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Title: The Life of Lyman Trumbull
Author: White, Horace, 1834-1916
Language: English
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THE LIFE OF LYMAN TRUMBULL
BY
HORACE WHITE
BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
The Riverside Press Cambridge
1913
COPYRIGHT, 1913, BY HORACE WHITE
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
_Published October 1913_
PREFACE
A few years since, the widow of Lyman Trumbull requested me to write a
biography of her husband, who was United States Senator from Illinois
during the three senatorial terms 1855-1873, or to recommend some
suitable person for the task. It had been a cause of surprise and regret
to me that the name of Trumbull had not yet found a place in the
swelling flood of biographical literature that embraces the Civil War
period. Everybody, North or South, who stood on the same elevation with
him, everybody who exercised influence and filled the public eye in
equal measure with him, had found his niche in the libraries of the
nation, and such place in the hearts of the people as his merits
warranted. Trumbull alone had been neglected. I reflected upon the
matter and came to the conclusion that, although better writers than
myself could be found for this kind of work, no one was likely to be
found who had been more intimate with him during his whole senatorial
career, or who had warmer sympathy for his aims or higher admiration for
his abilities and character. I reflected also that very soon there would
be no person living possessing these special qualifications. Accordingly
I decided to undertake the work.
Mrs. Trumbull placed in my hands several thousand letters received by
Trumbull, and a few written by him, during his public career. All these
have been examined by me, and they are now in the Library of Congress.
He was not in the habit of keeping copies of letters written by himself
unless he deemed them important, and such copies were generally written
out by his own hand, not taken in a copying-press. Other letters
written by him have been sought with varying success in the hands of his
correspondents, or their heirs, in various parts of the country, but
nothing has been found in this way that can be considered of much
importance.
During the Reconstruction era I had sustained the policy of Congress in
opposition to that of Andrew Johnson, but had revolted at the
carpetbaggery and misgovernment which had ensued, and had abhorred the
"Ku-Klux" bills and "Force" bills which the Union party for a long time
continued to enact or threaten. I was not quite prepared to find,
however, upon going over the whole ground again, that I had been wrong
from the beginning, and that Andrew Johnson's policy, which was
Lincoln's policy, was the true one, and ought never to have been
departed from. This is the conclusion to which I have come, after much
study, in the evening of a long life. This does not mean that all of the
doings and sayings of President Johnson were wise and good, but that I
believe him to have been an honest man, a true patriot, and a worthy
successor of Lincoln whose Reconstruction policy he followed. Lincoln
himself could not have carried that policy into effect without a fight,
and many persons familiar with the temper of the time think that even he
would have failed. All that we can now affirm is that he was armed with
the prestige of victory and the confidence of the North, and hence would
have been better prepared than Johnson was for meeting the difficulties
that sprang up at the end of the war. It must be admitted, however, that
Johnson honestly aimed to carry out that policy, both because it was
Lincoln's and because he himself, after careful consideration, esteemed
it sound.
I acknowledge my indebtedness to the _Diary of Gideon Welles_, which I
regard as the most important contribution to the history of the period
of which it treats that has yet been given to the public. The history of
Mr. James Ford Rhodes I have found to be an invaluable guide, as to both
facts and judgments of men and things. I am indebted to Professor
William A. Dunning, of Columbia University, for valuable suggestions,
criticism, and encouragement, as well as for the assistance derived from
his admired writings on Reconstruction. Miss Katherine Mayo has
lightened my labors greatly by her intelligent and indefatigable search
of old letters and newspaper files and by interviews with persons still
living. My gratitude is due also to the late William H. Lambert, of
Philadelphia, for giving me access to his collection of manuscript
correspondence that passed between Lincoln and Trumbull prior to the
inauguration of the former as President; also to Dr. William Jayne, of
Springfield, Illinois, to Hon. J. H. Roberts, of Chicago, to the wife of
Walter Trumbull (now Mrs. L. C. Pardee, of Chicago), and to Mrs. Mary
Ingraham Trumbull, of Saybrook Point, Connecticut.
H. W.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
ANCESTRY AND EARLY LIFE
The Trumbulls from Newcastle-on-Tyne, England--Most illustrious
family in Colony of Connecticut--Lyman Trumbull born and
educated at Colchester--Begins his career as school-teacher in
Georgia in 1833--Studies law there in office of Hiram Warner--In
1837 makes a journey on horseback to Shawneetown,
Illinois--Begins practice of law in office of Governor Reynolds
at Belleville--"Riding on the circuit" in the early days--In a
letter to his father describes the killing of Rev. Elijah P.
Lovejoy at Alton--Elected to the legislature from St. Clair
County in 1840--Appointed secretary of state in 1841 by Governor
Carlin--Removed from office in 1843 by Governor Ford--Political
disturbance in consequence--Belleville in 1842--Marriage of
Trumbull and Miss Julia Jayne--Their wedding journey--Political
campaign of 1848--Trumbull fails of nomination for governor--Is
elected judge of the supreme court in 1848--Removes his
residence to Alton--Reëlected as judge in 1852, but resigns in
the following year. 1
CHAPTER II
SLAVERY IN ILLINOIS
French adventurers from Canada the first whites in
Illinois--Followed by colonists from Louisiana--Slaves sent from
Santo Domingo by John Law's Company of the Indies--Thomas
Jefferson takes steps to exclude slavery from the Northwest
Territory--The Anti-Slavery Ordinance of 1787--The territorial
legislature authorizes the holding of "indentured servants" for
a limited time--Attempts to repeal the Ordinance defeated in
Congress by John Randolph of Roanoke--State constitution in 1818
prohibits slavery--the pro-slavery men attempt to change the
constitution--Bitter contest in 1824 results in their
defeat--Slavery continues, nevertheless, under judicial
decisions--Trumbull wages war against it in the courts--His
final victory in the Jarrot case, in 1845 23
CHAPTER III
FIRST ELECTION AS SENATOR
Senator Douglas and the repeal of the Missouri
Compromise--Disruption of political parties--Trumbull announces
himself a candidate for Congress in opposition to the Nebraska
Bill--Is elected in the Eighth Illinois District--Abraham
Lincoln takes the stump against Douglas--Their joint debate at
Springfield in October, 1854--An Anti-Nebraska legislature
elected--Lincoln a candidate for Senator in place of General
Shields--Five Anti-Nebraska Bill members vote for
Trumbull--Supporters of Shields transfer their votes to Governor
Matteson--Lincoln transfers his votes to Trumbull, who is
elected by a majority of one 32
CHAPTER IV
THE KANSAS WAR
Trumbull takes his seat in the Senate--A protest is presented
declaring him not eligible--It is overruled after
debate--Disturbances in Kansas consequent upon the passage of
the Nebraska Bill--Trumbull makes a speech criticizing Douglas's
report thereon--Debate between the two Senators attracts wide
attention--Speeches of Seward, Sumner, Collamer, and
others--Trumbull's first appearance in debate is warmly welcomed
by the opponents of the Nebraska Bill 48
CHAPTER V
THE LECOMPTON FIGHT
The national contest of 1856 results in the election of James
Buchanan as President--The Republicans of Illinois elect their
state ticket--The Kansas war continues--Buchanan appoints Robert
J. Walker governor of the territory--The Pro-Slavery party hold
a convention at the town of Lecompton to form a state
constitution--The Free State men decide not to participate, but
to vote against the constitution when submitted to the
people--The convention decides not to submit the constitution to
popular vote--President Buchanan agrees to this plan--Governor
Walker thereupon resigns his office and Senator Douglas opposes
the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution--Both
Trumbull and Douglas speak against the Lecompton measure and
Congress rejects it--Douglas contemplates joining the
Republicans 69
CHAPTER VI
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1858 AND THE JOHN BROWN RAID
Popularity of Douglas among the Eastern Republicans growing out
of the Lecompton fight--Not shared by those of Illinois--The
latter choose Lincoln as their candidate for Senator--Some
letters from Lincoln to Trumbull in 1858--The campaign of 1858
results in the reëlection of Douglas, but the popular vote shows
a plurality for Lincoln--Douglas's doctrine of "Unfriendly
Legislation" in the territories in regard to slavery turns the
South against him--The John Brown raid at Harper's
Ferry--Trumbull's speech and debate thereon in the Senate 86
CHAPTER VII
THE ELECTION OF LINCOLN--SECESSION
The National Republican Convention at Chicago in 1860--How
Lincoln was nominated in preference to Seward--the Secession
movement after the election--Trumbull makes a speech at
Springfield which includes a brief statement of Republican
policy written by Lincoln--Correspondence between Lincoln and
Trumbull before the inauguration--Trumbull advises his friends
in Chicago not to make concessions to those who threaten to
overthrow the Government--He has a debate in the Senate with
Jefferson Davis--Makes a speech at the night session, March 2,
1861, against the Crittenden Compromise--The latter defeated in
the Senate by Yeas, 19; Nays, 20--Some items of Washington
society news from Mrs. Trumbull--Interview between President
Buchanan and Judge McLean--Text of Trumbull's Speech against the
Crittenden Compromise 102
CHAPTER VIII
CABINET-MAKING--THE DEATH OF DOUGLAS
Trumbull's interview with William Cullen Bryant, and others, who
oppose William H. Seward as a member of Lincoln's Cabinet--They
consider Seward's coterie in New York corrupt and
dangerous--Trumbull communicates the objections to
Lincoln--Lincoln thinks that the forces which backed Seward at
the Chicago Convention must not be snubbed--He has already
offered a place to Seward--The question of Cameron more
difficult--David Davis's bargain with friends of Cameron and of
Caleb Smith--Cameron tries to procure an invitation to
Springfield, but Lincoln refuses--Leonard Swett gives invitation
without Lincoln's authority--Cameron visits Springfield and
secures promise of Cabinet position from Lincoln--A. K. McClure
protests against Cameron's appointment and Lincoln requests
Cameron to decline--Cameron does not decline--Trumbull advises
Lincoln not to appoint Cameron--Lincoln's Illinois friends
protest against Cameron--Trumbull urges appointment of
Judd--Seward and Weed support Cameron, who is finally appointed
Secretary of War--Trumbull, reëlected as Senator, becomes
Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary--The last great
service of Senator Douglas to his country--His death and
Trumbull's tribute to his memory 139
CHAPTER IX
FORT SUMTER
The Senate appoints a committee to ask the President to recall
the appointment of Harvey as Minister to Portugal--He had
notified Governor Pickens of the Government's intention to
relieve Fort Sumter--Trumbull a member of the committee--Seward
says that he did not know of Harvey's action till after the
appointment was made--In fact, Seward gave the information to
Harvey intending that he should send it to Pickens--John Hay's
Diary says that Lincoln, before his inauguration, offered to
evacuate Fort Sumter--Also that he repeated the offer after
inauguration--This confirms a narrative of John Minor Botts--The
controversy between Botts and J. B. Baldwin concerning the
latter's interview with Lincoln on April 5, 1861--Reasons for
believing that Botts's story is true--Remarkable interview
between Douglas and Seward as to Fort Sumter 155
CHAPTER X
BULL RUN--THE CONFISCATION ACT
Trumbull makes an excursion with Senator Grimes to the battle of
Bull Run--Is caught by the retreating Union army and driven back
to Washington--His account of the panic and stampede says, "It
was the most shameful rout you can conceive of"--Sends a
telegram to Mrs. Trumbull, but the authorities suppress
it--Consternation at the Capital--General Frémont's doings at
St. Louis--His military order of emancipation--Lincoln considers
it premature and revokes it--Correspondence between Trumbull and
M. Carey Lea, of Philadelphia--Cameron follows Frémont's example
in his first Annual Report--Sends report to the newspapers
without the President's knowledge--Lincoln directs him to recall
it and strike out the part relating to slavery--General David
Hunter issues an order freeing all slaves in South Carolina,
Georgia, and Florida--The President revokes it--Trumbull reports
a bill from the Senate Judiciary Committee to confiscate the
property of rebels and to give freedom to all of their
slaves--Collamer opposes confiscation as both unconstitutional
and impolitic--He offers an amendment to substitute judicial
process for military confiscation--Collamer's views prevail--The
President objected, however, to the forfeiture of real estate
beyond the lifetime of the owner--This was the first bill passed
by Congress dealing a heavy blow at slavery 165
CHAPTER XI
THE EXPULSION OF CAMERON
Cameron and Alexander Cummings--Two million dollars placed in
New York subject to Cummings's draft--The steamer Catiline
chartered and laden by Cummings and Thurlow Weed--The House
Committee on Government Contracts--Cummings's
testimony--Congressman Dawes's exposure of horse contracts--An
equine Golgotha around Washington City--The House censures
Cameron--Lincoln removes him and appoints Stanton in his
place--Cameron appointed Minister to Russia--Trumbull opposes
confirmation--Cameron is confirmed, six Republican Senators
voting in the negative 178
CHAPTER XII
ARBITRARY ARRESTS
Lincoln's first suspension of the writ of _habeas
corpus_--Secretary Seward and John Hay give verbal instructions
thereunder--Senate debate on arbitrary arrests--Wide differences
of opinion as to legality thereof--Trumbull calls for
information--Debate between Trumbull, Dixon, and Wilson--Was
power to suspend the writ lodged in the executive or in the
legislative department?--Chief Justice Taney held that the writ
had not been lawfully suspended anywhere--Trumbull demands trial
by jury, without delay, of civilians arrested in loyal
states--Before Congress takes action the election of 1862
results in victory for Democrats--Republican leaders
intimidated--Stanton discharges all civilian prisoners--Congress
passes Trumbull's bill authorizing President to suspend writ,
but requiring trial in civil courts and discharge of persons not
indicted--Bill to indemnify the President for previous acts
passed by both houses--Banishment of Vallandigham and
suppression of the Chicago _Times_--Trumbull opposes the latter 190
CHAPTER XIII
INCIDENTS OF THE YEARS 1863 AND 1864
The movement in the Senate for the retirement of Secretary
Seward--Letters from Gustave Koerner, Alfred Iverson, and Walter
B. Scates--The appointment of M. W. Delahay as judge of the U.S.
District Court of Kansas--His subsequent impeachment and
resignation--Letters of General John M. Palmer, Colonel Fred
Hecker, and Jesse K. Dubois--Trumbull doubts the expediency of
Lincoln's second nomination--He thinks that there is a lack of
efficiency in the prosecution of the war--This opinion shared by
Henry Wilson and by Congressmen generally in the beginning of
1864--The people, however, were for Lincoln's renomination--The
Cleveland Convention, and nomination of General
Frémont--Simultaneous retirement of Frémont and
Postmaster-General Blair 210
CHAPTER XIV
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
Scope of Lincoln's Proclamation of Emancipation--Amendment of
the Constitution to abolish slavery--First proposals by Wilson,
of Iowa, and Henderson, of Missouri--Trumbull reports the
Thirteenth Amendment from the Senate Judiciary Committee--His
argument thereon--Speeches of Senators Henderson and Reverdy
Johnson--Amendment passes the Senate, but fails in the
House--Second attempt in the House successful by a trade with
Democrats--Amendment ratified--Objections raised by Southern
States explained away by Seward 222
CHAPTER XV
RECONSTRUCTION
Death of Lincoln--Conflict of opinions concerning the status of
the seceding states--Lincoln's proclamation of December,
1863--Reconstruction of Louisiana in pursuance thereof--Trumbull
reports a joint resolution admitting that state--Sumner prevents
the Senate from voting on it--Lincoln's last speech on
Reconstruction--His plan indorsed by William Lloyd
Garrison--Andrew Johnson as President adopts it--Recognizes
Virginia, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Arkansas as restored to the
Union--Issues an executive order appointing a governor of North
Carolina to call a constitutional convention--Negroes not
included in the list of voters--Similar orders issued for the
other seceding states--Wendell Phillips sounds a blast against
President Johnson--Northern newspapers at first favorable to
Johnson--Desperate industrial condition of the South 231
CHAPTER XVI
ANDREW JOHNSON'S FIRST MESSAGE
Excellent tone and temper of Johnson's first communication to
Congress--Written by George Bancroft--Eulogy of the New York
_Nation_--Johnson's early life and training--A first-rate
stump-speaker--Sumner attacks Johnson for "whitewashing" the
ex-slaveholders--Acts of Southern legislatures passed to keep
the negroes in order--Senator Wilson moves that all such acts
establishing inequality of civil rights be declared
invalid--Trumbull argues for postponement of such legislation
until the Thirteenth Amendment is ratified--Debate between
Trumbull and Saulsbury--Reports of General Grant and General
Carl Schurz on the condition and temper of the Southern
people--Letter from J. L. M. Curry on the same 244
CHAPTER XVII
THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND CIVIL RIGHTS BILLS
Trumbull introduces two bills to protect the freedmen in the
states--Provisions of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill--Trumbull
contends that the Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress to
abolish the incidents and disabilities of slavery--The
Freedmen's Bureau Bill passed by Congress and vetoed by the
President--The Senate fails to pass it over the veto--Struggle
in the Senate to obtain a two-thirds majority--Senator Stockton
(Democrat), of New Jersey, unseated--Trumbull's Civil Rights
Bill taken up--It does not deal with the right of
suffrage--Debate in the Senate on the constitutional
question--Bill passes Senate--Is opposed in the House by
Bingham, of Ohio--Is vetoed by the President--Exciting scene in
Senate when the bill is passed over the veto--Trumbull takes
the lead in the campaign of 1866 and is reëlected to the
Senate--The Civil Rights Act in the courts--An echo from the
State of Georgia 257
CHAPTER XVIII
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction reports the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution--It holds that the seceding states
cannot be restored to their former places in the Union by the
executive alone--Tennessee admitted to the Union by
Congress--The Arm-in-Arm Convention at Philadelphia--President
Johnson's unfortunate speech following that event--The Southern
States refuse to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment--This refusal
gives increased power to the radicals in the North 281
CHAPTER XIX
CROSSING THE RUBICON
Decision of the Supreme Court in the Milligan case--It declares
all trials of civilians by military commissions unlawful--It
implies that Andrew Johnson's policy was preferable to that of
Congress--All the members of the Cabinet support the President's
policy--Stanton, however, secretly confers with the radicals to
undermine the President--Sumner and Stevens become the leaders
in Congress and pass bills annulling state governments in the
South--The Conservatives follow reluctantly, believing that the
negroes cannot be protected unless they have the right to
vote--Remarkable series of Reconstruction Acts passed in 1867
and 1868--The case of Georgia--Trumbull overthrows Governor
Bullock and his senatorial supporters 288
CHAPTER XX
IMPEACHMENT
The Tenure-of-Office Bill passed to curtail the President's
power to remove office-holders--It does not apply to members of
the Cabinet--The President vetoes it--The veto message written
by Seward and Stanton in conjunction--Bill repassed over
veto--First mutterings about impeachment--The Judiciary
Committee reports in favor of it--The House rejects the
report--The President requests Stanton's resignation--Stanton
refuses to resign--The President removes him and appoints Grant
Secretary of War _ad interim_--Stanton retires--The Senate
disapproves of the removal of Stanton--Grant retires and Stanton
resumes office--The President accuses Grant of bad faith, and
appoints Lorenzo Thomas Secretary of War--The House votes to
impeach the President and appoints managers therefor--The trial
begins March 5, 1868--The President is acquitted by vote of 35
to 19, not two thirds--Seven Republican Senators including
Trumbull vote "Not Guilty"--Newspaper comments sustaining the
"Seven Traitors"--Trumbull's written opinion filed with the
record--Consequences of the impeachment trial--Death of
Fessenden--Death of Mrs. Lyman Trumbull 301
CHAPTER XXI
THE McCARDLE CASE--GRANT'S CABINET--THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
W. H. McCardle, of Mississippi, arrested by General Ord for
seditious publications--Takes an appeal to the Supreme
Court--General Grant, as Secretary of War _ad interim_, retains
Trumbull to defend the military authorities--Congress passes a
law to deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction--Trumbull votes
for it--The Court rules that its jurisdiction has been withdrawn
by Congress--Secretary Stanton fixes Trumbull's compensation for
professional services at $10,000--Senator Chandler contends that
the payment is contrary to law--Trumbull shows that both law and
precedent are on his side--The facts in the case--President
Grant's mishaps in choosing his Cabinet--Washburne for the State
Department, Stewart for the Treasury, and Borie for the
Navy--They are succeeded by Fish, Boutwell, and Robeson--General
John A. Rawlins selected by himself for Secretary of War with
Grant's approval--General Jacob Cox and Rockwood Hoar, two men
of the highest type, appointed but soon resign--Adoption of the
Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution 327
CHAPTER XXII
CAUSES OF DISCONTENT
Senator Grimes's estimate of the Republican party in
1870--President Grant's methods of carrying on the
Government--His attempt to annex Santo Domingo--Senate rejects
the treaty of annexation--The President comes in conflict with
Charles Sumner, who is displaced as chairman of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations--Trumbull sustains
Sumner--Motley, Minister to Great Britain, is removed from
office and Trumbull is asked to take his place--He declines the
offer--First movement for civil service reform--Trumbull makes a
speech at Chicago advocating it--Secretary Cox and
Attorney-General Hoar cease to be members of Grant's Cabinet 341
CHAPTER XXIII
THE LIBERAL REPUBLICANS
The Liberal Republican movement begins in Missouri--Its
leaders--Enfranchisement of the ex-Confederates, civil service
reform, and revenue reform, the issues--Meeting of revenue
reformers at New York, November 22, 1871--James G. Blaine,
Speaker of the House, offers them a majority of the Committee of
Ways and Means--The Missouri movement alarms the Republican
leaders--They pass the Ku-Klux Bill for the employment of
military force in the South--Trumbull and Schurz oppose the
Ku-Klux bill--Trumbull pronounces it an unconstitutional
measure--Schurz advocates the removal of all political
disabilities--Congress passes an act of universal amnesty after
the meeting of the Liberal Republican Convention 351
CHAPTER XXIV
GRANT'S ADMINISTRATION
General Grant's habits and training were not well adapted to
civil and political duties--He was nominated for President on
account of his military success--Rottenness in the New York
Custom-House--Trumbull moves a general investigation of the
waste of public money--The Senate decides in favor of a
committee to investigate only matters specifically referred to
it--The Leet and Stocking scandal--Colonel Leet found to be
receiving $50,000 per year from the "General Order" business of
the New York Custom-House--A Senate committee reports the facts
to Secretary of the Treasury, Boutwell--The Secretary makes a
new investigation and recommends that Collector Murphy
discontinue the "General Order" system--Murphy allows it to
continue indefinitely--A second Senate investigation
ordered--The Leet and Stocking mystery explained--President
Grant not a participant in the profits--The "General Order"
system broken up--Indignation among Republicans resulting from
the exposure 361
CHAPTER XXV
THE CINCINNATI CONVENTION
The Liberal Republican Convention in Missouri calls national
convention at Cincinnati--Prompt and favorable response in Ohio
and other states--Coöperation of leading Democrats--Springfield
_Republican_, Cincinnati _Commercial_, and Chicago _Tribune_,
Republican newspapers, support the movement--Henry Watterson,
Manton Marble, and August Belmont, Democrats, coöperate--The
movement in Pennsylvania--William C. Bryant and others favor the
nomination of Trumbull for President--Great meeting at Cooper
Union, New York--Governor Palmer, of Illinois, favors the
movement--Charles Francis Adams, Horace Greeley, David Davis, B.
Gratz Brown, and A. G. Curtin mentioned for
President--Correspondence with Trumbull on the subject--The
editors' dinner at Murat Halstead's house--Platform
embarrassment--The tariff question referred to the congressional
districts--Frank Blair and Gratz Brown cause a commotion--Carl
Schurz made chairman of the convention--Balloting for
President--Brown withdraws his name and advises his friends to
vote for Greeley--Greeley nominated on the sixth
ballot--Consternation of the supporters of Adams and
Trumbull--Most of the Liberal Republican editors decide to
support Greeley--Carl Schurz is much distressed--Godkin and
Bryant reject Greeley--Correspondence between Bryant and
Trumbull--Charles Sumner's hesitating course--He finally decides
to support Greeley 372
CHAPTER XXVI
THE GREELEY CAMPAIGN
How Trumbull received the news--Carl Schurz advises Greeley to
decline the nomination--Greeley decides to accept it--Meeting of
Liberal Republican leaders in New York to consider their
course--Trumbull and Schurz decide to support the Cincinnati
ticket--Correspondence between Schurz and Godkin--Parke Godwin
against Greeley--President Grant renominated by the Republicans
with Henry Wilson for Vice-President--The Democrats at Baltimore
adopt both nominees and platform of the Liberal Republicans--A
minority call a bolting convention, which nominates Charles
O'Conor--Trumbull's speech at Springfield, Illinois, in support
of the Cincinnati ticket--Greeley's campaign starts with the
prospect of victory--North Carolina election in August gives the
Grant ticket a small majority--The tide turns against
Greeley--Greeley takes the stump in September and makes a
favorable impression, but too late--The October elections, in
Pennsylvania and Ohio, go heavily Republican--Greeley and Brown
defeated--Death of Greeley following the election--State
election in Louisiana in 1872--Fraudulent returns in favor of
Kellogg exposed by Senators Carpenter and Trumbull--Kellogg
sustained by President Grant 389
CHAPTER XXVII
LATER YEARS
Trumbull's senatorial term expires in 1873--Not reëlected--He
resumes the practice of law in Chicago--The second Grant
administration worse than the first--The Republican party beaten
in the congressional elections of 1874--The Hayes-Tilden
campaign in 1876--Disputed returns in Louisiana, South Carolina,
and Florida--The Electoral Commission--"Visiting Statesmen" sent
to Louisiana to watch the count of the votes--Trumbull chosen as
one of them--Chosen also to support Tilden's claim before the
electoral commission--His argument thereon--E. W. Stoughton, in
behalf of Hayes, contends that the returns of election certified
by the governor of a state must be accepted--Also that the
status of a governor recognized by the President of the United
States cannot be questioned--Both these contentions are
sustained by the Electoral Commission--By a vote of 8 to 7
Hayes is declared elected President--Trumbull's marriage to Miss
Mary Ingraham--He is nominated for governor of Illinois by the
Democrats in 1880--Is defeated by Shelby M. Cullom--My last
meeting with Trumbull at the World's Columbian
Exposition--Trumbull's professional services in the Debs
case--His public speech, after the case was decided--He sides
with the Populist party--Prepares their declaration of
principles in December, 1894--Text of the Declaration 407
CHAPTER XXVIII
CONCLUSION
Trumbull goes to Belleville to attend the funeral of Gustave
Koerner--Is taken with illness at hotel--On his return to his
home he is found to be suffering from an internal tumor--His
physicians decide that a surgical operation would be fatal--He
lingers till June 5, 1896--Dies in his eighty-third
year--Impressive funeral--His great qualities as a lawyer and
political debater--His conscientiousness and courage--His
generosity, and fondness for little children--His place in the
country's history--Eulogy by Joseph Medill, and other
contemporaries--Trumbull's estimate of Lincoln--His religious
views--His surviving family and descendants 418
INDEX 433
INTRODUCTION
Events in the year 1854 brought into the field of national politics two
members of the bar of southern Illinois who were destined to hold high
places in the public councils--Abraham Lincoln and Lyman Trumbull. They
were members of opposing parties, Lincoln a Whig, Trumbull a Democrat.
Both were supporters of the compromise measures of 1850. These measures
had been accepted by the great majority of the people, not as wholly
satisfactory, but as preferable to never-ending turmoil on the slavery
question. There had been a subsidence of anti-slavery propagandism in
the North, following the Free Soil campaign of 1848. Hale and Julian
received fewer votes in 1852 than Van Buren and Adams had received in
the previous election. Franklin Pierce (Democrat) had been elected
President of the United States by so large a majority that the Whig
party was practically killed. President Pierce in his first message to
Congress had alluded to the quieting of sectional agitation and had
said: "That this repose is to suffer no shock during my official term,
if I have the power to avert it, those who placed me here may be
assured." Doubtless the Civil War would have come, even if Pierce had
kept his promise instead of breaking it; for, as Lincoln said a little
later: "A house divided against itself cannot stand."
It was not at variance with itself on the slavery question solely. In
fact, the North did not take up arms against slavery when the crisis
came. A few men foresaw that a war raging around that institution would
somehow and sometime give it its death-blow, but at the beginning the
Northern soldiers marched with no intention of that kind. They had an
eye single to the preservation of the Union. The uprising which followed
the firing upon Fort Sumter was a passionate protest against the insult
to the national flag. It betokened a fixed purpose to defend what the
flag symbolized, and it was only slowly and hesitatingly that the
abolition of slavery was admitted as a factor and potent issue in the
Northern mind.
It is true that the South seceded in order to preserve and extend
slavery, but it was penetrated with the belief that it had a perfect
right to secede--not merely the right of revolution which our ancestors
exercised in separating from Great Britain, but a right under the
Constitution.
The states under the Confederation, during the Revolutionary period and
later, were actually sovereign. The Articles of Confederation declared
them to be so. When the Constitution was formed, the habit of state
sovereignty was so strong that it was only with the greatest difficulty
that its ratification by the requisite number of states could be
obtained. John Quincy Adams said that it was "extorted from the grinding
necessity of a reluctant people." The instrument itself provided a
common tribunal (the Supreme Court) as arbiter for the decision of all
disputed questions arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States. But it was not generally supposed that the jurisdiction of the
court included the power to extinguish state sovereignty.[1]
The first division of political parties under the new government was the
outgrowth of emotions stirred by the French Revolution. The Republicans
of the period, led by Jefferson, were ardent sympathizers with the
uprising in France. The Federalists, who counted Washington, Hamilton,
and John Adams as their representative men, were opposed to any
connection with European strife, or to any fresh embroilment with
England, growing out of it. The Alien and Sedition Laws were passed in
order to suppress agitation tending to produce such embroilment.
Jefferson met these laws with the "Resolutions of '98," which were
adopted by the legislatures of Virginia and Kentucky. These resolutions
affirmed the right of the separate states to judge of any infraction of
the Constitution by the Federal Government and also of the mode and
measure of redress--a claim which necessarily included the right to
secede from the Union if milder measures failed. The Alien and Sedition
Laws expired by their own limitation before any actual test of their
validity took place.
The next assertion of the right of the states to nullify the acts of the
Federal Government came from a more northern latitude as a consequence
of the purchase of Louisiana. This act alarmed the New England States.
The Federalists feared lest the acquisition of this vast domain should
give the South a perpetual preponderance and control of the Government.
Since there was no clause in the Constitution providing for the
acquisition of new territory (as President Jefferson himself conceded),
they affirmed that the Union was a partnership and that a new partner
could not be taken in without the consent of all the old ones, and that
the taking in of a new one without such consent would release the old
ones.
Controversy on this theme was superseded a few years later by more acute
sources of irritation--the Embargo and War of 1812. These events fell
with great severity on the commerce of the Northern States, and led to
the passage by the Massachusetts legislature of anti-Embargo
resolutions, declaring that "when the national compact is violated and
the citizens are oppressed by cruel and unauthorized law, this
legislature is bound to interpose its power and wrest from the oppressor
his victim." In this doctrine Daniel Webster concurred. In a speech in
the House of Representatives, December 9, 1814, on the Conscription
Bill, he said:
The operation of measures thus unconstitutional and illegal
ought to be prevented by a resort to other measures which are
both constitutional and legal. It will be the solemn duty of
the State Governments to protect their own authority over their
own militia and to interpose between their own citizens and
arbitrary power.... With the same earnestness with which I now
exhort you to forbear from these measures I shall exhort them
to exercise their unquestionable right of providing for the
security of their own liberties.[2]
The anti-Embargo resolutions were followed by the refusal of both
Massachusetts and Connecticut to allow federal officers to take command
of their militia and by the call for the Hartford Convention. The latter
body recommended to the states represented in it the adoption of
measures to protect their citizens against forcible drafts,
conscriptions, or impressments not authorized by the Constitution--a
phrase which certainly meant that the states were to judge of the
constitutionality of the measures referred to. The conclusion of peace
with Great Britain put an end to this crisis before it came to blows.
On February 26, 1833, Mr. Calhoun, following the Resolutions of '98,
affirmed in the Senate the doctrine that the Government of the United
States was a compact, by which the separate states delegated to it
certain definite powers, reserving the rest; that whenever the general
Government should assume the exercise of powers not so delegated, its
acts would be void and of no effect; and that the said Government was
not the sole judge of the powers delegated to it, but that, as in all
other cases of compact among sovereign parties without any common judge,
each had an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the infraction
as of the mode and measures of redress. This was the stand which South
Carolina took in opposition to the Force Bill of President Jackson's
administration.[3]
A state convention of South Carolina was called which passed an
ordinance nullifying the tariff law of the United States and declaring
that, if any attempt were made to collect customs duties under it by
force, that state would consider herself absolved from all allegiance to
the Union and would proceed at once to organize a separate government.
President Jackson was determined to exercise force, and would have done
so had not Congress, under the lead of Henry Clay, passed a compromise
tariff bill which enabled South Carolina to repeal her ordinance and say
that she had gained the substantial part of her contention.
Despite the later speeches of Webster, the doctrine of nullification had
a new birth in Massachusetts in 1845, the note of discord having been
called forth by the proposed admission of Texas into the Union. In that
year the legislature passed and the governor approved resolutions
declaring that the powers of Congress did not embrace a case of the
admission of a foreign state or a foreign territory into the Union by an
act of legislation and "such an act would have no binding power whatever
on the people of Massachusetts." This was a fresh outcropping of the
bitterness which had prevailed in the New England States against the
acquisition of Louisiana.
Thus it appears that, although the Constitution did create courts to
decide all disputes arising under it, the particularism which previously
prevailed continued to exist. Nationalism was an aftergrowth proceeding
from the habit into which the people fell of finding their common centre
of gravity at Washington City, and of viewing it as the place where the
American name and fame were embodied and emblazoned to the world. During
the first half-century the North and the South were changing coats from
time to time on the subject of state sovereignty, but meanwhile the
Constitution itself was working silently and imperceptibly in the North
to undermine particularism and to strengthen nationalism. It had
accomplished its educational work in the early thirties when it found
its complete expression in Webster's reply to Hayne. But the South
believed just as firmly that Hayne was the victor in that contest, as
the North believed that Webster was. Hayne's speech was not generally
read in the North either then or later. It was not inferior, in the
essential qualities of dignity, courtesy, legal lore, and oratorical
force, to that of his great antagonist. Webster here met a foeman worthy
of his steel.
In the South the pecuniary interests bottomed on slavery offset and
neutralized the unifying process that was ripening in the North. The
slavery question entered into the debate between Webster and Calhoun in
1833 sufficiently to show that it lay underneath the other questions
discussed. Calhoun, in the speech referred to, reproached Forsyth, of
Georgia, for dullness in not seeing how state rights and slavery were
dovetailed together and how the latter depended on the former.
That African slavery was the most direful curse that ever afflicted any
civilized country may now be safely affirmed. It had its beginning in
our country in the year 1619 at Jamestown, Virginia, where a Dutch
warship short of provisions exchanged fourteen negroes for a supply
thereof. Slavery of both Indians and negroes already existed in the West
Indies and was regarded with favor by the colonists and their home
governments. It began in Massachusetts in 1637 as a consequence of
hostilities with the aborigines, the slaves being captives taken in war.
They were looked upon by the whites as heathen and were treated
according to precedents found in the Old Testament for dealing with the
enemies of Jehovah. In order that they might not escape from servitude
they were sent to the West Indies to be exchanged for negroes, and this
slave trade was not restricted to captives taken in war, but was applied
to any red men who could be safely seized and shipped away.
From these small beginnings slavery spread over all the colonies from
Massachusetts to Georgia and lasted in all of them for a century and a
half, i.e., until after the close of the Revolutionary War. Then it
began to lose ground in the Northern States. Public sentiment turned
against it in Massachusetts, but all attempts to abolish it there by act
of the legislature failed. Its death-blow was given by a judicial
decision in 1783 in a case where a master was prosecuted, convicted, and
fined forty shillings for beating a slave.[4]
Public opinion sustained this judgment, although there had been no
change in the law since the time when the Pequot Indians were sent by
shiploads to the Bermudas to be exchanged for negroes. If masters could
not punish their slaves in their discretion,--if slaves had any rights
which white men were bound to respect,--slavery was virtually dead. No
law could kill it more effectually.
In one way and another the emancipation movement extended southward to
and including Pennsylvania in the later years of the eighteenth century.
Nearly all the statesmen of the Revolution looked upon the institution
with disfavor and desired its extinction. Thomas Jefferson favored
gradual emancipation in Virginia, to be coupled with deportation of the
emancipated blacks, because he feared trouble if the two races were
placed upon an equality in the then slaveholding states. He labored to
prevent the extension of slavery into the new territories, and he very
nearly succeeded. In the year 1784 he reported an ordinance in the
Congress of the Confederation to organize all the unoccupied territory,
both north and south of the Ohio River, in ten subdivisions, in all of
which slavery should be forever prohibited, and this ordinance failed of
adoption by only one vote. Six states voted in the affirmative. Seven
were necessary. Only one representative of New Jersey happened to be
present, whereas two was the smallest number that could cast the vote of
any state. If one other member from New Jersey had been there, the
Jeffersonian ordinance of 1784 would have passed; slavery would have
been restricted to the seaboard states which it then occupied, and would
never have drawn the sword against the Union, and the Civil War would
not have taken place.[5]
After the emancipation movement came to a pause, at the southern border
of Pennsylvania, the fact became apparent that there was a dividing line
between free states and slave states, and a feeling grew up in both
sections that neither of them ought to acquire a preponderance of power
and mastery over the other. The slavery question was not concerned with
this dispute, but a habit grew up of admitting new states to the Union
in pairs, in order to maintain a balance of power in the national
Senate. Thus Kentucky and Vermont offset each other, then Tennessee and
Ohio, then Louisiana and Indiana, then Mississippi and Illinois.
In 1819, Alabama, a new slave state, was admitted to the Union and there
was no new free state to balance it. The Territory of Missouri, in which
slavery existed, was applying for admission also. While Congress was
considering the Missouri bill, Mr. Tallmadge, of New York, with a view
of preserving the balance of power, offered an amendment providing for
the gradual emancipation of slaves in the proposed state, and
prohibiting the introduction of additional slaves. This amendment was
adopted by the House by a sectional vote, nearly all the Northern
members voting for it and the Southern ones against it, but it was
rejected by the Senate.
In the following year the Missouri question came up afresh, and Senator
Thomas, of Illinois, proposed, as a compromise, that Missouri should be
admitted to the Union with slavery, but that in all the remaining
territory north of 36 degrees and 30 minutes north latitude, slavery
should be forever prohibited. This amendment was adopted in the Senate
by 24 to 20, and in the House by 90 to 87. Of the affirmative votes in
the House only fourteen were from the North, and nearly all of these
fourteen members became so unpopular at home that they lost their seats
in the next election. The Missouri Compromise was generally considered a
victory for the South, but one great Southerner considered it the
death-knell of the Union. Thomas Jefferson was still living, at the age
of seventy-seven. He saw what this sectional rift portended, and he
wrote to John Holmes, one of his correspondents, under date of April 22,
1820:
This momentous question, like a fire-bell in the night,
awakened me and filled me with terror. I considered it at once
as the knell of the Union. It is hushed, indeed, for the
moment. But this is a reprieve only, not a final sentence. A
geographical line, coinciding with a marked principle, moral
and political, once conceived and held up to the angry passions
of men, will never be obliterated, and every new irritation
will mark it deeper and deeper.
Nearly all of the emancipationists, during the decade following the
adoption of the Compromise, were in the slaveholding states, since the
evil had its seat there. The Colonization Society's headquarters were
in Washington City. Its president, Bushrod Washington, was a Virginian,
and James Madison, Henry Clay, and John Randolph, leading Southerners,
were its active supporters. The only newspaper devoted specially to the
cause (the _Genius of Universal Emancipation_), edited by Benjamin Lundy
and William Lloyd Garrison, was published in the city of Baltimore. This
paper was started in 1829, but it was short-lived. Mr. Garrison soon
perceived that colonization, depending upon voluntary emancipation
alone, would never bring slavery to an end, since emancipation was
doubtful and sporadic, while the natural increase of slaves was certain
and vastly greater than their possible deportation. For this reason he
began to advocate emancipation without regard to colonization. This
policy was so unpopular in Maryland and Virginia that his subscription
list fell nearly to zero, and this compelled the discontinuance of the
paper and his removal to another sphere of activity. He returned to his
native state, Massachusetts, and there started another newspaper,
entitled the _Liberator_, in 1831. The first anti-slavery crusade in the
North thus had its beginning. It did not take the form of a political
party. It was an agitation, an awakening of the public conscience. Its
tocsin was immediate emancipation, as opposed to emancipation
conditioned upon deportation.
The slaveholders were alarmed by this new movement at the North. They
thought that it aimed to incite slave insurrection. The governor of
South Carolina made it the subject of a special message. The legislature
of Georgia passed and the governor signed resolutions offering a reward
of $5000 to anybody who would bring Mr. Garrison to that state to be
tried for sedition. The mayor of Boston was urged by prominent men in
the South to suppress the _Liberator_, although the paper was then so
obscure at home that the mayor had never seen a copy of it, or even
heard of its existence. The fact that there was any organized expression
of anti-slavery thought anywhere was first made generally known at the
North by the extreme irritation of the South; and when the temper of the
latter became known, the vast majority of Northern people sided with
their Southern brethren. They were opposed to anything which seemed
likely to lead to slave insurrection or to a disruption of the Union.
The abolitionist agitation seemed to be a provocation to both. Hence
arose anger and mob violence against the abolitionists everywhere. This
feeling took the shape of a common understanding not to countenance any
discussion of the slavery question in any manner or anywhere. The
execution of this tacit agreement fell for the most part into the hands
of the disorderly element of society, but disapproval of the Garrisonian
crusade was expressed by men of the highest character in the New England
States, such as William Ellery Channing and Dr. Francis Wayland. The
latter declined to receive the _Liberator_, when it was sent to him
gratuitously.
* * * * *
What was going on in the South during the thirties and forties of the
last century? There were varying shades of opinion and mixed motives and
fluctuating political currents. In the first place cotton-growing had
been made profitable by the invention of the cotton-gin. This machine
for separating the seeds from the fibre of the cotton plant caused an
industrial revolution in the world, and its moral consequences were no
less sweeping. It changed the slaveholder's point of view of the whole
slavery question. The previously prevailing idea that slavery was
morally wrong, and an evil to both master and slave, gradually gave way
to the belief that it was beneficial to both, that it was an agency of
civilization and a means of bringing the blessings of Christianity to
the benighted African. This change of sentiment in the South, which
became very marked in the early thirties, has been ascribed to the bad
language of the abolitionists of the North. People said that the prime
cause of the trouble was that Garrison and his followers did not speak
easy. They were too vociferous. They used language calculated to make
Southerners angry and to stir up slave insurrection. But how could
anybody draw the line between different tones of voice and different
forms of expression? Thomas Jefferson was not a speak-easy. He said that
one hour of slavery was fraught with more misery than ages of that which
led us to take up arms against Great Britain. If Garrison ever said
anything more calculated to incite slaves to insurrection than that, I
cannot recall it. On the other hand, Elijah Lovejoy, at Alton, Illinois,
was a speak-easy. He did not use any violent language, but he was put to
death by a mob for making preparations to publish a newspaper in which
slavery should be discussed in a reasonable manner, if there was such a
manner.
Nevertheless, the Garrisonian movement was erroneously interpreted at
the South as an attempt to incite slave insurrection with the attendant
horrors of rapine and bloodshed. There were no John Browns then, and
Garrison himself was a non-resistant, but since insurrection was a
possible consequence of agitation, the Southern people demanded that the
agitation should be put down by force. As that could not be done in any
lawful way, and since unlawful means were ineffective, they considered
themselves under a constant threat of social upheaval and destruction.
The repeated declaration of Northern statesmen that there never would
be any outside interference with slavery in the states where it existed,
did not have any quieting effect upon them. The fight over the Missouri
Compromise had convinced them that the North would prevent, if possible,
the extension of slavery to the new territories, and that this meant
confining the institution to a given space, where it would be eventually
smothered. It might last a long time in its then boundaries, but it
would finally reach a limit where its existence would depend upon the
forbearance of its enemies. Then the question which perplexed Thomas
Jefferson would come up afresh: "What shall be done with the blacks?"
Mr. Garrott Brown, of Alabama, a present-day writer of ability and
candor, thinks that the underlying question in the minds of the Southern
people in the forties and fifties of the last century was not chiefly
slavery, but the presence of Africans in large numbers, whether bond or
free. This included the slavery question as a dollar-and-cent
proposition and something more. Mrs. Fanny Kemble Butler, who lived on a
Georgia plantation in the thirties, said that the chief obstacle to
emancipation was the fact that every able-bodied negro could be sold for
a thousand dollars in the Charleston market. Both fear and cupidity were
actively at work in the Southern mind.
In short, there was already an irrepressible conflict in our land,
although nobody had yet used those words. There was a fixed opinion in
the North that slavery was an evil which ought not to be extended and
enlarged; that the same reasons existed for curtailing it as for
stopping the African slave trade. There was a growing opinion in the
South that such extension was a vital necessity and that the South in
contending for it was contending for existence. The prevailing thought
in that quarter was that the Southern people were on the defensive,
that they were resisting aggression. In this feeling they were sincere
and they gave expression to it in very hot temper.
General W. T. Sherman, who was at the head of an institution of learning
for boys in Louisiana in 1859, felt that he was treading on underground
fires. In December of that year he wrote to Thomas Ewing, Jr.:
Negroes in the great numbers that exist here must of necessity
be slaves. Theoretical notions of humanity and religion cannot
shake the commercial fact that their labor is of great value
and cannot be dispensed with. Still, of course, I wish it never
had existed, for it does make mischief. No power on earth can
restrain opinion elsewhere and these opinions expressed beget a
vindictive feeling. The mere dread of revolt, sedition, or
external interference makes men, ordinarily calm, almost mad.
I, of course, do not debate the question, and moderate as my
views are, I feel that I am suspected, and if I do not actually
join in the praises of slavery I may be denounced as an
abolitionist.[6]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Mr. H. C. Lodge, in his _Life of Daniel Webster_, says, touching the
debate with Hayne in 1830:
"When the Constitution was adopted by the votes of states at
Philadelphia, and accepted by the votes of states in popular
conventions, it is safe to say that there was not a man in the country,
from Washington and Hamilton, on the one side, to George Clinton and
George Mason, on the other, who regarded the new system as anything but
an experiment entered upon by the states, and from which each and every
state had the right to peaceably withdraw, a right which was very likely
to be exercised."
Mr. Gaillard Hunt, author of the _Life of James Madison_, and editor of
his writings, has published recently a confidential memorandum dated May
11, 1794, written by John Taylor of Caroline for Mr. Madison's
information, giving an account of a long and solemn interview between
himself and Rufus King and Oliver Ellsworth, in which the two latter
affirmed that, by reason of differences of opinion between the East and
the South, as to the scope and functions of government, the Union could
not last long. Therefore they considered it best to have a dissolution
at once, by mutual consent, rather than by a less desirable mode.
Taylor, on the other hand, thought that the Union should be supported if
possible, but if not possible he agreed that an amicable separation was
preferable. Madison wrote at the bottom of this paper the words: "The
language of K and E probably _in terrorem_," and laid it away so
carefully that it never saw the light until the year 1905.
[2] _Letters of Daniel Webster_, edited by C. W. Van Tyne, p. 67. Mr.
Van Tyne says that Webster "here advocated a doctrine hardly
distinguishable from nullification."
[3] Referring to this speech of Calhoun and to Webster's reply, Mr.
Lodge says:
"Whatever the people of the United States understood the Constitution to
mean in 1789, there can be no question that a majority in 1833 regarded
it as a fundamental law and not a compact,--an opinion which has now
become universal. But it was quite another thing to argue that what the
Constitution had come to mean was what it meant when it was adopted."
See also Pendleton's _Life of Alexander H. Stephens_, chap. XI.
[4] G. H. Moore's _History of Slavery in Massachusetts_, p. 215.
[5] Jefferson was cut to the heart by this failure. Commenting on an
article entitled "États Unis" in the _Encylopédie_, written by M. de
Meusnier, referring to his proposed anti-slavery ordinance, he said:
"The voice of a single individual of the State which was divided, or one
of those which were of the negative, would have prevented this
abominable crime from spreading itself over the new country. Thus we see
the fate of millions unborn hanging on the tongue of one man, and Heaven
was silent in that awful moment."
[6] _General W. T. Sherman as College President_, p. 88.
THE LIFE OF LYMAN TRUMBULL
CHAPTER I
ANCESTRY AND EARLY LIFE
The subject of this memoir was born in Colchester, Connecticut, October
12, 1813. The Trumbull family was the most illustrious in the state,
embracing three governors and other distinguished men. All were
descendants of John Trumbull (or rather "Trumble"[7]), a cooper by
trade, and his wife, Ellenor Chandler, of Newcastle, England, who
migrated to Massachusetts in 1639, and settled first in Roxbury and
removed to Rowley in the following year. Two sons were born to them in
Newcastle-on-Tyne: Beriah, 1637 (died in infancy), and John, 1639.
The latter at the age of thirty-one removed to Suffield, Connecticut. He
married and had four sons: John, Joseph, Ammi, and Benoni.
Captain Benoni Trumbull, married to Sarah Drake and settled in Lebanon,
Connecticut, had a son, Benjamin, born May 11, 1712.
This Benjamin, married to Mary Brown of Hebron, Connecticut, had a son,
Benjamin, born December 19, 1735.
This son was graduated at Yale College in 1759, and studied for the
ministry; he was ordained in 1760 at North Haven, Connecticut, where he
officiated nearly sixty years, his preaching being interrupted only by
the Revolutionary War, in which he served both as soldier and as
chaplain. He was the author of the standard colonial history of
Connecticut. He was married to Miss Martha Phelps in 1760. They had two
sons and five daughters.
The elder son, Benjamin, born in North Haven, September 24, 1769, became
a lawyer and married Elizabeth Mather, of Saybrook, Connecticut, March
15, 1800, and settled in Colchester, Connecticut. The wife was a
descendant of Rev. Richard Mather, who migrated from Liverpool, England,
to Massachusetts in 1635, and was the father of Increase Mather and
grandfather of Cotton Mather, both celebrated in the church history of
New England. Eleven children were born to these parents, of whom Lyman
was the seventh. This Benjamin Trumbull was a graduate of Yale College,
representative in the legislature, judge for the probate districts of
East Haddam and Colchester, and died in Henrietta, Jackson County,
Michigan, June 14, 1850, aged eighty-one. His wife died October 20,
1828, in her forty-seventh year. Lyman Trumbull was thus in the seventh
generation of the Trumbulls in America.[8]
Five brothers and two sisters of Lyman reached maturity. A family of
this size could not be supported by the fees earned by a country lawyer
in the early part of the nineteenth century. The only other resource
available was agriculture. Thus the Trumbull children began life on a
farm and drew their nourishment from the soil cultivated by their own
labor. It is recorded that, although the father and the grandfather of
Lyman were graduates of Yale College, chill penury prevented him from
having similar advantages of education. His schooling was obtained at
Bacon Academy, in Colchester, which was of high grade, and second only
to Yale among the educational institutions of the state. Here the boy
Lyman took the lessons in mathematics that were customary in the
academies of that period, and became conversant with Virgil and Cicero
in Latin and with Xenophon, Homer, and the New Testament in Greek.
[Illustration: BIRTHPLACE OF LYMAN TRUMBULL, COLCHESTER, CONN.]
The opportunities to put an end to one's existence are so common to
American youth that it is cause for wonder that so many of them reach
mature years. Young Trumbull was not lacking in such facilities. The
following incident is well authenticated, being narrated in part in his
own handwriting:
When about thirteen years old he was playing ball one cold day
in the family yard. The well had a low curbing around it and
was covered by a round flat stone with a round hole in the top
of it. He ran towards the well for the ball, which he picked up
and threw quickly. As he did so his foot slipped on the ice and
he went head first down the well. His recollection of the
immediate details is vague, but he did not break his neck or
stun himself on the rocky sides, but appears to have gone down
like a diver, and somehow managed to turn in the narrow space
and come up head first. The well had an old-fashioned sweep
with a bucket on it, which his brothers promptly lowered and he
was hoisted out, drenched and cold, but apparently not
otherwise injured.
He attended school and worked on the farm until he was eighteen years of
age when he earned some money by teaching the district school one year
at Portland, Connecticut. At the age of nineteen he taught school one
winter in New Jersey, returning to Colchester the following summer. He
had established a character for rectitude, industry, modesty, sobriety,
and good manners, so that when, in his twentieth year (1833), he decided
to go to the state of Georgia to seek employment as a school-teacher,
nearly all the people in the village assembled to wish him godspeed on
that long journey, which was made by schooner, sailing from the
Connecticut River to Charleston, South Carolina. The voyage was
tempestuous but safe, and he arrived at Charleston with one hundred
dollars in his pocket which his father had given him as a start in life.
This money he speedily returned out of his earnings because he thought
his father needed it more than himself.
A memorandum made by himself records that "on the evening of the day
when he arrived at Charleston a nullification meeting was held in a
large warehouse. The building was crowded, so he climbed up on a beam
overhead and from that elevated position overlooked a Southern audience
and heard two of the most noted orators in the South, Governor Hayne,
and John C. Calhoun, then a United States Senator. He remembers little
of the impression they made upon a youth of twenty, except that he
thought Hayne an eloquent speaker."
From Charleston he went by railroad (the first one he had ever seen and
one of the earliest put in operation in the United States) to a point on
the Savannah River opposite Augusta, Georgia, and thence by stage to
Milledgeville, which was then the capital of Georgia. From Milledgeville
he walked seventy-five miles to Pike County, where he had some hope of
finding employment. Being disappointed there he continued his journey
on foot to Greenville, Meriwether County, where he had more success even
than he had expected, for he obtained a position as principal of the
Greenville Academy at a salary of two hundred dollars per year in
addition to the fees paid by the pupils. This position he occupied for
three years.
While at Greenville he employed his leisure hours reading law in the
office of Hiram Warner, judge of the superior court of Georgia,
afterwards judge of the supreme court of the state and member of
Congress. In this way he acquired the rudiments of the profession. As
soon as he had gained sufficient capital to make a start in life
elsewhere, he bought a horse, and, in March, 1837, took the trail
through the "Cherokee Tract" toward the Northwest. This trail was a
pathway formed by driving cattle and swine through the forest from
Kentucky and Tennessee to Georgia. Dr. Parks, of Greenville, accompanied
Trumbull during a portion of the journey. They traveled unarmed but
safely, although Trumbull carried a thousand dollars on his person, the
surplus earnings of his three years in Georgia. For a young man of
twenty-four years without a family this was affluence in those days.
Through Kentucky, Trumbull continued his journey without any companion
and made his entrance into Illinois at Shawneetown, on the Ohio River,
where he presented letters of introduction from his friends in Georgia
and was cordially welcomed. After a brief stay at that place he
continued his journey to Belleville, St. Clair County, bearing letters
of introduction from his Shawneetown friends to Adam W. Snyder and
Alfred Cowles, prominent members of the bar at Belleville. Both received
him with kindness and encouraged him to make his home there. This he
decided to do, but he first made a visit to his parental home in
Colchester, going on horseback by way of Jackson, Michigan, near which
town three of his older brothers, David, Erastus, and John, had settled
as farmers.
Returning to Belleville in August, 1837, he entered the law office of
Hon. John Reynolds, ex-governor of the state, who was then a
Representative in Congress and was familiarly known as the "Old Ranger."
Reynolds held, at one time and another, almost every office that the
people of Illinois could bestow, but his fame rests on historical
writings composed after he had withdrawn from public life.[9]
For how long a time Trumbull's connection with Governor Reynolds
continued, our records do not say, but we know that he had an office of
his own in Belleville three years later, and that his younger brother
George had joined him as a student and subsequently became his partner.
The practice of the legal profession in those days was accomplished by
"riding on the circuit," usually on horseback, from one county seat to
another, following the circuit judge, and trying such cases as could be
picked up by practitioners en route, or might be assigned to them by the
judge. Court week always brought together a crowd of litigants and
spectators, who came in from the surrounding country with their teams
and provisions, and often with their wives and children, and who lived
in their own covered wagons. The trial of causes was the principal
excitement of the year, and the opposing lawyers were "sized up" by
juries and audience with a pretty close approach to accuracy. After
adjournment for the day, the lawyers, judges, plaintiffs, defendants,
and leading citizens mingled together in the country tavern, talked
politics, made speeches or listened to them, cracked jokes and told
stories till bedtime, and took up the unfinished lawsuit, or a new one,
the next day. In short, court week was circus, theatre, concert, and
lyceum to the farming population, but still more was it a school of
politics, where they formed opinions on public affairs and on the mental
calibre of the principal actors therein.
Two letters written by Trumbull in 1837 to his father in Colchester have
escaped the ravages of time. Neither envelopes nor stamps existed then.
Each letter consisted of four pages folded in such a manner that the
central part of the fourth page, which was left blank, received the
address on one side and a wafer or a daub of sealing wax on the other.
The rate of postage was twenty-five cents per letter, and the writers
generally sought to get their money's worth by taking a large sheet of
paper and filling all the available space. Prepayment of postage was
optional, but the privilege of paying in advance was seldom availed of,
the writers not incurring the risk of losing both letters and money.
Irregularity in the mails is noted by Trumbull, who mentions that a
letter from Colchester was fifteen days en route, while a newspaper made
the same distance in ten.
In a letter dated October 9, 1837, he tells his father that he is
already engaged in a law case involving the ownership of a house. If he
finds that he can earn his living in the practice of law, he shall like
Belleville very much. In the same missive he tells his sister Julia that
balls and cotillions are frequent in Belleville, and that he had
attended one, but did not dance. It was the first time he had attended a
social gathering since he left home in 1833. He adds, "There are more
girls here than I was aware of. At the private party I attended, there
were about fifteen, all residing in town." The writer was then at the
susceptible age of twenty-four.
The other letter gives an account of the Alton riot and the killing of
Rev. Elijah P. Lovejoy. This is one of the few contemporary accounts we
have of that shocking event. Although he was not an eye-witness of the
riot, the facts as stated are substantially correct, and the comments
give us a view of the opinions of the writer at the age of twenty-four,
touching a subject in which he was destined to play an important part.
The letter is subjoined:
BELLEVILLE, SUNDAY, Nov. 12, 1837.
DEAR FATHER: Since my last to you there has been a mob to put
down Abolitionism, in Alton, thirty-five miles northwest of
this place, in which two persons were killed and six or seven
badly wounded. The immediate cause of the riot was the attempt
by a Mr. Lovejoy to establish at Alton a religious newspaper in
which the principles of slavery were sometimes discussed. Mr.
Lovejoy was a Presbyterian minister and formerly edited a
newspaper in St. Louis, but having published articles in his
paper in relation to slavery which were offensive to the people
of St. Louis, a mob collected, broke open his office, destroyed
his press and type and scattered it through the streets.
Immediately after this transaction, which was about a year
since, Mr. Lovejoy left St. Louis, and removed to Alton, where
he attempted to re-establish his press, but he had not been
there long before a mob assembled there also, broke into his
office and destroyed his press. In a short time Mr. Lovejoy
ordered another press which, soon after its arrival in Alton,
was taken from the warehouse (where it was deposited), by a
mob, and in like manner destroyed. Again he ordered still
another press, which arrived in Alton on the night of the 7th
inst., and was safely deposited in a large stone warehouse four
or five storeys high.
Previous to the arrival of this press, the citizens of Alton
held several public meetings and requested Mr. L. to desist
from attempting to establish his press there, but he refused to
do so. Heretofore no resistance had ever been offered to the
mob, but on the night of the 8th inst., as it was supposed that
another attempt might possibly be made to destroy the press,
Mr. L. and some 18 or 20 of his friends armed themselves and
remained in the warehouse, where Mr. Gilman, one of the owners
of the house, addressed the mob from a window, and urged them
to desist, told them that there were several armed men in the
house and that they were determined to defend their property.
The mob demanded the press, which not being given them, they
commenced throwing stones at the house and attempted to get
into it. Those from within then fired and killed a man of the
name of Bishop. The mob then procured arms, but were unable to
get into the house. At last they determined on firing it, to
which end, as it was stone, they had to get on the roof, which
they did by means of a ladder. The firing during all this time,
said to be about an hour, was continued on both sides. Mr.
Lovejoy having made his appearance near one of the doors was
instantly shot down, receiving four balls at the same moment.
Those within agreed to surrender if their lives would be
protected, and soon threw open the doors and fled. Several
shots were afterward fired, but no one was seriously injured.
The fire was then extinguished and the press taken and
destroyed.
So ended this awful catastrophe which, as you may well suppose,
has created great excitement through this section of the
country. Mr. Lovejoy is said to have been a very worthy man,
and both friends and foes bear testimony to the excellence of
his private character. Here, the course of the mob is almost
universally reprobated, for whatever may have been the
sentiments of Mr. Lovejoy, they certainly did not justify the
mob taking his life. It is understood here that Mr. L. was
never in the habit of publishing articles of an insurrectionary
character, but he reasoned against slavery as being sinful, as
a moral and political evil.
His death and the manner in which he was slain will make
thousands of Abolitionists, and far more than his writings
would have made had he published his paper an hundred years.
This transaction is looked on here, as not only a disgrace to
Alton, but to the whole State. As much as I am opposed to the
immediate emancipation of the slaves and to the doctrine of
Abolitionism, yet I am more opposed to mob violence and
outrage, and had I been in Alton, I would have cheerfully
marched to the rescue of Mr. Lovejoy and his property.
Yours very affectionately,
LYMAN TRUMBULL.
After three years of riding on the circuit, Trumbull was elected, in
1840, a member of the lower house of the state legislature from St.
Clair County. In politics he was a Democrat as was his father before
him. This was the twelfth general assembly of the state. Among his
fellow members were Abraham Lincoln, E. D. Baker, William A. Richardson,
John J. Hardin, John. A. McClernand, William H. Bissell, Thomas
Drummond, and Joseph Gillespie, all of whom were destined to higher
positions.
Trumbull was now twenty-seven years of age. He soon attracted notice as
a debater. His style of speaking was devoid of ornament, but logical,
clear-cut, and dignified, and it bore the stamp of sincerity. He had a
well-furnished mind, and was never at loss for words. Nor was he ever
intimidated by the number or the prestige of his opponents. He possessed
calm intellectual courage, and he never declined a challenge to debate;
but his manner toward his opponents was always that of a high-bred
gentleman.
On the 27th of February, 1841, Stephen A. Douglas, who was Trumbull's
senior by six months, resigned the office of secretary of state of
Illinois to take a seat on the supreme bench, and Trumbull was
appointed to the vacancy. There had been a great commotion in state
politics over this office before Trumbull was appointed to it. Under the
constitution of the state, the governor had the right to appoint the
secretary, but nothing was said in that instrument about the power of
removal. Alexander P. Field had been appointed secretary by Governor
Edwards in 1828, and had remained in office under Governors Reynolds and
Duncan. Originally a strong Jackson man, he was now a Whig. When
Governor Carlin (Democrat) was elected in 1838 he decided to make a new
appointment, but Field refused to resign and denied the governor's right
to remove him. The State Senate sided with Field by refusing to confirm
the new appointee, John A. McClernand. After the adjournment of the
legislature, the governor reappointed McClernand, who sued out a writ of
_quo warranto_ to oust Field. The supreme court, consisting of four
members, three of whom were Whigs, decided in favor of Field. The
Democrats then determined to reform the judiciary. They passed a bill in
the legislature adding five new judges to the supreme bench. "It was,"
says historian Ford, "confessedly a violent and somewhat revolutionary
measure and could never have succeeded except in times of great party
excitement." In the mean time Field had retired and the governor had
appointed Douglas secretary of state, and Douglas was himself appointed
one of the five new members of the supreme court. Accordingly he
resigned, after holding the office only two months, and Trumbull was
appointed to the vacancy without his own solicitation or desire.
Two letters written by Trumbull in 1842 acquaint us with the fact that
his brother Benjamin had removed with his family from Colchester to
Springfield and was performing routine duties in the office of the
secretary of state, while Trumbull occupied his own time for the most
part in the practice of law before the supreme court. He adds: "I make
use of one of the committee rooms in the State House as a sleeping-room,
so you see I almost live in the State House, and am the only person who
sleeps in it. The court meets here and all the business I do is within
the building." Not quite all, for in another letter (November 27, 1842)
he confides to his sister Julia that a certain young lady in Springfield
was as charming as ever, but that he had not offered her his hand in
marriage, and that even if he should do so, it was not certain that she
would accept it.
Trumbull had held the office of secretary of state two years when his
resignation was requested by Governor Carlin's successor in office,
Thomas Ford, author of a _History of Illinois from 1814 to 1847_. In his
book Ford tells his reasons for asking Trumbull's resignation. They had
formed different opinions respecting an important question of public
policy, and Trumbull, although holding a subordinate office, had made a
public speech in opposition to the governor's views.[10] Of course he
did this on his own responsibility as a citizen and a member of the same
party as the governor. He acknowledged the governor's right to remove
him, and he made no complaint against the exercise of it.
The question of public policy at issue between Ford and Trumbull related
to the State Bank, which had failed in February, 1842, and whose
circulating notes, amounting to nearly $3,000,000, had fallen to a
discount of fifty cents on the dollar. Acts legalizing the bank's
suspension had been passed from time to time and things had gone from
bad to worse. At this juncture a new bill legalizing the suspension for
six months longer was prepared by the governor and at his instance was
reported favorably by the finance committee of the House. Trumbull
opposed this measure, and made a public speech against it. He maintained
that it was disgraceful and futile to prolong the life of this bankrupt
concern. He demanded that the bank be put in liquidation without further
delay.
When Trumbull's resignation as secretary became known, the Democratic
party at the state capital was rent in twain. Thirty-two of its most
prominent members, including Virgil Hickox, Samuel H. Treat, Ebenezer
Peck, Mason Brayman, and Robert Allen, took this occasion to tender him
a public dinner in a letter expressing their deep regret at his removal
and their desire to show the respect in which they held him for his
conduct of the office, and for his social and gentlemanly qualities. A
copy of this invitation was sent to the _State Register_, the party
organ, for publication. The publishers refused to insert it, on the
ground that it "would lead to a controversy out of which no good could
possibly arise, and probably much evil to _the cause_." Thereupon the
signers of the invitation started a new paper under the watchword "Fiat
Justitia, Ruat Coelum," entitled the _Independent Democrat_, of which
Number 1, Volume 1, was a broadside containing the correspondence
between Trumbull and the intending diners, together with sarcastic
reflections on the time-serving publishers of the _State Register_.
Trumbull's reply to the invitation, however, expressed his sincere
regret that he had made arrangements, which could not be changed, to
depart from Springfield before the time fixed for the dinner. He
returned to Belleville and resumed the practice of his profession.
Charles Dickens was then making his first visit to the United States,
and he happened to pass through Belleville while making an excursion
from St. Louis to Looking Glass Prairie. His party had arranged
beforehand for a noonday meal at Belleville, of which place, as it
presented itself to the eye of a stranger in 1842, he gives the
following glimpse:
Belleville was a small collection of wooden houses huddled
together in the very heart of the bush and swamp. Many of them
had singularly bright doors of red and yellow, for the place
had lately been visited by a traveling painter "who got along,"
as I was told, "by eating his way." The criminal court was
sitting and was at that moment trying some criminals for
horse-stealing, with whom it would most likely go hard; for
live stock of all kinds, being necessarily much exposed in the
woods, is held by the community in rather higher value than
human life; and for this reason juries generally make a point
of finding all men indicted for cattle-stealing, guilty,
whether or no. The horses belonging to the bar, the judge and
witnesses, were tied to temporary racks set roughly in the
road, by which is to be understood a forest path nearly
knee-deep in mud and slime.
There was an hotel in this place which, like all hotels in
America, had its large dining-room for a public table. It was
an odd, shambling, low-roofed outhouse, half cow-shed and half
kitchen, with a coarse brown canvas tablecloth, and tin
sconces stuck against the walls, to hold candles at
supper-time. The horseman had gone forward to have coffee and
some eatables prepared and they were by this time nearly ready.
He had ordered "wheat bread and chicken fixings" in preference
to "corn bread and common doings." The latter kind of refection
includes only pork and bacon. The former comprehends broiled
ham, sausages, veal cutlets, steaks, and such other viands of
that nature as may be supposed by a tolerably wide poetical
construction "to fix" a chicken comfortably in the digestive
organs of any lady or gentleman.[11]
A few months later, Trumbull made another journey to Springfield to be
joined in marriage to Miss Julia M. Jayne, a daughter of Dr. Gershom
Jayne, a physician of that city--a young lady who had received her
education at Monticello Seminary, with whom he passed twenty-five years
of unalloyed happiness. The marriage took place on the 21st of June,
1843, and Norman B. Judd served as groomsman. Miss Jayne had served in
the capacity of bridesmaid to Mary Todd at her marriage to Abraham
Lincoln on the 4th of November preceding. There was a wedding journey to
Trumbull's old home in Connecticut, by steamboat from St. Louis to
Wheeling, Virginia, by stage over the mountains to Cumberland, Maryland,
and thence by rail via Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York. After
visiting his own family, a journey was made to Mrs. Trumbull's relatives
at Stockbridge, Massachusetts, including her great-grandfather, a marvel
of industry and longevity, ninety-two years of age, a cooper by trade,
who was still making barrels with his own hands. This fact is mentioned
in a letter from Trumbull to his father, dated Barry, Michigan, August
20, 1843, at which place he had stopped on his homeward journey to visit
his brothers. One page of this letter is given up to glowing accounts
of the infant children of these brothers. And here it is fitting to say
that all these faded and time-stained epistles to his father and his
brothers and sisters, from first to last, are marked by tender
consideration and unvarying love and generosity. Not a shadow passed
between them.
The return journey from Michigan to Belleville was made by stage-coach.
October 12, 1843, Mrs. Trumbull writes to her husband's sisters in
Colchester that she has arrived in her new home. "We are boarding in a
private family," she says, "have two rooms which Mrs. Blackwell, the
landlady, has furnished neatly, and for my part, I am anticipating a
very delightful winter. Lyman is now at court, which keeps him very much
engaged, and I am left to enjoy myself as best I may until G. comes
around this afternoon to play chess with me."
May 4, 1844, the first child was born to Lyman and Julia Trumbull, a
son, who took the name of his father, but died in infancy. July 2, 1844,
Trumbull writes to his father that the most disastrous flood ever known,
since the settlement of the country by the whites, has devastated the
bottom lands of the Mississippi, Missouri, and Illinois Rivers. He also
gives an account of the killing of Joseph Smith, the Mormon prophet, who
was murdered by a mob in the jail at Carthage, Hancock County, after he
had surrendered himself to the civil authorities on promise of a fair
trial and protection against violence; and says that he has rented a
house which he shall occupy soon, and invites his sister Julia to come
to Belleville and make her home in his family.
In 1845, Benjamin Trumbull, Sr., sold his place in Colchester and
removed with his two daughters to Henrietta, Michigan, where three of
his sons were already settled as farmers. It appears from letters that
passed between the families that none of the brothers in Michigan kept
horses, the farm work being done by oxen exclusively. The nearest church
was in the town of Jackson, but the sisters were not able to attend the
services for want of a conveyance. They were prevented by the same
difficulty from forming acquaintances in their new habitat. In a letter
to his father, dated October 26, Trumbull delicately alludes to the
defect in the housekeeping arrangements in Michigan, and says that
anything needed to make his father and sisters comfortable and
contented, that he can supply, will never be withheld. His brother
George writes a few days later offering a contribution of fifty dollars
to buy a horse, saying that good ones can be bought in Illinois at that
price. George adds: "Our papers say considerable about running Lyman for
governor. No time is fixed for the convention yet, and I don't think he
has made up his mind whether to be a candidate or not."
The greatest drawback of the Trumbull family at this time, and, indeed,
of all the inhabitants roundabout, was sickness. Almost every letter
opened tells either of a recovery from a fever, or of sufferings during
a recent one, or apprehensions of a new one and from these harassing
visitations no one was exempt. In a letter of October 26 we read:
We have all been sick this fall and this whole region of
country has been more sickly than ever before known. George and
myself both had attacks of bilious fever early in September
which lasted about ten days. Since then Julia has had two
attacks, the last of which was quite severe and confined her to
the room nearly two weeks. I also have had a severe attack
about three weeks since, but it was slight. When I was sick we
sent over to St. Louis for Dr. Tiffany, and by some means the
news of our sending there, accompanied by a report that I was
much worse than was really the case, reached Springfield, and
Dr. and Mrs. Jayne came down post haste in about a day and a
half. When they got here, I was downstairs. They only staid
overnight and started back the next morning. They had heard
that I was not expected to live.
In February, 1846, when Trumbull was in his thirty-third year, his
friends presented his name to the Democratic State Convention for the
office of governor of the state. A letter to his father gives the
details of the balloting in the convention. Six candidates were voted
for. On the first ballot he received 56 votes; the next highest
candidate, Augustus C. French, had 47; and the third, John Calhoun, had
44. The historian, John Moses, says that "the choice, in accordance with
a line of precedents which seemed almost to indicate a settled policy,
fell upon him who had achieved least prominence as a party leader, and
whose record had been least conspicuous--Augustus C. French."
A letter from Trumbull to his father says that his defeat was due to the
influence of Governor Ford, whose first choice was Calhoun, but who
turned his following over to French in order to defeat Trumbull. French
was elected, and made a respectable governor. Calhoun subsequently went,
in an official capacity, to Kansas, where he became noted as the chief
ballot-box stuffer of the pro-slavery party in the exciting events of
1856-58.
A letter from Mrs. Trumbull to her father-in-law, May 4, 1846, mentions
the birth of a second son (Walter), then two and a half months old. It
informs him also that her husband has been nominated for Congress by the
Democrats of the First District, the vote in the convention being, Lyman
Trumbull, 24; John Dougherty, 5; Robert Smith, 8. The political issues
in this campaign are obscure, but the result of the election was again
adverse. The supporters of Robert Smith nominated him as a bolting
candidate; the Whigs made no nomination, but supported Smith, who was
elected.
A letter written by Mrs. Trumbull at Springfield, December 16, 1846,
mentions the first election of Stephen A. Douglas as United States
Senator. "A party is to be given in his name," she says, "at the State
House on Friday evening under the direction of Messrs. Webster and
Hickox. The tickets come in beautiful envelopes, and I understand that
Douglas has authorized the gentlemen to expend $50 in music, and
directed the most splendid entertainment that was ever prepared in
Springfield."
A letter to Benjamin Trumbull, Sr., from his son of the same name, who
was cultivating a small farm near Springfield, gives another glimpse of
the family health record, saying that "both Lyman and George have had
chills and fever two or three days this spring"; also, that "Lyman's
child was feeble in consequence of the same malady; and that he
[Benjamin] has been sick so much of the time that he could not do his
Spring planting without hired help, for which Lyman had generously
contributed $20, and offered more."
May 13, 1847, Trumbull writes to his father that he intends to go with
his family and make the latter a visit for the purpose of seeing the
members of the family in Michigan; also in the hope of escaping the
periodical sickness which has afflicted himself and wife and little boy,
and almost every one in Belleville, during several seasons past. As this
periodical sickness was chills and fever, we may assume that it was due
to the prevalence of mosquitoes, of the variety _anopheles_. Half a
century was still to pass ere medical science made this discovery, and
delivered civilized society from the scourge called "malaria."
The journey to Michigan was made. An account (dated Springfield, August
1, 1847) of the return journey is interesting by way of contrast with
the facilities for traveling existing at the present time.
We left Cassopolis Monday about ten o'clock and came the first
48 miles, which brought us to within five miles of La Porte.
The second night we passed at Battstown 45 miles on the road
from La Porte towards Joliet. The third night we passed at
Joliet, distance 40 miles. The fourth night we passed at
Pontiac, having traveled 60 miles to get to a stopping place,
and finding but a poor one at that. The fifth night we were at
Bloomington, distance 40 miles. The sixth day we traveled 43
miles and to within 18 miles of this place; the route we came
from Cassopolis to Springfield is 294 miles, and from Brother
David's about 386 miles. Our expenses for tavern bills from
David's to this place were $17.75. Pretty cheap, I think.
Among other items of interest it may be noted that the rate of postage
had been reduced to ten cents per letter, but stamps had not yet come
into use. The earnings of the Trumbull law firm (Lyman and George) for
the year 1847 were $2300.
In 1847, a new constitution was adopted by the state of Illinois which
reduced the number of judges of the supreme court from nine to three.
The state was divided into three grand divisions, or districts, each to
select one member of the court. After the first election one of the
judges was to serve three years, one six years, and one nine years, at a
compensation of $1200 per year each. These terms were to be decided by
lot, and thereafter the term of each judge should be nine years.
Trumbull was elected judge for the first or southern division in 1848.
His colleagues, chosen at the same time, were Samuel H. Treat and John
D. Caton. He drew the three years' term.
In the year 1849, Trumbull bought a brick house and three acres of
ground, with an orchard of fruit-bearing trees, in the town of Alton,
Madison County, and removed thither with his family. In announcing this
fact to his father the only reason he assigns for his change of
residence is that the inhabitants of Alton are mostly from the Eastern
States. Its population at that time was about 3000; that of Upper Alton,
three miles distant, was 1000. The cost of house and ground, with some
additions and improvements, was $2500, all of which was paid in cash out
of his savings. Incidentally he remarks that he has never borrowed
money, never been in debt, never signed a promissory note, and that he
hopes to pass through life without incurring pecuniary liabilities.[12]
From the tone of the letter in which his change of residence is
announced, the inference is drawn that Trumbull had abandoned his law
practice at Belleville with the expectation of remaining on the bench
for an indefinite period. He accepted a reëlection as judge in 1852 for
a term of nine years, yet he resigned a year and a half later because
the salary was insufficient to support his family. Walter B. Scates was
chosen as his successor on the supreme bench. Nearly forty-five years
later, Chief Justice Magruder, of the Illinois supreme court, answering
John M. Palmer's address presenting the memorial of the Chicago Bar
Association on the life and services of Trumbull, recently deceased,
said that no lawyer could read the opinions handed down by the dead
statesman when on the bench, "without being satisfied that the writer
of them was an able, industrious, and fair-minded judge. All his
judicial utterances ... are characterized by clearness of expression,
accuracy of statement, and strength of reasoning. They breathe a spirit
of reverence for the standard authorities and abound in copious
reference to those authorities.... The decisions of the court, when he
spoke as its organ, are to-day regarded as among the most reliable of
its established precedents."
FOOTNOTES:
[7] Stuart's _Life of Jonathan Trumbull_ says that the family name was
spelled "Trumble" until 1766, when the second syllable was changed to
"bull."
[8] Joseph, the second son of the John above mentioned, who had settled
in Suffield, Connecticut, in 1670, removed to Lebanon. He was the father
of Jonathan Trumbull (1710-1785), who was governor of Connecticut during
the Revolutionary War, and who was the original "Brother Jonathan," to
whom General Washington gave that endearing title, which afterwards came
to personify the United States as "John Bull" personifies England.
(Stuart's _Jonathan Trumbull_, p. 697.) His son Jonathan (1740-1809) was
a Representative in Congress, Speaker of the House, Senator of the
United States, and Governor of Connecticut. John Trumbull (1756-1843),
another son of "Brother Jonathan," was a distinguished painter of
historical scenes and of portraits.
[9] Reynolds wrote a _Pioneer History of Illinois from 1637 to 1818_,
and also a larger volume entitled _My Own Times_. The latter is the more
important of the two. Although crabbed in style, it is an admirable
compendium of the social, political, and personal affairs of Illinois
from 1800 to 1850. Taking events at random, in short chapters, without
connection, circumlocution, or ornament, he says the first thing that
comes into his mind in the fewest possible words, makes mistakes of
syntax, but never goes back to correct anything, puts down small things
and great, tells about murders and lynchings, about footraces in which
he took part, and a hundred other things that are usually omitted in
histories, but which throw light on man in the social state, all
interspersed with sound and shrewd judgments on public men and events.
[10] The following correspondence passed between them:
SPRINGFIELD, March 4, 1843.
LYMAN TRUMBULL, ESQ.,
DEAR SIR: It is my desire, in pursuance of the expressed wish of
the Democracy, to make a nomination of Secretary of State, and I
hope you will enable me to do so without embarrassing myself. I
am most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
THOMAS FORD.
SPRINGFIELD, March 4, 1843.
TO HIS EXCELLENCY, THOMAS FORD:
SIR,--In reply to your note of this date this moment handed me,
I have only to state that I recognize fully your right, at any
time, to make a nomination of Secretary of State.
Yours respectfully,
LYMAN TRUMBULL.
[11] _American Notes_, chap. XIII. The reason why horses were more
precious than human life was that when the frontier farmer lost his
work-team, he faced starvation. Both murder and horse-stealing were then
capital offenses, the latter by the court of Judge Lynch.
[12] Mr. Morris St. P. Thomas, a close friend of Trumbull in his latter
years, a member of his law office, and administrator of his estate, made
the following statement in an interview given at 107 Dearborn Street,
Chicago, June 13, 1910: "Judge Trumbull once told me that he had never
in his life given a promissory note. 'But you do not mean,' said I,
'that in every purchase of real estate you ever made you paid cash
down!' 'I do mean just that,' the Judge replied. 'I never in my life
gave a promissory note.'"
CHAPTER II
SLAVERY IN ILLINOIS
When the territory comprising the state of Illinois passed under control
of the United States, negro slavery existed in the French villages
situated on the so-called American Bottom, a strip of fertile land
extending along the east bank of the Mississippi River from Cahokia on
the north to Kaskaskia on the south, embracing the present counties of
St. Clair, Monroe, and Randolph. The first European settlements had been
made here about 1718, by colonists coming up the great river from
Louisiana, under the auspices of John Law's Company of the Indies.
The earlier occupation of the country by French explorers and Jesuit
priests from Canada had been in the nature of fur-trading and religious
propagandism, rather than permanent colonies, although marriages had
been solemnized in due form between French men and Indian women, and a
considerable number of half-breed children had been born. Five hundred
negro slaves from Santo Domingo were sent up the river in 1718, to work
any gold and silver mines that might be found in the Illinois country.
In fact, slavery of red men existed there to some extent, before the
Africans arrived, the slaves being captives taken in war.
In 1784-85, Thomas Jefferson induced Rev. James Lemen, of Harper's
Ferry, Virginia, to migrate to Illinois in order to organize opposition
to slavery in the Northwest Territory and supplied him with money for
that purpose. Mr. Lemen came to Illinois in 1786 and settled in what is
now Monroe County. He was the founder of the first eight Baptist
churches in Illinois, all of which were pledged to oppose the doctrine
and practice of slavery. Governor William H. Harrison having forwarded
petitions to Congress to allow slavery in the Northwest Territory,
Jefferson wrote to Lemen to go, or send an agent, to Indiana, to get
petitions signed in opposition to Harrison. Lemen did so. A letter of
Lemen, dated Harper's Ferry, December 11, 1782, says that Jefferson then
had the purpose to dedicate the Northwest Territory to freedom.[13]
In 1787, Congress passed an ordinance for the government of the
territory northwest of the river Ohio which had been ceded to the United
States by Virginia. The sixth article of this ordinance prohibited
slavery in said territory. Inasmuch as the rights of persons and
property had been guaranteed by treaties when this region had passed
from France to Great Britain and later to the United States, this
article was generally construed as meaning that no more slaves should be
introduced, and that all children born after the passage of the
ordinance should be free, but that slaves held there prior to 1787
should continue in bondage.
Immigration was mainly from the Southern States. Some of the immigrants
brought slaves with them, and the territorial legislature passed an act
in 1812 authorizing the relation of master and slave under other names.
It declared that it should be lawful for owners of negroes above fifteen
years of age to take them before the clerk of the court of common pleas,
and if a negro should agree to serve for a specified term of years, the
clerk should record him or her as an "indentured servant." If the negro
was under the age of fifteen, the owner might hold him without an
agreement till the age of thirty-five if male, or thirty-two if female.
Children born of negroes owing service by indenture should serve till
the age of thirty if male, and till twenty-eight if female. This was a
plain violation of the Ordinance of 1787 and was a glaring fraud in
other respects. The negroes generally did not understand what they were
agreeing to, and in cases where they did not agree the probable
alternative was a sale to somebody in an adjoining slave state, so that
they really had no choice. The state constitution, adopted in 1818,
prohibited slavery, but recognized the indenture system by providing
that male children born of indentured servants should be free at the age
of twenty-one and females at the age of eighteen. The upshot of the
matter was that there was just enough of the virus of slavery left to
keep the caldron bubbling there for two generations after 1787, although
the Congress of the Confederation supposed that they had then made an
end of it.
This arrangement did not satisfy either the incoming slave-owners or
those already domiciled there. Persistent attempts were made while the
country was still under territorial government, to procure from Congress
a repeal of the sixth article of the Ordinance, but they were defeated
chiefly by the opposition of John Randolph, of Roanoke, Virginia. After
the state was admitted to the Union, the pro-slavery faction renewed
their efforts. They insisted that Illinois had all the rights of the
other states, and could lawfully introduce slavery by changing the
constitution. They proposed, therefore, to call a new convention for
this purpose. To do so would require a two-thirds vote of both branches
of the legislature, and a majority vote of the people at the next
regular election. A bill for this purpose was passed in the Senate by
the requisite majority, but it lacked one vote in the House. To obtain
this vote a member who had been elected and confirmed in his seat after
a contest, and had occupied it for ten weeks, was unseated, and the
contestant previously rejected was put in his place and gave the
necessary vote. Reynolds, who was himself a convention man, says that
"this outrage was a death-blow to the convention." He continues:
The convention question gave rise to two years of the most
furious and boisterous excitement that ever was visited on
Illinois. Men, women, and children entered the arena of party
warfare and strife, and families and neighborhoods were so
divided and furious and bitter against one another that it
seemed a regular civil war might be the result. Many personal
combats were indulged in on the question, and the whole country
seemed to be, at times, ready and willing to resort to physical
force to decide the contest. All the means known to man to
convey ideas to one another were resorted to and practiced with
energy. The press teemed with publications on the subject. The
stump orators were invoked, and the pulpit thundered with
anathemas against the introduction of slavery. The religious
community coupled freedom and Christianity together, which was
one of the most powerful levers used in the contest.
At this time all the frontier communities were anxious to gain additions
to their population. Immigration was eagerly sought. The arrivals were
mostly from the Southern States, the main channels of communication
being the converging rivers Ohio, Mississippi, Cumberland, and
Tennessee. Many of these brought slaves, and since there was no security
for such property in Illinois, they went onward to Missouri. One of the
strongest arguments used by the convention party was, that if slavery
were permitted, this tide of immigration would pour a stream of wealth
into Illinois.
Most of the political leaders and office-holders were convention men,
but there were some notable exceptions, among whom were Edward Coles,
governor of the state, and Daniel P. Cook, Representative in Congress,
the former a native of Virginia, and the latter of Kentucky. Governor
Coles was one of the Virginia abolitionists of early days, who had
emancipated his own slaves and given them lands on which to earn their
living. The governor gave the entire salary of his term of office
($4000) for the expenses of the anti-convention contest, and his
unceasing personal efforts as a speaker and organizer. Mr. Cook was a
brilliant lawyer and orator, and the sole Representative of Illinois in
Congress, where he was chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, and
where he cast the vote of Illinois for J. Q. Adams for President in
1824. Cook County, which contains the city of Chicago, takes its name
from him. He was indefatigable on the side of freedom in this campaign.
Another powerful reinforcement was found in the person of Rev. John M.
Peck, a Baptist preacher who went through the state like John the
Baptist crying in the wilderness. He made impassioned speeches, formed
anti-slavery societies, distributed tracts, raised money, held
prayer-meetings, addressed Sunday Schools, and organized the religious
sentiment of the state for freedom. He was ably seconded by Hooper
Warren, editor of the Edwardsville _Spectator_. The election took place
August 2, 1824, and the vote was 4972 for the convention, and 6640
against it. In the counties of St. Clair and Randolph, which embraced
the bulk of the French population, the vote was almost equally
divided--765 for; 790 against.
In 1850, both Henry Clay and Daniel Webster contended that Nature had
interposed a law stronger than any law of Congress against the
introduction of slavery into the territory north of Texas which we had
lately acquired from Mexico. From the foregoing facts, however, it is
clear that no law of Nature prevented Illinois from becoming a
slaveholding state, but only the fiercest kind of political fighting and
internal resistance. John Reynolds (and there was no better judge) said
in 1854: "I never had any doubt that slavery would now exist in Illinois
if it had not been prevented by the famous Ordinance" of 1787. The law
of human greed would have overcome every other law, including that of
Congress, but for the magnificent work of Edward Coles, Daniel P. Cook,
John Mason Peck, Hooper Warren, and their coadjutors in 1824.
The snake was scotched, not killed, by this election. There were no more
attempts to legalize slavery by political agency, but persevering
efforts were made to perpetuate it by judicial decisions resting upon
old French law and the Territorial Indenture Act of 1812. Frequent law
suits were brought by negroes, who claimed the right of freedom on the
ground that their period of indenture had expired, or that they had
never signed an indenture, or that they had been born free, or that
their masters had brought them into Illinois after the state
constitution, which prohibited slavery, had been adopted. In this
litigation Trumbull was frequently engaged on the side of the colored
people.
In 1842, a colored woman named Sarah Borders, with three children, who
was held under the indenture law by one Andrew Borders in Randolph
County, escaped and made her way north as far as Peoria County. She and
her children were there arrested and confined in a jail as fugitive
slaves. They were brought before a justice of the peace, who decided
that they were illegally detained and were entitled to their freedom. An
appeal was taken by Borders to the county court, which reversed the
action of the justice. The case eventually went to the supreme court,
where Lyman Trumbull and Gustave Koerner appeared for the negro woman in
December, 1843, and argued that slavery was unlawful in Illinois and had
been so ever since the enactment of the Ordinance of 1787. The court
decided against them.[14]
Trumbull was not discouraged by the decision in this case. Shortly
afterward he appeared before the supreme court again in the case of
Jarrot _vs._ Jarrot, in which he won a victory which practically put an
end to slavery in the state. Joseph Jarrot, a negro, sued his mistress,
Julia Jarrot, for wages, alleging that he had been held in servitude
contrary to law. The plaintiff's grandmother had been the slave of a
Frenchman in the Illinois country before it passed under the
jurisdiction of the United States. His mother and himself had passed by
descent to Julia Jarrot, nobody objecting. Fifty-seven years had elapsed
since the passage of the Ordinance of 1787 and twenty-six since the
adoption of the state constitution, both of which had prohibited slavery
in Illinois. The previous decisions in the court of last resort had
generally sustained the claims of the owners of slaves held under the
French régime and their descendants, and also those held under the
so-called indenture system. Now, however, the court swept away the whole
basis of slavery in the state, of whatever kind or description,
declaring, as Trumbull had previously contended, that the Congress of
the Confederation had full power to pass the Ordinance of 1787, that no
person born since that date could be held as a slave in Illinois, and
that any slave brought into the state by his master, or with the
master's consent, since that date became at once free. It followed that
such persons could sue and recover wages for labor performed under
compulsion, as Joseph Jarrot did.
This decision, which abolished slavery in Illinois _de facto_, was
received with great satisfaction by the substantial and sober-minded
citizens. Although the number of aggressive anti-slavery men in the
state was small and of out-and-out abolitionists still smaller, there
was a widespread belief that the lingering snaky presence of the
institution was a menace to the public peace and a blot upon the fair
fame of the state, and that it ought to be expunged once for all. The
growth of public opinion was undoubtedly potent in the minds of the
judges, but the untiring activity of the leading advocates in the cases
of Borders, Jarrot, etc., should not be overlooked. On this subject Mr.
Dwight Harris, in the book already cited, says:
The period of greatest struggle and of greatest triumph for the
anti-slavery advocates was that from 1840 to 1845. The contest
during these five years was serious and stubbornly carried on.
It involved talent, ingenuity, determination, and perseverance
on both sides. The abolitionists are to be accredited with
stirring up considerable interest over the state in some of the
cases. Southern sympathizers and the holders of indentured
servants in the southern portion of the state were naturally
considerably concerned in the decisions of the supreme court.
Still there seems to have been no widespread interest or
universal agitation in the state over this contest in the
courts. It was carried on chiefly through the benevolence of a
comparatively small number of citizens who were actuated by a
firm belief in the evils of slavery; while the brunt of the
fray fell to a few able and devoted lawyers.
Among these were G. T. M. Davis, of Alton, Nathaniel Niles, of
Belleville, Gustave Koerner, of Belleville, and Lyman Trumbull.
James H. Collins, a noted abolition lawyer of Chicago, should
also be highly praised for his work in the Lovejoy and Willard
cases, but to the other men the real victory is to be ascribed.
They were the most powerful friends of the negro, and lived
where their assistance could be readily secured. They told the
negroes repeatedly that they were free, urged them to leave
their masters, and fought their cases in the lower courts time
and time again, often without fees or remuneration. Chief among
them was Lyman Trumbull, whose name should be written large in
anti-slavery annals.
He was a lawyer of rare intellectual endowments, and of great
ability. He had few equals before the bar in his day. In
politics he was an old-time Democrat, with no leanings toward
abolitionism, but possessing an honest desire to see justice
done the negro in Illinois. It was a thankless task, in those
days of prejudice and bitter partisan feelings, to assume the
rôle of defender of the indentured slaves. It was not often
unattended with great risk to one's person, as well as to one's
reputation and business. But Trumbull did not hesitate to
undertake the task, thankless, discouraging, unremunerative as
it was, and to his zeal, courage, and perseverance, as well as
to his ability, is to be ascribed the ultimate success of the
appeal to the supreme court.
This disinterested and able effort, made in all sincerity of
purpose, and void of all appearance of self-elevation, rendered
him justly popular throughout the State, as well as in the
region of his home. The people of his district showed their
approval of his work and their confidence in his integrity by
electing him judge of the supreme court in 1848, and
Congressman from the Eighth District of Illinois by a handsome
majority in 1854, when it was well known that he was opposed to
the Kansas-Nebraska Bill.
FOOTNOTES:
[13] These facts are detailed in a paper contributed to the Illinois
State Historical Society in 1908 by Joseph B. Lemen, of O'Fallon,
Illinois.
[14] _Negro Servitude in Illinois_, by N. Dwight Harris, p. 108.
CHAPTER III
FIRST ELECTION AS SENATOR
The repeal of the Missouri Compromise was the cause of Trumbull's return
to an active participation in politics. The prime mover in that
disastrous adventure was Stephen A. Douglas, who had been Trumbull's
predecessor in the office of secretary of state and also one of his
predecessors on the supreme bench. He was now a Senator of the United
States, and a man of world-wide celebrity. Born at Brandon, Vermont, in
1813, he had lost his father before he was a year old. His mother
removed with him to Canandaigua, New York, where he attended an academy
and read law to some extent in the office of a local practitioner. At
the age of twenty, he set out for the West to seek his fortune, and he
found the beginnings of it at Winchester, Illinois, where he taught
school for a living and continued to study law, as Trumbull was doing at
the same time at Greenville, Georgia. He was admitted to the bar in
1834. In 1835, he was elected state's attorney. Two years later he was
elected a member of the legislature by the Democrats of Morgan County,
and resigned the office he then held in order to take the new one. In
1837, he was appointed by President Van Buren register of the land
office at Springfield. In the same year he was nominated for Congress in
the Springfield district before he had reached the legal age, but was
defeated by the Whig candidate, John T. Stuart, by 35 votes in a total
poll of 36,742.[15] In 1840, he was appointed secretary of state, and
in 1841, elected a judge of the supreme court under the circumstances
already mentioned. In 1843, he was elected to the lower house of
Congress and was reëlected twice, but before taking his seat the third
time he was chosen by the legislature, in 1846, Senator of the United
States for the term beginning March 4, 1847, and was reëlected in 1852.
In Congress he had taken an active part in the annexation of Texas, in
the war with Mexico, in the Oregon Boundary dispute, and in the Land
Grant for the Illinois Central Railway. In the Senate he held the
position of Chairman of the Committee on Territories.
In the Democratic party he had forged to the front by virtue of boldness
in leadership, untiring industry, boundless ambition, and
self-confidence, and horse-power. He had a large head surmounted by an
abundant mane, which gave him the appearance of a lion prepared to roar
or to crush his prey, and not seldom the resemblance was confirmed when
he opened his mouth on the hustings or in the Senate Chamber. As stump
orator, senatorial debater, and party manager he never had a superior in
this country. Added to these gifts, he had a very attractive personality
and a wonderful gift for divining and anticipating the drift of public
opinion. The one thing lacking to make him a man "not for an age but for
all time," was a moral substratum. He was essentially an opportunist.
Although his private life was unstained, he had no conception of morals
in politics, and this defect was his undoing as a statesman.
On the 4th of January, 1854, Douglas reported from the Senate Committee
on Territories a bill to organize the territory of Nebraska. It
provided that said territory, or any portion of it, when admitted as a
state or states, should be received into the Union with or without
slavery, as their constitution might prescribe at the time of their
admission. The Missouri Compromise Act of 1820, which applied to this
territory, was not repealed by this provision, and it must have been
plain to everybody that if slavery were excluded from the _territory_ it
would not be there when the people should come together to form a
_state_.
Douglas did not at first propose to repeal the Missouri Compromise. He
intended to leave the question of slavery untouched. He did not want to
reopen the agitation, which had been mostly quieted by the Compromise of
1850; but it soon became evident that if he were willing to leave the
question in doubt, others were not. Dixon, of Kentucky, successor of
Henry Clay in the Senate and a Whig in politics, offered an amendment to
the bill proposing to repeal the Missouri Compromise outright. Douglas
was rather startled when this motion was made. He went to Dixon's seat
and begged him to withdraw his amendment, urging that it would reopen
the controversies settled by the Compromise of 1850 and delay, if not
prevent, the passage of any bill to organize the new territory. Dixon
was stubborn. He contended that the Southern people had a right to go
into the new territory equally with those of the North, and to take with
them anything that was recognized and protected as property in the
Southern States. Dixon's motion received immediate and warm support in
the South.
Two or three days later, Douglas decided to embody Dixon's amendment in
his bill and take the consequences. His amended bill divided the
territory in two parts, Kansas and Nebraska. The apparent object of
this change was to give the Missourians a chance to make the
southernmost one a slave state; but this intention has been controverted
by Douglas's friends in recent years, who have brought forward a mass of
evidence to show that he had other sufficient reasons for thus dividing
the territory and hence that it must not be assumed that he intended
that one of them should be a slave state. The evidence consists of a
record of efforts put forth by citizens of western Iowa in 1853-54 to
secure a future state on the opposite side of the Missouri River
homogeneous with themselves, and to promote the building of a Pacific
railway from some point near Council Bluffs along the line of the Platte
River. These efforts were heartily seconded by Senators Dodge and Jones
and Representative Henn, of Iowa. They labored with Douglas and secured
his coöperation. So Douglas himself said when he announced the change in
the bill dividing the territory into two parts.
Most people at the present day, including myself, would be glad to
concur with this view, but we must interpret Douglas's acts not merely
by what he said in 1854, but also by what he said and did afterwards. In
1856 he made an unjustifiable assault upon the New England Emigrant Aid
Company, for sending settlers to Kansas, as they had a perfect right to
do under the terms of the bill; and he apologized for, if he did not
actually defend, the Missourian invaders who marched over the border in
military array, took possession of the ballot boxes, elected a
pro-slavery legislature, and then marched back boasting of their
victory. Troubles multiplied in Douglas's pathway rapidly after he
introduced his Nebraska Bill, and it is very likely that an equal
division of the territory between the North and South seemed to him the
safest way out of his difficulties. That was the customary way of
settling disputes of this kind. We need not assume, however, that he
intended to do more than give the Missourians a chance to make Kansas a
slave state if they could, for Douglas was not a pro-slavery man at
heart.
Senator Thompson, of Kentucky, once alluded to the division of the
territory embraced in the original Nebraska Bill into two territories,
Kansas and Nebraska, showing that his understanding was that one should
be a free state and the other a slave state, if the South could make it
such. He said:
When the bill was first introduced in 1854 it provided for the
organization of but one territory. Whence it came or how it
came scarcely anybody knows, but the senator from Illinois (Mr.
Douglas) has always had the credit of its paternity. I believe
he acted patriotically for what he thought best and right. In a
short time, however, we found a provision for a division--for
two territories--Nebraska, the larger one, to be a free state,
and as to Kansas, the smaller one, repealing the Missouri
Compromise, we of the South taking our chance for it. That was
certainly a beneficial arrangement to the North and the bill
was passed in that way.[16]
What were Douglas's reasons for repealing the Missouri Compromise? It
was generally assumed that he did it in order to gain the support of the
South in the next national convention of the Democratic party. In the
absence of any other sufficient motive, this will probably be the
verdict of posterity, although he always repelled that charge with heat
and indignation. A more important question is whether there would have
been any attempt to repeal it if Douglas had not led the way. This may
be safely answered in the negative. The Southern Senators did not show
any haste to follow Douglas at first. They generally spoke of the
measure as a free-will offering of the North, both Douglas and Pierce
being Northern men, and both being indispensable to secure its passage.
Francis P. Blair, of Missouri, a competent witness, expressed the
opinion that a majority of the Southern senators were opposed to the
measure at first and were coerced into it by the fear that they would
not be sustained at home if they refused an advantage offered to them by
the North.[17]
The Nebraska Bill passed the Senate by a majority of 22, and the House
by a majority of 13. The Democratic party of the North was cleft in
twain, as was shown by the division of their votes in the House: 44 to
43. The bill would have been defeated had not the administration plied
the party lash unmercifully, using the official patronage to coerce
unwilling members. In this way did President Pierce redeem his pledge to
prevent any revival of the slavery agitation during his term of office.
When the bill actually passed there was an explosion in every Northern
State. The old parties were rent asunder and a new one began to
crystallize around the nucleus which had supported Birney, Van Buren,
and Hale in the elections of 1844, 1848, and 1852. Both Abraham Lincoln
and Lyman Trumbull were stirred to new activities. Both took the stump
in opposition to the Nebraska Bill.
Trumbull was now forty-one years of age. He had gained the confidence of
the people among whom he lived to such a degree that his reëlection to
the supreme bench in 1852 had been unanimous. He now joined with Gustave
Koerner and other Democrats in organizing the Eighth Congressional
District in opposition to Douglas and his Nebraska Bill. Although this
district had been originally a slaveholding region, it contained a large
infusion of German immigration, which had poured into it in the years
following the European uprising of 1848. Of the thirty thousand Germans
in Illinois in 1850, Reynolds estimated that fully eighteen thousand had
settled in St. Clair County. These immigrants had at first attached
themselves to the Democratic party, because its name signified
government by the people. When, however, it became apparent to them that
the Democratic party was the ally of slavery, they went over to the
opposition in shoals, under the lead of Koerner and Hecker. Koerner was
at that time lieutenant-governor of the state, and his separation from
the party which had elected him made a profound impression on his fellow
countrymen. Hecker was a fervid orator and political leader, and later a
valiant soldier in the Union army.
The Eighth Congressional District then embraced the counties of Bond,
Clinton, Jefferson, Madison, Marion, Monroe, Randolph, St. Clair, and
Washington. It was the strongest Democratic district in the state, but
political parties had been thrown into such disorder by the Nebraska
Bill that no regular nominations for Congress were made by either Whigs
or Democrats. Trumbull announced himself as an anti-Nebraska Democratic
candidate. He had just recovered from the most severe and protracted
illness of his life and was in an enfeebled condition in consequence,
but he made a speaking campaign throughout the district, and was elected
by 7917 votes against 5306 cast for Philip B. Fouke, who ran
independently as a Douglas Democrat. This victory defeated so many of
the followers of Douglas who were candidates for the legislature that it
became possible to elect a Senator of the United States in opposition to
the regular Democracy.
If political honors were awarded according to the rules of _quantum
meruit_, Abraham Lincoln would have been chosen Senator as the successor
of James Shields at this juncture, since he had contributed more than
any other person to the anti-Nebraska victory in the state. He had been
out of public life since his retirement from the lower house of Congress
in 1848. Since then he had been a country lawyer with a not very
lucrative practice, but a very popular story-teller. He belonged to the
Whig party, and had followed Clay and Webster in supporting the
Compromise measures of 1850, including the new Fugitive Slave Law, for,
although a hater of slavery himself, he believed that the Constitution
required the rendition of slaves escaping into the free states. He was
startled by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. Without that
awakening, he would doubtless have remained in comparative obscurity. He
would have continued riding the circuit in central Illinois, making a
scanty living as a lawyer, entertaining tavern loungers with funny
stories, and would have passed away unhonored and unsung. He was now
aroused to new activity, and when Douglas came to Springfield at the
beginning of October to defend his Nebraska Bill on the hustings,
Lincoln replied to him in a great speech, one of the world's
masterpieces of argumentative power and moral grandeur, which left
Douglas's edifice of "Popular Sovereignty" a heap of ruins. This was the
first speech made by him that gave a true measure of his qualities. It
was the first public occasion that laid a strong hold upon his
conscience and stirred the depths of his nature. It was also the first
speech of his that the writer of this book, then twenty years of age,
ever listened to. The impression made by it has lost nothing by the
lapse of time. In Lincoln's complete writings it is styled the Peoria
speech of October 16, 1854, as it was delivered at Peoria, after the
Springfield debate, and subsequently written out by Lincoln himself for
publication in the _Sangamon Journal_. The Peoria speech contained a few
passages of rejoinder to Douglas's reply to his Springfield speech. In
other respects they were the same.[18]
It was this speech that drew upon Lincoln the eyes of the scattered
elements of opposition to Douglas. These elements were heterogeneous and
in part discordant. The dividing line between Whigs and Democrats still
ran through every county in the state, but there was a third element,
unorganized as yet, known as "Free-Soilers," who traced their lineage
back to James G. Birney and the campaign of 1844. These were numerous
and active in the northern counties, but south of the latitude of
Springfield they dwindled away rapidly. The Free-Soilers served as a
nucleus for the crystallization of the Republican party two years later,
but in 1854 the older organizations, although much demoralized, were
still unbroken. Probably three fourths of the Whigs were opposed to the
Nebraska Bill in principle, and half of the remainder were glad to avail
themselves of any rift in the Democratic party to get possession of the
offices. There was still a substantial fraction of the party, however,
which feared any taint of abolitionism and was likely to side with
Douglas in the new alignment.
The legislature consisted of one hundred members--twenty-five senators
and seventy-five representatives. Twelve of the senators had been
elected in 1852 for a four years' term, and thirteen were elected in
1854. Among the former were N. B. Judd, of Chicago, John M. Palmer, of
Carlinville, and Burton C. Cook, of Ottawa, three Democrats who had
early declared their opposition to the Nebraska Bill. The full Senate
was composed of nine Whigs, thirteen regular Democrats, and three
anti-Nebraska Democrats. A fourth holding-over senator (Osgood,
Democrat) represented a district which had given an anti-Nebraska
majority in this election. One of the Whig members (J. L. D. Morrison)
of St. Clair County was elected simultaneously with Trumbull, but he was
a man of Southern affiliations and his vote on the senatorial question
was doubtful.
At this time there was no law compelling the two branches of a state
legislature to unite in an election to fill a vacancy in the Senate of
the United States. Accordingly, when one party controlled one branch of
the legislature and the opposite party controlled the other, it was not
uncommon for the minority to refuse to go into joint convention. This
was the case now. In order to secure a joint meeting, it was necessary
for at least one Democrat to vote with the anti-Nebraska members. Mr.
Osgood did so.
In the House were forty-six anti-Nebraska men of all descriptions and
twenty-eight Democrats. One member, Randolph Heath, of the Lawrence and
Crawford District, did not vote in the election for Senator at any time.
Two members from Madison County, Henry L. Baker and G. T. Allen, had
been elected on the anti-Nebraska ticket with Trumbull.
In the chaotic condition of parties it was not to be expected that all
the opponents of Douglas would coalesce at once. The Whig party was held
together by the hope of reaping large gains from the division of the
Democrats on the Nebraska Bill. This was a vain hope, because the Whigs
were divided also; but while it existed it fanned the flame of old
enmities. Moreover, the anti-Nebraska Democrats in the campaign had
claimed that they were the true Democracy and that they were purifying
the party in order to preserve and strengthen it. They could not
instantly abandon that claim by voting for a Whig for the highest office
to be filled.
The two houses met in the Hall of Representatives on February 8, 1855,
to choose a Senator. Every inch of space on the floor and lobby was
occupied by members and their political friends, and the gallery was
adorned by well-dressed women, including Mrs. Lincoln and Mrs. Matteson,
the governor's wife, and her fair daughters. The senatorial election had
been the topic of chief concern throughout the state for many months,
and now the interest was centred in a single room not more than one
hundred feet square. The excitement was intense, for everybody knew the
event was fraught with consequences of great pith and moment, far
transcending the fate of any individual.
Mr. Lincoln had been designated as the choice of a caucus of about
forty-five members, including all the Whigs and most of the
Free-Soilers, with their leader, Rev. Owen Lovejoy, brother of the Alton
martyr.
When the joint convention had been called to order, General James
Shields was nominated by Senator Benjamin Graham, Abraham Lincoln by
Representative Stephen T. Logan, and Lyman Trumbull by Senator John M.
Palmer. The first vote resulted as follows:
Lincoln 45
Shields 41
Trumbull 5
Scattering 8
--
Total 99
Several members of the House who had been elected as anti-Nebraska
Democrats voted for Lincoln and a few for Shields. The vote for Trumbull
consisted of Senators Palmer, Judd, and Cook and Representatives Baker
and Allen.
On the second vote, Lincoln had 43 and Trumbull 6, and there were no
other changes. A third roll-call resulted like the second. Thereupon
Judge Logan moved an adjournment, but this was voted down by 42 to 56.
On the fourth call, Lincoln's vote fell to 38 and Trumbull's rose to 11.
On the sixth, Lincoln lost two more, and Trumbull dropped to 8.
It now became apparent by the commotion on the Democratic side of the
chamber that a flank movement was taking place. There had been a rumor
on the streets that if the reëlection of Shields was found to be
impossible, the Democrats would change to Governor Matteson, under the
belief that since he had never committed himself to the Nebraska Bill he
would be able, by reason of personal and social attachments, to win the
votes of several anti-Nebraska Democrats who had not voted for Shields.
This scheme was developed on the seventh call, which resulted as
follows:
Matteson 44
Lincoln 38
Trumbull 9
Scattering 7
--
Total 98
On the eighth call, Matteson gained two votes, Lincoln fell to 27, and
Trumbull received 18. On the ninth and tenth, Matteson had 47, Lincoln
dropped to 15, and Trumbull rose to 35.
The excitement deepened, for it was believed that the next vote would be
decisive. Matteson wanted only three of a majority, and the only way to
prevent it was to turn Lincoln's fifteen to Trumbull, or Trumbull's
thirty-five to Lincoln. Obviously the former was the only safe move, for
none of Lincoln's men would go to Matteson in any kind of shuffle,
whereas three of Trumbull's men might easily be lost if an attempt were
made to transfer them to the Whig leader. Lincoln was the first to see
the imminent danger and the first to apply the remedy. In fact he was
the only one who could have done so, since the fifteen supporters who
still clung to him would never have left him except at his own request.
He now besought his friends to vote for Trumbull. Some natural tears
were shed by Judge Logan when he yielded to the appeal. He said that the
demands of principle were superior to those of personal attachment, and
he transferred his vote to Trumbull. All of the remaining fourteen
followed his example, and there was a gain of one vote that had been
previously cast for Archibald Williams. So the tenth and final
roll-call gave Trumbull fifty-one votes, and Matteson forty-seven. One
member still voted for Williams and one did not vote at all. Thus the
one hundred members of the joint convention were accounted for, and
Trumbull became Senator by a majority of one.
This result astounded the Democrats. They were more disappointed by it
than they would have been by the election of Lincoln. They regarded
Trumbull as an arch traitor. That he and his fellow traitors Palmer,
Judd, and Cook should have carried off the great prize was an unexpected
dose; but they did not know how bitter it was until Trumbull took his
seat in the Senate and opened fire on the Nebraska Bill.
Lincoln took his defeat in good part. Later in the evening there was a
reception given at the house of Mr. Ninian Edwards, whose wife was a
sister of Mrs. Lincoln. He had been much interested in Lincoln's success
and was greatly surprised to hear, just before the guests began to
arrive, that Trumbull had been elected. He and his family were easily
reconciled to the result, however, since Mrs. Trumbull had been from
girlhood a favorite among them. When she and Trumbull arrived, they were
naturally the centre of attraction. Mr. and Mrs. Lincoln came in a
little later. The hostess and her daughters greeted them most cordially,
saying that they had wished for his success, and that while he must be
disappointed, yet he should bear in mind that his principles had won.
Mr. Lincoln smiled, moved toward the newly elected Senator, and saying,
"Not _too_ disappointed to congratulate my friend Trumbull," warmly
shook his hand.
Lincoln's account of this election, in a letter to Hon. E. B. Washburne,
concludes by saying:
I regret my defeat moderately, but I am not nervous about it.
I could have headed off every combination and been elected had
it not been for Matteson's double game--and his defeat now
gives me more pleasure than my own gives me pain. On the whole,
it was perhaps as well for our general cause that Trumbull is
elected. The Nebraska men confess that they hate it worse than
anything that could have happened. It is a great consolation to
see them worse whipped than I am. I tell them it is their own
fault--that they had abundant opportunity to choose between him
and me, which they declined, and instead forced it on me to
decide between him and Matteson.
There is no evidence that Trumbull took any steps whatever to secure his
own election in this contest.[19]
If Lincoln had been chosen at this time, his campaign against Douglas
for the Senate in 1858 would not have taken place. Consequently he would
not have been the cynosure of all eyes in that spectacular contest. It
was Douglas's prestige and prowess that drew him into the limelight at
that important juncture, and made his nomination as President possible
in 1860.
FOOTNOTES:
[15] The Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society for October,
1912, contains an autobiography of Stephen A. Douglas, of fifteen pages,
dated September, 1838, which was recently found in his own handwriting
by his son, Hon. Robert M. Douglas, of North Carolina. It terminates
just before his first campaign for Congress.
[16] _Cong. Globe_, July, 1856, Appendix, p. 712.
[17] Letter to the _Missouri Democrat_, dated March 1, 1856, quoted in
P. Ormon Ray's _Repeal of the Missouri Compromise_, p. 232.
[18] Some testimony as to the effect produced upon Douglas himself by
this speech was supplied to me long afterwards from a trustworthy
quarter in the following letter:--
NEW YORK, Dec. 7, 1908.
MY DEAR MR. WHITE:
In 1891, at his office in Chicago, Mr. W. C. Gowdy told me that
Judge Douglas spent the night with him at his house preceding
his debate with Mr. Lincoln; that after the evening meal Judge
Douglas exhibited considerable restlessness, pacing back and
forth upon the floor of the room, evidently with mental
preoccupation. The attitude of Judge Douglas was so unusual that
Mr. Gowdy felt impelled to address him, and said: "Judge
Douglas, you appear to be ill at ease and under some mental
agitation; it cannot be that you have any anxiety with reference
to the outcome of the debate you are to have with Mr. Lincoln;
you cannot have any doubt of your ability to dispose of him."
Whereupon Judge Douglas, stopping abruptly, turned to Mr. Gowdy
and said, with great emphasis: "Yes, Gowdy, I am troubled over
the progress and outcome of this debate. I have known Lincoln
for many years, and I have continually met him in debate. I
regard him as the most difficult and dangerous opponent that I
have ever met and I have serious misgivings as to what may be
the result of this joint debate."
These in substance, and almost in exact phraseology, are the
words repeated to me by Mr. Gowdy. Faithfully yours,
FRANCIS LYNDE STETSON.
Mr. Gowdy was a state senator in 1854 and his home was at or near
Peoria. There was no joint debate between Lincoln and Douglas at or near
Gowdy's residence, except that of 1854.
[19] The following manuscript, written by one of Lincoln's supporters
who was himself a member of the legislature, was found among the papers
of William H. Herndon:
"In the contest for the United States Senate in the winter of
1854-55 in the Illinois Legislature, nearly all the Whigs and
some of the '_anti-Nebraska Democrats_' preferred Mr. Lincoln to
any other man. Some of them (and myself among the number) had
been candidates and had been elected by the people for the
express purpose of doing all in their power for his election,
and a great deal of their time during the session was taken up,
both in caucus and out of it, in laboring to unite the
anti-Nebraska party on their favorite, but there was from the
first, as the result proved, an insuperable obstacle to their
success. Four of the anti-Nebraska Democrats had been elected in
part by Democrats, and they not only personally preferred Mr.
Trumbull, but considered his election necessary to consolidate
the union between all those who were opposed to repeal of the
Missouri Compromise and to the new policy upon the subject of
slavery which Mr. Douglas and his friends were laboring so hard
to inaugurate. They insisted that the election of Mr. Trumbull
to the Senate would secure thousands of Democratic votes to the
anti-Nebraska party who would be driven off by the election of
Mr. Lincoln--that the Whig party were nearly a unit in
opposition to Mr. Douglas, so that the election of the favorite
candidate of the majority would give no particular strength in
that quarter, and they manifested a fixed purpose to vote
steadily for Mr. Trumbull and not at all for Mr. Lincoln, and
thus compel the friends of Mr. Lincoln to vote for their man to
prevent the election of Governor Matteson, who, as was
ascertained, could, after the first few ballots, carry enough
anti-Nebraska men to elect him. These four men were Judd, of
Cook, Palmer, of Macoupin, Cook, of LaSalle, and Baker, of
Madison. Allen, of Madison, went with them, but was not
inflexible, and would have voted for Lincoln cheerfully, but did
not want to separate from his Democratic friends. These men kept
aloof from the caucus of both parties during the winter. They
would not act with the Democrats from principle, and would not
act with the Whigs from policy.
"When the election came off, it was evident, after the first two
or three ballots, that Mr. Lincoln could not be elected, and it
was feared that if the balloting continued long, Governor
Matteson would be elected. Mr. Lincoln then advised his friends
to vote for Mr. Trumbull; they did so, and elected him.
"Mr. Lincoln was very much disappointed, for I think that at
that time it was the height of his ambition to get into the
United States Senate. He manifested, however, no bitterness
towards Mr. Judd or the other anti-Nebraska Democrats, by whom
practically he was beaten, but evidently thought that their
motives were right. _He told me several times afterwards that
the election of Trumbull was the best thing that could have
happened._
"There was a great deal of dissatisfaction throughout the state
at the result of the election. The Whigs constituted a vast
majority of the anti-Nebraska party. They thought they were
entitled to the Senator and that Mr. Lincoln by his contest with
Mr. Douglas had caused the victory. Mr. Lincoln, however,
generously exonerated Mr. Trumbull and his friends from all
blame in the matter. Trumbull's first encounter with Douglas in
the Senate filled the people of Illinois with admiration for his
abilities, and the ill-feeling caused by his election gradually
faded away.
"SAM C. PARKS."
CHAPTER IV
THE KANSAS WAR
Trumbull took his seat in the Senate at the first session of the
Thirty-fourth Congress, December 3, 1855. His credentials were presented
by Senator Crittenden, of Kentucky. Senator Cass, of Michigan, presented
a protest from certain members of the legislature of Illinois reciting
that the constitution of that state made the judges of the supreme and
circuit courts ineligible to any other office in the state, or in the
United States, during the terms for which they were elected and one year
thereafter; affirming that Trumbull was elected judge of the supreme
court June 7, 1852, for the term of nine years and entered upon the
duties of that office June 24, 1852; that the said term of office would
not expire until 1861; and that, therefore, he was not legally elected a
Senator of the United States. The papers were eventually referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary, but in the mean time Trumbull was sworn in.
Before the question of reference was disposed of, however, Senator
Seward contended that no state could fix or define the qualifications of
a Senator of the United States. He instanced the case of N. P.
Tallmadge, who had been elected a Senator from New York while serving as
a member of the legislature of that state, although the constitution of
New York disqualified him and all other members from such election.
Tallmadge was nevertheless admitted to the Senate and served his full
term. Trumbull's right to his seat was decided in accordance with that
precedent by a vote of 35 to 8, on the 5th of March, 1856. Senator
Douglas did not vote on this question, nor did he take part in the
argument on it.
The subject of burning interest in Congress was the condition of affairs
in Kansas Territory. When the bill repealing the Missouri Compromise was
pending, the opinion had been generally expressed by its supporters that
slavery never would or could go into that region. Several Southern
Senators and most of the Northern Democrats had held this view. Hunter,
of Virginia, considered it utterly hopeless to expect that either Kansas
or Nebraska would ever be a slaveholding state. Badger, of North
Carolina, said that he had no more idea of seeing a slave population in
either of them than he had of seeing it in Massachusetts. Dixon, of
Kentucky, held a similar view. Nor is there any reason to doubt the
sincerity of these men. Apparently the only Southern Senator who then
cherished a different belief was Atchison, of Missouri, whose home was
on the border of Kansas and whose opinions were based upon personal
knowledge and backed by self-interest.
President Pierce appointed Andrew H. Reeder, of Pennsylvania, governor
of Kansas Territory. Reeder was not unwilling to coöperate with the
South in establishing slavery in an orderly way, but was quite
unprepared for the tactics which had been planned by others to expedite
his movements. He called an election for a delegate in Congress to be
held on the 29th of November, 1854. An organized army of Missourians
marched over the Kansas border, seized the polling-places, and cast 1749
fraudulent votes for a pro-slavery man named Whitfield. This was a
gratuitous and unnecessary act of violence, since the bona-fide settlers
from Missouri outnumbered the Free State men and the latter were, as
yet, unorganized and unprepared. Governor Reeder confirmed the election
and thus gave encouragement to the invaders for their next attempt.
A few immigrants had already gone into the territory from the New
England States, moved by the desire of bettering their condition in
life. Some of them had been assisted by the Emigrant Aid Company of
Worcester, Massachusetts, a society started by Eli Thayer for the
purpose of furnishing capital, by loans, to such persons for traveling
expenses and for the building of hotels, sawmills, private dwellings,
etc. These settlers from the East were as little prepared as Reeder
himself for the sudden swoop of Missourians, and although they wrote
letters to Northern Congressmen and newspapers protesting against the
election of Whitfield as an act of invasion and a barefaced fraud,
nothing was done to prevent him from taking his seat.
The next election (for members of the territorial legislature) was fixed
for the 30th of March, 1855. What kind of preparations for it had been
made in the mean time in Missouri was plainly indicated by the following
letter, dated Brunswick, Missouri, April 20, 1855, published in the New
York _Herald_:
From five to seven thousand men started from Missouri to attend
the election, some to remove, but most to return to their
families with an intention, if they liked the territory, to
make it their permanent home at the earliest moment
practicable. But they intended to vote. The Missourians were
many of them Douglas men. There were one hundred and fifty
voters from this county, one hundred and seventy-five from
Howard, one hundred from Cooper. Indeed, every county furnished
its quota, and when they set out it looked like an army. They
were armed. And as there were no houses in the territory they
carried tents. Their mission was a peaceable one--to vote, and
to drive down stakes for their future homes.
After the election some 1500 of the voters sent a committee to
Mr. Reeder to ascertain if it was his purpose to ratify the
election. He answered that it was, and said that the majority
at an election must carry the day. But it is not to be denied
that the 1500, apprehending that the governor might attempt to
play the tyrant, since his conduct had already been insidious
and unjust, wore on their hats bunches of hemp. They were
resolved, if a tyrant attempted to trample on the rights of the
sovereign people, to hang him.
It was not conscious brigandage that prompted this movement, but the
simplicity of minds tutored on the frontier and fashioned in the
environment of slavery. The fifteen hundred Missourians, who gave
Governor Reeder to understand that they would hang him on the nearest
tree if he did not ratify their invasion of Kansas, had homes, farms,
and families. They supported churches and schools of a certain kind and
considered themselves qualified to civilize Africans. They were types of
the best society that they had any conception of. Far from concealing
anything that they had done, they boasted of it openly in their
newspaper organ, the _Squatter Sovereign_, which published the following
under the date of April 1:
INDEPENDENCE, MO., March 31, 1855.--Several hundred emigrants
from Kansas have just entered our city. They were preceded by
the Westport and Independence brass bands. They came in at the
west side of the public square and proceeded entirely around
it, the bands cheering us with fine music, and the emigrants
with good news. Immediately following the bands were about two
hundred horsemen in regular order. Following these were one
hundred and fifty wagons, carriages, etc. They gave repeated
cheers for Kansas and Missouri. They report that not an
anti-slavery man will be in the Legislature of Kansas. We have
made a clean sweep.[20]
This invasion was as needless as the former one, since the Free State
men were still in the minority, counting actual settlers only; but the
pro-slavery party were determined to leave nothing to chance. Senator
Atchison, in a speech at Weston, Missouri, on the 9th of November, 1854,
had told his constituents how to secure the prize:
When you reside in one day's journey of the territory, and when
your peace, your quiet, and your property depend upon your
action, you can, without an exertion, send five hundred of your
young men who will vote in favor of your institution. Should
each county in the state of Missouri only do its duty, the
question will be decided quietly and peaceably at the
ballot-box. If you are defeated, then Missouri and the other
Southern States will have shown themselves to be recreant to
their interests, and will deserve their fate.[21]
A little later we find him writing letters like the following to a
friend in Atlanta, Georgia:
Let your young men come forth to Missouri and Kansas. Let them
come well armed, with money enough to support them for twelve
months and determined to see this thing out! I do not see how
we are to avoid a civil war;--come it will. Twelve months will
not elapse before war--civil war of the fiercest kind--will be
upon us. We are arming and preparing for it.
Atchison was constantly spurring others to deeds of lawlessness and
violence, but he always stopped short of committing any himself. He was
probably restrained by the fear of losing influence at Washington. It
was by no means certain that President Pierce would tolerate everything.
The sad fate of one of the companies recruited in the South for
immigration to Kansas is narrated in the following letter, addressed to
Senator Trumbull by John C. Underwood, of Culpeper Court House,
Virginia:
Soon after the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in 1854, in
the neighborhood of Winchester and Harper's Ferry the project
of sending a company of young men to Kansas to make it a slave
state was much agitated. Subscriptions for that purpose were
asked, and the duty of strengthening our sectional interest of
slavery by adding two friendly Senators to your honorable body,
was urged with great zeal upon my neighbors. This was long
before I had heard of any movement of the New England Aid Co.,
or of anybody on the part of freedom. It was my understanding
at the time that Senator Mason was the main adviser in the
project. This may not have been the case. The history of this
company will not be soon forgotten. Its taking the train on the
Baltimore and Ohio R. R. at Harper's Ferry, its exploits in
Kansas up to the fall of its leader (Sharrard) at the hands of
Jones, the friend of the Democratic Gov. Geary, are all still
well remembered. The return of the company with the dead body
of their leader, and the blasted hopes of its sanguine
originators, was a gloomy day in our beautiful valley, and
created a sensation throughout the country.
Another letter among the Trumbull papers deserves a place here, the
author of which was Isaac T. Dement, who (writing from Hudson, Illinois,
January 10, 1857) says that he was living in Kansas the previous year
and had filed his intention on one hundred and sixty acres of land where
he had a small store and a dwelling-house:
On the 3d of September last [he continues] a band of armed men
from Missouri came to my place, and after taking what they
wanted from the store, burned it and the house, and said that
if they could find me they would hang me. They said that they
had broken open a post-office and found a letter that I wrote
to Lane and Brown asking them to come and help us with a
company of Sharpe's rifles (this is a lie); and also that I had
furnished Lane and Brown's men with provisions (a lie), and
that I was a Free State man (that is so).
Mr. Dement hoped that Congress would do something to compensate him for
his losses.
Governor Reeder ought to have been prepared for the second invasion. He
had had sufficient warning. Unless he was ready to go all lengths with
Atchison and Stringfellow, he ought to have declared the entire election
invalid and reported the facts to President Pierce. But he did nothing
of the kind. He merely rejected the votes of seven election districts
where the most notorious frauds had been committed, and declared "duly
elected" the persons voted for in others. Eventually the members holding
certificates organized as a legislature and admitted the seven who had
been rejected by Reeder. The latter took an early opportunity to go to
Washington City to make a report to the President in person. He stopped
en route at his home in Easton, Pennsylvania, where he made a public
speech exposing the frauds in the election and confirming the reports of
the Free State settlers. Stringfellow warned him not to come back. In
the _Squatter Sovereign_ of May 29, 1855, he said:
From reports received of Reeder he never intends returning to
our borders. Should he do so we, without hesitation, say that
our people ought to hang him by the neck like a traitorous dog,
as he is, so soon as he puts his unhallowed feet upon our
shores. Vindicate your characters and the territory; and should
the ungrateful dog dare to come among us again, hang him to the
first rotten tree. A military force to protect the ballot-box!
Let President Pierce or Governor Reeder, or any other power,
attempt such a course in this, or any portion of the Union, and
that day will never be forgotten.
The "Border Ruffian" legislature proceeded to enact the entire slave
code of Missouri as laws of Kansas. It was made a criminal offense for
anybody to deny that slavery existed in Kansas, or to print anything, or
to introduce any printed matter, making such denial. Nobody could hold
any office, even that of notary public, who should make such denial. The
crime of enticing any slave to leave his master was made punishable with
death, or imprisonment for ten years. That of advising slaves, by
speaking, writing, or printing, to rebel, was punishable with death.
Reeder was removed from office by President Pierce on the 15th of
August, and Wilson Shannon, a former governor of Ohio, was appointed as
his successor.
The Free State men held a convention at Topeka in October, 1855, and
framed a state constitution, to be submitted to a popular vote, looking
to admission to the Union. This was equivalent merely to a petition to
Congress, but it was stigmatized as an act of rebellion by the
pro-slavery party.
On the 24th of January, 1856, President Pierce sent a special message to
Congress on the subject of the disturbance in Kansas. He alluded to the
"angry accusations that illegal votes had been polled," and to the
"imputations of fraud and violence"; but he relied upon the fact that
the governor had admitted some members and rejected others and that each
legislative assembly had undoubted authority to determine, in the last
resort, the election and qualification of its own members. Thus a
principle intended to apply to a few exceptional cases of dispute was
stretched to cover a case where all the seats had been obtained by fraud
and usurpation. "For all present purposes," he added feebly, the
"legislative body thus constituted and elected was the legitimate
assembly of the Territory."
This message was referred to the Senate Committee on Territories. On the
12th of March, Senator Douglas submitted a report from the committee,
and Senator Collamer, of Vermont, submitted a minority report. This was
the occasion of the first passage-at-arms between Douglas and his new
colleague. The report was not merely a general endorsement of President
Pierce's contention that it was impossible to go behind the returns of
the Kansas election, as certified by Governor Reeder, but it went much
further in the same direction, putting all the blame for the disorders
on the New England Emigrant Aid Company, and practically justifying the
Missourians as a people "protecting their own firesides from the
apprehended horrors of servile insurrection and intestine war."
Logically, from Douglas's new standpoint, the New Englanders had no
right to settle in Kansas at all, if they had the purpose to make it a
free state. To this complexion had the doctrine of "popular sovereignty"
come in the short space of two years.
Two days after the presentation of this report, Mr. Trumbull made a
three hours' speech upon it without other preparation than a perusal of
it in a newspaper; it had not yet been printed by the Senate. This
speech was a part of one of the most exciting debates in the annals of
Congress. He began with a calm but searching review of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, dwelling first on the failure of the measure to fix
any time when the people of a territory should exercise the right of
deciding whether they would have slavery or not. He illustrated his
point by citing some resolutions adopted by a handful of squatters in
Kansas as early as September, 1854, many months before any legislature
had been organized or elected, in which it was declared that the
squatters aforesaid "would exercise the right of expelling from the
territory, or otherwise punishing any individual, or individuals, who
may come among us and by act, conspiracy, or other illegal means, entice
away our slaves or clandestinely attempt in any way or form to affect
our rights of property in the same." These resolutions were passed
before any persons had arrived under the auspices, or by the aid, of the
New England Emigrant Aid Company; showing that, so far from being
aroused to violence by the threatening attitude of that organization,
the Missourians were giving notice beforehand that violence would be
used upon any intending settlers who might be opposed to the
introduction of slavery.
Douglas had wonderful skill in introducing sophisms into a discussion so
deftly that his opponent would not be likely to notice them, or would
think them not worth answering, and then enlarging upon them and leading
the debate away upon a false scent, thus convincing the hearers that, as
his opponent was weak in this particular, he was probably weak
everywhere. It was Trumbull's forte that he never failed to detect these
tricks and turns and never neglected them, but exposed them instantly,
before proceeding on the main line of his argument. It was this faculty
that made his coming into the Senate a welcome reinforcement to the
Republican side of the chamber.
The report under consideration abounded in these characteristic Douglas
pitfalls. It said, for example:
Although the act of incorporation [of the Emigrant Aid Company]
does not distinctly declare that it was formed for the purpose
of controlling the domestic institutions of Kansas and forcing
it into the Union with a prohibition of slavery in her
constitution, _regardless of the rights and wishes of the
people as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States
and secured by their organic law_, yet the whole history of the
movement, the circumstances in which it had its origin, and the
professions and avowals of all engaged in it rendered it
certain and undeniable that such was its object.
Here was a double sophistry: First, the implication that, if the
Emigrant Aid Company had boldly avowed that its purpose was to control
the domestic institutions of Kansas and bring it into the Union as a
free state, its heinousness would have been plain to all; second, that
the Constitution of the United States, and the organic act of the
territory itself, guaranteed the people against such an outrage. But the
declared object of the Nebraska Bill was to allow the people to do this
very thing by a majority vote. Mr. Trumbull brought his flail down upon
this pair of sophisms with resounding force. In debate with Senator
Hale, a few days earlier, Toombs, of Georgia, had had the manliness to
say:
With reference to that portion of the Senator's argument
justifying the Emigrant Aid Societies,--whatever may be their
policy, whatever may be the tendency of that policy to produce
strife,--if they simply aid emigrants from Massachusetts to go
to Kansas and to become citizens of that territory, I am
prepared to say that they violate no law; and they had a right
to do it; and every attempt to prevent them from doing so
violated the law and ought not to be sustained.[22]
By way of justifying the Border Ruffians the report said that when the
emigrants from New England were going through Missouri, the violence of
their language and behavior excited apprehensions that their object was
to "abolitionize Kansas as a means of prosecuting a relentless warfare
on the institution of slavery within the limits of Missouri."
What! [said Trumbull,] abolitionize Kansas! It was said on all
sides of the Senate Chamber (when the Nebraska bill was
pending) that it was never meant to have slavery go into
Kansas. What is meant, then, by abolitionizing Kansas? Is it
abolitionizing a territory already free, and which was never
meant to be anything but free, for Free State men to settle in
it? I cannot understand the force of such language. But they
were to abolitionize Kansas, according to this report, and for
what purpose? As a means for prosecuting a relentless warfare
on the institution of slavery within the limits of Missouri.
Where is the evidence of such a design? I would like to see it.
It is not in this report, and if it exists I will go as far as
the gentleman to put it down. I will neither tolerate nor
countenance by my action here or elsewhere any society which
is resorting to means for prosecuting a relentless warfare upon
the institution of slavery within the limits of Missouri or any
other state. But there is not a particle of evidence of any
such intention in the document which professes to set forth the
acts of the Emigrant Aid Society, and which is incorporated in
this report.[23]
Trumbull next took up the contention of the report that since Governor
Reeder had recognized the usurping legislature, he and all other
governmental authorities were estopped from inquiring into its validity.
No great effort of a trained legal mind was required to overthrow that
pretension. Trumbull demolished it thoroughly. After giving a calm and
lucid sketch of the existing condition of affairs in the territory,
Trumbull brought his speech to a conclusion. It fills six pages of the
_Congressional Globe_.[24]
This was the prelude to a hot debate with Douglas, who immediately took
the floor. Trumbull had remarked in the course of his speech that the
only political party with which he had ever had any affiliations was the
Democratic. Douglas said that he should make a reply to his colleague's
speech as soon as it should be printed in the _Globe_, but that he
wished to take notice now of the statement that Trumbull claimed to be
a Democrat. This, he said, would be considered by every Democrat in
Illinois as a libel upon the party.
Senator Crittenden called Douglas to order for using the word "libel,"
which he said was unparliamentary, being equivalent to the word "lie."
Douglas insisted that he had not imputed untruth to his colleague, but
had only said that all the Democrats in Illinois would impute it to him
when they should read his speech. He then went into a general tirade
about "Black Republicans," "Know-Nothings," and "Abolitionists," who, he
said, had joined in making Trumbull a Senator, from which it was evident
that he was one of the same tribe, and not a Democrat. So far as the
people of Illinois were concerned, he said that his colleague did not
dare to go before them and take his chances in a general election, for
he (Douglas) had met him at Salem, Marion County, in the summer of 1855,
and had told him in the presence of thousands of people that, differing
as they did, they ought not both to represent the State at the same
time. Therefore, he proposed that they should both sign a paper
resigning their seats and appeal to the people, "and if I did not beat
him now with his Know-Nothingism, Abolitionism, and all other isms by a
majority of twenty thousand votes, he should take the seat without the
trouble of a contest."
Neither Trumbull nor Douglas was gifted with the sense of humor, but
Trumbull turned the laugh on his antagonist by his comments on the
coolness of the proposal that both Senators should resign their seats,
which Governor Matteson would have the right to fill immediately, and
which the people could in no event fill by a majority vote, since the
people did not elect Senators under our system of government. The reason
why he did not answer the challenge at Salem was that his colleague did
not stay to hear the answer. After he had finished his speech it was
very convenient for him to be absent. "He cut immediately for his tavern
without waiting to hear me." Trumbull denominated the challenge "a bald
clap-trap declamation and nothing else."
Douglas's charges about Know-Nothings and Abolitionists were well
calculated to make an impression in southern Illinois; hence Trumbull
did not choose to let them go unanswered. His reply was pitched upon a
higher plane, however, than his antagonist's tirade. He said:
In my part of the state there are no Know-Nothing organizations
of whose members I have any knowledge. If they exist, they
exist secretly. There are no open avowed ones among us. These
general charges, as to matters of opinion, amount to but very
little. It is altogether probable that the gentleman and myself
will differ in opinion not only upon this slavery question, but
also as to the sentiments of the people of Illinois. The views
which I entertain are honest ones; they are the sincere
sentiments of my heart. I will not say that the views which he
entertains in reference to those matters are not equally
honest. I impute no such thing as insincerity to any Senator.
Claiming for myself to be honest and sincere, I am willing to
award to others the same sincerity that I claim for myself. As
to what views other men in Illinois may entertain we may
honestly differ. The views of the members of the legislature
may be ascertained from their votes on resolutions before them.
I do not know how to ascertain them in any other way. As for
Abolitionists I do not know one in our state--one who wishes to
interfere with slavery in the states. I have not the
acquaintance of any of that class. There are thousands who
oppose the breaking-down of a compromise set up by our fathers
to prevent the extension of slavery, and I know that the
gentleman himself once uttered on this floor the sentiment that
he did not know a man who wished to extend slavery to a free
territory.
Douglas replied at length to Trumbull on the 20th of March, in his most
slippery and misleading style. If it were possible to admire the kind
of argument which makes the worse appear the better reason, this speech
would take high rank. It may be worth while to give a single sample.
Trumbull had said that in his opinion the words of the Missouri
Compromise, prohibiting slavery in certain territories "forever," meant
until the territory should be admitted into the Union as a state on
terms of equality with the other states. Douglas seized upon this as a
fatal admission, and asked why, if "forever" meant only a few years,
Trumbull and all his allies had been abusing him for repealing the
sacred compact.
If so [he continued], what is meant by all the leaders of that
great party, of which he (Trumbull) has become so prominent a
member, when they charge me with violating a solemn compact--a
compact which they say consecrated that territory to freedom
forever? _They_ say it was a compact binding forever. _He_ says
that it was an unfounded assumption, for it was only a law
which would become void without even being repealed; it was a
mere legislative enactment like any other territorial law, and
the word "forever" meant no more than the word
"hereafter"--that it would expire by its own limitation. If
this assumption be true, it necessarily follows that what he
calls the Missouri Compromise was no compact--was not a
contract--not even a compromise, the repeal of which would
involve a breach of faith.[25]
And he continued, ringing the changes on this alleged inconsistency
through two entire columns of the _Globe_, as though a compact could not
be made respecting a territory as well as for a state, and ignoring the
fact that if slaves were prevented from coming into the territory, the
material for forming a slave state would not exist when the people
should apply for admission to the Union. If the word "forever" had, as
Trumbull believed, applied only to the territory, it nevertheless
answered all practical purposes forever, by moulding the future state,
as the potter moulds the clay.[26]
The remainder of Douglas's speech was founded upon the doings of
Governor Reeder, whom he first used to buttress and sustain the bogus
legislature in its acts, and then turned upon and rent in pitiable
fragments, calling him "your Governor," as though the Republicans and
not their opponents had appointed him.
June 9, 1856, the two Senators drifted into debate on the Kansas
question again, and Trumbull put to Douglas the question which Lincoln
put to him with such momentous consequences in the Freeport debate two
years later: whether the people of a territory could lawfully exclude
slavery prior to the formation of a state constitution. Trumbull said
that the Democratic party was not harmonious on this point. He had heard
Brown, of Mississippi, argue on the floor of the Senate that slavery
could not be excluded from the territories, while in the formative
condition, by the territorial legislature, and he had heard Cass, of
Michigan, maintain exactly the opposite doctrine. He would like to know
what his colleague's views were upon that point:
My colleague [he said] has no sort of difficulty in deciding
the constitutional question as to the right of the people of a
territory, when they form their constitution, to establish or
prohibit slavery. Now will he tell me whether they have the
right _before_ they form a state constitution?[27]
Douglas did not answer this interrogatory. He insisted that it was
purely a judicial question, and that he and all good Democrats were in
harmony and would sustain the decision of the highest tribunal when it
should be rendered. The Dred Scott case was pending in the Supreme
Court, but that fact was not mentioned in the debate. The right of the
people of a territory to exclude slavery before arriving at statehood
was already the crux of the political situation, but its significance
was not generally perceived at that time. That Trumbull had grasped the
fact was shown by his concluding remarks in this debate, to wit:
My colleague says that the persons with whom he is acting are
perfectly agreed on the questions at issue. Why, sir, all of
them in the South say that they have a right to take their
slaves into a territory and to hold them there as such, while
all in the North deny it. If that is an agreement, then I do
not know what Bedlam would be.
Bedlam came at Charleston four years later. It is worthy of remark that
in this debate Douglas held that a negro could bring an action for
personal freedom in a territory and have it presented to the Supreme
Court of the United States for decision. In the Dred Scott case,
subsequently decided, the court held that a negro could not bring an
action in a court of the United States.
The Senate debate on Kansas affairs in the first session of the
Thirty-fourth Congress was participated in by nearly all the members of
the body. The best speech on the Republican side was made by Seward.
This was a carefully prepared, farseeing philosophical oration, in which
the South was warned that the stars in their courses were fighting
against slavery and that the institution took a step toward perdition
when it appealed to lawless violence. Sumner's speech, which in its
consequences became more celebrated, was sophomorical and vituperative
and was not calculated to help the cause that its author espoused; but
the assault made upon him by Preston S. Brooks maddened the North and
drew attention away from its defects of taste and judgment. Collamer, of
Vermont, made a notable speech in addition to his notable minority
report from the Committee on Territories. Wilson, of Massachusetts, and
Hale, of New Hampshire, received well-earned plaudits for the
thoroughness with which they exposed the frauds and violence of the
Border Ruffians, and commented on the vacillation and stammering of
President Pierce. That Trumbull had the advantage of his wily antagonist
must be the conclusion of impartial readers at the present day.
If a newcomer in the Senate to-day should plunge _in medias res_ and
deliver a three-hours' speech as soon as he could get the floor, he
would probably be made aware of the opinion of his elders that he had
been over-hasty. It was not so in the exciting times of the decade
before the Civil War. All help was eagerly welcomed. Moreover,
Trumbull's constituents would not have tolerated any delay on his part
in getting into the thickest of the fight. Any signs of hanging back
would have been construed as timidity. The anti-Nebraska Democrats of
Illinois required early proof that their Senator was not afraid of the
Little Giant, but was his match at cut-and-thrust debate as well as his
superior in dignity and moral power. The North rang with the praises of
Trumbull, and some persons, whose admiration of Lincoln was unbounded
and unchangeable, were heard to say that perhaps Providence had selected
the right man for Senator from Illinois. Although Lincoln's personality
was more magnetic, Trumbull's intellect was more alert, his diction the
more incisive, and his temper was the more combative of the two.
From a mass of letters and newspapers commending Mr. Trumbull on his
first appearance on the floor of the Senate, a few are selected for
notice.
The New York _Tribune_, March 15, 1856, Washington letter signed "H.
G.," p. 4, col. 5:
Mr. Trumbull's review of Senator Douglas's pro-slavery Kansas
report is hailed with enthusiasm, as calculated to do honor to
the palmiest days of the Senate. Though three hours long, it
commanded full galleries, and the most fixed attention to the
close. It was searching as well as able, and was at once
dignified and convincing.
When Mr. Trumbull closed, Mr. Douglas rose, in bad temper, to
complain that the attack had been commenced in his absence, and
to ask the Senate to fix a day for his reply. He said Mr.
Trumbull had claimed to be a Democrat; but that claim would be
considered a libel by the Democracy of Illinois. Here Mr.
Crittenden rose to a question of order, and a most exciting
passage ensued; the flash of the Kentuckian's eye and the
sternness of his bearing were such as are rarely seen in the
Senate.
The New York _Daily Times_, Washington letter, dated June 9:
Douglas was much disconcerted to-day by Senator Trumbull's keen
exposure of his Nebraska sophism. He was directly asked if he
believed that the people of the territories have the right to
exclude slavery before forming a state government, but he
refused to give his opinion, saying that it was a question to
be determined by the Supreme Court. Trumbull then exposed with
great force Douglas's equivocal platform of popular
sovereignty, which means one thing at the South and another at
the North. The "Little Giant" was fairly smoked out.
Charles Sumner writes to E. L. Pierce, March 21:
Trumbull is a hero, and more than a match for Douglas.
Illinois, in sending him, has done much to make me forget that
she sent Douglas. You will read the main speech which is able;
but you can hardly appreciate the ready courage and power with
which he grappled with his colleague and throttled him. We are
all proud of his work.
S. P. Chase, Executive Office, Columbus, Ohio, April 14, 1856, writes:
I have read your speech with great interest. It was
timely--exactly at the right moment and its logic and statement
are irresistible. How I rejoice that Illinois has sent you to
the Senate.
John Johnson, Mount Vernon, Illinois, writes:
I wish I could express the pleasure that I and many other of
your friends feel when we remember that we have such a man as
yourself in Congress, who loves liberty and truth and is not
ashamed or afraid to speak. Let me say that I thank the Ruler
of the Universe that we have got such a man into the Senate of
the United States.... Your influence will tell on the interests
of the nation in years to come.
John H. Bryant, Princeton, writes:
The expectations of those who elected Mr. Trumbull to the
Senate have been fully met by his course in that body, those of
Democratic antecedents being satisfied and the Whigs very
happily disappointed. For Mr. Lincoln the people have great
respect, and great confidence in his ability and integrity.
Still the feeling here is that you have filled the place at
this particular time better than he could have done.[28]
At this time Trumbull received a letter from one of the Ohio River
counties which, by reason of the singularity of its contents as well as
of the subsequent distinction of the writer, merits preservation:
Green B. Raum, Golconda, Pope Co., Feb. 9, '57, wishes Trumbull
to find out why he cannot get his pay for taking depositions at
the instance of the Secretary of the Interior in a lawsuit
involving the freedom of sixty negroes legally manumitted, but
still held in slavery in Crawford County, Arkansas. The
witnesses whose depositions were taken were living in Pope Co.,
Ill. Raum advanced $43.25 for witness fees and costs and was
engaged one month in the work, for which he charged $300. This
was done in May, 1855, but he had never been paid even the
amount that he advanced out of his own pocket.[29]
In April, 1857, Trumbull received an urgent appeal from Cyrus Aldrich,
George A. Nourse, and others in Minnesota asking him to come to that
territory and make speeches for one month to help the Republicans carry
the convention which had been called to frame a state constitution. He
responded to this call and took an active part in the campaign, which
resulted favorably to the Republican party.
FOOTNOTES:
[20] Edited by B. F. Stringfellow, author of _African Slavery no Evil_,
St. Louis, 1854.
[21] Cited in Villard's _John Brown_, p. 94.
[22] _Cong. Globe_, Appendix, 1856. p. 118.
[23] The writer of this book was intimately acquainted with the doings
of the Emigrant Aid Societies of the country, having been connected with
the National Kansas Committee at Chicago. The emigrants usually went up
the Missouri River by rail from St. Louis to Jefferson City and thence
by steamboat to Kansas City, Wyandotte, or Leavenworth. They were
cautioned to conceal as much as possible their identity and destination,
in order to avoid trouble. Such caution was not necessary, however,
since the emigrants knew that their own success depended largely upon
keeping that avenue of approach to Kansas open. Later, in the summer of
1856, it was closed, not in consequence of any threatening language or
action on the part of the emigrants, but because the Border Ruffians
were determined to cut off reinforcements to the Free State men in
Kansas. The tide of travel then took the road through Iowa and Nebraska,
a longer, more circuitous, and more expensive route.
[24] Appendix, p. 200.
[25] _Cong. Globe_, 34th Congress, Appendix, p. 281.
[26] In this debate Clayton, of Delaware, contended that the word
"forever" was meant to apply to any future political body, whether
territory or state, occupying the ground embraced in the defined limits.
Hence he considered the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, but he had
opposed the Nebraska Bill because he was not willing to reopen the
slavery agitation. _Cong. Globe_, 34th Congress, Appendix, p. 777.
[27] _Cong. Globe_, 1856, p. 1371.
[28] John H. Bryant, a man of large influence in central Illinois,
brother of William Cullen Bryant.
[29] Green B. Raum, Lawyer, Democrat, brigadier-general in the Union
army in the Civil War.
CHAPTER V
THE LECOMPTON FIGHT
In June, 1856, Lincoln wrote to Trumbull urging him to attend the
Republican National Convention which had been called to meet in
Philadelphia to nominate candidates for President and Vice-President and
suggesting that he labor for the nomination of a conservative man for
President. Trumbull went accordingly and coöperated with N. B. Judd,
Leonard Swett, William B. Archer, and other delegates from Illinois in
the proceedings which led up to the futile nominations of Frémont and
Dayton. The only part of these proceedings which interests us now is the
fact that Abraham Lincoln, who was not a candidate for any place,
received one hundred and ten votes for Vice-President. This result was
brought about by Mr. William B. Archer, an Illinois Congressman, who
conceived the idea of proposing his name only a short time before the
voting began, and secured the coöperation of Mr. Allison, of
Pennsylvania, to nominate him. Archer wrote to Lincoln that if this
bright idea had occurred to him a little earlier he could have obtained
a majority of the convention for him. When the news first reached
Lincoln at Urbana, Illinois, where he was attending court, he thought
that the one hundred and ten votes were cast for Mr. Lincoln, of
Massachusetts.
He wrote to Trumbull on the 27th saying, "It would have been easier for
us, I think, had we got McLean" (instead of Frémont), but he was not
without high hopes of carrying the state. He was confident of electing
Bissell for governor at all events. In August, Lincoln wrote again
saying that he had just returned from a speaking tour in Edgar, Coles,
and Shelby counties, and that he had found the chief embarrassment in
the way of Republican success was the Fillmore ticket. "The great
difficulty," he says, "with anti-slavery-extension Fillmore men is that
they suppose Fillmore as good as Frémont on that question; and it is a
delicate point to argue them out of it, they are so ready to think you
are abusing Mr. Fillmore." The Fillmore vote in Illinois was 37,444.
The Republican state ticket, headed by William H. Bissell for governor,
was elected, but Buchanan and Breckinridge, the Democratic nominees,
received the electoral vote of the state and were successful in the
country at large. The defeat of Frémont caused intense disappointment to
the Republicans at the time, but it was fortunate for the party and for
the country that he was beaten. He was not the man to deal with the
grave crisis impending. Disunion was a club already held in reserve to
greet any Republican President. Senator Mason, of Virginia, frankly said
so to Trumbull in a Senate debate (December 2, 1856), after the
election:
MR. MASON: What I said was this, that if that [Republican]
party came into power avowing the purpose that it did avow, it
would necessarily result in the dissolution of the Union,
whether they desired it or not. It was utterly immaterial who
was their President; he might have been a man of straw. I
allude to the purposes of the party.
MR. TRUMBULL: Why, sir, neither Colonel Frémont nor any other
person can be elected President of the United States except in
the constitutional mode, and if any individual is elected in
the mode prescribed in the Constitution, is that cause for
dissolution of the Union? Assuredly not. If it be, the
Constitution contains within itself the elements of its own
destruction.[30]
Four years passed ere Mr. Mason's prediction was put to the test, and
the intervening time was mainly occupied by a continuation of the Kansas
strife. The prevailing gloom in the Northern mind was reflected in a
letter written by Trumbull to Professor J. B. Turner, of Jacksonville,
Illinois, dated Alton, October 19, 1857, from which the following is an
extract:
Our free institutions are undergoing a fearful trial, nothing
less, as I can conceive, than a struggle with those now in
power, who are attempting to subvert the very basis upon which
they rest. Things are now being done in the name of the
Constitution which the framers of that instrument took special
pains to guard against, and which they did provide against as
plainly as human language could do it. The recent use of the
army in Kansas, to say nothing of the complicity of the
administration with the frauds and outrages which have been
committed in that territory, presents as clear a case of
usurpation as could well be imagined. Whether the people can be
waked up to the change which their government is undergoing in
time to prevent it, is the question. I believe they can. I will
not believe that the free people of this great country will
quietly suffer their government, established for the protection
of life and liberty, to be changed into a slaveholding
oligarchy whose chief object is the spread and perpetuation of
negro slavery and the degradation of free white labor.
Soon after the inauguration of Buchanan, Robert J. Walker, of
Mississippi, was appointed by him governor of Kansas Territory. Walker
was a native of Pennsylvania and a man of good repute. He had been
Secretary of the Treasury under President Polk, and was the author of
the Tariff of 1846. When he arrived in Kansas steps had already been
taken by the territorial legislature for electing members of a
constitutional convention with a view to admission to the Union as a
state. Governor Walker urged the Free State men to participate in this
election, promising them fair treatment and an honest count of votes;
but they still feared treachery and violence and fraud in the election
returns. Moreover, voters were required to take a test oath that they
would support the Constitution as framed. As Walker had assured them
that the Constitution would be submitted to a vote of the people, they
decided to take no part in framing it, but to vote it down when it
should be submitted.
The convention met in the territorial capital, Lecompton. While it was
in session a regular election of members of the territorial legislature
took place, and Governor Walker had so far won the confidence of the
Free State men that they took part in it and elected a majority of the
members of both branches. About one month later news came that the
constitutional convention had completed its labors and had decided not
to submit the constitution itself to a vote of the people, but only the
slavery clause. People could vote "For the constitution with slavery,"
or "For the constitution with no slavery," but in no case should the
right of property in slaves already in the territory be questioned, nor
should the constitution itself be amended until 1864, and no amendment
should be made affecting the rights of property in such slaves.
Senator Douglas was in Chicago when this news arrived. He at once
declared to his friends that this scheme had its origin in Buchanan's
Cabinet. Governor James W. Geary, Walker's predecessor in office, had
vetoed the bill calling the convention, because it contained no clause
requiring submission of the constitution to the people; but it had been
passed over his veto. He subsequently said, in a published letter, that
the committees of the legislature having the matter in charge informed
him that their friends in the South did not desire a submission clause.
It was proved later that a conspiracy with this aim existed in
Buchanan's Cabinet without his knowledge, and that the guiding spirit
was Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior. The chief
manager in Kansas was John Calhoun, the president of the convention, who
had been designated also as the canvassing officer of the election
returns under the submission clause.
Buchanan was not admitted to the secret of the conspiracy until the deed
was done. He had committed himself both verbally and in writing to the
submission of the whole constitution to the people for ratification or
rejection. He had pledged himself in this behalf to Governor Walker, who
had pledged himself to the people of Kansas. Walker kept his pledge, but
Buchanan broke his. He surrendered to the Cabinet cabal and made the
admission of Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution the policy of his
administration. It proved to be his ruin, as an earlier breach of
promise had been the ruin of Pierce.
Walker exposed and denounced the whole conspiracy and resigned the
governorship, the duties of which devolved upon F. P. Stanton, the
secretary of the territory, a man of ability and integrity, who had been
a member of Congress from Tennessee. Stanton called the legislature in
special session. The legislature declared for a clause for or against
the constitution as a whole, to be voted on at an election to be held
January 4, 1858. Stanton was forthwith removed from office by Buchanan,
and John A. Denver was appointed governor to fill Walker's place.
The stand taken by Douglas in reference to the Lecompton Constitution
before the meeting of Congress, and the doubts and fears excited thereby
in the minds of the leading Republicans of Illinois, are indicated in
private letters received by Trumbull in that interval, a few of which
are here cited:
E. Peck, Chicago, November 23, 1857, says: Judge Douglas takes the
ground openly that the _whole_ of the Kansas constitution must be
submitted to the people for approval.
C. H. Ray, chief editor of the Chicago _Tribune_, writes that Douglas is
just starting for Washington; he says that he sent a man to the
_Tribune_ office to remonstrate against its course toward him "while he
is doing what we all want him to do." Dr. Ray had no faith in him.
N. B. Judd, Chicago, November 24, says that Douglas took pains to get
leading Republicans into his room to tell them that he intended to fight
the administration on the Kansas issue.
Judd, November 26, writes that Douglas tells his friends that "the whole
proceedings in Kansas were concocted by certain members of the Cabinet
to ruin him." He does not think that the President desires this, but he
cannot well help himself, and the conspirators intend to use Buchanan's
name again (for the Presidency).
Lincoln wrote under date, Chicago, Nov. 30, 1857: ... What think you of
the probable "rumpus" among the Democracy over the Kansas constitution?
I think the Republicans should stand clear of it. In their view both the
President and Douglas are wrong; and they should not espouse the cause
of either because they may consider the other a little farther wrong of
the two. From what I am told here, Douglas tried before leaving to draw
off some Republicans on the dodge, and even succeeded in making some
impression on one or two.
A. Jonas, Quincy, December 5, is unable to say whether Douglas is
sincere in the position he has lately taken. "Should he act right for
once on this question, it will be with some selfish motive."
William H. Bissell, governor, Springfield, December 12, thinks Douglas's
course is dictated solely by his fears connected with the next
senatorial election.
S. A. Hurlbut, Belvidere, December 14, thinks that as between Douglas
and the Southern politicians the latter have the advantage in point of
logic. "If the Lecompton Constitution prevails, no amount of party
discipline will hold more than one third of the Democratic voters in
Illinois." He predicts that the next Democratic National Convention will
endorse John C. Calhoun's doctrine that slavery exists in the
territories by virtue of the Constitution.
Sam Galloway, Columbus, Ohio, December 12, asks: "What means the
movement of Douglas? Is it a ruse or a bona-fide patriotic effort? We
don't know whether to commend or censure, and we are without any
knowledge of the workings of his heart except as indicated in his
speeches."
W. H. Herndon, Springfield, December 16, says: "Douglas is more of a man
than I took him to be. He has some nerve at least. I do not think he is
honest in any particular, yet in this difficulty he is right."
C. H. Ray, Chicago, December 18, asks for Trumbull's views of Douglas's
real purposes: "We are almost confounded here by his anomalous position
and do not know how to treat him and his overtures to the Republican
party. Personally, I am inclined to give him the lash, but I want to do
nothing that will damage our cause or hinder the emancipation of
Kansas."
John G. Nicolay, Springfield, December 20, has been canvassing the state
to procure subscribers for the St. Louis _Democrat_. He had very good
success until the "hard times" came. Then he found it necessary to
suspend operations. He says everybody is watching the political
developments in Washington, and he thinks that Douglas will be sustained
by nearly all his party in Illinois. "The Federal office-holders keep
mum and will not of course declare themselves until they are forced to
do so."
Samuel C. Parks, Lincoln, Logan County, December 26, says: Douglas is no
better now than when he was the undisputed leader of the pro-slavery
party. He has done more to undermine the principles upon which this
Government was founded than any other man that ever lived.
D. L. Phillips, Anna, Union County, March 2, 1858: "You need not pay any
attention to the silly statements of the _Missouri Republican_ and other
sheets respecting this part of the state being attached to Buchanan. It
is simply false. The Democracy here are led by the Allens, Marshall,
Logan, Parrish, Kuykendall, Simons, and others, and these are all for
Douglas. John Logan is bitter against Buchanan. I think we ought all to
be satisfied with the course of things. Let the worst come now. Better
far than defer it, for come it will and must."
The first session of the Thirty-fifth Congress began on the 7th of
December, 1857. President Buchanan's first message was largely concerned
with the affairs of Kansas. He spoke of the framers of the Topeka
Constitution as a "revolutionary organization," and said that the
Lecompton Constitution was the work of the lawfully constituted
authorities. He conceded that the submission clause of the Lecompton
instrument fell short of his own intentions and expectations, but
insisted that the slavery question was the only matter of dispute and
that that was actually submitted to the popular vote.
Trumbull was the first Senator to expose these unfounded assumptions,
and this he did in a brief argument as soon as the reading of the
message was finished. He showed, in the first place, that the Topeka
Constitution was no whit more "revolutionary" or irregular than the
Lecompton one, and one of the authorities whom he cited to sustain his
contention was Buchanan himself, who, in a parallel case, had contended
that the territorial legislature of Michigan had no authority to call a
convention to frame a state constitution, and that any such proceeding
was "an act of usurpation." This was not necessarily conclusive as to
anybody but Buchanan. Yet in another case cited, that of Arkansas, where
a territorial legislature was considering an act for the calling of a
convention to frame a state constitution and where the governor had
asked instructions from President Jackson as to his duty in the
premises, the Attorney-General had held that such an act of the
Legislature would be without authority and absolutely void. (This case
had been cited by Douglas the previous year, in an argument against the
Topeka Constitution.) The only regular proceeding was for Congress to
pass an enabling act, on such terms and conditions as it might
prescribe, under which the people might form a constitution preparatory
to admission to the Union. Any other mode of accomplishing the same
result, whether initiated by a popular assembly, as at Topeka, or by the
legislature, as at Lecompton, was in the nature of a petition which
Congress might respond to favorably, and thus legalize, or not. Neither
of these modes of beginning had any higher authority than the other.
Therefore, the underpinning of President Buchanan's first argument was
knocked out by two citations of authority which he could not controvert.
His second argument, that the slavery clause in the Lecompton
Constitution, the only thing in controversy, was submitted to the
popular vote, was easily demolished. The submission clause, said Mr.
Trumbull, "amounts simply to giving the free white people of Kansas a
right to determine the condition of a few negroes hereafter to be
brought into the state, and nothing more; the condition of those now
there cannot be touched."
On the following day, Senator Douglas made his speech against the
Lecompton Constitution. It had been eagerly expected, and the galleries
and floor were crowded. From his own standpoint it was a very strong
argument, and was received with vociferous applause, contrary to the
rules of the Senate. It left Buchanan with not a rag to cover him. It
was the first public speech Douglas had ever made which went counter to
the wishes of the Southern people. So when he said,--"I will go as far
as any of you to save the party. I have as much heart in the great cause
that binds us together as a party as any man living; I will sacrifice
anything short of principle and honor for the peace of the party; but if
the party will not stand by its principles, its faith, its pledges, I
will stand there and abide whatever consequences may result from the
position,"--we must believe that he was sincere and must respect him
for his courage. But his standpoint was that of one who "did not care
whether slavery was voted down or voted up." It represented no high
principle; the only right he contended for was the right of the people
to decide for themselves whether they would have a particular banking
system, or none at all; a Maine liquor law; or a railroad running this
way or that way; and finally whether they would have a slave code or
not. Great speeches are not kindled with such short stubble.
One thing hinted at in this speech was that Buchanan had been so
frightened by the revolt in the party against the Lecompton Constitution
that he had taken steps to have the pro-slavery clause rejected at the
coming election, by the very people who had framed it. "I think I have
seen enough in the last three days," he said, "to make it certain that
it will be _returned out_, no matter how the vote may stand." In a later
debate, February 4, Douglas said:
I made my objection [against the Lecompton Constitution] at a
time when the President of the United States told all his
friends that he was perfectly sure the pro-slavery clause would
be voted down. I did it at a time when all or nearly all the
Senators on this floor supposed the pro-slavery clause would be
stricken out. I assumed in my speech that it was to be returned
out, and that the constitution was to come here with that
article rejected.[31]
If Buchanan had that intention he was not able to carry it into effect.
Douglas at this time contemplated an alliance with the Republicans. His
state of mind is pictured in a letter written by Henry Wilson to Rev.
Theodore Parker, dated Washington, February 28, 1858, of which the
following is an extract:[32]
I say to you in confidence that you are mistaken in regard to
Douglas. He is as sure to be with us in the future as Chase,
Seward, or Sumner. I leave motives to God, but he is to be with
us, and he is to-day of more weight to our cause than any ten
men in the country. I know men and I know their power, and I
know that Douglas will go for crushing the Slave Power to
atoms. To use his own words to several of our friends _this
day_ in a three-hours' consultation: "We must grind this
administration to powder; we must punish every man who supports
this crime, and _we must prostrate forever the Slave Power_,
which uses Presidents and dishonors and disgraces them."
Similar testimony is found in the Trumbull correspondence, to wit:
Jesse K. Dubois, state Auditor, Springfield, March 22, 1858,
says he has a letter from Ray, of the Chicago _Tribune_, who
says that Sheahan, of the _Times_, who has just returned to
Washington, says that (1) Lecompton will be defeated; (2) that
the Republicans shall have all the majority they like in the
next Illinois legislature, to favor which he wants to unite
with us in all doubtful counties or rather help us by running
Douglas legislative tickets "(N. B. I do not see the point of
this)"; (3) he concedes us the Senator, and says Douglas is
willing to go into private life for a brief period, but
protests that we must not sacrifice their Congressmen who run
again on the Lecompton issue, if any one of them desires to go
back; (4) they will run candidates for Congress in every
district, but without hope of electing one in the four northern
districts "(N. B. I should think this is an easy matter)"; (5)
Douglas is willing to retire, and if he beats Lecompton, to
take his chances by and by; (6) Douglas and his friends have
had a caucus in Washington and they agree so to shape matters,
if possible, with Republican aid, as to return to the next
Congress an unbroken phalanx of anti-Lecompton men, and break
down the administration by making it harmless at home and
abroad; (7) the fight is to the death, _à l'outrance_, and
cannot be discontinued, no matter what comes up. Ray seems to
think Sheahan is honest in what he says, and has no doubt that
he speaks for Douglas.
A. Jonas, Quincy, April 11, says that letters have been
received from Chicago and Springfield implying that a
coalition is forming between a portion of the Republican party
on the one hand and Douglas and his followers on the other. He
protests strongly against any such coalition and declares it
can never be carried into effect. "To suppose that the
Republicans of this District can under any circumstances be
induced to support such a political demagogue and trickster as
Isaac N. Morris is to believe them capable of worshiping Satan
or submitting to the dictation of the slave oligarchy."
W. H. Herndon, Springfield, April 12, has just returned from
the East. He speaks of Greeley's "puffs" of Douglas, which he
regards as demoralizing to the Republicans of Illinois. "I
heard Greeley handled quite roughly by the candidate for
lieutenant-governor of Wisconsin, a very intelligent German. He
spoke to Greeley in my presence and said that Wisconsin stood
by Illinois and was not for sale."
E. Peck, Chicago, April 15: "Dr. Brainard has had a talk with
Dr. Ray, the substance of which was that we should consent to
run Douglas as our candidate for the House of Representatives
from this district. What does this mean? Can Brainard have any
authority to make such a proposition? Ray has been advising
with me, and we are both in the clouds. I requested permission
to write to you for your opinion before any opinions were
expressed here. Mr. Colfax may be able to tell you something of
the opinions of Douglas. I am shy in believing, and more shy in
confiding, ... yet Ray believes that Brainard was authorized by
Douglas to make the proposition."
N. B. Judd, Chicago, April 19, says that if the Lecompton Bill
is passed, Douglas is laid on the shelf. The Buchanan party in
Chicago is of no consequence, "great cry and little wool." We
shall have to fight the Democratic party as a unit. "How
Douglas is to be the Democratic party in Illinois and the ally
of the Republicans outside of the state is a problem which
those, who are arranging with him, ought to know how to work
out."
Overtures to the Republicans of Illinois did not come from Douglas only.
Here is one of a different hue:
George T. Brown, Alton, February 24, urges the appointment of
J. E. Starr (Buchanan Democrat) as postmaster at Alton.
"Slidell opened the way for you to talk to him and you can
easily do so. The Administration is very desirous that you
should not oppose their appointments, and will give you
anything."
The foregoing letter betokens a sudden change of mind in administration
circles at Washington, as is evidenced by the following communication
which Trumbull had received from one of his constituents a few weeks
earlier:
B. Werner, Caseyville, January 4, refers to a former letter
enclosing a petition for the establishment of a post-office at
Caseyville. Hearing nothing of the matter, he went to see Mr.
Armstrong, the postmaster at St. Louis, narrated the facts, and
asked whether any order had been received by him respecting it.
"He asked me to whom I had sent the petition. I told him to
you. He replied if I had sent the petition to Robert Smith
(Dem. M.C.) the matter would have been attended to, but as Mr.
Trumbull was a Black Republican, the department would not pay
any attention to it."
On the 2d of February, 1858, President Buchanan sent a special message
to Congress with a copy of the Lecompton Constitution, and recommended
that Kansas be admitted to the Union as a state under it. In this
message he made reference to the Dred Scott decision, which had been
pronounced by the Supreme Court in the previous March. On this point the
message said:
It has been solemnly adjudged by the highest tribunal known to
our laws that slavery exists in Kansas by virtue of the
Constitution of the United States. Kansas is, therefore, at
this moment as much a slave state as Georgia, or South
Carolina.
Trumbull made a speech on the special message as soon as the reading of
it was finished by the secretary. He reviewed the action of Governor
Walker, which, in the beginning, had been avowedly taken with the view
of creating and promoting a Free State Democratic party in Kansas, to
which end he had made use of the soldiers placed at his disposal by the
President. That this was an act of usurpation was conclusively shown by
Trumbull, although Walker claimed that it had served the desirable
purpose of preventing an armed collision between the contending
factions. Trumbull then touched upon the Dred Scott case and maintained
that the Supreme Court had likewise usurped authority by pronouncing an
opinion on a case not before it. The court had virtually dismissed the
case for want of jurisdiction. It had decided that Dred Scott was not a
citizen and had no right to bring this action. There was no longer any
case before the judges who so held. "Their opinions," said Trumbull,
"are worth just as much as, and no more than, the opinions of any other
gentlemen equally respectable in the country." Consequently, President
Buchanan's assertion that Kansas was then as much a slave state as
Georgia or South Carolina was unfounded and preposterous. Seward,
Fessenden, and the Republican Senators generally held to this doctrine,
but Senator Benjamin, of Louisiana, replied with considerable force that
it was competent for the court to decide on what grounds it would give
its decision, and that it did, in so many words, elect to decide the
question of slavery in the territories, which was the principal question
raised by the counsel of Dred Scott. That the decision had an aim
different from the settlement of Dred Scott's claim, and that this aim
was political, is now sufficiently established. It is also established
that Dred Scott never took any steps consciously to secure freedom, but
that the action was brought in his name by some speculating lawyers in
St. Louis to secure damages or wages from the widow of Scott's master,
Dr. Emerson.[33] One additional fact is supplied by a letter in the
Trumbull correspondence, showing how the money was collected to pay the
plaintiff's court costs.
G. Bailey, Washington, May 12, 1857, writes, that when the case
of Dred Scott was first brought to the notice of Montgomery
Blair, he applied to him (Bailey) to know what to do. Blair
said he would freely give his services without charge if Bailey
would see to the necessary expenses of the case. Not having an
opportunity to confer with friends, Bailey replied that he
would become responsible. He had no doubt the necessary money
could be raised. On this assurance he proceeded, the case was
tried, and the result was before the country. Mr. Blair had
just rendered the bill of costs: $63.18 for writ of error and
$91.50 for printing briefs; total, $154.68. "May I be so bold,
my dear sir, as to ask you to contribute two dollars toward the
payment of this bill. I am now writing to seventy-five of the
Rep. Members of the late Congress, and if they will answer me
promptly, each enclosing the quota named, I can discharge the
bill by myself paying a double share."
_Mem._: $2 sent by Trumbull June 20th, '57.
The debate in the Senate on the Lecompton Bill continued till March 23.
The best speech on the Republican side was made by Fessenden, of Maine,
than whom a more consummate debater or more knightly character and
presence has not graced the Senate chamber in my time, if ever. On the
administration side the laboring oar was taken by Toombs, who spoke with
more truculence than he had shown in the Thirty-fourth Congress.
Jefferson Davis, who had been returned to the Senate after serving as
Secretary of War under Pierce, bore himself in this debate with decorum
and moderation.
The Lecompton Bill passed the Senate, but was disagreed to by the House,
and a conference committee was appointed which adopted a bill proposed
by Congressman English, of Indiana, which offered a large bonus of lands
to Kansas, for schools, for a university, and for public buildings, if
she would vote to come into the Union under the Lecompton Constitution
now. If she would not so vote, she should not have the lands and should
not come into the Union until she should have a population sufficient
to elect one member of Congress on the ratio prescribed by law. The form
of submission to a popular vote was to be: "Proposition accepted," or
"Proposition rejected." If there was a majority of acceptances, the
territory should be admitted as a state at once. Senator Seward and
Representative Howard, Republican members of the conference committee,
dissented from the report. This bill passed the House.
Douglas made a dignified speech against the English Bill, showing that
it was in the nature of a bribe to the people to vote in a particular
way. Although he did not think that the bribe would prevail, he could
not accept the principle. The bill nevertheless passed on the last day
of April, and on the 2d of August the English proposition was voted down
by the people of Kansas by an overwhelming majority. The Lecompton
Constitution thus disappeared from sublunary affairs, and John Calhoun
disappeared from Kansas as soon as steps were taken to look into the
returns of previous elections canvassed by him.
The opinion of a man of high position on the attitude of President
Buchanan toward Lecomptonism is found in another letter to Trumbull:
J. D. Caton, chief justice of the supreme court of Illinois,
Ottawa, March 6, 1858, does not think all the Presidents and
all the Cabinets and all the Congresses and all the supreme
courts and all the slaveholders on earth, with all the
constitutions that could be drawn, could ever make Kansas a
slave state. "No, there has been no such expectation, and I do
not believe desire on the part of the present administration to
make it a slave state, but as he [Buchanan] had already been
pestered to death with it, he resolved to make it a state as
soon as possible, and thus being rid of it, let them fight it
out as they liked. In this mood the Southern members of the
Cabinet found him when the news came of that Lecompton
Constitution being framed, and he committed himself, thinking,
no doubt, that Douglas would be hot for it and that there would
be no general opposition in his own party to it.... You say
that the slave trade will be established in every state in the
Union in five years if the Democratic party retains power! As
Butterfield told the Universalist preacher, who was proving
that all men would be saved, 'We hope for better things.'"
FOOTNOTES:
[30] _Cong. Globe_, vol. 42, p. 16.
[31] _Cong. Globe_, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 571.
[32] Lincoln and Herndon, by Joseph Fort Newton, p. 148.
[33] Frederick Trevor Hill in _Harper's Magazine_, July, 1907.
CHAPTER VI
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1858 AND THE JOHN BROWN RAID
The events described in the preceding chapter left Senator Douglas still
the towering figure in national politics. Although he had contributed
but a small part of the votes in the Senate and House by which the
Lecompton Bill had been defeated, he had furnished an indispensable
part. He had humbled the Buchanan administration. He had delivered
Kansas from the grasp of the Border Ruffians. What he might do for
freedom in the future, if properly encouraged, loomed large in the
imagination of the Eastern Republicans. Greeley, Seward, Banks, Bowles,
Burlingame, Henry Wilson, and scores of lesser lights were quoted as
desiring to see him returned to the Senate by Republican votes. Some
were even willing to support him for the Presidency.
The Republicans of Illinois did not share this enthusiasm. Not only had
they fixed upon Lincoln as their choice for Senator, but they felt that
they could not trust Douglas. He still said that he cared not whether
slavery was voted down or voted up. That was the very thing they did
care about. Could they assume that, after being reëlected by their votes
and made their standard-bearer, he would be a new man, different from
the one he had been before? And if he remained of the same opinions as
before, what would become of the Republican party? Who could answer for
the demoralizing effects of taking him for a leader? The views of the
party leaders in Illinois are set forth at considerable length in
letters received by Senator Trumbull, the first one from Lincoln
himself:
BLOOMINGTON, December 28, 1857.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL,
DEAR SIR: What does the New York _Tribune_ mean by its constant
eulogizing and admiring and magnifying Douglas? Does it, in
this, speak the sentiments of the Republicans at Washington?
Have they concluded that the Republican cause generally can be
best promoted by sacrificing us here in Illinois? If so, we
would like to know it soon; it will save us a great deal of
labor to surrender at once.
As yet I have heard of no Republican here going over to
Douglas, but if the _Tribune_ continues to din his praises into
the ears of its five or ten thousand readers in Illinois, it is
more than can be hoped that all will stand firm. I am not
complaining, I only wish for a fair understanding. Please write
me at Springfield.
Your obt. servant,
A. LINCOLN.
C. H. Ray, Chicago, March 9, 1858, protests against any trading with
Douglas on the basis of reëlecting him to the Senate by Republican
votes. The Republicans of Illinois are unanimous for Lincoln and will
not swerve from that purpose. Thinks that Douglas is coming to the
Republican camp and that the disposal of him will be a difficult problem
unless he will be content with a place in the Cabinet of the next
Republican President.
J. K. Dubois, Springfield, April 8, says that Hatch (secretary of state)
and himself were in Chicago a few days since. Found every man there firm
and true--Judd, Peck, Ray, Scripps, W. H. Brown, etc. Herndon has just
come home; says that Wilson, Banks, Greeley, etc., are for returning
Douglas to the Senate. "God forbid! Are our friends crazy?"
J. M. Palmer, Carlinville, May 25:
We feel here that we have fought a strenuous and
well-maintained battle with Douglas, backed up by the whole
strength of the Federal patronage, and have won some prospect
of overthrowing him and placing Illinois permanently in the
ranks of the party of progress, whether called Republican or by
some other name, and now, by a "Wall street operation,"
Lincoln, to whom we are all under great obligations, and all
our men who have borne the heat and burden of the day, are to
be kicked to one side and we are to throw up our caps for Judge
Douglas, and he very coolly tells us all the time that we are
Abolitionists and negro worshipers and that he accepts our
votes as a favor to us! Messrs. Greeley, Seward, Burlingame,
etc., are presumed to be able to estimate themselves properly,
and if they fix only that value on themselves, no one has a
right to complain, but if I vote for Douglas under such
circumstances, may I be ----. I don't swear, but you may fill
this blank as you please. Yet I have no personal feelings
against Douglas.... Lincoln and his friends were under no
obligation to us in that controversy [of 1855]. We had, though
but five, refused to vote for him under circumstances that we
thought, at the time, furnished good reason for our refusal. We
elected an anti-Nebraska Democrat to the Senate, by his aid
most magnanimously rendered, and that result placed us, through
you, on the highest possible ground in the new party. If you
had not been elected, we should have been a baffled faction at
the tail of an alien organization. We have, as a consequence,
an anti-Nebraska Democrat for governor, and our men are the
bone and sinew of the new organization, though we are in a
minority. In all these results Lincoln has contributed his
efforts and the Whig element have coöperated. For myself,
therefore, I am unalterably determined to do all that I can to
elect Lincoln to the Senate. _I_ cannot elect him, but I can
give him and all his friends conclusive proof that I am
animated by honor and good faith, and will stand up for his
election until the Republican party, including himself and his
personal friends, say we have done enough. Hence no arrangement
that looks to the election of Douglas by Republican votes, that
does not meet the approval of Lincoln and his friends, can meet
my approval.
The chief difficulty was that Douglas had never established for himself
a character for stability. People did not know what they could depend
upon in dealing with him. Other questions than Lecompton would soon come
up, as to which his course would be uncertain. Who could say whether he
would look northward or southward for the Presidency two years hence?
Douglas knew that he need not look in either direction unless he could
first secure his reëlection to the Senate. Bear-like, tied to a stake,
he must fight the course. His campaign against Lincoln for the
senatorship does not properly appertain to the Life of Trumbull,
although the latter took an active part in it. The author's
recollections and memoranda of that campaign were contributed to another
publication.[34] He recalls with pity the weary but undaunted look,
after nearly four months of incessant travel and speaking, of the Little
Giant, whose health was already much impaired. A letter from Fessenden
to Trumbull, dated November 16, 1856, spoke of him as "a dying man in
almost every sense, unless he mends speedily--of which, I take it, there
is little hope." In the Senate debates from 1855 on, he often spoke of
his bad health, and in one instance he got out of a sick-bed to vote on
the Lecompton Bill. The campaign of 1858 was a severe drain on his
remaining strength, but in manner and mien he gave no sign of the waste
and exhaustion within.
The Trumbull papers contain some contemporary notes on the campaign of
1858. The Buchanan Democrats in Illinois gave themselves the
high-sounding title of the National Democracy. By the Douglas men they
were called "Danites," a name borrowed from the literature of Mormondom.
Traces of this sect are found in the following letters:
D. L. Phillips, Anna, Union County, February 16, 1858, says
that Hon. John Dougherty will start in a few days for
Washington to console the President and look for an office for
himself. (He obtained the Marshalship of southern Illinois.)
W. H. Herndon, Springfield, July 8:
Mr. Lincoln was here a moment ago and told me that he had just
seen Col. Dougherty and had a conversation with him. He told
Lincoln that the National Democracy intended to run in every
county and district, a National Democrat for each and every
office. Lincoln replied, "If you do this the thing is settled."
... Lincoln is very certain as to Miller's and Bateman's
election (on the state ticket), but is gloomy and rather
uncertain about his own success.
Lincoln's own thoughts respecting the Danites are set forth incidentally
in the following letter:
SPRINGFIELD, June 23, 1858.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 16th reached me only yesterday.
We had already seen by telegraph a report of Douglas's
onslaught upon everybody but himself. I have this morning seen
the Washington _Union_, in which I think the Judge is rather
worsted in regard to the onslaught.
In relation to the charge of an alliance between the
Republicans and the Buchanan men in the state, if being rather
pleased to see a division in the ranks of Democracy, and not
doing anything to prevent it, be such an alliance, then there
is such an alliance. At least, that is true of me. But if it be
intended to charge that there is any alliance by which there is
to be any concession of principle on either side, or furnishing
of sinews, or partition of offices, or swapping of votes to any
extent, or the doing of anything, great or small, on the one
side for a consideration expressed or implied on the other, no
such thing is true so far as I know or believe.
Before this reaches you, you will have seen the proceedings of
our Republican State Convention. It was really a grand affair
and was in all respects all that our friends could desire.
The resolution in effect nominating me for Senator was passed
more for the object of closing down upon the everlasting
croaking about Wentworth than anything else. The signs look
reasonably well. Our state ticket, I think, will be elected
without much difficulty. But with the advantages they have of
us, we shall be hard run to carry the legislature. We shall
greet your return home with great pleasure.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
The only counties in the state in which the Danites showed any vitality
were Union County in the south and Bureau County in the north. They
polled only 5079 votes in the whole state.
The influence of the Eastern Republicans, who were inclined to support
Douglas at the beginning of the campaign, and especially that of the New
York _Tribune_, is noted by Judd and Herndon.
N. B. Judd, Chicago, July 16:
We have lost some Republicans in this region.... You may
attribute it to the course of the New York _Tribune_, which has
tended to loosen party ties and induce old Whigs to look upon
D.'s return to the Senate as rather desirable. You ought to
come to Illinois as soon as you can by way of New York and
straighten out the newspapers there. Even the _Evening Post_
compares Douglas to Silas Wright. Bah!
W. H. Herndon, Springfield, July 22:
There were some Republicans here--more than we had any idea
of--who had been silently influenced by Greeley, and who
intended to go for Douglas or not take sides against him. His
speech here aroused the old fires and now they are his enemies.
Has received a letter from Greeley in which he says: "Now,
Herndon, I am going to do all I reasonably can to elect
Lincoln."
N. B. Judd, Chicago, December 26 (after the election), says:
Horace Greeley has been here lecturing and doing what mischief
he could. He took Tom Dyer [Democrat, ex-mayor] into his
confidence and told him all the party secrets that he knew,
such as that we had been East and endeavored to get money for
the canvass and that we failed, etc.;--a beautiful chap he is,
to be entrusted with the interests of a party. Lecturing is a
mere pretense. He is running around to our small towns with
that pretense, but really to head off the defection from his
paper. It is being stopped by hundreds.
A. Jonas, Quincy, same date:
H. Greeley delivered a lecture before our lyceum last
evening--a large crowd to hear him. John Wood, Browning,
myself, and others talked to him very freely about the course
of the _Tribune_ in the late campaign. He acknowledged we were
right.
The Douglas men elected a majority of the legislature, but did not have
a majority, or even a plurality, of the popular vote. So it appears from
a letter to Trumbull, the existence of which the author himself had
forgotten.
Horace White, Chicago, January 10, 1859, sends a table of votes
cast for members of the legislature in the election of 1858,
showing a plurality of 4191 for Republican candidates for the
House of Representatives.
W. H. Herndon, Springfield, says that Lincoln was defeated in
the counties of Sangamon, Morgan, Madison, Logan, and Mason--a
group of counties within a radius of eighty miles from the
capital. They were men from Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia
mainly, old-line Whigs, timid, but generally good men,
supporters of Fillmore in the election of 1856. "These men must
be reached in the coming election of 1860. Otherwise Trumbull
will be beaten also."
SPRINGFIELD, January 29,1859.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL,
DEAR SIR: I have just received your late speech in pamphlet
form, sent me by yourself. I had seen and read it before in a
newspaper and I really think it a capital one. When you can
find leisure, write me your present impression of Douglas's
movements.
Our friends here from different parts of the state, in and out
of the legislature, are united, resolute, and determined, and I
think it almost certain that we shall be far better organized
in 1860 than ever before.
We shall get no just apportionment (of legislative districts)
and the best we can do--if we can do that--is to prevent one
being made worse than the present.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
A letter from Lincoln following the campaign of 1858, is appended as
showing the cordial relations existing between himself and Trumbull. The
latter had written to him from Washington under date January 29, 1859,
saying that John Wentworth had written an article, intended for
publication in the Chicago _Journal_ (but which the editor of that paper
had refused to print), imputing bad faith toward Lincoln on the part of
N. B. Judd, B. C. Cook, and others, including Trumbull, in the last
senatorial campaign. Trumbull had received a copy of this article, and
as its object was to create enmity between friends, and as it would
probably be published somewhere, he wished to assure Lincoln that the
statements and insinuations contained in it were wholly false. To this
Lincoln replied as follows:
SPRINGFIELD, February 3, 1859.
HON. L. TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 29th is received. The article
mentioned by you, prepared for the Chicago _Journal_, I have
not seen; nor do I wish to see it, though I heard of it a month
or more ago. Any effort to put enmity between you and me is as
idle as the wind. I do not for a moment doubt that you, Judd,
Cook, Palmer, and the Republicans generally coming from the old
Democratic ranks, were as sincerely anxious for my success in
the late contest as myself, and I beg to assure you beyond all
possible cavil that you can scarcely be more anxious to be
sustained two years hence than I am that you shall be
sustained. I cannot conceive it possible for me to be a rival
of yours or to take sides against you in favor of any rival.
Nor do I think there is much danger of the old Democratic and
Whig elements of our party breaking into opposing factions.
They certainly shall not if I can prevent it.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
Twenty days after this letter was penned, there was a debate in the
Senate which was an echo of the Illinois campaign, which must have been
extremely interesting to both Lincoln and Trumbull. In a debate with
Douglas in 1856, as already noted, Trumbull had asked him whether, under
his doctrine of popular sovereignty, the people could prohibit slavery
in a territory before they came to form a state constitution. He replied
that that was a judicial question to be settled by the courts, and that
all good Democrats would bow to the decision of the Supreme Court
whenever it should be made. At Freeport, in the campaign of 1858,
Lincoln put the same question to him in a slightly different form.
On the 23d of February, 1859, there was a Senate debate on this
question, in which Douglas contended that the Democratic party, by
supporting General Cass in 1848, had endorsed the same opinion that he
(Douglas) had maintained at Freeport, since Cass, in his so-called
"Nicholson Letter," had affirmed the doctrine of squatter sovereignty as
to slavery in the territories. Douglas now contended that every Southern
state that gave its electoral vote to Cass, including Mississippi, was
committed to the doctrine that the people of a territory could lawfully
exclude slavery while still in a territorial condition. Jefferson Davis
replied:
The State of Mississippi voted [in 1848] under the belief that
that letter meant no more than that when the territory became a
state, it had authority to decide that question.... If it had
been known that the venerable candidate then of the Democratic
party, and now Secretary of State, held the opinion which he so
frankly avowed at a subsequent period on the floor of the
Senate, I tell you, sir [addressing Douglas], he would have had
no more chance to get the vote of Mississippi than you with
your opinions would have to-day.[35]
On the 2d of February, 1860, Davis introduced a series of resolutions in
the Senate of a political character evidently intended to head off
Douglas at the coming Charleston Convention; or, failing that, to pave
the way for the withdrawal of the delegates of the cotton-growing
states. The fourth resolution was directed against the Douglas doctrine
of unfriendly legislation, thus:
_Resolved_, That neither Congress nor a territorial
legislature, whether by direct legislation or legislation of
indirect and unfriendly nature, possesses the power to annul or
impair the constitutional right of any citizen of the United
States to take his slave property into the common territories;
but it is the duty of the Federal Government there to afford
for that, as for other species of property, the needful
protection; and if experience should at any time prove that the
judiciary does not possess power to insure adequate protection,
it will then become the duty of Congress to supply such
deficiency.
The Senate debate between Douglas and his Southern antagonists was
resumed in May, after the explosion of the Charleston Convention.
Douglas made a two days' speech (May 15 and 16) occupying four hours
each day, but did not mention the subject of unfriendly legislation, or
show how a territorial legislature could nullify or circumvent the Dred
Scott decision. He was answered by Benjamin, of Louisiana, in a speech
which made a sensation throughout the country, and in which the
doctrine of unfriendly legislation was mauled to tatters. Benjamin was
the first Southern statesman to make his bow to the rising fame of
Lincoln. After examining the Freeport debate, he said:
We accuse him [Douglas] for this, to-wit: that, having
bargained with us upon a point upon which we were at issue,
that it should be considered a judicial question; that he would
abide the decision; that he would act under the decision and
consider it a doctrine of the party; that, having said that to
us here in the Senate, he went home, and under the stress of a
local election his knees gave way; his whole person trembled.
His adversary stood upon principle and was beaten, and lo, he
is the candidate of a mighty party for Presidency of the United
States. The Senator from Illinois faltered; he got the prize
for which he faltered, but lo, the prize of his ambition slips
from his grasp, because of the faltering which he paid as the
price of the ignoble prize--ignoble under the circumstances
under which he obtained it.[36]
There are scores of letters in Trumbull's correspondence calling for
copies of Benjamin's speech, yet it had no effect in Illinois, the
Danite vote being smaller in 1860 than it had been in 1858. Probably it
had influence in the National Democratic Convention at Charleston, from
which the delegates from ten Southern States seceded in whole or part
when the Douglas platform was adopted. This split was followed by an
adjournment to Baltimore, where a second split took place, Douglas being
nominated by one faction and Breckinridge, of Kentucky, by the other.
* * * * *
Fifty years have passed since John Brown, with twenty-one men, seized
the Government armory and arsenal at Harper's Ferry (October 16, 1859),
in an attempt to abolish slavery in the United States. As sinews of
war, he had about four thousand dollars, or dollars' worth of material
of one kind and another. With such resources he expected to do something
which the Government itself, with more than a million trained soldiers,
five hundred warships, and three billions of dollars, accomplished with
difficulty at the end of a four years' war, during which no negro
insurrection, large or small, took place. One might think that the
scheme itself was evidence of insanity. But to prove Brown insane on
this ground alone, we must convict also the persons who plotted and
coöperated with him and who furnished him money and arms, knowing what
he intended to do with them. Some of these were men of high intelligence
who are still living without strait-jackets, and it is not conceivable
that they aided and abetted him without first estimating, as well as
they were able, the chances of success. Yet Brown refused to allow his
counsel to put in a plea of insanity on his trial, saying that he was no
more insane then than he had been all his life, which was probably true.
If he was not insane at the time of the Pottawatomie massacre, he was a
murderer who forfeited his own life five times in one night by taking
that number of lives of his fellow men in cold blood.
I saw and talked with Brown perhaps half a dozen times at Chicago during
his journeys to and from Kansas. He impressed me then as a religious
zealot of the Old Testament type, believing in the plenary inspiration
of the Scriptures and in himself as a competent interpreter thereof. But
the text "Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord, I will repay," never
engaged his attention. He was oppressed with no doubts about anything,
least of all about his own mission in the world. His mission was to
bring slavery to an end, but that was a subject that he did not talk
about. He was a man of few words, and was extremely reticent about his
plans, even those of ordinary movements in daily life. He had a square
jaw, clean-shaven, and an air of calmness and self-confidence, which
attracted weaker intellects and gave him mastery over them. He had
steel-gray eyes, and steel-gray hair, close-cropped, that stood stiff on
his head like wool cards, giving him an aspect of invincibleness. When
he applied to the National Kansas Committee for the arms in their
possession after the Kansas war was ended, he was asked by Mr. H. B.
Hurd, the secretary, what use he intended to make of them. He refused to
answer, and his request was accordingly denied. The arms were voted back
to the Massachusetts men who had contributed them originally. Brown
obtained an order for them from the owners.
The Thirty-sixth Congress met on the 5th of December, 1859. The first
business introduced in the Senate was a resolution from Mason, of
Virginia, calling for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the
facts attending John Brown's invasion and seizure of the arsenal at
Harper's Ferry. Trumbull offered an amendment proposing that a similar
inquiry be made in regard to the seizure in December, 1855, of the
United States Arsenal at Liberty, Missouri, and the pillage thereof by a
band of Missourians, who were marching to capture and control the
ballot-boxes in Kansas. On the following day Trumbull made a brief
speech in support of his amendment, in the course of which he commented
on the Harper's Ferry affair in words which have never faded from the
memory of the present writer. Nobody during the intervening half-century
has summed up the moral and legal aspects of the John Brown raid more
truly or more forcibly. He said:
I hope this investigation will be thorough and complete. I
believe it will do good by disabusing the public mind, in that
portion of the Union which feels most sensitive upon this
subject, of the idea that the outbreak at Harper's Ferry
received any countenance or support from any considerable
number of persons in any portion of this Union. No man who is
not prepared to subvert the Constitution, destroy the
Government, and resolve society into its original elements, can
justify such an act. No matter what evils, either real or
imaginary, may exist in the body politic, if each individual,
or every set of twenty individuals, out of more than twenty
millions of people, is to be permitted, in his own way and in
defiance of the laws of the land, to undertake to correct those
evils, there is not a government on the face of the earth that
could last a day. And it seems to me, sir, that those persons
who reason only from abstract principles and believe themselves
justifiable on all occasions, and in every form, in combating
evil wherever it exists, forget that the right which they claim
for themselves exists equally in every other person. All
governments, the best which have been devised, encroach
necessarily more or less on the individual rights of man and to
that extent may be regarded as evils. Shall we, therefore,
destroy Government, dissolve society, destroy regulated and
constitutional liberty, and inaugurate in its stead anarchy--a
condition of things in which every man shall be permitted to
follow the instincts of his own passions, or prejudices, or
feelings, and where there will be no protection to the
physically weak against the encroachments of the strong? Till
we are prepared to inaugurate such a state as this, no man can
justify the deeds done at Harper's Ferry. In regard to the
misguided man who led the insurgents on that occasion, I have
no remarks to make. He has already expiated upon the gallows
the crime which he committed against the laws of his country;
and to answer for his errors, or his virtues, whatever they may
have been, he has gone fearlessly and willingly before that
Judge who cannot err; there let him rest.
The debate continued several days and took a pretty wide range, the
leading Senators on both sides taking part in it. Trumbull bore the
brunt of it on the Republican side, and was cross-examined in courteous
but searching terms by Yulee, of Florida, Chesnut, of South Carolina,
and Clay, of Alabama, who conceived that the teachings of the Republican
party tended to produce such characters as John Brown. Trumbull answered
all their queries promptly, fully, and satisfactorily to his political
friends, if not to his questioners. Nothing in his senatorial career
brought him more cordial letters of approval than this debate. One such
came from Lincoln:
SPRINGFIELD, December 25, 1859.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL,
DEAR SIR: I have carefully read your speech, and I judge that,
by the interruptions, it came out a much better speech than you
expected to make when you began. It really is an excellent one,
many of the points being most admirably made.
I was in the inside of the post-office last evening when a mail
came bringing a considerable number of your documents, and the
postmaster said to me: "These will be put in the boxes, and
half will never be called for. If Trumbull would send them to
me, I would distribute a hundred where he will get ten
distributed this way." I said: "Shall I write this to
Trumbull?" He replied: "If you choose you may." I believe he
was sincere, but you will judge of that for yourself.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
The next in chronological order of the letters of Lincoln to Trumbull is
the following:
SPRINGFIELD, March 16, 1860.
HON. L. TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: When I first saw by the dispatches that Douglas
had run from the Senate while you were speaking, I did not
quite understand it; but seeing by the report that you were
cramming down his throat that infernal stereotyped lie of his
about "negro equality," the thing became plain.
Another matter; our friend Delahay wants to be one of the
Senators from Kansas. Certainly it is not for outsiders to
obtrude their interference. Delahay has suffered a great deal
in our cause and been very faithful to it, as I understand. He
writes me that some of the members of the Kansas legislature
have written you in a way that your simple answer might help
him. I wish you would consider whether you cannot assist that
far, without impropriety. I know it is a delicate matter; and I
do not wish to press you beyond your own judgment.
Yours as ever,
A. Lincoln.[37]
FOOTNOTES:
[34] Herndon-Weik. _Life of Lincoln_, 2d edition, vol. II, chap. IV.
[35] When Lincoln, at the Freeport debate, asked Douglas whether the
people of a territory could in any lawful way exclude slavery from their
limits prior to the formation of a state constitution, Douglas replied
that Lincoln had heard him answer that question "a hundred times from
every stump in Illinois." He certainly had answered it more than once,
and his answer had been published without attracting attention or
comment either North or South. On the 16th of July, 1858, six weeks
before the Freeport joint debate, he spoke at Bloomington, and there
announced and affirmed the doctrine of "unfriendly legislation" as a
means of excluding slavery from the territories. Lincoln was one of the
persons present when this speech was delivered. On the next day, Douglas
spoke at Springfield and repeated what he had said at Bloomington. Both
of these speeches were published in the Illinois _State Register_ of
July 19, yet the fact was not perceived, either by Lincoln himself, or
by any of the lynx-eyed editors and astute political friends who labored
to prevent him from asking Douglas the momentous question. Nor did the
Southern leaders seem to be aware of Douglas's views on this question
until they learned it from the Freeport debate.
[36] _Cong. Globe_, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2241.
[37] The manuscript of the foregoing letter is in the Lambert collection
of Lincolniana. The two following which relate also to Delahay's
senatorial aspirations, are in the collection of Jesse W. Weik, of
Greencastle, Ind.:
SPRINGFIELD, October 17, 1859.
DEAR DELAHAY: Your letter requesting me to drop a line in your
favor to Gen. Lane was duly received. I have thought it over,
and concluded it is not the best way. Any open attempt on my
part would injure you; and if the object merely be to assure
Gen. Lane of my friendship for you, show him the letter herewith
enclosed. I never saw him, or corresponded with him; so that a
letter directly from me to him, would run a great hazard of
doing harm to both you and me.
As to the pecuniary matter, about which you formerly wrote me, I
again appealed to our friend Turner by letter, but he never
answered. I can but repeat to you that I am so pressed myself,
as to be unable to assist you, unless I could get it from him.
Yours as ever,
(Enclosure) A. LINCOLN.
SPRINGFIELD, October 17, 1859.
M. W. DELAHAY, ESQ.,
My dear Sir: I hear your name mentioned for one of the seats in
the U.S. Senate from your new state. I certainly would be
gratified with your success; and if there was any proper way for
me to give you a lift, I would certainly do it. But, as it is, I
can only wish you well. It would be improper for me to
interfere; and if I were to attempt it, it would do you harm.
Your friend, as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
P.S. Is not the election news glorious?
We shall hear of Delahay again.
CHAPTER VII
THE ELECTION OF LINCOLN--SECESSION
The nomination of Lincoln for President by the Republican National
Convention in 1860 was a rather impromptu affair. In the years preceding
1858 he had not been accounted a party leader of importance in national
politics. The Republican party was still inchoate. Seward and Chase were
its foremost men. Next to them in rank were Sumner, Fessenden, Hale,
Collamer, Wade, Banks, and Sherman. Lincoln was not counted even in the
second rank until after the joint debates with Douglas. Attention was
riveted upon him because his antagonist was the most noted man of the
time. After the contest of 1858 was ended, although ended in defeat,
Lincoln was certainly elevated in public estimation to a good place in
the second rank of party leadership. It was not until the beginning of
1860, however, that certain persons in Illinois began to think of him as
a possible nominee for the Presidency. Lincoln did not think of himself
in that light until the month of March, about ten weeks before the
convention met. His estimate of his own chances was sufficiently modest,
and even that was shared by few. After the event his nomination was seen
to have been a natural consequence of preëxisting facts. Seward was the
logical candidate of the party if, upon a comparison of views, it were
believed that he could be elected. One third of the delegates of
Illinois desired his nomination and intended to vote for him after a few
complimentary votes for Lincoln.
There were some indispensable states, however, which, many people
believed, Seward could not carry. In Pennsylvania, Indiana, New Jersey,
Connecticut, and Rhode Island he was accounted too radical for the
temper of the electors. Illinois was reckoned by Trumbull and other
experienced politicians as doubtful if Seward should be the
standard-bearer. A conservative candidate of good repute, and
sufficiently well known to the public, seemed to be a desideratum.
Nobody had as yet thought of seeking a _radical_ candidate, who was
generally reputed to be a _conservative_. Bates, of Missouri, and
McLean, of Ohio, were the men most talked about by those who hesitated
to take Seward. McLean was a judge of the Supreme Court appointed by
President Jackson. He had been Postmaster-General under Monroe and John
Quincy Adams, and was now seventy-five years of age. Trumbull considered
him the safest candidate, for vote-getting purposes, as regarded
Illinois, if Lincoln were not nominated. In a letter dated April 7,
Lincoln had said that "if McLean were ten years younger he would be our
best candidate." Bates was regarded by both Lincoln and Trumbull as a
fairly good candidate, but Trumbull had been advised by Koerner, the
most influential German in Illinois, that Bates could not command the
German vote. Koerner had said also (in a letter dated March 15) that he
had made himself acquainted with the contents of more than fifty German
Republican newspapers in the United States and had found that they were
nearly unanimous for Seward, or Frémont, as first choice, but that they
would cordially support Lincoln or Chase.
On the 24th of April, Trumbull wrote to Lincoln in reference to the
Chicago nomination. He said that his own impression was that, as between
Lincoln and Seward, the latter would have the larger number of delegates
and would be likely to succeed; and that this was the prevailing belief
in Washington, even among those who did not want Seward nominated. He
was also of the opinion that Seward could not be elected if nominated.
The Congressmen from the doubtful states were generally of that opinion,
and his own correspondence from central and southern Illinois pointed
the same way. The next question was whether the nomination of Seward
could be prevented. It was Trumbull's opinion that McLean was the only
man who could succeed in the convention as against Seward, and he could
do so only as a compromise candidate, beginning with a few votes, but
being the second choice of a sufficient number to outvote Seward in the
end. As to Lincoln's chances he said:
Now I wish you to understand that I am for you first and
foremost, and want our state to send not only delegates
instructed in your favor, but your friends, who will stand by
you and nominate you if possible, never faltering unless you
yourself shall so advise.
In conclusion he asked Lincoln's opinion about McLean. Lincoln replied
in the following letter:
SPRINGFIELD, April 29, 1860.
Hon. L. Trumbull,
My dear Sir: Yours of the 24th was duly received, and I have
postponed answering it, hoping by the result at Charleston, to
know who is to lead our adversaries, before writing. But
Charleston hangs fire, and I wait no longer.
As you request, I will be entirely frank. The taste _is_ in my
mouth a little; and this, no doubt, disqualifies me, to some
extent, to form correct opinions. You may confidently rely,
however, that by no advice or consent of mine shall my
pretensions be pressed to the point of endangering our common
cause.
Now as to my opinion about the chances of others in Illinois, I
think neither Seward nor Bates can carry Illinois if Douglas
shall be on the track; and that either of them can, if he shall
not be. I rather think McLean could carry it, with Douglas on
or off. In other words, I think McLean is stronger in Illinois,
taking all sections of it, than either Seward or Bates, and I
think Seward the weakest of the three. I hear no objection to
McLean, except his age, but that objection seems to occur to
every one, and it is possible it might leave him no stronger
than the others. By the way, if we should nominate him, how
should we save ourselves the chance of filling his vacancy in
the court? Have him hold on up to the moment of his
inauguration? Would that course be no drawback upon us in the
canvass?
Recurring to Illinois, we want something quite as much as, and
which is harder to get than, the electoral vote,--the
legislature,--and it is exactly on this point that Seward's
nomination would be hard on us. Suppose he should gain us a
thousand votes in Winnebago, it would not compensate for the
loss of fifty in Edgar.
A word now for your own special benefit. You better write no
letter which can be distorted into opposition, or
_quasi_-opposition, to me. There are men on the constant watch
for such things, out of which to prejudice my peculiar friends
against you. While I have no more suspicion of you than I have
of my best friend living, I am kept in a constant struggle
against questions of this sort. I have hesitated some to write
this paragraph, lest you should suspect I do it for my own
benefit and not for yours, but on reflection I conclude you
will not suspect me. Let no eye but your own see this--not that
there is anything wrong or even ungenerous in it, but it would
be misconstrued.
Your friend as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
What happened in the Chicago Convention was widely different from the
conjectures of these writers, but the result seemed entirely reasonable
after it was reached. Lincoln was as radical as Seward--subsequent
events proved him to be more so--but his tone and temper had been more
conservative, more sedative, more sympathetic toward "our Southern
brethren," as he often called them. He had never endorsed the
"higher-law doctrine," with which Seward's name was associated; he
believed that the South was entitled, under the Constitution, to an
efficient Fugitive Slave Law; he had never incurred the enmity, as
Seward had, of the Fillmore men, or of the American party.
These facts, coupled with some personal contact and neighborliness,
early attracted the conservative delegates of Indiana. Seward, with his
"irrepressible conflict" speech, had been too strong a dose for them,
but they were quite willing to take Lincoln, whose phrase, "the house
divided against itself," had preceded the irrepressible conflict speech
by some months. The example of Indiana bore immediate fruit in other
quarters, and especially in Pennsylvania. Curtin, the nominee for
governor, was early convinced that Seward could not carry that state,
but that Lincoln could. Curtin and Henry S. Lane, the nominee for
governor of Indiana, became active torch-bearers for Lincoln.
When those states pronounced for Lincoln, the men of Vermont (the most
radical of the New England States), who had been waiting and watching in
the Babel of discord for some solid and assured fact, voting meantime
for Collamer, turned to Lincoln and gave him their entire vote.
Vermont's example was more important than her numerical strength, for it
disclosed the inmost thoughts of a group of intelligent, high-principled
men, who were moved by an unselfish purpose and a solemn responsibility.
Lincoln had now become the cynosure of the conservatives with a
first-class radical endorsement to boot, and he deserved both
distinctions. His nomination followed on the third ballot.
Dr. William Jayne, Springfield, May 20, wrote to Trumbull:
The National Convention is over and Lincoln is our
standard-bearer, much (I doubt not) to his own surprise; I know
to the surprise of his friends. They went to Chicago fearful
that Seward would be nominated, and ready to unite on any
other man, but anxious and zealous for Lincoln. Pennsylvania
could agree on no man of her own heartily. Ohio was for Chase
and Wade. Indiana was united on Lincoln. That fact made an
impression on the New England States. Seward's friends were
quite confident after the balloting commenced. Now, if Douglas
is not nominated, we will carry the state by thousands. If D.
is nominated, we will carry the state, but we will have a hard
fight to do it.
Out of a large mass of letters in the Trumbull correspondence touching
the nomination of Lincoln, a half-dozen are selected as examples.
Richard Yates, Jacksonville, May 24, 1860, says the Chicago
nominations were received with delight, and there is every
indication of success in Illinois.
John Tillson, Quincy, May 28, writes that the nominations are
highly acceptable here to every one except the Douglas men, who
have just found out that Mr. Seward is the purest, ablest, and
most consistent statesman of the age.
J. A. Mills, Atlanta, Logan County, June 4: "I have never seen
such enthusiasm, at least since 1840, as is now manifested for
Lincoln. Scores of Democrats are coming over to us."
B. Lewis, Jacksonville, June 6: "The Charleston Convention has
struck the Democratic party with paralysis wherever Douglas was
popular as their leader (and that was pretty much all over the
free states), and we have now such an opportunity to make an
impression as I never saw before.... We are actually making
conversions here every day. The fact tells the whole story. In
1858 I anxiously desired to hear of one occasionally, at least
as a sign, but I could never hear of a single one. Now it is
all gloriously changed."
W. H. Herndon, Springfield, June 14: "Lincoln is well and doing
well. Has hundreds of letters daily. Many visitors every hour
from all sections. He is bored, _bored badly_. Good gracious! I
would not have his place and be bored as he is. I could not
endure it."
H. G. McPike, Alton, June 29: "We have distributed a large
number of speeches as you are aware, the most effective, I
think, under all the circumstances, is that of Carl Schurz."
In reply to letters of Trumbull, of which no copies were kept by him,
Lincoln wrote the following:
SPRINGFIELD, May 26, 1860.
HON. L. TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: I have received your letter since the nomination,
for which I sincerely thank you. As you say, if we cannot get
our state up now, I do not see when we can. The nominations
start well here, and everywhere else as far as I have heard. We
may have a back-set yet. Give my respects to the Republican
Senators, and especially to Mr. Hamlin, Mr. Seward, Gen.
Cameron, and Mr. Wade. Also to your good wife. Write again, and
do not write so short letters as I do.
Your friend as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., June 5, 1860.
HON. L. TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: Yours of May 31, inclosing Judge R.'s[38] letter
is received. I see by the papers this morning, that Mr.
Fillmore refused to go with us. What do the New Yorkers at
Washington think of this? Governor Reeder was here last
evening, direct from Pennsylvania. He is entirely confident of
that state and of the general result. I do not remember to have
heard Gen. Cameron's opinion of Penn. Weed was here and saw us,
but he showed no signs whatever of the intriguer. He asked for
nothing and said N. Y. is safe without conditions.
Remembering that Peter denied his Lord with an oath, after most
solemnly protesting that he never would, I will not swear I
will make no committals, but I do not think I will.
Write me often. I look with great interest for your letters
now.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
Notwithstanding the brilliant opening of the campaign, the contest in
Illinois was a very stiff one. Dr. Jayne's forecast was confirmed by the
result. Lincoln's plurality over Douglas in the state was 11,946, and
his majority over all was 4629. Dr. Jayne was himself elected State
Senator in the district composed of Sangamon and Morgan counties. The
Republican State Committee made extraordinary efforts to carry this
district, as they believed that the reëlection of Senator Trumbull would
depend upon it. They obtained five thousand dollars as a special fund
from New York for this purpose. Jayne was elected by a majority of seven
votes, but Douglas received a plurality of one hundred and three over
Lincoln in the same district. By the election of Jayne, the Republicans
secured a majority of one in the State Senate. This insured the holding
of a joint convention of the legislature, at which Trumbull was
reëlected Senator.
At Springfield, Illinois, November 20, 1860, there was a grand
celebration of the election of Lincoln and Hamlin, at which speeches
were made by Trumbull, Palmer, and Yates. Lincoln had been urged to say
something at this meeting that would tend to quiet the rising surges of
disunion at the South, but he thought that the time for him to speak had
not yet come. He wished to let his record speak for him, and to see
whether the commotion in the slaveholding states would increase or
subside. Meanwhile he desired that the influence of this public meeting
at his home should be peaceful and not irritating. To this end he wrote
the following words, handed them to Trumbull and asked him to make them
a part of his speech:
I have labored in and for the Republican organization with
entire confidence that, whenever it shall be in power, each and
all of the states will be left in as complete control of their
own affairs respectively, and at as perfect liberty to choose
and employ their own means of protecting property and
preserving peace and order within their respective limits, as
they have ever been under any administration. Those who have
voted for Mr. Lincoln have expected and still expect this; and
they would not have voted for him had they expected otherwise.
I regard it as extremely fortunate for the peace of the whole
country that this point, upon which the Republicans have been
so long and so persistently misrepresented, is now brought to a
practical test and placed beyond the possibility of a doubt.
Disunionists _per se_ are now in hot haste to get out of the
Union, because they perceive they cannot much longer maintain
an apprehension among the Southern people that their homes and
firesides and their lives are to be endangered by the action of
the Federal Government. With such "Now or never" is the maxim.
I am rather glad of the military preparations in the South. It
will enable the people the more easily to suppress any
uprisings there, which those misrepresentations of purpose may
have encouraged.
These words were incorporated in Mr. Trumbull's speech and were printed
in the newspapers, and the manuscript in Lincoln's handwriting is still
preserved.[39]
But Mr. Lincoln's record neither hastened nor retarded the secession of
the Southern States. The words he had previously spoken or written were
as completely disregarded by the promoters of disunion as were those
uttered now by Trumbull.
Jefferson Davis was not one of the hot-heads of secession. His speech in
the Senate on January 10, 1861, reads like that of a man who sincerely
regretted the step that South Carolina had taken, and deprecated that
which Mississippi was about to take, although he justified it afterward,
but he believed that the coercion of South Carolina would be the
death-knell of the Union. His remedy for the existing menace was not to
reinforce the garrison at Fort Sumter, but to withdraw it altogether, as
a preliminary step to negotiations with the seceding state. Yet he did
not say what terms South Carolina would agree to, or that she would
agree to any. That Lincoln was in no mood to offer terms to South
Carolina or to any seceding states which did not say what would satisfy
them, was made emphatic in a letter from Dr. William Jayne to Trumbull,
dated Springfield, January 28, saying that Governor Yates had received
telegraph dispatches from the governors of Ohio and Indiana, asking
whether Illinois would appoint peace commissioners in response to a call
sent out by the governor of Virginia to meet at Washington on the 4th of
February. "Lincoln," he continued, "advised Yates not to take any action
at present. He said he would rather be hanged by the neck till he was
dead on the steps of the Capitol than buy or beg a peaceful
inauguration."
The following letters from Lincoln throw light on his attitude toward a
compromise at a somewhat earlier stage:
_Private and Confidential_
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 10, 1860.
HON. L. TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: Let there be no compromise on the question of
_extending_ slavery. If there be, all our labor is lost, and
ere long must be done over again. The dangerous ground--that
into which some of our friends have a hankering to run--is Pop.
Sov. Have none of it. Stand firm. The tug has to come; and
better now than any time hereafter.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
_Confidential_
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 17, 1860.
HON. L. TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: Yours enclosing Mr. Wade's letter, which I
herewith return, is received. If any of our friends do prove
false and fix up a compromise on the territorial question, I am
for fighting again--that is all. It is but a repetition for me
to say I am for an honest enforcement of the Constitution--the
fugitive slave clause included.
Mr. Gilmore of N. C. wrote me, and I answered confidentially,
enclosing my letter to Gov. Corwin to be delivered or not as he
might deem prudent. I now enclose you a copy of it.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
_Confidential_
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 21, 1860.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: Thurlow Weed was with me nearly all day yesterday,
and left last night with three short resolutions which I drew
up, and which, or the substance of which, I think, would do
much good if introduced and unanimously supported by our
friends. They do not touch the territorial question. Mr. Weed
goes to Washington with them; and says that he will first of
all confer with you and Mr. Hamlin. I think it would be best
for Mr. Seward to introduce them, and Mr. Weed will let him
know that I think so. Show this to Mr. Hamlin, but beyond him
do not let my name be known in the matter.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
The first of the three resolutions named was to amend the Constitution
by providing that no future amendment should be made giving Congress the
power to interfere with slavery in the states where it existed by law.
The second was for a law of Congress providing that fugitive slaves
captured should have a jury trial. The third recommended that the
Northern States should "review" their personal liberty laws.
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 24, 1860.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: I expect to be able to offer Mr. Blair a place in
the Cabinet, but I cannot as yet be committed on the matter to
any extent whatever.
Dispatches have come here two days in succession that the forts
in South Carolina will be surrendered by order, or consent, at
least, of the President. I can scarcely believe this, but if it
prove true, I will, if our friends in Washington concur,
announce publicly at once that they are to be retaken after the
inauguration. This will give the Union men a rallying cry, and
preparations will proceed somewhat on this side as well as on
the other.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
Trumbull's own opinions about compromise were set forth in a
correspondence with E. C. Larned, an eminent lawyer of Chicago. Under
date January 7, Larned sent him a series of resolutions written by
himself which were passed at a great Union meeting composed of
Republicans and Democrats in Metropolitan Hall. One of these resolutions
suggested "great concessions" to the South without specifying what they
should be. Larned asked Trumbull to read them and advise him whether
they met his approval. Trumbull replied under date January 16, at
considerable length, saying:
In the present condition of things it is not advisable, in my
opinion, for Republicans to concede or talk of conceding
anything. The people of most of the Southern States are mad and
in no condition to listen to reasonable propositions. They
persist in misrepresenting the Republicans and many of them are
resolved on breaking up the Government before they will
consider what guarantees they want. To make or propose
concessions to such a people, only displays the weakness of the
Government. A Union which can be destroyed at the will of any
one state is hardly worth preserving. The first question to be
determined is whether we have a Government capable of
maintaining itself against a state rebellion. When that
question is effectually settled and the Republicans are
installed in power, I would willingly concede almost anything,
not involving principle, for the purpose of overcoming what I
regard the misapprehension and prejudice of the South, but to
propose concessions in advance of obtaining power looks to me
very much like a confession in advance that the principles on
which we carried the election are impracticable and wrong. Had
the Republican party from the start as one man refused to
entertain or talk compromises and concessions, and given it to
be understood that the Union was to be maintained and the laws
enforced at all hazards, I do not believe secession would ever
have obtained the strength it now has.
The pages of the _Congressional Globe_ of 1860-61 make the two most
intensely interesting volumes in our country's history. They embrace the
last words that the North and South had to say to each other before the
doors of the temple of Janus were thrown open to the Civil War. As the
moment of parting approached, the language became plainer, and its most
marked characteristic was not anger, not hatred between disputants, but
failure to understand each other. It was as though the men on either
side were looking at an object through glasses of different color, or
arguing in different languages, or worshiping different gods. Typical of
the disputants were Davis and Trumbull, men of equally strong
convictions and high breeding, and moved equally by love of country as
they understood that term. Davis made three speeches, two of which were
on the general subject of debate, and one his farewell to the Senate.
The first, singularly enough, was called out by a resolution offered by
a fellow Southerner and Democrat, Green, of Missouri (December 10,
1860), who proposed that there should be an armed police force provided
by Federal authority to guard, where necessary, the boundary line
between the slaveholding and the non-slaveholding states, to preserve
the peace, prevent invasions, and execute the Fugitive Slave Law. This
scheme Davis considered a quack remedy, and he declared that he could
not give it his support because it looked to the employment of force to
bring about a condition of security which ought to exist without force.
The present want of security, he contended, could not be cured by an
armed patrol, but only by a change of sentiment in the majority section
of the Union toward the minority section. Upon this test he argued in a
dispassionate way for a considerable space, ending in these words:
This Union is dear to me as a Union of fraternal states. It
would lose its value to me if I had to regard it as a Union
held together by physical force. I would be happy to know that
every state now felt that fraternity which made this Union
possible; and if that evidence could go out, if evidence
satisfactory to the people of the South could be given, that
_that_ feeling existed in the hearts of the Northern people,
you might burn your statute books and we would cling to the
Union still. But it is because of their conviction that
hostility and not fraternity now exists in the hearts of the
Northern people, that they are looking to their reserved rights
and to their independent powers for their own protection. If
there be any good, then, which we can do, it is by sending
evidence to them of that which I fear does not exist--the
purpose in your constituents to fulfill in the spirit of
justice and fraternity all their constitutional obligations. If
you can submit to them that evidence, I feel confidence that
with the evidence that aggression is henceforth to cease, will
terminate all the measures for defense. Upon you of the
majority section it depends to restore peace and perpetuate the
Union of equal states; upon us of the minority section rests
the duty to maintain our equality and community rights; and the
means in one case or the other must be such as each can
control.[40]
This was the explicit confirmation of what Lincoln had said, in his
Cooper Institute speech a year earlier, was the chief difficulty of the
North: "We must not only let them (the South) alone, but we must somehow
convince them that we do let them alone."
The best speech made on the Republican side of the chamber during this
momentous session of Congress was made by Trumbull on the night of March
2. It was a speech adverse to the Crittenden Compromise, and was a reply
to Crittenden's final speech in support of it. This measure was a joint
resolution proposing certain amendments to the Constitution, the first
of which proposed to apply the old Missouri Compromise line, of 36° 30'
north latitude, to all the remaining territory of the United States, so
that in all territory north of it, then owned or thereafter acquired,
slavery should be prohibited, and that in all south of it, then owned or
thereafter acquired, slavery should be recognized as existing, and that
the right of property in slaves there should be protected by Federal
law. It was offered on the 18th of December, 1860, and debated till the
2d of March following, when it was defeated by yeas 19, nays 20, all the
Republicans voting against it except Seward, who did not vote and was
not paired.[41]
Just before the vote was taken, Crittenden tried to amend his measure by
striking out the words "hereafter acquired" as to the territory south of
36° 30', which he said was giving great offense in some parts of the
North. This was not in the measure as originally proposed by him, but he
had accepted it as an amendment offered by his colleague, Senator
Powell. It was then too late to amend except by unanimous consent, and
Hunter, of Virginia, objected. In this last debate, Mason drew attention
to the minimum demands of Virginia as expressed by her legislature.
These were the Crittenden Compromise, including territory "hereafter
acquired," and the right of slaveholders to pass with their slaves
through the free states with protection to their slave property in
transit. Mason intimated pretty plainly that even this would not satisfy
him, for which he received some castigation at the hands of Douglas. The
latter was a steady supporter of the Crittenden Compromise, but he
maintained throughout the debate that no cause for disunion would
exist, even if the measure were defeated, and that none would exist if
the Federal Government should attempt to compel a state or any number of
states to obey the Federal law.
Simultaneously with the rejection of the Crittenden Compromise, the
Senate, by a two-thirds majority, passed a joint resolution to amend the
Constitution by adding to it the following article:
Article XIII. No amendment shall be made to the Constitution
which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish
or interfere, within any state, with the domestic institutions
thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by
the laws of said state.
This was a resolution introduced by Corwin, of Ohio. It had already
passed the House by a two-thirds majority, but it fell into the limbo of
forgotten things before sunrise of the 4th of March.
During this crisis Trumbull was receiving hundreds of letters from his
constituents, nearly all exhorting him to stand firm. The only ones
counseling compromise were from the commercial classes in Chicago, and
of these there were fewer than might have been expected in view of the
threatened danger to trade and industry. The dwellers in the small towns
and on the farms were almost unanimously opposed to the Crittenden
Compromise. A few letters are here cited from representative men in
their respective localities:
A. B. Barrett (Mount Vernon, January 5) has taken pains to
gather the opinions of Republicans in his neighborhood in
reference to the secession movement and finds them, without a
single exception, in favor of enforcing the laws and opposed to
any concession on the part of Congress which would recognize
slavery as right in principle, or as a national institution.
J. H. Smith (Bushnell, January 7) contends that the Chicago
platform was a contract between the Republican voters and the
men elected to office by them, and the voters expect them to
live up to it, to the very letter. "If the South wants to fight
let them pitch in as soon as they please; we would rather fight
than allow slavery to go into any more territory." Encloses
resolutions to this purport passed by a public meeting of
citizens of his town.
A. C. Harding (Monmouth, January 12) is pained to hear a rumor
that some Republicans in Washington are considering a bill to
make a slave state south of 36° 30', thus sanctioning a slave
code by Congress. Any concessions that shall violate the
pledges of the Republican party will instantly turn the guns of
our truest friends upon those who thus give strength to the
Southern rebels. Neither Adams nor Seward nor Lincoln can for a
moment escape the fatal consequences if they yield their
principles at the threat of disunion.
Wait Talcott (Rockford, January 17) has just finished reading
Seward's speech. It leads him to fear that yielding to the
South, and calling a national convention under their threat,
will embolden them, whenever the result of an election does not
suit them, to insist that the victors shall take the place of
the vanquished.
G. Koerner (Belleville, January 21): The Democratic Convention
at Springfield has done some mischief by inflaming the lower
order of the Democracy and confirming them in their seditious
views. On the other hand, it has disgusted the better class of
Democrats. It was a sort of indignation meeting of all the
disappointed candidates, office-seekers, and losers of bets. A
few Republicans are giving way under the pressure, but upon the
whole the party stands firm. "Has secession culminated or is
worse to come? I am prepared for the application of force. In
fact, a collision is inevitable. Why ought not we to test our
Government instead of leaving it to our children?"
H. G. McPike (Alton, January 24): "Our people believe the
Constitution to be good enough. Let it alone. A compromise of
any principle dissolves the Republican party, takes the great
moral heart out of it, and will in so far bring ruin on the
Government."
J. M. Sturtevant, president of Illinois College (Jacksonville,
January 30), protests against the tone of Mr. Seward's speech.
Says that the solid phalanx of thoughtful, conscientious,
earnest, religious men who form the backbone of the Republican
party will never follow Mr. Seward, or any other man, in the
direction in which he seems to be leading. "We want the
Constitution as it is, the Union as the Fathers framed it, and
the Chicago platform. And we will support no man and no party
that surrenders these or any portion of them."
Grant Goodrich (Chicago, January 31) is convinced by his
intercourse with the mass of Republicans, and with many
Democrats, that any concessions by which additional rights are
given to slavery will end the Republican party. There will be a
division of the Republicans; a new party will arise, which will
include the entire German element and which will be as hostile
to the "Union-saving" Republicans as to the Democrats, and much
more intolerant to their former allies.
E. Peck (Springfield, February 1) says that the proposition to
send commissioners to Washington was passed by the legislature
as a matter of necessity, because, if the Republicans had not
taken the lead, the Democrats would have done so, and would
have obtained the help of a sufficient number of weak-kneed
Republicans to make a majority. Mr. Lincoln would have
preferred that commissioners be not appointed.
W. H. Herndon (Springfield, February 9): "Are our Republican
friends going to concede away dignity, Constitution, Union,
laws, and justice? If they do, I am their enemy now and
forever. I may not have much influence, but I will help tear
down the Republican party and erect another in its stead.
Before I would buy the South, by compromises and concessions,
to get what is the people's due, I would die, rot, and be
forgotten, willingly."
Samuel C. Parks (Lincoln, Logan County, February 11) is opposed
to the Crittenden Compromise, because the integrity of the
Republican party and the salvation of the country require that
this grand drama of secession, disunion, and treason be played
out entirely. Either slavery or freedom must rule this country,
or there must be a final separation of the free and the slave
states. No compromise will do any permanent good. On the
contrary, if the territorial question is compromised now, it
will but postpone, aggravate, and prolong the contest.
Considers it mean and cowardly to leave to our children a great
national trouble that we might settle ourselves.
January 2, 1861, Trumbull wrote to Governor Yates advising that some
steps be taken in the way of military preparations, saying:
The impression is very general here that Buchanan has waked up
at last to the sense of his condition and will make an effort
to enforce the laws and protect the public property. That this
was his determination two days ago, I have the best reasons for
knowing, but he is so feeble, vacillating, and irresolute, that
I fear he will not act efficiently; and some even say that he
has again fallen into the hands of the disunionists. This I
cannot believe. If he does his duty with tolerable efficiency,
even at this late day, there will be no serious difficulty. The
states which resolved themselves out of the Union would be
coming back before many months. But if he continues to side
with the disunionists, we cannot avoid serious trouble, for in
that event I think the traitors would be encouraged to attempt
to take possession here, and most of the public property and
munitions of war would be placed in the hands of the
disunionists before the 4th of March. In view of the present
condition of affairs and the uncertainty as to the future, I
think it no more than prudent that our state should be making
some preparations to organize its military, or get up volunteer
companies, so as to be ready to come to the support of the
Constitution and the laws if the occasion should require. I
think that there will be no occasion for troops here, and that
the inauguration will probably take place. But take place it
must, and at Washington, even though a hundred thousand men
have to come here to effect it. The Government is a failure
unless this is done.
Governor Yates's reply, if any, is not found in the Trumbull papers, but
a letter from him dated Springfield, January 22, says that Frank P.
Blair, Jr., had just arrived from St. Louis with information that the
secessionists in Missouri had formed a plot to seize the United States
Arsenal at St. Louis, which was the only depot of arms west of
Pittsburg. If this should be attempted, Yates said it would lead to
serious complications and perhaps a collision between Illinois and
Missouri, since it could not be permitted that this great arsenal,
intended for the use of the entire West, should fall into the hands of
enemies of the Union. He asked Trumbull to see General Scott at once and
insist that something be done which would obviate the necessity of
action on the part of the state of Illinois.
Some letters from Mrs. Trumbull to her son Walter, who was on a warship
in foreign parts during the month of January, 1861, supply a few items
of interest.
January 21 she says:
The Senators of Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida yesterday
took formal leave of the Senate. The speech of Clay, of
Alabama, was very ugly, but that of Davis was pathetic, and
even Republican ladies were moved to tears. Gov. Pickens of S.
C. sent for $300 due him as Minister to Russia, and the
Treasurer sent him a draft on the sub-treasury at Charleston
which the Rebels had seized.
January 24:
Called at Dr. Sunderland's[42] yesterday. He said that in
talking with a disunionist a few days ago he asked what the
South demanded and what would satisfy them. He replied that the
North must be uneducated, or educated differently; their
sentiments must be changed, and it can't be done in this
generation.
Just before starting home, Toombs's coachman, strange to say,
deserted his kind master for a trip on the Underground
Railroad, greatly to the disgust of Mrs. Toombs. She was met by
Mrs. Judge McLean, who said to her, "Mrs. Toombs, are you going
to leave us?" "Yes," she replied, "I am glad enough to go; here
I am riding in a hack!" It was very hard, very disgusting, and
Mrs. McLean, instead of trying to hunt up her fugitive for her,
told her that when the South had all seceded, they would have
Canada right on their borders, and where one now escaped, there
would then be a hundred.
January 26:
The city begins to present a warlike appearance. Two companies
are stationed quite near us on E St. and others are placed in
Judiciary Square near the Capitol, and at the President's,
about 700 in all. A company of light artillery arrived
yesterday morning, soon after which cannonading was heard,
volley after volley. I supposed the thunder of the cannon was
meant to convey wholesome instruction to the revolutionists,
but I learned this evening that it was a salute for Kansas,
which is now a state. Thirty-four guns were fired. I understood
that some of the ladies at the National Hotel were so alarmed
that they began to pack their trunks so as to retreat promptly
with all their luggage. I believe that Gen. Scott intends to
have more troops here, but the O. P. F.[43] countermands most
of his orders. The Cabinet find him very troublesome even now;
he still listens to Slidell and others.
A set of compromisers came here a few days since from New York
with a string of resolutions and explained them to Senator
King, hoping he would endorse them. Mr. King read them and
handed them back silently. Said the spokesman: "I trust they
meet your approval, they are good resolutions; you approve
them, do you not, Mr. King?" He answered in his good-humored,
laughing way, but withal very firmly: "I would resign my seat
first and I think I would rather die." The same men went to
your father urging him to support them, and stated that New
York would not defend the public property within her limits
unless Congress adopted some such action. Your father told them
that if that was to be the course of New York, we might as well
know it now as ever, and refused to have anything to do with
their resolutions.
In the same letter she writes:
Mrs. McLean called yesterday. She said they dined at the White
House once while the President was making up his mind whether
or not to recall Major Anderson. The judge took the President
aside to make some inquiries about the Major. Buchanan replied
that he had exceeded his instructions and must be recalled. The
Judge raised his hand with vehemence, almost in the President's
face, and asserted with emphasis: "You dare not do it, sir, you
dare not do it." And he did not.
Probably this is the only instance on record where a Judge of the
Supreme Court shook his fist in the face of the President after dining
with him at the White House. It is not improbable that the vehemence of
the venerable Judge was one of the potent reasons deterring Buchanan
from ordering Anderson to return from Fort Sumter to Fort Moultrie.[44]
TRUMBULL'S SPEECH AGAINST THE CRITTENDEN COMPROMISE
[In the Senate, March 2, 1861.]
MR. TRUMBULL. Mr. President, the long public service of the
Senator from Kentucky, his acknowledged patriotism and devotion
to the Union, give great importance to whatever he says; and in
all he has said in favor of the Union and its preservation, and
the maintenance of the Constitution, I most heartily concur. No
man shall exceed me in devotion to the Constitution and the
Union. But, while this is so, what the Senator says of those of
us who disagree with him as to the mode of preserving the Union
and maintaining the peace of the country is well calculated, in
consequence of the position he occupies, to mislead and
prejudice the public mind as to our true position. Does he
expect, or can he expect, that compromises will be made and
concessions yielded when he talks of the great party of this
country, constituting a majority of its people, as being wedded
to a dogma set up above the Constitution; when he talks of us
as usurping all the territories, as ostracizing all the people
of the South, and denying them their rights? Is that the way to
obtain compromises? Instead of turning his denunciation upon
those who violate the Constitution and trample the flag of the
country in the dust, he turns to us and talks to us of
usurpations, of our dogmas; tells us that for a straw we are
willing to dissolve the Union and involve the country in blood.
Why are not these appeals made and these rebukes administered
to the men who are involving the country in blood? If it is a
straw for us to yield, is it anything more than a straw for
them to demand? If it is a trifle for us to concede, is it any
larger than a trifle which the South demands, and to obtain
which it is willing to destroy this Union, which he has so
beautifully and so highly eulogized?
Sir, I have heard this charge against the people of the North,
of a desire to usurp the whole of the common territories, till
I am tired of the accusation. It has been made and refuted ten
thousand times. Not a man in the North denies to every citizen
of the South the same right in a territory that he claims for
himself. And who are the people of the South? Slaveholders? Not
one white citizen in twenty of the population in the South owns
a slave. The nineteen twentieths of the non-slaveholding
population of the South are forgotten, while the one twentieth
is spoken of as "the South." The man who owns a slave in the
South has just as much right in the territory as a man in the
North who owns no slave. If the Southerner cannot take his
negro slave to the territory, neither can the Northern man.
Again, sir, the Senator talks of the rights of the States to
the common territories. The territories do not belong to the
States; they are the property of the General Government; and
the state of Kentucky has no more right in a territory than has
the city of Washington, or any county in the state of Maryland.
As a state, Kentucky has no right in a territory, nor has
Illinois; but the territories belong to the Federal government,
and are disposed of to the citizens of the United States,
without regard to locality.
But, sir, I propose to inquire what it is that has brought the
country to its present condition; what it is that has
occasioned this disruption, this revolution in a portion of the
country. Many years ago an attempt was made in the state of
South Carolina to disrupt this Government, at that time on
account of the revenue system. It failed. The disunionists of
1832 were put down by General Jackson; and from that day to
this there have been secessionists _per se_, men who have been
struggling continuously and persistently to propagate their
doctrine wherever they could find followers; and, I am sorry to
say, they seem to have impressed the public mind of the South,
to a great extent, with their notions. In 1850, the effort to
break up the Government was renewed. It was then settled by
what were known as the compromise measures of that year. The
great men of that day--Clay, Webster, Cass, and others--took
part in that settlement, and it was then supposed that the
settlement would be permanent. The controversy of 1850 was not
in regard to a tariff, but in regard to the negro question; the
very question which General Jackson had prophesied, in the
nullification times, would be the one upon which the next
attempt would be made to destroy the Government. After a long
struggle, the compromise measures of 1850 were passed. Quiet
was given to the country; all parties in all sections of the
country acquiesced in the settlement then made. Resolutions
were offered in this body denouncing any person who should
attempt again to introduce the question of slavery into
Congress. Speeches were made, in which Senators declared that
they would never again speak upon the subject in the Congress
of the United States. It was said that the slavery question was
forever removed from the halls of Congress, and we then
supposed that the country would continue quiet on this exciting
subject. But, sir, in 1854, notwithstanding the pledges which
had been given in 1850, notwithstanding the quiet of the
country, when no man was agitating the slavery question; when
no petitions came from the states, counties, cities, or towns,
from villages or individuals, asking a disturbance of former
compromises; when all was quiet, of a sudden a proposition was
sprung in this chamber to unsettle the very questions which had
been put to rest by the compromises of 1850. A proposition was
then introduced to repeal one of the compromises which had been
recognized by the acts of 1850; for the Missouri Compromise,
which excluded slavery from Kansas and Nebraska, was, by
reference, directly and in express terms, reaffirmed by the
compromises of 1850. But, sir, in the beginning of 1854, that
fatal proposition was introduced and embodied in the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, which declared that the eighth section of
the act for the admission of Missouri into the Union, which had
passed in 1820, and which excluded slavery from Kansas and
Nebraska, should be repealed, it being declared to be "the true
intent and meaning of the act not to introduce slavery into any
state or territory, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave
the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their
domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States"--a little stump speech, as
Colonel Benton denominated it, introduced into the body of the
bill, which has since become as familiar to all the children of
the land, from its frequent repetition, as Mother Goose's
stories. That was the fatal act which brought about the
agitation of the slavery question; and on the repeal of the
Missouri Compromise followed the disturbances in the settlement
of Kansas. That act led to civil war in Kansas, to the burning
of towns, to the invasion from Missouri, to all the horrors and
anarchy which reigned in that ill-fated territory for several
years, all of which is too fresh in the recollection of the
American people to require repetition. And, sir, from that day
to this, the doctrine which it is pretended was enunciated in
1854 in the Kansas-Nebraska Act, of non-intervention, of
popular sovereignty, for it is known under various names, has
been preached all over the country, until in the election of
1860, it was repudiated and scouted, North and South, by a
majority of the people in every state in the Union; and even at
this session, it has been thrust in here upon almost every
occasion, as the grand panacea that was to give peace to the
country; whereas it was the very thing which gave rise to all
the difficulties. The disunionists per se have seized hold of
the disturbances growing out of the slavery question, all
occasioned by this fatal step in 1854, to inflame the public
mind of the South, and bring about the state of things which
now exists.
But, sir, the Union survived the disunion movement of 1832; it
survived the excitement upon the slavery question in 1850; it
survived the disturbances in Kansas in 1855 and 1856,
consequent upon the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. It
survived them all without an actual attempt at disruption,
until we came down to 1860, and Abraham Lincoln was elected
President; and even now, notwithstanding the dissatisfaction at
his election in some portions of the country, and all the
previous troubles, the laws to-day would have had force in
every part of the Union, and secession would have been checked
in its very origin, had the Government done its duty and not
acted in complicity with the men who had resolved to destroy
it.
The secession movement, then, dates back several years. It
received an impetus in 1850; another in 1854; and in 1860, by
the connivance and the assistance of the Government itself, it
acquired the strength which it now has. What has been the
policy of the expiring administration? Its Cabinet officers
boasting of their complicity with the men who were plotting the
destruction of the Government; openly proclaiming in the face
of the world that they had used their official power, while
members of the Cabinet, and sworn to protect and preserve the
Government, to furnish the means for its destruction; openly
acknowledging before the world that they had used the power
which their positions gave them to discredit the Government,
and also to furnish arms and munitions of war to the men who
were conspiring together to assault its fortifications, and
seize its property; openly boasting that they had taken care,
during their public service, to see that the arms of the
Federal Government were placed in convenient positions for the
use of those who designed to employ them for its destruction.
More than this, members, while serving in the other branch of
Congress, go to the Executive of the United States, and tell
him, "Sir, we are taking steps in South Carolina to break up
this Government; you have forts and fortifications there; they
are but poorly manned; now if you will leave them in the
condition they are until the state of South Carolina gets ready
to take possession, we will wait until that time before we
seize them"; and the Executive of the nation asks that the
treasonable proposition be put in writing, and files it away.
Why, sir, is there another capital on the face of the globe, to
which men could come from state or province, and inform the
executive head that they were about to take steps to seize the
public property belonging to the Government, and warn the
Executive to leave it in its insecure and undefended state
until they should be prepared to take possession, and they be
permitted to depart? Is there another capital on the face of
the globe where commissioners coming to the Executive under
these circumstances would not have been arrested on the spot
for treason? But your Government, if it did not directly
promise not to arm its forts, certainly took no steps to
protect its public property; and this went on, until a gallant
officer who was in command of less than a hundred men in the
harbor of Charleston, acting upon his own responsibility,
thought proper to throw his little force into a fort where he
could protect himself; and then it was that these insurgents,
rebelling against the Government, demanded that he should be
withdrawn, and the Executive then was forced to take position.
Then his Cabinet officers who had been in conspiracy with the
plotters of treason, then the Chief Magistrate himself was
forced to take position. He must openly withdraw his forces,
and surrender the public property he was sworn to protect,
openly violate the oath he had taken to support the
Constitution of the United States, and execute the laws, and
take side with traitors; or else he must leave Major Anderson
where he was. Exposed to public view, brought to this dilemma,
I am glad to say that even then, at that late day, the
President of the United States concluded to take sides for the
Union; that even he came out, though feebly it was, on the part
of the United States, and his Secretary of War retired from his
Cabinet, not in disgrace, so far as its executive head was
concerned, for he parted pleasantly with the President of the
United States, but he retired because the President would not
carry out the policy which he understood to have been agreed
upon, which was to leave the fortifications in a position that
Carolina might take them whenever she thought proper.
But, sir, notwithstanding this, the Executive of the nation,
disregarding the advice of the Lieutenant-General who commands
the armies of the United States, and who had warned him months
before of the movements which were taking place to seize the
public property at the South, still leaves the property
unprotected; and the insurgents go on in some of the states,
before even passing ordinances of secession, and continue to
seize the public property; to capture the troops of the United
States; to take possession of the forts; to fire into its
vessels; to take down its flag; until they have at this time in
their possession fortifications which have cost the Government
more than $5,000,000, and which mount more than a thousand
guns.
All this has been done without any effort on the part of the
Government to protect the public property; and this is the
reason that secession has made the head it has. Why, sir, let
me ask, is it that the United States to-day has possession of
Fort Sumter? Can you tell me why is Fort Sumter in possession
of the United States? Because there are a hundred soldiers in
it--for no other reason. Why is Fort Moultrie in possession of
the insurgents? Because there were no men there to protect it;
and it is now matter of history that, had the Executive done
his duty, and placed a hundred men in Fort Moultrie, a hundred
in Castle Pinckney, and a hundred in Fort Sumter, Charleston
Harbor to-day would have been open, and your revenues would
have been collected there, as elsewhere throughout the United
States.
Will it be said that Carolina would have attacked those forts,
thus garrisoned? She does not attack a hundred men in Fort
Sumter. It is a wonder that she does not. The little, feeble
garrison there is well calculated to invite attack; but this
thing of secession, under the policy of the Administration, has
been made a holiday affair in the South. This great Government,
one of the most powerful on the face of the globe, is falling
to pieces just from its own imbecility.
MR. WIGFALL. Mr. President--
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (MR. BRIGHT). Does the Senator from
Illinois yield the floor?
MR. TRUMBULL. I have some further observations to make. I will
yield for a single question; not for a speech.
MR. WIGFALL. For a single question. I do not wish to interrupt
the Senator if it is not agreeable to him. I desire to ask a
single question.
MR. TRUMBULL. I have no objection to the question.
MR. WIGFALL. I understand the Senator to object to the course
that the present outgoing Administration has pursued in
reference to the forts. I know the Senator's candor, directness
of purpose, fairness, and boldness of statement; and I desire
to know whether the succeeding Administration will pursue the
same peace policy of leaving the forts in the possession of the
seceding states, or whether they will attempt to recapture
them?
MR. TRUMBULL. The Senator will find out my opinions on this
subject before I conclude. The opinions of the incoming
Administration, I trust, he will learn to-morrow from the
eastern front of the capitol.
MR. WIGFALL. I trust we shall, sir.
MR. TRUMBULL. I speak for myself, without knowing what may be
said in the inaugural of to-morrow; but I apprehend that the
Senator will learn to-morrow that we have a Government; and
that will be the beginning of the maintenance of the Union.
MR. WIGFALL. I hope we may.
MR. TRUMBULL. While the forts in the South were left thus
unprotected, and to be seized by the first comers, where was
your army? Scattered beyond reach, and sent to the frontiers,
so as not to be made available when it was wanted. And where
was your navy? The navy of the United States, when it was known
that the secession movement was on foot, was sent to distant
seas, until there was not at the command of the Secretary of
the Navy a single vessel, except one carrying two guns, that
could enter Charleston Harbor--a small vessel destined, I
believe, to take supplies to the African squadron, which
carried two guns. Does anybody suppose this was accidental? If
it were a question of fact to be tried before an intelligent
jury in any part of Christendom, does any one doubt that the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy would both be
convicted of having purposely, and by design, removed the army
and navy out of reach, in order that the forts might be seized,
and that the secession movement might progress? And how has it
been from that day to this? Irresolution and indecision on the
part of the Executive--one day sending a vessel with troops to
Charleston, and the next countermanding the order; and the
Senator from Texas, with a taste which I cannot admire, spoke
in terms of derision of his country's flag, when it returned in
disgrace--"struck in the face," I think, was his
expression--from Charleston Harbor. I admit it was disgraceful;
but I am sorry it should have afforded the Senator from Texas,
a member of the Senate of the United States, as the eloquent
Senator from Kentucky said he was, any pleasure that such a
transaction should have occurred.
This, then, briefly, is the reason that this secession movement
has acquired the strength it has. It is because this Government
has either favored it, or refused to do anything to check it.
Notwithstanding the mistake of 1854, the country would have
survived it all, had we had a Government to take care of and
preserve it.
Now, sir, what are the remedies that are proposed for the
present condition of things, and what have they been from the
beginning? They have been propositions of compromise; and
Senators have spoken of peace, and of the horrors of civil war;
and gentlemen who have contended for the right of the people of
the territories to regulate their own affairs, and who have
been horrified at the idea of a geographical line dividing free
states from slave states, free territory from slave territory,
and who have proclaimed that the great principle upon which the
Revolution was fought was that of the right of the people to
govern themselves, and that it was monstrous doctrine for
Congress to interfere in any way with its own territories, come
forward here with propositions to divide the country on a
geographical line; and not only that, but to establish slavery
south of the line; and they call this the Missouri Compromise!
The proposition known as the "Crittenden Proposition" is no
more like the Missouri Compromise than is the Government of
Turkey like that of the United States. The Missouri Compromise
was a law declaring that in all the territory which we had
acquired from Louisiana, north of a certain line of latitude,
slavery or involuntary servitude should never exist. But it
said nothing about the establishment of slavery south of that
line. It was a compromise made in order to admit Missouri into
the Union as a slave state, in 1820. That was the consideration
for the exclusion of slavery from all the country north of 36°
30'. Now, sir, I have no objection to the restoration of the
Missouri Compromise as it stood in 1854, when the
Kansas-Nebraska Bill passed; and I have drawn up--and I intend
to offer it at the proper time as an amendment to some of these
propositions--a clause declaring that so much of the fourteenth
section of the act to organize the territories of Nebraska and
Kansas, approved the 30th of May, 1854, as repeals the Missouri
Compromise, and contains the little stump speech, shall be
repealed, and that we may hear no more of it, I trust, forever.
Since its authors have repudiated it, and have come forward
with a proposition to establish not the Missouri Compromise,
but to establish a geographical line running through the
territory which we now have, establishing slavery south of it,
and prohibiting it north, and providing that, in the territory
we may hereafter acquire, slavery shall be established south of
that line, I suppose we shall hear no more about leaving the
people "perfectly free to regulate their own affairs in their
own way"! The proposition known as the "Crittenden Compromise"
declares not only that, "in the territory south of the said
line of latitude, slavery of the African race is hereby
recognized as existing, and shall not be interfered with by
Congress"; but it provides further, that, in the territory we
shall hereafter acquire south of that line, slavery shall be
recognized, and not interfered with by Congress; but "shall be
protected as property by all the departments of the territorial
government during its continuance"; so that, if we make
acquisitions on the south of territories now free, and where,
by the laws of the land, the footsteps of slavery have never
been, the moment we acquire jurisdiction over them, the moment
the stars and stripes of the Republic float over those free
territories, they carry with them African slavery, established
beyond the power of Congress, and beyond the power of any
territorial legislature, or of the people, to keep it out; and
we are told that this is the Missouri Compromise! We are told
that slavery now exists in New Mexico; and I was sorry to find
even my friend from Oregon [Mr. Baker] ready to vote for this
proposition, which establishes slavery. Why, sir, suppose
slavery does exist in New Mexico; are you for putting a clause
into your Constitution that the people of New Mexico shall not
drive it out?
* * * * *
But, sir, unlike the Senator from Oregon, I will never agree to
put into the Constitution of the country a clause establishing
or making perpetual slavery anywhere. No, sir; no human being
shall ever be made a slave by my vote. No foot of God's soil
shall ever be dedicated to African slavery by my act--never,
sir. I will not interfere with it where I have no authority by
the Constitution to interfere; but I never will consent, the
people of the great Northwest, numbering more in white
population than all your Southern States together, never will
consent by their act to establish African slavery anywhere.
Why, sir, the seven free states of the Northwest, at the late
presidential election, cast three hundred thousand more votes
than all the fifteen Southern States together. Senators talk
about the North and the South, and speak of having two
Presidents, a Northern President and a Southern President, as
if we had no such country as the Northwest, more populous with
freemen than all the South. The people of the South and the
people of the East both will, by and by, learn, if they have
not already learned, that we have a country, and a great and
growing country, in the Northwest; a free country--made free,
too, by the act of Virginia herself. I do not propose to
discuss the House Resolution. I have said on any and all proper
occasions, and am willing to say at any time, to our brethren
of the South, we have no disposition, and never had any, and
have no power, if we had the disposition, to interfere with
your domestic institutions.
I think, then, sir, that none of these compromises will amount
to anything; but still I am willing to do this, and I think if
there is any difficulty it may be settled in this way: three of
the states of this Union, the state of Kentucky, the state of
New Jersey, and the State of Illinois, have called upon
Congress to call a convention of all the states for the purpose
of proposing amendments to the Constitution. I do not think the
Constitution needs amendment. In my judgment, the Constitution
as it is, is worthy to be lived up to and supported. I doubt if
we shall better it; but out of deference to those states, one
of which is my own state, I am willing to vote for the
resolution which has been introduced into this body
recommending to the various states to take into consideration
this proposition of calling a convention, in order to make such
amendments as may be deemed necessary by the states themselves
to this instrument. So far, I am willing to go. Would it not
have been better for the seceding states to have done that? Why
did they not propose, instead of attempting hastily to break up
the Government and seizing its public property, to call a
convention, in the constitutional form, of the various states,
and if the Federal Constitution needed amendment, amend it in
that way. No such proposition came from them; but Kentucky has
made the proposition for a convention, and I am willing to meet
her in the spirit in which it is made, and am ready, for one,
and would be glad if we could all unitedly pass the resolution
suggesting to the states to call a convention to make any and
all amendments to the Constitution which the exigencies of the
times may require.
The Senator from Texas wants to know how we are going to
preserve the Union; how we are going to stop the states from
seceding? And our Southern friends sometimes ask us to give
them something to stand upon in the South. The best political
foundation ever laid by mortal man upon which to plant your
foot is the Constitution. Take the old Constitution as your
fathers made it, and go to the people on that; rally them
around it, and not suffer it to be kicked about, rolled in the
dust, spit upon, and their efforts to be wasted in vain efforts
to amend it. Why, sir, has that old instrument ceased to be of
any value? These gentlemen who are talking about amending it,
and talking about guarantees as a condition to remain in the
Union, claim to be _par excellence_ the Union men. Why, sir, I
conceive I am a much better Union man than they. I am for the
Union under the Constitution as it is. I am willing, however,
that a convention should be called out of deference to those
who may wish to alter it; but I am not one of those who declare
that unless this provision is made, and unless this guarantee
is given, I will unite to destroy the Union, and cease to
observe the Constitution as it is.
Sir, the Southern States have been arming. The Senator from
Virginia [Mr. Mason] told us the other day that his state had
appropriated $1,500,000 to arm its citizens. For what? To arm
its citizens to fight against this Government; and then tell us
that, to a man, they will fight against this Government, if it
undertakes to enforce its laws, which they call coercion, the
coercion of a State! Why, sir, a government that has not the
power of coercing obedience to its laws is no government at
all. The very idea of a law without a sanction is an absurdity.
A government is not worth having that has not power to enforce
its laws. If the Senator from Texas wants to know my opinion, I
tell him yes, I am for enforcing the laws. Do you mean by that
you are going to march an army to coerce a state? No, sir; and
I do not mean the people of this country to be misled by this
confusion of terms about coercing a state. The Constitution of
the United States operates upon individuals; the laws operate
upon individuals; and whenever individuals make themselves
amenable to the laws, I would punish them according to the
laws. We may not always be able to do this. Why, sir, we have a
criminal code, and laws punishing larceny and murder and arson
and robbery and all these crimes; and yet murder is committed,
larcenies and robberies are committed, and the culprits are not
always punished and brought to justice. We may not be able, in
all instances, to punish those who conspire against the
Government. So far as it can be done, I am for executing the
laws; and I am for coercion. I am for settling, in the first
place, the question whether we have a government before making
compromises which leave us as powerless as before.
Sir, if my friend from Kentucky would employ some of that
eloquence of his which he uses in appealing to Republicans--and
talking about compromise--in defense of the Constitution as it
is, and in favor of maintaining the laws and the Government, we
should see a very different state of things in the country. If,
instead of coming forward with compromises, instead of asking
guarantees, he had put the fault where it belongs; if he called
upon the Government to do its duty; if, instead of blaming the
North for not making concessions where there is nothing to
concede, and not making compromises where there was nothing to
compromise about, he had appealed to the South, which was in
rebellion against the Government, and painted before them, as
only he could do it, the hideousness of the crimes they were
committing, and called upon them to return to their allegiance,
and upon the Government to enforce its authority, we would have
a very different state of things in this country to-day from
what now exists.
This, in my judgment, is the way to preserve the Union; and I
do not expect civil war to follow from it. You have only to put
the Government in a position to make itself respected, and it
will command respect. As I said before, five hundred troops in
Charleston would unquestionably have kept that port open; and
if you will arm the Government with sufficient authority to
maintain its laws and give us an honest Executive, I think you
will find the spread of secession soon checked; it will no
longer be a holiday affair. But while we submit to the disgrace
which is heaped upon us by those seceding states, while the
President of the United States says, "You have no right to
secede; but if you want to, you may, we cannot help it," you
may expect secession to spread.
Why, sir, the resolutions of the legislature of the state of
New York, which were passed early in the session, tendering to
the Federal Government all the resources of the state in money
and men to maintain the Government, had a most salutary effect
when it was heard here. I saw the effect of it at once. It was
the first blow at secession. Let the people of the North
understand that their services are required to maintain this
Union, and let them make known to the people of the South, to
the Government, and to the country, that the Union shall be
maintained; and the object is accomplished. Then you will find
Union men in the South. But while this secession fever was
spreading, and the Union men of the South had no support from
their Government, it is no wonder that state after state
undertook to withdraw from a confederacy which manifested no
disposition to maintain itself.
My remedy for existing difficulties is, to clothe the
Government with sufficient power to maintain itself; and when
that is done, and you have an Executive with the disposition to
maintain the authority of the Government, I do not believe that
a gun need be fired to stop the further spread of secession. I
believe, sir, after the new Administration goes into operation,
and the people of the South see, by its acts, that it is
resolved to maintain its authority, and, at the same time, to
make no encroachments whatever upon the rights of the people of
the South, the desire to secede will subside. When the people
of the Southern States, on the 5th of March, this year, and on
the 5th of March, 1862, shall find that, after a year has
transpired under a Republican administration, they are just as
safe in all their rights, just as little interfered with in
regard to their domestic institutions, as under any former
Administration, they will have no disposition to inaugurate
civil war and commence an attack upon the Federal Government.
Why, sir, some Senators talk about the Federal Government
making war. Who proposes it? The Southern people affect to
abhor civil war, when they, themselves, have commenced it.
Inhabitants of the six seceding states have begun the war. What
is war? Is firing into your vessels war? Is investing your
forts war? Is seizing your arsenals war? They have done it all,
and more; and then have the effrontery to say to the United
States, "Do not defend yourselves; do not protect your
Government; let it fall to pieces; let us do as we please, or
else you will have war." The highwayman meets you on the
street, demands your purse, and tells you to deliver it up, or
you will have a fight. You can always escape a fight by
submission. If in the right--and which is far better than to
submit to degradation--you can often escape collision by being
prepared to meet it. The moment the highwayman discovers your
preparation and ability to meet him, he flees away. Let the
Government be prepared, and we shall have no collision.
I cannot think the people of this country in the loyal states
would causelessly inaugurate civil war by attacking the
Government; and I regard all the states as loyal, which have
not undertaken to secede. I regard Kentucky and Tennessee and
Missouri as loyal states, just as much so as Illinois. Why,
sir, I live right upon the borders of Missouri, and I know that
the people across the river were, last fall, just as good Union
men as they were in Illinois. They never thought of secession
until the thing was started in South Carolina, and until some
persons here in Congress began to talk about guarantees,
instead of coming out for the Constitution and the Union as
they are. When Senators began to introduce propositions
demanding guarantees as a condition of continuing in the Union,
the real true Union men, in many instances, took sides with
them, and thus became, in fact, only conditional Unionists. I
am happy to say that they are getting over it, not only in
Missouri, but they are already cured of it in Tennessee, and I
trust in all the other states save those which, in their hurry,
and with inconsiderate zeal, have already taken measures, as
far as they could, to dissolve their connection with the
Government. Sir, I cannot think it possible that this great
Government is to go out without a struggle--a Government which
has been blessed so highly, and prospered so greatly. What
occasion is there for breaking it up? Are we not the happiest
people in the world? Do we not enjoy personal liberty and
religious freedom? What is it that the people of these Southern
States would have? Does anybody propose to interfere with their
domestic institutions? Nobody. Does anybody deny their equal
rights in the territories? Nobody. Why, sir, look at our
condition. We are one of the great nations of the world. At the
peace of 1783, we had, I think, something like three million
population; we have now more than thirty million. At that time
we had thirteen states; now we have thirty-four states; and our
territories have spread out until they extend across the
continent. The boundaries of the Republic embrace to-day a
greater extent of country than was contained within the Roman
Empire in the days of its greatest extent, or within the
empire of Alexander when he was said to have conquered the
world.
Sir, I cannot believe that this mad and insane attempt to break
up such a Government is to succeed. If my voice could reach
them, I would call upon my Southern brethren to pause, to
reflect, to consider if this Republican party has yet done them
any wrong. What complaints have they to make against us? We
have never wielded the power of Government--not for a day. Have
you of the South suffered any wrong at the hands of the Federal
Government? If you have, you inflicted it yourselves. We have
not done it. Is it the apprehension that you are going to
suffer wrong at our hands? We tell you that we intend no such
thing. Will you, then, break up such a government as this, on
the apprehension that we are all hypocrites and deceivers, and
do not mean what we say? Wait, I beseech you, until the
Government is put into operation under this new administration;
wait until you hear the inaugural from the President-elect;
and, I doubt not, it will breathe as well a spirit of
conciliation and kindness towards the South as towards the
North. While I trust it will disclose a resolute purpose to
maintain the Government, I doubt not it will also declare, in
unequivocal terms, that no encroachments shall be made upon the
constitutional rights of any state while he who delivers it
remains in power.
FOOTNOTES:
[38] Presumably Judge Read, of Pennsylvania.
[39] MS. in the collection of the late Major W. H. Lambert,
Philadelphia.
[40] _Cong. Globe_, 1860-61, p. 30.
[41] Trumbull's speech on the Crittenden Compromise, which was impromptu
and was delivered about midnight, is printed as an appendix to this
chapter.
[42] Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church.
[43] "Old Public Functionary"--a name that Buchanan in one of his
messages had given to himself.
[44] Jefferson Davis says, in his _Rise and Fall of the Confederate
States_, that Buchanan told him that "he thought it not impossible that
his homeward route would be lighted by burning effigies of himself and
that on reaching his home he would find it a heap of ashes."
CHAPTER VIII
CABINET-MAKING--THE DEATH OF DOUGLAS
During all this storm and stress the President-elect was at home
struggling with office-seekers. They came in swarms from all points of
the compass, and in the greatest numbers from Illinois. Judging from the
Trumbull papers alone it is safe to say that Illinois could have filled
every office in the national Blue Book without satisfying half the
demands. Every considerable town had several candidates for its own
post-office, and the applicants were generally men who had real claims
by reason of party service and personal character for the positions
which they sought. But there were exceptions, and Trumbull brought
trouble on his own head many times by taking part in the mêlée. Yet
there seemed to be no way of escape, even if he had wished to stand
aloof. The day of civil service reform had not yet dawned. Time has
kindly dropped its veil over those struggles except as relates to
Lincoln's Cabinet. The selection of the Cabinet will be considered
chronologically so far as the Trumbull papers throw light on it.
On his journey to Washington for the coming session of Congress,
Trumbull stopped a few days in New York. While there he received a call
from three gentlemen, who were a sub-committee of a larger number who
had been chosen, by the opponents of the Weed overlordship in New York
politics, to call upon Lincoln and remonstrate against the appointment
of Seward as a member of his Cabinet. The three men were William C.
Bryant, William Curtis Noyes, and A. Mann, Jr. They said that finding
it impracticable to see Lincoln, they had decided to call upon Trumbull
and ask him to present their views to the President-elect. Although
Trumbull disclaimed any peculiar knowledge or influence in respect of
Cabinet appointments, they proceeded to make their wishes known. They
said that a division had taken place in the Republican party of New
York, growing out of corruption at Albany during the last session of the
legislature, in which many Republicans were implicated; that so strong
was the feeling against certain transactions there, that but for the
presidential election the Republicans would have lost the state in
November; and that unless the transactions were repudiated by the coming
legislature the party would be beaten next year. They did not connect
Governor Seward personally with these transactions, but said that
several of his particular and most intimate friends, whom they named,
were implicated, and that if he went into the Cabinet he would draw them
after him.
Trumbull suggested to them that if Governor Seward went into the
Cabinet, as many people considered to be his due, it did not necessarily
follow that he would control the patronage of New York. Mr. Mann,
however, thought that this would be inevitable. He and Mr. Bryant and
Mr. Noyes expressed the opinion that Seward did not desire to go into
the Cabinet unless he could control the patronage and thus serve his
friends. They said they had no name to propose as a New York member of
the Cabinet, but they did not want the load of the Albany plunderers put
upon them, and that if it were so the party in New York would be ruined.
The purport of this interview was communicated by Trumbull to Lincoln by
letter dated Washington, December 2, 1860. Lincoln replied as follows:
_Private_
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Dec. 8, 1860.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL.
MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 2nd is received. I regret exceedingly
the anxiety of our friends in New York, of whom you write; but
it seems to me the sentiment in that State which sent a united
delegation to Chicago in favor of Gov. Seward ought not and
must not be snubbed, as it would be, by the omission to offer
Gov. S. a place in the Cabinet. _I will myself take care of the
question of "corrupt jobs"_ and see that justice is done to all
our friends of whom you wrote, as well as others.
I have written to Mr. Hamlin on this very subject of Gov. S.
and requested him to consult fully with you. He will show you
my note and enclosures to him; and then please act as therein
requested.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
The enclosures were a formal tender of the office of Secretary of State
to Seward and a private letter to him urging his acceptance of the
appointment. The note to Hamlin requested that if he and Trumbull
concurred in the step, the letters should be handed to Seward. They were
promptly delivered.
As matters stood at that time it was certainly due to Seward that a
place in the Cabinet should be offered to him and that it should be the
foremost place. He was still the intellectual premier of the party and
nobody could impair his influence but himself. The principal scheme at
Albany, to which Bryant and his colleagues alluded, was a "gridiron"
street railroad bill for New York City, for which Weed was the political
engineer.
Trumbull saw Horace Greeley at this time. The latter would not recommend
taking a Cabinet officer from New York at all, but he did suggest giving
the mission to France to John C. Frémont. If this advice had been
followed, and Frémont had been kept out of the country, Lincoln would
have been spared one of the most terrible thorns in the side of his
Administration; but fate ordained otherwise, for when Cameron was taken
into the Cabinet it became necessary to provide a place for Dayton, and
Paris was chosen for that purpose.
The Cameron affair was the greatest embarrassment that Lincoln had to
deal with before his inauguration. It was a fact of evil omen that David
Davis, one of the delegates of Illinois to the Chicago Convention,
assuming to speak by authority, made promises that Simon Cameron, of
Pennsylvania, and Caleb Smith, of Indiana, should have places in the
Cabinet if Lincoln were elected. In so doing, Davis went counter to the
only instructions he had ever received from Lincoln on that subject. The
day before the nomination was made, the editor of the Springfield
_Journal_ arrived at the rooms of the Illinois delegation with a copy of
the _Missouri Democrat_, in which Lincoln had marked three passages and
made some of his own comments on the margin. Then he added, in words
underscored: "Make no contracts that will bind me." Herndon says that
this paper was read aloud to Davis, Judd, Logan, and himself. Davis then
argued that Lincoln, being at Springfield, could not judge of the
necessities of the situation in Chicago, and, acting upon that view of
the case, went ahead with his negotiations with the men of Pennsylvania
and Indiana, and made the promises as above stated.[45]
Gideon Welles, in his book on Lincoln and Seward, says there was but one
member of the Cabinet appointed "on the special urgent recommendation
and advice of Seward and his friends, but that gentleman was soon, with
Seward's approval, transferred to Hyperborean regions in a way and for
reasons never publicly made known." That man was Cameron.
The implication here is that Simon Cameron was appointed a member of
Lincoln's Cabinet in consequence of Seward's influence, and at his
desire. That Seward and Weed labored for Cameron's appointment, and that
Weed had private reasons for doing so, is true, but the controlling
factor was something of earlier date. David Davis had left his
comfortable home at Bloomington and gone to Springfield to redeem his
convention pledges. He camped alongside of Lincoln and laid siege to
him. He had a very strong case _prima facie_. He had not only worked for
Lincoln with all his might, but he had paid three hundred dollars out of
his own pocket for the rent of the Lincoln headquarters during the
convention. This seems like a small sum now, but it was three times as
much as Lincoln himself could have paid then for any political purpose.
Moreover, Davis had actually succeeded in what he had undertaken.[46]
A. K. McClure says, in his book on "Lincoln and Men of War Times" (p.
139), that the men who immediately represented Cameron on that occasion
(John P. Sanderson and Alexander Cummings) really had little influence
with the Pennsylvania delegation, and that the change of votes from
Cameron to Lincoln was not due to this barter.
Nicolay and Hay say that after the election Lincoln invited Cameron to
come to Springfield, but they produce no evidence to that effect. On the
other hand, Gideon Welles, quoting from an interview with Fogg, of New
Hampshire (a first-rate authority), says that Cameron tried to get an
invitation to Springfield, but that Lincoln would not give it; that a
little later Cameron invited Leonard Swett to his home at Lochiel,
Pennsylvania, and that while there Swett took upon himself to extend
such an invitation in Lincoln's name, and that Lincoln, although
surprised, was obliged to acquiesce in what Swett had done.[47] Swett,
it may be remarked, was the _Fidus Achates_ of David Davis at all times.
Cameron came to Springfield with a troop of followers, and the result
was that, on the 31st of December, Lincoln handed him a brief note
saying that he intended to nominate him for Secretary of the Treasury,
or Secretary of War, at the proper time.
Almost immediately thereafter he received a shock from A. K. McClure in
the form of a telegram saying that the appointment of Cameron would
split the party in Pennsylvania and do irreparable harm to the new
Administration. He invited McClure to come to Springfield and give him
the particular reasons, but McClure does not tell us what the reasons
were. Evidently they were graver and deeper than a mere faction fight in
the party, or a question whether Cameron or Curtin should have the
disposal of the patronage. They included personal as well as political
delinquencies, but McClure declined to put them in writing.
After hearing them, Lincoln wrote another letter to Cameron dated
January 3, 1861, asking him to decline the appointment that had been
previously tendered to him, and to do so at once by telegraph. Cameron
did not decline. Consequently Lincoln repeated the request ten days
later, January 13.
In the mean time Trumbull, having learned that a place in the
Cabinet--probably the Treasury--had been offered to Cameron, wrote a
letter to Lincoln, dated January 3, advising him not to appoint him. To
this letter Lincoln wrote the following reply:
_Very Confidential_
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 7, 1861.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 3d is just received.... Gen. C. has
not been offered the Treasury and I think will not be. It seems
to me not only highly proper but a _necessity_ that Gov. Chase
shall take that place. His ability, firmness, and purity of
character produce this propriety; and that he alone can
reconcile Mr. Bryant and his class to the appointment of Gov.
S. to the State Department produces the necessity. But then
comes the danger that the protectionists of Pennsylvania will
be dissatisfied; and to clear this difficulty Gen. C. must be
brought to coöperate. He would readily do this for the War
Department. But then comes the fierce opposition to his having
any Department, threatening even to send charges into the
Senate to procure his rejection by that body. Now, what I would
most like, and what I think he should prefer too, under the
circumstances, would be to retain his place in the Senate, and
if that place has been promised to another let that other take
a respectable and reasonably lucrative place abroad. Also, let
Gen. C.'s friends be, with entire fairness, cared for in
Pennsylvania and elsewhere. I may mention before closing that
besides the very fixed opposition to Gen. C. he is more amply
recommended for a place in the Cabinet than any other man....
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
It is easy to read two facts between these lines: first, that although
Lincoln had written a letter four days earlier withdrawing his offer to
Cameron, some influence had intervened to cause new hesitations; second,
that Lincoln knew that Cameron ought not to be taken into the Cabinet at
all, and that he was now seeking some way to buy him off. The cause of
the new hesitation was that David Davis was clinging to him like a burr.
The last observation in the letter to Trumbull, that Cameron was more
amply recommended for a place in the Cabinet than any other man, points
to the activity of Seward and Weed in Cameron's behalf, of which Welles
gives details in the interview with Fogg above mentioned.
Before Lincoln's letter of the 7th reached Trumbull, the latter wrote
the following, giving his objections to Cameron more in detail:
WASHINGTON, Jan. 10, 1861.
HON. A. LINCOLN,
MY DEAR SIR: My last to you was written in a hurry--in the
midst of business in the Senate, and I have not a precise
recollection of its terms--but I desire now to write you a
little more fully in regard to this Cameron movement, and in
doing so, I have no other desire than the success of our
Administration. Cameron is very generally regarded as a
trading, unscrupulous politician. He has not the confidence of
our best men. He is a great manager and by his schemes has for
the moment created an apparent public sentiment in Penna. in
his favor. Many of the persons who are most strenuously urging
his appointment are doubtless doing it in anticipation of a
compensation. It is rather an ungracious matter to interfere to
oppose his selection and hence those who believe him unfit and
unworthy of the place [Copy illegible] seems to me he is
totally unfit for the Treasury Department. You may perhaps ask,
how, if these things are true, does he have so many friends,
and such, to support him, and such representative men. I am
surprised at it, but the world is full of great examples of men
succeeding for a time by intrigue and management. Report says
that C. secured Wilmot in his favor by assurances of support
for the Senate, and then secured Cowan by abandoning W. at the
last. The men who make the charges against Cameron are not all,
I am sure, either his personal enemies, or governed by
prejudice. Another very serious objection to Cameron is his
connection with Gov. Seward. The Governor is a man who acts
through others and men believe that Cameron would be his
instrument in the Cabinet. It is my decided conviction that
C.'s selection would be a great mistake and it is a pity he is
[Copy illegible] Gov. Seward's appointment is acquiesced in by
all our friends. Some wish it were not so, but regard it rather
as a necessity, and are not disposed to complain. There is a
very general desire here to have Gov. Chase go into the Cabinet
and in that wish I most heartily concur. In my judgment you had
better put Chase in the Cabinet and leave Cameron out, even at
the risk of a rupture with the latter, but I am satisfied he
can be got along with. He is an exacting man, but in the end
will put up with what he can get. He cannot get along in
hostility to you, and when treated fairly, and as he ought to
be, will acquiesce. This letter is, of course, strictly
confidential.
There is a reaction here and the danger of an attack on
Washington is, I think, over.
Very truly your friend,
LYMAN TRUMBULL.
The newspapers soon got hold of the fact that a place in the Cabinet had
been offered to Cameron. They did not learn that he had been asked to
decline it. Letters began to reach Trumbull urging him to use his
influence to prevent such a calamity. For example:
James H. Van Alen, New York, January 8, says honest men of all
parties were shocked by the rumor of Cameron's appointment to
the Treasury. This evening Judge Hogeboom and Mr. Opdycke leave
for Springfield and Messrs. D. D. Field and Barney for
Washington to make their urgent protest against the act. Says
he has written to Lincoln and forwarded extracts from
congressional documents in relation to Simon Cameron's actions
as commissioner to settle the claims of the half-breed
Winnebago Indians. Refers to the _Congressional Globe_, 25th
Congress, 3d Session, p. 194.
E. Peck, Springfield, January 10, says all the Chicago members
of the legislature took such steps as they could to prevent the
appointment of Cameron, believing him not to be a proper man
for any place in the Cabinet. If he goes in, it will not be as
the head of the Treasury Department. Understands that Chase was
offered the Treasury, but did not accept.
C. H. Ray, Springfield, January 16, thinks that the Cameron
business should be brought to a halt by some decisive action
among the Republicans in Senate and House. Says Lincoln sees
the error into which he has fallen, and would, most likely, be
glad to recede; but, except a dozen letters, he hears only from
the Cameron and Weed gang.
E. Peck, Springfield, February 1, says David Davis is quite
"huffy" because of the objections raised to Cameron and because
Smith, of Indiana, is not at once admitted to the Cabinet.
William Butler (state treasurer), Springfield, February 7, says
that last evening he had a confidential conversation with
Lincoln, who told him that the appointment of Cameron, or his
intimation to Cameron that he would offer him a place in the
Cabinet, had given him more trouble than anything else that he
had yet encountered. He had made up his mind that after
reaching Washington he would first send for Cameron and say to
him that he intended to submit the question of his appointment
to the Republican Senators; that he should call them together
for consultation, but would leave Cameron out, as the question
to be considered would be solely in reference to him; and that
he (Lincoln) wished to deal frankly and for the good of the
party. Butler thinks it would be disastrous to Cameron to go
into the Cabinet under such circumstances.
Norman B. Judd, of Chicago, was also expecting a place in the Cabinet.
He was a lawyer by profession and general attorney of the Chicago and
Rock Island Railroad. He had been a member of the State Senate, where he
contributed largely to Trumbull's first election to the United States
Senate, after which he had been devoted to Trumbull's political
interests and no less to Lincoln's. He was chairman of the Republican
State Committee and a member of the National Committee. He had been a
delegate-at-large to the Chicago Convention, where he had worked
untiringly and effectively for Lincoln's nomination. He was not a man
of ideas, but was fertile in expedients. In politics he was a "trimmer,"
sly, cat-like, and mysterious, and thus he came to be considered more
farseeing then he really was; but he was jovial, companionable, and
popular with the boys who looked after the primaries and the nominating
conventions. Both as a legislator and a party manager his reputation was
good, but his qualities were those of the politician rather than of the
statesman. He was certainly the equal of Caleb Smith and the superior of
Cameron. If he had been taken into the Cabinet, he would not have been
ejected without assignable reasons nine months later. It was known
immediately after the November election that he expected a Cabinet
position and that Trumbull favored him.
January 3, 1861, Judd wrote to Trumbull that he had heard no word from
Lincoln, but he had heard indirectly from Butler (state treasurer) that
Lincoln "never had a truer friend than myself and there was no one in
whom he placed greater confidence; still circumstances embarrassed him
about a Cabinet appointment." Judd understood this to mean that he would
not be appointed and he took it very much to heart. Doubtless the
circumstance that most embarrassed Lincoln was the same that operated in
Cameron's case. David Davis was insisting that his pledge to the Indiana
delegates should be made good.
January 6, Lincoln made an early call on Gustave Koerner at his hotel in
Springfield, before the latter was out of bed. Koerner gives the
following account of it in his "Memoirs":[48]
I unbolted the door and in came Mr. Lincoln. "I want to see you
and Judd. Where is his room?" I gave him the number, and
presently he returned with Judd while I was dressing.
"I am in a quandary," he said; "Pennsylvania is entitled to a
Cabinet office. But whom shall I appoint?" "Not Cameron," Judd
and myself spoke up simultaneously. "But whom else?" We
suggested Reeder or Wilmot. "Oh," said he, "they have no show.
There have been delegation after delegation from Pennsylvania,
hundreds of letters and the cry is Cameron, Cameron. Besides,
you know I have already fixed on Chase, Seward, and Bates, my
competitors at the convention. The Pennsylvania people say if
you leave out Cameron you disgrace him. Is there not something
in that?" I said, "Cameron cannot be trusted. He has the
reputation of being a tricky and corrupt politician." "I know,
I know," said Lincoln; "but can I get along if that State
should oppose my administration?" He was very much distressed.
We told him he would greatly regret his appointment. Our
interview ended in a protest on the part of Judd and myself
against the appointment.
January 7, Trumbull wrote to Lincoln advising him to give a Cabinet
appointment to some person who could stand in a nearer and more
confidential relation to him than that which grew out of political
affinity, adding that he (Lincoln) knew whether Judd was the kind of man
who would meet such requirements, and enclosing a written recommendation
of Judd for such a position, signed by himself and Senators Grimes,
Chandler, Wade, Wilkinson, Durkee, Harlan, and Doolittle. These, he
said, were the only persons to whom the paper had been shown and the
only ones aware of its existence.
Let it be said in passing that this was bad advice. Any man going into
the Cabinet as a more confidential friend of the President than the
others would have had all the others for his enemies.
January 10, William Jayne and Ebenezer Peck (both members of the state
legislature) expressed the opinion that Judd would be appointed.
Evidently the Trumbull letter and enclosure had, for the time being,
produced the intended effect. Jayne said that Davis and Yates were
opposed to Judd, but that Butler and Judge Logan favored him.
February 17, Judd wrote from Buffalo, New York, where he was
accompanying Lincoln on his journey to Washington, saying that he
believed the Treasury would be offered again to Chase, and if so he must
accept, although it might cause another "irrepressible conflict." He
said nothing about his own prospects.[49]
Evidently Lincoln had not yet decided to take Cameron into the Cabinet,
but after he arrived in Washington the influence of Seward and Weed,
which Dr. Ray had prefigured in a letter to Trumbull, prevailed upon him
to do so. This was the opinion of Montgomery Blair, a high-minded man
and an acute observer, expressed to Gideon Welles in these words:
Cameron had got into the War Department by the contrivance and
cunning of Seward who used him and other corruptionists as he
pleased with the assistance of Thurlow Weed; that Seward had
tried to get Cameron into the Treasury, but was unable to quite
accomplish that, and, after a hard underground quarrel against
Chase, it ended in the loss of Cameron, who went over to Chase
and left Seward.[50]
When Cameron and Smith were appointed, the Berlin Mission was given to
Judd, as a salve to his wound. Gustave Koerner had been "slated" in the
newspapers for the Berlin Mission, although he had not applied for it. A
telegram had been sent out from Springfield to the effect that that
place had been reserved for him, and he erroneously supposed that it had
been done with Lincoln's consent. It had been published far and wide in
America and Europe without contradiction. Koerner's friends on both
sides of the water had written congratulatory letters to him, and
everybody seemed to think that the thing was done, and wisely done. Some
of his clients had notified him that, having observed in the newspapers
that he was going abroad for a few years, they had engaged other counsel
to attend to their law business. At this very time Koerner was laboring
for Judd's appointment as member of the Cabinet.
The same telegram that announced failure in this attempt announced that
Judd had been designated as Minister to Prussia and had accepted.
Koerner felt humiliated, and he now applied for some other foreign
mission which might be awarded to the German element of the
party--preferably that of Switzerland; but it was now too late. The
other places had all been spoken for. At a later period he was appointed
Minister to Spain.
On the 9th of January, 1861, Trumbull was reëlected Senator of the
United States by the legislature of Illinois, by 54 votes against 46 for
S. S. Marshall (Democrat). His nomination in the Republican caucus was
without opposition.
At the beginning of the special session of Congress called by President
Lincoln for July 4, 1861, Trumbull was appointed by his fellow Senators
Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, which place he occupied
during the succeeding twelve years.
The first duty he was called to perform was to announce the death of his
colleague, Stephen A. Douglas. Douglas had placed himself at Lincoln's
service in all efforts to uphold the Constitution and enforce the laws
against the disunionists. He returned from Washington early in April and
got in touch with his constituents, ready to act promptly as events
might turn out. It turned out that the Confederates struck the first
blow in the Civil War by bombarding Fort Sumter. This was the signal
for Douglas's last and greatest political and oratorical effort. The
state legislature, then in session, invited him to address them on the
present crisis, and he responded on the 25th of April in a speech which
made Illinois solid for the Union. The writer was one of the listeners
to that speech and he cannot conceive that any orator of ancient or
modern times could have surpassed it. Douglas seized upon his hearers
with a kind of titanic grasp and held them captive, enthralled,
spellbound for an immortal hour. He was the only man who could have
saved southern Illinois from the danger of an internecine war. The
southern counties followed him now as faithfully and as unanimously as
they had followed him in previous years, and sent their sons into the
field to fight for the Union as numerously and bravely as those of any
other section of the state or of the country. Douglas had only a few
more days to live. He was now forty-eight years of age, but if he had
survived forty-eight more he could never have surpassed that eloquence
or exceeded that service to the nation, for he never could have found
another like occasion for the use of his astounding powers.
He died at Chicago, June 3, 1861. Trumbull's eulogy was solemn, sincere,
pathetic, and impressive--a model of good taste in every way. He
retracted nothing, but, ignoring past differences, he gave an abounding
and heartfelt tribute of praise to the dead statesman for his matchless
service to his country in the hour of her greatest need. He concluded
with these words:
On the 17th day of June last, all that remained of our departed
brother was interred near the city of Chicago, on the shore of
Lake Michigan, whose pure waters, often lashed into fury by
contending elements, are a fitting memento of the stormy and
boisterous political tumults through which the great popular
orator so often passed. There the people, whose idol he was,
will erect a monument to his memory; and there, in the soil of
the state which so long without interruption, and never to a
greater extent than at the moment of his death, gave him her
confidence, let his remains repose so long as free government
shall last and the Constitution he loved so well endure.
FOOTNOTES:
[45] _Life of Lincoln_, by Herndon-Weik, 2d edition, III, 172, 181.
[46] David Davis's habit of coercing Lincoln was once complained of by
Lincoln himself, as related in a letter (now in the possession of Jesse
W. Weik) of Henry C. Whitney to Wm. H. Herndon. Whitney says:
"On March 5, 1861, I saw Lincoln and requested him to appoint Jim Somers
of Champaign to a small clerkship. Lincoln was very impatient and said
abruptly: 'There is Davis, with that way of making a man do a thing
whether he wants to or not, who has forced me to appoint Archy Williams
judge in Kansas right off and John Jones to a place in the State
Department; and I have got a bushel of despatches from Kansas wanting to
know if I'm going to fill up all the offices from Illinois.'"
[47] _Diary of Gideon Welles_, II, 390.
[48] Vol. II, p. 114.
[49] Fogg of New Hampshire says: "Mrs. Lincoln has the credit of
excluding Judd, of Chicago, from the Cabinet,"--which is not unlikely.
_Diary of Gideon Welles._
[50] _Diary of Gideon Welles_, I, 126.
CHAPTER IX
FORT SUMTER
Mrs. Trumbull did not accompany her husband to Washington at the special
session of Congress July 4, 1861. A few letters written to her by him
have been preserved. One of these revives the memory of an affair which
caused intense indignation throughout the loyal states.
On the day when it was decided in Cabinet meeting to send supplies to
Major Anderson in Fort Sumter, a newspaper correspondent named Harvey, a
native of South Carolina, sent a telegram to Governor Pickens at
Charleston notifying him of the fact. Harvey was the only newspaper man
in Washington who had the news. He did not put his own name on the
telegram, but signed it "A Friend." He was afterward appointed, at
Secretary Seward's instance, as Minister to Portugal, although he was so
obscure in the political world that the other Washington correspondents
had to unearth and identify him to the public. It was said that he had
once been the editor of the Philadelphia _North American_. After he had
departed for his mission, there had been a seizure of telegrams by the
Government and this anonymous one to Governor Pickens was found. The
receiving-clerk testified that it had been sent by Harvey. The
Republicans in Congress, and especially the Senators who had voted to
confirm him, were boiling with indignation. A committee of the latter
was appointed to call upon the President and request him to recall
Harvey. A letter of Trumbull to his wife (July 14) says:
The Republicans in caucus appointed a committee to express to
him their want of confidence in Harvey, Minister to Portugal.
Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward informed the committee that they
were aware of the worst dispatch to Governor Pickens before he
left the country, but not before he received the appointment,
and they did not think from their conversation with Harvey that
he had any criminal intent, and requested the committee to
report the facts to the caucus, Mr. Lincoln saying that he
would like to know whether Senators were as dissatisfied when
they came to know all the facts. The caucus will meet to-morrow
and I do not believe will be satisfied with the explanation.
The inside history of this telegram was made public long afterward.
Shortly before Seward took office as Secretary of State there came to
Washington City three commissioners from Montgomery, Alabama, whose
purpose was to negotiate terms of peaceful separation of the Confederate
States of America from the United States, or to report to their own
Government the refusal of the latter to enter into such negotiation.
These men were Martin J. Crawford, John Forsyth, and A. B. Roman. They
arrived in Washington on the 27th of February, four days after Lincoln's
arrival and one week before his inauguration. They did not make their
errand known until after the inauguration. They then communicated with
Seward, by an intermediary, the nature of their mission, and the latter
replied verbally that it was the intention of the new Administration to
settle the dispute in an amicable manner. On the 15th of March, Seward
assured the Confederate envoys that Sumter would be evacuated before a
letter from them could reach Montgomery--that is, within five days. The
negotiations were protracted till a decision had been reached, contrary
to Seward's desires and promises, to send a fleet with provisions to
relieve the garrison at Fort Sumter. Then Seward gave this fact to
Harvey, knowing that he would transmit it to Governor Pickens and that
the probable effect would be to defeat the scheme of relieving the
garrison. This he evidently desired. He had already secretly detached
the steamer Powhatan, an indispensable part of the Sumter fleet, and
sent it on a useless expedition to Pensacola Harbor.
Gideon Welles's account of the Harvey affair is as follows:
Soon after President Lincoln had formed the resolution to
attempt the relief of Sumter, and whilst it was yet a secret, a
young man connected with the telegraph office in Washington,
with whom I was acquainted, a native of the same town with
myself, brought to me successively two telegrams conveying to
the rebel authorities information of the purposes and decisions
of the Administration. One of these telegrams was from Mr.
Harvey, a newspaper correspondent, who was soon after, and with
a full knowledge of his having communicated to the rebels the
movements of the Government, appointed Minister to Lisbon. I
had, on receiving these copies, handed them to the President.
Mr. Blair, who had also obtained a copy of one, perhaps both,
of these telegrams from another source, likewise informed him
of the treachery. The subject was once or twice alluded to in
Cabinet without eliciting any action, and when the nomination
of Mr. Harvey to the Portuguese Mission was announced--a
nomination made without the knowledge of any member of the
Cabinet but the Secretary of State and made at his special
request--there was general disapprobation except by the
President (who avoided the expression of any opinion) and by
Mr. Seward. The latter defended and justified the selection,
which he admitted was recommended by himself, but the President
was silent in regard to it.[51]
Trumbull says in his letter that Lincoln and Seward told the committee
that they did not know that Harvey had sent the dispatch before he
received the appointment. Welles says that both of them knew it
beforehand, and that it was a matter of Cabinet discussion in which
Lincoln, however, took no part. How are we to explain this
contradiction? It was impossible for Lincoln to utter an untruth, but if
we may credit Gideon Welles, _passim_, it was not impossible for Seward
to do so and for Lincoln to remain silent while he did so, as he
remained silent while the Cabinet were discussing the appointment of
Harvey. If Seward, at the meeting of which Trumbull wrote, in this
private letter to his wife, took the lead in the conversation, as was
his habit, and said that there was no knowledge of Harvey's telegram to
Governor Pickens until after Harvey had been appointed as minister, and
Lincoln said nothing to the contrary, he would naturally have assumed
that Seward spoke for both.
There is reason to believe that Seward had previously prevailed upon the
President to agree to surrender Fort Sumter, as a means of preventing
the secession of Virginia. Evidence of this fact is supplied by the
following entry in the diary of John Hay, under date October 22, 1861:
At Seward's to-night the President talked about Secession,
Compromise, and other such. He spoke of a Committee of Southern
pseudo-unionists coming to him before inauguration for
guarantees, etc. _He promised to evacuate Sumter if they would
break up their Convention without any row, or nonsense._ They
demurred. Subsequently he renewed proposition to Summers, but
without any result. The President was most anxious to prevent
bloodshed.[52]
Hay here speaks of two offers made by Lincoln to evacuate Sumter, one
before his inauguration and one after. Both were made on condition that
a certain convention should be adjourned. This was the convention of
Virginia, which had been called to consider the question of secession.
It had met in Richmond on the 18th of February, while Lincoln was _en
route_ for Washington. As Lincoln arrived in Washington on the 23d of
February, the first offer must have been made in the interval between
that day and the 4th of March.
The History of Nicolay and Hay does not mention the first offer. It
speaks of the second one as a matter about which the facts are in
dispute, the disputants being John Minor Botts and J. B. Baldwin. Botts
was an ex-member of Congress from Virginia and a strong Union man.
Baldwin was a member of the Virginia Convention and a Union man. He had
come to Washington in response to an invitation which Lincoln had sent,
on or about the 20th of March, to George W. Summers, who was likewise a
member of the convention. Summers was not able to come at the time when
the invitation reached him, and he deputed Baldwin to go in his place.
After the war ended, Botts wrote a book entitled "The Great Rebellion,"
in which he gave the following account of an interview he had had with
President Lincoln on Sunday, April 7, 1861 (two days after Baldwin had
had his interview):
About this time Mr. Lincoln sent a messenger to Richmond,
inviting a distinguished member of the Union party to come
immediately to Washington, and if he could not come himself, to
send some other prominent Union man, as he wanted to see him on
business of the first importance. The gentleman thus addressed,
Mr. Summers, did not go, but sent another, Mr. J. B. Baldwin,
who had distinguished himself by his zeal in the Union cause
during the session of the convention; but this gentleman was
slow in getting to Washington, and did not reach there for
something like a week after the time he was expected. He
reached Washington on Friday, the 5th of April, and, on calling
on Mr. Lincoln, the following conversation in substance took
place, as I learned from Mr. Lincoln himself. After expressing
some regret that he had not come sooner, Mr. Lincoln said, "My
object in desiring the presence of Mr. Summers, or some other
influential and leading member of the Union party in your
convention, was to submit a proposition by which I think the
peace of the country can be preserved; but I fear you are
almost too late. However, I will make it yet.
"This afternoon," he said, "a fleet is to sail from the harbor
of New York for Charleston; your convention has been in session
for nearly two months, and you have done nothing but hold and
shake the rod over my head. You have just taken a vote, by
which it appears you have a majority of two to one against
secession. Now, so great is my desire to preserve the peace of
the country, and to save the border states to the Union, that
if you gentlemen of the Union party will adjourn without
passing an ordinance of secession, I will telegraph at once to
New York, arrest the sailing of the fleet, and take the
responsibility of EVACUATING FORT SUMTER!"
The proposition was declined. On the following Sunday night I
was with Mr. Lincoln, and the greater part of the time alone,
when Mr. Lincoln related the above facts to me. I inquired,
"Well, Mr. Lincoln, what reply did Mr. Baldwin make?" "Oh,"
said he, throwing up his hands, "he wouldn't listen to it at
all; scarcely treated me with civility; asked me what I meant
by an adjournment; was it an adjournment _sine die_?" "Of
course," said Mr. Lincoln, "I don't want you to adjourn, and,
after I have evacuated the fort, meet again to adopt an
ordinance of secession." I then said, "Mr. Lincoln, will you
authorize _me_ to make that proposition? For I will start
to-morrow morning, and have a meeting of the Union men
to-morrow night, who, I have no doubt, will gladly accept it."
To which he replied, "It's too late, now; the fleet sailed on
Friday evening."
In 1866, the Reconstruction Committee of Congress got an inkling of this
interview between Lincoln and Baldwin, called Baldwin as a witness, and
questioned him about it. He testified that he had an interview with the
President at the date mentioned, but denied that Lincoln had offered to
evacuate Fort Sumter if the Virginia Convention would adjourn _sine
die_. Thereupon Botts collected and published a mass of collateral
evidence to show that Baldwin had testified falsely.
Botts says in his book that he had confirmatory letters from Governor
Peirpoint, General Millson, of Virginia, Dr. Stone, of Washington, Hon.
Garrett Davis (Senator from Kentucky), Robert A. Gray, of Rockingham
(brother-in-law to Baldwin), Campbell Tarr, of Wheeling, and three
others, to whom Lincoln made the statement regarding his interview with
Baldwin, in almost the same language in which he made it to Botts
himself. Botts quotes from two letters written to him by John F. Lewis
in 1866, in which the latter says that Baldwin acknowledged to him
(Lewis) that Lincoln did offer to evacuate Fort Sumter on the condition
named. There are persons now living to whom Lewis made the same
statement, verbally.
There is another piece of evidence, supplied by Rev. R. L. Dabney in the
Southern Historical Society Papers, in a communication entitled "Colonel
Baldwin's Interview with Mr. Lincoln." This purports to give the
writer's recollections of an interview with Baldwin in March, 1865, at
Petersburg, while the siege of that place was going on. Baldwin said
that Secretary Seward sent Allan B. Magruder as a messenger to Mr.
Janney, president of the Virginia Convention, urging that one of the
Union members come to Washington to confer with Lincoln. Baldwin was
called out of the convention by Summers on the 3d of April to see
Magruder, and the latter said that Seward had authorized him to say that
Fort Sumter would be evacuated on Friday of the ensuing week. The
gentlemen consulted urged Baldwin to go to Washington, and he consented
and did go promptly. Seward accompanied him to the White House and
Lincoln took him upstairs into his bedroom and locked the door. Lincoln
"took a seat on the edge of the bed, spitting from time to time on the
carpet." The two entered into a long dispute about the right of
secession. Baldwin insisted that coercion would lead to war, in which
case Virginia would join in behalf of the seceded states.
Lincoln's native good sense [the narrative proceeds], with
Baldwin's evident sincerity, seemed now to open his eyes to the
truth. He slid off the edge of the bed and began to stalk in
his awkward manner across the chamber in great excitement and
perplexity. He clutched his shaggy hair as though he would jerk
out handfuls by the roots. He frowned and contorted his
features, exclaiming, "I ought to have known this sooner; you
are too late, sir, _too late_. Why did you not come here four
days ago and tell me all this?" Colonel Baldwin replied: "Why,
Mr. President, you did not ask our advice."
The foregoing narrative involves the supposition that Lincoln, in the
midst of preparations for sending a fleet to Fort Sumter, dispatched a
messenger to Richmond to bring a man to Washington to discuss with him
the abstract question of the right of a state to secede, and that,
having procured the presence of such a person, he took him into a
bedroom, locked the door, and had the debate with him, taking care that
nobody else should hear a syllable of it. Not a word about Fort Sumter,
although Magruder, the messenger, had said that it would be evacuated on
the following Friday! Yet the Rev. Mr. Dabney did not see the
incongruity of the situation.
Nicolay and Hay say that Lincoln did not make any offer to Baldwin to
evacuate Sumter, but did tell him what he had intended to say to
Summers, if the latter had come to Washington at the right time.[53]
Douglas in combating the Rebels, in contrast to the futile diplomacy of
Seward:
A marvelous incident is related in Welles's Diary immediately after his
narrative of the Harvey affair. It describes the activity and
earnestness of Stephen A.
Two days preceding the attack on Sumter, I met Senator Douglas
in front of the Treasury Building. He was in a carriage with
Mrs. Douglas, driving rapidly up the street. When he saw me he
checked his driver, jumped from the carriage, and came to me on
the sidewalk, and in a very earnest and emphatic manner said
the rebels were determined on war and were about to make an
assault on Sumter. He thought immediate and decisive measures
should be taken; considered it a mistake that there had not
already been more energetic action; said the dilatory
proceedings of the Government would bring on a terrible civil
war; that the whole South was united and in earnest. Although
he had differed with the Administration on important questions
and would never be in accord with some of its members on
measures and principles that were fundamental, yet he had no
fellowship with traitors or disunionists. He was for the Union
and would stand by the Administration and all others in its
defense, regardless of party. [Welles proposed that they should
step into the State Department and consult with Seward.] The
look of mingled astonishment and incredulity which came over
him I can never forget. "Then you," he said, "have faith in
Seward! Have you made yourself acquainted with what has been
going on here all winter? Seward has had an understanding with
these men. If he has influence with them, why don't he use it?"
Douglas considered it a waste of time and effort to talk to Seward,
considered him a dead weight and drag on the Administration; said that
Lincoln was honest and meant to do right, but was benumbed by Seward;
but finally yielded to Welles's desire that they should go into Seward's
office, in front of which they were standing. They went in and Douglas
told Seward what he had told Welles, that the rebels were determined on
war and were about to make an assault on Sumter, and that the
Administration ought not to delay another minute, but should make
instant preparations for war. All the reply they got from Seward was
that there were many rash and reckless men at Charleston and that if
they were determined to assault Sumter he did not know how they were to
be prevented from doing so.
Seward's aims were patriotic but futile. He wished to save the Union
without bloodshed, but the steps which he took were almost suicidal.
What the country then needed was a jettison of compromises, and a
resolution of doubts. Providence supplied these. The bombardment of
Sumter accomplished the object as nothing else could have done. Nothing
could have been contrived so sure to awaken the volcanic forces that
ended in the destruction of slavery as the spectacle in Charleston
Harbor.
FOOTNOTES:
[51] _Diary of Gideon Welles_, I, 32.
[52] _Letters and Diaries of John Hay_, 1, 47.
[53] Nicolay and Hay, III, 428. Probably the entry in Hay's Diary had
been forgotten when the History was written, twenty-five years later.
CHAPTER X
BULL RUN--THE CONFISCATION ACT
In company with other Senators, Trumbull went to the battle of Bull Run,
July 21, 1861. His experience there he communicated to his wife, first
by a brief telegram, and afterwards by letter. The telegram was
suppressed by the authorities in charge of the telegraph office, who
substituted one of their own in place of it and appended his name to it.
The letter follows:
WASHINGTON, July 22nd, 1861.
We started over into Virginia about 9 o'clock A.M., and drove
to Centreville, which is a high commanding position and a
village of perhaps fifty houses. Bull Run, where the battle
occurred, is South about 3 miles and the creek on the main
road, looking West, is about 4-1/2 miles distant. The country
is timbered for perhaps a mile West of the creek, between which
and Centreville there are a good many cleared fields. At
Centreville, Grimes and I got saddles and rode horseback down
the main road towards the creek about three miles toward a
hospital where were some few wounded soldiers and a few
prisoners who had been sent back. This was about half-past
three o'clock P.M. Here we met with Col. Vandever of Iowa, who
gave us a very clear account of the battle. He had been with
Gen. McDowell and Gen. Hunter, who with the strongest part of
the army, had gone early in the morning a few miles north of
the main road and crossed the creek to take the enemy in the
flank. His division had very serious fighting, but had driven
the enemy back and taken three of his batteries. At the
hospital we were about one and a half miles from Generals Tyler
and Schenck, Col. Sherman, etc., who were down the road in the
woods and out of sight, with several regiments and a number of
guns. Their troops, Vandever told us, were a good deal
demoralized, and he feared an attack from the South towards
Bull Run where the battle of a few days ago was fought. About
this time a battery, apparently not more than a mile and a half
distant and from the South, fired on the battery where Sherman
and Schenck were. The firing was not rapid. On the hill at
Centreville we could see quite beyond the timber of the creek
off towards Manassas and see the smoke and hear the report of
the artillery, but not very rapid as I thought. This we
observed before leaving Centreville, and were told it was our
main army driving the enemy back, but slowly and with great
difficulty.
While at the hospital McDougall of California came up from the
neighborhood of Gen. Schenck and said he was going back towards
Centreville to a convenient place where he could get water and
take lunch. As Grimes and myself had got separated from Messrs.
Wade and Chandler and Brown, who had with them our supplies, we
concluded to go back with McD. and partake with him. We
returned on the road towards Centreville and turned up towards
a house fifty or a hundred yards from the road, where we
quietly took our lunch, the firing continuing about as before.
Just as we were putting away the things we heard a great noise,
and looking up towards the road saw it filled with wagons,
horsemen and footmen in full run towards Centreville. We
immediately mounted our horses and galloped to the road, by
which time it was crowded, hundreds being in advance on the way
to Centreville and two guns of the Sherman battery having
already passed in full retreat. We kept on with the crowd, not
knowing what else to do. On the way to Centreville many
soldiers threw away their guns, knapsacks, etc. Gov. Grimes and
I each picked up a gun. I soon came up to Senator Lane of
Indiana, and the gun being heavy to carry and he better able to
manage it, I gave it to him. Efforts were made to rally the men
by civilians and others on their way to Centreville, but all to
no purpose. Literally, three could have chased ten thousand.
All this stampede was occasioned, as I understand, by a charge
of not exceeding two hundred cavalry upon Schenck's column down
in the woods, which, instead of repulsing as they could easily
have done (having before become disordered and having lost some
of their officers), broke and ran, communicating the panic to
everybody they met. The rebel cavalry, or about one hundred of
them, charged up past the hospital where we had been and took
there some prisoners, as I am told, and released those we had.
It was the most shameful rout you can conceive of. I suppose
two thousand soldiers came rushing into Centreville in this
disorganized condition. The cavalry which made the charge I did
not see, but suppose they disappeared in double-quick time, not
dreaming that they had put a whole division to flight. Several
guns were left down in the woods, though I believe two were
brought off. What became of Schenck I do not know. Tyler, I
understand, was at Centreville when I got back there. Whether
other portions of our army were shamefully routed just at the
close of the day, after we had really won the battle, it seems
impossible for me to learn, though I was told that McDowell was
at Centreville when we were there and that his column had also
been driven back. If this be so it is a terrible defeat. At
Centreville there was a reserve of 8000 or 10,000 men under
Col. Miles who had not been in the action and they were formed
in line of battle when we left there, but the enemy did not, I
presume, advance to that point last night, as we heard no
firing. We fed our horses at Centreville and left there at six
o'clock last evening. Came on to Fairfax Court House, where we
got supper, and leaving there at ten o'clock reached home at
half-past two this morning, having had a sad day and witnessed
scenes I hope never to see again. Not very many baggage wagons,
perhaps not more than fifty, were advanced beyond Centreville.
From them the horses were mostly unhitched and the wagons left
standing in the road when the stampede took place. This side of
Centreville there were a great many wagons, and the alarm if
possible was greater than on the other. Thousands of shovels
were thrown out upon the road, also axes, boxes of provisions,
etc. In some instances wagons were upset to get them out of the
road, and the road was full of four-horse wagons retreating as
fast as possible, and also of flying soldiers who could not be
made to stop at Centreville. The officers stopped the wagons
and a good many of the retreating soldiers by putting a file of
men across the road and not allowing them to pass. In this way
all the teams were stopped, but a good many stragglers climbed
the fences and got by. I fear that a great, and, of course, a
terrible slaughter has overtaken the Union forces--God's ways
are inscrutable. I am dreadfully disappointed and mortified.
Copy of telegram sent to Mrs. Lyman Trumbull, July 22, 1861:
The battle resulted unfavorably to our cause.
LYMAN T.
When received by Mrs. Trumbull, it read:
I came from near the battlefield last night. It was a
desperately bloody fight.
The only bill of importance passed at the July session of Congress at
Trumbull's instance was one to declare free all slaves who might be
employed by their owners, or with their owners' consent, on any military
or naval work against the Government, and who might fall into our hands.
It was called a Confiscation Act, but it did not confiscate any other
than slave property. It was an entering wedge, however, for complete
emancipation which came by successive steps later.
At the beginning of the regular session (December, 1861), I was sent to
Washington City as correspondent of the Chicago _Tribune_, and was, for
the first time, brought into close relations with Trumbull. He had
rented a house on G Street, near the Post-Office Department.
Very few Senators at that period kept house in Washington. At Mrs.
Shipman's boarding-house on Seventh Street, lived Senators Fessenden,
Grimes, Foot, and Representatives Morrill, of Vermont, and Washburne, of
Illinois; and there I also found quarters. As this was only a block
distant from the Trumbulls', and as I had received a cordial welcome
from them, I was soon on terms of intimacy with the family. Mr. Trumbull
was then forty-eight-years of age, five feet ten and one half inches in
height, straight as an arrow, weighing one hundred and sixty-seven
pounds, of faultless physique, in perfect health, and in manners a
cultivated gentleman. Mrs. Trumbull was thirty-seven years old, of
winning features, gracious manners, and noble presence. Five children
had been born to them, all sons. Walter, fifteen years of age, the
eldest then living, had recently returned from an ocean voyage on the
warship Vandalia, under Commander S. Phillips Lee. A more attractive
family group, or one more charming in a social way or more kindly
affectioned one to another, I have never known. Civilization could show
no finer type.
The Thirty-seventh Congress met in a state of great depression. Disaster
had befallen the armies of the Union, but the defeat at Bull Run was not
so disheartening as the subsequent inaction both east and west.
McClellan on the Potomac had done nothing but organize and parade.
Frémont on the Mississippi had done worse than nothing. He had
surrounded himself with a gang of thieves whose plundering threatened to
bankrupt the treasury, and when he saw exposure threatening he issued a
military order emancipating slaves, the revocation of which by the
President very nearly upset the Government. The popular demand for a
blow at slavery as the cause of the rebellion had increased in
proportion as the military operations had been disappointing. Lincoln
believed that the time had not yet come for using that weapon. He
revoked Frémont's order. He thereby saved Kentucky to the Union, and he
still held emancipation in reserve for a later day; but he incurred the
risk of alienating the radical element of the Republican party--an
honest, fiery, valiant, indispensable wing of the forces supporting the
Union. The explosion which took place in this division of the party was
almost but not quite fatal. Many letters received by Trumbull at this
juncture were angry and some mournful in the extreme. The following
written by Mr. M. Carey Lea, of Philadelphia, touches upon a danger
threatening the national finances, in consequence of this episode:
PHILADELPHIA, Nov. 1, 1861.
DEAR SIR: The ability of our Government to carry on this war
depends upon its being able to continue to obtain the enormous
amounts of money requisite. Of late, within a week or so, an
alarming falling off in the bond subscriptions has taken place.
Now it is upon these private subscriptions that the ability of
the banks to continue to lend the Government money depends, and
unless a change takes place they will be unable to take the
fifty millions remaining of the one hundred and fifty millions
loan. A member of the committee informed me lately that the
banks had positively declined to pledge themselves before the
1st of December, notwithstanding Mr. Chase's desire that they
should do so.
This sudden diminution of subscriptions arises from the course
taken by some of our friends in the West. Even suppose that
Gen. Frémont is treated unfairly by the Government (and I think
he is fairly termed incapable)--but suppose there should be
injustice done him--you might disapprove it, but the moment
there is any serious idea of _resisting_ the act of the
President, _this_ war is ended. For the bare suggestion of such
a thing has almost stopped subscriptions, and the serious
discussion, much more the attempt, would instantly put an end
to them.
I beg to remind you that in what I say I have no prejudice
against Frémont. I voted for him and have always concurred in
opinions with the Republican party, but we have now reached a
point where, if we look to _men_ and not to _principles_, we
are shipwrecked. Frémont is not more anti-slavery in his views
than Lincoln and Seward, and if he were in their place would
adopt the same cautious policy. The state of affairs must be my
excuse for intruding upon you these views. We _all_ have _all_
at stake and such a crisis leads those to speak who are
ordinarily silent. I remain, my dear Sir,
Yours respectfully,
M. CAREY LEA.
To this weighty communication Trumbull made the following reply:
WASHINGTON, Nov. 5th, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR: Thanks for your kind letter just received. I was
not aware of a disposition in the West to resist the act of the
President in regard to Gen. Frémont; though I was aware that
there was very great dissatisfaction in that part of the
country at the want of enterprise and energy on that part of
our Grand Army of the Potomac. We are fighting to sustain
constitutional government and regulated liberty, and, of
course, to set up any military leader in opposition to the
constituted authorities would be utterly destructive of the
very purpose for which the people of the loyal states are now
so liberally contributing their blood and treasure, and could
only be justified in case those charged with the administration
of affairs were betraying their trusts or had shown themselves
utterly incompetent and unable to maintain the Government. In
my opinion this rebellion ought to and might have been crushed
before this.
I have entire confidence in the integrity and patriotism of the
President. He means well and in ordinary times would have made
one of the best of Presidents, but he lacks confidence in
himself and the _will_ necessary in this great emergency, and
he is most miserably surrounded. Now that Gen. Scott has
retired, I hope for more activity and should confidently expect
it did I not know that there is still remaining an influence
almost if not quite controlling, which I fear is looking more
to some grand diplomatic move for the settlement of our
troubles than to the strengthening of our arms. It is only by
making this war terrible to traitors that our difficulties can
be permanently settled. War means desolation, and they who have
brought it on must be made to feel all its horrors, and our
armies must go forth using all the means which God and nature
have put in their hands to put down this wicked rebellion. This
in the end will be done, and if our armies are vigorously and
actively led will soon give us peace. I trust that Gen.
McClellan will now drive the enemy from the vicinity of the
Capital--that he has the means to do it, I have no doubt. If
the case were reversed and the South had our means and our arms
and men, and we theirs, they would before this have driven us
to the St. Lawrence. If our army should go into winter quarters
with the Capital besieged, I very much fear the result would be
a recognition of the Confederates by foreign Governments, the
demoralization of our own people, and of course an inability
to raise either men or money another season. Such must not be.
Action, action is what we want and must have. God grant that
McClellan may prove equal to the emergency.
Yours very truly,
LYMAN TRUMBULL.
The "influence almost if not quite controlling" meant Seward. Secretary
Cameron went to St. Louis to investigate Frémont and found him guilty.
Two months later he followed Frémont's example.[54] In his report as
Secretary of War he inserted an argument in favor of the emancipation
and arming of slaves. This he sent to the newspapers in advance of its
delivery to the President and without his knowledge. The latter
discovered it in time to expunge the objectionable part and to prevent
its delivery to Congress, but not soon enough to recall it from the
press. The expunged part was published by some of the newspapers that
had received it and was reproduced in the _Congressional Globe_
(December 12), by Representative Eliot, of Massachusetts.
The next man to take upon himself the responsibility of declaring the
nation's policy on this momentous question was General David Hunter, who
then held sway over a small strip of ground on the coast of South
Carolina. In the month of May, 1862, he issued an order granting freedom
to all slaves in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Hunter's order
was promptly revoked by the President.
Trumbull had been the pioneer, at the July session, in the way of
legislation for freeing the slaves. On the first day of the regular
session he took another step forward, by introducing a bill for the
confiscation of the property of the rebels and for giving freedom to
persons held as slaves by them. This came to be known as the
Confiscation Act.
On the 5th of December, 1861, he reported the bill from the Committee on
the Judiciary and made a brief speech on it. It provided that all the
property, real and personal, situated within the limits of the United
States, belonging to persons who should bear arms against the
Government, or give aid and comfort to those in rebellion, which persons
should not be reachable by the ordinary process of law, should be
forfeited and confiscated to the United States and that the forfeiture
should take immediate effect; and that the slaves of all such persons
should be free. Also that no slaves escaping from servitude should be
delivered up unless the person claiming them should prove that he had
been at all times loyal to the Government. Also that no officer in the
military or naval service should assume to decide whether a claim made
by a master to an escaping slave was valid or not.
This bill was the _pièce de résistance_ of senatorial debate for the
whole session. Its confiscatory features were attacked on the 4th of
March by Senator Cowan, in a speech of great force. Cowan was a new
Senator from Pennsylvania, a Republican of conservative leanings, and a
great debater. He opposed the bill on grounds of both constitutionality
and expediency. On the 24th of April, Collamer, of Vermont, expressed
the sound opinions that private property could not be confiscated except
by judicial process, and that even if it could be done it would be bad
policy, since it would tend to prolong the war and would constitute a
barrier against future peace.
The Confederate Government had led the way by passing a law (May 21,
1861) sequestrating all debts due to Northern individuals or
corporations and authorizing the payment of the same to the Confederate
Treasury. The whole subject was extremely complex. "There was commonly,"
says a recent writer in the _American Historical Review_, "a failure in
the debates to discriminate between a general confiscation of property
within the jurisdiction of the confiscating government and the treatment
accorded by victorious armies to private property found within the
limits of military occupation. Thus the general rule exempting private
property on land from the sort of capture property must suffer at sea,
was erroneously appealed to as an inhibition upon the right of judicial
confiscation. That a military capture on land analogous to prize at sea
was not regarded as a legitimate war measure was so obvious and well
recognized a principle that it would hardly require a continual
reaffirmation. It was a very different matter, however, so far as the
law and practice of nations was concerned, for a belligerent to attack
through its courts whatever enemy's property might be available within
its limits."[55]
Collamer offered an amendment to strike out the first section of the
bill and insert a clause providing that every person adjudged guilty of
the crime of treason should suffer death, or, at the discretion of the
court, be imprisoned not less than five years and fined not less than
ten thousand dollars, which fine should be levied on any property, real
or personal, of which he might be possessed. The fine was to be in lieu
of confiscation. The aim of the amendment was to substitute due process
of law in place of legislative forfeiture. Various other amendments were
offered. On the 6th of May, the Senate voted by 24 to 14 to refer the
bill and amendments to a select committee of nine. The House, which had
been waiting for the Senate bill, decided on the 14th of May to take up
a measure of its own, which it passed on the 26th. The select committee
of the Senate framed a measure regarding the emancipation of escaping
slaves. This and the House bill were sent to a conference committee,
which reported the bill which became a law July 17, 1862.
This was not the end of it, however. Provision had been made in the bill
for the forfeiture, by judicial process, of the property, both real and
personal, of rebels, regardless of the clause of the Constitution which
declares that "no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood,
or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted." No such
exception was made in the bill. The President considered it
unconstitutional in this particular, and he wrote a short message giving
his reasons for withholding his approval of the measure. A rumor of his
intention reached Senator Fessenden, who called at the White House to
inquire whether it was true. He had a frank conversation with the
President, the result of which was that both houses passed a joint
resolution providing that no punishment or proceedings under the
Confiscation Act should be so construed as to work a forfeiture of the
real estate of the offender beyond his natural life. Lincoln's intended
veto of the Confiscation Bill is printed on page 3406 of the
_Congressional Globe_. Touching confiscation in general he expressed the
golden opinion that "the severest justice may not always be the best
policy." But he would not have vetoed the bill on grounds of expediency
merely. The forfeiture of real estate in perpetuity was the insuperable
objection in his mind. And he here seems to me to have been entirely
right. Yet Trumbull had the support of Judge Harris, Seward's successor
in the Senate, than whom nobody stood higher as a lawyer at that day.
The President then signed both the bill and the joint resolution. The
Confiscation Act remained, however, practically a dead letter, except as
to the freeing of the slaves. In the latter particular it was the first
great step toward complete emancipation, since it took effect upon
slaves within our lines, who could be reached and made free _de facto_.
It provided that all slaves of persons who should be thereafter engaged
in rebellion, escaping and taking refuge in the lines of the Union
forces, and all such slaves found in places captured by such forces,
should be declared free; that no slaves escaping should be delivered up
unless the owner should swear that he had not aided the rebellion; that
no officer of the United States should assume to decide on the validity
of the claim of any person to an escaping slave; that the President
should be authorized to employ negroes for the suppression of the
rebellion in any capacity he saw fit; and that he might colonize negroes
with their own consent and the consent of the foreign Government
receiving them.
According to a report of the Solicitor of the Treasury dated Dec. 27,
1867, the total proceeds of confiscation actually paid into the Treasury
up to that time amounted to the insignificant sum of $129,680.
The enforcement of the confiscation act was placed under the charge of
the Attorney-General. Practically, however, it was performed by officers
of the army, so far as it was enforced at all. General Lew Wallace,
while in command of the Middle Department at Baltimore, in 1864, issued
two orders declaring his intention to confiscate the property of
certain persons who were either serving in the rebel army or giving aid
to the Confederate cause. These orders, which were published in the
newspapers, came to the notice of Attorney-General Bates, who at once
wrote to Wallace to remind him that the execution of the confiscation
act devolved upon the Attorney-General, and that he (Bates) had not
given any orders which would warrant the Commander of the Middle
Department in seizing private property, and requesting him to withdraw
the orders. Wallace replied that his construction of the law differed
from that of the Attorney-General and that he should execute it
according to his own understanding of it. Thereupon Bates took the
orders, and the correspondence, to the President and declared his
intention to resign his office if his functions were usurped by military
men in the field, or by the War Department. Lincoln took the papers, and
directed Secretary Stanton to require Wallace to withdraw the two orders
and to desist from confiscation altogether. This was done by Stanton,
but the orders were never publicly withdrawn although action under them
was discontinued.
FOOTNOTES:
[54] Gideon Welles quotes Montgomery Blair as saying in conversation
(September 12, 1862): "Bedeviled with the belief that he might be a
candidate for the Presidency, Cameron was beguiled and led to mount the
nigger hobby, alarmed the President with his notions, and at the right
moment (B. says) he plainly and promptly told the President he ought to
get rid of C. at once, that he was not fit to remain in the Cabinet, and
was incompetent to manage the War Department, which he had undertaken to
run by the aid of Tom A. Scott, a corrupt lobby jobber from
Philadelphia." (_Diary_, I, 127.)
[55] Article on "Some Legal Aspects of the Confiscation Acts of the
Civil War," by J. G. Randall. _Am. Hist. Review_, October, 1912.
CHAPTER XI
THE EXPULSION OF CAMERON
Early in the year 1862, it was found that the national credit was
sinking in consequence of frauds in the War Department. A Committee on
Government Contracts was appointed by the House, and the first man to
fall under its censure was Alexander Cummings, one of the two
Pennsylvania politicians with whom David Davis had made his bargain for
votes at the Chicago convention.
The War Department was represented at New York by General Wool with a
suitable staff, Major Eaton being the commissary. There was also a Union
Defense Committee consisting of eminent citizens who had volunteered to
serve the Government in whatever capacity they might be needed.
Nevertheless, Secretary Cameron placed a fund of two million dollars in
the hands of General Dix, Mr. Opdycke, and Mr. Blatchford, to be
disbursed by E. D. Morgan and Alexander Cummings, or either of them, for
the purpose of forwarding troops and supplies to Washington. As E. D.
Morgan was Governor of the State and was busy at Albany, this
arrangement would be likely to devolve most of the purchases on Cummings
alone. Cameron wrote on April 2, to Cummings:
The Department needs at this moment an intelligent,
experienced, and energetic man on whom it can rely, to assist
in pushing forward troops, munitions, and supplies. I am aware
that your private affairs may demand your time. I am sure your
patriotism will induce you to aid me even at some loss to
yourself.
Major Eaton, the army commissary, distinctly informed Cummings that his
services were not needed in the purchase of supplies. Nevertheless,
Cummings drew $160,000 out of the two-million fund and proceeded to
disburse the same. He first appointed a certain Captain Comstock to
charter or purchase vessels. Captain Comstock went to Brooklyn,
accompanied by a friend, and inspected a steamer appropriately named the
Catiline, which he found could be bought for $18,000. Before he made his
report to Cummings, the friend who accompanied him suggested to another
friend named John E. Develin that there was a chance to make some money
"by good management." Comstock at the same time assured Colonel D. D.
Tompkins, of the Quartermaster's Department, that the ship was worth
$50,000. Comstock testified that he was sent for by Thurlow Weed to come
to the Astor House at the outbreak of the troubles, and that Weed stated
to him that he (Weed) was an agent of the Government to send troops and
munitions of war to Washington by way of the Chesapeake, and that he
wished to charter vessels for that purpose. Afterwards Cummings called
upon Comstock and showed him the same authority that Weed had shown.
The Catiline was bought by Develin for $18,000. The seller of the ship
testified that he received, as security for the purchase money, four
notes of $4500 each executed by Thurlow Weed, John E. Develin, G. C.
Davidson, and O. B. Matteson. Matteson had been a member of a previous
Congress from Utica, New York, but had been expelled from the House. The
Catiline was chartered for the Government at the rate of $10,000 per
month for three months, with an agreement that if she were lost in the
service the owners should be paid $50,000. The title to the Catiline
was, for convenience, placed in the name of a Mr. Stetson.
Cummings was examined by the Committee on Government Contracts. He
testified that he had formerly been the publisher of the Philadelphia
_Evening Bulletin_, and later publisher of the New York _World_, and
that he had resided in the latter city about eighteen months; his family
still residing in Philadelphia. The purchases made by him to be shipped
on the Catiline consisted mainly of groceries and provisions, including
twenty-five casks of Scotch ale, and twenty-five casks of London porter;
but he testified that he did not see any of the articles bought, nor did
he have any knowledge of their quality, nor did he see any of them put
on board the ship. The purchases, he said, were made from the firm of E.
Corning & Co., of Albany, through a member of the firm named Davidson,
whom Cummings met at the Astor House. Cummings assumed that Davidson was
a member of the firm because Davidson told him so; he had no other
evidence of the fact. He assumed also that Corning & Co. were dealers in
provisions, but had no absolute knowledge on that point.[56] He supposed
that the goods were shipped from Albany to be loaded on the Catiline,
but did not know that such was the fact. All these details he left to
his clerk, James Humphrey, who had been recommended as clerk by Thurlow
Weed. Cummings testified that he did not know Humphrey before; did not
know whether he had ever been in business in Albany or in New York; took
him on Weed's recommendation; made no bargain with him as to salary; did
not know where he could be found now. Bought a lot of hard bread from a
house in Boston. Questioned to whom he made payment for this bread, he
answered: "Directly to the party selling it, I suppose." "By you?" "By
my clerk, I suppose." Did not recollect who first suggested the purchase
of bread. Had no directions from the Government to purchase any
particular articles. Bought a quantity of straw hats and linen
pantaloons, thinking they would be needed by the troops in warm weather.
Did not personally know that any of the goods had been loaded on the
steamer or by whom they should have been so loaded. The cargo was
certified by Cummings to Cameron as shipped for the Government. Mr.
Barney, Collector of the Port, refused to give a clearance to the
Catiline to sail. Mr. Stetson, the owner, produced a letter from Thurlow
Weed requesting a clearance, but Barney still refused. Finally General
Wool gave a "pass" on which the Catiline sailed without a clearance.
General Wool revoked the pass on the following day, but the ship had
already departed.[57]
The report says: "The Committee have no occasion to call in question the
integrity of Mr. Cummings." We must infer, therefore, that he was chosen
by Cameron to disburse Government money in this emergency because he was
an extraordinary simpleton, and likely to be guided by Thurlow Weed in
buying army supplies from a hardware firm in Albany, and an unknown
Boston house that furnished hard bread.
Congressman Van Wyck of New York, a member of the Committee, said that
Mr. Weed's absence from home had prevented an examination into the
nature and extent of his agency in the matter of the Catiline.[58] At
the time when Weed's testimony was wanted he was in Europe acting as a
volunteer diplomat "assisting to counteract the machinations of the
agents of treason against the United States in that quarter," as appears
by a letter of Secretary Seward to Minister Adams, dated November 7,
1861.
The Committee on Government Contracts were unable to determine whether
the cargo of the Catiline was a private speculation or a _bona-fide_
purchase for the Government. The character of the goods purchased and
the mode of purchase pointed to the former conclusion. Scotch ale and
London porter were not embraced in any list of authorized rations, nor
were straw hats and linen pantaloons included in quartermaster's stores.
Congressman Van Wyck conjectured that it was a private speculation until
Collector Barney refused to grant a clearance, and that then it was
turned over to the Government. Mr. Stetson, who applied for the
clearance, first told the Collector that the ship was loaded with flour
and provisions belonging to several of his friends. When he called the
second time he testified that the cargo consisted of supplies for the
troops. The ship was destroyed by fire before the three months' charter
expired.
On the 13th of January, Henry L. Dawes, of Massachusetts, another member
of the committee, alluded to certain purchases of cavalry horses,
saying:
A regiment of cavalry has just reached Louisville one thousand
strong, and a board of army officers has condemned four hundred
and eighty-five of the one thousand horses as utterly
worthless. The man who examined those horses declared, upon his
oath, that there is not one of them worth twenty dollars. They
are blind, spavined, ring-boned, with the heaves, with the
glanders, and with every disease that horseflesh is heir to.
Those four hundred and eighty-five horses cost the Government,
before they were mustered into the service, $58,200, and it
cost the Government to transport them from Pennsylvania to
Louisville, $10,000 more before they were condemned and cast
off.
There are, sir, eighty-three regiments of cavalry one thousand
strong now in or roundabout the army. It costs $250,000 to put
one of those regiments upon its feet before it marches a step.
Twenty millions of dollars have thus far been expended upon
these cavalry regiments before they left the encampments in
which they were gathered and mustered into the service. They
have come here and then some of them have been sent back to
Elmira; they have been sent back to Annapolis; they have been
sent here and they have been sent there to spend the winter;
and many of the horses that were sent back have been tied to
posts and to trees within the District of Columbia and there
left to starve to death. A guide can take you around the
District of Columbia to-day to hundreds of carcasses of horses
chained to trees where they have pined away, living on bark and
limbs till they starve and die; and the Committee for the
District of Columbia have been compelled to call for
legislation here to prevent the city wherein we are assembled
from becoming an equine Golgotha.[59]
Horse contracts of this sort had been so plentiful that Government
officials had gone about the streets of Washington with their pockets
full of them. Some of these contracts had been used to pay Cameron's
political debts and to cure old political feuds, and banquets had been
given with the proceeds, "where the hatchet of political animosity,"
said Dawes, "was buried in the grave of public confidence and the
national credit was crucified between malefactors."
Dawes said also that there was "indubitable evidence that somebody has
plundered the public treasury well-nigh in a single year as much as the
entire current yearly expenses of the Government which the people hurled
from power because of its corruption"--meaning Buchanan's
Administration.[60]
In the Senate on the 14th, Trumbull, quoting from the testimony of the
House Committee, said that Hall's carbines, originally owned by the
Government, but condemned and sold as useless at about $2 each, were
purchased back for the Government, in April or May, at $15 each. In
June, the Government sold them again at $3.50 each. Afterwards in
August, they were purchased by an agent of the Government at $12.50 each
and turned over to the Government at $22 each, and the Committee of the
House was then trying to prevent this last payment from being made, and
eventually succeeded in doing so. The beneficiary in this case was one
Simon Stevens, not a relative of Thaddeus Stevens, but a protégé of his,
and an occupant of his law office. He operated through General Frémont,
not through Cameron.
"Sir," said Dawes, "amid all these things is it strange that the public
treasury trembles and staggers like a strong man with a great burden
upon him? Sir, the man beneath an exhausted receiver gasping for breath
is not more helpless to-day than is the treasury of this Government
beneath the exhausting process to which it is subjected."
Somewhat later Congressman Van Wyck showed, among other things, that
Thurlow Weed, by the favor of Cameron, had established himself between
the Government and the powder manufacturers in such a way as to pocket a
commission of five per cent on purchases of ammunition.[61]
The committee visited severe censure on Thomas A. Scott, for acting as
Assistant Secretary of War, while holding the office of vice-president
of the Pennsylvania Central Railroad. Scott said that he ceased to draw
salary from the railroad when he became Assistant Secretary, but that
he had retained his railroad connection because he considered it of more
value to himself than the other position. The committee considered it
highly improper for him to hold the power to award large Government
contracts for transportation and to fix prices therefor while he had
personal railroad interests, and while Secretary Cameron, to whom he
owed his appointment, was interested in the Northern Central Railroad.
The latter was commonly called "Cameron's road." An order had been
issued by Scott, without consultation with the Quartermaster-General of
the army, fixing the rates to be paid for the transportation of troops,
baggage, and supplies. The Quartermaster-General testified that Scott's
order as to prices was addressed to one of his own subordinates and that
he first saw it in the hands of that subordinate. He construed it,
however, as an order from his superior officer and therefore as
governing himself. Officers of other railroads testified that the rates
fixed by Scott were much too high considering the magnitude and kind of
work to be done. Thus, the rate for transporting troops was fixed at two
cents per mile per man, whether carried in passenger cars or in box
cars, and whether taken as single passengers or by regiments.
Nicolay and Hay tell us that Cameron's departure from the Cabinet was in
consequence of his disagreement with the President as to that part of
his report relating to the arming of slaves; that although nothing more
was said by either himself or Lincoln on that subject, "each of them
realized that the circumstance had created a situation of difficulty and
embarrassment which could not be indefinitely prolonged." Cameron, they
say, began to signify his weariness of the onerous labors of the War
Department, and hinted to the President that he would prefer the less
responsible duties of a foreign mission. To outsiders this affair
seemed to have completely blown over when, on January 11, 1862, Lincoln
wrote the following short note:
MY DEAR SIR: As you have more than once expressed a desire for
a change of position, I can now gratify you consistently with
my view of the public interest. I, therefore, propose
nominating you to the Senate next Monday as Minister to Russia.
Very sincerely your friend,
A. LINCOLN.
The real facts were given to the world by A. K. McClure somewhat later
in his book on "Lincoln and Men of War-Time." He says that Cameron's
dismissal was due to the severe strain put upon the national credit,
which led to the severest criticisms of all manner of public profligacy,
culminating in a formal appeal to the President from leading financial
men of the country for an immediate change of the Secretary of War; that
Lincoln's letter of dismissal was sent to Cameron by the hand of
Secretary Chase, and that it was extremely curt, being almost, if not
quite, literally as follows: "I have this day nominated Hon. Edwin M.
Stanton to be Secretary of War and you to be Minister Plenipotentiary to
Russia"; that Cameron in great agitation brought this missive to the
room of Thomas A. Scott, Assistant Secretary of War, where Mr. McClure
happened to be dining and showed it to them; that he wept bitterly, and
said that it meant his personal degradation and political ruin. Scott
and McClure volunteered to see Lincoln and ask him to withdraw the
offensive letter and to permit Cameron to antedate a letter of
resignation, to which Lincoln consented. "The letter conveyed by Chase
was recalled; a new correspondence was prepared, and a month later given
to the public."[62]
McClure palliates Cameron's conduct by saying that "contracts had to be
made with such haste as to forbid the exercise of sound discretion in
obtaining what the country needed; and Cameron, with his peculiar
political surroundings and a horde of partisans clamoring for spoils,
was compelled either to reject the confident expectation of his friends
or to submit to imminent peril from the grossest abuse of his delegated
authority." This is another way of saying that he was compelled either
to pay his political debts out of his own pocket, or give his henchmen
access to the public treasury, and that he chose the latter alternative.
The House of Representatives passed a resolution of censure upon Cameron
for investing Alexander Cummings with the control of large sums of the
public money and authorizing him to purchase military supplies without
restriction when the services of competent public officers were
available. A few days later the President sent to the House a special
message, assuming for himself and the entire Cabinet the responsibility
for adopting that irregular mode of procuring supplies in the then
existing emergency, a message which, when read in the light of
Cummings's testimony, adds nothing to Lincoln's fame.
There was a struggle in executive session of the Senate, lasting four
days, over the confirmation of Cameron as Minister to Russia. Trumbull
took the lead in opposition. He considered it an immoral act, like
giving to an unfaithful servant a "character" and exposing society to
new malfeasance at his hands. He believed and said that the new office
conferred upon him would serve simply as whitewash to enable him to
recover his seat in the Senate, and that that was the reason why he
wanted the mission to Russia.
Sumner, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, had been
much impressed by Cameron's anti-slavery zeal. As soon as the nomination
came in, he moved that it be confirmed unanimously and without reference
to any committee, which was the usual custom in cases where ex-Senators
of good repute were nominated to office. Objection being made, the
nomination went over. This was the day on which Dawes made his speech in
the House. Sumner saw the speech, called Cameron's attention to it, and
asked what answer should be made to such accusations. Cameron replied
that he had never made a contract for any kind of army supplies since he
had been Secretary of War, but had left all such business to the heads
of bureaus charged with such duties, and had never interfered with them.
On the 15th he put this statement in writing and addressed it to
Vice-President Hamlin:--
I take this occasion to state that I have myself not made a
single contract for any purpose whatever, having always
interpreted the laws of Congress as contemplating that the
heads of bureaus, who are experienced and able officers of the
regular army, shall make all contracts for supplies for the
branches of the service under their care respectively.
So far I have not found any occasion to interfere with them in
the discharge of this portion of their responsible duties.
I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,
SIMON CAMERON.
HON. H. HAMLIN,
President of the Senate of the United States.
In reply Dawes produced documents to show that there were then
outstanding contracts, made by Cameron himself, for 1,836,900 muskets
and rifles, and for only 64,000 by the Chief of Ordnance, the officer
charged with that duty, and that on the very day when the letter to
Hamlin was written, Cameron made a contract, against the advice of the
Chief of Ordnance, for an unlimited number of swords and sabres--all
that a certain Philadelphia firm could produce in a given time. This was
done after he had resigned and before his successor, Stanton, had been
sworn in.[63]
Cameron was confirmed as Minister to Russia on the 17th, by a vote of 28
to 14. The Republican Senators who voted against confirmation were
Foster, Grimes, Hale, Harlan, Trumbull, and Wilkinson. Trumbull handed
me this list of names for publication, saying that all of them desired
to have it published.
Cameron remained abroad until time and more exciting events had cast a
kindly shadow on his record. He then came home and a few years later was
reëlected to the Senate. When the attack was made on his dear friend
Sumner, which ended in displacing him from the chairmanship of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, which he had held ten years, Cameron
retreated to a Committee room, as to a cyclone cellar, where he remained
until the deed was done, leaving Trumbull, Schurz, and Wilson to fight
the battle for his dear friend. Then he returned and sat down in the
chair thus made vacant. He subsequently explained that he did so because
his name was the next one to Sumner's on the committee list.[64]
FOOTNOTES:
[56] E. Corning & Co., of Albany, were dealers in stoves and hardware.
[57] House Report no. 2, 37th Congress, 2d Session, p. 390. Cummings
reappears in Welles's _Diary_, near the close of Andrew Johnson's
Administration, as a favored candidate for the office of Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. The report of the Committee on Government Contracts
had been forgotten or only vaguely remembered. Welles had a dim
recollection that Cummings had a spotted record, and he warned Johnson
against him. Seward indorsed him, however; said he was "a capital man
for the place--no better could be found." (_Diary of Gideon Wells_, III,
414.)
[58] _Cong. Globe_, February, 1862, p. 710.
[59] _Cong. Globe_, January. 1862, p. 208.
[60] _Cong. Globe_, April, 1862, p. 1841.
[61] _Cong. Globe_, February, 1862, p. 712.
[62] _Lincoln and Men of War Time_, p. 165.
[63] Dawes, _Cong. Globe_, April, 1862, p. 1841.
[64] _Congressional Record_, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3434.
CHAPTER XII
ARBITRARY ARRESTS
The jaunty manner in which Secretary Seward administered the laws
respecting the liberty of the citizen in the earlier years of the war is
treated by John Hay with a humorous touch under date October 22, 1861:
To-day Deputy Marshal came and asked what he should do with
process to be served on Porter in contempt business. I took him
over to Seward and Seward said: "The President instructs you
that the _habeas corpus_ is suspended in this city at present,
and forbids you to serve any process upon any officer here."
Turning to me: "That is what the President says, is it not, Mr.
Hay?" "Precisely his words," I replied; and the thing was
done.[65]
Prior to the assembling of Congress in July, 1861, the President had
given to General Winfield Scott authority in writing to suspend the
privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_ at any point on the line of the
movement of troops between Philadelphia and Washington City. Without
other authority Seward began to issue orders for the arrest and
imprisonment of persons suspected of disloyal acts or designs, not only
on the line between Philadelphia and Washington City, but in all parts
of the country.
When the special session of Congress began, Senator Wilson, Chairman of
the Committee on Military Affairs, introduced a joint resolution to
declare these and other acts of the President "legal and valid to the
same intent and with the same effect as if they had been issued and
done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress
of the United States." The clause of the Constitution which says that
the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_ shall not be suspended
unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may
require it, does not say in what mode, or by what authority, it may be
suspended.
Straightway there were differences of opinion as to the lodgment of the
power to suspend, whether it was in the executive or in the legislative
branch of the Government. Other differences cropped up as to the
phraseology of the Wilson Resolution and its legal intendment. It might
be construed as an affirmance by Congress that the President's act
suspending the writ was lawful at the time when he did it, or, on the
other hand, that it became lawful only after Congress had so voted, and
hence was unlawful before. These diversities of opinion were very
tenaciously held by different members of the Senate and House, of equal
standing in the legal profession. The result was that Wilson's joint
resolution was debated at great length, but did not pass. Instead of it
an amendment was added to one of the military bills declaring that all
acts, proclamations, and orders of the President after the 4th of March,
1861, respecting the army and navy, should stand approved and legalized
as if they had had the previous express authority of Congress; and the
bill was passed as amended. This was understood to be a mere makeshift
for the time being.
The general question was again brought to the attention of Congress by
Trumbull, December 12, 1861, when he introduced in the Senate the
following resolution:
Resolved, that the Secretary of State be directed to inform the
Senate whether, in the loyal states of the Union, any person or
persons have been arrested by orders from him or his
department; and if so, under what law said arrests have been
made and said persons imprisoned.
When this resolution came up for consideration (December 16), Senator
Dixon, of Connecticut, objected strongly to it. He thought that it was
unnecessary and unwise, and that it could result in nothing advantageous
to the cause of the Union. Some of the persons referred to, he said, had
been arrested in his own state. They had manifested their treasonable
purposes by attempting to institute a series of peace meetings,
so-called, by which they hoped to debauch the public mind under false
pretense of restoring peaceful relations between the North and the
South. The Secretary of State had put a sudden stop to their treasonable
designs by arresting and imprisoning one or more of them. He contended
that the Secretary had done precisely the right thing, at precisely the
right time, and had nipped treason in Connecticut in the bud. The only
criticism which loyal citizens had to make of his doings was that he had
not arrested a greater number. If there had been any error on the part
of the Executive, it had been on the side of lenity and indulgence. He,
Dixon, would not vote for an inquiry into the legality of such arrests
because they found their justification in the dire necessity of the
time.
Trumbull asked how the Senator knew that the persons arrested were
traitors. Who was to decide that question? If people were to be arrested
and imprisoned indefinitely, without any charges filed against them,
without examination, without an opportunity to reply, at the click of
the telegraph, in localities where the courts were open, far from the
theatre of war, such acts were the very essence of despotism. The only
purpose of making the inquiry was to regulate these proceedings by law.
If additional legislation was necessary to put down treason or punish
rebel sympathizers in Connecticut, or in any other loyal state, he
(Trumbull) was ready to give it, but he was not willing to sanction
lawlessness on the part of public officials on the plea of necessity. He
denied the necessity. The principle contended for by the Senator from
Connecticut would justify mobs, riots, anarchy. He understood that some
of the parties arrested had been discharged without trial and he asked
if Mr. Dixon justified that. Then the following ensued:
MR. DIXON. I do.
MR. TRUMBULL. Then the Senator justifies putting innocent men
in prison. Else why were they discharged? I take it that was
the reason for their discharge. I have heard of such cases.
MR. DIXON. They ought to be discharged, then.
MR. TRUMBULL. They ought to be discharged, and they ought to be
arrested, too. An innocent man ought to be arrested, put into
prison, and by and by discharged. Sir, that is not my idea of
individual or constitutional liberty. I am engaged, and the
people whom I represent are engaged, in the maintenance of the
Constitution and the rights of the citizens under it. We are
fighting for the Government as our fathers made it. The
Constitution is broad enough to put down this rebellion without
any violations of it. I do not apprehend that the present
Executive of the United States will assume despotic powers. He
is the last man to do it. I know that his whole heart is
engaged in endeavoring to crush this rebellion, and I know that
he would be the last man to overturn the Constitution in doing
it. But, sir, we may not always have the same person at the
head of our affairs. We may have a man of very different
character, and what we are doing to-day will become a precedent
upon which he will act. Suppose that when the trouble existed
in Kansas, a few years ago, the then President of the United
States had thought proper to arrest the Senator or myself, and
send him or me to prison without examination, without
opportunity to answer, because in his opinion we were dangerous
to the peace of the country, and the necessity justified it.
What would the Senator have thought of such action?
The debate lasted the whole day. Senators Hale, Fessenden, Kennedy, and
Pearce, of Maryland, supported the resolution. Senators Wilson, of
Massachusetts, and Browning, of Illinois, opposed it.
Read in the light of the present day the arguments of the opposition are
extremely flimsy. They said in effect: "We know that our rulers mean
well; if we ask them any questions, we shall cast a doubt upon their
acts and then the wicked will be encouraged in their wrongdoing, and
treason will multiply in the land." It was Trumbull's opinion that
arbitrary arrests were causing division and dissension among the loyal
people of the North, and were thus doing more harm than good, even from
the standpoint of their apologists. Democratic conventions censured
them. That of Indiana, for example, resolved:
That the total disregard of the writ of _habeas corpus_ by the
authorities over us and the seizure and imprisonment of the
citizens of the loyal states where the judiciary is in full
operation, without warrant of law and without assigning any
cause, or giving the party arrested any opportunity of defense,
are flagrant violations of the Constitution, and most alarming
acts of usurpation of power, which should receive the stern
rebuke of every lover of his country, and of every man who
prizes the security and blessings of life, liberty, and
property.
At the close of the debate, Senator Doolittle moved to refer the
resolutions to the Committee on the Judiciary, in order to have a report
on the question whether the right to suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_
appertains to the President or to Congress. This motion was opposed by
Trumbull, but it prevailed by a vote of 25 to 17, and the subject was
shelved for six months.
The question upon which Senator Doolittle wanted information had already
been decided, so far as one eminent jurist could decide it, in the case
of John Merryman, a citizen of Maryland, who was arrested at his home
in the middle of the night on the 25th of May, 1861. He applied to Chief
Justice Taney for a writ directing General Cadwalader, the commandant of
Fort McHenry, to produce him in court, on the ground that he had been
arrested contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United States. He
stated that he had been taken from his bed at midnight by an armed force
pretending to act under military orders from some person to him unknown.
The Chief Justice issued his writ and General Cadwalader sent his
regrets by Colonel Lee, saying that the prisoner was charged with
various acts of treason and that the arrest was made by order of General
Keim, who was not within the limits of his command. He said further that
he was authorized by the President of the United States to suspend the
writ of _habeas corpus_ for the public safety. He requested that further
action be postponed until he could receive additional instructions from
the President.
Judge Taney thereupon issued an attachment against General Cadwalader
for disobedience to the high writ of the court. The next day United
States Marshal Bonifant certified that he sent in his name from the
outer gate of the fort, which he was not permitted to enter, and that
the messenger returned with the reply that there was no answer to his
card, and that he was thereupon unable to serve the writ. The Chief
Justice then read from manuscript as follows:
1. The President, under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, cannot suspend the privilege of the writ of _habeas
corpus_, nor authorize any military officer to do so.
2. A military officer has no right to arrest and detain a
person not subject to the rules and articles of war, for an
offense against the laws of the United States, except in aid of
the judicial authority and subject to its control, and if the
party is arrested by the military, it is the duty of the
officer to deliver him over immediately to the civil authority
to be dealt with according to law.
The Chief Justice then remarked orally that if the party named in the
attachment were before the court he should fine and imprison him, but
that it was useless to attempt to enforce his legal authority, and he
should, therefore, call upon the President of the United States to
perform his constitutional duty and enforce the process of the court.
July 8, 1862, the House, after a brief debate, passed a bill reported by
its Judiciary Committee directing the Secretaries of State and of War to
report to the judges of the courts of the United States the names of all
persons held as political prisoners, residing in the jurisdiction of
said judges, and providing for their prompt release unless the grand
jury should find indictments against them during the first term of court
thereafter. The bill also authorized the President, during any recess of
Congress, to suspend the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_
throughout the United States, or any part thereof, in cases of
rebellion, or invasion, where the public safety might require it, until
the meeting of Congress. Mr. Bingham, of Ohio, who reported the bill,
explained that the committee did not attempt to decide whether the right
to suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_ was vested in the executive or in
the legislative branch of the Government. That was a matter of dispute,
and the bill was intended to settle doubts, not theoretically but
practically. If the right belonged to the Executive under the
Constitution the passage of the bill would do no harm; if it belonged to
Congress the bill would enable the President to exercise it legally. A
motion to lay the bill on the table was negatived by a vote of 29 to 89,
after which it was passed without a division.
July 15, Trumbull reported this bill from the Judiciary Committee of the
Senate with a recommendation that it pass. It was opposed vigorously by
Wilson, of Massachusetts, who called it a general jail delivery for the
benefit of traitors. He moved to strike out all of it except the section
which authorized the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of
_habeas corpus_. This motion was rejected by a majority of one, but the
session came to an end on the following day without a final vote on the
passage of the bill.
In the meantime President Lincoln had seen fit to transfer the license
of making arbitrary arrests from the Secretary of State to the Secretary
of War. The change was no betterment, however, for, where Seward had
previously chastised the suspected ones with whips, Stanton now
chastised them with scorpions. Arbitrary arrests became more numerous
and arbitrary than before. A special bureau was created for them under
charge of an officer styled the Provost Marshal of the War Department.
In the ensuing political campaign the Democrats made the greatest
possible use of the issue thus presented, and they showed large gains in
the congressional elections in the autumn of 1862. They carried New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin.
Horatio Seymour was elected governor of the Empire State, and William A.
Richardson (Democrat) was chosen by the legislature of Illinois as
Senator in place of Browning, who was filling the vacancy caused by the
death of Senator Douglas. It is impossible to say how much influence the
arbitrary arrests had in producing these results, but it is certain that
the Republican leaders were alarmed. Stanton fell into a panic. The
general jail delivery apprehended by Wilson took place by a stroke of
Stanton's pen on the 22d of November, without waiting for the final vote
on Trumbull's bill, and Wilson himself voted for the bill.
In the House, Thaddeus Stevens introduced a bill to indemnify the
President and all persons acting under his authority for arrests and
imprisonments previously made. This was passed under the previous
question, December 8, unfairly and without debate.
When Congress reassembled in December, Trumbull called up the House bill
and offered a substitute for it. He held that under the Constitution
Congress must authorize and regulate the suspension of the writ of
_habeas corpus_. He would not, however, limit the exercise of the
executive power to the time of meeting of the next Congress, as the
House bill provided. His substitute proposed that the suspension of the
writ should be left to the discretion of the President as to time and
place during the continuance of the rebellion, but that political
prisoners should not be held indefinitely without knowing the charges
against them. The second section provided that lists of all prisoners of
this class in the loyal states should be furnished, within twenty days,
to the courts of the respective districts and laid before the grand
juries with a statement of the charges against them, and if no
indictments should be found against them during that term of court they
should be discharged upon taking an oath of allegiance to the United
States, and (if required by the judge) giving a bond for good behavior.
Future arrests for political offenses were to be regulated in like
manner. Collamer moved to strike out the second section, but failed by
two votes.
Republican resistance to this measure now ceased and the rôle of
opposition was taken up by the Democrats. Powell, of Kentucky, contended
that the power to suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_ was lodged in
Congress exclusively and could not be delegated to the President. He
raised the objection also that there was no definition of the phrase
"political offenses." Trumbull agreed to strike out that phrase
altogether, in which case the President would have the power to suspend
the writ for all offenses, and could determine for himself which ones
were political and which were non-political. As to the right of Congress
to delegate its own powers to the President in analogous cases, he cited
the power to borrow money, the power to grant letters of marque and
reprisal, and the power to call forth the militia, all of which were
lodged in Congress, but which Congress never exercised directly, but
only by delegating its powers to the Executive.
Senator Carlile, of Virginia, held that the writ of _habeas corpus_
ought never to be suspended in places where the courts were open.
Trumbull replied that if it were not suspended in those places it could
never be suspended at all, for if there were no courts open, the writ
itself could not be issued. Yet the Constitution clearly contemplated
the necessity of suspending it in certain conditions where it actually
existed.
February 23, 1863, Trumbull's substitute was agreed to by yeas 25, nays
12, and the bill was passed by 24 to 13. All of the negative votes,
except two, were cast by Democrats.
February 27, the Senate took up the Stevens House bill to indemnify the
President and adopted a substitute proposed by Trumbull. The substitute
was not adopted by the House, but a conference was asked for and agreed
to by the Senate. The conferees decided to consolidate into one act the
Indemnity Bill and the _Habeas Corpus_ Bill, which was still pending
between the two houses. The report of the Conference Committee was
presented to the Senate by Trumbull on March 2, one day before the end
of the Thirty-seventh Congress.
Except the financial bills, this was the most important measure of the
session, and the one about which the most heat had been engendered. On
the 24th of September, 1862, the President had proclaimed martial law
throughout the nation as to persons discouraging enlistments or
resisting the Conscription Act and had suspended the writ of _habeas
corpus_ as to such persons. On the 1st of January following, he had
issued the Emancipation Proclamation, of which he had given preliminary
notice one hundred days before. These measures were extremely
distasteful to the Democrats and especially so to those of the border
slave states. The pending measure was intended to condone all former
arbitrary arrests and to sanction an indefinite number in the future,
although providing for speedy trials.
When the report was presented, Powell, of Kentucky, moved to postpone it
till the following day. Trumbull would not agree to any postponement
unless there was an understanding on both sides that a vote should be
taken within a limited time. It was finally agreed between himself and
Bayard, of Delaware, that it should be postponed until seven o'clock in
the evening, with the understanding that there should be no
filibustering on the measure. The postponement was to be for debate and
discussion only. "So far as I know, or can learn, or believe," said
Bayard, "it is delay for no other purpose." Powell was present when this
colloquy took place and he neither affirmed nor denied. Trumbull took it
to be an agreement between the two political parties.
The debate began with a speech from Senator Wall (Democrat), of New
Jersey, who held the floor till midnight, when Saulsbury, of Delaware,
moved that the Senate adjourn. The motion was negatived by 5 to 31.
Powell moved that the bill be laid upon the table. This was negatived
without a division. Then Powell began a speech against the bill. At
12.40 A.M., Richardson moved that the Senate adjourn; negatived by 5 to
30. Powell continued his speech and became involved in a running debate
with Cowan, of Pennsylvania, who took the floor after Powell had
finished and made a speech, apparently unpremeditated, but nevertheless
a great speech, going to the foundation of things and showing that the
Administration must be sustained in this crisis, since otherwise the
fabric of self-government in the United States would perish. He did not
say that he approved of, or condoned, arbitrary arrests in the loyal
states. All his implications were to the contrary, but he insisted that
those who would save the country and ward off chaos and anarchy could
not pause now to contend with each other on the issue whether the
President had the right to suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_ or
whether Congress had it. He said that he observed signs, on the
Democratic side, of filibustering against the bill, and he thought that
such tactics were unjustifiable and highly dangerous. His argument
carried the greater force because of his habitual conservatism. While it
did not, perhaps, change any votes, it probably dampened the resistance
of the Northern Democrats to the bill.
When Cowan had concluded, Powell took the floor to reply. At 1.53 A.M.,
Bayard interrupted him with a motion to adjourn, which was negatived by
4 to 35. Powell resumed his speech and made a much longer one than his
first, at the end of which he moved an adjournment, negatived by 4 to
32. Then Bayard made a long speech against the bill. He finished at 5
o'clock and Powell made another motion to adjourn, which was negatived,
4 to 18, no quorum voting.
Some confusion followed the disclosure of the absence of a quorum.
Several motions were made and withdrawn, and finally Fessenden called
for the yeas and nays on Powell's motion to adjourn. In the mean time a
quorum had been drummed up and the roll-call showed 4 yeas to 33 nays.
There was considerable noise and confusion on the floor when the result
was announced and the presiding officer (Pomeroy, of Kansas) said
quickly:
The question is on concurring in the report of the Committee of
Conference. Those in favor of concurring in the report will say
"aye"; those opposed, "no." The ayes have it. It is a vote. The
report is concurred in.
Trumbull instantly moved to take up a bill from the House relating to
public grounds in Washington City, and his motion was agreed to. Then
Powell wanted to go on with the Indemnity Bill and was informed by
Grimes that it had already passed. He denied that it had passed and
called for the yeas and nays. Trumbull claimed the floor and his claim
was sustained by the chair. Powell called it a piece of "jockeying."
After some further recrimination the Senate adjourned.
On reassembling, the question whether the bill had passed or not was
again taken up. The Senate Journal showed that it had passed, and the
question arose on a motion to correct the Journal. In the debate which
ensued it was proved that the presiding officer did actually put the
motion in the words quoted above; that, of the four Democrats who voted
on the last roll-call, none heard it; that the Democrats were in fact
filibustering against the bill, or at all events that Powell was doing
so, for he avowed that he had intended to defeat it by any means in his
power. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the passage of the
bill was accomplished by the sharp practice of Pomeroy; but it was
_damnum absque injuria_, snap judgment being no worse than
filibustering. Moreover, there is evidence that of the thirteen
Democratic Senators, only four or five were really determined to kill
the bill at all hazards. All except that number absented themselves from
the night session, while all or nearly all the Republicans remained in
their places.
The Conference Report was concurred in on the 2d of March and the bill
was approved by the President on the following day. We may infer,
therefore, that the power to suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_ resides
in the legislative branch of the Government, of which the President is a
part, and that Congress may delegate its powers to the President and
prescribe conditions and limitations to its exercise.
No legislation more wholesome was enacted during the war period. No act
of the period was more precise and lucid and less equivocal in its
terms. Yet within two months it was grossly violated by the banishment
of Clement L. Vallandigham, an ex-member of Congress from Ohio.
Vallandigham was the incarnation of Copperheadism. I heard his speech of
January 14, 1863, in the House, in which he discharged all the
pro-slavery virus that he had been collecting from his boyhood days. As
a public speaker he had no attractions, but rather, as it seemed to me,
the tone and front of a fallen angel defying the Almighty. There was
neither humor nor persuasion nor conciliation in his make-up. He was
cold as ice and hard as iron. Although born and bred in a free state, he
avowed himself a pro-slavery man. In the speech referred to he took two
hours to prove the following propositions: (1) That the Southern
Confederacy never could be conquered; (2) that the Union never could be
restored by war; (3) that it could be restored by peace; (4) that
whatever else might happen, African slavery would be "fifty-fold
stronger" at the end of the war than it had been at the beginning.
General Ambrose E. Burnside, after his defeat at Fredericksburg, had
been sent to take command of the Department of the Ohio. Vallandigham
was now seeking the nomination of his party for governor of Ohio, and
his chances of success were not flattering until Burnside caused him to
be arrested for alleged treasonable utterances in a speech delivered at
the town of Mount Vernon on the 1st day of May, 1863. He was taken out
of his bed at Dayton in the night and carried to Cincinnati, put in a
military prison, tried by a military commission, found guilty, and
sentenced to close confinement in Fort Warren during the continuance of
the war. President Lincoln commuted his sentence to banishment to the
Southern Confederacy. He was accordingly sent across the army lines and
handed over to his supposed friends, who did not, however, receive him
with any touching marks of affection.
Under the Act of Congress approved March 3, 1863, it was the duty of the
Secretary of War within twenty days to report the arrest of Vallandigham
to the judge of the United States District Court for southern Ohio, with
a statement of the charges against him, in order that they might be laid
before the grand jury, and if an indictment were found against him, to
bring him to trial; and if no indictment were found during that term of
court, to discharge him from confinement. Any officer, civil or
military, holding a prisoner in contravention of that act was guilty of
a misdemeanor and liable to a fine of not less than five hundred dollars
and to imprisonment in the common jail not less than six months.
Accordingly, all the proceedings in the case of Vallandigham subsequent
to his arrest were unwarranted and lawless. The arrest itself was,
perhaps, permissible under the act, because the President had the right
to suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_. When Vallandigham applied for
the writ, Judge Leavitt refused it on that ground. The refusal of the
writ, however, did not justify the later proceedings.
The military trial of Vallandigham and his subsequent banishment led to
vehement protests from Northern Democrats, which, in the light of the
present day, seem not unreasonable. President Lincoln replied at great
length and on the whole successfully to one such protest which came from
a committee of citizens of New York, of which Erastus Corning was
chairman. He did not fare so well in a later controversy with a
committee of the Ohio Democratic State Convention, who visited the
Executive Mansion and submitted their protest in writing under date of
June 26. In this communication they covered the same ground as the New
York men and added these words:
And finally, the charge and the specifications on which Mr.
Vallandigham was tried entitled him to a trial before the civil
tribunals according to the express provisions of the late acts
of Congress approved by yourself July 17, 1862, and March 3,
1863.
Mr. Lincoln replied to everything in the protest of the Ohio men except
this paragraph. His failure to reply on this point gave them the
opportunity to retort that his answer was "a mere evasion of the grave
questions involved." This is the only instance in Mr. Lincoln's
controversial writings, so far as I can discover, where such a retort
seems justified. The correspondence is published in Appleton's Annual
Cyclopædia, 1863.
The New York _Tribune_ deprecated, in no querulous tone, but in
moderate and dignified language, the entire proceedings in
Vallandigham's case, and deemed them not helpful to the cause of the
Union, but the contrary.
Vallandigham was not the kind of man to win public sympathy, even for
his misfortunes. Moreover, his transference to the society that he was
supposed to be most fond of (as an alternative to close confinement in
Fort Warren) had a flavor of jocularity that dulled the edge of
criticism; but his strength in his own party was vastly augmented by
these proceedings. He was nominated for governor by acclamation, and
would probably have been elected had not the victories at Gettysburg and
Vicksburg, two months later, withdrawn attention from him, inspired the
Unionists with new enthusiasm, and correspondingly depressed their
opponents.
Burnside, finding himself sustained by his superiors in doctoring
Copperheadism in Ohio, enlarged the scope of his practice. On the 1st of
June he issued an order forbidding the circulation of the New York
_World_ in his department and stopping the publication of the Chicago
_Times_. Brigadier-General Ammen was charged with the execution of the
latter order. On the following day, Ammen notified Wilbur F. Storey, the
editor of the _Times_, that he would not be allowed to issue his paper
on the 3d of June. Storey appealed to the United States District Court
for protection. Shortly after midnight Judge Drummond issued a writ
directing the military authorities to take no further steps under
Burnside's order to suppress the _Times_ until the application for a
permanent writ of injunction could be heard in open court. The judge
said:
I may be pardoned for saying that personally and officially I
desire to give every aid and assistance in my power to the
Government and the Administration in restoring the Union, but
I have always wished to treat the Government as a government
of law and a government of the Constitution, and not a
government of mere physical force. I personally have contended
and shall always contend for the right of free discussion and
the right of commenting under the law and under the
Constitution upon the acts of the officers of the Government.
Notwithstanding the order of the judge, a body of troops broke into the
office of the _Times_ at half-past three o'clock in the morning, after
nearly the whole edition had been printed, and took possession of the
establishment. When daylight came there was great excitement in Chicago.
Although the _Times_ was a Copperhead sheet of an obnoxious type, many
loyal citizens were convinced that Burnside's order would produce vastly
more harm than good to the Union cause. A meeting was hastily called at
the circuit court room, at which Senator Trumbull and Congressman I. N.
Arnold were present. Hon. William B. Ogden, ex-mayor, president of the
Chicago and Northwestern Railway, a Republican in politics, offered for
adoption a resolution requesting President Lincoln to suspend or rescind
Burnside's order suppressing the _Times_. The resolution was adopted
unanimously by the meeting and a petition to that effect was drawn up,
signed, and sent around town for additional signatures. It was then
telegraphed to the President, and Trumbull and Arnold sent an additional
telegram asking that it might receive his prompt attention.
Outside of the room, however, the utmost contrariety of opinion existed.
The streets were filled with heated disputants, and there was danger of
rioting throughout the day following the suppression of the newspaper.
In the evening of June 3, a great meeting of persons opposed to
Burnside's order was held in the Court-House Square, which was addressed
by General Singleton, Moses M. Strong, of Wisconsin, B. G. Caulfield,
and E. G. Asay, Democrats, and by Senator Trumbull and Wirt Dexter,
Republicans.
In the mean time Judge Drummond was hearing the arguments of Storey's
lawyers on the question of making permanent the injunction that had
already been disobeyed. While the proceedings were going on, a telegram
came from Burnside to Ammen, dated Lexington, Kentucky, June 4, saying
that his order for the suppression of the Chicago _Times_ had been
revoked by order of the President of the United States. The soldiers
were accordingly withdrawn and Mr. Storey resumed possession of his
property.
The Chicago _Evening Journal_ published the following outline of
Trumbull's speech on this event:
The point of Judge Trumbull's speech was to show the importance
of adhering to the Constitution and laws in all measures
adopted for the suppression of the rebellion. He contended that
they furnished ample provisions for dealing with traitors in
our midst; that the Administration and its friends were
weakened by resort to measures of doubtful authority against
rebel sympathizers where the law furnished adequate remedies;
that while no one questioned the authority of military
commanders in the field and within their lines where the civil
authorities were overborne, to exercise supreme authority, the
right to do this in the loyal portions of the country, where
the judicial tribunals were in full operation, was very
questionable. He held that by its exercise in such localities
the enemies of the country were given a great advantage, by
alleging that their constitutional rights and privileges were
arbitrarily interfered with. He insisted that the Constitution
and laws were supreme in war as well as in peace, and that the
denial of this proposition was an acknowledgment that the
people were incapable of self-government--an admission that
constitutional liberty and the rights of the citizen,
guaranteed by fundamental laws, were of no value except in
peaceful times, so that in tumultuous times personal liberty
regulated by law, to establish which the Anglo-Saxon race had
been contending for centuries, must give way to the discretion
of any man who might happen at the time to be at the head of
the Government; that this, the American people are not prepared
to admit, nor was it necessary they should; that the right of
free speech and a free election should never be surrendered;
but that this freedom did not imply the right, in time of civil
war, to give aid and comfort to the enemies of the country,
either directly or indirectly, against which the laws made
ample provision.
The legislature of Illinois was then in session and both houses passed
resolutions condemning the action of the military authorities in
suppressing the Chicago _Times_.[66]
FOOTNOTES:
[65] _Letters and Diaries_, I, 47.
[66] The New York _Tribune_, June 6, said: "We trust the great majority
of considerate and loyal citizens share the relief and satisfaction we
feel in view of the President's course in revoking the order of General
Burnside which directs the suppression of the Chicago _Times_. And we
further trust that the zealous and impulsive minority, who would have
had General Burnside's order sustained, will, on calm reflection,
realize and admit that the President has taken the wiser and safer
course. We cannot reconcile the decision of the Executive in this case
with his action in regard to Vallandigham. Journalists have no special
license to commit treason, and Vallandigham's sympathy with the rebels
was neither more audacious nor more mischievous than that of the
_Times_. Yet it is better to be inconsistently right than consistently
wrong--better to be right to-day, though wrong yesterday, than to be
wrong both days alike."
CHAPTER XIII
INCIDENTS OF THE YEARS 1863 AND 1864
James W. White, of New York City, writes, March 6, to ask Trumbull, as a
member of the Seward Committee, whether it is a fact that President
Lincoln had knowledge of the dispatches written by Secretary Seward to
Minister Adams, dated April 10, 1861, and July 5, 1862, before they were
sent, and whether he approved the same.
This refers to an event which very nearly upset President Lincoln's
Cabinet in the beginning of 1863. Secretary Seward had entered the
Cabinet under strong suspicions of lukewarmness toward the war policy of
the President, which suspicions were shared by the Republican Senators
generally. Consequently they were prepared to believe that the want of
success which attended the Union arms was due to a lack of earnestness
at headquarters, and that the man who paralyzed Lincoln was the
Secretary of State. While this feeling was rankling in many bosoms, and
especially among those who had considered the Executive remiss in
dealing with the slavery question, the official correspondence of the
State Department of the preceding year came from the press, containing,
among other letters, one from Seward to Minister Adams dated July 5,
1862, with the following words:
It seems as if the extreme advocates of African slavery and its
most vehement opponents were acting in concert together to
precipitate a servile war--the former by making the most
desperate attempts to overthrow the Federal Union, the latter
by demanding an edict of universal emancipation as a lawful and
necessary, if not, as they say, the only legitimate way of
saving the Union.
Probably this was a private note, which got into the published volume by
mistake, but it was oil on the flames in 1863, and it became public
simultaneously with the news of General Burnside's defeat at
Fredericksburg. These were among the darkest hours of the war. The
Republican Senators thought that the rebellion would never be put down
unless Seward were forced out of the Cabinet and that now was the time
to act. A caucus was held and a committee appointed, of which Senator
Collamer was chairman, to visit the President and express the opinion
that Mr. Seward had lost the confidence of Congress and the country, and
that his resignation was necessary to a successful prosecution of the
war. Trumbull was one of the members of the committee.
Seward's unlucky letter, which formed the occasion of Judge White's
communication to Trumbull, was written shortly before Lincoln's
preliminary proclamation of emancipation as to slaves in the rebel
states was published. Senator Sumner took the letter to the President
and asked if he had ever given his sanction to it. He replied that he
had never seen it before. The newspapers got hold of this fact and made
it hot for Seward. The New York _Times_, however, denied, apparently by
authority, that Seward had ever sent any dispatch to a foreign minister
without first submitting it to the President and getting his approval of
it. Such a denial would be technically correct if this letter were a
private communication, not intended for the public archives. Judge
White, in a public letter, maintained that Seward never had submitted
this letter to his chief, thus raising a question of veracity with the
_Times_. So he wrote the foregoing letter to Trumbull hoping to find a
backer in him. Trumbull replied in the following terms:
Pressing engagements and an indisposition to become involved
in the controversy to which your letter of the 6th alludes must
be my apology for not sooner replying to your inquiries. The
want of harmony, not to say the antagonism, between some of the
dispatches referred to and the avowed policy of the President
would seem to afford sufficient evidence to a discerning public
that both could not have emanated from the same mind. In view,
therefore, of the manner in which the information in my
possession was obtained, and not perceiving at this time that
the public good would be subserved by any disclosure I could
make, I must be excused for not undertaking to furnish
extraneous evidence in the matter.
The accusations of the senatorial committee against Seward were
summarized by Lincoln truthfully and with a touch of humor. "While they
seemed to believe in my honesty," he said, "they also appeared to think
that whenever I had in me any good purpose Seward contrived to suck it
out unperceived." Seward was no more to blame for the ill success of the
Union armies than any other member of the Cabinet. The inefficiency in
our armies, according to Gideon Welles, resided in the President's chief
military adviser, General Halleck. However that may have been, it is
well that the errand of the Republican Senators to the White House
proved fruitless, since, if successful, it might have created a
precedent which would have upset our form of government.
G. Koerner, Minister to Spain, writes from Madrid, March 22, 1863, that
he is very much discouraged about the prospects of the war. He trusts
more to the exhaustion of the South than to the victories of the North.
My situation, under the circumstances, has been a very
unpleasant one. For days and weeks I have avoided meetings and
reunions where I would have had to answer questions, often
meant in a very friendly manner, but still embarrassing to me.
My family has also lived very retired, for the additional
reason that we are not able to return the many hospitalities to
which we are invited constantly. We have the greatest trouble
in the world to live here in the most modest manner within our
means. We forego many, very many, of the comforts we were
accustomed to at home.
From Columbus, Georgia, October 26, 1863, Alfred Iverson (former
Senator), trusting that the difficulties in which the two sections are
involved may not have extinguished the feelings of courtesy and humanity
in the hearts of individual gentlemen, writes, at the instance of an
anxious mother, to make inquiries in reference to Charles G. Flournoy,
supposed to have been captured with other Confederate soldiers by
General Grant's forces in the vicinity of Vicksburg, and to be confined
in a military prison at Alton, Illinois.
Walter B. Scates (former judge of the supreme court of Illinois,
Democrat, now serving as assistant adjutant-general in the Thirteenth
Army Corps) writes from New Orleans, November 14, 1863, that he is
thoroughly convinced of the propriety and necessity of destroying
slavery as a means of ending this most wicked war and preventing a
recurrence of a like misfortune; is ready to take an active part in the
organization of colored regiments, that they may assist in maintaining
the Government and winning their own freedom.
From Topeka, Kansas, November 16, John T. Morton remonstrates against
the appointment of M. W. Delahay as judge of the United States District
Court, because he is utterly incompetent. Says he gave up the practice
of his profession in Illinois because he was so ignorant that nobody
would employ him. O. M. Hatch confirms Morton; says the appointment is
unfit to be made; has known Delahay personally for twenty years. Jesse
K. Dubois and D. L. Phillips confirm Hatch.
Jackson Grimshaw writes from Quincy, December 3:
Will the Senate confirm that miserable man Delahay for Judge
in Kansas? The appointment is disgraceful to the President, who
knew Delahay and all his faults, but the disgrace to the
Administration will be greater if the Senate confirms him. He
is no lawyer, could not try a case properly even in a Justice's
court and has no character. Mr. Buchanan in his worst days
never made so disgraceful an appointment to the bench.
Herndon relates that Delahay's expenses to the Chicago nominating
convention, as an expected delegate from Kansas, were promised by
Lincoln. He was not a delegate and never had the remotest chance of
being one, but he came as a "hustler" and Lincoln paid his expenses all
the same. He was nevertheless appointed judge, was impeached by Congress
in 1872 under charges of incompetency, corruption, and drunkenness on
and off the bench, and resigned while the impeachment committee was
taking testimony.
Major-General John M. Palmer writes from Chattanooga, December 18, 1863:
The Illinois troops (now voters) are beginning to talk about
the Presidency. Mr. Lincoln is by far the strongest man with
the army, and no combination could be made which would impair
his strength with this army unless, perhaps, Grant's candidacy
would. The people of Tennessee would now vote for Lincoln, it
is thought by many. Andy Johnson is understood to be a
Presidential aspirant by most people in this state. He is not
as popular as I once thought he was, though if he will exert
himself to do so he can be Governor, or Senator, when the state
is reorganized. He is understood to favor emancipation, and the
people are prepared for it, but I fear personal questions will
complicate the matter. The truth is all these Southern
politicians are behind the times sadly. There is nothing
practical about them. Now, when the whole social and political
fabric is broken up, new foundations might be laid for
institutions which would in their effects within twenty years
compensate the State for all its losses, heavy as they are. But
not much will be done, I fear, because the politicians don't
seem to know what is required. One fourth of the people are
destitute, and yet the leaders have not humanity and energy
enough to induce them to organize for mutual assistance. There
are farms enough in middle Tennessee deserted by their rebel
owners to give temporary homes to thousands, and yet no one
will take the responsibility of putting them in possession, but
the leaders quietly suffer the poor to wander homeless all over
the country.
Colonel Fred Hecker writes from Lookout Valley, Tennessee, December 21:
Again we are encamped in Lookout Valley after heavy fighting
and marching from November 22 to December 16, stopping a
victorious march at the gates of Knoxville, returning with
barefooted, ragged men, but cheerful hearts. This was more than
a fight. It was a wild chase after an enemy making no stand,
leaving everywhere in our hands, muskets, cannon, ammunition,
provisions, stores, etc., and large numbers of prisoners.
These, as well as the populations, were unanimous in declaring
that the people of the South are tired of the war and rebellion
and are in earnest in the desire for peace and order. I
conversed much with men of different positions in life,
education, and political parties, from the enraged secessionist
to the unwavering Union man just returning from his
hiding-place, and I am fully convinced that most of the work is
done. A great many had no idea what war was till both armies,
passing over the country, had taught them the lesson, and there
is such a prevailing union feeling in North Carolina, northern
Alabama, and Georgia, as I have ascertained in a hundred
conversations with men of that section of the country, that the
result of the next campaign is not the least doubtful. You
remember what I told you about General Grant at a time when
this excellent man was pursued by malice and slander. I feel
greatly satisfied that his enemies are now forced to do him
justice. The battle of Chattanooga, with all its great
consequences, was a masterpiece of planning and manoeuvring,
and every man of us is proud to have been an actor in this ever
memorable action. Revolution and war sift men and consume
reputations with the voracity of Kronos, and it is good that it
is so.
From Chattanooga, January 24, 1864, Major-General John M. Palmer writes:
I saw Grant yesterday and had a conversation with him.
Peace-at-any-price men would have a hard bargain in him as
their candidate. He is a soldier and, of course, regards
negroes at their value as military materials. He has just
enough sentiment and humanity about him to make him a careful
general, and he esteems men, black or white, as too valuable to
be wasted. He does not desire to be a candidate for the
Presidency; prefers his present theatre of service to any
other. Nor will the officers of the army willingly give him up.
He has no enemies, and it is very difficult to understand how
he can have any. He is honest, brave, frank, and modest. Is
perfectly willing that his subordinates shall win all the
reputation and glory possible; will help them when he can, with
the most unselfish earnestness. He demands no adulation, and
gives credit for every honest effort, and if efforts are
unsuccessful he has the sense, and the sense of justice, to
understand the reasons for failure and to attach to them their
proper importance. Nobody is jealous of Grant and he is jealous
of no one. He is not a great man. He is precisely equal to his
situation. His success has been wonderful and must be
attributed, I think, to his fine common sense and the faculty
he possesses in a wonderful degree of making himself
understood. I do not think he will be anybody's candidate for
the Presidency this time, but after that his stock will be at a
premium for anything he wants. Mr. Lincoln is popular with the
army, and will, as far as the soldiers can vote, beat anything
the Copperheads can start. No civilian or mere book-making
general can get votes in the army against him.
J. K. Dubois, Springfield, January 30, says:
We are receiving daily old regiments who are reënlisting and
are sent home on furlough for thirty days to see their friends
and recruit. This is very damaging to the Copperhead crew of
our state. They swear and groan over this fact, for they have
preached and affirmed that the soldiers were held in subjection
by their officers, and that as soon as their time was up they
would show their officers and the President that they would
have nothing more to do with this Abolition crusade. And so
when these same men's time will have expired, commencing next
June, they say to rebels both front and rear: "We were at the
beginning of this fight and we intend also to be at the end."
All honor to these brave and loyal men.
Israel B. Bigelow, Brownsville, Texas, May 5, 1864, says that before the
war it was commonly said that soil and climate would regulate slavery.
In theory this was right if slavery was right, and whether
right or wrong, slavery is declining, and with my very hearty
concurrence--to my own astonishment. No man ever regarded a
Massachusetts Abolitionist with greater abhorrence than myself,
and yet I have subscribed to Mr. Lincoln's ironclad oath. Time
works wondrous changes in men's feelings, and there are
thousands of slaveholders in this state who, two years ago,
cursed Mr. Lincoln and his Government, who are now willing to
have their slaves freed if the war can be brought to an end.
We now come upon the first evidence of any difference, of a personal
kind, existing between Senator Trumbull and President Lincoln. Opposing
views on questions of public policy, such as the Confiscation Bill and
arbitrary arrests, have already been noted. A difference of another kind
is disclosed in a letter from N. B. Judd, Minister to Prussia. Judd had
returned to his post after a visit to this country. He wrote to Trumbull
under date, Berlin, January, 1864:
When I last saw you your conviction was that L. would be
reëlected. I tell you combinations can't prevent it. Events
possibly may. But until some event occurs, is it wise or
prudent to give an impression of hostility for no earthly good?
Usually your judgment controls your feelings. Don't let the
case be reversed now. Although a severe thinker you are not
constitutionally a croaker. Excuse the freedom of my writing. I
have given you proofs that I am no holiday friend of yours.
The next piece of evidence found is a letter from Trumbull himself to
H. G. McPike, of Alton, Illinois, one of the few letters of which he
kept a copy in his own handwriting:
WASHINGTON, Feb. 6, 1864.
The feeling for Mr. Lincoln's reëlection _seems_ to be very
general, but much of it I discover is only on the surface. You
would be surprised, in talking with public men we meet here, to
find how few, when you come to get at their real sentiments,
are for Mr. Lincoln's reëlection. There is a distrust and fear
that he is too undecided and inefficient to put down the
rebellion. You need not be surprised if a reaction sets in
before the nomination, in favor of some man supposed to possess
more energy and less inclination to trust our brave boys in the
hands and under the leadership of generals who have no heart in
the war. The opposition to Mr. L. may not show itself at all,
but if it ever breaks out there will be more of it than now
appears. Congress will do its duty, and it is not improbable we
may pass a resolution to amend the Constitution so as to
abolish slavery forever throughout the United States.
The third scrap is a letter from Governor Yates to Trumbull dated
Springfield, February 26, to whom, perhaps, McPike showed Trumbull's
letter quoted above. Yates writes:
As you are a Senator from _Illinois_, the state of Mr. Lincoln,
please be cautious as to your course till I see you. I have
such strong regard for you personally that I do not wish either
enemies or friends on our side, who would like to supplant you,
to get any undue advantage over you.
Trumbull believed there was a lack of efficiency in the use made, by the
executive branch of the Government, of the means placed at its disposal
for putting down the rebellion. That such was his opinion was made clear
by his participation in the anti-Seward movements of the previous year.
Whether the opinion was justified or not, it was so generally
entertained in Washington that if the nomination had rested in the hands
of the Senators and Representatives in Congress, Lincoln would have had
very few votes in the Baltimore Convention. Albert G. Riddle describes a
scene in the White House in February, 1864, illustrative of public
sentiment in Washington at that time. The reception room of the
Executive Mansion was filled with persons, most of whom were inveighing
against Lincoln, who was not present. The one most loud and bitter
against the President was Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts. His assaults
were so amazing that Riddle cautioned him to choose some other place
than the Executive Mansion for uttering them; advised him to make his
speeches in the Senate, or get himself elected to the coming National
Union Convention and then denounce Lincoln, where his words might have
some effect. Wilson replied that he knew the people were for Lincoln and
that nothing could prevent his renomination.[67]
The opposition was based wholly upon charges of inefficiency and lack of
earnestness and vigor in the prosecution of the war. But the feeling,
both among the people at home and the soldiers in the field, was so
overwhelmingly for Lincoln, that when the delegates came together in
convention the opposition in Congress was silenced. After the
nominations of both parties had been made, however, the previous
distrust reappeared on a larger scale and became so pronounced that
Lincoln himself thought that he was about to be defeated and took steps
to turn the Government over to McClellan practically before the
constitutional period for his own retirement.[68] If Lincoln himself was
in despair, other persons who shared his gloom might be excused.
The radicals who were opposed to Lincoln held a convention in the city
of Cleveland on the 31st of May, 1864, and nominated General John C.
Frémont for President and General John Cochrane for Vice-President.
Among the leaders in this movement were B. Gratz Brown, of Missouri,
Wendell Phillips, of Massachusetts, and Rev. George B. Cheever, of New
York. They had the sympathy of Ben Wade, of Ohio, and Henry Winter
Davis, of Maryland, and they reckoned upon the support of many radical
Germans of the fiery type, perhaps sufficiently numerous to turn the
votes of some important Western States. On the 21st of September,
Frémont withdrew as a candidate and on the 23d the President asked for
the resignation of Montgomery Blair as Postmaster-General, which the
latter immediately gave. The simultaneous retirement of Frémont and
Blair, who were known to be enemies to each other, led to a suspicion
that there was some connection between the two events. The account given
by Nicolay and Hay conveys no hint of this, but is confused and
self-contradictory. Evidence is available to indicate that Frémont made
his retirement conditional upon the removal of Blair from the Cabinet,
and that Lincoln, although reluctant to lose Blair from his official
family, deemed it a necessity to get the third ticket out of the
presidential contest, for public reasons.[69]
In the Senatorial contest of 1867 the false accusation was made that
Trumbull had refused to make speeches in favor of Lincoln's reëlection;
whereas he was the leading speaker at the great Union Mass Meeting at
Springfield on the 5th of October, 1864, which was addressed by
Doolittle, Yates, and Logan also. His correspondence shows that he
spoke at several other places during that month.
But speech-making did not gain the victory in the election of 1864. That
fight was won by General Sherman at Atlanta, aided by General Sheridan
in the Valley of Virginia, and by Admiral Farragut at Mobile.
FOOTNOTES:
[67] Riddle's _Recollections of War-Time_, p. 267.
[68] Nicolay & Hay, ix, 251.
[69] A letter dated August 9, 1910, in my possession, from Mr. Gist
Blair, son of Montgomery Blair, says: "I have always understood that my
father retired from Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet in order to secure the
withdrawal of Frémont as a candidate against Mr. Lincoln. There are
letters which I cannot now put my hand on, which indicate that Mr.
Lincoln continued to consult my father practically the same as if he
were a member of the Cabinet, up to the time of Mr. Lincoln's death."
CHAPTER XIV
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
Donn Piatt, meeting William H. Seward on the street on the morning
immediately after the issuing of the preliminary proclamation of
emancipation, complimented him for his share in the act, whereupon the
following colloquy ensued:
"Yes," said Seward, "we have let off a puff of wind over an accomplished
fact."
"What do you mean, Mr. Seward?"
"I mean that the emancipation proclamation was uttered in the first gun
fired at Sumter and we have been the last to hear it. As it is, we show
our sympathy with slavery by emancipating slaves where we cannot reach
them and holding them in bondage where we can set them free."[70]
Seward did not say this in a censorious spirit, but what he did say was
true. The proclamation applied only to states and parts of states under
rebel control. It did not emancipate any slaves within the emancipator's
reach. Whether it freed anybody anywhere was a matter of dispute. What
its legal effect would be after the war should cease, no one could say.
Moreover, if the President had legal authority to issue the
proclamation, then he, or a successor in office, could revoke it.
The Constitution had not given to the Federal Government power to
emancipate slaves. The proclamation did not purport to rest upon any
constitutional power, but upon war powers solely. But war powers last
only while war lasts, and when it comes to an end, all sorts of people
have all sorts of opinions as to the validity of acts done under them.
Public opinion at the time was keenly alive to doubts regarding the
President's powers in this particular. Congress was flooded with
petitions calling for action to confirm and validate the proclamation,
but the way was beset with difficulties. Should the Constitution be
amended, or would an act of Congress suffice? If the Constitution should
be amended, should it abolish slavery everywhere or only in the places
designated by the President? Should loyal slave-owners be compensated,
as Lincoln desired? What were the chances of getting such an amendment
ratified by three fourths of the states? And for this purpose should the
rebel states be counted as still in the Union? If so, the requisite
number might not be obtained.
The first resolution offered in Congress for such an amendment of the
Constitution was proposed in the House on the 14th of December, 1863, by
Representative James F. Wilson of Iowa, in these words:
SECTION 1. Slavery being incompatible with a free government is
forever prohibited in the United States; and involuntary
servitude shall be permitted only as a punishment for crime.
SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce the foregoing
section by appropriate legislation.
On the 13th of January, 1864, Senator Henderson, of Missouri, offered a
resolution to amend the Constitution by adding thereto the following
article:
Slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime, shall not exist in the United States.
These resolutions were referred to the Judiciary Committees of the
respective houses.
On the 10th of February, Trumbull reported the Henderson Resolution from
the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment in the nature of a
substitute in the following terms:
ARTICLE XIII
SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
The phraseology followed pretty closely that of the Ordinance of 1787.
Trumbull adopted it because it was among the household words of the
nation. To become effective as a part of the Constitution, this article
required the votes of two thirds of each branch of Congress and
ratification by the legislatures of three fourths of the States.
Presenting the resolution to the Senate, Trumbull said that nobody could
doubt that the conflict then raging, and all the desolation and death
consequent thereon, had their origin in the institution of slavery; that
even those who contended that the trouble was due to the agitators and
abolitionists of the North must admit that if there were no slavery
there would be no abolitionists. So also it must be admitted that if
there had been no slavery there would have been no secession and no
civil war. All the strife that had ever afflicted the nation, or all
that could be considered menacing to the country's peace, had had its
source in that institution. Various laws had been passed by Congress to
give freedom to slaves of rebel owners and even these laws had not been
executed properly. The President of the United States had issued a
preliminary proclamation in September, 1862, and a final one in January,
1863, declaring all slaves under rebel control free, but not those
under our control. The legal effect of such a proclamation had been a
matter of dispute. Some persons held that the President had the
constitutional power to issue it and that all the slaves designated were
free, or would become so whenever the rebellion should be crushed; while
others contended that it had no effect either _de jure_ or _de facto_.
It was the duty of the lawmaking power to put an end to this uncertainty
by some act more comprehensive than any that had yet been adopted. Would
a mere act of Congress suffice? It had been an axiom of all parties from
the beginning of the Government that Congress had no authority to
interfere with slavery in the states where it existed. We had authority,
of course, to put down the enemies of the country and the right to slay
them in battle; we had authority to confiscate their property; but did
that give us authority to slay the friends of the Union, to confiscate
their property, or to free their slaves? In his opinion the only
conclusive and irrepealable way to make an end of slavery was by an
amendment of the Constitution, and the only practical question remaining
was whether the resolution recommended by the committee could secure a
two-thirds vote in Congress and the concurrence of three fourths of the
states. There were thirty-five states, including those in rebellion, and
two territories about to become states. Presumably the affirmative votes
of twenty-eight states would be required for ratification.
In this speech Trumbull gave public expression to his feelings regarding
the feeble prosecution of the war to which he had given private
expression in the letters to friends referred to in the preceding
chapter. He said:
I trust that within a year, in less time than it will take to
make this constitutional amendment effective, our armies will
have put to flight the rebel armies. I think it ought to have
been done long ago. Hundreds of millions of treasure and a
hundred thousand lives would have been saved had the power of
this republic been concentrated under one mind and hurled in
masses upon the main rebel armies. This is what our patriotic
soldiers have wanted and what I trust is now soon to be done.
But instead of looking back and mourning over the errors of the
past, let us remember them only for the lessons they teach for
the future. Forgetting the things which are past, let us press
forward to the accomplishment of what is before. We have at
last placed at the head of our armies a man in whom the country
has confidence, a man who has won victories wherever he has
been, and I trust that his mind is to be permitted,
uninterfered with, to unite our forces, never before so
formidable as to-day, in one or two grand armies, and hurl them
upon the rebel force.[71]
The feeling here expressed by Trumbull was the prevailing sentiment at
Washington at that time, even in President Lincoln's Cabinet. Both
Gideon Welles and Edward Bates shared it. Welles wrote:
In this whole summer's campaign I have been unable to see or
hear or obtain evidence of power or will or talent or
originality on the part of General Halleck. He has suggested
nothing, decided nothing, done nothing but scold and smoke and
scratch his elbows. Is it possible that the energies of a
nation should be wasted by the incapacity of such a man?
When Welles said to the President that he had observed the "inertness if
not incapacity of the General-in-Chief, and had hoped that he [the
President] who had better and more correct views would issue peremptory
orders," Lincoln replied that it was better that he, who was not a
military man, should defer to Halleck, rather than Halleck to him.
Additional light is thrown by an entry in Hay's "Diaries"[72] under date
April 28, 1864, where Lincoln says:
When it was proposed to station Halleck in general command, he
insisted, to use his own language, on the appointment of a
General-in-Chief who should be held responsible for results. We
appointed him, and all went well enough until after Pope's
defeat, when he broke down,--nerve and pluck all gone,--and has
ever since evaded all possible responsibility, little more,
since that, than a first-rate clerk.
General Francis V. Greene, reviewing the war as a whole, says that
If Lincoln had placed Grant in command of the Western armies in
July, 1862, when Halleck was made General-in-Chief, instead of
in October, 1863, it would have probably shortened the war by a
year.[73]
This opinion is concurred in by General Grenville M. Dodge, one of the
surviving major-generals of the Civil War,[74] and I imagine that it
will not be disputed by any military man at the present day. These
citations show that the opinions held by Trumbull, as to the
inefficiency of the directing force of the Union armies, up to the time
when Grant was called to take command at Washington, were not those of a
mere fault-finder and backbiter.
A notable speech in favor of the anti-slavery amendment was made by
Henderson, of Missouri, who was himself a slave-owner. The most
impressive speech made in either branch of Congress, however, was that
of Senator Reverdy Johnson, of Maryland. The fact that he represented a
slaveholding State could not fail to add force to any argument he might
make in support of the measure, but the argument itself, both in its
moral and its legal aspects, was of surpassing merit. It deserves a high
place in the annals of senatorial eloquence.
The constitutional amendment was under debate in the Senate until the
8th of April, 1864, when it was passed by a vote of 38 to 6. The
negative votes were the two from Delaware, two from Kentucky, and those
of Hendricks, of Indiana, and McDougall, of California. It then went to
the House, where it was under consideration till the 15th of June, when
it failed of passage by a vote of 93 to 65, not two thirds. The
Democrats generally voted in the negative. A second attempt to pass it
was made in the House on February 1, 1865, this time successfully, the
yeas being 119 and the nays, 56. There was an extraordinary scene in the
House when the final vote was taken. It is described by George W.
Julian, in his "Recollections" (page 250), thus:
The time for the momentous vote had now come, and no language
could describe the solemnity and impressiveness of the
spectacle pending the roll-call. The success of the measure had
been considered very doubtful, and depended upon certain
negotiations, the result of which was not fully assured, and
the particulars of which never reached the public.[75] The
anxiety and suspense during the balloting produced a deathly
stillness, but when it became certainly known that the measure
had prevailed, the cheering in the densely packed hall and
galleries surpassed all precedent and beggared all description.
Members joined in the general shouting, which was kept up for
several minutes, many embracing each other, and others
completely surrendering themselves to their tears of joy....
The ratification of the amendment was announced by the Secretary of
State on the 18th of December, 1865. Three states, South Carolina,
Alabama, and Florida, when they ratified it, passed resolutions
expressing their understanding that the second section did not authorize
Congress to legislate on the political status or civil relations of the
negroes, but merely to confirm and protect their freedom. On November 1,
1865, Governor Perry, of South Carolina, wrote to President Johnson,
saying that his state had abolished slavery in all good faith and never
would wish to restore it again, but that his people feared that the
second section might be construed to give Congress local power over
legislation respecting negroes and white men in the state of freedom. To
this letter Secretary Seward replied that the second section was "really
restraining in its effect instead of enlarging the powers of Congress."
By this he meant that it restrained Congress to the single subject of
slavery. It did not give citizenship or civil rights to the freedmen.
The legislature of South Carolina accordingly ratified the amendment on
the 13th of November, and put on record the letter of Seward as the
official interpretation of this clause by the Federal Executive. Alabama
did substantially the same on the 2d of December and Florida on the 28th
of December. Seward's interpretation of the second section of the
amendment turned out to be correct, but many years of doubt and gloom
were to pass before a decision upon it was reached in the Supreme Court.
From what has gone before it appears doubtful whether President
Lincoln's proclamation of emancipation freed any slaves legally. Its
immediate value was not so much in its effect upon the blacks as upon
the whites. It liberated millions of the latter from bondage to a false
philosophy and a monstrous social creed and made possible and necessary
the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment. To Senator Trumbull belongs
the distinction of having traced its lines and this is his title to
immortality.
FOOTNOTES:
[70] _Memories of Men who Saved the Union_, by Donn Piatt, p. 150.
[71] _Cong. Globe_, 1863-64, part 2, p. 1314.
[72] Vol. I, p. 187.
[73] _Scribner's Magazine_, July, 1909.
[74] In a letter to the writer.
[75] The particulars referred to by Julian were subsequently made public
by Mr. A. G. Riddle in his _Recollections of War-Time_, p. 325. Two
Democrats were induced to vote in the affirmative and one other to be
absent when the vote was taken. One of them was induced to vote right by
the promise of an office for his brother; another was facing an election
contest in the coming Congress where his own seat was claimed by a
Republican opponent. The Democrat was promised favorable consideration
by the Republicans before the testimony in the case was examined. The
third was counsel for a railroad against whose interests a bill was
about to be reported in the Senate, which bill was in the control of
Charles Sumner. The bill would not be reported, or not reported soon, if
the Congressman should be absent when the vote was taken. These
arrangements, Riddle says, were negotiated by James M. Ashley, of Ohio,
in whose hands the Republicans of the House had deposited their honor
for the time being. If the three Democrats had voted in the negative,
the result would have been 117 to 59, one less than the necessary two
thirds. But that would only have delayed the adoption of the amendment
till the next Congress.
CHAPTER XV
RECONSTRUCTION
The next event of world-wide concern was the assassination of President
Lincoln, which took place April 14, 1865. It does not come within the
scope of this work, except as it finds expression or comment in the
Trumbull papers. One such, found in a letter of Norman B. Judd, Minister
to Prussia, dated Berlin, May 7, ought to be preserved.
At the present moment he [Lincoln] is deified in Europe.
History shows no similar outburst of grief and indignation.
Crowned heads and statesmen, parliaments and corporate bodies,
literary institutions and the people, all vie in pronouncing
the eulogy. The entire press of Europe has for the last ten
days been filled with nothing else. We have had a very
impressive and imposing funeral service. Kings,
Representatives, Ministers, and the Diplomatic Corps were
amongst the number present. The people assembled to three times
the capacity of the church. I told my colleagues to come
without uniform.--Something new under the sun at this Court of
Uniforms.
When the work of Reconstruction began, two opposing ideas came in
conflict with each other respecting the status of the seceding states.
One was that the act of secession annihilated the State Governments and
put the inhabitants and their belongings in the condition of newly
acquired territories, subject in all things to the conquering power.
This opinion was held by Charles Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens. The other
view was that every act of secession was null and void; that state
sovereignty was suspended but not extinguished in the Confederacy; and
that when the rebellion was crushed, it became the duty of the General
Government to recognize the loyal men in each state, as the rightful
nucleus of sovereignty, to assist them to set the state Governments
going again; in harmony, however, with accomplished facts, including the
abolishment of slavery.
The latter view had been adopted by President Lincoln in a proclamation
issued simultaneously with his annual message to Congress December 8,
1863. This proclamation declared that whenever the voters of any
seceding state, not less in number than one tenth of those who had voted
in the presidential election of 1860, should reëstablish a loyal State
Government, it should be recognized as the true Government of the state.
The qualifications of voters should be those existing in the state
immediately before secession, "excluding all others," but it was
provided that all previous proclamations of the President and all acts
of Congress in reference to slavery should be held inviolable. It was
explained that the question of admitting to seats in Congress any
persons who might be elected by such states as members would rest with
the respective houses exclusively. It was added that while this plan of
Reconstruction was favored by the President he did not mean that no
other would be acceptable.
In pursuance of the proclamation an election was held in February, 1864,
in that portion of Louisiana controlled by the Union army under command
of General Banks, at which election 11,411 votes were cast--the whole
vote of the state had usually been about 40,000. At this election,
Michael Hahn had been chosen governor and he was inaugurated as such on
the 4th of March, with impressive ceremonies, "in the presence of more
than 50,000 people," as General Banks announced. Writing to Governor
Hahn under date, March 13, 1864, Lincoln said:
Now you are about to have a convention which, among other
things, will probably define the elective franchise. I barely
suggest for your private consideration whether some of the
colored people may not be let in, as, for instance, the very
intelligent and especially those who have fought gallantly in
our ranks. They will probably help, in some trying time to
come, to keep the jewel of liberty in the family of freedom.
But this is only a suggestion, not to the public but to you
alone.
A constitutional convention of Louisiana was elected March 28, 1864; it
assembled April 6; adopted a free state constitution July 22, which was
ratified by popular vote September 5. Under this constitution a
legislature was elected by which two Senators were chosen to represent
the state at Washington. Their credentials were referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary, and on the 8th of January, 1865, Trumbull
called at the White House to consult with Lincoln respecting their
admission. One of the consequences of the interview was the unanimous
agreement of the Judiciary Committee in favor of a joint resolution
recognizing the Government of which Michael Hahn was the head. This
resolution was reported by Trumbull on the 23d of February. Sumner
objected to it because the constitution did not grant negro suffrage,
and he avowed the intention of using all parliamentary means to defeat
it. In this endeavor he had the coöperation of Senators Chandler and
Wade and of most of the Democrats. The latter opposed the resolution
because the constitution was not the work of the majority of the white
people of the state. On the 24th, there was a debate of some bitterness
between Sumner and Doolittle. The latter contended that the vote of
Louisiana was needed to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. To this Sumner replied that the so-called state of
Louisiana was a shadow, that no such state existed, and that its
ratification would be worthless if obtained. In this contention he was
sustained by Garrett Davis, of Kentucky.
There were only seven working days remaining of the Thirty-eighth
Congress, and Sumner managed to stave off the vote, although there was a
large majority in favor of the resolution, as was shown by roll-calls on
various motions. There was a sharp passage-at-arms between Trumbull and
Sumner, which made a breach between them for a considerable time.
On the 11th of April, five days before his assassination, Lincoln
delivered a carefully prepared address from the balcony of the White
House in response to a greeting of citizens who had assembled to welcome
him on his return from Richmond after the surrender of that city. He
embraced the occasion to call attention again to the question of
Reconstruction which was now becoming momentous. He referred to the plan
which he had recommended in his annual message of December, 1863, and
said that it had received the approval of every member of his Cabinet
(which then included Chase and Blair). It had not been objected to by
any professed emancipationist until after the news reached Washington
that the people of Louisiana were about to take action in accordance
with it. Then the question had been raised whether the seceded states
were in the Union or out of it. He did not consider that question a
material one, but rather a pernicious abstraction, having only the
mischievous effect of dividing loyal men. The question now uppermost was
how to get the seceded states again into their proper practical
relations with the Union. "Let us all join," he said, "in doing the
acts necessary to restoring the proper practical relations between these
states and the Union, and each forever after innocently indulge his own
opinion whether, in doing the acts, he brought the states from without
into the Union, or only gave them proper assistance, they never having
been out." The question was not whether the Louisiana Government as
reconstructed was quite all that was desirable, but whether it was wiser
to take it and help to improve it, or to reject and disperse it.
"Concede that the new Government of Louisiana is only, to what it should
be, as the egg is to the fowl, we shall sooner have the fowl by hatching
the egg than by smashing it." He concluded by saying that his remarks
would apply generally to other states, but that there were peculiarities
pertaining to each state, and important and sudden changes occurring in
the same state, so that no exclusive and inflexible plan could safely be
prescribed as to details. Therefore, he held himself free to make some
new announcement to the people of the South when satisfied that such
action would be proper.
This was, in a political sense, his last will and testament. No other
communication from him to his countrymen was more fraught with wisdom
and patriotism. It received the prompt endorsement of William Lloyd
Garrison, who defended it when attacked by Professor Newman, of London
University.[76] Garrison held not only that Lincoln had no right to
interfere with the voting laws of the states, but that it would be bad
policy to do so; for if negro suffrage were imposed upon the South
against the will of the people, then, "as soon as the State was
organized and left to manage its own affairs, the white population, with
their superior intelligence, wealth, and power, would unquestionably
alter the franchise in accordance with their prejudices and exclude
those thus summarily brought to the polls."
Garrison saw further than Sumner, but nobody at the North then imagined
the tremendous consequences that were to follow the upsetting of
Lincoln's plan. If Trumbull's resolution had passed, it would have
served as a precedent for all the seceding states, in which case most of
the misery of the next fifteen years in the South, including the
carpet-bag governments and the Ku-Klux-Klan, would have been avoided.
President Johnson at first had been rather more radical than the
majority of his party as to the measure of punishment to be visited upon
the leaders of the rebellion. He had several times talked about "making
treason odious," and had said that traitors should take back seats in
the work of Reconstruction, and had used language which implied that
some of the more prominent Confederates ought to be tried and executed
for treason. He had a sharp difference with General Grant as to the
inclusion of General Lee in that category, Grant insisting that no
officer or soldier who had observed the terms of capitulation at
Appomattox could be rightfully molested.[77]
But this feeling of animosity on Johnson's part gradually passed away.
In an authorized interview with George L. Stearns, October 3, 1865, on
the subject of Reconstruction, and again in an interview with Frederick
Douglass and others, February 7, 1866, on the suffrage question, he said
nothing about making treason odious, but declared himself opposed to
unrestricted negro suffrage because he believed it would lead to a war
of races--a war between the non-slaveholding class (the poor whites) and
the negroes. The former hated and despised the latter, and this feeling
he thought would be intensified if the suffrage were granted to the
negroes.
"The query comes up," said Johnson in his colloquy with Douglass,
"whether these two races, situated as they were before, without
preparation, without time for the slightest improvement, whether the one
should be turned loose upon the other, and be thrown together at the
ballot-box with this enmity and hate existing between them. The question
comes up right there, whether we don't commence a war of races. I think
I understand this thing, and especially is this the case when you force
it upon a people without their consent."
Johnson had adopted not only Lincoln's plan of Reconstruction, but his
Cabinet also. At its first meeting, April 16, the unfinished project for
the establishment of civil government in Virginia, drafted by Secretary
Stanton at Lincoln's instance, was presented but not acted on. At a
subsequent meeting, May 8, it was considered and adopted, and was
promulgated as an Executive Order on the following day. It recognized
Francis M. Peirpoint, who had been nominal governor in Lincoln's time,
as actual governor, and declared that in order to guarantee to the state
of Virginia a republican form of government and to afford the advantage
and security of domestic laws, and the full and complete restoration of
peace, he would be aided by the Government of the United States in the
measures he might take to accomplish those ends.
A loyal State Government of considerable scope and solidity, formed by
Johnson himself as military governor, already existed in Tennessee. This
was now recognized by the President as an accomplished fact. W. G.
Brownlow had been elected governor, and a legislature had been
constituted, which had passed a franchise act that limited the voting
privilege to whites and excluded rebels of a certain grade. The Lincoln
State Government of Louisiana and a similar one in Arkansas were allowed
to stand.
On the 29th of May, the President issued an Executive Order appointing
W. W. Holden provisional governor of North Carolina, and prescribing
certain duties to be performed by him; among others that of calling a
convention to be chosen by the loyal people of the state for the purpose
of altering or amending the state constitution, and forming a government
fit to be recognized and defended by the Government of the United
States. Following the precedent made by Lincoln in the Louisiana case,
the qualifications of voters at the election of delegates to the
convention were fixed and declared to be those "prescribed by the
constitution and laws of North Carolina in force immediately before the
20th day of May, 1861, the date of the so-called ordinance of
secession," excepting, however, certain classes of whites. Similar
orders followed in rapid succession for reorganizing Mississippi,
Georgia, Texas, Alabama, South Carolina, and Florida, the last one
bearing date July 13, 1865. Before the form of the order was adopted, a
vote had been taken in the Cabinet on the question whether negroes
should be allowed to vote in the election of Delegates. Of the six
members present, three had voted in the affirmative and three in the
negative. Seward was not present, being still confined to his bed by the
wounds inflicted on him the night when Lincoln was assassinated. The
President then took the matter in his own hands, and at the next meeting
of the Cabinet read the North Carolina order and none of the members
offered any objection to it.
Thus Reconstruction had been mapped out, so far as the executive branch
of the Government was concerned, before the Thirty-ninth Congress
assembled.
Together with the order for Reconstruction in North Carolina, the
President issued a proclamation of amnesty for all persons who had
participated in the rebellion, excepting, however, certain specified
classes of offenders. This proclamation bore the same date, and was
published simultaneously with the North Carolina order; but the
newspapers of the day, while commenting upon and generally approving,
made little account of the fact that negroes were excluded from voting
at the election for delegates. The New York _Tribune_ of May 30 merely
said: "Of course no blacks can vote." The New York _Times_ made mention
of the same fact.
The New York _Evening Post_ of the same date, however, after pointing
out that only white men and taxpayers could vote in the coming election
in North Carolina, said:
Unless, in the process of the reorganization, we build upon the
principle laid down in the Declaration of Independence, that
all men are created free and equal, there is no assurance that
the different elements of which our social and political state
is composed will subsist in harmony and tranquil coöperation.
In that direction lies our way to political safety. If we
attempt to build upon any foundation of inequality between
races and castes, we shall find a condition of things
prevailing similar to that which has been the source of so many
calamities to Ireland.
The first blast against Andrew Johnson was sounded by Wendell Phillips
at the New England Anti-Slavery Convention, Boston, May 31, on a
resolution offered by himself affirming that
The reconstruction of the rebel states without negro suffrage
is a practical surrender to the Confederacy and will make the
anti-slavery proclamation of the late President, and even the
expected amendment of the Constitution utterly inefficient for
the freedom and protection of the negro.
This resolution was supported by Phillips in a spirit of blind fury.
Every life and every dollar that had been spent by the North had been
stolen, he contended, if this policy should prevail, and "there was but
one way in which the people could still hold the helm of affairs, and
that was by a repudiation of the entire war debt!" Such a party would
have his voice and vote until God called him home. "Better, far better,
would it have been for Grant to have surrendered to Lee, than for
Johnson to have surrendered to North Carolina."
The New York _Tribune_, June 2, took notice of Phillips, and, after
adverting to his intemperate attacks on Salmon P. Chase and Abraham
Lincoln in the past, turned to his "like delicate attentions" to Mr.
Lincoln's successor.
President Johnson [it said] believes in, and favors, the
extension of the elective franchise to blacks, but since he
holds that no state has gone out, or could go out, of the
Union, he believes that the Southern state constitutions stand
as before, and that the right of suffrage stands as before
until legally changed. We do not insist [it continued] that
this is the true doctrine--we do not admit an _unqualified_
right in the enfranchised people of any state to do as they
will with the residue. Yet we insist that President Johnson's
view is one that a true man may honestly, conscientiously
hold--may hold it without being a hypocrite, a demagogue, or a
tool of the slave power. And we think few considerate persons
will deny that it is greatly desirable, _if_ the desired
reparation in the _status_ of the freedmen can be achieved
_through_ the several states rather than over them--that it
would be more stable, less grudging, more real, if thus
accomplished. In fact, we should prefer waiting a year or two,
or accepting a limited enfranchisement, to a full recognition
of the Equal Rights of Man by virtue only of a presidential
edict, or order from the War Department, or even an act of
Congress.
The New York _Times_, June 21, concurred, saying:
It is an open question whether the Government should or should
not attempt to secure suffrage to the Southern blacks; the best
men may differ about it.
It scored Wendell Phillips for advocating repudiation of the national
debt as a cure for any other evil whatsoever.
When Mr. Phillips says that if the Government and the people do
not accept his doctrine, he will turn scoundrel and join a
party of scoundrels, he does his doctrine the very worst injury
possible.
Meanwhile there was a witches' caldron boiling in the South. The
Confederate States had been impoverished by the war. Their labor system
had been overturned under circumstances and in a mode that no other
people had ever experienced. The negroes knew nothing of the
responsibilities of freedom. They could not understand the meaning of a
contract. The ex-slaves, when hired for a specified time, might abandon
their work the next day or the next week, and return the following day
or week and run the risk of being flogged or shot, either for going away
or for coming back. The ex-masters, knowing only one way of getting work
out of the negro,--that of compulsion,--contended and believed that
there was no other way, or none that would serve the purpose during
_their_ lifetime; and since the crops of the present year could not wait
for the milder teachings of education and reason, they adopted the only
means that would secure immediate results. The planters, or the majority
of them, were still further crippled by having no money to pay wages.
All of their money had become filthy rags by the downfall of the
Confederacy. The only alternative was hiring labor on shares. This was
an embarrassment that the Northern men (carpet-baggers) who went to the
South directly after the war did not suffer from. Some of these, tempted
by the high price of cotton and the low price of land, hired or bought
plantations, and they had the pick of the labor market because they
could pay cash. Their example was a fresh irritation to the impecunious
native planter, who, in losing the Confederacy, had lost everything
except the clothes he stood in, which were much the worse for wear.
If there was to be a crop of cotton, or of anything, in 1865, the
laboring population must be kept in some kind of order. Work days must
be continuous, and not alternative with hunting and fishing days and
play days. The planters looked to their legislatures in this emergency,
and the legislatures enacted laws as near to the old slave codes as the
condition of emancipation would allow,--if not nearer. These enactments
began to reach the North before the Thirty-ninth Congress assembled.
They were accompanied by tales of cruelty and outrage committed upon the
freedmen, and of disloyal utterances and threats on the part of the
unreconciled whites, male and female, who had been deprived of every
weapon except their tongues. Little account was made of the need of time
in which to become reconciled to these changes and to acquire admiration
for those who had brought them about.
Among letters which reached Trumbull was one from Colonel J. W. Shaffer,
of the Union Army, dated New Orleans, December 25, 1865, who gave the
following account of what he had observed along the Gulf Coast:
I have been to Mobile, spent a week there, have traveled around
in this state, talked much with friend and enemy, and I
unhesitatingly say that our President has been going too fast.
I am told by all Union men that after the surrender of the
rebel armies the men returned perfectly quiet, came to Southern
and Northern Union men, saying, "We don't know what is expected
of us by the Government, but one thing is certain, we are tired
of war and desire above all things to return to the quiet
pursuits of life and try to mend our fortune as best we can,
and cultivate a friendly feeling with all parts of the country
once more; now tell us how to do this." Soon, however, to their
surprise they found that the control of everything was to be
again put in their hands, and at once they became insolent,
abused the Government openly, and openly declared that Union
men and Yankees must leave as soon as the military is
withdrawn. Had they been given to understand that the
Government was going to continue to govern and control, and
that Union men alone would be trusted with the management of
affairs, these people would have been entirely satisfied, glad
to escape with their lives, and would at once have adapted
themselves to circumstances. Now they are drunk with power,
ruling and abusing every loyal man, white and black.
Per contra, Dr. C. H. Ray wrote, under date September 29, 1865, on the
subject of Reconstruction:
What are our Republican papers thinking of when they make war
upon the President as they are now doing? I see that there is
hardly one to stand up in his defense, and that he will be
fought out of our ranks into the arms of the Democracy. I do
not see that he is so guilty as he is said to be, and for one I
cannot join the cry against him. What do his assailants
expect--to carry the country on the Massachusetts idea of negro
suffrage, female suffrage, confiscation, and hanging? If so,
they will drive all moderate men out of the party and the
remainder straight to perdition.
Only five Northern States at this time allowed negroes to vote at
elections, and one of these (New York) required a property qualification
from blacks but not from whites. The state of Illinois had an unrepealed
black code similar to that of Kentucky, and had added to it, as lately
as 1853, a law for imprisoning any black or mulatto person brought into,
or coming into, the state, for the purpose of residing there, whether
free or otherwise. Some litigation for the enforcement of this act was
begun in Cass County in 1863, while the Civil War was in progress.[78]
FOOTNOTES:
[76] _Life of Garrison_, by his sons, IV, 123.
[77] Grant's testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary, July
18, 1867. McPherson, p. 303.
[78] _Journal_ of the Illinois State Historical Society, vol. IV, no. 4.
CHAPTER XVI
ANDREW JOHNSON'S FIRST MESSAGE
Said the New York _Times_, December 6, 1865:
Probably no executive document was ever awaited with greater
interest than the message transmitted to Congress yesterday. It
is safe to say that none ever gave greater satisfaction when
received. Its views on the most momentous subjects, domestic
and foreign, that ever concerned the nation, are full of
wisdom, and are conveyed with great force and dignity.
The original manuscript of the message thus eulogized was discovered
nearly half a century later by Professor Dunning, of Columbia
University, in the handwriting of George Bancroft, among the Johnson
papers in the Library of Congress.
It remains a document creditable alike to the man who composed it and to
the one who made it his own by sending it as an official communication
to Congress. It breathed the spirit of peace and harmony, of justice
tempered with mercy, of human kindness and helpfulness, of
self-abnegation and self-restraint, all couched in the tone of high
statesmanship. It adhered, however, to the opinion previously expressed
by the President, that the Executive had no right to extend the suffrage
to persons to whom it had not been granted by state authority.
A discriminating yet warm eulogium of the message was pronounced by the
New York _Nation_, which was then in the sixth month of its existence.
It had criticized the President's Reconstruction acts as too hasty. Two
or three months' time it considered too short to reconcile whites and
blacks and teach them to respect each other's rights. Nevertheless,
taken for all in all, the message was one which every American might
read with pride.
We do not know [it continued] where to look in any other part
of the globe, for a statesman whom we could fix upon as likely
to seize the points of so great a question, and state them with
so much clearness and breadth, as this Tennessee tailor who was
toiling for his daily bread in the humblest of employments when
the chiefs of all other countries were reaping every advantage
which school, college, and social position could furnish. Those
who tremble over the future of democracy may well take heart
again when men like Lincoln and Johnson can at any great crisis
be drawn from the poorest ranks of society, and have the
destinies of the nation placed in their hands with the free
assurance that their very errors will be better and wiser than
the skill and wisdom of kings and nobles. For if the President
were to commit to-morrow every mistake or sin which his worst
enemies have ever feared, his plan of Reconstruction would
still remain the brightest example of humanity, self-restraint,
and sagacity ever witnessed--something to which the history of
no other country offers any approach, and which it is safe to
say none but a democratic society would be capable of carrying
out.
The statesmanship of George Bancroft did not govern very long. The irony
of fate decreed that within two months of the time when such words as
the foregoing were uttered by the most competent critics in the land,
the President of whom they were spoken should be in bitter strife with
the majority of his own party, and within two years be facing trial by
impeachment.
Andrew Johnson was born of a fighting race and in a region of fighters.
He shared the poverty and ignorance of the mountaineers of East
Tennessee. Hard labor was his portion in youth and early manhood. He was
a tailor by trade.[79] He could read, but could not write until he was
married, when the latter accomplishment was imparted to him by his wife.
With this kind of start he became, like Abraham Lincoln, and in much the
same way and facing the same difficulties, a public speaker, and
acquired by steady practice the faculty of making his meaning clear to
the commonest understanding. When he found himself in the Senate of the
United States, shortly before the outbreak of secession, he had few if
any superiors as a debater in that body, and the Union had not a more
unflinching defender, North or South. Alexander H. Stephens, a competent
judge, considered Johnson's speech against secession the best one made
in the Senate during the whole controversy. Secretary Seward, who
accompanied him in his "swing around the circle" in 1866, said that he
was then the best stump speaker in the country. Certainly the speech
with which he began that tour at New York on the 29th of August was a
great one. It fills five pages of McPherson's "History of
Reconstruction." It was extemporaneous, but faultless in manner and
matter; it was charged with the spirit of patriotism, and it will bear
comparison with anything in the annals of American polemics. If he had
made no other speech in that campaign the results might have been far
different, and the Union party which elected him might have avoided the
breach which soon became remediless.
The first blow leading to this breach was struck by Sumner in the
Senate, December 19, 1865, when he referred to a message of the
President, of the previous day, on the condition of the South, as a
"whitewashing message" akin to that of President Pierce on the affairs
of Kansas. When Reverdy Johnson deprecated such an assault on the
President of the United States, Sumner replied that it was "no assault
at all," but after two other Senators (Doolittle and Dixon) had said
that it was the same as accusing the President of falsifying, he replied
that he did not so intend it, but he did not withdraw or modify it.
Certain acts of Southern legislatures on the subjects of apprenticeship,
vagrancy, domicile, wages, patrols, idleness, disobedience of orders,
and violation of contracts on the part of laborers were early brought to
the attention of the Thirty-ninth Congress. Many of these acts betokened
an intention on the part of the lawmakers to reduce the freedmen to a
state of serfdom or peonage. The Virginia legislature, for example,
passed a vagrancy act, the ultimate effect of which, Major-General Terry
said, would be to "reduce the freedmen to a condition of servitude worse
than that from which they had been emancipated--a condition which will
be slavery in all but its name." Whereupon the general, being in command
of the military department, issued an order dated January 26, 1866, that
"no magistrate, civil officer, or other person, shall, in any way or
manner, apply or attempt to apply, the provisions of said statute to any
colored person in this department." President Johnson refused to
interfere with General Terry's order when it was brought to his
attention.
On the 13th of December, Senator Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced a
bill to declare invalid all acts, ordinances, rules, and regulations in
the states lately in insurrection, in which any inequality of civil
rights was established between persons on account of color, race, or
previous condition of servitude. The Natick cobbler was as keen and
fluent a debater as the Knoxville tailor. He had a Yankee drawl in his
pronunciation which detracted from the real merits of his argument, and
so it came to pass that, contrary to the usual fate of extempore
speaking, his speeches read better than they sounded. His speech in
support of his measure on the 21st of December was in his best style. It
was devoid of passion or invective. He cherished no ill-feeling toward
any person, high or low, who had been engaged in the rebellion. He did
not seek or desire to punish anybody. Least of all did he desire to
raise an issue with the President. He wanted only peace, order,
friendship, and brotherhood between North and South, as soon as
possible; but there could be no peace with these statutes staring us in
the face. Therefore, he demanded that they be swept into oblivion with
the slave codes that had preceded them.
Wilson desired an immediate vote on his bill. Senator Sherman thought
that it ought to be referred to a committee and postponed until the
anti-slavery amendment of the Constitution should be officially
proclaimed. Trumbull concurred with Sherman. He said:
I do not rise, sir, with a view of discussing the bill under
consideration: it is one relating to questions of a very grave
character, and ought not to pass without due consideration. The
Senator from Massachusetts tells us that it has been submitted
to distinguished lawyers, and they all conceded its propriety,
and nobody disputes the power of Congress to pass it. Doubtless
that was their opinion and is the opinion of the Senator from
Massachusetts. Perhaps it would be my opinion upon
investigation. I will not undertake to say, at this time, what
the powers of the Congress of the United States may be over the
people in the lately rebellious states.
There was a time between the suppression of the rebellion and
the institution of any kind of government in those states when
it was absolutely necessary that some power or other to prevent
anarchy should have control. The Senator from Delaware, and I
believe the Senator from Maryland, said the rebellion was over,
but at the time that the rebellion ceased there was no
organized government whatever in most of the rebel states; and
was the Government of the United States to withdraw its forces
and leave the people in a state of anarchy for the time being?
Surely not. As a consequence of the rebellion and of the
authority clearly vested in the Government of the United States
to put down the rebellion, in my judgment the Government had
the right, in the absence of any local governments, to control
and govern the people till state organizations could be set up
by the people which should be recognized by the Federal
Government as loyal and true to the Constitution. It must be
so. It is a necessity of the condition of things.
But, sir, I do not propose at this time to discuss this bill.
It is one, I think, of too much importance to be passed without
a reference to some committee. The bill does not go far enough,
if what we have been told to-day in regard to the treatment of
freedmen in the Southern States is true. The bill, perhaps,
also may be premature in the sense stated by the Senator from
Ohio. We have not yet the official information of the adoption
of the constitutional amendment. That that amendment will be
adopted, there is very little question; until it is adopted
there may be some question (I do not say how the right is) as
to the authority of Congress to pass such a bill as this, but
after the adoption of the constitutional amendment there can be
none.
The second clause of that amendment was inserted for some
purpose, and I would like to know of the Senator from Delaware
for what purpose? Sir, for the purpose, and none other, of
preventing state legislatures from enslaving, under any
pretense, those whom the first clause declared should be free.
It was inserted expressly for the purpose of conferring upon
Congress authority by appropriate legislation to carry the
first section into effect. What is the first section? It
declares that throughout the United States and all places
within their jurisdiction neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude shall exist; and then the second section declares
that Congress shall have authority by appropriate legislation
to carry this provision into effect. What that "appropriate
legislation" is, is for Congress to determine, and nobody else.
Mr. Saulsbury here interrupted, saying, "I wish to ask the honorable
Senator a question, with his consent, first answering his own. He asks
me for what purpose that second section was introduced. I do not know; I
had nothing to do with it. And now I wish to ask the honorable Senator
whether, when it was before this body for adoption, he avowed in his
advocacy of it that it was meant for such purposes as are now claimed."
Then the following colloquy ensued:
MR. TRUMBULL. I never understood it in any other way.
MR. SAULSBURY. Did you state it to the Senate?
MR. TRUMBULL. I do not know that I stated it to the Senate. I
might as well have stated to the Senator from Delaware that the
clause which declared that Slavery should not exist anywhere
within the United States means that slavery should not exist
within the United States! I could make it no plainer by
repetition or illustration than the statement itself makes it.
I reported from the Judiciary Committee the second section of
the constitutional amendment for the very purpose of conferring
upon Congress authority to see that the first section was
carried out in good faith, and for none other; and I hold that
under that second section Congress will have the authority,
when the constitutional amendment is adopted, not only to pass
the bill of the Senator from Massachusetts, but a bill that
will be much more efficient to protect the freedman in his
rights. We may, if deemed advisable, continue the Freedmen's
Bureau, clothe it with additional powers, and if necessary back
it up with a military force, to see that the rights of the men
made free by the first clause of the constitutional amendment
are protected. And, sir, when the constitutional amendment
shall have been adopted, if the information from the South be
that the men whose liberties are secured by it are deprived of
the privilege to go and come when they please, to buy and sell
when they please, to make contracts and enforce contracts, I
give notice that, if no one else does, I shall introduce a bill
and urge its passage through Congress that will secure to those
men every one of these rights: they would not be freemen
without them. It is idle to say that a man is free who cannot
go and come at pleasure, who cannot buy and sell, who cannot
enforce his rights. These are rights which the first clause of
the constitutional amendment meant to secure to all; and to
prevent the very cavil which the Senator from Delaware suggests
to-day, that Congress would not have power to secure them, the
second section of the amendment was added.
There were some persons who thought it was unnecessary to add
the second clause. It was said by some that wherever a power
was conferred upon Congress there was also conferred authority
to pass the necessary laws to carry that power into effect,
under the general clause in the Constitution of the United
States which declares that Congress shall have authority to
pass all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution
any of the powers conferred by the Constitution. I think
Congress would have had the power, even without the second
clause, to pass all laws necessary to give effect to the
provision making all persons free; but it was intended to put
it beyond cavil and dispute, and that was the object of the
second clause, and I cannot conceive how any other construction
can be put upon it.
Now, sir, I trust that this bill may be referred, because I
think that a bill of this character should not pass without
deliberate consideration and without going to some of the
committees of the Senate. But the object which is had in view
by this bill I heartily sympathize with, and when the
constitutional amendment is adopted I trust we may pass a bill,
if the action of the people in the Southern States should make
it necessary, that will be much more sweeping and efficient
than the bill under consideration. I will not sit down,
however, without expressing the hope that no such legislation
may be necessary. I trust that the people of the South, who in
their state constitutions have declared that slavery shall no
more exist among them, will by their own legislation make that
provision effective. I trust there may be a feeling among them
in harmony with the feeling throughout the country, and which
shall not only abolish slavery in name, but in fact, and that
the legislation of the slave states in after years may be as
effective to elevate, enlighten, and improve the African as it
has been in past years to enslave and degrade him.[80]
On the 18th of December the adoption of the anti-slavery amendment was
officially announced. On the same day the President sent to the Senate
two reports on the condition of affairs, and the state of opinion, in
the South,--a very brief one from Lieutenant-General Grant and a much
longer one from Major-General Carl Schurz. The former was an incidental
result of a three weeks' tour of inspection for military purposes.
General Grant had spent one day in Raleigh, North Carolina, two days in
Charleston, South Carolina, and one day each in Savannah and Augusta,
Georgia. The substance of his report was that he did not think it
practicable to withdraw the military at present; that the citizens of
the Southern States were anxious to return to self-government within the
Union as soon as possible; that they were in earnest in wishing to do
what they supposed was required of them by the Government and not
humiliating to them as citizens.
I am satisfied [he said] that the mass of thinking men of the
South accept the present situation of affairs in good faith.
The questions which have heretofore divided the sentiment of
the people of the two sections--slavery and state rights, or
the right of a state to secede from the Union--they regard as
having been settled forever by the highest tribunal--arms--that
man can resort to. I was pleased to learn from the leading men
whom I met that they not only accepted the decision arrived at
as final, but, now that the smoke of battle has cleared away
and time has been given for reflection, that this decision has
been a fortunate one for the whole country, they receiving like
benefits from it with those who opposed them in the field and
in council.
He alluded to a belief widely spread among the freedmen that the lands
of their former owners were to be divided, in part at least, among them
and that this belief was seriously interfering with their willingness to
make labor contracts for the ensuing year. Then he added:
In some instances, I am sorry to say, the freedman's mind does
not seem to be disabused of the idea that a freedman has the
right to live without care or provision for the future. The
effect of the belief in the division of lands is idleness and
accumulation in camps, towns, and cities. In such cases, I
think, it will be found that vice and disease will tend to the
extermination or great reduction of the colored race. It cannot
be expected that the opinions held by men at the South for
years can be changed in a day; and, therefore, the freedmen
require for a few years not only laws to protect them, but the
fostering care of those who will give them good counsel and on
whom they can rely.
General Schurz's investigation had been made at the special request of
the President. He had spent three months in South Carolina, Georgia,
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. The President, when appointing him,
had said that his own policy of Reconstruction was merely experimental
and subject to change if it did not lead to satisfactory results. Schurz
says in his "Reminiscences?"[81] that when he returned to Washington
from his journey he had much difficulty in procuring an interview with
the President; that the latter received him coldly and did not ask him
for the results of his investigation; and that when he (Schurz) said
that he intended to write a report, the President said that he need not
take that trouble on his account. Schurz was convinced that the
President wished to suppress his testimony and he resolved that he
should not do so. He accordingly wrote the report and sent it in, with
the accompanying documents, and let his friends in the Senate know that
he had done so. On the 12th of December the Senate, on Sumner's motion,
called for the report. The President did not respond immediately. In the
mean time he had had a conversation with General Grant whose views were
for the most part in accord with his own, and he asked the latter to
communicate the information he had gained during his Southern tour in
order to make it a part of his reply to the Senate Resolution. The reply
occupies only one page and a half of McPherson's "Reconstruction."
Schurz's consists of forty-four printed pages of text and fifty-eight
pages of appendix; Schurz considered this the best paper he had ever
written on a public matter, and there can be no doubt that it had great
influence in Congress and on the Republican party. Yet the brief report
of Grant was the sounder of the two. Indeed, Schurz himself in his later
years had doubts as to the validity of his own conclusions.[82]
Schurz's conclusions may be summarized thus:
If nothing were necessary but to restore the machinery of
government in the states lately in rebellion in point of form,
the movements made to that end by the people of the South might
be considered satisfactory. But if it is required that the
Southern people should also accommodate themselves to the
result of the war in point of spirit, those movements fall far
short of what must be insisted upon....
The emancipation of the slaves is submitted to only in so far
as chattel slavery in the old form could not be kept up. But
although the freedman is no longer considered the property of
the individual master, he is considered the slave of society,
and all independent state legislation will share the tendency
to make him such. The ordinances abolishing slavery, passed by
the conventions under pressure of circumstances, will not be
looked upon as barring the establishment of a new form of
servitude.
Practical attempts on the part of the Southern people to
deprive the negro of his rights as a freeman may result in
bloody collisions, and will certainly plunge Southern society
into restless fluctuations and anarchical confusion. Such evils
can be prevented only by continuing the control of the National
Government in the states lately in rebellion until free labor
is fully developed and firmly established, and the advantages
and blessings of the new order of things have disclosed
themselves. This desirable result will be hastened by a firm
declaration, on the part of the Government, that national
control in the South will not cease until such results are
secured....
The solution of the problem would be very much facilitated by
enabling all the loyal and free-labor elements in the South to
exercise a healthy influence upon legislation. It will hardly
be possible to secure the freedman against oppressive class
legislation and private persecution, unless he be endowed with
a certain measure of political power.
It is fitting to notice here a letter written by Hon. J. L. M. Curry, of
Alabama, to Senator Doolittle and read by him in the Senate on April 6,
1866.
I was [said Mr. Curry] a secessionist, for a while a member of
the Confederate Congress, and afterward in the army, on the
staff of generals, or in command of a regiment. It would be
merest affectation to pretend that I was not somewhat prominent
as a secessionist.... Having laid the predicate for my
competency, I desire to aver, as a gentleman, and a Christian,
I hope, that with large personal intercourse with the people
and those who are suspected of rebel intentions, I never heard
(of course, since the surrender) of any conspiracy or movement
or society or purpose, secret or public, present or
prospective, to overthrow the United States Government, to
resist its authority, to _reënslave the negroes_, or in any
manner to disturb the relations that now exist between the
Southern States as constituent elements of the Federal
Government and that Government, until I read of such intentions
recently in Northern newspapers. With perfect certainty as to
the truth of my affirmation, I can state that there is not a
sane or sober man in Alabama who believes or expects that
African slavery will be reëstablished. As unalterable facts,
the people accept the abolition of slavery, the extinction of
the right of secession, and the supremacy of the Federal
Government. It is as idle, a thousand times more so, to speak
of another contemplated resistance to Federal authority as to
anticipate the overthrow of the British Government by the
Fenians.[83]
Mr. Curry's words were true, but at the time when they were written the
weight of testimony available at Washington and in the North generally
was of a contrary sort, and Mr. Curry counted for no more at the
national capital than any other disarmed secessionist. At a later period
he became known to the North as one of the great benefactors of his time
and country, especially noted for his labors in educating and upbuilding
both races in the Southern States.[84]
FOOTNOTES:
[79] "For a man who had 'come from the people,' as he was fond of
saying, and whose heart was always with the poor and distressed, Andrew
Johnson was one of the neatest men in his dress and person I have ever
known. During his three years in Nashville, in particular, he dressed in
black broadcloth frock-coat and waistcoat and black doeskin trousers,
and wore a silk hat. This had been his attire for thirty years, and for
most of that time, whether as governor of Tennessee, member of Congress,
or United States Senator, he had made all of his own clothes." (Benjamin
C. Truman, Secretary to Andrew Johnson, in _Century Magazine_, January,
1913.)
[80] _Cong. Globe_, 1865-66, I, 42, 43.
[81] Vol. III, p. 202.
[82] "It gives me some satisfaction now to say that none of those
statements of fact have ever been effectually controverted. I cannot
speak with the same assurance of my conclusions and recommendations, for
they were matters not of knowledge but of judgment. And we stood at that
time face to face with a situation bristling with problems so
complicated and puzzling that every proposed solution based upon
assumptions ever so just, and supported by reasoning apparently ever so
logical, was liable to turn out in practice apparently more mischievous
than any other. In a great measure this has actually come to pass.... I
am far from saying that somebody else might not have performed the task
much better than I did. But I do think that this report is the best
paper I have ever written on a public matter. The weakest part of it is
that referring to negro suffrage--not as if the argument, as far as it
goes, were wrong, but as it leaves out of consideration several aspects
of the matter, the great importance of which has since become apparent."
(_Reminiscences_, III, 204, 209.)
[83] _Cong. Globe_, 1865-66, p. 1808.
[84] See _Biography of J. L. M. Curry_, by Alderman and Gordon, New
York, 1911.
CHAPTER XVII
THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND CIVIL RIGHTS BILLS
On January 5, 1866, Trumbull introduced two measures which engrossed
public attention during the next three months and enlarged the parting
of the ways between Congress and the President. These were the
Freedmen's Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Bill. The former was a
measure to continue in force and amend an act of Congress already in
operation, but which would expire by limitation one year after the end
of the war, and which had been passed to provide for needy and homeless
whites, as well as blacks. It embraced also the temporary disposition of
abandoned lands. Under its operation General Sherman had assigned some
thousands of acres of abandoned land to freedmen for the purpose of
giving them employment and enabling them to earn their own living, and
they were in actual possession. Of course, the title to such lands would
revert to the former owners, whenever military rule should come to an
end. The Freedmen's Bureau Bill provided that in places where the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings had been interrupted by the
rebellion, and where any of the civil rights enjoyed by white persons
were denied to other persons by reason of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude, the latter should be under military protection
and jurisdiction, which should be exercised by the Commissioner of the
Freedmen's Bureau under orders of the President of the United States,
and that any person, who, under color of any state or local law or
custom, should infringe such rights, should be punished by fine or
imprisonment or both. The courts authorized to hear and decide such
cases were to consist of the officers and agents of the Bureau, without
jury trial and without appeal; but this jurisdiction should not exist in
any state after it should have been restored to its constitutional
relations to the Union.
The last-mentioned feature of the bill brought up the question whether
Congress had power under the Constitution in time of peace to pass laws
for the ordinary administration of justice in the states. Senator
Hendricks, of Indiana, had doubts on that point. In a debate on the 19th
of January, 1866, he said:
My judgment is that under the second section of the
[thirteenth] constitutional amendment we may pass such a law as
will secure the freedom declared in the first section, but that
we cannot go beyond that limitation.[85]
To this Trumbull replied:
If the construction put by the Senator from Indiana upon the
amendment be the true one, and we have merely taken from the
master the power to control the slave and left him at the mercy
of the state to be deprived of his civil rights, the trumpet of
freedom that we have been blowing throughout the land has given
an uncertain sound, and the promised freedom is a delusion.
Such was not the intention of Congress, which proposed the
Constitutional amendment itself. With the destruction of
slavery necessarily follows the destruction of the incidents of
slavery. When slavery was abolished slave codes in its support
were abolished also.
Those laws that prevented the colored man going from home, that
did not allow him to buy or to sell, or to make contracts; that
did not allow him to own property; that did not allow him to
enforce rights; that did not allow him to be educated, were all
badges of servitude made in the interest of slavery and as a
part of slavery. They never would have been thought of or
enacted anywhere but for slavery, and when slavery falls they
fall also. The policy of the States where slavery has existed
has been to legislate in its interest; and out of deference to
slavery, which was tolerated by the Constitution of the United
States, even some of the non-slaveholding states passed laws
abridging the rights of the colored man which were restraints
upon liberty. When slavery goes, all this system of
legislation, devised in the interest of slavery and for the
purpose of degrading the colored race, of keeping the negro in
ignorance, of blotting out from his very soul the light of
reason, if that were possible, that he might not think, but
know only, like the ox, to labor, goes with it.
Now, when slavery no longer exists, the policy of the
Government is to legislate in the interest of freedom. Now, our
laws are to be enacted with a view to educate, improve,
enlighten, and Christianize the negro; to make him an
independent man; to teach him to think and to reason; to
improve that principle which the Great Author of all has
implanted in every human breast, which is susceptible of the
highest cultivation, and destined to go on enlarging and
expanding through the endless ages of eternity.
* * * * *
If in order to prevent slavery Congress deem it necessary to
declare null and void all laws which will not permit the
colored man to contract, which will not permit him to testify,
which will not permit him to buy and sell, and to go where he
pleases, it has the power to do so, and not only the power, but
it becomes its duty to do so. That is what is provided to be
done by this bill. Its provisions are temporary; but there is
another bill on your table, somewhat akin to this, which is
intended to be permanent, to extend to all parts of the
country, and to protect persons of all races in equal civil
rights.
* * * * *
I hope that the people of the rebellious states themselves will
conform to the existing condition of things. I do not expect
them to change all their opinions and prejudices. I do not
expect them to rejoice that they have been discomfited. But
they acknowledge that the war is over; they agree that they can
no longer contend in arms against the Government; they say they
are willing to submit to its authority; they say in their state
conventions that slavery shall no more exist among them. With
the abolition of slavery should go all the badges of servitude
which have been enacted for its maintenance and support. Let
them all be abolished. Let the people of the rebellious states
now be as zealous and as active in the passage of laws and the
inauguration of measures to elevate, develop, and improve the
negro, as they have hitherto been to enslave and degrade him.
Let them do justice and deal fairly with loyal Union men in
their midst, and henceforth be themselves loyal, and this
Congress will not have adjourned till the states whose
inhabitants have been engaged in the rebellion will be restored
to their former position in the Union, and we shall all be
moving on in harmony together.[86]
In short, Trumbull held that it was for Congress to decide what rights
might be established and enforced by federal law, in addition to that of
emancipation. That this was to be a troublesome question was shown a
little later by a colloquy between Trumbull and Henderson. The latter
was of the opinion that the only sure way to protect the freedmen was to
give them the right to vote. Trumbull thought that, for the present
purpose of providing them with food, clothing, and shelter, Dr.
Townsend's Sarsaparilla or any other patent medicine, would be as
effectual as the right of suffrage.[87] Sumner, a little later, thought
that the right to serve on juries and to hold office was among the
essential securities of freedom, and Thaddeus Stevens thought that
land-ownership also was necessary. What could be done under the second
clause of the Thirteenth Amendment was the question, either expressed or
implied, underlying the whole controversy on Reconstruction during the
next ten years.
It was commonly believed that the President would approve the Freedmen's
Bureau Bill; hence, when a veto message came, on the 19th of February,
it was received with consternation by the Republicans in Congress. He
held that the bill was both unconstitutional and inexpedient. It had
been passed in the Senate by yeas 37, nays 10, every Republican voting
for it and every Democrat against it. There were three absentees when
the vote was taken: Cowan and Willey, Republicans, and Nesmith,
Democrat. There was ample margin here for passing the bill over the
veto, if the Republicans could hold together, but when the second vote
was taken, February 20, the yeas were 30, and the nays 18, not two
thirds. So the bill failed. Eight Republicans, Cowan, Dixon, Doolittle,
Morgan, Norton, Stewart, Van Winkle, and Willey, had sided with the
President. There were two absentees: Foot (Rep.), of Vermont, and Wright
(Dem.), of New Jersey, both sick.
The question of negro suffrage had not yet become acute in public
discussions. The state of public opinion in the North was fairly set
forth by Dr. C. H. Ray in a private letter to Trumbull dated Chicago,
February 7, thus:
If he [Johnson] will agree to your bill giving the freedmen the
civil rights that the whites enjoy, and if he halts at that,
and war is made on him because he will not go to the extent of
negro suffrage, he will beat all who assail him. The party may
be split, the Government may go out of Republican hands; but
Andy Johnson will be cock-of-the-walk. The people, so far as I
understand, are of the opinion that the war for the Union is
over.... And as for the negro, they think that when he has the
rights which your bill will give him, he must be contented to
look upon the elective franchise as a something to be earned by
giving evidence of his fitness therefor.
The excitement caused by the veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill was
still further intensified by a struggle on a side issue, in which
Trumbull took the leading part, and which involved the seat of the
Democratic Senator Stockton, of New Jersey. He had been chosen by the
Legislature of his state in joint meeting on March 15, 1865. The
Democrats had a majority of five in the legislature, but had been
unable, at first, to agree upon a candidate. Accordingly, the joint
meeting, by a vote of 41 to 40, adopted a rule that any person receiving
a plurality of the votes cast for Senator should be declared elected. In
pursuance of this rule, a vote was taken by roll-call and John P.
Stockton received 40 votes, John C. Ten Eyck received 37 votes, and
there were 4 scattering, the total number being 81. Stockton was
accordingly declared elected without objection, and the joint meeting
adjourned _sine die_.
When Congress assembled in December, Stockton's certificate of election,
in due form, was presented and he was sworn in. A protest, however, had
been signed by all the Republican members of the New Jersey legislature
and this was presented by Senator Cowan by request. It affirmed that
Stockton had not received the votes of a majority of the members, as
required by a law of the state. The protest and credentials were
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, which consisted of five
Republicans (Trumbull, Harris, Clark, Poland, and Stewart) and one
Democrat (Hendricks).
Trumbull, in behalf of the committee, reported that Stockton was duly
elected and entitled to the seat. All the members concurred except
Clark, of New Hampshire. Regarding the law of the state, which required
a majority to elect, the report said that the state constitution
denominated and recognized the two houses, either in joint session, or
separately, as "The Legislature"; that the legislature, in either
capacity, had the right to make its own rules; and that since a majority
had voted for the plurality rule the subsequent action taken in
pursuance of it was the act of the majority. There was room for an
honest difference of opinion, since the enactment of a law required
action by the two houses separately and a submission of the same to the
governor. On this point, however, Trumbull quoted from "Story on the
Constitution" to the effect that, since the governor had nothing to do
with the choice of Senators, he was eliminated from consideration in any
and all steps leading thereto.
It happened at this time that one Republican Senator, Foot, of Vermont,
and one Democrat, Wright, of New Jersey, were absent by reason of
serious illness. Wright had gone to his home in Newark for treatment,
but, before going, had paired with Morrill, of Maine, on the question of
his colleague's contested election. When the debate was drawing to a
close, severe pressure was put upon Morrill by his radical friends in
the Senate to declare his pair off, and to vote against Stockton. When
the vote was taken, on concurring in the report of the Judiciary
Committee, the yeas were 21 and the nays 20. Stockton himself had not
voted. Twelve of the affirmative votes were Republicans. Before the
result was announced, Senator Morrill, who had withheld his vote, asked
the Secretary to call his name, and then voted in the negative, making a
tie. Then Senator Stockton said that Morrill had been paired with his
colleague on this question, and that Wright had told him before he went
away that he would not go home at all without first obtaining a pair on
this question. Under such circumstances he (Stockton) felt at liberty to
vote in his own behalf. So he directed the Secretary to call his name
and he voted in the affirmative. Morrill admitted that the pair had been
made, but said that when it was made he had not contemplated that it
would run so long (seven weeks), and that he therefore felt at liberty
to vote. He added, with apparent satisfaction, that his vote did not
change the result. This was true, but Stockton's vote did change it to
his own disadvantage.
The result was announced; yeas 22, nays 21. If Stockton had not voted,
the result would have been a tie, and he would have held his seat. His
opponents had exhausted their resources and there was no parliamentary
way of trying the case over again. By casting a vote in his own case he
gave them a weapon with which to renew the fight.
When the Senate reassembled, Sumner moved that the journal be corrected
by striking out Stockton's name from the vote last taken, on the ground
that he had no right to vote in his own case. The subject was thus
brought up again, and the result was a reconsideration of the vote of
the previous day. Trumbull concurred in the view that the question
before the Senate was judicial in its nature and that, therefore,
Stockton could not vote when his own seat was in question.
On the last day of the debate a telegram was received from Senator
Wright requesting a postponement of the vote till the following day,
saying that he would then be in his seat or would not ask further delay.
His request was supported by Reverdy Johnson in a pathetic appeal to the
fraternal feeling and gentlemanly instincts of Senators; but Clark, who
led the opposition, objected strenuously to any postponement, although
two postponements had been previously granted on account of his own
illness.
On the motion to postpone till the following day the vote was, yeas 21,
nays 22. Senator Dixon, a Republican supporter of Stockton, had fallen
sick and was absent. Senator Stewart, another Republican supporter, was
absent when the vote was taken, although he had been in the Senate
Chamber earlier in the day; he had dodged. All the members of the
Judiciary Committee, who had signed the original report in favor of
Stockton, voted for him to the last, except Stewart. If he and Dixon had
been present, the final vote would have been postponed, and in all
probability Stockton would have retained his seat, although Morgan, of
New York, who had voted for postponement, changed on the very last vote,
which was against Stockton, 20 to 23.
An impartial reader of the whole debate, in the calm atmosphere of the
present day, will be apt to conclude that partisan zeal rather than
judicial fairness was the deciding factor in Stockton's case, and that
the heat developed in the contest was due to a desire on the part of the
majority to gain a two-thirds vote in order to overcome the President's
vetoes.
* * * * *
Consideration of the Civil Rights Bill began on the 29th of January, on
an amendment proposed by Trumbull which provided that all persons of
African descent born in the United States should be citizens thereof,
and there should be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities
among the inhabitants of any state or territory on account of race,
color, or previous condition of slavery. The question was not merely
whether this provision was just, but whether Congress had power under
the Constitution to pass laws for the ordinary administration of justice
in the states. On this point Trumbull said:
Under the constitutional amendment which we have now adopted,
and which declares that slavery shall no longer exist, and
which authorizes Congress by appropriate legislation to carry
this provision into effect, I hold that we have a right to pass
any law which, in our judgment, is deemed appropriate, and
which will accomplish the end in view, secure freedom to all
people in the United States. The various state laws to which I
have referred,--and there are many others,--although they do
not make a man an absolute slave, yet deprive him of the rights
of a freeman; and it is perhaps difficult to draw the precise
line, to say where freedom ceases and slavery begins, but a law
that does not allow a colored person to go from one county to
another is certainly a law in derogation of the rights of a
freeman. A law that does not allow a colored person to hold
property, does not allow him to teach, does not allow him to
preach, is certainly a law in violation of the rights of a
freeman, and being so may properly be declared void.
Without going elaborately into this question, as my design was
to state rather than to argue the grounds upon which I place
this bill, I will only add on this branch of the subject that
the clause of the Constitution, under which we are called to
act, in my judgment vests Congress with the discretion of
selecting that "appropriate legislation" which it is believed
will best accomplish the end and prevent slavery.
Then, sir, the only question is, will this bill be effective to
accomplish the object, for the first section will amount to
nothing more than the declaration in the Constitution itself
unless we have the machinery to carry it into effect. A law is
good for nothing without a penalty, without a sanction to it,
and that is to be found in the other sections of the bill. The
second section provides:
"That any person, who under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject or cause to be
subjected any inhabitant of any state or territory to the
deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or
to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such
person having at any time been held in a condition of slavery
or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or by reason
of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of
white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on
conviction shall be punished by fine not exceeding $1000, or
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion
of the court."
This is the valuable section of the bill so far as protecting
the rights of freedmen is concerned. That they are entitled to
be free we know. Being entitled to be free under the
Constitution, that we have a right to enact such legislation as
will make them free, we believe; and that can only be done by
punishing those who undertake to deny them their freedom. When
it comes to be understood in all parts of the United States
that any person who shall deprive another of any right, or
subject him to any punishment in consequence of his color or
race, will expose himself to fine and imprisonment, I think all
such acts will soon cease.[88]
Senator Saulsbury, of Delaware, contended that the Thirteenth Amendment
of the Constitution had given no power to Congress to confer upon free
negroes rights and privileges which had not been conceded to them by the
states where they resided. He said that in Maryland about one half of
the colored population were free before the Thirteenth Amendment was
adopted, that in Delaware the free negroes largely outnumbered the
slaves, and that in Kentucky the free negroes were a large part of the
population. All that the Thirteenth Amendment did was to put the slave
population on the same footing on which the free negroes already stood.
Congress had no power to legislate on the status of free negroes in the
several states before the Civil War. But the powers of Congress in this
respect had not been enlarged by anything in the Thirteenth Amendment.
That amendment had merely said that the condition of slavery--the
condition in which one man belongs to another, which gives that other a
right to appropriate the profits of his labor to his own use and to
control his person--should no longer exist. Those who voted for the
amendment might have contemplated a larger exercise of power by Congress
than mere emancipation, but they did not avow it on the floor of the
Senate when the measure was pending. He continued:
The honorable Senator from Illinois has avowed that he does not
propose by this bill to confer any political power. I have no
doubt the Senator is perfectly honest in that declaration, and
that he personally does not mean to give any political power,
for instance, the right of voting, not only to the freedmen,
but to the whole race of negroes; but the intention of the
Senator in framing this bill will not govern its construction,
and I have not the least doubt that, should it be enacted and
become a law, it will receive very generally, if not
universally, the construction that it does confer a right of
voting in the states; and why do I say so? Says the Senator,
"It confers no political power; I do not mean that." The
question is not what the Senator means, but what is the
legitimate meaning and import of the terms employed in the
bill. Its words are, "That there shall be no discrimination in
civil rights or immunities." What are civil rights? What are
the rights which you, I, or any citizen of this country enjoy?
What is the basis, the foundation of them all? They are
divisible into two classes; one, those rights which we derive
from nature, and the other those rights which we derive from
government. I will admit that you may divide and subdivide the
rights which you derive from government into different
classifications; you may call some, for the sake of convenience
and more definiteness of meaning, political; you may call
others civil.
* * * * *
What is property? It has been judicially decided that the
elective franchise is property. Leaving out the question of
voting, however, as a question of property, is it not true
that, under our republican form and system of government, the
ballot is one of the means by which property is secured? Your
bill gives to these persons every security for the protection
of person and property which a white man has. What is one means
and a very important means of securing the rights of person and
property? It is a voice in the Government which makes the laws
regulating and governing the right of property. Under our
system of government--mark you, I do not say that it is so
under all governments--one of the strongest and most efficient
means for the security of person and property is a
participation in the selection of those who make the laws. It
was therefore that I thought that the honorable Senator when he
framed this bill meant to give to these persons the right of
voting; and I should still think so but for his personal
disclaimer of any such object.
Senator Van Winkle (Unionist), of West Virginia, contended that negroes
were not citizens of the United States and could not be made such by act
of Congress, or by anything short of constitutional amendment. He was
opposed to the introduction of inferior races into the ranks of
citizenship, but if the Constitution should be changed in the mode
provided for its amendment so as to introduce negroes, Indians, Chinese,
and other alien races to citizenship, he would endeavor to do his whole
duty toward them by recognizing them as citizens in every respect.
Senator Cowan held that the second clause of the Thirteenth Amendment of
the Constitution was limited to the breaking of the bond by which the
negro slave was held by his master. It was not intended to revolutionize
all the laws of the various states. The bill under consideration would
not only repeal statutes of Pennsylvania, but would subject the judges
of her courts to criminal prosecution, for enforcing her own laws. He
(Cowan) was willing to vote for an amendment of the Constitution giving
Congress the power to secure to all men of every race, color, and
condition their natural rights to life, liberty, and property, but the
bill under consideration was an attempt to do, without any power, that
which it was very questionable whether we ought to do, even if we had
the power. Cowan concluded by arguing that Congress ought not to enact
laws affecting the Southern States so radically, when they were not
represented in Congress.
Senator Howard, of Michigan, supported the bill in a speech of great
force from the humanitarian point of view, but did not dwell upon the
constitutional question, except to affirm that he, as a member of the
Judiciary Committee which had reported the Thirteenth Amendment, had
intended, by the second clause thereof, to empower Congress to enact
such measures as the pending Civil Rights Bill.
Garrett Davis, of Kentucky, contended that negroes could not be made
citizens of the United States under the power granted to Congress to
pass naturalization laws, since naturalization applied only to
foreigners. Negroes born in this country were not foreigners.
Trumbull replied that free negroes were citizens under the fourth
article of the Confederation, prior to the adoption of the Constitution
and that an attempt to exclude them from citizenship on the 25th of
June, 1778, received only two votes in the Congress of the
Confederation. He quoted a decision of Judge Gaston, of North Carolina,
that free negroes born in that state were citizens of the state and that
slaves manumitted there became citizens by the fact of manumission.
Reverdy Johnson held that it was as competent for Congress to strike out
the word "white" from our naturalization law as it had been for a former
Congress to insert that word. In that case a negro migrating from Africa
to the United States might be made a citizen exactly like an immigrant
from Europe.
Garrett Davis denied this, saying:
This is a government and a political organization by white
people. It is a principle of that Government and that
organization, before and below the Constitution, that nobody
but white people are or can be parties to it.
The colloquy between Senators Johnson and Davis continued until the
latter affirmed that the making of negroes citizens by any process
whatsoever was "revolutionary," as destructive to our Government as
would be a bill establishing a monarchy, or declaring that the President
should hold office for life.[89]
The debate continued till February 2, Senators Guthrie, Hendricks, and
Cowan opposing the bill and Trumbull, Fessenden, and Wilson supporting
it. The vote was then taken and resulted, yeas 33, nays 12, absent 5. It
went to the House, where it encountered unexpected opposition from
Bingham, of Ohio, a radical Republican, who said:
Now what does this bill propose? To reform the whole civil and
criminal code of every State Government by declaring that there
shall be no discrimination between citizens on account of race
or color in civil rights, or in the penalties prescribed by
their laws. I humbly bow before the majesty of justice, as I
bow before the majesty of that God whose attribute it is, and
therefore declare that there should be no such inequality or
discrimination even in the penalties for crime, but what power
have you to correct it? That is the question. You further say
that in the courts of justice of the several states there
shall, as to the qualifications of witnesses, be no
discrimination on account of race or color. I agree that as to
persons who appreciate the obligation of an oath--and no others
should be permitted to testify--there should be no such
discrimination. But whence do you derive power to cure it by
congressional enactment? There should be no discrimination
among citizens of the United States, in the several states, of
like sex, age, and condition, in regard to the franchises of
office. But such a discrimination does exist in nearly every
state. How do you propose to cure all this? By a congressional
enactment? How? Not by saying in so many words (which would be
the bold and direct way of meeting this issue) that every
discrimination of this kind, whether existing in state
constitution or state law, is hereby abolished. You propose to
make it a penal offence for the judges of the states to obey
the constitution and laws of their states, and for their
obedience thereto to punish them by fine and imprisonment as
felons. I deny your power to do this. You cannot make an
official act done under color of law and without criminal
intent and from a sense of duty, a crime.[90]
The only Republican member of the House, from the non-slaveholding
states, who sided with Bingham, was Raymond, of New York. The House
passed the bill by yeas 111, nays 38.
On the 27th of March, the President returned the bill to the Senate
without his approval. He vetoed it on grounds of inexpediency and
unconstitutionality. His arguments were substantially the same as those
of Senators Saulsbury and Cowan.
Trumbull replied to the veto message in a speech of great power which
occupies five pages of the _Congressional Globe_. He took up and
answered the President's objections _seriatim_. These details need not
now be repeated. There was one of a personal character, however, which
calls for notice. He said that he had endeavored to meet the President's
wishes in the preparation of both the bills, and had called upon him
twice and had given him copies of them before they were introduced and
asked his coöperation in order to make them satisfactory. In short, he
had done everything possible to avoid a conflict between the executive
and legislative branches of the Government, and since he had been
assured that the President's aims, like his own, were in the direction
of peace and concord, he was amazed when they were vetoed. At the
conclusion of his speech he referred briefly to the constitutional
objection to the bill saying:
If the bill now before us, which goes no further than to secure
civil rights to the freedmen, cannot be passed, then the
constitutional amendment proclaiming freedom to all the
inhabitants of the land is a cheat and a delusion.
The floor and galleries of the Senate Chamber were crowded during the
delivery of the speech and the roll-call followed immediately,
resulting: yeas 33, nays 15, more than two thirds. The closing scene was
thus described in a Washington letter to the _Nation_, April 12:
After three days of extremely ardent debate signalized by a
speech of singular cogency and power from Senator Trumbull, the
father of the bill, the vote was reached about 7 o'clock on
Friday evening. When the end of the roll was reached and
Vice-President Foster announced the result, nearly the whole
Senate and auditory were carried off their feet and joined in a
tumultuous outburst of cheering such as was never heard within
those walls before.
The veto of the Civil Rights Bill and the struggle over its passage the
second time precipitated the exciting contest at the polls in the autumn
of 1866. In that campaign Trumbull held the foremost position in the
Republican column. Whether it was possible to avoid the conflict we
cannot now say. It was most desirable that the party in power should
march all one way, and hence that the President should respond to the
friendly overtures of the leaders in Congress. When he found that he
could not approve the two bills that the Senator had placed in his hands
for examination, he ought to have sent for him and pointed out his
objections and at all events expressed regret that he could not concur
with him in the particulars where they disagreed. Then there might have
been mutual concessions leading to harmony. In any event, there would
have been no sting left behind, no hard feeling, no sense of injury, and
perhaps no rupture in the party. That was not Johnson's way. He lacked
_savoir faire_. He was combative by nature. He not only made personal
enemies unnecessarily, but he alienated thousands who wished to be his
friends.[91] "Many persons," says a not unfriendly critic, "whose
feelings were proof against the appeals made on behalf of the freedmen
and loyalists were carried over to the side of Congress by sheer
disgust at Johnson's performances. The alienation, by the President, of
this essentially thoughtful and conservative element of the Northern
voters was as disastrous and inexcusable as the alienation of those
moderate men in Congress whom he had repelled by his narrow and
obstinate policy in regard to the Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights
Bills. It was again demonstrated that Andrew Johnson was not a statesman
of national size in such a crisis as existed in 1866."[92]
On the other hand, it must be admitted that Johnson was within his
constitutional right in vetoing the bills without previously consulting
anybody in Congress.
The Civil Rights Act came before the Circuit Court of the United States
twice, soon after it was enacted, and in both instances was held to be
constitutional. The circuit courts were then presided over by Justices
of the Supreme Court. In the case of United States _v._ Rhodes, Seventh
Circuit, District of Kentucky, 1866, before Justice Swayne, the act was
pronounced constitutional in all its provisions, and held to be an
appropriate method of exercising the power conferred on Congress by the
Thirteenth Amendment.
The other case was the Matter of Turner, Fourth Circuit, Maryland,
October Term, 1867, before Chief Justice Chase. This case was submitted
to the court without argument. The Chief Justice expressed regret that
it was not accompanied by arguments of counsel, but he decided that the
act was constitutional and that it applied to all conditions prohibited
by it, whether originating in transactions before, or since, its
enactment.[93]
If either of these cases had been taken to the Supreme Court on appeal,
at that time, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would doubtless have been
upheld by that body; yet in October, 1882, the court held by unanimous
vote that none of the latest amendments of the Constitution (the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth) did more than put prohibition on
the action of the states. No state should have slavery; no state should
make any law to abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States; no state should deny the right of voting by reason of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The power of Congress
to go into the states to enforce the criminal law against individuals
had not been granted in any of these amendments. It could not be
affirmed that the second section of the Thirteenth Amendment gave power
to Congress to legislate for the states as to other matters than actual
slavery. But the Civil Rights Act applied to all the states--to those
where slavery had never existed as well as to those where it had been
recently abolished.[94]
The act which the court in October, 1882, pronounced unconstitutional
was the Anti-Ku-Klux Act of 1871. Trumbull himself spoke and voted
against that act believing it to be unconstitutional, as we shall see
later. He drew the line somewhere between the two acts. The judges
participating in the decision in the Harris case were Chief Justice
Waite and Associate Justices Miller, Bradley, Woods, Gray, Field,
Harlan, Matthews, and Blatchford.
One year later the court held that the Equal Rights Act of March 1,
1875, which gave to all persons full and equal enjoyment of
accommodations and privileges of inns, public conveyances, theatres, and
other places of public amusement, common schools and public
institutions of learning or benevolence supported in whole or in part by
general taxation, was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court still
consisted of the Justices above named.[95] It held that the Thirteenth
Amendment of the Constitution related only to slavery and its incidents
and that the Fourteenth Amendment was merely prohibitory on the states;
that is, that it did not confer additional powers upon Congress, but
merely forbade discriminating acts on the part of the states. The
opinion of the court was delivered by Justice Bradley. The only
dissenting opinion was given by Justice Harlan, of Kentucky, who held
that the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution was not restricted to
the prohibition of slavery, but that it conferred upon Congress the
power to make freedom effectual to the former victims of slavery. He
said:
The Thirteenth Amendment, it is conceded, did something more
than to prohibit slavery as an institution resting upon
distinctions of race and upheld by positive law. My brethren
admit that it established and decreed universal civil freedom
throughout the United States. But did the freedom thus
established involve nothing more than the exemption from actual
slavery? Was nothing more intended than to forbid one man from
owning another as property? Was it the purpose of the nation
simply to destroy the institution and then remit the race,
theretofore held in bondage, to the several states for such
protection in their civil rights, necessarily growing out of
freedom, as those states in their discretion might choose to
provide? Were the states, against whose protest the institution
was destroyed, to be left free, so far as national interference
was concerned, to make or allow discriminations against that
race, as such, in the enjoyment of those fundamental rights
which by universal concession inhere in a state of freedom? Had
the Thirteenth Amendment stopped with the sweeping declaration
in its first section against the existence of slavery and
involuntary servitude, except for crime, Congress would have
had the power by implication, according to the doctrines of
Prigg _v._ Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, repeated in Strauder
_v._ West Virginia, to protect the freedom established and
consequently to secure the enjoyment of such civil rights as
were fundamental in freedom. That it can exert its authority to
that extent is made clear, and was intended to be made clear,
by the express grant of such power contained in the second
section of the Amendment.
The question whether the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was or was not
constitutional never came squarely before the Supreme Court on a test
case, but, as we have seen, other acts analogous to it did come before
that tribunal in such a way that the authority of the court must be
construed as adverse to it. My own thought is that the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan above quoted is worth more than all the
other literature on this subject that the books contain.
The autumn elections of 1866 returned a larger majority in Congress
against President Johnson than had been there before. The result in
Illinois was the reëlection of Trumbull as Senator by the unanimous vote
of the Republican legislative caucus, although there were three
major-generals of the victorious Union army (Palmer, Oglesby, and Logan)
competing for that position, all of whom reached it later.
Trumbull sustained Johnson until the latter vetoed the Civil Rights
Bill. He believed that the freedom of the emancipated blacks was put in
peril by this action of the President, and he gave all of his energies
to the task of passing the bill over the veto and sustaining it before
the people. In this he was successful, but the avalanche of public
opinion thus started did not stop with the defeat of Johnson in the
election of 1866. It carried the control of the Union party out of the
hands of the conservatives and gave the reins of leadership to Sumner,
Stevens, and the radical wing. Trumbull followed this lead till the
impeachment of Johnson took place, when he halted and saved Johnson at
the expense of his own popularity, and he never regretted that he had
done so.
A distant echo of the Civil Rights controversy reached the Illinois
Senator from the state of Georgia, where he had been a school-teacher
thirty years earlier. The correspondence is introduced here as a
corrective, in some part, of the erroneous opinion that Trumbull was a
man of cold and unfeeling nature:
MORGAN [Ga.], May 17th [1866].
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL:
DEAR SIR: Truth seems strange, but, stranger still appears the
fact, that after a lapse of thirty years, I should offer you a
feeble acknowledgment of the gratitude, and high respect I have
ever cherished for you. It was my good fortune to enjoy, in
Greenville, for nearly three years, the advantage of your
profound teachings; and, in later life, when adverse
circumstances compel me to impart those lessons, and the
hallowed influence of that instruction, to others, I award to
you the full meed of praise. You cannot imagine the
satisfaction I experience, when my eye turns to the many
eloquent addresses you deliver before Congress; but as there
lurks beneath the most beautiful rose, thorns that inflict deep
wounds, so your avowed animosity to us casts a gloom over those
delightful emotions. Is there no delightful thrill of
association still lingering in your bosom, when memory reverts
to your sojourn among us? Is there no period in that long
space, around which fond retrospection can joyfully flutter her
wings, and crush out the large drops of gall that have been
distilled into your cup? I think you, and you alone, have the
power and influence to arrest the mighty tide that threatens to
overwhelm us. Can you not forget our past delinquencies, to
which, I confess, we have been too prone, and remember only the
little good you discovered? I often make special inquiries
after you, and was much interested in an account given by an
old Southern member. As I had still in my mind's eye your tall
and erect form, my surprise was great, indeed, to be told that
your form was not so straight, and that you used spectacles. I
have failed in the proper place to mention my name, "Fannie
Lowe," the most mischievous girl of the school. I married a
gentleman from Mobile, who lived eight years after the union.
He fell a victim to cholera, fourteen years since, during its
prevalence in New Orleans. It was my great misfortune to lose
my daughter, just as the flower began to expand and promise
hope and comfort for my old age. In conclusion, I will be
delighted to hear from you, and by all means send me your
photograph. My kindest regards to your dear ones, and accept
the warmest wishes of
MRS. F. C. GARY.
MORGAN, CALHOUN CY., GEORGIA.
UNITED STATES SENATE CHAMBER,
WASHINGTON, June 27, 1866.
MY DEAR MRS. GARY: I was truly grateful to receive yours of the
17th ult., and to know that after the lapse of thirty years I
was not forgotten by those who were my pupils. I remember many
of them well, and for all have ever cherished the kindest of
feelings and the best of wishes. It pains me, however, to think
that you and probably most of those about you, including those
once my scholars, should so misunderstand me and Northern
sentiments generally. How can you, my dear child,--excuse the
expression, for it is only as a school-girl I remember Fannie
Lowe,--how can you, I repeat, accuse me of entertaining
feelings of "animosity" and of the bitterness of "gall" towards
you or the South?... Towards the great mass of those engaged in
the rebellion the North feels no animosity. We believe they
were induced to take up arms against the Government from
mistaken views of Northern sentiment brought about by ambitious
and wicked leaders, and those political leaders we do want, at
least, to exclude from political power, if nothing more, till
loyal men are protected and loyalty is respected in the
rebellious districts. It is in the power of the Southern people
to have reconstruction at once, and the restoration of civil
government, complete, if they will only put their state
organizations in loyal hands, elect none but loyal men to
office, and see that those who were true to the Union, during
the war, of all classes, are protected in their rights. I ask
you, in all candor, till the disloyal of the South are willing
to do this, ought they to complain if they are subjected to
military control? I enclose you, as requested, a couple of
photographs, which you will hardly recognize as of the young
man whom you knew thirty years ago. The one without a beard was
taken three or four years since; the other, this year. My
family consists of a wife and three boys, the eldest twenty
years of age.
Please remember me to any who once knew me at Greenville, for
all of whom I cherish a pleasant remembrance; and believe me
your sincere friend,
LYMAN TRUMBULL.
FOOTNOTES:
[85] _Cong. Globe_, 1866, p. 319.
[86] _Cong. Globe_, 1866, p. 322.
[87] _Cong. Globe_, 1866, pp. 745-46.
[88] _Cong. Globe_, 1866, p. 475.
[89] _Cong. Globe_, 1866, p. 530.
[90] _Cong. Globe_, 1866, p. 1293.
[91] "Doolittle tells me he wrote the President a letter on the morning
of the 22d of February, knowing there was to be a gathering which would
call at the White House, entreating him not to address the crowd. But,
said D., he did speak and his speech lost him two hundred thousand
votes." (_Diary of Gideon Welles_, II, 647.)
[92] W. A. Dunning, _Reconstruction_, p. 82.
[93] Both of these cases are reported in the first volume of Abbott's
Circuit Court Reports.
[94] United States _v._ Harris, 106 U.S. 629.
[95] Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3.
CHAPTER XVIII
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
While the events in the preceding chapter were transpiring, a joint
committee on Reconstruction were making an inquiry into the condition of
the ex-Confederate States in order to determine whether they or any of
them were entitled to immediate representation in Congress. It consisted
of Senators Fessenden, Grimes, Harris, Howard, Williams, and Johnson,
and Representatives Stevens, Washburne, of Illinois, Morrill, of
Vermont, Bingham, Conkling, Boutwell, Blow, Rogers, and Grider. Senator
Reverdy Johnson and Representatives Rogers and Grider were Democrats.
All the others were Republicans. There was a preponderance of
conservatives on the committee. Senator Fessenden was the chairman, and
his selection for the place marked him as _princeps senatus_ in the
estimation of his colleagues.
While the Civil Rights Bill was pending in the House, we have seen that
Bingham, of Ohio, made a speech against it and voted against it, holding
it to be unconstitutional. He had supported the Freedmen's Bureau Bill
because it applied only to states in the inchoate condition which then
existed. It was to be inoperative in any state, when restored to its
constitutional relations with the Union. The Civil Rights Bill, on the
other hand, was to apply to the whole country, North and South, without
limit as to time, and to affect the civil and criminal code of every
State Government. He held that there was no constitutional warrant for
this, either in the Thirteenth Amendment or elsewhere. In order to cure
the supposed defect, Bingham proposed to the Reconstruction Committee a
new constitutional amendment in these words:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each state
all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states, and to all persons in the several states equal
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.
This was agreed to by the committee, but before it was reported to the
House, Stevens presented a series of amendments consisting of five
sections which had been prepared by Robert Dale Owen, a distinguished
publicist, who was not a member of the Congress. This series had met
Stevens's approval, and after some delay and some changes it was adopted
by the committee. Bingham then withdrew his own proposed amendment and
offered the following in place of it, which was adopted as section one:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The difference between this provision and the first one proposed by
Bingham was the whole difference between giving Congress power to pass
laws for the administration of justice in the states and merely
prohibiting the states from making discriminations between citizens.
There was no definition of citizenship in the amendment as reported by
the joint committee. Apparently they relied upon the Civil Rights Act,
which had been passed over the President's veto, to supply that
definition, but shortly before the final vote was taken in the Senate,
Howard, who had charge of the measure in the temporary illness of
Fessenden, proposed the following words to be placed at the beginning of
the first section.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside.
The reason for adopting this clause was to validate the corresponding
part of the Civil Rights Act and put it beyond repeal, in the event that
the Republicans should at some future time lose control of Congress.
In addition to the first section, as shown above, the amendment provided
that Representatives should be apportioned among the several states
according to population, but that when the right to vote was denied in
any state to any of the male inhabitants who were twenty-one years of
age and citizens of the United States, except for rebellion or other
crime, the representation of such state in Congress and the Electoral
College should be proportionately reduced. Also that no person should
hold any office under the United States or any state who, having
previously taken an oath to support the Constitution of the United
States, had engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, but
that Congress might, by a two-thirds vote, remove such disability. Also
that the validity of the public debt of the United States should not be
questioned, but that no debt incurred in aid of insurrection or
rebellion should ever be paid by the United States or any state. The
concluding section provided that Congress should have power to enforce
by appropriate legislation the provisions of the article.
The Fourteenth Amendment passed the Senate June 8, by 33 to 11, and the
House June 13, by 138 to 36. Sumner had opposed it bitterly in debate
because it dodged, as he said, the question of negro suffrage; but when
the vote was taken he recorded himself in the affirmative.
The report of the committee giving the reasons for their action was
submitted on the 18th of June. It held that the seceding states, having
withdrawn from Congress and levied war against the United States, could
be restored to their former places only by permission of the
constitutional power against which they had rebelled acting through all
the coördinate branches of the Government and not by the executive
department alone.
If the President [it said] may, at his will and under his own
authority, whether as military commander, or chief executive,
qualify persons to appoint Senators and elect Representatives,
and empower others to elect and appoint them, he thereby
practically controls the organization of the legislative
department. The constitutional form of government is thereby
practically destroyed, and its powers absorbed by the
Executive. And while your committee do not for a moment impute
to the President any such design, but cheerfully concede to him
the most patriotic motives, they cannot but look with alarm
upon a precedent so fraught with danger to the Republic.
This conclusion was logical but misleading. The danger to the Republic
lay not in the absorption of powers by the Executive, but in the
prolongation of chaos, in dethroning intelligence, and arming ignorance
in the desolated districts of the South.[96]
Stevens also reported a bill "to provide for restoring the states lately
in insurrection to their full political rights." It recited that
whenever the Fourteenth Amendment should become a part of the
Constitution, and any state lately in insurrection should have ratified
it and conformed itself thereto, its duly elected Senators and
Representatives would be admissible to seats in Congress. This bill was
not acted on, but lay on the table of each house awaiting the action of
the Southern States on the proposed amendment.
On July 23, the two houses adopted a preamble and joint resolution
admitting Tennessee to her former relations to the Union. The preamble
recited that that state had ratified the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. There were only four negative votes on
the Tennessee bill: Brown and Sumner, Republicans, and Buckalew and
McDougall, Democrats. The President signed the bill, but he added a
brief message explaining that his reason for doing so was that he
desired to remove every cause of further delay, whether real or
imaginary, to the admission of the Representatives of Tennessee, but he
affirmed that Congress could not rightfully make the passage of such a
law a condition precedent to such admission in the case of Tennessee, or
of any other state.
The next event of importance in the controversy over Reconstruction was
the National Union Convention held in Philadelphia on the 14th of
August. It was composed of delegates from all the states and
territories, North and South, who sustained the President's policy and
acquiesced in the results of the war, including the abolition of
slavery. This came to be known as the "Arm-in-Arm Convention" as the
procession leading to the platform was headed by two delegates, one from
Massachusetts and one from South Carolina, walking together with their
arms joined. The signers of the call embraced the names of A. W.
Randall, ex-governor of Wisconsin, Senators Cowan, Doolittle, Fowler,
Norton, Dixon, Nesmith, and Hendricks, and ex-senator Browning, then
Secretary of the Interior. The convention itself was eminently
respectable in point of numbers and character. It was presided over by
Senator Doolittle, and the chairman of its Committee on Resolutions was
Senator Cowan. The resolutions adopted were ten in number and were
faultless in principle and in expression. They were conveyed to the
President by a committee of seventy-two persons. The effect of this
dignified movement was offset and neutralized in large part by one
paragraph of the President's reply to the presentation speech, namely:
We have witnessed in one department of the Government every
endeavor to prevent the restoration of peace, harmony, and
union. We have seen hanging upon the verge of the Government,
as it were, a body called, or which assumed to be, the Congress
of the United States, while in fact it is a Congress of only a
part of the states. We have seen this Congress pretend to be
for the Union when its every step and act tended to perpetuate
disunion and make the disruption of the states inevitable.
Instead of promoting reconciliation and harmony its legislation
has partaken of the character of penalties, retaliation, and
revenge. This has been the course and policy of your
Government.
This impeachment of the legality of Congress was followed by a battle in
the political field, which raged with increasing fury during the whole
remainder of Johnson's term of office and projected itself into the two
terms of President Grant and the beginning of that of President Hayes,
embracing the episodes of the impeachment trial and the Liberal
Republican movement of 1872. All of this turmoil, and the suffering
which it brought upon the South, would, probably, have been avoided if
Lincoln, with his strong hold upon the loyal sentiment of the country
and his readiness to conciliate opponents, without surrendering
principle, had not been assassinated. They became possible if not
inevitable when the presidential chair was taken, in a time of crisis,
by a man of combative temper, without prestige in the North, and devoid
of tact although of good intentions and undoubted patriotism.
The Southern States refused to agree to the Fourteenth Amendment. To
them the insuperable objection was the clause excluding from the
office-holding class those who had taken an oath to support the
Constitution of the United States and had afterwards engaged in
insurrection against the same. The common people refused to accept
better terms than were accorded to their leaders. This was true chivalry
and is not to be condemned, but the consequence was an increase of the
power of the radicals in the North. It disabled conservatives like
Fessenden, Trumbull, and Grimes in Congress, John A. Andrew, Henry Ward
Beecher, and William C. Bryant, influential in other walks in life, from
making effective resistance to the measures of Sumner and Stevens. If
the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified by any of the other
ex-Confederate States, such states would have been admitted at once as
Tennessee was. Both Wade and Howard, hot radicals as they were, refused
to go with Sumner when he insisted that further conditions should be
exacted. When he offered an amendment looking to negro suffrage, Howard
said that the Joint Committee on Reconstruction had maturely considered
that question and had carefully abstained from interfering with "that
very sacred right"--the right of each state to regulate the suffrage
within its own limits. He argued that it was inexpedient in a party
point of view to do so, and predicted that if the rebel states were
coerced to adopt negro suffrage by an act of Congress, or by
constitutional amendment, they would rid themselves of it after gaining
admission.[97]
FOOTNOTES:
[96] Trumbull did not take an active part in the framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment. A minute and unbiased history of it has been
written by Horace Edgar Flack, Ph.D., and published by the Johns Hopkins
Press, Baltimore, 1908. It is impossible to resist the conclusion of
this writer, that partisanship was a potent factor in the framing and
adoption of it.
[97] _Cong. Globe_, February 15, 1867, p. 1381.
CHAPTER XIX
CROSSING THE RUBICON
On the 17th of December, 1866, the Supreme Court rendered its decision
in the Milligan case, which had reached that tribunal on a certificate
of disagreement between the two judges of the United States Circuit
Court for Indiana. Milligan, a citizen, not in the military or naval
service, had been arrested in October, 1864, by General A. P. Hovey,
commanding the military district of Indiana, for alleged treasonable
acts, had been tried by a military commission, found guilty, and
sentenced to be hanged on the 19th day of May, 1865. He petitioned the
court for a discharge from custody under the terms of the Habeas Corpus
Act passed by Congress March 3, 1863. He affirmed that, since his
arrest, there had been a session of the grand jury in his district and
that it had adjourned without finding an indictment against him. The act
of Congress provided that the names of all civilians arrested by the
military authorities in places where the courts were open should be
reported to the judges within twenty days after their arrest, and that
if they were not indicted at the first term of court thereafter they
should be set at liberty.
This question had been pretty thoroughly thrashed out in the
Vallandigham case, but it had been imperfectly understood; President
Lincoln had gone astray in that labyrinth, and judges on the bench had
differed from each other in their interpretation of an unambiguous
statute. The most commonly accepted opinion was that the act of 1863
was not applicable to Copperheads, or, if it was, that it ought not to
be obeyed.
The Supreme Court was unanimous in the opinion that Milligan must be
discharged, since the law was plain and unequivocal, but there was a
division among the nine judges of the court as to the power to try
persons not in the military service, by military commission. Five judges
held that Congress could not abolish trial by jury in places where the
courts were open and the course of justice unimpeded. Four judges
maintained that Congress might authorize military commissions to try
civilians in certain cases where the civil courts were open and freely
exercising their functions, although Congress had not actually done so.
The five judges constituting the majority were Davis (who wrote the
opinion of the court), Clifford, Nelson, Grier, and Field. The four who
dissented from the argument, but not from the judgment, were Chief
Justice Chase (who wrote the minority opinion), and Judges Wayne,
Swayne, and Miller. Davis's opinion is not surpassed in argumentative
power or in literary expression by anything in the annals of that great
tribunal.
The logical consequences of the decision were tremendous, or would have
been, if the public mind had been in a condition to appreciate its
gravity. Not only did it follow logically that the trial and execution
of Booth's fellow conspirators, Payne, Atzerodt, Herold, and Mrs.
Surratt, were, in contemplation of law, no better than lynching, but
that Andrew Johnson's endeavor to put an end to government by military
commissions, as soon as possible, was right, and that the contrary
design, by whomsoever held, was wrong.
The radicals in Congress, however, were only angered by the decision.
They were not in the least disconcerted by it, but the court itself was
very much so. If it had been necessary to pass a law reorganizing the
court, in order to reap the fruits of the victory won in the recent
elections, a majority could have been obtained for it.
Under date of January 8, 1867, the "Diary of Gideon Welles" tells us
that there was a Cabinet meeting at which the President said that he
wished to obtain the views of each member on the subject, already
mooted, of dismantling states and throwing them into a territorial
condition. A colloquy ensued which is reported as follows:
Seward was evidently taken by surprise. Said he had avoided
expressing himself on these questions; did not think it
judicious to anticipate them; that storms were never so furious
as they threatened; but as the subject had been brought up, he
would say that never, under any circumstances, could he be
brought to admit that a sovereign state had been destroyed, or
could be reduced to a territorial condition.
McCulloch was equally decided, that the states could not be
converted into territories.
Stanton said he had communicated his views to no man. Here, in
the Cabinet, he had assented to and cordially approved of every
step which had been taken, to reorganize the governments of the
states which had rebelled, and saw no cause to change or depart
from it. Stevens's proposition he had not seen, and did not
care to, for it was one of those schemes which would end in
noise and smoke. He had conversed with but one Senator, Mr.
Sumner, and that was one year ago, when Sumner said he
disapproved of the policy of the Administration and intended to
upset it. He had never since conversed with Sumner nor any one
else. He did not concur in Mr. Sumner's views, nor did he think
a state would or could be remanded to a territorial condition.
I stated my concurrence in the opinions which had been
expressed by the Secretary of War, and that I held Congress had
no power to take from a state its reserved rights and
sovereignty, or to impose terms on one state which were not
imposed on all states.
Stanbery said he was clear and unqualifiedly against the whole
talk and theory of territorializing the states. Congress could
not dismantle them. It had not the power, and on that point he
would say that it was never expedient to do or attempt to do
that which we had not the power to do.
Browning declared that no state could be cut down or
extinguished. Congress could make and admit states, but could
not destroy or extinguish them after they were made.[98]
This extract is rather astounding for what it tells us of Stanton's
position. Simultaneously, or nearly so, Congress passed an act virtually
making the General of the Army independent of the President, and
prohibiting the President from assigning him to duty elsewhere than in
Washington City without the consent of the Senate, except at his own
request. Congressman Boutwell, of Massachusetts, tells us that this
provision was privately suggested to him by Stanton and that he
(Boutwell) wrote it down at the War Department as dictated by Stanton,
and took it to Thaddeus Stevens who incorporated it in an appropriation
bill.[99]
If the radicals were elated by the result of the elections, the
conservatives were correspondingly depressed. It was no longer possible
to prevent Stevens and Sumner from taking the lead, which they did
forthwith. They crossed the Rubicon with the whole army. The
Reconstruction policy initiated by Lincoln was now for the first time
definitely abandoned by the Union party. In the month of February,
Stevens carried through the House a bill declaring that there were no
legal governments in the ten rebel states, and providing that the
existing governments should be superseded by the military authority. It
provided for no termination of such military government. Amendments were
added by the Senate providing for constitutional conventions in those
states, to be elected by the male citizens twenty-one years old and
upward, of whatever race or color, except those disfranchised for
participation in rebellion. It was provided further that when the
constitutions so framed should contain clauses giving the elective
franchise to all persons entitled to vote in the election for delegates,
and when the constitutions should be ratified by a majority of the
people, and when such constitutions should have been submitted to and
approved by Congress, and when the states should have ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment and it should have been adopted, then the states so
reorganized should be entitled to representation in Congress, provided
that no persons disfranchised by the Fourteenth Amendment should vote at
the election or be eligible to membership of the conventions. The clause
making negro suffrage a permanent condition of Reconstruction was
adopted in a senatorial caucus on the motion of Sumner by a majority of
two, after it had been rejected almost unanimously by the Senate
committee to which it had been referred.[100]
Trumbull, Fessenden, and Sherman voted against Sumner's motion, but
after it became the policy of the party they supported it. And here they
made a mistake, for this was the act which placed the governments of ten
states in the hands of the most ignorant portion of the community and
disfranchised the most intelligent, entailing the direful consequences
of the succeeding ten years.
The road which the dominant party had now taken was, however, taken
conscientiously. Congress and the Northern people sincerely believed
that slavery would be reëstablished in some form unless the negroes had
the right to vote and the assurance that their votes would be counted,
and that, in that case, the war would have to be fought over again. Of
course, party spirit and the greed of office had a place among the
impelling motives at Washington, but these considerations would not have
availed had not the opinion been deep-seated that a Democratic victory
won by the votes of the solid South and a minority of the North would
endanger the Union.
Senator Cullom, of Illinois, who was then a member of the House, said,
forty-four years later, that "the motive of the opposition to the
Johnson plan of Reconstruction was a firm conviction that its success
would wreck the Republican party and, by restoring the Democracy to
power, bring back Southern supremacy and Northern vassalage."[101]
Montgomery Blair apprehended another revolution or rebellion and said
that there might be two opposing governments organized in Washington.
Maynard, of Tennessee, a stanch loyalist, believed that Senators and
Representatives from all the states would soon make their appearance at
the national capital and that those from the rebel states would join
with the Democratic members from the loyal states, constitute a
majority, organize, repeal the test oath, and have things their own way.
Welles, while recording these opinions, held the sounder one that the
South was too exhausted and the Northern Democrats too timid for such a
step.[102]
The Reconstruction Bill passed both houses on the 20th day of February,
1867, was vetoed by the President on the 2d of March, and was repassed
on the same day by more than two-thirds majority in each house,
Trumbull voting in the affirmative.
It was followed by a supplementary bill even more drastic, providing for
a registration of voters, and requiring each person, before he could be
registered, to take an oath that he had not been disfranchised for
participation in any rebellion, or civil war, against the United States,
and had never held any legislative, executive, or judicial office and
afterwards engaged in rebellion against the United States, or given aid
or comfort to the enemies thereof. The President was not slow to
perceive the monstrosity of these provisions. In his veto message he
dwelt on the absurdity of expecting every man to know whether he had
been disfranchised or not, and what acts amounted to "participation" or
fell short of it, and what constituted the giving of aid and comfort to
the enemies of the United States. With genuine pathos he added:
When I contemplate the millions of our fellow citizens of the
South with no alternative left but to impose upon themselves
this fearful and untried experiment of complete negro
enfranchisement, and white disfranchisement (it may be) almost
as complete, or submit indefinitely to the rigor of martial law
without a single attribute of freemen, deprived of all the
sacred guaranties of our Federal Constitution, and threatened
with even worse wrongs, if any worse are possible, it seems to
me their condition is the most deplorable to which any people
can be reduced.
This bill was passed over the veto on the 23d of March, Trumbull voting
in the affirmative. These votes, however, did not prevent him from
publishing in the Chicago _Advance_ of September 5, the same year, a
carefully written article denying the power of Congress to regulate the
suffrage in the states, concluding with the following paragraphs:
If the views expressed are correct, it follows that there are
but two ways of securing impartial suffrage throughout the
Union. One is, for the states themselves to adopt it, which is
being done by some already; and now that the subject is being
agitated and its justice being made apparent, it is to be hoped
it will soon commend itself to all: the other is, by an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, adopting
impartial suffrage throughout the Union, which to become
effective must be ratified by three fourths of the States.
Amendments of the constitutions of Ohio, Kansas, and Minnesota for that
purpose were then pending, but they were all voted down by the people in
October and November, 1867.
Congress continued to pass supplementary Reconstruction measures at
short intervals. One such authorized the commanders of the military
districts to suspend or remove any persons holding any office, civil or
military, in their districts and appoint other persons to fill their
places and exercise their functions subject to the disapproval of the
General of the Army of the United States. It was declared to be the duty
of the commanders aforesaid to remove from office all persons disloyal
to the United States and all who should seek to hinder, delay, or
obstruct the administration of the Reconstruction Acts. Section eight of
this act made members of boards of registration removable in like
manner. Section eleven provided that "all the provisions of this act,
and of the acts to which it is supplementary, should be construed
liberally." This bill was vetoed by the President July 19, 1867, and was
passed over the veto by both houses the same day. Still another
supplementary act was passed on the 11th of March, 1868, relating to the
election of members of Congress in the rebel states.
Under this harness of militarism constitutional conventions were held
and constitutions adopted by all of said states, except Texas and
Mississippi, during the year 1868, and all the rest of them were
admitted to the Union except Virginia, subject, however, to the
condition that their constitutions should never be amended, or changed,
so as to deprive any citizen, or class of citizens, of the right to
vote, except as a punishment for crimes of the grade of felonies at
common law.
Delays having occurred in the course of procedure in Virginia,
Mississippi, and Texas, there was opportunity to apply new conditions to
their readmission and this chance was eagerly seized by the radicals.
Trumbull, on the 13th of January, 1870, reported from the Judiciary
Committee a simple resolution reciting that Virginia, having complied
with all the requirements, was entitled to representation in Congress.
This was amended on motion of Drake, of Missouri, by a proviso that it
should never be lawful for the state to deprive any citizen of the
United States, on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude, of the right to hold office. Trumbull said in the debate on
this proposition that Congress had no authority to enact it and that it
would not be binding on the state. Yet it was adopted by a majority of
one vote, 30 to 29. Wilson then moved as an amendment that the state
constitution should never be so changed as to deprive any citizen or
class of citizens of school privileges, and this was adopted by 31 to
29, Trumbull in the negative. In addition to these a long section was
added prescribing a new form of oath to be taken by all state officers
and members of the legislature, which was adopted by 45 to 16, Trumbull
voting no. In the final vote on the Bill, however, he voted in the
affirmative. The same conditions were applied to Mississippi and Texas.
In the debate on the Virginia Bill there was a passage-at-arms between
Trumbull and Sumner which came near to overstepping parliamentary rules
on both sides and which caused widespread newspaper comment. It was
generally believed that a rupture had taken place between them which
would never be healed; yet a year later, when the decree went forth
(presumably from the White House) that Sumner must be deposed from the
chairmanship of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Trumbull was one of
his strongest supporters in the fight which ensued.
Following close after the reconstruction of Virginia came the
re-reconstruction of Georgia. That state ratified her _post-bellum_
constitution on the 11th of May, 1868, and elected Rufus P. Bullock,
governor. He represented the radicals, but the conservatives at the same
time carried the state legislature. A few negroes had been elected as
members, and these were expelled on the ground that the right to hold
office had not been conferred upon them by the new constitution. The
supreme court of the state a few months later decided that since the
rights of citizenship and of voting had been conferred upon them, the
right to hold office belonged to them also unless expressly denied. In
addition to unseating the blacks, the conservatives had admitted certain
members who could not take the oath prescribed in the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution. Governor Bullock needed a legislature
different from the one which had been elected, in order to accomplish
certain ends which he had in view, and he seized upon these
irregularities as a means of overturning the majority. He then raised an
outcry, which he knew would stir the north,--that the blacks in Georgia
were still terrorized by the Ku-Klux Klans.
President Grant soon thereafter recommended that Congress take Georgia
again in hand. This was done promptly. An act was passed directing
Governor Bullock to call the legislature together and directing the
legislature to reorganize itself in accordance with the oaths of office
heretofore prescribed, including that of the Fourteenth Amendment; to
exclude all persons who could not lawfully take those oaths and to admit
all who had been expelled on account of color; also requiring Georgia to
ratify the Fifteenth Amendment before her Representatives and Senators
should be admitted to seats in Congress. The seventh section of the act
authorized Governor Bullock to call for the services of the army and
navy of the United States to enforce the provisions of the act. Under
this authority, exercised by General Terry, twenty-four conservatives
were expelled from the legislature and their places were filled by
radicals, and the negroes formerly excluded were returned to their
places. Even this did not satisfy Bullock. He went to Washington with a
troop of carpet-baggers and a pocketful of money and railroad bonds and
persuaded General Butler, who was chairman of the House Committee on
Reconstruction, to bring in a bill for the restoration of Georgia
similar to that of Virginia, with a proviso extending for two years the
term of office of the present legislature, which would otherwise expire
in November, 1870. Butler reported such a bill from his committee, but
Bingham, of Ohio, offered an amendment to require a new election of the
legislature at the time fixed in the state constitution, and this
amendment was agreed to, in spite of Butler's opposition, by 115 to 71.
The Georgia Bill was the subject of an exciting battle in the Senate
where Trumbull supported the Bingham proviso against the efforts of
Morton, Howard, Drake, Stewart, Sumner, Wilson, and all of the new
Senators from the South, two of whom (those of Texas) were hastily
admitted in time to vote on the Georgia question. The first vote was on
the motion of Williams, of Oregon, to prolong the life of the existing
legislature till November, 1872. One effect of so doing would be to
save a seat in the United States Senate for a man who had been elected
unlawfully. The vacancy would occur on March 4, 1871, and could be
lawfully filled only by the legislature chosen next preceding that date.
Williams's motion was voted down April 14, by a majority of one. On the
19th of the same month, Trumbull made one of the great speeches of his
public career, filling twelve columns of the _Congressional Globe_, on
the Georgia question, demolishing the Bullock case and stirring public
opinion strongly. The struggle was protracted till July 8, when the bill
passed, as Trumbull desired, with the Bingham proviso.
An editorial in the _Nation_ of May 26, 1870, tells, in brief compass,
what took place while the Georgia Bill was the matter of chief concern
in the Senate:
Our readers may remember that when Mr. Trumbull, some weeks
ago, made his severe summing up of the "Georgia difficulty," he
hinted in very plain terms that the patriots of the Bullock
faction had been guilty of both corruption and intimidation in
trying to get their "Reconstruction" bill through, installing
them in office for two years. By many people this charge was
ascribed partly to Mr. Trumbull's hatred of the black man, and
partly to his hostility to the pure and good of all colors, and
doubtless some asked themselves, as they asked themselves when
the Traitor Ross refused to give up his chair to Senator
Revels, for the sake of the dramatic unities: "What else can we
expect of a man who voted No on the Eleventh Article?"
[A committee of the Senate, appointed to look into the matter,
had taken a mass of testimony and submitted a report.] Their
finding is--and we blush to write it--that Bullock and his
friends have been for a long time in Washington, complaining of
the Ku-Klux Klan, and asking fresh guarantees for "the
persecuted Unionists" of Georgia; that somehow or other, while
there, they have had a great deal of money and railroad bonds,
which they seemed to have no particular use for, themselves;
that they tried unsuccessfully to purchase the votes of
Senators Carpenter and Tipton against the Bingham amendments;
that harrowing reports of "outrages" in Georgia were actually
prepared to order, like boots or dinners, furnished to them and
paid for; that the writing of threatening letters to Senators
was procured in the same manner; that $4000 was paid to that
good and great man, Colonel Forney, of the Washington
_Chronicle_, for "advertising and printing speeches and
documents," the Colonel's editorial denunciations of the
opponents of the Georgia Bill, we suppose, being thrown into
the bargain. The Washington correspondent of the Boston
_Advertiser_--a wicked fellow--adds that some of the witnesses
when first examined "were very loath to tell what they knew,
and indulged in the tallest kind of lying." The report of the
committee is unanimous.
The result of this exposé probably will be that the Georgia
question will at last, after a year's delay, filled with this
lying and intrigue and corruption, be settled at the outset, by
handing the State Government back to the electors on the same
terms as Virginia, and letting the "Bullock faction" go home
and find some means of gaining an honest livelihood.... We
cannot pass from this affair, however, without bearing hearty
testimony to the services which Mr. Trumbull has, by his
attitude in it from the very beginning, rendered to truth,
justice, good government, and civilization. He has made every
honest man, North and South, his debtor, not for being able,
for this he cannot help, but for being bold, and hitting hard.
"By Time," says Hosea Biglow, "I du like a man that ain't
afeared!"
FOOTNOTES:
[98] _Diary of Gideon Welles_, III, 10-12.
[99] Boutwell, _Reminiscences_, II, 108.
[100] This was the second time that Sumner had shunted the nation in the
direction he desired it to go; the first time was when he filibustered
the Louisiana Bill to death at the end of the Thirty-ninth Congress.
Edward L. Pierce, his biographer and eulogist, writing in the early
nineties, says rather dubiously: "For weal or woe, whether it was well
or not for the black race and the country, it is to Sumner's credit or
discredit as a statesman that suffrage, irrespective of race or color,
became fixed and universal in the American system." (_Memoir and
Letters_, I, 228.)
[101] _Fifty Years of Public Service_, by Shelby M. Cullom, p. 146.
[102] _Diary of Gideon Welles_, II, 484.
CHAPTER XX
IMPEACHMENT
Early in 1867, Congress passed an act, originating in the Senate, to
prevent the President from removing, without the consent of the Senate,
any office-holders whose appointment required confirmation by that body.
In its inception it was not intended to include members of the Cabinet,
but merely to protect postmasters, collectors, and other appointees of
that grade, whom the President, in his stump speech at St. Louis, had
declared his intention to "kick out." Accordingly a clause was inserted
excluding Cabinet officers from the operation of the measure.
When the bill came before the House, a motion was made to strike out
this exception, and it was at first negatived by a majority of four.
Subsequently the motion was renewed and carried, but the Senate refused
to concur. The differences between the two houses were referred to a
committee of conference of which Sherman was a member. He had been
extremely resolute heretofore in opposing the attempt to include members
of the Cabinet, because he held that no gentleman would be willing to
remain a member after receiving an intimation from his chief that his
services were no longer desired. To this Senator Hendricks replied that
it was not a question of getting rid of a _gentleman_, but of a man of
different stamp, who might be in the Cabinet and desire to stay in. "The
very person who ought to be turned out," he said, "is the very person
who will stay in." The Conference Committee reported the following
proviso, which was adopted by both houses:
That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the
Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster-General, and the
Attorney-General shall hold their offices respectively for and
during the term of the President by whom they may have been
appointed and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Senator Doolittle, who opposed the bill _in toto_, pointed out that it
did not accomplish what it aimed at: that is, it did not prevent the
President from removing the Secretary of War. He showed that Stanton had
never been appointed by Johnson at all. He was merely holding office by
sufferance. The term of the President by whom he was appointed had
expired and the "one month thereafter" had also expired; therefore, the
proviso reported by the Conference Committee was futile to protect him.
Sherman replied that the proviso was not intended to apply to a
particular case or to the present President, and that Doolittle's
interpretation of the phrase as not protecting Stanton in office was the
true interpretation. He added that if he supposed that Stanton, or any
other Cabinet officer, was so wanting in manhood and honor as to hold
his office after receiving an intimation that his services were no
longer desired, he (Sherman) would consent to his removal at any time.
This declaration committed Sherman in advance to a definite opinion as
to the President's right to remove Stanton whenever he pleased.
The bill passed with the clause above quoted, all the Republican
Senators present voting for it except Van Winkle and Willey, of West
Virginia. Trumbull was recorded in the affirmative.
At the first Cabinet meeting of February 26, the bill was considered,
and all the members thought that it ought to be vetoed. "Stanton was
very emphatic," says Welles, "and seemed glad of an opportunity to be in
accord with his colleagues." (He had previously given his sanction to
the Stevens Reconstruction Bill in opposition to his colleagues.) The
President said he would be glad if Stanton would prepare a veto or make
suggestions for one. Stanton pleaded want of time. The President then
turned to Seward, who said that he would undertake it if Stanton would
help him. This was agreed to, and the veto (based on the ground of
unconstitutionality) was prepared and submitted by them at the Cabinet
meeting of March 1. Stanton must have been aware of the colloquy between
Sherman and Doolittle in which his name was mentioned, and he probably
agreed with them in the opinion that he was not protected by the
Tenure-of-Office Act. If he had thought differently he would hardly have
favored the veto, or joined with Seward in writing it. The veto message
was sent in on March 2, 1867, and the bill was passed by two thirds of
both houses the same day.
Few persons at the present time believe that there was any substantial
ground for the impeachment of Andrew Johnson. The unsparing condemnation
of history has been visited upon the whole proceeding, and the commonly
received opinion now is that if the Senate had voted him guilty as
charged in the articles of impeachment a precedent would have been made
whereby the Republic would have been exposed to grave dangers. Trumbull
was one of the so-called "Seven Traitors" who prevented that
catastrophe.
The first session of the Fortieth Congress began on March 4, 1867. The
radical wing of the Republican party had been muttering about
impeachment even earlier, and a resolution had been passed by the House
on the 7th of January preceding, authorizing the Judiciary Committee to
inquire into the official conduct of the President and to report whether
he had been guilty of acts designed or calculated to "overthrow,
subvert, or corrupt the Government of the United States, or any
department or office thereof." On the 28th of February, the committee
reported that it had examined a large number of witnesses and collected
many documents, but had not been able to reach a conclusion and that it
would not feel justified in making a final report upon so important a
matter in the expiring hours of this Congress, even if it had been able
to make an affirmative one. On the 29th of March following, the
committee was instructed to continue its investigation.
It accordingly continued its work and voted on the 1st of June, by 5 to
4, that there was no evidence that would warrant impeachment; but at the
earnest solicitation of the minority it kept the case open during the
recess which Congress took from July to November. In this interval one
member of the committee changed his vote and this change made the
committee stand 5 to 4 in favor of impeachment. The report of the
committee was presented by Boutwell, of Massachusetts, November 25,
accompanied by a resolution that Andrew Johnson, President of the United
States, be impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors. James F. Wilson,
of Iowa, chairman of the committee, submitted a minority report adverse
to impeachment, and the House on the 7th of December sustained Wilson
and rejected the majority report by a vote of 57 to 108. Among those
voting against impeachment were Allison, Bingham, Blaine, Dawes, Poland,
Spalding, and Washburne, of Illinois. On the other side were Thaddeus
Stevens, B. F. Butler, and John A. Logan. On the 5th of August, the
President sent to Stanton a note of three lines saying that his
resignation as Secretary of War would be accepted. Stanton replied on
the same day declining to resign before the next meeting of Congress.
The President thereupon decided to remove him regardless of
consequences, but he felt the necessity of finding somebody to take the
office who would be acceptable to the country. His choice fell upon
General Grant, who was perhaps the only person whose appointment under
the circumstances would not have caused a disturbance. No plausible
objection could be raised against him in any quarter, not even by
Stanton himself. Grant reluctantly consented to accept the place.
Accordingly one week after Stanton had refused to resign, the President
suspended him and appointed Grant Secretary _ad interim_ and so notified
Stanton. The latter had undoubtedly made plans for retaining the office
in defiance of the President and was chagrined to find that a man had
been appointed whom he could not resist. Although a few months earlier
he had advised the President that the Tenure-of-Office Law was
unconstitutional and had assisted in writing the message vetoing it on
that ground, he now denied the President's power to suspend him without
the consent of the Senate, but said that he yielded to superior force.
He then surrendered his office to Grant. Although the usual expressions
of confidence and esteem were exchanged between himself and his
successor, a residue of asperity remained in the breast of the retiring
Secretary, who felt that the head of the army ought not to have enabled
the President to get the better of him. But as a matter of fact Grant
did not want the office. He accepted it only because he feared that
trouble might follow from the appointment of somebody less familiar than
himself with conditions prevailing in the South.
On the 13th of January, 1868, the Senate, having considered the reasons
assigned by the President for the suspension of Stanton from office,
non-concurred in the same and sent notice to this effect to the
President and to Grant. The latter considered his functions as Secretary
_ad interim_ terminated from the moment of receipt of the notice and so
notified the President, at the same time locking the door of his room
and handing the key to the person in charge of the Adjutant-General's
office in the same building.
Under the terms of the Tenure-of-Office Law, Stanton returned and
resumed his former place.
On the 27th of January, a motion was made by Mr. Spalding in the House
of Representatives that the Committee on Reconstruction be authorized to
inquire what combinations had been made to obstruct the due execution of
law and to report what action, if any, was necessary in consequence
thereof. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 99 to 31. A few days
later, on the motion of Thaddeus Stevens the evidence taken by the
Committee on the Judiciary on the impeachment question was referred to
the Committee on Reconstruction. Certain correspondence that had passed
between General Grant and President Johnson relating to the retirement
of the former from the War Office was also sent to the same committee.
The correspondence between General Grant and the President here referred
to gives a fresh illustration of Andrew Johnson's want of tact in
dealing with men and events. He first made an accusation that Grant had
failed to keep a promise that he had previously given that "if you
[Grant] should conclude that it would be your duty to surrender the
department to Mr. Stanton, upon action in his favor by the Senate, you
were to return the office to me, _prior to a decision by the Senate_, in
order that if I desired to do so I might designate somebody to succeed
you." This letter was dated January 31, 1868. Grant replied (February
3) denying that he had made any such promise, and saying that the
President in making this accusation had sought to involve him in a
resistance to law and thus to destroy his character before the country.
Several other letters followed, including one from each member of the
Cabinet, who was present when the matter was talked of between the two
principals, all confirming the President's statements. The letters of
Browning and Seward, however, tended to show that the President's desire
was to make up a case for the Supreme Court, to decide whether he had a
right under the Constitution to remove a Cabinet officer or not, and
that he supposed that Grant had promised to coöperate with him to
promote that end; but that whatever Grant might have promised, the
sudden action of the Senate led him to believe that he could not delay
his retirement without subjecting himself to the chance of fine and
imprisonment under the Tenure-of-Office Law.[103]
The quarrel between Johnson and Grant did not, however, help the
impeachers, who were voted down in the Committee on Reconstruction,
February 13, by 6 to 3, Stevens being in the minority.
Stanton was now in a position of great embarrassment, being a member of
the Cabinet by appointment of the Senate, but unable to attend Cabinet
meetings. He was endowed with sufficient assurance for most purposes,
but not enough to go to the White House and take a seat among gentlemen
who would have looked upon him as an intruder and a spy. Johnson was
advised by General Sherman and others to leave him severely alone.[104]
If this advice had been followed, Stanton would have been exposed to
ridicule ere long and the Senate could not have helped him to ward it
off. But Johnson came to his rescue by making a fresh attempt to oust
him. Eight days after Thaddeus Stevens's impeachment resolution had been
voted down, two to one, in his own committee, the President sent a note
to Edwin M. Stanton saying that he had removed him from the office of
Secretary of War and appointed Lorenzo Thomas, the Adjutant-General of
the Army, as Secretary of War _ad interim_. The new appointee
immediately presented himself at the War Office and showing his
authority demanded possession, which Stanton refused to yield.
The tables were instantly turned. Stanton was no longer looked upon as
holding an office with nothing to do except to draw his salary, but as a
champion of the people defending them against a law-breaking President.
Grant had warned Johnson months before that the public looked upon the
Tenure-of-Office Law as constitutional until pronounced otherwise by the
courts, and that although an astute lawyer might explain it differently
the common people would "give it the effect intended by its framers,"
that is, to protect Stanton.[105]
This was sound advice. The revulsion in the public mind was electrical
in suddenness and strength. The House of Representatives, which, on the
7th of December, by nearly two to one had rejected an impeachment
resolution recommended by its Judiciary Committee, now (February 24)
adopted the same resolution by 128 to 47. Every Republican member who
was present, including James F. Wilson, voted in the affirmative. A
committee of seven was appointed to prepare articles of impeachment and
present them to the Senate. Nine such articles were reported to the
House on the 2d of March and two additional ones on the following day,
all of which were agreed to, and seven members of the House were
appointed as managers to conduct the impeachment, namely: John A.
Bingham, George S. Boutwell, James F. Wilson, Benjamin F. Butler, Thomas
Williams, John A. Logan, and Thaddeus Stevens.
The trial began on the 5th of March, Chief Justice Chase presiding. The
President was represented by Henry Stanbery, Benjamin R. Curtis, William
S. Groesbeck, William M. Evarts, and Thomas A. R. Nelson. The House
managers were overmatched in point of legal ability by the President's
counsel, and still more by the facts in the case. The first eight
articles of impeachment were based upon the President's attempt to
remove Stanton and appoint Thomas as Secretary of War _ad interim_, but
inasmuch as Senator Sherman had publicly declared that Stanton, being an
appointee of Lincoln, was not protected by the Tenure-of-Office Law,
and that he ought to be removed anyhow if he refused to resign at the
President's request, it was deemed best by the impeachers to divide the
offense into two parts. So the first article related only to the removal
of Stanton and the second only to the appointment of Thomas. This, it
was believed, would enable Sherman to vote not guilty on the first, but
guilty on the second. He could vote that the President had a perfect
right to remove his Secretary of War, but no right to fill the vacancy,
and that any attempt on his part to do so would be a high misdemeanor,
punishable by impeachment and removal from office. And so it turned out
as regarded Sherman's vote, and also that of Senator Howe, of Wisconsin,
who shared Sherman's view that Stanton was not protected by the law.
The ninth article charged the President with having a conversation with
General Emory, who commanded the military department of Washington, and
saying to him that that portion of the Army Appropriation Act, which
provided that all orders relating to military affairs should be issued
through the General of the Army, or the officer next in rank, and not
otherwise, was unconstitutional, thus seeking to induce said Emory to
violate the provisions of said act.
The tenth article recited that Andrew Johnson did at certain times and
places make and "deliver with a loud voice certain intemperate,
inflammatory, and scandalous harangues and did therein utter loud
threats and bitter menaces as well against Congress as the laws of the
United States duly enacted thereby, amid the cries, jeers, and laughter
of the multitudes then assembled." Extracts from the speeches were
embodied in this article, "by means whereof the said Andrew Johnson has
brought the high office of President of the United States into
contempt, ridicule, and disgrace, to the great scandal of all good
citizens, whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States,
did commit, and was then and there guilty of, a high misdemeanor in
office." This article was the production of General Butler.
The eleventh article embraced the charge of seeking to prevent Stanton
from resuming his office as Secretary of War, but not that of removing
him from it (this to accommodate Sherman and Howe), and a _mélange_ of
all the charges in the preceding articles, ending with a charge that the
President had in various ways attempted to prevent the execution of the
Reconstruction Acts of Congress. Thaddeus Stevens considered it the only
one of the series that was bomb-proof, but the Chief Justice ruled that
the Stanton matter was the only thing of substance in it, the residue
being mere objurgation. The answer filed by the President's counsel set
forth:
First, that the Tenure-of-Office Law, in so far as it sought to prevent
the President from removing a member of his Cabinet, was
unconstitutional; that such was the opinion of each member of his
Cabinet, including Stanton, and that Stanton among others advised him to
veto it;
Second, that even if the law were in harmony with the Constitution the
Secretary of War was not included in its prohibitions, since the term
for which he was appointed had expired before the President sought to
remove him;
Third, that it seemed desirable, in view of the foregoing facts, to
secure a judicial determination of all doubts respecting the rights and
powers of the parties concerned, from the tribunal created for that
purpose; and to this end he had taken the steps complained of, and that
he had committed no intentional violation of law.
In answer to the eleventh article, the defendant said that the matters
contained therein, except the charge of preventing the return of
Stanton to the office of Secretary of War, did not allege the commission
or omission of any act whatever whereby issue could be joined or answer
made. As to the Stanton matter, his answer was already given in the
answer to the first article.
There were two theories rife in the Senate and in the country,
respecting this trial. One was that impeachment was a judicial
proceeding where charges of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or
misdemeanors were to be alleged and proved; the Senators sitting as
judges, hearing testimony and argument, and voting guilty or not guilty.
This opinion was generally accepted at first, both in and out of
Congress, and was the correct one. The other was that impeachment was a
political proceeding which the whole people were as competent to decide
as the Senate. This was the view taken by Charles Sumner and avowed by
him in his written opinion while sitting as one of the sworn judges to
vote guilty or not guilty, and it came to be the opinion prevailing in
the Republican party generally before the case was ended. According to
this view it was a question for the people to decide in their character
as an unsworn "multitudinous jury." No method of arriving at, or of
recording, their verdict was suggested or deemed necessary. To a person
holding this view the trial itself was logically a waste of time, since
a decision could have been reached without a scrap of testimony, or a
single speech, on either side.
The trial lasted from the 5th of March to the 16th of May, and the heat
and fury of the contest both in and out of Congress became more intense
from day to day. The impeachers lost ground in the estimation of the
sober-minded and reflecting classes by their intemperate language, by
their frantic efforts to bring outside pressure to bear upon Senators,
and especially by their refusal to admit testimony offered to show that
the President's intent was not to defy the law, but to get a judicial
decision as to what the law was. The Chief Justice ruled that testimony
to prove intent was admissible, and Senator Sherman asked to have it
admitted, but it was excluded by a majority vote. Testimony to prove
that Stanton advised the President that the Tenure-of-Office Law was
unconstitutional and that he aided in writing the veto message was
excluded by the same vote. Gideon Welles, under date April 18,[106] says
that Sumner, who had previously moved to admit all testimony offered,
absented himself when it was proposed to call the Cabinet officers as
witnesses. Monday, May 11, the case was closed and the Senate retired
for deliberation. The session was secret, but the views of Senators, so
far as expressed, leaked out. "Grimes boldly denounced all the
articles," says Welles, "and the whole proceeding. Of course he received
the indignant censure of all radicals; but Trumbull and Fessenden, who
followed later, came in for even more violent denunciation and more
wrathful abuse."
The vote was not taken until the 16th, and the intervening time was
employed by the impeachers in bringing influence to bear upon Senators
who had not definitely declared how they would vote. There were 54 votes
in all; two thirds were required to convict. There were 12 Democrats,
counting Dixon, Doolittle, and Norton, who had been elected as
Republicans, but had been classed as Democrats since they had taken part
in the Philadelphia Convention of August, 1866. If seven Republicans
should join the twelve in voting not guilty, the President would be
acquitted. Three had declared in the conference of Monday, the 11th, for
acquittal, and they were men who could not be swerved by persuasion or
threats after they had made up their minds. If four more should join
with the three, impeachment would fail. Welles names as doubtful to the
last Senators Anthony and Sprague, of Rhode Island, Van Winkle and
Willey, of West Virginia, Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey, Morgan, of New
York, Corbett, of Oregon, Cole, of California, Fowler, of Tennessee,
Henderson, of Missouri, and Ross, of Kansas. He adds, May 14:
The doubtful men do not avow themselves, which, I think, is
favorable to the President, and the impeachers display distrust
and weakness. Still their efforts are unceasing and almost
superhuman. But some of the more considerate journals, such as
the New York _Evening Post_, Chicago _Tribune_, etc., rebuke
the violent. The thinking and reflecting portion of the
country, even Republicans, show symptoms of revolt against the
conspiracy.[107]
The article in the New York _Evening Post_ of May 14, two days before
the first vote was taken, is a column long. It can only be summarized
here.
So long as the court sat, it says, decency forbade the
discussion of the issue elsewhere. It characterizes the
articles of impeachment in groups and severally, and says
Article XI "reads like a jest, in charging solemn official acts
of 1868 as done in pursuance of an extreme and excited
declaration, made to a crowd, in a political speech almost two
years before...." Impertinent issues were constantly pressed
upon the court from without. The New York _Tribune_ demanded
conviction and removal for breaking the Tenure-of-Office Act,
because, it said, the President was guilty of drunkenness,
adultery, treason, and murder. The investigation is of a sudden
changed in its nature by the advocates of conviction and
becomes a matter of politics, and no longer a judicial concern.
Senator Wilson leads off by violating an absolutely fundamental
principle of the life and law of every free people, i.e., the
principle that an accused man shall have the benefit of a
doubt, and be believed innocent until proved guilty. Wilson
says: "I shall give the benefit of whatever doubts have arisen
to perplex and embarrass me to my country rather than to the
Chief Magistrate." ... Here was a plain confession that to
obtain conviction a "first principle of public law must be
sacrificed; that one prominent judge, at least, would condemn
the accused, however conscientiously, from other than judicial
motives." It describes graphically the pressure brought to bear
upon the court and its shameless character, and quotes from the
New York _Tribune's_ flagrant attack upon Grimes, Trumbull, and
Fessenden, "three of the most honored statesmen and tried
patriots in the land." "Thus," it says, "a prominent party
organ tries to instigate the passions of the multitude to drive
the court to the judgment it desires."
"In a meeting of the Republican Campaign Club on Tuesday evening," it
continues, "Charles S. Spencer said that 'as a man of peace and one
obedient to the laws, he would advise Senator Trumbull not to show
himself on the streets in Chicago during the session of the National
Republican Convention, for he feared that the representatives of an
indignant people would hang him to the most convenient lamp-post.' And
the meeting adopted and ordered to be sent to our Senators in Congress,
a resolution, 'that any Senator of the United States elected by the
votes of Union Republicans, who at this time blenches and betrays, is
infamous, and should be dishonored and execrated while this free
Government endures.'"
The following is from the Chicago _Tribune_, May 14, 1868:
IMPEACHMENT
... The man who demands that each Republican Senator shall
blindly vote for conviction upon each article is a madman or a
knave. Why a Senator, or any number of Senators, should be at
liberty to vote as conscience dictates on any of the articles,
provided there be a conviction on some one of them, and not be
at liberty to vote conscientiously unless a conviction be
secured, is only to be explained upon the theory that the
President is expected to be convicted no matter whether
Senators think he has been guilty or not. We have protested,
and do now protest, against the degradation and prostitution of
the Republican party to an exercise of power so revolting that
the people will be justified in hurling it from place at the
first opportunity. We protest against any warfare by the party
or any portion of it against any Senator who may, upon the
final vote, feel constrained to vote against conviction upon
one, several, or even all of the articles. A conviction by a
free and deliberate judgment of an honest court is the only
conviction that should ever take place on impeachment; a
conviction under any other circumstances will be a fatal error.
To denounce such Senators as corrupt, to assail them with
contumely and upbraid them with treachery for failing to
understand the law in the same light as their assailants, would
be unfortunate folly, to call it by the mildest term; and to
attempt to drive these Senators out of the party for refusing
to commit perjury, as they regard it, would cause a reaction
that might prove fatal not only to the supremacy of the
Republican party, but to its very existence. Those rash papers
which have undertaken to ostracise Senators--men like Trumbull,
Sherman, Fessenden, Grimes, Howe, Henderson, Frelinghuysen,
Fowler, and others--are but aiding the Copperheads in the
dismemberment of our party.
From the _Nation_, May 14, 1868.
... Can any party afford to treat its leading men as a part of
the Republican press has been treating leading Republicans
during the last few weeks? Senators of the highest character,
who, in being simply honest and in having a mind of their own,
render more service to the country than fifty thousand of the
windy blatherskites who assail them, have been abused like
pickpockets, simply because they chose to think. We have,
during the last week, heard language applied to Mr. Fessenden
and Mr. Trumbull, for instance, which was fit only for a
compound of Benedict Arnold and John Morrissey, and all their
colleagues have been warned beforehand, that if they pleaded
their oaths as an excuse for differing from anybody who
happened to edit a newspaper, they would be held up to
execration as knaves and hypocrites. Now, the class of men who
are most needed in our politics just now are high-minded,
independent men, with their hands clean and souls of their own.
Their errors of judgment are worth bearing with for the sake of
their character. Yet this class is becoming smaller and
smaller, falling more and more into disrepute. The class of
roaring, corrupt, ignorant demagogues, who are always on "the
right side" with regard to all party measures, grows apace;
and, if we are not greatly mistaken, if the Republican party
does not make short work with them before long, they will make
short work of it....
When it became known that Grimes, Trumbull, and Fessenden would vote not
guilty, the pressure from outside was redoubled upon others who had been
reckoned doubtful, and especially upon Henderson, Fowler, and Ross.
Even the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, then in
session at Chicago, was called upon to lend a hand, and a motion was
made on the 13th of May for an hour of prayer in aid of impeachment. An
aged delegate moved to lay that proposal on the table, saying:
My understanding is that impeachment is a judicial proceeding
and that Senators are acting under an oath. _Are we to pray to
the Almighty that they may violate their oaths?_
The motion to lay on the table prevailed. On the following day, however,
Bishop Simpson offered a new preamble and resolution, omitting any
expression of opinion that Senators ought to vote for conviction, but
reciting that "painful rumors are in circulation that, partly by
unworthy jealousies and partly by corrupt influences, pecuniary and
otherwise, most actively employed, efforts were being made to influence
Senators improperly, and to prevent them from performing their high
duty"; therefore, an hour should be set apart in the following day for
prayer to beseech God "to save our Senators from error." This cunningly
drawn resolution was adopted without opposition. It was supposed to have
been aimed at Senator Willey, of West Virginia, rather than at the
Throne of Grace.
Under the rules adopted for the trial each Senator was allowed to file a
written opinion. That of Trumbull was the first one in the list. Among
other things he said:
To do impartial justice in all things appertaining to the
present trial, according to the Constitution and laws, is the
duty imposed on each Senator by the position he holds and the
oath he has taken, and he who falters in the discharge of that
duty, either from personal or party considerations, is unworthy
his position, and merits the scorn and contempt of all just
men.
The question to be decided is not whether Andrew Johnson is a
proper person to fill the presidential office, nor whether it
is fit that he should remain in it, nor, indeed, whether he has
violated the Constitution and laws in other respects than those
alleged against him. As well might any other fifty-four persons
take upon themselves by violence to rid the country of Andrew
Johnson, because they believed him a bad man, as to call upon
the fifty-four Senators, in violation of their sworn duty, to
convict and depose him for any other causes than those alleged
in the articles of impeachment. As well might any citizen take
the law into his own hands and become its executioner as to ask
the Senate to convict, outside of the case made. To sanction
such a principle would be destructive of all law and all
liberty worth the name, since liberty unregulated by law is but
another name for anarchy.
He then took up the articles of impeachment _seriatim_ and showed that
they all hinged upon the removal of Stanton and the _ad interim_
appointment of Thomas.
But even if a different construction could be put upon the law
[he continued], I could never consent to convict the Chief
Magistrate of a high misdemeanor and remove him from office for
a misconstruction of what must be admitted to be a doubtful
statute, and particularly when the misconstruction was the same
put upon it by the authors of the law at the time of its
passage.
As to the charge that he (Trumbull) had already voted that the President
had no authority to remove Stanton, he said:
Importance is sought to be given to the passage by the Senate,
before impeachment articles were found by the House of
Representatives, of the following resolutions: "Resolved by the
Senate of the United States, That under the Constitution and
laws of the United States the President has no power to remove
the Secretary of War and designate any other officer to perform
the duties of that office _ad interim_" as if Senators, sitting
as a court on the trial of the President for high crimes and
misdemeanors, would feel bound or influenced in any degree by a
resolution introduced and hastily passed before adjournment on
the very day the orders to Stanton and Thomas were issued. Let
him who would be governed by such considerations in passing on
the guilt or innocence of the accused, and not by the law and
the facts as they have been developed in the trial, shelter
himself under such a resolution. I am sure no honest man could.
He concluded with these words:
Once set the example of impeaching a President for what, when
the excitement of the hour shall have subsided, will be
regarded as insufficient cause, and no future President will be
safe who happens to differ with a majority of the House and two
thirds of the Senate on any measure deemed by them important,
particularly if of a political character. Blinded by partisan
zeal, with such an example before them they will not scruple to
remove out of the way any obstacle to the accomplishment of
their purpose, and what then becomes of the checks and balances
of the Constitution so carefully devised and so vital to its
perpetuity? They are all gone. In view of the consequences
likely to flow from this day's proceedings, should they result
in conviction on what my judgment tells me are insufficient
charges and proofs, I tremble for the future of my country. I
cannot be an instrument to produce such a result, and at the
hazard of the ties even of friendship and affection, till
calmer times shall do justice to my motives, no alternative is
left me but the inflexible discharge of duty.
Gideon Welles, under date May 16, says:
Willey, after being badgered and disciplined to decide against
his judgment, at a late hour last night agreed to vote for the
eleventh article, which was one reason for reversing the order
and making it the first.... Bishop Simpson, a high priest of
the Methodists and a sectarian politician of great shrewdness
and ability, had brought his clerical and church influence to
bear upon Willey through Harlan, the Methodist elder and organ
in the Senate.[108]
So the managers vaulted over ten articles and began the roll-call on the
last of the series. The vote resulted: guilty, 35; not guilty, 19. One
less than two thirds had voted not guilty; so the President was
acquitted on an article, the gravamen of which was the President's
attempt to prevent Stanton from returning to office after the Senate had
non-concurred in his removal. Sherman, Howe, and Willey had voted guilty
on this article, but Henderson, Fowler, Ross, and Van Winkle had voted
not guilty.
The impeachers were stunned, and before they could collect their
thoughts, the Chief Justice, in pursuance of a rule previously adopted,
directed that the vote should now be taken on the first article. He was
interrupted by a motion to adjourn, which he ruled out of order. An
appeal from the decision was taken and sustained by a majority vote, and
the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment adjourned for ten days. The
utmost efforts and direst threats were brought to bear upon Senator Ross
because he was believed to be weak and defenseless, but he remained
firm. When the court reassembled on the 26th of May, the first article
of impeachment, the one which charged the President with the high
misdemeanor of removing Stanton from office, was jettisoned altogether,
and votes were taken on the second and third articles, relating to the
appointment of Thomas as Secretary _ad interim_. On both of these
articles the result was identical in number and personnel with that on
the eleventh article. Impeachment had failed. The court then adjourned
_sine die_.
The opposition to impeachment had some latent strength that was never
officially disclosed. Sprague, of Rhode Island, and Willey, of West
Virginia, attended the meetings of the Republican anti-impeachers and
said they would vote not guilty if their votes should be needed.[109]
The President was assured that Morgan would do the same.[110]
On the same day, Edwin M. Stanton wrote a note to the President saying
that inasmuch as impeachment had failed he had relinquished the War
Department and had left the contents thereof in charge of the senior
Assistant Adjutant-General. He then retired to his own home broken in
health by hard labor and clouded in reputation by his retention of a
place in the Cabinet in defiance of his chief. Not even success in
maintaining his position could excuse such an act. Failure made it a
glaring misdemeanor. An attempt has been made to shift the
responsibility for his action to the shoulders of Sumner and his other
backers in the Senate, who advised him to "stick." Undoubtedly they did
so advise, and undoubtedly they believed, and persuaded him to believe,
that it was a patriotic duty to commit a glaring breach of good manners
and to persist in it for months; but the responsibility for such an act
could not be assumed by other persons. Moreover, if it was a breach of
the Constitution for the Senate to forbid the President to choose his
own cabinet, as Stanton himself had affirmed, it was a breach of the
Constitution for him to coöperate with the Senate in doing so.
The glory of the trial [says Mr. Rhodes][111] was the action of
the seven recusant Senators.... The average Senator who
hesitated finally gave his voice with the majority, but these
seven, in conscientiousness and delicacy of moral fibre, were
above any average, and in refusing to sacrifice their ideas of
justice to a popular demand, which in this case was neither
insincere nor unenlightened, they showed a degree of courage
than which we know none higher. Hard as was their immediate
future they have received their meed from posterity, their
monument in the admiring tribute of all who know how firm they
stood in an hour of supreme trial.
In this comment there is now general concurrence. Even Ross has been
immortalized by his resolute adherence to what he believed to be right.
His trial was the hardest of all, because on the one hand he had no
accumulated reputation to fall back upon, and on the other hand he had
the most radical state in the Union to deal with. Moreover, he was
desperately poor, his only property being a starving country newspaper.
Ill-luck followed him after his term expired. A cyclone struck the town
of Coffeyville, Kansas, and scattered the contents of his newspaper
office over the adjacent prairie. Among the Trumbull papers is an appeal
from the local relief committee for help to start Ross's newspaper
again, and a donation from Trumbull of two hundred dollars for this
purpose. Some forty years later, Ross died in New Mexico, old and poor.
He had been a soldier in the Civil War. Congress by a special act voted
him a pension, before his death. This was a solace on the brink of the
grave and a tribute to his fidelity to principle in a trying hour. It
was recognized as such and applauded by the press of the country without
a discordant note. In the award of credit for adherence to convictions
of duty in the trial of Andrew Johnson, three other Senators have been
for the most part overlooked, namely, James Dixon, of Connecticut, James
R. Doolittle, of Wisconsin, and Daniel S. Norton, of Minnesota. All of
these were elected as Republicans and all of them walked in the fiery
furnace along with the Seven, or rather preceded them thither. The
reason why they have been neglected by the muse of history is that they
started two years earlier. They went to the Philadelphia Arm-in-Arm
Convention and thus became classified as Democrats. Edgar Cowan, of
Pennsylvania, did likewise. His term expired, however, before
impeachment reached the acute stage. Dixon and Doolittle had served
through Lincoln's entire term. They approved of his Reconstruction
policy and simply adhered to it after Johnson came in. They received a
larger share of contumely as turn-coats and outcasts than the Seven,
because they began to earn that distinction earlier. Doolittle accepted
political martyrdom without a murmur. The legislature of Wisconsin
passed resolutions denouncing his support of President Johnson and his
policy and demanded his resignation as a Senator, and these resolutions
were presented to the Senate by his colleague, Timothy O. Howe, and were
answered by Doolittle on the floor of the Senate in a manly way. If
there are laurels to be distributed at this late day, he and his three
allies are entitled to "a far more exceeding and eternal weight of
glory."
Trumbull received his quota of abuse and vilification for his vote
against impeachment from small-minded newspapers and local politicians.
To these it seemed an infernal shame that he had still five years to
serve in the Senate before they could turn him out. The only reply he
ever made in writing, so far as I know, was in a letter dated May 20 to
Gustave Koerner, which the latter caused to be published in the
Belleville _Advocate_, reiterating in brief the views expressed in his
opinion as a member of the court.
Fessenden's unexpired term was shorter than Trumbull's. He was read out
of the party rather prematurely. In the autumn following his vote on
impeachment, George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, made his appearance as a
stump speaker in Maine supporting the Democratic policy of "paying the
bonds in greenbacks." This was a new issue in the East, and a rather
puzzling one everywhere. Pendleton had been a candidate for the
presidency in the national convention on that platform, but had fallen
somewhat short of a nomination. Fessenden was the only man within reach
able to meet him and expose his fallacies on the stump. The party was in
danger of losing the state. It was obliged to call for the Senator's
help. He responded favorably, took the field and routed the Greenbackers
completely. This was his last victory. He had been in poor health for
some years. Overwork and over-anxiety as chairman of the Finance
Committee during the War, and later as Secretary of the Treasury, had
told upon a feeble frame. He died September 2, 1869, and with him passed
away the most clairvoyant mind, joined to the most sterling character,
that the state of Maine ever contributed to the national councils.
Whether, if his life and health had been spared, he could have been
reëlected to the Senate, is doubtful. Gideon Welles was informed that he
had not a friend in the Maine legislature. When his death was announced
in the Senate, Trumbull said of him:
As a debater engaged in the current business of legislation the
Senate has not had his equal in my time. No man could detect a
sophistry or perceive a scheme or a job quicker than he, and
none possessed the power to expose it more effectually. He was
a practical, matter-of-fact man utterly abhorring all show,
pretension, and humbug.... But I did not rise so much to speak
of the great abilities and noble traits of character which have
made Mr. Fessenden's death to be felt as a national calamity,
as of the personal loss which I myself feel at his departure.
Only three others are now left who were here when I came to the
Senate, and there is but one who came with me. There has been
no one here since I came to whom I oftener went for counsel and
whose opinions I have been accustomed more to respect than
those of our departed friend. There were occasions during our
fourteen years of service together when we differed about minor
matters and had controversies, for the time unpleasant, but I
never lost my respect for him, nor do I believe that he ever
did for me. He was my friend more closely, perhaps, the last
year or two than ever before. Like other Senators I shall miss
him in the daily transactions of this chamber, and perhaps more
than any other shall miss him as the one person from whom I
most frequently sought advice. I am not one of those, however,
who believe that constitutional liberty, our free institutions,
or the progress of the age depend upon any one individual. When
the great and good Lincoln was stricken down, I did not believe
that the Government would fail, or liberty perish. Though his
loss may have subjected the country to many trials it would not
otherwise have had, still our Government stands and liberty
survives. Another has taken Mr. Fessenden's place; others will
soon occupy ours, to discharge their duties better, perhaps,
than we have done, and he among us to-day will be fortunate,
indeed, if, when his work on earth is done, he shall leave
behind him a life so pure and useful, a reputation so
unsullied, a patriotism so ardent, and a statesmanship so
conspicuous as William Pitt Fessenden.[112]
Grimes had a stroke of paralysis while the impeachment trial was in
progress, and it was feared that he could not be in his seat when the
time for voting came, but he rallied sufficiently to be carried into the
Senate Chamber and to rise upon his feet when his name was called. When
he learned the nature of his malady he announced that he would not be a
candidate for reëlection. Thus he was taken out of the reach of party
vengeance, but though as pure as ice, he did not escape calumny.
John B. Henderson died while this book was passing through the press. He
was the only one of the Seven Traitors whom the Republican party
publicly and formally forgave. He lost his seat in the Senate as he
expected, and he retired to private life as a lawyer in the city of St.
Louis. Twelve years passed. Two presidential lustrums of Grant and one
of Hayes had erased from the hearts of men the burning sensations of
impeachment. In 1884, a convention assembled in Chicago to nominate a
candidate of the Republican party for the presidency. I happened to be
there. On the second day of its sitting, the Committee on Permanent
Organization reported the name of John B. Henderson, of Missouri, for
permanent chairman. The assembled multitude knew at once the
significance of the nomination and gave cheer after cheer of applause
and approval. It was the signal that all was forgiven on both sides.
Which side most needed forgiveness was not asked.
In August, 1868, all the sorrows of Trumbull's public life were
submerged and belittled by a domestic affliction. His wife, Julia Jayne
Trumbull, died on the 16th of that month, at her home in Washington
City, in the forty-fifth year of her age, and was buried in the cemetery
of her native place, Springfield, Illinois. She was the mother of six
children, all boys, three of whom were living at the time of her death.
FOOTNOTES:
[103] On the 3d of August, 1868, shortly after his acquittal, Johnson
wrote a letter to Benjamin C. Truman, his former secretary, which gives
his estimate of Grant and throws some new light on the politics of the
time. There is nothing to show which of the Blairs was referred to as
giving him advice as to the make-up of his Cabinet, but it was probably
Montgomery. He says:
"I may have erred in not carrying out Mr. Blair's request by putting
into my Cabinet Morton, Andrew, and Greeley. I do not say I should have
done so had I my career to go over again, for it would have been hard to
have put out Seward and Welles, who had served satisfactorily under the
greatest man of all. Morton would have been a tower of strength,
however, and so would Andrew. No senator would have dared to vote for
impeachment with those two men in my Cabinet. Grant was untrue. He meant
well for the first two years, and much that I did that was denounced was
through his advice. He was the strongest man of all in the support of my
policy for a long while and did the best he could for nearly two years
in strengthening my hands against the adversaries of constitutional
government. But Grant saw the radical handwriting on the wall and heeded
it. I did not see it, or, if seeing it, did not heed it. Grant did the
proper thing to save Grant, but it pretty nearly ruined me. I might have
done the same thing under the same circumstances. At any rate, most men
would.... Grant had come out of the war the greatest of all. It is true
that the rebels were on their last legs and that the Southern ports were
pretty effectually blockaded, and that Grant was furnished with all the
men that were needed, or could be spared, after he took command of the
Army of the Potomac. But Grant helped more than any one else to bring
about this condition. His great victories at Donelson, Vicksburg, and
Missionary Ridge all contributed to Appomattox." (_Century Magazine_,
January, 1913.)
[104] Rhodes, _History of the United States_, VI, 104.
[105] McPherson, _Reconstruction_, p. 307.
[106] _Diary of Gideon Welles_, III, 335.
[107] _Diary of Gideon Welles_, III, 355.
[108] _Diary of Gideon Welles_, III, 358.
[109] This fact is mentioned in Dunning's _Reconstruction_, p. 107, on
the authority of ex-senator Henderson. The latter verbally made the same
statement to me.
[110] _Century Magazine_, January, 1913.
[111] _History of the United States_, VI, 156.
[112] _Cong. Globe_, 1869, p. 113.
CHAPTER XXI
THE McCARDLE CASE--GRANT'S CABINET--THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
In November, 1867, General Ord, commanding the military district of
Mississippi, arrested and imprisoned an editor named W. H. McCardle, for
alleged libelous and incendiary publications. McCardle applied to the
United States Circuit Court for a writ of _habeas corpus_ under the same
act of Congress which Milligan had successfully invoked. The writ was
granted, a hearing was had, and the prisoner was remanded to the custody
of the military authorities. McCardle took an appeal to the Supreme
Court. The Attorney-General of the United States, Mr. Henry Stanbery,
decided not to appear in the case. General Grant was at this time
Secretary of War _ad interim_, and Stanbery notified him of the pending
case and suggested to him the propriety of employing counsel to
represent the military authorities having McCardle in custody. As this
was a case involving the validity of the Reconstruction laws of
Congress, General Grant took steps to defend, and addressed a letter to
Senator Trumbull, dated January 8, 1868, saying: "This Department
desires to engage your professional services, for that object." Trumbull
replied on the 11th, accepting the employment, and saying that he should
desire to have other counsel associated with him. A few days later he
secured the assistance of Matt. H. Carpenter, of Wisconsin. A brief was
prepared, and both Trumbull and Carpenter made oral arguments. McCardle
was represented by Jeremiah S. Black.
Trumbull's argument was made on the 4th of March. He contended that the
court had no jurisdiction, and that, therefore, the appeal should be
dismissed. The legislation of Congress on the subject was as follows:
The Act of 1789, establishing the judiciary, did not give the right of
appeal to the Supreme Court in _habeas corpus_ cases. It was omitted in
order to avoid lumbering the docket of the highest tribunal with petty
details. On the 5th of February, 1867, Congress passed an act granting
the right of appeal to the Supreme Court in such cases, in order to
protect negroes and white Unionists in the South. The last clause of the
act was in these words:
This act shall not apply to the case of any person who is or
may be held in the custody of the military authorities of the
United States _charged with any military offense_, or with
having aided or abetted rebellion against the Government of the
United States prior to the passage of this act.
It was Trumbull's contention that McCardle fell within this exception,
and hence that the right of appeal, so far as he was concerned, did not
exist.
Congress was in trepidation as to the outcome of the case and was
resolved to take no chances on it. Various legislative remedies were
proposed. One was to require a unanimous vote of the Supreme Court to
pronounce any act of Congress unconstitutional and void. A bill
requiring a two-thirds vote of the court in such cases actually passed
the House on the 13th of January by yeas 116, nays 39, but it was never
considered by the Senate. The end was accomplished, however, in a
different way. The Senate had passed a bill of only one section,
reported by Williams, of Oregon, from the Committee on Finance, to amend
the code of judicial procedure in revenue cases. The House attached to
this bill another section repealing so much of the Act of February 5,
1867, as authorized an appeal to the Supreme Court in the class of
cases therein named, and withdrawing from the Supreme Court jurisdiction
as to appeals already taken. This bill passed the House March 13, 1868,
without a division. It was taken up in the Senate on the motion of
Senator Williams and passed by a vote of 32 to 6 the same day, although
Senators Buckalew and Hendricks asked for an explanation of its meaning,
which was not given to them.
Although Buckalew and Hendricks did not have time to find out the nature
of this bill, Andrew Johnson did. In due time he returned it to the
Senate with a veto message, exposing it as a measure to deprive citizens
of their rights under existing law and to arrest proceedings already in
course of judicial determination. On this veto there was a debate in the
Senate beginning on March 25, 1868, in which the Democrats, led by
Hendricks, had decidedly the best of it. The supporters of the bill had
very little to say for themselves. Trumbull contended that the bill did
not affect any case then pending in the court, but in this debate he was
worsted by Doolittle, who showed that it applied to the McCardle case.
Trumbull and Carpenter had argued that the Supreme Court had no
jurisdiction, since military cases were not appealable under the Act of
February 5, 1867. The court had ruled against them because McCardle was
arrested, not for a military, but for a civil offense. It still remained
to be determined whether the court below had jurisdiction. Trumbull was
confident that the Supreme Court would hold that the lower court had no
such jurisdiction, in which case the appeal would fail and the bill
vetoed by the President would be nugatory as to McCardle. Doolittle in
reply showed that the bill did cut off McCardle's rights as an
appellant, and the Supreme Court so held in the month of December
following, when it dismissed the petition expressly on the ground that
its jurisdiction had been withdrawn by the Act of March 27, 1868. The
bill was passed over the veto on that date, by 33 to 9 in the Senate and
by 115 to 34 in the House. It was partisan legislation. The Republicans
drew a long breath after its passage because they had apprehended
another Milligan decision, undermining, perhaps, the whole fabric of
Congressional Reconstruction. Had not the court been deterred by the
critical condition of public affairs, it might with perfect propriety
have retained its jurisdiction and decided in favor of McCardle, since
the Act of March 27 was glaringly unjust as to him. But the judges were
intimidated by the awful pother o'er their heads and were glad of an
excuse to drop McCardle.
It was not so easy to drop Trumbull, however. He was both Senator and
retained counsel in this case. Therefore he ought not to have used the
former position to help his own side in the litigation. The bill did not
originate with him, or his committee, but he voted for it twice,
although his vote was not needed. There was a two-thirds majority
without him. True, he maintained that the bill did not apply to
McCardle, but most of the Senators who took part in the debate held that
it did. In a case of doubt involving the rights of a litigant, he ought
to have refrained from voting.
Eventually he received $10,000 as compensation for legal services in
this and one other case in which he had been retained by the War
Department. The amount was fixed by Stanton, and was paid in part by him
and in part by Secretary Rawlins after Grant became President. Somewhat
later this payment became a subject of criticism in hostile newspapers;
and inasmuch as the McCardle case had been tried during Johnson's
Administration, it was hastily assumed that it had had some shady
connection with Trumbull's vote of not guilty in the impeachment case.
When it became evident that the opponents of Johnson were the ones who
had employed him and fixed the amount to be paid, the accusers said that
his action was contrary to law and that he ought not to have taken any
pay at all for legal services to the Government while he was a Senator.
This charge was made by Chandler, of Michigan, on the floor of the
Senate, and it led to a sharp debate, in which Chandler was called to
order by the Vice-President for using unparliamentary language.
There was a law, enacted in 1808, prohibiting executive officers of the
Government from making contracts with members of Congress, and
prohibiting the latter from receiving payment therefor. This law did not
apply in terms to legal services, and the presumption was that it did
not apply to them in spirit, since there were precedents for such
employment of members of Congress as late as 1864, when Roscoe Conkling,
then a member of the House from New York, had been employed by the War
Department and had been paid for the service rendered.
Chandler, in the debate, quoted an opinion of Attorney-General Wirt,
given in 1828, to the effect that although the circumstances attending
the passage of the Act of 1808 showed that Congress was then legislating
on contracts for carrying the mails and for the purchase of supplies and
not for legal services, yet, in his belief, the law was broad enough to
include such services. An opinion of an Attorney-General, however, was
not binding on Senators.
Trumbull replied that the law had been settled differently as to legal
services, and that the only prohibition then in force was against
Congressmen practicing for compensation in the Court of Claims or before
the executive departments. In this contention he could hardly fail to
be correct, since all such laws later than 1861 had emanated from, or
had passed through, the committee of which he was chairman. The
governing statute was the act of June 11, 1864, introduced by Senator
Wade, in 1863. As originally drawn, it prohibited Congressmen from
practicing for or against the Government before any court, or
department; but the word "court" was stricken out while it was pending
in the Senate, and this was good evidence to show what the intention of
Congress was.
Although the payment was certainly legal, it would have been better for
Trumbull if he had not taken it. Whenever he came before the people for
public preferment thereafter, the Chandler accusation was brought
against him afresh and it required a new refutation.
* * * * *
After the impeachment fiasco was ended, the nomination of Grant for
President by the Republican party was inevitable--not because he was a
Republican, but because he was the only man whom the party could
certainly elect. Until he quarreled with Andrew Johnson, nobody knew
which side he favored. Indeed, the Democrats, until that time, had
looked hopefully to him as a possible candidate for themselves.
The convention which nominated him was confronted by the fact that
Congress had imposed negro suffrage on the South, while some of the
largest Northern States had not yet adopted it, but had flatly refused
to do so. The platform committee, therefore, reported, and the
convention adopted, a resolution declaring:
The guaranty by Congress of equal suffrage to all loyal men at
the South was demanded by every consideration of public safety,
of gratitude, and of justice, and must be maintained, but the
question of suffrage in all the loyal states properly belongs
to the people of those states.
Grant was nominated unanimously May 20, 1868, and Schuyler Colfax was
nominated as Vice-President. The Democrats nominated Horatio Seymour for
President and Frank P. Blair for Vice-president. In the election, Grant
and Colfax received 214 electoral votes and Seymour and Blair 80.
Grant's first Cabinet was a conglomerate which stupefied the
politicians. For Secretary of State he named Elihu B. Washburne, of
Illinois. Washburne had represented the Galena District in Congress
continuously and creditably for twelve years, and was just entering upon
a new term. He was a fellow townsman of Grant when the war broke out and
had recommended him to Governor Yates as a military helper, and from
that time onward had been his stanch and unwavering supporter. When
Grant fell into disfavor after the battle of Shiloh, and almost
everybody in Washington was clamoring against him, Washburne fairly
roared on the other side, and contended not only that he ought to be
retained in his place, but that he ought to be promoted to Halleck's
place in command of all the Western armies--and here he was right. His
personal relations with the General had been so close and his services
so conspicuous that there was a general expectation that he would have a
place in the Cabinet; but nobody supposed that it would be the
Department of State, for which he was wholly unfitted. Although a man of
ability, tenacity, and long experience in public affairs, he was
impulsive, headstrong, combative, and unbalanced. The Department of
State was regarded then as the premier position, where equipoise was the
chief requisite, and this quality Washburne lacked.
Grant had chosen James F. Wilson, of Iowa, as Secretary of State and
Wilson had accepted the appointment. He had been a leading member of the
House and chairman of its Judiciary Committee, and had been consulted by
Grant on the most important matters connected with his duties as
Secretary of War _ad interim_, including his correspondence with Andrew
Johnson after he had resigned that office. Wilson had declined a
reëlection to Congress because he wished to retire from public life, and
he accepted the appointment offered by Grant with reluctance and only at
the urgent solicitation of the latter.
Washburne had been promised the office of Minister to France. When he
knew that Wilson was to be appointed Secretary of State, he went to
Grant and asked that the appointment of Secretary might be conferred
upon himself temporarily so as to give him prestige in his office as
Minister. Grant saw no objection to this, but he asked Wilson's
permission first. Wilson did not relish the proposition, but he
consented, on condition that Washburne should not take any action as
Secretary, either in the way of appointments to office or the
announcement of policies. As soon as Washburne had been confirmed by the
Senate, he began to make appointments and announce policies, and Grant
did not immediately call him to order. Wilson accordingly notified Grant
that as the conditions had been broken he would not now accept the
office. Grant then compelled Washburne to resign. But meanwhile Wilson
had gone to New York en route to his home in Iowa, and a messenger (A.
D. Richardson) was sent after him by Grant to urge him to change his
mind; he declined to do so, in terms, however, which preserved their
friendship unimpaired.[113]
"Who ever heard before of a man nominated Secretary of State merely as a
compliment?" was Fessenden's comment on the Washburne episode.
Wilson afterward served a term in the United States Senate. He was a
good lawyer, a man of sound judgment, of probity and stability of
character, and would have filled the office of Secretary of State
creditably if not brilliantly. When Grant found that Wilson's purpose to
withdraw could not be changed he offered the place to Hamilton Fish, who
accepted it.
Grant's mishaps in filling the Treasury Department were quite as droll
as the foregoing. He first sent in the name of Alexander T. Stewart, the
great dry-goods merchant of New York, as Secretary. Stewart was a
Scotch-Irishman who had migrated as a young man, and had taken up the
vocation of a school-teacher in his adopted country. Of his start in
life he was very proud. He kept a well-thumbed copy of the New Testament
in Greek on the centre table of his hospitable mansion, which he was
fond of exhibiting to his guests as one of the tools of trade with which
he began his career in America. Pedagogy, however, did not detain him
long. He had brought some capital from the old country and he turned his
attention to silks and muslins, and by diligence, skill, and integrity
had reached the foremost place in the nation as a merchant, before the
outbreak of the Civil War. His wholesale business was chiefly with the
South, and this part of it was suddenly obliterated in 1861. Yet he
recovered his leadership in dry goods before the war ended, and was then
rated as third in the list of rich men in the United States, the names
of Astor and Vanderbilt only being placed higher.
Nobody knew, at the time when he was named for a place in the Cabinet,
what political party he belonged to or favored. His most intimate
friend and counselor was Henry Hilton, a Democratic ex-judge, potent in
Tammany Hall. That fact, however, implied no political bias on the part
of Stewart. Hilton was his watch-dog at the place where the local taxing
and blackmailing power lay. Nor did Grant have any political aims or
thought in selecting Stewart for the portfolio of the Treasury. He chose
him because great wealth appealed strongly to the imagination of one who
had had severe struggles with poverty, and because he reasoned that a
man who had been very successful in his private business would
necessarily know how to manage the public business. Both Sumner and
Gideon Welles said that Stewart had made a gift of considerable amount
to Grant.
The nomination of Stewart was scoffed at by nearly everybody in
Washington, but it was well received by the press and no Senator dared
to vote against it. It was presently discovered, however, that he could
not legally hold the office, as he was disqualified by a law of 1789,
which provided that nobody engaged in trade or commerce, nor any owner
of a seagoing vessel, nor any dealer in public lands or in public
securities, should be eligible. Stewart had not been a candidate for the
position, or for any position, but when it was offered to him, he
thought he would like to have it, and to this end he proposed to retire
temporarily from trade and commerce, and put his business in the hands
of trustees for charitable use, in order to meet the requirements of
law. The President also requested Congress to change the law so that he
might be qualified. Congress, however, did not think it desirable to
trim the law to fit a particular case, and Stewart did not raise his
bid. After a week's delay the President sent in the name of George S.
Boutwell, of Massachusetts, for Secretary of the Treasury, and he
entered upon the duties of the office with general satisfaction.
When the name of Adolph Borie was announced for Secretary of the Navy,
everybody began to ask, Who is Borie? Even Admiral Farragut had never
heard of him. The answer came that he was a rich man in Philadelphia who
had entertained General Grant handsomely on some occasion when he was
temporarily in that city. Sumner said in his speech of May 31, 1872,
that he also had made a gift to Grant. He retained the position of
Secretary only three months. He then resigned and recommended George M.
Robeson, a lawyer of New Jersey, as his successor, and the latter was
appointed. Robeson was as little known as Borie had been before he was
appointed, but he was not the same kind of nonentity.
John A. J. Cresswell, of Maryland, who became Postmaster-General, had
been a member of Congress. If there was not much to be said for him,
there was nothing at all to be said against him.
John A. Rawlins, Grant's chief-of-staff during the war, a man of high
character and ability, chose himself for Secretary of War, and
communicated his preference to his chief through General James H.
Wilson, who was on terms of intimacy with both parties. Grant received
the communication favorably and sent the name of Rawlins to the Senate
and here he made no mistake. But Rawlins lived less than a year after
his appointment.
The two remaining members of the Cabinet, General Jacob D. Cox, of Ohio,
Secretary of the Interior, and E. R. Hoar, of Massachusetts,
Attorney-General, were ideal selections. The former had been governor of
his state and had served with distinguished valor and efficiency in the
Civil War. The latter was a man of sparkling wit and conversational
powers, which, however, did not outshine his solid qualities of mind
and character. Both these men came early into collision with the "spoils
system," which afflicted the whole of Grant's administration with
ever-increasing virulence. Both of them fought a losing battle with it,
as did George William Curtis, who essayed, in a humbler capacity, to
grapple with it. All three were retired, or retired voluntarily, before
the end of Grant's first term.
* * * * *
The plank in the Republican platform forcing negro suffrage upon the
South, but leaving it optional with the Northern States, was too brazen
to be long maintained. Moreover, there was danger lest this right of the
negroes should be taken from them after the Southern States should have
recovered the right to amend their own constitutions. These things
absorbed the attention of the Fortieth Congress during the last month of
its existence.
On January 30, 1869, the House passed an amendment to the Constitution
by more than two-thirds majority in these words:
The right of any citizen of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by
reason of race, color, or previous condition of slavery of any
citizen or class of citizens of the United States.
In the Senate, Vickers, of Maryland, moved to amend by providing that
the right to vote should not be denied because of participation in the
rebellion. This was rejected by 21 to 32, but it received the votes of
eleven Republicans, among whom were Grimes, Harlan, Trumbull, and
Wilson. Wilson, of Massachusetts, moved to add the words "nativity,
property, education, or creed" to the words "race or color," and this
was adopted by 31 to 27, Trumbull voting in the negative. The House
rejected the amendment by 37 to 133 and sent it back to the Senate,
which, by a vote of 33 to 24, receded from its amendment. The vote was
then taken on concurring in the House Resolution as originally
presented, and it failed by 31 to 27, not two thirds.
The Senate then took up a resolution that had been previously reported
by the Committee on the Judiciary which was similar in terms to the one
originally passed by the House, except that it added the words "and hold
office" after the word "vote." The resolution was passed by 35 to 11 and
sent to the House. Logan, of Illinois, moved to strike out the words
"and hold office." This was defeated. Bingham, of Ohio, moved to insert
the words "nativity, property, or creed," after the word "color." This
was adopted by 92 to 71, and the resolution passed by 140 to 37. The
Senate disagreed to both of the House amendments. The measure then went
to a Conference Committee consisting of Senators Stewart, Conkling, and
Edmunds, and Representatives Boutwell, Bingham, and Logan, who reported
in favor of Logan's amendment and against Bingham's, and in this shape
the resolution passed both houses by the requisite majorities. If the
word "nativity" had been retained the Southern States could not have
disfranchised the negroes by means of the "Grandfather Clause," as some
of them did. Morton, of Indiana, predicted that the South would find
means of circumventing the clause if the prohibitions were limited to
race, color, and servitude. When Morton came to Washington as Senator he
was bitterly opposed to negro suffrage. He was now so hot for it that he
shared the leadership of the radicals with Sumner.
The Fifteenth Amendment as finally passed by Congress, February 26,
1869, was in these words:
ARTICLE XV
SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any
state, on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.
It was declared ratified by the legislatures of twenty-nine states on
March 30, 1870. Ohio at first rejected, but later ratified it. New York
at first ratified, but later reconsidered and rejected it.
FOOTNOTES:
[113] Mr. Wilson communicated these facts to me at the time of their
occurrence, and the correctness of this narrative has been confirmed by
Major-General Grenville M. Dodge, who was then in close communication
with both parties.
CHAPTER XXII
CAUSES OF DISCONTENT
It looks at this distance as though the Republican party was
"going to the dogs"--which, I think, is as it should be. Like
all parties that have an undisturbed power for a long time, it
has become corrupt, and I believe that it is to-day the [most]
corrupt and debauched political party that has ever existed....
I have made up my mind that when I return home I will no longer
vote the Republican ticket, whatever else I may do.
So wrote James W. Grimes to Trumbull under date of Heidelberg, July 1,
1870. Grimes had had a stroke of paralysis while the impeachment trial
was going on, but had rallied sufficiently to be carried into the Senate
to vote not guilty on every article on which a vote was taken, and to
give his reasons for doing so. He shortly afterwards resigned his seat,
announced his retirement from public life, and went to Europe with his
family. He was a native of the Granite State, a man of granite mould, of
unblemished character, undaunted courage, keen discernment, and untiring
industry. In Newspaper Row he was styled "Grimes the Sturdy"--a title
bestowed upon him by Adams Sherman Hill, then on the Washington staff of
the New York _Tribune_, and later Professor of Rhetoric in Harvard
University.
Grimes's estimate of the Republican party in 1870 was widely shared.
Reconstruction, measured by the results of five years, was a failure,
being a confused medley of ignorant negro voters, disfranchised whites,
disreputable carpet-baggers, and corrupt legislatures. The civil service
was honeycombed with whiskey rings, custom-house frauds, assessments on
office-holders, nepotism, and general uncleanness. President Grant had
transferred his army headquarters to the White House. When he wanted to
have anything done in which he felt a deep interest, he chose an
aide-de-camp for the purpose instead of a civilian, and he never dreamed
that anybody would be surprised or vexed when he sent Major Babcock to
San Domingo to negotiate a treaty for the purchase of that country for
the sum of $1,500,000, without the knowledge of the Secretary of State
or any member of the Cabinet. He called at Sumner's house to secure his
support for the ratification of the treaty, found him dining with John
W. Forney and Ben Perley Poore, and had a hasty talk with him about a
treaty concerning San Domingo, no details being mentioned. He addressed
Sumner as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, to which he supposed it
would be referred, and hoped Sumner would approve of the treaty. Sumner
replied that he was an Administration man and that he would give very
careful and candid consideration to anything which the President
desired.
This was the beginning of an Iliad of woes. Grant understood Sumner's
answer as a promise to support the treaty, whereas Sumner meant no more
than his words signified, that he would consider it on its merits, but
in a friendly spirit. It was not his custom to promise to support
treaties before seeing them. When he came to consider this one, he found
that he could not support it. Not only was Sumner's judgment adverse,
but that of the press and other organs of public opinion was decidedly
so. The treaty was rejected by a tie vote (two thirds being required to
ratify). Grant put all the blame of rejection on Sumner. He thought that
the latter had broken a promise and intentionally deceived him. He
marked Sumner for destruction, and determined to have the treaty
ratified in spite of him, if possible. A commission of investigation had
been authorized by Congress, after the rejection of the treaty, to visit
San Domingo, and report upon the advisability of the purchase. This was
by way of letting the President down easy rather than with any serious
purpose of carrying out his wishes. The commission consisted of Benjamin
F. Wade, Andrew D. White, and Samuel G. Howe. While it was at work steps
were taken to reorganize the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
Who prompted that movement was never divulged, but the attempt and its
failure were narrated somewhat later by Senator Tipton, of Nebraska, in
open Senate, without contradiction. Tipton said that at the beginning of
the Third Session of the Forty-first Congress, a motion was made in the
Republican Senate Caucus to depose Sumner from the chairmanship of the
committee and to remove Schurz, of Missouri, and Patterson, of New
Hampshire, from membership altogether.[114] All three had voted against
San Domingo. The motion had been negatived at that time, but the purpose
had not been abandoned.
The second vote on deposing Sumner took place in the Senate March 10,
1871, on a report made by Senator Howe, of Wisconsin, from the
Republican Caucus, for the assignment of committees for the First
Session of the Forty-second Congress. The Committee on Foreign
Relations, as reported, had the name of Cameron as Chairman, and Sumner
was not even a member of it. Then a debate began on the unusual step
taken by the caucus committee in deposing Sumner, without his own
consent, from a place which he had held acceptably during all the time
that the Republicans had controlled the Senate. Wilson, Schurz, Logan,
Tipton, and Trumbull spoke against the action of the Caucus Committee.
Trumbull said:
I am not the special friend of the Senator from Massachusetts.
He and I, during our long course of service here, have had
occasion to differ, and differ, I am sorry to say,
unpleasantly. But, sir, that will not prevent me from trying to
do justice to the Senator from Massachusetts. I stood by him
when he was stricken down in his seat by a hostile party, by
the powers of slavery. I stand by him to-day when the blow
comes, not from those who would perpetuate slavery and make a
slave of every man that was for freedom, but comes from those
who have been brought into power as much through the
instrumentality of the Senator from Massachusetts as of any
other individual in the country.
But, sir, this question has been brought before us, and what
shall we do? I tried to avoid it. I have appealed to my
associates and I have said to them: "We are very much divided;"
I say to them now: "We are very much divided." A few votes one
way or the other constitute the majority in the Republican
party; now is it desirable, is it best, to force such a change
with such an opposition as has manifested itself here? What is
to be gained by it? I will not undertake to warn the Republican
party of the consequences.... I would that this debate had not
occurred, that we could have paused at the outset when we saw
this difference of opinion, and that there could have been some
concession even to those in the minority which would have
avoided this state of things.
Senator Sherman deprecated the action of the majority. He regarded the
change "unjustifiable, impolitic, and unnecessary," yet he offered
Sumner advice, like that of a doctor to a child respecting a dose of
castor oil--to throw his head back and take it off quick, because it
would do him good, thus:
Therefore, while I feel bound to utter my opinion that this is
an unwise proceeding, made without sufficient cause, yet in my
judgment it ought not to be debated here. It is settled; and
if my honorable friend from Massachusetts, the senior senator
in this body, wishes to add another good work in his services
to his country, in his services to the Republican party, he
cannot do better than rise in his place and say that, if for
any reason, whether sufficient or insufficient, a majority of
his political associates think it better for him to retire from
this position, he yields gracefully to their wish; and I tell
him that a new chaplet will crown his brow, and when his
memoirs are written this will be regarded as one of the
proudest opportunities of his life.[115]
Tipton let the cat out of the bag again by reading from some notes he
had made of the proceedings of the caucus of the previous day. He said
that Senator Howe in the caucus had defended the action of the committee
in displacing Sumner, on the ground that the Committee on Foreign
Relations was not in harmony with the Senate on the subject of San
Domingo, and that in order to correct this disagreement a change was
necessary; whereas Mr. Howe, and all the others who were for displacing
Sumner, now contended that San Domingo had nothing to do with it. Tipton
begged leave to say also that Howe was wrong in his contention that the
Committee on Foreign Relations was not in harmony with the Senate, the
vote on the treaty having been 28 to 28 (a tie vote operated as a
negative). In other words, the Senate had sustained the committee, and
there was no disagreement to be rectified.
Thereupon Sherman called Tipton to order for divulging the secrets of
the caucus, and Tipton replied that he had read all the proceedings of
the caucus in the morning papers, including the names of the Senators in
the call of the yeas and nays, 26 to 21, and that there was only one
error in the whole report and that a trifling one. Sherman retorted that
perhaps Tipton had furnished the report to the newspapers, but the
latter denied it. Sherman then insisted that the newspaper report
carried no weight unless confirmed by a Senator. He made the charge also
that Tipton had been guilty of divulging the vote on the treaty, taken
in executive session. To this charge Tipton could make no defense, but
he contended that it had done no harm. The discussion was continued till
a late hour, the report of the Caucus Committee being supported in
debate chiefly by Edmunds and Morton. The latter affirmed that San
Domingo did not enter into the question of displacing Sumner
now--implying that it might have been the bone of contention earlier.
Morton's statement was technically true. The original disagreement
between Sumner and the President had been so overlaid with fresh
material that it was now relatively unimportant. Moreover, the Senate
had no intention of ratifying the annexation treaty even if the Benjamin
Wade Commission should so recommend--as it did. Morton himself had no
such intention.
I happened to be in Washington at this juncture and was dining with the
late Senator Allison (then a member of the House), on the evening before
the report was presented. He informed me of the posture of affairs, said
that Sumner was to be deposed, and that Senator Howe had been designated
to report a resolution to that effect. He regarded the situation as
fraught with peril to the Republican party. I suggested that he and I
should call upon Senator Howe and endeavor to prevent or perhaps delay
the proposed step. Allison assented. So we went to Howe's apartments,
found him at home and alone, and we labored with him till past midnight,
seeking in a friendly way to change his purpose, but without avail. He
could not be moved. While we were returning, Allison said that Grant
must have played his last trump to break the custom of the majority in
the Senate, never to displace a member without his own consent. After
the deed was done, I called upon Sumner and had a conversation with him
on the subject. He said that the most puzzling thing to him was the part
taken by Senator Anthony, of Rhode Island, in the affair. Anthony was
chairman of the caucus. He appointed the Committee on Committees.
Anthony was his friend, a very close friend. He ought to have known
beforehand the purposes of the majority, especially since an attempt to
displace him had been made at the previous session. Was Anthony himself
deceived, or was he a party to the transaction? That was the puzzling
question.
When the vote was taken on Howe's report, it was adopted by a large
majority. The dissentients withheld their votes, as they did not choose
to bolt the decision of the caucus when bolting could accomplish
nothing. The result was a fresh grievance added to the growing stock of
discontent.
The President's first blow at Sumner had been the removal of his friend
Motley from the position of Minister to England. A request for Motley's
resignation was sent on July 1, 1870, but he did not comply with it. In
the mean time the position was offered to Trumbull in the following
letter:[116]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,
_Confidential_.
GARRISONS, August 5th, 1870.
MY DEAR JUDGE,
The President desires me to ask if it will be agreeable to you
to accept the Mission to London; if so, he is desirous of
securing to the country the value of your important service and
your experience and ability. I hope most sincerely that it will
meet your views to accept this Mission, now more than before
important. The events now happening and threatening in Europe
require the presence in London of a representative of ability,
of firmness, of learning, and of calm self-possession--and your
exceptional possession of these requisites has led to the very
strong desire of the President and myself that you would
undertake the duties of the position. I do not know that we are
on the eve of the settlement of our questions with Great
Britain, but there are reasons to justify the hope that _very
important_ questions may be adjusted within the term of whoever
may succeed Mr. Motley. The complications of European politics
are favorable and add to the evident desire of the British
Ministry to dispose of all questions between the two countries.
Can you come here and pass a day with me? I can tell more than
I can write. I sincerely hope that you can give a favorable
answer; for reasons which you will understand the President
desires that this communication be considered _confidential_,
at least for the present. Please let me have your answer as
soon as you conveniently can.
Very faithfully yours,
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL, HAMILTON FISH.
U.S. SENATOR,
KINGSTON, ULSTER CO., N. Y.
No written answer to this letter has been found. A verbal one was given
at the interview which Mr. Fish invited. Trumbull declined the
appointment because he preferred to remain a Senator rather than to be a
diplomat. Probably he became acquainted at this time with Secretary
Fish's intention to move for a settlement of our differences with Great
Britain: for in a speech made at Chicago on the 2d of November
following, on "Coming Issues," he discussed the subject of our claims
against that country at considerable length. In this speech he
maintained that we could justly ask for payment of the losses sustained
by the depredations of the Alabama and other British-built cruisers, and
that we had a still deeper grievance, although one not computable in
dollars and cents, growing out of the demand made upon us for the
surrender of the rebel envoys, Mason and Slidell, who were captured on
board the steamship Trent at the beginning of the Civil War. He showed
by the established rules of international law, affirmed by British
precedents and practice, that persons, papers, and materials in the
enemy's service were alike contraband and subject to capture in neutral
vessels on the high seas.[117]
Another "coming issue" referred to in this speech was the endeavor to
break up and abolish the iniquitous system by which the appointment of
thirty-five thousand officers and clerks of the National Government was
made part of the patronage of politicians; and to carry out the
principles of civil service reform in which these appointments should be
made after competitive examinations so as to secure officers of "the
highest fitness, honesty, and capacity." In his argument in favor of
this reform he instanced the experience of General J. D. Cox, Secretary
of the Interior, who had found it necessary to resign his office because
he could not purge his own department of spoilsmen and incompetents
foisted upon him by Senators and Representatives. Cox's resignation had
caused intense indignation when the reasons for it leaked out. President
Grant had pledged himself to the reform of the civil service and had
appointed a competent commission to carry on the work, and was really
desirous that it should succeed, but he was not willing to fight for
it. So when Congressmen fought against it he yielded and put the blame
upon them. And the last state of it was worse than the first. "No point
in Trumbull's speech," says the newspaper account of it, "was more
significant than his endorsement of Secretary Cox's civil service
reform, and the enthusiastic cheering with which the large audience
unanimously greeted this endorsement."
Attorney-General Hoar had retired from public life some months earlier
and for much the same reason. He had made several selections to fill
vacancies on the bench of the Circuit Court with an eye single to the
character and legal attainments of the judges, and had thereby incurred
the enmity of most of the Republican Senators, who wanted to dictate the
appointments. It happened at this time that the President was trying to
win support for the San Domingo Treaty, and he found, or supposed, that
the votes of certain carpet-bag Senators could be obtained if he would
give them a member of the Cabinet. In order to create a vacancy he
nominated Attorney-General Hoar as a justice of the Supreme Court. The
nomination was referred to the Judiciary Committee of the Senate,
consisting of Trumbull, Edmunds, Conkling, Carpenter, Stewart, Rice (of
Arkansas), and Thurman. Six of these voted against Hoar. The only
affirmative vote was that of Trumbull.[118]
After Hoar was rejected, the President asked for his resignation as
Attorney-General without assigning any reason therefor, and when it was
handed to him he appointed an obscure but respectable lawyer from
Georgia of the name of Akerman as Attorney-General, to please the
carpet-baggers; but this move did not secure a sufficient number of
votes to ratify the treaty, nor was it ever ratified.
FOOTNOTES:
[114] _Cong. Globe_, March 10, 1871, p. 48.
[115] _Cong. Globe_, 1871, p. 51.
[116] E. L. Pierce, in his _Life of Sumner_, says that the position was
first offered to Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey, and that he was confirmed
by the Senate on the last day of the session. Evidently he did not
accept it.
[117] Mr. Charles F. Adams has shown in a recent essay that the British
Ministry were perfectly aware that the capture of Mason and Slidell was
justifiable by British custom and precedent, but that public opinion was
so inflamed on the subject that they were swept off their feet, and
could not have faced Parliament an hour if they had not demanded the
surrender of the prisoners. On the other hand, our practice and
precedents were directly opposite. The American doctrine was "free ships
make free goods" and _a fortiori_ free persons, but so inflamed was
public opinion on this side of the water that the British demand for the
surrender of the prisoners would have been refused even at the risk of
war, if we had not had one war on hand already. Both nations "flopped"
simultaneously. _The Trent Affair--an Historical Retrospect._ By Charles
Francis Adams. Boston, 1912.
[118] Washington letter in the _Nation_, January 6, 1870.
CHAPTER XXIII
THE LIBERAL REPUBLICANS
The Liberal Republican movement of 1872 took its start in Missouri.
During the war between the states, Missouri had been a prey to a real
civil war, in which much blood had been spilled, and where churches,
communities, and particular families had been torn asunder. In the
agricultural districts and small towns, which were nine tenths of the
whole, nobody, whether Secessionist, or Unionist, or neutral, could feel
certain, when he went to bed, whether he should sleep till morning, or
be awakened after midnight by a guerilla raid or a burning roof. The
contending forces were not unequally divided. The Confederates were the
stronger half in wealth and influence, although not in numbers, but the
proximity of the Federal armies and their actual occupation of the soil
gave a preponderance to the Unionists and strangled secession in its
infancy. When the war came to an end, all the heart-burning that it had
engendered was still raging. Not only were the Republicans in power, but
the most radical of them had control within the party. Lincoln was not
sufficiently advanced for them. They had refused to vote for his
renomination in the Convention of 1864.
In the state constitution, adopted in 1865, disfranchisement and test
oaths abounded. In the succeeding four years there had been a gradual
slackening of recrimination and intestine strife; and a line of cleavage
broke in the Republican ranks in 1869 which resulted in the election of
General Carl Schurz as United States Senator, on the issue of
reënfranchisement of the ex-rebels. The leader of the "party of eternal
hate," as it was styled by its opponents, was Charles D. Drake, his
colleague in the Senate. The seat taken by Schurz was that formerly held
by John B. Henderson, who had lost it by his vote against impeachment.
Schurz was a torch-bearer wherever he went, and his entry into the
Senate gave a new impetus to the party of peace and amnesty not only in
his own state, but throughout the country. In the autumn of 1870 a
battle royal was fought in Missouri, beginning in the Republican state
convention, which was split on the issue of reënfranchisement. The
Liberals, under the lead of Schurz, nominated a full state ticket with
B. Gratz Brown for governor. The radicals nominated Joseph McClurg for
governor and a full ticket. The Democrats made no nominations, but
supported the Liberal nominees. The election resulted in a sweeping
victory for the Liberals. The platform on which Brown was chosen
declared that the time had come "for removing all disqualifications from
the disfranchised people of Missouri and conferring equal political
rights and privileges on all classes." The other platform favored
reënfranchisement "as soon as it could be done with safety to the
state."
Both sections adopted a resolution saying: "We are opposed to any system
of taxation which will tend to the creation of monopolies and benefit
one industry at the expense of another." This was interpreted by the
_Missouri Democrat_, the leading Republican newspaper of the state, as
an anti-tariff deliverance. Its editor, Colonel William M. Grosvenor,
was a party organizer of keen intelligence and tireless activity, as
effective in his own field as Schurz was in his. He was a free-trader,
and he gave the first impulse which brought the revenue reformers of
that period as a distinctive element into the Liberal movement. The
only organization then existing which offered any resistance to the
demands of the protected classes was the New York Free-Trade League, of
which Mahlon Sands was secretary. On the 10th of November, Sands sent
out an invitation to persons whom he took to be like-minded with
himself, including Carl Schurz, David A. Wells, Jacob D. Cox, William
Cullen Bryant, E. L. Godkin, Charles F. Adams, Jr., General Brinkerhoff,
Edward Atkinson, and others to a conference to be held in New York on
the 22d of that month. The declared object of this meeting was "to
determine whether an effort may not, with advantage, be made to control
the new House of Representatives by a union of Western Revenue Reform
Republicans with Democrats." The meeting took place at the date
mentioned and received the following notice in the _Nation_ of December
1:
There has been a good deal of activity among the Revenue
reformers during the week. On the 23d ult. they held a private
meeting in this city, which was attended by Mr. D. A. Wells,
Mr. George Walker, Mr. Horace White, of the Chicago _Tribune_,
Mr. Bryant, Mr. Bowles, of the Springfield _Republican_, and
others, and at which, after a good deal of talk, the conclusion
was reached that things were looking very well; that the
legislative debates of the coming winter would, under the
influence of the late elections, probably do a great deal to
educate the public and prepare the monopolists and jobbers for
what is certainly coming; and that the question of civil
service reform was closely connected with that of the reform of
the revenue, and ought to be discussed and pushed with it; and
it was resolved finally to charge a committee with the work of
looking after the interest of both in a general way during the
winter, with power to make arrangements for the calling of a
national convention in the spring, in case the course of
Congress proved unsatisfactory. The usual distribution of
"British gold" did not take place, it must be confessed to the
regret of all present. Indeed, the desire for it, and as much
of it as possible, was avowed with the greatest effrontery. The
open display of such feelings at a reform meeting was a
curious sign of the times. Why the British should have cut off
the supply was not explained, but we presume they were unable
to withstand the repeated exposures in the _Tribune_, which
have doubtless made Minister Thornton wince a little.
The Speaker of the House, James G. Blaine, got wind of the Sands
circular and sought an interview with myself, coming to Chicago for that
purpose. He said that he recognized the drift of public sentiment on the
tariff question, that he desired to avert anything like a split in the
Republican ranks, and that he intended to give the tariff reformers a
majority of the Committee on Ways and Means in the new Congress. He
submitted that they could not gain more than that by a fight, and that
it was the part of wisdom to be satisfied with that. He said that he
would allow us to name two Republican members who, in conjunction with
the Democrats, would constitute a majority. I reported this fact to the
members of the New York Conference and it was agreed that no other steps
should be taken in reference to the organization of the House. G. A.
Finkelnburg, of Missouri, and H. C. Burchard, of Illinois, were selected
as our preference for membership of the committee. The names were
communicated to Blaine and they were appointed by him. He even went
beyond his promise by prompting his friends on the floor to favor tariff
reform. Eugene Hale, of Maine, was especially zealous in this behalf. He
introduced a bill to make salt free of duty, and accepted an amendment
putting coal in the same category and advocated it with earnestness and
ability and carried it through the House, but it was strangled in the
Senate. Dawes, of Massachusetts, a protectionist, was made chairman, but
the majority of the committee was against him. Protection, at that time,
meant the highest rate of duty on imports that anybody desired, and
free trade meant any opposition to protection as thus interpreted. These
definitions are not wholly obsolete at the present day.
In the eyes of President Grant the Liberal movement in Missouri was
something in the nature of a new rebellion, and most of the Republican
politicians shared his views. The necessity of keeping the party in
power by fair means or foul had become a kind of religious tenet. The
spectre of a solid South and a divided North had been terrifying from
the start. What would happen if the example of Missouri should
overspread all of the reconstructed states? Seymour had carried New York
and New Jersey in the last election. The solid South added to these
would have made him President of the United States. No wonder that such
Senators as Morton, Chandler, Conkling, and the Southern carpet-baggers,
at the opening of Congress in December, 1870, gave a chilling reception
to all who had taken part in the Liberal campaign of Missouri, or who
sympathized with it. Anything in the nature of investigation of frauds,
or of reform in the civil service, was frowned upon by them. All who
favored such steps were accused of seeking to split the party and build
a new one upon its ruins. This was a false accusation. The
Administration could have averted the coming revolt by removing its
causes. The _Nation_ of December 8, 1870, said with truth:
What has been taken for a desire or design to found a new party
has been simply a design to make the old party attend to the
proper business of the party in power, by legislating for the
necessities of the time. There is a strong disposition on the
part of the old hacks not to do this, but to go on infusing
"economy and efficiency in the collection of the revenue," and
nothing would please them better than that those who are not
satisfied with this should take themselves off and try to
establish a little concern of their own, and give no further
trouble. We believe the intention of the malcontents, however,
is, and always has been, to stay where they are and give all
the trouble they can. Whenever the time comes to establish a
new party, it will make its appearance, whether anybody charges
himself with the special work of getting it up or not.
Among the sources of discontent disfranchisement was the most pressing,
since it was believed to be the chief cause of the shocking conditions
in the South. Other things could wait. This was the "house-on-fire"; it
must be put out at once. The Liberals said that universal amnesty with
impartial suffrage was the true cure. The ruling powers at Washington
maintained that the Southern whites were still rebellious and that a new
law, backed by adequate military power, was needed to deal with the
Ku-Klux Klans, which were terrorizing the blacks in order to prevent
them from voting. The President sent a special message of twenty lines
to Congress on March 23, calling attention to this condition of affairs
and recommending some action, he did not say what. The brevity and
indecision of it betokened reluctance on his part to send any message at
all. Congress, however, took the subject in earnest and passed the
Ku-Klux Bill of 1871, which authorized suspension of the writ of _habeas
corpus_ and the employment of military force in dealing with the Ku-Klux
outrages. Trumbull and Schurz opposed the bill by speech and by vote,
the former on the ground of unconstitutionality, the latter chiefly on
the ground of impolicy, although he also considered it unconstitutional.
Trumbull contended that the Constitution never contemplated that the
ordinary administration of criminal law in the states should be in the
hands of the Federal Government and that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not change the lodgment of that power from the state to the federal
authorities. He did not make a set speech on the bill, but in an
impromptu debate he said:
Show me that it is necessary to exercise any power belonging to
the Government of the United States in order to maintain its
authority and I am ready to put it forth. But, sir, I am not
willing to undertake to enter the states for the purpose of
punishing individual offences against their authority committed
by one citizen against another. We, in my judgment, have no
constitutional authority to do that. When this Government was
formed, the general rights of person and property were left to
be protected by the states and there they are left to-day.
Whenever the rights that are conferred by the Constitution of
the United States on the Federal Government are infringed upon
by the states, we should afford a remedy.... If the Federal
Government takes to itself the entire protection of the
individual in his rights of person and property what is the
need of the State Governments? It would be a change in our form
of Government and an unwise one, in my judgment, because I
believe that the rights of the people, the liberties of the
people, the rights of the individual, are safest among the
people themselves, and not in a central government extending
over a vast region of country. I think that the nearer you can
bring the administration of justice between man and man to the
people themselves, the safer the people will be in their rights
of person and property.[119]
He objected also to the clause of the bill authorizing the President to
suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_, as in conflict with the clause of
the Constitution which limits suspension to cases of invasion or
rebellion where the public safety requires it. There was no present
invasion to justify it and no rebellion in the proper definition of that
term. He quoted authorities showing that rebellion meant an armed
uprising against the Government, such as existed in 1861 and continued
till the end of the war. No such condition existed now.
Schurz's speech, delivered on the 14th of April, was a masterpiece of
political philosophy, not inferior to anything in the orations of Edmund
Burke. It was a plea for the abrogation of all political disabilities.
It occupies three pages of the _Congressional Globe_. Among other things
he said:
On the whole, sir, let us not indulge in the delusion that we
can eradicate all the disorders that exist in the South by
means of laws and by the application of penal statutes. Laws
are apt to be especially inefficacious when their
constitutionality is, with a show of reason, doubted, and when
they have the smell of partisanship about them; and however
pure your intentions may be (and I know they are), in that
light a law like this, unless greatly modified, will appear
suspicious. If we want to produce enduring effects there, our
remedies must go to the root of the evil; and in order to do
that, they must operate upon public sentiment in the South. I
admit that in that respect the principal thing cannot be done
by us: it must be done by the Southern people themselves. But
at any rate, we can in a great measure facilitate it.[120]
Edmunds and Carpenter, of the Judiciary Committee, held that the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution gave power to the federal
authorities to enforce the ordinary criminal law as between persons in
the states. Some years later a case, arising under this Ku-Klux Law in
Tennessee, reached the Supreme Court, where it was pronounced
unconstitutional and void. The court held that the three latest
amendments of the Constitution prohibited the states from discriminating
against citizens on account of race or color, but did not change the
administration of the criminal law in the states. That jurisdiction
remained with the states exclusively. Here Trumbull's position was
sustained almost in his own words.[121]
While the Ku-Klux Act was doing its work in South Carolina under
suspension of the _habeas corpus_, the Senate on December 20, 1871, took
up a bill which had passed the House by more than two-thirds majority to
remove the legal and political disabilities imposed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, except in a few cases. Sumner moved as an amendment a bill
which he had previously offered as a separate measure, that all
citizens, without distinction of race or color, should have equal rights
in steamboats, railway cars, hotels, theatres, churches, jury service,
common schools, colleges, and cemeteries, whether under federal or State
authority. Trumbull, and the two Senators from South Carolina, besought
him not to encumber the Amnesty Bill, which required a two-thirds vote,
with the Equal Rights Bill which required only a majority, since they
believed that both could be passed separately, but that if his bill were
tacked upon the Amnesty Bill, both would fail. Sumner insisted upon his
amendment, and a vote was taken on it, February 9, resulting in a tie
(Trumbull and Schurz voting in the negative), whereupon the
Vice-President (Colfax) voted in the affirmative. The Sumner amendment
having been adopted, all the Democrats turned against the bill and it
was lost by 33 to 19, not two thirds.
A second attempt, beginning in the House, had the same result. When the
bill was taken up in the Senate Sumner again moved his Equal Rights Bill
as an amendment, and it was again adopted by the casting vote of the
Vice-President, and then the whole was lost by 32 to 22.
In the mean time the Liberal Republican Convention had met at Cincinnati
and adopted a platform very emphatic on the subject of amnesty. A sudden
change came over the spirit of the regulars. The Amnesty Bill was
reintroduced in the House by General Butler, May 13, and passed the
same day without debate. It was taken up in the Senate, May 21. Sumner's
Equal Rights Bill, when offered in a modified form as an amendment, was
rejected by 11 to 81, and the bill was passed the same day by 38 to 2,
the negatives being Sumner and Nye.
FOOTNOTES:
[119] _Cong. Globe_, 1871, pp. 578-79.
[120] _Cong. Globe_, 1871, p. 688.
[121] United States _v._ Harris, 106 U.S. 629.
CHAPTER XXIV
GRANT'S ADMINISTRATION
The demerits of the first Grant Administration were the principal cause
of the Liberal uprising of 1872. They were enumerated in detail by
Charles Sumner in open Senate, on May 31 of that year. They need not be
reiterated here. I have no inclination to rake over the ashes of a dead
controversy or to detract from the fame of one who rendered inestimable
service to the nation in its greatest crisis, without which all other
service might have been unavailing. At the same time, the thread of this
narrative requires some notice of the stings planted in the minds of
sensitive persons, who were not seeking office, by the man who was then
the nation's head.
Grant's shortcomings in civil station were such as might have been
expected from one who was suddenly charged with vast responsibilities
without his own solicitation or desire and without any previous
experience or training for them. His most striking characteristic was
tenacity. Whether on the right track or on the wrong, he was deaf and
blind to obstacles and opposition, because there was resistance to be
overcome. This quality was reflected in his determination "never to
desert a friend under fire"--a maxim more generous than wise, fitter for
the field than for the forum, and which in his last days brought
misfortunes to his own door which were lamented by everybody.
The Republican politicians nominated him for President, not because they
deemed him qualified for the position, but because of his military
renown. He was elected at a time when military habits and modes of
thought were the worst possible equipment for the solution of political
problems. Nevertheless, he rendered great service on two occasions--in
the settlement of the Alabama Claims and by vetoing the Currency
Inflation Bill. In both these cases he was much indebted to Hamilton
Fish, his Secretary of State, but the credit is justly his own and the
fame thereof will outlast all the scandals that arose from his
confidence in, and association with, such characters as Orville Babcock,
John McDonald, Ben Butler, W. W. Belknap, and Tom Murphy.
The rottenness of the New York Custom-House was a crying evil before
Grant became President, and its flavor was not improved by the
appointment of Murphy as its chief officer. It was crammed with men who
"had to be taken care of," whose work was not needed by the Government,
and who were incompetent even if it had been needed--small politicians,
district leaders and "heelers," who were useful in carrying primaries
and getting delegates elected to conventions. A Joint Committee on
Retrenchment, organized as early as 1866 and kept alive by every
subsequent Congress, had been investigating frauds and abuses in various
quarters. Its chairman, Senator Patterson, of New Hampshire, made a
report early in 1871 containing many interesting disclosures.
On December 11, Senator Conkling offered a resolution directing the
Committee on Military Affairs to inquire into the defalcation of an army
paymaster named Hodge. Trumbull moved as an amendment that the Joint
Committee on Retrenchment be reconstituted and instructed to make a
general investigation of the waste and loss of money in the public
service. A debate sprang up on the proposed amendment, which continued
for a week and aroused keen interest throughout the country. Wilson,
the chairman of the Military Committee, sustained the amendment, saying
that the Hodge case did not appertain to military matters, but to
finance, to the handling of public money. Sumner took the same view.
Chandler objected to a joint committee with power to investigate all the
executive departments. He preferred to have each department investigated
by a separate committee, if it needed investigation. In the course of
the debate extracts were read from the Patterson Report, together with
the testimony of witnesses. Weighers in the custom-house testified that
men were sent to them by the collector as assistants for whom there was
no work to do. They were simply put on the pay-roll and did nothing but
draw their salaries. In the weighers' department alone $50,000 per year
was thus squandered. Collector Murphy was quoted as saying, in answer to
a remonstrance about unnecessary help in the custom-house, "There were
certain people who had to be taken care of: it was well known that they
had to be taken care of, and nobody in the party would say anything
about his taking care of them, and he would do it."[122]
Trumbull said that he did not denounce officers of the Government
indiscriminately. He merely wished to have some system introduced by
which appointments should be made with regard to the fitness of the
appointees and the need of their services. As the debate enlarged, a
line of cleavage was disclosed among Senators similar to that which
occurred on the deposition of Sumner; Morton, Conkling, Chandler,
Edmunds, and Sherman opposing, and Schurz, Sumner, Logan, Tipton, and
Wilson supporting, the Trumbull amendment. Finally the Republican
Senatorial Caucus took the matter in hand and adopted a substitute to
the Trumbull Resolution, which was offered in the Senate by Anthony and
adopted by 29 to 18. It provided for a select committee to investigate
only such subjects as the Senate should designate.
One of the things stumbled on by the Patterson Committee was the
"general order" system in the New York Custom-House, which led up to the
Leet and Stocking scandal, one of the most exasperating incidents of the
Grant régime. Leet had been a member of General Grant's staff. The
Patterson Committee found that he was enjoying the rank and pay of a
colonel in the army, and also of a clerk in the War Department, and was
receiving an additional income, estimated at $50,000 per year, for the
warehousing of imported goods in New York, without the expenditure of
any labor or capital of his own and without even his personal presence
in New York, he being a resident of Washington City. All goods arriving
by the Cunard and Bremen lines were sent by the collector's order to the
Leet and Stocking warehouse, and were required to pay one month's
storage whether they remained there a month or only a day, the cost
being not less than $1.50 per package. This "general order" system had
been devised before the Republican party came into power. It was
flourishing in 1862.[123] Collector Grinnell, Grant's first appointee to
that position, found it in force when he came into office. Before it was
devised the arriving goods had been stored temporarily in warehouses
belonging to the steamship companies, adjacent to the docks, without
cost to the owners.
When the Patterson Committee made this discovery they reported the facts
personally to the Secretary of the Treasury (Boutwell), who appointed a
board of three officers of the department to make an independent
investigation. This board made a report sustaining the findings of the
Patterson Committee. Boutwell thereupon wrote to Collector Murphy, who
had succeeded Grinnell as collector, advising him to discontinue the
"general order" system altogether and go back to the old system, no good
reasons for the former change, but many objections to it, having been
found. Months passed after Boutwell's letter was sent, but the "general
order" system was still flourishing and the coffers of Leet and Stocking
were still receiving an income, at least double that of the President of
the United States, as a reward for putting an obstruction in the pathway
of lawful commerce. A. T. Stewart, Grant's first choice for Secretary of
the Treasury, testified that the "general order" system was a damage to
honest traffic and a general nuisance. William E. Dodge testified that
he had been compelled by it to curtail his imports at New York and to
use other ports of entry to avoid the delays and exactions of the
"general order" system.
The indifference of the only man higher up than Secretary Boutwell--the
only man who had power to remove Collector Murphy or to choke off
Leet--was incomprehensible. Schurz made comments on the case which the
Administration Senators could not answer and dared not leave unanswered.
On the 18th of December, Conkling introduced a resolution directing the
Committee on Investigation and Retrenchment to make an inquiry into the
Leet and Stocking scandal. This resolution was preceded by a preamble
quoting the words of Schurz as a reason for making the inquiry, in the
following form:
Whereas it has been declared in the Senate that at the port of
New York there exists and is maintained by officers of the
United States under the name of the "General Order business" a
monstrous abuse fraudulent in character, and whereas the
following statement has been made by a Senator: "It was
intimated by some of the witnesses that Mr. Leet, who pockets
the enormous profits arising from that business, had some
connection with the White House; but General Porter was
examined, Mr. Leet himself was examined, and they both
testified that it was not so, and, counting the number of
witnesses, we have no right to form a different conclusion. But
the fact remains that this scandalous system of robbery is
sustained--is sustained against the voice of the merchants of
New York--is sustained against the judgment and the voice of
the Secretary of the Treasury himself. I ask you how is it
sustained? Where and what is the mysterious power that sustains
it? The conclusion is inevitable that it is stronger than
decent respect for public opinion, nay, a power stronger than
the Secretary of the Treasury himself":
Therefore resolved, that the Committee of Investigation and
Retrenchment be instructed to inquire into the matter fully and
at large, and particularly whether any collusion or improper
connection with said business exists on the part of any officer
of the United States, and that said committee further inquire
whether any person holding office in the custom-house at New
York has been detected or is known or believed by his superior
officer to have been guilty of bribery or of taking bribes or
of other crime or misdemeanor, and said committee is hereby
empowered to send for persons and papers.
The Committee of Investigation and Retrenchment had not been appointed
when Conkling offered this resolution. It had been agreed upon in the
Republican Caucus, but had not been reported to the Senate. Senator
Anthony immediately reported the names: Buckingham (Connecticut), Pratt
(Indiana), Howe (Wisconsin), Harlan (Iowa), Stewart (Nevada), Pool
(North Carolina), Bayard (Delaware). Sumner expressed mild surprise that
no Senator who had favored an investigation of the New York
Custom-House, or of frauds in general, was a member of the committee,
unless Bayard (Democrat) might be counted as such. He quoted from
Jefferson's "Manual of Parliamentary Law" to show that the proper course
was to give the leading place in such a committee to the prime mover of
it, who was, in this case, undoubtedly Trumbull, but that nobody who had
shown any interest in the matter to be investigated, not even the
Senator from New Hampshire (Patterson), whose investigation of the
previous session had uncovered the alleged frauds, and whose familiarity
with the case would be most useful now, had any place on it. Anthony
contended that inasmuch as all the Senators had voted to raise the
Committee, the vote having been unanimous, all the requirements of
parliamentary law were satisfied by the appointment of the seven
Senators named, or any other seven. Thurman, of Ohio, thought that
Anthony was "sticking in the bark" and not reaching the sound wood of
the tree. Considerable time was spent in the debate on the composition
of the committee, but in the end the list reported by Anthony was
adopted, as was Conkling's resolution, with its bulky preamble. The
preamble was doubtless intended to convince Grant that Schurz (not
Conkling) made the investigation necessary. The committee went to work
early in 1872 and eventually furnished a solution of the Leet and
Stocking mystery.
Leet learned in 1868, soon after Grant's election, that he intended to
appoint Moses H. Grinnell collector of the port of New York. He procured
from Grant a letter of introduction to Grinnell, but Grant cautioned
him, when he gave it, not to use it for the purpose of getting an
office. When Leet handed the letter to Grinnell he remarked to him that
he (Grinnell) was to be appointed collector of the port. Grinnell had
not received any intimation of the fact before, and he inferred that
Leet had been designated by the President to inform him of it. He asked
Leet what he could do for him, and Leet replied that he wanted the
"general order" business of the custom-house. Grinnell thought that this
also was a message from the President, and he arranged as soon as
possible to give Leet a portion of it. Leet farmed out this portion to a
man named Bixby for $5000 per year, plus one half of all the profits in
excess of $10,000. Then he went back to Washington and resumed his place
as a clerk in the War Department; but he complained bitterly to Grinnell
that his share in the "general order" business was not large enough, and
he told Grinnell that he would be removed from office if he did not give
him the whole of it. After much threatening, Grinnell did give him the
whole of it, but he was removed, nevertheless, after holding the office
about one year, and Murphy was appointed collector in his place. Murphy
kept the "general order" business in the hands of Leet and Stocking
until March, 1872, when the committee made its report. On the 14th of
March, the newspapers announced that Murphy had been removed as
collector and General Arthur appointed in his place, that the "general
order" business had been radically reformed, and that Leet and Stocking
had disappeared from history. In making this announcement the _Nation_
called the attention of the editor of _Harper's Weekly_ (George William
Curtis), who was still a little deaf to the shortcomings of the
Administration, to some things hard to understand.
When the President [it said] became aware that Leet had abused
his confidence, disregarded his wishes, made false
representations as to his influence over him, and concealed his
doings from him,--facts which were revealed by the repeated
complaints of prominent merchants and by Leet's appearance in
public as owner of the "plum," and finally by a congressional
investigation,--he took no notice of them whatever. So far as
we know he gave no sign of displeasure, paid no attention to
the complaints against him, and let him go on for nearly two
years preying on the commerce of the port, till a second
congressional investigation, obtained with great difficulty,
and the savage assaults of the press on the eve of an election,
made the change we have just witnessed imperatively necessary.
It has been the custom of the friends of the Administration
hitherto, whenever charges of this kind are brought up, instead
of answering them, to tell you that they endear the President
more than ever to the American people; that his renomination is
a sure thing, etc.; and that Horace Greeley is a friend of Hank
Smith. Now is this satisfactory? Let us have a candid answer,
without allusions to cigars, or fast horses, or investments, or
summer vacations, Hank Smith, or Horace Greeley.
No dollar of the Leet and Stocking "plum" ever reached President Grant
or any member of his family. We are left to conjecture what were his
reasons for allowing the scandal to continue so long after the facts
became known. Judging his course here by his second term, we are forced
to conclude that his combativeness was aroused by the criticisms of
Schurz, Trumbull, and others, which he interpreted as marks of personal
hostility to himself. In fact, his senatorial supporters so interpreted
them in public discussions. He probably upheld Leet for the same reasons
that he shielded Babcock in the greater scandal of the St. Louis Whiskey
Ring in 1876.[124] It was a mistake, however, to suppose (if he did
suppose) that Trumbull was moved by any personal hostility. An interview
with the latter, dated December 3, 1871, published in the Louisville
_Courier-Journal_,[125] shows that he was still on friendly terms with
the President. His interlocutor began by asking him if he would consent
to the use of his name as a conservative candidate for the Presidency
against General Grant, to which the "Illinois statesman replied with
more than usual emphasis, 'No sir, I would not.'"
Then the following conversation ensued:
Why not?
For many reasons. In the first place, I am satisfied where I
am. I consider a seat in the Senate of the United States a
position in which I can be more useful than in any other, and I
believe it to be as honorable as any under the Government if
its duties be efficiently and properly discharged. In the next
place, I do not agree with the programme which has been marked
out by those who refuse to support the candidacy of the
President for reëlection. I am conscious of the need for many
reforms, and I am daily striving to accomplish them. But I do
not believe that a revolution of parties would be salutary. I
do not believe that either the people of the North or of the
South are ready to profit by such a change.
And why not?
Because the people of the South have really accepted nothing,
and are not willing to coöperate with the Liberals of the North
in settling the practical relations of society on a sure and
generous basis. I know that the South has much to complain of.
But so have the Liberal Republicans. It is not the rebel
element, perhaps, but the nature of things, that the South
should not realize the complete overthrow of the old order and
the necessity for a complete change of the domestic policy. I
believe that the defeat of General Grant would involve a
reaction at the South whose consequences would be even worse
than the present state of affairs.
Don't you think General Grant meditates the permanent
usurpation of the Executive office?
No, I do not. My opinion is that General Grant is, in the main,
a conservative man. He has made mistakes. But I cannot say they
justify his removal.
What are your personal relations?
Very friendly. I have opposed some of his measures, but I have
no personal feeling, and, indeed, this is one of the reasons
why it is disagreeable to have my name mentioned in the
connection you name.
The interview closed with the writer's assurance that the views of
Senator Sumner coincided with those of Trumbull. A Washington letter in
the _Nation_ of December 28 said:
From what I see and hear, the conviction is forced upon me that
there will be no lead given by men like Trumbull voluntarily.
They may be forced by the Administration party into opposition,
but they will go reluctantly and timidly.
Among the letters received by Trumbull at this time was the following
from a man of high repute and influence in Ohio:
COLUMBUS, December 15, 1871.
You may remember me sufficiently to know who I am and my
position in Ohio. My special object in this writing is to
congratulate you for your proper and patriotic position on the
Retrenchment Resolution. Messrs. Morton, Sherman _et al_, are
grievously mistaken as to the state of public sentiment in
regard to the Administration and the President. I am bold to
say that outside of the Grand Army of the Republic and the
office-holders (an _imperium in imperio_), more than one half
of the Republicans are intensely dissatisfied with General
Grant. His indecent interference in Missouri and Louisiana, his
disgusting nepotism, his indefensible course in regard to San
Domingo, and his recent complimentary letter to Collector
Murphy have produced the conviction that he is intellectually
and morally unqualified for his present position. He will hear
deep and alarming thunder before the Kalends of November, 1872.
Go forward with your associates, Schurz, Sumner, Patterson, and
Tipton, in your exposure of the faults and frauds of the
Administration, and the best class of Republicans will honor
your magnanimity and patriotism. I know General Grant
personally. I have not asked him for any favor. As Senatorial
Elector I traversed the state, and advocated the Republican
principles and policy, but I have the pleasant consciousness
and delightful remembrance that I never eulogized General Grant
nor recommended him as suitable for the place. As long as he is
under the special superintendence of Morton, Chandler, and
Cameron, he must necessarily deteriorate, as none of them has
ever been suspected of having any profound sense of right or
wrong.
Confidentially yours,
SAM'L GALLOWAY.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL, U.S.S.
FOOTNOTES:
[122] _Cong. Globe_, 1871, p. 51.
[123] See House report No. 50, 37th Congress, 3d session, page 38.
[124] Rhodes, _History of the United States_, VII, 182-89.
[125] This interview was reprinted in the New York _Times_ of December
6. It is corroborated in sentiment by the Trumbull manuscripts of that
date, but it was probably not intended for publication. It purports to
be a conversation between Trumbull and an ex-Senator.
CHAPTER XXV
THE CINCINNATI CONVENTION
The Liberal Republicans of Missouri held a state convention at Jefferson
City, January 24, 1872. They adopted a platform which affirmed the
sovereignty of the Union, emancipation, equality of rights,
enfranchisement, complete amnesty, tariff reform, civil service reform,
local self-government, and impartial suffrage. They also called a
national mass convention to meet at Cincinnati on the first Monday in
May.
This call was at once endorsed by General J. D. Cox, George Hoadley,
Stanley Matthews, and J. B. Stallo, four of the most eminent citizens of
Ohio, the first of whom had been a member of President Grant's Cabinet.
Mr. Matthews, in an interview, expressed the hope that the Democrats
would join in nominating a candidate for the presidency of the type of
Charles Francis Adams, William S. Groesbeck, Lyman Trumbull, or Salmon
P. Chase.
The movement spread like wildfire. Groups of Republicans, eminent in
character and in public service in all the states, proclaimed their
adhesion to it and declared their intention to participate in the
convention. It had also the active support of the Springfield
_Republican_, the Cincinnati _Commercial_, and the Chicago _Tribune_,
and the sympathy of the New York _Evening Post_, the _Nation_, and the
New York _Tribune_. Democratic sympathy was manifested early and found
expression in the columns of the Louisville _Courier-Journal_, whose
editor, Henry Watterson, took a keen interest in the preliminaries of
the Cincinnati meeting and whose coöperation was gladly welcomed. The
New York _World_, edited by Manton Marble, gave passive support to the
movement by advising Democrats to conform to present facts and not seek
to revive or sustain the dead issues of the war and Reconstruction.
Under date, New Orleans, April 23, Marble wrote to Schurz:
It is due to you that I should say, before you go to
Cincinnati, that in my clear judgment the nomination of Charles
Francis Adams would defeat the reëlection of Grant. It has
always been obvious that Mr. Adams would be among the best of
Presidents. He has been growing, during the last few months, to
be the best of candidates. I could not name another so safe to
win. Adams and Palmer would be a quite perfect ticket.--This is
founded on careful consideration.
August Belmont, of New York, the most influential Democrat in that state
not holding any public office, took an active part, both by
correspondence and by personal solicitation, in the endeavor to secure
the nomination by the Cincinnati Convention of a candidate whom the
Democrats could support, and to induce the latter to abstain from making
a separate nomination. From Vincennes, Indiana, April 23, he wrote to
Schurz that, after having seen many prominent men of both parties, he
had found the Cincinnati movement even stronger with them, and the
people, than he had anticipated. He added:
Everybody looks for the action of your convention, and if you
make a good _national_ platform denouncing the abuses and
corruption of the Executive, the military despotism of the
South, the centralization of power and the subordination of the
civil power to the military rule, and declare boldly for
general amnesty and a revenue tariff, you will find every
Democrat throughout the land ready to vote for your candidate,
provided you name one whom our convention can endorse.... I
found in the West and in New York an overwhelming desire for
Charles F. Adams. Adams is the strongest and least vulnerable
man; he will draw more votes from Grant than will any other
candidate. The whole Democratic party will follow him.
There was a full delegation from Pennsylvania, composed of honorable
men, who were not office-seekers. The meeting which appointed them was
presided over by Colonel A. K. McClure, who announced, when taking the
chair, that inasmuch as the Cincinnati Convention was a mass meeting,
the persons attending it would not be entangled in the usual political
machinery. The movement was on the lines of the Republican party; it was
a movement of Republicans by necessity, who did not mean to be bound by
the Government party as it then stood. General William B. Thomas said
that he and other gentlemen had issued the call for this meeting to send
a delegation to Cincinnati. He was engaged in work looking to the
annihilation of the Republican party. He had helped to build up that
party, but now he was free to say that it was the most corrupt party on
the face of the earth. He was opposed to any candidate to be nominated
by the coming Philadelphia Convention; Grant, or any other man. Colonel
McClure said that the plain English of the whole thing was rebellion
against the party and the bringing of it to the dignity of a revolution.
Five years ago there might have been a necessity for the exercise of
military power in the South, but not now. The South, to his mind, had
been more desolated since the close of the war than before.
The Pennsylvanians had fifty-six votes in the convention. On the first
roll-call they cast all of them for Governor A. G. Curtin. On all
subsequent ones they gave a plurality for Adams.[126]
Numerous letters reached Trumbull before the call for the Cincinnati
Convention was issued suggesting that he be a candidate for the
presidency in opposition to Grant. One of these, dated Roslyn, Long
Island, November 30, 1871, was from John H. Bryant, brother of William
Cullen Bryant, who said that both himself and his brother desired to see
him elected President and that if he should be a candidate he could
count on the support of the _Evening Post_.
Silas L. Bryan, of Salem, Illinois, the father of William Jennings
Bryan, wrote under date, December 19, 1871, that he considered Trumbull
the Providential man for the present crisis and that if he would consent
to be a candidate for the highest office he (Bryan) would take steps to
promote that desirable end. To this letter Trumbull replied that to be
talked about for the presidency impaired the influence he might
otherwise have to promote the reforms which he labored to bring about.
He did not, however, refuse Judge Bryan's offer of assistance.
Joseph Brown, Mayor of St. Louis, wrote that he would rather see
Trumbull nominated for the presidency than any other man of either
party. To this letter Trumbull made a reply similar to that given to
Judge Bryan.
Walter B. Scates, ex-judge of the supreme court of Illinois, wrote: "You
saved the Republican party in the impeachment trial and I now hope you
may save the country from corruption, pillage, high tax, class
legislation, and central despotism."
Jesse K. Dubois, auditor of Illinois, perhaps the most sagacious and
experienced politician in the state, wrote, after signing the call for
the Cincinnati Convention: "With you as our candidate I would wager we
carry this state anywhere from 30,000 to 50,000 majority as against
Grant."
On February 23, Trumbull made a speech in the Senate defending the
Missouri Convention's platform against the objections of Senator Morton,
who had stigmatized it as a Democratic movement, because that party in
Connecticut had endorsed it in their state convention. In this speech
Trumbull took up each resolution in the platform and showed that it was
either in accord with Republican doctrine as affirmed in the national
platforms of the party, or had been commended by President Grant in
official messages to Congress. On the subject of civil service reform,
to promote which Grant had appointed the George William Curtis
Commission, he said:
The great evil of our civil service system grows out of the
manner of making appointments and renewals and the use which is
made of the patronage, treating it as mere party spoils. Often
the patronage is used for purposes not rising to the dignity of
even party purposes, but by certain individuals for individual
and personal ends. It would be bad enough if the patronage were
used as mere spoils for party, but it is infinitely worse than
that under our present system.
The Senator from Indiana, in his speech the other day,
undertook to create the impression that I was opposed to civil
service reform. Why, sir, I offered the very bill in this body
which became a law under which the Civil Service Commission was
organized. I introduced bills here years ago in favor of a
reform in the civil service and especially to break up the
running of members of Congress to the departments begging for
offices. In my judgment there is nothing more disreputable, or
which interferes more with the proper discharge of public duty,
than this hanging around the skirts of power begging for
offices for friends.
The growth of the Cincinnati movement was signalized by a meeting at the
Cooper Union in New York City on the evening of April 12, of which the
_Nation_ said: "We believe that it was the most densely packed meeting
which ever met there. All approach within fifty yards of the entrance
was next to impossible in the early part of the evening, so great was
the crowd in the street." Both Trumbull and Schurz spoke here to
enthusiastic hearers.
Among the letters received by Trumbull prior to the convention the most
thoughtful and weighty was the following written by Governor John M.
Palmer, of Illinois:
SPRINGFIELD, April 13, 1872.
I have felt considerable apprehension in regard to the
Cincinnati movement for the reason that I have doubted the
ability of men of the right stamp to control the action of the
proposed convention, and I have believed that it would be
better to endure the abuses and weaknesses and follies of
Grant's Administration for another four years than to
crystallize them by the mistake of making a bad nomination of
his successor. Grant is an evil that we can endure if we retain
the right to point out his faults in principle and practice,
but if some ancient Federalist should be elected to succeed him
what is now usurpation would be accepted by the people as the
proper theory of the government. But if the Cincinnati
Convention nominates a statesman I will support him, and you if
you are selected as the candidate.
JOHN M. PALMER.
Among the names mentioned as desirable candidates that of Charles
Francis Adams was the most prominent. After him came Lyman Trumbull,
Horace Greeley, David Davis, B. Gratz Brown, and Andrew G. Curtin. Adams
had been Minister to Great Britain during the war, and was now one of
the arbitrators of the Geneva Tribunal under the Alabama Claims Treaty.
He had written a letter to David A. Wells which showed that he did not
desire the nomination, was perfectly indifferent to it, but that if it
were given to him without pledges of any kind he would not refuse. He
said among other things:
If the call upon me were an unequivocal one based upon
confidence in my character earned in public life, and a belief
that I would carry out in practice the principles I professed,
then indeed would come a test of my courage in an emergency;
but if I am to be negotiated for, and have assurances given
that I am honest, you will be so kind as to draw me out of that
crowd.
This phrase was interpreted erroneously by some as an expression of
contempt for "that crowd," but, of course, it was not so intended. The
letter was not written for publication. Not only did Mr. Adams not seek
the nomination, but his son, Charles Francis, Jr., refused to go to the
convention, or to invite any of his Boston friends to go.
Greeley was an anti-slavery leader, founder of the New York _Tribune_,
book-writer, lecturer, foremost journalist in the country, distinguished
both for intellectual power and personal eccentricity. Davis was a
member of the Supreme Court of the United States, by Lincoln's
appointment. Brown was governor of Missouri, and next to Schurz the most
prominent leader of the Liberal movement. Curtin had been the war
governor of Pennsylvania and was a man of high ability and unblemished
character. The name of Sumner had been frequently mentioned as one
suitable for the presidency, but he had not yet given his adhesion to
the Liberal movement.
The New York _Herald_ of May 1 tells what I thought of the outlook when
I first arrived in Cincinnati, thus:
CINCINNATI, April 27, 1872.--Mr. Horace White, who arrived this
morning, says that the Liberal movement has as yet only
penetrated the crust of public sentiment and that the masses of
the people are waiting in a half-curious way to see what will
be done here before they will make up their minds.
Trumbull did not authorize the presentation of his name to the
convention until one week before its meeting. Then a qualified
acquiescence came in a letter to myself, dated Washington, April 24,
saying:
I do not think I ought to be nominated unless there is a
_decided_ feeling among those who assemble, and are outside of
rings and bargains, that I would be stronger than any one else.
Unless this is the feeling, I think it would not be wise to
present my name at all.... D. A. Wells has enclosed me a letter
written on the 20th by John Van Buren, Governor Hoffman's
secretary, which he thinks undoubtedly represents the feelings
of the Hoffman wing of the New York Democracy. In this letter
Van Buren says the convention must not touch the question of
free trade, that the persons pushing this question are not
unanimous on the question, and that a non-committal resolution
would do harm in both directions. Grosvenor is very strenuous
about having such a resolution as will commit the convention
distinctly to revenue reform, and I fear will be a little
unreasonable about it. I had thought that a resolution might be
adopted which would assert the principle without being
offensive to anybody; perhaps something like the resolution
adopted by the last Illinois State Convention. Free-traders and
protectionists differ more about the application of principles
than the principles themselves in their efforts. Wells and
other reformers of the East will be reasonable on this
question. Van Buren further says in his letter: "One thing rely
upon--you need do nothing at Cincinnati except with reference
to drawing Republicans into the movement. Disregard the
Democrats. The movement of that side will take care of itself.
There will be no cheating nor holding back on their side. They
will go over in bulk and with a will."
My reply to this letter, written immediately after the adjournment of
the convention, was the following:
My judgment was from the beginning of our arrival here that you
could not be nominated, but I did not tell anybody so. Dr.
Jayne and Governor Koerner thought you could be; and their
judgment, I thought, should be set before mine. So I held my
tongue and did what I could. If I had taken the responsibility
of withdrawing your name as suggested by your letter, I should
never have had any standing in Illinois again--certainly not
among your friends.
As this convention did not consist of delegates chosen by primary
meetings, any person of Republican antecedents or attachments was
permitted to attend and take part in it. To bring order out of chaos it
was necessary for the men of each state to come together and choose a
number corresponding to its population to cast its votes on all
questions arising, including the nomination of candidates. In states
which presented more than one candidate, as in Illinois, there was some
difficulty in making the proper division as between Davis and Trumbull;
but all such troubles were adjusted before the hour for assembling
arrived. The streets of Cincinnati had never beheld a more orderly,
single-minded, public-spirited crowd. At least four fifths had come
together at their own expense for no other purpose than the general
good. There was, however, a small minority of office-seekers among them.
The movement in its inception was altogether free from that class, but
when it began to assume formidable proportions and seemed not unlikely
to sweep the country, it attracted a certain number of professional
politicians, including a few estrays from the South.
The office-seeking fraternity were mostly supporters of Davis, whose
appearance as a candidate for the presidency was extremely offensive to
the original promoters of the movement. As a judge of the Supreme Court
his incursion into the field of politics, unheralded, but not
unprecedented, was an indecorum. Moreover, his supporters had not been
early movers in the ranks of reform, and their sincerity was doubted.
They were extremely active, however, after the movement had gained
headway, and they were able to divide the vote of Illinois into two
equal parts (21 to 21), so that Trumbull's strength in the convention
was seriously impaired. Davis's chances were early demolished by the
editorial fraternity, who, at a dinner at Murat Halstead's house,
resolved that they would not support him if nominated, and caused that
fact to be made known.
Greeley's candidacy had not been taken seriously by the editors at
Halstead's dinner-party. As an individual he was generally liked by them
and his ability and honesty were held in the highest esteem; but he was
looked upon as too eccentric and picturesque to find much support in
such a sober-minded convention as ours. Adams and Trumbull were the only
men supposed by us to be within the sphere of nomination, and the
chances of Adams were deemed the better of the two. We had yet to learn
that there are occasions and crowds where personal oddity and a flash of
genius under an old white hat are more potent than high ancestry or
approved statesmanship, or both those qualifications joined together.
Before nominations were made, a platform was to be framed and adopted.
There were three main issues to be considered: Universal amnesty, civil
service reform, and tariff reform. On the first and second there was no
difference of opinion. Without them the Cincinnati movement would never
have taken place; the convention would never have been called. As to the
third, there was a difference of opinion which divided the convention
and the Committee on Resolutions in the middle, and it soon became known
that "there was no common ground on which the protectionists and revenue
reformers could stand." So wrote E. L. Godkin from the convention hall
to the _Nation_. He continued:
The Committee on Resolutions, after sitting up a whole night,
were compelled to accept the compromise which he [Greeley]
proposed--the reference of the whole matter to the people in
the congressional districts. It is right to add that the
sentiment of the convention was overwhelmingly in favor of this
course. There is a touch of absurdity about it, it is true, but
it is at least frank and honest, and at all events nothing
else was possible. Even such outspoken free-traders as Judge
Hoadley, of this city, were compelled to concur in this
disposition of the question.
As chairman of the Committee on Resolutions, and a free-trader, I can
confirm all that Godkin wrote, and add that the committee considered the
expediency of reporting to the convention their inability to agree and
asking to be discharged. This plan was rejected lest it should cause a
bolting movement, on an issue which was rated only third in importance
among those which had brought us together. It was decided that tariff
reform could wait, while the pacification of the South and the reform of
the civil service could not.
Thursday night, May 2, I had gone to bed at the Burnet House when I was
aroused by a loud knock on my door and a voice outside which I
recognized as that of Grosvenor exclaiming: "Get up! Blair and Brown are
here from St. Louis." Without waiting for an answer he went on knocking
at other doors in the corridor and giving the same warning, but no other
explanation. I arose, dressed myself, and went down to the rotunda of
the hotel, where I found some of the supporters of Trumbull and of Adams
who were trying to discover why the arrival of Frank Blair and Gratz
Brown should produce a commotion in a convention of more than seven
hundred, of which Blair and Brown were not members. Blair was then the
Democratic Senator from Missouri. The two newcomers were not visible.
They had obtained a room and had called into it some of the Missouri
delegation and would not admit any uninvited persons. Presently
Grosvenor returned and told us that Brown intended to withdraw as a
candidate for the presidency and turn his forces over to Greeley, and
himself take the Vice-Presidency. Grosvenor considered this a dangerous
combination and said that steps should be taken to checkmate it at once.
The Adams and Trumbull men here collected remained till about two
o'clock trying to learn more about the expected _coup_, but as nothing
further could be obtained they retired one by one to uneasy slumber.
Grosvenor maintained to the last that great mischief was impending, but
could not suggest any way to meet it.
On the following day voting began, and the first roll-call showed Adams
in the lead with 205 votes; Greeley had 147, Trumbull 110, Brown 95,
Davis 92-1/2, Curtin 62, Chase 2-1/2. Carl Schurz, who was permanent
chairman of the convention and a supporter of Adams, then rose and with
some signs of embarrassment said that a gentleman who had received a
large number of votes desired to make a statement, whereupon he invited
the Hon. B. Gratz Brown to come to the platform. Brown advanced to the
front, and after thanking his friends for their support said that he had
decided to withdraw his name and that he desired the nomination of
Horace Greeley as the man most likely to win in the coming election.
There was great applause among the supporters of Greeley, but the
immediate result did not answer their expectations. Brown could not
control even the Missouri delegation. The first vote of the Missouri men
had been 30 for Brown. The second was, Trumbull 16, Greeley 10, Adams 4.
All the votes are shown in the following table:
----------------------------------------------------------
Roll-Call|Adams|Greeley|Trumbull| Davis|Chase|Brown|Curtin
---------+-----+-------+--------+------+-----+-----+------
First | 205 | 147 | 110 |92-1/2|2-1/2| 95 | 62
Second | 243 | 245 | 148 |81 | | 2 |
Third | 264 | 258 | 156 |44 | | |
Fourth | 279 | 251 | 141 |51 | | |
Fifth | 309 | 258 | 91 |30 |25 | |
Sixth | 324 | 332 | 19 | 6 |32 | |
----------------------------------------------------------
Although Greeley's plurality on the sixth roll-call was small, his gain
over the fifth was large, being 74 votes, that of Adams being only 15.
This was a signal to all who wished to be on the winning side to take
shelter under the old white hat. Changes were made before the result was
announced which gave Greeley 482 to 187 for Adams. Then Greeley was
declared nominated. The nomination of Gratz Brown for Vice-President
followed without much opposition.
The supporters of Adams and of Trumbull were stunned. The first impulse
of their leaders, and especially of Schurz, was to put on sackcloth, and
go into retirement. Prompt decision, however, was necessary to the
editors of daily newspapers. Other persons could go home and take days
or weeks to think the matter over, but those who, at Halstead's table,
had decided against David Davis, must needs make another prompt decision
before the next paper went to press. They decided to support Greeley,
because they had honestly led their readers to an honest belief that the
Cincinnati movement was for the best interests of the Republic; and they
deemed it unfair to turn against it on account of personal vexation
against a man whose candidacy had been tolerated through the whole
proceedings. That Greeley was an unbalanced man we all knew. That he was
liable to go off at a tangent and that his self-esteem and
self-confidence might put him beyond the reach of good counsel in
affairs of great pith and moment, was the unexpressed thought of most of
us. But we knew that his aims were patriotic, and we reflected that some
risks are taken at every presidential election. Greeley had not yet been
proved an unsafe President, and that was more than could be said for
Grant. In fact, Grant's second term proved to be worse than his first.
Schurz was more distressed by the "Gratz Brown trick," as it was
commonly called, than by anything else. This had the appearance of a
brazen political swap executed in the light of day, by which the
presidency and the vice-presidency were disposed of as so much
merchandise. He did not, however, in his thoughts connect Greeley with
the trade. It was physically impossible that the latter could have been
a party to it, if there was a trade. Nevertheless he considered the
German vote lost beyond recall by the bad look of it.[127] My own belief
is that Blair and Brown were jealous of Schurz's power in Missouri; that
they feared he would become omnipotent there, dominating both parties,
if Adams should be elected President; and that the only way to head him
off was to beat Adams. They chose Greeley for this purpose, not because
they had any bargain with, or fondness for, him, but because he was the
next strongest man in the convention.
The engineers of the Liberal Republican movement went their several
ways. Those who held tariff reform of more importance than all other
issues abjured Greeley at once. E. L. Godkin and William Cullen Bryant
declared war against him because they considered him dangerous and
unfit. The following correspondence which took place between Bryant and
Trumbull was illustrative of the feelings of many others:
THE EVENING POST,
41 NASSAU STREET, COR. LIBERTY,
NEW YORK, May 8th, 1872.
MY DEAR SIR,
It has been said that you will support the nomination of Mr.
Greeley for President. I have no right to speak of any course
which you may take in politics in any but respectful terms, but
I may perhaps take the liberty of saying that if you give that
man your countenance, some of your best friends here will
deeply regret it. We who know Mr. Greeley know that his
administration, should he be elected, cannot be otherwise than
shamefully corrupt. His associates are of the worst sort and
the worst abuses of the present Administration are likely to be
even caricatured under his. His election would be a severe blow
to the cause of revenue reform. The cause of civil service
reform would be hopeless with him for President, for Reuben E.
Fenton, his guide and counselor, and the other wretches by whom
Greeley is surrounded, will never give up the patronage by
which they expect to hold their power. As to other public
measures there is no abuse or extravagance into which that man,
through the infirmity of his judgment, may not be betrayed. It
is wonderful how little, in some of his vagaries, the scruples
which would influence other men of no exemplary integrity,
restrain him. But I need not dwell upon these matters--they are
all set forth in the _Evening Post_ which you sometimes see.
What I have written, is written in the most profound respect
for your public character, and because of that respect. If you
conclude to support Mr. Greeley, I shall, of course, infer that
you do so because you do not know him.
Yours truly,
HON. L. TRUMBULL.
W. C. BRYANT.
UNITED STATES SENATE CHAMBER,
WASHINGTON, May 10, 1872.
WM. C. BRYANT, Esq.,
MY DEAR SIR,--Your kind and frank letter is before me. I wish I
could see something better than to support Mr. Greeley, but I
do not. Personally, I know but little of him, but in common
with most people supposed he was an honest but confiding man,
who was often imposed upon by those about him. This would be a
great fault in a President, I admit, but with proper
surroundings could be guarded against, and almost anything
would be an improvement on what we have. One of the greatest
evils of our time is party despotism and intolerance. Greeley's
nomination is a bomb-shell which seems likely to blow up both
parties. This will be an immense gain. Most of the corruptions
in government are made possible through party tyranny. Members
of the Senate are daily coerced into voting contrary to their
convictions through party pressure. A notable instance of this
was the vote on the impeachment of Johnson, and matters in this
respect have not improved since. If by Greeley's election we
could break up the present corrupt organizations, it would
enable the people at the end of four years to elect a President
with a view to his fitness instead of having one put upon them
by a vote of political bummers acting in the name of party.
Having favored the Cincinnati movement and Greeley having
received the nomination, I see no course left but to try to
elect him, and endeavor to surround him, as far as possible,
with honest men. Greeley had a good deal of strength among the
people and was strong in the convention outside of bargain or
arrangement. Many voted for him as their first choice, and in
Illinois I feel confident he is a stronger candidate than Adams
would have been.
LYMAN TRUMBULL.
Sumner, although urged by many of his warmest friends both before and
after the convention, including Frank Bird, Samuel Bowles, and Greeley
himself (through Whitelaw Reid), to declare his position, did not break
silence until May 31, when he made his great speech against Grant. The
speech remains a true catalogue of the shortcomings of Grant as a civil
administrator up to that time. All his sins of omission and of
commission were there set forth in orderly array, together with the
proofs. Sumner thus spared future historians a deal of trouble in
searching the records, but the speech was not very effective in the way
of changing votes. Sumner sometimes mistook himself for a modern Cicero
impeaching Verres. He piled up the agony in the fashion customary in the
pleadings of the ancient forum. He overlooked the signal services
rendered by Grant before he held any civil office. He did not make
allowance for the transition of a tanner's clerk, earning fifty dollars
a month and having a family to support, first to the command of half a
million soldiers in war time, and then to the presidency of the United
States in time of peace, all within the period of eight years. The
mistakes naturally arising from such crude beginnings, when meeting
gigantic responsibilities in quick succession, ought to have excited
pathos as well as censure. By giving due consideration to Grant's whole
career, he would have secured a better hearing for the part of it which
he wished to impress upon the public mind.
Even now Sumner did not advise anybody to vote for Greeley. His omission
to do so was at once construed as an argument favorable to Grant. It was
said that the dangers involved in Greeley's eccentricities were so much
greater than anything that Grant had done, or could do, that Grant's
worst enemy (Sumner) would not advise people to vote for him. Not until
the 29th of July did the Massachusetts Senator publicly speak for
Greeley, and then only in a letter to some colored voters who had asked
his advice. It was then too late to exert much influence. It is doubtful
if even the colored men who had sought his advice gave any heed to it.
Probably the reason why Sumner did not speak earlier was that he
hesitated to break from his abolitionist friends, Garrison, Phillips,
and others, who had besought him not to join the Democrats. When he did
finally join the forces supporting Greeley, his old friend Garrison
turned upon him and chastised him severely in a series of open letters,
which Sumner declined to read.
FOOTNOTES:
[126] Chicago _Times_, April 22.
[127] Frank W. Bird, of Boston, who went to Cincinnati as an anti-Adams
delegate, wrote to Charles Sumner on May 7: "Don't believe a word about
the trade, in any discreditable sense, between Blair and Brown on the
one part and the Greeley men on the other. Undoubtedly Blair wanted to
head off Schurz, and equally truly an arrangement was made, or an
understanding reached, on Thursday night, in a certain contingency to
unite a portion of the Brown and Greeley forces: but, except perhaps in
the motives of the leading negotiators on one side, there was nothing
unusual in the affair, nothing that is not usually--indeed, almost
necessarily--done in such conventions; nothing that was not contemplated
and even proposed by the Adams men." (Sumner papers in Harvard
University Library.)
CHAPTER XXVI
THE GREELEY CAMPAIGN
My own feelings immediately after the nomination were set forth in a
telegram to the Chicago _Tribune_ published in its issue of May 4. The
chief part was in these words:
CINCINNATI, May 3.--The nomination of Mr. Greeley was
accomplished by the people against the judgment and strenuous
efforts of politicians, using the latter word in its larger and
higher sense. The Gratz Brown performance has given the whole
affair the appearance of a put-up job, but it was merely a
lucky guess. The Blairs and Browns do not like Schurz. To
defeat a candidate who was likely to be on confidential terms
with Schurz, as either Adams or Trumbull would have been, was
the thing nearest to their hearts, and for this purpose Brown
made his appearance here. His speech in the Convention fell
like dish-water on the whole assemblage, and, being followed by
the transfer of the Missouri votes to Trumbull, instead of
Greeley, showed that he had no influence in his own delegation.
The changes from Brown to Greeley were few and far between, and
in a short time the convention only remembered that Brown had
been a candidate once and was so no longer. But the personal
popularity of Greeley was more than a match for the
intellectual strength of Trumbull and the moral gravity of
Adams. He was stealing votes from both of them all the time.
When the Illinois delegation at last perceived that the heart
of the convention was carrying away the head, and retired for
consultation, the surprising fact was developed that fifteen of
their own number preferred Greeley to any candidate not from
their own state. The supporters of Adams, while entertaining
the most cordial feeling for the friends of Trumbull, think
that if the latter had come over to Adams's corner the result
would have been different. I do not think so. If the Illinois
vote could have been cast solid for Adams at an earlier stage,
the result might have been different: but there was no time
when Adams could have got more than the twenty-seven votes
which were finally cast for him. The contingency of having to
divide between Adams and Greeley had never been considered,
and, therefore, no time had been allowed to compare views. The
vote of the state being thus divided, its weight was lost for
any purpose of influencing other votes. Then gush and hurrah
swept everything down, and, almost before a vote of Illinois
had been recorded by the secretary, the dispatches came rushing
to the telegraph instruments that Greeley was nominated. For a
moment, the wiser heads in the convention were stunned, though
everybody tried to look perfectly contented. Of all the things
that could possibly happen, this was the one thing which
everybody supposed could not happen. Not even the Greeley men
themselves thought it could happen. The only able politician
who seemed to be really for Greeley was Waldo Hutchins, of New
York, and even his sincerity was questioned by Greeley's
backbone friends as long as the Davis movement was regarded as
still alive.
How the news was received by Trumbull was told by the New York
_Herald's_ Washington dispatch of May 3:
... The scene in the Senate, when the news was received, was
one of complacent dignity, such as only the members of that
body could arrange, even if they had studied to prepare
themselves for an art tableau. Mr. Fenton was the recipient of
the dispatches, and his chair was consequently surrounded by a
crowd of the less dignified Senators, who could not wait to
have the telegrams passed around. Trumbull was the most
undisturbed of all those on the floor. His equanimity
astonished his friends as well as the numerous strangers in the
galleries, who watched closely for indications of excitement in
his parchment-like face. In truth, he seemed to get the news
rather by some occult process of induction, if he got it at
all, than by the course usual to ordinary men. Other members
smiled, made comments, exchanged opinions and preserved their
dignity with customary success; but he alone asserted an
immobility of demeanor that will last for all time, in the
memory of its witnesses, as a remarkable instance of
self-possession. At last, when every one else had delivered
himself of some criticism he remarked to those in his
immediate vicinity: "If the country can stand the first
outburst of mirth the nomination will call forth, it may prove
a strong ticket."
Carl Schurz was slow in reaching a decision to support the ticket. His
first endeavor was to induce Greeley, in a friendly way, to decline the
nomination, by showing him the sombre aspects of the campaign ahead. In
a letter dated May 18, he told Greeley that the dissatisfaction of an
influential part of the Liberal Republican forces was such that a
meeting had been called to consider the question of putting another
ticket in the field before the Democrats should hold their convention.
Other discouraging features were presented and the letter concluded with
these words:
I have, from the beginning, made it a point to tell you with
entire candor how I feel and what I think about this business,
and now if the developments of the campaign should be such as
to disappoint your hopes, it shall not be my fault if you are
deceived about the real state of things.
To this Greeley replied on the 20th, saying that his advices warranted
him in predicting that New York would give 50,000 majority for the
Cincinnati ticket, and that New England and the South would be nearly
solid for it, while in Pennsylvania and the Northwest the chances were
at least even. He ended by saying: "I shall accept unconditionally."
The meeting foreshadowed in Schurz's letter to Greeley took place at the
Fifth Avenue Hotel on the 20th of June. It was composed mainly of
persons who had participated in the Cincinnati Convention and had been
greatly disappointed by Mr. Greeley's nomination. William Cullen Bryant
presided, but fell asleep in the chair soon after the proceedings began.
The first speech was made by Trumbull, who said that his mind was made
up to support the Cincinnati ticket. He thought that Greeley had gained
strength during the first month of the campaign and that the chances of
his election were good. He could see no reason for nominating another
ticket. That would simply be playing into the hands of the supporters of
Grant.
Schurz's position, as reported by the _Nation_, was this:
That he, more than any other man, was chagrined by the result
of Cincinnati; that he does not consider Mr. Greeley a
reformer, and has no expectations of any reforms at his hands,
and will say so on the stump; that he believes him "to be
surrounded by bad men"; that he (Mr. Schurz), however, is so
satisfied of the necessity of defeating Grant and dissolving
existing party organizations, that he is ready to use any
instrument for the purpose, and will, therefore, support
Greeley in the modified and guarded manner indicated above. He
looks forward, with a hopefulness bordering on enthusiasm, to
the good things which will grow out of the confusion following
on Greeley's election, and is deeply touched by the Southern
eagerness for Greeley.
A private letter from E. L. Godkin to Schurz, dated Lenox,
Massachusetts, June 28, gives reasons for deprecating the course that
the latter had decided to take in the campaign.
He has considered Schurz's words about Greeley; would be most
glad could he see any way to join in supporting Greeley, Schurz
being the one man in American politics who inspires Godkin with
some hope concerning them. He maturely considered what he could
and would do when Greeley was first nominated. In view of his
own share in bringing public feeling to the point of creating
the convention, he would have stood by Greeley if possible; saw
no chance to do so and sees none now; is satisfied he can have
nothing to do with Greeley. If Greeley gave pledges, and broke
them, "_as I believe he would_," it would be no consolation to
Godkin that an opposition would thereby be raised up. He went
through all this with Grant, who gave far better guarantees
than Greeley offers, "and he made fine promises and broke them,
and good appointments and reversed them, and I have in
consequence been three years in opposition." Cannot afford to
repeat this. "Greeley would have to change his whole nature, at
the age of 62, in order not to deceive and betray you," and
when he has done so it will be too late to atone for having
backed him by turning against him, which would then merely
discredit one's judgment, and invite suspicion of some personal
disappointment. Moreover, the small band of political reformers
will have fallen into disrepute and become ridiculous and the
country will be worse off than before. Feels that Schurz is
sacrificing the future in taking Greeley on any terms....
Parke Godwin was even more bitter against Greeley. He wrote to Schurz
under date May 28:
"... I have so strong a sense of Greeley's utter unfitness for
the presidency that I cannot well express it. The man is a
charlatan from top to bottom, and the smallest kind of a
charlatan,--for no other motive than a weak and puerile vanity.
His success in politics would be the success of whoever is most
wrong in theory and most corrupt in practice." All the most
corrupt spoilsmen of either side are either with him now or
preparing to go to him. It is the first of duties to expose him
and his factitious reputation. Grant and his crew are bad,--but
hardly so bad as Greeley and his would be. Besides, Grant,
though in very bad hands, has his clutches full: Greeley's set
would be newcomers.
The regular Republican Convention met at Philadelphia, June 5, and
nominated General Grant for President by unanimous vote. The names of
Henry Wilson, Schuyler Colfax, and several others were presented for
Vice-President. On the first roll-call Wilson had 361 votes and Colfax
306, and there were 66 for other candidates. Before the result was
announced, 38 votes from Southern States were changed to Wilson, giving
him 399, a majority of the whole number cast. This decision was brought
about by the wish of Grant himself, communicated to General Grenville
M. Dodge before the convention met. Grant had no liking for Colfax.[128]
The platform of the convention laid stress on the imperative duty of
"suppression of violent and treasonable organizations in certain lately
rebellious regions and for the protection of the ballot-box." This meant
the stern execution of the Ku-Klux Law, under suspension of the writ of
_habeas corpus_, which was already in progress. The remainder of the
platform was either "pointing with pride" at past achievements, or
clap-trap of various kinds, including a promise to take good care of
capital and labor, so as to secure "the largest opportunities and a just
share of the mutual profits of these two great servants of
civilization."
The Democratic National Convention met at Baltimore, July 9, and adopted
both the platform and the candidates of the Cincinnati Convention. This
involved a complete reversal of the party's principles as declared in
its last previous platform, but it was not inconsistent with inexorable
facts. There was nothing else to be done unless the party was determined
still to battle against the result of the Civil War. It was inevitable,
however, that there should be a remnant of the party that would never
vote for Greeley--the man who above all others had gored them most
savagely in the fights of a quarter of a century. The dissentients
called and held a convention at Louisville, September 3, where they
nominated Charles O'Conor of New York for President and John Quincy
Adams for Vice-President, both of whom declined. Other attempts to put a
third ticket in the field came to nothing. The recalcitrants either
voted for Grant or abstained from voting altogether.
Trumbull took an active part in the campaign, speaking to large crowds
and almost incessantly in Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan,
Indiana, and Illinois. His first speech was made at Springfield,
Illinois, June 26, a synopsis of which will serve to indicate the views
which he advocated.
He said that he was glad to explain to Illinoisans the position
he had felt it his duty to take on many points. It was now more
than seventeen years that he had represented the state in
Washington. In that time the principles on which the Republican
party was formed had all been settled. Nothing remained but the
machinery, which had fallen into the hands of those who sought
to use it for merely selfish ends. During his service he had
sometimes not acted according to the views of all his
constituents, but he had not failed to follow his own sense of
duty and right. Within the last ten years many abuses had crept
into the Government and numerous defalcations had occurred,
perhaps the most noted being that of Hodge, paymaster, in the
office of the Paymaster-General, "whose defalcations, occurring
right under the eye of the Government, amounted to more than
$400,000." An investigating committee had reported to a
previous Congress great abuses in the New York
Custom-House--bribery and demoralization. At the beginning of
the recent session he [Trumbull] had introduced a resolution
for a joint committee of investigation, with power to send for
persons and papers; introduced it in good faith to unearth
frauds, if existent, and to correct them, without design of
injuring the party. "I was simple-minded enough to believe that
the Republican party, ... with which I had been identified for
so many years, would be lifted in public estimation ... if it
had the virtue and the honesty to expose, even among its own
members, wrong, corruptions, and fraud if fraud existed, and to
apply the proper corrective. And I was very much astonished
when that proposition was met by gentlemen in the Senate who
constitute what, for brevity's sake, I may denominate a
Senatorial Ring, denouncing me as unfaithful to the Republican
party and as throwing dirt upon it by offering a resolution to
inquire into the conduct of public officers."
The public indignation aroused by this forced the Senatorial
Ring to action. "A party caucus of Republican Senators was
called, and a scheme devised to change the character of the
resolution, and to organize and pack the committee, which,
instead of going forth to uncover and expose corruption, should
go forth to conceal and cover it up. The proposition for the
joint committee of the two houses, with power to send for
persons and papers, was voted down, and in its place a
resolution was passed creating a committee of the Senate alone.
The members of the committee were selected in a party caucus,
and not a single Republican Senator who had originally favored
the investigation was placed upon the committee. This was
contrary to parliamentary law, and contrary to the plainest
principles of common sense, if the object was to discover
abuses, and contrary to that ordinary rule which says that a
child must not be put to a nurse who cares not for it. This
investigation was placed in the hands of the parties to be
investigated...." Even this committee, going to New York, could
not, however, shut their eyes to the enormous abuses there. But
they did give public notice that any merchants who had paid
bribe money to customs officials would be prosecuted to the
extent of the law, thereby securing the non-appearance of any
such merchant as a witness. They acted as if sent to
investigate merchants, not officials.... And the Senate Ring
would allow no measure to be considered tending to rectify
these abuses, wanting to keep the spoils to carry next fall's
elections. A bill from the House was referred to the Judiciary
committee, which had a majority of Ring members,--a bill to
inaugurate reforms and to protect merchants from plunder.
Although it was before the committee two months it was never
reported to the Senate. "I made two motions in the Senate to
have the committee discharged and to bring the bill before the
Senate, that it might receive its attention, but they were
voted down under party drill."
"Let me tell you of another committee of investigation, raised
in the House of Representatives, and packed also by an
obsequious and partisan Speaker,--a committee, a majority of
which consisted of the friends of the Secretary of the Navy
whose conduct was about to be investigated. I want to tell you
what that committee did, and I think you will be astonished
when I state the fact that a committee of members of the House
of Representatives could have been found, who were so blinded
by party zeal, so full of bigotry or cowardice that they could
not see, or were afraid to expose, violations of the law on the
part of political associates. This committee was raised on the
motion of Governor Blair, of Michigan, a high-minded,
independent, and able Republican.... At his [Blair's] instance,
a committee was raised to inquire into certain transactions in
the Navy Department, presided over by Secretary Robeson....
Among many of the things that the committee was instructed to
inquire into ... was a claim for building certain vessels for
the Government of the United States during the war. I have the
precise figures here, giving the exact amounts which the
Government contracted to pay for the construction of the three
vessels, Tecumseh, Mahopac, and Manhattan. The contract was
made in 1862, and the Government agreed to pay a contractor of
the name of Secor $1,380,000 for the construction of these
three vessels. After the contract was made, the Government
desired some changes in the plans of the vessels, and a board
of naval officers was appointed to superintend them and to
certify bills for extra work, which they did to the amount of
more than $500,000. The vessels were furnished, the contract
price paid--the sum due for the extra work was paid, and it was
all settled and closed in the Navy Department in 1865. But
these contractors, who had received more than $1,900,000 for
building the vessels and the extra work, came to Congress by
petition, and complained that they still had not received as
much as they ought, because they said that they were delayed in
their contracts by the action of the Government; that while
thus delayed the price of labor and of materials advanced, and
they had met with great loss, and they, therefore, asked
Congress to allow them something more. Congress, in 1867,
passed a law directing the Secretary of the Navy to look into
this matter and report to the next session. The Secretary
appointed a board of Naval officers, who made the
investigation, and reported to Congress that these Secors ought
to be allowed $115,000 more (I use round numbers)--$115,000 in
addition to what they had already received, and put into the
law these words, 'which shall be in full discharge of all
claims against the United States on account of the vessels upon
which the Board made the allowance as per this report.' Now,
do any of you, does any lawyer, ... know how to write a
stronger clause than that to end this claim? If you do, I do
not.... The Secors, in 1868, received the $115,000 and gave
their receipt.... Would you believe it possible that the
Secretary of the Navy would, after that, pay anything more?...
Mr. Robeson, in 1870, ... on his own motion, without any act of
Congress authorizing it, proceeds to reinvestigate this claim,
and without coming to Congress at all pays over to these
gentlemen $93,000 more. Well, that is not the worst of it. He
might just as well have paid them $93,000,000. The Congress of
the United States never appropriated any money to pay this
$93,000, but the Secretary of the Navy took the money
appropriated for other purposes and other years and paid it out
of that. This is bad enough.... But when this packed committee
came to examine this transaction, a majority of its members
reported that the transactions only involved a mere difference
of opinion as to the construction of the law, and, in their
opinion, the Secretary had construed it rightly. And Mr.
Robeson, instead of being rebuked, is commended by the
committee, and is continued in office. It is due to the
chairman of the committee--Governor Blair, of Michigan, and one
of his associates--the committee consisted of five members--to
say that they dissented from the majority report, and held that
the transaction was not only without authority of law, but in
direct violation of it....
"I was never a party man to the extent of being willing to
serve the party against my country and if, to-day, I am acting
with the Liberal Republican party, if I have denounced these
transactions at the hazard of being myself denounced, it was
done in good faith on my part, for the purpose of correcting
abuses, and appealing from a party tyranny established by a
Senatorial Ring to the honest, intelligent, upright citizens of
the country, who are bound by no such shackles as will compel
them to cover up fraud and iniquity in any party...."
He mentioned the encroachments of the Federal Government, as in
the attempt to destroy the privilege of the writ of _habeas
corpus_ in the last session of Congress, as a bill virtually
placing the elections of the Southern States under the
direction of the President. If the people have become so far
indifferent to their rights as to permit the President to
suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_ at will, and to control
and supervise their elections, their liberties are gone, and
"they have only to wait until a man sufficiently ambitious
reaches the Presidency, for him to grasp and maintain absolute
powers."
The speech was two hours long, and concluded with this tribute to
Greeley:
... Mr. Greeley [he said] is a man of the highest character and
intelligence. No man in the land is better acquainted with the
public men of the country than he. He is a man of purity of
character, of strict honesty, who would not look upon
corruption and official delinquency with the least degree of
allowance. You may rely upon that and upon his bringing about
him the ablest men of the land to form a strong and able
Administration, because he knows who the able men are, and
could have no other motive than to make his Administration a
success, as he will not seek a reëlection. I am not in the
habit of saying much about individuals, but I think I may say
to you that you may trust Horace Greeley for an honest
administration of the Government, and that is what the people
of the country want. You may trust him above almost all other
men in this land for bringing about that state of good feeling
between the North and the South, so essential to the peace and
prosperity of the nation.
The campaign started with considerable éclat among the ranks of
Greeley's supporters and corresponding depression on the other side.
Carl Schurz, who took the laboring oar, at first with reluctance
bordering on gloom, gathered confidence as he progressed in his stumping
tour. Enthusiasm for the old white hat seemed to be no figment of
imagination, but a living reality. All eyes were fixed upon North
Carolina which had an election for state officers on the 1st of August,
and which the Liberals expected to win. The early returns seemed to
justify their confidence, but there was a change when the western
mountain districts were heard from. The supporters of Grant carried the
state by about 2000 majority. This wound was not so deep as a well nor
so wide as a church door, but it answered one purpose. It ended the "old
white hat" enthusiasm and turned attention to the more sober and solid
aspects of the campaign. That Greeley was an unbalanced character, that
he was lacking in steadiness, in mental equipoise and ability to look at
both sides of any question where his feelings were strongly enlisted, it
was easy to show by many examples in his brilliant career. His
occasional controversies with Lincoln during the war, in which he was
invariably worsted, were now reproduced with effect by the orators on
the Grant side, and the old white hat and coat and the Flintwinch
neck-tie were savagely pictured by Tom Nast in _Harper's Weekly_. There
were satirical persons who said that Greeley took as much pains to make
himself a harlequin as another might take to make himself a dandy.
The attacks were not without effect upon people who had never seen
Greeley face to face. To his immediate friends in New York it seemed
necessary that he should show himself to the public so that people might
know he was a man of solid parts, of statesmanlike proportions and brain
power. He was persuaded to make a series of speeches in Indiana, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania in the month of September, as those states were likely
to have a decisive influence on the country in their local elections,
which took place in October. Accordingly he took the stump, beginning at
Jeffersonville, Indiana, and moving eastward. His speeches surprised
both friends and enemies by their high tone, argumentative force, good
temper, and versatility and vigor of expression. The main point which he
sought to enforce was the need of restored peace and brotherhood in all
the land. No pleading could be more persuasive or more touching. No
doubt can exist of the sincerity with which it was uttered.
It was somewhat droll that in the last speech of the series he was
confronted by a speaker on the Grant side at Easton, Pennsylvania,
September 28, who predicted that if Greeley were elected all the furnace
fires in the Lehigh Valley would be put out and their working-people
thrown upon the almshouses. This to the stoutest champion of the
protective tariff then living! He was not, however, struck dumb by the
prospect of the early impoverishment of the iron workers. He said:
A recent speaker of the opposition has asserted that if I were
made President all the furnace fires in the Lehigh Valley would
presently be put out. This seems incredible. All men know I am
a protectionist; but that I would not veto any bill fairly
passed by the Congress of the United States modifying or
changing the tariff is certainly true. I do not believe in
government by selfish rings, but I believe just as little in
government by the one-man power. I don't believe in government
by vetoes. The veto power of the President is not given him to
enable him to reject every bill for which he would have refused
to vote if a member of Congress, but only to be employed in
certain great emergencies where corruption or recklessness has
passed a measure through Congress which would not stand the
test of inquiry. I tell you, friends, I believe in legislation
by Congress, not by Presidents, and I should myself approve and
sign a bill which had a fair majority in Congress, although in
my judgment it was not accordant with public policy--with the
wisest policy.
Although Greeley's stumping tour raised him in the public estimation, it
is doubtful if it gained him any votes. It was now too late. People's
minds were made up and nothing could change them, not even the
Crédit-Mobilier scandal. General Grant was not concerned in this
scandal, but a number of his most distinguished supporters, the very
pillars of the Republican party, beginning with Vice-President Colfax,
were named as guilty of taking bribes to influence their votes in
Congress for the Union Pacific Railroad. This accusation was not made
public until September, and then by accident. Most of the persons
accused made denial, and since no investigation could be had until the
next session of Congress (a month later than the election), nobody was
bound to give credence to an unproved charge. The general answer of the
supporters of Grant was that they would not withhold their votes from
him even if the charge were true. Nor could they be blamed for so
saying. If the persons accused were really guilty, they would be
punished in due time, or at all events exposed, and exposure would
itself be punishment. It is needless to go into the details of the
Crédit-Mobilier scandal here. It was investigated by an able and
impartial committee of the House, and all the guilty ones were visited
with such punishment as Congress could legally inflict.
Of the three October states, Pennsylvania and Ohio gave large Republican
majorities and Indiana a small majority for Hendricks (Democrat) for
governor. This was decisive of the general result in November. Greeley
and Brown were overwhelmingly defeated. The only states that gave them
majorities were Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Tennessee, and
Texas, having altogether 66 electoral votes. The others gave Grant and
Wilson a total of 272 electoral votes. The state of New York, which
Greeley, in his letter to Schurz, had claimed by 50,000, gave 53,000
majority against him.
I have always held the opinion that either Adams or Trumbull could have
been elected if nominated at Cincinnati. I think also that Adams was the
stronger of the two, because he had incurred no personal ill-will during
the twelve years of war and Reconstruction and because the minds of the
Democratic leaders who had encouraged the Liberal movement were eagerly
expecting him. There would have been no bolting movement in that
quarter. The Germans also were enthusiastic for Adams, and although they
would have supported Trumbull willingly, there would have been perhaps a
trifle less of cordiality for him. Neither of the two was gifted with
personal "magnetism," but either of them had as much of that quality as
Grant had, or as the public then desired. The voters were not then in
search of the sympathetic virtues. There was a yearning for some
cold-blooded, masterful man to go through the temple of freedom with a
scourge of small cords driving out the grafters and money-changers.
Adams was qualified for this rôle. He was also the man of whom the
Republican leaders had the gravest fears as an opposing candidate.
The campaign and its result killed poor Greeley. The election took place
on the 5th of November. On the 10th he wrote a letter of two lines
marked "private forever" to Carl Schurz, saying:
I wish I could say with what an agony of emotion I subscribe
myself, gratefully yours, Horace Greeley.
He then took to his bed and his friends became alarmed. Frequent
bulletins were published in the _Tribune_ showing that he was a victim
of insomnia, from which, the paper said, he had been a sufferer, more or
less, at former periods of his life. He died on the 29th. His wife had
died one month earlier, October 30. History says that he died of a
broken heart.[129]
That Greeley had been eager for public office from an early period was
shown by his famous letter withdrawing himself as junior partner from
the firm of Seward, Weed, and Greeley. When the Cincinnati nomination
came to him his fondest dreams seemed to be on the eve of fulfillment.
Now all such dreams had vanished, a political party of noble aspirations
had foundered on him as the hidden rock, his self-esteem had received an
annihilating blow, and his beloved _Tribune_, the labor of his lifetime,
was supposed to be ruined pecuniarily. Whatever his faults may have
been, he received his punishment for them in this world. He was only
sixty-two years of age, of sound constitution and good habits, and had
never used liquor or tobacco. He ought to, and probably would, have
lived twenty years longer if he had put away ambition and contented
himself with the repute and influence he had fairly earned. He was the
most influential editor of his time and country, but as a political
writer E. L. Godkin was his superior, and in fact Godkin, in the columns
of the _Nation_, contributed more than any other writer, perhaps more
than any other person, to his overthrow.
* * * * *
The state election of Louisiana in 1872 had resulted in a disputed
return for governor and legislature. One set of returns showed a
majority for John McEnery, the conservative candidate. Another set
showed a majority for William P. Kellogg, Republican. The sitting
governor, Warmoth, controlled the returning board and he favored
McEnery. A former returning board headed by one Lynch had been dissolved
by an act of the legislature. To this defunct board the supporters of
Kellogg appealed. The Lynch Board, without any actual returns before
them, declared Kellogg elected. They then procured an order from Judge
Durell, of the United States Circuit Court at New Orleans, to the United
States Marshal, Packard, who had a small military force at his command,
to seize the State House. This was done and the act was approved by
President Grant. An appeal to him from the better class of citizens of
New Orleans was rejected. The excitement in Congress growing out of this
usurpation was intense, even among Republicans. The Senate Committee on
Privileges and Elections was ordered to make an investigation, which it
did, and it reported, through Senator Carpenter on the 20th of February,
that the action of Judge Durell was illegal and that all steps taken in
pursuance of it were void. It recommended a new election and reported a
bill for holding it; but Senator Morton, who made a minority report,
prevented it from coming to a vote. Trumbull, who was also a member of
the committee, made a report more drastic than that of Carpenter and
supported his own view by a speech delivered on the 15th of February.
Here you have [he said] an order sent from the city of
Washington on the 3d day of December, which was before Judge
Durell issued his order to seize the State House and organize a
legislature, and directing that nobody should take part in the
organization except such persons as were returned as members by
what was known as the Lynch Board, a board which the committee,
in their report drawn by the Senator from Wisconsin, say had
been abolished by an act of the legislature, and had not a
single official return before it. It undertook to canvass
returns without having any returns to canvass. On forged
affidavits, hearsay, and newspaper reports and verbal
statements, the Lynch Returning Board, consisting of four men,
without legal existence as a returning board, got together and
without one official return, or other legitimate evidence
before them, undertook to say who should constitute the
Legislature of Louisiana.[130]
This was Trumbull's last speech in the Senate and was one of his best,
but other influences prevailed with Grant.[131]
Thus Kellogg and his crew became the masters of Louisiana, and four
years later became the deciding factor in the Hayes-Tilden presidential
contest.
FOOTNOTES:
[128] This fact was given to me by General Dodge, in writing.
[129] John Bigelow's Diary, under date Nov. 28, 1872, contains the
following entry:
"Greeley is now in a madhouse, and before morning will probably be
dead--so Swinton tells me to-day; and Reid, whom I saw to-day, confirms
these apprehensions." _Retrospections of an Active Life_, v, 91.
[130] _Cong. Globe_, 1873, p. 1744.
[131] Rhodes thinks that the influence which prevailed with Grant in
this instance was that of Morton. (_History of the United States_, VII,
111.)
CHAPTER XXVII
LATER YEARS
The defeat of the Liberal Republicans terminated Trumbull's official
career. His senatorial term expired on the 3d of March, 1873. The
regular Republicans carried the legislature of Illinois, and Richard J.
Oglesby was elected Senator in his stead. He was now sixty years of age
and he resumed the practice of his profession in the city of Chicago,
which had been his place of residence during the greater part of his
senatorial service. His law firm at the beginning was Trumbull, Church &
Trumbull, the second member being Mr. Firman Church and the third Mr.
Perry Trumbull, a son of the ex-Senator. Mr. William J. Bryan soon
afterward became a student in the office. Various changes took place in
the Trumbull law firm. Mr. Church removed to California, and his place
was taken by Mr. Henry S. Robbins, and the firm became Trumbull,
Robbins, Willetts & Trumbull. Mr. Hempstead Washburne, son of Hon. Elihu
B. Washburne, became a member of the firm later. Trumbull's reputation,
talents, and experience soon gave him a place in the front rank of his
profession, which he maintained till the end of his long life. I shall
not attempt to follow the details of his career at the bar except as
they touch upon public questions. The first affair of this kind was the
Hayes-Tilden disputed election of 1876.
The second Grant Administration was more lamentable than the first in
respect of military rule, turbulence, and bloodshed in the South and
corruption in the civil service in the North. These evils became so
glaring and intolerable that the Republican party suffered a disastrous
defeat in the congressional elections of 1874, and failed to secure a
majority of the popular vote in the presidential election of 1876. The
opposing candidates in this contest were Hayes (Republican) and Tilden
(Democrat). One hundred and eighty-five electoral votes were necessary
to a choice. The undisputed returns gave Tilden 184 and Hayes 166. Those
of Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina were in dispute. It was
necessary that Hayes should have all of them in order to be the next
President. All of these states were under military control, and the
returning boards who had the power of canvassing the votes, and the
governors who had the power of certifying the result to Congress, were
Republicans.
The excitement in the country when this condition became known was
extreme. No confidence was placed in the character of the Southern
returning boards. That of Louisiana consisted of three knaves and one
fool,[132] and the governor of the state was W. P. Kellogg, who had
acquired the office by the acts of usurpation described in the preceding
chapter. It was seen at once that unless some respectable tribunal could
be devised to decide between the conflicting claims the country might
drift into a new civil war. The first thing to be done was to endeavor
to secure a fair count of the ballots cast in the disputed states. To
this end a certain number of "visiting statesmen" were chosen by the
heads of their respective political parties to go to the scene of the
contest and watch all the steps taken by the canvassers of the votes.
President Grant appointed those of the Republican party and Abram S.
Hewitt, chairman of the National Democratic Committee, appointed the
others. Trumbull had voted for Tilden in the election, and he was
chosen by Hewitt as one of ten visiting statesmen for Louisiana. Senator
Sherman, of Ohio, was one of the Republican visitors. Congress passed a
law on the 29th of January, 1877, to create an Electoral Commission,
consisting of five Senators, five Representatives, and five judges of
the Supreme Court, to take all the evidence in regard to the disputed
elections and to render a decision thereon by a majority vote of the
fifteen members. Four of the five judges of the Supreme Court were named
in the act of Congress. They were Miller and Swayne, Republicans, and
Clifford and Field, Democrats, and the act provided that these four
should choose the fifth. It was the general expectation that they would
choose David Davis as the fifth member, as he was commonly classed as an
Independent, since he had been a candidate in the Cincinnati Convention,
which nominated Greeley. But, on the very day when the Electoral
Commission Bill passed, Davis was elected by the legislature of Illinois
as Senator of the United States, to succeed Logan whose term was
expiring. Davis accepted the senatorship and declined to serve as the
fifth judge. Thereupon Bradley was chosen in his stead.
Trumbull was chosen as one of the counsel on the Tilden side to argue
the Louisiana case. On the 14th of February he appeared before the
Commission and offered to show that the votes certified by the
commissioners of election in the voting precincts of Louisiana to the
supervisors of registration, who were the officers legally appointed to
receive the same, showed a majority varying from six to nine thousand
for the Tilden electors; that the returning board did not receive from
any poll, voting place, or parish, and did not have before them, any
statement, as required by law, of any riot, tumult, act of violence,
intimidation, armed disturbance, bribery, or corrupt influence tending
to prevent a free, fair, peaceable vote; that the supervisors of
registration, without any such statements of violence or intimidation,
omitted to include in the returns of election, or to make any mention of
the same, votes amounting to a majority of 2267 against W. P. Kellogg,
one of the Hayes electors; that the votes cast on the 7th of November,
1876, had never been compiled or canvassed; that the votes had never
been opened by the governor in the presence of the other state officers
required by law to be present, nor in the presence of any of them; that
the law of Louisiana required that both political parties should be
represented on the returning board, but that all the members, four in
number, were Republicans, and that although there was one vacancy on the
board they refused to fill it by choosing anybody; that the returning
board employed as clerks and assistants four persons, whose names were
given, all of whom were then under indictment for crime, to whom was
committed the task of compiling and canvassing the returns, and that
none but Republicans were to be present; and that all the decisions of
the returning board were made in secret session.
Not to detain you [said Trumbull] as to this Government in
Louisiana, I will only say that it is not a republican
government, for it is a matter that I think this Commission
should take official knowledge of, that the pretended officers
in the state of Louisiana are upheld by military power alone.
They could not maintain themselves an hour but for military
support. Is that government republican which rests upon
military power for support? A republican government is a
government of the people, for the people, and by the people:
but the Government in Louisiana has been nothing but a military
despotism for the last four years, and it could not stand a day
if the people were not overborne by military power.
His speech was about two hours long, and he was followed by Carpenter
and Campbell on the same side. The leading argument on the Hayes side
was made by Mr. E. W. Stoughton, of New York, who contended that neither
the Commission nor Congress itself could go behind the official returns
certified by the governor of the state of Louisiana, and that the
recognition of Kellogg as governor by the President of the United States
was conclusive evidence of the fact that he was the person empowered to
act in that capacity.
By a vote of eight to seven the Commission decided in favor of
Stoughton's contention, and the same rule was applied to all the other
disputed returns, and by this ruling the presidential office was awarded
to Rutherford B. Hayes.
Under the circumstances then existing, and with the characters then
holding office in Louisiana, it is obvious that the latter had power to
throw out an unlimited number of Tilden votes if necessary to make a
majority for Hayes. It is not obvious that the supporters of Tilden had
power to intimidate an unlimited number of negroes; the number of the
latter was slightly less than the number of whites in the State, and it
was known that some of the negroes had joined the conservative party.
Moreover, the Kellogg government was shamefully illegal, even as
measured by the standards then enforced upon the South. It is fair to
presume, therefore, that Tilden was justly entitled to the electoral
votes of Louisiana. That is my belief although I voted for Hayes.
It does not follow, however, that the decision of the Electoral
Commission was wrong. That body was bound to consider the remote as well
as the immediate consequences of its acts. It was engaged in making a
precedent to be followed in similar disputes thereafter, if such should
arise. If Congress, or any commission acting by its authority, should
assume the functions of a returning board for all the states in future
presidential elections, what limit could be set to their investigations,
or to the passions agitating the country while the same were in
progress? In short, the Electoral Commission was sitting not to do
justice between man and man, but to save the Republic. Even if it made a
mistake in the exercise of its discretion, the mistake was pardonable.
* * * * *
On the 3d of November, 1877, the subject of this memoir was married to
Miss Mary Ingraham, of Saybrook Point, Connecticut. The lady's mother
was his first cousin. Two daughters were born of this union, both of
whom died in infancy.
* * * * *
In 1880, when the next presidential campaign, that of Garfield and
Hancock, opened, the Democrats of Illinois nominated Trumbull for
governor of the State, without his own solicitation or desire. He was
now sixty-seven years of age, with powers of body and mind unimpaired.
In accepting the nomination he gave a brief account of his political
life extending over a period of nearly forty years. He acknowledged that
he had made mistakes, but said he had never given a vote or performed an
act in his official capacity which he did not at the time believe was
for his country's good. He made a vigorous campaign, but the traces left
of it in the newspapers contain nothing that need be recalled now. The
Republican majority in the state was between thirty and forty thousand.
The Republicans nominated Shelby M. Cullom for Governor and he was
elected.
* * * * *
The World's Columbian Exposition took place at Chicago in the year 1893.
During one of my visits to it I had the pleasure of dining with Mr.
and Mrs. Trumbull at their home on Lake Avenue. The only other guest was
William J. Bryan, whom I had not met before. The leading issue in
politics then was the free coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen to
one. Mr. Bryan was an enthusiastic free-silver man and a firm believer
in the early triumph of that doctrine. Trumbull was inclined to the same
belief, although less confident of its success. We had an animated but
friendly discussion of that question. President Cleveland had just
called a special session of Congress to repeal the Silver Purchasing Act
then in force, which was not a free-coinage law. I ventured to predict
to my table companions that the purchasing law would be repealed and
that no free-coinage law would be enacted in place of it, either then or
later. None of us imagined that three years from that time Mr. Bryan
himself would be the nominee of the Democratic party for President of
the United States, on that issue. Trumbull's geniality and cordiality at
this meeting were a joy to his guests. Our conversation, ranging over a
period of nearly forty years, filled two delightful hours. He was then
eighty years of age, but in vigor of mind and body I did not notice any
change in him. We parted, not knowing that we should not meet again.
[Illustration: _AET. 80_]
Trumbull's next appearance on the public stage was in the case of Eugene
V. Debs, who is still with us as a perpetual candidate of the
Socialistic party for President. In 1894 he was president of an
organization of railway employees known as the American Railway Union.
In the month of May a dispute arose between the Pullman Palace Car
Company and its employees in reference to the rate of wages, which
resulted in a strike. Debs and his fellow officers of the Railway Union,
for the purpose of compelling the Pullman Company to yield to the
demands of their employees, issued an order to the railway companies
that they should cease hauling Pullman cars, and, if they should not so
cease, that the trainmen, switchmen, and others working on the railways
aforesaid should strike also. As a consequence of this order twenty-two
railroads were "tied up." All passengers trains composed in part of
Pullman cars were brought to a standstill. Riots broke out in the
streets of Chicago. An injunction was issued against Debs by Judge
Woods, of the United States Circuit Court. Governor Altgelt, of
Illinois, was called upon to restore order in the city, but before he
did so President Cleveland, having been officially informed that the
movement of the mails was obstructed by violence in the streets of
Chicago, ordered a small body of troops to that city to break the
blockade. This they accomplished without delay and without bloodshed. In
the mean time Debs and his associates were put under arrest for
violating the injunction of the court. Debs employed Mr. Clarence Darrow
as his attorney, and Darrow applied for a writ of _habeas corpus_, which
was refused. Darrow appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States
and engaged Lyman Trumbull and S. S. Gregory as associate counsel. The
appeal was argued by Trumbull at the October Term in Washington City.
Trumbull had volunteered his service and refused a fee, accepting only
his traveling expenses. The court rejected the petition for a writ of
_habeas corpus_ and affirmed the jurisdiction of the circuit court.
Both President Cleveland and the court were sustained by public opinion
in this disposition of Debs. On the 6th of October, a large meeting was
held at Central Music Hall in Chicago to consider the recent exciting
events. It was addressed by Trumbull and Henry D. Lloyd. Trumbull's
speech was published in the newspapers and in pamphlet form as a
Populist campaign document. It was extremely effective from the Populist
point of view, and was not, on the whole, more radical than the
so-called Progressive platform of the present day. While expressing
decided opinions on the subject of "judicial usurpation" (referring to
the Debs case without mentioning it), he exhorted his hearers to seek a
remedy by the action of Congress. "It is to be hoped," he said, "that
Congress when it meets will put some check upon federal judges in
assuming control of railroads and issuing blanket injunctions and
punishing people for contempt of their assumed authority. If Congress
does not do it, I trust the people will see to it that representatives
are chosen hereafter who will." The recall of judges, as a remedy for
unpopular decisions, had not yet been discovered.
The testimony of persons who were present at this meeting is that
Trumbull showed no abatement of his powers as a speaker, and that the
audience "went wild with enthusiasm."
In the month of December following, the leaders of the People's party in
Chicago, ten in number, requested Trumbull to prepare a declaration of
principles to be presented by them for consideration at a national
conference of their party to meet at St. Louis on the 28th. This paper
was drawn up and delivered to them in his own handwriting a few days
before the meeting and was published in the _Chicago Times_ of December
27, in the following words:
1. Resolved, That human brotherhood and equality of rights are
cardinal principles of true democracy.
2. Resolved, That, forgetting all past political differences,
we unite in the common purpose to rescue the Government from
the control of monopolists and concentrated wealth, to limit
their powers of perpetuation by curtailing their privileges,
and to secure the rights of free speech, a free press, free
labor, and trial by jury--all rules, regulations, and judicial
dicta in derogation of either of which are arbitrary,
unconstitutional, and not to be tolerated by a free people.
3. We endorse the resolution adopted by the National Republican
Convention of 1860, which was incorporated by President Lincoln
in his inaugural address, as follows: "That the maintenance
inviolate of the rights of the states, and especially of the
right of each state to order and control its own domestic
institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is
essential to that balance of power on which the endurance of
our political fabric depends, and we denounce the lawless
invasion by armed force of the soil of any state or territory,
no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes."
4. Resolved, That the power given Congress by the Constitution
to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of
the Union, to suppress insurrections, to repel invasions, does
not warrant the Government in making use of a standing army in
aiding monopolies in the oppression of their employees. When
freemen unsheathe the sword it should be to strike for liberty,
not for despotism, or to uphold privileged monopolies in the
oppression of the poor.
5. Resolved, That to check the rapid absorption of the wealth
of the country and its perpetuation in a few hands we demand
the enactment of laws limiting the amount of property to be
acquired by devise or inheritance.
6. Resolved, That we denounce the issue of interest-bearing
bonds by the Government in times of peace, to be paid for, in
part at least, by gold drawn from the Treasury, which results
in the Government's paying interest on its own money.
7. Resolved, That we demand that Congress perform the
constitutional duty to coin money, regulate the value thereof
and of foreign coin by the enactment of laws for the free
coinage of silver with that of gold at the ratio of 16 to 1.
8. Resolved, That monopolies affecting the public interest
should be owned and operated by the Government in the interest
of the people; all employees of the same to be governed by
civil service rules, and no one to be employed or displaced on
account of politics.
9. Resolved, That we inscribe on our banner, "Down with
monopolies and millionaire control! Up with the rights of man
and the masses!" And under this banner we march to the polls
and to victory.
These resolutions were conveyed to the St. Louis meeting by Henry D.
Lloyd and F. J. Schulte and were adopted by the conference without
alteration.
FOOTNOTES:
[132] Rhodes, _History of the United States_, VII, 231.
CHAPTER XXVIII
CONCLUSION
On the 22d of March, 1896, Trumbull made an argument before the Supreme
Court at Washington City. On the 11th of April, although ailing from an
unknown malady, he went to Belleville to attend the funeral of his old
and faithful friend, Gustave Koerner, and to make a brief address over
the remains. This journey was made against the advice of his physician.
At the conclusion of his remarks he became ill at his hotel in
Belleville. There was a consultation of physicians, who reached the
conclusion that he would be able to go home if he should go at once. He
decided not to delay, and he reached home on the morning of April 13.
Here another consultation of physicians took place at which a surgical
operation was decided upon. This led to the discovery of an internal
tumor which, in their judgment, could not be removed without causing
immediate death. He lingered till the 5th of June. Before his death he
made a calm and careful adjustment of his business affairs and gave to
his children and grandchildren keepsakes that he had for years preserved
for them. He passed away at the age of eighty-two years, seven months,
and twelve days. His funeral, which was largely attended, took place
from his house, No. 4008 Lake Avenue, and his remains were interred in
Oakwoods Cemetery.
There was a meeting of the Bar Association of Chicago to prepare a
memorial on his life and services. On this occasion Hon. Thomas A.
Moran, former judge of the appellate court, said:
At the end of his career in the United States Senate, Judge
Trumbull became a member of the Chicago Bar. He was thereafter
continuously, and up to the time of his death, engaged in the
active and laborious practice of his profession. The great
place that he had held in the councils of the nation, the
influence that he had exerted upon national legislation, and
the esteem in which he was held by the lawyers and the
statesmen of the country, entitled him to a lofty mien; but as
is well known to us all who had the privilege of his
acquaintance at the bar, while his demeanor was grave it was
also modest, and his manner was marked by a gentleness that was
most grateful to everybody with whom he came in contact. His
sincerity and honesty in the presentation of his case, his
respectful demeanor to any court in which he was engaged in a
legal contest, constituted him a model that the lawyers of our
bar might well imitate. He was in practice at the bar
forty-four years after he ceased to be a judge of the supreme
court of this state.... He was preëminently the grand old man
of this country. In his intercourse with his fellow citizens he
was a quiet, sincere, frank, honest American gentleman. Lyman
Trumbull was one of the very great men of the nation.
Eulogistic remarks were made also by Senator John M. Palmer, ex-Senator
James R. Doolittle, and Judge Henry W. Blodgett. Mr. Doolittle said that
of the sixty-six members of the United States Senate who were there when
Secession began, only four were then living. They were Harlan, of Iowa,
Rice, of Minnesota, Clingman, of North Carolina, and himself
(Doolittle).
Trumbull's forte was that of a political debater well grounded in the
law. Here he stood in the very front rank, both as a Senator addressing
his equals and as an orator on the hustings. He was always ready to
discuss the questions which he was required to face. He had a logical
mind, and the ability to think quickly and to choose the right words to
express his ideas. He never wasted words in ornament or display. He
never lost his balance when addressing the Senate, or a public audience.
He had perfect self-possession. He never stood in awe of any other
debater or hesitated to reply promptly to question or challenge. Nor did
he ever lose his dignity in debate. Once he came near to calling Sumner
a falsifier, when the latter had described him as recreant to the
principles of human liberty; but he restrained himself in time to avoid
an infraction of the rules of the Senate. And he afterwards came to the
defense of Sumner when the latter was deposed, by his more subservient
colleagues, from the chairmanship of the Committee on Foreign Relations.
On this occasion Sumner came forward holding out both hands, and with
tears in his eyes thanked him for his generosity.
His rare forensic gifts would have been unavailing without confidence in
the justice of his cause, and a clear conscience which shone in his face
and pervaded him through and through. Although not endowed with
oratorical graces he grasped the attention of his audience at once, and
he never failed to convince his hearers that he had an eye single to the
public good. It was hard for him to separate himself from the Republican
party in 1871-72, but he considered it a duty that he owed to the
country to expose the rottenness then pervading the national
administration. He did not have General Grant in mind when he moved the
investigation of custom-house frauds in New York. He did not aim at him
directly or indirectly, but at the system which had grown up before his
election. Grant's mental make-up was such that he considered any
fault-finding with federal office-holders a reproach to himself, as the
head of the Government, and accordingly braced himself against it; and
this habit grew on him through the whole eight years of his presidency.
Yet Trumbull uttered no reproach against him during the campaign of
1872, or later.
It was commonly said that Trumbull's nature was cold and unsympathetic.
This was a mannerism merely. He did not carry his heart upon his sleeve
for daws to peck at, but he was an affectionate husband and father and
grandfather, most generous to his parents, brothers, and sisters, and
one of the most unselfish men I ever knew. His poor constituents, who
were often stranded in Washington, needing help to get home, seldom
applied to him for assistance in vain, and this kind of drain was pretty
severe during his whole senatorial service. He was fond of little
children. He was often seen playing croquet with his own and others in
Washington City. Mr. Morris St. P. Thomas, a member of the Chicago Bar
who shared Trumbull's office during his later years, says that he never
knew a warmer-hearted man than Trumbull. He was kindness and
consideration itself to the people in his office. He was never cross or
short, and every young man there always felt that he could go into the
judge's room whenever he liked, and sit down and tell him his troubles.
Once it devolved upon Mr. Thomas to engage a stenographer for the
office. Of the several applicants the best was an unprepossessing,
hump-backed girl. "I told the judge about her--that she was the ablest
applicant, but very unprepossessing in appearance." "Why," said he, at
once, "that's the very reason to take her, poor girl!" And they kept her
for years.[133]
In short, he was a high-minded, kind-hearted, courteous gentleman,
without ostentation and without guile. In business affairs he was
punctual, accurate, and spotless. He never borrowed money, never bought
anything that he could not pay cash for, never gave a promissory note in
his life, not even in the purchase of real estate where deferred
payments are customary. The best blood of New England coursed in his
veins and he never dishonored it, in either private or public life.
It is perhaps too early to assign to Trumbull his proper place in the
roll of statesmen of the Civil War period. Those who come after us and
can look back one hundred years, instead of fifty, will doubtless have a
better perspective and a clearer vision than those who lived with the
actors of that momentous struggle. Some things, however, we may be sure
of. One is that the man who drew the Thirteenth Amendment of the
Constitution, abolishing slavery in the United States and all places
under the jurisdiction thereof, will never be forgotten as long as the
love of liberty survives in this land. Not that the Thirteenth Amendment
would not have been passed and incorporated in our system even if Lyman
Trumbull had not been a Senator, or if he had never been born. It was a
consequence of the taking-up of arms against the Union in 1861 that
slavery should come to an end somehow. All that Lincoln did, all that
Trumbull did, all that Congress did, was to seize the occasion to give
direction to certain irresistible forces then called into existence for
blessing or cursing mankind. There were different ways of bringing
slavery to an end. That of constitutional amendment was the best of all
because it removed the subject-matter from the field of dispute at once
and forever. Lincoln paved the way for it. He prepared the public mind
for it by his two proclamations of emancipation. Trumbull and Congress
and the state legislatures did the rest.
It may be fairly said that Trumbull took the lead in putting an end to
arbitrary arrests in the loyal states where the courts of justice were
open, and in prescribing the process of the suspension of the writ of
_habeas corpus_. This was a difficult problem to handle and it cost
Trumbull some popularity, since the loyal spirit of the North was very
touchy on the subject of Copperheads and easily inflamed against anybody
who was accused of sympathy with them. The law finally passed seems now
to be altogether just, and well suited to be put in practice again if
occasion for it should arise.
Trumbull's place as one of the "Seven Traitors" who voted not guilty on
the impeachment of Andrew Johnson is now universally considered a proud
position, and I think that that of his neighbor and friend, James R.
Doolittle, of Wisconsin, who earned the title of traitor a year or two
earlier, is entitled to a place in the same Valhalla. Both are deserving
of monuments at the hands of their respective states.
The reader of these pages cannot fail to discern a marked change in
Trumbull's course on Reconstruction about midway of the struggle on that
issue. Gideon Welles said, under date January 16, 1867, "He [Trumbull]
has changed his principles within a year.[134] The facts are that he
agreed with Lincoln's plan of Reconstruction, embodied it in the
Louisiana Bill, reported it favorably from the Judiciary Committee,
tried to pass it in the closing days of the Thirty-eighth Congress, but
was prevented by the filibustering tactics of Sumner. After Johnson
became President he adhered to that plan until Johnson vetoed the
Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights Bills. He then believed that Johnson
had betrayed the cause for which the nation had fought through a four
years' war and that the freedom of the blacks would be endangered if
Johnson were sustained by the loyal states. He accordingly went with his
party, but with misgivings, halting now and then, putting blocks in the
way of the radicals here and there. He ceased to be the leader of the
Senate as he had hitherto been, on this class of questions, and he
became a reluctant follower. When Sumner became angry and charged him in
1870 with betrayal of the cause of freedom, he hotly affirmed that he
had voted for every measure for the equal rights of the freedmen that
Congress had passed, including the three constitutional amendments. The
truth was that he had put obstacles in the way of several measures that
Sumner deemed indispensable, until it became plain that the Republican
party was determined to pass them and that further resistance would be
useless. Then he gave his assent to them. This course he pursued until
the Anti-Ku-Klux Bill was agreed to, by the Judiciary Committee, in
1871. Against this measure he voted in the committee and in the Senate.
He held it to be unconstitutional, and he used against it the same
arguments in substance that Bingham had used in the House against the
Civil Rights Bill; and both he and Bingham were right. Trumbull did not
change his principles, but he made an error in common with his party and
he corrected it as soon as he became convinced that it was an error. I
am open to the same criticism."
Among interviews with men of note published in the Chicago press
concerning the deceased was one with Mr. Joseph Medill, not a friendly
critic but a political seer of the first class, who thought that
Trumbull might have been President of the United States if he had voted,
in the impeachment case, to convict Andrew Johnson.
If he had remained true to his party [said Mr. Medill], Judge
Trumbull, I believe, would have died with his name in the roll
of Presidents of the United States. I have always thought that
he could have been the successor of Grant. He stood so high in
the estimation of his party and the nation that nothing was
beyond his reach. Grant, of course, came before everybody, but
Trumbull was next, a man of great ability, undoubted integrity,
and stainless reputation, pure as the driven snow and nearly
as cold. He could have been President instead of Hayes, or
Garfield, or Harrison.[1]
Following the interview with Mr. Medill is one with Mr. Henry S.
Robbins, a member of Trumbull's law firm from 1883 until 1890. Mr.
Robbins did not find Trumbull a cold man.
All the time we were together [said Mr. Robbins] I never heard
him speak a cross word to a clerk in the office. Among children
he was a child again. He and his little grandson, the child of
Walter Trumbull, who died several years ago, were inseparable
companions when the grandfather was at home. They played
together and talked together like two little boys. All the
children in the neighborhood where he lived were wont to come
to him with their little troubles and always found him one who
could enter into fullest sympathy with them. Judge Trumbull had
no worldliness. He seemed to practice law as a mission, not as
a vocation by which to make money. With his reputation and his
ability combined he might have died a millionaire. It always
gave him a pang to charge a fee, and when he fixed the charge
it was usually about half what a modern lawyer would charge.[1]
Another partner, Mr. William N. Horner, said:
I came here from Belleville where Judge Trumbull formerly
lived, and people down there--some of them at least--used to
think that he was a cold man. I never found him so. I remember
the first day we moved into these offices and while we were
getting settled, Judge Trumbull worked harder than any of us.
He was more solicitous for our comfort than he was for his own.
He was always trying to do something for the comfort of others.
He had all the gentleness and sweetness of disposition and
patience of a woman.[135]
Mr. C. S. Darrow, who had charge of the Debs case in which Trumbull
volunteered his services, said that
the socialistic trend of the venerable statesman's opinions in
his later years sprang from his deep sympathies with all
unfortunates; that sympathy that made him an anti-slavery
Democrat in his early years, and afterwards a Republican. He
became convinced that the poor who toil for a living in this
world were not getting a fair chance. His heart was with
them.[136]
A letter to myself from the widow of Walter Trumbull, who died in 1891,
says:
After my husband died, I, with my two boys, lived with Judge
Trumbull until his death; and I wish I could tell you how
beautiful that home life was. He was so devoted to his family,
so sweet and tender and thoughtful for us all. Others never
realized this and often thought him cold. He was so great a man
and yet so gentle and simple in his ways that little children
clung to him.
Among the papers left by Trumbull was the following estimate of the
character and career of Abraham Lincoln. It was addressed to his son
Walter Trumbull and is here published for the first time:
MY DEAR SON: I have often been requested to give my estimate of
Mr. Lincoln's life and character. His death at the close of a
great civil war in which the Government of which he was the
head had been successful, and the manner of his taking off,
were not favorable to a candid and impartial review of his
character. The temper of the public mind at that time would not
tolerate anything but praise of the martyred President, and
even now it is questionable whether the truthful history of his
life by Mr. Herndon, his lifelong friend, and law partner for
twenty years, will be received with favor. As I could not give
any other than a truthful narration of Mr. Lincoln's character,
as he was known to me, I have hitherto declined to write
anything for the public concerning him. Having known him at
different times as a political adversary and a political
friend, my opportunities for judging his public life and
character were from different standpoints. We were members of
the Illinois House of Representatives in 1840. He was a Whig
and I a Democrat, but we had no controversies, political or
otherwise. Indeed, Mr. Lincoln took very little part in the
legislation of that session. It was the period when, as
related by Mr. Herndon, he was engaged in love affairs which
some of his friends feared had well-nigh unsettled his mental
faculties. I recall but one speech he made during the session.
In that he told a story which convulsed the House to the great
discomfiture of the member at whom it was aimed. Mr. Lincoln
was regarded at that time by his political friends as among
their shrewdest and ablest leaders, and by his political
adversaries as a formidable opponent. Contemporary with him in
the legislature of 1840 were Edward D. Baker, William A.
Richardson, William H. Bissell, Thomas Drummond, John J.
Hardin, John A. McClernand, Ebenezer Peck, and others whose
subsequent careers in the national councils, on the field of
battle, and in civil life have shed lustre on their country's
history. It is no mean praise to say of Mr. Lincoln that among
this galaxy of young men convened at the capital of Illinois in
1840, to whom may be added Stephen A. Douglas, although not
then a member of the legislature, he stood in the front rank.
As a lawyer Mr. Lincoln was painstaking, discriminating, and
accurate. He mastered his cases, and had a most happy and
fascinating way of presenting them. He was logical, fair, and
candid. It was said of him by one of the most eminent judges
who ever presided in Illinois, that after Mr. Lincoln had
opened a case he [the judge] fully understood both sides of it.
Some of Mr. Lincoln's contemporaries at the bar were more
learned, and better lawyers, but no one managed a case, which
he had time to thoroughly study and understand, more adroitly.
The breaking-up of the Whig and Democratic parties in 1854,
growing out of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and the
opening of the territory to slavery, threw Mr. Lincoln and
myself together politically. We were both opposed to the spread
of slavery, and from the foundation of the Republican party
till his death we were in political accord. I do not claim to
have been his confidant, and doubt if any man ever had his
entire confidence. He was secretive, and communicated no more
of his own thoughts and purposes than he thought would subserve
the ends he had in view. He had the faculty of gaining the
confidence of others by apparently giving them his own, and in
that way attached to himself many friends. I saw much of him
after we became political associates, and can truthfully say
that he never misled me by word or deed. He was truthful,
compassionate, and kind, but he was one of the shrewdest men I
ever knew. To use a common expression he was "as cunning as a
fox." He was a good judge of men, their motives, and purposes,
and knew how to wield them to his own advantage. He was not
aggressive. Ever ready to take advantage of the public current,
he did not attempt to lead it. He did not promulgate the
article of war enacted by Congress forbidding army and navy
officers from employing their forces to return slaves to their
masters, under penalty of dismissal from the service, till more
than six months after its passage. It was more than nine months
after the enactment of a law by Congress declaring free all
slaves of rebels captured, or coming within the Union lines, or
found in any place occupied by rebel forces and afterwards
occupied by the forces of the Union, that he issued the
proclamation declaring free the slaves then within the rebel
lines, all of whom, belonging to persons in rebellion, were
made free by the act of Congress as soon as the Union forces
occupied the country, and till then the proclamation could not
be enforced. When applied to by a friend, just previous to the
meeting of the convention at Baltimore which nominated him for
a second term, to indicate what resolutions or policy he
desired the convention to adopt, he declined to suggest any.
These and many other illustrations might be given to show that
Mr. Lincoln was a follower and not a leader in public affairs.
Without attempting to form or create public sentiment, he
waited till he saw whither it tended, and then was astute to
take advantage of it. Some of Mr. Lincoln's admirers, instead
of regarding his want of system, hesitancy, and irresolution as
defects in his character, seek to make them the subject of
praise, as in the end the rebellion was suppressed, and slavery
abolished, during his administration, ignoring the fact that a
man of more positive character, prompt and systematic action,
might have accomplished the same result in half the time, and
with half the loss of blood and treasure.
Mr. Lincoln was by no means the unsophisticated, artless man
many took him to be. Mr. Swett, a lifelong friend and admirer,
writing to Mr. Herndon, says: "One great public mistake of his
character, as generally received and acquiesced in, is that he
is considered by the people of this country as a frank,
guileless, and unsophisticated man. There never was a greater
mistake. Beneath a smooth surface of candor, and apparent
declaration of all his thoughts and feelings, he exercised the
most exalted tact, and the widest discrimination.... In dealing
with men he was a trimmer, and such a trimmer as the world has
never seen."[137]
Herndon in his "Lincoln," at page 471, says: "He had a way of
pretending to assure his visitor that in the choice of his
advisers he was free to act as his judgment dictated, although
David Davis, acting as his manager at the Chicago Convention,
had negotiated with the Pennsylvania and Indiana delegations,
and assigned places in the Cabinet to Simon Cameron and Caleb
Smith, besides making other arrangements which Mr. Lincoln was
expected to satisfy."
Another popular mistake is to suppose Mr. Lincoln free from
ambition. A more ardent seeker after office never existed. From
the time when, at the age of twenty-three, he announced himself
a candidate for the legislature from Sangamon County, till his
death, he was almost constantly either in office, or struggling
to obtain one. Sometimes defeated and often successful, he
never abandoned the desire for office till he had reached the
presidency the second time. Swett says, "He was much more eager
for it [a second nomination] than for the first," and such was
known to his intimate friends to be the fact, though his manner
to the public would have indicated that he was indifferent to a
second nomination. When first a candidate for the presidency
Mr. Herndon tells us, "He wrote to influential party workers
everywhere," promising money to defray the expenses of
delegates to the convention favoring his nomination.
While ardently devoted to the Union, Mr. Lincoln had no
well-defined plan for saving it, but suffered things to drift,
watching to take advantage of events as they occurred. He was a
judge of men and knew how to use them to advantage. He brought
into his Cabinet some of the ablest men in the nation, and left
to them the management of their respective departments. This
country never had an abler head of the Treasury Department than
Salmon P. Chase. To his skillful management of the finances the
country was indebted for the means to carry on the war of the
rebellion, and bring it to a successful issue. For the
distinguished ability with which the State and War Departments
were managed during the rebellion the country is greatly
indebted to Mr. Seward and Mr. Stanton. Other members of Mr.
Lincoln's Cabinet were men of great executive ability. Lincoln
was unmethodical and without executive ability, but he selected
advisers who possessed these qualities in an eminent degree.
To sum up his character, it may be said that as a man he was
honest, pure, kind-hearted, and sympathetic; as a lawyer,
clear-headed, astute, and successful; as a politician,
ambitious, shrewd, and farseeing; as a public speaker,
incisive, clear, and convincing, often eloquent, clothing his
thoughts in the most beautiful and attractive language, a
logical reasoner, and yet most unmethodical in all his ways; as
President during a great civil war he lacked executive ability,
and that resolution and prompt action essential to bring it to
a speedy and successful close; but he was a philanthropist and
a patriot, ardently devoted to the Union and the equality and
freedom of all men. He presided over the nation in the most
critical period of its history, and lived long enough to see
the rebellion subdued, and a whole race lifted from slavery to
freedom. The fact that he was at the head of the nation when
these great results were accomplished, and of his most cruel
assassination, before there was time to fully appreciate the
great work that had been done during his administration, will
forever endear him to the American people, and hand his name
down to posterity as among the best, if not the greatest, of
mankind.
Another manuscript, addressed to Mrs. Gershom Jayne, the mother of the
first Mrs. Trumbull, in answer to a communication from her, gives
Trumbull's views on religion:
CHICAGO, Apr. 22, 1877.
DEAR MOTHER: I scarcely know how to reply to your texts of
Scripture and your solicitude for me. If the fervent prayers of
the righteous avail, it would seem as if yours and those of my
departed Julia should have their influence, and I sometimes
feel as if the spirit of my dear Julia was even now not far
away. That I am not what I should be is too true: I feel it
and I know it, and yet I trust the influence and prayers of
those who have loved me have not been entirely thrown away. I
have abundant reason to be thankful to our Heavenly Father for
his protection and ten thousand kindnesses to me which I know I
have not deserved. How often when the way was dark before me
has an unseen hand carried me safely through! And yet, whilst
ever ready to acknowledge my own imperfection and impotence, I
suppose I know nothing of, or at best see but as through a
glass dimly, that change of heart of which the converted speak,
and which comes of a faith it has not been given me to possess.
I certainly hope through the Saviour's interposition for a
happy hereafter, but at the same time am obliged to confess
that the way is to me dark and mysterious, and by no means as
discernible as it appears to some others. I rejoice that they
can see it clearly and wish that I could too....
Affectionately yours,
LYMAN TRUMBULL.
Three sons of Lyman Trumbull reached mature years: Walter, Perry, and
Henry. The latter died unmarried, January 20, 1895.
Walter, the eldest, was married September, 1876, to Miss Hannah Mather
Slater. Three sons were born of this union. The first of these, Lyman
Trumbull, Jr., died in infancy. The second, Walter S., was born in 1879,
married Miss Marjorie Skinner, of Hartford, Connecticut, in 1905, and
now resides in New York City. The third, Charles L., born in 1884,
married in 1910 Miss Lucy Proctor, of Peoria, Illinois, and now resides
in Chicago. Walter Trumbull died October 25, 1891.
Perry Trumbull was married to Mary Caroline Peck, daughter of Ebenezer
Peck, judge of the United States Court of Claims, in 1879. Four children
were born to them: (1) Julia Wright, married to H. Thompson Frazer,
M.D., now resides at Asheville, North Carolina; (2) Edward A., married
Anna Whitby, and resides at Seattle, Washington; (3) Charles P.,
married, resides at Las Vegas, New Mexico; (4) Selden, resides in
Chicago. Perry Trumbull died December 10, 1902.
Mrs. Mary Ingraham Trumbull, widow of Lyman Trumbull, resides at
Saybrook Point, Connecticut.
FOOTNOTES:
[133] Interview, June 13, 1910.
[134] _Diary of Gideon Welles_, III, 21.
[135] Chicago _Times_, June 26, 1896.
[136] Chicago _Times_, June 26, 1896.
[137] Herndon's _Life of Lincoln_, 537, 538.
THE END
INDEX
Throughout the Index, the Initial T., standing alone, represents the
subject of the book.
Abolition movement, the, and the murder of Lovejoy, 10.
Act of March 27, 1868, purpose of, 328, 329;
passed by Congress, and vetoed, 329;
passed over veto, 330;
its application to McCardle case glaringly unjust, 330.
Adams, Charles Francis, Seward's dispatches of April, 1861, and
July, 1862, to, 210 _ff._;
proposed for Liberal Republican nomination for President, 372, 373,
374, 381;
his attitude regarding the nomination, 377, 378;
defeated by Greeley, 383, 384;
why Blair and Brown opposed him, 385 and _n._;
a stronger candidate than T., 402, 403; xxi, 182, 389, 390.
Adams, Charles Francis, Jr., _The Trent Affair_, etc., 349 _n._; 353,
378.
Adams, John, xxiii.
Adams, John Quincy, xxii, 27, 103.
Adams, John Quincy, 2d, nominated for Vice-President by dissentient
Democrats (1872), 394;
declines, 394.
Akerman, Amos T., succeeds Hoar as Attorney-General, 350.
Alabama, admission of, xxix;
and the 13th Amendment, 229;
order for reconstruction of, 238.
Alabama Claims, T. on, 348;
Grant's great service in settling, 362.
Aldrich, Cyrus, 68.
Alien and Sedition laws, xxiii.
Allen, G. T., 42, 43, 46 _n._
Allen, Robert, 13.
Allison, John, 69.
Allison, William B., Senator, 304, 346.
Altgeld, John P., Governor, and the Pullman strike, 414.
Alton, Ill., T. removes to, 21.
Alton riot, the, 8-10.
American Bottom, locus of slavery in Ill., in 1783, 23.
_American Historical Review_, quoted, 174.
American Railway Union, 413.
Ammen, Jacob, General, 206, 208.
Amnesty, Johnson's proclamation of, 239.
Amnesty bill, debated in Senate, 359;
amended by Sumner, and rejected, 359;
reintroduced and passed, 359, 360.
Anderson, Robert, Major, proposed recall of, from Sumter, 122, 123;
128, 155.
_And see_ Sumter.
Andrew, John A., Governor, 287, 307 _n._
Anthony, Henry B., Senator, his attitude on ousting of Sumner from
Foreign Affairs Committee, 347; 314, 364, 366, 367.
Anti Ku-Klux bill. _See_ Ku-Klux Bill
Anti-Nebraska Democrats, in Ill. legislature, 41 _ff._;
and the Senatorial election of 1854, 46 _n._
Archer, William B., 69.
"Arm-in-Arm Convention." _See_ National Union Convention.
Armstrong, postmaster at St. Louis, 81.
Arnold, I. N., Congressman, 207.
Arrests, arbitrary, T's resolution of inquiry concerning, 191 _ff._;
censured by Democratic Convention, 193;
license to make, transferred to Stanton, 197;
effect of change, 197, 198;
action of Democrats on, 197;
T. took lead in stopping, in loyal states, 422, 423.
_And see_ Habeas corpus.
Arthur, Chester A., appointed Collector of New York, 368.
Asay, E. G., 208.
Ashley, James M., Congressman, 228 _n._
Atchison, David R., Senator, his advice to Missourians, 52; 49, 54.
Atkinson, Edward, 353.
Atzerodt, conspirator, 289.
Babcock, Orville E., sent by Grant to San Domingo, 342, 362, 369.
Bacon Academy, 3.
Badger, George E., 49.
Bailey, G., quoted on Dred Scott case, 83.
Baker, Edward D., Senator, 10, 132, 427.
Baker, Henry L., 42, 43, 46.
Baldwin, J. B., and Lincoln's offer to evacuate Sumter, 159, 160;
his version contradicted by Botts, 160, 161;
R. L. Dabney's account of interview of, with Lincoln, 161, 162.
Bancroft, George, wrote Johnson's first message, 244, 245.
Banks, Nathaniel P., General, 36, 87, 102, 232, 233.
Barney, Hiram, Collector of New York, 147, 181, 182.
Barrett, A. B., quoted, 117.
Bates, Edward, candidate for Republican nomination in 1860, 103;
and enforcement of Confiscation Act, 177; 104, 150.
Bayard, James A., Senator, 200, 201, 228.
Bayard, Thomas F., Senator, 366.
Beecher, Henry W., 287.
Belknap, William W., General, 362.
Belleville, Ill., T. settles at, 5, 6;
described by Dickens, 14, 15.
Belleville _Advocate_, the, 323.
Belmont, August, quoted, on Liberal Republican movement, 373, 374.
Benjamin, Judah P., Senator, on the Dred Scott case, 82;
his reply to Douglas, 95, 96;
contrasts Douglas and Lincoln, 96.
Benton, Thomas H., Senator, 126.
Bigelow, Israel B., quoted, 217.
Bigelow, John, his Diary quoted, 403 _n._
Bingham, John A., Congressman, opposes Civil Rights bill, 271, 272,
281;
on Reconstruction Committee, 281;
proposes amendment to Constitution, 282;
amends Georgia bill, 298, 299; 196, 304, 309, 339, 424.
Bird, Frank W., quoted, on Cincinnati nominations, 385 _n._; 387.
Birney, James G., 37, 40.
Bishop, Mr., killed in Alton riot, 9.
Bissell, W. H., Governor, quoted, 10, 69, 70, 74, 88, 427.
Black, Jere. S., counsel for McCardle, 327.
Blaine, James G., interview of, with author, on revenue reform, 354.
Blair, Austin, Congressman, 397, 398.
Blair, F. P., General, Democratic candidate for Vice-President (1868),
333;
and the Cincinnati convention, 385 and _n._; 37, 120, 382.
Blair, Gist, quoted, 220 _n._
Blair, Montgomery, quoted, on Cameron's appointment, 151;
on Cameron's emancipation hobby, 172 _n._;
his resignation as Postmaster General and Frémont's withdrawal, 220
and _n._;
on reconstruction, 293; 83, 112, 157, 234, 307 _n._
Blatchford, Samuel J., Justice, 275.
Blodgett, Henry W., 419.
Blow, Henry T., 281.
Bonifant, U. S. Marshal, 195.
Booth, J. Wilkes, 289.
Border Ruffians. _See_ Missourians in Kansas.
Borders, Sarah, 28, 29.
Borie, Adolph, appointed Secretary of Navy, 337;
resigns, 337.
Boston _Advertiser_, 300.
Botts, John Minor, his _Great Rebellion_ quoted on Lincoln's offer to
evacuate Sumter, 159, 160;
denies Baldwin's story, 160, 161.
Boutwell, George S., Congressman, appointed Secretary of Treasury,
336, 337;
and the Leet and Stocking scandal, 364, 365; 281, 291, 304, 309,
339.
Bowles, Samuel, 86, 353, 387.
Bradley, Joseph P., Justice, 275, 276, 409.
Brainard, Daniel, 80.
Brayman, Mason, 13.
Breckinridge, John C., elected Vice-President (1856), 70;
nominated for President (1860), by seceding delegates, 96.
Brinkerhoff, R., 353.
Brooks, Preston S., Congressman, his assault on Sumner, 65.
"Brother Jonathan," 2 _n._
Brown, Albert G., Senator, 63.
Brown, B. Gratz, elected governor of Mo. as a liberal, 352;
candidate for Liberal Republican nomination, 377, 378;
arrives at Cincinnati, 382;
withdraws in favor of Greeley, 383;
nominated for Vice-President, 384;
divers views of his course, 384, 385 and _n._;
nominated by Democrats, 394; 220, 285, 389, 402.
Brown, George T., 80.
Brown, John, his raid on Harper's Ferry, 96-100;
author's impression of, 97;
his own view of his mission, 97, 98;
T. on moral and legal aspects of the raid, 98, 99; 53.
Brown, Joseph, 375.
Brown, William G., quoted, xxxiv.
Brown, W. H., 87.
Browning, Orville H., Secretary of Interior, his views on question of
territorializing states, 291; 92, 194, 197, 285, 307.
Brownlow, W. G., reconstruction governor of Tenn., 237.
Bryan, Silas L., 375.
Bryan, William J., student in T.'s office, 407;
author's meeting with (1893), 413.
Bryant, John H., quoted, 67 and _n._; 375.
Bryant, William Cullen, refuses to support Greeley, 385;
correspondence with T. thereon, 386, 387; 139, 140, 141, 145, 287,
353, 375, 391.
Buchanan, James, elected President, 70;
appoints Walker Governor of Kansas, 71;
and the Lecompton Constitution, 73;
his message to Congress on Topeka and Lecompton constitutions,
answered by T., 76, 77, and by Douglas, 77;
said to favor rejection of pro-slavery clause, 78;
recommends admission of Kansas under Lecompton Constitution, 81;
his message thereon discussed by T., 81, 82;
Chief Justice Caton on his attitude toward Lecomptonism, 84, 85;
and Justice McLean, 122, 123 and _n._;
policy of his government toward secessionists, 127, 128;
takes sides for the Union under pressure, 128; 74, 75, 113.
Buchanan Democrats in Ill., adopt name of National Democracy, 89;
Lincoln quoted concerning, 90;
their small poll, 91;
their poll in 1860 even smaller, 96.
Buckalew, Charles R., Senator, 285, 329.
Buckingham, William A., Senator, 366.
Bull Run, first battle of, described by T. in letters to Mrs. T.,
165-167.
Bullock, Rufus P., reconstruction governor of Georgia, 297, 298,
299, 300.
Burchard, Horatio C., Congressman, 354.
Burke, Edmund, 358.
Burlingame, Anson, 86, 88.
Burnside, Ambrose E., General, orders arrest of Vallandigham, 204;
his proceedings against the Chicago _Times_, 206-209;
his order revoked by Lincoln, 208;
defeated at Fredericksburg, 211.
Butler, Benjamin F., Congressman, reports Georgia bill, 298;
author of 10th article of impeachment, 311; 304, 309, 359, 362.
Butler, Fanny Kemble, xxxiv.
Butler, William, quoted, 148; 149, 151.
Cabinet, Pres. Johnson's, discussion of Tenure-of-Office bill by,
302, 303;
unanimous in advising veto, 303, 311.
Cabinet officers, and the Tenure-of-Office Act, 301, 302.
Cadwalader, George, 195.
Calhoun, John, and the Lecompton Constitution, 73; 18, 75, 84.
Calhoun, John C., Senator, and the doctrine of Nullification, xxv and
_n._, xxvii; 4.
Cameron, Simon, history of his inclusion in Lincoln's Cabinet, 142
_ff._;
visits Lincoln at Springfield, 144;
Lincoln promises portfolio to, 144, 429;
urgent opposition to, from McClure, T., and others, 144, 145, 146,
147 _ff._;
and Frémont, 172;
his report in favor of freeing and arming slaves suppressed by
Lincoln, 172 and _n._;
and the War Department frauds, 178 _ff._;
and T. A. Scott, 184, 185;
Nicolay and Hay on causes of his leaving Cabinet, 185, 186;
made Minister to Russia, 186;
McClure on his dismissal, 186, 187;
censured by House in Cummings affair, 186;
his confirmation as Minister to Russia opposed by T. and others,
187, 188,
but favored by Sumner, 188;
his statement to Hamlin, 188;
vote on Confirmation of, 189;
how he repaid Sumner, 189; 108, 343, 371.
Carlile, John S., Senator, opposes habeas corpus suspension act, 199.
Carlin, Thomas, 11.
Carpenter, Matthew H., Senator, counsel in McCardle case, 327, 329;
300, 358;
report on Louisiana election, 405;
speech before Electoral Commission, 411.
Carpetbaggers, and the San Domingo treaty, 350; 241.
Cass, Lewis, Senator, his Nicholson letter on squatter sovereignty,
94; 48, 63, 125.
Castle Pinckney, 129.
Catiline, steamer, 179, 180, 181, 182.
Caton, John D., quoted, on Buchanan's attitude toward Lecomptonism,
84, 85; 20.
Caulfield, B. G., 208.
Cavalry, fraudulent contracts for purchase of horses for, 182, 183.
_Century Magazine_, cited, 245 _n._, 307 _n._, 321 _n._
Chandler, Zachariah, Senator, and T.'s connection with the McCardle
case, 331, 332; 150, 166, 233, 355, 363, 371.
Channing, William Ellery, xxxii.
Charleston Convention of 1860, 107.
Chase, Salmon P., Chief Justice, quoted, 67;
and Cameron's dismissal, 186;
presides at impeachment trial, 309;
on the 11th article, 311;
his ruling on evidence of Johnson's intent to make a case for the
Supreme Court, overruled by the Senate, 313;
vote for, in Cincinnati convention (1872), 383;
T's estimate of, as Secretary of Treasury, 429, 430; 79, 102, 103,
107, 145, 147, 148, 150, 151, 170, 234, 240, 274, 289, 320, 372.
Cheever, Rev. George B., 220.
Cherokee Tract, the, 5.
Chesnut, James, 99.
Chicago, rioting at, in Pullman strike, 414;
troops ordered to, 414;
meeting at, addressed by T., 414, 415.
Chicago _Advance_, T.'s article in, on restriction of suffrage, 294.
Chicago Bar Association, and T.'s death, 418, 419.
Chicago _Evening Journal_, quoted, on T.'s speech on Chicago Times
matter, 208; 93.
Chicago _Times_, publication of, forbidden by Burnside, 206-209;
meeting of protest against the order, 207;
the order revoked by Lincoln, 208; 415, 424, 425.
Chicago _Tribune_, quoted, on the duty of Senators in impeachment
trial, 315, 316; 372, 389, 390.
Cincinnati, Liberal Republican Convention at (1872), 374 _ff._;
how composed, 379, 380;
difficulties of, on tariff question, result in compromise, 381, 382;
Greeley nominated for President by, 383, 384.
Cincinnati _Commercial_, 372.
Citizens of U. S., definition of, in 14th Amendment, 283.
Civil Rights bill, introduced by T., 257;
T.'s proposed amendment to, debated in Senate, 265 _ff._;
passes Senate, 271, and House, 272;
vetoed by Johnson, 272;
passed over veto, 272, 273;
held constitutional by Circuit Court of U. S., 274;
in Supreme Court, 275 _ff._;
Bingham's objections to, 281;
relation of 14th Amendment to, 282, 283;
T.'s course on, 424, 425.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., 275, 276.
Civil service, demoralization of, under Grant, 341, 342.
Civil-service reform, T. on, 359, 376.
Civil War, the, could not have been averted, xxi, xxii.
Clark, Daniel, Senator, 262, 264.
Clay, Clement C., Senator, his farewell speech in Senate, 121; 100.
Clay, Henry, xxvi, xxxi, 27, 39, 125.
Clayton, John M., 63 _n._
Cleveland, Grover, orders troops to Chicago, 414; 413.
Clifford, Nathan, Justice Sup. Court, 289, 409.
Clingman, Thomas L., Senator, 419.
Cochrane, John, General, nominated for Vice-President by anti-Lincoln
Republicans (1864), 219, 220.
Cole, Cornelius, Senator, 314.
Coles, Edward, and the "Anti-convention"
Contest in Ill., 27, 28.
Colfax, Schuyler, elected Vice-President (1872), 333;
and Grant, 393, 394;
and the Crédit-Mobilier, 402; 80, 331, 359.
Collamer, Jacob, Senator, speech of, on Kansas affairs, 65;
attacks T.'s Confiscation bill, 173, 174; 55, 102, 198.
Collins, James H., 30.
Colonization Society, xxxi.
Compromise of 1860, xxi, 34, 124, 125.
Confederate States. _See_ States, seceding.
Confiscation bill, concerning slaves only, introduced by T., and
passed by Congress, 168.
Confiscation bill (II), introduced by T. (Dec. 1861), 173, 176;
debated all the session, 173 _ff._;
report of Conference committee on, adopted, 175;
Lincoln proposes to veto, 175;
passage of joint resolution interpreting, 175;
the first step toward full emancipation, 176;
trifling proceeds of confiscation under, 176;
controversy over enforcement of, 176, 177.
Congress, adopts Missouri Compromise, xxx;
passes Kansas-Nebraska bill, 37;
Pres. Pierce's special message to, on Kansas affairs, 55;
Pres. Buchanan's first message to, 76;
Buchanan recommends admission of Kansas to, 81;
passes first Confiscation bill, 168;
debate on second Confiscation bill in, 173 _ff._;
Pres. Johnson's first message to, 244, 245;
power of, to pass laws for ordinary administration of justice in
states, 258-260, 265 _ff._;
attacked by Johnson, 286;
radicals in, and the Milligan case, 289, 290;
makes general of the army virtually independent of the President,
291;
measures of reconstruction passed by, over vetoes, 291-295;
and impeachment of Johnson, 303 _ff._;
intensity of contest in, 312;
and the McCardle case, 328-330;
passes Act of March 27, 1868, over veto, 330;
and the 15th Amendment, 338-340;
Pres. Grant's message to, on Ku-Klux-Klans, 356;
and the Amnesty bill, 359, 360;
and the Crédit-Mobilier, 402.
_And see_ House of Representatives, Reconstruction, Committee on, and
Senate.
Congress of the Confederation, and Jefferson's ordinance concerning
slavery (1784), xxviii, xxix;
passes Ordinance of 1787, 24, 25, 29.
_Congressional Globe_ of 1860-61, 114.
Conkling, Roscoe, Senator, 281, 331, 339, 355, 362, 363.
Connecticut, opposed to nomination of Seward, 103.
Constitution of U. S., obstacles to ratification of, xxii and _n._;
its "educational work," xxvi, xxvii;
and the power to free slaves, 222, 223;
projects of amending, in that regard, 223;
the James F. Wilson resolution, 223;
the Henderson resolution, 223,
reported by T. in amended form, 224.
_Amendment_ XIII, reported by T. in Senate, 224;
his speech thereon, 224-226;
favored by Henderson and R. Johnson, 227;
adopted by both branches, 228;
scene in House described by Julian, 228 and _n._;
ratified by States, 229, 252;
Seward's interpretation of, 229;
discussed in connection with Freedmen's Bureau bill, 258, 260;
and the Civil Rights bill, 267, 269, 270;
construed by Supreme Court in U.S. v. Harris, 275, 358,
and in Civil Rights Cases, 276, 277;
T.'s connection with, 422.
_Amendment_ XIV, construed by Supreme Court in U.S. v. Harris, 275,
358,
and in Civil Rights Cases, 276;
prepared and reported by Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 282,
283;
provisions of, 283;
passes both houses, 283;
history of framing of, 284 _n._;
Southern States refuse to ratify, and why, 287;
and the power of Congress to enforce ordinary civil law in the
states, 356, 357, 358.
_Amendment_ XV, construed by Supreme Court in U.S. _v._ Harris, 276,
358;
history of, 338-340;
passed by Congress, 339;
text of, 340;
ratified by States, 340.
"Convention party," the, attempts to amend Illinois constitution to
legalize slavery, 25, 26; defeat of, 27.
Cook, Burton C., 41, 43, 45, 46 _n._, 93.
Cook, Daniel P., in the "anti-convention" contest, 27, 28;
Cook County, Ill., named for, 27.
Cooper Union, Liberal Republican meeting at, 376, 377.
Copperheadism, Vallandigham the incarnation of, 203.
Corbett, Henry W., Senator, 314.
Corning, Erastus, 205.
Corwin, Thomas, Congressman, 112, 117.
Cotton-gin, results of invention of, xxxii.
Cowan, Edgar, Senator, attacks T.'s Confiscation bill, 173;
his great speech in favor of _habeas corpus_ suspension act, 201;
on Civil Rights bill, 269, 271, 272; 146, 261, 262, 285, 286, 323.
Cox, Jacob D., appointed Secretary of Interior, 337, 338;
why he resigned, 349, 350; 353, 373.
Crédit-Mobilier scandal, the, 401, 402.
Cresswell, John A. J., appointed Postmaster General, 337.
Crittenden, John J., Senator, his compromise measure, debated and
rejected by Senate, 115-117; 48, 60, 66.
Crittenden Compromise, debated, 115, 116;
T's speech against, 115, 123-138;
rejected by Senate, 117;
letters to T. from Illinoisans concerning, 117-119.
Cullom, Shelby M., Senator, quoted, 293;
defeats T. for governor of Ill., 412.
Cummings, Alexander, one of Cameron's agents, 143, 178;
the leading figure in War Dep't scandal, 178 _ff._;
a candidate for office under Johnson, 181 _n._
Curry, J. L. M., letter of, to Doolittle, as to Southern views, 255,
256.
Curtin, Andrew G., Governor, vote for in Cincinnati Convention, 383;
106, 144, 374, 377, 378.
Curtis, Benjamin R., of counsel for Pres. Johnson, 309.
Curtis, George W., 338, 368.
Curtis Commission on Civil Service Reform, 376.
Dabney, Rev. R. L., his account of the Lincoln-Baldwin Interview, 161,
162.
"Danites." _See_ Buchanan Democrats.
Darrow, Clarence S., quoted, on T.'s "socialistic trend," 425, 426;
414.
Davidson, G. C., 179, 180.
Davis, David, and Cameron's appointment, 142 _ff._;
bargains with delegates from Penn. and Ind., 142, 429;
his influence with Lincoln, 143 and _n._;
opinion of, in Milligan case, 289;
candidate for Liberal Republican nomination at Cincinnati, 377, 378;
his candidacy objected to by editors, 380, 381;
and the Electoral Commission (1877), 409; 178, 384.
Davis, Garrett, Senator, on Civil Rights bill, 270; 161, 234.
Davis, Henry Winter, Congressman, opposes Lincoln's reëlection, 220.
Davis, Jefferson, and "Squatter Sovereignty," 94, 95;
his resolutions aimed at Douglas's nomination, 95;
not a hothead, 110;
his speech of Jan. 10, 1861, 110;
his last speeches in Senate, 114, 115;
his farewell speech, 121;
his Rise and _Fall of the Confederate States_, 123 _n._; 83.
Dawes, Henry L., Congressman, on purchases of cavalry horses, 182,
183;
on corruption in government service, 184;
replies to Cameron's statement to Hamlin, 188, 189; 304, 354.
Dayton, William L., Senator, 69, 142.
Debs, Eugene V., and the Pullman strike, 413-415;
T. counsel for, 414, 415.
Delahay, M. W., opposition to his appointment as district judge, 213,
214;
appointed, impeached, and resigns, 214; 100, 101 and _n._
Dement, Isaac T., on affairs in Kansas, 53.
Democratic National Convention at Baltimore (1860), nominates Douglas,
96;
Southern delegates secede from, 96; 107;
(1872) adopts platform and candidate of Liberal Republicans, 394.
Democratic party, in North, split by Kansas-Nebraska bill, 37.
Democrats, condemn suspension of habeas corpus and arbitrary arrests,
194, 197;
in Senate, oppose habeas corpus suspension bill, 198, 199,
and filibuster against it, 200-203;
in North, protest against Vallandigham's trial and sentence, 205;
in Congress, oppose 13th Amendment, 228,
but not unanimously, 228 _n._;
union of, with Liberal Republicans, suggested by M. D. Sands, 353;
sympathy of, with that movement, 372 _ff._, 379;
dissentient (in 1872), nominate O'Conor and Adams, 394.
Denver, John A., appointed Governor of Kansas, 73.
Develin, John E., 179.
Dexter, Wirt, 208.
Dickens, Charles, describes Belleville, Ill., in _American Notes_, 14,
15.
Disfranchisement, chief cause of bad conditions in South, 356.
Dixon, Archibald, Senator, and repeal of Missouri Compromise, 34; 49.
Dixon, James, Senator, opposes inquiry as to arbitrary arrests, 192,
193;
his vote
against Impeachment, 323; 247, 261, 264, 265, 285, 313.
Dodge, Augustus C., Senator, 35.
Dodge, Grenville M., General, 227, 334 _n._, 394.
Dodge, William E., 365.
Doolittle, James R., Senator, on Tenure-of-Office bill, 303;
his vote against impeachment, 323;
his resignation demanded, 323; 150, 194, 220, 233, 247, 261, 273
_n._, 285, 313, 329, 419, 423.
Dougherty, John, 18, 89, 90.
Douglas, Robert M., 32 _n._
Douglas, Stephen A., appointed to Ill. Supreme Court, 10;
elected U. S. Senator, 19;
his early career, 32 and _n._, 33;
his position in the Democratic party, 33;
his personal appearance, 33;
his talents and character, 33;
reports Nebraska bill, 33;
accepts Dixon Amendment repealing Missouri Compromise, 34;
offers amendment dividing the territory, 34;
his reasons, 35,
and why not convincing, 35, 36;
not a pro-slavery man, 36;
his reasons for repealing Missouri Compromise, 36, 37;
Lincoln's reply to his Springfield speech (1854), 39, 40 and _n._;
and the senatorial election of 1854, 46 _n._;
his report on affairs in Kansas, 55;
attached by T., 56;
his sophistry, 57, 58, 62;
his debate with T., 59 _ff._;
declares T. not a Democrat, 60, 66;
further debate with T. on Kansas, 63 _ff._;
T. a match for, in debate, 65, 66;
denounces Cabinet conspiracy regarding referendum on Lecompton
Constitution, 72, 73;
his motion for that action, 74, 75;
his anti-Lecompton speech, 77, 78;
for the first time, opposes wishes of South, 77;
was he sincere? 77, 78;
his lack of principle, 78;
contemplates alliance with Republicans, 78-80;
opposes English bill for admission of Kansas, 84;
his attitude toward slavery, 78, 86;
his aid indispensable in defeating Lecompton bill, 86;
appeals to imagination of Eastern Republicans, 86;
distrusted by Republicans of Ill., 86-88, 91, 92;
his instability, 88;
his campaign for reëlection in 1858, 89 _ff._;
his health impaired, 89;
reaffirms doctrine of Squatter Sovereignty, 94;
answered by J. Davis, 95;
his speech of May 15, 1860, 95;
answered by Benjamin, 95, 96;
nominated for President at Charleston, and by one faction at
Baltimore, 96;
favors Crittenden Compromise, 116;
his views on causes of disunion, 116, 117;
his last days devoted to the Union, 152, 153;
speaks to Ill. legislature, 153;
his influence alone saves Southern Ill., 153;
his death, 153;
T.'s eulogy of, 153, 154;
G. Welles's account of his attitude in 1861,
and his interview with Seward, 163, 164; 42, 47, 49, 76, 85, 100,
104, 107, 108, 169, 427.
Douglass, Frederick, 236, 237.
Drake, Charles D., Senator, 296, 298, 352.
Dred Scott case, opinion of Supreme Court, criticized by T., 82; 64.
Drummond, Thomas, Justice, enjoins executor of Burnside's order
against Chicago _Times_, 206;
his order disregarded, 207; 10, 208, 427.
Dubois, Jesse K., quoted, 79, 87, 216, 217; 213, 375.
Duncan, Joseph, Governor, 11.
Dunning, William A., his _Reconstruction_, quoted, 274, 321 _n._; 244.
Durell, Edward H., Justice, and the contested election in Louisiana,
404.
Durkee, Charles, Senator, 150.
Dyer, Thomas, 91.
Eaton, Major, 178.
Edmunds, George F., Senator, 339, 346, 358, 363.
Edwards, Ninian, Governor, 11, 45.
Electoral Commission (1877), composition of, 409;
decision of, 410, 411;
its purpose, "not to do justice between man and man, but to save the
Republic," 411.
Eliot, Thomas D., 172.
Ellsworth, Oliver, xxii _n._
Emancipation, Seward on actual date of, 222;
doubt regarding President's power in relation to, 222, 223.
_And see_ Slavery, Slaves.
Emancipation movement, history of, xxviii.
Emancipation Proclamation, issued, 200;
distasteful to Democrats, 200;
force and extent of, 222;
doubt as to its legal effect, 229, 230.
Embargo, the, xxiv.
Emerson, Dr., Dred Scott's master, 82.
Emigrant Aid Co. (Worcester), 50, 59 _n._
Emigrant Aid societies, 59 _n._
Emory, William H., General. 9th article of impeachment based on
alleged conversation of Johnson with, 310.
England, mission to, offered to T., 347, 348,
and declined, 348;
T.'s speech on claims against, 348, 349;
and demands surrender of Mason and Slidell, 349 and _n._
English, William H., Congressman, his bill for admission of Kansas,
passed by Congress, 83, 84,
but rejected by people, 84.
Equal Rights Act (1875) held unconstitutional by Supreme Court, 275.
Europe, and Lincoln's death, 231.
Evarts, William M., of counsel for Pres. Johnson, 309.
Farragut, David G., Admiral, 221.
Federalist party, xxiii.
Fenton, Reuben E., 386, 390.
Fessenden, William P., Senator, Chairman of Reconstruction Committee,
281, 282;
opposes conviction of Johnson, 313;
abused by radicals, 313;
"read out" of Republican party, 324;
called upon to resist Greenback heresy in Maine, 324;
his death and character, 324;
T's eulogy of, 324, 325; 82, 83, 89, 102, 168, 194, 202, 287, 292,
316, 317, 335.
Field, Alexander P., 11.
Field, D. D., 147.
Field, Stephen J., Justice, 275, 289, 409.
Fillmore, Millard, candidate for Pres., in 1856, 70; 92, 108.
Finkelnburg, Gustavus A., Congressman, 354.
Fish, Hamilton, appointed Secretary of State, 335;
letter of, to T., offering English mission, 347, 348; 362.
Flack, Horace E., history of the 14th Amendment, 284 _n._
Florida, and the 13th Amendment, 229;
order for reconstruction of, 238;
disputed returns from (1876), 408 _ff._
Flournoy, Charles G., 212.
Floyd, John B., Secretary of War, resigns, 128; 130.
Fogg, George G., 144, 146.
Foot, Solomon, Senator, 168, 261, 263.
Ford, Thomas, historian of Ill., quoted, 11;
as governor, requests T.'s resignation as Secretary of State, 12 and
_n._, 13; 18.
Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on, reorganization of, to punish
Sumner, 343-347.
"Forever," meaning of, in Missouri Compromise Act, 62, 63 _n._
Forney, John W., 300, 342.
Forsyth, John, Senator, xxvii, 156.
Foster, Lafayette S., Senator, 189, 273.
Fouke, Philip B., 38.
Fowler, Joseph S., Senator, 285, 314, 316, 317.
Free-silver, T. a believer in, 413.
Free Soilers, in 1854, 40;
nucleus of the Republican party, 41.
Free State men, in minority in Kansas in 1855, 49, 51;
convention of, 55;
refuse to take part in election of constitutional convention, 71,
72;
elect majority of territorial legislature, 72.
Free trade, meaning of, in 1871, 355.
Freedmen's Bureau, powers of, 257, 258.
Freedmen's Bureau bill, introduced by T., 257;
provisions of, 257, 258;
vetoed by Johnson, 260, 261;
fails to pass Senate over veto, 261;
T.'s course on, 423.
Freeport, Ill., joint debate between Lincoln and Douglas at, 94 _n._,
96.
Frelinghuysen, Frederick T., Senator, 314, 316, 347 _n._
Frémont, John C, Republican nominee for Pres., 69;
his defeat fortunate for the country, 70;
candidate for nomination in 1860, 103;
his order emancipating slaves revoked by Lincoln, 169, 170, 171;
nominated for Pres. by Anti-Lincoln Republicans (1864), 219, 220;
withdrawn, 220;
connection between his withdrawal and Mr. Blair's retirement, 220
and _n._; 141, 194.
French, Augustus C, Governor, 18.
French Revolution, effect of, on parties in U. S., xxiii.
Fugitive Slave Law, 114.
Galloway, Samuel, quoted, 75;
letter to T. on Republican grievances against Grant, 371.
Garfield, James A., General, 412.
Garrison, William L., his crusade mistakenly interpreted at the south,
xxxiii;
supports Lincoln's reconstruction plan, 235, 236; 388.
Gary, Mrs. F. C., letter of, to T., 278,
and his reply, 279.
Gaston, William, Judge, 270.
Geary, John W., Governor, 53, 72.
"General order" system in N. Y. custom-house, 364 _ff._
Genius of Universal Emancipation, the, xxxi.
Georgia, and Garrison, xxxi;
order for reconstruction of, 238;
re-reconstruction of, 297-300;
status of negroes in, 298;
bill for reorganization of, 298, 299;
T.'s attitude on treatment of, 298, 299, 300.
German vote, the, and the Republican nomination in 1860, 103.
Germans in St. Clair county, Ill., 38.
Gettysburg, battle of, and its effect on Vallandigham's ambition, 206.
Gillespie, Joseph, 10.
Gilman, Winthrop S., 9.
Godkin, Edwin L., quoted, 381, 382;
refuses to support Greeley, 385;
deprecates Schurz's contrary decision, 392, 393;
and Greeley's defeat, 404; 353.
Godwin, Parke, quoted, against Greeley, 393.
Goodrich, Grant, quoted, 119.
Government bonds, falling off in subscriptions to, in autumn of 1861,
170.
Government contracts, House committee on, 178 _ff._;
censures T. A. Scott, 184, 185.
Gowdy, W. C., 40 _n._
"Grandfather clause," the, in constitutions of southern states, 339.
Grant, Ulysses S., J. M. Palmer on his character and future, 216;
his southern tour of inspection, and report, 252, 253, 254;
Secretary of War _ad interim_, 305;
retires in favor of Stanton after action of Senate, 306;
his correspondence with Johnson, submitted to Reconstruction
Committee, 306, 307;
his reason for retiring, 307;
Johnson on his attitude, 307 _n._;
and the McCardle case, 327;
nominated for Pres., and elected, 332, 333;
his first cabinet a conglomerate, 333;
and Washburne's appointment, 334;
his agreement with J. F. Wilson, 334;
compels Washburne to resign, 334;
appoints Fish, 335;
nominates Stewart for Treasury, 335, 336,
then Boutwell, 336;
his other appointments, 337, 338;
his army-headquarters transferred to White House, 342;
the San Domingo treaty, and quarrel with Sumner, 342 _ff._;
removes Motley as minister to England, 347, 348;
offers English mission to T., 347, 348;
and civil-service reform, 349, 350;
and Attorney-General Hoar, 350;
and the Liberal movement in Mo., 355;
shortcomings of his administration, the main cause of Liberal
movement, 361;
his failings in civil station reviewed, 361 _ff._;
nominated because of his military renown, 361, 362;
his great services on two occasions, 362;
and the Leet and Stocking case, 365 _ff._;
T. not personally hostile to, 369, 370;
Republican dissatisfaction with, 370, 371,
and opposition to, 372 _ff._;
Sumner's speech against, 387, 388;
his services overlooked by Sumner, 388;
compared favorably with Greeley, 392, 393;
renominated by Republicans, 393;
not personally involved in Crédit-Mobilier scandal, 401;
reëlected, 402;
and the contest in La., in 1872, 405, 406 and _n._;
his second administration, 407, 408; 212, 214, 215, 226, 227, 236
and _n._, 240, 308, 309, 330, 384, 408, 411, 420.
Gray, Horace, 275.
Gray, Robert A., 161.
Greeley, Horace, "puffs" Douglas, 80, 91, 92;
candidate for Liberal Republican nomination, 377;
his career and character, 378;
editorial attitude toward his candidacy, 381;
Brown withdraws in his favor, 382, 383;
nominated, 384;
effect of his nomination, 384 _ff._;
Godkin and Bryant refuse to support, 385;
T.'s letter in favor of, 386, 387;
author's view of his nomination, 389, 390;
refuses Schurz's advice to decline, 391;
meeting of Liberal Republicans opposed to, 391, 392;
Schurz's attitude toward, 392, 393;
nominated by Democrats, 394;
supported by T. in the campaign, 395 _ff._;
T.'s tribute to, 399;
his failings laid bare, 400;
caricature by Nast, 400;
on the stump in Ohio, etc., 400;
his tariff views, 401;
his stumping tour too late, 401;
overwhelmingly defeated, 402;
fatal effect of defeat on, 403; and _n._;
his last letter to Schurz, 403;
his death, 403;
reflections on his fate, 404; 86, 87, 88, 141, 307 _n._, 369.
Green, James S., Senator, 114.
Greene, Francis V., General, quoted, 227.
Greenville Academy, 5.
Gregory, S. S., 414.
Grider, Henry, Congressman, 281.
Grier, Robert C. Justice Sup. Ct., 289.
Grimes, James W., Senator, denounces impeachment, 313;
censured by radicals, 313;
striken with paralysis, but votes against impeachment, 325;
"though pure as ice," did not escape calumny, 326;
quoted, on Republican corruption, 341;
his character, 341; 150, 165, 166, 168, 189, 202, 281, 287, 316,
317, 338.
Grimshaw, Jackson, quoted, 213.
Grinnell, Moses H., collector of N. Y., 364;
and Leet, 367, 368.
Groesbeck, William S., of counsel for Johnson, 309; 372.
Grosvenor, William M., 352, 353, 382, 383.
Guthrie, James, Senator, 271.
Habeas corpus, authority to suspend, given to Scott, 190;
discussion of power to suspend, 191, 194;
case of Merryman, 194-196;
writ of, denied Vallandigham, 205;
suspension of, authorized in Ku-Klux bill of 1871, 356, 357.
Habeas Corpus Suspension bill, passes House, 196;
reported by T. to Senate, but fails to pass, 197;
T. offers substitute for, 198,
which is opposed by Democrats, 199,
but passes Senate, 199;
in conference, combined with Stevens's indemnity bill, 199;
debated, filibustered against, and passed, 200-203;
characterized, 203;
violated by banishment of Vallandigham, 203 _ff._;
and the Milligan case, 288, 289;
invoked by McCardle, 327.
Hahn, Michael, chosen governor of La., under reconstruction, 232, 233.
Hale, Eugene, Congressman, as a revenue reformer, 354.
Hale, John P., Senator, speech of, on Kansas affairs, 65; xxi, 37, 38,
102, 189, 194.
Hall's carbines, fraudulent repurchases of, 184.
Halleck, Henry W., General, G. Welles on, 226;
other opinions of, 227; 212.
Halstead, Murat, 380, 381, 384.
Hamilton, Alexander, xxiii.
Hamlin, Hannibal, Vice-President, 108, 109, 112, 141.
Hancock, Winfield S., General, 422.
Hardin, John J., 10, 427.
Harding, A. C, quoted, 118.
Harlan, James, Senator, 150, 189, 320, 338, 366, 419.
Harlan, John M., Justice Sup. Ct., his dissenting opinion in Civil
Rights Cases, 276, 278; 275.
Harper's Ferry, Brown's raid on, 96-100.
Harris, Ira, Senator, 176, 262, 281.
Harris, N. Dwight, _Negro Servitude in Illinois_, 29 and _n._; 30, 31;
on T., 31.
Harrison, William H., Governor, favors slavery in Northwest Territory,
24.
Hartford Convention, xxiv, xxv.
Harvey, J. E., divulges purpose to send supplies to Sumter, 155 _ff._;
rewarded by Seward, 155, 157;
Republican senators seek his recall from Portugal, 155, 156.
Hatch, O. M., Secretary of State of Ill., 87, 213.
Hay, John, his diary, quoted, 158, 190, 227.
_And see_ Nicolay and Hay.
Hayes, Rutherford B., President, disputed election of, 406, 407 _ff._;
declared elected by Electoral Commission, 411.
Hayne, Robert Y., Senator, xxii _n._, xxvi, xxvii, 3.
Heath, Randolph, 42.
Hecker, Fred, quoted, 215; 38.
Henderson, John B., Senator, proposes amendment to Constitution,
forbidding slavery, 223;
his resolution, amended, reported by T., 224;
his speech in its favor, 227;
the only one of the "Traitors" whom the Republican party publicly
forgave, 326; 260, 314, 316, 317, 321 _n._; 362.
Hendricks, Thomas A., Senator, 228, 258, 262, 271, 285, 301, 329, 402.
Henn, Bernhart, Congressman, 35.
Herndon, William H., quoted, 75, 80, 89, 90, 91, 92, 107, 119, 214,
429; 87, 112, 143 _n._; 426, 428.
Herold, conspirator, 289.
Hewitt, Abram S., Congressman, 408, 409.
Hickox, Virgil, 13, 19.
Hill, Adams S., 341.
Hilton, Henry, and A. T. Stewart, 336.
Hoadley, George, 372, 382.
Hoar, E. Rockwood, appointed Attorney-General, 337, 338;
cause of his resignation, 350;
his recommendations for vacant judgeships, 350;
his nomination to Supreme Court not confirmed, and why, 350;
Grant asks his resignation, 350.
Hodge, Paymaster, 362, 363, 395.
Hoffman, John T., Governor, 379.
Hogeboom, Henry, 147.
Holden, W. H., 238.
Horner, William N., quoted, on T's character, 425.
House of Representatives, Kansas-Nebraska bill in, 37;
rejects Lecompton bill, 83,
but passes substituted English bill, 84;
passes proposed Amendment to Constitution, forbidding interference
with slavery, 117;
passes Confiscation bill, 175;
Committee on Government Contracts of, 178 _ff._;
censures Cameron, 187;
passes bill concerning political prisoners, 196;
passes Stevens's indemnity bill, 198;
debate on 13th Amendment in, 223, 228;
debate on Civil Rights bill in, 271, 272, 281;
passes 14th Amendment, 282, 283;
Stevens's Reconstruction bill introduced in, 284,
passed by, 291, 292,
and passed over veto, 293, 294;
passes bill admitting Tennessee, 295;
Tenure-of-Office bill in, 301,
and passed by, over veto, 303;
votes against impeachment (Dec., 1867), 303, 304;
impeachment voted by (Feb., 1868), 309;
passes 15th Amendment, 338-340;
Committee of Ways and Means of, 354;
Committee of inquiry into navy frauds, characterized by T., 397,
398.
Hovey, Alvin P., Governor, 288.
Howard,Jacob M., Senator, on Civil Rights bill, 269, 270;
on Reconstruction Committee, 281;
proposes definition of "citizens" in 14th Amendment, 282, 283; 287,
298.
Howe, Samuel G., 343.
Howe, Timothy O., Senator, his view of the impeachment, 310;
and the ousting of Sumner, 345, 346; 316, 320, 323, 343, 366.
Humphrey, James, 180.
Hunt, Gaillard, xxii _n._
Hunter, David, General, at first battle of Bull Run, 165;
his order freeing slaves in certain states, revoked by Lincoln, 172.
Hunter, R. M. T., Senator, 49, 116.
Hurd, H. B., 98.
Hurlbut, S. A., quoted, 74.
Hutchins, Waldo, 390.
Illinois, new constitution of, adopted in 1847, 20;
slavery in, when ceded to U.S., 23;
earlier occupation of, 23;
opposition to slavery in, organized by Lemen, 23, 24;
territorial legislature of, violates Ordinance of 1787, 24, 25;
provisions of constitution of, concerning slavery, 25;
pro-slavery efforts to amend constitution, 25, 26;
their failure, 27;
T. elected to Congress from 8th district of, 37, 38;
and Seward's candidacy, 103;
campaign of 1860 in, 108 _ff._;
office-seekers from, in 1861, 139;
status of negroes in, 243;
in the Cincinnati convention (1872), 389, 390;
T. nominated for governor of, and defeated, 412.
Illinois legislature, and the proposed constitutional convention, 25,
26;
and the Senatorial election of 1854, 39 _ff._, 46 _n._;
condemns proceedings against Chicago _Times_, 209:
reëlects T. as senator, 277.
Illinois State Bank, suspension of, 13.
Illinois Supreme Court, reconstruction of, 11;
number of judges of, 20;
T. elected judge of, 20;
T. reëlected to, and resigns, 21;
decision of, in Jarrot _v._ Jarrot, 29, 30.
Immigration, and attempted legalization of slavery in Ill., 26.
Impeachment, two theories of, 312;
a judicial or political process? 312.
Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, first mention of, 303;
House Judiciary Committee reports in favor of, 304;
House rejects resolution providing for, 304;
evidence submitted to Committee on Reconstruction, 306,
which refuses to recommend, 308;
resolutions of, adopted by House, 309;
articles of, adopted, 309-311;
managers appointed, 309;
trial of, 309, 312 _ff._;
conduct of managers of, 312, 313;
material evidence excluded, 313;
divers newspapers quoted concerning, 314-317;
T. files opinion in, 318, 319;
vote of acquittal on 11th, 2d, and 3d articles, 320, 321;
end of the trial, 321;
T.'s vote on, 423.
Indemnity, Stevens's bill of passes House, 198;
combined with habeas corpus bill, 199;
debated, filibustered against, and passed, 200-203.
_Independent Democrat_, the, 14.
Indiana, opposed to Seward, 103;
in convention of 1860, 106, 107;
election of Oct., 1872, in, 402.
Inflation bill, Grant's veto of, 362.
Ingraham, Mary, T.'s second wife, 412.
_And see_ Trumbull, Mary (Ingraham).
Investigation and Retrenchment, Committee on, established by Senate,
364;
personnel of, 366, 367;
solves Leet and Stocking scandal, 367-369;
characterized by T., 395, 396.
"Irrepressible Conflict," the, existed before it was so described,
xxxiv.
Iverson, Alfred, Senator, 213.
Jackson, Andrew, xxv, xxvi, 76, 103, 124.
Janney, Mr., 161.
Jarrot _v._ Jarrot, decision of Supreme Court in, abolished Slavery in
Ill., 29, 30.
Jayne, Gershom, T.'s father-in-law, 15.
Jayne, Mrs. Gershom, T.'s letter to, on religion, 430, 431.
Jayne, Julia M., marries T., 15.
_And see_ Trumbull, Julia (Jayne).
Jayne, William, quoted, 106, 107; 108, 109, 111, 150, 379.
Jefferson, Thomas, and slavery, xxviii, 23, 24;
the proposed ordinance relating thereto (1784), xxviii, xxix and
_n._;
quoted, on Missouri Compromise, xxx; xxiii, xxiv.
Johnson, Andrew, popularity of, in Tenn., 214;
his early radicalism and anti-Southern feeling, 236;
gradual change in his attitude, 236;
opposes unrestricted negro suffrage, 236, 237;
adopts Lincoln's plan of reconstruction and his Cabinet, 237;
executive orders of, reorganizing governments of all seceding
states, 237, 238;
issues amnesty proclamation, 239;
Phillips makes first attack on, 239, 240;
defended by N. Y. _Tribune_ and _Times_, 240, 241;
his first message to Congress, written by Bancroft, 244;
the message praised by N. Y. _Times_ and _Nation_, 244, 245;
his early history, 245 and _n._;
in Senate of U.S., 246;
as public speaker and debater, 246;
his speech against secession, 246;
Stephens and Seward on, 246;
his speech of Aug. 29, 1866, 246;
attacked by Sumner, 246, 247;
and Terry's order concerning vagrancy law of Va., 247;
and reports of Grant and Schurz on conditions in the South, 252,
253, 254;
vetoes Freedmen's Bureau bill, 260, 261, 423;
vetoes Civil Rights bill, 272, 423;
his veto message answered by T., 272;
his course discussed, 273, 274;
his combativeness, 273 and _n._, 274;
majority against, in Congress, increased by elections of 1866, 277;
sustained by T. until veto of Civil Rights bill, 277;
signs bill readmitting Tenn., 285;
"National Union Convention" of supporters of, 285, 286;
his attack on Congress, and its sequel, 286;
policy of, and the Milligan case, 289;
and the Cabinet meeting of Jan. 8, 1867, 290;
Northern view of his plan of reconstruction, 293;
vetoes Reconstruction bill, 293,
and divers supplementary bills, 293, 294;
his power of removal aimed at by Tenure-of-Office bill, 301, 302;
impeachment of, now generally condemned, 303;
first mention of impeachment of, 303, 304;
House rejects impeachment resolutions, 304;
requests Stanton's resignation, 304, 305;
suspends him and appoints Grant _ad interim_, 305;
correspondence of, with Grant, submitted to committee, 306, 307;
his lack of tact, 306;
wishes to make up a case for Supreme Court, 307;
quoted by Truman as to his Cabinet, 307 _n._;
advised to let Stanton alone, but attempts to remove him, 308;
names Thomas Secretary _ad interim_, 308;
his action causes change in public feeling, 309;
House votes to impeach, 309;
his trial, 309, 312 _ff._;
summary of articles, 309-311;
his answer, 311;
evidence of his purpose to make a case for Supreme Court not
admitted, 312, 313;
acquitted, 320, 321;
vetoes Act of March 27, 1868, 329;
T.'s vote on impeachment of, 423; 181 _n._, 229, 278.
Johnson, Reverdy, Senator, favors 13th Amendment, 227;
on Civil Rights bill, 270; 247, 264, 281.
Jonas, A., quoted, 74, 79, 92.
Jones, George W., 35.
Judd, Norman B., expects seat in Lincoln's Cabinet, 148;
his character, 149;
favored by T., 149;
interview of, with Lincoln, 149, 150;
receives Prussian mission as a salve, 151, 152;
quoted, as to T.'s feeling against Lincoln, 217;
as to European admiration of Lincoln, 231;
on other subjects, 74, 80, 91; 15, 41, 43, 45, 46 _n._, 69, 87, 93,
142.
Julian, George W., Congressman, describes scene in House on adoption
of 13th Amendment, 228 and _n._; xxi.
Kansas, did Douglas intend it to be a slave state? 35, 36;
affairs in, in 1855, 49 _ff._;
prospect of slavery in, 49;
Reeder appointed governor, 49;
invaded by Missourians, 49;
election of Whitfield, 49, 50;
second invasion of Missourians, 50 _ff._;
"Border Ruffian" legislature of, enacts Slave code, 54, 55;
Shannon appointed governor, 55;
Free State convention In, 55;
Pres. Pierce's special message on affairs in, 55;
reports of Senate Committee on Territories thereon, 55 _ff._;
debate on affairs in, in Senate, 55 _ff._;
T.'s letter to Turner on affairs in, 71;
Walker appointed governor, 71;
Constitutional Convention at Lecompton, 72;
Cabinet Conspiracy concerning referendum on Lecompton Constitution,
72, 73;
legislature declares for submission of the whole Constitution, 73;
admission of, thereunder, recommended by Buchanan, 81;
administration bill, passed by Senate, but repealed by House, 83;
English bill, passed by Congress, but rejected by people, 83, 84;
reign of terror in, 126;
proposed suffrage amendment to Constitution of, rejected, 295.
Kansas-Nebraska bill, its original form, 33, 34;
as amended, 34, 35;
passed by Congress, 37;
effect of passage of, on parties at the North, 37;
T. organizes opposition to, in Ill., 37, 38;
opposed by Lincoln, 39;
and the Senatorial election in Ill., in 1854, 39 _ff._;
attacked by T., 56; 125, 126, 131.
Keim, William H., 195.
Kellogg, William P., and the governorship of La., 404, 405, 406, 408;
410, 411.
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, xxiii.
King, Preston, Senator, 122.
King, Rufus, xxii _n._
Koerner, Gustave, quoted, 103, 118, 212, 213;
interview of, with Lincoln, 149, 150;
and the Russian mission, 151, 152;
appointed Minister to Spain, 152;
T. writes to, on impeachment, 323;
his death and funeral, 418; 29, 30, 37, 88, 379.
Ku-Klux bill, held unconstitutional by Supreme Court, 275, 358; 424.
Ku-Klux-Klan, in Georgia, 298, 300;
Grant's special message on, 356;
Congress passes bill relating to, 356,
which is opposed by T. and Schurz, 356, 357, 358.
Labor laws enacted by seceding states during reconstruction, 242;
brought before Congress, 247;
character of, 247.
Lambert, W. H., 110 _n._
Lane, Henry S., Senator, 106, 166.
Lane, James H., Senator, 53, 101 _n._
Larned, E. C, T.'s letters to, on compromise, 113, 114.
Lea, M. Carey, letter of, to T., on Frémont emancipation episode, 170,
and T.'s reply, 171, 172.
Lecompton constitution, slavery clause of, alone to be submitted to
people, 72, 73;
declared valid by Buchanan, 76;
condemned by T., 76, 77;
admission of Kansas under, urged by Buchanan, 81;
disappears with rejection of English bill by the people, 83.
Lee, S. Phillips, 169.
Leet and Stocking scandal, 364 _ff._;
Senate orders inquiry into, 355-367;
solution of, 367-369.
Lemen, Rev. James, organizes opposition to slavery in Northwest Terr.,
23, 24.
Lewis, B., quoted, 107.
Lewis, John F., 161.
Liberal Republican movement (1872) started in Mo., 351;
progress of, 351 _ff._;
Schurz a leader in, 352;
revenue reform an element in, 352, 353;
how viewed by Grant and his friends, 355;
shortcomings of Grant's administration the main cause of, 361.
_And see_ Cincinnati, Convention at.
Liberal Republicans, demand universal Amnesty with impartial suffrage,
356;
call for national Convention of, 372,
which meets at Cincinnati, 374 _ff._;
leading candidates for presidency among, 377;
division among, after Greeley's nomination, 385 _ff._;
meeting of dissentients, 391, 392.
_And see_ Missouri.
_Liberator_, the, established by Garrison (1831), xxxi;
attempts to suppress, xxxii.
Lincoln, Abraham, in Ill. legislature of 1840, 10;
his marriage, 15;
and the Kansas-Nebraska bill, 37;
and the Senatorial election of 1854, 39, 43 _ff._;
effect of repeal of Missouri Compromise on, 39;
his speech at Peoria in reply to Douglas, 39, 40 and _n._;
defeated by T., 45, 46 _n._;
letter of, to Washburne, on the result, 45, 46;
possible results of his election, 47;
urges T. to attend first Republican national convention, 69;
receives votes for Vice-President, 69;
writes T. on the ticket, 69, 70;
on Douglas's attitude on Lecompton, 74;
on Republican praise of Douglas, 87;
Palmer on candidacy of, for Senate, 88;
campaign of, for senatorship (1858), 89 _ff._;
on Buchanan Democrats, 90;
on prospects for 1860, 92; his relations with T., 93;
his debate with Douglas at Freeport, 94 _n._;
commends T.'s speech on John Brown raid, 100;
on Delahay's candidacy for Senate, 100, 101 _n._;
his status in 1860, 102;
a possible candidate for Republican nomination, 102 _ff._;
on the various candidates, 104, 105;
his radicalism, 105;
nominated, 106;
comments of Illinoisans on his candidacy, 106, 107;
on Republican prospects, 108;
his vote in Ill., 109;
and the ratification at Springfield, 109, 110;
on South Carolina's attitude, 110, 111;
opposed to compromise on extension of slavery, 111;
proposes resolutions on slavery, etc., 112;
on rumors of Buchanan's purpose to surrender forts, 112, 113;
his Cooper Institute speech, 115;
and the office-seekers, 139;
the making of his Cabinet, 139 _ff._;
and Seward, 139-141;
offers State Department to Seward, 141;
the Cameron affair, 142 _ff._;
his instructions against pre-convention contracts, 142;
Davis's influence over, 143 and _n._;
promises Cameron a portfolio, 144;
anti-Cameron appeal to, by McClure and T., 144, 145;
his reply to T., 145;
tries to buy Cameron off, 145, 146;
T.'s further remonstrance to, 146, 147;
and Judd, 148, 149;
interview with Koerner, 149, 150;
and the Harvey dispatch to Gov. Pickens, 155 _ff._;
makes Harvey Minister to Portugal, 155, 157, 158;
his previous consent to evacuate Sumter, to prevent secession of
Va., 158 _ff._;
his interviews with Baldwin and Botts, 159, 160, 161;
absurdity of Dabney's account, 162;
revokes Frémont's emancipation order, 169;
effect of his action, 169;
letters of Lea and T. on the crisis, 170-172;
T.'s view of his character, 171;
suppresses Cameron's pro-emancipation report, 172 and _n._;
revokes Hunter's order, 172;
proposes to veto T.'s Confiscation bill, 176;
his objections removed by resolution, 175, 176;
orders Wallace to desist from confiscation, 177;
and Cameron, 185;
nominates Cameron as minister to Russia, 186;
assumes responsibility in Cummings affair, 187;
authorizes Scott to suspend habeas corpus, 190;
his action approved, 191;
transfers authority to Stanton, 197;
proclaims martial law as to certain classes, 200;
issues Emancipation Proclamation, 200;
commutes Vallandigham's sentence to banishment, 204;
replies to protest of Northern Democrats, 205;
his only evasion, 205;
revokes Burnside's order suppressing Chicago _Times_, 207, 208;
criticized by N. Y. _Tribune_, 309 _n._;
and certain dispatches of Seward to Adams, 210 _ff._;
requested to demand Seward's resignation, 211;
his comment, 212;
and Delahay, 214;
Palmer on his prospect of renomination, 214, 215, 216;
first evidence of personal difference between T. and, 217, 218;
T.'s opinion of his administration, 218;
feeling in Congress adverse to his reëlection, 218, 219;
denounced by Wilson, 219;
basis of opposition to, 219; renominated, but fears defeat, 219;
requests Blair's resignation, and why, 220 and _n._;
T. favors his reëlection, 220, 221;
reëlected by favor of Union victories, 221;
and Halleck, 226; his death, 231;
European opinion of, 231;
his view of status of seceding states embodied in proclamation of
Dec. 8, 1863, 232;
letter of, to Gov. Hahn of La., 233;
his address of Apr. 11, 1865, on reconstruction, 234, 235;
his plan adopted by Johnson, 237;
had his life been spared, 286;
his plan of reconstruction definitely abandoned, 291;
T.'s estimate of his character and career, 430; xxi, 65, 67, 240,
245, 246, 423.
Lincoln, Mary (Todd), 42, 46.
Lloyd, Henry D., 414, 417.
Lodge, H. C, Senator, _Daniel Webster_, xxii _n._, xxv _n._
Logan, John A., General and Senator, 75, 277, 304, 309, 339, 344, 363,
409.
Logan, Stephen T., 43, 44, 142, 220.
Louisiana, election in, under Lincoln's reconstruction order, 232;
Hahn chosen governor, 232, 233;
constitutional convention in, 233;
U. S. Senators chosen under new free constitution, 233;
resolutions recognizing new government of, defeated by Sumner, 233,
234;
contested election of 1872 in, 404, 405;
Senatorial investigation thereof, 405;
disputed returns from, in 1876, 408 _ff._
Louisiana purchase, Federalist opposition to, xxiii, xxiv.
Louisville _Courier-Journal_, interview with T. in, 369, 370; 372.
Lovejoy, Rev. Elijah P., murder of, described by T., 8-10;
its effect on Abolition movement, 10; xxxiii.
Lovejoy, Rev. Owen, Congressman, 43.
Lundy, Benjamin, xxxi.
McCardle, William H., arrest and imprisonment of, 327;
remanded on habeas corpus, 327;
appeals, 327;
T. appears against in Supreme Court, 327, 328;
his appeal dismissed, under Act of March, 1868, 329, 330;
T.'s connection with case of, criticized, 330, 331.
McClellan, George B., General, inaction of, 169; 171, 172, 219.
McClernand, John A., 10, 11, 427.
McClure, A. K., his _Lincoln and Men of War-Time_, quoted, 143;
opposes Cameron's appointment, 144; 374.
McClurg, Joseph, 352.
McCulloch, Hugh, Secretary of Treasury, opinion of, on question of
territorializing states, 290.
McDougall, James A., Senator, 166, 228, 285.
McDowell, Irwin, General, at first Bull Run, 165, 167.
McEnery, John, and the governorship of La., 404, 405.
McLean, John, Justice Sup. Ct., candidate for Republican nomination
(1860), 103;
shakes his fist in Buchanan's face, 122, 123; 69, 104, 105.
McLean, Mrs. John, 121.
McPike. H. G., quoted, 107, 118;
T.'s letter to, on Lincoln's reëlection, 218.
Madison, James, xxii _n._, xxxi.
Magruder, Allan B., 161, 162.
Magruder, Benj. D., Chief Justice of Ill., quoted, 21, 22.
Mails, irregularity of, in early 19th century, 7.
Malaria, Trumbull family afflicted by, 19.
Managers of impeachment, overmatched by defendant's counsel, 309;
their conduct of the trial, 312, 313;
bring pressure to bear on Senators, 313.
Mann, A., Jr., 140, 141.
Marble, Manton, quoted, 373.
Mason, James M., Senator, threatens dissolution of Union, 70, 71;
moves for committee of inquiry into John Brown raid, 98; 53, 116,
134, 349 and _n._
Massachusetts, slavery in, xxvii.
Massachusetts legislature, Anti-Embargo resolutions of, xxiv.
Mather, Rev. Richard, 2.
Matteson, Joel A., Governor, 43, 44, 46 and _n._, 60.
Matteson, O. B., 179.
Matthews, Stanley, Justice of Sup. Ct., 275, 372.
Maynard, Horace, Congressman, quoted, 293.
Medill, Joseph, quoted, on T.'s character and possible future, 424,
425.
Meigs, Montgomery C, Q.-M. Gen., 185.
Merryman, John, summary arrest of, 194-196.
Methodist Church, the, and the impeachment trial, 317.
Miles, Nelson A., General, 167.
Military commission, trial of civilians by, divided opinion of Supreme
Court on, in Milligan case, 289.
Miller, Samuel F., Justice Sup. Ct., 275, 289, 409.
Milligan case, decided by majority of Supreme Court, 288, 289;
grounds of decision, 288, 289,
and its consequences, 289;
radicals angered by, 289, 290; 327.
Minnesota, proposed suffrage amendment to constitution of, repealed,
295.
Mississippi, order for reconstruction of, 238;
fails to adopt new constitution promptly, 295;
new conditions imposed on, 296.
Missouri, admission of, xxix, xxx,
during the war, 351;
continued political warfare in, after the war, 351;
state constitution of 1865, 351;
division in Republican party of, results in Schurz's election as
senator, 351, 352;
success of Liberal republican movement in, 352;
liberal movement in, how viewed by Grant, 355;
state convention of Liberal Republicans of, adopts platform and
calls national Convention, 372;
its platform defended by T., 376;
vote of, in Cincinnati convention, 383.
Missouri Compromise, history of, xxx;
repeal of, causes T.'s return to politics, 32;
not repealed by original Nebraska bill, 34;
Dixon amendment for repeal of, adopted by Douglas, 34;
repeal of, and Lincoln, 39;
meaning of "forever" in, 62, 63 _n._;
repeal of, 125, 126;
and the Crittenden Compromise, 131.
_Missouri Democrat_, the, 142, 352.
Missourians, and Kansas, 35;
invade Kansas, 49;
threaten Gov. Reeder, 50, 51;
Atchison's advice to, 52;
in Kansas, 56, 57, 58, 65.
Monroe, James, President, 103.
Moran, Thomas A., Judge, on T.'s public services, 419.
Morgan, Edwin D., Governor, 178, 261, 265, 314, 321.
Morrill, Justin S., Congressman, 168, 281.
Morrill, Lot N., Senator, 263.
Morrison, J. L. D., 41.
Morton, Oliver P., Senator, 298, 307 _n._, 339, 346, 355, 363, 371,
376, 405, 406 and _n._
Motley, J. Lothrop, minister to England, removed, 347, 348.
Moultrie, Fort, 129.
Murphy, Thomas, appointed collector of N. Y., 362, 363;
and the Leet and Stocking case, 365, 368; 371.
_Nation_, the, praises Johnson's first message, 244, 245;
quoted, on T. and the Georgia bill, 299, 300;
on Republican abuse of the "Seven traitors," 316, 317;
on conference of revenue reformers, 353, 354;
on Liberal Republican movement, 355, 356;
on Leet and Stocking case, 368, 369;
on opposition to Grant, 370, 371;
on Cooper Union meeting, 376, 377;
on Schurz's attitude toward Greeley, 392;
and the defeat of Greeley, 404; 273, 372.
National Union Convention of Johnson men, 285, 286, 323.
Nationalism, and the Constitution, xxvi, xxvii.
Nebraska, bill to organize territory of, reported by Douglas, 33, 34.
_And see_ Anti-Nebraska Democrats, and Kansas-Nebraska bill.
Negro suffrage, omitted from new constitution of La., 233;
Garrison opposes imposition of, in the South, 235;
Pres. Johnson opposed to, 236, 237;
vote of Johnson's Cabinet on, as applying to provisional
governments, 238;
not included in executive orders, 238, 239;
W. Phillips's views on, 239, 240,
traversed by N. Y. _Tribune_, 240,
and _Times_, 240, 241;
in Northern States in 1866, 243;
question of, not acute in early 1866, 261;
Howard argues against, 287;
made a permanent condition of reconstruction, 292 and _n._;
Northern opinion concerning, 293;
in Republican convention of 1868, 332, 333;
finally embodied in 15th Amendment, 338-340.
Negroes, T. appears for in attempts to regain freedom, 28 _ff._;
right of, to bring actions in U. S. courts, 64;
condition of, in South, under reconstruction, 241-243;
status of, in Northern states, in 1866, 243;
debate on granting civil rights to, 265 _ff._
Nelson, Samuel, Justice Sup. Ct, 289.
Nelson, Thomas A.R., of counsel for Johnson, 309.
Nesmith, James W., Senator, 261, 285.
New England, why opposed to Louisiana Purchase, xxiii, xxiv.
New England Emigrant Aid Co., attacked by Douglas, 35;
blamed by Pierce and Douglas for disorders in Kansas, 26 _ff._;
defended by T., 58, 59.
New Jersey, opposed to Seward, 103;
legislature of, elects Stockton Senator, 262;
validity of his election challenged, 262-265.
New York, "compromisers" from, 122;
and the 15th Amendment, 340;
majority against Greeley in, 402.
New York _Evening Post_, quoted, on exclusion of negroes from
suffrage, 239;
on the impeachment trial, 314, 315; 91, 372, 375.
New York Free Trade League, 353.
New York _Herald_, quoted, on Cincinnati convention, 390; 50, 378.
New York Republicans oppose Seward's inclusion in Lincoln's Cabinet,
139 _ff._;
T.'s Interview with, 140, 141.
New York _Times_, quoted, on T.'s debate with Douglas, 66;
on Seward's dispatch to Adams, 211;
on Johnson's first message, 244.
New York _Tribune_, quoted, in T.'s debate with Douglas, 66;
praises Douglas, 87;
and the Vallandigham case, 205, 206, 209 _n._;
on Lincoln's revocation of order suppressing Chicago _Times_, 209
_n._;
defends Johnson against Phillips, 240; 91, 92, 239, 314, 315, 372.
New York _World_, circulation of, in Burnside's department, forbidden
by him, 206; 373.
Newman, Professor, 235.
Nicholson letter, on squatter sovereignty, 94.
Nicolay, John G., quoted, 75.
Nicolay (John G.) and Hay (John), _Abraham Lincoln_, on Lincoln's
offer to evacuate Sumter, 159;
on Cameron's leaving the Cabinet, 185, 186;
quoted, 143, 162, 220.
Niles, Nathaniel, 30.
North, the, took up arms to preserve the Union, xxi, xxii;
slavery in, xxviii.
North Carolina, attempt at reconstruction in, 238;
qualifications of electors in, 238;
election of August, 1872, in, 399, 400.
Northern States, negro suffrage in, 243.
Northern view of reconstruction, 293.
Northwest, the, its claim to consideration, 132, 133.
Northwestern Territory, slavery in, before
1787, 23, 24;
provisions of Ordinance of 1787, concerning slavery in, 24;
main source of immigration to, 24.
Norton, Daniel S., Senator, his vote against impeachment, 323; 261,
285, 313.
Nourse, George A., 68.
Noyes, William C., 140, 141.
Nullification, in South Carolina, xxv, xxvi;
in Mass. (1885), xxvi.
Nye, James W., Senator, 360.
O'Conor, Charles, nominated for Pres. by dissentient Democrats (1872),
but declines, 394.
Ogden, William B., 207.
Oglesby, Richard J., General, succeeds T. in Senate, 407; 277.
Ohio, in convention of 1860, 107;
proposed suffrage amendment to constitution of, rejected, 295;
and the 15th Amendment, 340;
and the call for a Liberal Republican convention, 372;
election of Oct., 1872, in, 402.
"Old Public Functionary" (Buchanan), 122.
Opdycke, George, 147, 178.
Ord, Edward O. C., General, orders arrest of McCardle, 327.
Ordinance of 1787, provisions of, concerning slavery, 24;
violated by territorial legislature of Ill., 24, 25;
attempts to repeal 6th article of, 25;
kept slavery out of Ill., 28.;
and the 13th Amendment, 224.
Osgood, Uri (Illinois senate), 41, 42, 43.
Otis, Harrison G., Mayor of Boston, and the _Liberator_, xxxii.
Owen, Robert Dale, principal author of 14th Amendment, 282.
Palmer, John M., General, on Republican alliance with Douglas, 87, 88;
on Lincoln's prospect of renomination, 214, 215, 216;
on Grant's character and future, 216;
on Liberal Republican movement, 377; 21, 41, 43, 45, 46 _n._, 93,
109, 277, 373, 419.
Parker, Rev. Theodore, 78.
Parks, Sam C., quoted, 46 _n._, 75, 119.
Particularism, and the Constitution, xxvi.
Patterson, James W., Senator, 343, 362, 363, 364, 367, 371.
Payne, conspirator, 289.
Pearce, James A., Senator, 194.
Peck, Ebenezer, quoted, 74, 80, 119, 147, 148; 13, 87, 150, 427, 431.
Peck, Rev. John M., 27, 28.
Peirpoint, Francis M., recognized as Governor of Va., under
reconstruction, 237; 161.
Pendleton, George H., Congressman, and the "Greenback" movement, 324.
Pennsylvania, opposed to Seward, 103;
in convention of 1860, 106, 107;
in Liberal Republican movement, 374;
election of Oct. 1872, in, 402.
People's party, issues T's speech at Chicago as campaign document,
415;
T. draws resolutions for meeting of, 415-417.
Philadelphia, National Union Convention at, 285, 286.
Phillips, D. L., quoted, 75, 89; 213.
Phillips, Wendell, opposes reëlection of Lincoln, 220;
savagely attacks Johnson, 239, 240;
reproved by N. Y. _Tribune_, 240,
and _Times_, 240, 241; 388.
Piatt, Donn, _Memories of Men who saved the Union_, quoted, 222.
Pickens, Francis W., Governor, 121, 155, 156, 157, 158.
_And see_ Harvey.
Pierce, Edward L., _Life of Sumner_, quoted, 292 _n._, 347 _n._; 66.
Pierce, Franklin, President, makes Reeder Governor of Kansas, 49;
removes Reeder and appoints Shannon, 55;
his special message on Kansas affairs, 55; xxi, 37, 52, 54, 65, 73,
83, 246.
Poland, Luke D., Senator, 262, 304.
Pomeroy, Samuel C., Senator, 202, 203.
Poore, Ben: Perley, 342.
"Popular sovereignty," 39.
Porter, Horace, General, 366.
Postage in early 19th century, 7, 20.
Pottawatomie massacre, the, 97.
Powell, Lazarus W., Senator, opposes habeas corpus suspension bill,
198, 199, 200, 201, 202; 116.
Protection, meaning of, in 1871, 354.
Pullman Co., strike of employees of, 413-415.
Randall, Alexander W., Postmaster General, 285.
Randall, J. G., 174 and _n._
Randolph, John, of Roanoke, and article 6 of Ordinance of 1787, 25;
xxxi.
Raum, Green B., quoted, 67 and _n._
Rawlins, John A., General, appointed Secretary of War, 337; 330.
Ray, C. H., quoted, 74, 75, 87, 148, 243, 261; 79, 80, 151.
Ray, P. Ormon, Repeal of the Missouri Compromise, 37 _n._
Raymond, Henry J., Congressman, 272.
Read, John M., 108.
Reconstruction, Lincoln's plan of, set forth in proclamation of
Dec. 8, 1863, 232;
the La. attempt at, 233, 234;
Lincoln's address on, Apr. 11, 1865, 235;
his plan endorsed by Garrison, 235, 236,
and adopted by Johnson, 237;
in Va., 237;
in Tenn., 237, 238;
in Ark., 238;
in No. Carolina, and other seceding states, 238;
Shaffer and Ray on conditions in those States under, 242, 243;
the _Nation_ on Johnson's plan of, 244, 245;
Lincoln's plan of, definitely abandoned, 291;
supplementary measure of, passed by Congress, vetoed, and passed
over veto, 294;
drastic provisions of, 294;
further measures of, passed over vetoes, 295;
a failure, 341;
change in T.'s course on, 423, 424.
Reconstruction, House Committee on, inquires into suspension of
Stanton, 306;
refuses to recommend impeachment, 308.
Reconstruction, Joint Committee on, members of, 281;
amendment to Constitution proposed to, by Bingham and Stevens, 282;
reports 14th Amendment, 283, 284.
Reconstruction bill (Stevens's) establishing military government in
South, 291, 292;
amended by provision for negro suffrage, 292;
passed by Congress, vetoed, and passed over veto, 293, 294.
Reeder, Andrew H., appointed Governor of Kansas, 49;
confirms elections of Whitfield as Delegate to Congress, 49, 50;
and the Missourian invaders, 50, 51, 53, 54;
removed by Pierce, 55; 56, 59, 63, 108, 150.
Religion, T.'s views on, 430, 431.
Republican National Convention (_1856_), 69;
(_1860_), nominates Lincoln, 105, 106;
(_1868_) on negro suffrage, 332, 333;
its negro-suffrage plank too brazen to be long maintained, 338;
(_1872_), nominates Grant and Wilson, 393;
platform of, 394.
Republican party, first national convention of, 69, 70;
rumored alliance of Douglas with, 78-80;
still inchoate in 1860, 102;
candidate for presidential nomination of, in 1860, 102 _ff._;
T.'s views concerning, 103, 104;
T.'s view of duty of, in 1861, 113, 114;
T.'s position in, in campaign of 1866, 273;
control of, shifted to radical wing by veto of Civil Rights bill,
277;
power of that wing of, increased by refusal of South to ratify 14th
Amendment, 287;
lead of, in Congress, assumed by Sumner and Stevens, 291;
definitely abandons Lincoln's plan of reconstruction, 291;
generally adopts Sumner's view of impeachment, 312;
treatment of "traitor" Senators by, 322-326;
Henderson alone forgiven, 326;
corruption in, in 1870, 341 _ff._;
division in, in Mo., 351 _ff._;
both sections of, in Mo., adopt "Anti-tariff" resolution, 352;
defeated in Congressional elections of 1874, 408;
T.'s separation from, 420.
Republicans of the first period, xxiii.
Republicans, Eastern, favor Douglas's re-election to Senate, 86;
and the Lincoln-Douglas campaign, 91, 92;
in Ill., distrust Douglas, 86,
and prefer Lincoln for Senator, 86;
those opposed to Lincoln, nominate Frémont and Cochrane (1864), 219,
220.
Retrenchment, Joint Committee on, report of, 362, 363;
and the Leet and Stocking case, 364 _ff._
Revenue reform, an element in Liberal Republican movement, 352, 353;
conference of advocates of, 353, 354;
in the Cincinnati convention, 381, 382.
Reynolds, John, Governor, and the pro-slavery attempt to amend the
constitution of Ill., 26;
quoted, 28; 6 _n._, 11, 38.
Rhode Island, opposed to Seward, 103.
Rhodes, James F., _History of the U. S._, quoted on "anti-impeachment"
Senators, 322;
on La. returning board, 408;
cited, 406 _n._
Richardson, William A., Senator, 10, 197, 201, 427.
Riddle, A. G., _Recollections of War-Time_, quoted, 228 _n._; 219.
Robbins, Henry S., T.'s partner, 407;
quoted, on T.'s character, 425.
Robertson, Thomas J., 359.
Robeson, George M., appointed Secretary of the Navy, 337;
action in the Secor case, 396, 397, 398.
Ross, Edmund G., Senator, immortalized by his vote against
impeachment, 322;
his later years, and death in poverty, 322; 299, 314, 317.
Russia, Cameron appointed Minister to, 186, 187-189.
San Domingo treaty, opposed by Sumner, 342, 343;
Wade commission, 343,
and its report, 386;
attempt to secure ratification of, 360.
Sands, Mahlon D., convokes conference of revenue reformers, 353.
Saulsbury, Willard, Senator, 201, 228, 249, 250, 267, 268, 272.
Scates, Walter B., Judge, quoted, 213; 21, 375.
Schenck, Robert C., Congressman, 165, 166, 167.
Schurz, Carl, Senator, report of, in his Southern tour, 253-255;
his report has great influence, 254;
his later doubts as to his conclusions, 254 _n._;
succeeds Henderson in Senate, 351, 352;
a leader in Liberal Republican movement, 352;
opposes Ku-Klux-Klan bill, 356, 358;
his speech a masterpiece, 358;
on Leet and Stocking case, 365, 366;
chairman of Cincinnati Convention, 383;
his view of nomination, 384, 385;
how connected with course of Blair and Brown, 385 and _n._; his
attitude toward Greeley's candidacy, 391, 392;
urges him to decline, 391;
Godkin and Godwin remonstrate with, 392, 393;
in the campaign, 399;
Greeley's farewell letter to, 403; 107, 189, 343, 344, 353, 359,
363, 369, 371, 373, 377, 378, 389, 402.
Scott, Dred, not consciously a party to suit brought in his name, 82,
83.
_And see_ Dred Scott case.
Scott, Thomas A., censured by House Committee, 184, 185; 172 _n._,
186.
Scott, Winfield, General, has authority from Lincoln to suspend habeas
corpus, 190; 121, 122, 128, 171.
Scripps, John L., 87.
Secession movement, history of, 125 _ff._
Secors, the, and the Navy Dep't, 397, 398.
Senate of U. S., debates Kansas-Nebraska bill, 34,
and passes it, 37; T. takes his seat in, 48;
debates on affairs in Kansas in, 55 _ff._, 63, 64, 65, 76 _ff._, 81,
82, 83;
passes Lecompton bill, 83,
and substituted English bill, 84;
debate on popular sovereignty in, 94;
debate on Davis's anti-Douglas resolutions in, 95, 96,
and on John Brown raid, 98-100;
J. Davis's last speeches in, 110, 114, 115;
debates Crittenden Compromise, 115-117,
and rejects it, 117;
passes proposed amendment to constitution forbidding interference
with slavery, 117;
Douglas's death announced to, by T., 152, 153;
struggle in, over confirmation of Cameron as Minister to Russia,
187-189;
debate in, on arbitrary arrests, 190 _ff._;
passes bill concerning political prisoners, 197;
debates habeas corpus suspension bill, 198 _ff._;
Democratic filibuster thereon, 200-203;
debates 13th Amendment, 223 _ff._;
debates Louisiana bill, 233, 234;
Sumner's attack on Johnson in, 246, 247;
debate on Wilson bill in, 247-250;
calls for Schurz's report on Southern affairs, 253;
debates Freedmen's Bureau bill, 258-260,
but fails to pass it over veto, 261;
Stockton election contest in, 261-265;
debates Civil Rights bill, 265-270,
and passes it over veto, 272;
passes 14th Amendment, 283;
passes bill admitting Texas, 284;
amendment looking to negro suffrage offered in, 287;
adopts Sumner's negro-suffrage amendment to Reconstruction bill,
292, and passes bill over veto, 293, 294;
pass bills readmitting divers States, 296, 297;
debates Georgia bill, 298, 299;
debates Tenure-of-Office bill, 301, 302,
and passes it over veto, 303;
non-concurs in removal of Stanton, 305, 306;
trial of Johnson impeachment in, 309-314, 318-320;
acquits him on three counts, 320, 321;
debate on T.'s connection with McCardle case, 331, 332;
debates and passes 15th Amendment, 338-340;
debate in, on ousting Sumner from Foreign Affairs Committee, 343
_ff._;
debates Ku-Klux-Klan bill, 356-358,
and Amnesty bill, 359, 360,
and Hodge resolution, 362-364;
orders inquiry into Leet and Stocking scandal, 365, 366;
discusses make-up of committee, 366, 367;
T.'s speech on Mo. convention of 1872, 376;
Sumner's anti-Grant speech in, 387, 388;
orders investigation of La. election, 405;
T.'s last speech in, 405.
Seward, William H., speech of, on Kansas affairs, 64;
the "logical candidate" in 1860, 102;
opposition to nomination of, 102, 103;
too radical for some states, 103;
T. and Lincoln on candidacy of, 103, 104, 105;
his inclusion in Cabinet opposed, 139 _ff._;
State Dep't. offered to, 141;
and Cameron's appointment, 143;
and the Harvey despatch to Gov. Pickens, 155 _ff._;
and Harvey's appointment to Portugal, 155, 157;
his assurance to Confederate envoys as to evacuation of Sumter, 156;
his purpose, to defeat relief of Sumter, 157;
had induced Lincoln to agree to evacuation to prevent secession of
Va., 158;
sends Magruder to Va. convention, 161;
and Douglas, in April, 1861, 163, 164;
his aims patriotic but futile, 164;
assumes power to order arbitrary arrests, 190 _ff._;
his dispatches of Apr. 1861, and July, 1862, to Adams, 210 _ff._;
his attitude toward Lincoln's war policy, 210;
unjustly blamed for non-success of Union arms, 210, 211, 212;
committee of Republican Senators urge Lincoln to demand his
resignation, 211;
Lincoln's comment thereon, 212;
on real date of emancipation, 222;
his construction of 13th Amendment confirmed by Supreme Court, 229;
on Johnson as a speaker, 246;
opinion of, on matter of territorializing States, 290;
prepares Johnson's veto message of Tenure-of-Office bill, 303; 48,
79, 82, 84, 86, 88, 106, 107, 108, 112, 116, 118, 119, 145, 146,
147, 150, 151, 170, 172, 181 _n._, 182, 197, 238, 307, 430.
Seymour, Horatio, elected Governor of N. Y., 197;
Democratic nominee for Pres. (1868), 333; 355.
Shaffer, J. W., quoted, on conditions in seceding states, 242, 243.
Shannon, Wilson, succeeds Reeder as Governor of Kansas Terr., 55.
Sheahan, James W., 79.
Sheridan, P. H., General, 221.
Sherman, John, Senator, on Tenure-of-Office bill, 301, 302, 303;
his view of impeachment, 309, 310;
and evidence of Johnson's intent, 313;
on Sumner and the Foreign Affairs Committee, 344, 345;
on Caucus secrets, 345, 346; 102, 248, 249, 292, 316, 320, 363, 371,
409.
Sherman, William T., General, quoted, on conditions in La. (1859),
xxxv, 165, 166, 221, 257, 308.
Shields, James, Senator, 39, 43.
Shiloh, battle of, 334.
Simpson, Matthew, Methodist bishop, and the impeachment trial, 317,
320.
Slave trade, extension of, deemed a vital necessity in the South,
xxxiv.
Slavery, how involved in the War, xxi, xxii;
history of, in the U. S., xxvii _ff._;
change in Southern view of, xxxii, xxxiii;
in Ill., early history of, 23 _ff._;
provisions of Ordinance of 1787 concerning, violated by legislature,
25;
prohibited by State Constitution, 25;
attempts to perpetuate in Ill., 28-30;
and the Kansas-Nebraska bill, 34 _ff._;
in Lecompton Constitution, 72, 76;
Douglas's attitude toward, 78, 86;
in territories, doctrine of Squatter Sovereignty, 94 and _n._, 95;
resolutions concerning, proposed by Lincoln, 112;
proposed Amendment to Constitution forbidding interference with,
passes both Houses, 117;
T.'s review of question of, 124 _ff._;
T.'s view of effect of 13th Amendment on, 249, 250, 251, 258, 259,
260.
_And see_ Constitution (Amendment XIII), and Squatter Sovereignty.
Slaves, premature attempts to emancipate, by Frémont, 169, 170,
Cameron, 172,
Hunter, 172;
T.'s confiscation bill, 173 _ff._,
the first step toward full emancipation, 176.
Slidell, John, 80, 349, and _n._
Smith, Caleb, Secretary of the Interior, 142, 148, 149, 151, 429.
South, the, and the right of Secession, xxx;
and the Missouri Compromise, xxx;
condition of, in second quarter of 19th century, xxxii, xxxiii;
changing view of slavery in, xxxii,
and of the slave trade, xxxiv.
South Carolina, and Nullification, xxv, xxvi;
attitude of, in 1861, 110;
forts in, Lincoln's attitude concerning, 112, 113;
and the 13th Amendment, 229;
disputed returns from (1876), 408.
Southern States. _See_ States seceding.
Spaulding, Rufus P., Congressman, moves for inquiry into suspension of
Stanton, 306; 304.
Spencer, Charles S., threatens T. for his attitude on impeachment,
315.
Spoils system, T. on iniquities of, 349.
Springfield (Ill.) _Journal_, 142.
Springfield (Mass.) _Republican_, 372.
_Squatter Sovereign_, the, quoted, 51.
Squatter Sovereignty, doctrine of, reaffirmed by Douglas, 94;
denied by Jefferson Davis, 94.
Stallo, J. G., 373.
Stanbery, Henry, Attorney-General, opinion of, on question of
territorializing states, 290, 291;
of counsel for Johnson, 309; 327.
Stanton, Edwin M., Secretary of War, and arbitrary arrests, 197;
general jail delivery by, 198;
opinion of, on question of territorializing states, 290, 291;
and the Cabinet section of Tenure-of-Office bill, 302;
advises veto, and assists Seward in preparing veto message, 303;
declines to resign as Secretary of War, 305;
suspended, 305;
denies power of Pres. to suspend him, 305;
surrenders office to Grant, 305;
resumes office, after Senate's action, 306;
his embarrassing position, 308;
Johnson attempts to remove, 308;
refuses to turn over office to Thomas, 308;
change in popular feeling concerning, 308, 309;
attempted removal of, basis of first 8 articles of impeachment, 309,
310;
claims to be protected by Tenure-of-Office Act, 310;
evidence of his advice to Johnson as to that act, excluded, 313;
articles based on removal of, not voted on, 320;
relinquishes office, 321;
his conduct condemned, 321; 177, 186, 189, 237, 318, 319, 330, 430.
Stanton, F. P., acting Governor of Kansas, removed by Buchanan, 73.
_State Register_, the, 13, 14.
State sovereignty, xxii, xxv.
States, admitted in pairs, xxix.
States, seceding, opposing views as to status of, 231, 232;
Sumner and Stevens against Lincoln, 231, 232;
reconstruction of, mapped out before 39th Congress met, 237, 238;
witches' caldron in, under reconstruction, 241;
labor problem in, 241, 242;
new labor laws of, 242,
and their effect in the North, 242;
Shaffer quoted on conditions in, 242, 243;
reports of Grant and Schurz on conditions in, 252-254;
Committee on Reconstruction on status of, 284;
Stevens reports bill to restore political rights of, 284, 285;
except Tenn., refuse to ratify 14th Amendment, 287;
cause and consequence of their refusal, 287;
Stevens's bill to make military authority supreme in, 291, 292;
constitutions adopted by, in 1868, 295, 296.
Stephens, Alex. H., on Johnson's speech against secession, 246.
Stetson, Francis L., letter of, to author, 40 _n._
Stevens, Simon, 184.
Stevens, Thaddeus, his bill of indemnity for arbitrary arrests, 198;
his views of status of seceding states, 231;
on Reconstruction Committee, 271;
proposes amendments to Constitution, 282;
reports bill to restore political rights of states, 284;
his bill making military authority supreme in the South, 291, 292;
author of 11th article of impeachment, 311; 184, 260, 278, 287, 304,
306, 308, 309.
Stewart, Alex. T., nominated by Grant as Secretary of Treasury, 335,
and why, 335, 336;
ineligible, 336;
on the "general order" system, 365.
Stewart, William M., Senator, 261, 262, 264, 265, 298, 339, 366.
Stockton, John P., elected Senator from N. J., 261, 262;
his election contested, 262-265;
unseated for partisan reasons, 265.
Storey, Wilbur F., and the Chicago _Times_, 206-208.
Stoughton, E. W., 411.
Stringfellow, J. H., quoted, 54.
Strong, Moses M., 208.
Stuart, John T., 32.
Sturtevant, J. M., quoted, 118.
Suffrage, in seceding states, restriction of, 294.
Summers, George W., 158, 159, 161, 162.
Sumner, Charles, his speech on Kansas affairs, 64;
Brooks's assault on, 65;
quoted, in T.'s debate with Douglas, 66;
and Cameron, 188, 189;
his view of status of seceding states, 231;
opposes recognition of new state government of La., 233,
and defeats it, 234;
attacks Johnson, 246, 247;
and the 14th Amendment, 283;
secures adoption of negro suffrage as permanent element of
reconstruction, 292 and _n._;
Northern views concerning, 293;
dispute with T. on Va. bill, 297;
T. opposes ousting of, from Foreign affairs Committee, 297, 344,
420;
his theory of impeachment, 312;
and Stanton, 321;
and the San Domingo treaty, 342;
charged with bad faith by Grant, 342, 343;
deposed as Chairman of Foreign affairs committee, 343-347;
Sherman's advice to, 345;
interview of author with, 347;
on attitude of Anthony, 347;
Motley's removal a blow at, 347;
moves his Equal Rights bill as amendment to Amnesty bill, 360;
and Grant's administration, 361;
his speech against Grant, 387, 388;
his attitude toward Greeley's nomination, 388;
chastised by Garrison, 388; 79, 102, 211, 228 _n._, 236, 260, 264,
278, 285, 287, 291, 298, 313, 363, 366, 367, 370, 371, 378, 385
_n._, 423, 424.
Sumter, Fort, J. Davis's views concerning, 110;
Buchanan's reported purpose to surrender, 112, 113;
effect on Douglas of attack on, 115;
Harvey divulges plans to send supplies to, 155_ ff._;
Seward determined to prevent relief of, 156, 157;
Lincoln's earlier promise to evacuate, 158 _ff._;
attack on, aroused forces that finally destroyed slavery, 164;
attack on, and emancipation, 222; 128, 129.
Sunderland, Rev. Byron, 121.
Supreme Court of U. S., and the second clause of 13th Amendment, 229;
construes 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments, in U. S. _v._ Harris, 275,
276, 358;
holds Ku-Klux Act unconstitutional, 275;
holds Equal Rights Act (1875) unconstitutional, 275, 276;
and the Civil Rights Act, 277;
divided decision of, in Milligan Case, 288, 289;
proposed legislation concerning, 328;
its jurisdiction as affected by Act of Mch. 27, 1868, 329, 330;
dismisses McCardle's appeal, 330;
and the Debs case, 414.
Surratt, Mary E., 289.
Swayne, Noah H., Justice Sup. Ct., 274, 289, 409.
Swett, Leonard, quoted, 428, 429; 69, 144.
Talcott, Wait, quoted, 118.
Tallmadge, James, Congressman, and the admission of Missouri, xxix,
xxx.
Tallmadge, N. P., 48.
Taney, Roger A., Chief Justice Sup. Ct., on the power to suspend
habeas corpus, 195, 196.
Tarr, Campbell, 161.
Taylor, John, of Caroline, xxii, _n._
Ten Eyck, John C., Senator, 262.
Tennessee, loyal state government in, recognized by Johnson, 237;
bill for readmission of, 285.
Tenure-of-Office bill, purpose of, 301;
not at first intended to apply to cabinet officers, 301;
passes Congress, 301;
cabinet advises veto of, 301;
vetoed, and passed over veto, 303;
and the Stanton case, 306, 309;
unconstitutionality of, alleged by Johnson's counsel, 311, 313.
Territorializing states, opinions of Johnson's advisers on question
of, 290, 291.
Terry, Alfred H., General, and the legislature of Va., 247.
Texas, opposition in Mass. & admission of, xxvi;
order for reconstruction of, 238;
fails to adopt new constitution promptly, 295;
new conditions imposed on, 296.
Thayer,Eli, 50.
Thomas, Jesse B., Senator, Author of Missouri Compromise, xxx.
Thomas, Lorenzo, appointed Secretary of War _ad interim_, 308;
Stanton refuses to give way to, 308;
his appointment the basis of certain articles of impeachment, 309,
310, 320, 321; 318, 319.
Thomas, Morris St. P., quoted, 21 _n._, 421.
Thomas, William B., 374.
Thompson, Jacob, Secretary of Interior, and the Lecompton
Constitution, 73.
Thompson, John B., quoted, 36.
Thurman, Allen G., Senator, 367.
Tilden, Samuel J., and the Election of 1876, 406, 407 _ff._;
T. of counsel for, in La. case, 409, 410;
Electoral Commission decides adversely to, 411;
legally elected, 411.
Tillson, John, quoted, 107.
Tipton, Thomas W., Senator, 300, 343, 344, 345, 346, 363, 371.
Tompkins, D. D., 179.
Toombs, Robert, Senator, 58, 83, 121.
Topeka Constitution, condemned by Buchanan and upheld by T., 76, 77.
Toucey, Isaac, 130.
Traveling in U. S., in 1847, 20.
Treat, Samuel H., Justice, 13, 20.
Truman, Benj. C, quoted, 245 _n._; 307 _n._
Trumbull, Julia (Jayne), T.'s first wife, letters of, to Walter T.,
121-123;
T.'s letters to, on Harvey dispatch, 15, 157, 158,
and on first battle of Bull Run, 165-167;
her personality, 169;
her death, 326.
TRUMBULL, LYMAN, birth (1813) and ancestry, 1-3;
education, 3;
school-teaching in Georgia, 4, 5;
reads law there, 5;
goes to Illinois (1837), and settles at Belleville, 5, 6;
practices law, 7 _ff._;
describes murder of Lovejoy, 8-10;
his early attitude toward slavery, 10;
in State legislature, 10;
his qualities as a debater, 10;
appointed Secretary of State, 11;
his resignation requested by Gov. Carlin, and why? 12 and _n._,
13;
his resignation splits the Democratic party, 13, 14;
resumes practice, 14;
marries Julia M. Jayne, 15;
describes river floods, and murder of Joseph Smith, 16;
family affairs, 16, 17, 19, 20;
candidate for Democratic nomination for governor, 18;
defeated by Ford's influence, 18;
nominated for Congress, and defeated (1846), 18, 19;
his professional earnings, 20;
elected Judge of Ill. Supreme Court (1848), 20;
removed to Alton, 21;
reëlected judge (1852), but resigns (1853), 21;
Chief Justice Magruder on his judicial opinions, 21, 22.
Engaged as counsel for negroes, claiming their freedom, 28;
case of Sarah Borders, 28, 29;
in Jarrot _v._ Jarrot, wins a victory which practically puts an
end to slavery in Ill., 29;
N. D. Harris quoted on his efforts, 30, 31;
his return to politics due to repeal of Missouri Compromise, 32;
takes stump in opposition to Kansas-Nebraska bill, 37, 38;
Anti-Nebraska candidate for Congress in 8th district, 38,
and elected, 38;
in Senatorial election of 1854, receives votes of Anti-Nebraska
Democrats on early ballots, 43, 44;
elected by votes of Lincoln men, to defeat Gov. Matteson, 44, 45,
46 _n._;
regarded as a traitor by regular Democrats, 45;
Lincoln's attitude toward his election, 45, 46.
Takes his seat in Senate, 48;
protest against his election overruled, 48, 49;
letter from J. C. Underwood to, on Kansas affairs, 52, 53;
and from I. T. Dement, 53;
his speech on report of Committee on Territories endorsing
Pres. Pierce's view of Kansas affairs, 56 _ff._;
exposes Douglas's sophisms, 57, 58;
a welcome reinforcement to Republicans in Senate, 567;
Douglas declares him not a Democrat, 59;
his answer to Douglas's tirade against him, 60, 61;
Douglas's reply, 61, 62;
his construction of "forever" in the Missouri Compromise, 62, 63;
further debate with Douglas on Kansas, 63, 64;
effect of these debates on his reputation, 65;
his intellect and personality compared with Lincoln's, 65;
divers views of his first appearance in debate, quoted, 66, 67;
letter from G. B. Raum to, 67;
campaigns in Minnesota, 68;
attends Republican National Convention of 1856, 69;
colloquy with Mason, on destruction of the Union, 70;
letter of, to J. B. Turner, on conditions in 1857, 71;
divers reports to, on effect of Douglas's Anti-Lecompton stand,
74, 75;
demolishes Buchanan's message on Kansas affairs, 76, 77;
letters to, on possible alliance of Douglas with Republicans, 79,
80;
Democratic overtures to, 80, 81;
speaks on Buchanan's claim that slavery lawfully exists in Kansas,
81, 82;
letters to, from Lincoln and others, voicing Republican distrust
of Douglas in Ill., 87, 88,
and, generally, on the campaign of 1858, 90-92;
his cordial relations with Lincoln, 93;
takes part in debate on resolution for committee of inquiry into
John Brown's raid, 98-100;
his notable speech, 98, 99,
and Lincoln's praise thereof, 100;
letter from Lincoln on Delahay matter, 100, 101.
His view of candidates for Republican nomination in 1860, 103;
writes to Lincoln thereon, 103, 104;
thinks Seward cannot be elected, 104,
and believes McLean alone can beat him, 104;
Lincoln his first choice, 104;
Lincoln, in reply, avows his own ambition, and discusses other
candidates, 104, 105;
divers letters to, on Lincoln's nomination, 106-107;
post-nomination letters of Lincoln to, 108;
speaks for Lincoln at ratification meeting, 109, 110;
confidential letters of Lincoln to, against compromise, 111, 112,
and on Buchanan's reputed purpose to surrender So. Carolina
forts, 112;
his own views on compromise set forth in letter to E. C. Larned,
113, 114;
his speech on Crittenden Compromise (March 2, 1861), 115, 116, and
_n._, 123-138;
urged by constituents to stand firm, 117-119;
writes Gov. Yates, advising military preparations, 120;
declines to listen to "Compromisers" from N. Y., 122;
his troubles with office-seekers, 139;
in N. Y. meets remonstrants against Seward's inclusion in Cabinet,
and reports to Lincoln, 139, 140;
Lincoln's reply, 141;
Greeley's advice to, 141;
advises Lincoln not to appoint Cameron, 145, 146, 147;
is urged to use his influence to that end, 147, 148;
favors Judd for seat in Cabinet, 148, 149, 150;
reëlected senator (Jan. 1861), 152;
announces death of Douglas, 152;
his eulogy of Douglas, 153, 154;
the Harvey dispatch to Gov. Pickens, commented on in letter to
Mrs. T., 155,156.
Witnesses first battle of Bull Run, and describes it in letter to
Mrs. T., 165-167;
his reconstructed telegram, 168;
his first Confiscation Act passed by Congress, 168;
his physical aspect, etc., in 1861, 168;
his family, 169;
letter of M. C. Lea to, on financial affairs, 170,
and his reply, 171;
brings in his second Confiscation Act, 173;
his report thereon, 173;
history of the bill in Congress, 173-176;
speaks on War Dep't. frauds, 184;
leads opposition to confirmation of Cameron's nomination as
minister to Russia, 187;
votes against confirmation, 189;
introduces resolution of inquiry concerning arbitrary arrests in
loyal states, 191, 192;
his colloquy with Dixon of Conn., 192, 193;
his resolution shelved, 194;
reports from Judiciary Committee House bill on same subject, 197;
offers substitute for that bill, which is opposed by Democrats,
but finally passed, 198, 199;
offers substitute for Stevens's bill to indemnify Pres. for
arbitrary arrests, 199;
reports from conference his substitute combined with his
habeas corpus bill, 200;
his report concurred in, after Democratic filibuster, 201, 202;
his speech at meeting of protest against the order forbidding the
publication of Chicago _Times_, 207, 208, 209;
letter of Judge White to, regarding certain dispatches of Seward
to Adams, 210, 211,
and his reply, 211, 212;
one of committee to urge Lincoln to get rid of Seward, 211;
divers letters to, relating to the war, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217;
and Delahay's appointment to a judgeship, 213-214;
letters of J. M. Palmer to, concerning the election of 1864, 214,
216;
first evidence of personal difference between Lincoln and, 217,
218;
deems the government inefficient in putting down the rebellion,
218;
falsely accused of refusing to speak in favor of Lincoln's
reëlection, 220.
Reports to the Senate as a substitute for Henderson's proposed
Constitutional Amendment what later became the 13th Amendment,
224;
his speech thereon, 225-226;
his authorship thereof, his title to immortality, 230;
and the new Senators from La., 233;
reports resolution recognizing Hahn government of La., 233;
breaks temporarily with Sumner, 234;
letter of Shaffer to, on conditions in South, 242, 243,
and of Ray, on Reconstruction, 243;
his speech on postponement of Wilson bill invalidating certain
acts, etc., of seceding states, 248-251;
colloquy with Saulsbury, 250;
introduces Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights bills, 257;
speaks, in debate on the former, on construction of second clause
of 13th Amendment, 258-260;
colloquy with Henderson, 260;
letter from Ray, on negro suffrage, 261;
favors Stockton in N. J. election contest, 261 _ff._;
in debating his Amendment to Civil Rights bills, speaks again on
power of Congress to pass laws for ordinary administration of
justice in States, 265-267;
answered by Saulsbury, 267-268;
quotes Gaston as to citizenship of free negroes, 270;
his great speech in reply to Johnson's message vetoing Civil
Rights bill, 272;
the _Nation_, quoted, on his speech, 273;
his leading position in the campaign of 1866, 273;
opposed to Ku-Klux bill of 1871, 275, 356, 357, 358;
reëlected Senator (1866), 277;
sustains Johnson until veto of Civil Rights bill, 277, 278;
letter of Mrs. F. C. Gary to, 278,
and his reply, 279;
not active in drawing 14th Amendment, 284 _n._;
his influence as against radical measures lessened by refusal of
Southern states to ratify 14th Amendment, 287;
on Stevens's Reconstruction bill, votes against Sumner's amendment
making negro suffrage a permanent condition of reconstruction,
292,
but supports bill with that amendment, 292;
at fault in so doing, 292;
votes to pass bill over veto, 294;
votes to pass supplementary registration of voters bill over veto,
294;
writing in Chicago _Advance_, denies power of Congress to regulate
suffrage in states, 294, 295;
reports bill for readmission of Va., but opposes amendments
applying new conditions, 296;
has a lively dispute with Sumner, 296, 297,
but supports him strongly in the later movement to oust him from
chairmanship of Com. on Foreign Relations, 297, 344, 420;
supports Bingham proviso to the Georgia bill, 298,
and makes a powerful speech thereon, 299;
the _Nation's_ high praise of the speech and its author, 299, 300;
votes for Tenure-of-Office bill, as amended, 302;
abused for his stand against conviction of Johnson, 313, 315, 323;
Spencer's threat, 315;
N. Y. _Evening Post_, Chicago _Tribune_, and _Nation_, quoted, as
to abuse of the "traitors," 314-317;
his written opinion on the case against Johnson, 318, 319;
J. F. Rhodes quoted on the action of the seven, 322;
his only reply to his vilifiers, 323, 324;
his eulogy of Fessenden, 324, 325;
death of Mrs. Trumbull, 326.
Retained for the War Dep't. in the matter of McCardle's petition for
habeas corpus, 327;
appears before Supreme Court, 327, 328;
votes to pass over veto the Act of March 27, 1868, which the
Supreme Court held to apply _ex post facto_ to McCardle case,
329, 330:
his action criticized, 330, 332;
his acceptance of counsel fees attacked by Chandler as being
connected with his vote on impeachment, 330, 331;
his defense, 331, 332;
the Chandler charge would not down, 332;
supports Vickers's amendment to 15th Amendment, 338,
and opposes Wilson's amendment, 339;
letter of Grenier to, on Republican corruption, 341;
offered English mission, 347;
his reason for declining, 348;
in speech at Chicago, discusses claims of U.S. against England,
349, and the urgent need of reform of the Civil service, 349,
350;
indorses Cox's stand, 349, 350;
casts only vote in Judiciary Committee in favor of Hoar's
confirmation as Supreme Court Justice, 350;
votes against tacking Sumner's Equal Rights bill to Amnesty bill,
359;
offers amendment for general investigation of public service to
Conkling's resolution concerning Hodge, 362;
his remarks thereon, 363;
not appointed on investigating committee, 366, 367;
not moved by personal hostility to Grant, 369;
interview with, in _Courier-Journal_ on his relations with Grant
(Dec. 1871). 369 and _n._, 370;
letter of S. Galloway to, on Grant, 371;
mentioned by Stanley Matthews as possible candidate of Liberal
Republicans, 372;
J. H. Bryant and others urge him to become a candidate, 375;
his replies somewhat non-committal, 375;
defends Mo. Liberal Republican platform as Republican doctrine,
376;
on civil service reform, 376;
letter of Palmer to, offering his support, 377;
in letter to author, gives qualified assent to use of his name,
378, 379;
letter of author to, on his candidacy, 379;
his strength impaired by division of vote of Ill. at Cincinnati,
380;
opinions of editors as to candidates, 381;
vote for, in the convention, 383, 384;
his supporters decide to support Greeley, 384;
letter of W. C. Bryant to, urging him not to support Greeley, 386,
and his reply, 386, 387;
how Greeley's nomination was brought about, 389, 390;
how Trumbull received the news, 390, 391;
takes active part in campaign, 394 _ff._;
his speech at Springfield, Ill., denouncing Republican corruption,
395-399;
his tribute to Greeley, 399;
if nominated, could have been elected, 402;
Adams, the stronger candidate, 402, 403;
his speech on La. election of 1872, his last speech in the Senate,
405, 406.
His official career ended by defeat of Greeley, 407;
defeated for reëlection by Oglesby, 407;
resumes practice of law, 407;
one of the "visiting statesmen" sent to La. to watch canvass of
votes (1876), 409;
of counsel for Tilden before Electoral Commission, 409-411;
marries Mary Ingraham, 412;
Democratic candidate for governor of Ill. (1880), 412;
defeated by Cullom, 412;
entertains W. J. Bryan in 1893, 413;
inclined to free silver, 413;
his geniality, and vigor of mind and body, 413;
appears for Debs before Supreme Court, on petition for
habeas corpus, 414;
his speech in Chicago published as Populist campaign document,
414, 415;
no more radical than present-day "Progressive" doctrines, 415;
draws declaration of principles for Populist national conference,
415-417;
his death (June 5, 1896), 418;
Judge Moran quoted on his career, 419;
eminent as a political debater, well grounded in the law, 419,
420;
his character and talents reviewed and discussed, 419-422;
"a high-minded, kind-hearted, courteous gentleman, without
ostentation, and without guile," 421;
his place among the statesmen of his time discussed, 422;
his connection with the 13th Amendment, 422;
his opposition to arbitrary arrests unpopular, 422, 423;
his position as one of the "Seven Traitors" a proud one, 423;
change in his course on Reconstruction, 423, 424;
Medill quoted as to effect of vote in impeachment trial on his
future, 424, 425;
his partners quoted, as to his kindliness, 424;
Darrow on the "socialistic trend" of his opinions, 425;
letter of his daughter-in-law to author, 426;
his estimate of Lincoln's character and career, 426-430;
his views on religion, in letter to his mother, 430, 431;
his descendants, 431, 432.
Trumbull, Mary (Ingraham), T.'s second wife, 413, 432.
Trumbull, Walter, T.'s son, 18, 19, 121-123, 169, 425, 426, 431.
Trumbull family, the, 1, 2, 431, 432.
Turner, J. B., 71.
Turner, matter of, in Circuit Court of U.S., 274.
Underwood, John C, quoted, 52, 53.
Union Pacific R. R., 402.
United States _v._ Harris, 106 U. S., 275, 276, 358.
United States _v._ Rhodes (Circuit Court), 274.
Vagrancy law of Va., 247.
Vallandigham, Clement L., "the incarnation of Copperheadism," 203;
his speech of Jan. 14, 1863, 203, 204;
his arrest ordered by Burnside, 204;
tried by military commission, 204;
his sentence of imprisonment commuted to banishment to the South,
204;
all proceedings against, after arrest, illegal under habeas corpus
suspension act, 205;
nominated for governor of Ohio, but defeated, 206; 288.
Van Buren, John, 379.
Van Buren, Martin, xxi, 32, 37.
Van Tyne, C. H., _Letters of Daniel Webster_, xxiv _n._
Van Winkle, Peter G., Senator, on Civil Rights bill, 269; 261, 302,
314.
Van Wyck, Charles H., Congressman, 181, 182, 184.
Vermont, in convention of 1860, 106.
Vickers, George, Senator, 338.
Villard, Oswald G., _John Brown_, 52 _n._
Virginia, efforts to prevent secession of, 158 _ff._;
Lincoln's plan of reconstruction in, adopted by Johnson's Cabinet,
237;
Peirpoint recognized as Governor of, 237;
vagrancy law of, 247;
additional conditions imposed on readmission of, 296, 297.
Virginia Resolutions of 1798, xxiii.
"Visiting statesmen," and the contested election of 1876, 408, 409.
Wade, Benjamin F., Senator, opposed to Lincoln's renomination, 220;
102, 107, 108, 111, 150, 166, 233, 287, 332, 343.
Waite, Morrison R., Chief Justice Sup. Ct., 275.
Walker, Robert J., appointed governor of Kansas, 71;
and the Lecompton Convention, 71, 72;
denounces Cabinet conspiracy, 73;
resigns, 73; 81, 82.
Wall, James W., Senator, 200.
Wallace, Lew, General, attempts to usurp powers of Attorney-general
under Confiscation Act, 176, 177.
War Department, frauds in, 178 _ff._
War of 1812, xxiv.
Warren, Hooper, 27, 28.
Washburne, Elihu B., appointed Secretary of State, 333;
a strong partisan of Grant, 333;
his qualifications, 333;
terms of his appointment, 334;
resigns, 334; 45, 46, 168, 281, 304, 407.
Washington, Bushrod, xxxi.
Washington _Chronicle_, 300.
Washington, George, xxiii.
Washington, gathering of troops at, in Jan., 1861, 121, 122.
Watterson, Henry, 372, 373.
Wayland, Rev. Francis, xxxii.
Ways and Means, Committee of, 354.
Webster, Daniel, quoted, xxiv and _n._; xxii _n._, xxv _n._, xxvi,
xxvii, 27, 39, 125.
Weed, Thurlow, and Cameron's appointment, 143;
and the War Dep't. frauds, 179, 180; 108, 112, 139, 141, 146, 151,
181, 182; 184.
Welk, Jesse W., 101 _n._, 143 _n._
Welles, Gideon, quoted, on Cameron's appointment, 142, 144, 146, 151;
on the Harvey dispatch, 157, 158;
on Douglas's attitude in April, 1861, 163, 164;
on Cameron's emancipation hobby, 172 _n._;
on Cummings, 181 _n._;
on inefficiency of Union armies, 212;
on Halleck, 226;
on Cabinet meeting of Jan. 8, 1867, 290 _ff._;
opinion of, on question of territorializing states, 290;
on Stanton and the Tenure-of-Office Act, 303;
on Methodist pressure on Senator Willey, 319, 320;
on divers matters, 273 _n._, 313, 314, 324, 423.
Wells, David A., 353, 377, 379.
Wentworth, John, 90, 93.
Whigs, the, and the Kansas-Nebraska bill, 41.
White, Andrew D., 343.
White, Horace, and Lincoln's Peoria speech, 39;
his recollections of the Lincoln-Douglas campaign, 89,
quoted, 92;
impressions of John Brown, 97;
on Douglas's speech to Ill. legislature, 153;
his friendly relations with T., 168, 169, 413;
and the ousting of Sumner, 346, 347;
interview with Blaine, 354;
on the outlook at Cincinnati (1872), 378;
letter from T. to, and his reply, 379;
chairman of platform committee at Cincinnati, 382;
his view of the result, 385,
and of Greeley's nomination, 389, 390;
thinks Adams or T. could have been elected, 402, 403;
last meeting with T., 413.
Whitfield, pro-slavery Delegate in Congress from Kansas, 49, 50.
Whitney, Henry C, quoted, 143 _n._
Wigfall, Louis T., Senate, colloquy with T. in debate on Crittenden
Compromise, 129, 130; 133, 134.
Wilkinson, Morton S., Senator, 150, 189.
Willey, Waitman T., Senator, Methodist pressure on, in impeachment
trial, 317, 320;
votes "guilty," 320;
had agreed to vote "not guilty" if necessary, 321; 261, 302, 314.
Williams, Archibald, 45.
Williams, George H., Senator, 281, 298, 299, 328, 329.
Wilmot, David, Congressman, 146, 150.
Wilson, Henry, his speech on Kansas affairs, 65;
quoted on possible alliance of Douglas with Republicans, 79;
his resolution on suspension of habeas corpus, 190, 191;
opposes bill authorizing Pres. to suspend habeas corpus, 197;
his denunciation of Lincoln, 219;
brings in bill to nullify new labor laws in seceding states, 247,
248;
T.'s speech thereon, 248-251;
nominated for Vice-Pres., 393,
and elected, 402; 86, 87, 189, 194, 197, 198, 296, 298, 314, 315,
338, 344, 363.
Wilson, James F., Congressman, proposes amendment to Constitution,
prohibiting slavery, 223;
"slated" for State Dep't under Grant, 334 and _n._,
declines, 334;
his character, 335; 304, 309.
Wilson, James H., General, 337.
Wirt, William, 331.
Wood, John, 92.
Wool, John E., General, 178, 181.
World's Columbian Exposition, 412.
Wright, Silas, 91.
Wright, William, Senator, 261, 263, 264.
Yates, Richard, Governor, letter from, to T., 218;
letter from T. to, 120, 121; 107, 109, 111, 150, 197, 220.
Yulee, David L., Senator, 99.
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