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Title: History of the Zulu War
Author: Wilmot, A.
Language: English
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HISTORY
OF
THE ZULU WAR.
[Illustration: STEREOSCOPIC CO COPYRIGHT.
(_Facsimile of his Signature on the last Draft drawn by him
through the Standard Bank on Messrs. Rothschild & Co._)]
HISTORY
OF
THE ZULU WAR.
BY
A. WILMOT, F.R.G.S.
LONDON:
RICHARDSON AND BEST, PATERNOSTER ROW;
AND
A. WHITE AND CO.,
"SOUTH AFRICAN MAIL" OFFICE, 17, BLOMFIELD STREET.
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE:
TO BE HAD OF ALL BOOKSELLERS THROUGHOUT THE COLONY.
1880.
LONDON:
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS,
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.
PREFATORY NOTE.
The salient features and the principal events of the Zulu war
are referred to in this volume. Long and uninteresting details
respecting minor operations are omitted, and an attempt is made to
furnish a readable book, which gives a fair view of the causes,
origin, and progress of the war. It must be borne in mind that
South African Kafir wars constitute one tragedy in various acts.
The Zulu campaigns are merely last links of a chain. The war with
Cetywayo is identical in principle with those waged with Gaika,
T'Slambie, Dingaan, Kreli, and Sandilli. The tide of savagery has
been periodically rolled back, and it was either necessary that
this should be done, or that white men should abandon Southern
Africa. The fatuous policy of Lord Glenelg caused the wars of 1846
and 1852, and there is in essence no difference between it and the
policy advocated by the opponents of Sir Bartle Frere. In order
not to load this introductory note with lengthy observations, a
paper will be found in the Appendix treating upon this subject.[1]
Blue Books and correspondents' letters necessarily form the
principal authorities. The preliminary portion of the book has
been really requisite, and it is hoped that it will be found not
the least interesting portion of the volume. No doubt, in the
first connected narrative of the Zulu war, many omissions and
inaccuracies may be discovered, but every effort has been made to
collect the truth from the most reliable authorities, and to tell
it without fear, favour, or prejudice.
PORT ELIZABETH,
_25th September, 1879_.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
EARLY HISTORY OF THE ZULU NATION AND OF NATAL 1
CHAPTER II.
NATIVE POLICY IN NATAL—LAWS, CUSTOMS, AND RELIGION OF THE
ZULUS 21
CHAPTER III.
EVENTS PRELIMINARY TO ZULU WAR—COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES 34
CHAPTER IV.
LORD CHELMSFORD'S PLANS—THE BATTLE OF ISANDHLWANA—THE
HEROIC DEFENCE OF RORKE'S DRIFT—PANIC IN THE COLONY—REQUEST
FOR REINFORCEMENTS—REPLY FROM THE QUEEN—THE
MINISTRY—SIR BARTLE FRERE—LORD CHELMSFORD 50
CHAPTER V.
PEARSON'S COLUMN—MARCH TO EKOWE—BATTLE OF INYEZANE—EKOWE—ZULU
ARMY—WOOD'S COLUMN—REINFORCEMENTS
FROM ENGLAND—THE COLONISTS—THE NAVY 71
CHAPTER VI.
THE ZLOBANE MOUNTAIN—PIET UYS—THE BATTLE OF KAMBULA—THE
INTOMBE DISASTER—BATTLE OF GHINGHELOVO—RELIEF
OF EKOWE 91
CHAPTER VII.
THE SERVICES OF NATIVE CONTINGENTS—LORD CHELMSFORD AND
SIR H. BULWER—REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN—DIFFICULTIES
OF TRANSPORT—IMMENSE DELAY—BURYING THE DEAD AT
ISANDHLWANA 112
CHAPTER VIII.
SIR BARTLE FRERE'S POLICY—CENSURE OF THE HOME GOVERNMENT—SLOW
OPERATIONS—AFFAIR OF THE 5TH OF JUNE—THE
PRINCE IMPERIAL—HIS ARRIVAL—SERVICES—CHARACTER—DEATH—COURT-
MARTIAL—FUNERAL RITES AND EMBARKATION
OF THE BODY OF THE PRINCE IMPERIAL 140
CHAPTER IX.
THE POLICY OF SIR BARTLE FRERE—SLOW ADVANCE OF THE
BRITISH COLUMNS—APPOINTMENT AND ARRIVAL OF SIR GARNET
WOLSELEY—BATTLE OF ULUNDI—RESIGNATION AND DEPARTURE
OF LORD CHELMSFORD 170
CHAPTER X.
LORD CHELMSFORD'S POLICY—PROMPTNESS AND DECISION OF SIR
GARNET WOLSELEY—THE HUNT AND CAPTURE OF CETYWAYO—DEPARTURE
FROM NATAL—THE LAST OF THE ZULU KINGS
A PRISONER IN THE CASTLE OF CAPE TOWN—GREAT MEETING
WITH ZULU CHIEFS—SIR G. WOLSELEY'S SPEECH—SETTLEMENT
OF THE COUNTRY—END OF THE WAR 203
APPENDIX 231
[Illustration: MAP OF ZULU LAND AND PART OF NATAL
_Stanford's Geogˡ Estabᵗ_]
HISTORY OF THE ZULU WAR.
CHAPTER I.
EARLY HISTORY OF THE ZULU NATION AND OF NATAL.
Two different races met in Southern Africa about the middle of
the seventeenth century. One had migrated from the centre of
the continent; the other sent out settlers from one of the most
civilized and prosperous countries of Europe. These races were
the Kafirs and the Dutch. The former arrived at the banks of the
Great Fish River about the same time that Surgeon Van Riebeek
landed on the shores of Table Bay for the purpose of establishing
"a place of refreshment for the outward and homeward bound
fleets of the chartered Dutch East India Company." The progress
of the new colony was so gradual and slow that it was not until
the nineteenth century that Kafir irruptions were effectually
checked, and then the British Government had assumed sovereignty
over the Cape of Good Hope. Different causes, to which it is not
necessary to refer, made the descendants of the Dutch settlers
so dissatisfied with our rule that a portion of them, in the
year 1837, passed into that easterly portion of Southern Africa
styled Natal. There they came in contact with the bravest and
best-organized portion of the great Kafir race. The Ama-Zulus
were originally a small and despised tribe. They were "tobacco
sellers," or pedlars, and carried on this occupation at the
beginning of the present century in the country between the Black
and White Umvolosi rivers. In contradistinction to the nature of
their employment, and as an emblem of the ambition of the people,
the name they gave themselves was one of the proudest they could
have chosen, as "the Zulus" in the Kafir tongue signifies "the
Celestials." At an early period in this century a great leader
arose among them, who became the Genghis Khan of Southern Africa.
This chief was fitly named "Utskaka"—"Chaka," or "Break of Day;"
and it was in consequence of his efforts and of his success that a
new era commenced for his countrymen.
[Sidenote: _Chaka and his army._]
Chaka was never defeated, and never fled before a foe. Having
ascended the throne by means of the murder of his uncle, he
proceeded at once to convert a nation of pedlars into a nation of
warriors. Immense care was taken with military training, and the
weapon by means of which the Roman soldiers conquered the world
was adopted for the use of the army. The short sword, or stabbing
assegai, was supplied, with the command that each warrior should
carry but one, and either bring it back from the battle-field or
be put to death as a coward. Marriage was forbidden, although the
gratification of brutal lust was allowed. No warrior could have a
wife or child to imbue him with any tender sentiment. The practice
of circumcision, although one of the most ancient and important
rites, was abandoned, so that everything, no matter how sacred
or how important, was sacrificed in order to create invincible
legions. The army consisted of three divisions. The first was
composed of veterans, styled "amadoda," or men; the second of
youths, "ebuto;" and the third of "ezibuto," or carriers. It
was in the last division that conquered enemies were frequently
enrolled. The king was the commander-in-chief, and under him were
the principal indunas, or ministers of state. Each regiment was
at least 1500 strong, and was led by a captain, who had under
him numerous subalterns. Military kraals were scattered over the
country, generally of an oval shape, and of large dimensions.
Reviews took place at the great place of the king, where songs,
dances, and chivalrous games were all made use of to increase
the military enthusiasm of the warriors. When war was determined
upon, extreme secrecy was observed, spies were sent out, and the
usual incantations and sacrifices performed by the priest or
witch-doctor. A herald, dressed in the skins of wild beasts, so
as to present a terrific appearance, then was sent to the army,
and cried with a loud voice, "Maiku-puke!"—"Go up!" An inspiring
oration was delivered by the king, and they went forth to conquer
or to die, fifty thousand well-organized, determined savages,
giving no quarter, slaying men, women, children, and even domestic
animals. Thus has a warrior described the onset of one of these
savage armies:—"The Matabele lions raised the shout of death,
and fell upon their victims. It was the shout of victory. Their
hissing and hollow groans told their progress among the dead. A
few moments laid hundreds on the ground. The clash of shields was
the signal of triumph. They entered the town with the roar of the
lion; they pillaged and fired the houses, speared the mothers, and
cast their infants to the flames. They slaughtered cattle; they
danced and sang till the dawn of day; they ascended and killed
till their hands were weary of the spear."
Chaka not only led his army in person, but was accustomed himself
to seize the first victim, and to kill him with his spear. After
subduing the petty tribes around, he bore his victorious arms
further, and carried fire and sword along the slopes of the
Drakenberg Mountains. One of his greatest conquests was over the
Undwandwa people, and this was followed by the destruction of the
Umtetwas. An attack was then made upon the brave Amaquabi, who
occupied both sides of the Tugela river, which forms the present
boundary of Natal. Merciless slaughters followed victory, and the
tide of conquest only ceased on the banks of the Umsimvoboo.
In the year 1828, Lieutenant Farewell, Mr. H. Fynn, and a few
others, were permitted to visit Chaka, who then resided at a
distance of about 150 miles in a north-north-east direction from
D'Urban, Port Natal. The Englishmen were received by the mighty
Zulu potentate with great ceremony. Nine thousand armed warriors
stood around, and the despotic character of the monarch was
reflected in the servile submission with which he was treated by
his subjects. Chaka munificently granted a large tract of country
to Mr. H. Fynn, and subsequently conferred a similar favour upon
Lieutenant King. These grants—and all grants of this nature—were,
strictly speaking, mere feudal investitures, paramount rights
being retained by the monarch. The first European settlement
in Natal was thus formed. An act of treason on the part of one
of Chaka's greatest lieutenants alienated him from his native
land, and became the means of carrying fire and sword north of
the Drakenberg Mountains as far as Bamangwato. Moselekatsi,
whom Captain Harris styles the "Lion of the North," was this
lieutenant. Wherever he moved destruction and death marked his
path, and he soon succeeded in rearing another cruel military
despotism over the graves of those whom he had conquered.
[Sidenote: _Assassination of Chaka._]
The last army of Chaka which went forth to destroy was itself
destroyed by one of those strange judgments which bear analogy
to that inflicted on the hosts of Sennacherib. A nation dwelling
close to the Palula river had to be conquered, but before this
place was reached a frightful disease, styled "blood sickness,"
broke out, and was so fatal in its results that only a few men of
the great army were able to return to tell the tale. Scarcely had
this event occurred, when the tyrant was himself assassinated.
Chaka was seated peacefully in his kraal, near the Umvoti river,
surrounded by his councillors and principal officers, when a
band of desperate men, headed by his brother Dingaan, rushed
among them, and each, seizing his victim, plunged a spear into
his heart. Thus perished the Napoleon of the Zulu race, by the
hand of his own nearest relative, and at a moment when he did
not suspect treachery or dream of any insurrection against his
well-consolidated power.
Dingaan—"poor fellow!"—was no doubt secretly encouraged by a large
portion of the Zulu people. A number of the principal captains
and friends of the late monarch fled, and several were put to
death. The new capital was removed from the Umvati river to the
White Umvolosi river, distant 45 miles in a direct line from the
sea, and about 160 miles from D'Urban. The favour that had been
extended by Chaka to the few Englishmen who arrived in Natal
with Mr. H. Fynn was a sufficient reason for the adoption by his
successor of an exactly opposite policy. An army of 3000 men
was sent to D'Urban, and the few English settlers escaped with
the utmost difficulty. Every vestige of property was destroyed.
Quietness was, however, restored in a few years afterwards, and in
the year 1833 Dingaan sent down spies to find out what progress
had been made by the intruders.
Captain Allen Gardiner arrived in 1835, and proceeded to the great
place of the king. This missionary traveller mentions incidentally
that, according to treaty, he brought back several men who had
fled from the cruel despotism of the Zulu monarch. These captives
fully calculated upon being put to death. Captain Gardiner pleaded
for them, and was able to assure them that the king had promised
to spare their lives. Nowha, one of the unfortunate prisoners,
mournfully replied, "They are killing us now;" and they were all
cruelly tortured to death by starvation.[2]
[Sidenote: _Dingaan and the Boers._]
In consequence of various causes, among which discontent with
British rule requires prominent mention, a number of Dutch
farmers left the Cape Colony in 1835, and, under the command
of Pieter Retief, crossed the Drakensberg Mountains in 1837,
and entered Natal. Their leader proceeded to Dingaan's capital,
for the purpose of negotiating a treaty of peace and obtaining
a formal cession of territory. In the last week of January,
1838, Pieter Retief, accompanied by seventy picked horsemen,
crossed the Buffalo river, and on the 2nd of February arrived at
Dingaan's kraal. The Zulu monarch fixed the 4th of February as
the day for signing a formal cession of an immense district in
Natal to the emigrant Boers. The necessary document, drawn out
by the Rev. Mr. Owen, missionary, with Dingaan, was duly signed,
and business having been satisfactorily concluded, the Dutchmen
were invited into the king's kraal to take leave of Dingaan. As
requested, Retief and his followers left their arms outside. The
Zulu monarch, surrounded by his favourite regiments, conversed
in the most friendly manner, and while a "stirrup cup" of maize
beer was in course of being drunk, suddenly cried out, "Bulala
matagati!"—"Kill the wizards!" These words were the signal for
a cruel massacre. More than 3000 savages beat to death, with
knobkerries, the unfortunate Dutchmen who had been weak enough
to trust to Zulu promises and Zulu honesty. The corpses of the
slaughtered men were dragged out of the kraal to an adjacent
hillock, and there allowed to become the prey of wolves and
vultures.
Dingaan looked upon the massacre of the farmers who had vainly
trusted to his honour as only a commencement of hostilities. Ten
regiments were immediately ordered out to exterminate all the
Dutch emigrants. While these people were, without suspicion,
waiting for the return of their husbands and relatives, a Zulu
army crawled up to their nearest camp, near the Blaauwkrantz
river, close to the present commemorative town of Weenen, or
"Weeping." A sudden surprise at the dawn of day was effected,
and then ensued the barbarous murder in cold blood of every man,
woman, and child. Other detachments surprised other parties,
and few escaped. The destroying army moved swiftly southward
and towards the sea. Wherever the "laager" plan was adopted, it
was successful; and at "Necht Laager," on the Bushmans river, a
few determined men succeeded in defending themselves against an
overwhelming force of savages. The engagement lasted all day, but
when the farmers' ammunition was nearly exhausted, the fire from
a 3-pounder, rigged at the back of one of the waggons, killed
several Zulu chiefs, and caused a precipitate retreat. The men who
were afterwards able to visit the principal scenes of slaughter
discovered frightful scenes of horror and misery. Waggons were
demolished, and by their ruins lay the corpses of men, women,
and children abandoned to the wild beasts. Among the heaps of
dead found at Weenen two young girls were picked out, one of whom
had been pierced by nineteen assegai stabs, and the other by
twenty-one. Both survived, although they remained cripples for
life. It is estimated that in one week 600 white settlers were
sacrificed as victims to the savage treachery of Dingaan.
[Sidenote: _Slaughter of English._]
Vengeance was determined upon by the Dutch emigrants, and a
party of 400, having placed themselves under the command of
Piet Uys and of Hendrik Potgieter, advanced from the Klip River
Division against Dingaan. This took place in April, 1838; but
unfortunately, shortly before, a party of Englishmen from D'Urban,
with 700 friendly Zulus, having crossed the Tugela river near its
mouth and destroyed a native town, the army of Dingaan, which had
been kept in reserve, suddenly surrounded them and killed nearly
every European.[3] The conquerors followed up their success as far
as D'Urban, and forced the few white people then resident there
to take refuge on board a vessel named the _Comet_, fortunately
lying at anchor in the bay. Dingaan, with his principal forces,
watched the Dutch emigrants, and learned that Piet Uys and Hendrik
Potgieter had placed themselves at the head of 400 men, with the
object of invading Zululand. The wily savage allowed the Dutchmen
to advance to a place closed in between two hills, within a few
miles of his capital, and thence led them to a valley, where a
desperate hand-to-hand combat took place. The farmers had been
accustomed to fight by firing from horseback, and then falling
back rapidly to reload. They were so hemmed in by their position,
that this mode of procedure was impossible, and they were at last,
in desperation, compelled to concentrate their fire on one portion
of the Zulu host. They then charged through the gap thus made,
and escaped. Unfortunately, Piet Uys did not succeed in cutting
his way through, and died with his son, fighting bravely against
terrible odds. After this disastrous engagement, the Boers were so
disheartened that hostilities were for some time suspended. They
were renewed in August, 1838, when Dingaan attacked the Dutch in
their laagers, but was in all cases repulsed with loss. Towards
the close of that year, an army of 10,000 Zulus attacked the Dutch
farmers in a strongly intrenched position at the Umslatoos river.
The engagement took place on Sunday, the 16th of December. For
three hours overwhelming masses of natives endeavoured to force
the emigrant camp, until Pretorius, finding that ammunition was
beginning to fail, ordered 200 men to sally forth on horseback,
and take the enemy in flank. This manœuvre was successful, and the
forces of Dingaan were compelled to fly, after leaving a large
number on the field.[4] After this decisive battle 5000 head of
cattle were captured, and an advance was made to the hillock where
lay the mortal remains of Retief and the brave men who perished
with him. A frightful and ghastly spectacle was beheld: broken
skulls, on which could be seen the marks of the knobkerries and
stones with which they had been fractured, bones of legs and arms,
and, strange to say, the skeleton of Retief, recognizable by a
leathern pouch or bandoleer, in which was found the deed signed by
Dingaan, resigning to the emigrant farmers "the place called Port
Natal, together with all the land annexed; that is to say, from
the Tugela to the Umzimvoboo river, and from the sea to the north,
as far as the land may be useful and in my possession."
[Sidenote: _Arrival of Major Charteris._]
On the return of the emigrant Boers from this very successful
attack on the Zulus, they were surprised to find that a small
detachment of Highlanders, under the command of Major Charteris
had taken possession of the Bay of Natal. This was done by
order of Sir George Napier, Governor of the Cape Colony, from
a desire[5] "to put an end to the unwarranted occupation of
parts of the territories belonging to the natives by certain
emigrants of the Cape Colony, being subjects of his Majesty."
No conflict, however, took place at this time. The Dutch were
busily employed during the year 1839 in laying out the towns
of Pietermaritzburg[6] and D'Urban, as well as in appointing
landrosts or magistrates, and establishing regulations for the
government of the country. Dingaan frequently sent in ambassadors
charged with messages of peace, but it was soon discovered that
this was merely a plan for carrying out a system of espionage.
A brother of Dingaan, named Panda, who had been generally looked
upon with contempt as a mere sensualist who was undisposed for the
fatigues of warfare, became an object of jealousy to the king,
in consequence of a large party among the Zulus, who were tired
of constant fighting and bloodshed, showing some disposition to
prefer him to his brother. An attempt to capture and kill Panda
was followed by his flight across the Tugela into Natal, and his
application to the Dutch emigrant farmers for assistance. Such an
opportunity was gladly seized upon; and in the next year (1840) an
army of Panda's, 4000 strong, was joined by 400 mounted farmers,
under the command of Andries Pretorius. While the forces were
mustering in Pietermaritzburg, an ambassador from Dingaan, named
Tamboosa, arrived, bringing proposals for peace. Upon being seized
and questioned, this messenger admitted that one of the objects
of his mission was to obtain every possible information, with a
view of reporting it to his master. This, however, by no means
justified the blunder and crime committed by the Dutch farmers,
who put Tamboosa to death, and would not even listen to his prayer
for mercy on behalf of his young attendant, who suffered with him.
Scarcely was this execution over when the armies of Dingaan and
Panda met in battle. In this fierce encounter two regiments were
entirely destroyed, and the fortune of the day declared in favour
of Panda, merely in consequence of a portion of his brother's army
deserting in his favour. The Dutch farmers vigorously followed
up this success, and forced Dingaan to take shelter among a small
tribe close to Delagoa Bay, who killed him in order to secure the
favour of his conquerors.
[Sidenote: _Panda proclaimed king._]
On the 14th of February, 1840, and on the banks of the Umvolosi
river, the emigrant Boers proclaimed Panda king of the Zulu
people, and at the same time declared that their own sovereignty
extended from St. Lucia Bay to the Umzimvoboo (St. John's).
Shortly previous to this date, Sir George Napier had ordered the
British garrison to abandon D'Urban, and Captain Jervis, who held
the local command, said, on the occasion of his departure, that
he wished the inhabitants peace and happiness, hoping that they
would cultivate these beautiful regions in quiet and prosperity,
"ever regardful of the rights of the people whose country you
have adopted, and whose home you have made your own." We cannot
be surprised that, under all the circumstances, the emigrant
Boers looked upon Natal as rightfully their country, and that
the British Government had even abandoned it in their favour.
Having assisted in conquering Dingaan, and placed Panda upon the
throne, there was no reason to fear native aggressions. No fewer
than 36,000 head of cattle were given in by the new monarch as an
indemnity, so that the Boers were able to settle down not only in
peace, but with considerable additional means at their disposal.
The government adopted by this society of farmers was of an
exceedingly ill-concerted character, and soon proved to be
essentially anarchic and unworkable. The legislative, executive,
and judicial powers were centred in a Volksraad of twenty-four
members, who were required to assemble every three months
at Pietermaritzburg. All the members performed their duties
gratuitously, but landrosts, each of whom enjoyed a salary of
£100 per annum, were appointed at the chief town, as well as at
D'Urban and Weenen. Two or three members of the Volksraad, who
happened to live near Pietermaritzburg, formed what was styled the
Commissie Raad, to whom executive functions requiring immediate
despatch were entrusted; but whatever they did had to be submitted
for approval to the entire Volksraad. Besides, a federal bond of
union existed with the Winburg, Caledon, and Madder districts of
the Orange Free State, from which places delegates were sent. The
acts of the Commissie Raad, as well as those of the permanent
officials, were so assailed in the Volksraad, and such personal
and offensive attacks were indulged in by this body, that good
government became impossible; and so little was law respected,
that Judge Cloete informs us that when he arrived as Commissioner
in 1843, the landrost of Pietermaritzburg informed him that a
judgment which he had passed several months before, against a
respectable inhabitant living only a few miles from that town,
ordering him to return cattle which he had illegally withheld from
a Hottentot, was still a dead letter, as the defendant had openly
declared he would shoot the first messenger of the law who should
dare to come on his premises.
[Sidenote: _The English and the Boers._]
The Volksraad of the Boers had applied to the Governor of the
Cape Colony for acknowledgment and recognition of the State as
free and independent, and Sir George Napier had returned an answer
by no means unfavourable, but their conduct soon made it evident
that it would be impossible to grant their petition. Stock was
stolen from Natal farmers towards the end of the year 1840, and
armed burghers, under Andries Pretorius, were instructed to pursue
the thieves. Traces of cattle, supposed to be those stolen, were
followed to some kraals of the Amabaka tribe, and without any
delay these people were attacked, several killed, 3000 head of
cattle and 250 sheep and goats carried off. At the same time
seventeen children were seized—in fact, captured as slaves. The
conduct of Pretorius was approved by the Volksraad, but Sir George
Napier found himself obliged to reprobate it in the strongest
language. British troops were immediately sent to the Umgasi
river, between the Kei and the Umzimvoboo, and his Excellency
declined any further intercourse with the emigrant Boers, unless
they distinctly acknowledged that they were subjects of the Queen
of England. Although the Home Government was at that time very
reluctant to extend its colonial possessions, a despatch was sent
to Sir George Napier, in which he was informed that her Majesty
could not acknowledge the independence of her own subjects, but
that the trade of the emigrant Boers would be placed upon the
same footing as that of any other British settlement, upon their
receiving a military force to exclude the interference with the
country by any other European power. It was then within the
option of the Boers to secure all the substantial advantages of
self government; but as in the Transvaal now, so in Natal at the
period in question—obstinate folly animated the councils of the
people, and an ultimatum was sent, stating their intention "to
remain on the same footing as heretofore." Upon this, Sir George
Napier issued a proclamation, in which it was stated that as
the emigrant farmers had refused to be recognised or treated as
British subjects, and had recently passed a resolution by which
all Kafirs inhabiting Natal were to be removed, without their
consent, into the country of Faku (Pondoland), military occupation
of the colony would be resumed. Shortly afterwards, the troops
stationed at the Umgazi camp were ordered to march to Natal. This
small force, consisting of 250 men, besides a small party of the
Cape corps and two field-pieces, arrived safely at D'Urban, and a
few days afterwards the brig _Pilot_ came to anchor in the bay,
bringing them stores and provisions, as well as two 18-pounders
and ammunition. This vessel was soon afterwards followed by the
schooner _Mazeppa_.
The Volksraad of the emigrant Boers was astonished and indignant
at the military occupation of D'Urban, and more than 300 men,
under Andries Pretorius, were immediately ordered out. The capture
of some cattle, and the receipt of a letter ordering him to quit
Natal, so enraged the commander of the small English force, that
he led a night attack against the Dutch camp at Congella. So ill
managed, however, was the expedition, that Captain Smith was
repulsed and his guns captured. Out of 140 men whom he led in
this unfortunate affray no fewer than 103 were killed, wounded,
and missing. He then saw that his little force was reduced
to extremities, but exerted himself most indefatigably and
perseveringly to resist to the last. A fortification something
similar in character to a laager was formed at D'Urban, by means
of the numerous waggons in the camp, with the requisite trenches
and mounds. The Dutch Boers fortunately allowed the time in which
they should have taken advantage of their victory to pass by,
and soon saw that, in consequence of their inertness, a conquest
which in the first instance would have been easy was now converted
into a siege. In the mean time Captain Smith was able to send off
for assistance to the Cape Colony. Richard King, then living in
a hut at D'Urban, volunteered to carry the despatches. Mr. G. C.
Cato conveyed him and his horses across the channel to the Bluff,
and then he rode off, leading a spare horse, and before daybreak
succeeded in passing the Umcomas river. There he was safe from
the danger of pursuit, but had to face the perils of crossing
two hundred rivers, and of traversing a wild country inhabited
by savages. Upon this slender thread hung the destinies of the
British in Natal.
[Sidenote: _The English besieged._]
Encouraged by their success, the Boers overpowered the detachment
of British troops stationed at the Point, and took most of the
English residents prisoners to Pietermaritzburg.[7] Then all their
efforts were directed against the fort, in which Captain Smith had
been able to mount an 18-pounder and to secure provisions and
ammunition. The farmers, who had three field-pieces, carried on a
heavy cannonade for three days, and when they had exhausted their
ammunition, turned the siege into a rigorous blockade. Two sorties
made by the garrison were unavailing, and at last the rations
were reduced to the smallest quantity sufficient to sustain life;
dried horseflesh became the principal article of food, and the
utmost anxiety prevailed as to the success of Richard King, and
the arrival of reinforcements from the Cape Colony. Many a time
eyes were strained for some sign of assistance; at last, on the
night of the 24th of June, they saw, with inexpressible relief,
the rockets and blue lights which announced that a vessel with
reinforcements had arrived.
Dick King had succeeded. After a ride of many hundreds of miles
over trackless, unknown, and savage regions, he had safely reached
the Cape Colony. It was on the ninth day after he left the Bluff
at Natal that he arrived, almost exhausted, in Graham's Town.
Colonel Hare, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Province,
immediately sent the grenadier company of the 27th Regiment, in
the schooner _Conch_, from Port Elizabeth, and when Sir George
Napier heard the news in Cape Town, he lost no time in persuading
Admiral Percy to despatch the flagship _Southampton_, with the
25th Regiment on board, under the command of Colonel Cloete. The
ship of war arrived at Natal only one day after the _Conch_. A
landing was immediately effected with very trifling loss; the Boer
force was driven back to the Congella. A gale of wind drove the
Southampton to sea, and supplies became so scarce that Colonel
Cloete was obliged to obtain the services of Zulus to secure
cattle. Some of these killed two Dutch farmers, and this gave
occasion to a panic among the Boers, who precipitately fled to
Pietermaritzburg.
[Sidenote: _Dismay of the Boers._]
Amidst great consternation and great confusion, a meeting of
the Volksraad was held in the church at Pietermaritzburg, when
recriminations, quarrelling, and loud talking occupied the entire
Sunday. At last it was resolved to propose terms of peace to
Colonel Cloete; but the ignorance and simplicity of the Boers were
displayed by their holding out as a threat the succour they might
receive from the King of Holland, to whom letters had some time
previously been sent by the hands of a trader named Smellekamp.
After negotiations, Colonel Cloete granted an amnesty to all
except four ringleaders, and Natal was peaceably once more under
the rule of the British Crown. These transactions took place in
1842; and in the following year the Honourable Henry Cloete,
afterwards a Judge of the Supreme Court of the Cape Colony, was
sent to Natal as her Majesty's Commissioner, with ample authority
to inaugurate a settled system of government, and to put an end
to the anarchy and confusion which prevailed. By the exercise of
great tact and judgment he was successful. A powerful radical
faction in the Volksraad opposed submission in the most outrageous
and foolish manner. They even adopted a plan to assassinate the
leading members of the peace party; but Andries Pretorius, one of
the latter, and a wise, true friend of his adopted country, having
discovered the plot, exposed it publicly, and brought its authors
to shame. Judge Cloete tells us that this patriot addressed the
meeting in a strain of impassioned extemporaneous eloquence not
unworthy of Cicero when denouncing Cataline, and turned the tide
so powerfully against the would-be assassins as to entirely
defeat their plot. Entire submission to the British Government
followed. Major Smith was succeeded by Colonel Boys, of the 45th
Regiment, as military commandant, and his Honour Martin West,
resident magistrate of Graham's Town, was appointed the first
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal.
CHAPTER II.
NATIVE POLICY IN NATAL. LAWS, CUSTOMS, AND RELIGION OF THE ZULUS.
The protection of the natives was the professed object of the
British Government in taking possession of Natal. The conquests of
Chaka had driven no fewer than 100,000 fugitives to the westward
of the Tugela river, and how to rule this vast and fast increasing
number of natives soon became a problem fraught both with
difficulty and danger. Mr. Theophilus Shepstone, son of a Wesleyan
missionary, thoroughly conversant with the Kafir language,
customs, manners, and habits, was appointed to take charge of
the numerous natives of Natal. His policy can be very briefly
described. It was to keep all the coloured races entirely distinct
from the white population. They were collected in locations, and
governed by their own laws, through their own chiefs, under Mr.
Shepstone as the great chief. Large tracts of country, rugged and
mountainous, were set apart for the various tribes, and there,
in an Italian climate, and in the lap of a most productive and
generous soil, they increased and multiplied. Christianity and
real civilization were ignored, and a most dangerous _imperium
in imperio_ created. The wretched refugees who fled from the Zulu
tyrant found their lot in Natal incomparably more happy than in
the precarious existence of former days. Their easy, savage,
sensuous life made them useless citizens, and when labour was
required for the sugar plantations on the coast, it had to be
obtained from India. However smoothly and well the native policy
seemed to work, it soon became very evident that the 20,000 white
people of Natal were really seated on a political volcano. Three
hundred thousand heathen savages of an alien race had the power
to rise and destroy them at any moment, and it was impossible to
be sure that they might not at any time have the inclination. All
the checks which religion and civilization place on men had been
deliberately cast aside. No doubt the Zulu monarch was feared; but
there can be no doubt also that if the dread paramount ruler of
the Zulu race had at any time crossed the Tugela as a conqueror,
tens of thousands of his own race in the colony would have joined
him out of fear, and hastened to prove their loyalty by the
massacre of every white inhabitant of Natal. This is no fanciful
idea, but sober earnest fact.[8]
[Sidenote: _The Shepstone native policy._]
There was no difficulty at first in subjecting to proper control
the broken, dispirited bands of refugees, who sought shelter,
food, and protection in Natal; and if right methods had been
adopted, one of the finest races of the African continent would
have been raised from a state of loathsome degradation to one
of civilization—saved from heathenism themselves to become
coadjutors with the white races in raising the country to real
prosperity. In place of this, the cruel slavery of polygamy was
permitted, which allows the men to live in independent idleness
by means of the severe drudgery of their oppressed wives.
Grossly impure and inhuman laws and practices, including the
vile superstitions of witchcraft, were tolerated and allowed. No
country could advance under such circumstances, and the colony
of Natal, therefore, remains at the present day what it has
always been—immeasurably behind the Cape of Good Hope; a land of
samples in which nothing really succeeds, and where sugar, which
forms its principal export, is even now a doubtful experiment,
on which labour imported from India at enormous cost has to be
employed; a lovely country, whose fertility is almost as great as
its beauty, but cursed by a most unchristian, wicked, and foolish
system of government, so far as the great bulk of the population
is concerned. It would have been very easy at the outset to
establish comparatively small locations, presided over by British
magistrates, who would have administered justice according to
British law. If, in addition, title-deeds had been given in such
a manner as to give individual rights, then, in the words of the
Rev. W. C. Holden,[9] the large number of natives within the
colony might have been converted into men who would take a real
interest in the country and soil, for the defence of which they
would fight and die. They would have become a strong wall of
defence against the Zulu on the east, and the Amaxosa on the west,
instead of a source of continual danger and alarm.[10] Slavery was
abolished everywhere throughout the British dominions, with the
one exception of Natal. There 50,000 women were sold for wives to
the highest bidder, as horses, cattle, and goods at an auction
mart, under the special sanction and special arrangement of the
Queen's Government.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to pass briefly in
review the laws, manners, and customs of the Zulu race. Without
a knowledge of this subject it will be perfectly impossible to
appreciate the policy of Sir Bartle Frere, or to understand
either the real causes of the war, or of many events in its
progress. We have seen that Chaka, the Zulu conqueror, formed a
great military nation. His successors were specially warriors,
and as the people chose similar weapons to those with which the
ancient Romans conquered the world, so, like that people, were
they fully animated with the feeling that _virtus_, or the highest
possible merit, consisted in bravery in the field of battle. The
Boers despised the enemy, and hundreds of their bravest men fell
victims. Almost about the same time, the English settlers at
D'Urban made the same mistake, and 2000 of their Kafir allies, as
well as several of their own number, were slaughtered and left to
be devoured by beasts of prey on the hills of Zululand. History
repeats itself: Lord Chelmsford made the same mistake, which was
expiated in the blood of hundreds of British soldiers on the field
of Isandhlwana.
[Sidenote: _Zulu customs._]
Among the Zulus every female child is so much property, and in
this respect treated exactly like a chattel or beast of burden.
Her life is one of the grossest degradation and slavery. When
she has reached the age of puberty disgusting ceremonies are
performed, and there is no idea or appreciation of chastity. The
most brutal lust is not only tolerated, but actually enforced by
law. When a girl is married, she is merely sold to the highest
bidder, entirely without reference to her own consent, and then
becomes the slave of her husband, for whom she has to labour in
the field and perform menial work. The day after the party of
a bride has arrived at her owner's hut, the peculiar ceremony
takes place of the woman being allowed and enjoined to tax her
powers to the utmost to use abusive language to her lord. She
pours every insulting and provoking epithet she can think of upon
him, this being the last time in which she is permitted to act
and speak independently. At last she takes a certain feather out
of her head, by means of which the act of marriage, or rather
of going into slavery, becomes complete. Mr. Holden speaks of
the great obscenity at "marriage" celebrations, and remarks
that "no respectable pages can be defiled with a description
of what then takes place, especially in connection with the
marriage of men of rank and chiefs. There is full licence given
to wholesale debauchery, and both men and women glory in their
shame."[11] It is impossible to pursue this subject further. This
is certain, that the very grossest and most filthy obscenities
and immoralities are absolutely enjoined and required by Zulu
law and custom. Marriage is entirely a misnomer. To quote from
an excellent authority, "No word corresponding to the Saxon
word 'wife' is found in the Zulu language. The term most nearly
approaching to it is _umkake_, and its correlatives _umkako_ and
_umkami_, which means his _she_ or _female_. The man owns his
wives as truly, according to native law, as he does his spear or
his goat, and he speaks of them accordingly." The owner of the
woman says, "I have paid so many cattle for you; therefore you
are _my slave_, my dog, and your proper place is under my feet."
One of these poor slaves, when seen standing by a load far too
great for her strength, was asked if she could carry it. She
stood up and ingenuously remarked, "If I were a man I could not,
but I am a woman." There is no slavery in the world more sad or
deplorable than that to which the poor women of the Zulu nation
are subjected.[12]
[Sidenote: _Religion of the Zulus._]
Spiritualism is the religion of the Zulu, and witchcraft is the
machinery by means of which it is practised. Only a very vague
idea exists about a Supreme Being, and the definite national
faith embraces only a belief in the influence of the spirits of
deceased ancestors. The ghosts of departed chiefs and warriors
are specially respected and feared. It is to these spirits that
they attribute all the power given by Christians to God, and
the witch-doctors are the mediums or priests of the worship. A
knowledge of subtle and powerful vegetable poisons exists, and
so common is the practice of secret poisoning that universal
safeguards are used against it. Every one who gives food to
another takes a part himself, in proof that it contains no poison.
Besides deadly drugs, there is what is styled the "ubuti," or
bewitching matter, which is supposed to be deposited in some
secret place, and to be made the instrument of evil by means of
supernatural agency. The "isanusi," or witch-doctors, are the
go-betweens, whose duty it is to discover and to avert evil.
These men fill the threefold office of doctors, priests, and
soothsayers. They heal diseases, offer sacrifices, and exercise
the art of divination. As they are assumed to have full power
over the invisible world, their influence is enormous, and is
readily taken advantage of by chiefs and powerful men, for the
purpose of destroying enemies and promoting schemes of war and
plunder. A youth who aspires to be enrolled among the isanusi
gives early signs of being destined for the office. He dreams of
the spirits of the departed chiefs of his people, sees visions,
falls into fits of frenzy; he catches snakes and twists them round
his person, seeks out medicinal roots, and goes for instruction
to experienced isanusi. At last what is called a "change in the
moon" takes place within him; he becomes a medium fitted to hold
converse with spirits, and is able to communicate with them. One
of the greatest authorities who has ever lived with and studied
the Kafir races—Mr. Warner—says, "It is impossible to suppose that
these priests are not, to a considerable extent, self-deceived, as
well as the deceivers of others; and there is no difficulty, to
one who believes the Bible to be a divine revelation, in supposing
that they are also to a certain extent under Satanic influence;
for the idolatrous and heathen nations of the earth are declared
in the inspired volume to be, in a peculiar manner, under the
influence and power of the devil."
[Sidenote: _Witch doctors._]
Every illness and misfortune is supposed to be caused by
witchcraft. It usually happens that the suspected person is a
rich man, or some one on whom it is thought desirable to wreak
vengeance. The people of the kraal and neighbourhood go in
a body to the isanusi, who, before their arrival, foretells
their approach, and makes other revelations, frequently so
extraordinary that the Rev. Mr. Holden,[13] who is thoroughly
conversant with the subject, states that there is much greater
difficulty in explaining these phenomena by ordinary means than
by supernatural interposition. The whole company, on arrival,
sit down and salute the witch-doctor; they are then told to beat
the ground with their sticks, and while this is in course of
being done, he repeatedly shouts out, "Yeswa!"—"He is here!" He
discloses secrets about the accused, and at last, fixing his
eyes upon the doomed one, charges him with the crime. Generally
the isanusi succeeds in selecting the suspected person; but if he
fail, a circle is formed, and a wild, frenzied dance performed,
amidst most frightful gesticulations and cries. Among the Zulus,
not only is the unfortunate person killed whom the witch-doctor
declares guilty, but his wife and children are murdered, and his
property seized. Among the Amaxosa Kafirs, the most frightful
tortures are used to induce the unfortunate victim to confess.[14]
It is difficult to appreciate adequately the enormous power of
the witch-doctors. It was in 1857 that Umhlakaza was made a
willing tool in the hands of Kreli, Sandilli, and Umhala for the
purpose of a war of extermination against the whites. It was
prophesied that if the people destroyed their cattle and corn,
the whole would rise again with vast increase, and that their
enemies would be utterly destroyed. Sir George Grey had taken
every precaution, and war was therefore made impossible. Like
the witches in "Macbeth," the prophet had merely lured on his
victims to destruction. Having burned their ships, by destroying
all their resources there was no escape, and, in spite of the
humane exertions of the colonists, 70,000 human beings perished
of famine in a land of plenty. It will thus be seen how an entire
people can easily be induced to embark in the most desperate
undertakings by the skilful use of the superstitious means at
the disposal of their chiefs. Sacrifices of beasts are offered
by the priests, according to prescribed rules. These are made to
the spirits of the departed. A hut is sacredly cleaned and set
apart, in which the sacrifice is shut up during the night, in
order that the "isituta," or spirits, may drink in its flavour.
On the next day the place is opened, and the meat devoured by the
people. All sacrifices, with trifling exceptions, must be offered
by priests. The blood is never spilt, but caught in a vessel, and
it is necessary to burn the bones. The frenzy or inspired madness
characteristic of the priests of the ancient oracles is commonly
assumed by the priests of the Zulu spiritualists, and many of
their ceremonies are occult, and have never been made known to
Europeans.
[Sidenote: _Great military rite._]
The Zulu government is thoroughly despotic. The will of the
tyrant is law, and he has unlimited power of life or death. We
have seen that Chaka sacrificed everything to military power,
and in order to succeed, banished even circumcision, and refused
to allow his warriors to marry. Women's love and children's
tenderness were forbidden to the stern soldiers of the new
empire. Medicines composed of various plants and roots were used
to purify the body and make it strong, and ordinarily sacrifices
were offered for the same purpose. The great national sacrifice
to make the army invulnerable is styled "ukukufula," when flesh
is cut off the shoulder of a living beast and roasted on a fire
into which certain charms have been thrown. Each man bites off a
mouthful, and passes on the meat to the next, while the priest
makes incisions in parts of their bodies, into which he inserts
the powdered charcoal of the charms. The poor animal is left in
torture all this time, and is not killed until the ceremonies
are ended. A decoction is also prepared from medicinal roots,
and sprinkled by means of the tail of an ox over the bodies of
the warriors. All this is designed to make the Zulus either
invulnerable, or to enable them, if they do fall in battle, to
join triumphantly the heroes of their race in the spirit world.
The three great divisions of the army already referred to,
comprising "men," "young men," and "carriers," were sub-divided
into regiments with a proper staff of officers. The Zulu strength
is in attack, when with ferocious yells they throw themselves
with undaunted bravery upon their enemy. Two horns advance and
endeavour to flank the foe, while the main body follows quickly to
their support. _Virtus_—military bravery—is their _summum bonum_,
and death is the immediate penalty of any form of cowardice.
Extreme cunning and dissimulation are considered essential
qualifications of a general, so that to lure a foe into ambush,
or to deceive him by illusory promises or messages of peace, are
considered proofs of wisdom and ability. Honour, humanity, and
generosity are perfectly unknown, and merely considered signs of
weakness. When an enemy is defeated, prisoners are never taken,
and those not killed in the heat of battle are cruelly tortured
and mutilated, with every mark of indignity and contempt. Women
and children are not spared, and the most cruel destruction of
the most cruel northern barbarians, who devastated Europe, pales
before the complete and effectual ruin which marks the progress of
a Zulu conqueror.
[Sidenote: _Sir Bartle Frere._]
In times of peace the army remains at military kraals, and is
occasionally called up to the great place of the king for review.
It is always in a state of readiness, and burning for employment.
War is the pastime, glory, and wish of the men, who eagerly
desire to wash their spears in blood, that they may obtain the
only glory for which they care to live, and secure that plunder
which can enable them to acquire wives and cattle. Nothing could
be more dangerous, or a more awful threat to a colony, than an
army of this description under the orders of a despotic savage,
without the slightest principle, and urged on to fight by all the
traditions and ideas of his race. Let it be remembered also that
the country of Natal was once owned by the Zulus, and that, while
held by a garrison of only 20,000 whites, there were no fewer than
300,000 savage heathen inhabitants in it of similar colour, race,
and religion to the people of Cetywayo. Once let the flood-gates
be lifted and a conquering "invulnerable" army enter Natal,
nothing could prevent the general rising of the vast masses of
natives within that colony. If that had occurred, British dominion
would have set in an ocean of blood, and every white man, woman,
and child in the settlement must have been slaughtered. It was
one wise, good man who averted that catastrophe, and his name
was Bartle Frere. Slowly, but most certainly, will the mists of
prejudice be lifted from the minds of the English people, and they
will learn to know that the policy they so much vilified saved the
British name from dishonour, and the British people and British
interests in South Africa from destruction.
CHAPTER III.
EVENTS PRELIMINARY TO ZULU WAR—COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.
[Sidenote: _The Transvaal in danger._]
Thirty-six years had elapsed since the eventful ride of Dick
King from D'Urban to Graham's Town. The British colony of
Natal had grown slowly. Immigrants arrived; a representative
Constitution was granted. During this period numbers of people
of Dutch extraction formed settlements in the Orange Free State
and Transvaal Republic. The British Government in the first
instance established sovereignty over the former country, but
abandoned it on the 23rd of February, 1854. The Republic commenced
from that date. So far as the Transvaal is concerned, Potgieter
established the town of Potchefstroom in 1839, and soon after
enormous territory, extending from the Vaal to the Limpopo, came
under the dominion of the South African Republic. The first
session of Volksraad was held in 1848, and it was in 1852 that
Pretorius succeeded in obtaining the treaty at Sand river, by
means of which the independence of the Republic was recognized by
the British Crown. One of the first Acts of the Volksraad was to
repeal a former resolution fixing their southern boundary at the
twentyfifth degree of south latitude, because the Volksraad has
no means of determining where the said degree of south latitude
is. Amongst the people civilization made slow progress. "Not many
years ago," wrote Mr. Thomas Baines in his valuable work on the
Gold Regions of South Africa, "their own Surveyor-General was
mobbed for using a theodolite in the streets of Potchefstroom
instead of stepping off the distance like the Veldt Valkt miester
of the good old times." Sir Arthur Cunynghame, in his recent
narrative, gives us yet more amusing and striking illustrations
of the utter simplicity and ignorance of the Boers. As was to be
expected under the circumstances, the Government was extremely
narrow and objectionable; in proof of which it is only necessary
to state that no Englishman or German was allowed to possess
landed property, it was forbidden to discover or work minerals,
while slavery really existed, and was practised under what was
styled the Apprentice Law, passed in 1856.[15] In spite of the
discovery of gold-fields at Pilgrim's Rest, the country became
insolvent, wars with the natives took place, and at last such
a state of insolvency and danger was attained that the British
Government found it imperatively necessary to intervene. The
Zulus, under Cetywayo, intended to overrun the country, and this
would have threatened all British South Africa. The northern
territory of the State had already been abandoned to the natives;
the Government was powerless, and all confidence in it had fled;
commerce was destroyed, and the country was bankrupt. Under these
circumstances, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, on the 12th of April,
1877, found himself imperatively obliged to place the Transvaal
territory under the protection of the British flag.
In Natal, under the administration of Sir Benjamin Pine, during
the year 1873, a rebellion broke out on the part of a chief named
Langalibalele, which was only prevented from becoming a general
war by the admirably prompt action of the local Government.
The philanthropic societies in England, with Bishop Colenso,
championed the cause of this rebel, and Sir B. Pine was, in
consequence of their exertions, recalled. Sir Garnet Wolseley, who
succeeded that officer, says, "Langalibalele, as I am informed by
all classes here, official and non-official (a small knot of men
of extreme views excepted), is regarded by the native population
at large as a chief who, having defied the authorities, and in
doing so occasioned the murder of two white men, is now suffering
for that conduct. In their opinion his attempts to brave the
Government have been checkmated, and his banishment from the
colony, regarded as a lenient punishment by the natives at large,
cannot fail to be a serious warning to all other Kafir chiefs, not
only in Natal but in the whole of South Africa, to avoid imitating
his example."[16]
Sir Garnet Wolseley effected an important change in the colonial
legislature, by adding eight nominee members to the Council, which
previously consisted of five _ex-officio_ and fifteen elected
members. The annexation of the Transvaal followed; and, speaking
of this, Sir Benjamin Pine says that "the strong ground taken in
defence of the measure is that its hostilities with the native
tribes seriously imperilled the peace of our colonies—that it was,
in fact, a next-door neighbour's house in flames, which might any
moment set ours on fire. In this respect, the ground for annexing
the Transvaal Republic was very much stronger than that which
justified our taking possession of Natal. The latter country did
not at that time touch our boundary at any point. It was a house
several streets off."
[Sidenote: _Diamonds and guns._]
The discovery of diamonds in South Africa, in 1867, exercised by
degrees an enormous influence upon the attitude of the natives
throughout Southern Africa. When the success of the dry diggings
at the New Rush caused the formation of Kimberley, that town
became the centre of an enormous gun trade. From north and east,
thousands of Kafirs of various tribes flocked to a place where
they could obtain, for the reward of their labour, the means of
exterminating the hated white man in South Africa. The Gealekas
under Kreli, the Gaikas of Sandilli, as well as the Zulus beyond
Natal, were not slow to seize such an opportunity. For years
the trade continued, and the weapons purchased were soon used
against the Government which permitted their sale. Wars were waged
upon the eastern and northern borders of the Cape Colony during
1877, 1878, and 1879. Sir Benjamin Pine, with some fancy and a
great deal of truth, styles the diamond of the Kimberley mines
the bloodstone of South Africa. As the Zulu system makes war
a necessity constantly thirsted for by the army, advantage was
taken of the easy opportunity of getting firearms afforded by the
inconceivable blindness and fatuity of the British Government. In
the year 1877, Cetywayo had quite made up his mind for a deadly
conflict with the white man. Guns were purchased, preparations
were made, and the army crouched like a tiger in its lair, ready
to spring.
Since the first establishment of the colony of Natal, and of
the Transvaal Republic, the Governments of these countries had
the Zulu military power suspended, like the sword of Damocles,
as a perpetual threat over their heads. Of course, by the
annexation of the latter State in 1877, all its responsibilities
devolved upon her Majesty's Government. Cetywayo, the son of
Panda, succeeded his father in the year 1872, and it formed
part of Sir T. Shepstone's policy to conciliate and please him
in every possible manner. That officer went so far as to attend
his coronation, which was celebrated with the grandest forms of
savage ceremonial.[17] At the same time a number of promises and
engagements were received from the king. All this was, of course,
merely a solemn farce. The descendant of Dingaan, who first signed
a deed giving Natal to the Dutch, and then murdered in cold blood
the men who had trusted to his honour, was not likely to depart
from the traditions and policy of his race. Dissimulation, fraud,
and cunning are characteristic qualities of every Zulu ruler, and
Cetywayo excelled in them all. The Government of Natal was lulled
into security, while Bishop Colenso and the well-meaning but
profoundly ignorant men who form the self-styled philanthropical
societies in England have, even up to the present moment, been
completely hoodwinked and deceived. Sir Bartle Frere, writing of
Cetywayo's solemn promises, says, "None of these promises have
been since fulfilled; the cruelties and barbarisms which deformed
the internal administration of Zululand in Panda's reign have been
aggravated during the reign of Cetywayo, and his relations with
his neighbours have been conducted in a spirit fatal to peace and
security beyond the Zulu border."[18]
[Sidenote: _Natal in danger._]
The well-organized and peculiarly formidable military power of the
Zulus was still further consolidated and strengthened by Cetywayo,
so that a standing menace and threat of a very serious nature
existed against both Natal and the Transvaal. Nothing can better
prove the danger than the fact that the Zulu monarch formally and
repeatedly requested the consent of the British Government to
wars of aggression, which he proposed for the ostensible purpose
of initiating his young soldiers in bloodshed, and reviving
the system of unprovoked territorial aggression which had been
so successfully carried out by the model and demi-god of the
nation—Chaka.
A large tract of land on the western boundary of Zululand, between
the Buffalo and Pongolo rivers, which had long formed part of
the Transvaal, was claimed by the Zulus, and they had requested
the Natal Government to arbitrate in this matter. Eventually a
Commission was appointed, which decided that Cetywayo's cession
of a tract of land relied on by the Transvaal claim was promised
when he was only heir apparent, and that the cession had not
been subsequently formally ratified by his father Panda, nor by
the great council of the Zulu nation; therefore the country in
question had never ceased to belong to them. Private rights of
_bonâ fide_ settlers, which could not in justice be abrogated,
were confirmed, but otherwise the sovereignty of the territory was
ceded to the Zulus. Since his installation the tone of Cetywayo
had become entirely altered. When a remonstrance was sent against
a barbarous murder of young women by the king, replies of extreme
insolence were sent to the Natal Government, and the opportunity
was taken to state that no responsibility was admitted; at the
same time, the solemn installation promises were distinctly
denied, and Cetywayo affirmed his intention of shedding blood in
future on a much greater scale. In the latter part of July, 1878,
the Zulu chief Sirayo entered British territory, carried off two
women—British subjects—and forcibly put them to death. Redress was
demanded, but not given.
On the 11th of December, 1878, a final message was sent to
Cetywayo, in which the reasonable and just demands of the
Government were summarized. He was called upon to give up the
offenders who had violated British territory, and to effect
various reforms in the administration of his government, in
accordance with the solemn promises made at his installation. A
few informal messages made and retracted only served to show the
cunning and deceit of Cetywayo, and it was clear to demonstration
that the Zulu potentate and the Zulu army had determined upon war.
[Sidenote: _Hostile attitude of the Zulus._]
The High Commissioner writes (30th September) to the Imperial
Government:—"It is difficult to give any adequate idea of the
strength of evidence of the state of feeling. Zulu regiments are
reported as moving about on unusual and special errands, several
of them organizing royal hunts on a great scale in parts of the
country where little game is to be expected, and where the obvious
object is to guard the border against attack. The hunters are
said to have received orders to follow any game they may rouse
across the border, which it appears is, according to Zulu custom,
a recognized mode of provoking or declaring war. Unusual bodies of
armed men are stated to watch all drifts and roads leading into
Zululand, and these guards are occasionally reported as warning
off Natal natives from entering the Zulu territory, accompanying
the warning with contemptuous intimation that orders have been
given to kill all Natalions if they trespass across the border.
Zulu subjects came hastily into Natal to reclaim cattle which they
had sent hither to graze, giving as their reason that Zululand is
so disturbed that they know not what will happen. Serious alarm is
expressed because three large ships have been seen on the coast
making for Delagoa Bay, and great irritation is expressed by Zulus
at the stoppage of the supplies of arms and ammunition they used
to receive through that port.
"The reports first received of raids into Natal territory by
large bodies of armed men, who dragged two refugee women out of
the huts of British subjects, with expressions of contemptuous
disregard for what the English Government might think, or say,
or do, and the murders of the women directly they were on the
other side of the boundary line, appear to be confirmed in every
particular.
"There seems to be no doubt that the parties were headed by two
sons of Sirayo. This chief lives near the Natal border, and was
well known as extremely anti-English in his feelings. Until quite
lately he was so little in favour with Cetywayo, that he had not
for some time attended to any summons to the royal kraal. He
was nevertheless appointed by Cetywayo to represent him at the
Boundary Commission. Partly, it was said, on account of his rank
and influence and known antipathy to Europeans, and partly because
he could not refuse to attend at the royal kraal to give an
account of his stewardship, he did so attend, and in the absence
of the prime minister, was appointed to act for him, a proceeding
which, considering his known anti-English feeling, is regarded as
significant.
"It is to be remembered that the facts, of which a brief summary
is here given, have been sifted from a mass of very alarming
rumours, current during the month, which his Excellency the
Lieutenant-Governor considered more doubtful, or unworthy of
credit, but which are circulated in a manner to increase agitation
and excitement on both sides of the border."
[Sidenote: _Firmness of Sir Bartle Frere._]
The only question remained—Were we to allow the enemy to wait
for a favourable opportunity and attack us at an advantage, or
protect Natal and British South Africa by a policy of firmness
and consistency? The latter alternative was chosen by her
Majesty's High Commissioner; and on the 4th of January, 1879,
Sir Bartle Frere placed in the hands of Lieutenant-General Lord
Chelmsford, commanding in South Africa, the further enforcement
of all demands.[19] There can be no doubt whatever that this
course was the only possible one consistent with the safety of
Natal and British South Africa. Cetywayo had been long preparing
for war, and had most fully determined upon it, urged on by the
irrepressible warlike organization and the army, which thirsted
for an opportunity of exertion and could not safely be balked.
Self-preservation and self-defence rendered it absolutely
necessary that an army should enter Zululand.
Early in January, 1879, four columns crossed the Tugela. The line
of advance described a crescent, of which one horn rested on
Luneberg, or the Pongolo, and the other, or base, terminated at
the lower drift of the Tugela, close to the sea. Colonel Pearson
was in command of the first column, whose centre was an intrenched
camp on the summit of a bluff directly overlooking the Tugela
river.
It consisted of—
Regular infantry.—1500, comprising eight companies of the Buffs
under Colonel Parnell, and six companies of the 99th under Colonel
Welman.
Royal Engineers.—One company, with two 7-pounder guns, under
Lieutenant Lloyd.
Naval Brigade.—200 blue jackets and marines, under Captain
Campbell, from H.M.S. _Active_ and _Tenedos_, with three Gatling
guns.
Mounted infantry.—200 of Captain Barrow's.
Mounted volunteers.—200 belonging to the D'Urban Mounted Rifles
(Captain W. Shepstone); Alexander Mounted Rifles (Captain
Arbuthnot); Victoria Mounted Rifles (Captain Sauer); Stanger
Mounted Rifles (Captain Addison); the Natal Hussars (Captain
Norton). To all this must be added a native contingent of 2000,
under Major Graves, and two companies of the 99th, posted at
Stanger and D'Urban. This was the coast column.
The second column was planted at a commanding position called
Krantz Kop, inaccessible except on the Natal side. It comprised
3300 natives, with 200 European officers, supported by two rocket
tubes under Lieutenant Russell, R.E., and 250 mounted natives.
[Sidenote: _Lord Chelmsford's advance._]
The head-quarters of the third column was at Helpmakaar, situated
on high and open ground commanding an extensive prospect.
The depôts were at Grey Town and Ladysmith. This column was
exceptionally strong, and consisted of seven companies of the
1-24th, and eight of the 2-24th; six 7-pounder guns with special
Kaffrarian carriages; a squadron of mounted infantry under Captain
Browne; the Natal Mounted Police, 150 strong; the Natal Carbineers
(Captain Shepstone); the Buffalo Border Guard (Captain Robson);
the Newcastle Mounted Rifles (Captain Bradstreet); 2000 of the
Native Contingent, 2nd Regiment, under Commandant Lonsdale,
and 2000 natives under Colonel Glyn. General Lord Chelmsford,
commander-in-chief, accompanied the column.
The fourth column had Utrecht as its base, and rested its line
on the Blood river, thus covering the disputed Transvaal border.
It comprised the 13th and 90th Regiments, six guns, Buller's
Light Horse, and a number of natives. It consisted of about 2000
well-seasoned, reliable men, exclusive of the natives, and was
under the command of Colonel Evelyn Wood, V.C.
On the 10th of January, 1879, the full period expired for the Zulu
king to meet the demands of her Majesty's High Commissioner. On
the 11th of January No. 3 column, under Colonel Glyn, crossed the
Buffalo river into Zululand. Heavy rains had made the roads very
bad, and caused the Tugela to rise so much that a barrel-raft,
a pont, and a boat had to be made use of for the passage of the
troops. No opposition whatever was made by the enemy. In the mean
time the fourth column, under Colonel Wood, had been halted at
Bemba's Kop, distant about thirty-five miles from Rorke's Drift.
On the 11th of January, Lord Chelmsford, with the bulk of
the mounted men of No. 3 column, met Colonel Wood with his
"irregulars" about twenty miles from Rorke's Drift, and was
completely satisfied with the efficiency of the latter force,
and attributed the satisfactory state of Wood's column to its
commander's energy and military knowledge.[20]
[Sidenote: _Burning of Sirayo's kraal._]
On the 12th of January, Lord Chelmsford wrote: "We have had our
first fight to-day. I ordered the whole force out this morning
to reconnoitre the road along which we shall eventually have to
pass. In passing by the Nkudu hill, we noticed that some herds
of cattle had been driven up close under the krantz where one of
Sirayo's strongholds was said to be. I ordered Colonel Glyn, with
four companies 1-24th, and the 1-3rd Native Contingent, to work
up under the krantz in skirmishing order. On the approach of this
force near the krantz, fire was opened upon them out of the caves,
and the fight commenced. It lasted about half an hour, and ended
in our obtaining possession of all the caves and all the cattle.
Colonel Degacher, who had been sent for from camp when we found
that the krantz was occupied by the enemy, came up towards the
end of the affair with half-battalion 2-24th, and about 400 of the
2-3rd Native Contingent. This force went forward to Sirayo's own
kraal, which is situated under a very steep krantz filled with
caves. The British soldiers and natives skirmished, or rather
clambered, up the steep mountain-side, and entered all the caves,
which were found empty. I ordered Sirayo's kraal to be burned,
but none of the other huts were touched. The Native Contingent
behaved very well, and not a native touched a woman or child, or
killed the wounded men."[21] Subsequently Colonel Russell, with a
small detached force, was attacked by sixty of the enemy, but his
men dismounted and succeeded in killing nine or ten, among whom
was one of Sirayo's sons. This action was, in fact, the storming
of the stronghold of one of Cetewayo's principal chiefs, and was
accompanied by the capture of 500 cattle. Lord Chelmsford says of
this engagement, "I have visited two wounded Zulus who were in our
hospital, and have seen that they are well looked after. Directly
they are well enough I shall let them go, so that they may tell
their friends how the British make war."
Both previous to the successful and unresisted crossing of the
Tugela, as well as subsequently, frequent rains had caused great
discomfort to the troops, as well as immensely increased the
difficulties of transport. The _impedimenta_ of the large force
in the field was exceedingly great, and the want of knowledge of
the character of the roads, or tracks, and the capacity of oxen
to do the work, resulted in many delays and difficulties. Large
masses of infantry were moved into the enemy's country, whose
entire dependence for supplies was placed upon heavy waggons drawn
by numerous oxen. No system of carriers was established, and, with
the exception of the fourth (Wood's) column, the movement of the
troops was necessarily exceedingly slow. On the march each column
was exposed to be attacked at a disadvantage, so enormous was
the train of waggons which had to be guarded, and the knowledge
of these facts evidently enabled the Zulus to perceive the best
opportunity of striking a fatal blow. At a very early stage in
the war, Lord Chelmsford saw the difficulties connected with the
mode of supplies adopted, as he writes on the 16th of January,
"It would be impossible to keep a long line of road passable for
a convoy of waggons, and were we to advance far into the country
it would be almost certain that, instead of our supplies coming to
us, we should have to return for our supplies."
[Sidenote: _Zulu tactics._]
The country into which the British troops had entered was
one in which the mountain-sides are furrowed by deep kloofs
or ravines, generally covered by luxuriant vegetation. The
euphorbia, the cactus, the aloe, and mimosa grow in profusion,
and the bush in many places forms a natural fortress, in which
savages can easily lie in wait to surprise an enemy. It was in
such native fastnesses that the Kafirs of the Cape Colony loved
to wait—panther-like—either in war to attack the white man,
or in peace to rob his flocks and herds. The Zulus, however,
fortunately adopted tactics of a different character. Their plan
was to attack in the open field, and, by means of bravery and
overwhelming numbers, to entirely crush the enemy. It was thus
that Chaka had conquered, and it was upon the same system that
Cetywayo relied.
CHAPTER IV.
LORD CHELMSFORD'S PLANS—THE BATTLE OF ISANDHLWANA—THE HEROIC
DEFENCE OF RORKE'S DRIFT—PANIC IN THE COLONY—REQUEST FOR
REINFORCEMENTS—REPLY FROM THE QUEEN—THE MINISTRY—SIR BARTLE
FRERE—LORD CHELMSFORD.
It is desirable for the sake of justice that the plans of Lord
Chelmsford in commencing the campaign should be given in his own
words. They are contained in a memorandum dated 16th January, 1879,
and are as follows:—
"The reports which I receive from officers commanding the several
columns now operating against Cetywayo show clearly that at this
season of the year a rapid advance into the heart of Zululand is
absolutely impossible.
"The present state of the roads in Natal will be sufficient to
bring home to the mind of every one what difficulties must stand
in the way of those who are endeavouring to move forward into the
enemy's country, over tracts which have never been traversed,
except by a very few traders' wagons.
[Sidenote: _Lord Chelmsford's plans._]
"No. 3 column at Rorke's Drift cannot possibly move forward even
eight miles, until two swamps, into which our waggons sank up to
the body, have been made passable.
"This work will occupy us for at least four days, and we shall find
similar obstacles in front of us, in every march we are anxious to
make.
"Accepting the situation, therefore, it remains for me to determine
what modification of the plan of campaign at first laid down will
be necessary.
"I consider that my original idea of driving, as far as possible,
all the Zulus forward towards the north-east part of their country,
is still thoroughly sound.
"Without, therefore, attempting to push forward faster than our
means will admit of, I propose with Nos. 1, 2, and 3 columns to
thoroughly clear or subjugate the country between the Buffalo and
Tugela rivers and the Umhlatoosi river, by means of expeditions
made by those columns from certain fixed positions.
"No. 1 column will, as already instructed, occupy Etshowe.
"Instead, however, of crossing the Umhlatoosi river to Mr.
Samuelson's mission station (St. Paul's), it will move a portion of
its force to Entumeni, and occupy that position as well as Etshowe.
"Having established itself firmly in those two positions, the main
object of this column will be to clear the Inkandhla bush and
forest, or to induce the chiefs and headmen of the tribes residing
or specially stationed in that part of the country to tender their
submission.
"No. 3 column will first advance to a position near the Inkandhla
hill, and from there, assisted by a portion of No. 2 column, will
clear the Equideni forest, or induce the chiefs, etc., to submit.
"This work completed, the portion of No. 2 column under
Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford will move towards the mission station
near the Empand-leni hill, whilst No. 3 column advances to a fresh
position near the Isipezi hill, detaching, if necessary, part of
its force to support No. 2 column.
"These combined moves will, I hope, have the effect of removing any
dangerously large body from the Natal border.
"Colonel Wood, commanding No. 4 column, has been informed of
these intended movements, and has been instructed to act together
independently about the head waters of the White Umvoloosi river.
"When Cetywayo has either surrendered or been defeated, which can
only take a few more days to decide, Colonel Wood will take up
a position covering Utrecht and the adjacent Transvaal border,
wherever he considers his force can be most usefully employed. He
will not attempt to advance towards the Inhlazatze mountain until
an advance by the other three columns across the Umhlatoosi river
has become possible.
"By these movements I hope to be able to clear that portion of
Zululand which is situated south of the Umhlatoosi river, and
behind a straight line drawn from the head waters of that river to
the head waters of the White Umvoloosi river.
[Sidenote: _The fatal twenty-second of January._]
"Should the Swazies come down to the Pongolo river, that part of
Zululand which is behind a straight line drawn from the head waters
of the Umvoloosi river to the junction of the Bevan and Pongolo
rivers, will also, no doubt, be abandoned, and possibly as far as
the Lebombo mountains.
"I trust that this plan of campaign will meet with the approval of
the High Commissioner.
"From a military point of view I am convinced that it is the only
practicable one at this time of year, and if successfully carried
out, is capable of producing very satisfactory results.
"I am equally confident that, politically, it will also have good
results.
"We shall occupy a large extent of Zululand, and shall threaten the
portion which remains to the king. We shall completely cover the
Natal border, and shall to a considerable extent do the same for
the Transvaal. We expect Cetywayo to keep his army mobilized, and
it is clear his troops will have difficulty in finding sufficient
supplies."
On the 20th of January, 1879, the camp of the third column was
at the Isandhlwana mountain. This force was under the command of
Colonel Glyn, C.B., and the general commanding had accompanied it
from the Tugela river. On the date just quoted, orders were given
to Commandant Lonsdale and Major Dartnell to go out the following
morning, and make a forward movement with a force composed of
Native Contingent, Police, and Volunteers. On the next day (21st
January), Major Dartnell sent in word that the enemy was near
him in considerable force. Upon this Lord Chelmsford ordered
the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, the mounted infantry, and four
guns, to be under arms at once, and this force left so soon as
there was light enough to see the road. Before Lord Chelmsford
left, he sent the following order to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford,
commanding No. 2 column:—"Move up to Isandhlwana camp at once with
all your mounted men and rocket battery. Take command of it. I am
accompanying Colonel Glyn, who is moving off at once to attack
Matyana and a Zulu force said to be twelve or fourteen miles off,
and at present watched by Natal Police, Volunteers, and Natal
Native Contingent. Colonel Glyn takes with him 2-24th Regiment,
four guns R.A., and Mounted Infantry."[22] Major Clery, senior
staff officer to the third column, says—"Before leaving the camp I
sent written instructions to Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to
the following effect:—'You will be in command of the camp during
the absence of Colonel Glyn. Draw in' (I speak from memory) 'your
camp, or your line of defence,'—I am not certain which—'while the
force is out. Also draw in the line of your infantry outposts
accordingly; but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced.'
I went to Colonel Pulleine's tent just before leaving camp, to
ascertain that he had got those instructions, and I again repeated
them verbally to him."[23] Captain Alan Gardiner, of the 14th
Hussars, states that he left the camp with Lord Chelmsford on the
22nd of January, and was sent back into camp with an order from
the general, between 10 and 11 a.m. that day. Colonel Pulleine was
informed that the camp of the force out was to be struck, and sent
on immediately; "also rations and forage for about seven days."
This order came too late. At the moment of its receipt Colonel
Durnford was falling back and begging Colonel Pulleine to send him
reinforcements, and the enemy began to appear in large numbers.
[Sidenote: _Intentions of the Zulus._]
In order to make the proceedings of this fatal day more easily
understood, it is now necessary to advert to the proceedings of
the Zulu army. This was 20,000 strong, and consisted of the Undi
corps, the Nokenke and Umcityu regiments, and the Nkobamakosi and
Inbonambi regiments. These comprised the flower of Cetywayo's
troops. During the night of the 21st of January they were ordered
to move in small detached bodies to a position about a mile
and a half to the east of the camp at Isandhlwana, on a stony
table-land, only about 1000 yards distant from the spot visited
by Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Glyn on the afternoon of the 21st
of January. No fires were lighted, and the stillness of death was
preserved. The centre was occupied by the Undi corps, the right
wing by the Nokenke and Umcityu, and the left by the Inbonambi and
the Nkobamakosi regiments. The king's orders comprised a simple
command to drive the third column back into Natal. But there
was no intention whatever of making an attack upon the 22nd of
January. The state of the moon was unfavourable, the usual medicine
sprinkling had not taken place, nor had the war-song been chanted.
What superstition forbade was, however, conceded to expediency.
When the division of the British forces was noticed, and their
gross ignorance and carelessness observed, the Zulu leaders felt
like Cromwell, when he exclaimed, with reference to the Scottish
army, "The Lord has delivered them into our hands."
On the morning of the 22nd of January, the mounted Basutos
sent out under the command of Colonel Durnford fired upon the
Umcityu regiment. This was too favourable an opportunity to be
neglected. Here was a portion only of the third column, with an
unfortified camp, whose defenders were scattering themselves over
a large space, utterly ignorant and careless of the fact that the
overwhelming and concentrated Zulu force was close beside them.
The charge of the Umcityu regiment was immediately and vigorously
followed by that of the Nokenke, Inbonambi, and Nkobamikosi
regiments, the Undi corps holding its ground. Up to this time in
the day there had been no fighting. Early in the morning, not long
after the departure of the general, a body of the Native Contingent
had been sent out to scout, and either did not see or pretended
not to see any enemy. About 9 a.m. Colonel Durnford, R.E., arrived
with 250 mounted men and 250 native infantry, who were at once
divided into three bodies and scattered to the left east, the
left front, and the rear. So far from a plan of concentration
being adopted, the very opposite course was pursued. It was the
force sent to the left east that was attacked by the Zulu army.
No further concealment was now necessary, and messengers arrived
informing Colonel Durnford that an enormous force was advancing.
A consultation then took place between that officer and Colonel
Pulleine, when some difference of opinion seemed to prevail. A
company of the 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment, was then immediately
moved up to a distance of about a mile and a half from the camp,
where, at a neck of the Isandhlwana hill, an attempt was made to
check the advance of the Zulu army. For a very short time only this
manœuvre was successful.
[Sidenote: _The Zulu attack._]
The Zulu army now advanced in a steady, quiet, and determined
manner. The Umcityu regiment formed the right centre, and was
engaged with one company of the 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment,
and about 200 of Colonel Durnford's natives; the left centre was
composed of the Nokenke regiment, which was shelled by the two guns
as it advanced. Next on the left, came the Imbonambi regiment,
with the Nkobamakosi regiment outside of it, both making a turning
movement and threatening the front of the camp, while driving
before them a body of Colonel Durnford's mounted men, supported
by a patrol of volunteers.[24] The Undi corps, on seeing that the
other four regiments had commenced the attack, concealed themselves
on the north side of the Isandhlwana mountain, and so turned as to
arrive at the western front where the waggon road crosses the neck.
On the left front of the camp our infantry behaved with extreme
gallantry, and succeeded in thrice repulsing the Nkobamakosi
regiment; but the Inbonambi regiment coming up as a reinforcement,
enabled the Zulus to push forward along the south front of the camp
and accomplish their turning movement. The guns were moved to the
right of the Native Contingent, and troops lined the nullah below;
three companies of the 1-24th remained on the left of the camp,
supported by Durnford's mounted Basutos, who had been driven back.
The single company of the 1-24th, which had been thrown out a mile
and a half from the camp, was retiring, fighting to the best of
their ability, and, of course, was cut off to a man.
The Zulu army was fast surrounding the camp. They had been held
only partially in check by our fire, and their own was remarkably
ineffective. Their overwhelming numbers and their extremely
advantageous position filled them with redoubled courage. In place
of advancing steadily and in silence, they now began to double
and to shout exultantly to each other. The Native Contingent
and camp-followers fled in all directions, seized by panic; the
Undi corps showed itself on the right rear of the camp, cutting
off retreat to Rorke's Drift, and a hand-to-hand combat against
overwhelming odds was imminent. Like the sea breaking against
land, the Zulu host came on invincibly, with overwhelming power
and strength. Then took place one of the most awful tragedies ever
recorded in the pages of history. With short stabbing assegais, on
rushed the naked savages, accompanying the death groans of their
victims with yells and shouts of triumph. No mercy was either
expected or granted. Hundreds of men, overpowered by brute force,
fell at their posts, and their fate was rendered more pitiable, as
well as more blamable, by a failure in the supply of ammunition.
[Sidenote: _The camp at Isandhlwana._]
From first to last, nothing could have been worse managed than
the defence of our camp at Isandhlwana. Profound ignorance and
rashness caused the dispersion of a force which, if formed in
hollow square—or better still, laagered in accordance with the
Dutch custom—would have defied the enemy, at least until such
time as the general, with the rest of the third column, could
have arrived. The lamentable spectacle was seen at Isandhlwana of
brave soldiers sacrificed through the most glaring incompetency
and folly. For the British infantry there was no opportunity of
escape—death at their post on the field of battle was inevitable;
but for the mounted men a chance occurred in consequence of the
Nkobamakosi regiment neglecting to make a junction with the Undi.
This was taken advantage of by a crowd of fugitives. In the flight
many were killed before the Buffalo river was reached, and many
were drowned and shot when trying to cross it. The Zulus, however,
had themselves suffered severely. The Umcityu lost heavily from
the fire of the single company of the 24th Regiment which was
sent out from camp never to return, the Nkobamakosi fell in
heaps, and the hill down which the Nokenke came was covered with
slain. As regards the British troops, our loss comprised 62 men
of the N Battery, 5th Brigade, Royal Artillery; 7 of the Royal
Engineers, including Colonel Durnford; 405 of the 1st Battalion,
24th Regiment, including Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, Captains
Degacher, Mostyn, Wardell, and Younghusband (Lieutenant and
Adjutant Melvill was killed on the western side of the Buffalo
river, when most gallantly defending the colours of his regiment,
which were afterwards found wrapped round his body); 165 men of the
2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment; Surgeon-Major Shepherd, Army Medical
Department; 12 Mounted Infantry; 26 Natal Mounted Police; 22 Natal
Carbineers; 7 Newcastle Mounted Rifles, and 3 Buffalo Borderguard;
37 of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment, Natal Native Contingent; 37
of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, Natal Native Contingent. Among
the Carbineers and other volunteer corps were the sons of many of
the leading inhabitants of Natal, and in the Police also were many
relatives of colonists. The official lists comprising white men
killed, publish more than 770 names; but there is no doubt that,
including the loyal natives, quite 1000 of our men must have been
slain. All the baggage, guns, and ammunition became the property of
the enemy, and in the incredibly short space of one hour from the
beginning of the general attack, one of the most signal victories
possible had been gained by the Zulu army. The number of white men
who escaped across the Buffalo river was about forty, in addition
to natives on horseback and foot. Of the former, about twenty-five
or thirty arrived at Helpmakaar between 5 and 6 p.m. The Undi
corps, believing that the camp had been plundered by the other
portions of their army, thought it desirable to advance quickly on
Rorke's Drift to secure the booty there, and hurried off for this
destination, little dreaming of the possibility of any resistance.
[Sidenote: _Ignorance of Lord Chelmsford._]
While these occurrences had been taking place, Lord Chelmsford,
with Colonel Glyn and a large portion of the third column, were
absent in advance. On the 20th of January, the general had made
a reconnoissance as far as a place called Matyana's stronghold—a
deep valley, full of caves. Not having time to examine this place
thoroughly, two separate parties were ordered out to bring back
a full description of it. One of these, under Major Dartnell,
reported that he found the enemy in force, and would be able to
attack if three companies of infantry were sent to him. This was
not acceded to. At 2.30 a.m. on the 22nd of January, Colonel Glyn
was ordered to move to Dartnell's assistance with six companies
2-24th, four guns, and the mounted infantry. Colonel Durnford was
at the same time ordered up to strengthen the Isandhlwana camp. The
general followed Colonel Glyn's reinforcements, and reached Major
Dartnell at 6.30 a.m. The enemy shortly showed at a distance, but
retreated when a general advance was made. All this was, no doubt,
part of the Zulu plan of amusing this portion of our forces, and
keeping them from the Isandhlwana camp. The only actual engagement
that took place was at the extreme right, where 500 Zulus were cut
off, of whom 30 were killed. At 9 a.m. a short note was received
from Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, stating that firing had been
heard, but giving no further particulars. Lieutenant Milne, A.D.C.,
was sent by the general to the top of a high hill from which the
camp could be seen, and he remained there for at least an hour,
with a very powerful telescope, but could detect nothing unusual in
that direction. A site for a new camp was then fixed upon, and the
troops were ordered to bivouac there that night. The general then
started to return to camp with the mounted infantry under Colonel
Russell. When within six miles from Isandhlwana, Lord Chelmsford
found the 1st Battalion, Native Contingent, halted, and shortly
after Commandant Lonsdale rode up to report that he had ridden
into camp, and found it in possession of the Zulus. Intimation had
been received so far back as between 9.30 and 10 a.m.[25] that
there was a force of the enemy in the close neighbourhood of the
camp. Major Clery at this time received a half sheet of foolscap
from Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, giving him that information,
and as the force was only twelve miles from camp, an immediate
rapid advance would have saved the day. The exact words of this
letter are not given in the evidence, and are clearly of the utmost
consequence. It was after this, however, that Lieutenant Milne,
A.D.C., descended the hill, with the report that he noticed nothing
except the cattle being driven into camp. This fact, however,
was of great consequence, taken in connection with the pressing
nature of the despatch from Colonel Pulleine. Notwithstanding all
this, nothing was suspected until the dreadful news came like a
thunderclap, that the camp had been taken and its defenders killed.
So soon as the general heard the awful news, he sent back Major
Gossett, A.D.C., to order Colonel Glyn to advance with all his
force. He was six miles off, and it was then 4 p.m. The advance
party, with the general, continued to go forward, until they were
within two miles from the camp, when they halted. Colonel Russell
went to the front to reconnoitre, and returned about 5.45 with a
report that "all was as bad as could be." The Zulus held the camp.
At 6 p.m. Colonel Glyn came up with his troops, which, having been
formed into fighting order, were addressed by the general. No sign
of wavering was perceptible. They advanced with steady courage,
determined to attack and go through any enemy. Guns in the centre;
three companies 2-24th on each flank in fours; Native Contingent;
mounted infantry on extreme right, Natal Mounted Volunteers on the
extreme left; Mounted Police in reserve;—in this order the force
went forward with great speed. The artillery shelled the crest of
the narrow neck over which the line of retreat lay, and positions
were seized without opposition. The curtain of night had fallen
over the dreadful scene of carnage, and the entire force, tired and
dispirited, lay down amidst the _débris_ of the plundered camp and
the corpses of men, horses, and oxen. The weariness and sorrow of
these hours of darkness will never be forgotten. The troops fully
expected to be attacked in front and rear; but fortunately the
Zulus knew better how to gain than how to improve a victory, and
although there were several alarms, not a shot was fired, and Lord
Chelmsford, with the remnant of his forces, was able at dawn of day
to hurry on to the relief of Rorke's Drift.
[Sidenote: _The disaster discovered._]
On the 22nd of January, Lieutenant Chard, R.E., was left in command
at Rorke's Drift by Major Spalding, who went to Helpmakaar to
hurry on the company of the 24th Regiment ordered to protect the
ponts. About 3.15 p.m. of that day, two men came riding furiously
from Zululand, and shouted to be taken across the river. These were
Lieutenant Adendorff, of Lonsdale's regiment, and a carbineer.
The former remained to assist in the defence; the latter galloped
off to take the intelligence to Helpmakaar. The news was of the
frightful disaster at Isandhlwana—that the Zulus were advancing on
the colony in force, and that Rorke's Drift must, therefore, be
held at all cost. Lieutenant Bromhead, who commanded the company
of the 24th Regiment at the camp near the commissariat stores,
had just then received a note from the third column, and sent
for Lieutenant Chard. Preparations for defence were made with
the utmost vigour. Separate buildings were connected by walls of
mealie-bags and two waggons; the store building and hospital were
loopholed and barricaded. All available materials were made use of,
and the brave little garrison determined to repulse the enemy or
die behind their frail entrenchments.
At the river the ferryman, Daniells, and Sergeant Milne, 3rd Buffs,
offered to moor the pont in the middle of the stream, and with a
few men fight from its deck; but this offer was declined, and the
brave fellows who made it were enrolled among the garrison.
[Sidenote: _Rorke's Drift._]
The sound of firing was heard at 4.20 p.m. Previously, an officer
of Durnford's had been requested to send outposts in the direction
of the enemy, and to check their advances as much as possible.
His men, however, would not obey orders, and rode off, 100 in
number, to Helpmakaar. About the same time, Captain Stephenson,
with his detachment of Natal Native Contingent, left the little
garrison. The line of defence was at once seen to be too extended
for the small number of men that were left, and a new entrenchment
of biscuit-boxes had at once to be commenced. The wall had only
been built two boxes high, when, at 4.30 p.m., 600 Zulus were
seen advancing at a run against the south wall. They were met by
a well-sustained fire, but, notwithstanding their heavy loss,
continued to advance within fifty yards. Here they encountered
the additional cross-fire from the store and were checked.
Unfortunately, however, some were able to take advantage of the
shelter afforded by the cook-house ovens, etc. By far the larger
number never stopped, but moved to the left, round the hospital,
and made a rush at the north-west wall of mealie-bags. A desperate
bayonet struggle took place here, which resulted in the repulse of
the enemy with heavy loss.
The bush in the immediate neighbourhood, which had not been cut
down, enabled the Zulus to advance under cover close to the wall.
A number of desperate assaults were made, all of which were most
splendidly met and repulsed by the bayonet.
A very harassing fire was encountered from the rocks, which
caused severe loss, and about 6 p.m. obliged a retreat behind the
entrenchment of the biscuit-boxes. While all this was going on,
the Zulus had been attempting to force the hospital, and shortly
afterwards set fire to its roof. The garrison there most gallantly
defended the building from floor to floor, bringing out all the
sick that could be moved. Four privates of the 24th Regiment
(Williams, Hook, R. Jones, and W. Jones) were the last men to
leave, holding the doorway with the bayonet, their own ammunition
being exhausted.
Mealie-bags were then converted into a sort of redoubt, which gave
a second line of fire all round. While this was being done, the
hospital was in flames, and the enemy continued to make desperate
attempts to fire the roof of the stores. Shortly before darkness
came on, the gallant little force was completely surrounded, and,
after repulsing several attacks, felt compelled to retire to the
centre of their entrenchments. The vigour of the siege continued
until after midnight, and then it lapsed into a desultory fire,
which was kept up all night.
About 4 a.m. on the 23rd of January, the firing ceased, and
at daybreak the enemy was out of sight over the hill to the
south-west. The number of the defending force was exactly 104,[26]
and that of the Zulus who attacked about 3000. No fewer than 350
of the enemy were killed. Thus was the colony of Natal saved by
the undaunted resolution of a little band of heroes whose conduct
rivals that of the men of Thermopylæ.
At about 7 a.m. a large body of the enemy were seen advancing.
No reinforcements had arrived from Helpmakaar, although they had
been specially sent for, and the ammunition was almost expended.
At about 8 a.m. the third column providentially appeared in sight,
and Lord Chelmsford and staff soon afterwards galloped up to
Rorke's Drift and warmly congratulated its gallant defenders.
They had by their undaunted bravery and firm attitude before an
overwhelming force of the enemy done much to neutralize the effect
of the disaster at Isandhlwana, and, Lord Chelmsford himself
officially reports, "no doubt saved Natal from a serious invasion."
He adds, "The cool, determined courage displayed by the gallant
garrison is beyond all praise, and will, I feel sure, receive ample
recognition."
[Sidenote: _Natal saved._]
The disaster at Isandhlwana, looked at correctly, confirms most
strongly the arguments advanced by the High Commissioner in favour
of the war. It became perfectly evident that the Zulu king had
an army at his command which could, almost any day, unexpectedly
invade Natal; and, owing to the great extent of frontier and
character of the natives within the colony, they might have
devastated the country without the possibility of being adequately
checked. To use the words of Sir Bartle Frere, it would have been
vain—almost criminal—to ignore the fact that there had grown
up by our sufferance alongside Natal a very powerful military
organization, directed by an irresponsible, bloodthirsty, and
treacherous despot. This extraordinary power simply made the
existence of a peaceful English community so precarious as to
prevent its safe continuance in any other form than that of an
armed camp. So soon as the news of Isandhlwana reached the colony,
a terrible panic was the result. The inhabitants fled to the
towns, laagers were formed in every direction, while in D'Urban
and Pietermaritzburg entrenchments and fortifications were at once
erected. The heroic defence of Rorke's Drift and the providential
flooding of the Tugela river were the means of saving the colony.
Flushed with victory, nothing would have been able to withstand
the Zulu armies, if they had crossed the boundary and, in their
well-organized form, entered Natal.
As a result of the Isandhlwana disaster, the native allies could
no longer be trusted, and melted away by means of desertion. Lord
Chelmsford was obliged to report that large British reinforcements
were absolutely required if the operations against the Zulus
were to be carried to a successful issue. Three British infantry
regiments, two cavalry regiments, and one company of Royal
Engineers, as well as 100 artillerymen, were asked for. When the
request reached England, it was immediately granted, but a fearful
period of suspense and anxiety intervened. It is difficult to
pourtray in words the feelings of the white inhabitants of Natal,
who every moment expected to hear that a savage, ruthless foe was
in full march for the purpose of utterly exterminating the hated
white race. Sixty miles only intervened between D'Urban and the
Tugela river; Pietermaritzburg was still more exposed. Numbers of
people fled to the seaboard, and thence to the neighbouring colony;
while, behind laagers and hastily constructed fortifications, the
people waited in expectant terror for every item of news from the
theatre of war. In the Cape colony, the most vigorous measures
were adopted by its Government. Two hundred volunteers from Cape
Town, and 100 from Port Elizabeth, proceeded immediately to King
William's Town and relieved the 88th Regiment, ordered to Natal;
900 mounted yeomanry were called out to occupy certain positions
on the border, in conjunction with 800 Cape Mounted Riflemen.
Two thousand Europeans were thus placed under arms, 1700 of whom
were mounted men. This was really necessary in order to keep
down possible insurrections of Pondos, Basutos, and Griquas. All
the black races throughout Southern Africa had to be feared, as
they only waited an opportunity to make common cause against the
Europeans. Already in detail had the Gealekas and the Gaikas been
thoroughly defeated, but the Basutos and Pondos had hitherto hung
back. The Zulu war was watched by them with lively feelings of
interest and their sympathies were, of course, enlisted on the side
of Cetywayo.
[Sidenote: _Feeling in England._]
Her Majesty the Queen, with the utmost sympathy and promptness,
caused the Secretary of State to telegraph, on the 18th of
February, her sorrow at the loss of so many brave officers and men
of the regular and colonial forces, and her full confidence that
Lord Chelmsford would be able to meet the difficulties in which he
was placed. The message ended with the words, "Full reinforcements
of all arms will be sent with the utmost despatch."
The Imperial Ministry was fiercely attacked in England for having
entered upon the Zulu war, and succumbed to the pressure of
public opinion so far as to blame Sir Bartle Frere for taking,
without their full knowledge and sanction, a course almost certain
to result in war, which every effort should have been used to
avoid. The High Commissioner, under his commission, was not only
empowered, but really authorized and obliged, to enter upon
this war. His Excellency knew that it was necessary to open the
campaign at once in Zululand; and the mild, modified rebuke of the
Conservative Ministry was evidently wrung from them more by the
exigencies of party than by the actual circumstances. A disaster
always evokes a cry for victims, and the British populace were
loud in the usual _væ victis_ clamour. Sir Bartle Frere, however,
stood firm, strong in the confidence of eventually obtaining
justice; while the Ministry at home were sufficiently powerful and
sufficiently noble to refuse to sacrifice Lord Chelmsford to the
ferocious outcry that was raised against him.
CHAPTER V.
PEARSON'S COLUMN—MARCH TO EKOWE—BATTLE OF INYEZANE—EKOWE—ZULU
ARMY—WOOD'S COLUMN—ZULU RAIDS—REINFORCEMENTS FROM ENGLAND—THE
COLONISTS—THE NAVY.
We have now to advert to the proceedings of No. 1 column, comprising
1200 British troops, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pearson.
Having crossed the Tugela river, an advance was commenced towards Ekowe
on the 18th of January. No fewer than 130 waggons, as well as a number of
other vehicles, accompanied this column, whose order of march was as
follows:—
Cavalry.
Detachment Royal
Engineers.
Cavalry. One cart.
Company Native Half company Natal Company Native
Contingent. Native Pioneers. Contingent.
One cart.
Company of Buffs. Company of Buffs.
Company Native Two companies Buffs. Company Native
Contingent. Contingent.
Royal Artillery.
Two guns.
Two companies Buffs.
A and B Companies
Naval Brigade, with
two 24-pounder rockets
and crews.
Company Royal Engineers.
│
│
│
130 waggons and other vehicles.
│
│
│
{Three companies Native Contingent.}
{ Gatling crew. }
Rearguard. { Royal Marines. } Rearguard.
{ Two companies Buffs. }
The difficulties of transport were considerable, and the immense
train of waggons not only delayed progress, but made an attack,
when the troops were in motion, more difficult to resist. Nothing
of consequence occurred on the march, excepting the destruction
of a large military kraal. The enemy, however, hovered about the
column, and only waited for a favourable opportunity.
[Sidenote: _Lieutenant-Colonel Pearson's column._]
At last, on the 22nd of January, the day of Isandhlwana, the march
was commenced at 5 a.m. After passing five miles along a fertile
valley, the path turned suddenly to the left, and the ascent of
the high land on which Ekowe is situated commenced. The head of
the column reached the turning, and was preparing to halt for
breakfast, when it was suddenly attacked along the entire right
flank and on both fronts. The Zulus had been lying in ambush.
Rushing from bush to bush, and firing with great rapidity, they
advanced in extended order so as to come within a distance of
150 yards. Their advance was checked by the heavy fire from two
7-pounders, Royal Artillery, and two 24-pounder Naval Brigade
rockets, placed on a knoll at the foot of the pass commanding the
valley from which the flank attack proceeded. Two companies of the
Buffs, as well as A and B companies of the Naval Brigade, assisted
in holding this position, and poured in a steady fire. While these
proceedings were going on under the personal direction of Colonel
Pearson, the waggons continued to park, and as soon as the length
of the column had sufficiently decreased, two companies of the
Buffs, which had been guarding the waggons, were directed to clear
the enemy out of the bush. Led by Captains Harrison and Wild, they
got into skirmishing order, and in good style drove the Zulus back
into the open plain, where they were effectually swept by rockets,
shells, and musketry. The main body of the mounted infantry, under
Major Barrow and Captain Wynne, were now able to move forward.
An attempt to outflank on the part of the enemy was defeated by
the Naval Brigade and a part of the Native Contingent. Shortly
afterwards, a brilliant and successful attack was made upon heights
where a considerable body of Zulus were posted. The Zulus then fled
in all directions, and a complete victory was gained.
[Illustration: A. The enemy. C. Chest of Zulu army.
BB. Horns of Zulu army. D. Loins of Zulu army.]
The plan of fighting by the Zulus was in accordance with their
usual well-organized scheme. The formation of their attack is in
the figure of a beast, with horns, chest, and loins. They usually
make a feint with one horn, whilst the other, concealed by long
grass or bush, sweeps round for the purpose of encompassing its
enemy. The chest then advances, and endeavours by its vast power
to crush opposition. The loins are kept at a distance and only join
in pursuit.
The action of Inyezani lasted exactly one hour and a half,
commencing at 8 a.m. and the last shot being fired at 9.30 a.m. The
British loss was 12 killed and 16 wounded, while of the Zulus 300
were slain. It is conjectured that the attacking force comprised
nearly 5000 men.
After the battle was over the column calmly resumed the even tenor
of its way, and at night bivouacked on a high ridge distant only
three miles from the battle-field. The road led up a winding and
steep ascent, and on the 23rd of January, after marching six miles
further, Ekowe was reached. The intention was to leave surplus
stores here, with a small garrison, and push on to Cetywayo's kraal
at Ulundi. But these plans had to be completely changed. On the
29th of January, about noon, a messenger galloped in from Lord
Chelmsford with the news of the fearful disaster at Isandhlawana,
and that the entire Zulu army might be expected to attack them.
Colonel Pearson had to decide either to hold the fort, or to march
back, at once and quickly, to the Tugela river. A council of
war was assembled, and, by a small majority, it was resolved to
maintain their position at all costs. The result proved that this
was a wise determination.
[Sidenote: _The camp at Ekowe._]
In order to husband resources, all the cavalry, with the two
battalions of Native Contingent, were sent back, and by this means
the garrison lost all means of obtaining information of the enemy's
movements. The Victoria, Stanger, and D'Urban Mounted Rifles, as
well as the Natal Hussars, and two battalions of the Natal Native
Contingent, rode away at 2 p.m. of the day on which the order was
given, and at midnight arrived safely on the banks of the Tugela,
not having seen a Zulu on the way. Colonel Ely, _en route_ with
supplies, was directed to hasten on to Ekowe, and, in order to do
so more effectually, abandoned eight waggons, with their contents
of flour, biscuit, lime-juice, sugar, etc. On the 30th of January,
all the troops came inside the embryo fort; tents were no longer
allowed, and officers and men were obliged to huddle together under
waggons. The garrison consisted of 1339 whites and 355 blacks, of
whom 47 whites and 290 blacks were non-combatants. The armament
comprised 1200 Martini rifles, with 330 rounds per rifle; 1
Gatling, with 127,000 rounds; 2 rocket tubes, with 83 rockets; and
2 7-pounders, with 500 rounds.
The garrison had 3000 oxen, but were obliged to drive away a large
number, and soon learned, by the loss of 90 slaughter oxen from
the ditch of the parapet, that large numbers of Zulus were close
at hand. The fort soon attained a respectable appearance. It was
oblong in shape—east and west sides, 300 yards each; north side,
120 yards; south, 180 yards. Waggons were placed round the inside
of the parapet, a few yards distant. The church was converted into
a hospital, the schoolroom and parsonage into storerooms, and all
other buildings were demolished. All hands were up at réveille, and
engaged all day in making the fort, and, when that was completed,
in making roads. At 8 p.m. the "last post" sounded, and then all
gave themselves to sleep, often broken by the alarm of the church
bell, when the parapets were manned at once. A few irregular horse
had been enrolled, who did outpost duty during the day. At this
time an army of 20,000 Zulus was lying in wait between Ekowe and
the Tugela.
Lord Chelmsford desired Colonel Pearson to reduce his garrison,
and to establish a portion of it at the Tugela forts; but this
was clearly impossible, and it is very surprising that such an
order could ever have been issued. On the 6th of February, Colonel
Pearson wrote, suggesting that twenty waggons, with a convoy,
should be sent. In reply, the general sent word that there would
not be a force at Lower Tugela for six weeks sufficient to insure a
convoy to Ekowe, but wished the garrison there reduced and a flying
column formed. This was quite out of the question, and, of course,
was not attempted. On the 10th of February the fort was completed,
with ditches seven feet deep and twelve feet wide, flanked by
_caponnières_ or by the parapet itself; wire entanglements on
the glacis, and stakes in the ditch. The two 7-pounders were at
the south-east and south-west angles, the rocket battery at the
north-west, and the Gatling on the east face of the parapet.
The stench, at night particularly, was absolutely sickening,
although every effort was made to keep the camp clean. Rations soon
had to be reduced. A bottle of pickles fetched 25_s._; sardines,
12_s._; tin of milk, 23_s._; a ham, £7 10_s._ There was always,
however, a sufficient quantity of food of a coarse description,
and the only famine that the garrison really suffered from was a
dearth of news. Intelligence of how the war was going on, and of
the outside world, was greedily and earnestly thirsted for. Convoys
were always looked for and never arrived. No attack was ever made
upon the fort by the wily Zulus, although they lay in wait for any
opportunity.
[Sidenote: _Life at the camp._]
The defence of Rorke's Drift had not only saved Natal from
destruction, but Ekowe from attack. Affairs dragged on in a dull,
monotonous manner all through February until the beginning of
March. From a slight elevation near the camp the Lower Tugela
could be seen, and H.M.S. _Active_ cruising on the coast. Many a
time were eyes stretched over the thirty-five miles of country
intervening between Ekowe and Natal for some sign of relief and of
succour.
An officer in Ekowe says, "The troops inside consisted of three
companies of the 99th Regiment, five companies of the 2-3rd Buffs,
one company Royal Engineers, one company of the Pioneers, the
Naval Brigade, a body of artillery, and nineteen of the Native
Contingent, amongst them being several non-commissioned officers,
whom we found exceedingly useful, two of them being at once
selected as butchers, whilst two others were 'promoted' to the
rank of 'bakers to the troops.' Others attended to the sanitary
arrangements of the garrison, and altogether they were found to be
also exceedingly useful. As a portion of the column the company
of pioneers under the command of Captain Beddoes did a great deal
of very important work. This company was composed of ninety-eight
natives, one captain, and three lieutenants, and their proceedings
in connection with the making of the new road were watched with
much interest. They worked with the Naval Brigade, about three
companies of soldiers, and several men of the Royal Artillery. This
road was found useless in consequence of the numerous swampy places
at the foot of each of the numerous hills which occurred along the
route. Very thick bush had to be cut through, and at first but
slow progress was made. The road, as is generally known, took a
direction towards the Inyezane. Whilst out on one occasion, the
road party saw a torpedo explosion, which took place about three
miles from where the party was working. It had been accidentally
fired by Kafirs, who were unaware of the dangers connected with the
implement, and it is believed that several of them were killed. The
road was altogether a bad one. The relief column used it on their
way up, but only the pioneers and the mounted men went by that
route on the way back. In fact, it would have been useless to have
attempted to use it for the passage of waggons. Whenever the road
party went out they were fired on by Kafirs, but of course shots
were returned, and many a Zulu warrior was knocked over whilst the
work was being proceeded with. Everything in camp was conducted in
a most orderly manner. We were roused at half-past five, sharp,
and at eight o'clock, sharp, lights were out. For one month we
existed very comfortably on full rations, but at the end of that
time we were put on short rations, made up as follow:—One pound
and a quarter of trek oxen beef, six ounces of meal, one ounce and
a quarter of sugar, third of an ounce of coffee, onesixth of an
ounce of tea, one-ninth of an ounce of pepper, and a quarter of an
ounce of salt. Life of course was very monotonous. The bands of the
two regiments played on alternate afternoons, and every morning
they were to be heard practising outside the entrenchment. The most
pleasant part of the day was just after six o'clock, when we used
to be enlivened in the cool of the evening by the fife and drum
band, playing the 'retreat.' The water with which we were supplied
was indeed excellent, and the bathing places, I need not say, were
very extensively patronized. The grazing was not nearly sufficient
for the cattle, and from the first they must have suffered very
much from want of nourishment. You will have heard of the fate of
the 1100 head of oxen and the span of donkeys which we sent away
from the camp in expectation of their reaching the Lower Tugela.
They left us in charge of nineteen Kafirs; but at the Inyezane they
were attacked by a large body of Kafirs. The natives in charge of
the cattle decamped and reached the fort in safety, and the enemy
got possession of the whole of the cattle, which they drove off.
The donkeys were all killed, with the exception of one, and this
sagacious animal surprised everybody in camp by returning soon
after the Kafirs had come back."
[Sidenote: _Movements of Cetewayo._]
Shortly after the disaster at Isandhlwana, the main body of the
Zulu army went up to the king to be doctored with charms taken
from the mutilated bodies of the killed of the English army. The
intended movements of Cetywayo were described as follows:—"When
the doctoring is done, the king will order a still stronger force
than that of 22nd January; perhaps 20,000 or 30,000 to attack in
one mass Colonel Glynn's column, and if they succeed, then attack
Colonel Wood's column; but if they do not succeed in doing this,
he will try to check and harass the English columns in Zululand
by manœuvring a sufficient number of soldiers around them, and
simultaneously make strong impetuous raids into the colony, as he
has prohibited his people making raids in small numbers; he has
furthermore plainly and repeatedly expressed himself to the effect
that if he is to lose his life and kingdom, he will first make such
havoc in Natal that it for ever shall be remembered." The truth is
that something little short of a universal panic prevailed, which
only by degrees subsided as time passed on without any invasion,
and leisure was allowed for reflection. It does not seem to have
been remembered that in every direction except one, and by all
the columns except that of Colonel Glyn, the Zulus were defeated.
Isandhlwana was a purely exceptional case, entirely attributable to
blundering of the most gross and evident character. The defence of
Rorke's Drift and the battle of Ineyezani were most significant. At
the former a handful of infantry defended themselves successfully
behind mealie-bags and biscuit-boxes against three times their
number; at the latter, an overwhelming force was easily defeated in
the field by the simple strategy of common sense.
No. 4 column, under Colonel Wood, operated in the north and acted
as a means of defence to Utrecht and the Transvaal. It was assisted
from the first by a number of irregulars and volunteers. Successful
forays were made on various occasions, but it would be tedious
to do more than refer to these, although the greatest gallantry
and skill were exhibited. Colonel Wood most deservedly increased
his reputation as a brilliant and successful leader. A fort was
established at Kambula hill, entrenched in such a manner as to defy
the attacks of a savage enemy.
[Sidenote: _Discontent among the Boers._]
February was a month of suspense. Cetywayo had an opportunity of
which he did not avail himself, but was contented with reorganizing
and reanointing his armies. Colonel Pearson remained at Ekowe;
forts were placed on the Tugela river; mounted forces were
distributed along the border from Fort Pearson to Thring's Post.
There was, in addition, a border guard of white officers and
natives, about 1500 strong. "Stanger"—fifteen miles on the Natal
side—as well as D'Urban, Maritzburg, and every town of the least
consequence, was fortified, and then volunteer and citizen soldiers
prepared themselves for any emergency. The High Commissioner,
Sir Bartle Frere, who had proceeded to Natal on the outbreak of
hostilities, still remained at Pietermaritzburg, and was there in
the best possible position for giving that advice and assistance so
necessary in the serious emergencies in which a British colony and
a British general were placed. Unfortunately, many of the people of
Dutch extraction in the Transvaal seemed to take the opportunity
for loudly protesting against the annexation of that territory to
the Crown, then recently effected by Sir Theophilus Shepstone.
A people's committee was appointed, and a firm determination
expressed to regain that republican liberty of which they believed
they had been unjustly deprived. One of the most satisfactory
events of this month was the evident desire of the king's brother,
Oham, to be regarded as our friend. His country lay in the
north-west of Zululand, and at an interview held with Colonel Wood,
conditions of surrender were arranged. Early in March he came in
with more than 600 people.
Under the orders and with the connivance of Cetywayo, the chiefs
Umbellini and Manyanyoba perpetrated the most horrid cruelties.
Atrocious outrages had been committed long previously, but the
Transvaal republican authorities had not apparently considered it
expedient to report them fully. The little town of Luneberg was
undoubtedly saved by a company of troops sent there by Colonel
Wood. This officer had it in his power, when passing through
Manyanyoba's country, to crush him and his warriors, but accepted
in good faith the statement of that chief, professing a desire to
come under the British Government. In spite of this, on the 10th of
February, a Zulu war party, led by Umbellini, crossed the Pongolo,
and was joined on the north by a strong force of Manyanyoba's
people, led by Manyanyoba himself.[27] The combined force consisted
of 1500 men. At half-past 3 a.m. of the 11th February, they reached
the mission station of the Rev. Mr. Wagner, only four miles from
Luneberg, and then commenced a scene of most atrocious murder. Men,
women, and children were massacred. The houses of the Christian
natives were given to the flames, and no fewer than seven children
were burnt alive. From Wagner's they went to Nomapela's kraal,
where they killed two men, eleven women, and fifteen children.
Thence they proceeded to Luhlanya's kraal, where they murdered one
man, two women, and two children. But it is unnecessary to prolong
the narrative; suffice it to say that they went through the country
with fire and sword, sparing neither age nor sex, and plundering
wherever they had an opportunity. Bodies of women and children were
found frightfully mutilated, and at Mr. Wagner's house a woman was
found still alive, who bore thirty-seven assegai wounds on her body.
[Sidenote: _Life at Helpmakaar._]
The movements of the main Zulu army were mysterious. One day scouts
arrived with the information that the enemy was in force between
the Tugela and Ekowe; another day information was received that
there was an army beyond the later place. The plan adopted on our
side was simply to entrench and wait. A dull, monotonous round of
garrison duty had to be performed at a number of posts, while the
danger was so great and imminent as to turn every citizen into a
soldier, and every town into a barrack. As a specimen of life at
a fort, we quote from a correspondent who writes in February from
"Helpmakaar:" "Here we are, foot artillery, police, and contingent,
about 500 strong, living in tents during the day and going into
the fort at night. With the exception of a stink of rotten mealies
and the rain continually swelling through and through, the fort
is not so bad, being so strong and well built that the men here
now could hold it against the whole of the Zulu army. It is
not healthy. Hospital leaks. What with guards, vedettes, etc.,
the duties are very heavy." What was said at Helpmakaar might
have been said with very little variation at every other fort.
The most active operations were carried on from Colonel Wood's
column, whose head-quarters were entrenched at Kambula. Among its
brilliant exploits was the capture, on the 20th February, of the
almost inaccessible Makkatees mountain. One of the captured natives
said that our troops had not come a day too soon, as Cetywayo had
promised to send reinforcements.
[Sidenote: _Arrival of reinforcements._]
The first ship to arrive with reinforcements was H.M.S. _Shah_,
which anchored at Port Natal on Thursday, the 6th of March. The
troops available by her were 392 men of the Naval Brigade and 200
men from the St. Helena garrison.[28] Baker and Lonsdale's Light
Horse, as well as other irregulars, were recruited in the Cape
Colony, and sent on by degrees. The first steamer from England to
arrive with reinforcements was the _Pretoria_, of the Union Royal
Mail Steam Shipping Company's fleet. She made the run to Natal in
less than twenty-four days, and had on board 34 officers, 7 staff
officers, and 890 men of the 71st Highlanders. The British soldiers
were received in Natal with the utmost enthusiasm, as saviours of
the country. Each ship and each regiment was eagerly looked for and
gladly welcomed. Previous to the _Pretoria_, the 57th Regiment had
arrived from Ceylon in H.M. troopship _Tamar_. The Secretary of War
telegraphed, on the 13th of February, to Lord Chelmsford that the
following reinforcements had been placed under immediate orders
for Natal:—Two regiments of cavalry, each 648 men and 480 horses;
two field batteries of artillery, 336 men and 220 horses; one field
company of Engineers; five regiments of infantry from home, each
806 men; 57th Regiment from Ceylon; three companies Army Reserve
Corps, 140 men, 380 horses; Army Hospital Corps, 140; drafts for
the 57th, the 24th, and Royal Artillery. The steamers employed to
bring out these troops were—
_Line._ _Troops conveyed._
The Pretoria Union S.S. Co. 91st Highlanders
Danube Ditto 200 men 60th Rifles
Dublin Castle D. Currie & Co. 3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade
England National S.S. Co. 17th Lancers and horses
France Ditto Ditto
Egypt Ditto 1st Dragoon Guards and horses
Spain Ditto Ditto
Loando British and African
S.S. Co. Military stores and field
Ditto 58th Regiment
China Ditto 94th Regiment
Olympus Ditto Royal Artillery
Palmyra Ditto Royal Engineers
Manora McNeil Denny M Battery, 6th Brigade,
Royal Horse Artillery
City of Paris[29] Inman Company 21st Regiment
City of Venice Smith & Sons Army Service and Hospital Corps
Clyde Temperley's Drafts of 24th Regiment.
Wrecked off Cape Coast,
brought in by _Tamar_
Queen Margaret Queen Line Army Service Corps and horses
Andean East India and Reserve ammunition column
Pacific
STAFF OF THE TROOPS.
Major-General Marshall; 1 brigade major; 1 A.D.C.
Major-General Crealock. Ditto
Major-General Newdigate. Ditto
These magnificent steamships used the utmost despatch, and in
little more than twenty days[30] from England each one arrived at
the Cape of Good Hope. The voyage thence to Natal only occupies
three days. Immense enthusiasm prevailed as each noble steamer and
well-known regiment arrived. The landing at D'Urban was performed
in the most expeditious manner, and without the slightest accident.
In the midst of all these arrivals and the excitement connected
with them, apprehensions of Zulu inroads were at an end; but it
was felt that the retrieval of the disaster at Isandhlwana would
be a serious work, and that energy and ability were requisite to
bring the war to a speedy and satisfactory termination. The 12th
of March was observed throughout the colony of Natal as a day of
humiliation, and in every church prayers were offered up to the
God of battles, that He would bless our arms. The people of Natal
had, in proportion to their numbers, sent out a considerable force
across the Tugela. There was mourning in many families for sons,
brothers, husbands, slain at Isandhlwana; and the losses caused to
sugar estates and other interests by the war were neither small nor
unimportant. The war was entirely an imperial act—levied by the
High Commissioner, and carried on in Zululand for the protection of
the Transvaal and of British South Africa generally, as well as of
Natal.
[Sidenote: _The colonists maligned._]
When transport prices increased in accordance with the inexorable
laws of supply and demand, immense sums were obtained by waggoners
as well as by owners of oxen and waggons. Other classes also
greatly benefited by the large military expenditure. It stands to
reason that very large sums of money spent in South Africa must
have permeated through all classes of the community. At the same
time, it is incorrect to charge the people with special greed
and rapacity. They have been libelled by more than one person;
and with reference to various charges, the Rev. Mr. de Witt, at
an early stage of the war, publicly stated in London that the
people of Natal treated the Zulus worse than dogs, while, at a
subsequent period, Mr. Archibald Forbes, correspondent of the
_Daily News_, maligned them in the most insulting manner. It is so
well known as to be beyond question that the Zulus are extremely
well-treated—too well-treated frequently—by the colonists; and
to those conversant with the subject, the missionary's statement
at once is seen in its true light, as a mere attempt to obtain a
little popularity by joining the usual successful outcry against
the oppression of coloured races by the "cruel white men," so
constantly echoed by people who have never lived among blacks,
and are perfectly ignorant of the facts of the case. Philanthropy
obtained at this price, and by means of calumnies against our
fellow-countrymen at a distance and in a most trying position of
danger, cannot be estimated at a high price. Mr. Forbes was so very
short a time in Natal as to be perfectly incompetent to judge of
the entire character of the people. His sweeping condemnations must
be attributed to bad temper, occasioned by petty inconveniences
or rudeness; but it is a pity that a man of his eminence and
ability should permit such considerations to affect his judgment
or guide his pen. The fact is that the people of the colonies,
and of Natal very especially, are, in proportion to their number,
quite superior to the people of Europe. There is more education and
more intelligence; consequently, quite as much honesty. Let any
man who is really qualified to speak by a real knowledge of the
colonies say whether or not this is the truth. Of course, it must
be admitted that there is a greater spirit of independence and more
freedom, with less conventionality; but this is merely a sequence
of the circumstances in which colonists are necessarily placed.
Intelligent and influential public writers in England have gone
so far as to assert that "it would not be safe to rely on the
energetic co-operation of the Cape." His Excellency the Governor
and High Commissioner thus disposes of this subject:—"I fear that
possibly, in the press of work, I may have omitted to do justice to
the patriotic and energetic spirit shown by the Cape ministry, who
in this respect represent, I believe, very faithfully the feeling
of the colony generally.
"The Cape Government, indeed, appears to me to have done all and
much more than could have been expected from it. It has spared a
regiment and a half of her Majesty's forces, taken its own recently
subdued rebellious districts entirely under its own charge, and
is sending to Natal very useful contingents of volunteers, native
levies, waggon drivers, supplies of arms, and means of transport in
mules, horses, etc.
[Sidenote: _Public spirit at the Cape._]
"The tone and spirit generally shown by the Cape Government and
people will naturally be compared with that shown by the sister
colony of Natal, whose interests are so much greater; and without
any reflection on Natal, the population of which has risen to the
occasion, the comparison will be by no means unfavourable to the
Cape.
"It must not be forgotten that the nearer we approach the seat
of war, actual or threatened, the greater will be the natural
disinclination of colonists to volunteer for any but home service,
and to leave their houses defenceless. This is, I feel sure, the
principal reason of any disinclination to encourage volunteering
for service in Zululand; and the threatened disturbance in
Basutoland will naturally disincline the Cape colonists to weaken
too far their own means of defence."
The services of the navy during the entire war were of the
utmost value. In a despatch dated the 15th of February, the High
Commissioner brings specially to the notice of her Majesty's
Government the excellent service performed by the naval brigades
landed from H.M.S. _Active_ and _Tenedos_ by Admiral Sullivan,
and subsequently from the _Boadicea_. These men, in arduous and
prolonged military operations, earned most thoroughly the title of
"bravest of the brave." No sailor ever turned his back on an enemy
during the war, and it was with difficulty that their impetuous
heroism could be checked. The _Active_ men helped to win the battle
of Ineyezane, and were with Colonel Pearson at Ekowe; Fort Tenedos
was manned by the men of the ship of that name. This important
fort commanded the crossing of the Tugela river near its mouth.
Men-of-war cruising on the coast produced an excellent effect, but
it is the services of the gallant "blue jackets" in the field which
are specially deserving of eulogium.
So soon as the news of the Isandhlwana disaster had been received
at St. Helena, Governor Janisch obtained the consent of the
military and naval authorities to send off at once every available
man to Natal. This was done with promptitude. And the first real
ray of sunshine from home reached our troops in Zululand when they
heard that 650 gallant men in H.M.S. _Shah_, Captain Bradshaw, had
arrived in Natal to assist them.
CHAPTER VI.
THE ZLOBANE MOUNTAIN—PIET UYS—THE BATTLE OF KAMBULA—THE INTOMBE
DISASTER—BATTLE OF GHINGHELOVO—RELIEF OF EKOWE.
It is now necessary to refer to the operations of Colonel Wood's
column.
On the 27th of March a force started from the Kambula camp to
attack the Zlobane mountain, consisting of detachments of the
Frontier Light Horse, Raaff's Corps, Weatherley's Rangers, Baker's
Horse, Major Tremlett with rocket tube, and the burgher force.
The number of horsemen was 400, and in addition a large body of
the Native Contingent was sent, under Major Leet, 1-13th, and
Lieutenant Williams, 58th Regiment. Another column was despatched,
consisting of mounted infantry, Kaffrarian Mounted Rifles, and
Wood's Irregulars, under Commandant Schermbrucker. Colonel Wood,
chief in command, and staff followed. We will go with the first
column under Colonel Buller, which halted at noon on the south side
of the Zinquin neck. Colonel Weatherley, with his troopers, arrived
half an hour afterwards. As the column passed the south side of
the Zlobane mountain, two shots were fired from an elephant gun,
and three fires were instantaneously lit on a shelf of rock near
the summit. Commandant Uys, a brave Dutch burgher, who had already
frequently distinguished himself in the war, acted as guide, and
the march onward took place in perfect silence. Moving forward in
the stillness of death, the east side of the mountain was reached.
As the time of action approached, the front post of danger and of
honour was taken by Commandant Uys, Colonel Buller, Majors Leet and
Tremlett. When 500 yards from the top, the enemy opened a furious
fire, in which Lieutenant Williams was killed; but our gallant
fellows pressed on without faltering for an instant, and gained
the top of the mountain, although the ascent was extremely steep
and trying. The fight continued at this point for another hour,
and during the entire time the British force was exposed to a most
galling fire from Zulus stationed behind rocks and in caves. When
Colonel Wood was within 100 feet from the summit, Mr. Lloyd, his
interpreter, fell mortally wounded, and his own horse was shot
under him. Colonel Weatherley was desired to dislodge one or two
Zulus who were causing most of the loss; but as his men did not
advance rapidly, Captain Campbell, Lieutenant Lysons, and three men
of the 90th, jumping over a low wall, ran forward and charged into
a cave, where Captain (the Hon. R.) Campbell, leading in the most
gallant and determined manner, was shot dead. Lieutenant Lysons and
Private Fowler followed closely on his footsteps, and one of them,
for each shot fired, killed one Zulu and dislodged another, who
crawled away by a subterraneous passage, reappearing higher up the
mountain.
[Sidenote: _The Zlobane mountain._]
After silencing the fire of the Zulus at the top of the Zlobane
mountain, Colonel Buller and Commandant Raaff rode to the westward
end, where the track divides it. The Zulus had fortified the pass
with stone walls, and from this position were annoying the rear
of the attacking force. In the mean time parties of Raaff's and
Baker's Horse, and the burgher force, kept up a hot fire on the
enemy lurking under the krantzes on the north-west side, where the
Zulu troops had built huts for encampment. After having been four
or five hours on the summit, Colonel Buller, with Commandments
Uys and Raaff, were returning from silencing the enemy's fire at
the pass, when they noticed the arrival of a body of Zulus on the
northern extremity of the mountain. Colonel Buller rode off to
attack them, but before he could get half-way, he saw that troops
of natives were climbing every available baboon-path, with the
object of cutting off the retreat of our men from the only two
passes by which it was possible to descend. At the same time,
two great columns of the enemy were seen approaching along the
top of the mountain to the eastward, and another dense mass of
men advancing from the southward. Colonel Buller then gave the
order to ride for the pass over the krantz at the neck, which
was the only exit left open. Then ensued a scene which almost
defies description. Down a descent fearfully steep and covered
with boulders horses were ridden at full speed. Many who lost
their steeds were saved on the cruppers of their comrades. At the
foot, Colonel Buller, with other officers, did everything possible
to rally sufficient men to cover the retreat of those still
descending, but every effort was in vain. The retreat became a
flight, and that even degenerated into a species of stampede, panic
guiding the actions of the fugitives. It was when endeavouring to
descend the mountain that the brave Commandant Uys was killed. He
had already reached such a forward position as to be comparatively
free from danger, when he learned that one of his sons was behind,
and might probably fall into the enemy's hands. He returned
immediately, but only to die. A ring of savages closed around him.
True to the traditions of his race, he fought bravely to the last,
and only succumbed to overwhelming force. He fell, stabbed to
death by numerous assegais. The family of Piet Uys was celebrated
in Kafir wars. He was born in the Humansdorp district of the Cape
Colony, and his family left that neighbourhood for Natal in 1837.
Both his father and brother were killed fighting against Dingaan,
and he himself, determining to avenge their death, was among the
first to offer his services. In one of his letters he writes, "I
fight in a good faith and a righteous cause. I must avenge the
death of my father and brother, although in doing so I am almost
sure to lose my life; yet I cannot restrain myself when I remember
how they were slain."
A similar fate was reserved for the gallant Colonel Weatherley.
This officer, with his Rangers, delayed starting in retreat, and
lost his way. Nearly every man of his force was cut off, while
their brave leader, holding his son—a boy of fourteen—to his
breast, fought manfully, until he fell pierced with numerous wounds.
[Sidenote: _Death of Uys and Weatherley._]
Thus perished two of the most gallant officers who served in the
war—one of Dutch extraction, the other an Englishman. The services
of Commandant Uys were of such great value, in consequence of
his bravery and thorough knowledge of the country, as to receive
special recognition, and no more gallant officer fought under the
British flag than poor Weatherley, of the Transvaal Rangers.
Among those killed at the Zlobane was a man named Calverley,
whose antecedents were of a very peculiar and somewhat suspicious
character. He had come as ambassador from Oham, the brother of
Cetywayo, by whom he was evidently completely trusted. Shuffling
and vacillation characterized the negotiations, and it was noticed
in camp that Calverley rode the horse on which Lieutenant Coghill
was killed at Isandhlwana. He likewise possessed property known
to have been lost in that disaster. But for strict military
discipline, Calverley would undoubtedly have been killed by our
soldiers, and even after Oham came over he was still treated with
suspicion. On this day, however, he expiated any faults he may have
committed by his blood, and died fighting in the British ranks
against the enemies of Oham and of England.
Colonel Wood was riding slowly under the Zlobane mountain to the
westward, perfectly unconscious of the existence of a large Zulu
force moving on the left across his front. When about half-way,
at the centre of the mountain, one of the natives, named Umtanga,
explained by signs that a large Zulu army was close upon them.
From an adjacent hill they perceived that a great host was marching
towards them, disposed in five columns, with horns and the usual
dense "chest," in accordance with the rule of formation for attack.
An order was sent to Colonel Russell, who was then ascending the
western end of the range, to move eastward and cover the movement
of our natives to the camp. At 7 p.m. Colonel Wood reached camp.
Intelligence came in that Captain Barton's party were on foot about
ten miles distant, and Colonel Buller at once started in heavy
rain, and was able by means of led horses to bring in seven men,
who were the sole survivors of the Border Horse and of Captain
Barton's party. Thus terminated this disastrous affair, in which
our loss amounted to about 120 men, and in which the enemy gained
additional courage for the great attack on the camp so shortly to
follow.
[Sidenote: _Captain D'arcy's escape._]
Captain D'Arcy, of Irregular Horse, thus briefly and forcibly sums
up his experience of Zlobane:—"Now to give you a short account.
Three hundred and fifty of the mounted men had to take a very
strong position, a hill called the Zlobane. We got up there,
driving the natives back at every point, although they fought very
well. Williams was killed as we charged up the hill, the baron on
the top when he was in command of his troop; a Zulu spotted him
from a hole, right through his head. Barton was sent down a hill
with some of C Troop, and just as we got down we saw about 20,000
Zulus below us, trying to get between us and the camp. We at once
crossed the hill to come down a most fearfully steep place; the
Dutchmen got to the place, rushed down, and bolted as hard as they
could go. My troop was leading, and Blaine, myself, and Hutton
got them to go quietly down the hill, which was really a fearful
place. I had, of course, to stop on the top of the hill, as we
were retreating; the Zulus all this time were giving us awful
pepper from Martini rifles. I saw, I thought, all our men down,
and then considered I had to think of myself. I got half-way down,
when a stone about the size of a small piano came bounding down. I
heard a shout above, 'Look out below,' and down the beastly thing
came right on my horse's leg, cutting it right off. I at the same
time got knocked down the hill by another horse, and was nearly
squeezed to death. I had taken the bridle off, and was about to
take the saddle (I mean I was going up the hill to take it off
my horse), when I heard a scream; I looked up, and saw the Zulus
right in among the white men, stabbing horses and men. I made a
jump for it, and got down somehow or other, and ran as hard as I
could with seventy rounds of ball cartridge, a carbine, revolver,
field-glass, and heavy boots. I went some 300 yards, when a fellow
called Francis got a horse for me, but no saddle or bridle—a rein
did for both; when one of the Frontier Light Horse got wounded
through the leg, and I had to jump off, put him on my horse, and
run again. Colonel Buller saved my life by taking me up behind
him on his horse; then Blaine, who had been keeping the natives
off in the rear, saw me (as after I got my breath I got off the
colonel's horse), and he nearly cried when he met me, all the
fellows thinking I had been killed on the top of the hill. He
behaved as he always does, and stuck to me, and pulled me through
the second time. The third time a major in the artillery, Tremlett
by name, took me up behind. Our men and officers all behaved well,
but the other volunteers were what Major Robinson would call a big
rabble. We lost ninety-three white men and a number of natives.
The Frontier Light Horse lost three officers and twenty-four
non-commissioned officers and men, and sixty-six horses. Each of
our men arrived in camp with another man behind him."
The great Zulu army which nearly succeeded in encircling Colonel
Wood's mounted party at the Zlobane mountain, was discerned from
the Kambula camp at 9 a.m. on the 29th of March. Flushed with the
success of the previous day, and depending on their vast number and
excellent organization, they had determined to sweep away for ever
the small white force which had entrenched itself in their midst.
For four hours the Zulu army continued to advance at a slow pace,
executing the manœuvres considered necessary to surround Kambula.
The left horn was seen marching in the direction of Balter Spruit
for over three hours before the men of the right horn made their
appearance. About 1 p.m. the enemy began to make a rapid advance
to the right of the Kambula hill, facing Blood river. It was then
time to prepare. Orders were given to eat dinners with haste. The
alarm sounded, tents were lowered, positions were taken up on and
underneath the waggons, boxes of ammunition were opened, and every
preparation for defence was promptly made.
[Sidenote: _Zulu disaster at Kambula._]
When the right horn of the Zulu army was within two miles distance,
a mounted party went out amidst hearty cheers to give them battle.
Having advanced and fired, the enemy became too numerous, and our
men retired, drawing the Zulus after them, which was the real
object of this manœuvre. The right horn of the enemy's army then
commenced its attack in earnest, pressing on most bravely in spite
of a tremendous fire from the artillery, the 90th Light Infantry,
and the 1-13th. Shell ploughed their ranks, but they re-formed
and steadily came on. At last, chiefly through the scathing fire
of shot and shell from four of our big guns, the movements of the
enemy became paralyzed, and a panic commenced. At the rear of the
laager a body of the Zulus had gained the top of the hill, about
300 yards off, and kept up a galling fire upon the men of the
13th Regiment. All, however, was soon over, the Zulus wavered,
hesitated, turned, and fled. Amidst lusty cheers our men followed
in pursuit. F and G Companies of the 13th charged them down the
ravine at the point of the bayonet. Shrapnel, case shot, etc.,
continued to pour from the field-pieces on the heavy masses of
disorganized Zulus. The cavalry for seven miles pursued them, until
it was too dark to see. Many were shot down at distances of ten and
fifteen yards, while hand-to-hand encounters with the flying foe
diversified the scene.
The strength of the Zulu army at Kambula exceeded 20,000, and
their plan of battle was evidently to advance the right horn of
their army so as to entice our troops to come out and attack
it. The left horn would then have advanced up the ravine, and
gaining the summit of the hill, charge and take possession of the
waggons, thus completely surrounding our position. In fact, the
Isandhlwana tactics were to be repeated. Fortunately, however,
the lesson we learned there was not in vain, and Kambula proved
this to demonstration. The Native Contingent ran away before the
fight, but the Basutos stood steadily at their posts and fought
well. The flower of Cetywayo's army, consisting of young unmarried
men, was engaged in this attack, and more than 1200 were slain.
No fewer than 785 bodies of Zulus were buried in the immediate
vicinity of the camp. It is noteworthy that they had many kinds of
breechloaders—Martini, Snider, and Mitford's patterns being all
represented. It was a grand sight to see the great moving mass
of more than 20,000 Zulu warriors advancing straight amidst a
withering fire. They shouted out when near the camp, "We are the
boys from Isandhlwana," and retreated under circumstances where
no European forces in the world could have advanced. The victory
was specially one of artillery. The first shot was fired at 1.25
p.m., and the last at 5.25 p.m. Three hundred and sixty-two shells
and eighty-six charges of canister were expended. Many acts of
gallantry were performed. Colonel Wood, as usual, was pre-eminent.
The bravery and coolness of Captain Woodgate was the subject of
admiration, while Colonel Buller greatly added to the laurels he
had so deservedly earned in the retreat from the Zlobane mountain.
It was on the latter occasion that he six times risked his life
in carrying out of danger and saving six men who,
being unhorsed, must otherwise have fallen into the hands of a
remorseless and savage foe. Thirty killed and fifty wounded was the
loss on our side at the battle of Kambula.
[Sidenote: _Intombe._]
A description of the repulse of the Zulus from Kambula camp has
been written by Commandant Schermbrucker, and this is what he
says:—"As soon as we saw them turning their backs, I got all my
Kaffrarians rapidly to mount the horses already saddled, and
shortly afterwards all the mounted forces in camp were ready, and
we raced helter-skelter after the flying Zulus. I took the extreme
right, Colonel Buller led the centre, and Colonel Russell, with
mounted infantry, took the left. For fully seven miles I chased two
columns of the enemy, who tried to escape over the Umvolozi, but
I came beforehand and pushed them off the road. They fairly ran
like bucks; but I was after them like the whirlwind, and shooting
incessantly into the thick column, which could not have been less
than 5000 strong. They became exhausted, and shooting them down
would have taken too much time; so we took the assegais from the
dead men, and rushed among the living ones, stabbing them right and
left, with fearful revenge for the misfortunes of the 28th inst. No
quarter was given."
On the 12th of March a very serious disaster occurred at the
Intombe river, where an escort of the 80th Regiment, under Captain
Moriarty, was laagered. That officer commanded a party of 104 men
convoying a train of eighteen waggons variously loaded, _en route_
from Derby to Luneberg. The flooded state of the river caused
detention for several days. A small party under Lieutenant Harward
was stationed on the other side. That officer heard a shot fired
at 4 a.m., and shortly afterwards was roused by an alarm, and saw,
when the fog lifted, a dense mass of Zulus, about 4000 in number,
extending across the valley and on the point of surprising the
camp on the other side of the river. He immediately put his men,
thirty-five in number, under arms, and directed their fire on the
flanks of the enemy. With tremendous celerity, Captain Moriarty's
force was surprised and the camp taken. An immediate retreat was
made by Harward, but not before the awful sight was witnessed
of the enemy slaughtering our men on the banks of the river and
in the water. The Zulus crossed and came on in dense masses. A
hand-to-hand fight ensued, and a vain attempt to rally was made;
then, finding re-formation impossible, Lieutenant Harward put spurs
to his horse and galloped into Luneberg. Forty-four men were killed.
[Sidenote: _Losses of the English._]
An eye-witness, Mr. Josiah Sussons, says:—"I was in the waggon,
sleeping, and early in the morning I got up to see if it was
daylight, and saw the Kafirs swarming around within twenty yards of
me. The alarm was given, and Captain Moriarty called out, 'Guards
out.' I ran back to my waggon to get my rifle (which belonged to
No. 1 Company, Transvaal Rifle Volunteers, of which corps I am a
member), but in the confusion of the bullets flying about me, I
could not get it out. I now found it so dangerous that I determined
to try to bolt, if I could, without remaining to take my clothes.
As I emerged from the waggon for the last time, I heard Captain
Moriarty cry out, 'Fire away, men; I am done.' I then went to
the adjoining waggon to call Whittington (also a Pretoria man),
and I told him the niggers were around. He immediately came out
and jumped down, but was caught almost as soon as he got to the
ground, and assegaied. The poor fellow shrieked out, but without
avail, as no assistance was at hand. Seeing that I was powerless
to do anything, having no arms of any kind, I ran down between the
oxen, and made for the river, which was about sixty yards off. I
found the Zulus shooting and stabbing the people in all directions.
The sight was a most horrifying one, and never to be forgotten. I
had to dodge about to save myself, and am surprised that I managed
to get through at all. As soon as I got to the river, I jumped in
and made a dive, as swimming was too dangerous, the Zulus standing
on the banks, and at the edge of the river, as thick as thieves,
throwing assegais and aiming their guns wherever they saw a head.
I came up about the middle of the river, but the moment my head
was out, I saw several Zulus pointing their guns, and ready to
fire. I therefore dived again, and came out on the other side. The
river was very full at the time, and a strong current running. In
crossing I had torn off my shirt, the only garment I possessed,
and therefore when I landed I was entirely in a state of nudity.
I now found that fighting was still going on on all sides of me,
and that it was almost impossible I could get any further, and in
my desperation I contemplated throwing myself in the water, to
be drowned peaceably, rather than suffer the death by torture of
many of those I saw around me. I, however, got into a courageous
spirit again, and dashed off, keeping as much out of the way of the
enemy as I could. Several shots were fired at me, and assegais were
flying in all directions, but somehow I happened to be fortunate
and got clear of the encampment. I made for Meyer's station as fast
as I could, and overtook one soldier on the road, who was shot
dead just as I got up to him. I overtook two others shortly after,
who were also shot. Getting further on, I fell in with Sergeant
Booth and about a dozen men, who were keeping up a retreating
fire, and fighting very pluckily. I rested for a few minutes with
them, during which time I espied the Zulus coming round the hill
to intercept us. I informed Sergeant Booth of this, and he kept
up a steady fire upon them, and made the enemy retire back into
the hills. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of Sergeant
Booth on this occasion; he fought most pluckily, and lost four
of his small band here. It was entirely owing to their doing so
well that any of us managed to get through at all. The Zulus would
have entirely surrounded us, and not a soul could have escaped.
Seventeen leaders and drivers were killed altogether, amongst them
being Whittington, Campbell, and Goss. As I got in camp, I met
Major Tucker going out with his men to the relief."
[Sidenote: _Hair-breadth escape._]
One of the most sensational events which occurred during April
at the head-quarters camp of the fourth (Colonel Wood's) column,
was the arrival there of a man whose hairbreadth escapes enable
us to realize that truth is stranger than fiction. Captain Mayne
Reid could scarcely venture on imagining what our readers will
find stated below as sober fact. There may be exaggeration or
colouring, but in the main the narrative is correct. Mr. Rudolph,
landrost of Utrecht, when out scouting on the Zunguin Neck with
five men, encountered a party of forty Zulus, of whom he killed
four. He picked up about the same time a Frenchman named Grandier,
who had belonged to Colonel Weatherley's troop of Border Horse,
and was made prisoner by the enemy when so many of his comrades
fell at the Zlobane mountain. The story was told to Colonel Wood
and the staff—Captain Maude taking notes, the substance of which
is as follows:—He (Grandier) was one of the very few who succeeded
in charging through the mass of Zulus by whom they were beset in
front and rear. He had got on to fairly good ground, and had set a
comrade on his horse, he running by the side, when a Kafir caught
him by the leg, and he was immediately overpowered by numbers and
made prisoner. His captors took him to Umbellini's kraal, on the
south side of the Zlobane, about half-way up. He saw that chief,
who asked him where Shepstone was, and who was the commander of the
commando to which he belonged. He was kept prisoner that night in a
kraal, and sent out the next morning to work in the mealie fields.
Soon after he was taken by two or three mounted men to the middle
of a big commando, all of whom threatened him with death, while
the chief, Manymane, ordered him to be sent prisoner to Cetywayo.
He stopped one day after that at the Zlobane, starting the next
day for Ulundi in charge of four men riding, while he was made
to walk and carry their provisions. He was quite naked, all his
clothes having been taken from him. They took four days to make the
journey, arriving in the evening, when a messenger was sent forward
to announce their coming to the king. He remained all that night
and next day tied in a field. On the following day, at noon, he was
taken to Cetywayo, where a half-caste Dutchman, with long hair,
translated. Cetywayo asked what the English wanted coming in that
way to his country. He asked after Oham, where he was stopping,
and said he would kill him and Shepstone and everyone else, as he
had plenty of men to do the work. He was very particular to learn
the name of the commander of the Kambula column. After replying to
these questions, Grandier was removed in custody to a kraal, where
he was threatened and beaten with very little respite, and for four
days had nothing but mealies to eat. Some messengers then came and
reported to Cetywayo that Umbellini and his brother had been killed
in the attack on Colonel Wood's camp. On this Cetywayo ordered
Grandier to be sent back to Umbellini's Kafirs, that they might
sacrifice him to the _manes_ of their deceased chief. He was sent
back next day with a guard of two Zulus, only one of whom had a
gun, though plentifully supplied with assegais. On the 13th, about
noon, they were resting, after a long tramp, and the Zulus being
sleepy, Grandier watched his opportunity, snatched an assegai, and
pinned one man to the earth; the other woke up in a fright and
ran for his life. Grandier then made off in the direction of the
camp, walking all night and steering a course by the stars, when
this morning he was seen by Mr. Rudolph's party and brought in,
so crippled in the feet that he is at present in hospital. He saw
at Ulundi a Portuguese, who makes guns for Cetywayo, and on the
morning of the 14th so large a force of Kafirs, driving cattle,
passed him that he was obliged to remain hid all the morning to let
them pass.
[Sidenote: _Relief of Ekowe._]
About the beginning of April, everything was at last ready for the
relief of Ekowe. Nearly six thousand troops of all arms started
from Fort Tenedos, representing almost every branch of the service.
The relieving column consisted as follows:—
EKOWE RELIEVING COLUMN.
FIRST DIVISION OF THE COLUMN.
Lieutenant-Colonel Law, R.A., commanding.
Men.
Naval Brigade of H.M.S. _Shah_ and _Tenedos_,
except the Royal Marines of the _Shah_ 350
The 57th Regiment 640
2 companies the "Buffs" 140
5 companies 99th Regiment 430
5th Battalion N.N.C. 1200
Mounted infantry 70
Do. volunteers 40
Do. natives 130
Native foot scouts 150
Commissariat and transport department —
Medical department —
——
Total 1660 whites.
1480 N.C.
——
Grand total 3140 fighting men.
====
Artillery—2 9-pounder guns.
2 24-pounder rocket tubes.
1 Gatling gun.
There accompanied this division of the column the train of
supplies for Ekowe (a month's supply for 1200 men, about 25
waggons); a train of supplies for both divisions of the column for
10 days, about 25 waggons.
SECOND DIVISION OF THE COLUMN.
Lieutenant-Colonel Pemberton, 60th Rifles, commanding.
Men.
Naval Brigade of H.M.S. _Boadicea_ 190
Royal Marines, _Shah_ and _Boadicea_ 100
60th Rifles 540
91st Highlanders 850
4th Battalion N.N.C. 800
Commissariat and transport department —
Medical department —
————
Total 1680 whites.
800 N.C.
————
Total fighting men 2480
====
Artillery—2 24-pounder rocket tubes.
1 Gatling gun.
Grand total 1660 whites.
1680 do.
————
3340
1480 natives.
800 do.
————
2280
————
Grand total of fighting men 5620
On Saturday, the 30th of March, a start was made at daybreak, and
the column halted within entrenchments for the night at Inyoni
river. The force advanced without tents, and with only a blanket
and waterproof sheet for each man. On Sunday, the Amatekulu
river was reached, and here a considerable detention took place
in consequence of difficulty in crossing. On Tuesday the column
reached the hills which border the Inyezane valley, and then a
site was selected for an entrenched laager. On this day mounted
patrols and scouts of the enemy were seen for the first time. News
was then received that a large force was marching down, and that
an attack might be expected at any moment. The famous Ginghelovo
camp was then constructed. It was made sufficiently large for 2000
cattle to be placed in the centre, trenches were dug, and the
waggons laced together according to the approved method.
[Sidenote: _Camp at Ginghelovo._]
About eight o'clock on Tuesday evening (2nd April), a false alarm
took place, but nothing further noteworthy occurred until daybreak
of the next day, when the mounted natives and scouts were sent
out. A little before 6 a.m. (Wednesday, 3rd April) our men fell
back shooting steadily, and immediately after two large columns
of the enemy were seen coming down the Inyezane hills, while one
came round the left by the Amatekulu Bush, and another smaller
one from the direction of the old military kraal. In ten minutes'
time the camp was surrounded and the attack commenced. The nature
of the ground favoured the enemy, who came up with a rush to a
distance of 400 yards; then they scattered and obtained shelter in
long grass which grew about the camp. For one hour and a half, a
heavy fusillade was kept up from both sides, and as the Gatlings,
two 9-pounder guns, and the rocket tubes were all in action,
such a tremendous fire was poured into the enemy as to prevent
the possibility of their advancing. Many of our men, firing from
waggons and high positions, were able to pick off Zulus with their
rifles. This destructive fire evidently had a great effect upon
the enemy. At half past seven o'clock, the mounted men and those
of the Native Contingent went out amidst tremendous cheering, and
drove the Zulus before them from the long grass, and continued the
pursuit for a distance of four miles. Masses of the enemy then
clustered upon the hills, but dispersed upon being shelled from the
fort.
During the action, Lord Chelmsford and his staff went round the
trenches, encouraging the men, and telling them to fire steadily
and low. The general himself was not mounted, but the members of
his staff were. Colonel Crealock received a wound in the arm, and
lost a horse; a bullet went through Lieutenant Milne's clothes; and
Captain Molyneux had two horses shot under him. No fewer than 773
dead bodies of the enemy were found within a distance of 1000 yards
from the fort.
A flying column was now formed, consisting of the 57th, 60th, and
91st regiments, with 100 of the Naval Brigade, and a few of John
Dunn's scouts. It ought to be mentioned that Dunn had already
performed excellent service, and was attached to head-quarters as
principal guide. The life of this man had been a very peculiar one.
Born of English parents in the Cape Colony, he had been brought to
Natal, and early in life entered Zululand as a trader. Eventually,
he learned the language and adopted the manners and habits of the
savages. He was made an induna or chief, acquired cattle, wives,
and other property, and in many respects became the right-hand
councillor and adviser of Cetywayo. This is the more remarkable as
he had, previous to that monarch's accession, espoused the cause
of his brother. It is suspected that he made himself peculiarly
useful in supplying guns, and in this way gained much of both his
influence and his wealth. When war was declared by Britain, he
came over with his flocks, herds, and wives, became the trusted
adviser and guide of the general in command, and was marked out for
preferment and favour.
[Sidenote: _Meeting of Pearson and Chelmsford._]
The flying column left at daybreak on Thursday, reached the
Inyezane at about eleven, and as the sun was setting came in view
of the large hill behind which lay Ekowe. Colonel Pearson galloped
out by the new road, with 500 of his men, and when he grasped the
hand of Lord Chelmsford felt like one called forth from a dungeon
to the cheerful light of the sun. The fort he had guarded so well
was relieved. Crushing anxiety and responsibility were succeeded
by thankful congratulations. The cloud which hung around Ekowe had
passed away.[31]
CHAPTER VII.
THE SERVICES OF NATIVE CONTINGENTS—LORD CHELMSFORD AND SIR H.
BULWER—REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN—DIFFICULTIES OF TRANSPORT—IMMENSE
DELAY—BURYING THE DEAD AT ISANDHLWANA.
The Native Contingent, composed of loyal Zulus, although a large
force, turned out a comparatively useless one. After the battle
of Isandhlwana, Colonel Glynn reports (on the 24th of January),
"The whole of the Native Contingent walked off this morning." The
reasons for this conduct are furnished elaborately in a minute
of Sir H. Bulwer, Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, dated the 29th
of January. These men had numerous complaints. On the night of
the 23rd of January, whilst the European force at Rorke's Drift
was entrenched, the Native Contingent had no such protection.
The general and his staff leaving camp exercised a depressing
influence. Uncertainty existed regarding their wives and families.
These reasons, and reasons such as these, were furnished as
explanations for their desertion. Sir Henry Bulwer had been always
of opinion that to do away with the native system of organization
for the purpose of substituting a regimental system was one of very
doubtful advisableness. Nevertheless, he consented to give the men
required, and no fewer than 7050 were sent into the field. Lord
Chelmsford declared that he had never been able to understand what
the tribal system was, and that as often as he had endeavoured to
obtain information he had been baffled by vague generalities and
oft-repeated laudations. So anxious, however, were the commandants
to carry out what they considered the tribal system, that the
companies were organized with uneven strength, in order that men
of different tribes should be kept distinct. Sir Henry Bulwer
believed that each column should have had a Native Contingent, and
that these should have been led by officers who represented the
Lieutenant-Governor, or Supreme Chief. They would have then moved
and fought in accordance with their customs. The general could
not agree to this. The natives must be divided into battalions
1000 strong, and into companies 100 strong. They were not to fight
in their own fashion, and European officers, who did not know
their language, were given commands among them. Dissatisfaction,
discontent, and inefficiency resulted in such a manner that in all
respects the large Native Contingent, numbering more than 7000 men,
was a failure.
[Sidenote: _Bulwer and Chelmsford._]
Later on, very serious differences of opinion arose between Lord
Chelmsford and Sir Henry Bulwer. In reply to suggestions from the
general, the Executive Council of Natal decided, on the 1st of
March, that—
"(_a._) In the opinion of this Council the proposition that raiding
expeditions should be made into the Zulu country by the natives
of this colony is unadvisable of adoption, as being an impolitic
and undesirable system of war, as being calculated to provoke
retaliation, and as tending to demoralize the people engaged in it.
"(_b._) 1. That the proposition to call out every available native
in the colony is open to serious objections.
"2. That a large proportion of the able-bodied male population
has already been called out, and that this Council considers it
undesirable to press the power of the Supreme Chief to a point that
would probably cause serious discontent amongst the natives.
"3. That all trading, commercial, and farming operations would be
thereby disorganized and ruinous consequences would ensue, the
natives forming practically the only labouring portion of the
population in the upper districts of the colony.
"4. That the calling out of the whole able-bodied male population
would, in all probability, induce a panic, and be attended with
serious inconveniences."
It will thus be seen that very unfortunate differences of opinion
existed between the supreme military power and the civil government
of Natal. It certainly must be admitted that, as a rule, the
friendly Zulus of the colony were of little good as fighting men
in the campaign. Whether or not the opposite would have been the
case if the dangerous experiment had been tried of allowing them to
fight with their own weapons and in their own fashion is extremely
doubtful. The tribal system, root and branch, is a failure in
Natal, and a constant source of danger and anxiety. So soon,
therefore, as by means of enlightened statesmanship it can be
completely broken up and destroyed, the better for the protection
and defence of the colony, as well as for the cause of civilization
and the nation we are trying to civilize.
[Sidenote: _Correspondence._]
On the 11th of April, the general, writing to the Secretary of
State for War, says, "My orders regarding demonstrations were
fully carried out, but the fullness of the Tugela would have
prevented any general raid being made, even if the Natal natives
had not been forbidden to cross the border by his Excellency the
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal." In order to enable my readers to
understand the entire question fully, I subjoin that portion of
Sir Henry Bulwer's despatch to the Secretary of State (April 16)
which refers to the subject. He says, "I have placed under the
command of the lieutenant-general, for service in the Zulu country,
the Natal Mounted Police, most of the Natal Mounted Volunteers,
a number of natives who have been formed into what is called the
Natal Native Contingent, and a number of natives for pioneer,
transport, and hospital service, and that I have never interfered
with them, nor have I expected that the lieutenant-general's orders
to them should be referred to me before being complied with; but
with regard to the native levies, which have been called out
for the defence of the colony, and placed under the command of
colonial district commanders to protect the border and the colony,
I have never placed them in any way, directly or indirectly,
under the command of the lieutenant-general for service in the
Zulu country, nor have I authorized, directly or indirectly, in
any way, their being taken across the border, or their being
employed in making raids into the Zulu country. These levies were
called out expressly and solely for service in the colony and for
the defence of the colony, and were placed under the colonial
district commanders for that purpose only. The colonial district
commanders were, of course, made subject, so far as regarded the
defence of their districts, and the movement and disposition of
any forces under them in their districts, to the military command;
but no authority has been given, either to these colonial district
commanders or to the lieutenant-general, to employ the native
levies, which were exclusively called out for the defence of the
colony, on any service in the Zulu country, and I submit that the
lieutenant-general in issuing any instructions for these native
levies to cross the border to make raids into Zulu country, in
issuing these instructions as he has done, without my authority,
without my concurrence, and positively without any reference to
me, has exceeded his powers and acted without a due regard for the
authority of this Government.
"I pass by the question of the expediency or policy of making
raids into the Zulu country. In a letter addressed by me to the
High Commissioner, I have ventured to put before his Excellency
for his consideration the question of the expediency of such a
policy, and the risks involved in such a course, namely, the
risk of retaliation, and the risk of irritating and alienating
unnecessarily those of the Zulu people who might otherwise be
disposed to come to friendly terms with us, and through whose
friendly disposition towards us a satisfactory solution of the
difficulties between us and the Zulu people might eventually be
more easily arrived at. But I do not claim to have any authority in
respect of this question, and I have done no more than venture to
lay my suggestion before the High Commissioner, and to forward a
copy of my letter to the lieutenant-general.
[Sidenote: _Native levies._]
"With regard to the employment of the native levies who had
been called up for the defence of the border on service beyond
the border and in making raids, I have already shown that the
levies to which I refer were never in any way placed under the
lieutenant-general for employment across the border; and I have
also shown that they were levies which have nothing whatsoever
to do with the Native Contingent battalions to which the
lieutenant-general refers as having been hitherto associated
with the British troops, and which were placed under his command
for service across the border. The question, therefore, put by
the lieutenant-general, in the way that it is put before the
Secretary of State for War, by not distinguishing between the two
descriptions of native forces, but, as is actually done in the
last paragraph but one, by naming and associating the two together
as if there were no distinction between them, fails, I think, to
represent the real state of the case."
The general in command had felt extremely what he considered the
absence of co-operation on the part of Sir Henry Bulwer. Writing
to the Secretary of State for War on the 11th of April, Lord
Chelmsford mentions that when he had determined to move up to
Ekowe, secret instructions were sent to the different commanders
along the border from the Lower Tugela up to Kambula hill,
requesting them to make strong demonstrations all along the line,
and, if possible, to raid into Zululand. At this juncture the
Lieutenant-Governor forbade the Natal natives to cross. A general
raid into Zululand effected by a large body of native troops would,
in the opinion of Lord Chelmsford, have produced very important
results, and the general strongly resents the interference of Sir
H. Bulwer with his plans. The quarrel—for it was nothing less—to
which allusion has now been made, was very probably one of the
reasons for the appointment of Sir Garnet Wolseley, who in his own
person united both supreme civil and supreme military power.
In the Zulu war there were two campaigns—the first ended in
Isandhlwana, the second at Ulundi. Between these battles there was
an immense interval, chiefly occupied in moving great masses of
men and greater masses of supplies to the front. Lord Chelmsford
is blamed for want of foresight and care in the first campaign,
want of energy and judgment in the second campaign, and want of
generalship in both. There are two sides to the case, and it is
necessary to advert to both. Great difficulties were in the way;
but until the arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley and the joyful day
of Ulundi, it must be admitted that the general did not conquer
obstacles, but obstacles conquered him.
[Sidenote: _Review of the campaign._]
Let us endeavour to view the general conduct of the first campaign
in the light of facts about which there can be no question. Early
in January Lord Chelmsford was at the head of an army sufficiently
numerous and powerful for the conquest of Zululand. We shall see
that at Ulundi 4000 soldiers, properly handled, were adequate to
the complete defeat of 20,000 Zulus, comprising the flower of
Cetywayo's army; therefore it is absurd to imagine that, if good
generalship had been used, any defeat could have been sustained
in the first advance. Colonel Pearson was thoroughly victorious
at Inyezane, and Colonel Wood was also successful. Disastrous
failure, however, overtook the column of the general-in-chief.
Lord Chelmsford, conducting a large force with enormous stores,
made Rorke's Drift on the Tugela his base of operations, and
subsequently was forced to trust to the extraordinary efforts of
a young Engineer officer for the safety of Natal. All experience
of Zulu warfare had shown the absolute necessity of entrenchments,
yet the central column marched into Zululand without constructing
a single breastwork. The personal safety of the commander-in-chief
and that of half his column became really due to a sudden
inspiration and to a happy accident. Young subalterns conceived and
carried a plan of defence where mealie-bags formed the breastworks
and biscuit-boxes the entrenchments. It was providential that such
officers as Chard and Bromhead were there to do the work.
Lord Chelmsford was woefully deficient in knowledge of the enemy's
movements. An immense army lay in wait to destroy his camp while
he, with scattered forces, pursued a Will-o'-the-wisp foe which
found no difficulty in luring him on to destruction. He had
mounted men, but does not seem to have used them efficiently as
scouts. Colonel Buller, the able head of his intelligence branch,
was in quite another part of the country. Lord Chelmsford either
completely despised the enemy, which was a blunder in itself, or
he was incapable of appreciating his real position, and of taking
the evident means of preserving the column under his charge. He
evidently wanted that genius or instinct so absolutely necessary to
constitute a great military leader. A really great general, like a
poet, is born, not made; and it was the misfortune of the British
army not to have secured one on this important occasion.
No entrenchment or laager was either made or ordered to be made at
Isandhlwana, although it must be admitted that if the general had
been as lucky in subordinates there as at Rorke's Drift, a very
different issue of the day would have been the result. Nothing
could surpass the madness of Colonel Durnford in scattering his
troops at the very moment when, by means of laagering, or at least
forming a hollow square, it would have been possible to resist
the attack of the enemy. It is a libel on our soldiers to hint
that they did not behave well. The short service system is in no
way responsible for the disaster. The gallant 24th, as well as
the other troops, fought with the utmost bravery, and, if they
had been commanded by such a man as Wood or Pearson, undoubtedly
would have gained a brilliant victory. A few hundred Dutchmen,
without breech-loading guns, had behind a rough fortification of
waggons defied an entire Zulu army. Chard and Bromhead, with 100
infantry soldiers, at the back of mealie-bags and biscuit-boxes,
were able to drive back immensely superior forces. It is therefore
preposterous to imagine that our troops at Isandhlwana, assisted by
well-served large guns, could not easily, if properly commanded,
have been able to hold their own, at least until the rest of the
column arrived.
[Sidenote: _Lord Chelmsford criticised._]
In ten days' time Lord Chelmsford was so unfortunate as to sustain
a most signal defeat, in which half his force was literally
butchered, and his large quantity of ammunition and stores captured
by the enemy. His flank was turned and his column surprised by an
army of naked savages, without artillery, about whose movements his
ignorance was as profound as it was surprising. A similar success
to that gained by Colonel Pearson would have virtually concluded
the war. A march to Ulundi by a strong flying column would have
been possible, and Great Britain might then have saved the blood of
many of her best soldiers, and fully three million pounds sterling
of her treasure.
The opinions now expressed are those of the majority of military
correspondents and military men, but the thorough novelty and
difficulty of operations do not seem sufficiently taken into
account. Besides, in judging Lord Chelmsford, it must be specially
remembered that his instructions about concentrating at Isandhlwana
camp were not attended to, and to this fact many attributed the
disaster that ensued. Certainly no one deserved sympathy more than
this general, whose misfortunes were quite as great as his faults.
Subsequently, he did everything in his power to make the campaign
successful. Reinforcements poured in, and were pushed forward
to the front. It is true that delays occurred, but these, it is
argued, were thoroughly unsurmountable. We shall find at last that
Lord Chelmsford finished the campaign with glory and success at the
great battle of Ulundi. The people of Natal and the Cape Colony,
who had sympathized with his reverses, thoroughly recognized the
greatness of this victory and rejoiced in his triumph. It is only
fair, when furnishing opinions full of condemnation, to refer at
the same time to the fact that contrary views are held by numerous
men of intelligence, who have had every opportunity of studying the
subject.
The disaster of Isandhlwana was pregnant with results almost too
awful to contemplate. Natal was panic-stricken. Twenty thousand
white people were threatened, not only with the victorious army,
but with hundreds of thousands of natives, kept heathen and alien
from motives of policy, who would have, out of fear of Cetywayo,
quickly joined any army of massacre which that tyrant could
have sent to devastate Natal. Fortunately, in spite of their
much-vaunted strategy, the Zulus proved unequal to the task of
taking advantage of their victory. Had they, in the first instance,
only allowed the general to move forward into his new camp, the
destruction of the column could have been made complete. It was
by a miracle that Lord Chelmsford and the men with him escaped.
If they had been attacked when, exhausted and dispirited, they
flung themselves down on the reeking plain of Isandhlwana, it is
extremely likely that the general and every man with him would
have been killed. The gross absurdity of blaming Lord Chelmsford
for not burying the dead on the field is only equalled by its
injustice. The general and the remnant of his column were really
fugitives, and it was not until they found that, by the heroic
defence of Rorke's Drift, the base of operations was still held,
that they were able to breathe with any degree of safety. It was
hoping against hope to imagine that a place really left unfortified
could have been held against a victorious army; and it is well to
recognize the fact that not only Natal and its people, but Lord
Chelmsford and the remnant of his column, were saved by the heroes
of this colonial Thermopylæ.
[Sidenote: _Panic in Natal._]
The awful pause of suspense, which lasted many weeks, passed by.
The Tugela river and the indecision of the Zulu king saved the
colony. Reinforcements which had been telegraphed for poured in
with amazing celerity, and both Natal and British honour were
saved. For nine weeks the beleaguered column under General Pearson
had to suffer privations, and the Zulus, who had experienced what
British soldiers could do behind biscuit-boxes at Rorke's Drift,
hesitated to attack them when behind regular entrenchments at
Ekowe. At last, as we had seen, relief was sent. Then another
period of delay set in. Masses of troops continued to arrive, and
early in May our strength in Natal comprised more than 22,000 men,
divided as follows:—
First division (General Crealock's) 9,215
Second division (General Newdigate's) 10,238
General Wood's[32] flying column 3,092
——————
Effective and non-effective 22,545
[Sidenote: _The transport difficulty._]
This was a large army, the most powerful force of Europeans ever
engaged in war within South Africa. The occasion was supreme,
as the greatest power of the native races had challenged the
white man to a combat _à l'outrance_, and the question simply
was whether the Queen or Cetywayo should rule supreme in the
southern portion of this continent. Reinforcements were sent out
with immense celerity, and landed with the utmost despatch and
with neither casualty nor danger. But the delay in moving them
was most disappointing. It must have puzzled the Zulus immensely
to understand why we were so extraordinarily slow. Five weeks had
elapsed since the battle of Ginghelovo without any set engagement
with the enemy taking place, and the Press began to grumble.
Transport rose to unprecedented rates. Twenty shillings per cwt.,
or £20 per ton, was charged for the carriage of provisions a
distance of fifty-four miles, from D'Urban to Pietermaritzburg.
Oxen died in hundreds, and the progress of the battalions of
infantry which were marching against an enemy famous for their
celerity was most disheartening. The plan of Lord Chelmsford
was that of sending on masses of troops, whose _impedimenta_ in
the shape of baggage and means of supply was so enormous as to
completely cripple their movements. At a subsequent period, after
the arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley, we shall find that officer
successfully employing more than 2000 Zulu carriers; but this
method, cheap and efficient, does not seem to have been tried by
Lord Chelmsford.
To lessen the enormous difficulties of transport, which crushed the
efforts of our soldiers, a successful attempt was made to find a
landing-place on the Zululand coast. H.M. gunboat _Forester_ was
sent on this quest, which was ultimately successful, and Port
Durnford was established as a place for landing supplies. This
cut off more than a hundred miles of difficult road, and was of
immense service to the advancing columns. During May, 1879, the
_Forester_[33] performed important duties in this service, and more
than once fired at bands of the enemy near the seashore.
It is impossible to write any chronicle of the movements of General
Crealock's column which would be of interest. It crawled along
among hundreds of dead oxen killed in dragging its heavy baggage
and supplies over bad roads. Enormous expenditure for commissariat
and transport services went on, and it was very evident that this
war would be waged at frightful cost. The British lion growled in
England, and there was an undoubted echo in the colonies.
[Sidenote: _Position of the forces._]
On the 15th of May, the head-quarters of the South African field
force, under Major-General Newdigate, was situated on the Buffalo
river, near Doornberg. The force comprised:—Right wing of the 17th
Lancers; three companies 1-21st Regiment; six companies 58th; N
battery, 5th Brigade, Royal Artillery, with six 7-pounders, under
Colonel Harness; N Battery, 6th Brigade, with six 9-pounders;
Army Service Corps, Army Hospital Corps, Bengaugh's Native
Battalion, Natal Pioneers, and Natal Carbineers. Colonel Tatton
Browne commanded the Royal Artillery, and Captain Anstey the Royal
Engineers. Twelve miles further on, at Conference Hill, was
the most advanced post, where Colonel Davies, Grenadier Guards,
commanded. The garrison was composed of six companies of the 94th
Regiment, Bettington's troop of Natal Horse, a detachment of the
Royal Engineers, and Shepstone's Mounted Basutos. Another fort
and laager had been erected for their defence, while eight miles
further on towards the north-east was Brigadier-General Wood's new
camp at Magwechana, close to the Sand Spruit, one of the sources
of the White Umvolosi. General Marshall was with the cavalry camp.
The experience of Isandhlwana was thoroughly sufficient, and the
most complete precautions on all occasions were taken to prevent
the possibility of disaster. Forts and fortified positions covered
the country, but, nevertheless, there is excellent authority for
saying that if a Zulu impi had been ordered to invade, there would
have been no difficulty in driving back the weak border guard which
lined the Tugela, getting behind the regular forces, and making a
rapid destructive raid and an equally rapid retreat.[34] Cetywayo's
neglect of his opportunities was more useful in protecting Natal
than the immense armed force which, with infinite toil and a
slowness almost passing description, moved on towards Ulundi.
Loud were the public outcries at the transport break-down and the
tardiness of operations. General Newdigate's magnificent force
seemed paralyzed, and the difficulties of grass for horses and
supplies for troops _en route_ was the theme of every journal and
the excuse for a delay which was as costly as it was disappointing.
On the 17th of May, a road was made in the direction of Landman's
Drift, and a few days afterwards all the cavalry proceeded to
Rorke's Drift, and thence to Isandhlwana, for the purpose of
burying the dead. It was certainly full time to perform this duty.
One of the disgraceful occurrences or sad consequences of the Zulu
war is the fact, which cannot be slurred over without comment,
that the bodies of our brave men who fell at Isandhlwana remained
unburied for more than four months. Two regiments of Dragoon
Guards, with the Lancers and numerous other troops, moved on with
alacrity to perform the honourable task. The force advanced in
line, _échelon_, or column of squadrons, with extensive advance
and rear guards, as well as flankers. At night the men bivouacked
in groups of twelve, with their saddles turned inwards and placed
in a circle. At last they looked down from the Biggarsberg upon
Rorke's Drift and the Isandhlwana mountain in the distance. One
regiment of the Lancers and one of the Dragoon Guards, as well as
half the Natal Carbineers, swept the country in the neighbourhood.
The smoke of blazing huts rose up like burnt-offerings from the
hill-altars of Zululand. The signal-fires of the savages helped
to light up the country at night, and the British were again on
the field where Cetywayo had gained his first and last victory.
General Marshall, with Dragoons, Lancers, irregular horse, police,
and artillery, crossed the river at daybreak, and advanced in open
order. But my readers will prefer to read an account of what was
seen and done at Isandhlwana from the pen of a soldier who was
there. The correspondent of the _Times_ of Natal writes:—
[Sidenote: _Troops marching._]
"We pushed on very steadily and carefully, and at half-past nine
our advance-guard was on the ridge overlooking the valley beyond
Isandhlwana. There it lay, a magnificent stretch of country, with
undulating plains for miles, only broken by dongas and small rises,
and bordered by high hills on each side. Who would have thought,
looking down on the quiet scene, that it had witnessed one of the
most terrific fights and disasters of modern times? The grass had
grown up over the whole site of what had once been our camp, and
was thickly intermixed with mealie stalks and oat hay, green and
growing yet. Among these lay the bodies of our poor soldiers,
scattered about in all postures, and in all stages of decay; while
the positions of our tents were indicated by the broken remains
of boxes, trunks, tins of preserved meats, remnants of the tents
themselves, and masses of disordered papers, books, and letters,
etc., etc. The only thing, however, that at once drew the attention
of a casual observer was the broken remains of waggons and the
skeletons of horses and oxen. Everything else was hidden at first
sight, and required searching for to be noticed. One thing we had
observed coming along the road was the fresh spoor of a waggon or
two, and we conjectured that it had been recently used in conveying
crops from Sirayo's valley away into the strongholds further
inland. The spoor of two mounted Kafirs, and one on foot, was also
traced by the scouts fresh that morning; one of the horses was shod
all round, and these men were evidently of the party left by the
enemy to watch the coming of our troops. For some time after our
arrival, and while preparations were being actively carried out to
harness the horses to the best waggons, all the men except those
on vedette or other duty were allowed to wander over the scene
of the disaster. The Carbineers, under Captain Shepstone, made
immediately for their camp, and tried to find any relics of their
dead brethren. Nothing of any consequence was, however, found near
their lines; but upon searching over the ground where the bodies
of some of them had been seen on the night after Isandhlwana,
Captain Shepstone came upon the bodies of Colonel Durnford,
Lieutenant Scott, and nearly all the Carbineers, except London
and Bullock, and those few who were killed along the fugitive
path. Poor Durnford was easily recognizable, and he had on his
mess waistcoat, from the pocket of which Shepstone took a small
pocket-knife with his name on it. Two rings were also taken, and
are with the knife to be sent home _in memoriam_ to the colonel's
father. Durrant Scott lay partially hidden under a broken piece of
a waggon, and had evidently not been mutilated or touched after his
death. He had his patrol jacket on, buttoned across, and although
the rest of the body was only a skeleton, yet, strange to say,
the face was like in life, all the hair being still on, and the
skin strangely parched and dried up, although perfect. Both these
bodies lay right in the midst of the rest of the young colonists
who fell gallantly in defence of their country; and, judging from
the position in which they all were, they must have made one last
gallant stand, and have been killed altogether. None of these so
found had attempted to run, but had stuck together in life as we
found them in death. Knowing all of them well, and how they did
their duty, I felt it almost impossible to examine any, and had to
leave the scene for another one. I can only add that Durnford's
body was wrapped in canvas and buried in a kind of waterwash, while
all the others were covered over with stones, etc., and their names
written in pencil on wood or a stone close by them.
[Sidenote: _Isandhlwana revisited._]
"The bodies of the Royal Artillery and Natal Mounted Police were
also buried, the only ones left untouched being those of the 24th
Regiment, which was done at the express desire of Colonel Glyn
and the officers, in the hope of their being able some day to do
it themselves. This appeared, however, very strange to us, and
many remarks were made about the seeming dishonour to part of our
brave dead. However, let us hope that some day, not far distant,
we may be able to return to that once blood-red field and bury all
the bodies, bones, and relics that may be left. Great numbers of
waggons have undoubtedly been taken away, as also everything of
value in the camp, and many bodies have been, through one cause or
another, either wholly or partially removed or disturbed, so as
to effectually prevent recognition. I myself did not move far out
of camp, and, therefore, may be a bad judge, but from what I saw
there cannot have been more than 200 bodies in the camp itself, and
out of these not 25 Kafirs. Doubtless, had I gone out to where the
fighting first commenced, I should have found many more bodies, but
I am glad for my own sake that I did not do so. Others, who had not
perhaps so many bitter feelings or sorrowful remembrances of those
lying around us, went further and saw more, although I cannot hear
of any one having recognized any more bodies of officers, except
those of the Hon. S. Vereker and young Gibson, both lieutenants
in the Native Contingent. Many interesting relics were found and
brought away by others, and I know of a few cases where letters
addressed to relatives at home from those among the killed were
found complete, and will be sent home, to be held in loving regard
by the living, but will cause many sores scarce healed to be
reopened. The general was anxious, for more reasons than one, to
get away, and therefore, as soon as the waggons were ready, we made
a start back at twelve, and reached Rorke's Drift at half-past
three without any hitch whatever. Immediately on getting back
I went inquiring among the different parties who had been over
that day, and gleaned some other interesting facts from them. One
officer in the Dragoon Guards, while out with his squadron burning
kraals, found in one signs of very recent occupation, and the
staff of the Queen's colour of the 1-24th. He also later on came
across a kraal full of skeletons of Zulus; and this fact, taken in
conjunction with the finding of large graves on the left of our
camp containing bodies of the enemy, goes far to prove that the
Zulus did move their dead bodies, and as the kraal was some two
miles off where skeletons were found, they probably also moved them
in our waggons. The forty waggons we brought away included two
water carts in good preservation, one gun limber, a rocket battery
cart, and three Scotch carts. All that we left behind, in number
not more than twenty, were in a partially or entirely disabled
condition. Counting all these, therefore, there are still sixty or
seventy waggons missing, which have been taken away at different
times."
[Sidenote: _Kaffrarian riflemen._]
The irregular horse recruited in the Cape Colony and Natal deserve
special mention. Their services during the war were of a most
important and valuable character. Most of them were attached to
General Wood's column, and in the many daring raids in which their
services were used proved excellent soldiers. Among the most
prominent of these corps was that of the Kaffrarian Riflemen, under
Commandant Schermbrucker. On the 30th of April, at Utrecht, on
the occasion of the expiry of their engagement, that officer bade
farewell to his officers and men in an eloquent address in which
he recalled their principal services. Six months previously, on a
public parade at Pietermaritzburg, they had been selected by Lord
Chelmsford for a post of danger, in consequence of the manner in
which they had fought on the borders of the Cape Colony during
the Gaika rebellion. For nearly three months the important and
dangerous post of Luneberg had been held, and the handful of white
men had inflicted serious losses on the enemy, and secured safe
communication _viâ_ Intombe to Derby. They had been attached to
"that glorious column" commanded by Evelyn Wood, and formed part
of the forces under Buller engaged in the rescue of Oham's people
at his surrender. They were also in the disastrous storming of the
Zlobane and the glorious battle of Kambula. Admirable obedience and
cheerful discipline were maintained in the face of 20,000 enemies.
Their last duties were the harassing ones of escorting convoys _en
route_ from Batlee Spruit to Kambula.[35] What was said, and said
truly, of Schermbrucker's Irregular Horse might be said with little
variation of the other corps—Baker's, Whalley's, etc. Colonial men,
such as Schermbrucker, Nettleton, Shepstone, Lonsdale, Blaine,
Pickering, Wilson, and many others, distinguished themselves in the
field, and it can be said with equal truth and justice that the
volunteer force and levies, officers and men, proved most valuable
auxiliaries.
[Sidenote: _The Transvaal again._]
The Transvaal Republic had dragged along a sad existence for many
years, troubled constantly by native incursions from without,
and debt, quarrelling, and discontent from within, when the
Rev. Thomas F. Burgers was elected President in the year 1872.
He was to revolutionize the entire country, and to make a new
and improved Holland in Southern Africa. Gifted with certain
talents, among which that of oratory was conspicuous, Burgers
was deplorably deficient in a knowledge of men and business. His
plans were utopian, visionary, and unsound. He caused hundreds of
Boers to leave their adopted country, by forcing on them a system
of education from which the teachings of religion were excluded;
contracted a loan of £300,000 for a railway from Delagoa Bay, which
would have cost millions; designed a fanciful coat of arms and
flag; caused gold coins to be issued with his own likeness stamped
upon them, and played such "fantastic tricks before high heaven" as
to help forward that crisis of bankruptcy and ruin from which it
would have been very difficult, even by an exactly opposite course,
to have saved the country.
During the absence of the President in Europe, in 1875, Sekukuni,
the principal chief of the Bapedi people, broke out in rebellion.
In April, 1876, he was called upon to submit, but in place of doing
so boldly claimed the larger portion of the Lydenburg and Pretoria
districts. A commando then marched against him, and succeeded
in taking "Mathebi's Kop," which was grandiloquently styled the
Gibraltar of South Africa. A subsequent attack upon Sekukuni's
head kraal was a failure. The prosecution of the war was then
entrusted to volunteers, and after a short time an inglorious peace
was concluded. This treaty was only made to be broken, as it was
repudiated and treated with contempt by Sekukuni.
[Sidenote: _Annexation, history of._]
The peace of all British South Africa was seriously jeopardized
by the weakness and fatuity of the Government of the Transvaal
Republic. They were unable to conquer Sekukuni, and were so
threatened by Cetywayo as to make an incursion by that potentate
exceedingly probable. If the outworks of civilization were not
looked after there would soon be serious danger to the fortress.
Sir Theophilus Shepstone was therefore appointed special
Commissioner. He arrived at Pretoria in January, 1877, and an
extraordinary session of the Volksraad was held in February.
A radical reform, legislative, executive, and judicial, or the
British flag, was the alternative laid before them. They chose the
former, but remedies then came too late. The patient was incurable.
President Burgers declared that a new constitution could not save
them. On the 8th of March the Raad broke up, and on the 12th of
April Sir Theophilus Shepstone formally annexed the Transvaal
territory to the British crown. It was, without doubt, incomparably
the best course for a bankrupt country, perfectly unable to
cope either with its debts or its foes, but it is very doubtful
whether it was the wisest course for the British Government. An
immense burden was at once placed upon our shoulders, and the
people furnished with a grievance easily fanned into discontent,
and perhaps even into rebellion, by Hollanders and others who
could make capital out of factious opposition and a trade out
of revolution. If Sir Theophilus Shepstone had only waited
long enough, the people would have begged upon their knees for
protection and assistance when attacked by the enormous armies of
the Zulu king. If we had intervened in such a crisis, we would have
obtained the assistance—valuable assistance—of thousands of mounted
burghers; whereas, when we did fight really for the Transvaal,
its inhabitants were so disgusted with what had transpired, as to
render almost no assistance. There is no doubt that we managed the
annexation of this country badly, and have been compelled to suffer
for it. By a policy of delay, which would certainly have been
less kind but incomparably more wise, the people would have been
forced to come as suppliants for protection and annexation. Their
lives and property when threatened by Cetywayo, could have alone
been saved by British intervention. It can certainly be argued, on
the other side, that delay was particularly dangerous, and that
if we had not at once established ourselves in the Transvaal, the
Zulus would have lighted a fire which would have spread quickly
throughout every native tribe, and have endangered the peace of
all our settlements. Sir Theophilus Shepstone was in an excellent
position to judge of the necessity, and her Majesty's Government
has uniformly upheld the policy adopted by him in annexing the
Transvaal.
Sekukuni had proved a thorn in the side of the Republic which they
had really been unable to get rid of. The peace with this chief
was quite illusory, and only betrayed weakness on the part of the
Dutch. We cannot be surprised, therefore, that he soon resumed
hostilities. Under British rule an expedition was, in 1878, sent
against him, consisting of volunteers and native police, under the
command of Captain Clark. This force was not strong enough, and
portions of the 13th and 80th Regiments, together with mounted
infantry and volunteers, were despatched under Colonel Rowland.
An unprecedented drought rendered operations almost impossible,
and the expedition had to return, after leaving a portion of the
80th Regiment to guard the passes. The great war with Cetywayo
soon absorbed all our attention and efforts, therefore the attack
on Sekukuni in his stronghold was postponed. It was reserved
for Sir Garnet Wolseley to complete, late in 1879, that which
had been commenced previous to the close of 1878. The rebellion
of this native chief was specially one against the Republic of
the Transvaal, and we had to take it over among the other heavy
liabilities of that State.
[Sidenote: _Discontent of the Boers._]
Sir Bartle Frere found it desirable to proceed to Natal early in
1879, and remained there during the crisis which resulted from the
Isandhlwana disaster. On his return the High Commissioner passed
through the Transvaal, and found that grumbling and discontent
had been fomented into incipient rebellion. Mass meetings of the
farmers were held, a people's committee was appointed, and a
determination to recover their independence was freely expressed.
With perfect firmness and straightforwardness, accompanied by
admirable tact and patience, Sir Bartle Frere pointed out the real
position of affairs. Another petition to the Imperial Government
for restoration of their independence was sent through the High
Commissioner, and in this way the outbreak of feeling was calmed
for the time. Special envoys had been previously sent in vain
to gain this object, and it really seemed hoping against hope
to imagine that the Imperial Government could again allow the
re-establishment of such a republic as that which had been found
unable either to defend or govern the people whom it was supposed
to rule.
CHAPTER VIII.
SIR BARTLE FRERE'S POLICY—CENSURE OF THE HOME GOVERNMENT—SLOW
OPERATIONS—AFFAIR OF THE 5TH OF JUNE—THE PRINCE IMPERIAL—HIS
ARRIVAL—SERVICES—CHARACTER—DEATH—COURT-MARTIAL—FUNERAL RITES AND
EMBARKATION OF THE BODY OF THE PRINCE IMPERIAL.
So far back as the 9th of February, Lord Chelmsford had written
to the Home Government, requesting that an officer of the rank
of major-general should be sent out at once. Sir Bartle Frere
concurred in that representation, and suggested that the officer
selected should be fitted to succeed him in the position of High
Commissioner. On the 19th of March, the Secretary of State blamed
Sir Bartle Frere for not having afforded her Majesty's Government
an opportunity of considering the time as well as the manner of
coming to issue—should it be necessary to come to issue—with the
Zulu king. Sir Michael Hicks Beach says that this should have
been done, although a favourable season for the operations of
British troops might have been lost, and the means of further
arming and victualling his forces given to Cetywayo; but the
Secretary of State does not say, and of course could not say, that
it should have been done at the imminent risk of the invasion
and destruction of our colony at Natal. Yet, after all, that
is the true question. Sir Bartle Frere was specially charged,
under his commission, with the protection of our own territory
from native inroads, and was bound, in a great emergency, to make
use of his immense delegated power in a prompt manner. Cetywayo,
for two years, had been arranging for a great special blow upon
the white people. He was couching ready to spring, and the High
Commissioner knew it was absolutely necessary to act at once.[36]
Hence the commencement of hostilities early in January within
Zululand. If there had been no disaster at Isandhlwana there
would have been no censure. The ideas of her Majesty's Government
with regard to conditions of peace will be found expressed in the
Secretary of State's despatch, dated the 20th of March:—No further
interference with the internal government is to be permitted
than what is necessary for securing the peace and safety of the
adjacent colonies. Duly authorized residents or agents to reside
in the country. The Zulu military system to be discontinued, and
missionaries to be admitted. These views necessarily subject to
modification by future events.
[Sidenote: _Sir Bartle Frere's justification._]
[Sidenote: _Mission operations._]
The battle of Ghinghelovo was fought upon the 2nd of April, and the
battle of Ulundi, which will be referred to in due course, took
place on the 4th of July. A complete chronicle of the operations of
the different columns during the interval would be most tiresome
and uninteresting. Such a narrative would be occupied with little
raids upon the enemy, and of the enemy upon us; occasional scares;
the active operations from Wood's column in scouring the country
within forty miles; captures and losses of cattle; movement of
troops; fort-building; camp life; and, above all, the troubles,
anxieties, and annoyances of the slow march towards the front and
the difficulties of transport.[37] Messengers, ostensibly from
the king, came in at various times to ask for peace; but, viewed
in the light of subsequent events, there is little doubt that
such people were merely sent as spies, with the double object of
putting us off our guard and obtaining information. An engagement
took place on the 5th of June, between the enemy and a portion of
Brigadier-General Wood's column, which requires more than mere
passing mention. As an attack was expected on the line of march,
reinforcements of cavalry (Lancers and Dragoons) as well as mounted
natives were sent. Colonel Buller, with two troops of Frontier
Light Horse, and detachments of Baker's and McDonald's forces,
together with Cochrane's Mounted Basutos, formed a scouting force
in advance. Lord William Beresford assisted Colonel Buller as
staff officer. The 90th Regiment formed the advance-guard of the
main column, the 80th was in the centre, and the 1-13th formed
the rear-guard. Two large bodies of Zulus, about 1000 in number,
were observed near the large kraal of Usirayo, and they seemed
by their position to challenge an attack. Our men were ordered
to advance at a trot, and the enemy retired into the belt of
thornbush surrounding the base of the mountain, from which they
poured a heavy fire. After half an hour's fusillade from each side
the enemy's fire began to slacken. Lancers and Dragoons crossed
the river, but, not being supported by artillery, were unable
to dislodge the Zulus, and unfortunately lost Adjutant Frith, a
young officer of great promise. Subsequently the troop of Natal
mounted natives under Shepstone checkmated an attempt of the enemy
to cut off our retiring vedettes. After this the Zulus contented
themselves with shouting out defiance. The British troops returned,
having previously burned the kraals and ascertained the approximate
number of the enemy assembled to oppose the march of the column.
It is noteworthy that on this occasion the conduct of the regular
troops and volunteers is described as manifesting both pluck and
steadiness.[38]
[Sidenote: _The Prince Imperial._]
We must now advert to the career of the most distinguished
volunteer of the war, a prince who owned the most conspicuous
dynastic name of the time—Napoleon Louis Bonaparte, Prince Imperial
of France. Born in the purple and brought up amidst the greatest
magnificence, the misfortunes of France became his own, and as an
exile in England he studied at the Military College of Woolwich,
where his success far surpassed even the sanguine expectations of
his friends. The war in South Africa seemed to offer a sphere in
which the heir of conquerors could learn to conquer. As a soldier,
the prince earnestly desired to attain practical knowledge of his
profession; as a Napoleon, he thirsted to distinguish himself by
taking the sword each of his family had experienced to be the Key
of Empire. Great Britain was the refuge of his family, and among
the soldiers of Great Britain he felt at home. On the 27th of
February, 1879, Prince Louis Napoleon received the sacrament of
the Catholic Church before the Emperor's tomb at Chiselhurst, and
then embarked in the steamer _Danube_ for the theatre of war. His
determination to go to Zululand was absolutely his own act, and
his brave mother had to yield to his judgment what her own heart
opposed. The prince was singularly calculated to win the affection
of all. Pure, wise, and Christian, he had declared, "If I am
restored to the throne of my father, I will have none near me whose
truth, honour, and morality are not above suspicion." As free from
affectation as possible, he was gay, simple, affable, and so full
of kindliness as to draw to him the hearts of all with whom he came
in contact. On the voyage out he mixed with the passengers as one
of them, joined in their games, and made himself beloved as much by
the charm of his manner as the goodness of his nature.[39] Arrived
at Cape Town, the prince became the guest of Lady Frere, the
Governor being absent in Natal. He only remained there a few days,
during the stay of the _Danube_, and went on in that steamer to
Natal. The prince had received permission from the authorities to
accompany the staff of the British army, and the Duke of Cambridge
had written letters on this subject to Lord Chelmsford and to Sir
Bartle Frere.
[Sidenote: _The prince in action._]
With that hatred of ostentation and desire of giving as little
trouble as possible which markedly actuated all the proceedings
of the prince, he merely took one servant to the front, and even
left his faithful companion, M. Uhlmann, at D'Urban. Towards the
end of April indisposition prevented his joining the head-quarters
staff of Lord Chelmsford, but he was delayed only a few days in
Pietermaritzburg. It soon became evident to all his companions in
arms that the prince was the bravest of the brave. No idea of fear
ever crossed his mind, and as this undaunted disposition was not
tempered by experience, it should have induced greater watchfulness
on the part of those men of high rank in the British army who were
virtually his guardians during the campaign. In a reconnaissance
which took place on Sunday, the 18th of May, the prince displayed
that coolness in the face of danger for which he was remarkable.
On that day twenty-five men of Bettington's Horse, and the mounted
Basutos under Colonel Harrison, accompanied by the Prince Imperial,
crossed the Blood river, and subsequently descended into the
Ityotyozi valley, where they were to meet Colonel Buller and 300
men. They missed this force, however, and had to bivouac for the
night near the south-east extremity of the Incqutu. No fires were
allowed, and in shivering silence the night was passed, the enemy
being expected at any moment. At daybreak they set off in quest of
the road, and when approaching an ascent leading to a large kraal,
were fired upon by sixty Zulus, who lined the ridge of rocks above.
This fusillade was immediately returned, and without any hesitation
Captain Bettington led straight up. The road was exceedingly steep
and covered with boulders, but by a sudden charge the position was
taken. Two Zulus were killed and seven horses captured. The prince
evidently relished this engagement, and was as cool and collected
throughout as if sitting in his study. In the captured kraal
several relics of Isandhlwana were discovered, among which was a
saddle of Colonel Black's, 2-24th, empty boxes of Martini-Henry,
and an artillery forge bellows.
To show the narrow escapes which sometimes occurred, an incident
that followed this little engagement may be related. Captain
Bettington rode after three Zulus, two of whom were armed with guns
and one with assegai. Thinking he was unarmed, they allowed him to
come within ten yards. He called out and fired his revolver; two
of the three loaded chambers missed fire, and one of the Zulus was
just taking aim with his gun at a distance of only fifteen yards,
when the third chamber exploded and the man fell dead. The other
two ran away, and the remainder of the patrol came up shortly
afterwards.
The prince was exceedingly fond of real work, and of sharing
every privation and danger of his comrades. He was no feather-bed soldier.
Anxious always to go out with patrols and on reconnaissance
duty, it would have seemed ungracious to check his ardour, but
his own daring and utter absence of fear made it specially
necessary that men of tried experience should accompany him. At
the commencement of June the Prince Imperial, attached to the
Quartermaster-General's department, was at General Newdigate's
camp. He had applied for and obtained leave to go on ahead of
the division to the site of the new camp about to be formed. On
the morning of the 1st of June, the reconnoitring party set out,
consisting of the Prince Imperial, Lieutenant Carey of H.M. 98th
Regiment, six selected men of Bettington's Horse, and one Kafir.
Six mounted Basutos had been ordered to join the party, but they
were left behind. The spot to which they were about to proceed was
familiar to the prince, and he was aware
[Sidenote: _Death of the prince._]
that it was in the vicinity of Lord Chelmsford's camp on one side,
and of General Wood's on the other. The party started at half-past
nine o'clock, and when they arrived at the neck of the Incenci
mountain were joined by some officers, who, after riding some
distance with them, went off towards the left, in the direction
of General Wood's camp. After crossing a rivulet which forms a
tributary to the Ityotyozi river, they reached a large flat-topped
hill, and there the prince, ordering the men to slacken girths for
a little, took a sketch of the country.[40]
Shortly after the march was resumed, the prince pointed out the
kraal from which he had been fired upon on a previous occasion,
and turned off to examine another one, which was found empty.
Immediately afterwards the party descended towards a third kraal,
about a mile further on, as the prince observed a small river—the
Mbazani—at which the horses could be watered, and where coffee
could be made for the men. The kraal consisted of five huts, with
a small stone enclosure, and was distant about 200 yards from the
river. In front there was an open space, on which fires for cooking
had been made, but between the kraal and the river tambookie grass
grew, five or six feet in height, with mealies and Kafir corn
interspersed. The party halted on the open space, and the prince
gave the order to "off saddle" for an hour. No sign of life was
visible, except where two or three dogs furtively ran from the
intruders. Water was obtained, coffee made, the horses were turned
into the grass and grain crops, while with a feeling of perfect
security all lay stretched, resting, on the ground.
[Sidenote: _The prince's heroism._]
The hour quickly passed, and during that time, unknown and
unsuspected, fifty Zulus crawled in ambush preparing to make a
spring. The position of the ground was most advantageous for their
purpose. A deep donga formed excellent cover, and out of that
they crept along the water's edge, completely screened by the
rank vegetation. It was while they were thus concealed that one
of them was seen by the Kafir sent to bring water to the Prince
Imperial's party. The Zulu burst out of his ambush and fled. The
Kafir returned and reported what he had seen. Meanwhile the prince,
looking at his watch, remarked, "You can give your horses ten
minutes more." What the Kafir reported had, however, made every
one anxious to go, and the horses were caught and saddled. All
stood ready, and the prince examined the bit of his horse for a few
moments. Then came the words, "Prepare to mount! Mount!" and almost
at the same moment a volley fired from forty rifles, at a distance
of twenty yards, crashed among them. At this time the party were
standing in line, close to their horses, with their backs to the
kraal and their faces turned eastward, the prince being in front
and nearest to the Zulus. Then with a tremendous cry, "Usutu!"
and "Lo, the English cowards!" the savages rushed on. The horses
immediately swerved, and some broke away. An undoubted panic seized
the party; every one who could spring on his horse mounted and
galloped for his life. There was no thought nor idea of standing
fast and resisting this sudden attack. The prince was unwounded,
but unable to mount his charger, which was sixteen hands high, and
always difficult to mount. On this occasion the horse became so
frightened by the firing and sudden stampede, as to rear and prance
in such a manner as to make it impossible for the prince to gain
the saddle. Many of the others saw the difficulty, but none waited
or tried to give the least assistance. One by one they rushed their
horses past, Private Le Tocq exclaiming as he went by, lying across
his saddle, "Dépêchez-vous, s'il vous plaît, monsieur." The prince,
making no reply, strained every nerve, but, alas! in vain, to gain
the back of his horse, holding his stirrup-leather with his left
hand and the saddle with his right. With the help of the holster he
made one desperate effort, but the holster partially gave way, and
it must have been then that the horse trod upon him, and galloped
off, leaving his master prostrate on the ground. The prince then
regained his feet and ran after his friends, who were far in
advance. Twelve or thirteen Zulus were at this time only a few feet
behind him. The prince then turned round, and, sword in hand, faced
his pursuers. From the first he had never called for help, and now
died bravely with his face to the foes, fighting courageously to
the last. It is thought that the Zulus hurled their assegais at
him, and that he quickly fell dead, pierced through the eye by a
mortal wound.
In death, as in life, the Prince Imperial of France behaved as a
brave soldier, the worthy heir of a great cause and a true son of
France. No torture or pain accompanied his last moments. His first
wound was mortal, and the noble and beloved prince in his last
moments, as during his entire career, did nothing to sully the name
he bore or the country which gave him birth.
Two of the troopers were shot. One of them, Rogers, never reached
his horse, and received his death wound when standing by a hut,
rifle in hand, preparing to defend himself. Trooper Abel was shot
at the first discharge—at all events, before he could reach the
donga. The Kafir who had accompanied them and had brought the water
for coffee, was quickly surrounded and killed. The rest of the
party galloped off at full speed. Lieutenant Carey and two others
crossed the donga at a difficult place, while the others, who were
followed by the prince, took an easier route. The direction taken
by the fugitives was General Wood's camp. Lieutenant Carey, shortly
after starting, called out, "Keep to the left, and cross the donga,
and rally behind it." At the same time he noticed Zulus apparently
endeavouring to cut off their retreat. On a rise a little further
on, he looked round, and one of the troopers, who happened to be
near him, called attention to the prince's horse galloping away.
In reply to a question, the man said it was useless to return.
The other troopers were then 200 yards distant. Lieutenant Carey
shouted out to them to keep to the left, and all made the best of
their way to the camp, which was reached at 6.30 p.m.
[Sidenote: _Lieutenant Carey's report._]
It ought specially to be noted that the attack of the Zulus was a
thorough surprise by an overwhelming force. No sentries bad been
posted, nor precautions of any kind taken, and at the time of the
attack no carbines were loaded. Lieutenant Carey says that he did
not notice the prince after he saw him mounting, and that he did
not perceive any fighting when he looked round.
General Wood and Colonel Buller met Lieutenant Carey and the other
survivors of the party. These officers were at the time about
six miles from camp, and four or five from Isandhlwana mountain,
when they saw five white men riding as if for their lives under
the hills on the right. So soon as the fugitives saw the general
and his escort, they came up to them at full gallop, and told the
dreadful news. By means of field-glasses three horses were seen
being led off at a distance of about seven miles, accompanied by
twenty or thirty Zulus on foot. It was then nearly five in the
afternoon, and too late to do anything. On the following morning
(Whit Monday) the advanced guard of Natal Native Contingent and
Raaff's Horse pushed forward from Wood's camp to the scene of
the disaster. They were joined there by squadrons of Lancers and
Dragoons from General Newdigate. The search for the bodies was
not a long one. That of poor Rogers was first found, lying stark
naked, riddled with assegai stabs and with a gash in the abdomen.
Thirty yards distant was that of Abel in the same condition. A
wound in his right hand seemed to show that he had fought for his
life at close quarters. Thirty yards or so from this, and in the
donga, lay the corpse of the Prince Imperial. Surgeon-Major Scott,
specially deputed for the purpose by Lord Chelmsford, took charge
of the body and proceeded to examine it. There was one longish
wound on the right breast, which was evidently mortal; an assegai
had pierced the right eye, and had at once either caused death or
paralysis to pain. There were two wounds in the left side, and less
serious ones all over the upper part of the chest. A long gash in
the abdomen exposed the intestines, but had not injured them. Round
the neck was a small gold chain, to which was attached a medal and
Agnus Dei. These the Zulus had not dared to touch, as they look
upon all such articles as charms to be dreaded. The body of the
prince was then conveyed to camp, and those of the troopers were
buried with religious ceremony.
It is now necessary to furnish the evidence taken at the
court-martial and the statement of Lieutenant Carey. The
preliminary report was as follows:—
"The Court is of opinion that Lieutenant Carey did not understand
the position in which he stood towards the prince, and, as a
consequence, failed to estimate aright the responsibility which
fell to his lot. Colonel Harrison states that the senior combatant
officer, Lieutenant Carey, D.A.Q.M.G., was, as a matter of course,
in charge of the party, whilst on the other hand Carey says, when
alluding to the escort, 'I did not consider I had any authority
over it, after the precise and careful instructions of Lord
Chelmsford as to the position the prince held.' As to his being
invariably accompanied by an escort in charge of an officer, the
Court considers that the possibility of such a difference of
opinion should not have existed between two officers of the same
department. The Court is of opinion that Carey is much to blame for
having proceeded on the duty in question with a portion only of the
escort detailed by Colonel Harrison. The Court cannot admit the
irresponsibility for this on the part of Carey, inasmuch as he took
steps to obtain the escort, and failed in so doing. Moreover, the
fact that Harrison was present upon the Itelezi range gave him the
opportunity of consulting him on the matter, of which he failed to
avail himself. The Court, having examined the ground, is of opinion
that the selection of the kraal where a halt was made and the
horses off saddled, surrounded as it was by cover for an enemy, and
adjacent to difficult ground, showed a lamentable want of military
prudence. The Court deeply regrets that no effort was made after
the attack to rally the escort, and to show a front to the enemy,
whereby the possibility of aiding those who had failed to make
good their retreat might have been ascertained.—Signed by General
Marshall; Colonel Malthus, 94th Regiment; Major Le Grice, R.A."
[Sidenote: _The court-martial._]
On this report a court-martial was summoned by Lord Chelmsford,
for the trial of Lieutenant Carey, for having misbehaved before
the enemy on the 1st June, 1879, when in command of an escort
in attendance on the prince, who was making reconnaissances in
Zululand, in having, when the prince and escort were attacked by
the enemy, galloped away, and in not having attempted to rally them
or otherwise defend the prince. The Court, under the presidency of
Colonel Glyn, consisted of Colonels Whitehead, Courtney, Harness,
Major Bouverie, and Major Anstruther.
Judge-Advocate Brander prosecuted, and Captain Crookenden, R.A.,
was for the defence.
When the Court opened the plan of the ground was proved.
Corporal Grubb said the prince gave the order "Off saddle" at
the kraal, and "Prepare to mount." The prince mounted. After the
volley, he saw Carey putting spurs to his horse, and he did the
same. He saw Abel fall, and Rogers trying to get a shot at the
Zulus. Le Tocq passed him, and said, "Put spurs to your horse,
boy; the prince is down!" He looked round and saw the prince under
his horse. A short time after the prince's horse came up, and he
(Grubb) caught it. No orders were given to rally.
Le Tocq was called, and said: The prince told the natives to
search the kraals, and finding no one there they off saddled. At
the volley, he mounted, but, dropping his carbine, stopped to pick
it up. In remounting he could not get his leg over the saddle.
He passed the prince, and said in French, "Hasten to mount your
horse." The prince did not answer. He saw the prince's horse
treading on his leg. The prince was in command of the party. He
believed Carey and the prince would have passed on different sides
of a hut in fast flight, and it was possible that Carey might have
failed to see that the prince was in difficulty. It was 250 yards
from where he saw the prince down to the spot where he died.
Trooper Cochrane was called, and said: The prince was not in the
saddle at the time of mounting. He saw, about fifty yards off, the
prince running down the donga with fourteen Zulus in close pursuit.
Nothing was done to help him. He heard no orders given, and did not
tell Carey what he had seen until some time after. He was an old
soldier. He did not think any rally could have been made.
[Sidenote: _Examination of witnesses._]
The Court then adjourned to the next day. On reassembling, the
first witness called was—
Sergeant Willis, who stated that he had seen Trooper Rogers lying
on the ground by the side of his horse, close to the kraal, as he
left the spot. He thought he saw the prince wounded at the same
time that Trooper Abel threw up his arms. He thought the prince
might have been dragged to the place where he was found after
death, and that a rally might have been made twenty yards beyond
the donga.
Colonel Harrison being called, stated that Carey was senior
combatant officer, and must therefore have been in command of the
party. Carey volunteered to go on the reconnaissance to verify
certain points of his sketch. The prince was ordered to go to
report more fully on the ground. He had given the prince into
Carey's charge.
Examined by the Court, Colonel Harrison stated that when the prince
was attached to his department he was not told to treat him as a
royal personage in the matter of escort, but as any other officer,
taking due precaution against any possible danger.
Dr. Scott (the prince's medical attendant) was then called, and
stated that the prince was killed by eighteen assegai wounds, any
five of which would have been fatal. There were no bullet wounds.
The prince died where the body was found.
This closed the case for the prosecution. The defence called again—
Colonel Harrison, who testified to Carey's abilities as a staff
officer, and said he had every confidence in him.
Colonel Bellairs was also called, and stated that it was in
consequence of the occurrence of the 1st June that Carey had been
deposed from his staff appointment the day previous to his trial.
Lieutenant Carey here submitted that his case had been prejudged,
and that he had been punished before his trial.
[Sidenote: _Lieutenant Carey._]
The following is Lieutenant Carey's statement:—
"On the 31st May, I was informed by Colonel Harrison, A.Q.M.G.,
that the Prince Imperial was to start on the 1st June, to ride over
the road selected by me for the advance of the column, for the
purpose of selecting a camping ground for the 2nd June. I suggested
at once that I should be allowed to go with him, as I knew the road
and wanted to go over it again for the purpose of verifying certain
points. To this Colonel Harrison consented, reminding me that the
prince was going at his own request to do this work, and that I was
not to interfere with him in any way. For our escort, six Europeans
of Bettington's Horse and six Basutos were ordered. Bettington's
men were paraded at 9 a.m., but owing to some misunderstanding
the Basutos did not turn up, and, the prince being desirous of
proceeding at once, we went without them. On arriving at the ridge
between Itelezi and Incenci, I suggested waiting for them, but the
prince replied, 'Oh no; we are quite strong enough,' or words to
that effect. We proceeded on our reconnaissance from there, halting
about half an hour on a high hill overlooking the Ityotyozi for the
prince to sketch. From here the country was visible for miles, and
no sign of the enemy could be discovered. We then descended into
the valley, and, entering a kraal, off saddled, knee-haltering our
horses. We had seen the deserted appearance of the country, and,
though the kraal was to the right surrounded by mealies, we thought
there was no danger in encamping. If any blame is attributable to
any one for this, it is to me, as I agreed with the prince that
we were perfectly safe. I had been over this ground twice before,
and seen no one, and the brigade-major of the cavalry brigade had
ridden over it with only two or three men, and laughed at me for
taking so large an escort. We had with us a friendly Zulu, who,
in answer to my inquiries, said no Zulus were about. I trusted in
him, but still kept a sharp look-out, telescope in hand. In about
an hour—that is, at 3.40 p.m.—the prince ordered us to saddle up.
We went into the mealies to catch our horses, but took at least ten
minutes saddling. While doing so, the Zulu guide informed us he had
seen a Zulu in the distance, but as he did not appear concerned,
I saw no danger. The prince was saddled up first, and, seeing him
ready, I mounted, the men not being quite ready. The prince then
asked if they were all ready; they answered in the affirmative,
and he gave the word 'Prepare to mount.' At this moment I turned
round, and saw the prince with his foot in the stirrup, looking at
the men. Presently I heard him say, 'Mount,' and turning to the
men, saw them vault into their saddles. At this moment my eyes
fell on about twenty black faces in the mealies, twenty to thirty
yards off, and I saw puffs of smoke and heard a rattling volley,
followed by a rush, with shouts of 'Usutu!' There was at once a
stampede. Two men rushed past me, and as every one appeared to be
mounted, I dug the spurs into my horse, which had already started
of his own accord. I felt sure no one was wounded by the volley,
as I heard no cry, and I shouted out, 'Keep to the left, and cross
the donga, and rally behind it!' At the same time I saw more
Zulus in the mealies on our left flank, cutting off our retreat.
I crossed the donga behind two or three men, but could only get
beyond one man, the others having ridden off. Riding a few hundred
yards on to the rise, I stopped and looked round. I could see the
Zulus after us, and saw that the men were escaping to the right,
and that no one appeared on the other side of the donga. The man
beside me then drew my attention to the prince's horse, which was
galloping away on the other side of the donga, saying, 'I fear
the prince is killed, sir.' I immediately said, 'Do you think it
is any use going back?' The trooper pointed to the mealies on our
left, which appeared full of Kafirs, and said, 'He is dead long
ago, sir: they assegai wounded men at once.' I considered he had
fallen near the kraal, as his horse was going from that direction,
and it was useless to sacrifice more lives. I had but one man near
me, the others being some 200 yards down the valley. I accordingly
shouted to them to close to the left, and rode on to gain a drift
over the Tombokala river, saying to the man at my side, 'We will
keep back towards General Wood's camp, not returning the same way
we came, and then come back with some Dragoons to get the bodies.'
We reached camp about 6.30 p.m. When we were attacked our carbines
were unloaded, and, to the best of my belief, no shots were fired.
I did not see the prince after I saw him mounting, but he was
mounted on a swift horse, and I thought he was close to me. Besides
the prince, we lost two troopers, as well as the friendly Zulu. Two
troopers have been found between the donga and the kraal, covered
with assegai wounds. They must have fallen in the retreat and been
assegaied at once, as I saw no fighting when I looked round."
[Sidenote: _Grief in Natal._]
A shudder of horror and reproachful regret passed through Natal.
It was sorrowful that the prince should be killed, but doubly
lamentable that he should fall by the assegais of savages when his
comrades deserted him. In the army the feeling of indignation and
regret was particularly strong; and, however desirous men felt
to do justice, it was scarcely possible for human nature to be
entirely free from prejudice in forming a judgment with regard to
the conduct of those who had been with the prince on the fatal day
of his death. The court-martial condemned Lieutenant Carey, and
sent him home under arrest. But a reaction of opinion subsequently
took place. The Empress interceded for the unfortunate man, and our
own Queen was pleased to order his release from arrest.
The death of the Prince Imperial was felt as a personal grief
by every colonist. It spread gloom throughout the country,
and recalled vividly the shock that followed the disaster at
Isandhlwana. The generous ardour with which the prince had given
his services to the cause of the colonists seemed to have received
a pitiful return. The heir of an Empire was dead, and the news must
go hence to a widowed mother, who had made England her home. Every
possible manifestation of grief and respect was paid. The military
and the military authorities vied with the civil authorities and
the people in doing honour to the illustrious dead. Natal went
into mourning. When the corpse arrived at Pietermaritzburg, people
of all classes crowded into the streets to show their respect by
joining the procession. The _Times_ of Natal tells us that on
the 8th of June, at 1.15 p.m., a gun was fired from Fort Napier,
announcing that the body had arrived within two miles of the city,
and by two o'clock a number which must have exceeded 3000 had
assembled at the place of rendezvous on the Commercial Road. Here
the procession was formed, the military headed by Major-General the
Hon. H. H. Clifford, Inspector-General of Communications, on the
one side; and the civilians, headed by his Excellency Sir Henry
Bulwer, the Lieutenant-Governor of the colony, on the other.
[Sidenote: _The body brought to Natal._]
Thousands of people lined the way up to the place where the
procession had to fall in, and some time was taken before all were
in their places in the order above indicated. Following the civil
authorities, came the City Guard, some sixty strong, under Colonel
Mitchell as general leader, and J. H. Spence as district leader;
and after them came a large number of the Odd Fellows and Foresters
in the funeral insignia of their order. After this the general
public followed, all in mourning.
The arrangements being completed, amid the solemn booming of the
minute guns, and the tolling of the church bells, the gun-carriage
bearing the coffin was seen slowly coming down the hill,
accompanied by the escort of regulars and mounted police which
had come with it. As it approached the military fell into their
places, and there was a hush which spoke, more eloquently than
any words, the feelings of the vast concourse of people as the
body of the late prince approached. As the _cortège_ passed every
hat was raised in respect, and the military presented arms. The
coffin was wrapped in a large tricolour, and upon it was a helmet
and sword, together with wreaths of roses and camellias, and a
beautiful cross of violets; while the grey charger, draped with a
black pall, with the letter "N" on the corners, and with the boots
reversed, according to military custom, followed. The procession
then formed in the order given above, Major-General Clifford and
the Lieutenant-Governor being immediately in front, while behind it
were Fathers De Lacy and Baudry, the latter of whom had just come
down with the body. In the procession were observed many clergy
of the English Church and of other denominations, among them the
Right Reverend Bishop Colenso, the Right Reverend Bishop Macrorie,
Dean Green, Archdeacon Usherwood, the Rev. G. M. St. M. Ritchie,
chaplain to the forces, etc., etc. The two valets of the late
prince immediately followed the Catholic clergy. The pall-bearers
were Captain Willoughby, 21st Scots Fusiliers; Captain Fox,
R.A., D.A.A.G.; Major Russell, 12th Lancers; Lieutenant-Colonel
East, 57th Foot, D.Q.M.G.; Lieutenant-Colonel Steward, R.E.;
Colonel Reilly, C.B., R.H.A. The personal staff in attendance
upon Major-General Clifford were Captain Fox, R.A., D.A.A.G., and
Lieutenant Westmacott, 77th Regiment, A.D.C. General Bisset was
also present, in full uniform. Major Spalding, D.A.A.G., acted as
adjutant-general, in the absence of Colonel Bellairs. Amongst the
civil servants were the Attorney-General, Hon. M. H. Gallwey; the
Colonial Treasurer, Hon. Mr. Polkinghorne; the Surveyor-General,
Mr. P. C. Sutherland, M.D.; the Mayor of Maritzburg, Mr. W.
Francis, and the Town Councillors; Mr. W. Akerman, M.L.C., and Mr.
C. C. Griffin, M.L.C.; and all the heads of departments who were
not either absent from Maritzburg or prevented from being present
by sickness.
[Sidenote: _Lord Clifford's special order._]
The Maritzburg Rifles assembled in full number, under Lieutenant
and Adjutant Scoones, and their band played the Dead March in
"Saul," adding greatly to the solemnity of the procession. It
marched slowly up Commercial Road to the corner of Church Street,
up which it turned, and then wheeled along Chapel Street into
Longmarket Street, arriving at the Roman Catholic School at about
ten minutes before four. Here the coffin was taken from the
gun-carriage by the pall-bearers, and conveyed into the chapel,
followed by as many of the procession as the building would hold,
the military who were on the ground being formed into two lines
outside the building. The Rev. Father Barrett met the procession
at the door, and, together with Father De Lacy and Father Baudry,
officiated, reading a short service over the coffin; all present
appearing deeply affected. The military were then drawn up outside
the building, and his Excellency and other distinguished personages
passed through the lines, and the doors of the building were then
closed upon the mortal remains of the late lamented prince.
The following special order had been issued by General Clifford:—
"Wednesday, June 4th.
"The Inspector-General of Lines of Communication and Base has
received from his Excellency the Lieutenant-General commanding
official confirmation of the calamity which has befallen the
forces under his command, by the death, on duty in the field,
of the late gallant young soldier the Prince Imperial, Louis
Napoleon, who, having in his military training been associated
with the British army, came out to this country to take part in
the Zulu campaign.
"The Inspector-General feels that he is carrying out the wishes of
his Excellency the Lieutenant-General commanding, now in Zululand,
by thus recording the feelings of deep sorrow and sympathy,
experienced by every officer and man whose duty keeps him at his
post in the colony, with the loss thus sustained.
"The body of the unfortunate prince will arrive here probably on
Monday next, the 9th inst., _en route_ to England. Arrangements
will be made to receive it with all due respect and expression of
sorrow."
From the capital city of Pietermaritzburg, the body of the prince
was conveyed to D'Urban, the seaport, and at the latter place
the following eloquent special order was issued by the Assistant
Adjutant-General.[41]
"10th June, 1879.
"The mortal remains of Prince Louis Napoleon will be carried
to-morrow, at half-past 9 a.m., from the Roman Catholic Church, in
D'Urban, to the Wharf, at Port Natal, for embarkation in H.M.S.
_Boadicea_ to England.
"In following the coffin which holds the body of the late Prince
Imperial of France, and paying to his ashes the final tribute of
sorrow and of honour, the troops in garrison will remember:—
"First. That he was the last inheritor of a mighty name, and of a
great military renown.
"Second. That he was the son of England's firm ally in dangerous
days.
"Third. That he was the sole child of a widowed Empress, who is
now left throneless and childless, in exile, on English shores.
"Deepening the profound sorrow, and the solemn reverence that
attaches to these memories, the troops will also remember that the
Prince Imperial of France fell fighting as a British soldier.
"W. F. BUTLER,
"_A.A.-General, Base of Operations_.
"D'Urban, Natal, South Africa."
[Sidenote: _Funeral ceremonies at D'Urban._]
The Roman Catholic Church at D'Urban was transformed into a
_chapelle ardente_, and the coffin remained there all night after
its arrival. Solemn requiem Mass was celebrated the next morning.
The _Natal Mercury_ tells us that by nine o'clock an immense crowd
of persons had assembled outside the church where the gun-carriage
was in waiting, and every arrangement had been made for speedily
forming the procession after the ceremony was over. The principal
object of interest outside was the grey horse belonging to the late
prince, which he had purchased from a D'Urban gentleman, and the
groom in charge of it was busily engaged in answering questions put
to him with regard to the late prince. The horse was saddled, and
in just the same condition as it was when it came back riderless to
the camp. The troops outside waiting to take part in the procession
numbered altogether 700; the whole, as on the previous day, being
under the command of Major Huskisson, commandant of the garrison.
Every regiment doing service in South Africa was represented,
including even the Dragoons and Lancers. At a quarter to ten the
doors of the church were thrown open, and the coffin was brought
to the gun-carriage, the honour of carrying it having been
conferred on Captain Haynes (staff paymaster), Captain Granville
(commissariat), Captain Young (commissariat), Captain Brunker,
Commissary Marsh (ordnance), and Surgeon-Major Leslie.
The procession was constituted as follows:—
The band.
The body.
Guard of honour. Guard of honour.
Pall bearers. Chief mourners. Pall bearers.
Military.
Friendly societies.
Public bodies.
Town guard.
Consular officers.
Military and Heads of departments. Civilians four-deep.
Volunteers. Archdeacon and clergy.
Members executive and legislative.
Mayor and Town Council.
Public schools.
The public.
Having proceeded to the Point, the coffin was conveyed by a
small steamer to H.M.S. _Boadicea_, where it was taken on board
and hoisted into the hold of the vessel amid all the reverent
marks of respect so fitting for the occasion. Monsieur Deleage,
correspondent of the Paris _Figaro_, with two of the prince's
attendants, accompanied the remains.
"We will conclude this sad chapter of the history of the Zulu war
by inserting a copy of the address signed in Natal, expressing deep
sympathy with the widowed Empress:—
[Sidenote: _Letter of condolence._]
_"A Sa Majesté l'Imperatrice Eugénie._
"MADAME,
"Les sous-signés, habitants de Natal, viennent respectueusement
exprimer à votre Majesté Impériale leurs sentiments de douloureuse
sympathie, à l'occasion de la mort du jeune et vaillant prince
votre fils, tombé à la fleur de l'âge, victime de ses sentiments
de dévouement à une noble cause.
"En présence d'une telle infortune qui cause tant de regrets et
emporte de si brillantes espérances à votre cœur de mère, dejà si
éprouvé, tous les colons de Natal, sont emus d'un même et unique
sentiment de profonde affliction dont cette respectueuse adresse,
n'est que la faible expression.
"Nous prions Dieu, Madame, de vouloir bien répandre sur votre
Majesté les consolations que lui seul peut donner. En effet, votre
douleur est si grande, qu'il semble impossible a notre nature d'en
supporter le poids.
"Nous avons l'honneur d'être, avec le plus profond respect
"de votre Majesté Impériale,
"Les très humbles et obéissants serviteurs."
CHAPTER IX.
THE POLICY OF SIR BARTLE FRERE—SLOW ADVANCE OF THE BRITISH
COLUMNS—APPOINTMENT AND ARRIVAL OF SIR GARNET WOLSELEY—BATTLE OF
ULUNDI—RESIGNATION AND DEPARTURE OF LORD CHELMSFORD.
The policy of Sir Bartle Frere received the hearty and most
earnest support of those people who were best qualified to judge
of it, the colonists of Natal and the Cape Colony. At large and
enthusiastic public meetings held in every town of any consequence
unanimous votes of approval and sympathy were passed. In the city
of Cape Town a great mass meeting declared unanimously for Sir
Bartle Frere. Graham's Town expressed itself in the same manner.
Port Elizabeth notified its fullest confidence in his Excellency
the High Commissioner, "being persuaded that the policy he is
seeking to carry out in South Africa is eminently calculated to
secure the permanent tranquillity of the country and the welfare
of its inhabitants. King William's Town heartily sympathizes
with his Excellency, and expresses its entire confidence."
Graaff-Reinet, "having heard with the greatest satisfaction the
manner in which the metropolis has come forward to approve of the
policy of his Excellency Sir Bartle Frere, cordially endorses
the Cape Town resolution." Swellendam recorded its "satisfaction
with the well-timed movement in Cape Town;" George Town notified
its approval; Queen's Town expressed its cordial sympathy and
confidence; Kimberley declared strongly in favour of Sir Bartle
Frere, and, of course, so did Pietermaritzburg, D'Urban, and other
towns in Natal. In fact, from east to west, from north to south,
all classes, all creeds, all nationalities, were unanimous in
upholding the only policy which they considered could serve South
Africa. Bishop Colenso in Natal, and several other able men in
Cape Town, held different views, but then their number was so very
small as to detract in a very small measure from the unanimity of
the expression of feeling. At these public meetings hearty votes of
thanks were also passed to her Majesty's Government for having sent
out reinforcements.
[Sidenote: _Anxiety of the colonists._]
There can be no doubt whatever that during April, May, and June,
there was a very dissatisfied feeling in the colonies, as well as
at home, with regard to the exceeding tardiness of operations.
The small irritating raids made at different times upon Zululand
cannot be styled successful, and resulted in reprisals which were
calculated to have a demoralizing effect upon our own natives.
If Colonel Wood had been reasonably reinforced and allowed to
go forward, there is good reason to believe that he could have
finished the war. Up to the 18th of May his troops had been
successful in seven skirmishes and one pitched battle. They had
burnt the great Maquilizine military kraal, and captured 9000
head of cattle. This light brigade was admirably adapted for Zulu
warfare. Pearson's column on the coast had also performed admirable
service. The extraordinary difficulties and delays of transport
under the new organization in the second campaign have been
already referred to. Lord Chelmsford, writing to the Secretary of
State from Newcastle, Natal, on the 14th of May, states that the
troops are in position, only waiting for sufficient supplies and
transport to advance. From what the general commanding had learnt
from General Clifford,[42] he feared that it would be out of his
power to advance until the 1st of June. Major-General Crealock,
commanding the first (coast) division, reported that he hoped to
have two months' supplies in three weeks' time on the Inyezane
river. The posts on the northern line had all been visited, and
head-quarters fixed at Utrecht, until such time as the second
division, under General Newdigate, was ready to advance. Shortly
afterwards, information was received that the border tribes were
massing at Babincinqu and Inyayene, two points near the Blood
river, and that the Zulus had sent for reinforcements to Ulundi.
Rest and security for two entire months had now been given to the
enemy, and their determination to continue the war was perfectly
evident, in spite of the illusory messages, asking for conditions
of peace, which were periodically sent to the British camps. On
the 26th of May, General Wood advanced his column eight miles, and
General Newdigate proceeded a distance of twelve miles towards
the Blood river. Lord Chelmsford established his head-quarters at
Kopje Alleen. Not until the middle of June could Port Durnford be
used for sending supplies to General Crealock's coast column. Great
additional transport facilities were by this means secured. On June
3rd a belief prevailed at the Lower Tugela that an advance would
be made as soon as the supply of cattle for transport purposes was
sufficient. During all the operations the percentage of sickness
was not very great. In the early part of the war a large number of
men were invalided, particularly from the coast column. The D'Urban
hospitals were full, but the number of deaths was not large, and
as the cold season advanced sickness became less. Zululand, during
May, June, and July, is, in fact, as healthy as any country in the
world.
[Sidenote: _Lord Chelmsford's head quarters._]
The two northern columns moved on slowly. On the 7th of June Lord
Chelmsford was at Nondanai river, where a fortified post had been
established. The 5th of June was the date of Colonel Buller's
skirmish, already referred to, in which Lancers and Dragoons
were engaged. On the 17th of June a correspondent reports that
Newdigate's forces were constantly occupied patrolling and shelling
kraals and dongas, with no appreciable result. At this time the
Zulus appeared in great force within sight of the camp at Luneberg.
Newdigate's column then marched to join that of General Wood. The
utmost possible precautions were taken against surprise, both on
the march and in camp. At one place the rocks, which would have
offered excellent cover for an attacking force, were mined. The
mines could be fired by means of electricity from the laager. Lines
of galvanized wire were also placed round the camp, which the
soldiers styled "Cetywayo catchers." The heliograph was used for
signalling by means of flashes, and turned out extremely useful. On
the 26th of June[43] the 1st Brigade, with the Naval Brigade, moved
from Fort Napoleon, and the long-expected junction of the columns
appeared at last likely to be effected. It was certainly high
time. The English imported horses in Newdigate's[44] brigade were
beginning to suffer from the severity of weather and a scarcity
of food, the Zulus had abundance of time to collect a large army,
and the immense delay in striking a decisive blow discouraged our
troops, encouraged the enemy, and caused immense dissatisfaction to
the public at home and in the colony. The Imperial Ministry at last
seemed to partially yield to public pressure and public opinion.
Sir Garnet Wolseley was appointed Commander-in-Chief and her
Majesty's High Commissioner for the Natal, Transvaal, and Zululand.
In connection with the burning questions of the day and the blame
so lavishly bestowed upon the civil and military leaders in South
Africa, the following despatch from the Secretary of State ought to
be read with careful attention. Sir Michael Hicks Beach says (28th
May, 1879):—
[Sidenote: _Sir Michael Hicks Beach._]
"After full consideration of the condition of affairs in
South Africa, her Majesty's Government have decided that the
arrangements under which the chief civil and military authority
in the neighbourhood of the seat of war is distributed among
four different persons can no longer be deemed adequate to the
requirements of the present juncture.
"2. In the number of imperial troops engaged, and the expenditure
incurred, the Zulu war has assumed dimensions far exceeding those
of any that has been carried on for many years in South Africa;
and it appears but too evident that military operations have been
seriously impeded by a want of harmony between the civil and
military authorities, of which the difference that has arisen
between the Lieutenant-General commanding the forces and the
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, with regard to the disposal of a
portion of the native levies called out for service, has furnished
a striking example.
"3. In such a matter the High Commissioner has no power to
interfere, but were it otherwise you would be unable, in present
circumstances, to interfere with any practical effect. For the
prompt action requisite in time of war would entirely preclude the
satisfactory reference to Cape Town of this or any other of the
numerous questions requiring the decision of the High Commissioner;
while, on the other hand, your own presence at the seat of war
has become impossible. After an unavoidable protracted absence
from Cape Town (during which you have laboured with singular zeal
and energy to discharge all the duties which have devolved upon
you) you will be entirely occupied with many important matters
necessarily postponed until your return.
[Sidenote: _New arrangements._]
"4. The union of Griqualand West with the Cape, to the settlement
of which your recent visit to the province will have largely
contributed, has to be completed; the financial questions jointly
concerning the colony and this country demand immediate attention;
and important work remains to be done in carrying out the recent
legislation of the Cape Parliament for the defence of the colony.
But above all her Majesty's Government are anxious that the larger
and more complicated questions connected with confederation, on
which I shall shortly address you, should be considered, under your
guidance, during the approaching session of the Cape Parliament,
and they attach special importance to the advantages which may be
derived from your exertions in promoting this great work.
"5. Under these circumstances, Her Majesty's Government have
determined to place the chief military and civil command in the
eastern portion of South Africa in the hands of one officer,
and they have selected Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet Wolseley,
G.C.M.G., for this duty. His high professional standing and his
varied and distinguished services preclude any question as to the
fitness of placing him for the time in supreme authority over the
able men now commanding her Majesty's troops in South Africa and
administering the Governments of Natal and the Transvaal, and it
is equally beyond question that he will receive their most loyal
and cordial support. Sir Garnet Wolseley will, in addition to
his military command, be commissioned as Governor of Natal and
of the Transvaal, and High Commissioner for Native and Foreign
Affairs to the northward and eastward of those colonies. In the
latter capacity he will assume for the time that portion of your
functions which, at a crisis of such gravity as the present, could
not be performed by any High Commissioner acting at a distance
of more than 1000 miles from the scene of operations. You will,
I am confident, be the first to recognize the necessity of the
arrangement, and will readily assist Sir Garnet Wolseley, should
you have returned to Cape Town by the time of his arrival there
on his way to enter upon the duties of his office, with all the
valuable information which your knowledge and experience enable you
to afford."
The Under-Secretary for War, writing to Lord Chelmsford (29th May),
says:—
"I have now to convey to you the intimation that her Majesty's
Government, having carefully considered the information at their
command, have come to the conclusion that the satisfactory
administration of affairs in that part of South-Eastern Africa
in the immediate neighbourhood of the seat of war can at the
present moment only be carried out by placing that administration
in the hands of one person holding plenary powers, both civil
and military, and that they have selected Sir Garnet Wolseley to
discharge these duties.
"The Colonial Office will by this mail have informed Sir Bartle
Frere of this decision, and of its effects so far as he himself is
concerned.
[Sidenote: _Appointment of Sir Garnet Wolseley._]
"With respect to the military command though I have the
satisfaction of informing you that it is not intended that the
supersession caused by the appointment as High Commissioner of
an officer senior to yourself should be considered as conveying
censure on your proceedings, it will nevertheless be your duty, as
in the ordinary course of service, to submit and to subordinate
your plans to his control. This decision was communicated to you
by telegram sent yesterday _viâ_ St. Vincent, of which I enclose a
copy.
"Sir Garnet Wolseley, being qualified to act in a political as
well as in a military capacity, will be in possession up to the
latest date and in the fullest detail of the views of her Majesty's
Government; the responsibility placed upon you by Sir Bartle Frere
with regard to the enforcement of his demands upon Cetywayo will
therefore terminate upon the arrival of the High Commissioner,
and any overtures for peace will henceforward be transmitted for
decision by him."
The news of Sir Garnet Wolseley's appointment was received with the
greatest satisfaction in South Africa. The campaign had reached
a very critical stage, and the most contradictory and blundering
reports about the attitude of the Zulus were constantly circulated.
Cetywayo had been trying to deceive and gain time by sending in
messages for peace. Lord Chelmsford as a preliminary, had asked
that the guns taken at Isandhlwana[45] should be returned. At
the same time that Cetywayo pretended to desire peace, his people
raided over our border at Middle Drift, swooped down upon the
friendly natives near Luneberg, and endeavoured to enter into an
alliance with rebellious Boers. The impi that had been occupying
the Intombe valley was withdrawn into Zululand, and it was clear
that a concentration of forces was about to take place at Ulundi.
Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived at Natal on the 27th of June. His
staff comprised Colonels Colley, Russell, and Brackenbury; Major
McCalmont; and Captains Lord Gifford, Bushman, Yeatman Biggs,
Maurice, Brathwaite and Doyle. The Mayor and Corporation of
D'Urban presented an address to his Excellency, in which, after
heartily welcoming him, it is stated that British South Africa had
unanimously endorsed the consistent policy adopted and pursued by
Sir Bartle Frere, as the only means open for securing a lasting
and honourable peace. Sir Garnet Wolseley, in returning thanks,
expressed a hope that a strong and stable peace might be gained,
as a means to secure lasting immunity from external discord
and hostility. "Severe as is this stress upon you, you must, I
feel confident, see cause for satisfaction in the patriotic and
successful exertions with which your volunteers have laboured to
avert peril from your country, and to maintain the prowess of
English arms in battle." The new General and High Commissioner then
proceeded to Pietermaritzburg, and shortly afterwards returned and
went by sea to Port Durnford, but being unable to land there, was
compelled to return to D'Urban, and to proceed thence overland to
the front.
[Sidenote: _Opinions as to the war._]
A difference of opinion existed from the first as to the necessity
of the Zulu war, and with reference to the character of Cetywayo.
This became much more pronounced after the disaster at Isandhlwana.
It is a significant fact that a very small minority of those who
knew the Zulus and lived in Natal shared the sentiments of the
British philanthropists, who lived securely at home, and took upon
themselves to condemn a policy with the reasons for which they were
only imperfectly acquainted. The Bishop of Natal, Dr. Colenso, was,
in South Africa, the leader of the party who denounced the war. In
the Blue Books laid before Parliament interesting letters from his
able pen are published, in which he argues the Zulu case exactly
as if the race were a civilized one, which could be expected to
observe treaties, and with whom perfidy and deceit were unknown.
In a despatch from Sir Bartle Frere, written from Pretoria, in the
Transvaal, and dated the 18th of April, the High Commissioner sums
up the arguments for war. These reasons utterly and completely
exclude any feeling or desire for vengeance, and all intention to
advance civilization, commerce, and Christianity by the sword. It
was absolutely necessary, however, that the Zulu king should cease
to reign, the military power of that nation be broken up, and his
people made to feel themselves subject to the British power. Sir
Bartle Frere says:—
"I believe that this is in the interests of the Zulus, no less than
of their neighbours.
"It is in the interest of the European population of Natal and the
Transvaal, because they cannot possibly live in peace and quiet
with the Zulus in their present state as neighbours.
"The events of the last few months have rendered it unnecessary
to prove by argument that the Zulus have been made into a great
military power; that they can destroy an English regiment, with
artillery to support it; or shut up or defeat a brigade six times
as strong as the ordinary garrison of Natal, unless our troops are
very carefully posted and very well handled.
"The open declarations of their king, no less than the fundamental
laws of their organization, proclaim foreign conquest and bloodshed
as a necessity of their existence.
"They are practically surrounded by British territory. Except the
Portuguese, there is now no foreign territory they can reach for
purposes of bloodshed without passing through British territory.
"It is, therefore, clear that they cannot continue in their present
condition, with their present form of government and present
military organization, without attacking British subjects, or,
at best, unoffending neighbours, who believe themselves safe as
British subjects or allies.
"They make no prisoners save, occasionally, young women and
half-grown children. They show no quarter, and give no chance to
the wounded or disabled, disembowelling them at once.
[Sidenote: _Sir Bartle Frere's views._]
"They are separated from Natal by a river easily fordable for the
greater part of the year, and not too wide to talk across at any
time.
"The boundary between them and the Transvaal is even more easily
passed.
"All these, I submit, are incontrovertible facts, proved by the
well-known events of the past few months.
"I know that there are educated men to be found, of great ability,
who claim to be lovers of liberty and of right, and of their own
species, who have lived long near the Zulus, and who say there is
no danger to be apprehended from them if we let them alone; that
Cetywayo is a well-meaning prince, quite within his own right in
massacring his own subjects, and our soldiers, too, if they enter
his territory; that all that is necessary to our own safety is to
let the Zulu king alone, or if the English do not like that, to
leave his neighbourhood.
"Having lived now for many weeks within a couple of Zulu marches
of the Zulu border, among sensible Englishmen, many of them men of
great sagacity, coolness, and determination, and reasonably just
and upright in all their dealings, who never went to sleep without
having their arms within reach, and being prepared to take refuge
with wives and families at a minute's warning within a fortified
post; having learnt from 'voortrekkers' and their children, who had
witnessed the massacres of Weenen and Blauwkrantz, and who could
thus testify that the present peculiarities of Zulu warfare are no
recent innovation; I may be allowed to doubt the possibility of
making life within reach of a Zulu 'impi' permanently tolerable to
ordinary Englishmen and Dutchmen.
"Nor does it seem to me that we can justly say to colonists, either
in Natal or the Transvaal, that if they do not like the situation
they may go elsewhere.
"The Zulu right to be where the Zulus now are is, with the
exception of a small and remote tract towards Delagoa Bay, simply
one of recent conquest by devastation and massacre.
"I have never heard the historical fact questioned that the earlier
Zulu 'impis' into what is now Natal and Transvaal territory
preceded by a very few years, if they preceded at all, the first
appearance of Dutch and English adventurers in the same lands; and
the Zulus certainly cannot claim, as the Dutch and English may, any
right of occupation from having civilized or improved the land.
"Hence it seems to me no more than natural justice that if either
party is to make way for the other, the Zulus should yield, and not
the English or Dutch.
"But I submit that in the interests of the Zulus themselves we have
no right to leave them to their fate.
"The present system of Cetywayo is no real choice of the nation. It
is simply a reign of terror, such as has before now been imposed
on some of the most civilized nations of the world. The people
themselves are everything that could be desired as the unimproved
material of a very fine race. They seem to have all the capacities
for forming a really happy and civilized community, where law,
order, and right shall prevail, instead of the present despotism of
a ruthless savage.
[Sidenote: _Three courses before us._]
"I can imagine but three ways of their being so improved:—
"1st. They might, living alongside a civilized community, gradually
imbibe civilized ideas and habits.
"But for this it is necessary that their civilized neighbours
should be able to live in security, which, as I have already said,
seems to me hopeless, unless the military organization and power of
Cetywayo be broken down.
"2nd. There are the means of improvement which may follow conquest
and the breaking down of Cetywayo's military system; and this
seems to me the only reasonable mode of doing our duty by these
people. In the cases of Abyssinia and Ashantee we were compelled by
circumstances to retire after conquest, and wash our hands of all
further responsibility for the future of those countries; but there
is no such necessity in the case of Zululand—there is nothing to
prevent our taking up and easily carrying the burden of the duty
laid upon us to protect and civilize it.
"There is yet a third plan, which I have seen advocated by high
authority.
"The Zulus are, it is truly said, a nation of fine national
characteristics. They have qualities which might enable them to
become the regenerators and the foremost in civilization of all the
nations in South Africa.
"So far I can agree with those who hold the opinions I refer to,
but not in their further belief that Cetywayo is the Attila of the
Zulus, and that if we only let him alone he will develop into a
Charlemagne or an Alfred.
"How far this process might be rendered tolerable to the present
civilized inhabitants of Natal and the Transvaal, I will not
stop to inquire. It is quite possible that Zulus, overrunning
their now civilized neighbours, might in due time imbibe some of
their civilization, settle down, and become civilized themselves,
absorbing through their captives and subjects the germs of a better
system of national existence.
"I may doubt the probability of such a result, but I will not
contest its possibility, and will only say that I am quite sure the
countrymen of the present settlers in Natal and the Transvaal will
never leave the colonists there to be made the subjects of any such
experiment.
"I can, as I started by saying, see no alternative compatible with
our duty but effectually to subdue the Zulus, and govern them as
other South African races subject to the British Crown are governed.
"It seems to me that no terms can possibly be made with Cetywayo
which can be compatible with such a result, save with the
indispensable preliminary of his entire submission."
[Sidenote: _Cetywayo's peace offers._]
In the beginning of July Lord Chelmsford's column was within ten
miles of the king's kraal at Ulundi. Messengers again arrived
from Cetywayo, and on this occasion they brought the sword of the
Prince Imperial as a peace offering. The amanuensis of Cetywayo
was a Dutchman, named Vogel, who took the opportunity of marking
in pencil on the envelope of the letter, that the king had 20,000
men with him. The reply of Lord Chelmsford was as follows:—"If
the induna, Mundula, brings with him the 1000 rifles taken at
Isandhlwana, I will not insist on 1000 men coming in to lay down
their arms, if the Zulus are afraid to come. He must bring the two
guns and the remainder of the cattle. I will then be willing to
negotiate. As he has caused me to advance by the great delay he
has made, I must now go to the Umvolosi to enable my men to drink.
I will consent, pending negotiations, to halt on the further bank
of the river, and will not burn any kraals until the 3rd of July,
provided no opposition is made to my advance to the position on the
Umvolosi, by which day, the 3rd of July, at noon, the conditions
must be complied with. If my force is fired on, I shall consider
negotiations are at an end, and to avoid any chance of this, it
is best that Mundula come to my camp at daybreak or to-night, and
that the Zulus should withdraw from the neighbourhood of the river
to Ulundi. I cannot stop the general in command of the coast army
until these conditions are complied with."
Of course, nothing more was seen or heard of Mundula. On the 2nd
of July an impi, 20,000 strong, advanced from Ulundi as if to
attack. Newdigate and Wood, at a short distance from each other,
immediately laagered their waggons, and these preparations seemed
to check the enemy. It is possible that Cetywayo had personally
some idea of surrendering, as it is stated that a large herd of
white cattle (the royal colour) was seen coming towards the camp
from the direction of Cetywayo's new stronghold at Mahize Kanye. A
number of men came out and drove the cattle back. A sudden scare
or panic had just taken place at the camp. Men of the Native
Contingent, having become alarmed, rushed in over a portion of
the 2-4th Regiment; our short-service red jackets, seeing naked
black men rushing in past them, assegai in hand, imagined that
the Zulus were upon them, and fled in terror within the laager.
So demoralized did the men become, that it required the exertion
of physical force on the part of their officers to induce them to
return to their posts.
[Sidenote: _Preparations for battle._]
On the 3rd of July a large force of mounted men, under Colonel
Buller, crossed the river at a drift commanded by a rocky hill,
from which the enemy were gallantly and quickly dislodged by
Baker's Irregular Horse. Buller moved forward to Nodwengu kraal,
and on the way several stragglers were killed. One of them was
"stuck" by Lord William Beresford, with the exclamation, "First
spear, by Jove!" Shortly afterwards this force was nearly trapped,
by means of the decoy of a man with a number of goats, who moved
forward in front. The nonchalance of this fellow was so suspicious,
that the force was suddenly wheeled to the right in the direction
of Ulundi; and no sooner was this done than a crowd of Zulus,
who had been in ambush, rose out of a donga at a hundred yards
distance, and poured in a heavy volley.[46] Preparations for
battle were made during the night of the 3rd of July. War-dancing
took place among the enemy, while on our side the waggons were
carefully formed into laager, and at 6 a.m. on the 4th of July,
the British army, leaving this camp, crossed the Umvolosi river,
and ascending to the high ground, formed upon it in order of
battle. It was here that the Zulus had defeated the Boers, and it
was, therefore, fitting that upon the field where the white men
had met with disaster their crowning triumph should take place. A
victory sufficient to repair and efface the stains of all previous
calamities was absolutely required, and it was obtained in the most
complete and satisfactory manner.
The leaders of the Zulu army were named Tyingwayo, Manyamane,
Dabulamanzi, Mondula, Sirayo, Mehkla Ka Zulu. The force under their
command numbered more than thirteen corps of regiments, was larger
than that at Kambula, and comprised more than 20,000 men. One of
the prisoners, named Undungunyanga, son of Umgegane, declared that
it was true the king had wanted to make peace, and previous to the
battle, in an address to the army, said that as the Inkandampeonvu
regiment would not let the white cattle go to the British as a
peace offering, and as the white army was now at his home, they
could fight. The battle was to take place on the open plain between
the Nodwengu and Ulundi kraals. The king then personally placed the
different regiments, gave final orders, and retired to a kraal at
a short distance to witness the battle.[47] The place in which the
British army was drawn up had many advantages. A broad open country
was around, almost free from bush. The Nodwengu kraal, distant
about 1000 yards, offered some cover to the enemy, and it would
have been burned had not Colonel Buller suggested that if this were
done the Zulus would be enabled to creep up under cover of the
smoke.
[Sidenote: _The battle of Ulundi._]
Very shortly after a halt had been made, and while the solemn
duty of burying one of our men, killed on the previous day, was
taking place, it was observed that the enemy was approaching from
the direction of Ulundi, and from the bush on the right. Our
troops were formed up in a hollow parallelogram. In the centre
was the Native Contingent, with ammunition waggons. The four
sides of the parallelogram were formed by eight companies of the
13th Regiment, five companies of the 80th Regiment, the 90th,
58th, and 34th Regiments, together with the 17th Lancers and
the mounted irregulars. At the corners and centres artillery was
placed—Gatlings,[48] 7-pounders, and 9-pounders. At half-past 8
a.m., as the enemy were advancing, Buller's mounted men were thrown
out on the front, left, and rear. As the right was left uncovered
by cavalry, Cochrane's Mounted Basutos were sent out from this
direction to make the enemy advance nearer. As they retired the
right face of the square commenced the action by a brisk fire.
At ten minutes to nine o'clock the attacking army was so near
the British as to make the fire from the latter become general.
Silently and steadily the horns of the Zulu army came on in their
usual manner; without a word or cry, the warriors of Cetywayo
continued to press forward in spite of the deadly fusillade. As
at Ghinghelovo and Kambula, so now at Ulundi, their extraordinary
bravery and contempt of death was the chief feature in the attack.
During this time the British infantry were formed in four ranks, of
which the front knelt, while the rear rank was reversed. Inside the
square every means of obtaining ammunition swiftly was provided.
The continuous and tremendous fire poured upon the advancing enemy
had no perceptible effect at first. On, like a wave of the sea
which cannot be stopped, poured the human tide; but when it had
advanced to a distance of seventy yards, flesh and blood could no
longer stand the awful destruction which poured from the British
lines. The main body hesitated and stopped. A few, more intrepid
than the others, rushed on; but the wavering feeling spread
throughout the Zulu host, and now was the exact moment to take
advantage of it. The dogs of war were suddenly slipped. Out rushed
the Lancers, and bore down like a hurricane upon the disheartened
and discouraged multitude. Shells were breaking in all directions
among their masses, the incessant "pings" of rifle bullets were
doing deadly execution; and when the cavalry plunged in among them,
the Zulu army was literally torn asunder and broken. The flower of
these warriors of Zululand made yet one wild effort, when Captain
Edgell, of the Lancers, was shot dead, and Captain Drury-Lowe,
Lieutenant James, and other officers had a narrow escape. Nine men
were killed, and no fewer than seventy-five were wounded. But all
was in vain; Cetywayo's great army was forced to turn and fly. They
had met the white man upon the open plain, and, though more than
20,000 to 5000, were totally and completely defeated. Away went
the mounted men in pursuit, and before the slaughter ended, fully
1000 of the Zulu army bit the dust. The Lancers, with the Irregular
Horse, did very good work, as it is estimated 450 of the enemy were
killed in the pursuit. The Zulus ran with surprising swiftness.
The Lancers drove a crowd into a donga, and working round, pursued
a mass of fugitives, who, being overtaken and at bay, made an
unavailing stand, when 150 of their number were killed.
[Sidenote: _Total defeat of the Zulus._]
A rest was ordered after the battle; and then the mounted force
rode on to Ulundi, which was found wholly deserted, and was at
once given to the flames. Subsequently all the forces fell back
upon the laagered camp which had been left in the morning.
Ulundi, the great place of the great monarch of Southern Africa,
was wholly destroyed. The king's palace consisted merely of a
thatched building of four rooms with a verandah. A Spartan absence
of all furniture and of all luxuries was perceptible, but the
numerous huts and kraals indicated that this place had been the
head-quarters of a powerful army. Lord William Beresford was the
first to enter. It was a grand sight to see the flames mounting
to the skies, and to know that in their smoke the prestige and
influence of the greatest savage power in Southern Africa had
ended. Mr. Archibald Forbes, the correspondent of the _Daily News_,
although suffering from a wound, galloped to the colony with the
news of this victory. He carried an important despatch from the
general, and was the first to telegraph the news to Natal and to
the world. Starting early in the forenoon, immediately after the
battle of Ulundi, he rode in fourteen hours a distance of 110 miles
to the nearest telegraph station at Landman's Drift, on the Buffalo
river. Twice he lost his way in the midst of dense mist, and during
the entire journey he was exposed to attack by scattered parties of
the enemy. It was a daring ride, which will live in history, and
deserved special and generous recognition.
The following is Lord Chelmsford's telegraphic despatch giving a
description of the battle:—
"Cetywayo not having complied with my demands by noon yesterday,
July 3rd, and having fired heavily on the troops at the water,
I returned the 114 cattle he had sent in, and ordered a
reconnaissance to be made by the mounted force under Colonel
Buller; this was effectually made, and caused the Zulu army to
advance and show fight.
[Sidenote: _Lord Chelmsford's despatch._]
"This morning, a force under my command, consisting of the
second division, under Major-General Newdigate, numbering 1870
Europeans, 530 natives, and eight guns, and the flying column under
Brigadier-General Wood, numbering 2192 Europeans, 573 natives, four
guns, and two Gatlings, crossed the Umvolosi river at 6.15, and
marching in a hollow square, with the ammunition and entrenching
tool carts and bearer company in its centre, reached an excellent
position between Nodwengu and Ulundi, about half-past 8 a.m. This
had been observed by Colonel Buller the day before.
"Our fortified camp on the right banks of the Umvolosi river was
left with a garrison of about 900 Europeans, 250 natives, and one
Gatling gun, under Colonel Bellairs.
"Soon after half-past seven the Zulu army was seen leaving its
bivouacs and advancing on every side. The engagement was shortly
afterwards commenced by the mounted men.
"By nine o'clock the attack was fully developed. At half-past nine
the enemy wavered; the 17th Lancers, followed by the remainder of
the mounted men, attacked them, and a general rout ensued.
"The prisoners state that Cetywayo was personally commanding and
had made all the arrangements himself, and that he witnessed the
fight from Qikarzi kraal, and that twelve regiments took part in
it. If so, 20,000 men attacked us.
"It is impossible to estimate with any correctness the loss of the
enemy, owing to the extent of country over which they attacked
and retreated, but it could not have been less, I consider, than
1000 killed. By noon Ulundi was in flames, and during the day all
military kraals of the Zulu army and in the valley of the Umvolosi
were destroyed. At 2 p.m. the return march to the camp of the
column commenced.
"The behaviour of the troops under my command was extremely
satisfactory; their steadiness under a complete belt of fire was
remarkable. The clash and enterprise of the mounted branches was
all that could be wished, and the fire of the artillery very good.
A portion of the Zulu force approached our fortified camp, and at
one time threatened to attack it. The Native Contingent, forming a
part of the garrison, were sent out after the action, and assisted
in the pursuit.
"As I have fully accomplished the object for which I advanced, I
consider I shall now be best carrying out Sir Garnet Wolseley's
instructions by moving at once to Entonganini, and thence to
Kwamagaza. I shall send back a portion of this force with empty
waggons, for supplies, which are now ready at Fort Marshall."
[Sidenote: _Resignation of Lord Chelmsford._]
The last paragraph of this despatch requires comment. A great
victory had been gained, and certainly should have been improved
upon. It was known that Cetywayo was with the army, and subsequent
intelligence proved that a very little effort would have resulted
in his capture. The new kraal of the king was only twelve miles
distant, and if a forward movement had been made to that place,
an enormous advantage, which was merely a logical sequence of the
battle, could have been secured. Sir Garnet Wolseley's instructions
about retiring to Entonganini are quoted, and he is apparently made
responsible for a retrograde step. Thus was the war still further
protracted in an unnecessary manner. As regards the battle of
Ulundi itself, Lord Chelmsford did not attack, but was attacked.
Both at home and in the colonies, throughout the Empire, there
was a generous thrill of joy among all classes, not only for the
decisive victory, but because it had been gained by a general who
had been previously so unfortunate.[49]
The beginning of the end had now arrived, and evident signs
were not wanting that the Zulus accepted their defeat at Ulundi
as a settlement of the question of supremacy. Lord Chelmsford
resigned, and proceeded with a large staff from Entonganini to
Pietermaritzburg. On this long journey he met not the slightest
attempt at interruption or any sign of hostility. No enemy lurked
in the Umhlatusi Bush, and in every direction the Zulus could
be seen rebuilding their huts and cultivating their fields. The
sword was turned into the ploughshare, and the ruling of fate
was submitted to. Still serious doubts filled the minds of old
colonists, who ranked above all their other qualities the supreme
cunning and dissimulation of the Zulu race. It was felt as a
calamity that no forward move had been made after Ulundi, and that
there was no real finality to the war, until Cetywayo was either
killed or captured.
[Sidenote: _Banquet at D'Urban._]
Lord Chelmsford arrived at the capital of Natal on the 21st of
July, and was received there with an enthusiasm which completely
surprised him. Powerful reactions are common in the public mind,
and the general who had yesterday been severely criticized, was
to-day lauded to the skies. The Corporation presented an address
in which it was made a source of special gratification that, after
the numerous unforeseen difficulties which had to be overcome, his
lordship's arms had obtained a brilliant and decisive victory. At
D'Urban a grand public banquet was given, when Sir Garnet Wolseley,
Sir Henry Bulwer, General Clifford, Sir Evelyn Wood, Colonel
Buller, and all distinguished officers and citizens were present.
Lord Chelmsford on this occasion said, "There is a saying very
frequently quoted now-a-days, that 'nothing succeeds like success,'
but, gentlemen, if I thought that you asked me to dinner simply
because I had been successful, it would be as water from the Dead
Sea placed to my mouth; but from what the Mayor has said, it is
clear you sympathize with me not because I succeeded, but because
under circumstances of extreme difficulty I endeavoured to do my
duty. There have been many painful incidents connected with the
war, so that it is impossible to look back upon it without mingled
feelings of satisfaction and regret. On this I will not further
touch; but there is one point on which I can look back with pure
and unalloyed satisfaction, already alluded to by my gallant friend
General Wood—I mean the loyal and efficient assistance given to
me by all ranks in the army, which is such that the satisfaction
and pride that I feel will be remembered as long as I live. I
never could have believed it possible for any general to receive
such assistance and devotion as I have experienced from my men.
I could always feel that, whether I was present or absent, they
were striving to do their best to get out of difficulties, and
this was not confined to one rank, but was common to all ranks;
and I believe I may say that I had the confidence and sincere
support of all ranks of the army, from the lowest to the highest.
It would be invidious to particularize individuals and services,
but when I look back eighteen months, two names stand out in broad
relief—those already alluded to, the one by the Mayor, and the
other by General Wood—the names of Wood and Buller. I can say that
these two have been my right and left supporters during the whole
of my time in this country. They came out with me in the same
steamer; in every position I have been in they have been in the
fore-front, and now I feel proud to think they return with me to
their native land again. The Mayor asked one question, namely,
whether the war was over or not. I think I can best answer this by
saying that these two men are going back to England; depend upon
it, if there were any great work to be done, these two men would
never have left the forces. I again thank you for the manner in
which you have drank this toast, and desire to include in my thanks
all those who met me on Monday night. I shall carry back a grateful
remembrance of this place; and if in the public position I shall
hold it is ever possible for me to render any assistance towards
the prosperity of the colony, you may depend upon it I shall do so."
In concluding this chapter, it seems right to quote fully from the
London _Gazette_ the official reasons for placing five brave men on
the "roll of fame" for gallant deeds performed in the Zulu war.
"War Office, June 17th.
"The Queen has been graciously pleased to signify her intention to
confer the decoration of the Victoria Cross on the undermentioned
officers and soldier of her Majesty's army, whose claims have been
submitted for her Majesty's approval, for their gallant conduct
during the recent operations in South Africa, as recorded against
their names, viz.:—
[Sidenote: _Honour to the brave._]
"Captain and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Redvers H. Buller, C.B.,
60th Rifles, for his gallant conduct at the retreat at Zlobane on
the 28th of March, 1879, in having assisted, while hotly pursued
by Zulus, in rescuing Captain C. D'Arcy, of the Frontier Light
Horse, who was retiring on foot, and carrying him on his horse
until he overtook the rear-guard. Also for having, on the same
date and under the same circumstances, conveyed Lieutenant C.
Everitt, of the Frontier Light Horse, whose horse had been killed
under him, to a place of safety. Later on Colonel Buller, in the
same manner, saved a trooper of the Frontier Light Horse, whose
horse was completely exhausted, and who otherwise would have been
killed by the Zulus, who were within eighty yards of him.
"Major William K. Leet, 1st Battalion, 18th Regiment, for his
gallant conduct on the 28th of March, 1879, in rescuing from the
Zulus Lieutenant A. M. Smith, of the Frontier Light Horse, during
the retreat from the Zlobane. Lieutenant Smith, while on foot,
his horse having been shot, was closely pursued by the Zulus, and
would have been killed, had not Major Leet taken him upon his
horse and rode with him, under the fire of the enemy, to a place
of safety.
"Surgeon-Major James Henry Reynolds, Army Medical Department,
for the conspicuous bravery, during the attack at Rorke's Drift,
on the 22nd and 23rd of January, 1879, which he exhibited in
his constant attention to the wounded under fire, and in his
voluntarily conveying ammunition from the store to the defenders
of the hospital, whereby he exposed himself to a cross fire from
the enemy, both in going and returning.
"Lieutenant Edward S. Browne, 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment,
for the gallant conduct on the 29th of March, 1879, when the
Mounted Infantry were being driven in by the enemy at Zlobane, in
galloping back and twice assisting on his horse (under heavy fire
and within a few yards of the enemy) one of the mounted men, who
must otherwise have fallen into the enemy's hands.
"Private Wassall, 80th Regiment, for his gallant conduct in
having, at the imminent risk of his own life, saved that of
Private Westwood, of the same regiment. On the 22nd of January,
1879, when the camp at Isandhlwana was taken by the enemy, Private
Wassall retreated towards the Buffalo river, in which he saw a
comrade struggling and apparently drowning. He rode to the bank,
dismounted, leaving his horse on the Zulu side, rescued the man
from the stream, and again mounted his horse, dragging Private
Westwood across the river, under a heavy shower of bullets."
CHAPTER X.
LORD CHELMSFORD'S POLICY—PROMPTNESS AND DECISION OF SIR GARNET
WOLSELEY—THE HUNT AND CAPTURE OF CETYWAYO—DEPARTURE FROM NATAL—THE
LAST OF THE ZULU KINGS A PRISONER IN THE CASTLE OF CAPE TOWN—GREAT
MEETING WITH ZULU CHIEFS—SIR GARNET WOLSELEY'S SPEECH—SETTLEMENT
OF THE COUNTRY—END OF THE WAR.
Before leaving the shores of South Africa, Lord Chelmsford took
occasion at Cape Town to make a public defence of his policy,
in which he denied that he had been guilty of hesitation and
vacillation. His mind was made up at a very early date, and he went
on unswervingly to Ulundi by the route he had originally resolved
upon. If the work were to be done over again he would adopt the
same plan of campaign. In marching upon Ulundi no calculation was
made for assistance from the coast column—only indirect support was
reckoned upon. After the crushing defeat at Ulundi no advantage
would have been gained by endeavouring to penetrate the difficult
country lying north of the king's kraal, even had the state of
supplies permitted it. "While, therefore, one portion of the
force retraced its steps towards the Blood river, escorting the
sick and wounded, and taking with it all the empty waggons, the
others moved _viâ_ Kwamagwasa to St. Paul's, and then completed the
chain of strongly entrenched posts extending east and west along
the centre of Zululand at intervals of about twenty miles. So far
one side of the question. On the other hand, men of unquestioned
ability and experience, correspondents for several of the leading
journals of the world, did not hesitate to blame Lord Chelmsford
severely. These men were on the spot, were qualified to form an
opinion, and it is absurd and unjust to imagine that political bias
of any sort guided their pens.
The _Times'_ correspondent complains of the want of a definite
plan, and speaks of orders having been countermanded, and of
general uncertainty. "What is wanted is a bolder determination."
On the 16th of June he writes, "We are wandering towards
Ulundi much as the children of Israel wandered towards Canaan,
without plans or even definite notions for the future. Plain,
common-sense plans suffice, if backed by energy, decision, and
determination." The _Telegraph's_ correspondent tells us that
Lord Chelmsford's intelligence department "has been singularly
defective throughout." The correspondent of the _Daily News_, Mr.
Archibald Forbes, thoroughly shared these opinions, and expresses
them with conspicuous power and ability. Indeed, it is almost
impossible for any one to study carefully the proceedings of
this protracted campaign, from the arrival of reinforcements in
March until the battle of Ulundi, and not come to conclusions by
no means complimentary to the general commanding-in-chief. It is
urged that carriers, such as those employed by Sir Garnet Wolseley
immediately after his arrival,[50] would have immensely facilitated
transport, and when we consider that 4000 British troops at Ulundi
defeated, in the open field, the concentrated power of Cetywayo—an
army of more than 20,000 men—it is hard to believe that a column
such as Wood's, properly reinforced and moving quickly, would not
have been able to finish the war.
[Sidenote: _Sir Garnet Wolseley._]
Sir Garnet Wolseley's proceedings were of the most prompt and
vigorous character. Disappointed in not being able to land at
Port Durnford, he had to return to D'Urban and proceed overland
to General Crealock's coast column. When near the coast, he was
gratified by receiving news of the battle of Ulundi, but was
subsequently disappointed at Lord Chelmsford's neglecting to take
full advantage of this victory. That officer almost immediately
resigned, and had an interview with Sir Garnet, whom he met at St.
Paul's. A Ulundi column was organized under Lieutenant-Colonel
Clarke, consisting of the 60th Regiment, Barrow's Mounted Infantry,
two troops of Lonsdale's Horse, and two troops of the Native
Contingent. This small movable column was ordered to operate
towards the upper waters of the White and Black Umvolosi; Oham,
with a burgher force, was to move from Luneberg. On the 21st of
July Sir Garnet had a satisfactory interview with the principal
Zulu chiefs. Dabulamanzi, the king's brother and one of the chief
leaders of his army, had surrendered at Fort Chelmsford (Crealock's
column) on the 11th of July, and numbers of minor chiefs, with
their people, came forward to declare their submission to the
British Government. Colonel Baker Russell was directed to operate
from Intabankawa, in the direction of the Black Umvolosi, lending
assistance to Oham, whose forces were situated in a more northerly
direction. Under Colonel Villiers it was arranged that the Swazis
should cross the Pongolo, accompanied by Political Agent Macleod.
As Sir Garnet considered that there were more troops in the command
than were necessary, the first division and cavalry brigade were
broken up. Generals Crealock and Marshall went home. The 1-13th,
1-24th, and 17th Lancers were ordered to leave, and several
colonial corps were disbanded. Brigadier-General Wood and Colonel
Buller required rest, and proceeded to England, while the Marines
who arrived by the _Jumna_, from Plymouth, were sent back before
even they reached Natal.
The chase of Cetywayo must always form an interesting episode
in British colonial history. No war in Zululand could be said
to be thoroughly at an end in which the despot whose will was
law throughout the entire country was left uncaptured. The task
of securing his person was a very difficult one. The king was
looked upon as sacred, and we shall see that the most unbounded
loyalty was manifested towards him. The country into which he
had retreated was broken and difficult, intersected by forests
and unprovided with roads. Above all, the people were thoroughly
hostile, and faithful unto death to the monarch who was pursued
to death by the hated white man. Nevertheless, the chase was
successful, and that it was so reflected immense credit upon those
engaged in it.
[Sidenote: _Hunting Cetywayo._]
[Sidenote: _Capture of the king's people._]
The force told off for the duty was organized at Ulundi. It was
placed under the command of Major Barrow, and comprised the King's
Dragoon Guards, the Mounted Infantry, Lonsdale's Horse, Captain
Norse's Mounted Contingent, Jantje's Horse under Captain Hayes,
together with a corps of Guides under Corporal Acutt. The hunt
lasted fourteen days, and commenced on a Tuesday afternoon with a
forced march of twenty-one hours, during the whole of which time
the men were in the saddle. In this manner Zonyamma's kraal was
reached, where it was supposed the king might be. The king had
left the day previously with thirty men. Two hours' rest, and away
over very hilly country. A terribly steep hill was descended,
and a kraal visited where Cetywayo had been that morning. The
river Mona was then crossed, and a steep hill ascended in order
to reach Umbopa's kraal, where the scent was entirely lost. Of
course, the Zulus knew where the king was, but nothing on earth
would induce them to tell. Umbopa (whose son was with Cetywayo)
was then made prisoner and taken to his son's kraal, at a distance
of five miles, where some of the king's slaughter oxen were found.
The kraal was deserted. Lord Gifford, second in command, was
then ordered to scour the country, and had a very exciting but
unsuccessful chase after a naked Zulu, who afterwards turned out
to be one of the king's servants, appointed to look out and give
warning of the approach of pursuers. Forty Zulus were got together
by Major Barrow, but neither promises nor threats had any effect
upon them. They were as loyal to their sable ruler as a faithful
Highlander to his chief, or a loyal Cavalier to his king. At
last it was accidentally mentioned that one of Cetywayo's own
servants was present. With great difficulty some information was
obtained from him, and a promise to put the British force on the
right track. At the dawn of day the dense black forests of the
Umvolosi were entered, and as they proceeded pots and calabashes,
evidently dropped in flight, were picked up. On—on until the river
was reached, but there, alas! the trail was completely wanting.
A few "koodoos" quietly grazing was the only sign of life. Lord
Gifford was then sent to Funwayo's kraal, eight miles distant, and
there information was obtained that some of the king's girls had
been seen passing that way. Five miles further on was Shemana's
kraal, where the same party were again heard of. Pushing through
thick bush and long grass, in which the small band under Lord
Gifford—only eleven in number—could very easily have been cut off,
they got at length to a kraal, where they again heard of the girls.
Thence, taking two men as guides, they proceeded further, taking
care to make for the open country, in order to intercept Cetywayo
in case he endeavoured to reach the Inkanhla forest. At last they
reached Umgitya's kraal, from whence they could overlook the bush
in which they supposed the king to be. Disappointment then met
them on every side, only relieved by the encounter with the two
girls who, in spite of emphatic denials, there was every reason
to believe were the property of the king. One of the king's own
servants was shortly afterwards captured, and inside his bundle
was found a valuable Martini-Henry rifle of excellent workmanship.
Subsequently, this prisoner confessed that he had left the king
only two or three days previously. A day's rest was then taken, and
while encamped, seven girls, a young man, and a boy were caught,
who reported that Cetywayo was captured, and that they had fled
from his place two days before. It then turned out that when the
pursuing party was encamped on the banks of the Black Umvolosi,
they were only within 300 yards of the king, some of whose people
ran away, thinking that his capture was certain. Next day they
commenced to scour the bush. There they had to sleep, while Zulu
beef and Zulu beer were their fare. Most of the party at this time
thought the game was up, but Lord Gifford was still full of hope.
Back they went, beating the bush on the way, to Umbopa's son's
place, where the kraal was burned and the cattle captured. The main
body was shortly afterwards reached, and there, at last, rather
precise information was obtained from a Zulu "by means of proper
persuasive measures." This man was to act as guide, but no sooner
had they entered the bush than he slipped off and escaped. Two
places which had evidently been prepared for the king were seen,
and the party had to return again to the kraals, which had now
become head-quarters.
Two of Oham's men came in professing their loyalty, and were
appointed spies, but a little boy revealed the fact that one of
them had been with the king down in the bush, and then, before all
the people, they were told that their double-dealing and humbug
were perfectly understood. Trails were followed, people were
examined, but all to no purpose; fealty to the king was paramount.
Neither the loss of their cattle, which were carried off, the
fear of death, nor the offer of bribes, immense in value to them,
were of any avail. Returning from one of their long exploring
expeditions, a woman was suddenly met in the bush, whose fright at
the sight of the white men and the guns was so great as to make her
confess the place where the king had slept two nights previously. A
party went off at dusk to this place, and captured three brothers,
who being questioned, under fear of death, declared that they knew
nothing, and that if killed they would die innocently. In the dark
forest, lit up by the moon and the bright glare of the bivouac
fire, the three men stood before their captors. It was a subject
worthy of the pencil of Salvator Rosa. Interrogatories, threats,
promises, all were useless, until at last the plan was adopted of
leading one of the brothers away blindfolded behind a bush, and
causing a rifle to be fired off in such a way as to induce the
others to believe that he was shot. At last, overcome by fear, one
of them told where the king had slept the night before, and where
he had seen him that morning. The other brother, being informed
that everything was known, confirmed the intelligence. Away went
Lord Gifford and his party, with these two men as guides, and at
daybreak the kraal was reached and found deserted. The direction
that Cetywayo had taken was then pointed out, and having been
followed to one of Umnyamna's kraals, it was then discovered
that the king was only five miles distant, and had halted for
the day. It was then absolutely necessary to surround the place
without being seen, particularly as his refuge was close by the
side of a forest, into which, upon the slightest alarm, he would
immediately escape. As it was known that the Dragoons had gone some
distance beyond this place, a note was sent by Lord Gifford to
Major Marter, telling him to watch the passes. The latter officer,
upon questioning the Zulu, ascertained where the king was, and
immediately made such dispositions as to render escape impossible.
The kraal was surrounded before Cetywayo had the slightest idea
that his pursuers were upon him. The men of the Natal Native
Contingent called upon him to surrender, but no notice was taken of
this summons. Upon Major Marter repeating it, the king came out.
The natives stretched out their hands towards him, but with dignity
the monarch of the Zulus waved them back, and surrendered to Major
Marter, accompanying his submission with a request that he might be
immediately shot. He was informed, in reply, that if no resistance
were made his person was perfectly safe. Then there was mounting
in hot haste, and, under the escort of Major Marter's party, the
king, with four of his women, were hurried away towards Ulundi.
From that place an ambulance with eight mules was sent out, on the
morning of the 29th of August, to proceed to the Black Umvolosi
river and convey him thence. The king complained of the jolting,
and walked a good deal of the way.
[Sidenote: _Cetywayo captured._]
[Sidenote: _Major Marter's narrative._]
The authority for the preceding account is Mr. Lysight, interpreter
with Lord Gifford's party. The following is the interesting
narrative of the capture given by Major Marter. That officer
left Colonel Clarke's column at the Black Umvolosi at daylight
on Wednesday the 27th, in consequence of news coming in from
General Colley that the king was making for the Ignome forest. He
had with him his squadron King's Dragoon Guards, one company of
Barton's natives under Captain Plesh, ten Mounted Irregulars under
Lieutenant Wingh, and young Oftenbro as interpreter, with four
scouts or guides. He sent his men on to threaten the inhabitants
of the kraals that unless they gave him information about the king
and helped to catch him, he had orders to burn their kraals, take
prisoners, capture cattle, and not allow them to cultivate any
land until he was caught. At last he got an indirect hint, after
sleeping out one night, from a Zulu whom he met, named Uzililo,
who stated that he had come from Umbopa's kraal, and had heard
that the "wind blew that way," pointing to where the king was
afterwards taken, but that the troops had better go "that way,"
pointing further to the north-east, so as to get there well. This
was enough for the major, and having also met Gifford's messenger
with the note to Captain Maurice, who was not near, and opened
it, in which it spoke of his being on the track again, and that
he expected to capture the king that night, he felt sure he was
also on the track and would try and assist at the capture. He went
on carefully up the hill, until near the top he came to a kraal,
when, in answer to a question for guides, two men started off
without speaking or answering any questions, and took their guests
to the top of the Ignome forest, at a place with precipitous edges
looking down nearly 1500 feet. They came to a small open space with
long grass, and here the guides put up their hands, and the party
was halted. From this point only Major Marter and his interpreter
proceeded on hands, knees, and stomach, imitating their guides,
until fifty yards further on they could look down and see a small
kraal of about twenty huts strongly stockaded, standing on a slight
rise in the centre, surrounded by forest-covered steep slopes on
three sides, and only open towards the south-west. This was the
place where the king was then, and a plan was quickly arranged to
surround it. The natives were stripped of all their clothes to the
skin, and taking only their rifles, assegais, and cartridges, were
to proceed down the left slope, and get round quietly in front and
across the opening, so as to be in time to co-operate with the
Dragoons, who were to dismount and lead their horses down, as best
they could, any place which was found at all accessible. The men
were all dismounted, and after a little search a place was found
where they could get into a little ravine and so work them very
carefully to the bottom. The major led, and left the top at 1.45,
reaching the bottom at 3 p.m., with the loss of two horses and
several men injured. They all say it was most horrible work, all
thick forest, with rocky boulders to jump down sometimes several
feet. However, "all's well that ends well," and the end was worth
the means; so, luckily, as there was a slight rise hiding them from
the kraal, which was only 600 yards distant, they managed to mount
again _en masse_, and then, directing Captain Gibbing's troops to
file off to the right, and Godsden's to the left, they charged at
the kraal full gallop, and surrounded it before the people inside
knew they were there. Fortunately, also, the natives first got
across the open, but at the same time others completely hemmed them
in. It was seen that all the men inside were armed; but they were
at once warned that if a shot was fired they would be fired into
all round, and the kraal burnt, so they unwillingly submitted.
Major Marter dismounted, and, followed by his interpreter and some
Dragoons, went in and demanded where the king was. Umkozana, the
last chief who remained with the king, pointed to a hut at the
other end, and they went there at once and told Cetywayo to come
out. He refused, asked them to come in to him, wanted to know the
rank of the officer in charge, and then requested them to shoot
him. After some useless parleying, and as it was foolish to lose
time, he was threatened that unless he came out they would burn the
kraal, and not until then did he come out. The first thing he said
was that they would never have caught him if they had not come down
the mountains, as he had spies on the flats, and thought it quite
impossible for any troops but Zulus to come down the precipices at
the back. He was told his life would be spared, but that he must go
along with them as a prisoner to the white chief at Ulundi. They
captured, besides the king and Umkozana, the headman of the kraal,
six men-servants and one boy, and five women and one girl; also
four Martini-Henry's, lots of cartridges, fourteen other guns, and
many relics of the 24th Regiment, with a lot of the king's cooking
and sleeping things. The king caused much intentional delay by
walking as slowly as he could.
[Sidenote: _Cetywayo a prisoner._]
In entering Ulundi six of the Dragoon Guards rode in front,
followed by Natal Native Contingent men and one company of the 60th
Regiment; then two Dragoon Guards, between whom walked Cetywayo,
with another Dragoon close behind him. Natal Native Contingent,
eight men of Lonsdale's Horse, and another company of the 60th
Regiment followed. Sir Garnet Wolseley did not go out to meet the
last of the Zulu kings, as the prisoner had rejected and despised
every overture. He was treated, not as a captured king, but as
a mere fugitive from law and order. After a very short delay,
the party again started, ostensibly for Pietermaritzburg _viâ_
Rorke's Drift; but the march had not proceeded long, when an
express messenger galloped up from the general with an order to
proceed with all speed to Fort Durnford. When Cetywayo arrived at
Kwamagwaza, he said, "This is not the way to the Tugela," and knew
at once that he would have to cross the sea. He became melancholy
and abstracted. During the entire journey, he retained the quiet
dignity for which he is remarkable. At Port Durnford a surf-boat
was ready, into which the king and his party were placed and taken
to the steamer _Natal_, which was waiting.[51] The sea was rough,
and Cetywayo had to crawl on his hands and knees on board, while
one of his people, overcome by the terrors of the ocean, lay on his
back in the surf-boat, and made signs that he desired to be killed.
The gunboat _Forester_ escorted the _Natal_ to Simon's Bay, and
thence to Table Bay, where Cetywayo and his wives were landed, and
were lodged in the castle of Cape Town. Thus ended in a prison in
the metropolis of the Cape Colony the career of the last of the
Zulu kings and the autonomy of the nation. The greatest and most
powerful ruler of South Africa had defied Great Britain, and in his
defeat fell once and for ever all the hopes of domination so long
cherished among the native tribes of Southern Africa.
[Sidenote: _Cetywayo's personal appearance._]
In spite of his large proportions, Cetywayo is a handsome man,
of much dignity of aspect. His limbs are large, but symmetrical;
very broad chest, large and lustrous eyes, intelligent and not
unamiable countenance. With plenty of food and perfect safety, he
lost all inclination to be shot. Speaking of the war, he took all
the responsibility for the battle of Kambula, but declared that
Ulundi was fought against his wish, and in consequence of the
determination of his young men once more to try the arbitration of
the sword. Now that his power is broken, he laughs to scorn the
idea of any more fighting being possible against British rule.
A great meeting was called by the white "inkosi" (Sir Garnet) for
the 1st of September—the same day, six years ago, on which Cetywayo
was crowned. It was fitting that the anniversary of the day of
promises never fulfilled should be also a day of atonement. Two
hundred Zulus were seated a few paces from Sir Garnet's tent, and
although naturally great talkers, the silence of death prevailed.
Ranged in rows four deep, with the principal chiefs in front, they
listened with perfect attention to the words which decided the fate
of their country and of themselves. Two of the king's brothers and
the prime minister of the king were present. At half-past four,
Sir Garnet Wolseley left his tent, and, as he walked towards the
assembly, was greeted with uplifted hands and shouts of "Inkose."
Leaning upon the hilt of his sword, he calmly gazed for a few
moments upon the representatives of a conquered nation assembled
to hear its doom. Mr. Shepstone interpreted into Zulu sentence by
sentence as Sir Garnet Wolseley spoke, as follows:—
[Sidenote: _Sir Garnet Wolseley and the Zulus._]
"It is six years ago on this very day, the 1st of September, that
Cetywayo was crowned King of the Zulus, and only yesterday you
yourselves have seen him carried away a prisoner, never to return
again to Zululand. On the occasion of his coronation Cetywayo made
certain promises regarding laws to be observed in the future, which
promises he never fulfilled, and his country is now about to be
divided into different chieftainships, and I hope his fate will be
a warning to all of the chiefs not to follow in his footsteps, but
to act according to the commands and terms given by the English
Queen, who will most certainly punish any who do not do so. The
interests and welfare of the South African races are very dear to
the Queen, and she is anxious that the natives of this country
should thrive, as those in Natal have done up to the present time.
She will be lenient to faults arising from ignorance; but although
inclined, as I have said, to deal leniently when ignorance causes
them to commit faults, those who persistently go contrary to good
government and peace will assuredly be punished as Cetywayo has
been. As they are aware, she lives far away; but her power is very
great, and she is quite able to, and will, punish those who take
life or make wars contrary to her orders. Cetywayo took the lives
of his people for trivial offences, without giving them a chance
of defending themselves, or allowing them a fair trial. This must
cease. In future, trivial offences will be punishable by fines.
Cetywayo kept on foot a large and powerful army, and did not allow
his men to marry without his permission; in future, the young men
will be allowed to marry when and whom they like, provided always
they have sufficient for the support of a wife, and the consent of
the girl's parents. Disobedience of this law is to be punishable
by a fine inflicted by the headmen of the kraal. As Zululand is
almost entirely surrounded by country under the Queen of England's
rule, and not threatened in any way, there is no need of a larger
army; and in future no guns or ammunition will be allowed to be
imported, or to be in the hands of any Zulu. Nor will any stores be
permitted to be landed on the Zulu coast, in case, under the guise
of merchandise, arms should be brought into the country. The young
men are to be encouraged to labour, and are to be allowed to come
and leave when they like; for only by work can they become rich
and prosperous. Cetywayo encouraged witchcraft, and what is known
as 'smelling out.' That I look to the chiefs to put down, and an
end to such ridiculous and foolish practices arrived at. Cetywayo,
by this practice of witchcraft, caused many lives to be taken, and
neither life nor property was safe. And each chief must clearly
understand, before he signs his name to the treaty, that none of
his people must be taken without a fair trial before the chief
being granted, and the accused being allowed to call his witnesses.
In what I have said there is nothing new, though the young men may
have forgotten; but these laws and customs held good before Chaka's
ancient laws and usages introduced what is known as the military
system. I intend leaving an English officer here as Resident, to be
the eyes and ears of England, to watch over the people, to see the
laws observed, and that the chiefs rule with justice and equity. I
am aware there are still a considerable number of rifles and guns
of ours, as well as cattle scattered about the country, and those
chiefs who wish to stand well with the English Queen will lose no
time in bringing them in and delivering them up to the British
Resident.
[Sidenote: _General Crealock's column._]
"As they are well aware by their own rules of war and conquest,
Zululand now belongs to the Queen of England. She has, however,
already enough land in Africa, and so she has, through me as her
representative, appointed certain chiefs to rule over districts
which I shall presently name. The chiefs elected must remember
that this is an act of grace, and that what I am now doing in
partitioning the country to various chiefs is only what Cetywayo
has himself done in former times. They are well aware our laws,
religion, and customs are very different to theirs, and the Queen
has no wish to force ours upon them. As regards the laws and
customs they are to be ruled by, they are to be those good and
ancient ones in use before Chaka's time; but life and property is
to be protected, and no life to be forfeited without a fair trial.
As regards religion, there is no wish to force ours upon them, and
missionary enterprise will not be encouraged contrary to the wish
of the chief and people he proposes to reside amongst. The British
Government is very anxious to prevent white people settling in
the country, and no sale, transfer, or alienation of land will be
permitted or recognized. I consider this a very important point, as
in many instances land has been said by white people to have been
purchased by them from the Zulus, and given rise to very serious
complications. If, therefore, missionaries do come and wish to
reside among the people, all that can be permitted them to hold in
land must be a small patch for their house and garden, but none
whatever must be alienated from the Zulu people, to whom it really
belongs. Some of those I have intended to make chiefs, I am sorry
to see, are not here to-day; but some who are here to-day will now
sign a document, the purport of which I have now told you all; and
a duplicate of the treaty will be given to each chief to keep,
and a similar one retained by me. The boundaries of the various
chieftainships will be told them, and will be clearly defined
hereafter by officers sent round for that purpose."
The first division, or coast column, under General Crealock,
had not been opposed by the Zulus in the field. It established
a series of fortified posts along the south coast of Zululand,
opened a new base of supplies at Port Durnford, from which to feed
a force operating against Ulundi, destroyed the military kraal
of Emangwene and the king's old military kraal at Ondini, besides
clearing the coast district. By the 6th of July, all the great
Zulu chiefs, with their people, from the Tugela river to St. Lucia
Bay, had given in their submission. It was the coast column, under
Pearson, which gained the battle of Inyezane, and had gallantly
held Ekowe for three months; and it was the coast column, more
than any other, which had suffered from disease. Among General
Crealock's valedictory remarks are the following:—
"July 17, 1879.
"In notifying to the army in South Africa that Brigadier-General
Wood, V.C., C.B., and Lieutenant-Colonel Buller are about to leave
Zululand for England, Sir Garnet Wolseley desires to place on
record his high appreciation of the services they have rendered,
and that their military abilities and untiring energy have
materially tended to bring the war to an end. The success which
has attended the operations of the flying column is largely due to
General Wood's genius for war, to the admirable system which he
has established in his command, and to the zeal and energy with
which his ably conceived plans have been carried out by Colonel
Buller."
BRIGADIER-GENERAL WOOD'S ORDERS.
[Sidenote: _General Wood's farewell._]
"The Brigadier-General proposes, weather permitting, to leave for
Pietermaritzburg to-morrow. In saying good-bye to the soldiers of
all ranks, he wishes to express his warm gratitude for the support
he has invariably received. The Brigadier-General has gained the
commendation of his superiors for the successful operations of
the flying column; he feels that the credit he has so obtained
has been gained by the courage and untiring devotion to duty of
his fellow-soldiers, and he will never forget his comrades of the
flying column."
It is right to quote the following orders respecting two
distinguished officers of the war:—
"The troops and Naval Brigade forming the first division must be
content with the conviction that their gallantry in the earlier
part of this war has probably diminished the opposition of the
Zulus in this country.
"You must be content with the honest conviction that your hard
work and energy, under very great difficulties, and with your
ranks thinned day by day with sickness and fever, has successfully
carried out the task set you by Lord Chelmsford to perform; and,
thanks to the valuable assistance and co-operation of Commodore
Richards and the Naval Brigade, you have established the
landing-place opened at Port Durnford, which will enable further
operations towards the capital to be carried out with facility
should they become necessary.
"Soldiers and sailors of the first division, I thank you all for
your good conduct, your hard works; and sympathize with you in
the loss of so many comrades whose lives have been sacrificed to
this climate, so deadly to man and beast. We have all had great
difficulties to overcome.
"I wish you all a hearty 'good-bye;' I wish you success and
prosperity wherever your duty to her Majesty may lead you."[52]
[Sidenote: _Zululand and the new chiefs._]
It would be uninteresting to go into details with respect to the
movements of the columns under Colonels Villiers and Baker Russell.
Mahabolin and other Magulisin chiefs surrendered, Manyonyoba asked
terms of the commanding officer at Luneberg, and the various
scattered embers left after the great war conflagration were
soon extinguished in the north. In September Zululand was most
thoroughly conquered. On the 1st of September, John Dunn, Umgayna,
Usibilo, Umcitsobu, Somkelu, and Gonzi signed the terms upon which
they accepted chieftainship; Oham and others were proclaimed at a
later date. The principal undertakings and conditions were that
the chiefs should respect the boundaries assigned; abolish the
military system; allow all men to marry and work as they will;
prohibit importation of arms; take no life without fair trial;
discontinue witchcraft; surrender fugitive criminals from British
territory; make no war without the sanction of Government; prevent
sale or alienation of land; arbitration to be appealed to in case
of disputes with British subjects. The succession to chieftainships
to be dependent on approval of our Government.
The following is an exact summary of the terms and conditions
signed in duplicate by all the newly appointed chiefs in Zululand
at Ulundi, September 1, 1879. The prelude and ending are verbatim;
terms and conditions summarized:—
I recognize the victory of British arms over the Zulu nation and
the full right and title of her Majesty Queen Victoria, Queen of
England and Empress of India, to deal as she may think fit with
the Zulu chiefs and the people, and with the Zulu country; and I
agree and hereby signify my agreement to accept from General Sir
Garnet Joseph Wolseley, G.C.M.G. and K.C.B., as the representative
of her Majesty Queen Victoria, the chieftainship of a territory
of Zululand, to be known hereafter as——, subject to the following
terms, conditions, and limitations:—
Terms, conditions, and limitations laid down by General Sir Garnet
Joseph Wolseley, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., and assented to by me——, as the
terms, conditions, and limitations subject to which I agree to
accept the chieftainship of the aforesaid territory.
1. To observe and respect whatever boundaries shall be assigned to
my territory by the British Government through the Resident of the
division in which his territory is situated.
2. Not to permit the existence of the Zulu military system or the
existence of any military system or organisation whatsoever within
my territory; to proclaim and make it a rule that all men shall be
allowed to marry when they choose and as they choose, according
to the good and ancient customs of his people known and followed
in the days preceding the establishment by Chaka of the military
system, and to allow and encourage all men living within his
territory to go and come freely for peaceful purposes, and to work
in Natal or in the Transvaal or elsewhere for themselves or for
hire.
[Sidenote: _Sir Garnet Wolseley's conditions._]
3. Not to import or allow to be imported into his territory by any
person, for any object whatsoever, firearms, or other goods of any
description, and ammunition from any port, inland or sea-coast,
and to confiscate all such goods or arms, etc., as come in, fining
the owners or possessors of them with heavy fine or such other
punishment as may be allowed.
4. Not to allow life to be taken on any pretence without trial
before the council of chiefsmen, allowing fair and impartial
examination of witnesses in the chiefs presence, and further not
to permit of witchcraft or witch-doctors, or "smelling out."
5. To surrender all fugitives demanded by British Government
flying from the laws, and to prevent their coming into Zululand,
and if in, to exert himself and his people to catch them.
6. Not to make war on any other chiefs without the sanction of the
British Government through the Resident of the district.
7. The succession to the chieftainship to be decided by ancient
laws and customs, and nominations of successors to be submitted
for approval of Government.
8. Not to sell or alienate the land.
9. To permit all people now in the district to remain upon
recognition of his power, and any wishing to leave to be allowed
to do so.
10. In all cases of dispute in which British subjects are
concerned, to appeal and decide by decision of British Resident,
and in other cases not to punish until approved of by Resident.
11. In all cases not included in the above, or in any doubt or
uncertainty, to govern and decide in accordance with ancient laws.
These terms, conditions, and limitations I engage, and I hereby
solemnly pledge my faith, to abide by and respect in letter or in
spirit without qualification or reserve.
Signed at Ulundi on the 1st day of September, 1879.
Chief——his X mark.
Induna——Do.
General commanding her Majesty's forces in South Africa, and High
Commissioner for South-Eastern Africa.
Signed by John Shepstone as witness of the correct interpretation
by him and thorough knowledge of the contents of the document the
chief has signed.
On the 12th of September Major-General Clifford was able to notify
that Colonels Villiers' and Russell's columns were in course
of being broken up, after they had thoroughly patrolled the
Makulusi district and found all quiet. Oham had returned to his
own territory, accompanied by Wheelwright, who was appointed to
act as Resident in Zululand. Mongodhla had been driven from his
caves and his cattle captured, while his brother had surrendered
at Luneburg. Two companies of the 24th Regiment, ordered to encamp
at Isandhlwana, removed the last vestiges of the camp, buried any
bodies remaining above ground, and erected cairns of stones over
the graves of the troops who fell there. More than 5000 guns had
been taken, or surrendered by Zulus. Sir Garnet Wolseley did his
work thoroughly. Troops were despatched against Sekukuni, and
Sir Garnet himself proceeded to the Transvaal, in order to subdue
discontent among the inhabitants, and establish a settled system of
government. It is not necessary to follow him there.
[Sidenote: _John Dunn._]
With the conclusion of the Zulu war this book must terminate.
As regards the political adjustment of affairs in Zululand, the
directions of the Home Government, were no doubt, implicitly
obeyed. The country was made self-supporting in a military point
of view, and the chiefs, with their tribes, were so disposed as
to form a barrier against hostile aggression. John Dunn, who was
a Christian renegade, living as a Zulu in polygamic life, but
whose influence was supreme throughout the country, was placed as
chief over South-Eastern Zululand. One of his first steps was the
prohibition of all missionaries in the country in which he holds
sway. Over Sirayo's country near the border, extending to the foot
of the Drakenberg, the chief Hlubi was appointed, about whose tried
fidelity and loyalty there can be no question. Oham occupies the
region between the Pongolo and the Black Umvolosi. Mnyame, the late
king's prime minister, is established near him, and, it is to be
hoped, will not hatch plots for the establishment of Oham on the
throne of his brother. "Zululand for the Zulus" has been the motto
for this arrangement, but hopeless heathenism has been riveted
as chains upon the people. Missionary enterprise is discouraged
and even forbidden, while all the evils of tribal rule are
virtually perpetuated. It has been said with some fancy, but great
exactitude, that the new dispensation realizes the description of
the country given by Tennyson in "Locksley Hall"—
"Never comes the trader, never floats an European flag,
Slides the bird o'er lustrous woodland, swings the trailer from the crag.
* * * * * *
There methinks would be enjoyment more than in this march of mind.
* * * * * *
The passions cramped no longer shall have scope and breathing-space."
Savage women shall be taken to rear dusky races. Polygamy receives
approval. Missionaries are forbidden; and, strange to say, all this
is really done in consequence of the efforts of the Exeter Hall
zealots, who have denounced Sir Bartle Frere and the colonists from
the beginning, lauded the heathens, and strenuously objected to any
assumption of their territory. The toleration of heathenism is both
a blunder and a crime, which, if not stopped in time, must result
in disastrous consequences.
APPENDIX.
CAPE COLONISTS _VERSUS_ NATIVES.
(_Articles published in the P.E. Telegraph._)
I.
It is an axiom that history repeats itself, and historical studies,
therefore, become particularly useful in a political crisis like
the present, when the policy of Sir Bartle Frere towards the native
tribes of South Africa has been condemned by the Home Government.
In all parts of the world a tragedy is enacted when barbarism and
civilization come into contact. It was so with the Puritans, whose
pioneers landed in North America from the _Mayflower_; it is so
with the Dutch and the natives of Java, with the British and the
Maoris, with the French and the people of New Caledonia. Wherever,
throughout the world, colonization takes place among savages
there must be war, or there can be no safety or progress. When
the Dutch formed a settlement on the shores of Table Bay in 1652,
it was neither their interest nor their wish to fight, but it was
perfectly impossible to avoid it. Although a mere place of call for
outward and homeward-bound ships was required, yet it soon became
apparent that not merely as a sequence of successful defence, but
as a means of protection, it was requisite to annex conquered
territory. The Hottentots were the first enemies of Europeans in
South Africa, and the Kafirs—themselves aggressors—were the second.
The latter people were robbers by profession, and an organized
system of plunder continually harassed the border farmers of the
colony.
The first act of the present tragedy of Kafir war waged against
Great Britain took place in 1811, when constant depredations on
the part of the Kafirs made it necessary either to repel the
enemy or to abandon the country. The latter system of tactics was
not then in vogue among the countrymen of Nelson and Wellington,
therefore a large force under Colonel Graham was despatched to the
front. Landdrost Stockenstrom, who accompanied this force, rode
up to a party of the natives and urgently endeavoured to secure
peace. In reply he was stabbed to death, and fourteen of the men
who accompanied him were likewise murdered. Of course the Kafirs
were chastised, but the snake was only scotched, not killed, and
in 1816 the colonial frontier farmers were so plundered by the
natives that they were forced to state to Government that they
would have to abandon their farms unless effectively protected.
As a result, Lord Charles Somerset held a solemn conference with
Gaika and other great chiefs in April, 1817, which was followed
by a solemn treaty of peace. Those solemn farces must have been
sources of immense amusement to the savages. Gaika gave pledges
with the utmost readiness—there was no difficulty whatever. Honesty
and justice were in future to prevail; the people of the kraal to
which stolen cattle were traced should always be held responsible,
and reparation was always to be made _instanter_. Presents were
lavished upon the "Paramount" Chief, and then (in the words of
the Rev. Mr. Williams) "Gaika fled instantly to the other side
of the Kat river like a thief," plundering was soon vigorously
recommenced, and the idea of restitution became almost as great a
joke as the treaty of peace. In 1818 the chief T'Slambie positively
refused to restore cattle traced to his kraal. Afterwards, to
gain time, he promised, and then, of course, broke his promise.
War was once more forced upon the authorities, and this time the
contest was a serious one. While military operations were going on
in Kafirland, the confederate chiefs got behind our forces, drove
in the small military posts, and ravaged the frontier districts.
Incited to fanaticism by the witch-doctor Mokanna, or Lynx, 9000
savages impetuously attacked the head-quarters of the military
at Graham's Town, and it was only by means of desperate fighting
that the town was saved. Soon afterwards another solemn treaty
was made, in which it was agreed that all Kafirs should evacuate
the country between the Great Fish and Keiskamma rivers, and that
this territory should remain neutral and unoccupied. The usual
sequence occurred, the treaty was laughed at and violated by our
enemies at the earliest possible moment. Downing Street invariably
looked upon the Kafirs in the light of honourable belligerents,
and the unfortunate colonists as grasping, unscrupulous men. An
outrageous divorce was constituted between truth and justice on the
one side, and so-called philanthropy on the other, and the people
of the Cape Colony had to suffer the heavy and bitter penalties
of this extraordinary ignorance and fatuity. The course of events
from first to last has been very simple. It must be borne in mind
that the South African Kafir wars constitute _one_ tragedy in
various acts, with intervals of unequal duration. The war with
Cetywayo is identical in principle with those waged with Gaika,
T'Slambie, Dingaan, Kreli, and Sandilli. By immense exertions the
tide of savagery has been periodically rolled back, and if wise
counsel had been followed, the war of 1835 would have been final;
but Downing Street intervened, and it is to the disastrous fatuous
policy then adopted that we owe the wars of 1846 and 1852. It
is to this intervention, and to this policy, that we desire in
this article, and in others that are to follow, specially to draw
attention, because the part taken by Sir Benjamin D'Urban in 1836
is now filled by Sir Bartle Frere in 1879; and the character of
Lord Glenelg, who declared that "the Kafirs had ample justification
in the late war," seems likely to be attempted by the gentleman who
is at present her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the
Colonies.—_April 22, 1879._
II.
The Kafir war of 1835 was exceedingly disastrous to the colonists.
Shortly after it had commenced Colonel Smith (afterwards Sir
Harry Smith) wrote: "Already are 7000 persons dependent upon the
Government for the necessaries of life. The land is filled with
the lamentations of the widows and the fatherless. The indelible
impressions already made upon myself by the horrors of an irruption
of savages upon a scattered population, almost exclusively engaged
in the peaceful occupation of husbandry, are such as make me look
on those I have witnessed in a service of thirty years as trifles
to what I have now witnessed." The Kafirs were on this occasion,
as on every other, the aggressors, and plunder was the principal
motive of the war. Fifteen years previously Great Britain had taken
the responsibility of settling 5000 of her subjects in the frontier
districts of the Cape Colony, and then defence and protection
became both the duty and the interest of the home country. With
great exertions and after immense loss the war was brought to a
close. As a glorious trophy of the war no fewer than 15,000 Fingoes
were literally saved from cruel captivity. The Moses who led them
out of their house of bondage was Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and it was
this wise and enlightened Governor who annexed the province of
Queen Adelaide, and determined that the liberated people should be
placed in this territory, so as to form "the best barrier against
the entrance of the Kafirs into the great Fish River jungle." This
extensive bush was the "quadrilateral" of the Kafirs, and it was
only acquired by the best blood of the British and colonial troops.
During the whole period of the war of 1835 a very small section of
colonists had endeavoured to poison the minds of our Downing Street
rulers. Their arguments were based on several fictions, including
affirmations about violence on the part of colonists having begot
violence on the part of Kafirs, and that the great body of Kafirs
had never offended us. They even went so far as to make use of
glaring untruths respecting Hintza not having been engaged in the
war, and misled Lord Glenelg so much respecting the particulars
of that chief's death as to induce his lordship to make use of
expressions which he was afterwards compelled to retract. A steady
fire of prejudice, fed by pre-conceived ideas, constantly existed
at home in favour of the Kafir tribes—and indeed all savages—which
required very little effort to turn into a consuming fire of anger
and indignation. These little efforts were sedulously made and
constantly continued in South Africa with the most disastrous
results. A number of well-meaning and prejudiced men, who can be
styled the Exeter Hall party, declaimed with virulence against
the colonists, and unfortunately Lord Glenelg was enrolled among
their number. This nobleman evidently considered that humanitarian
efforts were due to savages only, not to colonists, and through
his contemptible folly became the means of inflicting the most
severe injuries upon both. Sir Benjamin D'Urban, who was completely
master of the situation, and had proved himself an honest and wise
administrator, was entirely ignored, his policy was stigmatized in
the most insulting manner, and the sentimental ideas of theorists
made to take its place. In a despatch, dated 28th December,
1835, the Secretary of State entirely exculpates the Kafirs and
censures both Sir Benjamin D'Urban and the colonists. He says:
"In the conduct which was pursued towards the Kafir nation by the
colonists, and the public authorities of the colony, through a long
series of years, the Kafirs had ample justification of the late
war; they had a perfect right to hazard the experiment, however
hopeless, of extorting by force that redress which they could not
expect otherwise to obtain; and the claim of sovereignty over
the new province, bounded by the Keiskamma and the Kei, must be
renounced. It rests upon a conquest resulting from a war in which,
as far as I am at present able to judge, the original justice is
on the side of the conquered, not of the conquering party." The
governor is severely reproved for styling the Kafirs "irreclaimable
savages," and the Wesleyan missionaries are also censured. As a
sequence the whole country between the Fish and Buffalo rivers
had to be handed over to the Kafirs, although that portion of
this territory which extended between the Fish and Keiskamma
rivers had been ceded by Gaika to the colony so far back as the
year 1819, and was therefore not conquered in the recent war. The
extraordinary fatuity of this course, judged from a military point
of view, is evident from the description of the boundary furnished
by Major Charters, military secretary to Sir George Napier. This
able officer says: "The line of frontier is all in favour of the
Kafirs; a dense jungle—the medium breadth is about five miles—torn
and intersected by deep ravines, a great part impenetrable except
to Kafirs and wild beasts, occupies about one hundred miles of
frontier, following the sinuosities of the Great Fish river. The
whole British army would be insufficient to guard it." In fact,
this country comprised what, by analogy, may be styled the Kafir
quadrilateral, or combination of almost impregnable fortresses.
British and colonial blood had to be poured out as water in the
wars of 1845 and 1852 to recapture this country; but fanaticism
and prejudice are always impervious to argument. "Their blood be
upon us and upon our children" is a sentence often repeated in
history, so when the Waterloo veteran and gallant British soldier,
Sir Benjamin D'Urban, was dismissed for doing his duty, Lord
Glenelg defiantly wrote, "You announce to me the abandonment of the
province of Adelaide and cast on me the responsibility of all the
consequent disasters you predict. I am perfectly ready to take upon
myself the sole and exclusive responsibility on this occasion."
It is difficult to find language sufficiently strong to stigmatize
the base perfidy and fatuous incompetency of the Glenelg policy.
A colony is acquired and its people exchange allegiance for
protection; later on 5000 British emigrants are placed in its
frontier districts. The savages in and beyond the borders of this
country are numerically far superior to our own subjects, and
systematically send in plundering bands who devastate the country
and impoverish the farmers. It is these savages who make war, and
in defence it is at last absolutely necessary either to repel the
invaders or to abandon the country. The case, let it be remembered,
is not one of emigrants seizing a country and then applying for
protection. It is the British Government which established its
sovereignty first and sent its emigrants afterwards. With immense
exertion, and at the cost of much blood and treasure, the savage
tide is pushed back—and then Lord Glenelg deliberately makes it
flow again over the conquered country, perfidiously becomes the
ally and friend of the savages and creates a cruel necessity—no
other than that of doing the work over again in the bloody wars
of 1845 and 1852. There is scarcely anything in history to form a
parallel to this gross injustice and perfidy. Yet at the present
moment a large party of fanatical "philanthropists" in England are
crying out for a repetition of the same policy in Natal. The tide
will be pushed back to Cetywayo's kraal, but we must abandon the
country after we conquer it. The Zulu King made the war, and it
is as purely one of righteous self-defence as any ever waged in
the world; yet we are told that the colonists provoked it and are
responsible for it! Sir Bartle Frere is to be converted into Sir
Benjamin D'Urban! and a new edition of the Glenelg policy must be
adopted by her Majesty's Government!—_April 25, 1879._
III.
Lord Glenelg emphatically stated that the Kafirs had perfect
justification for the war of 1835, and this affirmation was the
foundation of his entire policy. He identified himself with the
pseudo-philanthropists who looked upon the white inhabitants of
the Eastern districts as usurpers and persecutors. The ideas of
1836 remain substantially the ideas of 1879, the only difference
being that the _venue_ is changed and that the tide of savagery
has been pushed further eastward. The settlers of 1820 were placed
by the British Government on the frontier of the Cape Colony, and
on their part and that of their descendants there was certainly no
usurpation, while it positively seems to be the result of monomania
to speak of their having persecuted the Kafirs. The incontestable
facts of history prove exactly the opposite: it was the Kafirs that
harassed and persecuted them. A comparatively small, struggling,
and sparsely settled community was persistently tormented and
impoverished by most cruel thefts and constant aggressions, which
at last culminated in wars of defence most disastrous to the
farmers and the principal portion of the settlers. The stock,
dwellings, etc., of the poor border population destroyed in the
war of 1835 alone were valued at upwards of £280,000! This was
a cruel, terrible infliction on those poor settlers, but it was
not considered enough by the Exeter Hall party. Christianity
was blasphemed by a policy of the grossest injustice adopted in
its name. Those who were bound by every tie of justice—putting
aside charity—to defend their own countrymen turned against them
most virulently, and did everything in their power to cause the
re-enactment of the bloody scenes in which British settlers in this
distant land had suffered so much.
In Mr. Godlonton's "Case for the Colonists" there is abundant
proof of the facts already adduced. The Kafirs were the aggressors
and the colonists the sufferers. Gross injustice, faithlessness,
rapine, and fraud—or in other words, _savagery_—had to be
grappled with, repelled, and conquered in the Cape Colony, and
the pseudo-philanthropists of England, headed by Lord Glenelg,
did everything in their power to aid and assist the latter cause.
Perhaps the most clear proof of the error of the British policy
on which we are now animadverting may be found in the evidence of
one of Lord Glenelg's chosen men and champions. Sir George Napier
was sent out specially to reverse the policy of Sir Benjamin
D'Urban. In answer to a Port Elizabeth address, he said, "I
_decidedly_ tell you that I accepted the government of this colony
in the conviction that the former system, as regarded our Kafir
neighbours, was erroneous; and I am come out here, agreeing in,
and determined to support, the system of policy pursued by the
Lieutenant-Governor of these districts (Captain Stockenstrom) in
accordance with the instructions which his Honour and myself have
received from her Majesty's Secretary of State (Lord Glenelg)."
Nothing can be clearer than this, or more decided; but when Sir
George Napier learnt the facts of the case, the mist of prejudice
dropped from his eyes. Most fortunately, this officer was an honest
man, and dared to give his testimony in favour of the truth in
spite of his employers in England. He found that the policy he
had been directed to carry out "shocked one's natural sense of
justice" (these are his own words), and that he had been completely
duped and deceived. Referring to the aggressions of the Kafirs,
Sir George Napier says, "It would not be just to pass over the
fact that while much loss has been sustained by the colonists,
as stated in the official returns, I am not aware, except in one
instance—and that one of no importance—that any aggression has
been committed by the border colonists against the persons or
property of the neighbouring tribes." It was at Port Elizabeth,
and in the month of October, 1840, that Sir George Napier forcibly
admitted that the Glenelg treaties "seem to shock our sense of
natural justice, and to be unsupported by any considerations of
sound policy." Speaking subsequently to a gathering of the Slambie
and Congo tribes of Kafirs at Fort Peddie, his Excellency said,
"You have sustained no bad treatment on the part of the colonists,
and I now appeal to you whether the colonists have not kept their
part of the treaties ever since they were made? I ask if there
has been a single act of injustice of which you have any reason
to complain on the part of the Government and the colonists?
You will answer, None. I therefore appeal to you for justice
towards the colonists." In fact, Sir George Napier was forced to
thoroughly change his opinions, and it is unnecessary to multiply
proofs of this well-known fact. Would to God that Sir Michael
Hicks-Beach, or even Sir Charles Dilke, could come out to South
Africa and report to the Home Government so as to avert the awful
catastrophe of surrendering conquered Zululand to Cetywayo! This
would be a suicide greater in extent and more terrible even in its
consequences than the surrender of the province of Queen Adelaide
by Lord Glenelg. But surely if the world had been searched no more
reliable man than Sir Bartle Frere could have been chosen. He is
a most upright, wise, and experienced administrator; the friend
of her Majesty the Queen, and himself distinguished for all the
qualities which make men respected and trusted. He belongs to the
"Aborigines' Protection Society," and is in all respects above
suspicion, yet his most positive assurances weigh lightly in the
balance against the monomania existing among certain classes in
Europe, that savages must be right and colonists invariably wrong.
It is a bitter reflection that Zulu savagery finds its best allies
among the very people from whom we spring, and that the most deadly
enemies of the white people of South Africa are literally "those of
their own household."
One of the most able newspapers in South Africa echoes the
sentiments of Lord Glenelg, Dr. Philip, and Bishop Colenso. It
declares against annexation, and also against interference with
the usages of the native chiefs. It is said that to rule the Zulus
through their chiefs is the policy of her Majesty's Ministers.
The extraordinary admission is added that "order will be found
better than caprice and the law better than individual notions of
right." Surely we must admit that the rule of chiefs is purely
a rule of absolute caprice, and that the history of Cetywayo's
government specially proves it. The will of the monarch is the
law of the land, and bloody sacrifices constantly connected with
witchcraft are purely the effects of cruel and avaricious caprice.
The entire history of South Africa shows the folly and cruelty of
the policy advocated by the enemies of Sir Bartle Frere. No careful
student of Cape history can fail to see that the Glenelg plan of
non-annexation was most disastrous, while it was only when the
power of the Gaika and Gcaleka chiefs had been finally taken from
them—and not till then—that the people of this country, whites as
well as blacks, could hope to be finally released from the fearful
curse of recurring thefts, bloodshed, and wars. In fact history
teaches plainly that to secure peace, prosperity, and happiness to
all the people of Southern Africa it is absolutely necessary: (1.)
To secure territorial guarantees, such as those justly acquired in
a war of defence by Sir Benjamin D'Urban. (2.) To create a firmly
knit and strong confederation of colonies and states in which
the Queen and just laws shall be supreme, to the exclusion of
witchcraft and the caprice of chiefs.
Incidentally, we may be permitted to illustrate what is really
meant by this "rule of chiefs." Every one knows that diabolical
and wholesale slaughter is a characteristic of the rule of all
Zulu potentates. Dingaan, Panda, Cetywayo, are all alike in this
particular. It is the system as much as the men that we have to
blame. Perhaps there is no more distinguishing proof of constant
cold-blooded and revolting cruelty arising directly and constantly
from the rule of chiefs than in the administration of the laws of
witchcraft. One example out of hundreds is sufficient. Missionaries
from time to time publish most revolting cases, but they are all
of the same type, and merely as a sample we refer our readers to
the one alluded to by Mr. Godlonton, at page 99 of his "Case for
the Colonists." The son of a chief was sick, and a man of property
was immediately selected for torture and death, simply because the
witch-doctor said that it was under his evil influence that the
sick man was suffering. He begged and prayed for instant death,
but of course that boon is never granted. First of all the victim
was held to the ground, and several men pierced his body all over
with Kafir needles, two or three inches deep. The victim bore this
with extraordinary resolution, and his tormentors became tired,
complaining of the pain it gave their hands, and of the needles
or skewers bending. By this time a fire was kindled, into which
large square stones were placed to heat. His wife having first
been cruelly beaten and ill-treated, the victim was brought to the
fire, laid on his back, with his feet and hands tied to pegs driven
into the ground. When the stones became as hot as possible, they
were placed upon his groin, stomach, and chest. Then the scorching
and broiling of the body went on, the stones occasionally slipping
off, and being immediately replaced and held on by sticks. These
awful tortures lasted from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m., when the unfortunate
victim of the benefit of the rule of the chiefs in South Africa
breathed his last. We are asked to perpetuate this system, and to
surrender any conquered country in Zululand, so that savagery may
still continue without interruption, and we may reap in Zululand
from the policy of 1879 the fruits obtained in 1845 and 1852 from
the Glenelg policy of 1836.—_April 29, 1879._
IV.
The great question of Sir Bartle Frere's native and Zulu policy is
easily narrowed. His Excellency believes in abolishing the power of
chiefs, and in obtaining after defensive war adequate territorial
guarantees. The opposite policy has, undoubtedly, caused the wars
of 1845, 1852, and 1877. The relinquishment of the province of
Queen Adelaide by Lord Glenelg necessitated its reconquest, and the
system of endeavouring to rule through the medium of chiefs has
resulted in disastrous failure. A chief is necessarily antagonistic
to civilization: all his power, influence, and means are obtained
from savagery, and it is this latter system it is his interest to
foster and to continue. But for the astuteness and ability of Sir
George Grey Kreli would undoubtedly have thrown us into a serious
war in 1857. This great chief ordered cattle to be slaughtered in
such a manner as to prove that he had even determined to "burn
his ships." Emissaries were despatched to Moshesh, to Taku, and
to the Tambookies. A witch-doctor was used as a tool in the usual
manner, so as to stir up the people by means of superstition,
and the system, whose continuance is advocated by a party, only
failed because of the checkmate movements of the Governor.
Subsequently, it was purely the continuance of the system of the
chiefs that led us into the war of 1877. If their power had been
abolished, as it should have been, great calamities would have
been averted from their own people and from the Cape Colony. A
careful honest study of colonial history is all that is necessary
to prove to demonstration that weak half-measures with Kafirs
are as irrational and absurd as they are cruel. When we conquer
we are bound to take away entirely the pernicious powers of the
chiefs, as well as to retain such land guarantees as are really
necessary for future safety. Those who advocate this sound, wise
policy are real philanthropists, substituting justice and sound
ideas for theoretical ideas, founded for the most part upon that
worst description of ignorance which is founded upon prejudice and
pre-conceived ideas.
One argument brought forward against Confederation is based upon
the lowest possible motives. It is the pockets, not the heads or
hearts, to which this earnest appeal is made. One great Government
in South Africa with provincial administrations will really be too
expensive! Besides, an objection is taken to the removal of the
liability under which the British Government labours at present.
Let the Home country continue to lose its best blood and treasure
rather than we should lose our money. A great strong Confederation
would put an end to Kafir wars by putting an end to the possibility
of their success, but lest we should have to pay a few more taxes
the British ratepayers' purses and the British soldiers' bodies
must continue to bleed. This infamous policy is not worthy of the
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. We have attained our majority
as children of the Empire, and we must be prepared to resume our
own responsibilities. These, unquestionably, include self-defence,
and to make that efficient the fable of the bundle of sticks must
be exemplified in the close union of all our states and colonies.
Nothing is more clear than the fact that all South Africa is like a
draughtboard—the blacks are on one side, the whites on the other.
There is no separating the interests of either combatants, so
that when Cetywayo fights against Natal, he fights against this
colony as well as against the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.
But real economy is always attended by a sound and statesmanlike
system of Government. There would be no recurrence of native wars
under Confederation, and this alone would be a source of great
economy and great prosperity. South Africa, not Downing Street,
would conduct its own native policy, and there would be then no
fear of the recurrence of such a policy as that of Lord Glenelg.
At present we are not safe, and the sooner such a period of
incertitude and danger is terminated the better for the taxpayers
here and in England. Are the people of this country not able to
govern themselves in a Confederation? The history of the separate
states and colonies proves the contrary. If we are able we ought to
be willing, as such a union means against the natives invincible
strength, and consequently both peace and economy. Above all things
we ought to relieve ourselves from the curse of being perpetually
exposed to the meddling and muddling of our native policy. Fatuous
incompetency, such as that of Lord Glenelg, is quite enough to ruin
half a dozen colonies, and we really can never be quite sure that
it will not be renewed.
A reference to Sir Bartle Frere's instructions proves very clearly
that his Excellency had incomparably more power than any previous
Governor-General or High Commissioner, and in acting as he did
under _carte blanche_ authority, in no way exceeded his powers. He
had to choose between allowing the Zulu despot to make war when he
wished and in what manner he chose, or in checkmating him by early
action. The latter policy has been adopted with Cetywayo as it was
with Kreli, and in spite of a temporary check will be the means of
effectively protecting the interests both of the British colonists
and the British crown. England never had a more faithful or
conscientious officer than Sir Bartle Frere, and a time will come
when on the page of history his name, with those of Sir Benjamin
D'Urban and Sir George Grey, will be blazoned as the greatest and
most enlightened statesmen who ever ruled in Southern Africa.
"After me, the Deluge," would have been a convenient and very
safe motto for each of these men, but they scorned the wretched
time-serving policy of shunting off the evil day from themselves so
as to allow its calamities to accumulate into terrible magnitude
and burst with awful force upon their successors. But the principal
defence of Sir Bartle Frere's action and policy is to be found in
his despatches, and to them we earnestly beg careful and impartial
attention.
The people of the Cape Colony and Natal are composed of many races
and of many creeds, but with the most insignificant exceptions they
all declare in the most emphatic manner in favour of the policy of
Sir Bartle Frere.
"Saxon and Celt and Dane are we,
But all of us Danes in our welcome of thee."
From Capetown to the Tugela river and from L'Agulhas to the Orange
river one universal shout of sympathy and approval goes forth
to England. Resolutions, earnestly and emphatically declaring
that the High Commissioner is right, are sent to the foot of
the Queen's throne from Capetown, Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown,
Graaff-Reinet, Pietermaritzburg, D'Urban, and hosts of smaller
places. The newspaper press, with very few exceptions, constantly
and vigorously declares aloud the public sentiments. Surely all
this is a powerful argument. The people of South Africa, whose
lives, property, and character are at stake, may be trusted to
take such a lively interest in the entire subject as to understand
it thoroughly. Their interests and those of the United Kingdom
are thoroughly identical in this matter, and the sky does not so
change the mind even in this portion of the British Empire as to
pervert entirely the moral nature of so many of her Majesty's loyal
subjects.
Political events connected with the Zulu war form incomparably the
most powerful argument that has yet been adduced in favour of South
African Confederation. We really cannot afford any further Glenelg
experiments, and so soon as we can knit ourselves together in a
powerful dominion we are by no means apprehensive of the expense
of fighting our own battles. In the first place we would take care
that there would be no chiefs to fight with, and that witchcraft,
tyranny, and other abominations should finally cease. The natives
would have to learn the habits of industry and peace, and would be
induced to substitute spades and ploughs for guns and ammunition.
A just, firm policy of this character, would form a basis for
Christianity, peace, and civilization, whereas the senseless and
fatuous plans of so-called philanthropists are as destructive to
the natives as they are injurious to the colonists and to the
British Empire of which they form a part.
It would be fortunate for South Africa if fair play were as much
the practice as it is the boast of Englishmen. There are many men
at home full of the same sentiments of righteous indignation as
those which animated Sir George Napier previous to his arrival
in South Africa. How few are there like that Governor, who will
consider it their duty to make themselves conversant with the
subject, and then be guided by their conscientious convictions.
The cause at issue is simply savagery _versus_ civilization, and
before a verdict is given the entire evidence and arguments ought
to be attentively heard and carefully considered. Colonists do not
desire war, but an end of all war. They are most anxious to save,
not to destroy, the savages, and the wise statesmanship of such men
as Sir Benjamin D'Urban, Sir George Grey, and Sir Bartle Frere is
_absolutely necessary_ for this purpose.—_May 2, 1879._
IMPORTANT DESPATCH FROM SIR BARTLE FRERE.
The following despatch from Sir Bartle Frere, dated
Pietermaritzburg, February 12, has been issued as a parliamentary
paper:—
"Sir,—In my despatch of January 24th last, I only partially
answered your despatch of December 18th. I was, in fact,
interrupted while writing by the intelligence of our disaster
at the headquarter camp on the 22nd, and was obliged to close
my unfinished despatch to be in time for the mail. The very
serious check which we received on the 22nd does not, however,
seem to me to call for any modification in the opinions I had
already ventured to lay before her Majesty's Government; on the
contrary, it seems to confirm most strongly the arguments I had
already advanced in my despatch of the 24th, to show that it was
impossible, with any regard to the safety of these colonies, to
defer placing in the hands of the general commanding her Majesty's
forces the enforcement of the demands made on Cetywayo. Deeply
as, in common with every subject of her Majesty, I deplore the
disastrous check we have received, it is impossible to shut one's
eyes to the fact that it was, in all human probability, mainly
due to disregard of the general's orders that so great a disaster
occurred; whilst every circumstance accompanying or following the
events of that day proves what an insecure position we occupied
both here and in the Transvaal with such a neighbour along so
many hundred miles of undefended frontier. As a consequence of
the crippling of Colonel Glyn's and Colonel Durnford's columns,
and the shock which has been given to the colonial forces,
Europeans as well as natives, the columns of Colonel Pearson
and Colonel Wood have been obliged to suspend their advance
and await reinforcements, which can only be looked for to the
extent required from more distant parts of South Africa and from
England. It has become painfully evident that the Zulu king has
an army at his command, which could almost any day unexpectedly
invade Natal, and, owing to the great extent of frontier and
utter helplessness of the undisciplined hordes of Natal natives
to offer effectual resistance, the Zulus might march at will
through the country, devastating and murdering, without a chance
of being checked, so long as they abstained from attacking the
entrenched posts of her Majesty's troops, which are from fifty to
a hundred miles apart. The capital and all the principal towns
are at this moment in 'laager,' prepared for attack, which, even
if successfully resisted, would leave two-thirds of them in
ashes, and the country around thoroughly desolated. From every
part of South Africa outside the colony, where the native races
predominate, come the same reports of uneasiness and of intended
rising of the native race against the white man; whilst the
majority of the Transvaal European population is in a state of
avowed readiness to take any opportunity of shaking off the yoke
of the English Government. It may be said that these are only the
stronger reasons why hostilities should not have been commenced
with the Zulu king. But I submit that every circumstance which has
lately occurred shows how impossible it is to defer hostilities
for more than a few weeks at the utmost, possibly till the harvest
now ripening was gathered, and till the Tugela was fordable. The
feeling which has just burst out, both among native tribes and
in the Transvaal, was there already, and in the Transvaal, at
all events, its expression could not have been deferred by any
postponement of hostilities with the Zulus. But what possible
chance was there that Cetywayo himself would for any length of
time have remained quiescent within his own borders? He had not
acknowledged officially, and in the usual form, the award of the
disputed territory in his favour, nor had he condescended even
to discuss the terms of the High Commissioner's messages to him.
Had Lord Chelmsford's large force been kept permanently on his
frontier, he might possibly have refrained from action as long
as this force remained. But its permanent retention was not,
as Cetywayo knew, probable, and the removal of the force would
assuredly have led to a renewal of the encroachments and the
violations of the territory which he had directed or acquiesced
in during the preceding year and a half; the slightest accident
might have led to a collision taking us at a disadvantage, and
what he had the power to do in a colony so little prepared for
self-defence may be judged from what he has done since her
Majesty's troops crossed the border. It seems to me vain, I had
almost said criminal, to shut our eyes to the fact that there
has grown up, by our sufferance, alongside this colony, a very
powerful military organization, directed by an irresponsible,
bloodthirsty, and treacherous despot, and that as long as this
organization exists and is so directed it is impossible for
peaceful subjects of her Majesty to feel security of life or
property within fifty miles of his border. The existence of this
military organization makes that of a peaceful English community
in his neighbourhood impossible, and unless Cetywayo's power of
murder and plunder be restrained, this colony can only continue
to exist as an armed camp. Again, it may be said that before
attempting to coerce Cetywayo the presence of a large force in
the field should have been secured. To this I can only answer
that though a larger force might undoubtedly have lessened the
chance of successful opposition, there was no reason whatever
at the time to suppose that the force at our disposal was too
small for the task attempted. I will not dwell on what might have
been the case had orders been obeyed, and had things happened
otherwise than they did happen. I stand on the broad fact that I
sought information in every possible quarter, and had, and have,
no reason whatever to suppose that there was anything rash in the
undertaking. I know of no one who is supposed to know the Zulus
whose advice had not been as fully heard as I could obtain it.
Of the three persons who, among unofficial as well as official
authorities, are supposed best to know the Zulus, their feelings
and probable intentions, one expressed to me his own belief in
the ultimate acceptance of the terms offered without fighting;
another considered we had, in our military calculations, greatly
over-estimated the Zulu power; and a third, who had perhaps better
means of judging than any one else, whilst agreeing that the
Zulu power had been much overrated, was convinced that the Zulu
people themselves would bring their tyrant to reason, and that,
after a single action or two, the military system of the Zulus
would collapse. It is a singular coincidence that the latter
opinion was expressed to me on the 22nd, at the very time that
our camp at Isandala was in possession of the Zulus. Looking back
on the past in the light of what has happened, I cannot think
the work was rashly undertaken. But even if I could have hoped
that further reinforcements could be expected within a reasonable
time in answer to a call for them, there was no time to wait. No
one who had carefully studied the events of the last two years,
and knew the ways of these barbarians, could reasonably have
expected the Zulus to remain quiet, and it was clear that, even
if they deferred action, there were elements of strife elsewhere
which could not be evaded or delayed. As I have said before, and
in other communications, the die for peace or for war had been
cast more than two years ago. It was a simple question whether
we should steadily bring our differences to an issue on a clear
and unmistakable demand for our right to live at peace with our
neighbours, or whether we should await the convenience of the Zulu
king, and be taken at disadvantage when he saw his opportunity.
It seems to me that this same principle of self-preservation and
self-defence should be steadfastly adhered to in all our future
proceedings. It may be quite possible to patch up a peace with
this or that tribe, which shall for the time be more or less
satisfactory to some of the interests in this or in a neighbouring
colony. But I submit that her Majesty's Government should not
permit peace to be made till her Majesty's unquestioned supremacy
has been established and recognized by all Zulu tribes who now
acknowledge Cetywayo between this and the Portuguese territory
around Delagoa Bay. This I firmly believe to be the only guarantee
for peace, security, good government, and progressive civilization
throughout her Majesty's possessions and all neighbouring
territories in South Africa; and without such security I feel
assured that this colony of Natal can never be a safe residence
for peace-loving and civilized men of European descent.
"H. B. E. FRERE,
Governor and High Commissioner."
LONDON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET AND
CHARING CROSS.
[Illustration]
C. S. WINDOVER,
Coach Builder.
By special appointment to Her Majesty the Queen, H.R.H. the Prince
of Wales, and Her Imperial Majesty the Empress of Austria,
32 & 33, LONG ACRE, LONDON; HUNTINGDON; AND 25, LOWER KING STREET,
MANCHESTER,
[Illustration]
Begs to introduce his manufactures to the Nobility and Gentry as
being unsurpassed in style, finish, strength, and durability,
combined with lightness and adaptability for the purposes for which
they are specially built, whether pleasure or business.
C. S. WINDOVER, having resided for some years in Australia,
America, and India, has there gained the experience necessary to
enable him to select the various materials absolutely requisite to
construct carriages suitable for the Colonies, and his especial
care having been given to the construction of such carriages,
they will stand the vicissitudes of the climates. This experience
naturally gives him an advantage over all other English Carriage
Builders.
Carriages are built at prices which, taking quality into
consideration, cannot be surpassed.
All orders will have prompt attention, and will be shipped in
the shortest space of time. The whole constructed on the best
principles from C. S. WINDOVER'S immense stock of seasoned
materials.
Carriages shipped in all cases by the lowest possible running
freights.
N.B.—A selection of designs, with Quotations, with a List of
Patrons, to be seen in _The African Mail_.
C. WINDOVER has been awarded first-class Gold and Silver Medals at
the foreign Exhibitions at Santiago, Philadelphia, London, Vienna,
Moscow, and Paris, 1878.
The immense success which has attended these carriages at the
various Exhibitions in different parts of the world, and the large
number of orders taken at the Paris International Exhibition, is a
sufficient proof of their stability and adaptability to all roads,
countries, and climates.
The Standard Bank of British South Africa
LIMITED,
10, CLEMENT'S LANE, LOMBARD STREET,
LONDON, E.C.
Nominal Capital £4,000,000
Subscribed Capital 3,400,000
Paid-up Capital 850,000
Reserve Fund 315,000
Directors.
SIR HY. BARELY, K.C.B. G.C.M.G. │ DANIEL MACKENZIE, ESQ.
ALEXANDER CROLL, ESQ. │ ROBERT WHITE, ESQ.
SIR WM. HY. DRAKE, K.C.B. │ EDWARD WYLD, ESQ.
FREDERICK GREENE, ESQ. │
│
Bankers.
THE BANK OF ENGLAND. │ THE ALLIANCE BANK.
│
Auditors.
JAMES GLEGG, ESQ. │ FREDK. MAYNARD, ESQ.
Chief Manager.
ROBERT STEWART, ESQ.
Assistant Manager.
JOHN CHUMLEY, ESQ.
Secretary.
HENRY FROST, ESQ.
Joint General Managers in the South African Colonies.
GILBERT FARIE, ESQ., AND HUGH C. ROSS, ESQ.
Inspector of Branches.
REES WILLIAMS, ESQ.
Assistant Inspectors.
JAMES DARGIE, ESQ. │ ALEXR. MAIR, ESQ.
W. H. RENNIE, ESQ. │ RICHARD SEYMOUR, ESQ.
────────┴─────────
THE STANDARD BANK OF BRITISH AFRICA, LIMITED, LONDON, ISSUES
LETTERS OF CREDIT AND DRAFTS on its Branches in South Africa;
RECEIVES DEPOSITS at favourable Rates of Interest, which are
regulated by the amount and the length of time for which the
Deposits are made; at present it allows interest at the rate of £4
per cent. per annum for twelve months fixed.
OPENS CURRENT ACCOUNTS for the convenience of its South African
constituents;
NEGOTIATES AND COLLECTS BILLS payable in any part of the South
African Colonies;
MAKES ADVANCES against produce shipped, on receipt of Bills of
Lading, Policies of Insurance, and Invoices;
UNDERTAKES THE AGENCY of persons connected with the Colonies;
and receives for safe custody Colonial Securities, Shares, &c.,
drawing Interest and Dividends on the same as they fall due;
UNDERTAKES all other descriptions of South African Banking and
Monetary business, and affords every facility to persons in their
transactions with South Africa.
LONDON, MAY, 1879.
[Illustration]
FARROW & JACKSON,
18, GT. TOWER STREET, LONDON,
WINE AND SPIRIT MERCHANTS' ENGINEERS.
Manufacturers of Iron Wine Bins, Beer Engines, Corking,
Bottling, and Bottle Washing Machines, Bar Fittings for Spirit
Stores, Bottle Wax, Bottle Seals with Shifting Centres, Taps,
Porcelain and Glass Casks, Bottle Baskets, Soda Water Machines,
Refrigerators, Knife Cleaning Machines, and every other Article
used in the Liquor Trades.
[Illustration]
CATALOGUES FREE ON APPLICATION.
In ordering it is well to have the Packages filled with Corks, to
save Freight.
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, NATAL, ZANZIBAR, AND EAST AFRICAN
ROYAL MAIL SERVICE.
UNION STEAM SHIP COMPANY (LIMITED)
ESTABLISHED 1853.
FLEET.
Tonnage. Horse-power.
TROJAN 3600 3400
PRETORIA 3199 3000
ARAB 3170 3000
NUBIAN 3091 1800
GERMAN 3028 2650
DURBAN 2874 2800
AMERICAN 2474 1500
TEUTON 2313 1800
ANGLIAN 2274 1400
NYANZA 2128 1500
ASIATIC 2087 1100
DANUBE 2038 1200
AFRICAN 2019 1400
ROMAN 1850 1200
NATAL 734 523
UNION 113 60
THE SERVICE.
_The UNION STEAM SHIP COMPANY (Limited) has Three Distinct
Services:_—
1st.—The Mail Service with the Colonies of the Cape of Good Hope
and Natal.
2nd.—The Direct Port Elizabeth and Natal Service.
3rd.—The Cape, Natal, and Zanzibar Mail Service.
CAPE MAIL SERVICE.—The Packets leave Plymouth (under Contract with
the Cape of Good Hope Government) every alternate Friday, sailing
from Southampton the preceding day. The days for departure from
Cape Town homeward are every alternate Tuesday. The time occupied
between Plymouth and Cape Town is about 22 days.
DIRECT PORT ELIZABETH AND NATAL STEAMERS are despatched from
Southampton every fourth Friday (unless circumstances prevent),
and from Plymouth the following day. These Steamers proceed
through to Zanzibar. The time usually occupied to Port Elizabeth
is about 24 days, and to Natal about 28 days.
CAPE AND NATAL SERVICE.—A large and powerful Intercolonial Steamer
is despatched from Cape Town immediately after the arrival of
each fortnightly Ocean Steamer. The Intercolonial Steamers are
despatched from Natal every alternate Tuesday, connecting at
Cape Town with the Company's homeward-bound Mail Steamers. It
is anticipated the passage between England and Natal, and _vice
versâ_, will be accomplished under 28 days usually. The passage
between Cape Town and Natal is expected to occupy about 5 days.
CAPE, NATAL, AND ZANZIBAR MAIL SERVICE, under Contract with Her
Majesty's Government. The Steamers in this Service leave Cape
Town, Cape of Good Hope, every Fourth Wednesday, and, after
calling at all intermediate Ports, connect at Zanzibar with the
British India Steamers to Aden, Bombay, &c., and thence to Ports
in India, China, and Australia. The time occupied from Cape Town
to Zanzibar is about 20 days, and from England to Zanzibar about
44 days.
Passengers and Goods are conveyed by the Union Steam Ship Company's
Steamers in the Cape Mail Service to Cape Town, Mossel Bay, Port
Elizabeth (Algoa Bay), Port Alfred (Kowie River), East London
and Natal, and by each alternate Mail Steamer to Delagoa Bay,
Quillimane, Mozambique and Zanzibar. Passengers only for Inhambane
are also carried by each alternate Mail Steamer, and Passengers and
Goods for St. Helena at stated intervals.
The Steamers in the Direct Port Elizabeth and Natal Service convey
Passengers and Goods for Port Elizabeth and Natal, and call at East
London to land Passengers only.
All Steamers out and home call at Madeira, and the homeward Mail
Steamers call at St. Helena and Ascension at regular intervals.
For rates of Freight and Passage Money apply to—
Messrs. STUMORE, WESTON & Co., 20, Water Street, Liverpool.
Mr. F. W. ALLAN, 15, Gordon Street, Glasgow.
Messrs. KELLER, WALLIS & Co., 73, Piccadilly, Manchester.
Messrs. CAROLIN & EGAN, 30, Eden Quay, Dublin.
Messrs. H. J. WARING & Co., The Wharf, Millbay, Plymouth.
Or at the Company's Offices,
ORIENTAL PLACE, SOUTHAMPTON,
AND
11, LEADENHALL STREET, LONDON.
SOUTH AFRICAN ROYAL MAIL SERVICE.
LONDON LINE OF STEAMERS.
THE COLONIAL MAIL LINE OF STEAMSHIPS
[Illustration]
(_carrying Her Majesty's Mails_)
BETWEEN
ENGLAND AND SOUTH AFRICA,
Sail from London every alternate Tuesday, and from Dartmouth for
Cape Town every alternate Friday.
Extra Steamers are despatched from London and Dartmouth every 28
days, and oftener if required by the Trade.
LIST OF VESSELS.
Tons. Tons.
"KINFAUNS CASTLE" 3507 │ "GRANTULLY CASTLE" 3489
"WARWICK CASTLE" 2957 │ "CONWAY CASTLE" 2966
"BALMORAL CASTLE" 2948 │ "EDINBURGH CASTLE" 2678
"DUBLIN CASTLE" 2911 │ "WALMER CASTLE" 2446
"DUNROBIN CASTLE" 2811 │ "TAYMOUTH CASTLE" 1827
"DUART CASTLE" 1825 │ "DUNKELD" 1158
"LAPLAND" 1269 │ "MELROSE" 840
"ELIZABETH MARTIN" 1246 │ "FLORENCE" 695
"COURLAND" 1241 │ "VENICE" 511
Mails, Passengers, and Goods conveyed to and from Cape Town, Mossel
Bay, Port Elizabeth (Algoa Bay), Port Alfred (Kowie River), East
London and Natal. The Royal Mail Steamers call at Madeira, and, at
stated intervals, at St. Helena and Ascension.
=Mauritius.=—The Mail packets of the above Line convey Mails
and Passengers for MAURITIUS once every four weeks. Transhipment is
effected at Cape Town. Cargo for Mauritius is taken fortnightly by
the Mail Steamers from London.
=Delagoa Bay.=—A similar service, once every four weeks, is
conducted by the Company between Cape Town and Lourenço Marquez
(Delagoa Bay) for the transhipment of mails, passengers, and goods
to and from the Steamers of the British India Steam Navigation
Company for Zanzibar and Aden.
All goods to be marked with the name of Port of Destination.
Passengers embark either in London or at Dartmouth. All heavy
baggage must be shipped in London. Twenty cubic feet allowed to
each adult passenger freight free; all in excess will be charged
for.
All letters to be addressed "_viâ_ Dartmouth." Postage, 6_d._ per
half-ounce to East and South Africa; and 4_d._ per half-ounce to
Mauritius.
Particulars of rates for South African Telegrams, _viâ_ Madeira,
or by through Cable, _viâ_ Aden and Zanzibar, can be obtained
at Postal Telegraph Stations, or at the Offices of the Eastern
Telegraph Company (Limited).
For Dates of Sailing, Freight, Passage, or any further information,
apply to the Owners:—
DONALD CURRIE & Co.,
LONDON—3 and 4, Fenchurch Street, E.C.; MANCHESTER—11, Commercial
Buildings, Cross Street; LIVERPOOL—23 and 25 Castle Street; and in
GLASGOW or LEITH to Messrs. James Currie & Co.
PARIS EXHIBITION, 1878.—HIGHEST AWARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN.
THE ONLY GOLD MEDAL.
[Illustration]
PATENT
PIANOFORTE MANUFACTURERS,
235, REGENT STREET, LONDON, W.,
AND
5 & 6, COMMERCIAL STREET, LEEDS.
AWARDED
THE PRIZE MEDAL OF THE GREAT EXHIBITION, LONDON, 1851.
THE GOLD MEDAL OF HONOUR, PARIS EXHIBITION, 1855.
THE PRIZE MEDAL OF THE GREAT EXHIBITION, LONDON, 1862,
_For_ "_Great Excellence of Tone._"
THE GOLD MEDAL AND DIPLOMA OF HONOUR,
SOUTH AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION, 1877.
THE ONLY GOLD MEDAL FOR GREAT BRITAIN, PARIS, 1878,
_For_ "_Pianos of various Models—Good quality and improved
Mechanism._"
PRICES FROM 25 TO 200 GUINEAS.
Iron-framed and other Pianofortes made especially for Exportation.
_ILLUSTRATED LISTS FORWARDED ON APPLICATION._
Manufactory—FITZROY ROAD, PRIMROSE HILL, LONDON, N.W.
MR. HAROLD STEPHENS,
ATTORNEY OF THE HIGH & CIRCUIT COURTS,
NOTARY PUBLIC AND CONVEYANCER,
PRETORIA, TRANSVAAL, SOUTH AFRICA.
_Cases Conducted in the High Circuit and Landrosts
Courts of the Transvaal._
NOTARIAL DEEDS PREPARED.
_TITLES TO LAND CAREFULLY INSPECTED._
REAL PROPERTY TRANSFERRED OR MORTGAGED.
AGENCIES UNDERTAKEN.
AGENTS BY APPOINTMENT IN THE TRANSVAAL FOR THE
Lion Fire Assurance Company of London.
MR. B. T. KNIGHTS,
Attorney of the High Court of Griqualand, and of the Transvaal,
NOTARY PUBLIC & CONVEYANCER.
Cases conducted in the High and Circuit Courts of the Transvaal and
Griqualand West; also in the Lower Courts of these Colonies.
NOTARIAL DEEDS PREPARED.
_Titles to Land carefully Inspected._
REAL PROPERTY MORTGAGED AND TRANSFERRED.
AGENT BY APPOINTMENT OF THE
Lion Fire Assurance Company of London.
ADDRESS—
KIMBERLEY, DIAMOND FIELDS,
SOUTH AFRICA.
IRON HOUSES.
GALVANIZED CORRUGATED IRON,
PERFORATED ZINC,
AND ALL GALVANIZED AND ZINC GOODS.
FRED. BRABY & COMPY.,
WORKS—LONDON, LIVERPOOL, AND GLASGOW.
EXPORT OFFICE—120, CANNON ST., LONDON.
_Catalogues and full particulars furnished on application, but all
Orders must be sent through responsible merchants._
F. BRABY & CO., pay special attention to Quality Iron, and
Colonists desirous of obtaining excellence in this respect will
find it to their advantage to use the
"Sun" Brand of Galvanized Corrugated Iron for Roofing.
"Ida" Brand Flat Annealed Sheets for Working-up.
[Illustration]
GEORGE CARLEY & CO.,
30, ELY PLACE,
HOLBORN, LONDON, E.C.,
Watch and Chronometer Manufacturers.
Keyless Half Quarter and Minute Repeaters, Chronographs, Perpetual
Calendars, Independent Seconds, Central Seconds, and other
complicated Watches always in Stock.
Special Keyless and all kinds of Adjusted Compensation Balance
Watches, adapted for changes of climate, in Gold and Silver cases.
_Excellence of Workmanship combined with Moderate Prices._
ESTABLISHED HALF A CENTURY.
HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE.
SPECIALLY MANUFACTURED FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN MARKET.
[Illustration]
G. BARTHOLOMEW & CO.,
CABINET MAKERS AND UPHOLSTERERS,
FINSBURY, LONDON, E.C.
ILLUSTRATED CATALOGUES FREE.
_Orders may be sent direct or through any London Merchant._
JOHN WALKER
(_late of the Firm of WM. COLLINS, SONS & CO._)
AND
COMPANY,
PUBLISHERS,
WHOLESALE AND EXPORT STATIONERS,
96, Farringdon Street, London, E.C.
SPECIAL FACILITIES FOR THE CAPE TRADE.
CATALOGUES IN PREPARATION.
DEPARTMENTS.
_BIBLE DEPARTMENT,
ACCOUNT BOOK DEPARTMENT,
PAPER AND ENVELOPE DEPARTMENT,
MISCELLANEOUS STATIONERY._
SAMPLES ON APPLICATION.
96, FARRINGDON STREET, LONDON, E.C.
N. J. POWELL & CO.,
WHOLESALE AND EXPORT
MANUFACTURING STATIONERS,
Offices—101, WHITECHAPEL, LONDON.
[Illustration]
_An Illustrated Price List will be forwarded upon Application,
containing_
ACCOUNT BOOKS, │ POCKET BOOKS, │ POCKET LEDGERS,
COPYING BOOKS, │ WALLETS, DIARIES, │ ENVELOPES,
MEMORANDUM BOOKS, │ BLOTTING CASES, │ NOTE PAPER FOOLSCAP,
METALLIC BOOKS, │ BLOTTING PADS, │ PRINTING PAPERS, &c.
GENERAL STATIONERY.
PARTRIDGE & COOPER,
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL
MANUFACTURING STATIONERS,
_191 & 192, Fleet Street, and 1 & 2, Chancery Lane, London_.
Carriage Paid to the Country on all Orders over 20s.
THE PUBLIC SUPPLIED AT WHOLESALE PRICES WITH
NOTE PAPER AND ENVELOPES.
RELIEF STAMPING REDUCED IN PRICE. NO CHARGE FOR PLAIN STAMPING.
The Vellum Wove Club House Note Paper, combines a perfectly smooth
surface with perfect freedom from grease.
_Sample Packets of different sizes of Paper and Envelopes sent Post
Free for Twenty-four stamps._
ILLUSTRATED CATALOGUES, WITH SAMPLES. SENT POST FREE ON
APPLICATION.
INKS FOR HOT CLIMATES.
STEPHENS'
WRITING FLUIDS & COPYING INK
_Have obtained the Highest Awards every time they have been
Exhibited._
PARIS, HAVRE, AMSTERDAM, LYONS,
1867, 1876, 1868. 1869. 1872.
and 1879.
VIENNA, PHILADELPHIA,
1873. 1876.
They embrace the higher qualities of
WRITING AND COPYING INKS
And each possesses some special character adapted to the many
different requirements of Correspondence and the Counting House.
These distinctive features, and their general excellence, make
them preferable to, and more widely useful than the ordinary class
of manufactures.
STEPHENS' BLUE BLACK WRITING-FLUID.
STEPHENS' BLUE BLACK COPYING FLUID.
STEPHENS' SCARLET INK FOR STEEL PENS.
_The above are particularly adapted for hot climates, extremely
fluid, but becoming intense and durable colours._
And every description of Writing and Copying Ink, Quills, Gum
Mucilage (to resist fermentation in hot climates), and Sealing Wax,
Manufactured by
HENRY C. STEPHENS, CHEMIST,
WHOLESALE AND FOR EXPORT, AT
171, ALDERSGATE STREET, LONDON, E.C.
SOLD BY ALL BOOKSELLERS AND STATIONERS.
WHOLESOME HOUSES.
[Illustration] [Illustration]
BANNER'S SYSTEM
OF
HOUSE DRAINAGE
AND
SANITATION.
BANNER'S PATENT
VENTILATING COWL.
_No House having a Water Closet in it should be without one fixed
on the Soil Pipe carried above the Roof, and for the Ventilation
of Public Buildings and Rooms they surpass any Ventilator yet
introduced._
OPINIONS OF THE PRESS, Etc.
"Ventilate! Ventilate! Ventilate!"—PUBLIC HEALTH.
"The word 'impossible' has ceased to exist in the vocabulary of
the sanitary reformer; if a prevalent evil ought to be removed, it
can be removed."—TIMES.
"The system devised by Mr. Banner is as near perfection as may
be: nothing better need be desired. By means of this simple
apparatus the _foul air_ in _any shaft_ will be continuously
extracted."—SANITARY RECORD.
"We believe Mr. Banner's system of sanitation will make any
house absolutely safe from sewer gas or noxious odours of any
description from the drains or closets."—ARCHITECT.
"One lesson which Mr. Banner has learned, namely, that to make a
ventilating-pipe of constant avail air must be introduced at the
bottom, is of itself a boon of value."—THE BUILDER.
"A thorough current of air is constantly maintained by an inlet
placed just above the trap, and an outlet above the roof, to which
is annexed the cowl, preventing any downdraught. A velocity of
510 feet per minute was registered by an anemometer under very
ordinary circumstances."—BUILDING NEWS.
"The conclusion I have come to after a considerable time spent
upon their study is, that Banner's Sanitary Appliances are the
best media extant for the work which they are intended to compass,
that I can confidently recommend them, and that they ought to be
specified by architects generally."—WM. EASSIE, C.E., author of
"Sanitary Arrangements for Dwellings."
"Mr. Banner's system thoroughly effects what it proposes—namely,
to render houses wholesome which are now mere deadly fever-traps,
whether they be mansions in Belgravia or cottages in the
suburbs."—JOHN P. SEDDON, F.R.I.B.A.
"Mr. Banner's system fulfils all the conditions specified in the
contract. There is no foul air generated. The several currents in
the soil-pipe, in the drain, and in the large sewers—a channel of
350 feet in length—have uniformly been found to be flowing in the
right direction whenever they have been tested; and this has been
done repeatedly."—GUY'S HOSPITAL GAZETTE.
"I believe in your cowls, and I think that probably I am as
impartial a judge as can be had, yet I candidly confess that if
I knew of a better cowl I would most certainly employ it."—H. H.
COLLINS, F.R.I.B.A.
"Your system at the Royal Infirmary, Ryde, continues to act
perfectly, and I am applying it everywhere."—THOS. HELLYER,
F.R.I.B.A.
"The system introduced by Mr. Banner has now undergone a
crucial test, and can only be looked upon as a great _fait
accompli_."—METROPOLITAN.
"I must say, in justice to Mr. Banner, that the greatest possible
credit is due to him for having succeeded in solving a problem
which has hitherto baffled all the combined talent of the best
sanitary authorities of the day."—Major H. C. SEDDON, R.E., War
Office.
The system is substantially recommended by the Local Government
Board, and should be universally adopted. Amongst a number of
important places far too numerous to mention, the system has been
applied, wholly or partially, at Marlborough House, Stafford
House, Burghley, Crom Castle, Kylemore Castle; Guy's, Ryde, West
Herts, Middlesex, and other Hospitals; Bank of England, City Bank,
Standard Bank of Africa, and other Banks; at Radcliffe College,
Oxford; Presbyterian College, Bloomsbury; New City Liberal, Naval
and Military, Thatched House, and other Clubs; and at the Council
Chamber, Guildhall.
FOR PARTICULARS, ADDRESS E. G. BANNER, C.E.
No. 11, BILLITER SQUARE, LONDON, E.C.
THE GOLD REGIONS OF
SOUTH EASTERN AFRICA,
BY THE LATE
THOMAS BAINES, ESQ., F.R.G.S.,
(_Dedicated by Special Permission to H.R.H. Prince Alfred._)
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WITH MAGNIFICENT MAP
Of the Country, between the Vaal and Zambesi Rivers—With the Route
marked out by this celebrated Traveller—Comprising the seat of War
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which is annexed a Map of the Cape Colonies.
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FOOTNOTES:
[1] Cape Colonists _versus_ Natives; also despatch of Sir Bartle
Frere, dated 12th February, 1879.
[2] Strange to say, this Captain Allen Gardiner met the same cruel
death some years afterwards, in South America.
[3] The names of the principal Englishmen killed are—R. Biggar,
Cane, Stubbs, Richard Wood, William Wood, Henry Batt, John
Campbell, Thomas Campbell, and Thomas Carden.
[4] The Dutch say 3000 Zulus were killed; but this is probably a
great exaggeration.
[5] Proclamation in the Government _Gazette_.
[6] Called after a Dutchman named Pieter Maritz.
[7] A little vessel, the _Mazeppa_, Captain Cato, escaped from the
inner harbour, although fired upon by the Boers, and proceeded to
Delagoa Bay in order to obtain assistance. She found no British
man-of-war there, and on her return to Natal H.M.S. _Southampton_
had arrived.
[8] The writer has been assured of this by old inhabitants, who
spoke the Zulu tongue like natives, and had been brought up with
Zulu refugees. There is no doubt whatever that if Cetywayo had
entered Natal with a large victorious army, one of the most awful
massacres on record would have been the result.
[9] "History of the Colony of Natal," p. 205.
[10] Sir George Grey, writing many years ago, tells us of the
Maories in New Zealand, that nearly the whole nation has now been
converted to Christianity; that they are fond of agriculture; take
great pleasure in cattle and horses; like the sea and form good
sailors, have now many coasting vessels of their own; are attached
to Europeans, and admire their customs and manners; and that they
are extremely ambitious of rising in civilization, and becoming
skilled in European arts.
[11] "The Past and Future of the Kafir Races," p. 198.
[12] The common price of a wife is from ten to twelve head of
cattle, but a strong and young woman of good muscular frame often
commands as many as fifty oxen. When the sale is completed, the
woman must go into slavery, and, if she run away, is frequently
hunted for with dogs.
[13] "Kafir Races," p. 287.
[14] The Hon. Mr. Godlonton, in his case for the colonists, gives
us details of one of the very numerous cases of torture inflicted
on men whose only guilt was their wealth, and who fell victims
to the avarice of their tormentors. Although this poor victim
implored for death, it was not granted to him until he had been
literally roasted. Red-hot stones were placed on his groin, and
when they slipped off, were held in position by means of sticks.
Another very common torture is that of smearing a victim, and then
allowing him to be slowly eaten up by black ants or scorpions,
whose thousand bites and stings produce lingering and excruciating
torture. All these infernal proceedings take place in connection
with the spiritualist religion, and are carried out by the order
and direction of its priests.
[15] For proof of these charges see "Jeppe-Transvaal Book Almanack
for 1879." Gideon Steyn, who reported the existence of slavery to
Sir P. E. Wodehouse in 1869, was fired at in Potchefstroom.
[16] Sir Garnet Wolseley, quoted in the _Contemporary Review_,
June, 1879.
[17] For a description of this ceremony, see Baines's South Africa.
This traveller was present on the occasion.
[18] Memorandum by his Excellency the High Commissioner, January,
1879.
[19] The High Commissioner writes: "Government has done its best
to avoid war by every means consistent with honour, and now feels
bound to use the power with which it has been entrusted to secure
the future peace and safety alike of her Majesty's dominions in
South Africa, and of the Zulus and all other neighbouring tribes
and people."—Memorandum of his Excellency the High Commissioner,
13th January, 1879.
With reference to the disputed Transvaal land awarded to Cetywayo,
it has been argued that the territory in question should have
been handed over to this savage potentate without any reference
to the rights of private proprietors who had settled down and
acquired domiciles. The Chief Justice of the Cape Colony, Sir J.
H. De Villiers (Blue Book, July, 1879), gives a very lengthy and
interesting opinion upon this subject. His Honour holds that if
negotiations had been entered into between the British Government
and Cetywayo for the purpose of a convention defining the mutual
rights of the parties, the equitable view would have been entitled
to as much weight as the legal view. The arguments used by Sir
Bartle Frere are so weighty, that if they had been addressed to a
potentate who is capable of understanding them, and at the same
time is open to reason, they would certainly have induced him to
relinquish his private rights to the land, retaining only his
sovereign rights.
[20] Despatch of the Lieutenant-General commanding-in-chief to the
Secretary of State, 14th January, 1879.
[21] Extract from semi-official letter to the High Commissioner,
dated 12th January, 1879.
[22] Lieutenant-Colonel Crealock—Statement to Court-Martial.
[23] Major Clery, chief of the staff, third column—Evidence before
Court-Martial.
[24] See Statement by Natives, and Statement by W. Drummond,
Headquarters Staff.—Blue Books.
[25] See Statement of Lieutenant-Colonel Crealock, Acting Military
Secretary.
[26] This excludes the sick, who were thirty-five in number.
[27] See report from Colonel Schermbrucker to Colonel Evelyn
Wood.—Parliamentary Blue Book.
[28] The excellent conduct of Governor Janisch, of St. Helena, in
despatching troops in H.M.S. _Shah_ to Natal so soon as he received
intelligence of the Isandhlwana disaster, forms the subject of a
special despatch of thanks and appreciation from the Right Hon. the
Secretary of State for the Colonies.
[29] The _City of Paris_ touched the Roman Rock, in Simon's Bay;
the _Tamar_ had to take on her troops.
[30] The _Manora_ made the passage to Simon's Bay in 19 days, 23
hours. Her average speed was 13.5 miles per hour.
[31] One who was there, writing in _Blackwood's Magazine_, tells
us: "On the afternoon of the 3rd (April) the column detailed on
the 31st March, about 500 whites and 50 blacks, and the mounted
infantry with one gun, left the fort, under General Pearson, to
meet the relief column.... A solitary horseman is seen towards 5
p.m., galloping up the new road to the fort: he had an officer's
coat on, and we could see a sword dangling from his side. Who
is he?... He proved to be the correspondent of the _Standard_.
'First in Ekowe,' he said; 'proud to shake hands with an
Ekoweian.' A second horseman appeared, approaching the fort, his
horse apparently much blown. Who is he? The correspondent of the
_Argus_ (Cape Town). They had a race who would be first in Ekowe,
the _Standard_ winning by five minutes. Thus, it was two Press
correspondents who distanced every one and were the first men to
arrive."
Four officers and twenty-seven men were buried at Ekowe. Two
hundred sick officers and men were taken to hospital; Captain Wynne
and Lieutenant Thirkell died shortly after.
[32] The following is a brief biography of this distinguished
officer:—General Henry Evelyn Wood, V.C., C.B., of the 90th
Regiment, and commanding the column at Kambula, entered the Royal
Navy in 1852, and served in the Naval Brigade as A.D.C. to Captain
Peel, of the _Shannon_, from 1st October, 1854, to 18th January,
1855, when he was severely wounded carrying up scaling ladders to
the Redan. He was mentioned in Lord Raglan's despatches (medal
with clasps, Knight of the Legion of Honour, 5th Class of the
Medjidie and Turkish medal). He next served in the Indian campaign
of 1858 in the 17th Lancers, and as brigade-major in Somerset's
Brigade, and was present at Rajghur, Sindwaho (mentioned in General
Michel's despatches), Kharie, and Barode, mentioned in despatches
(medal). In 1859-60 he was employed, while commanding 1st Regiment
Beatson's Horse, in hunting down rebels in the Seronge jungles;
thanked by the Indian Government for his services, and received the
Victoria Cross. He raised the 2nd Regiment Central Indian Horse.
Accompanied Sir Garnet Wolseley to the Gold Coast in September,
1873, on special service, and served throughout the Ashantee war of
1873-4. Organized the natives forming "Wood's Regiment." Commanded
the attacking force at the action of Essaman (received the
expression of her Majesty's approbation). Commanded the troops at
the head of the road, following the enemy from Mansu to the river
Piah, prior to the arrival of the European troops, including the
reconnaisance in force of the 27th November. Commanded the right
column at the battle of Amoaful (slightly wounded), and commanded
the head-quarters of his regiment at the battle of Ordahsu and
capture of Coomassie (several times mentioned in despatches,
brevet of colonel, C.B., medal with clasps). His Victoria Cross
was gained for having, on the 19th of October, 1858, during action
at Sandwaho, when in command of a troop of the 3rd Light Cavalry,
attacked with much gallantry, almost single-handed, a body of
rebels who had made a stand, whom he routed. Also, for having,
subsequently, near Sindwaho, gallantly advanced with a duffadar
and sowar of Beatson's Horse, and rescued from a band of robbers a
potail, Chemmum Singh, whom they had captured and carried off to
the jungles, where they intended to hang him.
[33] Captain Bradshaw, of H.M.S. _Shah_, accompanied Captain Smith
of the _Forester_. Mr. G. C. Cato, one of the oldest and most
respected inhabitants of Natal, furnished important information
with regard to a landing-place on the coast, and went in H.M.S.
_Forester_ to assist in choosing one.
[34] A resident on the Tugela, writing to the _Natal Mercury_ on
the 7th of May, 1879, says, "It is my deliberate opinion that were
the Zulus to cross the Tugela in force anywhere between Toohey's
Drift and Fort Buckingham, they might avoid the military and make a
raid into Natal easily. The general commanding has done all in his
power to protect the border, by placing native guards, under white
men, all along it; but their only use will be to give the alarm
in case the Zulus attack. I have seen many of them, and I have
asked them what they will do if the Zulus make an attack. 'Run, of
course,' was the reply; and I have heard—not from them, but from
a third person—that they have said, 'If our officers order us to
cross the Tugela unsupported by white troops, we shall tell them to
kill us in Natal, and save themselves the trouble of taking us to
Zululand to be killed.' I therefore look upon the border guard as
utterly worthless as a means of defence, and two at least of the
volunteers at Thring's Post—intelligent men they are—entirely agree
with me.
"What may be the state of affairs at Cetywayo's kraal I know not;
but this I do know, namely, that all along the Tugela border the
Zulus have returned to and occupied their kraals, and that they
sometimes shout defiance and exchange shots with the border guards."
[35] A few particulars connected with the gallant Schermbrucker's
movements cannot fail to be of interest. Having assumed command
on April 15th, he directed his first attention to Luneberg, where
he arrived with Colonel Bray, C.B., about the middle of May,
when he reconnoitred in preparation for an attack upon Tafelberg
(Umbellini's caves), accompanied by Captain Moore, 4th Regiment,
and an orderly. They got too far within the enemy's lines, and
with river and a dangerous donga between them, on the road back
to camp found themselves attacked by about fifty Zulus, all armed
with Martini-Henry rifles. The commandant was unarmed, except his
British bull-dog (a little revolver). His horse was shot under him;
Captain Moore's fell, also shot down dead. The orderly mounted
behind the commandant was thrown again and again, whilst the Zulus
came closer and closer. At last the orderly got somewhat confused
and could not be remounted. He went down to the river to find a
hole where he could eventually defend himself; Captain Moore then
mounted behind the commandant, and after a fearful ride through
the Zulus' bullets, which whistled about them like hailstones,
they at last gained the camp. Without a minute's delay he started
off with twenty mounted men to the relief of Larson (the name of
the orderly). Alas! the poor fellow had disappeared. All searching
was in vain, not the vestige of a spoor could be detected. On May
20th Tafelberg was attacked. One hundred Zulus in well-entrenched
positions poured in a deadly fire. Lieutenant Gown, of the 4th
Regiment, distinguished himself in a gallant charge, and the enemy
were driven back into their caves and holes.—Extract from private
letters.
[36] The following information is from a colonist whose character
and experience render him an unexceptionable witness. He says, "As
a resident of many years in Zululand, I have had some experience
and means of observation. The year before the Commission sat at
Rorke's Drift, the chief Usirayo built his head kraal at Usogexe,
and a strong stone wall with loopholes round it; and his people
often told me that they hoped to use them against the white men.
They often talked about war; and I more than once remonstrated with
Usirayo and his people, telling them that they should take care
not to bring about a war with 'abelungu' (the white men), as it
would be worse for themselves, but in vain, as they felt confident
in their guns and their numbers. Cetywayo once sent an ox-hide to
Sir T. Shepstone, and said, if he could count the hair on it, he
would perhaps be able to form an idea of the number of the Zulu
warriors; but I do not think the hide reached its destination. When
the Commission was sitting at Rorke's Drift, Usirayo threatened
to destroy the men and tents, if they came across the Buffalo to
inspect the border line, near Usirayo's head kraal, where you
still see the stone heaps left since the beacons. I warned the
Commission through a missionary, and the late Colonel Durnford
noted it. The Zulus have bought their thousands of guns, for the
purpose of using them against the whites; have bought most of
their ammunition with the same intention; have engaged people
from Basutoland to teach them to make powder; and they have had a
good deal of training in shooting. When Umbellini committed his
first massacre at Umpongolo—I think in 1877—he went to the king,
who adorned him with the usual sign of an 'iqawe' (a plucky and
brave fellow); so it seems to be little use in saying the king
did not agree with the rascal in his doings, as somebody seems
to mean. Why did the king allow Usirayo and his people to steal
horses, cattle, and sheep from the Boers, year after year, without
punishing them? Why did he not at once punish Usirayo and his men,
for crossing the border with arms last winter, and dragging away
the poor women, who had fled for their lives? Why has he tried to
rouse other tribes against the whites? Why did he not care for the
promises made at the coronation? He wished for war, and he has got
it; and that which brought him to that madness is chiefly this:
First, that he despised the Gospel, of which he knows a good deal,
and would not allow his people to become Christians; secondly,
because the Christian Government would not allow him to make war
upon other tribes, as his forefathers had done; and thirdly, his
strong belief that he should succeed in exterminating the whites,
because he thought them only a handful, and his own soldiers as
plentiful as grass—which phrase he often uses with regard to them
in conversation. Could he but get rid of the whites, he would soon
subdue the black tribes—that has been his hope. And now we must be
thankful to God, who sent such a man as Sir Bartle Frere to save
the colonists from such a blow as Cetywayo intended to have aimed
at them."
[37] Paragraphs such as the following would frequently recur. A
correspondent at the Lower Tugela writes, in May, "Knowing that
the reinforcements have arrived, looking at and counting the
forces now in the field, seeing the waggon road full of starving
oxen which will very soon be unable to work, while the grass grows
dry and scarce, and no sign is seen of the troops being ready to
move, the talk in the papers of months being likely to pass before
any operation can begin again, etc., really makes you sad and
despairing, and causes you to fear that the whole Zulu war will
be a failure. If any of the successes the English troops have had
could have been followed up by speedy advances, the war would have
been finished long ago; but as it is, it gives the enemy plenty of
time to collect and reorganize, thinking that the English, checked
by some unknown difficulties, must give it up at last altogether.
If the campaign is to be directed from home it will be a failure,
without doubt. Had the troops been able to advance a fortnight
ago, we might now have seen something of the end of the war. This
lingering cannot but have a bad effect upon the enemy, keeping up
their hopes of an ultimate success.
"Transport is more and more the bugbear. As we point out elsewhere,
the simple fact is that the resources of the country are
overstrained. Young and untrained cattle are, in many cases, being
employed, at a very serious risk of loss. We are glad to learn,
indirectly, that the proceedings of the commission of enquiry go
to show that cost and difficulties of transport are at the bottom
of the high charges complained of, and that the question is really
one of supply and demand. The commissariat are now employing 1800
waggons, and want 200 more very urgently. There is, we believe,
much exaggeration in the statements put forth as to the exorbitant
charges made upon the commissariat. However, we await the report of
the commission with much interest."
[38] Several correspondents of newspapers were under fire on this
occasion, including those of the _Standard_, _Telegraph_, and
_Daily Chronicle_.
[39] At one of the Cape ports, a passenger remarked that a young
man he noticed could not have been the prince, as he saw him at
the foot of a ladder, handing into a boat the children of a poor
workman. At Cape Town the crowd mistook a handsomely dressed young
exquisite for the Prince Imperial, and were surprised when a simply
dressed, unassuming youth stepped out of the steamer and entered
the Governor's carriage, which was in waiting.
[40] The prince had already become noted for skill in sketching,
and for remarkable ability in recognizing the capabilities of
positions.
[41] Major W. F. Butler, author of 'The Great Lone Land.'
[42] General Clifford remained in Pietermaritzburg and was charged
with the defence of Natal.
[43] It was in June that Lord Chelmsford received from the
Secretary of State for War congratulations on the success of
Ghinghelova, which he states he is convinced is largely due to
the careful arrangements made by Lord Chelmsford for the march of
the relieving column. He also says that the tenacity with which
Ekowe was held by Colonel Pearson and the force under his command,
deserves the highest praise.
The Secretary for War, referring to the action with Wood's column,
says, "I note with great satisfaction the part taken by the
colonial troops in the operations, though I deeply regret the heavy
losses they have sustained. The country has to deplore the loss of
many gallant officers. It is difficult to single out individuals
for special notice, but I must express my sorrow at the loss of Mr.
Piet Uys, whose services on this as well as other occasions have
been so fully recognized by those under whom he has served."
He also says, "Colonel Wood's force seems to have defended Kambula
camp with a gallantry and determination worthy of great praise....
I rejoice to note that the repulse of the enemy was on both
occasions complete and decisive. I have communicated to the Queen
the welcome news conveyed in Colonel Bellairs' telegram above
referred to; and I have received her Majesty's commands to convey
to you, and to the forces under your command, a gracious message of
congratulation."
[44] A correspondent from Newdigate's column writes as
follows:—"Réveille at 5 a.m. as usual; the men dispersed at 6.30 to
drink the warm coffee prepared for them. Shortly after the disperse
was sounded, to the annoyance of every one in camp, the enjoyment
of their coffee was spoilt by the assembly being sounded; the tents
were lowered, the cavalry saddling up and riding some 200 yards
from camp. The utility of this manœuvre was not apparent to the
troops, being at an unreasonable time. In Wood's column the alarm
is invariably sounded about sunset after a new laager has been
formed, in order that every one might know at night what waggon
he is stationed at, without creating confusion. If a night attack
should be made, everything is so slovenly and loosely carried out
here that we pray for the return of General Wood, to rejoin our own
column; for then we feel that we should be safer from our enemies
than we are from our friends. This column has too much gold lace
and red tape about it for South African warfare. The contrast
between the two columns is very striking in many things, more
especially in the punctilious military etiquette of this column,
where on every side one is likely to be stopped by the sentry, and
told that you must not go through a row of huts because a staff
tent is under his charge. At head-quarters, plebeian's feet must
not intrude within a certain distance. With General Wood's column
there are no sentries over staff tents; the only day sentries are
over Government stores, the regimental colours, and guard tents.
All the staff tents display flags, denoting that business is done
there, and they are open to the approach of every one who may have
business to transact. General Wood, Colonel Buller, and their
officers, have no pride or affectation. As a rule the officers of
all branches of the service follow the example of their commanders,
and are as courteous and friendly as they are brave."
[45] On the 27th of June, Major-General Gifford telegraphs. "Black
wires from Isandhlwana, 'I have just completed burying the dead;
the outlying bodies may remain lost but those on the field of
battle are now interred. The few remaining bodies far down on
the Fugitives' Drift track will be interred in a day or two.'"
Subsequently another party was sent, and suitable cairns were
erected.
[46] The following graphic description of the pursuit of
stragglers, and a narrow escape from falling into a Zulu trap, will
be read with interest:—"During the first two days the king made
no sign, and his people were marching, drilling, and performing
war-dances in a fashion that did not strike me as being very
pacific. On the day the armistice expired at noon (July 3rd), the
question was solved in a way that must at least have convinced
even Lord Chelmsford himself, that Cetywayo had been making a fool
of him. Early in the morning (about 9 a.m.), lurking Zulus crept
down to the strong kopje commanding the drift, and fired on the
soldiers, who were washing and bathing in the river below. There
was a great panic and scamper, but I believe no one was wounded.
That, however, was not all, for some of them came across the river
and drove off fifty trek oxen which were feeding, taking them over
the river and some distance up the opposite bank. The cattle guard
promptly crossed and recaptured them, but up to noon our camp was
insulted by the impudent rascals firing at us, and some few of
the Martini-Henry bullets actually fell in the camp and laager.
This was carrying things too far, and at noon Buller's brigade
was ordered out to try and cut off a few of them. We crossed the
river at a drift below the camp, and galloping round the base of
the hill, tried to pick off a few; but we were too late. They had
seen our preparations and were off, and we saw them racing off
near Nodwengu. We started in pursuit, and on nearing the kraal we
overtook the rear fugitive. There was a race to get him, amongst
half a dozen of us, but he fell to Lord William Beresford, who gave
point with his sabre, just as the Zulu turned to use his assegai,
running him through the shield and through the body. We then turned
and galloped after the others, at least 150, whom we should have
cut off had everything been on the square; but the black rascals
were leading us into a nice trap, which had been laid for the
express purpose. Half-way between Nodwengu and Ulundi there is a
sluggish spruit, with a deep bed, which runs parallel with this
road for some distance, and then turns sharply across it at right
angles. I had doubts when I saw some of these fugitives disappear
in the spruit bed, and these doubts became certainty when I heard
Buller shout out to 'retire,' and almost at the same moment, before
we could get our horses up and round, two lines of Zulus rose in
the spruit bed and poured in a volley within 100 yards. If they had
known how to shoot, which happily for us they do not, nearly every
saddle ought to have been emptied; but only three men and half a
dozen horses were over. Lord William Beresford took up a dismounted
man, and Commandant D'Arcy one who was wounded. The former got his
man out safely; the latter, I am sorry to say, was thrown by his
horse bucking at the unaccustomed burden. The poor trooper was
overtaken and killed, while the commandant was so severely bruised
from falling on his revolver, that he was able to get back safe,
but not able to take part in the next day's fight. It is hardly
necessary to say that we galloped back at least as fast as we had
come, perhaps even a little faster, for we were seen and pursued,
Zulus springing up from the grass in all directions and firing
continuously. We ran the gauntlet the whole way back, making only
one rally on a crest sprinkled with small trees. The line in our
rear was 500 yards off, and some of them were shot, but we were
not able to stop very long, for we saw columns making for the
drift to cut us off. Happily Colonel Buller had left Baker and his
men on the stony kopje to cover our retreat, and his men peppered
one of these intercepting columns so effectually as to stop their
advance. Our peril was seen from the camp, and Major Le Grice's
battery of 9-pounders took up a position on the high ground in
front, from which they so astonished the other column of Zulus by
a well-directed fire of shrapnel at long range, that they too were
prevented from carrying out their philanthropic intention. We had
only, therefore, the pursuing Zulus to deal with, but they followed
up closely as far as the ford, where Captain Whalley, with the
Natal Light Horse, drew up and covered our crossing. It is a marvel
to me, considering the heavy fire that we were under, that we only
lost three men killed, four wounded, and thirteen horses missing."
[47] This Zulu prisoner also stated, "The white man who writes
the king's letters is a trader. The king has his movements always
watched." Speaking of the result of the battle of Ulundi, he said,
"The army is now thoroughly beaten, and, as we were beaten in the
open, it will not reassemble or fight again."
[48] The Gatlings were not very successful. Firing had to cease six
times during the action, as they got overheated.
[49] Sir Garnet Wolseley was at dinner at Fort Pearson when the
news of the victory of Ulundi was received, and a correspondent who
was present thus describes its reception:—"As we sat at dinner we
discussed all the probabilities and possibilities of the situation.
Had Lord Chelmsford embarked upon a desperate enterprise of his
own? What if success should not be his? And when we thought of
Isandhlwana our reflections were gloomy. We were still at dinner
when a despatch was handed to Sir Garnet, and as he read it his
face broke into a smile, and looking up cheerfully he said, 'This
is indeed the best news I have read for many a long day. To-night,
gentlemen, we may sleep peacefully, for Lord Chelmsford has been
engaged with the army of the Zulu king, and has thoroughly defeated
it." The despatch was from Mr. Sivewright, the general manager of
the telegraph in South Africa. Sir Garnet read us the sentence,
short, clear, and decisive, showing us how Cetywayo in person had
made his final effort to save his kingdom, and was now a refugee
and an outcast from his nation in the black swamps of the Umvolosi.
The despatch was read by order of the general to the troops;
and borne by the high wind across the waters of the Tugela into
Zululand went the British cheers which announced the fall of the
bold, brave, cruel, and crafty king. We slept soundly that night."
[50] "Some 2000 Zulus have been employed by the general as
carriers, on the same principle as he adopted in the Ashantee
campaign. It has proved a great success, and saved tremendous
expense in transport. They receive twenty shillings per month, and
rations. Every man carries fifty-six pounds at a time. This system
has caused some discontent among the Natal Native Contingent, who
complain that after these men fighting against us the Government
are paying and allowing them the same privilege as themselves. But
considering these men don't do half the work the carriers do, and
having a natural failing for grumbling, no notice is taken of their
complaint."
[51] The king, the last to get on the gangway, did so by crawling
up as the others had done, and when landed on deck gave vent to a
sigh, whether of despondency or relief could only be guessed. He
would not go near the ship's side, and grasped at the officer's
hand to support him while standing on the deck. He was asked to
look out to see the anchor weighed, but declined to do so, though
manifesting a childlike curiosity about many things on board.
Various trappings, such as blankets and mats, were brought on
board, the king having two mattresses and two blankets supplied by
the military, and the men and women one blanket and mattress each.
The prisoners soon became reconciled to their situation on board,
and began to manifest much interest in all they saw and heard. A
kraal, about twelve feet square, was rigged up on the fore part of
the poop deck, where there was less motion to the ship and plenty
of breeze. The king's women and servants were placed in here with
himself, and were made as comfortable as possible. He retired
to his kraal soon after coming on board, and did not come out
till next day, when the officers showed him through the ship. He
expressed his great surprise and admiration at many of the things
he saw, and was especially struck with the machinery. He would not
go down into the engine-room, but gave a token of his wonder at the
works of the white men by giving utterance to the peculiar Kafir
"Whouw!" He could not comprehend the use of many of the appliances
of the cabin, and although he believed the account given to him of
how the ship was made, and how much it cost, the processes were
a mystery to him and the amount a fable. His first question with
regard to the ship was how old she was and "how many cattle she
cost." He had a great objection to coming to the Cape, as his spies
and messengers had brought up an evil report of the land in times
past. Cetywayo expressed his perfect resignation to his fate, and
said he knew from the first the war would end as it did, and that
he himself would be the sufferer. He blamed his young men, whom he
could not restrain at the beginning, and also blamed the English
for pursuing the war to its present conclusion.
[52] The following were the orders as to the movements of the
troops:—
TO ENGLAND.
Royal Engineers.—C Troop, 6 officers, 160 men; and 7th Company,
3 officers, 80 men, when transport available. To concentrate at
Pinetown when relieved from Transvaal.
Army Service Corps.—750 men, when transport available, concentrate
at Pinetown, according as companies can be spared, probably some
time yet. All waggons will eventually be sent to England.
Army Hospital Corps.—350 men. To be withdrawn and concentrated at
Pinetown, as portions can be spared from duty, into troopships.
PROBABLY ENGLAND.
3-60th Regiment.—30 officers, 920 men. To sail when transport is
available, concentrating at Pinetown.
2-4th Regiment.—28 officers, 970 men, 3 officers' wives, 37 women,
57 children. Ditto, ditto.
TO INDIA.
17th Lancers.—24 officers, 455 men, 18 horses. To sail first week
in October, per _Crocodile_ and _Serapis_. Concentrate at Pinetowm
Royal Artillery.—M Battery, 6th Brigade, 5 officers, 157 men; O
Battery, 6th Brigade, 5 officers, 157 men. Ditto.
88th Regiment.—23 officers, 664 men, 4 officers' wives, 50 women,
87 children. Ditto. This does not include two companies at
Mauritius.
90th Regiment.—23 officers, 886 men, 3 officers' wives, 35 women,
57 children. Ditto.
TO MAURITIUS.
91st Regiment.—2 companies, 6 officers, 243 men. Sail first week in
October, per _Crocodile_ and _Serapis_. Concentrate at Pinetown.
Royal Artillery.—10th Battery, 7th Brigade, 4 officers, 110 men.
Ditto.
TO SINGAPORE.
2-3rd Regiment.—26 officers, 800 men. End of September, per
_Orontes_. Concentrate at Pinetown.
TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE
-Plain print and punctuation errors fixed.
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