bridge was not far from the site of London
Bridge (_Proceedings of Institut. Civil Engineers_, xlix. 120), but Dr
Guest was not prepared to allow that the Britons were able to construct
a bridge over a tidal river such as the Thames, some 300 yds. wide, with
a difference of level at high and low water of nearly 20 ft. He
therefore suggested that the bridge was constructed over the marshy
valley of the Lea, probably near Stratford. It needs some temerity to
differ from so great an authority as Dr Guest, but it strikes one as
surprising that, having accepted the fact of a bridge made by the
Britons, he should deny that these Britons possessed a town or village
in the place to which he supposes that Aulus Plautius retired.

As the Welsh word for "bridge" is "pont," and this was taken directly
from the Latin, the inference is almost conclusive that the Britons
acquired their knowledge of bridges from the Romans. Looking at the
stage of culture which the Britons had probably reached, it would
further be a natural inference that there was no such thing as a bridge
anywhere in Britain before the Roman occupation; but, if Dion's
statement is correct, it may be suggested as a possible explanation that
the increased intercourse with Gaul during the hundred years that
elapsed between Julius Caesar's raids and Claudius Caesar's invasion may
have led to the construction of a bridge of some kind across the Thames
at this point, through the influence and under the guidance of Roman
traders and engineers. If so, the word "pont" may have been borrowed by
the Britons before the commencement of the Roman occupation. Much
stronger are the reasons for believing that there was a bridge in Roman
times. Remains of Roman villas are found in Southwark, which was
evidently a portion of Londinium, and it therefore hardly seems likely
that a bridge-building people such as the Romans would remain contented
with a ferry. Roach Smith is a strong advocate for the bridge, and
remarks, "It would naturally be erected somewhere in the direct line of
road into Kent, which I cannot but think pointed towards the site of Old
London Bridge, both from its central situation, from the general
absence of the foundations of buildings in the approaches on the
northern side, and from discoveries recently made in the Thames on the
line of the old bridge" (_Archaeologia_, xxix. 160). Smith has, however,
still stronger arguments, which he states as follows: "Throughout the
entire line of the old bridge, the bed of the river was found to contain
ancient wooden piles; and when these piles, subsequently to the erection
of the new bridge, were pulled up to deepen the channel of the river,
many thousands of Roman coins, with abundance of broken Roman tiles and
pottery, were discovered, and immediately beneath some of the central
piles brass medallions of Aurelius, Faustina and Commodus. All these
remains are indicative of a bridge. The enormous quantities of Roman
coins may be accounted for by consideration of the well-known practice
of the Romans to make these imperishable monuments subservient towards
perpetuating the memory, not only of their conquests, but also of those
public works which were the natural result of their successes in remote
parts of the world. They may have been deposited either upon the
building or repairs of the bridge, as well as upon the accession of a
new emperor" (_Archaeological Journal_, i. 113).

At the beginning of the 5th century the Roman legions left Britain, and
the _Saxon Chronicle_ gives the exact date, stating that never since
A.D. 409 "have the Romans ruled in Britain"--the chronicler setting down
the Roman sway at 470 winters and dating from Julius Caesar's invasion.
We learn that in the year 418 "the Romans collected all the treasures
that were in Britain, and hid some of them in the earth, that no man
might afterwards find them, and conveyed some with them into Gaul."

2. _Saxon_ (449-1066).--We are informed in the _Saxon Chronicle_ that
about A.D. 449 or 450 the invaders settled in Britain, and in 457
Hengist and Aesc fought against the Britons at Crayford, driving them
out of Kent. The vanquished fled to London in terror and apparently
found a shelter there. After this entry there is no further mention of
London in the _Chronicle_ for a century and a half. This silence has
been taken by some historians of weight to imply that London practically
ceased to exist. Dr Guest asserted "that good reason may be given for
the belief that even London itself for a while lay desolate and
uninhabited" (_Archaeological Journal_, xix. 219). J. R. Green and Mr
Loftie strongly supported this view, and in Sir Walter Besant's _Early
London_ (1908) the idea of the desolation of the city is taken for

In answer to this contention it may be said that, although the silence
of the _Chronicle_ is difficult to understand, it is almost impossible
to believe that the very existence of the most important city in the
country could suddenly cease and the inhabitants disappear without some
special notice. Battles and scenes of destruction are so fully described
in other instances that one must believe that when nothing is related
nothing special occurred. No doubt the coming of the Saxons, which
entirely changed the condition of the country, must have greatly injured
trade, but although there was not the same freedom of access to the
roads, the Londoners had the highway of the river at their doors.
Although the Saxons hated towns and refused to settle in London, they
may have allowed the original inhabitants to continue their trade on
condition that they received some share of the profits or a tribute. The
only question really is whether London being an exceptional city
received exceptional treatment.

  Saxon Settlement.

Along the banks of the Thames are several small havens whose names have
remained to us, such as Rotherhithe, Lambhith (Lambeth), Chelchith
(Chelsea), &c., and it is not unlikely that the Saxons, who would not
settle in the city itself, associated themselves with these small open
spots. Places were thus founded over a large space which otherwise might
have remained unsettled.

  Origin of the Liberties.

If what is here suggested really occurred it may be that this separation
of London from the surrounding country originated the remarkable
position of London with its unparalleled privileges, which were
continued for many centuries and kept it not only the leader among
cities but distinct from all others. Laurence Gomme, in _The Governance
of London_ (1907), opposes the view that the city was for a time left
deserted (a view which, it may be remarked, is a comparatively modern
one, probably originating with Dr Guest). H. C. Coote in his _Romans of
Britain_ elaborated a description of the survival of Roman influence in
English institutions, but his views did not obtain much support from
London historians. Mr Gomme's contention is to some extent a
modification of Mr Coote's view, but it is original in the illustrations
that give it force. Londinium was a Roman city, and (as in the case of
all such cities) was formed on the model of ancient Rome. It may
therefore be expected to retain evidence of the existence of a Pomoerium
and Territorium as at Rome. The Pomoerium marked the unbuilt space
around the walls. Gomme refers to an open space outside the western wall
of Dorchester still called the Pummery as an indication of the Pomoerium
in that place; and he considers that the name of Mile End, situated 1 m.
from Aldgate and the city walls, marks the extent of the open space
around the walls of London known as the Pomoerium. This fact throws a
curious light upon the growth of the "Liberties." It has always been a
puzzle that no note exists of the first institution of these liberties.
If this open space was from the earliest times attached to the city
there would be no need when it was built upon for any special act to be
passed for its inclusion in London. "The _Territorium_ of the city was
its special property, and it extended as far as the limits of the
territorium of the nearest Roman city or as near thereto as the natural
boundaries." This explains the position of Middlesex in relation to
London. In connexion with these two features of a Roman city supposed to
be found in Ancient London the author argues for the continuity of the
city through the changes of Roman and Saxon dominion.

One of the most striking illustrations of the probable continuity of
London history is to be found in the contrast between York and London.
This is only alluded to in Gomme's book, but it is elaborated in an
article in the _Cornhill Magazine_ (November 1906). These two were the
chief Roman cities in Britain, one in the north and the other in the
south. They are both equally good examples of important cities under
Roman domination. York was conquered and occupied by the Saxons, and
there not only are the results of English settlement clear but all
records of Roman government were destroyed. In London the Saxon stood
outside the government for centuries, and the acceptance of the Roman
survival explains much that is otherwise unintelligible.

  Independence of London.

Gomme finds important evidence of the independence of London in the
existence of a merchant law which was opposed to Anglo-Saxon law. He
reprints and discusses the celebrated _Judicia Civitatis Lundoniae_ of
King Æthelstan's reign--"the ordinance" (as it declares itself) "which
the bishop and the reeves belonging to London have ordained." He holds
that the Londoners passed "their own laws by their own citizens without
reference to the king at all," and in the present case of a king who
according to Kemble "had carried the influence of the crown to an extent
unexampled in any of his predecessors." He adds: "What happened
afterwards was evidently this: that the code passed by the Londoners was
sent to the king for him to extend its application throughout the
kingdom, and this is done by the eleventh section." The view originated
by Gomme certainly explains many difficulties in the history of the
transition from Roman to English London, which have hitherto been
overlooked by historians.

  Arrival of Christianity.

When the city is next referred to in the _Saxon Chronicle_ it appears to
have been inhabited by a population of heathens. Under the date 604 we
read: "This year Augustine consecrated two bishops: Mellitus and Justus.
He sent Mellitus to preach baptism to the East Saxons, whose king was
called Sebert, son of Ricole the sister of Æthelbert, and whom Æthelbert
had then appointed king. And Æthelbert gave Mellitus a bishop's see in
Lundenevic and to Justus he gave Rochester, which is twenty-four miles
from Canterbury." The Christianity of the Londoners was of an
unsatisfactory character, for, after the death of Sebert, his sons who
were heathens stirred up the multitude to drive out their bishop.
Mellitus became archbishop of Canterbury, and London relapsed into
heathenism. In this, the earliest period of Saxon history recorded,
there appears to be no relic of the Christianity of the Britons, which
at one time was well in evidence. What became of the cathedral which we
may suppose to have existed in London during the later Roman period we
cannot tell, but we may guess that it was destroyed by the heathen
Saxons. Bede records that the church of St Paul was built by Æthelbert,
and from that time to this a cathedral dedicated to St Paul has stood
upon the hill looking down on Ludgate.

After the driving out of Mellitus London remained without a bishop until
the year 656, when Cedda, brother of St Chad of Lichfield, was invited
to London by Sigebert, who had been converted to Christianity by Finan,
bishop of the Northumbrians. Cedda was consecrated bishop of the East
Saxons by Finan and held the see till his death on the 26th of October
664. He was succeeded by Wini, bishop of Winchester, and then came
Earconuald (or St Erkenwald), whose shrine was one of the chief glories
of old St Paul's. He died on the 30th of April 693, a day which was kept
in memory in his cathedral for centuries by special offices. The list of
bishops from Cedda to William (who is addressed in the Conqueror's
Charter) is long, and each bishop apparently held a position of great
importance in the government of the city.

  Danish Invasions.

In the 7th century the city seems to have settled down into a prosperous
place and to have been peopled by merchants of many nationalities. We
learn that at this time it was the great mart of slaves. It was in the
fullest sense a free-trading town; neutral to a certain extent between
the kingdoms around, although the most powerful of the kings conquered
their feebler neighbours. During the 8th century, when a more settled
condition of life became possible, the trade and commerce of London
increased in volume and prosperity. A change, however, came about
towards the end of the century, when the Scandinavian freebooters known
as Danes began to harry the coasts. The Saxons had become law-abiding,
and the fierce Danes treated them in the same way as in former days they
had treated the Britons. In 871 the chronicler affirms that Alfred
fought nine great battles against the Danes in the kingdom south of the
Thames, and that the West Saxons made peace with them. In the next year
the Danes went from Reading to London, and there took up their winter
quarters. Then the Mercians made peace with them. In 886 Alfred overcame
the Danes, restored London to its inhabitants, rebuilt its walls,
reannexed the city to Mercia, and committed it to Ethelred, alderman of
Mercia. Then, as the chronicler writes, "all the Angle race turned to
him (Alfred) that were not in bondage of the Danish men." In 896 the
Londoners came off victorious in their encounters with the Danes. The
king obstructed the river so that the enemy could not bring up their
ships, and they therefore abandoned them. The Londoners broke up some,
and brought the strongest and best to London. In 912 Æthelred, the
alderman of the Mercians, who had been placed in authority by Alfred,
died, and Edward the Elder took possession of London and Oxford, "and
all the lands which thereto belonged."

Under Æthelstan we find the city increasing in importance and general
prosperity. There were then eight mints at work, a fact which exhibits
evidence of great activity and the need of coin for the purposes of
trade. The folk-moot met in the precincts of St Paul's at the sound of
the bell of the famous bell-tower, which also rang out when the armed
levy was required to march under St Paul's banner. For some years after
the decisive battle of Brunanburh (A.D. 937) the Danes ceased to trouble
the country. Fire, however, was almost as great an enemy to London as
the Dane. Fabyan when recording the entire destruction of London by fire
in the reign of Æthelred (981) makes this remarkable statement--"Ye
shall understand that this daye the cytie of London had more housynge
and buyldinge from Ludgate toward Westmynstre and lytel or none wher
the chief or hart of the citie is now, except (that) in dyvers places
were housyng, but they stod without order."

In the reign of Æthelred II., called the Unready (but more correctly the
Redeless), the Danes were more successful in their operations against
London, but the inhabitants resisted stoutly. Snorre the Icelander tells
us that the Danes fortified Southwark with ditch and rampart, which the
English assailed in vain. In 982 London was burnt, and in 994 Olaf and
Sweyn (the father of Canute) came with ninety-four ships to besiege it.
They tried to set the city on fire, but the townsmen did them more harm
than they "ever weened." The chronicler piously adds that "the holy
Mother of God on that day manifested her mercy to the townsmen, and
delivered them from their foes." The Danes went from the town and
ravaged the neighbourhood, so that in the end the king and his witan
agreed to give sixteen thousand pounds to be relieved of the presence of
the enemy. This was the origin of the Danegelt. In the year 1009 the
Danes frequently attacked London, but they had no success, and fared ill
in their attempts. The Londoners withstood Sweyn in 1013, but in the end
they submitted and gave him hostages. Three years after this, Æthelred
died in London, and such of the witan as were there and the townsmen
chose Edmund Ironside for king, although the witan outside London had
elected Canute. Canute's ships were then at Greenwich on their way to
London, where they soon afterwards arrived. The Danes at once set to
work to dig a great ditch by Southwark, and then dragged their ships
through to the west side of the bridge. They were able after this to
keep the inhabitants from going either in or out of the town. In spite
of all this, after fighting obstinately both by land and by water, the
Danes had to raise the siege of London and take the ships to the river
Orwell. After a glorious reign of seven months Edmund died in London,
and Canute became master of England. The tribute which the townsmen of
London had to pay was £10,500, about one-seventh of the amount which was
paid by all the rest of the English nation. This shows the growing
importance of the city. From this time there appears to have been a
permanent Danish settlement in London, probably Aldwich, referred to

There is little more to be said of the history of Saxon London than that
Edward the Confessor held his Witanagemot there. On his death the Witan
which had attended his funeral elected to succeed him Harold, the
foremost man in England, and the leader who had attempted to check the
spread of the Norman influence fostered by the Confessor. After his
defeat and death on the hill on the Sussex Downs then called Senlac, the
duke of Normandy had the country at his mercy, but he recognized the
importance of London's position, and moved forward with the greatest
caution and tact.

Before proceeding with the history of London during the Norman period it
is necessary to say something of the counties more especially connected
with London.

  The "Home Counties."

The walled city of London was a distinct political unit, although it
owed a certain allegiance to that one of the kingdoms around it which
was the most powerful for the time being. This allegiance therefore
frequently changed, but London retained its identity and individuality
all through. Essex seems seldom to have held an independent position,
for when London first appears as connected with the East Saxons the real
power was in the hands of the king of Kent. According to Bede, Wini,
being expelled from his bishopric of Wessex in 635, took refuge with
Wulfhere, king of the Mercians, of whom he purchased the see of London.
Hence the Mercian king must then have been the overlord of London. Not
many years afterwards the king of Kent again seems to have held some
jurisdiction here. From the laws of the Kentish kings Lhothhere and
Eadric (673-685) we learn that the Wic-reeve was an officer of the king
of Kent, who exercised a jurisdiction over the Kentish men trading with
or at London, or was appointed to watch over their interests.

The origin of the two counties in which London is chiefly situated opens
up an interesting question. It is necessary to remember that London is
older than these counties, whose names, Middlesex and Surrey, indicate
their relative positions to the city and the surrounding county. We have
neither record of their settlement nor of the origin of their names.
Both must have been peopled from the river. The name Middle Saxons
plainly shows that Middlesex must have been settled after the East and
West Saxons had given their names to their respective districts. The
name Surrey clearly refers to the southern position of the county.


Reference has already been made to a Danish settlement, and there seems
some reason for placing it on the ground now occupied by the parishes of
St Clement Danes and St Giles's. For many centuries this district
between London and Westminster was a kind of "no man's land" having
certain archaic customs. Gomme in his _Governance of London_ (1907)
gives an account of the connexion of this with the old village of
Aldwich, a name that survived in Wych Street, and has been revived by
the London County Council in Aldwych, the crescent which leads to

  The Conquest.

3. _Norman_ (1066-1154).--To return to the condition of things after the
great battle. The citizens of London were a divided body, and Duke
William knowing that he had many friends in the city saw that a waiting
game was the best for his cause in the end. The defeated chiefs retired
on the city, led by Ansgar the Staller, under whom as sheriff the
citizens of London had marched to fight for Harold at Senlac. They
elected Edgar Atheling, the grandson of Edmund Ironside, as king, which
the _Saxon Chronicle_ says "was indeed his natural right." On hearing of
this action William marched towards London, when the citizens sallied
forth to meet him. They were repulsed by the Norman horse, but with such
loss to the latter that the duke thought it imprudent to lay siege to
the city at that time, and he retired to Berkhampstead.[5] It is
reported that William sent a private message to Ansgar asking for his
support. The result was that Edgar and Earls Edwin and Morkere and "the
best men of London" repaired to Berkhampstead, where they submitted
themselves and swore fealty to the Conqueror.

  Changes in the City.

Thus ends the Saxon period, and the Norman period in London begins with
the submission of the citizens as distinct from the action of the rest
of the kingdom, which submission resulted soon afterwards in the
Conqueror's remarkable charter to William the bishop and Gosfrith the
portreeve, supposed to be the elder Geoffrey de Mandeville. A great
change was at once made both in the appearance and in the government of
the city under Norman rule. One of the earliest acts of the Conqueror
was to undertake the erection of a citadel which should overawe the
citizens and give him the command of the city. The Tower was situated at
the eastern limit of the city, and not far from the western extremity
Castle Baynard was built.

The position of the city grew in importance, but the citizens suffered
from severe laws and from serious restrictions upon their liberties. In
August 1077 occurred a most extensive fire, such a one, says the
_Chronicle_, as "never was before since London was founded." This
constant burning of large portions of the city is a marked feature of
its early history, and we must remember that, although stone buildings
were rising on all sides, these were churches, monasteries, and other
public edifices; the ordinary houses remained as before, small wooden
structures. The White Tower, the famous keep of the Tower of London, was
begun by Gundulph, bishop of Rochester, c. 1078. In 1083 the old
cathedral of St Paul's was begun on the site of the church which
Æthelbert is said to have founded in 610. But four years afterwards the
chronicler tells us "the holy monastery of St Paul, the episcopal see of
London, was burnt, and many other monasteries, and the greatest and
fairest part of the whole city." In this same year (1087) william the
Conqueror died. In 1090 a tremendous hurricane passed over London, and
blew down six hundred houses and many churches. The Tower was injured,
and a portion of the roof of the church of St Mary-le-Bow, Cheapside,
was carried off and fell some distance away, being forced into the
ground as much as 20 ft., a proof of the badness of the thoroughfares as
well as of the force of the wind, William Rufus inherited from his
father a love for building, and in the year 1097 he exacted large sums
of money from his subjects with the object of carrying on some of the
undertakings he had in hand. These were the walling round of the Tower
and the rebuilding of London Bridge, which had been almost destroyed by
a flood. In 1100 Rufus was slain, and Henry I. was crowned in London.
This king granted the citizens their first real charter, but this was
constantly violated, when Stephen seized the crown on the death of Henry
I., he tried successfully to obtain the support of the people of London.
He published a charter confirming in general terms the one granted by
Henry, and commanding that the good laws of Edward the Confessor should
be observed. The citizens, however, did not obtain their rights without
paying for them, and in 1139 they paid Stephen one hundred marks of
silver to enable them to choose their own sheriffs. In this reign the
all-powerfulness of the Londoners is brought prominently forward.
Stephen became by the shifting fortune of war a prisoner, and the
empress Matilda might, if she had had the wisdom to favour the citizens,
have held the throne, which was hers by right of birth. She, however,
made them her enemies by delivering up the office of justiciary of
London and the sheriffwick to her partisan Geoffrey, earl of Essex, and
attempting to reduce the citizens to the enslaved condition of the rest
of the country. This made her influential enemies, who soon afterwards
replaced Stephen upon the throne. The Norman era closes with the death
of Stephen in 1154.

  Early parishes.

  Religious foundations.

One of the most striking changes in the appearance of Norman London was
caused by the rebuilding of old churches and the building of new ones,
and also by the foundation of the great monastic establishments. The
early history of the parishes of London is one of great difficulty and
complexity. Although some of the parishes must be of great antiquity, we
have little authentic information respecting them before the Conquest.
The dedications of many of the churches indicate their great age, but
the constant fires in London destroyed these buildings. The original
churches appear to have been very small, as may be judged from their
number. It is not easy, however, to understand how it was that when the
first parishes were formed so small an area was attached to each. The
parish church of which we have the most authentic notice before the
Conquest is St Helen's, Bishopsgate. It was in existence many years
before the priory of the nuns of St Helen's was founded. Bishop Stubbs
in his Introduction to the Historical Works of Ralph de Diceto writes:
"St Paul's stood at the head of the religious life of London, and by its
side, at some considerable interval, however, St Martin's le Grand
(1056), St Bartholomew's, Smithfield (1123) and the great and ancient
foundation of Trinity, Aldgate" (1108). The great Benedictine monastery
of Black Monks was situated away from the city at Westminster, and it
was the only monastic house subject to the rule of St Benedict in the
neighbourhood of London, although the houses of nuns, of which there
were many dotted over the suburbs of London, were governed by this rule.
In course of time there was a widespread desire in Europe for a stricter
rule among the monks, and reforms of the Benedictine rule were
instituted at Cluni (910), Chartreuse (about 1080) and Citeaux (1098).
All these reforms were represented in London.

  _Cluniac Order._--This order was first brought to England by William,
  earl of Warren (son-in-law of William the Conqueror), who built the
  first house at Lewes in Sussex about 1077. The priory of Bermondsey in
  Surrey was founded by Aylwin Child, citizen of London about 1082.

  _Carthusians._--When this order was brought to England in 1178 the
  first house was founded at Witham in Somersetshire. In all there were
  nine houses of the order in England. One of these was the Charterhouse
  of London which was not founded until 1371 by Sir Walter Manny, K.G.

  _Cistercians._--It was usual to plant these monasteries in solitary
  and uncultivated places, and no other house, even of their own order,
  was allowed to build within a certain distance of the original
  establishment. This makes it surprising to learn that there were two
  separate houses of this order in the near neighbourhood of London. A
  branch of the order came to England about 1128 and the first house was
  founded at Waverley in Surrey. Very shortly after (about 1134) the
  abbey of Stratford Langthorne in Essex was founded by William de
  Montfichet, who endowed it with all his lordship in West Ham. It was
  not until two centuries afterwards that the second Cistercian house in
  the immediate neighbourhood of London was founded. This was the Abbey
  of St Mary Graces, East-Minster or New Abbey without the walls of
  London, beyond Tower Hill, which Edward III. instituted in 1350 after
  a severe scourge of plague (the so-called Black Death).

  The two great Military Orders--the Knights Hospitallers of St John of
  Jerusalem and the Templars--followed the Augustinian rule and were
  both settled in London. The Hospital or Priory of St John was founded
  in 1100 by Jordan Briset and his wife Muriel, outside the northern
  wall of London, and the original village of Clerkenwell grew up around
  the buildings of the knights. A few years after this the Brethren of
  the Temple of Solomon at Jerusalem or Knights of the Temple came into
  being at the Holy City, and they settled first on the south side of
  Holborn near Southampton Row. They removed to Fleet Street or the New
  Temple in 1184. On the suppression of the order by command of the pope
  the house in Fleet Street was given in 1313 by Edward II. to Aymer de
  Valence, earl of Pembroke, at whose death in 1324 the property passed
  to the knights of St John, who leased the new Temple to the lawyers,
  still the occupants of the district.

  The queen of Henry I. (Matilda or Maud) was one of the chief founders
  of religious houses, and so great was the number of monasteries built
  in this king's reign that it was said almost all the labourers became
  bricklayers and carpenters and there was much discontent in

  Fitzstephen's description of London.

4. _Plantagenet (1154-1485)._--Henry II. appears to have been to a
certain extent prejudiced against the citizens of London on account of
their attitude towards his mother, and he treated them with some
severity. In 1176 the rebuilding of London Bridge with stone was begun
by Peter of Colechurch. This was the bridge which was pulled down early
in the 19th century. It consisted of twenty stone arches and a
drawbridge. There was a gatehouse at each end and a chapel or crypt in
the centre, dedicated to St Thomas of Canterbury, in which Peter of
Colechurch was buried in 1205. The large amount of building at this time
proves that the citizens were wealthy. Fitzstephen, the monk of
Canterbury, has left us the first picture of London. He speaks of its
wealth, commerce, grandeur and magnificence--of the mildness of the
climate, the beauty of the gardens, the sweet, clear and salubrious
springs, the flowing streams, and the pleasant clack of the watermills.
Even the vast forest of Middlesex, with its densely wooded thickets, its
coverts of game, stags, fallow deer, boars and wild bulls is pressed
into the description to give a contrast which shall enhance the beauty
of the city itself. Fitzstephen tells how, when the great marsh that
washed the walls of the city on the north (Moorfields) was frozen over,
the young men went out to slide and skate and sport on the ice. Skates
made of bones have been dug up in this district. This sport was allowed
to fall into disuse, and was not again prevalent until it was introduced
from Holland after the Restoration.

In spite of Fitzstephen's glowing description we must remember that the
houses of London were wholly built of wood and thatched with straw or
reeds. These houses were specially liable to be destroyed by fire, and
in order to save the city from this imminent danger the famous Assize of
Building known as "Fitz-Ailwyne's Assize" was drawn up in 1189. In this
document the following statement was made: "Many citizens, to avoid such
danger, built according to their means, on their ground, a stone house
covered and protected by thick tiles against the fury of fire, whereby
it often happened that when a fire arose in the city and burnt many
edifices and had reached such a house, not being able to injure it, it
then became extinguished, so that many neighbours' houses were wholly
saved from fire by that house."

Various privileges were conceded to those who built in stone, but no
provision was made as to the material to be used in roofing tenements.
This Assize, which has been described as the earliest English Building
Act, is of great value from an historical point of view, but
unfortunately it had little practical effect, and in 1212 what was
called "Fitz-Ailwyne's Second Assize," with certain compulsory
regulations, was enacted. Thenceforth everyone who built a house was
strictly charged not to cover it with reeds, rushes, stubble or straw,
but only with tiles, shingle boards or lead. In future, in order to stop
a fire, houses could be pulled down in case of need with an alderman's
hook and cord. For the speedy removal of burning houses each ward was to
provide a strong iron hook, with a wooden handle, two chains and two
strong cords, which were to be left in the charge of the bedel of the
ward, who was also provided with a good horn, "loudly sounding."

Richard I. was a popular king, but his fighting in the Holy Land cost
his subjects much. London had to pay heavily towards his ransom; and,
when the king made his triumphal entry into London after his release
from imprisonment, a German nobleman is said to have remarked that had
the emperor known of the wealth of England he would have insisted on a
larger sum. The Londoners were the more glad to welcome Richard back in
that the head of the regency, Longchamp, bishop of Ely, was very
unpopular from the encroachments he made upon the city with his works at
the Tower.

The first charter by which the city claims the jurisdiction and
conservancy of the river Thames was granted by Richard I. John granted
several charters to the city, and it was expressly stipulated in Magna
Charta that the city of London should have all its ancient privileges
and free customs. The citizens opposed the king during the wars of the
barons. In the year 1215 the barons having received intelligence
secretly that they might enter London with ease through Aldgate, which
was then in a very ruinous state, removed their camp from Bedford to
Ware, and shortly after marched into the city in the night-time. Having
succeeded in their object, they determined that so important a gate
should no longer remain in a defenceless condition. They therefore
spoiled the religious houses and robbed the monastery coffers in order
to have means wherewith to rebuild it. Much of the material was obtained
from the destroyed houses of the unfortunate Jews, but the stone for the
bulwarks was obtained from Caen, and the small bricks or tiles from

Allusion has already been made to the great change in the aspect of
London and its surroundings made during the Norman period by the
establishment of a large number of monasteries. A still more important
change in the configuration of the interior of London was made in the
13th century, when the various orders of the friars established
themselves there. The Benedictine monks preferred secluded sites; the
Augustinians did not cultivate seclusion so strictly; but the friars
chose the interior of towns by preference. At the beginning of the 13th
century the remarkable evangelical revival, instituted almost
simultaneously by St Dominic and St Francis, swept over Europe.

  The four chief orders of Mendicant friars were magnificently housed in

    Mendicant friars.

  _Blackfriars._--The Black, Preaching or Dominican Friars came to
  England in 1221 and their first house was at Oxford. Shortly after
  this they came London and settled in Holborn near Lincoln's Inn, where
  they remained for more than fifty years. In 1276 they removed to the
  neighbourhood of Baynard Castle, and their house gave a name to a
  London district which it still retains.

  _Greyfriars._--The Greyfriars, Minorites or Franciscans, first settled
  in Cornhill, and in 1224 John Ewin made over to them an estate
  situated in the ward of Farringdon Within and in the parish of St
  Nicholas in the Shambles, where their friary was built. Christ Church,
  Newgate Street, occupies the site of the choir of the great church of
  the Greyfriars.

  _Austin Friars._--The house of the Austin Friars or Friars Eremites
  was founded in Broad Street ward in 1253.

  _White Friars._--The Friars of the Blessed Virgin of Mount Carmel or
  Carmelites or Whitefriars came to London in 1241, and made their home
  on land between Fleet Street and the Thames given by Edward I.

  Besides the four chief orders of friars there were the Crutched Friars
  in the parish of St Olave, Hart Street (about 1298), and the Friars
  of the Sac first outside Aldersgate (about 1257) and afterwards in the
  Old Jewry.

The names of places in London form valuable records of the habitations
of different classes of the population. The monasteries and friaries are
kept in memory by their names in various parts of London. In the same
way the residences of the Jews have been marked. When Edward I. expelled
the Jews from England in 1290 the district in which they had lived since
William the Conqueror's day came to be called the Old Jewry. On their
return after many centuries of exile most of them settled in the
neighbourhood of Aldgate and Aldersgate. There is a reminder of them in
the names of Jewry Street near the former and of Jewin Street near the
latter place. Jewin Street was built on the site of the burying-place of
the Jews before the expulsion.


In the middle ages there was a constant succession of pageants,
processions and tournaments. The royal processions arranged in connexion
with coronations were of great antiquity, but one of the earliest to be
described is that of Henry III. in 1236, which was chronicled by Matthew
Paris. After the marriage at Canterbury of the king with Eleanor of
Provence the royal personages came to London, and were met by the mayor,
aldermen and principal citizens to the number of 360, sumptuously
apparelled in silken robes embroidered, riding upon stately horses.
After the death of Henry III. (1272) the country had to wait for their
new king, who was then in the Holy Land. Edward I. came to London on the
2nd of August 1274, when he was received with the wildest expressions of
joy. The streets were hung with rich cloths of silk arras and tapestry;
the aldermen and principal men of the city threw out of their windows
handsful of gold and silver, to signify their gladness at the king's
return; and the conduits ran with wine, both white and red.

Dr Jessopp gives a vivid picture of what occurred when King Edward III.
entered London in triumph on the 14th of October 1347. He was the
foremost man in Europe, and England had reached a height of power and
glory such as she had never attained before. Ten years after this, one
of the most famous scenes in the streets of London occurred, when Edward
the Black Prince brought the French King John and other prisoners after
the battle of Poitiers to England. This was a scene unequalled until
Henry V. returned from the glorious field of Agincourt in 1415. The
mayor and aldermen apparelled in orient-grained scarlet, and four
hundred commoners in murrey, well mounted, with rich collars and chains,
met the king at Blackheath. At the entrance to London Bridge the towers
were adorned with banners of the royal arms, and in the front of them
was inscribed _Civitas Regis Justicie_.

During the troubles of the 15th century the authorities had seen the
necessity of paying more attention to the security of the gates and
walls of the city, and when Thomas Nevill, son of William, Lord
Fauconberg, made his attack upon London in 1471 he experienced a
spirited resistance. He first attempted to land from his ships in the
city, but the Thames side from Baynard's Castle to the Tower was so well
fortified that he had to seek a quieter and less prepared position. He
then set upon the several gates in succession, and was repulsed at all.
On the 11th of May he made a desperate attack upon Aldgate, followed by
500 men. He won the bulwarks and some of his followers entered into the
city, but the portcullis being let down these were cut off from their
own party and were slain by the enemy. The portcullis was drawn up, and
the besieged issued forth against the rebels, who were soon forced to

When Richard, duke of Gloucester, laid his plans for seizing the crown,
he obtained the countenance of the lord mayor, Sir Edmund Shaw, whose
brother Dr Shaw praised Richard at Paul's Cross. Crosby Hall, in
Bishopsgate Street, then lately built, was made the lodging of the
Protector. There he acted the accessible prince in the eyes of the
people, for the last of the Plantagenets was another of the usurpers who
found favour in the eyes of the men of London. His day, however, was
short, and with the battle of Bosworth ends Plantagenet London.

  First maps of London.

5. _Tudor (1485-1603)._--It was during this period that the first maps
of London were drawn. No representation of the city earlier than the
middle of the 16th century has been discovered, although it seems more
than probable that some plans must have been produced at an earlier
period.[6] The earliest known view is the drawing of Van den Wyngaerde
in the Bodleian Library (dated 1550). Braun and Hogenberg's map was
published in 1572-1573, and the so-called Agas's map was probably
produced soon afterwards, and was doubtless influenced by the
publication of Braun and Hogenberg's excellent engraving; Norden's maps
of London and Westminster are dated 1593. Some of these maps were pasted
upon walls, and must have been largely destroyed by ordinary wear and
tear. It is curious that the only two existing copies of Agas's map[7]
were published in the reign of James I., although apparently they had
not been altered from the earlier editions of Elizabeth's reign which
have been lost. By the help of these maps we are able to obtain a clear
notion of the extent and chief characteristics of Tudor London. Henry
VII. did little to connect his name with the history of London, although
the erection of the exquisite specimen of florid Gothic at Westminster
Abbey has carried his memory down in its popular name of Henry VII.'s
chapel. Soon after this king obtained the throne he borrowed the sum of
3000 marks from the city, and moreover founded the excellent precedent
of repaying it at the appointed time. The citizens were so pleased at
this unexpected occurrence that they willingly lent the king £6000 in
1488, which he required for military preparations against France. In
1497 London was threatened by the rebels favourable to Perkin Warbeck,
who encamped on Blackheath on the 17th of June. At first there was a
panic among the citizens, but subsequently the city was placed in a
proper state of defence, and the king himself encamped in St George's
Fields. On June 22 he entirely routed the rebels; and some time
afterwards Perkin Warbeck gave himself up, and was conducted in triumph
through London to the Tower.

  Suppression of religious houses.

As the chief feature of Norman London was the foundation of monasteries,
and that of Plantagenet London was the establishment of friaries, so
Tudor London was specially characterized by the suppression of the whole
of these religious houses, and also of the almost numberless religious
gilds and brotherhoods. When we remember that more than half of the area
of London was occupied by these establishments, and that about a third
of the inhabitants were monks, nuns and friars, it is easy to imagine
how great must have been the disorganization caused by this root and
branch reform. One of the earliest of the religious houses to be
suppressed was the hospital of St Thomas of Acon (or Acre) on the north
side of Cheapside, the site of which is now occupied by Mercers' Hall.
The larger houses soon followed, and the Black, the White and the Grey
Friars, with the Carthusians and many others, were all condemned in
November 1538.

Love of show was so marked a characteristic of Henry VIII. that we are
not surprised to find him encouraging the citizens in the same expensive
taste. On the occasion of his marriage with Catherine of Aragon the city
was gorgeously ornamented with rich silks and tapestry, and Goldsmiths'
Row (Cheapside) and part of Cornhill were hung with golden brocades.
When on the eve of St John's Day, 1510, the king in the habit of a
yeoman of his own guard saw the famous march of the city watch, he was
so delighted that on the following St Peter's Eve he again attended in
Cheapside to see the march, but this time he was accompanied by the
queen and the principal nobility. The cost of these two marches in the
year was very considerable, and, having been suspended in 1528 on
account of the prevalence of the sweating sickness, they were soon
afterwards forbidden by the king, and discontinued during the remainder
of his reign. Sir John Gresham, mayor in 1548, revived the march of the
city watch, which was made more splendid by the addition of three
hundred light horsemen raised by the citizens for the king's service.

The best mode of utilizing the buildings of the suppressed religious
houses was a difficult question left unsolved by Henry VIII. That king,
shortly before his death, refounded Rahere's St Bartholomew's Hospital,
"for the continual relief and help of an hundred sore and diseased," but
most of the large buildings were left unoccupied to be filled by his
successor. The first parliament of Edward's reign gave all the lands and
possessions of colleges, chantries, &c., to the king, when the different
companies of London redeemed those which they had held for the payment
of priests' wages, obits and lights at the price of £20,000, and applied
the rents arising from them to charitable purposes. In 1550 the citizens
purchased the manor of Southwark, and with it they became possessed of
the monastery of St Thomas, which was enlarged and prepared for the
reception of "poor, sick and helpless objects." Thus was refounded St
Thomas's Hospital, which was moved to Lambeth in 1870-1871. Shortly
before his death Edward founded Christ's Hospital in the Grey Friars,
and gave the old palace of Bridewell to the city "for the lodging of
poor wayfaring people, the correction of vagabonds and disorderly
persons, and for finding them work." On the death of Edward VI. Lady
Jane Grey was received at the Tower as queen, she having gone there by
water from Durham House in the Strand. The citizens, however, soon found
out their mistake, and the lord mayor, aldermen and recorder proclaimed
Queen Mary at Cheapside. London was then gay with pageants, but when the
queen made known her intention of marrying Philip of Spain the
discontent of the country found vent in the rising of Sir Thomas Wyat,
and the city had to prepare itself against attack. Wyat took possession
of Southwark, and expected to have been admitted into London; but
finding the gates shut against him and the drawbridge cut down he
marched to Kingston, the bridge at which place had been destroyed. This
he restored, and then proceeded towards London. In consequence of the
breakdown of some of his guns he imprudently halted at Turnham Green.
Had he not done so it is probable that he might have obtained possession
of the city. He planted his ordnance on Hay Hill, and then marched by St
James's Palace to Charing Cross. Here he was attacked by Sir John Gage
with a thousand men, but he repulsed them and reached Ludgate without
further opposition. He was disappointed at the resistance which was
made, and after musing a while "upon a stall over against the Bell
Savadge Gate" he turned back. His retreat was cut off, and he
surrendered to Sir Maurice Berkeley, we have somewhat fully described
this historical incident here because it has an important bearing on the
history of London, and shows also the small importance of the districts
outside the walls at that period.

  Tudor London.

We now come to consider the appearance of London during the reign of the
last of the Tudors. At no other period were so many great men associated
with its history; the latter years of Elizabeth's reign are specially
interesting to us because it was then that Shakespeare lived in London,
and introduced its streets and people into his plays. In those days the
frequent visitation of plagues made men fear the gathering together of
multitudes. This dread of pestilence, united with a puritanic hatred of
plays, made the citizens do all they could to discountenance theatrical
entertainments. The queen acknowledged the validity of the first reason,
but she repudiated the religious objection provided ordinary care was
taken to allow "such plays only as were fitted to yield honest
recreation and no example of evil." On April 11, 1582, the lords of the
council wrote to the lord mayor to the effect that, as "her Majesty
sometimes took delight in those pastimes, it had been thought not unfit,
having regard to the season of the year and the clearance of the city
from infection, to allow of certain companies of players in London,
partly that they might thereby attain more dexterity and perfection the
better to content her Majesty" (Analytical Index to the _Remembrancia_).
When theatres were established the lord mayor took care that they should
not be built within the city. The "Theatre" and the "Curtain" were
situated at Shoreditch; the "Globe," the "Swan," the "Rose" and the
"Hope" on the Bankside; and the Blackfriars theatre, although within the
walls, was without the city jurisdiction.

In 1561 St Paul's steeple and roof were destroyed by lightning, and the
spire was never replaced. This circumstance allows us to test the date
of certain views; thus Wyngaerde's map has the spire, but Agas's map is
without it. In 1566 the first stone was laid of the "Burse," which owed
its origin to Sir Thomas Gresham. In 1571 Queen Elizabeth changed its
name to the Royal Exchange. The Strand was filled with noble mansions
washed by the waters of the Thames, but the street, if street it could
be called, was little used by pedestrians. Londoners frequented the
river, which was their great highway. The banks were crowded with stairs
for boats, and the watermen of that day answered to the chairmen of a
later date and the cabmen of to-day. The Bankside was of old a favourite
place for entertainments, but two only--the bull-baiting and the
bear-baiting--were in existence when Agas's map was first planned. On
Norden's map,[8] however, we find the gardens of Paris Garden, the
bearhouse and the playhouse.

  The settled character of the later years of Elizabeth's reign appears
  to have caused a considerable change in the habits of the people. Many
  of the chief citizens followed the example of the courtiers, and built
  for themselves country residences in Middlesex, Essex and Surrey; thus
  we learn from Norden that Alderman Roe lived at Muswell Hill, and we
  know that Sir Thomas Gresham built a fine house and planned a
  beautiful park at Osterley. The maps show us much that remains
  somewhat the same as it was, but also much that has greatly altered.
  St Giles's was literally a village in the fields; Piccadilly was "the
  waye to Redinge," Oxford Street "the way to Uxbridge," Covent Garden
  an open field or garden, and Leicester Fields lammas land. Moorfields
  was drained and laid out in walks in Elizabeth's reign. At
  Spitalfields crowds used to congregate on Easter Monday and Tuesday to
  hear the Spital sermons preached from the pulpit cross. The ground was
  originally a Roman Cemetery, and about the year 1576 bricks were
  largely made from the clayey earth, the recollection of which is kept
  alive in the name of Brick Lane. Citizens went to Holborn and
  Bloomsbury for change of air, and houses were there prepared for the
  reception of children, invalids and convalescents. In the north were
  sprinkled the outlying villages of Islington, Hoxton and Clerkenwell.

6. _Stuart (1603-1714)._--The Stuart period, from the accession of James
I. to the death of Queen Anne, extends over little more than a century,
and yet greater changes occurred during those years than at any previous
period. The early years of Stuart London may be said to be closely
linked with the last years of Elizabethan London, for the greatest men,
such as Raleigh, Shakespeare and Ben Jonson, lived on into James's
reign. Much of the life of the time was then in the City, but the last
years of Stuart London take us to the 18th century, when social life had
permanently shifted to the west end. In the middle of the period
occurred the civil wars, and then the fire which changed the whole
aspect of London. When James came to the throne the term suburbs had a
bad name, as all those disreputable persons who could find no shelter in
the city itself settled in these outlying districts. Stubbs denounced
suburban gardens and garden houses in his _Anatomy of Abuses_, and
another writer observed "how happy were cities if they had no suburbs."

The preparations for the coronation of King James were interrupted by a
severe visitation of the plague, which killed off as many as 30,578
persons, and it was not till March 15, 1604, that the king, the queen
and Prince Henry passed triumphantly from the Tower to Westminster. The
lord mayor's shows, which had been discontinued for some years, were
revived by order of the king in 1609. The dissolved monastery of the
Charterhouse, which had been bought and sold by the courtiers several
times, was obtained from Thomas, earl of Suffolk, by Thomas Sutton for
£13,000. The new hospital chapel and schoolhouse were begun in 1611,
and in the same year Sutton died.

  Social life.

With the death of James I. in 1625 the older history of London may be
said to have closed. During the reign of his successor the great change
in the relative positions of London within and without the walls had set
in. Before going on to consider the chief incidents of this change it
will be well to refer to some features of the social life of James's
reign. Ben Jonson places one of the scenes of _Every Man in his Humour_
in Moorfields, which at the time he wrote the play had, as stated above,
lately been drained and laid out in walks. Beggars frequented the place,
and travellers from the village of Hoxton, who crossed it in order to
get into London, did so with as much expedition as possible. Adjoining
Moorfields were Finsbury Fields, a favourite practising ground for the
archers. Mile End, a common on the Great Eastern Road, was long famous
as a rendezvous for the troops. These places are frequently referred to
by the old dramatists; Justice Shallow boasts of his doings at Mile End
Green when he was Dagonet in Arthur's Show. Fleet Street was the
show-place of London, in which were exhibited a constant succession of
puppets, naked Indians and strange fishes. The great meeting-place of
Londoners in the day-time was the nave of old St Paul's. Crowds of
merchants with their hats on transacted business in the aisles, and used
the font as a counter upon which to make their payments; lawyers
received clients at their several pillars; and masterless serving-men
waited to be engaged upon their own particular bench. Besides those who
came on business there were gallants dressed in fashionable finery, so
that it was worth the tailor's while to stand behind a pillar and fill
his table-books with notes. The middle or Mediterranean aisle was the
Paul's walk, also called the Duke's Gallery from the erroneous
supposition that the tomb of Sir Guy Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, was
that of the "good" Humphrey, duke of Gloucester. After the Restoration a
fence was erected on the inside of the great north door to hinder a
concourse of rude people, and when the cathedral was being rebuilt Sir
Christopher Wren made a strict order against any profanation of the
sacred building. St Paul's churchyard was from the earliest days of
printing until the end of the 18th century the headquarters of the book
trade, when it shifted to Paternoster Row. Another of the favourite
haunts of the people was the garden of Gray's Inn, where the choicest
society was to be met. There, under the shadow of the elm trees which
Bacon had planted, Pepys and his wife constantly walked. Mrs Pepys went
on one occasion specially to observe the fashions of the ladies because
she was then "making some clothes."


In those days of public conviviality, and for many years afterwards, the
taverns of London held a very important place. The Boar's Head in Great
Eastcheap was an inn of Shakespeare's own day, and the characters he
introduces into his plays are really his own contemporaries. The
"Mermaid" is sometimes described as in Bread Street, and at other times
in Friday Street and also in Cheapside. We are thus able to fix its
exact position; for a little to the west of Bow church is Bread Street,
then came a block of houses, and the next thoroughfare was Friday
Street. It was in this block that the "Mermaid" was situated, and there
appear to have been entrances from each street. What makes this fact
still more certain is the circumstance that a haberdasher in Cheapside
living "'twixt Wood Street and Milk Street," two streets on the north
side opposite Bread and Friday Streets, described himself as "over
against the Mermaid tavern in Cheapside." The Windmill tavern occupies a
prominent position in the action of _Every Man in his Humour_.[9] The
Windmill stood at the corner of the Old Jewry towards Lothbury, and the
Mitre close by the Mermaid in Bread Street. The Mitre in Fleet Street,
so intimately associated with Dr Johnson, also existed at this time. It
is mentioned in a comedy entitled _Ram Alley_ (1611) and Lilly the
astrologer frequented it in 1640. At the Mermaid Ben Jonson had such
companions as Shakespeare, Raleigh, Beaumont, Fletcher, Carew, Donne,
Cotton and Selden, but at the Devil in Fleet Street, where he started
the Apollo Club, he was omnipotent. Herrick, in his well-known _Ode to
Ben_, mentions several of the inns of the day.


Under James I. the theatre, which established itself so firmly in the
latter years of Elizabeth, had still further increased its influence,
and to the entertainments given at the many playhouses may be added the
masques so expensively produced at court and by the lawyers at the inns
of court. In 1613 _The Masque of Flowers_ was presented by the members
of Gray's Inn in the Old Banqueting House in honour of the marriage of
the infamous Carr, earl of Somerset, and the equally infamous Lady
Frances, daughter of the earl of Suffolk. The entertainment was prepared
by Sir Francis Bacon at a cost of about £2000.

  The "West End."

It was during the reign of Charles I. that the first great exodus of the
wealthy and fashionable was made to the West End. The great square or
piazza of Covent Garden was formed from the designs of Inigo Jones about
1632. The neighbouring streets were built shortly afterwards, and the
names of Henrietta, Charles, James, King and York Streets were given
after members of the royal family. Great Queen Street, Lincoln's Inn
Fields, was built about 1629, and named in honour of Henrietta Maria.
Lincoln's Inn Fields had been planned some years before. With the
Restoration the separation of fashionable from city life became

When the Civil War broke out London took the side of the parliament, and
an extensive system of fortification was at once projected to protect
the town against the threatened attack of the royal army. A strong
earthen rampart, flanked with bastions and redoubts, surrounded the
City, its liberties, Westminster and Southwark, making an immense

  The Plague.

  The Great Fire.

  Rebuilding: Wren's scheme.

London had been ravaged by plague on many former occasions, but the
pestilence that began in December 1664 lives in history as "the Plague
of London." On the 7th of June 1665 Samuel Pepys for the first time saw
two or three houses marked with the red cross and the words "Lord, have
mercy upon us," on the doors. The deaths daily increased, and business
was stopped. Grass grew in the area of the Royal Exchange, at Whitehall,
and in the principal streets of the city. On the 4th of September 1665
Pepys writes an interesting letter to Lady Carteret from Woolwich: "I
have stayed in the city till above 7400 died in one week, and of them
about 6000 of the plague, and little noise heard day or night but
tolling of bells." The plague was scarcely stayed before the whole city
was in flames, a calamity of the first magnitude, but one which in the
end caused much good, as the seeds of disease were destroyed, and London
has never since been visited by such an epidemic. On the 2nd of
September 1666 the fire broke out at one o'clock in the morning at a
house in Pudding Lane. A violent east wind fomented the flames, which
raged during the whole of Monday and great part of Tuesday. On Tuesday
night the wind fell somewhat, and on Wednesday the fire slackened. On
Thursday it was extinguished, but on the evening of that day the flames
again burst forth at the Temple. Some houses were at once blown up by
gunpowder, and thus the fire was finally mastered. Many interesting
details of the fire are given in Pepys's _Diary_. The river swarmed with
vessels filled with persons carrying away such of their goods as they
were able to save. Some fled to the hills of Hampstead and Highgate, but
Moorfields was the chief resort of the houseless Londoner. Soon paved
streets and two-storey houses were seen in that swampy place. The people
bore their troubles heroically, and Henry Oldenburg, writing to the Hon.
Robert Boyle on September 10, says: "The citizens, instead of
complaining, discoursed almost of nothing but of a survey for rebuilding
the city with bricks and large streets." Within a few days of the fire
three several plans were presented to the king for the rebuilding of the
city, by Christopher Wren, John Evelyn and Robert Hooke. Wren proposed
to build main thoroughfares north and south, and east and west, to
insulate all the churches in conspicuous positions, to form the most
public places into large piazzas, to unite the halls of the twelve chief
companies into one regular square annexed to Guildhall and to make a
fine quay on the bank of the river from Blackfriars to the Tower. His
streets were to be of three magnitudes--90 ft., 60 ft. and 30 ft. wide
respectively. Evelyn's plan differed from Wren's chiefly in proposing a
street from the church of St Dunstan's in the East to the cathedral, and
in having no quay or terrace along the river. In spite of the best
advice, however, the jealousies of the citizens prevented any systematic
design from being carried out, and in consequence the old lines were in
almost every case retained. But though the plans of Wren and Hooke were
not adopted, it was to these two fellows of the Royal Society that the
labour of rebuilding London was committed. Wren's great work was the
erection of the cathedral of St Paul's, and the many churches ranged
round it as satellites. Hooke's task was the humbler one of arranging as
city surveyor for the building of the houses. He laid out the ground of
the several proprietors in the rebuilding of the city, and had no rest
early or late from persons soliciting him to set out their ground for
them at once. The first great impetus of change in the configuration of
London was given by the great fire, and Evelyn records and regrets that
the town in his time had grown almost as large again as it was within
his own memory. Although for several centuries attempts had been made in
favour of building houses with brick or stone, yet the carpenters
continued to be the chief house-builders. As late as the year 1650 the
Carpenters' Company drew up a memorial in which they "gave their reasons
that tymber buildings were more commodious for this citie than brick
buildings were." The Act of Parliament "for rebuilding the city of
London" passed after the great fire, gave the _coup de grâce_ to the
carpenters as house-builders. After setting forth that "building with
brick was not only more comely and durable, but also more safe against
future perils of fire," it was enacted "that all the outsides of all
buildings in and about the city should be made of brick or stone, except
doorcases and window-frames, and other parts of the first story to the
front between the piers," for which substantial oaken timber might be
used "for conveniency of shops." In the winter of 1683-1684 a fair was
held for some time upon the Thames. The frost, which began about seven
weeks before Christmas and continued for six weeks after, was the
greatest on record; the ice was 11 in. thick.

The revocation of the edict of Nantes in October 1685, and the
consequent migration of a large number of industrious French
Protestants, caused a considerable growth in the east end of London. The
silk manufactories at Spitalfields were then established.

During the short reign of James II. the fortunes of the city were at
their lowest, and nowhere was the arrival of the prince of Orange more

William III. cared little for London, the smoke of which gave him
asthma, and when a great part of Whitehall was burnt in 1691 he
purchased Nottingham House and made it into Kensington Palace.
Kensington was then an insignificant village, but the arrival of the
court soon caused it to grow in importance.

Although the spiritual wants of the city were amply provided for by the
churches built by Wren, the large districts outside the city and its
liberties had been greatly neglected. The act passed in the reign of
Queen Anne for building fifty new churches (1710) for a time supplied
the wants of large districts.

7. _Eighteenth Century._--London had hitherto grown up by the side of
the Thames. In the 18th century other parts of the town were more
largely built upon. The inhabitants used coaches and chairs more than
boats, and the banks of the river were neglected. London could no longer
be seen as a whole, and became a mere collection of houses. In spite of
this the 18th century produced some of the most devoted of
Londoners--men who considered a day lived out of London as one lost out
of their lives. Of this class Dr Johnson and Hogarth are striking
examples. The exhibitions of vice and cruelty that were constantly to
be seen in the capital have been reproduced by Hogarth, and had they not
been set down by so truthful an observer it would have been almost
impossible to believe that such enormities could have been committed in
the streets of a great city. A few days after his accession George I.
addressed the representatives of the city in these words: "I have lately
been made sensible of what consequence the city of London is, and
therefore shall be sure to take all their privileges and interests into
my particular protection." On the following lord mayor's day the king
witnessed the show in Cheapside and attended the banquet at Guildhall.
Queen Anne and the first three Georges were all accommodated, on the
occasions of their visits to the city to see the show, at the same house
opposite Bow church. In the time of Queen Anne and George I. David
Barclay (the son of the famous apologist for the Quakers) was an
apprentice in the house, but he subsequently became master, and had the
honour of receiving George II. and George III. as his guests. There was
a large balcony extending along the front of the house which was fitted
with a canopy and hangings of crimson damask silk. The building, then
numbered 108 Cheapside, was pulled down in 1861.

  Extension in the 18th century.

Early in the 18th century there was a considerable extension of building
operations in the West End. Still, however, the north of London remained
unbuilt upon. In 1756 and for some years subsequently the land behind
Montague House (now the British Museum) was occupied as a farm, and when
in that year a proposal was made to plan out a new road the tenant and
the duke of Bedford strongly opposed it. In 1772 all beyond Portland
Chapel in Great Portland Street was country. Bedford House in Bloomsbury
Square had its full view of Hampstead and Highgate from the back, and
Queen's Square was built open to the north in order that the inhabitants
might obtain the same prospect.

In 1737 the Fleet ditch between Holborn Bridge and Fleet Bridge was
covered over, and Stocks Market was removed from the site of the Mansion
House to the present Farringdon Street, and called Fleet market. On
October 25, 1739, the first stone of the Mansion House was laid.
Previously the first magistrates lived in several different houses. A
frost almost as severe as the memorable one of 1683-1684 occurred in the
winter of 1739-1740, and the Thames was again the scene of a busy fair.
In 1758 the houses on London Bridge were cleared away, and in 1760-1762
several of the city gates were taken down and sold. Moorgate is said to
have fetched £166, Aldersgate £91, Aldgate £177, Cripplegate £90, and
Ludgate £148. The statue of Queen Elizabeth which stood on the west side
of Ludgate was purchased by Alderman Gosling and set up against the east
end of St Dunstan's church in Fleet Street, where it still remains.

8. _Nineteenth Century._--In 1806 London saw the public funerals of
three of England's greatest men. On the 8th February the body of Nelson
was borne with great pomp from the Admiralty to St Paul's Cathedral,
where it was interred in the presence of the prince of Wales and the
royal dukes. Pitt was buried on the 22nd of February, and Fox on the
10th of October, both in Westminster Abbey.

The first exhibition of Winsor's system of lighting the streets with gas
took place on the king's birthday (June 4) 1807, and was made in a row
of lamps in front of the colonnade before Carlton House. Finsbury Square
was the first public place in which gas lighting was actually adopted,
and Grosvenor Square the last. In the winter of 1813-1814 the Thames was
again frozen over. The frost began on the evening of December 27, 1813,
with a thick fog. After it had lasted for a month, a thaw of four days,
from the 26th to the 29th of January, took place, but this thaw was
succeeded by a renewal of the frost, so severe that the river soon
became one immovable sheet of ice. There was a street of tents called
the City Road, which was daily thronged with visitors. In 1838 the
second Royal Exchange was destroyed by fire; and on October 28, 1844,
the Queen opened the new Royal Exchange, built by Mr (afterwards Sir
William) Tite. The Great Exhibition of 1851 brought a larger number of
visitors to London than had ever been in it before at one time. The
great and continuous increase in the buildings and the enlargement of
London on all sides dates from this period.

London within the walls has been almost entirely rebuilt, although in
the neighbourhood of the Tower there are still many old houses which
have only been refronted. From the upper rooms of the houses may be seen
a large number of old tiled roofs.

Unlike many capitals of Europe which have shifted their centres the city
of London in spite of all changes and the continued enlargement of the
capital remains the centre and headquarters of the business of the
country. The Bank of England, the Royal Exchange and the Mansion House
are on the site of Ancient London.

In 1863 on the occasion of the marriage of King Edward VII. (when prince
of Wales) the streets of London were illuminated as they had never been
before. Among other events which made the streets gay and centred in
processions to St Paul's may be specially mentioned the Thanksgiving Day
on the 27th of February 1872 for the recovery of the prince of Wales
after his dangerous illness; and the rejoicings at the Jubilee of Queen
Victoria in 1887, and the Diamond Jubilee in 1897.

The first great emigration of the London merchants westward was about
the middle of the 18th century, but only those who had already secured
large fortunes ventured so far as Hatton Garden. At the beginning of the
19th century it had become common for the tradesmen of the city to live
away from their businesses, but it was only about the middle of the 19th
century that it became at all usual for those in the West End to do the

During the first half of the 19th century the position of the City
Corporation had somewhat fallen in public esteem, and some of the most
influential men in the city were unconnected with it, but a considerable
change took place in the latter half of the century. Violent attacks
were made upon the Livery Companies, but of late years, largely owing to
the public spirit of the companies in devoting large sums of money
towards the improvement of the several industries in connexion with
which they were founded, and the establishment of the City and Guilds of
London Technical Institute, a complete change has taken place as to the
public estimation in which they are held.


    Medieval Population.

  Much has been written upon the population of medieval London, but
  little certainty has resulted therefrom. We know the size of London at
  different periods and are able to guess to some extent as to the
  number of its inhabitants, but most of the figures which have come
  down to us are mere guesses. The results of the poll-tax have often
  been considered as trustworthy substitutes for population returns, but
  Professor Oman has shown that little trust can be placed in these
  results. As an instance he states that the commissioners of the
  poll-tax reported that there were only two-thirds as many
  contributaries in 1381 as in 1377. The adult population of the realm
  had ostensibly fallen from 1,355,201 to 896,481. These figures were
  monstrous and incredible.[10]

  The Bills of Mortality of the 16th and 17th centuries are of more
  value, and they have been considered and revised by such able
  statisticians as John Graunt and Sir William Petty. It was not,
  however, before the 19th century that accurate figures were
  obtainable. The circuit of the walls of London which were left by the
  Romans was never afterwards enlarged, and the population did not
  overflow into the suburbs to any extent until the Tudor period.
  Population was practically stationary for centuries owing to
  pestilences and the large proportion of deaths among infants. We have
  no materials to judge of the number of inhabitants before the Norman
  Conquest, but we can guess that there were many open spaces within the
  walls that were afterwards filled up. It is scarcely worth while to
  guess as to the numbers in Saxon London, but it is possible that in
  the early period there were about 10,000 inhabitants, growing later to
  about 20,000. During the latter part of the Saxon period the numbers
  of the population of the country began to decay; this decay, however,
  was arrested by the Norman Conquest. The population increased during
  ten peaceful years of Henry III., and increased slowly until the death
  of Edward II., and then it began to fall off, and continued to
  decrease during the period of the Wars of the Roses and of the Barons
  until the accession of the first Tudor monarch. The same causes that
  operated to bring about these changes in the whole kingdom were of
  course also at work in the case of the City of London.

  One of the earliest statements as to the population of London occurs
  in a letter of about the year 1199 written to Pope Innocent III. by
  Peter of Blois, then archdeacon of London, and therefore a man of some
  authority on the subject. He states that the City contained 120 parish
  churches and 40,000 inhabitants. These numbers have been very
  generally accepted as fairly correct, and Dr Creighton[11] comes to
  the conclusion after careful consideration that the population of
  London from the reign of Richard I. to that of Henry VII. varied
  within a limit of about forty to fifty thousand inhabitants.

    Plagues and Mortality.

  Dr Creighton points out that the number given by certain chroniclers
  of the deaths from the early pestilences in London are incredible;
  such for instance as the statement that forty or fifty thousand bodies
  were buried in Charterhouse churchyard at the time of the Black Death
  in 1348-1349. These numbers have been taken as a basis for calculation
  of population, and one statistician reasoned that if 50,000 were
  buried in one churchyard 100,000 should represent the whole mortality
  of London. If this were allowed the population at this time must have
  been at least 200,000, an impossible amount.

  Although the mortality caused by the different plagues had a great
  effect upon the population of the country at large the city soon
  recovered the losses by reason of the numbers who came to London from
  outside in hopes of obtaining work. Although there were fluctuations
  in the numbers at different periods there is evidence to show that on
  the average the amount of forty to fifty thousand fixed by Dr
  Creighton for the years between 1189 and 1509 is fairly correct. The
  medieval period closed with the accession of the Tudor dynasty, and
  from that time the population of London continued to increase, in
  spite of attempts by the government to prevent it. One of the first
  periods of increase was after the dissolution of the religious houses;
  another period of increase was after the Restoration.

    Bills of Mortality.

  A proclamation was issued in 1580 prohibiting the erection within 3 m.
  of the city gates of any new houses or tenements "where no former
  house hath been known to have been." In a subsequent proclamation
  Queen Elizabeth commanded that only one family should live in one
  house, that empty houses erected within seven years were not to be let
  and that unfinished buildings on new foundations were to be pulled
  down. In spite of these restrictions London continued to grow. James
  I. and Charles I. were filled with the same fear of the increasing
  growth of London. In 1630 a similar proclamation to that of 1580 was
  published. During the greater part of the 18th century there was a
  serious check to the increase of population, but at the end of the
  century a considerable increase occurred, and in the middle of the
  19th century the enormous annual increase became particularly marked.
  To return to the 16th century when the Bills of Mortality came into
  existence.[12] Mention is made of these bills as early as 1517, but
  the earliest series now known dates from 1532. Dr Creighton had access
  to the manuscript returns of burials and christenings for five years
  from 1578 to 1582 preserved in the library at Hatfield House. The
  history of the Bills of Mortality which in the early years were
  intermittent in their publication is of much interest, and Dr
  Creighton has stated it with great clearness. The Company of Parish
  Clerks is named in an ordinance of 1581 (of which there is a copy in
  the Record Office) as the body responsible for the bills, and their
  duties were then said to be "according to the Order in that behalf
  heretofore provided." John Bell, clerk to the company, who wrote an
  essay during the great plague of 1665, had no records in his office of
  an earlier date than 1593, and he was not aware that his company had
  been engaged in registering births and deaths before that year. The
  fire of 1666 destroyed all the documents of the Parish Clerks Company,
  and in its hall in Silver Street only printed tables from about the
  year 1700 are to be found. There is a set of Annual Bills from 1658
  (with the exception of the years 1756 to 1764) in the library of the
  British Museum.[13]

  These bills were not analysed and general results obtained from them
  until 1662, when Captain John Graunt first published his valuable
  _Natural and Political Observations upon the Bills of Mortality_. Sir
  William Petty followed with his important inquiries upon the
  population (_Essay on Political Arithmetic_, 1683).

  It is not worth while to refer to all the wild guesses that were made
  by various writers, but Dr Creighton shows the absurdity of one of
  these calculations made in 1554 by Soranzo, the Venetian ambassador
  for the information of the doge and senators of Venice. He estimates
  the population to have been 180,000 persons, which Dr Creighton
  affirms to be nearly three times the number that we obtain by a
  moderate calculation from the bills of mortality in 1532 and 1535.

  Population in 16th and 17th centuries.

  Following on his calculations from 1509, when the population may be
  supposed to have been about 50,000, Dr Creighton carries on his
  numbers to the Restoration in the following table:--

    1532-1535    62,400  |  1605     224,275
    1563         93,276  |  1622     272,207
    1580        123,034  |  1634     339,824
    1593-1595   152,478  |  1661     460,000

  The numbers for 1661 are those arrived at by Graunt, and they are just
  about half the population given authoritatively in the first census
  1801 (864,845). It therefore took 140 years to double the numbers,
  while in 1841 the numbers of 1801 were more than doubled.

  These numbers were arrived at with much care and may be considered as
  fairly accurate although some other calculations conflict with a few
  of the figures. The first attempt at a census was in August 1631 when
  the lord mayor returned the number of mouths in the city of London and
  Liberties at 130,268, which is only about half the number given above.
  This is accounted for by the larger area contained in the bills of
  mortality compared with that containing only the city and its
  liberties.[14] Howell's suggestion that the population of London in
  1631 was a million and a half need only be mentioned as a specimen of
  the wildest of guesses.

    18th century.

  Petty's numbers for 1682 are 670,000 and those of Gregory King for
  1696, 530,000. The latter are corroborated by those of 1700, which are
  given as 550,000. Maitland gives the numbers in 1737 as 725,903. with
  regard to the relative size of great cities Petty affirms that before
  the Restoration the people of Paris were more in number than those of
  London and Dublin, whereas in 1687 the people of London were more than
  those of Paris and Rome or of Paris and Rouen.

  It is not necessary to give any further numbers for the population of
  the 18th century, as that has been already stated to have been almost
  stationary. This is proved by Gregory King's figures for 1696
  (530,000) when compared with those of the first census for 1801
  (864,035). A corroboration is also to be found in the report of the
  first census for 1801, where a calculation is made of the probable
  population of the years 1700 and 1750. These are given respectively as
  674,350 and 676,250. These figures include (1) the City of London
  within and (2) without the walls, (3) the City and Liberties of
  Westminster, (4) the outparishes within the bills of mortality and (5)
  the parishes not within the bills of mortality. No. 5 is given as 9150
  in 1700, and 22,350 in 1750. It is curious to find that already in the
  18th century a considerable reduction in the numbers of the city of
  London is supposed to have taken place, as is seen in the following

                                         1700.   1750.

    City of London within the walls     139,300  87,000
        "     "    without the walls     69,000  57,300

  As the increase in Westminster is not great (130,000 in 1700 and
  152,000 in 1750) and there is little difference in the totals it will
  be seen that the amount is chiefly made up by the increase in the
  parishes without the bills of mortality. The extraordinary growth of
  London did not come into existence until about the middle of the 19th
  century (see § IV. above).


    Saxon Period.

  We know little of the government of London during the Saxon period,
  and it is only incidentally that we learn how the Londoner had become
  possessed of special privileges which he continued to claim with
  success through many centuries. One of the chief of these was the
  claim to a separate voice in the election of the king. The citizens
  did not dispute the right of election by the kingdom but they held
  that that election did not necessarily include the choice of London.

  An instance of this is seen in the election of Edmund Ironside,
  although the Witan outside London had elected Canute. The remarkable
  instance of this after the Conquest was the election of Stephen, but
  William the Conqueror did not feel secure until he had the sanction of
  the Londoners to his kingship, and his attitude towards London when he
  hovered about the neighbourhood of the city for a time shows that he
  was anxious to obtain this sanction freely rather than by compulsion.
  His hopes and expectations were fulfilled when the gates of London
  were opened to receive him, as already related. Athelstan's acceptance
  of the London-made law for the whole kingdom, as pointed out by Mr
  Gomme, is another instance of the independence of the Londoner. When
  William the Conqueror granted the first charter to London he addressed
  the bishop and the portreeve--the bishop as the ecclesiastical
  governor and the portreeve as the representative of the civil power.

  The word "port" in the title "portreeve" does not indicate the Port of
  London as might naturally be supposed, for Stubbs has pointed out that
  it is _porta_ not _portus_, and "although used for the city generally,
  seems to refer to it specially in its character of a Mart or City of
  Merchants." The Saxon title of reeve was continued during the Norman
  period and the shire-reeve or sheriff has continued to our own time.
  There were originally several distinct reeves, all apparently officers
  appointed by the king. Some writers have supposed that a succession of
  portreeves continued in London, but J. H. Round holds that this title
  disappeared after the Conqueror's charter. Henry I. granted to the
  city by charter the right of appointing its own sheriffs; this was a
  great privilege, which, however, was recalled in the reigns of Henry
  II. and Richard I., to be restored by John in 1199.

  J. H. Round holds that the office of Justiciar was created by Henry
  I.'s charter, and as he was the chief authority in the city this
  somewhat takes off from the value of the privilege of appointing

  In the 12th century there was a great municipal movement over Europe.
  Londoners were well informed as to what was going on abroad, and
  although the rulers were always willing to wait for an opportunity of
  enlarging their liberties, they remained ready to take advantage of
  such circumstances as might occur. Their great opportunity occurred
  while Richard I. was engaged abroad as a crusader.

  In 1889 a medal was struck to commemorate the 700th anniversary of the
  mayoralty which according to popular tradition was founded in 1189.
  With respect to this tradition Round writes (_Commune of London_, p.
  223): "The assumption that the mayoralty of London dates from the
  accession of Richard I. is an absolute perversion of history," and he
  adds that "there is record evidence which completely confirms the
  remarkable words of Richard of Devizes, who declares that on no terms
  whatever would King Richard or his father have ever assented to the
  establishment of the _Communa_ in London."

    The Commune.

  In October 1191 the conflict between John the king's brother and
  Longchamp the king's representative became acute. The latter bitterly
  offended the Londoners, who, finding that they could turn the scales
  to either side, named the Commune as the price of their support of
  John. A small party of the citizens under Henry of Cornhill remained
  faithful to the chancellor Longchamp, but at a meeting held at St
  Paul's on the 8th of October, the barons welcomed the archbishop of
  Rouen as chief justiciar (he having produced the king's sign manual
  appointing a new commission), and they saluted John as regent. Stubbs,
  in his introduction to the Chronicle of Roger de Hoveden, writes:
  "This done, oaths were largely taken: John, the Justiciar and the
  Barons swore to maintain the _Communa_ of London; the oath of fealty
  to Richard was then sworn, John taking it first, then the two
  archbishops, the bishops, the barons, and last the burghers with the
  express understanding that should the king die without issue they
  would receive John as his successor." Referring to this important
  event Mr Round writes: "The excited citizens, who had poured out
  overnight, with lanterns and torches, to welcome John to the capital,
  streamed together on the morning of the eventful 8th of October at the
  well-known sound of the great bell swinging out from its campanile in
  St Paul's Churchyard. There they heard John take the oath to the
  'Commune' like a French king or lord; and then London for the first
  time had a municipality of her own."

    The Mayor and Échevins.

  Little is known as to what the Commune then established really was.
  Round's remarkable discovery among the manuscripts of the British
  Museum of the Oath of the Commune proves for the first time that
  London in 1193 possessed a fully developed "Commune" of the
  continental pattern. A striking point in this municipal revolution is
  that the new privileges extended to the city of London were entirely
  copied from those of continental cities, and Mr Round shows that there
  is conclusive proof of the assertion that the Commune of London
  derived its origin from that of Rouen. This MS. gives us information
  which was unknown before, but upsets the received opinions as to the
  early governing position of the aldermen. From this we learn that the
  government of the city was in the hands of a mayor and twelve échevins
  (_skivini_); both these names being French, seem for a time to have
  excluded the Saxon aldermen.

  Twelve years later (1205-1206) we learn from another document,
  preserved in the same volume as the oath, that _alii probi homines_
  were associated with the mayor and échevins to form a body of
  twenty-four (that is, twelve _skivini_ and an equal number of
  councillors). Round holds that the Court of Skivini and _alii probi
  homines_, of which at present we know nothing further than what is
  contained in the terms of the oaths, was the germ of the Common
  Council. We must not suppose that when the city of London obtained the
  privilege of appointing a mayor, and a citizen could boast in 1194
  that "come what may the Londoners shall have no king but their
  mayor," that the king did not occasionally exert his power in
  suspending the liberties of the city. There were really constant
  disagreements, and sometimes the king degraded the mayor and appointed
  a custos or warden in his place. Several instances of this are
  recorded in the 13th and 14th centuries. It is very important to bear
  in mind that the mayors of London besides holding a very onerous
  position were mostly men of great distinction. They often held rank
  outside the city, and naturally took their place among the rulers of
  the country. They were mostly representatives of the landed interests
  as well as merchant princes.

  There is no definite information as to when the mayor first received
  the title of lord. A claim has been set up for Thomas Legge, mayor for
  the second time in 1354, that he was the first lord mayor, but there
  is positively no authority whatever for this claim, although it is
  boldly stated that he was created lord mayor by Edward III. in this
  year. Apparently the title was occasionally used, and the use
  gradually grew into a prescriptive right. There is no evidence of any
  grant, but after 1540 the title had become general.


  No record has been found of the date when the aldermen became the
  official advisers of the mayor. The various wards were each presided
  over by an alderman from an early period, but we cannot fix the time
  when they were united as a court of aldermen. Stubbs writes: "The
  governing body of London in the 13th century was composed of the
  mayor, twenty-five aldermen of the wards and two sheriffs."

  As we do not find any further evidence than the oath of the Commune
  alluded to of the existence of "échevins" in London, it is possible
  that aldermen were elected on the mayor's council under this title.
  This, however, is not the opinion of Mr Round, who, as before stated,
  is inclined to believe that the body of échevins became in course of
  time the Court of Common Council. The aldermen are not mentioned as
  the colleagues of the mayor until the very end of the 13th century,
  except in the case of Fitz-Ailwin's Assize of 1189, and this, of
  course, related specially to the duties of aldermen as heads of the
  wards of the city.

  In March 1298-1299 letters were sent from "the Mayor and Commune of
  the City of London" to the municipalities of Bruges, Caen and Cambray.
  Although the official form of "The Mayor and Commune" was continued
  until the end of the 13th century, and it was not until early in the
  14th century that the form "Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council" came
  into existence, there is sufficient evidence to show that the aldermen
  and common council before that time were acting with the mayor as
  governors of the city. In 1377 it was ordered that aldermen could be
  elected annually, but in 1384 the rule was modified so as to allow an
  alderman to be re-elected for his ward at the expiration of his year
  of office without any interval.

  In 1394 the Ordinance respecting annual elections was repealed by the
  king (Richard II.). Distinct rank was accorded to aldermen, and in the
  _Liber Albus_ we are told that "it is a matter of experience that ever
  since the year of our Lord 1350, at the sepulture of aldermen, the
  ancient custom of interment with baronial honours was observed." When
  the poll-tax of 1379 was imposed the mayor was assessed as an earl and
  the aldermen as barons.


  The government of the city by reeves dates back to a very early
  period, and these reeves were appointed by the king. The prefix of the
  various kinds of reeves made but little difference in the duties of
  the office, although the area of these duties might be different.
  There was slight difference between the office of sheriff and that of
  portreeve, which latter does not appear to have survived the Conquest.

  After the establishment of the Commune and the appointment of a mayor
  the sheriffs naturally lost much of their importance, and they became
  what they are styled in _Liber Albus_ "the Eyes of the Mayor." When
  Middlesex was in farm to London the two sheriffs were equally sheriffs
  of London and Middlesex. There is only one instance in the city
  records of a sheriff of Middlesex being mentioned as distinct from the
  sheriffs, and this was in 1283 when Anketin de Betteville and Walter
  le Blond are described as sheriffs of London, and Gerin as sheriff of
  Middlesex. By the Local Government Act of 1888 the citizens of London
  were deprived of all right of jurisdiction over the county of
  Middlesex, which had been expressly granted by various charters.

  In 1383 it was ordained and agreed "that no person shall from
  henceforth be mayor in the said city if he have not first been sheriff
  of the said city, to the end that he may be tried in governance and
  bounty before he attains such estate of the mayoralty."

    Common Council.

  The two courts--that of aldermen and that of the common council--were
  probably formed about the same time, but it is remarkable that we have
  no definite information on the subject. The number of members of the
  common council varied greatly at different times, but the right to
  determine the number was indirectly granted by the charter of Edward
  III. (1341) which enables the city to amend customs and usages which
  have become hard.

  There have also been many changes in the mode of election. The common
  council were chosen by the wards until 1351, when the appointments
  were made by certain companies. In 1376 an ordinance was made by the
  mayor and aldermen, with the assent of the whole commons, to the
  effect that the companies should select men with whom they were
  content, and none other should come to the elections of mayors and
  sheriffs; that the greater companies should not elect more than six,
  the lesser four and the least two. Forty-seven companies nominated 156
  members. In 1383 the right of election reverted to the wards, but was
  obtained again by the livery companies in 1467.

    Common Hall.

  The Common Hall was the successor of the folkmote, the meetings of
  which were originally held in the open air at the east end of St
  Paul's and afterwards in the Guildhall. These general assemblies of
  the citizens are described in the old city records as _immensa
  communitas_ or _immensa multitudo_ civium. The elections in Common
  Hall were by the whole body of citizens until Edward I.'s reign,
  citizens were then specially summoned to Common Hall by the mayor. In
  Edward IV.'s reign the elections of mayor, sheriffs and other officers
  and members of parliament were transferred to liverymen. Various
  alterations were subsequently made and now the qualification of
  electors at the election of the corporate offices of lord mayor,
  sheriffs, chamberlain and minor offices in Common Hall is that of
  being a liveryman of a livery company and an enrolled freeman of
  London. The election of aldermen and common councilmen takes place in
  the wardmotes.

    Officials of the city.

  The recorder, the chief official, is appointed for life. He was
  formerly appointed by the city, but since the Local Government Act of
  1888 he is nominated by the city and approved by the lord chancellor.
  The common sergeant was formerly appointed by the city, but since 1888
  by the lord chancellor. The town clerk is appointed by the city and
  re-elected annually.

  The chamberlain or comptroller of the king's chamber is appointed by
  the livery. He was originally a king's officer and the office was
  probably instituted soon after the Conquest. The remembrancer is
  appointed by the common council.

  The common hunt, an office abolished in 1807, was filled by John
  Courtenay in 1417. The sword-bearer is noticed in the _Liber Albus_
  (1419) and the first record of an appointment is dated 1426.

    Later history of the corporation.

  Few fundamental alterations have been made in the constitution of the
  city, but in the reign of Charles II. the most arbitrary proceedings
  were taken against its liberties. The king and his brother had long
  entertained designs against the city, and for the purpose of crushing
  them two pretexts were set up--(1) that a new rate of market tolls had
  been levied by virtue of an act of common council, and (2) that a
  petition to the king, in which it was alleged that by the prorogation
  of parliament public justice had been interrupted, had been printed by
  order of the Court of Common Council. Charles directed a writ _quo
  warranto_ against the corporation of London in 1683, and the Court of
  King's Bench declared its charter forfeited. Soon afterwards all the
  obnoxious aldermen were displaced and others appointed in their room
  by royal commission. When James II. found himself in danger from the
  landing of the Prince of Orange he sent for the lord mayor and
  aldermen and informed them of his determination to restore the city
  charter and privileges, but he had no time to do anything before his
  flight. The Convention which was summoned to meet on the 22nd of
  January 1689 was converted by a formal act into a true parliament
  (February 23). One of the first motions put to the House was that a
  special Committee should be appointed to consider the violations of
  the liberties and franchises of all the corporations of the kingdom
  "and particularly of the City of London." The motion was lost but the
  House resolved to bring in a bill for repealing the Corporation Act,
  and ten years later (March 5) the Grand Committee of Grievances
  reported to the House its opinion (1) that the rights of the City of
  London in the election of sheriffs in the year 1682 were invaded and
  that such invasion was illegal and a grievance, and (2) that the
  judgment given upon the _Quo Warranto_ against the city was illegal
  and a grievance. The committee's opinion on these two points (among
  others) was endorsed by the House and on the 16th of March it ordered
  a Bill to be brought in to restore all corporations to the state and
  condition they were in on the 29th of May 1660, and to confirm the
  liberties and franchises which at that time they respectively held and

  When the Act for the reform of Municipal Corporations was passed in
  1835 London was specially excepted from its provisions. When the
  Metropolitan Board of Works was formed by the Metropolis Management
  Act of 1855 the city was affected to a certain extent, but by the
  Local Government Act of 1888 which founded the London County Council
  the right of appointing a sheriff for Middlesex was taken away from
  the city of London.

  When the county of Middlesex was dissociated from the city of London
  one portion was joined to the administrative county of London, and the
  other to the county of Middlesex.

    Privileges of the lord mayor.

  The lord mayor of London has certain very remarkable privileges which
  have been religiously guarded and must be of great antiquity. It is
  only necessary to mention these here, but each of the privileges
  requires an exhaustive examination as to its origin. They all prove
  the remarkable position of Old London, and mark it off from all other
  cities of modern Europe. Shortly stated the privileges are four:

  1. The closing of Temple Bar to the sovereign.

  2. The mayor's position in the city, where he is second only to the

  3. His summons to the Privy Council on the accession of a new

  4. His position of butler at the coronation banquets.

  The last may be considered in abeyance as there has not been any
  coronation banquet since that of George IV. In the case of the
  coronation of King Edward VII. the claim was excluded from the
  consideration of the Court of Claims under the royal proclamation. The
  terms of the judgment on a further claim are as follows: "The Court
  considers and adjudges that the lord mayor has by usage a right,
  subject to His Majesty's pleasure, to attend the Abbey during the
  coronation and bear the crystal mace."

  BIBLIOGRAPHY.--The earliest description of London is that written by
  the monk Fitzstephen in 1174 as an introduction to his life of
  Archbishop Thomas à Becket. This was first printed by Stow in his
  Survey. It was reprinted by Strype in his editions of Stow; by Hearne
  in his edition of Leland's _Itinerary_ (vol. 8), by Samuel Pegge in
  1772, and elsewhere. The first history is contained in _A Survey of
  London_ by John Stow (1598, 1603). The author died in 1605, and his
  work was continued by Anthony Munday and others (1618, 1633) and in
  the next century by John Strype (1720, 1754-1755). Stow's original
  work was reprinted by W. J. Thoms in 1842 and a monumental edition has
  been published by C. L. Kingsford (Oxford, 1908).

  The following are the most important of subsequent histories arranged
  in order of publication; James Howell, _Londinopolis_ (1657); W. Stow,
  _Remarks on London and Westminster_ (1722); Robert Seymour (John
  Mottley), _Survey of the Cities of London and Westminster_ (1734,
  another edition 1753); William Maitland, _History of London_ (1739,
  other editions 1756, 1760, 1769, continued by John Entick 1775); John
  Entick, _A New and Accurate History of London, Westminster, Southwark_
  (1766); The City Remembrancer, _Narratives of the Plague 1665, Fire
  1666 and Great Storm 1703_ (1769); _A New and Compleat History and
  Survey_, by a Society of Gentlemen (1770, revised by H. Chamberlain,
  folio revised by W. Thornton 1784); J. Noorthouck, _A New History_
  (1773); Walter Harrison, _A New and Universal History_ (1775); J. P.
  Malcolm, _Londinium Redivivum or an Ancient History and Modern
  Description of London_ (1803); David Hughson (E. Pugh), _London_
  (1805-1809); B. Lambert, _History and Survey of London_ (1806); Henry
  Hunter, _History of London_ (1811); J. W. Abbott, _History of London_
  (1821); Thomas Allen, _History and Antiquities of London_ (1827-1829,
  continued by Thomas Wright 1839); William Smith, _A New History of
  London_ (1833); Charles Mackay, _A History of London_ (1838); _The
  History of London_, illustrated by W. G. Fearnside (1838); George
  Grant, _A Comprehensive History of London_ (Dublin, 1849); John Timbs,
  _Curiosities of London_ (1855, later editions 1855, 1868, 1875, 1876);
  _Old London Papers, Archaeological Institute_ (1867); W. J. Loftie, _A
  History of London_ (1883); W. J. Loftie, _Historic Towns_ (London,
  1887); Claude de la Roche Francis, _London, Historic and Social_
  (Philadelphia, 1902); Sir Walter Besant, _The Survey of London_
  (1902-1908)--_Early London, Prehistoric, Roman, Saxon and Norman_
  (1908); _Medieval London_, vol. 1, _Historical and Social_ (1906),
  vol. 2, _Ecclesiastical_ (1906); _London in the Time of the Tudors_
  (1904); _London in the Time of the Stuarts_ (1903); _London in the
  Eighteenth Century_ (1902); H. B. Wheatley, _The Story of London_
  [Medieval Towns] (London, 1904).

  The following are some of the Chronicles of London which have been
  printed, arranged in order of publication: R. Grafton, _Chronicle
  1189-1558_ (1809); R. Arnold, _London Chronicle_ (1811); _A Chronicle
  of London from 1089 to 1483 written in the Fifteenth Century_ (1827);
  _William Gregory's Chronicle of London, 1189-1469_ (1876); _Historical
  Collections of a Citizen of London_, edited by James Gairdner (Camden
  Society, 1876); _Chronicles of London [1200-1516]_, edited by C. L.
  Kingsford (Oxford, 1905).

  Many books have been published on the government of London, of which
  the following is a selection: _City Law_ (1647, 1658); _Lex
  Londinensis or the City Law_ (1680); W. Bohun, _Privilegia Londini_
  (1723); Giles Jacob, _City Liberties_ (1733); _Laws and Customs,
  Rights, Liberties and Privileges of the City of London_ (1765); David
  Hughson, _Epitome of the Privileges of London_ (1816); George Norton,
  _Commentaries on the History, Constitution and Chartered Franchises of
  the City of London_ (1829, 3rd ed. 1869); _Munimenta Gildhallae
  Londoniensis_, edited by H. T. Riley--vol. 1, _Liber Albus_ (1419),
  vol. 2, _Liber Custumarum_ (1859); _Liber Albus: the White Book of the
  City of London_, translated by H. T. Riley (1861); H. T. Riley,
  _Memorials of London and London Life in the 13th, 14th and 15th
  centuries_ (1868); _De Antiquis Legibus Liber. Curante Thoma
  Stapleton_ (Camden Society, 1846); _Chronicles of the Mayors and
  Sheriffs of London 1188-1274_, translated from the _Liber de Antiquis
  Legibus_ by H. T. Riley. _French Chronicle of London_ 1259-1343
  (1863); _Analytical Index to the Series of Records known as the
  Remembrancia 1579-1664_ (1888); _Calendar of Letter-Books_ [_circa
  1275-1399_] preserved among the Archives of the Corporation of London
  at the Guildhall, edited by Reginald R. Sharpe, D.C.L. (1899-1907); W.
  and R. Woodcock, _Lives of Lord Mayors_ (1846); J. F. B. Firth,
  _Municipal London_ (1876); Walter Delgray Birch, _Historical Charters
  and_ _Constitutional Documents of the City of London_ (1884, 1887);
  J. H. Round, _The Commune of London and other Studies_ (1899);
  Reginald R. Sharpe, _London and the Kingdom; a History derived mainly
  from the Archives at Guildhall_ (1894); G. L. Gomme, _The Governance
  of London. Studies on the Place occupied by London in English
  Institutions_ (1907); Alfred B. Beaven, _The Aldermen of the City of
  London temp. Henry III._ (1908).

  In connexion with the government of London may be noted works on the
  following: Inns of Court. William Herbert, _Antiquities of the Inns of
  Court and Chancery_ (1804); Robert P. Pearce, _History_ (1848).
  Artillery Company, Anthony Highmore, _History of the Hon. Artillery
  Co. of London to 1802_ (1804); G. A. Raikes, _History of the Hon.
  Artillery Co._ (1878). William Herbert published in 1837 _History of
  the Twelve great Livery Companies of London_, and in 1869 Thomas
  Arundell published _Historical Reminiscences of the City and its
  Livery Companies_. Since then have appeared _The Livery Companies of
  the City of London_, by W. Carew Hazlitt (1892); _The City Companies
  of London_, by P. H. Ditchfield (1904); _The Gilds and Companies of
  London_, by George Unwin (1908). Separate histories have been
  published of the chief London companies.

  The following are some of the chief works connected with the
  topography of London: Thomas Pennant, _Of London_ (1790, 1793, 1805,
  1813, translated into German 1791); John T. Smith, _Antient Topography
  of London_ (1815); David Hughson [E. Pugh], _Walks through London_
  (1817); _London_ (edited by Charles Knight 1841-1844, reprinted 1851,
  revised by E. Walford 1875-1877); J. H. Jesse, _Literary and
  Historical Memorials of London_ (1847); Leigh Hunt, _The Town, its
  Memorable Character and Events_ (1848, new ed. 1859); Peter
  Cunningham, _A Handbook of London past and present_ (1849, 2nd ed.
  1850, enlarged into a new work in 1891); Henry B. Wheatley, _London
  past and present; Vestiges of Old London, etchings_ by J. W. Archer
  (1851); _A New Survey of London_ (1853); G. W. Thornbury, _Haunted
  London_ (1865, new ed. by E. Walford 1880); _Old and New London_,
  vols. i.-ii. by G. W. Thornbury, vols. iii.-vi. by Edward Walford
  (1873-1878); Walter Besant, _London, Westminster, South London, East
  London_ (1891-1902); _East London Antiquities_, edited by Walter A.
  Locks (_East London Advertiser_, 1902); Philip Norman, _London
  vanished and vanishing_ (1905); _Records of the London Topographical
  Society; Monographs of the Committee for the Survey of the Memorials
  of Greater London._

  The following books on the population of London have been published:
  John Graunt, _Natural and Political Observations on the Bills of
  Mortality_ (1661, other editions 1662, 1665, 1676); _Essay in
  Political Arithmetick_ (1683); _Five Essays on Political Arithmetick_
  (1687); _Several Essays in Political Arithmetick_ (1699, 1711, 1751,
  1755); _Essay concerning the Multiplication of Mankind_ (1682, 1683,
  1686), all by Sir William Petty; Corbyn Morris, _Observations on the
  past Growth and present State of the City of London_ (1751);
  _Collection of the Yearly Bills of Mortality from 1657 to 1758_ (ed.
  by T. Birch, D.D. 1759); Graunt's _Observations_, Petty's _Another
  Essay_ and C. Morris's _Observations_ are reprinted in this
  collection. Graunt and Petty's _Essays_ are reprinted in _Economic
  Writings_ of Sir W. Petty (1899).     (H. B. W.*)


  [1] See map in _London Statistics_ (vol. xix., 1909), an annual
    publication of the London County Council, which besides these
    divisions shows "Water London," the London main drainage area, and
    the Central Criminal Court district.

  [2] Charing Cross station was the scene of a remarkable catastrophe
    on the 5th of December 1905, when a large part of the roof collapsed,
    and the falling débris did very serious damage to the Avenue theatre,
    which stands close to the station at a lower level.

  [3] The report appeared in eight volumes, the first of which,
    containing the general conclusions to which allusion is here made,
    bore the number, as a blue-book. Cd. 2597.

  [4] Over 200 local acts were repealed by schemes made under the act
    of 1899.

  [5] A valuable article on "The Conqueror's Footprints in Domesday"
    was published in the _English Historical Review_ in 1898 (vol. xiii.
    p. 17). This article contains an account of Duke William's movements
    after the battle of Senlac between Enfield, Edmonton, Tottenham and

  [6] "A map of London engraved on copper-plate, dated 1497," which was
    bought by Ferdinand Columbus during his travels in Europe about
    1518-1525, is entered in the catalogue of Ferdinand's books, maps,
    &c., made by himself and preserved in the Cathedral Library at
    Seville, but there is no clue to its existence.

  [7] One is in the Guildhall Library, and the other among the Pepysian
    maps in Magdalene College, Cambridge.

  [8] This map of London by Norden is dated 1593, as stated above. The
    same topographer published in his _Middlesex_ a map of Westminster as
    well as this one of the City of London.

  [9] Various changes in the names of the taverns are made in the folio
    edition of this play (1616) from the quarto (1601); thus the Mermaid
    of the quarto becomes the Windmill in the folio, and the Mitre of the
    quarto is the Star of the folio.

  [10] _The Great Revolt of 1381_ (Oxford, 1906), p. 27.

  [11] In a valuable paper on "The Population of Old London" in
    _Blackwood's Magazine_ for April 1891.

  [12] The old Bills of Mortality, although of value from being the
    only authority on the subject, were never complete owing to various
    causes: one being that large numbers of Roman Catholics and
    Dissenters were not registered in the returns of the parish clerk who
    was a church officer. The bills were killed by the action of the
    Registration Act for England and Wales, which came into operation
    July 1, 1837. The weekly Returns of the Registrar-General began in

  [13] "The invention of 'bills of mortality' is not so modern as has
    been generally supposed, for their proper designation may be found in
    the language of ancient Rome. Libitina was the goddess of funerals;
    her officers were the Libitinarii _our_ undertakers; her temple in
    which all business connected with the last rites was transacted, in
    which the account of deaths--_ratio Libitinae_--was kept, served the
    purpose of a register office."--_Journal Statistical Society_, xvii.
    117 (1854).

  [14] The return was made "by special command from the Right
    Honourable the Lords of His Majesty's Privy Council." The Privy
    Council were at this time apprehensive of an approaching scarcity of
    food. The numbers (130,268) were made up as follows: London Within
    the Walls 71,029, London Without the Walls 40,579, Old Borough of
    Southwark (Bridge Without) 18,660.

  [15] R. R. Sharpe, _London and the Kingdom_ (1894), i. 541.

LONDON CLAY, in geology, the most important member of the Lower Eocene
strata in the south of England. It is well developed in the London
basin, though not frequently exposed, partly because it is to a great
extent covered by more recent gravels and partly because it is not often
worked on a large scale. It is a stiff, tenacious, bluish clay that
becomes brown on weathering, occasionally it becomes distinctly sandy,
sometimes glauconitic, especially towards the top; large calcareous
septarian concretions are common, and have been used in the manufacture
of cement, being dug for this purpose at Sheppey, near Southend, and at
Harwich, and dredged off the Hampshire coast. Nodular lumps of pyrites
and crystals of selenite are of frequent occurrence. The clay has been
employed for making bricks, tiles and coarse pottery, but it is usually
too tenacious for this purpose except in well-weathered or sandy
portions. The base of the clay is very regularly indicated by a few
inches of rounded flint pebbles with green and yellowish sand, parts of
this layer being frequently cemented by carbonate of lime. The average
thickness of the London Clay in the London basin is about 450 ft.; at
Windsor it is 400 ft. thick; beneath London it is rather thicker, while
in the south of Essex it is over 480 ft. In Wiltshire it only reaches a
few feet in thickness, while in Berkshire it is some 50 or 60 ft. It is
found in the Isle of Wight, where it is 300 ft. thick at Whitecliff
Bay--here the beds are vertical and even slightly reversed--and in Alum
Bay it is 220 ft. thick. In Hampshire it is sometimes known as the
Bognor Beds, and certain layers of calcareous sandstone within the clays
are called Barnes or Bognor Rock. In the eastern part of the London
basin in east Kent the pebbly basement bed becomes a thick deposit (60
ft.), forming part of the Oldhaven and Blackheath Beds.

  The London Clay is a marine deposit, and its fossils indicate a
  moderately warm climate, the flora having a tropical aspect. Among the
  fossils may be mentioned _Panopoea intermedia_, _Ditrupa plana_,
  _Teredina personata_, _Conus concinnus_, _Rostellaria ampla_,
  _Nautilus centralis_, _Belosepia_, foraminifera and diatoms. Fish
  remains include _Otodus obliquus_, _Sphyroenodus crassidens_; birds
  are represented by _Halcyornis Toliapicus_, _Lithornis_ and
  _Odontopteryx_, and reptiles by _Chelone gigas_, and other turtles,
  _Palaeophis_, a serpent and crocodiles. _Hyracotherium leporinum_,
  _Palaeotherium_ and a few other mammals are recorded. Plant remains in
  a pyritized condition are found in great abundance and perfection on
  the shore of Sheppey; numerous species of palms, screw pines, water
  lilies, cypresses, yews, leguminous plants and many others occur; logs
  of coniferous wood bored through by annelids and _Teredo_ are common,
  and fossil resin has been found at Highgate.

  See EOCENE; also W. Whitaker, "The Geology of London and part of the
  Thames Valley," _Mem. Geol. Survey_ (1889), and _Sheet Memoirs of the
  Geol. Survey_, London, Nos. 314, 315, 268, 329, 332, and _Memoirs on
  the Geology of the Isle of Wight_ (1889).

LONDONDERRY, EARLS AND MARQUESSES OF. The 1st earl of Londonderry was
Thomas Ridgeway (c. 1565-1631), a Devon man, who was treasurer in
Ireland from 1606 to 1616 and was engaged in the plantation of Ulster.
Ridgeway was made a baronet in 1611, Baron Ridgeway in 1616 and earl of
Londonderry in 1623. The Ridgeways held the earldom until March 1714,
when Robert, the 4th earl, died without sons. In 1726 Robert's
son-in-law, Thomas Pitt (c. 1688-1729), son of Thomas Pitt, "Diamond
Pitt," governor at Madras and uncle of the great earl of Chatham, was
created earl of Londonderry, the earldom again becoming extinct when his
younger son Ridgeway, the 3rd earl of this line, died unmarried in
January 1765. In 1796 Robert Stewart (1739-1821), of Mount Stewart, Co.
Down, was made earl of Londonderry in the Irish peerage. He had been
created Baron Londonderry in 1789 and Viscount Castlereagh in 1795; in
1816 he was advanced to the rank of marquess of Londonderry. The 3rd
marquess married the heiress of the Vane-Tempests and took the name of
Vane instead of Stewart; the 5th marquess called himself Vane-Tempest
and the 6th marquess Vane-Tempest-Stewart.

(1778-1854), British soldier and diplomatist, was the son of the 1st
marquess by a second marriage with the daughter of the 1st Earl Camden.
He entered the army and served in the Netherlands (1794), on the Rhine
and Danube (1795), in the Irish rebellion (1798), and Holland (1799),
rising to be colonel; and having been elected to parliament for Kerry he
became under secretary for war under his half-brother Castlereagh in
1807. In 1808 he was given a cavalry command in the Peninsula, where he
brilliantly distinguished himself. In 1809, and again in the campaigns
of 1810, 1811, having become a major-general, he served under Wellington
in the Peninsula as his adjutant-general, and was at the capture of
Ciudad Rodrigo, but at the beginning of 1812 he was invalided home.
Castlereagh (see LONDONDERRY, 2nd Marquess of) then sent him to Berlin
as minister, to represent Great Britain in the allied British, Russian
and Prussian armies; and as a cavalry leader he played an important part
in the subsequent fighting, while ably seconding Castlereagh's
diplomacy. In 1814 he was made a peer as Baron Stewart, and later in the
year was appointed ambassador at Vienna, and was a member of the
important congresses which followed. In 1822 his half-brother's death
made him 3rd marquess of Londonderry, and shortly afterwards,
disagreeing with Canning, he resigned, being created Earl Vane (1823),
and for some years lived quietly in England, improving his Seaham
estates. In 1835 he was for a short time ambassador at St Petersburg. In
1852, after the death of Wellington, when he was one of the
pall-bearers, he received the order of the Garter. He died on the 6th of
March 1854. He was twice married, first in 1808 to the daughter of the
earl of Darnley, and secondly in 1819 to the heiress of Sir Harry
Vane-Tempest (a descendant of Sir Piers Tempest, who served at
Agincourt, and heir to Sir Henry Vane, Bart.), when he assumed the name
of Vane. Frederick William Robert (1805-1872), his son by the first
marriage, became 4th marquess; and on the latter's death in 1872, George
Henry (1821-1884), the eldest son by the second marriage, after
succeeding as Earl Vane (according to the patent of 1823), became 5th
marquess. In 1884 he was succeeded as 6th marquess by his son Charles
Stewart Vane-Tempest-Stewart (b. 1852), a prominent Conservative
politician, who was viceroy of Ireland (1886-1889), chairman of the
London School Board (1895-1897), postmaster-general (1900-1902),
president of the Board of Education (1902-1905) and lord president of
the Council (1903-1905).

statesman, was the eldest son of Robert Stewart of Ballylawn Castle, in
Donegal, and Mount Stewart in Down, an Ulster landowner, of kin to the
Galloway Stewarts, who became baron, viscount, earl and marquess in the
peerage of Ireland. The son, known in history as Lord Castlereagh, was
born on the 18th of June in the same year as Napoleon and Wellington.
His mother was Lady Sarah Seymour, daughter of the earl of Hertford. He
went from Armagh school to St John's College, Cambridge, but left at the
end of his first year. With Lord Downshire, then holding sway over the
County Down, Lord Stewart had a standing feud, and he put forward his
son, in July 1790, for one of the seats. Young Stewart was returned, but
at a vast cost to his family, when he was barely twenty-one. He took his
seat in the Irish House of Commons at the same time as his friend,
Arthur Wellesley, M.P. for Trim, but sat later for two close boroughs in
England, still remaining member for Down at College Green.

From 1796, when his father became an earl, he took the courtesy title of
Viscount Castlereagh, and becoming keeper of the privy seal in Ireland,
he acted as chief secretary, during the prolonged absence of Mr Pelham,
from February 1797. Castlereagh's conviction was that, in presence of
threatened invasion and rebellion, Ireland could only be made safe by
union with Great Britain. In Lord Camden, as afterwards in Lord
Cornwallis, Castlereagh found a congenial chief; though his favour with
these statesmen was jealously viewed both by the Irish oligarchy and by
the English politicians who wished to keep the machine of Irish
administration in their own hands. Pitt himself was doubtful of the
expediency of making an Irishman chief secretary, but his view was
changed by the influence of Cornwallis. In suppressing Lord Edward
Fitzgerald's conspiracy, and the rebellion which followed in 1798,
Castlereagh's vigilance and firmness were invaluable. His administration
was denounced by a faction as harsh and cruel--a charge afterwards
repudiated by Grattan and Plunket--but he was always on the side of
lenity. The disloyal in Ireland, both Jacobins and priest-led, the
Protestant zealots and others who feared the consequence of the Union,
coalesced against him in Dublin. Even there Castlereagh, though defeated
in a first campaign (1799), impressed Pitt with his ability and tact,
with Cornwallis he joined in holding out, during the second Union
campaign (1800), the prospect of emancipation to the Roman Catholics.
They were aided by free expenditure of money and promises of honours,
methods too familiar in Irish politics. When the Act of Union was
carried through the Irish parliament, in the summer of 1800,
Castlereagh's official connexion with his native land practically ended.
Before the Imperial Parliament met he urged upon Pitt the measures which
he and Cornwallis thought requisite to make the Union effective. In
spite of his services and of Pitt's support, disillusion awaited him.
The king's reluctance to yield to the Roman Catholic claims was
underestimated by Pitt, while Cornwallis imprudently permitted himself
to use language which, though not amounting to a pledge, was construed
as one. George III. resented the arguments brought forward by
Castlereagh--"this young man" who had come over to talk him out of his
coronation oath. He peremptorily refused to sanction emancipation, and
Pitt and his cabinet made way for the Addington administration.
Thereupon Castlereagh resigned, with Cornwallis. He took his seat at
Westminster for Down, the constituency he had represented for ten years
in Dublin. The leadership of an Irish party was offered to him, but he
declined so to limit his political activity. His father accepted, at
Portland's request, an Irish marquessate, on the understanding that in
the future he or his heirs might claim the same rank in the Imperial
Legislature; so that Castlereagh was able to sit in the House of Commons
as Marquess in 1821-1822. Wilberforce discussed with Pitt the
possibility of sending out Castlereagh to India as governor-general,
when the friction between Lord Wellesley and the directors became grave;
but Pitt objected, as the plan would remove Castlereagh from the House
of Commons, which should be "the theatre of his future fame."

In 1802, Castlereagh, at Pitt's suggestion, became president of the
Board of Control in the Addington cabinet. He had, though not in office,
taken charge of Irish measures under Addington, including the repression
of the Rebellion Bill, and the temporary suspension of the Habeas Corpus
in 1801, and continued to advocate Catholic relief, tithe reform, state
payment of Catholic and dissenting clergy and "the steady application of
authority in support of the laws." To Lord Wellesley's Indian policy he
gave a staunch support, warmly recognized by the governor-general. On
Pitt's return to office (May 1804), Castlereagh retained his post, and,
next year, took over also the duties of secretary for war and the
colonies. Socially and politically, the gifts of his wife, Lady Emily
Hobart, daughter of a former Irish viceroy, whom he had married in 1794,
assisted him to make his house a meeting-place of the party; and his
influence in parliament grew notwithstanding his defects of style,
spoken and written. As a manager of men he had no equal. After Pitt's
death his surviving colleagues failed to form a cabinet strong enough to
face the formidable combination known as "All the Talents," and
Castlereagh acquiesced in the resignation. But to the foreign policy of
the Fox-Greville ministry and its conduct of the war he was always
opposed. His objections to the Whig doctrine of withdrawal from
"Continental entanglements" and to the reduction of military expenditure
were justified when Fox himself was compelled "to nail his country's
colours to the mast."

The cabinet of "All the Talents," weakened by the death of Fox and the
renewed quarrel with the king, went out in April 1807. Castlereagh
returned to the War Office under Portland, but grave difficulties arose,
though Canning at the Foreign Office was then thoroughly at one with him.
A priceless opportunity had been missed after Eylau. The Whigs had
crippled the transport service, and the operations to avert the ruin of
the coalition at Friedland came too late. The Tsar Alexander believed
that England would no longer concern herself with the Continental
struggle, and Friedland was followed by Tilsit. The secret articles of
that compact, denied at the time by the Opposition and by French
apologists, have now been revealed from official records in M. Vandal's
work, _Napoléon et Alexandre_. Castlereagh and Canning saw the vital
importance of nullifying the aim of this project. The seizure of the
Danish squadron at Copenhagen, and the measures taken to rescue the
fleets of Portugal and Sweden from Napoleon, crushed a combination as
menacing as that defeated at Trafalgar. The expedition to Portugal,
though Castlereagh's influence was able only to secure Arthur Wellesley a
secondary part at first, soon dwarfed other issues. In the debates on the
Convention of Cintra, Castlereagh defended Wellesley against
parliamentary attacks: "A brother," the latter wrote, "could not have
done more." The depression produced by Moore's campaign in northern
Spain, and the king's repugnance to the Peninsular operations, seemed to
cut short Wellesley's career; but early in 1809, Castlereagh, with no
little difficulty, secured his friend's appointment as commander-in-chief
of the second Portuguese expedition. The merit has been claimed for
Canning by Stapleton, but the evidence is all the other way.

Meanwhile, Castlereagh's policy led to a crisis that clouded his own
fortunes. The breach between him and Canning was not due to his
incompetence in the conduct of the Walcheren expedition, In fact,
Castlereagh's ejection was decided by Canning's intrigues, though
concealed from the victim, months before the armament was sent out to
the Scheldt. In the selection of the earl of Chatham as commander the
king's personal preference was known, but there is evidence also that it
was one of Canning's schemes, as he reckoned, if Chatham succeeded, on
turning him into a convenient ministerial figurehead. Canning was not
openly opposed to the Walcheren expedition, and on the Peninsular
question he mainly differed from Castlereagh and Wellington in fixing
his hopes on national enthusiasm and popular uprisings. Military opinion
is generally agreed that the plan of striking from Walcheren at Antwerp,
the French naval base, was sound. Napoleon heard the news with dismay;
in principle Wellington approved the plan. Castlereagh's proposal was
for a _coup de main_, under strict conditions of celerity and secrecy,
as Antwerp was unable to make any adequate defence. But Chatham, the
naval authorities and the cabinet proceeded with a deliberation
explained by the fact that the war secretary had been condemned in
secret. The expedition, planned at the end of March, did not reach
Walcheren till the end of July 1809; and more time was lost in movements
against Batz and Flushing, protracted until an unhealthy autumn
prostrated the army, which was withdrawn, discredited and disabled, in
September. Public opinion threw the whole blame upon Castlereagh, who
then found that, in deference to Canning, his colleagues had decreed his
removal half a year earlier, though they kept silence till the troops
were brought back from Walcheren. When Castlereagh learned from Percival
that the slur cast on him had its origin in a secret attack on him many
months before, he was cruelly hurt. The main charge against him was, he
says, that he would not throw over officers on whom unpopularity fell,
at the first shadow of ill-fortune. His refusal to rush into censure of
Moore, following Canning's sudden change from eulogy to denunciation,
requires no defence. According to the ideas then prevailing Castlereagh
held himself justified in sending a challenge to the original author, as
he held, of a disloyal intrigue against a colleague. In the subsequent
duel Canning was wounded and the rivals simultaneously resigned. In
private letters to his father and brother, Castlereagh urged that he was
bound to show that he "was not privy to his own disgrace." When Canning
published a lengthy explanation of his conduct, many who had sided with
him were convinced that Castlereagh had been much wronged. The excuse
that the protest upon which the cabinet decided against Castlereagh did
not mention the minister's name was regarded as a quibble. Men widely
differing in character and opinions--Walter Scott, Sidney Smith,
Brougham and Cobbett--took this view. Castlereagh loyally supported the
government in parliament, after Lord Wellesley's appointment to the
Foreign Office. Though Wellington's retreat after Talavera had been
included, with the disasters of the Corunna and Walcheren campaigns, in
the censures on Castlereagh, and though ministers were often depressed
and doubtful, Castlereagh never lost faith in Wellington's genius. Lord
Wellesley's resignation in 1812, when the Whigs failed to come to terms
with the regent, led to Castlereagh's return to office as foreign
secretary (March 1812). The assassination of Percival soon threw upon
him the leadership of the House of Commons, and this double burden he
continued to bear during the rest of his life.

From March 1812 to July 1822 Castlereagh's biography is, in truth, the
history of England. Though never technically prime minister, during
these years he wielded a power such as few ministers have exercised.
Political opponents and personal ill-wishers admitted that he was the
ablest leader who ever controlled the House of Commons for so long a
period. As a diplomatist, nobody save Marlborough had the same influence
over men or was given equal freedom by his colleagues at home.
Foreigners saw in him the living presence of England in the camp of the
Allies. At the War Office he had been hampered by the lack of technical
knowledge, while nature had not granted him, as an organizer, the powers
of a Carnot or Roon. But in diplomacy his peculiar combination of
strength and charm, of patience and conciliatory adroitness, was
acknowledged by all. At the Foreign Office he set himself at once to
meet Napoleon's designs in northern Europe, where Russia was preparing
for her life-and-death struggle. Lord Wellesley paid a high tribute to
Castlereagh's conduct in this situation, and Wellington declared that he
had then "rendered to the world the most important service that ever
fell to the lot of any individual to perform." Castlereagh wisely
rejected Napoleon's insincere overtures for peace. After the Moscow
_débâcle_ Napoleon's fate was affected not only by Wellington's progress
in Spain, but by the attitude of the northern powers and by the action
of Turkey, due to Castlereagh's opportune disclosure to the Porte of the
scheme of partition at Tilsit. At home, the repeal of the Orders in
Council was carried, the damage to British trade plainly outweighing the
injury inflicted on France by the restrictive system. The British
subsidies to the Allies were largely increased as the operations of 1813
developed, but all Castlereagh's skill was needed to keep the Coalition
together. The Allied powers were willing, even after Leipzig, to treat
with France on the basis of restoring her "natural frontiers"--the
Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees; but Castlereagh protested. He would
not allow the enemy to take ground for another tiger-spring. Before the
Conference of Châtillon, where Napoleon sent Caulaincourt to negotiate
for peace--with the message scribbled on the margin of his instructions,
"Ne signez rien"--Aberdeen wrote to hasten Castlereagh's coming:
"Everything which has been so long smothered is now bursting forth"; and
again, "Your presence has done much and would, I have no doubt, continue
to sustain them (the Allies) in misfortune." The Liverpool cabinet then
and later were as urgent in pressing him to return to lead the House of
Commons. He had lost his seat for Down in 1805, and afterwards sat for
British boroughs; but in 1812 he was re-elected by his old constituents;
and again in 1818 and 1820, sitting, after he became marquess of
Londonderry in 1821, for Orford. Early in 1814 his colleagues
reluctantly consented to his visit to the allied headquarters. The Great
Alliance showed signs of weakness and division. Austria was holding
back; Prussia had almost broken away; above all, the ambiguous conduct
of Alexander bred alarm and doubt. This situation became increasingly
serious while Napoleon was giving daily proofs that his military genius,
confronting a hesitant and divided enemy, was at its best. Castlereagh
strove to keep the Allies together, to give no excuse for those separate
arrangements upon which Napoleon was reckoning, to assert no selfish
policy for England, to be tied by no theoretical consistency. At the
Châtillon conferences England was represented by others, but Castlereagh
was present with supreme authority over all, and it was he who
determined the result. He declined to commit his country either to a
blank refusal to negotiate with Napoleon or to the advocacy of a Bourbon
restoration. He was ready to give up almost the whole of England's
conquests, but he insisted on the return of France within her ancient
limits as the basis of a settlement. Caulaincourt's advice was to take
advantage of these overtures; but his master was not to be advised. The
counter-projects that he urged Caulaincourt to submit to were advanced
after his victory at Montereau, when he boasted that he was nearer to
Munich than the Allies were to Paris. Even before the Châtillon
conference was dissolved (March 18th), Castlereagh saw that
Caulaincourt's efforts would never bend Napoleon's will. The Allies
adopted his view and signed the treaty of Chaumont (March 1st), "my
treaty," as Castlereagh called it, with an unusual touch of personal
pride; adding "Upon the face of the treaty this year our engagement is
equivalent to theirs united." The power of England when she threw her
purse into the scale had been just exhibited at Bar-sur-Aube, when at a
council of all the representatives of the powers the retreat of the
allied armies was discussed. Bernadotte, playing a waiting game in
Holland, was unwilling to reinforce Blücher, then in a dangerous
position, by the Russian and Prussian divisions of Winzingerode and
Bülow, temporarily placed under his orders. Having asked for and
received the assurance that the military leaders were agreed in holding
the transfer necessary, Castlereagh declared that he took upon himself
the responsibility of bringing the Swedish prince to reason. The
withholding of the British subsidies was a vital matter, not only with
Bernadotte but with all the powers. Castlereagh's avowed intention to
take this step without waiting for sanction from his cabinet put an end
to evasion and delay. Blücher was reinforced by the two divisions; the
battle of Laon was fought and won, and the allies occupied the French
capital. In April 1814 Castlereagh arrived in Paris. He did not disguise
his discontent with Napoleon's position at Elba, close to the French
coast, though he advised England not to separate herself at this crisis
from her allies. His uneasiness led him to summon Wellington from the
south to the Embassy in Paris. He hastened himself to London during the
visit of the allied sovereigns, and met with a splendid reception. He
was honoured with the Garter, being one of the few commoners ever
admitted to that order. When the House of Commons offered to the Crown
its congratulations upon the treaty of peace, Castlereagh's triumph was
signalized by a brilliantly eloquent panegyric from Canning, and by a
recantation of his former doubts and denunciations from Whitbread. His
own dignified language vindicated his country from the charge of selfish

His appointment as British representative at Vienna, where the congress
was to meet in September, was foreseen; but meanwhile he was not idle.
The war with the United States, originating in the non-intercourse
dispute and the Orders in Council, did not cease with the repeal of the
latter. It lasted through 1814 till the signing of the treaty of Ghent,
soon before the flight from Elba. In parliament the ministry, during
Castlereagh's absence, had been poorly championed. Canning had thrown
away his chance by his unwise refusal of the Foreign Office. None of the
ministers had any pretension to lead when Castlereagh was busy abroad
and Canning was sulking at home, and Castlereagh's letters to
Vansittart, the chancellor of the exchequer, show how these difficulties
weighed upon him in facing the position at Vienna, where it was
imperative for him to appear. At Vienna he realized at once that the
ambition of Russia might be as formidable to Europe and to Great Britain
as that of the fallen tyrant. His aim throughout had been to rescue
Europe from military domination; and when he found that Russia and
Prussia were pursuing ends incompatible with the general interest, he
did not hesitate to take a new line. He brought about the secret treaty
(Jan. 3, 1815) between Great Britain, Austria and France, directed
against the plans of Russia in Poland and of Prussia in Saxony. Through
Castlereagh's efforts, the Polish and Saxon questions were settled on
the basis of compromise. The threat of Russian interference in the Low
Countries was dropped.

While the Congress was still unfinished, Napoleon's escape from Elba
came like a thunderclap. Castlereagh had come home for a short visit
(Feb. 1815), at the urgent request of the cabinet, just before the
flight was known. The shock revived the Great Alliance under the compact
of Chaumont. All energies were directed to preparing for the campaign of
Waterloo. Castlereagh's words in parliament were, "Whatever measures you
adopt or decision you arrive at must rest on your own power and not on
reliance on this man." Napoleon promptly published the secret treaty
which Castlereagh had concluded with Metternich and Talleyrand, and the
last left in the French archives. But Russia and Prussia, though much
displeased, saw that, in the face of Bonaparte's return, they dared not
weaken the Alliance. British subsidies were again poured out like water.
After Napoleon's overthrow, Castlereagh successfully urged his removal
to St Helena, where his custodians were charged to treat him "with all
the respect due to his rank, but under such precautions as should render
his escape a matter of impossibility." Some of the continental powers
demanded, after Waterloo, fines and cessions that would have crushed
France; but in November a peace was finally concluded, mainly by
Castlereagh's endeavours, minimising the penalties exacted, and
abandoning on England's part the whole of her share of the indemnity.
The war created an economic situation at home which strengthened the
Whigs and Radicals, previously discredited by their hostility to a
patriotic struggle. In 1816 the Income Tax was remitted, despite
Castlereagh's contention that something should first be done to reduce
the Debt Charge. His policy, impressed upon British representatives
abroad, was "to turn the confidence Great Britain inspired to the
account of peace, by exercising a conciliatory influence in Europe."
Brougham's action, at the end of 1815, denouncing the Holy Alliance,
even in its early form, was calculated to embarrass England, though she
was no party to what Castlereagh described as a "piece of sublime
mysticism and nonsense."

While he saw no reason in this for breaking up the Grand Alliance, which
he looked upon as a convenient organ of diplomatic intercourse and as
essential for the maintenance of peace, he regarded with alarm "the
little spirit of German intrigue," and agreed with Wellington that to
attempt to crush France, as the Prussians desired, or to keep her in a
perpetual condition of tutelage under a European concert from which she
herself should be excluded, would be to invite the very disaster which
it was the object of the Alliance to avoid. It was not till Metternich's
idea of extending the scope of the Alliance, by using it to crush "the
revolution" wherever it should raise its head, began to take shape, from
the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818) onward, that Great Britain's
separation from her continental allies became inevitable. Against this
policy of the reactionary powers Castlereagh from the first vigorously
protested. As little was he prepared to accept the visionary schemes of
the emperor Alexander for founding an effective "confederation of
Europe" upon the inclusive basis of the Holy Alliance (see ALEXANDER I.
of Russia).

Meanwhile financial troubles at home, complicated by the resumption of
cash payments in 1819, led to acute social tension. "Peterloo" and the
"Six Acts" were furiously denounced, though the bills introduced by
Sidmouth and Castlereagh were carried in both Houses by overwhelming
majorities. The danger that justified them was proved beyond contest by
the Cato Street Conspiracy in 1820. It is now admitted by Liberal
writers that the "Six Acts," in the circumstances, were reasonable and
necessary. Throughout, Castlereagh maintained his tranquil ascendancy in
the House of Commons, though he had few colleagues who were capable of
standing up against Brougham. Canning, indeed, had returned to office
and had defended the "Six Acts," but Castlereagh bore the whole burden
of parliamentary leadership, as well as the enormous responsibilities of
the Foreign Office. His appetite for work caused him to engage in
debates and enquiries on financial and legal questions when he might
have delegated the task to others. Althorp was struck with his
unsleeping energy on the Agricultural Distress Committee; "His
exertions, coupled with his other duties--and unfortunately he was
always obstinate in refusing assistance--strained his constitution
fearfully, as was shown by his careworn brow and increasing paleness."
In 1821, on Sidmouth's retirement, he took upon himself the laborious
functions of the Home Office. The diplomatic situation had become
serious. The policy of "intervention," with which Great Britain had
consistently refused to identify herself, had been proclaimed to the
world by the famous Troppau Protocol, signed by Russia, Austria and
Prussia (see TROPPAU, CONGRESS OF). The immediate occasion was the
revolution at Naples, where the egregious Spanish constitution of 1812
had been forced on the king by a military rising. With military revolts,
as with paper constitutions of an unworkable type, Castlereagh had no
sympathy; and in this particular case the revolution, in his opinion,
was wholly without excuse or palliation. He was prepared to allow the
intervention of Austria, if she considered her rights under the treaty
of 1813 violated, or her position as an Italian Power imperilled. But he
protested against the general claim, embodied in the Protocol, of the
European powers to interfere, uninvited, in the internal concerns of
sovereign states; he refused to make Great Britain, even tacitly, a
party to such interference, and again insisted that her part in the
Alliance was defined by the letter of the treaties, beyond which she was
not prepared to go. In no case, he affirmed, would Great Britain
"undertake the moral responsibility for administering a general European
police," which she would never tolerate as applied to herself.

To Troppau, accordingly, no British plenipotentiary was sent, since the
outcome of the conferences was a foregone conclusion; though Lord
Stewart came from Vienna to watch the course of events. At Laibach an
attempt to revive the Troppau proposals was defeated by the firm
opposition of Stewart; but a renewal of the struggle at Verona in the
autumn of 1822 was certain. Castlereagh, now marquess of Londonderry,
was again to be the British representative, and he drew up for himself
instructions that were handed over unaltered by Canning, his successor
at the Foreign Office, to the new plenipotentiary, Wellington. In the
threatened intervention of the continental powers in Spain, as in their
earlier action towards Naples and Sardinia, England refused to take
part. The Spanish revolutionary movement, Castlereagh wrote, "was a
matter with which, in the opinion of the English cabinet, no foreign
power had the smallest right to interfere." Before, however, the
question of intervention in Spain had reached its most critical stage
the development of the Greek insurrection against the Ottoman government
brought up the Eastern Question in an acute form, which profoundly
modified the relations of the powers within the Alliance, and again drew
Metternich and Castlereagh together in common dread of an isolated
attack by Russia upon Turkey. A visit of King George IV. to Hanover, in
October 1821, was made the occasion of a meeting between Lord
Londonderry and the Austrian chancellor. A meeting so liable to
misinterpretation was in Castlereagh's opinion justified by the urgency
of the crisis in the East, "a practical consideration of the greatest
moment," which had nothing in common with the objectionable
"theoretical" question with which the British government had refused to
concern itself. Yet Castlereagh, on this occasion, showed that he could
use the theories of others for his own practical ends; and he joined
cordially with Metternich in taking advantage of the emperor Alexander's
devotion to the principles of the Alliance to prevent his taking an
independent line in the Eastern Question. It was, indeed, the belief
that this question would be made the matter of common discussion at the
congress that led Castlereagh to agree to be present at Verona; and in
his _Instructions_ he foreshadowed the policy afterwards carried out by
Canning, pointing out that the development of the war had made the
recognition of the belligerent rights of the Greeks inevitable, and
quoting the precedent of the Spanish American colonies as exactly
applicable. With regard to the Spanish colonies, moreover, though he was
not as yet prepared to recognize their independence _de jure_, he was
strongly of opinion that the Spanish government should do so since
"other states would acknowledge them sooner or later, and it is to the
interest of Spain herself to find the means of restoring an intercourse
when she cannot succeed in restoring a dominion."

But the tragic ending of Castlereagh's strenuous life was near; and the
credit of carrying out the policy foreshadowed in the _Instructions_ was
to fall to his rival Canning. Lord Londonderry's exhaustion became
evident during the toilsome session of 1822. Both the king and
Wellington were struck by his overwrought condition, which his family
attributed to an attack of the gout and the lowering remedies employed.
Wellington warned Dr Bankhead that Castlereagh was unwell, and, perhaps,
mentally disordered. Bankhead went down to North Cray and took due
precautions. Castlereagh's razors were taken away, but a penknife was
forgotten in a drawer, and with this he cut his throat (August 12,
1822). He had just before said, "My mind, my mind, is, as it were,
gone"; and, when he saw his wife and Bankhead talking together, he
moaned "there is a conspiracy laid against me." It was as clear a case
of brain disease as any on record. But this did not prevent his enemies
of the baser sort from asserting, without a shadow of proof, that the
suicide was caused by terror at some hideous and undefined charge. The
testimony of statesmen of the highest character and of all parties to
Castlereagh's gifts and charm is in strong contrast with the flood of
vituperation and calumny poured out upon his memory by those who knew
him not.

  BIBLIOGRAPHY.--Castlereagh's correspondence and papers were published
  by his brother and successor (1850-1853) in twelve volumes. Sir
  Archibald Alison's _Biography_ in three volumes came out in 1861, with
  copious extracts from the manuscripts preserved at Wynyard. It was
  made the subject of an interesting essay in the _Quarterly Review_ for
  January 1862, reprinted in _Essays by the late Marquis of Salisbury_
  (London, 1905). A graceful sketch by Theresa, Marchioness of
  Londonderry (London, 1904), originally brought out in the _Anglo-Saxon
  Review_, contains some extracts from Castlereagh's unpublished
  correspondence with his wife, the record of an enduring and passionate
  attachment which throws a new light on the man.     (E. D. J. W.)

LONDONDERRY, a northern county of Ireland in the province of Ulster,
bounded N. by the Atlantic, W. by Lough Foyle and Donegal, E. by Antrim
and Lough Neagh, and S. by Tyrone. The area is 522,315 acres, or about
816 sq. m. The county consists chiefly of river valleys surrounded by
elevated table-lands rising occasionally into mountains, while on the
borders of the sea-coast the surface is generally level. The principal
river is the Roe, which flows northward from the borders of Tyrone into
Lough Foyle below Newton-Limavady, and divides the county into two
unequal parts. Farther west the Faughan also falls into Lough Foyle, and
the river Foyle passes through a small portion of the county near its
north-western boundary. In the south-east the Moyola falls into Lough
Neagh, and the Lower Bann from Lough Neagh forms for some distance its
eastern boundary with Antrim. The only lake in the county is Lough Finn
on the borders of Tyrone, but Lough Neagh forms about 6 m. of its
south-eastern boundary. The scenery of the shores of Lough Foyle and the
neighbouring coast is attractive, and Castlerock, Downhill, Magilligan
and Portstewart are favourite seaside resorts. On the flat Magilligan
peninsula, which forms the eastern horn of Lough Foyle, the base-line of
the trigonometrical survey of Ireland was measured in 1826. The scenery
of the Roe valley, with the picturesque towns of Limavady and Dungiven,
is also attractive, and the roads from the latter place to Draperstown
and to Maghera, traversing the passes of Evishgore and Glenshane
respectively, afford fine views of the Sperrin and Slieve Gallion

  The west of this county consists of Dalradian mica-schist, with some
  quartzite, and is a continuation of the northern region of Tyrone. An
  inlier of these rocks appears in the rising ground east of Dungiven,
  including dark grey crystalline limestone. Old Red Sandstone and Lower
  Carboniferous Sandstone overlie these old rocks in the south and east,
  meeting the igneous "green rocks" of Tyrone, and the granite intrusive
  in them, at the north end of Slieve Gallion. Triassic sandstone covers
  the lower slope of Slieve Gallion on the south-east towards Moneymore,
  and rises above the Carboniferous Sandstone from Dungiven northward.
  At Moneymore we reach the western scarp of the white Limestone (Chalk)
  and the overlying basalt of the great plateaus, which dip down
  eastward under Lough Neagh. The basalt scarp, protecting chalk and
  patches of Liassic and Rhaetic strata, rises to 1260 ft. in Benevenagh
  north of Limavady, and repeats the finest features of the Antrim
  coast. A raised shelf with post-glacial marine clays forms the flat
  land west of Limavady. Haematite has been mined on the south flank of
  Slieve Gallion.

  The excessive rainfall and the cold and uncertain climate are
  unfavourable for agriculture. Along the sea-coast there is a district
  of red clay formed by the decomposition of sandstone, and near the
  mouth of the Roe there is a tract of marl. Along the valleys the soil
  is often fertile, and the elevated districts of the clay-slate region
  afford pasture for sheep. The acreage of pasture-land does not greatly
  exceed that of tillage. Oats, potatoes and turnips are chiefly grown,
  with some flax; and cattle, sheep, pigs and poultry are kept in
  considerable numbers. The staple manufacture of the county is linen.
  The manufacture of coarse earthenware is also carried on, and there
  are large distilleries and breweries and some salt-works. There are
  fisheries for salmon and eels on the Bann, for which Coleraine is the
  headquarters. The deep-sea and coast fisheries are valuable, and are
  centred at Moville in Co. Donegal. The city of Londonderry is an
  important railway centre. The Northern Counties (Midland) main line
  reaches it by way of Coleraine and the north coast of the county, and
  the same railway serves the eastern part of the county, with branches
  from Antrim to Magherafelt, and Magherafelt to Cookstown (Co. Tyrone),
  to Draperstown and to Coleraine, and from Limavady to Dungiven. The
  Great Northern railway reaches Londonderry from the south, and the
  city is also the starting-point of the County Donegal, and the
  Londonderry and Lough Swilly railways.

  The population decreases (152,009 in 1891; 144,404 in 1901) and
  emigration is extensive, though both decrease and emigration are well
  below the average of the Irish counties. Of the total, about 43% are
  Roman Catholics, and nearly 50% Presbyterians or Protestant
  Episcopalians. Londonderry (pop. 38,892), Coleraine (6958) and
  Limavady (2692) are the principal towns, while Magherafelt and
  Moneymore are lesser market towns. The county comprises six baronies.
  Assizes are held at Londonderry, and quarter sessions at Coleraine,
  Londonderry and Magherafelt. The county is represented in parliament
  by two members, for the north and south divisions respectively. The
  Protestant and Roman Catholic dioceses of Armagh, Derry and Down each
  include parts of the county.

At an early period the county was inhabited by the O'Cathans or
O'Catrans, who were tributary to the O'Neills. Towards the close of the
reign of Elizabeth the county was seized, with the purpose of checking
the power of the O'Neills, when it received the name of Coleraine,
having that town for its capital. In 1609, after the confiscation of the
estates of the O'Neills, the citizens of London obtained possession of
the towns of Londonderry and Coleraine and adjoining lands, 60 acres out
of every 1000 being assigned for church lands. The common council of
London undertook to expend £20,000 on the reclamation of the property,
and elected a body of twenty-six for its management, who in 1613 were
incorporated as the Irish Society, and retained possession of the towns
of Londonderry and Coleraine, the remainder of the property being
divided among twelve of the great livery companies. Their estates were
sequestrated by James I., and in 1637 the charter of the Irish Society
was cancelled. Cromwell restored the society to its former position, and
Charles II. at the Restoration granted it a new charter, and confirmed
the companies in their estates. In the insurrection of 1641 Moneymore
was seized by the Irish, and Magherafelt and Bellaghy, then called
Vintner's Town, burned, as well as other towns and villages. There are
several stone circles, and a large number of artificial caves. The most
ancient castle of Irish origin is that of Carrickreagh; and of the
castles erected by the English those of Dungiven and Muff are in good
preservation. The abbey of Dungiven, founded in 1109, and standing on a
rock about 200 ft. above the river Roe, is a picturesque ruin.

LONDONDERRY, or DERRY, a city, county of a city, parliamentary borough
(returning one member) and the chief town of Co. Londonderry, Ireland, 4
m. from the junction of the river Foyle with Lough Foyle, and 95 m.
N.N.W. of Belfast. Pop. (1901) 38,892. The city is situated on an
eminence rising abruptly from the west side of the river to a height of
about 120 ft. The eminence is surrounded by hills which reach, a few
miles to the north, an elevation of upwards of 1500 ft., and the river
and lough complete an admirable picture. The city is surrounded by an
ancient rampart about a mile in circumference, having seven gates and
several bastions, but buildings now extend beyond this boundary. The
summit of the hill, at the centre of the town, is occupied by a
quadrangular area from which the main streets diverge. Some old houses
with high pyramidal gables remain but are much modernized. The
Protestant cathedral of St Columba, in Perpendicular style, was
completed from the design of Sir John Vanbrugh in 1633, at a cost of
£4000 contributed by the city of London, and was enlarged and restored
in 1887. The spire was added in 1778 and rebuilt in 1802. The bishop's
palace, erected in 1716, occupies the site of the abbey founded by
Columba. The abbot of this monastery, on being made bishop, erected in
1164 Temple More or the "Great Church," one of the finest buildings in
Ireland previous to the Anglo-Norman invasion. The original abbey church
was called the "Black Church," but both it and the "Great Church" were
demolished in 1600 and their materials used in fortifying the city.
There is a large Roman Catholic cathedral, erected c. 1870 and dedicated
to St Eugenius. For Foyle College, founded in 1617, a new building was
erected in 1814. This and the Academical Institution, a foundation of
1868, were amalgamated in 1896. Magee College, taking its name from its
foundress, Mrs Magee of Dublin, was instituted in 1857 as a
training-school for the Presbyterian ministry.

The staple manufacture of the town is linen (especially shirt-making),
and there are also shipbuilding yards, iron-foundries, saw-mills,
manure-works, distilleries, breweries and flour-mills. The salmon
fishery on the Foyle is valuable. The river affords a commodious
harbour, its greatest depth being 33 ft. at high tide, and 12 ft. at low
tide. It is under the jurisdiction of the Irish Society. The port has a
considerable shipping trade with Great Britain, exporting agricultural
produce and provisions. Regular services of passenger steamers serve
Londonderry from Glasgow, Liverpool, Morecambe, Belfast and local coast
stations. In 1898 Londonderry was constituted one of the six county
boroughs which have separate county councils.

About 5 m. W. of the city, on a hill 803 ft. high, is a remarkable fort,
consisting of three concentric ramparts, and an interior fortification
of stone. It is named the Grianan of Aileach, and was a residence of the
O'Neills, kings of Ulster. It was restored in 1878.

Derry, the original name of Londonderry, is derived from _Doire_, the
"place of oaks." It owes its origin to the monastery founded by Columba
about 546. With the bishopric which arose in connexion with this
foundation, that of Raphoe was amalgamated in 1834. From the 9th to the
11th century the town was frequently in the possession of the Danes, and
was often devastated, but they were finally driven from it by Murtagh
O'Brien about the beginning of the 12th century. In 1311 it was granted
by Edward II. to Richard de Burgh. After the Irish Society of London
obtained possession of it, it was incorporated in 1613 under the name of
Londonderry. From this year until the Union in 1800 two members were
returned to the Irish parliament. The fortifications, which were begun
in 1600, were completed in 1618. In 1688 Derry had become the chief
stronghold of the Protestants of the north. On the 7th of December
certain of the apprentices in the city practically put themselves and it
in a stage of siege by closing the gates, and on the 19th of April 1689
the forces of James II. began in earnest the famous siege of Derry. The
rector of Donaghmore, George Walker, who, with Major Baker, was chosen
to govern Derry, established fame for himself for his bravery and
hopefulness during this period of privation, and the historic answer of
"No surrender," which became the watchword of the men of Derry, was
given to the proposals of the besiegers. The garrison was at the last
extremity when, on the 30th of July, ships broke through the obstruction
across the harbour and brought relief. Walker and the siege are
commemorated by a lofty column (1828), bearing a statue of the governor,
on the Royal Bastion, from which the town standards defied the enemy;
and the anniversary of the relief is still observed.

LONG, GEORGE (1800-1879), English classical scholar, was born at
Poulton, Lancashire, on the 4th of November 1800, and educated at
Macclesfield grammar-school and Trinity College, Cambridge. He was
Craven university scholar in 1821 (bracketed with Lord Macaulay and
Henry Malden), wrangler and senior chancellor's medallist in 1822 and
became a fellow of Trinity in 1823. In 1824 he was elected professor of
ancient languages in the new university of Virginia at Charlottesville,
U.S.A., but after four years returned to England as the first Greek
professor at the newly founded university of London. In 1842 he
succeeded T. H. Key as professor of Latin at University College; in
1846-1849 he was reader in jurisprudence and civil law in the Middle
Temple, and finally (1849-1871) classical lecturer at Brighton College.
Subsequently he lived in retirement at Portfield, Chichester, in receipt
(from 1873) of a Civil List pension of £100 a year obtained for him by
Gladstone. He was one of the founders (1830), and for twenty years an
officer, of the Royal Geographical Society; an active member of the
Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, for which he edited the
quarterly _Journal of Education_ (1831-1835) as well as many of its
text-books; the editor (at first with Charles Knight, afterwards alone)
of the _Penny Cyclopaedia_ and of Knight's _Political Dictionary_; and a
member of the Society for Central Education instituted in London in
1837. He contributed the Roman law articles to Smith's _Dictionary of
Greek and Roman Antiquities_, and wrote also for the companion
dictionaries of _Biography and Geography_. He is remembered, however,
mainly as the editor of the _Bibliotheca Classica_ series--the first
serious attempt to produce scholarly editions of classical texts with
English commentaries--to which he contributed the edition of Cicero's
_Orations_ (1851-1862). He died on the 10th of August 1879.

  Among his other works are: _Summary of Herodotus_ (1829); editions of
  Herodotus (1830-1833) and Xenophon's _Anabasis_ (1831); revised
  editions of J. A. Macleane's Juvenal and Persius (1867) and Horace
  (1869); the _Civil Wars of Rome_; a translation with notes of thirteen
  of Plutarch's _Lives_ (1844-1848); translations of the _Thoughts of
  Marcus Aurelius_ (1862) and the _Discourses of Epictetus_ (1877);
  _Decline of the Roman Republic_ (1864-1874), 5 vols. See H. J.
  Matthews, "In Memoriam," reprinted from the _Brighton College
  Magazine_, 1879.

LONG, JOHN DAVIS (1838-   ), American lawyer and political leader, was
born in Buckfield, Oxford county, Maine, on the 27th of October 1838. He
graduated at Harvard in 1857, studied law at the Harvard Law School and
in 1861 was admitted to the bar. He practised in Boston, became active
in politics as a Republican, was a member of the Massachusetts House of
Representatives in 1875-1878 and its speaker in 1876-1878,
lieutenant-governor of the state in 1879, and governor in 1880-1882. In
1883-1889 he was a member of the National House of Representatives, and
from March 1897 to May 1902 was secretary of the navy, in the cabinet,
first of President McKinley and then of President Roosevelt. In 1902 he
became president of the Board of Overseers of Harvard College. His
publications include a version of the _Aeneid_ (1879), _After-Dinner and
Other Speeches_ (1895) and _The New American Navy_ (1903).

LONG BRANCH, a city of Monmouth county, New Jersey, U.S.A., on the
easternmost or "long" branch of the Shrewsbury river and on the Atlantic
coast, about 30 m. S. of New York City. Pop. (1890) 7231; (1900) 8872,
of whom 1431 were foreign-born and 987 were negroes; (1910 census)
13,298. It is served by the Pennsylvania, the Central of New Jersey, the
New York & Long Branch, and electric railways, and by steamboats to New
York. The carriage roads in the vicinity are unusually good. Long Branch
is one of the oldest American watering-places. It is situated on a bluff
which rises abruptly 20-35 ft. above the beach, and along the front of
which bulkheads and jetties have been erected as a protection from the
waves; along or near the edge of the bluff, Ocean Avenue, 60 ft. wide
and about 5 m. long (from Seabright to Deal), commands delightful views
of the ocean. A "bluff walk" runs above the water for 2 m. The city has
one public park, Ocean Park (about 10 acres), and two privately owned
parks, one of which is Pleasure Bay Park (25 acres), on the Shrewsbury
river, where operas are given in the open air. The principal public
institutions are the Monmouth Memorial Hospital and the Long Branch
Circulating Library. In Long Branch the Monmouth County Horse Show is
held annually in July. The southern part of Long Branch, known as
Elberon, contains some beautiful summer residences--in one of its
cottages General U. S. Grant spent his summers for many years, and in
another, the Francklyn, President J. A. Garfield died in 1881. In 1909 a
monument to Garfield was erected in Ocean Park. Adjoining Long Branch on
the N. is the borough of Monmouth Beach (incorporated in 1906;
population, 1910, 485). Before the War of Independence the site of Long
Branch was owned by Colonel White, a British officer. It was confiscated
as a result of the war, and late in the century its development as a
watering-place began. Long Branch was chartered as a city in 1904.

_LONGCHAMP, WILLIAM_ (d. 1197), chancellor of England and bishop of Ely,
entered public life at the close of Henry II.'s reign as official to the
king's son Geoffrey, for the archdeaconry of Rouen. Henry II., who
disliked him, called him the "son of two traitors." He soon deserted
Geoffrey for Richard, who made him chancellor of the duchy of Aquitaine.
He always showed himself an able diplomatist. He first distinguished
himself at Paris, as Richard's envoy, when he defeated Henry II.'s
attempt to make peace with Philip Augustus (1189). On Richard's
accession William became chancellor of the kingdom and bishop of Ely.
When Richard left England (Dec. 1189), he put the tower of London in his
hands and chose him to share with Hugh de Puiset, the great bishop of
Durham, the office of chief justiciar. William immediately quarrelled
with Hugh, and by April 1190 had managed to oust him completely from
office. In June 1190 he received a commission as legate from Pope
Celestine. He was then master in church as well as state. But his
disagreeable appearance and manners, his pride, his contempt for
everything English made him detested. His progresses through the country
with a train of a thousand knights were ruinous to those on whom
devolved the burden of entertaining him. Even John seemed preferable to
him. John returned to England in 1191; he and his adherents were
immediately involved in disputes with William, who was always worsted.
At last (June 1191) Geoffrey, archbishop of York and William's earliest
benefactor, was violently arrested by William's subordinates on landing
at Dover. They exceeded their orders, which were to prevent the
archbishop from entering England until he had sworn fealty to Richard.
But this outrage was made a pretext for a general rising against
William, whose legatine commission had now expired, and whose power was
balanced by the presence of the archbishop of Rouen, Walter Coutances,
with a commission from the king, William shut himself up in the Tower,
but he was forced to surrender his castles and expelled from the
kingdom. In 1193 he joined Richard in Germany, and Richard seems to have
attributed the settlement soon after concluded between himself and the
emperor, to his "dearest chancellor." For the rest of the reign
Longchamp was employed in confidential and diplomatic missions by
Richard all over the continent, in Germany, in France and at Rome. He
died in January 1197. His loyalty to Richard was unswerving, and it was
no doubt through his unscrupulous devotion to the royal interest that he
incurred the hatred of Richard's English subjects.

  AUTHORITIES.--Benedictus, _Gesta Henrici_, vol. ii.; Giraldus
  Cambrensis, _De Vita Galfridi_; Stubbs' Preface to Roger of Hoveden,
  vol. iii.; L. Bovine-Champeaux, _Notice sur Guillaume de Longchamp_
  (Évreux, 1885).

LONGCLOTH, a plain cotton cloth originally made in comparatively long
pieces. The name was applied particularly to cloth made in India.
Longcloth, which is now commonly bleached, comprehends a number of
various qualities. It is heavier than cambric, and finer than medium or
Mexican. As it is used principally for underclothing and shirts, most of
the longcloth sold in Great Britain passes through the hands of the
shirt and underclothing manufacturers, who sell to the shopkeepers,
though there is still a considerable if decreasing retail trade in
piece-goods. The lower kinds of longcloth, which are made from American
cotton, correspond in quality to the better kinds of "shirting" made for
the East, but the best longcloths are made from Egyptian cotton, and are
fine and fairly costly goods.

LONG EATON, an urban district in the Ilkeston parliamentary division of
Derbyshire, England, 10 m. E.S.E. of Derby, on the Midland railway. Pop.
(1891) 9636; (1901) 13,045. It lies in the open valley of the Trent, at
a short distance from the river, and near the important Trent Junction
on the Midland railway system. The church of St Lawrence has Norman
portions, and an arch and window apparently of pre-Conquest date. The
large industrial population of the town is occupied in the manufacture
of lace, which extended hither from Nottingham; there are also railway
carriage works. To the north is the township of SANDIACRE (pop. 2954),
where the church has a fine Decorated chancel.

LONGEVITY, a term applied to express either the length or the duration
of life in any organism, but, as cases of long duration excite most
interest, frequently used to denote a relatively unusual prolongation of
life. There is no reason to suppose that protoplasm, the living material
of organisms, has a necessarily limited duration of life, provided that
the conditions proper to it are maintained, and it has been argued that
since every living organism comes into existence as a piece of the
protoplasm of a pre-existing living organism, protoplasm is potentially
immortal. Living organisms exist, however, as particles or communities
of particles of protoplasm (see LIFE), and as such have a limited
duration of life. Longevity, as E. Ray Lankester pointed out in 1869,
for practical purposes must be understood to mean the "length of time
during which life is exhibited in an individual." The word "individual"
must be taken in its ordinary sense as a wholly or partially
independent, organized mass produced from a pre-existing organized mass,
as otherwise the problem will be confused by arguments as to the meaning
of biological individuality.

_Empirical Data._--A multitude of observations show that only a very
brief life, ranging from a few hours to a few days, is the normal fate
of the vast majority of single-celled organisms, whether these be animal
or vegetable or on the border-line between the two kingdoms. Death comes
to them rapidly from internal or external causes, or the individual life
ends in conjugation or division or spore-formation. Under special
conditions, natural or artificial, the individual life may be prolonged
by desiccation, or freezing, or by some similar arrest of functional

The duration of life among plants is varied. The popular division into
annuals, biennials and perennials is not absolute, for natural and
artificial conditions readily prolong the lives of annuals and biennials
for several seasons, whereas the case of perennials is much complicated
by the mode of growth, and the problem of individuality, however we
desire to exclude it, obtrudes itself. In the vast majority of cases
where a plant is obviously a simple individual, its life is short,
ranging from a few days in the case of fungi, to two seasons in the case
of biennial herbs. Most of the simple algae are annual, their life
enduring only for part of the year; the branching algae are more often
perennial, but in their cases not only are observations as to duration
lacking, but however simply we may use the