By Author [ A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z |  Other Symbols ]
  By Title [ A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z |  Other Symbols ]
  By Language
all Classics books content using ISYS

Download this book: [ ASCII | HTML | PDF ]

Look for this book on Amazon

We have new books nearly every day.
If you would like a news letter once a week or once a month
fill out this form and we will give you a summary of the books for that week or month by email.

Title: The Histories of Polybius, Vol. II (of 2)
Author: Polybius
Language: English
As this book started as an ASCII text book there are no pictures available.
Copyright Status: Not copyrighted in the United States. If you live elsewhere check the laws of your country before downloading this ebook. See comments about copyright issues at end of book.

*** Start of this Doctrine Publishing Corporation Digital Book "The Histories of Polybius, Vol. II (of 2)" ***

This book is indexed by ISYS Web Indexing system to allow the reader find any word or number within the document.

   Transcriber’s note:

   This book was published in two volumes, of which this is the second.

   Following entries in the Index are erroneous,
   as there is no Chapter 15 in Book XXXIV and no
   Chapter 59 in Book VI.:

   Sallentini, a tribe in Calabria. 34, 15, Rhyncus,
   in Aetolia, 6, 59, Morini, a Gallic tribe, 34, 15,
   Mauretania, 34, 15, Lugdunum, a town in Gaul, 34,
   15. and there are no references in the text
   related to these entries.

   Bold characters are enclosed within plus signs.(+)








   VOL. II


   _All rights reserved_


   BOOKS X TO XXXIX                                       1-541

   SMALLER FRAGMENTS                                    542-559

   APPENDICES                                           560-568

   INDEX                                                569-615




[Sidenote: B.C. 209, Coss. Q. Fabius Maximus V. Q. Fulvius Flaccus IV.]

+1.+ The distance from the strait and town of Rhegium to Tarentum is
more than two thousand stades; and that portion of the shore of Italy
is entirely destitute of harbours, except those of Tarentum: I mean
the coast facing the Sicilian sea, and verging towards Greece, which
contains the most populous barbarian tribes as well as the most famous
of the Greek cities. For the Bruttii, Lucani, some portions of the
Daunii, the Cabalii, and several others, occupy this quarter of Italy.
So again this coast is lined by the Greek cities of Rhegium, Caulon,
Locri, Croton, Metapontum, and Thurii: so that voyagers from Sicily or
from Greece to any one of these cities are compelled to drop anchor in
the harbours of Tarentum; and the exchange and commerce with all who
occupy this coast of Italy take place in this city. One may judge of
the excellence of its situation from the prosperity attained by the
people of Croton; who, though only possessing roadsteads suitable for
the summer, and enjoying therefore but a short season of mercantile
activity, still have acquired great wealth, entirely owing, it seems,
to the favourable situation of their town and harbour, which yet cannot
be compared with those of Tarentum. For, even at this day, Tarentum
is in a most convenient position in respect to the harbours of the
Adriatic, and was formerly still more so. Since, from the Iapygian
promontory as far as Sipontum, every one coming from the other side
and dropping anchor at Italy always crossed to Tarentum, and used that
city for his mercantile transactions as an emporium; for the town of
Brundisium had not yet been founded in these times.[1] Therefore Fabius
regarded the recovery of it as of great importance, and, omitting
everything else, turned his whole thoughts to this....


[Sidenote: A common mistake as to Scipio’s character.]

+2.+ Being about to narrate the exploits of Publius Scipio in Iberia,
and in fact all the achievements in his life, I think it necessary to
direct my readers’ attention, to begin with, to his moral and mental
qualities. For as he is perhaps the most illustrious man of any born
before the present generation, everybody seeks to know what kind of
man he was, and what advantages from natural ability or experience he
enjoyed, to account for a career so crowded with brilliant achievement;
and yet is compelled to remain in the dark, or to entertain false
opinions, because those who write about him have not kept to the truth.
The soundness of this assertion will be rendered evident in the course
of my narrative to all who are capable of estimating the noblest and
most gallant of his exploits. Now all other writers represent him as
a man favoured by fortune, who succeeded in his undertakings contrary
to rational expectation, and by the mere force of circumstances. They
consider apparently such men to be, so to speak, more god-like and
worthy of admiration, than those who act in every case by calculation.
They do not seem to be aware of the distinction between credit for
good fortune and credit for good conduct in the case of such men; and
that the former may be assigned to any one however commonplace, while
the latter belongs to those alone who act from prudent calculation and
clear intelligence: and it is these last whom we should look upon as
the most god-like and god-beloved.

[Sidenote: Scipio’s use of religion compared with that of Lycurgus.]

Now it seems to me that in his character and views Publius was very
like Lycurgus the legislator of the Lacedaemonians. For we must not
suppose that it was from superstition that Lycurgus continually
consulted the Pythian priestess in the establishment of the
Lacedaemonian constitution; nor that Publius depended on dreams and
ominous words for his success in securing empire for his country.
But as both saw that the majority of mankind cannot be got to accept
contentedly what is new and strange, nor to face dangers with courage,
without some hope of divine favour,—Lycurgus, by always supporting his
own schemes by an oracular response from the Pythia, secured better
acceptation and credit for his ideas; and Publius, by always in like
manner instilling into the minds of the vulgar an opinion of his acting
on some divine suggestion in the formation of his designs, caused those
under his command to confront dangerous services with greater courage
and cheerfulness. But that he invariably acted on calculation and with
foresight, and that the successful issue of his plans was always in
harmony with rational expectation, will be evident by what I am about
to relate.

[Sidenote: Scipio’s first exploit, B.C. 218.]

+3.+ For that he was beneficent and high-minded is acknowledged; but
that he was acute, sober-minded, and earnest in pursuit of his aims, no
one will admit, except those who have lived with him, and contemplated
his character, so to speak, in broad daylight. Of such Gaius Laelius
was one. He took part in everything he did or said from boyhood to the
day of his death; and he it was who convinced me of this truth: because
what he said appeared to me to be likely in itself, and in harmony with
the achievements of that great man. He told me that the first brilliant
exploit of Publius was when his father fought the cavalry engagement
with Hannibal near the Padus. He was then, as it seems, eighteen years
old and on his first campaign. His father had given him a squadron of
picked cavalry for his protection; but when in the course of the battle
he saw his father surrounded by the enemy, with only two or three
horsemen near him, and dangerously wounded, he first tried to cheer on
his own squadron to go to his father’s assistance, but when he found
them considerably cowed by the numbers of the enemy surrounding them,
he appears to have plunged by himself with reckless courage into the
midst of the enemy: whereupon, his comrades being forced to charge
also, the enemy were overawed and divided their ranks to let them pass;
and Publius the elder, being thus unexpectedly saved, was the first to
address his son as his preserver in the hearing of the whole army.[2]
Having gained an acknowledged reputation for bravery by this exploit,
he ever afterwards freely exposed himself to every sort of personal
danger, whenever his country rested its hope of safety on him. And this
is not the conduct of a general who trusts to luck, but of one who has
a clear head.

[Sidenote: Elected aedile, end of B.C. 217.]

+4.+ Subsequently, when his elder brother Lucius was a candidate for
the Aedileship, which is about the most honourable office open to a
“young” man at Rome: it being the custom for two patricians to be
appointed, and there being many candidates, for some time he did not
venture to stand for the same office as his brother. But as the day
of election drew near, judging from the demeanour of the people that
his brother would easily obtain the office, and observing that his own
popularity with the multitude was very great, he made up his mind that
the only hope of his brother’s success was that they should combine
their candidatures. He therefore resolved to act as follows: His mother
was going round to the temples and sacrificing to the gods in behalf
of his brother, and was altogether in a state of eager expectation as
to the result. She was the only parent whose wishes he had to consult;
for his father was then on his voyage to Iberia, having been appointed
to command in the war there. He therefore said to her that he had seen
the same dream twice: for he thought that he was coming home from the
Forum after being elected Aedile with his brother, and that she met
them at the door and threw her arms round them and kissed them. His
mother with true womanly feeling exclaimed, “Oh, that I might see that
day!” He replied, “Do you wish us to try”? Upon her assenting, under
the idea that he would not venture, but was only jesting on the spur
of the moment (for of course he was quite a young man), he begged her
to prepare him at once a white toga, such as it is the custom for
candidates for office to wear.

+5.+ His mother thought no more about it: but Publius, having obtained
a white toga, went to the Forum before his mother was awake. His
boldness, as well as his previous popularity, secured him a brilliant
reception from the people; and when he advanced to the spot assigned
for candidates, and took his place by the side of his brother, the
people not only invested him with the office, but his brother also
for his sake; and both brothers returned home Aediles designate. The
news having been suddenly brought to their mother, she rushed in the
utmost delight to meet them at the door, and kissed the young men in an
ecstasy of joy. Accordingly Publius was believed by all who had heard
previously about his dream to have held commune with the gods, not
merely in his sleep, but rather in a waking vision, and by day. But in
point of fact there was no dream at all: Scipio was kind, open-handed,
and courteous, and by these means had conciliated the favour of the
multitude. But by a dexterous use of the occasion, both with the
people and his mother, he obtained his purpose, and moreover got the
reputation of acting under divine inspiration. For those persons, who,
from dulness or want of experience, or idleness, can never take a clear
view of the occasions or causes or connexion of events, are apt to give
the gods and chance the credit for what is really effected by sagacity
and far-seeing calculation. I have thought it worth while to say thus
much, that my readers may not be misled by unfounded gossip to pass
over this great man’s finest and most splendid qualities, I mean his
wealth of resource and untiring diligence; which will become still more
apparent when we come to recount his actual achievements.

[Sidenote: Speech of Publius Scipio to the soldiers in Spain, B.C. 210.]

[Sidenote: Scipio crosses the Ebro, and swoops down upon New Carthage.]

+6.+ Such was the man who now assembled the soldiers and exhorted them
not to be dismayed by the disaster which had befallen them. “For,”
said he, “Romans have never been beaten by Carthaginians in a trial of
valour. It was the result of treachery on the part of the Celtiberians,
and of rashness, the two commanders getting cut off from each other
owing to their trust in the alliance of these men. But now these two
disadvantages are on the side of the enemy: for they are encamped at a
wide distance from each other; and by their tyrannical conduct to their
allies have alienated them all, and made them hostile to themselves.
The consequence is that some of them are already sending messages to
us; while the rest, as soon as they dare, and see that we have crossed
the river, will gladly join us; not so much because they have any
affection for us, as because they are eager to punish the outrages of
the Carthaginians. Most important of all is the fact that the enemy are
at variance with each other, and will refuse to fight against us in a
body, and by thus engaging in detail will be more easily dealt with by
us.” Looking to these facts, therefore, he bade them cross the river
with confidence, and undertook that he and the other officers would see
to the next step to be taken. With these words he left his colleague,
Marcus Silanus, with five hundred horse to guard the ford, and to
protect the allies on the north of the river, while he himself began
taking his army across, without revealing his design to any one. As
a matter of fact he had resolved to do nothing of what he gave out
publicly, and had made up his mind to make a rapid attack upon the
town called Iberian Carthage. This may be looked upon as the first and
strongest proof of the judgment which I lately passed upon him. He was
now only in his twenty-seventh year: and yet he, in the first place,
undertook to accomplish what the magnitude of the previous disasters
had made the world look upon as completely hopeless; and, in the second
place, having undertaken it, he left on one side the plain and obvious
course, and conceived and carried out a plan which was a surprise
to the enemy himself. This could only be the result of the closest

[Sidenote: Scipio’s careful inquiries as to the state of things in

+7.+ The fact is that he had made minute inquiries, before leaving
Rome, both about the treason of the Celtiberians, and the separation
of the two Roman armies; and had inferred that his father’s disaster
was entirely attributable to these. He had not therefore shared the
popular terror of the Carthaginians, nor allowed himself to be overcome
by the general panic. And when he subsequently heard that the allies
of Rome north of the Ebro were remaining loyal, while the Carthaginian
commanders were quarrelling with each other, and maltreating the
natives subject to them, he began to feel very cheerful about his
expedition, not from a blind confidence in Fortune, but from deliberate
calculation. Accordingly, when he arrived in Iberia, he learnt, by
questioning everybody and making inquiries about the enemy from every
one, that the forces of the Carthaginians were divided into three.
Mago, he was informed, was lingering west of the pillars of Hercules
among the Conii; Hasdrubal, the son of Gesco, in Lusitania, near the
mouth of the Tagus; while the other Hasdrubal was besieging a certain
city of the Caspetani; and none of the three were less than ten days’
march from the New Town. Now he calculated that, if he decided to give
the enemy battle, it would be risking too much to do so against all
three at once, because his predecessors had been beaten, and because
the enemy would vastly out-number him; if, on the other hand, he were
to march rapidly to engage one of the three, and should then find
himself surrounded—which might happen by the one attacked retreating,
and the others coming up to his relief,—he dreaded a disaster like that
of his uncle Gnaeus and his father Publius.

[Sidenote: He determines to attempt New Carthage.]

+8.+ He therefore rejected that idea altogether: but being informed
that New Carthage was the most important source of supplies to the
enemy and of damage to the Romans in the present war, he had taken the
trouble to make minute inquiries about it during the winter from those
who were well informed. He learnt that it was nearly the only town in
Iberia which possessed a harbour suitable for a fleet and naval force;
that it lay very conveniently for the Carthaginians to make the sea
passage from Libya; that they in fact had the bulk of their money and
war material in it, as well as their hostages from the whole of Iberia;
that, most important of all, the number of fighting men garrisoning the
citadel only amounted to a thousand,—because no one would ever suppose
that, while the Carthaginians commanded nearly the whole of Iberia, any
one would conceive the idea of assaulting this town; that the other
inhabitants were exceedingly numerous, but all consisted of craftsmen,
mechanics, and fisher-folk, as far as possible removed from any
knowledge of warfare. All this he regarded as being fatal to the town,
in case of the sudden appearance of an enemy. Nor did he moreover fail
to acquaint himself with the topography of New Carthage, or the nature
of its defences, or the lie of the lagoon: but by means of certain
fishermen who had worked there he had ascertained that the lagoon
was quite shallow and fordable at most points; and that, generally
speaking, the water ebbed every day towards evening sufficiently to
secure this. These considerations convinced him that, if he could
accomplish his purpose, he would not only damage his opponents, but
gain a considerable advantage for himself; and that, if on the other
hand he failed in effecting it, he would yet be able to secure the
safety of his men owing to his command of the sea, provided he had once
made his camp secure,—and this was easy, because of the wide dispersion
of the enemy’s forces. He had therefore, during his residence in winter
quarters, devoted himself to preparing for this operation to the
exclusion of every other: and in spite of the magnitude of the idea
which he had conceived, and in spite of his youth, he concealed it from
all except Gaius Laelius, until he had himself decided to reveal it.

+9.+ But although historians agree in attributing these calculations
to him; yet, when they come to narrate their issue, they somehow
or another attribute the success obtained not to the man and his
foresight, but to the gods and to Fortune, and that, in spite of all
probability, and the evidence of those who lived with him; and in spite
of the fact that Publius himself in a letter addressed to Philip has
distinctly set forth that it was upon the deliberate calculations,
which I have just set forth, that he undertook the Iberian campaign
generally, and the assault upon New Carthage in particular.

[Sidenote: Gaius Laelius proceeds to New Carthage with the fleet.]

[Sidenote: Scipio by land. B.C. 209.]

However that may be, at the time specified he gave secret instructions
to Gaius Laelius, who was in command of the fleet, and who, as I have
said, was the only man in the secret, to sail to this town; while he
himself marched his army at a rapid pace in the same direction. His
force consisted of twenty-five thousand infantry and two thousand five
hundred cavalry; and arriving at New Carthage on the seventh day he
pitched his camp on the north of the town;[3] defended its rear by a
double trench and rampart stretching from sea to sea,[4] while on the
side facing the town he made absolutely no defences, for the nature of
the ground made him sufficiently secure.

But as I am now about to describe the assault and capture of the
town, I think I must explain to my readers the lie of the surrounding
country, and the position of the town itself.

[Sidenote: Description of New Carthage.]

+10.+ It stands about half-way down the coast of Iberia in a gulf which
faces south-west, running about twenty stades inland, and about ten
stades broad at its entrance. The whole gulf is made a harbour by the
fact that an island[5] lies at its mouth and thus makes the entrance
channels on each side of it exceedingly narrow. It breaks the force of
the waves also, and the whole gulf has thus smooth water, except when
south-west winds setting down the two channels raise a surf: with all
other winds it is perfectly calm, from being so nearly landlocked. In
the recess of the gulf a mountain juts out in the form of a chersonese,
and it is on this mountain that the city stands, surrounded by the sea
on the east and south, and on the west by a lagoon extending so far
northward that the remaining space to the sea on the other side, to
connect it with the continent, is not more than two stades. The city
itself has a deep depression in its centre, presenting on its south
side a level approach from the sea; while the rest of it is hemmed in
by hills, two of them mountainous and rough, three others much lower,
but rocky and difficult of ascent; the largest of which lies on the
east of the town running out into the sea, on which stands a temple
of Asclepius. Exactly opposite this lies the western mountain in a
closely-corresponding position, on which a palace had been erected at
great cost, which it is said was built by Hasdrubal when he was aiming
at establishing royal power. The remaining three lesser elevations
bound it on the north, of which the westernmost is called the hill of
Hephaestus, the next to it that of Aletes,—who is believed to have
attained divine honours from having been the discoverer of the silver
mines,—and the third is called the hill of Cronus. The lagoon has been
connected with the adjoining sea artificially for the sake of the
maritime folk; and over the channel thus cut between it and the sea
a bridge has been built, for beasts of burden and carts to bring in
provisions from the country.

+11.+ Such is the nature of this city’s situation. The side of the
Roman camp which faced the city therefore was secured, without any
artificial means, by the lagoon and the sea. The neck of land lying
between these two, and connecting the city with the continent, Scipio
did not fence off with a stockade, although it abutted on the middle of
his camp,—either for the sake of making an impression upon the enemy,
or by way of suiting the arrangement to his own design,—that he might
have nothing to hamper the free egress and return of his troops to and
from the camp. The circuit of the city wall was not more than twenty
stades formerly,—though I am aware that it has been stated at forty
stades; but this is false, as I know from personal inspection and not
from mere report,—and in our day it has been still farther contracted.

[Sidenote: Scipio discloses his intention of assaulting New Carthage.]

The fleet arrived to the hour, and Publius then thought it time to
summon a meeting of his men and to encourage them to the undertaking by
the use of the same arguments by which he had convinced himself, and
which I have just now detailed. He pointed out to them that the plan
was practicable; and briefly summing up the blow which their success
would be to their enemies, and the advantage it would be to themselves,
he ended by promising crowns of gold to those who first mounted the
walls, and the usual rewards to those who displayed conspicuous
gallantry. And finally he declared that “Poseidon had appeared to
him in his sleep, and originally suggested his plan to him; and had
promised to give him such signal aid in the actual hour of battle that
his assistance should be made manifest to all.” The skilful mixture
in this speech of accurate calculation with promises of gold crowns,
and a reference to Divine Providence, created a great impression and
enthusiasm in the minds of the young soldiers.

[Sidenote: The assault.]

[Sidenote: A sally of the defenders.]

[Sidenote: repulsed.]

+12.+ Next morning he stationed ships supplied with missiles of every
sort, all along the seaboard, under the command of Gaius Laelius;
and having told off two thousand of his strongest men to accompany
the ladder-carriers, he begun the assault about the third hour. The
commandant of the town, Mago, divided his garrison of a thousand men
into two companies; half he left upon the citadel, and the rest he
stationed upon the eastern hill. Of the other inhabitants he accoutred
about two thousand of the strongest men with such arms as there were
in the city, and stationed them at the gate leading to the isthmus and
the enemy’s camp: the rest he ordered to assist to the best of their
power at all points in the wall. As soon as the bugles of Publius
sounded the moment of the assault, Mago caused those whom he had armed
to sally from the gate, feeling confident that he should create a
panic among the assailants and entirely baffle their design. These men
vigorously attacked those of the Roman army who were drawn up opposite
the isthmus, and a sharp engagement took place accompanied by loud
cries of encouragement on both sides: the Romans in the camp cheering
on their men, and the people in the city theirs. But the contest was
an unequal one in the respect of the facility of bringing up reserves.
The Carthaginians had all to come out by one gate, and had nearly two
stades to march before they got on the ground; whereas the Romans had
their supports close at hand and able to come out over a wide area;
for Publius had purposely stationed his men close to the camp in order
to induce the enemy to come out as far as possible: being quite aware
that if he succeeded in destroying these, who were so to speak the
sharp edge of the urban population, universal consternation would be
the result, and no more of those in the town would have the courage
to come out of the gate. The contest however for a certain time was
undecided, for it was between picked men on both sides; but finally
the Carthaginians were overpowered by the superior weight of their
opponents, owing to the constant reinforcements from the camp, and
turned to flight. A large number of them fell in the actual engagement,
and during the retreat; but the greater number were trampled to death
by each other as they crowded through the gate. The city people were
thrown into such a panic by these events, that even those who were
guarding the walls fled. The Romans very nearly succeeded in forcing
their way in through the gates with the fugitives; and of course fixed
their scaling-ladders against the wall in perfect security.

+13.+ Meanwhile Publius, though throwing himself heartily into the
struggle, yet took all possible precautions to protect his life. He had
three men with him carrying large shields, which they held in such a
position as to completely protect him from the side of the wall; and
accordingly he went along the lines, or mounted on elevated ground,
and contributed greatly to the success of the day. For he was enabled
to see all that was going on, and at the same time, by being himself
in view of all, inspired great zeal in the hearts of the combatants.
The result was that nothing was omitted which could contribute to the
success of the battle; but any help he saw to be at any moment required
was rapidly and thoroughly supplied.

[Sidenote: Difficulties of the escalade.]

But though the leaders of the escalade had begun mounting the walls
with great spirit, they found the operation accompanied by some danger:
not so much from the number of the defenders, as from the height of
the walls. The defenders accordingly plucked up courage considerably
when they saw the distress of the assailants: for some of the ladders
were breaking under the weight of the numbers which, owing to their
length, were on them at the same time; while on others the first to
mount turned giddy owing to their great height, and without requiring
much resistance from the defenders threw themselves from the ladders:
and when beams, or anything of that sort, were hurled upon them from
the battlements, they were swept off _en masse_ and fell to the ground.
In spite however of these difficulties nothing could check the zeal
and fury of the Roman attack; but as the first fell their place was
always taken at once by the next in order. And now, as the day was far
advanced, and the soldiers were worn out with fatigue, Scipio sounded a
recall for the assaulting party.

[Sidenote: Towards evening Scipio renews the assault on the gate, to
distract attention from his attack by way of the lagoon.]

+14.+ The men in the town were accordingly in high spirits at having,
as they thought, repulsed the assault. But Scipio, who was conscious
that the time was now approaching for the ebb of the lagoon, had five
hundred men stationed ready by its edge with ladders; and meanwhile
massed some fresh soldiers upon the gate and isthmus, and, after
urging them to undertake the work, furnished them with a larger number
of ladders than before: so that the wall was almost covered with men
scaling it. When the signal for attack was sounded, and the men placed
their ladders against the wall, and began ascending at every point, the
excitement and consternation inside the walls was extreme; for when
they thought themselves released from the threatened danger, they saw
it beginning all over again by another assault. Besides, their missiles
were beginning to fall short; and the number of men they had lost
greatly disheartened them. Still, though they were in great distress,
they continued the defence as well as they could.

[Sidenote: Scipio crosses the lagoon and gets his men upon the wall.]

Just when the struggle at the ladders was at its hottest the ebb of the
tide began. The water began gradually to leave the edges of the lagoon,
and the current ran with such violence, and in such a mass through its
channel into the adjoining sea, that to those who were unprepared for
the sight it appeared incredible. Being provided with guides, Scipio at
once ordered his men, who had been stationed ready for this service,
to step in and to fear nothing. His was a nature especially fitted to
inspire courage and sympathy with his own feelings. So now the men at
once obeyed him, and when the army saw them racing each other across
the marsh, it could not but suppose that the movement was a kind of
heaven-sent inspiration. This reminded them of the reference Scipio had
made to Poseidon, and the promises contained in his harangue: and their
enthusiasm rose to such a height that they locked their shields above
their heads, and, charging up to the gate, they began trying to hew
their way through the panels of the doors with their axes and hatchets.

Meanwhile the party which had crossed the marsh had approached the
wall. They found the battlements unguarded: and therefore, not only
fixed their ladders against the wall, but actually mounted and took
it without striking a blow; for the attention of the garrison was
distracted to other points, especially to the isthmus and the gate
leading to it, and they never expected that the enemy were likely to
attack on the side of the lagoon: besides, and above all, there was
such disorderly shouting, and such a scene of confusion within the
wall, that they could neither hear nor see to any purpose.

[Sidenote: The city entered and given up to the sword.]

+15.+ As soon as they found themselves in possession of the wall, the
Romans began making their way along the top of it, hurling off such of
the enemy as they met, the nature of their arms being especially suited
for an operation of that sort. But when they arrived at the gate they
descended and began cutting through the bolts, while those without
began forcing their way in, and those who were mounting the walls in
the direction of the isthmus, beginning by this time to get the better
of their opponents, were getting a footing on the battlements. Thus
the walls were finally in possession of the enemy: and the troops,
which entered by the gate, carried the eastern hill and drove off the
garrison occupying it.

When Scipio thought that a sufficient number of troops had entered the
town, he gave leave to the larger number of them to attack those in it,
according to the Roman custom, with directions to kill everything they
met, and to spare nothing; and not to begin looting until they got the
order to do so. The object of this is, I suppose, to strike terror.
Accordingly, one may often see in towns captured by the Romans, not
only human beings who have been put to the sword, but even dogs cloven
down the middle, and the limbs of other animals hewn off. On this
occasion the amount of such slaughter was exceedingly great, because of
the numbers included in the city.

[Sidenote: Mago surrenders the citadel.]

[Sidenote: Sack of the city.]

Scipio himself with about a thousand men now pressed on towards the
citadel. When he arrived there, Mago at first thought of resistance;
but afterwards, when he was satisfied that the city was completely
in the power of the enemy, he sent to demand a promise of his life,
and then surrendered. This being concluded, the signal was given to
stop the slaughter: whereupon the soldiers left off slaying, and
turned to plunder. When night fell those of the soldiers to whom this
duty had been assigned remained in the camp, while Scipio with his
thousand men bivouacked in the citadel; and summoning the rest from the
dwelling-houses by means of the Tribunes, he ordered them to collect
all their booty into the market-place by maniples, and to take up their
quarters for the night by these several heaps. He then summoned the
light-armed from the camp, and stationed them upon the eastern hill.

Thus did the Romans become masters of Carthage in Iberia.

[Sidenote: The Roman customs in the distribution of booty.]

[Sidenote: See 6, 33.]

+16.+ Next morning the baggage of those who had served in the
Carthaginian ranks, as well as the property of the city-folk and the
craftsmen, having been collected together in the market-place, the
Tribunes divided it according to the Roman custom among their several
legions. Now the Roman method of procedure in the capture of cities
is the following: Sometimes certain soldiers taken from each maniple
are told off for this duty, their numbers depending on the size of the
city; sometimes maniples are told off in turn for it: but there are
never more than half the whole number assigned to the work. The rest
remain in their own ranks in reserve, sometimes outside, at others
inside the city, for taking such precautions as may be from time to
time necessary. Sometimes, though rarely, four legions are massed
together; but generally speaking the whole force is divided into two
legions of Romans and two of allies. This being settled, all who are
told off for plundering carry all they get, each to his own legion; and
when this booty has been sold, the Tribunes distribute the proceeds
among all equally, including not only those who were thus held in
reserve, but even those who were guarding the tents, or were invalided,
or had been sent away anywhere on any service. But I have spoken fully
before, when discussing the Roman constitution, on the subject of the
distribution of booty, showing how no one is excluded from a share in
it, in accordance with the oath which all take upon first joining the
camp. I may now add that the arrangement whereby the Roman army is thus
divided, half being engaged in gathering booty and half remaining drawn
up in reserve, precludes all danger of a general catastrophe arising
from personal rivalry in greed. For as both parties feel absolute
confidence in the fair dealing of each in respect to the booty,—the
reserves no less than the plunderers,—no one leaves the ranks, which
has been the most frequent cause of disaster in the case of other

+17.+ For, as the majority of mankind encounter miseries and embrace
dangers for the sake of gain, it is plain that when such opportunity
is presented to them as this, the men in the reserve or in the camp
would be with difficulty induced to abstain from taking advantage of
it; because the usual idea is that everything belongs to the man who
actually takes it: and though a general or king may be careful to order
all booty to be brought into the common stock, yet everybody considers
that what he can conceal is his own. The result is that, while the ruck
of the army cannot be prevented from eagerly devoting themselves to
plunder, they often run the risk of a complete overthrow: and it has
often in fact happened that after a successful movement, such as the
carrying of an entrenched camp or the capture of a city, the victorious
army has, from no other cause but this, been not only ejected but even
utterly defeated. Therefore there is nothing about which leaders ought
to exercise more care or foresight, than that, on such an occasion, all
may have an absolutely equal prospect of sharing in the booty.

[Sidenote: Scipio’s treatment of the prisoners. The citizens are
dismissed to their homes.]

[Sidenote: The skilled slaves are promised their freedom at the end of
the war.]

[Sidenote: Some are drafted into the navy.]

Thus on the present occasion, while the Tribunes were busied in the
distribution of the spoil; the Roman commander caused the prisoners,
who numbered little short of ten thousand, to be assembled; and having
first ordered them to be divided into two groups, one containing the
citizens and their wives and children, the other the craftsmen, he
exhorted the first of these to be loyal to the Romans, and to remember
the favour which they were now receiving, and allowed them all to
depart to their own houses. With tears of joy at this unexpected
preservation, they bowed in reverence to Scipio and dispersed. He then
told the craftsmen that they were for the present public slaves of
Rome, but that, if they showed themselves loyal and zealous in their
several crafts, he promised than their freedom, as soon as the war with
the Carthaginians had been brought to a successful issue. He then bade
them go get their names enrolled in the office of the Quaestor, and
appointed a Roman overseer for every thirty of them, their whole number
being about two thousand. From the remaining captives he selected the
strongest, those who were in the prime of youth and physical vigour,
and assigned them to serve on board ship: and having thus increased
the number of his naval allies by one half, he manned the ships taken
from the enemy as well as his own; so that the number of men on board
each vessel were now little short of double what it was before. For the
captured ships numbered eighteen, his original fleet thirty-five. These
men he also promised their freedom, if they showed themselves loyal
and zealous, as soon as they had conquered the Carthaginians. By this
treatment of the captives he inspired the citizens with warm feelings
of loyalty and fidelity, and the handicraftsmen with great readiness to
serve, from the hope held out to them of recovering their freedom.

[Sidenote: Mago is entrusted to Lachus.]

[Sidenote: The women.]

[Sidenote: The hostages.]

+18.+ He next took Mago and the Carthaginians with him separately,
consisting of one member of the Council of ancients and fifteen of the
Senate.[6] These he put under the charge of Gaius Laelius, with orders
that he should take due care of them. He next summoned the hostages,
who numbered more than three hundred. Such of them as were children he
called to him one by one, and stroking their heads told them not to be
afraid, for in a few days they would see their parents. The others also
he exhorted to be of good cheer, and to write word to their relations
in their several cities, first, that they were safe and well; and,
secondly, that the Romans were minded to restore them all unharmed to
their homes, if only their relations adopted the Roman alliance. With
these words, having already selected from the spoils such articles as
were fitting for his purpose, he presented each with what was suitable
to their sex and age: the girls with ear-rings and bracelets, the young
men with daggers and swords. Among the captive women was the wife of
Mandonius, brother of Andobalus king of the Ilergētes. This woman fell
at his feet and besought him with tears to protect their honour better
than the Carthaginians had done. Touched by her distress Scipio asked
her in what respect she and the other women were left unprovided. She
was a lady of advanced years and of a certain majestic dignity of
appearance: and upon her meeting his question by perfect silence, he
summoned the men who had been appointed to take charge of the women;
and when they reported that they had supplied them with all necessaries
in abundance, and when the woman again clasped his knees and repeated
the same request, Scipio felt still more embarrassed; and, conceiving
the idea that their guardians had neglected them, and were now making
a false report, he bade the women fear nothing, for that he would
appoint different men to see to their interests, and secure that they
were not left in want of anything. Then after a brief hesitation the
woman said, “You mistake my meaning, General, if you think that we are
asking you for food.” Scipio then at length began to understand what
she wished to convey; and seeing under his eyes the youthful beauty of
the daughters of Andobalus, and of many of the other nobles, he could
not refrain from tears, while the aged lady indicated in a few words
the danger in which they were. He showed at once that he understood her
words: and taking her by the hand, he bade her and the others also be
of good cheer, for that he would watch over them as he would over his
own sisters and daughters, and would accordingly put men in charge of
them on whom he could rely.

[Sidenote: The money.]

+19.+ His next business was to pay over to the Quaestors such public
money of the Carthaginians as had been captured. It amounted to more
than six hundred talents, so that when this was added to the four
hundred which he had brought with him from Rome, he found himself in
possession of more than one thousand talents.

[Sidenote: Scipio’s continence.]

It was on this occasion that some young Romans fell in with a girl
surpassing all the other women in bloom and beauty; and seeing that
Scipio was fond of the society of women, they brought her to him, and,
placing her before him, said that they desired to present the damsel
to him. He was struck with admiration for her beauty, and replied
that, if he had been in a private position, he could have received no
present that would have given him greater pleasure; but as general it
was the last in the world which he could receive. He meant to convey, I
presume, by this ambiguous answer that, in hours of rest and idleness,
such things are the most delightful enjoyments and pastimes for young
men; whereas in times of activity they are hindrances physically and
mentally. However that may be, he thanked the young men; but called the
girl’s father, and handing her over at once to him, told him to bestow
her in marriage on whichever of the citizens he chose. By this display
of continence and self-control he gained the warm respect of his men.

[Sidenote: Laelius sent to Rome with the news. B.C. 209.]

Having made these arrangements, and handed over the rest of the
captives to the Tribunes, he despatched Gaius Laelius on board a
quinquereme to Rome, with the Carthaginian prisoners and the noblest
of the others, to announce at home what had taken place. For as the
prevailing feeling at Rome was one of despair of success in Iberia, he
felt certain that on this news their spirits would revive, and that
they would make much more strenuous efforts to support him.

[Sidenote: Preparations for an advance.]

[Sidenote: Xen. _Hellen._ 3, 4, 17: _Agesil._ 1, 26.]

+20.+ Scipio himself stayed a certain time in New Carthage and
assiduously practised his fleet; and drew up the following scheme
for his military Tribunes for training their men. The first day he
ordered the men to go at the double for thirty stades in their full
arms; and on the second all of them to rub down, clean, and thoroughly
examine their whole equipments; on the third to rest and do nothing;
on the fourth to have a sham fight, some with wooden swords covered
with leather and with a button at the end, others with javelins also
buttoned at the end; on the fifth the same march at the double as on
the first. That there might be no lack of weapons for the practises,
or for the real fighting, he took the greatest pains with the
handicraftsmen. He had, as I have already stated, appointed overseers
over them in regular divisions to secure that this was done; but he
also personally inspected them every day, and saw that they were
severally supplied with what was necessary. Thus while the legions were
practising and training in the vicinity of the town, and the fleet
manoeuvring and rowing in the sea, and the city people sharpening
weapons or forging arms or working in wood, every one in short busily
employed in making armour, the whole place must have presented the
appearance of what Xenophon called “a workshop of war.” When he thought
all these works were sufficiently advanced for the requirements of
the service, he secured the town by posting garrisons and repairing
the walls, and got both his army and navy on the move, directing his
advance upon Tarraco, and taking the hostages with him....


[Sidenote: Euryleon Achaean Strategus, B.C. 210-209.]

+21.+ Euryleon, the Strategus of the Achaeans, was a man of timid
character, and quite unsuited for service in the field.

But as my history has now arrived at a point at which the achievements
of Philopoemen begin, I think it only proper that, as I have attempted
to describe the habits and characters of the other men of eminence
with whom we have had to deal, I should do the same for him. It is
strangely inconsistent in historians to record in elaborate detail
the founding of cities, stating when and how and by whom they were
established, and even the circumstances and difficulties which
accompanied the transaction, and yet to pass over in complete silence
the characteristics and aims of the men by whom the whole thing was
done, though these in fact are the points of the greatest value. For as
one feels more roused to emulation and imitation by men that have life,
than by buildings that have none, it is natural that the history of the
former should have a greater educational value. If I had not therefore
already composed a separate account of him, clearly setting forth who
he was, his origin, and his policy as a young man, it would have been
necessary to have given an account now of each of these particulars.
But since I have done this in a work in three books, unconnected with
my present history, detailing the circumstances of his childhood and
his most famous achievements, it is clear that in my present narrative
my proper course will be to remove anything like details from my
account of his youthful characteristics and aims; while I am careful to
_add_ details to the story of the achievements of his manhood, which
in that treatise were only stated summarily. I shall thus preserve
the proper features of both works. The former being in the nature of
a panegyric demanded an account of his actions, put briefly and in a
style deliberately intended to enhance their merits; my present work,
which is history, and therefore absolutely uncommitted to praise or
blame, requires only a true statement, which puts the facts clearly,
and traces the policy which dictated the several actions.

[Sidenote: Birth, parentage, and education of Philopoemen, b. B.C. 252.]

+22.+ Philopoemen, then, to begin with, was of good birth, descended
from one of the noblest families in Arcadia. He was also educated under
that most distinguished Mantinean, Cleander, who had been his father’s
friend before, and happened at that time to be in exile. When he came
to man’s estate he attached himself to Ecdemus and Demophanes, who were
by birth natives of Megalopolis, but who having been exiled by the
tyrant, and having associated with the philosopher Arcesilaus during
their exile, not only set their own country free by entering into an
intrigue against Aristodemus the tyrant, but also helped in conjunction
with Aratus to put down Nicocles, the tyrant of Sicyon. On another
occasion also, on the invitation of the people of Cyrene, they stood
forward as their champions and preserved their freedom for them. Such
were the men with whom he passed his early life; and he at once began
to show a superiority to his contemporaries, by his power of enduring
hardships in hunting, and by his acts of daring in war. He was moreover
careful in his manner of life, and moderate in the outward show which
he maintained; for he had imbibed from these men the conviction, that
it was impossible for a man to take the lead in public business with
honour who neglected his own private affairs; nor again to abstain from
embezzling public money if he lived beyond his private income.

[Sidenote: Elected Hipparch, B.C. 210. Cp. Plut. _Phil._ 7, συχνὸς
χρόνος after the battle of Sallasia, B.C. 222.]

Being then appointed Hipparch by the Achaean league at this time, and
finding the squadrons in a state of utter demoralisation, and the men
thoroughly dispirited, he not only restored them to a better state
than they were, but in a short time made them even superior to the
enemy’s cavalry, by bringing them all to adopt habits of real training
and genuine emulation. The fact is that most of those who hold this
office of Hipparch, either, from being without any genius themselves
for cavalry tactics, do not venture to enforce necessary orders upon
others; or, because they are aiming at being elected Strategus, try all
through their year of office to attach the young men to themselves and
to secure their favour in the coming election: and accordingly never
administer necessary reprimands, which are the salvation of the public
interests, but hush up all transgressions, and, for the sake of gaining
an insignificant popularity, do great damage to those who trust them.
Sometimes again, commanders, though neither feeble nor corrupt, do more
damage to the soldiers by intemperate zeal than the negligent ones, and
this is still oftener the case with regard to the cavalry....

[Sidenote: The cavalry tactics of Philopoemen, B.C. 210-209.[7]

+23.+ Now the movements which he undertook to teach the horsemen as
being universally applicable to cavalry warfare were these. ] In the
first place each separate horse was to be practised in wheeling first
to the left and then to the right, and also to face right-about;
and in the next place they were to be taught to wheel in squadrons,
face-about, and by a treble movement to face-about right-turn. Next
they were to learn to throw out flying columns of single or double
companies at full speed from both wings or from the centre; and then
to pull up and fall in again into troops, or squadrons, or regiments:
next to deploy into line on both wings, either by filling up the
intervals in the line or by a lateral movement on the rear. Simply to
form an oblique line, he said, required no practice, for it was exactly
the same order as that taken up on a march. After this they were to
practice charging the enemy and retreating by every kind of movement,
until they were able to advance at an alarming pace; provided only that
they kept together, both line and column, and preserved the proper
intervals between the squadrons: for nothing is more dangerous and
unserviceable than cavalry that have broken up their squadrons, and
attempt to engage in this state.

After giving these instructions both to the people and their
magistrates, he went on a round of inspection through the towns, and
inquired, first, whether the men obeyed the words of command; and,
secondly, whether the officers in the several towns knew how to give
them clearly and properly: for he held that the first thing requisite
was technical knowledge on the part of the commanders of each company.

+24.+ When he had thus made the proper preliminary preparations, he
mustered the cavalry from the various cities into one place, and set
about perfecting their evolutions under his own command, and personally
directed the whole drill. He did not ride in front of the army, as
generals nowadays do, from the notion that this is the proper position
for a commander. For what can be less scientific or more dangerous
than for a commander to be seen by all his men, and yet not to see one
of them? In such manoeuvres a Hipparch should not make a display not
of mere military dignity, but of the skill and ability of an officer,
appearing at one time in the front, at another on the rear, and at
another in the centre. This is what he did, riding along the lines, and
personally seeing to all the men, giving them directions when they were
at a loss what to do, and correcting at once every mistake that was
being made. Such mistakes, however, were trifling and rare, owing to
the previous care bestowed on every individual and company. Demetrius
of Phalerum has, as far as words go, given expression to the same idea:
“As in the case of building, if you lay each single brick rightly, and
if proper care is taken in placing each successive course, all will be
well; so in an army, accuracy in the arrangement of each soldier and
each company makes the whole strong....”

_A fragment of a speech of some Macedonian orator as to the Aetolians
making an alliance with Rome._

[Sidenote: Alliance between Aetolians and Rome against Philip,
negotiated by Scopas and Dorimachus, B.C. 211. See Livy, 26, 24.]

+25.+ “The case is just like that of the disposition of the various
kinds of troops on the field of battle. The light-armed and most active
men bear the brunt of the danger, are the first to be engaged and
the first to perish, while the phalanx and the heavy-armed generally
carry off the glory. So in this case, the Aetolians, and such of the
Peloponnesians as are in alliance with them, are put in the post of
danger; while the Romans, like the phalanx, remain in reserve. And
if the former meet with disaster and perish, the Romans will retire
unharmed from the struggle; while if they are victorious, which Heaven
forbid! the Romans will get not only them but the rest of the Greeks
also into their power....”[8]


[Sidenote: King Philip’s conduct at Argos after presiding at the Nemean
games, B.C. 208. See Livy, 27, 30, 31.]

+26.+ After finishing the celebration of the Nemean games, King Philip
of Macedon returned to Argos and laid aside his crown and purple robe,
with the view of making a display of democratic equality and good
nature. But the more democratic the dress which he wore, the more
absolute and royal were the privileges which he claimed. He was not
now content with seducing unmarried women, or even with intriguing
with married women, but assumed the right of sending authoritatively
for any woman whose appearance struck him; and offered violence to
those who did not at once obey, by leading a band of revellers to their
houses; and, summoning their sons or their husbands, he trumped up
false pretexts for menacing them. In fact his conduct was exceedingly
outrageous and lawless. But though this abuse of his privileges as a
guest was exceedingly annoying to many of the Achaeans, and especially
to the orderly part of them, the wars that threatened them on every
side compelled them to show a patience under it uncongenial to their

None of his predecessors had better qualifications for sovereignty, or
more important defects, than this same Philip. And it appears to me
that the good qualities were innate, while the defects grew upon him as
he advanced in years, as happens to some horses as they grow old. Such
remarks I do not, following some other historians, confine to prefaces;
but when the course of my narrative suggests it, I state my opinion of
kings and eminent men, thinking that most convenient for writer and
reader alike....

_War between Antiochus the Great (III.) and Arsaces III., King of the
Parthians._ B.C. 212-205. _See above_ 8, 25.

[Sidenote: Description of Media, and of the palace at Ecbatana.]

+27.+ In regard to extent of territory Media is the most considerable
of the kingdoms in Asia, as also in respect of the number and excellent
qualities of its men, and not less so of its horses. For, in fact,
it supplies nearly all Asia with these animals, the royal studs
being entrusted to the Medes because of the rich pastures in their
country.[9] To protect it from the neighbouring barbarians a ring
of Greek cities was built round it by the orders of Alexander. The
chief exception to this is Ecbatana, which stands on the north of
Media, in the district of Asia bordering on the Maeotis and Euxine.
It was originally the royal city of the Medes, and vastly superior to
the other cities in wealth and the splendour of its buildings. It is
situated on the skirts of Mount Orontes, and is without walls, though
containing an artificially formed citadel fortified to an astonishing
strength. Beneath this stands the palace, which it is in some degree
difficult to describe in detail, or to pass over in complete silence.
To those authors whose aim is to produce astonishment, and who are
accustomed to deal in exaggeration and picturesque writing, this city
offers the best possible subject; but to those who, like myself,
are cautious when approaching descriptions which go beyond ordinary
notions, it presents much difficulty and embarrassment. However, as
regards size, the palace covers ground the circuit of which is nearly
seven stades; and by the costliness of the structure in its several
parts it testifies to the wealth of its original builders: for all its
woodwork being cedar or cypress not a single plank was left uncovered;
beams and fretwork in the ceilings, and columns in the arcades and
peristyle, were overlaid with plates of silver or gold, while all
the tiles were of silver. Most of these had been stripped off during
the invasion of Alexander and the Macedonians, and the rest in the
reigns of Antigonus and Seleucus Nicanor. However, even at the time
of Antiochus’s arrival, the temple of Aena[10] still had its columns
covered with gold, and a considerable number of silver tiles had been
piled up in it, and some few gold bricks and a good many silver ones
were still remaining. It was from these that the coinage bearing the
king’s impress was collected and struck, amounting to little less than
four thousand talents....

[Sidenote: The nature of the desert between Media and Parthia.]

+28.+ Arsaces expected that Antiochus would come as far as this
district (of Media), but that he would not venture to proceed across
the adjoining desert with so large a force, if for no other reason,
yet from the scarcity of water. For in this tract of country there is
no water appearing on the surface, though there are many subterranean
channels which have well-shafts sunk to them, at spots in the desert
unknown to persons unacquainted with the district. A true account of
these channels has been preserved among the natives to the effect
that, during the Persian ascendency, they granted the enjoyment of
the profits of the land to the inhabitants of some of the waterless
districts for five generations, on condition of their bringing fresh
water in; and that, there being many large streams flowing down Mount
Taurus, these people at infinite toil and expense constructed these
underground channels through a long tract of country, in such a way,
that the very people who now use the water are ignorant of the sources
from which the channels are originally supplied.

[Sidenote: Antiochus prepares to cross it: Arsaces orders the wells to
be choked.]

[Sidenote: Antiochus arrives at Hecatompylos.]

When, however, Arsaces saw that Antiochus was determined to attempt
to cross the desert, he endeavoured at once to choke up and spoil the
wells. But King Antiochus, upon this being reported to him, despatched
Nicomedes with a thousand horse; who found that Arsaces had retired
with his main army, but came upon some of his cavalry in the act of
choking up the shafts which went down into the underground channels.
They promptly attacked these men, and, having routed and forced them
to fly, returned back again to Antiochus. The king, having thus
accomplished the journey across the desert, arrived before the city
Hecatompylos, which is situated in the centre of Parthia, and derives
its name from the fact that the roads which lead to all the surrounding
districts converge there.

[Sidenote: Antiochus determines to follow Arsaces into Hyrcania.]

+29.+ Having rested his army at this place, and having convinced
himself that, had Arsaces been able to give him battle, he would
not have abandoned his own country, nor have sought a ground more
favourable to his own army for fighting him than the district round
Hecatompylos; he concluded that, since he had done so, it stood to
reason that he had had entirely changed his mind. He therefore decided
to advance into Hyrcania. But having arrived at Tagae, he learnt from
the natives that the country he had to cross, until he reached the
ridges of Mount Labus sloping down into Hyrcania, was exceedingly rough
and difficult, and that large numbers of barbarians were stationed at
the narrowest points. He therefore resolved to divide his light-armed
troops into companies, and distribute their officers among them, giving
them directions as to the route they were severally to take. He did the
same with the pioneers, whose business it was to make the positions
occupied by the light-armed possible of approach for the phalanx and
beasts of burden. Having made these arrangements, he entrusted the
first division to Diogenes, strengthening him with bowmen and slingers
and some mountaineers skilled in throwing javelines and stones, and
who, without keeping any regular order, were always ready to skirmish
at a moment’s notice, and in any direction, and rendered the most
effective assistance at the narrow passes. Next to these he ordered a
company of about two thousand Cretans armed with shields to advance,
under the command of Polyxenidas of Rhodes. The rear was to be brought
up by companies armed with breastplate and shield, and commanded by
Nicomedes of Cos, and Nicolaus the Aetolian.

[Sidenote: The ascent of Mount Labus.]

+30.+ But as they advanced, the ruggedness of the ground and the
narrowness of the passes were found to far exceed the king’s
expectations. The length of the ascent was altogether about three
hundred stades; and a great part had to be made up the bed of a winter
torrent of great depth, into which numerous rocks and trees had been
hurled by natural causes from the overhanging precipices, and made a
passage up it difficult, to say nothing of the obstacles which the
barbarians had helped to construct expressly to impede them. These
latter had felled a large number of trees and piled up heaps of huge
rocks; and had besides occupied all along the gully the high points,
which were at once convenient for attack and capable of covering
themselves; so that, if it had not been for one glaring error on their
part, Antiochus would have found the attempt beyond his powers, and
would have desisted from it. The error was this. They assumed that
the whole army would be obliged to march the entire way up the gully,
and they accordingly occupied the points of vantage. But they did not
perceive this fact, that, though the phalanx and the baggage could
not possibly go by any other route than the one they supposed, there
was yet nothing to make it impossible for the light-armed and active
troops to accomplish the ascent of the bare rocks. Consequently, as
soon as Diogenes had come upon the first outpost of the enemy, he and
his men began climbing out of the gully, and the affair at once took a
different aspect. For no sooner had they come to close quarters, than,
acting on the suggestion of the moment, Diogenes avoided the engagement
by ascending the mountains that flanked the enemy’s position, and so
got above him; and by pouring down volleys of darts and stones he
seriously harassed the barbarians. Their most deadly weapons however
proved to be the slings, which could carry a great distance; and when
by these means they had dislodged the first outpost and occupied their
position, an opportunity was secured for the pioneers to clear the way
and level it, without being exposed to danger. Owing to the number of
hands the work went on rapidly; and meanwhile the slingers, bowmen,
and javelin-men advanced in skirmishing order along the higher ground,
every now and then reforming and seizing on strong points of vantage;
while the men with shields formed a reserve, marching in order and
at a regular pace along the side of the gully itself. The barbarians
thereupon abandoned their positions, and, ascending the mountain,
mustered in full force on the summit.

[Sidenote: The battle on the summit of Mount Labus.]

[Sidenote: He reaches Tambrax.]

[Sidenote: Capture of Sirynx.]

+31.+ Thus Antiochus effected this ascent without loss, but slowly and
painfully, for it was not until the eighth day that his army made the
summit of Labus. The barbarians being mustered there, and resolved
to dispute his passage, a severe engagement took place, in which the
barbarians were eventually dislodged, and by the following manoeuvre.
As long as they were engaged face to face with the phalanx, they
kept well together and fought desperately; but before daybreak the
light-armed troops had made a wide circuit, and seized some high ground
on the rear of the enemy, and as soon as the barbarians perceived
this they fled in a panic. King Antiochus exerted himself actively
to prevent a pursuit, and caused a recall to be sounded, because he
wished his men to make the descent into Hyrcania, without scattering,
and in close order. He accomplished his object: reached Tambrax, an
unwalled city of great size and containing a royal palace, and there
encamped. Most of the natives fled from the battle-field, and its
immediate neighbourhood, into a city called Sirynx, which was not
far from Tambrax, and from its secure and convenient situation was
considered as the capital of Hyrcania. Antiochus therefore determined
to carry this town by assault; and having accordingly advanced thither,
and pitched his camp under its walls, he commenced the assault. The
operation consisted chiefly of mining under pent-houses. For the city
was defended by three trenches, thirty cubits broad and fifteen deep,
with a double vallum on the edge of each; and behind these there was
a strong wall. Frequent struggles took place at the works, in which
neither side were strong enough to carry off their killed and wounded:
for these hand-to-hand battles took place, not above ground only, but
underground also in the mines. However, owing to the numbers employed
and the activity of the king, it was not long before the trenches
were choked up and the walls were undermined and fell. Upon this the
barbarians, giving up all as lost, put to death such Greeks as were in
the town; and having plundered all that was most worth taking, made off
under cover of night. When the king saw this, he despatched Hyperbasus
with the mercenaries; upon whose approach the barbarians threw down
their booty and fled back again into the city; and when they found the
peltasts pouring in energetically through the breach in the walls they
gave up in despair and surrendered.


[Sidenote: B.C. 208. Coss. M. Claudius Marcellus, T. Quinctius
Crispinus. The two Consuls were encamped within three miles of each
other, between Venusia and Bantia, Hannibal had been at Lacinium in
Bruttii, but had advanced into Apulia. Livy, 27, 25-27.]

[Sidenote: Death of the Consul M. Claudius Marcellus.]

+32.+ The Consuls, wishing to reconnoitre the slope of the hill towards
the enemy’s camp, ordered their main force to remain in position; while
they themselves with two troops of cavalry, their lictors, and about
thirty velites advanced to make the reconnaisance. Now some Numidians,
who were accustomed to lie in ambush for those who came on skirmishes,
or any other services from the Roman camp, happened, as it chanced, to
have ensconced themselves at the foot of the hill. Being informed by
their look-out man that a body of men was coming over the brow of the
hill above them, they rose from their place of concealment, ascended
the hill by a side road, and got between the Consuls and their camp. At
the very first charge they killed Claudius and some others, and having
wounded the rest, forced them to fly in different directions down
the sides of the hill. Though the men in camp saw what was happening
they were unable to come to the relief of their endangered comrades;
for while they were still shouting out to get ready, and before they
had recovered from the first shock of their surprise, while some were
putting the bridles on their horses and others donning their armour,
the affair was all over. The son of Claudius, though wounded, narrowly
escaped with his life.

[Sidenote: Fiat experimentum in corpore vili.]

Thus fell Marcus Marcellus from an act of incautiousness unworthy of a
general. I am continually compelled in the course of my history to draw
the attention of my readers to occurrences of this sort; for I perceive
that it is this, more than anything else connected with the science
of tactics, that ruins commanders. And yet the blunder is a very
obvious one. For what is the use of a commander or general, who has
not learnt that the leader ought to keep as far as possible aloof from
those minor operations, in which the whole fortune of the campaign is
not involved? Or of one who does not know that, even if circumstances
should at times force them to engage in such subordinate movements,
the commanders-in-chief should not expose themselves to danger until
a large number of their company have fallen? For, as the proverb has
it, the experiment should be made “on the worthless Carian”[11] not
on the general. For to say “I shouldn’t have thought it,”—“Who would
have expected it?” seems to me the clearest proof of strategical
incompetence and dulness.

+33.+ And so, though Hannibal’s claims to be reckoned a great general
are manifold, there is none more conspicuous than this, that though
engaged for a great length of time in an enemy’s country, and though he
experienced a great variety of fortune, he again and again inflicted a
disaster on his opponents in minor encounters, but never suffered one
himself, in spite of the number and severity of the contests which he
conducted: and the reason, we may suppose was, that he took great care
of his personal safety. And very properly so: for if the leader escapes
uninjured and safe, though a decisive defeat may have been sustained,
fortune offers many opportunities for retrieving disasters; but if he
has fallen, the pilot as it were of the ship, even should fortune give
the victory to the army, no real advantage is gained; because all the
hopes of the soldiers depend upon their leaders. So much for those who
fall into such errors from foolish vanity, childish parade, ignorance,
or contempt. For it is ever one or the other of these that is at the
bottom of such disasters....

[Sidenote: An incident in the attempt of Hannibal to enter Salapia,
under cover of a letter sealed by the ring of the dead Consul Marcus.
Livy, 27, 28.]

They suddenly let down the portcullis, which they had raised somewhat
by pulleys, and thus closed up the gateway. Then they took the men and
crucified them before the walls....


[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 209-208. See _supra_. ch. 20. The adhesion of
Edeco, prince of the Edetani.]

+34.+ In Iberia Publius Scipio took up his winter quarters at Tarraco,
as I have already stated; and secured the fidelity and affection of the
Iberians, to begin with, by the restoration of the hostages to their
respective families. He found a voluntary supporter of his measures in
the person of Edeco, the prince of the Edetani; who no sooner heard
that New Carthage had been taken, and that Scipio had got his wife
and children into his hands, than, concluding that the Iberians would
change sides, he resolved to take the lead in the movement: conceiving
that, by acting thus, he would best be able to get back his wife and
children, and at the same time have the credit of joining the Romans
by deliberate choice, and not under compulsion. And so it turned out.
For as soon as the armies were dismissed to their winter quarters, he
came to Tarraco, accompanied by his kinsfolk and friends; and there
being admitted to an interview with Scipio, he said that “he thanked
the gods heartily that he was the first of the native princes to come
to him; for whereas the others were still sending ambassadors to the
Carthaginians and looking to them for support,—even while stretching
out their hands to the Romans,—he was come there to offer not only
himself, but his friends and kinsfolk also, to the protection of
Rome. If therefore he should have the honour to be regarded by him as
a friend and ally, he would be able to render him important service
both in the present and the future. For as soon as the Iberians saw
that he had been admitted to Scipio’s friendship, and had obtained
what he asked, they would all come in with a similar object, hoping
to have their relatives restored, and to enjoy the alliance of Rome.
Their affection being secured for the future by receiving such a mark
of honour and benevolence, he would have in them sincere and ready
coadjutors in all his future undertakings. He therefore asked to have
his wife and children restored to him, and to be allowed to return
home an acknowledged friend of Rome; in order that he might have a
reasonable pretext for showing, to the best of his power, his own and
his friends’ affection for Scipio himself and for the Roman cause.”

[Sidenote: Edeco is followed by other tribes. B.C. 209-8.]

+35.+ When Edeco had finished his speech, Scipio, who had been ready to
gratify him from the first, and took the same view as to the policy of
the proceeding, delivered him his wife and children, and granted the
friendship which he asked. More than this, his subtle intellect made an
extraordinary impression on the Iberian in the course of the interview;
and having held out splendid hopes to all his companions for the
future, he allowed him to return to his own country. This affair having
rapidly got wind, all the tribes living north of the Ebro, such as had
not done so before, joined the Romans with one consent.

Thus so far everything was going well with Scipio. After the departure
of these people, he broke up his naval force, seeing that there was
nothing to resist him at sea; and selecting the best of the crews, he
distributed them among the maniples, and thus augmented his land forces.

[Sidenote: Andobales and Mandonius abandon Hasdrubal.]

But Andobales and Mandonius, the most powerful princes of the day
in Iberia, and believed to be the most sincerely devoted to the
Carthaginians, had long been secretly discontented and on the look-out
for an opportunity: ever since Hasdrubal, under a pretence of having a
doubt of their loyalty, had demanded a large sum of money, and their
wives and daughters as hostages, as I have already narrated.[12] And
thinking that a convenient opportunity had now come, they got together
their own forces, and, quitting the Carthaginian camp under cover of
night, occupied a position sufficiently strong to secure their safety.
Upon this, most of the other Iberians also abandoned Hasdrubal: having
long been annoyed at the overbearing conduct of the Carthaginians, and
now seizing the first opportunity to manifest their feelings.

+36.+ This has often happened to people before. For though, as I have
many times remarked, success in a campaign and victory over one’s
enemies are great things, it requires much greater skill and caution
to use such successes well. Accordingly, you will find that those who
have gained victories are many times more numerous than those who have
made good use of them. The Carthaginians at this crisis are an instance
in point. After conquering the Roman armies, and slaying both the
generals, Publius and Gnaeus Scipio, imagining that Iberia was their
own without dispute, they began treating the natives tyrannically;
and accordingly found enemies in their subjects instead of allies and
friends. And they were quite rightly served, for imagining that the
conduct necessary for keeping power was something different from that
necessary for obtaining it; and for failing to understand that they
keep empire best, who best maintain the same principles in virtue of
which they gained it. And yet it is obvious enough, and has been again
and again demonstrated, that men gain power by beneficent actions, and
by holding out hopes of advantage to those with whom they are dealing;
but that, as soon as they have got what they wanted, and begin to act
wickedly and rule despotically, it is but natural that, as their rulers
have changed, the feelings of the subjects should change too. So it was
with the Carthaginians.

+37.+ Surrounded by such difficulties Hasdrubal was agitated by many
conflicting emotions and anxieties. He was vexed by the desertion of
Andobales; vexed by the opposition and feud between himself and the
other commanders; and greatly alarmed as to the arrival of Scipio,
expecting that he would immediately bring his forces to attack him.
Perceiving therefore that he was being abandoned by the Iberians, and
that they were joining the Romans with one accord, he decided upon
the following plan of action. He resolved that he must collect the
best force he could, and give the enemy battle: if fortune declared in
his favour he could then consider his next step in safety, but if the
battle turned out unfavourably for him, he would retreat with those
that survived into Gaul; and collecting from that country as many of
the natives as he could, would go to Italy, and take his share in the
same fortune as his brother Hannibal.

[Sidenote: Early in B.C. 208, Scipio moves southward to attack
Hasdrubal in the valley of the Baetis. Livy, 27, 18-19.]

While Hasdrubal was arriving at this resolution, Publius Scipio was
rejoined by Gaius Laelius; and, being informed by him of the orders
of the Senate, he collected his forces from their winter quarters
and began his advance: the Iberians joining him on the march with
great promptness and hearty enthusiasm. Andobales had long been in
communication with Scipio: and, on the latter approaching the district
in which he was entrenched, he left his camp with his friends and came
to Scipio. In this interview he entered upon a defence of himself in
regard to his former friendship with the Carthaginians, and spoke of
the services he had done them, and the fidelity which he had shown to
them. He then went on to narrate the injustice and tyranny which he had
experienced at their hands; and demanded that Scipio himself should
be the judge of his pleas. If he were shown to be making ungrounded
complaints against the Carthaginians, he might justly conclude him
incapable of keeping faith with the Romans either: but if, on a review
of these numerous acts of injustice he were proved to have had no other
course than to desert the Carthaginians, Scipio might confidently
expect that, if he now elected to join the Romans, he would be firm in
his loyalty to them.

[Sidenote: Andobales joins Scipio.]

+38.+ Andobales added many more arguments before finishing his
speech; and when he had done, Scipio answered by saying that “he
quite believed what he had said; and that he had the strongest reason
for knowing about the insolent conduct of the Carthaginians, both
from their treatment of the other Iberians, and conspicuously from
their licentious behaviour to their wives and daughters, whom he had
found occupying the position, not of hostages, but of captives and
slaves; and to whom he had preserved such inviolable honour as could
scarcely have been equalled by their very fathers themselves.” And upon
Andobales and his companions acknowledging that they were quite aware
of this, and falling at his feet and calling him king, all present
expressed approval. Whereupon Scipio with emotion bade them “fear
nothing, for they would experience nothing but kindness at the hands
of the Romans.” He at once handed over his daughters to Andobales; and
next day made the treaty with him, the chief provision of which was
that he should follow the Roman commanders and obey their commands.
This being settled, he returned to his camp; brought over his army to
Scipio; and, having joined camps with the Romans, advanced with them
against Hasdrubal.

[Sidenote: Hasdrubal changes his position to one of superior strength.]

[Sidenote: Scipio arrives.]

Now the Carthaginian general was encamped at Baecula, in the district
of Castulo, not far from the silver mines. But when he learnt the
approach of the Romans, he shifted his quarters; and his rear being
secured by a river, and having a stretch of table-land in front of
his entrenchment of sufficient extent for his troops to manœuvre, and
bounded by a steep descent sufficiently deep for security, he stayed
quietly in position: always taking care to post pickets on the brow
of the descent. As soon as he came within distance, Scipio was eager
to give him battle, but was baffled by the strength of the enemy’s
position. After waiting two days, however, he became anxious, lest by
the arrival of Mago and Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, he should find himself
surrounded by hostile forces: he therefore determined to venture on an
attack and make trial of the enemy.

[Sidenote: Scipio successfully assaults Hasdrubal’s position.]

[Sidenote: Hasdrubal retreats, and makes the Pyrenees.]

+39.+ His whole army having been got ready for battle, he confined the
main body within his camp, but sent out the velites and some picked
men of the infantry with orders to assault the brow of the hill and
attack the enemy’s pickets. His orders were carried out with great
spirit. At first the Carthaginian commander watched what was happening
without stirring: but when he saw that, owing to the fury of the Roman
attack, his men were being hard pressed, he led out his army and drew
them up along the brow of the hill, trusting to the strength of the
position. Meanwhile Scipio despatched all his light-armed troops with
orders to support the advanced guard: and the rest of his army being
ready for action, he took half of them under his own command, and
going round the brow of the hill to the enemy’s left, began assaulting
the Carthaginians; while he entrusted the other half to Laelius, with
orders to make a similar attack on the right of the enemy. While this
was going on, Hasdrubal was still engaged in getting his troops out
of camp: for hitherto he had been waiting, because he trusted in the
strength of the position, and felt confident that the enemy would never
venture to attempt it. The attack, therefore, took him by surprise,
before he was able to get his men on to the ground. As the Romans were
now assaulting the two wings of the position which the enemy had not
yet occupied, they not only mounted the brow of the hill in safety, but
actually advanced to the attack while their opponents were still in all
the confusion and bustle of falling in. Accordingly they killed some
of them on their exposed flank; while others, who were actually in the
act of falling in, they forced to turn and flee. Seeing his army giving
way and retreating, Hasdrubal reverted to his preconceived plan; and
determining not to stake his all upon this one desperate hazard, he
secured his money and his elephants, collected as many of his flying
soldiers as he could, and commenced a retreat towards the Tagus, with
a view of reaching the passes of the Pyrenees and the Gauls in that

Scipio did not think it advisable to pursue Hasdrubal at once, for fear
of being attacked by the other Carthaginian generals; but he gave up
the enemy’s camp to his men to pillage.

[Sidenote: Scipio’s self-restraint.]

+40.+ Next morning he collected the prisoners, amounting to ten
thousand foot and more than two thousand horse, and busied himself in
making arrangements about them. All the Iberians of that district,
who were in alliance at that time with the Carthaginians, came in and
submitted to the Roman obedience, and in addressing Scipio called him
“king.” The first to do this and to bow the knee before him had been
Edeco, and the next Andobales. On these occasions Scipio had passed
the word over without remark; but after the battle, when all alike
addressed him by that title, his attention was drawn to it; and he
therefore summoned the Iberians to a meeting, and told them that “he
quite wished to be called a man of royal liberality by them all, and to
be so in the truest sense, but that he had no wish to be a ‘king,’ nor
to be called one by any one; they should address him as general.”

Even at this early period of his career, an observer might have
remarked the loftiness of Scipio’s character. He was still quite young.
His good fortune had been so persistent, that all who came under his
rule were led naturally to think and speak of him as a king. Yet he
did not lose his self-control; but deprecated this popular impulse and
this show of dignity. But this same loftiness of character was still
more admirable in the closing scenes of his life, when, in addition to
his achievements in Iberia, he crushed the Carthaginians; reduced the
largest and fairest districts of Libya, from the Altars of Philaenus
to the Pillars of Hercules, under the power of his country; conquered
Asia and the kings of Syria; made the best and largest part of the
world subject to Rome; and in doing so had numerous opportunities of
acquiring regal sway, in whatever parts of the world suited his purpose
or wish. For such achievements were enough to have kindled pride,
not merely in any human breast, but even, if I may say so without
irreverence, in that of a god. But Scipio’s greatness of soul was so
superior to the common standard of mankind, that he again and again
rejected what Fortune had put within his grasp, that prize beyond which
men’s boldest prayers do not go—the power of a king: and he steadily
preferred his country and his duty to that royalty, which men gaze at
with such admiration and envy.

[Sidenote: Scipio occupies the position evacuated by the Carthaginians.]

[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 208-207.]

Scipio next proceeded to select from the captives the native Iberians,
and all these he dismissed to their homes without ransom; and bidding
Andobales select three hundred of the horses, he distributed the
remainder among those who had none. For the rest, he at once occupied
the entrenchment of the Carthaginians, owing to its excellent
situation; and there he remained himself, waiting to see the movements
of the other Carthaginian generals; while he detached a body of men
to the passes of the Pyrenees to keep a look-out for Hasdrubal. After
this, as it was getting late in season, he retired with his army to
Tarraco being bent on wintering there....


[Sidenote: King Philip undertakes to aid the Achaean league, and other
Greek states, against a threatened attack of the Aetolians in alliance
with Rome, B.C. 208. Cp. Livy, 27, 30. See above Bk. 9, ch. 28-42.]

+41.+ The Aetolians had recently become greatly encouraged by the
arrival of the Romans and King Attalus: and accordingly began menacing
every one, and threatening all with an attack by land, while Attalus
and Publius Sulpicius did the same by sea. Wherefore Achaean legates
arrived at the court of King Philip entreating his help: for it was not
the Aetolians alone of whom they were standing in dread, but Machanidas
also, as he was encamped with his army on the frontier of Argos. The
Boeotians also, in fear of the enemy’s fleet, were demanding a leader
and help from the king. Most urgent of all, however, were the Euboeans
in their entreaties to him to take some precaution against the enemy.
A similar appeal was being made by the Acarnanians; and there was an
embassy even from the Epirotes. News had arrived that both Scerdilaidas
and Pleuratus were leading out their armies: and, over and above this,
that the Thracian tribes on the frontier of Macedonia, especially the
Maedi, were planning to invade Macedonia, if the king were induced to
stir from his realm however short a distance. Moreover the Aetolians
were already securing the pass of Thermopylae with trenches and
stockades and a formidable garrison, satisfied that they would thus
shut out Philip, and entirely prevent him from coming to the assistance
of his allies south of the pass. It appears to me that a crisis of this
sort is well worth the observation and attention of my readers; for it
affords a trial and test of the vigour of the leader affected. As in
the hunting-field the wild animals never show their full courage and
strength until surrounded and brought to bay,—so it is with leaders.
And no more conspicuous instance could be found than this of Philip. He
dismissed the various embassies, promising each that he would do his
best: and then devoted his attention to the war which surrounded him on
all sides, watching to see in what direction, and against which enemy,
he had best direct his first attack.

+42.+ Just then intelligence reached him that Attalus had crossed the
sea and, dropping anchor at Peparethos, had occupied the island. He
therefore despatched a body of men to the islanders to garrison their
city; and at the same time despatched Polyphontes with an adequate
force into Phocis and Boeotia; and Menippus, with a thousand peltasts
and five hundred Agrianes to Chalcis and the rest of Euboea; while
he himself advanced to Scotusa, and sent word at the same time to
the Macedonians to meet him at that town. But when he learnt that
Attalus had sailed into the port of Nicaea, and that the leaders
of the Aetolians were collecting at Heraclea, with the purpose of
holding a conference together on the immediate steps to be taken, he
started with his army from Scotusa, eager to hurry thither and break
up their meeting. He arrived too late to interrupt the conference: but
he destroyed or carried off the corn belonging to the people along
the Aenianian gulf, and then returned. After this he left his army
in Scotusa once more; and, with the light-armed troops and the royal
guard, went to Demetrias, and there remained, waiting to see what
the enemy would attempt. To secure that he should be kept perfectly
acquainted with all their movements, he sent messengers to the
Peparethii, and to his troops in Phocis and Euboea, and ordered them to
telegraph to him everything which happened, by means of fire signals
directed to Mount Tisaeum, which is a mountain of Thessaly conveniently
situated for commanding a view of those places.

[Sidenote: Fire signals.]

+43.+ The method of signalling by fire, which is of the highest utility
in the operations of war, has never before been clearly expounded; and
I think I shall be doing a service if I do not pass it over, but give
an account of it adequate to its importance. Now that opportuneness
is of the utmost moment in all undertakings, and pre-eminently so in
those of war, no one doubts; and of all the things which contribute
to enable us to hit the proper time nothing is more efficacious than
fire signals. For they convey intelligence sometimes of what has
just happened, sometimes of what is actually going on; and by paying
proper attention to them one can get this information at three or
four days’ journey off, and even more: so that it continually happens
that the help required may be unexpectedly given, thanks to a message
conveyed by fire signals. Now, formerly, as the art of signalling by
fire was confined to a single method, it proved in very many cases
unserviceable to those employing it. For as it was necessary to employ
certain definite signals which had been agreed upon, and as possible
occurrences are unlimited, the greater number of them were beyond
the competence of the fire signals to convey. To take the present
instance: it was possible by means of the signals agreed upon to send
the information that a fleet had arrived at Oreus or Peparethos or
Chalcis; but it was impossible to express that “certain citizens had
gone over to the enemy,” or “were betraying the town,” or that “a
massacre had taken place,” or any of those things which often occur,
but which cannot be all anticipated. Yet it is precisely the unexpected
occurrences which demand instant consideration and succour. All such
things then were naturally beyond the competence of fire signalling,
inasmuch as it was impossible to adopt an arbitrary sign for things
which it was impossible to anticipate.

[Sidenote: The improvement introduced by Aeneas Tactitus.]

+44.+ Aeneas, therefore, the writer of the treatise on tactics, wished
to correct this defect, and did in fact make some improvement; but
his invention still fell very far short of what was wanted, as the
following passage from his treatise will show.[13] “Let those who
wish,” he says, “to communicate any matter of pressing importance to
each other by fire-signals prepare two earthenware vessels of exactly
equal size both as to diameter and depth. Let the depth be three
cubits, the diameter one. Then prepare corks of a little shorter
diameter than that of the vessels: and in the middle of these corks
fix rods divided into equal portions of three fingers’ breadth, and
let each of these portions be marked with a clearly distinguishable
line: and in each let there be written one of the most obvious and
universal of those events which occur in war; for instance in the first
‘cavalry have entered the country,’ in the second ‘hoplites,’ in the
third ‘light-armed,’ in the next ‘infantry and cavalry,’ in another
‘ships,’ in another ‘corn,’ and so on, until all the portions have
written on them the events which may reasonably be expected to occur
in the particular war. Then carefully pierce both the vessels in such
a way that the taps shall be exactly equal and carry off the same
amount of water. Fill the vessels with water and lay the corks with
their rods upon its surface, and set both taps running together. This
being done, it is evident that if there is perfect equality in every
respect between them, both corks will sink exactly in proportion as the
water runs away, and both rods will disappear to the same extent into
the vessels. When they have been tested, and the rate of the discharge
of water has been found to be exactly equal in both, then the vessels
should be taken respectively to the two places from which the two
parties intend to watch for fire signals. As soon as any one of those
eventualities which are inscribed upon the rods takes place, raise a
lighted torch, and wait until the signal is answered by a torch from
the others: this being raised, both parties are to set the taps running
together. When the cork and rod on the signalling side has sunk low
enough to bring the ring containing the words which give the desired
information on a level with the rim of the vessel, a torch is to be
raised again. Those on the receiving side are then at once to stop the
tap, and to look at the words in the ring of the rod which is on a
level with the rim of their vessel. This will be the same as that on
the signalling side, assuming everything to be done at the same speed
on both sides.”

[Sidenote: The drawbacks to this method.]

+45.+ Now this method, though introducing a certain improvement in the
system of fire signalling, is still wanting in definiteness: for it is
evident that it is neither possible to anticipate, or, if you could
anticipate, to write upon the rod every possible thing that may happen:
and therefore, when anything unexpected in the chapter of accidents
does occur, it is plainly impossible to communicate it by this method.
Besides, even such statements as are written on the rods are quite
indefinite; for the number of cavalry or infantry that have come, or
the particular point in the territory which they have entered, the
number of ships, or the amount of corn, cannot be expressed. For what
cannot be known before it happens cannot have an arrangement made for
expressing it. And this is the important point. For how is one to take
proper measures for relief without knowing the number or direction of
the enemy? Or how can the party to be relieved feel confidence or the
reverse, or indeed have any conception at all of the situation, if it
does not know how many ships or how much corn have been despatched by
the allies?

[Sidenote: The improved method of Cleoxenus and Democlitus.]

But the last method which was hit upon by Cleoxenus and Democlitus, and
further elaborated by myself, is above all things definite, and made
capable of indicating clearly whatever is needed at the moment; but
in its working it requires attention and more than ordinarily close
observation. It is as follows: Divide the alphabet into five groups
of five letters each (of course the last group will be one letter
short, but this will not interfere with the working of the system). The
parties about to signal to each other must then prepare five tablets
each, on which the several groups of letters must be written. They must
then agree that the party signalling shall first raise two torches, and
wait until the other raises two also. The object of this is to let each
other know that they are attending. These torches having been lowered,
the signalling party raises first torches on the left to indicate which
of the tablets he means: for instance, one if he means the first, two
if he means the second, and so on. He next raises torches on the right
showing in a similar manner by their number which of the letters in the
tablet he wishes to indicate to the recipient.

+46.+ This matter being agreed upon, the two parties must go to their
respective points of observation; and each must have, to begin with,
a stenoscope with two funnels, to enable him to distinguish through
one the right, through the other the left position of the signaller
opposite him. Near this stenoscope the tablets must be fixed, and both
points, to the right and to the left, must be defended by a fence ten
feet long and about the height of a man, in order to make it clear
on which side the torches are raised, and to hide them entirely when
they are lowered. These preparations completed on both sides, when a
man wishes, for instance, to send the message “Some of our soldiers
to the number of a hundred have deserted to the enemy,”—the first
thing to do is to select words that may give the same information with
the fewest letters, for instance, “A hundred Cretans have deserted,”
for thus the number of letters is diminished by more than a half and
the same information is given. This sentence having been written on
a tablet will be transmitted by five signals thus: The first letter
is κ, this comes in the second group of letters and therefore on the
second tablet; the signaller therefore must raise two torches on the
left to show the recipient that he must look at the second tablet; then
he will raise five on the right, because κ is the fifth letter in the
group,[14] which the recipient must thereupon write on his tablet. Then
the signaller must raise four torches on the left, for ρ is in that
group, and two on the right, because it is the second in the fourth
group, and the recipient will write ρ on his tablet: and so on for the
other letters.

+47.+ Now everything that happens can be definitely imparted by means
of this invention; but the number of torches employed is large,
because each letter has to be indicated by two series of them: still,
if proper preparations are made, the thing can be adequately carried
out. But whichever method is employed, those who use it must practise
beforehand, in order that when the actual occasion for putting it
in use arises they may be able to give each other the information
without any hitch. For there are plenty of instances to show what a
wide difference there is between the way an operation is carried out
by men who hear of it for the first time, and by men who have become
habituated to it. Many things which were considered not only difficult,
but impossible at first, are, after an interval of time and practice,
performed with the greatest ease. I could give many illustrations of
the truth of this remark, but the clearest may be found in the art
of reading. Put side by side a man who has never learnt his letters,
though otherwise acute, and a child who has acquired the habit, and
give the latter a book, and bid him read it: the former will clearly
not be induced to believe that the reader has first to attend to the
look of each of the letters, secondly to their sound-value, and thirdly
to their combinations with others, each of which operation requires
a certain time. Therefore when he sees the boy, without a pause for
thought, reading off seven or five lines at a breath, he will not
easily be induced to believe that he has not read the book before;
and certainly not, if he is able also to observe the appropriate
enunciation, the proper separations of the words, and the correct use
of the rough and smooth breathings. The moral is, not to give up any
useful accomplishment on account of its apparent difficulties, but to
persevere till it becomes a matter of habit, which is the way mankind
have obtained all good things. And especially is this right when the
matters in question are such as are often of decisive importance to our

I was led to say this much in connexion with my former assertion that
“all the arts had made such progress in our age that most of them were
reduced in a manner to exact sciences.” And therefore this too is a
point in which history properly written is of the highest utility....

ANTIOCHUS IN PARTHIA, B.C. 209-5. See ch. 31.

[Sidenote: The entrance of the Nomad Scythians into Hyrcania.]

+48.+ The Apasiacae live between the rivers Oxus and Tanais, the
former of which falls into the Hyrcanian Sea, the latter into the
Palus Maeotis.[15] Both are large enough to be navigable; and it seems
surprising how the Nomads managed to come by land into Hyrcania along
with their horses. Two accounts are given of this affair, one of them
probable, the other very surprising yet not impossible. The Oxus rises
in the Caucasus, and being much augmented by tributaries in Bactria, it
rushes through the level plain with a violent and turbid stream. When
it reaches the desert it dashes its stream against some precipitous
rocks with a force raised to such tremendous proportions by the mass
of its waters, and the declivity down which it has descended, that
it leaps from the rocks to the plain below leaving an interval of
more than a stade between the rock and its falls. It is through this
space that they say the Apasiacae went on foot with their horses into
Hyrcania, under the fall, and keeping close to the rock. The other
account is more probable on the face of it. It is said that, as the
basin of the river has extensive flats into which it descends with
violence, the force of the stream makes hollows in them, and opens
chasms into which the water descends deep below the surface, and
so is carried on for a short way, and then reappears: and that the
barbarians, being well acquainted with the facts, make their way on
horseback, over the space thus left dry, into Hyrcania....

[Sidenote: Battle on the river Arius between Antiochus and the

+49.+ News being brought that Euthydemus[16] with his force was at
Tapuria, and that a body of ten thousand horsemen were keeping guard
at the passage of the river Arius, he decided to abandon the siege
and attack these last. The river was three days’ march away. For two
days therefore he marched at a moderate speed; but on the third, after
dinner, he gave orders for the rest of his army to start next day at
daybreak; while he himself, with the cavalry and light-armed troops and
ten thousand peltasts, started in the night and pushed on at a great
rate. For he was informed that the cavalry of the enemy kept guard
by day on the bank of the river, but at night retired to a city more
than twenty stades off. Having completed therefore the rest of the way
under cover of night, the plains being excellent for riding, he got
the greater part of his army across the river by daybreak, before the
enemy came back. When their scouts told them what had happened, the
horsemen of the Bactrians hastened to the rescue, and fell in with
their opponents while on the march. Seeing that he must stand the first
charge of the enemy, the king summoned the two thousand horsemen who
were accustomed to fight round his own person; and issuing orders that
the rest were to form their companies and squadrons, and take up their
usual order on the ground on which they already were, he advanced with
the two thousand cavalry, and met the charge of the advanced guard of
the Bactrians. In this engagement Antiochus is reputed to have shown
the greatest gallantry of any of his men. There was heavy loss on
both sides: the king’s men conquered the first squadron, but when a
second and a third charged, they began to be hard pressed and to suffer
seriously. At that juncture, most of the cavalry being by this time on
the ground, Panaetolus ordered a general advance; relieved the king
and his squadrons; and, upon the Bactrians charging in loose order,
forced them to turn and fly in confusion. They never drew rein before
the charge of Panaetolus, until they rejoined Euthydemus, with a loss
of more than half their number. The king’s cavalry on the contrary
retired, after killing large numbers and taking a great many prisoners,
and bivouacked by the side of the river. In this action the king had
a horse killed under him, and lost some of his teeth by a blow on the
mouth; and his whole bearing obtained him a reputation for bravery of
the highest description. After this battle Euthydemus retreated in
dismay with his army to the city of Zariaspa in Bactria....


+1.+ My reason for prefixing a table of contents to each book, rather
than a preface, is not because I do not recognise the usefulness of a
preface in arresting attention and rousing interest, and also giving
facilities for finding any passage that is wanted, but because I find
prefaces viewed, though from many inadequate reasons, with contempt and
neglect. I therefore had recourse to a table of contents throughout my
history, except the first six books, arranged according to Olympiads,
as being as effective, or even more so, than a preface, and at the same
time as less subject to the objection of being out of place, for it
is closely connected with the subject-matter. In the first six books
I wrote prefaces, because I thought a mere table of contents less

_After the battle at Baecula, Hasdrubal made good his passage over
the Western Pyrenees, and thence through the Cevennes, B.C. 208. In
the spring of B.C. 207 he crossed the Alps and descended into Italy,
crossed the Po, and besieged Placentia. Thence he sent a letter to his
brother Hannibal announcing that he would march southward by Ariminum
and meet him in Umbria. The letter fell into the hands of the Consul
Nero, who was at Venusia, and who immediately made a forced march
northward, joined his colleague at Sena, and the next day attacked
Hasdrubal. See above, 10, 39; Livy, 27, 39-49._

Much easier and shorter was Hasdrubal’s journey into Italy....[17]

Never at any other time had Rome been in a greater state of excitement
and terrified expectation of the result....[18]

[Sidenote: Battle of the Metaurus, B.C. 207. Coss. C. Claudius Nero, M.
Livius Salinator II.]

None of these arrangements satisfied Hasdrubal. But circumstances no
longer admitted of delay. He saw the enemy drawn out in battle array
and advancing; and he was obliged to get the Iberians and the Gauls
who were serving with him into line. He therefore stationed his ten
elephants on the front, increased the depth of his lines, and so
had his whole army covering a somewhat small ground. He took up a
position himself in the centre of the line, immediately behind the
elephants, and commenced an advance upon the Roman left, with a full
resolution that in this battle he must either conquer or die. Livius
advanced to meet the enemy with proud confidence, and having come to
close quarters with him was fighting with great gallantry. Meanwhile
Claudius, who was stationed on the right wing, found himself unable
to advance and outflank the enemy, owing to the rough ground in front
of him, relying on which Hasdrubal had directed his advance upon the
Roman left: and being embarrassed by his inability to strike a blow,
he promptly decided what the circumstances pointed out as the tactics
to pursue. He withdrew his men from the right wing, and marched them
on the rear of the field of battle; and, after passing the left of
the Roman line, fell upon the flank of the Carthaginians who were
fighting near the elephants. Up to this point the victory had been
doubtful; for both sides fought with desperation, the Romans believing
that all would be over with them if they failed, and the Iberians and
Carthaginians holding exactly the same conviction for themselves.
Moreover the elephants were being of disservice to both sides alike;
for finding themselves between two forces, and exposed to a crossfire
of javelins, they kept throwing both the Carthaginian and Roman lines
into confusion. But as soon as Claudius fell upon the rear of the
enemy the battle ceased to be equal: for the Iberians found themselves
attacked on front and rear at once, which resulted in the greater part
of them being cut down on the ground. Six of the elephants were killed
with the men on them, four forced their way through the lines and were
afterwards captured, having been abandoned by their Indian drivers.

[Sidenote: Hasdrubal falls in the battle.]

+2.+ Hasdrubal had behaved on this occasion, as throughout his whole
life, like a brave man, and died fighting: and he deserves not to be
passed over without remark. I have already stated that Hannibal was
his brother, and on his departure to Italy entrusted the command in
Iberia to him. I have also described his many contests with the Romans,
and the many embarrassing difficulties with which he had to struggle,
caused by the generals sent from Carthage to Iberia; and how in all
these matters he had supported these vicissitudes and reverses in a
noble spirit worthy of a son of Barcas. But I will now speak of his
last contest, and explain why he seems to me pre-eminently to deserve
respectful attention and imitation. Most generals and kings, when
entering upon decisive battles, place before their eyes the glory and
advantages to be obtained from victory, and frequently consider and
contrive what use they will make of every success; but they do not
go on to review the chances of failure, nor contemplate the plan to
be adopted, or the action to be taken, in the case of reverse. Yet
the former is obvious, the latter requires foresight. Therefore it is
that most of them, though in many instances their soldiers have fought
nobly, by their own folly and imprudence in this respect have added
dishonour to defeat: have disgraced their previous achievements, and
rendered themselves, during the remainder of their lives, objects of
reproach and contempt. It is easy to see that many leaders make this
fatal mistake, and that the difference between one man and another in
these points is most signal; for history is full of such instances.
Hasdrubal, on the contrary, as long as there was reasonable hope of
being able to accomplish anything worthy of his former achievements,
regarded his personal safety in battle as of the highest consequence;
but when Fortune deprived him of all hopes for the future, and reduced
him to the last extremities, though neglecting nothing either in
his preparations or on the field that might secure him the victory,
nevertheless considered how, in case of total overthrow, he might face
his fate and suffer nothing unworthy of his past career.

These remarks are meant for those engaged in active operations, that
they may neither dash the hopes of those who rely upon them by a
heedless seeking of danger, nor by an unworthy clinging to life add
disgrace and shame to the catastrophies which befall them.

+3.+ Having won the victory, the Romans began pillaging the enemy’s
camp; and killed a number of the Celts, as they lay stupefied with
drunkenness in their beds, like unresisting victims. Then they
collected the rest of the booty, from which more than three hundred
talents were paid into the treasury. Taking Carthaginians and Celts
together, not less than ten thousand were killed, and about two
thousand Romans. Some of the principal Carthaginians were taken
prisoners, but the rest were put to the sword. When the report reached
Rome, people at first could not believe it, from the intensity of their
wish that it might be true; but when still more men arrived, not only
stating the fact, but giving full details, then indeed the city was
filled with overpowering joy; every temple-court was decked, and every
shrine full of sacrificial cakes and victims: and, in a word, they were
raised to such a pitch of hopefulness and confidence, that every one
felt sure that Hannibal, formerly the object of their chief terror,
could not after that stay even in Italy....

_A speech of the legate from Rhodes[19] before an assembly of Aetolians
at Heraclea in the autumn of B.C. 207 (see Livy, 28, 7), at the end of
the summer campaign_.

+4.+ “Facts I imagine, Aetolians, have made it clear to you that
neither King Ptolemy nor the community of Rhodes, Byzantium, Chios, or
Mitylene, regard a composition with you as unimportant. For this is not
the first or the second time that we have introduced the subject of
peace to your assembly; but ever since you entered upon the war we have
beset you with entreaties, and have never desisted from warning you on
this subject; because we saw that its immediate result would be the
destruction of yourselves and of Macedonia, and because we foresaw in
the future danger to our own countries and to that of all other Greeks.
For as, when a man has once set a fire alight, the result is no longer
dependent upon his choice, but it spreads in whatever direction chance
may direct, guided for the most part by the wind and the combustible
nature of the material, and frequently attacks the first author of the
conflagration himself: so too, war, when once it has been kindled by
a nation, sometimes devours the first those who kindled it; and soon
rushes along destroying everything that falls in its way, continually
gathering fresh strength, and blown into greater heat by the folly of
the people in its neighbourhood, as though by the wind. Wherefore,
men of Aetolia, considering that we, as representatives of the whole
body of the islanders and of the Greek inhabitants of Asia, are here
to beseech you to put an end to war and to choose peace, because the
matter affects us as well as you, show your wisdom by listening to
us and yielding to our entreaties. For if you were carrying on a war
which, though profitless (and most wars are that), was yet glorious
from the motive which prompted it, and the reputation likely to accrue
from it, you might be pardoned perhaps for a fixed determination to
continue it; but if it is a war of the most signal infamy, which
can bring you nothing but discredit and obloquy,—does not such an
undertaking claim considerable hesitation on your part? We will speak
our opinion frankly; and you, if you are wise, will give us a quiet
hearing. For it is much better to hear a disagreeable truth now and
thereby be preserved, than to listen to smooth things now, and soon
afterwards to be ruined yourselves, and to ruin the rest of the Greeks
with you.

[Sidenote: Cp. 9. 39.]

+5.+ “Put then before your eyes your own folly. You profess to be
at war against Philip on behalf of the Greeks, that they may escape
from servitude to him; but your war is really for the enslavement
and ruin of Greece. That is the tale told by your treaty with Rome,
which formerly existed only in written words, but is now seen in full
operation. Heretofore, though mere written words, it was a disgrace
to you: but now your execution of it has made that disgrace palpable
to the eyes of all the world. Moreover, Philip merely lends his name
and serves as a pretext for the war: he is not exposed to any attack:
it is against his allies,—the majority of the Peloponnesian states,
Boeotia, Euboea, Phocis, Locris, Thessaly, Epirus,—that you have made
this treaty, bargaining that their bodies and their goods shall belong
to the Romans, their cities and their territory to the Aetolians. And
though personally, if you took a city, you would not stoop to violate
the freeborn, or to burn the buildings, because you look upon such
conduct as cruel and barbarous; yet you have made a treaty by which you
have handed over all other Greeks to the barbarians, to be exposed to
the most shameful violence and lawlessness. And all this was hitherto
kept a secret. But now the fate of the people of Oreus, and of the
miserable Aeginetans, has betrayed you to every one,—Fortune having,
as though of set purpose, suddenly brought your infatuation before the

“So much for the origin of the war and its events up to now. But as to
its result,—supposing everything to go to your wish,—what do you expect
that to be? Will it not be the beginning of great miseries to all

+6.+ “For I presume no one can fail to see that, if once the Romans get
rid of the war in Italy,—and this is all but done, now that Hannibal
has been confined to a narrow district in Bruttii,—they will direct
their whole power upon Greece: professedly, indeed, in aid of the
Boeotians against Philip, but really with the view of reducing it
entirely under their own power. And if they design to treat it well
when they have conquered it, theirs will be the honour and glory; and
if badly, theirs too will be the plunder from the states they destroy,
and the power over those which they allow to survive: while you will
be calling upon the gods to witness your wrongs, when no god will be
any longer willing, nor any man be able to help you. Now, perhaps,
you ought to have foreseen all this from the first, for that would
have been your best course. But since the future often escapes human
foresight, now, at any rate, that you have seen by actual experience
what has happened, it must be your duty to take better measures for the
future. In any case we have omitted nothing which it becomes sincere
friends to say or do. We have spoken our opinion about the future with
absolute frankness; and you we urge and entreat not to stand in the way
of the freedom and safety of yourselves or of the rest of Greece.”

This speaker having, as it seemed, made a considerable impression,
he was followed by the ambassadors of Philip, who, without making a
long speech, merely said that they were commissioned to do one of
two things,—if the Aetolians chose peace, to accept it readily: if
not, to call the gods and the ambassadors from Greece to witness that
the Aetolians, and not Philip, ought to be held responsible for what
happened thereafter, and so to depart....

[Sidenote: Attalus eludes Philip. Livy, 28, 7, 8, B.C. 207.]

+7.+ Philip loudly lamented his ill-fortune in having so narrowly
missed getting Attalus into his hands....

[Sidenote: Philip at Thermus. See 5, 6-18.]

On his way to the lake Trichonis Philip arrived at Thermus, where there
was a temple of Apollo; and there he once more defaced all the sacred
buildings which he had spared on his former occupation of the town. In
both instances it was an ill-advised indulgence of temper: for it is
a mark of utter unreasonableness to commit an act of impiety against
heaven in order to gratify one’s wrath against man....


[Sidenote: Defects of the Achaean officers.]

+8.+ There are three methods followed by those who wish to arrive at an
intelligent knowledge of tactics. The first is by the study of history,
the second by the use of scientific treatises composed by specialists,
the third by actual experience on the field. But of all three of these
methods the Achaean commanders were equally ignorant....

A very general fault in the men was an unfortunate rivalry, engendered
by the ostentation and bad taste of the others. They were very
particular about their attendants and their dress; and there was a show
of splendour in this, kept up by the majority beyond their means. But
to their arms they paid no attention whatever....

Most people, indeed, do not so much as attempt to imitate the real
achievements of those who obtain success, but, while trying to
reproduce their unimportant peculiarities, succeed only in displaying
their own frivolity....

[Sidenote: Speech of Philopoemen urging reform.]

+9.+ “Brightness in the armour,” he said, “contributes much to
inspire dismay in the enemy; and care bestowed on having it made to
fit properly is of great service in actual use. This will best be
secured if you give to your arms the attention which you now bestow
on your dress, and transfer to your dress the neglect which you now
show of your arms. By thus acting, you will at once save your money,
and be undoubtedly able to maintain the interests of your country.
Therefore the man who is going to take part in manoeuvres or a campaign
ought, when putting on his greaves, to see that they are bright and
well-fitting, much more than that his shoes and boots are; and when he
takes up his shield and helmet, to take care that they are cleaner and
more costly than his cloak and shirt: for when men take greater care
of what is for show, than of what is for use, there can be no doubt
of what will happen to them on the field. I beg you to consider that
elaboration in dress is a woman’s weakness, and a woman of no very
high character either; but costliness and splendour in armour are the
characteristics of brave men who are resolved on saving themselves and
their country with glory.”

The whole audience were so convinced by this speech and so much struck
with the wisdom of the advice, that, immediately after leaving the
council-chamber, they began pointing with scorn at the over-dressed
dandies, and forced some of them to quit the market-place; and what is
more, in future manoeuvres and campaigns they kept a stricter watch on
each other in these points.

[Sidenote: Philipoemen’s own example.]

+10.+ So true it is that a single word spoken by a man of credit is
often sufficient not only to turn men from the worst courses, but even
to incite them to the noblest. But when such a speaker can appeal to
his own life as in harmony with his words, then indeed his exhortation
carries a weight which nothing can exceed. And this was above all
others the case with Philopoemen. For in his dress and eating, as well
as in all that concerned his bodily wants, he was plain and simple; in
his manners to others without ceremony or pretence; and throughout his
life he made it his chief aim to be absolutely sincere. Consequently a
few unstudied words from him were sufficient to raise a firm conviction
in the minds of his hearers; for as he could point to his own life
as an example, they wanted little more to convince them. Thus it
happened on several occasions, that the confidence he inspired, and
the consciousness of his achievements, enabled him in a few words to
overthrow long and, as his opponents thought, skilfully argued speeches.

[Sidenote: War against Machanidas, tyrant of Sparta. B.C. 208-207.]

So on this occasion, as soon as the council of the league separated,
all returned to their cities deeply impressed both by the words and
the man himself, and convinced that no harm could happen to them with
him at their head. Immediately afterwards Philopoemen set out on a
visitation of the cities, which he performed with great energy and
speed. He then summoned a levy of citizens and began forming them into
companies and drilling them; and at last, after eight months of this
preparation and training, he mustered his forces at Mantinea, prepared
to fight the tyrant Machanidas in behalf of the freedom of all the

[Sidenote: Battle of Mantinea, B.C. 207.]

[Sidenote: The road to Tegea. See Paus. 8, 10 _sq._]

+11.+ Machanidas had now acquired great confidence, and looked upon
the determination of the Achaeans as extremely favourable to his
plans. As soon as he heard of their being in force at Mantinea, he
duly harangued his Lacedaemonians at Tegea, and the very next morning
at daybreak advanced upon Mantinea. He led the right wing of the
phalanx himself; his mercenaries marched in two parallel columns on
each side of his front; and behind them were carts carrying quantities
of field artillery and bolts for the catapults. Meanwhile Philopoemen
too had arranged his army in three divisions, and was leading them
out of Mantinea, the Illyrians and the men with body armour by the
gate leading to the temple of Poseidon, and with them all the rest
of the foreign contingent and light-armed troops; by the next gate,
toward the west, the phalanx; and by the next the Achaean cavalry. He
sent his light-armed men forward to occupy the hill, which rises to a
considerable height above the road called Xenis and the above-mentioned
temple: he stationed the men with body armour next, resting on this
hill to the south; next them the Illyrians; next them, in the same
straight line, the phalanx, drawn up in companies, with an interval
between each, along the ditch which runs towards the temple of
Poseidon, right through the middle of the plain of Mantinea, until it
touches the range of mountains that forms the boundary of the territory
of the Elisphasii. Next to them, on the right wing, he stationed the
Achaean cavalry, under the command of Aristaenetus of Dyme; while on
the left wing he led the whole of the foreign contingent, drawn up in
lines one behind the other.

+12.+ As soon as the enemy were well in sight, Philopoemen went down
the ranks of the phalanx, and addressed to them an exhortation which,
though short, clearly pointed out to them the nature of the battle
in which they were engaged. But most of what he said was rendered
inaudible by the answering shouts of the troops. The affection and
confidence of the men rose to such a pitch of enthusiasm and zeal
that they seemed to be almost acting under a divine inspiration, as
they cried out to him to lead them on and fear nothing. However he
tried, when he could get the opportunity, to make this much clear to
them, that the battle on the one side was to establish a shameful and
ignominious servitude, on the other to vindicate an ever-memorable and
glorious liberty.

[Sidenote: The attack of Machanidas.]

[Sidenote: The battle begun by light-cavalry charges.]

Machanidas at first looked as though he meant to attack the enemy’s
right wing in column; but when he got within moderate distance he
deployed into line by the right, and by this extension movement made
his right wing cover the same amount of ground as the left wing of
the Achaeans, and fixed his catapults in front of the whole force at
intervals. Philopoemen understood that the enemy’s plan was, by pouring
volleys from the catapults into his phalanx, to throw the ranks into
confusion: he therefore gave him no time or interval of repose, but
opened the engagement by a vigorous charge of his Tarentines[20] close
to the temple of Poseidon, where the ground was flat and suitable for
cavalry. Whereupon Machanidas was constrained to follow suit by sending
his Tarentines forward also.

[Sidenote: Defeat of the Achaean right wing.]

+13.+ At first the struggle was confined to these two forces, and was
maintained with spirit. But the light-armed troops coming gradually
to the support of such of them as were wavering, in a very short time
the whole of the mercenaries on either side were engaged. They fought
sometimes in close order, sometimes in pairs: and for a long time so
entirely without decisive result, that the rest of the two armies, who
were watching in which direction the cloud of dust inclined, could
come to no conclusion, because both sides maintained for a long while
exactly their original ground. But after a time the mercenaries of the
tyrant began to get the better of the struggle, from their numbers,
and the superiority in skill obtained by long practice. And this is
the natural and usual result. The citizens of a democracy no doubt
bring more enthusiasm to their battles than the subjects of a tyrant;
but in the same proportion the mercenaries of sovereigns are naturally
superior and more efficient than those of a democracy. For in the
former case one side is fighting for liberty, the other for a condition
of servitude; but in the case of mercenaries, those of the tyrant are
encouraged by the certain prospect of reward, those of a democracy
know that they must lose by victory: for as soon as a democracy has
crushed its assailants, it no longer employs mercenaries to protect
its liberties; while a tyranny requires more mercenaries in proportion
as its field of ambition is extended: for as the persons injured by it
are more numerous, those who plot against it are more numerous also;
and the security of despots rests entirely on the loyalty and power of

+14.+ Thus it came about that the mercenaries in the army of Machanidas
fought with such fury and violence, that even the Illyrians and men
with body armour, who formed the reserve supporting the mercenaries of
the Achaean army, were unable to withstand their assault; but were all
driven from their position, and fled in confusion towards the city of
Mantinea, which was about seven stades distant.

And now there occurred an undoubted instance of what some doubt,
namely, that the issues in war are for the most part decided by the
skill or want of skill of the commanders. For though perhaps it is a
great thing to be able to follow up a first success properly, it is a
greater thing still that, when the first step has proved a failure, a
man should retain his presence of mind, keep a good look-out for any
error of judgment on the part of the victors, and avail himself of
their mistakes. At any rate one often sees the side, which imagines
itself to have obtained a clear victory, ultimately lose the day; while
those who seemed at first to have failed recover themselves by presence
of mind, and ultimately win an unexpected victory. Both happened on
this occasion to the respective leaders.

[Sidenote: Machanidas pursues the fugitives, and thus allows the
Achaean hoplites to get between him and his quarters.]

The whole of the Achaean mercenaries having been driven from
their ground, and their left wing having been thoroughly broken
up, Machanidas abandoned his original plan of winning the day by
outflanking the enemy with some of his forces and charging their
front with others, and did neither; but, quite losing his head,
rushed forward heedlessly with all his mercenaries in pursuit of the
fugitives, as though the panic was not in itself sufficient to drive
those who had once given way up to the town gates.

[Sidenote: The fight at the dyke.]

+15.+ Meanwhile the Achaean general was doing all he could to rally the
mercenaries, addressing the officers by name, and urging them to stand;
but when he saw that they were hopelessly beaten, he did not run away
in a panic nor give up the battle in despair, but, withdrawing under
cover of his phalanx, waited until the enemy had passed him in their
pursuit, and left the ground on which the fighting had taken place
empty, and then immediately gave the word to the front companies of
the phalanx to wheel to the left, and advance at the double, without
breaking their ranks. He thus swiftly occupied the ground abandoned by
his mercenaries, and at once cut off the pursuers from returning, and
got on higher ground than the enemy’s right wing. He exhorted the men
to keep up their courage, and remain where they were, until he gave the
word for a general advance; and he ordered Polybius of Megalopolis[21]
to collect such of the Illyrians and body armour men and mercenaries
as remained behind and had not taken part in the flight, and form a
reserve on the flank of the phalanx, to keep a look-out against the
return of the pursuers. Thereupon the Lacedaemonians, excited by the
victory gained by the light-armed contingent, without waiting for the
word of command, brought their sarissae to the charge and rushed upon
the enemy. But when in the course of their advance they reached the
edge of the dyke, being unable at that point to change their purpose
and retreat when at such close quarters with the enemy, and partly
because they did not consider the dyke a serious obstacle, as the
slope down to it was very gradual, and it was entirely without water
or underwood growing in it, they continued their advance through it
without stopping to think.

+16.+ The opportunity for attack which Philopoemen had long foreseen
had now arrived. He at once ordered the phalanx to bring their
sarissae to the charge and advance. The men obeyed with enthusiasm,
and accompanied their charge with a ringing cheer. The ranks of the
Lacedaemonians had been disorganised by the passage of the dyke, and
as they ascended the opposite bank they found the enemy above them.
They lost courage and tried to fly; but the greater number of them
were killed in the ditch itself, partly by the Achaeans, and partly
by trampling on each other. Now this result was not unpremeditated
or accidental, but strictly owing to the acuteness of the general.
For Philopoemen originally took ground behind the dyke, not to avoid
fighting, as some supposed, but from a very accurate and scientific
calculation of strategical advantages. He reckoned either that
Machanidas when he arrived would advance without thinking of the dyke,
and that then his phalanx would get entangled, just as I have described
their actually doing; or that if he advanced with a full apprehension
of the difficulty presented by the dyke, and then changing his mind
and deciding to shrink from the attempt, were to retire in loose order
and a long straggling column,[22] the victory would be his, without
a general engagement, and the defeat his adversary’s. For this has
happened to many commanders, who having drawn up their men for battle,
and then concluded that they were not strong enough to meet their
opponents, either from the nature of the ground, the disparity of their
numbers, or for other reasons, have drawn off in too long a line of
march, and hoped in the course of the retreat to win a victory, or at
least get safe away from the enemy, by means of their rear guard alone.

[Sidenote: Machanidas, returning from the pursuit, is killed while
trying to recross the dyke.]

+17.+ However, Philopoemen was not deceived in his prognostication
of what would happen; for the Lacedaemonians were thoroughly routed.
Seeing therefore that his phalanx was victorious and that he had gained
a complete and brilliant success, he set himself vigorously to secure
the only thing wanting to complete it, that is, to prevent the escape
of Machanidas. Seeing therefore that, in the course of the pursuit,
he was caught between the dyke and the town with his mercenaries,
he waited for him to attempt a return. But when Machanidas saw that
his army was in full retreat, with the enemy at their heels, he knew
that he had advanced too far, and had lost his chance of victory: he
therefore rallied the mercenaries that he had with him, and tried
to form close order, and cut his way through the enemy, while they
were still scattered and engaged in the pursuit. Some of his men,
understanding his plan and seeing no other hope of safety, kept by him
at first; but when they came upon the ground, and saw the Achaeans
guarding the bridge over the dyke, they lost heart; and the whole
company began falling away from him, each doing the best he could to
preserve his own life. Thereupon the tyrant gave up all hope of making
his way over the bridge; and rode along the edge of the dyke, trying
with all his might to find a place which he could cross.

[Sidenote: Death of Machanidas and capture of Tegea.]

[Sidenote: Achaeans in Laconia.]

+18.+ Philopoemen recognised Machanidas by his purple cloak and the
trappings of his horse. He at once left Anaxidamus, with orders to
guard the bridge with vigilance, and give no quarter to any of the
mercenaries; because they were the men on whom the despots of Sparta
always depended for supporting their power. Then taking Polyaenus of
Cyprus and Simias, who were attending on him at the time, he rode
along the edge of the ditch opposite to that in which the tyrant
and his attendants were; for Machanidas had still two men with him,
Arexidamus and one of the mercenaries. As soon as Machanidas had found
a spot in the dyke which could be crossed, he put spurs to his horse,
and tried to force it to go on and get over. Then Philopoemen turned
suddenly round upon him and dealt him a mortal wound with his spear,
and a second with a stab from the spike at the butt end of it, and
thus killed the tyrant in a hand-to-hand encounter. Those who were
riding with him did the same to Arexidamus; but the third man seeing
their fall gave up the idea of crossing the dyke and escaped. Simias
immediately stripped the bodies of the two who had fallen, and with
their armour carried off also the tyrant’s head, and then hurried off
to overtake the pursuing party; being eager to give the soldiers ocular
evidence of the fall of the enemy’s commander, that they might continue
the pursuit of their opponents with all the more confidence and spirit
right up to Tegea. And this in fact added so greatly to the spirit of
the men that it contributed more than anything else to their carrying
Tegea by assault, and pitching their camp next day on the Eurotas,
undisputed masters of all the open country. For many years past they
had been vainly trying to drive the enemy from their own borders,
but now they were themselves devastating Laconia without resistance,
without having lost any great number of their own men in the battle;
while they had killed not less than four thousand Lacedaemonians, taken
even more prisoners, and possessed themselves of all their baggage and

+19.+ What profit is it to our readers to describe wars and battles,
the storming of cities and the enslavement of their inhabitants, if
they are to know nothing of the causes which conduce to success and
failure? The results of such operations merely touch the fancy: it is
the tracing of the designs of the actors in such scenes that is really
instructive; and above all it is the following in detail of each step
that can educate the ideas of the student....


[Sidenote: B.C. 218-202.]

Who could refrain from speaking in terms of admiration of this great
man’s strategic skill, courage, and ability, when one looks to the
length of time during which he displayed those qualities; and realises
to one’s self the pitched battles, the skirmishes and sieges, the
revolutions and counter-revolutions of states, the vicissitudes of
fortune, and in fact the course of his design and its execution in its
entirety? For sixteen continuous years Hannibal maintained the war
with Rome in Italy, without once releasing his army from service in
the field, but keeping those vast numbers under control, like a good
pilot, without any sign of disaffection towards himself or towards
each other, though he had troops in his service who, so far from being
of the same tribe, were not even of the same race. He had Libyans,
Iberians, Ligurians, Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, Greeks, who had
naturally nothing in common with each other, neither laws, nor customs,
nor language. Yet the skill of the commander was such, that these
differences, so manifold and so wide, did not disturb the obedience to
one word of command and to a single will. And yet circumstances were
not by any means unvarying: for though the breeze of fortune often set
strongly in his favour, it as often also blew in exactly the opposite
direction. There is therefore good ground for admiring Hannibal’s
display of ability in campaign; and there can be no fear in saying
that, if he had reserved his attack upon the Romans until he had first
subdued other parts of the world, there is not one of his projects
which would have eluded his grasp. As it was, he began with those whom
he should have attacked last, and accordingly began and ended his
career with them....


[Sidenote: Hasdrubal son of Gesco encamps near Ilipa (or Silpia) in
Baetica, B.C. 206. Livy 28, 13-6.]

[Sidenote: Scipio advances into Baetica,]

[Sidenote: and encamps close to the Carthaginian forces.]

+20.+ Hasdrubal having collected his forces from the various towns
in which they had wintered, advanced to within a short distance of
Ilipa and there encamped; forming his entrenchment at the foot of the
mountains, with a plain in front of him well suited for a contest and
battle. His infantry amounted to seventy thousand, his cavalry to four
thousand, and his elephants to thirty-two. On his part, Scipio sent M.
Junius Silanus to visit Colichas and take over from him the forces that
had been prepared by him. These amounted to three thousand infantry
and five hundred horse. The other allies he received personally in
the course of his march up the country to his destination. When he
approached Castalo and Baecula, and had there been joined by Marcus
Junius and the troops from Colichas, he found himself in a position
of great perplexity. For without their allies the Roman forces were
not strong enough to risk a battle; yet to do so, in dependence upon
the allies for his hopes of ultimate success, appeared to him to be
dangerous and too venturesome. In spite however of his perplexity, he
was obliged to yield to the force of circumstances so far as to employ
the Iberians; but he resolved to do so only to make a show of numbers
to the enemy, while he really fought the action with his own legions.
With this purpose in his mind he got his whole army on the march,
forty-five thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; and when he
had come within the view of the Carthaginians, he pitched his camp on
some low hills exactly opposite the enemy.

[Sidenote: Futile attack by Mago.]

+21.+ Mago thought that it would be an excellent moment to attack the
Romans while actually engaged in making their camp; he therefore rode
up to the entrenchment with the greater part of his own cavalry and
Massanissa with the Numidians, persuaded that he should catch Scipio
off his guard. Scipio had however all along foreseen this, and had
placed some cavalry equal in number to those of the Carthaginians
under cover of some hills. Upon these making an unexpected charge,
many of the enemy’s horsemen at once took to flight at the startling
appearance, and began to make off; while the rest closed with their
opponents and fought with great gallantry. But the Carthaginians
were disconcerted by the agility of some of the Roman horsemen
in dismounting, and after a short resistance they retreated with
considerable loss. The retreat was at first conducted in good order:
but as the Romans pressed them hard, they broke up their squadrons, and
fled for safety to their own camp. This affair gave the Romans better
spirits for engaging in a pitched battle, and had the contrary effect
on the Carthaginians. However, during the next few days they both
drew out on the intervening plain; skirmished with their cavalry and
light-armed troops; and, after thus trying each other’s mettle, were
resolved to bring the matter to the test of a general engagement.

[Sidenote: Scipio resolves on a general engagement, and alters his
disposition so as to make the battle depend upon the Italians rather
than the Spaniards.]

+22.+ On this occasion Scipio appears to have employed a twofold
stratagem. Hasdrubal had been accustomed to make his demonstrations in
force somewhat late in the day, with the Libyans in his centre, and the
elephants on either wing; while his own practice had been to make his
counter-movements somewhat later still, with the Roman soldiers on his
centre opposite the Libyans, and the Iberians on his two wings; but the
day on which he resolved upon a general engagement, by reversing this
arrangement, he greatly contributed to secure the victory for his own
men, and succeeded in putting the enemy at a considerable disadvantage.
For directly it was light he sent his aides with orders to the tribunes
and men to arm, as soon as they had got their breakfasts, and parade
outside the camp. The order was obeyed with alacrity because the men
suspected what was going to take place. He then sent the cavalry and
light-armed forward, with orders to advance close to the enemy’s camp,
and skirmish boldly up to it; while he himself marched out with the
infantry, just as the sun was appearing above the horizon; and on
reaching the middle of the plain, made his dispositions in the reverse
order to his usual arrangement, placing the Iberians in the centre and
the Roman legionaries on the two wings.

The sudden approach of the cavalry to their camp, and the simultaneous
appearance of the rest of the army getting into order, left the
Carthaginians barely time to get under arms. Hasdrubal was therefore
obliged, without waiting for the men to get breakfast, or making any
preparations, to despatch his cavalry and light-armed troops at once
against the enemy’s cavalry on the plain, and to get his infantry into
order on some level ground not far from the skirts of the mountains,
as was their custom. For a time the Romans remained quiet; but when
the morning was getting on, and the engagement between the light-armed
troops still continued undecided, because such of them as were forced
from their ground retired on their own heavy infantry and then formed
again for attack, Scipio at length thought that the time was come. He
withdrew his skirmishers through the intervals of the maniples, and
then distributed them equally between the two wings on rear of his
line, first the velites and behind them the cavalry. He then advanced,
at first in line direct; but when he was about a stade[23] from the
enemy, he ordered the Iberians to continue the advance in the same
order, while he commanded the maniples and squadrons on the right wing
to turn outwards to the right, and those on the left wing to the left.

+23.+ Scipio with the three leading squadrons of cavalry from the
right wing, preceded by the usual number of velites and three maniples
(a combination of troops which the Romans call a cohort), and Lucius
Marcius and Marcus Junius with a similar force from the left wing,
turned the one to the left the other to the right, and advanced at a
great speed in column upon the enemy, the troops in succession forming
up and following in column as they wheeled. When these troops were
within a short distance of the enemy,—the Iberians in the line direct
being still a considerable distance behind, because they were advancing
at a deliberate pace,—they came into contact with the two wings of
the enemy simultaneously, the Roman forces being in column, according
to Scipio’s original plan. The movements subsequent to this, which
resulted in the troops on the rear finding themselves in the same line
as the troops in front, and engaged like them with the enemy, were
exactly the converse of each other—taking the right and left wings in
general, and the cavalry and infantry in particular. For the cavalry
and velites on the right wing came into line on the right and tried
to outflank the enemy, while the heavy infantry came into line on the
left; but on the left wing the heavy infantry came into line by the
right, the cavalry and velites by the left. The result of this movement
was that, as far as the cavalry and light infantry were concerned,
their right became their left. Scipio cared little for this, but was
intent on something more important, namely, the outflanking of the
enemy. For while a general ought to be quite alive to what is taking
place, and rightly so, he ought to use whatever movements suit the

[Sidenote: The elephants.]

+24.+ When these troops were at close quarters the elephants were
severely handled, being wounded and harassed on every side by the
velites and cavalry, and did as much harm to their friends as to
their foes; for they rushed about promiscuously and killed every one
that fell in their way on either side alike. As to the infantry,—the
Carthaginian wings began to be broken, but the centre occupied by the
Libyans, and which was the best part of the army, was never engaged at
all. It could not quit its ground to go to the support of the wings for
fear of the attack of the Iberians, nor could it by maintaining its
position do any actual fighting, because the enemy in front of it did
not come to close quarters. However, for a certain time the two wings
fought gallantly, because it was for them, as for the enemy, a struggle
for life and death. But now the midday heat was become intense, and
the Carthaginians began to feel faint, because the unusual time at
which they had been forced to come on the field had prevented them
from fortifying themselves with the proper food; while the Romans had
the advantage in physical vigour as well as in cheerfulness, which was
especially promoted by the fact that the prudence of their general had
secured his best men being pitted against the weakest troops of the
enemy. Thus hard pressed Hasdrubal’s centre began to retreat: at first
step by step; but soon the ranks were broken, and the men rushed in
confusion to the skirts of the mountain; and on the Romans pressing
in pursuit with still greater violence, they began a headlong flight
into their entrenchments. Had not Providence interfered to save them,
they would promptly have been driven from their camp too; but a sudden
storm gathered in the air, and a violent and prolonged torrent of rain
descended, under which the Romans with difficulty effected a return to
their own camp....

[Sidenote: The Romans in the mining district of Spain.]

Many Romans lost their lives by the fire in trying to get the silver
and gold which had been melted and fused....


[Sidenote: Scipio’s idea of transferring the war to Africa.]

When every one complimented Scipio after he had driven the
Carthaginians from Iberia, and advised him straightway to take some
rest and ease, as having put a period to the war, he answered that
he “congratulated them on their sanguine hopes; for himself he was
now more than ever revolving in his mind how to begin the war with
Carthage. Up to that time the Carthaginians had waged war upon the
Romans; but that now fortune put it in the power of the Romans to make
war upon them....”


See Livy, 28, 17, 18

[Sidenote: Scipio’s influence over Syphax.]

In his conversation with Syphax, Scipio, who was eminently endowed
by nature in this respect, conducted himself with so much kindness
and tact, that Hasdrubal afterwards remarked to Syphax that “Scipio
appeared more formidable to him in such an interview than in the


[Sidenote: Scipio appeases a mutiny in the Roman camp, at Sucro. Livy,
28, 24. In the autumn of B.C. 206.]

+25.+ When a mutiny broke out among part of the troops in the Roman
camp, Scipio, though he had now had a very adequate experience of the
difficulties of administration, never felt himself more at a loss how
to act or in greater embarrassment. And naturally so. For as in the
case of the body, causes of mischief, such as cold, heat, fatigue, or
wounds, may be avoided by precautions, or easily relieved when they
occur; while those which arise from within the body itself, such as
tumours or diseases, are difficult to foresee and difficult to relieve
when they do exist, so it is, we must believe, with political and
military administration. Against plots from without, and the attacks
of enemies, the precautions to be taken and the measures for relief
may readily be learned by those who pay the requisite attention;
but to decide on the right method of resisting intestine factions,
revolutions, and disturbances is difficult, and requires great tact and
extreme acuteness; and, moreover, the observation of one maxim suitable
in my opinion to all armies, states, and bodies alike, which is this:
never in such cases to allow any lengthened idleness or repose, and
least of all at a time of success and when provisions are abundant.

Being, then, as I have all along said, a man eminently careful, acute,
and prompt, Scipio summoned a meeting of the military tribunes and
proposed a solution of the existing troubles as follows. He said
that “he must promise the soldiers the settlement of their pay;
and, in order to create a belief in his promise, he must now take
public steps to exact with all speed the contributions which had been
already imposed upon the cities for the support of the whole army,
with the distinct understanding that the object of that measure was
the settlement of the pay: and these same tribunes should return to
the army and urge and entreat the men to abandon their rebellious
spirit, and come to him to receive their pay, either singly or, if they
preferred it, in a body. And when this was done he would consider, as
circumstances arose, what measures it was necessary to take.”

+26.+ With this suggestion in their minds these officers deliberated on
the means of raising money; and having communicated their decisions to
Scipio, he said that he would now consult them on the next necessary
step. They accordingly resolved that they would name a day on which
all were to appear; and that then they would pardon the general body
of the men, but severely punish the instigators of the mutiny, who
were as many as thirty-five. The day having arrived, and the mutineers
having appeared to make terms and receive their pay, Scipio gave secret
instructions to the tribunes, who had been sent on the mission to them,
to meet them; and, each of them selecting five of the ringleaders,
to greet them with politeness and invite them, if possible, to their
own tent, or, if they could not do that, to dinner or some such
entertainment. But to the troops with him he sent round orders to have
provisions for a considerable period ready in three days’ time, because
they were to march against the deserter Andobales under Marcus Silanus.
When they heard this the mutineers were much emboldened, because they
imagined that they would have everything in their own hands, as the
other troops would be gone by the time they joined the general.

[Sidenote: The mutiny suppressed and the ringleaders executed at New

+27.+ Upon the approach of the mutineers, Scipio gave orders to his
army to march out the next morning at daybreak with their baggage. But
he instructed the tribunes and praefects that, as soon as they met the
mutineers, they should order their men to put down their baggage, and
keep them under arms at the city gate; and then, placing a detachment
at each of the gates, take good care that none of the mutineers should
leave the city. The officers who had been sent to meet the men fell
in with them on their arrival, and took the ringleaders with every
appearance of civility to their own tents, in accordance with the
arrangement that had been made. At the same time orders had been given
to them to arrest the thirty-five immediately after dinner, and to keep
them in fetters: without allowing any one in the tent to go out, except
the messenger who was to inform the general from each of them that this
had been accomplished.

[Sidenote: Scipio’s speech to the mutineers.]

The tribunes having done as they were ordered, at daybreak next
morning, seeing that the new arrivals were collected in the
market-place, the general gave the signal for the assembly of the army.
The signal was as usual promptly obeyed by all, for they were curious
to see how the general would demean himself in their presence, and what
he would say to them about the business in hand. As soon as they were
come together, Scipio sent word to the tribunes to bring their soldiers
under arms, and station them round the assembled men. He then came
forward himself. His first appearance caused an immediate change of
feeling. The soldiers supposed that he was still unwell, and when they
suddenly saw him, contrary to all expectations, with all the appearance
of full health and strength, they were struck with terror.

+28.+ He began his speech by saying that he wondered what their
grievances were, or what they looked for forward that induced them to
mutiny. For that there were three motives only on which men usually
venture to rebel against their country and their commanders,—discontent
and anger with their officers; dissatisfaction with their present
position; or, lastly, hopes of something better and more glorious.
“Now, I ask you,” he continued, “which of these can you allege? It is
with me, I presume, that you are dissatisfied, because I did not pay
you your wages. But this cannot be laid to my charge; for while I was
in office your pay was never short. The fault then may lie with Rome
that the accumulated arrears have not been settled. Which was your
proper course then in that case? To have brought forward your complaint
thus, as rebels and enemies to the country that nurtured you, or to
have come personally to me and stated your case, and to have begged
your friends to support and help you? The latter would have been the
better plan in my opinion. In those who serve others for pay it is
sometimes pardonable to revolt against their paymasters; but in the
case of those who are fighting for themselves, for their own wives and
children, it can in no circumstances be conceded. It is just as though,
on the plea of being wronged in money matters by his own father, a man
were to come in arms to slay him from whom he received his own life.
Or perhaps you may allege that I imposed greater hardships and dangers
on you than on the others, and gave the rest more than their share of
profits and booty. But you can neither venture to say this, nor, if you
did venture, could you prove it. What then is your grievance against me
at this moment, I should like to ask, that you have mutinied? I believe
that not one of you will be able to express or even conceive it.

+29.+ “Nor again can it have been any dissatisfaction with the position
of affairs. For when was any prosperity greater? When has Rome won
more victories, when have her arms had brighter prospects than now?
But perhaps some faint-heart will say that our enemies have more
numerous advantages, fairer and more certain prospects than ourselves.
Which, pray, of these enemies? Is it Andobales and Mandonius? But
which of you is ignorant of the fact that these men first betrayed the
Carthaginians and joined us, and now once more, in defiance of their
oaths and pledges, have come forward as our opponents? It is a fine
thing surely to become the enemies of your country in reliance on such
men as these! Nor again had you any prospect of becoming masters of
Iberia by your own prowess: for you would not have been strong enough,
even in conjunction with Andobales, to meet us in the field, to say
nothing of doing so without such aid. I should like then to ask,—what
was it in which you trusted? Surely not in the skill and valour of the
leaders whom you have now elected, or in the fasces and axes which
were borne in front of them,—men of whom I will not deign to say even
another word. All this, my men, is absolutely futile; nor will you be
able to allege even the smallest just complaint against me or your
country. Wherefore I will undertake your defence to Rome and myself,
by putting forward a plea which all the world will acknowledge to hold
good. And it is that, _a crowd is ever easily misled and easily induced
to any error_. Therefore it is that crowds are like the sea, which in
its own nature is safe and quiet; but, when winds fall violently upon
it, assumes the character of the blasts which lash it into fury: thus
a multitude also is ever found to be what its leaders and counsellors
are. Acting on this consideration, I and all my fellow-officers hereby
offer you pardon and amnesty for the past: but to the guilty authors
of the mutiny we are resolved to show no mercy, but to punish them as
their misconduct to their country and to ourselves deserves.”

[Sidenote: Execution of the ringleaders.]

+30.+ Just as he said these words, the soldiers, who were posted under
arms round the assembly, clashed their swords against their shields:
and at the same instant the ringleaders of the mutiny were brought in,
stripped and in chains. But such terror was inspired in the men by
the threatening aspect of the surrounding troops, and by the dreadful
spectacle before them, that, while the ringleaders were being scourged
and beheaded, they neither changed countenance nor uttered a sound,
but remained all staring open-mouthed and terrified at what was going
on. So the ringleaders of the mischief were scourged and dragged off
through the crowd dead; but the rest of the men accepted with one
consent the offer of an amnesty from the general and officers; and then
voluntarily came forward, one by one, to take an oath to the tribunes
that they would obey the orders of their commanders and remain loyal to

Having thus crushed what might have been the beginning of serious
danger, Scipio restored his troops to their former good disposition....

_Scipio at New Carthage has heard of hostile movements on the part of
Andobales north of the Ebro, B.C. 206. See Livy, 28, 31-34._

[Sidenote: Scipio’s address to his soldiers.]

+31.+ Scipio at once summoned a meeting of the soldiers in New
Carthage, and addressed them on the subject of the audacious
proceedings of Andobales, and his treachery to them; and by dwelling
at great length on these topics he inspired the men with a very great
eagerness to attack these princes. He then proceeded to enumerate the
battles they had already fought against the Iberians and Carthaginians
combined, the Carthaginians acting as leaders in the campaigns.
“Seeing,” he added, “that you always beat them, it does not now become
you to fear defeat in a war against Iberians by themselves, and led by
Andobales. I will not therefore even accept any Iberian of them all as
a partner in the struggle, but I will undertake the campaign by the
unassisted services of my Roman soldiers: in order to make it plain
to all that it was not, as some assert, by the aid of Iberians that
we defeated the Carthaginians and drove them from Iberia; but that
it was by Roman valour and your own gallantry that we have conquered
Carthaginian and Celtiberian combined. Let nothing therefore disturb
your confidence in each other: but, if you have ever done it before,
approach this undertaking with courage undismayed. For securing the
victory I will with God’s help make every necessary provision.” This
speech filled the troops with such zeal and confidence, that they
presented all the appearance of men whose enemies are in full view, and
who are on the very point of closing with them.

[Sidenote: Scipio marches to the Ebro, crosses it, and in fourteen days
is in the presence of the enemy.]

[Sidenote: A skirmish.]

+32.+ Scipio then dismissed the assembly, but on the next day got
his troops on the march, and having reached the Ebro in ten days and
crossed it, on the fourth day after that pitched his camp near that
of the enemy, with a valley between his own and the enemy’s lines.
Next day he turned some cattle that had accompanied his army into this
valley, after giving Caius Laelius instructions to have the cavalry
ready, and some of the tribunes to prepare the velites. The Iberians
having at once made an onslaught upon the cattle, he despatched some
of the velites against them. These two forces became engaged, and
reinforcements being sent to either party from time to time, a severe
infantry skirmishing place in the valley. The proper moment for attack
being now come, Caius Laelius, having the cavalry prepared as directed,
charged the skirmishers of the enemy, getting between them and the high
ground, so that the greater number of them were scattered about the
valley and killed by the cavalry. This event roused the barbarians to
a furious desire to engage, that they might not appear to be entirely
reduced to despair by their previous defeat; and accordingly by
daybreak next day they drew out their whole army for battle. Scipio was
quite ready to give them battle; but when he saw that the Iberians had
come down into the valley in an imprudent manner, and were stationing,
not only their cavalry, but their infantry also on the level ground,
he waited for a time, because he wished as many of the enemy as
possible to take up a position like that. He felt confidence in his
cavalry, and still more in his infantry; because, in such deliberate
and hand-to-hand battles as this, his men were vastly superior to the
Iberians both in themselves and in their arms.

[Sidenote: Decisive victory of Scipio.]

+33.+ When he thought the right time had come he drew out [the
velites][24] to oppose those of the enemy who occupied the foot of the
hills; while against those who had descended into the valley he led his
main force from the camp in four cohorts, and attacked the infantry.
Caius Laelius at the same time made a detour with the cavalry by the
hills, which stretched from the camp to the valley, and charged the
enemy’s horse on the rear; and so kept them occupied with fighting him.
The enemy’s infantry therefore, being thus deprived of the support of
the cavalry, on which they had relied in descending into the valley,
were distressed and overmatched in the battle; while their cavalry was
in much the same plight: for, being surprised on ground of insufficient
extent, they fell into confusion, and lost more men by hurting each
other than by the hands of the enemy; for their own infantry was
pressing upon their flank, and the enemy’s infantry on their front,
while his cavalry were attacking on their rear. The battle having taken
this course, the result was that nearly all those who had descended
into the valley lost their lives; while those who had been stationed
on the foot of the hills managed to escape. These last were the
light-armed troops, and formed about a third of the whole army: with
whom Andobales himself contrived to make good his escape to a certain
stronghold of great security....

_By further operations in this year, B.C. 206, Scipio had compelled
Mago to abandon Spain: and towards the winter the Roman army went into
winter-quarters at Tarraco._

[Sidenote: Scipio returns to Rome in the autumn of B.C. 206.]

Having thus put a finishing stroke to his campaigns in Iberia, Scipio
arrived at Tarraco in high spirits, bringing with him the materials
of a brilliant triumph for himself, and a glorious victory for his
country. But being anxious to arrive in Rome before the consular
elections, he arranged for the government of Iberia,[25] and, having
put the army into the hands of Junius Silanus and L. Marcius, embarked
with Caius Laelius and his other friends for Rome....


[Sidenote: The answer of Euthydemus (a Magnesian), king of Bactria, to
Teleas, the envoy of Antiochus.]

[Sidenote: Antiochus continues his march into the interior of Asia.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 212-205.]

+34.+ Euthydemus was himself a Magnesian, and he answered the envoy
by saying that “Antiochus was acting unjustly in trying to expel
him from his kingdom. He was not himself a revolted subject, but
had destroyed the descendant of some who had been such, and so had
obtained the kingdom of Bactria.” After adding more arguments to the
same effect, he urged Teleas to act as a sincere mediator of peace,
by urging Antiochus not to grudge him the royal title and dignity,
“for if he did not yield to this demand, neither of them would be
safe: seeing that great hords of Nomads were close at hand, who were
a danger to both; and that if they admitted them into the country,
it would certainly be utterly barbarised.” With these words he sent
Teleas back to Antiochus. The king had long been looking about for some
means of ending the controversy; and when he was informed by Teleas
of what Euthydemus had said, he readily admitted these pleas for a
pacification. And after several journeys of Teleas to and fro between
the two, Euthydemus at last sent his son Demetrius to confirm the terms
of the treaty. Antiochus received the young prince; and judging from
his appearance, conversation, and the dignity of his manners that he
was worthy of royal power, he first promised to give him one of his
own daughters, and secondly conceded the royal title to his father.
And having on the other points caused a written treaty to be drawn up,
and the terms of the treaty to be confirmed on oath, he marched away;
after liberally provisioning his troops, and accepting the elephants
belonging to Euthydemus. He crossed the Caucasus[26] and descended
into India; renewed his friendship with Sophagasenus the king of the
Indians; received more elephants, until he had a hundred and fifty
altogether; and having once more provisioned his troops, set out again
personally with his army: leaving Androsthenes of Cyzicus the duty
of taking home the treasure which this king had agreed to hand over
to him. Having traversed Arachosia and crossed the river Enymanthus,
he came through Drangene to Carmania; and, as it was now winter, he
put his men into winter quarters there. This was the extreme limit
of the march of Antiochus into the interior: in which he not only
reduced the up-country Satraps to obedience to his authority, but
also the coast cities, and the princes on this side Taurus; and, in a
word, consolidated his kingdom by overawing all his subjects with the
exhibition of his boldness and energy. For this campaign convinced the
Europeans as well as the Asiatics that he was worthy of royal power....



+1.+ Byzacia is near the Syrtes; it has a circumference of two thousand
stades, and is circular in shape....

Hippo, Singa, Tabraca, are cities in Libya. Chalkeia, however, is not,
as Demosthenes ignorantly states, the name of a city, but means only a
“bronze-factory.” ...

[Sidenote: The lotus. See Herodotus, 2, 92.]

+2.+ The lotus is not a large tree; but it is rough and thorny, and has
a green leaf, like the rhamnus (black or white thorn), a little longer
and broader. The fruit is like white myrtle-berries when they are come
to perfection; but, as it grows, it becomes purple in colour, and in
size about equal to round olives, and has a very small stone. When it
is ripe they gather it: and some of it they pound up with groats of
spelt, and store in vessels for their slaves; and the rest they also
preserve for the free inhabitants, after taking out the stones, and use
it for food. It tastes like a fig or a date, but is superior to them in
aroma. A wine is made of it also by steeping it in water and crushing
it, sweet and pleasant to the taste, like good mead; and they drink it
without mixing it with water. It will not keep, however, more than ten
days, and they therefore only make it in small quantities as they want
it. Vinegar also is made out of it....

[Sidenote: Misstatements of Timaeus about Libya,]

+3.+ The excellence of the soil of Libya must excite our admiration.
But one would feel inclined to say of Timaeus, not merely that he
had never studied the country, but that he was childish and entirely
unintelligent in his notions; completely enslaved to those old
traditional stories of Libya being wholly sandy, parched, and barren.
The same too holds good about its animals. The supply of horses, oxen,
sheep, and goats in it is beyond anything to be found in any other part
of the world; because many of the tribes in Libya do not use cultivated
crops, but live on and with their flocks and herds. Again what writer
has failed to mention the vast number and strength of its elephants,
lions, and panthers, or the beauty of its buffalos, or the size of its
ostriches? Of these not one is to be found in Europe, while Libya is
full of them. But Timaeus, by passing them over without a word, gives,
as though purposely, an impression exactly the reverse of the truth.

[Sidenote: and Corsica,]

And just in the same random way in which he has spoken about Libya, he
has also done about the island called Cyrnus. For, when mentioning it
in his second book, he says that wild goats, sheep, wild oxen, stags,
hares, wolves, and some other animals are plentiful in it; and that the
inhabitants employ themselves in hunting them, and in fact spend most
of their time in that pursuit. Whereas in this island there are not
only no wild goats or wild oxen, but not even hare, wolf, or stag, or
any animal of the sort, except some foxes, rabbits, and wild sheep. The
rabbit indeed at a distance looks like a small hare; but when taken in
the hand, it is found to be widely different both in appearance and in
the taste of its flesh; and it also lives generally underground.

[Sidenote: the reason of his mistake.]

+4.+ The idea, however, of all the animals in the island being wild,
has arisen in the following way: The caretakers cannot keep up with
their animals, owing to the thick woods and rocky broken nature of
the country; but, whenever they wish to collect them, they stand on
some convenient spots and call the beasts together by the sound of a
trumpet; and all of them flock without fail to their own trumpets. Now,
when ships arrive at the coast, and the sailors see goats or cattle
grazing without any one with them, and thereupon try to catch them,
the animals will not let them come near them, because they are not
used to them, but will scamper off. But as soon as the keeper sees the
men disembarking and sounds his trumpet, they all set off running at
full speed and collect round the trumpet. This gives the appearance
of wildness; and Timaeus, who made only careless and perfunctory
inquiries, committed himself to a random statement.

[Sidenote: Swine-keeping in Italy.]

Now this obedience to the sound of a trumpet is nothing astonishing.
For in Italy the swineherds manage the feeding of their pigs in the
same way. They do not follow close behind the beasts, as in Greece,
but keep some distance in front of them, sounding their horn every
now and then; and the animals follow behind and run together at the
sound. Indeed, the complete familiarity which the animals show with
the particular horn to which they belong seems at first astonishing
and almost incredible. For owing to the populousness and wealth of the
country, the droves of swine in Italy are exceedingly large, especially
along the sea coast of the Tuscans and Gauls: for one sow will bring
up a thousand pigs, or sometimes even more. They therefore drive them
out from their night styes to feed, according to their litters and
ages. Whence, if several droves are taken to the same place, they
cannot preserve these distinction of litters; but they of course get
mixed up with each other, both as they are being driven out, and as
they feed, and as they are being brought home. Accordingly the device
of the horn-blowing has been invented to separate them, when they have
got mixed up together, without labour or trouble. For as they feed,
one swineherd goes in one direction sounding his horn, and another in
another: and thus the animals sort themselves of their own accord, and
follow their own horns with such eagerness that it is impossible by any
means to stop or hinder them. But in Greece, when the swine get mixed
up in the oak forests in their search for the mast, the swineherd who
has most assistants and the best help at his disposal, when collecting
his own animals, drives off his neighbour’s also. Sometimes too a thief
lies in wait, and drives them off without the swineherd knowing how he
lost them; because the beasts straggle a long way from their drivers,
in their eagerness to find acorns, when they are just beginning to

[Sidenote: False criticisms of Timaeus on Theopompus and Ephorus.]

(_a_) It is difficult to pardon such errors in Timaeus, considering how
severe he is in criticising the slips of others. For instance he finds
fault with Theopompus for stating that Dionysius sailed from Sicily to
Corinth in a merchant vessel, whereas he really arrived in a ship of
war. And again he falsely charges Ephorus with contradicting himself,
on the ground that he asserts that Dionysius the Elder ascended the
throne at the age of twenty-three, reigned forty-two years, and died at
sixty-three. Now no one would say, I think, that this was a blunder of
the historian, but clearly one of the transcriber. For either Ephorus
must be more foolish than Coroebus and Margites, if he were unable to
calculate that forty-two added to twenty-three make sixty-five; or, if
that is incredible in the case of a man like Ephorus, it must be a mere
mistake of the transcriber, and the carping and malevolent criticism of
Timaeus must be rejected.

[Sidenote: His false account of the October horse.]

(_b_) Again, in his history of Pyrrhus, he says that the Romans still
keep up the memory of the fall of Troy by shooting to death with
javelins a war-horse on a certain fixed day, because the capture of
Troy was accomplished by means of the “Wooden Horse.” This is quite
childish. On this principle, all non-Hellenic nations must be put down
as descendants of the Trojans; for nearly all of them, or at any rate
the majority, when about to commence a war or a serious battle with
an enemy, first kill and sacrifice a horse. In making this sort of
ill-founded deduction, Timaeus seems to me to show not only want of
knowledge, but, what is worse, a trick of misapplying knowledge. For,
because the Romans sacrifice a horse, he immediately concludes that
they do it because Troy was taken by means of a horse.

[Sidenote: The reason of his mistakes a want of care in making

(_c_) These instances clearly show how worthless his account of Libya,
Sardinia, and, above all, of Italy is; and that, speaking generally,
he has entirely neglected the most important element in historical
investigation, namely, the making personal inquiries. For as historical
events take place in many different localities, and as it is impossible
for the same man to be in several places at the same time, and also
impossible for him to see with his own eyes all places in the world and
observe their peculiarities, the only resource left is to ask questions
of as many people as possible; and to believe those who are worthy of
credit; and to show critical sagacity in judging of their reports.

[Sidenote: Nor is he to be trusted even in matters that fell under his
own observation.]

[Sidenote: Arethusa.]

(_d_) And though Timaeus makes great professions on this head, he
appears to me to be very far from arriving at the truth. Indeed, so far
from making accurate investigations of the truth through other people,
he does not tell us anything trustworthy even of events of which he has
been an eye-witness, or of places he has personally visited. This will
be made evident, if we can convict him of being ignorant, even in his
account of Sicily, of the facts which he brings forward. For it will
require very little further proof of his inaccuracy, if he can be shown
to be ill-informed and misled about the localities in which he was born
and bred, and that too the most famous of them. Now he asserts that
the fountain Arethusa at Syracuse has its source in the Peloponnese,
from the river Alpheus, which flows through Arcadia and Olympia. For
that this river sinks into the earth, and, after being carried for four
thousand stades under the Sicilian Sea, comes to the surface again in
Syracuse; and that this was proved from the fact that on a certain
occasion a storm of rain having come on during the Olympic festival,
and the river having flooded the sacred enclosure, a quantity of dung
from the animals used for sacrifice at the festival was thrown up by
the fountain Arethusa; as well as a certain gold cup, which was picked
up and recognised as being one of the ornaments used at the festival....

[Sidenote: The traditions of the colonisation of Locri Epizephyrii
agree with the account in Aristotle, rather than with that of Timaeus.]

+5.+ I happened to have visited the city of the Locrians on several
occasions, and to have been the means of doing them important services.
For it was I that secured their exemption from the service in Iberia
and Dalmatia, which, in accordance with the treaty, they were bound
to supply to the Romans. And being released thereby from considerable
hardship, danger, and expense, they rewarded me with every mark
of honour and kindness. I have therefore reason to speak well of
the Locrians rather than the reverse. Still I do not shrink from
saying and writing that the account of their colonisation given by
Aristotle is truer than that of Timaeus. For I know for certain that
the inhabitants themselves acknowledge that the report of Aristotle,
and not of Timaeus, is the one which they have received from their
ancestors. And they give the following proofs of this. In the first
place, they stated that every ancestral distinction existing among them
is traced by the female not the male side.[27] For instance, those
are reckoned noble among them who belong to “the hundred families”;
and these “hundred families” are those which were marked out by the
Locrians, before embarking upon their colonisation, as those from
which they were in accordance with the oracle to select the virgins
to be sent to Ilium. Further, that some of these women joined the
colony: and that it is their descendants who are now reckoned noble,
and called “the men of the hundred families.” Again, the following
account of the “cup-bearing” priestess had been received traditionally
by them. When they ejected the Sicels who occupied this part of Italy,
finding that it was a custom among them for the processions at their
sacrifices to be led by a boy of the most illustrious and high-born
family obtainable, and not having any ancestral custom of their own
on the subject, they adopted this one, with no other improvement than
that of substituting a girl for one of their boys as cupbearer, because
nobility with them went by the female line.

[Sidenote: The trick of the Locrians.]

+6.+ And as to a treaty, none ever existed, or was said to have
existed, between them and the Locrians in Greece; but they all knew
by tradition of one with the Sicels: of which they give the following
account. When they first appeared, and found the Sicels occupying the
district in which they are themselves now dwelling, these natives were
in terror of them, and admitted them through fear into the country; and
the new-comers made a sworn agreement with them that “they would be
friendly and share the country with them, as long as they stood upon
the ground they then stood upon, and kept heads upon their shoulders.”
But, while the oaths were being taken, they say that the Locrians put
earth inside the soles of their shoes, and heads of garlic concealed on
their shoulders, before they swore; and that then they shook the earth
out of their shoes, and threw the heads of garlic off their shoulders,
and soon afterwards expelled the Sicels from the country. This is the
story current at Locri....

By an extraordinary oversight Timaeus of Tauromenium commits himself
to the statement that it was not customary with the Greeks to possess

[Sidenote: Locri Epizephyrii colonised by certain slaves who had
obtained their freedom, and by some free born women.]

These considerations would lead us to trust Aristotle rather than
Timaeus. His next statement is still more strange. For to suppose, with
Timaeus, that it was unlikely that men, who had been the slaves of the
allies of the Lacedaemonians, would continue the kindly feelings and
adopt the friendships of their late masters is foolish. For when they
had the good fortune to recover their freedom, and a certain time has
elapsed, men, who have been slaves, not only endeavour to adopt the
friendships of their late masters, but also their ties of hospitality
and blood: in fact, their aim is to keep them up even more than the
ties of nature, for the express purpose of thereby wiping out the
remembrance of their former degradation and humble position; because
they wish to pose as the descendants of their masters rather than as
their freedmen. And this is what in all probability happened in the
case of the Locrians. They had removed to a great distance from all who
knew their secret; the lapse of time favoured their pretensions; and
they were not therefore so foolish as to maintain any customs likely
to revive the memory of their own degradation, rather than such as
would contribute to conceal it. Therefore they very naturally called
their city by the name of that from which the women came; and claimed a
relationship with those women: and, moreover, renewed the friendships
which were ancestral to the families of the women.

[Sidenote: The Locrians then were naturally friends of Sparta and
enemies of Athens.]

And this also indicates that there is no sign of Aristotle being wrong
in saying that the Athenians ravaged their territory. For it being
quite natural, as I have shown, that the men who started from Locri
and landed in Italy, if they were slaves ten times over, should adopt
friendly relations with Sparta, it becomes also natural that the
Athenians should be rendered hostile to them, not so much from regard
to their origin as to their policy.

[Sidenote: The reason of the women of Locris (in Greece) leaving their
homes with the slaves.]

It is not, again, likely that the Lacedaemonians should themselves
send their young men home from the camp for the sake of begetting
children, and should refuse to allow the Locrians to do the same. Two
things in such a statement are not only improbable but untrue. In
the first place, they were not likely to have prevented the Locrians
doing so, when they did the same themselves, for that would be wholly
inconsistent: nor were the Locrians, in obedience to orders from them,
likely to have adopted a custom like theirs. (For in Sparta it is a
traditional law, and a matter of common custom, for three or four men
to have one wife, and even more if they are brothers; and when a man
has begotten enough children, it is quite proper and usual for him to
sell his wife to one of his friends.) The fact is, that though the
Locrians, not being bound by the same oath as the Lacedaemonians, that
they would not return home till they had taken Messene, had a fair
pretext for not taking part in the common expedition; yet, by returning
home only one by one, and at rare intervals, they gave their wives
an opportunity of becoming familiar with the slaves instead of their
original husbands, and still more so the unmarried women. And this was
the reason of the migration....

[Sidenote: Timaeus and Aristotle.]

+7.+ Timaeus makes many untrue statements; and he appears to have
done so, not from ignorance, but because his view was distorted by
party spirit. When once he has made up his mind to blame or praise, he
forgets everything else and outsteps all bounds of propriety. So much
for the nature of Aristotle’s account of Locri, and the grounds on
which it rested. But this naturally leads me to speak of Timaeus and
his work as a whole, and generally of what is the duty of a man who
undertakes to write history. Now I think that I have made it clear from
what I have said, first, that both of them were writing conjecturally;
and, secondly, that the balance of probability was on the side of
Aristotle. It is in fact impossible in such matters to be positive and
definite. But let us even admit that Timaeus gives the more probable
account. Are the maintainers of the less probable theory, therefore,
to be called by every possible term of abuse and obloquy, and all but
be put on trial for their lives? Certainly not. Those who make untrue
statements in their books from ignorance ought, I maintain, to be
forgiven and corrected in a kindly spirit: it is only those who do so
from deliberate intention that ought to be attacked without mercy.

+8.+ It must then either be shown that Aristotle’s account of Locri
was prompted by partiality, corruption, or personal enmity; or, if no
one ventures to say that, then it must be acknowledged that those who
display such personal animosity and bitterness to others, as Timaeus
does to Aristotle, are wrong and ill advised.

[Sidenote: The vulgar abuse of Timaeus.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 333.]

The epithets which he applies to him are “audacious,” “unprincipled,”
“rash”; and besides, he says that he “has audaciously slandered Locri
by affirming that the colony was formed by runaway slaves, adulterers,
and man-catchers.” Further, he asserts that Aristotle made this
statement, “in order that men might believe him to have been one of
Alexander’s generals, and to have lately conquered the Persians at the
Cilician Gates in a pitched battle by his own ability; and not to be
a mere pedantic sophist, universally unpopular, who had a short time
before shut up that admirable doctor’s shop.” Again, he says that
he “pushed his way into every palace and tent:” and that he was “a
glutton and a gourmand, who thought only of gratifying his appetite.”
Now it seems to me that such language as this would be intolerable in
an impudent vagabond bandying abuse in a law court; but an impartial
recorder of public affairs, and a genuine historian, would not think
such things to himself, much less venture to put them in writing.

[Sidenote: Timaeus’s account of his investigations in the history of
the colony of Locri.]

+9.+ Let us now, then, examine the method of Timaeus, and compare his
account of this colony, that we may learn which of the two better
deserves such vituperation. He says in the same book: “I am not now
proceeding on conjecture, but have investigated the truth in the course
of a personal visit to the Locrians in Greece. The Locrians first of
all showed me a written treaty which began with the words, ‘as parents
to children.’ There are also existing decrees securing mutual rights
of citizenship to both. In fine, when they were told of Aristotle’s
account of the colony, they were astonished at the audacity of that
writer. I then crossed to the Italian Locri and found that the laws and
customs there accorded with the theory of a colony of free men, not
with the licentiousness of slaves. For among them there are penalties
assigned to man-catchers, adulterers, and runaway slaves. And this
would not have been the case if they were conscious of having been such

[Sidenote: Criticism of the above statement of Timaeus.]

+10.+ Now the first point one would be inclined to raise is, as to
what Locrians he visited and questioned on these subjects. If it had
been the case that the Locrians in Greece all lived in one city, as
those in Italy do, this question would perhaps have been unnecessary,
and everything would have been plain. But as there are two clans of
Locrians, we may ask, Which of the two did he visit? What cities of
the one or the other? In whose hands did he find the treaty? Yet we
all know, I suppose, that this is a speciality of Timaeus’s, and that
it is in this that he has surpassed all other historians, and rests
his chief claim to credit,—I mean his parade of accuracy in studying
chronology and ancient monuments, and his care in that department of
research. Therefore we may well wonder how he came to omit telling us
the name of the city in which he found the treaty, the place in which
it was inscribed, or the magistrates who showed him the inscription,
and with whom he conversed: to prevent all cavil, and, by defining the
place and city, to enable those who doubted to ascertain the truth. By
omitting these details he shows that he was conscious of having told
a deliberate falsehood. For that Timaeus, if he really had obtained
such proofs, would not have let them slip, but would have fastened upon
them with both hands, as the saying is, is proved by the following
considerations. Would a writer who tried to establish his credit on
that of Echecrates,—he mentioning him by name as the person with whom
he had conversed, and from whom he had obtained his facts about the
Italian Locri—taking the trouble to add, by way of showing that he
had been told them by no ordinary person, that this man’s father had
formerly been entrusted with an embassy by Dionysius,—would such a
writer have remained silent about it if he had really got hold of a
public record or an ancient tablet?

[Sidenote: Timaeus and the Olympic registers.]

+11.+ This is the man forsooth who drew out a comparative list of the
Ephors and the kings of Sparta from the earliest times; as well as
one comparing the Archons at Athens and priestesses in Argos with the
list of Olympic victors, and thereby convicted those cities of being
in error about those records, because there was a discrepancy of three
months between them! This again is the man who discovered the engraved
tablets in the inner shrines, and the records of the guest-friendships
on the door-posts of the temples. And we cannot believe that such a
man could have been ignorant of anything of this sort that existed, or
would have omitted to mention it if he had found it. Nor can he on any
ground expect pardon, if he has told an untruth about it: for, as he
has shown himself a bitter and uncompromising critic of others, he must
naturally look for equally uncompromising attacks from them.

Being then clearly convicted of falsehood in these points, he goes
to the Italian Locri: and, first of all, says that the two Locrian
peoples had a similar constitution and the same ties of amity, and that
Aristotle and Theophrastus have maligned the city. Now I am fully aware
that in going into minute particulars and proofs on this point I shall
be forced to digress from the course of my history. It was for that
reason however that I postponed my criticism of Timaeus to a single
section of my work, that I might not be forced again and again to omit
other necessary matter....

[Sidenote: Timaeus condemned out of his own mouth.]

+12.+ Timaeus says that the greatest fault in history is want of truth;
and he accordingly advises all, whom he may have convicted of making
false statements in their writings, to find some other name for their
books, and to call them anything they like except history....

[Sidenote: See 1, 14.]

For example, in the case of a carpenter’s rule, though it may be too
short or too narrow for your purpose, yet if it have the essential
feature of a rule, that of straightness, you may still call it a
rule; but if it has not this quality, and deviates from the straight
line, you may call it anything you like except a rule. “On the same
principle,” says he, “historical writings may fail in style or
treatment or other details; yet if they hold fast to truth, such books
may claim the title of history, but if they swerve from that, they
ought no longer to be called history.” Well, I quite agree that in
such writings truth should be the first consideration: and, in fact,
somewhere in the course of my work I have said “that as in a living
body, when the eyes are out, the whole is rendered useless, so if you
take truth from history what is left is but an idle tale.” I said
again, however, that “there were two sorts of falsehoods, the ignorant
and the intentional; and the former deserved indulgence, the latter
uncompromising severity.” ... These points being agreed upon—the wide
difference between the ignorant and intentional lie, and the kindly
correction due to the one and the unbending denunciation to the
other—it will be found that it is to the latter charge that Timaeus
more than any one lays himself open. And the proof of his character in
this respect is clear....

[Sidenote: The proverb Λοκροὶ τὰς συνθήκας.]

There is a proverbial expression for the breakers of an agreement,
“Locrians and a treaty.” An explanation given of this, equally
accepted by historians and the rest of the world, is that, at the
time of the invasion of the Heracleidae, the Locrians agreed with
the Peloponnesians that, if the Heracleidae did not enter by way of
the isthmus, but crossed at Rhium, they would raise a war beacon,
that they might have early intelligence and make provisions to oppose
their entrance. The Locrians, however, did not do this, but, on the
contrary, raised a beacon of peace; and therefore, when the Heracleidae
arrived opposite Rhium, they crossed without resistance; while the
Peloponnesians, having taken no precautions, found that they had
allowed their enemies to enter their country, because they had been
betrayed by the Locrians....

[Sidenote: Callisthenes.]

[Sidenote: Timaeus’s attitude towards the art of divination.]

Many remarks depreciatory of divination and dream interpretation may
be found in his writings.[29] But writers who have introduced into
their books a good deal of such foolish talk, so far from running
down others, should think themselves fortunate if they escape attack
themselves. And this is just the position in which Timaeus stands. He
remarks that “Callisthenes was a mere sycophant for writing stuff of
this sort; and acted in a manner utterly unworthy of his philosophy in
giving heed to ravens and inspired women; and that he richly deserved
the punishment which he met with at the hands of Alexander, for having
corrupted the mind of that monarch as far as he could.” On the other
hand, he commends Demosthenes, and the other orators who flourished
at that time, and says that “they were worthy of Greece for speaking
against the divine honours given to Alexander; while this philosopher,
for investing a mere mortal with the aegis and thunderbolt, justly met
the fate which befel him from the hands of providence....”

[Sidenote: Demochares.]

+13.+ Timaeus asserts that Demochares was guilty of unnatural lust,
and that his lips therefore were unfit to blow the sacred fire; and
that in morals he went beyond any stories told by Botrys and Philaenis
and all other writers of indecent tales. Foul abuse and shameless
accusations of this sort are not only what no man of cultivation would
have uttered, they go beyond what you might expect from the lowest
brothels. It is, however, to get credit for the foul and shameless
accusations, which he is always bringing, that he has maligned this
man: supporting his charge by dragging in an obscure comic poet. Now
on what grounds do I conjecture the falsity of the accusation? Well,
first, from the fact of the good birth and education of Demochares; for
he was a nephew of Demosthenes. And in the second place, from the fact
that he was thought worthy at Athens, not only of being a general, but
of the other offices also; which he certainly would not have obtained,
if he had got into such troubles as these. Therefore it seems to me
that Timaeus is accusing the people of Athens more than Demochares, if
it is the fact that they committed the interests of the country and
their own lives to such a man. For if it had been true, the comic poet
Archedicus would not have been the only one to have made this statement
concerning Demochares, as Timaeus alleges: it would have been repeated
by many of the partisans of Antipater, against whom he has spoken with
great freedom, and said many things calculated to annoy, not only
Antipater himself, but also his successors and friends. It would have
been repeated also by many of his political opponents: and among them,
by Demetrius of Phalerum, against whom Demochares has inveighed with
extraordinary bitterness in his History, alleging that “his conduct as
a prince, and the political measures on which he prided himself, were
such as a petty tax-gatherer might be proud of; for he boasted that in
his city things were abundant and cheap, and every one had plenty to
live upon.” And he tells another story of Demetrius, that “He was not
ashamed to have a procession in the theatre led by an artificial snail,
worked by some internal contrivance, and emitting slime as it crawled,
and behind it a string of asses; meaning by this to indicate the
slowness and stupidity of the Athenians, who had yielded to others the
honour of defending Greece, and were tamely submissive to Cassander.”
Still, in spite of these taunts, neither Demetrius nor any one else has
ever brought such a charge against Demochares.

+14.+ Relying therefore on the testimony of his own countrymen, as
safer ground than the virulence of Timaeus, I feel no hesitation in
declaring that the life of Demochares is not chargeable with such
enormities. But even supposing that Demochares had ever so disgraced
himself, what need was there for Timaeus to insert this passage in
his History? Men of sense, when resolved to retaliate upon a personal
enemy, think first, not of what he deserves, but of what it is
becoming in them to do. So in the case of abusive language: the first
consideration should be, not what our enemies deserve to be called,
but what our self respect will allow us to call them. But if men
measure everything by their own ill temper and jealousy, we are forced
to be always suspicious of them, and to be ever on our guard against
their exaggeration. Wherefore, in the present instance, we may fairly
reject the stories to the discredit of Philochares told by Timaeus;
for he has put himself out of the pale of indulgence or belief, by so
obviously allowing his native virulence to carry him beyond all bounds
of propriety in his invectives.

[Sidenote: Agathocles defended against the aspersions of Timaeus.]

+15.+ For my part I cannot feel satisfied with his abuse of Agathocles
either, even admitting him to have been the worst of men. I refer to
the passage at the end of his History in which he asserts that in his
youth Agathocles was “a common stale, extravagantly addicted to every
unnatural vice,” and that “when he died, his wife in the course of her
lamentations exclaimed ‘Ah, what have I not done for you! what have you
not done to me?’” To such language one can only repeat what has been
already said in the case of Demochares, and express one’s astonishment
at such extravagant virulence. For that Agathocles must have had fine
natural qualities is evident from the narrative of Timaeus itself. That
a man who came as a runaway slave to Syracuse, from the potter’s wheel
and smoke and clay, at the early age of eighteen, should have within
a short time advanced from that humble beginning to be master of all
Sicily, and after being a terror to the Carthaginians, should have
grown old in office and died in enjoyment of the royal title,—does not
this prove that Agathocles had some great and admirable qualities, and
many endowments and talents for administration? In view of these the
historian ought not to have recounted to posterity only what served to
discredit and defame this man, but those facts also which were to his
honour. For that is the proper function of history. Blinded, however,
by personal malignity, he has recorded for us with bitterness and
exaggeration all his defects; while his eminent achievements he has
passed over in entire silence: seeming not to be aware that in history
such silence is as mendacious as misstatement. The part of his history,
therefore, which was added by him for the gratification of his personal
spite I have passed over, but not what was really germane to his

[Sidenote: The laws of Zaleucus, and an incident in their working at
Locri (for which he legislated, see Arist. _Pol._ 2, 12).]

+16.+ Two young men had a dispute about the ownership of a slave. This
slave had been in the possession of one of them for a long time; but
two days before, as he was going to the farm without his master, the
other laid violent hands upon him and dragged him to his house. When
the first young man heard of this, he came to the house, seized the
slave, and taking him before the magistrate asserted his ownership and
offered sureties. For the law of Zaleucus ordained that the party from
whom the abduction was made should have possession of the property
in dispute, pending the decision of the suit. But the other man in
accordance with the same law, alleged that he was the party from whom
the abduction had been made, for the slave had been brought before the
magistrate from his house. The magistrates who were trying the case
were in doubt, and calling in the Cosmopolis[30] referred the point to
him. He interpreted the law as meaning that “the abduction was always
from that party in whose possession the property in dispute had last
been for a certain period unquestioned; but that if another abducted
this property from a holder, and then the original holder repossessed
himself of it from the abductor, this was not abduction in the sense of
the law.” The young man, who thus lost his case, was not satisfied, and
alleged that such was not the intention of the legislator. Thereupon
the Cosmopolis summoned him to discuss the interpretation in accordance
with the law of Zaleucus; that is, to argue on the interpretation of
the law with him before the court of the one thousand, and with a
halter round the neck of each: whichever should be shown to be wrong in
his interpretation was to lose his life in the sight of the thousand.
But the young man asserted that the compact was not a fair one, for the
Cosmopolis, who happened to be nearly ninety, had only two or three
years of life left, while in all reasonable probability he had not yet
lived half his life. By this adroit rejoinder the young man turned off
the affair as a jest: but the magistrates adjudged the question of
abduction in accordance with the interpretation of the Cosmopolis....


[Sidenote: Callisthenes and the battle of Issus, B.C. 333.]

+17.+ That I may not be thought to detract wantonly from the credit of
such great writers, I will mention one battle, which is at once one of
the most famous ever fought, and not too remote in point of time; and
at which, above everything else, Callisthenes was himself present. I
mean the battle between Alexander and Darius in Cilicia. He says that
“Alexander had already got through the pass called the Cilician Gates:
and that Darius, availing himself of that by the Amanid Gates, made
his way with his army into Cilicia; but on learning from the natives
that Alexander was on his way into Syria, he followed him; and having
arrived at the pass leading to the south, pitched his camp on the bank
of the river Pinarus. The width of the ground from the foot of the
mountain to the sea was not more than fourteen stades, through which
this river ran diagonally. On first issuing from the mountains its
banks were broken, but in its course through the level down to the
sea it ran between precipitous and steep hills.” Starting with this
description of the ground, he goes on to say that “When Alexander’s
army faced about, and, retracing its steps, was approaching to attack
them, Darius and his officers determined to draw up their whole phalanx
on the ground occupied by his encampment, as it then was, and to defend
his front by the river, which flowed right along his camp.” But he
afterwards says that Darius “stationed his cavalry close to the sea,
his mercenaries next along the river, and his peltasts next resting on
the mountains.”

+18.+ Now it is difficult to understand how he could have drawn up
these troops in front of his phalanx, considering that the river ran
immediately under the camp:[31] especially as their numbers were so
great, amounting, on Callisthenes’s own showing, to thirty thousand
cavalry and thirty thousand mercenaries. Now it is easy to calculate
how much ground such a force would require. At the most cavalry in a
regular engagement is drawn up eight deep, and between each squadron
a clear space must be left in the line to enable them to turn or face
about. Therefore eight hundred will cover a stade of front; eight
thousand, ten stades;[32] three thousand two hundred, four stades;
and so eleven thousand two hundred would cover the whole of fourteen
stades. If therefore he were to put his whole thirty thousand on the
ground, he would have to mass his cavalry alone nearly three times
the usual depth; and then what room is left for his large force of
mercenaries? None, indeed, unless on the rear of the cavalry. But
Callisthenes says this was not the case, but that these latter engaged
the Macedonians first. We must therefore understand half the front,
that nearest the sea, to have been occupied by the cavalry; the other
half, that nearest the mountains, by the mercenaries. We may by these
data easily calculate the depth of the cavalry, and the distance the
river must have been from the camp to allow of it.

Again, he says that “on the approach of the enemy Darius himself, who
was on the centre, ordered up the mercenaries from the wing.” It is
difficult to see what he means by this: for the point of junction of
the mercenaries and the cavalry must have been at the centre. Where
and how then, and to what point could Darius, who was himself actually
among the mercenaries, be said to “order them up”?

Lastly, he says that “the cavalry on the right wing charged Alexander;
and that his men stood the charge gallantly, and, making a counter
charge, kept up an obstinate fight.” But he quite forgets that there
was a river between them, a river, too, of the nature that he had just
himself described.[33]

+19.+ His account of the movements of Alexander are equally vague. He
says that “he crossed into Asia with forty thousand infantry and four
thousand five hundred cavalry; but that when he was about to enter
Cilicia he was joined by a reinforcement of five thousand infantry and
eight hundred cavalry.” From these numbers, if one were to make the
liberal allowance of three thousand absentees from the infantry and
three hundred from the cavalry on various services, there would still
remain forty-two thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry. Starting
with these numbers, he goes on to say “that Alexander heard of the
entrance of Darius into Cilicia when he was a hundred stades away from
him, having already marched through the pass:[34] that he therefore
retraced his steps through the pass, his phalanx on the van, his
cavalry next, and his baggage on the rear. But that as soon as he had
debouched upon the open country, he gave general orders to form up into
a phalanx, at first thirty-two deep; then sixteen; and lastly, when
they were nearing the enemy, eight deep.” Now this is a worse blunder
than the last. A stade, allowing for the distances which must be kept
on a march, and reckoning the depth at sixteen, admits of one thousand
six hundred men, each man covering six feet. It is plain, therefore,
that ten stades will admit of only sixteen thousand men, and twenty
twice that number. Hence, when Alexander caused his men to form sixteen
deep, he would have wanted a width of ground of twenty stades; and even
then, the whole of the cavalry and ten thousand infantry would have
been unaccounted for.

+20.+ Again, he says that Alexander was marching in line when he was
about forty stades from the enemy. A greater blunder it is difficult to
conceive. For where could one find a ground; and especially in Cilicia,
twenty stades broad by forty deep, for a phalanx armed with sarissae to
march in line? It would not be easy to count all the impossibilities
in the way of such an arrangement and such a movement. One that is
mentioned by Callisthenes himself is sufficient to establish the point.
For he remarks that the winter torrents which descend from the hills
make so many gullies in the plain, that, in the course of the flight,
the chief part of the Persians are said to have lost their lives in
deep places of that kind. But, it may be urged, Alexander wished to be
ready for battle as soon as the enemy were in sight. But what could
be less ready than a phalanx in a disordered and straggling line?
Is it not much easier to form up a phalanx from a proper column of
route, than to bring a disordered and straggling line back into the
same alignment, and get it into order of battle on a broken and woody
ground? It was, therefore much better to march twice or four times the
ordinary depth of a phalanx[35] in good order, for which sufficient
ground could possibly be found. And it was easy to deploy his men
quickly into the line of the phalanx, because he was able by means of
scouts to ascertain the presence of the enemy in plenty of time. But
in this case, beside other absurdities, while bringing his men in line
across the level, he did not even (we are told) put the cavalry in
front, but marched with them in the same alignment.

+21.+ But the greatest blunder is still to come. “As soon as
Alexander,” he says, “was within distance of the enemy he caused his
men to take up order eight deep,” which would have necessitated ground
forty stades wide for the length of the line; and even had they, to
use the poet’s expression, “laid shield to shield and on each other
leaned,” still ground twenty stades wide would have been wanted, while
he himself says that it was less than fourteen. [We have also to deduct
from these fourteen stades the space occupied by the two divisions of
the cavalry, one on the left next the sea, the other on the right];[36]
and to allow for the fact that the whole force was kept a considerable
distance from the hills, to avoid being exposed to the enemy occupying
the skirts of the mountains; for we know that Callisthenes represents
the wing to have been facing these, at an angle with the centre. We are
also leaving out of account the ten thousand foot, whom we showed to be
too many according to his own calculation.

The upshot is that eleven stades at most is left for the whole length
of the phalanx, even taking Callisthenes’s own account, in which
thirty-two thousand men standing shield to shield must necessarily be
drawn up thirty deep: while he asserts that they fought eight deep.
Such blunders admit of no defence: for the facts at once demonstrate
the impossibility of the assertion. We have only to compare the space
occupied by each man, the width of the whole ground, and the number of
the men, to prove its falsity.

+22.+ It would be tedious to mention all his other absurdities in
connexion with this battle. I must be content with a very few. He says,
for instance, that “Alexander took care in arranging his order of
battle to be himself personally opposed to Darius; and that at first
Darius was equally anxious to be opposite Alexander, but afterwards
altered his mind.” But he does not vouchsafe to tell us how these kings
learnt at what part of their respective forces they were each posted,
or to what point in his own line Darius re-transferred himself. Again,
how could a phalanx mount to the edge of the river bank, when it was
precipitous and covered with brushwood? Such a piece of bad generalship
must not be attributed to Alexander, because he is acknowledged by
all to have been a skilful strategist and to have studied the subject
from childhood: we must rather attribute it to the historian’s want
of ability to discern between what is or is not practicable in such
movements. So much for Ephorus and Callisthenes....

[Sidenote: Timaeus’s over-estimate of Timoleon.]

+23.+ Timaeus attacks Ephorus with great severity, though he is himself
liable to two grave charges—bitterness in attacking others for faults
of which he is himself guilty, and complete demoralisation, shown by
the opinions which he expresses in his memoirs, and which he endeavours
to implant in the minds of his readers. If we are to lay it down that
Callisthenes deserved his death, what ought to happen to Timaeus?
Surely there is much more reason for Providence to be wroth with him
than with Callisthenes. The latter wished to deify Alexander; but
Timaeus exalts Timoleon above the most venerable gods. The hero of
Callisthenes, again, was a man by universal consent of a superhuman
elevation of spirit; while Timoleon, far from having accomplished
any action of first-rate importance, never even undertook one. The
one expedition which he achieved in the course of his life took him
no farther than from Corinth to Syracuse; and how paltry is such a
distance when compared with the extent of the world! I presume that
Timaeus believed that if Timoleon, by gaining glory in such a mere
saucer of a place as Sicily, should be thought comparable to the most
illustrious heroes, he too himself, as the historian of only Italy
and Sicily, might properly be considered on a par with the writers
of universal history. This will be sufficient defence of Aristotle,
Theophrastus, Callisthenes, Ephorus, and Demochares against the
attacks of Timaeus: and it is addressed to those who believe that this
historian is impartial and truthful....

[Sidenote: The incapacity of Timaeus for forming a judgment.]

+24.+ We may fairly judge Timaeus on the principles which he has
himself laid down. According to him, “poets and historians betray their
own tastes by the incidents which they repeatedly record in their
writings. Thus the poet[37] by his fondness for banqueting scenes shows
that he is a glutton; and in the same way Aristotle, by frequently
describing rich food in his writings, betrays his love of dainty living
and his greediness.” On the same principle he judges Dionysius the
tyrant because he “was always very particular in the ornamentation of
his dining-couches, and had hangings of exquisite make and variegated
colours.” If we apply this principle to Timaeus, we shall have abundant
reason to think badly of him. In attacking others he shows great
acuteness and boldness; when he comes to independent narrative he is
full of dreams, miracles, incredible myths,—in a word, of miserable
superstition and old wives’ tales. The truth is that Timaeus is a proof
of the fact, that at times, and in the case of many men, want of skill
and want of judgment so completely destroy the value of their evidence,
that though present at and eye-witnesses of the facts which they
record, they might just as well have been absent or had no eyes....

[Sidenote: The brazen bull of Phalaris.]

+25.+ The story of the brazen bull is this. It was made by Phalaris at
Agrigentum; and he used to force men to get into it, and then by way of
punishment light a fire underneath. The metal becoming thus red hot,
the man inside was roasted and scorched to death; and when he screamed
in his agony, the sound from the machine was very like the bellowing of
a bull. When the Carthaginians conquered Sicily this bull was removed
from Agrigentum to Carthage. The trap door between the shoulders,
through which the victims used to be let down, still remains; and no
other reason for the construction of such a bull in Carthage can be
discovered at all: yet Timaeus has undertaken to upset the common
story, and to refute the declarations of poets and historians, by
alleging that the bull at Carthage did not come from Agrigentum, and
that no such figure ever existed there; and he has composed a lengthy
treatise to prove this....


What epithet ought one to apply to Timaeus, and what word will
properly characterise him? A man of his kind appears to me to deserve
the very bitterest of the terms which he has applied to others. It
has already been sufficiently proved that he is a carping, false and
impudent writer; and from what remains to be said he will be shown to
be unphilosophical, and, in short, utterly uninstructed. For towards
the end of his twenty-first book, in the course of his “harangue of
Timoleon,” he remarks that “the whole sublunary world being divided
into three parts—Asia, Libya, and Europe....”[38] One could scarcely
believe such a remark to have come, I don’t say from Timaeus, but even
from the proverbial Margites....

(_a_) The proverb tells us that one drop from the largest vessel is
sufficient to show the whole contents. This is applicable to the
present case. When one or two false statements have been discovered
in a history, and they have been shown to be wilful, it is clear that
nothing which such an historian may say can be regarded as certain
or trustworthy. But in order to convince the more careful student, I
must speak on his method and practice in regard to public speeches,
military harangues, ambassador’s orations, and all compositions of that
class; which are, as it were, a compendium of events and an epitome of
all history. Now that he has given these in his writings with entire
disregard of truth, and that of set purpose, can any reader of Timaeus
fail to be aware? He has not written down the words actually used, nor
the real drift of these speeches; but imagining how they ought to have
been expressed, he enumerates all the arguments used, and makes the
words tally with the circumstances, like a schoolboy declaiming on a
set theme: as though his object were to display his own ability, not to
give a report of what was in reality said....

(_b_) The special province of history is, first, to ascertain what
the actual words used were; and secondly, to learn why it was that
a particular policy or argument failed or succeeded. For a bare
statement of an occurrence is interesting indeed, but not instructive:
but when this is supplemented by a statement of cause, the study of
history becomes fruitful. For it is by applying analogies to our own
circumstances that we get the means and basis for calculating the
future; and for learning from the past when to act with caution, and
when with greater boldness, in the present. The historian therefore
who omits the words actually used, as well as all statement of the
determining circumstances, and gives us instead conjectures and mere
fancy compositions, destroys the special use of history. In this
respect Timaeus is an eminent offender, for we all know that his books
are full of such writing.

(_c_) But perhaps some one may raise the question as to how it comes
about that, being the sort of writer that I am showing him to be, he
has obtained acceptance and credit among certain people. The reason
is that his work abounds with hostile criticism and invective against
others: and he has been judged not by the positive merits of his own
composition and his independent narrative, but by his skill in refuting
his fellow historians; to which department he appears to me to have
brought great diligence and an extraordinary natural aptitude. The case
of the physicist Strato is almost precisely similar. As long as this
man is endeavouring to descredit and refute the opinions of others,
he is admirable: directly he brings forward anything of his own, or
expounds any of his own doctrines, he at once seems to men of science
to lose his faculties and become stupid and unintelligent. And for my
part, I look upon this difference in writers as strictly analogous to
the facts of everyday life. In this too it is easy to criticise our
neighbours, but to be faultless ourselves is hard. One might almost say
that those who are most ready at finding fault with others are most
prone to errors in their own life.

(_d_) Besides these I may mention another error of Timaeus. Having
stayed quietly at Athens for about fifty years, during which he devoted
himself to the study of written history, he imagined that he was in
possession of the most important means of writing it. To my mind this
was a great mistake. History and the science of medicine are alike in
this respect, that both may be divided broadly into three departments;
and therefore those who study either must approach them in three ways.
For instance the three departments of medicine are the rhetorical, the
dietetic, and the surgical and pharmaceutical. [The second of these
though important is discredited by some.][39] The first, which takes
its rise from the school of Herophilus and Callimachus of Alexandria,
does indeed rightly claim a certain position in medical science; but
by its speciousness and liberal promises acquires so much reputation
that those who are occupied with other branches of the art are supposed
to be completely ignorant. But just bring one of these professors to
an actual invalid: you will find that they are as completely wanting
in the necessary skill as men who have never read a medical treatise.
Nay, it has happened before now that certain persons, who had really
nothing serious the matter with them, have been persuaded by their
powerful arguments to commit themselves to their treatment, and have
thereby endangered their lives: for they are like men trying to steer
a ship out of a book. Still such men go from city to city with great
_éclât_, and get the common people together to listen to them. But if,
when this is done, they induce certain people to submit as a specimen
to their practical treatment; they only succeed in reducing them to
a state of extreme discomfort, and making them a laughing stock to
the audience.[40] So completely does a persuasive address frequently
get the advantage over practical experience. The third branch of the
medical science, though it involves genuine skill in the treatment of
the several cases, is not only rare in itself, but is also frequently
cast into the shade, thanks to the folly of popular judgment, by
volubility and impudence.

(_e_) In the same way the science of genuine history is threefold:
first, the dealing with written documents and the arrangement of the
material thus obtained; second, topography, the appearance of cities
and localities, the description of rivers and harbours, and, speaking
generally, the peculiar features of seas and countries and their
relative distances; thirdly, political affairs. Now, as in the case of
medicine, it is the last branch that many attach themselves to, owing
to their preconceived opinions on the subject. And the majority of
writers bring to the undertaking no spirit of fairness at all: nothing
but dishonesty, impudence and unscrupulousness. Like vendors of drugs,
their aim is to catch popular credit and favour, and to seize every
opportunity of enriching themselves. About such writers it is not worth
while to say more.

(_f_) But some of those who have the reputation of approaching history
in a reasonable spirit are like the theoretical physicians. They spend
all their time in libraries, and acquire generally all the learning
which can be got from books, and then persuade themselves that they
are adequately equipped for their task.... Yet in my opinion they
are only partially qualified for the production of genuine history.
To inspect ancient records indeed, with the view of ascertaining
the notions entertained by the ancients of certain places, nations,
polities and events, and of understanding the several circumstances
and contingencies experienced in former times, is useful; for the
history of the past directs our attention in a proper spirit to the
future, if a writer can be found to give a statement of facts as they
really occurred. But to persuade one’s self, as Timaeus does, that
such ability in research is sufficient to enable a man to describe
subsequent transactions with success is quite foolish. It is as though
a man were to imagine that an inspection of the works of the old
masters would enable him to become a painter and a master of the art

[Sidenote: Ephorus was fairly acquainted with naval, but not with
military tactics.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 371. B.C. 362.]

This will be rendered still more evident from what I have now to say,
particularly from certain passages in the history of Ephorus. This
writer in his history of war seems to me to have had some idea of
naval tactics, but to be quite unacquainted with fighting on shore.
Accordingly, if one turns one’s attention to the naval battles at
Cyprus and Cnidus, in which the generals of the king were engaged
against Evagoras of Salamis[41] and then against the Lacedaemonians,
one will be struck with admiration of the historian, and will learn
many useful lessons as to what to do in similar circumstances.
But when he tells the story of the battle of Leuctra between the
Thebans and Lacedaemonians, or again that of Mantinea between the
same combatants, in which Epaminondas lost his life, if in these one
examines attentively and in detail the arrangements and evolutions in
the line of battle, the historian will appear quite ridiculous, and
betray his entire ignorance and want of personal experience of such
matters. The battle of Leuctra indeed was simple, and confined to
one division of the forces engaged, and therefore does not make the
writer’s lack of knowledge so very glaring: but that of Mantinea was
complicated and technical, and is accordingly unintelligible and indeed
completely inconceivable, to the historian. This will be rendered clear
by first laying down a correct plan of the ground, and then measuring
the extent of the movements as described by him. The same is the case
with Theopompus, and above all with Timaeus, the subject of this book.
These latter writers also can conceal their ignorance, so long as they
deal with generalities; but directly they attempt minute and detailed
description, they show that they are no better than Ephorus....

(_g_) It is in fact as impossible to write well on the operations in
a war, if a man has had no experience of actual service, as it is
to write well on politics without having been engaged in political
transactions and vicissitudes. And when history is written by the
book-learned, without technical knowledge, and without clearness of
detail, the work loses all its value. For if you take from history its
element of practical instruction, what is left of it has nothing to
attract and nothing to teach. Again, in the topography of cities and
localities, when such men attempt to go into details, being entirely
without personal knowledge, they must in a similar manner necessarily
pass over many points of importance; while they waste words on many
that are not worth the trouble. And this is what his failure to make
personal inspection brings upon Timaeus....

[Sidenote: Timaeus’s want of practical knowledge.]

(_h_) In his thirty-fourth book Timaeus says that “he spent fifty
continuous years at Athens as an alien, and never took part in any
military service, or went to inspect the localities.” Accordingly, when
he comes upon any such matters in the course of his history, he shows
much ignorance and makes many misstatements; and if he ever does come
near the truth, he is like one of those animal-painters who draw from
models of stuffed skins. Such artists sometimes preserve the correct
outline, but the vivid look and life-like portraiture of the real
animal, the chief charm of the painter’s art, are quite wanting. This
is just the case with Timaeus, and in fact with all who start with mere
book-learning; there is nothing vivid in their presentment of events,
for that can only come from the personal experience of the writers. And
hence it is, that those who have gone through no such course of actual
experience produce no genuine enthusiasm in the minds of their readers.
Former historians showed their sense of the necessity of making
professions to this effect in their writings. For when their subject
was political, they were careful to state that the writer had of course
been engaged in politics, and had had experience in matters of the
sort; or if the subject was military, that he had served a campaign and
been actually engaged; and again, when the matter was one of everyday
life, that he had brought up children and had been married; and so on
in every department of life, which we may expect to find adequately
treated by those writers alone who have had personal experience, and
have accordingly made that branch of history their own. It is difficult
perhaps for a man to have been actually and literally engaged in
everything: but in the most important actions and most frequently
occurring he must have been so.

(_i_) And that this is no impossibility, Homer is a convincing
instance; for in him you may see this quality of personal knowledge
frequently and conspicuously displayed. The upshot of all this is that
the study of documents is only one of three elements in the preparation
of an historian, and is only third in importance. And no clearer
proof of this could be given than that furnished by the deliberative
speeches, harangues of commanders, and orations of ambassadors as
recorded by Timaeus. For the truth is, that the occasions are rare
which admit of all possible arguments being set forth; as a rule, the
circumstances of the case confine them to narrow limits. And of such
speeches one sort are regarded with favour by men of our time, another
by those of an earlier age; different styles again are popular with
Aetolians, Peloponnesians, and Athenians. But to make digressions,
in season and out of season, for the purpose of setting forth every
possible speech that could be made, as Timaeus does by his trick of
inventing words to suit every sort of occasion, is utterly misleading,
pedantic, and worthy of a schoolboy essayist. And this practice has
brought failure and discredit on many writers. Of course to select from
time to time the proper and appropriate language is a necessary part
of our art: but as there is no fixed rule to decide the quantity and
quality of the words to be used on a particular occasion, great care
and training is required if we are to instruct and not mislead our
readers. The exact nature of the situation is difficult to communicate
always; still it may be brought home to the mind by means of systematic
demonstration, founded on personal and habitual experience. The best
way of securing that this should be realised is for historians, first,
to state clearly the position, the aims, and the circumstances of
those deliberating; and then, recording the real speeches made, to
explain to us the causes which contributed to the success or failure
of the several speakers. Thus we should obtain a true conception of
the situation, and by exercising our judgment upon it, and drawing
analogies from it, should be able to form a thoroughly sound opinion
upon the circumstances of the hour. But I suppose that tracing causes
is difficult, while stringing words together in books is easy. Few
again have the faculty of speaking briefly to the point, and getting
the necessary training for doing so; while to produce a long and futile
composition is within most people’s capacity and is common enough.

[Sidenote: Timaeus on Sicilian history.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 413. Thucyd. 7, 42 _sqq._]

[Sidenote: B.C. 405. Hermocrates was not there. Xen. _Hellen._ 1, 1,

(_k_) To confirm the judgment I have expressed of Timaeus, on his
wilful misstatements as well as his ignorance, I shall now quote
certain short passages from his acknowledged works as specimens.... Of
all the men who have exercised sovereignty in Sicily, since the elder
Gelo, tradition tells us that the most able have been Hermocrates,
Timoleon, and Pyrrhus of Epirus, who are the last persons in the world
on whom to father pedantic and scholastic speeches. Now Timaeus tells
us in his twenty-first book that on his arrival in Sicily Eurymedon
urged the cities there to undertake the war against Syracuse; that
subsequently the people of Gela becoming tired of the war, sent an
embassy to Camarina to make a truce; that upon the latter gladly
welcoming the proposal, each state sent ambassadors to their respective
allies begging them to despatch men of credit to Gela to deliberate on
a pacification, and to secure the common interests. Upon the arrival of
these deputies in Gela and the opening of the conference, he represents
Hermocrates as speaking to the following effect: “He praised the people
of Gela and Camarina first, for having made the truce; secondly,
because they were the cause of the assembling of this peace congress;
and thirdly because they had taken precautions to prevent the mass
of the citizens from taking part in the discussion, and had secured
that it should be confined to the leading men in the states, who knew
the difference between peace and war.” Then after making two or three
practical suggestions, Hermocrates is represented as expressing an
opinion that “if they seriously consider the matter they will learn the
profound difference between peace and war,”—although just before he had
said that it was precisely this which moved his gratitude to the men
of Gela, that “the discussion did not take place in the mass assembly,
but in a congress of men who knew the difference between peace and
war.” This is an instance in which Timaeus not only fails to show the
ability of an historian, but sinks below the level of a school theme.
For, I presume, it will be universally admitted that what an audience
requires is a demonstration of that about which they are in ignorance
or uncertainty; but to exhaust one’s ingenuity in finding arguments
to prove what is known already is the most futile waste of time. But
besides his cardinal mistake of directing the greater part of the
speech to points which stood in need of no arguments at all, Timaeus
also puts into the mouth of Hermocrates certain sentences of which
one could scarcely believe that any commonplace youth would have been
capable, much less the colleague of the Lacedaemonians in the battle of
Aegospotami, and the sole conqueror of the Athenian armies and generals
in Sicily.

+26.+ For first he “thinks that he should remind the congress that in
war sleepers are woke at dawn by bugles, in peace by cocks.”[42] Then
he says that “Hercules established the Olympic games and the sacred
truce during them, as an exemplification of his own principles;” and
that “he had injured all those persons against whom he waged war, under
compulsion and in obedience to the order of another, but was never
voluntarily the author of harm to any man.”[43] Next he quotes the
instance of Zeus in Homer as being displeased with Ares, and saying[44]—

   “Of all the gods that on Olympus dwell
   I hold thee most detested; for thy joy
   Is ever strife and war and battle.”

And again the wisest of the heroes says[45]—

   “He is a wretch, insensible and dead
   To all the charities of social life,
   Whose pleasure is in civil broil and war.”

Then he goes on to allege that Euripides agrees with Homer in the

   “O well of infinite riches!
     O fairest of beings divine!
   O Peace, how alas! thou delayest;
     My heart for thy coming is fain.
   I tremble lest age overtake me,
     Ere thy beauty and grace I behold;
   Ere the maidens shall sing in their dancing,
     And revels be gladsome with flowers.”

Next he remarks that “war is like disease, peace like health; for that
the latter restores those that are sick, while in the former even the
healthy perish. Moreover, in time of peace, the old are buried by the
young as nature directs, while in war the case is reversed; and above
all in war there is no security even as far as the city walls, while
in peace it extends to the frontier of the territory”—and so on. I
wonder what other arguments would have been employed by a youth who had
just devoted himself to scholastic exercises and studies in history;
and who wished, according to the rules of the art, to adapt his words
to the supposed speakers? Just these I think which Timaeus represents
Hermocrates as using.

[Sidenote: Timoleon’s victory over the Carthaginians, B.C. 344.]

(_a_) Again, in the same book, Timoleon is exhorting the Greeks to
engage the Carthaginians;[47] and when they are on the very point of
coming to close quarters with the enemy, who are many times superior
to them in number, Timaeus represents him as saying, “Do not look to
the numbers of the foe, but to their cowardice. For though Libya is
fully settled and abounds in inhabitants, yet when we wish to express
complete desolation we say ‘more desolate than Libya,’ not meaning to
refer to its emptiness, but to the poor spirit of its inhabitants. And
after all, who would be afraid of men who, when nature gives hands as
the distinctive feature of man among all living creatures, carry them
about all their life inside their tunics idle?[48] And more than all,
who wear shirts under their inner tunics, that they may not even when
they fall in battle show their nakedness to their enemies?...”

[Sidenote: Gelo. See Herod. 7, 157-165, B.C. 481.]

(_b_) When Gelo promised to help the Greeks with twenty thousand land
forces and two hundred decked ships, if they would concede to him the
chief command either by land or sea, they say that the congress of
Greeks, sitting at Corinth, gave Gelo’s envoys a most spirited answer.
They urged Gelo to come to their aid with his forces, and observed that
the logic of facts would give the command to the bravest. This is not
the language of men depending for succour on the Syracusans, as a last
resource; but of men who felt confidence in themselves, and challenged
all comers to a rivalry of courage and for the crown of valour. In
spite of this, Timaeus spends such a wealth of rhetoric and earnestness
on these points, in his desire to exalt the importance of Sicily above
all the rest of Greece, to represent its history as the most splendid
and glorious of all the world, its men as the wisest of all who have
been great in philosophy, and the Syracusans as the most consummate
and divine of statesmen, that he could scarcely be surpassed by the
cleverest schoolboy declaimers when undertaking to prove such paradoxes
as that “Thersites was an excellent man,” or “Penelope a bad wife,” or
other thesis of that description.

(_c_) However, the only effect of such extravagant exaggeration is
to bring ridicule upon the men and the transactions which it is his
intention to champion; while he himself incurs the same discredit as
ill-trained disputants in the Academy; some of whom, in their desire
to embarrass their opponents on all subjects, possible or impossible
alike, carry their paradoxical and sophistical arguments to such a
length as to dispute whether it is possible for people at Athens to
smell eggs cooking at Ephesus: and to offer to maintain that, while
they are discussing these points, they are lying on their couches
at home and carrying on a second discussion on other subjects. This
extravagance of paradox has brought the whole school into such
disrepute, that even reasonable discussions have lost credit with the
world. And apart from their own futility, these persons have inspired
our young men with so depraved a taste, that they pay no attention
whatever to questions of ethics and politics, which bring benefit to
those who study them; but spend their lives in pursuit of an empty
reputation for useless and paradoxical verbiage.

(_d_) This is just the case with Timaeus and his imitators in history.
Paradoxical and tenacious, he has dazzled the multitude by skill in
words; and has forced attention to himself by a show of veracity, or
has conciliated confidence by a pretence of producing proof of his
assertions. The most conspicuous instances of his success in inspiring
this confidence are those parts of his work which treat of colonies,
founding of cities, and the relationships of nations. In these points
he makes such a parade of minute accuracy, and inveighs so bitterly
when refuting others, that people came to imagine that all other
historians have been mere dreamers, and have spoken at random in
describing the world; and that he is the only man who has made accurate
investigations, and unravelled every history with intelligence.

(_e_) As a matter of fact, his books contain much that is sound, but
also much that is false. Those, however, who have spent much time on
his earlier books, in which the passages I have alluded to occur,
when the confidence which they have fully given to his exaggerated
professions is disturbed by some one pointing out that Timaeus is
obnoxious to the same reproaches which he has brought with such
bitterness against others (as, for instance, in the misstatements as to
the Locrians, and other instances lately mentioned by me), become angry
and obstinate in controversy, and difficult to convince. And that, I
might almost say, is all the benefit which the most diligent students
of his history get from their reading. While those who devote their
attention to his speeches, and generally to the didactic part of his
work, become pedantic, sophistical, and wholly insensible to truth, for
reasons which I have already stated.

[Sidenote: Cp. Herod. 1, 8. Hor. A. P. 180.]

+27.+ Moreover, when he comes to deal with facts in his history, we
find a combination of all the faults which I have mentioned. The
reason I will now proceed to state. It will not, perhaps, to most
people seem to his credit, and it is in truth the real source of
his errors. For whereas he is thought to have possessed great and
wide knowledge, a faculty for historical inquiry, and extraordinary
industry in the execution of his work, in certain cases he appears
to have been the most ignorant and indolent person that ever called
himself an historian. And the following considerations will prove it.
Nature has bestowed on us two instruments of inquiry and research,
hearing and sight. Of these sight is, according to Heracleitus, by
far the truer; for eyes are surer witnesses than ears. And of these
channels of learning Timaeus has chosen the pleasanter and the worse;
for he entirely refrained from looking at things with his own eyes,
and devoted himself to learning by hearsay. But even the ear may be
instructed in two ways, reading and answers to personal inquiries: and
in the latter of these he was very indolent, as I have already shown.
The reason of his preference for the other it is easy to divine. Study
of documents involves no danger or fatigue, if one only takes care to
lodge in a city rich in such records, or to have a library in one’s
neighbourhood. You may then investigate any question while reclining on
your couch, and compare the mistakes of former historians without any
fatigue to yourself. But personal investigation demands great exertion
and expense; though it is exceedingly advantageous, and in fact is
the very corner-stone of history. This is evident from the writers of
history themselves. Ephorus says, “if writers could only be present
at the actual transactions, it would be far the best of all modes of
learning.” Theopompus says, “the best military historian is he who has
been present at the greatest number of battles; the best speech maker
is he who has been engaged in most political contests.” The same might
be said of the art of healing and of steering. Homer has spoken even
more emphatically than these writers on this point. For when he wishes
to describe what the man of light and leading should be, he introduces
Odysseus in these words—

   “Tell me, oh Muse, the man of many shifts
   Who wandered far and wide.”

and then goes on—

   “And towns of many saw, and learnt their mind,
    And suffered much in heart by land and sea.”

and again[49]—

   “Passing through wars of men and grievous waves.”

[Sidenote: Historians must be practical men.]

[Sidenote: Timaeus on Ephorus.]

+28.+ It is such a man that the dignity of history appears to me to
require. Plato says that “human affairs will not go well until either
philosophers become kings or kings become philosophers.”[50] So I
should say that history will never be properly written, until either
men of action undertake to write it (not as they do now, as a matter of
secondary importance; but, with the conviction that it is their most
necessary and honourable employment, shall devote themselves through
life exclusively to it), or historians become convinced that practical
experience is of the first importance for historical composition.
Until that time arrives there will always be abundance of blunders
in the writings of historians. Timaeus, however, quite disregarded
all this. He spent his life in one place, of which he was not even a
citizen; and thus deliberately renounced all active career either in
war or politics, and all personal exertion in travel and inspection
of localities: and yet, somehow or another, he has managed to obtain
the reputation of a master in the art of history. To prove that I have
not misrepresented him, it is easy to bring the evidence of Timaeus
himself. In the preface to his sixth book he says that “some people
suppose that more genius, industry, and preparation are required for
rhetorical than for historical composition.” And that “this opinion
had been formerly advanced against Ephorus.” Then because this writer
had been unable to refute those who held it, he undertakes himself to
draw a comparison between history and rhetorical compositions: a most
unnecessary proceeding altogether. In the first place he misrepresents
Ephorus. For in truth, admirable as Ephorus is throughout his whole
work, in style, treatment, and argumentative acuteness, he is never
more brilliant than in his digressions and statements of his personal
views: in fact, whenever he is adding anything in the shape of a
commentary or a note. And it so happens that his most elegant and
convincing digression is on this very subject of a comparison between
historians and speech-writers. But Timaeus is anxious not to be thought
to follow Ephorus. Therefore, in addition to misrepresenting him and
condemning the rest, he enters upon a long, confused, and in every way
inferior, discussion of what had been already sufficiently handled by
others; and expected that no one living would detect him.

(_a_) However, he wished to exalt history; and, in order to do so,
he says that “history differs from rhetorical composition as much as
real buildings differ from those represented in scene-paintings.” And
again, that “to collect the necessary materials for writing history
is by itself more laborious than the whole process of producing
rhetorical compositions.” He mentions, for instance, the expense and
labour which he underwent in collecting records from Assyria, and
in studying the customs of the Ligures, Celts, and Iberians. But he
exaggerates these so much, that he could not have himself expected to
be believed. One would be glad to ask the historian which of the two
he thinks is the more expensive and laborious,—to remain quietly at
home and collect records and study the customs of Ligures and Celts,
or to obtain personal experience of all the tribes possible, and see
them with his own eyes? To ask questions about manœuvres on the field
of battle and the sieges of cities and fights at sea from those who
were present, or to take personal part in the dangers and vicissitudes
of these operations as they occur? For my part I do not think that
real buildings differ so much from those in stage-scenery, nor history
from rhetorical compositions, as a narrative drawn from actual and
personal experience differs from one derived from hearsay and the
report of others. But Timaeus had no such experience: and he therefore
naturally supposed that the part of an historian’s labour which is the
least important and lightest, that namely of collecting records and
making inquiries from those who had knowledge of the several events,
was in reality the most important and most difficult. And, indeed, in
this particular department of research, men who have had no personal
experience must necessarily fall into grave errors. For how is a man,
who has no knowledge of such things, to put the right questions as
to manœuvering of troops, sieges of cities, and fights at sea? And
how can he understand the details of what is told him? Indeed, the
questioner is as important as the narrator for getting a clear story.
For in the case of men who have had experience of real action, memory
is a sufficient guide from point to point of a narrative: but a man who
has had no such experience can neither put the right questions, nor
understand what is happening before his eyes. Though he is on the spot,
in fact, he is as good as absent....



[Sidenote: Straitened finances in Aetolia cause a revolution, B.C. 204.]

+1.+ From the unbroken continuity of their wars, and the extravagance
of their daily lives, the Aetolians became involved in debt, not
only without others noticing it, but without being sensible of it
themselves. Being therefore naturally disposed to a change in their
constitution, they elected Dorimachus and Scopas to draw out a code
of laws, because they saw that they were not only innovators by
disposition, but were themselves deeply involved in private debt. These
men accordingly were admitted to the office and drew up the laws....

When they produced them they were opposed by Alexander of Aetolia,
who tried to show by many instances that innovation was a dangerous
growth which could not be checked, and invariably ended by inflicting
grave evils upon those who fostered it. He urged them therefore not
to look solely to the exigencies of the hour, and the relief from
their existing contracts, but to the future also. For it was a strange
inconsistency to be ready to forfeit their very lives in war to
preserve their children, and yet in their deliberations to be entirely
careless of the future....

[Sidenote: Scopas goes to Egypt. See 16, 18-19; 18, 53.]

+2.+ Having failed to obtain the office, for the sake of which he had
had the boldness to draw up these laws, Scopas turned his hopes to
Alexandria, in the expectation of finding means there of restoring his
broken fortunes, and satisfying to a fuller extent his grasping spirit.
He little knew that it is impossible to assuage the ever-rising desires
of the soul without correcting this passion by reason, any more than
it is to stay or quench the thirst of the dropsical body by supplying
it with drink, without radically restoring its healthy condition.
Scopas, indeed, is a conspicuous example of this truth; for though on
his arrival at Alexandria, in addition to his military pay, which he
possessed independently as commander-in-chief, the king assigned him
ten minae a day, and one mina a day to those next him in rank, still he
was not satisfied; but continued to demand more, until he disgusted his
paymasters by his cupidity, and lost his life and his gold together.


+3.+ Philip now entered upon a course of treachery which no one would
venture to say was worthy of a king; but which some would defend on
the ground of its necessity in the conduct of public affairs, owing to
the prevailing bad faith of the time. For the ancients, so far from
using a fraudulent policy towards their friends, were scrupulous even
as to using it to conquer their enemies; because they did not regard
a success as either glorious or secure, which was not obtained by
such a victory in the open field as served to break the confidence of
their enemies. They therefore came to a mutual understanding not to
use hidden weapons against each other, nor such as could be projected
from a distance; and held the opinion that the only genuine decision
was that arrived at by a battle fought at close quarters, foot to
foot with the enemy. It was for this reason also that it was their
custom mutually to proclaim their wars, and give notice of battles,
naming time and place at which they meant to be in order of battle.
But nowadays people say that it is the mark of an inferior general
to perform any operation of war openly. Some slight trace, indeed,
of the old-fashioned morality still lingers among the Romans; for
they do proclaim their wars, and make sparing use of ambuscades, and
fight their battles hand to hand and foot to foot. So much for the
unnecessary amount of artifice which it is the fashion for commanders
in our days to employ both in politics and war.

[Sidenote: Philip employs Heracleides of Tarentum.]

+4.+ Philip gave Heracleides a kind of problem to work out,—how
to circumvent and destroy the Rhodian fleet. At the same time he
sent envoys to Crete to excite and provoke them to go to war with
the Rhodians. Heracleides, who was a born traitor, looked upon the
commission as the very thing to suit his plans; and after revolving
various methods in his mind, presently started and sailed to Rhodes.
He was by origin a Tarentine, of a low family of mechanics, and he had
many qualities which fitted him for bold and unscrupulous undertakings.
His boyhood had been stained by notorious immorality; he had great
acuteness and a retentive memory; in the presence of the vulgar no one
could be more bullying and audacious; to those in high position no one
more insinuating and servile. He had been originally banished from his
native city from a suspicion of being engaged in an intrigue to hand
over Tarentum to the Romans: not that he had any political influence,
but being an architect, and employed in some repairs of the walls, he
got possession of the keys of the gate on the landward side of the
town. He thereupon fled for his life to the Romans. From them, being
detected in making communications by letters and messages with Tarentum
and Hannibal, he again fled for fear of consequences to Philip. With
him he obtained so much credit and influence that he eventually was the
most powerful element in the overthrow of that great monarchy.

[Sidenote: The false pretences of Heracleides at Rhodes.]

+5.+ The Prytanies of Rhodes were now distrustful of Philip, owing to
his treacherous policy in Crete,[51] and they began to suspect that
Heracleides was his agent.... But Heracleides came before them and
explained the reasons which had caused him to fly from Philip....

Philip was anxious above everything that the Rhodians should not
discover his purpose in these transactions; whereby he succeeded in
freeing Heracleides from suspicion....

[Sidenote: Magna est veritas.]

Nature, as it seems to me, has ordained that Truth should be a most
mighty goddess among men, and has endowed her with extraordinary power.
At least, I notice that though at times everything combines to crush
her, and every kind of specious argument is on the side of falsehood,
she somehow or another insinuates herself by her own intrinsic virtue
into the souls of men. Sometimes she displays her power at once; and
sometimes, though obscured for a length of time, she at last prevails
and overpowers falsehood. Such was the case with Heracleides when he
came from king Philip to Rhodes....[52]

Damocles, who was sent with Pythio as a spy upon the Romans, was a
person of ability, and possessed of many endowments fitting him for the
conduct of affairs....


[Sidenote: The character of Nabis’s tyranny.]

+6.+ Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, being now in the third year of his
reign, ventured upon no undertaking of importance, owing to the
recent defeat of Machanidas by the Achaeans; but employed himself in
laying the foundations of a long and grinding tyranny. He destroyed
the last remains of the old Spartan nobles; drove into banishment
all men eminent for wealth or ancestral glory; and distributed their
property and wives among the chief men of those who remained, or among
his own mercenary soldiers. These last were composed of murderers,
housebreakers, foot-pads, and burglars. For this was, generally
speaking, the class of men which he collected out of all parts of the
world, whose own country was closed to them owing to their crimes and
felonies. As he put himself forward as the patron and king of such
wretches, and employed them as attendants and bodyguards, there is
evidently no cause for surprise that his impious character and reign
should have been long remembered. For, besides this, he was not content
with driving the citizens into banishment, but took care no place
should be secure, and no refuge safe for the exiles. Some he caused to
be pursued and killed on the road, while others he dragged from their
place of retreat and murdered. Finally, in the cities where they were
living, he hired the houses next door to these banished men, wherever
they might be, by means of agents who were not suspected; and then sent
Cretans into these houses, who made breaches in the party walls, and
through them, or through such windows as already existed, shot down the
exiles as they stood or lay down in their own houses; so that there
was no place of retreat, and no moment of security for the unfortunate

[Sidenote: Nabis’s wife.]

+7.+ When he had by these means put the greater number of them out of
the way, he next had constructed a kind of machine, if machine it may
be called, which was the figure of a woman, clothed in costly garments,
and made to resemble with extraordinary fidelity the wife of Nabis.
Whenever then he summoned one of the citizens with a view of getting
some money from him, he used first to employ a number of arguments
politely expressed, pointing out the danger in which the city stood
from the threatening attitude of the Achaeans, and explaining what
a number of mercenaries he had to support for their security, and
the expenses which fell upon him for the maintenance of the national
religion and the needs of the State. If the listeners gave in he was
satisfied; but if they ever refused to comply with his demand, he would
say, “Perhaps I cannot persuade you, but I think this lady Apéga will
succeed in doing so.” Apéga was the name of his wife. Immediately on
his saying these words, the figure I have described was brought in. As
soon as the man offered his hand to the supposed lady to raise her from
her seat, the figure threw its arms round him and began drawing him by
degrees towards its breasts. Now its arms, hands, and breasts were full
of iron spikes under its clothes. When the tyrant pressed his hands on
the back of the figure, and then by means of the works dragged the man
by degrees closer and closer to its breasts, he forced him under this
torture to say anything. A good number of men who refused his demands
he destroyed in this way.[53]

[Sidenote: The beginning of the war between Nabis and the Achaeans.]

+8.+ The rest of his conduct was on a par with this beginning. He
made common cause with the Cretan pirates, and kept temple-breakers,
highway-robbers, and murderers all over the Peloponnese; and as he
shared in the profits of their nefarious trades, he allowed them to
use Sparta as their base of operations. Moreover, about this time
some visitors from Boeotia, who happened to be staying at Lacedaemon,
enticed one of his grooms to make off with them, taking a certain
white horse which was considered the finest in the royal stud. They
were pursued by a party sent by Nabis as far as Megalopolis, where the
tyrants found the horse and groom, and took them off without any one
interfering. But they then laid hands on the Boeotians, who at first
demanded to be taken before the magistrate; but as no attention was
paid to the demand, one of them shouted out “Help!” Upon a crowd of the
people of the place collecting and protesting that the men should be
taken before the magistrate, Nabis’s party were obliged to let them go
and retire. Nabis, however, had been long looking out for a ground of
complaint and a reasonable pretext for a quarrel, and having seized on
this one, he harried the cattle belonging to Proagoras and some others;
which was a commencement of the war....[54]


+9.+ Labae, like Sabae, is a city of Chattenia, which is a territory of
the Gerraei.... In other respects, Chattenia is a rugged country, but
the wealth of the Gerraei who inhabit it has adorned it with villages
and towers. It lies along the Arabian Sea, and Antiochus gave orders to
spare it....

In a letter to Antiochus the Gerraei demanded that he should not
destroy what the gods had given them—perpetual peace and freedom; and
this letter having been interpreted to him he granted the request....

Their freedom having been confirmed to the Gerraei, they presented King
Antiochus at once with five hundred talents of silver, one thousand of
frankincense, and two hundred of oil of cinnamon, called stactè, all of
them spices of the country on the Arabian Sea. He then sailed to the
island of Tylos, and thence to Seleucia....



[Sidenote: 144th Olympiad, B.C. 204-200.]

Perhaps a _resumé_ of events in each Olympiad may arrest the attention
of my readers both by their number and importance, the transactions in
every part of the world being brought under one view. However, I think
the events of this Olympiad especially will do so; because in it the
wars in Italy and Libya came to an end; and I cannot imagine any one
not caring to inquire what sort of catastrophe and conclusion they had.
For everybody, though extremely interested in details and particulars,
naturally longs to be told the end of a story. I may add that it was
in this period also that the kings gave the clearest indication of
their character and policy. For what was only rumour in regard to them
before was now become a matter of clear and universal knowledge, even
to those who did not care to take part in public business. Therefore,
as I wished to make my narrative worthy of its subject, I have not, as
in former instances, included the history of two years in one book....

_Elected Consul for_ B.C. _205 (see 11, 33) Scipio had Sicily assigned
as his provincia, with leave to cross to Africa if necessary (Livy,
28, 45). He sent Laelius to Africa in B.C. 205, but remained himself
in Sicily. Next spring (B.C. 204) he crossed to Africa with a year’s
additional imperium. In the course of this year he ravaged the
Carthaginian territory and besieged Utica (Livy, 29, 35), and at the
beginning of_ B.C. _203 his imperium was prolonged till he should have
finished the war (id. 30, 1)._

[Sidenote: The proposal of Syphax.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 203. Cn. Servilius Caepio, C. Servilius Geminus Coss.
Livy, 30, 1.]

+1.+ While the Consuls were thus engaged,[55] Scipio in Libya learnt
during the winter that the Carthaginians were fitting out a fleet;
he therefore devoted himself to similar preparations as well as to
pressing on the siege of Utica. He did not, however, give up all hopes
of Syphax; but as their forces were not far apart he kept sending
messages to him, convinced that he would be able to detach him from the
Carthaginians. He still cherished the belief that Syphax was getting
tired of the girl[56] for whose sake he had joined the Carthaginians,
and of his alliance with the Punic people generally; for the Numidians,
he knew, were naturally quick to feel satiety, and constant neither
to gods nor men. Scipio’s mind, however, was distracted with various
anxieties, and his prospects were far from seeming secure to him;
for he shrank from an engagement in the open field on account of
the enemy’s great superiority in numbers. He therefore seized an
opportunity which now presented itself. Some of his messengers to
Syphax reported to him that the Carthaginians had constructed their
huts in their winter camp of various kinds of wood and boughs without
any earth; while the old army of the Numidians made theirs of reeds,
and the reinforcements which were now coming in from the neighbouring
townships constructed theirs of boughs only, some of them inside the
trench and palisade, but the greater number outside. Scipio therefore
made up his mind that the manner of attacking them, which would be most
unexpected by the enemy and most successful for himself, would be by
fire. He therefore turned his attention to organising such an attack.
Now, in his communications with Scipio, Syphax was continually harping
upon his proposal that the Carthaginians should evacuate Italy and the
Romans Libya; and that the possessions held by either between these two
countries should remain in _statu quo_. Hitherto Scipio had refused to
listen to this suggestion, but he now gave Syphax a hint by the mouth
of his messengers that the course he wished to see followed was not
impossible. Greatly elated at this, Syphax became much bolder than
before in his communications with Scipio; the numbers of the messengers
sent backwards and forwards, and the frequency of their visits,
were redoubled; and they sometimes even stayed several days in each
other’s camps without any thought of precaution. On these occasions
Scipio always took care to send, with the envoys, some men of tried
experience or of military knowledge, dressed up as slaves in rough and
common clothes, that they might examine and investigate in security
the approaches and entrances to both the entrenchments. For there were
two camps, one that of Hasdrubal, containing thirty thousand infantry
and three thousand cavalry; and another about ten stades distant from
it of the Numidians, containing ten thousand cavalry and about fifty
thousand infantry. The latter was the easier of approach, and its huts
were well calculated for being set on fire, because, as I said before,
the Numidians had not made theirs of timber and earth, but used simply
reeds and thatch in their construction.

[Sidenote: Spring of B.C. 203.]

[Sidenote: Scipio’s ruse to deceive Syphax.]

+2.+ By the beginning of spring Scipio had completed the
reconnaissances necessary for this attempt upon the enemy; and he began
launching his ships, and getting the engines on them into working
order, as though with the purpose of assaulting Utica by sea. With
his land forces he once more occupied the high ground overlooking
the town, and carefully fortified it and secured it by trenches. He
wished the enemy to believe that he was doing this for the sake of
carrying on the siege; but he really meant it as a cover for his
men, who were to be engaged in the undertaking described above, to
prevent the garrison sallying out, when the legions were separated
from their lines, assaulting the palisade which was so near to them,
and attacking the division left in charge of it. Whilst in the midst
of these preparations, he sent to Syphax inquiring whether, “in case
he agreed to his proposals, the Carthaginians would assent, and not
say again that they would deliberate on the terms?” He ordered these
legates at the same time not to return to him, until they had received
an answer on these points. When the envoys arrived, the Numidian king
was convinced that Scipio was on the point of concluding the agreement,
partly from the fact that the ambassadors said that they would not
go away until they got his answer, and partly because of the anxiety
expressed as to the disposition of the Carthaginians. He therefore sent
immediately to Hasdrubal, stating the facts and urging him to accept
the peace. Meanwhile he neglected all precautions himself, and allowed
the Numidians, who were now joining, to pitch their tents where they
were, outside the lines. Scipio in appearance acted in the same way,
while in reality he was pushing on his preparations with the utmost
care. When a message was returned from the Carthaginians bidding
Syphax complete the treaty of peace, the Numidian king, in a state of
great exaltation, communicated the news to the envoys; who immediately
departed to their own camp to inform Scipio from the king of what had
been done. As soon as he heard it, the Roman general at once sent fresh
envoys to inform Syphax that Scipio was quite satisfied and was anxious
for the peace; but that the members of his council differed from him,
and held that they should remain as they were. The ambassadors duly
arrived and informed the Numidians of this. Scipio sent this mission to
avoid the appearance of a breach of truce, if he should perform any act
of hostility while negotiations for peace were still going on between
the parties. He considered that, by making this statement, he would be
free to act in whatever way he chose without laying himself open to

[Sidenote: Scipio discloses his project.]

+3.+ Syphax’s annoyance at this message was great, in proportion to
the hopes he had previously entertained of making the peace. He had an
interview with Hasdrubal, and told him of the message he had received
from the Romans; but though they deliberated long and earnestly as to
what they ought to do, they neither had any idea or conjecture as to
what was really going to happen. For they had no anticipation whatever
as to the need of taking precautions, or of any danger threatening
them, but were all eagerness and excitement to strike some blow, and
thus provoke the enemy to descend into the level ground. Meanwhile
Scipio allowed his army generally, by the preparations he was making
and the orders he was issuing, to imagine that his aim was the capture
of Utica; but summoning the most able and trusty Tribunes at noon, he
imparted to them his design, and ordered them to cause their men to get
their supper early, and then to lead the legions outside the camp as
soon as the buglers gave the usual signal by a simultaneous blast of
their bugles. For it is a custom in the Roman army for the trumpeters
and buglers to sound a call near the commander’s tent at supper time,
that the night pickets may then take up their proper positions.
Scipio next summoned the spies whom he had sent at different times to
reconnoitre the enemy’s quarters, and carefully compared and studied
the accounts they gave about the roads leading to the hostile camps and
the entrances to them, employing Massanissa to criticise their words
and assist him with his advice, because he was acquainted with the

[Sidenote: Destruction of the camp of Syphax by C. Laelius and
Massanissa, and of Hasdrubal.]

+4.+ Everything being prepared for his expedition, Scipio left a
sufficiently strong guard in the camp, and got the rest of the men on
the march towards the end of the first watch, the enemy being about
sixty stades distant. Arrived in the neighbourhood of the enemy,
about the end of the third watch, he assigned to Gaius Laelius and
Massanissa half his Roman soldiers and all his Numidians, with orders
to attack the camp of Syphax, urging them to quit themselves like
brave men and do nothing carelessly; with the clear understanding
that, as the darkness hindered and prevented the use of the eyes, a
night attack required all the more the assistance of a cool head and a
firm heart. The rest of the army he took the command of in person, and
led against Hasdrubal. He had calculated on not beginning his assault
until Laelius’s division had set fire to the enemy’s huts; he therefore
proceeded slowly. The latter meanwhile advanced in two divisions, which
attacked the enemy simultaneously. The construction of the huts being
as though purposely contrived to be susceptible of a conflagration, as
I have already explained, as soon as the front rank men began to set
light to them, the fire caught all the first row of huts fiercely, and
soon got beyond all control, from the closeness of the huts to each
other, and the amount of combustible material which they contained.
Laelius remained in the rear as a reserve; but Massanissa, knowing
the localities through which those who fled from the fire would be
sure to retreat, stationed his own soldiers at those spots. Not a
single Numidian had any suspicion of the true state of the case,
not even Syphax himself; but thinking that it was a mere accidental
conflagration of the rampart, some of them started unsuspiciously out
of bed, others sprang out of their tents in the midst of a carouse
and with the cup actually at their lips. The result was that numbers
of them got trampled to death by their own friends at the exits from
the camp; many were caught by the flames and burnt to death; while all
those who escaped the flame fell into the hands of the enemy, and were
killed, without knowing what was happening to them or what they were

+5.+ At the same time the Carthaginians, observing the proportions
of the conflagration and the hugeness of the flame that was rising,
imagined that the Numidian camp had been accidentally set on fire. Some
of them therefore started at once to render assistance, and all the
rest hurried outside their own camp unarmed, and stood there gazing
in astonishment at the spectacle. Everything having thus succeeded to
his best wishes, Scipio fell upon these men outside their camp, and
either put them to the sword, or, driving them back into the camp,
set fire to their huts. The disaster of the Punic army was thus very
like that which had just befallen the Numidians, fire and sword in
both cases combining to destroy them. Hasdrubal immediately gave up
all idea of combating the fire, for he knew from the coincidence of
the two that the fire in the Numidian camp was not accidental, as
he had supposed, but had originated from some desperate design of
the enemy. He therefore turned his attention to saving his own life,
although there was now little hope left of doing so. For the fire was
spreading rapidly and was catching everywhere; while the camp gangways
were full of horses, beasts of burden, and men, some of them half
dead and devoured by the fire, and others in a state of such frantic
terror and mad excitement that they prevented any attempts at making
a defence, and by the utter tumult and confusion which they created
rendered all chance of escape hopeless. The case of Syphax was the
same as that of Hasdrubal, as it was also that of the other officers.
The two former, however, did manage to escape, accompanied by a few
horsemen: but all those myriads of men, horses, and beasts of burden,
either met a miserable and pitiable death from the fire, or, if they
escaped the violence of that, some of the men perished ignominiously
at the hands of the enemy, cut down naked and defenceless, not only
without their arms, but without so much as their clothes to cover them.
The whole place was filled with yells of pain, confused cries, terror,
and unspeakable din, mingled with a conflagration which spread rapidly
and blazed with the utmost fierceness. It was the combination and
suddenness of these horrors that made them so awful, any one of which
by itself would have been sufficient to strike terror into the hearts
of men. It is accordingly impossible for the imagination to exaggerate
the dreadful scene, so completely did it surpass in horror everything
hitherto recorded. Of all the brilliant achievements of Scipio this
appears to me to have been the most brilliant and the most daring....

[Sidenote: Hasdrubal at Anda, see Appian, 8, 24.]

[Sidenote: The Senate, however, resolves to continue their resistance.]

[Sidenote: Dismay at Carthage.]

+6.+ When day broke, and he found the enemy either killed or in
headlong flight, Scipio exhorted his Tribunes to activity, and at once
started in pursuit. At first the Carthaginian general seemed inclined
to stand his ground, though told of Scipio’s approach, trusting in the
strength of the town [of Anda]; but when he saw that the inhabitants
were in a mutinous state, he shrank from meeting the attack of Scipio,
and fled with the relics of his army, which consisted of as many as
five hundred cavalry and about two thousand infantry. The inhabitants
of the town thereupon submitted unconditionally to the Romans, and
were spared by Scipio, who, however, gave up two neighbouring towns to
the legions to plunder. This being done he returned to his original
entrenchment. Baffled in the hopes which they had entertained of the
course which the campaign would take, the Carthaginians were deeply
depressed. They had expected to shut up the Romans on the promontory
near Utica, which had been the site of their winter quarters, and
besiege them there with their army and fleet both by sea and land. With
this view all their preparations had been made; and when they saw,
quite contrary to their calculations, that they were not only driven
from the open country by the enemy, but were in hourly expectation
of an attack upon themselves and their city, they became completely
disheartened and panic-stricken. Their circumstances, however, admitted
of no delay. They were compelled at once to take precautions and adopt
some measures for the future. But the senate was filled with doubt
and varied and confused suggestions. Some said that they ought to
send for Hannibal and recall him from Italy, their one hope of safety
being now centred in that general and his forces. Others were for an
embassy to Scipio to obtain a truce and discuss with him the terms of a
pacification and treaty. Others again were for keeping up their courage
and collecting their forces, and sending a message to Syphax; who, they
said, was at the neighbouring town of Abba, engaged in collecting the
remnants of his army. This last suggestion was the one which ultimately
prevailed. The Government of Carthage accordingly set about collecting
troops, and sent a despatch to Syphax begging him to support them and
abide by his original policy, as a general with an army would presently
join him.

+7.+ Meanwhile the Roman commander was pressing on the siege of Utica.
But when he heard that Syphax was still in position, and that the
Carthaginians were once more collecting an army, he led out his forces
and pitched his camp close under the walls of Utica. At the same
time he divided the booty among the soldiers....[57] The merchants
who purchased them from the soldiers went away with very profitable
bargains; for the recent victory inspired the soldiers with high hopes
of a successful conclusion of the campaign, and they therefore thought
little of the spoils already obtained, and made no difficulties in
selling them to the merchants.

[Sidenote: Syphax is persuaded by Sophanisba to stand by the
Carthaginians still.]

[Sidenote: The Carthaginians again take the field.]

The Numidian king and his friends were at first minded to continue
their retreat to their own land. But while deliberating on this,
certain Celtiberes, over four thousand in number, who had been hired
as soldiers by the Carthaginians, arrived in the vicinity of Abba.
Encouraged by this additional strength the Numidians stopped on their
retreat. And when the young lady, who was daughter of Hasdrubal and
wife of Syphax, added her earnest entreaties that he would remain and
not abandon the Carthaginians at such a crisis, the Numidian king gave
way and consented to her prayer. The approach of these Celtiberes
did a great deal also to encourage the hopes of the Carthaginians:
for instead of four thousand, it was reported at Carthage that they
were ten thousand, and that their bravery and the excellency of their
arms made them irresistible in the field. Excited by this rumour,
and by the boastful talk which was current among the common people,
the Carthaginians felt their resolution to once more take the field
redoubled. And finally, within thirty days, they pitched a camp in
conjunction with the Numidians and Celtiberes on what are called the
Great Plains, with an army amounting to no less than thirty thousand.

[Sidenote: Syphax and Hasdrubal escape.]

[Sidenote: The Celtiberes, on the centre, are cut to pieces after a
gallant resistance.]

[Sidenote: The Roman wings are both victorious.]

[Sidenote: The battle on the Great Plains. 24th June, B.C. 203.]

+8.+ When news of these proceedings reached the Roman camp Scipio
immediately determined to attack. Leaving orders, therefore, to the
army and navy, which were besieging Utica, as to what they were to
do, he started with all his army in light marching order. On the
fifth day he reached the Great Plains, and during the first day after
his arrival encamped on a piece of rising ground about thirty stades
from the enemy. Next day he descended into the plain and drew up his
army[58] at a distance of seven stades from the enemy, with his cavalry
forming an advanced guard. After skirmishing attacks carried on by
both sides during the next two days, on the fourth both armies were
deliberately brought out into position and drawn up in order of battle.
Scipio followed exactly the Roman system, stationing the maniples of
hastati in the front, behind them the principes, and lastly the triarii
in the rear. Of his cavalry he stationed the Italians on the right
wing, the Numidians and Massanissa on the left. Syphax and Hasdrubal
stationed the Celtiberes in the centre opposite the Roman cohorts, the
Numidians on the left, and the Carthaginians on the right. At the very
first charge the Numidians reeled before the Italian cavalry, and the
Carthaginians before those under Massanissa; for their many previous
defeats had completely demoralised them. But the Celtiberes fought
gallantly, for they had no hope of saving themselves by flight, being
entirely unacquainted with the country; nor any expectation of being
spared if they were taken prisoners on account of their perfidy to
Scipio: for they were regarded as having acted in defiance of justice
and of their treaty in coming to aid the Carthaginians against the
Romans, though they had never suffered any act of hostility at Scipio’s
hands during the campaigns in Iberia. When, however, the two wings gave
way these men were surrounded by the principes and triarii, and cut to
pieces on the field almost to a man. Thus perished the Celtiberes, who
yet did very effective service to the Carthaginians, not only during
the whole battle, but during the retreat also; for, if it had not been
for the hindrance caused by them, the Romans would have pressed the
fugitives closely, and very few of the enemy would have escaped. As it
was, owing to the delay caused by these men, Syphax and his cavalry
effected their retreat to his own kingdom in safety; while Hasdrubal
with the survivors of his army did the same to Carthage.

[Sidenote: Scipio receives the submission of the country, while Laelius
goes in pursuit of Syphax.]

+9.+ After making the necessary arrangements as to the booty and
prisoners, Scipio summoned a council of war to consult as to what to
do next. It was resolved that Scipio himself and one part of the army
should stay in the country and visit the various towns; while Laelius
and Massanissa, with the Numidians and the rest of the Roman legions,
should pursue Syphax and give him no time to deliberate or make any
preparations. This being settled the commanders separated; the two
latter going with their division in pursuit of Syphax, Scipio on a
round of the townships. Some of these were terrified into a voluntary
submission to the Romans, others he promptly took by assault. The whole
country was ripe for a change, owing to the constant series of miseries
and contributions, under which it had been groaning from the protracted
wars in Iberia.

[Sidenote: A panic at Carthage.]

In Carthage meanwhile, where the panic had been great enough before,
a still wilder state of excitement prevailed, after this second
disaster, and the disappointment of the hopes of success which they
had entertained. However, those of the counsellors who claimed the
highest character for courage urged that they should go on board their
ships and attack the besiegers of Utica, try to raise the blockade, and
engage the enemy at sea, who were not in a forward state of preparation
in that department; that they should recall Hannibal, and without
delay test to the utmost this one more chance: for both these measures
offered great and reasonable opportunities of securing their safety.
Others declared that their circumstances no longer admitted of these
measures: what they had to do was to fortify their town and prepare to
stand a siege; for chance would give them many occasions of striking
a successful blow if they only held together. At the same time they
advised that they should deliberate on coming to terms and making
a treaty, and see on what conditions and by what means they might
extricate themselves from the danger. After a long debate, all these
proposals were adopted together.

+10.+ Upon this decision being come to, those who were to sail to Italy
went straight from the council chamber to the sea, while the Navarch
went to prepare the ships. The rest began to take measures for securing
the city, and remained in constant consultation on the measures
necessary for the purpose.

Meanwhile Scipio’s camp was getting gorged with booty; for he found no
one to resist him, and everybody yielded to his attacks. He therefore
determined to despatch the greater part of the booty to his original
camp; while he advanced with his army in light marching order to
seize the entrenchment near Tunes, and pitched his camp within the
view of the inhabitants of Carthage, thinking that this would do more
than anything else to strike terror into their hearts and lower their

The Carthaginians had in a few days manned and provisioned their ships,
and were engaged in getting under sail and carrying out their plan of
operations, when Scipio arrived at Tunes, and, the garrison flying
at his approach, occupied the town, which is about a hundred stades
from Carthage, of remarkable strength both natural and artificial, and
visible from nearly every point of Carthage.

[Sidenote: Scipio recalled to Utica by the fear of an attack upon his

Just as the Romans pitched their camp there, the Carthaginians were
putting out to sea on board their ships to sail to Utica. Seeing the
enemy thus putting out, and fearing some misfortune to his own fleet,
Scipio was rendered exceedingly anxious, because no one there was
prepared for such an attack, or had anything in readiness to meet the
danger. He therefore broke up his camp and marched back in haste to
support his men. There he found his decked ships thoroughly well fitted
out for raising siege-engines and applying them to walls, and generally
for all purposes of an assault upon a town, but not in the least in the
trim for a sea-fight; while the enemy’s fleet had been under process
of rigging for this purpose the whole winter. He therefore gave up all
idea of putting to sea to meet the enemy and accepting battle there;
but anchoring his decked ships side by side he moored the transports
round them, three or four deep; and then, taking down the masts and
yard-arms, he lashed the vessels together firmly by means of these,
keeping a space between each sufficient to enable the light craft to
sail in and out....


+11.+ Philo was a parasite of Agathocles, the son of Oenanthe, and the
friend of king Philopator....

[Sidenote: The extraordinary influence of women of low character at

Many statues of Cleino, the girl who acted as cupbearer to Ptolemy
Philadelphus, were set up at Alexandria, draped in a single tunic and
holding a cup in the hands. And are not the most splendid houses there
those which go by the names of Murtium, Mnesis, and Pothine? And yet
Mnesis was a flute-girl, as was Pothine, and Murtium was a public
prostitute. And was not Agathocleia, the mistress of king Ptolemy
Philopator, an influential personage,—she who was the ruin of the whole

[Sidenote: The feeble character of Ptolemy Philopator.]

+12.+ The question may be asked, perhaps, why I have chosen to give
a sketch of Egyptian history here, going back a considerable period;
whereas, in the case of the rest of my history, I have recorded the
events of each year in the several countries side by side? I have
done so for the following reasons: Ptolemy Philopator, of whom I am
now speaking, after the conclusion of the war for the possession of
Coele-Syria,[59] abandoned all noble pursuits and gave himself up
to the life of debauchery which I have just described. But late in
life he was compelled by circumstances to engage in the war I have
mentioned,[60] which, over and above the mutual cruelty and lawlessness
with which it was conducted, witnessed neither pitched battle, sea
fight, siege, or anything else worth recording. I thought, therefore,
that it would be easier for me as a writer, and more intelligible
to my readers, if I did not touch upon everything year by year as
it occurred, or give a full account of transactions which were
insignificant and undeserving of serious attention; but should once for
all sum up and describe the character and policy of this king.


_A slight success on the part of the Carthaginian fleet at Utica (14,
10) had been more than outweighed by the capture of Syphax by Laelius
[Livy, 39, 11]. Negotiations for peace followed, and an armistice, in
the course of which occurred the incident referred to in the first
extract of this book._

[Sidenote: Some transports under Cn. Octavius wrecked in the Bay of
Carthage, and taken possession of by the Carthaginians in spite of the
truce. Autumn of B.C. 203. See Livy, 30, 24.]

[Sidenote: Speech of the Roman envoys.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal leaves Italy, 23d June, B.C. 203.]

+1.+ The Carthaginians having seized the transports as prizes of
war, and with them an extraordinary quantity of provisions, Scipio
was extremely enraged, not so much at the loss of the provisions,
as by the fact that the enemy had thereby obtained a vast supply of
necessaries; and still more at the Carthaginians having violated the
sworn articles of truce, and commenced the war afresh. He therefore at
once selected Lucius Sergius, Lucius Baebius, and Lucius Fabius to go
to Carthage, to remonstrate on what had taken place, and at the same
time to announce that the Roman people had ratified the treaty; for he
had lately received a despatch from home to that effect. Upon their
arrival in Carthage these envoys first had an audience of the Senate,
and then were introduced to a meeting of the people. On both occasions
they spoke with great freedom on the situation of affairs, reminding
their hearers that “Their ambassadors who had come to the Roman camp
at Tunes, on being admitted to the council of officers, had not been
content with appealing to the gods and kissing the ground, as other
people do, but had thrown themselves upon the earth, and in abject
humiliation had kissed the feet of the assembled officers; and then,
rising from the ground, had reproached themselves for breaking the
existing treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians, and acknowledged
that they deserved every severity at the hands of the Romans; but
intreated to be spared the last severities, from a regard to the
vicissitudes of human fortune, for their folly would be the means of
displaying the generosity of the Romans. Remembering all this, the
general and the officers then present in the council were at a loss to
understand what had encouraged them to forget what they then said, and
to venture to break their sworn articles of agreement. Plainly it was
this—they trusted in Hannibal and the forces that had arrived with him.
But they were very ill advised. All the world knew that he and his army
had been driven these two years past from every port of Italy, and had
retreated into the neighbourhood of the Lacinian promontory, where they
had been so closely shut up and almost besieged, that they had barely
been able to get safe away home. Not that, even if they had come back,”
he added, “as conquerors, and were minded to engage us who have already
defeated you in two consecutive battles, ought you to entertain any
doubt as to the result, or to speculate on the chance of victory. The
certainty of defeat were a better subject for your reflections: and
when that takes place, what are the gods that you will summon to your
aid? And what arguments will you use to move the pity of the victors
for your misfortunes? You must needs expect to be debarred from all
hope of mercy from gods and men alike by your perfidy and folly.”

[Sidenote: Treacherous attempt on the lives of the Roman envoys.]

+2.+ After delivering this speech the envoys retired. Some few of the
citizens were against breaking the treaty; but the majority, both of
the politicians and the Senate, were much annoyed by its terms, and
irritated by the plain speaking of the envoys; and, moreover, could
not make up their minds to surrender the captured transports and
the provisions which were on board them. But their main motive was
a confident hope that they might yet conquer by means of Hannibal.
The people therefore voted to dismiss the envoys without an answer.
Moreover, the political party, whose aim it was to bring on the war
at all hazards, held a meeting and arranged the following act of
treachery. They gave out that it was necessary to make provision for
conducting the envoys back to their camp in safety. They therefore at
once caused two triremes to be got ready to convoy them; but at the
same time sent a message to the Navarch Hasdrubal to have some vessels
ready at no great distance from the Roman camp, in order that, as soon
as the convoys had taken leave of the Roman envoys, he might bear
down upon their ships and sink them; for the Carthaginian fleet was
stationed at the time close under Utica. Having made this arrangement
with Hasdrubal, they despatched the envoys, with instructions to
the officers of the convoys to leave them and return, as soon as
they had passed the mouth of the River Macara; for it was from this
point that the enemy’s camp came into sight. Therefore, according
to their instructions, as soon as they had passed this point, the
officers of the convoys made signs of farewell to the Roman envoys
and returned. Lucius and his colleagues suspected no danger, and felt
no other annoyance at this proceeding than as regarding it as a mark
of disrespect. But no sooner were they left thus alone, than three
Carthaginian vessels suddenly started out to attack them, and came
up with the Roman quinquereme. They failed, indeed, to stave her in,
because she evaded them; nor did they succeed in boarding her, because
the men resisted them with great spirit. But they ran up alongside of
the vessel, and kept attacking her at various points, and managed to
wound the marines with their darts and kill a considerable number of
them; until at last the Romans, observing that their forage parties
along the shore were rushing down to the beach to their assistance, ran
their ships upon land. Most of the marines were killed, but the envoys
had the unexpected good fortune to escape with their lives.

[Sidenote: Renewal of hostilities.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s cavalry reinforced by Tychaeus.]

+3.+ This was the signal for the recommencement of the war in a fiercer
and more angry spirit than before. The Romans on their part, looking
upon themselves as having been treated with perfidy, were possessed
with a furious determination to conquer the Carthaginians; while the
latter, conscious of the consequences of what they had done, were
ready to go all lengths to avoid falling under the power of the enemy.
With such feelings animating both sides, it was quite evident that the
result would have to be decided on the field of battle. Consequently
everybody, not only in Italy and Libya, but in Iberia, Sicily, and
Sardinia, was in a state of excited expectation, watching with
conflicting feelings to see what would happen. But meanwhile Hannibal,
finding himself too weak in cavalry, sent to a certain Numidian named
Tychaeus, who was a friend of Syphax, and was reputed to possess the
most warlike cavalry in Libya, urging him “to lend his aid, and not
let the present opportunity slip; as he must be well aware that, if
the Carthaginians won the day, he would be able to maintain his rule;
but if the Romans proved victorious, his very life would be in danger,
owing to the ambition of Massanissa.” This prince was convinced by
these arguments, and joined Hannibal with two thousand horsemen.

[Sidenote: B.C. 202. Scipio traverses the Carthaginian territory, and
summons Massanissa to his aid.]

+4.+ Having secured his fleet, Scipio left Baebius in command of it in
his place, while he himself went a round of the cities. This time he
did not admit to mercy those who voluntarily surrendered, but carried
all the towns by force, and enslaved the inhabitants, to show his
anger at the treachery of the Carthaginians. To Massanissa he sent
message after message, explaining to him how the Punic government had
broken the terms, and urging him to collect the largest army he was
able and join him with all speed. For as soon as the treaty had been
made, Massanissa, as I have said, had immediately departed with his
own army and ten Roman cohorts, infantry and cavalry, accompanied by
some commissioners from Scipio, that he might not only recover his
own kingdom, but secure the addition of that of Syphax also, by the
assistance of the Romans. And this purpose was eventually effected.

[Sidenote: Scipio orders the Carthaginian envoys to be released.]

It happened that just at this time the envoys from Rome arrived at the
naval camp. Those of them who had been sent by the Roman government,
Baebius at once caused to be escorted to Scipio, while he retained
those who were Carthaginians. The latter were much cast down, and
regarded their position as one of great danger; for when they were
informed of the impious outrage committed by their countrymen on the
persons of the Roman envoys, they thought there could be no doubt
that the vengeance for it would be wreaked upon themselves. But when
Scipio learnt from the recently-arrived commissioners that the senate
and people accepted with enthusiasm the treaty which he had made with
the Carthaginians, and were ready to grant everything he asked, he
was highly delighted, and ordered Baebius to send the envoys home
with all imaginable courtesy. And he was very well advised to do so,
in my opinion. For as he knew that his countrymen made a great point
of respecting the rights of ambassadors, he considered in his own
mind, not what the Carthaginians deserved to have done to them, but
what it was becoming in Romans to inflict. Therefore, though he did
not relax his own indignation and anger at what they had done, he
yet endeavoured, in the words of the proverb, “to maintain the good
traditions of his sires.” The result was that, by this superiority in
his conduct, a very decided impression was made upon the spirits of the
Carthaginians and of Hannibal himself.

[Sidenote: Hannibal moves to Zama.]

[Sidenote: Arrival of Massanissa.]

+5.+ When the people of Carthage saw the cities in their territory
being sacked, they sent a message to Hannibal begging him to act
without delay, to come to close quarters with the enemy, and bring the
matter to the decision of battle. He bade the messengers in answer “to
confine their attention to other matters, and to leave such things to
him, for he would choose the time for fighting himself.” Some days
afterwards he broke up his quarters at Adrumetum, and pitched his camp
near ZAMA, a town about five days march to the west of Carthage. From
that place he sent spies to ascertain the place, nature, and strength
of the Roman general’s encampment. These spies were caught and brought
to Scipio, who, so far from inflicting upon them the usual punishment
of spies, appointed a tribune to show them everything in the camp
thoroughly and without reserve; and when this had been done, he asked
the men whether the appointed officer had been careful to point out
everything to them. Upon their replying that he had, he gave them
provisions and an escort, and despatched them with injunctions to be
careful to tell Hannibal everything they had seen. On their return to
his camp, Hannibal was so much struck with the magnanimity and high
courage of Scipio, that he conceived a lively desire for a personal
interview with him. With this purpose he sent a herald to say that he
was desirous of a parley to discuss the matters at issue. When the
herald had delivered his message, Scipio at once expressed his consent,
and said that he would himself send him a message when it suited him to
meet, naming the time and place. The herald returned to Hannibal with
this answer. Next day Massanissa arrived with six thousand infantry
and about four thousand cavalry. Scipio received him with cordiality,
and congratulated him on having added to his sway all those who had
previously been subject to Syphax. Thus reinforced, he removed his camp
to Naragara: selecting it as a place which, among other advantages,
enabled him to get water within a javelin’s throw.

+6.+ From this place he sent to the Carthaginian general, informing him
that he was ready to meet him, and discuss matters with him. On hearing
this, Hannibal moved his quarters to within thirty stades of Scipio,
and pitched his camp on a hill, which seemed a favourable position
for his present purpose, except that water had to be fetched from a
considerable distance, which caused his soldiers great fatigue.

[Sidenote: Meeting of Scipio and Hannibal.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s speech.]

Next day both commanders advanced from their camps attended by a few
horsemen. Presently they left these escorts and met in the intervening
space by themselves, each accompanied by an interpreter. Hannibal was
the first to speak, after the usual salutation. He said that “He wished
that the Romans had never coveted any possession outside Italy, nor
the Carthaginians outside Libya; for these were both noble empires,
and were, so to speak, marked out by nature. But since,” he continued,
“our rival claims to Sicily first made us enemies, and then those for
Iberia; and since, finally, unwarned by the lessons of misfortune, we
have gone so far that the one nation has endangered the very soil of
its native land, and the other is now actually doing so, all that there
remains for us to do is to try our best to deprecate the wrath of the
gods, and to put an end, as far as in us lies, to these feelings of
obstinate hostility. I personally am ready to do this, because I have
learnt by actual experience that Fortune is the most fickle thing in
the world, and inclines with decisive favour now to one side and now
to the other on the slightest pretext, treating mankind like young

+7.+ “But it is about you that I am anxious, Scipio. For you are still
a young man, and everything has succeeded to your wishes both in Iberia
and Libya, and you have as yet never experienced the ebb tide of
Fortune; I fear, therefore, that my words, true as they are, will not
influence you. But do look at the facts in the light of one story, and
that not connected with a former generation, but our own. Look at me!
I am that Hannibal who, after the battle of Cannae, became master of
nearly all Italy; and presently advancing to Rome itself, and pitching
my camp within forty stades of it, deliberated as to what I should do
with you and your country; but now I am in Libya debating with you,
a Roman, as to the bare existence of myself and my countrymen. With
such a reverse as that before your eyes, I beg you not to entertain
high thoughts, but to deliberate with a due sense of human weakness on
the situation; and the way to do that is among good things to choose
the greatest, among evils the least. What man of sense, then, would
deliberately choose to incur the risk which is now before you. If you
conquer, you will add nothing of importance to your glory or to that of
your country; while, if you are worsted, you will have been yourself
the means of entirely cancelling all the honours and glories you have
already won. What then is the point that I am seeking to establish by
these arguments? It is that the Romans should retain all the countries
for which we have hitherto contended—I mean Sicily, Sardinia, and
Iberia; and that the Carthaginians should engage never to go to war
with Rome for these; and also that all the islands lying between Italy
and Libya should belong to Rome. For I am persuaded that such a treaty
will be at once safest for the Carthaginians, and most glorious for you
and the entire people of Rome.”

[Sidenote: Scipio’s reply.]

+8.+ In reply to this speech of Hannibal, Scipio said “That neither
in the Sicilian nor Iberian war were the Romans the aggressors, but
notoriously the Carthaginians, which no one knew better than Hannibal
himself. That the gods themselves had confirmed this by giving the
victory, not to those who struck the first and unprovoked blow, but
to those who only acted in self-defence. That he was as ready as any
one to keep before his eyes the uncertainty of Fortune, and tried his
best to confine his efforts within the range of human infirmity. But
if,” he continued, “you had yourself quitted Italy before the Romans
crossed to Libya with the offer of these terms in your hands, I do
not think that you would have been disappointed in your expectation.
But now that your departure from Italy has been involuntary, and we
have crossed into Libya and conquered the country, it is clear that
matters stand on a very different footing. But above all, consider
the point which affairs have reached now. Your countrymen have been
beaten, and at their earnest prayer we arranged a written treaty, in
which, besides the offer now made by you, it was provided that the
Carthaginians should restore prisoners without ransom, should surrender
all their decked vessels, pay five thousand talents, and give hostages
for their performance of these articles. These were the terms which
I and they mutually agreed upon; we both despatched envoys to our
respective Senates and people,—we consenting to grant these terms, the
Carthaginians begging to have them granted. The Senate agreed: the
people ratified the treaty. But though they had got what they asked,
the Carthaginians annulled the compact by an act of perfidy towards
us. What course is left to me? Put yourself in my place and say. To
withdraw the severest clauses of the treaty? Are we to do this, say
you, not in order that by reaping the reward of treachery they may
learn in future to outrage their benefactors, but in order that by
getting what they ask for they may be grateful to us? Why, only the
other day, after obtaining what they begged for as suppliants, because
your presence gave them a slender hope of success, they at once treated
us as hated foes and public enemies. In these circumstances, if a
still severer clause were added to the conditions imposed, it might
be possible to refer the treaty back to the people; but, if I were to
withdraw any of these conditions, such a reference does not admit even
of discussion. What then is the conclusion of my discourse? It is, that
you must submit yourselves and your country to us unconditionally, or
conquer us in the field.”

[Sidenote: The momentous issues depending on the battle of Zama, B.C.

+9.+ After these speeches Hannibal and Scipio parted without coming to
any terms; and next morning by daybreak both generals drew out their
forces and engaged. To the Carthaginians it was a struggle for their
own lives and the sovereignty of Libya; to the Romans for universal
dominion and supremacy. And could any one who grasped the situation
fail to be moved at the story? Armies more fitted for war than these,
or generals who had been more successful or more thoroughly trained in
all the operations of war, it would be impossible to find, or any other
occasion on which the prizes proposed by destiny to the combatants
were more momentous. For it was not merely of Libya or Europe that the
victors in this battle were destined to become masters, but of all
other parts of the world known to history,—a destiny which had not to
wait long for its fulfilment.

[Sidenote: Scipio’s order of battle.]

Scipio placed his men on the field in the following order: the
_hastati_ first, with an interval between their maniples; behind them
the _principes_, their maniples not arranged to cover the intervals
between those of the _hastati_ as the Roman custom is, but immediately
behind them at some distance, because the enemy was so strong in
elephants. In the rear of these he stationed the _triarii_. On his left
wing he stationed Gaius Laelius with the Italian cavalry, on the right
Massanissa with all his Numidians. The intervals between the front
maniples he filled up with maniples of _velites_, who were ordered to
begin the battle; but if they found themselves unable to stand the
charge of the elephants, to retire quickly either to the rear of the
whole army by the intervals between the maniples, which went straight
through the ranks, or, if they got entangled with the elephants, to
step aside into the lateral spaces between the maniples.

[Sidenote: Scipio’s speech to his men.]

+10.+ These dispositions made, he went along the ranks delivering an
exhortation to the men, which, though short, was much to the point
in the circumstances in which they were placed. He called upon them,
“Remembering their former victories, to show themselves to be men of
mettle and worthy their reputation and their country. To put before
their eyes that the effect of their victory would be not only to make
them complete masters of Libya, but to give them and their country
the supremacy and undisputed lordship of the world. But if the result
of the battle were unfavourable, those who fell fighting gallantly
would have the record of having died for their country, while those
that saved themselves by flight would spend the rest of their days as
objects of pitying contempt and scorn. For there was no place in Libya
which could secure their safety if they fled; while, if they fell into
the hands of the Carthaginians, no one who looked facts in the face
could doubt what would happen to them. May none of you,” he added,
“learn that by experience! Since, then, Fortune puts before us the most
glorious of rewards, in whichever way the battle is decided, should
we not be at once the most mean-spirited and foolish of mankind if we
abandon the most glorious alternative, and from a paltry clinging to
life deliberately choose the worst of misfortunes? Charge the enemy
then with the steady resolve to do one of two things, to conquer or to
die! For it is men thus minded who invariably conquer their opponents,
since they enter the field with no other hope of life.”

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s order of battle.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s speech to the “army of Italy.”]

+11.+ Such was Scipio’s address to his men. Meanwhile Hannibal
had put his men also into position. His elephants, which numbered
more than eighty, he placed in the van of the whole army. Next his
mercenaries, amounting to twelve thousand, and consisting of Ligurians,
Celts, Baliarians, and Mauretani; behind them the native Libyans
and Carthaginians; and on the rear of the whole the men whom he had
brought from Italy, at a distance of somewhat more than a stade. His
wings he strengthened with cavalry, stationing the Numidian allies on
the left wing, and the Carthaginian horsemen on the right. He ordered
each officer to address his own men, bidding them rest their hopes of
victory on him and the army he had brought with him; while he bade
their officers remind the Carthaginians in plain terms what would
happen to their wives and children if the battle should be lost. While
these orders were carried out by the officers, Hannibal himself went
along the lines of his Italian army and urged them “to remember the
seventeen years during which they had been brothers-in-arms, and the
number of battles they had fought with the Romans, in which they had
never been beaten or given the Romans even a hope of victory. Above
all, putting aside minor engagements and their countless successes, let
them place before their eyes the battle of the River Trebia against
the father of the present Roman commander; and again the battle in
Etruria against Flaminius; and lastly that at Cannae against Aemilius,
with none of which was the present struggle to be compared, whether in
regard to the number or excellence of the enemy’s men. Let them only
raise their eyes and look at the ranks of the enemy; they would see
that they were not merely fewer, but many times fewer than those with
whom they had fought before, while, as to their soldierly qualities,
there was no comparison. The former Roman armies had come to the
struggle with them untainted by memories of past defeats: while these
men were the sons or the remnants of those who had been beaten in
Italy, and fled before him again and again. They ought not therefore,”
he said, “to undo the glory and fame of their previous achievements,
but to struggle with a firm and brave resolve to maintain their
reputation of invincibility.”

Such were the addresses of the two commanders.

[Sidenote: A stampede of the elephants.]

[Sidenote: Flight of the Carthaginian cavalry.]

+12.+ All arrangements for the battle being complete, and the two
opposing forces of Numidian cavalry having been for some time engaged
in skirmishing attacks upon each other, Hannibal gave the word to the
men on the elephants to charge the enemy. But as they heard the horns
and trumpets braying all round them, some of the elephants became
unmanageable and rushed back upon the Numidian contingents of the
Carthaginian army; and this enabled Massanissa with great speed to
deprive the Carthaginian left wing of its cavalry support. The rest
of the elephants charged the Roman velites in the spaces between the
maniples of the line, and while inflicting much damage on the enemy
suffered severely themselves; until, becoming frightened, some of
them ran away down the vacant spaces, the Romans letting them pass
harmlessly along, according to Scipio’s orders, while others ran away
to the right under a shower of darts from the cavalry, until they
were finally driven clear off the field. It was just at the moment of
this stampede of the elephants, that Laelius forced the Carthaginian
cavalry into headlong flight, and along with Massanissa pressed them
with a vigorous pursuit. While this was going on, the opposing lines
of heavy infantry were advancing to meet others with deliberate step
and proud confidence, except Hannibal’s “army of Italy,” which remained
in its original position. When they came within distance the Roman
soldiers charged the enemy, shouting as usual their war-cry, and
clashing their swords against their shields: while the Carthaginian
mercenaries uttered a strange confusion of cries, the effect of which
was indescribable, for, in the words of the poet,[61] the “voice of all
was not one”—

                     “nor one their cry:
   But manifold their speech as was their race.”

[Sidenote: The fight of the heavy infantry.]

+13.+ The whole affair being now a trial of strength between man
and man at close quarters, as the combatants used their swords and
not their spears, the superiority was at first on the side of the
dexterity and daring of the mercenaries, which enabled them to wound
a considerable number of the Romans. The latter, however, trusting to
the steadiness of their ranks and the excellence of their arms, still
kept gaining ground, their rear ranks keeping close up with them and
encouraging them to advance; while the Carthaginians did not keep
up with their mercenaries nor support them, but showed a thoroughly
cowardly spirit. The result was that the foreign soldiers gave way:
and, believing that they had been shamelessly abandoned by their own
side, fell upon the men on their rear as they were retreating, and
began killing them; whereby many of the Carthaginians were compelled
to meet a gallant death in spite of themselves. For as they were being
cut down by their mercenaries they had, much against their inclination,
to fight with their own men and the Romans at the same time; and as
they now fought with desperation and fury they killed a good many both
of their own men and of the enemy also. Thus it came about that their
charge threw the maniples of the _hastati_ into confusion; whereupon
the officers of the _principes_ caused their lines to advance to oppose
them. However, the greater part of the mercenaries and Carthaginians
had fallen either by mutual slaughter or by the sword of the _hastati_.
Those who survived and fled Hannibal would not allow to enter the ranks
of his army, but ordered his men to lower their spears and keep them
back as they approached; and they were therefore compelled to take
refuge on the wings or make for the open country.

[Sidenote: Final struggle between Hannibal’s reserves, his “army of
Italy,” and the whole Roman infantry.]

[Sidenote: The battle is decided by the return of the Roman and
Numidian cavalry.]

+14.+ The space between the two armies that still remained in position
was full of blood, wounded men, and dead corpses; and thus the rout
of the enemy proved an impediment of a perplexing nature to the
Roman general. Everything was calculated to make an advance in order
difficult,—the ground slippery with gore, the corpses lying piled up in
bloody heaps, and with the corpses arms flung about in every direction.
However Scipio caused the wounded to be carried to the rear, and the
_hastati_ to be recalled from the pursuit by the sound of a bugle, and
drew them up where they were in advance of the ground on which the
fighting had taken place, opposite the enemy’s centre. He then ordered
the _principes_ and _triarii_ to take close order, and, threading
their way through the corpses, to deploy into line with the _hastati_
on either flank. When they had surmounted the obstacles and got into
line with the _hastati_, the two lines charged each other with the
greatest fire and fury. Being nearly equal in numbers, spirit, courage,
and arms, the battle was for a long time undecided, the men in their
obstinate valour falling dead without giving way a step; until at last
the divisions of Massanissa and Laelius, returning from the pursuit,
arrived providentially in the very nick of time. Upon their charging
Hannibal’s rear, the greater part of his men were cut down in their
ranks; while of those who attempted to fly very few escaped with their
life, because the horsemen were close at their heels and the ground
was quite level. On the Roman side there fell over fifteen hundred, on
the Carthaginian over twenty thousand, while the prisoners taken were
almost as numerous.

+15.+ Such was the end of this battle, fought under these famous
commanders: a battle on which everything depended, and which assigned
universal dominion to Rome. After it had come to an end, Scipio pushed
on in pursuit as far as the Carthaginian camp, [Hannibal escapes to
Adrumetum.] and, after plundering that, returned to his own. Hannibal,
escaping with a few horsemen, did not draw rein until he arrived safely
at Adrumetum. He had done in the battle all that was to be expected of
a good and experienced general. First, he had tried by an interview
with his opponent to see what he could do to procure a pacification;
and that was the right course for a man, who, while fully conscious of
his former victories, yet mistrusts Fortune, and has an eye to all the
possible and unexpected contingencies of war. Next, having accepted
battle, the excellence of his dispositions for a contest with the
Romans, considering the identity of the arms on each side, could not
have been surpassed. For though the Roman line is hard to break, yet
each individual soldier and each company, owing to the uniform tactic
employed, can fight in any direction, those companies, which happen
to be in nearest contact with the danger, wheeling round to the point
required. Again, the nature of their arms gives at once protection and
confidence, for their shield is large and their sword will not bend:
the Romans therefore are formidable on the field and hard to conquer.

+16.+ Still Hannibal took his measures against each of these
difficulties in a manner that could not be surpassed. He provided
himself with those numerous elephants, and put them in the van, for
the express purpose of throwing the enemy’s ranks into confusion and
breaking their order. Again he stationed the mercenaries in front and
the Carthaginians behind them, in order to wear out the bodies of the
enemy with fatigue beforehand, and to blunt the edge of their swords by
the numbers that would be killed by them; and moreover to compel the
Carthaginians, by being in the middle of the army, to stay where they
were and fight, as the poet says[62]—

   “That howsoe’er unwilling fight he must.”

But the most warlike and steady part of his army he held in reserve
at some distance, in order that they might not see what was happening
too closely, but, with strength and spirit unimpaired, might use their
courage to the best advantage when the moment arrived. And, if in spite
of having done everything that could be done, he who had never been
beaten before failed to secure the victory now, we must excuse him. For
there are times when chance thwarts the plans of the brave; and there
are others again, when a man

   “Though great and brave has met a greater still.”[63]

And this we might say was the case with Hannibal on this occasion....

[Sidenote: Scipio’s answer to the envoys from Carthage after Zama, who
made extravagant displays of sorrow.]

+17.+ Manifestations of emotion which go beyond what is customary
among a particular people, if they are thought to be the result of
genuine feeling evoked by extraordinary disasters, excite pity in the
minds of those who see or hear them; and we are all in a manner moved
by the novelty of the spectacle. But when such things appear to be
assumed for the purpose of taking in the spectators and producing a
dramatic effect, they do not provoke pity, but anger and dislike. And
this was the case in regard to the Carthaginian envoys. Scipio deigned
to give a very brief answer to their prayers, saying that “They, at
any rate, deserved no kindness at the hands of the Romans, since they
had themselves confessed that they were the aggressors in the war,
by having, contrary to their treaty obligations, taken Saguntum and
enslaved its inhabitants, and had recently been guilty of treachery and
breaking the terms of a treaty to which they had subscribed and sworn.
It was from a regard to their own dignity, to the vicissitudes of
Fortune, and to the dictates of humanity that the Romans had determined
to treat them with lenity and behave with magnanimity. And of this
they would be convinced if they would take a right view of the case.
For they ought not to consider it a hardship if they found themselves
charged to submit to any punishment, to follow a particular line of
conduct, or to give up this or that; they ought rather to regard it
as an unexpected favour that any kindness was conceded to them at
all; since Fortune, after depriving them of all right to pity and
consideration, owing to their own unrighteous conduct, had put them
in the power of their enemies.” After this preamble he mentioned the
concessions to be made to them, and the penalties to which they were to

[Sidenote: Terms imposed on Carthage after the battle of Zama, B.C.

+18.+ The following are the heads of the terms offered them:—_The
Carthaginians to retain the towns in Libya, of which they were
possessed before they commenced the last war against Rome, and the
territory which they also heretofore held, with its cattle, slaves,
and other stock: and from that day should not be subject to acts of
hostility, should enjoy their own laws and customs, and not have a
Roman garrison in their city._ These were the concessions favourable
to them. The clauses of an opposite character were as follows:—_The
Carthaginians to pay an indemnity to the Romans for all wrongs
committed during the truce; to restore all captives and runaway slaves
without limit of time; to hand over all their ships of war except ten
triremes, and all elephants; to go to war with no people outside Libya
at all, and with none in Libya without consent from Rome; to restore
to Massanissa all houses, territory, and cities belonging to him or
his ancestors within the frontiers assigned to that king; to supply
the Roman army with provisions for three months, and with pay, until
such time as an answer shall be returned from Rome on the subject of
the treaty; to pay ten thousand talents of silver in fifty years, two
hundred Euboic talents every year; to give a hundred hostages of their
good faith,—such hostages to be selected from the young men of the
country by the Roman general, and to be not younger than fourteen or
older than thirty years._

[Sidenote: A scene in the Carthaginian assembly. Hannibal persuades
them to accept the treaty.]

+19.+ This was the nature of Scipio’s answer to the envoys, who
hastened home and communicated its terms to their countrymen. It was
then that the story goes that, upon a certain Senator intending to
speak against accepting the terms and actually beginning to do so,
Hannibal came forward and pulled the man down from the tribune; and
when the other senators showed anger at this breach of custom, Hannibal
rose again and “owned that he was ignorant of such things; but said
that they must pardon him if he acted in any way contrary to their
customs, remembering that he had left the country when he was but
fourteen, and had only returned when now past forty-five. Therefore
he begged them not to consider whether he had committed a breach of
custom, but much rather whether he were genuinely feeling for his
country’s misfortunes; for that was the real reason for his having
been guilty of this breach of manners. For it appeared to him to be
astonishing, and, indeed, quite unaccountable, that any one calling
himself a Carthaginian, and being fully aware of the policy which
they had individually and collectively adopted against the Romans,
should do otherwise than adore the kindness of Fortune for obtaining
such favourable terms, when in their power, as a few days ago no
one—considering the extraordinary provocation they had given—would have
ventured to mention, if they had been asked what they expected would
happen to their country, in case of the Romans proving victorious.
Therefore he called upon them now not to debate, but unanimously to
accept the terms offered, and with sacrifices to the gods to pray with
one accord that the Roman people might confirm the treaty.” His advice
being regarded as both sensible and timely, they resolved to sign the
treaty on the conditions specified; and the senate at once despatched
envoys to notify their consent....

_The intrigues of Philip V. and Antiochus the Great to divide the
dominions of the infant king of Egypt, Ptolemy Epiphanes, B.C. 204._

[Sidenote: Shameless ambition of Philip and Antiochus.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 197. B.C. 191.]

+20.+ Is it not astonishing that while Ptolemy Philopator was alive and
did not need such assistance, these two kings were ready with offers of
aid, but that as soon as he was dead, leaving his heir a mere child,
whose kingdom they were bound by the ties of nature to have defended,
they then egged each other on to adopt the policy of partitioning the
boy’s kingdom between themselves, and getting rid entirely of the heir;
and that too without putting forward any decent pretext to cover their
iniquity, but acting so shamelessly, and so like beasts of prey, that
one can only compare their habits to those ascribed to fishes, among
which, though they may be of the same species, the destruction of the
smaller is the food and sustenance of the larger. This treaty of theirs
shows, as though in a mirror, the impiety to heaven and cruelty to man
of these two kings, as well as their unbounded ambition. However, if
a man were disposed to find fault with Fortune for her administration
of human affairs, he might fairly become reconciled to her in this
case; for she brought upon those monarchs the punishment they so well
deserved, and by the signal example she made of them taught posterity
a lesson in righteousness. For while they were engaged in acts of
treachery against each other, and in dismembering the child’s kingdom
in their own interests, she brought the Romans upon them, and the very
measures which they had lawlessly designed against another, she justly
and properly carried out against them. For both of them, being promptly
beaten in the field, were not only prevented from gratifying their
desire for the dominions of another, but were themselves made tributary
and forced to obey orders from Rome. Finally, within a very short time
Fortune restored the kingdom of Ptolemy to prosperity; while as to the
dynasties and successors of these two monarchs, she either utterly
abolished and destroyed them, or involved them in misfortunes which
were little short of that....

[Sidenote: The intrigues and tyranny of Molpagorus at Cius, in

+21.+ There was a certain man at Cius named Molpagoras, a ready speaker
and of considerable ability in affairs, but at heart a mere demagogue
and selfish intriguer. By flattering the mob, and putting the richer
citizens into its power, he either got them put to death right out, or
drove them into exile and distributed their confiscated goods among
the common people, and thus rapidly secured for himself a position of
despotic power....

[Sidenote: The causes of the ruin of Cius.]

The miseries which befel the Cians were not so much owing to Fortune or
the aggressions of their neighbours, as to their own folly and perverse
policy. For by steadily promoting their worst men, and punishing all
who were opposed to these, that they might divide their property among
themselves, they seemed as it were to court the disasters into which
they fell. These are disasters into which, somehow or another, though
all men fall, they yet not only cannot learn wisdom, but seem not even
to acquire the cautious distrust of brute beasts. The latter, if they
have once been hurt by bait or trap, or even if they have seen another
in danger of being caught, you would find it difficult to induce to
approach anything of the sort again: they are shy of the place, and
suspicious of everything they see. But as for men, though they have
been told of cities utterly ruined by their policy, and see others
actually doing so before their eyes, yet directly any one flatters
their wishes by holding out to them the prospect of recruiting their
fortunes at the cost of others, they rush thoughtlessly to the bait:
although they know quite well that no one, who has ever swallowed
such baits, has ever survived; and that such political conduct has
notoriously been the ruin of all who have adopted it.

[Sidenote: Capture of Cius by Philip V. B.C. 202.[64]

+22.+ Philip was delighted at taking the city, as though he had
performed a glorious and honourable achievement; ] for while displaying
great zeal in behalf of his brother-in-law (Prusias), and overawing all
who opposed his policy, he had secured for himself in fair warfare a
large supply of slaves and money. But the reverse of this picture he
did not see in the least, although it was quite plain. In the first
place, that he was assisting his brother-in-law, who, without receiving
any provocation, was treacherously assailing his neighbours. In the
second place, that by involving a Greek city without just cause in the
most dreadful misfortunes, he was sure to confirm the report, which
had been widely spread, of his severity to his friends; and by both of
these actions would justly gain throughout Greece the reputation of a
man reckless of the dictates of piety. In the third place, that he had
outraged the envoys from the above-mentioned states,[65] who had come
with the hope of saving the Cians from the danger which threatened
them, and who, after being day after day mocked by his professions,
had been at length compelled to witness what they most abhorred. And
lastly, that he had so infuriated the Rhodians, that they would never
henceforth listen to a word in his favour: a circumstance for which
Philip had to thank Fortune as well as himself.

[Sidenote: The anger of the Rhodians at the fall of Cius.]

+23.+ For it happened that just when his ambassador was defending
his master before the Rhodians in the theatre,—enlarging on “the
magnanimity of Philip,” and announcing that “though already in a manner
master of Cius, he conceded its safety to the wishes of the Rhodian
people; and did so because he desired to refute the calumnies of his
enemies, and to establish the honesty of his intentions in the eyes of
Rhodes,”—just then a man entered the Prytaneum who had newly arrived
in the island, and brought the news of the enslavement of the Cians
and the cruelty which Philip had exercised upon them. The Prytanis
coming into the theatre to announce this news, while the ambassador was
absolutely in the middle of his speech, the Rhodians could scarcely
make up their minds to believe a report which involved such monstrous

[Sidenote: It causes a breach with the Aetolians.]

He had then betrayed himself quite as grossly as the Cians; and so
blind or misguided had he become as to the principles of right and
wrong, that he boasted of actions of which he ought to have been most
heartily ashamed, and plumed himself upon them as though they were
to his credit. But the people of Rhodes from that day forth regarded
Philip as their enemy, and made their preparations with that view. And
no less by this course had he gained the hatred of the Aetolians. He
had but lately made terms with, and held out the hand of friendship to
that nation: no excuse for a breach had arisen; and the Lysimachians,
Calchedonians, and Cianians were friends and allies of the Aetolians.
Nevertheless only a short time before he had separated Lysimachia
from the Aetolian alliance, and induced it to submit to him: then he
had done the same to Calchedon: and lastly he had enslaved the Cians,
though there was an Aetolian officer actually in Cius and conducting
the government. Prusias, however, in so far as his policy was
accomplished, was delighted; but inasmuch as another was in possession
of the prizes of the operations, while he himself got as his share
nothing but the bare site of a city, was extremely annoyed, but was yet
unable to do anything....

[Sidenote: Philip at Thasos, B.C. 202-201.]

+24.+ During his return voyage Philip engaged in one act of treachery
after another, and among others put in about midday at the town of
Thasos, and though it was on good terms with him, took it and enslaved
its inhabitants....

The Thasians answered Philip’s general Metrodorus, that they would
surrender their city, on condition that he would guarantee them freedom
from a garrison, tribute, or billeting of soldiers, and the enjoyment
of their own laws. Metrodorus having declared the king’s consent to
this, the whole assembly signified their approval of the words by a
loud shout, whereupon they admitted Philip into the town....

All kings perhaps at the beginning of their reign dangle the name of
liberty before their subjects’ eyes, and address as friends and allies
those who combine in pursuing the same objects as themselves; but when
they come to actual administration of affairs they at once cease to
treat these as allies, and assume the airs of a master. Such persons
accordingly find themselves deceived as to the honourable position they
expected to occupy, though as a rule not as to the immediate advantage
which they sought. But if a king is meditating undertakings of the
greatest importance, and only bounding his hopes by the limits of the
world, and has as yet had nothing to cast a damp upon his projects,
would it not seem the height of folly and madness to proclaim his own
fickleness and untrustworthiness in matters which are of the smallest
consequence, and lie at the very threshold of his enterprise?...


+24+ (_a_). My plan being to narrate under each year all the events in
the several parts of the world which were contemporary, it is clear
that in some cases it will be necessary to mention the end before the
beginning; when, that is to say, that particular part of the subject
calls for mention, first, as being in place in the general course of my
narrative, and the events which embrace the end of an episode fit in
sooner than those which belong to its beginning and first conception....

[Sidenote: The previous career of Sosibius.]

+25.+ Sosibius, the unfaithful guardian of Ptolemy Epiphanes, was a
creature of extraordinary cunning, who long retained his power, and
was the instrument of many crimes at court: he contrived first the
murder of Lysimachus, son of Arsinoe, daughter of Ptolemy and Berenice;
secondly, that of Maga, son of Ptolemy and Berenice the daughter of
Maga; thirdly, that of Berenice the mother of Ptolemy Philopator;
fourthly, that of Cleomenes of Sparta; and fifthly, that of Arsinoe the
daughter of Berenice....

[Sidenote: B.C. 205. The death of Ptolemy Philopator announced, and
Epiphanes crowned.]

Three or four days after the death of Ptolemy Philopator, having caused
a platform to be erected in the largest court of the palace, Agathocles
and Sosibius summoned a meeting of the foot-guards and the household,
as well as the officers of the infantry and cavalry. The assembly
being formed, they mounted the platform, and first of all announced
the deaths of the king and queen, and proclaimed the customary period
of mourning for the people. After that they placed a diadem upon the
head of the child, Ptolemy Epiphanes, proclaimed him king, and read a
forged will, in which the late king nominated Agathocles and Sosibius
guardians of his son. They ended by an exhortation to the officers to
be loyal to the boy and maintain his sovereignty. They next brought in
two silver urns, one of which they declared contained the ashes of the
king, the other those of Arsinoe. And in fact one of them did really
contain the king’s ashes, the other was filled with spices. Having
done this they proceeded to complete the funeral ceremonies. It was
then that all the world at last learnt the truth about the death of
Arsinoe. For now that her death was clearly established, the manner of
it began to be a matter of speculation. Though rumours which turned out
to be true had found their way among the people, they had up to this
time been disputed; now there was no possibility of hiding the truth,
and it became deeply impressed in the minds of all. Indeed there was
great excitement among the populace: no one thought about the king; it
was the fate of Arsinoe that moved them. Some recalled her orphanhood;
others the tyranny and insult she had endured from her earliest days;
and when her miserable death was added to these misfortunes, it excited
such a passion of pity and sorrow that the city was filled with
sighs, tears, and irrepressible lamentation. Yet it was clear to the
thoughtful observer that these were not so much signs of affection for
Arsinoe as of hatred towards Agathocles.

[Sidenote: Agathocles propitiates the army and gets rid of the rivals.]

The first measure of this minister, after depositing the urns in the
royal mortuary, and giving orders for the laying aside of mourning,
was to gratify the army with two months’ pay; for he was convinced that
the way to deaden the resentment of the common soldiers was to appeal
to their interests. He then caused them to take the oath customary at
the proclamation of a new king; and next took measures to get all who
were likely to be formidable out of the country. Philammon, who had
been employed in the murder of Arsinoe, he sent out as governor of
Cyrene, while he committed the young king to the charge of Oenanthe and
Agathocleia. Next, Pelops the son of Pelops he despatched to the court
of Antiochus in Asia, to urge him to maintain his friendly relations
with the court of Alexandria, and not to violate the treaty he had
made with the young king’s father. Ptolemy, son of Sosibius, he sent
to Philip to arrange for a treaty of inter-marriage between the two
countries, and to ask for assistance in case Antiochus should make a
serious attempt to play them false in any matter of importance.

He also selected Ptolemy, son of Agesarchus, as ambassador to Rome:
not with a view of his seriously prosecuting the embassy, but because
he thought that, if he once entered Greece, he would find himself
among friends and kinsfolk, and would stay there; which would suit his
policy of getting rid of eminent men. Scopas the Aetolian also he sent
to Greece to recruit foreign mercenaries, giving him a large sum in
gold for bounties. He had two objects in view in this measure: one was
to use the soldiers so recruited in the war with Antiochus; another
was to get rid of the mercenary troops already existing, by sending
them on garrison duty in the various forts and settlements about the
country; while he used the new recruits to fill up the numbers of the
household regiments with new men, as well as the pickets immediately
round the palace, and in other parts of the city. For he believed that
men who had been hired by himself, and were taking his pay, would have
no feelings in common with the old soldiers, with whom they would be
totally unacquainted; but that, having all their hopes of safety and
profit in him, he would find them ready to co-operate with him and
carry out his orders.

Now all this took place before the intrigue of Philip, though it was
necessary for the sake of clearness to speak of that first, and to
describe the transactions which took place, both at the audience and
the dispatch of the ambassadors.

[Sidenote: The debauchery of Agathocles.]

To return to Agathocles: when he had thus got rid of the most eminent
men, and had to a great degree quieted the wrath of the common soldiers
by his present of pay, he returned quickly to his old way of life.
Drawing round him a body of friends, whom he selected from the most
frivolous and shameless of his personal attendants or servants, he
devoted the chief part of the day and night to drunkenness and all
the excesses which accompany drunkenness, sparing neither matron,
nor bride, nor virgin, and doing all this with the most offensive
ostentation. The result was a widespread outburst of discontent; and
when there appeared no prospect of reforming this state of things, or
of obtaining protection against the violence, insolence and debauchery
of the court, which on the contrary grew daily more outrageous, their
old hatred blazed up once more in the hearts of the common people, and
all began again to recall the misfortunes which the kingdom already
owed to these very men. But the absence of any one fit to take the
lead, and by whose means they could vent their wrath upon Agathocles
and Agathocleia, kept them quiet. Their one remaining hope rested upon
Tlepolemus, and on this they fixed their confidence.

[Sidenote: Tlepolemus, governor of Pelusium, determines to depose
Agathocles, B.C. 205-204.]

[Sidenote: Agathocles will anticipate him.]

As long as the late king was alive Tlepolemus remained in retirement;
but upon his death he quickly propitiated the common soldiers, and
became once more governor of Pelusium. At first he directed all his
actions with a view to the interest of the king, believing that
there would be some council of regency to take charge of the boy and
administer the government. But when he saw that all those who were
fit for this charge were got out of the way, and that Agathocles was
boldly monopolising the supreme power, he quickly changed his purpose;
because he suspected the danger that threatened him from the hatred
which they mutually entertained. He therefore began to draw his troops
together, and bestir himself to collect money, that he might not be
an easy prey to any one of his enemies. At the same time he was not
without hope that the guardianship of the young king, and the chief
power in the state might devolve upon him; both because, in his own
private opinion, he was much more fit for it in every respect than
Agathocles, and because he was informed that his own troops and those
in Alexandria were looking to him to put an end to the minister’s
outrageous conduct. When such ideas were entertained by Tlepolemus, it
did not take long to make the quarrel grow, especially as the partisans
of both helped to inflame it. Being eager to secure the adhesion of
the generals of divisions and the captains of companies, he frequently
invited them to banquets; and at these assemblies, instigated partly by
the flattery of his guests and partly by his own impulse (for he was a
young man and the conversation was over the wine), he used to throw out
sarcastic remarks against the family of Agathocles. At first they were
covert and enigmatic, then merely ambiguous, and finally undisguised,
and containing the bitterest reflections. He proposed the health of
the scribbler of pasquinades, the sackbut-girl and waiting-woman; and
spoke of his shameful boyhood, when as cupbearer of the king he had
submitted to the foulest treatment. His guests were always ready to
laugh at his words and add their quota to the sum of vituperation. It
was not long before this reached the ears of Agathocles: and the breach
between the two thus becoming an open one, Agathocles immediately
began bringing charges against Tlepolemus, declaring that he was a
traitor to the king, and was inviting Antiochus to come and seize the
government. And he brought many plausible proofs of this forward, some
of which he got by distorting facts that actually occurred, while
others were pure invention. His object in so doing was to excite the
wrath of the common people against Tlepolemus. But the result was the
reverse; for the populace had long fixed their hopes on Tlepolemus, and
were only too delighted to see the quarrel growing hot between them.
The actual popular outbreak which did occur began from the following
circumstances. Nicon, a relation of Agathocles, was in the lifetime of
the late king commander of the navy....

[Sidenote: A fragment from the earlier history of Agathocles.]

+26.+ (_a_) Another murder committed by Agathocles was that of Deinon,
son of Deinon. But this, as the proverb has it, was the fairest of
his foul deeds. For the letter ordering the murder of Arsinoe had
fallen into this man’s hands, and he might have given information
about the plot and saved the Queen; but at the time he chose rather
to help Philammon, and so became the cause of all the misfortunes
which followed; while, after the murder was committed, he was always
recalling the circumstances, commiserating the unhappy woman, and
expressing repentance at having let such an opportunity slip: and this
he repeated in the hearing of many, so that Agathocles heard of it, and
he met with his just punishment in losing his life....


[Sidenote: Agathocles pretends a plot of Tlepolemus against the king,
B.C. 202.]

+26.+ (_b_) The first step of Agathocles was to summon a meeting of the
Macedonian guards. He entered the assembly accompanied by the young
king and his own sister Agathocleia. At first he feigned not to be able
to say what he wished for tears; but after again and again wiping his
eyes with his chlamys he at length mastered his emotion, and, taking
the young king in his arms, spoke as follows: “Take this boy, whom his
father on his death-bed placed in this lady’s arms” (pointing to his
sister) “and confided to your loyalty, men of Macedonia! That lady’s
affection has but little influence in securing the child’s safety: it
is on you that that safety now depends; his fortunes are in your hands.
It has long been evident to those who had eyes to see, that Tlepolemus
was aiming at something higher than his natural rank; but now he has
named the day and hour on which he intends to assume the crown. Do
not let your belief of this depend upon my words; refer to those who
know the real truth and have but just come from the very scene of his
treason.” With these words he brought forward Critolaus, who deposed
that he had seen with his own eyes the altars being decked, and the
victims being got ready by the common soldiers for the ceremony of a

[Sidenote: Anger of the populace and soldiers against Agathocles.]

When the Macedonian guards had heard all this, far from being moved by
his appeal, they showed their contempt by hooting and loud murmurs,
and drove him away under such a fire of derision that he got out
of the assembly without being conscious how he did it. And similar
scenes occurred among other corps of the army at their meetings.
Meanwhile great crowds kept pouring into Alexandria from the up-country
stations, calling upon kinsmen or friends to help the movement, and
not to submit to the unbridled tyranny of such unworthy men. But what
inflamed the populace against the government more than anything else
was the knowledge that, as Tlepolemus had the absolute command of all
the imports into Alexandria, delay would be a cause of suffering to

+27.+ Moreover, an action of Agathocles himself served to heighten
the anger of the multitude and of Tlepolemus. For he took Danae, the
latter’s mother-in-law, from the temple of Demeter, dragged her through
the middle of the city unveiled, and cast her into prison. His object
in doing this was to manifest his hostility to Tlepolemus; but its
effect was to loosen the tongues of the people. In their anger they no
longer confined themselves to secret murmurs: but some of them in the
night covered the walls in every part of the city with pasquinades;
while others in the day time collected in groups and openly expressed
their loathing for the government.

[Sidenote: Terror of Agathocles.]

[Sidenote: Arrest of Moeragenes.]

Seeing what was taking place, and beginning to fear the worst,
Agathocles at one time meditated making his escape by secret flight;
but as he had nothing ready for such a measure, thanks to his own
imprudence, he had to give up that idea. At another time he set himself
to drawing out lists of men likely to assist him in a bold _coup
d’état_, by which he should put to death or arrest his enemies, and
then possess himself of absolute power. While still meditating these
plans he received information that Moeragenes, one of the bodyguard,
was betraying all the secrets of the palace to Tlepolemus, and was
co-operating with him on account of his relationship with Adaeus, at
that time the commander of Bubastus. Agathocles immediately ordered
his secretary Nicostratus to arrest Moeragenes, and extract the truth
from him by every possible kind of torture. Being promptly arrested by
Nicostratus, and taken to a retired part of the palace, he was at first
examined directly as to the facts alleged; but, refusing to confess
anything, he was stripped. And now some of the torturers were preparing
their instruments, and others with scourges in their hands were just
taking off their outer garments, when just at that very moment a
servant ran in, and, whispering something in the ear of Nicostratus,
hurried out again. Nicostratus followed close behind him, without a
word, frequently slapping his thigh with his hand.

[Sidenote: Moeragenes rouses the soldiers.]

+28.+ The predicament of Moeragenes was now indescribably strange.
There stood the executioners by his side on the point of raising
their scourges, while others close to him were getting ready their
instruments of torture: but when Nicostratus withdrew they all stood
silently staring at each other’s faces, expecting him every moment
to return; but as time went on they one by one slipped away, until
Moeragenes was left alone. Having made his way through the palace,
after this unhoped-for escape, he rushed in his half-clothed state
into a tent of the Macedonian guards which was situated close to the
palace. They chanced to be at breakfast, and therefore a good many
were collected together; and to them he narrated the story of his
wonderful escape. At first they would not believe it, but ultimately
were convinced by his appearing without his clothes. Taking advantage
of this extraordinary occurrence, Moeragenes besought the Macedonian
guards with tears not only to help him to secure his own safety, but
the king’s also, and above all their own. “For certain destruction
stared them in the face,” he said, “unless they seized the moment when
the hatred of the populace was at its height, and every one was ready
to wreak vengeance on Agathocles. That moment was _now_, and all that
was wanted was some one to begin.”

+29.+ The passions of the Macedonians were roused by these words, and
they finally agreed to do as Moeragenes advised. They at once went
round to the tents, first those of their own corps, and then those of
the other soldiers; which were all close together, facing the same
quarter of the city. The wish was one which had for a long time been
formed in the minds of the soldiery, wanting nothing but some one to
call it forth, and with courage to begin. No sooner, therefore, had a
commencement been made than it blazed out like a fire: and before four
hours had elapsed every class, whether military or civil, had agreed to
make the attempt.

[Sidenote: Agathocles despairs.]

[Sidenote: Oenanthe in the temple of Demeter.]

At this crisis, too, chance contributed a great deal to the final
catastrophe. For a letter addressed by Tlepolemus to the army as well
as some of his spies, had fallen into the hands of Agathocles. The
letter announced that he would be at Alexandria shortly, and the spies
informed Agathocles that he was already there. This news so distracted
Agathocles that he gave up taking any measures at all or even thinking
about the dangers which surrounded him, but departed at his usual
hour to his wine, and kept up the carouse to the end in his usual
licentious fashion. But his mother Oenanthe went in great distress to
the temple of Demeter and Persephone, which was open on account of a
certain annual sacrifice; and there first of all she besought the aid
of those goddesses with bendings of the knee and strange incantations,
and then sat down close to the altar and remained motionless. Most of
the women present, delighted to witness her dejection and distress,
kept silence: but the ladies of the family of Polycrates, and certain
others of the nobility, being as yet unaware of what was going on
around them, approached Oenanthe and tried to comfort her. But she
cried out in a loud voice: “Do not come near me, you monsters! I know
you well! Your hearts are always against us; and you pray the goddess
for all imaginable evil upon us. Still I trust and believe that, God
willing, you shall one day taste the flesh of your own children.” With
these words she ordered her female attendants to drive them away, and
strike them with their staves if they refused to go. The ladies availed
themselves of this excuse for quitting the temple in a body, raising
their hands and praying that she might herself have experience of those
very miseries with which she had threatened her neighbours.

[Sidenote: A mob assembles.]

+30.+ The men having by this time decided upon a revolution, now
that in every house the anger of the women was added to the general
resentment, the popular hatred blazed out with redoubled violence. As
soon as night fell the whole city was filled with tumult, torches, and
hurrying feet. Some were assembling with shouts in the stadium; some
were calling upon others to join them; some were running backwards
and forwards seeking to conceal themselves in houses and places least
likely to be suspected. And now the open spaces round the palace, the
stadium, and the street were filled with a motley crowd, as well as
the area in front of the Dionysian Theatre. Being informed of this,
Agathocles roused himself from a drunken lethargy,—for he had just
dismissed his drinking party,—and, accompanied by all his family,
with the exception of Philo, went to the king. After a few words of
lamentation over his misfortunes addressed to the child, he took him
by the hand, and proceeded to the covered walk which runs between the
Maeander garden and the Palaestra, and leads to the entrance of the
theatre. Having securely fastened the two first doors through which
he passed, he entered the third with two or three bodyguards, his own
family, and the king. The doors, however, which were secured by double
bars, were only of lattice work and could therefore be seen through.

By this time the mob had collected from every part of the city in
such numbers, that, not only was every foot of ground occupied, but
the doorsteps and roofs also were crammed with human beings; and
such a mingled storm of shouts and cries arose, as might be expected
from a crowd in which women and children were mixed with men: for in
Alexandria, as in Carthage, the children perform as conspicuous a part
in such commotions as the men.

[Sidenote: Cries for the king.]

+31.+ Day now began to break and the uproar was still a confused babel
of voices; but one cry made itself heard conspicuously above the rest,
it was a call for THE KING. The first thing actually done was by the
Macedonian guard: they left their quarters and seized the vestibule
which served as the audience hall of the palace; then, after a brief
pause, having ascertained whereabouts in the palace the king was, they
went round to the covered walk, burst open the first doors, and, when
they came to the next, demanded with loud shouts that the young king
should be surrendered to them. Agathocles, recognising his danger,
begged his bodyguards to go in his name to the Macedonians, to inform
them that “he resigned the guardianship of the king, and all offices,
honours, or emoluments which he possessed, and only asked that his
life should be granted him with a bare maintenance; that by sinking to
his original situation in life he would be rendered incapable, even
if he wished it, of being henceforth oppressive to any one.” All the
bodyguards refused except Aristomenes, who afterwards obtained the
chief power in the state.

[Sidenote: Aristomenes.]

This man was an Acarnanian, and, though far advanced in life when he
obtained supreme power, he is thought to have made a most excellent and
blameless guardian of the king and kingdom. And as he was distinguished
in that capacity, so had he been remarkable before for his adulation
of Agathocles in the time of his prosperity. He was the first, when
entertaining Agathocles at his house, to distinguish him among his
guests by the present of a gold diadem, an honour reserved by custom
to the kings alone; he was the first too who ventured to wear his
likeness on his ring; and when a daughter was born to him he named her

[Sidenote: The guards insist on the surrender of the king.]

But to return to my story. Aristomenes undertook the mission, received
his message, and made his way through a certain wicket-gate to the
Macedonians. He stated his business in few words: the first impulse
of the Macedonians was to stab him to death on the spot; but some of
them held up their hands to protect him, and successfully begged his
life. He accordingly returned with orders to bring the king or to
come no more himself. Having dismissed Aristomenes with these words,
the Macedonians proceeded to burst open the second door also. When
convinced by their proceedings, no less than by the answers they had
returned, of the fierce purpose of the Macedonians, the first idea of
Agathocles was to thrust his hand through the latticed door,—while
Agathocleia did the same with her breasts which she said had suckled
the king,—and by every kind of entreaty to beg that the Macedonians
would grant him bare life.

[Sidenote: The king conducted to the stadium.]

+32.+ But finding that his long and piteous appeals produced no effect,
at last he sent out the young king with the bodyguards. As soon as they
had got the king, the Macedonians placed him on a horse and conducted
him to the stadium. His appearance being greeted with loud shouts and
clapping of hands, they stopped the horse, and dismounting the child,
ushered him to the royal stall and seated him there. But the feelings
of the crowd were divided: they were delighted that the young king
had been brought, but they were dissatisfied that the guilty persons
had not been arrested and met with the punishment they deserved.
Accordingly, they continued with loud cries to demand that the authors
of all the mischief should be brought out and made an example. The
day was wearing away, and yet the crowd had found no one on whom to
wreak their vengeance, when Sosibius, who, though a son of the elder
Sosibius, was at that time a member of the bodyguard, and as such had
a special eye to the safety of the king and the State,—seeing that the
furious desire of the multitude was implacable, and that the child
was frightened at the unaccustomed faces that surrounded him and the
uproar of the crowd, asked the king whether he would “surrender to
the populace those who had injured him or his mother.” The boy having
nodded assent, Sosibius bade some of the bodyguard announce the king’s
decision, while he raised the young child from his seat and took him
to his own house which was close by to receive proper attention and
refreshment. When the message from the king was declared, the whole
place broke out into a storm of cheering and clapping of hands. But
meanwhile Agathocles and Agathocleia had separated and gone each to
their own lodgings. Without loss of time soldiers, some voluntarily and
others under pressure from the crowd, started in search of them.

[Sidenote: Death of Agathocles, his sister, and Oenanthe.]

+33.+ The beginning of actual bloodshed, however, was this. One of
the servants and flatterers of Agathocles, whose name was Philo, came
out to the stadium still flustered with wine. Seeing the fury of the
multitude, he said to some bystanders that they would have cause to
repent it again, as they had only the other day, if Agathocles were
to come there. Of those who heard him some began to abuse him, while
others pushed him about; and on his attempting to defend himself, some
tore his cloak off his back, while others thrust their spears into him
and wounded him mortally. He was dragged into the middle of the crowd
breathing his last gasp; and, having thus tasted blood, the multitude
began to look impatiently for the coming of the other victims. They
had not to wait long. First appeared Agathocles dragged along bound
hand and foot. No sooner had he entered than some soldiers rushed at
him and struck him dead. And in doing so they were his friends rather
than enemies, for they saved him from the horrible death which he
deserved. Nicon was brought next, and after him Agathocleia stripped
naked, with her two sisters; and following them the whole family. Last
of all some men came bringing Oenanthe, whom they had torn from the
temple of Demeter and Persephone, riding stripped naked upon a horse.
They were all given up to the populace, who bit, and stabbed them, and
knocked out their eyes, and, as soon as any one of them fell, tore him
limb from limb, until they had utterly annihilated them all: for the
savagery of the Egyptians when their passions are roused is indeed
terrible. At the same time some young girls who had been brought up
with Arsinoe, having learnt that Philammon, the chief agent in the
murder of that Queen, had arrived three days before from Cyrene, rushed
to his house; forced their way in; killed Philammon with stones and
sticks; strangled his infant son; and, not content with this, dragged
his wife naked into the street and put her to death.

Such was the end of Agathocles and Agathocleia and their kinsfolk.

[Sidenote: The contemptible character of Agathocles.]

+34.+ I am quite aware of the miraculous occurrences and embellishments
which the chroniclers of this event have added to their narrative
with a view of producing a striking effect upon their hearers, making
more of their comments on the story than of the story itself and the
main incidents. Some ascribe it entirely to Fortune, and take the
opportunity of expatiating on her fickleness and the difficulty of
being on one’s guard against her. Others dwell upon the unexpectedness
of the event, and try to assign its causes and probabilities. It was
not my purpose, however, to treat this episode in this way, because
Agathocles was not a man of conspicuous courage or ability as a
soldier; nor particularly successful or worth imitating as a statesman;
nor, lastly, eminent for his acuteness as a courtier or cunning as an
intriguer, by which latter accomplishments Sosibius and many others
have managed to keep one king after another under their influence
to the last day of their lives. The very opposite of all this may
be said of this man. For though he obtained high promotion owing to
Philopator’s feebleness as a king; and though after his death he had
the most favourable opportunity of consolidating his power, he yet soon
fell into contempt, and lost his position and his life at once, thanks
to his own want of courage and vigour.

[Sidenote: See 12, 15.]

+35.+ To such a story then no such dissertation is required, as was in
place, for instance, in the case of the Sicilian monarchs, Agathocles
and Dionysius, and certain others who have administered governments
with reputation. For the former of these, starting from a plebeian
and humble position—having been, as Timaeus sneeringly remarks, a
potter—came from the wheel, clay, and smoke, quite a young man to
Syracuse. And, to begin with, both these men in their respective
generations became tyrants of Syracuse, a city that had obtained at
that time the greatest reputation and the greatest wealth of any in the
world; and afterwards were regarded as suzerains of all Sicily, and
lords of certain districts in Italy. While, for his part, Agathocles
not only made an attempt upon Africa, but eventually died in possession
of the greatness he had acquired. It is on this account that the story
is told of Publius Scipio, the first conqueror of the Carthaginians,
that being asked whom he considered to have been the most skilful
administrators and most distinguished for boldness combined with
prudence, he replied, “the Sicilians Agathocles and Dionysius.” Now, in
the case of such men as these, it is certainly right to try to arrest
the attention of our readers, and, I suppose, to speak of Fortune and
the mutability of human affairs, and in fact to point a moral: but in
the case of such men as we have been speaking of, it is quite out of
place to do so.

+36.+ For these reasons I have rejected all idea of making too much of
the story of Agathocles. But another and the strongest reason was that
all such wonderful and striking catastrophes are only worth listening
to once; not only are subsequent exhibitions of them unprofitable
to ear and eye, but elaborate harping upon them soon becomes simply
troublesome. For those who are engaged on representing anything either
to eye or ear can have only two objects to aim at,—pleasure and profit;
and in history, more than in anything else, excessive prolixity on
events of tragic interest fails of both these objects. For, in the
first place, who would wish to emulate extraordinary catastrophes? And
next, no one likes to be continually seeing and hearing things that
are unnatural and beyond the ordinary conceptions of mankind. We are,
indeed, eager to see and hear such things once and for the first time,
because we want to know that a thing is possible which was supposed to
be impossible: but when once convinced on that point no one is pleased
at lingering on the Unnatural; but in fact would rather not come across
it at all oftener than need be. In fact, the dwelling upon misfortunes
which exceed the ordinary limits is more suitable to tragedy than to
history. But perhaps we ought to make allowances for men who have
studied neither nature nor universal history. They think, I presume,
that the most important and astonishing events in all history are
those which they happen to have come across themselves or to have
heard from others, and they therefore give their attention exclusively
to those. They accordingly do not perceive that they are making a
mistake in expatiating on events which are neither novel,—for they have
been narrated by others before,—nor capable of giving instruction or
pleasure. So much on this point....


[Sidenote: Disappointments as to the character of Antiochus the Great.]

+37.+ King Antiochus, at the beginning of his reign, was thought to
be a man of great enterprise and courage, and great vigour in the
execution of his purposes; but as he grew older his character evidently
deteriorated in itself, and disappointed the expectation of the


See _supra_ 15, 20-24; Livy, 31, 17, _sqq._

[Sidenote: Philip’s impious conduct in Asia, B.C. 201.]

[Sidenote: Zeuxis, Satrap of Antiochus, fails to help Philip

+1.+ King Philip having arrived at Pergamum, and believing that he
had as good as made an end of Attalus, gave the rein to every kind of
outrage; and by way of gratifying his almost insane fury he vented his
wrath even more against the gods than against man. For his skirmishing
attacks being easily repelled by the garrison of Pergamum, owing to the
strength of the place, and being prevented by the precautions taken
by Attalus from getting booty from the country, he directed his anger
against the seats of the gods and the sacred enclosures; in which,
as it appears to me, he did not wrong Attalus so much as himself.
He threw down the temples and the altars, and even had their stones
broken to pieces that none of the buildings he had destroyed might be
rebuilt. After spoiling the Nicephorium, cutting down its grove, and
demolishing its ring wall, and levelling with the ground many costly
fanes, he first directed his attack upon Thyatira, and thence marched
into the plain of Thebe, thinking that this district would supply him
with the richest spoil. But finding himself again disappointed in this
respect, on arriving at the “Holy Village” he sent a message to Zeuxis,
demanding that he would furnish him with corn, and render the other
services stipulated for in the treaty.[66] Zeuxis, however, though
feigning to fulfil the obligations of the treaty, was not minded to
give Philip real and substantial help....


[Sidenote: Philip failing to take Chios sails off to Samos.]

[Sidenote: Attalus and Theophiliscus follow him.]

+2.+ As the siege was not going on favourably for him, and the enemy
were blockading him with an increasing number of decked vessels, he
felt uncertain and uneasy as to the result. But as the state of affairs
left him no choice, he suddenly put to sea quite unexpectedly to the
enemy; for Attalus expected that he would persist in pushing on the
mines he had commenced. But Philip was especially keen to make his
putting to sea a surprise, because he thought that he would thus be
able to outstrip the enemy, and complete the rest of his passage along
the coast to Samos in security. But he was much disappointed in his
calculations; for Attalus and Theophiliscus (of Rhodes), directly they
saw him putting to sea, lost no time in taking action. And although,
from their previous conviction that Philip meant to stay where he
was, they were not in a position to put to sea quite simultaneously,
still by a vigorous use of their oars they managed to overtake him,
and attacked,—Attalus the enemy’s right wing, which was his leading
squadron, and Theophiliscus his left. Thus intercepted and surrounded,
Philip gave the signal to the ships of his right wing, ordering them
to turn their prows towards the enemy and engage them boldly; while
he himself retreated under cover of the smaller islands, which lay in
the way, with some light galleys, and thence watched the result of
the battle. The whole number of ships engaged were, on Philip’s side,
fifty-three decked, accompanied by some undecked vessels, and galleys
and beaked ships to the number of one hundred and fifty; for he had
not been able to fit out all his ships in Samos. On the side of the
enemy there were sixty-five decked vessels, besides those which came
from Byzantium, and along with them nine _triemioliae_ (light-decked
vessels), and three triremes.

[Sidenote: Incidents in the battle.]

[Sidenote: Loss of Philip’s flagship and admiral.]

[Sidenote: Deinocrates.]

[Sidenote: Dionysodorus.]

+3.+ The fight having been begun on the ship on which King Attalus was
sailing, all the others near began charging each other without waiting
for orders. Attalus ran into an eight-banked ship, and having struck it
a well-directed blow below the water-line, after a prolonged struggle
between the combatants on the decks, at length succeeded in sinking
it. Philip’s ten-banked ship, which, moreover, was the admiral’s,
was captured by the enemy in an extraordinary manner. For one of the
_triemioliae_, having run close under her, she struck against her
violently amidships, just beneath the thole of the topmost bank of
oars, and got fast jammed on to her, the steersman being unable to
check the way of his ship. The result was that, by this craft hanging
suspended to her, she became unmanageable and unable to turn one way
or another. While in this plight, two quinqueremes charged her on both
sides at once, and destroyed the vessel itself and the fighting men on
her deck, among whom fell Democrates, Philip’s admiral. At the same
time Dionysodorus and Deinocrates, who were brothers and joint-admirals
of the fleet of Attalus, charged, the one upon a seven-banked,
the other upon an eight-banked ship of the enemy, and had a most
extraordinary adventure in the battle. Deinocrates, in the first place,
came into collision with an eight-banked ship, and had his ship struck
above the water-line; for the enemy’s ship had its prow built high; but
he struck the enemy’s ship below the water-line,[67] and at first could
not get himself clear, though he tried again and again to back water;
and, accordingly, when the Macedonian boarded him and fought with great
gallantry, he was brought into the most imminent danger. Presently,
upon Attalus coming to his aid, and by a vigorous charge separating
the two ships, Deinocrates unexpectedly found himself free, and the
enemy’s boarders were all killed after a gallant resistance, while
their own vessel being left without men was captured by Attalus. In the
next place, Dionysodorus, making a furious charge, missed his blow; but
running up alongside of the enemy lost all the oars on his right side,
and had the timbers supporting his towers smashed to pieces, and was
thereupon immediately surrounded by the enemy. In the midst of loud
shouts and great confusion, all the rest of his marines perished along
with the ship, but he himself with two others managed to escape by
swimming to the _triemiolia_ which was coming up to the rescue.

[Sidenote: The skill of the Rhodian sailors.]

+4.+ The fight between the rest of the fleet, however, was an undecided
one; for the superiority in the numbers of Philip’s galleys was
compensated for by Attalus’s superiority in the number of his decked
ships. Thus on the right wing of Philip’s fleet the state of things was
that the ultimate result was doubtful, but that, of the two, Attalus
had the better hope of victory. As for the Rhodians, they were, at
first starting, as I have said, far behind the enemy, but being much
their superiors in speed they managed to come up with the rear of
the Macedonians. At first they charged the vessels on the stern as
they were retiring, and broke off their oars; but upon Philip’s ships
swinging round and beginning to bring help to those in danger, while
those of the Rhodians who had started later than the rest reached the
squadron of Theophiliscus, both parties turned their ships in line prow
to prow and charged gallantly, inciting each other to fresh exertions
by the sound of trumpets and loud cheers. Had not the Macedonians
placed their galleys between the opposing lines of decked ships, the
battle would have been quickly decided; but, as it was, these proved
a hindrance to the Rhodians in various ways. For as soon as the first
charge had disturbed the original order of the ships, they became
all mixed up with each other in complete confusion, which made it
difficult to sail through the enemy’s line or to avail themselves
of the points in which they were superior, because the galleys kept
running sometimes against the blades of their oars so as to hinder the
rowing, and sometimes upon their prows, or again upon their sterns,
thus hampering the service of steerers and rowers alike. In the direct
charges, however, the Rhodians employed a particular manœuvre. By
depressing their bows they received the blows of the enemy above the
water-line, while by staving in the enemy’s ships below the water-line
they rendered the blows fatal. Still it was rarely that they succeeded
in doing this, for, as a rule, they avoided collisions, because the
Macedonians fought gallantly from their decks when they came to
close quarters. Their most frequent manœuvre was to row through the
Macedonian line, and disable the enemy’s ships by breaking off their
oars, and then, rowing round into position, again charge the enemy on
the stern, or catch them broadside as they were in the act of turning;
and thus they either stove them in or broke away some necessary part of
their rigging. By this manner of fighting they destroyed a great number
of the enemy’s ships.

[Sidenote: Further incidents in the fight on the left wing. The Rhodian
admiral Theophiliscus mortally wounded.]

+5.+ But the most brilliant and hazardous exploits were those of three
quinqueremes: the flagship on which Theophiliscus sailed, then that
commanded by Philostratus, and lastly the one steered by Autolycus,
and on board of which was Nicostratus. This last charged an enemy’s
ship, and left its beak sticking in it. The ship thus struck sank
with all hands; but Autolycus and his comrades, as the sea poured
into his vessel through the prow, was surrounded by the enemy. For
a time they defended themselves gallantly, but at last Autolycus
himself was wounded, and fell overboard in his armour, while the rest
of the marines were killed fighting bravely. While this was going on,
Theophiliscus came to the rescue with three quinqueremes, and though he
could not save the ship, because it was now full of water, he yet stove
in three hostile vessels, and forced their marines overboard. Being
quickly surrounded by a number of galleys and decked ships, he lost the
greater number of his marines after a gallant struggle on their part;
and after receiving three wounds himself, and performing prodigies of
valour, just managed to get his own ship safely off with the assistance
of Philostratus, who came to his aid and bravely took his share of the
danger. Having thus rejoined his own squadron, he darted out once more
and ran in upon the enemy, utterly prostrated in body by his wounds,
but more dashing and vehement in spirit than before.

So that there were really two sea-fights going on at a considerable
distance from each other. For the right wing of Philip’s fleet,
continually making for land in accordance with his original plan, was
not far from the Asiatic coast; while the left wing, having to veer
round to support the ships on the rear, were engaged with the Rhodians
at no great distance from Chios.

[Sidenote: Attalus intercepted by Philip, and forced to abandon his

[Sidenote: Victory of the Rhodians.]

+6.+ As the fleet of Attalus, however, was rapidly overpowering the
right wing of Philip, and was now approaching the small islands, under
cover of which Philip was moored watching the result of the battle,
Attalus saw one of his quinqueremes staved in and in the act of being
sunk by an enemy’s ship. He therefore hurried to its assistance with
two quadriremes. The enemy’s ship turning to flight, and making for
the shore, he pursued it somewhat too eagerly in his ardent desire
to effect its capture. Thereupon Philip, observing that Attalus had
become detached a considerable distance from his own fleet, took four
quinqueremes and three _hemioliae_, as well as all the galleys within
reach, and darting out got between Attalus and his ships, and forced
him in the utmost terror to run his three ships ashore. After this
mishap the king himself and his crew made their way to Erythrae, while
Philip captured his vessels and the royal equipage on board them. For
in this emergency Attalus had employed an artifice. He caused the most
splendid articles of the royal equipage to be spread out on the deck of
his ship; the consequence of which was that the first Macedonians who
arrived on the galleys, seeing a quantity of flagons and purple robes
and such like things, abandoned the pursuit, and turned their attention
to plundering these. Thus it came about that Attalus got safe away to
Erythrae; while Philip, though he had distinctly got the worst of it
in the general engagement, was so elated at the unexpected reverse
which had befallen Attalus, that he put to sea again and exerted
himself strenuously in collecting his ships and restoring the spirits
of his men by assuring them that they were the victors. For when they
saw Philip put to sea towing off the royal ship, they very naturally
thought that Attalus had perished. But Dionysodorus, conjecturing what
had really happened to the king, set about collecting his own ships
by raising a signal; and this being speedily done, he sailed away
unmolested to their station in Asia. Meanwhile those Macedonians who
were engaged with the Rhodians, having been for some time past in evil
case, were gradually extricating themselves from the battle, one after
the other retiring on the pretence of being anxious to support their
comrades. So the Rhodians, taking in tow some of their vessels, and
having destroyed others by charging them, sailed away to Chios.

[Sidenote: B.C. 201. The losses in the battle.]

+7.+ In the battle with Attalus Philip had had destroyed a ten-banked,
a nine-banked, a seven-banked, and a six-banked ship, ten other
decked vessels, three _triemioliae_, twenty-five galleys and their
crews. In the battle with the Rhodians ten decked vessels and about
forty galleys. While two quadriremes and seven galleys with their
crews were captured. In the fleet of Attalus one _triemiolia_ and two
quinqueremes were sunk, while two quadriremes besides that of the king
were captured. Of the Rhodian fleet two quinqueremes and a trireme
were destroyed, but no ship was taken. Of men the Rhodians lost sixty,
Attalus seventy; while Philip lost three thousand Macedonians and six
thousand rowers. And of the Macedonians and their allies two thousand
were taken prisoners, and of their opponents six hundred.

[Sidenote: Philip vainly pretends that he won the battle.]

+8.+ Such was the end of the battle of Chios; in which Philip claimed
the victory on two pretexts. First, because he had driven Attalus
ashore and had captured his ship; and secondly, because, as he had
anchored at the promontory of Argennum, he had the credit of having
taken up his anchorage where the wrecks were floating. He acted in
accordance with this assertion next day by collecting the wrecks, and
causing the corpses which could be recognised to be picked up for
burial, all for the sake of strengthening this pretence. For that he
did not himself believe that he had won was shortly afterwards proved
by the Rhodians and Dionysodorus. For on that very next day, while he
was actually engaged on these operations, after communication with
each other they sailed out to attack him, but, on nobody putting out
to meet them, they returned to Chios. Philip indeed had never before
lost so many men either by land or sea at one time, and was extremely
mortified at what had happened and had lost much of his spirit for the
enterprise. To the outside world, however, he tried to conceal his real
sentiments: though this was forbidden by facts. Besides everything
else, what happened after the battle impressed all who saw it too
strongly. For the slaughter and destruction was so great that, on the
day of battle itself the whole strait was filled with corpses, blood,
arms, and wrecks; while on the subsequent days the strands might be
seen piled up with all these together in wild confusion. Hence the
extreme consternation of the king could not be confined to himself, but
was shared by all his Macedonians.

[Sidenote: Death of Theophiliscus.]

+9.+ Theophiliscus survived for one day; and then having written a
despatch home with an account of the battle, and appointed Cleonaeus to
succeed him in his command, died from his wounds. He had shown great
valour in the engagement, and his far-sighted policy deserves to be
remembered. If it had not been for his boldness in attacking Philip in
time, all the allies would have let the opportunity pass, in terror
at Philip’s audacity. But by beginning the war as he did he forced
his countrymen to seize the opportunity, and compelled Attalus not
to lose time in mere preparatory measures for war, but to go to war
energetically and grapple with the danger. The Rhodians, therefore,
were quite right to pay him, even after his death, such honours as
were incentives, not only to men living at the time, but to future
generations also, to prompt service in their country’s cause....


+10.+ After the battle of Lade, the Rhodians being out of his way, and
Attalus not having yet appeared on the scene, it is clear that Philip
might have accomplished his voyage to Alexandria. And here we have
evidence stronger than any other of Philip’s infatuation in acting as
he did. What, then, prevented his design? Nothing in the world but what
always occurs in the natural course of affairs. For at a distance many
men at times desire the impossible from the extravagant prospects it
holds out, their ambition over-mastering their reason; but when they
approach the moment of action they quite as irrationally abandon their
purpose, because their calculations are obscured and confused by the
embarrassments and difficulties which meet them....


[Sidenote: The stratagem by which Philip took Prinassus.]

+11.+ Having made some assaults which proved abortive owing to the
strength of the place, Philip went away again, plundering the forts and
villages in the country. Thence he marched to Prinassus and pitched
his camp under its wall. Having promptly got ready his pent-houses and
other siege artillery, he began to attempt the town by mines. This
plan proving impracticable, owing to the rocky nature of the soil, he
contrived the following stratagem. During the day he caused a noise to
be made under ground, as though the mines were being worked at; while
during the night he caused earth to be brought and piled up at the
mouth of the mine, in order that the men in the city, by calculating
the quantity of earth thrown up, might become alarmed. At first the
Prinassians held out bravely: but when Philip sent them a message
informing them that he had underpinned two plethra of their walls, and
asking them whether they preferred to march out with their lives, or
one and all to perish with their town when he set fire to the props,
then at last, believing that what he said was true, they surrendered
the city.

[Sidenote: Legends of Iassus and Bargylia.]

+12.+ The town of Iassus is situated in Asia on the gulf between the
temple of Poseidon, the territory of Miletus, and the city of Myndus,
called the gulf [of Iassus by some], but by most the gulf of Bargylia,
from the names of the cities built upon its inner coast. The Iassians
boast of being originally colonists from Argos, and more recently
from Miletus, their ancestors having invited to their town the son
of Neleus, the founder of Miletus, owing to their losses in the war
with the Carians. The size of the town is ten stades. Among the people
of Bargylia it is a common report widely believed that the statue of
the Kindyan Artemis, though in the open air, is never touched by snow
or rain; and the same belief is held among the Iassians as to the
Artemis Astias.[69] All these stories have been repeated by certain
historians. But, for my part, I have in the whole course of my work
set myself against such statements of our historiographers and have
had no toleration for them. For it appears to me that such tales are
only fit to amuse children, when they transgress not only the limits
of probability but even those of possibility. For instance, to say
that certain bodies when placed in full light cast no shadow argues a
state of quite deplorable folly. But Theopompus has done this; for he
says that those who enter the holy precinct of Zeus in Arcadia cast
no shadow, which is on a par with the statements to which I have just
referred. Now, in so far as such tales tend to preserve the reverence
of the vulgar for religion, a certain allowance may be made for some
historians when they record these miraculous legends. But they must not
be allowed to go too far. Perhaps it is difficult to assign a limit in
such a matter; still it is not impossible. Therefore, in my judgment,
such displays of ignorance and delusion should be pardoned if they
do not go very far, but anything like extravagance in them should be


[Sidenote: The tyranny of Nabis. See 13, 6-8.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 202-201.]

+13.+ I have already described the deliberate policy of Nabis, tyrant
of the Lacedaemonians; how he drove the citizens into exile, freed
the slaves, and gave them the wives and daughters of their masters.
How also, by opening his kingdom as a kind of inviolable sanctuary
for all who fled from their own countries, he collected a number of
bad characters in Sparta. I will now proceed to tell how in the same
period, being in alliance with Aetolians, Eleans, and Messenians, and
being bound by oaths and treaties to support one and all of those
peoples in case of any one attacking them, he yet in utter contempt of
these obligations determined to make a treacherous attack on Messene....


[Sidenote: The necessity of discussing the histories of Zeno and

+14.+ As some episodical historians have written on the period which
embraces the affair at Messene and the sea-fights already described, it
is my intention to discuss them briefly. I will not however speak of
them all, but only those whom I suppose to be worthy of commemoration
and full discussion. These are the Rhodian writers Zeno and
Antisthenes, whom I judge to deserve this distinction, for more than
one reason. They were contemporary with the events, and were engaged
in practical politics; and, lastly, they composed their histories with
no view to gain, but for the sake of fame, and as part of the business
of politicians. Since then they write of the same events as myself,
I cannot omit mentioning them; lest, from the reputation of their
country, and the idea that naval affairs are peculiarly the province
of Rhodians, some students may prefer their authority to mine where I
differ from them.

[Sidenote: Their description of the battle of Lade. See ch. 10.]

Now both these writers, to begin with, describe the battle of Lade as
not less severe than that of Chios, but more fiercely and daringly
contested, both in detail and as a whole, and finally assert that the
victory was with the Rhodians. For my part I should be inclined to
allow that historians must show some partiality to their own countries;
not however that they should state what is exactly opposite to the
facts regarding them. There are quite enough mistakes which writers
make from ignorance, and which it is difficult for poor human nature
to avoid: but if we deliberately write what is false for the sake
of country, friends, or favour, how do we differ from those who do
the same to get a living? For as the latter, by measuring everything
by the standard of private gain, ruin the credit of their works, so
your politicians often fall into the same discredit by yielding to
the influence of hatred or affection. Therefore readers ought to be
jealously watchful on this head; while writers ought to be on their
guard for their own sakes.

+15.+ The present matter is an example. When coming to details of the
battle of Lade, these writers confess that in it “two quinqueremes of
Rhodes were captured by the enemy; and that upon one ship raising its
studding-sail to escape from the conflict, owing to its having being
staved in and shipping sea, many of the vessels near it did the same
and made for the open sea; and that at last the admiral, being left
with only a few vessels, was forced to follow their example. That for
the present they were forced by unfavourable winds to drop anchor
on the territory of Myndus, but next day put to sea and crossed to
Cos; while the enemy, having secured the quinqueremes, landed at Lade
and took up their quarters in the Rhodian camp: that, moreover, the
Milesians, deeply impressed by what had taken place, presented not only
Philip, but Heracleides also, with a garland of victory on his entrance
to their territory.” And yet, though they give all these particulars,
which all evidently indicate the losing side, they still declare the
Rhodians to have been victorious both in particular combats and in
the whole battle; and that too in spite of the fact that the original
despatch from the admiral concerning the battle, sent to the Senate and
Prytanies, still exists in their Prytaneium, which testifies to the
truth, not of the statements of Antisthenes and Zeno, but of mine.

[Sidenote: Zeno’s account of the attack of Nabis upon Messene. See ch.

+16.+ Next as to their account of the treacherous attempt upon Messene.
Zeno says that “Nabis started from Sparta, crossed the Eurotas near the
tributary called the Hoplites, and advanced along the narrow road past
Poliasium until he arrived at Sallasia, thence past Pharae to Thalamae,
and so to the river Pamisus.” About which I do not know what to say.
It is just as if one were to say that a man started from Corinth and
marched through the Isthmus and arrived at the Scironean way, and then
came straight to the Contoporian road, and journeyed past Mycenae to
Argos. For such a statement would not be merely slightly wrong but
wholly contradictory. For the Isthmus and the Scironian rocks are east
of Corinth, while the Contoporian road and Mycenae are nearly due
south-west; so that it is completely impossible to go by way of the
former to the latter. The same may be said about Lacedaemon; for the
Eurotas and Sallasia are to the north-east of Sparta, while Thalamae,
Pharae, and the Pamisus are to the south-west. Therefore it is not
possible to go to Sallasia, nor necessary to cross the Eurotas, if a
man means to go to Messenia by way of Thalamae.

+17.+ Besides these mistakes, he says that Nabis started on his return
from Messenia by the gate on the road to Tegea. This is another
absurdity; for Megalopolis is between Tegea and Messene, so that it is
impossible that a gate at Messene should be called the “Gate to Tegea.”
The fact is that there is a gate there called the “Tegean Gate,” by
which Nabis commenced his return; and this led Zeno into the mistake
of supposing that Tegea was near Messene, which is not the fact: for
the Laconian territory, as well as that of Megalopolis, lies between
that of Messene and Tegea. Lastly, he says that the Alpheus flows
underground from its source for a considerable distance, and comes
up near Lycoa, in Arcadia. The truth is that this river does go down
underground not far from its source, and, after remaining hidden for
about ten stades, comes up again, and then flows through the territory
of Megalopolis, at first with a gentle stream, and then gaining volume,
and watering that whole district in a splendid manner for two hundred
stades, at length reaches Lycoa, swollen by the tributary stream of the
Lusius, and become unfordable and deep....

However, I think that the points I have mentioned, though all of them
blunders, admit of some palliation and excuse; for the latter arose
from mere ignorance, those connected with the sea-fight from patriotic
affection. But is it not then a fault in Zeno, that he does not bestow
as much pains on investigating the truth and thoroughly mastering his
subject, as upon the ornaments of style; and shows on many occasions
that he particularly plumes himself on this, as many other famous
writers do? To my mind it is quite right to take great care and pay
great attention to the presentation of one’s facts in correct and
adequate language, for this contributes in no small degree to the
effectiveness of history; still I do not think that serious writers
should regard it as their primary and most important object. Far from
it. Quite other are the parts of his history on which a practical
politician should rather pride himself.

[Sidenote: Zeno’s account of the battle of Panium between Antiochus the
Great and Scopas, B.C. 201.]

+18.+ The best illustration of what I mean will be the following.
This same writer, in his account of the siege of Gaza and Antiochus’s
pitched battle with Scopas in Coele-Syria, at Mount Panium,[70]
showed such extreme anxiety about ornaments of style, that he made it
quite impossible even for professional rhetoricians or mob orators to
outstrip him in theatrical effect; while he showed such a contempt
of facts, as once more amounted to unsurpassable carelessness and
inaccuracy. For, intending to describe the first position in the field
taken up by Scopas, he says that “the right extremity of his line,
together with a few cavalry, rested on the slope of the mountain, while
its left with all the cavalry belonging to this wing, was in the plains
below. That Antiochus, just before the morning watch, despatched his
elder son Antiochus with a division of his army to occupy the high
ground which commanded the enemy; and that at daybreak he led the rest
of his army across the river which flowed between the two camps, and
drew them up on the plain; arranging his heavy-armed infantry in one
line, facing the enemy’s centre, and his cavalry, some on the right
and the rest on the left wing of the phalanx, among which were the
heavy-armed horsemen, under the sole command of the younger of the
king’s sons Antiochus. That in advance of this line he stationed the
elephants at certain intervals, and the Tarentines[71] commanded by
Antipater; while he filled up the spaces between the elephants with
archers and slingers. And finally, that he took up his own station
on the rear of the elephants with squadron of household cavalry and
bodyguards.” After this preliminary description he continues: “The
younger Antiochus”—whom he had described as being on the level ground
with the heavy-armed cavalry—“charged down from the high ground and put
to flight and pursued the cavalry under Ptolemy, son of Aeropus, who
was in command of the Aetolians in the plain on the left wing; but the
two lines, when they met, maintained a stubborn fight.” But he fails to
observe that, as the elephants, cavalry, and light-armed infantry were
in front, the two lines could not possibly meet at all.

+19.+ Next he says that “the phalanx, outmatched in agility and forced
backwards by the Aetolians, retired step by step, while the elephants
received the retreating line, and did great service in charging the
enemy.” But how the elephants got on the rear of the phalanx it is not
easy to understand, or how, if they had got there, they could have
done good service. For as soon as the two lines were once at close
quarters, the animals would no longer have been able to distinguish
friend from foe among those that came in their way. Again, he says that
“the Aetolian cavalry were thrown into a panic during the engagement,
because they were unaccustomed to the look of the elephants.” But, by
his own account, the cavalry which was originally stationed on the
right wing remained unbroken; while the other division of the cavalry,
that on the left wing, had all fled before the successful attack of
Antiochus. What portion of the cavalry was it, then, that was on the
centre of the phalanx, and was terrified by the elephants? And where
was the king, or what part did he take in the battle, seeing that he
had with him the very flower of the infantry and cavalry? For not a
word has been told us about these. And where was the elder of the young
Antiochi, who, with a division of the troops, occupied the high ground?
For this prince is not represented even as returning to his quarters
after the battle. And very naturally so. For Zeno started by assuming
two sons of the king named Antiochus, whereas there was only one in
the army on that occasion. How comes it, again, that according to him,
Scopas returned first and also last from the field? For he says: “when
he saw the younger Antiochus, after returning from the pursuit, on the
rear of his phalanx, and accordingly gave up all hopes of victory, he
retired.” But afterwards he says that “he sustained the most imminent
peril when his phalanx got surrounded by the elephants and cavalry, and
was the last man to retire from the field.”

[Sidenote: Polybius wrote to Zeno on his geographical mistakes.]

+20.+ These and similar blunders appear to me to reflect very great
discredit upon writers. It is necessary, therefore, to endeavour to
make one’s self master of all departments of history alike. That
is the ideal; but if that is impossible, one ought at least to be
excessively careful on the most essential and important points in
it. I have been induced to say this because I have observed that in
history, as in other arts and sciences, there is a tendency to neglect
the true and essential, while the ostentatious and the showy secure
praise and emulation as something great and admirable. The fact being
that in history, as in other departments of literature, these latter
qualities require less trouble and gain a cheaper reputation. As to
his ignorance of the topography of Laconia, considering that his error
was an important one, I did not hesitate to write to Zeno personally.
For I thought it a point of honour not to look upon the mistakes of
others as personal triumphs, as is the way with some writers; but to do
the best I could to secure correctness, not only of my own historical
writings, but of those of others also, for the benefit of the world at
large. When Zeno received my letter and found that it was impossible to
make the correction, because his history was already published, he was
much vexed, but could do nothing. He, however, put the most friendly
interpretation on my proceeding; and, in regard to this point, I would
beg my own readers, whether of my own or future generations, if I am
ever detected in making a deliberate misstatement, and disregarding
truth in any part of my history, to criticise me unmercifully; but if
I do so from lack of information, to make allowances: and I ask it for
myself more than others, owing to the size of my history and the extent
of ground covered by its transactions....


[Sidenote: Character and extravagance of Tlepolemus.]

+21.+ Tlepolemus,[72] the chief minister in the kingdom of Egypt, was
a young man, but one who had spent all his life in the camp, and with
reputation. By nature aspiring and ambitious, he had done much that
was glorious in the service of his country, but much that was evil
also. As a general in a campaign, and as an administrator of military
expeditions, he was a man of great ability, high natural courage, and
extremely well fitted to deal personally with soldiers. But on the
other hand, for the management of complicated affairs, he was deficient
in diligence and sobriety, and had the least faculty in the world for
the keeping of money or the economical administration of finance.
And it was this that before long not only caused his own fall, but
seriously damaged the kingdom as well. For though he had complete
control of the exchequer, he spent the greater part of the day in
playing ball and in matches in martial exercises with the young men;
and directly he left these sports he collected drinking parties, and
spent the greater part of his life in these amusements and with these
associates. But that part of his day which he devoted to business, he
employed in distributing, or, I might rather say, in throwing away the
royal treasures among the envoys from Greece and the Dionysian actors,
and, more than all, among the officers and soldiers of the palace
guard. He was utterly incapable of saying no, and bestowed anything
there was at hand on any one who said anything to please him. The evil
which he himself thus began continually increased. For every one who
had received a favour expressed his gratitude in extravagant language,
both for the sake of what he had got and of what he hoped to get in
the future. And thus being informed of the universal praise which was
bestowed on him, of the toasts proposed in his honour at banquets,
of complimentary inscriptions, and songs sung in his praise by the
public singers all through the town, he became entirely befooled, and
grew daily more and more puffed up with conceit, and more reckless in
squandering favours upon foreigners and soldiers.

[Sidenote: Tlepolemus suppresses a court intrigue against himself.]

+22.+ These proceedings were very offensive to the other members of the
court; and, therefore, they watched everything he did with a jealous
eye, and conceived a detestation for his insolence, which they began to
compare unfavourably with the character of Sosibius. For the latter was
considered to show more wisdom in his guardianship of the king than his
age gave reason to expect; and, in his dealings with other persons, to
maintain the dignity proper to his high trust, which was the royal seal
and person. Just at this time, Ptolemy, the son of Sosibius, returned
from his mission to Philip. Before he left Alexandria on his voyage, he
had been full of foolish pride, partly from his own natural disposition
and partly from his father’s success. But upon landing in Macedonia,
and mixing with the young men at court, he conceived the notion that
the virtue of the Macedonians consisted in the better fashion of their
boots and clothes; he therefore came home, got up in imitation of
all these peculiarities, and fully persuaded that his foreign tour
and association with Macedonians had made a man of him. He therefore
immediately began showing jealousy of Tlepolemus, and inveighing
against him; and as all the courtiers joined him, on the ground that
Tlepolemus was treating the business and revenue of the state as
though he were its heir and not its guardian, the quarrel quickly
grew. Meanwhile Tlepolemus, being informed of certain unfriendly
speeches, originating in the jealous observation and malignity of the
courtiers, at first turned a deaf ear to them and affected to despise
them; but when at length they ventured to hold a meeting and openly
express their disapproval of him in his absence, on the ground of his
maladministration of the government of the kingdom, he grew angry; and,
summoning the council, came forward and said that “they brought their
accusations against him secretly and in private, but he judged it right
to accuse them in public and face to face.”...

After making his public speech, Tlepolemus deprived Sosibius of
the custody of the seal also, and having got that into his hands,
thenceforth conducted the administration exactly as he chose....


[Sidenote: B.C. 332.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 201. Valour of the people of Gaza.]

+22+ (_a_). It seems to me to be at once just and proper to give the
people of Gaza[73] the praise which they deserve. For though they do
not differ as to bravery in war from the rest of the inhabitants of
Coele-Syria, yet as parties to an international agreement, and in
their fidelity to their promises, they far surpass them, and show
altogether a courage in such matters that is irresistible. In the first
place, when all the other people were terrified at the invasion of the
Persians,[74] in view of the greatness of their power, and one and all
submitted themselves and their countries to the Medes, they alone faced
the danger and stood a siege. Again, on the invasion of Alexander, when
not only did the other cities surrender, but even Tyre was stormed
and its inhabitants sold into slavery; and when it seemed all but
hopeless for any to escape destruction, who resisted the fierce and
violent attack of Alexander, they alone of all the Syrians withstood
him, and tested their powers of defence to the uttermost. Following
the same line of conduct on the present occasion, they omitted nothing
within their power in their determination to keep faith with Ptolemy.
Therefore, just as we distinguish by special mention in our history
individuals of eminent virtue, so ought we, in regard to states as
such, to mention with commendation those which act nobly in any point
from traditional principles and deliberate policy....

ITALY (LIVY, 30, 45)

[Sidenote: Scipio’s return to Rome and triumph, B.C. 201, cp. 15, 19.]

+23.+ Publius Scipio returned from Libya soon after the events I
have narrated. The expectation of the people concerning him was
proportionable to the magnitude of his achievements: and the splendour
of his reception, and the signs of popular favour which greeted
him were extraordinary. Nor was this otherwise than reasonable and
proper. For after despairing of ever driving Hannibal from Italy, or
of averting that danger from themselves and their kinsfolk, they now
looked on themselves as not only securely removed from every fear
and every menace of attack, but as having conquered their enemies.
Their joy therefore knew no bounds; and when Scipio came into the
city in triumph, and the actual sight of the prisoners who formed the
procession brought still more clearly to their memories the dangers of
the past, they became almost wild in the expression of their thanks to
the gods, and their affection for the author of such a signal change.
For among the prisoners who were led in the triumphal procession
was Syphax, the king of the Masaesylii, who shortly afterwards died
in prison. The triumph concluded, the citizens celebrated games and
festivals for several days running with great splendour, Scipio, in his
magnificent liberality, supplying the cost....


[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 201-200. Coss. P. Sulpicius Galba, Maximus
II., C. Aurelius. Cotta (for B.C. 200).]

[Sidenote: Philip’s anxieties,]

[Sidenote: and the starving state of his army.]

+24.+ At the beginning of the winter in which Publius Sulpicius was
elected consul at Rome, king Philip, who was staying at Bargylia, was
rendered exceedingly uneasy and filled with many conflicting anxieties
for the future, when he observed that the Rhodians and Attalus, far
from dismissing their navy, were actually manning additional ships and
paying more earnest attention than ever to guarding the coasts. He
had a double cause, indeed, for uneasiness: he was afraid of sailing
from Bargylia, and foresaw that he would have to encounter danger
at sea; and at the same time he was not satisfied with the state of
things in Macedonia, and therefore was unwilling on any consideration
to spend the winter in Asia, being afraid both of the Aetolians and
the Romans; for he was fully aware of the embassies sent to Rome to
denounce him [as soon as it was known] that the war in Libya was ended.
These considerations caused him overwhelming perplexity; but he was
compelled for the present to remain where he was, leading the life of
a wolf, to use the common expression: for he robbed and stole from
some, and used force to others, while he did violence to his nature by
fawning on others, because his army was suffering from famine; and by
these means managed sometimes to get meat to eat, sometimes figs, and
sometimes nothing but a very short allowance of corn. Some of these
provisions were supplied to him by Zeuxis, and some by the people of
Mylae, Alabanda, and Magnesia, whom he flattered whenever they gave him
anything, and barked at and plotted against when they did not. Finally,
he made a plot to seize Mylae by the agency of Philocles, but failed
from the clumsiness with which the scheme was contrived. The territory
of Alabanda he harried as though it were an enemy’s, alleging that it
was imperatively necessary to get food for his troops....

When this Philip, father of Perseus, was thus overrunning Asia, being
unable to get provisions for his army, he accepted a present of figs
from the Magnesians, as they had no corn. For which reason, when he
conquered Myus, he granted its territory to the Magnesians in return
for their figs....

[Sidenote: The visit of Attalus to Athens, B.C. 200.]

+25.+ The Athenian people sent envoys to king Attalus, both to thank
him for the past, and to urge him to come to Athens to consult with
them on the dangers that still threatened them.[75] The king was
informed a few days afterwards that Roman ambassadors had arrived at
the Peiraeus; and, believing that it was necessary to have an interview
with them, he put to sea in haste. The Athenian people, being informed
of his coming, passed very liberal votes as to the reception and
general entertainment of the king. Arrived at the Peiraeus, Attalus
spent the first day in transacting business with the Roman ambassadors,
and was extremely delighted to find that they were fully mindful of
their ancient alliance with him, and quite prepared for the war with
Philip. Next morning, in company with the Romans and the Athenian
magistrates, he began his progress to the city in great state. For
he was met, not only by all the magistrates and the knights, but by
all the citizens with their children and wives. And when the two
processions met, the warmth of the welcome given by the populace to the
Romans, and still more to Attalus, could not have been exceeded. At his
entrance into the city by the gate Dipylum the priests and priestesses
lined the street on both sides: all the temples were then thrown
open; victims were placed ready at all the altars; and the king was
requested to offer sacrifice. Finally they voted him such high honours
as they had never without great hesitation voted to any of their former
benefactors: for, in addition to other compliments, they named a tribe
after Attalus, and classed him among their eponymous heroes.

[Sidenote: The Athenians vote for war against Philip.]

+26.+ They next summoned an ecclesia and invited the king to address
them. But upon his excusing himself, on the plea that it would be
ill-bred for him to appear before the people and recount his own good
services in the presence of those on whom they had been bestowed, they
gave up asking for his personal appearance; but begged him to give them
a written statement as to what he thought was the best thing to do
in view of the existing circumstances. On his consenting to do this,
and writing the document, the magistrates produced the despatch to
the ecclesia. The contents of this written communication were briefly
these: he recalled the good services he had done the people in the
past; enumerated the things he had accomplished in the existing war
against Philip; and lastly exhorted them to activity in this war, and
protested that, if they did not determine resolutely to adopt this
policy of hostility to Philip in common with the Rhodians, Romans, and
himself, and yet afterwards wished to share in the benefits which had
been secured by others, they would miss securing the true interests
of their country. As soon as this despatch had been read, the people,
influenced both by its contents and by their warm feeling towards
Attalus, were prepared to vote the war: and when the Rhodians also
entered and argued at great length to the same effect, the Athenians
at once decreed the war against Philip. They gave the Rhodians also a
magnificent reception, honoured their state with a crown of valour, and
voted all Rhodians equal rights of citizenship at Athens, on the ground
of their having, besides other things, restored the Athenian ships
which had been captured with the men on board them. After concluding
this arrangement, the Rhodian ambassadors sailed to Ceos with their
fleet to visit the islands....

[Sidenote: The Romans warn Philip to abstain from attacking Greece, and
to do justice to Attalus, on pain of war.]

+27.+ While the Roman ambassadors were still at Athens, Nicanor, by
the command of Philip, made a raid upon Attica, and came as far as
the Academy. Thereupon the Romans sent a herald to him and bade him
announce to his master Philip that “The Romans admonished him to make
no war upon any Greek State, and to submit to an arbitration before a
fair tribunal as to the injuries he had inflicted upon Attalus: that,
if he did this, he might have peace with Rome, but, if he refused to
obey, the opposite would immediately follow.” On the receipt of this
message Nicanor retired. Then the Romans sailed along the coast of
Epirus and delivered a similar announcement in regard to Philip in the
town of Phoenice; also to Amynandrus in the district of Athamania; also
to the Aetolians in Naupactus, and the Achaeans in Aegium. And having
thus by the mouth of Nicanor given Philip this clear warning, the Roman
envoys themselves sailed away to visit Antiochus and Ptolemy with a
view to settle their controversies....

[Sidenote: The firmness and vigour of Philip in meeting the danger.]

[Sidenote: 1, 14.]

+28.+ It appears to me that to make a good beginning, and even to
maintain enthusiasm long enough to secure a considerable measure of
success, is an achievement of which many have been found capable; but
to carry a purpose through to its end, and, even though fortune be
adverse, to make up by cool reason for the deficiency of enthusiasm
is within the power of few. From this point of view one cannot but
disparage the inactivity of Attalus and the Rhodians, while regarding
with admiration the royal and lofty spirit displayed by Philip, and
his constancy to his purpose,—not meaning to speak in praise of his
character as a whole, but simply commending the vigour with which he
acted on this occasion. I make this distinction to prevent any one
supposing that I contradict myself, because I recently praised Attalus
and the Rhodians and found fault with Philip, whereas I am now doing
the reverse. This is just such a case as I referred to at the beginning
of my history, when I said that it was necessary sometimes to praise,
and sometimes to blame the same persons, since it frequently happens
that changes of circumstances for the worse and calamities alter men’s
original dispositions, and frequently also changes for the better; and
sometimes too it is the case that from natural temperament men are at
one time inclined to what is right, at another to the reverse. And it
is a variation of this sort that I think occurred to Philip in this
instance. For, irritated by his defeats, and influenced in a great
degree by anger and passion, he addressed himself with a kind of insane
or inspired eagerness to meet the dangers of the hour; and it was in
this spirit that he rose to the attack upon the Rhodians and king
Attalus, and gained the successes which followed. I was induced to make
these remarks, because I observe that some men, like bad runners in the
stadium, abandon their purposes when close to the goal; while it is at
that particular point, more than at any other, that others secure the
victory over their rivals....

[Sidenote: B.C. 200.]

+29.+ Philip was anxious to anticipate the Romans in seizing bases of
operation and landing-places in this country (Asia)....

In order that, if it should be his purpose again to cross to Asia, he
might have a landing-place at Abydos....

[Sidenote: The Dardanelles compared with the Straits of Gibraltar.]

The position of Abydos and Sestos, and the advantages of the situation
of those towns it would, I think, be waste of time for me to state
in great detail, because the singularity of those sites has made
them familiar to all persons of intelligence. Still I imagine that
it will not be otherwise than useful to remind my readers briefly of
the facts, by way of attracting their attention. A man would best
realise the advantages of these cities, not by regarding their sites by
themselves, but by comparing and contrasting them with those about to
be mentioned. For just as it is impossible to sail from the Ocean,—or
as some call it the Atlantic,—into our sea, except by passing between
the Pillars of Heracles, so is it impossible to sail from our sea into
the Propontis and the Pontus except through the channel separating
Sestos and Abydos. But as though Fortune had designed these two straits
to counterbalance each other, the passage between the Pillars of
Heracles is many times as broad as that of the Hellespont,—the former
being sixty, the latter two stades; the reason being, as far as one may
conjecture, the great superiority in size of the external Ocean to our
sea: while the channel at Abydos is more convenient than that at the
Pillars of Heracles. For the former being lined on both sides by human
habitations is of the nature of a gate admitting mutual intercourse,
sometimes being bridged over by those who determine to cross on foot,
and at all times admitting a passage by sea. But the channel at the
Pillars of Heracles is seldom used, and by very few persons, owing to
the lack of intercourse between the tribes inhabiting those remote
parts of Libya and Europe, and owing to the scantiness of our knowledge
of the external Ocean. The city of Abydos itself is enclosed on both
sides by two European promontories, and possesses a harbour capable of
sheltering ships anchoring in it from every wind; while there is no
possibility of anchoring at any point near the city outside the harbour
mouth, owing to the rapidity and violence of the current setting
through the strait.

[Sidenote: Siege of Abydos.]

+30.+ Having then invested Abydos partly by a palisade and partly by
an earthwork, Philip began blockading it by land and sea together.
This siege was not at all remarkable for the extent of the machinery
employed, or the ingenuity displayed in those works on which besiegers
and besieged are wont to exhaust all their invention and skill against
each other; but still it deserves, if any ever did, to be remembered
and recorded for the noble spirit and extraordinary gallantry exhibited
by the besieged. At first, feeling full confidence in themselves,
the inhabitants of Abydos maintained a courageous resistance to the
attempts of Philip; struck and dislodged some of his engines, which he
brought against their walls by sea, with stones from their catapults,
and destroyed others by fire, and with such fierceness, that the
enemy were barely able to drag their ships out of danger. Against the
siege operations on land, too, up to a certain point they offered an
undaunted resistance, not at all despairing of ultimately overpowering
the enemy. But when their outer wall was undermined and fell, and
when moreover the Macedonians by means of these same mines were
approaching the inner wall, which had been erected by the besieged to
cover the breach: then at length they send Iphiades and Pantacnotus as
ambassadors, with an offer to Philip that he should take over the city,
on condition of letting the soldiers from Rhodes and Attalus depart
under a truce; and of permitting all free persons to depart as they
could, and wherever each might choose, with the clothes that each was
wearing. But on Philip bidding them “surrender at discretion or fight
like men,” the ambassadors returned to the town.

[Sidenote: Desperate resolution of the people of Abydos.]

+31.+ On being informed of the message the people of Abydos met in
public assembly, and with feelings of utter despair deliberated upon
their position. They thereupon resolved, first to liberate the slaves,
that they might secure their sincere interest and loyalty; next, to
collect all the women into the temple of Artemis, and the children with
their nurses into the gymnasium; and finally to bring together their
silver and gold into the market-place, as well as collect their clothes
which were of any value into the quadrireme of the Rhodians and the
trireme of the Cyzicenes. Having formed these resolutions and acted
on the decree with unanimity, they again assembled in public meeting,
and elected fifty of the older and most trusted men, who at the same
time were possessed of sufficient bodily vigour to enable them to carry
out what had been determined upon; and these they bound on oath in the
presence of the whole of the citizens, that “whenever they saw the
inner wall being captured by the enemy, they would kill the children
and women, and would burn the above-mentioned ships, and, in accordance
with the curses that had been invoked, would throw the silver and gold
into the sea.” After this they brought the priests forward, and all
the citizens swore that they would conquer the enemy or die fighting
for their country. To crown all, they slew victims and compelled the
priests and priestesses to dictate the words of this imprecation over
the burnt offerings. Having bound themselves by this solemn agreement,
they left off attempting to countermine the enemy, and resolved that,
directly the interior wall fell, they would fight to the last in the
breach with the enemy’s storming party and there die.

[Sidenote: Comparison of this resolution of the Abydenians with similar
ones of the Phocians and Acarnanians.]

+32.+ This would justify us in saying that the gallantry of the
Abydenians outdid the proverbial Phocian recklessness and Acarnanian
courage.[76] For the Phocians have the reputation of having adopted
a similar resolution as to their families, but not because they
despaired of victory, for they were about to fight a pitched battle
with the Thessalians in the open field. So too the Acarnanians, upon
the mere prospect of an Aetolian invasion, adopted a like resolution;
the details of which I have already narrated. But the Abydenians, at a
time when they were closely invested and in all but complete despair of
being saved, elected by a unanimous resolution to meet their fate along
with their children and wives, rather than to live any longer with the
knowledge that their children and wives would fall into the power of
the enemy. Therefore one might justly complain of Fortune for having,
in the former cases, given victory and safety to those who despaired
of them, while she adopted the opposite decision in regard to the
Abydenians. For the men were killed, and the city was taken, but the
children with their mothers fell into the hands of the enemy.

[Sidenote: How the city was surrendered and the women and children
saved after all.]

+33.+ As soon as the interior wall had fallen, the men, according
to their oaths, sprang upon the ruins and fought the enemy with
such desperate courage, that Philip, though he had kept sending the
Macedonians to the front in relays till nightfall, at last abandoned
the contest in despair of accomplishing the capture at all. For not
only did the Abydenian forlorn hope take their stand upon the dead
bodies of the fallen enemies, and maintain the battle with fury; nor
was it only that they fought gallantly with mere swords and spears;
but when any of these weapons had been rendered useless, or had been
knocked out of their hands, they grappled with the Macedonians, and
either hurled them to the ground arms and all, or broke their sarissae,
and stabbing their faces and exposed parts of their bodies with the
broken ends, threw them into a complete panic. But the fight being
interrupted by nightfall, most of the citizens having now fallen in the
breach, and the rest being utterly exhausted by fatigue and wounds,
Glaucides and Theognetus collected a few of the older men together,
and, instigated by hopes of personal safety, lowered the special
eminence and unique glory which their fellow-citizens had acquired. For
they resolved to save the children and women alive, and at daybreak to
send the priests and priestesses with garlands to Philip, to entreat
his mercy and surrender the city to him.

[Sidenote: A Roman envoy arrives to warn Philip to desist.]

[Sidenote: The voluntary death of the Abydenians.]

+34.+ While this was going on, king Attalus, having heard that Abydos
was being besieged, sailed through the Aegean to Tenedos; and similarly
the youngest of the Roman ambassadors, Marcus Aemilius, arrived on
board ship at Abydos itself. For the Roman ambassadors, having learnt
at Rhodes the fact of the siege of Abydos, and wishing in accordance
with their commission to deliver their message to Philip personally,
put off their purpose of visiting the two kings, and despatched
this man to him. Having found the king outside Abydos, he explained
to him that “The Senate had resolved to order him not to wage war
with any Greek state; nor to interfere in the dominions of Ptolemy;
and to submit the injuries inflicted on Attalus and the Rhodians to
arbitration; and that if he did so he might have peace, but if he
refused to obey he would promptly have war with Rome.” Upon Philip
endeavouring to show that the Rhodians had been the first to lay
hands on him, Marcus interrupted him by saying: “But what about the
Athenians? And what about the Cianians? And what about the Abydenians
at this moment? Did any one of them also lay hands on you first?” The
king, at a loss for a reply, said: “I pardon the offensive haughtiness
of your manners for three reasons: first, because you are a young man
and inexperienced in affairs; secondly, because you are the handsomest
man of your time” (this was true); “and thirdly, because you are a
Roman. But for my part, my first demand to the Romans is that they
should not break their treaties or go to war with me; but if they do,
I shall defend myself as courageously as I can, appealing to the gods
to defend my cause.” With these words they separated. On becoming
master of Abydos, Philip found all the property of the citizens
collected by themselves ready to his hand. But when he saw the numbers
and fury of those who were stabbing, burning, hanging, throwing into
wells, or precipitating themselves from housetops, and their children
and wives, he was overpowered with surprise; and resenting these
proceedings he published a proclamation, announcing, that “he gave
three days’ grace to those who wished to hang or stab themselves.”
The Abydenians, already bent on executing their original decree, and
looking upon themselves as traitors to those who had fought and died
for their country, could not endure remaining alive on any terms; and,
accordingly, with the exception of those who had previously been put in
chains or some similar restraint, they all without delay hastened to
their death, each family by itself....

[Sidenote: The Rhodians resolve to side with Rome.]

+35.+ After the capture of Abydos, envoys came from the Achaean nation
to Rhodes urging the Rhodians to make terms with Philip. But upon these
being followed by the arrival of the ambassadors from Rome, who argued
that they should make no terms with Philip without consulting the
Romans, the Rhodian people voted to listen to the latter and to hold to
their friendship with them....


[Sidenote: Philopoemen’s device for collecting all the Achaean levies
at Tegea simultaneously, B.C. 200.]

+36.+ Philopoemen calculated the distances of all the cities of the
Achaean league, and from which of them men could arrive at Tegea along
the same roads. He then wrote despatches to each of them, and sent them
to the most distant cities, so dividing them that each city that was
farthest on a particular road should get, not only the one addressed
to itself, but those also of the other cities on the same road. The
contents of these first despatches addressed to the chief magistrate
were as follows: “As soon as ye receive this despatch, forthwith cause
all the men of military age, with arms, and provisions, and money for
five days, to assemble immediately in the market-place. And as soon as
they are thus collected, march them out and lead them to the next city.
As soon as ye have arrived there, deliver the despatch addressed to its
chief magistrate and follow the instructions therein contained.” Now,
this second despatch contained exactly the same words as the former,
except of course that the name of the next town was changed to which
they were to march. By this arrangement being repeated right along the
road, in the first place no one knew for what purpose or undertaking
the expedition was directed; and in the next place, every one was
absolutely ignorant where he was going, beyond the name of the next
town, but all marched forward in a state of complete mystification,
taking on the successive contingents as they went. But as of course the
most remote towns were not equally distant from Tegea, the letters were
not delivered to them all at the same time, but to each in proportion
to its distance. By which arrangement, without either the Tegeans or
the new arrivals knowing what was going to happen, all the Achaeans
marched into Tegea under arms by all the gates simultaneously.

[Sidenote: A raid upon Laconia.]

+37.+ What suggested to Philopoemen this stratagem was the great number
of the tyrant’s eavesdroppers and spies. On the day then on which the
main body of the Achaeans were to arrive at Tegea, he despatched a
band of picked men, so timing their start, that they might pass the
night near Sellasia and at daybreak begin a raid on Laconia. They had
orders that, in case the mercenaries of Nabis left their quarters and
attacked them, they were to retire on Scotita, and in other respects
follow the directions of Didascalondas of Crete; for Philopoemen had
given his confidence to this officer, and full directions as to the
whole expedition. These men therefore set out in good spirits to the
task assigned to them. Philopoemen himself having issued orders to the
Achaeans to sup early, led out his army from Tegea, and after a rapid
night’s march halted it about the time of the morning watch in the
neighbourhood of Scotita, which is between Tegea and Lacedaemon. When
day broke the mercenaries in Pellene, being informed by their scouts of
the raid which the enemy were making, started at once to the rescue, as
was their custom, and bore down upon them; and when the Achaeans, in
accordance with their instructions, retired, they followed, harassing
them with bold and daring assaults. But as soon as they came to the
place where Philopoemen lay in ambush, the Achaeans sprang up and cut
some of them to pieces, and took others prisoners....

+38.+ Philip seeing that the Achaeans were disposed to hesitate about
undertaking the war with Rome, tried earnestly by every means to rouse
their feeling of hostility....


+39.+ Ptolemy’s general Scopas marched into the upper region during the
winter and subdued the Jewish nation....

The siege having been conducted in a desultory manner, Scopas fell into
bad repute and was attacked with all the petulance of youth....

[Sidenote: B.C. 200. Antiochus conquers Coele-Syria and the Jews after
beating Scopas at Panium. See _supra_, ch. 18.]

Having conquered Scopas, Antiochus took Batanaea, Samaria, Abila, and
Gadara; and after a while those of the Jews who inhabit the sacred
town called Jerusalem submitted to him also. On the subject of this
town I have a good deal more to say, and especially on account of the
splendour of its temple, but I shall put it off to another opportunity.



[Sidenote: Congress at Nicaea in Locris, winter of B.C. 198-197. Coss.
Titus Quinctius Flamininus, Sext. Aelius Paetus Catus.]

[Sidenote: Cycliadas expelled for favouring Philip. See Livy, 32, 19.]

[Sidenote: The Roman demand.]

[Sidenote: Peace of Epirus B.C. 205. See _supra_ 11, 5-7.]

+1.+ When the time appointed arrived, Philip put to sea from Demetrias
and came into the Melian Gulf, with five galleys and one beaked
war-ship (pristis), on the latter of which he himself was sailing.
There met him the Macedonian secretaries Apollodorus and Demosthenes,
Brachylles from Boeotia, and the Achaean Cycliadas, who had been driven
from the Peloponnese for the reasons I have already described. With
Flamininus came king Amynandrus, and Dionysodorus, legate of king
Attalus. The commissioners from cities and nations were Aristaenus and
Xenophon from the Achaeans; Acesimbrotus the navarch from the Rhodians;
Phaeneas their Strategus from the Aetolians, and several others of
their statesmen with him. Approaching the sea near Nicaea, Flamininus
and those with him took their stand upon the very edge of the beach,
while Philip, bringing his ship close to shore, remained afloat. Upon
Flamininus bidding him disembark, he stood up on board and refused to
leave his ship. Flamininus again asked him what he feared, he said
that he feared no one but the gods, but he distrusted most of those
who were there, especially the Aetolians. Upon the Roman expressing
his surprise, and remarking that the danger was the same to all and
the risk common, Philip retorted that “He was mistaken in saying that:
for that, if anything happened to Phaeneas, there were many who would
act as Strategi for the Aetolians; but if Philip were to perish at the
present juncture, there was no one to be king of the Macedonians.”
Though all thought this an unconciliatory way of opening the
discussion, Flamininus nevertheless bade him speak on the matters he
had come to consider. Philip however said that “The word was not with
himself but with Flamininus; and therefore begged that he would state
clearly what he was to do in order to have peace.” The Roman consul
replied that “What he had to say was simple and obvious: it was to
bid him evacuate Greece entirely; restore the prisoners and deserters
in his hands to their several states; hand over to the Romans those
parts of Illyricum of which he had become possessed since the peace of
Epirus; and, similarly, to restore to Ptolemy all the cities which he
had taken from him since the death of Ptolemy Philopator.

[Sidenote: Demands of Attalus,]

[Sidenote: of the Rhodians,]

[Sidenote: of the Achaeans,]

[Sidenote: and of the Aetolians.]

+2.+ Having said this Flamininus refrained from any further speech
of his own; but turning to the others he bade them deliver what
they had been severally charged to say by those who sent them. And
first Dionysodorus, the envoy of Attalus, took up the discourse by
declaring that “Philip ought to restore the king’s ships which had
been captured in the battle at Chios and their crews with them; and to
restore also the temple of Aphrodite to its original state, as well
as the Nicephorium, both of which he had destroyed.” He was followed
by the Rhodian navarch Acesimbrotus, who demanded “That Philip should
evacuate Peraea, which he had taken from them; withdraw his garrisons
from Iasus, Bargylia, and Euromus; restore the Perinthians to their
political union with Byzantium; and evacuate Sestos, Abydos, and all
commercial ports and harbours in Asia.” Following the Rhodians the
Achaeans demanded “The restoration of Corinth and Argos uninjured.”
Then came the Aetolians, who first demanded, like the Romans, that
“Philip should entirely evacuate Greece; and, secondly, that he should
restore to them uninjured all cities formerly members of the Aetolian

[Sidenote: Speech of Alexander Isius.]

+3.+ When Phaeneas the Aetolian strategus had delivered this demand,
a man called Alexander Isius, who had the reputation of being an able
politician and good speaker, said that “Philip was neither sincere
at the present moment in proposing terms, nor bold in his manner of
making war, when he had to do that. In conferences and colloquies
he was always setting ambushes and lying in wait, and using all the
practices of war, but in actual war itself took up a position at
once unjust and ignoble: for he avoided meeting his enemies face to
face, and, as he fled before them, employed himself in burning and
plundering the cities; and by this policy, though himself beaten, he
spoilt the value of the victor’s reward. Yet former kings of Macedonia
had not adopted this plan, but one exactly the reverse: for they were
continually fighting with each other in the open field, but rarely
destroyed and ruined cities. This was shown clearly by Alexander’s war
in Asia against king Darius; and again in the contentions between his
successors, when they combined to fight Antigonus for the possession of
Asia. So too had the successors of these kings followed the same policy
down to the time of Pyrrhus: they had been prompt to war against each
other in the open field, and to do everything they could to conquer
each other in arms, but had spared the cities, that they might rule
them if they conquered, and be honoured by their subjects. But that
a man should abandon war, and yet destroy that for which the war was
undertaken, seemed an act of madness, and madness of a very violent
sort. And this was just what Philip was doing at that moment; for he
had destroyed more cities in Thessaly, on his rapid march from the pass
of Epirus, though he was a friend and ally of that country, than any
one who had ever been at war with the Thessalians.”

After a good deal more to the same effect he ended by asking Philip,
“On what grounds he was holding the town of Lysimacheia with a
garrison, having expelled the strategus sent by the Aetolian league, of
which it was a member? Also on what grounds he had enslaved the Ciani
who were also in alliance with the Aetolians? Lastly, on what plea he
was in actual occupation of Echinus, Phthiotid Thebes, Pharsalus, and

[Sidenote: The rejoinder of Philip.]

+4.+ When Alexander had concluded his speech, Philip came somewhat
nearer to the shore than he was before, and, rising on board his
ship, said that “Alexander had composed and delivered a speech in the
true Aetolian and theatrical style. For every one knew quite well
that nobody willingly destroys his own allies, but that, at times of
special danger, military commanders are compelled to do many things
contrary to their natural feelings.” While the king was still speaking,
Phaeneas, who was very short-sighted, interrupted him by saying, “You
are trifling with us; you must either fight and conquer, or obey the
commands of the stronger.” Philip, in spite of the unfortunate position
of his affairs, could not refrain from his habitual humour: turning
towards Phaeneas he said, “Even a blind man could see that.” Such a
knack had he of cutting repartee. Then he turned to Alexander again and
said, “You ask me, Alexander, why I took possession of Lysimacheia.
I reply, in order that it might not by your neglect be devastated by
Thracians, as it has now actually been; because I was compelled by this
war to remove my soldiers, who indeed were no hostile garrison, as you
say, but were there for its protection. As for the Ciani, I did not go
to war with them, but only assisted Prusias to take them who was at war
with them. And of this you yourselves were the cause. For though I sent
envoy after envoy to you desiring that you would repeal the law which
allows you the privilege of taking ‘spoil from spoil,’ you replied that
rather than abolish this law you would remove Aetolia from Aetolia.”

[Sidenote: Philip explains the peculiar law of the Aetolians.]

+5.+ When Flamininus expressed some wonder at what he meant by this,
the king tried to explain it to him by saying that “The Aetolian
custom was this. They not only plundered those with whom they were at
war, and harried their country; but, if certain other nations were at
war with each other, even though both were friends and allies of the
Aetolians, none the less the Aetolians might, without a formal decree
of the people, take part with both combatants and plunder the territory
of both. The result was that in the eyes of the Aetolians there were
no defined limits of friendship or enmity, but they were ready to be
the enemies and assailers of all who had a dispute on anything. “How
then,” he added, “have they any right to blame me if, while on terms
of friendship with the Aetolians, I did anything against the Ciani in
support of my own allies? But the most outrageous part of their conduct
is that they try to rival Rome, and bid me entirely evacuate Greece!
The demand in itself is sufficiently haughty and dictatorial: still, in
the mouths of Romans, it is tolerable, but in that of Aetolians quite
intolerable. What is this Greece, pray, from which ye bid me depart?
How do you define it? Why, most of the Aetolians themselves are not
Greeks; for neither the Agrai, nor the Apodoti, nor the Amphilochi are
counted as Greek. Do you then give up those tribes to me?”

[Sidenote: Philip’s answer to the Rhodians and Attalus,]

[Sidenote: and the Achaeans.]

+6.+ Upon Flamininus laughing at these words, Philip proceeded: “Well,
enough said to the Aetolians! But to the Rhodians and Attalus I have to
say that, in the eyes of a fair judge, it would be held more just that
they should restore to me the ships captured, than I to them. For I did
not begin the attack upon Attalus and the Rhodians, but they upon me,
as everybody acknowledges. However, at your instance, Titus, I restore
Peraea to the Rhodians, and to Attalus his ships and as many of the men
as are still alive. As for the destruction of the Nicephorium and the
grove of Aphrodite, I am not able to do anything else towards their
restoration, but I will send plants and gardeners to attend to the
place and the growth of the trees that have been cut down.” Flamininus
once more laughing at the king’s sarcastic tone, Philip turned to the
Achaeans, and first went through the list of benefactions received by
them from Antigonus and himself; then quoted the extraordinary honours
Antigonus and he had received from them; and concluded by reading their
decree for abandoning him and joining Rome. Taking this for his text,
he expatiated at great length on the fickleness and ingratitude of
the Achaeans. Still he said he would restore Argos to them, and as to
Corinth would consult with Flamininus.

[Sidenote: A retort of Flamininus.]

+7.+ Having thus concluded his conversation with the other envoys, he
asked Flamininus, observing that the discussion was really confined to
himself and the Romans, “Whether he considered that he was bound to
evacuate only those places in Greece which he had himself acquired, or
those also which he had inherited from his ancestors?” On Flamininus
making no answer, Aristaenus for the Achaeans, and Phaeneas for the
Aetolians, were on the point of replying. But as the day was closing
in, time prevented them from doing so; and Philip demanded that they
should all hand into him a written statement of the terms on which
peace was to be granted: for being there alone he had no one with whom
to consult; and therefore wished to turn their demands over in his own
mind. Now Flamininus was much amused at Philip’s sarcastic banter; but
not wishing the others to think so, he retaliated on him by a sarcasm
also, saying: “Of course you are alone, Philip: for you have killed
all the friends likely to give you the best advice!” The king smiled
sardonically, but said nothing. And for the present, all having handed
in the written statements of their demands as aforesaid, the conference
broke up, after appointing to meet again next day at Nicaea. But next
morning, though Flamininus came to the appointed place and found the
others there, Philip did not arrive.

[Sidenote: Second day’s conference, Philip comes late.]

[Sidenote: Philip’s final offers.]

+8.+ When the day, however, had nearly come to an end, and Titus and
the others had almost given him up, Philip appeared accompanied as
before, and excused himself by saying that he had spent the whole day
in perplexity and doubt, caused by the severity of the demands made
upon him. But every one else thought that he had acted thus from a wish
to prevent, by the lateness of the hour, the delivery of invectives
by the Achaeans and Aetolians: for he saw, as he was going away on
the previous evening, that both were ready to attack him and state
grievances. Therefore, as soon as he approached the meeting this time,
he demanded that “The Roman Consul should discuss the matter with him
in private; that they might not have a mere war of words on both sides,
but that a definite settlement should be come to on the points in
dispute.” On his several times repeating this request and pressing it
strongly, Flamininus asked those present what he ought to do. On their
bidding him meet the king and hear what he had to say, he took with
him Appius Claudius, at that time a military Tribune, and telling the
others to retire a short way from the sea and remain there, he himself
bade Philip disembark. Accordingly the king, attended by Apollodorus
and Demosthenes, left his ship, and, joining Flamininus, conversed with
him for a considerable time. What was said by the one and the other on
that occasion it is not easy to state. However, when Philip and he had
parted, Flamininus, in explaining the king’s views to the others, said
that he consented to restore Pharsalus and Larisa to the Aetolians,
but not Thebes: and that to the Rhodians he surrendered Peraea, but
not Iasus and Bargylia: to the Achaeans he gave up Corinth and Argos:
to the Romans he promised that he would surrender Illyricum and all
prisoners: and to Attalus the ships, and as many of the men captured in
the sea-fights as survived.

[Sidenote: Dissatisfaction of the Congress.]

+9.+ All present expressed their dissatisfaction at these terms, and
alleged that it was necessary before all that he should perform the
general injunction, that, namely, of evacuating all Greece: otherwise
these particular concessions were vain and useless. Observing that
there was an animated discussion going on among them, and fearing at
the same time that they would indulge in accusations against himself,
Philip requested Flamininus to adjourn the conference till next day,
as the evening was closing in; and promised that he would then either
persuade them to accept his terms or submit to theirs. Flamininus
consenting, they separated, after appointing to meet next day on the
beach near Thronium.

[Sidenote: Third day’s conference. A reference to the Senate agreed on.]

Next day all came to the appointed place in good time. Philip in a
short speech called on all, and on Flamininus, “Not to break off
the negotiation for peace now that by far the greater number were
inclined to come to some arrangement; but, if possible, to come to an
understanding by themselves on the points in dispute; or, if that could
not be, to send envoys to the Senate, and either convince it as to this
controversy, or submit to whatever it enjoined.”

On this proposition of the king, all the others declared that they
preferred war to such a demand. But the Roman Consul said that “He was
quite aware that it was improbable that Philip would submit to any of
their demands, yet, as it did not in the least stand in the way of
such action as they chose to take to grant the favour demanded by the
king, he would concede it. For not one of the proposals actually made
at present could be confirmed without the authority of the Senate; and
besides the season now coming on was a favourable one for ascertaining
its opinion; for, even as things were, the armies could do nothing
owing to the winter: it was therefore against no one’s interests, but,
on the contrary, very convenient for them all, to devote this time to a
reference to the Senate on the present state of affairs.”

[Sidenote: The embassies to Rome.]

+10.+ Seeing that Flamininus was not averse to referring the matter
to the Senate, all the others presently consented, and voted to allow
Philip to send envoys to Rome, and that they too should severally send
envoys of their own to plead their cause before the Senate, and state
their grievances against Philip.

The business of the conference having thus been concluded in accordance
with his views and the opinions he had originally expressed, Flamininus
at once set about carefully securing his own position, and preventing
Philip from taking any undue advantage. For though he granted him
three months’ suspension of hostilities, he stipulated that he should
complete his embassy to Rome within that time, and insisted on his
immediately removing his garrisons from Phocis and Locris. He was
also very careful to insist on behalf of the Roman allies, that no
act of hostility should be committed against them during this period
by the Macedonians. Having made these terms in writing with Philip,
he immediately took the necessary steps himself to carry out his own
policy. First, he sent Amynandrus to Rome at once, knowing that he
was a man of pliable character, and would be easily persuaded by his
own friends in the city to take any course they might propose; and
at the same time would carry with him a certain prestige, and rouse
men’s curiosity and interest by his title of royalty. Next to him he
sent as personal envoys his wife’s nephew Quintus Fabius, Quintus
Fulvius, and Appius Claudius Nero. From the Aetolians went Alexander
Isius, Damocritus of Calydon, Dicaearchus of Trichonium, Polemarchus of
Arsinoe, Lamius of Ambracia, Nicomachus of Acarnania,—one of those who
had fled from Thurium and settled in Ambracia,—and Theodotus of Pherae,
an exile from Thessaly who settled in Stratus: from the Achaeans
Xenophon of Aegium: from King Attalus only Alexander: and from the
Athenian people Cephisodorus and his colleagues.

[Sidenote: The speeches of the Greek envoys in the Senate.]

+11.+ Now these envoys arrived in Rome before the Senate had settled
the provinces of the Consuls appointed for this year, and whether
it would be necessary to send both to Gaul, or one of them against
Philip. But the friends of Flamininus having assured themselves that
both Consuls would remain in Italy owing to the threat of an attack
from the Celts, all the ambassadors appeared and bluntly stated their
grievances against Philip. The bulk of their accusations was to the
same effect as what they had before stated to the king himself; but
they also endeavoured carefully to instil this idea in the minds of
the Senators, “That so long as Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias were
subject to Macedonia, it was impossible for the Greeks to think of
liberty; for Philip himself had spoken the exact truth when he called
these places the ‘fetters of Greece.’ For neither could the Peloponnese
breathe while a royal garrison was stationed in Corinth, nor the
Locrians, Boeotians, and Phocians feel any confidence while Philip was
in occupation of Chalcis and the rest of Euboea; nor indeed could the
Thessalians or Magnesians raise a spark of liberty[78] while Philip
and the Macedonians held Demetrias. That, therefore, Philip’s offer to
evacuate the other places was a mere pretence in order to escape the
immediate danger; and that on the very first day he chose he would with
ease reduce the Greeks again under his power, if he were in possession
of these places.” They accordingly urged the Senate “either to force
Philip to evacuate the cities they had named, or to stand by the policy
they had begun, and vigorously prosecute the war against him. For in
truth the most difficult part of the war was already accomplished,
the Macedonians having already been twice defeated, and most of their
resources on land already expended.”

They concluded by beseeching the Senate “not to beguile the Greeks of
their hopes of liberty, nor deprive themselves of the most glorious
renown.” Such, or nearly so, were the arguments advanced by the Greek
envoys. Philip’s envoys were prepared to make a long speech in reply:
but they were stopped at the threshold. For being asked whether they
were prepared to evacuate Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias, they
declared that they had not any instructions as to those towns. They
were accordingly rebuked by the Senate and obliged to discontinue their

[Sidenote: B.C. 197 Coss. G. Cornelius Cethegus, Q. Minucius Rufus.]

+12.+ The Senate then, as I have said before, assigned Gaul to both
the consuls as their province, and ordered that the war against Philip
should go on, assigning to Titus Flamininus the entire control of
Greek affairs. These decrees having been quickly made known in Greece,
Flamininus found everything settled to his mind, partly no doubt by the
assistance of chance, but for the most part by his own foresight in
the management of the whole business. For he was exceedingly acute, if
ever Roman was. The skill and good sense with which he conducted public
business and private negotiations could not be surpassed, and yet he
was quite a young man, not yet more than thirty, and the first Roman
who had crossed to Greece with an army....

[Sidenote: Was Aristaenus a traitor or a wise Opportunist?]

+13.+ It has often and in many cases occurred to me to wonder at the
mistakes men make; but none seems to me so surprising as that of
traitors. I wish, therefore, to say a word in season on the subject. I
know very well that it is one which does not admit of easy treatment or
definition. For it is not at all easy to say whom we ought to regard as
a real traitor. Plainly all those, who at a time of tranquillity make
compacts with kings or princes, cannot be reckoned such off hand; nor,
again, those who in the midst of dangers transfer their country from
existing friendships and alliances to others. Far from it. For such men
have again and again been the authors of manifold advantages to their
own countries. But not to go any further for example, my meaning can be
made clear by the circumstances of the present case. For, if Aristaenus
had not at this time opportunely caused the Achaeans to leave their
alliance with Philip and join that of Rome, it is clear that the whole
league would have been utterly ruined. But as it was, this man and this
policy were confessedly the sources, not only of security to individual
Achaeans at the time, but of the aggrandisement of the whole league.
Therefore he was not looked upon as a traitor, but universally honoured
as a benefactor and saviour of the country. The same principle will
hold good in the case of all others who regulate their policy and
measures by the necessities of the hour.

[Sidenote: Comparison of the policy of the Achaeans and other
Peloponnesians towards Philip V. with that recommended by Demosthenes
towards Philip II.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 338.]

+14.+ From this point of view fault might be found with Demosthenes,
admirable as he is in many respects, for having rashly and
indiscriminately launched an exceedingly bitter charge at the most
illustrious Greeks. For he asserted that in Arcadia, Cercidas,
Hieronymus, and Eucampidas were traitors to Greece for making an
alliance with Philip; in Messene the sons of Philiades, Neon and
Thrasylochus; in Argos, Mystis, Teledamus, one Mnaseas; in Thessaly,
Daochus and Cineas; in Boeotia, Theogeiton and Timolas: and many
more besides he has included in the same category, naming them city
by city; and yet all these men have a weighty and obvious plea to
urge in defence of their conduct, and above all those of Arcadia and
Messene.[79] For it was by their bringing Philip into the Peloponnese,
and humbling the Lacedaemonians, that these men in the first place
enabled all its inhabitants to breathe again, and conceive the idea of
liberty; and in the next place, by recovering the territory and cities
which the Lacedaemonians in the hour of prosperity had taken from the
Messenians, Megalopolitans, Tegeans, and Argives, notoriously raised
the fortunes of their own countries.[80] In return for this they were
bound not to make war on Philip and the Macedonians, but to do all they
could to promote his reputation and honour. Now, if they had been doing
all this, or if they had admitted a garrison from Philip into their
native cities, or had abolished their constitutions and deprived their
fellow-citizens of liberty and freedom of speech, for the sake of their
own private advantage or power, they would have deserved this name
of traitor. But if, while carefully maintaining their duty to their
countries, they yet differed in their judgment of politics, and did not
consider that their interests were the same as those of the Athenians,
it is not, I think, fair that they should have been called traitors on
that account by Demosthenes. The man who measures everything by the
interests of his own particular state, and imagines that all the Greeks
ought to have their eyes fixed upon Athens, on the pain of being styled
traitors, seems to me to be ill-informed and to be labouring under a
strange delusion, especially as the course which events in Greece took
at that time has borne witness to the wisdom, not of Demosthenes, but
of Eucampidas, Hieronymus, Cercidas, and the sons of Philiades. For
what did the Athenians eventually get by their opposition to Philip?
Why, the crowning disaster of the defeat at Chaeronea. And had it not
been for the king’s magnanimity and regard for his own reputation,
their misfortunes would have gone even further, thanks to the policy
of Demosthenes. Whereas, owing to the men I have mentioned, security
and relief from attacks of the Lacedaemonians were obtained for Arcadia
and Messenia generally, and many advantages accrued to their states

[Sidenote: The true traitor is the man who acts with personal objects
or from party spirit.]

[Sidenote: The reward of treason.]

[Sidenote: Demosth. _de Corona_, § 47.]

+15.+ It is not easy then to define to whom one may properly apply this
name. The nearest approach to truth would be to assign it to those who
in times of public danger, either for the sake of personal security or
advantage, or to retaliate upon political opponents, put their cities
into the hands of the enemy: or indeed to those who, by admitting
a foreign garrison, and employing external assistance to carry out
private aims and views, bring their country under the direction of a
superior power. All such men as these one might include in the category
of traitors with perfect reasonableness. Such men, indeed, gain neither
profit nor honour, but the reverse, as every one acknowledges. And
this brings me back to my original observation, that it is difficult
to understand with what object, and supported by what reasoning, men
rush upon such a disastrous position. For no one ever yet betrayed his
city or camp or fort without being detected; but even if a man here and
there managed to conceal it at the moment of his crime, yet all have
been detected in the course of time. Nor when known has any such ever
had a happy life; but, as a rule, they meet with the punishment they
deserve from the very persons in whose favour they act. For, indeed,
though generals and princes constantly employ traitors for their own
purposes; yet when they have got all they can out of them, they treat
them thenceforth as traitors, as Demosthenes says; very naturally
considering that those, who have put their country and original friends
into the hands of their enemies, are never likely to be really loyal or
to keep faith with themselves. Nay, even though they escape violence
at the hands of these, yet they do not easily avoid the vengeance of
those whom they betrayed. Or if, finally, they manage to evade the
designs of both the one and the other, yet all over the world fame
dogs their footsteps with vengeance to their lives’ end, suggesting to
their imaginations night and day numberless terrors, false and true;
helping and hounding on all who design any evil against them; and,
finally, refusing to allow them even in sleep to forget their crimes,
but forcing them to dream of every kind of plot and disaster, because
they are aware of the universal loathing and hatred which attend them.
Yet, though all this is true, nobody who wanted one was ever at a loss
for a traitor, except in the rarest cases. From which one might say
with some plausibility that man, reputed the most cunning of animals,
gives considerable grounds for being regarded as the stupidest. For the
other animals, which obey their bodily appetites alone, can be deceived
by these alone; while man, though he has reason to guide him, is led
into error by the failure of that reason no less than by his physical

[Sidenote: Attalus in Sicyon, B.C. 198.]

+16.+ King Attalus had for some time past been held in extraordinary
honour by the Sicyonians, ever since the time that he ransomed the
sacred land of Apollo for them at the cost of a large sum of money; in
return for which they set up the colossal statue of him, ten cubits
high, near the temple of Apollo in the market-place. But on this
occasion, on his presenting them with ten talents and ten thousand
medimni of wheat, their devotion to him was immensely increased; and
they accordingly voted him a statue of gold, and passed a law to offer
sacrifice in his honour every year. With these honours, then, Attalus
departed to Cenchreae....[81]

[Sidenote: The cruelty of Apéga, wife of Nabis.]

+17.+ The tyrant Nabis, leaving Timocrates of Pellene at Argos,—because
he trusted him more than any one else and employed him in his most
important undertakings,—returned to Sparta: and thence, after some few
days, despatched his wife with instructions to go to Argos and raise
money. On her arrival she far surpassed Nabis himself in cruelty. For
she summoned women to her presence either privately or in families, and
inflicted every kind of torture and violence upon them, until she had
extorted from almost all of them, not only their gold ornaments, but
also the most valuable parts of their clothing....

[Sidenote: B.C. 197. King Attalus before the assembled Boeotians. See
Livy, 33, 2.] In a speech of considerable length Attalus reminded them
of the ancient valour of their ancestors....


[Sidenote: B.C. 197, at the beginning of spring. Livy, 33, 1.]

[Sidenote: The methods of forming palisades among the Greeks and

+18.+ Flamininus being unable to ascertain where the enemy were
encamped, but yet being clearly informed that they had entered
Thessaly, gave orders to all his men to cut stakes to carry with them,
ready for use at any moment. This seems impossible to Greek habits,
but to those of Rome it is easy. For the Greeks find it difficult
to hold even their sarissae on the march, and can scarcely bear the
fatigue of them; but the Romans strap their shields to their shoulders
with leathern thongs, and, having nothing but their javelins in their
hands, can stand the additional burden of a stake. There is also a
great difference between the stakes employed by the two peoples. The
Greeks hold that the best stake is that which has the largest and most
numerous shoots growing round the stem; but the Roman stakes have only
two or three side shoots, or at most four; and those are selected which
have these shoots on one side only. The result is that their porterage
is very easy (for each man carries three or four packed together),
and they make an exceedingly secure palisade when put into use. For
the Greek palisading, when set in the front of the camp, in the first
place can easily be pulled down; for since the part that is firm and
tightly fixed in the ground is single, while the projecting arms of it
are many and large, two or three men can get hold of the same stake
by its projecting arms, and easily pull it up; and directly that is
done, its breadth is so great that a regular gateway is made: and
because in such a palisade the stakes are not closely interlaced or
interwoven with each other, when one is pulled up the part next to it
is made insecure. With the Romans it is quite different. For as soon
as they fix their stakes, they interlace them in such a manner that
it is not easy to know to which of the stems fixed in the ground the
branches belong, nor on which of these branches the smaller shoots
are growing. Moreover, it is impossible to insert the hand and grasp
them, owing to the closeness of the interlacing of the branches and the
way they lie one upon another, and because the main branches are also
carefully cut so as to have sharp ends. Nor, if one is got hold of, is
it easy to pull up: because, in the first place, all the stakes are
sufficiently tightly secured in the ground to be self-supporting; and,
in the second place, because the man who pulls away one branch must,
owing to the close interlacing, be able to move several others in its
train; and it is quite unlikely that two or three men should happen to
get hold of the same stake. But even if, by the exertion of enormous
force, a man has succeeded in pulling one or another up, the gap is
scarcely perceptible. Considering, therefore, the vast superiority of
this method, both in the readiness with which such stakes are found,
the ease with which they are carried, and the security and durability
of the palisade made with them, it is plain, in my opinion, that if any
military operation of the Romans deserves to be admired and imitated,
it is this.

[Sidenote: Flamininus marches to Pherae in Thessaly.]

[Sidenote: Thebae Pthiotides.]

[Sidenote: The advanced guards of the two armies meet.]

+19.+ After providing for contingencies by these preparations,
Flamininus advanced with his whole force at a moderate pace, and,
having arrived at about fifty stades from Pherae, pitched a camp
there; and next morning, just before the morning watch, sent out some
reconnoitring parties to see whether they could get any opportunity of
discovering the position and movements of the enemy. Philip, at the
same time, being informed that the Romans were encamped near Thebes,
started with his whole force from Larisa in the direction of Pherae.
When about thirty stades from that town, he pitched his camp there,
and gave orders for all his men to make their preparations early next
morning, and about the morning watch got his troops on the march. The
division whose usual duty it was to form the advance guard he sent
forward first, with instructions to cross the heights above Pherae,
while he personally superintended the main army’s advance from the
camp as the day was breaking. The advanced guards of the two armies
were within a very little of coming into collision in the pass; for
the darkness prevented their seeing each other until they were quite a
short distance apart. Both sides halted, and sent speedy intelligence
to their respective leaders of what had happened, and asking for

[The generals decided] to remain in their intrenchments, and recall
these advanced guards. Next morning both sent out about three hundred
cavalry and light infantry to reconnoitre, among which Flamininus also
sent two squadrons of Aetolians, because they were acquainted with
the country. These opposing reconnoitring parties fell in with each
other on the road between Pherae and Larisa, and joined battle with
great fury. The men under Eupolemus the Aetolian fighting gallantly,
and urging the Italian troops to do the same, the Macedonians were
repulsed; and, after skirmishing for a long while, both parties retired
to their respective camps.

[Sidenote: Autumn of B.C. 197. Both Philip and Flamininus advance
towards Scotusa, on opposite sides of a range of hills.]

+20.+ Dissatisfied with the country near Pherae, as being thickly
wooded and full of walls and gardens, both parties broke up their
camps next day. Philip directed his march towards Scotusa, because he
desired to supply himself with provisions from that town, and thus,
with all his preparations complete, to find a district more suitable
to his army: while Flamininus, divining his intention, got his army
on the march at the same time as Philip, in great haste to anticipate
him in securing the corn in the territory of Scotusa. A range of hills
intervening between their two lines of march, the Romans could not see
in what direction the Macedonians were marching, nor the Macedonians
the Romans. Both armies, however, continued their march during this
day, Flamininus to Eretria in Phthiotis, and Philip to the river
Onchestus; and there they respectively pitched their camps. Next day
they advanced again, and again encamped: Philip at Melambium in the
territory of Scotusa, and Flamininus at the temple of Thetis in that of
Pharsalus, being still ignorant of each other’s whereabouts. A violent
storm of rain and thunder coming on next day, the whole atmosphere
descended from the clouds to the earth about the time of the morning
watch, so that the darkness was too dense to see even those who were
quite close. In spite of this, Philip was so eager to accomplish his
object, that he started with his whole army; but finding himself much
embarrassed on the march by the mist, after accomplishing a very
small distance he again encamped; but he sent his reserve back, with
instructions to halt upon the summit of the intervening hills.[82]

[Sidenote: Another skirmish between detached parties.]

+21.+ Flamininus, in his camp near the temple of Thetis, being
uncertain as to the position of the enemy, sent out ten troops of
cavalry and a thousand light infantry in advance, with instructions to
keep a careful look-out as they traversed the country. As these men
were approaching the ridge of the hills they came upon the Macedonian
reserve without expecting it, owing to the dimness of the light. After
a short interval of mutual alarm, both sides began irregular attacks
on each other, and both despatched messengers to their respective
chiefs to give information of what had occurred; and when the Romans
began to get the worst of it in the encounter, and to suffer heavily at
the hands of the Macedonian reserve, they sent to their camp begging
for supports. Flamininus accordingly despatched the Aetolians under
Archedamus and Eupolemus, as well as two of his own tribunes, with a
force altogether of five hundred cavalry and two thousand infantry,
after properly exhorting them to do their duty. On their arrival to the
support of the skirmishing party already engaged, the aspect of affairs
was promptly changed. For the Romans, inspired by the hope which this
reinforcement gave, renewed the contest with redoubled spirit; while
the Macedonians, though offering a gallant defence, were now in their
turn hard pressed, and being forced to make a general retreat, retired
to the highest points in the hills, and despatched messengers to the
king for help.

[Sidenote: Philip sends supports.]

[Sidenote: Valour of the Aetolian cavalry.]

[Sidenote: Cynoscephalae. Flamininus offers battle, which Philip,
against his better judgment, accepts.]

+22.+ But Philip, who had not expected, for reasons indicated above,
that a general engagement would take place on that day, happened to
have sent a considerable part of his troops out of camp foraging. But
when informed of what was taking place by these messengers, the mist at
the same time beginning to lift, he despatched, with due exhortation,
Heracleides of Gyrton, the commander of his Thessalian cavalry; Leon,
the general of his Macedonian horse; and Athenagoras, with all the
mercenaries except those from Thrace. The reserve being joined by these
troops, and the Macedonian force having thus become a formidable one,
they advanced against the enemy, and in their turn drove the Romans
back from the heights. But what prevented them, more than anything
else, from entirely routing the enemy was the gallantry of the Aetolian
cavalry, which fought with desperate fury and reckless valour. For the
Aetolians are as superior to the rest of the Greeks in cavalry for
fighting in skirmishing order, troop to troop, or man to man, as they
are inferior to them both in the arms and tactics of their infantry
for the purpose of a general engagement. The enemy being held in check
therefore by these troops, the Romans were not forced back again quite
on to the level ground, but, after retiring to a short distance, faced
round and halted. But when Flamininus saw that not only had the cavalry
and light infantry retired, but that, owing to them, his whole force
was rendered uneasy, he drew out his entire army and got them into
order of battle close to the hills. Meanwhile one man after another
of the Macedonian reserve ran towards Philip shouting out, “King, the
enemy are flying: do not let slip the opportunity. The barbarians
cannot stand before us: now is the day for you to strike: now is your
opportunity!” The result was that he was induced to fight in spite of
his dissatisfaction with the ground. For these hills, which are called
Cynoscephalae, are rough, precipitous, and of considerable height; and
it was because he foresaw the disadvantages of such a ground, that he
was originally disinclined to accept battle there; but, being excited
now by the extravagantly sanguine reports of these messengers, he gave
the order for his army to be drawn out of camp.

[Sidenote: Flamininus addresses his men, and advances to the attack.]

[Sidenote: The advanced guard are encouraged.]

+23.+ Having got his main body into order, Flamininus gave his
attention at the same time to relieving his advanced guard, and to
going along the ranks to encourage his men. His exhortation was short,
but clear and intelligible to the hearers: for, pointing to the enemy
with his hand, he said to his soldiers: “Are not these the Macedonians,
my men, whom, when occupying in their own country the pass to Eordaea,
you routed in open battle, under the command of Sulpicius, and drove
to take refuge on the hills with the loss of many of their comrades?
Are not these the Macedonians whom, when defended by what seemed an
impassable country in Epirus, you dislodged by sheer valour, and forced
to throw away their shields and fly right into Macedonia? Why then
should you feel any hesitation when you are to fight the same men on
equal ground? Why look anxiously to the past, rather than let that past
minister courage to you for the present? Therefore, my men, rouse each
other by mutual exhortations, and hasten in your might to the struggle!
For, with God’s will, I am persuaded that this battle will quickly
have the same issue as the contests in the past.” With these words he
ordered his right wing to remain where they were, and the elephants in
front of them; while with his left, supported by the light infantry,
he advanced in gallant style to attack the enemy. And the Roman troops
already on the field, finding themselves thus reinforced by the legions
on their rear, once more faced round and charged their opponents.

[Sidenote: Philip also advances and occupies the hills.]

[Sidenote: Philip’s advanced guard defeated.]

+24.+ Meanwhile, when he had seen the main part of his army in position
outside the camp, Philip himself advanced with his peltasts and the
right wing of his phalanx, commencing the ascent of the hills with
great rapidity, and having left instructions with Nicanor, surnamed the
Elephant, to see that the rest of the army followed at once. As soon as
his first files reached the summit, he deployed his men into line by
the left, and occupied the range of high ground: for the Macedonians
who had been sent in advance had forced the Romans a considerable
distance down the other side of the hills, and therefore he found the
ridges unoccupied by the enemy. But while he was still engaged in
getting the right wing of his army into line, his mercenaries came on
the ground, having been decisively repulsed by the enemy. For when the
Roman light infantry found themselves supported by the heavy, as I
said just now, with their assistance, which they regarded as turning
the scale in their favour, they made a furious charge on the enemy,
and killed a large number of them. When the king first came on the
ground, and saw that the fighting between the light armed was going
on near the enemy’s camp, he was delighted: but when, on the other
hand, he saw his own men giving ground and requiring support, he was
compelled to give it, and allow the necessities of the moment to decide
the fortunes of the whole day, in spite of the fact that the greater
part of his phalanx was still on the march and engaged in mounting the
hills. Receiving therefore the men who had been already engaged, he
massed them all upon his right wing, both infantry and cavalry; while
he ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their depth and close
up to the right. By the time this was effected the enemy were close
at hand; and, accordingly, the word was given to the phalanx to lower
spears and charge; to the light infantry to cover their flank. At the
same time Flamininus also, having received his advanced party into the
intervals between his maniples, charged the enemy.

[Sidenote: The battle.]

[Sidenote: Philip’s right wing repulse the Roman left.]

[Sidenote: Successful advance of the Roman right.]

+25.+ The charge was made with great violence and loud shouting on
both sides: for both advancing parties raised their war cry, while
those who were not actually engaged shouted encouragement to those that
were; and the result was a scene of the wildest excitement, terrible
in the last degree. Philip’s right wing came off brilliantly in the
encounter, for they were charging down hill and were superior in
weight, and their arms were far more suited for the actual conditions
of the struggle: but as for the rest of the army, that part of it which
was in the rear of the actual fighters did not get into contact with
the enemy; while the left wing, which had but just made the ascent, was
only beginning to show on the ridge. Seeing that his men were unable
to stand the charge of the phalanx, and that his left wing was losing
ground, some having already fallen and the rest slowly retiring, but
that hopes of saving himself still remained on the right, Flamininus
hastily transferred himself to the latter wing; and when he perceived
that the enemy’s force was not well together—part being in contact with
the actual fighters, part just in the act of mounting the ridge, and
part halting on it and not yet beginning to descend,[83]—keeping the
elephants in front he led the maniples of his right against the enemy.
The Macedonians having no one to give them orders, and unable to form a
proper phalanx, owing to the inequalities of the ground and to the fact
that, being engaged in trying to come up with the actual combatants,
they were still in column of march, did not even wait for the Romans to
come to close quarters: but, thrown into confusion by the mere charge
of the elephants, their ranks were disordered and they broke into

[Sidenote: The Macedonian phalanx outflanked.]

[Sidenote: The king quits the field and flies.]

+26.+ The main body of the Roman right followed and slaughtered
the flying Macedonians. But one of the tribunes, with about twenty
maniples, having made up his mind on his own account what ought to
be done next, contributed by his action very greatly to the general
victory. He saw that the division which was personally commanded by
Philip was much farther forward than the rest of the enemy, and was
pressing hard upon the Roman left by its superior weight; he therefore
left the right, which was by this time clearly victorious, and
directing his march towards the part of the field where a struggle was
still going on, he managed to get behind the Macedonians and charge
them on the rear. The nature of the phalanx is such that the men cannot
face round singly and defend themselves: this tribune, therefore,
charged them and killed all he could get at; until, being unable to
defend themselves, they were forced to throw down their shields and
fly; whereupon the Romans in their front, who had begun to yield,
faced round again and charged them too. At first, as I have said,
Philip, judging from the success of his own division, felt certain of
a complete victory; but when he saw his Macedonians all on a sudden
throwing away their shields, and the enemy close upon their rear, he
withdrew with a small body of foot and horse a short distance from
the field and took a general survey of the whole battle: and when
he observed that the Romans in their pursuit of his left wing were
already approaching the tops of the hills, he rallied as many Thracians
and Macedonians as he could at the moment, and fled. As Flamininus
was pursuing the fugitives he came upon the lines of the Macedonian
left, just as they were scaling the ridge in their attempt to cross
the hills, and at first halted in some surprise because the enemy
held their spears straight up, as is the custom of the Macedonians
when surrendering themselves or intending to pass over to the enemy.
Presently, having had the reason of this movement explained to him, he
held his men back, thinking it best to spare the lives of those whom
fear had induced to surrender. But whilst he was still reflecting on
this matter, some of the advanced guard rushed upon these men from
some higher ground and put most of them to the sword, while the few
survivors threw away their shields and escaped by flight.

[Sidenote: Philip retreats to Tempe.]

+27.+ The battle was now at an end in every part of the field; the
Romans everywhere victorious; and Philip in full retreat towards Tempe.
The first night he passed at what is called Alexander’s tower; the next
day he got as far as Gonni, on the pass into Tempe, and there remained,
with a view of collecting the survivors of the battle.

[Sidenote: The Romans soon abandon pursuit and devote themselves to the

[Sidenote: The losses on both sides.]

But the Romans, after following the fugitives for a certain distance,
returned; and some employed themselves in stripping the dead; others
in collecting the captives; while the majority hurried to the plunder
of the enemy’s camp. But there they found that the Aetolians had been
beforehand with them; and thinking, therefore, that they were deprived
of their fair share of the booty, they began grumbling at the Aetolians
and protesting to their general that “he imposed the dangers upon
them, but yielded the spoil to others.” For the present, however,
they returned to their own camp, and passed the night in their old
quarters: but next morning they employed themselves in collecting the
prisoners and the remainder of the spoils, and then started on the
march towards Larisa. In the battle the Romans lost seven hundred men;
the Macedonians eight thousand killed, and not less than five thousand
taken prisoners.

Such was the result of the battle at Cynoscephalae in Thessaly between
the Romans and Philip.

+28.+ In my sixth book I made a promise, still unfulfilled, of taking
a fitting opportunity of drawing a comparison between the arms of the
Romans and Macedonians, and their respective system of tactics, and
pointing out how they differ for better or worse from each other.
I will now endeavour by a reference to actual facts to fulfil that
promise. For since in former times the Macedonian tactics proved
themselves by experience capable of conquering those of Asia and
Greece; while the Roman tactics sufficed to conquer the nations of
Africa and all those of Western Europe; and since in our own day there
have been numerous opportunities of comparing the men as well as their
tactics,—it will be, I think, a useful and worthy task to investigate
their differences, and discover why it is that the Romans conquer and
carry off the palm from their enemies in the operations of war: that
we may not put it all down to Fortune, and congratulate them on their
good luck, as the thoughtless of mankind do; but, from a knowledge
of the true causes, may give their leaders the tribute of praise and
admiration which they deserve.

[Sidenote: The Roman defeats in the Punic wars were not from inferior
tactics, but owing the genius of Hannibal.]

Now as to the battles which the Romans fought with Hannibal, and the
defeats which they sustained in them, I need say no more. It was not
owing to their arms or their tactics, but to the skill and genius of
Hannibal that they met with those defeats: and that I made quite clear
in my account of the battles themselves. And my contention is supported
by two facts. First, by the conclusion of the war: for as soon as the
Romans got a general of ability comparable with that of Hannibal,
victory was not long in following their banners. Secondly, Hannibal
himself, being dissatisfied with the original arms of his men, and
having immediately after his first victory furnished his troops with
the arms of the Romans, continued to employ them thenceforth to the
end.[84] Pyrrhus, again, availed himself not only of the arms, but also
of the troops of Italy, placing a maniple of Italians and a company
of his own phalanx alternately, in his battles against the Romans.
Yet even this did not enable him to win; the battles were somehow or
another always indecisive.

It was necessary to speak first on these points, to anticipate any
instances which might seem to make against my theory. I will now return
to my comparison.

+29.+ Many considerations may easily convince us that, if only the
phalanx has its proper formation and strength, nothing can resist it
face to face or withstand its charge. For as a man in close order
of battle occupies a space of three feet; and as the length of the
sarissae is sixteen cubits according to the original design, which
has been reduced in practice to fourteen; and as of these fourteen
four must be deducted, to allow for the distance between the two hands
holding it, and to balance the weight in front; it follows clearly that
each hoplite will have ten cubits of his sarissa projecting beyond his
body, when he lowers it with both hands, as he advances against the
enemy: hence, too, though the men of the second, third, and fourth rank
will have their sarissae projecting farther beyond the front rank than
the men of the fifth, yet even these last will have two cubits of their
sarissae beyond the front rank; if only the phalanx is properly formed
and the men close up properly both flank and rear, like the description
in Homer[85]—

   “So buckler pressed on buckler; helm on helm;
    And man on man: and waving horse-hair plumes
    In polished head-piece mingled, as they swayed
    In order: in such serried rank they stood.”

And if my description is true and exact, it is clear that in front of
each man of the front rank there will be five sarissae projecting to
distances varying by a descending scale of two cubits.

+30.+ With this point in our minds, it will not be difficult to imagine
what the appearance and strength of the whole phalanx is likely to be,
when, with lowered sarissae, it advances to the charge sixteen deep.
Of these sixteen ranks, all above the fifth are unable to reach with
their sarissae far enough to take actual part in the fighting. They,
therefore, do not lower them, but hold them with the points inclined
upwards over the shoulders of the ranks in front of them, to shield the
heads of the whole phalanx; for the sarissae are so closely serried,
that they repel missiles which have carried over the front ranks and
might fall upon the heads of those in the rear. These rear ranks,
however, during an advance, press forward those in front by the weight
of their bodies; and thus make the charge very forcible, and at the
same time render it impossible for the front ranks to face about.

[Sidenote: The Roman more open order compared with the phalanx.]

Such is the arrangement, general and detailed, of the phalanx. It
remains now to compare with it the peculiarities and distinctive
features of the Roman arms and tactics. Now, a Roman soldier in full
armour also requires a space of three square feet. But as their method
of fighting admits of individual motion for each man—because he defends
his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which
a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and
stabbing,—it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and
an interval of at least three feet both on flank and rear, if he is
to do his duty with any effect. The result of this will be that each
Roman soldier will face two of the front rank of a phalanx, so that he
has to encounter and fight against ten spears, which one man cannot
find time even to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor
force his way through easily—seeing that the Roman front ranks are not
supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight to their
charge, or vigour to the use of their swords. Therefore it may readily
be understood that, as I said before, it is impossible to confront a
charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and

[Sidenote: Why the phalanx fails.]

+31.+ Why is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that
brings disaster on those who employ the phalanx? Why, just because
war is full of uncertainties both as to time and place; whereas there
is but one time and one kind of ground in which a phalanx can fully
work. If, then, there were anything to compel the enemy to accommodate
himself to the time and place of the phalanx, when about to fight a
general engagement, it would be but natural to expect that those who
employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory. But if the
enemy finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what
becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies that for
its employment it is indispensable to have a country flat, bare, and
without such impediments as ditches, cavities, depressions, steep
banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are sufficient to
hinder and dislocate this particular formation. And that it is, I may
say, impossible, or at any rate exceedingly rare to find a piece of
country of twenty stades, or sometimes of even greater extent, without
any such obstacles, every one will also admit. However, let us suppose
that such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down
into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and territories
of the allies, what use will the phalanx be? For if it remains on the
ground suited to itself, it will not only fail to benefit its friends,
but will be incapable even of preserving itself; for the carriage of
provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy, seeing that they are
in undisputed possession of the country: while if it quits its proper
ground, from the wish to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the
enemy. Nay, if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not
risk his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance,
but manœuvres for a time to avoid coming to close quarters in the
engagement, it is easy to learn what will be the result from what the
Romans are now actually doing.

+32.+ For no speculation is any longer required to test the accuracy
of what I am now saying: that can be done by referring to accomplished

[Sidenote: Flexibility of the Roman order.]

The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that
of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force:
but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others join
battle with the enemy at close quarters. Now, whether the phalanx in
its charge drives its opponents from their ground, or is itself driven
back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for whether
in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they
quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy’s
reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the
phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer charge them
face to face, but fall upon them on their flank and rear. If, then,
it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar
advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its
disadvantages, must it not follow that in practice the difference
between these two systems is enormous? Of course those generals who
employ the phalanx must march over ground of every description, must
pitch camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged,
and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy: for all these
are part and parcel of war, and have an important and sometimes
decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases the
Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible to handle,
because the men cannot act either in squads or separately. The Roman
order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and
on the field, is equally well equipped for every place, time, or
appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make
no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a
detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as
the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable,
their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of

I thought it necessary to discuss this subject at some length, because
at the actual time of the occurrence many Greeks supposed when
the Macedonians were beaten that it was incredible; and many will
afterwards be at a loss to account for the inferiority of the phalanx
to the Roman system of arming.

[Sidenote: Prudent conduct of Philip.]

+33.+ Philip having thus done all he could in the battle, but having
been decisively beaten, after taking up as many of the survivors as he
could, proceeded through Tempe into Macedonia. On the night previous
to his start he sent one of his guard to Larisa, with orders to
destroy and burn the king’s correspondence. And it was an act worthy
of a king to retain, even in the midst of disaster, a recollection
of a necessary duty. For he knew well enough that, if these papers
came into the possession of the Romans, they would give many handles
to the enemy both against himself and his friends. It has, perhaps,
been the case with others that in prosperity they could not use power
with the moderation which becomes mortal men, while in disaster they
displayed caution and good sense; but certainly this was the case with
Philip. And this will be made manifest by what I shall subsequently
relate. For as I showed without reserve the justice of his measures at
the beginning of his reign, and the change for the worse which they
subsequently underwent; and showed when and why and how this took
place, with a detailed description of the actions in this part of his
career;[86] in the same way am I bound to set forth his repentance, and
the dexterity with which he changed with his change of fortune, and may
be said to have shown the highest prudence in meeting this crisis in
his affairs.

As for Flamininus, having after the battle taken the necessary measures
as to the captives and the rest of the spoils, he proceeded to

[Sidenote: Estrangement of Aetolians.]

[Sidenote: Flamininus grants fifteen days’ truce to Philip.]

+34.+ Flamininus was much annoyed at the selfishness displayed by the
Aetolians in regard to the spoils; and had no idea of leaving them to
be masters of Greece after he had deprived Philip of his supremacy
there. He was irritated also by their braggadocio, when he saw that
they claimed all the credit of the victory, and were filling Greece
with the report of their valour. Wherefore, wherever he met them
he behaved with hauteur, and never said a word on public business,
but carried out all his measures independently or by the agency of
his own friends. While the relations between these two were in this
strained state, some few days after the battle Demosthenes, Cycliadas,
and Limnaeus came on a mission from Philip; and, after considerable
discussion with them, Flamininus granted an immediate armistice of
fifteen days, and agreed to have a personal interview also with Philip
in the course of them to discuss the state of affairs. And this
interview being conducted in a courteous and friendly manner, the
suspicions entertained of Flamininus by the Aetolians blazed forth with
double fury. For as corruption, and the habit of never doing anything
without a bribe, had long been a common feature in Greek politics, and
as this was the acknowledged characteristic of the Aetolians, they
could not believe that Flamininus could so change in his relations with
Philip without a bribe. They did not know the habits and principles of
the Romans on this subject; but judging from themselves they concluded
that there was every probability of Philip in his present position
offering a large sum of money, and of Flamininus being unable to resist
the temptation.

[Sidenote: The disinterestedness of the Romans generally as to money.]

[Sidenote: Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus Minor.]

[Sidenote: Lucius Aemilius Paulus.]

+35.+ If I had been speaking of an earlier period, and expressing what
was generally true, I should have had no hesitation in asserting of the
Romans as a nation that they would not be likely to do such a thing,—I
mean in the period before they engaged in wars beyond the sea, and
while they retained their own habits and principles uncontaminated.[87]
But in the present times I should not venture to say this of them all;
still, as individuals, I should be bold to say of the majority of the
men of Rome that they are capable of preserving their honesty in this
particular: and as evidence that I am making no impossible assertion,
I would quote two names which will command general assent,—I mean
first, Lucius Aemilius who conquered Perseus, and won the kingdom
of Macedonia. In that kingdom, besides all the other splendour and
wealth, there was found in the treasury more than six thousand talents
of gold and silver: yet he was so far from coveting any of this,
that he even refused to see it, and administered it by the hands of
others; though he was far from being superfluously wealthy himself,
but, on the contrary, was very badly off. At least, I know that on
his death, which occurred shortly after the war, when his own sons
Publius Scipio and Quintus Maximus wished to pay his wife her dowry,
amounting to twenty-five talents, they were reduced to such straits
that they would have been quite unable to do so if they had not sold
the household furniture and slaves, and some of the landed property
besides. And if what I say shall appear incredible to any one, he may
easily convince himself on the subject: for though there are many
controversies at Rome, and especially on this particular point, arising
from the antagonistic parties among them, yet he will find that what
I have just said about Aemilius is acknowledged by every one. Again,
Publius Scipio, son by blood of this Aemilius, and son by adoption of
Publius called the Great, when he got possession of Carthage, reckoned
the wealthiest city in the world, took absolutely nothing from it for
his own private use, either by purchase or by any other manner of
acquisition whatever, although he was by no means a very rich man, but
very moderately so for a Roman. But he not only abstained from the
wealth of Carthage itself, but refused to allow anything from Africa
at all to be mixed up with his private property. Therefore, in regard
to this man once more, any one who chooses to inquire will find that
his reputation in this particular is absolutely undisputed at Rome.
I shall, however, take a more suitable opportunity of treating this
subject at greater length.

[Sidenote: The congress of Tempe, B.C. 197.]

[Sidenote: Speech of King Amynandros.]

[Sidenote: Alexander the Aetolian.]

+36.+ Titus then having appointed Philip a day for the congress,
immediately wrote to the allies announcing when they were to appear;
and a few days afterwards came himself to the pass of Tempe at the
appointed time. When the allies had assembled, and the congress met,
the Roman imperator rose and bade each say on what terms they ought
to make peace with Philip. King Amynandros then delivered a short
and moderate speech, merely asking that “they would all have some
consideration for him, to prevent Philip, as soon as the Romans left
Greece, from turning the whole weight of his anger upon him; for the
Athamanes were always an easy prey to the Macedonians, because of
their weakness and the close contiguity of their territory.” When he
had finished, Alexander the Aetolian rose and complimented Flamininus
for “having assembled the allies in that congress to discuss the terms
of peace; and, above all, for having on the present occasion called
on each to express his opinion. But he was deluded and mistaken,”
he added, “if he believed that by making terms with Philip he would
secure the Romans peace or the Greeks freedom. For neither of these was
possible. But if he desired to accomplish both the design of his own
government and his own promises, which he had given to all the Greeks,
there was one way, and one only, of making terms with Macedonia, and
that was to eject Philip from his throne; and this could easily be done
if he did not let slip the present opportunity.”

After some further arguments in support of this view he sat down.

[Sidenote: Reply of Flamininus.]

+37.+ Flamininus here took up the argument, and said that “Alexander
was mistaken not only as to the policy of Rome, but also as to the
object which he proposed to himself, and above all as to the true
interests of Greece. For it was not the Roman way to utterly destroy
those with whom they had been at open war. A proof of his assertion
might be found in the war with Hannibal and the Carthaginians; for
though the Romans had received the severest provocation at their
hands, and afterwards had it in their power to do absolutely what they
pleased to them, yet they had adopted no extreme measures against the
Carthaginians. For his part, moreover, he had never entertained the
idea that it was necessary to wage an inexpiable war with Philip;
but on the contrary had been prepared before the battle to come to
terms with him, if he would have submitted to the Roman demands. He
was surprised, therefore, that those who had taken part in the former
peace conference should now adopt a tone of such irreconcilable
hostility. Have we not conquered? (say they). Yes, but this is the most
senseless of arguments. For brave men, when actually at war, should be
terrible and full of fire; when beaten, undaunted and courageous; when
victorious, on the other hand, moderate, placable, and humane. But your
present advice is the reverse of all this. Yet, in truth, to the Greeks
themselves it is greatly to their interest that Macedonia should be
humbled, but not at all so that she should be destroyed. For it might
chance thereby that they would experience the barbarity of Thracians
and Gauls, as has been the case more than once already.” He then added
that “the final decision of himself and Roman colleagues was, that, if
Philip would consent to fulfil all the conditions formerly enjoined
by the allies, they would grant him peace, subject, of course, to
the approval of the Senate: and that the Aetolians were free to take
what measures they chose for themselves.” Upon Phaeneas attempting to
reply that “Everything done hitherto went for nothing; for if Philip
managed to extricate himself from his present difficulties, he would
at once find some other occasion for hostilities,”—Flamininus sprang
at once from his seat, and said, with some heat, “Cease this trifling,
Phaeneas! For I will so settle the terms of the peace that Philip will
be unable, even if he wished it, to molest the Greeks.”

[Sidenote: On the third day of the conference Philip appears.]

[Sidenote: The Aetolians checkmated by Flamininus.]

+38.+ After this they separated for that day. On the next the king
arrived: and on the third, when all the delegates were met for
discussion, Philip entered, and with great skill and tact diverted the
anger which they all entertained against him. For he said that “He
conceded the demands made on the former occasion by the Romans and
the allies, and remitted the decision on the remaining points to the
Senate.” But Phaeneas, one of the Aetolians present, said: “Why then,
Philip, do not you restore to us Larisa Cremaste, Pharsalus, Phthiotid
Thebes, and Echinus?” Whereupon Philip bade them take them over. But
Flamininus here interposed, and forbade the Aetolians to take over any
of the towns except Phthiotid Thebes; “for upon his approaching this
town with his army, and summoning it to submit to the Roman protection,
the Thebans had refused; and, as it had now come into his hands in
the course of war, he had the right of taking any measures he chose
regarding it.” Phaeneas and his colleagues indignantly protested at
this, and asserted that it was their clear right to recover the towns
previously members of their league, “first on the ground that they had
taken part in the recent war; and secondly in virtue of their original
treaty of alliance, according to which the movable property of the
conquered belonged to the Romans, the towns to the Aetolians.” To which
Flamininus answered that “they were mistaken in both points; for their
treaty with Rome had been annulled when they abandoned the Romans, and
made terms with Philip: and, even supposing that treaty to be still in
force, they had no right to recover or take over such cities as had
voluntarily put themselves under the protection of Rome, as the whole
of the cities in Thessaly had done, but only such as were taken by

[Sidenote: The terms of the peace settled. Winter of B.C. 197.]

+39.+ The other members of the congress were delighted at this speech
of Flamininus. But the Aetolians listened with indignation; and what
proved to be the beginning of serious evils was engendered. For this
quarrel was the spark from which, not long afterwards, both the war
with the Aetolians and that with Antiochus flamed out. The principal
motive of Flamininus in being thus forward in coming to terms was the
information he had received that Antiochus had started from Syria with
an army, with the intention of crossing over into Europe. Therefore he
was anxious lest Philip, catching at this chance, should determine to
defend the towns and protract the war; and lest meanwhile he should
himself be superseded by another commander from home, on whom the
honour of all that he had achieved would be diverted. Therefore the
terms which the king asked were granted: namely, that he should have
four months’ suspension of hostilities, paying Flamininus at once the
two hundred talents; delivering his son Demetrius and some others of
his friends as hostages; and sending to Rome to submit the decision
on the whole pacification to the Senate. Flamininus and Philip then
separated, after interchanging mutual pledges of fidelity, on the
understanding that, if the treaty were not confirmed, Flamininus was
to restore to Philip the two hundred talents and the hostages. All the
parties then sent ambassadors to Rome, some to support and others to
oppose the settlement....

[Sidenote: Foolish credulity, see ch. 13; and 31, 21.]

+40.+ Why is it that, though deceived again and again by the same
things and persons, we are unable to abandon our blind folly? For
this particular kind of fraud has often been committed before now,
and by many. That other men should allow themselves to be taken in is
perhaps not astonishing; but it is wonderful that those should do so
who are the authors and origin of the same kind of malpractice. But I
suppose the cause is the absence of that rule so happily expressed by

   “Cool head and wise mistrust are wisdom’s sinews.”...


+41.+ [They endeavoured] to prevent Antiochus from sailing along their
coast, not from enmity to him, but from a suspicion that by giving
support to Philip he would become an obstacle in the way of Greek

King Antiochus was very desirous of possessing Ephesus, owing to its
extremely convenient position; for it appeared to occupy the position
of an Acropolis for expeditions by land and sea against Ionia and the
cities of the Hellespont, and to be always a most convenient base of
operations for the kings of Asia against Europe....

Of King Attalus, who now died, I think I ought to speak a suitable
word, as I have done in the case of others. [Sidebar: Death of
King Attalus, who had fallen ill at Thebes, before the battle
of Cynoscephalae, and had been brought home to die at Pergamum,
autumn, B.C. 197. Livy, 33, 21.] Originally he had no other external
qualification for royalty except money alone, which, indeed, if handled
with good sense and boldness, is of very great assistance in every
undertaking, but without these qualities is in its nature the origin
of evil, and, in fact, of utter ruin to very many. For in the first
place it engenders envy and malicious plots, and contributes largely
to the destruction of body and soul. For few indeed are the souls that
are able by the aid of wealth to repel dangers of this description.
This king’s greatness of mind therefore deserves our admiration,
because he never attempted to use his wealth for anything else but the
acquisition of royal power,—an object than which none greater can be
mentioned. Moreover he made the first step in this design, not only
by doing services to his friends and gaining their affection, but
also by achievements in war. For it was after conquering the Gauls,
the most formidable and warlike nation at that time in Asia, that he
assumed this rank and first puts himself forward as king. And though he
obtained this honour, and lived seventy-two years, of which he reigned
forty-four, he passed a life of the utmost virtue and goodness towards
his wife and children; kept faith with all allies and friends; and died
in the midst of a most glorious campaign, fighting for the liberty of
the Greeks; and what is more remarkable than all, though he left four
grown-up sons, he so well settled the question of succession, that
the crown was handed down to his children’s children without a single


[Sidenote: B.C. 196. Coss. L. Furius Purpureo, M. Claudius Marcellus.
The treaty with Philip is confirmed.]

+42.+ After Marcus Marcellus had entered upon the consulship the
ambassadors from Philip, and from Flamininus and the allies, arrived
at Rome to discuss the treaty with Philip; and after a lengthened
hearing the confirmation of the terms was decreed in the Senate. But on
the matter being brought before the people, Marcus Claudius, who was
ambitious of being himself sent to Greece, spoke against the treaty,
and did his best to get it rejected. The people however ratified the
terms, in accordance with the wish of Flamininus; and, upon this being
settled, the Senate immediately despatched a commission of ten men
of high rank to arrange the settlement of Greece in conjunction with
Flamininus, and to confirm the freedom of the Greeks. Among others
Damoxenus of Aegium and his colleagues, envoys from the Achaean
league, made a proposal in the Senate for an alliance with Rome; but
as some opposition was raised to this at the time, on account of a
counter-claim of the Eleians upon Triphylia, and of the Messenians, who
were at the time actually in alliance with Rome, upon Asine and Pylus,
and of the Aetolians upon Heraea,—the decision was referred to the
commission of ten. Such were the proceedings in the Senate....


[Sidenote: Philip allows his Boeotian followers to return home.]

[Sidenote: Zeuxippus and Peisistratus, heads of the Romanising party,
determine to get rid of Brachylles, B.C. 196.]

+43.+ After the battle of Cynoscephalae, as Flamininus was wintering
at Elateia, the Boeotians, being anxious to recover their citizens
who had served in Philip’s army, sent an embassy to Flamininus to
try and secure their safety. Wishing to encourage the loyalty of the
Boeotians to himself, because he was already anxious as to the action
of Antiochus, he readily assented to their petition. These men were
promptly restored from Macedonia, and one of them named Brachylles
the Boeotians at once elected Boeotarch; and in a similar spirit
honoured and promoted, as much as before, such of the others as were
thought to be well disposed to the royal house of Macedonia. They
also sent an embassy to Philip to thank him for the return of the
young men, thus derogating from the favour done them by Flamininus,—a
measure highly disquieting to Zeuxippus and Peisistratus, and all who
were regarded as partisans of Rome; because they foresaw what would
happen to themselves and their families, knowing quite well that if
the Romans quitted Greece, and Philip remained closely supporting the
political party opposed to themselves, it would be unsafe for them to
remain citizens of Boeotia. They therefore agreed among themselves
to send an embassy to Flamininus in Elateia: and having obtained an
interview with him, they made a lengthy and elaborate statement on this
subject, describing the state of popular feeling which was now adverse
to themselves, and discanting on the untrustworthiness of democratic
assemblies. And finally, they ventured to say that “Unless they could
overawe the common people by getting rid of Brachylles, there could
be no security for the party in favour of Rome as soon as the legions
departed.” After listening to these arguments Flamininus replied that
“He would not personally take any part in such a measure, but he
would not hinder those who wished to do so.” Finally, he bade them
speak to Alexamenus the Strategus of the Aetolians. Zeuxippus and his
colleagues accepted the suggestion, and communicated with Alexamenus,
who at once consented; and agreeing to carry out their proposal sent
three Aetolians and three Italians, all young men, to assassinate

[Sidenote: Zeuxippus condemned by his own conscience. See Livy, 33, 28.]

There is no more terrible witness, or more formidable accuser, than the
conscience which resides in each man’s breast....

[Sidenote: The Senatus Consultum.]

+44.+ About this same time the ten commissioners arrived from Rome
who were to effect the settlement of Greece, bringing with them the
decree of the Senate on the peace with Philip. The main points of the
decree were these: “All other Greeks, whether in Asia or Europe, to be
free and enjoy their own laws; but that Philip should hand over to the
Romans those at present under his authority, and all towns in which he
had a garrison, before the Isthmian games; and restore Euromus, Pedasa,
Bargylia, Iasus, Abydos, Thasus, Marinus, and Perinthus to freedom, and
remove his garrisons from them. That Flamininus should write to Prusias
commanding him to liberate Cius, in accordance with the decree of the
Senate. That Philip should restore to the Romans within the same period
all captives and deserters; and likewise all decked ships, except three
and his one sixteen-banked vessel; and should pay a thousand talents,
half at once, and half by instalments spread over ten years.”

[Sidenote: Objections of the Aetolians.]

+45.+ Upon this decree being published in Greece, it created a feeling
of confidence and gratification in all the communities except the
Aetolians. These last were annoyed at not getting all they expected,
and attempted to run down the decree by saying that it was mere words,
without anything practical in it; and they based upon the clauses of
the decree itself some such arguments as follow, by way of disquieting
those who would listen to them. They said “That there were two distinct
clauses in the decree relating to the cities garrisoned by Philip: one
ordering him to remove those garrisons and to hand over the cities to
the Romans; the other bidding him withdraw his garrisons and set the
cities free. Those that were to be set free were definitely named, and
they were towns in Asia; and it was plain, therefore, that those which
were to be handed over to the Romans were those in Europe, namely,
Oreus, Eretria, Chalcis, Demetrias, and Corinth. Hence it was plain
that the Romans were receiving the ‘fetters of Greece’ from the hands
of Philip, and that the Greeks were getting, not freedom, but a change
of masters.”

[Sidenote: The commissioners sit at Corinth, and declare all Greek
cities free, except the Acrocorinthus, Demetrias, and Chalcis.]

These arguments of the Aetolians were repeated _ad nauseam_. But,
meanwhile, Flamininus left Elateia with the ten commissioners, and
having crossed to Anticyra, sailed straight to Corinth, and there sat
in council with the commissioners, and considered the whole settlement
to be made. But as the adverse comments of the Aetolians obtained
wide currency, and were accepted by some, Flamininus was forced to
enter upon many elaborate arguments in the meetings of the commission,
trying to convince the commissioners that if they wished to acquire
unalloyed praise from the Greeks, and to establish firmly in the minds
of all that they had originally come into the country not to gain any
advantage for Rome, but simply to secure the freedom of Greece, they
must abandon every district and free all the cities now garrisoned by
Philip. But this was just the point in dispute among the commissioners;
for, as to all other cities, a decision had been definitely arrived at
in Rome, and the ten commissioners had express instructions; but about
Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias they had been allowed a discretion on
account of Antiochus, in order that they might take such measures as
they thought best from a view of actual events. For it was notorious
that this king had for some time past been meditating an interference
in Europe. However, as far as Corinth was concerned, Flamininus
prevailed on the commissioners to free it at once and restore it to the
Achaean league, from respect to the terms of the original agreement;
but he retained the Acrocorinthus, Demetrias, and Chalcis.

[Sidenote: The Isthmian games, July B. C. 196.]

[Sidenote: Proclamation of the freedom of the Greek cities.]

+46.+ When these decisions had been come to, the time for the
celebration of the Isthmian games arrived, The expectation of what
would happen there drew the men of highest rank from nearly every
quarter of the world; and there was a great deal of talk on the subject
from one end of the assembled multitude to the other, and expressed in
varied language. Some said that from certain of the places and towns it
was impossible that the Romans could withdraw; while others asserted
that they would withdraw from those considered most important, but
would retain others that were less prominent, though capable of being
quite as serviceable. And such persons even took upon themselves in
their ingenuity to designate the precise places which would be thus
treated. While people were still in this state of uncertainty, all the
world being assembled on the stadium to watch the games, the herald
came forward, and having proclaimed silence by the sound of a trumpet,
delivered the following proclamation: “The senate of Rome and Titus
Quintius, proconsul and imperator, having conquered King Philip and
the Macedonians in war, declare the following peoples free, without
garrison, or tribute, in full enjoyment of the laws of their respective
countries: namely, Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Achaeans
of Phthiotis, Magnesians, Thessalians, Perrhaebians.”

[Sidenote: An exciting scene.]

Now as the first words of the proclamation were the signal for a
tremendous outburst of clapping, some of the people could not hear it
at all, and some wanted to hear it again; but the majority feeling
incredulous, and thinking that they heard the words in a kind of
dream, so utterly unexpected was it, another impulse induced every one
to shout to the herald and trumpeter to come into the middle of the
stadium and repeat the words: I suppose because the people wished not
only to hear but to see the speaker, in their inability to credit the
announcement. But when the herald, having advanced into the middle
of the crowd, once more, by his trumpeter, hushed the clamour, and
repeated exactly the same proclamation as before, there was such an
outbreak of clapping as is difficult to convey to the imagination of
my readers at this time. When at length the clapping ceased, no one
paid any attention whatever to the athletes, but all were talking
to themselves or each other, and seemed like people bereft of their
senses. Nay, after the games were over, in the extravagance of
their joy, they nearly killed Flamininus by the exhibition of their
gratitude. Some wanted to look him in the face and call him their
preserver; others were eager to touch his hand; most threw garlands
and fillets upon him; until between them they nearly crushed him to
death. But though this expression of popular gratitude was thought to
have been extravagant, one might say with confidence that it fell short
of the importance of the actual event. For that the Romans and their
leader Flamininus should have deliberately incurred unlimited expense
and danger, for the sole purpose of freeing Greece, deserved their
admiration; and it was also a great thing that their power was equal to
their intention. But the greatest thing of all is that Fortune foiled
their attempt by none of her usual caprices, but that every single
thing came to a successful issue at the same time: so that all Greeks,
Asiatic and European alike, were by a single proclamation become “free,
without garrison or tribute, and enjoying their own laws.”

[Sidenote: Answer of commissioners to King Antiochus.]

[Sidenote: Final arrangements.]

+47.+ The Isthmian festival having come to an end, the first persons
with whom the commissioners dealt were the ambassadors from Antiochus.
They instructed them that “Their master must abstain from attacking
those cities in Asia which were autonomous, and go to war with none
of them; and must evacuate those that had been subject to Ptolemy or
Philip. In addition to this they forbade him to cross over into Europe
with an army; for no Greek henceforth was to be attacked in war or
to be enslaved to any one. Finally, they said that some of their own
number would go to visit Antiochus.” With this answer Hegesianax and
Lysias returned to Antiochus. They next summoned the representatives
of all the nations and cities, and declared to them the decisions of
the commissioners. The Macedonian tribe of the Orestae, on the ground
of their having joined Rome during the war, they declared autonomous;
the Perrhaebians, Dolopes, and Magnesians they declared to be free.
To the Thessalians, in addition to their freedom, they assigned the
Phthiotid Achaeans, with the exception, however, of Phthiotid Thebes
and Pharsalus: for the Aetolians made such a point of their claim to
Pharsalus, as also to Leucas, on the ground of the rights secured
them by the original treaty, that the commissioners referred the
consideration of their demand in regard to these places back again to
the Senate, but allowed them to retain Phocis and Locris as members of
their league, as they had been before. Corinth, Triphylia, and Heraea
they handed over to the Achaeans. Oreus and Eretria the majority wished
to give to King Eumenes, but on the instance of Flamininus this design
was not confirmed; and, accordingly, a short time afterwards these
towns, with Carystus, were declared free by the Senate. To Pleuratus
they assigned Lychnis and Parthus in Illyria, towns which had been
subject to Philip; and Amynandros they allowed to retain all such
strongholds as he had taken from Philip during the war.

[Sidenote: The commissioners separate and go to various parts of

[Sidenote: Two go to Antiochus and others to Philip.]

[Sidenote: Gnaeus Cornelius at the congress of the Aetolian league.]

+48.+ This business completed, the commissioners separated in various
directions: Publius Lentulus sailed to Bargylia and announced its
freedom; Lucius Stertinius did the same to Hephaestia, Thasus, and the
cities in Thrace; while Publius Villius and Lucius Terentius started
to visit Antiochus; and Gnaeus Cornelius with his colleagues went to
king Philip. They met him near Tempe, and after speaking with him on
the other matters about which they had instructions, they advised him
to send an embassy to Rome, to ask for an alliance, in order to obviate
all suspicion of being on the watch for an opportunity in expectation
of the arrival of Antiochus. The king agreeing to follow this advice,
Cornelius left him and went to the league congress at Thermus; and
coming into the public assembly urged the Aetolians in a lengthy speech
to abide by the policy they had adopted, from the first, and maintain
their good disposition towards the Romans. Many rose to answer: of whom
some expressed dissatisfaction with the Romans in moderate and decorous
language, for not having used their good fortune with sufficient regard
to their joint interests, and for not observing the original compact;
while others delivered violent invectives, asserting that the Romans
would never have set foot on Greece or conquered Philip if it had not
been for them. Cornelius disdained to answer these speeches in detail,
but he advised them to send ambassadors to Rome, for they would get
full justice in the Senate: which they accordingly did. Such was the
conclusion of the war with Philip....


+49.+ Whenever they are reduced to the last extremity, as the phrase
goes, they will fly to the Romans for protection and commit themselves
and their city to them....[89]

[Sidenote: Antiochus in the Chersonesus and Thrace, B.C. 196.]

[Sidenote: Speech of Lucius Cornelius.]

+50.+ Just when the designs of Antiochus in Thrace were succeeding
to his heart’s desire, Lucius Cornelius and his party sailed into
Selybria. These were the envoys sent by the Senate to conclude a peace
between Antiochus and Ptolemy. And at the same time there arrived
Publius Lentulus from Bargylia, Lucius Terentius and Publius Villius
from Thasus, three of the ten commissioners for Greece. Their arrival
having been promptly announced to Antiochus, they all assembled within
the next few days at Lysimacheia; and it so happened that Hegesianax
and Lysias, who had been on the mission to Flamininus, arrived about
the same time. The private intercourse between the king and the Romans
was informal and friendly; but when presently they met in conference
to discuss public affairs, things took quite another aspect. Lucius
Cornelius demanded that Antiochus should evacuate all the cities
subject to Ptolemy which he had taken in Asia; while he warned him in
solemn and emphatic language that he must do so also to the cities
subject to Philip, “for it was ridiculous that Antiochus should come in
and take the prizes of the war which Rome had waged with Philip.” He
also admonished him to abstain from attacking autonomous cities, and
added that “He was at a loss to conjecture with what view Antiochus
had crossed over to Europe with such a powerful army and fleet; for if
it were not with the intention of attacking the Romans, there was no
explanation left that any reasonable person could accept.” With these
words the Romans ceased speaking.

[Sidenote: The reply of Antiochus.]

[Sidenote: Lysimachus conquered by Seleucus Nicanor, B.C. 281.]

+51.+ The king began his reply by saying that “He did not understand
by what right the Romans raised a controversy with him in regard to
the cities in Asia. They were the last people in the world who had any
claim to do so.” Next he claimed that “They should refrain entirely
from interfering in the affairs of Asia, seeing that he never in the
least degree interposed in those of Italy. He had crossed into Europe
with his army to recover his possessions in the Chersonese and the
cities in Thrace; his right to the government of these places being
superior to that of any one in the world. For this was originally
the principality of Lysimachus; and as Seleucus waged war with and
conquered that prince, the whole domain of Lysimachus passed to
Seleucus[90]: then owing to the multifarious interests which distracted
the attention of his predecessors, first Ptolemy and then Philip had
managed to wrest this country from them and secure it for themselves.
He had not then availed himself of Philip’s difficulties to take
it, but had _recovered_ possession of it in the exercise of his
undoubted rights. It was no injury to the Romans that he should now be
restoring to their homes, and settling again in their city, the people
of Lysimacheia who had been expelled by an unexpected raid of the
Thracians. He was doing this, not from any intention of attacking the
Romans, but to prepare a place of residence for his son Seleucus. As
for the autonomous cities of Asia, they must acquire their freedom by
his free grace, not by an injunction from Rome. As for Ptolemy, he was
about to settle matters amicably with him: for it was his intention to
confirm their friendship by a matrimonial alliance.”

[Sidenote: Antiochus refuses to acknowledge the Romans as arbitrators.]

+52.+ But upon Lucius expressing an opinion that they ought to call
in the representatives of Lampsacus and Smyrna and give them a
hearing, this was done. The envoys from Lampsacus were Parmenio and
Pythodorus, and from Smyrna Coeranus. These men expressing themselves
with much openness, Antiochus was irritated at the idea of defending
himself against accusers before a tribunal of Romans, and interrupting
Parmenio, said: “A truce to your long speeches: I do not choose to have
my controversies with you decided before a Roman but before a Rhodian
court.” Thereupon they broke up the conference very far from pleased
with each other....


[Sidenote: Death of Scopas. See _supra_, 13, 2; 16, 18, B.C. 196.]

+53.+ Many people have a yearning for bold and glorious undertakings,
but few dare actually attempt them. Yet Scopas had much fairer
opportunities for a hazardous and bold career than Cleomenes. For the
latter, though circumvented by his enemies, and reduced to depend
upon such forces as his servants and friends could supply, yet left
no chance untried, and tested every one to the best of his ability,
valuing an honourable death more highly than a life of disgrace. But
Scopas, with all the advantages of a formidable body of soldiers and
of the excellent opportunity afforded by the youth of the king, by his
own delays and halting counsels allowed himself to be circumvented.
For having ascertained that he was holding a meeting of his partisans
at his own house, and was consulting with them, Aristomenes sent
some of the royal bodyguards and summoned him to the king’s council.
Whereupon Scopas was so infatuated that he was neither bold enough to
carry out his designs, nor able to make up his mind to obey the king’s
summons,—which is in itself the most extreme step,—until Aristomenes,
understanding the blunder he had made, caused soldiers and elephants to
surround his house, and sent Ptolemy son of Eumenes in with some young
men, with orders to bring him quietly if he would come, but, if not, by
force. When Ptolemy entered the house and informed Scopas that the king
summoned him, he refused at first to obey, but remained looking fixedly
at Ptolemy, and for a long while preserved a threatening attitude as
though he wondered at his audacity; and when Ptolemy came boldly up
to him and took hold of his chlamys, he called on the bystanders to
help him. But seeing that the number of young men who had accompanied
Ptolemy into the house was large, and being informed by some one of the
military array surrounding it outside, he yielded to circumstances, and
went, accompanied by his friends, in obedience to the summons.

[Sidenote: Scopas before the council.]

[Sidenote: Death of Dicaearchus.]

+54.+ On his entering the council chamber the king was the first to
state the accusation against him, which he did briefly. He was followed
by Polycrates lately arrived from Cyprus; and he again by Aristomenes.
The charges made by them all were much to the same effect as what I
have just stated; but there was now added to them the seditious meeting
with his friends, and his refusal to obey the summons of the king. On
these charges he was unanimously condemned, not only by the members
of the council, but also by the envoys of foreign nations who were
present. And when Aristomenes was about to commence his accusation
he brought in a large number of other Greeks of rank also to support
him, as well as the Aetolian ambassadors who had come to negotiate
a peace, among whom was Dorimachus son of Nicostratus. When these
speeches had been delivered, Scopas endeavoured to put forward certain
pleas in his defence: but gaining no attention from any one, owing to
the senseless nature of his proceedings, he was taken along with his
friends to prison. There after nightfall Aristomenes caused Scopas and
his family to be put to death by poison; but did not allow Dicaearchus
to die until he had had him racked and scourged, thus inflicting on him
a punishment which he thoroughly deserved in the name of all Greece.
For this was the Dicaearchus whom Philip, when he resolved upon his
treacherous attack on the Cyclades and the cities of the Hellespont,
appointed leader of the whole fleet and the entire enterprise: who
being thus sent out to perform an act of flagrant wickedness, not only
thought that he was doing nothing wrong, but in the extravagance of
his infatuation imagined that he would strike terror into the gods as
well as man. For wherever he anchored he used to build two altars, to
Impiety and Lawlessness, and, offering sacrifice upon these altars,
worshipped them as his gods. Therefore in my opinion he met with a just
retribution both from gods and men: for as his life had been spent
in defiance to the laws of nature, his end was properly also one of
unnatural horror. All the other Aetolians who wished to depart were
allowed by the king to go in possession of their property.

[Sidenote: Enormous wealth collected by Scopas.]

+55.+ As in the lifetime of Scopas his love of money had been
notorious, for his avarice did in fact surpass that of any man in the
world, so after his death was it made still more conspicuous by the
enormous amount of gold and other property found in his house; for by
the assistance of the coarse manners and drunken habits of Charimortus
he had absolutely pillaged the kingdom.

[Sidenote: The anacleteria of Ptolemy Epiphanes, B.C. 176. Aet. 12.]

Having thus settled the Aetolian business to their liking, the
courtiers turned their attention to the ceremony of instituting the
king into the management of his office, called the _Anacleteria_. His
age was not indeed yet so far advanced as to make this necessary; but
they thought that the kingdom would gain a certain degree of firmness
and a fresh impulse towards prosperity, if it were known that the king
had assumed the independent direction of the government. They then made
the preparations for the ceremony with great splendour, and carried
it out in a manner worthy of the greatness of the kingdom, Polycrates
being considered to have contributed very largely to the accomplishment
of their efforts. For this man had enjoyed even during his youth,
in the reign of the late king, a reputation second to no one in the
court for fidelity and practical ability; and this reputation he had
maintained during the present reign also. For having been entrusted
with the management of Cyprus and its revenues, when its affairs were
in a critical and complicate state, he not only preserved the island
for the young king, but collected a very considerable sum of money,
with which he had just arrived and had paid to the king, after handing
over the government of Cyprus to Ptolemy of Megalopolis. But though
he obtained great applause by this, and a large fortune immediately
afterwards, yet, as he grew older, he drifted into extravagant
debauchery and scandalous indulgence. Nor was the reputation of
Ptolemy, son of Agesarchus very different in the later part of his
life. But in regard to these men, when we come to the proper time, I
shall not shrink from stating the circumstances which disgraced their
official life....


The only fragment we possess of the nineteenth book of Polybius is
a statement quoted by Plutarch as to M. Porcius Cato, to the effect
that by his orders the walls of all the numerous Spanish cities north
of the Baetis were dismantled on the same day. Cato was in Spain B.C.
195. The means taken by him to secure this simultaneous destruction of
fortifications are told by Frontinus, _Strateg._ 1, 1, 1.

We thus lose the history of the years B.C. 195, 194, 193; as well as
the greater part of that of B.C. 192, 191, contained in the early part
of book 20, of which only a few fragments remain. Livy, however, has
evidently translated from Polybius in his history of these years, and a
brief abstract of events in Greece may help the reader in following the
fragmentary book which follows with more interest.

   B.C. 195.
   Lucius Valerius Flaccus, } Coss.
   M. Porcius Cato,         }

Flamininus’s imperium is extended for this year, because of the danger
from Antiochus and Nabis. The Aetolians, still discontented, push their
demand for Pharsalus and Leucas, and are referred by the Senate back to
Flamininus. The latter summons a conference of Greek states at Corinth,
and a war is decreed against Nabis, the Aetolians still expressing
their dislike of Roman interference. The levies are collected; Argos
is freed from Nabis; Sparta all but taken; and Nabis forced to submit
to most humiliating terms: the Aetolians again objecting to his being
allowed to remain at Sparta on any terms at all. In this year also
legates from Antiochus visit Flamininus, but are referred to the Senate.

   B.C. 194.
   Publius Cornelius Scipio II., } Coss.
   Tiberius Sempronius Longus,   }

Flamininus leaves Greece after a speech at Corinth to the assembled
league advising internal peace and loyalty to Rome, and enters Rome in
triumph. There is a time of comparative tranquillity in Greece.

   B.C. 193.
   L. Cornelius Merula, } Coss.
   Q. Minucius Thermus, }

The legates from Antiochus are sent back with the final answer that,
unless the king abstains from entering Europe in arms, the Romans will
free the Asiatic Greek cities from him. Roman legates, P. Sulpicius,
P. Villius, P. Aelius, are sent to him. Hannibal arrives at the court
of Antiochus, and urges him to resist; and the Aetolians urge the same
course, trying also to stir up Nabis and Philip of Macedon. Antiochus
accordingly will give the Roman envoys no satisfactory answer.

   B.C. 192.
   L. Quintius Flamininus,   } Coss.
   Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, }

The Romans therefore prepare for war. A fleet under the praetor Atilius
is sent against Nabis: commissioners are sent into Greece—T. Quintius
Flamininus, C. Octavius, Cn. Servilius, P. Villius—early in the year:
M. Baebius is ordered to hold his army in readiness at Brundisium.
Then news is brought to Rome by Attalus of Pergamum (brother of king
Eumenes) that Antiochus has crossed the Hellespont, and the Aetolians
on the point of joining him. Therefore Baebius is ordered to transport
his army to Apollonia.

Meanwhile Nabis takes advantage of the alarm caused by Antiochus to
move. He besieges Gythium, and ravages the Achaean territory. The
league, under Philopoemen, proclaim war against him, and, after losing
an unimportant naval battle, decisively defeat him on land and shut him
up in Sparta.

The Aetolians now formally vote to call in Antiochus, “to liberate
Greece and arbitrate between them and Rome.” They occupy Demetrias;
and kill Nabis by a stratagem. “Whereupon Philopoemen annexes Sparta
to the Achaean league. Later in the year Antiochus meets the assembly
of the Aetolians at Lamia in Thessaly, is proclaimed “Strategus”; and
after a vain attempt to conciliate the Achaeans seizes Chalcis, where
he winters, and marries a young wife.

   B.C. 191.
   P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, } Coss.
   M. Acilius Glabrio,         }

The Romans declare war with Antiochus. Manius Acilius is selected to go
to Greece, where he takes over the army of Baebius, and after taking
many towns in Thessaly meets and defeats Antiochus at Thermopylae;
where the Aetolian league did after all little service to the king, who
retires to Ephesus.

See Livy, 34, 43——36, 21. See also Plutarch, _Philopoemen_, and
_Flamininus_; Appian, _Syriacae_, 6-21.



[Sidenote: Antiochus the Great at a meeting of Aetolians at Lamia,
autumn of B.C. 192. Livy, 35, 43-46.]

+1.+ The Aetolians chose thirty of the Apocleti[91] to confer with King

He accordingly summoned a meeting of the Apocleti and consulted them on
the state of affairs....

+2.+ When Antiochus sent an embassy to the Boeotians, they answered
that they would not consider his proposals until the king came in

[Sidenote: Antiochus passes the winter of B.C. 192-191 at Chalcis.
Visit of envoys from Epirus and Elis.]

+3.+ As Antiochus was staying at Chalcis, just as the winter was
beginning, two ambassadors came to visit him, Charops from Epirus,
and Callistratus from Elis. The prayer of the Epirotes was that “The
king would not involve them in the war with Rome for they dwelt on the
side of Greece immediately opposite Italy; but that, if he could, he
would secure their safety by defending the frontier of Epirus: in that
case he should be admitted into all their towns and harbours: but if
he decided not to do so at present, they asked his indulgence if they
shrank from a war with Rome.” The Eleans, in their turn, begged him “To
send a reinforcement to their town; for as the Achaeans had voted war
against them, they were in terror of an attack from the troops of the
league.” The king answered the Epirotes by saying that he would send
envoys to confer with them on their mutual interests; but to Elis he
despatched a thousand foot soldiers under the command of Euphanes of

[Sidenote: The decline of Boeotia,]

[Sidenote: from B.C. 371-361.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 245. See Plutarch, _Arat._ 16.]

+4.+ The Boeotians had long been in a very depressed state, which
offered a strong contrast to the former prosperity and reputation of
their country. They had acquired great glory as well as great material
prosperity at the time of the battle of Leuctra; but by some means or
another from that time forward they steadily diminished both the one
and the other under the leadership of Amaeocritus; and subsequently not
only diminished them, but underwent a complete change of character, and
did all that was possible to wipe out their previous reputation. For
having been incited by the Achaeans to go to war with the Aetolians,
they adopted the policy of the former and made an alliance with them,
and thenceforth maintained a steady war with the Aetolians. But on
the Aetolians invading Boeotia, they marched out with their full
available force, and without waiting for the arrival of the Achaeans,
who had mustered their men and were on the point of marching to their
assistance, they attacked the Aetolians; and being worsted in the
battle were so completely demoralised, that, from the time of that
campaign, they never plucked up spirit to claim any position of honour
whatever, and never shared in any enterprise or contest undertaken by
the common consent of the Greeks. They devoted themselves entirely to
eating and drinking, and thus became effeminate in their souls as well
as in their bodies.

[Sidenote: B.C. 222.]

[Sidenote: The rise of the house of Neon.]

[Sidenote: Demetrius II. B.C. 239-229.]

+5.+ Such were, briefly, the steps in the degeneracy of Boeotia.
Immediately after the battle just mentioned they abandoned the Achaeans
and joined the Aetolians.[92] But on the latter presently going to war
with Philip’s father Demetrius, they once more abandoned the Aetolians;
and upon Demetrius entering Boeotia with an army, without attempting
resistance they submitted completely to the Macedonians. But as a
spark of their ancestral glory still survived, there were found some
who disliked the existing settlement and the complete subservience to
Macedonia: and they accordingly maintained a violent opposition to the
policy of Ascondas and Neon, the ancestors of Brachylles, who were
the most prominent in the party which favoured Macedonia. However,
the party of Ascondas eventually prevailed, owing to the following
circumstance. Antigonus (Doson), who, after the death of Demetrius,
was Philip’s guardian, happened to be sailing on some business along
the coast of Boeotia; when off Larymna he was surprised by a sudden
ebb of the tide, and his ships were left high and dry. Now just at
that time a rumour had been spread that Antigonus meant to make a raid
upon the country; and therefore Neon, who was Hipparch at the time,
was patrolling the country at the head of all the Boeotian cavalry to
protect it, and came upon Antigonus in this helpless and embarrassed
position: and having it thus in his power to inflict a serious blow
upon the Macedonians, much to their surprise he resolved to spare them.
His conduct in so doing was approved by the other Boeotians, but was
not at all pleasing to the Thebans. Antigonus, however, when the tide
flowed again and his ships floated, proceeded to complete the voyage
to Asia on which he was bound, with deep gratitude to Neon for having
abstained from attacking him in his awkward position. Accordingly, when
at a subsequent period he conquered the Spartan Cleomenes and became
master of Lacedaemon, he left Brachylles in charge of the town, by
way of paying him for the kindness done him by his father Neon. This
proved to be the beginning of a great rise in importance of the family
of Brachylles. But this was not all that Antigonus did for him: from
that time forward either he personally, or king Philip, continually
supported him with money and influence; so that before long this family
entirely overpowered the political party opposed to them in Thebes, and
forced all the citizens, with very few exceptions, to join the party of
Macedonia. Such was the origin of the political adherence to Macedonia
of the family of Neon, and of its rise to prosperity.

[Sidenote: Disorganised state of Boeotia.]

[Sidenote: Antigonus Gonatas, _ob._ B.C. 239.]

[Sidenote: Cleomenic war B.C. 227-221.]

+6.+ But Boeotia as a nation had come to such a low pitch, that for
nearly twenty-five years the administration of justice had been
suspended in private and public suits alike. Their magistrates were
engaged in despatching bodies of men to guard the country or in
proclaiming national expeditions, and thus continually postponed their
attendance at courts of law. Some of the Strategi also dispensed
allowances to the needy from the public treasury; whereby the common
people learnt to support and invest with office those who would
help them to escape the penalties of their crimes and undischarged
liabilities, and to be enriched from time to time with some portion of
the public property obtained by official favour. No one contributed
to this lamentable state of things more than Opheltas, who was always
inventing some plan calculated to benefit the masses for the moment,
while perfectly certain to ruin them in the future. To these evils was
added another unfortunate fashion. It became the practice for those
who died childless not to leave their property to the members of their
family, as had been the custom of the country formerly, but to assign
it for the maintenance of feasts and convivial entertainments to be
shared in by the testator’s friends in common; and even many who did
possess children left the larger part of their property to the members
of their own club. The result was that there were many Boeotians who
had more feasts to attend in the month than there were days in it.
The people of Megara therefore, disliking this habit, and remembering
their old connexion with the Achaean league, were inclined once more
to renew their political alliance with it. For the Megarians had been
members of the Achaean league since the time of Antigonus Gonatas;
but upon Cleomenes blockading the Isthmus, finding themselves cut off
from the Achaeans they joined the Boeotians, with the consent of the
former. But a little before the time of which we are now speaking,
becoming dissatisfied with the Boeotian constitution, they again joined
the Achaeans. The Boeotians, incensed at what they considered acts
of contempt, sallied out in full force to attack Megara; and on the
Megarians declining to listen to them, they determined in their anger
to besiege and assault their city. But being attacked by a panic, on a
report spreading that Philopoemen was at hand at the head of a force of
Achaeans, they left their scaling ladders against the walls and fled
back precipitately to their own country.

+7.+ Such being the state of Boeotian politics, it was only by
extraordinary good fortune that they evaded destruction in the
dangerous periods of the wars of Philip and Antiochus. But in the
succeeding period they did not escape in the same way. Fortune, on the
contrary, seemed determined to make them pay for their former good luck
by a specially severe retribution, as I shall relate hereafter....

[Sidenote: Antiochus received in Thebes, B.C. 192.]

Many of the Boeotians defended their alienation from the Romans by
alleging the assassination of Brachylles,[93] and the expedition
made by Flamininus upon Coronea owing to the murders of Romans on
the roads.[94] But the real reason was their moral degeneracy,
brought about by the causes I have mentioned. For as soon as the king
approached, the Boeotian magistrates went out to meet him, and after
holding a friendly conversation with him conducted him into Thebes....

[Sidenote: Antiochus wintering in Chalcis, B.C. 192-191.]

+8.+ Antiochus the Great came to Chalcis in Euboea, and there completed
his marriage, when he was fifty years old, and had already undertaken
his two most important labours, the liberation of Greece—as he called
it—and the war with Rome. However, having fallen in love with a young
lady of Chalcis, he was bent on marrying her, though the war was
still going on; for he was much addicted to wine and delighted in
excesses. The lady was a daughter of Cleoptolemus, a man of rank, and
was possessed of extraordinary beauty. He remained in Chalcis all the
winter occupied in marriage festivities, utterly regardless of the
pressing business of the time. He gave the girl the name of Euboea, and
after his defeat[95] fled with his bride to Ephesus....

[Sidenote: Heracleia Trachinia taken by Acilius after the battle of
Thermopylae, B.C. 191.]

[Sidenote: Embassy of the Aetolians.]

+9.+ When the Romans took Heracleia, Phaeneas the Aetolian Strategus,
in view of the danger threatening Aetolia, and seeing what would happen
to the other towns, determined to send an embassy to Manius Acilius to
demand a truce and treaty of peace. With this purpose he despatched
Archidamus, Pantaleon and Chalesus, who on meeting the Roman consul
were intending to enter upon a long argument, but were interrupted in
the middle of their speech and prevented from finishing it. For Acilius
remarked that “For the present he had no leisure to attend to them,
being much engaged with the distribution of the spoils of Heracleia:
he would, however, grant a ten days’ truce and send Lucius Valerius
Flaccus with them, with instructions as to what he was to say.” The
truce being thus made, and Valerius having come to Hypata, a lengthened
discussion took place on the state of affairs. The Aetolians sought
to establish their case by referring to their previous services to
Rome. But Valerius cut this line of argument short by saying that
“Such justification did not apply to the present circumstances; for
as these old friendly relations had been broken off by them, and the
existing hostility was owing entirely to the Aetolians themselves,
the services of the past could be of no assistance to them in the
present. They must therefore abandon all idea of justification, and
adopt a tone of supplication, and beseech the consul’s pardon for
their transgressions.” After a long discussion on various details, the
Aetolians eventually decided to leave the whole matter to Acilius, and
commit themselves without reserve to the good faith of the Romans.
They had no comprehension of what this really involved; but they were
misled by the word “faith” into supposing that the Romans would thereby
be more inclined to grant them terms. But with the Romans for a man
“to commit himself to their good faith” is held to be equivalent to
“surrendering unconditionally.”

[Sidenote: Aetolian embassy to Acilius.]

[Sidenote: Roman terms.]

[Sidenote: The Aetolians fail to ratify the peace.]

+10.+ Having come to this resolution, Phaeneas despatched legates with
Valerius to announce the decision of the Aetolians to Acilius. On being
admitted to the presence of the Consul, these legates, after once
more entering upon a plea of self-justification, ended by announcing
that the Aetolians had decided to commit themselves to the good faith
of the Romans. Hereupon Acilius interrupted them by saying, “Is this
really the case, men of Aetolia?” And upon their answering in the
affirmative, he said: “Well then, the first condition is that none
of you, individually or collectively, must cross to Asia; the second
is that you must surrender Menestratus the Epirote” (who happened at
that time to be at Naupactus, where he had come to the assistance of
the Aetolians), “and also King Amynander, with such of the Athamanians
as accompanied him in his desertion to your side.” Here Phaeneas
interrupted him by saying: “But it is neither just nor consonant with
Greek customs, O Consul, to do what you order.” To which Acilius
replied,—not so much because he was angry, as because he wished to
show him the dangerous position in which he stood, and to thoroughly
frighten him,—“Do you still presume to talk to me about Greek customs,
and about honour and duty, after having committed yourselves to my
good faith? Why, I might if I chose put you all in chains and commit
you to prison!” With these words he ordered his men to bring a chain
and an iron collar and put it on the neck of each of them. Thereupon
Phaeneas and his companions stood in speechless amazement, as though
bereft of all power of thought or motion, at this unexpected turn of
affairs. But Valerius and some others who were present besought Acilius
not to inflict any severity upon the Aetolians then before him, as
they were in the position of ambassadors. And on his yielding to these
representations, Phaeneas broke silence by saying that “He and the
Apocleti were ready to obey the injunctions, but they must consult the
general assembly if they were to be confirmed.” Upon Acilius agreeing
to this, he demanded a truce often days to be granted. This also having
been conceded, they departed with these terms, and on arrival at Hypata
told the Apocleti what had been done and the speeches that had been
made. This report was the first thing which made their error, and the
compulsion under which they were placed, clear to the Aetolians. It
was therefore decided to write round to the various cities and call
the Aetolians together, to consult on the injunctions imposed upon
them. When the news of the reception Phaeneas had met with was noised
abroad, the Aetolian people were so infuriated that no one would even
attend the meeting to discuss the matter at all. It was thus impossible
to hold the discussion. They were further encouraged by the arrival
of Nicander, who just at that time sailed into Phalara, on the Malian
gulf, from Asia, bringing news of the warm reception given him by
Antiochus, and the promises for the future which the king had made;
they therefore became quite indifferent as to the non-completion of the
peace. Thus when the days of the truce had elapsed the Aetolians found
themselves still at war with Rome.

[Sidenote: The fate of Nicander.]

+11.+ But I ought not to omit to describe the subsequent career and
fate of Nicander. He arrived back at Phalara on the twelfth day after
leaving Ephesus, and found the Romans still engaged in Heracleia,
and the Macedonians having already evacuated Lamia, but encamped at
no great distance from the town: he thereupon conveyed his money
unexpectedly into Lamia, and attempted himself to make his way
between the two camps into Hypata. But, falling into the hands of the
Macedonian pickets, he was taken to Philip, while his evening party
was still at the midst of their entertainment, greatly alarmed lest
he should meet with rough treatment from having incurred Philip’s
resentment, or should be handed over to the Romans. But when the
matter was reported to the king, he at once gave orders that the
proper officers should offer Nicander refreshments, and show him
every politeness and attention. After a time he got up from table and
went personally to visit him; and after enlarging at great length
on “the folly of the Aetolians, for having first brought the Romans
into Greece, and afterwards Antiochus,” he still, even at this hour,
urged that “they should forget their past, adhere to their loyalty to
himself, and not show a disposition to take advantage of each other’s
difficulties.” He bade Nicander convey this message to the leaders of
the Aetolians, and exhorting him personally to remember the favours
which he had received at his hands, he despatched him with a sufficient
escort, which he ordered to see him safe into Hypata. This result was
far beyond Nicander’s hopes or expectations. He was restored in due
course to his friends, and from the moment of this adventure remained
devoted to the royal family of Macedonia. Thus, in the subsequent
period of the war with Perseus, the obligations which this favour had
imposed upon him caused him to offer such an unwilling and lukewarm
opposition to the designs of Perseus, that he exposed himself to
suspicion and denunciation, and at last was summoned to Rome and died

[Sidenote: The Spartans wish to offer Philopoemen the palace of Nabis
as a reward, and as an inducement to defend their liberty. Plutarch,
_Philop._ 15.]

+12.+ The Spartans could not find one of their own citizens willing
to address Philopoemen on this subject. To men who for the most part
undertake work for what they can get by it there are plenty of people
to offer such rewards, and to regard them as the means of founding
and consolidating friendship: but in the case of Philipoemen no one
could be found willing to convey this offer to him at all. Finally,
being completely at a loss, they elected Timolaus to do it, as being
his ancestral guest-friend and very intimate with him. Timolaus twice
journeyed to Megalopolis for this express purpose, without daring
to say a word to Philopoemen about it. But having goaded himself to
making a third attempt, he at length plucked up courage to mention
the proposed gifts. Much to his surprise Philopoemen received the
suggestion with courtesy; and Timolaus was overjoyed by the belief
that he had attained his object. Philopoemen, however, remarked that
he would come to Sparta himself in the course of the next few days;
for he wished to offer all the magistrates his thanks for this favour.
He accordingly came, and, being invited to attend the Senate, he said:
“He had long been aware of the kindness with which the Lacedaemonians
regarded him; but was more convinced than ever by the compliments and
extraordinary mark of honour they now offered him. But while gratefully
accepting their intention, he disliked the particular manner of its
exhibition. They should not bestow such honour and rewards on their
friends, the poison of which would indelibly infect the receiver, but
rather upon their enemies; that the former might retain their freedom
of speech and the confidence of the Achaeans when proposing to offer
assistance to Sparta; while the latter, by swallowing the bait, might
be compelled either to support their cause, or at any rate to keep
silence and do them no harm....”

_The remaining events of the war against Antiochus in this year are
related by Livy, 36, 41-45. Acilius was engaged for two months in the
siege of Naupactus: while the Roman fleet under Gaius Livius defeated
that of Antiochus, under his admiral Polyxenidas, off Phocaea._

To see an operation with one’s own eyes is not like merely hearing
a description of it. It is, indeed, quite another thing; and the
confidence which such vivid experience gives is always greatly


[Sidenote: B.C. 190. Embassy from Sparta, and the answer of the Roman

+1.+ At this time also it happened that the embassy, which the
Lacedaemonians had sent to Rome, returned disappointed. The subject of
their mission was the hostages and the villages. As to the villages the
Senate answered that they would give instructions to envoys sent by
themselves; and as to the hostages they desired to consider further.
But as to the exiles of past times, they said that they wondered
why they were not recalled, now that Sparta had been freed from her

+2.+ At the same period the Senate dealt with the ambassadors from
Philip. They had come to set forth the loyalty and zeal of the king,
which he had shown to the Romans in the war against Antiochus. On
hearing what the envoys had to say, the Senate released the king’s
son Demetrius from his position as hostage at once, and promised that
they would also remit part of the yearly indemnity, if he kept faith
with Rome in future. The Senate likewise released the Lacedaemonian
hostages, except Armenas, son of Nabis; who subsequently fell ill and

[Sidenote: Supplicatio for the victory off Phocaea.]

[Sidenote: Answer to the Aetolian Envoys sent, on the intercession of
Flamininus, when Acilius was about to take Naupactus. Livy, 36, 34-35;
37, 1.]

+3.+ Directly the news of the victory at sea reached Rome, the
Senate first decreed a public _supplicatio_ for nine days,—which
means a public and universal holiday, accompanied by the sacrifice
of thank-offerings to the gods for the happy success,—and next gave
audience to the envoys from Aetolia and Manius Acilius. When both
parties had pleaded their cause at some length, the Senate decreed
to offer the Aetolians the alternative of committing their cause
unconditionally to the arbitration of the Senate, or of paying a
thousand talents down and making an offensive and defensive alliance
with Rome. But on the Aetolians desiring the Senate to state definitely
on what points they were to submit to such arbitration, the Senate
refused to define them. Accordingly the war with the Aetolians went

[Sidenote: Spring of B.C. 190. Coss. L. Cornelius Scipio, C. Laelius.]

[Sidenote: P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus in Greece as legatus to his
brother Lucius. (March.)]

[Sidenote: Aetolian envoys visit the consuls.]

+4.+ While Amphissa was still being besieged by Manius Acilius, the
Athenians, hearing at that time both of the distress of the Amphissians
and of the arrival of Publius Scipio, despatched Echedemus and others
on an embassy to him, with instructions to pay their respects to both
Lucius and Publius Scipio, and at the same time to try what could
be done to get peace for the Aetolians. On their arrival, Publius
welcomed them gladly and treated them with great courtesy; because he
saw that they would be of assistance to him in carrying out his plans.
For he was very desirous of effecting a settlement in Aetolia on good
terms; but had resolved that, if the Aetolians refused to comply,
he would at all hazards relinquish that business for the present,
and cross to Asia: for he was well aware that the ultimate object of
the war and of the entire expedition was not to reduce the Aetolian
nation to obedience, but to conquer Antiochus and take possession of
Asia. Therefore, directly the Athenians mentioned the pacification,
he accepted their suggestion with eagerness, and bade them sound the
Aetolians also. Accordingly, Echedemus and his colleagues, having sent
a preliminary deputation to Hypata, presently followed in person, and
entered into a discussion with the Aetolian magistrates on the subject
of a pacification. They, too, readily acquiesced in the suggestion,
and certain envoys were appointed to meet the Romans. They found
Publius and the army encamped sixty stades from Amphissa, and there
discoursed at great length on their previous services to Rome. Publius
Scipio adopted in reply a still milder and more conciliatory style,
quoting his own conduct in Iberia and Libya, and explaining how he had
treated all who in those countries had confided to his honour: and
finally expressing an opinion that they had better put themselves in
his hands. At first, all who were present felt very sanguine that the
pacification was about to be accomplished. But when, in answer to the
Aetolian demand to know on what terms they were to make the peace,
Lucius Scipio explained that they had two alternatives—to submit their
entire case unconditionally to the arbitrament of Rome, or to pay a
thousand talents down and to make an offensive and defensive alliance
with her—the Aetolians present were thrown into the state of the most
painful perplexity at the inconsistency of this announcement with
the previous talk: but finally they said that they would consult the
Aetolians on the terms imposed.

[Sidenote: See bk. 20, ch. 10.]

[Sidenote: A six months’ truce with the Aetolians.]

+5.+ On the return of the Aetolian envoys for the purpose of consulting
their countrymen, Echedemus and his colleagues joined the council of
the _apocleti_ in their deliberations on this subject. One of the
alternatives was impossible owing to the amount of money demanded,
and the other was rendered alarming in their eyes by the deception
they had experienced before, when, after submitting to the surrender,
they had narrowly escaped being thrown into chains. Being then much
perplexed and quite unable to decide, they sent the same envoys back
to beg the Scipios that they would either abate part of the money, so
as to be within their power to pay, or except from the surrender the
persons of citizens, men and women. But upon their arrival in the Roman
camp and delivering their message, Lucius Scipio merely replied that
“The only terms on which he was commissioned by the Senate to treat
were those which he had recently stated.” They therefore returned once
more, and were followed by Echedemus and his colleagues to Hypata, who
advised the Aetolians that “Since there was at present a hitch in the
negotiations for peace, they should ask for a truce; and, having thus
at least delayed the evils threatening them, should send an embassy to
the Senate. If they obtained their request, all would be well; but, if
they did not, they must trust to the chapter of accidents: for their
position could not be worse than it was now, but for many reasons might
not impossibly be better.” The advice of Echedemus was thought sound,
and the Aetolians accordingly voted to send envoys to obtain a truce;
who, upon reaching Lucius Scipio, begged that for the present a truce
of six months might be granted them, that they might send an embassy
to the Senate. Publius Scipio, who had for some time past been anxious
to begin the campaign in Asia, quickly persuaded his brother to grant
their request. The agreement therefore was reduced to writing, and
thereupon Manius Acilius handed over his army to Lucius Scipio, and
returned with his military tribunes to Rome....


[Sidenote: A party at Phocaea wish to join Antiochus, B.C. 190.]

+6.+ Factions became rife at Phocaea,[96] partly because they suffered
from the Romans left with the ships being quartered on them, and partly
because they were annoyed at the tribute imposed on them....

Then the Phocaean magistrates, alarmed at the state of popular
excitement caused by the dearth of corn, and the agitation kept up by
the partisans of Antiochus, sent envoys to Seleucus,[97] who was on
their frontiers, ordering him not to approach the town, as they were
resolved to remain neutral and await the final decision of the quarrel,
and then obey orders. Of these ambassadors the partisans of Seleucus
and his faction were Aristarchus, Cassander, and Rhodon; those, on
the contrary, who inclined to Rome were Hegias and Gelias. On their
arrival Seleucus at once showed every attention to Aristarchus and his
partisans, but treated Hegias and Gelias with complete neglect. But
when he was informed of the state of popular feeling, and the shortness
of provisions in Phocaea, he threw aside all negotiation or discussion
with the envoys, and marched towards the town....

[Sidenote: The Roman Fleet at Sestos. Intercession of the Galli or
priests of Cybele. Livy, 37, 9.]

Two Galli, with sacred images and figures on their breasts, advanced
from the town, and besought them not to adopt any extreme measures
against the city....[98]

[Sidenote: The Rhodian firing apparatus.]

+7.+ The fire-carrier used by Pausistratus, the navarch of the
Rhodians, was a scoop or basket. On either side of the prow two staples
were fixed into the inner part of the two sides of the ship, into which
poles were fitted with their extremities extending out to sea. To the
end of these the scoop filled with fire was attached by an iron chain,
in such a way that in charging the enemy’s ship, whether on the prow or
the broadside, fire was thrown upon it, while it was kept a long way
off from his own ship by the slope of the poles....

[Sidenote: Pausistratus beaten by Polyxenidas, the admiral of the king.
Livy, 37, 10, 11.]

The Rhodian admiral Pamphilidas was thought to be better capable than
Pausistratus of adapting himself to all possible contingencies, because
his character was more remarkable for its depth and solidity than for
its boldness. For most men judge not from any fixed principle but by
results. Thus, though they had recently elected Pausistratus to the
command, on the ground of his possessing these very qualities of energy
and boldness, their opinions at once underwent a complete revolution
when he met with his disaster....

[Sidenote: The Aetolian truce announced to Eumenes and Antiochus.]

+8.+ At this time a letter arrived at Samos for Lucius Aemilius and
Eumenes from the consul Lucius Scipio, announcing the agreement made
with the Aetolians for the truce, and the approaching advance of the
land forces to the Hellespont. Another to the same effect was sent to
Antiochus and Seleucus from the Aetolians....

[Sidenote: Achaean contingent sent to the war. Livy, 37, 20.]

+9.+ An embassy from King Eumenes having arrived in Achaia proposing
an alliance, the Achaeans met in public assembly and ratified it, and
sent out some soldiers, a thousand foot and a hundred horse, under the
command of Diophanes of Megalopolis....

Diophanes was a man of great experience in war; for during the
protracted hostilities with Nabis in the neighbourhood of Megalopolis,
he had served throughout under Philopoemen, and accordingly had gained
a real familiarity with the operations of actual warfare. And besides
this advantage, his appearance and physical prowess were impressive;
and, most important of all, he was a man of personal courage and
exceedingly expert in the use of arms....

[Sidenote: Antiochus proposes peace with Rome, Eumenes, and Rhodes.]

[Sidenote: Eumenes opposes the peace, on the grounds of honour and

+10.+ King Antiochus had already penetrated into the territory of
Pergamum; but when he heard that king Eumenes was close at hand, and
saw that the land forces as well as the fleet were ready to attack
him, he began to consider the propriety of proposing a pacification
with the Romans, Eumenes, and the Rhodians at once. He therefore
removed with his whole army to Elaea, and having seized a hill facing
that town, he encamped his infantry upon it, while he entrenched his
cavalry, amounting to over six thousand, close under the walls of the
town. He took up his own position between these two, and proceeded to
send messengers to Lucius Aemilius in the town, proposing a peace.
The Roman imperator thereupon called Eumenes and the Rhodians to a
meeting, and desired them to give their opinions on the proposal.
Eudemus and Pamphilidas were not averse to making terms; but the king
said that “To make peace at the present moment was neither honourable
nor possible. How could it be an honourable conclusion of the war that
they should make terms while confined within the walls of a town? And
how was it possible to give validity to those terms without waiting for
the Consul and obtaining his consent? Besides, even if they did give
any indication of coming to an agreement with Antiochus, neither the
naval nor military forces could of course return home until the Senate
and people had ratified the terms of it. All that would be left for
them to do would be to spend the winter where they were, waiting idly
for the decision from home, doing nothing, and exhausting the wealth
and resources of their allies. And then, if the Senate withheld its
approval of the terms, they would have to begin the war all over again,
having let the opportunity pass, which, with God’s help, would have
enabled them to put a period to the whole war.” Such was the speech of
king Eumenes. Lucius Aemilius accepted the advice, and answered the
envoys of Antiochus that the peace could not possibly be made until
the Proconsul arrived. On hearing this Antiochus immediately began
devastating the territory of Elaea; and subsequently, while Seleucus
remained in occupation of that district, Antiochus continued his march
through the country as far as the plain of Thebe, and having there
entered upon an exceedingly fertile and wealthy district, he gorged his
army with spoil of every description....

[Sidenote: Prusias, King of Bithynia.]

[Sidenote: Letter of the Scipios to Prusias.]

+11.+ On his arrival at Sardis after this expedition, Antiochus at once
sent to Prusias to urge him to an alliance. Now in former times Prusias
had by no means been disinclined to join Antiochus, because he was much
alarmed lest the Romans should cross over to Asia for the purpose of
putting down all crowned heads. But the perusal of a letter received
from Lucius and Publius Scipio had served to a great extent to relieve
his anxiety, and give him a tolerably correct forecast of the result
of the war. For the Scipios had put the case with great clearness
in their letter, and had supported their assertions by numerous
proofs. They entered not only upon a defence of the policy adopted by
themselves, but of that also of the Roman people generally; by which
they showed that, so far from depriving any of the existing kings of
their sovereignties, they had themselves been the authors in some cases
of their establishment, in others of the extension of their powers and
the large increase of their dominions. To prove this they quoted the
instances of Andobales and Colichas in Iberia, of Massanissa in Libya,
and of Pleuratus in Illyria, all of whom they said they had raised from
petty and insignificant princes to the position of undisputed royalty.
They further mentioned the cases of Philip and Nabis in Greece. As to
Philip, they had conquered him in war and reduced him to the necessity
of giving hostages and paying tribute: yet, after receiving a slight
proof of his good disposition, they had restored his son and the young
men who were hostages with him, had remitted the tribute, and given him
back several of the towns that had been taken in the course of war.
While as for Nabis, though they might have utterly destroyed him, they
had not done so, but had spared him, tyrant as he was, on receiving
the usual security for his good faith. With these facts before his
eyes they urged Prusias in their letter not to be in any fear for his
kingdom, but to adopt the Roman alliance without misgiving, for he
would never have reason to regret his choice. This letter worked an
entire change in the feelings of Prusias; and when, besides, Caius
Livius and the other legates arrived at his court, after conversation
with them, he entirely relinquished all ideas of looking for support
from Antiochus. Foiled, therefore, of hope in this quarter, Antiochus
retired to Ephesus: and being convinced on reflection that the only
way of preventing the transport of the enemy’s army, and in fact of
repelling an invasion of Asia at all, was to keep a firm mastery of the
sea, he determined to fight a naval battle and leave the issue of the
struggle to be decided by his success in that....

[Sidenote: On its voyage from Samos to Teos the Roman fleet sight some
pirate vessels. Livy, 37, 27.]

+12.+ When the pirates saw that the Roman fleet was coming they turned
and fled....

_The battle between the fleets of Rome and Antiochus took place between
the promontories Myonnesus and Corycum, which form the bay of Teos.
Antiochus was beaten with a loss of forty-two ships early in B.C. 190.
Livy, 37, 30._

[Sidenote: Antiochus despairs of resistance, and sends an envoy to the
Scipios to treat of peace.]

[Sidenote: The laws relating to the Salii or priests of Mars.]

+13.+ After sustaining this defeat at sea, Antiochus remained in
Sardis, neglecting to avail himself of such opportunities as he had
left, and taking no steps whatever to prosecute the war; and when he
learnt that the enemy had crossed into Asia he lost all heart, and
determined in despair to send an envoy to Lucius and Publius Scipio
to treat of peace. He selected Heracleides of Byzantium for this
purpose, and despatched him with instructions to offer to surrender
the territories of Lampsacus and Smyrna as well as Alexandria (Troas),
which were the original cause of the war, and any other cities in
Aeolis and Ionia of which they might wish to deprive him, as having
embraced their side in the war; and in addition to this to promise an
indemnity of half the expenses they had incurred in their quarrel with
him. Such were the offers which the envoy was instructed to make in his
public audience; but, besides these, there were others to be committed
to Publius Scipio’s private ear, of which I will speak in detail
later on. On his arrival at the Hellespont the envoy found the Romans
still occupying the camp which they had constructed immediately after
crossing. At first he was much cheered by this fact, for he thought it
would materially aid his negotiation that the enemy were exactly where
they were at first, and had not as yet taken any further action. But
when he learnt that Publius Scipio was still on the other side of the
water he was much disturbed, because the turn which his negotiations
were to take depended principally on Scipio’s view of the matter. The
reason of the army being still in their first camp, and of Publius
Scipio’s absence from the army, was that he was one of the Salii. These
are, as I have before stated, one of the three colleges of priests by
whom the most important sacrifices to the gods are offered at Rome. And
it is the law that, at the time of these sacrifices, they must not quit
the spot for thirty days in which it happens to find them.[99] This
was the case at the present time with Publius Scipio; for just as the
army was on the point of crossing this season arrived, and prevented
him from changing his place of abode. Thus it came about that he was
separated from the legions and remained in Europe, while, though the
army crossed, it remained encamped, and could take no further step,
because they were waiting for him.

[Sidenote: Speech of Heracleides.]

[Sidenote: The Consul’s answer.]

+14.+ However, Publius arrived a few days afterwards, and Heracleides
being summoned to attend the Council delivered the message with which
he was charged, announcing that Antiochus abandoned Lampsacus, Smyrna,
and Alexandria; and also all such towns in Aeolis and Ionia as had
sided with Rome; and that he offered, further, an indemnity of half
their expenses in the present war. He added many arguments besides,
urging the Romans “Not to tempt fortune too far, as they were but
men; nor to extend their empire indefinitely, but rather to keep it
within limits, if possible those of Europe,—for even then they would
have an enormous and unprecedented dominion, such as no nation before
them had attained;—but if they were determined at all hazards to grasp
parts of Asia also, let them say definitely what parts those were, for
the king would go to the utmost stretch of his power to meet their
wishes.” After the delivery of this speech the council decided that the
Consul should answer that “It was only fair that Antiochus should pay,
not the half, but the whole expense of the war, seeing that he, and
not they, had originally begun it; and as to the cities, he must not
only liberate those in Aeolis and Ionia, but must surrender his whole
dominion on this side of Mount Taurus.” On receiving this answer from
the council, conveying demands which went far beyond his instructions,
the envoy, without answering a word, abstained from a public audience
thenceforth, but exerted himself to conciliate Publius Scipio.

[Sidenote: The secret offers of Antiochus to Publius Scipio.]

[Sidenote: Scipio’s reply.]

+15.+ Having at length got a suitable opportunity, he disclosed to him
the offers with which he was charged. These were that the king would
first restore his son without ransom, who had been taken prisoner in
the early part of the war; and was prepared, secondly, to pay him any
sum of money he might name, and thenceforth share with him the wealth
of his kingdom, if he would only support the acceptance of the terms
offered by the king. Publius replied that the promise as to his son
he accepted, and would feel under an obligation to the king if he
fulfilled it; but as to the rest he assured him that the king, among
his other delusions, was under a complete mistake as to the course
demanded by his own interests. “For if he had made these offers while
still master of Lysimacheia and the entrance into the Chersonese, he
would at once have got what he asked: and so too, even after evacuating
these places, if he had appeared with his army at the Hellespont and
shown that he meant to prevent our crossing, and then had sent his
envoys, he might even thus have obtained his demands. But when he comes
with his proposals of equitable terms, after allowing our troops to
set foot in Asia, and having so not only submitted to the bridle, but
allowed the rider to mount, he must expect to fail and be disappointed
of his hopes. Therefore, I advise him to adopt wiser measures, and look
at the facts in their true light. In return for his promise in regard
to my son, I will give him a hint which is well worth the favour he
offers me: make any concession, do anything, rather than fight with
the Romans.” With this answer Heracleides returned and told the king
everything. And Antiochus, considering that no severer terms could be
imposed on him if he were beaten in the field, abandoned all idea of
negotiation, and began making preparations of all sorts and in every
direction for the battle....

_Antiochus sent Scipio’s son back. The decisive battle took place in
the neighbourhood of Thyatira, and proved a decisive victory for the
Romans. This was in the late autumn of B.C. 190. See Livy, 37, 38-44._

+16.+ After the victory the Romans took Sardis and its Acropolis, and
there they were visited by Musaeus bringing a message from Antiochus.
Being politely received by the Scipios, he announced that Antiochus
wished to send envoys to treat on the terms of peace, and therefore
desired that a safe conduct should be given them. This was granted
and the herald returned; and some days after, Zeuxis, formerly Satrap
of Lydia, and Antipater, his nephew, came as ambassadors from king
Antiochus. Their first anxiety was to meet king Eumenes, because they
feared that his old quarrel would cause him to be only too ready
to do them a bad turn. But when they found him, contrary to their
expectation, disposed to moderate and gentle methods, they at once
addressed themselves to meeting the council. Being summoned to attend
it they made a lengthy speech, among other things exhorting the Romans
to use their victory with mildness and generosity; and alleging that
such a course was still more to the interest of the Romans than of
Antiochus, since Fortune had committed to them the empire and lordship
of the world. Finally, they asked “What they were to do to obtain peace
and the friendship of Rome?” The members of the council had already in
a previous sitting discussed and agreed upon this point, and now bade
Publius Scipio deliver their decision.

[Sidenote: The Roman terms imposed on Antiochus.]

[Sidenote: The terms are accepted, and missions sent to Rome.]

+17.+ Scipio began by saying that victory never made the Romans more
severe than before, and accordingly the envoys would receive the
same answer as they had previously received when they came to the
Hellespont before the battle. “They must evacuate Europe and all Asia
this side Taurus: must pay the Romans fifteen thousand Euboic talents
as an indemnity for the expenses of the war, five hundred at once, two
thousand five hundred on the ratification of the treaty by the people,
and the rest in twelve yearly instalments of a thousand talents.
Further, Antiochus must pay Eumenes the four hundred talents owing to
him, and the balance of the corn due in accordance with the treaty made
with his father Attalus. He must at the same time deliver Hannibal
the Carthaginian, Thoas the Aetolian, Mnasilochus the Acarnanian, and
Philo and Eubulides the Chalcidians. As security for the fulfilment
of these terms, Antiochus must at once give twenty hostages named in
the treaty.” Such was the decision announced by Publius Scipio in the
name of the whole Council. Antipater and Zeuxis having expressed their
consent to them, it was agreed by all to send envoys to Rome to appeal
to the Senate and people to confirm the treaty. The ambassadors of
Antiochus departed with this understanding: and during the following
days the Roman commanders divided their forces into their winter
quarters; and when some few days later the hostages arrived, both
Eumenes and the envoys of Antiochus started on their voyage to Rome.
Nor were they alone in their mission; for Rhodes also, and Smyrna, and
nearly all the nations and states on this side Taurus sent ambassadors
to Rome....

[Sidenote: Eumenes.]

[Sidenote: The audiences in the Senate.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 189. Coss. Cn. Manlius Vulso, M. Fulvius Nobilior.
Reception of king Eumenes and the ambassadors at Rome.]

+18.+[100] At the beginning of the summer following the victory of
the Romans over Antiochus, the ambassadors of that king, and those
from Rhodes, as well as from the other states arrived in Rome. For,
as I said, nearly all the states in Asia began sending envoys to Rome
immediately after the battle, because the hopes of all as to their
future position rested at that time on the Senate. All who arrived were
graciously received by the Senate; but the most imposing reception was
that accorded to king Eumenes, both in the complimentary processions
sent out to meet him and the arrangements made for his entertainment;
and next in cordiality to his reception was that given to the Rhodians.
When the time for the audiences came, they first called in the king
and bade him say freely what he wished to obtain at the hands of the
Senate. But Eumenes at first evaded the task by saying: “If I had been
desirous of obtaining any favour from others, I should have looked to
the Romans for advice, that I might neither desire anything that was
wrong nor ask anything unfair; but seeing that I am here to prefer
my request to the Romans themselves, I think it better to leave the
interests of myself and my brothers unreservedly in their hands.” And
though one of the Senators rose and begged him to have no apprehension,
but to speak his mind, he still adhered to this view. And so after a
certain time had elapsed the king withdrew; and the Senate, remaining
in the curia, debated what was to be done. Eventually it was decreed
to call upon Eumenes to declare with his own mouth the objects of his
visit without reserve, on the ground that he knew best what his own
kingdom required, and what was the state of things in Asia. He was then
called in; and, one of the Senators having informed him of the vote, he
was compelled to speak on the business.

[Sidenote: Speech of Eumenes.]

+19.+ He said therefore that “He would not say another word on his own
concerns, but would adhere strictly to his resolution of leaving the
decision as to them entirely in the hands of the Romans. But there was
one subject on which he felt anxiety, namely, the policy of Rhodes;
and it was this that induced him to address the Senate on the present
occasion. These Rhodians had come to Rome to further the interests of
their own country, and their own prosperity, quite as much as he had
come to promote those of his own kingdom at that moment; but their
professions were entirely at variance with their real purpose. And
it was easy to satisfy one’s self of this: for, when they enter the
Senate house, they will say that they come neither to ask anything
for themselves nor to thwart Eumenes in any way whatever; but are
ambassadors for the liberty of the Greek inhabitants of Asia. ‘To
secure this,’ they will say, ‘is not so much a favour to themselves as
an act incumbent on the Romans, and in consonance with their former
achievements.’ Such will be their specious professions; but the real
truth of the case will be wholly different. For if these cities are
once set free, the result will be that their dominion will be many
times increased, while his own would be in a manner entirely broken up.
For the attractive name of liberty and autonomy would draw from his
rule not only the cities to be freed at present, but those also which
had been under his rule from of old, directly it is made apparent that
the Senate has adopted that policy, and would add them to the dominion
of Rhodes. That was the natural course for things to take. Imagining
that they owed their freedom to Rhodes, those cities would become in
name its allies, but in reality entirely subservient, owing to the
heavy obligation under which they will find themselves. He begged the
Senators, therefore, to be on their guard on that point: lest they
should find that they had unwittingly aggrandised one friendly nation
too much, and disproportionately weakened another; or even that they
were benefiting men who had once been their foes, to the neglect and
contempt of their genuine friends.”

+20.+ “For myself,” he continued, “though in every other point I would
yield, if it were necessary, to my neighbours, yet in the matter of
your friendship and of my goodwill towards you I will never, if I can
help it, yield to any one alive. And I think that my father, if he
had been living, would have said the same: for as he was the first to
become your friend and ally, so of all the inhabitants of Asia and
Greece he was the most nobly loyal to you to the last day of his life,
not only in heart but in deed. For he took his part in all your wars
in Greece, and furnished the largest contingents of men and ships of
all your allies; contributed the largest share of supplies; and faced
the most serious dangers: and to sum up all, ended his life actually
engaged in the war with Philip, while employed in urging the Boeotians
to join your alliance. I, too, when I succeeded to his kingdom, while
fully maintaining my father’s views, for it was impossible to do more,
have yet gone even beyond him in actual achievements: for the state of
the times brought me to a more fiery test than they did him. Antiochus
offered me his daughter and a share in his whole kingdom: offered me
immediate restoration of all the cities that had been before wrested
from me: and finally promised me any price I chose if I would join him
in his war with you. But so far from accepting any one of these offers,
I joined you in your struggle against Antiochus with the largest
military and naval contingents of any of your allies; contributed the
largest share of supplies at the time of your utmost need; and exposed
myself unreservedly to every danger along with your generals. Finally,
I submitted to being invested in Pergamos itself, and risked my life as
well as my crown in my loyalty to your people.

+21.+ “Therefore, men of Rome, as many of you have been eye-witnesses
of the truth of my words, and all of you know it, it is but just that
you should have a corresponding regard for my interests. You have made
Massanissa king of the greater part of Libya, though he had once been
your enemy and at last deserted to your side accompanied only by a few
horsemen, only because he kept faith with you in one war: you have
raised Pleuratus to the first position among the princes of Illyria,
though he had done absolutely nothing for you beyond keeping loyal; it
would be the height of inconsistency if you should neglect me and my
family, who from generation to generation have co-operated in your most
important and glorious undertakings. What is it, then, that I am asking
you to do, and what do I claim at your hands? I will tell you openly,
since you have called upon me to speak my mind to you. If you decide,
then, to continue holding certain parts of Asia which are on this side
Taurus, and were formerly subject to Antiochus, that is what I should
wish to see best of all: for I consider that the security of my realm
would best be secured by having you for neighbours, and especially by
my sharing in your prestige. But if you decide not to do this, but to
evacuate Asia entirely, there is no one to whom you may with greater
justice surrender the prizes you have won in the field than to me. But
it may be said, it is a more honourable thing still to set the enslaved
free. Yes! if they had not ventured to join Antiochus in the war
against you. But since they had the hardihood to do so, it is a much
more honourable course to make a proper return to your sincere friends,
than to benefit those who have shown themselves your enemies.”

[Sidenote: The legates from Smyrna.]

+22.+ After the delivery of this effective speech Eumenes retired. The
Senate received both the king himself and the speech with every mark of
favour, and were enthusiastic for doing everything in their power to
gratify him. They wished to call in the Rhodians next after him; but
one of the Rhodian ambassadors not being there in time, they called in
those from Smyrna, who delivered a long disquisition on the goodwill
and zeal which they had displayed towards Rome during the late war. But
as there are no two opinions about the fact of their having been, of
all the autonomous states in Asia, the most strenuous in the cause, I
do not think it necessary to set forth their speech in detail.

[Sidenote: Speech of the Rhodians.]

But next to them came in the Rhodians: who, after a short preamble
as to their services to the Romans, quickly came to the discussion
of the position of their own country. They said that “It was a very
great embarrassment to them, in the discharge of their ambassadorial
duties, to find themselves placed by the necessities of the case in
opposition to a sovereign with whom their public and private relations
were of the most friendly description. It was the opinion of their
countrymen that the most honourable course, and the one which above
all others would redound to the credit of Rome, was, that the Greeks
in Asia should be set free, and should recover that possession dearest
to all mankind—autonomy: but this was the last thing to suit Eumenes
and his brothers. It was the nature of monarchy to hate equality,
and to endeavour to have everybody, or at least as many as possible,
subject and obedient. But though that was the case now, still they
felt convinced that they should gain their object, not because they
had greater influence with the Romans than Eumenes, but because they
would be shown to be suggesting a course more just in itself and more
indisputably advantageous to all concerned. If, indeed, the only
way the Romans could requite Eumenes was by handing over to him the
autonomous towns, they might reasonably be at a loss to determine what
to do; for they would have had to decide between neglecting a sincere
friend and disregarding their own honour and duty, and thus entirely
obscuring and degrading the glory of their great achievements. But if,
on the other hand, it were possible adequately to consult for both
these objects at the same time, who could doubt about the matter any
longer? Yet the fact was that, as in a costly banquet, there was enough
and to spare for all. Lycaonia, Phrygia on the Hellespont, and Pisidia,
the Chersonese also and the districts bordering on it, were at the
disposal of the Romans to give to whom they chose; only a few of which
added to the kingdom of Eumenes would double its present extent, while
if all, or even the great part were assigned to him, it would become
second to that of no other prince in Asia.

+23.+ “It was therefore in the power of the Romans to strengthen their
friends very materially without destroying the glory of their own
policy. For the end which they proposed to themselves in their war
was not the same as that of other nations, but widely different. The
rest of the world all entered upon war with the view of conquering
and seizing cities, wealth, or ships: but heaven had ordained that
they should want none of these things, by having put everything in
the whole world under their rule. What was it, then, that they had
still occasion to wish for, and to take the securest means to obtain?
Plainly praise and glory among mankind; which it was difficult indeed
to gain, but most difficult of all to preserve when gained. Their
war with Philip might show them their meaning. That war they had, as
they professed, undertaken with the sole object of liberating Greece;
and that was in fact the only prize they gained in it, and no other
whatever: yet the glory they got by it was greater than that which the
tribute of the Carthaginians had brought them. And justly so: for money
is a possession common to all mankind, but honour and praise and glory
are attributes of the gods and of those men who approach nearest to
them. Therefore, the most glorious of all their achievements was the
liberation of Greece; and if they now completed that work their fame
would receive its consummation: but if they neglected to do so, even
what they had already accomplished would lose its lustre.” They finally
wound up by saying, “As for us, gentlemen, having once deliberately
adopted this policy and joined with you in the severest battles and in
genuine dangers, we do not now propose to abandon the part of friends;
but have not hesitated to say openly what we believe to be for your
honour and your interests alike, with no ulterior design whatever, and
with a single eye to our duty as the highest earthly object.”

[Sidenote: Treaty with Antiochus confirmed.]

[Sidenote: Settlement of Asia, B.C. 189.]

+24.+ This speech of the Rhodians was universally regarded as temperate
and fair. The Senate next caused Antipater and Zeuxis, the ambassadors
of Antiochus, to be introduced: and on their speaking in a tone of
entreaty and supplication, an approval of the agreement made by him
with Scipio in Asia was voted. A few days later the people also
ratified it, and oaths were accordingly interchanged with Antipater
and his colleague. This done, the other ambassadors from Asia were
introduced into the Senate: but a very brief hearing was given to each,
and the same answer was returned to all; namely, that ten commissioners
would be sent to decide on all points of dispute between the cities.
The Senate then appointed ten commissioners, to whom they gave the
entire settlement of particulars; while as a general principle they
decided that of Asia this side Taurus such inhabitants as had been
subject to Antiochus were to be assigned to Eumenes, except Lycia and
Caria up to the Maeander, which were to belong to the Rhodians; while
of the Greek cities, such of them as had been accustomed to pay tribute
to Attalus were to pay the same to Eumenes; and only those who had done
so to Antiochus were to be relieved of tribute altogether. Having given
the ten commissioners these outlines of the general settlement, they
sent them out to join the consul, Cnaeus Manlius Vulso, in Asia.

[Sidenote: Soli in Cilicia.]

[Sidenote: Summer B.C. 189.]

After these arrangements had been completed, the Rhodian envoys came to
the Senate again with a request in regard to Soli in Cilicia, alleging
that they were called upon by ties of kindred to think of the interests
of that city; for the people of Soli were, like the Rhodians, colonists
from Argos. Having listened to what they had to say, the Senate invited
the attendance of the ambassadors from Antiochus, and at first were
inclined to order Antiochus to evacuate the whole of Cilicia; but upon
these ambassadors resisting this order, on the ground of its being
contrary to the treaty, they once more discussed the case of Soli by
itself. The king’s ambassadors still vehemently maintaining their
rights, the Senate dismissed them and called in the Rhodians. Having
informed them of the opposition raised by Antipater, they added that
they were ready to go any length in the matter, if the Rhodians, on a
review of the whole case, determined to push their claim. The Rhodian
envoys, however, were much gratified by the spirit shown by the Senate,
and said that they would ask nothing more. This question, therefore,
was left as it was; and just as the ten commissioners and the other
ambassadors were on the point of starting, the two Scipios, and Lucius
Aemilius, the victor in the sea fight with Antiochus, arrived at
Brundisium; and after certain days all three entered Rome in triumph....

_Amynandrus was restored to the kingdom of Athamania, which was
occupied by a garrison of Philip’s, by the aid of the Aetolians,
who then proceeded to invade Amphilochia and the Dolopes. Hence the
Aetolian war, beginning with the siege of Ambracia by M. Fulvius
Nobilior. Livy, 38, 1-11._

[Sidenote: Summer of 190.]

[Sidenote: Late autumn of B.C. 190.]

[Sidenote: Spring of B.C. 189.]

+25.+ Amynandrus, king of the Athamanes, thinking that he had now
permanently recovered his kingdom, sent envoys to Rome and to the
Scipios in Asia, for they were still in the neighbourhood of Ephesus,
partly to excuse himself for having, as it appeared, secured his
recall by the help of the Aetolians, but chiefly to entreat that he
might be received again into the Roman alliance. But the Aetolians,
imagining that they had now a good opportunity of once more annexing
Amphilochia and Aperantia, determined on an expedition against those
countries; and when Nicander their Strategus had mustered the league
army, they invaded Amphilochia. Finding most of the people willing
to join them, they advanced into Aperantia; and the Aperantians also
willingly yielding to them, they continued their expedition into
Dolopia. The Dolopians for a time made a show of resistance, and of
keeping loyal to Philip; but on considering what had happened to the
Athamanes, and the check which Philip had received there, they quickly
changed their minds and gave in their adhesion to the Aetolians. After
this successful issue of his expedition Nicander led his army home,
believing that Aetolia was secured by the subjection of these tribes
and places, against the possibility of any one injuring its territory.
But immediately after these events, and when the Aetolians were still
in the full elation of their successes, a report reached them of the
battle in Asia, in which they learnt that Antiochus had been utterly
defeated. This caused a great revulsion of feeling; and when presently
Damoteles came from Rome and announced that a continuation of the war
was decreed against them, and that Marcus Fulvius and an army had
crossed to attack them, they were reduced to state of complete despair;
and not knowing how to meet the danger which was impending over them,
they resolved to send to Rhodes and Athens, begging them to despatch
envoys to Rome to intercede in their behalf, and, by softening the
anger of the Romans, to find some means of averting the evils that
threatened Aetolia. They also sent ambassadors of their own to Rome
once more, Alexander Isius, and Phaeneas, accompanied by Callippus of
Ambracia and Lycopus....

[Sidenote: M. Fulvius Nobilior at Apollonia.]

[Sidenote: Fulvius advances upon Ambracia.]

[Sidenote: The Aetolian envoys intercepted.]

+26.+ Some envoys from Epirus having visited the Roman Consul, he
consulted with them as to the best way of attacking the Aetolians.
They advised that he should begin by attacking Ambracia, which was at
that time a member of the Aetolian league. They gave as their reasons
that, if the Aetolians ventured to give battle, the neighbourhood of
Ambracia was very favourable for the legions to fight in; and that if,
on the other hand, the Aetolians avoided an engagement, the town was
an excellent one to besiege: for the district round it would supply
abundant timber for the construction of siege artillery; and the river
Arachthus, which flowed right under the walls, would be of great use
in conveying supplies to the army in the summer season, and serve as
a protection to their works. Fulvius thought the advice good, and
accordingly marched through Epirus to attack Ambracia. On his arrival
there, as the Aetolians did not venture to meet him, he reconnoitred
the city, and set vigorously to work on the siege. Meanwhile the
Aetolian envoys that had been sent to Rome were caught off Cephallenia
by Sibyrtus, son of Petraeus, and brought into Charadrus. The Epirotes
first resolved to place these men at Buchetus and keep them under
strict guard. But a few days afterwards they demanded a ransom of them
on the ground that they were at war with the Aetolians. It happened
that one of them, Alexander, was the richest man in Greece, while the
others were badly off, and far inferior to Alexander in the amount of
their property. At first the Epirotes demanded five talents from each.
The others did not absolutely refuse this, but were willing to pay if
they could, because they cared above everything to secure their own
safety. But Alexander refused to consent, for it seemed a large sum
of money, and he lay awake at night bewailing himself at the idea of
being obliged to pay five talents. The Epirotes, however, foresaw what
would happen, and were extremely alarmed lest the Romans should hear
that they had detained men who were on a mission to themselves, and
should send a despatch ordering their release; they, therefore, lowered
their demand to three talents a-piece. The others gladly accepted the
offer, gave security, and departed: but Alexander said that he would
not pay more than a talent, and that was too much; and at last, giving
up all thought of saving himself, remained in custody, though he was an
old man, and possessed property worth more than two hundred talents;
and I think he would have died rather than pay the three talents. So
extraordinarily strong in some men is the passion for accumulating
money. But on this occasion Fortune so favoured his greed, that the
result secured all men’s praise and approval for his infatuation.
For, a few days afterwards, a despatch arrived from Rome ordering the
release of the ambassadors; and, accordingly, he was the only one of
them that was set free without ransom. When the Aetolians learnt what
had happened to him, they elected Damoteles as their ambassador to
Rome; who, however, when as far as Leucas on his voyage, was informed
that Marcus Fulvius was marching through Epirus upon Ambracia, and,
therefore, gave up the mission as useless, and returned back to

[Sidenote: Siege of Ambracia, and the gallant resistance of the

+27.+ The Aetolians being besieged by the consul Marcus Fulvius,
offered a gallant resistance to the assault of the siege artillery and
battering rams. Marcus having first strongly secured his camp began
the siege on an extensive scale; he opened three separate parallel
works across the plain against the Pyrrheium, and a fourth opposite
the temple of Asclepius, and a fifth directed against the Acropolis.
And the attack being pushed on energetically at all these points at
once, the besieged became terribly alarmed at the prospect before them.
Still, as the rams vigorously battered the walls, and the long poles
with their iron sickles tore off the battlements, they tried to invent
machines to baffle them, letting down huge masses of lead and stones
and oak logs by means of levers upon the battering rams; and putting
iron hooks upon the sickles and hauling them inside the walls, so that
the poles to which they were fastened broke against the battlements,
and the sickles fell into their hands. Moreover they made frequent
sallies, in which they fought with great courage: sometimes making a
descent by night upon the pickets quartered at the works, and at others
attacking in broad daylight the day-parties of the besiegers: and by
these means they managed to protract the siege....

Nicander was outside the city, and sent five hundred horse into it.
They carried the intervening entrenchment of the enemy and forced their
way into the town. With these he had fixed on a day on which they were
to sally out, and he was to be ready to support them. They accordingly
made the sally with great courage and fought gallantly; but either from
fear of the danger, or because he conceived that what he was engaged
upon at the time could not be neglected, Nicander failed to come up to
time, and accordingly the attempt failed....[101]

[Sidenote: The Romans begin mining operations.]

[Sidenote: Counter-mines by the besieged.]

[Sidenote: The Romans smoked out.]

+28.+ By assiduously working the battering rams the Romans were always
breaking down this or that part of the wall. But yet they could not
succeed in storming any of these breaches, because the besieged were
energetic in raising counter walls, and the Aetolians fought with
determined gallantry on the débris. They, therefore, in despair had
recourse to mines and underground tunnels. Having safely secured the
central one of their three works, and carefully concealed the shaft
with wattle screens, they erected in front of it a covered walk or stoa
about two hundred feet long, parallel with the wall; and beginning
their digging from that, they carried it on unceasingly day and night,
working in relays. For a considerable number of days the besieged did
not discover them carrying the earth away through the shaft; but when
the heap of earth thus brought out became too high to be concealed from
those inside the city, the commanders of the besieged garrison set
to work vigorously digging a trench inside, parallel to the wall and
to the stoa which faced the towers. When the trench was made to the
required depth, they next placed in a row along the side of the trench
nearest the wall a number of brazen vessels made very thin; and, as
they walked along the bottom of the trench past these, they listened
for the noise of the digging outside. Having marked the spot indicated
by any of these brazen vessels, which were extraordinarily sensitive
and vibrated to the sound outside, they began digging from within, at
right angles to the trench, another underground tunnel leading under
the wall, so calculated as to exactly hit the enemy’s tunnel. This was
soon accomplished, for the Romans had not only brought their mine up
to the wall, but had underpinned a considerable length of it on either
side of their mine; and thus the two parties found themselves face to
face. At first they conducted this underground fighting with their
spears: but as neither side could do much good, because both parties
protected themselves with shields and wattles, some one suggested
another plan to the defenders. Putting in front of them an earthenware
jar, made to the width of the mine, they bored a hole in its bottom,
and, inserting an iron funnel of the same length as the depth of the
vessel, they filled the jar itself with fine feathers, and putting a
little fire in it close to the mouth of the jar, they clapped on an
iron lid pierced full of holes. They carried this without accident
through the mine with its mouth towards the enemy. When they got near
the besiegers they stopped up the space all round the rim of the jar,
leaving only two holes on each side through which they thrust spears
to prevent the enemy coming near the jar. They then took a pair of
bellows such as blacksmiths use, and, having attached them to the
orifice of the funnel, they vigorously blew up the fire placed on the
feathers near the mouth of the jar, continually withdrawing the funnel
in proportion as the feathers became ignited lower down. The plan was
successfully executed; the volume of smoke created was very great, and,
from the peculiar nature of feathers, exceedingly pungent, and was
all carried into the faces of the enemy. The Romans, therefore, found
themselves in a very distressing and embarrassing position, as they
could neither stop nor endure the smoke in the mines.[102] The siege
being thus still further protracted the Aetolian commander determined
to send an envoy to the Consul....

[Sidenote: Intercession of Athens, Rhodes, and king Amynandrus.]

+29.+ About this time the ambassadors from Athens and Rhodes came
to the Roman camp for the purpose of furthering, if they could, the
conclusion of a peace. The Athamanian king, Amynandrus, also arrived,
very eager to relieve the Ambraciots from their miserable position, and
having received a safe conduct from Marcus Fulvius in consideration of
the urgent nature of the business: For he had a very friendly feeling
towards the Ambraciots, from having passed most of the time of his
exile in that town[103]. A few days afterwards also some Acarnanians
arrived, bringing Damoteles and his fellow envoys. For Marcus Fulvius,
having been informed of their misfortunes, had written to the people
of Thyreum to bring the men to him. All these various persons,
therefore, having assembled, the negotiations for peace were pushed
on energetically. For his part, Amynandrus was urgent in his advice
to the Ambraciots to save themselves from the destruction which would
not be long in coming to them unless they adopted wiser counsels. On
his coming again and again up to the wall and conversing with them on
this subject, the Ambraciots decided to invite him inside the town. The
consul having given the king leave to enter the walls, he went in and
discussed the situation with the inhabitants. Meanwhile the Athenian
and Rhodian envoys got hold of the consul and tried by ingenious
arguments to mollify his anger. Some one also suggested to Damoteles
and Phaeneas to apply to Caius Valerius and endeavour to win him over.
He was the son of that Marcus Valerius Laevinus who made the first
alliance with the Aetolians; and half brother, by the mother’s side, of
the consul Marcus Fulvius, and being a young man of vigorous character
enjoyed the greatest confidence of the consul. Being appealed to by
Damoteles, and thinking that in a way he had a family interest in the
matter, and was bound to undertake the patronage of the Aetolians, he
exerted himself with the greatest zeal and enthusiasm to rescue that
people from their perilous position. The matter then being vigorously
pushed forward on all sides at once was at length accomplished. For the
Ambraciots, by the persuasion of the king, surrendered to the consul
unreservedly as far as they themselves were concerned, and gave up the
town, on the one condition that the Aetolian garrison should march out
under truce. This primary exception they made that they might keep
faith with their allies.

[Sidenote: Terms granted to the Aetolians.]

+30.+ So the consul agreed to grant the Aetolians peace on condition
of receiving two hundred Euboic talents down, and three hundred in six
yearly instalments of fifty: of the restoration to the Romans of all
prisoners and deserters within six months without ransom: of their
retaining no city in their league, nor thenceforth admitting any fresh
one, of such as had been captured by the Romans, or had voluntarily
embraced their friendship since Titus Quinctius crossed into Greece:
the Cephallenians not to be included in these terms.

[Sidenote: The Aetolian people confirm the treaty.]

Such was the sketch in outline of the main points of the treaty. But it
required first the consent of the Aetolians, and then to be referred to
Rome: and meanwhile the Athenian and Rhodian envoys remained where they
were, waiting for the decision of the Aetolians. On being informed by
Damoteles and his colleagues on their return of the nature of the terms
that had been granted them, the Aetolians consented to the general
principle—for they were in fact much better than they had expected,—but
in regard to the towns formerly included in their league they hesitated
for some time; finally, however, they acquiesced. Marcus Fulvius
accordingly took over Ambracia, and allowed the Aetolian garrison to
depart under terms; but removed from the town the statues and pictures,
of which there was a great number, owing to the fact of Ambracia
having been a royal residence of Pyrrhus. He was also presented with
a crown[104] weighing one hundred and fifty talents. After this
settlement of affairs he directed his march into the interior of
Aetolia, feeling surprised at meeting with no communication from the
Aetolians. But on arriving at Amphilochian Argos, a hundred and eighty
stades from Ambracia, he pitched his camp; and being there met by
Damoteles and his colleagues with the information that the Aetolians
had resolved to ratify the treaty which they had concluded, they went
their several ways, the Aetolians back to their own country, and Marcus
to Ambracia, where he busied himself about getting his army across
to Cephallenia; while the Aetolians appointed Phaeneas and Nicander
ambassadors to go to Rome about the peace: for not a single line of the
above treaty held good until ratified by the Roman people.

[Sidenote: Speech of Damis.]

+31.+ While these envoys, accompanied by those from Rhodes and Athens,
were on their voyage with this object, Marcus Fulvius sent Caius
Valerius also, and some others of his friends to Rome to secure the
ratification of the treaty. But when they arrived at Rome they found
that a fresh cause of anger with the Aetolians had arisen by the
instrumentality of king Philip; who, looking upon himself as wronged
by the Aetolians having taken Athamania and Dolopia from him, had sent
to some of his friends at Rome, urging them to share his displeasure
and secure the rejection of the pacification. Accordingly, on the first
arrival of the Aetolians, the Senate would not listen to them; but
afterwards, at the intercession of the Rhodians and Athenians, changed
its mind and consented to their request: for Damis[105], besides other
excellences displayed in his speech, was thought to have introduced
a very apt simile, extremely applicable to the case in hand. He said
“The Romans had good cause for anger with the Aetolians; for, instead
of being grateful for the many kindnesses received at their hands,
they had brought the Roman Empire into great danger by causing the war
with Antiochus to break out. But the Senate were wrong in one point,
namely in directing their anger against the masses. For in states the
common people were like the sea, which left to its own nature was ever
calm and unmoved, and not in the least likely ever to trouble any of
those who approached or used it; but directly violent winds blew upon
and disturbed it, and forced it against its nature to become agitated,
then indeed nothing could be more dreadful or formidable than the sea.
This was just the case with the Aetolians. As long as they were left to
themselves, no people in Greece were more loyal to you or more staunch
in supporting your active measures. But when Thoas and Dicaearchus
brought a storm from Asia, and Mnestas and Damocritus from Europe, and,
disturbing the calm of the Aetolian masses, compelled them to become
reckless of what they said or did,—then indeed their good disposition
gave way to bad, and while intending to do mischief to you they really
inflicted damage upon themselves. It is against these mischief-makers
therefore that you should be implacable; while you should take pity on
the masses and make peace with them: with the assurance that, if once
more left to themselves, with the additional feeling of having owed
their safety on the present occasion to you, their attachment to you
will be the warmest in Greece.”

[Sidenote: Treaty with Aetolia, B.C. 189.]

+32.+ By these arguments the Athenian envoy persuaded the Senate
to make peace with the Aetolians. The decree therefore having been
passed and confirmed by a vote of the people, the treaty was formally
ratified, of which the text was as follows: “The people of the
Aetolians shall in good faith maintain the empire and majesty of the
people of Rome.

“They shall not allow hostile forces to pass through their territory or
cities against the Romans, their allies or friends; nor grant them any
supplies from the public fund.

“They shall have the same enemies as the people of Rome; and if the
Roman people go to war with any, the Aetolian people shall do so also.

“The Aetolians shall surrender to the praefectus in Corcyra, within
a hundred days from the completion of the treaty, runaway slaves,
and prisoners of the Romans and their allies, except such as having
been taken during the war have returned to their own land and been
subsequently captured; and except such as were in arms against Rome
during the time that the Aetolians were fighting on the side of the

“If there should be any not found within that time, they shall hand
them over as soon as they are forthcoming, without deceit or fraud. And
such persons, after the completion of the treaty, shall not be allowed
to return to Aetolia.

“The Aetolians shall pay the consul in Greece at once two hundred
Euboic talents of silver, of a standard not inferior to the Attic. In
place of one third of this silver, they may, if they so choose, pay
gold, at the rate of a mina of gold to ten minae of silver. They shall
pay the money in the six years next following the completion of the
treaty in yearly installments of fifty talents; and shall deliver the
money in Rome.

“The Aetolians shall give the Consul forty hostages, not less than
ten or more than forty years old, to remain for the six years; they
shall be selected by the Romans freely, excepting only the Strategus,
Hipparch, public secretary, and such as have already been hostages at

“The Aetolians shall deliver such hostages in Rome; and if any one of
them die, they shall give another in his place.

“Cephallenia shall not be included in this treaty.

[Sidenote: B.C. 192.]

“Of such territories, cities, and men as once belonged to the
Aetolians, and, in the consulship of Titus Quinctius and Cnaeus
Domitius, or subsequently, were either captured by the Roman or
voluntarily embraced their friendship, the Aetolians shall not annex
any, whether city or men therein.

“The city and territory of Oeniadae shall belong to the Acarnanians.”

The treaty having been solemnly sworn, peace was concluded, and the war
in Aetolia, as in the rest of Greece, thus came to an end....


+33.+ While the negotiations for peace with Antiochus, and for the
settlement of Asia generally were going on at Rome, and the Aetolian
war was being fought in Greece, it happened that another war in Asia,
that, namely, against the Gauls, was brought to a conclusion, the
account of which I am now about to give....

+34.+ Moagĕtes was Tyrant of Cibyra, a cruel and crafty man, whose
career deserves somewhat more than a passing reference....

[Sidenote: Coss. Cn. Manlius Vulso, M. Fulvius Nobilior, B.C. 189;
Moagĕtes reduced to submission.]

When Cnaeus Manlius was approaching Cibyra and had sent Helvius to find
out the intentions of Moagĕtes, the latter begged him by ambassadors
not to damage the country, because he was a friend of Rome, and ready
to do anything that was required of him; and, at the same time, he
offered Helvius a compliment of fifteen talents. In answer to this,
Helvius said that he would refrain from damaging the territory; but
that as to the general question Moagĕtes must communicate with the
Consul, for he was close behind with his army. Moagĕtes accordingly
sent ambassadors to Cnaeus, his own brother being one of them. When
the Consul met them in the road, he addressed them in threatening
and reproachful terms, asserting that “Not only had Moagĕtes shown
himself the most determined enemy of Rome, of all the princes in Asia,
but had done his very best to overthrow their empire, and deserved
punishment rather then friendship.”[106] Terrified by this display
of anger, the ambassadors abstained from delivering the rest of the
message with which they were charged, and merely begged him to have
an interview with Moagĕtes: and when Cnaeus consented they returned
to Cibyra. Next morning the Tyrant came out of the town accompanied
by his friends, displaying his humility by a mean dress and absence
of all pomp; and, in conducting his defence, descanted in melancholy
terms on his own helplessness and the poverty of the towns under his
rule (which consisted of Cibyra, Syleium, and the town in the Marsh),
and entreated Cnaeus to accept the fifteen talents. Astonished at his
assurance, Cnaeus made no answer, except that, “If he did not pay five
hundred talents, and be thankful that he was allowed to do so, he would
not loot the country, but he would storm and sack the city.” In abject
terror Moagĕtes begged him not to do anything of the sort; and kept
adding to his offer little by little, until at last he persuaded Cnaeus
to take one hundred talents, and one thousand medimni of corn, and
admit him to friendship....[107]

[Sidenote: Pacification of Pamphylia.]

+35.+ When Cnaeus Manlius was crossing the River Colobatus, ambassadors
came to him from the town of Sinda (in Pisidia) begging for help,
because the people of Termessus had called in the aid of the people
of Philomelus, and had depopulated their territory and sacked their
town; and were at that very moment besieging its citadel, into which
all the citizens, with wives and children, had retreated. On hearing
this, Cnaeus immediately promised them aid with the greatest readiness;
and thinking the affair was a stroke of luck for himself, directed
his march towards Pamphylia. On his arrival in the neighbourhood of
Termessus, he admitted the Termessians to friendship on the payment of
fifty talents. He did the same with the Aspendians: and having received
the ambassadors of the other towns in Pamphylia, he impressed on them
in these interviews the conviction mentioned above,[108] and having
relieved the Sindians from their siege, he once more directed his march
against the Gauls....

[Sidenote: Conquest of Pisidia.]

+36.+ After taking the town of Cyrmasa (in Pisidia), and a very large
booty, Cnaeus Manlius continued his advance. And as he was marching
along the marsh, envoys came from Lysinoe, offering an unconditional
surrender. After accepting this, Cnaeus entered the territory of
Sagalassus, and having driven off a vast quantity of spoil waited to
see what the Sagalassians were prepared to do. When their ambassadors
arrived he received them; and accepting a compliment of fifty talents,
twenty thousand medimni of barley, and twenty thousand of wheat,
admitted them to friendship with Rome....

[Sidenote: Cnaeus Manlius in Galatia.]

+37.+ Cnaeus sent envoys to Eposognatus the Gaul, desiring him to send
embassies to the kings of the Gauls. Eposognatus in his turn sent
envoys to Cnaeus begging him not to move his quarters or attack the
Tolistobogian Gauls; and assuring him that he would send embassies
to the kings, and propose peace to them, and felt quite certain that
he would be able to bring them to a proper view of affairs in all

In the course of his march through the country Cnaeus made a bridge
over the River Sangorius, which was extremely deep and difficult to
cross. And having encamped on the bank of the river, he was visited by
some Galli[109] sent by Attis and Battacus, the priests of the mother
of the gods at Pesinus, wearing figures and images on their breasts,
and announcing that the goddess promised him victory and power; to whom
Cnaeus gave a courteous reception....

When Cnaeus was at the small town of Gordieium, ambassadors came
from Eposognatus, announcing that he had been round and talked with
the kings of the Gauls, but that they would not consent to make any
overtures of friendship whatever; on the contrary, they had collected
their children and women on Mount Olympus, and were prepared to give

_The victory of the Romans over the Tolistoboii at Mount Olympus is
described by Livy, 38, 19-23; that over the Tectosages, a few miles
from Ancyra, in 38, 24-27. The second battle took place in mid-autumn,
B.C. 189; and the result was that the Gauls gave in their submission at
Ephesus, and were forced to engage to leave off predatory excursions,
and to confine themselves to their own frontiers. Livy, 38, 27 and 40._

[Sidenote: The vengeance of Chiomara, wife of the Gallic chief Ortiago.
See Livy, 38, 24.]

+38.+ It chanced that among the prisoners made when the Romans won
the victory at Olympus over the Gauls of Asia, was Chiomara, wife of
Ortiago. The centurion who had charge of her availed himself of his
chance in soldierly fashion, and violated her.

He was a slave indeed both to lust and money: but eventually his love
of money got the upper hand; and, on a large sum of gold being agreed
to be paid for the woman, he led her off to put her to ransom. There
being a river between the two camps, when the Gauls had crossed it,
paid the man the money, and received the woman, she ordered one of
them by a nod to strike the Roman as he was in the act of taking a
polite and affectionate farewell of her. The man obeyed, and cut off
the centurion’s head, which she picked up and drove off with, wrapped
in the folds of her dress. On reaching her husband she threw the head
at his feet; and when he expressed astonishment and said: “Wife to
keep faith is a good thing,” she replied: “Yes; but it is a better
thing that there should be only one man alive who has lain with me!”
[Polybius says that he conversed with the woman at Sardis, and was
struck with her dignified demeanour and intelligence.][110]...

[Sidenote: The Gauls try to take Cnaeus Manlius by a stratagem, but are
foiled. See Livy, 38, 25.]

+39.+ After the victory over the Gauls at Olympus, when the Romans
were encamped at Ancyra, and Cnaeus was on the point of continuing his
advance, ambassadors came from the Tectosages asking that Cnaeus would
leave his troops in their quarters, and advance himself in the course
of the next day into the space between the two camps; and promising
that their kings would come to meet him, and discuss the terms of a
peace. But when Cnaeus consented, and duly arrived at the appointed
place with five hundred horse, the kings did not appear. After his
return to the camp, however, the ambassadors came again, and, offering
some excuses for the kings, begged him to come once more, as they
would send some of their chief men to discuss the whole question.
Cnaeus consented; but, without leaving the camp himself, sent Attalus
and some tribunes with three hundred horse. The envoys of the Gauls
duly appeared and discussed the business: but finally said that it was
impossible for them to conclude the matter or ratify anything they
agreed upon; but they engaged that the kings would come next day to
agree on the terms, and finally settle the treaty, if the Consul would
also come to them. Attalus promised that Cnaeus would come, and they
separated for that day. But the Gauls were deliberately contriving
these postponements, and amusing the Romans, because they wanted to get
some part of their families and property beyond the river Halys; and,
first of all, to get the Roman Consul into their hands if they could,
but if not, at any rate to kill him. With this purpose they watched
next day for the coming of the Romans, with a thousand horse ready to
fall upon him. When Cnaeus heard the result of Attalus’s interview,
believing that the kings would come, he left the camp, attended as
usual by five hundred horse. Now it happened that, on the days of the
previous interviews, the foraging parties which went out from the Roman
camp to fetch wood and hay had gone in the same direction, in order
to have the protection of the squadron which went to the parley. A
numerous foraging party acted in the same way on this third occasion,
and the tribunes ordered them to proceed in the same direction, with
the usual number of horsemen to protect them as they advanced. And
their being out on this duty proved accidentally to be the salvation of
their comrades in the danger which threatened them....


[Sidenote: The citadel of Same in Cephallenia taken by a night

+40.+ M. Fulvius took the quarter of the town in which was the citadel
by a night surprise, and introduced the Romans into the town.[111]

[Sidenote: Philopoemen’s policy towards Sparta. See above, bk. 19.]

+41.+ The good and the expedient are seldom compatible, and rare indeed
are those who can combine and reconcile them. For as a general rule
we all know that the good shuns the principles of immediate profit,
and profit those of the good. However, Philopoemen attempted this
task, and succeeded in his aim. For it was a good thing to restore the
captive exiles to Sparta; and it was an expedient thing to humble the
Lacedaemonian state, and to punish those who had served as bodyguards
to a tyrant. But seeing clearly that money is ever the support on which
every dynasty rests, and having a clear head and the instincts of a
ruler, he took measures to prevent the introduction into the town of
money from outside....

[Sidenote: Spring of B.C. 188.]

[Sidenote: Cnaeus Manlius spends the winter of 189-188 B.C. at Ephesus,
the last year of the 147th Olympiad, and arranges the settlement of

+43.+[112] Meanwhile in Asia the Roman consul Cnaeus Manlius wintered
at Ephesus, in the last year of this Olympiad, and was there visited
by embassies from the Greek cities in Asia and many others, bringing
complimentary crowns to him for his victories over the Gauls. For the
entire inhabitants of Asia this side Taurus were not so much rejoiced
at the prospect given them by Antiochus’s defeat of being relieved from
tribute, garrisons, or other royal exactions, as at the removal of
all fear of the barbarians, and at their escape from their insolence
and lawlessness. Among the rest Musaeus came from Antiochus, and some
envoys from the Gauls, desiring to ascertain the terms upon which
friendship would be granted them; and also from Ariarathes, the king
of Cappadocia. For this latter prince, having attached himself to the
fortunes of Antiochus, and having taken part in his battle with the
Romans, had become alarmed and dismayed for his own fate, and therefore
was endeavouring by frequent embassies to ascertain what he would have
to pay or do to get pardon for his error. The Consul complimented the
ambassadors from the cities, and dismissed them after a very favourable
reception; but he replied to the Gauls that he would not make a treaty
with them until king Eumenes, whom he expected, had arrived. To the
envoys from Ariarathes he said that they might have peace on the
payment of six hundred talents. With the ambassador of Antiochus he
arranged that he would come with his army to the frontier of Pamphylia,
to receive the two thousand five hundred talents, and the corn with
which the king had undertaken to furnish the Roman soldiers before
his treaty with Lucius Scipio. This business being thus settled, he
solemnly purified his army; and, as the season for military operations
was now beginning, he broke up his quarters, and, taking Attalus with
him, arrived at Apameia in eight days’ march, and remained there three
days. On the fourth he continued his advance; and, pushing on at great
speed, arrived on the third day at the rendezvous with Antiochus, and
there pitched his camp. Here he was visited by Musaeus, who begged
him to wait, as the carts and cattle that were bringing the corn and
money were late. He consented to wait: and, when the supply arrived, he
distributed the corn among the soldiers, and handed over the money to
one of his tribunes, with orders to convey it to Apameia.

[Sidenote: A faithful officer at Perga.]

+44.+ He himself started in full force for Perga, where he heard that
a commander of a garrison placed in that town by Antiochus had neither
left it himself nor withdrawn his garrison. When he came within a
short distance of the place he was met by the captain of the garrison,
who begged Cnaeus not to condemn him unheard. “He had received the
city from Antiochus in trust, and was holding it until he should be
instructed what to do by the sovereign who had entrusted it to him.”
And he therefore begged for thirty days’ respite, to enable him to
send and ask the king for instructions. Observing that Antiochus was
behaving straightforwardly in other particulars, Cnaeus consented to
allow him to send and ask the king the question. After some days the
officer accordingly received an answer, and surrendered the city.

[Sidenote: Summer, B.C. 188. The ten Roman commissioners arrive in
Asia. See ch. 24.]

About this time, just at the beginning of summer, the ten commissioners
and king Eumenes arrived by sea at Ephesus; and, after giving
themselves two days to recover from the voyage, proceeded up the
country to Apameia. When their arrival was known to Cnaeus Manlius, he
sent his brother Lucius with four thousand men to Oroanda (in Pisidia),
as a forcible hint that they must pay the money owing, in accordance
with the terms agreed on; while he himself marched his army at full
speed to meet Eumenes and the commissioners. On his arrival he found
the king and the ten commissioners, and immediately held a consultation
with them on the measures to be taken. The first resolution come to was
to confirm the sworn agreement and treaty with Antiochus, about which
I need say no more, beyond giving the actual text of the treaty, which
was as follows:—

[Sidenote: Text of the treaty between Antiochus and Rome.]

+45.+ “There shall be perpetual peace between Antiochus and the Romans
if he fulfils the provisions of the treaty.

“Neither Antiochus nor any subject to him shall allow any to pass
through their territories to attack the Romans or their allies, nor
supply them with aught. Neither shall the Romans or their allies do the
like for those attacking Antiochus or those subject to him.

“Antiochus shall not wage war upon the Islanders or the dwellers in

“He shall evacuate all cities and territory (this side Taurus[113]).
His soldiers shall take nothing out with them except the arms they are
carrying. If they chance to have taken anything away they shall restore
it to the same cities.

“He shall receive neither soldiers nor other men from the territory of
king Eumenes.

“If there be any men in the army of Antiochus coming from any of the
cities taken over by the Romans, he shall deliver them up at Apameia.

“If there be any from the kingdom of Antiochus with the Romans or their
allies, they may remain or depart as they choose.

“Antiochus and those subject to him shall give back the slaves,
captives, and deserters of the Romans or their allies and any captive
received from any quarter. Antiochus shall give up, if it be within
his power so to do, Hannibal, son of Hamilcar, the Carthaginian,
Mnesilochus the Acarnanian, Thoas the Aetolian, Euboulidas and Philo
the Chalcidians, and such of the Aetolians as have held national

“Antiochus shall give up all his elephants, and shall have none

“Antiochus shall surrender his ships of war, their tackle, and
fittings, and henceforth have only ten decked ships. He shall not have
a vessel rowed by thirty oars, [or by less][114] for purposes of war
begun by himself.

“He shall not sail west of the river Calycadnus and the promontory of
Sarpedon, except to convey tribute or ambassadors or hostages.

“It shall not be lawful for Antiochus to enlist soldiers or receive
exiles from the territory subject to Rome.

“Such houses as belonged to the Rhodians or their allies, in the
territory subject to Antiochus, shall continue to belong to the
Rhodians as before the war: any money owed to them shall still be
recoverable: and any property left behind by them, if sought for, shall
be restored.

“The Rhodians shall, as before the war, be free from tribute.

“If Antiochus has given any of the towns to others which he is bound to
restore, he shall remove from them also his garrisons and men. And if
any shall wish hereafter to desert to him, he shall not receive them.

“Antiochus shall pay to the Romans ten thousand talents, in ten yearly
instalments, of the best Attic silver, each talent to weigh not less
than eighty Roman pounds, and ninety thousand medimni of corn.

“Antiochus shall pay to king Eumenes three hundred and fifty talents
in the five years next following, in yearly instalments of seventy
talents; and in lieu of the corn, according to the valuation of
Antiochus himself, one hundred and twenty-seven talents, two hundred
and eight drachmae, which sum Eumenes has consented to accept ‘as
satisfying his claims.’

“Antiochus shall give twenty hostages, not less than eighteen nor more
than forty-five years old, and change them every three years.

“If there be in any year a deficit in the instalment paid, Antiochus
shall make it good in the next year.

“If any of the cities or nations, against whom it has been hereby
provided that Antiochus should not make war, should commence war
against him, it shall be lawful for Antiochus to war with them; but of
such nations and cities he shall not have sovereignty nor attach them
as friends to himself.

“Such complaints as arise between the parties to this treaty shall be
referred to arbitration.

“If both parties agree in wishing anything to be added to or taken from
this treaty, it shall be lawful so to do.”

[Sidenote: Burning of Antiochus’s ships at Patara in Lycia.]

+46.+ Immediately after this treaty had been solemnly sworn to, the
proconsul Cnaeus sent Quintus Minucius Thermus and his brother Lucius,
who had just brought the money from Oroanda to Syria, with orders to
receive the oath from the king, and confirm the several clauses of the
treaty. And to Quintus Fabius Labeo, who was in command of the fleet,
he sent a despatch ordering him to sail back to Patara, and take over
and burn the ships there....

[Sidenote: Ariarathes V. King of Cappadocia.] +47.+ The proconsul
Cnaeus Manlius made Ariarathes a friend of Rome on receipt of three
hundred talents....

[Sidenote: Final settlement of the affairs of Asia Minor by the
commissioners. B. C. 188.]

+48.+ At Apameia the Proconsul and the ten commissioners, after
listening to all who appealed to them, assigned in the case of disputed
claims to territory, money, or anything else, certain cities in which
the parties might have their claims settled by arbitration. The general
scheme which they drew out was as follows: Those of the autonomous
cities which, having formerly paid tribute to Antiochus, had remained
faithful to Rome, they relieved from tribute altogether. Those that
had been tributary to Attalus they ordered to pay the same tribute to
his successor Eumenes. Such as had abandoned the Roman friendship and
joined Antiochus in the war, they ordered to pay Eumenes the amount of
tribute imposed on them by Antiochus. The people of Colophon, Notium,
Cymae, and Mylae, they freed from tribute. To the Clazomenians, besides
this relief, they gave the Island Drymussa. To the Ephesians they
restored the sacred district which they had been obliged by the enemy
to evacuate....[115] To the people of Chios, Smyrna, and Erythrae,
besides other marks of honour, they assigned the territory which
they severally expressed a wish to have at the time, and alleged was
their right, from regard for their loyalty and zeal which they had
shown to Rome during the war. To the Phocaeans they restored their
ancestral city and the territory which they possessed of old. They
next transacted business with the Rhodians, giving them Lycia and
Caria up to the river Maeander, except Telmissus. As to king Eumenes
and his brothers, not content with the liberal provision made for them
in their treaty with Antiochus, they now assigned him in addition
the Chersonese, Lysimacheia, and the castles on the borders of these
districts, and such country as had been subject to Antiochus in Europe;
and in Asia, Phrygia on the Hellespont, Great Phrygia, so much of Mysia
as he had before subjugated, Lycaonia, Milyas, Lydia, Tralles, Ephesus,
and Telmissus: all these they gave to Eumenes. As to Pamphylia, Eumenes
alleged that it was on this side Taurus, the ambassadors of Antiochus
on the other; and the commissioners feeling unable to decide, referred
the question to the Senate. Having thus decided the largest number and
most important of the matters brought before them, they started on
the road towards the Hellespont, intending on their journey to still
further secure the settlement arrived at with the Gauls....



_In the 148th Olympiad (B.C. 188-184) embassies came from Philip and
the tribes bordering on Macedonia to Rome. The decrees of the Senate
concerning them. In Greece the quarrel of Philip with the Thessalians
and Perrhaebians about the cities held by Philip in their countries
from the time of the war with Antiochus. The decision concerning them
before Q. Caecilius at Tempe. Decisions of Caecilius. A difference of
Philip with the ambassadors of Eumenes and the exiles from Maroneia;
the pleadings on these points at Thessalonica and the decision of
Caecilius. The massacre at Maroneia instigated by king Philip. The
arrival of the Roman legates, and their decisions. The causes of the
war between the Romans and Perseus. Arrival of ambassadors from kings
Ptolemy and Eumenes and Seleucus in the Peloponnese. The decision of
the Achaeans on the alliance with Ptolemy, and on the gifts offered
them by these kings. Arrival of Q. Caecilius and his disapprobation
of the measures taken in regard to Sparta. Embassy of Areus and
Alcibiades, two of the earlier exiles from Sparta, to Rome, and their
accusations against Philopoemen and the Achaeans. The Roman envoys come
to Cleitor, where there is an Achaean assembly. The speeches delivered
for both parties, and the Achaean decrees in the affair of Sparta._[116]

[Sidenote: An appeal to Rome against Philopoemen. B.C. 187. Coss. M.
Aemilius Lepidus, C. Flamininus.]

+3.+ After the execution of the men at Compasium,[117] some of the
Lacedaemonians, incensed at what had been done, and believing that
the power and authority of the Romans had been set at naught by
Philopoemen, went to Rome and accused Philopoemen and his proceedings;
and finally obtained a letter addressed to the Achaeans from Marcus
Lepidus, the consul of the year, and afterwards Pontifex Maximus, in
which he told the Achaeans that they had not acted equitably in the
matters of the Lacedaemonians. At the same time as this mission from
Sparta, Philopoemen also appointed Nicodemus of Elis and others to go
on an embassy to Rome.

[Sidenote: Renewal of the treaty between the Achaean league and

[Sidenote: The accomplishments of Ptolemy Epiphanes.]

Just at that time Demetrius of Athens came on a mission from Ptolemy,
to renew the existing alliance between the king and the Achaean league.
This was eagerly accepted, and my father, Lycortas, and Theodoridas,
and Rhositeles of Sicyon were appointed ambassadors to take the oaths
on behalf of the Achaeans, and receive those of the king. And on
that occasion a circumstance occurred, which, though not important
perhaps, is still worth recording. After the completion of this renewal
of alliance on behalf of the Achaeans, Philopoemen entertained the
ambassador; and in the course of the banquet the ambassador introduced
the king’s name, and said a great deal in his praise, quoting anecdotes
of his skill and boldness in hunting, as well as his excellence in
riding and the use of arms; and ended by quoting, as a proof of what
he said, that the king on horseback once transfixed a bull with a

[Sidenote: The effect of the collapse of Antiochus upon Boeotia.]

[Sidenote: Resistance to the recall of Zeuxippus.]

[Sidenote: See 18, 43. Livy, 33, 28.]

+4.+ In Boeotia, after the formation of the treaty between Rome and
Antiochus, the hopes of the whole revolutionary party were destroyed.
Politics therefore began to assume a new aspect; and whereas the
administration of justice among them had been postponed for nearly the
last twenty years, voices began to make themselves heard in the cities
to the effect that “there ought to be an end and settlement of their
mutual disputes.” But after considerable controversy on this point,
because the discontented were more numerous than the wealthy, the
following circumstance occurred which helped accidently to support the
party of order. Titus Flamininus had for some time past been zealously
working in Rome to secure the restoration of Zeuxippus to Boeotia,
because he had found him serviceable on many occasions during the wars
with Antiochus and Philip. And just at this time he had induced the
Senate to send a despatch to the Boeotians ordering them to recall
Zeuxippus and his fellow exiles. When this despatch arrived, the
Boeotians, fearing that, if these men were restored, they would become
detached from their good understanding with Macedonia, determined that
the legal sentence upon Zeuxippus and the rest should be publicly
proclaimed,[118] which they had formerly drawn up against them. Thus
they condemned them on two charges, first, of sacrilege for having
stripped off the silver from the plated table of Zeus, and, secondly,
of murder for having killed Brachylles. Having made this arrangement,
they assumed that they need pay no further attention to the despatch
of the Senate, but contented themselves with sending Callicritus and
others to Rome with the message that they were unable to rescind what
had been settled by their laws. Zeuxippus having sent an embassy to the
Senate at the same time, the Romans wrote to the Aetolians and Achaeans
an account of the attitude assumed by the Boeotians, and ordered them
to restore Zeuxippus to his country. The Achaeans refrained from
invading the country with an army, but selected some ambassadors to go
and persuade the Boeotians to obey the orders from Rome; and also to
settle the legal disputes existing between them and the Achaeans, on
the same principles as they conducted the administration of justice at
home: for it happened that there were some controversies between the
two nations that had been dragging on for a long time. On receiving
this message the Boeotians, whose Strategus was then Hippias, promised
at the moment that they would do what was demanded of them, but shortly
afterwards neglected it at every point. Therefore, when Hippias had
laid down his office and Alcetas had succeeded him, Philopoemen gave
all who chose license to make reprisals on the territories of the
Boeotians; which proved the beginning of a serious quarrel between the
two nations. For on the cattle of Myrrhichus and Simon being driven
off,[1] and a struggle arising over this transaction, the contest soon
ceased to be political, and became the beginning and prelude of open
war. If indeed the Senate had persisted in carrying out the restoration
of Zeuxippus, war would quickly have been kindled; but as it maintained
silence on the subject, the Megareans were induced by an embassy
proposing terms to stop the reprisals.[119]...

[Sidenote: Rhodes and the Lycians.]

+5.+ A quarrel arose between the Lycians and Rhodians from the
following causes. When the ten commissioners were employed in the
settlement of Asia, they were visited by Theaetetus and Philophron
on a mission from Rhodes, demanding that Lycia and Caria should be
given to them in return for the goodwill and zeal displayed by them in
the war with Antiochus. At the same time Hipparchus and Satyrus came
from Ilium begging, on the ground of their kindred with the Lycians,
that the latter should receive pardon for their transgressions. The
commissioners listened to these pleadings, and tried to do what they
could to satisfy both. For the sake of the people of Ilium, they
inflicted no severity on the Lycians, but gratified the Rhodians by
presenting them with the sovereignty over that people. This decision
was the origin of a serious division and controversy between the
Lycians and Rhodians. For the envoys of Ilium visited the Lycian
cities, giving out that they had succeeded in pacifying the Roman
anger, and that they owed their liberty to them; while Theaetetus and
his colleague took back word to their countrymen that Lycia and all
Caria south of the Maeander had been given as a free gift by the Romans
to Rhodes. Presently an embassy came from Lycia to Rhodes desiring
an alliance; while the Rhodians on their part had elected certain of
their citizens to go to Lycia and give orders to the several cities as
to what they were to do. They were thus entirely at cross purposes,
and for some time the cause of the misunderstanding was not generally
intelligible. But when the Lycian ambassadors appeared in the assembly
and began talking about an alliance, and Pothion the Prytanis rose
after them and explained the different ideas which the two people
entertained on the subject, and moreover, sternly rebuked the Lycian
envoys,[120] the latter declared that they would endure anything rather
than be subject to the Rhodians....


[Sidenote: Contrast of the conduct of Philip II. of Macedon to Athens
in B.C. 338 with that of Ptolemy.]

+6.+ All men admire the magnanimity of Philip towards Athens; for
though he had been injured as well as abused by them, yet when he
conquered them at Chaeroneia, so far from using this opportunity for
injuring his opponents, he caused the corpses of the Athenians to be
buried with the proper ceremonies; while those of them who had been
taken prisoners he actually presented with clothes, and restored to
their friends without ransom. But though men praise they do not imitate
such conduct. They rather try to outdo those with whom they are at
war, in bitterness of passion and severity of vengeance. Ptolemy, for
instance, had men tied naked to carts and dragged at their tail, and
then put to death with torture....

[Sidenote: Lycopolis in the Thebaid.]

[Sidenote: Suppression of the revolt in Lower Egypt, B.C. 186-185.]

+7.+ When this same Ptolemy was besieging Lycopolis, the Egyptian
nobles surrendered to the king at discretion; and his cruel treatment
of them involved him in manifold dangers. The same was the result at
the time Polycrates suppressed the revolt. For Athinis, Pausiras,
Chesuphus, and Irobastus, who still survived of the rebellious nobles,
yielding to necessity, appeared at the city of Sais and surrendered
at discretion to the king. But Ptolemy, regardless of all pledges,
had them tied naked to the carts and dragged off, and then put to
death with torture. He then went to Naucratis with his army, where he
received the mercenaries enlisted for him by Aristonicus from Greece,
and thence sailed to Alexandria, without having taken any part whatever
in the actual operations of the war, thanks to the dishonest advice of
Polycrates, though he was now twenty-five years old....

[Sidenote: B.C. 186. The origin of the last Macedonian war.]

[Sidenote: Abrupolis, a Thracian prince and friend of the Romans. See
Livy, 42, 13, 40. Death of Philip V. B.C. 179.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 176-172.]

[Sidenote: See bk. 3, ch. 6.]

+8.+ At this time were sowed the seeds of fatal evils to the royal
house of Macedonia. I am aware that some historians of the war between
Rome and Perseus, when they wish to set forth the causes of the quarrel
for our information, assign as the primary one the expulsion of
Abrupolis from his principality, on the ground of having made a raid
upon the mines at Pangaeum after the death of Philip, which Perseus
repulsed, finally expelling him entirely out of his own dominions.
Next they mention the invasion of Dolopia, and the visit of Perseus
to Delphi, the plot against Eumenes at Delphi, and the murder of
the ambassadors in Boeotia; and from these they say sprang the war
between Perseus and the Romans. But my contention is that it is of
most decisive advantage, both to historians and their readers, to
know the causes from which the several events are born and spring.
Most historians confound these, because they do not keep a firm hold
upon the distinction between a pretext and a cause, or again between
a pretext and a beginning of a war. And since events at the present
time recall this distinction I feel compelled to renew my discussion of
this subject. For instance, of the events just referred to, the first
three are pretexts; the last two—the plot against Eumenes, the murder
of the ambassadors, and other similar things that happened during the
same period—are clear _beginnings_ of the war between Rome and Perseus,
and of the final overthrow of the Macedonian kingdom; but not one of
them is a _cause_ of these things. I will illustrate by examples. Just
as we say that Philip son of Amyntas contemplated and determined upon
accomplishing the war with Persia, while Alexander put into execution
what he had projected, so in the present instance we say that Philip
son of Demetrius first projected the last war against Rome, and had all
his preparations ready for the execution of his design, but that after
his death Perseus became the agent in carrying out the undertaking
itself. If this be true, the following also is clear: it is impossible
that the causes of the war should have been subsequent to the death of
him who resolved upon and projected it; which would be the case if we
accepted the account of these historians; for the events alleged by
them as its causes were subsequent to the death of Philip....

[Sidenote: Complaints lodged against Philip at Rome, B. C. 185.]

[Sidenote: A commission of investigation appointed.]

+9.+ About the same time ambassadors came to Rome from king Eumenes,
informing the Senate of the encroachment of Philip upon the cities in
Thrace. There came also the exiles of the Maronitae denouncing Philip,
and charging him with being the cause of their expulsion. These were
followed by Athamanians, Perrhaebians, and Thessalians, demanding the
restoration of their cities which Philip had taken from them during the
war with Antiochus. Ambassadors also came from Philip to make answer
to all accusers. After repeated debates between all these envoys and
the ambassadors of Philip, the Senate decided to appoint a commission
at once, to investigate the actions of Philip, and to protect all
who chose to state their views and their complaints of the king to
his face. The legates thus appointed were Quintus Caecilius, Marcus
Baebius, and Tiberius Claudius.[121]...

[Sidenote: Aenus in Thrace.]

There was again a war of parties among the Aenii, one side inclining to
Eumenes, the other to Macedonia....

_The result of these embassies was the Congress of Tempe, at which no
definite settlement was made. Livy, 39, 25-28._


[Sidenote: Philopoemen Achaean Strategus for two years running, from
May B.C. 189 to May B.C. 187.] +10.+ I have already stated that in the
Peloponnese, while Philopoemen was still Strategus, the Achaean league
sent an embassy to Rome on the subject of Sparta, and another to king
Ptolemy to renew their ancient alliance.

[Sidenote: Aristaenus. May, B.C. 187 to May, B.C. 186.]

[Sidenote: Seleucus Philopator succeeded his father Antiochus the
Great, B.C. 187.]

[Sidenote: Business of the Achaean assembly.]

[Sidenote: Letter from the Senate on the subject of Philopoemen’s
actions at Sparta.]

Immediately after Philopoemen had been succeeded by Aristaenus as
Strategus, the ambassadors of king Ptolemy arrived, while the league
meeting was assembled at Megalopolis. King Eumenes also had despatched
an embassy offering to give the Achaeans one hundred and twenty
talents, on condition that it was invested and the interest used to
pay the council of the league at the time of the federal assemblies.
Ambassadors came also from king Seleucus, to renew his friendship
with them, and offering a present of a fleet of ten ships of war.
But when the assembly got to business, the first to come forward to
speak was Nicodemus of Elis, who recounted to the Achaeans what he and
his colleagues had said in the Roman Senate about Sparta, and read
the answer of the Senate; which was to the effect that the Senate
disapproved of the destruction of the walls, and of the execution of
the men put to death at Compasium, but that it did not rescind any
arrangement made. No one saying a word for or against this, the subject
was allowed to pass.

[Sidenote: The offer of Eumenes.]

Next came the ambassadors from Eumenes, who renewed the ancestral
friendship of the king with the Achaeans, and stated to the assembly
the offer made by him. They spoke at great length on these subjects,
and retired after setting forth the greatness of the king’s kindness
and affection to the nation.

[Sidenote: Answer of Apollonidas.]

+11.+ After they had finished their speech, Apollonidas of Sicyon rose
and said that: “As far as the amount of the money was concerned, it was
a present worthy of the Achaeans. But if they looked to the intention
of the donor, or the purpose to which the gift was to be applied,
none could well be more insulting and more unconstitutional. The laws
prohibited any one, whether a private individual or magistrate, from
accepting presents from a king on any pretence whatever; but if they
took this money they would every one of them be plainly accepting a
present, which was at once the gravest possible breach of the law,
and confessedly the deepest possible personal disgrace. For that the
council should take a great wage from Eumenes, and meet to deliberate
on the interests of the league after swallowing such a bait, was
manifestly disgraceful and injurious. It was Eumenes that offered
money now; presently it would be Prusias; and then Seleucus. But as
the interests of democracies and of kings are quite opposite to each
other, and as our most frequent and most important deliberations
concern the points of controversy arising between us and the kings,
one of two things must necessarily happen; either the interests of the
king will have precedence over our own, or we must incur the reproach
of ingratitude for opposing our paymasters.” He therefore urged
the Achaeans not only to decline the offer, but to hold Eumenes in
detestation for thinking of making it.

[Sidenote: Speech of Cassander of Aegina.]

Next rose Cassander of Aegina and reminded the Achaeans of “The
misfortunes which the Aeginetans had met with through being members of
the Achaean league; when Publius Sulpicius sailed against them with
the Roman fleet, and sold all the unhappy Aeginetans into slavery.” In
regard to this subject I have already related how the Aetolians, having
got possession of Aegina in virtue of their treaty with Rome, sold it
to Attalus for thirty talents. Cassander therefore drew the attention
of the Achaeans to these facts; and demanded that Eumenes should not
seek to gain the affection of the Achaeans by offering them money,
but that he should establish an incontestable claim to every sign of
devotion by giving back Aegina. He urged the Achaeans not to accept
presents which would place them in the position of being the destroyers
of the hopes of Aeginetan restoration for all time.

[Sidenote: The present of Eumenes is refused.]

After these speeches had been delivered, the people showed such signs
of enthusiastic approval that no one ventured to speak on the side of
the king; but the whole assembly rejected the offer by acclamation,
though its amount certainly made it exceedingly tempting.

[Sidenote: Ptolemy. The speech of Lycortas.]

[Sidenote: A mistake discovered.]

+12.+ The next subject introduced for debate was that of king Ptolemy.
The ambassadors who had been on the mission to Ptolemy were called
forward, and Lycortas, acting as spokesman, began by stating how they
had interchanged oaths of alliance with the king; and next announced
that they brought a present from the king to the Achaean league of
six thousand stands of arms for peltasts, and two thousand talents in
bronze coinage. He added a panegyric on the king, and finished his
speech by a brief reference to the goodwill and active benevolence of
the king towards the Achaeans. Upon this the Strategus of the Achaeans,
Aristaenus, stood up and asked Lycortas and his colleagues in the
embassy to Ptolemy “which alliance it was that he had thus renewed?”

No one answering the question, but all the assembly beginning to
converse with each other, the Council chamber was filled with
confusion. The cause of this absurd state of things was this. There
had been several treaties of alliance formed between the Achaeans and
Ptolemy’s kingdom, as widely different in their provision as in the
circumstances which gave rise to them: but neither had Ptolemy’s envoy
made any distinction when arranging for the renewal, merely speaking
in general terms on the matter, nor had the ambassadors sent from
Achaia; but they had interchanged the oaths on the assumption of there
being but one treaty. The result was, that, on the Strategus quoting
all the treaties, and pointing out in detail the differences between
them, which turned out to be important, the assembly demanded to know
which it was that it was renewing. And when no one was able to explain,
not even Philopoemen himself, who had been in office when the renewal
was made, nor Lycortas and his colleagues who had been on the mission
to Alexandria, these men all began to be regarded as careless in
conducting the business of the league; while Aristaenus acquired great
reputation as being the only man who knew what he was talking about;
and finally, the assembly refused to allow the ratification, voting on
account of this blunder that the business should be postponed.

[Sidenote: Offer of Seleucus.]

Then the ambassadors from Seleucus entered with their proposal. The
Achaeans, however, voted to renew the friendship with Seleucus, but to
decline for the present the gift of the ships.

[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 185.]

+13.+ Having thus finished their deliberations, the assembly broke up
and the people separated to their several cities. But subsequently,
while the (Nemean) games were in course of celebration, Quintus
Caecilius arrived from Macedonia, on his way back from the embassy
which he had been conducting to Philip. Aristaenus having called a
meeting of the league magistrates in Argos, Quintus attended and
upbraided them for having exceeded justice in the harshness and
severity with which they had treated the Lacedaemonians, and urged
them strongly to repair the error. Aristaenus said not a word, showing
clearly by his silence that he disapproved of what had been done and
agreed with the words of Caecilius. But Diophanes of Megalopolis, who
was more of a soldier than a statesman, stood up to speak, and so far
from offering any defence of the Achaeans, suggested to Caecilius, from
hostility to Philopoemen, another charge that might be brought against
them. For he said that “the Lacedaemonians were not the only people who
had been badly treated; the Messenians had been so also.” There were
as a fact some controversies going on among the Messenians, in regard
to the decree of Flamininus concerning the exiles, and the execution
of it by Philopoemen: and Caecilius, thinking that he now had a party
among the Achaeans themselves of the same opinion as himself, expressed
still greater anger at the hesitation on the part of the assembled
magistrates in obeying his orders. However, when Philopoemen, Lycortas,
and Archon argued long and elaborately to prove that what had been done
at Sparta was right, and advantageous to the Lacedaemonians themselves
more than to any one else, and that it was impossible to disturb any
existing arrangements without violating justice to man and piety to
the gods, they came to the decision that they would maintain them, and
give an answer to that effect to the Roman legate. Seeing what the
disposition of the magistrates was, Caecilius demanded that the public
assembly should be summoned, to which the Achaean magistrates demanded
to see the instructions which he had from the Senate on these points:
and when he gave no answer to this demand, they said that they would
not summon the assembly for him, as their laws forbade them to do so
unless a man brought written instructions from the Senate, stating
the subject on which they were to summon it. Caecilius was so angry
at this uncompromising opposition to his orders, that he refused to
receive his answer from the magistrates, and so departed without any
answer at all. The Achaeans laid the blame both of the former visit
of Marcus Fulvius and the present one of Caecilius on Aristaenus and
Diophanes, on the ground that they had invited them on account of their
political opposition to Philopoemen; and accordingly the general public
felt a certain suspicion of these two men. Such was the state of the

[Sidenote: Philopoemen on Archon.]

+14.+ Philopoemen had a sharp difference in debate with Archon the
Strategus. In course of time, however, Philopoemen was convinced by
Archon’s arguments, and, changing his mind, spoke in warm commendation
of Archon as having managed his business with skill and address. But
when I heard the speech at the time it did not seem to me right to
praise a man and yet do him an injury, nor do I think so now in my
maturer years. For I think that there is as wide a distinction in
point of morality between practical ability and success secured by
absence of scruples, as there is between skill and mere cunning. The
former are in a manner the highest attainments possible, the latter the
reverse. But owing to the lack of discernment so general in our day,
these qualities, which have little in common, excite the same amount of
commendation and emulation in the world....

[Sidenote: Ambassadors from Philip and the Achaeans heard on the report
of Caecilius, B.C. 185-184.]

+15.+ When Caecilius returned from Greece and made his report to the
Senate concerning Macedonia and the Peloponnese, the ambassadors who
had come to Rome on these matters were introduced into the Senate.
First came those from Philip and Eumenes, as well as the exiles from
Aenus and Maroneia; and on their saying much the same as they had said
before Caecilius and his colleagues at Thessalonica, the Senate voted
to send another deputation to Philip, to see first of all whether he
had evacuated the cities in Perrhaebia in conformity with the answer he
gave to Caecilius: and secondly, to order him to remove his garrison
from Aenus and Maroneia; and in a word, to abandon all fortresses,
positions, and towns on the seaboard of Thrace.

[Sidenote: The Achaean ambassadors make their defence.]

After these the ambassadors from the Peloponnese were introduced.
For the Achaeans on their part had sent Apollonidas of Sicyon, and
others, to justify themselves to Caecilius for his having received no
answer, and generally to inform the Senate on the question of Sparta;
and at the same time Areus and Alcibiades had come from Sparta as
ambassadors,—two of the old exiles recently restored by Philopoemen
and the Achaeans. And this was a circumstance that particularly roused
the anger of the Achaeans; because they thought it the height of
ingratitude on the part of the exiles, after receiving so important and
recent a service at their hands, to be now sending a hostile embassy,
and accusing to the sovereign people those who had been the authors of
their unlooked-for preservation and restoration to their country.

[Sidenote: The Spartan envoys.]

[Sidenote: The decision.]

+16.+ Both parties were heard in their defence in each other’s
presence. Apollonidas of Sicyon and his colleagues tried to convince
the Senate that the affairs of Sparta could not have been better
managed than they were managed by Philopoemen. Areus and his colleagues
attempted to establish the reverse: alleging, first of all, that the
power of the city was entirely destroyed by the violent withdrawal
of so large a number; and, in the second place, that even those that
were left were so few that their position was insecure, now that the
walls were pulled down; and that their freedom of speech was entirely
destroyed by the fact that they were not only amenable to the general
decrees of the Achaean league, but were also made specially subject to
the magistrates set over them from time to time. After hearing these
envoys also, the Senate decided to give the same legates instructions
regarding them as well as the others, and appointed Appius Claudius and
his colleagues commissioners for Greece.

[Sidenote: Defence of the refusal to call the Achaean assembly.]

But the ambassadors from the Achaeans offered an explanation also to
Caecilius in the Senate, on behalf of the magistrates, asserting that
“They did not act wrongly or deserve blame for refusing to summon the
assembly, unless it were requisite to decide on an alliance or a war,
or unless some one brought a letter from the Senate. The magistrates
had therefore impartially considered the subject of summoning the
assembly, but were prevented from doing so by the laws, because he
neither brought a despatch from the Senate nor would show them any
written instructions.” At the conclusion of this speech Caecilius
rose and made an attack on Philopoemen and Lycortas, and the Achaeans
generally, and on the policy they had pursued towards the city of
Sparta. After listening to the arguments, the Senate answered the
Achaeans by saying that they would send commissioners to investigate
the matter of Sparta; and they accompanied this answer by an admonition
to them to pay attention to the ambassadors sent by them from time to
time, and show them proper respect, as the Romans did to ambassadors
who came to them....

[Sidenote: Philip’s vengeance on the people of Maroneia, early in B. C.
184. Livy, 39, 33.]

[Sidenote: He attempts to evade responsibility for it.]

+17.+ When Philip learnt, by a message from his own ambassadors at
Rome, that he would be obliged to evacuate the cities in Thrace, he
was extremely annoyed, because he regarded his kingdom as being now
curtailed on every side; and he vented his wrath upon the unhappy
people of Maroneia. He sent for Onomastus, his governor in Thrace, and
communicated with him on the subject. And Onomastus on his return sent
Cassander to Maroneia, who, from long residence there, was familiar
with the inhabitants,—for Philip’s practice had long been to place
members of his court in these cities, and accustom the people to their
residence among them. Some few days after his arrival, the Thracians
having been prepared for what they had to do, and having obtained
entrance to the city by night through the instrumentality of Cassander,
a great massacre took place, and many of the Maronites were killed.
Having wreaked this vengeance on those who opposed him, and satisfied
his own anger, Philip waited for the arrival of the Roman legates,
persuaded that no one would venture for fear of him to denounce his
crime. But when Appius and his colleagues presently arrived, they were
promptly informed of what had happened at Maroneia, and expostulated in
severe terms with Philip for it. The king attempted to defend himself
by asserting that he had nothing to do with this act of violence;
but that the Maronites, being divided into two hostile parties, one
inclined to Eumenes and the other to himself, inflicted this misfortune
upon themselves. He moreover bade them confront him with any one who
wished to accuse him. He said this from a conviction that no one would
venture to do so; because they would consider that Philip’s vengeance
upon those who opposed him would be near at hand, while assistance from
Rome would have a long way to come. But when Appius and his colleagues
said that “they required to hear no defence, for they were well aware
of what had happened, and who was the cause of it,” Philip became much

[Sidenote: The guilty agents are to be sent to Rome.]

[Sidenote: Another crime.]

[Sidenote: Philip’s hostility to Rome.]

+18.+ They went no further than this in the first interview: but during
the next day Appius ordered Philip to send Onomastus and Cassander at
once to Rome, that the Senate might inform itself on what had happened.
The king was disturbed at this to the greatest possible degree, and for
some time did not know what to say; but at last he said that he would
send Cassander, who was the actual author of the business, that the
Senate might learn the truth from him; but he tried to get Onomastus
excused, both in this and subsequent interviews with the legates,
alleging as a reason that not only had Onomastus not been in Maroneia
at the time of the massacre, but not even in any part of the country
in its neighbourhood. His real motive, however, was fear lest, if he
got to Rome, having been engaged with him in many similar transactions,
he would not only tell the Romans the story of Maroneia, but all the
others also. Eventually he did get Onomastus excused; and having, after
the departure of the legates, sent off Cassander, he sent some agents
with him as far as Epirus, and there had him poisoned.[122] But Appius
and his colleagues left Philip with their minds fully made up both as
to his guilt in the matter of Maroneia and his alienation from Rome.

[Sidenote: King Philip meditates a breach with Rome.]

[Sidenote: Sends his son Demetrius there, in hopes of putting off the
war for a time.]

The king, thus relieved of the presence of the legates, after
consulting with his friends Apelles and Philocles became clearly
conscious that his quarrel with Rome had now become serious, and that
it could no longer be concealed, but was become notorious to most
people in the world. He was therefore now wholly bent on measures of
self-defence and retaliation. But as he was as yet unprepared for
some of the plans which he had in his mind, he cast about to find
some means of putting matters off, and gaining time for making his
preparations for war. He accordingly resolved to send his youngest son
Demetrius to Rome: partly to make his defence on the charges brought
against him, and partly also to beg pardon for any error which he
might have committed. He felt certain that everything he wished would
be obtained from the Senate by means of this young prince, because
of the extraordinary attentions which had been shown him when he was
acting as a hostage. He no sooner conceived this idea than he set about
making preparations for sending the prince and those of his own friends
destined to accompany him on his mission. At the same time he promised
the Byzantines to give them help: not so much because he cared for
them, as from a wish under cover of their name to strike terror into
the princes of the Thracians living beyond the Propontis, as a step
towards the fulfilment of his main purpose....

[Sidenote: Disputes in Crete.]

+19.+ In Crete, while Cydas son of Antalces was _Cosmus_,[123] the
Gortynians, who sought in every way to depress the Gnossians, deprived
them of a portion of their territory called Lycastium, and assigned it
to the Rhaucii, and another portion called Diatonium to the Lyctii.
But when about this time Appius and his colleagues arrived in the
island from Rome, with the view of settling the controversies which
existed among them, and addressed remonstrances to the cities of
Gnossus and Gortyn on these points, the Cretans gave in, and submitted
the settlement of their disputes to Appius. He accordingly ordered
the restoration of their territory to the Gnossians; and that the
Cydoniates should receive back the hostages which they had formerly
left in the hands of Charmion, and should surrender Phalasarna, without
taking anything out of it. As to sharing in the legal jurisdiction of
the whole island, he left it free to the several cities to do so or not
as they pleased, on condition that in the latter case they abstained
from entering the rest of Crete, they and the exiles from Phalasarna
who murdered Menochius and his friends, their most illustrious

[Sidenote: The Queen-Dowager, widow of Attalus, and her sons.]

[Sidenote: Herodotus, 1, 31.]

+20.+ Apollonias, the wife of Attalus, father of king Eumenes, was a
native of Cyzicus, and a woman who for many reasons deserves to be
remembered, and with honour. Her claims upon a favourable recollection
are that, though born of a private family, she became a queen, and
retained that exalted rank to the end of her life, not by the use of
meretricious fascinations, but by the virtue and integrity of her
conduct in private and public life alike. Above all, she was the mother
of four sons with whom she kept on terms of the most perfect affection
and motherly love to the last day of her life. And so Attalus and his
brother gained a high character, while staying at Cyzicus, by showing
their mother proper respect and honour. For they took each of them one
of her hands and led her between them on a visit to the temples and on
a tour of the town, accompanied by their suite. At this sight all who
saw it received the young princes with very warm marks of approval,
and, recalling the story of Cleobis and Biton, compared their conduct
with theirs; and remarked that the affectionate zeal shown by the young
princes, though perhaps not going so far as theirs, was rendered quite
as illustrious by the fact of their more exalted position. This took
place in Cyzicus, after the peace made with king Prusias....

[Sidenote: The policy of Ostiagon in Galatia.]

+21.+ Ostiagon the Gaul, king of the Gauls of Asia, endeavoured to
transfer to himself the sovereignty of all the Gauls; and he had many
qualifications for such a post, both natural and acquired. For he was
open-handed and generous, a man of popular manners and ready tact;
and, what was most important in the eyes of the Gauls, he was a man of
courage and skill in war....

[Sidenote: Character of Aristonicus. See above, ch. 7.]

+22.+ Aristonicus was one of the eunuchs of Ptolemy, king of Egypt,
and had been brought up from childhood with the king. As he grew up he
displayed more manly courage and tastes than are generally found in
an eunuch. For he had a natural predilection for a military life, and
devoted himself almost exclusively to that and all that it involved.
He was also skilful in dealing with men, and, what is very rare, took
large and liberal views, and was naturally inclined to bestow favours
and kindnesses....


[Sidenote: 149th Olympiad, B.C. 184-180.]

[Sidenote: Coss. P. Claudius Pulcher, L. Porcius Licinus, B.C. 184.]

+1.+ In the 149th Olympiad a greater number of embassies came to
Rome from Greece than were almost ever seen before. For as Philip
was compelled by treaty to submit disputes with his neighbours to
arbitration, and as it was known that the Romans were willing to
receive accusations against Philip, and would secure the safety of
those who had controversies with him, all who lived near the frontier
of Macedonia came to Rome, some in their private capacity, some from
cities, others from whole tribes, with complaints against Philip. At
the same time also came ambassadors from Eumenes, accompanied by his
brother Athenaeus, to accuse Philip in regard to the Thracian cities
and the aid sent to Prusias. Philip’s son, Demetrius, also came to
make answer to all these various envoys, accompanied by Apelles and
Philocles, who were at that time considered the king’s first friends.
Ambassadors also came from Sparta, representatives of each faction of
the citizens.

[Sidenote: B.C. 183, Coss. M. Claudius Marcellus, Q. Fabius Labeo.]

The first summoned to the Senate was Athenaeus, from whom the Senate
accepted the compliments of fifteen thousand gold pieces, and passed
a decree highly extolling Eumenes and his brothers for their answer,
and exhorting them to continue in the same mind. Next the praetors
called upon all the accusers of Philip, and brought them forward by one
embassy at a time. But as they were numerous, and their entry occupied
three days, the Senate became embarrassed as to the settlement to be
made in each case. For from Thessaly there were ambassadors from the
whole nation, and also from each city separately; so also from the
Perrhaebians, Athamanians, Epirotes, and Illyrians. And of these some
brought cases of dispute as to territory, slaves, or cattle; and some
about contracts or injuries sustained by themselves. Some alleged
that they could not get their rights in accordance with the treaty,
because Philip prevented the administration of justice; while others
impeached the justice of the decisions given, on the ground that Philip
had corrupted the arbitrators. And, in fact, there was an inextricable
confusion and multiplicity of charges.

[Sidenote: Demetrius in the Senate. Livy, 39, 47.]

+2.+ In such a state of things the Senate felt unable to come to a
clear decision itself, and did not think it fair that Demetrius should
have to answer each of the several indictments; for it regarded him
with great favour, and saw at the same time that his extreme youth
unfitted him to cope with business of such intricacy and complexity.
Besides, what it desired most was not to hear speeches of Demetrius,
but to ascertain with certainty the disposition of Philip. Excusing him
therefore from pleading his cause, the Senate asked the young man and
his friends whether they were the bearers of any written memoir from
the king; and upon Demetrius answering that he was, and holding out a
paper of no great size, the Senate bade him give a summary of what the
paper contained in answer to the accusations alleged. It amounted to
this, that on each point Philip asserted that he had carried out the
injunctions of the Senate, or, if he had not done so, laid the blame
upon his accusers; while to the greater number of his declarations he
had added the words, “though the commissioners with Caecilius were
unfair to me in this point,” or again, “though I am unjustly treated in
this respect.” Such being Philip’s mind, as expressed in the several
clauses of the paper, the Senate, after hearing the ambassadors who
were come to Rome, comprehended them all under one measure. By the
mouth of the praetor it offered an honourable and cordial reception to
Demetrius, expressed in ample and emphatic language, and answered his
speech by saying that “The Senate fully believe that on all the points
mentioned by Demetrius, or read by him from his paper of instructions,
full justice was already done or would be done. But, in order that
Philip might be made aware that the Senate paid this honour to
Demetrius, ambassadors would be sent to see that everything was being
done in accordance with the will of the Senate, and at the same time to
inform the king that he owed this grace to his son Demetrius.” Such was
the arrangement come to on this part of the business.

[Sidenote: The ambassadors of Eumenes complain that Philip has not
evacuated Thrace.]

+3.+ The next to enter the Senate were the ambassadors of king Eumenes,
who denounced Philip on account of the assistance sent to Prusias, and
concerning his actions in Thrace, alleging that even at that moment he
had not withdrawn his garrisons from the cities. But upon Philocles
showing his wish to offer a defence on these points, as having been
formerly charged with a mission to Prusias, and being now sent to
the Senate to represent Philip on this business, the Senate, without
listening very long to his speech, answered that “With regard to
Thrace, unless the legates found everything there settled in accordance
with its will, and all the cities restored to the entire control of
Eumenes, the Senate would be unable any longer to allow it to pass, or
to submit to being continually disobeyed.”

[Sidenote: The high honour paid to Demetrius at Rome, and its fatal

Though the ill-feeling between the Romans and Philip was becoming
serious, a check was put to it for the time by the presence of
Demetrius. And yet this young prince’s mission to Rome proved
eventually no slight link in the chain of events which led to the final
ruin of his house. For the Senate, by thus making much of Demetrius,
somewhat turned the young man’s head, and at the same time gravely
annoyed Perseus and the king, by making them feel that the kindness
they received from the Romans was not for their own sakes, but for
that of Demetrius. And T. Quintius Flamininus contributed not a little
to the same result by taking the young prince aside and communicating
with him in confidence. For he flattered him by suggesting that the
Romans meant before long to invest him with the kingdom; while he
irritated Philip and Perseus by sending a letter ordering the king
to send Demetrius to Rome again, with as many friends of the highest
character as possible. It was, in fact, by taking advantage of these
circumstances that Perseus shortly afterwards induced his father to
consent to the death of Demetrius. But I shall relate that event in
detail later on.

[Sidenote: The four Spartan embassies. 1. Lysis, for the men banished
by Nabis. 2. Areus and Alcibiades.]

[Sidenote: 3. Serippus.]

[Sidenote: 4. Chaeron, for the recent exiles.]

[Sidenote: Decision of the IIIviri.]

+4.+ The next ambassadors called in were the Lacedaemonians. Of these
there were four distinct factions. Lysis and his colleagues represented
the old exiles, and their contention was that they ought to have back
the possessions from which they had originally been driven. Areus
and Alcibiades, on the contrary, contended that they should receive
the value of a talent from their original property, and divide the
rest among deserving citizens. Serippus pleaded that things should
be left in exactly the state in which they were when they formerly
belonged to the Achaean league. Lastly, Chaeron and his colleagues
represented those who had been condemned to death or exile by the
votes of the Achaean league, and demanded their own recall and the
restoration of the constitution. These all delivered speeches against
the Achaeans in conformity with their several objects. The Senate,
finding itself unable to come to a clear decision on these particular
controversies, appointed a committee of investigation, consisting
of the three who had already been on a mission to the Peloponnese
on these matters, namely Titus Flamininus, Q. Caecilius, and Appius
Claudius Pulcher.[124] After long discussions before this committee
it was unanimously decided that the exiles and the condemned were to
be recalled, and that the city should remain a member of the Achaean
league. But as to the property, whether the exiles were each to select
a talent’s worth from what had been theirs [or to receive it all back],
on this point they continued to dispute. That they might not, however,
have to begin the whole controversy afresh [the committee] caused the
points agreed upon to be reduced to writing, to which all affixed
their seals. But the committee, also wishing to include the Achaeans
in the agreement, called in Xenarchus and his colleagues, who were at
that time on a mission from the Achaeans, to renew their alliance with
Rome, and at the same time to give an eye to their controversy with
the Lacedaemonians. These men, being unexpectedly asked whether they
consented to the terms contained in the written document, were somewhat
at a loss what to answer. For they did not approve of the restoration
of the exiles and the condemned persons, as being contrary to the
decree of the league, and the contents of the tablet on which that
decree was engraved; and yet they approved of the document as a whole,
because it contained the clause providing that Sparta should remain a
member of the league. Finally, however, partly from this difficulty,
and partly from awe of the Roman commissioners, they affixed their
seal. The Senate, therefore, selected Quintus Marcius to go as legate
to settle the affairs of Macedonia and the Peloponnese....

[Sidenote: Deinocrates of Messene.]

+5.+ When Deinocrates of Messene arrived on a mission at Rome, he was
delighted to find that Titus Flamininus had been appointed by the
Senate to go as ambassador to Prusias and Seleucus. For having been
very intimate with Titus during the Lacedaemonian war, he thought that
this friendship, combined with his disagreements with Philopoemen,
would induce him on his arrival in Greece to settle the affairs
of Messene in accordance with his own views. He therefore gave up
everything else to attach himself exclusively to Titus, on whom he
rested all his hopes....

This same Deinocrates was a courtier and a soldier by nature as well
as habit, but he assumed the air of consummate statesmanship. His
parts, however, were showy rather than solid. In war his fertility
of resource and boldness were beyond the common run; and he shone in
feats of personal bravery. Nor were these his only accomplishments: he
was attractive and ready in conversation, versatile and courteous in
society. But at the same time he was devoted to licentious intrigue,
and in public affairs and questions of policy was quite incapable of
sustained attention or far-sighted views, of fortifying himself with
well-considered arguments, or putting them before the public. On this
occasion, for instance, though he had really given the initiative to
grave misfortunes, he did not think that he was doing anything of
importance; but followed his usual manner of life, quite regardless
of the future, indulging day after day in amours, wine, and song.
Flamininus, however, did once force him to catch a glimpse of the
seriousness of his position. For seeing him on a certain occasion in
a party of revellers dancing in long robes, he said nothing at the
time; but next morning, being visited by him with some request in
behalf of his country, he said: “I will do my best, Deinocrates; but
it does astonish me that you can drink and dance after having given
the start to such serious troubles for Greece.” He appears, indeed,
at that to have a little recovered his soberer senses, and to have
understood what an improper display he had been making of his tastes
and habits. However, he arrived at this period in Greece in company
with Flamininus, fully persuaded that the affairs of Messene would
be settled at a blow in accordance with his views. But Philopoemen
and his party were fully aware that Flamininus had no commission from
the Senate in regard to affairs in Greece; they therefore awaited
his arrival without taking any step of any sort. Having landed at
Naupactus, Flamininus addressed a despatch to the Strategus and
Demiurgi[125] bidding them summon the Achaeans to an assembly; to
which they wrote back that “they would do so, if he would write them
word what the subjects were on which he wished to confer with the
Achaeans; for the laws enjoined that limitation on the magistrates.”
As Flamininus did not venture to write this, the hopes of Deinocrates
and the so-called “old exiles,” but who had at that time been recently
banished from Sparta, came to nothing, as in fact did the visit of
Flamininus and the plans which he had formed....

[Sidenote: See 4, 35.]

+6.+ About the same period some ambassadors were sent by the exiled
citizens of Sparta to Rome, among whom was Arcesilaus and Agesipolis
who, when quite a boy, had been made king in Sparta. These two men
were fallen upon and killed by pirates on the high seas; but their
colleagues arrived safely at Rome....

[Sidenote: The popularity of Demetrius in Macedonia. His father’s anger
and his brother’s jealousy.]

+7.+ On the return of Demetrius from Rome, bringing with him the formal
reply, in which the Romans referred all the favour and confidence
which they avowed to their regard for Demetrius, saying that all they
had done or would do was for his sake,—the Macedonians gave Demetrius
a cordial reception, believing that they were relieved from all fear
and danger: for they had looked upon war with Rome as all but at their
doors, owing to the provocations given by Philip. But Philip and
Perseus were far from pleased, and were much offended at the idea of
the Romans taking no account of them, and referring all their favour
to Demetrius. Philip however concealed his displeasure; but Perseus,
who was not only behind his brother in good feelings to Rome, but much
his inferior in other respects, both in natural ability and acquired
accomplishments, made no secret of his anger: and was beginning to be
thoroughly alarmed as to his succession to the crown, and lest, in
spite of being the elder, he should be excluded. Therefore he commenced
by bribing the friends of Demetrius....

_The end of this fraternal jealousy is described in Livy, 40, 5-24.
By a forged letter purporting to come from Flamininus, Philip is
persuaded that his son played the traitor at Rome and gives an order
or a permission for his being put to death; which is accordingly done,
partly by poison and partly by violence, at Heracleia_, B.C. 181.

[Sidenote: Philip feigns submission to Rome, B.C. 183.]

[Sidenote: The plain of the Hebrus.]

+8.+ Upon Quintus Marcius arriving on his mission in Macedonia,
Philip evacuated the Greek cities in Thrace entirely and withdrew his
garrisons, though in deep anger and heaviness of spirit; and he put
on a right footing everything else to which the Roman injunctions
referred, wishing to give them no indication of his estrangement, but
to secure time for making his preparations for war. In pursuance of
this design he led out an army against the barbarians, and marching
through the centre of Thrace he invaded the Odrysae, Bessi, and
Dentheleti. Coming to Philippopolis, the inhabitants flying for
safety to the heights, he took it without a blow. And thence, after
traversing the plain, and sacking some of the villages, and exacting a
pledge of submission from others, he returned home, leaving a garrison
in Philippopolis, which was after a time expelled by the Odrysae in
defiance of their pledge of fidelity to Philip....

[Sidenote: After midsummer of B. C. 183.]

[Sidenote: February, B.C. 182.]

+9.+ In the second year of this Olympiad, on the arrival of ambassadors
from Eumenes, Pharnaces, and the Achaean league, and also from the
Lacedaemonians who had been banished from Sparta,[126] and from those
who were in actual possession of it, the Senate despatched their
business. But there came after them a mission from Rhodes in regard to
the disaster at Sinope; to whom the Senate replied that it would send
legates to investigate the case of the Sinopeans and their grievances
against those kings. And Quintus Marcius having recently arrived from
Greece and made his report on the state of affairs in Macedonia and
the Peloponnese, the Senate did not require to hear much more; but
having called in the envoys from the Peloponnese and Macedonia they
listened indeed to what they had to say, but founded its reply, without
any reference to their speeches, wholly on the report of Marcius, in
which he had stated, in reference to king Philip, that he had indeed
done all that was enjoined on him, but with great reluctance; and
that, if he got an opportunity, he would go all lengths against the
Romans. The Senate accordingly composed a reply to the king’s envoys
in which, while praising Philip for what he had done, they warned him
for the future to be careful not to be found acting in opposition to
the Romans. As to the Peloponnese, Marcius had reported that, as the
Achaeans were unwilling to refer any matter whatever to the Senate,
but were haughtily inclined and desirous of managing all their affairs
themselves, if the Senate would only reject their present application
and give ever so slight an indication of displeasure, Sparta would
promptly come to an understanding with Messene; and then the Achaeans
would be glad enough to appeal to the protection of Rome. In
consequence of this report they answered the Lacedaemonian Serippus and
his colleagues, wishing to leave this city in a state of suspense, that
they had done their best for them, but that for the present they did
not think this matter concerned them. But when the Achaeans besought
for help against the Messenians[127] in virtue of their alliance with
Rome, or at least that they would take precautions to prevent any
arms or corn from being brought from Italy into Messene, the Senate
refused compliance with either request and answered that the Achaeans
ought not to be surprised if Sparta or Corinth or Argos renounced
their league, if they would not conduct their hegemony in accordance
with the Senate’s views. This answer the Senate made public, as a
kind of proclamation that any people who chose might break off from
the Achaeans for all the Romans cared; and they further retained the
ambassadors in Rome, waiting to see the issue of the quarrel between
the Achaeans and Messenians....

[Sidenote: The conflict of feelings in Philip’s mind.]

[Sidenote: See 5, 9.]

+10.+ In this period a certain dreadful foreshadowing of misfortune
fell upon king Philip and the whole of Macedonia, of a kind well worthy
of close attention and record. As though Fortune had resolved to exact
from him at once the penalties for all the impieties and crimes which
he had committed in the whole course of his life, she now visited
him with furies, those deities of retribution, those powers that had
listened to the prayers of the victims of his cruelties, who, haunting
him day and night, so plagued him to the last day of his life, that
all the world was forced to acknowledge the truth of the proverb, that
“Justice has an eye” which mere men should never despise. The first
idea suggested to him by this evil power was that, as he was about
to go to war with Rome, he had better remove from the most important
cities, and those along the sea-coast, the leading citizens, with
their wives and children, and place them in Emathia, formerly called
Paeonia, and fill up the cities with Thracians and other barbarians,
as likely to be more securely loyal to him in the coming hour of
danger. The actual carrying out of this measure, and the uprooting of
these men and their families, caused such an outburst of grief, and so
violent an outcry, that one might have supposed the whole district to
have been taken by the sword. Curses and appeals to heaven were rained
upon the head of the king without any further attempt at concealment.
His next step, prompted by the wish to leave no element of hostility
or disaffection in the kingdom, was to write to the governors of the
several cities ordering them to search out the sons and daughters of
such Macedonians as had been put to death by him, and place them in
ward; in which he referred especially to Admetus, Pyrrhicus, and Samus,
and those who had perished with them: but he also included all others
whosoever that had been put to death by order of the king, quoting this
verse, we are told:—[128]

   “Oh fool! to slay the sire and leave the sons.”

Most of these men being persons of distinguished families, their fate
made a great noise and excited universal pity. But Fortune had a third
act in this bloody drama in reserve for Philip, in which the young
princes plotted against each other; and their quarrels being referred
to him, he was forced to choose between becoming the murderer of
his sons and living the rest of his life in dread of being murdered
by them in his old age; and to decide which of the two he had the
greater reason to fear. Tortured day and night by these anxieties,
the miseries and perturbations of his spirit lead to the inevitable
reflection that the wrath of heaven fell upon his old age for the sins
of his previous life: which will be rendered still more evident by what
remains to be told.... Just when his soul was stung to madness by these
circumstances, the quarrel between his sons blazed out: Fortune, as it
were of set purpose, bringing their misfortunes upon the scene all at
one time....

[Sidenote: Fragment referring to the military sham fight in which
Perseus and Demetrius quarrelled, B. C. 182. See Livy, 40, 6.] The
Macedonians make offerings to Xanthus as a hero, and perform a
purification of the army with horses fully equipped....

[Sidenote: Part of a speech of Philip to his two sons after the quarrel
at the manœuvres. See Livy, 40, 8.]

+11.+ “One should not merely read tragedies, tales, and histories, but
should understand and ponder over them. In all of them one may learn
that whenever brothers fall out and allow their quarrel to go any
great length, they invariably end not only by destroying themselves
but in the utter ruin of their property, children, and cities; while
those who keep their self-love within reasonable bounds, and put up
with each other’s weaknesses, are the preservers of these, and live in
the fairest reputation and fame. I have often directed your attention
to the kings in Sparta, telling you that they preserved the hegemony
in Greece for their country just so long as they obeyed the ephors,
as though they were their parents, and were content to reign jointly.
But directly they in their folly tried to change the government to
a monarchy, they caused Sparta to experience every misery possible.
Finally, I have pointed out to you as an example the case of Eumenes
and Attalus; showing you that, though they succeeded to but a small
and insignificant realm, they have raised it to a level with the best,
simply by the harmony and unity of sentiment, and mutual respect which
they maintained towards each other. But so far from taking my words to
heart, you are, as it seems to me, whetting your angry passions against
each other....”


[Sidenote: The death of Philopoemen, B. C. 183, or perhaps early in B.
C. 182.]

+12.+ Philopoemen rose[129] and proceeded on his way, though he was
oppressed at once by illness and the weight of years, being now in the
seventieth year of his age. Conquering his weakness, however, by the
force of his previous habits he reached Megalopolis, from Argos, in one
day’s journey....

[Sidenote: Philopoemen was murdered by the Messenians, who had
abandoned the league and were at war with it. See Livy, 39, 49-50.]

He was captured, when Achaean Strategus, by the Messenians and
poisoned. Thus, though second to none that ever lived before him in
excellence, his fortune was less happy; yet in his previous life he
seemed ever to have enjoyed her favour and assistance. But it was,
I suppose, a case of the common proverb, “a man may have a stroke
of luck, but no man can be lucky always.” We must, therefore, call
our predecessors fortunate, without pretending that they were so
invariably—for what need is there to flatter Fortune by a meaningless
and false compliment? It is those who have enjoyed Fortune’s smiles in
their life for the longest time, and who, when she changes her mind,
meet with only moderate mishaps, that we must speak of as fortunate....

[Sidenote: Character of Philopoemen. He is succeeded by Lycortas as

Philopoemen was succeeded by Lycortas,[130] ... and though he had
spent forty years of an active career in a state at once democratic
and composed of many various elements, he had entirely avoided giving
rise to the jealousy of the citizens in any direction: and yet he had
not flattered their inclinations, but for the most part had used great
freedom of speech, which is a case of very rare occurrence....

[Sidenote: Character of Hannibal, who poisoned himself at the court of
Prusias, B. C. 183. See Livy, 39, 1.]

+13.+ An admirable feature in Hannibal’s character, and the strongest
proof of his having been a born ruler of men, and having possessed
statesmanlike qualities of an unusual kind, is that, though he was for
seventeen years engaged in actual warfare, and though he had to make
his way through numerous barbaric tribes, and to employ innumerable men
of different nationalities in what appeared desperate and hazardous
enterprises, he was never made the object of a conspiracy by any
of them, nor deserted by any of those who had joined him and put
themselves under his command....

[Sidenote: Character of P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, whose death
Polybius places in this year, but according to Livy wrongly, who
assigns it to the previous year (39, 52.)]

+14.+ Publius Scipio, in the course of an active career in an
aristocratic state, secured such popularity with the multitude and
such credit with the Senate, that when some one took upon himself to
bring him to trial before the people in the manner usual at Rome, and
produced many bitter accusations against him, he came forward and
said nothing but that “It ill became the Roman people to listen to
accusations against P. Cornelius Scipio, to whom his accusers owed
it that they had the power of speech at all.” At this the populace
dispersed, and quitting the assembly, left the accuser alone.... Once
when there was a sum of money required in the Senate for some pressing
business, and the quaestor, on the ground of a legal difficulty,
refused to open the treasury on that particular day, Scipio said that
“he would take the keys himself and open it; for he was the cause of
the treasury being locked at all.” And again, when some one in the
Senate demanded an account of the money which he had received from
Antiochus before the treaty for the pay of his army, he said that
he had the ledger, but that he ought not to be called to account by
any one. But on his questioner persisting, and urging him to produce
it, he bade his brother bring it. When the schedule was brought, he
held it out in front of him, and tearing it to pieces in the sight of
everybody bade the man who asked for it seek it out of these fragments,
and he demanded of the rest “How they could ask for the items of the
expenditure of these three thousand talents, and yet no longer ask for
an account of how and by whose agency the fifteen thousand talents
which they received from Antiochus came into the treasury, nor how it
is that they have become masters of Asia, Libya, and Iberia?” This
speech not only made a strong impression on the rest, but also reduced
the man who demanded the account to silence.

These anecdotes have been related by me for the double purpose
of enhancing the fame of the departed, and of encouraging future
generations in the paths of honour....

+15.+ For my part, I never concur with those who indulge their anger
against men of their own blood to the length of not only depriving
them of the year’s harvest when at war with them, but even of cutting
down their trees and destroying their buildings, and of leaving them
no opportunity for repentance. Such proceedings seem to me to be rank
folly. For, while they imagine that they are dismaying the enemy by the
devastation of their territory, and the deprivation of their future as
well as their present means of getting the necessaries of life, they
are all the while exasperating the men, and converting an isolated
ebullition of anger into a lasting hatred....

[Sidenote: Lycortas, the successor of Philopoemen, compels the
Messenians to sue for peace, B.C. 183-182.]

[Sidenote: Summer B.C. 182.]

+16.+ Lycortas the Achaean Strategus crushed the spirits of the
Messenians in the war. Up to this time the populace at Messene had
been afraid of their magistrates; but now at length, relying on the
protection of the enemy, some of them plucked up courage to break
silence and to say that the time was come to send an embassy to
negotiate a peace. Deinocrates and his colleagues, being no longer
able to face the people under this storm of popular odium, yielded to
circumstances and retired to their own houses. Thereupon the people,
acting under the advice of the older men, and especially under that
of Epaenetus and Apollodorus, the ambassadors from Boeotia,—who,
having arrived some time before to negotiate a peace, happened
fortunately to be at that time at Messene,—appointed and despatched
envoys, begging forgiveness for their transgressions. The Achaean
Strategus, having summoned his colleagues[131] to council, and given
the envoys a hearing, answered that “There was but one way in which
the Messenians could reconcile themselves to the league, and that
was by at once surrendering to him the authors of the revolt and of
the murder of Philopoemen, leave the rest to the authority of the
league assembly, and at once receive a garrison into their citadel.”
When this message was announced to the Messenian populace, those who
had long been bitterly opposed to the authors of the war were ready
enough to surrender them and to arrest them; while the rest, being
persuaded that they would not be severely dealt with by the Achaeans,
readily consented to submit the general question to the decision of
the assembly. But what chiefly induced them to unanimously accept
the proposal was, that they in fact had no choice in the matter. The
Strategus accordingly at once took over the citadel and marched his
peltasts into it; and then, taking some picked troops with him, entered
the city; and having summoned a meeting of the people, addressed them
in terms befitting the occasion, promising that “they would never have
reason to repent having committed themselves to the honour of the
Achaeans.” The general question of what was to be done he thus referred
to the league,—for it happened conveniently that the Achaeans were just
then reassembling at Megalopolis for the second Congress,[132]—but of
those who were guilty of the disturbances, he ordered all such as were
actually implicated in the summary execution of Philopoemen to put an
end to their own lives....

[Sidenote: Abia, Thuria, and Pharae make a separate league.]

+17.+ The Messenians were reduced by their own folly to the brink of
ruin, but were restored to their former position in the league by
the magnanimity of Lycortas and the Achaeans. But the towns of Abia,
Thuria, and Pharae during these transactions abandoned their connection
with Messene, and, setting up a pillar engraved with a treaty of
alliance between themselves, formed a separate league. When the Romans
were informed that the Messenian war had turned out successfully for
the Achaeans, without taking any account of their previous declaration
they gave a different answer to the same ambassadors, asserting that
they had taken measures to prevent any one from conveying arms or
corn from Italy into Messene. By this they showed clearly that, so
far from avoiding or disregarding the affairs of foreign nations not
directly concerning themselves, they were, on the contrary, annoyed at
everything not being referred to them and carried out in accordance
with their opinion.

[Sidenote: Achaean meeting at Sicyon.]

When the ambassadors arrived in Sparta with their answer, the Achaean
Strategus as soon as he had settled the Messenian business, summoned a
congress at Sicyon, and on its assembling, proposed a resolution for
the reception of Sparta into the league, alleging that “The Romans had
declined the arbitration which had previously been offered to them in
regard to this city,—for they had answered that they had now no concern
with any of the affairs of Sparta. Those, however, at present in power
at Sparta were desirous of being admitted to the privileges of the
league. Therefore he advised that they should admit the town; for this
would be advantageous in two ways: first, because they would be thus
admitting men who had remained unshaken in their loyalty to the league;
and secondly, because they would not be admitting those of the old
exiles, who had behaved with ingratitude and impiety towards them, to
any share of their privileges; but by confirming the measures of those
who had excluded them, would at the same time be showing, with God’s
help, due gratitude to the latter.” With these words Lycortas exhorted
the Achaeans to receive the city of Sparta into the league. But
Diophanes and some others attempted to put in a word for the exiles,
and urged the Achaeans “Not to join in pressing heavily upon these
banished men; and not to be influenced by a mere handful of men to
strengthen the hands of those who had impiously and lawlessly expelled
them from their country.”

[Sidenote: Sparta admitted to the league.]

+18.+ Such were the arguments employed on either side. The Achaeans,
after listening to both, decided to admit the city, and accordingly the
agreement was engraved on a tablet, and Sparta became a member of the
Achaean league: the existing citizens having agreed to admit such of
the old exiles as were not considered to have acted in a hostile spirit
against the Achaeans. After confirming this arrangement the Achaeans
sent Bippus of Argos and others as ambassadors to Rome, to explain to
the Senate what had been done in the matter. The Lacedaemonians also
sent Chaeron and others; while the exiles too sent a mission led by
Cletis Diactorius[133] to oppose the Achaean ambassadors in the Senate.


[Sidenote: Embassies at Rome from the Achaeans, the Spartan exiles,
Eumenes of Pergamus, Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, and Pharnaces,
king of Pontus, B.C. 182.]

+1.+ The ambassadors from the Spartan exiles and from the Achaeans
arrived in Rome simultaneously with those of Eumenes, king Ariarathes,
and Pharnaces; and the Senate attended to these latter first. A short
time previously a report had been made to the Senate by Marcus,[134]
who had been despatched on a mission respecting the war that had broken
out between Eumenes and Pharnaces, speaking highly of the moderation
of Eumenes in every particular, and the grasping temper and insolence
of Pharnaces. The Senate accordingly did not require any lengthened
arguments; but, after listening to the ambassadors, answered that they
would once more send legates to examine more minutely into the points
in dispute between the kings. Then came in the ambassadors from the
Lacedaemonian exiles, and with them the ambassadors from the citizens
actually in the city; and after giving them a long hearing, the Senate
expressed no disapproval of what had been done, but promised the exiles
to write to the Achaeans on the subject of their restoration to their
country. Some days afterwards, Bippus of Argos and his colleagues,
sent by the Achaeans, entered the Senate with a statement as to the
restoration of order in Messene; and the Senate, without showing
displeasure at any part of the arrangement, gave the ambassadors a
cordial reception....

[Sidenote: Terms granted to the Messenians.]

[Sidenote: The request of the Spartan exiles refused.]

+2.+ When the ambassadors of the Spartan exiles arrived in the
Peloponnese from Rome with a letter from the Senate to the Achaeans,
desiring that measures should be taken for their recall and restoration
to their country, the Achaeans resolved to postpone the consideration
of the question until their own ambassadors should return. After
making this answer, they caused the agreement between themselves and
the Messenians to be engraved on a tablet: granting them, among other
favours, a three years’ remission of taxes, in order that the damage
done to their territory should fall upon the Achaeans equally with the
Messenians. But when Bippus and his colleagues arrived from Rome, and
reported that the letter in regard to the exiles was not due to any
strong feeling on the part of the Senate, but to the importunity of the
exiles themselves, the Achaeans voted to make no change....

[Sidenote: M. Haemus. Livy, 46, 21.]

+3.+ Mount Haemus is close to the Pontus, the most extensive and
loftiest of the ranges in Thrace, which it divides into two nearly
equal parts, from which a view of both seas may be obtained....[135]

[Sidenote: Crete in B.C. 182. See bk. 22, ch. 19.]

+4.+ In Crete there was the beginning of great troubles set in motion,
if one should speak of “a beginning of troubles” in Crete: for owing
to the persistency of civil wars and the acts of savagery practised
against each other, beginning and end are much the same in Crete; and
what appears to some people to be an incredible story is a spectacle of
everyday occurrence there....

[Sidenote: End of the war between Eumenes and Pharnaces, which the
former had undertaken to support his father-in-law Ariarathes. See
Livy, 38, 39, B.C. 182-181.]

+5.+ Having come to terms with each other, Pharnaces, Attalus, and the
rest returned home. While this was going on, Eumenes had recovered
from his illness, and was staying at Pergamus; and when his brother
arrived to announce the arrangements that had been made, he approved of
what had been done, and resolved to send his brothers to Rome: partly
because he hoped to put and end to the war with Pharnaces by means of
their mission, and partly because he wished to introduce his brothers
to his own private friends at Rome, and officially to the Senate.
Attalus and his brother were eager for this tour; and when they arrived
in Rome the young men met with a cordial reception from everybody in
private society, owing to the intimacies which they had formed during
the Roman wars in Asia, and a still more honourable welcome from the
Senate, which made liberal provision for their entertainment and
maintenance, and treated them with marked respect in such conferences
as it had with them. Thus, when the young men came formally before
the Senate, and, after speaking at considerable length of the renewal
of their ancient ties of friendship with Rome and inveighing against
Pharnaces, begged the Senate to adopt some active measures to inflict
on him the punishment he deserved, the Senate gave them a favourable
hearing, and promised in reply to send legates to use every possible
means of putting an end to the war....

[Sidenote: Ptolemy Epiphanes sends a present to the Achaeans. Lycortas,
Polybius, and Aratus sent to return thanks, B.C. 181.]

[Sidenote: Bk. 22, ch. 12.]

[Sidenote: Ptolemy Epiphanes poisoned in B.C. 181.]

+6.+ About the same time king Ptolemy, wishing to make friends with the
Achaean league, sent an ambassador to them with an offer of a fleet of
ten penteconters fully equipped; and the Achaeans, thinking the present
worthy of their thanks, for the cost could not be much less than ten
talents, gladly accepted the offer. Having come to this resolution,
they selected Lycortas, Polybius, and Aratus, son of Aratus of Sicyon,
to go on a mission to the king, partly to thank him for the arms which
he had sent on a former occasion, and partly to receive the ships and
make arrangements for bringing them across. They appointed Lycortas,
because, as Strategus at the time that Ptolemy renewed the alliance, he
had worked energetically on the king’s side; and Polybius, though below
the legal age for acting as ambassador,[136] because his father has
been ambassador at the renewal of the alliance with Ptolemy, and had
brought the present of arms and of money to the Achaeans; and Aratus,
similarly, on account of his former intercourse with the king. However,
this mission never went after all as Ptolemy died just at this time....

[Sidenote: Chaeron’s malversations at Sparta.]

[Sidenote: Assassination of Apollonides.]

+7.+ There was at this time in Sparta a man named Chaeron, who in the
previous year had been on an embassy to Rome, a man of ready wit and
great ability in affairs, but still young, in a humble position of
life, and without the advantages of a liberal education. By flattering
the mob, and starting questions which no one else had the assurance to
move, he soon acquired a certain notoriety with the people. The first
use he made of his power was to confiscate the land granted by the
tyrants to the sisters, wives, mothers, and children of the exiles,
and to distribute it on his own authority among the poor without any
fixed rule or regard to equality. He next squandered the revenue, using
the public money as though it were his own, without the authority
of law, public decree, or magistrate. Annoyed at these proceedings,
certain men managed to get themselves appointed auditors of the
treasury in accordance with the laws. Seeing this, and conscious of his
maladministration of the government, Chaeron sent some men to attack
Apollonides, the most illustrious of the auditors, and the most able to
expose his embezzlements, who stabbed him to death in broad daylight as
he was coming from the bath. Upon this being reported to the Achaeans,
and the people expressing great indignation at what had been done,
the Strategus at once started for Sparta; and when he arrived there
he brought Chaeron to trial for the murder of Apollonides, and having
condemned him, threw him into prison. He then incited the remaining
auditors to make a real investigation into the public funds, and to see
that the relations of the exiles got back the property of which Chaeron
had shortly before deprived them....

[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 181-180.]

[Sidenote: Spring of B.C. 180.]

[Sidenote: Eumenes enters Cappadocia.]

[Sidenote: Two Galatian chiefs.]

[Sidenote: Calpitus in Galatia (?). Parnassus, a town on the Halys.]

[Sidenote: Mocissus, N. of the Halys.]

+8.+ In Asia king Pharnaces, once more treating the reference to Rome
with contempt, sent Leocritus in the course of the winter with ten
thousand men to ravage Galatia, while he himself at the beginning of
spring collected his forces and invaded Cappadocia. When Eumenes heard
of it, he was much enraged at Pharnaces thus breaking through the
terms of the agreement to which he was pledged, but was compelled to
retaliate by acting in the same way. When he had already collected his
forces, Attalus and his brother landed from their voyage from Rome, and
the three brothers, after meeting and interchanging views, marched out
at once with the army. But on reaching Galatia they found Leocritus
no longer there; and when Carsignatus and Gaesotorius, who had before
embraced the cause of Pharnaces, sent them a message desiring that
their lives might be spared, and promising that they would do anything
that might be required of them, they refused the request on the ground
of the treachery of which they had been guilty, and advanced with
their full force against Pharnaces; and having performed the distance
from Calpitus to the river Halys in five days, they reached Parnassus
in six more, and being there joined by Ariarathes, the king of the
Cappadocians, with his own army, they entered the territory of the
Mocissians. Just as they had pitched their camp, news came that the
ambassadors from Rome had arrived to effect a pacification. When the
heard this, Eumenes sent his brother Attalus to receive them; while he
devoted himself to doubling the number of his troops, and improving
them to the utmost: partly with a view to prepare them for actual
service, and partly to impress the Romans with the belief that he was
able to defend himself against Pharnaces, and beat him in war.

[Sidenote: The Roman legates arrive and undertake to negotiate.]

[Sidenote: The negotiation fails.]

[Sidenote: The Rhodians engaged in putting down a rising of the
Lycians. See Bk. 22, ch. 5.]

+9.+ When the Roman legates arrived and urged the putting an end to the
war, Eumenes and Ariarathes professed to be ready to obey; but begged
the Romans to bring them, if possible, to an interview with Pharnaces,
that they might see fully from what was said in their own presence how
faithless and cruel a man Pharnaces was; and, if this proved to be
impossible, to take a fair and impartial view of the controversy and
decide it themselves. The legates replied that they would do everything
that was in their power and was consistent with honour; but they
required the kings to remove their army from the country: for it was
inconsistent that, when they were there with proposals for a peace,
operations of war should be going on and mutual acts of hostility be
committed. Eumenes and his ally yielded to this representation, and
immediately marched off in the direction of Galatia. The Roman legates
then visited Pharnaces, and first demanded that he should meet Eumenes
and Ariarathes in a conference, as that would be the surest way of
settling the affair; but when he expressed repugnance to that measure,
and absolutely refused to do so, the Romans at once perceived that he
plainly thought himself in the wrong, and distrusted his own cause;
but, being anxious in any and every way to put an end to the war, they
continued to press him until he consented to send plenipotentiaries
to the coast, to conclude a peace on such terms as the legates might
command. When these plenipotentiaries, the Roman legates, and Eumenes
and Ariarathes met, the latter showed themselves ready to consent to
any proposal for the sake of concluding a peace. But the envoys of
Pharnaces disputed every point, and did not hold even to what they
had once accepted, but continually brought forward some fresh demand,
and altered their mind again and again. The Roman legates, therefore,
quickly came to the conclusion that they were wasting their labour,
as Pharnaces could not be induced to consent to the pacification. The
conference accordingly having come to nothing, and the Roman legates
having left Pergamum, and the envoys of Pharnaces having gone home, the
war went on, Eumenes and his allies proceeding in their preparations
for it. Meanwhile, however, the Rhodians earnestly requested Eumenes to
help them; and he accordingly set out in great haste to carry on a war
against the Lycians....

[Sidenote: B.C. 180. Debate in the Achaean assembly on the Roman

+10.+ This year the Achaean Strategus Hyperbatus brought before the
assembly the question of the letter from Rome as to the recall of the
Lacedaemonian exiles. Lycortas and his party recommended that no change
should be made, on the ground that “The Romans had only acted as they
were bound to do in listening to the petition of men who, on the face
of it, were deprived of their rights, so far as that petition seemed
reasonable; but when they were convinced that of a petition some points
were impossible, and others such as to inflict great disgrace and
damage upon their friends, it had never been their custom to insist
upon them peremptorily, or force their adoption. So in this case also,
if it were shown to them that the Achaeans by obeying their letter
would be breaking their oaths, their laws, and the provisions engraved
on the tablets, the very bonds of our league, they will retract their
orders, and will admit that we are right to hesitate and to ask to
be excused from carrying out its injunctions.” Such was the speech
of Lycortas. But Hyperbatus and Callicrates advised submission to
the letter, and that they should hold its authority superior to law
or tablet or anything else. Such being the division of opinion, the
Achaeans voted to send ambassadors to the Senate, to put before it the
points contained in the speech of Lycortas. Callicrates of Leontium,
Lydiades of Megalopolis, and Aratus of Sicyon were forthwith nominated
for this mission, and were despatched with instructions to this effect.
But on their arrival at Rome Callicrates went before the Senate, and,
so far from addressing it in accordance with his instructions, he on
the contrary entered upon an elaborate denunciation of his political
opponents; and, not contented with that, he undertook to rebuke the
Senate itself.

[Sidenote: Callicrates, instead of obeying his instructions, denounces
his opponents, and persuades the Senate that their interference is

+11.+ For he said that “The Romans were themselves responsible for the
Greeks neglecting their letters and orders instead of obeying them. For
in all the democratic states of the day there were two parties,—one
recommending obedience to the Roman rescripts, and holding neither law
nor tablet nor anything else to be superior to the will of Rome; the
other always quoting oaths and tablets, and exhorting the people to
be careful about breaking them. Now the latter policy was by far the
most popular in Achaia, and the most influential with the multitude;
consequently the Romanisers were discredited and denounced among the
populace—their opponents glorified. If then the Senate would give some
sign of their interest in the matter, the leaders, in the first place,
would quickly change to the Romanising party, and, in the next place,
would be followed by the populace from fear. But if this were neglected
by the Senate, the tendency towards the latter of the two parties would
be universal, as the more creditable and honourable in the eyes of the
populace. Thus it came about that at that very time certain statesmen,
without any other claims whatever, had obtained the highest offices
in their own cities, merely from coming forward to speak against the
rescripts of the Senate, with the view of maintaining the validity
of the laws and decrees made in the country. If then the Senate was
indifferent about having their rescripts obeyed by the Greeks, by all
means let it go on as it is now doing. But if the Senate wished that
its orders should be carried out, and its rescripts be despised by no
one, it must give serious attention to that subject. If it did not
do so, he knew only too well that the exact opposite of the Senate’s
wishes would come about, as in fact had already been the case. For but
lately, in the Messenian disturbance, though Quintus Marcius had taken
many precautions to prevent the Achaeans adopting any measures with
regard to the Messenians without the consent of the Romans, they had
disobeyed that order; had voted the war on their own authority; had not
only wasted the whole country in defiance of justice, but had in some
cases driven its noblest citizens into exile, and in others put them
to death with every extremity of torture, though they had surrendered,
and were guilty of no crime but that of appealing to Rome on the points
in dispute. Again, too, though the Senate had repeatedly written to
order the restoration of the Lacedaemonian exiles, the Achaeans were
so far from obeying, that they had actually set up an engraved tablet,
and made a sworn agreement with the men actually in possession of the
city that these exiles should never return. With these instances before
their eyes, the Romans should take measures of precaution for the

[Sidenote: The Romans adopt the policy of raising a party in Greece
against the Achaean league.]

+12.+ After delivering a speech in these words, or to this effect,
Callicrates left the Senate-house. He was followed by the envoys of
the exiles, who retired after delivering a short address, stating
their case, and containing some of the ordinary appeals to pity. The
Senate was persuaded that much of what Callicrates had said touched
the interests of Rome, and that it was incumbent upon it to exalt
those who supported its own decrees, and to humble those who resisted
them. It was with this conviction, therefore, and at this time that
it first adopted the policy of depressing those who in their several
states took the patriotic and honourable side, and promoting those
who were for appealing to its authority on every occasion, right or
wrong. The result of which was that gradually, as time went on,the
Senate had abundance of flatterers, but a great scarcity of genuine
friends. However, on this occasion the Senate did not write about
the restoration of the exiles to the Achaeans only, but also to the
Aetolians, Epirotes, Athenians, Boeotians, and Acarnanians, calling
them all as it were to witness, in order to break down the power of the
Achaeans. Moreover, they added to their answer, without saying a word
to his colleagues, a remark confined entirely to Callicrates himself,
that “everybody in the various states should be as Callicrates.” This
man accordingly arrived in Greece with his answer, in a great state of
exultation, little thinking that he had become the initiator of great
miseries to all the Greeks, but especially to the Achaeans. This nation
had still at that time the privilege of dealing on something like equal
terms with Rome, because it had kept faith with her from the time that
it had elected to maintain the Roman cause, in the hour of her greatest
danger—I mean during the wars with Philip and Antiochus.... The league,
too, had made progress in material strength and in every direction
from the period from which my history commences; but the audacious
proceeding of Callicrates proved the beginning of a change for the

[Sidenote: B.C. 180-179.]

The Romans having the feelings of men, with a noble spirit and generous
principles, commiserate all who have met with misfortunes, and show
favour to all who fly to them for protection; but directly any one
claims anything as of right, on the ground of having been faithful to
their alliance, they at once draw in and correct their error to the
best of their ability. Thus then Calibrates, who had been sent to Rome
to plead for the rights of the Achaeans, acted in exactly the opposite
spirit; and dragging in the subject of the Messenian war, on which
the Romans themselves had made no complaint, returned to Achaia to
overawe the people with the threat of the hostility of Rome. Having
therefore by his official report frightened and dismayed the spirits of
the populace, who were of course ignorant of what he had really said
in the Senate, he was first of all elected Strategus, and, to make
matters worse, proved to be open to bribery; and then, having got the
office, carried out the restoration of the Lacedaemonian and Messenian

[Sidenote: Comparison between the characters of Philopoemen and

+13.+ Philopoemen and Aristaenus, the Achaeans, were unlike both in
character and policy. Philopoemen was formed by nature in body and mind
for the life of a soldier, Aristaenus for a statesman and debater. In
politics they differed in this, that whereas during the periods of the
wars with Philip and Antiochus, Roman influence had become supreme in
Greece, Aristaenus directed his policy with the idea of carrying out
with alacrity every order from Rome, and sometimes even of anticipating
it. Still he endeavoured to keep up the appearance of abiding by the
laws, and did, in fact, maintain the reputation of doing so, only
giving way when any one of them proved to plainly militate against the
rescripts from Rome. But Philopoemen accepted, and loyally performed,
all Roman orders which were in harmony with the laws and the terms of
their alliance; but when such orders exceeded these limits, he could
not make up his mind to yield a willing obedience, but was wont first
to demand an arbitration, and to repeat the demand a second time; and
if this proved unavailing, to give in at length under protest, and so
finally carry out the order....

[Sidenote: The view of Aristaenus on the right attitude towards Rome.]

+14.+ Aristaenus used to defend his policy before the Achaeans by some
such arguments as these: “It was impossible to maintain the Roman
friendship by holding out the spear and the herald’s staff together.
If we have the resolution to withstand them face to face, and can do
so, well and good. But if Philopoemen himself does not venture to
assert this,[138]... why should we lose what is possible in striving
for the impossible? There are but two marks that every policy must aim
at—honour and expediency. Those to whom honour is a possible attainment
should stick to that, if they have political wisdom; those to whom
it is not must take refuge in expediency. To miss both is the surest
proof of unwisdom: and the men to do that are clearly those who, while
ostensibly consenting to obey orders, carry them out with reluctance
and hesitation. Therefore we must either show that we are strong enough
to refuse obedience, or, if we dare not venture even to suggest that,
we must give a ready submission to orders.”

[Sidenote: Philopoemen’s answer in defence of his policy.]

+15.+ Philopoemen, however, said that “People should not suppose him
so stupid as not to be able to estimate the difference between the
Achaean and Roman states, or the superiority of the power of the
latter. But as it is the inevitable tendency of the stronger to oppress
the weaker, can it be expedient to assist the designs of the superior
power, and to put no obstacle in their way, so as to experience as soon
as possible the utmost of their tyranny? Is it not, on the contrary,
better to resist and struggle to the utmost of our power?... And
if they persist in forcing their injunctions upon us,[138]... and
if, by reminding them of the facts we do something to soften their
resolution, we shall at any rate mitigate the harshness of their rule
to a certain extent; especially as up to this time the Romans, as you
yourself say, Aristaenus, have always made a great point of fidelity
to oaths, treaties, and promises to allies. But if we at once condemn
the justice of our own cause, and, like captives of the spear, offer an
unquestioning submission to every order, what will be the difference
between the Achaeans and the Sicilians or Capuans, who have been
notoriously slaves this long time past? Therefore it must either be
admitted that the justice of a cause has no weight with the Romans, or,
if we do not venture to say that, we must stand by our rights, and not
abandon our own cause, especially as our position in regard to Rome is
exceedingly strong and honourable. That the time will come when the
Greeks will be forced to give unlimited obedience, I know full well.
But would one wish to see this time as soon or as late as possible?
Surely as late as possible! In this, then, my policy differs from that
of Aristaenus. He wishes to see the inevitable arrive as quickly as
possible, and even to help it to come: I wish to the best of my power
to resist and ward it off.”

From these speeches it was made clear that while the policy of the
one was honourable, of the other undignified, both were founded on
considerations of safety. Wherefore while both Romans and Greeks were
at that time threatened with serious dangers from Philip and Antiochus,
yet both these statesmen maintained the rights of the Achaeans in
regard to the Romans undiminished; though a report found its way about
that Aristaenus was better affected to the Romans than Philopoemen....


+1.+ Tiberius Gracchus destroyed three hundred cities of the

[Sidenote: B. C. 179. Coss. Q. Fulvius, L. Manlius. The ex-praetors
Ti. Sempronius Gracchus and L. Postumius were still in Spain, where
they had been since B.C. 182. Livy, 40, 1, 44. Renewed war of Eumenes
and Ariarathes upon Pharnaces. See bk. 24, chs. 8, 9.] +2.+ The attack
upon him being sudden and formidable, Pharnaces was reduced to submit
to almost any terms; and on his sending an embassy, Eumenes and
Ariarathes immediately accepted his proposals, and sent ambassadors to
Pharnaces in return. When this had been repeated several times, the
pacification was concluded on the following terms: “Eumenes, Prusias,
and Ariarathes, shall maintain perpetual peace with Pharnaces and

“Pharnaces shall not enter Galatia on any pretence.

“Such treaties as exist between Pharnaces and Gauls are hereby

“Pharnaces shall likewise evacuate Paphlagonia, after restoring the
inhabitants whom he had previously expelled, with their shields,
javelins, and other equipment.

“Pharnaces shall restore to Ariarathes all territory of which he has
deprived him, with the property thereon and the hostages.

[Sidenote: See bk. 5, ch. 77.]

“He shall restore Tium by the Pontus, which some time before was given
freely and liberally by Eumenes to Prusias.

“Pharnaces shall restore, without ransom, all prisoners of war and all

“He shall repay to Morzius and Ariarathes, in lieu of all money and
treasure taken from them, the sum of nine hundred talents, and shall
add thereto three hundred talents for Eumenes towards the expenses of
the war.

“Mithridates, the Satrap of Armenia, shall also pay three hundred
talents, because he attacked Ariarathes in defiance of the treaty with

“The persons included under this treaty are, of the princes in Asia,
Artaxias, lord of the greater part of Armenia, and Acusilochus: of
those in Europe, Gatalus the Sarmatian: of the autonomous peoples, the
Heracleotes, the Mesembrians in the Chersonese, and the Cyzicenes.”

The number and quality of hostages to be given by Pharnaces was also
specified. The armies of the several parties then marched away, and
thus was concluded the war of Eumenes and Ariarathes against Pharnaces.

_Philip V. died at Amphipolis towards the end of B.C. 179. His last
days were embittered by remorse for the death of his son Demetrius,
whose innocence had been demonstrated to him. He wished to leave his
crown to Antigonus, the son of Echecrates and nephew of Antigonus
Doson, in order to punish his elder son Perseus for his treachery in
securing his brother’s death. But Philip died suddenly before this
could be secured, and Perseus succeeded him without opposition. See
Livy, 40, 55-57._

[Sidenote: The opening of the reign of Perseus.]

+3.+ Having renewed the alliance with Rome, Perseus immediately began
intriguing in Greece. He invited back into Macedonia absconding
debtors, condemned exiles, and those who had been compelled to leave
their country on charges of treason. He caused notices to be put
up to that effect at Delos, Delphi, and the temple of Athena at
Iton,[140] offering not only indemnity to all who returned, but also
the restoration of the property lost by their exile. Such also as
still remained in Macedonia he released from their debts to the Royal
exchequer, and set free those who had been confined in fortresses upon
charges of treason. By these measures he raised expectations in the
minds of many, and was considered to be holding out great hopes to
all the Greeks. Nor were other parts of his life and habits wanting
in a certain royal magnificence. His outward appearance was striking,
and he was well endowed with all the physical advantages requisite
for a statesman. His look and mien were alike dignified and such as
became his age. He had moreover avoided his father’s weakness for wine
and women, and not only drank moderately at dinner himself, but was
imitated in this respect by his intimates and friends. Such was the
commencement of the reign of Perseus....

[Sidenote: Philip V. in misfortune.]

When king Philip had become powerful and had obtained supremacy over
the Greeks, he showed the most utter disregard of faith and principle;
but when the breeze of fortune again set against him, his moderation
was as conspicuous in its turn. But after his final and complete
defeat, he tried by every possible expedient to consolidate the
strength of his kingdom.

[Sidenote: Laodice, daughter of Seleucus IV. Livy, 42, 12.]

[Sidenote: Embassy from Lycia against Rhodes. See bk. 24, ch. 9.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 177. Coss. C. Claudius Pulcher, Ti. Sempronius

+4.+ After despatching the consuls Tiberius and Claudius against the
Istri and Agrii,[141] the Senate towards the end of summer transacted
business with the ambassadors that had come from the Lycians. They had
not arrived at Rome until the Lycians had been completely conquered,
but they had been despatched a considerable time before. For the
people of Xanthus in Lycia, when about to embark upon the war, had
sent Nicostratus and others to Achaia and Rome as ambassadors: who
coming to Rome at that time moved many of the Senators to pity them,
by laying before them the oppressiveness of the Rhodians and their
own danger; and at length induced the Senate to send envoys to Rhodes
to declare that “On inspecting the record of the arrangements made
by the ten commissioners in Asia, when settling the dominions of
Antiochus, it appeared that the Lycians had been given to the Rhodians,
not as a gift, but rather as friends and allies.” But many were
still dissatisfied with this solution of the matter. For the Romans
seemed to wish, by thus pitting Rhodes against Lycia, to exhaust the
accumulations and treasures of the Rhodians, because they had heard of
the recent conveyance of the bride of Perseus by the Rhodians, and of
their grand naval review. For shortly before this the Rhodians had been
holding, with great splendour and elaboration of equipment, a review of
all vessels belonging to them; the fact being that a vast quantity of
timber for shipbuilding had been presented to them by Perseus. Moreover
he had presented a gold tiara to each of the rowers on the upper bench
in the ship that had brought him his bride Laodice.[142]...

[Sidenote: Excitement at Rhodes; and a fresh determination of the
Lycians to assert independence.]

+5.+ When the envoys from Rome reached Rhodes and announced the decrees
of the Senate, there was a great excitement in the island, and much
confused discussion among the leading politicians. They were much
annoyed at the allegation that the Lycians had not been given them as
a gift but as allies; for having just satisfied themselves that the
Lycian war was successfully concluded, they saw the commencement of
fresh trouble for themselves growing up. For no sooner had the Romans
arrived and made this announcement to the Rhodians, than the Lycians
began a fresh revolt, and showed a determination of fighting to the
last extremity for autonomy and freedom. However, after hearing the
Roman envoys, the Rhodians made up their minds that the Romans had been
deceived by the Lycians, and forthwith appointed Lycophron to lead an
embassy to offer an explanation to the Senate. And the state of affairs
was such that there was momentary expectation of a fresh rising of the

[Sidenote: Rhodian question deferred.]

[Sidenote: Reports of the intrigues of Perseus. See Livy, 41, 19, B. C.

+6.+ When the Rhodian envoys arrived in Rome the Senate, after
listening to their address, deferred its answer. Meanwhile the
Dardanian envoys came with reports as to the number of the Bastarnae,
the size of their men, and their courage in the field. They gave
information also of the treacherous practices of Perseus and the Gauls,
and said that they were more afraid of him than of the Bastarnae, and
therefore begged the help of the Romans. The report of the Dardani
being supported by that of the Thessalian envoys who arrived at that
time, and who also begged for help, the Senators determined to send
some commissioners to see with their own eyes the truth of these
reports; and they accordingly at once appointed and despatched Aulus
Postumius, accompanied by some young men....


   Seleucus Philopator, whom we last heard of as king of Syria, was
   assassinated by one of his nobles—Heliodorus—in the twelfth year
   of his reign. Antiochus his younger brother had been a hostage at
   Rome, and being, according to agreement, exchanged in B.C. 175 for
   Philopator’s son Demetrius, he was returning to Syria. At Athens,
   on his journey home, he heard of the death of Seleucus, and the
   attempt of Heliodorus to usurp the kingdom. By the help of Eumenes
   Heliodorus was expelled and Antiochus installed, to the satisfaction
   of the people, who gave him at first the surname of Epiphanes. He is
   the Antiochus Epiphanes whose cruelties are recorded in the books
   of the Maccabees. He died mad at Tabae in Persia, B.C. 164. See
   31, 11. For the following extract preserved by Athenaeus, see the
   translation of Livy, 41, 19.

[Sidenote: Antiochus Epiphanes, B.C. 175-164.]

+1.+ Antiochus Epiphanes, nicknamed from his actions Epimanes (the
Madman), would sometimes steal from the court, avoiding his attendants,
and appear roaming wildly about in any chance part of the city with one
or two companions. His favourite place to be found was the shops of
the silversmiths or goldsmiths, chatting and discussing questions of
art with the workers in relief and other artists; at another time he
would join groups of the people of the town and converse with any one
he came across, and would drink with foreign visitors of the humblest
description. Whenever he found any young men carousing together he
would come to the place without giving notice, with fife and band, like
a rout of revellers, and often by his unexpected appearance cause the
guests to rise and run away. He would often also lay aside his royal
robes, and, putting on a tebenna,[143] go round the market-place as
though a candidate for office, shaking hands and embracing various
people whom he intreated to vote for him, sometime as aedile, and
sometimes as tribune. And when he got the office and took his seat
on an ivory curule chair, after the fashion of the Romans, he heard
law cases which came on in the agora, and decided them with the
utmost seriousness and attention. This conduct was very embarrassing
to respectable people, some of whom regarded him as a good natured
easy-going man, and others as a madman. In regard to making presents,
too, his behaviour was on a par with this. Some he presented with
dice made of gazelle horn, some with dates, others with gold. There
were even instances of his making unexpected presents to men whom he
met casually, and whom he had never seen before. In regard to public
sacrifices and the honours paid to the gods, he surpassed all his
predecessors on the throne; as witness the Olympieium at Athens and
the statues placed round the altar at Delos. He used also to bathe in
the public baths, when they were full of the townspeople, pots of the
most expensive unguents being brought in for him; and on one occasion
on some one saying, “Lucky fellows you kings, to use such things and
smell so sweet!” without saying a word to the man, he waited till he
was bathing the next day, and then coming into the bath caused a pot
of the largest size and of the most costly kind of unguent called
_stactè_ to be poured over his head, so that there was a general rush
of the bathers to roll themselves in it; and when they all tumbled
down, the king himself among them, from its stickiness, there was loud


_The events of the years B.C. 174, 173, 172, which gradually led up to
the war with Perseus, to be described in the twenty-seventh book, were
briefly these_:—

In B.C. 174 Perseus forced the Dolopes, who had appealed against him
to Rome, to submit to his authority. After this successful expedition
he marched through Central and Northern Greece, visiting Delphi, where
he stayed three days, Phthiotid Achaia, and Thessaly. He carefully
abstained from inflicting any damage in the districts through which he
passed, and tried to gain the confidence of the various states. In the
same year he made friendly advances to the Achaeans, who had forbidden
any Lacedaemonian to enter their territory, by offering to restore
their fugitive slaves. But in spite of the exertions of Xenarchus the
Strategus, the Achaeans refuse to make any change (Livy, 41, 22-24).

The same year saw also commotions in Aetolia, which were settled by
five Roman commissioners: and in Crete, on the old score of the status
of the Lycians. Q. Minucius was sent to settle this also (Livy, 41, 25).

In B.C. 173 Perseus entered on still more active intrigues in
Greece, and in spite of the wildest scandals that were afloat as to
his tyranny, he gained a powerful hold in Aetolia, Thessaly, and
Perrhaebia. The Senate accordingly sent Marcellus to Aetolia and
Achaia, and App. Claudius to Thessaly, to inquire into the facts;
and a commission of five into Macedonia, with directions to proceed
afterwards to Alexandria (Livy, 42, 5, 6).

In B.C. 172 king Eumenes visited Rome and urged the Senate to take
measures in time to counteract the attempts of Perseus; warning them
that he had already obtained strong hold upon the Boeotians and
Aetolians, and had an inexhaustible recruiting ground in Thrace. That
everywhere he had secured the death or exile of the partisans of Rome,
and was overrunning in arms Thessaly and Perrhaebia (Livy, 42, 11-13).

The Senate, already inclined to listen to these representations,
was still more inclined to do so by the defiant tone of Harpalus,
the representative of king Perseus; by the attempted assassination
of Eumenes by emissaries of Perseus at Delphi on his home journey;
by receiving a report from Greece from C. Valerius confirming the
speech of Eumenes; and lastly by the confession of one L. Rammius of
Brundisium, that he had been requested to poison certain Roman envoys
who were accustomed to stay at his house on their journeys to and from
Macedonia and Greece (Livy, 42, 15-17).

War was now determined on for the next year, and the praetor ordered to
enroll troops. And Eumenes also, now recovered from the wounds of the
assassins, made preparations to join in the struggle (Livy, 42, 18-27).

In B.C. 171, fresh legions having been enrolled, and an army of sixteen
thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry ordered to Macedonia,
envoys appeared from Perseus demanding the reason. The Senate would
not allow them to enter the Pomoerium, but received them in the temple
of Bellona: and after listening to a report from Sp. Cavilius that
Perseus had, among other acts of hostility, taken cities in Thessaly
and entered Perrhaebia in arms, the Senate answered the Macedonian
envoys that any complaint they had to make must be made to the consul,
P. Licinius, who would presently be in Macedonia, but that they must
not come into Italy again (Livy, 42, 36).

A few days afterwards five commissioners were sent into Greece, who
distributed the districts to be visited among themselves: Servius
and Publius Lentulus and Lucius Decimius were to go to Cephallenia,
the Peloponnese, and the west coast generally; Q. Marcius and Aulus
Atilius to Epirus, Aetolia, Thessaly, and thence to Boeotia and Euboea,
where they were to meet the Lentuli. Meanwhile a letter from Perseus,
demanding the cause of their coming and of the presence of troops
in Macedonia, was received and left unanswered. After visiting the
districts assigned to them, in the course of doing which Marcius and
Atilius had met Perseus on the river Peneus, and granted him a truce to
enable him to send envoys to Rome (Marcius knowing well that the Romans
were not yet fully prepared for war[144]), the commissioners reached
their destination at Chalcis, where the earlier events narrated in the
following extracts occurred (Livy, 42, 36-43).


[Sidenote: Thebes.]

[Sidenote: The Roman commissioners at Chalcis: ambassadors from
Thespiae and Neon of Boeotia.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 171. Coss. P. Licinius Crassus, C. Cassius Longinus.]

+1.+ At this time Lases and Callias arrived at the head of an embassy
from the Thespians, and Ismenias[145] from Neon. Lases and his
colleagues offered to put their city wholly into the hands of the
Romans; Ismenias proposed to submit all the cities of Boeotia as one
nation to the discretion of the commissioners. But this latter proposal
was diametrically opposed to the policy of Marcius and his colleagues.
What suited that policy best was to split up Boeotia into separate
cities: and they therefore received Lases and his party, as well as
the envoys from Chaeronea and Lebadea, and all who came from single
cities, with great favour and lavish courtesy; but treated Ismenias
with ostentatious neglect and coldness. Some of the exiles[146] also
attacked Ismenias and were very near stoning him to death, and would
have done so if he had not saved himself by taking refuge through the
door[147] of the chamber where the commissioners were sitting. At the
same period there were disturbances and party contests at Thebes. One
party were for committing the town unconditionally to Rome; but the
Coroneans and Haliartians flocked to Thebes and vehemently maintained
that they ought to maintain the alliance with Perseus. For a time
neither of the two parties showed any disposition to give in to each
other; but when Olympichus of Coronea set the example of changing
sides and asserting that they ought to cleave to the Romans, a great
change and revolution came over the feelings of the populace. First,
they compelled Dicetas to go on an embassy to Marcius and the other
commissioners to excuse them for their alliance with Perseus. Next,
they expelled Neon and Hippias, crowding to their houses, and bidding
them go and make their own defence for the terms that they had made;
for they were the men who had negotiated the alliance. When these men
had left the town, the people immediately collected into the assembly
and first voted honours and gifts to the Romans, and then ordered
the magistrates to push on the alliance. Last of all they appointed
ambassadors to hand over the city to the Romans and to restore their

[Sidenote: The cause of the exiles’ triumph at Chalcis.]

+2.+ Whilst these things were being accomplished at Thebes, the
exiles in Chalcis appointed Pompides to state their grievances
against Ismenias, Neon, and Dicetas. The bad policy of these men
being manifest, and the Romans lending their support to the exiles,
Hippias and his party were rendered so odious that they were in danger
of falling victims to the fury of the populace, until the Romans, by
checking the assaults of the mob, secured them a certain degree of

[Sidenote: Dissolution of the Boeotian league, B.C. 171.]

When the Theban envoys arrived, bringing with them to the commissioners
the decrees and honours I have mentioned, a rapid change passed over
the face of things in each of the towns, for they were separated by a
very narrow interval from each other. The commissioners with Marcius
received the Theban envoys, complimented their town and counselled
them to restore the exiles, and bade the several towns send embassies
to Rome submitting themselves individually and unreservedly to the
protection of the Romans. Their policy, therefore, of splitting up
the league of the Boeotian towns, and of destroying the popularity
of the Macedonian royal house with the Boeotian populace having thus
completely succeeded, the commissioners sent for Servius Lentulus from
Argos, and leaving him in charge at Chalcis went themselves to the
Peloponnese; while Neon a few days afterwards retired to Macedonia;
and Ismenias and Dicetas, being thrown at once into prison, shortly
afterwards put an end to their lives. Thus it came about that the
Boeotians, who had for a long period of years, and through many
strange vicissitudes, maintained a national league, by now rashly and
inconsiderately adopting the cause of Perseus, and giving way to an
outburst of unreasoning excitement, were entirely disintegrated and
split up into separate cities.

[Sidenote: The Commissioners in the Peloponnese.]

When Aulus and Marcius arrived at Argos, after communication with the
council of the Achaean league, they called upon Archon the Strategus
to despatch a thousand men to Chalcis, to garrison the town until the
arrival of the Romans; an order which Archon readily obeyed. Having
thus settled affairs in Greece during the winter, and met Publius
Lentulus and his two colleagues, the commissioners sailed back to

[Sidenote: The Rhodians prepare to co-operate with Rome.]

+3.+ Meanwhile Tiberius Claudius and Aulus Postumius had been engaged
on a visitation of the islands and Greek cities in Asia, and had spent
the longest time in Rhodes; though the Rhodians at that time did not
require any supervision, for the prytanis that year was Agesilochus,
a man of high rank, who had once been on an embassy to Rome. Even
before the legates came, as soon as it became clear that the Romans
intended to go to war with Perseus he had urged his people to throw
in their fortunes with those of Rome; and, among other things, had
counselled them to repair forty ships, in order that, if any occasion
for using them should arise, it should not find them still in the midst
of preparations, but ready to answer to the call and to carry out
their resolve at once. By stating these facts to the Roman envoys, and
showing them the preparations visibly progressing, he let them return
to Rome in a high state of satisfaction with Rhodes....

[Sidenote: Perseus sends a circular despatch to the Greek States.]

[Sidenote: The reply of the Rhodians.]

+4.+ After the conferences had been held between the Roman envoys
and the Greeks, Perseus drew up a despatch containing a statement of
his case, and the arguments employed on either side; partly from an
idea that he would thus be shown to have the superiority of right on
his side, and partly because he wished to test the feelings of the
several states. Copies of this despatch he sent to the other states
by his ordinary letter-carriers; but to Rhodes he sent also Antenor
and Philip as ambassadors, who, on their arrival in the island, handed
over the document to the magistrates, and a few days afterwards entered
the Council chamber and urged the Rhodians “To remain neutral for the
present and watch what happened; and, if the Romans attacked Perseus
in violation of the treaty, to endeavour to mediate. For this was the
interest of all, and pre-eminently of the Rhodians, who more than most
peoples desired equality and freedom of speech, and were ever the
protectors, not only of their own liberty, but of that of the rest
of Greece also; and therefore ought to be proportionally careful to
provide and guard against a policy of an opposite tendency.” These
and similar arguments of the envoys found favour with the Rhodian
people. But, as they were already pledged to an attitude of friendship
to Rome, the influence of the upper classes so far prevailed that,
though a friendly reception was given to the Macedonian envoys, they
demanded in their formal answer that Perseus should not ask them to
take any measure which would involve the appearance of hostility to
Rome. Antenor and his colleagues would not accept this reply, but with
thanks for the kindness of their general reception, sailed back to

[Sidenote: Mission of Perseus to Boeotia.]

[Sidenote: Truce made with Q. Marcius. See Livy, 42, 43, B.C. 171.]

+5.+ Being informed that some of the cities of Boeotia remained
faithful to him, Perseus sent Alexander on a mission to them. On his
arrival in Boeotia, Alexander was obliged to abstain from visiting any
of the cities except Coronea, Thisbae,[148] and Haliartus, finding
that they offered him no facilities for securing close relations. But
he entered those three towns and exhorted their inhabitants to cling
to their loyalty to the Macedonians. They received his words with
enthusiasm, and voted to send ambassadors to Macedonia. Alexander
accordingly returned to the king and reported the state of things in
Boeotia. A short time afterwards the ambassadors arrived, desiring the
king to send aid to the cities which favoured the Macedonian cause; for
the Thebans were oppressing them severely, because they would not agree
with them and side with Rome. But Perseus replied that he was precluded
by the truce from sending any aid to any one; but he begged them to
resist the Thebans to the best of their power, and yet not to go to war
with the Romans, but to remain neutral....

[Sidenote: War is decided upon at the expiration of the truce.]

[Sidenote: Attempted assassination of Eumenes at Delphi. Livy, 42, 16,
B.C. 172.]

+6.+ When the report of the commissioners from Asia concerning Rhodes
and the other states had been made at Rome, the Senate called in the
ambassadors of Perseus, Solon and Hippias: who endeavoured to argue the
whole case and to deprecate the anger of the Senate; and particularly
to defend their master on the subject of the attempt upon the life of
Eumenes. When they had finished all they had to urge, the Senate, which
had all the while been resolved on war, bade them depart forthwith
from Rome; and ordered all other Macedonians also that happened to be
staying in the country to quit Italy within thirty days. The Senate
then called upon the Consuls to act at once and see that they moved in
good time....

[Sidenote: Jealousy of Eumenes.]

[Sidenote: The Macedonian party.]

[Sidenote: The Romanising party.]

[Sidenote: Politics at Rhodes.]

+7.+ Caius Lucretius[149] being at anchor off Cephallenia, wrote
a letter to the Rhodians, requesting them to despatch some ships,
and entrusted the letter to a certain trainer named Socrates. This
letter arrived at Rhodes in the second six months of the Prytany of
Stratocles. When the question came on for discussion, Agathagetus,
Rhodophon, Astymedes, and many others were for sending the ships and
taking part in the war from the first, without any further pretence;
but Deinon and Polyaratus, though really displeased at the favour
already shown to Rome, now for the present used the case of Eumenes as
their pretext, and began by that means to alienate the feelings of the
populace. There had in fact been a long standing feeling of suspicion
and dislike in the minds of the Rhodians against Eumenes, dating from
the time of his war with Pharnaces; when, upon king Eumenes blockading
the entrance of the Hellespont to prevent ships sailing into the
Pontus, the Rhodians had interfered with his design and thwarted him.
This ill-feeling had again been recently exasperated during the Lycian
war on the question of certain forts, and a strip of territory on the
frontier of the Rhodian Peraea, which was being damaged by some of
Eumenes’s subjects. These incidents taken together made the Rhodians
ready to listen to anything against the king. Seizing on this pretext,
the party of Deinon tried to discredit the despatch, asserting that it
did not come from the Romans but from Eumenes, who wished to involve
them on any possible pretext in a war, and bring expense and perfectly
unnecessary suffering upon the people. In support of their contention
they put forward the fact that the man who brought the letter was some
obscure trainer or another; and asserted that the Romans were not
accustomed to employ such messengers, but were rather inclined to act
with unnecessary care and dignity in the despatch of such missives.
When they said this they were perfectly aware that the letter had
really been written by Lucretius: their object was to persuade the
Rhodian people to do nothing for the Romans readily, but rather to
perpetually make difficulties, and thus give occasions for offence and
displeasure to crop up between the two nations. For their deliberate
purpose was to alienate Rhodes from the Roman friendship, and to join
it to that of Perseus, by every means in their power. Their motives for
thus clinging to Perseus were that Polyaratus, who was ostentatious and
vain, had become heavily in debt; and that Deinon, who was avaricious
and unscrupulous, had from the first relied on increasing his wealth
by getting presents from princes and kings. These speeches having been
delivered, the Prytanis Stratocles rose, and, after inveighing at some
length against Perseus, and speaking with equal warmth in praise of the
Romans, induced the people to confirm the decree for the despatch of
the ships. Forthwith six quadriremes were prepared, five of which were
sent to Chalcis under the command of Timagoras, and the other under
the command of another Timagoras to Tenedos. This latter commander
fell in at Tenedos with Diophanes, who had been despatched by Perseus
to Antiochus, and captured both him and his crew. All such allies
as arrived with offers of help by sea Lucretius thanked warmly, but
excused from taking part in this service, observing that the Romans had
no need of naval support....

_Perseus now collected a large army at Citium, thirty-nine thousand
foot and four thousand horse, and advanced through the north of
Thessaly taking many towns, and finally taking up his quarters at
Sicyrium, at the foot of Mount Ossa. The Roman consul, P. Licinius,
marched from the south-west through Gomphi, and thence to Larisa, where
he crossed the river Peneus. After some cavalry skirmishes, which were
generally favourable to the king, Perseus advanced nearer to the Roman
camp, and a more important battle was fought, in which the king again
scored a considerable success with his cavalry and light-armed troops.
The Romans lost two hundred cavalry killed and as many prisoners and
two thousand infantry, while Perseus only had twenty cavalry and
forty infantry killed. He did not, however, follow up the victory
sufficiently to inflict a crushing blow upon the Roman army; and though
the Consul withdrew to the south of the Peneus, after some days’
reflection the king made proposals of peace. See Livy, 42, 51-62. B.C.
171 (summer.)_

[Sidenote: After beating the Roman cavalry on the Peneus, and obliging
Licinius to retire south of the river, Perseus endeavours to make

[Sidenote: The Romans are inexorable.]

[Sidenote: Perseus returns to Sicyrium.]

+8.+ After the Macedonian victory Perseus summoned his Council, when
some of his friends expressed an opinion that he ought to send an
embassy to the Roman general, to signify his readiness even now to
pay the Romans the same amount of tribute as his father had formerly
undertaken to pay when beaten in war, and to evacuate the same places.
“For if,” they argued, “the Romans accept the terms the war will be
ended in a manner honourable to the king after his victory in the
field; and the Romans, after this taste of Macedonian valour, will
be much more careful in the future not to impose an unjust or harsh
burden upon the Macedonians. And if, on the other hand, in spite of
the past, they prove obstinate and refuse to accept them, the anger
of heaven will with justice fall on them; while the king by his
moderation will gain the support of Gods and men alike.” The majority
of his friends held this view, and Perseus expressing his assent to
it, Pantauchus, son of Balacrus, and Midon of Beroea, were forthwith
sent as ambassadors to Licinius. On their arrival, Licinius summoned
his Council, and the ambassadors having stated their proposals in
accordance with their instructions, Pantauchus and his colleague were
requested to withdraw, and they deliberated on the proposition thus
made to them. They decided unanimously to return as stern an answer
as possible. For this is a peculiarity of the Romans, which they have
inherited from their ancestors, and are continually displaying,—to
show themselves most peremptory and imperious in the presence of
defeat, and most moderate when successful: a very noble peculiarity, as
every one will acknowledge; but whether it be feasible under certain
circumstances may be doubted. However that may be, on the present
occasion they made answer that Perseus must submit without reserve
himself, and give the Senate full power to take whatever measures it
might think good concerning Macedonia and all in it. On this being
communicated to Pantauchus and Midon, they returned and informed
Perseus and his friends; some of whom were roused to anger at this
astonishing display of haughtiness, and advised Perseus to send no more
embassies or messages about anything whatever. Perseus, however, was
not the man to take such a line. He sent again and again to Licinius,
with continually enhanced offers, and promising a larger and larger
sum of money. But as nothing that he could do had any effect, and as
his friends found fault with him, and told him that, though he had
won a victory, he was acting like one who had been defeated and lost
all, he was at length compelled to renounce the sending of embassies,
and remove his camp back to Sicyrium. Such was the position of the

[Sidenote: The effect of the success of Perseus upon the Greeks.]

[Sidenote: A scene at Olympia.]

+9.+ When the report of the favourable result for Perseus of the
cavalry engagement, and of the victory of the Macedonians, spread
through Greece, the inclination of the populace to the cause of
Perseus blazed out like a fire, most of them having up to that time
concealed their real feelings. Their conduct, to my mind, was like what
one sees at gymnastic contests. When some obscure and far inferior
combatant descends into the arena with a famous champion reputed to be
invincible, the spectators immediately bestow their favour upon the
weaker of the two, and try to keep up his spirits by applause, and
eagerly second his efforts by their enthusiasm. And if he succeeds
so far as even to touch the face of his opponent, and make a mark to
prove the blow, the whole of the spectators again show themselves on
his side. Sometimes they even jeer at his antagonist: not because they
dislike or undervalue him, but because their sympathies are roused by
the unexpected, and they are naturally inclined to take the weaker
side. But if any one checks them at the right moment, they are quick to
change and see their mistake. And this is what Cleitomachus is said to
have done. He had the character of being an invincible athlete, and,
as his reputation was spread all over the world, King Ptolemy is said
to have been inspired with the ambition of putting an end to it. He
therefore had Aristonicus the boxer, who was thought to have unusual
physical capabilities for that kind of thing trained with extraordinary
care, and sent to Greece. When he appeared on the arena at Olympia a
great number of the spectators, it seems, immediately showed their
favour for him, and cheered him on, being rejoiced that some one should
have had the courage to make some sort of stand against Cleitomachus.
But when, as the fight went on, he showed that he was a match for
his antagonist, and even gave him a well-placed wound, there was a
general clapping of hands, and the popular enthusiasm showed itself
loudly on his side, the spectators calling out to Aristonicus to keep
up his spirits. Thereupon they say that Cleitomachus stepped aside,
and after waiting a short time to recover his breath, turned to the
crowd and asked them “Why, they cheered Aristonicus, and supported him
all they could? Had they detected him in playing foul in the combat?
Or were they not aware that Cleitomachus was at that moment fighting
for the honour of Greece, Aristonicus for that of king Ptolemy? Would
they prefer an Egyptian to carry off the crown by beating Greeks, or
that a Theban and Boeotian should be proclaimed victor in boxing over
all comers?” Upon this speech of Cleitomachus, they say that such a
revulsion of feeling came over the spectators, that Aristonicus in
his turn was conquered more by the display of popular feeling than by

+10.+ What happened in the case of Perseus in regard to the feeling of
the multitude was very similar to this. For if any one had pulled them
up and asked them plainly, in so many words, whether they wished such
great power to fall to one man, and were desirous of trying the effect
of an utterly irresponsible despotism, I presume that they would have
promptly bethought themselves, recanted all they had said, and gone
to the other extreme of feeling. Or if some one had briefly recalled
to their recollection all the tyrannical acts of the royal house of
Macedonia from which the Greeks had suffered, and all the benefits they
had received from the Romans, I imagine they would have at once and
decisively changed their minds. However, for the present, at the first
burst of thoughtless enthusiasm, the people showed unmistakable signs
of joy at the news, being delighted at the unlooked-for appearance of a
champion able to cope with Rome. I say this much to prevent anyone, in
ignorance of human nature, from bringing a rash charge of ingratitude
against the Greeks for the feelings which they displayed at that

[Sidenote: A new kind of missile used in the army of Perseus.]

+11.+ The _cestros_ was a novel invention, made during the war with
Perseus. This weapon consisted of an iron bolt two palms long, half
of which was spike, and half a tube for the reception of the wooden
shaft which was fixed into the tube, and measured a span in length and
a finger-breadth in diameter. At the middle point of the shaft three
wooden “plumes” were morticed in. The sling had thongs of unequal
length, and on the leather between them the missile was loosely set.
When the sling was being swung round, with the two thongs taut, the
missile kept its place; but when the slinger let go one of the thongs,
it flew from the leather like a leaden bullet, and was projected from
the sling with such force as to inflict a very grievous wound upon any
one whom it hit.[150]

[Sidenote: Character of Cotys, king of the Odrysae, an ally of Perseus.]

+12.+ Cotys was a man of distinguished appearance and of great ability
in military affairs, and besides, quite unlike a Thracian in character.
For he was of sober habits, and gave evidence of a gentleness of temper
and a steadiness of disposition worthy of a man of gentle birth....

[Sidenote: A prudent governor of Cyprus. See above, bk. 18, ch. 55.]

+13.+ Ptolemy, the general serving in Cyprus, was by no means like
an Egyptian, but was a man of sense and administrative ability. He
received the governorship of the island when the king of Egypt was
quite a child, and devoted himself with great zeal to the collection of
money, refusing payments of any kind to any one, though he was often
asked for them by the king’s agents, and subjected to bitter abuse for
refusing to part with any. But when the king came of age he made up a
large sum and sent it to Alexandria, so that both king Ptolemy himself
and his courtiers expressed their approval of his previous parsimony
and determination not to part with any money....

_The battle on the Peneus was followed by other engagements of no
great importance; and finally Perseus returned to Macedonia, and the
Romans went into winter quarters in various towns in Thessaly, without
a decisive blow having been struck on either side. Winter of B.C.
171-170. Livy, 42, 64-67._

[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 171-170. Dispute at Rhodes as to the release
of Diophanes, the envoy of Perseus, captured at Tenedos. See ch. 7.]

+14.+ Just about the time when Perseus retired for the winter from the
Roman war, Antenor arrived at Rhodes from him, to negotiate for the
ransom of Diophanes and those who were on board with him. Thereupon
there arose a great dispute among the statesmen as to what course they
ought to take. Philophron, Theaetetus, and their party were against
entering into such arrangement on any terms; Deinon and Polyaratus
and their party were for doing so. Finally they did enter upon an
arrangement with Perseus for their redemption....

[Sidenote: Aetolian leaders arrested.]

[Sidenote: Charops.]

[Sidenote: What induced the leading men in Epirus to join Perseus.]

+15.+ Cephalus came [to Pella] from Epirus. He had long been connected
by friendship with the royal house of Macedonia, but was now compelled
by the force of circumstances to embrace the side of Perseus, the
cause of which was as follows: There was a certain Epirote named
Charops, a man of high character, and well disposed to Rome, who, when
Philip was holding the passes into Epirus, was the cause of his being
driven from the country, and of Titus Flamininus conquering Epirus
and Macedonia. Charops had a son named Machatus, who had a son also
named Charops. Machatus having died when this son was quite a youth,
the elder Charops sent his grandson with a suitable retinue to Rome
to learn to speak and read Latin. In the course of time the young man
returned home, having made many intimate friendships at Rome. The elder
Charops then died, and the young man, being of a restless and designing
character, began giving himself airs and attacking the distinguished
men in the country. At first he was not much noticed, Antinous and
Cephalus, his superiors in age and reputation, managing public affairs
as they thought right. But when the war with Perseus broke out, the
young man at once began laying information against these statesmen
at Rome, grounding his accusations on their former intimacy with the
Macedonian royal family; and by watching everything they said or did,
and putting the worst construction on it, suppressing some facts and
adding others, he succeeded in getting his accusations against them
believed. Now Cephalus had always shown good sense and consistency,
and at the present crisis had adhered to a course of the highest
wisdom. He had begun by praying heaven that the war might not take
place, or the question come to the arbitrament of arms; but when the
war was actually begun, he was for performing all treaty obligations
towards Rome, but for not going a step beyond this, or showing any
unbecoming subservience or officiousness. When Charops then vehemently
accused Cephalus at Rome, and represented everything that happened
contrary to the wishes of the Romans as malice prepense on his part, at
first he and others like him thought little of the matter, being not
conscious of entertaining any designs hostile to Rome. But when they
saw Hippolochus, Nicander, and Lochagus arrested without cause, and
conveyed to Rome after the cavalry battle, and that the accusations
made against them by Lyciscus were believed,—Lyciscus being a leader
of the same party in Aetolia as Charops was in Epirus,—they at length
began to be anxious about what would happen, and to consider their
position. They resolved therefore to try every possible means to
prevent themselves from being similarly arrested without trial and
carried to Rome, owing to the slanders of Charops. It was thus that
Cephalus and his friends were compelled, contrary to their original
policy, to embrace the cause of Perseus....

[Sidenote: Coss. A. Hostilius Mancinus, A. Atilius Serranus, B.C. 170.]

[Sidenote: Attempt of two Molossian leaders to seize the consul.]

+16.+ Theodotus and Philostratus committed an act of flagrant impiety
and treachery. They learnt that the Roman consul Aulus Hostilius was
on his way to Thessaly to join the army; and thinking that, if they
could deliver Aulus to Perseus, they would have given the latter the
strongest possible proof of their devotion, and have done the greatest
possible damage to the Romans at this crisis, they wrote urgently to
Perseus to make haste. The king was desirous of advancing at once and
joining them; but he was hindered by the fact that the Molossians had
seized the bridge over the Aous, and was obliged to give them battle
first. Now it chanced that Aulus had arrived at Phanota,[151] and put
up at the house of Nestor the Cropian,[152] and thus gave his enemies
an excellent opportunity; and had not fortune interfered on his behalf,
I do not think that he would have escaped. But, in fact, Nestor
providentially suspected what was brewing, and compelled him to change
his quarters for the night to the house of a neighbour. Accordingly he
gave up the idea of going by land through Epirus, and, having sailed to
Anticyra,[153] thence made his way into Thessaly....

[Sidenote: Pharnaces, king of Pontus.] +17.+ Pharnaces was the worst of
all his predecessors on the throne....

[Sidenote: Attalus desires that his brother Eumenes should be restored
to honour in the Peloponnese.]

+18.+ While Attalus was spending the winter in Elateia (in Phocis),
knowing that his brother Eumenes was annoyed in the highest possible
degree at the splendid honours which had been awarded to him having
been annulled by a public decree of the Peloponnesians, though he
concealed his annoyance from every one,—he took upon himself to send
messages to certain of the Achaeans, urging that not only the statues
of honour, but the complimentary inscriptions also, which had been
placed in his brother’s honour, should be restored. His motive in
acting thus was the belief that he could give his brother no greater
gratification, and at the same time would display to the Greeks by this
act his own brotherly affection and generosity.[154]...

[Sidenote: Preparations for the attack upon Coele-Syria by the
ministers of Ptolemy Philometor.]

+19.+ When Antiochus saw that the government of Alexandria was openly
making preparations for a war of annexation in Coele-Syria, he sent
Meleager at the head of an embassy to Rome, with instructions to inform
the Senate of the fact, and to protest that Ptolemy was attacking him
without the least justification....

[Sidenote: The need of promptness,]

+20.+ In all human affairs perhaps one ought to regulate every
undertaking by considerations of time; but this is especially true in
war, in which a moment makes all the difference between success and
failure, and to miss this is the most fatal of errors....

[Sidenote: and of persistency.]

Many men desire honour, but it is only the few who venture to attempt
it; and of those who do so, it is rare to find any that have the
resolution to persevere to the end....


[Sidenote: B.C. 169, Antiochus and Ptolemy both appeal to Rome on the
subject of Coele-Syria.]

+1.+ When the war between the kings Antiochus and Ptolemy[155] for
the possession of Coele-Syria had just begun, Meleager, Sosiphanes,
and Heracleides came as ambassadors from Antiochus, and Timotheos and
Damon from Ptolemy. The one actually in possession of Coele-Syria and
Phoenicia was Antiochus; for ever since his father’s victory over
the generals of Ptolemy at Panium[156] all those districts had been
subject to the Syrian kings. Antiochus, accordingly, regarding the
right of conquest as the strongest and most honourable of all claims,
was now eager to defend these places as unquestionably belonging to
himself: while Ptolemy, conceiving that the late king Antiochus had
unjustly taken advantage of his father’s orphan condition to wrest the
cities in Coele-Syria from him, was resolved not to acquiesce in his
possession of them. Therefore Meleager and his colleagues came to Rome
with instructions to protest before the Senate that Ptolemy had, in
breach of all equity, attacked him first; while Timotheos and Damon
came to renew their master’s friendship with the Romans, and to offer
their mediation for putting an end to the war with Perseus; but, above
all, to watch the communications made by Meleager’s embassy. As to
putting an end to the war, by the advice of Marcus Aemilius they did
not venture to speak of it; but after formally renewing the friendly
relations between Ptolemy and Rome, and receiving a favourable answer,
they returned to Alexandria. To Meleager and his colleagues the Senate
answered that Quintus Marcius should be commissioned to write to
Ptolemy on the subject, as he should think it most to the interest of
Rome and his own honour. Thus was the business settled for the time....

[Sidenote: The Rhodians ask for license to import corn.]

+2.+ About this time there came also ambassadors from the Rhodians
towards the end of summer, Agesilochus, Nicagoras, and Nicander. The
objects of their mission were to renew the friendship of Rhodes and
Rome; to obtain a license for importing corn from the Roman dominions;
and to defend their state from certain charges that had been brought
against it. For there were most violent party contests going on in
Rhodes: Agathagetus, Philophron, Rhodophon, and Theaetetus resting
all their hopes on the Romans, and Deinon and Polyaratus on Perseus
and the Macedonians; and as these divisions gave rise to frequent
debates in the course of their public business, and many contradictory
expressions were used in their deliberations, plenty of opportunities
were afforded to those who wished to make up stories against the state.
On this occasion, however, the Senate affected to be ignorant of all
this, though perfectly acquainted with what went on in the island,
and granted them a license to import one hundred thousand medimni of
corn from Sicily. This answer was given by the Senate to the Rhodians
separately. Audience was then given collectively to all the envoys from
the rest of Greece that were united in the same policy....

[Sidenote: B.C. 169. Aulus Hostilius, in Greece with proconsular
authority, sends Popilius and Octavius to visit the Greek towns and
read the decree of the Senate.]

[Sidenote: Lycortas, Archon, and Polybius are supposed to be
particularly aimed at.]

[Sidenote: They visit the Peloponnese, and express some dissatisfaction
at the backward policy of certain Achaeans.]

+3.+ Aulus being thus Proconsul, and wintering in Thessaly with
the army, sent Gaius Popilius and Gnaeus Octavius to visit certain
places in Greece. They first came to Thebes, where, after speaking in
complimentary terms of the Thebans, they exhorted them to maintain
their good disposition towards Rome. They then went a round of the
cities in the Peloponnese, and endeavoured to convince the people of
the clemency and humanity of the Senate by producing the[157] decree
which I recently mentioned. At the same time they made it clearly
understood that the Senate was aware who in the several states were
hanging back and trying to evade their obligations, and who were
forward and zealous; and they let it be seen that they were as much
displeased with those who thus hung back as with those who openly took
the opposite side. This brought hesitation and doubt to the minds of
the people at large, as to how to frame their words and actions so
as to exactly suit the necessities of the times. Gaius and Gnaeus
were reported to have resolved, as soon as the Achaean congress was
assembled, to accuse Lycortas, Archon, and Polybius, and to point out
that they were opposed to the policy of Rome; and were at the present
moment refraining from active measures, not because that was their
genuine inclination, but because they were watching the turn of events,
and waiting their opportunity. They did not, however, venture to do
this, because they had no well-founded pretext for attacking these men.
Accordingly, when the council[158] met at Aegium, after delivering
a speech of mingled compliments and exhortation, they took ship for

[Sidenote: The legates in Aetolia.]

[Sidenote: Various Aetolians accuse each other.]

[Sidenote: Proandrus.]

[Sidenote: Lyciscus.]

[Sidenote: Pantaleon.]

[Sidenote: Thoas stoned.]

+4.+ The Aetolian congress being summoned to meet them at Thermum,
they came before the assembled people, and again delivered a speech
in which expressions of benevolence were mixed with exhortations. But
the real cause of summoning the congress was to announce that the
Aetolians must give hostages. On their leaving the speakers’ platform,
Proandrus stood forward and desired leave to mention certain services
performed by himself to the Romans, and to denounce those who accused
him. Gaius thereupon rose; and, though he well knew that Proandrus was
opposed to Rome, he paid him some compliments, and acknowledged the
truth of everything he had said. After this, Lyciscus stood forward,
and, without accusing any one person by name, yet cast suspicion on a
great many. For he said that “The Romans had been quite right to arrest
the ringleaders and take them to Rome” (whereby he meant Eupolemus,
Nicander, and the rest): “but members of their party still remained in
Aetolia, all of whom ought to meet with the same correction, unless
they gave up their children as hostages to the Romans.” In these
words he meant to point especially to Archedamus and Pantaleon; and,
accordingly, when he retired, Pantaleon stood up, and, after a brief
denunciation of Lyciscus for his shameless and despicable flattery of
the stronger side, turned to Thoas, conceiving him to be the man whose
accusations of himself obtained the greater credit from the fact that
he had never been supposed to be at enmity with him. He reminded Thoas
first of the events in the time of Antiochus; and then reproached him
for ingratitude to himself, because, when he had been surrendered
to Rome, he obtained an unexpected release at the intercession of
Nicander and himself. He ended by calling upon the Aetolians, not only
to hoot Thoas down if he tried to speak, but to join with one accord
in stoning him. This was done; and Gaius, after administering a brief
reproof to the Aetolians for stoning Thoas, departed with his colleague
to Acarnania, without any more being said about hostages. Aetolia,
however, was filled with mutual suspicions and violent factions.

[Sidenote: Acarnania.]

+5.+ In Acarnania the assembly was held at Thurium, at which Aeschrion,
Glaucus, and Chremes, who were all partisans of Rome, begged Gaius
and Gnaeus to place a garrison in Acarnania; for they had among them
certain persons who were for putting the country in the hands of
Perseus and the Macedonians. The advice of Diogenes was the opposite.
“A garrison,” he said, “ought not to be put into any of their cities,
for that was what was done to those who had been at war with Rome
and had been beaten; whereas the Acarnanians had done no wrong, and
did not deserve in any respect to have a garrison thrust upon them.
Chremes and Glaucus and their partisans were slandering their political
opponents, and desired to bring in a garrison which would support their
selfseeking policy, in order to establish their own tyrannical power.”
After these speeches, Gaius and his colleague, seeing that the populace
disliked the idea of having garrisons, and wishing to follow the line
of policy marked out by the Senate, expressed their adherence to the
view of Diogenes; and departed to join the Proconsul at Larisa, after
paying some compliments to the Acarnanians....

[Sidenote: Meeting of Achaean statesmen to consider their policy, B.C.

[Sidenote: Lycortas is for complete neutrality.]

[Sidenote: Apollonides and Stratius for suppressing rash declarations
for Rome, and yet not openly opposing her.]

[Sidenote: The Strategus Archon is for bending to the storm, and acting
frankly for Rome.]

[Sidenote: Polybius Hipparch.]

+6.+ The Greeks made up their minds that this embassy required much
consideration on their part. They therefore called to council such
men as were of one mind in other political questions,—Arcesilaus and
Ariston of Megalopolis, Stratius of Tritaea, Xenon of Patrae and
Apollonides of Sicyon. But Lycortas stood firm to his original view:
which was that they should send no help to either Perseus or Rome in
any way, nor, on the other hand, take part against either. For he held
that co-operation with either would be disadvantageous to the Greeks at
large, because he foresaw the overwhelming power which the successful
nation would possess; while active hostility, he thought, would be
dangerous, because they had already in former times been in opposition
to many of the most illustrious Romans in their state policy.
Apollonides and Stratius did not recommend open and avowed hostility
to Rome, but thought that “Those who were for plunging headlong into
the contest, and wished to use the action of the nation to secure their
own personal favour at Rome, ought to be put down and boldly resisted.”
Archon said that “They must yield to circumstances, and not give their
personal enemies a handle for accusations; nor allow themselves to fall
into the same misfortune as Nicander, who, before he had learnt what
the power of Rome really was, had met with the gravest calamities.”
With this last view, Polyaenus, Arcesilaus, Ariston, and Xenon agreed.
It was thereupon decided that Archon should go without delay to his
duties as Strategus, and Polybius to those of Hipparch.

[Sidenote: Embassy from Attalus to the Achaeans desiring the
restoration of the honours formally decreed to his brother Eumenes. See
27, 18.]

[Sidenote: Speech of Polybius.]

+7.+ Very soon after these events, and when Archon had made up his
mind that the Achaeans must take active part with Rome and her allies,
it happened most conveniently that Attalus made his proposal to him
and found him ready to accept it. Archon at once eagerly promised his
support to Attalus’s request: and when thereupon that prince’s envoys
appeared at the next congress, and addressed the Achaeans about the
restoration of king Eumenes’s honours, begging them to do this for the
sake of Attalus, the people did not show clearly what their feeling
was, but a good many rose to speak against the proposal from many
various motives. Those who were originally the advisers of the honours
being paid to the king were now desirous to confirm the wisdom of their
own policy; while those who had private reasons for animosity against
the king thought this a good opportunity for revenging themselves upon
him; while others again, from spite against those who supported him,
were determined that Attalus should not obtain his request. Archon,
however, the Strategus, rose to support the envoys,—for it was a matter
that called for an expression of opinion from the Strategus,—but after
a few words he stood down, afraid of being thought to be giving his
advice from interested motives and the hope of making money, because
he had spent a large sum on his office. Amidst a general feeling of
doubt and hesitation, Polybius rose and delivered a long speech. But
that part of it which best fell in with the feelings of the populace
was that in which he showed that “The original decree of the Achaeans
in regard to these honours enacted that such honours as were _improper
and contrary to law_ were to be abolished, but not _all_ honours by any
means. That Sosigenes and Diopeithes and their colleagues, however, who
were at the time judges, and for private reasons personally hostile to
Eumenes, seized the opportunity of overturning all the erections put up
in honour of the king; and in doing so had gone beyond the meaning of
the decree of the Achaeans, and beyond the powers entrusted to them,
and, what was worst of all, beyond the demands of justice and right.
For the Achaeans had not resolved upon doing away with the honours
of Eumenes on the ground of having received any injury at his hands;
but had taken offence at his making demands beyond what his services
warranted, and had accordingly voted to remove everything that seemed
excessive. As then these judges had overthrown these honours, because
they had a greater regard for the gratification of their private
enmity than for the honour of the Achaeans, so the Achaeans, from the
conviction that duty and honour must be their highest consideration,
were bound to correct the error of the judges, and the unjustifiable
insult inflicted upon Eumenes: especially as, in doing so, they would
not be bestowing this favour on Eumenes only, but on his brother
Attalus also.” The assembly having expressed their agreement with this
speech, a decree was written out ordering the magistrates to restore
all the honours of king Eumenes, except such as were dishonourable to
the Achaean league or contrary to their law. It was thus, and at this
time, that Attalus secured the reversal of the insult to his brother
Eumenes in regard to the honours once given him in the Peloponnese....

[Sidenote: Early in B.C. 169,[159]

[Sidenote: Perseus goes back to Hyscana in Illyria.]

[Sidenote: A second mission to Genthius.]

[Sidenote: Genthius temporises.]

+8.+ Perseus sent Pleuratus the Illyrian, an exile living at his court,
and Adaeus of Beroea on a mission to king Genthius, after taking
Hyscana in Illyria, Perseus advances to Stubera, and thence sends
envoys to king Genthius at Lissus. Livy, 43, 19.] with instructions to
inform him of what he had achieved in his war with the Romans, Dardani,
Epirotes, and Illyrians up to the present time; and to urge him to make
a friendship and alliance with him in Macedonia. These envoys journeyed
beyond Mount Scardus, through Illyria Deserta, as it is called,—a
region a short time back depopulated by the Macedonians, in order to
make an invasion of Illyria and Macedonia difficult for the Dardani.
Their journey through this region was accompanied by much suffering;
but they reached Scodra, and being there informed that Genthius was at
Lissus, they sent a message to him. He promptly responded: and having
been admitted to an interview with him, they discussed the business
to which their instructions referred. Genthius had no wish to forfeit
the friendship of Perseus; but he alleged want of means as an excuse
for not complying with the request at once, and his inability to
undertake a war with Rome without money. With this answer, Adaeus and
his colleagues returned home. Meanwhile Perseus arrived at Stubera,
and sold the booty and gave his army a rest while waiting for the
return of Pleuratus and Adaeus. On their arrival with the answer from
Genthius, he immediately sent another mission, consisting again of
Adaeus, Glaucias, one of his bodyguards, and the Illyrian (Pleuratus)
also, because he knew the Illyrian language, with the same instructions
as before: on the ground that Genthius had not stated distinctly what
he wanted, and what would enable him to consent to the proposals. When
these envoys had started the king himself removed with his army to

[Sidenote: Genthius being unpersuaded by the second mission, Perseus
sends a third, but still without offering money.]

[Sidenote: The dislike of Perseus to give money turned out happily for

+9.+ The ambassador sent to Genthius returned without having
accomplished anything more than the previous envoys, and without any
fresh answer; for Genthius remained of the same mind,—willing to
join with Perseus in his war, but professing to be in want of money.
Perseus disregarded the hint, and sent another mission under Hippias to
conclude the treaty, without taking any notice of the main point, while
professing a wish to do whatever Genthius wished. It is not easy to
decide whether to ascribe such conduct to mere folly, or to a spiritual
delusion. For my part, I am inclined to regard it as a sheer spiritual
delusion when men aim at bold enterprises, and risk their life, and
yet neglect the most important point in their plans, though they see
it all the time and have the power to execute it. For I do not think
it will be denied by any man of reflection that, had Perseus at that
time been willing to make grants of money either to states as such, or
individually to kings and statesmen, I do not say on a great scale, but
even to a moderate extent, they would all—Greeks and kings alike—have
yielded to the temptation. As it was, he happily did not take that
course, which would have given him, if successful, an overweening
supremacy; or, if unsuccessful, would have involved many others in his
disaster. But he took the opposite course: which resulted in confining
the numbers of the Greeks who adopted the unwise policy at this crisis
to very narrow limits....

   [Perseus now returned from Stubera to Hyscana, and after a vain
   attempt upon Stratus in Aetolia, retired into Macedonia for the
   rest of the winter. In the early spring of B.C. 169 Q. Marcius
   Philippus began his advance upon Macedonia from his permanent camp
   in Perrhaebia. Perseus stationed Asclepiodotus and Hippias to defend
   two passes of the Cambunian mountains, while he himself held Dium,
   which commanded the coast road from Thessaly into Macedonia. Marcius
   however, after only a rather severe skirmish with the light-armed
   troops of Hippias, effected the passage of the mountains and
   descended upon Dium. The king was taken by surprise: he had not
   secured the pass of Tempe, which would have cut off the Romans from
   retreat; and he now hastily retired to Pydna. Q. Marcius occupied
   Dium, but after a short stay there retired upon Phila, to get
   provisions and secure the coast road. Whereupon Perseus reoccupied
   Dium, and contemplated staying there to the end of the summer. Q.
   Marcius took Heracleum, which was between Phila and Dium, and made
   preparations for a second advance on Dium. But the winter (B.C.
   169-168) was now approaching, and he contented himself with seeing
   that the roads through Thessaly were put in a proper state for the
   conveyance of provisions. Livy, 43, 19-23; 44, 1-9.]

[Sidenote: Perseus lays the blame of his failure on his generals. Livy,
44, 8.]

+10.+ Having been completely worsted on the entrance of the Romans
into Macedonia, Perseus found fault with Hippias. But in my opinion it
is easy to find fault with others and to see their mistakes, but it
is the hardest thing in the world to do everything that can be done
one’s self, and to be thoroughly acquainted with one’s own affairs. And
Perseus was now an instance in point....

[Sidenote: The testudo. Livy, 44, 9.]

+11.+ The capture of Heracleum was effected in a very peculiar manner.
The city wall at one part and for a short distance was low. The Romans
attacked with three picked maniples: and the first made a protection
for their heads by locking their shields together over them so closely,
that they presented the appearance of a sloping tiled roof....

This manœuvre the Romans used also in mock fights....

_While C. Marcius Figulus, the praetor, was engaged in Chalcidice, Q.
Marcius sent M. Popilius to besiege Meliboea in Magnesia. Perseus sent
Euphranor to relieve it, and, if he succeeded, to enter Demetrias.
This he did, and was not attacked at the latter place by Popilius or
Eumenes—scandal saying that the latter was in secret communication with
Perseus. Livy_, _44, 10-13_, B.C. _169_.

[Sidenote: The Achaeans decide to co-operate actively with the Romans
in Thessaly.]

[Sidenote: Polybius sent to the Consul.]

[Sidenote: Ptolemy Physcon celebrates his anacleteria.]

+12.+ Upon Perseus designing to come into Thessaly and there decide
the war by a general engagement, as he probably would have done,
Archon and his colleagues resolved to defend themselves against the
suspicions and slanders that had been thrown upon them, by taking some
practical steps. They therefore brought a decree before the Achaean
congress, ordering an advance into Thessaly, with the full force of
the league, to co-operate energetically with the Romans. The decree
being confirmed, the Achaeans also voted that Archon should superintend
the collection of the army and the necessary preparations for the
expedition, and should also send envoys to the Consul in Thessaly, to
communicate to him the decree of the Achaeans, and to ask when and
where their army was to join him. Polybius and others were forthwith
appointed, and strictly instructed that, if the Consul approved of
the army joining him, they should at once send some messengers to
communicate the fact, that they might not be too late on the field; and
meanwhile, that Polybius himself should see that the whole army found
provisions in the various cities through which it was to pass, and
that the soldiers should have no lack of any necessaries. With these
instructions the envoys started. The Achaeans also appointed Telocritus
to conduct an embassy to Attalus, bearing the decree concerning the
restoration of the honours of Eumenes. And as news arrived about the
same time that king Ptolemy had just celebrated his _anacleteria_, the
usual ceremony when the kings come of age, they voted to send some
ambassadors to confirm the friendly relations existing between the
league and the kingdom of Egypt, and thereupon appointed Alcithus and
Pasiadas for this duty.

[Sidenote: Summer of B.C. 169.]

[Sidenote: Autumn of B.C. 169.]

[Sidenote: Q. Marcius declines the offered army of Achaeans.]

[Sidenote: Appius Claudius Cento defeated at Hyscana in B.C. 170. Livy,
43, 10.]

[Sidenote: See above, p. 372.]

+13.+ Polybius and his colleagues found the Romans moved from
Thessaly and encamped in Perrhaebia, between Azorium and Doliche.
They therefore postponed communication with the Consul, owing to the
critical nature of the occasion, but shared in the dangers of the
invasion of Macedonia. When the Roman army at length reached the
district of Heracleum, it seemed the right moment for their interview
with Q. Marcius, because he considered that the most serious part of
his undertaking was accomplished. The Achaean envoys therefore took
the opportunity of presenting the decree to Marcius, and declaring
the intention of the Achaeans, to the effect that they wished with
their full force to take part in his contests and dangers. In addition
to this they demonstrated to him that every command of the Romans,
whether sent by letter or messenger, had been during the present war
accepted by the Achaeans without dispute. Marcius acknowledged with
great warmth the good feeling of the Achaeans, but excused them from
taking part in his labours and expenses, as there was no longer any
need for the assistance of allies. The other ambassadors accordingly
returned home; but Polybius stayed there and took part in the campaign,
until Marcius, hearing that Appius Cento asked for five thousand
Achaean soldiers to be sent to Epirus, despatched Polybius with orders
to prevent the soldiers being granted, or such a heavy expense being
causelessly imposed on the Achaeans; for Appius had no reason whatever
for asking for these soldiers. Whether he did this from consideration
for the Achaeans, or from a desire to prevent Appius from obtaining
any success, it is difficult to say. Polybius, however, returned to
the Peloponnese and found that the letter from Epirus had arrived, and
that the Achaean congress had been soon afterwards assembled at Sicyon.
He was therefore in a situation of great embarrassment. When Cento’s
demand of soldiers was brought before the Congress he did not think it
by any means proper to reveal the charge which Q. Marcius had given
him privately: and on the other hand to oppose the demand, without
some clear pretext, was exceedingly dangerous. In this difficult
and delicate position he called to his aid the decree of the Roman
Senate, forbidding compliance with the written demands of commanders
unless made in accordance with its own decree. Now, no mention of such
a decree occurred in the despatch from Appius. By this argument he
prevailed with the people to refer the matter to the Consul, and by
his means to get the nation relieved of an expense which would amount
to over a hundred and twenty talents. Still he gave a great handle to
those who wished to denounce him to Appius, as having thwarted his
design of obtaining a reinforcement....

[Sidenote: Crete. The Cydonians attack and take Apollonia near Cnossus.]

+14.+ The people of Cydon at this time committed a shocking act of
indisputable treachery. Though many such have occurred in Crete,
yet this appeared to go beyond them all. For though they were bound to
Apollonia, not only by the ties of friendship, but by those of common
institutions also, and in fact by everything which mankind regard
as sacred, and though these obligations were confirmed by a sworn
treaty engraved and preserved in the temple of Idaean Zeus, yet they
treacherously seized Apollonia, put the men to the sword, plundered the
property, and divided among themselves the women, children, city, and

[Sidenote: The Cydonians ask help from Eumenes.]

+15.+ Afraid of the Gortynians, because they had narrowly escaped
losing their city in the previous year by an attack led by Nothocrates,
the Cydonians sent envoys to Eumenes demanding his assistance in virtue
of their alliance with him. The king selected Leon and some soldiers,
and sent them in haste to Crete; and on their arrival the Cydonians
delivered the keys of their city to Leon, and put the town entirely in
his hands....

[Sidenote: The Rhodians determine to send a mission to Rome, B.C. 170.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 169.]

[Sidenote: See _supra_, ch. 2.]

+16.+ The factions in Rhodes kept continually becoming more and more
violent. For when the decree of the Senate, directing that they should
no longer conform to the demands of the military magistrates but
only to those contained in the Senate’s decrees, was communicated to
them, and the people at large expressed satisfaction at the care of
the Senate for their interests; Philophron and Theaetetus seized the
occasion to carry out their policy further, declaring that they ought
to send envoys to the Senate, and to Q. Marcius Philippus the Consul,
and Gaius Marcius Figulus, the commander of the fleet. For it was by
that time known to everybody which of the magistrates designate in Rome
were to come to Greece. The proposal was loudly applauded, though some
dissent was expressed: and at the beginning of the summer Agesilochus,
son of Hegesias, and Nicagoras, son of Nicander, were sent to Rome;
Agepolis, Ariston, and Pancrates to the Consul and commander of the
fleet, with instructions to renew the friendship of the Cretans with
Rome, and to make their defence against the accusations that were being
uttered against their state; while Agesilochus and his colleagues were
at the same time to make a proposal about a license to export corn from
the Roman dominions. The speech made by these envoys to the Senate, and
the reply made by the Senate, and the successful termination of their
mission, I have already mentioned in the section devoted to Italian
affairs. But it is useful to repeat such points, as I am careful to
do, because I am obliged frequently to record the actual negotiations
of ambassadors before mentioning the circumstances attending their
appointment and despatch. For since I am recording under each year the
contemporary events in several countries, and endeavouring to take a
summary review of them all together at the end, this must of necessity
form a feature in my history.

[Sidenote: The envoys visit Q. Marcius Philippus at Heracleum.]

[Sidenote: Why do not the Rhodians stop the war between Antiochus and

[Sidenote: They endeavour to make peace between Antiochus Epiphanes and
Ptolemy Physcon.]

[Sidenote: Effect of the warm reception of their ambassadors on the

+17.+ Agepolis and his colleagues found Q. Marcius himself encamped
near Heracleum in Macedonia, and delivered their commission to him
there. In answer, he said that “He himself paid no attention to those
calumnies, and advised them not to pay any to those who ventured to
speak against Rome.” He added many other expressions of kindness,
and even wrote them in a despatch to the people of Rhodes. Agepolis
was much charmed by his whole reception; and observing this, the
Consul took him aside and said to him privately that “He wondered
at the Rhodians not trying to put an end to the war,[161] which it
would be eminently in their interests to do.” Did the Consul act
thus because he was suspicious of Antiochus, and was afraid, if he
conquered Alexandria, that he would prove a formidable second enemy to
themselves, seeing that the war with Perseus was becoming protracted,
and the war for Coele-Syria had already broken out? Or was it because
he saw that the war with Perseus was all but decided, now that the
Roman legions had entered Macedonia, and because he had confident hopes
of its result; and therefore wished, by instigating the Rhodians to
interfere between the kings, to give the Romans a pretext for taking
any measures they might think good concerning them? It would not be
easy to say for certain; but I am inclined to believe that it was the
latter, judging from what shortly afterwards happened to the Rhodians.
However, Agepolis and his colleagues immediately afterwards proceeded
to visit Gaius Marcius Figulus: and, having received from him still
more extraordinary marks of favour than from Quintus Marcius, returned
with all speed to Rhodes. When they received the report of the embassy,
and knew that the two commanders had vied with each other in warmth,
both by word of mouth and in their formal answers, the Rhodians were
universally elated and filled with pleasing expectation. But not all in
the same spirit: the sober-minded were delighted at the good feeling
of the Romans towards them; but the restless and fractious calculated
in their own minds that this excessive complaisance was a sign that
the Romans were alarmed at the dangers in which they found themselves,
and at their success not having answered to their expectations. But
when Agepolis communicated to his friends that he had a private message
from Q. Marcius to the Cretan Council about putting an end to the war
(in Syria), then Deinon and his friends felt fully convinced that the
Romans were in a great strait; and they accordingly sent envoys also to
Alexandria to put an end to the war then existing between Antiochus and

_Ptolemy Epiphanes, who died B.C. 181, left two sons, Ptolemy
Philometor and Ptolemy Physcon, and a daughter, Cleopatra, by his wife
Cleopatra, sister of Antiochus Epiphanes. After the death of Ptolemy’s
mother Cleopatra, his ministers, Eulaeus and Lenaeus, engaged in a war
with Antiochus for the recovery of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, which
had been taken by Antiochus the Great, and which they alleged had been
assigned as a dower to the late Cleopatra. Their war was singularly
unsuccessful. Antiochus Epiphanes defeated their troops at Pelusium,
took young Ptolemy Philometor captive, and advanced as far as Memphis.
Thereupon Ptolemy Physcon assumed the royal title at Alexandria as
Euergetes II., and sent envoys to Antiochus at Memphis. Antiochus,
however, treated Ptolemy Philometor with kindness, established him as
king at Memphis, and advanced to Naucratis, and thence to Alexandria,
which he besieged on the pretext of re-establishing Philometor_. B.C.
171. See _infra, bk. 29. ch. 23._

[Sidenote: Character of Antiochus IV. (Epiphanes).]

+18.+ King Antiochus was a man of ability in the field and daring in
design, and showed himself worthy of the royal name, except in regard
to his manœuvres at Pelusium....

[Sidenote: Comanus and Cineas, Physcon’s ministers, determine to send
embassies to Antiochus, B. C. 169.]

+19.+ When Antiochus was actually in occupation of Egypt, Comanus and
Cineas, after consultation with king Ptolemy Physcon, determined upon
summoning a conference of the most distinguished Egyptian nobles to
consult about the danger which threatened them. The first resolution
the conference came to was to send the Greek envoys who were then at
Alexandria as envoys to Antiochus to conclude a pacification. There
were at that time in the country two embassies from the Achaean league,
one which had been sent to renew the alliance between the league and
Egypt, and which was composed of Alcithus of Aegium, son of Xenophon,
and Pasiodes, and another sent to give notice of the festival of the
Antigoneia.[162] There was also an embassy from Athens led by Demaratus
on the subject of some present, and two sacred embassies, one in
connexion with the Panathenaea under the presidency of Callias the
pancratiast, and the other on the subject of the mysteries, of which
Cleostratus was the active member and spokesman. There were also there
Eudemus and Hicesius from Miletus, and Apollonides and Apollonius from
Clazomenae. The king also sent with them Tlepolemus and Ptolemy the
rhetorician as envoys. These men accordingly sailed up the river to
meet Antiochus....

[Sidenote: Antiochus occupies Naucratis and thence advances to

[Sidenote: Reply of Antiochus.]

[Sidenote: Their arguments.]

[Sidenote: The Greek envoys visit Antiochus and endeavour to make

+20.+ While Antiochus was occupying Egypt,[163] he was visited
by the Greek envoys sent to conclude terms of peace. He received
them courteously, devoted the first day to giving them a splendid
entertainment and on the next granted them an interview, and bade them
deliver their instructions. The first to speak were the Achaeans,
the next the Athenian Demaratus, and after him Eudemus of Miletus.
And as the occasion and subject of their speeches were the same, the
substance of them was also nearly identical. They all laid the blame
of what had occurred on Eulaeus, and referring to Ptolemy’s youth and
his relationship to himself, they intreated the king to lay aside his
anger. Thereupon Antiochus, after acknowledging the general truth of
their remarks, and even supporting them by additional arguments of his
own, entered upon a defence of the justice of his original demands. He
attempted to establish the claim of the king of Syria on Coele-Syria,
“Insisting upon the fact that Antigonus, the founder of the Syrian
kingdom, exercised authority in that country; and referring to the
formal cession of it to Seleucus,[164] after the death of Antigonus,
by the sovereigns of Macedonia. Next he dwelt on the last conquest
of it by his father Antiochus; and finally he denied that any such
agreement was made between the late king Ptolemy and his father as the
Alexandrian ministers asserted, to the effect that Ptolemy was to take
Coele-Syria as a dowry when he married Cleopatra, the mother of the
present king.” Having by these arguments not only persuaded himself,
but the envoys also, of the justice of his claim, he sailed down the
river to Naucratis. There he treated the inhabitants with humanity, and
gave each of the Greeks living there a gold piece, and then advanced
towards Alexandria. He told the envoys that he would give them an
answer on the return of Aristeides and Thesis, whom he had sent on
a mission to Ptolemy; and he wished, he said, that the Greek envoys
should all be cognisant and witnesses of their report....

[Sidenote: The evil influence of Eulaeus upon Ptolemy Philometor. He
advises him to yield to Antiochus and retire to Samothrace.]

+21.+ The eunuch Eulaeus persuaded Ptolemy to collect his money,
give up his kingdom to his enemies, and retire to Samothrace. This
will be to any one who reflects upon it a convincing proof of the
supreme mischief done by evil companions of boyhood. That a monarch
so entirely out of reach of personal danger and so far removed from
his enemies, should not make one effort to save his honour, while in
possession too of such abundant resources, and master over such wide
territory and such numerous subjects, but should at once without a
blow surrender a most splendid and wealthy kingdom,—is not this the
sign of a spirit utterly effeminate and corrupted? And if this had
been Ptolemy’s natural character, we must have laid the blame upon
nature and not upon any external influence. But since by his subsequent
achievements his natural character has vindicated itself, by proving
Ptolemy to be sufficiently resolute and courageous in the hour of
danger, we may clearly, without any improbability, attribute to this
eunuch, and his companionship with the king in his boyhood, the ignoble
spirit displayed by him on that occasion, and his idea of going to

[Sidenote: Antiochus leaves Alexandria for a time, being met by some
Roman envoys. See 29, 25.]

+22.+ After raising the siege of Alexandria, Antiochus sent envoys to
Rome, whose names were Meleager, Sosiphanes, and Heracleides, agreeing
to pay one hundred and fifty talents, fifty as a complimentary present
to the Romans, and the rest as a gift to be divided among certain
cities in Greece....

[Sidenote: Envoys from Rhodes visit Antiochus in his camp not far from

+23.+ In the course of these same days envoys sailed in from Rhodes to
Alexandria, headed by Pration, to negotiate a pacification; and a few
days afterwards presented themselves at the camp of Antiochus. Admitted
to an interview, they argued at considerable length, mentioning their
own country’s friendly feelings to both kingdoms, and the ties of blood
existing between the two kings themselves, and the advantage which
a peace would be to both. But the king interrupted the envoy in the
middle of his speech by saying that there was no need of much talking,
for the kingdom belonged to the elder Ptolemy, and with him he had long
ago made terms, and they were friends, and if the people wished now to
recall him Antiochus would not prevent them. And he kept his word....


[Sidenote: B. C. 168. Coss. L. Aemilius Paullus, C. Licinius Crassus.
A fragment of the speech of L. Aemilius before starting for Macedonia.
See Livy, 44, 22.]

+1.+ “Their one idea, expressed at parties or conversations in the
street, was, that they should manage the war in Macedonia while
remaining quietly at home in Rome, sometimes by criticising what the
generals were doing, at others what they were leaving undone. From this
the public interests never got any good, and often a great deal of
harm. The generals themselves were at times greatly hampered by this
ill-timed loquacity. For as it is the invariable nature of slander
to spread rapidly and stop at nothing, the people got thoroughly
infected by this idle talk, and the generals were consequently rendered
contemptible in the eyes of the enemy.”...

[Sidenote: In answer to an embassy from Ptolemy Physcon and his sister
Cleopatra, the Senate sends Gaius Popilius Laenas to Alexandria. Livy,
44, 19.]

+2.+ The Senate being informed that Antiochus had become master
of Egypt, and all but taken Alexandria, and conceiving that the
aggrandisement of that king was a matter affecting themselves,
appointed Gaius Popilius and others to go as ambassadors to put an end
to the war, and generally to inspect the state of affairs....

[Sidenote: Genthius joins Perseus on being supplied with 300 talents;]

[Sidenote: and also consents to join in a mission to Rhodes.]

+3.+ Hippias, and the other ambassadors sent by Perseus, to Genthius
to make an alliance with him, returned before the winter, and reported
that Genthius would undertake to join in the war with Rome if he was
paid three hundred talents and received proper securities. Thereupon
Perseus sent Pantauchus, one of his chief friends, with the following
instructions: He was to agree to pay Genthius the money; to interchange
oaths of alliance; to take from Genthius such hostages as he himself
might select, and send them at once to Macedonia; and to allow Genthius
to have such hostages from Perseus as he might name in the text of
the treaty; further, he was to make arrangements for the transport
of the three hundred talents. Pantauchus immediately started and met
Genthius at Mebeōn, in the country of the Labeates, and quickly bought
the young monarch over to join in the projects of Perseus. The treaty
having been sworn to and reduced to writing, Genthius at once sent the
hostages whose names Pantauchus had caused to be entered in the text of
the treaty; and with them he despatched Olympion to receive the oaths
and hostages from Perseus, with others who were to have charge of the
money. Pantauchus persuaded him to send also some ambassadors to join
in a mission to Rhodes with some sent by Perseus, in order to negotiate
a mutual alliance between the three states. For if this were effected,
and the Rhodians consented to embark upon the war, he showed that they
would be easily able to conquer the Romans. Genthius listened to the
suggestion, and appointed Parmenio and Morcus to undertake the mission;
with instructions that, as soon as they had received the oaths and
hostages from Perseus, and the question of the money had been settled,
they were to proceed on the embassy to Rhodes.

[Sidenote: Perseus meets the envoys from Genthius;]

+4.+ So these various ambassadors started together for Macedonia. But
Pantauchus stayed by the side of the young king, and kept reminding
him of the necessity of making warlike preparations, and urging him
not to be too late with them. He was especially urgent that he should
prepare for a contest at sea; for, as the Romans were quite unprepared
in that department on the coasts both of Epirus and Illyria, any
purpose he might form would be easily accomplished by himself and the
forces he might despatch. Genthius yielded to the advice and set about
his preparations, naval and military alike: and Perseus, as soon as
the ambassadors and hostages from Genthius entered Macedonia, set off
from his camp on the River Elpeius,[165] with his whole cavalry, to
meet them at Dium. His first act on meeting them was to take the oaths
to the alliance in the presence of the whole body of cavalry; for he
was very anxious that the Macedonians should know of the adhesion
of Genthius, hoping that this additional advantage would have the
effect of raising their courage: and next he received the hostages
and handed over his own to Olympion and his colleagues, the noblest
of whom were Limnaeus, the son of Polemocrates, and Balacrus, son of
Pantauchus. Lastly, he sent the agents who had come for the money to
Pella, assuring them that they would receive it there: and appointed
the ambassadors for Rhodes to join Metrodorus at Thessalonica, and hold
themselves in readiness to embark.

[Sidenote: and sends others to Eumenes and Antiochus.]

This embassy succeeded in persuading the Rhodians to join in the war.
And, having accomplished this, Perseus next sent Herophon, who had been
similarly employed before, on a mission to Eumenes; and Telemnastos of
Crete to Antiochus to urge him “Not to let the opportunity escape; nor
to imagine that Perseus was the only person affected by the overbearing
and oppressive conduct of Rome: but to be quite sure that, if he did
not now assist Perseus, if possible by putting an end to the war, or,
if not, by supporting him in it, he would quickly meet with the same
fate himself.”...

[Sidenote: The intrigues of Perseus and Eumenes.]

+5.+ In venturing upon a narrative of the intrigues of Perseus and
Eumenes, I have felt myself in a position of great embarrassment. For
to give full and accurate details of the negotiations, which these two
kings conducted in secret between themselves, appeared to me to be
an attempt open to many obvious criticisms and exceedingly liable to
error: and yet to pass over in complete silence what seemed to have
exercised the most decisive influence in the war, and which alone
can explain many of the subsequent events, seemed to me to wear the
appearance of a certain sluggishness and entire want of enterprise. On
the whole, I decided to state briefly what I believed to be truth, and
the probabilities and surmises on which I founded that opinion; for I
was, in fact, during this period more struck than most people at what

[Sidenote: The Romans become suspicious of Eumenes, and ostentatiously
transfer their favour to his brother Attalus.]

+6.+ I have already stated[166] that Cydas of Crete, while, serving
in the army of Eumenes and held in especial honour by him, had in the
first place had interviews with Cheimarus, one of the Cretans in the
army of Perseus, and again had approached the walls of Demetrias, and
conversed first with Menecrates, and then with Antimachus. Again, that
Herophon had been twice on a mission from Perseus to Eumenes, and that
the Romans on that account began to have reasonable suspicions of king
Eumenes, is rendered clear from what happened to Attalus. For they
allowed this prince to come to Rome from Brundisium, and to transact
the business he had on hand, and finally gave him a favourable answer
and dismissed him with every mark of kindness, although he had done
them no service of any importance in the war with Perseus; while
Eumenes, who had rendered them the most important services, and had
assisted them again and again in their wars with Antiochus and Perseus,
they not only prevented from coming to Rome, but bade him leave Italy
within a certain number of days, though it was mid-winter. Therefore
it is quite plain that some intriguing had been taking place between
Perseus and Eumenes to account for the alienation of the Romans from
the latter. What this was, and how far it went, is our present subject
of inquiry.

[Sidenote: The origin of the intrigue between Eumenes and Perseus was
the idea of the former that, both sides being tired of the war, he
might intervene with profit to himself.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 168.]

+7.+ We can easily satisfy ourselves that Eumenes cannot have wished
Perseus to be the victor in the war and become supreme in Greece. For
to say nothing of the traditional enmity and dislike existing between
these two, the similarity of their respective powers was sufficient to
breed distrust, jealousy, and, in fact, the bitterest animosity between
them. It was always open to them to intrigue and scheme against each
other secretly, and that they were both doing. For when Eumenes saw
that Perseus was in a bad way, and was hemmed in on every side by his
enemies, and would accept any terms for the sake of putting an end to
the war, and was sending envoys to the Roman generals year after year
with this view; while the Romans also were uneasy about the result,
because they made no real progress in the war until Paulus took the
command, and because Aetolia was in a dangerous state of excitement, he
conceived that it would not be impossible that the Romans would consent
to some means of ending the war and making terms: and he looked upon
himself as the most proper person to act as mediator and effect the
reconciliation. With these secret ideas in his mind, he began sounding
Perseus by means of Cydas of Crete, the year before, to find out how
much he would be inclined to pay for such a chance. This appears to me
to be the origin of their connexion with each other.

[Sidenote: The bargain attempted between Eumenes and Perseus.]

+8.+ Two kings, one of whom was the most unprincipled and the other
the most avaricious in the world, being now pitted against each
other, their mutual struggles presented a spectacle truly ridiculous.
Eumenes held out every kind of hope, and threw out every species of
bait, believing that he would catch Perseus by such promises. Perseus,
without waiting to be approached, rushed to the bait held out to him,
and made for it greedily; yet he could not make up his mind to swallow
it, to such an extent as to give up any money. The sort of huckstering
contest that went on between them was as follows. Eumenes demanded
five hundred talents as the price of his abstention from co-operating
with the Romans by land and sea during the fourth year of the war,
and fifteen hundred for putting an end to the war altogether, and
promised to give hostages and securities for his promise at once.
Perseus accepted the proposal of hostages, named the number, the time
at which they were to be sent, and the manner of their safe custody
at Cnosus. But as to the money, he said that it would be disgraceful
to the one who paid, and still more to the one who received it, to be
supposed to remain neutral for hire; but the fifteen hundred talents he
would send in charge of Polemocrates and others to Samothrace, to be
held as a deposit there. Now Perseus was master of Samothrace; but as
Eumenes, like a poor physician, preferred a retaining-fee to a payment
after work, he finally gave up the attempt, when he found that his own
craftiness was no match for the meanness of Perseus. They thus parted
on equal terms, leaving, like good athletes, the battle of avarice a
drawn one. Some of these details leaked out at the time, and others
were communicated subsequently to Perseus’s intimate friends; and he
has taught us by them that every vice is clinched, so to speak, by

[Sidenote: Reflexions on the blindness of the avaricious kings.]

[Sidenote: See Plutarch, _Aemilius_, ch. 12.]

+9.+ I add the further question from my own reflexions, whether avarice
is not also short-sighted? For who could fail to remark the folly of
both the kings? How could Eumenes on the one hand expect to be trusted
by a man with whom he was on such bad terms; and to get so large a sum
of money, when he was able to give Perseus absolutely no security for
recovering it, in case of his not carrying out his promises? And how
could he expect not to be detected by the Romans in taking so large a
sum? If he had concealed it at the time he certainly would not have
done so long. Moreover, he would have been bound at any rate, in return
for it, to have adopted the quarrel with Rome; in which he would have
been certain to have lost the money and his kingdom together, and very
probably his life also, by coming forward as an enemy of the Romans.
For if, even as it was, when he accomplished nothing, but only imagined
it, he fell into the gravest dangers, what would have happened to
him if this design had been brought to perfection? And again, as to
Perseus—who could fail to be surprised at his thinking anything of
higher importance, or more to his advantage, than to give the money and
allow Eumenes to swallow the bait? For if, on the one hand, Eumenes had
performed any part of his promises, and had put an end to the war, the
gift would have been well bestowed; and if, on the other hand, he had
been deceived of that hope, he could at least have involved him in the
certain enmity of Rome; for he would have had it entirely in his own
power to make these transactions public. And one may easily calculate
how valuable this would have been to Perseus, whether he succeeded or
failed in the war: for he would have regarded Eumenes as the guilty
cause of all his misfortunes, and could in no way have retaliated upon
him more effectually than by making him an enemy of Rome. What then was
the root of all this blind folly? Nothing but avarice. It could have
been nothing else; for, to save himself from giving money, Perseus was
content to suffer anything, and neglect every other consideration. On a
par too with this was his conduct to the Gauls and Genthius....

[Sidenote: The Rhodians take active steps to form a confederation
against Rome, in case their intervention fails.]

+10.+ The question being put to the vote at Rhodes, it was carried to
send envoys to negotiate a peace; and this decree thus decided the
relative strength of the opposite political parties at Rhodes [as has
been stated in my essay on public speaking], showing that the party for
siding with Perseus was stronger than that which was for preserving
their country and its laws. The Prytanies immediately appointed
ambassadors to negotiate the cessation of the war: Agepolis, Diocles,
and Cleombrotus were sent to Rome; Damon, Nicostratus, Agesilochus,
and Telephus to Perseus and the consul. The Rhodians went on in the
same spirit to take further steps, so that they eventually committed
themselves past all excuse. For they at once sent ambassadors to Crete,
to renew their friendly relations with the entire Cretan people, and
to urge that, in view of the dangers that threatened them, they should
throw in their lot with the people of Rhodes, and hold the same people
to be friends and enemies as they did, and also to address the separate
cities to the same effect....

[Sidenote: The manner in which this vote of the Rhodians was carried,
B.C. 168.]

+11.+ When the embassy led by Parmenio and Morcus from Genthius,
accompanied by those led by Metrodorus, arrived in Rhodes, the
assembly summoned to meet them proved very turbulent, the party of
Deinon venturing openly to plead the cause of Perseus, whilst that of
Theaetetus was quite overpowered and dismayed. For the presence of
the Illyrian galleys, the number of the Roman cavalry that had been
killed, and the fact of Genthius having changed sides, quite crushed
them. Thus it was that the result of the meeting of the assembly was
as I have described it. For the Rhodians voted to return a favourable
answer to both kings, to state that they had resolved to put an end to
the war, and to exhort the kings themselves to make no difficulty about
the terms. They also received the ambassadors of Genthius at the common
altar-hearth or Prytaneum of the city with every mark of friendship....

[Sidenote: A digression on Polybius’s method in writing history, and
his avoidance of imaginary details.]

+12.+ Other historians [have spoken in exaggerated terms][167] of the
Syrian war. And the reason is one which I have often mentioned. Though
their subjects are simple and without complications, they seek the name
and reputation of historians not from the truth of their facts, but
the number of their books; and accordingly they are obliged to give
petty affairs an air of importance, and fill out and give rhetorical
flourishes to what was originally expressed briefly; dress up actions
and achievements which were originally quite secondary; expatiate on
struggles; and describe pitched battles, in which sometimes ten or a
few more infantry fell, and still fewer cavalry. As for sieges, local
descriptions, and the like one cannot say that their treatment is
adequate, because they have no facts to give. But a writer of universal
history must pursue a different plan; and therefore I ought not to be
condemned for minimising the importance of events, if I sometimes pass
over affairs that have met with wide fame and laboured description,
or for mentioning them with brevity; but I ought to be trusted to
give to each subject the amount of discussion which it deserves. Such
historians as I refer to, when they are describing in the course of
their work the siege, say of Phanoteia, or Coroneia, or [Haliartus],
are forced to display all the contrivances, bold strokes, and other
features of a siege; and when they come to the capture of Tarentum, the
sieges of Corinth, Sardis, Gaza, Bactra, and, above all, of Carthage,
they must draw on their own resources to prolong the agony and heighten
the picture, and are not at all satisfied with me for giving a more
truthful relation of such events as they really occurred. Let this
statement hold good also as to my description of pitched battles and
public harangues, as well as other departments of history; in all of
which I might fairly claim considerable indulgence, as also in what is
now about to be narrated, if I am detected in some inconsistency in
the substance of my story, the treatment of my facts, or the style of
language; and also if I make some mistakes in the names of mountains or
rivers, or the special features of localities: for indeed the magnitude
of my work is a sufficient excuse in all these points, unless, indeed,
I am ever detected in deliberate or interested misstatements in my
writings: for such I ask no indulgence, as I have repeatedly and
explicitly remarked in the course of my history....

[Sidenote: Intemperance and brutality of Genthius.]

+13.+ Genthius, king of the Illyrians, disgraced himself by many
abominable actions in the course of his life from his addiction to
drink, in which he indulged continually day and night. Among other
things he killed his brother Plastor, who was about to marry the
daughter of Monunius, and married the girl himself. He also behaved
with great cruelty to his subjects....

_In the spring of B.C. 168 Genthius was forced to surrender to the
praetor L. Anicius Gallus (Livy, 44, 30-31). The consul L. Aemilius
Paulus found Perseus on the left bank of the Macedonian river Enipeus
in a very strong position, which was however turned by a gallant
exploit of Nasica and Q. Fabius Maximus, who made their way with a
considerable force over the mountains, thus getting on the rear of
Perseus. Livy, 44 30-35. Plutarch,_ Aemil. _15._

[Sidenote: Nasica, Fabius, and others volunteer to cross the mountains
into Macedonia by Gytheum.]

+14.+ The first man to volunteer to make the outflanking movement was
Scipio Nasica, son-in-law of Scipio Africanus, who afterwards became
the most influential man in the Senate,[168] and who now undertook
to lead the party. The second was Fabius Maximus, the eldest of the
sons of the consul Aemilius Paulus,[169] still quite a young man, who
stood forward and offered to join with great enthusiasm. Aemilius was
therefore delighted and assigned them a body of soldiers.[170]...

[Sidenote: Struggle in the bed of the Enipeus. Livy, 44, 35.] +15.+ The
Romans offered a gallant resistance by aid of their strong targets or
Ligurian shields....

[Sidenote: The Romans force the heights by way of Gytheum.]

Perseus saw that Aemilius had not moved, and did not reckon on what was
taking place, when suddenly a Cretan, who had deserted from the Roman
army on its march, came to him with the information that the Romans
were getting on his rear. Though thrown into the utmost panic he did
not strike his camp, but despatched ten thousand mercenaries and two
thousand Macedonians under Milo, with orders to advance with speed
and seize the heights. The Romans fell upon these as they were lying

+16.+ An eclipse of the moon occurring, the report went abroad, and
was believed by many, that it signified an eclipse of the king. And
this circumstance raised the spirits of the Romans and depressed those
of the Macedonians. So true is the common saying that “war has many a
groundless scare.”[172]...

_Perseus finding himself thus on the point of being outflanked retired
on Pydna, near which town Aemilius Paulus, after considerable delay,
about midsummer inflicted a crushing defeat upon him. Perseus fled to
Amphipolis, and thence to Samothrace, where he was captured by Paulus
and taken to Rome to adorn his triumph, and afterwards allowed to
live as a private person at Alba. This was the end of the Macedonian
kingdom. (Livy, 44, 36-43; 45, 1-8. Plutarch,_ Aemil. _16-23.)_

[Sidenote: The phalanx the battle of Pydna, B.C. 168.]

+17.+ The consul Lucius Aemilius had never seen a phalanx until he saw
it in the army of Perseus on this occasion; and he often confessed to
some of his friends at Rome subsequently, that he had never beheld
anything more alarming and terrible than the Macedonian phalanx: and
yet he had been, if any one ever had not only a spectator but an actor
in many battles....

Many plans which look plausible and feasible, when brought to the test
of actual experience, like base coins when brought to the furnace,
cease to answer in any way to their original conceptions....

When Perseus came to the hour of trial his courage all left him,
like that of an athlete in bad training. For when the danger was
approaching, and it became necessary to fight a decisive battle, his
resolution gave way....

As soon as the battle began, the Macedonian king played the coward and
rode off to the town, under the pretext of sacrificing to Hercules,—who
certainly does not accept craven gifts from cravens, nor fulfil
unworthy prayers....

[Sidenote: Scipio Africanus the younger, cf. Livy, 44, 44 (?)]

+18.+ He was then very young, and it was his first experience of actual
service in the field, and having but recently begun to taste the sweets
of promotion, he was keen, ambitious, and eager to be first....

[Sidenote: The Rhodian mission deliver their message too late.]

[Sidenote: Uncompromising answer of the Senate.]

+19.+ Just when Perseus had been beaten and was trying to save himself
by flight, the Senate determined to admit the ambassadors, who had
come from Rhodes to negotiate a peace, to an audience: Fortune
thus appearing designedly to parade the folly of the Rhodians on
the stage,—if we may say “of the Rhodians,” and not rather “of the
individuals who were then in the ascendant at Rhodes.” When Agesipolis
and his colleagues entered the Senate, they said that “They had come
to arrange an end to the war; for the people of Rhodes,—seeing that
the war was become protracted to a considerable length of time, and
seeing that it was disadvantageous to all the Greeks, as well as to
the Romans themselves, on account of its enormous expenses,—had come
to that conclusion. But as the war was already ended, and the wish of
the Rhodians was thus fulfilled, they had only to congratulate the
Romans.” Such was the brief speech of Agesipolis. But the Senate seized
the opportunity of making an example of the Rhodians, and produced
an answer of which the upshot was that “They did not regard this
embassy as having been sent by the Rhodians in the interests either
of the Greeks or themselves, but in those of Perseus. For if they had
meant to send an embassy in behalf of the Greeks, the proper time for
doing so was when Perseus was plundering the territory and cities of
Greece, while encamped for nearly two years in Thessaly. But to let
that time pass without notice, and to come now desiring to put an end
to the war, at a time when the Roman legions had entered Macedonia,
and Perseus was closely beleagured and almost at the end of his hopes,
was a clear proof to any one of observation that the Rhodians had sent
their embassy, not with the desire of ending the war, but to rescue and
save Perseus to the best of their ability. Therefore they deserved no
indulgence at the hands of the Romans at this time, nor any favourable
reply.” Such was the Senate’s answer to the Rhodians....

[Sidenote: Perseus, being brought a prisoner before Aemilius Paulus and
his council, refuses to reply to his questions, Paulus addresses the
king in Greek and then his council in Latin. Livy, 45, 8.]

+20.+ Then Aemilius Paulus speaking once more in Latin bade the members
of his council, “With such a sight before their eyes,”—pointing to
Perseus,—“not to be too boastful in the hour of success, nor to take
any extreme or inhuman measures against any one, nor in fact ever
to feel confidence in the permanence of their present good fortune.
Rather it was precisely at the time of greatest success, either private
or public, that a man should be most alive to the possibility of a
reverse. Even so it was difficult for a man to exhibit moderation in
good fortune. But the distinction between fools and wise was that the
former only learnt by their own misfortunes, the latter by those of

[Sidenote: Demetrius of Phalerum on mutability.]

+21.+ One is often reminded of the words of Demetrius of Phalerum. In
his treatise on Fortune, wishing to give the world a distinct view
of her mutability, he fixed upon the period of Alexander, when that
monarch destroyed the Persian dynasty, and thus expresses himself: “If
you will take, I don’t say unlimited time or many generations, but only
these last fifty years immediately preceding our generation, you will
be able to understand the cruelty of Fortune. For can you suppose, if
some god had warned the Persians or their king, or the Macedonians
or their king, that in fifty years the very name of the Persians,
who once were masters of the world, would have been lost, and that
the Macedonians, whose name was before scarcely known, would become
masters of it all, that they would have believed it? Nevertheless it
is true that Fortune, whose influence on our life is incalculable,
who displays her power by surprises, is even now I think, showing all
mankind, by her elevation of the Macedonians into the high prosperity
once enjoyed by the Persians, that she has merely lent them these
advantages until she may otherwise determine concerning them.” And this
has now come to pass in the person of Perseus; and indeed Demetrius has
spoken prophetically of the future as though he were inspired. And as
the course of my history brought me to the period which witnessed the
ruin of the Macedonian kingdom, I judged it to be right not to pass it
over without proper remark, especially as I was an eye-witness of the
transaction. It was a case I thought both for enlarging on the theme
myself, and for recalling the words of Demetrius, who appeared to me to
have shown something more than mere human sagacity in his remarks; for
he made a true forecast of the future almost a hundred and fifty years
before the event....

[Sidenote: The unexpected always happens.]

[Sidenote: Eumenes disappointed of his hope of quiet by a rising in
Galatia, and was the case now with Eumenes. He imagined that at last
his own kingdom was safe, and that he might look forward to a time of
ease, now that Perseus and the whole kingdom of Macedonia were utterly
destroyed; yet it was then that he was confronted with the gravest
dangers, by the Gauls in Asia seizing the opportunity for an unexpected

_After reigning in Memphis for a time Philometor made terms with his
brother and sister, returned to Alexandria, and there all three were
being besieged by Antiochus. See above, 28, 18._

[Sidenote: Autumn of B.C. 169.]

+22.+ After the conclusion of the battle between Perseus and the
Romans, king Eumenes found himself in what people call an unexpected
and extraordinary trouble, but what, if we regard the natural course of
human concerns, was quite an everyday affair. For it is quite the way
of Fortune to confound human calculations by surprises; and when she
has helped a man for a time, and caused her balance to incline in his
favour, to turn round upon him as though she repented, throw her weight
into the opposite scale, and mar all his successes.

[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 169-168.]

+23.+ In the Peloponnesus a mission arrived before the end of the
winter from the two kings, Ptolemy (Philometor) and Ptolemy (Physcon),
asking for help. This gave rise to repeated and animated discussions.
The party of Callicrates and Diophanes were against granting the help;
while Archon, Lycortas, and Polybius were for sending it to the kings
in accordance with the terms of their alliance. For by this time it
had come to pass that the younger Ptolemy had been proclaimed king
by the people (at Alexandria), owing to the danger which threatened
them; and that the elder had subsequently returned from Memphis,
and was reigning jointly with his sister. As they stood in need of
every kind of assistance, they sent Eumenes and Dionysodorus to the
Achaeans, asking a thousand foot and two hundred horse, with Lycortas
to command the foot and Polybius the horse. They sent a message also to
Theodoridas of Sicyon, urging him to hire them a thousand mercenaries.
For the kings chanced to have become intimately acquainted with these
particular men, owing to the transactions I have related before.
The ambassadors arrived when the Achaean congress was in session in
Corinth. They therefore came forward, and after recalling the many
evidences of friendship shown by the Achaeans to the kingdom of Egypt,
and describing to them the danger in which the kings then were,
they entreated them to send help. The Achaeans generally were ready
enough to go to the help of the kings (for both now wore the diadem
and exercised regal functions), and not only with a detachment, but
with their full levy. But Callicrates and his party spoke against it;
alleging that they ought not to meddle in such affairs at all, and
certainly not at that time, but should reserve their undivided forces
for the service of Rome. For there was a general expectation just then
of a decisive battle being fought, as Q. Philippus was wintering in

[Sidenote: Polybius advocates the cause of the Ptolemies.]

+24.+ The people were alarmed lest they should be thought to fail the
Romans in any way: and accordingly Lycortas and Polybius rose in their
turn, and, among other advice which they impressed upon them, argued
that “When in the previous year the Achaeans had voted to join the
Roman army with their full levy, and sent Polybius to announce that
resolution, Quintus Marcius, while accepting the kindness of their
intention, had yet stated that the assistance was not needed, since
he had won the pass into Macedonia. Their opponents therefore were
manifestly using the need of helping the Romans merely as a pretext
for preventing this aid being sent to Alexandria. They entreated the
Achaeans, in view of the greatness of the danger surrounding the king
of Egypt, not to neglect the right moment for acting; but keeping in
mind their mutual agreement and good services, and above all their
oaths, to fulfil the terms of their agreement.”

[Sidenote: Callicrates defeats the motion,]

[Sidenote: but at a smaller meeting at Sicyon Polybius prevails.]

The people were once more inclined to grant the aid when they heard
this: but Callicrates and his party managed to prevent the decree
being passed, by staggering the magistrates with the assertion that it
was unconstitutional to discuss the question of sending help abroad
in public assembly.[173] But a short time afterwards a meeting was
summoned at Sicyon, which was attended not only by the members of the
council, but by all citizens over thirty years of age; and after a
lengthened debate, Polybius especially dwelling on the fact that the
Romans did not require assistance,—in which he was believed not to be
speaking without good reason, as he had spent the previous summer in
Macedonia at the headquarters of Marcius Philippus,—and also alleging
that, even supposing the Romans did turn out to require their active
support, the Achaeans would not be rendered incapable of furnishing
it by the two hundred horse and one thousand foot which were to be
despatched to Alexandria,—for they could, without any inconvenience,
put thirty or forty thousand men into the field,—the majority of the
meeting were convinced, and were inclined to the idea of sending the
aid. Accordingly, on the second of the two days on which, according
to the laws, those who wished to do so were bound to bring forward
their motions, Lycortas and Polybius proposed that the aid should be
sent. Callicrates, on the other hand, proposed to send ambassadors
to reconcile the two Egyptian kings with Antiochus. So once more, on
these two motions being put, there was an animated contest; in which,
however, Lycortas and Polybius got a considerable majority on their
side. For there was a very wide distinction between the claims of the
two kingdoms. There were very few instances to be found in past times
of any act of friendship on the part of Syria to the Greeks,—though the
liberality of the present king was well known in Greece,—but from Egypt
the acts of kindness in past times to the Achaeans had been as numerous
and important as any one could possibly expect. By dwelling on this
point Lycortas made a great impression, because the distinction between
the two kingdoms in this respect was shown to be immense. For it was as
difficult to count up all the benefactions of the Alexandrine kings,
as it was impossible to find a single act of friendship done by the
dynasty of Antiochus to the Achaeans....

[Sidenote: The measure is again defeated by a trick of Callicrates.]

[Sidenote: The kings ask for Lycortas and Polybius.]

+25.+ For a time Andronidas and Callicrates kept on arguing in support
of the plan of putting an end to the war: but as no one was persuaded
by them, they employed a stratagem. A letter-carrier came into the
theatre (where the meeting was being held) who had just arrived with a
despatch from Quintus Marcius, urging those Achaeans who were of the
pro-Roman party to reconcile the kings; for it was a fact that the
Senate had sent a mission under T. Numisius to do so. But this really
made against their argument: for Titus Numisius and his colleagues
had been unable to effect the pacification, and had returned to Rome
completely unsuccessful in the object of their mission. However, as
Polybius and his party did not wish to speak against the despatch, from
consideration for Marcius, they retired from the discussion: and it
was thus that the proposal to send an aid to the kings fell through.
The Achaeans voted to send ambassadors to effect the pacification:
and Archon of Aegeira, and Arcesilaus and Ariston of Megalopolis
were appointed to the duty. Whereupon the envoys of Ptolemy, being
disappointed of obtaining the help, handed over to the magistrate the
despatch from the kings, in which they asked that they would send
Lycortas and Polybius to take part in the war....

[Sidenote: Annoyed by the two Ptolemies thus joining each other,
Antiochus renews the war, B.C. 168.]

+26.+ Forgetful of all he had written and said Antiochus began
preparing for a renewal of the war against Ptolemy. So true are the
words of Simonides,—“‘Tis hard to be good.” For to have certain
impulses towards virtue, and even to hold to it up to a certain point,
is easy; but to be uniformly consistent, and to allow no circumstances
of danger to shake a resolute integrity, which regards honour and
justice as the highest considerations, is indeed difficult....

[Sidenote: Antiochus is met near Alexandria (Livy, 45, 12) by C.
Popilius Laenas, who forces him to abstain from the war.]

+27.+ When Antiochus had advanced to attack Ptolemy in order to possess
himself of Pelusium, he was met by the Roman commander Gaius Popilius
Laenas. Upon the king greeting him from some distance, and holding out
his right hand to him, Popilius answered by holding out the tablets
which contained the decree of the Senate, and bade Antiochus read that
first: not thinking it right, I suppose, to give the usual sign of
friendship until he knew the mind of the recipient, whether he were
to be regarded as a friend or foe. On the king, after reading the
despatch, saying that he desired to consult with his friends on the
situation, Popilius did a thing which was looked upon as exceedingly
overbearing and insolent. Happening to have a vine stick in his hand,
he drew a circle round Antiochus with it, and ordered him to give his
answer to the letter before he stepped out of that circumference. The
king was taken aback by this haughty proceeding. After a brief interval
of embarrassed silence, he replied that he would do whatever the Romans
demanded. Then Popilius and his colleagues shook him by the hand, and
one and all greeted him with warmth. The contents of the despatch was
an order to put an end to the war with Ptolemy at once. Accordingly a
stated number of days was allowed him, within which he withdrew his
army into Syria, in high dudgeon indeed, and groaning in spirit, but
yielding to the necessities of the time.

[Sidenote: Popilius goes on to Cyprus and forces the army of Antiochus
to evacuate it.]

[Sidenote: The previous defeat of Perseus really secured the salvation
of Egypt.]

Popilius and his colleagues then restored order in Alexandria; and
after exhorting the two kings to maintain peaceful relations with
each other, and charging them at the same time to send Polyaratus to
Rome, they took ship and sailed towards Cyprus, with the intention of
promptly ejecting from the island the forces that were also gathered
there. When they arrived, they found that Ptolemy’s generals had
already sustained a defeat, and that the whole island was in a state
of excitement. They promptly caused the invading army to evacuate the
country, and remained there to keep watch until the forces had sailed
away for Syria. Thus did the Romans save the kingdom of Ptolemy, when
it was all but sinking under its disasters. Fortune indeed so disposed
of the fate of Perseus and the Macedonians, that the restoration of
Alexandria and the whole of Egypt was decided by it; that is to say, by
the fate of Perseus being decided previously: for if that had not taken
place, or had not been certain, I do not think that Antiochus would
have obeyed these orders.


[Sidenote: B.C. 167. Coss. Q. Aelius Paetus, M. Junius Pennus.]

[Sidenote: Attalus at Rome, is persuaded to try by the Roman help to
supplant his brother.]

+1.+ Attalus, brother of king Eumenes, came to Rome this year,
pretending that, even if the disaster of the Gallic rising had not
happened to the kingdom, he should have come to Rome, to congratulate
the Senate, and to receive some mark of its approval for having been
actively engaged on their side and loyally shared in all their dangers;
but, as it happened, he had been forced to come at that time to Rome
owing to the danger from the Gauls. Upon finding a general welcome from
everybody, owing to the acquaintance formed with him on the campaign,
and the belief that he was well disposed to them, and meeting with a
reception that surpassed his expectation, the young man’s hopes were
extraordinarily raised, because he did not know the true reason of
this friendly warmth. The result was that he narrowly escaped ruining
his own and his brother’s fortunes, and indeed the entire kingdom.
The majority at Rome were thoroughly angry with king Eumenes, and
believed that he had been playing a double game during the war, keeping
up communications with Perseus, and watching his opportunity against
them: and accordingly some men of high rank got Attalus under their
influence, and urged him to lay aside the character of ambassador for
his brother, and to speak in his own behalf; as the Senate was minded
to secure a separate kingdom and royal government for him, because
of their displeasure with his brother. This excited the ambition of
Attalus still more, and in private conversation he signified his assent
to those who advised this course. Finally, he arranged with some men of
position that he would actually appear before the Senate and deliver a
speech on the subject.

[Sidenote: Stratius is sent to dissuade Attalus from his meditated

+2.+ While Attalus was engaged on this intrigue, Eumenes, fearing
what would happen, sent his physician Stratius to Rome, putting him
in possession of the facts and charging him to employ every means to
prevent Attalus from following the advice of those who wished to ruin
their kingdom. On arriving at Rome and getting Attalus by himself, he
used a great variety of arguments to him (and he was a man of great
sense and powers of persuasion), and at length, with much trouble,
succeeded in his object, and in recalling him from his mad project.
He represented to him that “he was already practically joint-king
with his brother, and only differed from him in the fact that he wore
no diadem, and was not called king, though in everything else he
possessed an equal and identical authority: that in the future he was
the acknowledged heir to the crown, and with no very distant prospect
of possession; as the king, from the weak state of his health, was in
constant expectation of his departure, and being childless could not,
even if he wished it, leave the crown to any one else.” (For in fact
that natural son of his, who afterwards succeeded to the crown, had
not as yet been acknowledged.) “Above all, he was surprised at the
hindrance Attalus was thus interposing to the measures necessary at
that particular crisis. For they ought to thank heaven exceedingly if
they proved able, even with hearty co-operation and unanimity, to repel
the threatened attack of the Gauls; but if he should at such a time
quarrel with and oppose his brother, it was quite clear that he would
ruin the kingdom, and deprive himself both of his present power and his
future expectations, and his other brothers also of the kingdom and the
power they possessed in it.” By these and similar arguments Stratius
dissuaded Attalus from taking any revolutionary steps.

[Sidenote: Embassy to Galatia.]

+3.+ Accordingly, when Attalus appeared before the Senate, he
congratulated it on what had happened; expatiated on the loyalty and
zeal shown by himself in the war with Perseus; and urged at some
length that the Senate should send envoys to restrain the audacity
of the Gauls, and compel them to confine themselves once more to
their original boundaries. He also said something about the cities
of Aeneus and Maronea, desiring that they might be given as a free
gift to himself. But he said not a single word against the king, or
about the partition of the kingdom. The senators, supposing that
he would interview them privately on a future occasion upon these
points, promised to send the envoys, and loaded him lavishly with the
customary presents, and, moreover, promised him these cities. But when,
after receiving these marks of favour, he at once left Rome without
fulfilling any of its expectations, the Senate, though foiled in its
hopes, had nothing else which it could do; but before he had got out
of Italy it declared Aeneus and Maronea free cities,—thus rescinding
its promise,—and sent Publius Licinius at the head of a mission to
the Gauls. And what instructions these ambassadors had given to them
it is not easy to say, but it may be guessed without difficulty from
what subsequently happened. And this will be rendered clear from the
transactions themselves.

[Sidenote: Fresh embassies from Rhodes, B.C. 167. See 29, 27.]

[Sidenote: Terror of the Rhodian envoys at the threat of war.]

[Sidenote: A criticism on the speech of the Rhodian Astymedes.]

+4.+ There also came embassies from Rhodes, the first headed by
Philocrates, the second by Philophron and Astymedes. For when the
Rhodians received the answer given to the embassy of Agesipolis
immediately after the battle of Pydna, they understood the anger
and threatening attitude of the Senate towards them, and promptly
despatched these embassies. Astymedes and Philophron, observing in the
course of public and private conversations the suspicions and anger
entertained towards them at Rome, were reduced to a state of great
discouragement and distress. But when one of the praetors mounted the
Rostra and urged the people to declare war against Rhodes, then indeed
they were beside themselves with terror at the danger that threatened
their country. They assumed mourning garments, and in their various
interviews with their friends dropped the tone of persuasion or demand,
and pleaded instead, with tears and prayers, that they would not adopt
any measure of supreme severity towards them. A few days afterwards
Antony, one of the tribunes, introduced them to the Senate, and dragged
the praetor who advised the war down from the Rostra. Philophron spoke
first, and was followed by Astymedes; and, having thus uttered the
proverbial “swan’s song,” they received an answer which, while freeing
them from actual fear of war, conveyed a bitter and stern rebuke from
the Senate for their conduct. Now Astymedes considered himself to have
made a good speech on behalf of his country, but did not at all satisfy
the Greeks visiting or residing at Rome. For he afterwards published
the speech containing his argument in defence, which, to all those
into whose hands it fell, appeared absurd and quite unconvincing. For
he rested his plea not alone on the merits of his country, but still
more on an accusation of others. Comparing the good services done and
the co-operation undertaken by the others, he endeavoured to deny or
minimise them; while he exaggerated those of Rhodes as far above their
actual amount as he could. The errors of others, on the contrary, he
inveighed against in bitter and hostile terms, while those of the
Rhodians he attempted to cloak and conceal, in order that, by this
comparison, those of his own country might appear insignificant and
pardonable, those of others grave and beyond excuse, “all of whom,” he
added, “had already been pardoned before.” But this sort of pleading
can in no circumstances be considered becoming to a statesman. Take the
case of the betrayal of secrets. It is not those who, for fear or gain,
turn informers that we commend; but those who endure any torture and
punishment rather than involve an accomplice in the same misfortune.
These are the men whom we approve and consider noble. But a man who,
from some undefined alarm, exposes to the view of the party in power
all the errors of others, and who recalls what time had obliterated
from the minds of the ruling people, cannot fail to be an object of
dislike to all who hear of it.

[Sidenote: Dismayed by this answer the Rhodians endeavour to propitiate
the Senate. Livy, 45, 25.]

[Sidenote: The Senate declare Caria and Lycia free. See 22, 5.]

[Sidenote: Caunus, in Peraea, and Mylassa, in Caria, revolt.]

[Sidenote: The astuteness of the Rhodian policy.]

+5.+ After receiving the above answer Philocrates and his colleagues
immediately started home; but Astymedes and his fellows stayed where
they were and kept on the watch, that no report or observation against
their country might be made unknown to them. But when this answer of
the Senate was reported at Rhodes, the people, considering themselves
relieved of the worst fear—that, namely, of war—made light of the
rest, though extremely unfavourable. So true it ever is that a dread
of worse makes men forget lighter misfortunes. They immediately voted
a complimentary crown worth ten thousand gold pieces[174] to Rome,
and appointed Theaetetus at once envoy and navarch to convey it at
the beginning of summer, accompanied by an embassy under Rhodophon,
to attempt in every possible way to make an alliance with the Romans.
They acted thus because they wished that, if the embassy failed by
an adverse answer at Rome, the failure might take place without the
people having passed a formal decree, the attempt being made solely
on the initiative of the navarch, and the navarch having by the law
power to act in such a case. For the fact was that the republic of
Rhodes had been administered with such consummate statesmanship,
that, though it had for nearly a hundred and forty years been engaged
in conjunction with Rome in actions of the greatest importance and
glory, it had never yet made an alliance with her. Nor ought I to omit
stating the reason of this policy of the Rhodians. They wished that
no ruler or prince should be entirely without hope of gaining their
support or alliance; and they therefore did not choose to bind or
hamper themselves beforehand with oaths and treaties; but, by remaining
uncommitted, to be able to avail themselves of all advantages as they
arose. But on this occasion they were much bent upon securing this mark
of honour from Rome, not because they were anxious for the alliance,
or because they were afraid of any one else at the time except the
Romans, but because they wished, by giving an air of special importance
to their design, to remove the suspicions of such as were inclined to
entertain unfavourable thoughts of their state. For immediately after
the return of the ambassadors under Theaetetus, the Caunians revolted
and the Mylassians seized on the cities in Eurōmus. And about the same
time the Roman Senate published a decree declaring all Carians and
Lycians free who had been assigned to the Rhodians after the war with
Antiochus. The Caunian and Mylassian revolts were speedily put down by
the Rhodians; for they compelled the Caunians, by sending Lycus with a
body of soldiers, to return to their allegiance, though the people of
Cibyra had come to their assistance; and in an expedition into Eurōmus
they conquered the Mylassians and Alabandians in the field, these two
peoples having combined their forces to attack Orthosia. But when the
decree concerning the Lycians and Carians was announced they were once
more in a state of dismay, fearing that their gift of the crown had
proved in vain, as well as their hopes of an alliance....

[Sidenote: The three classes of men who in the various states got into
trouble for their conduct during the Macedonian war.]

+6.+ I have already directed my readers’ attention to the policy
of Deinon and Polyaratus. For Rhodes was not the only place which
experienced grave danger and important changes. Nearly all the states
suffered in the same way. It will therefore be instructive to take a
review of the policy adopted by the statesmen in the several countries,
and to ascertain which of them will be proved to have acted with
wisdom, and which to have done otherwise: in order that posterity in
similar circumstances of danger may, with these examples as models,
so to speak, before their eyes, be able to choose the good and avoid
the bad with a genuine insight; and may not in the last hour of their
lives dishonour their previous character and achievements, from failing
to perceive where the path of honour lies. There were, then, three
different classes of persons who incurred blame for their conduct in
the war with Perseus. One consisted of those who, while displeased at
seeing the controversy brought to a decisive end, and the control of
the world fall into the power of one government, nevertheless took
absolutely no active steps for or against the Romans, but left the
decision entirely to Fortune. A second consisted of those who were glad
to see the question settled, and wished Perseus to win, but were unable
to convert the citizens of their own states or the members of their
race to their sentiments. And a third class consisted of those who
actually succeeded in inducing their several states to change round and
join the alliance of Perseus. Our present task is to examine how each
of these conducted their respective policies.

[Sidenote: Antinous, Theodotus, and Cephalus of the Molossi are
instances of the third class.]

+7.+ In the last class were Antinous, Theodotus, and Cephalus, who
induced the Molossians to join Perseus. These men, when the results of
the campaign went completely against them, and they found themselves
in imminent danger of the worst consequences, put a bold face upon
it and met an honourable death in the field. These men deserve our
commendation for their self-respect, in refusing to allow themselves to
lapse into a position unworthy of their previous life.

[Sidenote: Several instances of the first class in Achaia Phthiotis,
Thessaly, and Perrhaebia.]

Again, in Achaia and Thessaly and Perrhaebia several persons incurred
blame by remaining neutral, on the ground that they were watching their
opportunity, and were in heart on the side of Perseus; and yet they
never let a word to that effect get abroad, nor were ever detected
in sending letter or message to Perseus on any subject whatever, but
conducted themselves with unexceptionable discretion. Such men as these
therefore very properly determined to face judicial inquiry and stand
their judgment, and to make every effort to save themselves. For it is
quite as great a sign of cowardice to abandon life voluntarily when a
man is conscious of no crime, from fear of the threats of political
opponents or of the power of the conquerors, as it is to cling to life
to the loss of honour.

[Sidenote: Instances of the second class in Rhodes, Cos, and other

Again, in Rhodes and Cos, and several other cities, there were men
who favoured the cause of Perseus, and who were bold enough to speak
in behalf of the Macedonians in their own cities, and to inveigh
against the Romans, and to actually advise active steps in alliance
with Perseus, but who were not able to induce their states to transfer
themselves to alliance with the king. The most conspicuous of such men
were in Cos the two brothers Hippias and Diomedon, and in Rhodes Deinon
and Polyaratus.

+8.+ And it is impossible not to view the policy of these men with
disapproval. To begin with, all their fellow-citizens were aware of
everything they had done or said; in the next place, the letters were
intercepted and made public which were coming from Perseus to them, and
from themselves to Perseus, as well as the messengers from both sides:
yet they could not make up their minds to yield and put themselves
out of the way, but still disputed the point. The result of this
persistence and clinging to life, in the face of a desperate position,
was that they quite ruined their character for courage and resolution,
and left not the least ground for pity or sympathy in the minds of
posterity. For being confronted with their own letters and agents,
they were regarded as not merely unfortunate, but rather as shameless.
One of those who went on these voyages was a man named Thoas. He had
frequently sailed to Macedonia on a mission from these men, and when
the decisive change in the state of affairs took place, conscious of
what he had done, and fearing the consequences, he retired to Cnidos.
But the Cnidians having thrown him into prison, he was demanded by
the Rhodians, and on coming to Rhodes and being put to the torture,
confessed his crime; and his story was found to agree with everything
in the cipher of the intercepted letters, and with the despatches from
Perseus to Deinon, and from Deinon and Polyaratus to him. Therefore it
was a matter of surprise that Deinon persuaded himself to cling to life
and submit to so signal an exposure.

[Sidenote: The vain attempts of Polyaratus to escape,]

[Sidenote: at Phaselis,]

[Sidenote: at Caunus,]

[Sidenote: and at Cibyra.]

+9.+ But in respect to folly and baseness of spirit, Polyaratus
surpassed Deinon. For when Popilius Laenas charged king Ptolemy to send
Polyaratus to Rome, the king, from a regard both to Polyaratus himself
and his country, determined not to send him to Rome but to Rhodes, this
being also what Polyaratus himself asked him to do. Having therefore
caused a galley to be prepared, the king handed him over to Demetrius,
one of his own friends, and despatched him, and wrote a despatch to the
Rhodians notifying the fact. But touching at Phaselis in the course
of the voyage, Polyaratus, from some notion or another which he had
conceived, took suppliant branches in his hand, and fled for safety to
the city altar. If any one had asked him his intention in thus acting,
I am persuaded that he could not have told it. For if he wanted to go
to his own country, where was the need of suppliant branches? For his
conductors were charged to take him there. But if he wished to go to
Rome, that was sure to take place whether he wished it or no. What
other alternative was there? Other place that could receive him with
safety to himself there was none. However, on the people of Phaselis
sending to Rhodes to beg that they would receive Polyaratus, and take
him away, the Rhodians came to the prudent resolution of sending an
open vessel to convoy him; but forbade the captain of it to actually
take him on board, on the ground that the officers from Alexandria had
it in charge to deliver the man in Rhodes. When the vessel arrived
at Phaselis, and its captain, Epichares, refused to take the man
on board, and Demetrius, who had been deputed by the king for that
business, urged him to leave the altar and resume his voyage; and when
the people of Phaselis supported his command, because they were afraid
they would incur some blame from Rome on that account, Polyaratus
could no longer resist the pressure of circumstances, but once more
went on board Demetrius’s galley. But in the course of the voyage he
seized an opportunity of doing the same again at Caunus, flying for
safety there in the same way, and begging the Caunians to save him.
Upon the Caunians rejecting him, on the grounds of their being leagued
with Rhodes, he sent messages to Cibyra, begging them to receive him
in their city, and to send him an escort. He had some claim upon this
city, because the sons of its tyrant, Pancrates, had been educated at
his house; accordingly, they listened to his request, and did what he
asked. But when he got to Cibyra, he placed himself and the Cibyratae
into a still greater difficulty than that which he caused before when
at Phaselis. For they neither dared to retain him in their town for
fear of Rome, nor had the power of sending him to Rome, because of
their ignorance of the sea, being an entirely inland folk. Eventually
they were reduced to send envoys to Rhodes and the Roman proconsul in
Macedonia, begging them to take over the man. Lucius Aemilius wrote to
the Cibyratae, ordering them to keep Polyaratus in safe custody; and to
the Rhodians to make provision for his conveyance by sea and his safe
delivery upon Roman territory. Both peoples obeyed the despatch: and
thus Polyaratus eventually came to Rome, after making a spectacle of
his folly and cowardice to the best of his ability; and after having
been, thanks to his own folly, four times surrendered—by king Ptolemy,
the people of Phaselis, the Cibyratae, and the Rhodians.

The reason of my having dwelt at some length on the story of Polyaratus
and Deinon is not that I have any desire to trample upon their
misfortunes, for that would be ungenerous in the last degree; but in
order that, by clearly showing their folly, I might instruct those who
fall into similar difficulties and dangers how to take a better and
wiser course....

[Sidenote: The columns constructed at Delphi for statues of Perseus
used by Aemilius. Autumn of B.C. 167. Livy, 45, 27.]

+10.+ The most striking illustration of the mutability and
capriciousness of Fortune is when a man, within a brief period, turns
out to have been preparing for the use of his enemies the very things
which he imagined that he was elaborating in his own honour. Thus
Perseus was having some columns made, which Lucius Aemilius, finding
unfinished, caused to be completed, and placed statues of himself on

[Sidenote: Aemilius at Corinth.]

He admired the situation of the city, and the excellent position of the
acropolis for commanding the districts on both sides of the Isthmus....

[Sidenote: At Olympia.]

Having been long anxious to see Olympia, he set out thither....

Aemilius entered the sacred enclosure at Olympia, and was struck with
admiration at the statue of the god, remarking that, to his mind,
Pheidias was the only artist who had represented the Zeus of Homer; and
that, though he had had great expectations of Olympia, he found the
reality far surpassed them....

[Sidenote: The disturbed state of Aetolia,]

+11.+ The Aetolians had been accustomed to get their livelihood from
plundering and such like lawless occupations; and as long as they
were permitted to plunder and loot the Greeks, they got all they
required from them, regarding every country as that of an enemy.
But subsequently, when the Romans obtained the supremacy, they were
prevented from this means of support, and accordingly turned upon
each other. Even before this, in their civil war, there was no horror
which they did not commit; and a little earlier still they had had a
taste of mutual slaughter in the massacres at Arsinoe;[175] they were,
therefore, ready for anything, and their minds were so infuriated that
they would not allow their magistrates to have even a voice in their
business. Aetolia, accordingly, was a scene of turbulence, lawlessness,
and blood: nothing they undertook was done on any calculation or fixed
plan; everything was conducted at haphazard and in confusion, as though
a hurricane had burst upon them....

[Sidenote: and of Epirus. See 27, 15.]

+12.+ The state of Epirus was much the same. For in proportion as the
majority of its people are more law-abiding than those of Aetolia,
so their chief magistrate surpassed every one else in wickedness and
contempt for law. For, I think, there never was and never will be a
character more ferocious and brutal than that of Charops....

[Sidenote: The selection of suspected Greeks, especially Achaeans, to
be sent to Italy, B.C. 167.]

+13.+ After the destruction of Perseus, immediately after the decisive
battle, embassies were sent on all sides to congratulate the Roman
commanders on the event. And as now all power tended towards Rome, in
every city those who were regarded as of the Romanising party were in
the ascendant, and were appointed to embassies and other services.
Accordingly they flocked into Macedonia—from Achaia, Callicrates,
Aristodamus, Agesias, and Philippus; from Boeotia, Mnasippos; from
Acarnania, Chremas; from Epirus, Charops and Nicias; from Aetolia,
Lyciscus and Tisippus. These all having met, and eagerly viewing with
each other in attaining a common object; and there being no one to
oppose them, since their political opponents had all yielded to the
times and completely retired, they accomplished their purpose without
trouble. So the ten commissioners issued orders to the other cities
and leagues through the mouths of the strategi themselves as to what
citizens were to go to Rome. And these turned out to be, for the most
part, those whom the men I have named had made a list of on party
grounds, except a very few of such as had done something conspicuous.
But to the Achaean league they sent two men of the highest rank of
their own number, Gaius Claudius and Gnaeus Domitius. They had two
reasons for doing so: the first was that they were uneasy lest the
Achaeans should refuse to obey the written order, and lest Callicrates
and his colleagues should be in absolute danger from being reputed
to be the authors of the accusations against all the Greeks,—which
was about true; and in the second place, because in the intercepted
despatches nothing distinct had been discovered against any Achaean.
Accordingly, after a while, the proconsul sent the letter and envoys
with reference to these men, although in his private opinion he did
not agree with the charges brought by Lyciscus and Callicrates, as was
afterwards made clear by what took place....

[Sidenote: Triumph of L. Anicius Gallus over the Illyrians at the
Quirinalia, February 17, B.C. 167.]

[Sidenote: A scene in a Roman theatre.]

+14.+ Lucius Anicius, who had been praetor, after his victory over the
Illyrians, and on bringing Genthius prisoner to Rome with his children,
while celebrating his triumph, did a very ridiculous thing. He sent for
the most famous artists from Greece, and having constructed an immense
theatre in the circus, he brought all the flute-players on the stage
together first. Their names were Theodorus the Boeotian, Theopompus and
Hermippus of Lysimacheia, the most celebrated of the day. He placed
them on the proscenium with the chorus, and bid them all play at once.
But on their beginning to play the tune, accompanied by appropriate
movements, he sent to them to say that they were not playing well,
and must put more excitement into it. At first they did not know what
to make of this, until one of the lictors showed them that they must
form themselves into two companies, and facing round, advance against
each other as though in a battle. The flute-players caught the idea
at once, and, adopting a motion suitable to their own wild strains,
produced a scene of great confusion. They made the middle group of the
chorus face round upon the two extreme groups, and the flute-players,
blowing with inconceivable violence and discordance, led these groups
against each other. The members of the chorus meanwhile rushed, with a
violent stamping which shook the stage, against those opposite them,
and then faced round and retired. But when one of the chorus, whose
dress was closely girt up, turned round on the spur of the moment
and raised his hands, like a boxer, in the face of the flute-player
who was approaching him, then the spectators clapped their hands and
cheered loudly. Whilst this sort of sham fight was going on, two
dancers were brought into the orchestra to the sound of music; and four
boxers mounted upon the stage, accompanied by trumpeters and clarion
players. The effect of these various contests all going on together
was indescribable. But if I were to speak about their tragic actors, I
should be thought by some to be jesting.[176]...

+15.+ It requires the same sort of spirit to arrange public games
well, and to set out great banquets and wine with fitting splendour,
as it does to draw up an army in presence of the enemy with strategic

[Sidenote: Aemilius in Epirus.]

+16.+ Aemilius Paulus took seventy cities in Epirus after the conquest
of the Macedonians and Perseus, most of which were in the country of
the Molossi; and enslaved one hundred and fifty thousand men....

[Sidenote: Release of Menalcidas.]

+17.+ In Egypt the first thing the kings did after being relieved from
the war with Antiochus was to send Numenius, one of their friends, as
an envoy to Rome to return thanks for the favours received; and they
next released the Lacedaemonian Menalcidas, who had made active use of
the occasion against the kingdom for his own advantage; Gaius Popilius
Laenas asked the king for his release as a favour to himself.[177]...

[Sidenote: Cotys, king of the Odrysae, cp. bk. 27, ch. 12.]

+18.+ At this period Cotys, king of the Odrysae, sent ambassadors to
Rome, asking for the restoration of his son, and pleading his defence
for having acted on the side of Perseus. The Romans, considering that
they had effected their purpose by the successful issue of the war
against Perseus, and that they had no need to press their quarrel with
Cotys any further, allowed him to take his son back—who, having been
sent as a hostage to Macedonia, had been captured with the children of
Perseus,—wishing to display their clemency and magnanimity, and with
the idea at the same time of binding Cotys to themselves by so great a

[Sidenote: The abject conduct of king Prusias.]

+19.+ About the same time king Prusias also came to Rome to
congratulate the Senate and the generals on their success. This Prusias
was in no sense worthy of the royal title, as we may judge from the
following facts: When the Roman envoys first appeared at his court, he
met them with shorn head and wearing a cap, toga, and shoes, and in
fact exactly in the garb worn by those recently manumitted at Rome,
whom they call _liberti_: and greeting the envoys respectfully, he
exclaimed, “Behold your freedman, who is willing to obey you in all
things and to imitate your fashions!” than which a more contemptible
speech it would be difficult to imagine. And now, again, when he
reached the entrance of the Senate-house he stopped at the door facing
the senators, and, dropping both his hands he paid reverence to the
threshold and the seated Fathers, exclaiming, “Hail, ye gods my
preservers!” seeming bent on surpassing all who might come after him
in meanness of spirit, unmanliness, and servility. And his behaviour
in the conference which he held when he had entered the Senate-house
was on a par with this; and was such as might make one blush even to
write. However this contemptible display served in itself to secure him
a favourable answer.

[Sidenote: To prevent a visit from Eumenes the Senate pass a decree
forbidding all kings to visit Rome.]

[Sidenote: Eumenes stopped at Brundisium.]

+20.+ Just as he had got his answer, news came that Eumenes was on his
way. This caused the Senators much embarrassment. They were thoroughly
incensed with him, and were entirely fixed in their sentiments towards
him; and yet they did not wish to betray themselves. For having
proclaimed to all the world that this king was their foremost and
most esteemed friend, if they now admitted him to an interview and
allowed him to plead his cause, they must either, by answering as they
really thought and in harmony with their sentiments, signalise their
own folly in having marked out such a man in past times for special
honour; or if, in deference to appearances, they gave him a friendly
answer, they must disregard truth and the interests of their country.
Therefore, as both these methods of proceeding could have consequences
of a disagreeable nature, they hit upon the following solution of the
difficulty. On the ground of a general dislike of the visits of kings,
they published a decree that “no king was to visit Rome.” Having been
informed subsequently that Eumenes had landed at Brundisium in Italy,
they sent the quaestor to convey the decree to him, and to bid him to
communicate with himself if he wanted anything from the Senate; or, if
he did not want anything, to bid him depart at the earliest possible
opportunity from Italy. When the quaestor met the king and informed him
of the decree, the latter, thoroughly understanding the intention of
the Senate, said not a single word, except that “he wanted nothing.”

[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 167-166.]

This is the way in which Eumenes was prevented from coming to Rome.
And it was not the only important result of this decree. For the Gauls
were at that time threatening the kingdom of Eumenes; and it was soon
made apparent that by this repulse the king’s allies were all greatly
depressed, while the Gauls were doubly encouraged to press on the war.
And it was in fact their desire to humiliate him in every possible way
that induced the Senate to adopt this resolution. These things were
going on at the beginning of the winter: but to all other ambassadors
who arrived—and there was no city or prince or king who had not at that
time sent an embassy of congratulation—the Senate returned a gracious
and friendly answer, except to the Rhodians; and these they dismissed
with displeasure, and with ambiguous declarations as to the future. As
to the Athenians again the Senate hesitated....

[Sidenote: The Athenians ask for the restoration of Haliartus; failing
that, to have its territory, with Delos and Lemnos themselves.]

+21.+ The first object of the Athenian embassy was the restoration of
Haliartus;[178] but when they met with a refusal on that point, they
changed the subject of their appeal and put forward their own claim
to the possession of Delos, Lemnos, and the territory of Haliartus.
No one could properly find fault with them for this, as far as Delos
and Lemnos were concerned, for they had of old laid claim to them; but
there is good reason for reproaching them in respect to the territory
of Haliartus. Haliartus was nearly the most ancient city in Boeotia;
had met with a heavy misfortune: instead of endeavouring in every
possible way to restore it,—to contribute to its utter annihilation,
and to deprive its dispossessed inhabitants of even their hopes for the
future, was an act which would be thought worthy of no Greek nation,
and least of all of the Athenians. They open their own territory to all
comers; and to take away that of others can never appear consonant with
the spirit of their State. However, the Senate granted them Delos and
Lemnos. Such was the decision in the Athenian business....

[Sidenote: The possession of these places a misfortune to Athens. See
32, 17.] As to Lemnos and Delos they had, according to the proverb,
“got the wolf by the ears:” for they suffered much ill fortune from
their quarrels with the Delians; and from the territory of Haliartus
they reaped shame rather than profit....

[Sidenote: Death of Theaetetus of Rhodes.]

[Sidenote: Caunus and Stratoniceia in Caria.]

+22.+ At this time Theaetetus being admitted into the Senate spoke
on the subject of the alliance. The Senate, however, postponed the
consideration of the proposal, and in the meantime Theaetetus died in
the course of nature, for he was more than eighty years old. But on
the arrival in Rome of exiles from Caunus and Stratoniceia, and their
admission to the Senate, a decree was passed ordering the Rhodians to
withdraw their garrisons from Caunus and Stratoniceia. And the embassy
of Philophron and Astymedes having received this answer sailed with all
speed home, alarmed lest the Rhodians should disregard the order for
withdrawing the garrisons, and so give a fresh ground for complaints....

[Sidenote: The effect of the message from the Romans in the Achaean
league. _Supra_ ch. 13.]

+23.+ In the Peloponnese, when the ambassadors arrived and announced
the answers from Rome, there was no longer mere clamour, but downright
rage and hatred against Callicrates and his party....

[Sidenote: Unpopularity of Callicrates, Adronidas, and their party.]

An instance of the hatred entertained for Callicrates and Adronidas,
and the others who agreed with them, was this. The festival of the
Antigoneia was being held at Sicyon,—the baths being all supplied with
large public bathing tubs, and smaller ones placed by them used by
bathers of the better sort,—if Adronidas or Callicrates entered one of
these, not a single one of the bystanders would get into it any more,
until the bathman had let every drop of water run out and filled it
with fresh. They did this from the idea that they would be polluted
by entering the same water as these men. Nor would it be easy to
describe the hissing and hooting that took place at the public games in
Greece when any one attempted to proclaim one of them victor. The very
children in the streets as they returned from school ventured to call
them traitors to their faces. To such height did the anger and hatred
of these men go....

[Sidenote: Joy of the people of Peraea at the Roman decree emancipating
them from Rhodes.]

+24.+ The inhabitants of Peraea were like slaves unexpectedly released
from chains, who are scarcely able to believe their present good
fortune, thinking it a change almost too great to be natural; and
cannot believe that those they meet can understand or fully see that
they are really released, unless they do something strange and out of
the ordinary course....


[Sidenote: B.C. 165. War in Crete of Cnosus and Gortyn against Rhaucus.]

+1.+ At this time the Cnosians, in alliance with the Gortynians, made
war upon the Rhaucians, and swore a mutual oath that they would not end
the war until they had taken Rhaucus.

[Sidenote: The Rhodians are again refused an alliance.]

But when the Rhodians received the decree regarding Caunus, and saw
that the anger of the Romans was not abating, after having scrupulously
carried out the orders contained in the Senate’s replies, they
forthwith sent Aristotle at the head of an embassy to Rome, with
instructions to make another attempt to secure the alliance. They
arrived in Rome at the height of summer, and, having been admitted to
the Senate, at once declared how their people had obeyed the Senate’s
orders, and pleaded for the alliance, using a great variety of
arguments in a speech of considerable length. But the Senate returned
them a reply in which, without a word about their friendship, they
said that, as to the alliance, it was not proper for them to grant the
Rhodians this favour at present....

[Sidenote: Autonomy to Galatia on conditions.]

+2.+ To the ambassadors of the Gauls in Asia they granted autonomy, on
condition that they remained within their dwellings, and went on no
warlike expeditions beyond their own frontiers....

[Sidenote: The grand festival held by Antiochus Epiphanes at Daphne, a
suburb of Antioch, sacred to Apollo.]

+3.+ When this same king (Antiochus Epiphanes) heard of the games in
Macedonia held by the Roman proconsul Aemilius Paulus, wishing to
outdo Paulus by the splendour of his liberality, he sent envoys to the
several cities announcing games to be held by him at Daphne; and it
became the rage in Greece to attend them. The public ceremonies began
with a procession composed as follows: first came some men armed in the
Roman fashion, with their coats made of chain armour, five thousand in
the prime of life. Next came five thousand Mysians, who were followed
by three thousand Cilicians armed like light infantry, and wearing gold
crowns. Next to them came three thousand Thracians and five thousand
Gauls. They were followed by twenty-thousand Macedonians, and five
thousand armed with brass shields, and others with silver shields, who
were followed by two hundred and forty pairs of gladiators. Behind
these were a thousand Nisaean cavalry and three thousand native
horsemen, most of whom had gold plumes and gold crowns, the rest having
them of silver. Next to them came what are called “companion cavalry,”
to the number of a thousand, closely followed by the corps of king’s
“friends” of about the same number, who were again followed by a
thousand picked men; next to whom came the _Agema_ or guard, which was
considered the flower of the cavalry, and numbered about a thousand.
Next came the “cataphract” cavalry, both men and horses acquiring that
name from the nature of their panoply; they numbered fifteen hundred.
All the above men had purple surcoats, in many cases embroidered with
gold and heraldic designs. And behind them came a hundred six-horsed,
and forty four-horsed chariots; a chariot drawn by four elephants and
another by two; and then thirty-six elephants in single file with all
their furniture on.

The rest of the procession was almost beyond description, but I must
give a summary account of it. It consisted of eight hundred young men
wearing gold crowns, about a thousand fine oxen, foreign delegates to
the number of nearly three hundred, and eight hundred ivory tusks.
The number of images of the gods it is impossible to tell completely:
for representations of every god or demigod or hero accepted by
mankind were carried there, some gilded and others adorned with
gold-embroidered robes; and the myths, belonging to each, according
to accepted tradition, were represented by the most costly symbols.
Behind them were carried representations of Night and Day, Earth,
Heaven, Morning and Noon. The best idea that I can give of the amount
of gold and silver plate is this: one of the king’s friends, Dionysius
his secretary, had a thousand boys in the procession carrying silver
vessels, none of which weighed less than a thousand drachmae;[179] and
by their side walked six hundred young slaves of the king holding gold
vessels. There were also two hundred women sprinkling unguents from
gold boxes; and after them came eighty women sitting in litters with
gold feet, and five hundred in litters with silver feet, all adorned
with great costliness. These were the most remarkable features of the

+4.+ The festival, including the gladiatorial shows and hunting, lasted
thirty days, in the course of which there was continual round of
spectacles. During the first five of these everybody in the gymnasium
anointed himself with oil scented with saffron in gold vessels, of
which there were fifteen, and the same number scented with cinnamon and
nard. On the following days other vessels were brought in scented with
fenugreek, marjoram, and lily, all of extraordinary fragrancy. Public
banquets were also given, at which couches were prepared, sometimes for
a thousand and sometimes for fifteen hundred, with the utmost splendour
and costliness.

The whole of the arrangements were made personally by the king. He
rode on an inferior horse by the side of the procession, ordering one
part to advance, and another to halt, as occasion required; so that,
if his diadem had been removed, no one would have believed that he
was the king and the master of all; for his appearance was not equal
to that of a moderately good servant. At the feasts also he stood
himself at the entrance, and admitted some and assigned others their
places; he personally ushered in the servants bringing the dishes;
and walking about among the company sometimes sat down and sometimes
lay down on the couches. Sometimes he would jump up, lay down the
morsel of food or the cup that he was raising to his lips, and go to
another part of the hall; and walking among the guests acknowledge the
compliment, as now one and now another pledged him in wine, or jest
at any recitations that might be going on. And when the festivity had
gone on for a long time, and a good many of the guests had departed,
the king was carried in by the mummers, completely shrouded in a robe,
and laid upon the ground, as though he were one of the actors; then,
at the signal given by the music, he leapt up, stripped, and began to
dance with the jesters; so that all the guests were scandalised and
retired. In fact every one who attended the festival, when they saw
the extraordinary wealth which was displayed at it, the arrangements
made in the processions and games, and the scale of the splendour on
which the whole was managed, were struck with amazement and wonder
both at the king and the greatness of his kingdom: but when they fixed
their eyes on the man himself, and the contemptible conduct to which he
condescended, they could scarcely believe that so much excellence and
baseness could exist in one and the same breast.[180]...

[Sidenote: Roman envoys at Antioch. Antiochus affects extreme

+5.+ After the completion of the festival, the envoys with Tiberius
Gracchus arrived, who had been sent from Rome to investigate the state
of affairs in Syria. Antiochus received them with such tact and with so
many expressions of kindness, that Tiberius not only had no suspicion
that he was meditating any active step, or cherishing any sinister
feeling on account of what had happened at Alexandria, but was even
induced by the extraordinary kindness of his reception to discredit
those who made any such suggestion. For, besides other courtesies,
the king gave up his own hall for the use of the envoys, and almost
his crown in appearance; although his true sentiments were not at all
of this kind, and he was on the contrary profoundly incensed with the

[Sidenote: B.C. 164. Complaints against Eumenes at Rome from Prusias of
Bithynia, and other parts of Asia.]

[Sidenote: The Senate’s policy in Galatia.]

[Sidenote: Failure of the mission of Gracchus.]

+6.+ A large number of ambassadors from various quarters having arrived
at Rome, the most important of which were those with Astymedes from
Rhodes, Eureus, Anaxidamus and Satyrus from the Achaeans, and those
with Pytho from Prusias,—the Senate gave audience to these last. The
ambassadors from Prusias complained of king Eumenes, alleging that he
had taken certain places belonging to their country, and had not in
any sense evacuated Galatia, or obeyed the decrees of the Senate; but
had been supporting all who favoured himself, and depressing in every
possible way those who wished to shape their policy in accordance with
the Senate’s decrees. There were also some ambassadors from certain
towns in Asia, who accused the king on the grounds of his intimate
association with Antiochus. The Senate listened to the accusers,
and neither rejected their accusations nor openly expressed its own
opinion; but acted with close reserve, thoroughly distrusting both
Eumenes and Antiochus: and meanwhile contented itself by continually
supporting Galatia and contriving some fresh security for its freedom.
But the envoys under Tiberius Gracchus, on their return from their
mission, had no clearer idea themselves in regard to Eumenes and
Antiochus than before they left Rome, nor could they give the Senate
one either. So completely had the kings hoodwinked them by the
cordiality of their reception.

[Sidenote: Rhodians appeal against the injury done to their trade, B.C.

[Sidenote: Speech of Astymedes.]

[Sidenote: The Senate is mollified by this speech and by the report of
Gracchus, and grants the alliance.]

+7.+ The Senate next called in the Rhodians and heard what they had
to say. When Astymedes entered, he adopted a more moderate and more
effective line of argument than on his former embassy. He omitted
the invectives against others, and took the humble tone of men who
are being flogged, begging to be forgiven, and declaring that his
country had suffered sufficient punishment, and a more severe one
than its crime deserved. And then he went briefly through the list of
the Rhodian losses. “First, they have lost Lycia and Caria, which had
already cost them a large sum of money, having been forced to support
three wars against them; while at the present moment they have been
deprived of a considerable revenue which they used to draw from those
countries. But perhaps,” he added, “this is as it should be: you gave
them to our people as a free gift, because you regarded us with favour;
and in now recalling your gift, because you suspect and are at variance
with us, you may seem only to be acting reasonably. But Caunus, at any
rate, we purchased from Ptolemy’s officers for two hundred talents;
and Stratoniceia we received as a great favour from Antiochus, son
of Seleucus; and from those two towns our people had a revenue of a
hundred and twenty talents a year. All these sources of revenue we
have surrendered, in our submission to your injunctions. From which it
appears that you have imposed a heavier penalty on the Rhodians for one
act of folly, than on the Macedonians that have been continually at war
with you. But the greatest disaster of all to our State is that the
revenue from its harbour has been abolished by your making Delos a free
port; and by your depriving our people of that independence by which
the harbour, as well as other interests of the States, were maintained
in suitable dignity.[181] And it is easy to satisfy yourselves of the
truth of my words. Our revenue from harbour dues amounted in past years
to one million drachmae, from which you have now taken one hundred
and fifty thousand; so that it is only too true, gentlemen of Rome,
that your anger has affected the resources of the country. Now, if the
mistake committed, and the alienation from Rome, had been shared in by
the entire people, you might perhaps have seemed to be acting rightly
in maintaining a lasting and irreconcilable anger against us; but if
the fact is made clear to you that it was an exceedingly small number
who shared in this foolish policy, and that these have all been put to
death by this very people itself, why still be irreconcilable to those
who are in no respect guilty? Especially when to every one else you
are reputed to exhibit the highest possible clemency and magnanimity.
Wherefore, gentlemen, our people having lost their revenues, their
freedom of debate, and their position of independence, in defence of
which in time past they have been ever willing to make any sacrifices,
now beg and beseech you all, as having been smitten sufficiently, to
relax your anger, and to be reconciled and make this alliance with
them: that it may be made manifest to all the world that you have put
away your anger against Rhodes, and have returned to your old feelings
and friendship towards them.” Such among others were the words of
Astymedes. He was thought to have spoken much to the point in the
circumstances; but what helped the Rhodians to the alliance more than
anything else was the recent return of the embassy under Tiberius
Gracchus. For he gave evidence, in the first place, that the Rhodians
had obeyed all the decrees of the Senate; and in the next place, that
the men who were the authors of their hostile policy had all been
condemned to death; and by this testimony overcame all opposition, and
secured the alliance between Rome and Rhodes....

[Sidenote: B.C. 165. Embassy from Achaia asking for the trial or
release of the Achaean _détenus_, who to the number of over 1000 had
been summoned to Italy in B. C. 167. See 30, 13. Pausan. 7, 10, 11.]

+8.+ After an interval the envoys of the Achaeans were admitted with
instructions conformable to the last reply received, which was to
the effect that “The Senate were surprised that they should apply to
them for a decision on matters which they had already decided for
themselves.” Accordingly another embassy under Eureus now appeared to
explain that “The league had neither heard the defence of the accused
persons, nor given any decision whatever concerning them; but wished
the Senate to take measures in regard to these men, that they might
have a trial and not perish uncondemned. They begged that, if possible,
the Senate should itself conduct the investigation, and declare who are
the persons guilty of those charges; but, if its variety of business
made it impossible to do this itself, that it should intrust the
business to the Achaeans, who would show by their treatment of the
guilty their detestation of their crime.” The Senate recognised that
the tone of the embassy was in conformity with its own injunctions, but
still felt embarrassed how to act. Both courses were open to objection.
To judge the case of the men was, it thought, not a task it ought to
undertake; and to release them without any trial at all evidently
involved ruin to the friends of Rome. In this strait the Senate,
wishing to take all hope from the Achaean people of the restitution
of the men who were detained, in order that they might obey without a
murmur Callicrates in Achaia, and in the other states those who sided
with Rome, wrote the following answer: “We do not consider it advisable
either for ourselves or for your nationalities that these men should
return home.” The publication of this answer not only reduced the men
who had been summoned to Italy to complete despair and dejection,
but was regarded by all Greeks as a common sorrow, for it seemed to
take away all hope of restoration from these unfortunate men. When it
was announced in Greece the people were quite crushed, and a kind of
desperation invaded the minds of all; but Charops and Callicrates, and
all who shared their policy, were once more in high spirits....

[Sidenote: Reduction of the Cammani in Cappadocia.]

+9.+ Tiberius Gracchus, partly by force and partly by persuasion,
reduced the Cammani to obedience to Rome....

A large number of embassies having come to Rome, the Senate gave a
reply to Attalus and Athenaeus. For Prusias, not content with earnestly
pressing his accusations himself against Eumenes and Attalus, had also
instigated the Gauls and Selgians (in Pisidia), and many others in
Asia, to adopt the same policy; consequently king Eumenes had sent his
brothers to defend him against the accusations thus brought. On their
admission to the Senate they were thought to have made a satisfactory
defence against all accusers; and finally returned to Asia, after not
only rebutting the accusations, but with marks of special honour. The
Senate, however, did not altogether cease to be suspicious of Eumenes
and Antiochus. They sent Gaius Sulpicius and Manius Sergius as envoys
to investigate the state of Greece; to decide the question of territory
that had arisen between Megalopolis and the Lacedaemonians; but, above
all, to give attention to the proceedings of Antiochus and Eumenes, and
to discover whether any warlike preparations were being made by either
of them, or any combination being formed between them against Rome....

[Sidenote: The mission, Sulpicius Gallus in Asia; he collects facts
against Eumenes.]

+10.+ Besides his other follies, Gaius Sulpicius Gallus, on arriving
in Asia, put up notices in the most important cities, ordering any one
who wished to bring any accusation against king Eumenes to meet him at
Sardis within a specified time. He then went to Sardis, and, taking his
seat in the Gymnasium, gave audience for ten days to those who had such
accusations to make: admitting every kind of foul and abusive language
against the king, and, generally, making the most of every fact and
every accusation; for he was frantic and inveterate in his hatred of

But the harder the Romans appeared to bear upon Eumenes, the more
popular did he become in Greece, from the natural tendency of mankind
to feel for the side that is oppressed....

[Sidenote: B.C. 164. Death of Antiochus Epiphanes on his return from
Susiana. See 26, 1.]

+11.+ In Syria king Antiochus, wishing to enrich himself, determined
on an armed attack upon the temple of Artemis, in Elymais. But having
arrived in this country and failed in his purpose, because the native
barbarians resisted his lawless attempt, he died in the course of
his return at Tabae, in Persia, driven mad, as some say, by some
manifestations of divine wrath in the course of his wicked attempt upon
this temple....

_Antiochus Epiphanes left a son and daughter; the former, nine years
old, was called Antiochus Eupator, and succeeded to the kingdom,
Lysias acting as his guardian. Demetrius, his cousin, son of Seleucus
Philopator, being at Rome as a hostage in place of the late Antiochus
Epiphanes, endeavoured to persuade the Senate to make him king of Syria
instead of the boy._

[Sidenote: Demetrius, son of Seleucus, and grandson of Antiochus the
Great, wishes to be restored to the kingdom of Syria.]

[Sidenote: The commissioners are also to visit Galatia, Cappadocia, and

[Sidenote: A Syrian commission appointed.]

+12.+ Demetrius, son of Seleucus, who had been long detained at Rome as
an hostage, had been for some time past of opinion that his detention
was unjust. He had been given by his father Seleucus as a pledge of his
good faith; but, when Antiochus (Epiphanes) succeeded to the throne,
he considered that he ought not to be a hostage in behalf of that
monarch’s children. However, up to this time he kept quiet, especially
as he was unable, being still a mere boy, to do anything. But now,
being in the very prime of youthful manhood, he entered the Senate
and made a speech: demanding that the Romans should restore him to
his kingdom, which belonged to him by a far better right than to the
children of Antiochus. He entered at great length upon arguments to the
same effect, affirming that Rome was his country and the nurse of his
youth; that the sons of the Senators were all to him as brothers, and
the Senators as fathers, because he had come to Rome a child, and was
then twenty-three years old.[182] All who heard him were disposed in
their hearts to take his part: the Senate however, as a body voted to
detain Demetrius, and to assist in securing the crown for the boy left
by the late king. Their motive in thus acting was, it seems to me, a
mistrust inspired by the vigorous time of life to which Demetrius had
attained, and an opinion that the youth and weakness of the boy who
had succeeded to the kingdom were more to their interest. And this was
presently made manifest. For they appointed Gnaeus Octavius, Spurius
Lucretius, and Lucius Aurelius as commissioners to arrange the affairs
of the kingdom in accordance with the will of the Senate, on the ground
that no one would resist their injunctions, the king being a mere
child, and the nobles being quite satisfied at the government not being
given to Demetrius, for that was what they had been most expecting.
Gnaeus and his colleagues therefore started with instructions, first
of all to burn the decked ships, next to hamstring the elephants, and
generally to weaken the forces of the kingdom. They were also charged
with the additional task of making an inspection of Macedonia; for the
Macedonians, unaccustomed to democracy and a government by popular
assembly, were splitting up into hostile factions.[183] Gnaeus and his
colleagues were also to inspect the state of Galatia and of the kingdom
of Ariarathes. After a time the further task was imposed on them, by
despatch from the Senate, of reconciling as well as they could the two
kings in Alexandria....

[Sidenote: Mission to Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, in regard to the
encroachments of the Gauls.]

+13.+ While this was going on at Rome, envoys from the city, under
Marcus Junius, had arrived to arbitrate on the disputes between the
Gauls and king Ariarathes. For the Trocmi, having found themselves
unable to annex any portion of Cappadocia by their unaided efforts,
and having been promptly foiled in their audacious attempts,[184]
sought refuge with the Romans, and endeavoured to bring Ariarathes
into discredit there. On this account an embassy under M. Junius was
sent to Cappadocia. The king gave them a satisfactory account of the
affair, treated them with great courtesy, and sent them away loud
in his praises. And when subsequently Gnaeus Octavius and Spurius
Lucretius arrived, and again addressed the king on the subject of
his controversies with the Gauls, after a brief conversation on that
subject, and saying that he would acquiesce in their decision without
difficulty, he directed the rest of his remarks to the state of Syria,
being aware that Octavius and his colleagues were going thither.
He pointed out to them the unsettled state of the kingdom and the
unprincipled character of the men at the head of affairs there; and
added that he would escort them with an army, and remain on the watch
for all emergencies, until they returned from Syria in safety. Gnaeus
and his colleagues acknowledged the king’s kindness and zeal, but
said that for the present they did not need the escort: on a future
occasion, however, if need should arise, they would let him know
without delay; for they considered him as one of the true friends of

_Ariarathes died soon after this embassy, and was succeeded by his son
Ariarathes Philopator. B.C. 164. Livy,_ Ep. _46._

[Sidenote: B.C. 163. Ariarathes Philopator continues his father’s
policy of friendship with Rome.]

+14.+ About this time ambassadors arrived from Ariarathes, who had
recently succeeded to the kingdom of Cappadocia, to renew the existing
friendship and alliance with Rome, and in general to exhort the Senate
to accept the king’s affection and goodwill, which he entertained,
both in their private and public capacity, for all the Romans. The
Senate, on hearing this, acceded to the request for the renewal of the
friendship and alliance, and graciously acknowledged the general amity
of the king. The chief reason for this warmth on the part of the Senate
was the report of the envoys under Tiberius, who, when sent to inspect
the state of Cappadocia, had returned full of the praises of the late
king and of his kingdom generally. It was on the credit of this report
that the Senate received the ambassadors of Ariarathes graciously, and
acknowledged the goodwill of the king....

[Sidenote: The Rhodians ask for Calynda in Caria, and for the retention
of private property in Caria and Lycia.]

[Sidenote: A colossal statue of Rome.]

+15.+ Having somewhat recovered from their previous disaster, the
Rhodians sent Cleagoras with ambassadors to Rome to ask that Calynda
should be ceded to them, and to petition the Senate that those of their
citizens who had properties in Lycia and Caria might be allowed to
retain them as before. They had also voted to raise a colossal statue
of the Roman people thirty cubits high, to be set up in the temple of

[Sidenote: The Rhodians undertake the protection of Calynda.]

+16.+ The Calyndians having broken off from Caunus, and the Caunians
being about to besiege Calynda, the Calyndians first called in the
aid of the Cnidians; and, on their sending the required support, they
held out against their enemies for a time: but becoming alarmed as to
what would happen, they sent an embassy to Rhodes, putting themselves
and their city in its hands. Thereupon the Rhodians sent a naval and
military force to their relief, forced the Caunians to raise the siege,
and took over the city....

[Sidenote: Ariarathes’s joy at the favourable answer from Rome.]

[Sidenote: He recovers the ashes of his mother and sister from Antioch.]

+17.+ When Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, had received his ambassadors
on their return from Rome, judging from the answers they brought that
his kingdom was secured, because he had gained the goodwill of Rome,
he offered a thank-offering to the gods for what had happened, and
entertained his nobles at a feast. He then sent ambassadors to Lysias
in Antioch, desiring to be allowed to bring away the bones of his
sister and mother. He determined not to say a word of blame as to the
crime that had been committed, lest he should irritate Lysias, and
so fail to effect his present object, though he was in fact greatly
incensed at it. He gave his envoys therefore instructions couched in
terms of courteous request. Lysias and his friends acceded to his
wishes; and the bones having been conveyed to Cappadocia, the king
received them in great state, and buried them next the tomb of his
father with affectionate reverence....[185]

[Sidenote: The influence of good men, Artaxias of Armenia. See 25, 2.]

Artaxias wished to kill a man, but on the remonstrances of Ariarathes
did not do so, and held him on the contrary in higher respect than
ever. So decisive is the influence of justice, and of the opinions and
advice of good men, that they often prove the salvation of foes as well
as of friends, and change their whole characters for the better....

Good looks are a better introduction than any letter....

_The quarrels of the two kings of Egypt, Ptolemy VI. Philometor and
Euergetes II. (or Ptolemy VII.) Physcon. The former had been expelled
by the latter, and had taken refuge in Cyprus, but had been restored
by a popular outbreak in his favour, and under the authority of
Commissioners sent from Rome, B.C. 164. (Livy,_ Ep. 46. _Diod._ Sic.
_fr. xi.) Fresh quarrels however broke out, in the course of which
Physcon was much worsted by his brother_, (_Diod._ Sic. _fr. of 31),
and at length it was arranged that one should reign in Egypt the other
in Cyrene. B.C. 162. (Livy,_ Ep. 47.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 162. Euergetes II. (Ptolemy Physcon), who had Cyrene as
his share, asks for Cyprus.]

[Sidenote: The members of the Commission who had been in Egypt support
the elder brother.]

[Sidenote: The object of the Senate is to divide and weaken Egypt.]

[Sidenote: The Senate decide in favour of Physcon.]

+18+. After the Ptolemies had made their partition of the kingdom, the
younger brother arrived in Rome desiring to set aside the division made
between himself and his brother, on the ground that he had not acceded
to the arrangement voluntarily, but under compulsion, and yielding to
the force of circumstances. He therefore begged the Senate to assign
Cyprus to his portion; for, even if that were done, he should still
have a much poorer share than his brother. Canuleius and Quintus
supported Menyllus, the ambassador of the elder Ptolemy, by protesting
that “the younger Ptolemy owed his possession of Cyrene and his very
life to them, so deep was the anger and hatred of the common people to
him[186]; and that, accordingly, he had been only too glad to receive
the government of Cyrene, which he had not hoped for or expected; and
had exchanged oaths with his brother with the customary sacrifices.”
To this Ptolemy gave a positive denial: and the Senate, seeing that
the division was clearly an unequal one, and at the same time wishing
that, as the brothers themselves were the authors of the division being
made at all, it should be effected in a manner advantageous to Rome,
granted the petition of the younger Ptolemy with a view to their own
interest. Measures of this class are very frequent among the Romans,
by which they avail themselves with profound policy of the mistakes
of others to augment and strengthen their own empire, under the guise
of granting favours and benefiting those who commit the errors. On
this principle they acted now. They saw how great the power of the
Egyptian kingdom was; and fearing lest, if it ever chanced to obtain a
competent head, he would grow too proud, they appointed Titus Torquatus
and Gnaeus Merula to establish Ptolemy Physcon in Cyprus, and thus to
carry out their own policy while satisfying his. These commissioners
were accordingly at once despatched with instructions to reconcile the
brothers to each other, and to secure Cyprus to the younger....

_When the Roman commissioners (see ch. 12) arrived in Syria, and
began carrying out their orders, by burning the ships and killing
the elephants, the popular fury could not be restrained; and Gnaeus
Octavius was assassinated in the gymnasium at Laodicea by a man named
Leptines. Lysias did his best to appease the anger of the Romans, by
giving Octavius honourable burial, and by sending an embassy to Rome to
protest his innocence. Appian_, Syr. 46.

[Sidenote: B.C. 162. The Senate pay little attention to Lysias’s

+19.+ News having come to Rome of the disaster by which Gnaeus Octavius
lost his life, ambassadors also arrived from king Antiochus, sent by
Lysias, who vehemently protested that the king’s friends had had no
part in the crime. But the Senate showed scant attention to the envoys,
not wishing to make any open declaration on the subject or to allow
their opinion to become public in any way.

[Sidenote: Demetrius thinks there is again a chance for him.]

[Sidenote: Polybius advises, “act for yourself.”]

[Sidenote: He however again appeals to the Senate,]

[Sidenote: and is again refused.]

But Demetrius was much excited by the news, and immediately summoned
Polybius to an interview, and consulted him as to whether he should
once more bring his claims before the Senate. Polybius advised him
“not to stumble twice on the same stone,” but to depend upon himself
and venture something worthy of a king; and he pointed out to him that
the present state of affairs offered him many opportunities. Demetrius
understood the hint, but said nothing at the time; but a short while
afterwards consulted Apollonius one of his intimate friends, on the
same subject. This man, being simple minded and very young, advised
him to make another trial of the Senate. “He was convinced,” he said,
“that, since it had deprived him of his kingdom without any just
excuse, it would at least release him from his position of hostage; for
it was absurd that, when the boy Antiochus had succeeded to the kingdom
in Syria, Demetrius should be a hostage for him.” Persuaded by these
arguments he once more obtained a hearing of the Senate, and claimed
to be relieved of his obligations as a hostage, since they had decided
to secure the kingdom to Antiochus. But, though he pleaded his cause
with many arguments, the Senate remained fixed in the same resolve as
before. And that was only what was to be expected. For they had not,
on the former occasion, adjudged the continuance of the kingdom to
the child on the ground that the claim of Demetrius was not just, but
because it was advantageous to Rome that it should be so; and as the
circumstances remained precisely the same, it was only natural that the
policy of the Senate should remain unchanged also.

[Sidenote: Demetrius resolves to escape from Rome, and again consults

+20.+ Demetrius having thus delivered himself in vain of his swan’s
song, his last appeal, and becoming convinced that Polybius had given
him good advice, repented of what he had done. But he was naturally
of a lofty spirit, and possessed sufficient daring to carry out his
resolutions. He promptly called Diodorus, who had recently arrived from
Syria, to his aid, and confided his secret purpose to him. Diodorus had
had the charge of Demetrius as a child, and was a man of considerable
adroitness, who had besides made a careful inspection of the state of
affairs in Syria. He now pointed out to Demetrius that “The confusion
caused by the murder of Octavius,—the people mistrusting Lysias, and
Lysias mistrusting the people, while the Senate was convinced that
the lawless murder of their envoy really originated with the king’s
friends,—presented a most excellent opportunity for his appearing on
the scene: for the people there would promptly transfer the crown to
him, even though he were to arrive attended by but one slave; while the
Senate would not venture to give any further assistance or support to
Lysias after such an abominable crime. Finally, it was quite possible
for them to leave Rome undetected, without any one having any idea of
his intention.” This course being resolved upon, Demetrius sent for
Polybius, and telling him what he was going to do, begged him to lend
his assistance, and to join him in contriving to manage his escape.

[Sidenote: Menyllus of Alabanda (in Caria) helps him by hiring a

There happened to be at Rome a certain Menyllus of Alabanda, on a
mission from the elder Ptolemy to confront and answer the younger
before the Senate. Between this man and Polybius there was a strong
friendship and confidence, and Polybius therefore thought him just
the man for the purpose in hand. He accordingly introduced him with
all speed to Demetrius, and with warm expressions of regard. Being
trusted with the secret, Menyllus undertook to have the necessary ship
in readiness, and to see that everything required for the voyage was
prepared. Having found a Carthaginian vessel anchored at the mouth of
the Tiber, which had been on sacred service, he chartered it. (These
vessels are carefully selected at Carthage, to convey the offerings
sent by the Carthaginians to their ancestral gods at Tyre.) He made no
secret about it but chartered the vessel for his own return voyage;
and therefore was able to make his arrangements for provisions also
without exciting suspicion, talking openly with the sailors and making
an appointment with them.

[Sidenote: Preparations for the flight.]

[Sidenote: Polybius sends a warning to Demetrius.]

+21.+ When the shipmaster had everything ready, and nothing remained
except for Demetrius to do his part, he sent Diodorus to Syria to
gather information, and to watch the disposition of the people there.
His foster-brother Apollonius took part in this expedition; and
Demetrius also confided his secret to the two brothers of Apollonius,
Meleager and Menestheus, but to no one else of all his suite, though
that was numerous. These three brothers were the sons of the Apollonius
who occupied so important a position at the court of Seleucus, but who
had removed to Miletus at the accession of Antiochus Epiphanes. As the
day agreed upon with the sailors approached, it was arranged that one
of his friends should give an entertainment to serve as an excuse for
Demetrius going out. For it was impossible that he should sup at home;
as it was his constant habit, when he did so, to invite all his suite.
Those who were in the secret were to leave the house after supper and
go to the ship, taking one slave each with them; the rest they had sent
on to Anagnia, saying that they would follow next day. It happened
that at this time Polybius was ill and confined to his bed; but he was
kept acquainted with all that was going on by constant communications
from Menyllus. He was therefore exceedingly anxious, knowing Demetrius
to be fond of conviviality and full of youthful wilfulness, lest, by
the entertainment being unduly prolonged, some difficulty should arise
from over-indulgence in wine to prevent his getting away. He therefore
wrote and sealed a small tablet; and just as it was getting dusk sent
a servant of his own, with orders to ask for Demetrius’s cupbearer and
give him the tablet, without saying who he was or from whom he came,
and to bid the cupbearer to give it to Demetrius to read at once. His
orders were carried out, and Demetrius read the tablet, which contained
the following apophthegms[187]:—

   “The ready hand bears off the sluggard’s prize.”

   “Night favours all, but more the daring heart.”

   “Be bold: front danger: strike! then lose or win,
   Care not, so you be true unto yourself.”

   “Cool head and wise distrust are wisdom’s sinews.”

[Sidenote: Demetrius takes the hint, and the voyage is safely begun.]

+22.+ As soon as Demetrius had read these lines, he understood their
purport, and from whom they came; and at once pretending that he felt
sick, he left the banquet escorted by his friends. Arrived at his
lodging, he sent away those of his servants who were not suited to
his purpose to Anagnia, ordering them to take the hunting nets and
hounds and meet him at Cerceii, where it had been his constant custom
to go boar hunting, which, in fact, was the origin of his intimacy
with Polybius. He then imparted his plan to Nicanor and his immediate
friends, and urged them to share his prospects. They all consented
with enthusiasm; whereupon he bade them return to their own lodgings,
and arrange with their servants to go before daybreak to Anagnia and
meet them at Cerceii, while they got travelling clothes and returned
to him, telling their domestics that they would join them, accompanied
by Demetrius, in the course of the next day at Cerceii. Everything
having been done in accordance with this order, he and his friends
went to Ostia, at the mouth of the Tiber, by night. Menyllus preceded
them and had a conversation with the sailors; telling them that orders
had arrived from the king which made it necessary for him to remain at
Rome for the present, and to send some of the most trustworthy of his
young men to his Majesty, to inform him of what had been done about
his brother. He should not, therefore, he said, go on board himself;
but the young men who were to sail would come about midnight. The
shipmasters made no difficulty about it, as the passage money for which
they had originally bargained was in their hands; and they had long
made all their preparations for sailing, when Demetrius and his friends
arrived about the third watch. There were altogether eight of them,
besides five slaves and three boys. Menyllus entered into conversation
with them, showed them the provisions in store for the voyage, and
commended them earnestly to the care of the shipmaster and crew. They
then went on board, and the pilot weighed anchor and started just as
day was breaking, having absolutely no idea of the real state of the
case, but believing that he was conveying some soldiers from Menyllus
to Ptolemy.

[Sidenote: The absence of Demetrius is not ascertained in Rome until
the fourth day.]

[Sidenote: The Senate is summoned, but decides not to attempt pursuit.]

[Sidenote: Commissioners appointed for Greece and Asia, B.C. 162.]

+23.+ At Rome, during the whole of the following day, no one was likely
to make any inquiry for Demetrius or those who had gone with him. For
those of his household who stayed in the city supposed him to have
gone to Cerceii; and those at Anagnia were expecting him to come there
too. The flight from Rome, therefore, was entirely unremarked; until
one of his slaves, having been flogged at Anagnia, ran off to Cerceii,
expecting to find Demetrius there; and not finding him, ran back again
to Rome, hoping to meet him on the road. But as he failed to meet him
anywhere, he went and informed his friends in Rome and the members of
his household who had been left behind in his house. But it was not
until the fourth day after his start that, Demetrius being looked for
in vain, the truth was suspected. On the fifth the Senate was hastily
summoned to consider the matter, when Demetrius had already cleared
the Straits of Messina. The Senate gave up all idea of pursuit: both
because they imagined that he had got a long start on the voyage (for
the wind was in his favour), and because they foresaw that, though
they might wish to hinder him, they would be unable to do so. But some
few days afterwards they appointed Tiberius Gracchus, Lucius Lentulus,
and Servilius Glaucia as commissioners: first to inspect the state of
Greece; and, next, to cross to Asia and watch the result of Demetrius’s
attempt, and examine the policy adopted by the other kings, and
arbitrate on their controversies with the Gauls. Such were the events
in Italy this year....

Demetrius expecting the arrival of the commissioner who was to be sent
to him....

[Sidenote: Cato on the growth of luxury.]

+24.+ The dissoluteness of the young men in Rome had grown to such
a height, and broke out in such extravagances, that there were many
instances of men purchasing a jar of Pontic salt-fish for three hundred
drachmae.[188] In reference to which Marcus Porcius Cato once said to
the people in indignation, that no better proof could be shown of the
degeneracy of the state than that good-looking slaves[189] should fetch
more than a farm, and a jar of salt-fish more than a carter....

[Sidenote: The Rhodians accept money to pay their schoolmasters, B.C.

+25.+ The Rhodians, though in other respects maintaining the dignity
of their state, made in my opinion a slight lapse at this period. They
had received two hundred and eighty thousand medimni of corn from
Eumenes, that its value might be invested and the interest devoted
to pay the fees of the tutors and schoolmasters of their sons. One
might accept this from friends in a case of financial embarrassment,
as one might in private life, rather than allow children to remain
uneducated for want of means; but where means are abundant a man would
rather do anything than allow the schoolmaster’s fee to be supplied by
a joint contribution from his friends. And in proportion as a state
should hold higher notions than an individual, so ought governments
to be more jealous of their dignity than private men, and above all a
Rhodian government, considering the wealth of the country and its high

[Sidenote: Ptolemy Physcon returning with the commissioners, collects
mercenaries in Greece, but is persuaded to disband them, B.C. 162.]

[Sidenote: He, however, takes about 1000 Cretans back with him to

[Sidenote: ch. 18.]

+26.+ After this the younger Ptolemy arrived in Greece with the Roman
commissioners, and began collecting a formidable army of mercenaries,
among whom he enlisted Damasippus the Macedonian, who, after murdering
the members of the council at Phacus, fled with his wife and children
from Macedonia, and after reaching Peraea, opposite Rhodes, and being
entertained by the people there, determined to sail to Cyprus. But
when Torquatus and his colleagues saw that Ptolemy had collected a
formidable corps of mercenaries, they reminded him of their commission,
which was to restore him “without a war,” and at last persuaded him to
go as far as Side (in Pamphylia), and there disband his mercenaries,
give up his idea of invading Cyprus, and meet them on the frontiers of
Cyrene. Meanwhile, they said that they would sail to Alexandria, and
induce the king to consent to their demands, and would meet him on the
frontiers, bringing the other king with them. The younger Ptolemy was
persuaded by these arguments, gave up the attack upon Cyprus, dismissed
the mercenaries, and first sailed to Crete, accompanied by Damasippus
and Gnaeus Merula, one of the commissioners; and, after enlisting about
a thousand soldiers in Crete, put to sea and crossed to Libya, landing
at Apis.

[Sidenote: Ptolemy Physcon invades the dominions of his brother.]

+27.+ Meanwhile Torquatus had crossed to Alexandria and was trying
to induce the elder Ptolemy to be reconciled to his brother, and
yield Cyprus to him. But Ptolemy, by alternate promises and refusals
and the like, managed to waste the time, while the younger king lay
encamped with his thousand Cretans at Apis in Libya, according to his
agreement. Becoming thoroughly irritated at receiving no intelligence,
he first sent Gnaeus Merula to Alexandria, hoping by this means to
bring Torquatus and those with him to the place of meeting. But Merula
was like the others in protracting the business: forty days passed
without a word of intelligence, and the king was in despair. The fact
was that the elder king, by using every kind of flattery, had won the
commissioners over, and was keeping them by him, rather against their
will than with it. Moreover, at this time the younger Ptolemy was
informed that the people of Cyrene had revolted, that the cities were
conspiring with them, and that Ptolemy Sympetesis had also taken their
side. This man was an Egyptian by birth, and had been left by the king
in charge of his whole kingdom when he was going on his journey to
Rome. When the king was informed of this, and learned presently that
the Cyreneans were encamped in the open country, afraid lest, in his
desire to add Cyprus to his dominions, he might lose Cyrene also, he
threw everything else aside and marched towards Cyrene. When he came
to what is called the Great Slope, he found the Libyans and Cyreneans
occupying the pass. Ptolemy was alarmed at this: but, putting half his
forces on board boats, he ordered them to sail beyond the difficult
ground, and show themselves on the rear of the enemy; while with the
other half he marched up in their front and tried to carry the pass.
The Libyans being panic-stricken at this double attack on front and
rear, and abandoning their position, Ptolemy not only got possession
of the pass, but also of Tetrapyrgia, which lay immediately below it,
in which there was an abundant supply of water. Thence he crossed
the desert in seven days, the forces under Mochyrinus coasting along
parallel to his line of march. The Cyreneans were encamped eight
thousand five hundred strong, eight thousand infantry and five hundred
cavalry: for having satisfied themselves as to the character of Ptolemy
from his conduct at Alexandria, and seeing that his government and
policy generally were those of a tyrant rather than a king, they could
not endure the idea of becoming his subjects, but were determined to
venture everything in their desire for freedom. And at last he was

[Sidenote: The Roman commission fails to secure peace between the

+28.+ At this time Gnaeus Merula also came from Alexandria, informing
the king (Physcon) that his brother would consent to none of the
proposals, but maintained that they ought to abide by the original
agreements. On hearing this, Physcon selected the brothers Comanus and
Ptolemy[190] to go as ambassadors to Rome with Gnaeus, and inform the
Senate of his brother’s selfish and haughty behaviour. At the same
time the elder Ptolemy sent away Titus Torquatus also without having
attained the object of his mission. Such was the state of things in
Alexandria and Cyrene....


[Sidenote: B.C. 161. The Senate break off relations with Ptolemy
Philometor, and encourage Ptolemy Physcon in his claim on Cyprus.]

+1.+ This year Comanus and his brother arrived at Rome on their
mission from the younger Ptolemy, and Menyllus of Alabanda from the
elder. Their interview with the Senate was the occasion of many
mutual recriminations expressed with great bitterness; and when Titus
Torquatus and Gnaeus Merula gave evidence in favour of the younger
king, and supported him with great earnestness, the Senate voted that
Menyllus and his colleagues should leave Rome within five days, and
that the treaty of alliance with the elder Ptolemy should be annulled;
but that they should send envoys to the younger to inform him of
the decree of the Senate. Publius Apustius and Gaius Lentulus were
appointed to this service, who immediately sailed to Cyrene, and with
great despatch announced to Physcon the decree of the Senate. Greatly
elated by this, Ptolemy began collecting mercenaries, and devoted his
whole attention and energies to the acquisition of Cyprus. This was
what was going on in Italy....

[Sidenote: Between the second and third Punic wars Massanissa
constantly encroached on Carthaginian territory. Both sides refer to

[Sidenote: and the Romans invariably support Massanissa.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 193, cp. Livy, 34, 62.]

+2.+ Not long before this period Massanissa resolved to try his
strength with the Carthaginians. He saw how numerous the cities
built along the lesser Syrtis were, and noticed the excellence of
the district which they call Emporia, and he had long been casting
an envious eye upon the revenues which those places produced. He
quickly possessed himself of the open part of the country, because the
Carthaginians were always averse from service in the field, and were
at that time completely enervated by the long peace. But he was unable
to get possession of the towns, because they were carefully guarded
by the Carthaginians. Both parties then referring their case to the
Roman Senate, and frequent embassies coming to Rome from both sides,
it always happened that the Carthaginians got the worst of it in the
judgment of the Romans, not on the merits of the case, but because the
judges were convinced that such a decision was in their interests. For
instance, not many years before this Massanissa was himself at the
head of an army in pursuit of Aphther, who had revolted from him, and
asked permission of the Carthaginians to go through this territory,
which they refused on the ground that it had nothing to do with him.
Owing, however, to the decisions given at Rome during this period, the
Carthaginians were put into such difficulties that they not only lost
the cities and territory, but had to pay besides five hundred talents
as mesne profits from the district. And this was the origin of the
present controversy.[191]...

[Sidenote: Further complaints against Eumenes by Prusias and the Gauls.
See 31, 4, B.C. 161.]

+3.+ Prusias sent envoys to Rome with some Gauls to accuse Eumenes; and
Eumenes in his turn sent his brother Attalus to rebut the accusations.
Ariarathes sent a present of ten thousand gold pieces, and envoys to
inform the Senate of the reception given to Tiberius Gracchus; and
generally to ask for their commands, and to assure them that he would
do anything they told him....

[Sidenote: Surrenders the murderer of Octavius.]

[Sidenote: Demetrius induces Tiberius Gracchus to salute him as king.]

+4.+ When Menochares arrived in Antioch to visit Demetrius, and
informed the king[192] of the conversation he had had with the
commission under Tiberius Gracchus in Cappadocia, the king, thinking
it a matter of the most urgent necessity to get these men on his side
as much as he could, devoted himself, to the exclusion of every other
business, to sending messages to them, first to Pamphylia, and then
to Rhodes, undertaking to do everything the Romans wished; till at
last he extracted their acknowledgment of him as king. The fact was
that Tiberius was very favourably disposed to him; and, accordingly,
materially contributed to the success of his attempt, and to his
acquisition of the royal power. Demetrius took advantage of this to
send envoys to Rome, taking with them a complimentary crown, the
murderer of Gnaeus Octavius, and with them Isocrates the critic....

[Sidenote: Ambassadors from Ariarathes.]

[Sidenote: Attalus again in Rome early in B.C. 160. Coss. L. Anicius
Gallus. M. Cornelius Cethegus.]

+5.+ At this time came ambassadors from Ariarathes, bringing a
complimentary present of ten thousand gold pieces, and announcing
the king’s faithful attachment to Rome; and of this they appealed to
Tiberius and his colleagues as witnesses. Tiberius and his colleagues
confirmed their statements: whereupon the Senate accepted the present
with warm thanks, and sent back in return presents, which with them
are the most honourable they can give—a sceptre and ivory chair. These
ambassadors were dismissed at once by the Senate before the winter. But
after them arrived Attalus when the new Consuls had already entered on
their office; as well as the Gauls who had accusations against him,
and whom Prusias had sent, with as many more from Asia. After giving
all a hearing, the Senate not only acquitted Attalus of all blame, but
dismissed him with additional marks of their favour and kindness: for
their friendship for and active support of Attalus was in the same
proportion as their hostility and opposition to king Eumenes....

[Sidenote: Reception of the ambassadors of Demetrius.]

[Sidenote: Previous career of Isocrates.]

[Sidenote: His conduct in Syria.]

+6.+ The ambassadors with Menochares arrived in Rome from Demetrius,
bringing the present of ten thousand gold pieces, as well as the man
who had assassinated Gnaeus Octavius. The Senate was for a long time
doubtful what to do about these matters. Finally they received the
ambassadors and accepted the present, but declined to receive the
men who were thus brought prisoners. Yet Demetrius had sent not only
Leptines, the actual assassin of Octavius, but Isocrates as well.
The latter was a grammarian and public lecturer; but being by nature
garrulous, boastful, and conceited, he gave offence even to the Greeks,
Alcaeus and his friends being accustomed to direct their wit against
him and hold him up to ridicule in their scholastic discussions.[193]
When he arrived in Syria, he displayed contempt for the people of the
country; and not content with lecturing on his own subjects, he took
to speaking on politics, and maintained that “Gnaeus Octavius had
been rightly served; and that the other ambassadors ought to be put
to death also, that there might be no one left to report the matter
to the Romans; and so they might be taught to give up sending haughty
injunctions and exercising unlimited power.” By such random talk he got
into this trouble.

[Sidenote: The boldness of Leptines.]

[Sidenote: Extraordinary conduct of Isocrates.]

+7.+ And there is a circumstance connected with both these men that
is worth recording. After assassinating Gnaeus, Leptines immediately
went openly about Laodicea, asserting that what he had done was just,
and that it had been effected in accordance with the will of the gods.
And when Demetrius took possession of the government, he went to the
king exhorting him to have no fear about the murder of Gnaeus, nor to
adopt any measures of severity against the Laodiceans; for that he
would himself go to Rome and convince the Senate that he had done this
deed in accordance with the will of the gods. And finally, thanks to
his entire readiness and even eagerness to go, he was taken without
chains or a guard. But directly Isocrates found himself included under
this charge, he went entirely beside himself with terror; and, after
the collar and chain were put on his neck, he would rarely touch food,
and completely neglected all care of his body. He accordingly arrived
at Rome a truly astonishing spectacle, sufficient to convince us that
nothing can be more frightful than a man, in body and soul alike,
when once divested of his humanity. His aspect was beyond all measure
terrifying and savage, as might be expected in a man who had neither
washed the dirt from his body, nor pared his nails, nor cut his hair,
for a year. The wild glare and rolling of his eyes also showed such
inward horror, that any one who saw him would have rather approached
any animal in the world than him. Leptines, on the contrary, maintained
his original view: was ready to appear before the Senate; owned plainly
to all who conversed with him what he had done; and asserted that he
would meet with no severity at the hands of the Romans. And eventually
his expectation was fully justified. [The Senate decide to keep the
question of the murder open.] For the Senate, from the idea, I believe,
that, if it received and punished the guilty men, the populace would
consider that full satisfaction had been taken for the murder, refused
almost outright to receive them; and thus kept the charge in reserve,
that they might have the power of using the accusation whenever they
chose. They therefore confined their answer to Demetrius to these
words: “He shall find all favour at our hands, if he satisfy the Senate
in accordance with the obedience which he owed to it before.”...

[Sidenote: Fruitless embassy from Achaia on behalf of Polybius and the
other Achaean detenus, B.C. 160.]

There came also ambassadors from the Achaeans, headed by Xenon and
Telecles, in behalf of their accused compatriots, and especially in
behalf of Polybius and Stratius; for lapse of time had now brought
an end to the majority, or at any rate to those of any note. The
ambassadors came with instructions couched in a tone of simple
entreaty, in order to avoid anything like a contest with the Senate.
But when they had been admitted and delivered their commission in
proper terms, even this humble tone failed to gain their end, and the
Senate voted to abide by their resolve....

[Sidenote: The small property left by Aemilius Paulus at his death is a
proof of his disinterestedness.]

[Sidenote: See 18, 35.]

[Sidenote: Polybius has the fear of Roman critics before his eyes.]

+8.+ The strongest and most honourable proof of the integrity of Lucius
Aemilius Paulus was made public after his death. For the character
which he enjoyed while alive was found to be justified at his death,
than which there can be no clearer proof of virtue. No one of his
contemporaries brought home more gold from Iberia than he; no one
captured such enormous treasures as he did in Macedonia; and yet,
though in both these countries he had the most unlimited authority, he
left so small a private fortune, that his sons could not pay his wife’s
jointure wholly from the sale of his personalty, and were obliged to
sell some of his real estate also to do so, a fact of which I have
already spoken in some detail. This forces us to acknowledge that the
fame of the men who have been admired in Greece in this respect suffers
by a comparison. For if to abstain from appropriating money, entrusted
to a man for the benefit of the depositor, deserves our admiration,—as
is said to have happened in the case of the Athenian Aristeides and the
Theban Epaminondas,—how much more admirable is it for a man to have
been master of a whole kingdom, with absolute authority to do with it
as he chose, and yet to have coveted nothing in it! And if what I say
appears incredible to any of my readers, let them consider that the
present writer was fully aware that Romans, more than any other people,
would take his books into their hands,—because the most splendid and
numerous achievements recorded therein belong to them; and that with
them the truth about the facts could not possibly be unknown, nor
the author of a falsehood expect any indulgence. No one then would
voluntarily expose himself to certain disbelief and contempt. And let
this be kept in mind throughout the whole course of my work, when I
seem to be making a startling assertion about the Romans.

[Sidenote: The origin of the friendship between Scipio Aemilianus and

[Sidenote: Young Scipio opens his heart to Polybius.]

+9.+ As the course of my narrative and the events of the time have
drawn our attention to this family, I wish to carry out fully, for the
sake of students, what was left as a mere promise in my previous book.
I promised then that I would relate the origin and manner of the rise
and unusually early glory of Scipio’s reputation in Rome; and also
how it came about that Polybius became so attached to and intimate
with him, that the fame of their friendship and constant companionship
was not merely confined to Italy and Greece, but became known to more
remote nations also. We have already shown that the acquaintance began
in a loan of some books and the conversation about them. But as the
intimacy went on, and the Achaean detenus were being distributed among
the various cities, Fabius and Scipio, the sons of Lucius Aemilius
Paulus,[194] exerted all their influence with the praetor that Polybius
might be allowed to remain in Rome. This was granted: and the intimacy
was becoming more and more close, when the following incident occurred.
One day, when they were all three coming out of the house of Fabius, it
happened that Fabius left them to go to the Forum, and that Polybius
went in another direction with Scipio. As they were walking along, in
a quiet and subdued voice, and with the blood mounting to his cheeks,
Scipio said, “Why is it, Polybius, that though I and my brother eat
at the same table, you address all your conversation and all your
questions and explanations to him, and pass me over altogether? Of
course you too have the same opinion of me as I hear the rest of the
city has. For I am considered by everybody, I hear, to be a mild effete
person, and far removed from the true Roman character and ways, because
I don’t care for pleading in the law courts. And they say that the
family I come of requires a different kind of representative, and not
the sort that I am. That is what annoys me most.”

[Sidenote: Scipio Aemilianus, b. B.C. 185.]

[Sidenote: Polybius is somewhat alarmed at the responsibility.]

+10.+ Polybius was taken aback by the opening words of the young man’s
speech (for he was only just eighteen), and said, “In heaven’s name,
Scipio, don’t say such things, or take into your head such an idea.
It is not from any want of appreciation of you, or any intention of
slighting you, that I have acted as I have done: far from it! It is
merely that, your brother being the elder, I begin and end my remarks
with him, and address my explanations and counsels to him, in the
belief that you share the same opinions. However, I am delighted to
hear you say now that you appear to yourself to be somewhat less
spirited than is becoming to members of your family: for you show
by this that you have a really high spirit, and I should gladly
devote myself to helping you to speak or act in any way worthy of
your ancestors. As for learning, to which I see you and your brother
devoting yourselves at present with so much earnestness and zeal, you
will find plenty of people to help you both; for I see that a large
number of such learned men from Greece are finding their way into Rome
at the present time. But as to the points which you say are just now
vexing you, I think you will not find any one more fitted to support
and assist you than myself.” While Polybius was still speaking the
young man seized his right hand with both of his, and pressing it
warmly, said, “Oh that I might see the day on which you would devote
your first attention to me, and join your life with mine. From that
moment I shall think myself worthy both of my family and my ancestors.”
Polybius was partly delighted at the sight of the young man’s
enthusiasm and affection, and partly embarrassed by the thought of the
high position of his family and the wealth of its members. However,
from the hour of this mutual confidence the young man never left the
side of Polybius, but regarded his society as his first and dearest

[Sidenote: Scipio's high character for continence as a young man.]

[Sidenote: The deterioration in Roman morals and its causes.]

+11.+ From that time forward they continually gave each other practical
proof of an affection which recalled the relationship of father and
son, or of kinsmen of the same blood. The first impulse and ambition
of a noble kind with which he was inspired was the desire to maintain
a character for chastity, and to be superior to the standard observed
in that respect among his contemporaries. This was a glory which,
great and difficult as it generally is, was not hard to gain at that
period in Rome, owing to the general deterioration of morals. Some had
wasted their energies on favourite youths; others on mistresses; and
a great many on banquets enlivened with poetry and wine, and all the
extravagant expenditure which they entailed, having quickly caught
during the war with Perseus the dissoluteness of Greek manners in
this respect. And to such monstrous lengths had this debauchery gone
among the young men, that many of them had given a talent for a young
favourite. This dissoluteness had as it were burst into flame at this
period: in the first place, from the prevalent idea that, owing to
the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy, universal dominion was
now secured to them beyond dispute; and in the second place, from
the immense difference made, both in public and private wealth and
splendour, by the importation of the riches of Macedonia into Rome.
Scipio, however, set his heart on a different path in life; and by a
steady resistance to his appetites, and by conforming his whole conduct
to a consistent and undeviating standard, in about the first five years
after this secured a general recognition of his character for goodness
and purity.

[Sidenote: Scipio’s liberality to his mother.]

+12.+ His next object was to cultivate lofty sentiments in regard
to money, and to maintain a higher standard of disinterestedness
than other people. In this respect he had an excellent start in his
association with his natural father (L. Aemilius): but he also had good
natural impulses towards the right; and chance contributed much to his
success in this particular aim. For he first lost the mother of his
adoptive father, who was the sister of his natural father Lucius, and
wife of his adoptive grandfather, Scipio the Great. She left a large
fortune, to which he was heir, and which gave him the first opportunity
of giving a proof of his principles. Aemilia, for that was this lady’s
name, was accustomed to attend the women’s processions in great state,
as sharing the life and high fortune of Scipio. For besides the
magnificence of her dress and carriage, the baskets, cups, and such
implements for the sacrifice, which were carried in her train, were all
of silver or gold on great occasions; and the number of maid-servants
and other domestics that made up her train was in proportion to this
splendour. All this establishment, immediately after Aemilia’s funeral,
Scipio presented to his own mother, who had long before been divorced
by his father Lucius, and was badly off considering the splendour of
her birth.[195] She had therefore in previous years refrained from
taking part in grand public processions; but now, as there chanced
to be an important state sacrifice, she appeared surrounded with all
the splendour and wealth which had once been Aemilia’s, using among
other things the same muleteers, pair of mules, and carriage. The
ladies, therefore, who saw it were much impressed by the kindness and
liberality of Scipio, and all raised their hands to heaven and prayed
for blessings upon him. This act, indeed, would be thought honourable
anywhere, but at Rome it was quite astonishing: for there no one ever
thinks of giving any of his private property to any one if he can help
it. This was the beginning of Scipio’s reputation for nobility of
character, and it spread very widely,—for women are talkative and prone
to exaggeration whenever they feel warmly.

[Sidenote: Scipio’s liberality to his cousins, sisters to his adoptive

+13.+ The next instance was his conduct to the daughters of the
Great Scipio, sisters to his adoptive father.[196] When he took the
inheritance he was bound to pay them their portion. For their father
covenanted to give each of his two daughters a marriage portion of
fifty talents. Half of this their mother paid down at once to their
husbands, but left the other half undischarged when she died. Now, the
Roman law enjoins the payment of money due to women as dowry in three
annual instalments, the personal outfit having been first paid within
ten months according to custom.[197] But Scipio instructed his banker
at once to pay the twenty-five talents to each within the ten months.
When, therefore, Tiberius Gracchus and Scipio Nasica, for they were the
husbands of these ladies, called on the banker at the expiration of the
ten months, and asked whether Scipio had given him any instructions as
to the money, he told them they might have it at once, and proceeded
to enter the transfer of twenty-five talents to each.[198] They then
said that he had made a mistake, for they had no claim for the whole as
yet, but only took a third according to the law; and upon the banker
answering that such were his instructions from Scipio, they could not
believe him, and went to call on the young man, supposing him to have
made a mistake. And, indeed, their feelings were natural: for at Rome,
so far from paying fifty talents three years in advance, no one will
pay a single talent before the appointed day; so excessively particular
are they about money, and so profitable do they consider time. However,
when they reached Scipio and asked him what instructions he had given
his banker, on his replying, “To pay both sisters the whole sum due to
them,” they told him he had made a mistake; and with a show of friendly
regard pointed out to him that, according to the laws, he had the use
of the money for a considerable time longer. But Scipio replied that
he was quite aware of all that; but that close reckoning and legal
exactness were for strangers; with relations and friends he would do
his best to behave straightforwardly and liberally. He therefore bade
them draw on the banker for the whole sum. When Tiberius and Nasica
heard this they returned home in silence, quite confounded at the
magnanimity of Scipio, and condemning themselves for meanness, though
they were men of as high a character as any at Rome.

[Sidenote: The liberality of Scipio to his brother and sisters, B.C.

+14.+ Two years afterwards, when his natural father, Lucius Aemilius,
died, and left him and his brother Fabius joint heirs to his property,
he did an act honourable to himself and worthy to be recorded. Lucius
died without children in the eyes of the law, for the two elder had
been adopted into other families, and the other sons, whom he was
bringing up to be the successors to himself and to continue his family,
all died;[199] he therefore left his property to these two. But Scipio,
perceiving that his brother was worse off than himself, renounced the
whole of his share of the inheritance, though the property was valued
altogether at over sixty talents, with a view of thus putting Fabius
on an equality with himself in point of wealth. This was much talked
about; but he afterwards gave a still clearer proof of his liberality.
For when his brother wished to give some gladiatorial games in honour
of his father, but was unable to support the expense, because of the
enormous costliness of such things, Scipio contributed half of this
also from his own pocket. Now the cost of such an exhibition, if it
is done on a large scale, does not amount in all to less than thirty
talents. While the fame of his liberality to his mother was still
fresh, she died; and so far from taking back any part of the wealth he
had recently bestowed on her, of which I have just spoken, Scipio gave
it and the entire residue of his mother’s property to his sisters,[200]
though they had no legal claim at all upon it. Accordingly his sisters
again adopted the splendour and retinue which Aemilia had employed
in the public processions; and once more the liberality and family
affection of Scipio were recalled to the minds of the people.

With such recommendations dating from his earliest years, Publius
Scipio sustained the reputation for high morality and good principles,
which he had won by the expenditure of perhaps sixty talents, for
that was the sum which he bestowed from his own property. And this
reputation for goodness did not depend so much on the amount of the
money, as on the seasonableness of the gift and the graciousness with
which it was bestowed. By his strict chastity, also, he not only saved
his purse, but by refraining from many irregular pleasures he gained
sound bodily health and a vigorous constitution, which accompanied
him through the whole of his life and repaid him with many pleasures,
and noble compensations for the immediate pleasures from which he had
formerly abstained.

[Sidenote: Scipio’s physical strength and courage were confirmed by the
exercise of hunting in Macedonia,]

[Sidenote: and his taste continued after his return to Rome, and was
encouraged by Polybius.]

+15.+ Courage, however, is the most important element of character for
public life in every country, but especially in Rome: and he therefore
was bound to give all his most serious attention to it. In this he
was well seconded by Fortune also. For as the Macedonian kings were
especially eager about hunting, and the Macedonians devoted the most
suitable districts to the preservation of game, these places were
carefully guarded during all the war time, as they had been before, and
yet had not been hunted the whole of the four years owing to the public
disturbances: the consequence was that they were full of every kind of
animal. But when the war was decided, Lucius Aemilius, thinking that
hunting was the best training for body and courage his young soldiers
could have, put the royal huntsmen under the charge of Scipio, and
gave him entire authority over all matters connected with the hunting.
Scipio accepted the duty, and, looking upon himself as in a quasi-royal
position, devoted his whole time to this business, as long as the army
remained in Macedonia after the battle of Pydna. Having then ample
opportunity for following this kind of pursuit, and being in the very
prime of his youth and naturally disposed to it, the taste for hunting
which he acquired became permanent. Accordingly when he returned to
Rome, and found his taste supported by a corresponding enthusiasm on
the part of Polybius, the time that other young men spent in law courts
and formal visits,[201] haunting the Forum and endeavouring thereby to
ingratiate themselves with the people, Scipio devoted to hunting; and,
by continually displaying brilliant and memorable acts of prowess, won
a greater reputation than others, whose only chance of gaining credit
was by inflicting some damage on one of their fellow-citizens,—for
that was the usual result of these law proceedings. Scipio, on the
other hand, without inflicting annoyance on any one, gained a popular
reputation for manly courage, rivalling eloquence by action. The result
was that in a short time he obtained a more decided superiority of
position over his contemporaries, than any Roman is remembered to have
done; although he struck out a path for his ambition which, with a view
to Roman customs and ideas, was quite different from that of others.

[Sidenote: Scipio’s subsequent success, therefore, was the natural
result of his early conduct, and not the offspring of chance.]

+16.+ I have spoken somewhat at length on the character of Scipio,
because I thought that such a story would be agreeable to the older,
and useful to the younger among my readers. But especially because
I wished to make what I have to tell in my following books appear
credible; that no one may feel any difficulty because of the apparent
strangeness of what happened to this man; nor deprive him of the credit
of achievements which were the natural consequences of his prudence,
and attribute them to Fortune and chance. I must now return from this
digression to the regular course of my history....

[Sidenote: The Delians having been allowed to leave their island with
“all their property,” found many occasions of legal disputes with the
Athenians, to whom the island was granted. See 30, 21. They remove
to Achaia, and sue the Athenians under the Achaean convention. Roman
decision against Athens.]

+17.+ Thearidas and Stephanus conducted a mission from Athens and the
Achaeans on the matter of the reprisals. For when the Delians were
ordered, in answer to an embassy to Rome after Delos had been granted
to Athens, to depart from the island, but to take all their goods with
them, they removed to Achaia; and having been enrolled as citizens of
the league, wished to have their claims upon the Athenians decided,
according to the convention existing between the Achaeans and Athens.
But, on the Athenians denying that they had any right to plead under
that agreement, the Delians demanded from the Achaeans license to make
reprisals on the Athenians. The latter, therefore, sent an embassy to
Rome on these points, and were answered that decisions made by the
Achaeans according to their laws concerning the Delians were to be

[Sidenote: Piracies of the Dalmatians on the island of Issa, B.C. 158.]

+18.+ The people of Issa having often sent embassies to Rome,
complaining that the Dalmatians damaged their territory and the cities
subject to them,—meaning thereby Epetium and Tragyrium,—and the Daorsi
also bringing similar complaints, the Senate sent a commission under
Gaius Fannius to inspect the state of Illyria, with special reference
to the Dalmatians. This people had been subject to Pleuratus as long
as he was alive; but when he died, and was succeeded on the throne
by Genthius, they revolted, overran the bordering territories, and
reduced the neighbouring cities, some of which even paid them a tribute
of cattle and corn. So Fannius and his colleague started on their

[Sidenote: Death of Lyciscus.]

+19.+ Lyciscus the Aetolian was a factious turbulent agitator, and
directly he was killed the Aetolians from that hour lived harmoniously
and at peace with each other, simply from the removal of one man. Such
decisive influence has character in human affairs, that we find not
only armies and cities, but also national leagues and whole divisions
of the world, experiencing the greatest miseries and the greatest
blessings through the vice or virtue of one man....

Though he was a man of the worst character, Lyciscus ended his life
by an honourable death; and accordingly, most people with some reason
reproach Fortune for sometimes giving to the worst of men what is the
prize of the good—an easy death....

[Sidenote: Death of Charops, B.C. 157.]

[Sidenote: The tyranny of Charops in Epirus after the battle of Pydna,
B.C. 168-157.]

[Sidenote: He extorts money from the rich under threat of exile.]

+20.+ There was a great change for the better in Aetolia when the
civil war was stopped after the death of Lyciscus; and in Boeotia when
Mnasippus of Coronea died; and similarly in Acarnania when Chremas
was got out of the way. Greece was as though purified by the removal
from life of those accursed pests of the country. For in the same year
Charops of Epirus chanced to die at Brundisium. Affairs in Epirus had
been still in disorder and confusion as before, owing to the cruelty
and tyranny of Charops, ever since the end of the war with Perseus. For
Lucius Anicius having condemned some of the leading men in the country
to death, and transported all others to Rome against whom there was the
slightest suspicion, Charops at once got complete power to do what he
chose; and thereupon committed every possible act of cruelty, sometimes
personally, at others by the agency of his friends: for he was quite
a young man himself, and was quickly joined by a crowd of the worst
and most unprincipled persons, who gathered round him for the sake of
plunder from other people. But what protected him and inclined people
to believe that he was acting on a fixed design, and in accordance with
the will of the Romans, was his former intimacy with them, and the
support of the old man Myrton and his son Nicanor. These two had the
character of being men of moderation and on good terms with the Romans;
but though up to that time they had been widely removed from all
suspicion of injustice, they now gave themselves up wholly to support
and share in the lawless acts of Charops. This man, after murdering
some openly in the market-place, others in their own houses, others by
sending secret assassins to waylay them in the fields or on the roads,
and selling the property of all whom he had thus killed, thought of
another device. He put up lists of such men and women as were rich,
condemning them to exile; and having held out this threat, he extracted
money out of them, making the bargain himself with the men, and by the
agency of his mother Philotis with the women; for this lady was well
suited to the task, and for any act of violence was even more helpful
than could have been expected in a woman.

[Sidenote: The people of Phoenice terrified or cajoled into supporting

[Sidenote: Charops goes to Rome, but is forbidden by the leading nobles
to enter their houses,]

[Sidenote: and repudiated by the Senate.]

[Sidenote: He suppresses the reply of the Senate.]

+21.+ When he and his mother had thus got all the money they could
out of these persons, they none the less caused all the proscribed to
be impeached before the people; and the majority in Phoenice, partly
from fear and partly induced by the baits held out by Charops and
his friends, condemned all thus impeached, for being ill-disposed to
Rome, to death instead of banishment. These men, however, fled while
Charops visited Rome, whither he went with money, and accompanied
by Myrton and Nicanor, wishing to get a seal of approval put to his
wickedness by means of the Senate. On that occasion a very honourable
proof was given of Roman principles; and a spectacle was displayed
exceedingly gratifying to the Greeks residing in Rome, especially the
detenus. Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, who was Pontifex Maximus and Princeps
Senatus, and Lucius Aemilius, the conqueror of Perseus, a man of the
highest credit and influence, learning what had been done by Charops
in Epirus, refused to admit him into their houses. This becoming much
talked about, the foreign residents in Rome were exceedingly rejoiced,
and observed with pleasure that the Romans discountenanced evil. And
on Charops being afterwards admitted to the Senate-house, the Senate
refused to consent to his demands, but answered that “They would give
instructions to commissioners to examine into what had taken place.”
But when Charops returned home he entirely suppressed this reply; and
having written one to suit his own ideas, gave out that the Romans
approved of what had been done by him....

[Sidenote: Death and character of Eumenes, B.C. 159.]

[Sidenote: He raised his kingdom to the first rank;]

[Sidenote: was exceedingly bountiful;]

[Sidenote: and was loyally served by four brothers.]

+22.+ King Eumenes was entirely broken in bodily strength, but still
maintained his brilliancy of mind. He was a man who in most things was
the equal of any king of his time; and in those which were the most
important and honourable, was greater and more illustrious than them
all. First, he succeeded his father in a kingdom reduced to a very few
insignificant cities; and he raised it to the level of the largest
dynasties of his day. And it was not chance which contributed to this,
or a mere sudden catastrophe, it was his own acuteness, indefatigable
industry, and personal labour. Again, he was exceedingly ambitious of
establishing a good reputation, and showed it by doing good services
to a very large number of cities, and enriching privately a great many
men. And in the third place, he had three brothers grown up and active,
and he kept all four of them loyal to himself, and acting as guards of
his person and preservers of the kingdom: and that is a thing of which
there are very rare instances in history....

[Sidenote: Attalus restores Ariarathes.]

On succeeding his brother Eumenes on the throne, Attalus at once gave a
specimen of his principles and activity by restoring Ariarathes to his

[Sidenote: Fannius and his colleagues roughly treated by the
Dalmatians, B.C. 157.]

[Sidenote: The Senate decide on declaring war with the Dalmatians.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 168-157.]

+23.+ When the envoys under Fannius returned from Illyria, and reported
that, so far from the Dalmatians making any restitution to those who
asserted that they were being continually wronged by them, they refused
even to listen to the commissioners at all, saying that they had
nothing to do with the Romans. Besides, they reported that no lodging
or entertainment of any sort had been supplied to them; but that the
very horses, which they had procured from another city, the Dalmatians
had forcibly taken from them; and would have laid violent hands upon
themselves, if they had not yielded to necessity and retired as quietly
as they could. The Senate listened attentively to the report; they were
exceedingly angry at the disobedience and rudeness of the Dalmatians,
but their prevailing feeling was that the present time was a suitable
one for declaring war against this people for more reasons than one.
For, in the first place, the coasts of Illyria towards Italy had been
entirely neglected by them ever since they had expelled Demetrius of
Pharos; and, in the next place, they did not wish their own citizens to
become enervated by a long-continued peace; for it was now the twelfth
year since the war with Perseus and the campaigns in Macedonia. They
therefore planned that, by declaring war against the Dalmatians, they
would at once renew as it were the warlike spirit and enterprise of
their own people, and terrify the Illyrians into obedience to their
injunctions. Such were the motives of the Romans for going to war with
the Dalmatians. But to the world at large they gave out that they had
determined on war owing to the insults offered to their legates....

[Sidenote: B.C. 157. Coss. Sext. Julius Caesar, L. Aurelius Orestes.]

+24.+ King Ariarathes arrived in Rome in the course of the summer.[203]
And when Sextus Julius Caesar and his colleague had entered on their
consulship, the king visited them privately, presenting in his personal
appearance a striking picture of the dangers with which he was

Ambassadors also arrived from Demetrius, headed by Miltiades, prepared
to act in two capacities—to defend the conduct of Demetrius in regard
to Ariarathes, and to accuse that king with the utmost bitterness.
Orophernes also had sent Timotheus and Diogenes to represent him,
conveying a crown for Rome, and charged to renew the friendship and
alliance of Cappadocia with the Romans; but, above all, to confront
Ariarathes, and both to answer his accusations and bring their own
against him. In these private interviews Diogenes and Miltiades and
their colleagues made a better show, because they were many to one in
the controversy; besides their personal appearance was better than that
of Ariarathes, for they were at present on the winning side and he had
failed. They had also the advantage of him, in making their statement
of the case, that they were entirely unscrupulous, and cared nothing
whatever about the truth of their words; and what they said could not
be confuted, because there was no one to take the other side. So their
lying statements easily prevailed, and they thought everything was
going as they wished....

[Sidenote: The evil rule of Orophernes.]

+25.+ After reigning for a short time in Cappadocia in utter contempt
of the customs of his country, Orophernes introduced the organised
debaucheries of Ionia.[204]...

It has happened to not a few, from the desire for increasing their
wealth, to lose their life along with their money. It was from being
captivated by such passions that Orophernes, king of Cappadocia,
perished and was expelled from his kingdom. But having briefly narrated
the restoration of this king (Ariarathes), I will now bring back
my narrative to its regular course; for at present I have, to the
exclusion of Greek affairs, selected from those of Asia the events
connected with Cappadocia out of their proper order, because it was
impossible to separate the voyage of Ariarathes from Italy from his
restoration to his kingdom.[205] I will therefore now go back to
the history of Greece during this period, in which a peculiar and
extraordinary affair took place in regard to the city of Oropus, of
which I will give the whole story from beginning to end, going both
backward and forward in point of time, that I may not render the
history of an episode which was made up of separate events, and was
not on the whole important, still more insignificant and indistinct by
relating it under different years. For when an event as a whole does
not appear to readers to be worth attention, I cannot certainly expect
a student to follow its details scattered at intervals through my

For the most part when things go well men generally get on together;
but in times of failure, in their annoyance at events, they become
sore and irritable with their friends. And this is what happened
to Orophernes, when his affairs began to take a wrong turn in his
relations with Theotimus,—both indulging in mutual recriminations....

[Sidenote: B.C. 156. Coss L. Cornelius Lentulus, C. Marcius Figulus II.]

+26.+ Ambassadors having arrived from Epirus about this time, sent both
from those who were in actual possession of Phoenice and from those who
been banished from it; and both parties having made their statement
in presence of each other, the Senate answered that they would give
instructions on this point to the commissioners that were about to be
sent into Illyria with Gaius Marcius the Consul.[207]...

[Sidenote: Prusias, king of Bithynia, attacks Attalus of Pergamum.]

[Sidenote: 5, 11.]

[Sidenote: Elaea on the Casius, the port of Pergamum.]

+27.+ After defeating Attalus, and advancing to Pergamum, Prusias
prepared a magnificent sacrifice and brought it to the sacred enclosure
of Asclepius, and after offering the victims, and having obtained
favourable omens, went back into his camp for that day; but on the
next he directed his forces against the Nicephorium, and destroyed
all the temples and sacred enclosures, and plundered all the statues
of men and the marble images of the gods. Finally he carried off the
statue of Asclepius also, an admirably executed work of Phyromachus,
and transferred it to his own country,—the very image before which the
day before he had poured libations and offered sacrifice; desiring,
it would seem, that the god might in every way be propitious and
favourable to him. I have spoken of such proceedings before, when
discoursing on Philip, as sheer insanity. For at one time to offer
sacrifice, and endeavour to propitiate heaven by their means,
worshipping and uttering the most earnest prayers before holy tables
and altars, as Prusias was wont to do, with bendings of the knee and
effeminate prostrations, and at the same time to violate these sacred
objects and to flout heaven by their destruction,—can we ascribe such
conduct to anything but a mind disordered and a spirit lost to sober
reason? I am sure this was the case with Prusias: for he led his army
off to Elaea, without having performed a single act of manly courage in
the course of his attempts on Pergamum, and after treating everything
human and divine with petty and effeminate spite. He attempted to take
Elaea, and made some assaults upon it; but being unable to effect
anything, owing to Sosander, the king’s foster-brother, having thrown
himself into the town with an army and repelling his assaults, he
marched off towards Thyateira. In the course of his march, he plundered
the temple of Artemis in the Holy village; and the sacred enclosure
of Apollo Cynneius at Temnus[208] likewise he not only plundered but
destroyed by fire. After these achievements he returned home, having
waged war against the gods as well as against men. But Prusias’s
infantry also suffered severely from famine and dysentery on their
return march, so that the wrath of heaven appears to have quickly
visited him for these crimes.[209]...

[Sidenote: Attalus sends his brother to Rome.]

[Sidenote: Prusias had sent his son Nicomedes and some ambassadors to
represent his case at Rome.]

[Sidenote: The Senate send fresh commissioners to investigate.]

+28.+ After his defeat by Prusias Attalus appointed his brother
Athenaeus to accompany Publius Lentulus to Rome to inform the Senate
of what had happened. At Rome they had not paid much attention when a
previous messenger named Andronicus had come from Attalus, with news
of the original invasion; because they suspected that Attalus wished
to attack Prusias himself, and was therefore getting up a case against
him beforehand, and trying to prejudice him in their eyes by these
accusations; and when Nicomedes and some ambassadors from Prusias,
headed by Antiphilus, arrived and protested that there was not a word
of truth in the statement, the Senate was still more incredulous of
what had been said about Prusias. But when after a time the real truth
was made known, the Senate still felt uncertain, and sent Lucius
Apuleius and Gaius Petronius to investigate what was the state of the
case in regard to these two kings.


[Sidenote: B.C. 155. The Roman legate Publius Lentulus, and Athenaeus,
brother of Attalus, reach Rome and declare the truth.]

+1.+ Before spring this year the Senate, after hearing the report of
Publius Lentulus and his colleagues, who had just reached Rome from
Asia, in the business of king Prusias, called in Athenaeus also,
brother of king Attalus. The matter, however, did not need many words:
the Senate promptly appointed Gaius Claudius Cento, Lucius Hortensius,
and Gaius Arunculeius, to accompany Athenaeus home, with instructions
to prevent Prusias from waging war against Attalus.

[Sidenote: Another embassy in behalf of the Achaean detenus.]

[Sidenote: It fails by the action of the praetor, who, by putting the
question simply “yes” or “no” for release, forced the party who were
for postponing it to vote “no.”]

Also Xeno of Aegium and Telecles of Tegea arrived as ambassadors from
the Achaeans in behalf of the Achaean detenus. After the delivery of
their speech, on the question being put to the vote, the Senators only
refused the release of the accused persons by a very narrow majority.
The man who really prevented the release from being carried was Aulus
Postumius, who was praetor, and as such presided in the Senate on that
occasion. Three alternatives were proposed—one for an absolute release,
another for an absolute refusal, and a third for a postponement of the
release for the present. The largest numbers were for the first of
these three; but Postumius left out the third, and put the two first
to the vote together, release or no release; the result was that those
who were originally for the postponement transferred their votes to the
party that were against the release, and thus gave a majority against

[Sidenote: The Achaeans are encouraged to try again.]

+3.+[210] When the ambassadors returned to Achaia with the news that
the restoration of all the detenus had been only lost in the Senate by
a narrow majority, the people becoming hopeful and elated sent Telecles
of Megalopolis and Anaxidamus on a fresh mission at once. That was the
state of things in the Peloponnese....

[Sidenote: Aristocrates proves a failure in the war with Crete.]

+4.+ Aristocrates, the general of the Rhodians, was in appearance a
man of mark and striking ability; and the Rhodians, judging from this,
believed that they had in him a thoroughly adequate leader and guide
in the war.[211] But they were disappointed in their expectations: for
when he came to the test of experience, like spurious coin when brought
to the furnace, he was shown to be a man of quite a different sort. And
this was proved by actual facts....

+5.+ [Demetrius] offered him five hundred talents if he would surrender
Cyprus to him, with other similar advantages and honours from himself
if he would do him this service....

Archias, therefore, wishing to betray Cyprus to Demetrius, and being
caught in the act and led off to stand his trial, hanged himself with
one of the ropes of the awnings in the court. For it is a true proverb
that led by their desires “the reckonings of the vain are vain.” This
man, for instance, imagining that he was going to get five hundred
talents, lost what he had already, and his life into the bargain....

[Sidenote: Honesty of the people of Priene (in Caria) in preserving the
money deposited by Orophernes.]

+6.+ About this time an unexpected misfortune befell the people of
Priene. They had received a deposit of four hundred talents from
Orophernes when he got possession of the kingdom; and subsequently
when Ariarathes recovered his dominion he demanded the money of them.
But they acted like honest men, in my opinion, in declaring that they
would deliver it to no one as long as Orophernes was alive, except to
the person who deposited it with them; while Ariarathes was thought by
many to be committing a breach of equity in demanding a deposit made by

However, up to this point, one might perhaps pardon his making the
attempt, because he looked upon the money as belonging to his own
kingdom; but to push his anger and imperious determination as much
farther as he did seems utterly unjustifiable. At the period I
refer to, then, he sent troops to pillage the territory of Priene,
Attalus assisting and urging him on from the private grudge which he
entertained towards the Prienians. After losing many slaves and cattle,
some of them being slaughtered close to the city itself, the Prienians,
unable to defend themselves, first sent an embassy to the Rhodians, and
eventually appealed for protection to Rome....

But he would not listen to the proposal. So it came about that the
Prienians, who had great hopes from the possession of so large a sum
of money, found themselves entirely disappointed. For they repaid
Orophernes his deposit, and, thanks to this same deposit, were unjustly
exposed to severe damage at the hands of Ariarathes....

[Sidenote: B.C. 155. The Ligurians harass Marseilles and besiege
Antibes and Nice.]

+7.+ This year there came ambassadors also from the people of
Marseilles, who had long been suffering from the Ligurians, and at
that time were being closely invested by them, while their cities of
Antipolis and Nicaea were also subjected to a siege. They, therefore,
sent ambassadors to Rome to represent the state of things and beg for
help. On their being admitted, the Senate decided to send legates to
see personally what was going on, and to endeavour by persuasion to
correct the injurious proceedings of the barbarians....

_The peaceful mission failed, and the consul Opimius subdued the
Oxybii, a Ligurian tribe, in arms, B.C. 154. Livy_, Ep. 47.

[Sidenote: B.C. 154. Coss. Q. Opimius, L. Postumius Albinus. Ptolemy
Physcon charges his brother with inciting a plot against his life.]

[Sidenote: The Senate refuses to hear the ambassadors of Ptolemy

[Sidenote: and send commissioners to restore Physcon to Cyprus.]

+8.+ At the same time as the Senate despatched Opimius to the war with
the Oxybii, Ptolemy the younger arrived at Rome; and being admitted
to the Senate brought an accusation against his brother, laying on
him the blame of the attack against his life. He showed the scars of
his wounds, and speaking with all the bitterness which they seemed
to suggest, moved his hearers to pity him; and when Neolaidas and
Andromachus also came on behalf of the elder Ptolemy, to answer the
charges brought by his brother, the Senate refused even to listen to
their pleas, having been entirely prepossessed by the accusations of
the younger. They commanded them to leave Rome at once; while they
assigned five commissioners to the younger, headed by Gnaeus Merula and
Lucius Thermus, with a quinquereme for each commissioner, and ordered
them to restore Ptolemy (Physcon) to Cyprus; and at the same time sent
a circular to their allies in Greece and Asia, granting permission to
them to assist in the restoration of Ptolemy....

[Sidenote: Prusias having refused obedience to the former commission
(see _supra_, ch. 1), a new commi