The History of the 36th (Ulster) Division

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Title: The History of the 36th (Ulster) Division
Author: Falls, Cyril
Language: English
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THE HISTORY

OF THE

36^{TH} (ULSTER) DIVISION

O socii, neque enim ignari sumus ante malorum,
O passi graviora, dabit deus his quoque finem.

VIRGIL: _Æneid_.

And he hadde been somtyme in chyvachie,
In Flaundrés, in Artoys and Pycardie,
And born hym weel.

CHAUCER: _Canterbury Tales_.

_Dawbeney_--
Wise princes, Oxford,
Fight not alone with forces. Providence
Directs and tutors strength; else elephants
And barbèd horses might as well prevail
As the most subtle stratagems of war.

FORD: _Perkin Warbeck_.

[Illustration: THE MEMORIAL TO THE 36TH (ULSTER) DIVISION AT
THIEPVAL]

THE HISTORY

OF THE

36^{TH} (ULSTER) DIVISION

CYRIL FALLS

_Late Lieutenant, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers
and Captain, G.S., 36th Division_

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
FIELD MARSHAL THE LORD PLUMER
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.

[Illustration: (colophon)]

M'CAW, STEVENSON & ORR, LIMITED
THE LINENHALL PRESS, BELFAST
AND 329 HIGH HOLBORN, LONDON, W.C.

1922

_This History is dedicated to the men of the_

ULSTER DIVISION,

_returned from the War, and to those who have not
come back; of whom I name two friends_:

HARRY GALLAGHER, D.S.O.,
_Captain, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
killed at the Battle of Messines, 1917_;

_and_

GEORGE BRUCE, D.S.O., M.C.,
_Brigade Major, 109th Brigade,
killed near Dadizeele, 1918_;

_Patterns to men-in-arms_.

INTRODUCTION

The history of the 36th (Ulster) Division is the record of a great
effort and a great achievement. The effort which resulted in its
inception was the outcome of the determination, on the part of a
people brought up in great traditions and inspired with a fervent
spirit of loyalty, that they should be worthily represented in the
fierce and prolonged struggle which from the outset was clearly
foreshadowed. The achievement was the response made to the call by
their representatives, the gallant deeds accomplished, the courage
and determination displayed, and the sacrifices made.

The narrative gives a very clear picture of what the campaign in
France and Flanders involved for the troops engaged in it. There is
no reference to any great strategical movements or brilliant tactical
operations, because there were none such to describe. It brings out,
however, quite plainly that the victory was gained in the only way
in which it could have been gained, by sheer hard fighting, carried
out continuously, now on a small, now on a large, scale, but always
by troops who never admitted defeat.

This was the character of the struggle into which the Ulster Division
was plunged from its entrance into the campaign until its close, and
the book describes very fully the part it played in it. Each chapter
is a little history of itself, which frequently has sufficient
subject-matter for a volume, and which always contains a record of
events or incidents of absorbing interest. It is not a narrative of a
series of unbroken successes, and there is no pretence that all the
efforts made by the Division were successful. Readers of the History
will find stories of failures, but they were glorious failures, the
account of which no-one need feel ashamed to describe or peruse.

A tribute, no more than is due, is paid to Major-General Sir
Oliver Nugent, K.C.B., D.S.O., the General who was in command of
the Division for the greater part of the campaign, and who led it
throughout with a confidence in it only equalled by its confidence in
him. All who served under him will always hold him in affectionate
remembrance, and all Ulstermen should realize that they owe him a
debt of gratitude.

I hope this History will be read, not only by those who served in the
Division and their relatives and friends, but by all Irishmen.

Young men approaching manhood and young women approaching womanhood
should read it, and ponder over the example their predecessors have
set them. For all who read will realize that in the great struggle
which convulsed Europe for more than four years the men of Ulster did
not fail.

PLUMER, F.M.

MALTA,
_25th November, 1922._

PREFACE

The history of the 36th (Ulster) Division is published under the
patronage of the Right Hon. the Lord Carson of Duncairn, the Prime
Minister of Northern Ireland, and Major-General Sir O. S. W. Nugent,
K.C.B., D.S.O.

Its publication once decided upon, the first step taken was the
formation of an influential Committee; the second, that of a
Guarantee Fund to cover the whole cost of its production, which was,
within a few weeks, largely over-subscribed.

The materials upon which the History is chiefly based are the
official War Diaries in the possession of the Historical Section
(Military Branch) of the Committee of Imperial Defence. To the
officials at 2, Cavendish Square I am indebted for courtesy and
assistance in matters of difficulty. I have made use also of a very
large number of contributions sent to me by those who served with
the Division, from Sir James Craig and Sir Oliver Nugent to several
private soldiers. So long is the list that I cannot acknowledge my
debt to these contributors by name, but I desire to thank one and all
for material without which the record would have been bald and dry,
material which has, I hope, enabled me to give some tinge of humanity
to the History. In several cases these personal contributions have
been of greater value still than this. They have--and this is
true especially of the Retreat of March, 1918--furnished me with
a record of incidents upon which official Diaries throw no light.
Two such incidents, in particular, the defence of a company of the
12th Royal Irish Rifles at Le Pontchu Quarry, near St. Quentin, on
March the 21st, and the last stand of the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles at
Cugny, three days later, have hitherto gone unrecorded, because the
survivors of these heroic episodes fell into the hands of the enemy.

I have also to thank Sir Oliver Nugent, Colonel-Commandant W. M.
Withycombe, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.; Brigadier-General C. J. Griffith,
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.; Brigadier-General A. St. Q. Ricardo, C.M.G.,
C.B.E., D.S.O.; Major H. F. Grant Suttie, D.S.O., M.C., and Major
J. C. Boyle for their trouble in reading the History in MS. and
for their many helpful suggestions. The Honours List, a very big
undertaking, is based almost entirely on the compilation of Mr.
Andrew Jardin, M.S.M., formerly Chief Clerk in the Administrative
Branch of Divisional Headquarters. In this and other matters
connected with the History I have had much assistance from my wife.

The most important acknowledgment, on behalf of the Committee and
all interested in the publication of the work as well as on my own,
is due to Captain Kenneth M. Moore, M.C., who acted as Honorary
Secretary. The whole of the business side of the undertaking has been
conducted by him. Into it he has thrown all his organizing ability
and his enthusiasm. No appeal has been made to him in vain.

I have only to add that it has been my endeavour to make this History
not a mere record of battles, but, so far as space has permitted,
a picture of life as it was lived in the days of war. Lacking the
second, the first is like dry bones without flesh to cover them. If I
have succeeded in combining the two, I have right to hope that I have
made a contribution, however small, to history in a general sense, as
apart from military history.

It is to-day a favourite pretension that the war was as uninteresting
as it was terrible: a vast error, based upon a temporary reaction,
when not upon a pose. I made recently the discovery that between
1906 and 1921 there were published over one hundred books on the
Napoleonic Wars. The number would have been far greater but for the
fall in the publication of all books between 1914 and 1919. So, a
hundred years hence, men will be delving into our records of the
late war. Soldiers will be studying the lessons of its battles. But
a yet greater number of seekers will be demanding with curiosity
how men lived in such circumstances, how they reacted to the strain
of war, what compensations they found. It behoves those who were
eye-witnesses to depict it in all its aspects, not to shrink from
discovering its horror, indeed, but also not to pretend that it had
not a better side. The picture now so often painted, representing
the war as a single scene in a torture chamber, whence men emerged
physical or mental wrecks, may be good anti-militarist propaganda,
but it is false, because incomplete. From those experiences many men
have emerged happy and strong. Many knew how to snatch some happiness
even from their midst. A far greater number can see, in retrospect,
that they played a part in one of the most dramatic, as well as one
of the most terrible, tragedies in history. That stands for something
of good, amid all its evil, in any man's life. The comradeship of
war's days is a memory not less happy.

It is not alone because the story of the Ulster Division is a record
of courage and fortitude, in which men who are my friends had part,
but because it represents in a microcosm man in one of the greatest
and most curious catastrophes the world has known, that I have had,
however unworthy of the task, a pleasure so intense in writing this
book.

C. F.

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

I THE RAISING AND TRAINING OF THE DIVISION:
SEPTEMBER 1914 TO SEPTEMBER 1915 1

Lord Kitchener and Sir Edward Carson--Sir
Edward Carson's Appeal--Formation of the Division--A
Commander appointed--Training begins--The
Clan Spirit--Realities of War--The Move to England--Lord
Kitchener's Tribute--His Majesty's Review.

II THE DIVISION IN FRANCE: OCTOBER 1915 TO
JUNE 1916 22

First Experiences--Picardy--107th Brigade in
Line--The Division enters Line--Holding a Quiet
Front--Rations--The Brighter Side--Preparation for
Offensive--Reorganization of Artillery.

III THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME: JULY 1ST, 1916 41

New Aspect of Warfare--Plans for the Attack--Artillery
Programme--A Successful Raid--Anniversary
of the Boyne--Attack North of Ancre--Advance
of 107th Brigade--A Desperate Situation--July 2nd--Causes
of Failure--Move to Flanders.

IV FROM THE SOMME TO MESSINES: JULY 1916
TO JUNE 1917 64

In Line before Messines--Warfare Underground--Trench
Mortar Battles--The Policy of Raids--Lieutenant
Godson's Ambush--A Series of Raids--La
Plus Douve Farm--A Growth of Activity--Shelling
of Ulster Camp.

V MESSINES: JUNE 1917 82

Preparation for the Offensive--Plans for the
Attack--Second Army Methods--Medical Arrangements--Waiting
for Zero--First Objective reached--Wytschaete
captured--Artillery moves Forward--Pack
Transport--Death of Captain Gallagher--German
Commander's Problem--Von Richthofen.

VI THE BATTLE OF LANGEMARCK: AUGUST 1917 107

Plans of the Allies--107th Brigade enters Line--Wieltje
Dug-outs--Barrage Plans--Failure of 108th
Brigade--The Division's Losses--Causes of Failure--General
Nugent's Suggestions.

VII YPRES TO CAMBRAI: SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER
1917 125

The Hindenburg Line--Fighting at Yorkshire
Bank--Raiding Activity--The Livens Projector--Life
amidst Desolation--British Organization--Problem
of Man-power--Work in the Mist.

VIII CAMBRAI AND AFTER (I): NOVEMBER 20TH TO
22ND, 1917 143

Plans for Cambrai--Task of 109th Brigade--Tanks
move up--Capture of Spoil Heap--Defence
of Flesquières--Results of November 20th--Gains of
November 21st--Mœuvres: November 22nd--A New
Phase.

IX CAMBRAI AND AFTER (II): NOVEMBER 23RD TO
DECEMBER 31ST, 1917 162

Plans for Nov. 23rd--The Grapple at Bourlon--Relief
of 36th Division--The German Counter-offensive--British
Withdrawal--Defence of 9th Inniskillings--Attack
of 11th Inniskillings--Relief in a
Blizzard--Summary of the Battle.

X THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE ON THE SOMME (I):
JANUARY TO MARCH 22ND, 1918 181

The New Line--Reorganization of Division--System
of Defence--Dispositions--The Weeks of
Waiting--Morning of March 21st--The German
Assault launched--Defence of Le Pontchu--Break-through
to the South--Defence of Racecourse
Redoubt--Heroic Action of Lieutenant Knox--The
Second Withdrawal--Open Warfare begins.

XI THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE ON THE SOMME (II):
MARCH 23RD TO 30TH, 1918 208

Sights in Ham--Both Flanks turned--Dawn of
March 24th--2nd Rifles at Cugny--Relief of 36th
Division--Horrors of the Retreat--A Gap between
the Allies--Colonel Place captured--Counter-attack
at Erches--What the Division achieved--Action of
the Artillery--Defence of XVIII. Corps.

XII FLANDERS: THE 108TH BRIGADE IN THE MESSINES-KEMMEL
BATTLE: APRIL TO JUNE 1918 232

Back to Ypres--108th Brigade on Messines Ridge--Fighting
at Wulverghem--A Black Day--Withdrawal
from Poelcappelle--German Rebuff in
Flanders--Changes in Command--Back after a Rest.

XIII BACK TO THE MESSINES RIDGE: JULY TO SEPTEMBER,
1918 248

Successful Raids--The Enemy withdraws--A
Fighting Retreat--September 3rd and 4th--Attack
of September 6th--Move to Ypres--The Hope of
Victory.

XIV THE ADVANCE TO FINAL VICTORY (I):
SEPTEMBER 28TH TO OCTOBER 17TH, 1918 262

Attack of September 28th--Advance of September
29th--Menin-Roulers Road reached--Review of
Situation--Death of Captain Bruce--Attack of
October 14th--A Great Day--Courtrai entered--Difficulties
of Supply.

XV THE ADVANCE TO FINAL VICTORY (II):
OCTOBER 18TH TO NOVEMBER 11TH, 1918 280

Plan for Forcing the Lys--Success of the Crossing--Attack
of October 20th--The Advance continued--Kleineberg
Ridge occupied--General Jacob's
Tribute--Special Order of Marshal Foch.

XVI THE END: NOVEMBER 1918 TO JUNE 1919 294

Preparations for Christmas--The Divisional Fund--Characteristics
of 36th Division--The End.

APPENDIX I ORDER OF BATTLE 305

" II LIST OF HONOURS AND AWARDS 313

INDEX 347

MAPS

I THE BATTLE OF ALBERT, 1916 at page 62

II THE BATTLE OF MESSINES, 1917 " 106

III THE BATTLE OF LANGEMARCK, 1917 " 124

IV THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1917 " 180

V THE POSITION BEFORE GERMAN ATTACK,
MARCH 21ST, 1918 " 206

VI THE RETREAT OF MARCH 1918 " 230

VII THE FINAL ADVANCES, 1918 " 292

SKETCH IN TEXT page 284

ILLUSTRATIONS

THE MEMORIAL TO THE 36TH (ULSTER) DIVISION
AT THIEPVAL Frontispiece

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR C. H. POWELL, K.C.B. facing page 14

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR O. S. NUGENT, K.C.B., D.S.O. " " 36

WINNERS OF VICTORIA CROSS, 1916 " " 76

" " " " 1917 & 1918 " " 184

MAJOR-GENERAL C. C. COFFIN, V.C., C.B., D.S.O. " " 244

THE HISTORY OF

THE 36^{TH} (ULSTER) DIVISION

CHAPTER I

THE RAISING AND TRAINING OF THE DIVISION: SEPTEMBER 1914 TO SEPTEMBER
1915

It is no rightful part of the historian of a Division in the Great
War to embark upon preliminary sketches of the state of Europe
or of the movements in international politics that preceded the
catastrophe. If once he begin to seek for causes he must seek far.
Three pistol shots fired in the narrow streets of Serajevo may be
likened to an accidental spark that explodes a great charge. But the
charge was long laid. War had been determined upon in Berlin. Without
that accidental spark, there can be no doubt that it would shortly
have been deliberately exploded by a detonator from that quarter. If
the divisional historian cannot trace the laying of the charge, which
had been accumulating, it may be a hundred, and certainly fifty,
years, let him not begin by dealing with what were merely the final
accretions. Let him begin with the beginning of the war. War was
declared between this country and Germany on the 4th of August, 1914.

There are, however, certain local circumstances anterior to that
declaration, which have an intimate connection with the particular
Division that is the subject of this History, and so could not be
omitted without robbing the latter of much of its significance. The
Ulster Division was not created in a day. The roots from which it
sprang went back into the troubled period before the war. Its life
was a continuance of the life of an earlier legion, a legion of
civilians banded together to protect themselves from the consequences
of legislation which they believed would affect adversely their
rights and privileges as citizens of the United Kingdom--the Ulster
Volunteer Force.

The Ulster Volunteer Force, or U.V.F., as it soon came to be known
the world around, was the creation of Sir Edward Carson.[1] He
believed that if the Imperial Parliament were to persist in its
declared intention of forcing the Protestant population of Ulster
into an Irish Parliament, without its consent, the inevitable
consequence would be civil war in Ireland. Unorganized resistance
would be ineffective, and would beyond doubt lead to disorder and
unnecessary bloodshed. That the attempt would be made appeared
certain. The fate of the Government was bound up with its Home Rule
Bill. A failure to carry it through would have involved instant
defeat in the House of Commons, wherein the Irish Nationalist
Party held the balance of power. All the signs pointed to a clash.
It appeared to Sir Edward Carson that the surest defence of the
political ideals of his followers lay in convincing the people of
Great Britain that Protestant Ulster would fight for the preservation
of liberties and traditions which it held dear, which, in its eyes,
were now menaced. It was in this faith that he gave his approval to
the formation of the U.V.F.

It was on the advice of Lord Roberts, a warm advocate of Ulster's
cause, that Sir Edward Carson invited General Sir George Richardson
to take command of the U.V.F. Under his leadership the force was
organized on a territorial basis. At the outbreak of war it contained
over 80,000 men between the ages of seventeen and sixty-five, and a
number of women, enrolled not only as nurses but for many of those
supplementary services which were not allotted to women in the
European war until a comparatively late period. The people of Ulster
entered into their adventure in the same spirit that they entered
into that of the war when it came, a spirit of single-minded faith
in their leaders and in themselves. Admirably did Mr. Kipling sum up
their attitude in the lines:

Believe we dare not boast,
Believe we do not fear.

Probably their worst danger was over before the declaration of war.
The incident at the Curragh, as well as conferences at the War
Office, at Aldershot, and elsewhere, of which the general public
never knew, had made it clear that the Army could not be used to
enforce the legislation projected at the cost of civil war. General
John Gough, V.C., then Sir Douglas Haig's Chief of Staff, visited
Ulster in July, and stated that the idea of coercion was abandoned.
He is known to have formed the opinion that the Ulster Volunteers
could, with experienced leaders, be made a very formidable fighting
force. He, as well as the Government, knew that those leaders would
not have been lacking.

Lord Kitchener, once at the War Office, was not long in arriving at
the same opinion as General Gough. He was appointed Secretary of
State for War on Wednesday the 5th of August. On Friday the 7th he
sent for Colonel T. E. Hickman,[2] a Member of the House of Commons,
President of the British League for the Defence of Ulster, who had
acted as Inspector-General of the U.V.F., and said to him: "I want
the Ulster Volunteers."

Colonel Hickman replied: "You must see Carson and Craig."

Lord Kitchener saw them. Sir Edward Carson's position was not easy.
He was most eager to help by every means in his power. But he had a
heavy responsibility towards the people of Ulster. If the fighting
men of the Province were to go to the war, and in their absence
a Home Rule Act, such as they had banded themselves together to
resist, were to be forced upon those they had left behind, they
would have had cause to reproach him. The Prime Minister was asked
for an assurance with regard to the Home Rule Bill. No definite
assurance could be obtained from him. A political truce had come into
operation at the beginning of hostilities, but it was ill-defined,
and the Prime Minister evidently did not see his way clearly out of
the difficulties of his situation.[3] Sir Edward raised some minor
points, asking that the word "Ulster" might succeed the number of the
Division which it was proposed to raise. To this Lord Kitchener at
first demurred, but the appelation was subsequently granted.[4]

A short delay ensued. The news from France was bad. A meeting of the
Ulster Unionist Members of Parliament, attended by Lord Roberts,
was held at Sir Edward Carson's house in Eaton Place. The result of
the meeting was that, then and there, Colonel Hickman took a letter
to Lord Kitchener, offering the aid of Sir Edward and the Council
in raising as large a force as possible from the Ulster Volunteers,
without any conditions whatsoever. Later that day there was another
meeting between the Secretary for War and the Ulster representatives
at the War Office. At first Lord Kitchener was modest in his demands,
thinking that a Brigade from the U.V.F. would be ample, at least as
a start. Captain Craig[5] assured him they could recruit a Division.
Lord Kitchener at once appointed Colonel Hickman and Captain Craig as
Chief Recruiting Officers for the Ulster area.

Captain Craig, on leaving the War Office, jumped into a taxicab in
Whitehall and went straight to a firm of outfitters with which he
had had dealings in equipment for the U.V.F., and gave an order for
10,000 complete outfits. Returning to the House he was somewhat
exercised in his mind as to where the money was to come from to pay
for all this. He spoke to Mr. Oliver Locker-Lampson,[6] one of
Ulster's staunchest friends, who pulled out a cheque-book, and said:

"Don't say another word! There's a thousand pounds: to go on with,
and nine more will follow in a day or two. This is out of a special
fund just available for your purpose."

In the first days of September Colonel Hickman and Captain Craig
crossed to Ireland to begin their work. On the 3rd of the month
Sir Edward Carson made a great appeal, at a meeting of the Ulster
Unionist Council in Belfast, to the men of the U.V.F., urging them to
come forward for the defence of the Empire, the honour of Ulster and
of Ireland.

In Ireland much had happened meanwhile. A large number of Ulstermen,
the eager spirits who would not wait, had already enlisted. Of these
the greater number had gone to the 10th Division, then being formed.
Others had crossed the Channel and joined Manchester and Glasgow
battalions. At Omagh Captain A. St. Q. Ricardo, D.S.O.,[7] Reserve of
Officers, had been put in charge of the Depot, and in mid-August had,
anticipating the formation of an Ulster Division, begun to recruit
men from the Tyrone Volunteers for a battalion of Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers. In a very short time he had two companies, which were,
as they had as yet no official status, attached to the 5th and 6th
Battalions of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. In these battalions
some of the officers subsequently elected to remain, and went with
the 10th Division to the Dardanelles. When the Ulster Division
was formed these two companies became the nucleus of the senior
battalion of the 109th Infantry Brigade, the 9th Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers.[8] This was an exceptional incident, since Captain
Ricardo, before taking up his duties at the Omagh Depot, had been
Adjutant of the Tyrone Regiment, U.V.F. Throughout Ulster, however,
a preliminary recruiting campaign had been carried out, promises to
enlist on the official formation of an Ulster Division being obtained
from members of the U.V.F.

The short delay may have lost a few men to the Ulster Division, but
it had created an atmosphere of expectation and excitement. When
the recruiting officers arrived the men came forward with a rush,
above all in Belfast. A building near the Old Town Hall had been
taken over. As each man came out of the former after attestation,
he entered the latter, was passed from department to department,
emerging from another door a recruit in uniform, leaving his civilian
clothing to be packed up and sent home. In this respect the Ulster
Division was peculiarly fortunate. The men who enlisted in it had not
to endure those weeks of drilling in wet weather in their civilian
clothes, with inadequate boots, which were productive of moral as
well as physical discomfort. For this advantage they were indebted
to the foresight and powers of organization of Captain Craig and
his assistants, the generosity of their friends, and the aid of the
big business men of Belfast; the work being carried out without any
cost to the State. Captain Craig made further visits to the War
Office, on one of which he pointed out to Lord Kitchener that the
camp accommodation in Ulster was insufficient. Lord Kitchener replied
that such details must be arranged by others. Knowing him well from
South African days, when he had learned to regard him with the
highest admiration, Captain Craig answered that it was all very well
to talk in that autocratic manner, but that at present he himself
had not the weight behind him to carry the matter through. The
response was characteristic. Lord Kitchener summoned in succession
the Adjutant-General, the Director of Personal Services, the
Quartermaster-General, and the Director of Fortifications, and said
to them:

"Take Craig away and see that he gets what he requires."

Captain Craig was then able to return to Ireland, and set about the
building of hutted camps at Clandeboye, Ballykinlar, and Newtownards
in the east, and Finner on the Donegal coast.

The organization of the Division proceeded swiftly. A large house,
29, Wellington Place, Belfast, was taken over and equipped as
Headquarters. Three Infantry Brigades were formed: the 107th from the
City of Belfast itself; the 108th from the counties of Antrim, Down,
Armagh, Cavan, and Monaghan; the 109th from Tyrone, Londonderry,
Donegal, and Fermanagh, with one Belfast Battalion. The Pioneer
Battalion was also recruited in County Down, mainly from the Lurgan
area. The Royal Engineers, of which two Field Companies only were
raised at first, the 121st and 122nd, as well as the Divisional
Signal Company, came mainly from Belfast, above all from the great
shipyards. Royal Army Medical Corps personnel was recruited and sent
to Clandeboye, where, on the appointment of an A.D.M.S., Colonel
F. J. Greig, it was formed into three Field Ambulances, the 108th,
109th, and 110th, and moved to Newry. So successful was recruiting
for the R.A.M.C. that Colonel Greig was instructed by the War Office
to raise a Casualty Clearing Station, the 40th, which served both in
France and at Salonika. The Royal Army Service Corps personnel was
fine both in physique and intelligence. The horses were good, as was
natural, seeing how large was the proportion of horses bought for the
Army in Ireland, and among the officers were some excellent horsemen
and horsemasters. Indeed the horsemastership in the Division was
throughout the campaign of a very high order, the Infantry contriving
to keep their mules sleek and fat and the Artillery their gun-horses
fit and well-groomed amid conditions which none can realize who did
not witness them. A Cavalry Squadron and a Cyclist Company were also
formed, the former being unique in that it was a service Squadron of
the Inniskilling Dragoons.

One question which received much attention and gave rise to much
discussion was that of a Divisional Artillery. It was reluctantly
decided not to raise one in Ulster, though this meant losing many
an Ulsterman to other Divisions. The U.V.F. had no artillery and
consequently no partially trained force upon which to draw. It was
thought that the raising and training of artillery in Ulster would
take so long that it might delay the departure to the front of the
Division for several months. In those days, it will be remembered,
the one feverish anxiety of the men of the New Armies was lest the
war should be over ere they were able to play their part in it! In
the event, as will later be explained, the Division went to France
in advance of the Artillery that had been raised for it, with a
Territorial Artillery attached.

The 36th Divisional Artillery was raised, six months after the rest
of the Division, in the suburbs of London, though from quarters
stranger to one another than towns fifty miles apart in Ireland.
The 153rd and 154th Brigades R.F.A. were formed by the British
Empire League, of which one of the moving spirits was General Sir
Bindon Blood. They were recruited chiefly from Croydon, Norbury, and
Sydenham. The 172nd and 173rd Brigades, on the other hand, came from
North-east London. They were formed on the initiative of the Mayors
of East and West Ham and recruited from those districts.

The first date recorded in the Artillery annals is that of May the
5th, 1915, when sixty recruits of the 153rd Brigade assembled at
60, Victoria Street, the headquarters of the British Empire League,
and marched to Norbury, where they were billeted in private houses.
Londoners from South and North did not meet until July, when the
four Brigades and the 36th Divisional Ammunition Column were moved
to Lewes. It was within a few days of the arrival of the rest of the
Division, already at a high standard of efficiency, in England, that
serious training of the Divisional Artillery really began.

To the great regret of all Ulster, it was ruled that Sir George
Richardson, owing to the seniority of his rank, could not take
command of the Division. He remained in Belfast, working for the
good of the cause, and none can speak more highly of his efforts
and his loyalty than Sir James Craig and General Hickman, the chief
organizers of those early days. "Trusted by every class," writes an
officer who had long worked on his staff, "he was able to induce
employers to permit those of their workmen to enlist who were not
indispensable, and to perform the much more difficult task of making
the skilled craftsmen of the shipyards realize that their duty to
their country called them to remain at work, helping the Navy and
Merchant Service to hold command of the sea, on which our success
depended equally with our victory on land." How they and others,
notably the makers of linen for aircraft, who were, for the most
part, women, played their part, cannot be discussed here, though it
is a record worthy the pen of a eulogist. What is less generally
known to the people of Great Britain is that in Ulster not a strike
occurred throughout the course of the war.

Major-General C. H. Powell, C.B.,[9] an officer with a distinguished
record in the Indian Army, was appointed to the command of the
Division. Colonel Hickman, after remaining in Belfast till the three
Brigades had been formed, went to Finner to take command of the 109th.

The following is the formation of the Division as finally
constituted:--

COMMANDER:
Major-General C. H. POWELL, C.B.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT AND QUARTER-MASTER GENERAL:
Lieut.-Colonel JAMES CRAIG.

GENERAL STAFF OFFICER, 2ND GRADE:[10]
Captain W. B. SPENDER.[11]

ROYAL ARTILLERY.[12]
(Brigadier-General H. J. BROCK.)

153rd Brigade, Royal Field Artillery.
154th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery.
172nd Brigade, Royal Field Artillery.
173rd Brigade, Royal Field Artillery.
Divisional Ammunition Column, Royal Field Artillery.

ROYAL ENGINEERS.
121st Field Company, Royal Engineers.
122nd Field Company, Royal Engineers.
150th Field Company, Royal Engineers.

107TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.
(Brigadier-General G. H. H. COUCHMAN, C.B.)

8th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (East Belfast Volunteers).
9th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (West Belfast Volunteers).
10th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (South Belfast Volunteers).
15th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (North Belfast Volunteers).

108TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.
(Brigadier-General G. HACKET PAIN, C.B.)[13]

11th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (South Antrim Volunteers).
12th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (Central Antrim Volunteers).
13th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (1st Co. Down Volunteers).
9th Battn. Royal Irish Fusiliers (Armagh, Monaghan, and Cavan
Volunteers).

109TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.
(Brigadier-General T. E. HICKMAN, C.B., D.S.O.)

9th Battn. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (Tyrone Volunteers).
10th Battn. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (Derry Volunteers).
11th Battn. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (Donegal and Fermanagh
Volunteers).
14th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (Young Citizen Volunteers of
Belfast).

PIONEER BATTALION.
16th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (2nd Co. Down Volunteers).

DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
Service Squadron, Royal Inniskilling Dragoons.
36th Divisional Signal Company, Royal Engineers.
Divisional Cyclist Company.
Royal Army Medical Corps.
108th Field Ambulance.
109th Field Ambulance.
110th Field Ambulance.
76th Sanitary Section, R.A.M.C.
Divisional Train, R.A.S.C.
48th Mobile Veterinary Section.

The present is perhaps the most suitable moment for mention of the
reserve battalions, of which six were formed in 1915: the 17th, 18th,
19th, and 20th Royal Irish Rifles, 12th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
and 10th Royal Irish Fusiliers. The 36th was the sole Irish Division
to have its own reserve formations. In addition to the provision of
drafts, these battalions had important tasks in the disturbed period
following the rebellion of Easter Week, 1916. A detachment from the
18th Royal Irish Rifles, which battalion was commanded by Colonel R.
G. Sharman Crawford, C.B.E., took part in the capture of "Liberty
Hall."

Training was in full swing by the end of September, 1914, the
107th Brigade being at Ballykinlar, the 108th at Clandeboye and
Newtownards, and the 109th at Finner; where the accommodation
consisted at this early date almost entirely of tents. By good chance
the weather of the first three weeks of October was fine and mild,
but thereafter, and before the hutting was completed, a very wet and
severe winter set in. The U.V.F. training was a great advantage. It
was easy to handle bodies of men, the most ignorant of whom could
at least number, form fours, march in step, and keep alignment from
the first. And the old organization held till it could be replaced
by the new. As one Commanding Officer writes: "The U.V.F. officers
and N.C.O.'s kept the men in order till we straightened out into
the regular army formation." The enthusiasm of the men of those
days of 1914 is something that no officer who served with them can
ever forget; something perhaps, also, that none but those officers
who began their training in the first six months of the war ever
witnessed. There is a slow-burning flame in the Ulster blood that
keeps her sons, once raised to the passion of great endeavour, at
a high and steady pitch of resolution. They took their work with
extraordinary seriousness. They were all anxiety to learn. They
made their platoon commanders, beginners for the most part like
themselves, struggle to keep ahead of them in the art that both
were acquiring. How many of the junior officers must remember those
"conferences" of sergeants and section leaders after parade hours
and the circle of keen heads bent inward toward them; how many the
"parades" on the mess table, matches for sections, inked on one side
so that after many manœuvres the front rank might remain the front!

The Infantry of the 36th Division was formed on perhaps the most
strictly territorial basis of any Division of the New Armies; the
general rule being that battalions were drawn from the larger
regimental areas of the U.V.F., companies from the smaller, and
platoons from battalion areas. This had the great advantage that
it engendered a natural companionship and spirit of pride in the
units. The company, the platoon, was a close community, an enlarged
family. In after days, in the trenches and in billets behind the
lines, the talk, not only of men from Belfast and the larger towns,
but of those from the country villages, would be of streets and, in
the latter case, of farms and lanes of which those present had known
every detail from childhood. The old clan-names of the Northumbrian
and Scottish Borders were clustered thick together. A platoon would
have five Armstrongs or Wilsons or Elliots, a company half a dozen
Irvines or Johnstons, a battalion half a score of Morrows or Hannas.
To be set against that great accretion of moral force which springs
from such a survival of the clan was the minor disadvantage that
the non-commissioned officers for the most part, and certainly all
the juniors amongst them, were the brothers and cousins and close
companions of the men they commanded. It was not that their orders
were disobeyed; it was rather that there was at first a diffidence
about the orders, which sometimes appeared to be rather in the nature
of persuasive requests. In a few units the non-commissioned officers
were changed about, so that they came in contact with men with whom
they were less familiar. But the problem was never a serious one,
and it finally disappeared. The only other disciplinary problem was
that of week-end leave. The great bulk of the men of the 107th and
108th Brigades and most of the Divisional Troops were training near
their homes. They could not understand why they should be kept in
camp doing nothing on Sundays when they might have been visiting
them. Though leave was given generously enough, this remained a sore
point till the Division moved to England. Apart from "absence without
leave" there was no crime to speak of. Such occasional blackguards
as were found in the ranks were swiftly disposed of, a sentence of
"discharged as incorrigible and worthless," which was, as a fact,
quite illegal in time of war, being their fate.

The Divisional Commander was a firm believer in marching, not only
as a preparation for that feature of military life, but as a creator
of toughness and endurance to meet the varied strain of war. By
the early months of 1915 one brigade route march of from twenty
to twenty-five miles, and shorter battalion marches each week,
had become the general rule. Equipment being slow in making its
appearance, General Powell had rucksacks, of the Alpine pattern,
made in Belfast, to be carried, fully loaded, on the march instead
of the pack, and bolts from the shipyards to take the place of
small-arm ammunition in the pouches. There was, as might be expected,
some grumbling at what appeared to be a needless imposition, but
the troops benefited by the experience, and Sir Archibald Murray,
when they marched past him the following summer, remarked how
easily they carried their packs. Numerous recruiting marches were
also carried out, which provided further training in marching and
march-discipline, and at the same time exhibited detachments of the
units from the countryside to the remotest villages in their area.
Everywhere they were received with the greatest pride and enthusiasm.

For the rest, the training was that of all the New Armies. The
Infantry had "D.P." rifles, the R.E. for a long time no material
save what was bought for them. Little musketry could be carried out,
such as there was being done with a handful of short service rifles
allotted to each battalion, and in some cases with rifles borrowed
from the U.V.F.--upon which inspecting Generals turned a blind eye.
By Infantry and Sappers alike trenches were dug, as an officer of
the latter acidly remarks, about eighteen inches wide and with
perpendicular sides. But that, of course, was a universal experience.
Much discussion took place upon the relative merits of trenches
sited upon the forward and reverse slopes of undulating ground.
Not till 1918, and then to an extent but small, was any choice to
be left by the enemy in the siting of positions. The R.A.M.C. was
the first to be equipped. The people of Ulster showed its affection
for its Division by the presentation of very fine motor ambulances,
each of which bore inscribed upon the body the name of the town or
association from which it came. In some of these cars the gangway was
sufficiently wide to take two additional stretchers, which proved an
inestimable boon in the Battle of the Somme.

[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL SIR C. H. POWELL, K.C.B.]

The winter, it has already been remarked, was a very wet one. The
health of the troops was generally good, a few cases of that dreadful
disease cerebro-spinal meningitis causing the medical staff its
greatest anxiety. In order, however, to spare the men as far as
possible from strain and discomfort, and to allow those that remained
to be accommodated in the huts as they were completed, some units
were moved out of the camps; the 9th Irish Fusiliers[14] of the 108th
Brigade, and the 11th Inniskillings[14] of the 109th, for example,
moving to barracks, the first to Holywood and Belfast, the second to
the town that gives the regiment its name, Enniskillen. In January
the 109th Brigade, less the 10th Inniskillings, moved to Randalstown.
The 10th Inniskillings remained on the West coast till the first days
of May, suffering the wildest weather in their exposed camp, but
probably no worse than was suffered by the rest of the Brigade in
the first days at Randalstown, which became such a quagmire that men
who slipped from the "duck-boards" between the huts sometimes sank
to their knees in the mud. As weather improved and the hutments were
completed, the full Brigades reassembled in their camps, the 10th
Inniskillings marching across Ireland, from west coast to east, to
rejoin. With the spring there began a new era of intensive training.

Meanwhile had been fought the Marne, the Aisne, the two Battles
of Ypres, Neuve Chapelle. The life in France was impossible to
imagine for those who had not seen it. Not all the marching and
countermarching, the attacks, the trench-digging, the bivouacks,
and cooking of meals in the open could print for the mind's eye an
adequate picture of that. But gradually, through letters, through
the recitals of wounded friends, men began to form some conception
of the realities of modern war, as fought against a race which, for
courage, endurance, and resource, ranked with the most formidable
warrior peoples of the world's history. The gas attack in the Salient
was evidence, if any were still needed, of the temper of the new
Germany. Men did not blanch, but it was inevitable that, to the more
seriously minded among them at least, another and a grimmer picture
than that which had been present with them at the beginning should
form itself. They had answered many calls, chief among them love of
country in various aspects. Mingled with this had been, however, the
spirit of adventure. The old rowel that had driven Ulstermen over
the seas, making them colonists and administrators, was sharpened
again by the war. It pricked on these young men, the flower of their
country. Now, perhaps, the spirit of happy adventure faded a little,
but it was replaced by that of hard resolution and duty. The training
had had its physical results. The troops were strong and supple in
their strength. But it had had a moral result also. The Division was
no longer a mass of men, even of drilled and disciplined men. It had
become, in the mysterious fashion that such things happen, welded
into a whole, a spiritual unit. Little by little the group-spirit had
grown, till before the troops quitted Ireland a sensitive observer
might fancy he could detect it whenever he came in contact with them.

One factor in this group-spirit and in the whole life of the
Division, which is here approached with diffidence, but which could
not be omitted from a faithful record, was the element of religion.
It is sometimes forgotten that the Covenant of the seventeenth
century was taken almost as widely in Ulster as in Scotland.
Undoubtedly something of the old covenanting spirit, the old sense of
the alliance of "Bible and Sword," was reborn in these men. It was
the easier recreated because of the strength of religious feeling
which had existed in times of peace in Protestant Ulster, one of the
few parts of the country wherein the reformed churches had not, by
their own admission, lost ground in the last thirty years. Religious
feeling inspired the men of Ulster in those days of training, and
remained with them in the days of war. The General commanding the
4th Division, to which the 36th was attached for instruction after
its arrival in France, spoke of his astonishment at finding so many
Ulstermen reading their Bibles. The writer of this book can bear
witness from personal observation that it was not uncommon to find a
man sitting on the fire-step of a front-line trench, reading one of
the small copies of the New Testament which were issued to the troops
by the people at home. The explanation was that, on the one hand,
religion was near and real to them; on the other, that they were
simple men. They saw no reason to hide or disguise that which was a
part of their daily lives.

The people of Ulster were given an opportunity to see their Division
as a whole. On May the 8th it was inspected by Major-General Sir Hugh
McCalmont at Malone, afterwards marching through Belfast, the salute
being taken by the General at the City Hall. It was a fine day; the
City was dressed in bunting, and the main streets rocked with a mass
of enthusiastic spectators, who had crowded in by special train from
all about the Province. The troops were to remain two months longer
in Ireland, always on the tiptoe of expectation of a move, but that
was the real farewell of Ulster to the Division she had given to the
nation.

Early in July the Division moved to Seaford, on the Sussex coast,
leaving the 9th Inniskillings to recruit at Ballycastle from the
shameful disease of German measles! But a small proportion of those
15,000 men had ever previously crossed the Irish Sea. The English
were new to them, as they were to the English. The impressions
made on either side were favourable. The men were treated with
the greatest kindliness, and, for their part, their behaviour was
excellent; reassuring, indeed, to some of those residents who had
been perturbed at the idea of this incursion of "wild Irishmen." Not
a few of the people of Seaford, on seeing the announcement of this
History in the press, wrote to the author and spoke of their pleasant
memories of the Ulstermen's sojourn in the district. Seaford made a
fine training area. It was a healthy place, and the splendid downs
behind the town were ideal for tactical exercises. Soon they were
scored with white chalk trenches. On one occasion, when the whole
Division, with the exception of the Artillery--Infantry, Cavalry,
Cyclists, Engineers, R.A.S.C., and R.A.M.C.--had been engaged in
night manœuvres, it was discovered when dawn broke that a deep trench
had been cut across a very valuable gallop belonging to an Alfriston
training stable. An apologetic letter was sent to the owner, who
wrote back expressing his pleasure that his ground had been put to a
purpose so useful, offered half his jumps to the mounted units and
young officers for practice, and scarcely hinted that he hoped the
occurrence would not be repeated.

In the last week of July, when the troops were carrying out
their usual routine of training, a message was received that
Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray, Deputy Chief of the General
Staff, would hold an immediate inspection. The result was of great
importance. Sir Archibald Murray informed Lord Kitchener on his
return that the Ulster Division was worthy of a higher place than it
occupied on the latter's private list of troops for the front. It was
not Lord Kitchener's fashion to ponder such questions.

"I'll go and see them to-morrow!" was his reply.

At half-past four on the 26th of July came a telephone message
that the Division was to parade for Lord Kitchener at 11 a.m. the
following day.

July the 27th was a bright, sunny day. Lord Kitchener came, dashed
at the waiting horses with such speed that before anyone could
speak he was on the back of one with a doubtful reputation, by no
means intended for his riding, and rode off. Colonel FitzGerald,
his Military Secretary, said he had never seen him better pleased,
and was quite unable to persuade him to leave the field for another
engagement. To General Powell he remarked that he was relieved to
find he had under his hand a Division ready for the front at a
moment's notice.

One incident of this inspection, related by the A.D.M.S. of the
Division, must be recorded, as it throws an interesting light on
Lord Kitchener's quickness of eye for and memory of details. The
personnel of the Field Ambulances was of fine physique, the mounted
men including many farmers' sons. As the Field Ambulances passed
the saluting point, Lord Kitchener turned to the A.D.M.S. with the
remark: "Those men are too fine for the R.A.M.C. You will have to
give me two hundred for the Artillery." The A.D.M.S. replied that
he hoped they would not be taken, as they had undergone a very
thorough training; to which Lord Kitchener, raising his voice,
simply repeated: "You will have to give me some of those men for the
Artillery."

A few days later an officer from the Adjutant-General's department
came down. He said that, at the moment, men were in fact not
particularly wanted for the Artillery, but that as "K." had ordered
it, they must be taken. The upshot was that, from a large number
who volunteered and some reinforcements from Newry, one hundred and
fifty were transferred to the Artillery, with the promise that they
should be used to reinforce that of their own Division--a promise
that, it is to be feared, was not in the majority of their cases
fulfilled. The sequel came two months later, when Lord Kitchener was
present at the King's Review. On reaching the 108th Field Ambulance,
the A.D.M.S. rode out to take up his position behind Lord Kitchener,
who turned to him and asked: "How many men did you send to the
Artillery?" "A hundred and fifty, sir." Lord Kitchener, somewhat
gruffly: "I thought I told you to send two hundred." The A.D.M.S.
thought it best to leave it at that.

Returning from the Seaford review, Sir Archibald Murray pointed
out to the Secretary for War that the 36th Division was not quite
so ready for France as he had supposed, since, though it had had
practice on the ranges at Seaford, as well as in Ireland, it had not
completed its official musketry and machine-gun courses, and was
not equipped for the front. Nor was the training of the Divisional
Artillery, which Lord Kitchener had not seen, nearly sufficiently
advanced. Lord Kitchener gave orders that musketry and equipment
should at once be completed, and that a fully trained Divisional
Artillery should be attached to the Division. Shortly afterwards he
said to Sir Edward Carson, referring no doubt to the New Armies only:
"Your Division of Ulstermen is the finest I have yet seen."

Owing to lack of accommodation it was a few weeks before the Division
moved to an area where its musketry could be carried out. By the
2nd of September it was assembled at Bordon and Bramshott. Here the
final equipment arrived, and there was feverish activity in fitting
it. Here also the musketry course was fired, for the most part with
American ammunition, which gave unsatisfactory results.[15] And
here the rest of the Division came to closer quarters with its own
Artillery, which had arrived at Bordon from Lewes on August the
31st. To be frank, there was some dismay when it was discovered how
elementary was its training. A year was the estimate by some regular
officers of the time needed to make it fit for service. The critics
had yet to learn what could be accomplished by intensive training,
directed from above with skill and energy, backed by hard work,
loyalty, and the swift intelligence of the Cockney from below.

The senior officers were now sent to France for instructional
purposes, being attached to the 5th and 18th Divisions. On their
return, news met General Powell that during his absence Major-General
O. S. W. Nugent, D.S.O.,[16] who had commanded a Brigade in France
with distinction, had been appointed to succeed him. The grounds of
the decision were unexceptionable: that Divisions should be taken
to France by general officers with experience of the conditions of
warfare in that country. There was, however, throughout the Division,
much sympathy with General Powell, who had been allowed to make his
tour in the line in ignorance of the fact, which the staff officers
with whom he came in contact knew, that his successor had been
appointed. He received the honour of the K.C.B. in recognition of his
high services in the training of the Division. Sir Herbert Powell
finally went to Vladivostok in charge of the British Red Cross. The
new commander was to remain with the Division for over two and a
half years. To-day his name is universally associated with it.

On September the 30th, the 36th (Ulster) Division, with the 1st/1st
London Territorial Artillery, was reviewed by His Majesty King George
the Fifth. It was desired not to prolong unduly the march past, as
His Majesty always insisted on waiting till the last man had gone
by, and General Nugent decided that the Artillery should advance in
column of batteries, and the Infantry in column of half-companies
with reduced intervals. It was a high test, triumphantly
accomplished. Lord Kitchener informed General Sir A. Hunter, G.O.C.
Aldershot Command, that the inspection was the quickest the King had
made since the beginning of the war: a triumph of staff work and of
drill. None of those who saw them is likely to forget the physique or
the bearing of that splendid body of men. It is hard to think without
emotion of what the Division was that day and the fate that awaited
it.

Lord Kitchener was there again, smiling and obviously well-pleased.
His Majesty warmly congratulated General Nugent, and, turning to Sir
George Richardson, who was present, told him what a fine Division had
been given by his Ulster Volunteers. As the King's motor-car overtook
some of the troops marching back to camp the men burst out into
wild cheering, so that the car swept along a loud-roaring line--an
unrehearsed and spontaneous exhibition of loyalty.

At the time of His Majesty's inspection the Advance Parties were
already in France. In the first days of October the Division crossed
the Channel, the mounted portion and transport to Havre, the
dismounted to Boulogne.

The year of preparation for battle was over.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Now Lord Carson of Duncairn.

[2] Now Brigadier-General T. E. Hickman, C.B., D.S.O., M.P.

[3] Sir Edward Carson's apprehensions were found to have been
justified when, on September the 15th, Mr. Asquith's Government
passed the Home Rule Act, the whole of the Unionist Party leaving
the Chamber as a protest against what it regarded as a breach of the
Truce.

[4] As, of course, were the titles "Scottish," "Irish," "Welsh,"
"Northern," "Southern," etc., to other Divisions.

[5] Now the Right Honble. Sir James Craig, Bt., Prime Minister of
Northern Ireland.

[6] Now Commander Locker-Lampson, C.M.G., D.S.O.

[7] Now Brigadier-General Ricardo, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.

[8] Captain Ricardo was asked officially to ascertain the views
of the Nationalist Party, in his district, which had a military
organization of its own. They replied that they would help on the
following conditions: (_a_) they would guard the shores of Ulster
only, and would not leave it; (_b_) they must be allowed to keep
their arms at the end of the war.

[9] Now Sir Herbert Powell, K.C.B.

[10] A G.S.O., 1st Grade, was not appointed to Divisions in training
at home.

[11] Now Lieut.-Colonel Spender, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.

[12] Formed May 1915.

[13] Now Sir G. Hacket Pain, K.B.E., C.B., M.P.

[14] In future, battalions of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
Royal Irish Rifles, and Royal Irish Fusiliers will be alluded to as
"Inniskillings," "Rifles," and "Irish Fusiliers," respectively.

[15] The writer saw one man, at whose shoulder he had stood on a
U.V.F. range while he put five huge bullets from an Italian Veterli
into the bull's-eye, miss the target twice at 600 yards.

[16] Now Sir Oliver Nugent, K.C.B., D.S.O.

CHAPTER II

THE DIVISION IN FRANCE: OCTOBER 1915 TO JUNE 1916

General Nugent and his Staff arrived at Boulogne at midnight on the
3rd of October. Between the 5th and the 9th of the month the Division
concentrated in the area round Flesselles, where, some ten miles
north of Amiens, Divisional Headquarters were established. Here the
troops realized for the first time that France did not always mean
the firing-line. The sound of guns was, strangely enough, heard less
than it had been at Seaford, though the Vérey lights that could be
seen by night against the sky were evidence of the proximity of the
trenches. The countryside of the Somme was poor of soil, though
the industry of the inhabitants extracted good crops from it, and
curiously unlike that of the North of Ireland in its absence of
pasture. It was, however, pleasant enough, high and rolling, the
sites of the little villages in the uplands determined by the scanty
water supply, but traversed by numerous streams in the valleys, full
of beautiful panoramas wherever woodland interposed to break the
monotony of its contours. The villages were not uncomfortable so long
as troops could be widely spread. When, however, they were used as
"staging areas" and billeting was at all close, their poverty was
only too apparent.

Of this, some portions of the Division had early experience. On
October the 9th the 107th Brigade and the 1st/1st London Brigade
R.F.A. moved up for attachment to the 4th Division, and instruction
in trench warfare. The 4th Division at this time held a wide and
comparatively quiet front north of the River Ancre, which had been
taken over from the French during the previous summer. The general
method of instruction in vogue was the attachment of formations and
units to those next larger; that is, a battalion to an infantry
brigade, a company to a battalion, a battery to a brigade of
artillery. The troops in this preliminary experience of trench
warfare suffered less from the enemy than the elements. The weather
was bad, roads and trenches were wet; the billeting accommodation
_en route_ was scanty, and while in rest behind the line, consisted
almost entirely of war-worn tents without floor-boards. The men in
those first days scarce seemed to notice these things, so intense
was their eagerness and curiosity. The conventional and traditional
grumble of the British private soldier, a _sotto voce_ accompaniment
to the most generous efforts and the most unselfish devotion, was
forgotten here. One of the Brigadiers of the 4th Division said of
them:

"The men are extraordinarily quiet, and I thought at first somewhat
subdued, and put it down to the big marches they had had. But when I
came to talk to them I found they were like new schoolboys, taking
in everything, deadly keen, and only afraid of one thing--letting
down their unit in any way. I have never seen any men with such quiet
confidence in themselves, in spite of their efforts to hide it."

The attachments lasted five days, the 107th Brigade being the only
one which was not divided between two divisions in the line. Its
attachment being complete, the 108th was sent up, two battalions to
the 4th Division and two to the 48th, further north. Then, towards
the end of the month, the 109th Brigade had its turn with the same
two Divisions. Meanwhile the R.E. Headquarters and the three Field
Companies had moved to Arquèves, to work on the new Third Army Line,
later to become important as the Amiens Defences. At this task they
were soon joined by the 16th Rifles (Pioneers), while they also
had as companions French Territorials. All worked hard and well,
though in the light of subsequent experience their trenches were
far too narrow, and their traverses too small by half. The troops
not under instruction in the line were kept hard at work training,
officers from the 4th Division having come to initiate them into the
mysteries of bombing--mysteries to which they took in kindly fashion.
One instructor declared that the national sport of the Ulsterman,
the throwing of kidney-stones in street riots, was an admirable
preparation for bombing. Another introduction was to gas helmets,
the horrible bags of those days without even mouth-pieces. Passing
through a gas-chamber in these bags was unpleasant, though accepted
as a necessity, but "doubling" and marching in them, as ordered by
some zealous instructors, was purgatory, and resulted in some of
the men being violently sick. On October the 21st the Division,
except for such infantry and artillery as were under instruction in
the line, moved slightly further west, toward Abbeville, to a more
comfortable and spacious area about Bernaville and Canaples, with
Headquarters at Domart-en-Ponthieu.

The Higher Command had decided that the 36th Division was not to
enter the line as a formation for the present. The Battle of Loos
was not long past, when troops fresh from England had been pushed
into the fight at its fiercest and after very long marches, with
disastrous results. It was determined that in future divisions should
be given a chance gradually to accustom themselves to the conditions.
Another decision which had been arrived at was that New Army and
Territorial Divisions should receive an admixture of thirty per cent.
of regular infantry by the transfer of brigades. Orders were received
for the transfer of one brigade to the 4th Division. The 107th, in
the command of which General W. M. Withycombe, C.M.G., had succeeded
General Couchman, was selected to go. The 12th Brigade of the 4th
Division was transferred to the 36th Division in exchange.

By November the 4th the 107th Brigade, with its Light Trench Mortar
Battery, which had just arrived from England, and the 110th Field
Ambulance, were clear of the 36th Divisional area. On the 7th the
12th Brigade marched in to take its place. The 2nd Lancashire
Fusiliers of this Brigade were transferred to the 108th Brigade in
exchange for the 11th Rifles, and the 2nd Essex to the 109th in
exchange for the 14th Rifles. These inter-divisional changes lasted a
month only. Any advantages they may have had were found insufficient
to counterbalance the dislike of the break-up of their old formations
felt by battalions of both Divisions.

The Division as now constituted passed a winter very different
from that of its expectations. Late in November it moved down to
Abbeville, with Headquarters at Pont Remy, on the bank of the Somme
just outside that city. For the time it was concerned more with
sanitation than with war. Never was such cleaning of streets, such
draining of middens, such wholesale carting away of manure-heaps,
as when the Ulster Division marched into an area. The inhabitants
wondered and gaped, and a humorist wrote home that the troops "were
sweeping onward through village after village in the North of France."

Some writers--among them, it is to be regretted, a well-known
dramatist and critic of Ulster birth--have spoken unfavourably of the
French peasant and his attitude to the troops. There can be few men
of the 36th Division who look back upon the peasant-farmer of the
Somme with anything but affection and admiration. For their part,
the villagers testified by their letters and expressions of regret,
whenever a unit moved, how good had been the terms between troops and
civilians. The Calvinistic Ulsterman was sometimes a little startled
and pained at first on finding a countryside so liberally besprinkled
with shrines and crucifixes, but, if he were a countryman,
especially, he made the surprising discovery that these countrymen of
the Somme were very like himself. They thought twice before speaking
once; they had a certain dourness; they did not wear their hearts on
their sleeves, though they were furnished with those organs in the
proper places.

On November the 26th two of the Field Companies, the 121st and
150th, were returned by the Third Army, and began to assist and
supervise the infantry at work in the villages. In view of the
projected spring offensive, not actually launched till after
midsummer, all these back areas were being prepared to accommodate
large bodies of troops in some comfort. Bunks were put into barns,
the holes which had appeared in the lath and mud walls, through
shortage of male labour in the villages, were repaired, and excellent
horse-lines, with standings of chalk and stone, were built. The
timber was cut locally and sawn by the troops themselves, using their
own saw-mill.

On November the 27th the Ulster Divisional Artillery, so called at
that date to distinguish it from the London Territorial Artillery,
which was known as the 36th Divisional Artillery, landed at Havre,
and joined the Division in the area east of Abbeville. It had
remained at Bordon since the departure of the Division. Its training
was not yet complete, and it was to have a course of gunnery at
Cayeux, on the coast, south of the mouth of the Somme, before
entering the line. The only other important event, from the military
point of view, to be recorded before February, was the formation of
the 108th and 109th Machine-Gun Companies, from personnel and guns
withdrawn from the battalions. To replace the guns each battalion was
issued with four Lewis guns, which number was gradually increased
till, a year later, it had been quadrupled.

Christmas 1915 was celebrated by the troops in their billets with
sport and festivities. Many units had bought suckling pigs from
the farmers, and fattened them in anticipation of the event; none
had failed to provide some luxuries. The villagers took part in
the merrymaking, and in most of the officers' messes the people of
the house drank with their guests the toast of victory. For very
many of the men in those Somme villages it was one of the happiest
Christmases they had ever spent, and one on which they looked
back in after years with delight. Within a few days the services
of the Pioneers were lost for a long period to the Division. They
were ordered to construct, under the Chief Engineer of the Third
Army, a broad-gauge railway line between Candas and Acheux. For the
rest, there was little change in the daily life of the Division.
On New Year's Day it moved back again to the area about Domart,
roughly that in which it had been previously billeted. The same
work--wood-cutting, repairing and "bunking" of barns, construction
of horse-lines--continued, with the exception that it was done in
different villages. When the work was well in hand some training was
interspersed with it. Not till January the 30th was the Division
ordered to hold itself in readiness to take over a portion of the
line. It had passed the worst of the winter by no means disagreeably.

The 107th Brigade had existed in a fashion less idyllic. On arrival
in the 4th Division area two of its battalions, the 8th and 15th
Rifles, were transferred to the 10th and 11th Brigades respectively,
while in exchange it received three battalions, the 1st Rifle
Brigade, 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers, and 2nd Monmouths. Three days
later it took over the left sector of the 4th Division front, astride
the Mailly-Maillet--Serre Road, the Brigade Headquarters being in
the former village. Here for upwards of two months it remained,
alternating with the 10th Brigade in six-day tours in the line. In
November the weather was indifferent; by December it became very
bad indeed. Men sank in the mud so that they had to be dug out by
their comrades with spades. The communication trenches were so deep
in water that they were for the most part impassable. Movement from
front to rear had to take place after dark, in the open. "Trench
feet," a disease then generally known as "frost-bite," though caused
by constant immersion of the feet in water far above freezing-point,
became prevalent. Rubber thigh boots, most precious of boons to men
in such sectors, were all too rare as yet, and had to be doled out
with parsimony. Battle casualties were light in this sector, but
the life in it was very far from pleasant. On New Year's Day the
Brigade, now returned to its original formation, exchanged it for
the right sector of the front held by 4th Division, south of the
Mailly-Maillet--Serre Road. Of this sector the chief peculiarity was
a tiny parallelogram of trenches jutting out from the British line
on the high ground east of Beaumont Hamel, known as the Redan. It
was a most unpleasant corner. In the first place, it was not more
than fifty yards from the German lines, and the mine-craters which
fringed its eastern edge, which were occupied at night by British
posts--a doubtful policy, as it appears to-day--were in constant
danger of surprise. During the 107th Brigade's tour one post was,
indeed, bombed by the enemy and a man taken out of it. In the second
place, the Redan was the scene of constant mining, and the bugbear of
battalions in reserve, which had to send up large working-parties to
carry sandbags filled with chalk for the miners. It was the one point
in our trenches which received fairly constant attention from German
gunners, and the average weekly casualties in this tiny lozenge were
probably higher than on the whole of the rest of the 4th Division's
front. One of the best pieces of work performed by the 107th Brigade
during this period was the construction, by the 8th Rifles, in one
night, of a trench a hundred yards in length and protected by a
double "apron" of wire, which denied to the enemy ground which would
have given him important observation. The digging and wiring were
carried out without arousing the least suspicion among the German
sentries.

The Brigade had during these three months established an excellent
reputation, both for work and for demeanour under fire. General
Nugent had suggested the reconstitution of the 36th Division on its
old basis on the grounds that, with three Brigades of Ulstermen, it
would be more homogeneous and of greater fighting value than as at
present constituted. This suggestion was favourably received. The
men had not been unhappy in the 4th Division, but feelings of local
patriotism were still strong in them, and they were most anxious to
return. It was announced that the reconstitution--the first of any
division so dismembered, and the only one which occurred for some
time--would take place simultaneously with the Division taking over
a portion of the front.

The 1st/1st London Artillery had departed, two howitzer batteries to
the East, and the remainder to the 38th Division in Flanders. The
original Artillery, henceforth the 36th Divisional Artillery, was
completing its training on the coast. With its exception the whole
Division now marched linewards, between the 2nd and 6th of February.
The 4th Division had meanwhile extended its right flank, and had
the 11th Brigade on the right of the 107th, its outer flank on the
River Ancre, just east of Hamel. As the new divisional boundaries
were to be the Ancre and the Mailly-Maillet--Serre Road, all that was
necessary to complete the relief and reconstitute the Division was
for the 108th Brigade to relieve the 11th. The 36th Division then
took over, at noon on February the 7th, its first line, with the
108th Brigade on the right, the 107th on the left, and the 109th in
reserve. Headquarters were at the large village, or small town, of
Acheux.

Of the next six weeks there is little of interest to report, save
a heavy bombardment of the left flank of the 107th Brigade and of
the 12th Brigade to the north of it. Shelling with 210, 105, and
77-mm. howitzers and field guns lasted for about half an hour, after
which the artillery lifted range to rear lines and communication
trenches. The 9th Rifles at once manned their battered trenches,
some men getting out beyond the wire and opening rapid fire. There
was no attack, though a party of the enemy succeeded in entering the
trenches of the 12th Brigade, to be quickly ejected. It was curious
that in this, its first bombardment, and a not inconsiderable one,
the Division did not suffer a casualty.

A mine exploded in front of the Redan cost the lives of three men
of an attached Tunnelling Company, who were buried in a blown-in
passage. Otherwise, during this period the weather was probably an
opponent more formidable than the Germans. The men in the trenches
lived under conditions of the deepest discomfort. For weeks together
the communication trenches were knee-deep in water. Previous troops
had dug deep sumps in the bottoms of the trenches, covering them with
boards, with the idea of draining off the water. But the water soon
filled these and rose till it floated off the boards. Then would
come some unfortunate fellow splashing his way along the trench,
to plunge into the hole and be soused in icy water to the waist or
higher. Some of the ills then endured were, it must be admitted,
not unavoidable. There was a certain lack of revetting material, it
is true. Few of those who were compelled to use it will forget one
notorious communication trench, "Jacob's Ladder," which ran from the
village of Mesnil to that of Hamel, down a forward slope completely
exposed to the enemy. By night the road could be followed without
worse risk than occasional bursts of machine-gun fire, so that large
bodies of men had seldom to use this trench. By day, however, men
clawing their way through its mud experienced the sensations of flies
in treacle. When time and material had become available for the
revetting of its sides, all this was changed, and "Jacob's Ladder"
lost much of its evil reputation. But on the front line trenches more
could have been done than was accomplished. The chief methods of
drainage employed were the digging of large sumpholes in the parados
of the trench to carry off the water, and the pumping of it out over
the parapet with hand-pumps, whence, of course, it presently filtered
back to the trench bottom. Scientific trench drainage, by means of
trenches cut for the purpose, had as yet made little progress, though
the undulating character of the country was suitable to it. It is
scarcely an exaggeration to say that the Division suffered more from
the wet at this time than during the following winter in Flanders, in
flat country and on a water-logged soil, simply because in the latter
case the R.E. and infantry had learnt by experience how to deal with
it.

If the 36th Division had yet something to learn by way of prevention
in these matters, it had little as regards cure. When rubber
boots--"gum-boots, thigh," in the parlance of the Ordnance--became
commoner, "trench feet" almost disappeared. The men laughed at the
special grease with which they were provided to rub their feet, but
they used it as they were ordered to do. Contrary to legend, but a
small proportion was really used for the frying of food. They laughed
also at the foot drill, each man rubbing the feet of his next number
once a day, but to a great extent they carried it out. Excellent as
these things were, the best remedy of all was found to be dry socks.
Drying them in the trenches was difficult, but it was easy to send up
dry ones by the ration parties at night, who took back the wet ones
with them and dried them during the following day.

As this History is intended not alone for men who fought in the war,
but also for their relatives and friends at home, a few remarks
on the routine of holding a line of trenches, commonplace to the
soldier as they may be, are perhaps permissible. Let us imagine a
division with two brigades in line, and one in reserve. Each of the
brigades in line would have two battalions in the trenches, relieved
at regular intervals, though never on the same night, by the other
two. These intervals were from four to eight days, according to the
weather and state of the trenches. The distance of the rest billets
from the front line, again, depended upon accommodation, the enemy's
command of the country from his observation posts, and the activity
of his artillery. They might be three or four miles back. At this
time the battalion which held the line at Hamel, on the right bank of
the Ancre, rested in Mesnil, little more than a mile from the German
lines. The battalion in the trenches had probably two companies in
the front line, one in support and one in reserve, and carried out
inter-battalion reliefs in the course of its tour. The front and
support lines were held by posts consisting of sections, about ten
or twelve men in these early days, half as many later on. These
posts furnished each a single sentry by day, and double sentries by
night. For half an hour before and half an hour after dawn, the hour
of surprise attacks, the troops would "stand to" in their trenches.
In winter months this was the hour of the rum-ration--very welcome
after a cold or wet night. Each company had one officer permanently
on duty in the trench, night and day. In the trenches these periods
were practically reversed. Night was the time when most of the work,
all the wiring, all the patrolling of "No Man's Land," was carried
out. Roughly speaking, the battalion in the line was responsible for
the work as far back as its headquarters, with the expert assistance
of a few sappers. Behind that worked the resting battalion--though
parties from this had frequently to assist the battalion in line
also--under the direction of the R.E., of which one Field Company
was in general attached to each brigade. It was important that the
infantry should know the sappers, and look upon them as assistants
rather than task-masters. The Pioneer battalion had generally some
special task of importance allotted to it under the direction of the
C.R.E.

A Machine-Gun Company at this time formed part of each brigade. The
guns were distributed in depth in the trenches, but much further
forward than was the case later on, when the number of Lewis guns
with the infantry had been increased. Such subtleties as machine-gun
barrages, indirect fire, the linking of guns by telephone to
battalion headquarters, had as yet scarce been conceived. Machine
gunners and infantry had their ammunition and bombs in boxes let into
the parapet, these stores increasing in size from front to rear.

The artillery, in rear, was also distributed in depth. Covering two
brigades, as we have imagined, it would probably be divided into two
groups, the group commander living at or near the headquarters of
his infantry brigade. For this purpose the present formation, four
artillery brigades, of which one was a howitzer brigade, was clumsy
and extravagant. The howitzer brigade, for example, was invariably
split between the groups, and its commander "functioned" as an
administrator, but not as a combatant. This system was to be modified
later. The guns were in pits, hidden as well as possible among trees
or houses, or if in the open covered with "camouflage" to match the
surrounding fields. The dug-outs of their detachments were close
at hand, and, close at hand also, were pits containing from two
to four hundred rounds per gun. At dusk the guns were laid on the
"night-lines"; that is to say, each was set so as to fire upon a
certain zone, in accordance with a previously arranged plan. A sentry
in an observation post watched the line. Within a few seconds of a
telephone call or an "S.O.S." rocket going up, the guns could open
fire. An artillery liaison officer lived with each battalion in the
trenches.

The rations arrived each day for all these people in the following
manner: The Divisional Supply Column went daily to railhead with
its lorries to meet the "pack train," bringing up the supplies to
the "refilling point," and dividing them into four groups, one for
each infantry brigade and one for all the rest of the divisional
units. Here, under the supervision of the Brigade Supply Officer, the
supplies were parcelled out, loaded into the horsed supply wagons,
and taken to the transport lines of the units, where they came into
the keeping of the Quartermaster. In a very quiet part of the front,
when the railhead was far advanced, the supply wagons could draw
direct from the railhead, cutting out altogether the Supply Column
and its lorries. Divisions were urged to do this when possible to
save petrol. Let not the innocent, however, imagine that uses were
not found for the lorries thus set at liberty!

The food we need follow no further, except in the case of a
battalion in the trenches. For all other units its preparation was
comparatively simple. But to supply the man on the fire-step with
hot food at regular intervals was a problem of some difficulty.
Rations were brought up to battalion headquarters after dusk by the
transport. In a well-organized battalion--and battalions varied
much in this respect--the maximum was done before the food left
the transport lines, the minimum when it arrived. That minimum
was the heating. In some sectors of the front it used to be said
that cooking was impossible. As a fact, there never was a sector
wherein, with resource and ingenuity, at least the _heating_ of food
already prepared was impracticable. For extras, the stock-pot was the
soldier's best friend; and unhappy was he if his battalion did not
possess it. Ration biscuit, soaked in stock and put through a mincing
machine, made "dough" which produced cheese biscuits, sausage rolls,
jam tarts. As for the dry rations, tobacco, etc., they were put into
a sandbag for each section, labelled with the number of that section.
So, at least, marched affairs in a battalion of which the internal
economy was at a high stage of efficiency.

The evacuation of wounded may also be briefly described. On a
casualty occurring the wounded man was brought by the regimental
stretcher-bearers to the Regimental Aid Post, a dug-out or shelter
near a communication trench, generally in the neighbourhood of
battalion headquarters. A mile or two further back was the Advanced
Dressing Station, to which the Field Ambulance stretcher-bearers
carried "lying-down" cases and conducted "walking" cases. If
possible, wheeled stretchers or a trench tramway were here employed.
At the A.D.S. food in some form was always ready; wounds were
re-dressed if necessary, morphia given if required, and the soothing
cigarette added. Then the cars of the Field Ambulance conveyed the
casualty to the Main Dressing Station; _i.e._, the headquarters of
the Field Ambulance. This was to all intents and purposes a temporary
hospital, where the wounded man might obtain rest, and further
surgical aid if required. It was the last stage in the divisional
chain. From it the cars of the Motor Ambulance convoy took him to the
Casualty Clearing Station, whence a hospital train bore him to the
base hospital or, during an offensive, direct to the hospital ship.

The above is an attempt to sketch, without entering into its ten
thousand complications, some of the main features of the life of a
man in the trenches. War, at that time and in such a sector as this,
had not acquired many of the horrors that were to come. Bombing
by aeroplanes was in its infancy; so was the use of gas shell.
Long-range shelling of villages with high-velocity guns was almost
unheard of hereabouts. With regard to all shelling there would appear
to have been conventions. Those who have seen German shells at
Mailly-Maillet dropping at dusk, the hour when the transport started
for the line, on to the Serre and Auchonvillers Roads, but never
closer than one hundred yards to the first houses of the village,
will agree with this opinion. The surroundings were far less grisly
and depressing than they afterwards became. There was, it must be
remembered, save that at Ypres and that which at the moment was being
fashioned at Verdun, no devastated area wider than a narrow ribbon
from the coast to Switzerland. From the Mesnil Ridge, where the
observation posts of the Division were manned by the Cyclist Company,
the country behind the enemy's lines showed green and smiling.
Villages which the troops were not to see at close hand save as
ruins, Irles, Pys, Grévillers, Bihucourt, were intact. The time could
be read with the aid of a telescope by the church clock of Bapaume.
On the British side, villages a couple of miles back were little
disturbed. Martinsart was no farther from the enemy, and here it was
possible to call on Brigade headquarters at their château as one
returned from the trenches, and drink a cup of tea poured out by the
daughter of the house, who rang for a British orderly to bring hot
water. Mediæval idyll! With spring appearing, the trenches drying,
and the grasses above them filled with field flowers; with the Valley
of the Ancre taking on a new beauty as its trees were feathered
green; with nature bursting into life, man's thoughts could not be
ever fixed upon death. Warfare, to many of the men in the Division,
must have seemed less than terrible in these days. But they were the
last of the good days. The terrible was not far off.

In the first week of March the Division extended its front, the
109th Brigade taking over the sector south of the Ancre, known by
the name of Thiepval Wood. At the same time the 36th Divisional
Artillery, back from its final training at Cayeux, took over the
defence of the long line. By the last day of the month the latter
had been shortened to the two-battalion front astride the Ancre, the
31st Division having come into line on the left. The two sub-sectors
were known as Thiepval Wood and Hamel respectively. The Hamel
sub-sector was comfortable and quiet, troubled by nothing worse than
the aggressions of a new long-range medium trench mortar, which
often smashed in its communication trenches, but seldom caused many
casualties. The battalion which held it was responsible for the
defence of the Ancre and its swampy valley, filled with miniature
lakes. This was carried out by the reserve company in the village,
which found a platoon for small and isolated posts, the most advanced
being at the bridge on the Thiepval-Hamel Road. The men enjoyed this
duty better than any other. They were never shelled, they had no work
to do, and they could employ their leisure fishing in the stream,
with the chance of an occasional shot at wild duck or widgeon.
Thiepval Wood, on the other hand, with an appearance of quietude
that deceived visitors and newcomers, was wont to be transformed by
sudden and not infrequent bombardments into a very unpleasant spot
indeed. It was here that on the 10th of March the 10th Inniskillings
suffered their real baptism of fire. At three in the afternoon there
had been ranging shots from all calibres of artillery upon the wood,
strengthening the belief of the man in the line, which was accepted
with some hesitation by the Staff, that the army opposite possessed
a "travelling circus" of heavy artillery, moved from point to point
for the covering of raids. Precisely at midnight came a roar of
explosions, a whistle and screaming of shells, a crash of falling
trees. All telephone lines were cut, and S.O.S. rockets failed to
ignite, but the artillery soon opened fire on its own initiative. On
the right of the battalion front the trenches were pounded beyond
recognition, and soon littered with dead and wounded. The garrison
of the trenches manned their fire-steps and opened rapid fire on
the enemy's front line. Not till 2 a.m. did the shelling die down.
Then it was found that the enemy had penetrated the trenches of the
troops on the right of the Division, killing a number of officers
and men, and taking several prisoners. In a Special Order of the
Day, congratulating the 10th Inniskillings, the Divisional Commander
stated that "there seemed no reason to doubt that the German
bombardment was intended to cover a raid similar to the raid which
actually took place elsewhere the same night." The battalion had the
further honour of mention in the despatches of Sir Douglas Haig. Its
losses amounted to some thirty killed and wounded.

[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL SIR O. S. NUGENT, K.C.B., D.S.O.]

From the moment when the Division first entered the line,
preparations had been made for the long-planned offensive. By the
month of May this work was intensified. It is difficult to give in a
few lines an adequate idea of the scope of such preliminary labour.
The mere plans and instructions issued by the Staffs of the Division,
its formations and units, would fill the greater part of this
volume. There were miles of tramway to be laid, gun-pits for the new
artillery to be constructed, roads to be improved, new communication
trenches cut, and innumerable dug-outs excavated. The heaviest task
of all was the building of two causeways over the Ancre and its
marshes; the only communications with our line on the left bank of
the river being some crazy wooden foot-bridges put up by French
troops. As a first step the drainage of the marshes was examined,
and many obstructions in the small streams removed. The flooded area
was thus decreased, but there were at first frantic protests from
the Division on the right when the water rose behind its lines. This
flooding was, however, but temporary. The construction of these
causeways was entrusted to the 122nd Field Company R.E., which
employed large infantry working parties in two shifts, from dusk to
dawn. The causeways were built of sandbags filled with chalk. The
river was constantly swept at night by machine-gun fire, and the
casualties suffered were not inconsiderable, particularly on the
northern causeway. The mainstay of the whole scheme of preparation
was the Pioneer battalion, which had already made its name by the
construction of the Candas-Acheux railway. It was for this battalion
a proud day when railhead for supplies and personnel opened at Belle
Eglise Farm on the line that was its handiwork. But the whole of the
Division worked with a will also. Tasks were nearly always completed
before the allotted time, for which the sole explanation lay not
entirely in the good hearts of the men, but also in the splendid
physique of the Division at this period.[17] The artillery dug on the
Mesnil Ridge an observation trench known as "Brock's Benefit," in
honour of their General, which contained a whole series of "O.P.s,"
and will be very well remembered by a long series of divisions
subsequently inhabiting that sector.

The first raid carried out by the Division was on May the 7th, and,
by an extraordinary coincidence, that night was also chosen by the
enemy to raid the troops of the 32nd Division on its right, at a
point about 200 yards west of that of the British raid. The German
barrage opened at 11 p.m.; the British "zero" was midnight. Major
Peacocke,[18] second-in-command of the 9th Inniskillings, had his
party already out in the sunken Thiepval-Hamel Road when the German
bombardment began. He spoke on a telephone which he had taken out
with him to his commanding officer, Colonel Ricardo, and it was
decided to carry through the raid. The British guns, trained on the
barrage lines selected for the raid, held their fire, and a most
uncomfortable hour had to be endured in Thiepval Wood. At midnight
the British barrage opened and the raiders charged in. The enemy was
on the alert, and a fierce struggle followed. The raid was successful
in inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. No prisoners were taken,
as the Germans in the deep dug-outs showed fight, firing up the
steps. The raiders thereupon bombed the dug-outs till all sounds of
life below had ceased. The casualties were trifling, but there were
a good many more in the sunken road, where the raiding party had to
lie two hours before it could return to its trenches, so heavy was
the German barrage.

Meanwhile, the enemy's intentions with regard to the troops on
the right of the 36th Division being only too clear, six platoons
of the 10th Inniskillings, two from dug-outs on the reverse slope
of Thiepval Wood, and a company from Authuille, moved up to their
support. The former body arrived in the front line of the 1st Dorsets
in time to assist them in repelling the enemy, who left a dead
officer and a wounded prisoner in the hands of the English battalion.
The company from Authuille and two guns of the 109th Machine-Gun
Company also pushed up through a very heavy barrage to the front
line. The Dorsets had suffered very considerable casualties, and
the troops of the Ulster Division assisted to man their line till
morning. The appreciation of the 32nd Division was warmly expressed
by the G.O.C.

In May took place the first reorganization of the Divisional
Artillery, the object of which was to divide the howitzers among
the Brigades, to overcome the disadvantages of which there has been
mention. Three of the Brigades, the 153rd, the 172nd, and the 173rd,
were made up of three four-gun 18-pounder batteries and one four-gun
4.5 howitzer battery. The fourth, the 154th Brigade, which had been
the Howitzer Brigade, thus lost all its howitzer batteries, and was
made up by three 18-pounder batteries, one from each of the other
Brigades, in exchange for the howitzers. Brigade Ammunition Columns
were abolished and the Divisional Ammunition Column largely increased.

At the end of May Brigadier-General Hickman, commanding the 109th
Brigade, returned to England, being succeeded by Brigadier-General R.
Shuter, D.S.O. General Hickman, whose part in the formation of the
Division has been recorded, was the last of the Infantry Brigadiers
who had accompanied the Division to France. General Hacket Pain,
commanding the 108th Brigade, had been succeeded by Brigadier-General
C. R. J. Griffith, C.M.G., D.S.O., on December the 4th.

With the month of June began those more detailed preparations for the
offensive which must be reserved for the chapter that deals with it.
By this time all ranks had become aware of what was brewing. A keen
sense of expectation was in the air. The Division had become a living
soul ere ever it crossed the Channel. The months of trench warfare
had strengthened it to an inestimable extent. The men were keyed up
to a very high pitch of daring and determination. The infantry had
the utmost confidence in itself, and in the artillery which was to
support it. Officers and men of these two arms had known each other
but a short time, but already a personal liaison, unusually close, to
grow even closer during the comparatively quiet months in Flanders,
had been established between them. The Division was to do great deeds
in after days, and upon other fields of battle, but never was there
quite the same generous and noble enthusiasm with which it entered
upon this, its first offensive. That which it was about to accomplish
will live in memory as long as there is a British Empire to honour
the exploits of British arms.

FOOTNOTES:

[17] The writer can recall working parties when the allotted task
was completed a full hour before the allotted time, owing to the
fact that the big countrymen of his company were able to carry two
sandbags full of chalk, one in either hand, at once.

[18] Afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel Peacocke, D.S.O., who was foully
murdered at his home near Cork, on June the 1st, 1921.

CHAPTER III

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME: JULY 1ST, 1916

On the first day of June, 1916, the front of the 36th Division
was held by the 107th Brigade, the 108th being in support in the
neighbourhood of Martinsart, and the 109th training. To permit the
two latter Brigades to train together, the 147th Brigade of the 49th
Division was ordered to relieve the 108th and take over its working
parties. The 108th Brigade then moved back to Varennes, and the
neighbouring villages of Harponville and Léalvillers. Training was
carried out over an elaborate system of dummy trenches marked out
with plough and spade, near Clairfaye Farm, to represent those of the
German system to be attacked. It was largely due to this preparation
that the men knew their task so well, and were able to push on to
their objectives when their leaders had fallen. On the 5th a raid was
carried out by a party of the 12th Rifles, sent up from the training
area, on the German sap that ran parallel with the main railway line
north of the Ancre.[19] The wire was cut by an ammonal torpedo. This
was a zinc tube, three inches in diameter, filled with ammonal. Each
tube was about six feet in length, but tubes could be connected up
with bayonet joints, and any length of torpedo thus made. It was
generally fired by a sapper accompanying the raiding party. The
Germans had run back or taken to their dug-outs under the fire of
our artillery, and few were seen. The dug-outs were bombed, and an
officer shot. Two tunnels leading toward the British lines were
discovered, one containing fourteen high-tension copper wires, which
seemed to point to mining with a mechanical digger. The heads of
these saps were blown in by the engineers who accompanied the raiding
party. Five nights later the Germans retaliated upon the little
salient in the British line opposite, known as the William Redan,
then held by the 15th Rifles. After our trenches had been pounded by
a bombardment of half an hour, the raiders advanced. They suffered
loss from our barrage, and not more than half a dozen ever actually
entered our trench. Half a minute's bitter hand-to-hand fighting,
and they were out of it again, bearing with them the leader of the
raid, who had been shot by a British officer. Our trenches were
considerably damaged, but casualties were not heavy.

The weather now took a turn for the worse, there being a sort of
cloud-burst on the 12th. Cross-country tracks were impassable for
infantry, and the carriage of ammunition to the new gun positions was
a very heavy task. The rain came at an unfortunate moment. Battalions
of the 109th Brigade were moving up to Aveluy Wood, south of Mesnil,
to complete the work of preparation. The 16th Rifles (Pioneers) were
there already. These troops had to endure the gravest discomfort
from the weather. Little canvas shelters were all their protection,
and for days together their clothes were not dry. Yet their work was
magnificent. When, almost at the last moment, a Regiment of French
Field Artillery joined the Division to assist in the attack, the
11th Inniskillings were ordered to help them in the construction of
gun-pits and shelters, with little enough time to do it. The men
threw themselves into the task with splendid enthusiasm. It seemed
that they worked the harder because their work was for strangers,
who would be left half-protected if they failed them. There was a
fine flavour of international courtesy in the manner of their toil,
for they gave of their free will energy that not the most skilful
of taskmasters could have wrung from them. General Nugent sent to
Colonel Brush, then in command of the Battalion, a letter of warm
congratulation upon their efforts.

In the battle that was about to begin, General Sir H. Rawlinson's
Fourth Army was taking the offensive along its whole front, with the
Sixth French Army of General Fayolle on its right. The Battle of the
Somme, the first in which our New Armies of volunteers were engaged
in great numbers, concerned the 36th Division but at its opening.
Its general aspects were, however, of the highest importance to
all the Allied troops. It differed broadly from such an action as
that of Loos. There an immediate strategic result was sought from a
small offensive. Here, while a break through was sought on the first
day, and would doubtless have been possible had the whole German
trench system been captured all along the front, thereafter the aims
became quite other. On the vast plateau of Picardy, an advance of
ten miles or thereabouts had small strategic importance. The nearest
first-class railway junction, Cambrai, was thirty miles away. The
new phase was the "limited offensive." The plan was to push forward
infantry behind artillery fire of overwhelming weight upon a broad
front, step by step, smashing down resistance. The plan was made
possible for us by the huge development of our munition factories.
It was the war of attrition. It was a mighty assault battle, wherein
England and France hurled man and gun and material upon German man
and gun and material. It had manifold and obvious blemishes. Its cost
was prodigious, particularly in its early stages, before certain
needful lessons had been learnt. It stereotyped attack and robbed
commanders of initiative, and was in this respect the text-book of
all the lessons Ludendorff impressed upon his troops in the first
three months of 1918. But--and of this there can be no shadow of
doubt to-day--it laid the foundations of final victory.[20] The
German troops were never quite the same after it, while our young
levies, dreadful as were their sacrifices, were to arrive at a far
higher standard of military value.

The 36th Division was the left Division of the X. Corps, having on
its right the 32nd Division and on its left the 29th Division, not
long arrived from the East, which was in the VIII. Corps. The 49th
Division was in X. Corps Reserve. The 36th Division was to attack
astride the Ancre. On the left, or southern bank, its objective was
the fifth line of German trenches, known as the "D" line.[21] The
right flank boundary ran from the north-east corner of Thiepval
Wood to D 8. On the right bank the objective was a triangle of
trenches enclosed between the left boundary line and the Ancre,
beyond Beaucourt Station. The left boundary ran from the point of the
salient in our lines, known as the Mary Redan, to two houses half-way
between Beaucourt and its railway station, thence along the river
to the railway bridge. The ground rose sharply on either side from
the deep-cut bed of the Ancre, but while on the northern bank it was
cut by a gorge running down from the village of Beaumont-Hamel, at
right angles to the river, and parallel with the German trenches, on
the south it swelled up in a great convex curve, rising two hundred
and fifty feet in a thousand yards. The crest was crowned by a
parallelogram of trenches, extending from the German "B" line to the
"C" line, that will live long in history as the Schwaben Redoubt.
The trenches were defended by masses of wire. An artillery officer,
who made a careful reconnaissance with a good glass from "Brock's
Benefit," on the Mesnil Ridge, counted sixteen rows guarding the
front line just south of the river, and an average of five rows along
the second line. The dug-outs, most of them at least thirty feet deep
in the chalk, were to all intents and purposes shell-proof, and were
numerous enough to house the whole trench garrison. The enormous
activity behind our lines had taught the Germans long before that an
attack was brewing. They trusted to their fortifications and awaited
it with confidence.

For the purposes of attack, the front was divided into four sections.
The right and right centre sections were allotted to the 109th and
108th Brigades respectively. The left centre section, bounded by a
line drawn from the north corner of Thiepval Wood just north of B
19, C 11, and D 11, and the Ancre, was, owing to the great frontage
of the 36th Division, not to be attacked directly. The left section,
on the right bank of the Ancre, was allotted to the 108th Brigade.
This Brigade had attached to it one battalion of the 107th. It was
to employ three battalions in the right centre section, and two in
the left section. The 107th Brigade (less one battalion) was in
Divisional Reserve.

The task of the 109th Brigade in the right section was to attack the
"A" and "B" lines within its section,[22] and to advance to a line
drawn from C 8 through B 16 to the Grandcourt-Thiepval Road at C 9;
there to halt and consolidate. For this purpose General Shuter was
attacking with two battalions, the 9th Inniskillings on the right,
the 10th on the left, in first line; and the two remaining, 11th
Inniskillings on right and 14th Rifles on left, in second. The two
first were to take and consolidate the final objective, the rear
battalions to hold the "A" and "B" lines and to send up liaison
patrols to get touch with the leading battalions. The most important
task of the 11th Inniskillings was the fortification of the Crucifix
on the Thiepval-Grandcourt Road.

The task of the 108th Brigade in the right centre section was to
clear the "A" and "B" lines within the section, and advance to the
"C" line, halting and consolidating on the salient C 9, C 10, C 11,
the north-east corner of the Schwaben Redoubt. A special detachment,
with one Stokes mortar, one Lewis and one Vickers gun, was to act as
left flank guard, to clear the communication trench from B 19 to C
12, holding the latter as a defensive post, and sending a detachment
down to C 13, to ensure observation and fire on the Grandcourt-St.
Pierre Divion Road. In addition, two officers' patrols, each a
platoon in strength, with a Lewis gun, were to reconnoitre and clear
the left of the "A" and "B" lines up to St. Pierre Divion. General
Griffith was attacking here with the 11th Rifles on the right, the
13th on the left, and the 15th Rifles of the 107th Brigade, attached,
in support.

North of the Ancre, in the left section, the task allotted to the
two remaining battalions of the 108th Brigade was to assault the
German salient on the left of its objective and clear the trenches
down to the railway, to establish strong points at B 26, B 24, and
B 21, and to occupy Beaucourt Station and the trenches immediately
behind it. It was afterwards to occupy the mill on the river bank
and the two houses beyond the station. Here the 9th Irish Fusiliers
were attacking on the right, and the 12th Rifles on the left. Of the
latter battalion one platoon was detailed to attack the railway sap,
of which mention has already been made, and one to patrol the marsh.

The assault on the "D" line, the final objective, was to be carried
out by the 107th Brigade with its three remaining battalions. The
Brigade was to advance through Thiepval Wood, following the 109th
Brigade, pass through the leading Brigades on the "C" line and attack
the "D" line from D 8 to D 9; then to extend its left to D 11.
General Withycombe disposed the 10th and 9th Rifles in first line,
the former with its right on D 8, the latter with its left on D 9.
After the capture of this objective, the 9th Rifles were to extend to
D 10 and the 10th to D 9. The 8th Rifles, moving up in rear, were to
occupy and hold from D 10 to D 11.

The assaulting battalions were to advance, each in eight successive
waves, at fifty yards' interval, but the 107th Brigade, passing
through to the attack on the final objective, was to advance in
artillery formation till compelled to extend.

The artillery consisted of the 36th Divisional Artillery, one
Brigade of the 49th Division, a Regiment of French Artillery, and,
under the orders of the X. Corps, a greater concentration of heavy
artillery than had been made in the course of the war till now,
except perhaps in the latter stages of Verdun. The preliminary
bombardment was to last five days, from the 24th to the 28th of June.
Owing to wet weather the attack was postponed two days, and there
were two extra days of bombardment. The results, as witnessed from
our observation posts, were magnificent. All wire that could be seen
was effectively cut. As one watched the big shells bursting, sending
up huge columns of earth, day after day, it appeared as though no
life could continue in that tortured and blasted area. The barrage
for the attack was not the true "creeping barrage" which was to
become universal later on, and was, indeed, employed that day by the
French. After a final intensive bombardment of sixty-five minutes, it
fired upon each German line in succession, lifting from the "A" to
the "A.I." at Zero, from the "A.I." at Zero plus three minutes, from
the "B" at Zero plus eighteen minutes, to a line 400 yards east of
this objective. Then at Zero plus twenty-eight minutes it moved on to
the "C" line, and at Zero plus one hour eighteen minutes off the "C"
line to the "D." There was then a long halt to permit of the passing
through of the 107th Brigade. At Zero plus two hours thirty-eight
minutes the barrage moved up to a line three hundred yards east of
the "D" line. At each lift, sections of 18-pounders and 4.5 howitzers
"walked up" the communication trenches to the next barrage line.
Stokes mortars were to take part in a final hurricane bombardment
prior to Zero, while medium[23] and heavy mortars were also employed,
the former on special points, the latter moving with the artillery
barrage to the extremity of their range. The French artillery joined
in the preliminary wire-cutting, using high explosive instead of
shrapnel according to its custom, but its main task was the drenching
of the Ancre valley with gas shell. Two machine-guns were to
accompany each battalion in the attack, the remaining eight of each
Machine-Gun Company being in Brigade Reserve. Guns were allotted
to all the principal strong points that were to be consolidated.
Eighteen Stokes mortars were to go forward, the personnel of the
remaining eighteen acting as carriers. Two sections of the 150th
Field Company were allotted to the 109th Brigade, and one section
of the 122nd Field Company to the 108th Brigade on each bank of
the Ancre. The remainder of the Field Companies were in Divisional
Reserve.

The medical arrangements were of peculiar difficulty, particularly
on the southern part of the front. The two Main Dressing Stations,
for stretcher cases and "walking wounded" respectively, were at
Forceville, manned by the 108th Field Ambulance, and Clairfaye Farm,
further west, manned by the 110th Field Ambulance. The Advanced
Dressing Station was situated close to the Albert-Arras Road in
Aveluy Wood. Evacuation of wounded from the Regimental Aid Posts
in Thiepval Wood and Authuille had to take place over Authuille
Bridge, or by the trench tramway which crossed the Ancre to the
north of it. The motors of the Field Ambulance were parked on the
Martinsart-Albert Road, south of the former village. For "walking
wounded" there was a collecting station west of Martinsart, whence
horsed wagons carried them by a cross-country track through
Hédauville to Clairfaye. From Hamel evacuation was simpler, though
even here it had to follow a specially dug trench from the village to
a point where the Hamel-Albert Road was screened from observation.

On the 22nd and 23rd the infantry took up the positions it was to
occupy during the bombardment; the 9th Inniskillings in the right
section of Thiepval Wood, the 11th Rifles in the left, and the 9th
Irish Fusiliers in the Hamel trenches. These troops had a purgatory
to endure. For the most part in the narrow slit assembly trenches,
with the rain pouring steadily down upon them, they were under
furious German bombardments that wreathed the wood in smoke and
flame, and made the crashing of great trees the accompaniment to the
roar of bursting shells. On the night of the 26th gas was liberated
by us from cylinders in the wood after a great bombardment. It was
the first time the Division had had to do with the abominable stuff,
which brought no good fortune. Many cylinders were burst by the
heavy German barrage, and serious casualties suffered by the men of
the Special Brigade responsible for opening the cocks, and by the
infantry assisting them.

Two hours later a raid was carried out in this sector by a party sent
up by the 13th Rifles. The men, now at a pitch of excitement and
enthusiasm that rendered them resistless opponents in hand-to-hand
fighting, swarmed into the battered German trenches, shooting right
and left, and bombing dug-outs. They returned with one German officer
and twelve other ranks as prisoners, the first captured by the 36th
Division. Their own casualties were six killed and nine wounded,
suffered for the most part in the Sunken Road, where, like the 9th
Inniskillings, they had to lie for some time ere it was possible to
return to their trenches. Captain Johnston, the leader of the raid,
brought in all his casualties, as well as his prisoners. He was to
fall five days later in the greater venture. The prisoners denied
knowledge of our gas, nor did their respirators smell of it. It was
occasionally the experience of the Division that the British gas
services rated too highly the effects of their devices.

On the 27th, "X" day, it rained in sheets, and "Y" day was little
better. It was accordingly decided by the Higher Command to postpone
the attack for two days. This necessitated a postponement of the
assembly also. Instead, inter-brigade reliefs were carried out in
the trenches to give some rest to the troops that had endured the
early hammering. Their rest, unfortunately, was in huts in Martinsart
Wood, huts that trembled and creaked to the terrific roar of siege
howitzers firing night and day beside them. Yet it was better than
that other wood across the river, which was the following day, now
"Y.1" day, visited by the heaviest bombardment yet seen. The trenches
were in a terrible state, and the men of the medium trench mortar
batteries, engaged in cutting the German wire, suffered more even
than the infantry, and earned the admiration of the latter by their
devotion to their task.

In all the circumstances it must be said that the total casualties
for the month of June, approximately seven hundred and fifty,
were not heavy. They included the results of a veritable calamity
that befell the 13th Rifles. On the evening of the 28th, "Y" day,
the battalion was relieving the 11th Rifles in Thiepval Wood,
and marching out of Martinsart by platoons at two hundred yards'
interval. As number 11 Platoon and battalion headquarters were about
to march out together a shell fell right in the midst of the party.
Fourteen were killed on the spot, and ten more died later. Almost all
the rest were wounded, including the second-in-command, Major R. P.
Maxwell, and the adjutant, Captain Wright. The confusion in the pitch
darkness, with scarce a man on his feet, was appalling. Fortunately a
platoon of the 11th Rifles, just relieved from the trenches, appeared
on the scene, and the street was speedily cleared. But the Germans
could have had far bigger hauls than this at "Lancashire Dump" on the
Albert-Hamel Road in Aveluy Wood any night they had chosen to shell
it.

This was the _rendezvous_ of a mass of transport immediately after
dusk, bringing up munitions and rations for the offensive. Large
stores of the latter were placed in specially constructed dug-outs
on the river bank. The work of the Divisional Train was here most
admirably organized by its commander, Colonel Bernard. So close
were the big convoys to the German trenches that extraordinary
precautions to avoid noise had to be taken. Wheels were bound with
straw and old motor tyres, steel chains replaced by leather straps,
boots, like those used in rolling a cricket ground, placed over the
horses' hoofs. And it was an amusing sight to see an A.S.C. driver
frantically clinging to the nose of some sociable horse that desired
to greet new acquaintances with a friendly neigh.

The reward of waiting came in a fine day on "Y.2" day, the 30th.
Divisional Headquarters moved up to their report centre on the
Englebelmer-Martinsart Road. At night the approach march took
place, and assaulting battalions returned to their positions in the
trenches. The assembly positions of the 107th Brigade (less 15th
Rifles) were in slit trenches in Aveluy Wood. The battalions marched
up by cross-country tracks, marked, one by red lanterns, the other by
green. The night was fine, and the artillery on either side rather
less active, though lachrymatory shell was falling in the wood.
In a curious complete lull that fell before dawn, men heard with
astonishment a nightingale burst into song, pouring out her bubbling
notes one upon the other, as though this had been still the pleasant
copse, deserted by man, but a kingdom of the birds, of two years gone.

The two days' postponement had had upon the men an effect contrary to
that which might have been attended. The extra strain of waiting was
more than counterbalanced by the coincidence of the date. For it was
upon July the 1st, the anniversary of the Boyne, that the sons of the
victors in that battle, after eight generations, fought this greater
fight. To them it had a very special significance. A stirring in
their blood bore witness to the silent call of their ancestors. There
seemed to them a predestination in the affair. They spoke of it as
they waited, during the final intensive bombardment, while the German
counter-barrage rained upon their trenches.

Day had dawned clear and sunny. Zero was at 7-30 a.m., when it
had been light for four hours. Far better had it been had the
conventional dawn attack been carried out. However, the first
movements were concealed by the intensity of our fire, and by smoke
barrages put down by 4-inch Stokes mortars in the valley of the
Ancre and in front of Thiepval village. The troops formed up in "No
Man's Land," facing their objectives, following for the most part,
on the left bank of the Ancre, the line of the sunken Thiepval-Hamel
Road. At 7-15 a.m. the leading companies issued from the gaps cut
in our wire, extended to two paces' interval, and moved forward to
within one hundred and fifty yards of the German trench. The hubbub
of the British bombardment was terrific; over their heads the Stokes
mortars, firing at highest rate, were slinging a hundred shells into
the air at once.

Zero! The hurricane Stokes bombardment ceased. The artillery lifted
off the first line. The whistles of the officers sounded, and the
men sprang up and advanced at steady marching pace on the German
trenches. Those who saw those leading battalions move to the assault,
above all their commanding officers, forbidden to accompany them, who
waved to them from the parapet, received one of the most powerful
and enduring impressions of their lives. Colonel Macrory of the 10th
Inniskillings speaks of "lines of men moving forward, with rifles
sloped and the sun glistening upon their fixed bayonets, keeping
their alignment and distance as well as if on a ceremonial parade,
unfaltering, unwavering." General Ricardo, then commanding the 9th
Inniskillings, wrote a few days later: "I stood on the parapet
between the two centre exits to wish them luck.... They got going
without delay; no fuss, no shouting, no running, everything solid
and thorough--just like the men themselves. Here and there a boy
would wave his hand to me as I shouted good luck to them through my
megaphone. And all had a cheery face. Most were carrying loads. Fancy
advancing against heavy fire with a big roll of barbed wire on your
shoulder!" So they bore upon the German lines, while behind them,
from Thiepval Wood, rocked by exploding shells, sheeted in the smoke
and flame of bursting shrapnel, fresh troops issued and followed upon
their advance in little columns.

It is the custom, kept throughout this History, to describe the
course of battles from the right hand to the left. If here it is
departed from, it is only because the action on the north side of
the Ancre was separate from the other and of lesser importance. Its
description, alas! will occupy small space enough. There was here in
"No Man's Land" a deep ravine, which the map contours show without
giving an idea of its abruptness. The first wave of the 9th Irish
Fusiliers reached this with little trouble, but those which followed
met with very heavy machine-gun fire, and suffered terrible loss.
Advancing at Zero with splendid dash, the survivors of a battalion
which Colonel Blacker's training had made one of the best in the
Division, swept through the enemy's front line trenches. One small
body of the right centre company in particular carried all before it,
and was last seen advancing upon Beaucourt Station. On the left the
12th Rifles had worse fortune. The wire round the German salient over
the hill-brow, less easy to observe, was less completely destroyed
than on the rest of the front. Many gaps were cut, but machine-guns
were trained upon them. Beaten back at the first rush, and having
lost the barrage, the remnants of the battalion were twice re-formed
by devoted officers under that withering hail, and twice again led
forward. It was of no avail. On their left the leading troops of the
next Division crossed the front line trenches, but were assailed from
the rear by machine-gunners emerging from dug-outs. At eight o'clock
the 36th Division was informed that the enemy had retaken his front
line. The attack north of the Ancre was a failure, though gallantry
every whit as great as that of the battalions on the left bank was
behind it.

Elsewhere, for all its losses, the attack was a complete success.
Every objective was reached. Had it been possible to attain the
same results all along the front, the day would have ended with the
greatest British victory of the war.

The leading waves, still moving as on parade, reached the German
front line trench and moved straight across it. They did not suffer
heavily. Hardly were they across, however, when the German barrage
fell upon "No Man's Land," upon the rear companies of the first
line battalions, and upon those of the second line. And immediately
the barrage left it, flanking machine-gun fire burst out from the
dominating position of Thiepval cemetery. The 11th Inniskillings and
14th Rifles, as they emerged from the wood, were literally mown
down, and "No Man's Land" became a ghastly spectacle of dead and
wounded. On the left of the line the 13th Rifles, under long-range
fire from the Beaucourt Redoubt across the river, suffered at this
stage most heavily of all. They had lost the bulk of their officers
ere ever they reached the German trenches. The Division on the right
was never able to clear Thiepval village, and it was that fact which
was responsible for the gravest losses of the 36th.

Under this deadly punishment the men never hesitated. They went
straight forward across the first two lines, sending back the few
prisoners they took. The "B" line was to be reached at 7-48. Despite
the gaps in their ranks the first wave swept upon it at precisely
that moment. There was not much fighting here, but a large number of
prisoners was taken, the German infantry surrendering as our men came
upon them. The 15th Rifles, the supporting battalion of the 108th
Brigade's attack, had, however, to deal with some Germans who came up
out of unnoticed dug-outs after the leading battalions had crossed
the "A" lines, the bombing squads told off to clear the trenches
having been destroyed by machine-gun fire. On pressed the leading
waves. Never losing the barrage, they took the "C" line, including
the north-east corner of the Schwaben Redoubt, at 8-48. Even in
the trenches they suffered loss from the flanking machine-guns,
while movement from front to rear was now all but impossible. The
supporting battalions, or their survivors, were also upon their
objectives. Every man had done what he was set to do, or dropped in
his path. And, to the eternal credit of our artillery, no man appears
to have needed his wire-cutters.

Let us turn to the 107th Brigade, which had meanwhile advanced to the
"A" line. It had moved from Aveluy Wood and across the Ancre to the
western skirts of Thiepval Wood, almost at the bottom of the valley,
assembling at 6-30 about the track known as Speyside. It had an hour
to wait, shell after shell passing just over the heads of the troops
and bursting in the marshes beyond them. At Zero, led by the 10th
Rifles, it moved back east for a short distance, to reach the rides
which were its paths to the front line. Here the men could see the
troops of the Division on the right issuing from their trenches,
and each platoon, as it extended in "No Man's Land," disappearing
before the blast of machine-gun fire that met it. The ride used by
the 10th Rifles on the right had been denuded of its foliage by
the bombardments of several days, and was in view. The battalion
came under machine-gun fire from front, right, and right _rear_
simultaneously. The commanding officer, Colonel Bernard, was killed,
and casualties were high. The final passage had to be carried out by
rushes to the front line. The leading men could even see the German
machine-guns firing at them, so that it is easy to imagine what sort
of target they offered to those guns. Lewis guns were brought forward
to engage them, but their teams were destroyed. The other battalions
suffered considerably less, being screened in their rides, and
further from the Thiepval guns. Before ten o'clock, runners, with the
skill and devotion of their kind, had come back to report that the
"C" line had been reached. Eight minutes past, it may be remembered,
was the hour for the assault upon the "D" line.

To General Nugent it had appeared long before probable that his
troops, if they went forward further as a wedge into the enemy's
defensive system, with not a yard gained on either flank, would go
only to their own destruction. At 8-32 his G.S.O.1., Colonel Place,
had asked the X. Corps whether the 107th Brigade might be stopped
from advancing upon the last line. The reply was that a new attack
was being made on Thiepval, and also by the VIII. Corps north of the
Ancre, and that the 107th Brigade must do its part by continuing
its advance. But three-quarters of an hour later, at 9-16 a.m.,
instructions from the Corps to withhold the 107th Brigade till the
situation upon the flanks had been cleared up were received. General
Withycombe was ordered to stop his troops, and employed every means
in his power to do so. But all the telephone lines taken forward had
been cut by German fire, while for a runner to reach the line now
held by the troops was a very long affair. Fortunate was he if he
crossed that zone of death without scathe. The message arrived too
late; the troops were committed to the attack. With them went forward
some men of the other Brigades.

Of that last wild and desperate venture across a thousand yards of
open country, few returned to tell the tale. Those that did tell
of an entry into that last entrenchment, of desperate hand-to-hand
fighting, and then, when the odds were too great, for the trench
was full of German reserves, of a stubborn retirement to the next
line. And now the German bombers surged up the trenches from St.
Pierre Divion, to be beaten off again and again by the 8th and
15th Rifles, and the handful of the 13th remaining on that flank.
Pressure on the other side did not come so soon: in fact, Lieutenant
Sanderson, of the 9th Rifles, reconnoitred the trench "Mouquet
Switch," on the front of the 32nd Division, and found it unoccupied.
But Thiepval's machine-guns were still firing, and "No Man's Land"
was a land of death. Two companies of the Pioneers were sent up to
dig a communication trench across, which would have permitted the
sending up of bombs and water. But at two o'clock Colonel Leader,
their commanding officer, reported that the machine-gun fire rendered
the task impossible. Supplies had run out, and the little parties
that strove to bear them across were annihilated by fire. After noon
attacks came upon the right flank also, the 11th Inniskillings at
the Crucifix, and the 9th in the Schwaben Redoubt, being hard beset.
The French artillery was ordered to put down a flank barrage on the
right, and carried out its task admirably.

The 146th Brigade of the 49th Division had crossed the Ancre during
the morning. At three p.m. it received orders to attack Thiepval
village under a barrage, after an intense bombardment. The attack
failed completely under terrific machine-gun fire. It was, in fact,
stopped after the leading battalion, the 1/6th West Yorks, had seen
the platoons which strove to deploy wither away. It was about this
time that the Germans launched a counter-attack in the open on the
left flank. Two companies emerged from the trees of the river valley
and advanced on C 11. Caught on the hill by our artillery and the
Lewis guns of the 8th Rifles, they were destroyed. There was a grave
misunderstanding about the employment of the 146th Brigade. At four
o'clock the 36th Division was informed that it was at its disposal.
General Withycombe, the senior Brigadier in Thiepval Wood, was
ordered to send two of its battalions to the Schwaben Redoubt, to
rally the troops beginning to be forced back. But two battalions of
the Brigade were already committed to the attack on Thiepval, while
the two others had moved up behind them into the trenches of the 32nd
Division. Not till 7-18 did six companies move up towards the "C"
line, and now it was too late. On this flank it was already lost, and
the Yorkshiremen were beaten off by German machine-gun fire.

Meanwhile the situation had grown desperate. Major Peacocke,
second-in-command of the 9th Inniskillings, had managed to cross "No
Man's Land" at noon into the front line about A 12, and after beating
off attacks by Germans bombing their way up from Thiepval, collected
a little bodyguard and worked forward to the Crucifix. He speedily
discovered that the holding of the ground here, now slipping from
our hands, was an impossibility unless Thiepval were taken. The men
were still determined, but at their last gasp from fatigue. There was
scarcely any ammunition or water for the Vickers guns, and it was
all but impossible to send it up. A similar report was brought to
General Griffith by Major Blair Oliphant, second-in-command of the
11th Rifles, who carried out an admirable reconnaissance. A final
counter-attack, launched in the dusk by fresh troops that had come
into Grandcourt by train during the evening, drove our men in from
the "B" line. By ten o'clock it did not appear that we had any troops
in the German lines. That which had been won at a sacrifice so vast,
had been lost for lack of support.

Fresh troops for a further attack on Thiepval were put at the
disposal of the 36th Division in the middle of the night. General
Withycombe, at 11-30 p.m., received the 4th York and Lancs, of the
148th Brigade, with the intimation that the 4th and 5th K.O.Y.L.I.'s
of the same Brigade would follow, to retake the Schwaben Redoubt,
with the assistance of the remnants of the 107th and 109th Brigades.
At one o'clock the latter battalions had not arrived. General
Withycombe made the following appreciation of the position:

It was doubtful if it would be possible to organize an attack before
daylight. This was a vital consideration, since an advance by
daylight would be swept by fire from Thiepval, which was not being
attacked that night, and the inevitable result would be a repetition
of the previous day's experiences.

If the troops did succeed in moving off before dawn, it would be
almost impossible for them to keep direction in the darkness, on
ground they did not know.

Lastly, General Withycombe submitted that, if the Schwaben Redoubt
were taken, it could not be held while Thiepval was still in German
occupation.

General Nugent was fully in accord with these views. He submitted the
matter to the Corps Commander, who replied that in such a case the
man on the spot must decide. The proposed operation was therefore
cancelled, and General Withycombe sent the 4th and 5th K.O.Y.L.I.'s
to Aveluy Wood, retaining under his hand the 4th York and Lancs, in
case of emergency.

At seven a.m. next morning, as sun dispersed the first summer
ground-mist, observers on the Mesnil Ridge saw that there were yet
British troops in small numbers in the first two lines of German
trenches. General Nugent ordered General Withycombe to support and
reinforce these troops, and to send forward supplies of bombs,
ammunition, and water. General Withycombe collected a force of four
hundred men of the four battalions of his own Brigade, together
with two guns of the 107th Machine-Gun Company. Under the command
of Major Woods, of the 9th Rifles, this devoted band moved across
"No Man's Land" at two o'clock in artillery formation. It lost a
third of its numbers from the enemy's fire, but it reached its
objectives. Two small parties of the 16th Rifles (Pioneers), with
bombs and ammunition, crossed later in the afternoon, going through
the German barrage in most gallant fashion. On the left flank Major
Woods found Corporal Sanders, of the 7th West Yorks, with a party of
forty men, whom he described as "played out, but full of fight." He
had been beating off German bombing attacks all night, had rescued
several wounded Ulstermen, and taken a number of prisoners. This
stout-hearted N.C.O. was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross.

That night the 36th Division was relieved by the 49th. The 148th
Brigade relieved the 107th in the two lines of trenches now held,
between A 12 and A 19. The relief was not complete till after ten
o'clock the following morning, when a weary, tattered, pitiful
remnant marched into Martinsart and flung themselves down to sleep.
They had brought back to Thiepval Wood fourteen prisoners. The total
number captured by the 36th Division in the offensive was five
hundred and forty-three. Its casualties in the two days amounted to
five thousand five hundred officers and other ranks killed, wounded,
and missing. The whole Province was thrown into mourning for its
sons. Among the dead were Colonel H. C. Bernard, of the 10th Rifles;
Major G. H. Gaffiken, of the 9th, who had led his company to the
final objective; Lieutenant G. St. G. S. Cather, Adjutant of the 9th
Irish Fusiliers, awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for his services
in bringing in wounded under machine-gun fire, in the course of which
he lost his life; Captain E. N. F. Bell, 9th Inniskillings, attached
109th Trench Mortar Battery, who likewise had bestowed on him that
last honour. Captain Charles Craig, M.P. for South Antrim, was
wounded and taken prisoner. Some battalions had almost disappeared.
The 9th Irish Fusiliers, for example, had at the end of the first
day none of the officers and only eighty other ranks left unwounded
of the force that took part in the attack. The figures of the 8th
Rifles, as of a battalion below rather than above the average in
casualties, may be given in full. Officers: fifteen wounded, five
missing. Other ranks: twenty-four killed, two hundred and sixteen
wounded, one hundred and eighty-six missing. And of the "missing," it
must be recorded that three-fourths at least were in reality dead,
somewhere out in front of the line finally handed over.

Of the deeds of heroism that day accomplished, it is not possible to
enumerate one-hundredth. Notable among them were the achievements
of junior officers and N.C.O.'s when their seniors had fallen.
Lieutenant H. Gallagher, 11th Inniskillings, was the sole officer
of his battalion to cross the German front line. With his orderly's
rifle he killed six Germans holding up the advance, and then, at the
Crucifix, organized the resistance, being one of the last to quit
the German trenches at night. Lieutenant Sir Harry Macnaghten, 12th
Rifles, twice reformed the tatters of his company in "No Man's Land,"
and led them against gaps in the German wire, to fall himself on the
second occasion. Corporal John Conn, 9th Inniskillings, came upon two
of our machine-guns out of action. He repaired one under fire and
annihilated a German flanking party. He carried both guns himself
most of the way back, but had to abandon one at last owing to utter
exhaustion. These are but examples, picked at random. Another very
remarkable Victoria Cross was that won by Private Quigg, 12th Rifles,
Sir Harry Macnaghten's servant. He had, on July the 1st, advanced
thrice to the attack. Next morning he heard a rumour that his officer
was out wounded in "No Man's Land." Seven times he went out to look
for him, and seven times he brought in a wounded man, the last
dragged on a waterproof sheet from within a few yards of the German
wire.

All arms had supported the infantry finely in their great, heroic
achievement. The work of the artillery could not have been bettered.
It carried out its long and gruelling task to perfection. Even in
front of the "D" line the wire was well cut. One forward battery of
the 172nd Brigade in Hamel, in full view of the enemy, enfiladed his
lines across the Ancre, doing great execution and being handled with
extreme gallantry. The Engineers suffered very heavy casualties in
their devotion to duty, working in the marsh at keeping repaired the
vital pipe-lines, regardless of the shells that all day fell about
them. The stretcher-bearers of the R.A.M.C. were tireless. Often,
owing to break-down on the trench tramway due to shell-fire, they had
to carry wounded right down from Thiepval Wood and across the Ancre
at Authuille. Many dropped from sheer exhaustion, and many refused
to rest when reliefs arrived. The Army Service Corps drivers of the
ambulances kept their cars continuously on the roads for thirty-six
hours. There was throughout no hitch in the medical arrangements,
though at one period of the day the overcrowding of the Main Dressing
Station at Forceville, due to the strain upon the Motor Ambulance
Convoy which evacuated the wounded to the Casualty Clearing Stations,
gave rise to much anxiety.

A volume might be written--the extent of many a volume probably
has--upon the causes of the failure, for such the whole northern
section of the attack undoubtedly was. This is not the place for a
detailed discussion of them. It may at least be said that, while
the work of the artillery could not have been excelled, the whole
scheme of its employment had not reached anything approaching the
science of the following year. Artillerymen of the higher ranks were
to some extent carried away by the weight of metal for the first
time at their disposal, and carried away other arms by their new
enthusiasm. The heavy gunners believed and proclaimed that no life
could endure their fire, and that the battle would resolve itself
into an advance by the infantry to take over shattered and undefended
trenches. They had not realized that the machine-guns would be
comparatively safe under their bombardment, and that it would take
but a few seconds to bring them into action when the barrage was
past. It is probable that at a later stage of the war a fortress
such as Thiepval would not have been attacked directly by infantry
till it had been first encircled and isolated by its advance, being
kept the while under such artillery fire as would have forced the
machine-gunners to lie low, and then rushed from all sides by bombing
parties. It may be said that our organization at the beginning of
the Somme Offensive was in a transitional stage. We had realized
that defence with the machine-gun had beaten attack, and had begun
the process of increasing the quantity and improving the quality of
mechanical accessories. It was still, however, to cost thousands of
lives before the factories could produce sufficient of the latter,
or the higher commands reach the ratio between infantry force and
mechanical aids necessary to the prosecution of a given operation.
But no explanations that can be found stand without ample tribute to
the fighting qualities of the German soldier. The dash and bravery
of the counter-attacks of the bombers moving up from the valley
merit high praise. The highest, however, must be reserved for the
machine-gunners, who had sat for days in their dug-outs without fresh
food, the very earth shaking to the thunders of our artillery, and
then came up and brought their guns into action at the right moment.

On July the 5th the Division moved back to Rubempré and the
neighbouring villages, and five days later to the Bernaville area.
The Artillery remained in line under the orders of the 49th Division,
while the Pioneers, 121st and 122nd Field Companies, were left
several days at work, the former having, amongst other unpleasant
tasks, to make a communication trench across "No Man's Land" to the
new-won ground.[24] The 150th Field Company had a yet harder time. It
was sent to the 12th Division, further south, in the neighbourhood
of Ovillers, where a slight advance had been made. Its work here was
the consolidation of strong points, "before they were taken," as its
commander, Major Boyle, remarks.

[Illustration: Map I.
The Battle of Albert, 1916.]

Orders came at Bernaville for a move to Flanders. The Engineers,
relieved of their task, marched north. The rest of the Division, less
the Artillery, was moved by train from Auxi-le-Château, Frévent, and
Conteville, to Berguette, Thiennes, and Steenbecque, between Aire and
Hazebrouck, on its way to the training area west of St. Omer. The
infantry battalions were but shadows of their former selves. Well
might commanding officers feel appalled at the magnitude of the task
before them in building up anew, without the best of their officers
and N.C.O.'s. The men were very silent in these first few days after
the battle. Not one of the survivors but had lost companions who had
been two years at his side; many, friends of a lifetime. But if ever
gift be God-given, it is the healing effect of time. And in days of
war a week even is a long period. These men, moreover, felt that in
all that had happened there was no reproach for them. They, at least,
had accomplished their task in the face of incredible difficulties.
On the 12th of July, General Nugent and his Staff saw the battalions
of the 107th Brigade marching from the station of Thiennes into
Blaringhem. Sun was shining on the old Flemish village. Officers
and men wore marigolds in caps to honour the day; the bands played
"King William's March." The least practised eye could tell that to
these men confidence was returning; that the worst of the horror they
had endured had been shaken from their shoulders. They marched like
victors, as was their right.

FOOTNOTES:

[19] See Map I.

[20] For a brilliant appreciation of the Somme Battle and its
lessons, General Mangin's book, _Comment finit la Guerre_, should be
read.

[21] The boundaries of the 36th Division, with all names that occur
in the description of the battle, will be found in Map I.

[22] The "A" line consisted of a double line of trenches, a front
line, and immediate support. The second was alluded to as the "A.I."
line.

[23] Z/49 Trench Mortar Battery was attached to the 36th Division for
this operation.

[24] It was not held for long, nor was the Schwaben Redoubt to come
again into British hands for several months.

CHAPTER IV

FROM THE SOMME TO MESSINES: JULY 1916 TO JUNE 1917

On July the 13th the Division moved into the well-known training
area west of St. Omer, with headquarters at Tilques. Those of the
107th Brigade were at Bayenghem, of the 108th at Eperlecques, and of
the 109th at Boisdinghem. Here training and reorganization began,
and here reinforcements arrived in considerable numbers.[25] Five
days later the Artillery, which had remained in line covering the
49th Division, rejoined, having moved north by march route. R.A.
Headquarters were established at the château at Recques. The troops
were much refreshed by this return to civilization, and units had
leisure to absorb their drafts. Unfortunately it did not last very
long. On July the 20th Headquarters moved to Esquelbecq, to a famous
and beautiful moated château, that bore at the door rings to which
Marlborough's troopers had tied their reins, and had been occupied
by General Grant after Waterloo. Meanwhile the 108th Brigade moved
forward, by 'bus and lorry, to Kortepyp Camp, south of the village of
Neuve Eglise, and Red Lodge, on the southern slopes of Hill 63, and
west of the famous Bois de Ploegsteert, that will go down to Britons
for all time as "Plug Street Wood." On the 23rd Headquarters moved
to the château on Mont Noir, a couple of miles north of Bailleul,
and that night the 108th Brigade re-entered the line in relief of two
battalions of the 20th Division. By the end of July the 109th Brigade
had come in on the right, in relief of troops of the 41st Division,
and the 107th had relieved the 108th Brigade. The front line now
held ran from a ruin on the Neuve Eglise-Warneton Road, known as
Anton's Farm, on the right, to another known as Boyle's Farm on the
Wulverghem-Messines Road, on the left. The frontage was some three
thousand yards in a straight line, but there were over two and a half
miles of front-line trench. On September the 1st the headquarters of
the Division moved from Mont Noir to the village of St. Jans Cappel,
near Bailleul.

The Division was to remain for upwards of a year in this part of the
line, but it seldom held precisely the same section of front for more
than a few weeks at a time. The various moves cannot be treated in
detail. There were changes in August, all three Brigades entering the
line, and early in September a "side-step" to the north, the right
boundary now being the River Douve, and the left "Piccadilly Trench,"
south of the Kemmel-Wytschaete Road. The 108th Brigade was now on
the right, the 107th in the centre, and the 109th on the left. The
characteristics of the various parts of all this front were similar,
the conditions of the soil the same throughout, so that a general
description will hold good for all the period passed by the Division
in the neighbourhood.

The trenches and dug-outs, to begin with, were not such at all in
the sense in which the troops had been wont to use the names on
the Ancre. The fighting trenches consisted, everywhere save on the
highest ground, of parapets built of sandbags filled with clay. In
places there was a parados similarly constructed, but over long
stretches the men in the front line simply stood behind the wall,
with no protection against the back-burst of shells. Water in this
country appeared everywhere just below the surface, and it was
useless to dig trenches in the real sense for any purpose other than
drainage. Even the communication trenches were sunk not deeper
than a foot, and piled high on either side with earth, which made
them satisfactory enough as cover from view, but very vulnerable to
shell-fire. These communication trenches were longer than those to
which the troops had been accustomed, the approaches to the front
line being much more exposed than among the folds of the Somme
country. As for dug-outs, there were none. Little wooden-framed
shelves in the parapet, a few "baby elephants"--arched steel
shelters, which, if covered thickly enough with sandbags, afforded
protection against the shells of field guns--served for the troops
in line, while further back, for battalion headquarters and forts,
there were ruined farms, which often had good cellars, and in the
frame-work of which concrete structures could be hidden. It was hard
for troops used to the Somme chalk to accustom their minds to the
spongy nature of this soil. In the dry weeks of August, for example,
the R.E. built one very fine dug-out, twenty feet deep, and were
proud of their handiwork. In September there was in it a foot of
water, in October two; November found the water level with the top of
the stairs, and a sarcastic notice, "The R.E. Swimming Bath," at the
entrance.

When it rained, which was not seldom, all the low-lying ground
flooded. The valley of the Douve, above all, from Wulverghem to the
front line, became a muddy swamp, in which the water lay in sheets.
At such times, and indeed during a great part of the winter, many
trenches simply could not be occupied. No adequate idea of the
impression conveyed upon the mind of a man coming up north from the
clean, white trenches of the Somme can be obtained of all this area
unless it is conceived as dirty, mournful, and disconsolate; haunted
by the evil stench of blue clay, and brooded over by an atmosphere of
decay.

Since the days of the first Battle of Ypres and of the rival turning
movements which had ended in the present deadlock, the Germans
had had the best of the ground in the Messines sector. Behind
the salient of their front trenches it rose sharply, with a dip
half-way up, formed by the shallow valley of the Steenebeek, to a
dominating ridge, crowned south and north by the fortress-villages
of Messines and Wytschaete. The road joining these was the limit of
our observation, except for telescopes on Kemmel Hill. To the south
we had a fair observation point in Hill 63, but the one great boon
granted to us was Kemmel. Had it been a thousand yards nearer the
front line, it would have done much to counteract the advantage of
the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge. It is scarcely necessary to add that
the enemy had, in his long possession of the ridge, fortified it with
all his wonted industry and art. It was protected by four general
lines of well wired trenches west of the road, and peppered over with
little forts, wired all round, the garrisons of which were provided
with concrete structures, miniature houses rather than dug-outs,
proof against anything up to an eight-inch shell.

General Plumer's Second Army was at this time playing the _rôle_ of
Cinderella among the British forces. Its front was lightly held,
even at Ypres, which had grown strangely quiet of late. Certain
preparations had been made for an offensive in the summer, but had
been largely abandoned for lack of labour. The Army Commander,
however, insisted on pushing on his mining, in which he had great
faith, a faith amply to be justified the following year. Throughout
the winter and spring the Division furnished large parties for work
under the various Tunnelling Companies in the shafts that were being
driven under "No Man's Land," and beneath the strongest portions
of the enemy's front line. The German miners were skilful enough,
and on other parts of the front often gave rather more than they
got, but here, from first to last, they were out-manœuvred and
out-fought in an underground war. A striking instance of this was at
La Petite Douve Farm, on the Ploegsteert-Messines Road, where the
British tunnellers succeeded in pumping a fair proportion of the
muddy Douve into the Germans' shaft, whence they could be heard,
night after night, frantically ejecting it with a motor-pump. One
"camouflet," as a defensive explosion was called, did indeed blow
in our gallery here and undo months of work, but the enemy probably
did not know what he had achieved, and the temporary check availed
him nothing in the end. No Ulsterman who served in Flanders in that
winter and the following spring will forget the skill, patience,
and absolute contempt for danger displayed by those tunnellers.
The 171st Tunnelling Company, with which the Division was most
closely associated, will be remembered with particular affection and
admiration.

The Second Army has been called the Cinderella of our forces. Not
only was it holding a long line lightly, and with few reserves, but
the main flow of ammunition and material passed it by and went down
to the Somme, where the British were creeping forward in desperate
fighting to Bapaume. There were weeks in August and September when
the allowance of shells dropped to two and even one round per
18-pounder a day, with heavier calibres proportionately rationed.[26]
The Germans were in this respect similarly situated. Their ammunition
also was wanted on the Somme to put down those eternal barrages with
which they opposed our assaults. When the Division first arrived in
Flanders the artillery shell-fire was very light indeed. That of
the trench mortars did a good deal to replace it. The Germans had
concentrated on these weapons as their chief means of offence, and,
possessing the advantage of the ground, they used them cleverly and
with great effect. With that curious regularity that appeared to form
part of the German mentality their bombardments generally took place
almost precisely at 3-30 p.m. They were particularly severe in the
neighbourhood of the Spanbroek salient.[27] "In this sector," writes
a machine-gun officer, "I have seen five or six large 'minnies' in
the air at one time--really fearsome things. You could see the
fuses of the bombs alight in the air and follow their flight most
of the way, only to lose it when straight overhead; and then there
was nothing to do but wonder where it would fall!" These long aerial
torpedoes exploded with shattering effect and made huge craters. It
is useless to disguise the fact that, during the first few weeks
of the Division's acquaintance with these trenches, the enemy had
an ascendancy in trench-mortar warfare. That ascendancy had to be
fought down. In the first place the German mortars, or rather their
emplacements, were carefully marked down from observations taken in
the line, and by the study of aeroplane photographs. Maps were then
issued by the staff, upon which each active emplacement was shown
by name. The names began with the letter of the map square; all in
the "S" squares with S, and in the "U" squares with U. The names
chosen were generally feminine--doubtless without ironic intention.
A certain number of the emplacements were allotted to each howitzer
battery of the Divisional Artillery, and also to such 6-inch howitzer
batteries of the Corps Heavy Artillery as were available. When the
mortar opened fire, all that was necessary was for the words "Susie
active," or "Ursula active," to be wired back to the batteries.
Susie, or Ursula, as the case might be, was instantly engaged, while
any machine-guns that could be brought to bear upon her neighbourhood
also took a hand in the game. By this means it was generally found
possible to silence any individual mortar in about a quarter of an
hour at most, and to prevent it from getting the exact range, and
then knocking in a whole section of trench at leisure.

On the British side, also, big trench-mortar bombardments, aided
by the Divisional Artillery, were periodically arranged. In these
affairs the leading _rôle_ was played by that terrific weapon, the
heavy trench mortar, firing a projectile of 180 lbs., and highly
dramatic it not infrequently was. One of these monsters dwelt at
R.E. Farm, on the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road, and it was from this
locality that the principal "hates" were discharged. For perhaps
ten minutes the fire would continue, the "flying pig," as it was
called, sending over its giant shells, the medium mortars firing
their 60-lb. "plum puddings," and perhaps two batteries of light
Stokes mortars discharging twenty or twenty-five rounds a minute from
every gun. Meanwhile the 18-pounders and howitzers behind joined in,
while machine-guns fired upon communication trenches. The German
retaliation was frequently heavy, and the teams of the mortars,
heavy, medium, and light, showed grim determination in carrying out
their tasks under punishment. General Brock, the C.R.A., did not
believe in sending to the mortar batteries weaklings who were not
wanted with the guns, and these trench mortars acquired a peculiar
type of artillery officer,[28] resolute, hard-bitten, perhaps often
careless and unconventional, but capable in great moments of the most
splendid courage, lightly worn and taken for granted between comrade
and comrade.

Few who have known anything of it can recall the "flying pig" without
a smile. There was a pleasing uncertainty about this weapon. When
the first round was fired from R.E. Farm, the charge did not ignite
properly, and the big shell went forth, flaming gun-cotton marking
its path, to land three hundred yards away just behind the British
front line, making a huge crater and demolishing the local company
headquarters! Thereafter the propellent was improved, but it was
thought wiser temporarily to evacuate the front line over which the
mortar was firing. It was typical of the infantryman's good humour
that the incident was greeted everywhere with laughter and treasured
as an excellent jest. War, indeed, has a curious effect upon the
sense of humour, and far grimmer pleasantries than this were the
subjects of mirth. When a IX. Corps intelligence summary remarked
that a German cemetery behind the ridge "appeared to be filling
nicely," it was hailed as the joke of the season. It was the aim of
the Army Commander to harass by all means in his power the troops
that faced him, to prevent divisions that were sent down to the Somme
from going as fresh troops, and to prevent those others that had been
withdrawn from the hell-broth from recovering too quickly and easily
from its effects. The intense bombardments with trench artillery
were but one weapon in this campaign. Another, as autumn drew on and
supplies of ammunition came more freely to hand, was the shelling
of approaches and, above all, the railway terminus in Messines, by
night. But the principal weapon in this minor offensive was the
raiding party. So long as men who took part in the war are alive,
the subject of raids is like to crop up whenever two or three are
met together. But the conclusion of such discussions is invariably
the same. Raids were frequently useful, and sometimes imperatively
necessary; but the British raided too often. Raids to obtain
identification of troops opposite, and even to keep the enemy "on
the stretch," were justifiable; those with the object of raising the
moral of our troops were not, because they did not succeed in their
object. "No doubt," writes one of the Brigadiers of the 36th Division
who was responsible for many raids, "no doubt a successful raid had
a good effect in a unit, but not always among the raiding party. The
meticulous preparation made the 'waiting-for-the-dentist' period hard
and trying. And the raiders were always picked men, who in a battle
were of inestimable value. Many units had to deplore the loss of the
very cream of their officers, N.C.O.'s, and men in raids. And the
cold-blooded courage demanded of all concerned took heavy toll of the
nervous energy of even the biggest thruster." The Higher Command,
also, often called for raids immediately troops had taken over a
line, before they had learnt their way about in "No Man's Land" by
dint of patrolling, and before they had recovered from the effects of
an attack delivered on some other part of the front.

The record of the 36th Division with regard to raids was from first
to last a very high one. The failures were few in comparison with
the successes. It was also the case that, while the troops of the
Division carried out a great number of successful raids, the number
of occasions on which they themselves failed to repulse German raids
or lost prisoners to the raiders can be numbered on the fingers of
both hands. In the eleven months between the opening of the Somme
Offensive and the Battle of Messines, the Division carried out over a
dozen raids; but the first hand-to-hand encounter with the enemy took
place, not in his trenches, but in "No Man's Land." It is a curious
little episode, and deserves to be treated at some length.

It may be mentioned that only a short time before the Somme Battle
was the efficacy of the German apparatus for overhearing telephone
conversation realized by the British. Till then it had been our
easy custom to talk of such important matters as reliefs over
the telephone from the front line. It was established that these
casual conversations could be picked up by the enemy's instruments,
especially in chalky ground. They were accordingly banned, and,
after the British manner, from the extreme of imprudence we rushed
to a comical extreme of caution. It was currently believed that
all conversations within three miles of the line could be heard by
the Germans, and brigadiers sometimes found themselves precluded
from using the telephone. It was still possible to send telegraphic
messages, using the "fullerphone," an invention which greatly
diminished the risk of tapping. And an instrument of torture, known
as the "B.A.B. Code Book," became part of the equipment of every
officer. How many company commanders have sat in their dug-outs
translating a series of numerals into amazing gibberish, to discover
that they had wasted half an hour by using last month's correction!

On the occasion in question, an officer of the 9th Irish Fusiliers,
Lieutenant Godson, conceived the idea of using the listening set of
the enemy as a bait to take some of his men. On the afternoon of the
14th of August, he announced in the clearest possible tones, on a
telephone at company headquarters in the front line, that an officer
and three men would leave the trench at midnight, and move out on
the right of the Le Rossignol-Messines Road to reconnoitre the clump
of willows in "No Man's Land." At 9-30 p.m. he moved out to this spot
with a party of two officers and sixteen other ranks. By 10 he had
his force in prearranged formation near the willows, and waited for
what might happen. But he must be allowed to tell in his own words,
as they were written next morning, the story of his sensations and of
his achievement.

"At 11 p.m. I see, I see--what do I see? A little black mark in the
grass forty yards in front that was not there when I looked before.
O yes, it was. I look about. The moon is very full out now on our
right front. What a nice night, and so quiet! Not a sound from the
German lines. I look to the front again. I am getting fed with this.
I am wet from head to foot crawling through the wet grass.... This is
not a job for one man to be at day after day. Everyone ought to take
his turn at this. The discomfort is beastly. It is all right till I
move, then I have to warm a new place on the dank grass. Hullo! by
Jove, I've forgotten that black spot, the only thing in sight I had
made a mental note to look at again.... It's growing bigger. What the
devil is it? There's another behind, and another. They're coming!
I have heard of hearts leaping into the mouth. It meant nothing to
me, but by Jove that's what mine did. It nearly made me dizzy just
for two seconds. I collect myself. Twenty-five yards off and coming,
oh, so slowly and cautiously, moving down a little ditch in the open
that I had not noticed.... I sign to the sick scout to stop his noise
and lie close to the ground. I level my revolver. They're coming.
And one of the other men is sure to make a noise or cough.... I see
the first distinctly now, ten yards off,--nine, eight, seven, six,
five. He sees something, he whips round, all turn behind him; as far
as I can see, three, four, five, six, seven--how many? Bang, bang,
bang, ring out the rifles! I let off five with my revolver, and they
have disappeared as if by magic. 'Come on, boys!' I'm up and out. I
see a figure on his back. I leap at his throat. 'Kamerad, Kamerad!'
he shouts, and waves his hands. Clements whips by me and Ervin and
Breen."

The net result of the ambuscade was two Germans killed and four
prisoners. That the false message had been overheard could never be
exactly proved, but the probabilities seemed to be in that direction.

To summarize the raids carried out or attempted during autumn and
winter, there were two on the night of September the 15th, two on
September the 30th, three on October the 12th, two on the 31st, and
one, the most important, on November the 16th. Of these ten, six were
successful in varying degree. The two first were carried out by the
9th Rifles, just east of the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road, and by the
11th Inniskillings some five hundred yards north of it. The former,
by reason of its neatness and the fact that the raiders suffered
no loss, must be accounted the best of the series. It was sent to
obtain an identification, and it obtained one, a single prisoner.
In addition, the officer who led it shot two Germans as he entered
the trench, and a third was shot by the flank guard on the left. But
the great achievement of the raid was the work of Rifleman Kidd,
the champion long-distance bomber of the battalion, a man worth a
platoon in such an affair. By his long-range bombing he kept off,
single-handed, the German bombers moving up to the rescue, killing
three. The British casualties were three men so lightly wounded that
they remained at duty. The other raid was notable for very pretty
work by the Artillery. At this point, opposite Kruisstraat Cabaret,
the British lines jutted out into a work known as the "Bull Ring,"
which commanded some relatively high ground, about seventy yards
from the enemy's trench. The raid was just north of this work, on an
enemy trench almost on the same longitudinal line, yet a machine-gun
was able to fire from the "Bull Ring" two thousand rounds on the
enemy's trenches, while the "box" barrage of the Artillery was put
round the raiding party, and no shell came near it. Over thirty
Germans were estimated to have been killed, but, unfortunately, the
Inniskillings, besides ten wounded, had three wounded and missing.
One prisoner was taken as an identification.

The raids on the 30th were part of a series on the whole IX. Corps
front. On the right the 11th Rifles did not start, owing to an
accidental bomb explosion; in the centre the 10th Rifles were held
up by the depth of the wire; on the left the 10th Inniskillings
entered the enemy's trenches--after the fuse of their ammonal torpedo
had failed to ignite, and the sapper in charge had affixed and lit
a new one under the very noses of the German sentries--killed a
number of the enemy, blew up dug-outs, took a machine-gun, rifles,
and equipment. In the raids of the 12th of October the 108th Brigade
had again no fortune at the strongly wired Petite Douve Farm, but
the 107th and 109th Brigades each took prisoners. Of the latter
raid, carried out by the 9th Inniskillings, it is related that,
just before it took place, the two officers who planned it were out
in "No Man's Land" having a look round, and lost their way, the
trenches being here only fifty yards apart. Having seen some wire
they could not agree whether it was "ours or theirs," and tossed a
coin in a shell-hole to decide which view should prevail. The winner
approached the wire, put up his head, and was fired at at four
yards' range--and missed! He bobbed down. Again he took a look, and
again there was a miss by the sentry. Finally he heard footsteps
approach on the trench-boards, and a voice demand: "Jasus, what
are ye shootin' at?" That was a welcome and homely sound. _Sotto
voce_ explanations followed, and he and his companion came in. The
raids of October the 31st were held up by showers of bombs from the
stout-hearted Swabian peasants of the 26th (Wuertemberg) Division.
But the Wuertembergers were wanted on the Somme. On November the 16th
the 11th Inniskillings, raiding the Spanbroek salient on a front
of two hundred yards, came upon their less formidable successors,
a Saxon Division, before they were accustomed to the new trenches,
and dealt with them in terrible fashion. Twenty-three dead were
counted in the trenches, and more than twice as many must have
fallen. The terror-stricken Saxons deserted their front line on a
wide front, and the Inniskillings had their pleasure with it for half
an hour, looting everything which they could carry over, blowing up
all the dug-outs, to the accompaniment of tunes played in "No Man's
Land" on mouth organs. Three prisoners were taken. Our losses were
slight. One of the few successful raids carried out against the
Division in all its career took place on February the 14th, when the
enemy obliterated the trenches on the Wulverghem-Messines Road and
apparently captured two prisoners.

It will be remembered that the Divisional Artillery, which had
come to France consisting of three 18-pounder and one 4.5 howitzer
Brigades, had been reorganized in May, the howitzer batteries being
divided among the other three Brigades. A second reorganization
took place in September, to a basis of six-gun instead of four-gun
batteries, though the howitzer batteries did not receive their
extra section of two guns till the New Year. The 154th Brigade was
broken up, and in February 1917 the 172nd Brigade became the 113th
Army Brigade, and left the Division. The details can best be shown
by a tabular statement which appears in the "Order of Battle."
Henceforth the Artillery consisted of two Brigades only, the 153rd
and the 173rd. A large number of Army Brigades were created by the
reorganization, and were used to increase the artillery at the
disposal of divisions for offensives or in dangerous sectors. The
change had some tactical advantages, but the lot of the new Army
Brigades, "nobody's children" as it were, and constantly moved from
one lively front to another, could not be described as happy.

[Illustration: VICTORIA CROSSES OF THE 36^{th} (Ulster)
DIVISION--1916.

The late Lt. G. St. G. S. CATHER
9^{th} Royal Irish Fusiliers.

The late Pte. W. F. M^cFADZEAN
14^{th} Royal Irish Rifles.

The late Capt. E. N. F. BELL
9^{th} Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.

Pte. R. QUIGG
12^{th} Royal Irish Rifles.

The Late 2/Lt. J. S. EMERSON
9^{th} Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.]

The Division always worked hard, but there was probably no part of
the front in which it attempted and accomplished so much as here.
Just at first there was shortage of material, as there was of
ammunition, but the situation soon improved. By the labours of the
Pioneers and Infantry, working under the supervision of the three
Field Companies, the whole trench system was transformed. Parapets
were built stout and strong; parados, where none had been before,
appeared to match them. The communication trenches were strengthened
and improved by the famous "A" frame, the greatest single blessing
that authority provided for troops in Flanders. The deepening of the
bed of the Douve, and the removal of obstructions by the Engineers,
did much to lessen the winter floods. Trench tramways were laid, good
shelters constructed, reinforced concrete being largely employed.
Of these the most interesting was the battalion headquarters at La
Plus Douve Farm.[29] As one approached the place, one saw no sign of
human occupation, nor of its possibility. There was nothing but a
huge roofless farm, built round three sides of a square, as is common
in Flanders. But inside one of the wings was an unobtrusive concrete
structure thirty feet long, wherein the commanding officer and his
staff dwelt in great comfort, above ground, with ample head-room,
real windows, and protection from "five-nines." The courtyard
remained as it had been when the farm was finally destroyed by
bombardment eighteen months before, and its smashed reaping-machine,
half a bicycle, and old umbrella, seemed to have grouped themselves
after a Bairnsfather drawing.

Mention must here be made of the remarkable underground barracks,
made on the southern slopes of Hill 63 by the Australian Tunnelling
Company, to which the troops of the Division acted as carriers.
Driven into the steep flank of the hill, it was proof against any
artillery, lit all through by electric light, and capable of holding
two battalions at a pinch. There its charm ended, for it must be
confessed that it was damp, close, and malodorous, and that it was
impossible to leave a battalion long in it without ill effects upon
its health.

For the first three months of 1917 the Division was without its
Pioneers, filched by the new "railway king," Sir Eric Geddes. The
Pioneers worked with their wonted vigour on 60 c.m. light railways
between Ouderdom, south of the Salient, and Kemmel, and between
Busseboom and Dickebusch, and also on broad-gauge work. In their
absence it was very difficult to continue the elaborate programmes of
construction. A temporary "Works Battalion," one company from each
Brigade, with a nucleus of one hundred trained Pioneers, who had been
retained, was formed to replace them. It was intensely unpopular
with the men, and cannot be said to have been a success. In February
practically all work of other natures ceased, so that men might be
put to that of wiring. The intense frost had converted the Belgian
inundations into solid ice! They were no obstacle to the enemy, who
for some weeks was suspected of the preparation of an offensive.
Certainly his artillery had become very aggressive, carrying out
heavy bombardments of our trenches and batteries, and shelling camps
in rear. The country was literally sown with wire, "Plug Street Wood"
being such a tangle that it has always been a mystery to those who
saw it how the Germans passed through it in 1918. The alarm died down
presently. It had never very serious foundation, but the frost in the
ground constituted a risk.

There was one advantage in holding the line in the same area
for a long period. It was possible to provide some comfort and
recreation for the troops. There were a football competition, boxing
competitions, a horse-show, many sports meetings. A large hut was
put up at Dranoutre for concerts and other entertainments. Over a
long period a 'bus ran daily from "Hyde Park Corner," just outside
Ploegsteert village, to Bailleul, which represented with its shops
and eating-houses comparative civilization. Many will recall with
regret its fine square and beautiful _Hôtel de Ville_, all smashed
to powder in 1918. Probably the worst hardships of the troops were
due to the intense cold of that winter. Life in the trenches was bad
enough, but there were many men who found it easier to sleep there
than in their rest camps. A bare, draughty wooden hut, a temperature
of fifteen degrees below zero, insufficient fuel; it does not
require much imagination to conjure up the misery implied by such
conditions.

With early spring came a great burst of activity. In the last days
of the old year the Division had been reorganized on a two-brigade
frontage, so that the troops of one Brigade might obtain some rest
and training. Now, in mid-March, it closed down to a small front,
from the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road on the right, to a point opposite
Maedelstede Farm[30] on the left. This was held by one Brigade, the
second being well back about Flêtre, while the third trained in the
pleasant neighbourhood of Lumbres, west of St. Omer. No longer was
the Second Army Cinderella. Its area was packed with troops. Even the
private soldier, who saw the opening of the splendid new railhead
at Haagedoorne, outside Bailleul, with its maze of sidings, saw the
country covered with transport lines, saw the dumps grow full, saw
the digging of new communication trenches and the laying of light
railways, must have realized that something was toward. It is certain
at least that the enemy did. On the morning of March the 24th he
bombarded the lines of the 107th Brigade on the right flank and those
of the New Zealanders, its neighbours, for an hour and a half. Just
before dawn his men were seen to issue from their trenches. Caught
by our artillery barrage and the fire of machine and Lewis guns, the
party was swept away like chaff. He made other unsuccessful attempts
to raid the Division. That, however, represented but one aspect
of his alertness. The more serious was his persistent shelling of
billets and horse-lines, and his bombing of Bailleul. It was also
observed that he had large parties at work on his rear lines.

The Second Army was preparing the capture of the Messines-Wytschaete
Ridge.

The raiding activity of the Division was renewed in those last weeks
of preparation. On several occasions men slipped across in broad
daylight to the nose of the Spanbroek salient and threw bombs into
the German trenches. On May the 19th a raid was attempted from the
"Bull Ring," but beaten off by the enemy, who in turn sent over
parties in the early hours of the morning, which were beaten off
with loss. On May the 23rd the 14th Rifles raided the trenches on
the Kemmel-Wytschaete Road, taking a prisoner and confirming the
suspicion that the Germans had reinforced their line. On the 29th a
very big party of Germans, estimated at a hundred strong, made three
attempts to enter the "Bull Ring," but was kept out by the barrage
and the fire of the Lewis guns. These raids were without doubt
attempts to reach and destroy the mine-shafts in our front line.

Meanwhile there had come into the divisional area, and moved
quietly, battery by battery, into the positions already prepared,
the Divisional Artillery of the 32nd Division, with four Army
Artillery Brigades, making a total of 192 field guns and howitzers
on the front. All the positions for the incoming batteries had
been constructed by the 36th Divisional Artillery, and much of
their ammunition stacked in them ready for their use. Upon this
General Brock was most insistent. To him and to the hard work of his
subordinates the newcomers owed provision such as incoming batteries
all too rarely met with. A great mass of heavy artillery under the
orders of the IX. Corps had arrived also, and was bombarding the
slope of the Messines Ridge, doing great execution upon the concrete
shelters with which it was studded. The Germans could play at this
game also, and they had some tempting targets. All over the back
areas were horses piqueted in the open, troops in tents. Against
these the Germans did much damage with a railway gun, which, as it
could easily be moved, was safe from our fire. On the night of May
the 27th Divisional Headquarters, which had moved up to their new
Ulster Camp, west of Dranoutre, were bombarded by a 10 c.m. gun. A
direct hit was obtained on one of the huts, and several clerks were
wounded. The shelling continued for two hours, during which the
staff and personnel of the headquarters had to take to the fields.
That which would have been pure comedy--for such the spectacle of
a whole divisional headquarters running about in the dark must
undoubtedly appear to the troops--was turned to tragedy by the death
of Lieut.-Colonel W. A. de C. King, the C.R.E., who was killed on the
spot by one shell. On the following morning General Nugent moved,
with his advanced Headquarters Staff, to the command post that had
been prepared on the western slope of Kemmel Hill.

On the 31st of May the preliminary bombardment opened.

FOOTNOTES:

[25] In the month of July the Division received 193 officers and
2,182 other ranks. These reinforcements left it still, of course,
considerably below strength.

[26] Men who served do not need to be told, but perhaps civilians
may, that there was no parallel between these conditions and those of
early days, when there were often, literally, only a few rounds per
gun available. At this time the ammunition was there, in the gun-pits
and echelons behind, and could be used quite unsparingly at a sign of
danger. When, however, there was no danger, it had to be conserved.

[27] See Map II.

[28] The heavy and medium batteries were manned by artillery, the
Stokes mortars by infantry, personnel.

[29] Local names were frequently transformed by British troops,
followed by the map-makers. This was probably La Plus Douce. When
the Douve overflowed its banks the new name was certainly the more
suitable.

[30] See Map II.

CHAPTER V

MESSINES: JUNE 1917

The Battle of Messines has more than one claim to a prominent
position in the history of the war. It was, in the first place, the
first completely successful single operation on the British front. It
shares with the action of Malmaison, fought four months later, the
distinction of being the most perfect and successful example of the
limited offensive. Lastly, it was by far the most elaborately and
carefully "mounted" action ever fought by British arms. Fine as were
the fighting qualities of the formations and units that took part in
it, the most remarkable aspects which stand out when we look back
upon it are the perfection of its organization and of the liaison
between all arms. It represented a triumph of staff work. Every man
in the huge force under his command was made to feel the guiding hand
of the Commander of the Second Army, and of one of the most brilliant
staff officers the war discovered. The troops entered upon it with
high heart. The capture of the Vimy Ridge had seemed of good augury
for the year's campaign. The doubtful success of the French offensive
in Champagne, which might have acted as a check upon this optimism,
was not generally known.

Before no other battle was there such an infinity of detail to be
mastered as in the preparation of this. It would not be difficult to
write fifty pages about the plans. Since space permits of about six
only being allotted to them, it is impossible to do more than outline
them in the briefest manner.

Some idea of the thoroughness of the training for the assault may be
gained when it is recorded that not only were attacks practised over
ground marked out to represent the German trench system, but officers
from the flanking battalions of divisions attended each others' field
days to ensure that in the minutest details there was harmony along
the line. An elaborate model of the Messines Ridge, with all its
trenches, forts, roads, and woods, was constructed by the C.E. of the
IX. Corps on the slopes of the Scherpenberg Hill, between Locre and
La Clytte. It was surrounded by a wooden gallery and trench-board
walks, so that at least a company could examine it at one time. The
men took great interest in it, while all day long little knots of
officers were to be observed studying it. Another new feature of the
attack was the message-map served out on a large scale to officers
and N.C.O.'s. This had on one side a map of the German trenches,
on which the position could be marked; and on the other a skeleton
message-form, bringing forcibly to the mind of the sender those
details in a message that were of importance to the recipient, which,
in the heat of battle, a young and inexperienced officer might forget.

Nothing was studied more carefully than the provision of food,
water, ammunition, and stores for the advancing troops. In front of
the huge divisional dumps at Lindenhoek cross-roads and "Daylight
Corner," on the Lindenhoek-Neuve Eglise Road, there were an advance
dump, a dump for each of the attacking brigades, six battalion
dumps, and many smaller in the trenches. An elaborate system of pack
transport was devised, two hundred extra pack-saddles with special
crates attached being issued. Two hundred and fifty "Yukon packs"--a
Canadian device which enabled a man trained in its use to carry a
very heavy load--were also issued. Arrangements were made to serve in
the trenches a hot meal at midnight prior to the assault. A special
ration of oranges, Oxo cubes, chewing gum, and lime juice was issued
to every man, and a tin of solidified alcohol for cooking to every
fourth man.

Means of communication, by visual signalling, pigeons, wireless,
the fullerphone, runners, and the rocket for S.O.S. calls, were
worked out in detail. For the fullerphone there were two lines of
buried cables, with cable-heads in our front line trenches. Forward
stations were selected in the enemy's line at Spanbroekmolen and
Peckham, to which armoured lines were to be laid across "No Man's
Land," from the cable-heads, by the brigade forward parties. As soon
as the final objective was reached, these forward stations were
to move to the crest of the ridge. Working independently of this
machinery, which was in the hands of the Signal Service, were the
brigade and battalion intelligence sections, the former of which were
to establish observation posts at Spanbroekmolen and Peckham, while
the latter moved up behind their battalions, selected observation
posts to follow their movements and cover their final position, and
sent out scouts to obtain touch with flanking battalions and bring
information as to their progress. For visual signalling a divisional
signal station was established on Kemmel Hill, which had a clear
line to the brigade forward stations, so that messages could be sent
either forward or back by the Lucas lamp.

The Second Army was to attack the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, and the
ground east of it as far as the Oosttaverne line.[31] The IX. Corps
was allotted from the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road to the Diependaal
Beek, a distance of six thousand four hundred yards along the front
line of the enemy's salient. It was to attack with three divisions
in line: from right to left the 36th (Ulster) Division, the 16th
(Irish) Division, and the 19th (Western) Division. These troops
were to advance to the Black Line, east of the Messines-Wytschaete
Road, after which the 11th Division, in Corps Reserve, was to pass
through to the final objective. A glance at the map will show how
the frontage of attack narrowed with every thousand yards of the
advance. On the right of the 36th Division was the 25th, in the II.
Anzac Corps.

The attack of the 36th Division, of which the final objective was
from Lumm Farm to a cutting on the Wytschaete-Oosttaverne Road east
of Staenyzer Cabaret, was to be made by two Brigades, the 107th on
the right and the 109th on the left, each having one battalion from
the 108th Brigade attached. Each Brigade was to attack with two
battalions in front, which advanced as far as the Blue Line, the
ground in rear of that objective being "mopped up" by the attached
battalion of the 108th Brigade. The remaining two battalions of each
Brigade were to pass through on the Blue Line for the advance to the
Black, providing their own "mopping-up" parties. The 107th Brigade
was to use the 8th Rifles on the right and the 9th on the left for
the attack on the Blue Line, with the 15th and 10th Rifles to pass
through to the Black Line. The 12th Rifles, from the 108th Brigade,
carried out the work of "mopping up" and consolidation in rear. The
109th Brigade was to use the 14th Rifles on the right and the 11th
Inniskillings on the left to take the Blue Line, and the 10th and 9th
Inniskillings to take the Black Line. The 11th Rifles were attached
for consolidation and "mopping up." The boundary line between the
36th and 16th Divisions ran, it will be noticed, along the main
street of Wytschaete, half the village being in the objective of each
Division.

The date of the attack was designated "Z" day, the five days of
preliminary bombardment being designated "U," "V," "W," "X," and
"Y." There had been considerable bombardment of the ridge before
"U" day, but from this day onwards it became more intense. Its
object was not the total destruction of the hostile trench system,
but the disorganization of the defence by the smashing of concrete
emplacements and shelters. It took nothing short of an 8-inch
howitzer to destroy the German concrete, while 12-inch and 15-inch
howitzers fired on Wytschaete. The cutting of wire was performed by
the 18-pounders, assisted in the case of the front line by trench
mortars. Further to disorganize the enemy, a programme of barraging
night and day his communications, and shelling his billets, was
carried out, while bursts of fire with lethal and lachrymatory gas
shell of various sorts took place throughout the period. Special
half-hour hurricane bombardments of Messines and Wytschaete, during
which every gun available, from largest to smallest, was in action,
were carried out. The barrage for the advance consisted of, firstly,
a creeping barrage of 18-pounder shrapnel, moving in advance of the
infantry, with average lifts of a hundred yards, at the rate of a
hundred yards in three minutes; and, secondly, a standing barrage
of 18-pounders, 4.5 inch howitzers, and medium and heavy howitzers,
established in succession on trenches and strong points. For the
creeping barrage there was one gun to twenty yards, firing at maximum
rate. One gun a section fired smoke shell, to screen the infantry.
The barrage was highly complicated, as, owing to the configuration of
the German salient and the varying rate of the advance, it lifted off
none of the objectives at the same moment all along the line.

Meticulous care was taken by Army Headquarters to ensure that the
preparation was as complete as human forethought could make it. Each
morning air photographs, showing the effect of the previous day's
bombardment, were circulated to Divisions in the line. Each Division
was required to state, day by day, what further special bombardment
it desired. From its observation post on Kemmel Hill the Staff of the
36th Division could see practically all the slope of the Messines
Ridge, from just above the dip of the Steenebeek valley to the crest.
Day by day it studied the ground during the bombardment. A trench or
concrete work which did not appear to have been sufficiently shelled
was noted, and request made that it should receive further attention
next day. Such requests were invariably met. Trenches and dug-outs
were shelled again and again, till Divisional Headquarters declared
itself satisfied. Many of the concrete structures were revealed
only when the bombardment of the trenches had blown away the earth
about them. They were then subjected to the fire of heavy howitzers
till destroyed. Finally, each Division was asked to state if it were
satisfied with the preparation. In the case of the 36th Division at
least, the answer was an enthusiastic affirmative.

The sympathy and understanding which existed between the Staff of the
Second Army and the man in the fighting line created a moral tone of
incalculable value to the Army's efficiency as a striking force.

The work of the preliminary bombardment threw a great strain upon the
personnel of the artillery, though such rest as possible was given
by carefully organized reliefs. The infantry was greatly impressed
with the results it could witness. In particular the liaison between
infantry and heavy gunners, hardly thought of before this action, was
of the closest, the artillery officers bringing battalion commanders
aeroplane photographs to show the results of the bombardment on their
front.

Stokes mortars and machine-guns were assigned important _rôles_ in
the early part of the attack. The 3-inch mortars belonging to the
Division, less four a brigade, to be taken forward in the attack,
were to open a hurricane bombardment for three and a half minutes at
"Zero." A battery of 4-inch Stokes mortars, specially attached, was
to preface the assault with a bombardment of the Spanbroek salient,
with two lifts, using the highly demoralizing incendiary shell known
as "thermit." Six guns of the Machine-Gun Companies of the attacking
Brigades were to go forward with them; the rest of the guns of these
companies, with those of the 108th, the 32nd, two sections of the
33rd, and six guns of the 19th Motor Machine-Gun Battery,[32] a total
of sixty-six guns, were to be employed to provide a creeping barrage
beyond that of the artillery, a standing barrage on the main defences
of the ridge, and fire on strong points, woods, and ravines. One
section of Tanks[33] was allotted. They were not to catch up the
infantry till the Blue Line was reached, and in the advance to the
Black Line were to concentrate mainly upon Wytschaete.

All the successive lines, with the exception of the Green, were to
be consolidated, special strong points being established at such
positions as L'Enfer Farm, Skip Point, and Jump Point, in the Blue
Line; and Lumm Farm, Pick House, and Torreken Farm in the Black.
The infantry was to start the work of consolidation; then, when the
Black Line had been taken, the 121st and 150th Field Companies were
to move up to work upon the principal strong points. After dusk on
the evening of "Z" day, the 122nd Field Company was to move up and
construct a wire entanglement along the whole front of the Black
Line. Small opportunity, it will be seen, was left for successful
counter-attack if the assault reached its objectives.

Two contact aeroplanes were to be in the air at once throughout the
battle, calling at fixed hours, by the sounding of a Klaxon horn and
the firing of a Vérey light, for the signals by which the infantry
was to mark its progress. The latter consisted of green flares, lit
in bunches of three, and the turning of Watson fans, marked white on
one side and black on the other.

A whole series of mines, the greatest ever used in war, was to be
fired at "Zero." Of these there were three on the 36th Division's
front: one at Kruisstraat Cabaret, one at Spanbroekmolen, and one
at Peckham. The second had been doubtful up to the last minute. The
passage to the charge had been cut some time before by a German
defensive "camouflet," and it had seemed as though the toil of a
year and of thousands of men had been wasted. The tunnellers of the
171st Company had laboured unceasingly to cut a new gallery. On the
eve of the action a scribbled note from the commanding officer to
Colonel Place, G.S.O.1. of the Division, announced that the work
was accomplished and that it was "almost certain" the mine would go
up. In case there might be failure with this or any other charge,
the assaulting infantry was instructed not to wait more than fifteen
seconds after the opening of the barrage before leaving its trenches.

For the evacuation of the wounded there was an Advanced Dressing
Station at Lindenhoek, close to the main road, skilfully prepared by
the 109th Field Ambulance. Wounded could be carried into the main
shelter by the entrance on the north side, from the trench tramway,
given what attention was necessary, and conveyed out by the exit on
the west side, where the motor ambulances of the Division arrived
by a specially constructed semi-circular road. This relieved the
main road at that point, and enabled the cars to sweep round without
turning. The cars bore the wounded to the Main Dressing Station
just east of Dranoutre, manned by the 108th Field Ambulance, while
"walking wounded" were sent by a specially-marked track to the Main
Dressing Station prepared for them and manned by the 110th Field
Ambulance a mile east of the village. From these Dressing Stations
the Motor Ambulance Park had the task of carrying the wounded to the
two Casualty Clearing Stations in Bailleul. Distances were shorter
and roads better than on the Somme; and, had the casualties been as
many as on that occasion, they would have been removed in less than
half the time and with far less discomfort to the wounded. As it most
happily chanced, the casualties were less than a fourth of those at
Thiepval.

So much for the preparations. Any of importance which have not been
mentioned will appear in the account of the actual battle.

The 108th Brigade held the line during the period of preliminary
bombardment, employing for the purpose the two battalions which it
was to retain during the battle as divisional reserve. It having
been decided to carry out some practice barrages in broad daylight,
to note the effect of the smoke shell, and see whether any guns were
shooting short, these seemed to offer good opportunity for big raids.
The first of these raids took place at 3 p.m. on June the 3rd. A
party of three officers and seventy other ranks of the 13th Rifles
entered the enemy's trenches at Peckham behind the barrage, and after
a short bombing fight captured nineteen prisoners of the 2nd German
Division. On the following afternoon at 2 p.m., a larger party of the
9th Irish Fusiliers followed the barrage into the Spanbroek salient,
returning with one officer and thirty men as prisoners--a remarkable
haul for a raid. Their casualties were two killed and six wounded.
It was a fine, sunny day, and, despite the haze of dust caused by
the shelling, the whole operation could be seen in detail from the
observation posts on Kemmel Hill. The barrage, though the rate of
fire was but a third of what it was to be on the great day, was very
impressive. It appeared a wall of curling smoke creeping slowly up
the ridge. The figures of the infantrymen following it could be seen
distinctly; there was the flash of bombs, and there were Germans
coming from their dug-outs holding up their arms. As the party
returned one man was seen to break away from it, walk back fifty
yards in most leisurely fashion, summon forth two Germans whom he had
evidently observed hiding in a hole, and bring them in at the point
of the bayonet.

The day of battle was at hand. Nothing could have been more
favourable than the elements to the British cause. The weather
was clear for observation, dry, and not unduly cold at night.[34]
The infantry which was to make the attack was bivouacked in tents
and shelters, the 107th Brigade south of Locre, the 109th S.W.
of Dranoutre, thus avoiding the shelling, particularly with gas,
wherewith the Germans visited all our hutted camps. After dusk on
June the 6th, "Y" day, these Brigades moved up to their positions
of assembly, which consisted partly of our front and support line
trenches, and partly of slit trenches specially dug. As on the
occasion of the assembly for the Somme Battle, cross-country tracks
had been prepared to avoid the congested roads. East of the Neuve
Eglise-Lindenhoek Road there were no less than four tracks available
for each brigade. It was reported that the assembly was complete,
without a hitch, by 2-30 a.m. on June the 7th.

The reader must strive to imagine the emotions of the men who waited
in the dark for the fateful moment. Some, the luckier ones, those of
the battalions and attached troops that were to take the Blue Line,
had but another forty minutes, though those forty minutes must have
seemed long enough. The battalions which were to pass through them
on that objective had two hours after that. It was eleven months
since the Division had made its first great attack. Despite its heavy
losses on that day and since, there was here a large proportion
of officers and men who had taken part in it, including many who
had then been wounded. They must have recalled, as they waited for
the crash of opening artillery, with what high hopes they had gone
forward on the banks of the Ancre. The task must have appeared to
them almost equally formidable to-day. And yet there was a general
feeling of confidence, and confidence not unreasoned. The British
Army had learnt much since then, and the men in the line realized the
growth of that knowledge and had their part in it. They had watched
the stage prepared for the triumphant _dénouement_, prepared with
matchless industry and forethought, and they were ready to play their
part fitly when the curtain rose. There was among the men, it may
be, less of that spirit of gay, generous, headlong valour, ready to
spill itself without a thought of the cost, but there was a greater
store of the soldier's craft; the craft which seeks to save itself
that it may inflict the more loss upon the opponent. In fighting
efficiency the Division, war-tried, but not war-weary, was probably,
in the small hours of that June morning, at the highest pitch it ever
attained.

Zero was at 3-10 a.m. It had been fixed, after long consultation with
Divisions, by the Army as the hour at which men should be able to see
just one hundred yards ahead. In the conferences after the battle the
general opinion seemed to be that it had been put five or ten minutes
too early. It had been arranged that a normal programme of harassing
fire should be carried out, as a cessation of this would have
appeared suspicious to the enemy. It seemed, nevertheless, to those
who watched and waited, that the night was unusually quiet. A few of
our howitzers spoke now and again, and from the German lines came
regularly the hiccoughing double thud of their great gun, followed by
the whine of its missile overhead, on its course to some objective as
far back as Hazebrouck.

Then, with one monstrous roar, every British gun upon ten miles
of front opened fire. At the same time the great semi-circle of
mines exploded, spewing up, as it seemed, the solid earth, of
which fragments fell half a mile away, and sending to the skies
great towers of crimson flame, that hung a moment ere they were
choked by the clouds of dense black smoke which followed them from
their caverns. There came first one ghastly flash of light, then
a shuddering of earth thus outraged, then the thunder-clap. That
opening uproar was heard quite distinctly in England. General Nugent,
returning to his command post on Kemmel from the observation post a
hundred yards away, declared that the sight he had seen was "a vision
of hell."

Amid a gloom still thick and intensified by a smother of dust, the
first wave of the infantry sprang from its trenches and went forward.
The second followed at twenty-five yards' interval to avoid the
German barrage. One of the mines was fifteen seconds late. Curiously
enough, it was the doubtful one at Spanbroekmolen. The infantry had
obeyed instructions and had not waited for it. A few of the leading
men of the 14th Rifles, out in "No Man's Land," were thrown off their
feet by the force of the explosion. But there were no casualties,
and the men quickly closed in to the barrage. The size of the
craters to be skirted and the darkness made the keeping of direction
a matter of difficulty. It would have been impossible but for the
use of compasses by the platoon commanders. There was considerable
overlapping by the troops of the Division on our right, at least
two companies of which swung across our front. The body of one of
their officers was subsequently found in the bed of the Steenebeek,
at L'Enfer Wood, over two hundred yards within the 36th Division's
boundary.

There was no resistance by the enemy in his front or support
trenches. Dazed and disorganized by the mines and the tremendous
weight of artillery, the few survivors surrendered. Two machine-guns
only, firing through our barrage, are recorded to have come into
action at this stage, on the front of the 109th Brigade. They came
into the open when it had passed, on the extreme left flank, and
were put out of action, one by a section of rifle grenadiers, the
other by a Lewis gun of the 11th Inniskillings. The enemy's barrage
was unaccountably light and ragged, even when the violence of our
counter-battery fire is considered, and fell upon the British
front line. The assaulting troops went straight forward to the
Red Line, close upon the barrage, leaving to the "moppers up" the
task of taking prisoners. It was reached at Zero plus 35; that is,
at 3-45 a.m. Here there was a halt in the barrage of a quarter of
an hour, and here the third and fourth company of each battalion
"leap-frogged" the first and second for the assault of the Blue Line.
The serious business of the attack was but beginning.

As in almost every action of the war, the stoutest-hearted German
was the German behind the machine-gun. The artillerymen, with shell
hailing upon their positions, were more anxious to withdraw their
batteries than to support their infantry, but the machine-gunners
lived up to their reputation. As the new waves swept on, dipping now
on the right brigade front into the marshy bed of the Steenebeek,
guns came into action directly the barrage was past at L'Enfer Wood,
Earl Farm, Skip Point, and Scott Farm. At Skip Point, in particular,
two guns were handled with boldness, firing till the work was rushed
with the bayonet by the 9th Rifles, assisted by a platoon of the
14th, which swung in from the left. There was still resistance in
this veritable fortress, and some bombing of its dug-outs. Upwards
of a hundred and fifty prisoners were taken in it. At Scott Farm an
officer was seen standing on top of the work, encouraging his men. He
was shot at long range by a sniper, whereat the defence at this point
collapsed. There yet remained, however, Jump Point, the strongest
position short of the road. By this time the Intelligence Officer of
the 109th Brigade was on the high ground beyond Peckham, in touch
with his Brigadier on the telephone. He reported that he saw a yellow
flag at Jump Point. Now, the battalion flag of the 14th Rifles was
_orange_, a far more significant shade. "I said," writes General
Ricardo, "'Yellow be damned!' slammed down the 'phone, called the
Division on the other, and said I wished to report that Jump Point
was occupied. Corps was informed accordingly, within a few minutes of
schedule time. I was asked by B.G.G.S. Corps next day how we managed
our information and communications. I told him, 'by orange flags.'"
And so the first flag moved forward from the border of the map at IX.
Corps Headquarters, which was to mark the progress of the battle, and
was stuck into Jump Point.

All along the front the leading waves, well closed up to the barrage,
reached the Blue Line at the appointed hour, 4-50 a.m. The troops
of the 36th Division were in touch with those of the 25th and 16th
Divisions on right and left, both of which also reached their
objectives successfully. Here there was a halt of two hours, during
which consolidation was begun, during which also the battalions
attacking the Black Line, the 15th and 10th Rifles and the 10th and
9th Inniskillings, moved up in artillery formation. The two former
battalions had to pass through a light barrage which the enemy had
now put down upon the valley of the Steenebeek, but had not many
casualties. At 6-50 a.m. the barrage moved forward once more, the
fresh troops following it with great dash.

The severest resistance was not met here till the Green Line was past
and the troops were almost on the famous road, upon which they had
looked so long. Pick House was strongly held. With the rifle grenade
it was attacked, while a captured machine-gun was brought into
action against it from the flank.[35] The garrison, which included
a battalion commander, then surrendered. A little further north the
10th Inniskillings were held up by a machine-gun. A tank was just
in front, but the occupants apparently could not see the gun, nor
could the infantrymen attract their attention to it. A sergeant of
the Inniskillings ran up to the tank, beat upon its side with a Mills
bomb, and so gained the attention of the crew. The tank then bore
down upon the machine-gun and put it out of action. Still further
north, on their extreme left flank, the 10th had trouble from a
line of riflemen behind a ditch. A platoon of their neighbours,
the 9th Inniskillings, outflanked this party, killing three and
making prisoners of the rest. In their half of Wytschaete the 9th
Inniskillings had some "mopping up" to accomplish, and took about
fifty prisoners. Their neighbours, the Munsters of the 16th Division,
had a like task in the northern half of the village--a village that
was now a crumbled rubbish-heap of bricks, nowhere more than a few
feet high.

But the point at which resistance was most dogged was on the extreme
right, and it was the 15th Rifles which had the heaviest casualties
among the infantry. The following graphic account is taken from a
letter written by Captain P. K. Miller, who commanded the right flank
company of this battalion:

"About a hundred, or perhaps two hundred, yards short of the
Messines-Wytschaete Road we came into a lot of machine-gun fire, and
the men went to ground to find out where it came from, so I crossed
the road and lay down on the other side for about five minutes and
got my field-glasses going. Very warm spot, as our barrage was
dropping about there! Beat it back to the company, and ordered Lieut.
Falkiner to take his platoon, less Lewis-gun team, and put out of
action the strong point which I had spotted on my right. Got the
L.G. in action to spray the place meantime (had three out of five
riflemen killed doing this; however, they kept the gun going). Then
I went along to left of line and started Lieut. ---- of 'B' Company
(forget his name, but he got the M.C. for it) to attack another S.P.
which was plugging at our left. (O.C. 'B' Company had got a 'blighty'
coming up hill.) Then I went back to the right of the line and found
that Lieut. Falkiner had got Lumm Farm. The Huns put up a fight here.
However, one of the concrete places was bombed by Riflemen Aicken
and Cochrane. In the other the Hun officer and Lieut. Falkiner had
a rough-and-tumble fight. The Hun collared him somehow round the
waist, but he managed to get an arm free and shot him, and his men
came tumbling down after him and finished the rest of them. About
fifteen were left alive and surrendered.... I then pushed all the men
on a hundred yards and started them digging.... Some time later the
commander of the (25th Division) company on my right came along and
asked me if I would let him use Lumm Farm as a company headquarters,
as he had no dug-outs in his sector. So I gave him one of the
rooms--there were three or four in the dug-out."

The final part of this first-hand narrative is inserted because, in
a book recently published, the capture of Lumm Farm is attributed to
the 25th Division.[36]

Consolidation of the Black Line was started. At 8-40 a.m. patrols
pushed forward in touch with those of the 25th and 16th Divisions,
and established themselves without much difficulty a thousand yards
ahead, on what had been known on the preliminary plans as the Dotted
Black Line, afterwards called the Mauve Line, which was held as
an outpost line. Meanwhile, in the lull that followed, the field
artillery was moving forward. Most of the batteries moved to the
neighbourhood of the old British front line, but batteries of the
153rd and 173rd Brigades crossed "No Man's Land," and established
themselves as far forward as the Red Line. The gunners, in the
enthusiasm of victory, forgot their fatigue and the strain of those
sleepless nights of bombardment, and rushed their guns forward over
the difficult ground with the delight of schoolboys. At 10-5 a.m. it
was reported to General Nugent that batteries of the 173rd Brigade
were in position. A few minutes later came a similar report with
regard to the 153rd Brigade. Not for upwards of two hours was there
sign of a counter-attack in force. Then the IX. Corps announced that
long columns of troops and transport had been observed by balloon and
aeroplane moving west from the canal at Houthem. The German command
had, however, been too slow. By this time good progress had been made
with the work of consolidation of the Black Line, and of the strong
points in rear of it, the latter of which the engineers of the 121st
and 150th Field Companies had already taken in hand. In addition
to the wire brought forward on pack mules, far greater quantities
of German wire had been found, particularly at one big dump near
Guy Farm. All the twelve Vickers guns which had gone forward with
the infantry had arrived successfully. There were now three in
position north of Lumm Farm, three between Guy Farm and Staenyzer
Cabaret, three some hundred yards west of the main road, and two
in reserve. All the sixteen guns of the 108th Machine-Gun Company
were in position in their rear, a battery of eight east of L'Enfer
Wood, four at Jump Point, and four on Hill 94, at the south-west
corner of Wytschaete. A big counter-attack would have driven in the
outposts on the Mauve Line; it appeared improbable that it would
dislodge our troops from the Black. When it came, a little after one
o'clock, it was not on the front of the 36th Division, but on that of
its right-hand neighbours, the 25th and New Zealand Divisions. The
Germans came forward stoutly enough across the open ground, but the
attack got nowhere near the British lines. Before the terrific blast
of our barrage it withered away and dispersed.

The heat was now very great and the stench round Wytschaete from the
many horses that had been killed by our bombardments of the past week
was almost overwhelming. The troops were suffering from fatigue. It
was the hour at which reaction from the strain he has endured, and
the high pitch to which he has keyed himself, begins to creep upon
all but the very strongest of men. They solaced themselves during
the intervals of digging and wiring with the doubtful joys of German
ration cigars, found in great quantities in some of the dug-outs. The
Germans had begun to shell Messines and Wytschaete heavily.

The hour of the "New Zero"--that is, for the passing through of the
troops of the 11th Division--had been fixed meanwhile at 3-10 p.m. At
12-20 p.m. came an order from the IX. Corps that the Mauve Line was
to be held in force and consolidated, so that a good second line of
defence should be prepared by the time the 11th Division had captured
the Oosttaverne Line. Each Brigade was accordingly instructed to
garrison the Mauve Line with a battalion. Each Brigadier decided
to use the attached battalion of the 108th Brigade which had been
employed for "mopping up," and so was fresher than his other
battalions. Before three o'clock the 12th and 11th Rifles were upon
the Mauve Line, and at work putting it into a state of defence.

Punctually at 3-10 p.m. the 34th Brigade of the 11th Division moved
through the Mauve Line, behind a splendid barrage and with four
tanks. Though less artillery was firing, the barrage was even thicker
than had been that of the 36th Division, owing to the frontage having
been reduced to less than one half. It reached its objective, the
Oosttaverne Line, but was subjected to intense bombardment from the
German artillery, now all east of the Canal. The IX. Corps Cavalry
went through at 6 p.m.--too late, even if it had ever had a chance.
It suffered casualties from machine-gun fire, and could make little
or no progress.

The 16th Rifles (Pioneers) had attacked their heavy task of
road-making. Bridges for the trenches had been prepared and were
set in position. Shell-holes were hastily filled. With such a will
did the two companies on the road work, that before dusk wheeled
transport could move on the Lindenhoek-Messines Road beyond the great
crater in the Spanbroek salient. Another company cleared tracks for
pack transport up to the Black Line, marking them out with white
stakes and notice-boards. After the taking of the Oosttaverne Line
the battalion turned its attention to the top of the ridge, clearing
old communication trenches and cutting new ones. The 122nd Field
Company put up a fine obstacle along the whole length of the Black
Line, using, for the most part, German wire. This task was completed
by 3 a.m. on June the 8th.

It was an ideal opportunity for the employment of pack transport.
Once the enemy had been pushed off the ridge it was secure from
ground observation, while, as for German aeroplanes, they had no
chance to cross our lines, so complete was the British mastery of
the air. The pack was one of the successes of the battle. Officers
commanding battalions had in most cases picked their headquarters in
the enemy's lines days before, and told their transport officers they
would expect them at such an hour with the rations, just as if they
had been holding the most placid trenches on the front. They were
not disappointed. Indeed, mules were moving up with grenades, water,
and wire, before ever the Black Line was reached. The transport
officers of the battalions showed in this action that long months of
stagnation in the war had not robbed them of their initiative.

The forward slopes of the Messines Ridge, ere dusk put for a while
a decent veil upon it, presented a ghastly spectacle to bear
witness to the destructive power of modern artillery. The ground
had been literally ploughed up. L'Enfer Wood, which had remained a
considerable copse of stunted trees through years of shell-fire, was
now but an indeterminate collection of stumps. Some of the concrete
structures had disappeared. The Steenebeek stream was a stream no
more. Its path was marked by mud thicker than elsewhere, and where
its bed had been the shell-holes were full of water. There were a
number of dead Germans in the valley, with their faces turned toward
the hill. They had run back before the dreadful moving wall of the
British barrage, and had been caught by it in the marshy ground. Some
lay on their faces, arms outstretched. It was a sight that, at normal
times, would have filled the breast of everyone who witnessed it with
pity and horror. But in such moments the wells of these emotions are
almost dried up.

At night the 108th Brigade relieved the 107th and 109th in the
line; that is to say, its remaining battalions, which had been in
divisional reserve, relieved the troops holding the Black and Blue
Lines, while General Griffith took command of the front. The relieved
troops moved back to the comparative comfort of the old British
trenches. The night was very disturbed. On more than one occasion the
S.O.S. rocket went up on the right of the Division, and at 10 p.m.
a counter-attack on Messines was reported. If counter-attack there
was, it was of small account. No big attack could, in fact, have been
carried out in the darkness. Morning dawned, leaving the British in
secure occupation of the battlefield and all their objectives. The
ridge was, however, subjected to very heavy shelling all that day and
at night, when the 150th Field Company had a very wild task in wiring
the whole of the Mauve Line. On the afternoon of the following day,
at 4 p.m., command of the sector, the actual front line of which had
been held for upwards of forty-eight hours by his troops, passed to
the G.O.C. 11th Division. That night the 32nd Brigade of the 11th
Division relieved the 108th Brigade in the Mauve, Black, and Blue
Lines, the weary battalions moving back to bivouac on the slopes
of Kemmel Hill. On the 16th the Headquarters of the 36th Division
returned to their old village, St. Jans Cappel.

The total number of prisoners captured by the 36th Division in the
offensive was 31 officers and 1,208 other ranks. Against this its
casualties, to the night of June the 9th, when it was relieved, were
61 officers and 1,058 other ranks. In the actual assault, the losses
were probably not above seven hundred. Other divisions, notably some
of the Australians of the II. Anzac Corps, suffered more severely
than the 36th; but, on the whole, it seems safe to presume that the
German losses were more than thrice our own. One prisoner stated that
practically all his company was destroyed by one of the mines, while
the tenor of the letters found upon others was that it had been "far
worse than the Somme." No German field guns could be withdrawn by our
troops before the Division was relieved, but a number were captured
between the Black Line and the Mauve. Among the comparatively few
officers killed was Captain H. Gallagher, D.S.O., of the 11th
Inniskillings, whose gallantry and fine leadership upon the Somme
have been recorded. At the beginning of the action his right arm was
shattered by a fragment of shell. Urged to go back, he laughingly
refused, threw down the rifle he was carrying, and took his revolver
in his left hand, saying: "This will do me rightly." He led his
company to its objective, and was returning later to have his arm
dressed when he was killed instantly by a shell. He was buried in the
old "No Man's Land," just outside the "Bull Ring," which he had so
often held, from which he and his company had repulsed a big German
raiding party a short while before.

The 16th Division lost one distinguished man in Major William
Redmond, M.P., who was brought in by stretcher-bearers of the 36th
Division, and conveyed to its Main Dressing Station. He had been
attached to Divisional Headquarters, but had insisted on rejoining
his regiment for the battle. His wound was light, but he was no
longer a young man, nor in a state of physical fitness to withstand
such a strain. He died some hours later.

The 36th Division had by no means finished with the
Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, even for this year; but before dealing
with its last days in the area, it may be not unprofitable to
speculate upon the causes of this triumphant success. If this
account has achieved its object, the majority of them will stand
out clearly enough. In the conferences after the battle, and in
reply to _questionnaires_ issued by the commanders, there were very
few criticisms made. Zero, as has been stated, was considered to
have been too early, though by not more than a few minutes at most.
All the infantry was enthusiastic about the manner in which the
artillery had been handled, and about the effect of the barrage.
Some battalions considered that it had been set to move rather too
fast, but the general opinion was that the infantry had been able to
keep up with it comfortably enough, and that the pace was a factor
in the success. The mines, it was agreed, had been decisive in the
capture of the front-line system, and had exercised a great moral
effect much farther back. The tanks had been a success. They were
useful in incidents such as that which has been described, and they
probably saved the infantry some casualties on the top of the ridge.
Broadly speaking, however, they did not appear to have exercised any
great effect upon the course of the battle. Brigadiers and battalion
commanders were unanimous in praise of the smoothness with which the
machinery worked from behind. The services of supply--the Divisional
Train, Supply Column, and Divisional Ammunition Column--were at their
best, and their standard of excellence was high. The Ordnance had
responded to every demand made upon it for the multifarious material
used in the offensive.

With regard to the infantry itself, the most interesting feature of
the Battle of Messines was the triumph of the platoon. Each platoon
had now a Lewis-gun section and a section of rifle grenadiers. It
was converted thereby into a little self-sufficing force, an army in
miniature, with every weapon necessary for the carrying out of the
minor operations likely to confront it in such an assault. Some of
the platoon leaders displayed in this battle a high order of tactical
skill.

But let us glance also at the affair from the other side, where a
German Army Commander, the famous Sixt von Armin, was seated at his
map-table. What were the problems that confronted him, and how did he
face them?

The Germans meant to hold the ridge if they could. It was a valuable
position that had cost them dear in the winning. They knew an
attack was coming, but they put it one or two days later than it
was delivered. The Higher Command was well aware that the troops
in the trenches were in no fit state to meet it, after days of
terrific pounding, heavy losses, and shortage of food. It was in the
act of relieving them when the attack was launched. The relief of
one Division was incomplete when the mines went up and the British
bayonets came in the dark upon the columns in the communication
trenches. The confusion must have been indescribable. Again, the
German position, admirable for trench warfare, had weaknesses in
such a battle as this. It was a sharp salient, with a semi-circle of
artillery about it. The artillery had excellent observation. Had the
weather been misty, Kemmel would have been of little avail, and the
work of destruction comparatively ineffective. But the atmosphere was
wonderfully clear. The British fire upon the forts was overwhelming.
The counter-battery work was the best accomplished in the war. An
average of one gun to every German battery in action was destroyed
by our fire, according to the evidence of captured artillerymen.
The loss in horses alone constituted a severe blow. As to the
counter-attack, which was made in the afternoon with the 7th and
probably regiments of the 24th Divisions, it was launched late, and
met the full weight of our barrage. With its failure the High Command
appears to have decided, wisely no doubt, to abandon the struggle,
and made all haste to get every gun left to it east of the Canal
d'Ypres. It must have appeared to it that the position held by the
British offered doubtful results to a counter-attack in force. The
latter had now all the best of the ground, and a great counter-attack
upon the re-entrant held by them would have required more troops than
the enemy probably had available.

On the 13th of July the 36th Division, less its Artillery, which
remained in position, moved to the area between Mont Noir and
Bailleul. A certain amount of rest was obtained, but large parties
of infantry had to work under the Chief Engineer of the IX. Corps.
However, better things were in prospect, the Division being under
orders to move back to Merris. These orders were suddenly cancelled.
On the night of the 19th, the 107th Brigade on the right, and the
109th on the left, took over from the 11th Division the whole front
now held by the IX. Corps, from the Blauwepoortbeek at Deconinck
Farm, just north of the village of Gapaard, on the right, to Rose
Wood, north of the Roozebeek, on the left. The length of the front
was about three thousand yards. The Headquarters of the 107th Brigade
were established in a company headquarters of our old trenches, those
of the 109th Brigade in enemy dug-outs in the northern part of Grand
Bois. On the 20th, 36th Divisional Headquarters opened at Ulster Camp.

The holding of a new-won position after a great attack was always
an unpleasant task. In this case the conditions were, from some
points of view, more difficult than those of the capture of the
ridge. "Jerry was angry," said the men, with justice. The Germans
now had a mass of heavy artillery behind the Canal d'Ypres, and
day and night they shelled the British forward positions and the
western slope of the ridge. On their second day in the line the
Headquarters of the 109th Brigade in the Grand Bois were so heavily
bombarded that General Nugent decided they should be withdrawn to
a company headquarters in our old lines. The troops in the front
trenches were on a forward slope, very exposed to observation, and
suffered heavily. At night ration parties on the roads had many
evil experiences. Casualties rarely amounted to less than a hundred
for the period of twenty-four hours, and several battalions had
considerably greater losses in ten days of this experience than in
the period from the 7th to the 9th of June.

Nor was it alone upon areas over which he had observation from the
ground that the enemy was able to bring to bear accurate fire.
Parties on railway work, lorries on the Wytschaete Road, suffered
very heavily also. The reason was that the situation in the air had
altered. British supremacy there had been absolute. Not a German
aeroplane had been seen during the battle. Since then certain of our
squadrons had moved north to the Salient. The German air force, on
the contrary, had been heavily reinforced. In particular the famous
Richthofen, with a squadron of very fast single-seater scouts,
painted bright red, raged up and down the front, catching many of
our comparatively slow photographic and artillery aeroplanes, and
shooting them down. Another favourite device of his was to sweep
low over our trenches, firing belt after belt upon the infantry in
them, who retorted, without much effect, by the fire of machine-guns
on anti-aircraft mountings. But his most spectacular feat was
undoubtedly the burning of our balloons. Of these there was a great
number on the front. From Kemmel about fourteen could be counted,
stretching almost to the coast on one side, and perhaps to Estaires
on the other. For men in the neighbourhood of the hill it became one
of the interests of those sunny afternoons to watch the balloons. The
programme was always of a similar nature. There would be a sudden
uproar of anti-aircraft fire, a fast-moving dot would approach one of
the balloons, two silver dots below the latter would represent the
observers making their way earthwards in their parachutes. A tiny
flicker of fire would appear atop of the balloon, swiftly growing and
spreading. Within a few seconds the flaming mass would sink slowly.
Sometimes the aggressor would dart straight off to the next balloon
in the line, and repeat the process with that. On the afternoon of
June the 23rd, three balloons in succession were brought down by one
aeroplane. It must, however, have been displeasing to the Germans to
observe how swiftly every balloon burnt by them was replaced.

The German infantry, it must be added, was entirely unaggressive, nor
was it easy to locate its positions. It held the ground west of the
Canal d'Ypres with isolated posts, and made no effort to improve the
half-dug trenches already existing. All labour was concentrated upon
the positions east of the Canal.

On the 29th a welcome relief of the 36th by the 37th Division took
place. On the following day the G.O.C. 37th Division took over
command of the front, the whole of the 36th Division, less Artillery,
Engineers, and Pioneers, moving to the Merris area. The Headquarters
of the Division and that of the 108th Brigade were in that village;
the 107th Brigade at Outtersteene, and the 109th at Strazeele. The
batteries, which had withdrawn to their forward wagon-lines for
rest on the 19th, had returned to the line by the 27th in relief
of the 11th Divisional Artillery, and remained there till July the
5th, under heavy hostile shelling, in indifferent weather with poor
visibility. The Pioneers and Field Companies had but a day's rest
before being moved to the Salient to begin new work.

The first week of July was given to rest and training at Merris.

[Illustration: Map II.
The Battle of Messines, 1917.]

FOOTNOTES:

[31] The boundaries of the 36th Division, the successive objectives,
and all the names used in the following description are shown on Map
II.

[32] The 32nd, half of the 33rd Machine-Gun Companies, and the 19th
Motor Machine-Gun Battery, were at the disposal of the 36th Division
for the attack.

[33] _i.e._, four Tanks.

[34] One officer records that, two evenings before the attack, he
played bridge in the open air till midnight.

[35] Our own Vickers gun teams had dropped behind the infantry here.
Vickers guns, tripods, and belt boxes are very heavy loads on ground
cut to pieces by shell-fire.

[36] _The 25th Division in France and Flanders._ By Lieut.-Colonel M.
Kincaid-Smith.

CHAPTER VI

THE BATTLE OF LANGEMARCK: AUGUST 1917

On July the 7th the Division, less Artillery, Engineers, and
Pioneers, moved to the training area south-west of St. Omer,
headquarters being established at Wizernes. The area was considerably
smaller than that occupied the previous summer after the Somme
fighting, being in fact the southern portion of the latter.
Billeting accommodation in the villages was inadequate, and had to
be augmented by tents. Small hardship this in such weather and such
surroundings. Many officers whose lodging was entirely comfortable
chose for preference to sleep in the open air, or in tents in the
cherry orchards. The men were soaked in sunshine. Old friendships
of 1916, and of the early spring, when Brigades had been training
for Messines, were renewed. Fishermen obtained some excellent
trout-fishing. In fact, the Division probably never had, during all
its service in France and Flanders, a pleasanter period than these
twelve days of rest and training. They ended with a great gymkana at
Acquin on the 23rd, with horse-races, mule-races, jumping, transport
competitions, wrestling on horseback, and sports of all kinds. A
feature of the afternoon was the "divisional drag," whipped by Major
S. H. Green, the D.A.Q.M.G., with a team of horses borrowed from
Signals, trained and mannered to a point not unworthy of the Coaching
Club, but undoubtedly on the heavy side--and the hairy!

On moving to Wizernes the 36th Division had come under the command
of the XIX. Corps, Fifth Army, General Gough having moved north from
Artois for the impending battle. The Artillery, Engineers, and 16th
Rifles had not shared the good fortune of their comrades. Relieved
at Wytschaete on July the 5th, the former had marched straight to
wagon-lines off the Poperinghe-Ypres Road, coming under the orders
of the C.R.A., 55th Division. By the night of the 7th one section
of each 18-pounder battery was in action in the northern part of
the Salient, on the Ypres-Poelcappelle Road. A week later all the
batteries were in positions allotted by the 55th Division for the
opening attack, the preliminary bombardment for which began on the
16th. The Field Companies and Pioneers moved first to the region
about Watou, half-way between Cassel and Poperinghe, where they were
engaged in digging new wells to improve the water supply for the
great numbers of troops that would be passing through during the
offensive. This was hard work but safe. After three weeks of it,
however, they moved forward, and were henceforth employed on road
repair and the making of cross-country tracks for men and animals. At
this work they suffered much from shelling, and particularly from gas
shell. The 150th Field Company, of its complement of six officers,
had three killed and two wounded within a week; as well as losing a
high proportion of its sappers.

The Division moved up at the end of July in huge brigade convoys of
'buses and lorries, and by the 30th was in the back area of the XIX.
Corps, between Watou and Poperinghe. Headquarters were established
temporarily in the latter town at two houses in the rue d'Ypres. The
following morning began the terrible struggle which is generally
known as the third Battle of Ypres.[37]

The great attack launched that morning was the second stroke of a
campaign which had begun triumphantly at Messines. The plans made
for 1917 by the Allied Command had been thrown into some confusion by
the retirement of the German armies on the Somme to their Hindenburg
system, in March, and later by the stopping of General Nivelle's
great offensive in Champagne.[38] The British had certainly played
their part at Arras and Messines. The British Command could obviously
now not count upon another great French offensive for some little
while, and it was under the vital necessity of keeping the German
armies heavily engaged. Its greater object was to strike at the
Belgian coast, where the submarine bases of Ostend and Zeebrugge were
becoming a menace so serious to the very existence of the nation.
That scheme has not been made public, and its details can be no
more than a matter of surmise to any but those in the confidence
of the British Command, or the Imperial General Staff. It will not
be discussed here. It is known, however, pretty generally, that it
involved an attack upon the coast-line and a landing. Camps had been
formed near Dunkirk, surrounded by barbed wire, where divisions were
to be assembled in greatest secrecy. And as for the attack in the
Salient, a glance at a railway map will show how serious an advance
across the Passchendaele Ridge upon Roulers would have been to the
German communications. A threat to the next great railway, the main
Brussels line between Ghent and Bruges, would probably have led to
the abandonment of the coast by the enemy. Ludendorff, in mid-July,
while the 36th Division was enjoying its repose in peaceful country,
had made one move in the game--no more than the move of a pawn in
such a struggle, but a clever and effective one. At Lombartzyde,
outside Nieuport, he had launched an attack against our troops upon
the little slice of ground held by them north of the Yser Canal,
driving them back into the river. Two divisions had very serious
losses, including over a thousand prisoners, and, worst of all,
the "jumping-off" ground for an attack on the coast line had been
snatched away.

Even if they failed in the ambitious venture, the British could at
least hope, beside continuing their policy of striking blow upon
blow at the enemy, to make an end of the accursed Ypres Salient, and
drive the Germans from the dominating semicircle of higher ground
from which they had so long harassed our troops. Half of this task
had indeed been accomplished by the Battle of Messines. The southern
curve of the Salient had almost disappeared. It remained to cut away
the northern. The great part of the fighting of Ypres, 1917, was to
take place north of the Zonnebeke Road.

The attack launched on July the 31st by the Fifth Army of General
Gough, and the First French Army of General Anthoine on his left, met
with a considerable measure of success. At its outset, indeed, the
success appeared complete; but the Germans, holding their positions
lightly and in depth, with the local counter-attack as one of the
main weapons of defence, retook much of the ground won. The Pilkem
spur was, however, in our hands. Great as had been our losses, the
attack upon a position of tremendous strength had gone well enough
for a beginning. But the weather, so pitiless on the Somme, that
had almost startled pessimists by its unwonted mercy at Messines,
broke that very day. Ere afternoon was over rain began to fall in
torrents. By the following morning the ground, ploughed up by weeks
of shell-fire, was a sea of mud.

The 55th Division, in the fate of which the 36th Division was
particularly interested, since its artillery was supporting the
attack, and its other arms were to relieve their Lancashire comrades
in that sector at a later date, had fared as well as any other. The
troops had gone forward with great dash and had almost everywhere
reached their final objective, known as the Green Line, east and just
south of St. Julien. The leading battalions had, however, suffered
very heavy loss from the fire of German machine-guns, distributed
in depth, and had not been sufficiently strong to resist the
counter-attack when it came. They were driven in upon the second
objective, or Black Line, which followed, roughly speaking, the line
of the road running south-east from St. Julien to the farm known as
Pommern Castle, in the Pommern Redoubt.[39] It was an advance of
fifteen hundred yards. To the south affairs had gone less well, and
the Black Line remained to be taken.

It had been the intention of the Commander of the XIX. Corps to keep
the assaulting troops in line after they had made their attack,
till the eve of the next. The result of the Battle of Langemarck
was greatly affected by the fact that this resolution was not kept.
The 55th Division had suffered so greatly, and its infantry was
in a state of such fatigue, that it was decided to withdraw it at
once. The decision may have been inevitable; on that point the Corps
Commander, General Watts, was alone in a position to form a judgment.
For him and the 36th Division alike, it was disastrous. It meant that
for his next attack he had in his hands a Division jaded, weary,
shaken by deadly shell-fire, having lost a good third of its infantry
strength ere ever it left its trenches for the assault.

On the morning of August the 2nd, the 107th Brigade entrained at
Poperinghe and detrained at the famous Goldfish Château, west of
Ypres, coming under the orders of the 55th Division, to which
it had been allotted as a reserve. While his Brigade was on the
move, General Withycombe received orders from the 55th Division
for it to relieve the 164th Brigade in the old British front-line
trenches. The General reached Wieltje, the Headquarters of the 164th
Brigade, at 12-45 p.m. Three-quarters of an hour later he received a
telegram from the 55th Division ordering a further relief, that of
the much-depleted 165th and 166th Brigades in the captured German
positions. His men had a long march in heavy rain, and had not
completed the relief of the 164th Brigade till 3-40 p.m. The new
relief was entirely unexpected, and was not in accordance with the
intimation received by General Nugent that his troops were to be
used as a reserve. It was carried out in continuous rain, through
mud eighteen inches deep, under heavy fire from howitzers of heavy
calibre, and in the midst of bombing attacks launched against the
right flank of the 55th Division. Not till six o'clock on the morning
of August the 3rd was its completion announced. The Brigade had had
heavy casualties, particularly the 10th and 15th Rifles, which had
taken over the Black Line. After that night's work, in fact, there
could be no question of employing those battalions in the coming
attack.

That night two battalions of the 108th Brigade, the 13th Rifles and
9th Irish Fusiliers, relieved the 165th Brigade, which had moved back
to the old British front and support lines; and two battalions of
the 109th Brigade, the 11th Inniskillings and 14th Rifles, the 166th
Brigade; the whole force under the command of General Withycombe,
G.O.C. 107th Brigade, who had his headquarters in the great mined
dug-outs at Wieltje. Divisional Headquarters were established at
Mersey Camp, north of the Poperinghe-Ypres Road, and about mid-way
between the two towns, taking over command at 4 a.m. on August the
4th. On taking over the line from the 55th Division, General Nugent
decided that, in view of the dreadful conditions, it might be held
more lightly, and withdrew two of the supporting battalions to camps
about Brandhoek and Vlamertinghe, replacing them by companies of the
supporting battalions of the 107th Brigade. There were other reliefs
during the period of waiting, all the battalions having a turn,
though the six which were to lead over on August the 16th were saved
as much as might be. The headquarters of the Brigades also took turn
about in command of the line, in the filth and stenches of Wieltje
dug-outs.

Wieltje dug-outs! Who that saw it will forget that abominable mine,
with its "town major," its thirteen entrances, the water that flowed
down its main passages and poured down its walls, its electric light
gleaming dully through steam-coated lamps, its sickly atmosphere,
its smells, its huge population of men--and of rats? From behind
sack-curtained doorways the coughing and groaning of men in uneasy
slumber mingled with the click of typewriters. In the corridor one
would fall over a runner, slimy from head to foot with mud, resting
while he waited for a return message to the front line. One advantage
only it had: it was safe within. And that was in part counterbalanced
by the danger of exit and entrance, constantly menaced by storms of
fire. The cross-country tracks, simply paths from which wire had
been cleared, behind it, were more horrible still. Their object was
to allow troops and pack animals--even the shells for the field
artillery had to go forward by pack--to avoid roads under constant
shell-fire. But the Germans now knew them every whit as well as the
roads, and shelled them all day with every calibre up to 8-inch
howitzers. No one who used them but had at some point to lie crouched
on his belly, watching huge columns of earth and water spout up with
the burst of the big shells. Horrors were not new, nor did the sight
of dead bodies affect men overmuch, but there was one vision upon one
of these tracks, the mangled remains of a complete party of artillery
carriers, six men and twelve horses, which burnt itself upon the
brains of those that saw it.

The war had in those days reached its worst stage. Gas shelling and
aeroplane bombing were at their height. The infantry resting in the
camps between Vlamertinghe and Elverdinghe had to endure, night
after night, the crashing of great bombs among the huts and tents.
The casualties to horses were very high, a horse being ten times as
vulnerable as a man to bombs. The Casualty Clearing Stations probably
suffered higher losses than in any other battle of the war. The
counter-battery work was ferocious on both sides. For our batteries
there was little concealment, and for their guns and teams little
shelter. The gunners of the 36th Division, who had been in action at
the opening of the Battle of Langemarck for over a month, suffered
from strain and discomfort perhaps even more severely than the
infantry on this occasion. And, day after day, fell the rain.

In the trenches the mud and the artillery fire were the most serious
foes. The German infantry could easily be held. There was one
counter-attack on the 8th, on the extreme left. Our bombing squads
moved up and drove the enemy out. On the 10th the II. Corps on the
right attacked to establish itself upon the Black Line, the artillery
covering the 36th Division co-operating. The attack was in the main
successful, and the way was prepared for a further advance. On the
night of the 14th the troops of the 107th Brigade, then in front
line, were relieved, and those which were to carry out the attack
moved up, picking up their bombs and special equipment at battle
stores previously established as far forward as possible, past which
the platoons moved slowly in single file.

The final objective of the 36th Division was from a point on the
Zonnebeke-Langemarck Road near Gallipoli Copse, on the right, to
Aviatik Farm on the left. This was represented by a series of strong
concrete forts, and known as the Red Line. The 16th Division was
attacking on the right and the 48th Division on the left of the 36th.
The attack of the 36th Division was to be made by the 108th Brigade
on the right and the 109th Brigade on the left, with the 107th
Brigade in reserve. Each Brigade was to attack with two battalions
in front line, one in support, about a thousand yards in rear, and
one in reserve, in the old British front and support lines. Each
battalion was to attack on a two-company front, in four waves. The
second and fourth waves were to be only half the strength of the
first and third, owing to companies having been reduced for the time
being to three platoons. The objective of the leading companies was
the line Gallipoli-Schuler Farm, the old Green Line of the first
offensive, still so-called. On this line the rear companies were to
pass through to the final objective, the original leading companies
following in close support. The supporting battalions were then to
move up and take over the Green Line. A company from each of the
supporting battalions was allotted to the leading two battalions on
each brigade front as "moppers up." Special platoons were given as
their objectives such concrete strongholds as Somme, Pond Farm, Hindu
Cott, Green House, Schuler Farm. Four guns of each of the Machine-Gun
Companies of the attacking brigades were to go forward with the
infantry, the remainder being used for the barrage. No Stokes mortars
could be taken forward owing to the state of the ground. The task of
the R.E. was the consolidation of the Dotted Green Line. This was to
be a defensive system on our side of the wire running from Gallipoli
Copse through Green House, using that obstacle for our own purposes.
That of the Pioneers was the clearance of the Wieltje-Gravenstafel
Road.

The field artillery, under the orders of General Brock, the C.R.A.,
consisted of the 36th and 61st Divisional Artilleries and the 108th
and 150th Army Field Artillery Brigades. For the creeping barrage
there were fourteen 18-pounder batteries, giving, as at Messines,
about one gun to twenty yards. There were four 18-pounder batteries
for distant barrage, to search hidden ground, and deal with strong
points beyond the creeping barrage, while the six 4.5 howitzer
batteries fired a hundred yards ahead of the latter, resting on
all known strong points and machine-gun emplacements. The pace of
the barrage was a hundred yards in five minutes, with a pause of
thirty-five minutes in front of the Green Line. This seems as slow
as could well be, but events were to prove that it was too fast in
the conditions. There were three gas-shell bombardments prior to the
attack, the last being on the night of the 15th, "Y/Z" night. For
these there was allotted a hundred rounds per 18-pounder and fifty
rounds per howitzer. One section of tanks was to take part in the
attack, but there was at no time a probability of tanks reaching our
front line. Zero was at 4-45 a.m.

There was very heavy shelling of the assembly trenches and the roads
in rear during the night of the 15th. A small dug-out occupied
by the headquarters of the 14th Rifles near Spree Farm was hit
repeatedly, and it was impossible to keep alight a candle inside it.
So excellent, however, was the German concrete, that it held out.
Between midnight and 2-30 a.m. the four leading battalions must have
suffered on an average fifty casualties apiece.

The story of the attack, alas! is not a long one. The German barrage
came down swiftly, but, as it was for the most part on the assembly
trenches and behind them, it had small effect upon the leading
waves. But enemy machine-guns all along the front opened fire almost
simultaneously with our barrage. Gallipoli, Somme, Aisne House,
Hindu Cott, Schuler Farm, Border House, and Jew's Hill, were held
in strength by the enemy. The concrete "pill-boxes," containing in
some cases half a dozen separate compartments, seemed to be entirely
unaffected by the pounding of many weeks. Moreover, strong wire
entanglements running down obliquely from Gallipoli were encountered.
The lanes cut by artillery fire were covered by machine-guns. The
ground was a veritable quagmire. The "mopping-up" system was found to
be impossible. The concrete works had to be fought for; they could
not be passed by and left to "moppers up" in rear. The inevitable
result was that the men quickly lost the barrage. The strength of
the attacking force had become inadequate to its frontage of one
thousand five hundred yards. So heavily had the battalions lost
since the Division took over the line, and particularly during the
last twenty-four hours in the trenches, that seventy men was about
the average strength of the company. There were assuredly not two
thousand infantrymen in the force which went "over the top." The
foremost wave must have consisted of less than three hundred men,
probably reduced to a third within half a minute. Not unfitting was
the description of a sergeant who took part in the attack: "It looked
more like a big raiding party than anything else."

In the circumstances, after what they had endured, with ranks so
thinned, against such opposition, it may be said, without calling
upon superlatives or high-flown words, that none but troops of
excellent quality would have gone forward at all. The troops of the
36th Division did much more than this. On the extreme right the
9th Irish Fusiliers, attacking from the Pommern Redoubt, pressed up
across Hill 35, driving the Germans before them from the gun-pits on
its forward slope. The 13th Rifles on their left advanced equally
well. Somme, one of the strongest forts on the front, was passed by
the leading wave, but the platoon detailed to take and hold it was
unable to do so, though the rifle-grenade section strove gallantly
to work round and take it in flank. The adjutant, Captain Belt,
made an attempt to dig in in front of the place with a handful of
men, but was severely wounded and fortunate in being able to crawl
back to our lines. On the right of the 36th Division, the 16th had
at first made good progress, but a counter-attack drove its troops
back to their original line. From six o'clock onwards men began to
fall back. Colonel R. P. Maxwell, commanding the 13th, seeing what
was happening, led forward his battalion headquarters to a desperate
attack upon Somme. He was unsuccessful, being himself severely
wounded. It will be remembered that Colonel Maxwell, who had two sons
on active service, had been wounded in Martinsart on the eve of the
Somme attack. He was to reappear, none the less, in France in 1918.
Colonel Somerville, commanding the 9th Irish Fusiliers, had already
been mortally wounded. With the failure of Colonel Maxwell's forlorn
hope, it may be said that the attack on the front of the 108th
Brigade collapsed, though the 9th Irish Fusiliers made an effort to
cling to the top of Hill 35.

On the right of the 109th Brigade, the 14th Rifles had to cross
ground far worse even than the ordinary, completely under water,
in fact. In their passage they came under withering machine-gun
fire from Pond Farm. Lieutenant Ledlie made a fine attempt to
capture this place, surrounding it on three sides with the few
men remaining to him when he reached it, and killing any Germans
who showed themselves. With his numbers so greatly depleted, he
waited for support before making an attempt to rush it, sending
back two messages. But no supports came; the men could not face
the machine-gun fire. They had already suffered greatly from the
artillery barrage, which the leading waves had avoided. At eight
o'clock, seeing that his position was hopeless, he withdrew his men
a hundred and fifty yards, covering his retirement by Lewis-gun
fire. The best work of the day was accomplished by the men of the
11th Inniskillings. They also had heaviest casualties on the right,
where a mere fragment was left glued to the ground in front of the
Green Line, the men crawling in to our line after dark. On the left
the usual blast of fire came from Border House and Fort Hill. One
officer and seven men, by doubling when they fell behind the barrage,
reached the Green Line, but none could move up to their support, and
they were compelled to withdraw. The men of the supporting companies
rushed Fort Hill with bomb and bayonet, killing a number of Germans
and taking some prisoners. This was the one appreciable gain, an
advance on the extreme left of some four hundred yards. The 48th
Division had not been able to accomplish even as much on the flank.
From Fort Hill a rough line to the original position in Capricorn
Keep was consolidated. The reserve battalions of each Brigade, the
12th Rifles on the right and the 10th Inniskillings on the left,
had moved up to the Black Line, where officers busied themselves
in reorganizing the men and making preparations for a possible
counter-attack by the enemy. The latter may have had such intention.
He was at least observed to reinforce his position strongly behind
Pond Farm. On an S.O.S. rocket being sent up, our barrage fell upon
his platoons moving up at this point, and scattered them with heavy
loss.

General Nugent for a time contemplated a second attack with a
new barrage, to take at least the Green Line. The reports of
Brigadiers and Staff Officers visiting the line in the afternoon
made it clear that the troops were in no fit state for any such
attempt. Disorganization was still considerable; a high proportion
of officers and N.C.O.'s had fallen, and the men were utterly
exhausted. Moreover, neither the 108th nor the 109th Brigade could
have mustered five hundred men for a new attack. General Nugent
accordingly decided against this course, and instead ordered the
relief of the two attacking Brigades by the 107th that night. This
was carried out in circumstances of great difficulty, some platoons
not quitting the front line till after five o'clock next morning. The
weary remnants were moved straight back by 'bus to Winnizeele, and
that night a Brigade of the 61st Division relieved the 107th Brigade
in the line.

It is impossible to arrive at the exact casualties during the hours
of the actual assault. Between 6 a.m. on the 16th and 9 a.m. on
the 18th, however, there passed through the Divisional Dressing
Stations 58 officers and 1,278 other ranks, wounded or gassed. These
casualties do not include those of the attached artillery. They are
very high if the depleted state of the infantry prior to the attack
be taken into consideration. But they are almost insignificant if
compared with the total casualties suffered in the holding of the
line in the Salient, from August the 2nd to the 18th. In that period
the 36th Division lost 144 officers and 3,441 other ranks killed,
wounded, or missing. That is to say, it had more than two thousand
casualties ere launched to the attack. Two other commanding officers,
besides Colonels Somerville and Maxwell, were among the casualties.
Colonel A. C. Pratt, 11th Inniskillings, had been killed at the
entrance to Wieltje dug-outs early on the morning of the 16th, while
Colonel Macrory, 10th Inniskillings, had been severely wounded a
few days earlier. The difficulties of evacuating wounded during
the action were extraordinary. Stretcher cases had to be brought
by hand at least two thousand yards, and it took eight men to each
stretcher. There were 433 stretcher-bearers, of whom rather more than
half were R.A.M.C., the remainder being men of a Tunnelling Company
and the Divisional Salvage section. Among many who displayed great
bravery in the work of evacuating wounded under heavy shell-fire
was the Assistant Chaplain-General of the Division, the Rev. F. J.
Halahan, M.C., who by precept and personal example encouraged the
stretcher-bearers to new efforts. Search parties, sent out after
dark, brought in about a hundred wounded men from in front of our
line. The conduct of the medical officers with the battalions,
tending their wounded under the very heavy shell-fire that was
maintained throughout upon the Black Line, was beyond praise. Captain
Gavin, R.A.M.C., attached to the 14th Rifles, did splendid work at
Rat Farm, where two other medical officers were killed. This gallant
officer, who earned a bar to his Military Cross on that occasion, and
had escapes little short of miraculous, was to be killed a few months
later by no more serious an accident than a fall from his horse.

Among those good dumb soldiers, the transport animals, the casualties
were the highest ever suffered by the Division. The pack mules,
the use of which was even more necessary than at Messines, but
infinitely less favoured by the _terrain_, were pushed forward too
soon, and came under heavy machine-gun fire. Many were killed, and a
far greater number had to be destroyed, though a few survived their
wounds, and, like gallant veterans, bore their scars till the war was
over. The loss among artillery horses was also very great.

This action was the only attack made by the 36th Division which
suffered complete reverse, for that on the Ancre had been a local
victory, of which the fruits were lost through no fault of its
troops. It is important to consider what were its causes and what its
lessons.

Many of the former will have become apparent in the course of
this sketch of the battle and of the days preceding. They may be
summarized as, firstly, exhaustion and attrition of units; secondly,
weather; thirdly, lack of essential preparation.

The Division had been holding the line for thirteen days. Owing to
the dreadful state of the trenches and the heaviness of the German
shell-fire, constant reliefs had been necessary. From the "resting"
battalions parties totalling sometimes as much as a thousand men
a day had been furnished for work on forward areas under constant
fire from artillery of the highest calibres. Apart from the
question of the huge losses, there were no troops really fit or in a
normal state of efficiency when the day of the assault arrived. The
personal equation had been overlooked, with disastrous results. The
water-logged condition of the ground was another prominent factor.
What it was only those who have seen the Flanders plain strewn with
shell-holes, sometimes almost lip to lip, can imagine.

But it was the machine-guns in the "pill-boxes," and the excellent
fashion in which they were defended, that were by far the most fatal
obstacles. The new German methods of defence in depth depended,
in Flanders, upon the concrete structures built in and around the
foundations of the destroyed farms with which that countryside
is studded. They served their purpose admirably. Few that were
captured by us were found to have been damaged by artillery. The
British heavy artillery was firing from a salient, instead of, as at
Messines, upon a salient. It had against it a far greater weight of
German metal than in that battle, and suffered far more heavily from
counter-battery. The German artillery dominated ours in the early
stages of the battle, certainly in position, probably also in actual
gun-power. The observation of the latter was almost worthless. And
where any could be obtained it was well-nigh impossible to identify
the "pill-boxes" from map to ground. An instance given by the G.O.C.
109th Brigade, General Ricardo, is illuminating. A few days prior
to the attack he arranged with a liaison officer from the Corps
Heavy Artillery a series of three-minute bombardments of certain
strong points, with pauses between, so that it should be clear to
the observers exactly which was being shelled, to correct the many
various readings of maps and photographs. In several cases, he
states, the concentration, nominally upon one strong point, covered
many hundred yards. The same considerations applied to the cutting of
wire, not nearly so effective as at Messines, through no fault of the
gunners of the Division and of the batteries working beside them.

The "pill-boxes," which were mainly responsible for the losses of
the troops in the attack of July the 31st, were standing intact and
garrisoned on the 16th of August. The claims of counter-battery
sometimes prevented demands for re-bombardment being fully met.

"We felt," said a distinguished officer after the action, "that the
Battle of Messines was won at Zero, and that the Battle of Ypres was
lost long before it." In the vast armies of the late war the Army
Commander, and even the Corps Commander, was a shadowy personage,
not alone to the private soldier, but to the Colonel commanding a
battalion in the trenches or a brigade of artillery behind them. But
the Second Army and the IX. Corps, under the orders of which the
36th Division fought at Messines, had a subtle power of making their
presence felt. The system of liaison was practised by the Second
Army as in no other. General Harington's car stopped at every door,
and the cheerful young staff officers, who knew every communication
trench on the Army front, who drank with company commanders in their
front-line dug-outs before coming back to tea with a Brigadier, or
with General Nugent at his Headquarters, formed a very real link
between the Higher Command and the troops. The private soldier knew
the Army Commander and his eyeglass as he knew no Corps Commander
under whom he fought. His personality was a real accretion of
strength. The difficulties at Ypres were infinitely greater than at
Messines; that everyone recognised. But in the former case they did
not appear to be met with quite the precision, care, and forethought
of the latter. The private soldier felt a difference. He may have
been unfair in his estimate, but that estimate was none the less of
importance. For what the private soldier felt had a marked effect
upon what the private soldier, the only ultimate winner of battles,
accomplished.

Of the lessons the most obvious was that the barrage must be slower
and of greater depth. General Nugent, in notes written after the
battle as a comment upon captured orders of the Fourth German Army,
made some interesting suggestions in this regard. He stated in
the first case that the Germans could now no longer shell the area
over which our troops were advancing, since their own troops were
distributed in depth upon it. However much damage their barrage
did to our supports, it did little or none to the leading troops.
It was, however, more important to facilitate the advance of the
latter than to protect the rear area during an attack. If both could
not be accomplished, the artillery covering the front of assault
should be strengthened at the expense of counter-battery groups.
The creeping barrage, he suggested, might be slightly reduced to
one 18-pounder per twenty-five yards, and augmented by a sweeping
barrage, concentrated to cover about ten yards a gun, each group
sweeping right and left along the front allotted to it, with a higher
burst and greater searching effect upon shell-holes. The pace of the
creeping barrage must be reduced, and there must be more frequent
pauses. During these the sweeping barrage and a 60-pounder barrage
in front of it might sweep and search. He also made some remarks
upon the possibility of control of the barrage by the infantry, the
advantages of which are too obvious to merit discussion, and the
difficulties of which are equally apparent.

But the most interesting of General Nugent's suggestions were with
regard to the formations of the infantry. "With the adoption," he
wrote, "of a new form of German defensive tactics, consisting of
small parties dotted about a wide area, the disadvantages of long
lines of attack are that lines have small manœuvring capacity and
lack depth. It is for consideration whether mobile company columns
echeloned in depth on a narrow front, each a self-contained tactical
unit with a machine-gun and trench mortar, each operating within
an allotted zone, would not be a more suitable tactical formation
than the present system, which breaks up under machine-gun fire and
in badly shelled ground into a number of isolated groups without
cohesion or leaders."

It is to be noted that when, on September the 20th, the 9th
(Scottish) Division attacked at Frezenberg, the creeping barrage
advanced the first two hundred yards in eight minutes; then slowed to
a hundred yards in six minutes; halted on the first objective--four
to five hundred yards--no less than an hour, and went forward again
at the snail pace of a hundred yards in eight minutes. As regards the
infantry, the attack was carried out by lines of sections in file at
about twenty yards' interval. The system of "leap-frogging" was also
employed instead of special groups for "mopping up." This attack was
a complete success.[40]

[Illustration: Map III.
The Battle of Langemarck, 1917.]

FOOTNOTES:

[37] The official title of the campaign is "The Battles of Ypres,
1917"; that of the action of August 16th, in which the 36th Division
took part, "The Battle of Langemarck."

[38] The attack, after very heavy losses, was stopped by the orders
of the French Government. History will decide whether the stopping
was right or wrong. General Mangin, who commanded an Army in it,
has given his reasons for the belief that the attack should have
continued.

[39] See Map III.

[40] _History of the 9th (Scottish) Division._ By John Ewing.

CHAPTER VII

YPRES TO CAMBRAI: SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 1917

Having once more left its Artillery and Pioneers in line, under the
orders of another division, the 36th Division, after four days'
rest about Winnizeele, moved south by train. The troops detrained
at Bapaume and Miraumont, ruins now, upon the church steeples of
which some of them had looked from the Mesnil Ridge a little over a
year before. With the Division moved the 1st Battalion Royal Irish
Fusiliers. This regular battalion had joined the Division in the
Salient before the Battle of Langemarck, but had not taken part in
that dolorous affair. Its arrival was highly significant. It was a
sign of the shortage of recruits from home. The 36th Division had not
been made up to strength between Messines and Langemarck, and was now
deplorably below it.

The country into which the troops stepped from their trains was of
a like they had not yet seen in all their active service. Behind
them lay the "shelled" area; that in which they now stood was the
"devastated" area. The former was featureless to an indescribable
degree. Marks of battle there were few, save for the stumps of trees.
All the countryside, its débris and its shell-holes, was covered with
a mass of very coarse grass. There were not even ruins, for buildings
had been blown flat and their rubble carted away to help maintain
the excellent main roads with which the area was now traversed. It
was hard to discover the sites even of villages. Most people who
used the Albert-Bapaume Road will remember a wooden cross whereon was
written: "This is the site of Le Sars Church." For that statement it
was necessary to take the writer's word. There was no other evidence.

The devastated area, on the other hand, had not been fought upon.
It represented the ground evacuated by the enemy in his retreat to
the Hindenburg Line. It had, however, been cleared of civilians and
scientifically demolished to make it as difficult and comfortless as
possible for our troops. All houses had been blown up by explosives,
bridges destroyed, fruit-trees cut down or gashed to death. Yet it
was far from being as dreadful or as ugly as the battle-field. The
ground was unbroken and covered with good grass or crop run to seed.
There were still woods and copses. It was depressing, yet far less
so than the Salient. It resembled primeval prairie, and the hutments
springing up here and there might have been the encampments of bold
pioneers.

Between the 28th and 30th of August the Division relieved the 9th
(Scottish) Division in the line. The right boundary was marked by
a communication trench, "Queen Lane," on the Beaucamp-Ribécourt
Road, a thousand yards north of the former village; the left was on
the Demicourt-Graincourt Road. The frontage was very considerable,
upwards of six thousand yards in a straight line. All three Brigades
were in line, the 107th on the right, in what was known as the
Trescault sector; the 108th in the centre, in the Havrincourt sector;
and the 109th Brigade on the left, in the Hermies sector. The men of
the Scottish Division made a very good impression upon their comrades
of the 36th by working on their trenches till the moment of relief.
As the troops of the 107th Brigade filed up the long communication
trenches they saw the men of the 9th Division's South African
Brigade carrying up the last sacks of chalk from the deep dug-outs
under construction. It was a friendly gesture, typical of the good
sportmanship of this fine Division.

It was an interesting and remarkable front that was taken over by
the 36th Division. Its principal feature was the Canal du Nord,
designed to link up the Canal de la Sensée with the Canal de la
Somme at Peronne. The Canal du Nord had been about half completed
at the outbreak of war. It ran due south to the northern skirts of
Havrincourt Wood, the height from its bottom to the ground level
varying from fifteen to a hundred feet, dry where it crossed the
Bapaume-Cambrai Road, but with a few feet of water in it further
south. North of Havrincourt Wood it turned west along the Grand
Ravin, then south again, disappearing at Ruyalcourt, and reappearing
a couple of miles further on north of Etricourt. Just at the
destroyed railway bridge between Hermies and Havrincourt it formed a
barrier between British and German.

The other important feature was the Hindenburg system of trenches,
two great lines, from five hundred to two thousand yards apart, each
consisting of front and support trenches. The system constituted in
all probability the most formidable fortification constructed in the
course of the war. The Germans had sited and dug it at their ease, to
a great extent with gangs of Russian prisoners and forced civilian
labour. The trenches were wide, deep, and well revetted. The mined
dug-outs were all designed to a pattern; the stairways, supports, and
all timber used in them having been turned out by the sawmills in
replica by the thousand pieces. They represented the first successful
application of mass production to the construction of dug-outs.
The wire defences were of huge extent, generally in three or four
deep belts, at least twenty feet apart. The system had already been
pierced by our troops at Bullecourt, but on a tiny front and at vast
cost. It appeared practically impregnable.

From the village of Mœuvres the front system of the Hindenburg
Line[41] followed the western bank of the Canal du Nord for four
thousand yards, then crossed it, sweeping in a bold curve round
the village of Havrincourt and south of that of Ribécourt. It did
not, however, represent by any means the line held by the German
outposts, which were in general a thousand yards in advance of it,
and frequently in themselves stout and well-wired positions. Along
the banks of the Canal du Nord there were at intervals spoil heaps,
consisting of the chalk dug from its bed. Of these, two were of
great importance to the Division. The northern spoil heap was on the
front of the 109th Brigade, on the west bank of the Canal. Sixty
feet in height, it was strongly wired and had machine-guns mounted
on its flat top which swept our trenches. The southern spoil heap
was smaller, at the sharp bend west of Havrincourt, where the Canal
turned westward along the Grand Ravin. It was known as Yorkshire
Bank. There was a British trench on the top of it, but on its eastern
rim the Germans had established posts, rather unaccountably in view
of the aggressive character of the troops of the 9th Division. They,
too, seemed to feel that such a legacy to a relieving division was
unworthy their fame. On the night of August the 30th, before General
Nugent had taken over command of the front, a party of Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders, advancing after the German part of the spoil
heap had been shelled with gas, drove out the enemy piquets and
established posts of their own. The 9th Division, therefore, was able
to leave an honourable legacy here after all, but a peculiarly lively
one. Next evening, after General Nugent had taken over the command
and established his headquarters in Little Wood, outside the village
of Ytres, the Germans hit back. After a bombardment of Yorkshire
Bank, they drove in our posts and re-established their own. At 4-15
a.m. next morning they were re-ejected. Next night they came again,
two parties bombing their way up simultaneously from either side.
At 1 a.m. on the 2nd the 12th Rifles retook the posts, with bomb
and Lewis gun. That evening at dusk an officer visiting the posts
saw Germans looking over the edge of the bank. They were rushed
immediately and driven out, leaving a wounded prisoner. Two nights
later they tried yet again, with typical German persistence. A shower
of bombs from the top of the spoil heap drove them off, and as they
were retreating a shell from a Stokes mortar was seen to drop in the
centre of a group. One other attempt was made, to meet with like
decisive failure. It was not an important affair, though it caused
the name of Yorkshire Bank to appear in the British _communiqué_
three days running. The 36th Division had had the better of the
exchanges, but did not unduly pride itself thereon, having a manifest
advantage in position.

For the rest, the area was rolling, well watered, and fairly thickly
wooded. In the big Havrincourt Wood, which had originally covered
some four square miles, the Germans had cut down much timber and
used it on the Hindenburg trenches, besides leaving a great many
trees lying on the ground. It still contained enough, however, to
afford excellent cover. The Hindenburg System was admirably sited,
and afforded to the enemy good observation of the area held by us,
particularly from the dark mass of Bourlon Wood, crowning the height
of the hundred-metre contour north of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road. In
such country as this, however, it was impossible for the Germans to
deny to us all the good ground. From the Hermies Ridge, from trees
in Havrincourt Wood, from the very front line on the Trescault
spur, the British had admirable views of their positions. Very
tantalizing they were to men who dwelt among ruins, for the villages
on the German side were intact, save for the nearest, which had been
slightly damaged by our shell-fire. Very distinct from one point, and
little more than eight miles off, were the steeples and roofs of the
beautiful city of Cambrai.

There was a striking contrast between the trenches in the Trescault
and Havrincourt sectors, and those in the northern or Hermies sector.
The former consisted of a whole series of lines, so many trenches
that they had to be occupied and defended at intervals only, by a
system of "localities," each manned in general by a platoon. These
trenches had, in fact, been prepared in the spring for assembly with
view to an offensive which did not eventuate. In the Hermies sector,
on the contrary, there were practically no defences at all, save a
shadowy front line and some trenches round the village. This northern
sector had been held by the 27th Brigade of the 9th Division,
commanded by the celebrated Brigadier-General F. A. Maxwell, V.C.,
who was killed in the Salient shortly after his Division had moved
north. He, apparently, was not a believer in trenches, and relied
on holding his position by counter-attack from the Hermies defences
and from behind the high ridge along which ran the Hermies-Demicourt
Road. The plan did not appeal to General Nugent or to General
Ricardo, commanding the 109th Brigade, and a heavy programme of
trench-digging and wiring in the Hermies sector was at once drawn up.

Meanwhile, in the Salient, the Artillery and 16th Rifles endured a
bitter period. Indeed, it is to be doubted whether any Divisional
Artillery, since the second Battle of Ypres in 1915, had been
subjected to strain such as that which now fell to the lot of the
36th Division's gunners. They had gone into action on July the 14th,
in support of the 55th Division. They remained in action after the
36th Division had departed, and on August the 21st supported an
unsuccessful attack by the 61st Division on the same front. They were
not relieved till the night of the 23rd. And these six weeks had
represented battle conditions in their worst form, a huge expenditure
of ammunition, heavy and continuous hostile counter-battery, shelling
of wagon-lines, the scantiest of accommodation, mud and indescribable
wretchedness. A great proportion of the personnel had disappeared,
new officers were commanding sections and junior officers batteries,
when they detrained at the end of August at Bapaume. The lot of the
Pioneers was not quite so hard, but their period in the Salient was
longer. Two companies worked on the ruins of the infantry barracks
at Ypres, the remainder on screening the Menin Road, on a trench
tramway to Railway Wood, on the construction of strong points on
the Westhoek Ridge, and like tasks, till September the 30th, when
the battalion was entrained at Vlamertinghe and sent to rejoin the
Division.

The line now held by the Division was on the whole the pleasantest
it had ever known. This does not imply that the troops were allowed
to take life easily. On the contrary, the fighting arms displayed
considerable aggression, with important results. The German methods
of defence, with outposts far in front of the main Hindenburg System,
not always very strongly defended, and sometimes held at night only,
offered considerable opportunity for those little silent raids upon
isolated piquets which the Canadians had perfected, and knew by the
expressive term "winkling." The first affair was on a scale rather
bigger than this implies, parties of about sixty being engaged on
either side. The scene was Wigan Copse, north of Yorkshire Bank, and
the result the retirement of the Germans, leaving a wounded prisoner
in the hands of the 12th Rifles, who had an officer and four men
slightly wounded. That was on October the 6th. Three days later,
at dusk, the 10th Rifles cut the wire of a post on the edge of the
eastern arm of Havrincourt Wood, known as Fémy Wood, waited for the
garrison to arrive, captured its leader, a corporal, and killed the
remaining ten. On the 23rd, a party of the 11th Rifles, covering
work on our wire, made a neat capture of six men who approached
it, closing in on them from either flank, and taking them without
a shot fired. Another prisoner was captured by the 1st Royal Irish
Fusiliers, now in the 107th Brigade, when one of its saps north of
Trescault was unsuccessfully attacked by the enemy. Various other
deserters and single wanderers were also taken from time to time.
On the British side was one minor disaster. A patrol of one officer
and nine other ranks of the 1st Irish Fusiliers, examining the
results of trench mortar fire on the German wire, was ambushed by a
party of about thirty Germans. After heavy fighting, in which they
inflicted numerous casualties on the enemy, the Fusiliers were forced
to withdraw, three wounded men being captured. But the most heroic
of these little episodes was when a party of Germans approached a
sap-head held by a section of four men of the 15th Rifles, calling
out in English: "It's all right. We're coming to visit you." Deceived
by the ruse, the Riflemen's first warning was a shower of bombs,
which wounded one of them. At the same moment the Germans jumped into
the sap. The three remaining Riflemen might well have been excused
had they retreated down the sap. Instead, upon the instant, they
charged the enemy with the bayonet. The Germans ran, but the plucky
defenders laid hands upon one that they had wounded, and kept him.
The prisoner stated that his party had consisted of an officer and
eight men. And at dawn the body of that officer, dead from a bayonet
wound, was found outside the sap-head. It was in truth a gallant
exploit.

In two or three other cases our men were unsuccessful in entering
posts, finding the enemy on the alert. One raid only on a big scale
was carried out, on the trenches south of the Hermies-Havrincourt
Road and east of the Canal. At 7-30 p.m. on November the 3rd,
three parties of the 9th Irish Fusiliers, numbering in all, with
stretcher-bearers and sappers, four officers and sixty-seven other
ranks, moved out from Yorkshire Bank and passed through gaps in the
German wire. They then sent up a red flare, which brought down a
heavy barrage on all approaches. The raid would have been a complete
success had not the right party come upon some wire repaired by
the Germans since it had been reported destroyed by our artillery.
Eventually they stormed the obstacle and cut down the defenders,
but not without heavy loss to themselves. Our total casualties were
one man killed, three missing, believed killed, and one officer and
fourteen men wounded. The Germans were estimated to have had forty
killed. Had the men, for the most part newly transferred troopers of
the North Irish Horse, not been more eager to kill than to capture, a
considerable number of prisoners might have been taken.

Among other offensive methods employed must be recorded a new horror
of war, the Livens projector, which the troops of the 36th Division
now saw for the first time. It was simply a large steel drum filled
with lethal gas, under compression, fired from a short tube. Its
range was upwards of two thousand yards. Six hundred of these mortars
were dug in at the bend of the Canal, and on the night of the 14th
of September fired into Havrincourt. It was definitely established
by the evidence of prisoners captured the following month that the
losses in the village were very heavy. The battalion which held it
had to be relieved that night. In two dug-outs alone twenty men were
killed by the gas.

The artillery also was active. The ammunition allotment was high.
It was, indeed, the huge increase in the supply of 18-pounder
ammunition that had made really "quiet bits" almost unknown upon
the British front. For when the British had ammunition they fired
it off. The French, on the other hand, on a quiet front, preferred
to live quiet lives. The IV. Corps ordered that two-thirds of the
allotment should be expended at night, in harassing fire upon roads.
As most of our batteries had little flash-cover, such shooting
betrayed gun positions. Recourse was therefore had to single guns for
night-firing, pushed forward at dusk and withdrawn before dawn. Some
of these forward guns had an unpleasant reception. One was destroyed
by accurate enemy fire. The Germans, for their part, paid greater
attention to our batteries than to our trenches. Their favourite
method, which the 36th Division had experienced in Flanders, was
a deliberate "shooting-up" of a single battery, beginning with
aeroplane observation, and continued by the aid of high shrapnel
bursts, which could be "spotted," for five or six hours at the rate
of about a round a minute. These bombardments did some damage and
caused some loss to the gunners, but the latter had more than once
the satisfaction of drawing fire upon dummy or abandoned positions,
while those in use went scatheless.

Mention has already been made of the arrival of the 1st Irish
Fusiliers from the 4th Division. This battalion was, on August the
27th, posted to the 107th Brigade. To make place for it two other
battalions of that Brigade, the 8th and 9th Rifles, were amalgamated,
becoming the 8th/9th Royal Irish Rifles. It was a sad occasion, above
all for such officers and other ranks of these original battalions
as still survived with them. It meant the end, or well-nigh the end,
of a cherished tradition. The next arrivals were over three hundred
all ranks of the North Irish Horse, a regiment of which had been
dismounted. This large draft was posted to the 9th Irish Fusiliers,
thereafter officially known as the 9th (North Irish Horse) Battalion
Royal Irish Fusiliers. Then came the 7th Irish Rifles from the 16th
Division, and a regular battalion, the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles,
from the 25th Division. The 7th Battalion, of a total strength of
less than four hundred all ranks, was broken up, and its personnel
transferred to the 2nd. The latter was then posted to the 108th
Brigade, while to make place for it the 11th and 13th Rifles were
amalgamated, becoming the 11th/13th Royal Irish Rifles. In each case
surplus personnel was drafted to the remaining battalions of the
107th and 108th Brigades, which were now over strength. The 109th
Brigade, which received considerable reinforcements during the month
of September, was little below it.

The work of the 36th Division in this area almost equalled that
of Flanders. The "localities" in the front line trenches soon
resembled model fortifications, such as might have been made for
the instruction of an engineering school. Curving round the village
of Hermies, the Pioneers dug perhaps the best trench ever made in
entirety by the Division, which was christened in their honour
"Lurgan Switch." The best deep dug-outs the Division had ever
known, with thirty feet of cover, were dug in the chalk under the
instruction of the Field Companies, now no mean experts in such work.
Here, too, what were known from their shape as "champagne" dug-outs
were constructed, on a pattern invented by that artist in trench
warfare, the enemy. In these the team of a single machine-gun could
shelter from the heaviest bombardment, and bring its gun into action
in the time it took two men to run up a ladder. Behind the lines
work was equally hard. In such country as this, with not a solitary
house standing, the troops had no other accommodation than that which
they constructed for themselves. This was the land of the "Nissen"
hut, too well known even to people who never saw the Front to merit
description here. They sprang up everywhere, these ugly but useful
buildings, with their arched roofs of corrugated iron. Excellent
Divisional Headquarters were built in Ytres, to replace those in
Little Wood. Fine new Brigade Headquarters appeared in Neuville and
Bertincourt, to which the two northern Brigades moved back from
unsafe and uncomfortable headquarters further forward. Bertincourt
represented perhaps the best example of scientific work upon a ruined
village. It was parcelled out between the various units, each being
allotted its own section, on which no other might encroach. General
Ricardo offered prizes for the best designed and best kept billets.
Under the stress of this competition Bertincourt had become, when the
109th Brigade reluctantly quitted it, a model village.

So, in line and behind it, the troops were as comfortable as
conditions on any part of the British front allowed. They would
have been as happy as was possible under any conditions of active
service had it not been for the desolation about them, which bred
a feeling of loneliness. The British soldier had grown used to
being billeted in villages, or lodged in encampments within reach
of them. He missed vaguely the sights of village life, the gallant
old men and the women setting about their endless toil, the clatter
of the farm, the children who watched him falling in for parade,
and came in the afternoon to listen to the band. More definite was
the loss of the shops, the eggs to be bought from the villagers,
the warmth and comfort of the _estaminet_, where he drank his beer,
solaced himself with bacon or fried potatoes if he had gone short
of a meal, joked with the daughter of the host, or played "House"
with his friends on benches about the fire. Officers of the Provost
Staff have stated that in their experience there was almost always
less crime and unrest among troops in inhabited regions than among
those living upon the Teuton-made _veldt_. There was among the men
of the Ulster Division little crime at any time, but undoubtedly
they also were in some degree a prey to the inevitable nostalgia
born of desolation. They would have come far more completely beneath
its influence but for the efforts that were made to afford them
distraction and increase their comfort. "Peace hath her victories,"
and a comparatively peaceful life afforded as much opportunity as
battle for the Quarter-master General's Staff--"Q"--to prove its
ingenuity and resource. In this sector the work of the 36th Division
"Q" was certainly triumphant in this respect; first of all under the
direction of Colonel Comyn, for eighteen months A.A. and Q.M.G., and
then, on his transfer to the War Office, under his successor, Colonel
S. H. Green, who had worked under him as D.A.Q.M.G. It organized in
the first place daily trips to Amiens. Three lorries, one to take
twelve officers, the remaining two each twenty other ranks, left
Ytres at an early hour each morning for Achiet-le-Grand. Thence the
party went by train to Amiens, being met again by the lorries at
Achiet in the evening. The trips allowed of six hours or more being
spent in the city. Beer was provided in great quantities to replace
the supplies of the lost _estaminets_. In September the Division was
buying from brewers of Amiens no less than two railway truck-loads
of forty-five barrels a day. A soda-water factory was established on
the Canal bank at Manancourt. Soda-water, labelled "Boyne Water," a
fancy which appealed to the troops, was sold at a penny a bottle,
and various other aerated concoctions at twopence. The Divisional
Canteens, always of the greatest benefit to the troops, became then
of incalculable importance. Added to their usual "lines"--tobacco,
biscuits, chocolate, tinned foods, books, candles--were now sold in
great quantities fruit and vegetables, eggs, bread and cake, and,
when procurable, fresh fish and even oysters; while special orders
for anything required in Amiens by officers or men were taken, the
goods being procured by the following evening, and sold to the
buyer at cost price. The Division had long had a cinema, a concert
party--"The Merry Mauves"--and an excellent band. These passed up
and down the front, all units taking turns in the pleasures of their
performances. Football and boxing competitions reappeared. There
was one very exciting race meeting and horse show, with numerous
classes for transport turn-outs. For animals at least the area was a
paradise, there being unlimited grazing and great fields of clover.
Some agriculture was attempted, over a hundred acres being ploughed
and sown. A few headquarters purchased cows, and many units pigs and
chickens.

To those who cared to ponder such things, the wonders of the great,
creaking, rather clumsy machine, in which it took a thousand men
to form the tiniest cog, never ceased to appeal. The British
organization for war was assuredly by now amazingly thorough. Was
there required some new-fangled and complicated Lewis-gun-mounting
for trench warfare; a message and a tracing to some workshop behind
brought a hundred in a week. Copies innumerable of an enlarged
aeroplane photograph wanted in a hurry for a raid could be printed
off at Albert in twenty-four hours. The little press of the IV.
Corps, the Intelligence Branch of which officers of the 36th Division
will remember with gratitude, seemed to pour forth up-to-date maps.
If there was the slightest hitch about rations, it was the topic of
conversation for a week. The post-office was an unceasing marvel.
In Flanders, Divisional Headquarters had had their newspapers the
day they were published, and the rest of the troops next morning.
The letters for men in the saps reached them in two or at most three
days. A letter to Hermies would probably take longer now.

But, there was no doubt about the matter, the organization was
expensive in man-power, and man-power at that moment was a problem
that engaged G.H.Q. almost as much as did the enemy. The writer
of this book can well remember being sent, in Flanders, when the
Division was very weak, to investigate the number of men a certain
battalion had in the trenches. The "paper strength" of that battalion
was just six hundred men. It had in the line, exclusive of its
headquarters, one hundred and seven men. He went through the state
with the adjutant. That revealed, indeed, a remarkably strong
battalion headquarters, and an undue number at the transport lines,
but no other leakages which the adjutant had power to stop. There
was a number of men at Divisional Headquarters, clerks, draughtsmen,
orderlies, a cook, five attached to the Signal Company; and about
three times as many at Brigade Headquarters. The rest followed varied
avocations. Five were on traffic control, a number attached to a
Tunnelling Company. There were clerks to town majors, camp wardens,
guardians of coal, straw, and ration dumps; cooks and servants at
the Rest Camp. There were about forty on leave, and twenty sick not
evacuated.

There were also twenty at various schools. Schools were a vital
necessity; but who at this period can doubt that they were
ludicrously overdone? Every formation had its schools--G.H.Q., the
Army, the Corps, the Division, the Brigade. There were infantry
schools, artillery schools, and trench-mortar schools; machine-gun
schools, Lewis-gun schools, bombing schools, gas schools; schools
which taught horse-mastership, shoe-making, brick-laying, carpentry,
sanitation, butchery, cooking. For a weak Division, schools became a
nightmare. Divisional commanders had to protest that they had either
to man their trenches inadequately, or refuse vacancies allotted.
And vacancies refused raised a vast to-do, because they threatened
the existence of the school, and the school naturally appealed to
the formation of which it was the _protégé_. Up to the Division
headquarters this did not so largely matter. The Division may have
been inconsiderate at times, but it did know precisely how its line
was held, how strong its posts, how far separated. But above the
Division the situation was not always so quickly grasped. The Corps
was an impersonal affair, encamped, sometimes for years, upon the
same front, changing its Divisions week by week. And when a Corps
headquarters, as happened before Cambrai, resting out of the line,
sent out appeals for students to attend _its_ schools, so that they
might not be idle, the most long-suffering were inclined to protest
and to feel that, after all, for the idle, there was a certain work
which might have been accomplished somewhat further forward. The
jests of most humorists are based upon exaggeration, but there is
just a kernel of truth in them, or they are not good jests. Of such
nature is the dictum of M. André Maurois,[42] the French interpreter
who loves the British so well and pokes such clever fun at them--that
a school "is a plot of ground traversed by imitation trenches, where
officers who have never been near the line teach war-worn veterans
their business."

The swarm of writers which, under the influence of the reaction from
war, has so bitterly criticised the higher staff officers for the
waste of man-power, has been hopelessly astray in its estimation of
the reason. It was not inefficiency or carelessness. It was rather
the Englishman's passion for organization, for orderliness and
smoothness. That passion for perfecting the machine put too many cogs
and fly-wheels upon it, made it over-complicated, clumsy. Ever eager
to expand their business, these directors put into it too much of the
one form of capital which they could not afford--man-power.

In October began preparations for a great new offensive, a surprise
offensive, which was to depend entirely upon the use of tanks. The
scheme and the plans for the Battle of Cambrai must be left for
discussion till the next chapter. Here will be detailed only some of
the preliminary moves. The part of the 36th Division in the first
day's attack was to be confined to the capture of the German trenches
bounded by the Bapaume-Cambrai Road and the Canal du Nord. This was
the task of one Brigade only, and the other two were to be withdrawn
from the Trescault and Havrincourt sectors, each being replaced
by a Division. These Divisions, the 51st (Highland) and the 62nd
(West Riding), were to be kept in rear as long as possible. It fell,
therefore, to the 36th to do much of the work of preparation in
their areas; the repairing of forward roads, the excavating of new
dug-outs, the construction of bridges over trenches. The C.R.E.'s of
these Divisions, with their Pioneer battalions and some Engineers,
moved forward early in November to work under the general control of
the C.R.E., 36th Division. Havrincourt Wood was crammed with little
wooden hutments, which its trees and scrub rendered invisible to
the enemy. One of the most important tasks was the metalling of the
roads, and the dumping of metal beside them in parts where it was
impossible to lay it, in order that work might commence with the
assault. The surface of the roads was good, but only because the
Division had been holding a front so wide, which made the traffic
upon them relatively light. It was quite obvious that a single day of
traffic such as an offensive entails would cut them to pieces. It was
front-line roadmaking upon which the C.R.E., Colonel Campbell, was
required to exercise his ingenuity. Work upon tracks in Havrincourt
Wood was easy; silence was all that was necessary. But work upon what
was to be the most important communication of the IV. Corps in the
offensive, the road from Metz to Ribécourt, was of great difficulty.
In Trescault, half-way between these villages and almost in our front
line, there were, to begin with, two enormous craters blown by the
enemy before his retirement. These had to be filled in by night, and
it took chalk by the ton to do it. Road-metal also was stacked by
night almost up to the front line, and covered with camouflage before
dawn. Wooden bridges were prepared for all the trenches crossing the
roads which would be required, and most of these for British trenches
set in position. The problem of gun positions on the northern part
of the front was difficult. Cover there was none reasonably far
forward, save among the ruins of Hermies and Demicourt. Among these
the positions were prepared, and by night seven hundred rounds per
18-pounder borne up to them.

During the first sixteen days of November, the 36th Division had
also to provide parties of from two to six hundred men daily for
unloading trains at Ytres station, for the Heavy Artillery ammunition
dump at Bus, and for the Field Artillery dump in Vallulart Wood.
Trains frequently did not arrive within six hours of the advertised
time, and the men had to sit about and wait for them, frequently
half through the night--as ill a preparation for troops on the eve
of an offensive as could well be imagined. Amid much confusion
and unnecessary hardship, one officer earned the gratitude of the
infantrymen by his foresight and consideration, the Staff Captain of
the IV. Corps Heavy Artillery. He required parties up to seventy-five
men, and always at short notice. He kept three of his lorries always
standing by at his headquarters, telephoned when he wanted men,
and fetched them from Ytres, Neuville, Ruyalcourt, or Bertincourt,
as detailed by the General Staff of the Division. Better still, he
generally gave them tea before sending them home, to supplement their
haversack rations.

The weather favoured the British arrangements amazingly. It was fine,
but morning after morning dawned with a thick ground mist which
hung about all day. Foden lorries carrying stone and light steam
rollers to lay it were enabled, beneath this shelter, to work at a
proximity to the Germans that had otherwise been out of the question.
Night after night the tanks, upon which all hinged, moved up into
Havrincourt Wood. Here again the mist was a godsend, for the track of
a tank across country is plain enough on an aeroplane photograph, and
not hard to distinguish with a glass. Contrary to the general belief
of those who have not heard them on the move, the tank is not very
noisy. It was the artillery tractors, dragging up the big howitzers,
which frightened everyone by their clatter.

The relief of the 107th and 108th Brigades took place on the nights
of the 17th and 18th of November. To deceive the enemy as to the
great concentration in front of him, a screen of the troops of these
Brigades remained to hold the outpost line. These men knew only that
a raid on a large scale was intended. In the early hours of the
18th, the Germans, evidently somewhat suspicious, raided a sap held
by the 1st Irish Fusiliers behind a heavy "box" barrage, and took six
prisoners. From the evidence of German prisoners taken subsequently,
it appeared that the most the enemy gathered from the examination
of his captives was that an attempt to capture Havrincourt might be
expected. This aroused in the German command no great uneasiness. On
the 16th, the 14th Rifles had taken over the whole front of the 109th
Brigade to permit the other battalions to train for their task, This
training was carried out by General Ricardo over trenches laid out to
scale with the plough, upon a front of four thousand yards.

Accommodation was so limited that much marching and counter-marching
was necessary to provide billets for the 51st and 62nd Divisions
moving up. In its course the 108th Brigade moved back as far as
Barastre, upwards of eight miles from the front line. By the
night of the 19th, however, the eve of the attack, the infantry
was concentrated well forward. The whole of the 109th Brigade was
in assembly positions, the 108th Brigade in Vélu Wood, and the
107th Brigade in the area Ytres-Lechelle. The 16th Rifles were in
Havrincourt Wood.

These details have been here given in order that the next chapter
may proceed with the scheme of the Battle of Cambrai, without
interruption to explain the moves which preceded it. It is in itself
one of the most interesting actions in which the 36th Division took
part during its combatant career, and, at the same time, measuring
final result by the standard of early achievement, one of the most
disappointing. The material results that it produced were small, but
it opened a new era in the history of war. No adequate conception of
the victories of 1918, first of the Germans, then of the Allies, can
be reached without a close study of its lessons.

FOOTNOTES:

[41] The expression "front Hindenburg Line" was applied loosely
either to the front-line trench of the first system, or to the whole
of that system. The word "system" will be used in this and succeeding
chapters to avoid misunderstanding.

[42] Author of two classic books on the humours of war: _The Silence
of Colonel Bramble_ and _General Bramble_.

CHAPTER VIII

CAMBRAI AND AFTER (I): NOVEMBER 20TH TO 22ND, 1917

The year 1917 had drawn to its close leaving unfulfilled most of the
high hopes that had buoyed men's spirits in the opening months. Some,
at least, of the causes of their downfall were far away from the
Western Front, and beyond the control of Generals Nivelle, Pétain,
and Sir Douglas Haig. Russia, that strong-armed but weak-headed
and weak-legged giant, had collapsed, leaving Roumania to its
fate--complete overthrow. At Carporetto the Italians had been heavily
defeated by the Austro-German armies, and France and England had
been forced to send divisions to Italy to act as rallying points
of resistance. In France the Champagne offensive had left a legacy
of doubt and exasperation among soldiers as well as civilians, and
it had taken all the fostering skill and care of General Pétain
to restore his troops to the standard at which they had begun
the year. The Flanders offensive, vitally necessary, crippling
to Ludendorff, as he has admitted in his book, had been unduly
prolonged in conditions far more dreadful even than when the 36th
Division had taken part in it. Not men only but horses were drowned
in the shell-holes ere it was over, and by the time Poelcappelle and
Passchendaele had been reached the evacuation of wounded had become
all but impossible. The heights were won, indeed, on the southern
flank, though at Westroosebeke the enemy still had the best ground,
but, broadly speaking, the strategical value of the advance was _nil_.

Passchendaele, indeed, had resolved itself into a terrible
object-lesson. Here was the point to which a mechanical conception of
warfare had led us. Was there not, the keenest minds in every army
were asking, was there not some outlet? Were men to be forever at the
mercy of the munition factory and the mud of its making, the roll of
barbed wire, the slab of reinforced concrete? Was the real genius of
the soldier never to have the chance to display itself outside this
war of fortifications? Often one heard the question, academic enough,
but of extraordinary interest: "Could supreme genius, could the
greatest captain that ever lived, could Napoleon have freed his hands
from the deadlock?" The greatest soldier of this war has revealed,
in the incomparable language that is his gift, that he also had
asked himself that question, and answered it unhesitatingly in the
affirmative.[43] As affairs were now marching, it did indeed appear
as though we were reverting to the mere tactics of the battering-ram,
as though, metaphorically speaking,

"Elephants
And barbèd horses might as well prevail
As the most subtle stratagems of war."

And a way out from mechanism was found, as might have been expected,
in mechanism.

Whose the credit for the conception of the surprise tank assault,
whether General Tudor's or General Ellis's, or another's, it is not
here pertinent to speculate. The germ of the idea was inherent in the
tank itself, and must have been present, vaguely or clearly, in the
minds of all who contributed to its design and organization. Here, at
any rate, had been found an ideal testing-ground for the scheme, good
ground, obstacles which it would have, at that date, been madness to
attack in the conventional manner, the prospect of inflicting upon
the enemy a swift and signal defeat. Moreover, a blow that would
prevent the massing of more German divisions on the Italian front,
where every German division put new life and dash into at least two
Austrian, was urgently needed. The striking of the blow was entrusted
to General Byng's Third Army.

The plan was simple. The tanks were to roll out gaps in the wire
of the Hindenburg System, through which the infantry columns could
push. The aim was to overcome the enemy holding the line between
the Canal du Nord and the Canal de l'Escaut, which runs parallel
with it at a distance of from six to eight miles further east; to
secure possession of the area bounded by these Canals on east and
west, and by the marshes of the Sensée River to the north; and, as
a consequence, to clear the whole area west of the Canal du Nord of
hostile forces. It must be remembered that the German line, running
north from Havrincourt to Mœuvres, there turned west by north. Had
the British, pressing northward, reached Oisy-le-Verger and the
banks of the Sensée River, they would have been ten miles behind the
German front line at that latitude. A precipitate retreat would have
been certain, and a very large haul, if not of prisoners, at least
of material, almost equally so. Even if the advance to the north
accomplished no more than the consolidation of the high ground round
Bourlon Wood, the Germans would have to abandon the Drocourt-Quéant
Switch, a very strong position. The battle was to have three stages:
the first, a surprise infantry attack assisted by tanks and an
unregistered artillery barrage to capture the crossings of the Canal
de l'Escaut at Masnières and Marcoing, and a German trench east of
them known as the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line; the second, the advance
of the Cavalry Corps to isolate the city of Cambrai, and seize the
crossings of the Sensée River, while the troops of the IV. Corps
captured Bourlon Wood; and the third, the clearance of the area and
of Cambrai itself. The attack was to be carried out by the III.
Corps on the right and the IV. Corps on the left, with the V. Corps
in reserve. The right flank of the attack lay upon the great spur,
crowned by the Bois Lateau and the hamlet of Le Pave, running from
Gonnelieu to the Canal de l'Escaut at Crèvecœur; the left roughly
upon the Canal du Nord. There was to be a subsidiary attack to the
north upon the Hindenburg Line at Bullecourt. If one were to search
for a key-word to define the general idea of the offensive, that
key-word would probably be "exploitation." It was not intended merely
to break through the enemy's defences, to strike him a heavy blow; it
was designed to exploit a preliminary success, to clear a great tract
of country of hostile troops, to turn a flank; for, be it remembered,
the advance to the Sensée marshes would have involved not merely a
headlong retreat or wholesale capture for the German troops south of
them, but an eventual retirement of several miles at least to the
north. The Drocourt-Quéant Switch, the main Hindenburg Lines, would
be gone. Cambrai was, for the Western Front, a small battle, but
great events hung upon it.

In the previous accounts of battles it has not been necessary, for
the purpose of writing the History of the 36th Division, to do more
than glance at the progress of the Divisions fighting upon its
flanks. In this battle, on the contrary, if any adequate conception
is to be reached from the account, the plan and the action of the IV.
Corps, that is, of the two Divisions on the right of the 36th, and
the 56th Division, which was under the orders of the IV. Corps for
the greater part of the action, must be studied in some detail. The
right boundary of the IV. Corps was the Trescault-Ribécourt Road;
thence north of Noyelles. It was to attack with three Divisions, the
51st on the right, the 62nd in the centre, and the 36th on the left.
The 51st and 62nd Divisions, the left of the latter on the Canal du
Nord, were to advance north from the skirts of Havrincourt Wood. The
normal northern objective of the first day was the Bapaume-Cambrai
Road. If, however, there was little opposition, the 51st and 62nd
Divisions were to press on and take the high ground crowned by
Bourlon Wood and village, or take them over from the Cavalry if the
latter had occupied them, while the 107th and 108th Brigades of the
36th Division moved parallel with them east of the Canal, formed a
flank-guard facing west, and seized the passages of the Canal at
Mœuvres and Inchy-en-Artois. In the event of serious opposition this
later programme was to be that of the next day. The primary task of
the 36th Division was to capture the German trenches west of the
Canal du Nord and south of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road. For this it
was to employ one Brigade, the 109th, one of its Field Artillery
Brigades, the 173rd, together with the 280th Brigade and the 93rd
Army Brigade R.F.A. Its other Artillery Brigade, the 153rd, was at
the disposal of the 62nd Division, to take part in its preliminary
barrage. The plans were entrusted to General Ricardo, who worked them
out with his Artillery Group Commander, Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Simpson,
D.S.O., and had thus an almost unique opportunity for a Brigadier
on the Western Front of fighting his own battle in his own fashion.
Communication across the Canal was to be established by the erection
of a bridge on the Demicourt-Flesquières Road, to take wagons and
field guns, at the earliest possible moment. Materials for this were,
of course, prepared in advance, as were some for a minor bridge, for
infantry and pack transport, to be thrown across at a suitable point
some fifteen hundred yards further south.

A glance at the map[44] will show that the German defences west of
the Canal began at the northern spoil heap, consisted for the greater
part of their length up to the Bapaume-Cambrai Road of two main
lines, and at their greatest depth, on a frontage of fifteen hundred
yards, of three. No tanks were allotted to the 36th Division, so a
frontal attack without artillery preparation was out of the question.
It was decided, therefore, to capture the northern spoil heap, wire
in front of which had been cut over a long period by artillery and
a 6-inch trench mortar with instantaneous fuse--the latter the best
wire-cutter the 36th Division ever discovered--and work up the
trenches from south to north. It appeared that this sixty-foot pile
would enable machine and Lewis guns to cover the infantry in their
advance. On paper the task of working up these trenches, traversed
at frequent intervals by rays of wire, appeared of well-nigh
insuperable difficulty. And, indeed, no planning and no gallantry in
execution could have accomplished it had not the enemy troops been
much demoralized by the advance of the tanks behind them east of the
Canal, as it was intended they should be. The attack of the 36th
Division was, therefore, not to take place till the main attack had
drawn level with its point of departure. Zero for the former was at
6-20 a.m.; for the 36th Division at 8-35 a.m.

The attack carried out by the 109th Brigade has been officially
described as a "bombing action," and such, doubtless, to a great
extent it was. But there was no fear more constantly present with
General Nugent and General Ricardo than that of its developing into
the conventional bombing action, which progressed at snail's pace at
best, at worst reached an early deadlock, and always required bombs
by the dozen for every yard of ground gained. In this case four
thousand yards, covered by two or three parallel lines of trenches,
with numerous communication trenches at right angles to the attack,
had to be taken. And speed was essential; for, much as the attack
depended upon the advance east of the Canal, that in its turn could
have been taken in flank by machine-gunners on the west had not the
109th Brigade kept pace with it. And so the order was--no bombing
till other methods failed. At the head of the platoon columns to
move up the trenches was to be not a bomber, but a Lewis gunner. A
Lewis gun could be used by a man of large physique--and of these
the Ulster Division still possessed plenty, if not such numbers as
a year back--with a sling over the left shoulder, the gun resting
above the right hip. It was heavy and clumsy, but its tremendous
moral effect in such broad trenches as those of the Hindenburg System
can readily be imagined. It was to be the spear-head of the attack
along each line of trenches. General Ricardo had learnt the idea from
the Canadians, who had employed it at Vimy. Moreover, when it was
found possible, riflemen were to move on top, outside the trench.
The question of artillery support was not easy, since no preliminary
registration, here, or on any other part of the front of attack, was
possible. Colonel Simpson, who took up his position with General
Ricardo at a command post in the sunken Demicourt-Havrincourt Road,
just short of the British front line, planned and controlled the
artillery support in most brilliant fashion, well worthy the fame
he was winning as one of the most scientific and least conventional
junior artillery commanders in the British Army. It must not be
supposed that the part played here, or on the whole front, by
artillery was negligible, nor that the barrage was inconsiderable. On
the contrary, the artillery support for the main attack was of vast
weight. In Havrincourt Wood, along the rides, guns stood almost wheel
to wheel. But these guns had not registered. Consequently the barrage
might be expected to be somewhat ragged, and was to keep considerably
further in front of the tanks and infantry than would otherwise have
been the case. Still, a barrage does not cut wire. It was the tanks
which were to accomplish this. Had they failed, the whole scheme
would have collapsed. During the night of November the 19th, the
whole line of tanks on the front of the III. and IV. Corps moved to
a general distance of a thousand yards from the German outpost line.
The noise of their advance was covered by long bursts of machine-gun
fire.

At 6-20 a.m. the great assault was launched. The tanks went forward
behind the barrage, followed by their infantry columns. From the
first moment it was evident that the calculations of the British
staffs had been correct. The surprise was complete, showing that
the Germans had learnt nothing of importance from their prisoners.
The advance had the precision of clock-work, the infantry following
the tanks without difficulty through gaps in the most formidable
wire entanglements in the world. It was 7-15 ere observers of the
36th Division upon the ridge east of Hermies could penetrate the
mist and smother of smoke. Then they saw the tanks going forward
over the ridge north of Havrincourt, well up to the barrage and
waiting for each lift, the columns of the 62nd Division behind
them, meeting with small opposition and suffering few casualties.
It was a very impressive sight. To the Germans it must have been
appalling, this line of great engines rushing through their
magnificent defences as they had been of paper, checking an instant
to put down huge brushwood-bound bundles to enable them to cross the
wide trenches, then moving steadily and remorselessly on. Here and
there a stout-hearted officer organized momentary resistance, but
for the most part the affair was on one side a rout, on the other a
procession. German barrage there was none; only some desultory and
ineffective shelling. By eight o'clock the first objective, which
included the villages of Havrincourt and Ribécourt, and Couillet
Wood, and, of course, the front system of the Hindenburg defences,
was in our hands all along the line. In Havrincourt and its château
park fighting continued till ten o'clock or later, but it was without
importance.

Upon the first objective there was a pause to allow troops for the
next to pass through. At 8-35 a.m. the new advance began. Here
again all went well--save at one point. The 62nd Division swept
on unchecking; on the front of the III. Corps all resistance was
easily overcome. But the 51st Division had no such fortune. The
Highlanders were baffled by the village of Flesquières, perched upon
its hill-top. Field-guns, dragged from their pits on the north side
of the village, came into action as the tanks approached, firing over
open sights, at point-blank range, crumpling them up, one after the
other. The front line of the Hindenburg Support System was pierced;
but as the tanks could not cut the wire of the second line, the
infantry could not penetrate it. For the moment there was deadlock
here. We must turn to our more immediate problem, the attack of the
109th Brigade, launched simultaneously with the general advance from
the first objective.

For the assault upon the spoil heap a battery of four-inch Stokes
mortars to fire "thermit" shell, which had been used with effect
at Messines, had been procured. For four minutes these mortars and
the covering artillery bombarded its south-west side. Then the
10th Inniskillings charged home and took it. There was no serious
fighting here. The effect of the "thermit" shell was terrific
morally. The defenders ran northwards up the trenches. A number were,
however, killed by machine-gun fire, while seventy prisoners and two
machine-guns were taken. The prisoners belonged to the 20th Landwehr
Division, which had not been identified, and had come into line but
two days before. This discovery was of good augury for the attack,
since by this period of the war Landwehr troops were not of high
quality.

The necessary point of entry into the German trenches having been
won, the 10th Inniskillings pushed up them according to plan,
behind their barrage. A second doorway was forced when, directly
the barrage lifted from it, a company of the 14th Rifles, attached
to the 10th Inniskillings, entered the communication trench on the
Demicourt-Flesquières Road, fifteen hundred yards north of the first
one. The clearing of the captured trenches was carried out most
systematically. The leading platoons dropped a man at the entrance to
each deep dug-out, to be picked up by the fourth section following in
rear, which was allotted the duty of "mopping up." As each dug-out
was cleared, a notice-board was set up at entrance bearing the
significant inscription "Mopped"! When the leading platoon exhausted
its men, another moved through to the front, the first reorganizing
behind it. A single flag with the battalion colours was carried by
the leading platoon, and never displayed save at the head of the
advance. The 10th Inniskillings reached their objective just north of
the Demicourt-Flesquières Road at 9-30 a.m., or a few minutes behind
schedule time. This, however, was of no significance, since the
line now held was part of the general second objective of the whole
attack, and there was a pause upon it of twenty-five minutes. The
second objective had been reached upon the whole front, save only at
Flesquières.

Meanwhile, the 9th Inniskillings, responsible for the next phase
of the attack after the 10th had captured Hill 90, had moved in.
Those only who have seen the Hindenburg trenches can realize how
comparatively easy it was to pass one body of troops through
another in them. In ordinary trenches such methods would have
resulted in hopeless congestion. Here all went smoothly owing to
the great breadth of the trenches. The 9th Inniskillings had one
platoon moving along the bed of the Canal, here dry. Craters on
the Demicourt-Graincourt Road, defended by machine-guns, caused
trouble, but the right companies pushed on, and gradually the
situation cleared. The 11th Inniskillings, for the final stage of
the attack, had now moved in. This battalion met with somewhat
stronger resistance. On the right some determined German bombers
held up the advance for a while, the Lewis gunner not being able to
see them. Here, as was generally the case, the Germans with their
stick bombs outranged our men with the Mills, but the Mills rifle
grenade more than restored the balance, and the Germans were driven
steadily back. This company of the 11th Inniskillings was also able
to give material assistance to the men of the 186th Brigade, across
the Canal, by its Lewis-gun fire. Lock 6 was the last centre of
strong resistance. Eventually the garrison fled across the Canal,
though few of them reached the other side. About half-past three
the Inniskillings crossed the Cambrai-Bapaume Road, and were soon
afterward consolidating their position, with their outpost three or
four hundred yards north of it. The bridge across the Canal here,
it may be added, had been blown up hours earlier. It had never been
doubted by the British that the enemy had prepared it for demolition.

On the left of the 109th Brigade the 56th Division now prolonged the
line along the Bapaume-Cambrai Road. On its right the 62nd Division,
working up the Hindenburg Support System and over open country, had
met with complete success. Graincourt had been reached and taken at
1-30, and the long communication trench north of the Bapaume-Cambrai
Road was consolidated at the same time as the final objective of the
36th. On the III. Corps front Noyelles had been reached. But the
failure of the 51st Division to capture Flesquières constituted a
serious menace to the whole scheme of the attack. It would have been
greater had the village been strongly held by the Germans, for then
the troops of the 62nd Division could never have advanced past it
as they did. The fact seems to be that it was the supreme gallantry
of one German officer, aided by the merest handful of men, that
withstood the attack. The attack was renewed with fresh tanks during
the afternoon without success, that one heroic officer, it is said,
firing his last gun with deadly effect with his own hands upon the
tanks, the wreckage of which, horribly twisted and maimed, strewed
the steep slope at nightfall. A patrol of King Edward's Horse,
attached to the 62nd Division, had early in the afternoon ridden into
the village from the north-west, and reported it clear as far as the
Marcoing Road. An attack from this direction by quite a small force
would probably have overcome what opposition there was.

The fact that Flesquières remained untaken caused some alteration
in the employment of the cavalry. The 1st Cavalry Division was to
have been passed through Marcoing, but at 4-30 p.m. the 2nd Cavalry
Brigade was ordered instead to occupy Cantaing, which should have
been already captured had all proceeded according to plan. But the
village was strongly held and the cavalrymen were beaten off. The
Brigade therefore remained that night in Noyelles. Just before dusk a
company of the 186th Brigade[45] and two squadrons of King Edward's
Horse made an attack upon Anneux, but were unsuccessful, owing to
wire about the village and machine-gun fire from within it.

At 1-30 the 107th and 108th Brigades moved forward, the former to
the northern slope of the Grand Ravin about Square Copse, the latter
to Yorkshire Bank and the old British trenches south of it. It had
now begun to rain heavily, and these troops, particularly those of
the 107th Brigade, which were without any shelter, were drenched to
the skin. At 8 o'clock the 107th Brigade was ordered across into
Havrincourt and the trenches and dug-outs about it. The men were
not finally settled with an opportunity for rest till 3 a.m. the
following morning. The 10th Inniskillings of the 109th Brigade,
which had carried out the first stages of its attack, was moved
across the Canal to Kangaroo Alley, south of and parallel with the
Bapaume-Cambrai Road. Patrols pushed forward on the west side by the
11th Inniskillings got within five hundred yards of the southern
outskirts of Mœuvres, where they encountered resistance enough to
compel them to withdraw. There is no reason, however, to suppose
that Mœuvres was at this time strongly held, or that a determined
attack would have failed to take it. The progress east of the Canal
did not appear to warrant such an attack. The Engineers meanwhile
had progressed excellently with their bridge-making. By 4 p.m. their
bridge for infantry and pack transport, about a thousand yards north
of the Hermies-Havrincourt railway line, was available. Half an hour
later a still more important task had been accomplished; the existing
causeway on the Demicourt-Flesquières Road having been repaired to
enable field-guns and wagons to cross. The 36th Division would have
been glad to have had at this stage its Pioneer Battalion to work
upon its own roads, now being churned up by heavy traffic, but it
was employed upon a similar task between Havrincourt and Ribécourt.
The Signal Service, admirably organized by Major Vigers, who on this
occasion excelled, if that were possible, his successes at Messines,
had opened up telephone communication, utilising the Canal bed to lay
its wires. So good was this that it was a matter of no difficulty to
speak from Divisional Headquarters, which still remained at Ytres, to
Lock 6, just south of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road.

When dusk came down to bring operations to a halt, the situation
was as follows. The 36th Division held a general line five hundred
yards north of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road, in touch with the 56th on
its left. East of the Canal the 62nd Division held the trench north
of the road and the factory. Thence their line curved down just west
of Anneux, with a long flank running east of Graincourt to the west
of Flesquières. The line of the III. Corps ran well to the north of
Noyelles. This left, as will be seen from the line roughly marked
on the map, an extraordinary little German salient, in the midst of
which there were still apparently German guns in action in Orival
Wood.

During the night there was great movement of guns. Most of the
heavy artillery of the IV. Corps, since it was difficult to move it
through Havrincourt, and would have been harder to feed it, took up
positions about Hermies and Demicourt, with the heaviest pieces back
at Doignies. Here it could easily be served with ammunition, and
here it proved invaluable in the days that were to come. The 153rd
Brigade had a very long march. After covering the advance of the 62nd
Division from Havrincourt Wood, the guns were withdrawn at midnight
and moved, _via_ Ruyalcourt, Hermies, and Demicourt, to positions
in the old "No Man's Land," east of the last-named village. The
batteries of the 173rd Brigade also moved to this neighbourhood, to
be prepared to cover a further advance. The bad, narrow roads were,
as may readily be imagined, in a state of much congestion. Batteries
of the 153rd Brigade were not in action till 7-30 a.m. on the 21st.

In the course of the day's fighting the IV. Corps had taken over two
thousand prisoners, of which the share of the 109th Brigade was five
hundred and nine. The latter had also taken a great deal of booty,
particularly at Lock 6, which had been used as a general store-house
for the forward area.

So ended the first day's fighting. The cavalry action on a grand
scale had been a complete failure. Whatever chances of success it
may have had were extinguished by the failure to take Flesquières.
For the rest, all had gone according to plan. The Bourlon Ridge had
not, it is true, been taken. That, however, was really, except in the
case of unexpectedly sweeping good fortune, to be the second day's
objective. Hopes still stood high.

At dawn on the 21st the German salient was eaten up in a flash.
The 51st Division, advancing through Flesquières, swept up to the
Graincourt-Marcoing Road, upon which it was established by 11 a.m.
A number of guns in Orival Wood were captured. Cantaing, too, fell,
after stiff fighting, before the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, assisted
by battalions of the 51st Division. Late in the afternoon the
Highlanders, who made tremendous efforts to atone for the failure
of the previous day, stormed Fontaine-Notre-Dame, on the road from
Bapaume to Cambrai, a mere two and a half miles from the latter city.
The right flank of the 62nd Division also did well. Anneux was taken,
and, after heavy fighting, Anneux Chapel, on the skirts of Bourlon
Wood. But the attack on Bourlon Wood was a failure. The troops went
round the western slopes in gallant fashion, but were woefully
thinned out by machine-gun fire and unable to hold their ground. They
advanced, however, to the south-west corner.

West of the Canal the attack was pushed forward by the 109th
Brigade, with the 9th Inniskillings, who reached the point where
the Hindenburg trenches swung west, a thousand yards north of the
Bapaume-Cambrai Road. Here the battalion was held up by heavy
machine-gun fire from Lock 5 and east of the Canal. At noon the
14th Rifles and 10th Inniskillings resumed the attack. In face of
steadily-increasing opposition they penetrated to the outskirts
of Mœuvres, but could not maintain their position under withering
machine-gun fire from the village and the Hindenburg trenches west of
it. The day's advance was one of less than a thousand yards, after
considerably heavier casualties than those of the 20th.

The ground won appeared considerable on paper, but the day had
not been successful. The advance had fallen very far short of the
programme. It had been intended that the 62nd and 51st Divisions
should reach Bourlon, while the 1st Cavalry Division followed
through and seized the Canal crossings from Sains-lez-Marquion
northward. The two reserve brigades of the 36th Division were to
have pressed up on the east side of the Canal, and held its line
from Mœuvres to Sains-lez-Marquion. All this had gone by the board.
The 40th Division from the V. Corps had moved forward to the area
Beaumetz-Doignies-Boursies, to be ready to take over Bourlon Wood
when captured, and resume the advance. It did not come into action
that day any more than the 107th and 108th Brigades.

The orders for the 22nd were for the 51st and 62nd Divisions to
improve and consolidate their positions, while the 36th and 56th
gained ground on their left. The 109th Brigade had now shot its bolt,
having accomplished its task with every credit. In the early hours of
the morning the 108th moved up to relieve it, and by 7 a.m. the 12th
Rifles had taken over its advanced positions, the 9th Irish Fusiliers
being closed up behind the leading battalion in the trenches about
the Bapaume-Cambrai Road. The relieved Brigade withdrew to the old
British trenches about Hermies.

East of the Canal the _rôle_ of the 107th Brigade was to clear the
first and second lines of the Hindenburg Support System up to the
Canal, while the 108th took Mœuvres. This task was allotted to the
15th Rifles. A second battalion, the 10th Rifles, was then to pass
through and continue the attack along what was known as the Canal
du Nord Line to Lock 4, opposite Inchy. General Withycombe moved up
to a German dug-out west of Graincourt. Eight guns of the 107th
Machine-Gun Company were to assist in covering these attacks east of
the Canal. The general rate of the barrage was to be fifty yards in
five minutes east of the Canal, and fifty yards in seven and a half
minutes west of it. The attack was further to be supported by four
Siege and one Heavy Battery, and one 9.2-inch howitzer. It was to be
launched at 11 a.m.

It was anticipated by the enemy. At 9-20 he counter-attacked upon the
front of the 51st and 62nd Divisions. The latter lost no ground on
its right, but its extreme left flank fell back for a short time on
to the Bapaume-Cambrai Road, subsequently reoccupying its position.
Worse fortune met the British further east, where the 51st Division
lost Fontaine. During the counter-attack there occurred one very
remarkable incident. A battery of machine-guns of the 36th Division
was in action in the open, pushed forward much too far, half-way
between Lock 5 and the factory on the Bapaume-Cambrai Road, when
it was attacked at close quarters by a company of the enemy. The
officer and section sergeant were killed and the guns surrounded. Two
guns of another battery were brought into action by Major Miller,
the Divisional Machine-Gun Officer, at little over a hundred yards'
range. The effect was withering, the Germans melting away before the
fire, saving themselves by jumping into trenches or crouching in
shell-holes. When quiet had supervened, a machine-gun officer counted
forty-two dead Germans about the recaptured position.

The attack of the 36th Division was launched at 11 a.m., after a
forty minutes' bombardment. On the right the leading company of the
15th Rifles reached its objective, gaining upwards of five hundred
yards of the Hindenburg trenches. The companies which passed through
it had a more difficult task. The trenches of the second line were
here but half dug, and this, seeing that the attack was working
up along them, was to the advantage of the defenders. The Germans
established a block above a length of trench about a foot deep, and
beat off every attempt by machine-gun fire. At dusk the 10th Rifles
made an attempt to rush the machine-guns, but could not get near
them, losing six officers in trying to do so.

West of the Canal things went better at the opening. The 12th
Rifles attacked Mœuvres with three companies in line. The two on
the left penetrated the village, but the right company was held
up by machine-guns in the Hindenburg Support System. On the left,
troops of the 56th Division, bombing up the Hindenburg Front System,
captured Tadpole Copse. Colonel Goodwin, commanding the 12th Rifles,
now handled his battalion with great skill. He ordered his right
company to bomb its way up the trench leading from the sunken
Mœuvres-Graincourt Road to the Hindenburg Support System, while the
other companies exploited their semi-success in the village. The
right company did succeed in reaching the front trench of the Support
System, and in clearing it, but the second line was full of Germans
and could never be reached. Meanwhile the centre and western side of
the village had been cleared, many Germans being killed in dug-outs
and cellars. Pushing on through the village, the Riflemen took the
trench on the western edge, fringing the cemetery, and began to
consolidate it. Then came the counter-attack.

At 4 p.m. the enemy was seen assembling in great force in Hobart
Street, half-way between Mœuvres and Inchy, and in the Hindenburg
Support System north-west of the former village. Messages were sent
back for support and for an artillery barrage. Both were procured,
the former in the shape of a company of the 9th Irish Fusiliers,
but, unfortunately, neither of them in time. The counter-attack,
launched just before dusk, appeared to be made by two battalions,
one working parallel with the Hindenburg Support System and one down
the Canal, in several waves. The company in the trench east of the
cemetery was forced to withdraw to avoid being surrounded. Our men
fell back from position to position, in orderly fashion, taking toll
of the enemy with their Lewis guns. There was no trace of fluster,
still less of panic. It took the Germans, in fact, an hour and forty
minutes from the launching of their attack to drive the 12th Rifles
to the southern outskirts of the village. It was a piece of evil
fortune after a fine achievement in village fighting. It must be
remembered that there was a heavy German barrage south of Mœuvres and
machine-gun fire from either flank, which delayed the supports of the
9th Irish Fusiliers.

The action once again demonstrated the disadvantages inherent in
attacks on narrow fronts. The Hindenburg trenches west of Mœuvres,
on higher ground, overlooked the village and permitted intense
machine-gun fire to be concentrated upon it. They were outside the
area of operations. In the same way, from the Hindenburg trenches
east of the Canal, heavy machine-gun fire was kept up on the village
and its approaches. This ground also was, for practical purposes,
outside the area of operations, since it could not be taken without
artillery preparation or tanks. There had been no artillery
preparation, and no tanks were available.

The close of this rather unsatisfactory day may fittingly mark
the end of a chapter. After wonderful initial success the action
had not continued as planned. Little has been said of the extreme
right flank because space does not permit. Nor does it in any way
concern the 36th Division. But here also, though Masnières, across
the Canal de l'Escaut, had been taken, the great cavalry "drive"
had been a failure. Henceforth the battle was to be fought in other
circumstances. Fresh German troops were up now, and resistance all
along the line was fierce. Every yard of ground had to be won by hard
fighting. The idea of exploitation to the Sensée River must have
faded from the mind of the Commander of the Third Army. Indeed, he
permitted a Division intended for that purpose, the 40th, to relieve
the 62nd, now very weary. But much had been won. It was of the
highest importance now to take the Bourlon Ridge. While it remained
in German hands all our positions were overlooked, and could have
been made in time almost untenable. In our hands, on the contrary,
it would have been a veritable thorn in the side of the Germans, and
would soon have compelled an important retirement to the north, if
neither so swift nor so great as that which would have been involved
by our reaching Oisy-le-Verger.

A new phase was opening, of powerful forces on either side battling
fiercely for position. And the crown of battle, looming up above the
combatants, was the great circular mass of the Bois de Bourlon.

FOOTNOTES:

[43] Aux moments sombres de la guerre, nous nous sommes souvent
demandés: "Si Napoléon sortait de son tombeau aux Invalides, que nous
dirait-il, que ferait-il de nos armées actuelles?"

Il nous aurait dit: "Vous avez des millions d'hommes; je ne les
ai jamais eus. Vous avez les chemins-de-fer, le télégraphe, la
télégraphie sans fil, les avions, l'artillerie à longue portée, les
gazs asphyxiants; je n'avais rien de tout cela. Et vous n'en tirez
point parti? Vous allez voir!"

Et, dans un mois ou deux, il aurait tout renversé, réorganisé, mis en
œuvre de quelque façon nouvelle, et culbuté l'ennemi désorienté.

MARSHAL FOCH: _The Times_ (Napoleon Supplement),
Thursday, May 5th, 1921.

[44] Map IV.

[45] 62nd Division.

CHAPTER IX

CAMBRAI AND AFTER (II): NOVEMBER 23RD TO DECEMBER 31ST, 1917

The conditions under which the attack was continued were difficult
in the extreme. From the 23rd of November onward the enemy artillery
fire increased enormously, while the ground appeared to be powdered
with machine-guns skilfully and tenaciously fought. The troops of the
36th Division were weary. Even such battalions as had not already
been in action were suffering from the long exposure to bad weather.
And the weather was worsening. Hitherto it had been wet, but, for
November, not cold, though the nights were trying enough for troops
in fighting kit and with small shelter. Now it began to appear as
though the rain would turn to snow. The most formidable difficulty
of all was that of communications. The light railways, of which
so much had been hoped, were useful certainly, but had not come
up to expectation. The roads were bad beyond expression. The main
communication of the 36th Division was the Hermies-Graincourt Road.
Over the greater part of its length it was sunken, as were those
from Hermies to Demicourt, and from Demicourt to Graincourt. Being
sunken, it was impossible to widen these mere country lanes, nor was
there anything approaching a sufficiency of metal to sustain the huge
volume of traffic upon them. On the Hermies-Graincourt Road there
were frequent serious blocks in the traffic during the early days,
when a limber broke a pole or a cooker lost a wheel. Eventually the
road itself ceased to be used at all, traffic proceeding on either
side of the banks, and chalk being hastily tumbled into the holes
which it speedily made.

The plans of the IV. Corps for November the 23rd were ambitious
enough, yet more modest than those of the preceding day. On the right
the 51st Division was to retake Fontaine, and secure the high ground
east of Bourlon Wood. The 40th Division, which had relieved the 62nd,
was to take Bourlon village. The 36th and 56th Divisions were to
advance up the Canal and roll up the Hindenburg Support System. Tanks
were to assist the attack of the 36th Division for the first time
during the operations.

The advance of the 36th Division was again to bestride the Canal du
Nord. The 107th Brigade was to attack on the east side, the 108th
Brigade on the west. The former was to be supported by the 93rd
Army Field Artillery Brigade and a Siege Battery; the latter by the
Division's own Artillery Brigades. The sixteen tanks available were
allotted to the 107th Brigade. General Withycombe held a conference
of commanding officers and officers of the Tank Battalion at his
headquarters near Graincourt. The attack was to have two phases:
the first, the capture of the Hindenburg trenches: up to the Canal,
of Round Trench and Lock 5; the second, an advance northward to
Hobart Street from the Canal to the north corner of Quarry Wood,
the northern and eastern skirts of which were to be held. To the
first phase eleven tanks were allotted; to the second five, with any
survivors of the first. An hour and a half was considered sufficient
for the carrying through of the first phase; after which there was to
be an hour's pause before the opening of the second.

West of the Canal the capture of Mœuvres was to coincide with the
first phase. The second was to be the capture of the trench running
westward from Lock 4 to the Hindenburg Support System. Zero for the
first phase was fixed at 10-30 a.m., the earliest moment possible,
seeing that General Withycombe had not been able to issue his orders
till 8-30, owing to the difficulty in collecting the tank officers.
One company commander in the 107th Brigade has informed the writer
that he had less than fifteen minutes to assemble his men and explain
the attack to his officers.

The task of the 15th Rifles was the rolling up of the Hindenburg
Support System to the Canal, and on the success of that battalion the
whole scheme of the 107th Brigade depended. It was nothing less than
a calamity that of the two tanks that should have led the troops, one
broke down, while the other turned off to the right and left them. As
they went forward they met overwhelming machine-gun fire. One company
made an advance of some hundred yards, while one of its platoons
most gallantly rushed an enemy crater-post in the road running north
from the factory. But the company was inadequately supported, being
neither reinforced nor supplied with ammunition and rifle grenades,
and, far from being able to improve its position, had eventually to
abandon some of the ground won. The 8th Rifles, assisted by a tank,
captured and consolidated Round Trench, also Lock 5, where a few
prisoners were taken. A frontal attack upon the Hindenburg System was
here out of the question, and these minor successes represented all
the ground gained. It is doubtful whether more than two tanks out
of the eleven ever crossed the Hindenburg Support System, the rest
having either broken down or been put out of action by the German
artillery fire, now very heavy. Without them, advance was all but
impossible. It was the more unfortunate since the 40th Division had
made a very fine attack and captured Bourlon, while the 51st again
took Fontaine. Repeated and heavy counter-attacks drove the 40th
from Bourlon, but the Germans could never penetrate the wood. The
51st were also driven out of Fontaine, and the line of the 40th was
represented by a very dangerous salient.

In the attack on Mœuvres, the 12th Rifles, with the 9th Irish
Fusiliers on the right, made small progress till the fresher 2nd
Rifles was thrown in to support them. Stubborn village fighting
lasted all day. By dusk three-quarters of the village had been
cleared, and four machine-guns captured by the 2nd Rifles. But while
the Hindenburg trenches either side of the village remained untaken,
consolidation was impossible. At dusk the troops were withdrawn to
the southern houses. Before the next dawn the 108th Brigade was
relieved by the 109th.

That day's fighting represented the last attack made by the 36th
Division. The 107th Brigade was to have made on the morrow another
attempt to advance, and would doubtless this time have captured
at least the Hindenburg Support System, since it was to have had
the co-operation of practically all the IV. Corps Heavy Artillery.
The day began, however, with a violent German assault on Bourlon
Wood, which drove the troops of the 40th Division back to a general
line about half-way through it. The artillery was in consequence
switched right to put down a barrage against this attack, and later
to support the highly successful counter-attack of the 40th Division
and some dismounted cavalry squadrons, which more than restored the
original line. The attack of the 107th Brigade, without the necessary
artillery assistance, could have achieved no more than that of the
previous day. Colonel Clements, commanding the 1st Irish Fusiliers,
took the responsibility of ordering his men not to advance, in which
he was entirely justified. During the counter-attack, a body of sixty
Germans which essayed to advance down the Hindenburg Line was almost
annihilated by the fire of machine-guns and the Lewis guns of the
15th Rifles. A machine-gun was captured here by this battalion. West
of the Canal, Germans debouching from Inchy, apparently to launch a
counter-attack here also, were dispersed by artillery fire.

In the afternoon Bourlon village was taken once more. The IV. Corps
had cancelled the attack, owing to the shortage of tanks. But
communication between the 40th Division and its 121st Brigade having
broken down, the latter attacked and took Bourlon with the twelve
tanks at its disposal. On the front of the Guards' Division, which
had relieved the 51st the previous night, there was no fighting of
importance.

The 25th was an eventless day for the troops of the 36th Division,
but for heavy shelling, particularly of its batteries. On the right
the Germans again attacked Bourlon, as it was inevitable they should,
while they had a battalion to go forward or artillery to cover its
advance. After hard fighting they retook it, but could not penetrate
the wood, which was in fact now almost impassable, owing to the haze
of the gas with which it had been drenched among the trees. The 40th
Division had suffered heavy casualties, and was relieved at night by
the 62nd. On the following night the 36th Division was to have taken
over a wider front, extending its line to within a thousand yards
of the western edge of Bourlon Wood. The 107th Brigade had suffered
appreciable casualties and its troops were jaded, so the 108th
Brigade was to relieve it. At the last moment, however, these orders
were cancelled. The Commander of the IV. Corps decided to relieve the
36th Division by the 2nd, which had been put at his disposal, and
ordered that the relief should take place that night. The Artillery,
Engineers, and Pioneers were to remain at the disposal of the 2nd
Division. The machine-guns were to be relieved twenty-four hours
later.

The night of November the 26th will remain an unpleasant memory
to the survivors of the troops who were then relieved. The snow
had come now, and swept almost horizontally before a wind that
rose at times to tempestuous force. The relief took a very long
time. When it was over, and the men staggered through the blizzard
to the very indifferent havens that were to be their lodgings
for the night--Beaumetz for the 108th Brigade, Doignies for the
109th, Hermies and the trenches about it for the 107th--they found
this shelter, such as it was, packed with odd units. Doignies, in
particular, had scarce a corner, being full of details of another
Division. The besetting sin of the British Army, the accumulation
of what might almost be described as camp followers, was on such
occasions as these a curse. A good many men spent what was left of
the night in the open, in the snow.

The following day the Division, less Artillery, Engineers, and
Pioneers, moved to the area Barastre-Rocquigny-Beaulencourt, where
the men had at least some comfort and the chance to sleep. A day
was spent here in the usual tasks of cleaning, refitting, and
reorganization.

The Division, to which the 121st Field Company had now been returned,
was transferred on November the 29th from the IV. to the XVII.
Corps, which was holding the line east of Arras. It was to move to
the area round Fosseux by tactical trains from Ytres and Bapaume,
the transport moving by road, staging on the night of the 29th at
Gomiecourt, Achiet-le-Petit, and Courcelles-le-Comte, ruined villages
of the Somme area, in which some shelter for men and animals had been
constructed. An agreeable prospect was held out by Staff Officers of
the XVII. Corps of some weeks at least out of the line. How far it
was realized will shortly appear. For the explanation we must turn
once more to the line at Cambrai.

The IV. Corps made another attempt upon Bourlon, the morning after
the relief of the 36th Division. Aided by tanks the 62nd Division
captured half the village, but could not hold it against powerful
German counter-attacks. It clung still, however, to the eastern
houses and to the wood. Three battalions of the Guards' Division
penetrated Fontaine, but were unsupported and had to be withdrawn at
dusk. The resources of the Third Army permitted no further attack. On
the evening of the 29th the IV. Corps relieved the Guards' Division
by the 59th and the 62nd by the 47th. It had thus in line on the 30th
three comparatively fresh Divisions.

On the morning of the 30th was launched the great German
counter-offensive. It is called counter-offensive advisedly. It was,
in effect, the greatest attack made by German forces on the Western
Front since Verdun had died down, more than eighteen months before.
Counter-attacks on a large scale had been expected, and preparation
made to meet them, but this was something far more serious. It was
a deliberately prepared attempt, supported by a great weight of
artillery, to apply pincers north and south to the large salient
formed by our recent advance. Its effect was curious, since on the
south it was completely successful, while on the north it gained
scarce a yard.

Of the northern blow the weight fell mainly from Bourlon Wood
westward, upon the 47th, the 2nd, and 56th Divisions. The resistance
of these, one an "Old Army" Division, the others London Territorials,
stands high among the achievements of the British Army in the war.
Here and there a section of trench was lost, a portion of a line
slightly withdrawn, a position temporarily abandoned, but, broadly
speaking, the great assault, launched in eight or ten successive
waves, followed by columns in artillery formation, preceded by a
whirlwind bombardment of all calibres, with gas and smoke, was
a total failure. Repeated attacks throughout the day met a like
fate. And not since the early days of the war had our artillery and
machine-guns seen such targets. The fact that the IV. Corps Heavy
Artillery had not been moved into the German lines, but was about
Doignies and Demicourt, was now of incalculable value. It took the
advancing host in enfilade. The field artillery likewise did enormous
execution. The Left Group covering the 2nd Division consisted of the
153rd and 173rd Brigades, under the command of Colonel Simpson, who
was with the Infantry Brigadier in the old headquarters in "Scotch
Street." The 153rd Brigade alone fired ten thousand rounds that day.
Many large parties of the enemy were caught in the open by its fire.
Enemy batteries were seen following up the attack, unlimbering and
coming into action. Several sections of 18-pounders and 4.5 howitzers
of the 173rd Brigade were run up on to the crest of the Demicourt
Ridge, whence they annihilated these batteries with direct fire. Ere
nightfall a situation which had had critical moments was restored.

But, as all the world knows, no such rebuff met the southern arm
of the pincer. Here the Germans broke through the British lines;
Masnières, defended by a brigade of the 29th Division, held out, but
to the extreme south of the original advance the front collapsed.
La Vacquerie was retaken by the enemy. Further south he bit deeply
even into our old line, taking Villers-Guislain, Gonnelieu, and
Gouzeaucourt, all of which had been ours before November the 20th,
and the last-named of which had then been over two thousand yards
from our front line. The prisoners captured by the enemy ran into
many thousands, and the guns into hundreds. It was a woeful affair,
of which the main causes were the lack of an organized defence in
depth, and that of training in junior officers and men.

It is pleasanter to turn to the very fine counter-attack by troops
of the Guards' Division, fortunately out of the line and still in
the neighbourhood. It was made at mid-day, and drove the Germans
headlong through Gouzeaucourt and a thousand yards east of it.
Further attempts were made that night and the following day to
retake Gonnelieu and La Vacquerie, but without success. The enemy
maintained his foothold in these villages and upon the edge of the
Welsh Ridge. How far precisely the German advance progressed it is
not easy to determine. It is certain at least that it was far east
of Gouzeaucourt, and that the main communication of the IV. Corps,
the Trescault-Metz Road, was seriously threatened at a time when that
Corps' own troops were maintaining their positions. That calamity was
averted by the action of the Guards' Division.[46]

It was at mid-day, while staffs were reconnoitring camps in the
neighbourhood of Arras, that news reached the 36th Division of the
break-through. Accompanying the news came orders that it should
instantly retrace its steps. There was no time now to provide
trains upon the congested railways. The troops were to march back
through the devastated area, Brigade Groups staging the night at
Achiet-le-Petit, Courcelles, and Gomiecourt. They were on the move by
half-past two that afternoon, cyclists having been sent out to meet
the transport and turn it back. The following night saw the Division
in the area Lechelle-Bancourt-Rocquigny. The men were very fatigued
after ten days of what was practically open warfare, followed by
marching and counter-marching. As for the transport horses, they too
were feeling the strain of dragging heavy loads over atrocious roads,
and had in many cases not been unhitched before their heads were
turned south again. Moreover, the accommodation for men and animals
in the Lechelle area was of the scantiest.

At 4 a.m. on the morning of the 23rd, the III. Corps informed the
36th Division that the latter had been placed at its disposal from
noon on the following day. Officers from the 108th Brigade were
ordered to reconnoitre the area then held by the 88th Brigade of the
29th Division, and from the 109th Brigade part of the area held by
troops of the 61st Division on its right. Later in the day, after the
reconnaissance had been carried out and invaluable lives lost in its
course, these orders were modified. The Germans made a fresh attack
at Gonnelieu. For a time the situation on the VII. Corps front was
highly critical, but the attack died down after the enemy had made
a certain advance. The 108th Brigade was put at the disposal of the
61st Division, and ordered to send up a battalion to hold an old
British trench near Beaucamp. Later in the afternoon the whole of the
Brigade was moved up to the neighbourhood of this village.

On December the 4th the 107th and 109th Brigades moved up from
Lechelle and Bertincourt, halting in Havrincourt Wood for dinners
_en route_. The 107th Brigade was disposed in old British trenches
between Beaucamp and Villers-Plouich, the 109th in the old German
front line north of the former, where it was in reserve to the 6th
Division. The two Field Companies left behind, and the Pioneers,
rejoined the Division, moving to a camp near Dessart Wood.
Headquarters of the Division were established in an infantry camp at
Sorel-le-Grand. That night the 108th Brigade relieved the 88th in
the line, in the Couillet Valley. The next night the 109th Brigade
followed, taking over the important plateau known as Welsh Ridge from
the 182nd Brigade of the 61st Division.

On this night G.H.Q. carried out a grave but inevitable decision.
The success of the German attack on the southern face of the
Bourlon-Noyelles-Masnières Salient had made that salient so narrow
in proportion to its depth that its maintenance would be a constant
source of attrition. A considerable portion of the ground here,
including Bourlon Wood, Cantaing, Noyelles, Graincourt, and Marcoing,
was evacuated, all dug-outs within the area being systematically
destroyed. This withdrawal was to have an effect upon the relief to
be carried out by the 36th Division.

The new line, of which General Nugent assumed command on the relief
of the 182nd Brigade, was curious and somewhat indeterminate as to
exact position. It represented an acute salient, of which the nose
pointed due east. Behind this ran, from south-west to north-east,
the deep, densely-wooded Couillet Valley. At the south-west end was
the ruined village of Villers-Plouich, at the north-east the little
damaged village of Marcoing, captured by the British in the Cambrai
battle, but now again in German hands. On either side of the Couillet
Valley were the two ridges destined to become famous, Welsh Ridge
on the south-east, and Highland Ridge on the north-west. Across
these, at right angles to the Couillet Valley, ran the two Hindenburg
Systems, which on Welsh Ridge drew to within two hundred yards of
each other, forming a single system of defence. That fact proved how
highly the men who had sited those trenches rated the importance
of Welsh Ridge. To the British at this moment it was well-nigh as
valuable as it had been to the enemy.

It will be remembered that the evacuation of Marcoing had taken
place on the night of the 4th. There was still some uncertainty
as to the position of the British outpost line. There was more
before the relief was complete. The 9th Inniskillings of the 109th
Brigade sent its No. 3 Company in advance up on to the Welsh Ridge
in the afternoon. This company arrived in the midst of a tremendous
bombardment, amid which the bursts of captured English 18-pounder
high explosive were only too apparent to the experienced eye. It
was greeted by the unpleasant news that the Germans were bombing
up the Hindenburg Support Systems, had already made considerable
headway, and that the troops awaiting relief, demoralized by utter
weariness and exposure, and by the bombardment which had reduced
them to a handful, were at that moment retreating only too fast.
The company, as was natural in such a bombardment, was spread out
with very long intervals between the platoons. The leading platoon
was at once pushed along the front line. It had few bombs and no
artillery support, so had to rely upon rifle fire. But it stopped
the German advance. Three times the enemy pressed up the trench,
and thrice was driven back. Moreover, on the report that the enemy
was advancing also up the second line, two sections, perhaps ten
men, were despatched to the assistance of the troops in that trench.
Here likewise the German bombers were checked. The remainder of the
battalion moved up, and the whole line was taken over. The night
passed fairly quietly.

The heroism of this action is not to be measured by ordinary
standards, since the men were in a state of fatigue and depression
when it started. It was surpassed on the morrow, when the
9th Inniskillings, assisted by a platoon of the 14th Rifles,
counter-attacked to restore the ground won by the enemy before their
arrival. They were enabled to carry this out by the action of the
Brigade transport officer, Lieutenant Vaughan, who had brought up,
in the course of the night, by the road through Villers-Plouich,
officially reported impracticable for any transport, fourteen
limber-loads of ammunition, grenades, and Stokes mortar bombs. The
attack was at first successful, winning back most of the lost ground
and capturing nine prisoners, but the Inniskillings followed the
retiring enemy too far, and parties of Germans, pushing down a sunken
road which had been overlooked, cut off and captured the leading men,
as well as a section of the 109th Machine-Gun Company, and drove
the attack back to its starting point. Of what followed, a graphic
account is given by Captain (then Lieutenant) Densmore Walker, of the
109th Machine-Gun Company, who had heard that his guns had been lost
and had come forward with the company commander to investigate.

"We went up the main front Hindenburg Line. This really was a filthy
place. Corpses were touching, laid along the fire-step, all men of
the 61st Division. I expect the _strafe_ of the afternoon previous
accounted for a great many.... On and on we went and then cut to
the left, where we found an officer called Emerson, of the 9th
Inniskillings. Emerson said we couldn't get further as the Hun was
thirty yards away bombing down the trench. Poor fellow, he thought
his whole company was wiped out, and he had been hit on the head by
a bomb. There was a hole in the top of his tin hat.... He was right
about the Huns. Moore said we were still one hundred and fifty yards
from the machine-gun positions. Some stick bombs fell around us,
several on top of the parapet and one or two in front of us in the
trench. We had about six men slowly falling back--they had no bombs.
One was hit while I was there. I took a squint over the top and saw
the Huns throwing many bombs. They had a light machine-gun in case we
attacked over the open. We threw our few bombs, and that stopped them
for a few minutes. When we stopped throwing they came on again. They
can throw their stick bombs further than a Mills can be chucked by a
normal man. We went on retreating quite slowly. We could have stopped
them all right with bombs. Mulholland[47] ran off to get some, and
finally some reinforcements of the 14th Rifles came up and held the
cross trench, the Hindenburg Line. Here we could easily hold the
Boche as we were right across his front. As there was nothing to do
here, we decided to try to get to the machine-gun positions from the
left flank, the right being effectually closed to us. Just as we were
pushing off, Emerson gathered some men together, got out on top, and
chased the Huns back up the trenches. It was uphill."

This heroic young officer, who had led his company in the original
attack that morning and captured four hundred yards of trench, had,
as Captain Walker remarks, been severely wounded in the head. For
three hours he had rallied the remnants of his company to withstand
the German bombers. He had made a previous attack over the open and
captured six prisoners. On this last occasion of which Captain Walker
speaks, having driven back the Germans at least a hundred yards, he
fell, mortally wounded. He was awarded the posthumous honour of the
Victoria Cross.

It may be added that Major Mulholland and Captain Walker, working
their way round to the left flank, found two of their gun teams
intact, though two men had been killed and thirteen captured by the
enemy. The guns had been posted where no machine-guns should ever
have been, in an outpost line very lightly held by isolated infantry
sections, owing to the previous troops not having realized exactly
how the land lay. The men had taken over their positions in the
dark, no reconnaissance having been possible, not realizing whither
they were being led by their guides, and had suffered the inevitable
consequences when the German bombers attacked them. A Vickers
machine-gun in a crooked trench is an indifferent weapon with which
to repel an attack along that trench.

It was found necessary to relieve the 9th Inniskillings after
twenty-four hours, so heavily had the battalion suffered. It had
lost all four company commanders. The 11th took its place. Stokes
mortars and rifle grenades had now been brought up, and at 6 a.m. on
the 7th the new battalion made a very fine bombing attack, clearing
three hundred yards of trenches on a front of two hundred yards,
straightening out the line, and driving the Germans off the crest
of Welsh Ridge. It avoided the mistake of the 9th in going too far.
Two local counter-attacks upon the Inniskillings, within four hours
of their establishing themselves upon their objectives, were beaten
off. The trenches were blocked and Stokes mortars put in position to
cover the obstructions. Germans massing for a further assault were
dispersed by a concentration of artillery. The achievement of the
109th Brigade, when the condition of its troops and the state of the
trenches are taken into consideration, must be held to rank high
among the exploits of its career. Weary and sorely tried handfuls
of men had made a most stout-hearted resistance to well-organized
and determined attacks, and the bombing counter-offensives had been
carried out with a dash that fresher troops could not have excelled.
Welsh Ridge had been denied to the enemy.

The position was even slightly improved by the 107th Brigade, which
took over the sector on the night of the 8th, and won some further
ground in the first Hindenburg Line the following morning. The 107th
Brigade also constructed new blocks. This work was carried out by
the permanent Brigade Works Party, under the command of Lieutenant
Haigh, who had earned the _sobriquet_ of "Sandbags" by many similar
achievements. The defence, an affair of makeshift at first, was now
thoroughly organized, with machine-gun batteries linked by telephone
to the Brigade Headquarters in Couillet Wood and on Highland Ridge.

On the front of the 108th Brigade there were fewer alarums and
excursions. In the Couillet Valley its troops had even room for
movement, the Germans contenting themselves with the establishment
of posts in the sunken roads leading from Marcoing. Two prisoners
were captured by the 2nd Rifles, and one by the 9th Irish Fusiliers.
One post on the higher ground, at the very nose of the salient, was
driven in by the enemy, but promptly re-established. One of the
German prisoners reported that an attack was to be launched at dawn
on the 14th. All troops and reserves "stood to," and an hour before
dawn a great bombardment was opened by all the artillery on the III.
Corps front. If attack were contemplated it did not develop. Until
two days before its final relief the Division's front was covered by
the 17th Artillery Brigade of the 6th Division, and three Army Field
Artillery Brigades, under the command of General Brock. On the 14th
the personnel of its own Artillery came in, taking over the guns _in
situ_ of two of these Brigades.

Welsh Ridge was safe now from anything but a "full dress" attack.
But that was precisely what appeared to be coming. The Germans were
plainly in aggressive mood. Their aeroplanes swept continually
down upon our front-line trenches, firing upon the men in them.
Areas in rear, about Metz especially, were bombed night and day.
Their artillery was very active. Havrincourt Wood was rendered
uninhabitable by its constant shelling. And it was increasingly plain
that the infantry and machine-gunners of the 36th Division were in no
fit state to withstand a new offensive in force.

Never since it landed in France had the troops of the 36th Division
been reduced to a physical ebb so low. The men became indescribably
dirty; lungs, throats, and hearts were affected. High as were battle
casualties, the sick wastage was higher still, which had not been the
case even at Ypres in August, because then the weather, if wet, was
warm. The troops had, in fact, been exposed to three weeks of winter
in the open, with almost continuous fighting, while it is doubtful if
those of the 36th Division had fully recovered from the effects of
the Ypres episode, three months earlier. The great captains of old
times, who decided that long spells of open warfare in winter were
impossible, were not fools. Man born of woman cannot withstand for
long that combined strain and exposure without appalling physical and
moral deterioration. Morally the infantry had survived far better
than the authority which left them in line had right to expect. The
men kept surprisingly good hearts. Walking round these much-harassed
outposts one was still greeted with a grin when one inquired how many
"pine-apples" had come over in the last twenty-four hours from the
German blocks a little further down the trenches. But physically they
were wrecks. They were living on their nerves.

A strong report as to the condition of the troops, sent up through
the chain of the medical services, added weight to General Nugent's
representations, which, realizing the embarrassments of the Higher
Command, he had not made till they were absolutely necessary. Relief
came at last. On the night of the 14th it began, the 189th Brigade
of the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division relieving the 107th Brigade on
the right. Two battalions of this latter Brigade had been exchanged
with two of the 108th, which had endured a continuous spell in
the line, though not in its worst portion. The following night
it also was relieved. Ere they came out, the 9th Irish Fusiliers
bombed an enemy machine-gun post, killing one man, driving off the
others, and bringing in the gun. This parting fling was, in all the
circumstances, it will be admitted, a _beau geste_.

Rest had come at last, but it had to be won after a last battle with
the elements. The Division was to concentrate in the area round the
delightful little village of Lucheux, near Doullens. It was now
that there swept over Northern France--indeed over much of Northern
Europe--a blizzard of snow that may almost be called historic.
Dismounted personnel moved by train, and reached its destinations
after long delays. Most of the lorries allotted to formations were,
however, "snowed up," and did not arrive for two or three days. The
transport struggled through in face of extraordinary difficulties.
The snow banked itself up on the hedgeless roads. In those which
were sunken it lay frequently six feet and more in depth. Units were
obliged to march miles out of their courses, bringing the vehicles
through drifts in relays with double teams, trace horses being sent
back for a second batch when the first was upon firmer ground. Some
of the country tracks off the Doullens-Arras Road simply could not
be found. One staging area had been allotted to two Divisions at
once. The mounted personnel of the Signal Company, turned out by
newcomers, marched fifty miles in these conditions.

Finally all troops reached their quarters and settled down, the
chief work being the clearance of the roads and the making of tracks
past the most formidable drifts where this was impracticable. By
Christmas the men were in fair comfort, and, good cheer being easily
procurable, a pleasant enough Christmas was celebrated. The troops
had reason to congratulate themselves when they learned the fate
they had narrowly missed. On December the 30th the Germans launched
a heavy attack upon Welsh Ridge, and drove the 63rd Division off a
great part of it.

General Ricardo returned at this time to England. The strain of the
Battle of Cambrai and the counter-offensive had told severely upon
his health. Except for a few weeks when he commanded another Brigade,
he had been with the 36th Division from the beginning, had indeed,
as has been elsewhere recorded, assisted at its birth. His brilliant
powers of organization and his concentration upon the whole aspect of
any problem presented to him, made him an ideal Brigadier in what has
been described as a war of material. He was succeeded by his friend
and brother-officer of the Inniskilling Fusiliers, Brigadier-General
W. F. Hessey, D.S.O. General Hessey also had been one of the original
commanding officers of the 109th Brigade, and had come to France with
the 11th Inniskillings, leaving that battalion to command a brigade
before the opening of the Somme battle. General Ricardo's organizing
abilities were not lost to the British Army. He ended the war as
Commandant of the large base of Dieppe.

The lessons of the Battle of Cambrai are clear enough, though some
of its aspects will remain mysterious till all the secrets of the
war are revealed. The piercing of the Hindenburg fortifications
was to a certain extent a gamble, since no such operation had yet
been attempted in such manner. The very fact that its surprise was
complete was perhaps the most remarkable feat of all. It was a
triumphant success, though it must be remembered that the Germans
were ill equipped with either armour-piercing ammunition or anti-tank
guns to oppose it. But, if the break-through was wonderfully
achieved, the ensuing exploitation was not. The resistance of
Flesquières and a broken bridge at Masnières checked the cavalry in
its eastward thrust, but, after all, the Canal de l'Escaut was won,
and exploitation east of it, including the capture of Cambrai, was
of less importance than the northern advance to the Sensée marshes.
"Cambrai," the writer heard a distinguished soldier say, "was either
a surprise or it was not. It opened as a surprise, but it was not
continued as a surprise should be." It appears probable to-day that
had two fresh Divisions been passed through after the troops had
reached their objectives--disregarding Flesquières, which actually
did very little harm--they could have been firmly consolidated on the
Bourlon Ridge by next morning, and possibly reached the outskirts of
Cambrai. Mœuvres likewise would probably not have been a hard nut
for the teeth of one of the reserve Brigades of the 36th Division
that afternoon. As it was, these troops on that first day sat in the
rain and were not employed. The supreme difficulty, which was not
surmounted, was the passing through of new formations in a fresh
state. This difficulty was due to the scanty accommodation in the
forward area, which could not be largely augmented without robbing
the attack of one of its most essential features--surprise. It was
probably this cause which kept the Divisions in the V. Corps so far
back. This question of accommodation was as important as any tactical
problem. There was no rest for troops in reserve; they were scarcely
better off than those in the fighting. The organization of billeting
during reliefs broke down. No provision was made for surplus
personnel of incoming Divisions. As a result, each area became
congested with their details, and other Divisions, when allotted such
areas, found no accommodation left. Another great difficulty was the
lack of tolerable roads. The work done upon the roads before and
during the battle was insufficient to preserve them, but it had the
effect of wearying the front-line troops. The preliminary work, the
exposure, cold, dirt, lack of rest and hot food, told very speedily
upon the health of the infantry engaged, and diminished its fighting
value.

The tanks were magnificent. They accomplished all that their
commanders had promised. But their employment after the first
day caused a tremendous strain upon their teams, which, when not
fighting, were greasing and "tuning up." It is possible--though this
is pure speculation--that the number used on November the 20th might
have been reduced by a third, which would have left a really large
reserve for subsequent operations. As it was, many tanks in the later
stages of the battle broke down before reaching their starting line.

And once more, in conclusion, we must pay our meed of praise to
the German machine-gunner. Machine-gun battalions were reported by
airmen to have detrained at Cambrai on the evening of the 20th. If
so, these picked troops were doubtless in action all along the front
the following day. It was machine-gun fire alone that delayed the
British advance till fresh troops were on the ground to bring it to
a halt. Of the German machine-gunners General Nugent wrote: "It is
not too much to say that the failure of our offensive to achieve the
objectives laid down, was entirely due to the devotion and fighting
spirit of these troops of the enemy, practically unsupported by their
own infantry and artillery, during the first forty-eight hours."

This fact proved, if proof were needed, that no troops, however
devoted, could, without mechanical assistance, face machine-guns
being handled by really determined defenders.

[Illustration: Map IV
The Battle of Cambrai, 1917.]

FOOTNOTES:

[46] On the return of the 36th Division to the Cambrai area, the
writer was informed that there was a dead German in Dessart Wood.
The wood being ten thousand yards from the German line before the
counter-attack, he found this hard to credit, and rode over to see.
He could find no German. There were, however, undoubtedly some in
Gouzeaucourt Wood, half-way between Metz and Gouzeaucourt.

[47] O.C. 109th Machine-Gun Company.

CHAPTER X

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE ON THE SOMME (I): JANUARY TO MARCH 22ND, 1918

Snowbound as they were, the troops of the 36th Division passed
several days in the most agreeable conditions. One day there might
be snow-fall; the next might succeed with keen frost, but there was
no lack of timber for fuel, and the amenities of civilization were
very welcome to men who for five months had dwelt amid devastation.
Training was practically impossible owing to the depth of the snow in
the fields, but some musketry was carried out on a good rifle-range
near Lucheux. The Artillery, having been relieved by that of the
63rd Division on Christmas Day, got no further than the Beaulencourt
staging area, where it remained hemmed in by drifts.

The rest was, as usual, all too short, particularly in view of the
exhausted condition of the troops. Immediately after Christmas the
Division was again on the move, to the area Corbie-Boves-Moreuil.
Brigade groups went by rail, the transport by road, staging at
Puchevillers and Contay. The latter met with difficulties equal to
those following the relief. Many lorries were stuck in drifts. In
some cases the trains even were considerably delayed.

The British Army was extending its flank, taking over from the French
a front far greater than it had ever held, even at the time of the
German retirement of 1917, when its right had been on the Amiens-St.
Quentin Road. This is not the place to discuss the wisdom of that
extension, or supposing, as few will deny, that it was in itself
reasonable, of its magnitude. Suffice it to say that Sir Douglas
Haig now found himself seriously short of reserves. The relief of
successive French divisions was being slowly effected, and the
progress of the 36th Division was leisurely. It remained five days at
rest in the Corbie area, where it was joined by its Artillery. Then
it went slowly forward, _via_ Harbonnières, to the area of Nesle, a
town left undamaged by the Germans in their retirement, into which
they had herded civilians, old men, women, and children, from other
towns and villages destroyed by them. Here Divisional Headquarters
were established on January the 12th. That night the 107th Brigade
relieved a regiment of the 6th French Infantry Division astride the
Somme before St. Quentin, remaining under the orders of the French
Divisional Commander. The night following the 109th Brigade relieved
the other French regiment in line, command passing to General Nugent
at 10 a.m. on the 14th, when Headquarters took over from those of
the 6th French Division at Ollézy. The 108th Brigade was billeted in
villages on the Ham-St. Quentin Road, with headquarters at Dury. The
Divisional Artillery had been joined by the 14th Army Field Artillery
Brigade. The relief of the French artillery was not complete till the
15th.

Reliefs of French by British formations always presented great
difficulties, owing to the fact that reserves of munitions of every
sort had to be transferred, instead of being simply handed over as
when Briton relieved Briton. Differences of language and of method
were scarcely less important. Yet it often happened that reliefs on
such occasions were the most satisfactory of all. Each side was on
its mettle. Staff work was meticulously careful, reconnaissances
were thorough, guides of proved intelligence chosen. This case was
no exception. There is hardly a diary of the formations and units
of the 36th Division in which is not expressed high appreciation of
the arrangements made by the French, and of the kindness with which
advance parties were treated by them. One officer writes of his own
reception by a French regimental commander: "The most amazing dinner
I ever did have in the line! We had course after course of wonderful
things, with suitable wines, till it was hard to think that the Huns
could be only a thousand yards distant, but that was all they were."
And not the officers only were entertained, for his men informed him
that "the _poilus_ made them eat the whole time and absolutely bathed
them in coffee."

The front taken over ran from Sphinx Wood, some twelve hundred
yards west of the village of Itancourt, to a point on the St.
Quentin-Roisel Railway a thousand yards west of Rocourt Station.
Rocourt is a suburb of the city of St. Quentin, at the gates of
which the British Armies now sat. The position and its defences
will have to be described later in some detail. Here it need only
be said that the latter were already considerable, but that, the
relief taking place in the midst of a thaw following upon weeks of
snow and frost, the 36th Division succeeded to a legacy of fallen-in
trenches and mud. For the rest, it was on the whole a quiet front and
not uncomfortable. The destruction of the villages behind our lines
did not appear to be as complete as before Cambrai. A few French
civilians had trickled back to villages such as Ollézy and Douchy,
while the town of Ham, where were the Headquarters of the XVIII.
Corps, was intact and was full of them.

The Germans, who had excellent observation, were, of course, quickly
aware of the relief, and evidently received orders to obtain
identifications of the new troops in front of them. After several
fruitless attempts they succeeded in obtaining them. On the night
of January the 22nd they entered our outpost line on the front of
both Brigades, capturing in each case a wounded prisoner. A small
patrol of the 10th Rifles was also waylaid by superior numbers, and
an officer and sergeant taken. This appeared to content them, and
thereafter, for a considerable time, the front became of a placidity
such as the troops of the 36th Division had seldom known.

For the moment--a fleeting moment, indeed--the enemy had second place
in the minds of officers and men of the Division. Its first concern
was with its reorganization. The shortage of man-power had been
talked of long enough. Its fruits had now to be plucked, and bitter
they were. The whole British Army was now cutting down its divisions
to nine infantry battalions, and its brigades to three. From the
tactical point of view, apart from the fact that it entailed a loss
of some hundred and seventy-five battalions, the change had serious
inconveniences. The brigade of four battalions was the traditional
British formation, just as the regiment of three was the Continental.
It was the formation which British commanders had handled in training
and practice, upon which their conceptions of infantry in war were
based. The moral loss was no less great, particularly in divisions
and brigades with strong territorial associations and sentiment.
It meant that battalions in every division disappeared, and that
either their personnel was transferred to others, or that they became
"Entrenching Battalions," pitiful, nameless ghosts, robbed of their
pride and their traditions. Such changes could not be without their
effect upon moral, working through the loss of _esprit-de-corps_, the
very life's blood of a combatant unit.

[Illustration: VICTORIA CROSSES OF THE 36^{th} (Ulster)
DIVISION--1917 and 1918.

The late 2/Lt. E. DE WIND
15^{th} Royal Irish Rifles.

The late Corp. E. SEAMAN
2^{nd} Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.

2/Lt. C. L. KNOX
Royal Engineers.

Pte. N. HARVEY
1^{st} Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.]

The 36th Division, it will be remembered, had already received two
regular battalions, the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles and the 1st Royal
Irish Fusiliers. It was now joined by three more, the 1st and 2nd
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, from the 29th and 32nd Divisions
respectively, and the 1st Royal Irish Rifles, from the 8th Division.
To make place for them, the 10th and 11th Inniskillings, the 8th/9th,
10th, and 11th/13th Rifles had to disappear. Three Entrenching
Battalions, the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd, were formed from the disbanded
battalions after the remainder, including the newcomers, had been
brought up to strength. The 2nd Rifles in the 108th Brigade, and the
1st Irish Fusiliers in the 107th, were exchanged. The infantry of the
Division was now as follows:

107TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

1st Royal Irish Rifles.
2nd Royal Irish Rifles.
15th Royal Irish Rifles.

108TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

12th Royal Irish Rifles.
1st Royal Irish Fusiliers.
9th Royal Irish Fusiliers.

109TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
9th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.

The new arrivals were all regular battalions of Ulster regiments, but
the characteristics of the Ulster Division were entirely changed. Its
infantry, formed originally from the U.V.F., had now Ulster-Scot and
Celt intermingled, and received English recruits as well.

At the same time the 16th Rifles (Pioneers) was reduced, with other
Pioneer battalions in France, to three companies. One accretion of
strength the Division received, as some small compensation. The 266th
Machine-Gun Company arrived from England on January the 18th, and was
formed, with the three existing Machine-Gun Companies, into the 36th
Machine-Gun Battalion. The tendency had been for the machine-guns
of a Division to come more and more directly under the control of
the Divisional Commander during active operations. A Divisional
Machine-Gun Officer had long been employed, but he was rather an
_attaché_ to the staff than a commander. Under the new system there
was a lieutenant-colonel commanding the battalion who received his
orders from the staff of the Division.

On February the 22nd the 30th Division, hitherto the reserve of the
XVIII. Corps, was interposed between the 36th and 61st, taking over
the front held by the 36th Division north of the Somme, in the
Forward System. In the second position, or Battle Zone, the 36th
Division continued to be responsible for a sector north of the Somme,
behind the village of Fontaine-les-Clercs.[48] The frontage was thus
reduced to about six thousand yards. The relief of French troops by
British had meanwhile extended further south, and the 36th Division
had on its right the 14th Division of the III. Corps.

The Battle of Cambrai had been the last fling of the Allies for the
time being. They were now definitely upon the defensive, awaiting a
great attack in some uncertainty as to the precise point at which it
should be launched. The victories of the Central Powers upon other
fronts, above all the collapse of Russia, had freed German troops
which, if not for the most part of high quality, would be able to
man defences while attack was delivered elsewhere by the superior
troops they relieved. Not a week passed without the announcement of
the arrival of new divisions from Russia or Italy. Between November
the 1st, 1917, and March the 20th, 1918, the number of German
divisions in the Western theatre had increased from one hundred and
forty-six to one hundred and ninety-two.[49] The total continued to
grow for some time after the launching of the offensive. The heavy
artillery had also been greatly increased, while a number of Austrian
artillery regiments had come to the aid of their allies. The forces
of the Allies were now considerably outnumbered, though not nearly
to the extent which many writers, then and since, have pretended.
Moreover, they were without unity of command, and there was among
them divided opinion as to the point at which they would have to meet
the onslaught, though Sir Henry Wilson had insisted that it would be
at the junction of British and French. There had been preparations
for an advance in Flanders. The French had apprehensions of one in
Champagne. On both these fronts there came, indeed, great attacks
at subsequent dates. Even if the attack were to come, as seemed
most probable, on the front of General Gough's Fifth and General
Byng's Third Armies, its exact scope was uncertain. The final opinion
appeared to be that, while the opening assault would extend further
south, the main weight of the attack would be north of the Somme,
along which would be formed a defensive flank. There is little doubt,
from the writings of German staff officers since published, that such
was the original intention, and that only unexpectedly great success
south of the Somme induced Ludendorff to modify it. It appears also
that the Crown Prince, in whose Group of Armies were the forces in
the left of the German advance, urged him to adhere to his first plan
even after the battle had been several days in progress.

Lord Haig in his Despatches has revealed that, not being able to hold
all his extended front in adequate strength, having to take risks
somewhere, he took them on the front of the Fifth Army, where there
was most elbow-room, and where loss of ground was likely to have
least serious effects. It had become more and more apparent that
defence in depth offered the best means of checking and breaking up
an advance, and it had been laid down by G.H.Q. that all preparations
must be based upon that system. Unfortunately, with the slender
forces at the disposal of General Gough, defence in adequate depth
implied a very shadowy defence in breadth.

The system of defence of divisions in line comprised a Forward
Zone and a Battle Zone. The object of the former was to withstand
a minor attack, and to check and, so far as might be, disorganize
and disintegrate a major one. On the Battle Zone the Army Commander
was to oppose the enemy's advance with all the forces at his
disposal. The Forward Zone comprised a front and intermediate system;
the former consisting of outpost line, line of resistance, and
counter-attack companies; the latter of a system of isolated forts,
wired all round, known as the Line of Redoubts. The Battle Zone
likewise consisted of two main lines of defence, organized internally
with counter-attack units and wired-in redoubts. The description
of these defences may sound formidable till it is explained that
there was but one battalion for the defence of each of them to two
thousand yards on the front of the 36th Division, and even less
density further south. There were likewise Rear Zone defences,
notably behind the Canal de St. Quentin and Canal de la Somme. Here
it may be added that confusion has been caused in the minds of many
by the fashion in which the names "Somme River," "Somme Canal," "St.
Quentin Canal," and "Crozat Canal" have been used by various writers
in their descriptions of the battle; because the canalized Somme,
giving birth to different canals at different parts of its course,
was also the main obstacle in two successive lines of defence. The
Somme runs south-west from St. Quentin to St. Simon, west for nine
miles to Voyennes, then more or less due north to Peronne. Over the
first of these three sections it is canalized under the name of the
Canal de St. Quentin; over the second two, under that of the Canal de
la Somme. Where confusion is apt to arise is in the fact that at St.
Simon the Canal de St. Quentin leaves its parent river and runs down
to the Oise at Terguier. In the account that follows, the river, a
winding, branching stream, will be disregarded, and the Canals, which
formed the real obstacles, alluded to always as the Canal de St.
Quentin and Canal de la Somme.[50]

The front held by the 36th Division was in its natural features not
ill adapted for defence. It was crossed by a series of ridges and
valleys running east and west, parallel to the front line. Behind
the front-line system, which was on the same ridge as the German
outposts and on its reverse slope, was a deep valley known as Grugies
Valley, from Grugies to the St. Quentin-La Fère Road, north of
Urvillers, thence curving northward into "No Man's Land," towards
Neuville-St. Amand. Grugies Valley had therefore its advantages and
its dangers. On the one hand it afforded good masked positions for
machine-guns; on the other, it was a conduit, from the north-eastern
end of which attack might flow down behind the line of resistance
of the Forward Zone. Behind it was another ridge, upon which was the
Line of Redoubts. Behind this again the ground sloped away gradually,
rising to a slighter ridge, along which ran the Essigny-Contescourt
Road. Upon the forward and reverse slopes of this last ridge were
the positions of the two southern sectors of the Battle Zone, four
thousand five hundred yards behind the front line. The northern
sector, as has been explained, was north of the St. Quentin Canal.
These positions were good, but they had one great failing. The front
line of the 36th Division ran roughly from west to east to Sphinx
Wood, while thence the line of the 14th Division ran more nearly
north and south. The right flank was therefore very insecure. Should
Urvillers fall, the right of the 36th Division's Forward System would
undoubtedly crumple, while should such a calamity as the capture of
Essigny occur, the defences of the Battle Zone would be turned.

The night of February the 22nd, which saw the entry into line of the
30th Division, saw also a reorganization of the system of defence.
All three Brigades now entered the line, the 108th on the right,
107th in the centre, and 109th on the left. Each had one battalion
in the Forward Zone, one as garrison for the Battle Zone, and one in
reserve. In each case the Forward Zone battalion had two companies
in the line of resistance, finding their own outposts, one company
for counter-attack in the front system, and one "passive resistance"
company, with battalion headquarters, in a large fort in the Line of
Redoubts. This unfortunate description implied that the last-named
company was not allowed to counter-attack to retake ground lost in
the front system. The Battle Zone battalions were billeted close
to their battle stations, that of the 108th Brigade in dug-outs at
Essigny Station, along the railway cutting, of the 107th Brigade in
quarries near Grand Séraucourt, and of the 109th at Le Hamel, on
the other side of the St. Quentin Canal. The artillery was disposed
in two groups covering the Forward Zone, with one of the three
Brigades, the 153rd, in reserve as supporting brigade. On February
the 28th, when XVIII. Corps announced a "state of preparation," the
batteries of this brigade took up positions south-east of Grand
Séraucourt to cover the Battle Zone, with a section per battery
pushed forward to temporary positions covering the Line of Redoubts.

Upon these positions a vast amount of work had to be accomplished, an
amount so vast that it permitted of very scanty time being allotted
for training. The Battle Zone had practically to be created. The
lines had been merely sited by the French, and a little wire put up.
Work was concentrated first of all upon this; secondly, upon the
fortresses which were to contain battalion headquarters and "the
passive resistance" company in the Line of Redoubts--known, from
right to left, as "Jeanne d'Arc," "Racecourse," and "Boadicea"; and
lastly, upon making good the main communication trenches, and making
wired-in platoon keeps in the Forward Zone. There was shortage of
wire in February and the early part of March, and bad indeed would
have been the state of the defences but for the large dumps left
behind by the French, for which the countryside was scoured. As it
was, no-one in the 36th Division can be said to have been satisfied
with the state of the Battle Zone by mid-March. Most of the trenches
were no more than eighteen inches deep, it having been ruled that
there would be time to dig them out when it became necessary to
occupy them.

Uncanny work it was awaiting, in the silence of quietest of quiet
lines, a mighty attack of which for very long there was scarce
an indication. In the earlier days, save for reports from higher
formations of aerodromes, hospitals, and railways far behind the
German lines, the sole warning sign was in the large numbers of
officers, maps in hand, observing day by day the British trenches
and the country behind them. There was no great increase of movement
on forward roads till about the 12th of March. Aeroplane photographs
taken about this date showed that a large number of shell-holes a few
hundred yards from the outpost line had been worked upon. It was
surmised that these were being prepared for trench mortars, for the
destruction of the British front-line system, as that of the Russians
had been destroyed before the last great German advance at Riga.
Significant also, in this connection, was the fact that Oskar von
Hutier, who had carried out that attack, was now in line opposite, in
command of Eighteenth Army. His known character and antecedents were
food for reflection.

New military roads were also discovered behind Itancourt. But it was
a few clear mornings and evenings, from the 15th of March onwards,
that brought most conclusive evidence of what was impending. From the
dovecote in Essigny, the best observation post on the XVIII. Corps
front, which was manned by the 36th Division's excellent observers,
an enormous amount of traffic could now be observed. Along the main
road from Guise-Mont d'Origny to St. Quentin, in particular, huge
convoys of lorries and horse transport were seen, as dusk drew
in, moving towards the last-named city. Small place for doubt now
remained.

On March the 4th occurred a curious incident. The Germans had
apparently come to the conclusion that the British front line had
been abandoned; and, indeed, it was held lightly enough by isolated
sections. Strong patrols, amounting in general to a platoon, suddenly
issued from the German trenches all along the 36th Division's front,
in broad daylight. The outposts might be weak, but they could resist
an attempt of this sort. Under the fire of Lewis guns all the patrols
were stopped and dispersed with heavy loss. Patrols sent out in turn
from the outpost companies captured in all one officer and ten other
ranks. It was a sharp lesson, and thereafter, till the opening of the
attack, was no move by the German infantry.

From March the 12th onward was instituted a series of nightly
bombardments, in which the now considerable heavy artillery at the
disposal of the XVIII. Corps took part, of valleys and dead ground
forming probable assembly positions. Tests of the action to follow
the preconcerted Corps message, "Man Battle Stations," were carried
out. Bridges had long been prepared for demolition and allotted to
particular sections of the Field Companies. Small mine-fields had
been constructed in case of the employment of tanks by the enemy.
Grugies Valley was starred with machine-guns, to sweep its length
with zones of flanking fire. It was felt by officers and men of the
Division that what the limited means at its disposal permitted had
been accomplished. The worst misgivings were with regard to the gaps
between keeps and redoubts in the Forward Zone, owing to the paucity
of numbers available for its defence. There was no touch between the
battalion headquarters forts in the Line of Redoubts; they were in no
sense mutually supporting. There was little to prevent the enemy from
breaking through in the intervals, pushing forward his main advance
almost unembarrassed by them, while special detachments swallowed
them at leisure.

Much noise of enemy traffic was heard at night from the 17th onward.
On the evening of the 18th two Germans entered our lines on the front
of the 107th Brigade to give themselves up. They declared they had
deserted to avoid the coming battle, which would not now be long
delayed. They confirmed the suspicions of massed trench mortars on
the front. They had seen great numbers of troops, particularly of
artillery. St. Quentin, they said, was packed with men. On the night
of the 20th a raid was carried out by the 61st Division, resulting
in the capture of prisoners who stated that the attack was to be
launched the following morning. A special bombardment was therefore
carried out from 2-30 to 3 a.m., with heavy rolling barrages on
likely positions of assembly.

The great moment, for which, it is scarce exaggeration to say, men
were waiting all the world over, came at 4-35 a.m. on the morning of
March the 21st. The infantry of the 36th Division was then disposed
as follows:

RIGHT BRIGADE: 108TH BRIGADE.

Forward Zone: 12th Rifles.
Battle Zone: 1st Irish Fusiliers.
Divisional Reserve: 9th Irish Fusiliers.

CENTRE BRIGADE: 107TH BRIGADE.

Forward Zone: 15th Rifles.
Battle Zone: 1st Rifles.
Divisional Reserve: 2nd Rifles.

LEFT BRIGADE: 109TH BRIGADE.

Forward Zone: 2nd Inniskillings.
Battle Zone: 1st Inniskillings.
Divisional Reserve: 9th Inniskillings.

The artillery had begun moving a large proportion of its guns to new
positions on the night of the 17th, having taken a hint from the fate
of batteries on the front of the Third Army, which had just been
subjected to the heaviest "mustard" gas bombardments experienced in
the whole course of the war. The moves of batteries of the 173rd
Brigade were actually not complete till a few hours prior to the
launching of the attack. The dispositions were then as follows:

RIGHT GROUP. (Covering front of 108th and 107th Infantry Brigades.)[51]

Headquarters, 173rd Brigade, R.F.A.
"A," "B," "C," and "D" Batteries, 173rd Brigade, R.F.A.
462nd Battery, R.F.A.
464th Battery, R.F.A.

LEFT GROUP. (Covering front of 109th Infantry Brigade.)

Headquarters, 179th Army Brigade, R.F.A.
383rd Battery, R.F.A.
463rd Battery, R.F.A.
"D" Battery, 232nd Brigade, R.F.A.

BATTLE ZONE GROUP.

Headquarters, 153rd Brigade, R.F.A.
"A," "B," "C," and "D" Batteries, 153rd Brigade, R.F.A.

With one great crash there opened a tremendous bombardment, of trench
mortars by the hundred and every calibre of artillery save the 77-mm.
field gun. Its continuous roar was punctuated, to those a little
distance from the line, by the explosions of huge single shells
upon objectives in rear. So far as can be ascertained the German
programme consisted of a concentration mainly of trench mortars on
the front system; a bombardment with high explosive and phosgene
gas of the Line of Redoubts, the valley in rear of it, the trenches
of the Battle Zone, and Battery Valley, which ran behind its ridge;
for which 105, 150, and 210-mm. howitzers were employed; and fire on
villages in rear, and upon the crossings of the Canal de St. Quentin,
with the largest howitzers and high-velocity guns. Particularly
heavy fire was directed upon the redoubts and battery positions. The
proportion of lethal shell to high-explosive gradually decreased,
till the barrages were composed entirely of the latter. There was,
according to the reports of artillerymen, a remarkable absence of
77-mm. shell and of instantaneous fuses.

Five minutes after the opening of the bombardment the order, "Man
Battle Stations," was sent out by the General Staff. Dawn had broken
in a dense mist. Morning mists at this season and in this district
are the rule rather than the exception, but this was far thicker than
the ordinary. It was at five o'clock impossible to see more than ten
yards ahead, and visibility increased very slowly till the afternoon.
All the battalions in the Battle Zone appear to have reached their
stations, upon ground thoroughly known to officers and men, in good
time, but, as communications were constantly cut and runners were
slow amidst the fog and the shelling, reports were long in coming
to hand. This loss of telephone communication rendered it almost
impossible to issue barrage orders to the artillery.

The German infantry attack was launched at 8-30 a.m. That the enemy
attacked the major part of the line of the 36th Division frontally
is disproved by the reports of survivors and returned prisoners. The
main assault of the Germans, it must be remembered, was due west,
almost parallel to the 36th Division's outpost line from Sphinx
Wood to Gauchy. The advance must have swept straight up the Grugies
Valley. There is evidence that Racecourse Redoubt, which contained
the battalion headquarters and one company of the 15th Rifles, was
attacked before the companies in the front system. Hopeless indeed
was the position of the men in this front system, outnumbered three
or four times, taken in rear by parties which came upon them without
warning. The case of the machine-gunners, from whom, in the defence
of the valley, much had been hoped, was equally desperate. The
Germans swept on them, as it were, out of nothingness. Few can have
had opportunity to fire a shot ere they were rushed.

It was believed at the time that all troops in the front system
had been speedily overwhelmed. The evidence of returned prisoners,
however, has established that there was at least one magnificent
defence in this area, which, though then unknown, must have had
invaluable results. The three companies of the 12th Rifles in the
front system of the 108th Brigade were, as will be seen from the
map, astride the national road running from St. Quentin to La Fère,
which for several miles south of this point ran roughly parallel
with the British front line. Captain L. J. Johnston, who commanded
"C," the counter-attack company, states that though the preliminary
bombardment smashed up their trenches and cut huge lanes in their
wire, though owing to the mist and the fumes of gas-shell it was
impossible to see more than a few feet ahead, the casualties were
relatively light. Though all communication to rear was cut, the
telephone line held as far back as Le Pontchu Quarry, "C" company's
headquarters. Captain Johnston thus received word when the attack
was launched, and began to move his company into Foucard Trench. In
its progress up the communication trench it met a small party of
Germans, who were shot or bayoneted. The fact was, however, thus made
unpleasantly apparent that the enemy had broken through the line of
resistance. The keeps held by "A" and "D" companies, farther forward,
were still resisting, but by 11 a.m. were completely surrounded, and
finally overwhelmed by weight of numbers. For four hours constant
bombing attacks were launched on Foucard Trench. On several occasions
parties of Germans entered the trench, but in savage hand-to-hand
fighting were ejected. About thirty prisoners were taken and sent
back under escort to Le Pontchu Quarry. About noon a most determined
assault was carried out with _flammenwerfer_, to be bloodily repulsed.

An hour later the fog suddenly lifted. It was then clear to "C"
company what progress the enemy had made. More than a mile to rear
the Germans could be seen swarming about Jeanne d'Arc Redoubt, which
held the battalion headquarters and "B" company. On the front of the
14th Division German cavalry could be seen advancing, and, what was
even more astonishing, a column of transport, three hundred yards
long, moving down the main St. Quentin-La Fère Road, about four
hundred yards to the right of "C" company's position. Lewis-gun fire
opened upon this body in a few seconds killed or wounded every man
and horse in it, leaving the whole column in a welter of confusion.

By now, however, the company was being attacked from both flanks,
and a withdrawal to Lejeune Trench, five hundred yards in rear, was
ordered. The enemy followed up the withdrawal fiercely and with
the greatest gallantry, a rather pathetic incident occurring when a
single German with bayonet fixed charged the whole line! The incident
is instructive, as it reveals the high state of training in the
offensive spirit of the attacking troops, and helps to account for
some of their successes in later days, when our men were wearied out.
"C" company, reinforced by the forward headquarters, which had been
in Le Pontchu Quarry, now numbered nearly a hundred and twenty men. A
further magnificent stand was here made.

About 3 p.m. a company of the enemy, evidently believing they had
to deal with but a handful, was seen marching up in fours from the
rear. The men held their fire till the Germans reached point-blank
range. Then such a blast burst forth as brought the whole body to the
ground. Captain Johnston believes that not a man escaped.

The position, however, was now hopeless. All thought of cutting a way
through was out of the question, so thick were the enemy to rear.
The end came at 4 p.m. A German tank came down the main road, firing
into the trench in enfilade. At the same moment a whole battalion
advanced from the front. There were about a hundred men only alive,
many of them wounded. There was no course open but surrender. As the
prisoners were marched back toward St. Quentin they had the grim
satisfaction of seeing the column of transport they had annihilated
still strewn in indescribable confusion about the road.

This most valorous defence was, as has been stated, unknown at the
time. After the Armistice one Military Cross, two Distinguished
Conduct Medals, and four Military Medals were awarded to the
survivors of the company. The defence of "C" company of the 12th
Rifles, against hopeless odds, when all seemed melting about them,
must be held to rank with the very finest episodes of that month
of March, the blackness of which is gilded with so many deeds of
imperishable courage and fortitude.

The front system pierced, the enemy wasted no time upon the Line of
Redoubts. The leading battalions pushed through the gaps between
them, leaving it to their successors to attack them deliberately,
with the aid of trench mortars and _flammenwerfer_. At 11-45
a.m. a report was received from the 30th Division, on the left,
that the enemy had broken through on either side of the Epine de
Dallon Redoubt, and that the special "redoubt barrage" was being
put down. At 12-10 p.m. the "redoubt barrage" was ordered on the
36th Division's front also. That the enemy had passed through the
Line of Redoubts before the barrage was put down is now certain.
Twenty minutes later the 107th Brigade received a message from
its Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Cumming, whose work in
reconnaissance was extremely gallant and useful, that the attack
upon the Battle Zone was developing. At 12-15 p.m. Artillery Groups
were warned to be prepared to withdraw their batteries to the Battle
Zone positions. The personnel of the 18-pounder batteries of the
173rd Brigade was, however, obliged to withdraw from its guns,
being attacked at close quarters by riflemen and machine-guns.
Breech blocks and sights were carried away by the gunners in their
retirement. The most serious report of all came from the 107th
Brigade. The enemy was in Contescourt, in the section of the Battle
Zone held by the 1st Rifles. It appears that the platoon of this
battalion told off to defend the northern part of the village, was
almost destroyed by a shell on the way up. A company of the 2nd
Battalion moved forward in an attempt to eject him, but suffered
heavily from machine-gun fire and failed to achieve its purpose.

The position was now very dangerous, but not irretrievable. Save at
Contescourt, where the enemy made no further progress, the Battle
Zone was intact. So, likewise, was that of the 30th Division on the
left, and of the 61st Division further north, save at one point. At
noon all three battalion headquarters on the Line of Redoubts were
most manfully holding out, beating off attack after attack. General
Nugent had refused to allow more than one company from a reserve
battalion on the 107th Brigade's front to reinforce that holding the
Battle Zone. He had still, therefore, with his Pioneer Battalion,
reserves to fill a gap. Moreover, there was in rear the 61st Brigade
of the 20th Division, allotted to the support of the 36th Division's
front, though not yet at General Nugent's disposal. Up till now it
might be said that, their superiority in numbers and their advantage
from the mist having been taken into consideration, the Germans had
been held as effectively as could have been expected. The mist was
now clearing, and machine-gunners in positions of the Battle Zone
were beginning to cause loss to the enemy.

But from the right there came news most disquieting. The Germans had
captured Manufacture Farm, in the front line of the 14th Division's
Battle Zone; soon afterwards they were in Essigny. It is difficult
to ascertain precisely at what moment this important point, on
dominating ground, was occupied by the enemy. The reports of the
108th Brigade would seem to put it about noon. On the other hand,
an air report to the 14th Division stated that at 1-30 p.m. all
the roads south of Urvillers were "teeming" with Germans, and that
batteries were in action in the open south-west of the village. Now,
in an attack, roads do not begin to "teem" with troops until supports
and reinforcements move up, some time after the leading waves.
Moreover, the detachments of two guns of the Machine-Gun Battalion,
with positions near Essigny, state positively that there were Germans
in that village considerably earlier, and that they themselves were
in action against parties advancing upon the railway station from it.
One gun dispersed an important attack with great loss before it was
destroyed by artillery fire. The second covered the railway cutting,
up which the enemy presently began to press from the _south_. Later
it was withdrawn to a point fifty yards west of the cutting, whence
it continued to engage the enemy advancing from Essigny. It remained
in action till ordered to withdraw at night.

At whatever hour precisely the enemy penetrated Essigny, it is
certain that by one o'clock, whilst all along the front the Germans
were attacking the Battle Zone, the right of the 108th Brigade
was completely turned. At this time the telephone line to Station
Redoubt, wherein were the headquarters of the 1st Irish Fusiliers,
which had been cut long before, was repaired, and General Griffith
learnt that fierce fighting was in progress here in the front line
of the Battle Zone, and that the 41st Brigade on the right had
been driven back. By 2-30 p.m. the enemy was in Fay Farm, south of
Essigny, three thousand yards behind the front line of the 14th
Division's Battle Zone. On the front of the 1st Irish Fusiliers the
enemy forced an entry at the railway cutting, but every attempt to
advance was defeated by the Lewis-gun fire of the garrison. General
Griffith now moved up the 9th Irish Fusiliers to form a defensive
flank. A veritable break-through had occurred on the right, extending
a considerable distance south over the front of the III. Corps. The
general situation, from being menacing, was become suddenly desperate.

At 4-5 p.m. General Nugent ordered the 108th Brigade to form a flank
along the railway line, half-way to the village of Lizerolles, to
which it should be prolonged by the 14th Division. On the left flank
of the 36th the 1st Inniskillings was holding stoutly. General Nugent
therefore put at General Griffith's disposal the 9th Inniskillings,
the reserve battalion from the 109th Brigade. This battalion was
swung across the front. Colonel Peacocke, its commanding officer,
reported, however, that the troops of the 41st Brigade were now
holding on, and that he had accordingly taken up a position behind
the 9th Irish Fusiliers. So the position remained, more or less,
till dusk began to draw on. The enemy was in Contescourt, but the
1st Rifles clung to the cross-roads south-east of the village. The
right company of the same battalion maintained its position in
desperate fighting. Enemy troops massing along the canal bank between
Dallon and Fontaine-les-Clercs, for the attack upon the Battle Zone
positions of the 1st Inniskillings north of the canal, were heavily
engaged by the batteries of the Left Group. The fire was observed
and controlled from Ararat Observation Post, on the high ground
north-west of Quarry Redoubt, with which telephone communication was
maintained. At length the Germans succeeded in running a forward gun
into Fontaine, but all efforts to serve it were frustrated by the
fire of the 463rd Battery R.F.A.

Up forward, meanwhile, the three Redoubts of the Forward Zone,
hopelessly beleaguered, completely surrounded by the enemy, had
fought a battle that may be described as epic. The enemy pounded
their trenches with trench mortars, attacked, was beaten off,
bombarded once again, again attacked. Jeanne d'Arc, on the right,
was the first to fall, about noon. The other two fought on, in
the hopes of effecting a break-through after dusk. But it was out
of the question, so thick was the enemy now in their rear. Trench
after trench was taken by the enemy in Racecourse Redoubt, till at
last only a corner round the railway cutting remained. Attacks with
_flammenwerfer_ were repulsed, largely through the skill with the
rifle grenade of Captain Stewart, the Adjutant. Such a battle against
incredible odds could not continue for ever. At half-past five,
almost simultaneously, though they had of course no communication
with one another, Colonel Cole-Hamilton, commanding the 15th Rifles,
and Lord Farnham, commanding the 2nd Inniskillings, decided that
further resistance was impossible. Both were highly complimented upon
their resistance by the German officers who took over the forts.
Colonel Cole-Hamilton was told that a battalion had been attacking
him all morning, and that a second had been brought up during the
afternoon. He himself had about thirty men unwounded. In the case
of the headquarters of the 2nd Inniskilling Fusiliers, the Germans
released two pigeons in Boadicea Redoubt with messages announcing its
capture. The messages were received by the Headquarters of the 36th
Division. The resistance of Racecourse and Boadicea Redoubts affords
a rare example of that "cold courage," unsupported by the ardour and
excitement of an advance or the hope of ultimate victory, which has
been so often displayed by soldiers of British race in all periods of
the history of British arms.

At 4-15 p.m. the 61st Brigade of the 20th Division, placed at the
disposal of the 36th Division, was ordered to man the St. Simon
defences, an arc covering the hairpin bend in the Canal de St.
Quentin, and including the villages of Avesne and the Pont de Tugny.
General Cochrane, commanding the Brigade, established headquarters at
St. Simon.

The position on the right flank grew still more serious toward
evening. Finally the Commander of the Fifth Army decided to withdraw
the III. Corps behind the Canal de St. Quentin, in conformity with
which move it was necessary for the 36th Division to be swung back
also, pivoting upon the 1st Inniskillings, which battalion still
clung to its Battle Zone. The 61st Brigade was ordered to withdraw
across the Canal, obtaining touch on the right with the troops of
the 14th Division, east of Avesne. From its left, half-way between
Tugny and Artemps, the 108th Brigade was to hold up to the cemetery
at Happencourt. Thence, up to and inclusive of Le Hamel, was to come
the 107th Brigade. Then the 9th Inniskillings was to prolong the
line to the Battle Zone defences of the 1st Inniskillings. The 61st
Brigade was not to withdraw from the arc of the St. Simon bridgehead
till the troops of the other Brigades had completed their retirement.
When this had been effected, the 61st Brigade was to be in touch not
only with the 108th, along the Canal, but with the 60th Brigade of
its own Division, now at the disposal of the 30th Division, which had
outposts on a line from the Canal south of Happencourt to Vaux, north
of the Ham-St. Quentin Road.

The retirement began at 10-30 p.m., being covered by small
rearguards. In the darkness the troops were not seriously pressed
by the Germans. Long before dawn all battalions were established
in their new positions, the three Brigade Headquarters of the 36th
Division being at Lavesne, and that of the 61st Brigade in the old
Divisional Headquarters at Ollézy. General Nugent had meanwhile
transferred his headquarters to Estouilly, north of Ham. It must be
remembered that each Brigade had by now had one battalion almost
completely destroyed, and that the Battle Zone battalions were at an
average strength of about two hundred and fifty men. There was an
accretion in artillery strength. Two batteries, A/91st and C/91st, of
the 20th Divisional Artillery, together with the 232nd Siege Battery,
were put at the disposal of the 36th Division, and remained with it
throughout the retreat, though there were constant changes in the
formation of Groups. The Siege Battery was later transferred to a
special Heavy Artillery Group, with two others, directly under the
orders of the 36th Divisional Artillery.

The destruction of bridges and pontoons allotted to the Engineers of
the 36th Division was carried through without hitch. Shortly after
noon the pontoon and foot-bridge at Fontaine were destroyed by the
121st Field Company, which in the small hours of the 22nd of March
blew up the whole group of bridges between Grand Séraucourt and
Le Hamel. Later, in daylight, the 150th Field Company blew up the
Artemps Group. The Tugny and St. Simon bridges had been allotted
to other sections of the company. Lieutenants C. L. Knox and J. B.
Stapylton-Smith were each responsible for twelve bridges. The first
warning received by the former was when the débris of the Artemps
bridges floated down-stream. He at once commenced his task. Several
of the bridges were destroyed under machine-gun fire. At Tugny,
the Germans were advancing on the main steel-girder bridge when
the time-fuse failed. The night dew or the mist had spoiled it. As
Lieutenant Knox rushed forward the foremost of the enemy were upon
the bridge, a long one. He tore away the useless time-fuse, clambered
under the frame-work of the bridge, and lit the instantaneous fuse.
The bridge was destroyed, and, by some miracle, Lieutenant Knox was
uninjured. He received the Victoria Cross. Among many heroic actions
performed by officers and men of the Division in the course of the
war it would be difficult to point to one of finer calibre. At St.
Simon, Lieutenant Stapylton-Smith blew up a large number of the enemy
with one of the three main bridges.

The early hours of March the 22nd, which dawned in thick mist like
the day before, passed fairly quietly. For the moment, the right
flank of the Division and the III. Corps on its right being behind
the barrier of the Canal de St. Quentin, the greater pressure was
shifted to the north. In bitter fighting the troops of the 1st
Inniskillings held their ground in the forward positions of the
Battle Zone, till 2 p.m., when, completely outflanked, they were
ordered to withdraw to Ricardo Redoubt, the headquarters redoubt
in the Battle Zone, upon which attack after attack was launched,
to be beaten off with heavy losses by the defenders. The Germans
across the Canal were meanwhile far in their rear, having batteries
in Artemps by now. Finally, Ricardo Redoubt was surrounded, the 9th
Inniskillings being compelled to fight a rearguard action back to the
Happencourt-Fluquières Line, upon which, as has been recorded, were
troops of the 60th Brigade. On the right the Canal Line held, though
the enemy had brought up batteries, trench mortars, and machine-guns
under cover of the mist, and was bombarding it heavily.

At noon General Nugent was informed that, in consequence of the
decision of the Higher Command to hold the line of the Canal de la
Somme and its continuation southward, the Canal de St. Quentin, a
further withdrawal was necessary. The 36th Division, with the 61st
Brigade attached, was now to hold this position from the present
right flank of that Brigade to Sommette-Eaucourt. The 61st Brigade
had already a battalion, the 7th D.C.L.I., holding from the Canal
junction to a point west of the Dury-Ollézy Road, less one company,
which had been moved down to the right flank to fill a gap between
its right battalion, the 7th Somerset L.I., and the troops of the
14th Division. Its other battalion, the 12th King's, was driven out
of Tugny at dusk by the advance of the enemy north of the Canal de
St. Quentin, crossed the Canal de la Somme at Dury, and was withdrawn
through the 7th D.C.L.I. to support on the railway behind that
battalion. The withdrawal of the Brigades of the 36th Division was
complete at 11 p.m., when the last troops passed through Pithon. The
108th Brigade took over the defence of the Canal bank from the left
of the 7th D.C.L.I. to Sommette-Eaucourt. The 107th Brigade moved
to Eaucourt and Cugny, the 109th to Brouchy in support. As no touch
could be obtained with the 30th Division, which was to have prolonged
the line westward, by the 108th Brigade, the 21st Entrenching
Battalion, which had now come under General Nugent's orders, was put
in on the left of the Brigade.

Ricardo Redoubt, in which the heroic resistance of Colonel Crawford's
1st Inniskillings continued all day, was now, of course, completely
isolated. At three o'clock the commanding officer sent away a
detachment, some men of which succeeded in making their way back to
our lines. The remainder fought to the end. Finally driven to the
north-western corner of the Redoubt, they ejected the enemy bombers
who had now a footing there. Two men alone, Privates Bailey and
Conway, drove out one group of the German bombers. Trench mortars
pounded them from all sides, which they could not reach. A mere
handful was taken prisoner with Colonel Crawford about 6 p.m. It is
difficult to overestimate the value of this magnificent stand against
overwhelming odds.

The position at two o'clock on the morning of March the 23rd may be
summarized for the sake of clarity. The 36th Division, with attached
troops, held the line of the Canal de St. Quentin and Canal de la
Somme from a mile and a half north-west of Jussy to a mile west of
Sommette-Eaucourt. Upon this line it had, from right to left, the
61st Brigade (7th Somerset L.I. on right, 7th D.C.L.I. on left, 12th
King's in support); the 108th Brigade (9th Irish Fusiliers on right,
1st Irish Fusiliers on left; with a composite battalion of details
and men returned from courses finding the outposts, to allow some
rest to the other battalions); 21st Entrenching Battalion. The length
of the front was upwards of five miles. The 16th Rifles (Pioneers)
was at Sommette-Eaucourt, where the battalion had been working
since before noon on a line of strong points. The 109th Brigade,
consisting now of the 9th Inniskillings, was at Brouchy, in reserve.
The 107th Brigade Headquarters and the 2nd Irish Rifles were at
Cugny. The other battalion of this Brigade, the 1st Rifles, now very
weak, was at Eaucourt. Divisional Headquarters were at Fréniches.

The artillery position is somewhat complicated, owing to early losses
and subsequent changes. The Potter Group (A/153rd Brigade R.F.A.;
B/153rd Brigade R.F.A.; D/173rd Brigade R.F.A.; D/91st Brigade
R.F.A.; and 383rd Battery R.F.A.) had been ordered to join the 20th
Division. It was in action in Bacquencourt during the day, rejoining
the 36th Division in the afternoon after a big march. The front was
now covered by the Erskine Group (A/91st and C/91st Brigade R.F.A.;
and D/173rd Brigade R.F.A.) on the right, in positions in and around
Aubigny; and the Eley Group (463rd and 464th Batteries R.F.A.;
C/153rd and D/153rd Brigade R.F.A,; B/91st Brigade R.F.A.; and two
howitzers of B/232nd Army F.A. Brigade) on the left, in positions
near Brouchy. The Heavy Artillery Group was out of touch, and could
no longer cover the divisional front.

The Machine-Gun Battalion had disappeared as a unit, but there were
still detachments with each of the Brigades, acting as a rule under
the orders of the battalion commander on the spot.

During the afternoon the Engineers of the 36th Division had taken
over from the XVIII. Corps the destruction of bridges in Ham and
along the river and canal to Ollézy. They were all effectively
destroyed, save the main railway bridge at Pithon, which was found
not to have been prepared. French railway troops, working in haste
and with insufficient explosives, did all the damage in their power
to it, but it is believed to have been swiftly repaired by the enemy.

[Illustration: Map V.
The Position before the German Attack, March 21st, 1918.]

The battle had been till now an attack with great superiority of
numbers upon partially-prepared positions, or naturally formidable
obstacles, such as the canals and the marshy bed of the Somme. From
the morning of the 23rd open warfare developed, from the moment
the enemy, as happened early, had driven the 14th Division back from
the Canal de St. Quentin at Jussy. That accomplished, the Canal de la
Somme at this point formed no real obstacle to the German advance,
because, from St. Simon to Voyennes, it was parallel with it. For the
36th Division there were no more defences till the front line of 1916
was reached. It had to fight its battle of the 23rd and 24th of March
in open country. The account of that battle and of the remainder of
the retreat must occupy a chapter to itself.

FOOTNOTES:

[48] Map V.

[49] Lord Haig's Despatches.

[50] Map VI.

[51] Four of the six batteries of this Group moved on the night of
the 20th. It is reported that their evacuated positions were assailed
with destructive fire so heavy that they would have been completely
neutralized from the first had they remained in them.

CHAPTER XI

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE ON THE SOMME (II): MARCH 23RD TO 30TH, 1918

In the account which follows, it is scarcely to be hoped that
all the confusion arising from reports that often conflicted can
be eliminated. The resistance made by the 36th Division and its
attached troops was one in which a large number of units, some
existing, some hastily improvised, took part. But, for the most
part, they were very small units, except for the battalions of the
61st Brigade, less depleted and less wearied by the morning of March
the 23rd than those of the 36th Division. This chapter opens with
events occurring forty-eight hours after the beginning of the great
German bombardment. In that period the troops of the Division had
been constantly engaged in fighting, or, when not fighting, on the
march, or upon the alert for a fresh attack. On the nights neither
of the 21st nor the 22nd had more than a couple of hours' sleep
been snatched by any of the infantry. Many units had had absolutely
none. The men were already wearied out. The 1st Rifles, to take one
example, after fighting all day on the 22nd in the neighbourhood,
first of Le Hamel, then of Happencourt, had marched by night to
Pithon, there crossed the Canal de la Somme, then continued its march
to Eaucourt, which was reached at three in the morning. The distance
covered was nine miles. Even on arrival there was not rest for all,
as piquets had to be posted round the village.

It is hard for those who have not seen a great retreat of this nature
to imagine how depressing are the circumstances and the sights which
he sees about him to the soldier entrusted with the fighting of
delaying actions, how great his mental and moral, apart altogether
from his physical, strain. The flood of civilians pouring out of
towns and villages was in itself a pathetic and depressing sight. At
three o'clock on the afternoon of the 22nd the nurses of the C.C.S.
in Ham were walking down the Guiscard Road, carrying bundles, some
of them assisting wounded men. Lorries and ambulances had already
taken the worst cases, but at this stage there was not transport
enough for all. Such sights as these were calculated to prey upon the
mind and react upon the moral of the stoutest hearted. Allied with
great physical fatigue and the sensation of being three or four times
outnumbered, their effect was even more dangerous.

The exploits of the troops of the Fifth Army are great enough without
straining the note. Some writers had made it appear as though the
men were of triple brass. Men are of less durable material. Each
has what may be called his "weakening-point," which is arrived at
sooner in some men than in others. There were cases of weakness in
the days that followed among troops of the 36th Division, as among
other troops. But their achievements must be measured by the standard
of their cruel and heart-breaking task. With that as gauge, these
achievements, viewed as a whole, stand out in their magnificence, a
shining monument to the spirit of the race that bred them.

The 21st Entrenching Battalion, interposed on the left of the 108th
Brigade to find touch with the troops of the 30th Division, had not
succeeded in its object. It was discovered at dawn that the line of
the 30th Division turned back from the Canal about Verlaines. The
23rd Entrenching Battalion, consisting of men of disbanded battalions
of the 36th Division, under the orders of the 30th, beat off all
hostile attempts to cross the Canal in the neighbourhood of Offoy.
Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. Odo Vivian, the officer commanding that
battalion, reports that at 7 a.m. troops fell back on his right from
Ham, saying that they had been driven out by the enemy. About eleven,
two Canadians informed him that they had slept the night in the town
and seen no sign of the Germans. Be this as it may, it seems certain
that the crossings at Ham, of all places on the front, were least
effectively guarded, and that the enemy had some troops over the
Canal here by noon. To cover the left flank, the dismounted sections
of the Engineers and a battalion of divisional details were put into
position north of Golancourt.

It was, however, on the other flank that danger first appeared.
The enemy, according to the reports of the 14th Division, effected
a crossing at Jussy at 3-30 a.m., but was counter-attacked and
driven back by the 7th K.R.R.C. This respite was temporary only.
By 11-15 a.m. the enemy was over the Canal de St. Quentin at many
points, though the 7th Somerset L.I. clung stoutly to its position.
Half an hour earlier the 2nd Rifles had been ordered to take up
a defensive line east of Cugny, in touch with troops of the 14th
Division, which had fallen back astride the road from that village
to Flavy-le-Martel. By noon the troops on the right were falling
back from Flavy-le-Martel and Annois, hard pressed by the enemy. The
retirement continuing, the 1st Rifles was moved up on the right flank
of the 2nd Battalion. On its right were at first no British troops,
but a line was hastily taken up by dismounted French dragoons. In
this position the line remained on this flank for some hours. The 1st
Rifles was constantly engaged and managed to hold its ground. The 2nd
Battalion did not come into action till later in the afternoon, as
there were still in front of it a few men of the 14th Division who
had retired from Flavy.

Meanwhile, in the centre, the line from Sommette-Eaucourt to Ollézy,
and that of the 61st Brigade upon the Canals, held in splendid
fashion. It was now the turn of the left flank. The 9th Inniskillings
was heavily attacked from the north-west at Aubigny. One company fell
back in disorder from the village. Thereupon the Brigade-Major,
Captain G. J. Bruce, rode forward, rallied the men, and galloped
into the village at their head. The Germans were driven out. It was
a wonderful example of the inspiration of personal gallantry and
leadership upon weary and disheartened men. Gradually, however, the
line at this point fell back under severe pressure. Sommette-Eaucourt
was lost, and a little later Brouchy. Both flanks of the Division
were now completely turned.

At 4-30 p.m. General Cochrane, commanding the 61st Brigade, ordered
the 7th D.C.L.I. and the 7th Somersets to withdraw to the line of
the Ham-Terguier Railway, from the brook west of Annois to the
Ollézy-Eaucourt Road. The Somersets, however, upon the Canal de St.
Quentin, lost the better part of three companies, which fought on
when surrounded till all their ammunition was gone ere surrendering.
The D.C.L.I. extricated itself under great pressure, and took up
position upon the new line.

And now upon the right the attack was renewed in great force. Enemy
battalions passed through Flavy and deployed on either side of the
Cugny Road. At about 5 p.m. the Germans attacked that village,
using trench mortars to cover the advance, to be repulsed by the
2nd Rifles. A gap had now formed between this battalion and the
1st, through which the enemy pushed at dusk. The 1st Rifles was
also attacked at 7 p.m., and also drove off the enemy, but this
mere handful of brave men was now menaced both from south-east
and north-west, and, to avoid being surrounded, withdrew towards
Beaulieu, a mile south-east of Cugny. The 2nd Rifles also was
compelled to evacuate the village, taking up a position astride the
Villeselve Road at its western outskirts.

When night fell the line ran east of Beaulieu, to the western edge
of Cugny, to the railway south-east of Ollézy, and along it to the
Ollézy-Eaucourt Road, thence along the road, including the village of
Eaucourt, a thousand yards south of Brouchy, to north of Golancourt.
Behind it was a line of French infantry, pushed up hurriedly,
without artillery or more ammunition than was carried on the men,
roughly from Esmery-Hallon, through Flavy-le-Meldeux and Villeselve,
to Beaumont-en-Beine. The Headquarters of the 36th Division were
withdrawn from Fréniches to Beaulieu-les-Fontaines, north of the
Roye-Noyon Road, at six in the evening.

In the course of the day all arms of the Division had been constantly
in action. The 16th Rifles, which had been put at the disposal of the
officer commanding the 9th Irish Fusiliers, had been fighting all
day upon the Somme, and had fallen back in the general withdrawal
on the left flank. Details of the Machine-Gun Battalion, under the
second-in-command, Major Low, had, as has previously been recorded,
also been in action on the left. All details, men returning from
courses and leave, had been pushed into the battle. The clerks and
runners of the 109th Brigade Headquarters had fought at Brouchy.

Great steadiness and devotion to duty had been shown by the
Artillery. Two batteries of the 91st Brigade (from the 20th
Divisional Artillery), A/91st and C/91st, are specially mentioned in
the report of the C.R.A. When infantry, in the first case that of
the 109th Brigade, in the second that of the 61st Brigade, fell back
upon their positions, the battery officers rallied the men, and the
gunners aided them to dig in in front of the guns.

Amid all the confusion food supplies had not failed, though no
rations could be distributed to the troops in line till the small
hours of the morning of March the 24th. The 107th Brigade was able,
besides keeping its own troops supplied with tools for entrenching,
to send a number of picks and shovels to Rifle Brigade battalions
of the 14th Division in the neighbourhood of Cugny. On this day
and throughout the retreat the work of the Train and Supply Column
was most praiseworthy, while the Staff Captains of Brigades showed
forethought in their arrangements. The medical services, under great
difficulties, had done all that was possible in the evacuation of
wounded.

The night passed fairly quietly. It was doubtless employed by the
Germans to bring up fresh guns, for upon the morrow the volume of
artillery fire was noticeably greater. There was no German infantry
attack with the light, as might have been expected, on the morning of
March the 24th. It did not come on either flank in any strength till
about ten o'clock. Very probably the enemy had been relieving his
front-line battalions, and their successors were not ready to renew
the struggle till some hours after dawn.

It was, however, discovered at dawn that parties of Germans had
entered Golancourt in the darkness, and that our men had evacuated
the village. This was a very serious blow, as it threw into confusion
schemes formulated overnight between General Hessey, commanding the
109th Brigade, and General Cochrane, commanding the 61st. These two
commanders had planned a counter-offensive to ease the pressure on
the left flank, and blunt the pronounced salient into which the line
was being forced. General Nugent had put at General Hessey's disposal
a composite battalion under Major Knox, and had later strengthened
his line by sending up three hundred details from Beaulieu, servants,
orderlies, grooms from Headquarters, and the personnel of the Signal
School. These were formed into two companies, under the command of
Captain W. Smyth, R.E., attached to the General Staff, and Captain
C. Drummond, A.D.C. to General Nugent. Major Knox's detachment was
to move _via_ Golancourt, approach Aubigny as closely as might be in
the mist, and attack the village at eight o'clock. Meanwhile the 9th
Inniskillings, with a company of details, was to reoccupy Brouchy.
General Cochrane arranged to retake Eaucourt with a hundred men of
the 284th Army Troops Company, R.E., who had come under his orders,
commanded by two of his own infantry officers. This he had succeeded
in doing before midnight on the 23rd. Touch was obtained by the
attacking force with the 7th D.C.L.I., on the railway where crossed
by the Ollézy-Eaucourt Road.

But Major Knox came under heavy machine-gun fire from Golancourt on
his march, and was unable to make headway. The attacks upon Aubigny
and Brouchy were therefore cancelled, and the companies of details
thrown in on the left of the 9th Inniskillings. The position of the
7th D.C.L.I. on the railway was now impossible. The battalion was
being pressed on either flank, and its right was in air. At eleven
o'clock General Cochrane ordered it to fall back from the railway,
and to take up a line in touch with the fragments of the 12th
King's, a thousand yards west of Cugny, roughly parallel with the
Cugny-Eaucourt Road. The right company of the D.C.L.I. had to fight a
rearguard action to cover the withdrawal, and suffered considerable
loss from machine-gun fire. Upon its heels the Germans pushed forward
their machine-guns and a number of single field guns which had been
brought across the Canal.

At this time the 2nd Rifles was still maintaining its position,
three hundred yards west of Cugny. Behind it, between Cugny and
Montalimont Farm, the 1st Battalion had dug itself in. It will thus
be seen that there were two thin lines of men, literally back to
back, with about a mile between them, one facing east toward Cugny,
the other west toward Golancourt. Such a situation could not possibly
persist. On the right there was intense confusion. Here the French
had been relieving what was left of the troops of the 14th Division,
between Cugny and Ugny-le-Gay, when the Germans attacked, and the two
lines, relievers and relieved, had been rolled back before noon. La
Neuville-en-Beine had been lost. The difficulties were not lessened
by the fact that small parties of troops of the 14th Division,
which had become intermixed with those of the 36th, received the
order that they were relieved by the French, and were to fall back
upon Guiscard. Their withdrawal left new gaps, of which the enemy,
whose light machine-gun groups were handled throughout the day with
consummate skill, was not slow to avail himself.

The salient held by the 36th Division suddenly caved. From all
sides the semicircle fell back upon Villeselve, which was heavily
bombarded by the enemy from noon onward. Desperate efforts were
made by Brigade Staffs to rally the men in front of Villeselve,
and get them into trenches with the French infantry. To a great
extent they were successful, but the impossibility of co-ordination
between troops which always fought in method so different was
plainly apparent. When the trenches were shelled the French troops
walked out of them. When the shelling ceased they walked back. Such
procedure was all very well for formed units under their own leaders;
it was impossible to make it understood by scattered details of men
of a dozen units, harassed and strained by four days' fighting.
Eventually, at about three o'clock, the French received orders to
retire. Our men likewise fell back from the village.

Meanwhile upon the right had been enacted a drama truly heroic
which has never been recorded, because, in the days when reports
and despatches were written, there was no survivor to tell its
story. On the morning of the 24th, the 2nd Rifles consisted of the
following officers: Captain T. Y. Thompson, D.S.O., commanding since
the officer commanding at the outset of the attack, Major Rose,
had been wounded; Captain J. C. Bryans, Lieutenant M. E. Y. Moore,
M.C.; Lieutenant R. B. Marriott Watson, M.C.; Lieutenant J. K.
Boyle, M.C.; Lieutenant E. C. Strohm; and perhaps two hundred other
ranks. Of these, Lieutenants Moore and Marriott Watson were old
companions-in-arms. They had served together in the 13th Rifles; had
together taken part in that battalion's great raid on June the 26th,
1916, and had both been wounded on July the 1st. Having withdrawn
from the eastern to the western skirts of Cugny overnight, the
battalion had steadfastly maintained its position, almost entirely
unsupported. After beating off an enemy attack at ten in the morning,
it was discovered that ammunition was woefully short, and orders were
issued to fire at especially good targets only. Captain Thompson,
deliberately exposing himself to encourage the men on the menaced
right flank, which was being again attacked, was killed, as also was
Lieutenant Marriott Watson. Captain Bryans now assumed command.
Messages sent up from the 1st Rifles in rear, ordering the battalion
to withdraw, did not reach it. The men who bore them were killed
or wounded. In any case, it was the opinion of Captain Bryans that
a retirement across the bare, open country between Cugny and the
village of Villeselve, with the Germans on three sides of him, was
impossible.

From noon onwards was a lull, which was occupied in reorganization
of the line. Then, about 2 p.m., preceded by a violent barrage
of artillery and machine-gun fire, supported by an attack from
low-flying aeroplanes, an assault was launched, the Germans sweeping
in from the left in overwhelming numbers, despite the gaps cut in
their ranks by fire. By the time the enemy was upon them there was
scarce a round left to fire. "Many," writes Captain Bryans, "had
only their bayonets left. Rather than wait for the end, they jumped
from the entrenchments and met it gallantly. It was an unforgettable
sight. We were overwhelmed, but not disgraced."

After a desperate hand-to-hand fight, the little band was simply
engulfed. Lieutenants Moore and Boyle were killed. Of about a hundred
and fifty men on their feet when the attack began, it is estimated
that over a hundred were killed or wounded.

With the enemy pressing south-eastward from the direction of
Golancourt, and westward from Beaumont-en-Beine, the situation was
as acute as it had been at the worst moment of the morning. It
was relieved by a great charge carried out at 3 p.m. by troops of
General Harman's 3rd Cavalry Division, which had been assisting to
maintain the line of the 14th Division during the morning. The 7th
and Canadian Brigades had been moved in the direction of Beaulieu,
to check the German pressure on the salient. A detachment of the
6th Brigade, about a hundred and fifty men, under Major Watkins
Williams, 10th Hussars, charged from the neighbourhood of Collézy
the enemy advancing through the two copses north-west of Villeselve.
The detachment came under heavy machine-gun fire, and many saddles
were emptied. But it achieved its object. The Germans were caught
in the open, a considerable number cut down or shot, and over a
hundred prisoners taken. Infantry of the 36th Division, weary as
they were, followed up the charge cheering. It was a most brilliant
little action. But it was, and could be, no more than a delaying
action. There was no question of reoccupying Villeselve. The 9th and
62nd French Divisions had orders to withdraw before heavy attacks,
holding the enemy where possible, but never risking a break in
their line. Toward evening Berlancourt and Guiscard were heavily
shelled. The enemy had now some 150-mm. batteries in action, and
employed instantaneous fuse against Guiscard. Here Captain Rabone,
Brigade-Major of the 108th Brigade was wounded. The Headquarters
of the 9th French Division moved out of Quesmy, south of Guiscard,
only just in time to avoid being surrounded. Patrols of the enemy,
using white flares after dark as a guide to their artillery, were in
Guiscard before 11 p.m.

At 11 p.m. the 36th Division was put at the disposal of the 62nd
French Division, and ordered to withdraw its troops through its line.
The 108th Brigade, leaving the remnant of the 9th Irish Fusiliers
to fight a rearguard action on the ridge between Guiscard and
Berlancourt, withdrew to Crisolles, and later to Sermaize, where the
men had some rest. The 107th and 109th Brigades withdrew to Sermaize
and Frétoy-le-Château, arriving about 2 a.m. in the morning of the
25th.

During the day the artillery attached to the 36th Division, to
which the Potter Group, after having been in action under the 20th
Division, had been returned, had actively barraged the roads leading
south from the Canal de la Somme upon which the enemy was advancing.
The Potter Group had bombarded the enemy massing for attack in
the neighbourhood of the Esmery-Hallon--Golancourt Road, causing
considerable casualties to parties in the open. The Erskine Group
continued in action near Beines till French and British infantry had
withdrawn through its guns. C/91st Battery remained covering the
retirement till after dark, and was fortunate to be able to extricate
its guns after the Germans were in Berlancourt. The Eley Group had
to make three withdrawals, first, before noon, to Berlancourt; then,
at 2-30 p.m., to Buchoire, where it covered the French infantry; and
at 6 p.m. to the neighbourhood or Frétoy-le-Château. In every case
the retirement was delayed till the last possible minute. The men of
"C" and "D" Batteries, 153rd Brigade R.F.A., displayed the highest
courage and most dogged perseverance throughout this day.

At night the Erskine Group was put at the disposal of the 9th
French Division, the Eley and Potter Groups at that of the 62nd
French Division, under the control of the 36th Divisional Artillery
Headquarters. General Brock, on return from leave, assumed command of
the two latter Groups. Colonel H. C. Simpson, who had hitherto acted
as C.R.A., became Liaison Officer with the 62nd French Division.

An order of the 62nd French Division, issued at 2-15 a.m. on March
the 25th, contained the following information and instructions
for the 36th Division. The general line held ran west of Quesmy,
Bethancourt, Fréniches, to the Canal de Robécourt at Rouy, east of
Nesle. The _rôle_ of the 62nd Division was to check the enemy's
advance, and prevent his crossing the Canal de Robécourt before,
at earliest, the evening of the 25th. The British batteries were
to remain in action under the orders of the 62nd French Division.
The remaining troops of the 36th Division were to be withdrawn for
reorganization, in readiness to assist the 62nd Division in case of
emergency.

The reorganization, such as it was, was carried out in the course
of a fifteen-mile march. The 21st Brigade, now reduced to less than
five hundred of all ranks, was ordered to rejoin its own Division
north of Roye. It was detached from the line of retreat at Avricourt,
where it was met by a column of 'buses. Officers and men saw it go,
to the further desperate fighting which awaited its survivors, with
sentiments of the warmest admiration. During the whole period of
their attachment to the 36th Division, General Cochrane's men had
displayed wonderful endurance and devotion. In the centre of a line
which was turned upon both flanks, they had held each one of their
successive positions till the last possible moment.

The troops of the 36th Division halted at mid-day in the
neighbourhood of Avricourt, where they had a few hours' rest. They
then received orders to resume their march. The 107th Brigade moved
back to Guerbigny, on the banks of the Avre; the 108th Brigade to
Erches, a mile north of that village; the 109th Brigade to Guerbigny
and Warsy. Troops arrived between midnight and two o'clock, and, for
the first time since the beginning of the attack, had a continuous
sleep of at least six hours in comfortable billets. The 9th Irish
Fusiliers, however, coming straight through from the neighbourhood of
Guiscard, a distance of upwards of thirty miles, did not arrive till
8 a.m. General Nugent established his headquarters in Warsy.

The spectacle of the infantry upon that march was one that would
have aroused compassion in the most war-hardened breast. Men's
faces were deeply marked by overwhelming fatigue and lack of sleep.
Some moved in a sort of trance, stumbling forward oblivious to
their surroundings. In some cases their boots had given out. Many
company officers, in the course of the last few miles, dispensed
with the regulation halts, because they found it almost impossible
to get their men on their feet again after them. They lay like logs,
and had to be violently shaken before they could be recalled to
consciousness. Fortunately more 'buses had been sent for the 61st
Brigade than that scanty remnant required, and a few were able to
assist in moving back the men absolutely unable to walk.

There were other sights upon that line of march perhaps even more
moving. The men in this evil case were, after all, soldiers,
undergoing such experiences as many soldiers have undergone in many
great retreats. The spectacle of the civilians, turning out in haste
from their homes, was often heartrending. Their big wains would
be piled high with their household possessions, with perhaps the
old grandmother of the family holding its youngest baby, perched
perilously on top. Mile after mile, at the cart-tail, or driving
cattle that became mixed up with the British transport, the children
trudged in the rain. It was only the rich and comparatively fortunate
that had horsed transport. The poorer struggled along with the most
valuable of their things upon handcarts. The present writer remembers
seeing a woman carried out on a bed and put on to a farm-cart. He
was told she had given birth to a child two hours earlier. A little
later he came upon an old woman pushing her paralyzed husband in
a wheelbarrow. Let those who desire to realize what effort this
requires for a woman of sixty, try wheeling a heavy man in a
wheelbarrow even a hundred yards. For these room was found in a
British lorry at the next village, but there were many cases where
such relief was impossible.

The mien of these unfortunates was wonderful. Here and there a woman
sobbed as she walked, a man cursed his chance. For the most part,
about the most incongruous of these little cavalcades there was the
high dignity of sorrow and suffering stoically and nobly borne.

In the course of the mid-day halt, details were as far as possible
sent to their own units. In the 107th Brigade the 2nd Rifles, which
had disappeared at Cugny, was reformed at about the strength of a
large platoon. A company of the 15th Rifles, under Captain Miller,
which had been a part of the first-formed battalion of details, was
attached to the Brigade. The 109th Brigade formed small companies
from the remnants of the 1st and 2nd Inniskillings.

The fighting of March the 25th exhibited in lamentable fashion the
difficulties that occur in a retreat when two armies, using different
methods, speaking different languages, based upon different lines of
communication, with different apprehensions preoccupying the minds
of their commanders, are being forced back before a victorious and
more powerful enemy. The French were retiring south-west; the British
west. Sooner or later a gap was inevitable. It occurred on this
evening, at Roye. The 62nd French Division, covered by the Potter
and Eley Groups under General Brock, fought an admirable delaying
action. The Germans did not reach Libermont till 4 p.m., nor was the
Canal crossed by them till about 6 p.m. Thereafter the 62nd Division,
its left flank turned by the German advance at Nesle, withdrew to the
line of the Roye-Noyon Road. During the remainder of the retreat the
36th Division saw no more of the artillery which had been attached to
it, nor of its own C.R.A. and staff. An account of their action with
the French must be left till a little later in this narrative.

The gap had formed, and in the early hours of the morning the enemy
poured through Roye from the north-east, scarcely checked by the
efforts of a French Cavalry Division, flung out upon a front of
six miles. New French Divisions were about to detrain upon the
Amiens-Montdidier Railway. If the Germans should strike home at that,
a disaster far greater than any which the Allies had yet suffered
would ensue. To close the gap there remained nothing but the remnants
of the two original southern Divisions of the XVIII. Corps, the 36th
and the 30th.

At 8 a.m. on the morning of March the 26th, the 36th Division
received orders to take up a line from the neighbourhood of l'Echelle
St. Aurin, on the Avre, where it was to obtain touch with the French,
to the main Amiens-Roye Road, north of Andechy, linking up with the
30th Division. The 109th Brigade was ordered to take up a position
from the river to Andechy, with the 108th Brigade on the left; the
107th Brigade remaining in reserve at Guerbigny. North and south
of the western outskirts of Andechy ran a good trench, covered by
a certain amount of wire, the second French line of 1916. Some
three hundred yards north of the village, however, this line bent
north-eastward, and could not be occupied. The advanced troops of the
enemy were already at hand, and it was a matter of minutes whether
the troops would be able to take up the position. The suddenness of
the advance may be gathered from the fact that farmers from Guerbigny
were yoking their horses to ploughs on the ridge north of the
village when they were informed of the situation by troops moving
forward. The present writer well remembers the gallant and dignified,
"_Eh bien, monsieur, il faut partir alors_," of one old man about to
hitch in his team, when informed that the Germans were about a mile
away.

By the time the troops of the 109th Brigade were in position the
enemy was in Andechy. Those of the 108th were actually prevented from
reaching their station on the Roye Road by machine-gun fire on their
left flank. Touch with the 30th Division was never obtained here, but
later on it was discovered that its right was at Bouchoir, a mile
further back on the main road.

All through the morning small parties of the enemy attempted to work
their way forward, but were held up by the fire of Lewis guns. The
122nd Field Company, under the orders of General Griffith, had been
posted in echelon to protect the left flank. At 1 p.m., as the enemy
appeared to be progressing slightly on the left, General Nugent
ordered the 107th Brigade to hold the old French line following
the road from Erches to Bouchoir. The 107th Brigade, to which was
attached the 121st Field Company, the 16th Rifles, and the 21st
Entrenching Battalion, as well as the personnel of its own Trench
Mortar Battery, contained now the remnants of seven units. It was
accordingly formed into three groups, the largest, under the command
of Colonel McCarthy-O'Leary, 1st Rifles, consisting of its own three
battalions. It was in position by 4 p.m., later pushing forward a
line to gain touch with the left of the 108th Brigade.

The troops had now been in position for six hours; six hours of time
the value of which no standard can measure. When their physical
state is considered, the steadiness they showed on this occasion is
equal to any of their achievements through the week that had passed.
Every German attempt to advance was frustrated by their fire. No
artillery was supporting them. Even a single battery of 18-pounders
would have been of great service, and would have had many splendid
targets round Andechy. The Germans, for their part, were now
heavily bombarding the village of Erches, which the 108th Brigade
Headquarters were obliged to quit, moving into the open fields behind
it.

At dusk the enemy launched an attack in strength upon Erches,
preceded by a bombardment. By eight o'clock he was in the village.
The 108th Brigade Headquarters was attacked at close quarters, and
General Griffith slightly wounded in the hand fighting his way
clear of the German patrols. Colonel Place, the G.S.O.1 of the
Division, going up from Guerbigny in a car, with Colonel Furnell of
the 1st Irish Fusiliers, and Major Brew of the 9th, to ascertain
the position, ran into a party of the enemy. A bullet stopped the
engine of the car. Colonel Place jumped out, but before he could
draw his pistol from under his coat was hit in the leg, and fell in
the roadway. Instantly a German sprang upon him and stabbed at him
with his bayonet. Fortunately for Colonel Place, the thickness of
his "British Warm" saved him. The little party had no alternative to
surrender. The car was subsequently recovered, towed back, and served
the Division well in after days.

Colonel Place had been G.S.O.1 of the 36th Division for more than
two years. As a staff officer he was far more than merely able and
efficient. His sympathy and imagination enabled him to grasp all
points of view, and to understand those which were different to
his own. He never seemed to require, as do so many men engaged on
difficult tasks, an hour free from interruption, but could switch
his mind on to each new problem presented to him, and return to his
own where he had left it. His loss in this unlucky fashion was much
regretted.

Lieutenant Cumming, whose reconnaissance on the 21st has been
mentioned, led a patrol of six men into Guerbigny, to see if the
enemy had yet entered it. They had not, but on his way the patrol was
attacked by a German patrol of five. As a result of the fight every
single German was killed.

The remnants of the 108th Brigade had taken up a line west of
Erches, putting themselves under the orders of General Hessey, as
their own Brigade Staff had been cut off from them by the German
patrols which had burst through. There was now heavy shelling and
trench-mortaring of the British positions, the enemy having moved up
guns and mortars into Andechy. A patrol sent out at 1-45 a.m. on the
morning of the 27th by the 121st Field Company, saw long columns of
the enemy; infantry, transport, a troop of cavalry, and a battery
of artillery, moving into Erches. Captain Miller's company of 15th
Rifles, west of the village, was pounded with artillery and mortar
fire, the trenches being obliterated and heavy casualties suffered.
He had with him one machine-gun, and, as light appeared, this gun
began to obtain many targets in Erches, inflicting considerable loss
upon the enemy. At 8 a.m. the enemy entered a sap in front of his
trench and began to bomb his way up. Lieutenant Young, with a handful
of riflemen, promptly drove him out.

Meanwhile, clinging to a trench on the Erches-Guerbigny Road, was
Captain Densmore Walker of the Machine-Gun Battalion, whose diary
has previously been drawn upon in the course of this narrative,
with a handful of men of his company, armed with rifles. Behind
him was a party of the 107th Brigade with one machine-gun. Captain
Walker had with him a rifleman of the old 14th Rifles, now in one
of the Entrenching Battalions, named Gilmour, one of those curious
individuals who, when all seems to be melting about them in moments
of great emergency, suddenly display resource and coolness which
amaze all who have known them. Together they had already carried
out a patrol into Guerbigny, into which some of the enemy had been
seen to move, in the course of which, Captain Walker cheerfully
confesses, Rifleman Gilmour, rather than he, had been the leader. The
counter-attack which followed may be described in Captain Walker's
own words, because it succeeds, as no official account ever can, in
picturing the exact details for the mind's eye.

"Things were looking as black as conceivable. I suppose it would
be about 7-30 a.m. when the attack came. We heard shouting straight
behind us and saw about a dozen men a mile away, coming towards us in
a line.[52] One waved a white flag and they all shouted. Some said
they were English, and we were relieved; some said they looked like
French; and I said that any way we would fire on them--which we did.
They were perfectly good Huns! They took cover when we opened, and
then, when we were really interested in them, the real attack came
from Erches. He swarmed on to the road and came down the trench.
This looked like the finish of it. There was a general movement
backwards, but Evans prevented the machine-gunners from dismounting
the one machine-gun with the 107th Brigade, and got it into action
on the top of the trench. This changed the aspect of things, as
the Huns checked. We all got out of our trench (most people with
the idea of clearing over the open, I fancy), and there we stood
for quite a while, our people firing towards Erches, and the Huns
hesitating. Seeing this latter tendency, Gilmour and I moved slowly
towards Erches, trying to urge the troops to attack, but they were
too undecided.... Then we saw a Hun in the trench just below us. I
fired my revolver at him and he ran back. So we chased him. This
settled matters! The Huns turned tail and our men followed. As my
particular Hun turned round traverses I got in another couple of
shots, but didn't bring him down. When we reached the road--which
was sunken-- ... the bank came up to his waist, and he looked
scared--horribly--but I fired again.... I distinctly saw what I
thought was a puff of smoke go out from his pack. Any way he at once
went down behind the bank, and Gilmour rushed up with his bayonet. I
said 'Leave him,' but I don't know whether he did or not. And now I
didn't know what to do. Fritz was legging it for Erches hard enough,
and by this time indeed they had all reached it. I don't know how big
the village was, but we might have rushed it. On the other hand,
I didn't know what had happened on the left, or in what strength
the enemy was.... At this stage I was delighted to see an infantry
officer with an M.C. come up. I asked him if he thought it was any
use trying to go on, and he said it would be better to make a line
there."

Eventually Captain Walker, surrounded, except on the north-west,
withdrew. He adds:

"I think on the whole the Erches scrap went in our favour. We
were few in numbers compared with the Huns. They were backed
up by victory, while our men were terribly tired, hungry, and
dispirited.... Our ammunition was about gone. For our M.G. we had
three belts left when we retired. We were entirely surrounded, if
only by Hun patrols, and we only knew hazily what direction to make
for. In the circumstances, to delay a force superior in numbers and
moral for half a day after it attacked our position, was as much as
could be expected. I reckon the Boche should have wiped out our party
at Erches, but we turned on him severely enough to persuade him to
let us go quietly."[53]

It was, then, at Erches that the enemy first broke the line on a
serious scale. On the right, south of the Avre, the French posts
were withdrawing. The 109th Brigade had no alternative but to cross.
It was impossible to retire along the right bank. The crossing was
superintended by the Brigade Major, Captain G. J. Bruce, and carried
out in orderly fashion, with covering fire from successive sections.
The line then fell back with the French outposts through the wood
north of Lignières, which was heavily shelled by the enemy.

North of Erches, Captain Miller held his ground till noon, when
his trenches were being blown in. On his left what remained of
the 1st and 2nd Rifles had fallen back a little after Colonel
McCarthy-O'Leary had been wounded--for the second time. Captain
Miller therefore withdrew upon Arvillers, when he gained touch with
Captain Patton, who had about sixty officers and men of the two other
battalions. Finally, on the order of General Withycombe, the whole
line withdrew upon Hangest-en-Santerre, since large columns of the
enemy could be seen advancing towards Davenescourt, and disappearing
in the wooded country in its rear. This withdrawal was complete at 5
p.m. By evening a French Division had moved up, and the remnant of
the 107th Brigade was ordered to march back on relief, and rejoin
the rest of the Division at Sourdon. One party of three officers and
sixty-eight other ranks, however, out of touch with the Brigade,
remained in action north-west of Arvillers till the morning of the
28th. Constantly pressed by the enemy, they kept him stationary by
their rifle fire. Not till 11 a.m. were they relieved by the French.

The achievement of the troops of the 36th Division, a mere handful
at this time, almost broken by fatigue, in many cases without food,
must take a high place, not alone in the annals of the March retreat,
but in that of the war. That men here and there, bowed beneath
the weight of a burden almost unbearable, showed weakness, is not
controverted. The account of Captain Walker has been purposely
inserted--as an instance, to which many might be added--to show in
what fashion weakness was overcome by leadership and example. It is
the finest type of courage that, in the slang phrase, "comes up to
scratch" again and again, beating down in the breast the inevitable
weakness as it arises. The individual Briton is at least as brave
as the individual of any other race; but men in the mass are not
naturally heroic. It is discipline, training, pride in a unit or a
formation, and, above all, in such crises as these, leadership alone
which can instil into men who have undergone the strain these men had
undergone, the courage to stand firm in the plight wherein they found
themselves. These men had stood. Not only to the officers and picked
men among them, who made the stand possible, but to the whole group
spirit which they created for their weaker brethren in adversity,
the adjective "heroic" may fairly be applied. Best of all, their
object had been achieved. There can be no suggestion of hyperbole if
that object be described in a phrase from Lord Haig's Despatch. The
resistance, he said, of the 36th Division near Andechy played "no
small part in preventing the enemy from breaking through between the
Allied Armies." If we ponder that phrase and its inferences we shall
have small need of further testimony.

After their long and trying march to Sourdon the troops had one
more call to answer. An enemy column had found a gap at Montdidier
and taken advantage of it. By 8 a.m. on the morning of the 28th
it was over two miles west of the town. At 12-30 p.m. General
Nugent received an order signed by General Débeney, commanding the
First French Army, to the effect that he was massing artillery at
Coullemelle, and that he required all infantry at his disposal to
cover it. All troops of the 107th and 109th Brigades that could be
collected were moved down to Coullemelle, and took up a position
covering the French batteries. They were in position at about
five in the evening. Subsequently came a message from the French
requesting that they should be moved to Villers-Tournelle, two
miles south-east of Coullemelle. But the French troops on the spot
informed our men that the situation had improved, the enemy having
been counter-attacked and driven back. Patrols sent out to Cantigny,
another mile and a half east of Villers-Tournelle, found the French
infantry solidly placed and unattacked. The night being very wet
and cold, the majority of the force was therefore withdrawn into
the houses of Coullemelle, piquets being posted south-east of the
village, and patrols keeping touch through the night with the French
in front.

The following day the march was continued. And now the weary
troops saw heartening sights upon the route. Column after column
of lorries, little Annamite drivers at the wheel, packed with the
dark blue uniforms of the Chasseurs Alpins, roared by them. At some
points there were serious blocks in the traffic. At Essertaux,
where General Nugent had his headquarters for a few hours, he was
succeeded by General Mangin, commanding the IX. French Corps. The
French were really now in strength. Attack and counter-attack were to
rage here a few days longer. Up north, upon the Scarpe, Below's great
final thrust had been heavily defeated. The German advance was stayed
at last.

On the morning of the 30th, after a night spent in the open in cold
and wet, the troops of the 36th Division were entrained at Saleux,
south of Amiens, now half-deserted and racked by bomb and shell,
and moved north to the area of Gamaches, on the Norman coast, for
reorganization.

Remains only to be related the last actions of the Artillery. On the
evening of the 25th it had withdrawn with the 62nd French Division
through the forest south of the Roye-Noyon Road, coming under the
orders of a new French Division, the 77th, on the morrow. On that
day, when the infantry was beginning its grapple at Andechy, an
important battle opened against the Germans debouching from Noyon,
upon the line Cannectancourt--Canny-sur-Matz. Here the Germans made
little progress. Attack after attack on the afternoon of the 27th was
beaten off, the barrage fire being very effective and earning high
praise from the French commanders. On the 28th the Germans succeeded
in entering Canny, but made no progress elsewhere. On the morning
of the 30th desperate German attacks penetrated some distance into
the French positions, taking the vital height of Plémont Hill. In
the afternoon, however, a brilliant counter-attack was carried out,
splendidly supported by our artillery. The whole line was restored,
and over seven hundred prisoners taken.

The French now had their own batteries in action. On March the 31st
the Artillery began its march back to Poix, the concentration area
for refitment. It had carried out a great task in a manner worthy of
the highest traditions of the Royal Regiment.

If this narrative has been faithful, and if--a task far harder to
accomplish--it has appealed to the imagination, there remains little
need to discuss the causes of the greatest defeat suffered by British
arms since York Town. The German victory was a victory of superior
numbers, but it was more than that. It was a victory of training.
While our thin-strung battalions were digging, Ludendorff trained his
great host, collected astride the Oise. He taught it what armies were
forgetting, how to advance without barrage or tanks. He instilled
into it the offensive spirit, and saw that it reached the very
corporals commanding light machine-gun groups. They it was who won
him his battle.

But, if the defence was overwhelmed by superior numbers, it seems
clear that it broke down earlier than it need have done, and that
the fault lay in its organization. The Forward Zone was little more
than a screen, and was so regarded. Yet it was held by three whole
battalions on the front of each Division. The orders were that the
enclosed keeps, even in the front system, were to resist to the
last. The whole position in front of the Battle Zone may be regarded
as the outpost line. This outpost line, manned by a third of the
infantry force of each Division, was not to retire and was not to
be reinforced. The first shock of the attack swept this third away.
It was defence in detail, not defence in depth, and in detail it
was defeated. Defence in depth may be defined as successive lines
of organized defence, upon which the defenders can fall back in
succession, always finding some fresh troops on the new position,
so that the line becomes gradually stronger as it falls back, until
at last is reached the line upon which the real defence is to be
made. Gallantly as they strove, much as they accomplished, the three
battalions in the Forward Zone of the 36th Division were wasted under
the Fifth Army scheme.

As for the lines of the St. Quentin and Somme Canals, which might
have been very formidable, there had been no preliminary organization
of their defence, nor even reconnaissance with that end in view. When
the moment came the defence had to be improvised.

[Illustration: Map VI.
The Retreat of March, 1918.]

This does not detract from, but rather increases, the
magnificence of the defence of the 36th Division, and indeed of the
whole of the XVIII. Corps, which had sixteen German Divisions, in
front and second line, against its four. There is at least every
reason to suppose that, had all gone elsewhere as on the front of the
XVIII. Corps, the full weight of reinforcements would have arrived
before the enemy had forced the lines of the St. Quentin and Somme
Canals. In that case the war would undoubtedly have had a speedier
ending.

FOOTNOTES:

[52] These men were evidently advancing from
Saulchoy-sur-Davenescourt, into which a number of the enemy had
filtered in the darkness.

[53] Returned prisoners of war informed Captain Miller, whose diary
has been drawn upon in this chapter, that the streets of Erches,
through which they were marched, were littered with German dead.
So, as he remarks in a letter to the writer, the affair "was not so
one-sided as it looked."

CHAPTER XII

FLANDERS: THE 108TH BRIGADE IN THE MESSINES-KEMMEL BATTLE:[54] APRIL
TO JUNE 1918

The 36th Division had a glance only, infinitely tantalizing, at the
beautiful valley of the Bresle, with its pastures and woodlands,
and snug villages in which the troops were billeted, from Gamaches,
several miles inland, to the little pleasure-resort of Ault on the
coast. A short rest in these surroundings would have been delightful.
But there was no rest for anyone for a long time to come, nor could
be. The last trains did not arrive in the area till the morning of
April the 1st; the last trains left it, bearing the remnants of the
Division towards Ypres, on the 4th. For the old battlefield, still
known as the Salient, was its new destination.

The interval had been spent in reorganization and the absorption of
the Entrenching Battalions, originally formed in February from the
surplus personnel of the infantry, which had accompanied the Division
north. They did not go very far to fill the gaps caused by the
prodigious casualties. The word gaps, in fact, is inapplicable. The
infantry of the Division had disappeared. The 108th Brigade had been
reduced to a little over three hundred, mostly transport and employed
men. The total casualties in the Division in the ten days from March
21st were 7,252. Of these, 185 officers and 5,659 other ranks were
reported missing. Perhaps four-fifths of these were prisoners of war,
wounded or unwounded. It was a very weak Division which detrained at
Proven and other stations further west.

From the day of its arrival, however, it began to receive very
large drafts from the flood of recruits that now poured across the
Channel. Bitter criticisms have been heard of the policy which had
kept so many troops in England till then. Whatever their justice
in some cases, they have none where the drafts now received by the
36th Division are concerned; for of these eighty or ninety per cent.
consisted of boys of nineteen, with far from adequate training. In
some cases these youths, almost before they knew their officers by
sight, were to be put to the severest test, and were to emerge from
it with quite astonishing credit.

Divisional Headquarters, in which Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Thompson,
D.S.O., Indian Army, had succeeded Colonel Place as G.S.O.1, were
established at Ten Elms Camp, near Poperinghe, on April the 3rd. On
the night of the 6th the Division began relieving the southern part
of the front held by the 1st Division. By the morning of the 8th the
relief was complete, the 107th Brigade being in front line, the 109th
in support, and Divisional Headquarters on the Canal Bank a mile
north of Ypres.[55]

The new front line included the village of Poelcappelle, which
consisted now of a few "pill-boxes" and naught besides. The area
behind it had been the scene of the most savage fighting on the
British front, and was simply a waste of shell-holes, traversed by
"duck-board" tracks. In rear, however, camps had sprung up amidst the
desolation. Ypres, of all places under the sky, boasted an officers'
club. There was a railway station at St. Jean, which those who had
seen the campaign of 1917 remembered as one of the most unpleasant
spots upon the front, and a mass of sidings at Wieltje, which had
been infinitely worse. Not for long was the area to enjoy these
amenities, nor Ypres its unwonted isolation from the enemy. On the
9th the troops heard a tremendous bombardment to the south. The
enemy's offensive on the Lys had opened.

From Givenchy, where they were magnificently held, to the
neighbourhood of Gapaard, on a front of some twenty miles, the
Germans had broken through. On the front of the Portuguese Corps the
line was shattered, and the German wave flowed up the low valley of
the Lys. The battered city of Armentières fell. For two or three days
no real resistance could be organized across the gap, and the Germans
pushed west upon Hazebrouck, a most important railway junction.
Estaires, ten miles west of Armentières, was occupied by the evening
of the 10th. By that time troops of the 36th Division were upon the
scene of action.

The 108th Brigade was in II. Corps reserve. At noon on the 10th it
received orders to move at once to Kemmel, with "C" Company of the
Machine-Gun Battalion. 'Buses were provided for dismounted personnel.
The 'bus column, moving _via_ La Clytte, reached Kemmel village at
4-15 p.m., the Brigade coming under the orders of the G.O.C. 19th
Division. That Division, with the 9th, had been fighting hotly for
the defence of the Messines Ridge. The admirable steadiness of their
young recruits and the gallant fashion in which their counter-attacks
had been launched form a brilliant page in the history of the war,
and helped to turn the Lys offensive, huge as were its gains, into
one of the most expensive and fruitless of the great series of German
assaults. General Griffith was ordered to put his Brigade into the
Kemmel defences. His headquarters were established in Kemmel Château.

Shortly after midnight General Griffith received orders to move up
to the Messines Ridge, in support of the weak South African Brigade
of the 9th Division, which had been thrown into the battle under
the orders of the 19th. The 1st Irish Fusiliers took up a line on
the Messines-Wytschaete Road, from five hundred yards north of the
former village to the neighbourhood of the 36th Division's old
acquaintance, Pick House. The 12th Rifles was on the Spanbroek Ridge
in support; the 9th Fusiliers about the old British front line on
the Wulverghem-Messines Road. The morning passed fairly quietly, but
there was ominous news as to the German advance north of Ploegsteert.
General Griffith received a secret warning order that, in the
event of the enemy capturing Hill 63, the whole line would have to
pivot back across the Spanbroek Ridge and its prolongation east of
Wulverghem, south of which village touch would be obtained with the
25th Division.

At half-past three, after heavy bombardment, the enemy launched an
attack upon the crest-road. The South Africans on the left were
pushed off it, and the line of the 1st Irish Fusiliers broken. A very
gallant counter-attack by Fusiliers and South Africans, side by side,
restored the position, though subsequent pressure on the left of the
latter forced them to bend back somewhat from the road toward Hell
Farm. At 7 p.m. came another assault, in face of which the Fusiliers
lost not a yard of ground. None of the officers who took those raw
boys into action can have dared to expect of them such steadiness and
resolution as they now displayed.

At night, however, came orders to carry into effect the movement
anticipated in the warning order. The advance of the enemy to the
south had made it only too necessary. The ridge must go, though the
9th Division was still to cling to its northern crown, the village of
Wytschaete. The retirement was carried out before dawn, but it was
discovered on its completion that there was no touch with the left
flank of the 25th Division. After a great deal of trouble, this was
attained by withdrawing the right of the 108th Brigade some hundred
yards.

All day was heavy shelling, but no infantry attack developed till
after six o'clock. On this occasion, as always, the Germans placed
great reliance upon a local assault delivered as dusk was falling,
which just permitted attackers to consolidate a position won, and
gave no time for a counter-attack before the pall of darkness
descended. Such a night as this, which would be lit scarce at all by
the thin sickle of a new moon, was peculiarly favourable to these
tactics.

They were, however, unsuccessful. Once again the defence of the 108th
Brigade prevailed. The left of the 9th Fusiliers was driven back.
Quickly a counter-attack was launched. The reserve company of the
9th, led by the commanding officer of the battalion, Lieut.-Colonel
P. E. Kelly, and a company of the 12th Rifles, led by Major Holt
Waring, most gallantly restored the position. By eight o'clock
all was quiet. But casualties had been heavy. The 1st Fusiliers
in particular had had very serious losses the previous day on the
Messines Ridge. This battalion was reorganized as a company, and
attached to the 9th. During the night there was no touch with troops
of the 25th Division, the gap having formed owing to the advance
of the enemy on Neuve Eglise and the consequent lengthening of the
line. In the early hours of April the 13th a battalion of the 178th
Brigade, now attached to the 19th Division, was moved up to fill it.

The 13th was a day of continuous alarms. Parties of the enemy made
attempts at dawn to advance by short rushes on the front of the
12th Rifles, east of Wulverghem, but were beaten off with loss by
Lewis-gun and rifle fire. A couple of hours later fresh attacks
appeared to be brewing. Parties of Germans were dispersed by the
fire of machine and Lewis guns. The former were excellently placed
by an officer who knew every foot of the ground, Captain Walker, in
old positions which he had often held before the Battle of Messines
in 1917. Then, all through the afternoon, small parties of the enemy
strove to make ground under cover of the old camouflage screens upon
the Messines-Wulverghem Road. They were counter-attacked and driven
off, suffering considerable casualties from the fire of Lewis guns.
The position on the right flank was, however, more desperate than
ever. At nine o'clock had come from the 25th Division the evil news
that the Germans were in Neuve Eglise.

During the night the 9th Fusiliers was relieved by troops of the
178th Brigade, and withdrawn to the dug-outs on Kemmel Hill. The 12th
Rifles remained in line. The relieved battalion was not given long
to rest. Before noon it was ordered to man the Kemmel defences, and
to send up its company of the 1st Fusiliers to dug-outs behind the
old British front line opposite Kruisstraat Cabaret. The 14th may be
accounted a quiet day, since it passed without infantry attack. But
the volume of artillery fire was immense, and distributed to a great
depth in rear of the positions held. "Green Kemmel Hill," as one
officer wrote, "was turning brown before our eyes." And the enemy was
definitely in possession of Neuve Eglise.

At 10-30 p.m. orders were received from the 19th Division for an
immediate withdrawal west of Wulverghem. This was carried out
before dawn, the line pivoting back on the left of the 12th Rifles,
which joined up with the 178th Brigade west of the village. It was
completed only just in time. With morning light the Germans opened an
intense bombardment on the new position, which, for the greater part
of its length, followed no old British trench. An infantry attack
followed, and bodies of Germans broke through at the junction of the
12th Rifles and 178th Brigade. A counter-attack by the 1st Irish
Fusiliers and the scanty reserves of the 12th Rifles, led by Major
Holt Waring, failed to restore the position, but prevented the enemy
gaining further ground on the left. Major Waring, a most gallant
officer and a born leader of men, was killed. The left and centre of
the 12th Rifles were very wisely withdrawn a few hundred yards to a
famous communication trench of old days, known as "Kingsway." From
this there was a fairly good field of fire. The 9th Irish Fusiliers
had now been moved up from the Kemmel defences, and was ordered to
send up two platoons to connect the right flank in "Kingsway" with
the original line west of Wulverghem. These two platoons had an
unfortunate fate. At dusk they were almost surrounded by groups of
the enemy pressing forward, and were forced to fall back some hundred
yards with heavy casualties.

At 2-15 a.m. on the 16th the little remnant of the Brigade began to
withdraw on relief, covered by small outposts. It then marched back
to a camp near La Clytte, suffering numerous casualties on its route
from shell-fire. Four machine-guns remained near Kemmel village.
The enemy was now indulging in what were known to artillerymen as
area bombardments, concentrating upon half a square mile of country
for half an hour, then switching his batteries to another. Such
methods are ineffective unless based upon an enormous mass of heavy
artillery. With this available, as it was on this occasion, they
are extraordinarily noxious and demoralizing. Reserves, tired units
withdrawn for a short rest, are kept constantly on the strain, ever
wondering when their turn is coming, compelled hurriedly to shift
position when it does. Severe loss and disorganization are caused to
transport piqueted in the open or bringing up rations and munitions.
A spot undisturbed at one minute becomes the centre-point of a
hellish tornado at the next.

April the 16th, while the men of the 108th Brigade, wearied out
and dazed by shell-fire, snatched what rest they could, was the
occasion of furious fighting at Wytschaete. The village was lost in
the morning, and retaken by a magnificent counter-attack of those
veritable paladins of modern war, the Highland Brigade of the 9th
Division. It could not be held on the morrow owing to its isolation,
and the line had to be withdrawn to the neighbourhood of the old
British trenches of 1917. The 17th, to many observers, appeared the
blackest day they had seen. Almost everywhere the gains of years of
desperate fighting had been lost. Passchendaele and Poelcappelle--to
which there will be further reference when we return to the fortunes
of the 36th Division--were gone. Huge slices of territory on which
the Germans had never stood, or over which they had been hustled in
retreat, were now in their possession. Bailleul, which had been at
many periods a Corps Headquarters, had fallen. From villages such
as Westoutre, where they had lived in comparative peace since 1914,
the villagers were rushing out under shell-fire, pushing barrows,
staggering under the burden of huge bundles, across the fields.
Men asked whether we had any reserves remaining, whether the young
American formations would ever be ready, whether the Channel ports
could be saved.

And yet, though none who watched can have guessed it, hardly even
the great soldier now in supreme command of the Allied Armies, or
his British colleague, the day may have marked a turning-point.
The French were hurrying north. Their troops were already in line
on the right of the 9th Division; their field artillery, the
"seventy-fives," rushed up, each at the tail of a lorry which carried
the detachment, were lining the hills, the Scherpenberg, Mont Rouge,
and Mont Vidaigne. The German infantry was suffering heavy loss.
Black as was the night, there was, if as yet no faintest light of
dawn, the paler gray on the horizon which is its herald.

On the evening of that day orders were received for the formation of
the Brigade, which could now muster about four hundred rifles, into
a composite battalion. This battalion, under the command of Colonel
Kelly, was ordered to move down behind Kemmel Hill, in reserve, to
be in position by 4 a.m. next morning. It encountered a storm of
shelling on its way, having seventy casualties. Among the killed
here was Captain Despard, 9th Irish Fusiliers, who had shown great
tenacity and fine leadership during the retreat of the previous
month. All day the battalion remained here, under very heavy fire,
from which Kemmel now afforded but slight protection. At evening it
was withdrawn, French troops having taken over the defence of this
part of the line. The remnants of the Brigade marched all night, to
Siege Camp and Hospital Farm, between Poperinghe and Elverdinghe,
rejoining the 36th Division at 5-30 a.m. on the 19th of April.

The Brigade had, for the second time in a month, been cut to pieces.
The 12th Rifles alone had had upwards of fifteen hundred casualties
in that period. One often saw in our summaries of intelligence
reference to reports that such and such a German formation had had
particularly heavy losses, followed by a statement that it might
be considered negligible for some time to come. Few can have had
losses higher than those of the 108th Brigade, which had, as has been
recorded, practically disappeared by the end of March. Yet in ten
days' time this Brigade had entered another great battle, to prove
itself very far from negligible. The admiration one feels for its
achievements is mingled with surprise when one thinks of the youth
and lack of experience in its ranks. Well did it merit its share of
the commendation expressed in a telegram received from the G.O.C.
IX. Corps the day before it was finally relieved. The message ran as
follows:

"The C. in C. has just been at Corps H.Q. He would have liked to see
all ranks now fighting on the 9th Corps front, and to tell each one
of them of his personal appreciation of the magnificent fight they
have made and are making. He would like to shake hands with each
individual and thank him for what he has done. He has not time for
this, but has asked me to give everybody this message."

The 36th Division, when the 108th Brigade departed on its desperate
lone venture, was left with its front line east of Poelcappelle, and
its headquarters on the Canal Bank. On that very day, March the 10th,
the Army Commander decided to withdraw the II. Corps to its Battle
Zone, here practically the British front line of 1917. The right of
the 36th Division would now be just in front of Wieltje, so well
known of old. An outpost line was, however, to be maintained upon the
Steenebeek.

The retirement was absolutely essential, nor could it be delayed.
By April the 11th the Germans were approaching the Forest of
Nieppe. Passchendaele and Poelcappelle now protruded, an incredible
salient, that made the old Ypres Salient unremarkable by comparison.
Nevertheless, a few nights' respite was allowed, in order that the
enemy might be deprived of the booty, and of the shelter for future
operations, that had otherwise fallen to him. The heavy artillery
was to move back first, bringing back all the ammunition that
could possibly be carried, and tipping that which could not into
shell-holes. An extensive programme of demolitions was planned by the
C.R.E. Every dug-out or "pill-box" of importance was to be destroyed
by explosives at the last possible moment. Craters were to be blown
at important road-junctions. Light railways were to be, as far as
possible, torn up or otherwise demolished.

There was a feverish rush by the Engineers, assisted by Infantry
working-parties, to do the work in the scanty time available. Most of
the forward demolitions were carried out by the 122nd Field Company,
now commanded by Major W. Smyth, who had greatly distinguished
himself during the March retreat as an _attaché_ to the Divisional
Staff. They were very effective. The 121st Field Company dammed the
Steenebeek in an attempt to make it a more formidable obstacle, and
began the construction of a new line behind it. The 150th Field
Company prepared ten bridges over the Ypres Canal for demolition. The
world knows that none of these bridges was ever "sent up," but may
not know by how little their destruction was averted.

On the night of the 11th of April the withdrawal of the heavy
artillery to cover the Battle Zone began, being completed three
days later. The field artillery also moved back, leaving, however,
forward guns in action by night, to deceive the enemy as to the
British intentions. All was now prepared in rear. It remained only
to withdraw the two battalions manning the outpost positions, firing
the charges for the demolitions as they retired. This was carried
out on the night of the 15th. Necessary as was the task, it was one
which could not but inspire disappointment and regret. In a night the
British Army was abandoning ground which had been profusely watered
with its blood, and had taken long months in winning. The enemy
advanced very slowly and cautiously on the morrow, heavily shelling
Poelcappelle, now a mile and a half from the outposts, before he
ventured to occupy it.

The Belgian Army was extending its front, as a helping hand in time
of adversity. On the night of April the 18th the 4th Belgian Division
relieved the 30th Division, on the left of the 36th, taking over the
front of one battalion of the 107th Brigade. The next week passed
quietly, the infantry showing aggression against the enemy outposts,
capturing six prisoners in patrol affairs on successive nights.
Divisional Headquarters were withdrawn from the Canal Bank to Border
Camp, in the woodlands north of the Vlamertinghe-Poperinghe Road.
For a couple of days the Steenebeek became the line of resistance,
with outposts on the east bank. But Kemmel, so many miles in rear,
had fallen, and the Germans were attacking north of it. General
Plumer felt himself compelled to order a further withdrawal. The
Ypres Canal was now to be the line of resistance. That decision, it
is believed, has never been realized by people in England. Battered
Ypres, small as was its actual importance of late, had been all
through the war a sort of lodestar to the Germans. The best blood of
England had been spilt in its defence. And now, theoretically, it
was in the front line. Theoretically only, however, it may happily
be recorded. An outpost line over two thousand yards east of it was
maintained, and, as the German troops on the immediate front remained
unaggressive--they had had a heavy defeat from the Belgians further
north a few days previously--and the Lys Battle died down, lines in
rear were gradually improved and dispositions altered, so that they
might be held in greater strength in the event of an attack.

The second withdrawal of the 36th Division was evidently anticipated
by the Germans, who followed it closely. An officer and two men of
the 31st Landwehr Division, over impetuous, were captured. One party
of the enemy, pressing swiftly on, entered Juliet Farm, a point which
the 107th Brigade had been ordered to retain. Both the "pill-box"
and Canopus Trench, in its neighbourhood, were retaken next night,
together with an enemy machine-gun. The 109th Brigade on the right
took five prisoners.

On the following day a great attack was launched by the Germans from
south of Meteren to Voormezeele, upon the French D.A.N.[56] and
the Second British Army. Everywhere it was completely and bloodily
repulsed. To the enemy it was a terrible check. April the 29th, 1918,
deserves to rank as high as the following 8th of August[57] in the
history of the war. It marked the failure of the German northward
offensive. For failure that offensive was, as the Somme offensive was
not. The tenacity of troops on the flanks, such as the 55th Division
on the right and the 9th on the left, had confined and narrowed the
thrust. The curious formation of great hills, in almost straight line
across the Flanders plain; Kemmel, the Scherpenberg, Mont Rouge,
Mont Vidaigne, Mont Noir, Mont Kokereele, Mont des Cats, then, after
a gap, Cassel, proved an impassable barrier in later stages of the
battle. The first of the series alone fell. Upon the rest French
artillery was now massed, pouring death into the Germans below. A few
days earlier Ludendorff had, at a critical moment, struck again at
Amiens. That offensive, which might have changed the whole position,
had been pushed back before counter-attacks, and nipped in bud by the
brilliant recapture of Villers-Bretonneux by the Australian Corps.
The Germans were to make new offensives and gain much ground, notably
near Rheims, where they cut the main Eastern Railway, and came all
too close to Paris at Château-Thierry. But they were the blows of
desperation. Week by week drew nearer the great retribution.

The next six weeks passed quietly for the 36th Division. The chief
diversion was about a little dug-out near Juliet Farm, in the front
line, formerly a Signals testing-point for overhead wires. Here
there was constant bombing and raiding, largely to the disadvantage
of the German troops, who were not of first quality and were unable
to withstand our men in close fighting. During the month of May
fourteen prisoners were taken by the Division on seven separate
occasions. One night a German wagon with rations drove into our
outpost position in error and was captured, so indeterminate were the
opposing front lines. The 36th Divisional Artillery had returned and
taken over the defence of the front before the end of April. Early
in May it received, with all other British divisional artilleries in
France, a proportion of Indian personnel for its D.A.C., to replace
English drivers. These were thereupon sent back for training as
gunners.

During this period there occurred a great change in the command
of the Division. Within three weeks three general officers long
associated with it returned to England. On May the 6th Major-General
O. S. Nugent, C.B., D.S.O., was succeeded by Major-General Clifford
Coffin, V.C., D.S.O., in the command of the Division, General Nugent
proceeding next day to England, preparatory to taking up a command in
India. As long as the 36th Division is remembered, General Nugent's
name will be associated with it. His whole existence was centred
upon it; he was intensely proud of its achievements and jealous for
its good name. It owed much to him, particularly to his training in
the early days after its arrival in France. His successor, General
Coffin, was an officer of the Royal Engineers, with a reputation
for vigour, and a Victoria Cross gained for great bravery at Ypres.
Just before General Nugent, General Withycombe and, just after him,
General Griffith gave up command of the 107th and 108th Brigades
respectively. General Withycombe had commanded his Brigade from
within a few days of its arrival in France, except for a short
period in 1917 when he had commanded a Brigade in England, and had
inspired affection and trust in all its ranks. His headquarters was
always a happy family, and a hospitable one, as the present writer
would be ingrate were he to refrain from recording. The war leaves
few pleasanter memories than those of meals at friendly boards
after much perambulating of trenches. General Griffith had arrived
a little later, and his service with the Division was actually
longer. His imperturbability and resource in moments of emergency
had often served it and his own Brigade well. Their successors were
Brigadier-General E. J. de S. Thorpe, D.S.O., in the 107th Brigade,
and Brigadier-General E. Vaughan, D.S.O., in the 108th.

[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL C. C. COFFIN, V.C., C.B., D.S.O.]

The 36th Division had indeed enjoyed the continuity of tradition and
purpose which comes from a long tenour of command by senior officers.
General Nugent, General Withycombe, General Griffith, General Brock,
in the Divisional Artillery, had now commanded for two and a half
years. In the 109th Brigade had been more frequent changes, but two
of its Brigadiers, Generals Ricardo and Hessey, who between them
commanded it for two years, had previously commanded two of its
battalions.

In the early days of June came a most welcome relief, just when the
country was at its best. Handing over the defence of the line to the
12th Belgian Division, the 36th moved back to the agreeable wooded
area between Poperinghe and Proven. It was now in II. Corps reserve,
ready if necessary to support the right flank of the Belgian Army.
One Brigade, two Field Companies, and two companies of the Pioneer
battalion, were at the disposal of the II. Corps for work on rear
defences. There was now, men said, "wire from Ypres to Calais."
Between Ypres and Poperinghe, six miles apart, were no less than four
well-defended lines: the Brielen defences, and the Green, Yellow,
and Blue Lines. In rear of Poperinghe were plenty more. The troops
working upon these defences were relieved periodically, the other
formations and units carrying out training. The Artillery put one
section per battery into positions prepared for the defence of the
Blue Line, in the event of another great attack, which still appeared
not improbable.

The troops benefited very greatly from this welcome respite, the
first the Division had had for a year, if the few days in the snow
at Christmas be excepted. The young soldiers who now for the most
part filled the ranks grew strong under the influence of good food,
exercise, and life in the open under pleasant conditions. Their
fitness for battle increased swiftly under that of steady training.
There was plenty of sport, football, cricket, running, and boxing, in
all of which their neighbours, the Belgians, took a hand. The only
trouble was the extraordinary epidemic of influenza which swept over
the world that summer, and visited all the armies in the field. Some
German divisions, it was reported, were for a time not in a fit state
to move or fight owing to its ravages. In the prevalent fine weather,
fortunately, men recovered quickly from its effects.

The 36th Division had great tasks yet before it. It had to swing
its hammer in the mighty line of destroyers that was to crush in
the German defences and open the road to final victory. For those
tasks that sunny month of June out of line was, as a prelude, of
inestimable worth. After the dazing and deadening effect, the
_abrutissement_ of a battle, nothing told so much on the dash and
energy of troops as long, dreary months of trench warfare, even in
a line relatively quiet. They lost not only their physical agility,
their power to march and run, but their mental power as well. A spell
such as this gave them not only new strength, but new heart, new
spirit, new hope. Affairs might be gloomy, but gloom was dispersed by
the sun, like the Flanders mists. When the Division next entered the
line, it was once again a fine fighting force.

That event came in the first week of July. The French, who, after
losing Kemmel, had made a very fine stand at Locre, the vital gateway
to the valley between the Scherpenberg and Mont Rouge, were now being
relieved by the British along the line of the hills. After three
days about Cassel, in reserve to the French XVI. Corps, the 36th
Division relieved the 41st French Division on the northern skirts
of Bailleul. Divisional Headquarters were established at Terdeghem,
with a command post on the Mont des Cats prepared for emergencies.
The sudden move had almost, but not quite, succeeded in spoiling
a very fine Divisional Horse Show, held at Proven, in beautiful
weather and surroundings, on July the 3rd. Upon this the officers
of the neighbouring Belgian Cavalry Division, including an Olympic
competitor, descended like wolves on the fold, giving a remarkable
display of skill and horsemanship, and taking practically all the
prizes for jumping events.

The Division was to hold this line for upwards of two months, then to
go forward upon the enemy's heels. Nor was it ever again to be forced
to give ground. The gray blur on the horizon was brighter now; the
light was not far off.

FOOTNOTES:

[54] The official description of the fighting on April 10th and 11th
is the Battle of Messines, 1918. It is safe to prophesy that the
official nomenclature will never in this case, nor in many others,
become the popular one. The 108th Brigade also took part in the
action officially known as the Battle of Bailleul, dated from the
13th to the 15th of April, 1918.

[55] On this date there died, at Rouen, of wounds received in March,
one of the most gallant and popular C.O.'s the Division ever had,
Lieutenant-Colonel P. E. K. Blair Oliphant, C.M.G., D.S.O., who had
served with it from earliest days, first with the 11th Rifles, and
later in command of the 11th/13th Battalion of that Regiment.

[56] Détachement des Armées du Nord.

[57] The opening of the Amiens offensive.

CHAPTER XIII

BACK TO THE MESSINES RIDGE: JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1918

The new sector was at the north-west corner of the great salient
made by the Lys offensive. It ran from Fontainehouck, a hamlet
north-east of Meteren, which was in the hands of the enemy, to the
high ground south of the Croix de Poperinghe. It was about a mile
and a half north of Bailleul. Here, as all along the line of hills,
the enemy was at heavy disadvantage. His territory was overlooked.
Every movement, every gun-flash, could be noted from Mont Noir and
the other hills. Bailleul crumbled away before the eyes of our men.
St. Jans Cappel, for so long Divisional Headquarters in days that now
seemed very far away, was not far behind the front line. It was to a
great extent destroyed. Many of the isolated farms, with which that
countryside is bestrewn, were, however, undamaged, right up to the
front line. The country was deep in crops, the wheat having to be cut
round the outposts to prevent surprise attacks and provide a field of
fire. As for vegetables, the men had all the potatoes and green peas
they could eat without walking a hundred yards from where they slept.
After Ypres, it was a very agreeable position. German artillery
fire was not as a rule severe, owing to the fact that the battery
positions were overlooked from the hills. The worst disturbance
was caused by night bombing, assiduously practised by the enemy.
Casualties were low. They would have been lower had our troops been
as circumspect in following the hedges, and confining their movement
to the night, as their predecessors, the French, had been. But the
lesson of "lying low," so well learnt by Frenchman and German, never
had been mastered by the British soldier, nor ever was.

On July the 19th the 9th Division, in line on the right, captured
Meteren, the Artillery of the 36th Division co-operating in the
attack. The 36th Division did not at first strive to improve its
position in a similar way, but contented itself with raids on a large
scale. One, by the 109th Brigade, resulted in very heavy fighting,
the enemy being on the alert. Though the enemy's casualties were
estimated at thirty, and a prisoner was taken, the raid hardly ranked
as a success, since our casualties were seventeen, including four
men missing. The 107th Brigade, on the left, had a more satisfactory
venture. A strong patrol of the 2nd Rifles surrounded a farm in which
there was an enemy garrison of ten. Two of these were taken prisoner,
the rest killed. The patrol had not a casualty, despite heavy
machine-gun fire. Further prisoners were taken by the 107th Brigade
on a later occasion, while the only raid attempted by the enemy, from
Haagedoorne, where his troops held the old railhead, was beaten off
by rifle fire, even though the Germans got within twenty yards of the
outposts before being seen.

An interesting event of this period was the visit of His Majesty the
King to the area. On August the 6th, at Oxelaere, a little village
on the slopes of Cassel Hill, he presented to Lieutenant Knox, 150th
Field Company, R.E., the Victoria Cross won by him during the March
retreat in circumstances that have been described. On the following
Sunday His Majesty attended a parade service at Terdeghem, where were
Divisional Headquarters.

The 36th Division, being in the Second Army, was not destined to
take part in the early great counter-offensives that raised all
men's spirits and showed the world that at last the tide had turned.
The first of these had been French, though four of the best British
Divisions had played their part in it. In what is now known as the
Battle of Tardenois, beginning on July the 18th, the salient of the
great German advance to Château-Thierry had been crushed in, and the
enemy routed, with great loss of prisoners and booty. Then, on the
8th of August, came a second mighty blow. The Fourth British and
First French Armies began a great offensive down the Amiens-Roye
Road. The quality of the resistance with which it was met showed that
German discipline and German steadfastness were weakening at last. On
the 21st the British Third Army, and a little later the First Army,
launched still greater attacks, sweeping swiftly across the waste of
the old Somme battlefield, and once more approaching the Hindenburg
Line. Before that was reached the 36th Division, up in Flanders, was
again in action.

Various local offensives had been planned, to take from the enemy
what little good ground he held near the point of his salient. The
9th Division's capture of Meteren has been mentioned. At the end
of July, the 1st Australian Division, further south, had retaken
Merris. On August the 18th the 9th Division carried out a further
successful operation, capturing the important Hoegenacker Ridge,
south-east of Meteren. It was now the turn of the 36th Division to
improve its position. On August the 22nd an attack carried out by
the 15th Rifles, on the right of the line, advanced it a quarter
of a mile on a front of half a mile. Twenty-two prisoners and two
machine-guns were captured. A curious and vastly effective ruse was
employed in conjunction with this operation. The demoralising effect
of the Livens projector upon the enemy was well known, but its use,
charged with gas, would have prevented any immediate attack by our
troops upon the area bombarded. The drums were therefore filled with
a scent which resembled the smell of gas. Many of the enemy had run
back before our men advanced, while others were caught wearing their
respirators.

Two days later an attack on the left by the 1st and 9th Irish
Fusiliers, under a barrage of smoke and shrapnel, advanced the line
to the Haagedoorne-Dranoutre Road on a front of upwards of a mile. So
great was the surprise and so swift the assault, that the enemy was
"smothered," and did not make a serious resistance. Sixty prisoners
and eleven machine-guns were taken here. An enemy counter-attack in
the evening was brought to a stop by rifle and machine-gun fire,
though the 108th Brigade lost one small post. The line was now a
thousand yards only from Bailleul, and the defences of the town
were pierced. An attack upon the salient would now have resulted in
a great German rout. The enemy did not await it. Under the skilful
leadership, that was never more apparent than in the months of defeat
and humiliation which were to follow, he flitted in a night.

The 36th Division, on the morning of August the 30th, was awaiting
relief by the 35th Division, to be given a short period of rest
and training before being launched upon the great series of final
offensives in Flanders. Its right-hand neighbour, the 9th Division,
had already been relieved by the 31st Division on the Hoegenacker
Ridge, with a like object. That rest the 36th Division was not
destined to enjoy. At ten o'clock that morning came a report from the
31st Division that the enemy was gone from its front, and that its
men were entering Bailleul from the south. Before two o'clock patrols
of the 36th were in the huge Asylum north of the town, and upon the
Neuve Eglise Road. The relief was cancelled and an immediate advance
ordered, to be carried out by the 109th Brigade.

This was not the first enemy retirement in the Western theatre. There
had been that of 1917, in which some of the troops now in the 36th
Division had been the pursuers. No doubt the men who had then tracked
the retreating Germans had felt elation. But that had been false
dawn. Now, as men sprang up eagerly to set about their preparations,
a conviction spread among them that this was the true, that not again
would they have to turn back. Some of our present-day pessimists
pretend that by the summer of 1918 the horror, the iron ruthlessness,
of the war had robbed men of their stores of latent enthusiasm, and
that, even for victory, they had none to summon forth.

It is untrue. Were it true, they could not have so swiftly prevailed
against an enemy, disheartened indeed, but still disciplined,
tenacious and well led, still admirably equipped, and, above all,
backed by a series of defences such as the Allies, in their days
of adversity, had never dreamed of. All testimony, moreover, is to
the contrary. Like a flame the spirit of victory, the bright-hued
prospect of deliverance, spread among all ranks. Defeat and
retirement had bred melancholy and bad temper. The new atmosphere
dissipated them. To go forward, to strike, to make an end--those were
the impulses and the hopes that swept through the waiting ranks.

The ground immediately to be recovered had a double appeal, a
sentimental interest. It was that which had been the area of the
Division for a year. The Château of St. Jans Cappel had been
Divisional Headquarters for the greater part of that period. The
remains of that pleasant villa--_heu quantum mutata!_--were to
shelter General Coffin's staff during the advance.[58] On the
Ravelsberg Ridge, the first objective, had been the Divisional
School. In Neuve Eglise, the second, had been a Brigade Headquarters.
Not a house, not a lane, not a forlorn camp with shell-punctured
hutments, not a machine-gun position further forward in the old
battle-line, but was known to some of the officers and men now making
ready to advance. There was triumph even, mingled with the pathos,
in re-entering poor, battered Bailleul, which had been a good friend
in time past. From a handsome town it was become a mass of ruins,
so completely destroyed that, across a fine central _place_ of
several acres, there was now but a single narrow track for transport
through the rubble. By midnight on the 30th the patrols were half
a mile along the Neuve Eglise Road and a mile from the summit of
Ravelsberg Hill. To capture that on the morrow was the task of the
109th Brigade. The Brigade had a wide frontage, roughly a thousand
yards north of the Neuve Eglise Road, and two thousand south of
it. The advance was steady, but made in the teeth of considerable
machine-gun fire. The Germans had evacuated their positions, but they
did not want to be hurried, nor were they prepared to forego the
opportunity of inflicting loss upon our troops which such a height
as the Ravelsberg afforded. But, once that hill captured, the enemy
rearguards were hustled down the further slope. By night the Brigade
had reached the foot of the next hill, a mile east of the Ravelsberg.
A mile and a half to the south the 1st Inniskillings had its right
upon the main Armentières Road.

Neuve Eglise was the first objective for September the 1st. The 2nd
Inniskillings was ordered to extend its left flank as far as the
road from that village to Dranoutre, and advance with its left upon
Wulverghem. The 108th Brigade had meanwhile moved up in support
to Haagedoorne, the 107th being in the area of Mont Noir and Mont
Kokereele. Great efforts were being made to bring artillery forward
over the very bad roads. Kemmel Hill was once again in British hands,
and good news came in the morning from the 30th Division, on the
left, which had reached Lindenhoek and south of it as far as the
valley of the Douve.

The severest resistance was met at Westhof Farm and De Broeken, both
well known of old, where German machine-guns caused serious loss.
German artillery fire was also heavy. The various strong points were
taken one by one. The German rearguards slipped back in each case
before our men came upon them, but a number were killed in flight
and, outside Neuve Eglise, a machine-gun and two prisoners captured.
By afternoon the enemy had been driven back to the western outskirts
of the village. Some of the 2nd Inniskillings appear actually to have
reached its houses, but the line finally taken up at night was five
hundred yards short of it.

The 108th Brigade was ordered to pass through the 109th at night and
resume the advance, its objectives being from Red Lodge, in the
north-west corner of "Plug Street Wood," to South Midland Farm on the
Wulverghem-Messines Road. The artillery was now in a position to give
it adequate support. The attack was carried out by the 12th Rifles on
the right and 1st Irish Fusiliers on the left. On its southern flank,
Kortepyp Cabaret and the Custom House on the Steenwerck Road gave
trouble.[59] A Stokes mortar here well repaid the labour of bringing
it and its ammunition forward, enabling the infantry to rush these
places after a short bombardment. Then the line pressed forward to
the Nieppe Road running south-east from Neuve Eglise. Machine-gun
fire from this village was at first galling, but, after it had been
heavily shelled by the artillery, a company of the 12th Rifles took
it in most gallant fashion, while two other companies made progress
to the south of it. By four o'clock the line was east of Neuve Eglise.

The next obstacle was a fairly formidable one, an old British
system, the name of which recalled the days when the British Army
had been a very small force indeed--the G.H.Q. Line. The Germans
had put up some wire to defend its support trench from the west. At
7-30 p.m., light being still good, our artillery bombarded these
defences heavily for an hour, after which the infantry advanced to
the attack. The trenches were not taken without fighting, though,
in all the circumstances, the enemy's resistance must be reckoned
feeble. Desultory encounters continued all night, but by morning the
infantry was in possession of the G.H.Q. Line along the whole front.
On the left, meanwhile, the troops of the 30th Division had entered
Wulverghem.

On the 3rd, as resistance stiffened, the frontage was narrowed. A
Brigade of the 29th Division had just relieved the 31st Division
troops on the right for the assault on the very important position
of Hill 63. The new objective of the 108th Brigade was from White
Gates, at the western foot of this hill, to South Midland Farm. At
9-30 a.m. the 12th Rifles and 1st Irish Fusiliers went forward. In
the early stages they had artillery support. Thereafter, owing to
constant movement and the difficulty of ascertaining the position of
the front line, the only assistance that could be rendered by the
artillery was by fire on objectives far in rear, save for occasional
opportunities that came the way of single mobile guns. The attack
resolved itself into individual assaults upon German machine-gun
positions, which were taken in flank by Lewis guns worked forward,
and then rushed with the bayonet. Three were thus taken, and their
detachments killed or captured, while none of the latter, which ran
before the infantry came upon them, escaped without loss from our
fire. By evening the line ran from L'Alouette, a mile east of Neuve
Eglise, to La Plus Douve Farm, a famous old battalion headquarters of
the 36th Division, south-east of Wulverghem. The whole of this front
was taken over after dark by the 9th Irish Fusiliers, which battalion
had not yet been in action.

The 108th Brigade's attack next morning began at 8-30 a.m. under a
creeping barrage. Half an hour prior to it, on the extreme right,
the 9th Irish Fusiliers advanced about a hundred yards toward Hill
63, to support an attack on the hill by troops of the 29th Division.
The attack was completely successful. Hill 63 was of the greatest
importance to the enemy, and was very strongly held, as was proved by
the capture of nearly two hundred and fifty prisoners by the men of
the 29th Division. The hill being in British hands made affairs far
easier for the 108th Brigade. The advance of the 9th Irish Fusiliers
met with considerable opposition. Gaps appeared, and there was some
loss of direction, not astonishing when it is considered that the
battalion was on a frontage of over a mile. Eventually a company of
the 1st Irish Fusiliers had to be brought up on the right flank,
on the Neuve Eglise-La Basseville Road. Before noon all objectives
were attained. On the right the 1st Irish Fusiliers had advanced
beyond White Gates. On the left, Gooseberry Farm, a mile east of the
starting-line, was in the hands of the 9th.

All had gone excellently so far. But the British were now facing
positions which the Germans desired to hold for some time longer, for
which they were prepared to fight. An immediate local counter-attack
down the Douve valley was repulsed with the aid of artillery fire.
But at 4-15 p.m., after a heavy bombardment, the enemy launched
a counter-attack from the south-west on this part of the line.
Gooseberry Farm and Stinking Farm[60] were lost, and the line driven
back five hundred yards.

On the following day the 36th Division actually lost a little ground
instead of gaining it. An attack carried out at dawn by the 1st and
9th Irish Fusiliers, under a light artillery barrage, insufficient to
keep down the very heavy machine-gun fire, was unsuccessful. A heavy
hostile counter-attack drove our troops back beyond their original
line. The 108th Brigade had now been fighting for four days, with no
shelter but that of old and dirty trenches, in persistent rain. The
men were in good spirits still, but fatigue was beginning to tell
upon them. It was decided that the 107th Brigade should relieve them
after dusk, to continue the attack upon the morrow. The 108th Brigade
had captured thirty-five prisoners and three machine-guns. Its
casualties, however, especially during the last two days, had been
very heavy, numbering upwards of four hundred. The 29th Division, on
the right, was again being relieved by the 31st.

The night of the relief was very unpleasant. The Germans, beginning
about ten o'clock, deluged all the low-lying valleys with mustard
and other gas shell. The new advance was to be supported by the fire
of two Machine-Gun Companies, instead of the one which had been in
action hitherto. Captain Walker describes how he rode out in the
darkness to find his sections, scattered among battalions of the
109th Brigade in reserve, and came into the cloud at Neuve Eglise,
forced to keep his eyes uncovered to find his way, but keeping the
nose-clip and mouth-piece of his respirator in position. When dawn
broke he discovered that the pool of gas lying in the basin in which
107th Brigade Headquarters were situated almost lipped the entrance
floor of the dug-out. Most fortunate it was that the dug-out was
half-way up the side of the basin. When, later, he walked down the
main road to Wulverghem, he found the occupants of the dug-outs which
bordered it "being sick by the score." A good many casualties were
caused during the relief, but for the most part the gas was not of
the most noxious sort, and many of those who had inhaled it were able
to take part in the action of September the 6th. It had the effect,
however, of delaying the relief. When dawn broke all the companies of
the 2nd Rifles were not in position; nor was it possible to move them
forward afterwards, owing to the forward slope on which that position
lay being in full view of the enemy.

The 36th Division Artillery was now prepared to put down a really
effective barrage, to advance at the rate of a hundred yards in three
minutes, then to form a protective curtain two hundred and fifty
yards in front of the objective, till an hour and a half after Zero.
This objective was the old British front line, from the Douve on the
right to the Wulverghem-Messines Road on the left.

At 4 p.m. the attack was launched. The companies of the 2nd Rifles
not already in position began to move up in little columns as
the bombardment opened, continuing this method of advance as the
barrage lifted. On the right, troops of the 31st Division attacked
simultaneously. Despite heavy German artillery fire the infantry went
forward with great spirit. After heavy fighting, all objectives,
except Gabion Farm on the right, were taken. Nineteen prisoners
were captured, and many Germans killed. How strongly the line was
held was shown by the capture of eight machine-guns, as well as a
trench mortar. The troops of the 31st Division also had reached their
objectives. Early on the morning of the 7th the advance was rounded
off by the capture of Gabion Farm, where a post was established.

The enemy was not yet resigned to the loss of the position. At
dawn on the 8th, after an intense bombardment, two groups advanced
to recapture the advanced posts. They were literally annihilated
by machine and Lewis-gun fire, a wounded survivor of each being
captured. That night the 30th Division took over the front to Gabion
Farm, while the 107th Brigade extended its right to Hyde Park Corner,
in "Plug Street Wood," becoming responsible for the defence of Hill
63.

Comparative stagnation ensued, broken only by two small attacks upon
the 15th Rifles, which had now taken over the line. The period was
marked by one distressing accident. General Thorpe, commanding the
107th Brigade, had gone up with General Brock on the night of the
13th to visit Hill 63 and the sentry-posts north of it. Moving along
"Winter Trench" he was suddenly fired at from point-blank range by
one of his own men and severely wounded in the arm, his elbow-bone
being shot away. It was a stroke of cruel ill-fortune, which
prevented General Thorpe from leading the Brigade to final victory.
He was able to return to the command of his regiment after the
war, but with an arm well-nigh useless for life, from which he has
since suffered incessant pain. Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. MacKenzie,
C.R.E. of the Division, took over command of the Brigade till the
appointment of his successor. That successor was General Brock, who,
after bringing the Divisional Artillery to France and commanding it
in the field for more than two and a half years, was to finish his
career with the 36th Division by leading an Infantry Brigade with
equal success. He was succeeded as C.R.A. by Brigadier-General C.
St. L. Hawkes, D.S.O. Another senior officer of the Division lost to
it a short time before was Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Knott, D.S.O.,
commanding the 2nd Inniskillings, severely wounded by a shell which
killed the Intelligence Officer of the 109th Brigade, Lieutenant J.
J. Fox, and wounded the Brigade Major R.A., Major H. F. Grant Suttie,
D.S.O., M.C., by his side. Another calamity was the bombing of the
wagon lines of the Divisional Train near St. Jans Cappel. Here a
single bomb killed five men, wounded nine, and killed no less than
fifty valuable horses, besides injuring about twenty more. A bomb or
big shell in crowded horse-lines was always one of the ugliest sights
of many very ugly that the war had to display.

On the night of September the 15th the 109th Brigade took over
the front, now slightly extended on the right toward Ploegsteert.
There was constant patrol activity in the days that followed, but
no further ground was to be gained by those methods. The enemy
was maintaining himself very stoutly and his line bristled with
machine-guns. It was evident that only a great "full-dress" assault
would retake the Messines Ridge.

The tide of victory meanwhile had continued to flow strongly on
other fronts. On the 12th of September the Third Army had crashed
through the Hindenburg trenches at Havrincourt. Three days later
the Balkan offensive, so long awaited that men had come to doubt
its possibility, had been launched, and attended with overwhelming
success. Within a few days Bulgaria was prostrate and Turkey out
of the war. It would have been poetical justice had it fallen to
the lot of the 36th Division to have a hand in the second capture
of the Messines Ridge, as the 62nd Division had taken Havrincourt
for the second time. If that were denied it, it was only because it
had a task even more important to perform, a task the successful
prosecution of which would render to the enemy the famous ridge of
no avail. As a necessary complement to the great convergent thrusts
of British, French, and American armies further south, a powerful
offensive, mainly Anglo-Belgian, but in which a French force also
took part, had been planned in Flanders, from Voormezeele northwards.
It was to be under the supreme command of His Majesty the King of
the Belgians, so that co-ordination between the three nationalities
should be assured. For this the 36th Division was required. For the
third time in its career, but in circumstances vastly different to
the two first, it was directed upon Ypres. For the new battle some
training had been obtained by the 107th and 108th Brigades during
the days that the 109th held the line.

The movements were carried out with greatest secrecy. All marches
took place after dark, on the nights of September the 21st and 22nd.
The 107th moved thus to Wormhoudt, north of Cassel, the 109th Brigade
to Eecke, east of that town, and the 108th to Houtquerque. The
Divisional Artillery moved straight to the neighbourhood of Ypres.
The Infantry of the Division was not to take part in the first day's
attack, and, for the preliminary barrage, the 153rd Brigade R.F.A.
was to be attached to the 9th Division, the 173rd Brigade to the 29th
Division, on its right, the troops of which were in line slightly
over a mile east of the famous ruined town.

After a few days of rest and training, the concentration took place
on the nights of the 26th and 27th. By the morning of the 28th,
the date of the attack, the three Brigades were in camps between
Poperinghe and Vlamertinghe. Headquarters were at Vogeltje Château,
near the better-known Lovie Château, in the woodlands west of
Poperinghe. The Division was again in General Jacob's II. Corps,
under which it had served in April, May, and June. It was in Corps
Reserve, its mission being to hold itself in readiness for a move
forward to assist in the exploitation of any success gained by the
first-line Divisions.

The late operations had been heartening. Despite, however, their
difficulty and costliness, they represented, at least till the final
stages, no more than hard and steady pressure upon a rearguard. No
great number of prisoners could be taken in such fighting, while the
casualties to be inflicted upon the enemy were comparatively small.
The Division had not yet had a hand in one of the great offensives.
All ranks knew that the attack about to open ranked in that category,
and that resistance of far more serious quality was to be expected.
For that they were prepared. It is no exaggeration to say that they
looked forward to the coming struggle, just because they believed it
would be the last. Officers who came back from England the day after
the opening of the attack, when the news that from Ypres to the sea
the whole line was advancing had been flashed abroad, describe the
returning leave-boat as being so full of cheerful faces that it might
have been taken for one homeward bound. Some were less ambitious than
others. In one officer's diary is expressed the opinion that the
Passchendaele Ridge, if captured, would serve as a good "jumping-off"
ground for an offensive the following spring! But for the most part,
men, beholding victory upon victory, had come to believe that the war
could be ended this year. For that speed was essential, else winter
would come to the aid of the enemy and give him time to collect
himself. That reasoning could be grasped by all, and acted upon all
as an added spur to endeavour in the days that followed.

FOOTNOTES:

[58] General Coffin was at this time on leave, the Division being
commanded by Brigadier-General Brock, the C.R.A.

[59] _i.e._, the Belgian Custom House, Neuve Eglise being in Belgium,
Steenwerck and Bailleul in France.

[60] The farm had earned its horrible name in 1915 from the odour
of a huge store of rotten potatoes in its cellars. These had been
removed the following year by sappers of the 36th Division, wearing
gas-masks. Thereafter it stank no worse than any other ruin in the
Flanders front line.

CHAPTER XIV

THE ADVANCE TO FINAL VICTORY (I): SEPTEMBER 28TH TO OCTOBER 17TH, 1918

The attack of the II. Corps was to be carried out with the 29th
Division on the right and the 9th on the left. The left flank of
the latter Division lay on the Zonnebeke Road at Mill Cott. On its
left was the 8th Belgian Division. The Belgians did not desire to
attack without preliminary bombardment, and for three hours before
Zero their artillery shelled the German positions and battery areas.
The artillery on the II. Corps front fired for five minutes only
before Zero, which was at 5-30 a.m. on the 28th of September. The
preliminary attack was to be carried out under a creeping barrage,
with a large proportion of smoke-shell. In density this was far less
than the "creepers" of 1917, there being a gun to upwards of fifty
yards. The German defences, however, owing to the drain caused by
reverses elsewhere, were no longer manned in the strength of those
days, nor was the resistance likely to be of a quality so high. The
task, however, was formidable enough, the ground being only less
difficult than during the Battles of Ypres, 1917.

The attack, launched in heavy rain, was a complete success. The
German infantry was left in the lurch by its artillery, and, save at
isolated points, made no serious resistance. The attacking troops,
Belgians and British, went forward with the greatest dash and
determination. The Belgian infantry, which had not been involved in
the great reverses of the British and French, was by this time of
excellent quality, its ranks filled by young men of good physique.
Neither wire nor shell-pocked waste could check the assault. The
Frezenberg Ridge, that had resisted so many attacks of old, was in
the hands of the 9th Division a little more than an hour after the
beginning of the advance. By night the 29th Division had Gheluvelt,
with its heroic memories of the 2nd Worcesters' charge on the 31st
of October, 1914, and was astride the Menin Road a mile east of
it. The Belgians had Zonnebeke, and were in touch with the 9th
Division on the Broodseinde Ridge. But it was the 9th which had most
accomplished. Passing its third Brigade through in early afternoon,
it had seized the village of Becelaere. At its greatest point the
day's advance exceeded six thousand yards. Verily were times changed
in these regions.

By an early hour it had been apparent that affairs were marching
swiftly, and at eleven in the morning the II. Corps ordered the 36th
Division to move forward, with its Infantry Brigades in echelon.
The 109th was ordered to entrain first, and was carried by light
railway to Potijze, where it detrained at 3 p.m. It then received
orders to march to the neighbourhood of the Bellewaarde Lake. The
108th Brigade was moved east of Ypres at noon; the 107th to Potijze
later in the afternoon. So fast had been the advance that the 107th
Brigade's first orders were to move no further than Vlamertinghe,
but on arrival the men were told to keep their places in the trucks,
which bore them forward another three miles before dusk. Headquarters
of the Division were established in the old dug-outs of the Ypres
Ramparts at 2 p.m.

The plan for the 29th of September was that one Brigade of the
36th--the 109th--was to come into line between the 29th and 9th
Divisions. The 109th Brigade was to be supported by the 153rd Brigade
R.F.A., hitherto under the orders of the 9th Division, if its
batteries could be got into action in time. As a matter of fact,
owing to the shocking state of the roads, they were not able to fire
a shot till the next day. The 109th Brigade was to pass through the
27th Brigade in Becelaere, the latter Brigade then following in
rear of the assaulting Brigade of its own Division. The objective
of the 109th was Terhand, but, if this were easily attained, the
intention was to exploit the success. It was attacking with the 2nd
Inniskillings on the right, the 9th on the left, and the 1st in
support. A dawn assault would have been desirable, but, owing to the
difficulty the 109th Brigade experienced in advancing by night across
broken country on roads so damaged and thronged, it was postponed
till 9-30 a.m. The Brigade's difficulties were increased by heavy
bombing of the approaches to the line by enemy aircraft during the
hours of darkness.

The rain continued all night, accompanied by great cold, and in
this blasted area there was no shelter for the troops. By a stroke
of fortune, however, the weather improved in the morning, the sun
appearing just about the hour of Zero. The advance was at first very
rapid. If the 109th had no artillery support, it had small opposition
from that arm. Its difficulties were caused by machine-guns, singly
or in nests of from two to five, cleverly disposed in depth behind
hedges or in buildings. For hedges there were now, and, though the
ground had been heavily shelled, it was no longer the sea of mud and
shell-holes of the old Salient battle-ground.

These German machine-guns were attacked with greatest _élan_. Often
the leading infantry put them out of action by rifle-fire before
the Lewis guns, a serious burden on such ground, could be brought
into action against them. Still, there is no reason to doubt that
the rate of advance could have been swifter had artillery support
been available. The left battalion, the 9th Inniskillings, aided
by the magnificent rush of the 9th Division to north of it, found
matters considerably easier than did the 2nd Inniskillings on the
right. From two o'clock onwards the latter was held up by machine-gun
fire from Terhand, while the former pressed forward north of the
village. Terhand fell at last at a quarter to four. By this time
the 9th Inniskillings was on the southern outskirts of Dadizeele,
which was captured by the 9th Division a few minutes later. Then, at
six o'clock, the 9th Inniskillings forced its way into Vijfwegen, a
road-side hamlet a mile south of Dadizeele.

The day's advance had been once more remarkable, but much more so on
the left of the II. Corps than on its right flank. The 9th Division,
from Becelaere to Dadizeele, had gained well-nigh three miles of
ground. From Vijfwegen, however, the line ran almost west--that is to
say, it faced south--to Terhand, and thence to south of Becelaere,
where the 29th Division had been held up.

At 4 a.m. the 108th Brigade had moved off in support to the 109th,
being upon the high ground west of Becelaere by 7 p.m. It was ordered
to move forward again, pass through the 109th at dawn, and advance
with as objective the great Menin-Roulers highway from Kezelberg
northward. The 29th Division, meanwhile, was to make a great effort
to force its way up into line on the right. "D" Company of the
Machine-Gun Battalion was attached to the 108th Brigade, together
with its own Stokes Mortar Battery.

The position to be attacked had few artificial defences--the German
wired line defending Menin and Roulers was just west of Dadizeele and
Vijfwegen, and had already been pierced--but it was naturally strong.
The embankment of the huge main road formed good protection to the
enemy. But the key to the position was a hillock half-way between
the road and Vijfwegen--Hill 41. Sixty feet above the surrounding
country, crowned with several farms and their outbuildings, which had
been strengthened with concrete, it was at once invaluable to the
enemy and an excellent defensive position in fighting of this nature,
when very little artillery was available to shake its machine-gun
detachments prior to the infantry assault. With plenty, even of field
artillery, it would not have been a very formidable obstacle, while a
concentration of heavy artillery would have blown the defenders off
its crest. But the big guns were still far behind.

At 7-30 a.m. the 108th Brigade passed through the troops of the
109th. The 9th Irish Fusiliers was on the right, the 12th Rifles on
the left, and the 1st Irish Fusiliers in reserve, eight hundred yards
behind the leading battalions. Each had one section of machine-guns
and one Stokes mortar attached. The advance encountered considerable
machine-gun fire from Hill 41 and the Menin-Roulers Road. Despite
this, north of the hill it went forward in splendid fashion. The
men of the 12th Rifles fought their way through the Zuidhoek Copse,
and reached the Menin-Roulers Road by 10-30 a.m. Touch being gained
here with the 9th Division, the 12th Rifles, according to previous
agreement, took over from its troops as far north as Klephoek
Cross Roads. On the right the 9th Irish Fusiliers reached the
Gheluwe-Vijfwegen Road, and pressed on south of the latter village
and past the southern flank of Hill 41. But upon the hill itself the
German machine-gunners resisted all attacks. On the right of the
9th Irish Fusiliers the 29th Division made great strides, despite
machine-guns distributed in depth all along its front. Though it did
not take Gheluwe, and was unable to do so all day, its left flank
reached the Gheluwe-Vijfwegen Road in touch with the 108th Brigade.

At last the 9th Irish Fusiliers also reached the Menin-Roulers Road,
at Kezelberg, and attempted to work up it and obtain touch with
its comrades of the 12th Rifles, a thousand yards further north,
thus surrounding Hill 41. One strongly held farm-house, with twelve
prisoners, was taken at 12-30, but thereafter fire from the hill
prevented any move northward.

The capture of Hill 41 evidently required a serious effort. General
Coffin arranged with the 9th Division that its 50th Brigade R.F.A.
should support an attack with a barrage of smoke and high explosive.
Behind this one company of the 12th Rifles was to advance at 4 p.m.

The Riflemen, in face of heavy fire, went forward most gallantly.
The German resistance was equally determined. For every hedge there
was a battle, the bayonet being frequently used. Thirty-one prisoners
were taken, and about the same number of dead Germans counted after
the attack. The crest, however, could not be reached, a line being
established just short of it. But the strength of the German defence
had been under-estimated. The story of Mœuvres was repeated with
regard to this battalion. Before reinforcements could move up a heavy
German bombardment came as prelude to a counter-attack, estimated at
three hundred strong. Atop the hill it was held by the fire of Lewis
guns, but, with their superiority of numbers, the Germans pushed
round on either flank, rendering the position untenable. At six
o'clock the company was compelled to fall back. Its casualties had
not been heavy considering the fierce nature of the fighting.

The 107th Brigade had reached the line of Becelaere by the morning,
and had been ordered to push up a battalion on the right of the 108th
Brigade in the afternoon. The 2nd Rifles had attempted to advance
upon Klythoek, on the Menin-Roulers Road, but had been held up by
heavy machine-gun fire. Another attempt to advance was planned for
the morning of October the 1st. This time there was more effective
artillery support, two batteries of 6-inch howitzers being able to
shell Hill 41 at long range. To attack the hill, two companies of
the reserve battalion, the 1st Rifles, were brought up. The 12th
Rifles was to co-operate on the left, and the 2nd Rifles of the 107th
Brigade on the right. The 9th Division was to endeavour to cross
the Menin-Roulers Road and capture Ledeghem, on the Menin-Roulers
Railway. The new attack was launched at 6-15 a.m. in heavy mist. On
the right the leading companies of the 2nd Rifles lost direction.
The commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel Bridcott, was killed while
attempting to reorganise them. On the left also the attack failed.
On Hill 41, however, the companies of the 1st Irish Fusiliers,
fighting their way desperately forward in face of heavy resistance,
reached Twigg Farm, just short of the crest, and captured that
place with twenty-two prisoners. Further they were unable to go in
face of the machine-gun fire. The fire from the eastern slope of
the hill was also causing serious trouble to the troops of the 9th
Division, now approaching the Menin-Roulers Railway. After capturing
Ledeghem the Lowland Brigade made an attempt to turn Hill 41 from the
north, to aid the 36th Division, but was beaten off in turn by the
irrepressible machine-guns.

One more attempt finally to clear the obstinate hill was made that
day by the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers of the 109th Brigade, swinging
in from the north. It was unsuccessful in its object, but it achieved
another not less important. The Germans were about to launch a heavy
counter-attack on the exposed right flank of the 9th Division, when
this diversion checked them. The affair is thus reported in the
_History of the 9th (Scottish) Division_:

"Lieut.-Colonel Smyth saw the Germans collecting troops for a great
counter-stroke, and the K.O.S.B. were bracing themselves for a
desperate resistance at Manhattan Farm, when the timely arrival of
the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, who made a most heroic attack on Hill
41 from the north, scared the enemy and turned his efforts solely to
defence. Though the Inniskillings failed to capture the hill, their
plucky effort probably saved the K.O.S.B., and so great was the
admiration of the latter and the troops of the Ninth Division who
witnessed the attack, that the G.O.C. at their request wrote at once
to the Thirty-sixth Division expressing the admiration and thanks of
the officers and men of the Ninth."

Local counter-attacks did come against Twigg Farm, to be beaten off
with loss by the company of the 1st Irish Fusiliers which held it.
That night the 109th Brigade relieved the 108th.

The action of this day and of those following cannot be understood
without a brief survey of the general situation. The British advance
of the first two days, at its greatest point, from east of Ypres to
the Menin-Roulers Road, had been eight miles. The Germans had been
broken and thrown into confusion. But the very rapidity of the
Allied advance, over such roads as those which crossed the welter
of the old Ypres Salient, had created new difficulties. It was hard
enough, as has been related, to bring guns forward. But that was by
no means the main difficulty, even where the artillery was concerned.
Batteries in an advance go forward only. The limbers which feed them,
the lorries which feed the limbers from the train, must go forward
and backward. Therein lay the real trouble. The roads were choked.
The only tolerable among them, because, bad though they were, the
remains of the old _pavé_ held them together, were the Menin and
Zonnebeke Roads. Upon each was a solid mass of transport, which often
for hours at a time remained immobile. A few days after the events
already recorded, wagons of the 107th Brigade took thirty-six hours
to proceed from Potijze Château to Terhand. Captain Walker thus
describes the Zonnebeke Road on the night of the 30th of September:

"I had never previously realized the number and variety of vehicles
which move in support of three Divisions; indeed, I think this
road fed only the 9th and 36th Divisions.[61] There were limbers
by scores with rations; there were G.S. wagons with forage for the
battalion transports forward; there were R.E. wagons, mess-carts,
guns and ammunition; there were lorries stuck in shell-holes in the
road, and the cause of most of the trouble. On every odd bit of
ground bordering the road were French cavalrymen. The surface and
the language were equally bad, and there was mud everywhere. I had
to wind my way through these troubles for several miles. During my
journey there was practically no movement of the traffic. It had
taken 'C' Company's transport fourteen hours to do the six miles
from Ypres to the Ridge, and the Company bivouacked on the road for
a night. A Gotha flew down that road at midnight, dropping bombs
at regular intervals. I'm glad I missed that. There must have been
many casualties, for that road was a mass of animals and men. Why
only one Gotha was out that night beats me. 'D' Company, which
was supposed to be with the advancing infantry, was held up with
everybody else. Major Wood, the O.C., was panic-stricken, having the
General's orders to be in action at a stated time and place, and,
putting eight guns on pack mules, set off across the desolation.
I believe about four guns did eventually come into action, but a
couple of mules got into shell-holes from which they could not be
extricated, and had to be despatched."

On the one hand, then, the Germans, now driven back to the fringe of
civilized and unbroken country, with roads and railways behind them,
were enabled to make some hasty attempts at reorganization; on the
other, the Allies, having overrun their supplies, were yet under the
necessity of keeping up steady pressure, to prevent the enemy from
improving and settling down upon those positions. Doubtless the enemy
had expected to be driven back and eventually to form up upon the
line of the Lys, but he had been driven back much more quickly than
he had anticipated, and was now anxious lest his troops should fall
back piecemeal upon the river, and its line be prematurely forced,
as the British line of the Somme had been forced in March. He was
therefore bringing up fresh troops, and, above all, artillery, with
the support of which a complete change had appeared in the fighting
quality of his infantry. The next fortnight was to be marked by a
constant see-saw, by desperate, if minor, stroke and counter-stroke.
Little more ground was to be won by the Allies till they had mastered
the difficulties behind them, pushed forward adequate artillery and
ammunition for a new "full-dress" attack to provide the initial
momentum for a great new advance.

On October the 2nd, the day after its relief of the 108th Brigade,
the 109th experienced the strength of the enemy's artillery and his
determination. At 5 p.m. a heavy barrage of artillery of all calibres
fell upon the front line, upon Dadizeele, and all approaches. Half
an hour later the German infantry advanced to the attack. The force
of the barrage had caused a withdrawal from some forward positions.
These the enemy penetrated, but was quickly driven out with the
bayonet. By night the line was completely restored.

It was during this attack that Captain G. J. Bruce, D.S.O., M.C.,
Brigade Major, 109th Brigade, making his way forward through the
barrage to ascertain the position, was killed. Captain Bruce was
one of the Division's original officers, and his total service with
it now amounted to over four years, except for a few months in
1917, when he had been Brigade Major of the 47th Infantry Brigade,
16th Division. His quickness and cleverness, and his wonderful eye
for country, which filled many a good professional soldier with
envy, made him a very fine example of the "civilian" staff officer.
His personal bravery was quite proverbial among all ranks of the
Division. He was one of those rare and fortunate men who do not seem
to require a mental effort, a summoning of resolution, to face great
danger. He walked into it as naturally and as unconcernedly as he
walked into his office. By all who knew him well George Bruce will
long be remembered as a sagacious soldier and a fine spirit.

The next three days passed without further attempt at progress on the
front of the 36th Division. All along the line, indeed, the advance
was held up, and preparations were in train for an important new
attack. For this it was necessary that the troops should have some
preliminary rest. On the night of the 4th the 108th Brigade again
relieved the 109th, while the 107th was relieved by troops of the
35th Division. On the 7th the 109th Brigade moved back across the
devastation to a camp between Ypres and Poperinghe, where baths and
clean clothes could be provided, and training for the new battle
carried out. The 107th Brigade had not such good fortune, as it was
retired as far only as Polygon Wood, and accommodated in canvas
trench shelters.

Meanwhile artillery had moved up in force. By October the 7th there
was in position covering the 36th Division's frontage its own
Divisional Artillery, the 113th Army Brigade, and three batteries of
the 4th French Cavalry Division. Medium trench mortars, including the
6-inch Stokes, had also been brought forward in face of extraordinary
difficulties. The enemy's artillery was very active, and the shelling
in its intensity now recalled the days of the big battles of trench
warfare.

On October the 11th, after an intense artillery preparation, in which
the trench mortars took part, two platoons of the 9th Irish Fusiliers
captured Goldflake Farm, with fourteen prisoners and three light
machine-guns. This very strong "pill-box," on the southern slope
of Hill 41, had defied all previous attempts. It did not on this
occasion remain long in our hands. At evening, after a tremendous
bombardment, the enemy launched an attack on the hill. Not only was
Goldflake Farm retaken, but from Twigg and Mansard Farms, on the
crest, our men were driven out. An immediate counter-attack caused
Twigg Farm to change hands for the third time. Next morning before
it was light a patrol got back Mansard Farm, with another prisoner
and another machine-gun. That was the last of the local fighting. All
things were now prepared for attack upon a very different scale.

The 35th Division, it has been recorded, had come into line on the
right of the 36th. At the same time the 29th, its old right-hand
neighbour, had been moved up to its left flank, from Klephoek
northward, and now separated it from the 9th Division. The Second
Army and the Belgians were now to attack with the objective of the
Lys. This operation, if successful, would almost certainly cause the
enemy to evacuate the great industrial cities of Lille, Roubaix, and
Tourcoing.

The first general objective of the II. Corps was the
Courtrai-Ingelmunster Railway. Upon this the 36th Division was
directed, from the Lys on the right to the northern skirts of the
town of Heule. It had also upon its front two other small towns,
Moorseele and Gulleghem. The three were in a straight line from west
to east; Moorseele being about two and a half miles from the present
position, Gulleghem four and a half, and Heule six. The attack was
to be carried out by the 107th Brigade on the right, and the 109th
on the left. To the former was attached the 121st, and to the latter
the 150th Field Company, while each had a company of the Machine-Gun
Battalion. A section of each Field Company was in readiness to bridge
the Heulebeek if necessary. The Divisional Reserve consisted of the
108th Brigade, the 36th Machine-Gun Battalion (less two companies),
the 16th Rifles (Pioneers), the 122nd Field Company, two platoons
of VIII. Corps Cyclists, and a company of the 104th Machine-Gun
Battalion. Each Brigade was to attack with one battalion in line, one
in support, and one in reserve. The Division's frontage was about a
thousand yards, though on the objective of the Courtrai-Ingelmunster
Railway it grew to fifteen hundred.

With the artillery now at the disposal of the Division, and the
considerable heavy artillery at that of the II. Corps, the barrage
was to be something like the barrage of old days. There was, in fact,
one field gun or howitzer to a little more than twenty yards. There
was to be no preliminary bombardment. The barrage was to come down
two hundred yards in front of the forming-up line of the infantry
three minutes before Zero, and to begin to creep forward at that
hour. It was to move at a rate that would have seemed incredible a
year ago, one hundred yards in two minutes, with a pause of fifteen
minutes every fifteen hundred yards. East of Moorseele the field
artillery barrage was to halt from Zero plus 115 minutes to Zero plus
132 minutes, then to cease. Upon this line the infantry was to remain
an hour, to allow the support battalions to pass through the leaders,
and batteries of field artillery to move up west of the town and aid
the next advance.

At two o'clock on the morning of October the 14th the attacking
troops were formed up east of the Vijfwegen-Zuidhoek Road, in
trenches hastily dug by the Pioneers and 122nd Field Company. At the
same hour the 108th Brigade began a quiet withdrawal, leaving its
outposts on Hill 41 in position. The batteries of the field artillery
were in position close up to the front line. Even then their final
barrage east of Moorseele would be at almost extreme range for the
18-pounders.

At 5-32, on a morning most fortunately fine, but foggy, the thunder
of the barrage broke out all along the line. Three minutes later it
began to move forward, followed by the infantry. The mist made the
keeping of direction difficult, and the attackers eventually fell
behind the barrage. It had served its purpose, however, in keeping
down fire from the German front-line "pill-boxes," which had been
the cause of so much trouble in the last fortnight. Behind it the
infantrymen swept in with the bayonet, and the struggle that had so
long endured was ended in a few fierce moments.

East of the Menin-Roulers Railway the enemy had ample opportunity to
stop the advance, had he been the grim-fighting German of old. But
this he certainly was not, though the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division,
opposed to the 36th, was one of his best. By eight o'clock the 15th
Rifles, the leading battalion of the 107th Brigade, were upon the
outskirts of Moorseele. Their neighbours, the 1st Inniskillings, were
slightly ahead, having reached the Rolleghem-Cappelle Road north
of the village. Here they were held up by machine-gun fire from
the town, till the latter was captured by the 15th Rifles. Then a
line was swiftly consolidated east of Moorseele, while the support
battalions, the 1st Rifles on the right and 2nd Inniskillings on
the left, made ready to pass through, and the batteries were rushed
forward into action close to the western outskirts of the town. This
operation was splendidly accomplished. The first action of Major R.
R. Sharp, D.S.O., M.C., commanding A/173, on reaching Moorseele, now
being heavily bombarded, was to ascend the church steeple. From there
he saw a German 77-mm. battery doing great damage. Fire opened by his
battery, under his observation, killed the detachment and horses of
this battery and blew up its ammunition, dumped beside the guns. The
latter were captured in the subsequent advance.

All had gone excellently so far. Casualties had been light, and
strong positions had been taken with surprising ease. Prisoners
numbered over a hundred and fifty, while ten field guns and five
horses had also been taken. As for light machine-guns, with which the
whole German front had bristled, they were now tossed in heaps, too
large to be counted for the time being. It was a fine achievement to
have accomplished between half-past five and ten o'clock. But it was
the beginning only of the day's work.

At 10-35 the advance was resumed, in weather still misty. Once more
all went well. There had been no trouble with the Heulebeek, the
bridges across which had not been destroyed by the enemy. For over a
mile the two battalions went forward almost unchecked, driving in or
capturing the machine-gun groups that disputed their passage. Then,
a thousand yards west of Gulleghem, came resistance more severe. The
machine-gun fire had greatly increased, and the town was defended by
three lines of wire. Attempts were made to outflank the town from
north and south. They were partially successful, some of the wire
being negotiated, but not all. By midnight a line three hundred yards
west of Gulleghem was being consolidated, and arrangements were in
train for an attack at nine the following day with a fresh barrage.
On the right the troops of the 36th Division were in touch with
those of the 35th Division; on the left with those of the 29th, held
up in front of the village of Salines. To the north the attack had
been equally successful, and the whole line ran almost due north and
south, the Belgians, who had fought magnificently, having their heads
slightly in front. It had been a splendid day's work; for the Allies
one of the great days of the war. With casualties comparatively
light, they had driven back the enemy four miles upon a wide front,
capturing ten thousand prisoners and over a hundred guns.

The barrage for the 15th, in view of the events of the preceding day,
was slowed down slightly, to a hundred yards in three minutes. East
of Gulleghem there was to be a halt of three-quarters of an hour, to
allow the third battalion of each Brigade to pass through and advance
upon Heule.

With the first onrush resistance was swept aside. Twenty minutes
after Zero the 1st Rifles was across the Gulleghem-Wevelghem Road. A
few minutes later the 2nd Inniskillings had the whole of Gulleghem
in its area, save a few "pockets" of machine-guns which could be
cleared at leisure. On the left the 87th Brigade took Salines
about the same time. The 1st Rifles, destined to pass through its
sister battalion on the front of the 107th Brigade, did not move
up quite swiftly enough, and, as a consequence, lost the barrage.
The 9th Inniskillings, on the left, with the advantage of a good
main road in its area, pushed ahead north of the Heulebeek. By two
o'clock its troops were through Heule, and upon the objective of the
Courtrai-Ingelmunster Railway, east of the town. It had advanced a
mile and a half in two and a half hours.

The 1st Rifles, meanwhile, without artillery support, had been
brought to a halt by machine-gun fire from farms and hedges. A new
barrage was arranged, to commence at 4 p.m. Under its cover the
1st Rifles quickly overran the enemy machine-guns. By 7 p.m. the
battalion was on the railway embankment, in touch with the 9th
Inniskillings. On the left the 29th Division had likewise reached the
railway, while further north the 9th Division and the Belgians, who
had made one of the greatest advances of a day in face of opposition,
were miles east of it, in possession of Cuerne and Bavichove. The
left flank of the 35th Division, on the other hand, was a thousand
yards in rear of the right of the 107th Brigade.

The original intention had been to pass the troops of the 108th
Brigade, the head of which was on Moorseele at the time the morning's
attack was launched, through those of the other Brigades that
afternoon, to advance upon the Lys at Courtrai. The slight delay
above recorded caused a change in this arrangement. The 108th Brigade
was now ordered to pass through at dawn on the 16th, and establish
itself upon the Lys. During the night the 107th Brigade was ordered
to send out a patrol to discover whether the Germans were going to
make a stand west of the great canalized river.

By a curious coincidence there happened to be in the 2nd Rifles
an officer, Lieutenant F. Adams, who was a native of the city of
Courtrai. He was naturally chosen to make the reconnaissance, but
his intimate knowledge of Courtrai may not have been altogether an
advantage, for he made an investigation so thorough that he was not
back till the following morning, when the barrage for the advance of
the 108th Brigade had commenced. He had discovered that the Germans
had evacuated all the quarter of the city north-west of the river,
and blown up the five bridges which spanned the latter. When this
news, and also the information that the troops of the 29th Division
were on the Lys, north of the city, was received, the barrage was
instantly stopped and the 12th Rifles, with no other protection than
that of advanced and flank guards, marched down the road from Heule
into Courtrai.

There were scenes of great enthusiasm among the citizens, who came
forth into the streets from their cellars to greet the troops. But
the Germans were not far off. As the first British troops appeared
on the quays of the Lys, here eighty feet wide, heavy machine-gun
fire burst out all along the opposite bank. Anything more difficult
than to force a crossing, in the heart of a city full of friendly
civilians, to whom and to whose property it was desired to do as
little damage as might be, against German troops of the old mettle,
could not well be imagined. But the Germans opposite were not of the
old mettle, and General Vaughan decided to attempt to throw a bridge
across in broad daylight. The 122nd Field Company with its pontoons
had moved forward in readiness.

At 2 p.m. a smoke-screen was put down. Five minutes later, under
its cover, the first boat-load was across. The men leapt ashore
exultingly and drove the Germans from the bank. They had had scarce
a casualty. Another boat-load followed, and in an incredibly
short time the bridge was practicable for infantry. But the German
artillery soon had its range. The men of the 122nd Field Company, who
displayed the greatest gallantry, suffered heavy loss, and eventually
the bridge was destroyed. The party on the other shore, however, held
its ground without difficulty. The machine-gunners of "C" Company,
attached to the Brigade, distinguished themselves particularly in
this day's operations.

The obvious course now was to await darkness, throw another bridge
across, clear the city of Germans, and be ready to advance eastward
at peep of day. But news arrived meanwhile which altered these plans.
The Allies were not going to batter Courtrai. They were going to
force the Lys to northward, swing half-right, and drive down upon
the Scheldt, or Escaut, as this portion of the river is called by
French-speaking people, thus turning all the great industrial towns.
As a fact, the evacuation of Lille, the western-most, was proceeding
at this very moment. The 36th Division was required for the new
thrust, and was to be relieved at once by the 123rd Brigade of the
41st Division.

In these circumstances, as the bridgehead--without a bridge--was
useless to the relieving Brigade, the bridgehead party was quietly
and skilfully withdrawn at dusk and ferried across, together with
six captured Germans. The relief was complete by eight o'clock, and
the 108th Brigade marched back through new-won Heule and Gulleghem,
to the village of Drei Masten, north of the latter town. The other
Brigades had begun to move back earlier in the afternoon.

If the troops had been cheerful before, they were jubilant now. They
knew themselves infinitely better men than the enemy, who, still
supported by huge masses of artillery and by machine-gun fire which
General Jacob later described as "the heaviest ever experienced in
this war," never awaited their onslaught long. It was evident to all
now that the war would be over by Christmas. A little longer and the
German Army would be beaten to its knees.

The worst danger, the greatest obstacle to the launching of the
death-thrust, was now, in fact, behind, not in front. It lay in
those terrible roads of the devastated area far behind, with which
the troops, now upon the untouched soil of the richest agricultural
land in Europe, might feel they had no connection, but across which
every mouthful of food they ate and every bullet they fired had to
come. The strain upon the mechanism of the lorries was tremendous,
and they were constantly breaking down. The strain upon their drivers
was no less, and at this period they were less easy to replace than
their wagons. The loss of horses, too, from bombing, in the Artillery
and the Supply Services, had been very serious and could not be
replaced at the moment. To add to the difficulties of communication,
rations had to be brought up for the Belgian civilians, many of
whom had been left stripped bare and in danger of starvation by the
Germans, who took horses, carts, cattle, fowls, and all stores they
could lay hand upon, in their retreat. In the hardest work they were
ever called on to perform, the A.S.C., both mechanical and horsed
services, scored a triumph. The success they achieved was due in part
to good organization and industry. But it was due, above all, to the
grit and determination of the junior officers and drivers in the
performance of their tasks. The lorry-driver, who stuck for fifteen
hours at his wheel amid the ruts and turmoil of the Menin Road, as
many of them did, with bombs crashing down at night; the section of
the Divisional Train bringing up its wagons through valleys wreathed
and stinking with gas, these men in truth deserved well of the
infantrymen facing the bullets further forward, and were in truth
their companions-in-arms.

FOOTNOTE:

[61] This supposition is correct. The 29th Division used the Menin
Road.

CHAPTER XV

THE ADVANCE TO FINAL VICTORY (II): OCTOBER 18TH TO NOVEMBER 11TH, 1918

In the forcing of the Lys the 36th Division was to have the honour
of the "left of the line," a real honour, because in an attack only
a good Division was employed on the flank of an Allied Army. The
reputation of the 9th Division, which had hitherto occupied that
position, is too high to stand in need of glorification. But the
36th Division was not only to move on the flank of the British Army;
it was to be its left flank-guard across the Lys, which was to be
crossed by it first of any British Division, and considerably before
its Allies on the left.

On the afternoon of the 18th of October General Coffin's headquarters
were established in Lendelede, a town of upwards of four thousand
inhabitants. Here the Germans had left behind perhaps the most
valuable gift they could at this juncture have bestowed--excellent
baths, where three hundred men could be bathed within an hour.
Accommodation generally was now very good in a country so thickly
populated, but there were still some unpleasant surprises. One
such was the discovery by one unit, that in an excellent stable,
recommended to it by a civilian, there was in each of ten stalls
a dead horse, killed a week earlier by a single burst of Belgian
shrapnel. That evening the relief of the 3rd Belgian Division, along
the left bank of the Lys, from Bavichove to the point of junction
between the river and the Canal de Roulers à la Lys, was carried out
by the 109th Brigade. Heavy bombing of the roads by enemy aeroplanes
made it an affair of great difficulty. A French Division, the 164th,
was coming in on the left of the 36th, but there was no prospect of
its being ready to cross till the night of the 20th. As every moment
was of importance, the 36th Division had orders to effect a passage
more than twenty-four hours earlier.

General Coffin's scheme was in itself a scathing commentary upon
the decadence of German moral. It was one which would not have been
contemplated in the heroic age of the German infantry. In those days
an isolated battalion, pushed across to form a bridgehead, would have
been flung back into the river almost before it had had time to draw
breath. But times had changed, and methods changed with them. Extreme
boldness now paid as it had never paid in the previous course of the
war. With adequate artillery support great risks could be taken, for
the German machine-gunners frequently left their positions under
heavy shell-fire. Moreover, there were no more "pill-boxes."

The Germans, it must be explained, appeared to be holding the
opposite bank of the Lys in some strength. At several points they
had put up wire fences to defend it. Opposite Oyghem, near the 36th
Division's left flank, was one very large moated farm, round which
they had dug a trench. The plan was that one battalion of the 109th
Brigade should be ferried across at dusk on the 19th, should push
forward to the main Courtrai-Ghent Road, from east of Beveren to
Dries, on a front of a thousand yards. That accomplished, a second
battalion was to cross, to form flank from the Oyghem-Desselghem
Road to the left of the leading battalion. Two machine-gun companies
were allotted to the operation, "B" to fire a barrage, "C" with
its sections attached to the battalions of the 109th Brigade. The
original intention had been for the 121st and 150th Field Companies
to effect crossings for the infantry opposite both Oyghem and
Beveren. A daring daylight reconnaissance of the river-bank by
Lieutenant W. Brunyate, of the latter company, caused the Oyghem
crossing to be abandoned, and the construction of a bridge at that
point postponed till the first part of the programme was complete.
The bank here was very steep, was heavily wired, and commanded by
machine-guns. The farm of which mention has been made would have been
in itself a formidable obstacle. Three bridging wagons with full
bridging equipment had been brought up the previous night and hidden
in farm buildings beside the river bank, north-west of Beveren, by
the 121st Field Company. The pontoons of the 150th Field Company were
hidden slightly further north.

At dusk two pontoons were launched, and at 7-25 p.m. the passage of
the 9th Inniskillings began. Two trips were actually made before
the enemy fired a shot; then machine-gun fire burst out, followed a
little later by that of artillery. Nevertheless, by 8 p.m. the whole
battalion and its attached section of machine-guns[62] were across,
with one casualty only. Hastily in the darkness the battalion formed
up. Then the British barrage dropped, and it began its advance over
open country. The night was cloud-veiled, but the full moon was of
great assistance to subsequent operations. Capturing such machine-gun
detachments as did not fly, the 9th Inniskillings worked its way
steadily forward, and crossed the Beveren-Dries Road, four hundred
yards short of its objective, the main road from Courtrai to Ghent.
Almost immediately afterwards, however, it was held up by heavy
machine-gun fire. It had not accomplished quite all that had been
hoped, but it had done enough. The still more complicated task of
bringing across a second battalion to guard the left flank remained.

Directly the 9th was over, the 121st Field Company set about throwing
across a "half-pontoon" bridge. It was found, however, that the river
was here actually over a hundred feet wide, considerably more than
was anticipated from the information in our possession, and that
two pontoons in halves would not reach across. Since pontoons were
infinitely precious--some having been sunk at Courtrai--as many as
possible being required for a subsequent heavy bridge, an attempt was
made to assemble a trestle-bridge instead. But under the very heavy
shell-fire now falling upon the river this had to be abandoned for
want of time, and eventually a pontoon was borrowed from the 150th
Field Company to complete the bridge. It was ready at ten o'clock,
just as the leading platoon of the 1st Inniskillings appeared on the
bank. The battalion had four hours for its crossing and assembly on
the further bank.

On the left flank of the attack were four villages, Desselghem,
Spriete, Straete, and Dries. Of these the first was considerable, the
others tiny hamlets which were really part of it.[63] Desselghem and
Spriete were to be attacked by the two leading companies; Straete
and Dries by the supporting companies, which were to pass through
them. The operation of bringing the battalion across, forming it up
and attacking north-eastward, at right angles to the line of attack
of the 9th Inniskillings, of supporting the new attack by barrage
fire, would have been considered of the greatest difficulty in the
mimic warfare of manœuvres, and would almost certainly have been
characterized as impossible by the umpires. In this case the whole
programme, owing to good staff work, intelligent local leadership,
and the dash of the private soldier, was carried through without
a hitch. Spriete and Desselghem were cleared; then the supporting
companies went through. Their task was a sterner one, since the
Germans had had time to make some preparation for resistance.
Straete was captured after fierce close fighting, the Inniskillings
frequently using the bayonet. On the right the other company reached
the outskirts of Dries, but was unable to make further headway, and
there consolidated its position. Here again, though not quite all
was won, elbow-room sufficient had been gained. Eighty prisoners had
been taken, and passed back over the pontoon bridge.

[Illustration: (Map of battle area)]

It was now the turn of the 107th Brigade. The sappers passed a busy
and disturbed night. The shelling of the Lys continued, and there was
a direct hit on the bridge, a pontoon being damaged and a length of
the superstructure destroyed. By desperately hard work all repairs
were completed for the leading battalion of the 107th Brigade, the
15th Rifles, to cross at 2 a.m. This battalion, followed by the 1st,
moved forward, the former forming up west of the Courtrai-Ghent
Road, in relief of the 9th Inniskillings, which withdrew through its
ranks. Troops of the 9th Division had crossed about midnight, but, as
may easily be imagined, it was not without considerable difficulty
that touch was obtained with them. This, however, was at last
accomplished, but the line at the point of junction was perilously
close to the river, owing to the fact that German machine-gunners
still held out in Beveren.

At 6 a.m. on the 20th the new attack began. Beveren was quickly
taken, with some aid from the Scots Fusiliers of the 9th Division.
Machine-gun fire was very heavy, and the 15th Rifles had considerable
casualties. The commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel B. Y. Jones,
D.S.O., was killed. But the advance continued at a great pace. The
main Courtrai-Ghent-Antwerp Railway was crossed before eight o'clock.
An hour later the line was astride the road from Deerlyck--already in
the hands of the 9th Division--to Waereghem. A mill on that road gave
considerable trouble, but was eventually taken by a platoon of the
1st Rifles. Further progress for the time being was found impossible.
The advance had reached a point two and a half miles from the Lys,
and could no longer be supported by artillery fire. At 12-30 p.m. the
1st Inniskillings made another attempt to clear Dries, and reached
the centre of the hamlet. Resistance was now quite determined, and it
was decided to await the crossing of the French before attempting any
move on the left flank. About two hundred prisoners had been captured
in the day's operations.

The Engineers had continued their good work. By evening a pontoon
bridge for first-line transport had been thrown across by the 150th
Field Company. The 121st had completed a good permanent foot-bridge,
and, returning to the abandoned trestle, for which all materials
had been collected locally, had finished that also. At night the
108th Brigade and a French regiment on the left made the crossing.
Artillery, however, could not cross yet awhile. The 108th Brigade was
to relieve the 109th, and the advance was to be continued for another
twenty-four hours without it.

The advance of the 21st was timed for 7-30 a.m. It was to be carried
out by the 1st Rifles of the 107th Brigade, and the 1st Irish
Fusiliers of the 108th. It was, however, important to be rid of the
hornet's nest in Dries upon the flank, and this village was cleared
by a company of the 12th Rifles before the attack began. Without
artillery this attack was of the greatest difficulty. There were no
hedges, and it was the custom in this part of the country to lop the
lower branches off the trees. Consequently, the attacking force was
constantly exposed to long-range machine-gun fire. Moreover, the
133rd French Regiment, since it had to fight its way from the river
bank, was always in rear. In all the circumstances the advance of the
day, which found the right of the 107th Brigade at Knock, north of
Vichte, and the left of the 108th at Spitael, on the Ghent Railway,
was highly creditable to the troops concerned. The advance of the
107th Brigade, with the 9th Division on its right, was to be resumed
on the morrow, but it was decided that the 108th Brigade should not
move till the French had come up into line.

By the morning of the 22nd the Lys was crossed by bridge after bridge
in the area of the 36th Division; there being, besides numerous
foot-bridges, three medium bridges for first-line transport, and a
trestle which was subsequently used by French motor-lorries. On the
night of the 21st the four batteries of the 153rd Brigade R.F.A.
crossed the river, to fire a barrage in support of the 107th Brigade
next day. On the right, upwards of half the distance between the
parallel rivers, the Lys and the Escaut, had now been covered. From
the Gaverbeek onwards the advance was now faced by rising ground,
which culminated in a general ridge before the drop down, over some
two miles, to the valley of the latter river. The various little
crests of this chain afforded excellent positions to the enemy, and
it was evident that, if so disposed, he could make a very effective
stand before falling back across the Escaut. The first of them had
to be attacked on this morning. It was taken by the 2nd Rifles. The
barrage, small though it would have been reckoned in old days,
and as it was in comparison with the German barrage which had to
be faced, nevertheless made a wonderful difference to the attack.
The little rise, about a mile north-east of Vichte and topped by
a windmill, was carried. But there followed the most resolute
counter-attack experienced for a long time by the 36th Division. It
was made by a Prussian Assault Battalion, and succeeded in driving
our men off the crest and back for almost eight hundred yards.
Colonel Becher, commanding the 2nd Rifles, organized a new attack
by two companies, which, going forward with the greatest gallantry,
once more drove the Germans off the crest and re-established the
position. The left flank swung sharply back, the junction with the
108th Brigade being on the Deerlyck-Waereghem Road. On the left of
the 108th Brigade the French, after heavy fighting, were established
in Spitael.

On the 23rd, as the enemy appeared to be withdrawing, the advance was
continued all along the line behind a screen of scouts. A squadron of
French dragoons, attached to the Division, made a spirited dash for
the Escaut crossing at Berchen, but came under heavy machine-gun fire
from the second line of hills, which it was evident the enemy held in
force. He had, in fact, withdrawn a mile or so during the previous
night. On the extreme left a company of the 1st Irish Fusiliers,
entering Heirweg, was vigorously counter-attacked and driven out
with the loss of several prisoners. Eventually a liaison post was
established by British and French at the station, just west of the
hamlet. On the right the 1st Rifles had captured Vossenhoek and
Hutteghem. The advance had been well maintained. The men of the 107th
Brigade were now, however, weary, and the battalions very weak. It
was decided to relieve the Brigade that night by the 109th. This was
carried out without event.

The following day was given to reorganization. Two batteries of the
173rd Brigade had crossed the river on the 22nd, the remainder were
now brought over in readiness to support an attack upon the ridge.
This took place at 9 a.m. on the 25th. The 109th Brigade on the right
had two battalions, the 1st and 2nd Inniskillings, in line; the
108th one only, the 12th Rifles. The advance was covered by a barrage
moving at the rate of a hundred yards in three minutes. On the right
not much progress was made, in face of heavy machine-gun fire. Loss
of direction, due to fog and the smoke-screen of the enemy barrage,
caused considerable difficulty. Eventually a line east of Hutsbosch
was consolidated. On the left the 12th Rifles made an advance of
half a mile, in face of the most determined opposition encountered
since the fighting at Hill 41. Every house was held, and the Germans
fought their machine-guns desperately. No less than ten were counted
in ten separate houses at the day's end. The advance would have been
greater had the French supported it on the left, but their line had
not moved beyond Heirweg. The work of the 12th Rifles on this day was
probably the best performed by that battalion, amid much good work
accomplished since the beginning of offensive operations. Repeatedly
the men had charged in upon houses defended by machine-guns, and
bayoneted the detachments.

The 9th Division had captured the twin crests of Ingoyghem and
Ooteghem, and it was determined that the 109th Brigade should, the
same afternoon, assault that of Kleineberg, to their north-east,
which would have brought the right of the Division, its left drawn
back through circumstances beyond its control, into the van of the
advance. A new barrage, starting at 5 p.m., was hastily planned
and admirably carried out. Unfortunately, however, orders did not
reach the battalions soon enough, and, at the appointed hour, three
companies only, two of the 1st Inniskillings and one of the 2nd, went
forward to the attack. And it must be remembered that companies were
now never more than fifty strong. The crest was actually reached, but
the advance had been on a frontage so narrow that it was impossible
to maintain the position. A farm-house at the foot of the slope was,
however, held and consolidated.

The 26th was a day of calm, broken when night fell by tremendous
shelling, above all with gas, which seemed almost to have superseded
high explosive and shrapnel in the enemy's armoury. Nor was a further
advance contemplated on the 27th, owing to the complete exhaustion
of the troops. A wounded prisoner had, however, reported that it was
the enemy's intention to withdraw at once to the Escaut, and our
outposts were on the _qui vive_ for signs of such a movement. About
2 p.m. that afternoon they were rewarded. Small bodies of the enemy
were seen retiring from the Kleineberg Ridge. Instantly patrols of
the 109th Brigade were pushed forward and occupied it. And so this
last goal of the 36th Division, after three years' campaigning,
was reached without a shot fired. The 108th Brigade, in attempting
to follow suit, met with a certain resistance, but the 9th Irish
Fusiliers had the railway "halt" west of Anseghem before dusk.
Attempts were made to push onward to the river, but it was found that
the Germans still held Bergstraat with machine-guns, and no further
progress could be made. It was quite evident that they were not
going to fall back on the Escaut till forced to do so. Their policy,
directed with great skill--for never did the work of their divisional
and regimental commanders shine more brightly than in these days--was
to give up what could not be held, and no more, thus husbanding till
the last the declining moral of their infantrymen, and delaying the
advance as long as might be. A resistance more rigid, with the German
soldier in his present temper, would inevitably have led to a break
through, somewhere or other, and a consequent rout.

The bolt of the 36th Division was now shot. Weary flesh was at last
proclaiming itself master over spirit unwearied. The only thing that
had kept the men so long on their legs in this winter warfare was the
excellence of the accommodation behind the line. Such a campaign in
devastated country would have been unthinkable. Even as it was, they
had been subjected to great hardship and exposure, while the constant
gas shelling had had some effect on many hundreds who had not left
the ranks. The casualties since the beginning of offensive operations
numbered over three thousand. Of these, six-sevenths were wounded,
and a very large proportion, most fortunately, suffering from light
wounds from machine-gun bullets, or a temporarily disabling whiff of
gas. But not more than a tenth of these casualties, or of a certain
sick wastage, had been replaced by reinforcements. As a consequence
battalions in action had seldom more than two hundred or two hundred
and fifty bayonets. Other arms had suffered in less, but still in
high proportion, while the loss of transport animals was becoming
serious. All preparations were made for a renewal of the attack, but
on the afternoon of the 27th came a wire from the X. Corps to the
effect that the Division would be relieved by the 34th, and would
come under its orders the following day, being withdrawn for rest
and reorganization. Soon after dusk on the 27th the 101st Brigade of
the 34th Division relieved the two weak Brigades of the 36th in the
line, which began their march back to the area about Courtrai. Though
little they knew it, their part in the war was finished.

The Artillery and Medium Trench Mortar Batteries had further work to
perform, when the 34th Division, having pushed up to the banks of
the Escaut, forced its crossing in the first week of November. The
107th, 108th, and 109th Light Trench Mortar Batteries were also lent
to the 34th Division on that occasion. The distinction of having
fired the last shot of any unit of the 36th Division is claimed
by both artillerymen and Stokes gunners of the 108th Light Trench
Mortar Battery, in action after the other two had expended all their
ammunition. Let both divide the crown. No other unit would begrudge
it to either.

In the late operations the 36th Division had inscribed, on these its
final pages, one of the brightest chapters of its career. It had been
a period marked by a brilliant co-operation of every arm, combatant
and non-combatant. Amid many great achievements, perhaps the most
satisfactory of all had been that of the Engineers. For once their
work, always so hard, but generally so obscure and thankless, had
stood out in the foreground. Upon it had hinged the whole attack
across the Lys. They had carried out, with supreme skill, devotion,
and success, what is perhaps the sapper's first task in warfare, of
which he is popularly supposed to dream, that of putting the infantry
across a great river, to be launched to victory from the further
bank. General Jacob's message, a few days before the Division was
finally withdrawn, is the best testimonial to what the troops and
their leaders had accomplished. It ran as follows:

"Major-General C. COFFIN, V.C., D.S.O.,
Commanding 36th Division.

"The 36th (Ulster) Division has been fighting continuously since
the 28th September in the operations in Flanders. The spirit, dash,
and initiative shown by all ranks have been splendid, and beyond
all praise. The leadership displayed by yourself and your Brigade
and other Commanders could not have been bettered. The conditions
under which the men have had to fight have been, and are still, very
trying, but nothing seems to stop your gallant Division.

"I have also been much struck with the good staff work of the
Division, and it is very creditable to all concerned.

"Will you kindly express to the Commanders, Staffs, and all ranks of
the Division my heartiest congratulations and thanks for their work.

"When the history is written of what the Division has done in
Flanders during the past month, it will prove to be a record of
magnificent fighting and wonderful progress; for, during this period,
an advance has been made of about twenty-five miles over the worst
of country, and under the heaviest machine-gun fire ever experienced
in this war. This advance has entailed constant fighting, but the
36th Division has overcome every obstacle, and has proved itself one
of the best fighting Divisions in the Army, well commanded and well
staffed.

"My best wishes to you all.

"C. N. JACOB, Lieutenant-General,
Commanding II. Corps."

On November the 2nd, Divisional Headquarters and the 107th Brigade
moved to Mouscron, practically a suburb of Tourcoing, but on the
other side of the frontier, in Belgium. Training and reorganization
were carried out. Ranks filled up, and the troops, in splendid
billets, speedily threw off their fatigue. Another turn in the
line was still expected. But that was not required. If the 36th
Division was not actually "in at the death," it had afterwards the
satisfaction of knowing that the war was really won when it left
the firing-line. The very day after, October the 28th, the German
_communiqué_ was signed by the "Chief of the General Staff of the
Field Army"--Hindenburg--instead of the "First Quarter-Master
General"--Ludendorff. The meaning of that was instantly grasped.
Ludendorff, the great gambler, whose final throws had brought him so
near success, had resigned. A day later, and it was announced that
Austria had thrown up the sponge. On the 7th of November the German
_parlementaires_ passed through the French lines at Guise, on their
way to interview Marshal Foch. Then came the news of the Armistice.

It was celebrated by the troops in France without that wild hilarity,
wild almost to hysteria, that greeted it in London. Perhaps the man
who had been trudging forward, week by week, facing the machine-guns,
if in front, sniffing for gas, and, by night, listening anxiously for
the purr of the Gotha, if in rear, hardly realized that it was all
over. The men were, none the less, intensely happy. Everywhere they
were _fêted_ and acclaimed by the civilians whom they had freed from
four long years of bondage. Best of all, after years of discomfort
and exposure, they slept softly, undisturbed by the crash of bombs.

And so, as Lord Fisher afterwards put it, "at the eleventh hour of
the eleventh day of the eleventh month," the war came to its end.

[Illustration: Map VII.
The Final Advances, 1918.]

This History contains few of those Special Orders of the Day which,
long after the events that gave them birth, are inclined to appear
heavy, and sometimes fail to accord with present sentiment. That
of General Jacob has been quoted because it was under his fine
leadership that the men of the 36th Division marched to final
victory. It would not be fitting to conclude this chapter without
recalling that issued at the end of hostilities to all the Allied
Armies by the Marshal in supreme command, who inherits from his
teacher, the greatest soldier his country and the modern world ever
produced, the gift of making a few words majestic and ever-memorable.
Amidst our present discontents some of the glory of these words of
Marshal Foch may appear tarnished, but, like the words of Napoleon
to his troops in Egypt, they will endure, when immediate sorrows and
disappointments are forgotten, perhaps when the very causes for which
men laid down their lives by millions have become obscure.

"Officiers, sous-officiers, soldats des Armées Alliées.

"Après avoir résolument arrêté l'ennemi, vous l'avez, pendant des
mois, avec une foi et une énergie inlassables, attaqué sans répit.

"Vous avez gagné la plus grande bataille de l'Histoire et sauvé la
cause la plus sacrée: la Liberté du Monde.

"Soyez fiers!

"D'une gloire immortelle vous aves paré vos drapeaux.

"La Postérité vous garde sa reconnaissance.

"Le Maréchal de France,
Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées,
F. FOCH."

FOOTNOTES:

[62] _i.e._, three guns. By this time none of the Machine-Gun
Companies had men enough to man more than twelve guns.

[63] This country is, in reality, one vast garden city. Groups of a
dozen houses have their names. It has not been found possible to show
them all on the small-scale map illustrating this chapter.

CHAPTER XVI

THE END: NOVEMBER 1918 TO JUNE 1919

But little remains to be told. The war was over, and men were eager
to be home. There was a certain disappointment that the Division was
not to form part of the British garrison on the Rhine. As a fact,
one Division only of the New Armies was chosen for this duty. It
was the 9th, with which, since April, in days of reverse and days
of victory, the 36th had been in comradeship as close as any two
Divisions can have known in the course of the war. None begrudged to
it this seal upon its splendid record. And, apart from a momentary
regret at missing the sight of that apotheosis of victory so long
awaited, officers and men speedily recognised that their lot, during
the remaining days of their incorporation, was fallen in fairer
ground. The end of the 36th Division's existence, amid a friendly and
a grateful populace, was far happier than it would have been amid
the restrictions and comically correct civilities of Cologne and the
Bridgehead.

Soon after the Armistice the 36th Division settled down for the
winter astride the Franco-Belgian frontier. Headquarters, the 107th
and 108th Infantry Brigades, the 121st and 122nd Field Companies
R.E., and the 16th Rifles (Pioneers) were one side, at Mouscron. The
Artillery, in Tourcoing, the 109th Brigade and 150th Field Company,
at Roncq, were the other. The Pioneers had the hardest work, being
employed on railway reconstruction and upon the Escaut bridges. Some
military training, mainly ceremonial, was carried out. But chief
energies were devoted to recreation and to the education scheme,
which attempted to provide for the young soldiers some preparation
for the civil life to which they would shortly be returning. The idea
was a worthy one, and was organized with skill and enthusiasm, yet
it is to be doubted whether a large proportion had much benefit of
it. By the time it was really in full swing, demobilization was at
the same stage. The majority of the men attended but a few classes
before they returned, and can have acquired but a smattering of the
subjects they were pursuing. December was the most successful month,
when there were recorded 54,203 attendances at the various classes.
On the lighter side there were competitions in Rugby and Association
football, cross-country running, boxing, and rifle-shooting.
Christmas, the fifth since the Division's formation, its fourth
since crossing the Channel, was happily celebrated. The Divisional
Canteen had on this occasion its greatest triumph. The position was
difficult. Behind lay the area of the Ypres battlefields; around, the
country had been practically denuded of food-stuffs by the Germans.
The Canteen Officer had, in the first place, made arrangements with
a farmer near Dunkirk to attend markets in that region, buy up
poultry, and feed them on her farm till it was time to kill them for
Christmas. Had a British officer done the buying, the prices would
have been prohibitive. It was soon found that the good _fermière's_
estate would not hold all the birds required, and a further order was
placed with the _Halles_ in Paris, through a Dunkirk merchant. Pigs
were also bought, to be killed on the appointed day. But difficulties
grew with demands. Lorries broke down in the swamps about Ypres. The
Canteen Officer began to wonder whether his head upon a charger would
not be the chief dish of the occasion. On Christmas Eve the Paris
consignment arrived at Dunkirk, but it was in the middle of a line of
trucks which could not be disentangled, and would not have been for
days. Finally, after some shunting, a lorry was got alongside. When
the lorry arrived at Mouscron it was found to contain also a large
case of eggs, a luxury unknown for months, a special order for some
unit in Dunkirk. Naturally it was then impossible to send it back.
Every man in the Division had plentiful fare, while, adds the Canteen
Officer modestly, "no other division in the district got anything
better than bully beef." The present writer can bear witness that the
turkeys ordered for divisions on the Rhine arrived in many cases long
after Christmas, and frequently had to be buried forthwith by special
parties.

In the combatant ranks, alas! there were few who had spent the first
Christmas with the Division.

The following day there was the great ball given by the ladies of
Ghent to the British Army, which was attended by fifty officers of
the 36th Division. At the end of January, H.R.H. the Prince of Wales,
on his return from Germany, paid the Division a visit of two days.
This visit was informal and marked by no parades, but the Prince,
despite very bad weather, visited a number of units, and had long
conversations with officers and men on their experiences.

January was also the month when the flood of demobilization rose to
its height. In its course over four thousand officers and men were
sent home. In the following month came orders for one battalion to
be sent to Germany for service. The 12th Royal Irish Rifles was
chosen, and made up to strength from volunteers of the 1st, 2nd,
and 15th battalions of that regiment. On March the 2nd it entrained
at Mouscron, where the whole Division, less the Artillery, was
now concentrated, and proceeded to join the 2nd (now the Light)
Division on the Rhine. Soon afterwards the _cadres_ of the regular
battalions began to move home. On March the 12th the Field Marshal
Commanding-in-Chief paid a farewell visit to the Division. When he
laid down those duties that he had so splendidly and courageously
performed, it was indeed clear that the era of the Great War was
at an end. A few days later General Coffin, under whose vigorous
leadership the 36th Division had achieved its final triumphs, left
it to command a Brigade in the British Army of the Rhine. Divisional
Headquarters were reduced to _cadre_, the new commander being
Brigadier-General P. Leveson-Gower.

The last words were not written till June. Then the _cadres_ of the
remaining service battalions proceeded to the Base, and Headquarters
formally closed. In January the 36th Division had practically ceased
to exist. Now, six months later, its name departed from official
registers.

Its History would not be complete without some reference to the
Ulster Divisional Fund. This Fund owed its inception to General
Nugent's forethought. The 36th Division was certainly the only one
to look forward to the period after the war as early as 1915. Before
quitting the Division in 1918, General Nugent executed a Trust Deed
in favour of Lord Dunleath and Sir Robert Kennedy, establishing a
Trust for the benefit of officers and men of the Division, their
wives, widows, children, orphans, or dependants. Roughly speaking, a
sum of £18,750 has been administered by the Administration Committee,
to whom the Trustees delegated the management of the Fund. Of this
over £14,000 was derived from divisional undertakings, including
the canteens, the concert party, the cinema, etc., and over £2,000
from dividends and interest. It must be remembered that the sums
derived from divisional undertakings represent a proportion only of
their actual profits. Large sums were expended in France, on sports
outfits, on Christmas fare, on free buffets at horse shows and other
entertainments, and on the still more important buffets for "walking
wounded" during the progress of a battle. The Fund was opened to
applications for relief in February 1919. It has now been practically
all distributed in grants to relieve and assist men of the Division,
and has been without doubt of very great value. The total number of
grants made exceeds two thousand five hundred.

The record of the 36th Division is high and honourable. The names
of the actions in which it fought, given according to the official
report of the "Battles Nomenclature Committee," are as follows:

1916 The Battle of Albert, July.

1917 The Battle of Messines, June;

The Battle of Langemarck, August;

The Battle of Cambrai, November.

1918 The Battle of St. Quentin, with Actions for
Somme Crossings, 21st-25th March;

The Battle of Rosières, 26th-27th March;

The Battle of Messines, 10th-11th April (108th
Brigade and one Company 36th Machine-Gun
Battalion only);

The Battle of Bailleul, 13th-15th April (108th
Brigade and one Company 36th Machine-Gun
Battalion only);

The Advance in Flanders, 18th August-6th
September;

The Battle of Ypres, 28th September-2nd
October;

The Battle of Courtrai, 14th-19th October, with
Action of Ooteghem, 25th October.

These names are given because, unfamiliar as they may sound to many
of the men who fought in the actions, they are their official titles.
It will be seen that from the first time the Division fought a big
battle there is one considerable gap only, between the Battle of
Albert, 1916, and the Battle of Messines, 1917. That gap is partly
to be explained, no doubt, by the fact that the Division, after its
great losses on the Somme, was never really up to strength till the
spring of 1917. The cause of that, again, is not far to seek. The
stream of recruits from the voluntary system was drying up by 1916
all over the country, and from the Military Service Act of that year
Ireland was excepted. The people of Ulster had certainly no cause
for shame with regard to its response during the voluntary period.
Belfast claims to stand second on the roll of British cities for
numbers of recruits in proportion to population, up to the imposition
of universal service. But, after Messines, a large number of English
reinforcements arrived, while, in late 1917 and 1918, as has been
recorded, five regular battalions of Ulster regiments joined the
Division. Of the offensive battles, it was engaged in two defeats,
but in one of these it was completely victorious upon its own front,
being compelled to withdraw because of failure elsewhere. The
36th Division, then, failed once only in attack, in the Battle of
Langemarck. And, on that day, in the circumstances wherein the troops
found themselves, it may be doubted whether success was within mortal
compass. In defensive fighting it proved itself equally devoted,
possessed above all of a hidden spring of fortitude which enabled it,
as we say of a gallant horse, to "come again" when apparently at its
last breath from exhaustion.

In bright days and dark there can be no doubt but that much of its
success sprang from the mutual confidence and affection which existed
between all arms. If we can employ a word so inhuman as machine to
describe a corporation of men that was intensely alive, that had
a soul of its own, we may say that it was a machine that worked
smoothly because it was weak in none of its parts. And we must not
forget, as men are prone to forget, that, if some parts bore a weight
heavier than others, each was of equal importance in the working of
the machine. This record has been mainly concerned with the fighting
arms and, of these, to by far the greatest extent with the infantry.
For that no apology is made. It is as just as it is inevitable. It
is not only upon the infantry that all hinges; it is mainly by a
record of the infantry's movements that the story of battles is told.
Not alone the other fighting arms, Artillery, Engineers, Signals,
Pioneers, Machine-Gunners, but Medical and Supply Services also
were animated by the same high spirit of devotion. Of the two last
comparatively little has been said, and perhaps least of all of the
Supply Services. That is a compliment rather than the reverse.
Happy, says Montesquieu, is the people whose annals are humdrum.
The saying may be applied to Supply Services in war. The Royal Army
Service Corps of the 36th Division has few remarkable dates or
occurrences in its record, but that record is one long chain of which
the alternating links are steady work, forethought, and resource. The
other service of supply, the Ordnance, was always at a peculiarly
high standard, the Division being most fortunate in possessing a very
efficient D.A.D.O.S. in Captain Mackenzie, over a long period. Staff
Officers might come and might go, but "Dados" went on for ever.

There may be required some explanation of why, in this narrative, the
series of victories in 1918 is compressed in detail by comparison
with such actions as Messines and Cambrai. One reason is that the
records of the latter are far more complete. Another is that final
victory was won not only by the men who went forward so gallantly to
achieve it, but by all their silent comrades whose graves lay behind
them, who had fought a far more bitter battle.

These took the blows of the enemy upon their breasts, but, ere they
fell, the blows delivered by their arms had enfeebled him, so that
those who came after could strike home. Like Mr. Valiant-for-truth,
they might have proclaimed with their last breath: "My sword I give
to him that shall succeed me in my pilgrimage, and my courage and
skill to him that can get it. My marks and scars I carry with me."
For them, as for him, we may humbly believe that, when they passed
over, all the trumpets sounded on the other side.

The 36th (Ulster) Division is but a memory to-day. This book, of
the imperfections of which as he writes its concluding lines the
author is but too acutely aware, represents in some sort an official
tribute, an attempt to put into words the silent tribute borne
by many thousands of hearts. That tribute is paid not alone to
victors in the flesh, but to those other victors who had put it off
before they themselves knew what part they had in victory. When we
commemorate that great corporation of men which was the 36th (Ulster)
Division, our minds should embrace the whole company of dead and
living, for they are of one brotherhood.

The worth of that brotherhood it is hoped these chapters have not
wholly failed to commemorate. But the power of better pens than that
of this writer were inadequate to express, to those who have not
looked upon a battle of modern war, to the younger generation, which
we pray may not see one, what strength there must be in the fibres
of the will if they are not to snap beneath its strain. Leadership,
training, discipline, the pride which springs from the individual's
association with and amalgamation in a great combatant formation,
have their part in the toughening of those human cords. Of themselves
they do not suffice. To engender that which was brought forth in the
exploits of the Ulster Division, they must mate with a racial spirit
possessing already in amplitude the seeds of endurance and of valour.

THE END

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE 36TH (ULSTER) DIVISION[64]

GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING.

Major-General C. H. Powell, C.B. Till Sept. 1915.

Major-General O. S. Nugent, C.B., D.S.O. Till 6th May, 1918.

Major-General C. Coffin, V.C., C.B., D.S.O.

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

C.R.A.

(Brigadier-General R. J. Elkington, commanding 1st/1st London
Divisional Artillery, attached. Till 12th December, 1915.)

Brigadier-General H. J. Brock, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Till 23rd
September, 1918.

Brigadier-General C. St. L. Hawkes, D.S.O.

BRIGADES.

(1/1st, 1/2nd, 1/3rd, 1/4th London Brigades, attached. Till 12th
December, 1915.)

153rd Brigade R.F.A.

A, B, C, D Batteries (18-pounder).

Reorganized 22nd May, 1916, into three 4-gun 18-pounder and one
4-gun 4.5 howitzer batteries. (D to 154th Brigade. C/154 joined,
becoming D/153.)

Reorganized 14th September, 1916, into three 6-gun 18-pounder and
one 4-gun 4.5 howitzer batteries. (A broken up, one section to B,
one section to C. A/154 and one section C/154 joined, becoming
A/153.)

D made up to 6-gun battery 13th January, 1917. (One section from
D/172.)

154th Brigade R.F.A.

A, B, C, D Batteries (howitzer).

A transferred to 46th Division 28th February, 1916.

Reorganized 22nd May, 1916, into three 4-gun 18-pounder batteries.
(B to 173rd Brigade. D/173 joined, becoming B/154. C to 153rd
Brigade. D/153 joined, becoming C/154. D to 172nd Brigade. D/172
joined, becoming A/154.)

Broken up 14th September, 1916. (A and one section of C to 153rd
Brigade. B and one section of C to 173rd Brigade.)

172nd Brigade R.F.A.

A, B, C, D Batteries (18-pounder).

Reorganized 22nd May, 1916, into three 4-gun 18-pounder and one
4-gun 4.5 howitzer batteries. (D to 154th Brigade. D/154 joined,
becoming D/172.)

Reorganized 14th September, 1916, into two 6-gun 18-pounder and one
4-gun 4.5 howitzer batteries. (C broken up and divided between A
and B.)

D/529 howitzer from England joined 7th October, 1916, becoming
C/172.

One section of D to 153rd Brigade and one to 173rd Brigade, 13th
January, 1917.

Brigade became 113th Army Brigade R.F.A., 22nd February, 1917. (A
to 77th Brigade.)

173rd Brigade R.F.A.

A, B, C, D Batteries (18-pounder).

Reorganized 22nd May, 1916, into three 4-gun 18-pounder and one
4-gun 4.5 howitzer batteries. (D to 154th Brigade. B/154 joined,
becoming D/173.)

Reorganized 14th September, 1916, into three 6-gun 18-pounder and
one 4-gun 4.5 howitzer. (B broken up and divided between A and C.
B/154 and one section C/154 joined, becoming B/173.) D made up to
6-gun battery 13th January, 1917. (One section from D/172.)

Divisional Ammunition Column. (Until May 1916 there had been four
Brigade Ammunition Columns.)

ROYAL ENGINEERS.

121st Field Company, R.E.

122nd Field Company, R.E.

150th Field Company, R.E.

INFANTRY BRIGADES.

107TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

COMMANDERS.

Brigadier-General Couchman, C.B. Till 20th October, 1915.

Brigadier-General W. M. Withycombe, C.M.G., D.S.O. Till 7th March,
1917.

Brigadier-General F. J. M. Rowley, D.S.O. Till 2nd June, 1917.

Brigadier-General W. M. Withycombe, C.M.G., D.S.O. Till 30th April,
1918.

Brigadier-General E. I. de S. Thorpe, C.M.G., D.S.O. Till 13th
September, 1918.

Brigadier-General H. J. Brock, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

BATTALIONS.

8th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.

Amalgamated with 9th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles, 29th August,
1917, as 8th/9th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.

9th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.

Amalgamated with 8th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles, 29th August,
1917, as 8th/9th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.

8th/9th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.
Disbanded 7th February, 1918.

10th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.
Disbanded 20th February, 1918.

15th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.

1st Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Joined from 4th Division 2nd August, 1917.
To 108th Brigade 8th February, 1918.

1st Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.
Joined from 8th Division 7th February, 1918.

2nd Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.
Joined from 108th Brigade 8th February, 1918.

This Brigade was attached to 4th Division from 6th November, 1915,
to 7th February, 1916, being replaced during that period by the
12th Infantry Brigade.

108TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

COMMANDERS.

Brigadier-General C. Hacket Pain, C.B. Till 4th December, 1916.

Brigadier-General C. R. J. Griffith, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Till 21st
May, 1918.

Brigadier-General E. Vaughan, C.M.G., D.S.O.

BATTALIONS.

11th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.

Amalgamated with 13th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles, 14th November,
1917, as 11th/13th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.

12th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.

13th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.

Amalgamated with 11th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles, 14th November,
1917, as 11th/13th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.

11th/13th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.
Disbanded 10th February, 1918.

9th Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Absorbed dismounted squadrons of North Irish Horse, September 1917,
becoming 9th (N.I.H.) Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers.

2nd Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.
Joined from 25th Division 14th November, 1917.
To 107th Brigade 8th February, 1918.

1st Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Joined from 107th Brigade 8th February, 1918.

109TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

COMMANDERS.

Brigadier-General T. E. Hickman, C.B., D.S.O. Till 27th May, 1916.

Brigadier-General R. J. Shuter, D.S.O. Till 13th January, 1917.

Brigadier-General A. St. Q. Ricardo, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O. Till
12th December, 1917.

Brigadier-General W. F. Hessey, D.S.O. Till 18th April, 1918.

Brigadier-General E. Vaughan, C.M.G., D.S.O. Till 21st May, 1918.

Brigadier-General W. F. Hessey, D.S.O.

BATTALIONS.

9th Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.

10th Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
Disbanded 19th February, 1918.

11th Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
Disbanded 8th February, 1918.

14th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.
Disbanded 21st February, 1918.

1st Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
Joined from 29th Division 19th February, 1918.

2nd Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
Joined from 32nd Division 4th February, 1918.

PIONEER BATTALION.

16th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS.

Service Squadron, 6th Inniskilling Dragoons.

Left Division. 1st June, 1916; to X. Corps Cavalry.

36th Divisional Signal Company.

Divisional Cyclist Company. Broken up 31st May, 1916; half to X.
Corps Cyclist Battalion, half to 15th Royal Irish Rifles.

R.A.M.C.

108th Field Ambulance.
109th Field Ambulance.
110th Field Ambulance.

Divisional Train, R.A.S.C.
Divisional Supply Column.
48th Mobile Veterinary Section.

MACHINE-GUN CORPS.

107th Brigade Machine-Gun Company.
Formed January 1916.

108th Brigade Machine-Gun Company.
Formed January 1916.

109th Brigade Machine-Gun Company.
Formed January 1916.

266th Machine-Gun Company.
Joined from England 18th January, 1918.

36th Battalion Machine-Gun Corps formed from these four Companies
1st March, 1918.

FOOTNOTE:

[64] Changes in command or formation subsequent to the Armistice are
not noticed.

As no similar official list is available, the compilation of the
following entailed considerable research, knowledge, and patience.
Before printing, copies of the list were submitted to representatives
of units for corrections and additions.

[Officers and other ranks (except in the case of those awarded the
Victoria Cross) have opposite their names their regiments or corps
only; not the numbers of battalions or other units. It was impossible
to insert these numbers in every case, and so it was thought best to
do so in none. In the case of the infantry, many officers and other
ranks served in several battalions of the same regiment at different
periods.

Officers of the Regular Army, Territorial Army, or Special Reserve,
who served on staffs of formations of the Division, are entered under
their regiments. Those who commanded infantry brigades are entered as
"Cmndg. ---- Brigade," without the names of their regiments. Those
who served with infantry battalions are entered under the regiments
to which those battalions belonged: for example, Lieut.-Col. C. F.
Meares, an officer of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, who commanded the
16th Royal Irish Rifles (Pioneers), is entered under the latter
regiment.

All names beginning with "M'," a form very frequent in the North
of Ireland, are included under "Mc," as it was in this form
they generally appeared in "Part II. Orders" in the field, and
subsequently in the _London Gazette_.]

APPENDIX II

A LIST OF HONOURS AND AWARDS GAINED BY OFFICERS AND OTHER RANKS WHILE
SERVING WITH THE 36TH (ULSTER) DIVISION 1914-1918

VICTORIA CROSS

Captain ERIC NORMAN FRANKLAND BELL, 9th Batt. Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers.

For most conspicuous bravery at Thiepval, on 1st July, 1916. He
was in command of a trench mortar battery, and advanced with
the infantry to the attack. When our front line was hung up by
enfilading machine-gun fire, Captain Bell crept forward and shot
the machine-gunner. Later, on no less than three occasions, when
our bombing parties, which were clearing the enemy's trenches, were
unable to advance, he went forward alone and threw trench mortar
bombs among the enemy. When he had no more bombs available, he
stood on the parapet, under intense fire, and used a rifle with
great coolness and effect on the enemy advancing to counter-attack.
Finally he was killed rallying and reorganizing infantry parties
which had lost their officers. All this was outside the scope of
his normal duties with his battery. He gave his life in his supreme
devotion to duty.

Lieutenant GEOFFREY ST. GEORGE SHILLINGTON CATHER, 9th Batt. Royal
Irish Fusiliers.

For most conspicuous bravery near Hamel, France, on 1st July, 1916.
From 7 p.m. till midnight he searched "No Man's Land," and brought
in three wounded men. Next morning, at 8 a.m., he continued his
search, brought in another wounded man, and gave water to others,
arranging for their rescue later. Finally, at 10-30 a.m., he took
out water to another man, and was proceeding further on when he was
himself killed. All this was carried out in full view of the enemy,
and under direct machine-gun fire and intermittent artillery fire.
He set a splendid example of courage and self-sacrifice.

Second-Lieutenant JAMES SAMUEL EMERSON, 9th Batt. Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers.

For repeated acts of most conspicuous bravery north of La
Vacquerie, on 6th December, 1917. He led the company in an attack,
and cleared four hundred yards of trench. Though wounded, when
the enemy attacked in superior numbers, he sprang out of the
trench with eight men and met the attack in the open, killing many
and taking six prisoners. For three hours after this, all other
officers having been casualties, he remained with his company,
refusing to go to the dressing station, and repeatedly repelled
bombing attacks. Later, when the enemy again attacked in superior
numbers, he led his men to repel the attack, and was mortally
wounded. His heroism, when worn out and exhausted from loss of
blood, inspired his men to hold out, though almost surrounded, till
reinforcements arrived and dislodged the enemy.

Private NORMAN HARVEY, 1st Batt. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.

For most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty near Ingoyghem,
on the 25th October, 1918, when his battalion was held up and
suffered many casualties from enemy machine-guns. On his own
initiative he rushed forward and engaged the enemy single-handed,
disposing of twenty enemy and capturing two guns. Later, when his
company was checked by another enemy strong-point, he again rushed
forward alone and put the enemy to flight. Subsequently, after
dark, he voluntarily carried out, single-handed, an important
reconnaissance, and gained valuable information. Private Harvey
throughout the day displayed the greatest valour, and his several
actions enabled the line to advance, saved many casualties, and
inspired all.

Second-Lieutenant CECIL LEONARD KNOX, R.E.

For most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty. Twelve bridges
were entrusted to this officer for demolition, and all of them were
successfully destroyed. In the case of one steel-girder bridge,
the destruction of which he personally supervised, the time-fuse
failed to act. Without hesitation, Second-Lieutenant Knox ran to
the bridge, under heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, and, when the
enemy were actually upon the bridge, he tore away the time-fuse and
lit the instantaneous-fuse, to do which he had to get under the
bridge. This was an act of the highest devotion to duty, entailing
the gravest risks, which, as a practical civil engineer, he fully
realized.

Private WILLIAM FREDERICK M'FADZEAN, 14th Batt. Royal Irish Rifles.

For most conspicuous bravery near Thiepval Wood, on 1st July,
1916. While in a concentration trench and opening a box of bombs
for distribution prior to an attack, the box slipped down into the
trench, which was crowded with men, and two of the safety-pins
fell out. Private M'Fadzean, instantly realizing the danger to
his comrades, with heroic courage threw himself on the top of the
bombs. The bombs exploded, blowing him to pieces, but only one
other man was injured. He well knew his danger, being himself a
bomber, but without a moment's hesitation he gave his life for his
comrades.

Lance-Corporal ERNEST SEAMAN, 2nd Batt. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.

For most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty. When the right
flank of his company was held up by a nest of enemy machine-guns,
he, with great courage and initiative, rushed forward under heavy
fire with his Lewis gun, and engaged the position single-handed,
capturing two machine-guns and twelve prisoners, and killing one
officer and two men. Later in the day he again rushed another
enemy machine-gun position, capturing the gun under heavy fire.
He was killed immediately after. His courage and dash were beyond
all praise, and it was entirely due to the very gallant conduct of
Lance-Corporal Seaman that his company was enabled to rush forward
to its objective and capture many prisoners.

Private ROBERT QUIGG, 12th Batt. Royal Irish Rifles.

For most conspicuous bravery at Hamel, France, on 1st July, 1916.
He advanced to the assault with his platoon three times. Early
next morning, hearing a rumour that his platoon officer was lying
out wounded, he went out seven times to look for him, under heavy
shell and machine-gun fire, each time bringing back a wounded man.
The last man he dragged in on a waterproof sheet from within a few
yards of the enemy's wire. He was seven hours engaged in this most
gallant work, and finally was so exhausted that he had to give it
up.

Second-Lieutenant EDMUND DE WIND, 15th Batt. Royal Irish Rifles.

For most conspicuous bravery and self-sacrifice on 21st March,
1918, at the Racecourse Redoubt, near Grugies. For seven hours he
held this important post, and, though twice wounded and practically
single-handed, he maintained his position till another section
could be got to his help. On two occasions, with two N.C.O.'s only,
he got out on top, under heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, and
cleared the enemy out of the trench, killing many. He continued
to repel attack after attack until he was mortally wounded and
collapsed. His valour, self-sacrifice, and example were of the
highest order.

COMPANION OF THE MOST HONOURABLE ORDER OF THE BATH

Brock, Brig.-Gen. H. J., _C.M.G._, _D.S.O._ Cmndg. R.A.
Coffin, Maj.-Gen. C., _V.C._, _D.S.O._ Cmndg. 36th Div.
Griffith, Brig.-Gen. C. R. J., _C.M.G._, _D.S.O._ Cmndg. 108th Bde.
Nugent, Maj.-Gen. O. S. W., _D.S.O._ Cmndg. 36th Div.

COMPANION OF THE ORDER OF ST. MICHAEL AND ST. GEORGE

Brock, Brig.-Gen. H. J., _C.B._, _D.S.O._ Cmndg. R.A.
Cole-Hamilton, Lt.-Col. C. G., _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Rif.
Comyn, Lt.-Col. L. J., _D.S.O._ Conn. Rangers.
Greig, Lt.-Col. F. J. R.A.M.C.
Goodwin, Lt.-Col. W. R., _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Rif.
Hawkes, Brig.-Gen. C. St. L. G., _D.S.O._ Cmndg. R.A.
Hunt, Lt.-Col. J. P., _D.S.O._, _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Knott, Lt.-Col. J. E., _D.S.O._ R. Innis. Fus.
Oliphant, Lt.-Col. P. E. K. Blair, _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Rif.
Pakenham, Col. H. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Place, Lt.-Col. C. O., _D.S.O._ R.E.
Potter, Lt.-Col. C. F., _D.S.O._ R.A.
Ricardo, Brig.-Gen. A. St. Q., _D.S.O._ Cmndg. 10th Bde.
Roch, Col. R. S., _D.S.O._ R.A.M.C.
Savage, Col. W. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Simpson, Lt.-Col. H. C., _D.S.O._ R.A.
Smythe, Lt.-Col. R. C., _D.S.O._ R. Innis. Fus.
Thompson, Lt.-Col. A. G., _D.S.O._ Indian Army.
Thompson, Lt.-Col. R. G. R.A.
Thorpe, Brig.-Gen. E. I. de S., _D.S.O._ Cmndg. 107th Bde.
Vaughan, Brig.-Gen. E., _D.S.O._ Cmndg. 108th Bde.

THIRD BAR TO DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER

Knox, Lt.-Col. R. S. R. Innis. Fus.

SECOND BAR TO DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER

Knox, Lt.-Col. R. S. R. Innis. Fus.

BAR TO DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER

Cole-Hamilton, Lt.-Col. C. G., _C.M.G._ R. Ir. Rif.
Crawford, Lt.-Col. E. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Dent, Lt.-Col. J. R. C., _M.C._ R. Innis. Fus.
Goodwin, Lt.-Col. W. R., _C.M.G._ R. Ir. Rif.
Hunt, Lt.-Col. J. P., _C.M.G._, _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Hessey, Brig.-Gen. W. F. Cmndg. 109th Bde.
Jones, Lt.-Col. B. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Knox, Lt.-Col. R. S. R. Innis. Fus.
McCarthy-O'Leary, Lt.-Col. H. W. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Peacocke, Lt.-Col. W. J. R. Innis. Fus.

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER

Allen, Lt.-Col. Sir W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Blacker, Lt.-Col. S. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Bowen, Lt.-Col. F. O. R. Ir. Rif.
Brock, Brig.-Gen. H. J., _C.B._, _C.M.G._ Cmndg. R.A.
Bruce, Maj. G. J., _M.C._ Genl. List.
Burnand, Lt.-Col. N. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Clements, Maj. S. U. L. R. Ir. Fus.
Clendinning, Maj. H R. Ir. Rif.
Comyn, Lt.-Col. L. J., _C.M.G._ Conn. Rangers.
Crawford, Lt.-Col. E. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Crozier, Brig.-Gen. F. P., _C.B._, _C.M.G._ R. Ir. Rif.
Dent, Lt.-Col. J. R. C., _M.C._ R. Innis. Fus.
Despard, Capt. C. B., _M.C._ R. Ir. Fus.
Dunbar, Lt.-Col. B. H. V. R.A.M.C.
Edwards, Maj. G. R. O. R.F.A.
Elwes, Lt.-Col. H. C., _M.V.O._ R. Ir. Rif.
Farnham, Lt.-Col. A. K., Lord R. Innis. Fus.
Forde, Lt.-Col. G. M., _M.C._ R. Innis. Fus.
Franklyn, Maj. G. E. W., _M.C._ R.A.
Gallagher, Lt. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Gooch, Maj. H., _M.C._ R.E.
Goodwin, Lt.-Col. W. R., _C.M.G._ R. Ir. Rif.
Gordon, Lt.-Col. F. L. R. Ir. Rif.
Grant-Suttie, Maj. H. F., _M.C._ R.A.
Green, Lt.-Col. S. H., _M.C._ West Yorks. Regt.
Hardie, Lt.-Col. C.C.A. R.E.
Hawkes, Brig.-Gen. C. St. L. G., _C.M.G._ Cmndg. R.A.
Hunt, Lt.-Col. J. P., _C.M.G._, _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Huskisson, Maj. G., _M.C._ R.F.A.
Ivey, Maj.T. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Jones, Lt.-Col. B. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Knott, Lt.-Col. J. E., _C.M.G._ R. Innis. Fus.
Knox, Lt.-Col. R. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Lowe, Lt.-Col. T. A., _M.C._ R. Ir. Fus.
McCallum, Maj. J. D. M. R. Ir. Rif.
McCarthy-O'Leary, Lt.-Col. H. W. D. R. Ir. Rif.
McKee, Maj. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Mackenzie, Lt.-Col. R. H., _M.C._ Cmndg. R.E.
Macrory, Lt.-Col. F. S. N. R. Innis. Fus.
Magill, Lt.-Col. R. R.A.M.C.
Maxwell, Lt.-Col. R. D. P. R. Ir. Rif.
May, Maj.E. R. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Meares, Lt.-Col. C. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Montgomery, Maj. W. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Muriel, Maj. J. C. R. Innis. Fus.
Nicholls, Maj. W. R.F.A.
Oliphant, Lt.-Col. P. E. K. Blair, _C.M.G._ R. Ir. Rif.
Peacocke, Lt.-Col. W. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Potter, Lt.-Col. C. F., _C.M.G._ R.A.
Pratt, Lt.-Col. A. C. R. Innis. Fus.
Rivis, Lt.-Col. T. C. L. R.A.S.C.
Roch, Lt.-Col. R. S., _C.M.G._ R.A.M.C.
Rogers, Maj. V. B., _M.C._ Genl. List.
Rowley, Brig.-Gen. F. G. M. Cmndg. 107th Bde.
Scott, Maj. C. A. R. R.F.A.
Scott, Capt. W., _M.C._ R. Ir. Fus.
Sharp, Capt. R. R., _M.C._ R.F.A.
Simpson, Lt.-Col. H. C., _C.M.G._ R.A.
Smyth, Maj. W., _M.C._ R.E.
Smythe, Lt.-Col. R. C., _C.M.G._ R. Ir. Fus.
Stewart, Capt. J. H., _M.C._ R. Ir. Rif.
Stidston, Lt.-Col. C. A. R.A.M.C.
Stranack, Maj. C. E. R.A.
Sugden, Capt. J. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Thompson, Maj. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Vivian, Lt.-Col. the Hon. O. R., _M.V.O._ R. Ir. Rif.
Withycombe, Brig.-Gen. W. M., _C.B._, _C.M.G._ Cmndg. 107th Bde.
Woods, Lt.-Col. P. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Young, Maj. T. F., _M.C._ R.E.

SECOND BAR TO MILITARY CROSS

Fullerton, Capt. A. R.A.M.C.
Law, Capt. R. O. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Lyness, Capt. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Paton, Rev. J. G. Army Chap. Dept.

BAR TO MILITARY CROSS

Adams, 2/Lt. T. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Apperson, Capt. G. J. R. Ir. Rif.

Bruce, Maj. G. J., _D.S.O._ Genl. List.

Charlton. Lt. J. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Condon, Capt. J. E. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Crawford, 2/Lt. C. O. R. Ir. Rif.
Crosbie, Capt. T. E. C. R. Ir. Fus.
Cuming, Lt. A. E. McM. R. Ir. Fus.

Darling, 2/Lt. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Deakin, Lt. G. R.E.
Dobbyn, Lt. A. L. R. Ir. Fus.
Dodd, Lt. F. R.E.
Duffin, Maj. J. T. Genl. List.
Duncan, Capt. L. S. R. Ir. Rif.

Forde, Lt.-Col. G. M., _D.S.O._ R. Innis. Fus.
Fullerton, Capt. A. R.A.M.C.

Gavin, Capt. N. J. H. R.A.M.C.
Gibson, Lt. M. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Godson, Capt. E. A. R. Ir. Fus.

Halahan, Rev. F. J. Army Chap. Dept.
Harding, Capt. C. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Higgins, Lt. R. L. R. Innis. Fus.
Holmes, 2/Lt. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Huskisson, Maj. G., _D.S.O._ R.F.A.

Kane, Capt. R. C. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Kitchen, Lt. H. M. M.G.C.
Knight, Capt. W. M. R. Innis. Fus.
Knox, 2/Lt. R. K. R. Ir. Rif.
Knox, Capt. T. K. R.E.

Lacey, Lt. and Q.M. J. C. de R. Innis. Fus.
Law, Capt. R. O. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Lendrum, Capt. A. C. R. Innis. Fus.
Logan, 2/Lt. S. R. Ir. Fus.
Lyness, Capt. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Lynch, Capt. V. J. R. Ir. Fus.

McDowell, Capt. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Marshall, Capt. E. L. R. Innis. Fus.
May, Lt. T. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Miller, Capt. P. M. R. Ir. Rif.
Morris, Rev, W. F. Army Chap. Dept.
Murphy, Capt. J. J., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Fus.

Ormandy, Lt. H. R.E.

Paton, Rev. J. G. Army Chap. Dept.
Patton, Capt. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Patton, Capt. J. H. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Purdy, 2/Lt. W. H. R. Innis. Fus.

Rawlins, 2/Lt. S. B. R.F.A.
Reddy, 2/Lt. J. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Rose, Maj. R. de R. R. Ir. Rif.
Russell, Maj. W. R.A.M.C.

Smyth, Maj. W., _D.S.O._ R.E.
Steele, 2/Lt. C. H. R. Ir. Fus.

Tooley, Capt. F. S. R. Ir. Rif.

Watts, Capt. R. R.A.S.C.

THE MILITARY CROSS

Abraham, 2/Lt. R., _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Achilles, Lt. H. M. R.F.A.
Adams, 2/Lt. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Adams, 2/Lt. J. R.A.M.C.
Adams, 2/Lt. Thos. R. Innis. Fus.
Adams, 2/Lt. T. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Allen, Capt. S. Genl. List.
Allkins, Lt. A. W. M.G.C.
Anderson, Capt. A. M. R. Ir. Rif.
Angle, 2/Lt. A. A. M.G.C.
Apperson, Capt. G. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Armstrong, C.S.M. W. R. Ir. Rif.

Bally, Rev. H. S. Army Chap. Dept.
Barbour, R.Q.M.S. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Barker, 2/Lt. J. M.G.C.
Barrett, Capt. E. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Barrington-Foote, Capt. R. C. R.F.A.
Barrowman, 2/Lt. R. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Battershill, Lt. E. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Bayly, Capt. L. M. R. Ir. Rif.
Beavis, Capt. M. J. R.F.A.
Beckett, 2/Lt. C. G. M.G.C.
Bell, Capt. W. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Belt, Capt. C. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Bennett, 2/Lt. J. T. M. R. Innis. Fus.
Bennett Lt. T. M. R. Ir. Rif.
Beveridge, Capt. G. R.F.A.
Blair, Capt. R. G. R.A.M.C.
Bleakley, R.S.M. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Boomer, Lt. W. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Boulton, Lt. L. G. M.G.C.
Bowerbank, Lt. W. M.G.C.
Boyce, Capt. T. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Boyle, Lt. R. M. R. Innis. Fus.
Brabazon, 2/Lt. R. E. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Briggs, Lt. and Q.M. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Broadbent, Maj. E. R. 8th Hussars.
Broome, Capt. F. N. R.F.A.
Brown, Lt. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Browne, 2/Lt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Browne, Capt. M. H. Genl. List.
Brunyate, Lt. W. M. W. R.E.
Bruce, Maj. G. J., _D.S.O._ Genl. List.
Bryson, 2/Lt. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Buchan, Capt. T. O. M. The Queen's.
Buckley, 2/Lt. H. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Bullock, C.S.M. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Burdge, 2/Lt. G. C. R. Innis. Fus.
Burrows, 2/Lt. H. C. R. Ir. Fus.
Burrows, Capt. O. V. R.A.M.C.

Caiger-Watson, 2/Lt. G. R. Ir. Fus.
Callingham, Lt. G. S. R.F.A.
Campbell, Lt. R. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Campbell, Major, S. B. B. R.A.M.C.
Carfrae, Maj. C. T. R.F.A.
Carse, 2/Lt. D. A., _M.M._ R.F.A.
Caskey, 2/Lt. J. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Castle, Maj. C. M. R. Ir. Rif.
Chalmers, Lt. J. L. R. Ir. Fus.
Chambers, Lt. R. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Charlton, Lt. J. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Chase, Capt. C. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Clarke, Capt. J. S. R.A.M.C.
Clotworthy, Capt. N. R. Ir. Rif.
Clough, 2/Lt. L. G. M.G.C.
Coffman, Lt. M. B. U.S.A. att. R. Ir. Rif.
Collings, Lt. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Conder, Capt. A. F. R. R.A.M.C.
Condon, Capt. J. E. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Corner, Lt. J. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Corkey, Capt. I. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Cousland, Capt. K. H. R.F.A.
Cowan, Maj. W. McC. C. R.F.A.
Cowser, Capt. R. J. R.A.S.C.
Cox, Lt. T. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Craig, Capt. H. D. C. H.L.I.
Crawford. 2/Lt. C. O. R. Ir. Rif.
Crosbie, Capt. T. E. C. R. Ir. Fus.
Crosbie, Capt. W. E. R.A.M.C.
Cullen, 2/Lt. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Cullen, Capt. P. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Cuming, Lt. A. E. McM. R. Ir. Fus.
Curley, Lt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Cuthbert, Lt. J. R.F.A.

Dalgleish, C.S.M. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Darling, 2/Lt. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Davidson, Capt. D. N. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Davis, 2/Lt. J. E. R. Innis. Fus.
Dawson, 2/Lt. N.C. R. Ir. Rif.
Deakin, Lt. G. R.E.
Dean, Capt. H. S. R. Ir. Fus.
Deans, Lt. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Delacour-Bles, Lt. J. M. M.G.C.
Delahey, 2/Lt. W. A. R.E.
Despard, Capt. C. B., _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Fus.
Devitt, 2/Lt. G. W. R.F.A.
Dickson, 2/Lt. A. McC. R. Ir. Rif.
Dobbyn, Lt. A.L. R. Ir. Fus.
Dodd, Lt. T. R.E.
Dolan, 2/Lt. J. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Donnelly, Maj. F. R.E.
Donohoe, Rev. F. Army Chap. Dept.
Douglas, Capt. J. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Drean, 2/Lt. R. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Duffin, Maj. J. T. Genl. List.
Duncan, Lt. L. S., _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Rif.
Dundee, 2/Lt. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Dundee, Capt. C. R.A.M.C.
Dunlop, Capt. J. L. R.A.M.C.
Dunworth, Capt. P. J. R. Innis. Fus.

Eaton, 2/Lt. R. O. R. Ir. Fus.
Ellis, Capt. S. G. R.F.A.
Ellis, Capt. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Ellwood, S.S.M. A. R.A.M.C.
Emerson, Maj. H. R.A.M.C.

Fagan, 2/Lt. J. J. A. R.E.
Falkiner, 2/Lt. F. E. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Falle, Capt. T. de C. R. Ir. Fus.
Fanning, 2/Lt. R. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Ferguson, Capt. A. R. Ir. Fus.
Ferrier, Capt. A. R.E.
Findlay, Capt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Finney, 2/Lt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Fitzgerald, Capt. J. G. E. M.G.C.
Flood, Capt. R. S. R. Ir. Fus.
Ford, 2/Lt. R. E. R.F.A.
Forde, Lt.-Col. G. M., _D.S.O._ R. Innis. Fus.
Fox, Capt. L. W. R.F.A.
Fox, Lt. S. M.G.C.
Fullerton, Capt. A. R.A.M.C.
Furness, Capt. W. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Furniss, Lt. J.E. R. Ir. Rif.

Gale, Maj. H. D. R.F.A.
Gavin, Capt. M. J. H. R.A.M.C.
Gibson, Rev. A. Army Chap. Dept.
Gibson, 2/Lt. A. J. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Gibson, Lt. M. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Gilmore, 2/Lt. A. W. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Gimson, Lt. A. F. R.F.A.
Given, Capt. T. F. R. Ir. Fus.
Glegg, Capt. J. D. R. Dub. Fus.
Glendinning, 2/Lt. J. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Godson, Capt. E. A. R. Ir. Fus.
Gooch, Maj. H., _D.S.O._ R.E.
Gordon, Capt. H. C. R. Innis. Fus.
Grant, 2/Lt. F. M. R.F.A.
Green, Lt.-Col. S. H., _D.S.O._ West Yorks. Regt.
Greenaway, 2/Lt. W. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Griffiths, Lt. T. E. U.S.A. att. R. Ir. Fus.
Grove-White, Capt. I. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Guinness, Maj. H. R. G. R.F.A.

Hackett, Capt. L. A. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Haigh, Lt. J. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Haire, Capt. A. L. R. Innis. Fus.
Halahan, Rev, F. J. Army Chap. Dept.
Hall, Capt. A. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Hamilton, 2/Lt. R. R.F.A.
Hanson, Capt. R. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Harbord, Capt. S. G. R.A.
Harcourt, 2/Lt. W. L. R. Ir. Rif.
Harding, Capt. C. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Harland, S.M. T. R.A.M.C.
Harpur, 2/Lt. H. de la M. R. Ir. Rif.
Harrison, 2/Lt. J. D., _M.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Haslett, 2/Lt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Haslett, 2/Lt. T. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Haughey, 2/Lt. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Henahan, Capt. M. R. Ir. Fus.
Henderson, 2/Lt. G. Y. R. Ir. Rif.
Hewitt, 2/Lt. J. O. N. R. Innis. Fus.
Higgins, Lt. R. L. R. Innis. Fus.
Hill, C.S.M. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Hill, Capt. F. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Hine, Lt. E. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Hogg, Lt. W. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Holland, 2/Lt. E. J. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Holmes, 2/Lt. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Horner, Maj. A. L. R.A.V.C.
Houston, 2/Lt. T. R. Ir. Fus.
Howard, Capt. A. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Hunter, Lt. W. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Huskisson, Maj. G., _D.S.O._ R.F.A.
Hutchison, Rev. W. H. Army Chap. Dept.

Idiens, 2/Lt. S. M.G.C.
Ireland, Capt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Irvine, Capt. G. M. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Irwin, 2/Lt. R. B. W. R. Innis. Fus.

Jackson, Lt. A. M. R.E.
Jackson, 2/Lt. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Johnston, Capt. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Johnston, 2/Lt. J. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Johnston, Lt.-Col. J. G. R.A.M.C.

Kane, Capt. R. C. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Kelleher, 2/Lt. P. St. J. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Kelly, C.S.M. J. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Kemp, Capt. A. E., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Kennedy, Capt. E. N R.F.A.
Kennedy, Lt. J. F. R.F.A.
Kennedy, R.Q.M.S. J. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Kennedy, Lt. R. N. R. Ir. Rif.
Kenworthy, 2/Lt. C. H. H. R. Innis. Fus.
King, 2/Lt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Kitchen, Lt. H. N. M.G.C.
Knight, Capt. W. M. R. Innis. Fus.
Knox, Lt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Knox, 2/Lt. R. K. R. Ir. Rif.
Knox, Capt. T. K. R.E.
Knox, Capt. W. H. R. Innis. Fus.

Lacey, Lt. and Q.M. J. C. de R. Innis. Fus.
Lamont, 2/Lt. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Lancaster, 2/Lt. E. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Lavelle, 2/Lt. M. R. Innis. Fus.
Lavery, Lt. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Law, Capt. R. O. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Leahy, 2/Lt. T. C. R. Ir. Fus.
Ledlie, Lt. J. C. St. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Lendrum, Capt. A. C. R. Innis. Fus.
Lennon, 2/Lt. J., _D.C.M._, _M.M._ R. Ir. Fus.
Lepper, Maj. E. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Leslie, Maj. C. G. 3rd Dragoon Gds.
Lewis, Maj. P. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Lindsay, Capt. G. E. R.A.M.C.
Linton, 2/Lt. W. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Logan, 2/Lt. S. R. Ir. Fus.
Lodge, 2/Lt. J. E. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Loveys, Lt. J. R.F.A.
Lowry, C.S.M. J. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Luce, Capt. A. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Lyle, Capt. S. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Lynch, Capt. V. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Lyness, Capt. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.

McCaw, Capt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
McClelland, Capt. E. W. R. Innis. Fus.
McClinton, Capt. A. N. R. Ir. Rif.
McConnell, 2/Lt. R. B. R. Innis. Fus.
McCorkindale, 2/Lt. J. C. R.F.A.
McCrea, 2/Lt. T. R. Innis. Fus.
McCullough, 2/Lt. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McDowell, Capt. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McFerran, 2/Lt. M. A. R. Ir. Rif.
McGranahan, 2/Lt. J. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Macgregor, 2/Lt. R. P. R. Ir. Rif.
McHugh, 2/Lt. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Mcintosh, 2/Lt. H. R. Ir. Rif.
McKeen, 2/Lt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
McKenna, 2/Lt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Mackenzie, Capt. C. A. R.A.O.C.
Mackeown, Capt. R. F. Genl. List.
McKinley, 2/Lt. R. W. R. Innis. Fus.
McKinstry, Lt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McKnight, 2/Lt. T. R. Innis. Fus.
McMaster, Capt. C. R. Ir. Rif.
McMechan, 2/Lt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Macpherson, 2/Lt. W. A. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Maguire, Capt. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Malone, 2/Lt. J. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Malone, Capt. W. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Malone, Lt. W. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Manning, Rev. C. C. Army Chap. Dept.
Marriott-Watson, 2/Lt. R. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Marshall, Capt. E. L. R. Innis. Fus.
Martin, Capt. H. R.F.A.
Maxwell, Capt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
May, Lt. T. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Meagher, 2/Lt. L. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Mearns, C.S.M. J. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Menaul, Capt. W. J. Genl. List.
Miller, Capt. P. M. R. Ir. Rif.
Milliken, Lt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Mills, Capt. F. M.G.C.
Milne, Capt. C. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Mitchell, 2/Lt. H. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Mitchell, 2/Lt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Mitchell, 2/Lt. J. E. M. R. Ir. Rif.
Moffatt, C.S.M. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Montgomery, Lt. F. P. R.A.M.C.
Montefiore, Capt. T. H. Sebag R.F.A.
Moon, Capt. W. J. K. R. Innis. Fus.
Moore, Capt. K. M. Genl. List.
Moore, Lt. M. E. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Moore, Capt. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Moore, 2/Lt. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Moreland, 2/Lt. J. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Morgan, Lt. H. S. U.S.A. att. R.A.M.C.
Morris, Rev. W. F. Army Chap. Dept.
Morrison, Capt. T. D. R. Innis. Fus.
Morrow, 2/Lt. H. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Moyles, 2/Lt. D. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Mulholland, Maj. J. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Mulholland, Maj. P. D. M.G.C.
Muller, Lt.-Col. J. M.G.C.
Munn, 2/Lt. N. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Munn, Capt. R. B. S. M.G.C.
Murphy, Capt. J. J., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Fus.
Murray, Capt. P. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Myles, Capt. J. S. R. Innis. Fus.

Nathan, Lt. R. P. R.F.A.
Nelson, 2/Lt. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Newton, Capt. and Q.M. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Nicholl, Capt. J. D. R. Ir. Rif.

O'Brien, Capt. J. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Odbert, 2/Lt. W. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Oliver, 2/Lt. D. E. R.F.A.
Ormandy, Lt. H. R.E.
Ozzard,2/Lt. H. T. R. Ir. Fus.

Painting, Lt. A. A. M.G.C.
Parcell, 2/Lt. H. G. R.F.A.
Partridge, 2/Lt. J. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Paton, Rev. J. G. Army Chap. Dept.
Pattern, Capt. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Patton, Capt. J. H. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Patterson, 2/Lt. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Patterson, 2/Lt. W. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Pearson, Capt. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Picken, Capt. S. E. R.A.M.C.
Pierce, Lt. I. R. Innis. Fus.
Potts, 2/Lt. G. R.E.
Poynter, 2/Lt. E. W. R.F.A.
Price, Capt. F. A. R.F.A.
Price, 2/Lt. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Puree, Capt. G. R. B. R.A.M.C.
Purdy, 2/Lt. W. H. R. Innis. Fus.

Rabone, Capt. E. L. Genl. List.
Rawlins, 2/Lt. S. B. R.F.A.
Reddy, 2/Lt. J. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Renwick, Capt. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Reynolds, 2/Lt. E. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Richards, Lt. M. J. R.F.A.
Richardson, Capt. A. W. C. Bedford Regt.
Robinson, Lt. G. R. Ir. Fus.
Robson, Capt. R. I. R. Ir. Rif.
Rogers, Maj. V. B., _D.S.O._ Genl. List.
Rogers, Lt. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Roland, 2/Lt. R. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Rose, Maj. R. de R. R. Ir. Rif.
Rothwell, 2/Lt. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Rounsefell, 2/Lt. E. de W. R. Ir. Rif.
Russell, Maj. W. R.A.M.C.
Rutter, 2/Lt. F. J. R. Ir. Rif.

Saunderson, Lt. W. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Saunderson, Lt. W. R. R. Ir. Fus.
Schweder, Lt. R. P. R.F.A.
Scott, Lt. D. H. Div. Cyclists.
Scott, Lt. R. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Scott, Capt. W., _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Fus.
Sharp, 2/Lt. R. R.F.A.
Sharp, Capt. R. R., _D.S.O._ R.F.A.
Shawe, 2/Lt. H. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Shearer, 2/Lt. T. H. R.F.A.
Sheat, 2/Lt. E. I. R. Innis. Fus.
Sheehan, Lt. H. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Shepperd, Capt. H. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Shields, 2/Lt. J. H. R.E.
Shiner, Lt. E. E. J. R.F.A.
Simpson, Capt. J. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Slater, Lt. C. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Smith, Lt. C. M. R. Innis. Fus.
Smith, Lt. J. I. R. Ir. Fus.
Smith, Capt. P. B. R.F.A.
Smyth, Maj. E. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Smyth, Maj. W., _D.S.O._ R.E.
Solomon, Capt. R. B. R.F.A.
Somers, Capt. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Somerset, 2/Lt. I. R. Ir. Rif.
Sowerby, Capt. E. S. R.A.M.C.
Sparkes, Capt. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Spence, Rev. A. Army Chap. Dept.
Spence, Capt. J. G. R.A.M.C.
Spender, Lt.-Col. W. B., _D.S.O._ R. of O.
Sprott, Lt. -- R. Ir. Rif.
Stapylton-Smith, Lt. J. B. R.E.
Steel, Capt. W. C. R.F.A.
Steele, 2/Lt. C. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Stephenson, Lt. T. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Stevens, C.S.M. R. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Stevenson, 2/Lt. L. W. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Stewart, Capt. J. E. R.E.
Stewart, Capt. J. H., _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Rif.
Stewart, 2/Lt. J. N. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Stokes,2/Lt. A. O. R. Ir. Rif.
Strong, 2/Lt. C. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Stronge, Capt. C. N. L. R. Innis. Fus.
Stuart, Capt. W. G. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Sweeny, 2/Lt. T. C. R. Innis. Fus.

Tait, Maj. M. W. M.G.C.
Talbot, 2/Lt. R. M. R. Innis. Fus.
Tayler, Capt. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Taylor, Lt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Teele, Capt. W. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Telford, Capt. E. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Thomas, Lt. J. G. S. M.G.C.
Thomas, 2/Lt. S. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Thompson, 2/Lt. R. L. R. Ir. Rif.
Thorne, 2/Lt. C. E. R.E.
Thornely, Capt. F. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Thornton, Capt. A. P. R. Ir. Rif.
Thornton, R.Q.M.S. S. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Tiptaft, 2/Lt. C. P. R. Ir. Rif.
Todd, 2/Lt. A. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Tooley, Capt. F. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Trousdale, Capt. E. H. R.A.S.C.
Turpin, Lt. D. O. R. Ir. Rif.
Turner, R.S.M. C. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Turner, Lt. E. G. L. R. Ir. Fus.
Tyner, 2/Lt. J. B. R. Innis. Fus.

Unsworth, 2/Lt. V. R. Ir. Rif.

Vesey, Lt. T. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Vigers, Lt.-Col. T. W. R.E.

Waddell, Capt. C. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Waldren, R.S.M. T. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Walkington, Lt. D. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Watson, Capt. J. R.A.S.C.
Watt, Lt. G. R. R.F.A.
Watts, Capt. R. R.A.S.C.
Wheatley, Capt. E. A. R.E.
Whelan, C.S.M. R. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Whinyate, Capt. R. R.F.A.
White, C.S.M. A. R. Innis. Fus.
White, Lt. T. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Willcox, Lt. J. T. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Williams, 2/Lt. J. H. R.F.A.
Williams, Capt. R. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Wilson, 2/Lt. G. W. R.F.A.
Wilson, Lt. J. M.G.C.
Wilton, Capt. J. M. E. R. Innis. Fus.
Wintle, Lt. A. L. C. R. Innis. Fus.
Wood, Lt. C. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Wright, 2/Lt. J. McH. R. Ir. Rif.
Wright, Rev. J. J. Army Chap. Dept.

Young, 2/Lt. J. B. R. Ir. Fus.
Young, 2/Lt. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Young, Maj. T. F., _D.S.O._ R.E.

BAR TO DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL

Fisher, L/Cpl. J. M.G.C.
Gilmour, Pte. J. P. M.G.C.

McIlveen, C.Q.M.S. W. R. Ir. Rif.

DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL

Adams, C.S.M. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Alcorn, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Armour, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Armstrong, L/Cpl. R. R. Ir. Fus.
Anderson, Sgt. J. I. R. Innis. Fus.

Baines, C.S.M. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Bamford, L/Sgt. R. R. Ir. Fus.
Barker, Sgt. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Barr, C.S.M. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Barr, Sgt. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Bell, Cpl. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Belshaw, C.S.M. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Blake, Cpl. E. R. Innis. Fus.
Blake, Rfm. T. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Bloom, L/Cpl. J. R.E.
Boal, L/Cpl. W. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Bow, Rfm. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Bowes, Cpl. J. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Boyd, Sgt. R. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Bradley, Sgt. J., _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Brooker, Pte. E. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Burke, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.

Cahill, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Capstick, Sgt. M. M.G.C.
Carpenter, C.S.M. W. M.G.C.
Carton, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Carvell, Sgt. S. R. Ir. Fus.
Chambers, Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Chapman, C.S.M. J. E. R. Innis. Fus.
Clarke, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Clarke, Cpl. R., _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Conn, C.S.M. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Cook, R.S.M. H. C. R.F.A.
Corish, Sgt. P. R. Ir. Fus.
Creese, C.Q.M.S. M. G. M.G.C.
Croft, C.S.M. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Cromie, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Cumming, R.Q.M.S. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Cunningham, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Curry, L/Cpl. W. R. Ir. Rif.

Dalrymple, L/Cpl. J. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Darling, B.Q.M.S. F. R.F.A.
Darrach, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Davidson, Sgt. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Deane, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Dickson, Sgt. J., _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Dillon, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Doherty, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Downey, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Dudgeon, Sgt. E. C., _M.M._ R.E.
Duke, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.

Eaton, Sgt. J., _M.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Edwardes, Sgt. O. J. R.E.
Emmett, C.S.M. W. R. R.F.A.

Fisher, L/Cpl. J. M.G.C.
Fleming, Cpl. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Forrest, Pte. E. T. R. Innis. Fus.
France, Sgt. M. S. M.G.C.
Fryer, Sgt. T. M.G.C.

Getgood, Cpl. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Gilmour, Pte. J. P. M.G.C.

Hamilton, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Hamilton, C.S.M. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Harbinson, Sgt. J., _M.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Higgins, Rfm. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Harrison, C.Q.M.S. S., _M.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Haslett, Cpl. L., _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Herdman, Cpl. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Higgins, Sgt. H., _M.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Higgins, Rfm. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Holmes, Sgt. A. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Homersham, Sgt. F., _M.M._ R. Ir. Fus.
Hughes, Sgt, J., _M.M._ R. Ir. Fus.
Hume, Sgt. J., _M.M._ M.G.C.
Humphreys, Cpl. W. M.G.C.
Hunter, Sgt. J. A., _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Hutchinson, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Hynds, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.

Irwin, Pte. R. R. Innis. Fus.

Jackson, Cpl. A. H., _M.M._ R.E.
Jackson, Sgt. J. E. R.E.
Jamieson, S.S.M. J. M.G.C.
Jones, Sgt. C. R. Ir. Fus.
Jones, Rfm. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.

Kearney, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Kelly, Sgt. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Kelly, Sgt. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Kennedy, Sgt. E. R.F.A.
Kent, Sgt. E. R.F.A.
Kirkpatrick, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Kirkwood, L/Cpl. N. R. Ir. Rif.

Laird, C.S.M. W. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Lake, Sapper E. R.E.
Lazard, Adjt. (Interpreter) A. A. French Army.
Lamb, Sgt. H. T. R.F.A.
Leach, Sgt. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Leighton, L/Cpl. R. H. P. R. Innis. Fus.
Leslie, Pte. J. M.G.C.
Littlechild, Sgt. W. E. R.F.A.
Lockhart, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Longworth, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Lowry, Sgt. G. E. R. Innis. Fus.
Lowry, Cpl. S., _M.M._ R.E.
Lucas, C.S.M. R., _M.M._ R. Ir. Fus.
Lyttle, Sgt. R.A.M.C.

McBirnay, Sgt. T. R. Ir. Rif.
McBride, Cpl. R. J. R. Ir. Fus.
McCabe, Pte. P. R. Ir. Rif.
McCarrol, Pte. E. R. Ir. Rif.
McCaughey, Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
McCauley, Sgt. P. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McClay, Sgt. T. R. Innis. Fus.
McClean, C.S.M. W. J. R. Ir. Fus.
McCormick, Sgt. B. R. Innis. Fus.
McCready, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Fus.
McCullough, R.S.M. J., _M.M._ R. Ir. Fus.
McCullough, Sgt. R. R. Ir. Rif.
McGaley, Sgt. A. R. Innis. Fus.
McIlveen, C.Q.M.S. W. R. Ir. Rif.
McIlwraith, Cpl., _M.M._ R.E.
McInnes, Sgt. S. R.E.
Mackey, C.S.M. J. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McKimm, Pte. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Mackintosh, C.S.M. J. L. R.E.
McMillan, Sgt.J. R. Ir. Rif.
McNabney, Sgt. J., _M.M._ R.E.
McPeake, Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
McQuiston, L/Cpl. T. R. Ir. Rif.
McWhirter, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Magill, Sgt. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Magookins, C.S.M. W. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Mallock, Pte. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Mathers, C.S.M. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Miller, R.S.M. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Miller, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Milligan, C.S.M. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Murray, C.S.M. J. R. Ir. Rif.

Neale, Pte. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Neely, Sgt. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Neill, Sapper J. R.E.
Neill, Sgt. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Neilly, Cpl. W. R.E.
Nesbitt, Sgt. A., _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Newman, C.S.M. M., _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Nicholls, Cpl. P. R.E.

Palmer, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Pameter, Sgt. R. Ir. Fus.
Patterson, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Patterson, C.S.M. J. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Pikeman, C.S.M. J. A., _M.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Pitt, Rfm. C.F. R. Ir. Rif.
Platt, Rfm. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Potter, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.

Quee, Sgt. H. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Quinn, Cpl. W. F., _M.M._ R.A.M.C.

Redding, B.S.M. W. L. R.F.A.
Reilly, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Robinson, C.Q.M.S. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Roe, Sgt. C.W., _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Roe, Cpl. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Rose, C.S.M. T. de M.G.C.
Rudling, Sgt. P. C. R.F.A.

Scott, Cpl. R. R.E.
Scott, C.Q.M.S. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Scott, L/Cpl. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Selby, C.Q.M.S. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Shain, Bdr. J. R.F.A.
Sharp, Bdr. T. R.F.A.
Sherman, Sgt. S.J. R.F.A.
Smith, Rfm. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Smyth, Sgt. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Smyth, Sgt. R., _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Snodden, R.S.M. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Somers, C.Q.M.S. R. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Stacey, Farr.-Sgt. H., _M.M._ R.F.A.
Stead, Sgt. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Stevens, Sgt. W. H. R.F.A.
Shrimpton, Sgt. E. D. R.F.A.
Stubbings, Sgt J. W., _M.M._ M.G.C.
Symons, Pte. W. R. Ir. Fus.

Taggart, C.S.M. C. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Tait, L/Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Thompson, Rfm. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Turton, Cpl. F. M.G.C.

Vennard, C.S.M. T. R. Ir. Fus.
Verner, Sgt. J. A. R. Ir. Rif.

Walker, L/Cpl. C. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Waring, C.S.M. S. M.G.C.
Werner, Cpl. A. R.F.A.
White, Sgt. R. R.F.A.
Wilson, L/Cpl. R.C. R. Ir. Rif.
Woods, C.Q.M.S. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Wright, Sapper B. R. R.E.
Wyer, Sgt. A. R. Innis. Fus.

Yardley, L/Cpl. W., _M.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Yeates, L/Cpl. W., _M.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Young, Sgt. H. R. Ir. Fus.

BAR TO MILITARY MEDAL

Adams, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Angus, L/Cpl. J. R.E.
Ashford, Sgt. T. R. Ir. Fus.

Baker, Sgt. J. R.G.A.
Barton, Cpl. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Baxter, Driver A. R.F.A.
Blair, Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Buck, Cpl. J. R.F.A.

Campbell, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Carolan, Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Carson, L/Cpl. R. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Cooke, L/Cpl. W. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Crisp, Sgt. G. H. R.E.

Eden, L/Cpl. R. R. Ir. Fus.

Gibson, L/Cpl. W. J. R.A.M.C.
Gillespie, S/Sgt. R. S. R.A.M.C.
Gillmann, Rfm. W. C., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Gowdy, II. Cpl. W. J. R.E.
Greaney, Rfm. B. J. R. Ir. Rif.

Hamilton, Sgt. W. D. R. Innis. Fus.
Harborne, Pte. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Harrison, C.Q.M.S. S., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Higgins. Sgt. H., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Hirst, Bdr. J. W. R.F.A.
Homersham, Sgt. F., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Fus.
Houston, C.S.M. J. R. Ir. Rif.

Irwin, Sgt. H. E. R.F.A.

Jackson, Cpl. A. H., _D.C.M._ R.E.
Johnston, L/Cpl. S. J. R. Ir. Rif.

Kane, Pte. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Laird, Sgt. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Lindberg, Pte. R. R. Ir. Fus.
Long, Cpl. W. E. R. Innis. Fus.
Loughlin, Pte. D. R. Innis. Fus.

McCall, L/Cpl. R. R. Ir. Fus.
McDowell, Pte. A. R. Innis. Fus.
McIlveen, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McIntyre, Sapper J. R.E.
McLaughlin, L/Cpl. M. R. Ir. Fus.
McNabney, Sgt. J., _D.C.M._ R.E.
McNeill, Sgt. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Mager, Sgt. H. C. R.F.A.
Matier, Sgt. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Montgomery, Sgt. R. R. Innis. Fus.

Nicholson, Sgt. A. R.E.

Owens, Sgt. P. R. Ir. Rif.
Owens, Sgt. T. M.G.C.

Packer, Pte. W. L. R. Ir. Fus.
Patterson, Rfm. R. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Pikeman, C.S.M. J. A., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.

Ringland, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Roberts, Rfm. S. R. Ir. Rif.

Savage, Pte. J. R.A.M.C.
Scullion, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Smith, Pte. T. R. Ir. Fus.
Soames, Cpl. C. R.E.

Taylor, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Thompson, Bdr. J. R.F.A.

Wakem, Sgt. A. R.F.A.
Walker, L/Cpl. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Wallen, C.S.M. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Wilson, Rfm. W. S. R. Ir. Rif.

MILITARY MEDAL

Abraham, Pte. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Accleton, Cpl. A. R.F.A.
Adams, L/Cpl. J. M.G.C.
Adams, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Adams, Rfm. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Adamson, Pte. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Agnew, Rfm. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Ahern, Cpl. J. R.F.A.
Aicken, Pte. J. M.G.C.
Ainsworth, L/Cpl. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Alexander, Rfm. N. R. Ir. Rif.
Alexander, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Alicoat, Sgt. P. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Allen, Rfm. T. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Anderson, Pte. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Anderson, L/Cpl. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Anderson, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Anderson, Sgt. J. I., _D.C.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Anderson, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Andrews, Pte. A. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Andrews, Pte. J. R.A.M.C.
Angus, L/Cpl. J. R.E.
Anstey, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Appleby, Pte. E. M.G.C.
Appleyard, Pte. T. V. M.G.C.
Arkless, L/Cpl. B. R. Innis. Fus.
Armour, L/Cpl. D. R. Innis. Fus.
Armour, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Armour, L/Cpl. T. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Armson, Rfm. P. R. Ir. Rif.
Armstrong, Sgt. J. L. R. Ir. Rif.
Armstrong, Sgt. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Arnold, Sgt. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Arthur, Pte. W. R.A.M.C.
Ashe, Rfm. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Ashford, Sgt. T. R. Ir. Fus.
Atkins, Cpl. B. R. Ir. Fus.
Auld, L/Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Averell, Pte. R. R. Ir. Fus.

Bacon, Gnr. E. R.G.A.
Bailey, Pte. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Bailie, Pte. H. R.A.M.C.
Baillie, Sgt. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Baines, Sgt. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Baker, Sgt. J. R.G.A.
Ball, Pioneer G. R.E.
Ballam, Bdr. G. J. R.F.A.
Ballantine, Rfm. L. R. Ir. Rif.
Banford, Rfm. W. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Bankhead, L/Cpl. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Banks, Rfm. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Barclay, Sapper W. R.E.
Barnes, Cpl. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Barnhill, Cpl. D. R. Innis. Fus.
Barr, Pte. T. E. R.A.M.C.
Barton, Cpl. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Bastable, Pte. W. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Bate, Rfm. W. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Baxter, Driver A. R.F.A.
Baxter, Rfm. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Baxter, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Baxter, L/Cpl. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Baxter, L/Cpl. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Bayes, Gnr. W. J. R.F.A.
Beattie, L/Cpl. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Beattie, Sgt. V. R. Ir. Rif.
Beatty, Pte. J. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Bell, C.S.M. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Bell, S.S.M. H. C. R.A.M.C.
Bell, Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Bell, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Bell, Sapper R. R.E.
Bell, Rfm. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Bennett, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Bertie, Cpl. E. R. Innis. Fus.
Bill, Rfm. J. M. R. Ir. Rif.
Bingham, Sgt. J. R.F.A.
Bingham, Rfm. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Birbeck, Rfm. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Birkby, Pte. L. R.A.M.C.
Birkmyre, L/Cpl.H. R. Ir. Rif.
Black, Cpl. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Blackburn, Pte. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Blacker, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Blackmore, Cpl. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Blackwell, Pte. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Blair, Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Blair, Rfm. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Blake, Cpl. E. R. Innis. Fus.
Blakey, Sapper J. R.E.
Blakley, Sgt. D. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Blunden, Sgt. A. R.F.A.
Bonner, Pte. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Bonner, Bdr. S. R.F.A.
Booth, Sapper R. R.E.
Boreland, Sgt.C. R. Ir. Rif.
Boreland, L/Cpl. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Bowden, Pte. W. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Bowman, Bdr. W. B. R.F.A.
Boxall, Pte. W. R. R.A.M.C.
Boyce, Sgt. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Boyd, Cpl. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Boyd, Pte. C. R. Innis. Fus.
Boyd, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Boyd, Sgt. J. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Boyd, Rfm. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Boyle, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Bradbury, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Bradley, Cpl. G. M.G.C.
Bradley, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Bradley, Sgt. J., _D.C.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Brady, Cpl. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Brangan, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Breen, Cpl. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Breeze, Rfm. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Brennan, Rfm. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Bright, Driver A. R.F.A.
Brind, L/Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Broadhead, Bdr. W. R.F.A.
Broadhurst, Pioneer G. R.E.
Broadhurst, Driver J. T. R.F.A.
Brown, Rfm. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Brown, Rfm. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Brown, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Brown, Rfm. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Brown, Pte. T. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Brown, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Brown, Sgt. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Bruce, Rfm. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Bryden, Pte. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Buchanan, Pte. J. M. R. Innis. Fus.
Buck, L/Cpl. A. R. Ir. Fus.
Buck, Cpl. J. R.F.A.
Buckley, Pte. R. R. Ir. Fus.
Buick, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Bullick, Sgt. W. P. R. Ir. Rif.
Bunting, Sgt. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Burke, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Burton, Sgt. A. T. R.A.M.C.
Butler, Sgt. W. R.A.M.C.
Butterfield, Bdr. A. R.F.A.
Byrne, L/Cpl. E. O. R. Ir. Rif.

Cadoo, L/Cpl. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Cairns, Sgt. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Cairns, L/Cpl. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Camp, Cpl. F. R.F.A.
Campbell, Sgt. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Campbell, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Campbell, Driver J. R.E.
Campbell, Rfm. J. (4434) R. Ir. Rif.
Campbell, Rfm. J. (15/12230) R. Ir. Rif.
Campbell, Driver W. R.E.
Canning, Bdr. J. R.F.A.
Canty, Gnr. C. E. R.F.A.
Capon, Cpl. H. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Carlisle, Sgt. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Carlisle, Rfm. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Carolan, Cpl. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Carson, Rfm. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Carson, L/Cpl. R. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Carson, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Carvell, Bdr. R. R.F.A.
Cathcart, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Caughey, Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Cavan, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Cavins, Sgt. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Chambers, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Chambers, Rfm. W. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Cherry, Pte. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Child, Pte. W. M.G.C.
Christie, L/Cpl. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Christopher, L/Cpl. O. J. R.E.
Clark, L/Cpl. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Clarke, L/Cpl. A. G. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Clarke, L/Cpl. D. R. Ir. Fus.
Clarke, Sgt. J. (5164) R. Ir. Rif.
Clarke, Sgt. J. (17444) R. Ir. Rif.
Clarke, Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Clarke, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Clarke, Cpl. R., _D.C.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Clarke, L/Cpl. S. J. R.A.M.C.
Clarke, Cpl. W. R.E.
Clements, Gnr. E. R.F.A.
Clements, Sgt. G. R.G.A.
Clements, Cpl. T. R. Ir. Fus.
Cleverley, L/Cpl. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Clintin, Sgt. H. R.F.A.
Clinton, Pte. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Codling, Sgt. H. W. R.F.A.
Cole, Sgt. E. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Collins, Sgt. J. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Collop, L/Cpl. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Colville, Pte. J. M.G.C.
Connolly, Rfm. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Connor, Pte. A. (18111) R. Innis. Fus.
Connor, Pte. A. (40639) R. Innis. Fus.
Conway, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Cook, Rfm. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Cook, Pte. W. R.A.M.C.
Cook, Rfm. W. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Cook, Pte. W. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Cooke, Pte. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Cooke, L/Cpl. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Cooke, Sgt. R. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Cooke, L/Cpl. W. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Cooper, Gnr. E. R.F.A.
Cooper, Pte. J. R.A.M.C.
Cooper, Cpl. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Corbett, Bdr. C. W. R.F.A.
Cornish, Rfm. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Coulter, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Coulter, Sapper W. R. R.E.
Courtney, Sgt. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Cousins, Sgt. W. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Craig, Cpl. G. R. Ir. Fus.
Craig, L/Cpl. R. R.A.M.C.
Craig, Cpl. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Cranston, L/Cpl. G. M.G.C.
Craven, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Craven, L/Cpl. R. H. R.A.M.C.
Crawford, Sgt. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Cremins, Pte. P. R. Ir. Fus.
Crichton, Sgt. D. R. Ir. Fus.
Crichton, II. Cpl. H. R.E.
Crisp, Sgt. G. H. R.E.
Crisp, Sgt. J. J. R.E.
Croad, Gnr. A. J. R.F.A.
Crone, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Croome, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Cropley, Bdr. W. J. R.F.A.
Cross, L/Cpl. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Crothers, L/Cpl. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Crowe, L/Cpl. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Culbert, Pte. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Cullen, Sgt. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Cullen, L/Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Cullinane, Pte. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Cully, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Cumberland, Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Cummins, Pioneer W. R.E.
Cunning, L/Cpl. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Curtis, Rfm. E. R. Ir. Rif.

Dale, Sgt. J. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Dalzelle, Rfm. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Davey, Sgt. W. R.F.A.
Davidson, Rfm. J. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Davies, Driver H. C. R.F.A.
Davies, Sapper M. R.E.
Davis, L/Cpl. J. D. R. Innis. Fus.
Davis, Sgt. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Davis, L/Cpl. W. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Dawson, Driver J. H. R.F.A.
Dean, Gnr. S. R.F.A.
Decker, Pte. J. Div. Emp. Coy.
Degnan, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Dempster, Rfm. A. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Dempster, Cpl. T. J. R.A.M.C.
Dick, Sgt. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Dick, L/Cpl. I. R. Ir. Fus.
Dickens, Rfm. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Dickens, Sgt. H. R.F.A.
Dickson, Driver G. R.F.A.
Dickson, Sgt. J., _D.C.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Diver, Pte. P. R. Innis. Fus.
Diver, L/Cpl. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Dixon, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Dobbin, Rfm. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Dodwell, L/Cpl. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Doggart, L/Cpl. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Doherty, L/Cpl. H. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Donaghy, Pte. D. R. Innis. Fus.
Donald, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Donald, Cpl. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Donaldson, Sgt. Jas., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Fus.
Donnell, Pte. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Donnelly, S/Sgt. A. R.A.M.C.
Donnelly, Pte. J. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Donohue, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Donolly, Pte. E. R.A.M.C.
Doonan, L/Cpl. F. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Doran, Pte. P. R. Innis. Fus.
Douthert, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Downes, Pte. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Driss, Driver H. R.F.A.
Dudgeon, Sgt. E. C., _D.C.M._ R.E.
Duffy, Sgt. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Duggan, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Dunn, Rfm. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Dunn, Cpl. W. R. Ir. Rif.

Eames, L/Cpl. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Eaton, Sgt. J., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Eccles, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Eden, L/Cpl. R. R. Ir. Fus.
Edgar, Sgt. A. R. Rif. Ir.
Edgar, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Edwards, Pte. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Edwards, Cpl. J. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Elliff, Cpl. A. R.F.A.
Elliott, Pte. A. R.A.S.C.
Elliott, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Elliott, L/Cpl. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Ervine, Q.M.S. A. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Essery, Sgt. A. R.F.A.
Evans, Bdr. C. C. R.F.A.
Evans, Sgt. E. R.F.A.
Evans, Sgt. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Everett, Cpl. S. R.F.A.
Ewart, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Ewing, Sgt. J. A. R. Ir. Rif.

Fallon, Sgt. M. R. Ir. Fus.
Farnon, Pte. D. R.A.M.C.
Farquhar, Rfm. J. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Farr, Pte. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Farrell, Pte. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Fawkes, Cpl. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Fawson, Sgt. A. L. R. Ir. Rif.
Feeley, Pte. J. H. R.A.M.C.
Fegan, Cpl. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Felstead, Bdr. F. R.F.A.
Ferguson, Rfm. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Ferguson, Gnr. D. R.F.A.
Ferguson, Rfm. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Ferguson, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Ferguson, Sgt. R. R. Ir. Fus.
Ferguson, Pte. R. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Fergusson, Pte. W. K. R. Innis. Fus.
Fern, L/Cpl. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Ferris, L/Cpl. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Fillis, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Finch, Pte. R. R.A.M.C.
Finlay, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Finlay, Rfm. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Finlay, Pte. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Finlay, Sgt. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Fisher, Sgt. D. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Fitt, Pte. P. A. R. Ir. Fus.
Fitzgerald, Pte. H. R.A.M.C.
Fitz-Simon, Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Fitzsimons, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Flanagan, Pte. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Fleming, Sgt. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Fleming, Cpl. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Flexon, Pte. J. R.A.M.C.
Forbes, Pte. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Forster, Rfm. J. L. R. Ir. Rif.
Forsythe, L/Cpl. D. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Forsythe, Sgt. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Foster, Cpl. F. R. Ir. Fus.
Fowler, Pte. A. M.G.C.
Fowler, Bdr. J. R.F.A.
Franklin, Pte. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Fry, Cpl. W. L. R.E.

Gageby, Sapper W. R.E.
Gallagher, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Galway, Rfm. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Gamble, Rfm. J. M. R. Ir. Rif.
Gardiner, Rfm. R. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Gardiner, Sgt. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Garland, Bdr. P. A. R.F.A.
Garvin, Pte. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Gascoyne, Rfm. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Gayner, L/Cpl. J. J. R. Ir. Rif.
George, Pte. W. R.A.M.C.
Getgood, Sgt. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Gibson, Cpl. E. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Gibson, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Gibson, II. Cpl. J. R.E.
Gibson, Pioneer, W. R.E.
Gibson, L/Cpl. W. J. R.A.M.C.
Gilchrist, Sgt. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Gildea, Sgt. J. R.E.
Gillanders, Pte. R. R. Ir. Fus.
Gillespie, S/Sgt. R. S. R.A.M.C.
Gilliland, Driver W. R.E.
Gillmann, Rfm. W. C., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Gilmour, L/Cpl. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Gilmour, Sgt. I. R. Ir. Rif.
Girvan, L/Cpl. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Girvan, Sgt. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Glasson, Fitter A. J. R.F.A.
Glidie, II. Cpl. G. R.E.
Glover, L/Cpl. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Godfrey, Pte. E. R. Innis. Fus.
Goldstone, Rfm. L. R. Ir. Rif.
Gooch, Sgt. W. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Goodwin, Rfm. R. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Goody, Driver A. R.F.A.
Gordon, Cpl. W. V. R.A.M.C.
Gowdy, Col.-Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Gowdy, Sapper J. R.E.
Gowdy, L/Cpl. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Gowdy, II. Cpl. W. J. R.E.
Gowing, Cpl. E. R.E.
Graham, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Graham, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Graham, L/Cpl. J. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Graham, B.S.M. R. D. R.F.A.
Grainger, Sgt. R. R.E.
Grange, Sgt. R. R.F.A.
Gray, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Gray, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Gray, Sgt. P. R. Innis. Fus.
Gray, L/Cpl. R. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Gray, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Greanery, Rfm. B. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Greaves, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Green, Driver F. R.F.A.
Green, Cpl. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Greene, C.S.M. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Greenfield, Pte. K. S. R.A.M.C.
Greenwood, Cpl. J. E. R.A.M.C.
Greenwood, Cpl. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Greer, Sgt. J. M.G.C.
Gregory, Gnr. A. R.F.A.
Gregory, L/Cpl. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Griffiths, Pte. D. R. Innis. Fus.
Grigg, L/Cpl. W., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Fus.
Groom, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Guest, Fitter D. R. R.F.A.

Hadaway, Sgt. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Hagan, Bdr. J. R.F.A.
Haire, L/Cpl. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Hall, Pte. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Hall, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Hall, Sgt. R. R.A.M.C.
Hallett, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Hamill, Cpl. T. J. R.E.
Hamilton, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Hamilton. II. Cpl. J. C. R.E.
Hamilton, L/Cpl. J. J. R.E.
Hamilton, Rfm. N. R. Ir. Rif.
Hamilton, Sgt. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Hamilton, Sgt. W. D. R. Innis. Fus.
Hands, Bdr. McD. H. R.F.A.
Hanna, C.S.M. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Hanson, Cpl. J. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Harbinson, Sgt. J., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Harbinson, Pte. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Harbinson, Pte. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Hardy, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Harkness, Sgt. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Harper, Sgt. M. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Harris, B.S.M. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Harris, C.Q.M.S. H. F. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Harris, Gnr. J. R. R.F.A.
Harrison, Pte. J. B. R. Ir. Fus.
Harrison, Cpl. J. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Harrison, C.Q.M.S. S., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Harrison, Rfm. T. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Harte, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Harvey, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Harvey, L/Cpl. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Haslett, Cpl. L., _D.C.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Hassan, L/Cpl. M. R. Innis. Fus.
Hassard, Pte. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Hatton, Gnr. G. W. R.F.A.
Hawkins, Sgt. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Hayes, Gnr. J. R.F.A.
Hayes, Sapper W. R.E.
Hayes, Gnr. W. J. R.F.A.
Heaney, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Heavans, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Helps, Pte. A. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Henderson, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Henry, Sgt. J. A. R. Ir. Fus.
Henry, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Herald, Sgt. P. R. Innis. Fus.
Herd, Bdr. A. R.F.A.
Herron, Sgt. W. R.E.
Hetherington, Sgt. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Heywood, Sgt. W. R.F.A.
Higgins, Sgt. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Higgins, Driver W. G. R.E.
Highman, Cpl. A. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Hildersley, L/Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Hill, L/Cpl. W. G. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Hill, Bdr. W. H. R.F.A.
Hirst, L/Cpl. E. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Hirst, Bdr. J. W. R.F.A.
Hislop, Sgt. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Hoare, Pte. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Hodgen, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Hodges, Rfm. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Hogg, L/Cpl. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Hogg, Rfm. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Holland, Sgt. J. R.F.A.
Holmes, Sgt. J. R.E.
Holmes, Pte. J. G. R.A.M.C.
Homersham, Sgt. F., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Fus.
Hope, L/Cpl. J. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Hopper, Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Hornby, Cpl. H. R.F.A.
Hoskins, Sgt. W. R.F.A.
House, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Houston, C.S.M. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Hoy, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Hudson, Rfm. R. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Hughes, Rfm. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Hughes, Sgt. J., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Fus.
Hughes, Pte. J. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Hughes, Sgt. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Hugheston, Rfm. P. R. Ir. Rif.
Hull, Pte. A. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Hull, Sapper H. R.E.
Hume, Sgt. J., _D.C.M._ M.G.C.
Humphrey, Cpl. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Humphreys, Sgt. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Humphreys, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Hunt, Driver A. R.F.A.
Hunt, Bdr. H. E. R.F.A.
Hunt, Pte. J. R.A.M.C.
Hunter, Cpl. B. R. Innis. Fus.
Hunter, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Hunter, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Hunter, Sgt. J. A., _D.C.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Hunter, Sgt. S. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Hutcheon, Cpl. A. R.F.A.
Hutchinson, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Hutchinson, Rfm. S. R. Ir. Rif.

Ingham, Pte. R. R. Ir. Fus.
Inkster, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Ireland, Rfm. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Irvine, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Irwin, Sgt. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Irwin, L/Cpl. G. R. Ir. Fus.
Irwin, Sgt. H. E. R.F.A.
Irwin, Sgt. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Irwin, Pte. R. R. Innis. Fus.

Jack, Sgt. W. R.F.A.
Jackson, Cpl. A. H., _D.C.M._ R.E.
Jackson, L/Cpl. E. R. Ir. Fus.
Jackson, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Jackson, L/Cpl. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Jackson, Sgt. V. R.E.
James, Rfm. F. C. R. Ir. Rif.
James, Rfm. F. L. R. Ir. Rif.
James, Sapper J. R.E.
Jeacock, L/Cpl. E. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Jeffcott, Sgt. L. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Jefferies, Gnr. J. R.F.A.
Jeffrey, Pte. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Jeffries, Pte. A. M.G.C.
Jeffries, II. Cpl. H. R.E.
Jelley, Rfm. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Jennings, L/Cpl. F. R. Ir. Fus.
Johnston, L/Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Johnston, L/Cpl. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Johnston, Sgt. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Johnston, Sgt. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Johnston, L/Cpl. G. M. R. Ir. Rif.
Johnston, Sgt. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Johnston, Cpl. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Johnston, L/Cpl. S. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Johnston, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Johnston, Sgt. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Johnstone, Sgt. R. R. Ir. Fus.
Jones, Cpl. D. R. Innis. Fus.
Jones, Pte. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Jones, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Jones, Rfm. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Jordan, Rfm. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Joyce, L/Cpl. N. R. Innis. Fus.

Kane, Pte. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Kealy, L/Cpl. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Kearns, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Keeling, L/Cpl. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Keir, Cpl. A. M. R.E.
Keith, L/Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Kelly, Rfm. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Kelly, Bdr. D. E. R.F.A.
Kelly, Pte. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Kelly, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Kelly, Pte. P. R. Ir. Fus.
Kelly, Sgt. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Kelly, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Kelso, Sgt. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Kemp, C.Q.M.S. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Kennedy, Pte. A. R.A.M.C.
Kennedy, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Kennedy, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Kennedy, Driver W. R.A.S.C.
Kenny, Sgt.. W. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Kerr, Sgt. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Keys, Pte. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Kidd, Rfm. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Kidd, Sapper H. R.E.
King, Sgt. A. R.F.A.
King, Cpl. G. R.E.
King, Rfm. R. R. Ir. Rif.
King, Sgt. R. H. R.E.
Kinghorn, Cpl. W. N. R. Ir. Rif.
Kirby, C.S.M. L. R. Innis. Fus.
Kirkpatrick, Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Knaggs, Cpl. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Knight, Rfm. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Knox, L/Cpl. W. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Kyle, Cpl. R. R. Ir. Rif.

Laird, Sgt. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Lally, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Lambert. Sgt. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Lanigan, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Larmour, Rfm. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Laverty, Sgt. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Lavery, L/Cpl. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Lawrence, Sgt. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Leathern, Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Letwine, Pte. L. R. Ir. Fus.
Lecky, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Letters, Pte. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Lewins, Sgt. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Lindberg, Pte. R. R. Ir. Fus.
Lindsay, Pte. J. M.G.C.
Lindsay, Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Lindsay, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Little, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Littlebury, Pte. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Lloyd, Cpl. R. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Lochray, Pte. D. R.A.M.C.
Long, Sgt. J. R.E.
Long, Sgt. J. E. R. Ir. Fus.
Long, Cpl. W. E. R. Innis. Fus.
Longhurst, L/Cpl. J. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Longhurst, Sgt. O. R. Innis. Fus.
Longstaff, L/Cpl. J. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Lough, L/Cpl. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Loughlin, Pte. D. R. Innis. Fus.
Lowden, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Lowe, Sgt. J. R.A.M.C.
Lowens, Rfm. J. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Lowry, Rfm. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Lowry, Cpl. S., _D.C.M._ R.E.
Lowther, L/Cpl. M. R. Innis. Fus.
Lucas, C.S.M. R., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Fus.
Lucas, Rfm. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Lumsden, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Lunny, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Lusty, L/Cpl. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Lyle, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Lynn, Pte. W. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Lytle, L/Cpl. D. R. Innis. Fus.

McAlpine, Sapper C. R.E.
McAtamney, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
McAteer, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Macauley, Sapper R. R.E.
McBratney, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
McCall, L/Cpl. W. R. Ir. Fus.
McCallum, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
McCann, Cpl. F. R.A.M.C.
McCann, Bdr. P. R.F.A.
McCarley, Pte. W. R. Ir. Fus.
McCarthy, Rfm. T. R. Ir. Rif.
McCartney, Pte. H. R. Innis. Fus.
McCaskell, Cpl. A. R. Innis. Fus.
McCaughan, L/Cpl. G. L. R. Ir. Rif.
McChesney, Rfm. S. R. Ir. Rif.
McClatchey, Rfm. T. R. Ir. Rif.
McClay, Cpl. T. R. Innis. Fus.
McClay, Cpl. W. R. Innis. Fus.
McClean, Cpl. D. R. Ir. Rif.
McClean, Sapper E. R.E.
McClean, II. Cpl. G. H. R.E.
McClelland, Pte. G. R. Ir. Fus.
McClelland, Pte. T. A. R. Ir. Fus.
McClements, Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
McClintock, Sgt. R. J. R. Innis. Fus.
McClintock, L/Cpl. S. R. Ir. Rif.
McClintock, L/Cpl. T. R. Innis. Fus.
McClune, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McCluney, Pte. H. R. Ir. Fus.
McClung, L/Cpl. R. R. Ir. Rif.
McConky, Sgt. C. R. Ir. Rif.
McConnell, L/Cpl. G. R. Ir. Rif.
McConnell, Sapper G. R.E.
McConnell, Cpl. H. R. Ir. Rif.
McConnell, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
McConnell, Rfm. R. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McConnell, L/Cpl. S. R. Ir. Rif.
McCormack, Sgt. J. R.F.A.
McCormick, Pte. R. J. R. Ir. Fus.
McCormick, Pte. W. R.A.M.C.
McCormick, L/Cpl. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McCoubrey, L/Cpl. S. R. Ir. Rif.
McCoy, Pte. W. J. R.A.M.C.
McCrea, L/Cpl. W. R. Ir. Rif.
McCrum, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McCullough, R.S.M. J. R. Ir. Fus.
McCullough, L/Cpl. J. F. R. Ir. Fus.
McCullough, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
McDermott, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
McDermott, Cpl. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McDonald, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
McDonald, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McDonald, Pte. T. R. Innis. Fus.
McDowell, Pte. A. R. Innis. Fus.
McDowell, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McEbury, Pte. J. T. R. Innis. Fus.
McElroy, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
McFaddon, L/Cpl. D. R.E.
McFall, Sgt. T. R. Ir. Rif.
McFarland, Sapper A. R.E.
McFeeters, Cpl. G. R.E.
McFerran, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McGahey, L/Cpl. R. R. Innis. Fus.
McGarrel, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
McGee, Pte. P. R. Innis. Fus.
McGirr, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
McGonagle, L/Cpl. S. R. Innis. Fus.
McGookin, II. Cpl. D. R.E.
McGough, Sgt. J. G. R. Ir. Rif.
McGovern, Cpl. A. R. Innis. Fus.
McGowan, Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
McGowan, Pte. A. R. Innis. Fus.
McGrann, Rfm. D. R. Ir. Rif.
MacGrath, Sgt. J. R.E.
McGready, Pte. D. R. Innis. Fus.
McGreghan, Rfm. H. R. Ir. Rif.
McGuinness, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
McIlroy, L/Cpl. T. R. Innis. Fus.
McIlveen, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McIlveen, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McIlwaine, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
McIlwaine, L/Cpl. S. R. Innis. Fus.
McIlwaine, L/Cpl. S. R. Ir. Rif.
McIlwrath, Cpl. H. R. Ir. Rif.
McIlwrath, Cpl. S., _D.C.M._ R.E.
McIntosh, Gnr. T. R.F.A.
McIntyre, Sgt. D. J. R. Innis. Fus.
McIntyre, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
McIntyre, Sapper J. R.E.
McKane, Sapper A. R.E.
McKay, L/Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
McKay, Sgt. R. R.A.M.C.
McKay, Pte. W. R.A.M.C.
McKee, Sapper J. R.E.
McKee, Rfm. J. (11/6658) R. Ir. Rif.
McKee, Rfm. J. (15436) R. Ir. Rif.
McKee, L/Cpl. R. R. Ir. Rif.
McKeaver, Sgt. S. R. Ir. Rif.
McKeown, Cpl. G. R. Innis. Fus.
McKeown, Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McKeown, Cpl. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Mackintosh, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Fus.
McKnight, Rfm. H. R. Ir. Rif.
McKnight, Gnr. S. R.F.A.
McKnight, L/Cpl. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McKnight, L/Cpl. W. T. R.E.
McLaren, L/Cpl. J. R.E.
McLarty, Rfm. F. R. Ir. Rif.
McLaughlin, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McLaughlin, L/Cpl. M. R. Ir. Fus.
McLaughlin, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McMartin, Rfm. V. R. Ir. Rif.
McMillen, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
McMullan, L/Cpl. A. R. Innis. Fus.
McMullan, Rfm. D. R. Ir. Rif.
McNabney, Sgt. J., _D.C.M._ R.E.
McNally, C.S.M. W. R. Innis. Fus.
McNamee, Pte. J. F. R. Innis. Fus.
McNeill, Sgt. R. R. Innis. Fus.
McNerlin, Cpl. W. J. H. R. Innis. Fus.
McNutt, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
McPhail, Cpl. J. R.E.
McVicker, Cpl. J. W. R.E.
McWhirter, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Magee, Rfm. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Magee, Sgt. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Magee, Pte. W. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Mager, Sgt. H. C. R.F.A.
Magill, Pte. M. R. Innis. Fus.
Magill, Sgt. W. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Maginnis, C.S.M. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Magowan, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Magowan, Driver R. R.A.S.C.
Magowan, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Mahaffy, Rfm. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Makinson, Cpl. A. R. Ir. Fus.
Maltby, Cpl. H. R.F.A.
Manderson, Sgt. E. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Mann, L/Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Mannis, Sgt. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Markin, Rfm. A. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Marks, Sgt. M. H. R.F.A.
Marsden, Pte. P. M.G.C.
Marshall, Rfm. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Marshall, Pte. J. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Marshall, Sapper R. R.E.
Martin, Sapper L. R. R.E.
Maskery, Sgt. I. M. R.F.A.
Matier, Sgt. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Matthews, Pte. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Matthews, L/Cpl. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Maude, Rfm. E. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Maxwell, Rfm. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Maxwell, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
May, L/Cpl. N. R. Ir. Rif.
Maybury, L/Cpl. D. R. Innis. Fus.
Mayes, Gnr. W. R.F.A.
Meaney, Cpl. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Meeke, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Megaghy, Pte. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Meharg, Rfm. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Mellon, Rfm. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Mendon, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Merritt, Gnr. J. R.F.A.
Millar, L/Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Millar, Cpl. G. R.A.M.C.
Millen, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Miller, Pte. G. F. R. Ir. Fus.
Miller, Rfm. J. (40060) R. Ir. Rif.
Miller, Rfm. J. (9/778) R. Ir. Rif.
Mills, Sgt. E. P. R. Innis. Fus.
Mills, Sgt. L. R. Ir. Rif.
Milne, Sgt. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Milner, Sapper W. R.E.
Minford, Rfm. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Minnis, Sgt. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Minnis, Sgt. W. R.E.
Minter, Rfm. F. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Mitchell, Pte. D. R. Innis. Fus.
Mitchell, Sgt. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Mitchell, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Mitchell, Pte. J. E. R.A.M.C.
Mitchell, Pte. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Mitchell, Sapper W. R.E.
Mitchell, Sgt. W. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Mitchen, Rfm. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Mitcheson, Sgt. J. R.E.
Moag, L/Cpl. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Moffatt, S/Sgt. D. R.A.M.C.
Moffatt, C.S.M. W., _M.C._ R. Ir. Rif.
Monger, Pte. F. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Montgomery, Sgt. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Montgomery, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Montgomery, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Montgomery, Sgt. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Moore, Rfm. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Moore, L/Cpl. B. R. Innis. Fus.
Moore, Cpl. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Moore, Cpl. H. R.E.
Moore, L/Cpl. J. R.E.
Moore, Sapper J. R.E.
Moore, Pte. L. R. Innis. Fus.
Moore, Sgt. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Moran, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Morgan, Sgt. W. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Moorhead, Sgt. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Morrison, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Morrison, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Morrow, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Morrow, Pte. J. M.G.C.
Morton, Sgt. J. R.A.M.C.
Morton, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Morton, Cpl. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Morton, Pte. T. R. Ir. Fus.
Morton, Sgt. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Muir, L/Cpl. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Mulholland, Sgt. G. R. Ir. Fus.
Munro, L/Cpl. G. M.G.C.
Murkin, Rfm. O. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Murray, Rfm. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Murray, Sgt. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Murtagh, Pte. M. R. Ir. Fus.
Mycock, Pte. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Myers, Pte. C. R. Ir. Fus.

Nash, Pte. E. M. R. Ir. Fus.
Nash, Bdr. J. R.F.A.
Neeson, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Neill, L/Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Neill, Pte. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Neill, Pte. S. R.A.M.C.
Nelson, L/Cpl. A. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Nelson, Rfm. N. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Nelson, Rfm. T. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Nesbit, Sgt. G. R. Ir. Fus.
Nesbitt, Sgt. A., _D.C.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Nevins, Cpl. M. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Newman, C.Q.M.S. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Newton, II. Cpl. A. E. R.E.
Nichol, Cpl. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Nicholson, Sgt. A. R.E.
Nightingale, Cpl. G. R.F.A.
Noble, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Noone, L/Cpl. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Norris, Pte. R. R. Ir. Fus.
Nutt, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.

O'Brien, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
O'Hanlon, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
O'Hara, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Oliver, Rfm. H. R. Ir. Rif.
O'Neill, Pte. E. R. Innis. Fus.
Onion, Pte. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Orbinson, L/Cpl. J. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Orgill, Pte. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Orgles, L/Cpl. J. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Owens, Sapper A. R.E.
Owens, L/Cpl. A. E. R.E.
Owens, Sgt.P. R. Ir. Rif.
Owens, L/Cpl. P. R. Innis. Fus.
Owens, Sgt. T. M.G.C.
Ownsworth, Cpl. A. R.F.A.

Pacey, Sgt. L. R.F.A.
Packer, Pte. W. L. R. Ir. Fus.
Padley, Pioneer E. M. R.E.
Painter, Gnr. S. F. R.F.A.
Pallister, Rfm. H. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Palmer, Sgt. E. R.A.M.C.
Palmer, Bdr. S. R. H. R.F.A.
Palmer, Sgt. W. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Parke, Pte. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Parke, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Parker, Rfm. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Parker, Driver V. G. R.F.A.
Parkhill, Sapper J. R.E.
Parks, Rfm. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Patchett, Rfm. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Patterson, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Patterson, Pte. R. R.A.M.C.
Patterson, Rfm. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Patterson, Rfm. R. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Patterson, Rfm. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Patton, Rfm. W. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Paul, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Payne, Pte. C. R. Innis. Fus.
Payne, Bdr. C. O. R.F.A.
Paysden, Rfm. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Peake, Cpl. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Pearce, Sapper A. R.E.
Pearson, Pte. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Peers, Pte. A. R. Ir. Fus.
Peet, Pte. F. J. M.G.C.
Pelan, Sapper M. R.E.
Peters, Sgt. H. C. M.G.C.
Phear, Sgt. H. W. R.F.A.
Phillips, Pte. E. R. Innis. Fus.
Phillips, Sapper R. C. R.E.
Phoenix, II. Cpl. H. R.E.
Pickis, Gnr. S. R.F.A.
Pikeman, C.S.M. S. A., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Pinion, Driver J. R.F.A.
Pitt, Cpl. R. B. R.F.A.
Platt, Sgt. W. R.F.A.
Plumley, Cpl. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Pollock, Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Pollock, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Pollock, Sgt. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Powell, Bdr. H. R.F.A.
Preston, Rfm. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Price, Rfm. F. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Prince, Sgt. J. E. R.F.A.
Proctor, Rfm. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Prole, Pte. R. R.A.M.C.
Pue, L/Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Pulford, Sgt. A. R.E.
Pulford, Sgt. H. R.E.
Pulham, Gnr. W. F. R.F.A.
Purdy, Sgt. W. M.G.C.
Pye, Pte. E. R. Ir. Fus.

Quail, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Quigley, Rfm. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Quinn, Cpl. W. F. R.A.M.C.

Radcliffe, Pte. J. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Rainbird, II. Cpl. H. H. R.E.
Ramsay, Pte. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Ramsay, Rfm. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Ranscombe, Sgt. W. R.F.A.
Ratcliffe, L/Cpl. L. R. Innis. Fus.
Rattray, Bdr. A. R.F.A.
Ray, Rfm. A. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Reed, Rfm. A. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Reid, Sgt. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Reid, Pte. H. R.A.M.C.
Reid, Sgt. P. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Reid, Rfm. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Remington, Gnr. R. R.F.A.
Rennick, L/Cpl. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Reynolds, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Richardson, Pte. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Rickwood, Rfm. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Riddle, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Riley, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Ringland, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Roberts, Rfm. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Robertson, Sgt. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Robertson, Cpl. R. R.E.
Robinson, Cpl. C. R. Ir. Fus.
Robinson, Cpl. E. R. Ir. Fus.
Robinson, Pte. P. F. G. M.G.C.
Robson, Sgt. W. R.E.
Robson, Cpl. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Roe, Sgt. C., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Fus.
Roffey, Gnr. S. R.F.A.
Rogers, Sgt. M.G.C.
Rogers, Pte. A. M.G.C.
Rogers, Pte. F. C. R. Ir. Fus.
Rogers, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Ronan, Rfm. P. R. Ir. Rif.
Ross, Rfm. C. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Ross, Sgt. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Roulston, Sgt. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Roulstone, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Rowney, Cpl. J. R.E.
Rush, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Russell, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Russell, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Russell, Cpl. R. R. Ir. Fus.
Russell, C.S.M. W. J., _M.S.M._ R.E.
Russell, Sgt. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Russell, Sgt. W. L. R. Ir. Rif.
Rutherford, Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Rutledge, L/Cpl. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Ryan, L/Cpl. F. R. Ir. Fus.

Sallinger, L/Cpl. M. R. Ir. Rif.
Salmon, Sgt. G. W. R.A.V.C.
Sands, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Savage, Cpl. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Savage, Pte. J. R.A.M.C.
Savage, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Savage, Bdr. W. J. R.F.A.
Scheffers, Sapper W. H. R.E.
Scott, L/Cpl. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Scott, L/Cpl. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Scott, Sgt. T. R. Ir. Fus.
Scott, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Scullion, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Service, Cpl. D. R. Ir. Fus.
Shanks, Pte. C. R. Ir. Fus.
Shanks, L/Cpl. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Sharman, Pte. J. R.A.M.C.
Sharp, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Shavin, Cpl. J. R.F.A.
Shaw, Rfm. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Shaw, Pte. G. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Sheers, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Shields, L/Cpl. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Shields, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Shields, Sgt. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Shields, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Shimmins, Gnr. J. E. R.F.A.
Siebert, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Simms, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Simpson, L/Cpl. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Sinclair, Sgt. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Sinclair, Cpl. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Sloan, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Sloane, Rfm. T. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Smallwood, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Smith, Sgt. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Smith, Pte. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Smith, Pte. A. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Smith, Sgt. E. H. R.F.A.
Smith, Cpl. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Smith, Pte. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Smith, Pte. G. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Smith, Sgt. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Smith, Gnr. H. R.F.A.
Smith, L/Cpl. J. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Smith, Pte. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Smith, Pte. T. R. Ir. Fus.
Smyth, Rfm. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Smyth, Sgt. R., _D.C.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Smyth, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Soames, Cpl. C. R.E.
Spencer, Driver J. E. R.F.A.
Spencer, Pte. R. A. R.A.S.C.
Spencer, Cpl. T. M.G.C.
Stacey, Farrier/Sgt. H. R.F.A.
Stanley, L/Cpl. J. A. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Stebbings, Cpl. W. R.F.A.
Steel, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Steele, Pte. G. R. Ir. Fus.
Steele, L/Cpl. W. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Stevenson, Rfm. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Stevenson, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Stevenson, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Stevenson, L/Cpl. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Stevenson, C.S.M. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Stevenson, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Stewart, Rfm. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Stewart, Rfm. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Stewart, C.S.M. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Stewart, Sapper W. R.E.
Stewart, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Stitt, Cpl. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Storey, Cpl. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Streatfield, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Strickland, Pte. R. A. S. R.A.M.C.
Stringer, Pte. F. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Stubbings, Sgt. J. W., _D.C.M._ M.G.C.
Summerscales, Sgt. V. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Sumner, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Swan, Pte. S. W. M.G.C.
Swan, L/Cpl. W. M.M.P.
Sweeney, Pioneer E. R.E.
Sweeney, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Sweeny, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Sweet, II. Cpl. W. S. R.E.

Tannahill, Cpl. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Taplin, Cpl. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Tarbett, Sgt. R. R.A.M.C.
Tarring, Gnr. F. W. R.F.A.
Tasker, Pte. C. R. Ir. Fus.
Taylor, Pte. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Taylor, L/Cpl. A. P. R. Ir. Rif.
Taylor, Rfm. G. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Taylor, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Templeton, Pte. W. R.A.M.C.
Thompson, Sgt. A. R.E.
Thompson, Gnr. A. R.F.A.
Thompson, Pte. C. R. Innis. Fus.
Thompson, Pte. C. A. R. Ir. Fus.
Thompson, Bdr. J. R.F.A.
Thompson, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Thompson, Sgt. O. R. Innis. Fus.
Thompson, Pte. S. R.A.M.C.
Tisseman, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Titchener, Sgt. J. H. R.F.A.
Toomey, Pte. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Topping, Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Townsley, L/Cpl. D. R.E.
Tozer, Sgt. W. R.A.S.C.
Trickey, Rfm. A. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Tucker, Rfm. O. R. Ir. Rif.
Tulip, Pte. O. R. Innis. Fus.
Turkington, Sgt. A. R. Ir. Fus.
Turkington, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Turner, C.Q.M.S. J. R. Tr. Rif.
Turner, Sgt. J. (18845) R. Ir. Rif.
Turner, Sgt. J. (12159) R. Ir. Rif.
Turner, Sgt. W. A. R.F.A.
Turney, Pte. E. R.A.M.C.
Tweedie, Sgt. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Tymble, Sgt. W. T. R.E.
Tyther, Rfm. T. W. R. Ir. Rif.

Upton, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Usher, C.Q.M.S. F. H. R.E.

Venard, Sgt. A. R. Ir. Fus.
Verity, Rfm. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Vogan, Sgt. R. R. Ir. Fus.
Vickers, Pte. R. R.A.S.C.
Vickers, Rfm. W. P. R. Ir. Rif.

Wakem, Sgt. A. R.F.A.
Walker, L/Cpl. C. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Walker, Rfm. E. McK. R. Ir. Rif.
Walker, Pte. G. R. Ir. Fus.
Walker, L/Cpl. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Walker, Pte. T. R.A.M.C.
Walker, Rfm. W. (9266) R. Ir. Rif.
Walker, Rfm. W. (19276) R. Ir. Rif.
Walker, L/Cpl. W. H. M.G.C.
Walkingshaw, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Wallace, Pte. G. R. Innis. Fus.
Wallen, C.S.M. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Walmsley, Bdr. S. R.F.A.
Walsh, Cpl. J. H. R.E.
Ward, Cpl. E. R.A.S.C.
Ward, L/Cpl. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Ward, Sapper T. R.E.
Wardley, Driver E. R.E.
Ware, Pte. F. S. R. Ir. Fus.
Warnock, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Warren, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Wasson, Pte. S. R. Ir. Fus.
Waterhouse, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Watson, Cpl. T. M.G.C.
Watt, Pte. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Watters, Rfm. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Weatherup, Cpl. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Wegg, Rfm. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Weir, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Weir, Pte. W. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Welch, L/Cpl. C. E. M.M.P.
Welsh, Pioneer P. H. R.E.
West, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Westwood, Rfm. P. R. Ir. Rif.
Whelan, II. Cpl. J. R.E.
Whelan, Sgt. R. R. Ir. Rif.
White, C.S.M. A., _M.C._ R. Innis. Fus.
White, Gnr. F. R.F.A.
White, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Whiteside, L/Cpl. S. R. Ir. Fus.
Whitla, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Wilkinson, Gnr. A. R. R.F.A.
Will, Pte. M. G. M.G.C.
Willacy, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Williams, Pte. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Williamson, C.S.M. G. R. Ir. Fus.
Williamson, Cpl. H. G. R. Ir. Fus.
Williamson, Cpl. J. R.A.M.C.
Williamson, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Williamson, Pte. T. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Williamson, Sgt. W. J. R.F.A.
Willott, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Wilmot, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Wilson, Rfm. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Wilson, Pte. C. R. Innis. Fus.
Wilson, Gnr. F. R.F.A.
Wilson, Sgt. G. R.E.
Wilson, Rfm. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Wilson, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Wilson, Rfm. J. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Wilson, Cpl. J. M. R.E.
Wilson, Sgt. T. R.A.M.C.
Wilson, Driver T. R.F.A.
Wilson, Cpl. W. J. R.E.
Wilson, Rfm. W. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Woodruff, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Woods, Cpl. W. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Woodside, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Woodward, Rfm. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Workman, Driver J. H. R.A.S.C.
Workman, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Wray, Pte. C. R. Innis. Fus.
Wright, Pte. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Wright, Rfm. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Wright, Pte. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Wrigley, Driver O. R.F.A.
Wynne, Pte. R. R. Innis. Fus.

Yardley, Cpl. W., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Yeaman, L/Cpl. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Yeates, L/Cpl. W., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Yendall, Cpl. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Young, Rfm. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Young, Cpl. T. R. Ir. Rif.

MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL

Alexander, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Anderson, Farrier/Sgt. C. R.F.A.
Anderson, Cpl. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Anderson, S/Sgt. J. R.A.S.C.
Armstrong, Sgt. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Armstrong, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.

Ballantine, Sgt. R. R.E.
Barham, Driver A. I. E. R.F.A.
Benfield, B.S.M. H. C. R.F.A.
Best, Rfm. F. V. R. Ir. Rif.
Blewitt, Cpl. J. R.A.S.C.
Boost, Sgt. T. W. R.F.A.
Bowers, S.M. H. C. R.F.A.
Bowra, Sgt. H. R.F.A.
Brennen, Condr. V. T. R.A.O.C.
Brew, L/Cpl. J. M.G.C.
Brown, Sgt. G. R.A.M.C.
Bunting, Sgt. W. J. R.A.M.C.
Burney, Sgt. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Byers, Cpl. S. R. Innis. Fus.

Callaway, C.Q.M.S. F. R. Ir. Fus.
Campbell, C.S.M. J. R.A.S.C.
Campbell, Pte. S. E. R.A.M.C.
Carmichael, C.Q.M.S. R. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Clancy, Q.M.S. P. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Clarke, Sgt. W. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Cormican, Sgt. J. R.A.S.C.
Corr, Sgt. M. R. Ir. Rif.
Corrigan, R.Q.M.S. L. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Cumming, R.Q.M.S. S., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Currall, S.S.M. T. M.M.P.

Davies, Cpl. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Dennison, Q.M.S. W. J. R.A.M.C.
Donnelly, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Dool, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Duggan, C.S.M. J. G. R. Innis. Fus.

Elphick, R.S.M. R. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Ervine, Q.M.S. A. G. _M.M._ R. Ir. Rif.

Ferguson, C.S.M. L. R.E.
Field, Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Fleming, Sgt. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Fleming, C.S.M. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Fooks, Sgt. J. R.A.M.C.
France, Sgt. M. S., _D.C.M._ M.G.C.
Freeman, Sub-Condr. N. A. R.A.O.C.

Gallaugher, Sgt. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Gowdy, Col.-Sgt. J., _M.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Griff, Sgt. H. E. R. Innis. Fus.
Guinn, Rfm. R. R. Ir. Rif.

Hanna, C.S.M. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Harkness, Sgt. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Harmon, C.Q.M.S. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Harvey, Sgt. T. G. R.A.S.C.
Hastings, L/Cpl. M. R. Innis. Fus.
Haydock, S.Q.M.S. J. R.A.S.C.
Hayes, Driver A. R.F.A.
Hazley, Sgt. J. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Highman, Sgt. A. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Holmes, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Hosie, S/Sgt. J. D. R. R.A.S.C.
Hughes, B.Q.M.S. E. F. B. R.F.A.
Hunt, Bdr. A. H. R.F.A.

Irwin, Sapper S. R.E.

James, S/Sgt. C. F. R.A.V.C.
Jamison, Pioneer Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Jamison, R.S.M. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Jardin, S.Q.M.S. A. R.A.S.C.

Keith, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Kelly, C.Q.M.S. C. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Kennedy, Sgt. J. R.A.S.C.
Kerr, Sgt. G. R.A.M.C.
King, Sgt. P. W. R.A.S.C.

Laird, C.S.M. W. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Lambert, S/Sgt. W. H. R.A.S.C.
Lapsley, Cpl. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Larmour, C.Q.M.S. E. M. R.E.
Leonard, Cpl. J. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Lester, S.Q.M.S. H. C. R.A.S.C.
Letson, C.Q.M.S. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Lloyd, Pte. E. E. R. Innis. Fus.

McClure, Sgt. D. R.A.S.C.
McComb, Cpl. R. Employment Coy.
McConville, C.Q.M.S. T. R. Ir. Fus.
McCormick, Driver H. R.E.
McCoy, Sgt. J. M.G.C.
McCurdy, Sgt. R. R.A.M.C.
McFerran, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McGuigan, Cpl. A. C. R. Ir. Rif.
McGuinness, Pte. E. Div. H.Q.
McLaren, R.Q.M.S. A. L. V. R. Innis. Fus.
McNeil, S.M. A. C. R.A.S.C.
McWilliams, Rfm. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Maddock, Sapper R. D. R.E.
Martin, L/Cpl. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Meneilly, Rfm. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Mitchell, Q.M.S. J. A. R.E.
Moore, Col.-Sgt. W. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Morrison, Sgt. F. R.A.M.C.
Morrow, Rfm. S. R. Ir. Rif.

Neary, Sgt. L. R. Innis. Fus.
Nelson, Sgt. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Ness, Sgt. R. R. Ir. Rif.

O'Rawe, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Owens, Pte. W. R. Innis. Fus.

Pasley, Rfm. W. O. R. Ir. Rif.
Pate, C.S.M. J. R.E.
Pedlow, Sgt. S. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Powers, Sgt. R. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Pyper, Cpl. R. R.E.

Rands, S.S.M. R. R.A.S.C.
Rigby, Pte. H. R.A.S.C.
Robinson, Cpl. C., _M.M._ R. Ir. Fus.
Rogers, Pte. J. M.G.C.
Russell, C.S.M. W. J., _M.M._ R.E.

Salters, Sub-Condr. J. R.A.O.C.
Sheldrake, Sgt. H. T. M.M.P.
Sherar, C.Q.M.S. H. N. R.A.S.C.
Sherwood, Q.M.S. T. 107th Bde. H.Q.
Sills, L/Cpl. A. K. R.A.O.C.
Silvey, C.S.M. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Smyth, Rfm. D. R. Ir. Rif.
Spencer, L/Cpl. T. M.M.P.
Stafford, R.Q.M.S. T. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Stewart, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Stewart, Sgt. P. M.G.C.
Sullivan, Sgt. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Swain, S.Q.M.S. J. R.F.A.
Swann, Sgt. R. R. Ir. Rif.

Taylor, C.Q.M.S. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Thompson, Sgt. A. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Thompson, L/Cpl. H. J. R.E.
Thompson, Sgt. J. R.E.
Thompson, Cpl. T. J. R.A.M.C.
Turner, Sgt. A. R.F.A.
Turner, C.Q.M.S. J., _M.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Turner, Sgt. W. J. R.A.M.C.
Tynan, R.S.M. F. R. Ir. Fus.

Walmsley, Bdr. S. R.F.A.
Waring, C.Q.M.S. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Warry, Sgt. E. R.E.
White, Sgt. J. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Williams, S.M. G. M.M.P.

_FOREIGN HONOURS_

FRENCH LEGION D'HONNEUR

Allen, Lt.-Col. Sir W. J., _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Rif.
Blacker, Lt.-Col. S. W., _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Fus.
Craig, Maj. C. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Haslett, Maj. H. R. R. Ir. Rif.
Magill, Lt.-Col. R., _D.S.O._ R.A.M.C.
Mirrless, Maj. W. H. B. R.F.A.
Pakenham, Col. H. A., _C.M.G._ R. Ir. Rif.
Vaughan, Brig.-Gen. E., _D.S.O._ Cmndg. 108th Bde.

FRENCH MEDAILLE MILITAIRE

Baker, Bdr. E. R.F.A.
Glass, Sgt. R. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Graham, C.S.M. H. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Higgins, Rfm. T., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Hughes, Pte. S. A. M.G.C.
Johnson, R.S.M. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Laird, Sgt. W., _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
McBride, Sgt. R. J., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
McCarrol, Rfm. R. Ir. Rif.
McIlveen, Sgt. J., _M.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
McMillan, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Moore, Sgt. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Potter, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Tynan, R.S.M. F. R. Ir. Fus.
Wilkinson, C.S.M. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Wilson, L/Cpl. R. C., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Wright, Sapper B. R., _D.C.M._ R.E.

FRENCH CROIX DE GUERRE

Allen, Capt. S., _M.C._ Genl. List.
Anderson, Lt. A. M. R. Ir. Rif.
Atkinson, L/Cpl. F. M.G.C.

Beezley, Lt. F. W. M.G.C.
Bell, Sgt. A. S. R.A.M.C.
Bell, Lt. H. C. R.A.S.C.
Benson, Lt. T. R. R.E.
Breeze, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Brock, Brig.-Gen. H. J., _C.B._, _C.M.G._, _D.S.O._ Cmndg. R.A.
Brown, Bdr. C. R.F.A.
Brown, Capt. W. A. Weber, R.A.S.C.
Bunting, Capt. T. E., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Fus.

Campbell, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Charlton, Capt. J. W., _M.C._ R. Innis. Fus.
Christie, Maj. A. W. S. R.A.M.C.
Corrigan, R.Q.M.S. L. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Crawford, Lt.-Col. S. W., _D.S.O._ R. Innis. Fus.
Crompton, 2/Lt. J. J. R.A.M.C.

Davidson, Capt. D. N. F., _M.C._ R. Innis. Fus.
Deane, Sgt. J., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Dent, Lt.-Col. J. R. C., _D.S.O._, _M.C._ R. Innis. Fus.
Dixon, Lt. H. R. R.E.
Doig, Lt. G. F. R. Ir. Rif.

Ferguson, Cpl. F. R. Ir. Rif.
Findlay, Sgt. H. M.G.C.
Ford, 2/Lt. F. J. R.E.

Goodall, S/Sgt. L. D. R.A.M.C.
Goodwin, Lt.-Col. W. R., _C.M.G._, _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Rif.
Goyder, Capt. G. B. Genl. List.
Green, Pte. R. R. Innis. Fus.
Green, Lt.-Col. S. H., _D.S.O._, _M.C._ West Yorks. Regt.
Grove-White, Capt. I. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Griffiths, Gnr. F. K., _D.C.M._ R.F.A.

Hatfull, Lt. and Q.M. L. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Hawkes, Brig.-Gen. C. St. L. G., _D.S.O._ Cmndg. R.A.
Hessey, Brig.-Gen. W. F., _D.S.O._ Cmndg. 109th Bde.
Hewitt, 2/Lt. J. O'N. R. Innis. Fus.
Hill, Cpl. W. R.F.A.
Hodgson, Maj. G. C. S., _M.C._ W. Somerset Yeo.
Hooks, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Hoskiss, Sgt. W. R.F.A.
Howard, Maj. A. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Hutchinson, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.

Jamison, R.S.M. W. R. Ir. Rif.

Kerr, Capt. C. H. R. Ir. Fus.
Kirby, C.S.M. L. R. Innis. Fus.
Knox, Lt.-Col. R. S., _D.S.O._ R. Innis. Fus.

Leach, Sgt. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Loughlin, Cpl. D., _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Lyness, Capt. W. J., _M.C._ R. Ir. Rif.

McAtamney, Rfm. D. R. Ir. Rif.
McCabe, Rfm. P. R. Ir. Rif.
McCallum, Maj. J. D. M., _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Rif.
McCaw, Capt. J., _M.C._ R. Innis. Fus.
McClurg, Sgt. R. R. Ir. Rif.
McDowell, Capt. S. S. R. Ir. Rif.
McFaull, C.Q.M.S. W. R. Ir. Rif.
MacKenzie, Lt.-Col. R. H., _D.S.O._, _M.C._ R.E.
McKnight, C.Q.M.S. H. K. R. Innis. Fus.
Magill, C.S.M. D. R. R. Ir. Fus.
Meares, Lt.-Col. C. F., _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Rif.
Moffatt, R.S.M. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Montgomery, Sgt. W. M.G.C.
Montserrat, Capt. W. R. R.F.A.
Moran, Pte. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Morrison, Capt. T. D., _M.C._ R. Innis. Fus.
Mulholland, Maj. J. A., _M.C._ R. Ir. Rif.
Murphy, Sgt. W. M.G.C.

O'Grady, Lt.-Col. D. de C. R.A.M.C.
O'Hanlon, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Fus.

Parnell, Lt. and Q.M. W. R.A.M.C.
Patterson, Cpl. H. J. R.F.A.
Peacocke, Lt.-Col. W. J., _D.S.O._ R. Innis. Fus.
Pemberton, Gnr. L. J. R.F.A.

Quinn, Sgt. W. J. R.E.
Quinn, Sgt. W. J. M.G.C.

Rattray, Lt. N. A. R. Ir. Fus.
Rickards, Maj. G. A., _M.C._ R.F.A.
Robinson, Maj. H. C. R.A.S.C.
Roch, Col. H. S., _D.S.O._ R.A.M.C.
Rogers, Maj. V. B., _D.S.O._, _M.C._ Genl. List.
Rose, C.S.M. T. de, _D.C.M._ M.G.C.
Ross, Maj. R. O., _M.C._ N.I.H.
Rule, 2/Lt. C. R. Ir. Rif.

Scott, B.S.M. W. R.F.A.
Sharp, Maj. R. R., _D.S.O._, _M.C._ R.F.A.
Simpson, Lt.-Col. H. C., _C.M.G._, _D.S.O._ R.A.
Skimmin, Sapper A. R.E.
Solomon, Capt. R. B., _M.C._ R.F.A.
Stevenson, L/Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Sturgeon, Sgt. J. R.E.
Swan, Capt. W. N. R. Ir. Rif.

Tamplin, Maj. R. F. A., _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Fus.
Tate, Lt. T. M. R. Ir. Rif.
Taylor, Sgt. F. R.F.A.
Thompson, Lt.-Col. A. G., _D.S.O._ Indian Army.
Thompson, Maj. G., _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Rif.
Thompson, Rfm. R. R. Ir. Rif.

Vaughan, 2/Lt. C. H. R. Innis. Fus.

Walker, Sgt. F. W. R.F.A.
Wallace, Capt. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Watts, Capt. R., _M.C._ R. Ir. Rif.
Wightman, S.S.M. B. R.A.M.C.
Wilkins, Capt. C. F., _D.S.O._, _M.C._ R. Ir. Rif.
Williamson, Rfm. A. E. R. Ir. Rif.
Wood, Cpl. G. H. R.F.A.
Wylie, Sapper G. R.E.

FRENCH MEDAILLE D'HONNEUR

Ward, R.S.M. W. R. Ir. Rif.

FRENCH ORDRE DE MERITE AGRICOLE

O'Neill, Maj. the Rt. Hon. H., M.P. R. Ir. Rif.

BELGIAN ORDRE DE LEOPOLD

Becher, Lt.-Col. C.M.L., _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Rif.
Boyd, Sgt. R. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Duncan, Capt. L. S., _M.C._ R. Ir. Rif.
Gordon, Capt. H. C., _M.C._ R. In. Fus.
McKee, Maj. J., _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Rif.
O'Neill, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Williams, C.S.M. G. A. R. Ir. Fus.

BELGIAN ORDRE DE LA COURONNE

Bell, Lt. and Q.M. D. F. R. Innis. Fus.
Coffin, Maj.-Gen. C., _V.C._, _C.B._, _D.S.O._ Cmndg. 36th Div.
McNeill, Lt. W. N. R. Ir. Rif.
McCarthy-O'Leary, Lt.-Col. H. W. D., _D.S.O._ R. Ir. Rif.
Wilson, Lt. and Q.M. G. W. R. Ir. Fus.

BELGIAN DECORATION MILITAIRE

Baxter, Rfm. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Connolly, Pte. B. R. Ir. Fus.
Forrest, Pte. E. M., _D.C.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Grattan, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Meredith, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Millichamp, Sgt. H. R.F.A.
Morton, Pte. T. R. Ir. Fus.
Pepper, Cpl. J. M.G.C.
Quinn, Cpl. W. F., _D.C.M._, _M.M._ R.A.M.C.
Robson, Sgt. W., _M.M._ R.E.
Rowan, Sgt. P. R. Innis. Fus.
Simons, Pte. W. R. Ir. Fus.
Stewart, Pte. T. R. Ir. Fus.
Sullivan, Gnr. C. R.F.A.
Wheatley, Pte. H. S. R. Innis. Fus.

BELGIAN CROIX DE GUERRE

Aitken, Cpl. J. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Askew, Sglr. E. R.F.A.

Barrett, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Bateman, Sgt. P. R. R.A.S.C.
Beckerson, Rev. W. F. Army Chap. Dept.
Bell, C.S.M. H., _M.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Birney, Sgt. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Blake, Lt. H. E. R.E.
Bowers, Sgt. R. B. R. Ir. Rif.
Brock, Brig.-Gen. H. J., _C.B._, _C.M.G._, _D.S.O._ Cmndg. R.A.
Buddy, Gnr. H. R.F.A.
Burrows, S/Sgt. F. R. R.A.M.C.

Carolan, L/Cpl. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Carson, L/Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Carton, L/Cpl. J., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Cassidy, L/Cpl. H. R. Innis. Fus.
Chambers, Cpl. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Cleary, L/Cpl. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Craig, L/Cpl. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Creese, C.Q.M.S. R. G., _D.C.M._ M.G.C.

Dawson, Lt. D. M. R. Ir. Rif.
Dick, L/Cpl. I., _M.M._ R. Ir. Fus.
Donnan, Sgt. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Donohue, Rev. F., _M.C._ Army Chap. Dept.
Doogan, C.S.M. M. J. 107th Bde. H.Q.
Douglas, L/Cpl. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Duncan, Capt. L. S., _M.C._ R. Ir. Rif.
Dunne, C.Q.M.S. J. R. Ir. Rif.

Edmonds, Bdr. G. R.F.A.
Edwards, Cpl. C. R. Ir. Fus.
Edwards, Capt. and Q.M. G. R. Ir. Rif.
Ellis, Maj. S. G. R.F.A.
Evans, Lt. T. H., _M.C._ Genl. List.

Farquhar, II. Cpl. C. R.E.
Fitzgerald, Capt. C. W. B. R. Innis. Fus.
Fox, Capt. L. W., _M.C._ R.F.A.
Franklyn, Maj. G. E. W., _M.C._ R.F.A.
French, B.S.M. J. R.F.A.

Galbraith, Sgt. W. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Garner, Maj. C. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Glegg, Capt. J. D., _M.C._ R. Dub. Fus.
Glenn, Pte. D. R. Innis. Fus.
Godfrey, C.S.M. S. R. Innis. Fus.
Godson, Capt. E. A., _M.C._ R. Ir. Fus.
Gordon, Cpl. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Graham, Sgt. J. M.G.C.
Graham, 2/Lt. W. G. R. Ir. Fus.
Green, Lt.-Col. S. H., _D.S.O._, _M.C._ West Yorks. Regt.
Greenwood, Cpl. A. R. Ir. Rif.

Haigh, Lt. J. H., _M.C._ R. Ir. Rif.
Harbinson, Sgt. J., _D.C.M._, _M.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Harris, C.S.M. W. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Harrison, Sgt. J. W. R.E.
Hawkins, Lt. A. G. J. Int. Corps.
Hazelton, Bdr. F. R.F.A.
Healas, B.S.M. H. R.F.A.
Herdman, Cpl. R., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Hill, Capt. F. J., _M.C._ R. Ir. Rif.
Hindmarsh, Sgt. M. R.A.V.C.
Howarth, II. Cpl. A. R.E.
Hulse, Maj. A. R. Ir. Fus.
Hunt, Rfm. A. R. Ir. Rif.
Hutchings, R.S.M. W. R. Ir. Rif.

Irvine, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.

Jardin, S.Q.M.S. A., _M.S.M._ R.A.S.C.

Kane, Pte. R., _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
King, Cpl. R. H. R.E.
Kirkpatrick, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Knaggs, L/Cpl. R. W. R. Ir. Fus.

Laverty, Pte. W. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Lawler, Sgt. E. R. Innis. Fus.
Leckey, Sgt. H. R.E.
Leeper, Capt. J. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Leslie, Maj. C. G., _M.C._ 3rd Dragoon Gds.
Leverett, Sgt.-Drmr. E. R. Ir. Fus.
Lindsay, Capt. G. E., _M.C._ R.A.M.C.
Lockhart, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Fus.
Lowe, Lt.-Col. T. A., _D.S.O._, _M.C._ R. Ir. Fus.

McBirney, Sgt. T., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
McCartney, Driver G. R.E.
McCullough, Rfm. T. R. Ir. Rif.
McCune, Sgt. A. R. Ir. Rif.
McDowell, Sgt. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McDowell, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McIldowie, Capt. G. R.E.
McKane, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.
McKnight, C.Q.M.S. H. K. R. Innis. Fus.
McLarty, L/Cpl. F., _M.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Macmillan, Maj. C. H. R.E.
McMurray, Rfm. J. E. R. Ir. Rif.
McNeill, II./Cpl. W. J. R.E.
McSeveny, Sgt. S. M.G.C.
McVeigh, L/Cpl. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Magee, Capt. F. W. H. R.F.A.
Magee, Pte. W. G., _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Mansell, Sgt. W. A. R.A.M.C.
Menaul, Capt. W. J., _M.C._ Genl. List.
Miller, Capt. J. C. R.A.V.C.
Milne, Capt. C. W. R. Innis. Fus.
Moore, Sgt. R. R.E.
Moorhouse, Maj. G. S. M.G.C.
Morgan, C.Q.M.S. V. R.E.
Muller, Lt.-Col. J., _M.C._ M.G.C.
Murphy, Rev. W. G. Army Chap. Dept.

Neary, Sgt. L. R. Innis. Fus.
Neville, Sgt. C. R. Ir. Fus.
Nightingale, Bdr. J. H. R.F.A.

O'Hara, Pte. P. R. Ir. Fus.

O'Hara, L/Cpl. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Ormerod, Cpl. J. E. R.E.

Perritt, Lt. and Q.M. W. E. R.A.M.C.
Porterfield, Sgt. A. R. Innis. Fus.
Purdon-Coote, Maj. C. R. R.A.S.C.
Purdy, 2/Lt. W. H. R. Innis. Fus.

Quigley, Rfm. M. R. Ir. Rif.

Rands, S.S.M. R. R.A.S.C.
Riley, Lt.-Col. J. H. G. R.F.A.
Rivis, Lt.-Col. T. C. L., _D.S.O._ R.A.S.C.
Robb, Capt. J. C. R.A.M.C.
Rogers, Lt. W., _M.C._ R. Ir. Rif.
Rosbotham, Sgt. S. R. Ir. Fus.

Savage, Sgt. T. R. Innis. Fus.
Scott, C.Q.M.S. T. R. Ir. Rif.
Searle, F.Q.M.S. S. R.F.A.
Shaw, Sgt. J. C. R. Ir. Rif.
Sloane, Bdr. S. R.F.A.
Small, Sgt. S. R. Ir. Rif.
Smyth, Maj. W., _D.S.O._, _M.C._ R.E.
Snodden, R.S.M. J., _D.C.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Sparks, Capt. W., _M.C._ R. Ir. Fus.
Sterling, Pte. J. R.A.M.C.
Stewart, Cpl. A. R.F.A.
Stronge, Capt. C. N. L., _M.C._ R. Innis. Fus.

Tait, Maj. M. W., _M.C._ M.G.C.
Thompson, Lt.-Col. A. G., _D.S.O._ Indian Army.
Thompson, Sgt. J. R. Innis. Fus.
Thornely, Capt. F. B., _M.C._ R. Ir. Rif.
Tweedie, Rfm. J. R. Ir. Rif.

Underbill, Driver E. R.F.A.

Vaughan, Brig.-Gen. E., _D.S.O._ Cmndg. 108th Bde.

Walker, Capt. D. M.G.C.
Wallen, C.S.M. H., _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Watson, Rev. R. Army Chap. Dept.
Watt, L/Cpl. J. R.E.
Watterson, Cpl. E. R. Innis. Fus.
Weldon, Cpl. J. R. Ir. Rif.
Wilgar, Lt. W. J. M.G.C.
Wilson, Sgt. G. R.E.
Wilson, S/Sgt. T. R.A.M.C.
Woodward, R.Q.M.S. H. R. Innis. Fus.

Yardley, Cpl. W., _D.C.M._, _M.M._ R. Ir. Rif.

ITALIAN ORDER OF ST. MAURICE AND ST. LAZARUS

Nugent, Maj. Gen. O. S. W., _C.B._, _D.S.O._ Cmndg. 36th Div.

ITALIAN SILVER MEDAL FOR MILITARY VALOUR

Howe Lt. W. R.E.

ITALIAN BRONZE MEDAL FOR MILITARY VALOUR

Gillespie, S/Sgt. R. S., _M.M._ R.A.M.C.
Henry, Rfm. W. R. Ir. Rif.
Lyttle, L/Cpl. D., _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
McMullan, Rfm. H. R. Ir. Rif.
Petman, Rfm. W. B. R. Ir. Rif.

RUSSIAN CROSS OF ST. GEORGE

Fleming, Cpl. T., _D.C.M._ R. Ir. Rif.
Hunter, Sgt. J. A., _D.C.M._, _M.M._ R. Innis. Fus.
Kennedy, Sgt. E., _D.C.M._ R.F.A.
Quigg, Rfm. R., _V.C._ R. Ir. Rif.

MONTENEGRIN ORDER OF ST. DANILO

Simpson, Lt.-Col. H. C., _C.M.G._, _D.S.O._ R.A.
Thornton, Capt. A. J. P. _M.C._ R. Ir. Rif.

Whilst every care has been taken in the compilation of the foregoing
list, omissions and other errors are unavoidable.

INDEX

Abbeville, 24-26.

Acheux, 29.

Achiet-le-Grand, 136.
-le-Petit, 167, 170.

Acquin, 107.

Adams, Lieut. F., 277.

Aicken, Rfm., 96.

Aisne, battle of the, 15.

Aisne House, 116.

Aire, 63.

Albert, H.M. King of Belgians, 259.

Albert, 137.
battle of, 298.
-Arras Road, 48, 50.
-Bapaume-Cambrai Road, 126, 127, 129, 139, 147, 148, 153-155, 157,
158.

Amiens, 22, 136, 221, 243.
defences, 23.
-Ham-St. Quentin Road, 181, 182, 229.
-Roye Road, 250.

Ancre, River, 23, 29, 31, 35-37, 44-48, 51-56, 65, 91, 120.

Andechy, 221-224, 228, 229.

Anneux, 154-156.
Chapel, 156.

Annois, 210, 211.

Anseghem, 289.

Anthoine, Gen., 110.

Anton's Farm, 65.

Antrim, Co., 7.

Ararat O.P., 200.

Argyll & S. Highlanders, 10th, 128.

Armagh, Co., 7.

Armentières, 234, 253.

Armies, First, 250.
Second, 67, 68, 79, 84, 87, 122, 166, 243, 249, 272.
Third, 26, 27, 160, 167, 187, 193, 259.
Fourth, 43, 250.
Fifth, 108, 110, 187, 202, 209, 230.
First French, 110, 228, 250.
Sixth French, 43.
Belgian, 245.
Fourth German, 122.
Eighteenth German, 191.

Armin, Gen. Sixt von, 102.

Army Corps, II., 114, 234, 240, 245, 260, 262, 263, 265, 272, 273.
III., 146, 149, 150, 155, 170, 176, 186, 200, 202, 204.
IV., 133, 137, 146, 149, 155, 163, 165-167, 169.
V., 146, 157, 179.
VII., 170.
VIII., 44, 55.
IX., 70, 75, 80, 83, 94, 97, 98, 104, 122, 240.
X., 44, 47, 55, 290.
XVII., 167.
XVIII., 183, 185, 190, 191, 206, 221, 231.
XIX., 108, 111.
Australian, 243.
II. Anzac, 85, 101.
XVI. French, 246.
Portuguese, 234.

Arquèves, 23.

Arras, 109, 167, 169.

Artemps, 202-204.

Artois, 108.

Arvillers, 227.

Asquith, Mr. H. H., 4 (foot-note).

Aubigny, 210, 213, 214.

Auchonvillers, 35.

Ault, 232.

Authuille, 39, 48, 61.

Auxi-le-Château, 63.

Aveluy Wood, 42, 48, 50, 51, 54, 58.

Avesne, 202.

Aviatik Farm, 114.

Avre, River, 219, 221, 226.

Avricourt, 218, 219.

Bacquencourt, 206.

Bailey, Pte., 205.

Bailleul, 65, 78, 79, 89, 103, 239, 236, 248, 251.

Ballycastle, 17.

Ballykinlar, 7, 11.

Bancourt, 170.

Bapaume, 35, 68, 125, 130, 167.

Barastre, 142, 167.

Battery Valley, 194.

Battle Zone, Artillery Group (at St. Quentin), 194.

Bavichove, 276, 281.

Bayenghem, 64.

Beaucamp, 126, 170.

Beaucourt, 44.
Station, 44, 46, 53.

Beaulencourt, 167, 181.

Beaulieu-les-Fontaines, 211-213.

Beaumetz, 157, 166.

Beaumont-en-Beine, 212, 216.

Beaumont-Hamel, 28, 44.

Becelaere, 263-265, 267.

Becher, Lieut.-Col. C. M. L., 287.

Belfast, 6-8, 12, 13, 15, 17, 299.

Bell, Capt. E. N. F., 59.

Belle Eglise Farm, 38.

Bellewaarde Lake, 263.

Belt, Capt. C. B., 117.

Berchen, 287.

Bergstraat, 289.

Berguette, 63.

Berlancourt, 217, 218.

Bernard, Col. H. C., 55, 59.

Bernard, Lieut.-Col. J., 50.

Bernaville, 24, 62, 63.

Bertincourt, 135, 141, 170.

Bethancourt, 218.

Beveren, 281, 282, 285.

Bihucourt, 35.

Blacker, Lieut.-Col. S. W., 53.

Blaringhem, 63.

Blauwepoortbeek, 104.

Blood, Gen. Sir B., 8.

Boadicea Redoubt, 190, 201.

Boisdinghem, 64.

Border Camp, 242.
House, 116, 118.

Bordon, 20, 26.

Bouchoir, 222.

Boulogne, 21, 22.

Bourlon, 156, 157, 160, 163-167, 179.
Wood, 129, 145-147, 156, 161, 165, 166, 168, 171.

Boursies, 157.

Boyes, 181.

Boyle, Major J. C., 62.

Boyle, Lieut. J. K., 215, 216.

Boyle's Farm, 65.

Boyne, battle of the, 51.

Bramshott, 20.

Brandhoek, 112.

Breen, Pte., 74.

Bresle, River, 232.

Brew, Major J., 223.

Bridcott, Lieut.-Col., 267.

Brigades, 2nd Cav., 153, 156.
6th Cav., 216.
7th Cav., 216.
Canadian Cav., 216.
10th Inf., 27.
11th Inf., 27, 29.
12th Inf., 24, 25, 29.
26th Inf. (Highland), 238.
27th Inf. (Lowland), 130, 264, 268.
32nd Inf., 100.
34th Inf., 98.
41st Inf., 200.
60th Inf., 202, 204.
61st Inf., 199, 202, 204, 205, 208, 210, 219.
87th Inf., 276.
88th Inf., 170, 171.
101st Inf., 290.
107th Inf., 7, 10, 13, 22-24, 27-29, 41, 45-47, 51, 54, 55, 58, 59,
63-65, 75, 79, 85, 90, 100, 104, 106, 111, 112, 114, 119, 126,
131, 133, 141, 142, 147, 154, 157, 163, 165, 166, 170, 175,
177, 182, 184, 185, 189, 192, 193, 198, 202, 205, 206, 212,
217, 220-222, 224, 225, 227, 228, 233, 242, 244, 245, 240,
253, 256-258, 260, 263, 267, 269, 271, 273, 276, 284, 286,
287, 292, 294.
108th Inf., 7, 10, 13, 15, 23, 25, 29, 41, 45, 46, 48, 54, 64, 65,
75, 85, 89, 100, 106, 112, 114, 117, 118, 126, 134, 141, 142,
147, 154, 157, 165, 166, 170, 171, 175, 177, 184, 185, 189,
193, 200, 202, 205, 209, 217, 219, 221, 222, 232, 234-236,
238, 240, 244, 245, 251, 253-256, 260, 263, 265, 268, 270,
271, 273, 276-278, 285-288, 294.
100th Inf., 5, 7, 10, 15, 23, 25, 20, 35, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 58,
64, 65, 75, 85, 90, 93, 94, 100, 104, 106, 112, 114, 117, 118,
126, 128, 134, 135, 142, 147, 148, 151, 153, 155-157, 165,
166, 170, 171, 175, 178, 182, 185, 189, 193, 205, 206, 217,
219-222, 226, 228, 233, 243, 245, 249, 251, 252, 256, 259,
260, 263-266, 268, 270, 271, 273, 281, 285, 287, 289, 294.
121st Inf., 165.
123rd Inf., 278.
146th Inf., 56, 57.
147th Inf., 41.
148th Inf., 58, 59.
164th Inf., 111.
165th Inf., 111, 112.
166th Inf., 111, 112.
178th Inf., 236, 237.
182nd Inf., 171.
186th Inf., 152, 154.
189th Inf., 177.
South African Inf., 126, 234, 235.
1st/1st London R.F.A., 23.
14th Army R.F.A., 182.
17th R.F.A., 176.
50th Army, R.F.A., 266.
91st R.F.A., 212.
93rd R.F.A., 147.
108th Army, R.F.A., 115.

Brigades, 113th Army, R.F.A., 76, 271.
150th R.F.A., 115.
153rd R.F.A., 8, 10, 39, 76, 96, 97, 147, 155, 168, 190, 218, 260,
263, 286.
154th R.F.A., 8, 10, 39, 76.
172nd R.F.A., 8, 10, 39, 61, 76.
173rd R.F.A., 8, 10, 39, 76, 96, 97, 147, 155, 168, 198, 287.
280th R.F.A., 147.
Special (Gas Services), 49.

Brigade Supply Officer, 33.

British Empire League, 8.

Brock, Brig.-Gen. H. J., 10, 70, 80, 115, 176, 218, 221, 245, 258.

Brock's Benefit, 38, 44.

Broodseinde Ridge, 263.

Brouchy, 205, 206, 211-214.

Bruce, Capt. G. J., 211, 226, 271.

Bruges, 109.

Brunyate, Lieut. W., 282.

Brush, Lieut.-Col., 43.

Bryans, Capt. J. C., 215, 216.

Buchoire, 218.

Bullecourt, 127, 146.

Bull Ring, 74, 80.

Bus-les-Artois, 141.

Busseboom, 78.

Byng, Gen. Hon. Sir J., 145.

Calais, 245.

Cambrai, 43, 129, 139, 146, 156, 167, 179, 180, 183.
battle of, 139 _et seq._; 186, 300.

Campbell, Lieut.-Col., 140.

Canal du Nord, 127, 128, 139, 145, 146-148, 152-154, 157-160, 163-165.
line, 157.

Canaples, 24.

Candas, 27.
-Acheux Railway, 37.

Cannectancourt, 229.

Canny-sur-Matz, 229.

Canopus Trench, 243.

Cantaing, 153, 156, 171.

Cantigny, 228.

Capricorn Keep, 118.

Carporetto, battle of, 143.

Carson, Sir E., 2-5, 19.

Cassel, 243, 249.

Casualty Clearing Station, 40th, 7.

Cather, Lieut. G., 59.

Cavalry Corps, the, 146.
Regiment, IX. Corps, 98.

Cavan, Co., 7.

Cayeux, 26, 35.

Champagne, 186.
French Offensive, 1917, 82, 109, 143.

Château-Thierry, 243, 250.

Clairfaye Farm, 41, 48.

Clandeboye, 7, 11.

Clements, Cpl. T., 74.

Clements, Lieut.-Col. S. U. L., 165.

Cochrane, Brig.-Gen. J. K., 202, 211, 213, 214, 219.

Cochrane, Rfm., 96.

Coffin, Maj.-Gen. C., 244, 252, 266, 280, 281, 291, 296.

Cole-Hamilton, Lieut.-Col. C. G., 201.

Collézy, 216.

Cologne, 294.

Comyn, Lieut.-Col. L., 136.

Conn, Cpl. J., 60.

Contay, 181.

Contescourt, 198, 200.

Conteville, 63.

Conway, Pte., 205.

Corbie, 181, 182.

Couchman, Brig.-Gen. G. H. H., 10, 24.

Couillet Wood, 150, 171, 175.

Coullemelle, 228.

Courcelles-le-Comte, 167, 170.

Courtrai, 276-278, 283, 290.
-Ghent Road, 281, 282, 285.
-Ghent Railway, 285, 286.
-Ingelmunster Railway, 272, 273, 276.

Craig, Capt. C., 59.

Craig, Sir J., Bt., 3-6, 9.

Crawford, Lt.-Col. J., 205.

Crèvecœur, 146.

Crisolles, 217.

Croix de Poperinghe, 248.

Crown Prince, the German, 187.

Croydon, 8.

Crucifix (at Thiepval), 45, 46, 57, 60.

Cuerne, 276.

Cugny, 205, 210, 211, 214-216.

Cumming, Lieut. A. E., 198, 223.

Custom House (at Neuve Eglise), 254.

Cyclist Company, 36th Divisional, 7, 11, 35.
Regiment, VIII. Corps, 273.

Dadizeele, 265, 270.

Dallon, 200.

Davenescourt, 227.

Daylight Corner, 83.

D.C.L.I., 7th, 204, 205, 211, 213, 214.

Débeney, Gen., 228.

Despard, Capt. C. B., 239.

De Broeken, 253.

Deconinck Farm, 104.

Deerlyck, 285, 287.

Demicourt, 126, 130, 140, 155, 168.
-Flesquières Road, 147, 151, 152, 154, 162.

Dessart Wood, 171.

Desselghem, 281, 283.

Dickebusch, 78.

Diependaal Beek, 84.

Dieppe, 178.

Divisions, Guards', 166, 167, 169.
1st, 233.
2nd, 168, 296.
4th, 16, 23, 24, 27-29, 133.
6th, 171.
8th, 184.
9th, 123, 126, 128, 234, 235, 239, 243, 249-251, 262-269, 272, 276,
280, 285, 288, 294.
10th, 5.
11th, 84, 98, 100, 104.
12th, 62.
14th, 185, 189, 196, 199, 200, 202, 204, 207, 210, 212, 214, 216.
16th, 84, 85, 94-96, 101, 114, 117, 134.
19th, 84, 234-236.
20th, 65, 199, 206, 217.
25th, 84, 94, 96, 97, 134, 235-237.
29th, 44, 169, 170, 184, 254-256, 260, 262, 263, 265, 266,
269 (foot-note), 272, 275-277.
30th, 185, 189, 198, 202, 209, 221, 222, 242, 258.
31st, 36, 251, 254, 256, 257.
32nd, 38, 44, 56, 80, 184.
34th, 290.
35th, 251, 271, 272, 275.
36th (Ulster).
origin of, 2.
recruiting of, 6.
training of, 11 _et seq._; 23 _et seq._; 41, 83, 107, 142, 245.
religious element in, 16.
moves to England, 17.
tributes to, by Lord Kitchener, 18;
by C.-in-C., 240;
by Gen. Jacob, 291.
reviewed by the King, 21.
arrival in France, 22.
takes over line on Ancre, 29.
prepares for Somme offensive, 37.
raids by, 38, 41, 49, 72, 74, 80, 90, 131, 249.
casualties of, 50, 59, 100, 119, 233, 240, 256, 290.
attacks on the Ancre, 52 _et seq._
prisoners taken in battle, 59, 100, 156, 256, 257, 267, 272, 275,
284, 285.
moves to Flanders, 63.
mining on front of, 67.
prepares for battle of Messines, 82.
attacks at Messines, 92 _et seq._
enters line at Ypres, 111, 232.
attacks at Ypres, 116 _et seq._
moves to Cambrai Area, 125.
prepares for battle of Cambrai, 139 _et seq._
attacks at Cambrai, 151 _et seq._
relieved at Cambrai, 166.
enters line on Welsh Ridge, 171.
local offensives by, 172 _et seq._; 250 _et seq._
relieves French before St. Quentin, 182.
reorganization of, 184.
defensive preparations of, 190, 245.
attacked by the enemy at St. Quentin, 194.
its flank turned, 199.
withdrawal to St. Quentin Canal, 202.
withdrawal to Somme Canal, 204.
relieved by French, 217, 227.
"fills the gap" on the Avre, 221 _et seq._
action of its artillery with French, 229.
action of its 108th Brigade at Kemmel, 234 _et seq._
carries out withdrawals in Salient, 241 _et seq._
relief of, at Ypres, 245.
relieves French at Bailleul, 246.
presses retreating enemy, 253 _et seq._
concentrates for attack at Ypres, 260.
enters line at Becelaere, 264.
reaches Menin-Roulers Road, 266.
attacks at Moorseele, 273.
enters Courtrai, 277.
moves to Lendelede, 280.
forces line of the Lys, 282 _et seq._
occupies its last objective, Kleineberg, 289.
settles down for winter, 1918, 294.
its demobilization, 296 _et seq._
record of, 297 _et seq._
characteristics of, 299 _et seq._
37th, 106.
38th, 29.
40th, 157, 160, 163-166.
41st, 65, 278.
47th, 167, 168.
48th, 23, 114, 118.
49th, 41, 44, 47, 56, 59, 62, 64.
51st, 139, 142, 147, 150, 153, 156-158, 163, 164, 166.
55th, 108, 110-112, 130, 243.
56th, 146, 153, 155, 157, 159, 163, 168.
59th, 167.
61st, 119, 130, 170, 171, 173, 185, 192, 198.
62nd, 140, 142, 147, 150, 153, 155-158, 160, 163, 166, 167, 259.
63rd (R.N.), 177, 178, 181.
1st Australian, 250.
New Zealand, 79, 97.
1st Cav., 153, 157.
3rd Cav., 216.
6th French, 182.
9th French, 217, 218.
41st French, 246.
62nd French, 217, 218, 220, 221, 229.
77th French, 229.
164th French, 281.
4th French Cav., 272.
3rd Belgian, 280.
4th Belgian, 242.
8th Belgian, 262.
12th Belgian, 245.
Belgian Cav., 247.
2nd German, 90.
26th German, 25.
20th Landwehr (German), 151.
31st Landwehr (German), 242.
1st Bavarian Res., 274.

Divisional Artillery,
11th, 106.
36th, 7, 8, 10, 19, 26, 29, 35, 39, 46, 60, 62, 64, 69, 74, 76, 80,
103, 106-108, 113, 115, 125, 130, 167, 176, 181, 182, 244,
245, 249, 257, 260, 271, 290, 294, 299.
61st, 115.

Divisional Amm. Column, 36th, 8, 10, 39, 102, 244.
Canteen, 136, 295.
Head Q., 36th, 22, 24, 29, 51, 80, 86, 100, 104, 106, 112, 135, 137,
138, 155, 182, 206, 212, 232, 233, 246, 248, 249, 252, 260,
263, 292, 297.
Supply Column, 36th, 33, 102, 212.
Train, 36th, 11, 50, 112, 212, 259, 279.

Doignies, 155, 157, 166, 168.

Domart-en-Ponthieu, 24, 27.

Donegal, Co., 7.

Dorsetshire Regt., 1st, 39.

Douchy, 183.

Doullens-Arras Road, 177.

Douve, River, 65-67, 77, 253, 257.

Down, Co., 7.

Dranoutre, 78, 80, 89, 90, 253.

Drei Masten, 278.

Dries, 281-283, 285, 286.

Drocourt-Quéant Switch, 145, 146.

Drummond, Capt. C., 213.

Dunkirk, 109, 295, 296.

Dunleath, Lord, 297.

Dury, 182, 204.

Earl Farm, 93.

East Ham, 8.

Eaucourt, 205, 206, 208, 211, 213.

Eecke, 260.

Eley Arty. Group (March 1918), 206, 218, 221.

Ellis, Maj.-Gen., 145.

Elverdinghe, 113.

Emerson, Lieut. J. S., 173, 174.

Enfer Farm, 88.
Wood, 93, 97, 99.

Englebelmer-Martinsart Road, 51.

Enniskillen, 15.

Entrenching Batts.,
21st, 184, 205, 209, 222.
22nd, 184.
23rd, 184, 209.

Eperlecques, 64.

Epine de Dallon Redoubt, 198.

Erches, 219, 222-226.

Erskine Arty. Group (March 1918), 206, 217, 218.

Ervin, Pte., 74.

Escaut, River, 278, 286, 287, 289, 290, 295.
Canal de l', 145, 146, 160, 179.

Esmery-Hallon, 212.

Esquelbecq, 64.

Essertaux, 228.

Essex Regt., 2nd, 35.

Essigny, 189, 191, 199.

Estaires, 105, 234.

Estouilly, 202.

Etricourt, 127.

Falkiner, Lieut. F. E. R., 95, 96.

Farnham. Lieut.-Col. Lord, 201.

Fay Farm, 200.

Fayolle, Gen., 43.

Fémy Wood, 131.

Fermanagh, Co., 7.

Field Ambulance,
108th, 7, 11, 19, 48, 89.
109th, 7, 11, 89.
110th, 7, 11, 25, 48, 89.

Field Company,
121st, 7, 10, 26, 62, 88, 97, 167, 203, 222, 224, 241, 273, 281,
282, 285, 294.

Field Company,
122nd, 7, 10, 26, 37, 48, 62, 88, 99, 222, 241, 273, 277, 278, 294.
150th, 10, 48, 62, 88, 97, 100, 108, 203, 241, 273, 282, 283, 285,
294.

Finner, 7, 11.

Fisher, Admiral Lord, 292.

Fitzgerald, Col., 18.

Flanders, 30, 40, 63, 77, 121, 133, 134, 137, 143, 186, 250, 259, 291.

Flavy-le-Martel, 210, 211.
-le-Meldeux, 212.

Flesquières, 150, 152, 153, 155, 156, 179.

Flesselles, 32.

Flêtre, 79.

Fluquières, 204.

Foch, Marshal, 144 (foot-note), 292, 293.

Fontainehouck, 248.

Fontaine-les-Clercs, 186, 200, 201, 203.
-Notre-Dame, 156, 158, 163 164.

Forceville, 48, 61.

Fort Hill, 118.

Fosseux, 167.

Foucard Trench, 196.

Fox, Lieut. J. J., 258.

French Arty, (with 36th Div. July 1st, 1916), 42, 47, 56.
Regt., 133rd, 286.

Fréniches, 206, 212, 218.

Frétoy-le-Château, 218.

Frévent, 63.

Frezenberg, 123, 263.

Furnell, Lieut.-Col. M., 223.

Gabion Farm, 257.

Gaffiken, Major G. H., 59.

Gallagher, Lieut, (later Capt.) H., 60, 101.

Gallipoli Copse, 114, 116.

Gamaches, 229, 232.

Gapaard, 104, 234.

Gauchy, 195.

Gaverbeek, 286.

Gavin, Capt. N. J., 120.

Geddes, Sir E., 77.

George the Fifth, H.M. King, 19, 21, 249.

Gheluvelt, 263.

Gheluwe, 266.

Ghent, 109, 296.

G.H.Q., 137, 138, 171, 187.

Gilmour, Rfm. J., 224, 225.

Givenchy, 234.

Godson, Lieut., 72.

Golancourt, 210, 211, 213, 214, 216.

Goldfish Château, 111.

Goldflake Farm, 272.

Gomiecourt, 167, 170.

Gonnelieu, 146, 169, 170.

Goodwin, Lieut.-Col. W. R., 159.

Gooseberry Farm, 255, 256.

Gough, Gen. Sir H., 108, 110, 187.

Gough, Brig.-Gen. J., 3.

Gouzeaucourt, 169.

Graincourt, 126, 153, 155, 157, 162, 171.

Grand Bois, 104.

Grandcourt, 57.
-Thiepval Road, 45.
-St. Pierre Divion Road, 46.

Grand Ravin, 127, 128, 154.
Séraucourt, 189, 190, 203.

Grant Suttie, Major H. F., 258.

Gravenstafel Road, 115.

Green, Maj. (later Lieut.-Col.) S. H., 107, 136.

Green House, 115.

Greig, Col. F. J., 7, 18, 19.

Grévillers, 35.

Griffith, Brig.-Gen. C. R., 39, 46, 57, 100, 200, 222, 223, 234, 244,
245.

Grugies, 188.
Valley, 188, 192, 195.

Guerbigny, 219, 221, 223, 224.

Gulleghem, 272, 273, 275, 276.

Guiscard, 209, 214, 217, 219.

Guise, 191, 292.

Guy Farm, 97.

Haagedoorne, 79, 249, 253.

Hacket Pain, Brig.-Gen. G., 10, 39.

Haig. F. M. Sir D., 3, 37, 143, 182, 183, 228, 240, 296.

Haigh, Lieut. J. W., 175.

Halahan, Rev. F. J., 119.

Ham, 183, 206, 209, 210.

Hamel, 29-31, 36, 48, 61.

Hangest-en-Santerre, 227.

Happencourt, 202, 204, 208.

Harington, Maj.-Gen. C. H., 122.

Harman, Maj.-Gen. A. E., 216.

Harponville, 41.

Havre, 21, 26.

Havrincourt, 126-129, 142, 145, 150, 154, 155, 259.
Wood, 127, 129, 131, 133, 139, 140-142, 147, 149, 170, 176.

Hawkes, Brig.-Gen. C. St. L., 258.

Hazebrouck, 63, 92, 234.

Heavy Arty., IV. Corps, 141, 165, 168.

Hédauville, 48.

Heirweg, 287, 288.

Hell Farm, 235.

Hermies, 126, 127, 129, 130, 134, 137, 140, 150, 155, 157, 162, 166.

Hessey, Brig.-Gen. W. F., 178, 213, 224, 245.

Heule, 272, 273, 276-278.

Heulebeek, 273, 275, 276.

Hickman, Brig.-Gen. T. E., 3-5, 9, 10, 39.

Highland Ridge, 171, 175.

Hill 35, 117.

Hill 41, 265-268, 272, 273.

Hill 63, 77, 235, 254, 255, 258.

Hill 90, 152.

Hill 94, 97.

Hindenburg, Marshal von, 292.

Hindenburg Line, 109, 126, 127, 129, 131, 145, 146, 149, 151, 153,
157-160, 163-165, 171-174, 178, 250, 259.

Hindu Cott, 115, 116.

Hobart Street, 159, 163.

Hoegenacker Ridge, 250, 251.

Holywood, 15.

Hospital Farm, 239.

Houtquerque, 260.

Hunter, Gen. Sir A., 21.

Hutier, Gen. O. von, 191.

Hutsbosch, 288.

Hutteghem, 287.

Hyde Park Corner, 78, 258.

Inchy-en-Artois, 147, 165.

Ingoyghem, 288.

Inniskilling Dragoons,
Service Squadron, 7, 11.

Inniskilling Fusiliers,
1st, 184, 200, 202, 204, 205, 220, 253, 264, 268, 274, 283, 285, 288.
2nd, 184, 201, 220, 253, 264, 274, 288.
5th, 5.
6th, 5.
9th, 5, 10, 17, 38, 45, 48, 49, 52, 57, 78, 85, 94, 95, 152, 156,
174, 175, 202, 204, 206, 210, 213, 214, 217, 264, 265, 276,
282, 283.
10th, 10, 15, 36, 37, 39, 45, 52, 75, 85, 94, 95, 118, 151, 152,
154, 156, 184.
11th, 11, 15, 42, 45, 53, 56, 74-76, 85, 93, 112, 118, 152, 154, 174,
178, 184.
12th, 11.

Irish Fusiliers,
1st, 27, 125, 131, 133, 142, 165, 184, 200, 235-237, 250, 254-256,
266-268, 286, 287.
9th, 10, 15, 46, 48, 53, 59, 72, 90, 112, 117, 132, 134, 157, 159,
160, 164, 177, 200, 212, 219, 235-237, 250, 255, 266, 272, 289.
10th, 11.

Irish Rifles,
1st, 184, 198, 200, 206, 208, 210, 211, 214, 216, 226, 267, 274, 276,
284-287, 296.
2nd, 134, 165, 175, 184, 198, 210, 211, 215, 220, 226, 249, 257, 267,
277, 286, 287, 296.
7th, 134.
8th, 10, 27, 28, 46, 56, 57, 60, 85, 134.
9th, 10, 29, 46, 56, 59, 74, 85, 93, 134.
8/9th, 134, 164, 184.
10th, 10, 46, 55, 75, 85, 94, 112, 131, 157, 158, 183, 184.
11th, 10, 25, 46, 48, 50, 57, 75, 85, 98, 131.
12th, 10, 41, 46, 53, 85, 98, 118, 128, 131, 157, 159, 160, 164, 195,
197, 235-237, 240, 254, 255, 266, 267, 277, 286, 287, 296.
13th, 10, 46, 49, 50, 54, 56, 90, 112, 117.
11/13th, 134, 184.
14th, 11, 25, 45, 53, 85, 92-94, 112, 115, 117, 142, 151, 156, 172.
15th, 10, 27, 42, 46, 51, 54, 56, 85, 94, 95, 112, 132, 157, 158,
164, 165, 195, 201, 220, 250, 258, 274, 284, 285, 296.
16th (Pioneers), 11, 23, 26, 37, 42, 56, 59, 62, 76, 78, 98, 106-108,
115, 125, 130, 134, 142, 154, 167, 171, 185, 199, 205, 212,
222, 245, 273, 294, 295, 299.
17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th, 11.

Irles, 35.

Itancourt, 183, 191.

Jacob, Lieut.-Gen. C. W., 260, 278, 291, 292.

Jacob's Ladder, 30.

Jeanne d'Arc Redoubt, 190, 196, 201.

Jew's Hill, 116.

Johnston, Capt. R., 49.

Johnston, Capt. L. J., 195-197.

Jones, Lieut.-Col. B. Y., 285.

Juliet Farm, 242, 244.

Jump Point, 88, 94, 97.

Jussy, 205, 207, 210.

Kangaroo Alley, 154.

Kelly, Lieut.-Col. P. E., 236, 239.

Kemmel, 78, 234, 238.
-Wytschaete Road, 65, 80, 104.
Hill, 81, 84, 86, 90, 92, 100, 103, 105, 237, 239, 242, 243, 246,
253.

Kennedy, Sir R., 297.

Kezelberg, 265, 266.

Kidd, Rfm., 74.

King, Lieut.-Col. W. A. de C., 81.

King Edward's Horse, 153, 154.

King's Liverpool Regt., 12th, 204, 214.

Kingsway, 237.

Kipling, Mr. R., 3.

Kitchener, Lord, 3, 4, 6, 18, 19, 21.

Kleineberg, 288, 289.

Klephoek, 266, 267, 272.

Knock, 286.

Knott, Lieut.-Col. J. E., 258.

Knox, Lieut. C. L., 203, 249.

Knox, Maj. (later Lieut.-Col.) R. S., 213.

Kortepyp, 64, 254.

K.O.Y.L.I., 4th, 58.
5th, 58.

K.R.R.C., 7th, 210.

Kruisstraat Cabaret, 74, 88, 257.

La Clytte, 234, 238.

L'Alouette, 255.

Lancashire Dump, 50.

Lancashire Fusiliers, 2nd, 25.

La Neuville-en-Beine, 214.

Langemarck, battle of, 111 _et seq._; 125, 299.

La Vacquerie, 169.

Lavesne, 202.

Leader, Lieut.-Col., 56.

Léalvillers, 41.

Lechelle, 142, 170.

L'Echelle St. Aurin, 221.

Ledeghem, 267, 268.

Ledlie, Lieut. J. C., 117.

Left Arty. Group (at St. Quentin), 194, 200.

Le Hamel, 189, 202, 203, 208.

Lejeune Trench, 196.

Lendelede, 280.

Le Pontchu Quarry, 196, 197.

Le Sars, 126.

Leveson-Gower, Brig.-Gen. P., 297.

Lewes, 8, 20.

Libermont, 221.

Liberty Hall, 11.

Lignières, 226.

Lille, 272, 278.

Lindenhoek, 83, 88, 99, 253.

Little Wood, 128, 135.

Lizerolles, 200.

Low, Major A., 212.

Lock 4 (on Canal du Nord), 157, 163.

Lock 5, 156, 158, 163, 164.

Lock 6, 152, 155, 156.

Locker-Lampson, Commander O., 5.

Locre, 90, 246.

Lombartzyde, 109.

London Territorial Arty., 1st/1st, 21, 26, 29.

Londonderry, Co., 7.

Loos, battle of, 24, 43.

Lucheux, 171, 181.

Ludendorff, Gen., 43, 109, 143, 187, 230, 243, 292.

Lumbres, 79.

Lumm Farm, 85, 88, 96, 97.

Lurgan, 7.
Switch, 134.

Lys, River, 234, 270, 272, 276, 277, 278, 280, 284-286, 291.
battle of, 234 _et seq._; 242, 248.

McCalmont, Gen. Sir H., 17.

McCarthy-O'Leary, Lieut.-Col. H., 222, 226.

Machine-Gun Battalion,
36th, 185, 199, 206, 212, 224, 234, 265, 273, 299.
104th, 273.

Machine-Gun Company,
32nd, 87.
33rd, 87.
107th, 58, 158.
108th, 26, 87, 97.
109th, 26, 39, 173.
266th, 185.

Mackenzie, Capt. C. A., 300.

MacKenzie, Lieut.-Col. R. H., 258.

Macnaghten, Sir H., Bt., 60.

Macrory, Lieut.-Col. F. S. N., 52, 119.

Maedelstede Farm, 79.

Mailly-Maillet, 27, 35.
--Serre Road, 27-29.

Malone Park, 17.

Malmaison, battle of, 82.

Manancourt, 136.

Mangin, Gen., 109 (foot-note), 229.

Manhattan Farm, 268.

Mansard Farm, 272.

Manufacture Farm, 199.

Marcoing, 153, 171, 172, 175.

Marne, battle of the, 15.

Martinsart, 35, 41, 48, 50, 59, 117.
-Albert Road, 48.
Wood, 49.

Mary Redan, 44.

Masnières, 145, 146, 160, 169, 179.

Maurois, M. André, 139.

Maxwell, Brig.-Gen. F. A., 130.

Maxwell, Major (later Lieut.-Col.) R. P., 50, 117, 119.

Menin, 265.
Road (from Ypres), 130, 263, 269, 279.
-Roulers Road, 265-268.
-Routers Railway, 267, 268, 274.

Merris, 104, 106, 250.

Merry Mauves, 137.

Mersey Camp, 112.

Mesnil, 30, 31, 35, 42.
Ridge, 35, 38, 44, 58, 125.

Messines, 66, 67, 71, 86, 98, 100.
battle of, 72, 82, _et seq._; 107, 109, 110, 115, 120-122, 125, 151,
155, 236, 298-300.
-Wytschaete Ridge, 67, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 99, 101, 234, 236, 259.
-Wytschaete Road, 84, 95, 235.

Meteren, 243, 248-250.

Metz-en-Couture, 140, 169, 176.

Mill Cott, 262.

Miller, Capt, P. K., 95, 220, 224, 226, 227.

Miller, Major, 158.

Miraumont, 125.

Mobile Veterinary Section,
48th, 11.

Mœuvres, 127, 145, 147, 154, 157, 159, 160, 163, 164, 179, 267.

Monaghan, Co., 7.

Monmouthshire Regt., 2nd, 27.

Montalimont Farm, 214.

Mont des Cats, 243, 246.

Montdidier, 221, 228.

Mont d'Origny, 191.

Montesquieu, 300.

Mont Kokereele, 243, 253.

Mont Noir, 64, 65, 103, 243, 253.

Mont Rouge, 239, 243, 246.

Mont Vidaigne, 239, 243.

Moore, Lieut. M. E. Y., 215.

Moorseele, 272-274, 276.

Moreuil, 181.

Mouquet Switch, 56.

Mouscron, 292, 294, 296.

Mulholland, Major P. O., 173, 174.

Munster Fusiliers, 95.

Murray, Gen. Sir A., 14, 18, 19.

Napoleon, 144, 293.

Nesle, 182, 221.

Neuve Chapelle, battle of, 15.

Neuve Eglise, 236, 237, 251-256.
-Lindenhoek Road, 90.
-Warneton Road, 65.

Neuville, 135, 141.
St. Amand, 188.

Newry, 7, 19.

Newtownards, 7, 11.

Nieppe, 254.
Forest of, 240.

Nivelle, Gen., 109, 143.

Norbury, 8.

North Irish Horse, 132, 134.

Noyelles, 153-155, 171.

Noyon, 229.

Nugent, Maj.-Gen. O. S. W., 20, 21, 28, 37, 43, 55, 58, 63, 81, 92, 97,
104, 111, 112, 118, 119, 122, 123, 128, 130, 148, 171, 177,
180, 182, 198-200, 202, 204, 205, 213, 219, 222, 228, 229, 244,
245, 297.

Offoy, 209.

Oise, River, 188, 230.

Oisy-le-Verger, 145, 161.

Oliphant, Major (later Lieut.-Col.) P. B., 57, 233 (foot-note).

Ollézy, 182, 183, 202, 204, 206, 210, 211.

Omagh, 5, 6.

Oosttaverne, 84, 98, 99.

Ooteghem, 288.

Ordnance, 36th Div., 102, 300.

Orival Wood, 155, 156.

Ostend, 109.

Ouderdom, 78.

Outtersteene, 106.

Ovillers, 62.

Oxelaere, 249.

Oyghem, 281, 282.

Paris, 243, 295.

Passchendaele, 109, 143, 144, 238, 240, 261.

Patton, Capt. E., 227.

Peacocke, Major (later Lieut.-Col.) J., 38, 57, 200.

Peckham Farm, 84, 88, 90, 94.

Peronne, 127, 188.

Pétain, Gen., 143.

Petite Douve Farm, 67, 75.

Piccadilly Trench, 65.

Picardy, 43.

Pick House, 88, 94, 235.

Pilkem, 110.

Pithon, 205, 206, 208.

Place, Lieut.-Col. C. O., 55, 88, 223, 233.

Plémont Hill, 229.

Ploegsteert, 78, 235, 259.
-Messines Road, 67.

Plug Street Wood, 64, 78, 254.

Plumer, Gen. Sir H., 67, 82, 122, 242.

Plus Douve Farm, 77, 253.

Poelcappelle, 143, 233, 238, 240, 242.

Poix, 229.

Polygon Wood, 271.

Pommern Castle, 111.
Redoubt, 111.

Pond Farm, 115, 117, 118.

Pont Remy, 25.

Poperinghe, 108, 111, 245, 260, 271.
-Ypres Road, 108.

Potijze, 263, 269.

Potter Arty. Group (March 1918), 206, 217, 218, 221.

Powell, Maj.-Gen. Sir C. H., 9, 13, 18, 20.

Pratt, Lieut.-Col. A. C., 119.

Proven, 245, 246.

Puchevillers, 181.

Pys, 35.

"Q" of 36th Division, 136.

Quarry Redoubt, 200.
Wood, 163.

Queen Lane, 126.

Quesmy, 217, 218.

Quigg, Pte. R., 60.

Rabone, Capt. E. L., 217.

Racecourse Redoubt, 190, 195, 201.

Railway Wood, 130.

R.A.M.C. of 36th Div., 7, 11, 14, 19, 61, 119, 299.

Randalstown, 15.

R.A.S.C. of 36th Div., 7, 300.

Ravelsberg, 252, 253.

Rawlinson, Gen. Sir H., 43.

Recques, 64.

Redan, the, 28, 29.

Red Lodge, 64.

Redmond, Major W., 101.

R.E. Farm, 69, 70.

Rheims, 243.

Rhine, River, 294, 296, 297.

Ribécourt, 126, 128, 140, 150, 154.

Ricardo, Capt. (later Lieut.-Col. and Brig.-Gen.) A., 5, 38, 52, 94,
121, 130, 135, 142, 147-149, 178, 245.

Ricardo Redoubt, 204, 205.

Richthofen, Lieut, von (German airman), 105.

Rifle Brigade, 1st, 27.

Right Arty. Group (at St. Quentin), 193.

Robécourt, Canal de, 218.

Roberts, Earl, 2, 4.

Rocourt, 183.

Rocquigny, 167, 170.

Rolleghem-Cappelle, 274.

Rose, Major R., 215.

Rose Wood, 104.

Rossignol-Messines Road, 73.

Roubaix, 272.

Roulers, 109, 265.
-Lys Canal, 281.

Round Trench, 163, 164.

Rouy, 218.

Roye, 220-222.

Roozebeek, 104.

Rubempré, 62.

Ruyalcourt, 127, 141.

Sains-lez-Marquion, 157.

St. Jans Cappel, 65, 100, 248, 252, 259.

St. Jean, 234.

St. Julien, 110, 111.

St. Omer, 63, 64, 107.

St. Pierre Divion, 46, 56.

St. Quentin, 182, 183, 191, 192, 197.
-La Fère Road, 188, 195, 196.
Canal, 189, 194, 202, 204, 205, 207, 210, 211, 230, 231.

St. Simon, 188, 202, 203, 207.

Saleux, 229.

Sanders, Cpl., 59.

Sanderson, Lieut., 56.

Sanitary Section, 76th, 11.

Scheldt, River, see Escaut.

Scherpenberg, 83, 239, 243, 246.

Schuler Farm, 114-116.

Schwaben Redoubt, 44, 45, 56-58.

Scotch Street, 168.

Scott Farm, 93, 94.

Seaford, 17, 19, 22.

Sensée, River, 127, 145, 146, 160, 179.

Sermaize, 217.

Serre, 35.

Sharman Crawford, Col. R. G., 11.

Sharp, Major R. R., 274.

Shuter, Brig.-Gen. R., 39, 45.

Siege Camp, 239.

Signal Company, 36th Divisional, 7, 11, 84, 107, 138, 155, 178, 299.

Simpson, Lieut.-Col. H. C., 147, 149, 168, 218.

Skip Point, 88, 93.

Smyth, Capt. (later Major) W., 213, 241.

Somerville, Lieut.-Col., 117, 119.

Somerset L.I., 7th, 204, 210, 211.

Somme, Dept. of the, 22, 25, 26, 66.
River, 25, 26, 68, 71, 182, 186-188, 206, 270, 298.
Canal de la, 127, 188, 204, 205, 207, 208, 210, 217, 230, 231.
battle of the, 14, 41 _et seq._; 72, 75, 89, 90, 110.
Farm, 115-117.

Sommette-Eaucourt, 204, 205, 210, 211.

Sorel-le-Grand, 71.

Sourdon, 227, 228.

South Midland Farm, 254.

Spanbroek (or Spanbroekmolen), 68, 75, 79, 84, 87, 88, 90, 92, 99, 235.

Spender, Capt. W. B., 9.

Speyside, 54.

Sphinx Wood, 183, 189, 195.

Spitael, 286, 287.

Spree Farm, 115.

Spriete, 283.

Square Copse, 154.

Staenyzer Cabaret, 85, 97.

Stapylton-Smith, Lieut. J. B., 203.

Station Redoubt, 200.

Steenbecque, 63.

Steenebeek, Stream (on Messines Ridge), 67, 86, 93, 94, 99.

Steenebeek, Stream (at St. Julien), 240-242.

Steenwerck, 254.

Stinking Farm, 256.

Straete, 283.

Strazeele, 106.

Strohm, Lieut. E. C., 215.

Sunken Road, see Thiepval-Hamel Road.

Sydenham, 8.

Tadpole Copse, 159.

Tank Corps, 163.

Tardenois, battle of, 250.

Ten Elms Camp, 233.

Terdeghem, 246, 249.

Terguier, 188.

Terhand, 264, 265, 269.

Thiennes, 63.

Thiepval, 36, 51, 53-58, 62, 89.
Wood, 35, 36, 38, 39, 44-46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 57, 59, 61.
-Hamel Road, 38, 49, 51.

Thompson, Capt. T. Y., 215.

Thompson, Lieut.-Col. A. G., 233.

Thorpe, Brig.-Gen. E., 245, 258.

Tilques, 64.

Torreken Farm, 88.

Tourcoing, 272, 292, 294.

Trench Mortar Batteries of 36th Division,
Heavy, 47, 69.
Medium, 47, 50, 70, 272, 290.
Light (Stokes), 47, 48, 52, 70, 87, 175.
107th Light, 24, 222, 290.
108th Light, 265, 290.
109th Light, 290.

Trescault, 129, 131, 139, 140, 146, 169.

Tudor, Maj.-Gen. H. H., 145.

Tugny, 202-204.

Tunnelling Company,
171st, 68, 88.
Australian, 77.

Twigg Farm, 267, 268, 272.

Tyrone, Co., 7.
Regt. U.V.F., 5, 6.

Ugny-le-Gay, 214.

Ulster Camp, 80, 104.
Volunteer Force, 2-6, 8, 12, 14, 21, 185.

Urvillers, 188, 189, 199.

Vallulart Wood, 141.

Varennes, 41.

Vaughan, Brig.-Gen. E., 245, 277.

Vaughan, Lieut. C. H., 172.

Vaux, 202.

Vélu Wood, 142.

Verdun, battle of, 35, 47, 167.

Verlaines, 209.

Vichte, 286, 287.

Vigers, Major T. W., 155.

Vijfwegen, 265, 273.

Villers-Bretonneux, 243.

Villers-Guislain, 169.

Villers-Plouich, 170-172.

Villers-Tournelle, 228.

Villeselve, 211, 214-217.

Vimy Ridge, 82, 149.

Vivian, Lieut.-Col. Hon. O., 209.

Vlamertinghe, 112, 113, 131, 260, 263.

Vogeltje Château, 260.

Voormezeele, 243, 259.

Vossenhoek, 287.

Voyennes, 188, 207.

Waereghem, 285, 287.

Wales, H.R.H. the Prince of, 296.

Walker, Capt, D., 173, 174, 224, 226, 227, 236, 256, 269.

Warsy, 219.

Watkins Williams, Major, 216.

Watou, 108.

Watson, Lieut. R. B. Marriott, 215.

Welsh Ridge, 169, 171, 172, 175, 176, 178.

Westhoek Ridge, 131.

Westhof Farm, 253.

Westoutre, 230.

Westroosabeke, 144.

West Yorks Regt., 1st/6th, 56.

Wevelghem, 276.

White Gates, 253, 255.

Wieltje, 111, 112, 119, 234, 240.

Wigan Copse, 131.

William Redan, 42.

Wilson, Gen. Sir H., 186.

Winnizeele, 119, 125.

Winter Trench, 258.

Wizernes, 107, 108.

Woods, Major P., 59.

Wormhoudt, 260.

Wright, Capt., 50.

Wulverghem, 66, 235-237, 253, 254, 257.
-Messines Road, 65, 76, 235, 236, 254, 257.
-Wytschaete Road, 69, 74, 79, 84.

Wytschaete, 85, 86, 88, 95, 98, 108, 235, 238.

York and Lancs Regt., 4th, 58.

Yorkshire Bank, 128, 129, 131, 132, 154.

York Town, surrender of, 230.

Young, Lieut. R., 224.

Ypres, 35, 67, 130, 176, 232-234, 242, 245, 248, 259, 261, 263, 268,
271, 295.
Canal, 103-105, 241, 242.
-Menin Road, see Menin Road.
-Zonnebeke Road, 110, 262, 269.
Salient, 78, 105, 106, 108, 110, 119, 125, 126, 130, 232, 240, 269.
first battle of, 15, 66.
second battle of, 15.
third battle of, 108, 262.

Yser Canal, 109.

Ytres, 128, 135, 136, 141, 155, 167.

Zeebrugge, 109.

Zonnebeke, 263.

Zuidhoek Copse, 266.

PRINTED BY
M'CAW, STEVENSON & ORR, LTD.
THE LINENHALL PRESS
BELFAST

TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE

Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.

A superscript is denoted by ^{x}; for example, 36^{th}.
The original text has a dot under the 'th', which has been removed
in the etext.

The format of time in the original text (with a hyphen) has been
retained. For example, 11-45 a.m.

Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
the text and consultation of external sources.

Footnote [14] is referenced twice from pg 15.

Except for those changes noted below, misspelling in the text, and
inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. For example,
battle-field, battlefield; break-through, break through; field-gun,
field gun.

Pg 26. 'sucking pig' replaced by 'suckling pig'.
Pg 35. 'couples of mile' replaced by 'couple of miles'.
Pg 75. 'Jasus, what what' replaced by 'Jasus, what'.
Pg 82. 'the the first place' replaced by 'the first place'.
Pg 95. 'droping' replaced by 'dropping'.
Pg 180. 'in being, handled' replaced by 'being handled'.
Pg 206. 'bur there' replaced by 'but there'.
Pg 246. 'emergiences' replaced by 'emergencies'.
Pg 290. 'cane a wire' replaced by 'came a wire'.
Appendix II.
Pg 321. Missing unit name 'R.F.A.' added to 'Huskisson' entry.
Pg 329. Missing unit name 'R. Innis. Fus.' added to 'Dickson, Sgt. J.' entry.
Pg 331. 'Humpherys' replaced by 'Humphreys'.
Pg 332. 'M'Alpine' replaced by 'McAlpine'.
Pg 341. Missing unit name 'Genl. List.' added to 'Rogers, Maj. V. B.' entry.
Index.
Armies, Fifth: duplicate '202' removed.

*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The History of the 36th (Ulster) Division" ***

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