The War History of the 4th Battalion The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) 1914-1919

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Title: The War History of the 4th Battalion The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) 1914-1919
Author: Grimwade, F. Clive
Language: English
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THE WAR HISTORY
OF THE 4TH BATTALION
THE LONDON REGIMENT
(ROYAL FUSILIERS)
1914-1919

[Illustration: _Frontispiece_

_Ypres Cathedral_]

THE WAR HISTORY
OF THE 4TH BATTALION
THE LONDON REGIMENT
(ROYAL FUSILIERS)
1914-1919

BY
CAPTAIN F. CLIVE GRIMWADE
4TH BATTALION, THE LONDON REGIMENT (ROYAL FUSILIERS)

LONDON
HEADQUARTERS OF THE 4TH LONDON REGIMENT
112 SHAFTESBURY STREET, N.1
1922

* * * * *

_Printed in Great Britain
by Turnbull & Spears, Edinburgh_

* * * * *

THIS HISTORY IS DEDICATED
TO THE MEMORY OF
COLONEL E. T. RODNEY WILDE, V.D.,
WHO COMMANDED THE BATTALION
FROM 23RD NOVEMBER 1890 TO 24TH JANUARY 1903
AND COMPILED ITS HISTORICAL RECORDS
FROM 1643 TO 1908

FOREWORD

It was considered by the past and present members of the 4th Battalion,
The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers), that some permanent record of
the part taken by the Regiment in the European War should be compiled,
and a War History Committee was formed in February 1920 to consider the
preparation of such a record.

At the unanimous request of the Committee Captain F. Clive Grimwade
undertook to write the Regiment's War History.

The Committee desire to express their keen appreciation of the manner
in which he has overcome the difficulties of compiling such a History
and of his devotion in carrying out this long and arduous work.

The Committee wish to express their thanks also to Lieut.-Col.
Marchment, to Captains Boutall, Garratt, Croll and Hetley, and to
other officers who have given Captain Grimwade valuable assistance;
to the author's mother, Mrs Grimwade, for her assistance in arranging
information as to officers' personal services and in correcting the
drafts of the book; and to the Regiment's Honorary Colonel, Lord
Marshall, for facilitating the publication of the book.

THE WAR HISTORY COMMITTEE,
4TH BATTALION, THE LONDON
REGIMENT (ROYAL FUSILIERS).

LESLIE T. BURNETT, LIEUT.-COL. (_Chairman_).
G. H. M. VINE, MAJOR (_retired_).
H. J. DUNCAN-TEAPE, MAJOR.
S. J. ELLIOTT, MAJOR.

_February 1922_

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

I. MOBILISATION--DEPARTURE OVERSEAS 1

II. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN MALTA--FORMATION
OF THE 2/4TH BATTALION 8

III. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN FRANCE--OPERATIONS
AT NEUVE CHAPELLE 18

IV. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE SECOND BATTLE
OF YPRES, 1915 40

V. OPERATIONS DURING THE SUMMER OF 1915 58

VI. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE 47TH DIVISION 73

VII. THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN MALTA, GALLIPOLI
PENINSULA AND SOUTHERN EGYPT 86

VIII. THE 3/4TH AND 4/4TH BATTALIONS AT HOME 115

IX. THE FORMATION OF THE 56TH DIVISION 132

X. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF
THE SOMME, 1916--I. THE ATTACK ON
GOMMECOURT 139

XI. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF
THE SOMME, 1916--II. THE BATTLES OF
SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 177

XII. THE 1/4TH BATTALION DURING THE WINTER
1916/17 217

XIII. THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN FRANCE--GERMAN
RETIREMENT FROM THE SOMME 236

XIV. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF
ARRAS, 1917 251

XV. THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES FOR
BULLECOURT, 1917 273

XVI. THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, 1917--I. THE
1/4 BATTALION ON THE MENIN ROAD. 294

XVII. THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, 1917--II. THE
2/4 BATTALION ON THE NORTHERN RIDGES 306

XVIII. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLE OF
CAMBRAI, 1917 325

XIX. THE 1/4TH BATTALION, WINTER 1917/18--THE
RESERVE BATTALION 1916/17 345

XX. THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN THE SECOND BATTLE
OF THE SOMME, 1918 359

XXI. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE DEFENCE OF
ARRAS, 1918 392

XXII. THE 1/4TH AND 2/4TH BATTALIONS DURING THE
SUMMER MONTHS OF 1918--THE RESERVE
BATTALION, 1918 409

XXIII. THE FINAL ADVANCE--I. THE 2/4TH BATTALION
IN THE BATTLES OF AMIENS AND BAPAUME,
1918 428

XXIV. THE FINAL ADVANCE--II. THE 1/4TH BATTALION
IN THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME, 1918 460

XXV. THE FINAL ADVANCE--III. THE 1/4TH
BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF CAMBRAI
AND THE SAMBRE, 1918 478

LIST OF APPENDICES

I. MALTA 508

II. HONOURS AND DECORATIONS 510

III. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE 4TH LONDON
REGIMENT IN 1920 518

INDEX 521

ILLUSTRATIONS

YPRES CATHEDRAL _Frontispiece_

TO FACE PAGE

GHAIN TUFFIEHA CAMP--MELLEHA CAMP--SELMUN
PALACE 8

MELLEHA--THE GRAND HARBOUR, VALETTA 16

ST JEAN VILLAGE IN APRIL 1920 56

ROUGE CROIX, LA BASSÉE ROAD--THE DOLL'S HOUSE
(FEROZEPORE BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS), LA BASSÉE
ROAD 64

SIGNPOST LANE, NEUVE CHAPELLE--RUINED FARMHOUSE,
NEUVE CHAPELLE 232

INVERNESS COPSE 304

PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE 320

ARRAS CATHEDRAL 416

SKETCH MAPS

BY CAPTAIN F. CLIVE GRIMWADE

NO.

1. NEUVE CHAPELLE--RICHEBOURG L'AVOUÉ 32

2. THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES, 1915 48

3. GALLIPOLI PENINSULA--CAPE HELLES TRENCHES,
1915 96

4. THE ATTACK ON GOMMECOURT, 1ST JULY 1916 144

5. THE BATTLE OF GINCHY, SEPTEMBER 1916 192

6. THE BATTLE OF MORVAL, SEPTEMBER 1916 204

7. THE BATTLE OF THE LE TRANSLOY RIDGES, OCTOBER
1916 208

8. LAVENTIE, WINTER 1916/17 224

9. THE GERMAN RETIREMENT, FEBRUARY-MARCH 1917 240

10. CAVALRY FARM, MAY 1917 266

11. BULLECOURT, MAY-JUNE, 1917 288

12. THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, 1917 (1/4TH
BATTALION) 296

13. THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, 1917 (2/4TH
BATTALION) 312

14. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1917 336

15. THE RETREAT FROM LA FÈRE, MARCH 1918 368

16. THE DEFENCE OF ARRAS, MARCH 1918 400

17. THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, 1918 (2/4TH BATTALION)--THE
ACTION AT CHIPILLY RIDGE, 8TH-10TH
AUGUST 432

18. THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME, 1918 (2/4TH BATTALION) 448

19. THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME, 1918 (1/4TH BATTALION) 472

20. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1918--THE CANAL DU
NORD 488

21. THE BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE, 1918 496

CHAPTER I

MOBILISATION--DEPARTURE OVERSEAS

Of the London Volunteer Corps the unit now known as the 4th (City of
London) Battalion, The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) is one of
the most ancient. Called out as a Trained Band in 1643 to share in
repelling a threatened Royalist invasion of the City during the Civil
Wars, it has had a practically unbroken history for nearly three
hundred years. After the regular constitution of the Volunteer Forces
in the middle of last century it achieved some distinction as the 1st
Tower Hamlets Rifle Brigade, and despatched a machine-gun detachment
to the fighting in South Africa in 1900. In 1903 it became affiliated
to The Royal Fusiliers, as the 4th Volunteer Battalion of that
distinguished Regiment. On the reorganisation of the auxiliary forces
in 1908 by Lord Haldane, it acquired its present designation, which we
will abbreviate to the more convenient title by which it became known
in the Great War, namely, The 4th London Regiment.

Prior to the War the training provided for the Territorial Force was
only such as to furnish the nucleus of a Second Line Army. Fourteen
days in camp each summer, an easy musketry course, and a few drills
at headquarters could not develop a soldier fit to meet fully trained
troops. That this was recognised by Lord Haldane is evidenced by the
fact that his scheme provided for a period of six months' training at
home for all Territorial soldiers should war break out, prior to their
despatch on active service.

But they were none the less given a definite rôle in the defence of the
Motherland. Possibly this was not always realised to the full by all
the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Regiment; but it was
unmistakably brought home to them one evening in February 1914 when a
secret meeting of officers was convened at Headquarters in Hoxton for
the explanation of the scheme of mobilisation and of the task which the
Regiment would be called upon to execute should war occur.

At that date the scheme of Mobilisation was already complete. Under it
the 1st London Infantry Brigade, of which the 4th London formed a part,
was entrusted with the supremely important task of guarding the London
and South Western Railway between London and Southampton during the
mobilisation and embarkation of the Expeditionary Force from the latter
port. The section allotted to the 4th Battalion was the main line from
Waterloo Station to Farnborough (inclusive); the Alton branch from its
junction with the main line near Brookwood to Bentley Station; and the
branch from the last-named station to Borden Camp. These dispositions
were worked out in the greatest detail, and arrangements were made
for the efficient guarding of all railway stations, signal boxes,
junctions, tunnels and bridges, and for a system of constant patrolling
of the line.

The Infantry of the Territorial Force not being supplied during peace
time with war scale of transport, ammunition, etc., provision was made
for this necessary equipment to be drawn on mobilisation, and waggons
and horses in civilian employ were "earmarked" beforehand for this
purpose.

The scheme having been explained, arrangements were made to detail all
guards, patrols, and requisitioning parties in readiness.

When the war cloud over South-eastern Europe began to spread in July
1914 and threatened to envelop this country in the storm, the finishing
touches were put to the scheme at a memorable secret meeting at
Headquarters on the evening of Thursday, 31st July 1914. After that
meeting few who attended it had any doubt as to what was about to take
place.

The annual camp in 1914 for the 1st London Division (Major-Gen. W. Fry,
C.B., C.V.O.) had been arranged for Sunday, 2nd August, and on that
date, this country still not having declared its intentions as to the
war, the 4th London Regiment entrained for Wareham, in Dorsetshire,
where the camp was to be held, with a strength of 23 officers and about
650 other ranks under Lieut.-Col. G. P. Botterill.

Camp was reached shortly after noon, but scarcely had the Battalion
marched in when an order was received recalling it to London. By
2.30 p.m. it was once again entrained, quivering with excitement and
well-nourished on the journey to town with the most impossible rumours
of gigantic battles, most of which apocryphal happenings it swallowed
with gusto. At 2 a.m. on the 3rd August the 4th Londons marched into
Headquarters, and after a few hours' rest began to put the wheels
of the carefully assembled machine of mobilisation into motion. All
went without a hitch. Field dressings, identity discs and small books
were issued: separation allowance and next-of-kin rolls prepared. The
"earmarked" horses and vehicles were collected, and with the aid of
these, ammunition drawn from the Hyde Park Magazine.

Blankets, lanterns and other stores sent up the River from Woolwich
were unloaded and conveyed direct to the platform at Waterloo Station,
ready for issue to the Battalion on its arrival there. The machine was
moving steadily. During the day the Regimental Colours were handed over
to the Lord Mayor of London for safe keeping.

Shortly after midnight the 4th London Regiment entrained at Waterloo in
two trains, from which at each stop the allotted platoons detrained: so
that by the time the end of the sector was reached in the early hours
of the 4th August 1914, the railway was already guarded. Eighteen hours
before the declaration of war the Battalion was on its war station: a
good lead from Territorial troops to the rest of the country!

The distribution of the Battalion was as follows:

Battalion Headquarters, Lieut.-Col. G. P. Botterill, Surbiton.

A and B Companies (forming No. 1 Double Company), Headquarters at
Clapham Junction, under Capt. H. J. Duncan-Teape.

C and E Companies (forming No. 2 Double Company), Headquarters at
Woking, under Capt. G. H. M. Vine.

D and F Companies (forming No. 3 Double Company), Headquarters at
North Camp, under Capt. R. J. Jackson.

G and H Companies (forming No. 4 Double Company), Headquarters at
Bentley, under Capt. E. H. Stillwell.

The Transport Section returned to Headquarters at Hoxton to complete
the formation of the Battalion transport on a war footing.

Brigade Headquarters were at Waterloo Station under command of
Brigadier-General the Earl of Lucan. The Brigade Major was Major
R. F. Legge (Leinster Regiment); and the Staff Captain, Captain
Cornelius-Wheeler (3rd London Regiment, Royal Fusiliers).

On the evening of the same day Lord Grey of Falloden (then Sir Edward
Grey), in the House of Commons, made his never-to-be-forgotten
indictment of the duplicity of Germany's action in the pre-war
negotiations and in her violation of Belgian neutrality, and the formal
declaration of war followed.

The order for General Mobilisation, which was applicable to the
Territorial Force equally with the Regular Army, immediately ensued,
and orders to report forthwith were issued to all members of the
Battalion who had not paraded for the summer training two days
previously. It is to the credit of the Battalion that within twelve
hours no member had failed to reply. The N.C.O.'s and men thus
reporting for duty were as quickly as possible despatched from peace
headquarters and reported to their respective companies on the line.

As the N.C.O.'s and men of the Battalion reported for duty they
were subjected to medical examination, and a certain number were
unfortunately unable to pass fit at the high standard required during
the early days of the war, so that the strength of the Battalion on the
6th August was 24 officers and 785 N.C.O.'s and men.

The early days of August on the railway line afforded unmistakable
proof, if such were needed, of the extraordinary power of the London
soldier to adapt himself to circumstances. Men from offices, factories
and docks, suddenly taken from their occupations and their homes,
settled down to patrols and guards, to cooking their food and taking
responsibility, as to the manner born. All were swept forward on the
high flood of a great enthusiasm, and buoyed up amid minor discomforts
with intense pride that their country needed them and had given them
a job of work to carry out. This enthusiasm certainly bid fair at
times to show signs of excess of zeal. But the zeal was tempered with
an immense sense of the dignity of each and every one as a soldier
in the 4th Londons: the days on railway guard thus formed the basis
of the _esprit de corps_ which is essential to military success and
which in pre-war days it had been difficult, by the nature of things,
to develop. Scattered though the Battalion was over some 50 miles of
railway, disciplinary trouble of a serious nature was conspicuous by
its absence.

By the middle of August the greater part of the Expeditionary Force had
been embarked to France, but the Brigade remained at its war station.
During the dark days which ensued, when telegram after telegram told
always of withdrawal before overwhelming forces of the German Army
after the glorious resistance at Mons, the Battalion continued to guard
the railway, and was busily occupied in recruiting to full strength
and in completing its equipment. The strength of the Battalion rose
steadily and rapidly, and by the end of August 941 N.C.O.'s and men
were at duty on the railway line.

The duties on the railway were extremely heavy, and no training was
possible except the rudimentary instructions of the recruits who were
retained at peace headquarters.

On the night of 31st August / 1st September orders were issued to the
Brigade to withdraw from the line and return to peace headquarters.
The move was satisfactorily completed by 12 noon on the 1st September,
the duties of the Brigade on the railway being taken over two days
later by the 3rd London Infantry Brigade. On return to headquarters the
Commanding Officer informed the Battalion that the whole Brigade would
be despatched on overseas garrison duty almost immediately, and called
for volunteers, a call which met with a favourable response from all
ranks.

The two following days were actively occupied with medical inspections,
recruiting to fill the few remaining vacancies, etc.

On the afternoon of the 3rd September the Battalion was paraded
for inspection by Major-Gen. W. Fry, C.B., C.V.O., commanding 1st
London Division, who, in an address to the troops, announced that the
destination of the Brigade was Malta; and conveyed to the Battalion,
to the great satisfaction of all ranks, the direct assurance of Earl
Kitchener that the Battalion would be retained in Malta only until it
should be passed fit to take the field. This announcement was received
with enthusiasm as it served to allay the disquieting rumours of the
possibility of the Malta station proving to be a "sidetrack" for the
period of the war.

Shortly after midnight on the 3/4th September 1914, the Battalion
(strength 29 officers and 976 other ranks, fully armed and equipped)
paraded and marched to Waterloo amid scenes of enthusiasm and
excitement in Hoxton which will probably never be forgotten by those
who witnessed them, and entrained at 3.30 a.m. on the 4th September
for Southampton, embarking on arrival in H.T. _Galician_ (Union Castle
Line).

The following officers proceeded overseas with the Battalion:

Lieut.-Col. G. P. Botterill, in command.
Major L. T. Burnett, second in command.
Capt. G. B. Scott, Adjutant (2nd Battalion The Leinster Regiment).
Major R. J. J. Jackson, commanding F Company.
Capt. G. H. M. Vine, " E "
" H. J. T. Duncan-Teape, commanding A Company.
" R. N. Arthur, " H "
" H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine, commanding D Company.
" W. Moore, commanding B Company.
" W. G. Clark, " C "
Lieut. C. R. Saunders, " G "
" S. Elliott (Machine Gun Officer).
" V. W. Edwards.
" F. C. Grimwade (Signalling Officer).
" P. B. K. Stedman (Transport Officer).
Lieut. H. W. Weathersbee.
2/Lieut. A. L. Long.
" J. T. Sykes.
" R. L. Herring.
" R. V. Gery.
" E. W. Bottomley.
" T. I. Walker.
" A. B. Lucy.
" A. R. Moore.
" T. Moody.
" J. R. Pyper.
" E. Giles.
Hon. Lieut. and Q.M., E. S. Tomsett (Quartermaster).
Major J. F. F. Parr, R.A.M.C.T., Medical Officer attached.

At 4 p.m. that afternoon anchor was weighed, and the transport convoy,
conveying the first Brigade of Territorial troops to leave this
country, dropped down Southampton water.

CHAPTER II

THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN MALTA--FORMATION OF THE 2/4TH BATTALION

Under escort of H.M.S. _Amphitrite_, and accompanied by four other
transports conveying the remainder of the 1st London Infantry Brigade,
the _Galician_, carrying, in addition to the 1/4th Londons, two
companies of the 1/3rd Londons and a section of the 1/1st London Field
Ambulance, made a fair passage through the Bay and reached Gibraltar
without mishap. Here the convoy broke up, and the transports proceeded
independently to their destination.

Nine days of the comparative peace of ship's routine formed a pleasant
interlude for the 1/4th Battalion after its recent trying duties on
the railway line. The passage to Malta was too short to allow the
monotony of ship's inspections, watches, and roll calls to pall, and
the interest of the troops was constantly quickened by the incidents of
a sea voyage--all so strange to Londoners whose horizon hitherto had
for the most part hardly extended beyond Hampstead Heath or Chingford.
Occasional fleeting glimpses of France and Spain, the gambols of a
school of whales, the brilliant hues of the African shore, and the
indescribable blue of the Mediterranean all contributed to render the
Battalion happy and indifferent to the discomforts of their quarters
'tween decks, where the heat was certainly trying after the Gates of
the Mediterranean had been passed.

The first glimpse of Malta on the morning of the 13th September was
uninspiring. From the sea no vegetation can be seen owing to the system
whereby the scanty soil is walled up along the hillsides to prevent
it from being washed away; and the island presents to the passing
voyager an aspect of monotonous drab rock. No time was allowed for
despondency, however, for, with the pilot on board, the _Galician_
steamed into the Marsamuscetto Harbour at Valetta where the Battalion
could feast on the riot of colour which unrolled before its eyes.

[Illustration: _Ghain Tuffieha Camp_]

[Illustration: _Melleha Camp_]

[Illustration: _Selmun Palace_]

The responsibilities of the 1st London Brigade for the defence of the
Fortress of Malta began immediately, for the day after its arrival the
infantry of the regular garrison left for the front.

In the early hours of the 14th September the 1/4th Londons disembarked,
and being allotted quarters under canvas in Ghain Tuffieha Camp, was
introduced to the ardours of a sub-tropical summer by undertaking the
longest march it is possible to make in the island--a very trying
experience indeed.

Ghain Tuffieha is a summer station on the west coast of the island
about eleven miles from Valetta, and is an important outpost of the
main defences of the Fortress. It lies in a broad, fertile valley
known as the Wied Tal Paules, which traverses the island from east
to west, its eastern limit being the coast at St Paul's Bay. To the
north of this valley lie the Melleha and the Marfa Ridges, two of the
northernmost barriers against invasion. The coast round these two
ranges of hills possesses a considerable number of sandy landing-places
in well-sheltered bays, which, as they face Sicily at about three
hours' passage from that island, required special guarding at this
period.

The Battalion now settled down seriously to its training, and it was
found necessary to deal with some 250 men as recruits. These, however,
were passed through the Barrack Square stage of their training as
expeditiously as possible in view of the heavy duties which fell to the
Battalion in guarding the northern coast.

The guards found from the main body of the Battalion at Ghain Tuffieha
were mostly night guards at the landing-places, at St Paul's Bay on
the east coast, and at Ghain Tuffieha Bay, Karraba Ridge, and Gneina
Bay on the west coast. In addition to these, G and H companies were
immediately despatched on detachment, the former to Selmun Palace
(which commands the promontory between the shores of Melleha and
St Paul's Bays), the latter to Melleha (which dominates the head of
Melleha Bay and the Marfa Ridge beyond it). The latter detachment was
subsequently moved down the ridge to the coast near the head of Melleha
Bay. The guards found by these detached companies were at Cala Mistra
Fort (at the foot of Kalkara Ravine), Ir Razzet tal Blata, L'Imgiebah,
and Ghain Zeituna by the Selmun force; and at Melleha Bay, Torri
L'Ahmar cross roads, and Marfa Palace by the Melleha force.

The duties of the detached companies were found to be particularly
onerous, and the proportion of N.C.O.'s and men employed not only on
guards, but also on such necessary duties as signals, look-outs, and
water-carrying fatigues, continuously totalled rather more than a third
of the total strength of the detachments. Arrangements were therefore
made for the relief of the detachment companies every seven or eight
days, and this procedure was maintained throughout the Battalion's duty
on the island.

The training of the Battalion proceeded smoothly but under conditions
of some difficulty, partly owing to the number of men constantly
engaged in coastal defence duties, and partly owing to the unfavourable
conditions of terrain. Every square yard of the rocky hillsides which
is covered with soil is devoted to some sort of cultivation by the
thrifty inhabitants, and the walling up of the soil on the hillsides,
which has already been alluded to, converts every hill into a series
of steps, over which manœuvres are both laborious and painful. In
spite of these obstacles, however, a good deal of useful work was
achieved, and the Battalion rapidly began to take shape as a useful
and well-disciplined unit. There can be no doubt that the experience
gained by all ranks in taking their share in ordinary garrison duties
at so early a stage in their embodied career proved of infinite value
later when the 1/4th Londons ultimately took their place in the
fighting line; and, moreover, the knowledge that they were subject to
the critical--and at that period not always sympathetic--surveillance
of the regular staff of the Fortress provided the strongest possible
incentive to all ranks to conduct themselves with credit to their
Regiment and to the Territorial Force.

Early in October a very thorough course of musketry instruction
under Fortress arrangements was begun, firing taking place on the
Naval ranges of Ghain Tuffieha. The companies were thus employed as
follows:--2 on detachment, 2 on musketry course, 3 on company training,
and 1 finding all the duties at Battalion Headquarters, the whole being
worked on a roster so that each company was kept for training and
detachment purposes at its greatest possible strength.

During the early days of the Battalion in Malta a few changes of
distribution took place among officers as follows:

Major R. J. J. Jackson was evacuated to Cottonera Hospital sick. He
unfortunately remained in hospital until early in December 1914,
when he was invalided to England. Command of F Company was taken by
Lieut. F. C. Grimwade, and the Machine-Gun Section was taken over by
2/Lieut. T. I. Walker, Lieut. S. Elliott transferring to E Company.
The Battalion was also joined by 2/Lieut. R. C. Kelly who, however,
remained with the unit for a few weeks only, at the end of which time
he was appointed to the Secret Service, and with this he remained until
the end of the War.

The middle of September, when the Battalion landed in Malta, found
the hot season waning, and although the temperature remained high
for some weeks the full intensity of the sub-tropical summer was not
experienced. In the early part of October, however, the scirocco, a
warm south-westerly wind which originates in the Sahara, followed, with
all its usual enervating effects, which were indeed quite as trying
as the intense heat of the sun had been. Towards the end of the same
month the wet season set in in earnest, and from that time until the
early part of December the camping ground at Ghain Tuffieha was swept
by tropical rains and sand storms of considerable violence, which from
time to time caused a certain amount of material damage and not a
little discomfort to the troops. The memory of suddenly having to turn
out and clear blocked drainage trenches and lay on to straining tent
ropes in the--sometimes--vain endeavour to prevent one's temporary home
from vanishing into thin air, and to rescue one's kit from a mud bath,
is now sufficiently remote to be contemplated without acute distress,
but the feelings which these encounters which the elements evoked at
the time were by no means so calm!

During the worst phase of the Malta climate the Battalion remained
under canvas, and it is of some interest--though admittedly of little
consolation--to remark that no battalion had previously spent the
winter in Malta in other than permanent barracks.

Thanks to the untiring efforts of the Battalion Medical Officer, Major
J. F. F. Parr, the bill of health during these marked variations of
climate remained extraordinarily clean, and in spite of its exposed
situation the Battalion suffered less from sickness than the others of
the Brigade which were accommodated in modern barracks.

The month of December, however, saw the beginning of the most
delightful season in the island's year. The temperature was mild but
the evenings cool; vegetation began to spring up with almost startling
rapidity, and the prospect of the island, seen from the tops of the
hills, when looking down on to the terraced fields set in a sea of the
deepest azure, formed a most welcome and delightful contrast to the
sun-baked and drab view which had greeted the Battalion on its arrival
three months earlier.

At the end of November the detachments were redistributed, the defence
duties on the northern coast being dealt with by one company only, half
at Selmun Palace, which formed its headquarters, the other half at
Melleha Bay. A fresh detachment was formed by the despatch of another
company to Verdala Barracks (in the Cottonera Lines, the Southern
Fortress of Valetta), for the duty of guarding prisoners of war,
notably the crew of the German raider _Emden_ who had just been landed
on the island.

But for these changes the routine of training proceeded with little
variation, and it began to be thought by some that the Battalion would
be condemned to continue its duties in Malta until the end of the War;
but on the 22nd December 1914 a warning order was issued that the
Brigade would leave the island at an early date.

On the 23rd the Battalion (less E and F Companies on detachment),
marched to Valetta to be reviewed by His Excellency the Governor on
the Marsa, a sports ground near the town. The review took place on the
following day and the Battalion returned the same evening, arriving in
camp at 6.30 p.m.

The following Fortress Order was published on the 24th December:

The Commander-in-Chief, after having inspected the units of
Lord Lucan's Brigade this morning, desires to place on record
his great satisfaction at the evident progress made by them to
become efficient soldiers of the King. His Excellency, who fully
appreciates the patriotic sentiments which have caused such a
magnificent body of men to respond to the call of the Empire in
this hour of national danger, has had much pleasure in telegraphing
to Lord Kitchener reporting the high state of efficiency and
fitness which the Brigade has reached. Such a result, which must
have been apparent to everyone who saw them on parade this morning,
could only have been obtained by the whole-hearted devotion to
their Country's cause of every officer, N.C.O., and man, and the
Commander-in-Chief wishes to congratulate the Earl of Lucan and the
whole of his Brigade on achieving such highly satisfactory results.

No further preparations for departure were made until after the
Christmas festivities, which were rendered very enjoyable by the
arrival of many good things from home and by special gifts from the
Corporation of the City of London and the Regimental Association,
the latter organisation providing a gift of a pipe and tobacco-box
for every officer, N.C.O., and man. Christmastide over, however, the
Battalion concentrated on its preparations for leaving the island at
short notice.

On the 28th December the detachment at Selmun was withdrawn, its place
being taken by a company of the Malta Militia; that at Verdala being
relieved by the 1st London Regiment, which for the time being was to
remain in the island.

* * * * *

On the departure of the 1/4th Battalion overseas the following officers
had been detailed to remain at headquarters to supervise the formation
of a Reserve Battalion:

Captain E. H. Stillwell.
Captain W. H. Hamilton.
Lieutenant H. G. Stanham.
Lieutenant H. Parkhouse.

These officers were assisted by a small number of N.C.O.'s and men
of the 1/4th Battalion who had been found medically unfit to proceed
overseas. The intention in raising the new battalion originally was to
provide a unit to supply reinforcements to the overseas battalion, but,
as will be seen, this intention was subsequently modified to a large
degree.

Recruiting for the new battalion, which was at first designated the 4th
(1st Reserve) Battalion The London Regiment, and later was known as
the 2/4th London Regiment, proceeded (as indeed for all the formations
then being raised) with unprecedented rapidity, and within a fortnight
over 400 men had been enrolled, while the ranks continued to be swelled
daily by the advent of fresh recruits.

Colonel Vickers Dunfee, V.D., was appointed with effect from 6th
September 1914 to command the new battalion with Hon. Lieut. E. V.
Wellby (late Lieut.-Col. 4th V.B. The Royal Fusiliers) as Captain and
Adjutant.

The available accommodation proving utterly inadequate for the growing
numbers, the 2/4th Battalion moved on 23rd September, after inspection
by the Lord Mayor, Sir Vansittart Bowater, to quarters under canvas at
Folly Farm, New Barnet. The strength was now 6 officers and 480 other
ranks, and steadily increased from this time until the establishment
in all ranks was filled. Training now began in earnest--so far as the
wills of every officer, N.C.O., and man were concerned--but under the
most acute practical difficulties, such as were general among the newly
raised formations, owing to the lack of stores of all kinds, including
clothing, arms, and equipment. Gradually, however, "wooden equivalents"
gave place to rifles, and mufti made its final disappearance from the
parade ground. During the following month the Battalion moved into
winter quarters, occupying as barracks two vacant houses at Barnet,
namely, "Littlegrove" and "Beech Hill," and also some stabling and
out-buildings at "Oakhill."

The Battalion owes a considerable debt of gratitude to the owners of
these houses and to other local residents, notably to W. H. Vernon,
Esq., and Sir Philip Sassoon, for their generosity in providing
accommodation and training facilities and for extending hospitality to
the Battalion in various ways, generosity which was also extended to
the 4/4th (Reserve) Battalion when it was formed in the following year.
Facilities for musketry training were also provided by the Enfield
Rifle Club, who very generously placed their range and the services
as instructors of several of their members at the disposal of the
Battalion.

Training at Barnet continued until 14th December 1914, when, after
inspection by Lieut.-Gen. G. H. Moncrieff, Honorary Colonel of
the Regiment, the Battalion, which had now grown to a strength of
27 officers and 986 other ranks, joined the Brigade in billets at
Maidstone. Here the Brigade received on the 17th a warning order to
proceed on foreign service at short notice. The necessary preparation
of equipment, medical inspection, inoculation, etc., was at once put in
hand, and the Battalion was inspected by Major-General W. Fry, C.B.,
C.V.O., commanding 1st London Division, who addressed the troops.

It was fortunately possible to grant forty-eight hours' leave to all
ranks before departure, destined to be the last home leave for some
nineteen months, and on 23rd December the Battalion entrained at 10
a.m. for Southampton, where it embarked on H.T. _Avon_ (Royal Mail
Steam Packet Company), the strength on embarkation being 27 officers
and 889 other ranks.

The following officers proceeded overseas with the Battalion:

Colonel Vickers Dunfee, V.D., in command.
Major V. H. Seyd, second in command.
Captain W. G. Hayward, Adjutant.
" G. H. Moore.
" H. Morris.
" F. C. Read.
" H. G. Stanham.
" H. Parkhouse.
Lieut. L. C. Coates.
" W. N. Towse.
" A. H. Simpson.
2/Lieut. R. N. Keen.
" W. A. Stark.
" W. R. Botterill.
" V. S. Bowater.
" S. N. Davies.
" R. C. Dickins.
" W. H. Stevens.
" N. L. Thomas.
" J. R. Webster.
" L. A. Dickins.
" L. R. Chapman.
" H. W. Dennis.
" E. G. Lovell.
" H. W. Vernon.

Hon. Lieut. and Quartermaster, J. E. W. Lambley (Quartermaster);
Lieut. Casey, R.A.M.C., Medical Officer attached.

Just before departure the following telegram was received by Colonel
Dunfee from General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O.:

Had arranged to go down and see your Battalion. Unfortunately
situation renders imperative my presence at Headquarters. Can only,
therefore, wish you best of good luck and hope we may meet again.

At about 5 p.m. on the 23rd December H.T. _Avon_ put to sea, and the
following day at daybreak the convoy assembled, consisting of:--

H.T. _Avon_--2/4th London Regiment and two Companies 2/3rd
London Regiment.

H.T. _Euralia_--2/2nd London Regiment and 2/3rd London
Regiment, less two companies, under the escort of
H.M.S. _Eclipse_, which accompanied the transports as
far as Gibraltar.

[Illustration: _Melleha_]

[Illustration: _Grand Harbour, Valetta_]

The following appointments were made on H.T. _Avon_: Colonel Vickers
Dunfee to be O.C. Ship; Captain and Adjutant W. G. Hayward to be Ship's
Adjutant.

Christmas was spent at sea with as much good cheer as circumstances
permitted, and after an uneventful voyage Malta was reached and H.T.
_Avon_ dropped anchor in the Grand Harbour at Valetta on 31st December
1914.

* * * * *

On the 30th December the 1/4th Battalion marched from Ghain Tuffieha to
St George's Barracks and handed over its arms and equipment, as it was
understood that these would be required for the relieving troops.

The strength of the 1/4th Battalion on leaving the Island was 24
officers and about 850 other ranks. Major J. F. F. Parr remained
on the Island and took over the duties of Medical Officer to the
2/4th Battalion, his duties in the 1/4th Battalion being assumed by
Lieutenant Casey, who had just arrived with the 2/4th Battalion. In
addition Captain R. N. Arthur and Lieut. V. W. Edwards transferred to
the 2/4th Battalion together with about 85 N.C.O.'s and men who were
found medically unfit for active service. These officers, N.C.O.'s, and
men reported on the 3rd January to the 2/4th Battalion which was thus
brought to about war strength.

On the 2nd January the 2/4th Battalion disembarked and marched to
quarters at St Andrew's barracks, and the same day at 6.35 a.m. the
1/4th Battalion paraded for the last time at Ghain Tuffieha, marched
to Valetta and embarked on the _Avon_. That afternoon the _Avon_,
conveying in addition to the 1/4th Battalion the 1/3rd Londons, put
to sea under sealed orders, which were subsequently found to be for
Marseilles.

CHAPTER III

THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN FRANCE--OPERATIONS AT NEUVE CHAPELLE

The Gulf of Lyons has an evil reputation and in January 1915 its
achievement did not belie its notoriety. The _Avon_ was a fine ship of
some 12,000 tons but being in ballast rolled unmercifully for three
days; and the smooth waters of Marseilles harbour, which were reached
early on the morning of the 5th January, were never more heartily
welcome than to the 1/4th Londons.

Disembarkation took place the following afternoon at about 4 p.m. and
the Battalion, after forming up on the quay, marched straight to the
railway siding, where a train stood in readiness to carry it into the
war area. To British soldiers who have served in the French theatre
of war there is, we imagine, no recollection more vivid than that
conveyed by the words "40 Hommes--Chevaux en long!" The fourth class
French railway carriage, which is employed with fine impartiality for
the conveyance of men or horses as occasion demands, is now too well
known to call for lengthy comment; it is a subject over which we prefer
to pass hurriedly! Into these abominations on wheels the Battalion was
inserted at the standard rate of 40 men to each truck and rations for
two days were issued. After a delay, which seemed to the troops as
interminable as it was certainly inexplicable to them, the train at
about 9.30 p.m. rumbled sedately out of Marseilles in the leisurely
manner of all troop trains.

Dawn next morning found the train at Avignon where a five minutes' halt
was made. The enthusiastic reception accorded to the Battalion all
along the line by the French civilians and also by the military was
most impressive; and the obvious satisfaction with which the arrival
of fresh British troops was hailed by one and all in the Rhone Valley
could not fail to impress the dullest sense with the strength of the
common cause which bound us to our gallant allies.

A "Halte Repas," that is a halt just not long enough to enable the
troops to detrain and cook dinners, was made at Macon, after which
the journey, which resolved itself practically into a triumphal
progress, was resumed. At one wayside station, the name of which has,
unfortunately, passed from our recollection, a military guard of honour
saluted the arrival of the Battalion, while the ladies of the district
appeared with offerings of milk, coffee, and bouquets. So great, in
fact, was the enthusiasm that M. le Maire sent for a cask of wine in
which to assert his faith in the Entente Cordiale! Unhappily the French
railway authorities were not stirred by such intense emotion and the
train moved on before the wine arrived.

By the morning of the 8th the train was skirting Paris, and that day
the first signs of war were reached. Near Chantilly (the famous French
racecourse) reserve lines of trenches forming the outer ring of the
Paris Defences were passed, while at Creil some buildings severely
damaged by shell fire stood as stern remembrances of the great retreat
three months earlier.

This amusing though very tedious railway journey terminated at 9 p.m.
on the 7th January, when the Battalion detrained some ten miles south
of Boulogne at Etaples, at that date a small, muddy, and evil-smelling
fishing village. Etaples, which at a later stage of the war became such
an important base camp, with accommodation for some thirty thousand
men and many hospitals, was, in January 1915, not used as a British
military station, and the 1st London Brigade were the first troops
to be quartered there. Accommodation was provided under canvas in an
exposed situation, and the severity of the weather, which was intensely
cold and windy with occasional falls of snow, formed a contrast to the
sub-tropical climate in which the Battalion had been basking ten days
previously, which can only evoke surprise at the comparatively small
amount of sickness which ensued.

The Battalion had, it will be remembered, left its rifles, equipment,
and transport in Malta, and the refitting and equipment of the troops
was taken in hand at once. The first step was the reorganisation of the
Battalion in four companies, as follows:

New A Company--Old A and C Companies;
Captain H. J. Duncan-Teape in command.
Captain W. G. Clark second in command.

New B Company--Old B and F Companies;
Captain W. Moore in command.
Captain F. C. Grimwade second in command.

New C Company--Old D and E Companies;
Captain G. H. M. Vine in command.
2/Lieut. W. H. Weathersbee second in command.

New D Company--Old G and H Companies;
Captain C. R. Saunders in command.
Captain H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine second in command.

The Company Sergeant-Majors were respectively Edwards, Elsom,
Chennels, and Cornwall.

In addition to this reorganisation the Battalion was issued with new
rifles of the long charger-loading type, with four Vickers guns, and
with new equipment of the 1914 pattern (webbing); and a refit of
clothing and necessaries was effected. Steps were also taken to dispose
of the surplus baggage and personal belongings acquired by all ranks
in Malta, and to reduce all to the scales of weight permissible in the
field.

Command of the Regimental Transport was assumed by 2/Lieut. R. L.
Herring, who proceeded with his section to Abbeville, and returned by
road with the full war scale of 1st and 2nd Line Transport and the
Battalion chargers.

These preparations which occupied the Battalion until the 25th January
were interspersed with such training as the state of the weather
permitted, the training being carried out on the sand dunes north of
Etaples. A warning order was received on the 25th to proceed to billets
near St Omer to join G.H.Q. Reserve.

The following day the Battalion moved by train from Etaples to St
Omer, and thence by march route to the billeting area which had been
allotted to it in two small straggling villages called Helfaut and
Bilques, where it arrived about midnight. At this point the Battalions
of the 1st London Brigade parted company until once more reassembled by
the formation of the 56th Division a year later.

Billeting in the early days of the war was not the simple matter
which it became at a later stage. For one thing, in most villages
neither wire beds, cook-houses, nor ablutions existed for the troops,
and the accommodation of barns and stables had not been tabulated by
Town-Majors ready for the use of billeting officers. All negotiations
for billets had therefore to be conducted by the billeting officer
direct with the communal authorities, through whom also straw and fuel
were drawn.

After a few days in Helfaut and Bilques the Battalion was driven from
its billets by an epidemic of measles which attacked the civilian
inhabitants, and it found fresh quarters slightly nearer St Omer in a
more important village called Blendecques.

The 1/4th Londons now embarked on a course of very severe training
under the immediate supervision of the Inspector of Infantry,
Brigadier-General Oxley. This was, indeed, a strenuous three weeks,
with breakfasts at 7.30 a.m. and dinners at 5 p.m., the hours between
being occupied in tactical exercises. Usually a march of five miles in
each direction to and from the training ground was involved and the
exercise itself was almost invariably the "Attack in Open Warfare." In
every conceivable formation, over every conceivable sort of ground,
did the Battalion attack every one of the villages within reach of
Blendecques, till at last it was entirely weary of the attack in any
shape or form! But the grounding in field work thus obtained was
excellent and so completely were the lessons rubbed into the mind
of every member of the Battalion that this wearisome training bore
excellent fruit as we shall see later.

Once or twice a slight variation of training was obtained in work on
a new reserve line of trenches then being constructed east of St
Omer. This work was carried out under R.E. supervision. The design of
these trenches was strange. Their like was indeed never met with in
any sector of the line held by the Battalion in the whole of its war
service, and we can only be thankful that this reserve line never came
into active use.

Throughout the training period the weather was continuously wet and
cold, and these adverse conditions, added to the long hours without
food, imposed a serious physical strain on all, and the news that the
Battalion had been passed fit to join a brigade was therefore received
by all ranks with extreme satisfaction.

At Blendecques the Battalion was joined by Lieut. A. Hurd, R.A.M.C.,
medical officer, vice Captain Casey to hospital. 2/Lieut. E. W.
Bottomley was also evacuated to hospital.

On the 19th February the 1/4th Londons left the many good friends they
had made in Blendecques and marched through Wittes, where it halted for
the night, to Ham-en-Artois, arriving at 12.30 p.m. on the 20th, and
joined the Ferozepore Brigade of the Lahore Division.

The Indian Corps (Lieut.-Gen. Sir James Willcocks, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.,
K.C.S.I., D.S.O.) had arrived in France in the preceding October and
comprised the 3rd (Lahore) and 7th (Meerut) Divisions, the former
including the following units:

LAHORE DIVISION

Major General H. D'U. KEARY, C.B., D.S.O.

DIVISIONAL CAVALRY
15th Lancers.

ENGINEERS
20th and 21st Sappers and Miners.
34th Sikh Pioneers.

JULLUNDUR BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. E. P. Strickland, C.M.G., D.S.O.
1st Manchesters.
1/4th Suffolks.
40th Pathans.
47th Sikhs.
59th Scinde Rifles (F.F.).

SIRHIND BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. W. R. Walker, V.C.
1st Highland Light Infantry.
4th King's Liverpools.
15th Ludhiana Sikhs.
1/1st Gurkha Rifles.
1/4th Gurkha Rifles.

FEROZEPORE BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. R. G. Egerton, C.B.
1st Connaught Rangers.
1/4th Londons.
9th Bhopals.
57th Wilde's Rifles (F.F.).
129th Baluchis (Duke of Connaught's Own).

During the months of December and January the Indian Corps had been
heavily engaged in a local operation which had raged with terrific
intensity between the small village of Givenchy and the extreme right
of our line; but our struggles to press forward along the canal to La
Bassée had been checked by a particularly vigorous defence on the part
of the enemy. The casualties suffered by the Brigades of the Indian
Corps in the fighting had been so severe that it was necessary to
withdraw some of them for a time from the line for the purpose of rest
and reorganisation.

On joining its Brigade the strength of the 1/4th Londons was 25
officers and 828 other ranks. The Battalion was fortunate in being
posted to the Division at this juncture as it had an opportunity
before going into action of becoming acquainted with its neighbouring
battalions with whom it was destined to share the fortunes of war
during the ensuing eleven months, and of gaining some insight into the
ancient, but at that date recently revived, sciences of bombing and
trench mortar work. And here let us remark for the benefit of those
members of the Battalion who joined the Service at a later stage and
found Mills Bombs and the Stokes Mortar ready for their use, that
in February 1915 the only bombs in use were those of the "jam-tin"
variety, that is to say, were roughly constructed out of old tins by
the troops who were to use them, filled with explosives, plugged with
clay, and fused with ordinary time fuse which had to be ignited before
the bomb was thrown; while the trench mortar of the day is perhaps best
described as a glorified rainwater pipe bound with copper wire, and
which threw a "jam-tin" bomb and was quite as dangerous to the team
which manned it as to the Germans.

With their unfailing adaptability to circumstances the men of the
Battalion rapidly became friends with the Indian troops whom they
held in the greatest admiration. The Gurkhas in particular seemed
to exercise an irresistible attraction for the men of London, who
were especially impressed with the Gurkhas' playful way of throwing
their murderous Kukri knives. Indeed, to such lengths did this
admiration--which took the form of imitation--lead them that a
Battalion order was very quickly necessary to the effect that "the
game known as 'Gurkhas' played with unsheathed bayonets must cease
forthwith!"

Throughout this period the weather was intensely cold and several falls
of snow occurred. The billets were passably good, however, and the
Battalion's bill of health remained clean.

The Battalion was unfortunate at this period in losing Sergeant-Major
Dudley, who had done excellent work since mobilisation and now left for
a commission in the Royal Fusiliers. He was killed a fortnight after
joining his regiment. His duties were taken by Col.-Sergt. Instr. M.
Harris, who filled this important position with success for nearly
three years.

On the 22nd February the undermentioned officers, being the first
reinforcement received by the Battalion, joined as follows:

Lieuts. F. A. Coffin, H. M. Lorden, D. J. Leonard, and A. D. Coates.

It is now necessary for a moment to look at the course which events
were taking on the wide field of the Western Theatre.

At the period with which we are dealing, the Front held by the British
troops extended from the Béthune-La Bassée Road, on the right to just
north of the Ypres Salient on the left, and General Headquarters
(Field-Marshal Sir John French in command) were at St Omer. The
British troops were divided into two Armies, of which the First Army
under Sir Douglas Haig, consisting of the I Corps (Gough), IV Corps
(Rawlinson), and Indian Corps (Willcocks), held the right or southern
end of the line; the left being entrusted to the Second Army (Sir H.
Smith-Dorrien), which comprised the II Corps (Fergusson), the III Corps
(Pulteney), and the V Corps (Plumer).

The moving warfare of the autumn of 1914, which had ended by the
opposing armies gradually extending their flanks until the sea
was reached and had culminated in the First Battle of Ypres in
October--November 1914, had given way to a siege warfare in which
the belligerents were confined in continuous lines of trenches which
were gradually being more heavily fortified. After the force of the
German drive toward Ypres had exhausted itself, a lull in active
operations ensued, hostilities flaring up here and there along the
line in the shape of minor operations of terrible intensity, in which
the possession of a few yards of ground was contested with ferocity by
both sides. In the intervals between these small struggles, however,
the battle line had been comparatively quiet during the winter months,
and not materially changed, the nett result being perhaps a slight gain
of ground to the British at the southern end of the line, which was
balanced by a tendency to lose ground in the north.

Since the bitter struggle at Ypres in November 1914, the enemy had, in
the opinion of Sir John French, shown certain signs of weakening on the
Western Front, and this was attributed by him to the success which was
attending the Russian offensive in East Prussia, and to the consequent
withdrawal of German troops from the West. In order to assist our
Russian Allies as far as possible it was necessary to have resort to
active operations with the main object of holding as many of the German
reserves as possible in the West, and efforts to this end were already
being made by the French at Arras and in Champagne.

The ravages caused during the winter trench warfare by sickness and
"trench-foot," which had had especially disastrous effects on those
regular divisions composed of troops withdrawn from tropical garrisons,
rendered necessary the early cultivation of a vigorous offensive
spirit, and these combined considerations led Sir John French to the
decision to take the offensive as soon as the condition of the ground
in Flanders should afford such an undertaking a reasonable prospect
of success. By the beginning of March the conditions were considered
sufficiently favourable, and the terrain selected for the proposed
offensive was the German positions opposed to the First Army and
defending the lower slopes of the Aubers Ridge.

The objective of the First Army's attack was the advancement of our
line to the high ground about Illies and Hermies as a prelude to the
occupation of La Bassée, and this involved as a first local objective
the capture of the village of Neuve Chapelle. The Aubers Ridge is a
strongly marked hill feature, which runs in a south-westerly direction
from Lille until it loses itself in the marshlands in the neighbourhood
of La Bassée. Neuve Chapelle, which had already changed hands several
times in the fighting of the previous autumn, is a small village, the
immediate surroundings of which are much intersected with orchards and
fences, about 1000 yards from the lowest slopes of the Ridge, which,
immediately opposite to it, are covered by a considerable wood called
the Bois du Biez.

The German defensive position skirted in front (or to the north-west)
of Neuve Chapelle and then making a sharp turn southwards, followed
the line of the Estaires-La Bassée Road, for some 600 yards, from its
junction with Foresters Lane (Rue des Berceaux) to its junction with
the Rue du Bois, where once more turning slightly to the west it left
the hamlet of Richebourg L'Avoué in the British lines, and finally made
a wide sweep once more to the south in the direction of Festubert (see
Map No. 1). The front of attack allotted to the Indian Corps was that
part which followed the alignment of the La Bassée road between Rue
du Bois and Foresters Lane, the actual capture of the greater part of
Neuve Chapelle being entrusted to the 8th Division.

The attack was to be preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment, which
on the Corps front would be conducted by the divisional artillery of
both the Lahore and Meerut Divisions and the Corps heavy artillery, and
this was to be directed towards destroying the enemy's front trenches
and entanglements and certain strong posts, the searching of the
Bois du Biez, in order to disperse the concentration of the enemy's
counter-attack troops, and finally the building up of a "curtain of
fire" (subsequently though less descriptively termed a "barrage") east
of the captured positions, with the object of assisting the work of
consolidating them.

The direction of the Indian Corps' attack being almost easterly
converged towards that of the IV Corps on their left (this being
south-easterly), and it was, therefore, necessary after the first
German positions had been carried and touch with the IV Corps secured,
to swing the direction of attack round more to the south, and to
establish a fire position facing south in order to guard against the
danger of a German flanking counter-attack from that quarter. The
position selected for this was a German sap, which had been thrown out
from the enemy lines towards the British strong point, Port Arthur, at
the corner of La Bassée Road and Rue du Bois.

The troops holding the line of the Rue du Bois front, outside the limit
of the general attack, would thus be responsible for the defence of the
Indian right flank. It was hoped that the first bound would carry our
line forward to the old II Corps line first occupied by Smith-Dorrien's
troops in October 1914, east of Neuve Chapelle village.

The assaulting troops detailed for this task were the Gharwal and Dehra
Dun Brigades of the Meerut Division, the Bareilly Brigade being in
close support; while the Lahore Division (less artillery) was placed in
Corps reserve, the Ferozepore Brigade being allotted to Army Reserve.

In accordance with these orders the Ferozepore Brigade moved forward
from Ham-en-Artois to the Zelobes area on the 7th March, the 4th
Londons marching to Calonne-sur-Lys about eight miles north-west of
Neuve Chapelle, where it remained in billets in a constant state of
readiness to move. On the eve of the outbreak of our offensive the
order was relaxed to one of readiness to move at twelve hours' notice.

On the 10th March Lieut.-Col. Botterill was granted seven days' leave
of absence on urgent private affairs, and command of the Battalion
devolved temporarily on Major L. T. Burnett, who remained in command
until after the termination of the Neuve Chapelle operations.

In addition to the Brigades of the Meerut Division already mentioned,
on the right of the line, the troops detailed for the assault comprised
the 25th Brigade of the 8th Division opposite Neuve Chapelle village,
with the 23rd Brigade of the same Division on the extreme left.

An enormous concentration of artillery had been quietly effected on
this front, including many of our newly arrived heavy batteries, and
at 7.30 a.m. on the 10th March, some 300 guns opened a devastating
bombardment on the German trenches along the frontage of attack.
The severity of this bombardment was unprecedented. Trenches were
obliterated, machine-guns and Germans were literally blown into the
air, and so dazed were the enemy by the appalling ordeal that our men
were able to stand on their parapets to watch the inferno in front
of them. At 8.5 a.m. the range of the guns was lengthened on to the
enemy's support trenches and our assaulting columns dashed forward.
The Indians and the 25th Brigade met with little resistance, but the
23rd Brigade on the left found itself faced with a practically unbroken
wire entanglement, from beyond which a deadly fire was poured into it
by the enemy machine-guns. By 8.35 a.m. the right and centre brigades
had effected a lodgment in the village, but the 23rd, being still held
up and suffering terrible losses, the 25th Brigade swung to its left
and turned the flank of the German troops who were opposing the 23rd.
By this means our left was able to advance and by 11 a.m. the village
of Neuve Chapelle was completely in our hands, and consolidation of
the ground won was begun under cover of our artillery barrage, which
effectually carried out its task of preventing the enemy bringing
forward reinforcements for a counter-attack.

The street fighting, however, had resulted in considerable
disorganisation of units, so that valuable hours were lost in the
necessary reorganisation, and it was not until 3.30 p.m. that the
advance could be resumed. The attack so far had proved--as was
intended--a complete surprise, and the enemy's resistance seems to have
been paralysed except on the extreme left where our troops were still
under heavy fire.

The only local counter-attack which developed during the morning of the
10th was on the extreme right of the attack, where the enemy succeeded
along the Rue du Bois in temporarily ejecting the Indian troops from
the captured trenches, and in effecting a strong lodgment in the
Orchard Trench in front of Richebourg L'Avoué. During the morning the
Jullundur and Sirhind Brigades moved forward to Richebourg St Vaast and
Vieille Chapelle respectively.

The afternoon advance was made on the right by the Dehra Dun Brigade,
supported by the Jullundur Brigade of the Lahore Division, and the
objective assigned to it was the Bois du Biez. Between Neuve Chapelle
and the wood runs the little Rivière des Layes, and at a point where
this stream is spanned by a road bridge the enemy had established a
strong machine-gun post. The Indians made a gallant advance over 1000
yards of open country, and succeeded in penetrating the wood, but their
line was enfiladed by the machine-guns on the bridge and they were
unable to hold the line of their furthest advance. On the left the
attack was renewed by the 25th and 24th Brigades, the hard-hit 23rd
being held back, their objective being the cluster of houses at Moulin
de Pietre, about a mile east of Neuve Chapelle; but their efforts also
were frustrated by the machine-guns on the bridge, which our artillery
was unable to dislodge. Further left still the front of attack had been
extended and the 21st Brigade (Watts) of the 7th Division was also
directed on Pietre; but in its advance encountered a line of undamaged
German trenches which effectually barred its efforts to progress.

The position, therefore, when darkness intervened was that an average
advance of over a thousand yards had been gained and held, while
practically no effort had been made by the enemy to regain possession
of the lost ground.

Preparations were made for a renewal of the advance on the following
day, but the 11th dawned misty and the day proved to be one of
equilibrium. A further advance was, attempted but the mist rendered
aircraft observation impossible and artillery co-operation with the
infantry extremely difficult owing to the constant breaking of our
forward lines of communication by the enemy shell fire. Our troops,
therefore, clung to their positions opposite the Bois du Biez and
Pietre under a murderous shell fire which caused many casualties; while
the enemy, by a stroke of ill fortune, was accorded a for him lucky
respite, in which he was able to prepare his counter-attack.

On the evening of the 11th the exhaustion of the troops after two days'
fighting rendered a relief desirable, as it was hoped that weather
conditions would favour a prosecution of the offensive on the next day.
The Meerut Division consequently handed over its newly won positions
to the Lahore Division, the Dehra Dun Brigade being replaced by the
Sirhind Brigade, while arrangements were completed for relieving the
Gharwal Brigade on the night of the 12th/13th by the Ferozepore Brigade.

The same evening the 4th London moved at 6 p.m. from Calonne to Lestrem
where it arrived at midnight and went into billets. Its stay there,
however, was short as within two hours it was turned out in order to
move further forward to Lacouture, about four miles west of Neuve
Chapelle, reaching there about 7.30 a.m. on the 12th March. Similar
forward moves were made by the remainder of the Brigade in view of its
impending occupation of the line.

When the 4th Londons reached Lacouture the village was under shell fire
from the enemy's heavy guns and the behaviour of all ranks under fire
for the first time was highly commendable. But here also the hopes
of rest on which the thoughts of all had been centred far more than
on the German shells, were dashed, for almost immediately on arrival
the Battalion received fresh orders to move forward to Richebourg St
Vaast, in which village Brigade headquarters were then operating. The
exhaustion of all ranks on arrival was considerable as the Battalion
had been almost continuously on the move in full marching order for
about eighteen hours. Richebourg was a village of some importance and
a considerable number of our heavy batteries supporting the Neuve
Chapelle attack were stationed in its vicinity, with the result that it
received a generous share of the enemy's counter-battery bombardment
and also a good deal of attention due, apparently, to the prominence of
its church tower, to the existence of which the Germans objected.

Here at last the Battalion was allotted billets in which it remained
until about 7 p.m., being under heavy shell fire the whole time and
sustaining its first battle casualties of seven men wounded.

The mist continued during the 12th and our main operation could not
be pursued. The hostile shell fire increased in intensity, but the
Germans were equally with ourselves embarrassed by the difficulties of
accurate observation and their bombardments were not very disastrous
to us. Local advances were attempted by our troops in various parts
of the line and the houses at Pietre were actually reached by the
Guards of the 20th Brigade, but the ground gained was heavily swept by
hostile fire and could not be retained. All day counter-attacks in mass
formation were attempted by the Germans, and costly as the day was to
us, our casualties must have been far exceeded by theirs, their ranks
being literally mown down by our rifle, machine-gun and shrapnel fire.
By dusk the enemy's attempts had exhausted themselves and for the first
time in the war the Germans gave up attempts to recapture ground they
had lost.

As it had been hoped that the 12th would witness the continuance of
our successes it had been impossible to arrange beforehand the details
of the relief of the Gharwal Brigade by the Ferozepore Brigade until
the result of the intended operations should be known, and it was not,
therefore, until late in the afternoon that the Brigade received orders
to move forward at once in order to take part in an attack that evening
on the Bois du Biez, which position it was proposed to carry at all
costs. For this operation the 41st Dogras of the Bareilly Brigade, then
in the trenches, were to be lent to the Brigade and relieved in their
position in line by the 4th Londons. This relief, however, could not
be effected in time to enable the 41st Dogras to join the Ferozepore
Brigade, which consequently advanced short of one battalion.

The Brigade was not assembled in front of Neuve Chapelle until darkness
had fallen, and in order to allow time for the necessary dispositions
to be made, General Egerton, who for this operation commanded not only
the Ferozepore, but also the Jullundur and Sirhind Brigades, arranged
for the attack to commence at 10.30 p.m. At 9.30 p.m., however, orders
were received cancelling the attack and indicating that the offensive
had closed, and the Brigade returned to billets in Vieille Chapelle and
Lacouture.

Meanwhile the 4th Londons proceeded with the relief of the 41st Dogras,
and although they occupied the line only for a few hours, perhaps we
may be pardoned for a rather more detailed record of the night's work
than the importance of the operation warrants in view of the fact that
this was the first tour of duty done by the Battalion in trenches.
The sector to be occupied lay at an interval of about 300 yards from
the right limit of the Neuve Chapelle attack as already described,
and consisted of a frontage of some 400 yards, in front of the Rue du
Bois. The line in this part did not consist of a continuous line of
trenches. In the first place, the ground here, as for miles in each
direction, was too waterlogged to admit of a trench being dug, and the
defences, therefore, consisted of a breastwork built up above ground
level, and in most parts of this sector the breastwork did not exceed
three feet in height and was entirely without parados. As a result,
moreover, of the recent fighting the defensive line consisted rather of
a series of short breastworks with gaps between them which could only
be crossed under cover of darkness. Communication trenches to the rear
were non-existent and the breastwork had to be approached from the Rue
du Bois, to which it ran parallel at a distance of about fifty yards,
"overland." It may be of interest to those who served in this area
with the regiment in the winter of 1916/17 to state that this feeble
breastwork was almost in the position of the support line subsequently
known as Guards' Trench.

[Illustration: NEUVE CHAPELLE--RICHEBOURG L'AVOUÉ]

This position perhaps was not an ideal one for the first introduction
of a raw Battalion to trench warfare, and the situation was not
improved by the exhaustion of the men or the fact that the Rue du
Bois was subject to a great deal of heavy shelling which had not died
down since the German counter-attacks of the day, but which continued
through the night. The Battalion moved forward by platoons past Windy
Corner, where it came under a heavy burst of shrapnel, and Edward Road,
skirting behind the ruined factory at the corner of the Rue du Bois,
and led by Indian guides, whose vague acquaintance with the language
of London did not assist matters to any appreciable extent. Be it
remembered also that no maps had been issued and no reconnaissance
of the line had been possible to any company officer. However, the
Battalion succeeded in occupying its breastwork and remained there
during the night, somewhat isolated as touch with the units on its
flanks was difficult to maintain owing to the breaks in the line, and
all ranks acquitted themselves in an exemplary manner. The shrapnel and
machine-gun fire maintained by the Germans during the night cost a few
casualties, amounting to 14 N.C.O.'s and men wounded. In addition to
these was 2/Lieut. A. R. Moore, who was hit in the leg on the way up to
the line. This officer, however, stuck to his duty and remained with
his platoon until after relief of the Battalion the next morning. He
was awarded the Military Cross for his gallant conduct.

The Ferozepore Brigade attack not having materialised, the 41st Dogras
returned to the trenches, and before daybreak the 4th Londons were
relieved and withdrew to billets in Vieille Chapelle.

With these incidents ended the battle of Neuve Chapelle in which,
although the gain of ground was much less than had been hoped for,
yet some solid success had been achieved. Our line had been carried
forward for about 1000 yards on a front of about two miles, and the
prisoners captured amounted to 1650 all ranks. The British casualties
had reached the serious total of 12,811, but the enemy's far exceeded
this number. The outstanding result of the action, however, was an
immense accession of moral strength to the British troops, for it had
been clearly established that where we could meet the Germans on terms
of equality in men and material, we were able to beat them, and the
confirmation of this, supplied by the battle of Neuve Chapelle, sent a
thrill of triumph in the hearts of our men all along the line.

On the night 13/14 March, the Ferozepore Brigade relieved the Bareilly
Brigade on the Rue du Bois, the front line being occupied by the 57th
Rifles, 129th Baluchis and 1st Connaught Rangers, the 4th Londons
moving to Richebourg St Vaast in Brigade reserve.

The sector now taken over extended from Chocolat Menier Corner on the
right to Port Arthur on the left, and during the tour proved to be
fairly quiet, except in the left subsection held by the Connaughts,
where two strong points, Port Arthur and the Orchard Redoubt, and also
the Crescent Trench, a circular trench connecting them, were daily
subjected to heavy bombardments.

The 4th Londons in reserve provided garrisons for the forward area as
follows:

D Company (Cart de Lafontaine) to the Orchard Redoubt, which it
held in company with a party of the Connaughts.

One Platoon of each of A, B and C Companies to the left subsection,
under instruction in trench warfare by the Connaughts.

Two Platoons each of B and C Companies (Moore and Vine) to Redoubts
D5 and D6 respectively. These redoubts were close to Windy
Corner on Forresters Lane, and were subsequently known as Dogs
and Edward Posts.

Machine-Gun Detachment to Port Arthur Keep, and Trench Mortar
Section to the left subsection.

The platoons under instruction were relieved every forty-eight hours
in order to ensure that during the tour of duty the companies were all
given a certain amount of trench experience. The remaining platoons,
not for the moment employed in garrison duty, were billeted with
Battalion Headquarters in Richebourg, and provided working and carrying
parties each night for the line.

The line was still not fully organised after the battle, and the
Crescent Trench was not properly connected either to the Orchard on
its right or to Port Arthur on the farther side of the La Bassée Road
on its left; and as the construction of communication trenches in this
area had not yet been seriously undertaken, the various companies
holding those works were isolated during the hours of daylight, as were
also the detached listening posts pushed forward in front of them into
No Man's Land. There was thus a very considerable amount of trench work
required to bring the defences to a proper state of organisation and
also in the completion of the wire entanglements in front of the new
advanced line, and the 4th Londons were called upon for heavy duties in
this direction in conjunction with the Sappers and Miners.

The tower of Richebourg church still proved a great attraction to the
enemy's heavy guns, and the village was daily subjected to severe shell
fire during daytime. On 21st March it became evident that the Germans
were determined to destroy the church tower, and a steady bombardment
with heavy shells began, which caused infinite damage to the church
itself and the surrounding houses. During this bombardment a direct
hit was obtained on a billet occupied by a platoon of Highland Light
Infantry, causing casualties of 12 killed and 30 wounded. Later three
direct hits were registered on the church tower, which fell about noon,
and this achievement was followed by a complete cessation of hostile
fire, which indicated sufficiently clearly what the intention of the
bombardment had been.

All ranks of the Battalion were now settling down to their duties
in the trenches, showing great keenness to increase their value as
fighting troops and exhibiting the greatest steadiness under the
numerous heavy bombardments to which they had been exposed, and it was,
therefore, gratifying to receive a word of appreciation as to their
behaviour from the Divisional Commander during a visit which he paid to
Battalion Headquarters on the 17th.

The Battalion was now again under command of Lieut.-Col. G. P.
Botterill, and Major L. T. Burnett resumed his duties as second in
command.

On the 17th also a further reinforcement of officers was received as
follows:

Major E. H. Stillwell and 2/Lieuts. E. P. M. Mosely and F. F. Hunt.

The Machine-Gun and Trench Mortar Sections were now carrying out their
full duties in the front trenches, and did exceedingly good work during
this tour, which, for the latter section, was their first experience of
working their mortars in action. During the bombardment of the 19th,
2/Lieut. J. T. Sykes, in charge of the trench mortars, was wounded by
shrapnel while "spotting" for a mortar shoot, and evacuated to hospital.

On the night of the 23/24 March the relief of the Ferozepore Brigade
by the 2nd Brigade began, and the forward garrisons of the 4th London
being withdrawn, the Battalion on the following evening marched back
to billets at Paradis, a small village near Merville. The Connaughts
were relieved in the line on the following night, and the Brigade being
concentrated in the Paradis area came into Army Reserve at two hours'
notice to move.

The total casualties sustained by the Battalion during this tour of
trench duty were 17, a very small number having regard to the severity
of the bombardments to which it had been subjected.

From the 26th March until the 2nd April, Lieut.-Col. Botterill was in
temporary command of the Brigade during the absence on leave of the
Brigadier; and command of the Battalion for this period was assumed by
Major G. H. M. Vine.

The rest billets at Paradis were retained until the 30th March, the six
days being occupied in company training and route marches, and viewing
of arms by the Brigade Armourer-Sergeant. On the 28th a parade service
was held by Captain Cart de Lafontaine, this being the first Church
Service which the Battalion had had the opportunity of attending since
the middle of February.

The Battalion was now firm friends with its Indian comrades whose
soldierly qualities it was learning to appreciate from actual
experience. Difficulties of language formed a barrier to close
intercourse, but a sort of war-cry was evolved which, being exchanged
between Indian and Cockney, formed a guarantee of friendship. A shout
of "Anglais-bon! Indian-bon! Allemand-NO BON!!" exchanged in passing
became a frequent form of greeting.

On the night of the 31st March the Brigade returned to the trenches,
relieving the Sirhind Brigade in a sector north of Neuve Chapelle
village, the right boundary of which was Sign Post Lane, a road running
through the lines in the direction of the Bois du Biez.

The 4th London was again in Brigade Reserve, and moved from Paradis
at 7 a.m. to Les Huit Maisons, where it remained in temporary billets
until dusk when it advanced to Croix Barbée, Battalion Headquarters
occupying a house at the corner of Loretto and Edward Roads. This house
will be in the recollection of those who served in this area in 1917
as the site of St Vaast R.E. dump. Here the Battalion was again under
instruction in trench duties with the Connaughts, who were in the right
subsection of the new Brigade sector, but on this occasion companies
went into the line in turn as a whole, the companies not actually in
trenches occupying reserve posts at Loretto, Green Barn, and St Vaast.

The right subsection was defended by breastworks and was immediately
facing Pietre, the hamlet which had stood between our troops and
success on the afternoon of the 10th March. It included the peculiar
feature of the Duck's Bill, in regard to which a word of description
may not be out of place. The name Duck's Bill brings to the minds of
most 4th London men the picture of a large defended mine crater quite
close to the German line, and approached by a defended sap which was
generally full of water. Such it was in the winter of 1916/17, but in
the spring of 1915 the Duck's Bill was a ruined farmhouse standing on
a knoll just in front of the cross-road connecting Sign Post Lane with
Sunken Road. This ruin was surrounded by a horseshoe trench, the points
of the horseshoe resting on the cross-road, which was barricaded and
connected with the front line by a rough breastwork. The defences
here were still in an unfinished condition as the farmhouse was the
extreme point of our advance in this sector in the battle, and the road
barricades were under the continual watch of German snipers in Pietre.
On the night of our entry into this sector the farmhouse had just
been demolished by German incendiary shells and the ruins were still
smouldering.

"A Bosche had been buried," writes Captain Moore, "in the hastily
constructed parapet, face downward, and with his booted feet sticking
into our trench. They were Bosche boots, so presumably were on Bosche
feet, and every time one passed in the dark one knocked them--a truly
gruesome spot."

The Duck's Bill farmhouse was finally disposed of when the mine crater
was blown in 1916.

The reserve posts to which the companies in reserve were detailed were
defended keeps forming with others the Croix Barbée line of defence.
The aftermath of the battle, which had taken the form of such vigorous
shelling by the enemy, now exhausted itself and this tour proved
particularly quiet. The enemy's attention was paid principally to the
roads and communications in rear of our trenches, but his shelling was
sporadic and harmless.

On the 11th April the Battalion moved out of Croix Barbée, marching
at 5 p.m. for Paradis, where it was joined the following day by the
remaining units of the Brigade, now in Divisional reserve.

Of the rest in Paradis little need be said. The twelve days were spent
in training under company arrangements and in bathing, completing
issues of deficiencies in clothing, etc. On the 16th and 17th April,
however, practice attacks on trenches were carried out as a brigade
exercise, and although no definite information was, at the time,
conveyed to the units as regards the purpose of the practice, the
exercise was in preparation for the rôle which the Brigade would
be called upon to play during its next tour in the line. It was,
therefore, with the greater satisfaction that the 4th Londons carried
out the exercises in leading the assaulting columns beside the
Connaught Rangers.

The novitiate of the Battalion was now over, and it was accepted as
being in every way able to do its full duty as a unit of the Ferozepore
Brigade, and the knowledge that it had "found itself" was in itself the
best possible incentive to all ranks to uphold worthily the honour of
their regiment. The weather was of the most perfect spring type, and
the ground and dykes were once more in their normal condition for the
time of year. Speculation was rife, therefore, as to the task which was
destined to be set the Brigade on its return to the line.

A warning order was received that the Brigade would relieve the
Dehra Dun Brigade on Saturday, the 26th April, in a sector in front
of Neuve Chapelle village, extending from the La Bassée Road on the
right to Sign Post Lane on the left. The 4th Londons were to take over
the left centre subsection, the other front line battalions being
the Connaughts, the 9th Bhopals and the 57th Rifles, with the 129th
Baluchis in Brigade reserve. But this relief was destined not to take
place.

During the day disquieting rumours went round--started as inexplicably
as such rumours always are--that things were not well in the north near
Ypres: rumours of heavy fighting, of defeat, and of dastardly crimes on
the part of the enemy. That the incredible brutality of the Germans was
indeed an accomplished fact all the world now knows, and we must now
review the tremendous happenings in the Ypres salient which caused the
outbreak of a storm destined to rage with ever-increasing fury for the
next three weeks.

CHAPTER IV

THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES, 1915

Since the exhaustion of the enemy's drive towards Ypres in November
1914, the Ypres area had not been the scene of any important
operations, although from time to time fierce struggles had raged here
and there for the possession of points of minor tactical importance.
Early in April 1915 the British lines had been extended slightly
northward, and a sector had been taken over from the French troops on
the left. On the 22nd of that month the line from Steenstraate (near
the Yser Canal) as far as the Poelcapelle Road east of Langemarck was
held by a Moroccan Division of the French Army. Thence the line took
a south-easterly turn towards the Passchendaele-Becelaere Road and
was occupied by the Canadian Division. On the right of the Canadians,
British divisions held the trenches which ran east of Zonnebeeke in the
direction of Hooge.

On the afternoon of the 22nd the French lines were subjected to a heavy
bombardment, following which at about 5 p.m. our aeroplanes reported
that they had seen thick clouds of yellow smoke issuing from the German
trenches between Langemarck and Bixschoote. These arose, as is now
well known, from poison gas, of which the effect was so terrible as to
render the troops exposed to it practically incapable of action. The
smoke and fumes at first hid everything from sight, and hundreds of
men were immediately incapacitated. Within an hour the whole position
had to be abandoned with the loss of fifty guns. This horrible and
unlooked-for attack was so overpowering in its moral effect that our
gallant allies were unable to combat it, and being totally unprovided
with means of defence against so diabolical a contrivance, were
forced--as indeed any troops would probably have been under the like
conditions--to abandon their position without offering resistance. The
confusion and moral effect were doubtless increased by the fact that
the trenches thus attacked were occupied by Africans whose firm belief
in the supernatural rendered it so much the more difficult for them to
withstand this assault.

The immediate result of this gas attack was that the left flank of the
Canadian Division was in the air and was in imminent danger of being
entirely cut off. But the Canadians stuck to their positions with
magnificent tenacity and during the night repulsed numerous German
attacks. In the disorganisation following the gas attack the Germans
had succeeded in establishing themselves on the west side of the
Yser Canal at Lizerne, thus threatening to drive a wedge between the
Canadians on the right and the French and Belgian troops on the left.

By 10 o'clock the next morning the position, though by no means
re-established, was slightly easier, touch being definitely ensured
between the Canadians' left and the French right, about 800 yards
east of the Canal; but in order to effect this junction so great an
extension of the British lines had been necessary that no reserves were
available for counter-attack. The enemy's artillery fire was severe all
day and the situation was rendered exceptionally difficult by the loss
of so many allied guns in the gas attack.

It was arranged between Sir John French and General Foch, who was in
command of the French Army on our left, that the latter should make
immediate arrangements for the recapture of the original French Line,
and for this purpose it was necessary for the British to maintain their
present position without further retirement; but it was clear that
the British troops could not be allowed to remain in the precarious
position held by them during the last twenty-four hours unless the
French attack were delivered within a reasonable time. In the meantime
such reinforcements as were immediately available from neighbouring
Corps were being rushed up into Ypres to strengthen the temporary line
between ourselves and the French.

On the 24th a heavy German attack breached our lines at St Julien. This
might have initiated an extremely critical situation but for a powerful
counter-attack organised and launched by Brig.-Gen. Hull (afterwards
G.O.C. 56th Division), who, with his own Brigade and parts of
battalions belonging to six different divisions all new to the ground,
was successful in stemming the tide of the enemy's advance, although
attempts to recapture St Julien were repulsed.

Early in the morning of the 25th the left flank of the Canadian
division was driven back after two days' magnificent fighting, and by
the evening the allied line north of Ypres ran practically east and
west from the neighbourhood of Boesinghe on the Canal to the south
outskirts of St Julien. The general tendency of this line was to bow
inwards towards Ypres. The seriousness of the threat to the whole
British position east of Ypres is obvious. It was now possible for the
enemy to shell any point in our lines from both sides of the salient,
while his positions being about two miles farther to the south than
they had been prior to the gas attack of the 22nd, he was able to keep
the arterial road from Ypres to Zonnebeeke under continuous and heavy
shell fire from guns of all calibres.

During the whole time considerable confusion was created by the
alteration of areas caused by the sudden relinquishment of the forward
positions; and by the fact that fresh troops on arrival in the Ypres
area had at once to be absorbed into the firing line to prevent
the enemy from exploiting his initial success. This confusion was
heightened by our lack of artillery, which was inadequate to keep
down the heavy German fire, and our casualties were in consequence
continuously heavy. Ypres was itself kept under very heavy shell fire
which vastly increased the difficulty of maintaining supplies of
munitions and food.

The Lahore Division was ordered on the 23rd April to move to the Ypres
area, and on the morning of the 24th orders were received by the 1/4th
Londons that the contemplated relief of the Dehra Dun Brigade on the
La Bassée Road would not take place and that the Battalion would be
ready to move--possibly by train--at 1.30 p.m. By 2 p.m. the Battalion
had joined in the Ferozepore Brigade column followed by the first
line transport. In ignorance of its destination, and quite unaware of
the bitter struggle then going on at Ypres, the Battalion expected to
entrain at Merville, and a great many packs were filled with eatables
and comforts for a long train journey.

However, when Merville, Indian Corps railhead, was passed it became
evident that whatever journey was before the column would be made
on foot. The march was an exceedingly trying one and was made under
"forced" conditions. The roads were in a bad state after the winter
rains, and a good deal of opening out in the column was inevitable,
so that the five-minute halts which took place each hour were mostly
spent in "closing up." Hour after hour the column moved on under the
burden of full marching order, now over uneven pavé, now in deep ruts
and thick mud. Merville, Vieux, Berquin, Strazeele, were passed in
succession. Daylight gave place to dusk and dusk to darkness but still
the column struggled forward. From all battalions stragglers now began
to line the sides of the road, unable after the physically weakening
experience of trench life to keep up the pace. At last about 10.30
p.m. a long halt was made just outside Godewaersvelde, a small village
at the foot of the Mont des Cats. Here a rest of some forty minutes
was obtained on the roadside while double lines of guns, ammunition
columns, and transport blocked the road.

Finally at about 10.45 p.m. the Battalion moved forward into
Godewaersvelde, but the village was packed with troops, and the
companies, therefore, had to content themselves with such shelter as
could be found beneath the parked lorries in the streets.

But the end of the march was not yet. After a hasty breakfast the
Battalion was again on parade before 6 o'clock on the morning of the
25th, and once more joining the Brigade Column struggled up the steep
hill at Boescheppe, at the top of which another delay was caused
by a cross-current of vehicular traffic. The distress of the troops
was now so evident that orders were received to lighten packs, and
garments of all sorts, principally gifts of knitted garments sent out
from ladies in England, were left by the roadside. Through Westoutre
and Reninghelst the column marched on to Ouderdom, where it arrived at
about 2.30 p.m. with orders to billet in huts. Most of the huts were
already fully occupied and the greater part of the 1/4th Londons were
compelled to bivouac in the fields adjoining. Ouderdom is about seven
miles south-west of Ypres, and the object of the forced march was at
last clear. Some little idea of the storm raging in the salient could
be gathered from the bivouacs, as throughout the afternoon and night
the air vibrated with the continuous thunder of artillery in which the
rapid and sharp rafales of the French "seventy-fives" away to the north
were plainly distinguishable.

Shortly after midnight orders were received that the Division would
be pushed into the firing line that day, the 26th April, and at dawn
the Battalion was once more formed up. Shovels and picks were issued
alternately to all the troops for the purpose of digging themselves
into such positions as they might be able to gain, and to each platoon
was issued a yellow flag for signalling its location to the artillery.
In these early days of the War no arrangements were made for the
formation of a "battle surplus," and consequently the whole available
strength of officers and men prepared to move forward. Packs were now
stacked to relieve the troops of superfluous weight, and at 4.30 a.m.
the companies began to move off at five minutes' intervals.

The exhaustion of the men made progress inevitably slow. The roads
traversed were fortunately not receiving much attention from the
enemy's artillery, though a steady bombardment of Ypres with shells of
the heaviest calibre was proceeding. By about 9.30 a.m. the Battalion
was concentrated in a field adjoining Outskirt Farm at La Brique, where
it proceeded to dig itself into assembly trenches (see map No. 3).

Meanwhile the Jullundur Brigade had concentrated farther to the east,
between St Jean and Wieltje, while the Sirhind Brigade in Divisional
Reserve had moved round the south of Ypres to a position north-west of
Potizje.

The 1/4th Londons' position[1] during the hours of waiting in the
morning was behind the crest of the spur which runs westward from St
Jean, past La Brique towards the Canal, and though out of view from the
German trenches was undoubtedly located by the enemy's Taubes, whose
reconnaissances over our lines were entirely unmolested. This, combined
with the close proximity of the Battalion's position to several British
and French batteries, brought it a fair share of German shrapnel during
the morning, the shelling being from both the north and south sides of
the salient. Happily but few casualties were sustained.

[1] It has been thought convenient in the account of this action to
designate buildings and other topographical features by the names by
which they afterwards became generally known, though they were not in
every case so named in April 1915.

Below the hillside on which the Battalion lay concealed and distant
something more than half a mile the gaunt ruins of Ypres stood out
clearly in the morning sunlight, the fast-crumbling tower of its
wonderful Cloth Hall still erect, a silent witness of the tragedy
which was being enacted. All the morning shells were falling into the
town, a steady and merciless bombardment without the least cessation
or abatement. From the centre of the town dense columns of black smoke
rose continuously, and the crash of explosions and the clatter of
falling débris followed each other without respite. The cross-roads
at which the St Jean road left the town were in particular a target
for the German heavy guns. All the morning the 50th (Northumberland)
Division T.F. was moving from Ypres along this road to St Julien, and
as each platoon passed the fatal cross-road at the double a heavy shell
fell close by thinning the ranks. It seemed to every spectator of this
horrible yet fascinating sight that the German artillery fire must
surely be directed from some point within the British lines.

At 12.40 p.m. the Brigade received orders to prepare to take part in
a divisional attack in conjunction with the French in a due northerly
direction, with the object of relieving the pressure on the left of St
Julien and of endeavouring to push the enemy back. With this attack the
50th Division would co-operate on the right of the Lahore Division in
an attempt to recapture St Julien itself.

The Ferozepore Brigade's frontage was on the right of Boundary Road
(the Ypres-Langemarck Road) and extended as far as English Farm, beyond
which the Jullundur Brigade was responsible as far as Wieltje Farm on
the extreme right, and the general line of assembly was on the forward
slope of the spur some 600 yards north of La Brique.

The Brigade's advance was led by the Connaught Rangers on the left,
the 57th Rifles in the centre, with the 129th Baluchis on the right.
The 1/4th Londons were to follow the Connaughts, while the 9th Bhopals
remained in reserve in La Brique.

At 2 o'clock the attack was launched under a heavy bombardment from all
available British and French batteries, but such was the shortage of
ammunition that this support died down for lack of supplies in about
five minutes, after which the German batteries were free to search
intensively the whole area of the Brigade advance, causing a good many
casualties in the assaulting columns.

From the line of assembly the ground subsided gently to a shallow
depression running across the direction of advance, beyond which, at a
distance of some 1000 yards from the crest on the La Brique side, the
hill swelled to a second skyline which impeded further view. Just below
the crest of the further spur an unfenced lane, Buffs Road, followed
the contour running eastwards from Boundary Road. None of this land was
intersected by trenches, the Allied trenches being several miles ahead
and to the rear of the German positions.

The 1/4th Londons moved from their position of waiting at about 2.30
p.m., and shaking out into four lines of platoons in file with B
Company (Moore) on the left, and A (Duncan-Teape) on the right of the
front line, followed by D (Saunders) and C (Clark). The German shrapnel
was now searching both slopes of the spur pretty severely and men
began to drop, but the Battalion steadily breasted the rise from which
it could overlook the shallow valley towards Buffs Road. The sight
which met their eyes defies description. The valley was covered with
a ragged crowd of agonised and nerve-racked men, both Moroccans and
Indians, who, having thrown down their arms and everything which could
impede them, were streaming back from the front trenches suffering
the tortures of poison gas. It was a revolting sight. The attack had
clearly failed and our leading troops were broken and in retirement.
But the men of the 1/4th Londons were splendid. Without wavering for
a single instant they trudged steadily forward, though indeed almost
completely exhausted, maintaining the intervals and distances between
platoons with the precision of the parade ground. Never was there a
more striking example of the results of training and discipline. The
"attack in open warfare" which had been so roundly cursed by one and
all in the days of training at Blendecques had indeed so sunk into the
minds of everyone that instinctively the troops remembering only their
orders to "follow the Connaughts at all costs" carried out under the
most trying ordeal the lessons which had been drilled into them.

The Battalion continued to advance as far as Buffs Road, where a halt,
believed at first to be temporary, was called. No trench line existed
here but the ditch on the near side of the road had been widened. This
was already filled with the remains of the 2nd K.O.S.B. (who had been
fighting continuously since the action at Hill 60 on the 17th April,
and were now reduced to under 100 all ranks) and by the reserve company
of the Connaughts. The majority of the Battalion were, therefore,
unable to obtain shelter in the ditch, and the digging of a fresh line
some fifteen yards in rear was at once put in hand.

Early in the advance Moore (B Coy.) was hit in the foot and his company
was taken over by Grimwade. Considering the severity of the enemy's
shrapnel fire the advance was made with surprisingly few casualties,
and although owing to the massing of the whole Battalion on one line
of narrow frontage some intermingling of platoons on halting was
inevitable, this was rapidly set to rights with little difficulty. The
enemy's bombardment soon died away considerably, though for a while he
maintained a steady machine-gun fire sweeping the crest of the ridge
ahead of Buffs Road.

The troops leading the attack had moved forward steadily at zero hour
and had pushed over the crest line in front of Buffs Road descending
the further slope towards Turco Farm. The front German trench north
of the Farm was reached and occupied, but before the position was
properly established dense yellow clouds of poison gas issued from
the enemy lines and, being gently wafted by the breeze, bore down on
our defenceless troops. Under the horror of this ordeal the greater
part of the line broke and a general retirement ensued which affected
most severely the French and Indian Battalions, as already described.
About 100 of the Connaughts and the Manchesters (Sirhind Brigade),
however, managed to cling gallantly to their ground under Major
Deacon, though they were shortly afterwards ejected by a strong enemy
counter-attack which followed the gas cloud. They eventually succeeded
in consolidating a line in the immediate vicinity of Turco Farm.

Shortly after the 1/4th Londons were established on Buffs Road
Lieut.-Col. Botterill became a casualty, and Major L. T. Burnett
assumed command of the Battalion. It was decided by Major Burnett that
the overcrowding of the Buffs Road alignment was so great and wasteful
of fire power, quite half the Battalion being unable to get into
position to use their rifles, that a redisposition of his forces was
desirable, and accordingly C and D companies withdrew to a position in
support some 300 yards in rear of Buffs Road, where they dug themselves
in.

During this time the Regimental Aid Post under Lieut. Hurd, R.A.M.C.,
was established at Irish Farm and the Battalion stretcher-bearers under
Corpl. Fulford worked with great coolness in evacuating the wounded
under heavy fire.

[Illustration: THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES, 1915]

At about 4.30 p.m. orders were received that the reserve company of
the Connaughts was to push forward and reinforce their two leading
companies, supported by the 1/4th Londons. But, after consultation
with Major Burnett, Major Hamilton of the Connaughts decided that the
severity of the enemy's fire was so great that there was no reasonable
probability of achieving a result commensurate with the inevitable
loss of life, and the orders for the projected advance were cancelled.
An attempt to reinforce the advanced troops was, however, actually
made at about 7.30 p.m. by the 15th Sikhs and the 1/4th Gurkhas of
the Sirhind Brigade, supported by the 9th Bhopals. This advance was
carried out in good order, the Indians passing through the 1/4th
Londons and disappearing over the ridge in front under a veritable hail
of fire; but although touch was obtained with the leading companies
of the Connaughts, the position of the German trenches could not be
ascertained in the gathering darkness, and Lieut.-Col. Hills, who was
in charge of the operation, decided to dig in on the position gained.

In conjunction with Bhopals' attempt an attack was also delivered
by the Turcos of the French Brigade Moroccaine, who passed over the
1/4th Londons' trench in the gathering dusk. They were met in the
crest line by a frightful machine-gun fire under which they advanced
steadily, suffering heavy losses. A young French officer in charge of
these Africans filled all who saw him with the deepest admiration of
his coolness. Smoking a cigarette and lightly swinging a small rattan
cane, he stood up on the sky line with his loose blue cloak thrown
negligently over his shoulders, directing the advance of his men
with all the indifference to danger of which his wonderful nation is
capable. None of these gallant fellows were seen again.

During the whole of the 26th very good work was done by 2/Lieut. A.
D. Coates, who was employed as _liaison_ officer between Brigade
Headquarters and the advanced troops. This gallant young officer
succeeded several times in passing through the enemy's barrage and was
the means of providing Headquarters with valuable information as to the
course of events at Turco Farm.

Meanwhile the 1/4th Londons remained in readiness for action on Buffs
Road, which was shelled heavily at intervals, especially at about
6 p.m., when the German shrapnel caused a great many casualties.
The enemy's fire, however, died down after the evening advance by
the Indians had been checked. The night was particularly quiet, and
Sergt.-Major Harris at La Brique was able to get rations up to the
Battalion and issue them.

The 27th April broke grey and cold and the morning was misty. During
the early hours the enemy's artillery was remarkably inactive and the
work of strengthening the Battalion's position was proceeded with
without molestation by the Germans. The signs of battle were few indeed
and it seemed almost impossible to realise the critical position of
the British troops. The sense of detachment from the serious events
of the preceding afternoon was enhanced by the unbroken state of the
countryside in the immediate neighbourhood and the presence of several
cows, which by some marvellous chance had escaped the enemy's shells
and continued to graze lazily in the field in rear of the Battalion's
position, as they had done during the battle on the previous afternoon.

The lull, however, was only the calm which proverbially precedes the
storm, for about noon the enemy's guns opened with intense violence on
the British positions and the 1/4th Londons received their full share
of these hostile attentions. Fortunately, however, its position behind
the crest secured it from heavy loss.

During this bombardment Major Burnett was ordered to report to Brigade
Headquarters, where he received orders for an attack to take place
in half an hour's time. When he got back to the Battalion under ten
minutes were left in which to explain the orders to his company
commanders and to make all preparations. The Battalion was to execute a
further advance in a north-easterly direction on to Oblong Farm, which
was given as the objective. In order to reach the assembly position,
it was necessary for the Battalion to move about 200 yards to the
right flank in order to come up on the right of the Sirhind Brigade,
who, in the early hours of the morning, had relieved the most advanced
troops of the Ferozepore Brigade.

The hurried nature of the attack precluded any possibility of
reconnaissance of the ground by the officers and allowed no time for
the explanation of the work on hand to the rank and file. The position
of the German trenches was unknown and the difficulties and obstacles
which might be met with during the advance were entirely undisclosed.

The movement of the Battalion toward its position of assembly for
this unpromising enterprise was carried out steadily although with
considerable loss. The British and Canadian artillery, which were
co-operating in giving support to the attack, were again lamentably
short of ammunition, so that an intense bombardment of some five
minutes left them unable to render further assistance. Thus as the
Battalion in moving to its flank came near the crest of the spur behind
which it had hitherto been concealed from direct observation by the
enemy, it became a very clear target for the hostile artillery, and the
German guns being no longer harassed by our artillery, were able to
pour a devastating fire upon the companies.

The actual "jumping-off" position was the ditch on the south side of
Buffs Road which, at this point, was bordered by a hedge. The Battalion
advanced in two lines of two companies in open order, each company
formed in three waves, and the leading companies were C (Clark) on
the left and D (Saunders) on the right, followed respectively by B
(Grimwade) and A (Duncan-Teape). In order to ensure that the waves in
each company should move forward together, it was necessary to collect
the whole of each wave in the ditch before it moved; and this could
only be effected by "feeding" the men along the ditch in single file,
from the western end of the Battalion's frontage, the hedge in rear
being impenetrable. The result of this slow progress was that the
remainder of the Battalion waiting its turn to go into the ditch was
compelled to wait on the hill, under a high explosive and shrapnel fire
which was both intense and accurate. The result needs no description,
but under this very trying ordeal the Battalion was perfectly steady,
each platoon grouped together and waiting its order to move with the
greatest nonchalance.

Before following the actual advance of the 1/4th Londons it will be
convenient to explain the object and scope of the operation of which it
formed part.

During the morning arrangements had been made for the Lahore Division
to co-operate in an attack which was projected by the French Brigade
Moroccaine. The general direction of the French attack was to be along
the Ypres-Langemarck Road, as on the previous day, and the Lahore
Division was to take all possible advantage of the French advance
to gain ground, but without committing itself to the attack before
the French troops had secured its left flank. The Lahore Division's
attack was to conform to the French movement but on the east side of
the Langemarck Road; the Sirhind Brigade occupying the left of the
Divisional front next the French with the Ferozepore Brigade on its
right.

The objective of the latter was, as already stated, Oblong Farm, a
moated farmstead some 1700 yards from starting-point, the attack being
led by the 1/4th Londons on the left and the 9th Bhopals on the right.
The Connaughts followed in support at a distance of 400 yards, while
the 57th Rifles and the 129th Baluchis, both of which regiments had
been seriously weakened in the action of the 26th, were in reserve.

At 12.30 p.m. the leading waves of the two assaulting battalions moved
forward under a continued heavy shell and machine-gun fire. The ground
over which the advance was to be made was for the first 700 yards
an unenclosed plateau which afforded the enemy good observation of
our movements, and then sloping gently downwards to a somewhat more
enclosed depression rose beyond it once more towards the objective. The
objective itself was not visible from starting-point, and it appears
probable that in consequence of the very hurried preparations for the
attack, its position was not fully appreciated by all concerned and
thus it was not recognised. However this may be, it is certain that the
general direction of the attack after crossing Admirals Road became
diverted too much towards the north and thus some encroachment was
made on the frontage for which the Sirhind Brigade was responsible.
This was probably accentuated by the fact that the position selected
as starting-point lay at an acute angle to the direction of advance,
so that a change of direction was necessary during the advance
itself--always an operation of great difficulty.

As far as Admirals Road cover was non-existent. On topping the crest
of the hill the Battalion came under an exceedingly severe rifle and
machine-gun fire, and losses were consequently heavy. The succeeding
waves, however, pushed on steadily as far as the near edge of the
depression described above, in the vicinity of Hampshire Farm, when it
became clearly impossible to get down the forward slope of the valley
under the raking fire of the enemy, without incurring frightful losses.
Half the leading companies were already hit, as were also Saunders,
fatally wounded, Grimwade, Stedman, Leonard, and Coates. It was,
therefore, decided by Major Burnett to hold the line gained and there
to reorganise the Battalion pending the arrival of reinforcements, when
it might be possible to carry the line forward.

A small part of C Company under Clark and of B Company under Giles,
however, were successful in gaining the bottom of the valley, but
finding himself isolated and further advance impossible without
support, Clark, who assumed command of the composite party, took up a
position to the right of Canadian Farm, where the men dug themselves in
with their entrenching tools and hung on gallantly under a murderous
fire. Splendid service was rendered by two N.C.O.'s of this party,
Sergeant A. C. Ehren and Lance-Corporal C. Badham, both of B Company,
who passed through the barrage three times unscathed with messages
between Captain Clark and Battalion Headquarters.

Excellent work was also done by the Machine-Gun Section under 2/Lieuts.
Walker and Pyper, who skilfully brought their guns into action on
the left of Hampshire Farm and assisted in no small measure to keep
down the hostile rifle fire from the enemy trenches on the further
side of the valley. Their position, however, was shortly afterwards
discovered, evidently by a Taube, which continued its reconnaissance
over our lines without let or hindrance, and the section came under
heavy shell fire and was forced to fall back on the main position, with
Walker dangerously wounded, Sergt. Phillips killed, and several other
casualties.

At about 2.30 p.m. the enemy's artillery fire abated considerably, but
by that time the advance of the whole Division had been definitely
checked on an alignment generally corresponding with that occupied by
the 1/4th Londons, and reports were received that the French also had
failed to gain their objectives.

Later in the evening the French attempted to renew their offensive, but
once more were met with clouds of poison gas which definitely broke
up their attack, and a report having been received from Col. Savy,
the French Commander, that his losses were so heavy as to preclude
all further attempts, orders were received that the Brigade would
consolidate its position.

During the evening before dusk the Ferozepore Brigade was again
subjected to violent shelling, which inflicted considerable loss on all
battalions. During this later bombardment Lieut. Coffin was buried by a
high explosive shell.

After darkness fell the 1/4th Londons were withdrawn from their
advanced line to Brigade Reserve in rear of Cross Roads Farm where
they set about digging fresh trenches. The Connaughts and the Bhopals
withdrew to the line of Admirals Road near Cross Roads Farm, in which
Brigade Headquarters were now established, while the Rifles and
Baluchis took up a position to the rear.

The night passed without incident and with very little shelling, and
the opportunity was taken to collect the wounded whom it had been
impossible to evacuate under the heavy fire of the afternoon. 2/Lieut.
E. Giles, who from many volunteers was selected for this work, set a
splendid example of devotion to duty and worked hard throughout the
night in endeavouring to relieve the sufferings of his men.

The day's losses had been heavy and the gain of ground nil, but the
bearing of the Battalion under somewhat disheartening circumstances had
been worthy of the highest traditions of regular troops. Something,
however, had been achieved as, in spite of his use of poison gas, the
enemy was no nearer Ypres and our line, though strained almost to
breaking point, was still holding. It appears indeed that the gallant
front shown by the Lahore Division was successful in deceiving the
Germans as to the extent of our resources, and deterred him from
pressing the advantages he had already gained.

The casualties of the afternoon of the 27th April were in officers:

Capt. C. R. Saunders and 2/Lieut. A. D. Coates, killed; Lieut. P.
B. K. Stedman, died of wounds; Capt. F. G. Grimwade, Lieuts.
F. A. Coffin and D. J. Leonard, and 2/Lieut. T. I. Walker,
wounded; and in N.C.O.'s and men, 32 killed (including C. S. M.
Chennels), 132 wounded, and 13 missing.

During the 28th the 1/4th Londons remained in position in rear of Cross
Roads Farm, and beyond a good deal of shelling in which gas shell was
freely used by the enemy the day passed without important incident.
Luckily the bombardment this day was not very costly to the Battalion
or, indeed, to the Brigade as a whole. The Lahore Division was
transferred from V Corps to a special counter-attack force then formed
under command of Gen. Plumer, and it was arranged that the Sirhind and
Ferozepore Brigades should be prepared to co-operate with an attack
contemplated by the French who were still on our left flank, making
such advance as might be justified by the results achieved by our
Allies. The French attack, however, did not materialise in consequence
of the very heavy losses of the preceding two days and our Allies
confined themselves to artillery action.

During the evening the enemy turned a large number of guns on to St
Jean and in a few hours the work of destruction, already far advanced,
was almost completed. In the darkness the church was clearly visible in
flames, the windows being lit up by the conflagration within: before
morning the tower had fallen, the roof had collapsed, and nothing but
smouldering ruins remained.

The 29th April found the Ferozepore Brigade still holding its trenches
and orders were again issued to it to be prepared to co-operate with
the French. But during the morning definite orders were received that
the French attack was postponed, the assault of the enemy positions
being a more formidable proposition than could be tackled by the Allied
troops in their then exhausted and numerically weak condition.

The German bombardment continued throughout the 29th, and the Battalion
remained inactive beyond the further strengthening of its trenches.
It did, however, have the satisfaction of seeing a Taube brought down
close to its lines by our anti-aircraft guns.

Before daybreak on the 30th, the Ferozepore Brigade was relieved and
marched out of the salient, the 1/4th Londons proceeding by way of
Buffs Road and La Brique to hutments at Ouderdom. While passing through
La Brique the Battalion was met by a reinforcement of about fifty
N.C.O.'s and men from the 3/4th Battalion in England, conducted by
Major E. H. Stillwell. Accompanying this draft were 2/Lieuts. L. G. Rix
and B. Rivers Smith.

The roads out of the salient were being very heavily shelled during the
relief, the cross roads at Vlamertinghe being in particular accurately
bombarded with heavy shrapnel. But Major Burnett was able to save a
great many casualties by varying the route of some platoons.

At about 7.30 a.m. on the same morning the Ferozepore Brigade moved
from the hutments to bivouacs close by to avoid the effects of the
continuous shelling to which the concentration camp was subjected,
but returned to the huts at night. The day was spent in rest and
reorganisation. The Battalion was undoubtedly a little shaken after its
rough handling and very seriously reduced in strength. Over 600 rifles
had left Ouderdom on the morning of the 26th, but at the roll call
which took place on return on the 30th only 235 names were answered,
apart from the newly arrived draft which had not been in action.

[Illustration: _St Jean Village in April 1920_]

The following awards were made for services rendered:

Capt. W. G. Clark, D.S.O.; Sergt. A. C. Ehren, D.C.M.; L/Corpl.
Colomb, D.C.M.; Corpl. Fulford, Médaille Militaire de France.

In this, its first serious action, the 1/4th Battalion had firmly
established its reputation by its remarkable steadiness under
unprecedented circumstances, and, though the price paid was heavy, it
had the satisfaction of having contributed materially to the undying
glory of the British defence of Ypres.

At 7.45 p.m. on the 1st May, the concentration of the Division being
now complete, the Ferozepore Brigade marched from Ouderdom _via_
Reninghelst, Westoutre, to Meteren, arriving there at 12.30 a.m. on
the 2nd. A rest was made here until the afternoon when the route was
resumed, Doulieu being reached about 10 p.m. The march was completed
the following evening, when at about 7 p.m. the Brigade returned to its
former billets in the Paradis area.

CHAPTER V

OPERATIONS DURING THE SUMMER OF 1915

In spite of the severe tax placed on his resources by the
ever-increasing weight of the enemy's assaults at Ypres, and the
consequent difficulty of finding sufficient reserves of men and
material to embark on a new attack on a large scale, Sir John French
decided early in May to adopt the bold course of launching a fresh
offensive at the southern extremity of the British front. He was led
to this resolve partly by the hope of diverting the enemy's attention
towards the south and thereby easing the pressure against Ypres,
and partly by the desire to assist the French who were launching an
offensive south of the La Bassée Canal.

The ultimate objective of this new undertaking was the opening of
the road to Lille, and the necessary preliminary to this was the
expulsion of the enemy from his defences on the Aubers Ridge and the
establishment of the British troops on the La Bassée-Lille Road.

This attack was entrusted to the First Army, whose operations were
divided into two separate zones. In the north the assault was to be
made by the IV Corps at Rouges Bancs with the object of turning the
Aubers defences from that flank; while farther south the I and Indian
Corps were to secure the line Ligny-le-Grand--La Clicqueterie Farm.

The Indian Corps attack was to be carried out by the Meerut
Division--the Lahore Division still being weak after its recent
fighting in the salient--on a front from the right of the Corps sector
near Chocolat Menier Corner to Oxford Road (on the left of La Bassée
Road). The rôle of the Lahore Division, which would occupy the line in
front of Neuve Chapelle with the Jullundur Brigade, was to support the
Meerut Division's attack with artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire,
and particularly to secure the left flank of the assaulting columns
during their advance by being prepared to operate as occasion might
arise against the Bois du Biez.

The attack was launched on the 9th May at 5.40 a.m. after a forty
minutes' bombardment of the enemy lines by all available guns.

The assaulting columns advanced with the greatest valour, but were
met by a murderous machine-gun and rifle fire, under which they were
literally mown down. The survivors struggled on in spite of the
frightful losses they were suffering, but practically none of the 1st
or Meerut Divisions reached the enemy's front trench. Farther north the
8th Division effected a lodgment in the enemy's trenches, but after
hanging on gallantly throughout the day were forced at night to return
to their original positions after suffering appalling casualties. From
all along the line came reports of what amounted to total failure. The
surprise effect which had proved so valuable at Neuve Chapelle in March
was wanting this day, and our artillery had been inadequately supplied
with high explosive shells to enable them to destroy the German
machine-gun emplacements.

Meanwhile reports were received from the French of some considerable
degree of success. On the following day Sir John French decided not to
pursue his offensive in the north, but to limit his further efforts to
the area south of the La Bassée Road, and accordingly preparations were
made for the resumption of operations on the 12th.

The Lahore Division had reached the Neuve Chapelle area after its march
back from Ypres on the evening of the 4th May, the Ferozepore Brigade
finding accommodation in its former billets at Paradis, which it left
the following day for Riez Bailleul.

On the evening of the 8th the Brigade moved forward to take up its
prearranged position of assembly in support to the Jullundur Brigade.

The position taken up by the 1/4th Londons and the 9th Bhopals was in
shallow assembly trenches in the orchards about the junction of Sign
Post Lane with Rue Tilleloy. These trenches were hastily dug and very
shallow, without either traverses or any sort of shelter; and it was
therefore fortunate that the weather was unusually warm and fine for
the time of year. The Connaughts and the 57th Rifles occupied the old
British front line (as it had been before the battle of Neuve Chapelle)
astride Sign Post Lane.

During the whole of the 9th, 10th and 11th May the 1/4th London
remained in these trenches under continual heavy shell fire: though
owing to the lack of success with which the main operation had met it
was not called upon to advance.

On the evening of the 11th it was withdrawn with the rest of the
Brigade to billets at Riez Bailleul. On return to billets great
discomfort was caused to all ranks by the discovery that the billet
in which the packs had been deposited during the three days spent in
trenches had been burnt to the ground, involving the total destruction
of its contents together with a mail from home. The following day the
Indian Corps Commander (Sir James Willcocks) visited the Battalion and
expressed his deep appreciation of its conduct at Ypres.

The 12th May dawned dull and misty and artillery observation was
exceedingly difficult; and for this and other causes the renewal of
the attack was again postponed until the 15th. The Meerut Division was
again responsible for the Indian Corps attack. The Lahore Division
adopted a role similar to that which it had played on the 9th, and the
Ferozepore Brigade moved forward once more on the evening of the 15th
May to its former assembly positions about Sign Post Lane.

In order to endeavour to secure the surprise effect which had been
lacking on the 9th it was decided this time to deliver the attack at
night, and after a preliminary bombardment the assaulting columns
dashed forward at 11.30 p.m. on the 15th. On the right of the attack
in the region of Festubert and La Quinque Rue considerable success was
achieved by the 7th Division, and some advance was also made by the 2nd
Division which was operating on the immediate right of the Indians.

The Meerut Division, however, was again faced with a hail of lead from
the enemy lines under which it was impossible to live, and though the
troops did all that men could do, by 4 a.m. on the 16th, after two
gallant efforts, the attempts of the Indians to advance were definitely
checked and the remains of the assaulting columns were once more back
in their original trenches.

From this date onwards operations were confined to the southern area
in the neighbourhood of Festubert, and though the battle continued to
rage until the 25th May, the Indian Corps was no longer concerned in
it beyond the preparations necessary to enable it to conform to the
advance on its right flank.

During the early part of the month the 1/4th Londons received further
officer reinforcements as follows:

Capt. A. A. N. Haine.
Lieut. S. G. Monk.
Lieut. D. C. Cooke.
2/Lieut. J. S. B. Gathergood.

The Battalion remained in its shallow trenches until the 18th May under
less favourable conditions of weather than previously, and the exposure
caused a large number of casualties through sickness, including Lieuts.
Rivers, Smith and Cooke, and 2/Lieut. Gathergood, who were evacuated to
hospital.

On the evening of the 18th May the Ferozepore Brigade took over the
front line from the Jullundur Brigade, the 1/4th Londons relieving the
4th Suffolks on the right, between the La Bassée Road and Oxford Road,
the subsection including Port Arthur Keep where Battalion Headquarters
were established. This tour of duty was uneventful and the troops were
occupied principally in repairing the damage done to the entanglements
and defences by the enemy's shell fire during the days of the battle.
A certain amount of shell fire was, however, experienced causing a few
casualties, including Captain Haine, who was hit on the 22nd. The enemy
also paid a good deal of attention to the back areas and the regimental
transport now established at Rouge Croix was heavily shelled on the
25th, and again on the 26th, with such severity that it was compelled
to change position to Riez Bailleul.

During this period also the issue of gas masks to all ranks was
completed.

On the 30th the Sirhind Brigade, which had been in divisional reserve
during the battle, came forward and took over the line from the
Ferozepore Brigade, the 1/4th Londons handing over their trenches to
the 1st Manchesters and withdrawing to billets at Riez Bailleul.

After the end of May no further attempt was made on the Indian Corps
front to conduct operations on a large scale. The difficulties
under which the Indian battalions were labouring in the supply
of reinforcements to replace casualties were extreme. The Indian
concentration camp at Marseilles was continually receiving
reinforcements from India, but of these an increasing proportion was
found to be unfit for despatch to the front, and as the summer wore
on the native regiments of the Corps gradually ebbed in numbers until
amalgamations began to be effected to maintain units at anything
approaching war strength. In these circumstances offensive operations
against so strongly defended a position as the Aubers Ridge were out
of the question, especially having regard to the continued shortage
in the supply of shells. At the same time the general situation did
not permit of the Indian Corps being entirely withdrawn from the line
for a prolonged rest and reorganisation. The story of the next three
months is, therefore, one of unceasing hard work in and out of the
line without any of those opportunities of distinction which are as
necessary to the well-being of a battalion--and especially a native
battalion--as a regular supply of rations.

This increasing numerical weakness of the native battalions threw a
greater burden of work and responsibility on the British units, both
Regular and Territorial, though even they experienced the greatest
difficulty in obtaining the regular supplies from home of that fresh
blood which was so earnestly desired. The 1/4th London returned from
Ypres in May at a strength well under 300 all ranks, and at no period
during the remainder of its attachment to the Indian Corps did its
strength approach even 450; in other words, for months on end, in
sentry-go, working and carrying parties, and patrols, every man was
doing two men's work; and this with a very scanty proportion of rest
behind the line. Out of 126 days from the end of May to the beginning
of October the 1/4th Londons spent 92 days in trenches, and of the
remaining 34 in billets not one was spent beyond the reach of the
enemy's guns.

With the exception of one tour of duty in the Min House Farm sector
the 1/4th Londons spent this summer on the right of the La Bassée Road
either in the trenches in front of the Rue du Bois, which included
the well-remembered positions of the Orchard Redoubt and Crescent
Trench, or in reserve, usually in Lansdowne Post, a large redoubt on
Forrester's Lane. The summer months saw very great improvements in the
Rue du Bois trenches. The isolated listening posts, like grouse-butts,
which had formed the advanced positions in March were now joined into
a continuous line of breastwork, connected with the Rue du Bois by
numerous communication trenches. Shelters for the trench garrisons
were also constructed, but these gave protection against nothing more
serious than rain--and not always that. In this waterlogged area the
sinking of a deep dugout was an impossibility, and the shelters were
in consequence mere "rabbit-hutches" built into the breastwork and
covered with corrugated iron and a few sandbags, which imbued the
occupants with an entirely unjustified sense of security. At the same
time the wire entanglements in No Man's Land were constantly extended
and strengthened. With all these defences steadily growing, the duties
of the Battalion on working parties, both when occupying the line and
when in reserve billets, were onerous and unceasing. Patrolling work by
night was vigorously prosecuted as being practically the only available
means of fostering the growth of the "offensive spirit." Trench routine
in 1915 was marked by a feature which in subsequent years almost
entirely vanished--the constant employment of rifle fire. At this
period the infantryman had not succumbed to the insensate craze for
bombs which later ruined his powers as a rifleman; and every night, in
one part of the trenches or another, saw something in the nature of an
organised shoot by the infantry, bursts of rapid fire being directed
on the enemy's parapet. These practices were of great value, not only
in keeping the men skilful with their rifles, but also in maintaining
their moral superiority over the enemy which might otherwise have
become seriously impaired through their knowledge of the inequality of
our strength in artillery.

The enemy's activity during this summer was for the most part confined
to artillery fire which at times attained serious proportions and
inflicted severe loss; indeed throughout the period under review the
toll of casualties was steady and continuous.

Out of the trenches the 1/4th Londons withdrew to reserve billets
either at Pont du Hem, L'Epinette, or La Fosse, and while in reserve
were invariably called upon for working parties in the forward area,
so that the opportunities available for training and repairing the
damage inevitably caused to parade discipline by long-continued
trench life were almost entirely wanting. At this period, moreover,
"back-of-the-line" organisation had not reached the high pitch attained
in later years. Baths were an infrequent luxury, concert parties--of
an organised type--unheard of, recreational training still without its
proper recognition. Such infrequent rests as were granted to the troops
were thus of comparatively small recuperative value.

But in spite of these numerous difficulties the Battalion was steadily
increasing its military efficiency and its morale throughout the summer
was high.

[Illustration: _Rouge Croix, La Bassée Road_]

[Illustration: _The Doll's House, La Bassée Road_]

One of the most unpleasant tours of duty was at Min House Farm, already
alluded to, a sector on the left of Neuve Chapelle, facing Mauquissart,
which the Battalion took over for a week in July as a temporary measure
during a readjustment of Brigade boundaries. The breastworks here were
especially weak and very much overlooked from the Aubers Ridge. Wire
was embryonic and communication trenches poor. Moreover, the area
appeared to be the subject of particular hatred on the part of the
Bosche, who shelled it frequently and heavily. Min House (or Moated
Grange) Farm, where Headquarters were established, was perched on the
crest of a little knoll which afforded the Headquarters staff a good
view over the sector, but, probably for this very reason, the Hun
objected to it. In fact before the tour of duty came to an end the farm
was totally destroyed by shell fire and Battalion Headquarters had been
forced to make a hasty exit to Ebenezer Farm, which, being outside the
sector and unprovided with signal communications, was not ideal for the
purpose of a Headquarters.

An extraordinary incident occurred during the last week of June, which
seems worth recording. One night a patrol of the 129th Baluchis left
the British lines to investigate the condition of the enemy's wire.
On its return one man, Ayub Khan, was missing and all endeavours to
recover his body were fruitless. The following evening Ayub turned up
again, and being taken before his company commander related how he had
entered the German trenches and passed himself off as a deserter. As is
well known the Germans were always anxious to secure the defection of
the native troops, and Ayub Khan's arrival was therefore hailed with
enthusiasm. He was taken to the rear and examined carefully. Having
kept his eyes open and seen all he could, Ayub Khan persuaded the
Germans to let him return to our trenches in order to bring more of
his friends over. In a weak moment the Germans agreed to let him go;
but instead of greeting Ayub and his party of fellow-deserters, they
were faced a few days later with a notice board which was displayed on
our parapet commenting on the incident in suitable terms. Not being
a humourist, the Hun lost his temper, and it is at this point in the
story that the 1/4th Londons become concerned. The luckless notice
board was displayed on Crescent Trench then occupied by D Company.
At 8.30 a.m. on the 27th June the enemy opened on the board with 5.9
howitzers, and almost the first shell hit Capt. Cart de Lafontaine's
Headquarters, causing him a severe attack of shell-shock and killing
his subaltern 2/Lieut. F. F. Hunt. All the morning the "hate" was
continued with great loss to D Company, and by midday the Crescent
Trench was practically obliterated. Company Sergt.-Major Risley showed
great coolness in controlling his men and withdrawing them as far as
was practicable out of the zone of fire, and set an excellent example
of steadiness under a most trying ordeal. He was subsequently awarded
the D.C.M.

On the 16th June Major L. T. Burnett, who had been in temporary command
of the 1/4th Londons since the 26th April, was promoted Lieut.-Colonel
and appointed to command, Major G. H. M. Vine assuming the duties of
second in command.

At the beginning of September, however, the Battalion was exceedingly
unfortunate in losing Major Vine, who was sent to hospital with eye
trouble, and Lieut.-Col. Burnett being on leave at the time the command
of the Battalion was assumed until his return by Lieut.-Col. Murray of
the 89th Punjabis.

Early in August Capt. and Adjt. G. B. Scott also said farewell to
the Battalion on taking up an extra-regimental employment, and the
Adjutancy was given to Capt. W. G. Clark, D.S.O., and subsequently to
Capt. E. Giles.

The following officers joined during August and September:

Lieuts. R. V. Gery, D. J. Leonard, C. Gaskin.

2/Lieuts. S. E. Lyons, H. B. A. Balls, H. Jones, C. C. Spurr, A. G.
Sharp, R. Johnstone, W. J. Boutall, F. C. Fanhangel, S. E. H.
Walmisley, A. S. Ford, G. L. Goodes and H. J. M. Williams.

In N.C.O.'s and men the Battalion was less fortunate, and up to the end
of September 3 N.C.O.'s and 14 men, all veterans of Neuve Chapelle or
Ypres, were the only reinforcements from home.

The casualties in officers for the same period were:

2/Lieut. F. F. Hunt, killed.

Capt. H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine, wounded (shell-shock).

Capts. H. W. Weathersbee and H. M. Lorden, and 2/Lieut. A. G.
Sharp, to hospital.

Arrangements had now been completed for the launching of an offensive
on the high ground south of La Bassée Canal in the direction of Loos
and Hulluch. The opening day of the offensive had been fixed for the
25th September, and as the Indian Corps was not concerned with the main
action it will be needless for us here to review the course of events
south of the Canal.

North of the Canal, however, a subsidiary operation of some magnitude
had been organised with the strategic object of increasing the pressure
on the German defences north of La Bassée to such an extent that he
would be compelled under the strain of our main offensive in the south
to relinquish the La Bassée line altogether and retire to the east of
the Aubers Ridge.

To this end an ambitious programme had been drawn up for the Indian
Corps which temporarily included the newly arrived 19th Division. The
preliminary attack was to be made by the Meerut Division under cover
of a smoke and gas attack to the north of Neuve Chapelle, with the
object of establishing a new line in the first instance along the road
from the Ducks Bill to Mauquissart. The experience of previous actions
having clearly shown that initial success had frequently been converted
into subsequent failure by a delay in following up the first advance,
it was arranged that the Jullundur and Ferozepore Brigades and the 19th
Division should be prepared immediately to exploit whatever success
should be gained by the Meerut Division by pushing forward at once to
the line Moulin d'Eau--La Tourelle--east edge of Bois du Biez, while
the Sirhind Brigade "leap-frogged" through them to Lorgies. It was
hoped that considerable moral effect might be obtained by the use of
poison gas against the Germans, and to magnify this as much as possible
arrangements were made for the building up of smoke screens, one by the
Meerut Division to cover the left flank of its attack and one by the
Jullundur Brigade on the right of the attack; for the projection of a
heavy smoke cloud by the Ferozepore Brigade on the Rue du Bois and by
the 19th Division (holding the extreme Southern Section, south of the
Boar's Head salient); and for an attempt simultaneously to set fire to
the Bois du Biez by means of incendiary bombs.

Systematic wire cutting on either side of the La Bassée Road was
begun on the 21st September, and a feint attack was conducted by the
Ferozepore Brigade late in the afternoon of the 22nd in conjunction
with the divisional artillery. This feint attack took the form of a
heavy bombardment of the enemy's front line by all available guns,
starting at about 5 p.m. After five minutes the guns lifted on to the
enemy's support line and the infantry in the line (Connaughts and 57th
Rifles) by means of rifle fire, lifting dummies on to the parapet and
flashing their bayonets, endeavoured to produce an impression among
the Germans that an attack was imminent. In the midst of the confusion
caused to the Germans by this demonstration our artillery once more
shortened its range, firing shrapnel on the enemy's front line. It was
believed that this feint attack had the desired effect: the fire of
our guns was certainly accurate and well distributed, and elicited but
little reply from the enemy. The hostile machine-gun fire, moreover,
betrayed some perturbation inasmuch as it was extremely erratic, the
bullets passing high over the Rue du Bois and doing no damage. The
1/4th Londons were at this period in Lansdowne Post.

On the 23rd the weather changed, and the favourable dry season which
had given such promise of success for our schemes gave way to heavy
rains. The wind, too, veered round to the south-east so that it blew
towards our lines instead of towards the enemy's. This was particularly
disastrous as it would nullify the effect of the smoke screens and
render the use of gas impossible. It was determined, however, to do
all possible to carry the offensive through to success, and the Lahore
Division was ordered to be completely ready to move forward by 6 a.m.
on the 25th September.

Once more, however, the attempt to advance on this front was foiled.
Possibly the feint attack on the 22nd had been somewhat too theatrical
to impress the enemy and had merely indicated our intentions to him.
Certain it was, however, that on the 25th he was holding his trenches
in particular strength and there remained stolidly throughout the day
in spite of our smoke screens and demonstrations, to which he replied
with vigorous machine-gun and shell fire. The attempt of the Meerut
Division to push forward proved abortive, and the Lahore Division was
unable to get forward, there being not the least sign of weakening on
the enemy's front opposite to them. There is no doubt that this failure
was in part at least due to the treachery of the elements. The smoke
screen was utterly ineffective; gas could not be used at all.

The 26th saw the general situation unchanged and the enemy still
sitting in his front line and showing not the least disposition to
leave it.

On the evening of the 26th the 1/4th Londons relieved the 57th Rifles
in a line of reserve posts on the Rue du Bois in the vicinity of
Chocolat Menier Corner (Dog, Cat, Pall Mall and "Z" Orchard Posts).

The weather had now definitely broken and heavy rains fell, reducing
the trenches to veritable seas of mud. The Battalion continued to
occupy the Keeps until the evening of the 30th, the duty having passed
quietly with the exception of a small amount of enemy shell fire; but a
large proportion of the shells being "blind" no casualties were caused.
On relief on the 30th the 1/4th Londons once more withdrew to Lansdowne
Post. On the 2nd October the Ferozepore Brigade was relieved by the
19th Division and moved out to billets in the La Gorgue-Riez Bailleul
area. Here it remained resting and training for a week, throughout
which the weather remained vile in the extreme.

On the 11th October the Ferozepore Brigade once more took over the
Neuve Chapelle sector from the Jullundur, the 1/4th Londons occupying
the right subsector with a detachment of the 89th Punjabis[2] in Hills
Redoubt and Battalion Headquarters in Sandbag Alley. On the left of the
1/4th Londons the Brigade sector was taken up as far as Château Road by
the 57th Rifles while the Connaughts were on the extreme left as far as
Sunken Road.

[2] The 89th Punjabis reached France in June and replaced the 9th
Bhopals in the Ferozepore Brigade.

Two days later the Ferozepore Brigade conducted a second feint attack
in conjunction with other operations which it is not necessary to
detail. On this occasion the feint was timed to take place shortly
after midday, the morning being occupied by our guns in a systematic
wire-cutting shoot, which was followed by a heavy bombardment of the
enemy trenches during the projection of the smoke screen. Following
the smoke screen, smoke barrages were formed on the flanks of the
feint attack at 1.45 p.m., and simultaneously with them the infantry
in the line operated with rifle fire and demonstrations similar to
those employed on the former occasion to give the illusion of a
pending attack. The wind again was unfavourable, this time blowing
the smoke along No Man's Land between the lines instead of over the
enemy's trenches; and owing to the strength of the wind the smoke
screen never became dense enough to conceal the bomb guns by which it
was delivered. During the whole period of the operation our front and
rear lines were subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery,
which caused very great damage to our breastworks and wire, guns as
heavy as 8-inch being employed with great intensity between 12.45 and
1.30 p.m. This bombardment caused large numbers of casualties in the
1/4th Londons, it being impossible to clear, even temporarily, the
bombarded trenches owing to the necessity of maintaining as intensely
as possible the bursts of rifle fire in accordance with the scheme.
It is a matter of grave doubt as to whether these demonstrations were
worth the casualties they cost; and it seems abundantly evident that no
useful purpose can have been served by carrying through a prearranged
scheme essentially dependent on the weather when the conditions on
the appointed day were unfavourable. Perhaps the best comment on the
undertaking is to be found in the orders for the operation, which
included a warning to the effect that "dummies must not be raised too
high so as to show the sticks, as they were before"!

After the disturbance caused by this operation the sector relaxed to
a condition of remarkable calmness, which was maintained during the
remainder of the tour of duty. This came to an end on the night of the
27th October when the Ferozepore Brigade was relieved for the last time
in France by the Jullundur. The 1/4th Londons were relieved by the 4th
Suffolks and withdrew to billets on the Merville Road at Estaires, the
remainder of the Brigade concentrating in the same area.

The casualties for the month of October included Lieuts. C. Gaskin and
D. J. Leonard, both wounded, the latter accidentally. During this rest
a reinforcement of about fifty N.C.O.'s and men joined the Battalion.

Rumour had been active for some time as to the possible transference
of the Indian Corps to another theatre of operations, and on the 31st
notification was received that the Lahore Division would embark at
Marseilles early in November, but that the Territorial units would not
accompany it. The gradual withdrawal of the Division from the line
had in fact begun, and when the 1/4th Londons returned to the reserve
trenches in Loretto Road on the 4th November it had said good-bye to
its good friends of the Ferozepore Brigade and was temporarily attached
to the Jullundur. The following day its attachment was transferred
to the Sirhind Brigade, the Jullundur having also made its final
withdrawal from the line.

On the 7th the Battalion relieved the 27th Punjabis (Sirhind) at
Ludhiana Lodge, and provided detachments to hold Church and Hills
Redoubts and Curzon Post, the front line being held by the 4th King's.
The three Territorial battalions of the Division, the 4th Londons,
4th King's, and 4th Suffolks were all now unattached and were handed
over to XI Corps, who were taking over the line from the Indians with
the Guards and 46th Divisions, and a few days of constant change of
positions ensued during the progress of the relief.

On the 8th the 1/4th Londons withdrew to Loretto Road. This day the
long connection of the Battalion with the Indian Corps, with which
it had passed through pleasant and rough times alike on terms of the
closest friendship, was finally severed. Lieut.-Col. Burnett, Capt. W.
G. Clark, D.S.O., and a detachment of the Battalion marched to Croix
Barbée to bid good-bye to the divisional commander, Major-Gen. Keary.
In the course of an address to the detachment the General said that on
the occasion of the departure of the Indian Corps from France and the
consequent severance of the Battalion from the Division, he wished to
express his thanks to the regiment for the good work they had done.
Their loyalty and devotion to duty had been worthy of all praise, their
bearing in action left nothing to be desired, and their discipline had
been excellent throughout. On conclusion of this address the General
handed Lieut.-Col. Burnett a written Order of the Day.

On the 10th the Battalion moved forward into Brigade reserve at Pont
Logy, and this day was attached to the 137th Brigade of the 46th
Division. The weather was still exceedingly wet, the trenches full of
water, and the conditions in the line owing to the lack of dugouts
were unusually uncomfortable. On the evening of the 14th the Battalion
finally left the Neuve Chapelle area, billeting at Croix Barbée for
the night and continuing its journey the following day by motor-bus
to Lillers, where it became attached to the 140th Brigade of the 47th
(London) Division.

This concludes the first phase of the 4th London Regiment's service in
France. The year 1915 all along the line had been one of equilibrium
after the defensive battles of 1914.

We have said enough of the Battalion's life in the Indian Corps to
indicate that the year 1915 was one of very hard work and continued
strain on all ranks. Out of 255 days spent in the Lahore Division the
Battalion was actually in trenches for 142 days, in reserve billets
providing working parties for 76 days, and at rest only for 37 days;
and although it was worn out and weak when it withdrew to Lillers in
November it was a thoroughly seasoned fighting battalion, every officer
and man of which was an experienced soldier.

CHAPTER VI

THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE 47TH DIVISION

The 47th (London) Division to which the 1/4th Londons were now attached
had just withdrawn for a period of rest and reorganisation from the
trenches around Loos where they had seen a good deal of heavy fighting
in the battle of the 25th September. The Division had come out from
England in March 1915 and had first been engaged as the extreme right
Division of the British Army at Festubert in May. Although serious
losses had been suffered in the attacks on Hill 70 in September,
the battalions of the Division had subsequently received strong
reinforcements from home, and the majority of them were far larger
than the 1/4th Londons who, at the date of attachment to the Division,
numbered only 24 officers and 435 other ranks.

The Division, which was under command of Major-Gen. C. St L. Barter,
K.C.B., K.C.V.O., comprised the following Infantry Brigades:

140TH INFANTRY BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. G. Cuthbert, C.B.

1/4th London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers).
1/6th " " (Rifles).
1/7th " "
1/8th " " (Post Office Rifles).
1/15th " " (Civil Service Rifles).

141ST INFANTRY BRIGADE

1/17th London Regiment (Poplar and Stepney Rifles).
1/18th " " (London Irish Rifles).
1/19th " " (St Pancras).
1/20th " " (Blackheath and Woolwich).

142ND INFANTRY BRIGADE

1/3rd London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers).
1/21st " " (First Surrey Rifles).
1/22nd " " (The Queen's), Kennington.
1/23rd " " (East Surrey, Clapham Junction).
1/24th " " (The Queen's), Bermondsey.

PIONEER BATTALION

4th Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

The Division was attached to the IV Corps (Rawlinson) of the First Army
(Haig).

The first day after arrival at Lillers (16th November 1915) was
devoted by the Battalion to cleaning up uniforms and equipment which
had, through the prolonged duty in waterlogged trenches, become caked
with weeks of mud. The general discipline of the 47th Division and of
the 140th Brigade in particular was exceedingly good; and although
the battle discipline of the Lahore Division had been excellent, and
the training and experience which the 1/4th Londons had gained while
attached to it of the highest order, yet it cannot be gainsaid that
the parade discipline among the Indian Brigades had not been given
that amount of attention which the long years of war showed to be
necessary, even in the field, to ensure the best results in action. We
have already indicated that this weakness in the Indian Brigades arose
through their continual deficiency in numbers and the consequent long
periods of trench duty which had been imposed on them.

The sudden change, therefore, from trench duty to a period of rest, in
which ceremonial mounting of guards and drill were prominent features,
created a totally new environment for the Battalion which was entirely
beneficial.

The whole Battalion, from the Commanding Officer to the most recently
arrived draft, was determined to maintain the reputation of the
Battalion; and by dint of hard work on and off parade the 4th Londons
became rapidly second to none in the Brigade in all the duties they
were called upon to carry out--and they were the more impelled to this
effort by the realisation that they were the senior Battalion of the
Brigade, not only in precedence, but also in point of active service
experience.

At Lillers the Brigade spent about a month, passed for the most part in
very cold and wet weather, in a thorough course of training, in which
particular attention was paid to drill and bombing. At this period
the question of the thorough organisation of bombing--or as they were
then called "grenadier"--sections with the proper quota of bayonet
men, throwers and carriers was attracting a great deal of thought,
and the time devoted to this particular branch of the art of war was
subsequently found, as will be seen later, to have been well spent.

Each Battalion mounted daily a quarter guard and an inlying piquet
of one officer, two sergeants, and thirty rank and file, and the
ceremonial mounting of these duties was carried cut with all possible
pomp on the Grande Place at Retreat.

In addition to this the peace-time system of "extra drills" as a minor
punishment was re-instituted--not perhaps an altogether pleasant
recollection for some--but in spite of the disadvantages such a system
must always have in the eyes of those for whose particular benefit it
is devised, there can be no question that this tightening of discipline
had in the end a beneficial effect on all ranks, the extent of which it
is impossible to overestimate.

The training period was varied by inter-battalion sports and football
matches in which the 1/4th Londons achieved some success, beating the
7th Battalion 3-1, and the 6th Battalion 3-1. On the whole the month
passed smoothly with very little incident worthy of mention beyond a
two-day divisional route march which took place on the 1st and 2nd
December.

On the 6th December the 1/4th Londons suffered a loss in the death
of Sergt. Bench, who had very efficiently carried out the duties of
Transport Sergeant since the Battalion's arrival in France, his death
being the result of injuries caused by a fall from his horse.

During the training at Lillers a most gallant action was performed by
Lieut. H. Jones. While practising throwing with live bombs one of the
men dropped a bomb with the fuse burning. At great risk Lieut. Jones
picked up the bomb and threw it out of the trench, where it at once
exploded. His bravery undoubtedly saved several lives.

In January, the Battalion was joined by Lieut. V. C. Donaldson.

* * * * *

The front of attack in the Battle of Loos had extended from the La
Bassée Canal on the left, where our lines were faced by the village of
Auchy, to the village of Loos on the extreme right. In this attack the
first objective was the line of the Lens-Hulluch-La Bassée Road, the
frontage being divided more or less equally by the Vermelles-Hulluch
Road, which ran directly out from our trenches towards the Germans.

North of this dividing line were three very serious obstacles, namely,
Auchy itself defended by impassable wire entanglements; a work of large
area and enormous strength known as the Hohenzollern Redoubt; and a
group of Quarries close to the Lens-Hulluch Road.

The 9th and 7th Divisions had met with great initial success on the
25th September 1915, the former overrunning the Hohenzollern Redoubt
and gaining a position beyond it on a large slag-heap known as Fosse
8, while elements of the 7th Division sweeping the enemy's defence of
the Quarries before them had gained the outskirts of Cité St Elie and
Hulluch beyond the Lens-Hulluch Road. The unfortunate check to the
advance of the 2nd Division at Auchy, however, had exposed the left
flank of the 9th Division, who were afterwards ejected from Fosse 8,
while the 7th on their right had been unable to retain their advanced
positions across the main road.

Desperate fighting ensued for the possession of these strongholds
until the conclusion of the battle about 13th October. At that date
the Germans retained possession of the whole of the Quarries and the
greater part of the Hohenzollern Redoubt. Between the two the British
had driven a wedge so that the part of the Hohenzollern which remained
in the enemy's hands formed an abrupt salient, of which the west face
was formed by a trench irreverently named by the British "Little
Willie," and the south face by its obvious companion "Big Willie."
Connecting the eastern extremity of Big Willie with the north-west
corner of the Quarries the Germans remained in possession of Potsdam
Trench, while the Quarries themselves formed another but smaller
salient in the enemy's lines, well flanked on the south-east side by
our positions, which caused a second abrupt turn to the east in the
enemy lines.

The whole area between these confused positions was a vast maze of
earthworks, for they were in the midst of what had, prior to the
battle, been a strong German third system of defence and No Man's
Land was traversed by innumerable short communication trenches and
saps, held by the opposing garrisons by means of barricades, for the
possession of which an unceasing and murderous struggle with bombs
and trench mortars was still proceeding. In addition to these deadly
conflicts a still more subtle warfare was being waged underground,
where our Tunnelling Companies were fighting a battle of wits with the
Germans by mining and counter-mining, and the blowing of mines followed
by fierce local infantry fights for possession of the craters thus
formed were of frequent recurrence.

A reference to a large map will render clear the extreme importance to
the enemy of the possession of these two positions. Situate as they
were, one on each of the two lowest spurs of the Vermelles-Hulluch
Ridge, their capture by the British would have involved a very serious
threat to the German defences on the line Auchy-Haisnes, and might
easily have been a prelude to the outflanking of La Bassée itself.
The enemy was obviously alive to these possibilities, and the daily
intelligence reports gleaned from our patrols and observers made it
abundantly clear that he was strengthening his trenches and wire, and
was burrowing strenuously in opposition to our mining operations.

* * * * *

This severely contested part of the front was taken over by the 47th
Division from the 9th between the 13th and the 15th December, C Section
opposite the Quarries and D Section opposite the Hohenzollern Redoubt
being occupied by the 141st and 142nd Brigades, the 140th Brigade
remaining in reserve.

For some time after the return to the line the 1/4th Londons did not
enter the trenches as a battalion, but on account of its small numbers
was retained in reserve, where it performed a great deal of heavy
labour in working and carrying parties for the rest of the Brigade.

On the 15th the 1/4th Londons moved from Lillers at 8.30 a.m.,
entraining for Nœux-les-Mines, whence it marched to billets at
Labourse, training being continued while the Brigade remained in
reserve.

This move was followed by a further approach to the line which took
place on the 19th December, when the 140th Brigade relieved the 141st
in C 1 and C 2 Sections, opposite the Quarries, the 6th and 15th
Battalions occupying the front trenches with the 7th Battalion in
support at Le Philosophe and the 4th and 8th Battalions in Brigade
reserve at Noyelles-les-Vermelles.

Here the 1/4th Londons' duties in carrying and trench working parties
in the forward areas were severe as the reserve billets were some three
miles from the front line trenches.

The most active part of the Brigade's new front was C 2, the subsection
now garrisoned by the 15th Londons, where on the left of the Quarries
the continuous struggle already referred to in sapping, bombing and
mining was proceeding with particular violence. The centre of this
fighting was a work held by the British, known as the Hairpin, and
two saps, Essex Trench and Shipka Pass, which pushed forward from the
Hairpin towards the German lines. Essex Trench in particular was the
scene of much hard fighting, for the Germans were in occupation of the
further end of it and were separated from our garrison by a double
barricade. This trench and Shipka Pass were coveted by the Germans,
as it was through them that they hoped to obtain a lodgment in the
Hairpin, the possession of which would secure the right flank of their
salient at the Quarries and render their precarious tenure of that
feature much more secure. With this object they had on the night of the
17th launched a determined bombing attack along Essex Trench and Shipka
Pass, the enemy bombers being well supported by trench mortar and rifle
grenade fire. Our garrisons, however, were ready, and none of the enemy
reached our barricades, and their attack was finally dispersed by our
artillery.

This attempt was renewed in the early hours of the 20th, when so
vigorous an attack was delivered that the 15th London bombers in Essex
Trench were forced back from their barricade for some 20 yards, and
were unable for the moment to organise a counter-attack as the Germans
had constructed "arrow head" trenches flanking his sap, so that he
was able to bring fire to bear on our garrison from three points
simultaneously.

After a personal reconnaissance the Brigadier decided on making the
same evening a bid for the recovery of the lost trench. The 15th London
bombers having already suffered considerable loss, they were reinforced
during the day by the Battalion bombers of the 1/4th Londons, who
moved up to the Hairpin. The day passed quietly but for some accurate
shelling of our positions to the right of the Quarries, which was
stopped by our heavy guns. At 9.45 p.m. our attack was delivered by
three parties of bombers simultaneously--one in Essex Trench, one in a
neighbouring sap, and one moving over the open, flanking support being
given by machine-guns posted in Shipka Pass and west of the Quarries.

The first attack failed, the Essex Trench party on reaching our
old barricade coming once more under a shower of bombs from three
directions, while the sap party found progress impossible owing to
the waterlogged condition of the sap, and the party in the open were
brought to a standstill by machine-gun fire. Second and third attempts
proved equally unsuccessful, and after the 23rd December attacks were
discontinued though the enemy portion of Essex Trench was kept under
constant trench mortar fire.

Through all these days the 1/4th London bombers remained in line,
taking an active part in the unceasing battle of bombs which was
pursued between the barricades, practically without intermission, and
unhappily a large number of casualties was caused.

On the 22nd December a special Order of the Day was received in which
Sir John French said farewell to the troops on the occasion of his
relinquishment of the Commander-in-Chief; and on the same day Sir Henry
Rawlinson handed over command of the IV Corps to General Wilson.

Orders were received on the 23rd that in consequence of certain signs
of activity on the enemy's part, the line would be held in greater
strength for the ensuing forty-eight hours, and in accordance with the
prearranged defence scheme the 1/4th Londons occupied the old British
front line in front of Vermelles early on the morning of the 24th. At
8 a.m. a mine near the Hohenzollern Redoubt was blown by the British,
the crater being successfully occupied by troops of the 141st Brigade.
The Artillery activity caused by this operation dying down shortly
afterwards, the 1/4th Londons and other units in reserve returned to
their billets later in the day.

During this tour of duty the Brigade Light Trench Mortar Battery, which
was in line in the Hairpin sector, was joined by 2/Lieut. Goodes. The
Battery did exceedingly good work during the fighting in the Hairpin.
When the 1/4th Londons left the 47th Division Goodes remained with 47/1
L.T.M. Battery, and was killed at High Wood in September 1916, having
been decorated, for his consistently gallant service, with the Military
Cross and Bar.

Christmas Day passed in the line without particular incident beyond the
daily "hates" of shells and bombs, and this year, in consequence of
special orders, no attempt was permitted to indulge in the remarkable
fraternisation with the enemy which had occurred during the first
Christmas of the war.

On the 26th the relief of the 140th Brigade by the 142nd in C Section
commenced, and the following day the 1/4th Londons withdrew to new
billets at Sailly Labourse.

In Divisional reserve the Brigade devoted a few days to the usual
routine of baths, cleaning, refitting and training, and on the last
day of the year once more entered the trenches, but on this occasion
in D Section, the left sector of the Divisional front, which it took
over from the 141st Brigade, the 6th and 15th Battalions once more
occupying the front system, the 8th Battalion in support to them,
while the 7th who joined the 4th at Sailly Labourse were with the 4th
in Brigade reserve. The new sector included the trenches opposed to
the Hohenzollern Redoubt, and extended to the left to the vicinity
of the Vermelles-Auchy railway. During the Brigade's short tenure of
the sector the usual shelling and trench mortar activity continued
but without incident of any particular interest. The 1/4th Londons
continued in the wearisome and unpicturesque task of supplying working
parties.

During the 2nd, 3rd and 4th of January 1916, the relief of the 47th
Division by the Dismounted Division took place, the 140th being
relieved on the morning of the 3rd by the 1st Dismounted Brigade,
withdrawing on relief to a group of villages some seven miles behind
the line in the Béthune area, the 1/4th Londons billeting at Drouvin,
and the remainder of the Brigade being distributed between Verquin and
Mouchin.

This relief was merely the first stage of a "side-step" which the
Division was making towards the south, and on the following day the
Brigade moved _via_ Nœux-les-Mines to Les Brebis and made arrangements
for the taking over of a sector of the line south of Loos from the
French.

The 1/4th Londons' service in the Hulluch area had been arduous owing
to the long marches imposed on the working parties in addition to their
tasks, but it had fortunately, except among the bombers, not been a
costly one, and its strength had not very much decreased since the date
of its joining the Division.

During December a few officer reinforcements were received as follows:
2/Lieuts. H. G. Beal, C. W. Cragg, J. Elliott and E. W. Monk, and
during January the Battalion was joined by 2/Lieut. C. F. P. de Pury
(to D Company).

During December also the Quartermaster (Lieut. E. S. Tomsett) went on
leave during which he fell sick, not returning to the Battalion until
the 15th March 1916. In his absence his duties were carried out by
2/Lieut. S. E. H. Walmisley.

In the New Year's Honours List the names of Lieut.-Col. L. T. Burnett,
Capt. W. G. Clark, D.S.O., and Capt. J. R. Pyper were mentioned in
despatches and a few weeks later the award of the Military Cross to
Captain Pyper was announced.

The new sector taken over by the 47th Division involved relief of the
18th French Division, and a consequent extension southwards of the
British lines. This sector roughly comprised the lines in front of
the villages of Maroc and Loos, and had first been taken over from
the French in June 1915. The 47th Division had fought in this part
of the line in the battle of Loos, and carried the British positions
forward through Loos village up to the famous Double Crassier, and on
to the lower slopes of Hill 70. Subsequently the French had once more
taken the position over from them. This sector was divided into two
subsectors known respectively as Maroc and Loos, the Maroc subsector
on the right including some 1000 yards of trench extending from the
vicinity of the Grenay-Lens railway to the extreme southern limit of
the British advance in September 1915 and also about 1700 yards of the
new positions then gained; while the Loos sector comprised entirely new
positions gained in September and extended for some 1700 yards to the
left completely covering Loos village and the well-known "Tower Bridge."

On the night of the 5/6 January the 140th Brigade entered the Maroc
sector, the 141st occupying the Loos sector with the 142nd in
Divisional reserve. The difficulties of the relief were somewhat
increased owing to the fact of taking over French troops, and the
difference of language was the inevitable cause of some delay, but
finally, however, matters were successfully adjusted and the 140th
Brigade was left in possession with the 1/4th Londons occupying the
right subsection, on a frontage of some 800 yards opposite the "Fosse
16 de Lens"; the 7th Londons in the right-centre subsection, the 15th
Londons in the left-centre subsection, which included the Double
Crassier, and the 6th Londons on the left. The 8th Battalion were in
reserve with two companies in South Maroc, and two in the old British
front line just in rear of the Double Crassier, which was the danger
point of the Brigade sector, not only on account of the observation of
our lines which it afforded the enemy but also because it lay at the
apex of an abrupt re-entrant in the British front line.

In this sector the 1/4th Londons found their own supports which were
billeted in cellars in South Maroc, a mining village built on the
unattractive "square" plan of American cities, and consisting of
innumerable rows of artisans' dwellings, then unhappily in a state of
complete ruin. The cellars of these dwellings, however, still afforded
sufficient cover for the concentration unobserved by the Germans of a
considerable body of troops, and the Germans were evidently somewhat
disturbed at the prospect of this for their artillery, both light and
heavy, paid continual attention to the village both day and night.

This sector having once more come into occupation by British troops
an enormous amount of work was immediately necessary to complete the
front line and company supplies of small arms ammunition, bombs, rifle
grenades and trench stores of all sorts; and this support and reserve
companies were kept busily engaged in this work throughout the tour of
duty.

In this sector also the steel shrapnel helmet first made its
appearance, so far as the 1/4th Londons were concerned. It is amusing
to look back on the distrust with which its advent was first regarded
by all ranks alike--although afterwards, when once its efficiency and
protective qualities had been tested, it was as highly prized as it had
been previously shunned. The first issue was made at the rate of one
helmet per fire bay, the honour of wearing it falling to the man on
sentry duty for the time being, and most remarkably disinclined the men
were to assume this undesired badge of office.

On the 9th the 140th Brigade was relieved in the line by the 142nd,
moving on the 13th into the Loos sector, where it took over the
trenches of the 141st Brigade. The 1/4th Londons did not take part in
this relief but remained in the right subsection, temporarily under
the orders of the 142nd Brigade, with the 22nd Londons on their left.
Here the Battalion remained until the 16th, when it was relieved by
the 17th Battalion, rejoining the 140th Brigade in rest billets at
Haillicourt.

On the 19th January Lieut.-Col. L. T. Burnett left the Battalion on
short leave, and as it unfortunately proved, permanently, for he
fell seriously ill while on leave and was unable to return to duty
for nearly a year. The command was assumed during his absence by
Major W. G. Clark, D.S.O., while Major S. Elliott became temporarily
second in command. The loss of Lieut.-Col. Burnett was keenly felt.
His nine months' command had been marked by a striking advance in the
Battalion's efficiency and by the unswerving loyalty of all ranks under
his command. Later he joined the Reserve Battalion in England, being
subsequently transferred to employment in the War Office.

At Haillicourt the Battalion spent a few days in rest and training
and returned to the trenches on the 24th January, occupying the same
subsector as on the previous occasion with the 7th Londons once more on
its left.

This tour of duty was marked by particularly heavy artillery activity
on both sides, the Germans shelling our trenches and Maroc daily with
great accuracy and using a good deal of gas shell. A certain number of
casualties inevitably occurred, but, having regard to the continued
intensity of the bombardment, the number was remarkably small.

On the 27th January the Kaiser's birthday was celebrated, and it was
somewhat confidently anticipated that, as in 1915, the Germans would
endeavour to score some success against the British. It had been known
for some time that enemy mining operations in this area had been
proceeding apace, and it therefore appeared not improbable that the
Germans would endeavour to time the firing of their mines for the 27th.
Preparations to meet this possibility were made. The Kaiser's birthday
did indeed prove to be a day of considerable activity, and though the
Germans delivered an abortive attack against the 15th Division on the
left no infantry movement occurred opposite the 140th Brigade; and
their activity was confined to shell fire, which assumed serious
proportions on the 27th and again on the 28th. Our artillery, however,
was ready with heavy retaliatory fire and by the evening of the 30th
conditions in the Maroc sector had reverted to something approaching
quietness.

During this period the newly arrived 16th (Irish) Division of the
New Army was attached to the 47th Division for instruction in trench
warfare, the 1/4th Londons taking over the supervision of the 8th
Munsters, among whom unfortunately several casualties were caused by
hostile shell fire on the 30th. The 31st January was marked principally
by heavy British artillery fire, which elicited but little response
from the enemy and inflicted considerable damage on his wire and
defences generally.

The following day the 140th Brigade handed over its trenches to the
142nd, the 1/4th Londons being relieved by the 21st Londons and
proceeding to rest billets in Haillicourt.

This tour of duty really brought to a conclusion the Battalion's
service with the 47th Division, for though it did not part from the
Brigade until the 9th February, the intervening days were spent in
training, route-marching and cleaning.

On the 8th Brig.-Gen. Cuthbert--then in temporary command of the
Division--inspected the 1/4th Londons prior to their departure, and
addressed the troops; and the following day the Battalion marched to
Béthune, entraining for Pont Remy (near Abbeville), and marched via
Hallencourt to Citerne, where it went into billets attached to the
168th Brigade of the newly formed 56th (London) Division, an attachment
which remained unbroken to the end of the War.

CHAPTER VII

THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN MALTA, GALLIPOLI PENINSULA AND SOUTHERN EGYPT

On the departure from Malta of the 1st London Infantry Brigade on the
2nd January 1915, the 2/1st Brigade became responsible in its place for
the defence of the Fortress.

The 2/4th Londons settled down at St George's Barracks to a vigorous
course of training. A musketry course under Fortress arrangements
was begun and also special classes for the Machine-Gun and Transport
sections, those for the latter being conducted by the A.S.C. at Musta
Fort. The Battalion also provided a detached company to continue the
duties of prisoner of war guard at Verdala Barracks, which had formerly
been carried out by a company of the 1/4th Battalion.

Shortly after the relief of the garrison, Major J. F. F. Parr,
R.A.M.C.T., who had been medical officer of the 1/4th Londons, was
appointed to be M.O. in charge of Imtarfa Hospital.

During the 2/4th Londons' duty in Malta they were frequently called
on to find the "public duties" consisting of an officer's guard at
the Governor's Palace in Valetta, and guards over various government
depôts, the first Palace Guard being found on the 9th February.

The 10th February was celebrated as a festival on the island, being the
anniversary of St Paul's shipwreck, and the usual religious procession
took place.

On the 11th February the Battalion moved from St George's Barracks to
Floriana Barracks, Valetta.

The following day H.E. the Governor-General, General Sir Leslie Rundle,
G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., and staff left Malta for England,
and on the 12th the new Governor-General (Field-Marshal Lord Methuen,
G.C.B., G.C.V.O., C.M.G.) arrived and took up his residence at the
Palace.

At this period occurred two events of paramount importance which
materially affected the part which the Malta Station was destined to
play in the War. The first of these was the opening on the 25th April
1915 of combined military and naval operations against the Gallipoli
Peninsula; the second being the decision to throw in her lot with the
Allies of Italy, who declared war on Austria on the 22nd May 1915.

The effect of the former of these events was to render British naval
supremacy in the Mediterranean, and consequently the security of the
Mediterranean Fleet Headquarters at Malta, of vital importance; and of
the second to ensure both desiderata not only by the relief from the
menace of a potential enemy at no great distance from the island, but
also by the accession to the Allied strength of the powerful Italian
Navy, which formed an additional protection to Malta against the
possibility of a surprise raid by Austria.

From this date onwards, therefore, the function of Malta became one not
so much of a fortress as of a base of operations, and a highly useful
evacuating station for the casualties from Gallipoli who now began to
be drafted to the island in great numbers. The accommodation on the
island for hospitals being limited to the normal service requirements
of peace time, the congestion rapidly became serious, and the troops of
the garrison vacated their barracks, going under canvas in the barrack
squares in order to provide accommodation for the sick and wounded; the
2/4th Londons moving to the parade ground at Ghain Tuffieha Camp.

On the 26th July a warning order was issued to the Battalion, which
was still regarded as a draft-finding unit to the 1/4th Battalion, to
prepare a draft of 400 other ranks to reinforce the 1/4th Battalion
in France. The resulting deficiency in the 2/4th Battalion was to
have been made up by a draft of equal size from the newly formed
4/4th Battalion in England, and although this latter draft actually
embarked at Southampton, the order was cancelled; and it appears that
the decision was made at this time, doubtless owing to the wastage
of personnel at Gallipoli, to treat the 2/4th Londons as a service
battalion and to leave the duty of provision of drafts for both the
1/4th and 2/4th Battalions to the 3/4th and 4/4th Battalions at home.

The following officers were invalided home from Malta: Major J. F. F.
Parr, R.A.M.C.T., Capt. W. G. Hayward, 2/Lieuts. L. R. Chapman and N.
L. Thomas. The Battalion was joined on the 13th August by: 2/Lieuts. B.
F. L. Yeoman, H. G. Hicklenton, C. P. Darrington and N. W. Williams.
Capt. Hayward's duties as Adjutant were taken over by Capt. L. C.
Coates.

On the 12th July Lieut. Simpson was ordered to join the 2nd Royal
Fusiliers, then attached to the 29th Division at the Dardanelles, and
was posted to the Machine-Gun Section of that Battalion.

During this period training was proceeding to such extent as was
possible in view of the congested state of the island, and detachments
were supplied for fatigue duties at St Andrew's and St Patrick's Camps,
Imtarfa Hospital, and for coast defence at 9th Mile Stone (between St
Paul's and Salina Bays).

On the 12th August three signallers of the Battalion, the first other
ranks to proceed on active service, left for the Dardanelles attached
for duty to H.M.S. _Euryalus_. Two days later a warning order was
issued for the Battalion to prepare for embarkation to Egypt.

Before departure from Malta the 2/4th Londons were inspected on the
14th August by H.E. the Governor, who subsequently issued a Fortress
Order to the following effect:

It is a pleasure to His Excellency to say with truth that it
has been a source of satisfaction to him to have had the four
Territorial battalions of the City of London Regiment under his
command. Their conduct has been excellent under trying conditions
lately on account of the heavy and unceasing fatigue work they have
had to perform. Their appearance in Valetta, the smart way in which
the men salute, the alacrity of the Main Guards in turning out,
all show the efficiency of the Battalions. His Excellency wishes
Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men "God Speed," and if
from Egypt they go to the Front he looks to them with confidence to
uphold the high reputation of the City of London Regiment.

On August 19th camp at Ghain Tuffieha was struck and the Battalion
marched to Valetta, embarking next day on H.T. _Southlands_--which
sailed for Egypt on the 21st, arriving at Alexandria on the 25th. The
Battalion disembarked and marched to quarters under canvas at Sporting
Club Camp on the seashore, where it remained until October 6th.

The strength on proceeding to Egypt was 30 officers and 765 other
ranks, the officers, N.C.O.'s and men who were not passed fit for
active service remaining under Lieut. V. W. Edwards in Malta for
garrison duty, until September 1916, when they returned to the Reserve
Battalion in England.

At Alexandria the Battalion provided duties, including the Main and
Ras-el-tin Guards and town pickets; and also a detachment of 3 officers
and 100 other ranks at Keb-el-Dick Fort, from which further guards were
supplied for Chatty Cable Station, Supply Stores and other points of
importance.

The Battalion was inspected by the Brigadier, the Earl of Lucan, on the
6th October, who in an address to the troops said:

I have come here to-day to do something which is quite sad for me,
and that is to say good-bye to you. I wish you all every success,
good luck, and a safe return to England. I trust we shall all meet
again.

I am proud that I have been in command of the 1st London Infantry
Brigade and am exceedingly sorry that I am not coming with you. I
had hoped that the four battalions of the London Regiment would
have gone to the Front as a Brigade.

I much appreciate the hard work you all did at Malta and I send you
from here with every confidence that you will acquit yourselves in
the future as I know you have done in the past, and you will uphold
the great reputation you have gained. I feel sure you will do great
credit to yourselves and to the City of London Regiment wherever
you go.

The commanding officer also received a letter from Major-Gen. Sir
A. Wallace, C.B., commanding the troops at Alexandria, expressing
his appreciation of the discipline and bearing of the Regiment and
affirming his conviction of the exemplary manner in which it would
carry out its duties on active service.

The same day embarkation commenced on to H.T. _Karroo_ at Alexandria,
and on the 9th, under escort of two destroyers, the _Karroo_ sailed for
Mudros, arriving on the evening of 12th October. The following officers
did not accompany the Battalion to Mudros:

Capts. G. H. Moore and H. Parkhouse (seconded for duty, in the
Censor's Office, Cairo).

Lieut. H. W. Dennis (granted leave to England) and 2/Lieut. F. R.
C. Bradford (in hospital).

For two days the Battalion remained on board in Mudros Harbour, but
on the 15th was transhipped to H.T. _Sarnia_, which put to sea about
3 p.m. At midnight the transport anchored off Cape Helles and the
Battalion disembarked on to the Gallipoli Peninsula at W. Beach and
bivouacked in dugouts in the early hours of the 16th October 1916.

The Battalion was now attached to the Royal Naval Division, the
infantry of which consisted of the following units:

ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION
Major-Gen. A. PARIS, C.B.

1ST BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. David Mercer, C.B.
"Hawke" Battalion.
"Drake" "
"Hood" "
"Nelson" "
2/3rd London Regiment.
2/4th London Regiment.

2ND BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. C. N. Trotman, C.B.
1st Royal Marines.
2nd Royal Marines.
"Anson" Battalion.
"Howe" "
2/1st London Regiment.
2/2nd London Regiment.

The Division was attached with the 42nd (South Lancashire) and 52nd
(Lowland) Territorial Divisions to the VIII Corps (Lieut.-Gen. Sir
Francis Davies, K.C.B.).

* * * * *

The 2/4th Londons landed on the Peninsula at a critical period in the
fortunes of the expedition, and in order to render clear the position
of affairs in the middle of October, some reference is necessary to the
course which events had taken since the inception of the campaign.

After witnessing the "amphibious battle" between British battleships
and the land forts of the Dardanelles, which took place on the 18th
March 1915, General Sir Ian Hamilton had formed the conclusion that
the Navy would be unable to open the way to Constantinople without the
fullest co-operation of all the military forces at his disposal.

The Gallipoli Peninsula runs in a south-westerly direction from its
isthmus at Bulair, where it is spanned by fortified lines, for some
fifty-two miles to its extreme point, Cape Helles, attaining in its
centre a breadth of nearly twelve miles.

The northern coast of the northern portion slopes abruptly towards
the Gulf of Zeros in a chain of hills extending as far as Cape Suvla,
the declivitous nature of the coastline precluding serious military
landings. In the southern half, which is more accessible from the
sea, the main features consist of Achi Baba, dominating the extreme
end of the Peninsula; Sari Bair Mountain, a succession of almost
perpendicular escarpments overlooking Suvla Bay; and the Kilid Bahr
plateau protecting the forts of the Narrows against attacks from the
north coast.

As a result of a reconnaissance of this unpromising feature it became
abundantly evident to Sir Ian Hamilton that he could achieve success
and overcome the difficulties caused by the inadequacy of the landing
places and the improvements made by the Turks in their defences
since the 18th March, only by rapidly flinging ashore the largest
possible force at several landing places simultaneously. The glorious
achievement of the landings at Cape Helles and Anzac on the 25th April
are now matters of history, and lack of space makes it impossible to
repeat the epic here. We can only record the fact that in face of
innumerable difficulties and a murderous fire from the Turkish lines
and forts, landings were in fact effected. By the end of the month,
by dint of furious and practically continuous fighting, the French
and British were definitely though precariously established on the
south-west extremity of the Peninsula on a line running from sea to sea
about three miles north of Cape Helles.

It was obviously essential to exploit the initial success as quickly as
possible in order to carry the Allied lines forward before the Turkish
reinforcements should arrive, and in spite of the exhaustion of the
troops, fighting of the most desperate character continued on both the
Helles and the Anzac fronts throughout May. But so enormously strong
were the Turkish entanglements and trenches, and so well placed their
machine-guns, that the Allied progress was slow and achieved only at
appalling cost.

On the 6th-8th June a last attempt was made on the Helles front to
carry the village of Krithia and the slopes of Achi Baba, but this
attack met with a similar fate to its predecessors, and the nett result
after a severe struggle was an advance of some 200 yards; the line thus
gained representing the most advanced position ever occupied on this
front.

As a result of strong representations by the Commander-in-Chief, fresh
forces were concentrated by the end of June consisting of the 10th,
11th and 13th Divisions of the New Armies, and the 52nd (Lowland),
53rd (Wessex) and 54th (East Anglian) Territorial Divisions, the two
last-named being represented by infantry only.

The impossibility of attaining further success by frontal attacks at
Helles now being clear, Sir Ian Hamilton determined to employ his fresh
forces in endeavouring to strangle the Turkish defence by an attack
across the Peninsula from Anzac, in a south-easterly direction towards
Maidos; supported by a fresh landing farther up the coast at Suvla Bay.

[Illustration: _V Beach, Cape Helles_]

The new operation was launched on the 6th August. The main attack from
Anzac involved as a preliminary objective the occupation of the heights
of Sari Bair, the possession of which would enable us to bring rifle
fire to bear on the enemy communications with Helles and, moreover,
bring the Narrows within field-gun range. So nearly to success did
this attack attain that had it received the support which had been
anticipated from the Suvla Bay landing, with its consequent diversion
of Turkish reserves, there can be little doubt that the advance would
have developed into one of first-rate importance. New Zealand troops
did, in fact, scale the heights of the main ridge, but in subsequent
counter-attacks were forced to yield to the enemy, and the few hundred
yards of ground which stood between us and decisive victory were denied
to us.

The actual landing at Suvla on the 8th was effected, as had been
hoped, as a complete surprise to the enemy, and met with little
resistance. But the exhaustion of the troops, caused by a failure
in the water supply arrangements, led to the waste of many valuable
hours of daylight in which no advance was possible and enabled the
enemy to prepare a stubborn resistance to our further attacks, and the
opportunity passed for ever.

During August and September the supply of reinforcements and munitions
for the Dardanelles Army fell off seriously, and in the middle of
October the position had become stabilised.

The general situation had indeed changed most unfavourably for our
chances of ultimate success. The wholesale retirement of our Russian
Allies during the summer had released large numbers of enemy reserves
for the Gallipoli theatre, and the recrudescence of enemy submarine
activity in the Ægean Sea increased the difficulties of supply and
transport from the bases at Mudros and Imbros, so that whereas the
Allied forces had indeed shot their bolt, the enemy's strength was
still increasing.

Since the Suvla landing no further active operations had been
attempted, but constant pressure was maintained on the Turkish lines
by our trench garrisons in mining and bombing, while our artillery
continually harassed him in his advanced and rearward positions.

* * * * *

The 1st Brigade was out of the trenches on the arrival of the 2/4th
Londons and the first few days were therefore spent by the Battalion in
the rest camp at W. Beach (Cape Helles) in providing working parties
and unloading stores, while the senior officers of the Battalion
visited a sector of the trenches. The fact should not be overlooked
in connection with the 2/4th Battalion's record that owing to the
narrowness of our foothold on the Peninsula it was impossible to
withdraw troops, even when "at rest," beyond the shelled zone, and the
beaches were constantly under fire of heavy batteries on the Asiatic
side.

On the 19th Oct. the Adjutant, Capt. L. C. Coates, was admitted to
hospital suffering from pleurisy and his duties were taken over by
Capt. J. R. Webster.

The Allied lines on the Helles front stretched from sea to sea in a
direction from south-east to north-west about a thousand yards short of
Krithia village. The trench system was divided into two approximately
equal portions by the Krithia Road, which, connecting Krithia with the
village of Sedd-el-Bahr, near Cape Helles, traversed a ridge which
formed the backbone of this part of the Peninsula. On the right of the
road the lines were held by the French, their right flank (nearest
the Narrows) being drawn back slightly on the near side of a deep
gorge called Kereves Dere, the waters of which discharged into the
Dardanelles. On the left of the road the lines were in the occupation
of the VIII Corps, and were divided into three sections, of which at
this date the right was held by the 52nd, the centre by the Royal Naval
and the left, next the Ægean Sea, by the 42nd Division.

The VIII Corps front was intersected by two deep ravines respectively
called Gully Ravine, near the Ægean coast, and Krithia Nullah on the
immediate left of the Krithia Road, and both of these, originating in
the slopes of Achi Baba, formed deep furrows through the British lines,
running towards the sea in a direction roughly parallel to the Krithia
Road. The high ground between the ravines formed a plateau covered
with scrub and gorse, and intersected in all directions by water
courses of less importance; the whole area being uncomfortably exposed
to direct observation from the Turkish defences on Achi Baba. All along
this front the British and Turkish lines were close together--in some
places only about 30 yards apart--and a continual and deadly warfare,
in which bombs played a prominent part, was being waged from sapheads
pushed out from the main defensive positions and held by barricades.

The Royal Naval Division's subsector included several of such centres
of activity, notably at the Northern and Southern Barricades, on the
left, and at Worcester Barricade, a sap pushed forward from the Rue de
Paris, in the centre.

The exposure of the whole British area to observation rendered
necessary the use of very long communication trenches, to afford cover
to the mule transport whereby the trench garrisons were supplied with
rations and trench stores. These wide mule tracks, doubled for upward
and downward traffic, were carried forward from the crest of the
plateau above the beaches at Cape Helles to within a few hundred yards
of the front trenches.

On the 20th October the 1st R.N. Brigade relieved the 2nd Brigade in
the centre subsection, the forward system of trenches being occupied
by "Drake," "Nelson," "Hood" and "Hawke," the 2/4th Londons relieving
the 2/2nd Londons in the Eski line, a reserve line some 1500 yards in
rear of the most advanced trenches. The Battalion occupied this line
with two companies each side of the Eastern Mule Trench. The relief
was carried out without difficulty, but during the move forward from
bivouacs the Battalion incurred its first battle casualties, Capt. H.
Morris and Privates Housden and Maunder being wounded.

At this time the Turkish Feast of Barram was proceeding, and when it
drew to a close on the evening of the 22nd it was anticipated with
some confidence that the enemy would attempt a demonstration against
the Allied positions. The only activity, however, was on our side and
our batteries both on land and sea gave the Turks a particularly hot
time during the evening. During this tour the weather began to break
and heavy rains fell, but apart from the wet condition of the trenches
and the consequent additional work in keeping them in repair the tour
of duty passed without incident of an unusual nature. On the 22nd half
the company officers and non-commissioned officers were attached for
instruction in the front line to the R.N. Battalions, their places
being taken after forty-eight hours by the other half.

On the 27th the 2nd Brigade returned to the line relieving the 1st
Brigade, which withdrew on relief to the Rest Camp, the 2/4th Londons
handing over their positions in the Eski line to the 2/2nd Londons.

This day General Sir Ian Hamilton handed over command-in-chief of the
Dardanelles Army to General Sir C. C. Monro, K.C.B. Sir Charles Monro's
duty on assuming command was in the first instance to report as to the
desirability, on purely military grounds, of evacuating the Peninsula,
and alternatively as to the force required to bring the campaign to
a successful issue. A reconnaissance of the position led him to the
conclusion that evacuation should be taken in hand, and the adoption
of this course received official approval, with results which will be
recorded in their place.

In the Rest Camp the Battalion spent six days, which were occupied in
work on new winter quarters and dugouts, and which passed quietly but
for heavy shelling on the 29th October and the 1st November from enemy
batteries on the Asiatic shore; but fortunately no casualties were
suffered.

The month of November was occupied in duty in and out of the line,
tours in the trenches being for seven days, followed by seven days in
the Rest Camp at Cape Helles. For both the tours in line the 2/4th
Londons were in reserve in the Eski lines though on each occasion
companies were sent in turn to the front trenches for instruction in
trench warfare. For this purpose they were attached to "Hawke," "Hood"
and "Drake" Battalions.

[Illustration: GALLIPOLI PENINSULA--CAPE HELLES TRENCHES, 1915]

The Turks at this period were comparatively quiet beyond a certain
amount of artillery fire, and for the companies in the Eski line the
time passed by no means unpleasantly. Engaged in strengthening and
improving the defences during working hours, they were allowed when
off duty to go in small parties down to Gully Beach on the Ægean
coast. These small excursions were the means of providing a change of
diet, for the men seldom returned without a good haul of fish, caught
by a stratagem in which, so rumour has it, the Mills Bomb figured
prominently.

It was not long, however, before the Battalion discovered that their
worst enemy on the Peninsula was the elements. The summer heat had now
broken and the autumn rains were beginning with all their sub-tropical
violence. The Battalion's first introduction to these deluges occurred
on the 10th November, when, having just returned from the trenches to
the Rest Camp, it was treated to a violent rainstorm which flooded all
the dugouts and shelters.

A week later when the 2/4th Londons had returned to the line a
thunderstorm burst over the lines and heavy rain fell for about two
hours, flooding many trenches and rendering them almost untenable.
This storm was followed by several days of rain and high wind which
inflicted considerable hardship on the troops, not only while they
were actually in the trenches but also by reason of the serious damage
caused to the Rest Camp, so that on coming out of the line when the
tour of duty was over the conditions of discomfort were unabated.

This sort of incident, which recurred during the rainy season with
monotonous frequency, was far more productive of discomfort and ill
effects than it would have been on the Western front; since owing to
the restriction of space it was impossible to attain on the Peninsula
to anything approaching the degree of "back-of-the-line" organisation
which was reached in France. Wet clothes, therefore, remained wet
until the sun dried them, and the inevitable result was a constantly
high proportion of sickness, which during the last few months on the
Peninsula accounted for vastly more casualties than the enemy's
weapons. But under the most unpromising circumstances the British
soldier invariably manages to make himself as comfortable as possible
and to undergo severe privations with a sort of fatalistic and stoical
cheerfulness, which he vainly endeavours to conceal by much "grousing."
And so on the Peninsula, a locality scarcely associated as a rule with
ideas of amusement, a certain amount of recreation was obtained by
football matches, and by the efforts of the bands of the four London
battalions who played in different battalion areas each evening when
the Brigades were out of the trenches. The officers also were able to
obtain some exercise through the kindness of the officers of the 2nd
Royal Fusiliers (29th Division) who lent their horses, on which a few
pleasant 'longshore excursions' were made.

The few days out of the trenches were occupied in supplying working
parties for the construction of the new winter quarters.

On the 20th November the Battalion was issued with gas masks, and
received its first instruction in defensive measures against gas
attacks. It was believed at this time that steps were being taken
by the Turks to employ poison gas against the Allies, but none was
actually used against the 2/4th Londons.

Hitherto the Battalion had fortunately suffered but few casualties at
the hands of the enemy, the total in all ranks amounting to 4 killed
and 5 wounded. Sickness, however, now began to take a heavy toll of all
units, and this became especially serious after the 26th November, on
which day a storm of unprecedented violence burst over the Peninsula,
accompanied by torrential rain, which rapidly filled the trenches and
forced the occupants on both sides on to the parapets, where they
crouched unable to move for fear of falling into the trenches and
being swept away by the torrents which poured down them and overflowed
on to the land adjoining. In the Rest Camps the dugouts were rapidly
flooded out and the troops spent a night of bitter exposure. In the
afternoon of the following day the wind suddenly shifted to the north,
and a biting frost ensued. The cold was agonising and the water froze
around the men's feet as they slept from sheer exhaustion. Greatcoats
which had been drenched by the rains were so stiffened by the frost
that they stood up by themselves. So severe was the cold that it was
only by keeping the men constantly at work with their shovels that
many were kept alive at all. On the 28th snow began to fall, and the
blizzard continued throughout the day and during the 29th. In the
meantime the sea had become very rough and the temporary quays and
breakwaters suffered great damage, both on the Peninsula and at Mudros
and Imbros, and this added seriously to the difficulties of the already
over-burdened transport services.

During the first few days of December over 200 deaths occurred from
exposure and over 10,000 sick were evacuated from the Peninsula;
and from the statements of deserters it is probable that the Turks
suffered even more severely. A famous war correspondent who was at
Cape Helles at the time wrote: "Never probably since Crimean days have
British forces in the field had to endure such cold as the last days of
November brought to our men at the Dardanelles."

On the 29th 2/Lieut. P. C. Darrington was evacuated to hospital.[3]

[3] Darrington on recovery transferred to the 5th London Regiment
(L.R.B.) with whom he served till almost the end of the War, being
unhappily killed a few days before the Armistice.

On the 1st December the 1st Brigade returned to the trenches and this
time the 2/4th Londons took over a sector of the front line between
"Drake" on the right, and "Hood" on the left. The sector included a
part of the front line known as Rue de Paris, from Sap B to Sap N,
which was occupied by A and C Companies, while D Company went into
support in Worcester Flats with B in reserve in Munster Terrace, the
machine-guns being in front line positions. This day the enemy's
artillery was more active than it had been for months, and for three
hours in the afternoon the British lines generally were subjected to a
violent bombardment by field guns and howitzers; but although an attack
was believed to be imminent no infantry movements developed, and in the
evening the situation became quieter.

Although this tour of duty was not unusually active, there were
abundant signs of a considerable accession of strength behind the
Turkish lines, and daily his artillery became a little more active,
a good deal of shelling being caused by the registering of fresh
batteries on our lines. The Turkish snipers also became particularly
annoying, and their efficiency reflected itself in our casualty list
which, though not large, was somewhat longer than usual. On the
evenings of the 9th and the 11th the Turks employed a field searchlight
from behind Achi Baba, but the experiment was not repeated and led to
no incident of interest.

Col. Dunfee was granted a month's leave of absence on urgent private
affairs, and left the Peninsula for England on the 5th, the command of
the Battalion devolving upon Major V. H. Seyd who continued in command,
with the acting rank of Lieut.-Col., until after the final evacuation
of the Peninsula, the duties of second in command being assumed by
Capt. R. N. Arthur.

During this tour a draft of 49 N.C.O.'s and men under 2/Lieuts. J.
W. Price and S. Davis joined the 2/4th Londons from England, and was
posted to companies. 2/Lieuts. N. L. Thomas and F. R. C. Bradford
rejoined from hospital.

The following is an extract from Battalion orders for the 12th December:

The Commanding Officer would like to place on record that whilst
with the Grenade Section in the trenches last week No. 2827 Pte.
Hedger threw back a live grenade which had fallen into the trench,
thereby saving his comrades and himself from injury.

On the 9th December a relief was effected, combined with a readjustment
of the boundaries of the Divisional sector on the arrival of the 29th
Division from the Suvla Bay front; and practically half the centre
subsection from Sap F (half-way along the 2/4th Londons' line) to the
left, occupied by two companies of the 2/4th Londons, "Hood" and
"Hawke," was handed over to the King's Own Scottish Borderers. On the
following morning A, B and C Companies and Battalion Headquarters
withdrew to the Rest Camp. D Company remained in line attached to
"Drake" until the 11th, when it rejoined the Battalion.

This relief being, as already stated, carried out in the course of a
readjustment of the line, the Brigade spent only four days out of the
trenches, and on the 15th it took over a fresh sector facing Kereves
Dere on the right of Achi Baba Nullah. Of this new sector about 750
yards were taken over from the 2nd R.N. Brigade while the French troops
were relieved in about 250 yards of trench adjoining on the right. The
sector was occupied with "Nelson" on the left, and "Drake" and A and
B Companies, 2/4th Londons, on the right. Battalion Headquarters and
C and D Companies occupied the Eski line in rear of the new sector,
in this part called the Tranchée d'Amade, with one company each side
of the junction with the main communication trench, the Avenue de
Constantinople.

The days following the occupation of this sector were marked by
considerable activity on the part of the enemy's bombers. The hostile
trenches opposite the 2/4th Londons were on an overage about 70 yards
from the British front line and numerous saps had been pushed out
toward them, from the heads of which the struggle continued without
cessation, the Grenadiers on each side plying their objectionable trade
without abatement.

On the 17th B Company relieved A Company in the front trenches. Capt.
F. C. J. Read this day was evacuated to hospital, being followed there
next day by Lieut. R. C. Dickins.

On the 20th December the announcement was made in Corps orders of the
successful evacuation of the Suvla and Anzac positions which had taken
place during the night of the 19th.

The details of the scheme for this evacuation had been carefully
worked out by Sir William Birdwood who had been appointed to command
of the Dardanelles Army on the formation of the Salonika Army (Sir C.
C. Monro assuming supreme command of the Mediterranean Forces). The
scheme provided for the completion of this difficult operation in three
stages, the first of which involved the embarkation of all troops,
animals and supplies not required for a prolonged campaign; this was
to be followed by the evacuation of troops, guns, stores, etc., not
immediately required for the defence of our positions, while the third
and final stage consisted of the embarkation of the rearguard troops
and the destruction of all guns, animals and stores which could not be
removed.

The actual evacuation had been fixed for as early a date as possible
owing to the improbability of the long continuance of favourable
weather; and at both Suvla and Anzac the process was completed without
a hitch of any kind, only a small quantity of stores having to be
destroyed, and without any interference on the part of the enemy.

Almost immediately after this operation a marked increase in the
Turkish activity on the Helles front took place, probably on account of
the release of large numbers of his batteries in the evacuated sectors.

In announcing the completion of this operation, the special order of
the day affirmed that the Helles position was not to be abandoned,
but that on the contrary the VIII Corps was entrusted with the task
of holding to this theatre of operations as large as possible a force
of Turkish troops in order to prevent their employment elsewhere. To
this end the battalions holding the line were urged to maintain their
pressure against the enemy at all points while schemes were evolved for
the construction of deep dugouts, the improvement of reserve lines,
and other works, which would only be necessary in the event of a long
continued occupation of the Peninsula.

Information was even disseminated that large reinforcements totalling
over 1600 all ranks were on the way, and were expected shortly. But
behind all these precautions against the leakage of information
among the Turks as to our intentions, and under cover of the various
fictions above described, preparations were being pressed forward for
the evacuation of the Helles front also; preparations which needed
particular care not only by reason of the greater activity of the
enemy than at Suvla and Anzac, but also because the enemy having been
successfully hoodwinked on the former occasion it hardly appeared
probable that we should be so successful a second time in masking our
intentions.

Another very severe storm broke over Cape Helles on the 21st December,
accompanied by heavy rain, and one of the 2/4th London machine-guns
was struck by lightning in the trenches. It became evident that with
the likelihood of an early complete break up in the weather the final
evacuation must not be delayed; and accordingly it was fixed for the
8th January 1916, or the first fine night after that date.

On the 21st Lieut. L. A. Dickins was seriously wounded and evacuated
from the Peninsula. This tour of duty indeed proved the most costly in
personnel which the Battalion had carried out, and among N.C.O.'s and
men 4 were killed and 13 wounded.

On the 22nd the 1st R.N. Brigade made a further "side-step" to the
right in the trenches, and in the course of the readjustment A and
B Companies of the 2/4th Londons were relieved in the trenches and
withdrew to a fresh Rest Camp, called Cæsar's Camp. The rest of the
Battalion, however, remained in the Tranchée d'Amade until after
Christmas.

On the 23rd December 2/Lieut. C. S. G. Blows joined the Battalion from
England.

Owing to the kindness of Mrs Dunfee and other ladies interested in the
2/4th Londons, Christmas gifts and cards had been received for every
member of the Battalion, and these materially helped to infuse a little
cheerfulness into a somewhat depressing and comfortless Christmastide.
On Christmas Day the Battalion was practically complete in the Tranchée
d'Amade, B Company and two platoons of A Company having moved forward
once more from Cæsar's Camp.

The general scheme for the evacuation of the Helles front was similar
to that employed at Anzac and Suvla, and in the course of the second
stage of the operation, detachments of the 2/4th Londons, consisting
of 63 other ranks under Lieut. S. N. Davies and 50 other ranks under
2/Lieut. S. Davis were embarked for Mudros on the night of the 31st
December. These were followed the next night by 5 officers and 147
other ranks under Capt. R. N. Keen.

On the 3rd January 1916, the machine-guns of the Battalion, now
increased to six, were evacuated in charge of a N.C.O. and two men, and
on the following day the last battle casualties occurred, three men
being slightly wounded in the Rest Camp.

The preparations for final evacuation were now practically complete.
A strong embarkation staff had been formed to deal with the rapid
embarkation of the last troops as they should reach the beaches;
and new lines of defence guarding the beaches had been prepared for
occupation in case the enemy should become aware of the operation and
harass it.

On the night of the 6th/7th January, a fourth detachment of 4 officers
and 118 other ranks of the Battalion under Capt. Arthur left the
Peninsula, and the next night Major Seyd in command of the remainder
of the Battalion (8 officers and 155 other ranks) embarked at V Beach.
This completed the safe evacuation of the whole Battalion with the
exception of four men who were left behind attached to the "Dumeszyl
Battery" under Commander Alan Campbell, R.N.D. (since killed), for
demolition work. After completion of their hazardous duties all the
members of this brave unit were also safely embarked.

The total strength of the Battalion on evacuating the Peninsula
(including the transport and other details who had remained at Mudros
and Imbros) was 23 officers and about 560 other ranks. The total
casualties sustained at the hands of the enemy had been 2 officers
wounded, 16 N.C.O.'s and men killed and 38 wounded, the remaining
reduction of strength having been due to sickness and exposure.

On the 7th January the enemy opened an intense bombardment, said to be
the heaviest since the original landing in April 1915, on our trenches;
the shelling lasting from noon till 3.30 p.m., at which time two
Turkish mines were sprung near Fusilier Bluff. No attack developed
except at this point, where a half-hearted advance of the enemy was
easily dispersed.

The 8th January was calm and still, but at night the weather became
stormy, and a steady and increasing swell did not tend to facilitate
the task of rapid embarkation, and indeed rendered it very doubtful
whether it would be possible to get the last troops away at all. This
caused considerable anxiety to the Embarkation Staff whose task was
not lightened by the knowledge of the presence of an enemy submarine
which (unsuccessfully) torpedoed H.M.S. _Prince George_. Add to this
the possibility that the enemy might discover the retirement in time
to give trouble on the beaches; and it will be possible in at least a
small measure to appreciate the great skill with which this apparently
impracticable task was brought to a successful issue. By 3.30 a.m. the
evacuation was completed and at 4 a.m. two of our magazines were blown
up. The conflagration caused by these appears to have been the first
intimation of our departure received by the Turks who promptly shelled
our vacated lines heavily until 6.30 a.m.

All material was removed except a few unserviceable guns, some 500
animals and a large quantity of stores, all of which were destroyed.

It is impossible to refrain from remarking on the excellent
organisation and discipline with which the evacuation was carried out,
and also on the extraordinary luck which was vouchsafed both at Anzac
and Suvla in the concealment of the moon.

The Gallipoli expedition must live for ever in the annals of the
world's military history, as one of the most remarkable exploits ever
carried out. Although failure ensued, it was indeed a glorious failure,
and the wonder is rather that success was so nearly attained. The base
of operations at Alexandria was 800 miles distant, and the lines of
communication possessed only two inadequate and unprotected harbours
at Mudros and Imbros respectively. The whole occupied zone, and also
the sea in its vicinity, was all the time under hostile observation
and fire; there were no roads worthy of the name, no storehouses or
railways, and the activity of enemy submarines made it impossible to
send to the Peninsula any store-ship over 1500 tons.

Yet in the face of all these obstacles not only was the landing
effected, but our position maintained for nearly nine months and the
whole force safely re-embarked; and the memory of it must live for ever
as one of the greatest pages of the history of the war.

After the evacuation, an appreciative order was published in R.N.
Divisional Orders complimenting the troops on the discipline and
devotion which had sustained them during the hardships of the
campaign, and which alone had rendered the task of evacuation possible
of accomplishment. General Paris, commanding the Division, wrote
personally to the Commanding Officer a letter in which he said: "I must
thank you and your Battalion for the good work you did when with us on
the Peninsula, we all admired the cheerful spirit your men showed under
very trying circumstances."

At Mudros the connection of the 2/4th Londons with the Royal Naval
Division was severed, and they became temporarily attached to the
29th Division. A few days were spent on the island in rest and
reorganisation, and during its stay there the Battalion was rejoined by
the Transport Section and other details who had been detached from it
during its duty at the Dardanelles; and a great deal of satisfaction
was caused by the distribution of mails from home, the delivery of
which had been delayed by the evacuation.

On the 11th January Capt. R. N. Keen was admitted to hospital, and on
the 14th Sergt. F. W. Walker left the Battalion for England to take up
a commission. The record of this N.C.O. will be referred to again later
in connection with the 3/4th Battalion to which he was subsequently
attached.

The Battalion embarked on H.T. _Ionian_ for Alexandria on the 18th,
arriving there three days later. Disembarkation took place on the
following day, and the Battalion entrained to Wardan, a camping ground
near Cairo, where it took up quarters under canvas and became attached
with the other three London Battalions to the 53rd Division, Major-Gen.
A. G. Dallas, C.B., in command. At Wardan company training was carried
out until the 16th February, when the 2/4th Londons, with two companies
of the 2/2nd Londons attached, moved by rail to Beni Mazar, where it
became part of the Minia Force.

* * * * *

At the period of the 2/4th Londons' return to Egypt the Eastern
frontier, on which the Turks had attempted to force the Suez Canal
defences about a year previously, had become quiet, and the principal
cause of anxiety centred in the Western Desert where the attitude of
the Senussi, a warlike tribe of Arabs, had created a situation of
some difficulty, which was rendered more complex by the possibility
of internal disorders and religious unrest in the Nile Valley and the
Delta district.

On the outbreak of war between England and Turkey the Senussi had not
at first shown any disposition towards hostile action, but under the
influence of a Germanised Turk named Gaafer Pasha they had become more
truculent as the summer of 1915 wore on. Several breaches of the peace
which occurred in the autumn left no room for doubt that military
operations would be necessary to bring the Senussi to a due sense of
their proper behaviour.

In November 1915 Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Maxwell, commanding in chief the
forces in Egypt, concentrated the Western Force at Mersa Matruh, a town
on the Mediterranean coast some 180 miles west of Alexandria. Under
Maj.-Gen. Wallace, C.B., to whom command of the Mersa Matruh troops was
given, several vigorous little operations were successfully carried out
against the tribesmen; but the lack of camel transport and water supply
arrangements restricted the scope of his activities. Preparations were
therefore made to remedy these defects and thus render possible the
despatch of a serious punitive expedition into the desert.

On the 11th February a newly concentrated force of the Senussi
occupied the Baharia Oasis, and on the 27th of the same month they
also seized the Farafra and Dakhla Oases. To combat the serious menace
to the Nile Valley offered by these fresh signs of activity, Sir John
Maxwell formed a new command, known as the Southern Force, under
Maj.-Gen. J. Adye, C.B., with Headquarters at Beni Suef, a township
on the Nile some 175 miles south of Cairo. This Southern Force was
concentrated in four distinct areas for the protection of the Nile
Valley and the cultivated areas, the three northern areas respectively
concentrated at Wadi Natrun, Beni Salama and the Fayoum, being grouped
under command of Maj.-Gen. Dallas; the fourth and southernmost being
located in the Minia and Assiut provinces under Brig.-Gen. A. Stirling.

General Stirling's Minia Force was being concentrated at the period
when the 2/4th Londons joined it, and comprised the following
formations:

Highland Mounted Brigade (dismounted).
1st Australian Light Horse Brigade.
One squadron of Cavalry (Egyptian Army).
Detachment of R.F.C. with two Aeroplanes.
Nos. 1 and 2 Armoured Trains.
1/4th Glamorgan Battery R.F.A.
One section Hong-Kong Mountain Battery.
2/1st Cheshire Field Company R.E.
2/4th London Regiment.
Two Companies 2/2nd London Regiment,

and was subsequently increased by the arrival of further units as
follows:

One squadron Armoured Cars R.N. Division.
Half section Camel Transport Corps.
One Company Australian Camel Corps.

In spite of the great strategic importance of the Oases it was found
impossible at the moment to undertake active operations, and the
activities of the Minia Force were therefore confined to defensive
measures. The whole Nile Valley at this time was infected by powerful
religious and political influences which were at work to endeavour to
induce the native population to co-operate with the enemy against the
British, and although these influences had not attained the success
hoped for by their instigators, they had taken a certain hold on all
classes of the civilian population. It was, therefore, extremely
important to counterbalance this smouldering agitation by the presence
of strong military forces in provincial stations, primarily to prevent
the occurrence of disturbances which might be fomented in the absence
of troops, and to safeguard points of military importance, such as
railway stations, bridges and canals. The natives of Egypt, though
not of warlike character, are capable of violent fanatical outbursts,
and the continued presence of the military, combined with frequent
displays of their force, was the best means of preventing altogether
disturbances which might assume very serious proportions.

* * * * *

Such was briefly the position of affairs at the period of the 2/4th
Londons' attachment to the Minia Force, but shortly after their arrival
a distinct improvement in the outlook was caused by the dispersal of
the Senussi forces in the battle of Agagia on the 26th February 1916.
This time it was possible to exploit the success, and the desert column
pushed forward to Sollum which was occupied on the 14th March. The
effect of this signal success on British prestige throughout Egypt was
marked, and this effect was enhanced by the continued failure of the
Turks to make any impression in the East on the Suez Canal defences.
The Senussi forces were now practically disposed of, only about 3000
remaining in the field, and this remnant appeared to be disheartened,
while the reputation of their commander, Sayed Ahmed, both as a
temporal leader and a spiritual guide, had waned.

The danger, however, was by no means past, and the occupation by the
Senussi of the Baharia Oasis, which followed soon after the battle of
Agagia, created a serious menace to the part of the Nile Valley for
which the Minia Force was responsible.

The Minia District includes about 65 miles of a strip of cultivated
land running north and south along the left bank of the Nile, varying
in width from 7 to 14 miles. This area is intersected for irrigation
purposes by numerous canals of which the largest, Bahr Yusef, runs
roughly parallel to the Nile near the western edge of the cultivated
strip. Beyond it sand-dunes run for some two miles into the desert.
Minia itself is a town of some importance, containing about 35,000
inhabitants. The loot to be obtained from its banks and merchants,
as well as the possibility of obtaining recruits from the Bedouin
population, and the certainty of creating a strong anti-British
influence, seemed to offer considerable inducements to raiding parties
from the Baharia Oasis, and it was against this danger that the
protective measures of the Minia Force were directed.

The troops at Beni Mazar, which is on the main railway line 26 miles
north of Minia, comprised the following:

2/4th London Regiment.
Two Companies 2/2nd London Regiment.
One Camel Machine-Gun Section, Lovat's Scouts.
One Troop Australian Light Horse.
Detachment of Cheshire Field Company R.E.
No. 2 Armoured Train.

A detached post of one company of infantry (supplied by 2/4th Londons)
was furnished from Beni Mazar to guard a bridge at Saqula over the Bahr
Yusef. The whole of the troops at Beni Mazar came under command of
A/Lieut.-Col. V. H. Seyd.

At Beni Mazar the 2/4th Londons settled down quickly to their new
surroundings and carried out company training to the extent which the
circumstances permitted. The situation, however, placed a considerable
restriction on the activities of the Battalion in this direction, as it
was held at all times under instant readiness to move. A good deal of
attention was paid, nevertheless, to long distance route marching with
the deliberate intention of hardening the troops in preparation for the
possibility of an advance against the Baharia Oasis.

On the 26th February a detachment of the 2/2nd Londons proceeded
to Nag Hamadi to guard the Nile bridgehead there. Col. Dunfee this
day returned from leave and took over once more the command of the
Battalion and of the forces at Beni Mazar, A/Lieut.-Col. Seyd reverting
to his former duties as second in command with the rank of Major.

On the 28th and 29th trial runs were made on the armoured train from
Beni Mazar to Maghaga with the double object of giving the troops
practice in rapid entrainment and of reminding the inhabitants of the
presence of British forces. A demonstration march was made through
the streets of Maghaga, but the demeanour of the natives was found to
be quite satisfactory. The behaviour of the inhabitants of Beni Mazar
also was so peaceful at this time that it was found possible to relax
somewhat the strict orders as to permitting troops to walk out in the
town, and henceforth they were allowed to walk in pairs instead of
parties of six as had formerly been the case, though side arms were
still worn at all times.

On the 1st March Capt. H. G. Stanham was appointed to command the
Saqula detachment.

The working hours of the Battalion at this period were early in the
day, owing to the advance of the hot season, but in spite of the severe
change from the trying conditions to which it had been subjected at
Cape Helles two months earlier, the Battalion showed a remarkably good
bill of health.

At the beginning of March the command in chief in Egypt was assumed by
Sir Archibald Murray, and in the rearrangement of the defensive forces
in the Nile Valley which ensued, the Beni Mazar troops ceased to form
part of the Minia Force, which was extended farther to the south, and
became attached to the Northern Force (Southern Area) under Maj.-Gen.
Dallas.

On the 3rd and 5th of March practice alarms took place and the Beni
Mazar Force moved tactically to Tambu, taking up a position there for
the defence of the railway. The strength of the 2/4th Londons on parade
at the second alarm was 16 officers and 450 other ranks.

Throughout the period of the 2/4th Londons' occupation of Beni Mazar
they received the greatest possible attention and kindness from the
local Egyptian residents, who overwhelmed them with presents of
eggs, fowls, turkeys, sheep, cigarettes, fruit and other "consumable
stores," which needless to say were gratefully received as a pleasant
alternative to rations. The officers of the Battalion were constantly
entertained by the local dignitaries, who extended to them all the
hospitality in their power, and among whom must be mentioned Mahomed
Marzouk, Mamur Markaz, Merza Mohed Ali F. Bey, Abdul Gawad, Mahomed
Zubi Abd el Razech, Ahmed H. el Keesz and H. Abd el Rezik.

On the 6th April the Saqula detachment was withdrawn and on the 12th
the Battalion left Beni Mazar, handing over duties to the 2/5th
Devonshire Regiment. The Battalion strength, 23 officers and 586 other
ranks, proceeded by train _via_ Cairo and Alexandria, travelling all
night, and detrained the following day at Sidi Gaber, marching to
quarters under canvas at Sidi Bishr. Here the 2/1st London Infantry
Brigade came together again as a Brigade for the first time since its
occupation of Malta, under the command of Col. Dunfee.

On the 17th April the Brigade embarked at Alexandria on H.T.
_Transylvania_ which carried in addition to the Brigade, detachments
of Colonial and Imperial troops, totalling together 130 officers and
about 3000 other ranks. The following appointments were made on H.T.
_Transylvania_:

O.C. Ship--Col. Vickers Dunfee, V.D. } 2/4th London Regiment.
Ship's Adjutant--Capt. J. R. Webster }

On the 18th the _Transylvania_ left Alexandria and during the passage
all possible precautions were taken against submarine attack. No
untoward incident however occurred, and on the 24th April the transport
arrived at Marseilles and disembarkation at once took place.

The Battalion entrained immediately for Rouen, arriving on the 26th
April, and was accommodated in the Bruyères Camp.

On arrival at Rouen the 2/1st London Infantry Brigade was finally
disbanded after having been in existence for about nineteen months.
Col. Dunfee, on the break-up of the Brigade, once more assumed command
of the Battalion, but its remaining life as a separate unit proved to
be short.

The wastage which had inevitably taken place in the ranks of the 1/4th
Battalion (which had now been in France for over fifteen months) had
been far beyond the capacity of the Reserve Battalion at home to
replace; and with the certain prospect of being called on to fill
serious deficiencies to be caused by the large numbers of additional
casualties which were expected in the great battle destined to open on
1st July, it was decided by the War Office to disband finally all the
units formerly comprising the 2/1st London Infantry Brigade, and to use
these troops for the purpose of reinforcing their first line battalions.

The dispersal of the 2/4th Battalion at Rouen is therefore the last
incident to be recorded in its separate history.

Owing to the exigencies of the campaign it was impossible to grant
leave to more than a very small proportion of the Battalion in spite of
its prolonged absence from the United Kingdom, and drafts were quickly
sent up the line beginning on the 5th May. By the 20th June the whole
strength of the Battalion in officers, N.C.O.'s and men, with a few
exceptions, had been despatched to the 1/4th Londons, in the history
of which the arrival of these drafts will be noted in detail in their
place.

The officers sent to other units were:

Capts. W. H. S. Stevens and W. N. Towse, Lieut. R. C. Dickins, and
2/Lieuts. G. F. Bishop and H. W. Dennis to 1/21st London Regiment (47th
Division).

Hon. Lieut. and Q.M. J. E. W. Lambley to XV Corps, A.C.C.

A draft of 133 other ranks was sent to the Kensingtons (13th London),
but by the intervention of Lieut.-Col. Wheatley they were subsequently
secured for the 1/4th Londons. Col. Vickers Dunfee was attached to
1/22nd London Regiment (The Queens) for some two months, after which he
returned to England to command the 4th (Reserve) Battalion.

Thus ends the separate record of the first reserve Battalion raised by
the 4th London Regiment during the war. Although the 2/4th Battalion
ceased to exist as a unit, the services rendered by its personnel
in the first line battalion were of a very high order, and the
reinforcements composed by it were particularly welcome inasmuch as
they afforded a large number of much needed non-commissioned officers,
who were quickly given an opportunity to prove their value in the
battles on the Somme later in the year.

CHAPTER VIII

THE 3/4TH AND 4/4TH BATTALIONS AT HOME

At home 1915 and 1916 were two years of hard work in developing the
organisation of the Regiment to enable it to provide the reinforcements
necessary for the maintenance in the field of its overseas battalions.

Prior to the war the 4th London Regiment--like all other Territorial
formations--had no reserve cadre which was capable of being expanded
into a reserve unit on mobilisation; and when therefore the 2/4th
Battalion followed the 1/4th Battalion overseas in December 1914 the
need of providing means of "feeding" the fighting battalions with fresh
personnel became pressing. The records of the home battalions are
necessarily lacking in the exciting incidents with which those of the
service battalions are crowded; but they represent an enormous amount
of labour carried out under conditions of great difficulty, and as a
rule with very little recognition of their vital importance to the
continued existence of the Regiment during the War.

Reference has already been made in Chapter II to the steps taken
to raise a third line battalion under Major E. H. Stillwell on the
departure of the 2/4th Battalion for Malta. This new Battalion,
the 3/4th London Regiment, secured recruits rapidly, and, like its
predecessor, very quickly outgrew the limits of Headquarters at Hoxton.
It was therefore moved early in January to Littlegrove and Beech Hill,
the two houses at Barnet which had previously been occupied by the
battalion raised by Col. Dunfee. A slight stiffening of the ranks was
supplied by a few members of the overseas battalions who had received
a good deal of training with them but had been found medically unfit
to accompany them abroad; but the vast majority of the officers,
non-commissioned officers and men had but recently joined, most of
them without any previous experience of soldiering. No member of the
new Battalion, moreover, had seen service in the War, and the magnitude
of the task imposed on the officers and warrant officers of instilling
the rudiments of discipline into so unwieldy a mass of men was no light
one. The enthusiasm of the early days of the War, had, however, by no
means subsided, and all ranks worked with a will; and before long the
Battalion, now about 600 strong, began to find its feet.

On the 8th February 1915 Capt. P. S. Cookson (late Royal Sussex
Regiment) was appointed to command the Battalion with the temporary
rank of Lieut.-Col. with Major W. H. Hamilton as second in command, and
Major E. V. Wellby as Adjutant. The company commanders were Capts. A.
A. N. Hayne, S. W. J. Limpenny, E. D. Wilson and A. E. Wood.

The training facilities which had been extended to the 2/4th Battalion
by local residents at Barnet were accorded to the 3/4th Battalion also,
and the training of recruits under company arrangements proceeded as
rapidly as possible and as efficiently as the circumstances permitted.
No time indeed was to be lost for the 1/4th Londons were now in France,
and as already described began to suffer battle casualties early in
March 1915; so that it was clear that the 3/4th Battalion might at any
time be called upon to make up its deficiencies. Towards the end of
April it was in fact called on to supply the first reinforcement, and
accordingly despatched 2 officers and 50 other ranks who, as referred
to in Chapter IV, joined the 1/4th Londons in the Ypres Salient.

Third line battalions had also been formed by the other regiments of
the 1st London Brigade, and hitherto these had been distributed over
a wide area on the outskirts of London; but in the last week of April
the four new battalions were concentrated under canvas at Tadworth
(Surrey) as the 3/1st London Brigade, under the command of Col. H. C.
Cholmondely, C.B. The 3/4th Battalion joined the Brigade on the 26th
April.

On the 5th May the Adjutancy was taken over by Capt. E. E. Spicer with
Lieut S. H. Stedman as Assistant Adjutant, Major E. V. Wellby having
transferred to the 1st London Regiment.

Early in June 1915 a general reconstruction was effected in the reserve
and training cadres at home; and a number of fresh battalions were
formed composed largely of personnel who were not medically fit to
serve overseas. To this end a composite Battalion, known as the 100th
Provisional Battalion, was formed of officers, N.C.O.'s and men of the
3/1st London Brigade. On the 2nd June Capt. A. E. Wood, and 2/Lieuts.
E. J. Bennet and J. S. B. Gathergood and about 100 N.C.O.'s and men
left the 3/4th Battalion at Tadworth to join the 100th Provisional
Battalion which was stationed at Aldeburgh. On the same day Major W. H.
Hamilton was appointed to raise, equip and train a new Battalion, to be
known as the 4/4th London Regiment.

Concurrently with this development the 3/1st London Brigade moved from
Tadworth to billets at Bury St Edmunds. Here training was proceeded
with, and the battalions of the Brigade were again opened for
recruiting to make good the gaps in their ranks caused by the formation
of the Provisional Battalion.

In the following month a further move took place, and the 3/1st London
Brigade took over billets in Ipswich. A further step was now made in
the organisation of the Home Forces and towards the end of August
all personnel of the Provisional Battalion except "home-service" men
were returned to their units. The 2/2nd and 2/3rd London Infantry
Brigades had also been concentrated in the Ipswich area, and a new
Division--the 58th--was now formed as a Service Division; and the duty
of "draft-finding" for the whole Regiment henceforth devolved solely on
the 4/4th Battalion under Major Hamilton.

The composition of the 58th Division was as follows:

58TH (LONDON) DIVISION
Brig.-Gen. E. J. COOPER, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.

DIVISIONAL CAVALRY.
Hampshire Yeomanry (Carabineers).

ARTILLERY.
290th, 291st, 292nd, 293rd Brigades, R.F.A.
58th Division Ammunition Column.

ROYAL ENGINEERS.
2/1st Wessex}
2/2nd " } Field Companies.
1/5th London}
58th Divisional Signal Company.

173RD INFANTRY BRIGADE.
3/1st London Regiment}
3/2nd " " } (Royal Fusiliers).
3/3rd " " }
3/4th " " }

174TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.
2/5th London Regiment (London Rifle Brigade).
2/6th " " (Rifles).
2/7th " "
2/8th " " (Post Office Rifles).

175TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.
2/9th London Regiment (Queen Victoria Rifles).
2/10th " " (Hackney).
2/11th " " (Finsbury Rifles).
2/12th " " (Rangers).
1/1st Wessex Divisional Cyclists.
509th, 510th, 511th, 512th S. and T. Companies, A.S.C.

The duties of second in command were now taken by Major E. D. Wilson,
who continued to occupy this appointment for some months till he
was appointed to Brigade Staff and subsequently to Southern Command
Headquarters. He was succeeded as second in command by Capt. A. A. N.
Hayne.

The constant changes of station to which the 3/4th Battalion had
been subjected during its short existence had, as will be readily
appreciated, a somewhat deleterious effect on its training and
general discipline. Prolonged life in billets is, moreover, highly
unsuitable for young troops under training, and the general effect
of the Division's stay in Ipswich was not altogether beneficial. All
units were similarly affected. The dispatch of the Division overseas
was in consequence delayed, and the troops began to become stale with
"over-training." Throughout 1915 and the early months of 1916 this
unsatisfactory state of affairs continued, and the routine of training,
now become wearying through its monotonous repetition, was broken only
by the occasional passing excitement of air raids, of which the eastern
counties saw a good deal.

During February 1916, recruits called up under the "Derby" scheme to
the number of 359 were posted to the Battalion and their training
proceeded with all possible speed. Owing, however, to the need for
bringing them into line with the remainder of the Battalion in view
of the possibility of its being sent to the front during 1916, the
training of these men was expedited by temporarily attaching a part of
the Battalion to the 4/4th Battalion in order to ease the duties of the
training staff.

In June the billets in Ipswich were vacated, and the Division removed
to quarters under canvas at Blackrock Camp outside the town, where the
former routine was resumed.

In these somewhat unhappy circumstances we may leave the 3/4th
Battalion and return to trace the growth of the 4/4th Battalion which
had sprung from it at Tadworth a year previously.

The following officers accompanied Major Hamilton to Headquarters and
were posted to the 4/4th Battalion: Capt. and Adjt. W. G. Hayward,
Lieut. H. E. Miller, and 2/Lieuts. W. H. Vernon and H. J. M. Williams.
Hon. Lieut. J. S. Fullalove (late Devonshire Regiment) was appointed
Quartermaster, and Coy. Sergt.-Major Potton (late 1/4th Londons) to
be Regimental Sergt.-Major. The Commanding Officer was fortunate in
enlisting into the Battalion as Warrant Officers and senior N.C.O.'s
several ex-Guardsmen and members of the City Police Force, including
Coy. Sergt.-Majors H. W. Dennis and J. Pearson, and C.Q.M.-Sergts. A.
Reed and F. Milne. These experienced soldiers formed the nucleus of
what afterwards became a very fine staff of instructors.

The new Battalion shortly after its inception became the draft-finding
unit for the first and second line battalions in the field, and also
the unit by which wounded and invalided officers, N.C.O.'s and men
of the regiment from the front were re-equipped and passed through a
"refresher" course of training, pending their return to the front as
reinforcements.

The Battalion was accordingly organised in three Companies, A and B
(respectively under Capts. W. Moore and F. C. Grimwade) being for the
reception and training of recruits; and C (under Lieut. D. C. Cooke)
being the "expeditionary" Company, the personnel being all N.C.O.'s and
men returned from the B.E.F. Lieut. F. A. Coffin succeeded Capt Hayward
as Adjutant, the latter taking over the duties of President of the
Regimental Institutes.

Just previously to the formation of the Battalion the forces in the
field had suffered immense casualties at Ypres and on the Gallipoli
Peninsula; and the full weight of the German offensive on the Eastern
Front where the Russians were steadily giving ground was making itself
felt. Earl Kitchener had issued his second call for more men, and
recruiting was proceeding rapidly for all branches of the Service; and
within a month of its formation some 600 recruits had been posted to
the 4/4th Battalion, while the ranks of the Expeditionary Company were
rapidly swelling with returning casualties from Neuve Chapelle and
Ypres.

It being obviously impossible to cope with the task of dealing with
such great numbers in the cramped accommodation at Headquarters
arrangements were made for taking over the billets at New Barnet,
previously occupied by the 2/4th and 3/4th Battalions; and the
Battalion moved to its new quarters on the 12th July, Headquarters and
A Company being billeted at Littlegrove and B and C Companies at Beech
Hill.

A vigorous programme of training was at once put in hand, the work
being carried out at Folly Farm and, by the kindness of Sir Philip
Sassoon, in Trent Park. Through the generosity of the Club Committee
the full resources of the Enfield Rifle Club were again placed at the
disposal of the Battalion, and it is hard to overestimate the value of
the assistance rendered in the musketry training of the recruits by the
many public-spirited members of the Club who volunteered their services
as instructors.

Owing to the continued influx of recruits, the training companies
having now each a strength of about 380, it was necessary to take over
additional billets at Oakhill which were allotted to the Expeditionary
Company.

Early in August, almost before the recruit training was under way,
orders were received to prepare a draft of 400 other ranks to proceed,
at three days' notice, to Malta to join the 2/4th Battalion. After
considerable exertion the draft was equipped, fitted with khaki drill
uniforms and sun-helmets, and in due course proceeded to Southampton,
where it actually embarked on the transport. The orders for its
departure were, however, cancelled, and the draft returned to Barnet to
resume its training in the 4/4th Battalion, much to the disappointment
of the N.C.O.'s and men concerned.

The supplies of webbing equipment having proved inadequate, the troops
were now being provided with leather equipment of the 1915 pattern; and
were armed with the long pattern charger-loading Lee-Enfield rifle. At
this date the training of recruits proceeded under no efficient system
such as was evolved at a later date. No set period was allowed for
the preparation of the drafts, and very few facilities were provided
for improving or speeding-up training beyond such as emanated from
the brains of the officers and N.C.O.'s immediately concerned, with
the inevitable result that a good deal of unnecessary delay and a
certain lack of uniformity in the training ensued. Thanks, however, to
the devoted efforts of the instructors, the recruits soon passed the
initial stages and were passed as "trained" men on a syllabus which
included drill, musketry, marching, physical training and bayonet
fighting, entrenching, field work and the rudiments of bomb-throwing.
The first draft of N.C.O.'s and men supplied by the Battalion
consisting of 40 other ranks under Lieut. N. L. Thomas and 2/Lieuts. S.
Davis, J. W. Price and C. S. G. Blows proceeded to the Dardanelles to
join the 2/4th Battalion at the beginning of November 1915.

Recruiting had continued at a great speed during the months of
July, August and September, and the training companies had assumed
such unmanageable proportions that they were subdivided and a new
training company, C, under Major H. J. Duncan-Teape, was formed, the
Expeditionary Company being renamed D.

On the 29th August 1915 the Battalion was visited by the following
ex-officers of the Regiment:

Lieut.-Col. E. T. Rodney Wilde, V.D.
Lieut.-Col. Harry Dade, V.D.
Lieut.-Col. A. H. Lock, V.D.
Major P. Lynch, and
Major W. Stevens.

On this occasion Church Parade was held at Folly Farm, after which
the Battalion marched past the ex-officers, the salute being taken by
Lieut.-Col. Dade.

On the 13th November an inter-company relief took place, A Company
moving to Beech Hill, and its billets at Littlegrove being occupied by
B Company.

At Christmas 48 hours' leave was granted to every member of the
Battalion, two leave parties being formed for the purpose.

During this period the Reserve Battalions of the 1st London Division
were stationed in all parts of the Home Counties, and the supervision
of training by those responsible was naturally extremely difficult; and
it was consequently decided to bring together all these battalions into
one Divisional camp, the site selected being near Salisbury Plain.

The move to Salisbury took place in January 1916, the 4/4th Battalion
proceeding on the 11th to No. 7 Camp, Hurdcott (between Salisbury and
Shaftesbury), where it found itself for the first time in company with
the 4/1st, 4/2nd, and 4/3rd Battalions, the remainder of the Division
being quartered at Hurdcott and Fovant.

No troops of the 4th London Regiment were after this date quartered at
Barnet, but before finally saying farewell to this the first station
of so many hundreds of the members of the Regiment, we must once more
express the indebtedness of the Regiment not only to those gentlemen
who so generously afforded the Battalion the use of such excellent
training grounds, but also to Mr Kingwell and Mr W. H. Vernon, the
owners respectively of Beech Hill and Littlegrove, for the pains taken
by them to render these houses comfortable for the troops, and to
the many local residents who extended kindness and hospitality to the
Battalion, among whom Mr Eldred of Cockfosters must not be forgotten.

About this time the designation of the Battalion was changed to the 4th
(Reserve) Battalion London Regiment, a corresponding alteration being
made in the titles of the other 4th and 3rd line battalions of the
Division.

Major H. J. Duncan-Teape assumed the duties of second in command in
January 1916.

The immediate result of the move to Salisbury Plain was an immense
strengthening of the _esprit-de-corps_ of the Battalion which now found
itself for the first time together in one camp, and a considerable
increase of efficiency and improvement in discipline followed. The
Hurdcott camps were arranged on suitably designed principles with well
ventilated sleeping huts and roomy messing and recreation rooms which
contributed in no small degree to the comfort and physical welfare of
the troops. The 4th (Reserve) Battalion was, moreover, exceptionally
fortunate in becoming the possessor of an excellent training and sports
ground some 5 acres in extent. Work was immediately set in hand to
construct a bayonet fighting assault course and a bombing ground, and
considerable improvements were made in the practice trenches which had
been left in a half-completed condition by the former occupants of the
camp.

The 3rd line Division now came under the command of Col. Williams, C.B.
(late Somerset Light Infantry), who was succeeded in the command in May
by Col. S. H. Godman, D.S.O. (Scots Guards), whose kindly personality
will be held in grateful remembrance by all who came into personal
touch with him.

Voluntary recruiting had come almost to a standstill during the
preceding December, and the training of all the N.C.O.'s and men who
had joined the Battalion previously was now practically completed.
Numerous drafts had been sent out to the 1/4th Battalion in France, and
the activities of the training staff of the Battalion were therefore
somewhat restricted. But in March the whole of the training reserve
camps in England became veritable hives of activity; for in that month
the first groups of men enlisted under the "Derby" scheme of recruiting
were called up, and were posted to their respective home training
battalions.

The recruits allotted to the Regiment under this scheme were clothed
at Headquarters (though not equipped or armed) and drafted straight to
Hurdcott, and within the space of a week no fewer than 650 were posted
to the 4th (Reserve) Battalion. In the following week a party of 220
N.C.O.'s and men of the 3/4th Battalion were sent to the 4th (Reserve)
Battalion for the completion of their training, which was found on
examination to be in a variety of stages of advancement.

It will be readily appreciated that the sudden advent of so large a
body of totally untrained men strained the instructional facilities of
the Battalion to the utmost, and it was deemed advisable somewhat to
modify the system of training which had proved sufficient hitherto.
The recruits were posted to companies as usual, an extra company, E
(under Lieut. Miller), being now formed, but the company staffs assumed
responsibility only for clothing, equipment, messing, pay and other
administrative and disciplinary duties, the whole of the training
being entrusted to a specially selected staff of officers and N.C.O.
instructors, who were as far as possible relieved of company and
battalion duties. It is believed that the Battalions of the London
Reserve Division were among the first to adopt this system of coping
with the problem of draft-production which, in modified and improved
forms, gradually became recognised as the most efficient and was
generally adopted.

It should be understood that the brief description which follows of the
work of the Reserve Battalion is somewhat anticipatory. The scheme of
training which was in force in the last year of the War was obviously
not evolved in a day, but was the fruit of three years' experience. But
it is thought that the present is perhaps the most suitable juncture
for the inclusion in this history of these notes, as the period now
under review saw the inception of the great training scheme whereby the
country produced its citizen soldiers who fought the great battles of
1916, 1917 and 1918.

The system as originally evolved in the 4th Battalion was intended to
apply to "barrack-square" instruction in drill only, but as training
proceeded, it was found desirable not only to ensure uniformity of
instruction, but also for economy of instructors and the avoidance of
delay in the completion of training, to apply it to all branches of
training. "Specialist" officers and N.C.O.'s were therefore appointed
to take charge of each different subject of instruction, such as drill,
musketry, bombing, Lewis Gun, physical training and bayonet fighting,
entrenching and wiring, and "anti-gas" measures; the whole training
school being under the executive control of an "officer in charge of
training."

This development was made the more desirable inasmuch as the War Office
now was tightening up the whole system of training, in view of the
continued heavy casualties at the front which rendered necessary not
only the fullest and quickest possible development of the untrained
man-power of the Empire, but also the regular and rapid filling up of
deficiencies in the ranks of the fighting troops. Under the War Office
scheme (the wisdom of which is demonstrated by the fact that in broad
principle it remained unaltered until the Armistice, modification only
being found desirable in matters of detail) the period allowed for the
conversion of the recruit into a trained soldier was fourteen weeks.
This period was subdivided with considerable skill and foresight, the
first two weeks being occupied in completing the equipment of the
recruit, coupled with light drill and physical training, together
with lectures on a few general subjects with the object of gradually
settling him into his new conditions of life, and to allow for his
complete recovery from the effects of "anti-typhoid" inoculation. The
serious training of the recruit therefore lasted twelve weeks, which
in the 1st London (Reserve) Brigade were subdivided into two distinct
periods. The first of these concerned the "individual" training of the
recruit in the subjects to which reference has been made above, and
which lasted for ten weeks. It was proceeded with in accordance with
War Office instructions, which laid down the number of hours to be
devoted weekly to each subject. During this period also the recruit was
put through a special table of musketry practices on the open range,
and it concluded with a series of tests of individual proficiency in
each subject, the passing of which decided the recruit's claim to be
classed as a trained soldier.

Throughout these three months the training proceeded by platoons, each
platoon of recruits living, messing and working together, with the
object of impressing on them, from the earliest days of their service,
the importance of the platoon as a unit in action. The latter part of
the "individual" training period saw the sub-division of each platoon
into Lewis Gun and bombing sections, training being arranged for in
accordance with the particular requirements of each. The "individual"
training having been completed, the final fortnight was devoted to
platoon "combined training" in field work as a properly organised
platoon, the men working in full marching order, loaded to the weight
which they would be called upon to carry in the field. The physical
strain of the last fourteen days was undoubtedly considerable, but the
results attained by it were amply justified, not only from the point of
actual instruction imparted, but also from that of the highly important
question of selection of N.C.O.'s, for each section of the platoon in
"combined training" was in charge of a recruit N.C.O., the specialist
instructor being attached merely for the purpose of supervision.

On completion of this final and most interesting period in the
recruit's training, he proceeded on "draft-leave" for four clear days,
on return from which he was reported as ready to proceed overseas, was
medically inspected and finally fitted out; and as a rule his departure
overseas ensued within a few days.

Such was the course of life in a Reserve Battalion, and it will not
be disputed that the duties of an instructor were both multifarious
and exceedingly onerous, while the degree of personal application
and physical endurance which the recruit himself was called upon
to display was severe to a degree. Owing to the frequent changes of
personnel among the N.C.O. instructors, it is impossible to record
the names of all those who were in turn employed in this manner, but
it would be unjust not to acknowledge the splendid devotion of the
training staffs or to recognise with gratitude the extreme importance
of the rôle played by them in the War. Neither can we refrain from
remarking that, however complete the scheme of training, and however
efficient the instructors, it would have been nearly impossible to
carry it into effect in the short period allowed but for the intense
keenness and willingness to learn displayed by the vast majority of the
many thousands of recruits who were trained in accordance with it.

The instructors themselves were drawn entirely from N.C.O.'s who had
served with the 1st or 2nd line battalions overseas, and had either
been invalided to the United Kingdom or were sent home for six months
"on exchange." In order to avoid staleness no instructor who was fit
for overseas service was permitted to retain his appointment for more
than one year, at the end of which period he himself returned to the
front as a reinforcement, his place on the training staff being taken
by one more recently returned to England.

Officer instructors were selected and retained on a similar principle,
the period of appointment to the establishment of a training reserve
unit being (in the case of physical fitness for service overseas) a
maximum of six months.

The officers of the first training staff appointed in the 4th (Reserve)
Battalion were:

Capt. F. C. Grimwade, in charge of training.
2/Lieut. E. G. Dew, Assistant to Training Officer.
2/Lieut. A. G. Croll;} Musketry Instructors.
" G. H. Hetley}
2/Lieut. R. K. Caparn, Physical Training Instructor.
2/Lieut. L. A. Allen, Lewis Gun "
2/Lieut. L. C. Haycraft, Bombing and Anti-gas "

Signalling instruction was provided under Brigade arrangements, the
first Brigade Signalling Officer, 2/Lieut. R. C. Hunt, being supplied
by the 4th (Reserve) Battalion.

Early in February 1916 the 4th (Reserve) Battalion received a very
welcome reinforcement in the shape of 50 men of the Second Trinidad
Contingent, and the honour done to the Regiment in selecting it for the
training of this draft, representative of one of the smallest and yet
most ancient and loyal outposts of the Empire, was much appreciated.
About the same time four Trinidad officers, 2/Lieuts. L. Farfan, H.
Dow, R. L. Fabien and J. MacDonald, were gazetted to the Battalion. It
was rapidly realised that the difference of climate between the West
Indies and the snow-laden winds of the "Plain" was too severe, and it
became evident that this keen and efficient platoon must be transferred
to a more suitable environment. After about six weeks with the 4th
(Reserve) Battalion, therefore, they were sent to complete their
training with the 7th Royal Fusiliers at Falmouth and later attached to
the 3/4th Devonshire Regiment in India.

In April Major H. J. Duncan-Teape rejoined the 1/4th Battalion in
France, the duties of second in command being assumed by Major G. H. M.
Vine.

During May the Battalion was inspected by Col. S. H. Godman, D.S.O.,
commanding the Division, who presented C. S. M. Risley, D.C.M., with
his medal. The Battalion also received a visit from Lieut.-Col. E.
T. Rodney Wilde, V.D. At the end of May the Division was reviewed by
Field-Marshal Earl French, commanding the Home Forces.

Although the whole of the Battalions at Hurdcott and Fovant Camps
existed for the training of recruits and were in no way formations
which were likely to be sent overseas as units, they were included in
the scheme which had been prepared for the defence of Great Britain in
the event of an attempt at landing by the Germans.

This scheme provided for the maintenance of a permanent defence force
on the East Coast and at other points where it was deemed likely that
any attempt at invasion would be put into effect. In addition to this,
arrangements were made for the rapid concentration from other sources
of a mobile force for use, in the event of active operations taking
place, as a general reserve. To this general reserve the units of the
3rd line groups of the 1st London Division contributed a quota of
officers, N.C.O.'s and men varying from time to time with the numbers
of men who were sufficiently advanced in their course of training to
render their inclusion in the force useful.

During the period at Hurdcott frequent test concentrations took place,
in several instances the parade being followed by a test route march.
These parades were always attended by the platoons of the 4th (Reserve)
Battalion detailed for the time being to this duty and passed off
satisfactorily.

On the 2nd June 1916 Major W. H. Hamilton, who had commanded the
Battalion since its formation, was gazetted to the 4th Battalion Duke
of Cornwall's Light Infantry and almost immediately proceeded to join
his new Battalion at Meerut.[4] He was succeeded in temporary command
of the Battalion by Major G. H. M. Vine. On the occasion of Major
Hamilton's departure the troops testified to their appreciation of his
unfailing kindness and sympathy with all ranks throughout the period of
his command by lining the camp road and heartily cheering him as his
car passed down it.

[4] Major Hamilton remained with the 4th D.C.L.I. until the following
year when he was attached to the 4th Hants Regiment. With this
Battalion he proceeded to Mesopotamia and took part in the victorious
advance which culminated in the occupation of Baghdad. He was later
appointed to command the detachment of the Hants Regiment which
accompanied the gallant little force led by General Dunsterville to
endeavour to secure the oilfield of Baku on the Caspian Sea.

In the latter part of July command of the Battalion was assumed by Col.
Vickers Dunfee, Major Vine resuming the duties of second in command.

On the 1st July 1916 began the great series of battles on the Somme,
the Regiment's part in which will be described, and almost immediately
calls were made for drafts of all ranks to fill the very serious
gaps caused by the heavy casualties sustained by the 1/4th Battalion
during the battle of Gommecourt; and between this date and the middle
of October when the 56th Division was finally withdrawn from the
Somme battles a total of some 30 officers and 400 other ranks were
despatched. These very heavy calls naturally depleted the ranks of the
home Battalion very seriously and took nearly all the "Derby" recruits
who had joined in the previous March.

With the object, apparently, of effecting an ultimate economy in staff,
a reorganisation of considerable importance took place on the 1st
September 1916 among the whole of the 3rd line units of the Division.
So far as the Fusilier Brigade was concerned this took the form of
amalgamation of the four existing battalions into two, the 1st and
2nd Battalions becoming the 1st (Reserve) Battalion, and the 3rd and
4th Battalions becoming the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion. Each of these
new battalions for the time being retained a double establishment of
officers, warrant officers and N.C.O.'s and were organised in eight
companies till the despatch of personnel on draft permitted a reduction
to be made. The composite battalion was made responsible for the
provision of reinforcements and for the reception of ranks returned
from overseas for each of the two Regiments of which it was composed.

These amalgamations of necessity involved extensive repostings of
officers, in particular among those of senior rank. Command of the
new 3rd (Reserve) Battalion was assumed by Lieut.-Col. T. Montgomerie
Webb, formerly commanding the old 3rd (Reserve) Battalion, Major G.
H. M. Vine being appointed second in command. The duties of Adjutant,
Quartermaster and Training Officer respectively were also assumed by
officers of the old 3rd (Reserve) Battalion (namely, Capt. McGlashan,
Capt. Coombe and Major H. Moore, M.C.), the officers who had previously
held the corresponding appointments in the old 4th (Reserve) Battalion
being posted as follows:--

Capt, F. A. Coffin (Adjt.) to Brigade Staff.

Lieut. Fullalove (Q.M.) to new 6th (Reserve) Battalion.

Capt. F. C. Grimwade (Training Officer) to command A Company new
3rd (Reserve) Battalion.

Col. Vickers Dunfee was appointed to command the new 1st (Reserve)
Battalion, an appointment which he retained until his demobilisation in
December 1918.

It must be confessed that the immediate result of this amalgamation,
involving as it did the extinction as a separate entity of the 4th
(Reserve) Battalion, was a heavy blow to the _esprit de corps_ of all
ranks, which was in the circumstances at least comprehensible. The rank
and file at a critical stage of their training came under the command
of officers and N.C.O. instructors who were unknown to them, while the
instructors of the old 4th (Reserve) Battalion experienced a natural
and very keen disappointment at not being permitted to complete the
task to which they had applied themselves with such devotion for many
weeks past.

A closer acquaintance with the new surroundings, however, resulted in
a gradual disappearance of these feelings of regret, and in due course
a new _esprit de corps_ and a closer bond of union between the two
Regiments concerned took their place. At the end of its existence in
November 1918 the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion had become an extremely happy
one, in which no sort of distinction existed between the 3rd and 4th
London Regiments, and each worked for the welfare of all.

CHAPTER IX

THE FORMATION OF THE 56TH DIVISION

From May onwards during the remainder of 1916 the history of the
Regiment in France is that of the 1/4th Battalion, into which the
2/4th Battalion was merged; and we may therefore proceed to follow
its fortunes from the date of its attachment to the newly formed 56th
Division.

At the date of the 1/4th Battalion's arrival in billets at Citerne on
the 9th February 1916, the 56th Division was just being concentrated.
The 47th Division, which comprised chiefly battalions of the 2nd London
Division of pre-war days and which the Battalion had just left, had
joined the British Armies in France as a Division; but the units of the
old 1st London Division, which had been among the first Territorial
units to leave England, had hitherto been scattered throughout the Army
attached to different regular divisions. The 56th, therefore, though
junior in precedence, owing to its comparatively late formation, to
many other Territorial Divisions which had left England as complete
organisations, consisted entirely of battalions which might fairly be
described as veteran, since all had seen a good deal of stiff work up
and down the lines.

The infantry battalions were brigaded as follows:

56TH (LONDON) DIVISION--Major-Gen. Sir C. P. A. Hull, K.C.B.

167TH INFANTRY BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. F. H. Burnell-Nugent, D.S.O.
1/1st London (Royal Fusiliers).
1/3rd London (Royal Fusiliers).
1/7th Middlesex.
1/8th Middlesex.

168TH INFANTRY BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. G. G. Loch, C.M.G., D.S.O.
1/4th London (Royal Fusiliers).
1/12th London (Rangers).
1/13th London (Kensingtons).
1/14th London (London Scottish).

169TH INFANTRY BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. E. S. D'Ewes Coke, C.M.G., D.S.O.
1/2nd London (Royal Fusiliers).
1/5th London (London Rifle Brigade).
1/9th London (Queen Victoria Rifles).
1/16th London (Queen's Westminster Rifles).

The Division was attached to the VI Corps (Keir) of the Third Army
(Allenby).

The record of the next three months may be passed over quickly as
they were devoted solely to organising and training the new Division
in areas well to the rear of the trenches, and it was not until the
early days of May 1916 that the various units came under fire as a
Division. This prolonged period of rest, which indeed was the longest
ever spent in this manner by the Battalion in the whole course of
its active service history, was of considerable importance in order
that staffs and units might become thoroughly acquainted with each
other, and that the individual battalions of each Brigade might have
a sufficient opportunity of creating the divisional _esprit de corps_
which experience has shown to be so necessary in action.

But the three months of routine work will provide us with a useful
respite in which to make some reference to one or two developments in
organisation which were carried out before the British forces plunged
into the dreary and protracted struggles of the Somme, and which
affected the 1/4th Londons equally with other units.

One of the developments which took place about this period, and which
had an effect on the general efficiency of the Army so far-reaching
that its value can hardly be overestimated, was the formation of Army
and Divisional Schools, in which the lead was taken by the Third Army.
These schools, as is well known, were established under selected
bodies of instructors to achieve the double object of keeping the
fighting troops, through the medium of the regimental officers and
non-commissioned officers who attended them for short courses of
instruction, in touch with the progress made from time to time in the
art of war, and particularly in the more technical branches, such as
gas, bombing, Lewis gunnery, etc., and also of assisting battalions
to provide efficient courses of instruction and training for their own
personnel while out of the trenches for short periods. The success
which in general attended these efforts was great and their influence
on the action of our troops in the great battles of the latter part of
the War was undoubtedly far-reaching.

The 56th Divisional Schools were first established under Major D. V.
Smith, D.S.O., 1/1st Londons, at Givenchy-le-Noble and Ambrines in
April 1916.

Attention was also directed at this time towards training the
infantry to assume greater responsibility for the general maintenance
and strengthening of the forward trenches in their own occupation,
and thereby releasing the Royal Engineers for works requiring more
technical skill. To this end the early days of March saw the formation
in the Division of trench pioneer squads in each battalion consisting
of selected men under the supervision of a subaltern officer. These
squads were given special training in erecting wire entanglements,
constructing strong points and consolidation of newly captured
positions. The first trench pioneer officer of the 1/4th Londons was
2/Lieut. V. C. Donaldson, and under him the trench pioneers began to
shape well towards efficiency; but the need for the existence of such
squads was subsequently modified to some extent by the attachment to
each Division of a specially trained Pioneer Battalion, the 1/5th
Cheshire Regiment joining the 56th Division in this capacity. The
Pioneer Battalions were fighting units but, as their name implies, were
employed more particularly on constructional work rather beyond the
powers of the ordinary infantry officer to direct or of the troops to
execute, and in active operations their usefulness in consolidating
new trenches and similar duties was established beyond a doubt. The
advent of such highly trained units had a tendency somewhat, perhaps
not altogether rightly, to depreciate the value of battalion pioneer
squads, and ultimately these were done away with. The duty of trench
working parties, whether in active operations or in holding trenches,
afterwards fell equally on all the personnel of the companies, while
in the 56th Division if not in others, general direction was given to
the Battalion's activity in trench work by a "Works" officer attached
to Battalion Headquarters. This appointment established early in June
1916 was first filled in the 1/4th Londons by Capt. R. N. Arthur, and
remained in existence until the end of the War. The Works officer
became responsible for making arrangements between company commanders
and the Royal Engineers for the supply of the material required for the
trench work undertaken by the companies in the line, for detailing the
working parties supplied by the Battalion while out of the line, and in
general forming a link between the Commanding Officer and the company
commanders in the matter of trench work.

A further development occurred in the formation of a Headquarters
Company, called in the 1/4th Londons for ease of distinction K
Company. The object of this change was to separate so far as was
reasonably possible the fighting personnel of the Battalion from the
administrative personnel, such as transport, headquarters clerks
and telephone operators; and to relieve the company commander of
responsibility as regards clothing, pay and accommodation, etc., of
such administrative personnel by bringing them under the direct control
of a Headquarters officer, usually the Assistant-Adjutant, to whom as a
rule such men were more accessible than to the company officers. This
left the companies more intact as fighting units and much reduced the
work of company quartermaster-sergeants in looking after large numbers
of men who in practice were seldom with the company. Upon the whole
the system worked exceedingly well; though, as was almost inevitable,
K Company showed from time to time a tendency to assume unreasonable
proportions and required a little "weeding out."

At least a passing reference must be made to the 56th Division's
famous concert troop, the Bow Bells. The uniform excellence of its
entertainments from its inception till the end of the war was the means
of providing all ranks of the Division from time to time with hours of
intense pleasure and mental rest of inestimable value.

Lastly, mention must be made of an institution which made its
appearance in the Battalion about this time and carried out exceedingly
useful work, namely, the Regimental Canteen. Thousands of 1/4th London
men have happy recollections of Sergt. Plumbley and his assistant Pte.
Blight, who, like the sutlers of former wars, followed the Battalion
in all its wanderings with their welcome stocks of tobacco, chocolate,
notepaper, newspapers and other useful articles, and, fair times or
foul, were always to be found with their little shop neatly set out in
a dugout or a ruined cottage not very far in rear of the most advanced
troops of the Battalion.

The Battalion occupied its comfortable quarters at Citerne for about
a fortnight amid conditions which presented a total change from those
amidst which it had passed the previous year, and which brought a
corresponding benefit to the troops by way of mental as well as
physical recuperation. The Hallencourt area, lying as it does on the
broad rolling hills of Ponthieu on the west bank of the Somme, formed a
complete contrast to the dreary flats and marches of Flanders not only
in the pretty variation of the landscape but also because this part of
the country was unscarred by the ravages of war. At Citerne, moreover,
the Battalion for the first time since it joined the Ferozepore Brigade
in February 1915 was stationed beyond the range of heavy gun fire.
Citerne is but a small village, but its kindly and warm-hearted folk,
from M. le Maire downwards, will always be held in grateful remembrance
by those of the 1/4th Londons who had the good fortune to enjoy their
hospitality.

The fortnight's sojourn here was devoted principally to training, but
the amusement of the Battalion was not overlooked and football matches
with other units and concerts in the tiny village theatre made a
welcome break in the routine of parades.

At Citerne the 1/4th Londons became possessed for the first time in
France of a Chaplain, the Rev. R. Palmer, C.F., Brigade Chaplain, being
attached to the Battalion on the 19th February. The Battalion was also
rejoined at Citerne by Capt. W. Moore, who had been hit at Ypres the
previous April, and was further strengthened by the arrival of a draft
of 95 N.C.O.'s and men.

On the 27th February the Division moved to a fresh training area on the
opposite bank of the Somme, Divisional Headquarters opening at Domart,
when the 168th Brigade Headquarters and the Battalion were billeted in
Vauchelles. Here the programme of training was continued until the 12th
March, on which day a second move was made, this time to the Doullens
area, all the battalions of the 168th Brigade occupying billets in the
town.

On the 8th March a further reinforcement of 100 N.C.O.'s and men
arrived from the 4/4th Battalion and was posted to companies. At this
time also the bad news was received that Lieut.-Col. L. T. Burnett, who
had gone on leave in January, was unfit to return overseas, and Major
W. G. Clark, D.S.O., therefore continued in command of the Battalion,
with Major W. Moore as second in command.

Doullens did not provide a refuge to the Brigade for long for the 15th
March saw the Division once more on the move to the Le Cauroy area
(east of Frevent), the 1/4th Londons taking over billets at Beaufort.
In this area the Division settled down steadily to a period of training
which continued without interruption and with very little incident
calling for notice for nearly seven weeks, during which the strength
of the Battalion, as of all other units, gradually crept up, if not to
war strength at least to such size that it became abundantly evident
that the Division was not destined to remain for long in billets
behind the line. Drafts joined the Battalion consisting of 2/Lieuts.
G. E. Stanbridge, G. H. Davis and A. G. Blunn, and also of 87 other
ranks on the 22nd March; of 12 other ranks on the 6th April; and a
final reinforcement of 33 other ranks arrived on the 20th April; these
additions bringing the Battalion to the respectable strength of nearly
600 all ranks.

During the same period the Battalion suffered losses among officers
in Capt. J. R. Pyper, M.C., who was seconded to the 168th Brigade
Machine-Gun Company; Lieut. S. E. H. Walmisley, who after carrying out
the duties of Quartermaster for nearly four months during the absence
on sick leave of Lieut. E. S. Tomsett, was appointed to the Central
Training School, Rouen; and 2/Lieut. C. R. P. de Pury who was seconded
as R.T.O.

On the 23rd March Major W. G. Clark, D.S.O., left the Battalion on
short leave and he also succumbed to a severe breakdown while at home
and was unable to return. Command of the Battalion was carried on
temporarily by Major W. Moore until the 8th April, when Lieut.-Col. L.
L. Wheatley, D.S.O., Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, Staff Captain
168th Infantry Brigade, took command.

It would be but tiresome to follow the daily routine of the Battalion
during this prolonged period of rest where one day's work so much
resembles that which preceded it, and we may therefore be forgiven for
passing quickly over this part of the record. Enough has been said to
show how from the Battalion point of view the Division came into being
and was prepared for the work allotted to it, and it remains therefore
for us to pass on and endeavour to recount the manner in which the
1/4th Londons performed their task.

CHAPTER X

THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF THE SOMME, 1916

I. _The Attack on Gommecourt_

The spring of 1916 was marked by two enemy offensives, at Verdun and
on the Italian front, both of which tried the resources of our Allies
severely. In order to draw off German troops to the East the Russian
offensive against the Austrians had been started in May, but in spite
of this the German pressure against Verdun continued to increase.

Sir Douglas Haig had for some time intended to undertake an offensive
operation on a large scale during 1916 in conjunction with the French,
and in view of the continual increase in the strength of the British
Armies it was clearly desirable that the launching of the battle should
be delayed as long as possible consistent with the advance of the
summer. But in view of the great pressure at Verdun it was decided that
the British attacks should begin at the latest at the end of June, with
the objects of relieving our Allies and of pinning as many enemies as
possible to the front opposite the British Armies, in addition to the
tactical improvement of our positions.

The part of the enemy's lines selected for attack was the right of the
British front, opposite which the Germans occupied high ground forming
the watershed between the River Somme and the rivers flowing north-east
into Belgium. The general direction of this watershed, which consists
of a chalk country of broad swelling downs and deep well-wooded
valleys, is roughly from east-south-east to west-north-west. The aspect
of this country bears a general resemblance to parts of Wiltshire,
and the gentle undulations of the higher slopes of the hills, which
descend with unexpected abruptness into waterless valleys lined with
banks whose declivitous sides seem to have been shaped by human agency,
cause the resemblance to be one also of detail. From this watershed
a series of long spurs runs south-westerly towards the Somme, and on
their lower slopes the German lines ran from Curlu near the river at
first north and then almost due west to Fricourt, a distance of some
10,000 yards. At Fricourt the lines took an abrupt turn northward for
a further 10,000 yards when they crossed the Ancre, a tributary of
the Somme, near Hamel. From this point they continued in a generally
northerly direction, passing through Beaumont Hamel, west of Serre
and between Hébuterne and Gommecourt. In the neighbourhood of the two
last-named villages the lines crossed the summit of the main watershed,
and thence descended gently in a north-easterly direction towards Arras.

On the 20,000 yards between the Somme and the Ancre the enemy had
already prepared a strong second system of defence about two miles
in rear of the front system; and on the whole front from Gommecourt
to the Somme he had spared no effort in the nearly two years of his
uninterrupted occupation to render these positions impregnable.
The strengthening of woods and villages into fortresses, and the
skilful use of the ground in siting trenches and gun and machine-gun
emplacements, had in fact woven his successive lines of trenches
into one composite system. Yet further in rear he was still at work
improving existing defences and constructing new.

The front of attack on which the British armies were to operate covered
the whole of the above described line from Gommecourt to Curlu--a total
of about 17 miles--while the French were to co-operate on a wide front
immediately south of the River Somme.

The story of the struggle which, lasting from the beginning of July
until the early part of November, gave us possession, first of the
forward trench systems, then of the crest of the ridge, and finally
of the whole plateau and parts of the further slopes, divides itself
into phases, which can be dealt with in turn to such an extent as the
record of the 1/4th Battalion is concerned with them. For the present
we are concerned with the enormous preparations which preceded the
opening of the struggle and of the first phase of the battle which
began on the 1st July 1916.

Dealing with the preparations for the battle generally, an enormous
amount of work was required in improving road and rail communications;
in digging assembly trenches and dugouts, for use not only as shelters
but also as aid posts and stores for ammunition for small arms and
trench mortars; and in constructing many additional machine-gun and gun
emplacements. The water supply for the assaulting troops presented a
serious problem, and Sir Douglas Haig records in his Despatches that in
this connection over a hundred pumping plants were installed and over
120 miles of water mains laid.

During most of the period in which this preliminary labour proceeded
the troops were working under most trying weather conditions and
frequently were harassed by heavy enemy fire.

The particular tasks for which the 168th Brigade, and in particular the
1/4th Londons, were called upon will be referred to in their places at
greater length.

* * * * *

After remaining in training in the Frevent area for the latter half of
March and the whole of April the 56th Division moved forward on the
3rd and 4th of May into the VII Corps area (D'Oyly Snow) and took over
from the 46th Division a sector of the line in front of the village of
Hébuterne and facing Gommecourt.

The line was occupied by the 167th Brigade, the 168th moving in reserve
to Souastre, a small village some three miles west of the front
trenches. The Battalion moved by march route from Beaufort on the 6th
and arrived at Souastre after a ten mile march at 9 p.m.

Two or three days were occupied in training, and on the 11th May the
Battalion began to supply working parties of considerable size. Of
these, one of 200 all ranks was despatched to Pas and employed in
felling and sawing trees to form props for gun pits and dugouts; and
another of 250 all ranks went to the chalk quarries of Hénu, where they
were given a task in digging road material. These working parties, the
first of many weary tasks, constituted so far as the Battalion was
concerned the first direct active preparations in the area of battle
for the Somme offensive.

The Battalion's duty at Souastre lasted a fortnight. Work, however,
did not take up the whole of the Battalion's time, and opportunity was
found for a football match with the Kensingtons, which was played on
the 12th May and resulted in a draw at one all. A few days later the
Battalion entered representatives at the London Scottish sports at St.
Amand, securing second and third places in the "open" 200 yards.

On the 15th Major H. J. Duncan-Teape rejoined the Battalion and was
appointed second in command. The works programme was now beginning
to be operated by Brigade Headquarters to the fullest extent and the
greatest possible working strength was daily employed, the chief tasks
being the digging of cable trenches for the signal services, the
construction of new dugouts and the deepening and strengthening of
existing communication and fire trenches.

D Company and one platoon of B Company in fact were despatched on the
18th to Hébuterne, where they were billeted for night digging work; and
every available man of the remaining companies was detailed for work
of one sort or another. So insistent was the demand for more labour
that on the 20th May the band and every available man of the transport
section had to be put to work on digging parties.

On the 20th and 21st May a series of Brigade reliefs took place, the
trenches being occupied by the 169th Brigade, who replaced the 167th;
while the 168th withdrew in Divisional reserve to Grenas, a hamlet near
the Doullens-Arras Road, where Brigade Headquarters opened on the 21st.
The Rangers and Scottish were billeted close by at Halloy; but the
1/4th Londons and the Kensingtons remained in the forward area attached
to the 169th Brigade, the latter battalion occupying W sector, on the
right of the Divisional front. The 1/4th Londons moved on the 21st
in Brigade reserve to Bayencourt, about a mile and a half south of
Souastre and slightly nearer the trenches.

On the 22nd the detachments in Hébuterne were relieved by C Company,
who took over their tasks. Each night of the period of duty in
Bayencourt the Battalion continued to supply large numbers of men for
fatigues of various sorts, the parties being small and divided amongst
a large number of tasks. These working parties were equipped as lightly
as possible, the men carrying water-bottles and respirators over the
left shoulder; a bandolier of fifty rounds over the right shoulder;
and their rifles with bayonet in scabbard fixed. But although the
troops moved "light" the duties were onerous, partly from the long
hours of work and the strain induced by the short available time in
which to complete apparently impossible tasks; and not least by the bad
weather, the season from the middle of May onwards being for the most
part wet. Hitherto practically no casualties had been sustained, the
first recorded casualties at the enemy's hands during the Battalion's
attachment to the 56th Division occurring on the 24th May, when two men
were wounded at work in Hébuterne.

On the afternoon of the 28th May the 1/4th Londons relieved the
Kensingtons in W subsector of the Divisional front, the Battalion still
being under the orders of the 169th Brigade. The Kensingtons took over
on relief the billets at Bayencourt.

The Divisional sector as taken over from the 46th Division early in
May had consisted of the original line taken up by the French troops
in October 1914 during the extension of the battle line from the Aisne
to the sea. This line the French had continued to hold until they
were finally relieved of responsibility for it in June 1915, when the
British extended their lines southward to the Somme. The frontage of
the sector extended as shown on Map No. 4 from the Bucquoy Road on
the right to a point opposite the most westerly point of Gommecourt
Wood on the left, being divided into two subsectors, W and Y, by an
imaginary line running roughly parallel to, and 200 yards north of, the
Hébuterne-Bucquoy Road. Opposite the British lines the Germans held a
position of enormous strength bastioned by the enclosure of Gommecourt
Wood which marked an abrupt salient in their line. As was only too
frequently the case the enemy possessed considerable advantages of
observation over the British lines, the ground rising steadily in rear
of his front trenches to the Gommecourt-Bucquoy ridge, which, although
not a hill of outstanding pre-eminence, formed the summit of the Somme
watershed described earlier in this chapter.

Except in the neighbourhood of villages such as Hébuterne, which are
surrounded by orchards and enclosed in a ring fence, the Somme country
is, like most of Picardy and Artois, devoid of hedges, and from road to
road the swell of the hillside is unbroken by fence or ditch. The roads
themselves, however, are in many cases "sunken," that is, contained in
a deep cutting, the cover afforded by the banks playing an important
part in the actions fought in this area.

A glance at the map will help to make the position clear. The trench
line shown as a reserve position on the map and marked as the WR and YR
lines was at the date of the 56th Division's advent the most advanced
trench, so that No Man's Land varied in width from 800 to 600 yards.
This fact is most important and a full realisation of it is essential
to a correct understanding of the enormous task performed by the 56th
Division.

In view of the impending attack the great width of No Man's Land was
clearly a great disadvantage, as the time which must necessarily be
occupied by assaulting columns in advancing an average of distance of
700 yards before reaching the German front line would expose them to
risk of very serious loss and possibly deprive the attack completely of
the weight necessary to enable it to be driven home. Nothing daunted
by this difficulty, however, the 56th Division at once proceeded to
make arrangements to push the lines forward and roughly to halve the
width of No Man's Land. This audacious scheme was put into operation,
and before the end of May the construction of the new front line--that
shown as the front line on the map--was begun.

[Illustration: THE ATTACK ON GOMMECOURT, 1ST JULY 1916]

The operation of digging a new front line at no great distance from the
enemy was one of considerable difficulty. It was clearly essential to
perform the work at night, and in view of the importance of the work it
was equally clearly a matter of necessity to have the task set out with
tapes as a mark for the troops to dig to. It was further reasonable to
anticipate that as soon as the enemy became aware of the existence of
the new line he would shell it violently, and therefore the new trench
must be sunk deeply enough in the first night's work to enable its
completion to be carried on from inside without the need for moving
troops about in the open. This aim postulated a working party of great
strength, for the front to be covered was nearly 2000 yards, and the
noise which must inevitably arise from over a mile of shovels and picks
hard at work was likely to bring down a hail of machine-gun bullets
and cause very severe casualties, and even, in the presence of an
enterprising enemy, the probability of a surprise attack in the middle
of the work. The attempt was clearly fraught with great risk, but with
characteristic boldness Gen. Hull determined to make the attempt.

On the night of the 25/26th May the setting out of the work was safely
accomplished by the Royal Engineers under cover of a screen of scouts,
and the following night a working party of 3000 men got to work on the
digging, a line of outposts being established for their protection
within 200 yards of the German line.

The Battalion responsible for W--the right or southern--sector of the
new line was the 1/4th Londons, the work being under the control of
Major Duncan-Teape, while the L.R.B. undertook the work in Y sector.
The night luckily passed quietly, and all ranks working with a will the
new trench, shown on map as W 47, W 48, W 49 and W 50, was opened and
sunk to a depth sufficient to provide cover.

When the Battalion, therefore, took over W sector on the night of
the 28th May, the new front line was becoming fit to occupy and had,
moreover, reached the anticipated stage in which, the Bosche being
alive to what had been done, it was becoming a favourite target for his
shells and trench mortar bombs of all calibres. From this time onwards,
in fact until the battle, the Divisional sector and in particular the
new trenches were daily harassed by the enemy's fire, and constant
repair work on the part of our trench garrisons was called for in
addition to the continuance of new construction.

The front line of W sector was taken up by A Company (A. R. Moore) on
the right with B Company (S. Elliott) on the left, supports to both
front line companies being found by D Company (Giles), while C Company
(Long) was in reserve at Hébuterne. Battalion Headquarters occupied
dugouts beneath a roller flour mill in Hébuterne. The move forward
from Bayencourt for this relief being made in daylight was carried out
across country along tracks, platoons moving separately at 300 yards
distance.

After relief the Kensingtons in Bayencourt remained at the disposal
of the 1/4th Londons for working parties, for the construction of
the new front line was but a small beginning of the task which still
remained to be completed before the opening of the battle. In addition
to the first line there was to be dug a control trench immediately
in rear of it, and a new support line--the WS line--and all these
were to be connected up by the advancement from the old WR line of
Warrior, Welcome, Whisky, Woman and Wood Street communication trenches.
These defensive works completed, there was also the erection of the
necessary wire entanglements in front, the construction of dugouts
for shelters, company headquarters, ammunition stores, and signal
offices; the laying of armoured signal cable from all headquarters
dugouts back to battalion and brigade, the digging of cable trenches
for lines of particular importance, the collection of the necessary
supplies of small arms and trench mortar ammunition and bombs in dumps;
and other tasks of varying importance and interest. Enough has been
said, however, to indicate that with only a month in which to do all
this work it was clear that the Battalion was not likely to find time
hanging heavily on its hands while in the line,--and indeed it did not.

The tour of duty proved somewhat unpleasant. The works programme was,
of course, the outstanding duty, and all ranks put their shoulders to
it with a will, but the heavy rains which fell each day made it hard to
keep pace with the time-table set for the work, while the remarkable
aggressiveness of the enemy's guns added to the digging scheme by
providing much undesired practice in trench repair work.

During the night following the relief the Battalion's positions were
heavily bombarded by heavy guns and trench mortars, which caused much
damage and several casualties, especially in the left company front.
Capt. Elliott had to be dug out of the trench which was blown in on
him, and he was sent to hospital suffering from severe concussion;
and 3 N.C.O.'s and men were killed and 12 wounded. Capt. Elliott was
unhappily never able to return to France, and in him the Battalion lost
an officer of remarkably cool and sound judgment and of wide sympathy
with the welfare of his men.

The 30th May opened with a heavy bombardment of our lines at 12.15
a.m., which was repeated half an hour later. About 2.50 a.m., following
further bombardment, the S.O.S. signal was received from the Queen
Victoria's Rifles in Y subsector, who reported the enemy advancing. A
very quick response to the call was made by our artillery, which laid
down a barrage on S.O.S. lines; but no infantry movement developed on
our front. At about 5 p.m. the enemy turned his attention to Battalion
Headquarters in Hébuterne, which were heavily shelled and severely
damaged. The sentry on duty was badly wounded, as were also four other
men of the Headquarters staff and four of D Company billeted in an
adjoining dugout. The total casualties for the day amounted to 31, of
whom 16 in B Company were cases of severe shell shock following the
previous day's bombardment.

This unpleasant degree of Bosche activity continued during the night,
when our working parties were harassed and seriously delayed; and the
31st May saw no abatement of the shelling. Battalion Headquarters again
received a "hate" at about 5 p.m., and the casualties for the day were
Lieut. H. B. A. Balls, wounded at duty, and in N.C.O.'s and men, 1
killed and 3 wounded.

Throughout this tour of duty the promptness with which the Divisional
artillery responded to calls for retaliatory fire against the enemy's
activity was excellent and did a great deal to inspire all ranks with
confidence in the gunners.

Further heavy bombardments occurred on the 1st June, which caused
a very great deal of damage to the new trenches. On the afternoon
of the next day the 1/4th Londons were relieved by the London
Scottish, withdrawing on relief to Bayencourt, where tea was served
and valises picked up from the stores. In the evening the Battalion
was concentrated in huts at Souastre. The Kensingtons had also been
relieved by the Rangers, who with the Scottish now came under the
orders of the 169th Brigade.

A day was spent in Souastre by the Battalion in cleaning trench mud
from uniforms and equipment, and in the evening it moved by march route
_via_ Hénu to Halloy, where it came once more under the orders of the
168th Brigade in Divisional reserve.

During this period of preparations for the battle the strength of the
Battalion had been steadily creeping up with reinforcements from home
and from the disbanded 2/4th Battalion. The drafts from the 2/4th
Battalion were particularly valuable; they had all seen active service
and, moreover, they were rich in potential N.C.O.'s. Throughout the
hard fighting which followed the Battalion was fortunate in having
so great an internal reserve of strength in this respect. As already
recorded the 2/4th Battalion had been on overseas service for nearly
eighteen months without the grant of any home leave. Through the
special intervention of Lieut.-Col. Wheatley several large allotments
of leave were made to the 1/4th Londons, and these were used chiefly
for the benefit of the 2/4th Battalion reinforcements, but it was of
course inevitable that large numbers of men should be unable to obtain
leave before the 1st July.

The drafts received were:

7th May--2/Lieuts. F. R. C. Bradford, C. S. G. Blows, J. W.
Price and S. Davis, and 214 other ranks from the 2/4th
Battalion.

14th May--44 other ranks from the Reserve Battalion.

24th May--130 other ranks from the 2/4th Battalion.

When the last-noted draft joined, the Battalion was treated to the
annoying spectacle of watching a further 100 men of the 2/4th Battalion
marching by _en route_ for the Kensingtons.

The day following arrival at Halloy being Sunday, a parade service was
held, the first since the 14th May; and later in the day a further
reinforcement, this time composed entirely of officers, reported to the
Battalion from the disbanded 2/4th Battalion, as follows:

Capts. R. N. Arthur and H. G. Stanham, Lieuts. W. R. Botterill and
W. A. Stark, and 2/Lieuts. H. W. Vernon, B. F. L. Yeoman, H. G.
Hicklenton and N. W. Williams.

The two first-named officers had been mobilised with the 1/4th
Battalion in August 1914, and were thus particularly welcome. The
officers of this draft were distributed among the companies, and Capt.
Arthur took over the duties of Works Officer as Major, an appointment
he continued to fill until the 27th June, when he was evacuated to
hospital seriously ill.

The 5th, 6th and 7th June were spent in training, of which the
principal feature was a practice attack over trenches constructed to
represent those opposite the sector of line which the Battalion had
just left, in preparation, of course, for the coming battle. Following
the last day's practice the Battalion was inspected by the Third Army
commander, Sir Edmund Allenby, who was accompanied by Major-Gen. Hull
and Brig.-Gen. Loch, and expressed himself satisfied with all that he
had seen and also with what he had heard of the Battalion's behaviour
during its recent tour of duty. A report of this kind may read
curiously at first in view of the fact that the Battalion had been in
France for eighteen months and had proved its steadiness in the line on
many occasions: but remember that the 56th Division was brand new, and
commanders so far did not know how their troops would shape in action.
Praise from Allenby at this stage was therefore praise indeed.

The same day the Battalion was once more sent adrift from its own
Brigade and became attached for duty to the 169th Brigade, though it
retained its billets at Halloy, and the 168th Brigade took over W and Y
sectors, Headquarters moving from Grenas to Sailly.

The Battalion now became responsible for the various works duties in
the back area, relieving the L.R.B. in this monotonous task; and from
this date onwards remained hard at work on various tasks until almost
the eve of battle. B Company was despatched to Mondicourt, an important
and vast R.E. dump on the Doullens-Arras Road, for work under the
R.E.'s. The remaining companies were split up to supply parties for the
daily work, the total numbers found each day being 8 officers and 350
other ranks, employed on such varied tasks as digging road material in
Halloy quarries; carrying logs at Pas for gun emplacements; shifting
and loading timber at Mondicourt; and working in the R.E. workshop at
Pas. This programme was pushed forward without a break until the 12th
June, the only intermission being an inspection on Sunday the 11th,
of such remnants of the Battalion as were available, by Sir Charles
Wakefield, then Lord Mayor of London, who was accompanied by Major-Gen.
Hull and Col. Evelyn Wood, and addressed the troops.

On the 13th a further redistribution of Brigades took place, the 168th
remaining in line but retaining W sector only; Y sector was handed over
to the 169th Brigade; while the 167th moved back into reserve. This
move placed the Brigades in the positions they were destined to occupy
on the day of battle. The same day the 1/4th Londons moved forward,
leaving Halloy at 5 p.m., and marching _via_ Authie, St Leger and
Coigneux to Bayencourt, where it was joined in billets by B Company
from detachment at Mondicourt. A Company was pushed straight on to
Hébuterne, when in spite of its long march and late arrival in billets
it set to work on its share of the Brigade works programme at 5 a.m. on
the 14th June.

The remaining companies were also set to work on the 14th in Hébuterne
on parts of the Brigade scheme, working hours being nightly from 9
p.m. to 5 a.m. The parties were much split up, 280 being detailed to
the 2/2nd Field Company R.E., 140 to the 5th Cheshires and 140 to the
Brigade Signal Officer for digging cable trenches. The tasks were
various, but were all directed in one way or another to the completion
and repair of the new trench system and the necessary dugouts for
the impending offensive. Night after night, for fourteen nights in
succession, did the Battalion continue these stiff working parties.
Each night there was a march of nearly three miles in each direction
between billets and work, each night the Bosche was unpleasantly active
with machine-guns, and nearly every night it rained steadily. That the
Battalion carried out this depressing duty--for there is nothing with
which the average infantryman gets more quickly "fed up" than continual
working parties--with such efficiency and keenness is all the more to
its credit. Conditions were not comfortable and the men were beginning
to be tired; but they stuck to it well for they knew the urgency of the
work and how much remained to be done in an impossibly short time.

On the 21st June the 167th Brigade took over the whole Divisional
sector for six days in order to give a final rest to the 168th and
169th and to keep them as fresh as possible for battle. The 168th
withdrew to its old rest billets at Halloy, but again the 1/4th Londons
were left behind as works battalion, remaining in Hébuterne attached to
the 167th Brigade and sticking to its works programme.

On the 23rd June Lieut. W. J. Boutall rejoined the Battalion from home
and was posted to D Company, but almost immediately took up the duties
of Assistant Adjutant.

A draft of the 2/4th Battalion arrived on the 24th, consisting of
Lieut. J. R. Webster and 40 other ranks.

Affairs in the line had now begun to "tune up." Some days previously
the British 9·2 batteries in Bayencourt had begun to register, while
on the 24th the preliminary bombardment of the enemy's lines began
systematically, with occasional intense periods, alternating with
intervals of quiet. This continued daily--and nightly--much to the
discomfort of those who were lucky enough to occupy billets with more
or less sound ceilings, for their nights were continually disturbed by
large pieces of plaster falling on them at each concussion! The attack
had been originally projected for the 29th June, and in preparation for
this the 168th and 169th Brigades returned to the line in the afternoon
of the 27th, the 1/4th Londons advancing from Bayencourt, taking over
the whole of W sector from the 8th Middlesex.

The sector was occupied on a three-company frontage as follows:

D Company--(Giles) with two platoons in W 47 and 48, one
platoon in W 47 S and one in billets in Hébuterne.

A Company--(A. R. Moore) with two platoons in W 49, one
in W 49 S and one in billets in Hébuterne.

C Company--(Sykes) with two platoons in W 49 and 50, one
in W 50 S and one in Napier Trench.

B Company--(W. Moore) with two platoons in reserve
dugouts in Cross Street. The two remaining platoons of
B were detailed for special duties as Brigade carrying
parties respectively under the Bombing and Machine-Gun
Officers.

The Somme Battle was the first important offensive in which steps
were taken to reduce the number of officers actually taking part to
the smallest possible limits, and a "battle surplus" of officers and
also of warrant officers, N.C.O.'s and men was therefore left behind
in bivouacs near Souastre when the Battalion moved into the line.
This precaution, which was always afterwards adopted, was the means
of avoiding unnecessary casualties and of providing an immediate
reinforcement, as might be required, of fresh officers who would be
acquainted with the men. The officers left in "battle surplus" were
Capts. H. G. Stanham and A. L. Long, Lieuts. J. R. Webster and H. W.
Vernon, and 2/Lieuts. C. S. G. Blows and N. W. Williams; and these were
joined on the eve of battle by Major H. J. Duncan-Teape and Lieut. W
J. Boutall, both of whom remained in the line until the last possible
minute. Lieut. W. R. Botterill also left the line before the battle to
proceed to Woolwich R.M. College.

During the day of relief the British bombardment of the German lines
was still proceeding, occasional intensive bursts being used. At
about 7.45 p.m. on the cessation of a burst the enemy put down a very
heavy retaliatory barrage on the W and WR lines, causing a good deal
of damage, especially to the latter. In the course of this shelling
D Company's headquarters were blown in and Capt. Giles was seriously
wounded, one of his company staff killed and another wounded. Poor
Giles, who had done magnificent work as platoon commander, adjutant and
company commander, and had never missed a day's duty since August 1914,
died in hospital from his injuries a few days later. He was a gallant
and unselfish officer. His place in command of D Company was taken by
Stanham, who came forward from surplus.

During the evening two patrols were despatched from New Woman Street to
examine and report on the condition of the enemy's wire and front line
trenches. They returned at 12.30 a.m. on the 28th, bringing samples
of German wire, which was reported as too thick to admit of access to
the front line. About the same time a rocket signal was sent up from
the Bosche line, a red light followed by two more in quick succession,
and this was the prelude to a sharp bombardment of our lines for about
fifteen minutes. Somewhat later, about 3.45 a.m., a second barrage came
down, this time on Hébuterne, but the damage caused was not great.
As the day wore on the enemy's activity became less intense though
he exhibited great persistence all day in his efforts to locate our
batteries near Cross Street and our trench mortar emplacements in W 47.
At night working parties were set on to the almost final preparation of
cutting gaps in our own wire at intervals of about 50 to 70 yards to
allow egress to the assaulting columns. This work is naturally rather
tricky, and the gaps, the cutting of which was left till the last
minute, must be so concealed if possible as to avoid the risk of the
enemy marking them down and plastering them with shell fire.

The day's casualties amounted to 2 officers, Lieut. W. A. Stark and J.
W. Price wounded, and 2 men killed and 11 wounded.

During the evening patrols had again been despatched to investigate
the enemy's wire and trenches, and this night greater success was
achieved. The right patrol which approached the Bosche line in front of
Farm-Farmyard was under 2/Lieut. W. H. Webster, who on looking over the
enemy's parapet found he had selected a firebay containing a party of
Bosche hard at work. Unfortunately the alarm was given and the presence
of the patrol being disclosed by Véry lights it was forced to withdraw.

Late on the evening of the 29th the warning was received that the
attack was postponed for forty-eight hours, until the 1st July.

Throughout the 29th our preliminary bombardment continued with
gradually increasing intensity; but it was noticeable that in spite of
the damage it was clearly doing to the enemy's defences it was not by
any means successful in silencing his batteries. The German artillery
was in fact unpleasantly lively, and from 6.30 a.m. until about 4.30
p.m. W sector was subjected to intermittent harassing fire from field
and machine-guns. This more or less desultory fire was followed at 6
p.m. by a sharp enemy barrage. All the evening the enemy's activity
continued, and the remarkable number of Véry lights which he put up
indicated his growing nervousness. There was indeed now every reason to
believe that the Bosche expected our attack. The long-continued British
bombardment of trenches, dumps, cross roads and battery positions, the
systematic wire-cutting, and the activity of our air forces, could have
left no room for doubt in the enemy's mind that an important offensive
was being launched. In some parts of the battle front, indeed, the
Germans had displayed notice boards inviting the British to start their
attack; and though probably these emanated from individual bravado they
formed some indication that surprise effect was not to be expected, and
that there was good reason to believe that the Germans would with their
usual thoroughness have made preparations to offer the most stubborn
possible resistance to our projected advance.

The 29th also demanded its toll of casualties from the Battalion, and
this day 28 N.C.O.'s and men were wounded.

The 30th June opened with a heavy barrage on W sector and Hébuterne
at about midnight, but this subsided after a few minutes and little
further activity was displayed by the enemy during the early morning
hours. As dawn approached the enemy's nervousness evidently increased,
and he maintained an almost continuous discharge of Véry lights.
From 7 a.m. onwards, however, the enemy artillery once more began to
show signs of liveliness which increased as the day passed. The WR
line in the vicinity of Woman and Cross Streets was in particular
heavily shelled, and altogether a great amount of damage was done
to our trench system. This action of the enemy did not call for any
particular retaliatory measures from our artillery, which proceeded
with the preliminary bombardment according to its programme. The losses
sustained by the Battalion on this day amounted to 2 N.C.O.'s and men
killed and 21 wounded, making a total of 69 casualties during the three
days the Battalion had held the line.

Little has been said of the actual occupation of the Battalion during
these three days; there is so much to relate of the battle day itself
that space does not permit us to dwell overmuch on the preceding
period. But be it understood that all the time the works programme was
being pushed on with feverish haste, though progress was slow owing
to the continued rain and the great delay caused in the projected new
work by having to divert from it a large proportion of the available
strength to repair the damage caused by the daily German bombardments.

During the evening the Battalion formed up in its prearranged assembly
areas in readiness for the attack on the following morning.

* * * * *

The part which the 56th Division was called on to play in the offensive
was that of a combined operation on a comparatively small front in
conjunction with the 46th Division, which was in line opposite the
northern flank of the Gommecourt Salient and adjoining the 56th. These
Divisions which, with the 37th (not engaged), formed the VII Corps
and were the right flank of Allenby's Third Army, were the two most
northern divisions operating in the Somme offensive.

Adjoining the 56th on the right lay Hunter-Weston's VIII Corps,
comprising from left to right the 31st, 4th and 29th Divisions in line,
with the 48th in support. One Brigade of this last-named Division--the
143rd--was in line between the 56th and the 31st, and its sector formed
a gap on which no forward move was attempted. The Gommecourt operation
was therefore entirely isolated, though forming an inherent part of the
one great offensive plan.

South of the VIII Corps the British battle front was taken up by the X
Corps (Morland), III Corps (Pulteney), XV Corps (Horne) and XIII Corps
(Congreve), these forming with the VIII, Rawlinson's Fourth Army.

The 56th Division's objectives, which will be easily followed from the
map, were to capture and consolidate a line running almost due north
from a strong point at the south end of Farm-Farmyard, through Fame,
Felon, Fell, Fellow, and the Quadrilateral to the junction of Fillet
and Indus. From this point the line was to be continued to the "little
Z" (a point about 2000 yards north of the apex of the Gommecourt
Salient) by the 46th Division, who were to clear Gommecourt village and
park.

The 168th Brigade on the right of the Divisional sector attacked on a
two-battalion front from the strong point on the right to the junction
of Felon and Epte on the left. Strong points were to be consolidated
on the extreme right and also at the junctions of Felon with Elbe and
Epte. From this point the 169th Brigade was to continue the line to
the junction of Fir and Firm and also to the point of union with the
46th Division.

The 167th Brigade was in Divisional reserve, and one battalion, the 1st
Londons, was detailed to supply 600 men to dig communication trenches
across No Man's Land after the attack.

The 168th Brigade group was disposed as follows:

HEADQUARTERS IN MARDI TRENCH

ASSAULTING BATTALIONS--
Right--London Scottish.
Left--Rangers.

SUPPORTING BATTALIONS--
Right--Kensingtons, with a special task of digging a
fire trench to form a defensive flank across
No Man's Land from the head of Welcome
Street.
Left--1/4th Londons.
168th M.G. Company--In tunnelled emplacements in the
WR line for overhead covering fire.
3-inch L.T.M. Battery (Stokes), (with half the 167th
Brigade Battery)--In emplacements in the
front line control trench.

In addition the following troops were at the disposal of the Brigadier
for the operation:

One Company 5th Cheshires (Pioneers).
One Section 2/2nd London Field Company, R.E.
Y 56--2-inch Mortar Battery.

The artillery affiliated to the Brigade consisted of four 18-pr.
batteries and one 4·5-inch howitzer battery, comprising the southern
group.

Similar attachments were made to the 167th Brigade, and over and above
these there remained at the disposal of the Divisional artillery,
a counter-battery group consisting of two 18-pr. and one 4·5-inch
howitzer batteries; and two 18-pr. batteries in reserve; while of
trench mortars there were one 2-inch battery (X 56) and two heavy
(9½-inch) mortars.

During the evening of the 30th June the other battalions of the Brigade
began to move into W sector to take up their assembly positions. The
assembly areas are marked on the map in Roman numerals as follows:

I. London Scottish (right front).
II. Rangers (left front).
III. Kensingtons (right support).
IV. 1/4th Londons (left support).

As each battalion arrived and took over its area the various companies
of the 1/4th Londons withdrew to No. IV area in rear of the Rangers.
In order to avoid congestion and cross traffic in the communication
trenches several platoons of the 1/4th Londons had to withdraw to
assembly position over the open, and by 10 p.m. this operation was
completed.

The 1st July was a glorious summer day, and the light haze which tells
of great heat hung over the rolling hills of this great plain which
was destined to become the scene of so great a struggle. With the
earliest grey of dawn the Germans opened an intense bombardment on all
our trenches, to which no reply was made by our artillery. This severe
shelling started at about 2.45 a.m. and lasted for nearly an hour: in
the course of it part of the Rangers were blown out of their assembly
trenches and compelled to make a temporary withdrawal to our area,
causing a good deal of congestion and confusion.

At 6.25 a.m. our week old bombardment increased to "hurricane"
intensity and every gun, trench mortar and machine-gun on the British
front from Gommecourt to the Somme came into action, pouring a hail
of shot and shell into the enemy lines with merciless precision and
rapidity. Under such a colossal weight of metal it seemed that nothing
could live, and it was confidently hoped that the bombardment would go
far towards breaking down the enemy's morale and power of resistance to
our attack.

At 7.25 a.m. a smoke barrage was raised along the whole front of the
attack by firing smoke bombs from the front trenches, and under this at
7.30 a.m. the British battalions moved to the assault under cover of a
creeping barrage, a moving curtain of fire.

On the 168th Brigade front the attack was made by each assaulting
battalion on a four-company front, each company in column of platoons
in extended order. The attack as a whole, therefore, moved in four
"waves," and following as a fifth wave moved a trench-clearing party
consisting of two platoons of B Company of the 1/4th Londons.

These platoons under 2/Lieuts. L. R. Chapman and H. G. Hicklenton had
the duty of completing the capture of each trench line by killing the
remaining garrison, clearing the dugouts, and collecting and sending
back the prisoners; thereby saving delay to the assaulting waves, who
would otherwise have had to perform these duties themselves to avoid
the risk of an attack from the rear after they had passed the first
objective. These platoons were made up to a strength of 1 officer, 3
N.C.O.'s and 36 men organised in four sections (clearing, bombing,
blocking and communicating), but during the hours of waiting after
assembly had already lost 26 men hit.

At the same time as the assaulting waves moved forward the Battalion,
less the two platoons of B Company above, advanced and occupied battle
positions in the area vacated by the Rangers, as follows:

A Company--(A. R. Moore) two platoons in front line
trench and two platoons in Boyau de Service, Sector W
49, between Whisky Street and Woman Street.

C Company--(J. T. Sykes) two platoons in W 50 and two
platoons in the Boyau de Service, north and south of
Bucquoy Road.

D Company--(H. G. Stanham) formed up in line in trench
W 49 S and W 50 S.

The WS line occupied by D Company had been very severely damaged by the
German bombardment and communication was therefore extremely difficult.
The company was inevitably much split up under the two platoon
commanders, G. H. Davis and B. F. L. Yeoman, while Stanham took up a
central position where he hoped to keep in touch with both flanks.

The two remaining platoons of B Company were employed as follows:

1 Platoon--Carrying party under Brigade Bombing Officer.
1 Platoon--1 Section--Carrying party to 168th M.G. Company.
3 Sections--In reserve in Napier Trench.

Battalion Headquarters (K Company) were disposed as follows:

Clerks, signallers, pioneers, In dugout and control trench
snipers, etc. (34 other ranks) of Woman Street.

Company runners (16 other In a sap adjoining.
ranks)

Battalion Bombers In a "crump" hole near the
Woman Street Battalion H.Q.
dugout.

Battalion Trench Pioneers W 50 R.

M.O. and Staff Aid Post (Junction of Wood
Street and Cross Street).

Band Ditto.

Reserve Lewis Gunners Divided between A and B
Companies.

Regimental Police In control posts, chiefly at
intersection of fire trenches
with communication trenches
throughout the sector.

A runner from the right company (A) reporting it in position arrived at
Headquarters at 8.15 a.m., but no report was received from any other
company, and from this time onwards throughout the day communication
was exceedingly difficult on account of the very heavy German barrage
which fell on all lines in W sector immediately after zero. It was
reported, however, by observers that all had successfully formed up on
their battle positions.

We must now turn for a moment to the leading battalions.

On the right the London Scottish advanced under the effective cover
of the smoke barrage, which was in fact so thick as to render the
maintenance of the correct direction a matter of difficulty, and
occupied Farm, Fell and Fate as far north as the Bucquoy Road, and
also the greater part of the strong point at the southern extremity of
attack. The blocking of the adjoining trenches and consolidation of
the captured lines was at once put in hand. The left companies appear
to have been drawn off somewhat towards Nameless Farm but seem to have
kept in touch with the Rangers on their left.

Shortly after 8 o'clock the Scottish were joined by a company of
Kensingtons, who did good work in the consolidation of Farm-Farmyard.

On the left four companies of the Rangers also crossed No Man's Land,
and although the position is obscure there can be no doubt that parties
of all companies succeeded in reaching the final objectives in Felon,
Elbe and Epte, and gained touch on Nameless Farm Road with the 169th
Brigade on the left.

At these advanced points bomb fighting in the communication trenches
began and the struggle was pursued along the line with varying success.
Realising the pressure that was being brought to bear on his now
dangerously weak companies the O.C. Rangers asked for two companies of
the 1/4th Londons to lend the weight necessary to carry forward his
attack again.

This order was received by Lieut.-Col. Wheatley at 8.45 a.m. and at
once he ordered A and C Companies to reinforce the Rangers in Fetter,
and D Company to move up to the W front line in their place. Telephone
communication having been cut by the enemy shell fire this order
was despatched by runner to the front companies; but of six runners
despatched by different routes, and two additional runners sent after
fifteen minutes' interval, only one returned after an unsuccessful
attempt to find the left company. The others were all killed. We must
pause here to offer a tribute to the bravery of runners, a class of
soldier whose gallantry was only too seldom adequately rewarded; their
duties compelled them to attempt to pass through impossible barrages
without the moral support of comradeship, and to face almost certain
death in the forlorn hope of getting through with a vital order. But
never once did they flinch from their duty.

At 9.5 a.m. a report was received through the Rangers that Rangers
and 1/4th Londons were together in the German front line, and this
was followed at intervals by other reports indicating their further
progress, till at 10.25 a.m. a message from the Rangers reported
parties of both battalions in the second German trench. Following
the receipt of this information at 10.45 a.m. Lieut-Col. Wheatley
despatched the Battalion Trench Pioneers to help consolidate the
trenches gained.

The above messages probably convey a substantially correct idea of
what occurred, but owing to the failure of all means of communication
on account of the intensity of the German shell fire, the movements
of A and C Companies will probably never be known in detail. At 11.50
a.m. an untimed message was received from Capt. A. R. Moore (A Company)
reporting that he was still in W 49, his battle position, though at
9.5 a.m., as we have seen, he was reported to have crossed to the
German line; and probably this latter report is correct. The situation,
however, evidently required clearing up, and a patrol consisting of
L.-Corpl. Hyde and Pte. Lear despatched from Battalion Headquarters
succeeded in returning with the information that A Company had gone
forward. L.-Corpl. Hyde was awarded the Military Medal for his good
work, and subsequently recommended for a commission by Lieut.-Col.
Wheatley; he was unfortunately killed in action later in the Somme
Battle whilst completing his training with C Company.

At 1 p.m. a message was received from Stanham (in reserve) that his
Company had suffered about fifty per cent. casualties and that his
position had become untenable. He was ordered to maintain his position.

By this time the situation on the other side of No Man's Land was
becoming desperate. The work of consolidation was almost impossible
owing to the German barrage, and the sustained bomb fighting was
rapidly becoming an unequal struggle owing to the impossibility of
replenishing the dwindling supplies of bombs. Again and again with
unsurpassed devotion the carrying party endeavoured to pass through
the barrier of German shells with the coveted supplies of bombs to our
harassed troops--but passage was impossible and the gallant carriers
only added to the roll of casualties.

At 1.30 p.m. a patrol returned from the German lines to Battalion
Headquarters. This had been despatched at 11 o'clock on a demand
from the Brigadier for information as to the left of the Brigade in
the German line, and Ptes. Whitehead and Buckingham had volunteered
for the duty. According to this patrol a party of the Rangers under
Lieut. Harper were holding on to the junction of Et and Felt, but was
urgently in need of bombs. Further, none of the 168th Brigade were then
in the German third line. This report was passed on to Brigade and to
the Rangers, and a special bomb carrying party from the Battalion was
ordered across to relieve Harper's need. But none reached the German
line, all being killed or wounded in No Man's Land. For their bravery
and devotion to duty Ptes. Whitehead and Buckingham were rewarded
with the Military Medal, and the former was subsequently granted a
commission.

At 2.30 p.m. the front of the Battalion Headquarters dugout was blown
in by a shell, which killed seven and wounded seven men. At the time
the dugout was occupied by a large number of Headquarters staff,
including the Colonel, the Adjutant, the Signalling Officer and Major
Moore, but of these luckily none was hit.

All this time the German shell fire continued without abatement, and at
3.30 p.m. further heavy casualties were reported by D Company. At 3.45
p.m. Brigade Headquarters ordered D Company to withdraw to the WR line,
and a report was received from Stanham at 4.45 p.m. that his withdrawal
with 1 officer and 20 men was complete.

Meanwhile the Brigade was gradually being compelled to give ground and,
owing to its lack of bombs, to loose its slender hold on the enemy's
positions. At about 2 p.m. the remnants of the Rangers, together with
a few 1/4th Londons and some Queen Victorias from the 169th Brigade
on the left, were driven into Fate, where they made a last determined
stand; but at 3.10 p.m. they were finally ejected from the German lines
and withdrew to the British trenches.

On the right the Scottish and Kensingtons met with a similar fate. A
gallant fight was put up by the remains of the Battalion under Capt. H.
C. Sparks in Farm-Farmyard, but by 4 p.m., both his flanks being in the
air and his whole force being in imminent danger of extinction, Sparks
decided to withdraw, this operation being stubbornly and successfully
carried out after the removal of as many wounded as possible.

At 6.30 p.m. the 1/4th Londons reformed in the WR line between Wood
Street and Woman Street, and later in the evening moved into the
trenches west of Hébuterne.

The other battalions of the 168th were also withdrawn and the sector
was taken over by the 167th Brigade.

The story of the 169th Brigade attack is, like that of the 168th, one
of initial success which could not be maintained. The line Fell-Feud
was carried in the early hours of the morning by the Queen Victorias
and London Rifle Brigade, but the intensity of the German shell fire
and the enfilading of the captured positions by machine-guns in
Gommecourt Park prevented the Queen's Westminsters from carrying the
Quadrilateral. Later in the day lack of bombs, as in the case of the
168th Brigade, proved the deciding factor, and resulted in a gradual
loss of the Brigade's grip on the enemy trenches, and after desperate
struggles the late afternoon hours found them also beaten back to their
original lines.

So ended the first day on which the 56th Division had been in battle, a
day on which after the most stubborn fighting and unsurpassed devotion
the gain of ground was nil, and which dealt London the severest blow in
loss of personnel that it ever suffered on any single day throughout
the War.

The losses in the Division during the period 24th June to 3rd July
amounted to 4749 all ranks, of whom 35 officers and 412 other ranks
were killed, 107 officers and 2632 other ranks wounded, and 40 officers
and 1532 other ranks missing. In the 1/4th Londons the losses for
the same period totalled the appalling number of 16 officers and 534
other ranks. These dreadful losses were borne fairly equally by all
companies, for all had been exposed to the same deadly and unrelenting
shell fire throughout the day.

Of A Company, gallantly led to the second German line by Capt. A. R.
Moore, M.C., but 18 returned. Moore himself and one of his subalterns,
F. C. Fanhangel, were killed, the other subaltern, A. G. Blunn, being
captured with 7 others. The rest of the company were killed. Moore's
end, like his life, was one of courageous devotion, and has been simply
told by one of his own sergeants: "Capt. Moore was wounded in the
wrist about thirty minutes before we went over. Nevertheless he led
the company, revolver in hand, and on the sunken road at the rear of
Nameless Farm I saw blood flowing from his back. He still pushed on,
and then I was shot through the leg and took shelter in a shell hole.
The last I saw of Capt. Moore he was still going ahead...."

The two platoons of B Company which went forward as clearing party were
severely handled. Both the subalterns, Chapman and Hicklenton, were hit
and only 10 men got back from the German line. 2/Lieut. A. S. Ford on
carrying party duty was also hit.

Of C Company only two platoons got forward as the order to advance
failed to reach Sykes, the company commander. But its casualties under
the terrific German barrage were as heavy as in any company, and after
Sykes had been wounded and both his subalterns, T. Moody and F. R. C.
Bradford, killed, the remnants of the company were brought steadily
out of action by Company Sergt.-Major Davis, who was rewarded with the
D.C.M.

D Company, which remained in reserve all day, had perhaps the most
trying time of all. From 2.30 a.m. until withdrawn at 3.30 p.m. it
sat still under the most intense artillery bombardment, but was kept
splendidly in hand and ready to move by Stanham and his only remaining
subaltern, G. H. Davis. B. F. L. Yeoman became a casualty early in the
day.

Of the Headquarters officers Major W. Moore and 2/Lieut. V. C.
Donaldson were wounded.

Magnificent work was done throughout the day by the Medical Officer,
Capt. Hurd, and his staff, who, though the number of casualties far
out-measured the facilities for dealing with them, continued their
work without a break throughout the day and the night following. In
this work splendid help was rendered by the Padre, Rev. R. Palmer, who
organised and led search and carrying parties in No Man's Land and
brought in many wounded who were unable to move.

The morning of the 2nd July was spent in the dreary duty of
ascertaining the casualties and reorganising the companies, and in the
afternoon the Battalion marched to billets at St Amand.

With the results of the day's fighting on other parts of the front
we are hardly concerned here. From Fricourt to the Somme the day was
successful and the bulk of the objectives were captured and held. But
from Fricourt northward the tale throughout was one of complete check.
Everywhere our troops met with initial success which everywhere was
later changed into disaster with appalling losses.

There is no doubt that in the northern half of attack the British
offensive was fully anticipated by the Germans. It would indeed have
been difficult to carry out such immense preparations over a period of
several weeks prior to the battle without permitting indications of the
impending attempt to become visible to hostile aerial scouts. But it
had been hoped that the weight and long continuance of the preliminary
bombardment, even though it disclosed its own purpose, would prove so
intense as to nullify all the German efforts to resist.

We must here make some reference to the battle of the 46th Division on
the northern face of the Gommecourt salient. Against this ill-fated
Division the German fire was terrific. On the right the South Staffords
were completely shattered by the enemy's machine-guns before they could
cross No Man's Land; on the left the Sherwood Foresters succeeded in
gaining the German front line, and isolated parties appear even to
have struggled forward as far as the second trench, but were rapidly
ejected. Soon after zero the whole of the 46th Division's assaulting
troops were back in their own line after suffering appalling losses:
their attack was a complete failure. At the time, therefore, that the
56th Division was making headway into the German positions, instead of
the enemy feeling, as had been hoped, the pincers closing on him from
both sides of his salient, he was relieved from all menace on his right
flank facing the 46th Division, and free to throw the whole weight of
his artillery and infantry against the 56th Division.

But the causes of the 56th Division's failure must be looked for deeper
than this.

Primarily it may be said to have been due to the shortage of bombs.
The great distance which carrying parties had to traverse over No
Man's Land with fresh supplies and the intensity of the German barrage
through which they had to pass were both such that the facilities for
getting bombs forward were inadequate. It should be remembered that
the 168th and 169th Brigades captured three lines of German trenches
and held them against all attacks in spite of the gruelling enemy fire
for many hours. It was only when bomb supplies failed that they were
ejected.

There are three other factors in this battle to which we may refer as
having contributed to the failure.

First, the enormously strong deep dugouts in the German lines, which
were large enough to give shelter to the whole trench garrison except
the few necessary sentries, had proved too strong for all except the
heaviest guns; and those of the heaviest calibre had not been directed
against them. The German garrisons were therefore able to remain in
safety until the last moment when our barrage lifted off their front
lines and they were able to man their parapets. The strength of the
German defences was increased by the density and depth of their wire
entanglements, which had been most skilfully sited with the support of
machine-guns firing in enfilade.

Secondly, the insufficient attention paid on our side to
counter-battery work. The batteries told off for counter-battery fire
were too few and of too light calibre. Throughout the day the cry arose
from all Headquarters to silence the German guns, but the few batteries
available, though served magnificently by splendid gunners, could not
cope with so gigantic a task.

The third and most important cause lay in the cunning skill with which
the German barrage was used. We have referred above to the manning of
the German parapets by their garrisons after our barrage had passed
over; but not in every case did this happen. In many instances a
greater refinement of skill was exhibited. As the British barrage
lifted off the first objective and the leading waves of the assault
poured over it, down came the enemy barrage like a dense curtain,
cutting them off for ever from their supports and their supplies. The
barrage having thus trapped them, the front trench filled with Germans
swarming up from their subterranean shelters, and these poured a hail
of machine-gun fire into the backs of our waves which were pushing
forward to the next line.

After the experience of two more years of organised trench to trench
attacks, it may be that failure for the reasons detailed above seems
a little obvious; but it would not be fair to pass them over without
pointing out that this was the first trench to trench attack of the
whole War which had been organised on so vast a scale, and it was
clearly impossible to provide against all eventualities when there
was no previous experience to act as a guide. It should be remembered
that in the south, where a greater degree of surprise was attained,
the arrangements for attack--which were substantially the same as in
the north--worked splendidly and resulted in marked success. And in
subsequent attacks attention was paid to the experience gained on this
great opening day of the First Somme Battle in increasing the strength
of counter-battery artillery and in making more efficient arrangements
for "mopping-up" captured lines.

As regards the 168th Brigade attack, in addition to the above general
criticisms, it may be remarked that the event showed that on the left
of the Brigade at least there was insufficient weight in the attack.
The Scottish on the right had to advance 250 yards and were able to
carry their objectives; but on the left the depth to be penetrated
was about 450 yards, and this proved too great for the available
strength of the Rangers, who were organised in five waves, even when
strengthened by two additional waves supplied by the companies of the
1/4th Londons.

A deal of congestion in the trenches and a great many casualties were
caused by the lack of those deep dugouts with which the Germans were
so well supplied, and in the case of the 1/4th Londons at any rate it
seems likely that they might have been of more use when called upon had
they been able to obtain efficient shelter during the hours of waiting.

We have sufficiently elaborated the causes of failure. It must not
be forgotten that a very real and important result was achieved by
the Londoners this day. The strategic object of their attack was not
primarily the capture of ground but the holding of German troops and
guns from the area of our main attack. This was an unpleasant rôle,
but a highly important one, and there can be no manner of doubt that
it was to a very large degree fulfilled. The Division's achievement
is summarised concisely in the message of congratulation issued by
Lieut.-Gen. D'Oyly Snow on the 4th July:

The Corps Commander wishes to congratulate all ranks of the 56th
Division on the way in which they took the German trenches and
held them by pure grit and pluck for so long in very adverse
circumstances. Although Gommecourt has not fallen into our hands,
the purpose of the attack, which was mainly to contain and kill
Germans, was accomplished, thanks to a great extent to the tenacity
of the 56th Division.

A remarkable incident occurred on the Divisional front on the 2nd
July. At about 2.30 p.m. that day a number of German stretcher-bearers
were seen to issue from their trenches and begin collecting the many
British wounded who were still lying round about their first three
lines of trenches. Prompt measures of precaution were taken by the
Division, and all guns were made ready to open fire on barrage lines
should any intention be shown by the Germans to take advantage of the
temporary truce. As, however, the enemy stretcher-bearers continued
their humane work quietly, our own stretcher-bearers followed their
example and began collecting casualties from No Man's Land. During this
extraordinary armistice no attempt was made by the Germans to come
outside or by our men to go beyond the line which had formerly been the
German wire entanglements. After about two hours of this work, which
was the means of saving many lives, the stretcher-bearers returned by
mutual and tacit consent to their own lines and the War was resumed!

* * * * *

The casualties suffered by the 46th Division were exceedingly heavy,
and the treatment it had received was so severe that it was deemed
necessary to withdraw it from the line temporarily, and arrangements
were made for the 56th Division to assume responsibility at once for
the 46th sector as well as its own.

This arrangement unfortunately deprived the 168th Brigade of its
well-earned rest. But though tired and in need of reorganisation after
the heavy losses it had sustained the Brigade's morale was good, for it
felt justifiably proud of its effort of the previous day. The relief
of the 46th Division began on the evening of the 2nd July when the
Scottish and the Kensingtons took over the line from the left of the
56th sector of the Fonquevillers-Gommecourt Road.

The 1/4th Londons remained at St Amand during the 3rd July, busily
engaged in reorganising its platoons and making up as far as possible
deficiencies in equipment and ammunition. In the evening the 1/4th
Londons and Rangers took over from the 138th Brigade the remainder of
the 46th Divisional sector, the Battalion relieving the 5th Lincolns on
a front adjoining that occupied by the Kensingtons the previous night.

The condition of the trenches was found to be shocking and the material
damage caused by shell and trench mortar fire was severe, but the
number of dead whose bodies had not yet been removed, and of wounded
who still were lying out in No Man's Land provided a great deal of work
of the utmost urgency. Fortunately the enemy did not interfere with
this work of clearing up the battlefield, and his lack of activity was
doubtless due to his being similarly employed. Reports were received
at night that enemy patrols were active in No Man's Land, but no
encounters took place and the Germans seen were probably covering
patrols for stretcher-bearing parties.

The following day passed without unusual incident except for a certain
amount of enemy shelling during the afternoon, which did considerable
further damage to the Battalion's trenches. During the night a storm
of terrific intensity burst over Fonquevillers, adding to the general
discomfort by filling the trenches with water.

The two remaining days spent by the Battalion in this sector were
occupied in continuing the work of removing the dead, baling out and
clearing blocked trenches, and generally attempting to reorganise the
broken-down defences as well as possible.

On the evening of the 6th July the 168th Brigade was relieved in Z
sector, as the 46th Divisional line was called, by the 169th, and the
Battalion, handing over its trenches to the Queen's Westminsters,
moved by platoons into billets at St Amand, a welcome issue of dry
underclothing being issued to the troops on arrival.

At this point the Battalion may be said finally to have finished its
share in the battle of the 1st July. Although not detailed as one of
the assaulting battalions in the attack, the strain to which it was
subjected both in actual hard work prior to the battle and by reason
of the enemy fire during the action, was as heavy as that borne by
any unit of the Division, while its casualties were among the most
severe. Starting at Bayencourt on the 13th June the Battalion had
supplied heavy working parties with long hours of work and with a
three-mile march in each direction to and from work for fourteen nights
in succession, always harassed by the enemy fire and frequently wet
through. For three nights of unusual enemy activity they had held the
line prior to the battle, and this duty was followed without respite
by the day of battle itself. After a brief interlude of two days in
billets it had once more returned to the trenches on the additional and
unexpected duty at Fonquevillers, and had there passed a further four
days in extreme discomfort--a record of which we think any battalion
might justly be proud.

The extended front now held by the Division rendered a prolonged rest
for the Brigade out of the question, and the Battalion's sojourn at
St Amand was of only three days' duration. Of these days the first
two were occupied in refitting the troops as far as possible, and in
cleaning up and drying clothing after the days spent in the line. The
last day, Sunday 9th July, was occupied with Church Parade and, in
the afternoon, a Brigade Parade at Souastre for inspections by the
Corps and Army Commanders, both of whom addressed the Brigade in
congratulatory terms.

On the afternoon of the 10th the 168th Brigade returned to the trenches
at Hébuterne, there relieving the 167th. An adjustment of sectors
was now effected as a result of which the 168th Brigade held the
right sector of the Divisional front, comprising the old W sector and
the part of Y sector south of the Hébuterne-Gommecourt Road; in the
centre was the 167th Brigade between the Hébuterne-Gommecourt and the
Fonquevillers-Gommecourt Roads; while the 169th Brigade held the left
of the Divisional front.

The 168th front was occupied by the London Scottish in the right
subsector and the Kensingtons on the left. The 1/4th Londons took over
billets at Bayencourt, while the Rangers moved to Sailly.

On the 17th the Battalion relieved the London Scottish in the right
subsector of the Brigade front, the relief being complete by 6 p.m. The
same day the Rangers took over the left subsector from the Kensingtons.

The principal operation carried out by the Battalion during this tour
of duty was the filling in of the advanced front line. This had been so
seriously damaged during the battle as to become almost untenable, and
the labour which would be involved in its repair and maintenance did
not appear to be justifiable. Accordingly the task of filling it and
the communication trenches as far back as the WS line was carried out
on the night 18/19th July. The portion from Whisky Street southwards
was dealt with by 2 officers and 140 men of C Company, while the part
north of Whisky Street was filled in by 120 men of the Kensingtons. A
covering party in No Man's Land of 2 platoons' strength secured the
safety of the working party.

This step clearly indicated that all ideas of an advance on this front
were--for the moment at any rate--given up, but the rôle played by
the Division during the remainder of its duty at Hébuterne was such
as to foster an offensive spirit in the troops by means of constant
patrolling activity and a general policy of aggression against the
enemy's defences and working parties. This rôle was the more important
on account of the striking developments which were occurring in the
British offensive operations nearer the Somme, where the pressure which
was being brought to bear on the Germans was severe and continually
increasing. Gradually the enemy was being compelled to push his
reserves into the fight and limit as far as possible his activities on
other parts of the front. Any action at Hébuterne, therefore, which
could prevent the withdrawal of the opposing garrison to the battle
area further south had a direct and important bearing on the fortunes
of the British arms.

On the nights of the 20th, 21st and 22nd July strong patrols were sent
out from the Battalion under 2/Lieuts. W. E. Osborne, H. W. Vernon and
J. C. Graddon respectively, with the object of securing a live prisoner
captured from a German patrol. No success, however, was achieved.

On the 23rd July an inter-battalion relief again took place and the
Battalion was relieved by the London Scottish withdrawing on relief to
Brigade support billets at Sailly, but leaving B Company in the Keep in
Hébuterne to furnish working parties.

The Battalion remained in Sailly supplying working parties in the
forward area until the end of July. Advantage was taken of this
period out of the line to straighten out some "cross-postings" which
had occurred among drafts of N.C.O.'s and men recently sent up from
the Base, and drafts of Queen's Westminsters and 3rd London men were
despatched from the Battalion to rejoin their own units. At the same
time the Battalion received drafts of 4th London men from the Queen
Victorias and the Kensingtons, to whom they had been sent in error.

On the last day of July the Battalion once more took over from the
London Scottish the right subsector of W sector, B and C Companies
occupying the WR line as the most advanced position with A Company in
support and D in reserve.

During the ensuing tour of duty the work of trench repairing, wiring
and patrolling was actively prosecuted, but no incident worthy of
record occurred. The enemy's activity, both in artillery and trench
mortar fire, became rather more marked, and Hébuterne itself attracted
more attention than had been the case prior to the battle. The enemy's
shell fire produced, however, an ample measure of retaliation from our
guns, which bombarded his trenches with good results.

On the 4th August the Battalion withdrew again to Brigade reserve at
Bayencourt, handing over its trenches to the London Scottish, and was
employed in furnishing working parties and in training.

Since the 1st July the Battalion had received some very valuable
reinforcements of officers which repaired the deficiencies caused by
the battle, as follows:

13th July--Capt. F. C. J. Read from the 2/4th Battalion,
Lieut. A. G. Sharp, 2/Lieuts. P. F. Smalley, J. C.
Graddon, Y. R. Oldrey, W. H. Calnan, C. E. Lewis, W.
E. Osborne, J. W. Chapman, F. J. Foden, C. F. English
and J. T. Middleton from the Reserve Battalion.

16th July--2/Lieut. G. E. Stanbridge from the Reserve
Battalion.

6th August--2/Lieut. F. R. R. Burford from the 3/4th
Battalion, 2/Lieuts. C. J. Brodie, O. D. Garratt, C.
H. T. Heaver, A. Potton, W. Quennell and C. M. Taylor
from the Reserve Battalion.

7th August--2/Lieuts. C. W. Denning, M.M., S. J.
Barkworth, M.M., E. McD. McCormick, T. B. Cooper,
M.M., W. H. Davey, D.C.M., C. F. Mortleman
commissioned direct from the 1/20th Londons.

9th August--2/Lieuts. N. A. Ormiston, R. E. Grimsdell and
W. Richards from the Reserve Battalion.

10th August--2/Lieut. J. W. Price from Hospital and
2/Lieut. L. W. Archer, commissioned from the ranks of
the Battalion.

On the 5th July a draft of 60, of whom 58 were N.C.O.'s, arrived from
the 2/4th Battalion, a particularly welcome addition to the strength
in view of the losses which had been sustained. Early in July Lieut.
L. G. Rix, the Transport Officer, had been appointed Brigade Transport
Officer, and his place in the Battalion was filled by Lieut. G. V.
Lawrie, attached from the Scottish Rifles.

2/Lieut. N. W. Williams was wounded at Fonquevillers on the 6th
July, and on the 18th the Battalion suffered a further great loss
in the Quartermaster, Lieut. E. S. Tomsett, who completely broke
down in health and was invalided to England. Tomsett had filled the
appointment of Quartermaster with great credit since November 1913,
and had served over thirteen years with the Battalion, his previous
service having been with the Rifle Brigade. On recovery from his
illness Tomsett was granted a combatant commission in recognition of
his services and appointed to command the depôt at Hoxton. His duties
as Quartermaster in the 1/4th Battalion were taken over by Lieut. H. B.
A. Balls.

The 10th August found the Battalion once more--and for the last
time--resuming possession of W sector, the relief of the London
Scottish being completed by 4.45 p.m. During the progress of the relief
Hébuterne was intermittently shelled and a direct hit was scored
on Battalion Headquarters, though fortunately without inflicting
casualties. A six-day tour of duty produced but little of interest
beyond the usual trench routine. Patrolling in No Man's Land was
actively pursued, and resulted in establishing definitely the energy
being displayed by the Germans in repairing their defences, and also
their acquiescence in our possession of No Man's Land, which seemed
to be undisputed. The German artillery continued to shell Hébuterne
and the Orchard, near Cross Street, a good deal, while his constant
machine-gun fire at night interfered seriously with our work of wiring
in front of W 48.

On the 12th Major-Gen. Hull presented ribands to those who had been
decorated for their work on the 1st July, the presentation being made
on the football field at Bayencourt.

A warning order had now been received that the Division was to be
relieved by the 17th Division and to withdraw for training in rear of
the line, in the St Riquier area near Abbeville.

The 168th Brigade was to concentrate at Halloy before proceeding to the
new area, and the first step in this concentration was the relief on
the 16th August of the 1/4th Londons and Rangers by the London Scottish
and Kensingtons respectively. On relief the 1/4th Londons moved to
billets in Sailly, leaving C Company at the Keep in Hébuterne for
working parties until the 18th, when the whole Battalion marched at
7 p.m. to Halloy, arriving in huts there at 11 p.m. By the 21st the
whole Brigade group was completely out of the line and the following
day moved to the new area, the Battalion entraining at Doullens at
11.40 a.m. and, detraining at St Riquier shortly before 6 p.m., marched
thence to billets at Le Plessiel.

CHAPTER XI

THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF THE SOMME, 1916

II. _The Battles of September and October_

As we have pointed out in the preceding chapter, the 1st July was
a day of almost complete check to the British attack from Fricourt
northwards. Between Fricourt and the Somme, however, a certain measure
of success had been attained, while south of the river the French had
made a considerable advance.

This limited success was exploited to the fullest extent during the
first half of July, and by the 14th, after very fierce fighting, in
which eleven British Divisions were engaged, our lines were pressed
forward through the series of fortresses forming the first German
system of defence.

The Main Ridge of the Somme watershed runs east-south-east from
Thiepval, above the Ancre, across the Albert-Bapaume Road, towards the
Péronne-Bapaume Road. About a mile and a half west of the latter road
it is completely severed by a narrow and deep ravine in which lies
the small township of Combles; and about half way between Combles and
Thiepval it is deeply indented by a valley which separates the villages
of Bazentin-le-Grand and Bazentin-le-Petit, the head of this valley
being dominated by the high ground on which stands High Wood. The
ridge, therefore, divides itself into three sections, all on the same
general alignment, as follows: In the west, from Thiepval, astride the
Albert-Bapaume Road to High Wood; in the centre, from High Wood to the
Combles Valley; in the east, the high ground about Sailly Saillisel on
the Péronne-Albert Road.

The German second system of defences followed roughly the near side
of the crest of this Main Ridge, including the villages (from east to
west) of Maurepas, Guillemont, Longueval (with Delville Wood), the
Bazentins and Pozières. The third system lay on the further slope of
the ridge and included the villages of Morval, Lesbœufs, Flers and
Gueudecourt.

On the 14th July the British attacked the second system on a front from
Bazentin-le-Petit to Longueval. This attack, which was successful,
was pressed forward to High Wood, of which practically the whole
was captured, and thus secured for us a footing on the Main Ridge,
dividing the German forces on the west and centre portions of it. The
advance was consolidated and rounded off locally in the direction
of Guillemont; but the new positions formed an abrupt and narrow
salient in our line, and before a further advance to the German third
system could be contemplated it was necessary for the British hold on
the Main Ridge to be widened. It was considered by G.H.Q. that the
Pozières-Thiepval series of fortresses at the western extremity of the
ridge was too powerful to yield to frontal attack, and it was therefore
decided to extend the hold on the centre portion of the ridge. This
postulated the capture of Guillemont, Ginchy and Combles, and a
swinging-up of the British right flank which rested on the Combles
valley. The French were to co-operate on the right of the Combles
valley by the capture of Frégicourt and Rancourt. Combles itself,
immensely fortified and strongly garrisoned, was too formidable an
obstacle to be likely to fall into our hands by direct attack, except
at an appalling cost of life; and it was therefore to be enveloped, the
British advancing on the heights west of it and the French to its east.

It is with this great outflanking movement for the capture of Combles
and the securing of the Main Ridge immediately west of it that the 56th
Division and the l/4th Londons are concerned.

Guillemont was first attacked on the 23rd July, but it was not until
after repeated attempts that it finally fell into our hands on the 3rd
September. On that day the line was advanced to the outskirts of Ginchy
and to the Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road, Falfemont Farm falling to us on the
5th.

Meanwhile local improvements had been made in our positions in various
parts of the line, and the bitter fighting of August, though productive
of no very deep advance was of the greatest value. It not only widened
our hold on the ridge, but also by a series of unrelenting sledgehammer
blows had a cumulative effect on the German morale and thus paved the
way for the greater successes of September.

* * * * *

The 168th Brigade continued training in the St Riquier area until
the end of August, the 1/4th Londons retaining their billets at Le
Plessiel. The training was rendered peculiarly interesting by reason of
the first appearance of the "Heavy Section Machine-Gun Corps," better
known as Tanks. These engines of war, which were regarded at first by
the troops with a good deal of wonderment and not a little misgiving,
only arrived in France on the 25th August. No time was lost in testing
them and giving infantry troops an opportunity to co-operate with them
in practice prior to their employment in action.

The 56th Division received the compliment of being one of the units
selected by G.H.Q. to co-operate with Tanks on the occasion of their
first appearance in battle, and accordingly a series of practice
schemes was begun on the 26th August, the Brigades of the 56th Division
being employed in turn. Needless to say the interest aroused by the
strange appearance of these iron monsters was intense and speculation
was rife as to their potential value in action, not only among the
troops, but also among the many staff officers who were present at
the demonstrations. Unfortunately the time allowed for "tuning up"
the engines was inadequate, the result being that during the first
practices the Tanks showed a most undesirable predilection for breaking
down--a habit not calculated to inspire with confidence the infantry
who were expected to follow them. However, these difficulties were
largely overcome, and by the 2nd September, when the 168th Brigade's
turn for practising with them arrived, the Tanks were working well.

In spite of the misgivings as to the tactical value of the Tanks which
presented themselves to the minds of those inclined to pessimism,
their arrival undoubtedly gave enormous encouragement to the troops
who were enabled at last to realise that the enemy were not always to
be first in the field with new inventions; and the anticipation of a
great surprise effect when the Tanks should first appear before the
enemy trenches brought all ranks to the tip-toe of expectation. The
strict injunction which was issued to avoid mention of the Tanks in
correspondence was most loyally obeyed.

On the 2nd September a warning order was received that the Division
would move forward to the battle area, and the following day the 168th
and 169th Brigades moved to the Corbie area. The Battalion left Le
Plessiel in the afternoon of the 3rd, marching to St Riquier, where
it entrained for Corbie, a town of some size at the confluence of
the Ancre and the Somme. Here the Battalion detrained at 11.15 p.m.,
marching, with the Rangers, to billets at Vaux-sur-Somme. The remainder
of the Brigade was accommodated a mile further forward at Sailly-le-Sec.

The Division now came under the orders of the XIV Corps (Cavan), the
extreme right of the British Army, consisting of the 5th, 16th and 20th
Divisions, which had this day been operating on the Guillemont front in
the action already alluded to.

On the morning of the 4th orders were received, without any previous
intimation that they might be coming, for the Battalion to move
forward at once. The whole Battalion, less personnel of the transport
and vehicles, marched out of Vaux-sur-Somme within one hour of the
receipt of these orders--a credit to the high state of organisation
to which the Battalion had been trained since leaving the Hébuterne
area. Boutall writes: "The march was a long and tedious one and I think
I am right in asserting that not a single man fell out on the way. I
distinctly remember Lieut.-Col. Wheatley congratulating himself on the
fact."

This march terminated at a large concentration camp known as the
Citadel about two miles north of Bray. At the Citadel the Battalion
was able to form a vague idea for the first time of the enormous
effort being put forth by the British in this already long drawn-out
struggle. The concentration camp covered an enormous area on the
rolling hillsides above the Somme and presented an astounding spectacle
of numbers of units from every arm of the Service--gunners, infantry,
engineers--besides vast stores of materials of all kinds. The roar
of the guns in the inferno of the battle line seemed to speak to the
troops of the great and yet increasing power of the British Armies,
and filled every heart with hope and confidence. To many of those who
remembered the lean days of 1915 when the British battle line was
starved for men and shells, this first contact with the reality of the
Empire's strength was almost overpowering.

On the 5th September the Division took the place in Corps Reserve of
the 20th Division, which had been withdrawn from the fighting line, and
in the evening of the same day the relief of the 5th Division in the
line began.

The front taken over from the 5th Division was the extreme right of the
line from its junction with the French, overlooking the Combles valley
to the left of Leuze Wood. The 169th Brigade (relieving the 15th)
took over the right sector and the 168th Brigade (relieving the 95th)
assumed responsibility in the left sector.

September had set in with steady rain which had already converted
all the roads, tracks and camping grounds into seas of liquid mud.
The Battalion, which since arrival at the Citadel had been held at
short notice to move, advanced during the afternoon of the 5th, in
full battle kit in the direction of the line. The state of the ground
made marching an impossibility, and after sliding along for some time
uncomfortably in the mud, orders were received for the Battalion to
return to the Citadel. The change of plan was, as usual, received with
philosophical resignation, and the men turned in to take advantage of
the short respite only to be roused again a few hours later the same
evening when the advance to the line began at 11.15 p.m.

At this hour the Battalion, which with the Rangers was in Brigade
support, left the Citadel, arriving in its allotted position in
Casement Trench at 5.30 a.m. on the 6th September. This trench was now
reduced to a series of shell holes which the bad weather had rendered
most uncomfortable, and was a part of the original German system
opposite Maricourt.

The departure from the Citadel was marked by a most unfortunate
accident. As the column began to move the explosion of a bomb which had
been left buried in the mud occurred at the head of D Company, and this
very seriously wounded Capt. A. L. Long, the company commander, and
2/Lieut. A. G. Sharp, and caused casualties to 19 N.C.O.'s and men.

With the advent of daylight the Battalion first came face to face with
the ghastly desolation of the Somme battlefield. In all directions
every sort of landmark seemed to be obliterated. A few torn stumps
marked what had been Bernafay and Trones Woods, the village of
Guillemont was practically effaced, and the only signs of life in the
neighbourhood of the Battalion were numerous batteries of artillery
in action. Here the nucleus personnel left the Battalion and returned
to the Citadel, where the Q.M. stores were established. At 2 p.m.
the Battalion changed its position to Chimpanzee Trench in the
neighbourhood of the Brickfield, south of Bernafay Wood, and here it
received a foretaste of the German barrage. After dark the forward
move was resumed, and the Battalion entered the support trenches in
rear of Leuze Wood, on the Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road, relieving the 4th
Gloucesters. This trench formed a "switch" in the second German system
which had fallen into our hands on the 3rd September.

_The Battle of Ginchy, 5th-10th September_

The disposition of the Brigade was now as follows:

In front line, Leuze Wood:--London Scottish.
In support, Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road:--1/4th Londons.
In reserve, Maltzhorn Farm:--Rangers.

The Kensingtons were attached to the 169th Brigade, and were in
line to the south of Leuze Wood.

During the night the enemy's bombardment of the front line and Wedge
Wood Valley increased in intensity and two platoons of the 1/4th
Londons, under Lieuts. Oldrey and Garratt, were ordered forward to
reinforce the Scottish in Leuze Wood. This advance was successfully
accomplished, the platoons managing to get through an unpleasantly
heavy barrage with only one casualty. No enemy attack materialised, and
towards dawn, the hostile bombardment having subsided, the two platoons
rejoined the Battalion.

Throughout the 7th September and far into the night the enemy
shelled Wedge Wood Valley and the support line heavily, and the
Battalion suffered a good many casualties, chiefly among ration and
water-carrying parties, while communication with Battalion Headquarters
was exceedingly difficult. The Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road which ran
immediately in front of the trench was sunken at this point, and the
bank was honeycombed with German dugouts, among them one which had been
used as an aid-post, and which produced an ample supply of bandages,
lint and field-dressings, and also cigars and tobacco--trench stores
which were promptly taken on charge by the Battalion.

The road itself was littered with German dead, the remnants of the
battle of the 3rd, who had apparently been caught by our barrage,
of the destructive nature of which evidences were everywhere to be
seen. "Unfortunately," writes an eyewitness, "the sunken road was an
attraction to countless flies in the daytime. So numerous were they
that from the road arose a continuous hum which was audible at a
considerable distance. They swarmed over into the trench and settled
on our food in such numbers that they often found their way into our
mouths at mealtimes."

During the afternoon of the 7th orders were issued for the 56th
Division to extend its front to the left by taking over the sector held
by the right Brigade of the 16th Division. This consisted of a trench
following the Leuze Wood-Guillemont Road, from near the north corner
of Leuze Wood, for about 500 yards to the left. This relief was to be
effected by "side-stepping" the 168th Brigade to the left, its trenches
in Leuze Wood being handed over to the 169th Brigade. In pursuance
of this scheme the Battalion took over with A and D Companies the
advanced front line--about 200 yards' frontage on the immediate left
of Leuze Wood--from the 7th Inniskilling Fusiliers. Immediately after
relief these companies began to dig assembly trenches for the impending
continuance of the offensive, and this task was completed before dawn
on the 8th September. The Rangers meanwhile had come up in line on the
left of the 1/4th Londons, while the Scottish on relief in Leuze Wood
by the 169th Brigade had withdrawn into Brigade support, where they
were joined by the Kensingtons.

The 8th September was occupied in improving the assembly trenches, and
in establishing an advanced report centre in a German dugout at the
south-west corner of Leuze Wood--by now corrupted by the ever-ready wit
of the Cockney into "Lousy" Wood--while under cover of darkness the
Cheshire Pioneers connected the Wood with Wedge Wood by a communication
trench. In addition a great deal of work was carried out in collecting
advanced dumps of tools, bombs, ammunition and water, in the west edge
of Leuze Wood. All this work was effected under very heavy shell fire
under which the Battalion sustained some loss.

Orders had now been received for the resumption of the offensive on
the 9th, and during the night the 1/4th Londons and Rangers occupied
their newly dug assembly trenches, while the Kensingtons advanced to
the Wedge Wood support trench, the Scottish remaining at Maltzhorn
Farm. The advanced report centre in Leuze Wood was taken over by the
1/4th Londons and placed under charge of Capt. Houlder (17th Londons
attached). Capt. Houlder, who could speak German fluently, was
instrumental during the action in gaining from prisoners much useful
first-hand information which he was able to pass back to Battalion
and Brigade Headquarters. The terrifying aspect of this huge British
officer, coupled with the fact that he always had a loaded revolver
conspicuously displayed during his investigations, no doubt increased
the desire of his victims to respond to his enquiries!

The battle of the 9th September was an attack on the whole front of the
Fourth Army, the French co-operating on our right. The object of the
XIV Corps, of which the 56th and 16th Divisions were in line, was to
advance the British positions from the Combles valley on the extreme
right well to the east of Leuze Wood on a line running from south-east
to north-west as far as the Ginchy-Morval Road, which formed the left
of the 56th Division front. From this point the 16th Division was to
reach a line which ran due west for some 800 yards along the road
towards Ginchy and then bent northwards to include the whole of the
village.

Map No. 5 shows the objectives of the 56th Division, the 169th Brigade
on the right being responsible for forcing our lines forward of Leuze
Wood on its north and east sides; and the 168th Brigade continuing the
line as far as Point 141·7 on the Ginchy-Morval Road. The map also
indicates that nearly every battalion taking part in the assault would
have to make a change of direction from its starting point in order to
advance to its objective.

So far as the 168th Brigade was concerned the advance was to be made
in two stages, the first objective being a line of German trenches,
running from the north corner of Leuze Wood towards Ginchy, and
the final objective being as above described. For this purpose the
dispositions of the Brigade remained as they had been on the eve of the
battle, that is:

Right Assaulting Battalion--1/4th Londons.
Left do. --Rangers.
Support Battalion --Kensingtons.
Reserve do. --London Scottish.

The 1/4th Londons were disposed for attack as follows:

Right--B Company (Lieut. H. W. Vernon).
Centre--D Company (Lieut. G. H. Davis).
Left--A Company (Capt. J. R. Webster).
Support--C Company (2/Lieut. W. E. Osborne).

Each company occupied a two-platoon frontage, so that the whole
Battalion was on a front of six platoons and in a depth of four waves.

The morning of the 9th September dawned mistily, but by 10 o'clock
the sun's rays had dispersed the haze and disclosed to the enemy the
new earth thrown up in front of our hastily dug assembly trenches. A
heavy bombardment of the assembly areas on the whole Divisional front
followed, lasting all the morning and causing a good many casualties.
The assaulting companies having already formed up over night, the
trenches were crowded with troops waiting for the hour of attack, and
the experience of having quietly to endure this remarkably accurate and
heavy shoot was one of the most trying of the whole engagement.

At 4 o'clock the enemy put down a heavy barrage on our lines. A quarter
of an hour later our preparatory bombardment, which had opened at 10
a.m., increased to "hurricane" intensity, and for half an hour the
German positions were subjected to a frightful ordeal under which it
seemed that nothing could live. At 4.45 p.m. the British columns, on a
front of several miles, moved to the assault.

The 1/4th Londons on getting out of their assembly trenches had to
make a change of direction, pivoting on their right flank, and this
accomplished, they moved forward steadily, keeping well up to their
barrage and suffering comparatively little loss.

In consequence of the conflicting reports which were received during
the action, the heavy toll of casualties in all ranks, and the
resultant intermingling of companies in the positions gained, it has
been a matter of considerable difficulty to elucidate the position and
to extract from the mass of evidence a fair and impartial account of
what really occurred.

It seems evident, however, that the position marked as the 1/4th
Londons' first objective was innocent of the trench which it was
expected to find there. At all events if a trench had ever existed on
the line of the Leuze Wood-Ginchy track it had been so battered by
shell fire as to be no longer recognisable as such; and it appears
that the greater part of the assaulting companies overshot the mark
and moved straight on to what was really the second objective, which
they occupied under the impression that it was the first objective.
It had been arranged that A Company on the left should consolidate
a strong point on the left of the real first objective at its point
of junction with the sector to be captured by the Rangers. Evidently
2/Lieut. Brodie, to whom was allotted this task, in making his change
of direction to the right took a somewhat wide sweep and struck the
east end of the Rangers' first objective, where a trench did actually
exist, and here he formed his block practically in the position where
it was intended to be. Subsequently Brodie, finding himself, no doubt,
out of touch with the remainder of the Battalion, who had gone too far,
came forward in the attempt to clear up the situation, but unhappily
was killed, together with all his men.

The too rapid advance of the Battalion naturally brought them under the
fire of our own barrage, and during the forty minutes' pause which was
ordered after the capture of the first objective before the resumption
of the advance on to the second, a good many casualties did in fact
occur from our own shells which were dropping in and uncomfortably
close to the trench which was occupied. This trench--the real second
objective--was subsequently known as Bully Trench. We will therefore so
refer to it in order to avoid confusion.

At 5.25 p.m. the Battalion, now including elements of all companies,
once more advanced in a commendably steady manner on to a trench just
topping the rise of the Main Ridge. This it occupied with very little
opposition. This advanced position--Beef Trench--was an isolated trench
about 150 yards ahead of Bully (the real second objective) with both
flanks in the air. It was shallow and evidently only in course of
construction. It afforded magnificent observation over the rearward
slopes of the Main Ridge on to the German third line system in front of
Morval, and in this position the work of consolidation was begun, two
Lewis gun posts being pushed forward overlooking the Morval-Lesbœufs
Road. Middle Copse, a small spinney about 200 yards to the front, was
seen to be teeming with Bosche who were effectively dealt with by our
Lewis guns.

In the meantime the right platoon of B Company under 2/Lieut. Garratt,
which, in keeping touch with the Queen Victorias, had got ahead of the
rest of the Battalion, had evidently become deflected slightly to the
right during its advance and had dropped into the communication trench
connecting Leuze Wood with Bully Trench. Apparently somewhat confusing
his direction in the total absence of landmarks, Garratt moved along
this trench and turned the corner to the left along Bully Trench.
Here he came in contact with a Bosche bombing party, and attacking
them vigorously pushed them back for some considerable distance, and
eventually constructed a temporary block in the trench, probably about
the centre of the Battalion's sector, _i.e._ about 200 yards short of
the Quadrilateral. In this bomb fighting the men of B Company displayed
great courage and dash, and their accurate throwing contributed largely
to their success. Among these gallant men Corpl. Udall was conspicuous,
and for his devotion to duty he was awarded the Military Medal.

During the advance of the assaulting companies of the Battalion from
Bully Trench to the advanced position in Beef, a somewhat determined
attack was delivered against B Company's block by a large party of the
enemy led by an officer. Fortunately the shallowness of the trench
exposed the enemy's advance and after a brisk exchange of bombs,
in the course of which some loss was inflicted on the attacking
party, including the officer who was shot by Garratt, the survivors
surrendered with the exception of a few who fled pursued by the fire of
our men and the Rangers. Garratt was subsequently awarded the Military
Cross for his good work.

On the Battalion's left the Rangers, whose line of advance was
dominated by the Quadrilateral and a small spur running from it in a
south-westerly direction, had been faced with a withering machine-gun
fire under which advance was utterly impossible. Their left company was
unable to make progress, and by 8.30 p.m. was compelled to withdraw
to its assembly positions in conjunction with the right Brigade of
the 16th Division who had also been unable to overcome the German
resistance. The right company of the Rangers pushed gallantly forward
losing heavily, but was finally brought to a stand in the vicinity of
the temporary block which was being held in Bully by Garratt. Here they
were forced to take such cover as shell craters afforded them, and to
reply to the Bosche fire, in which they were assisted by the party of B
Company at the block. Under the gathering darkness a good many of the
Rangers were able to make their way into Bully trench.

While all this was taking place two companies of the Kensingtons had
occupied the assembly trenches vacated by the 1/4th Londons, and the
commanders of these, appreciating the situation of the Rangers, at once
made a gallant attempt to fill the gap on the left. Their gallantry,
however, cost them dear, and the German barrage took a heavy toll of
casualties before they reached Bully Trench. The bravery of Major
Dickens was in particular remarkable. Mortally wounded some time before
he reached his objective, he continued to advance at the head of his
men, cheering and encouraging them until he collapsed into the trench.
Later in the evening the two remaining companies of the Kensingtons
were also thrown into the fight and became absorbed into the 1/4th
Londons' position in Bully Trench.

Darkness had now fallen, and the position of the companies in the
advanced trench was far from happy. Both flanks were in the air and
heavy losses had been suffered; of the officers who had started
with these companies, only four--Cooper, McCormick, Quennell and
Burford--were still standing. News from Garratt showed that he was
doubtful as to whether he could hold out against another attack.

Fearing to lose the advantage already gained, Cooper, who had assumed
command of the force in Beef Trench, decided to reoccupy Bully
temporarily, and finally clear it of the enemy. The withdrawal was
successfully accomplished in the dark, but the enemy was found to be
firmly established with an apparently ample supply of bombs on his
side of the block, which had now been completed with the help of the
Kensington and Ranger reinforcements; and further attempts to extend
our gains northward in Bully were abandoned. Communication being now
re-established with Battalion Headquarters, orders were received in
Bully for the reoccupation of the advanced positions in Beef; and the
Bully position being now much strengthened by Rangers and Kensingtons,
the 1/4th Londons moved forward alone to Beef Trench.

During the remainder of the night a good deal of work was necessary in
reorganising the somewhat mixed force by which the forward position was
now occupied. One or two enemy patrols approached the position but were
fired on and dispersed, and apart from continued shell fire and sniping
the night passed comparatively peacefully.

Captain Cooper gives the following account of a remarkable incident
which occurred during the night:--

A glow was seen in a shell hole some distance to the front and on
investigation this proved to be from the cigarette of a battalion
N.C.O., a corporal (Fergusson), who had formed part of one of the
forward posts. He had become separated from his men and wounded in
the back so that he was unable to walk. He stated that he had been
uncertain of his position and so had crawled into a shell hole. A
Bosche patrol had found him and removed his shoulder badges and
taken the contents of his pockets, but had propped him up in a
comfortable position and had left him his water-bottle, cigarettes
and matches. He was calmly and coolly enjoying a cigarette when
found. He was sent on a stretcher to the Aid Post.

While these events were taking place on the Battalion's front, the
Queen Victorias, the left of the 169th Brigade, had occupied their
objective, and were in touch on the right of Bully. The enemy, however,
had hitherto successfully resisted all efforts of the London Rifle
Brigade to emerge from the east side of Leuze Wood. At about 7 p.m. the
Bosche at this part of the line had launched a vigorous bomb attack
along the sunken road leading from Combles, and the L.R.B. had been
forced back after a most stubborn resistance which cost them heavily.
During the night the Queen's Westminsters took over the extreme right
of the Division.

The 16th Division on the left had also met with varied fortunes. The
47th Brigade on its left had successfully advanced through Ginchy
and established itself on its objective; but the right brigade, the
48th, whose objective lay along the Ginchy-Morval Road, met with most
stubborn resistance from the spur already referred to. In spite of
the most gallant efforts the Brigade was unable to make progress, and
eventually fell back with the left wing of the Rangers at about 8.30
p.m. and reoccupied their original position on the Wedge Wood-Ginchy
Road. About this time the London Scottish were ordered into the fight
in order to endeavour to clear up the situation in this part of the
field. After the march forward from Maltzhorn their preparations were
completed at about midnight, and shortly after they attacked from
a position to the left of the Rangers' assembly trenches towards
the Quadrilateral. The enemy was still vigorous in his defence, and
after losing their direction in the intense darkness, the Scottish
were ultimately withdrawn, having first rendered a good account of
themselves in a lively little hand-to-hand fight with a party of the
Bosche. During the night the 16th Division was relieved by the 3rd
Guards Brigade.

Shortly after dawn on the 10th 2/Lieut. McCormick, who had come back
to Battalion Headquarters with a report of the situation, returned to
Beef Trench with orders for the immediate evacuation of the advanced
position. Accordingly, after establishing two Lewis gun positions in
Beef Trench, the withdrawal was proceeded with as rapidly as possible,
the activity of the German snipers in the growing daylight making
movement difficult except in the smallest parties. The return of the
1/4th Londons to Bully Trench caused congestion which was subsequently
intensified by the arrival of a large reinforcement of London Scottish.
This Battalion made efforts during the day to prolong the line in the
direction of the Quadrilateral, while the Guards, working eastward
along the Ginchy-Morval Road, sought to join hands with them, but
the Germans were well supplied with bombs and put up a very gallant
resistance. The continued occupation of the spur--which on the previous
day had stopped the 16th Division--moreover forced an unpleasantly deep
re-entrant in the British line, leaving the left flank of the 1/4th
Londons dangerously exposed. An effort to rout out the pertinacious
defenders of this spur was made during the afternoon by the 168th
Stokes mortars, who fired 35 rounds with good effect into the enemy
trenches.

The position on the right flank of the Battalion was still less
satisfactory than had been hoped for. At 7 a.m. and again at 3 p.m. the
Queen's Westminsters had made local attempts to gain the previous day's
objective, but each time without success.

Throughout the day the Battalion's position was kept under heavy German
shell fire which caused the already heavy casualty roll to mount higher
and higher, and it was found necessary to relieve the congestion
in Bully by withdrawing the Rangers and Kensingtons to the rear.
Communication with Headquarters was rendered exceedingly difficult,
though, as always, there was no lack of brave volunteers to try to
pass through the German barrage, and these in some cases succeeded
in reaching the report centre in Leuze Wood. Moreover the trench,
only a shallow and half-finished work to start with, was becoming
badly shattered and was filled with wounded men, whom there was no
means of evacuating, for all the stretcher-bearers with companies had
themselves become casualties. Throughout this trying day all ranks
displayed magnificent spirit and clung to their hardly won gains with
grim determination. That night the 168th Brigade was relieved, the
1/4th Londons handing over their objective to the 8th Middlesex of the
167th Brigade. Following the relief, which was complete by midnight,
the Battalion moved by companies--by now sadly reduced in numbers--to
Casement Trench, whence the Battalion moved as a unit to Billon Farm,
near Carnoy, arriving in bivouacs there at 5.30 a.m. on the 11th
September.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF GINCHY, SEPTEMBER 1916]

The five days' duty just completed were perhaps the most strenuous
the Battalion had yet experienced. Almost all the time exposed to bad
weather conditions and to very heavy and accurate artillery fire, the
spirit of the men was magnificent; and their steadiness, after the loss
of 15 out of the 20 officers who led the companies into action, as well
as a large proportion of N.C.O.'s, was unsurpassed. Their fighting
qualities too were firmly established, for they had taken their
objectives up to time-table and handed them over intact twenty-four
hours later. The total casualties during the five days amounted to 22
officers and about 250 other ranks.

The officer casualties were as follows:

7th and 8th September--Capts. F. O. J. Read and H. G. Stanham,
2/Lieuts. W. Richards, A. Potton, J. T. Middleton, C. H. T.
Heaver and L. W. Archer, wounded.

9th and 10th September--Capt. J. R. Webster, 2/Lieuts. C. J.
Brodie, F. J. Foden, W. E. Osborne, C. E. Lewis, C. S. G. Blows
and C. F. Mortleman, killed; Lieuts. H. W. Vernon and G. H.
Davis, 2/Lieuts. J. W. Price, V. R. Oldrey, C. F. English, N.
A. Ormiston and J. C. Graddon, wounded; and 2/Lieut. W. H.
Davey, D.C.M., missing, presumed killed.

Throughout the 11th and 12th heavy fighting continued in which the
167th Brigade co-operated with the Guards on the left in numerous
efforts to clear out the re-entrant and reach the Ginchy Quadrilateral.
This magnificently defended position, however, held out against the
most gallant attempts of the attackers. During the night of the 11/12th
September the 167th Brigade was also relieved, the line being taken
over by the 16th Brigade of the 6th Division.

The Battalion remained at Billon Farm for three most welcome days of
rest and reorganisation during which the weather, which now once more
became fine and warm, was of inestimable value in cheering the troops
after their somewhat trying experience. The relief to the men's spirits
on emerging even for a short spell from the ghastly featureless waste
of the battle area to surroundings where trees still bore their leaves,
roads still crossed the hillsides, and houses were not completely
effaced, was immense; and by the time the period of rest was over the
Battalion was once more braced up to continue the struggle.

One or two changes occurred during this period among the officers of
the Battalion, of which the most important was the assumption of the
Adjutancy by Lieut. W. J. Boutall on the evacuation to hospital of
Capt. R. L. Herring, who had occupied this trying position practically
since the Battalion joined the 56th Division. 2/Lieut. Garratt assumed
the duties of Assistant Adjutant almost immediately afterwards. Capt.
J. T. Sykes left the Battalion for attachment to the Indian Army, and
the signalling officer, Lieut. E. W. Monk, to join the R.A.F. The
latter's duties were taken over by 2/Lieut. S. J. Barkworth, M.M. In
addition to these 2/Lieut. A. C. Knight was evacuated to hospital.

_The Battle of Flers-Courcelette 15th-18th September_

The renewal of the offensive was not long to be delayed. The object
of the High Command was to follow up the blows delivered against the
German positions as rapidly as possible, and to leave the enemy little
respite for reorganisation and rest. The constant hammering on his
defences had already had an appreciable effect on his morale, and it
was hoped that before long the strain on his resources would prove so
great that the situation would develop rapidly in favour of the Allies.

The next general attack was arranged for the 15th September, the
assault being launched on the whole battle front from Morval to Le Sars
on the Albert-Bapaume Road. The great pivoting movement by which the
British right flank was to be swung forward in line with the left on
the Main Ridge had now reached an important stage, and the operations
of the XIV Corps were now more than ever bound up with the fortunes of
the French south of Combles. The French were aiming at establishing
themselves astride the Bapaume-Péronne Road at the village of Sailly
Saillisel, about two miles north-east of Combles; but the task
presented unusual difficulties owing to the restriction of the lines
of possible advance between the deep Combles ravine on the one flank,
and the extensive wood of St Pierre Vaast on the other. The evils of
this confinement were aggravated by the fact that the enemy position
about Morval at the extreme east end of the Main Ridge dominated the
whole of our Allies' line of advance. It was therefore essential to
the success, not only of the French in their ultimate object but also
of the combined "squeezing-out" process which was being applied to
Combles itself, that the British should at once possess themselves
of such portions of the Main Ridge as remained in the enemy's hands.
This entailed the breaking of the Third German system on the line
Morval-Lesbœufs-Flers, and this was the task of the XIV and XV Corps on
the 15th September.

The positions held by the Division at the opening of the battle were as
follows:

167th Brigade--On the line north of Leuze Wood and
intersecting the south end of Bouleaux Wood
which had been captured on the 9th by the Queen
Victorias, and thence along the south-east edge
of Leuze Wood for about half its length.

169th Brigade--On the right of Leuze Wood, in a line
running due north and south, between the 167th
and the French.

168th Brigade--In reserve bivouacs in Angle Wood
Valley, the Battalion being at the head of the
Valley near Wedge Wood.

The position which the Battalion had captured on the 9th September was
now held by the 6th Division, who formed the centre of the Corps while
the Guards were on the extreme left.

The general idea of the attack was that the Guards and 6th Divisions
should attack positions in the German third line facing Lesbœufs, while
the 56th Division was to form a defensive flank facing the Combles
ravine.

To establish this defensive flank the 169th Brigade on the right was
to push forward of Leuze Wood and occupy a position roughly north
and south with its left flank astride the sunken road from Combles,
about 300 yards east of the edge of Leuze Wood. The 167th was to clear
Bouleaux Wood in two stages and establish a line parallel to and about
100 yards in front of its east edge. The 1/4th Londons were to follow
up the advance of the 167th Brigade and then "leapfrog" through it on
to the German third line immediately in front of Morval whence they
would connect up between the left of the 167th Brigade and the right of
the 6th Division.

The 15th September was on the greater part of the battle front a day
of big successes. At an early hour Flers fell before our assault, and
by the afternoon the British line had been pushed far beyond it; the
whole of High Wood was taken, and before nightfall Martinpuich and
Courcelette on the left had been added to the gains of the day.

On the extreme right, however, the advance suffered a rather severe
check. The Guards, who occupied the left of the Corps front, were able
to make solid advances between Flers and Lesbœufs, but the 6th Division
adjoining them were held up by the Quadrilateral at Ginchy, whose brave
defenders still maintained their position most stubbornly; and this
failure naturally reacted on the 56th Division who occupied a narrow
wedge between the Quadrilateral and the Combles ravine.

At 5.50 a.m. the three tanks which were to make their début with the
Division left their departure points for the first objective, and at
6.20 a.m. the infantry assault was launched. Almost three hours later,
at 9 a.m., the 1/4th Londons left their bivouacs in Angle Wood Valley
and moved forward in artillery formation towards the battle position
on the crest between the north edge of Leuze Wood and the west face
of Bouleaux Wood. Progress was not rapid owing to the heavy state of
the ground, and under the German shell fire a good many casualties
were sustained. The advance was made, however, in good order, and with
admirable steadiness.

The 169th Brigade made very slight advances on the south of Leuze Wood;
while the 167th managed to secure the part of its first objective which
lay outside Bouleaux Wood. The 8th Middlesex of the latter Brigade
even made a heroic attempt to reach the second objective, but had to
be brought back. The enemy barrage was heavy and fell, as it so often
had in the Somme battles, between the assaulting columns and their
starting-point, thus cutting them off from supplies and reinforcement,
while the accurate intensity of their machine-gun fire from their
positions in the Quadrilateral made advance an utter impossibility.
After ten hours' fighting, during which the assaulting Brigades did all
that men could do, the Corps Commander telephoned to Gen. Hull that the
Division would make no further attempt against Bouleaux Wood that day.

The 1/4th Londons luckily avoided the slaughter of the battle line this
day, for a few minutes prior to its advance from Angle Wood Valley
an order had been despatched to Brigade Headquarters to the effect
that in consequence of the check of the 6th Division in front of the
Quadrilateral the 168th Brigade would not occupy its battle position.
This order was transmitted by Brigade and reached the Battalion during
its advance. Upon receipt of it the Battalion was at once brought back
to its assembly area at Angle Wood Valley where, in common with the
remainder of the Brigade, it remained in bivouacs till the early hours
of the 18th September. This operation cost the Battalion a large number
of casualties among N.C.O.'s and men from the German shell fire, and
one officer, 2/Lieut. J. W. Chapman, wounded.

During these days Angle Wood Valley was a distinctly unhealthy
locality. The German artillery maintained a searching fire over the
whole area, and exacted a fair toll of casualties. The weather,
which a few days previously had shown signs of mending, had once
more turned wet and the shell holes, which formed the only available
cover, became not the most desirable resting-place for the troops. The
strain was great, but the situation was as usual not only borne by all
in the Battalion with an almost stoical resignation, but enlivened
occasionally with those rare flashes of humour which have made the
London soldiers famous during the War in three continents.

The story of the tanks on the 15th September is too well-known to
need elaboration here, and is, moreover, too much outside the actual
experience of the Battalion to allow of more than a passing reference.
The moral effect on the Germans was immense, and considering that their
employment had scarcely passed the experimental stage, the success
gained by them was conspicuous. As was anticipated, however, the tanks
promptly became a mark for a tremendous concentration of enemy fire
which made their room far more desirable than their company. Of the
three attached to the 56th Division one did useful work in the vicinity
of the Quadrilateral, and after trampling down a good deal of wire and
putting an enemy machine-gun team out of action returned to make a
personal report of its adventures. The careers of the other two were
sadly abbreviated, and the end of the day found them derelict--one
west of Bouleaux Wood, and one south-east of Leuze Wood--though not
before they had dealt out a certain amount of destruction to the German
defences.

Orders were received while the Battalion remained in Angle Wood
Valley for the resumption of the offensive on the 18th September. The
objectives on the XIV Corps front were on this occasion very much more
modest than they had been three days earlier, and so far as the 56th
Division was concerned were as follows:

169th Brigade--The sunken road from Leuze Wood to
Combles, between the east edge of the wood and
the orchard west of Combles.

67th Brigade--The east edge of Bouleaux Wood for a
distance of 600 yards from its southern
extremity, and thence a line through the wood to
Middle Copse. From Middle Copse the objective was
continued in a northerly direction by the 6th
Division.

The 168th Brigade remained in reserve in Angle Wood
Valley, but the 1/4th Londons and the London
Scottish were attached to the 167th.

For this operation the Battalion was detailed as the left assaulting
battalion of the 167th Brigade, its objective being the portion between
Middle Copse (which was held by an advanced post of the 7th Middlesex)
and the east edge of Bouleaux Wood. For this purpose its assembly
position was the old German communication trench connecting Bully
Trench with the north corner of Leuze Wood. The right of the Brigade
frontage was taken up by the 3rd Londons.

The hour of assault was fixed for 6.15 a.m. on the 18th, and to enable
it to reach its assembly position by 5.15 a.m. as ordered, the 1/4th
Londons moved from Angle Wood Valley at 3.30 a.m. But the ground was
impossible. All vestige of tracks had long since disappeared, and the
countryside in every direction was a vast slippery quagmire in which so
far from keeping any sort of march formation it was next to impossible
for the men, laden as they were with battle equipment, to stand upright
at all.

Zero hour arrived, but the Battalion as well as the 3rd Londons was
still slipping and struggling a long way short of its assembly area.
The British barrage opened and was at once replied to by a withering
machine-gun fire by the enemy. Seldom has the Battalion been exposed to
so accurate and devastating a fire. The only alternative to complete
destruction was to take cover in the waterlogged shell holes, which
movement was carried out with alacrity by all ranks: in this unexpected
position an order reached the Battalion abandoning the attack and
recalling it to Angle Wood.

On the right the much suffering 169th Brigade was able to achieve a
series of local bombing successes which carried their line appreciably
nearer Combles. From the 6th Division on the left, shortly after midday
came the cheering news that the Quadrilateral had at last fallen,
together with the trench to the north of it.

This important success, which had so long eluded the grasp of the
successive Divisions who had sought it, paved the way for the
magnificent achievements of the 25th September, which will be recounted
later, its especial importance being that it was practically the last
heavily fortified stronghold on the central portion of the Main Ridge
to resist the British attacks.

The abortive operation of the 18th cost the Battalion a good many
casualties in N.C.O.'s and men, and one officer, 2/Lieut. W. H. Calnan,
wounded.

The same evening the 168th Brigade relieved the 167th in the Leuze
Wood trenches, the London Scottish occupying the front system, which
comprised Beef and Bully Trenches. The 1/4th Londons took over from
the 3rd Londons the support line, which ran diagonally through Leuze
Wood in a north and south direction. Leuze Wood was at all times
an unhealthy locality and formed an unfailing source of attraction
for every conceivable sort of German projectile. The 3rd Londons had
already suffered heavily here, and the night of the relief proved
to be no exception to the rule. Throughout the evening the wood was
plastered with high explosive shell, and even the inadequate shelter
of the trenches hastily dug, damaged and waterlogged as they were, was
exceedingly welcome. The position was, without exception, the muddiest
that had yet fallen to the lot of the Battalion. "To stand still,"
writes a company commander, "was to sink gradually until the whole
of the legs to well above the knees were immersed and movement was
correspondingly difficult." Lewis guns and rifles had become choked
with mud so as to render the Battalion practically defenceless, but
with much labour they were cleaned, and some rations which were found
in the trench distributed. Dawn broke on a chilled but yet remarkably
cheerful Battalion. The continued strain of heavy shell fire and
conditions of physical misery were, however, beginning to have their
effect, and several men who in earlier actions had given ample proof
of their courage, collapsed. "One man of D Company who had previously
shown himself one of the stoutest-hearted, lost his mental balance and
suddenly became possessed of the idea of killing all the Germans in
the German Army, and had to be forcibly restrained from mounting the
parapet. 2/Lieut. Barkworth, who came up from Battalion Headquarters,
succeeded by sheer strength of personality in restraining him and
getting him back to H.Q."

The 19th September was a day of comparative quiet on the battle front,
though shelling and sniping continued in a desultory fashion. Rain fell
steadily and the condition of the trenches, appallingly bad to start
with, became so wretched as to defy description.

During the night of the 19th a large working party of the 5th Cheshire
Pioneers, under the supervision of the Brigade Major (Capt. R. E.
Neame, V.C., D.S.O., R.E.), and covered by a screen of one and a half
companies of the Scottish, dug a new trench 800 yards long. This new
work, Gropi Trench, ran forward from Beef Trench towards the German
line, parallel to the west edge of Bouleaux Wood, as far as the Morval
tram-line. The task was successfully completed before dawn, but with
the advent of daylight and the consequent exposure of the newly
turned-up earth, the whole brigade area was again subjected to a heavy
bombardment by the enemy's artillery. The German snipers again became
particularly active, and every rash movement was promptly punished.
Under this gruelling there was nothing for the Battalion to do but to
keep quietly in its trenches and make the best of an unpleasant state
of affairs. That night the Kensingtons came forward from Angle Wood
Valley and took over the support line from the Battalion, and also
Bully Trench in front of it. The relief was completed by 9.30 p.m., and
never was relief more welcome. The Rangers at the same time took over
the Beef and Gropi system from the London Scottish. On withdrawal from
the trenches the Battalion moved by companies to bivouacs at Falfemont
Farm, arriving there at 10.45 p.m.

No further movement was made during the 21st and 22nd September, and
these two days were fairly quiet as the principal target for the German
guns was provided by the numerous British batteries in Angle Wood
Valley, which received heavy punishment.

Between the 20th September and the 2nd October the following
reinforcements joined:

Capt. R. N. Keen, Lieuts. W. H. Vernon and A. Bath, 2/Lieuts. C. A.
Speyer, C. Potter, W. R. Gifford, H. W. Spiers, L. C. Haycraft,
L. J. R. Atterbury, C. P. Russell, T. R. Fletcher and S. A. G.
Richardson.

2/Lieut. T. Siddall (25th Londons).

100 N.C.O.'s and men.

A few days after joining Lieut. A. Bath and 2/Lieut. C. P.
Russell were evacuated, the former with a broken ankle, the
latter sick.

The men of this draft represented so far as the 1/4th Battalion was
concerned the firstfruits of the "Derby" scheme, and it must always be
a matter for regret that the dreadful losses already incurred by the
Battalion made it inevitable to pitchfork this fine material straight
into the inferno of the Somme without any opportunity for it to become
previously assimilated into the ranks of the Battalion. The Somme
battles were a severe ordeal even to the most veteran soldiers; and the
bearing of these young and inexperienced troops in the trials of the
latter half of the Battalion's Somme fighting stands to their lasting
credit.

As we have already remarked, the Cockney soldier, however wretched
his conditions, is never so depressed by his surroundings as to be
unable to find humour in the situation of the hour. The Battalion had
now spent seven consecutive days in the desolation of the battle area
practically without shelter from the pitiless torrents of rain which
combined with the German shells to churn the whole surface of the
ground into a disgusting glutinous mass; the troops were soaked to the
skin and plastered with mud from head to foot; but the unconquerable
spirit of cheerfulness held them together, dirty and dishevelled as
they were, a well-knit and disciplined fighting unit. The condition
of the ground, which added so vastly to the labours of the troops, is
illustrated by a story told by an officer who was present:

A man attempted to cross the valley and started to plough his way
through the mud, but rashly omitted to lace up his boots, which he
had previously removed. His negligence was quickly visited upon
him, for scarcely had he begun his journey when the mud claimed one
of his boots, which became stuck fast. His powers of balance were
unequal to the task of putting his foot back in the boot, and he
toppled over, both his hands becoming firmly embedded. His efforts
to regain a standing position were prolonged and violent, but
after a time successful, and finally, boots in hand, he proceeded
on his way amid the cheers of the onlookers, who accepted his
performance as being arranged for their especial amusement, and
were particularly interested in the man's lurid observations on the
subject of boots, mud and war generally.

There were a few occasions, however, when circumstances seemed too
strong even for the 1/4th Londons, and one of them occurred that night
when the rum jars which arrived with the rations were found, alas, to
contain--lime juice!

On the evening of the 22nd September the 168th Brigade was relieved in
the left subsector by the 167th and the Battalion moved back to the
comparative peace of Casement Trench, where it occupied bivouacs until
the afternoon of the 24th, making preparations for the next bout in the
battle line.

_The Battle of Morval, 25th September_

The continuance of the offensive had been arranged for the 21st,
but the weather conditions placed such a handicap on the chances of
success that it was postponed, first until the 23rd and again till
the 25th September, when once more the battle broke out on a front
from the British right at Combles to a point half-way between Flers
and Martinpuich. The French were to co-operate in this attack on the
right of Combles ravine. The objectives of the XIV Corps included the
villages of Lesbœufs and Morval, and, as on the occasion of their
earlier attempt on the 15th, the 56th Division was to form a defensive
flank facing south-east over Combles.

A series of local bombing operations was conducted on the 24th by the
169th Brigade on the extreme right in conjunction with the French,
which gave them an increased hold on Combles Trench immediately in
front of the village, and appreciably improved their jumping-off
positions for the following day. During the night also the two tanks
allotted to the Division moved forward to their rendezvous in the
quarry west of Leuze Wood.

For the battle of the 25th the three Brigades of the Division were
all in line, the 169th on the right, with the 167th in the centre and
the 168th on the left. The 1/4th Londons were the right assaulting
Battalion of the 168th, their duty being to clear the northern end of
Bouleaux Wood and to establish a line of posts overlooking the ravine,
while the London Scottish on the left continued the defensive flank in
the direction of Morval (see Map No. 6).

At 4.30 p.m. on the 24th the Battalion marched from Casement Trench
to occupy positions of assembly, relieving the 7th Middlesex in the
Gropi-Ranger system as follows:

C Company--Left front, in Ranger Trench.

B Company--Right front, in Gropi Trench, and the small
communication trench leading forward to Ranger Trench.

D Company--Support, in Gropi Trench.

A Company--Reserve, in the southern part of Gropi
Trench and Middle Copse.

Battalion Headquarters were established in a dugout west of the
north part of Gropi Trench and the Aid Post in the quarry west of
Leuze Wood.

The evening of relief was fortunately fairly quiet, but owing to the
complete obliteration of all landmarks some difficulty was experienced
by the guides provided for the companies in locating the positions to
be occupied. However, Middle Copse was eventually reached, and this
point being gained a little prospecting discovered Gropi Trench, after
which the relief proceeded smoothly and was completed without unusual
incident. Gropi Trench, which had been dug by the Cheshires, was found
to be very well constructed, and the excellent cover it afforded was
the means of sparing the Battalion a good many casualties from the
enemy snipers, who were active from the direction of Bouleaux Wood
during the morning of the 25th.

After a preliminary bombardment by all available batteries the British
attack opened at 12.35 p.m. on the 25th, but the 168th Brigade's
positions being well in advance of those occupied by the 5th Division
on its left, its attack was deferred until seven minutes later in
order to allow the 5th Division to come up into line. The creeping
barrage, under which the Brigade's advance was made, was supplied by
batteries firing from Angle Wood Valley, and being thus in enfilade was
particularly efficient and accurate; and under its excellent protection
the 1/4th Londons and the London Scottish advanced steadily at 12.42
p.m.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF MORVAL, SEPTEMBER 1916]

The advance of the Battalion was led by C Company (Grimsdell) in two
waves at 50 paces distance, followed by D Company (Cooper) in similar
formation. B Company's rôle was to conform to the advance and protect
the Brigade's right flank against any possible hostile action from
the southern half of Bouleaux Wood, while A Company in reserve moved
forward to occupy the positions vacated by the assaulting companies.

The Battalion reached its objectives in the northern fringe of the Wood
with little opposition, and with slight loss, killing a large number
of Germans in the western edge of the Wood. A great many of the enemy
were also put to flight, and these were caught on the open hillside on
their way to Combles by the Lewis gunners of the Scottish advancing
on our left, who did great execution among them. The consolidation
of the strong posts allotted to the Battalion at once began, but was
considerably interfered with by German snipers, who were still clinging
to their posts farther south in the Wood. Under their fire Grimsdell
(in charge of C Company) fell, shot through the head. This harassing
fire rendered communication with Battalion Headquarters a matter of
some difficulty, and continued through the night, as the 167th Brigade
on the right had not been successful in pushing through the southern
extremity of Bouleaux Wood. By nightfall the new posts were completed
and occupied as follows:

Post A--By 30 men and Lewis gun of C Company.
Post B1--By 25 men of D Company.
Post B2--By 30 men and 1 Lewis gun of D Company.

These posts were improved and wired by parties from the Royal Engineers
and the Cheshire Pioneers, while A Company subsequently constructed an
additional post in the tram-line embankment north of the Wood.

Meanwhile the London Scottish had been equally successful on our left,
and had taken possession of the German trench running north-east from
Bouleaux Wood in the direction of Morval; and farther still to the
north the Guards Division had captured Lesbœufs, while the 5th Division
were hammering at the western outskirts of Morval.

The positions now occupied by the Brigade were of immense importance,
as they secured excellent observation over the northern exits of
Combles; and information received through the French from a German
officer prisoner being to the effect that the Combles garrison was
making preparations to fight its way out north-eastwards, the further
operations of the Brigade were directed towards working round the north
side of Combles and cutting off its communication with Morval. This
scheme naturally affected the left flank of the Brigade more than the
right flank, on which the Battalion was posted.

Shortly after midnight the 167th Brigade gained a foothold in Bouleaux
Wood on the right of the Battalion, and a reconnaissance made by
Lieut.-Col. Wheatley soon after dawn on the 26th showed that the Wood
was finally cleared of the enemy. Touch was rapidly gained with the 1st
Londons and the line established in front of the east edge of the Wood.

A few hours later definite information was received that the enemy had
evacuated Combles and that troops of the 56th Division had entered it
and had met in its deserted streets patrols of the 56th French Division.

The remainder of the day passed quietly for the Battalion, and a
distinct lull occurred in the enemy's shell fire, while owing to the
clearance of Bouleaux Wood the ground west of it, which had been on the
previous afternoon so much swept by snipers, was now quite peaceful.

Combles having fallen into our hands the most immediate need was to
improve touch with the French and carry the united line forward east
of the village. Early on the morning of the 26th Sept. the French
captured Frégicourt and succeeded in establishing themselves in touch
with the 169th Brigade south of Combles, thus securing the whole of
Combles Trench; while on the north of the village they managed to push
patrols forward towards the sunken road leading to Morval. The road was
occupied by the Rangers who had orders to occupy if possible the main
German third line between Morval and Frégicourt. This was found still
to be strongly held and the assistance of the Division's two tanks
were requisitioned. Unfortunately both these machines became badly
"ditched" before reaching their objective, and the Rangers' attack was
therefore abandoned.

That evening the Battalion was relieved in Bouleaux Wood by the
Kensingtons, and withdrew to Bully and Beef Trenches with feelings of
immense elation at having contributed materially to this striking and
solid success.

During the 27th September the trenches held by the Battalion were
heavily shelled, but no attempt was made by the enemy to launch a
counter-attack on the Brigade's front, and the Germans were evidently
content to accept the loss of Combles as irretrievable. In the evening
the 168th Brigade handed over its positions to the 2nd French Division,
and the Battalion, without relief in Bully and Beef Trenches, withdrew
to Casement Trench.

The casualties sustained by the Battalion during this highly successful
operation were remarkably few, amounting to 2 officers (2/Lieuts. R.
E. Grimsdell, killed, and E. McD. McCormick, wounded), and about 30
N.C.O.'s and men killed and wounded.

During the evening of relief reports of the full success of the battle
of the 25th September reached the Battalion, including the splendid
news of the fall of the famous series of German redoubts on the
Thiepval Ridge. This welcome intelligence, combined with the knowledge
of the Combles success, put all ranks into the highest spirits, and
created the pardonable expectation that a "break-through" on a large
scale was imminent. How premature these high hopes were the Battalion
was to learn to its cost on the 7th October.

Mention should be made here of the tasks performed by R. S. M. Harris
during the period the Battalion was operating in the Leuze Wood and
Bouleaux Wood area. He was responsible for organising all carrying
parties up to advanced Battalion Headquarters with water, rations and
munitions. These duties he carried out in a highly praiseworthy manner,
both he and his small band of carriers being continually called upon
day and night to tramp up the long Angle Wood Valley, often in the
rain, on practically impassable tracks and more often than not under
shell fire. "As Adjutant," writes Boutall, "I highly appreciated the
assistance he gave me in thus relieving me of a considerable amount of
additional work and anxiety. I do not remember a single instance during
this whole period when he failed us, in spite of the difficult and
heavy tasks we were obliged to impose on him."

_The Battle of the Le Transloy Ridges 1st-18th October_

Owing to the shortening of the line consequent upon the fall of
Combles, and the extension to their left of the French, the 56th
Division was now withdrawn and moved out of the battle area, the
Battalion marching at 2 p.m. on the 28th Sept. from Casement to
Ville-sur-Ancre, where rough but welcome billets were occupied. The
Division's rest was destined to be short-lived, for the following day a
warning order was received that it would take the place in the line of
the 6th and Guards Divisions, which had suffered considerably during a
prolonged period in action.

The Battalion at this stage was unfortunate in losing Lieut.-Col.
Wheatley. The prolonged exposure had already undermined his health, and
at this period he was recommended a rest by the Medical Authorities. He
refused to go to hospital, and compromised by going to the Divisional
Rest Station, Major H. J. Duncan-Teape taking command, but so keen
was the Colonel to be with his unit, that without having sufficiently
recovered he returned on October 2nd.

The sector to be occupied was about 2000 yards in frontage, running in
a north-west to south-east direction through the eastern outskirts of
Lesbœufs, and was taken over on the evening of the 30th September with
the 169th Brigade on the right, and the 167th on the left, the dividing
line being the Lesbœufs-Le Transloy Road. The left subsector (or
northern half of the line) lay just below the crest of the ridge above
Lesbœufs, and orders were issued for the advancement of this part of
the line to positions from which direct observation could be obtained
over the German positions in front of Le Transloy, in preparation for
an early renewal of the offensive.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF THE LE TRANSLOY RIDGE, OCTOBER 1916]

The 168th Brigade remained in Divisional reserve, and on the morning
of the 30th the Battalion, together with the London Scottish, moved
forward to their former bivouac area between Trones and Bernafay Woods,
the Kensingtons and Rangers remaining at the Citadel.

The Battalion remained in the Trones Wood area during the 1st and 2nd
October, and a Brigade relief having been ordered for the following
day, moved forward at 4.30 p.m. to Lesbœufs, relieving the 2nd Londons.
The positions taken over by the Battalion formed the left subsector
of the Brigade front and extended from the Lesbœufs-Le Transloy Road,
which formed the left boundary, for some 800 yards southwards to the
junction with the London Scottish, who were in line on the right,
the latter battalion being the right flank of the British Army. The
Kensingtons moved into Brigade support in the old Morval-Flers line,
and the Rangers occupied bivouacs at Ginchy.

The main position taken over by the Battalion was a roughly constructed
trench known as Shamrock, about 50 yards east of the sunken road
leading from Lesbœufs to Morval. In advance of this main position,
which was allotted to A and B Companies, were a number of embryo
trenches in varying stages of construction and quite isolated from
the main line. Of these isolated trenches the chief was Rainy, which
adjoined the Lesbœufs-Le Transloy Road, about 300 yards ahead of
Shamrock, and Foggy, some distance farther south and separated from
Rainy by a gap of probably 300 yards. C and D Companies and Battalion
Headquarters took up positions in the old Lesbœufs-Gueudecourt line
west of the village.

The resumption of the offensive was imminent; and it was indeed first
fixed for the 5th October, though subsequently postponed till the 7th
owing to the continuance of adverse weather conditions.

A great deal of constructional work was immediately necessary in
assembly and communication trenches, as well as in the completion
of the necessary advanced dumps of munitions and stores of all
kinds. Working parties from the Battalion, of the greatest available
strength, began work on part of these tasks on the night of the 4th,
the new trenches to be dug comprising communications to join Rainy
with Shamrock and with a small advanced position on the crest of the
ridge overlooking Le Transloy. In addition the road at Rainy was
barricaded. Large working parties were also provided by the Kensingtons
to provide an advanced assembly position for the attack by connecting
Rainy and Foggy, and by the Cheshire Pioneers and the R.E.'s on other
tasks. This latter task, however, could not be completed in one night
and was continued the following evening. The shocking state of the
ground prevented it from ever being finished, and on the day of the
attack only about 150 yards of trench had been added to Foggy. On the
night of the 6/7th also a fresh assembly trench for the use of the
centre battalion was taped out by the Brigade Major, and dug by the
Kensingtons. This work was called New Trench.

Although the weather once again had embarked on a dry spell the
long continued rains had rendered working tasks immensely difficult
of accomplishment, and the tenacious character of the mud added
incalculably to the labour of digging and of reaching the site of the
work. The isolation of the various tasks in this appalling swamp, from
which every landmark had been swept out of existence, and the constant
harassing fire of the enemy's machine-gunners, caused great delays to
working parties in even locating their work, and all these factors
together tended to reduce the work actually carried out far below
expectations.

The Battalion, not being originally detailed for the assault, was
relieved in the trenches on the evening of the 5th by the Rangers and
moved by companies on relief to bivouacs between Ginchy and Guillemont,
leaving A and C Companies in line for the completion of their tasks
begun the previous night. The following day, however, intimation was
received of a change of orders, and the Battalion returned to the
trenches that night as the centre assaulting battalion of the Brigade,
its place in brigade support being taken by the Kensingtons.

So far as the 56th Division was concerned the attack of the 7th
October was for the purpose of advancing the line some 1400 yards
farther down the reverse slope of the Main Ridge, in order to provide
a suitable "jumping-off" line for a further offensive to be launched
later against the fourth German line in front of Le Transloy, which
guarded the Bapaume-Péronne Road. The advance was to be made under a
creeping barrage, in two stages, to objectives which were not marked
by enemy trenches, but on the farther of which the Division would
dig itself in. On the Division's right the French line would also be
advanced by the 56th French Division, with whom touch was to be gained
on the Frégicourt-Le Transloy Road.

The 168th Brigade's assault was entrusted to the London Scottish
(right), 1/4th Londons (centre) and Rangers (left), the dispositions
for attack of the Battalion being as follows:

D Company--(W. H. Vernon) two platoons in New Trench
and two platoons in 25 Trench; in touch with London
Scottish.

C Company--(Speyer) in Foggy Extension; in touch with
Rangers.

B Company--(Gifford) in Shamrock.

A Company--(Keen) in support in the sunken road.

Battalion Headquarters (Col. Wheatley) were in dugouts
south-west of Lesbœufs, and an advanced report centre (Major
Duncan-Teape) was established in the southern outskirts of
the village.

The plan of attack was for D, C and B Companies to advance at two
minutes after zero to the first objective, the two platoons of D in
New Trench being especially detailed to the task of "mopping up" some
German gun pits some 150 yards to the front which were believed to be
held by a few enemy snipers. At the same time A Company was to occupy
Foggy Extension. After about fifteen minutes' pause on the first
objective, the assault on the second objective would be pursued by C
and B Companies only.

Reference has already been made to the difficulty experienced prior
to the attack by working parties in locating their tasks, and similar
difficulty was met with by all troops throughout the operations.
The consistently bad atmospheric conditions had rendered aerial
photography almost impossible, and all through the action the doubt
which existed in the minds of commanders as to the exact position
of trenches, our own as well as the enemy's, was a fruitful source
of confusion and loss. The assembly of the companies for attack was
indeed only accomplished after serious delay owing to the extraordinary
but largely justifiable bewilderment of the guides detailed to the
Battalion. C Company only reached its position just before dawn
after having been led several hundred yards out of its way, to find
on arrival that its assembly trench was only knee deep and already
filled with wounded. Add to these obstacles to success, the fact that,
owing to the previous terrible losses in commissioned ranks, it was
impossible to avoid sending into the battle as many as nine officers
who had not been previously in action with the Battalion at all,
having only a few days earlier arrived from England, and it will be
appreciated that the probabilities of success were not great. Zero was
fixed for 1.45 p.m., and at that hour the barrage dropped. Two minutes
later the Battalion rose out of its trenches and made a gallant attempt
to advance. The story of the remainder of the day is a pitiful tragedy.

The gun pits which had been allotted to the two platoons of D Company
in New Trench were found to be alive with bravely-manned machine-guns,
and under their withering fire D Company simply melted out of
existence. C Company, following slightly to its right, was able to
avoid total extinction by taking cover in shell holes in dead ground
close by, but 2/Lieut. C. M. Taylor fell under this fire at the head
of the leading wave of the Company. B Company, following on from
Shamrock, met the full blast of the enemy counter-barrage, and suffered
heavy losses, but pushed bravely on and eventually filtered into the
same general line as was already held by C Company and the remains of
D. Under the devastating fire from the gun pits further advance was
impossible, and the troops continued to suffer loss where they lay. The
afternoon wore on and the Battalion remained clinging to its position,
about 50 yards from its starting-point, until after dark. Sergt. H. F.
Page of D Company displayed magnificent coolness, and from his shell
hole passed a busy afternoon picking off the German gunners in the
pits with great deliberation. He was subsequently commissioned to the
King's Own Regiment (Royal Lancaster). All ranks alike were exposed to
the fire and all suffered proportionately. L. C. Haycraft, a promising
young subaltern of D Company who had already proved his worth with the
bombers of the Civil Service Rifles in the Hairpin at Hulluch, made
an attempt after dark to ascertain the enemy's position, but he never
returned from his reconnaissance.

Gifford, in charge of B Company, also fell, as did his platoon
commanders, Fletcher and Richardson, the two last wounded; and C.S.M.
James, who received the Military Medal for his good work, took charge
of the Company and brought it out of action at the end of the day.

On the left the Rangers had met with a similar fate at the hands of
the machine-gunners in Dewdrop Trench, before whose fire they had been
stopped dead with ghastly loss immediately they rose from the assembly
trench.

The London Scottish, on the right, gained a little success, their right
flank achieving a maximum advance of about 400 yards, but their left
felt the blast of the deadly guns in the pits, and they were kept out
of all except the southern extremity of Hazy.

At about 8.30 p.m. the enemy delivered a counter-attack from Hazy and
Dewdrop under heavy artillery support, which had the effect of forcing
the Brigade definitely back to its starting trenches.

In the meantime a company of the Kensingtons had been brought up to
Burnaby with the idea of forcing the Dewdrop position by outflanking
it from the north, but the Germans being found still strongly in
possession of Spectrum, north of the road, the attack was cancelled.

It having become obvious that the assaulting battalions were
dangerously weakened, immediate reliefs were arranged, and the
Battalion that night handed over its position to the Queen Victorias,
who were attached to the Brigade, and withdrew to the bivouacs at
Trones Wood. Here it was joined by the London Rifle Brigade. The
withdrawal of the Battalion was supervised by Major Duncan-Teape,
who managed by great efforts to get the whole of the remnants of the
companies back over the Ridge just before daylight broke. The roll call
at Trones Wood was a gloomy spectacle, for neither the 1/4th Londons
nor the London Scottish could muster more than the strength of about
one company.

The total losses in all ranks sustained by the Battalion on this
unfortunate day amounted to about 300 all ranks, the casualties among
officers being:

Killed--Lieut. W. H. Vernon, 2/Lieuts. C. M. Taylor, W. H. Gilford,
L. J. R. Atterbury and L. C. Haycraft.

Wounded--Capt. R. N. Keen and 2/Lieuts. T. R. Fletcher, H. W.
Spiers and S. A. G. Richardson.

Of this, the last of the Battalion's actions in the great Somme
battles, but little more need be said. The position which it had been
proposed to carry with three weak battalions was attempted again the
following day with equal lack of success; and subsequently other
Divisions suffered heavy casualties in the unsuccessful endeavour.
Indeed the position never did fall into our possession until the enemy
deliberately gave it up in his retirement of the succeeding February on
to the Hindenburg line.

Lieut.-Col. L. L. Wheatley, D.S.O., had led the Battalion through many
trying ordeals with the unfailing confidence of all ranks who had the
honour to be under his command; but as already indicated, the strain of
the long-protracted struggle, especially of the last few days, combined
with continually wet clothes, had proved too much for him, and he now
contracted an acute attack of dysentery and was evacuated to hospital
on the 10th. He never returned to the Battalion which his compelling
personality had made essentially his own.

On the 11th October the Battalion moved to the Citadel Camp, the
gateway through which thirty-five days earlier it had entered
the inferno of the battle; and the Division being concentrated
here after relief by the 4th Division, it marched the following
morning to Ville-sur-Ancre, moving thence by motor-buses to a rest
area north-west of Amiens, billets being provided for it at St
Vaast-en-Chaussée.

Of all the great series of actions of the War the battles of the Somme
in 1916 stand out perhaps in the public memory as the most heroic, and
at the same time the most appalling, and we cannot leave the subject
finally without a few remarks generally reviewing the Battalion's
experiences. Of the thirty-five days spent in XIV Corps area only four
had been spent in rest bivouacs, and during the remaining thirty-one
the Battalion had taken part in active operations five times. The
losses incurred amounted to the enormous total of nearly 700 in all
ranks, of whom 40 were officers.

It would be unfitting to close our account of the Somme battles without
paying some tribute to the magnificent work performed throughout by
Rear Headquarters under Major H. J. Duncan-Teape. The administrative
ranks of a battalion in action are invariably worked to the limits
of human endurance, but usually with inadequate recognition of their
importance; for it is no exaggeration to say that on the efficiency
with which they maintain the stream of supplies, whether of rations or
munitions, to the fighting ranks, depends not merely the success, but
the very existence of the troops in advanced positions. On the Somme
the consistently atrocious weather increased tenfold the fatigue and
strain of the administrative portion of the Battalion: the mud swamps
which had to be traversed, the severe shell fire which plastered all
back areas, the wretched misery of the whole struggle, and above all
the vast responsibility which rested on them, all combined to make
the work of Rear Headquarters an enormous strain both mental and
physical. But throughout the battles Major Duncan-Teape was constantly
alert and constantly at advanced Headquarters, ascertaining exactly
what was wanted, and getting it done. In Lieut. H. B. A. Balls, the
Acting Quartermaster, and in R.S.M. Harris he found able and devoted
lieutenants whose cool handling of all difficulties was invaluable.

The transport sections of all battalions were brigaded under Capt. L.
G. Rix at the Citadel, and the 1/4th Londons' transport section under
Lieut. G. V. Lawrie worked throughout magnificently and never once
failed to deliver the day's supplies. Those who were present will fully
appreciate what this means. The work for horses and men was exhausting
and incessant; and oftentimes the limbers returned from the forward
area to the transport lines only just in time to load up once more for
the upward journey. The results that were obtained could only have been
achieved by the whole-hearted devotion of all ranks.

Of the men in the companies on whom day after day fell the burden
of physical discomfort and mental strain it is impossible to speak
adequately. The record of their achievements speaks, and can be left to
speak, for itself.

The decorations awarded for services rendered between the 1st July and
the 7th October were:

M.C.--Lieut. W. J. Boutall, 2/Lieuts. O. D. Garratt, S. J.
Barkworth, M.M., E. McD. McCormick and Rev. R. Palmer,
C.F.

D.C.M.--C.S.M. R. Davis, Sergt. T. Clark, Ptes. J. O'Brien and H.
S. Payne.

M.M.--C.Q.M.-Sergt. R. Forbes, Sergts. H. C. Gearle, H. H. Merrell,
R. Hebberd, R. R. L. Hyde, C. James and T. Lock, Corpl.
J. Castle, L.-Corpls. H. Whitehead, A. Sergeant, A. J.
Moger and L. R. Webb, Ptes. H. E. Hyde, W. Buckingham,
A. E. Colvin, F. Hedger, W. Lawrence and C. F. Collins.

CHAPTER XII

THE 1/4 BATTALION DURING THE WINTER 1916/17

On arrival at St Vaast-en-Chaussée the 1/4th Londons were reduced
in strength to about 275 all ranks, and although the morale of the
troops was not impaired by their recent experiences, the Battalion was
seriously in need of rest, reorganisation and reinforcement. A few days
of light training, which occupied the mornings only, with games in the
afternoon, went far towards recreating the troops physically; but the
reorganisation of the Battalion was necessarily a more lengthy and
difficult matter. No company had more than two officers, and N.C.O.'s
were very few. Lewis gun teams and bombers were newly detailed to their
respective duties and untrained, and the building up once more of the
fine fighting battalion which had entered the trenches at Hébuterne
three and a half months earlier, added to the proper assimilating of
the reinforcements which were expected from England, presented a task
the completion of which was likely to occupy the greater part of the
winter months.

After Lieut.-Col. Wheatley had succumbed to sickness the command of the
Battalion devolved on Major H. J. T. Duncan-Teape, who was appointed
acting Lieut.-Colonel.

The few days' rest at St Vaast were enlivened by an entertainment given
by the Bow Bells, which had an excellent effect in cheering up the men.

On the 20th October the Division moved to the Hallencourt area, where
it had originally been formed, the Battalion arriving in billets at
Citerne at about 5.30 p.m. after a march which, in the reduced physical
condition of the troops, proved to be exceedingly trying. Probably
never has the Battalion been accorded a kindlier welcome in billets
than from the good people of Citerne, who, having received it in
February and sent it out to battle, took a quite proprietary interest
in the laurels which it brought back to them.

At St Vaast and Citerne the Battalion was joined by Capt. F. C.
Grimwade, who assumed the duties of second in command with the acting
rank of Major, 2/Lieuts. C. E. V. Richardson and P. Pyne. Capt. L. G.
Rix also returned to the Battalion from Brigade Transport Officer, and
2/Lieut. O. D. Garratt was appointed Assistant Adjutant.

A course of light training was continued for a few days at Citerne
under weather conditions which continued bright and frosty until the
evening of the 24th October, when the Battalion marched at 8 p.m. in a
veritable deluge to Longpré Station to entrain for a fresh area. The
pitiless rain drenched all to the skin, but the men's spirits remained
completely undamped, for the rumour had gone forth that the new area
was far from the Somme, among the marshes of Flanders. The move from
Longpré was made by tactical train shortly after midnight, and about
midday on the 25th the Battalion detrained at Merville, whence it
marched straight to billets between Neuf Berquin and Estaires, being
now attached to the XI Corps (Haking) of the First Army (Horne).

No prolonged rest was, however, in store, for although the Battalions
of the 56th Division were momentarily not prepared for active
operations, they were perfectly capable of holding trenches. No
surprise, therefore, was caused by the receipt the day following
arrival at Neuf Berquin of orders to relieve the 61st Division in the
Neuve Chapelle-Fauquissart area.

A preliminary reconnaissance of the trenches by officers of Battalion
Headquarters and company commanders took place on the 26th, and on
the 27th the 1/4th Londons and London Scottish moved forward and
took over reserve billets in Laventie from the 2/7th and 2/8th Royal
Warwickshires.

On the 28th October the 168th Brigade completed the relief of the 182nd
Brigade, the 1/4th Londons and Scottish moving into the right and left
subsections respectively of the Fauquissart sector, there relieving
the 2/6th and 2/5th Royal Warwickshires, while the reserve billets in
Laventie were taken over by the Kensingtons and Rangers.

The new Divisional frontage covered some 7000 yards from the
neighbourhood of Richebourg l'Avoué on the right to a point opposite
Rouges Bancs on the left, all the Brigades being in line and each
finding its own supports and local reserves. The 168th Brigade held the
extreme left of the Divisional front, the 169th being on its right,
while the New Zealand Division was on its left. This extreme deployment
of a numerically weak Division was justified by the quiet character
of this area, and the fact that the German divisions opposed to it
were equally with ourselves somewhat exhausted by recent efforts in
the Somme battles and not anxious to venture on active operations. To
such an extent indeed had our continued pressure in the south drained
the enemy's resources that his lines opposite the 56th Division were
but feebly held, and at the moment not capable of being strongly
reinforced; and this area was therefore eminently suited to the
recuperation of a battle-worn Division and to the training in active
service conditions of the young troops from home who were shortly to
join it.

The Fauquissart breastworks were in every way similar to those in
the Neuve Chapelle area already described in connection with the
Battalion's service in the Indian Corps, though being opposite the
village of Aubers, which is on the highest part of the Ridge, were even
more seriously subject to observation from the enemy lines than the
Richebourg breastworks.

The village of Fauquissart, at this period in a condition of total
ruin, consisted of a scattered collection of houses extending for about
half a mile along each side of the Rue Tilleloy, which ran parallel
with the British front breastworks and about 200 yards in rear of them.
A thousand yards in rear of the Rue Tilleloy, and parallel to it, was
the Rue Bacquerot, these two roads forming good lateral communication
within the sector, though the former could only be used under cover of
darkness. The sector was also served by three communication trenches
starting from the Bacquerot, Elgin Street, Masselot Street and the
Strand, the last named during the winter months usually consisting of a
chain of unfordable lakes.

This sector was held by the Battalion with three companies in line and
one in reserve, the reserve company holding three keeps on the line
of the Rue Bacquerot, called Road Bend, Wangerie and Masselot Posts.
Battalion Headquarters was accommodated in shelters near Temple Bar on
the Rue Bacquerot.

The German lines opposite were heavily wired, and included two strongly
marked salients, the Devil's Jump and the Wick. But although the enemy
had the advantage in observation owing to his possession of the Ridge,
his front trenches were far from comfortable owing to the presence
behind his lines of the Rivière des Laies which, as the winter wore on,
became more and more swollen, finally bursting its banks and rendering
his forward defences completely untenable.

Our wire entanglements were exceedingly poor, and immediate attention
was directed to the improvement of this important part of our defences;
the parapets also were thin, firebays sadly in need of revetment, and
the whole sector seriously lacking in shelter for the men. No time
was lost in evolving an extensive works programme, which was promptly
put into execution, the more important work being carried out under
Royal Engineer supervision. The urgency of the Brigade works programme
rendered the supply of large working parties necessary, and it was
therefore arranged that of the two battalions for the time being
in Laventie one would act as "Works Battalion" finding all working
parties, while the other would devote itself to training.

The most peculiar feature of this sector lay in the immunity from shell
fire of Laventie behind the British lines and of Aubers in the German
territory. Each village layabout 2000 yards in rear of the respective
front trenches, and both were used as reserve billets for the troops
holding the line. By mutual and tacit consent the artillery on each
side refrained from bombarding the other's billets; any infringement
of this unwritten law on one side being met with immediate and severe
retaliation by the other. During the period therefore spent in
the Laventie area, the Battalion on coming out of the line had the
enjoyment of occupying tolerably wind-and water-tight billets without
molestation, although they were distant little more than a mile from
the enemy lines. A considerable number of civilians still clung to
their battered homes in Laventie, and it was strange to see French
soldiers, whose divisions were serving in Alsace or the Argonne, come
to Laventie "on leave from the front"!

The 1/4th Londons now settled down to a regular routine of four days in
the right subsection breastworks followed by four days in billets in
Laventie, tours being later extended to six days, and as this routine
continued until the middle of December we need not follow it in detail.

The sector had been particularly quiet prior to the 56th Division's
arrival, but almost from the day of its taking over the line conditions
began to change. Possibly a certain undesirable aggressiveness on
the part of the Londoners began to annoy an enemy who, but for
interference, was content to conduct a perfectly peaceful war; possibly
the change was due to the recovery of both sides from the fatigue and
over-strain of the Somme. Whatever the reason, certain it is that as
the winter wore on the whole Neuve Chapelle-Fauquissart area began
to become much more lively than it had been. On our side the most
vigorous system of patrolling, of daily organised shoots by guns of all
calibres, trench mortars and machine-guns, and of an intensive course
of sniping, quickly gave us the ascendancy and caused the Germans a
pardonable irritation under which they showed themselves less and less
disposed to take their punishment quietly.

In the line the Battalion was busily occupied with its share of
the works programme and in patrolling in which the infrequency of
encounters with the enemy in No Man's Land gradually led to the belief
that his front breastwork was not occupied. This was probed further on
the last evening of November when a fighting patrol of twenty men under
2/Lieut. W. H. Webster (Intelligence Officer) entered the enemy lines
at the Wick Salient and found it untenanted, in a shocking condition of
flood and affording ample evidence that no attempt was being made to
repair the serious damage caused by our artillery fire.

During the third week in November the Battalion's frontage was extended
to the right, involving the occupation by the right company of an extra
400 yards of breastwork and an additional supporting post, Erith, and
by the reserve company of a fourth keep on the Bacquerot line called
Lonely Post. This new piece of breastwork was usually subjected to a
good deal of enemy trench mortar fire, especially about the point at
which Erith Street communication trench joined the front line. This
was an unpleasant spot. Erith Street sunk into a slight depression so
that all traffic using it was plainly visible to the Germans; and as
it came to an abrupt end some fifteen yards short of the front line
an undesirable gap occurred which had to be traversed with more than
ordinary agility by those whose duty took them that way. A good deal
of extra trench repairing work was imposed on us in consequence of the
enemy's attentions at this point, and unfortunately some casualties
occurred.

The enemy's activity was rather marked on the 26th November, during the
morning of which day over seventy 5·9-inch shells fell near the Convent
observation post but without a direct hit being obtained. The Convent,
together with two or three other posts along the line of the Rue
Tilleloy, used by the forward observation officers of our supporting
artillery, consisted of a substantial brick tower some 25 feet in
height, like an attenuated Martello Tower. These had been erected
behind the cover of the houses of Fauquissart before the village had
been destroyed. But the subsequent demolition of the houses had exposed
the towers, which consequently stood up naked and unashamed within 200
yards of our front line, and their presence, possibly combined with
his evident inability to hit them, seemed to be a constant source of
annoyance to the enemy.

All this time the Battalion strength was steadily increasing with
reinforcements from home and with the return of many who had been
wounded on the Somme, till by Christmas it mustered some 700 all ranks.
Officer reinforcements followed on each other's heels with surprising
rapidity, and the following joined during November:

Captains V. S. Bowater and H. M. Lorden, Lieuts. H. Jones
(appointed Brigade Bombing Officer) and H. J. M. Williams,
2/Lieuts. E. G. Dew, L. W. Wreford, S. P. Stotter, H. W.
Spiers, R. W. Chamberlain and W. A. Froy; 2/Lieuts. H. N.
Williams, L. W. N. Jones, H. D. Rees, Bradley (to 168th L.T.M.
Battery) and A. L. Harper (attached from 4th Royal Welsh
Fusiliers); 2/Lieuts. F. H. Hutchins, A. G. Davis and L. E.
Ballance (attached from 11th Londons); Captain H. Pentelow and
Lieuts. T. Coleman (Works Officer) and H. D. Beeby (attached
from Hunts Cyclist Battalion).

Captain Pentelow was unluckily hit and sent to hospital two days after
his arrival.

At the end of November the Rev. R. Palmer, M.C., left the Battalion to
take up the duties of Divisional Chaplain in the 24th Division, his
place being taken a few days later by Rev. S. F. Leighton Green, who
remained with the Battalion until after the Armistice.

About this period a Divisional Musketry Camp was formed at Le Sart,
near Merville, and 2/Lieuts. Wreford and Pyne were appointed to it as
instructors. 2/Lieut. E. G. Dew was also appointed Battalion Bombing
Officer.

On the 21st December a readjustment of the Battalion sector was
effected, and in the afternoon the sector as originally taken over
from the 182nd Brigade was handed over to the 1/3rd Londons, and the
Battalion marched to billets at Bout Deville.

After three days occupied in cleaning up and training, Christmas Day
was celebrated as a holiday, and, the billets being beyond the range of
any but heavy guns, with which the Germans were not well supplied on
this front, the rest of the Battalion was quite undisturbed. But every
effort was made to render the Germans' Christmas as uncomfortable as
possible. At 6.30 p.m. on Christmas Eve a continuous steady bombardment
of his defences by all available batteries up to 6-inch guns began, and
lasted for forty-eight hours. This action was evidently much resented
by the enemy, and after Christmas the trench warfare in this area was
conducted with greater fierceness than it had been previously.

The Bow Bells were now established in the theatre at La Gorgue, and
it was found possible to provide a free visit for every man in the
Battalion to its splendid Christmas pantomime "Aladdin," which was most
heartily appreciated.

During the temporary absence of 2/Lieut. O. D. Garratt, the duties of
Intelligence Officer were taken by 2/Lieut. J. R. K. Paterson (Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders, attached), who remained with the Battalion
for about a month.

On New Year's Day 1917 the 168th Brigade relieved the 169th Brigade
in Moated Grange sector, the Rangers and Kensingtons occupying the
trenches, with the London Scottish in support, about Rouge Croix and
Pont du Hem on the La Bassée Road, while the 1/4th Londons remained in
Divisional reserve billets at Riez Bailleul.

A week here was spent in supplying working parties, of which the labour
was considerable owing to the long distance--about four miles--which
had to be covered each night in each direction by parties going up the
line for work. The weather, moreover, had taken a marked change, and
a very severe frost had set in which increased tenfold the labour of
digging. Towards the end of the week snow fell adding further to the
fatigue of the long night marches.

On the evening of the 9th January 1917 the Battalion took over from
the Kensingtons the right subsection of the Moated Grange sector.
This sector had seen a good many changes both as regards defences and
boundaries since the Battalion's previous occupation of it in the
summer of 1915, and the lines now taken over extended from Sign Post
Lane on the right for a frontage of some 1400 yards to a point opposite
the village of Mauquissart which lay just within the German lines.

[Illustration: LAVENTIE, WINTER 1916-1917]

The sector was held with three companies in the front breastworks
and supporting posts and one in reserve on Cardiff Road. Battalion
Headquarters occupied shelters at Ebenezer Farm. These positions were
far from ideal. The strength of the Battalion was much scattered
and difficult of control in emergency, owing to the exceedingly bad
communications within the area. The supporting platoons of the front
line companies, at Bristol House, Cornwall Siding and Pump House,
occupied the only remaining tenable portions of what had originally
been the German second line prior to the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, and
were separated from each other by about 100 yards of broken down and
almost impassably wet breastworks. For communication from front to rear
only one trench, Tilleloy South, was passable with any degree of safety
in daylight. Between Pump House and the front line, a distance of
about 250 yards, it was seriously overlooked from the German positions
in the Bois du Biez, with the result that traffic up and down it was
frequently sniped with trench mortar and 5·9 shells.

Always an area of considerable activity, the Moated Grange possessed
several unpleasant features as a result of the active mining operations
which had begun in 1915, and were still proceeding with unabated
energy. The Duck's Bill Farm had given place to an enormous crater
of the same name, linked with the British lines by a defended sap
which left the front line at Sunken Road. The defence of this crater
and sap took a platoon, whose arduous duties of continual listening
and constant preparedness for an enemy raid were carried out under
exceedingly rough conditions, as both the crater and the sap were full
of water and shelters were conspicuous by their absence.

On the front occupied by the left company the German lines were
invisible from the British breastworks owing to the lips thrown up
round the Colvin craters, a series of some thirty or more of immense
size which covered half the area of No Man's Land at this point. The
largest of this series, the Mauquissart crater, occupied the site of
what had once been our front line, and the breastwork now ran round
its nearer lip. This mined area was the most uncomfortable part of
the line, since the Germans were continually searching with trench
mortar fire for the heads of our mine shafts while the cover afforded
to enemy patrols by the crater lips themselves necessitated constant
vigilance and counter-patrolling activity on the part of our trench
garrison. Add to this the extreme hardship which the troops in this
part of the line inevitably had to undergo owing to the total lack of
dugouts and the perishing cold. The blowing of so many craters had,
moreover, cut off the ditches between fields which had formerly been
used for draining the trenches, with the result that there was no
means of getting rid of the water which in a large number of firebays
rose higher than the firestep. Under these conditions cooking in the
neighbourhood of the front line was out of the question, and all cooked
food had to be carried by permanent headquarter carrying parties from
the Battalion cook-house near Ebenezer Farm; in the case of rations
destined for the flank platoons this meant a trudge for the food
carriers of over a mile in each direction at each meal.

The defences generally had suffered severely both from the enemy's
shell fire and the effects of the alternation of sharp frost and
heavy rain, and an immense amount of labour was called for in
working and carrying parties for the breastworks as well as for the
wire entanglements, which were in a very weak condition. The single
communication trench, therefore, became frequently congested with long
lines of troops "humping" material and food to the front line, and
altogether the Moated Grange was a hard sector to run efficiently and a
remarkably unpleasant one to live in.

Two tours of six days each were spent in this sector, broken by
six days--not of rest, but of most exhausting working parties--in
Riez Bailleul. The days in line saw a good deal of shelling and the
Battalion suffered some loss, but in spite of this and of exposure
to intense cold the men were probably more happy in the line than in
billets. Further heavy falls of snow had occurred. The working parties
supplied from Riez Bailleul were largely engaged in drawing trench
stores and material at a dump on the La Bassée Road between Pont du
Hem and Rouge Croix, itself nearly two miles from billets; and thence
pushing it up to the front trenches on the tram-line dignified with the
title of Great Eastern Railway, a further distance of upwards of 3000
yards. From railhead this material, consisting of trench boards, rolls
of barbed wire, revetting frames, hurdles and other heavy stuff had to
be distributed to companies in the line. These fatigues were obviously
exhausting, and seldom did a party leaving billets at 5.30 p.m. return
before midnight.

The most difficult task of all, however, which may not yet have quite
faded from the memories of many, was connected with an ingenious scheme
for draining the craters with heavy cast-iron water mains each about 16
feet long. With infinite labour these were brought to tram railhead,
but at this point the difficulty of carrying pipes, each weighing some
200 pounds, along 500 yards of quagmire proved too much even for the
stout hearts of Cockneys; and the high hopes which the author of the
scheme had entertained of draining the craters vanished as his pipes
sank in the mud. A change from this routine to the comparative peace of
trench mortaring in the line was not unwelcome.

An act of gallantry occurred during the first tour which must be
recorded. During one of the enemy's midday bombardments a time-fuzed
medium trench mortar shell fell on the parapet of our breastwork on the
lip of Mauquissart crater, and lodged in the revetting hurdle at the
side of the trench. The firebay happened to be crowded with men working
on the defences, and heavy casualties must inevitably have been caused
but for the bravery of 2/Lieut. W. H. Webster, who rushed forward and,
seizing the shell, flung it over the parapet into the crater, where
it immediately exploded. For this gallant action 2/Lieut. Webster was
awarded the D.S.O.

The enemy's artillery and trench mortars showed a marked increase of
activity during the second occupation of Moated Grange, the craters,
the Duck's Bill and Pump House, coming in for most of the punishment.
The 23rd January was perhaps the most trying to the troops. During the
morning "hate" a well-placed minenwerfer completely cut off the left
platoon in the craters, the only approach to them being by way of an
exposed and little used trench, Min Street, which involved a detour
of about 3200 yards from Headquarters. Shortly after midday a second
lucky German shell lighted on a dump of medium trench mortar shells
which were lying within a few yards of a shelter occupied by several
men of the right company. A terrific explosion took place and caused
a large crater which cut off the Battalion's right flank also, but,
strange to say, without inflicting so much as a scratch on any of the
men in the vicinity. These incidents are recounted merely as instances
of the constant annoyance caused to the troops in line by the enemy's
harassing tactics, as every bit of damage caused in this way involved
extra work to the already over-burdened troops in repairing it.

On the last evening in the line, the 25th, an attempt was made by a
fighting patrol of the reserve company (C) under 2/Lieut. Ballance to
obtain an identification from the enemy. Wire-cutting shoots had taken
place for two days previously in preparation for this, and arrangements
were made to support the patrol with artillery fire as occasion
should arise. The enemy were found, however, to have made efficient
counter-preparations, and the surprise effect of the patrol having
failed, the project had to be abandoned with the loss of 1 man killed
and 2 wounded.

During this tour the Battalion sustained 1 officer casualty, 2/Lieut.
W. Quennell, wounded.

On the 26th January the Battalion was relieved by the 1/8th Middlesex
at 10.5 p.m. and withdrew to rest billets at La Gorgue, the 168th
Brigade having passed into Divisional reserve with Brigade Headquarters
at Merville.

The 168th Brigade in rest in the Merville area settled down to such
training as was possible, the ground being covered with snow. One or
two useful instructional schemes with contact aeroplanes were carried
out, but the weather conditions prevented serious outdoor work, and
the training hours were, for the most part, devoted to repolishing the
parade discipline of the Brigade. According to the usual custom of the
Battalion when opportunity offered itself, the drums beat Retreat daily
and the Regimental Quarter Guard and inlying picket mounted in the
Grande Place at La Gorgue.

Two further drafts of about 70 N.C.O.'s and men joined the Battalion in
January.

It had been the intention that the 168th Brigade should pass fourteen
days in rest, but this idea had to be unexpectedly abandoned owing to a
concentration of troops near the frozen inundations of the Yser, where
it was feared that a sudden German advance over the ice might have
somewhat disturbing effects on the Allies' positions. This caused the
services of the 168th Brigade to be requisitioned once more, and on the
1st and 2nd February it relieved the 111th Brigade of the 37th Division
in the Neuve Chapelle sector, the Rangers and Kensingtons occupying the
line, while the Scottish moved as Works Battalion to billets at Croix
Barbée and the 1/4th Londons as Training Battalion to Fosse.

On the 1st February 2/Lieut. C. E. V. Richardson was admitted to
hospital.

After training at Fosse for six days the 1/4th Londons took over from
the Kensingtons the right subsector of Neuve Chapelle sector on the 8th
February.

The Battalion now found itself after a lapse of over a year once more
in the area in which it had passed so many months with the Ferozepore
Brigade. The sector taken over comprised the old Rue du Bois (right,
centre and left) sections, and extended from a point opposite the
German Boar's Head Salient on the right to some 250 yards north of the
La Bassée Road on the left. Considerable changes had now taken place
in the method of holding the line; old well-known trenches had fallen
into disuse and fresh ones had taken their places. Those who looked for
the Crescent, Orchard Redoubt, and other well-remembered spots found
them broken down and no longer occupied. The front line breastwork was
now occupied in isolated posts at intervals of about 150 yards, each
garrisoned by a platoon. Each post was protected on its flanks as well
as in front by wire entanglements, while the intervening firebays had
been either filled in or choked with barbed wire.

The communications within the sector were tolerably good, but the
breastwork was thin and in many places low, a natural result of leaving
long portions of it unoccupied for several months.

The main line of resistance was now in the reserve or "B" line which,
on the right of the sector, was represented by Guards Trench in front
of the Rue du Bois, and on the left by the old British front line (as
it had been before the Battle of March 1915) in Edgware Road. Battalion
Headquarters in 1915 had occupied dugouts on the Rue du Bois, but were
now at Lansdowne Post, which formerly had housed a whole battalion. The
defence scheme provided for holding the "B" line at all costs in the
event of serious attack, so that the front line became virtually a line
of outposts. This method of holding the line in great depth was not
only far sounder than the former method of crowding the whole strength
into the front trench, but was also more economical, as the sector
which formerly had demanded a garrison of a whole brigade was held by
one battalion.

The line was held with two companies in the front line posts and two in
support in the "B" line.

On the right of the La Bassée Road the German trenches were about 100
yards distant, and it was soon found that the enemy snipers had been
allowed to gain the ascendancy over the British, a state of affairs
which all battalions of the Brigade promptly set to work to correct.

The first day's occupation of this sector passed without incident, but
on the evening of the 9th February, at about 7 p.m., the enemy opened
a heavy trench mortar and machine-gun bombardment on the front line
from Pioneer to Pope Posts, astride the La Bassée Road. The trench
mortar fire was well directed, and the breastwork on the right of Pope
Post was badly breached. At about 7.30 p.m. this preparatory shelling
was followed by a heavy "box" barrage, and an enemy raiding party
entered our lines between Pioneer and Pope Posts. An S.O.S. signal
was sent up from the left company Headquarters, and our artillery
responded promptly with a heavy barrage on the German front line and
communication trenches.

The raiders, about twelve in number, divided into two groups, of which
one attacked Pope Post and the other Pioneer Post. The attack on Pope
Post was driven off by the garrison, three of the raiding party being
bayoneted by Sergt. Gardiner, whereupon the others turned and fled,
being followed back to the German lines by the second group.

Capt. Rix, commanding B Company, accompanied by his Sergt.-Major
(Shelton) and his runner, gallantly endeavoured to pass through the
barrage on Hun Street in order to take control of affairs in the front
line; but all were unfortunately hit by the same shell, Shelton and
the runner being killed outright while Rix died in hospital a few days
later. The raiders were successful in capturing 2/Lieut. Webster,
D.S.O., who was with the Lewis gun post at Pioneer Post; he is believed
to have been mortally hit prior to his capture, and died in the enemy's
hands the following day. In addition to these regrettable casualties
about a dozen men were slightly wounded, the bulk of the loss on our
side being sustained by a carrying party from the Rangers who were
caught by the German barrage at Edgware Road tram railhead. 2/Lieut.
Stotter (B Company) was also slightly wounded. He remained at duty
for some days, but was admitted to hospital about ten days later.
The reorganisation of the line was promptly taken in hand by Capt.
Stanbridge (A Company) in support, who temporarily reinforced the front
line with one of his platoons under 2/Lieut. Harper, and subsequently
took over B Company vice Rix. The raiding party belonged, as was found
from the three enemy dead left in our hands, to the 2nd Battalion,
13th Bavarian Regiment. For his coolness and good work during the raid
Sergt. Gardiner was awarded the Military Medal.

The remainder of the night passed without incident, and the bright
moonlight during the later hours enabled our working parties to make
considerable headway in repairing the breaches in our breastwork.

On the morning of the following day an observed shoot--which caused
very great material damage--was carried out by our trench mortar
batteries on the enemy first and second lines. This shoot produced a
certain amount of trench mortar retaliation on Guards Trench, in the
course of which an unlucky shell destroyed a Stokes mortar section
under 2/Lieut. Bradley, and the whole of its team, causing a block in
our line at Mole Post.

No further incident of importance occurred during the remainder of
this tour, though our lines were daily subjected to heavy bombardments
by the enemy medium trench mortars, especially in the neighbourhood
of Pioneer Post, where very considerable damage was caused to our
breastworks and wire. On the evenings of the 12th and 13th, however,
when this activity of the enemy began to assume somewhat serious
proportions, they were effectively silenced by prearranged retaliatory
shoots by our supporting artillery on the German front and support
lines.

The following afternoon the Battalion handed over the right subsection
to the Kensingtons, and withdrew as Works Battalion to billets at Croix
Barbée. Here the Battalion supplied large working parties nightly, the
principal tasks being the raising and thickening of the weak portions
of the breastwork and the wiring of the new parts of the "B" line.

Throughout this winter the prosecution of the works programme placed a
heavy strain on all ranks and totally deprived the periods spent out
of the line of any semblance of rest. Even on the night of relief the
working parties were carried out, and many times during these months
companies which had held front line trenches for six days marched back
to reserve billets and within an hour were paraded again for a working
party from which they were not dismissed till after midnight. The
necessity for this extreme pressure of work was doubtless real, but the
unceasing drudgery of it could not be conducive to good work while the
efficient recreation of the men by games out of the line received so
little attention.

However, on this occasion it was found possible to make progress with
the Brigade boxing competition, a good ring being available at the
Brigade Lewis Gun School at Croix Barbée, and in this competition the
Battalion gained several successes.

On the 20th February the Battalion returned to the trenches, taking
over the right subsection from the Kensingtons.

[Illustration: _Sign Post Lane, Neuve Chapelle_]

[Illustration: _Ruined Farmhouse near Neuve Chapelle_]

This tour of duty was marked by an all round increase of activity both
in trench mortar and artillery fire on both sides, the points which
received the majority of the shelling being the front line about the
much battered Pope and Pioneer Posts, Port Arthur and the "B" line in
the neighbourhood of the Rue du Bois. The enemy was also active by day
with rifle grenades, and at night with machine-gun fire.

Owing to the particular discomfort of living in Pope and Pioneer Posts
an inter-company relief between the two left companies was effected on
the 23rd February, A Company withdrawing into support in favour of C
Company, which took over Port Arthur sector.

An attempt was made on the evening of the 26th by the 5th Division on
the right to raid in force the enemy's lines to the south of the Boar's
Head Salient. The enemy had exhibited numerous signs of nervousness,
and it was not altogether surprising to find him quite prepared for the
attempt by the 5th Division. The exact point against which the raiding
party was directed, however, did not coincide with his anticipations,
for the bulk of his rather sharp counter-barrage came down on the
sector held by this Battalion. This barrage lasted with intensity for
twenty minutes, and, trench mortars being freely employed, caused
a good deal of further damage to our already weak breastworks, but
inflicted practically no loss of personnel.

The following morning the Kensingtons once more relieved the 1/4th
Londons, taking over the right subsection and extending it to the left
as far as the outskirts of Neuve Chapelle village, the adjusted line
being known as the left subsection of Ferme du Bois sector.

On relief the Battalion occupied billets as training battalion at
Fosse, C Company being detached in hutments at Les Huit Maisons.
Training was proceeded with uninterruptedly though the weather remained
intensely cold and further falls of snow occurred. The opportunity
was taken to hold a Battalion cross-country run, which passed off as
satisfactorily as the arctic conditions permitted. The frost, which
had lasted for several weeks, was indeed now becoming a little serious
as it was utterly impossible, owing to the hardness of the soil, to
carry out repairs to the trenches which were daily being more knocked
about by the enemy's fire. The appalling destruction which must later
be caused by the inevitable thaw filled the hearts of those who would
form part of the subsequent working parties with feelings of misgiving,
mingled with resentment.

On the 5th March the Battalion relieved the Kensingtons in the left
subsection of Ferme du Bois, the order of battle in the front line
being from the right, B, D and A Companies, with C in support in the
"B" line. The additional frontage between La Bassée Road and Neuve
Chapelle was also held in isolated posts.

As before the "B" line was the main line of resistance; but the great
length of the "B" line sector--some 2300 yards--which had to be held in
eight separate posts, with three additional posts at night, presented
a difficult problem in defence to one weak company of about 120
fighting ranks. The solution of the problem was not, however, actually
called for as the enemy remained unusually quiet for the whole of this
tour of duty, during which the snow fell thicker every day. After an
occupation of four uninteresting days the Battalion was relieved in
the left subsection on the afternoon of the 9th March by 1/6th Duke of
Wellington's Regiment (49th Division). On relief it withdrew to billets
at Bout Deville, marching the following morning at 8 a.m. to Merville,
where the Brigade entrained for the Le Cauroy area. Detrainment took
place at Doullens, and the Battalion marched some six miles to billets
at Le Souich, arriving shortly before midnight.

The Battalion, which had left the Somme battlefields in an exhausted
condition in the previous October, had undergone a good schooling in
the Flanders breastworks. The strength had been increased to some 850
all ranks, and all new drafts had become not only well assimilated,
but also well trained in a rather trying trench warfare. The physical
strain on the troops throughout the winter had been exceptionally
severe, owing to the terrible intensity of the winter weather, and
the very great amount of trench work for which the Battalion had
been called upon; and of this side of the incidents of the winter
sufficient has already been said for it to be realised without
difficulty that, although the Battalion still had a clean bill of
health, the prospect of a rest before embarking on active operations
was welcomed by all.

The great retirement of the Germans was now in progress, and as the
1/4th Battalion was not actively concerned in this we may turn for the
moment to follow the fortunes of the 2/4th Battalion, who had recently
arrived in France with the 58th Division and were now in action in the
Arras sector.

CHAPTER XIII

THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN FRANCE--GERMAN RETIREMENT FROM THE SOMME

The 58th Division, of which the 2/4th Londons formed a part, after
remaining at Ipswich for about a month, was transferred to the Southern
Command in hutted camps at Sutton Veny, near Warminster, on the 10th
July 1916.

Here the Division, being concentrated in an area which provided
excellent training facilities, had a chance to become thoroughly
welded together and to show the material of which it was made in
a manner which had hitherto been impossible, for the influence of
scattered billets is invariably and inevitably unfavourable to strict
discipline. The fullest advantage was taken of this golden opportunity,
and the resultant tightening of discipline and advancement of all
ranks in technical efficiency rapidly justified the change of station.
A very great amount of work still lay before the whole Division
before it would be fit to take its place in the line overseas, and
much reorganisation in various directions was effected with entirely
beneficial results soon after its arrival at Warminster.

Amidst all this work, which was carried out at fever-heat, the
amusement of the men was not overlooked. An excellent Divisional band
was formed, and their good services were added to early in December
by the creation of a Divisional concert troop "The Goods." Not to be
left behind in these achievements the 2/4th Londons formed their own
concert party, called for some not too obvious reason "The Tanks,"
which afforded excellent entertainments under the able direction of
2/Lieuts. T. J. Bell and C. J. Graham, who were assisted by Pipe-Major
Ling, Corpl. Wilkinson, L./Corpls. Smith, Ringrose and Hardy, and Pte.
Rosenbloom.

The 2/4th Londons had already attained a position which is believed
to be unique in the annals of the British Army inasmuch as they, a
Battalion affiliated to an English line regiment, had become the
possessors of a pipe band. This band had originally been formed for
recruiting purposes, but with the initiation of the "Derby Scheme" its
services were no longer necessary for the enticement of recruits, and
it had been secured for the Battalion. The pipers wore the Glengarry
cap and the Royal Stuart tartan. They were without doubt an exceedingly
good band and lightened many a weary mile of road both in England and
France with their stirring music.

An attempt, which originated in the 2/4th Londons, was also made to
produce a Divisional magazine, and this appeared in September under the
title of _The Direct Hit_. It was well received and attained the age of
three months, but was then discontinued.

Shortly after arrival at Sutton Veny the Division came under the
command of Major-Gen. H. D. Fanshawe, C.B., who ultimately took it to
France where he remained in command for some months.

Various changes took place in the 2/4th Londons, and in November
1916 command of the Battalion was assumed by Lieut.-Col. W. R. H.
Dann (Bedfordshire Regiment), Capt. W. A. Nunneley becoming second
in command with the temporary rank of Major. The personnel was also
strengthened by the arrival of a large officer reinforcement from the
4th (Reserve) Battalion, the majority of whom had already seen service
in France in the ranks of various London Battalions.

In the latter part of January 1917 the long awaited order arrived for
the 58th Division to proceed overseas. On the 23rd of that month the
2/4th Battalion left Sutton Veny with a strength of 32 officers and
976 other ranks and proceeded to Southampton, where it embarked on
the _Viper_, and crossed to Havre, arriving the following morning at
daybreak. Disembarkation took place at once and the Battalion, preceded
by its pipe band, marched to the Reinforcement Camp at Sanvic. The
following officers accompanied the Battalion overseas:

Lieut.-Col. W. R. H. Dann, in command.
Major W. A. Nunneley, second in command.
Capt. E. E. Spicer, Adjutant.
" E. N. Cotton, cmdg. A Co.
" E. W. Bottomley, " B "
" G. E. A. Leake, " C "
" S. H. Stedman, " D "
" H. A. T. Hewlett.
" H. C. Long.
" W. H. Parker.
Lieut. B. Rivers Smith (Bde. L.G.O.).
2/Lieut. R. K. Caparn.
" E. A. Monkman.
" L. J. Bassett (attd. L.T.M. Battery).
" T. Stoaling.
" A. M. Duthie (Bombing Officer).
" S. G. Askham.
" A. R. Muddell (attd. L.T.M. Battery).
" W. J. Stickney.
" A. G. Croll (Intelligence Officer).
" F. Stickney.
" H. W. Hallett (Signalling Officer).
" G. G. Hunt.
" T. J. Bell.
" R. McDowell.
" H. E. English.
" D. S. Boorman.
" H. S. Daw (Transport Officer).
" C. J. Graham.
" E. C. Pratt.
" S. P. Ferdinando.
Hon. Lt. & Qm. C. W. Cragg, (Quartermaster).
Capt. P. H. Burton, R.A.M.C., Medical Officer.
" Rev. O'Brien, Chaplain attached.

The next day the Battalion entrained for Abbeville, but on arrival
found its orders to stay there countermanded and the journey was
therefore continued to Fortel, a small village about six miles
south-west of Frevent.

The unusually hard frost which was general throughout northern
France in the winter of 1916/17 still held the country in its grip,
and the conditions for a raw battalion even in billets were far
from comfortable, but a ten days' stay at Fortel, which was devoted
to training and generally acclimatising the Battalion to its new
surroundings, prepared it at least in a small degree for the rigours of
a winter campaign.

By the 5th February the concentration of the 58th Division was
complete, and the 173rd Brigade under Brig.-Gen. Hurst began to move by
easy stages to the line, the 2/4th Londons lying at Le Souich on the
6th, and at Sus-St Leger on the 7th and 8th.

The following day the Brigade moved forward and became attached to
the 146th Brigade of the West Riding (Territorial) Division, for
instruction in trench warfare, the 2/4th Londons being divided up
between the battalions of the 146th Brigade for this purpose, with two
companies in reserve at Bailleulmont and Humbercamp. The 146th Brigade
was at this time holding a sector south-west of Arras facing Ransart.
Ransart lies at the base of a small spur between two watercourses,
both of which are usually dry, and the German trenches in front of the
village were dominated at an average distance of about 600 yards by our
own on the western side of the valley.

This part of the front had the reputation of being exceedingly quiet
(and therefore suitable for the first tour of duty of inexperienced
troops), and was the defensive position taken up by the French in
October 1914 when, after the Battle of the Aisne, the battle front
had become stabilised by the continued extension of the flanks of the
opposing forces until they reached the sea. The British Army had taken
over the area from the French in July 1915.

After five uneventful days in this sector the Battalion was relieved on
the 14th by the 2/12th Londons, and having rendezvoused at La Cauchie,
about three miles in rear of the line, embussed to Sus-St Leger where
it went into billets for a week's rest.

* * * * *

The important changes which were to take place in this area during the
next six weeks are so material to the development of the Campaign of
1917 that it is necessary to review briefly the operations which were
being conducted further south. The termination of the battles of the
Somme in November 1916 had left the enemy in possession of the whole
of the Ancre Valley from Le Transloy to Grandcourt and of excellent
positions on the high ground immediately north of Beaumont-Hamel; while
in rear of this position he had made great progress in the construction
of two more lines of defence running in a direction from north-west to
south-east about Bapaume.

The advance of our troops over the Thiepval-Morval Ridge had, however,
left him confined in a marked salient, of which the apex was Gommecourt
Wood, between the Ancre on the south and the Scarpe where it passes
Arras on the north; and conditions appeared very favourable for
improving our situation in the neighbourhood of Beaumont-Hamel before
the conditions of winter should render active operations on a large
scale impossible. Accordingly operations which met with immediate
success were reopened on the 18th November on the left bank of the
Ancre between Grandcourt and Pys. These were renewed in January in the
Beaucourt valley on the opposite side of the river with such marked
success that the enemy was compelled to relinquish his hold on the high
ground north of Beaumont-Hamel while his position in Grandcourt became
precarious in the extreme.

On the night of the 5th/6th February 1917 Grandcourt was evacuated and
the enemy fell back to the line Serre-Miraumont-Pys. Attacks with which
these initial successes were followed up on the 17th and 18th February
secured to the British complete command over the enemy's defences of
the upper Ancre and Miraumont village, while they accentuated his
salient west of Serre. The loss of this would lay open for us a further
advance on Puisieux-au-Mont and render the defence of the Gommecourt
Salient exceedingly hazardous. It was therefore to be expected that any
further withdrawal on the part of the enemy from in front of Miraumont
would entail a withdrawal on a large scale, and this actually occurred.

By the 24th February British troops had occupied Serre and all the
enemy's defences on a line from that village to Gueudecourt, a frontage
of some nine miles. On the 27th February patrols entered Gommecourt
park and village, the prize so desperately fought for and withheld
from the 1/4th Battalion six months earlier, and the following morning
the whole of Puisieux fell into our hands. On the right the enemy's
resistance was more stubborn, but an assault on Irles on the 10th
March, which proved entirely successful, brought us face to face with
the first of the two lines of defence about Bapaume to which reference
has already been made. But even here the enemy made no determined
stand, and by the 13th our pursuing columns were making preparations to
assault the rear line.

[Illustration: THE GERMAN RETIREMENT, FEBRUARY-MARCH, 1917]

* * * * *

The situation, therefore, when the 2/4th Battalion returned to the line
after its rest, the last two days of which were spent at Gaudiempré,
was that Corps and Divisional staffs were eagerly seeking information
as to any indication of the enemy's expected retirement between Arras
and Monchy-au-Bois, this being the only sector between Arras and the
Somme now left in his possession, which he had held at the end of the
Somme operations. This entailed a heavily increased burden of night
patrolling duties on all troops in the line.

On the 24th February the 2/4th Battalion moved into Bellacourt,
relieving the 1/5th K.O.Y.L.I. in Brigade reserve, taking over the
front line from the 1/4th K.O.Y.L.I. on the following day. The sector
lay between Ransart and Blairville to the left of that previously
occupied, and was held with three companies in front trenches and one
in support. Battalion Headquarters were in Grosville.

The German lines opposite this sector possessed two features of
particular interest in the Blockhouse, a strongly defended salient, and
the Talus, a machine-gun post pushed some 200 yards forward of their
main line in a hillside embankment. Two sunken roads and a watercourse
in No Man's Land added to the interest of life and provided our patrols
with some useful work.

The advancing British troops in the south this day were beginning to
threaten Puisieux, the possession of which would lay open to attack the
Bucquoy Ridge to its north. It was clear that with British forces on
the Bucquoy Ridge the German reserve lines of defence and gun positions
about Adinfer Wood (which supported the lines now opposite the 173rd
Brigade) must either retreat precipitately or run a serious risk of
being cut off. Requests for information from Brigade consequently
became more and more insistent, and information was passed to the
Battalion that the lines opposite had actually been evacuated.
Officers' patrols under 2/Lieuts. A. G. Croll, A. M. Duthie, T. J.
Bell and D. S. Boorman, which covered No Man's Land, especially in the
vicinity of the Blockhouse and the Talus on the nights of the 24th and
28th, however, elicited unmistakable signs of occupation of the German
defences. But the desultory nature of the enemy's machine-gun fire,
and of his shell fire from the direction of Adinfer Wood, the marked
decrease in the number of Véry lights put up by him at night and the
constant sounds of transport moving on the roads in rear of his lines
all provided indications that his retirement could not long be delayed.
The patrols frequently heard working parties hard at work in rear of
the enemy's lines, and it afterwards transpired that these were busily
engaged in mining the roads over which our advancing troops must pursue
the German retreat.

It had long been known that the enemy was hard at work on a highly
fortified defensive line which left his front defences at Arras and ran
in a south-easterly direction in front of Cambrai to near St Quentin.
This line, the famous "Hindenburg" line, was roughly parallel to that
now occupied by our advancing troops in the south and some eight miles
distant from it. Reports from British airmen showed that the Hindenburg
line was now the scene of feverish activity on the part of the enemy,
and this information seemed to confirm the probability indicated by the
results of our patrolling that the relinquishment of the Monchy-Arras
line was imminent.

A most unfortunate incident occurred on the night of the 28th February,
when a strong patrol under 2/Lieut. R. K. Caparn returning to our lines
was fired upon by the sentries who apparently had failed to grasp the
prearranged signal, with the regrettable result that 2/Lieut. Caparn
was very seriously wounded and L./Corpl. Warren, Ptes. Anderson and
Vickery were killed.

On the morning of the 2nd March the Battalion was relieved by the 2/2nd
Londons and withdrew to Divisional reserve in billets at Basseux and
Bailleulval. Three days' training ensued, followed by a move on the 6th
to Humbercamp.

The 173rd Brigade had now "side-stepped" to the right, and on the 7th
March the 2/4th Londons once more entered the front line, relieving
the 1/6th North Staffords in a sector known as Z1 immediately opposite
Monchy-au-Bois. Battalion Headquarters opened in Bienvillers-au-Bois.

This sector was about three miles south of that previously occupied,
and similar conditions prevailed both as regards ground and the German
retirement. No Man's Land, which was here about 300 yards wide, fell
gently from our lines to the village of Monchy-au-Bois, which had
been made a network of defences by the enemy, his first line passing
immediately in front of the village. In rear of the village the ground
again rose gently to the Adinfer Ridge.

Bienvillers was almost daily given an unpleasantly copious allowance of
gas shells which caused numerous casualties, principally to carrying
parties from Battalion Headquarters. Among these was Major Nunneley,
who was gassed on the 10th; his duties of second in command were
assumed by Capt. Spicer, the Adjutancy being filled by Capt. A. Grover
(1st Bedfordshire Regiment), who had just been transferred to the 2/4th
Battalion at the request of Lieut.-Col. Dann.

The long frost had now been succeeded by a remarkably sudden thaw which
created conditions of marked discomfort in the trenches. The water pent
up in the soil for so long filled all the trenches to a depth of about
two feet, and the trench walls everywhere began to fall in, throwing an
enormous amount of work on the occupying battalions in keeping them in
a defensible condition.

By night our patrols continued their activities, but each night on
approaching the enemy's lines were met with brisk machine-gun fire,
which showed increasing activity each day. The Battalion observers also
reported daily columns of smoke in rear of the enemy's lines, arising,
as was found subsequently, from the systematic orgy of destruction
in which the Germans indulged prior to their retirement. There was,
moreover, during these few days a very marked increase of shelling
in our back areas, the villages of Pommier, Berles, Bretencourt and
Bailleulmont all receiving an unusually large amount of heavy fire.

The 11th proved to be the most disturbed day of this tour of duty, the
enemy being exceedingly active in machine-gun and trench mortar fire.
About 100 light shells, of which many were gas, fell in Bienvillers,
fortunately without inflicting loss on the Battalion. On the 12th the
2/4th Londons were relieved by the 2/1st Londons and moved in Brigade
reserve to Pommier, where they continued training. The XVIII Corps
Commander inspected the Battalion on the 16th.

The Battalion Orderly Room now began to be inundated by the Brigade
Intelligence Staff with plans, maps and all kinds of collated
information as to the villages which would lie in the line of the
Division's expected advance. All preparations were made for an
immediate move. Units in reserve were held in instant readiness to
advance, their first line transport wagons standing ready packed.

The night of the 16th/17th March was unusually quiet, and patrols
pushed out by the 2/1st Londons about daybreak on the 17th returned
with the information that the German trenches about Monchy were
deserted. A patrol sent forward from the 2/4th Battalion under Capt.
Bottomley was able to penetrate into Monchy itself and returned about
midday with the definite assurance that the village was evacuated.

The same day the order was given for a general advance of the whole of
the British forces from Arras to Roye.

That afternoon the 173rd Brigade moved forward, the 2/1st Londons
occupying the German front line at Monchy and some high ground south
of the village, while the 2/4th Battalion was brought forward from
Brigade reserve, "leap-frogging" through the leading Battalion to the
German trenches east of the village. A Company pushed ahead and reached
a point about 300 yards west of Adinfer Wood. Here the Battalion was
in touch with the 6th South Staffords on the right. North of Monchy
village the 2/2nd Londons continued the line with the 174th Brigade on
their left.

The withdrawal of the Germans from the Monchy Salient involved a
continual shortening of our lines as the salient became straightened
out, and in order to effect this the 2/1st Londons were withdrawn on
the night of the 17th to Pommier, while the 2/4th Battalion continued
its advance, "squeezing-out" the 2/2nd Londons as it pushed forward. By
5 p.m. the following day it had reached a position near Rabbit Wood, a
small copse on the North side of Adinfer Wood, its left being now in
touch with the 175th Brigade while the 46th Division kept pace with its
advance on the right.

At midnight on the 18th/19th March the 2/4th Londons were withdrawn in
Brigade reserve to Ransart, which village was now occupied by Brigade
Headquarters. A few hours later, at 4.30 a.m. on the 19th, the 2/1st
Londons once more took up the advance towards Boiry-Becquerelle.

The advance of the 19th March covered a depth of nearly 10,000 yards,
and as it was achieved with very little fighting it seems evident that
the Germans' preparations for withdrawal had been conducted with great
skill. From the time when they had left their original line at Monchy
they had almost entirely eluded close touch with our pursuing columns,
which were never able to harass their retirement to any useful extent.
Very little war material fell into our hands, and it seems possible
that valuable hours were lost on the 17th before the order to follow up
the retirement reached battalions in the line.

The pursuit of the Germans was rendered exceedingly slow and arduous
by the unspeakable destruction which met our advancing columns at
every step. Cross roads had been mined and vast craters forced all
wheeled traffic to deviate on to the sodden fields adjoining. Trees
had been felled across the roads and added to the impediments to the
advance of our artillery. Everywhere the Germans had committed wanton
destruction--young fruit trees were ringed, crops were burnt wholesale,
and every sort of live stock had been driven before them in their
retreat. The aspect of the villages was most peculiar. At a distance
they appeared to be untouched, and the red roofs of the cottages showed
nothing unusual. On a closer approach, however, they were found to
be ruined and the walls knocked down so that the roofs had subsided
intact to the ground. Furniture, too heavy to be moved, had shared in
this destruction, and its débris was lying shattered among the heaps
of brick and stone. Yet further abominations had been invented, and
a series of ingenious "booby-traps" were discovered in the shape of
common articles such as shovels and helmets. These were left lying
about in places where they were likely to be picked up by our troops,
and being connected with bombs and even large mines caused explosions
when they were touched.

By noon on the 19th March the 2/1st Londons had established themselves
after some opposition from machine-gun fire on the line between
Boiry-Becquerelle and Boyelles, in touch with the 46th Division in
Hamelincourt; but further efforts to advance from this position towards
St Leger, which was the objective for the day, were effectually stopped
by heavy enemy shell and machine-gun fire.

Meanwhile the 2/4th Londons were once more moved forward, leaving
Ransart at about 3 p.m., and by 5.30 had advanced to the line of the
Boyelles-St Leger Railway on the right of the 2/1st Londons.

The 173rd Brigade now occupied the whole of the 58th Divisional
front, being in touch with the Division on its right and its left
joining the 30th Division who were facing Henin-sur-Cojeul. The line
occupied by the 2/4th and 2/1st Londons formed a marked re-entrant
in the British line, overlooking a valley which runs in a northerly
direction from St Leger to Henin-sur-Cojeul. The enemy had apparently
deployed on the further side of this valley and was holding the line
of the Henin-Croisilles Road. Opposite the right flank of the 2/4th
Londons he had for the moment considerable advantage of ground over us,
as our line was dominated by a hill which protected Croisilles from
observation. The following day the Brigade consolidated itself in this
position, Brigade Headquarters moving forward to Boiry-St Rictrude,
which was also occupied by the 2/3rd Londons in Brigade reserve, while
the 2/2nd Londons moved into close support in Boisleux-au-Mont.

The line held by the Brigade extended from Judas Farm near St Leger,
where it was in close touch with the Division on the right, in front of
Boyelles and Boiry-Becquerelle to the north branch of the Cojeul River.
North of the river the line was continued by the 30th Division, who
were endeavouring to force the villages of St Martin and Henin.

The Battalion had pushed outposts beyond its main line on the railway
to the Boiry-St Leger Road, but all attempts to continue the general
advance beyond this line were frustrated by the heavy machine-gun and
shell fire with which the enemy sprayed the forward slopes of the ridge
down which the advance was to be made. At the same time signs were not
wanting that his withdrawal had not reached its limit, for fires were
observed in Henin and Croisilles which indicated that the systematic
destruction which hitherto had been the prelude to his retirement was
proceeding with unabated vigour.

On the 21st the 2/4th Londons were relieved by the 2/3rd in the right
subsector and withdrew to Boiry-St Martin in reserve. For three days
the Battalion remained here under conditions of extreme discomfort. The
weather was exceptionally severe and the ground was covered with snow,
while the open and bare hillsides were swept by biting winds. Billets
were non-existent owing to the total destruction of the village, so
that the change from the front line to reserve brought very little of
rest or easier conditions. Indeed throughout this period of the advance
the terrible exposure proved a far more serious enemy than the Germans
themselves, and the casualties caused through it were five times more
numerous than those caused by wounds.

The Hindenburg line was now within measurable distance, and the salient
previously held by the enemy being almost entirely flattened out
it was found possible to withdraw several divisions now in action.
This was the more desirable not only for the provision of as many
reserve divisions as possible for the impending offensive against
the Vimy Ridge, but also for the tasks of rendering the devastated
region covered by the advance habitable to our forces, of repairing
the ruined roads, and of bringing forward the supplies of material
necessary for further operations. One of the important gains of the
advance was the reopening of direct lateral communication between Arras
and Albert. With their usual thoroughness the Germans had completely
destroyed the railway connecting these two towns, the track being torn
up and the bridges demolished; and the complete reconstruction of it
presented one of the most pressing necessities in the organisation of
the new defences.

The 58th Division, in accordance with this programme, was now
withdrawn, and on the 25th March the 173rd Brigade handed over its
sector to the 174th and withdrew to Pommier, the 2/4th Londons being
billeted at Monchy and put to work on repairing the roads.

Each Brigade of the Division now became split up and battalions and
companies were scattered far afield on one or other of the necessary
works, of which a few have been enumerated above.

On the 28th the 2/4th Londons moved further back from the line to
Grenas (on the Doullens-Arras Road) leaving behind it two companies, A
and C, which were attached to VII Corps troops (C Company joining the
56th Division) for road repairing at Wailly and Arras respectively.

At the end of the month the Division, now attached to XIX Corps, was
concentrated, with the exception of the detachments referred to, in the
area of Frohen-le-Grand, between Doullens and Auxi-le-Château, and on
the 1st April the 2/4th Battalion, less A and C Companies, marched to
fresh billets in Bonnières, continuing their route the following day to
Vitz Villeroy, some four miles west of Auxi-le-Château.

From the beginning of March the Battalion had experienced continual
rough handling, not only from enemy machine-gun and shell fire, but
also from the remarkable amount of marching and counter-marching and
exposure to the elements which the pursuit of the Germans had entailed.
It must also be borne in mind that they had a month previously been raw
troops of whom practically none had been under fire. The writer is,
therefore, with all the more pleasure able to testify to the excellent
bearing and strict march discipline of the Battalion as it swung
through Auxi-le-Château on the 2nd April. But if the 2/4th Battalion
expected rest after its labours it was soon to learn how illusive rest
can be in modern war, for the next day it returned to Auxi and embussed
to Beaumetz-les-Loges in the Arras area, when it once more took the
road and marched to Boiry-St Martin. Accommodation here was provided
for Headquarters and B Company in old German dugouts, while D Company
contented itself with temporary and hastily constructed shelters in the
village.

A week of hard work in laying new track on the Arras-Albert Railway
followed, and on the 12th the Battalion, having been rejoined by A and
C Companies, moved to Pommier and thence to Achiet-le-Grand, where the
remainder of the 173rd, now under command of Brig.-Gen. Freyberg, V.C.,
D.S.O., was concentrated.

The Division was now in the Fifth Army area (Gough) and attached to the
V Corps.

The remainder of April, with the exception of short spells of training,
was entirely devoted to working parties, the principal tasks entrusted
to the 2/4th Londons being the formation of a large R.E. dump at
Achiet-le-Grand, the construction of a light railway at Ervillers and
the repair of the Ervillers-St Leger Road.

During the period under review the Battalion received one or two small
reinforcements of N.C.O.'s and men, and also the following officers:

18th March--2/Lieuts. G. H. Hetley, C. A. Clarke, S. M.
Williams and G. E. Lester, and 2/Lieut. Acason (18th
Londons).

27th April--2/Lieut. S. A. Seys (15th Londons).

Casualties included Major W. A. Nunneley, gassed; 2/Lieut. R. K.
Caparn, wounded; 2/Lieuts. A. M. Duthie and S. P. Ferdinando,
accidentally wounded; 2/Lieuts. H. W. Hallett and G. G. Hunt, sick; and
in N.C.O.'s and men 10 killed, 25 wounded, and about 170 sick, chiefly
from exposure.

The duties of signalling officer were taken by 2/Lieut. E. C. Pratt.

In February the Battalion was unfortunate in losing 2/Lieut. C. J.
Graham, who joined Brigade Headquarters as Intelligence Officer. He
filled this appointment with great success until March 1918, when he
was appointed Brigade Major in the 47th Division. He was decorated with
the D.S.O. and the M.C. with Bar.

CHAPTER XIV

THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF ARRAS, 1917

Reverting now to the 1/4th Battalion, we have the task of recording its
part in the great battles of April and May 1917 which developed after
the German retirement, some account of which has been attempted in the
preceding chapter.

On transfer from the First Army area the 1/4th Battalion was billeted
at Le Souich late on the evening of the 10th March 1917. The following
day was Sunday and was observed as far as possible as a rest, and this
day the Battalion was joined by a reinforcement of officers, 2/Lieuts.
J. F. Elders, T. Caudwell, S. Minear, C. J. Reid and E. C. Hayes, all
attached from the Queen's Westminsters. On the 12th the Battalion
marched in drenching rain to Ivergny, the next village to Le Souich,
but on arrival the billets were found to be already occupied, and
orders were received to move a mile further on to Beaudricourt, which
village was reached about 4.30 p.m.

At Beaudricourt the Battalion settled down to a steady course of
company training in preparation for active operations. According to
the Battalion custom, whenever possible, the day's work was started
by Commanding Officer's parade, and the strictest attention was paid
to all points of parade discipline; while the drums beat Retreat each
evening in the village street. The training included a good deal
of route marching to harden the troops after their long sojourn in
trenches, practice attacks from trench to trench, and "specialist"
training, in the course of which every man in the Battalion received
the rudiments of instruction in the Lewis gun. The opportunity was
also taken to reorganise the companies in accordance with the then
newly-evolved scheme, which had the object of rendering the platoon
a self-contained fighting unit comprising only fighting ranks.
The four sections of the platoon were definitely organised as one
of Lewis gunners, one of riflemen, one of rifle-grenadiers and one
of bombers; and all administrative details in the company, such as
cooks, stretcher-bearers and company runners, were collected into a
"headquarter" section under the immediate supervision of the company
second in command.

The advantages of the new platoon organisation were evidenced by
practical demonstrations to the officers of the division of methods
of employing the various sections in co-operation with each other in
operations such as the capture of a strong point. These demonstrations
were given by a selected platoon of the Rangers, and Gen. Hull took the
opportunity of announcing to the assembled officers the rôle which it
was expected the Division would play in the coming attack.

In the latter part of March the Battalion lost three officers,
2/Lieuts. S. P. Stotter and R. W. Chamberlain to hospital, and Capt. F.
C. Grimwade seconded to VII Corps School as Instructor.

* * * * *

The intention of G.H.Q. for the offensive of 1917 was to deliver a
heavy blow against the German positions in the Scarpe-Ancre Salient
(see Map No. 9); and in conjunction with this, and in order to secure
the left flank of the attack, to wrest from the enemy his commanding
positions on the Vimy Ridge, whence excellent observation could be
obtained over the Plains of Douai. This scheme underwent considerable
modifications before it was put into operation, firstly to secure
closer co-operation with the French offensive on the Aisne; and
secondly by reason of the German Retirement of March 1917, which
altered the rôle of the Fifth Army and compelled them to re-establish
themselves in fresh positions facing the Hindenburg line.

The Hindenburg line in the vicinity of its junction with the original
German trench lines south-east of Arras being the centre of the
Battalion's operations in April and May, a reference to the map will be
of assistance to the reader in appreciating what follows. It will be
seen that the old trench systems (_i.e._ those held by the enemy until
March) crossed the valley of the Scarpe running southwards through the
eastern suburbs of Arras, as far as the Arras-Cambrai Road, and then
swinging south-westward followed the valley of the Crinchon River.
These trenches consisted of two main systems about 2000 yards apart,
the village of Beaurains being incorporated into the first system
and that of Tilloy-les-Mofflaines into the second, with Mercatel and
Neuville-Vitasse in rear of the second system. About three-quarters
of a mile south of Tilloy was Telegraph Hill, the line between being
strengthened by the enormously fortified redoubt known as The Harp.
From the southern extremity of The Harp the new Hindenburg line (or
rather system of trenches) struck off south-eastward, including
Neuville-Vitasse, crossing the valley of the Cojeul River between St
Martin and Heninel and passing thence between Croisilles and Fontaine.
Between the west side of the Cojeul valley and the Scarpe at Fampoux
was a "switch" line known as the Wancourt line, which crossed the
Cambrai Road just east of Feuchy Chapel.

The task originally allotted to the 56th Division was the capture of
Beaurains and Telegraph Hill.

* * * * *

The 169th Brigade which had left the Neuve Chapelle area in advance
of the remainder of the Division had been placed in line at Agny,
opposite Beaurains, and to this point the commanding officers of the
168th Brigade proceeded on the 17th March to make the preliminary
reconnaissance for the attack. But the following day it was found that
Beaurains was clear of enemy and was already occupied by the 169th
Brigade who were following up energetically. The reconnaissance being
no longer required the party returned to billets pending further orders.

On the 18th Lieut.-Col. A. E. Maitland, M.C. (Essex Regiment), was
appointed to command the Battalion, and on the 23rd the Division moved
forward into a concentration area in rear of Arras, the Battalion
marching from Beaudricourt at 9.30 a.m. and arriving in billets at
Beaumetz-les-Loges at 4.30 p.m. At Beaumetz the Battalion resumed its
training programme though the whole Brigade was held at short notice
to move in view of the possible further development of the enemy's
withdrawal.

It is worth while pausing for a moment to consider the extraordinary
achievement of G.H.Q. in delivering the Arras-Vimy Ridge attack as it
did on the 9th April. The preparations were on similar lines to those
for the Somme offensive of the previous July, and were on an even
vaster scale owing to the increased number of the divisions which it
was proposed to employ and to the ever-growing strength and weight of
the British artillery. The preliminary work of forming reinforcement
and concentration camps, laying fresh and increasing the capacity of
existing railway lines, arranging for water supply, dumps of munitions
and _matériel_, establishment of hospitals and the hundred and one
other essential tasks had been steadily proceeding since the close of
the Somme offensive in November 1916.

Imagine, then, the inevitable dislocation of the scheme when, a
comparatively few days before the attack was to be delivered, the
enemy suddenly withdrew on part of the front from the positions it
had been intended to assault and betook himself within fortified
lines of enormous strength to the rear. Dumps, railheads, hospitals,
water-supply, concentration areas, guns, heavy siege and light, all
had to be pushed forward to fresh and rapidly selected positions in an
area which had been laid waste with all the fiendish skill of which a
resourceful enemy was capable, and all the consequent modifications of
objectives and orders effected at the shortest possible notice. Not
only was this achieved, but it was achieved with such efficiency as to
produce on the 9th April the most striking single-day success which had
crowned the British Armies since the outbreak of the War.

The Battalion was soon called on for its share in this "moving forward"
process of the preparations for battle, and on the 28th March it
marched with the remainder of the Brigade to positions in the old
British trench system opposite Beaurains, where for three days it
was engaged in supplying working parties. On the 1st April it was
withdrawn to Brigade reserve in Achicourt where it found comfortable
billets. A very large number of British heavy batteries were in action
here registering and wire-cutting for the coming battle, and the
continuous din of our own guns was trying. The shells of one battery of
60-pounders firing from just in rear of the Headquarters billet cleared
the roof of the house by about 18 inches.

In the meantime the pursuit of the Germans had been maintained by the
56th Division, which with the 21st and 30th on its right and the 14th
on its left comprised the VII Corps (D'Oyly Snow). A relief had been
effected on the 1st April, the 168th and 167th Brigades taking over the
Divisional sector from the 169th which was withdrawn to reserve. By the
2nd April, the Germans having reached the Hindenburg system, the line
became stabilised, and no further important alteration occurred until
the day of battle. When the Battalion took over the advanced trenches
from the Rangers on the 3rd, therefore, the positions which they
occupied formed practically the "start-line" for the 9th April.

The 56th Division occupied a salient of which the north-eastern face
was on the Beaurains-Neuville-Vitasse Road, and the south-eastern face
lay opposite the north-west corner of Neuville-Vitasse. On this side
the British positions had been pushed forward in the direction of
Neuville-Vitasse and posts were held in the old German communication
trenches leading back to the village.

This sector was held by the Battalion with three companies in the
front line and one in reserve in a system known as the Circular Work
south-east of Beaurains. It will be readily appreciated that as the
advanced British positions were outposts in different communication
trenches it was necessary in order to provide a good jumping-off line
for the battle to connect these up by continuous trenches to form a
front line, to supply that front line with support lines and feed it
with fresh communication trenches. Clearly a good deal of digging was
necessary in a very short space of time, and the Battalion was heavily
engaged in this work during its tour of duty, which lasted until
the 7th April. The principal trenches dug were Deodar, Poplar, Lime,
Elm and Skin in the front system, and Gun, How and New Battery as
communication trenches.

On the 4th April the British destructive bombardment began and
continued daily according to a prearranged programme until the day of
battle. This met with comparatively little retaliation.

On the 7th an inter-battalion relief was effected, the Battalion
vacating the line in favour of the Kensingtons and Rangers who were
respectively detailed as right and left assaulting battalions. The
London Scottish moved to the old British line at Agny while the 1/4th
Londons returned to dugouts in the railway cutting at Achicourt. The
following day battle positions were occupied, the London Scottish
moving forward to close support in rear of the Kensingtons, and the
1/4th Londons to Brigade reserve in the Circular Work.

The Division's objectives for the 9th April were as follows:

The 168th (left) and 167th (right) Brigades were to advance through
Neuville-Vitasse to the first objective which was an arbitrary line
(the Blue line) skirting the east edge of the village and facing the
Hindenburg system. (_Note._--The Hindenburg line between Telegraph Hill
and the Cojeul River was known as the Cojeul Switch.) This first phase
was entrusted in the 168th to the Kensingtons and Rangers, the latter
battalion on the left being prepared to adopt special measures and form
a defensive flank facing north should the 14th Division be checked at
Telegraph Hill.

After a pause on this objective of about four and a half hours the
London Scottish (168th) and 1st Londons (167th) were to "leapfrog"
through the leading troops and carry the Cojeul Switch, the Scottish
objectives being Back, Card and Telegraph Hill trenches (north of
the Neuville-Vitasse-Wancourt Road). Here a further pause was to be
made, after which the third phase of the battle would be taken up by
the 167th Brigade, who would advance, covering the whole Divisional
frontage on to the Wancourt line (Brown line).

To return to the 1/4th Battalion. The day spent in Achicourt prior to
manning battle positions produced the first serious German retaliation
to our bombardment. As already remarked Achicourt was "stiff" with
batteries and also contained a very extensive and important ammunition
dump. Doubtless the Bosche decided that the quickest way to silence
our guns was to destroy their supplies of shell, and from 11.30 a.m.
until 5 p.m. he bombarded the village, causing a good many casualties
in the Battalion and firing several houses which formed part of the
dump. The village square, moreover, was packed with lorries loaded
with shell waiting to move forward with the batteries, and unluckily
the enemy obtained some direct hits on these. For some time the flying
fragments rendered the place remarkably unhealthy. Excellent work was
done in saving two lorries by Major H. Campbell of the Kensingtons. He
well earned his D.S.O. by driving two of the blazing lorries out of the
square into a place of safety.

The battle positions occupied that night by the Battalion were as
follows:

A Company (Lorden)--New Battery Trench.
C " (Bowater)--Southend and Margate Trenches.
D " (Spiers)--Astride the Neuville-Vitasse Road in
Battery and New Battery Trenches.
Battalion Headquarters--In North End (Circular Work).
B Company (Stanbridge)--Attached as "moppers-up" to the
Kensingtons.

The role of the Battalion was laid down to provide for various
eventualities that might arise according to the degree of success
achieved by the assaulting battalions, and it was therefore held in
readiness either to assist the Rangers in forming a defensive flank in
case of failure by the division on the left, or to lend weight to the
Scottish attack on the Cojeul Switch.

At 5.30 a.m. on the 9th April, after a hurricane bombardment of the
German lines, the British barrage lifted and the attack began. The
advance of the 56th Division was deferred until two hours later to
allow the 14th Division, whose start-line was less advanced, to come
into line, and accordingly at 7.30 a.m. the Rangers and Kensingtons
moved to the assault, followed by B Company of the 1/4th Londons who
were equipped with Stokes mortar shells for dealing with deep dugouts.

B Company's job in mopping-up proved easier than had been expected, for
the German trench garrisons had been confined to their deep dugouts
for some days by the intensity of our bombardment, and the resultant
difficulties with which they had been faced in getting their rations
and water up from the rear made them on the whole not undisposed to
surrender; and in a short time the Battalion, in Brigade reserve, was
cheered by the sight of bodies of German prisoners marching in fours
down the road to Beaurains in a dazed and exhausted condition.

By 9.30 a.m. the Blue line on the whole of the Brigade front was in our
hands, and its consolidation was at once put in hand by the assaulting
troops with assistance from the 512th Company R.E. and a company of the
Cheshire Pioneers. At 11.20 a.m. the Scottish moved forward on a three
company front to attack the Cojeul Switch. Their advance was met with
heavy machine-gun fire, and although one company succeeded in gaining
Back Trench, the furthest of the three lines forming the Cojeul Switch,
and in pushing patrols beyond it, the battalion was forced ultimately
to fall back to Telegraph Hill Trench, the front line of the Switch
System and that nearest to Neuville-Vitasse.

At 12.30 p.m. the 1/4th Londons were ordered to advance to fresh
positions on the western edge of Neuville-Vitasse, where they came
under the orders of the 167th Brigade. The move was completed by 4 p.m.
with A Company in Tree, C in Leaf and D in Pine; B Company (still under
the orders of the Kensingtons) having by now withdrawn to reorganise in
Deodar Lane after their fight.

As reports of the attack on the Cojeul Switch came in it became clear
that a gap existed between the London Scottish and the 7th Middlesex,
who had advanced to the assistance of the 1st Londons on their right,
and at 5 p.m. Brigade ordered the Battalion forward to fill this gap.
The three available companies moved forward at once, but on emerging
from Neuville-Vitasse it was found that touch had been regained by
the Scottish and the Middlesex, and the companies therefore took up a
position on the eastern edge of the village in support to the Middlesex.

In the meantime the third phase of the attack, namely, the advance of
the 167th Brigade to the Wancourt line, had been definitely checked
by machine-gun fire, as had also that of the 14th Division on the
left; so that the day's fighting ended with the 14th Division in
possession of Telegraph Hill and The Harp, and the northern end of
the Cojeul Switch; the 56th occupying the Cojeul Switch astride the
Neuville-Vitasse-Wancourt Road; and the 30th on the right approaching
the Wancourt line in the vicinity of the Neuville-Vitasse-Henin Road--a
very substantial advance for the day.

The 168th Brigade captures for the day amounted to 5 officers and
635 other ranks, all of the 163rd R. I. Regt., 9 machine-guns, 2
granatenwerfer, 1 minenwerfer, and 2 heavy trench mortars, together
with large quantities of small arms and ammunition.

In the evening the Battalion was rejoined by B Company, and Battalion
Headquarters advanced to a dugout in rear of the start-line for the
day. The night was marked by bombing operations in the Cojeul Switch
which had the wholesome effect of clearing out the few remaining
pockets of Bosche, and by 7.30 a.m. on the 10th touch had been gained
with the 14th Division on the left, while the 56th Division's right
had been extended further south and the London Scottish had possessed
themselves of the whole of the Back-Card-Telegraph Hill system.

A remarkable instance of initiative on the part of a private soldier,
which occurred on the night of the 9th April, is worth recording. Pte.
Turner, a runner of D Company, lost his company and strayed into the
German line. Finding a dugout entrance he began to descend the stairs,
when he heard voices; and as the owners of the voices were evidently
Huns he announced his arrival by throwing a Mills bomb down the dugout.
The occupants apparently thought they were outnumbered and promptly
gave themselves up to the number of 1 officer and 16 other ranks.
Turner marshalled his bag in a shell hole outside, and the next morning
was found with them, all apparently quite content to be under the
leadership of one British private, outside Neuville-Vitasse. Turner's
coolness was rewarded with the Military Medal.

Early on the 10th the weather, which had hitherto been cold and wet,
became yet worse and the landscape was soon white with snow, from which
trenches and shell holes gave no protection.

Immediate arrangements were made by VII Corps to complete the previous
day's objectives, and an attack on the Wancourt line was delivered at
noon, the 56th Division attack being entrusted to the 167th Brigade.
During this attack the 1/4th Londons remained in support and withdrew
to their former position in the trenches on the western edge of
Neuville-Vitasse.

The assault of the 10th April was only partly successful on the Corps
front, but the pressure was maintained on the 11th. By noon on that
day the 56th Division, whose advance had developed into a flank attack
along the Hindenburg line, had cleared the Cojeul Switch as far south
as the Cojeul River and occupied the villages of Wancourt and Heninel.

While these successes had been gained south of the Scarpe an equally
striking victory had been gained north of the river where the XVII
Corps (Fergusson) of the Third Army and the Canadians (Byng) and 1
Corps (Holland) of the First Army had swept the enemy from his long
established positions on the Vimy Ridge to the plain east of it, and
had sensibly tightened our grip on the mining area of Lens.

Preparations were at once made to follow up this very striking success,
and VII Corps issued orders for the advance to be resumed on the 14th
over the watershed dividing the Cojeul valley from that of the Sensée.
The 13th was therefore devoted to preparations for this attack, in
forming advanced dumps and moving forward batteries, and the 168th
Brigade was placed under orders to advance at short notice, though no
actual move occurred during the day.

On the 14th April the enemy barrage was much heavier than it had
been on the 9th, and under a murderous fire the 169th Brigade,
which attacked on the 56th Division's front, was forced after some
initial success back to its start-line. That night the 168th Brigade
was ordered forward to form a defensive flank in the Cojeul Switch
facing north-east, and accordingly the 1/4th Battalion moved after
dark from the Back-Card-Telegraph Hill area, which they had occupied
earlier in the day, to relieve the Queen's Westminsters on the right
of the advanced line, with the London Scottish on their left and the
Kensingtons and Rangers respectively in support and reserve.

The relief was completed by 4 a.m. on the 15th with the exception of an
advanced post pushed well down the forward slope of the valley towards
Heninel. This was allotted to two platoons of B Company, but owing to
the complete devastation of the area, and the absence of landmarks,
the guides detailed to these platoons failed to find the post, and its
relief had to be postponed until the following evening.

The Battalion now experienced another change of command, and
Lieut.-Col. Maitland having fallen sick it was taken over by Major H.
Campbell, D.S.O., attached from the Kensingtons to command with the
acting rank of Lieut.-Col. as from the 12th April.

The 15th proved to be a day of inaction, though the enemy's artillery
was continuously active over the whole Battalion area. No further
advance was attempted on the 16th and no action occurred during the
early hours of the day, with the exception of a local counter-attack
by the enemy, directed against the 50th Division on our left, in the
course of which he managed to re-establish himself on the ridge in the
vicinity of Wancourt Tower.

During the afternoon the hostile shelling slackened considerably,
but at about 4.30 p.m. warning was received that he was preparing a
counter-attack in force, and at 7.30 a barrage of terrific intensity
fell on the Battalion's trenches. The front line companies in
accordance with the prearranged scheme of defence at once cleared the
advanced trenches and pushed forward Lewis gun sections about 60
yards into No Man's Land in order to smash up any attack that might be
delivered. By this time darkness was gathering and movement becoming
hard to detect. At about 8 o'clock, however, the enemy was observed
advancing in close formation to the attack. Our Lewis guns at once
opened fire and were magnificently supported by the artillery. The
attack was completely smashed and no German reached our lines. The
enemy barrage continued without abatement for about an hour, during
which the whole Battalion area was effectively searched and a great
many casualties caused. By 9 p.m., however, the bombardment slackened,
and after a few hours of desultory shelling died out altogether.

During the evening the sector held by the London Scottish was also
subjected to severe shelling but no infantry action occurred, and it
was evident that the whole weight of the attack had fallen on the 1/4th
Londons' sector. The heaps of German dead which were visible in No
Man's Land on the following day bore striking testimony to the accuracy
of the Battalion's Lewis gun fire.

During the attack excellent work was done under heavy fire by the
medical officer, Capt. Havard, R.A.M.C., and the medical orderlies.
The Aid Post was merely a corrugated iron shed built in the side of a
sunken road and afforded no cover from the shell splinters which were
flying in all directions.

The 17th April passed without incident on the Battalion's front, though
on the left the 50th Division recaptured Wancourt Tower, the possession
of which gave us complete command of the high ground between the Cojeul
and the Sensée. That evening an inter-battalion relief took place, the
Rangers relieving the 1/4th Londons and the Kensingtons taking over
from the London Scottish. The relief of A Company had, however, to be
postponed until the following night owing to the approach of daylight.

On relief the Battalion withdrew to deep dugouts in the Cojeul Switch
about 800 yards west of Heninel. These were large and well constructed,
and accommodated the whole Battalion underground without overcrowding.
The strength of the position was enormous, and it seemed a matter for
congratulation that the British attack had succeeded in dislodging the
former occupants with comparatively so little opposition. It pointed
to the fact that no well-defined earthwork defence is in the long-run
proof against an attack delivered by well-trained troops supported by
tanks and a sufficient weight of heavy artillery; and indeed, as will
be seen later, the capture of "pillboxes" and scattered shell hole
defences proved a greater obstacle in the third Battle of Ypres later
in the summer.

The 56th Division was now withdrawn to Corps reserve; and after
spending a day in the dugouts the Battalion was relieved on the
afternoon of the 19th by the 16th Manchesters (30th Division),
withdrawing after relief to billets in Arras.

Although the opening phases of the offensive involved the Battalion
in comparatively little fighting, it had been continuously engaged in
the general rough-and-tumble of shell holes and subjected to fairly
continuous shell fire since the opening of the battle. Its losses
during this period amounted in officers to: 2/Lieut. T. Siddall,
killed; 2/Lieuts. P. Pyne and L. W. N. Jones, wounded; Rev. S. F.
Leighton Green, C.F., wounded at duty.

The battle had now completely achieved its object as originally
conceived by G.H.Q. The enemy was dislodged from the high ground on a
wide front, and the resultant change of positions afforded our troops
advantages of observation and drier foothold; and had Sir Douglas Haig
been a free agent he would at once have transferred his intentions to
the northern area, where he was desirous of launching his Messines and
Ypres offensives. In deference to the needs of our Allies, however, it
was necessary to keep the Germans active without respite on the Arras
front to which they had already drawn large reserves, and this was the
more important in view of the ghastly collapse of the Russian Empire
and the consequent liberation of enemy troops for the Western Front.
Active operations were, therefore, pursued for some time longer on the
Arras front, though perhaps they should not strictly be regarded as
part of the Battle of Arras.

After the withdrawal of the 56th Division from the line, fighting broke
out again on a wide front both sides of the Scarpe on the 23rd April,
and continued with bitterness until the 26th though with comparatively
little success. Some progress was made on both sides of the Cojeul
River, and the village of Guémappe added to the British gains.

The 19th April was the occasion of the Battalion's first visit to
Arras, with which town it became so intimately connected in the later
stages of the War. At this date the town was not seriously damaged
although it had lain a short two miles from the German lines for
over two years, and with the exception of the railway station and
its immediate vicinity was still quite healthy for reserve billets.
The Battalion was accommodated in the barracks of the Citadel, which
formed a welcome change from sixteen days of shell holes and dugouts.
On the 21st the Battalion embussed for Bayencourt where it encamped
in the Coigneux valley. Two days were occupied here in resting and
reorganising, and advantage was taken by all ranks during leisure hours
of the opportunity to revisit the Battalion's old haunts at Hébuterne
and to cross unmolested to Gommecourt Park. On the 24th the Battalion
moved at short notice to Gouy-en-Artois, arriving in billets there at 8
p.m. While at Gouy the Battalion was inspected by the Brigadier-General.

The 56th Division was now once more placed under orders for the line,
this time in the VI Corps area, the sector held by the 15th Division
being taken over by the 167th Brigade on the 29th April. The 168th
Brigade, being once again in Divisional reserve, moved from Gouy to
Simencourt on the 27th April, and on the following day into Arras,
where preparations for further active operations were made in billets.
The few days in Arras were much enlivened by the excellent show given
by the Bow Bells in Arras Theatre.

The impending operation was to be an attempt to break through the
enemy's defences on a large scale, the Fifth, Third and First Armies
all being employed on a front from Fontaine-lez-Croisilles through
Chérisy and St Rohart Factory to a point north of Plouvain. The VI
Corps, consisting of the 3rd and 56th Divisions in line, took up the
frontage from the Scarpe to the Cojeul River, the 56th Division's
objective being on a line running north and south between St Rohart
Factory on the Arras-Cambrai Road and the Bois du Vert.

The sector now held by the Division was about 1000 yards east of
Guémappe and Monchy-le-Preux and lay sidelong on the spurs and side
valleys descending to the Cojeul River. The enemy's defences were far
more difficult to cope with on this occasion than on the 9th April.
The Hindenburg and Wancourt lines had been passed; the Drocourt-Quéant
line was still far ahead; and the intervening area which was now
to be attacked was intersected in all directions by short isolated
trench lines in the siting of which the enemy had displayed his usual
skill in the use of ground. His defences, disposed in great depth,
were strengthened by large numbers of machine-guns cunningly placed
for mutual support in sunken roads and shell holes. It was known,
however, that the deep dugouts of the Hindenburg line did not exist in
this area, and it was hoped that a heavy and continuous bombardment
beforehand would sufficiently reduce his numbers and morale to give
success to the British infantry.

The 56th Division attack was to be carried out by the 167th and 169th
Brigades, the 168th being relegated to reserve, though available for
the assistance of either assaulting brigade as occasion might arise.

The Battalion remained in Arras until the 2nd May when, warning being
received that "zero" for the attack was fixed for 3.45 a.m., the
following day it moved at 4 p.m. to assembly in The Harp. In order to
secure close co-operation between the Brigades, 2/Lieut. O. D. Garratt
was attached to the 169th Headquarters as liaison officer.

The night of the 2nd May was fine and cold, though the early hours
were misty, and at 3.40 a.m. on the 3rd when our bombardment increased
to hurricane intensity it was still almost dark. At this hour the
Battalion stood to, and the vivid flashes of the guns and the streams
of S.O.S. signals from the enemy lines showed that inferno had broken
loose, and the attack had begun. The British barrage was good, but the
enemy was evidently expecting the attack as his counter-barrage was
quick and his machine-gun fire devastating in volume and accuracy.

The 3rd May was a day of great disappointment all along the line, and
comparatively little success was achieved. The 169th Brigade were
held up by a German strong post in Cavalry Farm and, after occupying
a precarious position between it and the river for some hours, were
forced back by a heavy counter-attack to their original line. The 167th
Brigade was also unable to progress.

It seems clear that zero hour was too early. In the darkness it was
impossible for the troops to see visual signals of command, and the
delay caused by having to pass messages down the line owing to the din
of the bombardment resulted in the attacking waves moving off zig-zag
in shape with officers at the advanced points. In such a formation they
became an easy target for the enemy machine-guns. Some greater success
might, moreover, have been achieved had the creeping barrage moved
forward more quickly, which would have been quite possible in view of
the comparatively unbroken state of the ground.

Early in the day the 1/4th Londons had moved forward to positions
in shell holes at Airy Corner, near Feuchy Chapel, and at 8.30 p.m.
the Battalion, now definitely at the disposal of the 169th Brigade,
received orders to advance to positions in the Wancourt line just
south of the Arras-Cambrai Road. This move was followed by another at
11 p.m., which brought the Battalion into close support of the front
line in Tank Trench, apparently in anticipation of a further German
counter-attack. The forward movement was made under a very heavy
gas shell bombardment, but gas helmets were worn and practically no
casualties were suffered. Shortly after arrival in the new position the
enemy shelling slackened, and as no further action appeared imminent
the Battalion was once more withdrawn to the Wancourt line, the move
again being made in gas helmets. A move of 8000 yards in the dark with
respirators is no easy matter to troops laden with battle equipment,
and the men were somewhat exhausted on regaining the reserve position.
A few hours' rest, however, put them to rights, and at 3 p.m. on the
4th the Battalion was again under orders to move forward. The losses
of the 167th and 169th Brigades on the previous day were so severe
that immediate relief was necessary for them, and the 168th Brigade
therefore took over the whole Divisional front; the Battalion relieving
the Queen Victorias and Queen's Westminsters in the subsector between
the Arras-Cambrai Road and the Cojeul River, with the London Scottish
on its left.

[Illustration: CAVALRY FARM, MAY 1917]

The sector was occupied with two companies (C and D) in the front
line and two (A and B) in support, Headquarters occupying a dugout on
the hillside between Guémappe and Wancourt. The relief was completed
without incident at 2.30 a.m. on the 5th May. The enemy evidently
anticipated a renewal of our attack for throughout the day the lines
were subjected to heavy shelling. Some doubt existed as to whether the
enemy still remained in occupation of Cavalry Farm and of Tool Trench
to the north of it, and as no movement was visible two daylight patrols
were sent out in the afternoon to investigate. These patrols managed
to gain the edge of Cavalry Farm, where they drew sharp rifle fire
from the enemy which caused some loss; and their object being gained
the patrols withdrew bringing their casualties with them. At about
10 p.m. the enemy's bombardment increased to a heavy barrage, which
was especially severe on the sector held by the 14th Division on the
right of the river, and it seemed likely that an enemy attack was in
preparation. The 14th Division indeed called for artillery support, and
this was promptly supplied by our artillery, which opened a terrific
barrage on the enemy lines. After an artillery duel of about two hours
the shelling on both sides slackened. The 6th and 7th May were both
marked by heavy shelling, which on the part of the enemy seemed mostly
to be directed towards searching for our battery positions in rear,
though some loss was caused to the Battalion, and 2/Lieuts. Reid and
Caudwell were killed, and 2/Lieut. Hutchins wounded, with several
N.C.O.'s and men killed and wounded by stray shells.

On the night of the 7th May the Battalion handed over its sector to the
Rangers and withdrew to the old German trench system north of Wancourt,
Headquarters being accommodated in Marlière Caves. In this position the
Battalion remained a couple of days, during which the enemy's shell
fire continued at intervals but without causing serious damage.

The attack of the 3rd May was the last general attack on the Arras
front, and subsequent operations were confined to local enterprises up
and down the line with the object of improving and rounding off the
positions gained. On the Divisional front a minor operation of this
sort was immediately necessary in clearing up the situation at Cavalry
Farm and Tool Trench, and the 1/4th Londons and London Scottish were
detailed to capture these positions.

The Battalion moved into the line for this attack on the evening of the
10th May.

The objectives allotted to it were Cavalry Farm and the trench
south-east of it, and Tool Trench for a frontage of 250 yards north of
the Cambrai Road; while the London Scottish were to extend the attack
on Tool Trench for a further 600 yards to the north and also capture
a small copse on the extreme left. The attack was to be made in each
battalion on a two company front, each company advancing in two waves
on a front of two platoons. One company of the Rangers was attached to
the 1/4th Londons and one of Kensingtons to the Scottish.

For two days previous to the 11th, which was fixed for the operation,
the Divisional artillery had been carrying out destructive bombardments
with 4·5-inch howitzers on the objectives as well as on the
communication trenches leading to the rear and on the portion of Tool
Trench outside the limits of attack. On the evening of the 10th a
practice 18-pr. barrage was placed on the objectives, but the enemy
reply was so efficient that it was decided to conduct the assault
without any increase in our normal artillery activity and to endeavour
to carry the operation through as a surprise.

At 8.30 p.m. on the 11th May the assaulting waves moved forward, the
1/4th Londons' attack led by D Company (H. N. Williams) on the right
of the road and A Company (Lorden) on the left, with B (Beeby) and C
(Rees) Companies in support. The surprise effect was excellent, and was
heightened by the fact that all the objectives except the Farm itself
were hidden from our trenches by a slight spur which here drops down to
the Cojeul River. The enemy had thus, in the absence of a barrage, no
warning of the attack, and in a few minutes the whole of the objectives
were captured. Few prisoners were taken, but a party of about fifty of
the enemy, fleeing from Cavalry Farm, were caught by our Lewis guns and
annihilated. Lewis gun posts were at once pushed forward into No Man's
Land, and the consolidation of the captured trench begun. So quickly
had all this happened that the enemy artillery opening in response
to an S.O.S. sent up from their lines was harmless to the leading
companies, though it inflicted some loss on the support companies which
were moving up to our vacated front line.

The consolidation of the captured position was aided by the Cheshire
Pioneers, who completed before dawn a communication trench connecting
Cavalry Trench with the new front line.

In the early hours of the 12th May the line was thinned out and only a
sufficient garrison left in the captured position to hold it against
counter-attack, the surplus platoons being withdrawn to the old
line. After some hours the German barrage subsided and we were left
in undisputed possession of our capture. This neat little operation
cost but few casualties considering the advantages gained, and the
completeness of the surprise is illustrated by an incident which
occurred early the following morning. One of our advanced Lewis gun
posts, hearing movement in front, challenged. A reply being received
in German, fire was opened. Two of the team went forward to collect
the bag and found a German officer shot dead and a Sergt.-Major badly
wounded. The maps which were taken from the officer's case showed some
of our battery positions accurately, and it appears that this luckless
pair were coming forward to Cavalry Farm to "spot" for a German
artillery shoot, ignorant of the fact that it was in our hands.

The Battalion continued to occupy its new line until the evening of
the 13th May, when the 168th Brigade was relieved by the 167th. The
Battalion handed over its sector to the 1/3rd Londons and withdrew to a
reserve position on the Cambrai Road near Tilloy, arriving there in the
early hours of the 14th May. The following day a further move was made
to billets in Arras.

After the Brigade's withdrawal from the line its gains were extended
on the 18th and 19th by successful local operations carried out by the
167th Brigade, who completed the captures of the north end of Tool
Trench and also parts of Hook and Long Trenches adjoining it.

On the 19th May the 168th Brigade moved still further back to rest
billets in Berneville, and two days later the whole Division was
withdrawn, with Divisional Headquarters at Warlus.

During May the Battalion received the following officer reinforcements:

Lieuts. E. P. M. Mosely and A. S. Ford.

2/Lieuts. L. W. Archer and H. T. Hannay (commissioned from the
ranks of the Battalion).

2/Lieut. F. Barnes (20th Londons).

2/Lieuts. H. V. Coombes, N. Nunns, H. E. Jackman and W. G. Port
(21st Londons).

2/Lieut. S. A. Gray (23rd Londons).

Capt. Maloney, R.A.M.C., vice Havard to London Field Ambulance.

During the same period 2/Lieut. Wreford was wounded and Lieut. P. F.
Smalley evacuated to hospital.

The Battalion remained in rest for about three weeks, which were
officially occupied in training and reorganisation. The actual training
was, however, reduced to the minimum, and the Battalion's really
serious duty became that of training for Battalion and Brigade sports,
and the relaxation which these provided combined with the determination
with which all ranks strove to gain physical fitness for the purpose
of the sports was undoubtedly quite as valuable as hours spent on the
parade ground. On the 23rd the Brigade was paraded for inspection by
Gen. Hull, who presented ribands to those who had been decorated in the
recent operations.

The following day the Battalion moved from Berneville to fresh billets
in Simencourt, where the routine of training and recreation proceeded.
Early in June the 56th Division returned to the line, the 168th Brigade
moving to Montenescourt on the 11th and to Achicourt on the following
day.

Eight days later the 168th Brigade relieved the 169th in the line, the
Battalion moving into left support positions at Wancourt, where it
relieved the 1/2nd Londons. Here the Battalion remained for five days
supplying working parties chiefly in connection with the construction
of new communication trenches to connect up the recently gained advance
posts with the front line, and in connecting up the posts themselves
to form a new front line. These days passed without incident beyond a
certain amount of enemy shelling and trench mortar fire, and on the
evening of the 26th June the Battalion moved forward to relieve the
Kensingtons in the front line system, its right flank resting on the
Cojeul River, where it joined the London Scottish, and its left flank
about 800 yards north of the Arras-Cambrai Road in Hook Trench. This
relief was completed by 1.30 a.m. on the 27th, and the sector was held
with three companies in front line and one in reserve.

This tour of duty passed without important incident though the enemy's
artillery exhibited some activity, principally against the back areas
in the neighbourhood of Wancourt. On the 1st July hostile aircraft
were especially active, making many unsuccessful attempts to pass the
barrage of the British anti-aircraft batteries. This unusual anxiety of
the German airmen to cross our lines was possibly due to the presence
in the Arras area of H.M. the King, who was then visiting the troops in
France and staying at Bavencourt Château on the Arras-Doullens Road.

That evening at 11 p.m. the 6th Queens of the 12th Division took over
the portion of the Battalion's sector lying to the north of the Cambrai
Road, and the following evening the remainder of the sector was handed
over to the 5th Borders of the 50th Division, the Battalion withdrawing
on relief to billets in Achicourt, which it reached at 5 a.m. on the
3rd July.

The part of the 56th Division in the Arras fighting was now finished,
and the Division was withdrawn into Corps reserve for a welcome rest.
The fighting on the Hindenburg line was practically over, though we
shall have further reference to make to it in connection with the 2/4th
Battalion in another chapter.

The weeks of battle had placed a great strain on the Battalion. Long
marches to and from the line, shell hole bivouacs, heavy working
parties, bad weather and severe shelling had all had their effect, and
a period of rest and reorganisation was needed.

At 9.30 a.m. on the 4th July the 168th Brigade embussed for the Le
Cauroy area, in which it had trained a year previously prior to
occupying the Hébuterne trenches. The Battalion was allotted billets in
Denier where it entered on a short period of rest and reorganisation
in which the training was interspersed with the various rounds of the
Brigade boxing competition, the finals of which were held on the 15th
July.

In June Lieut. H. Jones was seconded to VI Corps School as Instructor;
Capt. V. S. Bowater was evacuated to hospital; and 2/Lieut. C. W.
Denning joined the Battalion, being posted to the 168th L.T.M. Battery
early in July; 2/Lieuts. L. W. Wreford and A. C. Knight rejoined the
Battalion in July.

The Division was now warned of an impending move to another theatre of
activity, and this move occurred on the 23rd, when the Division left
the VII Corps to join the Fifth Army in the Ypres Salient.

CHAPTER XV

THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES FOR BULLECOURT, 1917

We must now follow the battles which had been fought during the latter
part of the German retirement south of the area covered by the battles
of Arras.

All along the line the German retreat had been conducted steadily and
with marked success on to the Hindenburg line. Although on the whole
the retreat in the south had not been accompanied by heavy fighting,
the attempts of our troops to push forward and define rigidly the
Hindenburg system had met with resistance which had developed here and
there into fighting of the most desperate character. Nowhere had these
local conflagrations been more fierce than in the line of retreat to
Bullecourt. In this sector the retiring enemy was opposed by Australian
troops, who together with the 7th and 62nd (and later the 58th)
Divisions composed Gough's Fifth Army.

A successful advance on 2nd April in this region was followed
by an attempt by the Australians on the 12th to carry the line
Bullecourt-Lagnicourt, but without success owing to the inadequacy
of the supporting artillery fire. Severe fighting ensued, and a
counter-attack of a serious nature by the Germans on the 15th was
ultimately held.

On the 3rd May the Australians' efforts met with more success, and they
were able to penetrate the Hindenburg system on the immediate right of
Bullecourt. The 62nd Division on their left, however, were unable to
progress in the village itself, with the result that the ground held by
the Australians formed a salient badly enfiladed both from the village
and from the direction of Quéant.

The position of Bullecourt in the Hindenburg system was peculiar. From
Heninel the line ran in a generally south-easterly direction towards
Bullecourt in front of the Fontaine-lez-Croisilles-Bullecourt Road. At
Bullecourt the line turned due east, passing some 500 yards in front of
Riencourt. Bullecourt itself was between the front and support trenches
of the first system, so that the front line formed a very pronounced
salient. East of Riencourt the line once more took an abrupt turn, this
time almost due south, passing in front (or to the west) of Quéant.

Bullecourt lies on a spur which falls northward into the Hendecourt
valley, and its exits on all sides form a network of sunken roads. At
the period under review the majority of the houses were already in
ruins, and these, together with numerous fences enclosing orchards and
gardens, converted the space between the front and support Hindenburg
lines into a serious obstacle, of which the strength was increased by
an intermediate trench half-way through the village. The Germans had,
moreover, tunnelled the village in such a way that they could bring
reinforcements rapidly and safely to bear on any threatened point.
The small salient gained by the Australians straddling the Hindenburg
trenches on the immediate east of the village, uncomfortable as it
was for the occupants, was a serious menace to the enemy position;
and it was reasonable to anticipate that the Germans would not easily
acquiesce in this partial envelopment of their flank.

During the early days of May the Australians in the salient were
subjected to numerous counter-attacks, while by dint of hand-to-hand
fighting the 62nd Division had gained a firm footing in the village. On
the 12th May the assault was renewed by the 7th Division, and fighting
of a desperately severe character developed in the village in which our
troops met with varying fortunes. In the eastern half of the village
the 2nd Queen's made some progress, but at the western end no advance
was possible. The situation at the sunken cross-roads at the north-east
corner of the village was obscure, and north of this point no part of
the enemy's support line was gained. Such was the position in "Bloody
Bullecourt" when the 58th Division began to take over the line.

On the afternoon of the 12th May the Company Commanders and
Intelligence Officer of the 2/4th Battalion, together with their
Platoon Sergeants, were sent forward to reconnoitre the positions held
by the 15th Australian Infantry Brigade with a view to taking them
over. From Vaulx-Vraucourt to Noreuil the party followed the dried-up
bed of the Hirondelle River, the scene of many a desperate struggle
during the preceding month. The air was oppressive with the heat of a
premature burst of summer weather; the stench from hundreds of unburied
bodies and the ominous silence of the guns prior to the attack which
was to be renewed the following day caused the whole atmosphere to be
heavy with the presage of hard fighting to come. On arrival at the
Australian Headquarters the party was informed of the attack organised
for the following morning, so that further reconnaissance that day
was useless. After the barrage had died down, however, on the 13th a
fresh start was made up the communication trench, which was really the
Noreuil-Riencourt Road, a bank on the east side preventing observation
from Quéant.

The Australian attack was successful, although the position was not
entirely cleared up, and they were now holding the first two lines of
the Hindenburg system, the support line being our front line, and the
former front line now forming our support. The intense artillery fire
to which this ground had many times been subjected had resulted in the
almost total obliteration of the trench lines as such, and the position
was really held in a line of shell craters.

The arrangements for relief being completed, the 2/4th Battalion moved
up on the night of the 13th/14th May to take over the left sector of
the Brigade front, from the sunken cross-roads at the north-east corner
of Bullecourt to a small communication trench about 500 yards to the
east, C Company (Leake) and D Company (Parker) being in the front line
with A (Cotton) and B (Bottomley) in support. Battalion Headquarters
occupied a central position in the support line. A detached post under
2/Lieut. S. A. Seys was established in a shell hole west of the sunken
cross-roads in order to secure touch with the 7th Division in the
village. From the right of the 2/4th Battalion the Brigade sector as
far as the Noreuil-Riencourt Road was taken up by the 2/3rd Londons.

The actual process of the relief, which was not completed until 1.30
a.m. on the 14th May, was exceedingly trying owing to the heavy
shelling of the communication trench. Amongst the casualties caused
by this were 2/Lieut. F. Stickney (wounded) and Capt. P. H. Burton,
R.A.M.C. (killed).

The Germans, having been ejected from their trench system in this
sector, were holding on in a system of unconnected shell holes on the
lower slopes of the spur, and their main line of resistance appeared
to be a sunken road running laterally across our front, and distant
about 300 yards. A new and evidently unfinished trench line crossed the
opposite hillside in front of Hendecourt.

The heavy shelling which had interfered with the relief continued
throughout the night, our front and support lines being heavily
bombarded, while the back areas were subjected to incessant searching
with high explosive and shrapnel.

Shortly after the Battalion had taken up its position a party of some
12 Germans with a machine-gun attempted to attack C Company's line. The
attack completely failed owing principally to the great gallantry of
Capt. Leake. 2/Lieut. S. G. Askham, who was in the trench with Leake at
the time, writes:

We were inspecting the sentry posts and our attention was drawn
to considerable movement near our front line. Without a moment's
hesitation Capt. Leake leapt over the parapet and in a few seconds
we heard revolver shots being fired. He had single-handed attacked
a German machine-gun team who were on the point of establishing
a post in a position overlooking the whole of our front line. He
killed four of the team and the remainder were wounded by our rifle
fire. Leake returned with three prisoners and their machine-gun,
which he also secured.... Leake was a tower of strength to both
officers and men in the Company and we all felt that he richly
deserved the V.C., for which he was afterwards recommended.

The continued bombardment now began to cause difficulty in controlling
the situation, for early in the morning a direct hit on the Brigade
signal depôt completely wrecked all the instruments and killed the
occupants of the dugout. Later, communication by power buzzer was also
cut, and for the remainder of the day all communication between the
Brigade and the battalions in the line had to be effected by runners.

This intermittent shelling continued until shortly after midday on the
14th, when the enemy was observed from our lines to be massing for
attack in the neighbourhood of a ruined factory some 500 yards to our
front. A call was made on our artillery, which immediately put down a
heavy barrage under which the enemy's troops melted away. The hostile
bombardment now increased in intensity and a terrific barrage came down
on our lines, continuing with unabated violence all through the night.
This barrage was for the greater part in enfilade from the direction
of Quéant, and was therefore particularly accurate and deadly; under
the rain of shells our trenches, or what little remained of them, were
completely obliterated, the greater part of our front line supplies of
rifle ammunition and bombs were blown up and several Lewis guns with
their teams were buried. Through this appalling ordeal the Battalion
stuck to their posts grimly, though suffering severe losses. Shortly
before midnight the enemy launched an attack on the 7th Division in
Bullecourt village, in which by dint of fierce hand-to-hand conflicts
they wrested from the 7th Division some of its gains of the previous
two days.

We have already pointed to the importance of the salient now occupied
by the 2/4th Londons, and, fully alive to the position, the Battalion
was not surprised by the attack which broke upon it at dawn the next
day. The importance to the Germans of the possession of this part of
the line may be gauged by the fact that the troops employed by them
were the 3rd Prussian Guard.

At 4 a.m. on the 15th the enemy were seen to be massing for the attack.
Our artillery once more responded magnificently to the call made on
them, and their barrage caused severe disorganisation in the enemy's
ranks. The attack was stubbornly pushed home by the Germans, but their
barrage being lifted prematurely from our front line an opportunity was
afforded to our leading companies to prepare for the shock. Advantage
of this momentary respite was taken to reinforce the front line, three
platoons of B Company filling the gaps of D Company, and C Company
being strengthened by a party of A Company. These precautions cost the
enemy dearly, and his assaulting columns were met by a deadly rifle and
Lewis gun fire from the whole of our line, which completed the work
of the artillery. The German attack was broken and not a single enemy
reached our line. The remnants of the assaulting battalions turned and
fled down the hill, leaving an appalling number of dead and wounded.

Beyond the right of the Brigade front a small party succeeded in
effecting a lodgment in a portion of the front line held by the
Australians, but these were shortly afterwards ejected with the
assistance of a platoon of the 2/2nd Londons.

By six o'clock the enemy counter-attack was definitely and finally
broken and small parties could be seen doubling away from before
Bullecourt; and a further attempt to launch an attack on the
Australians about half an hour later was effectively stopped by our
artillery.

After the attack had failed the enemy settled down to a slow but steady
shelling of our line for the remainder of the 15th, which was spent in
endeavouring to reorganise the battered remnants of the Battalion and
to put the lines once more in a defensible condition. Under cover of
darkness the 2/1st Londons took over the left subsector from the 2/4th
Londons, which withdrew to reserve dugouts in the sunken road in front
of Noreuil.

The Battalion had found itself. In its first serious action it had
stood up to a frightful bombardment which had lasted without abatement
for nineteen hours, and at the end of it had seen the backs of the
Prussian Guard. It had paid, however, a severe price. The total
casualties during the two days in the line were, in officers, in
addition to the two already mentioned, 2/Lieuts. E. C. Pratt and T.
Stoaling (killed); Capts. G. E. A. Leake and H. C. Long (wounded); and
in N.C.O.'s and men 68 killed, 196 wounded and 2 missing.

Capt. Leake had behaved with the utmost gallantry throughout the
attack. He was hit after the attack itself was over by a shell which
fell on his Company Headquarters, wounding also his second in command,
Capt. Long, and several of his Company staff. While being conveyed on
a stretcher to the Aid Post, Leake was again severely hit by a shell
which burst almost under the stretcher, killing two of the bearers.
After the shelling had subsided he was evacuated, but died in hospital
a fortnight later. For his magnificent behaviour he was recommended by
Lieut.-Col. Dann for the Victoria Cross, and eventually was awarded
the D.S.O. a few days before his death. This was conferred on him by
Gen. Gough, who visited for the express purpose the C.C.S. in which
Leake was lying. Lieut.-Col. Dann was awarded the D.S.O. for his
excellent work in this action. Awards of the Military Medal were made
to L./Corpls. Spencer and Selby, and Ptes. Grierson, Olinski and Spence.

For three days the Battalion remained in the sunken road supplying
carrying parties to the front line. The destruction caused by the
hostile bombardment was such that all the necessary trench supplies in
munitions and material had to be completely renewed, and, moreover, the
battalion in the line was dependent on its supporting troops for their
water supply. This imposed a very heavy strain on the 2/4th Battalion
for the back areas were still continuously shelled, largely with gas
shell, and particularly during the hours of darkness when the carrying
parties were at work; and the relief of the 173rd Brigade by the 175th
which ensued on the night of the 18th/19th May was welcome.

That night at 11 p.m. the Battalion handed over to the 2/12th Londons
(175th Brigade) and marched to rest billets in Bihucourt, where it
remained until the 29th, engaged in reorganisation and refitting
and training. During this period the gaps in the Battalion were
partly filled by reinforcements of two officers, 2/Lieuts. J. H. L.
Wheatley and E. P. Higgs, and a large draft of N.C.O.'s and men. The
2/4th Londons were visited on the 20th May by Lieut.-Gen. Birdwood,
commanding the Australians, who congratulated Lieut.-Col. Dann on the
Battalion's achievement.

During the latter half of May the 58th Division extended its left
flank, taking over in succession from the 7th and 62nd Divisions both
of which had suffered severely. By the end of the month the Division
was occupying a front of 4000 yards with two brigades in line. The
173rd Brigade took over the left subsector with the 2/1st and 2/2nd
Londons in line, and the 2/3rd Londons in close support, while the
2/4th Londons moved on the 31st May in Brigade reserve to Mory, where
they continued training.

Map No. 11 shows the position at this date. It will be seen that
north-west of Bullecourt the Hindenburg line on the Divisional front
was still not captured, though on its left the 21st Division was in
possession of the front trench as far as the Croisilles-Fontaine Road.
The 58th Division sector consisted for the greater part of isolated
shell hole defences.

There thus remained in this area a length of about 2500 yards of
Hindenburg front and about 3500 yards of Hindenburg support trench
still to be captured from the enemy in order to complete the allotted
task.

The first two days in the new sector passed without incident beyond
the usual artillery activity. Early on the morning of the 3rd June a
gas attack was carried out on the enemy's lines opposite our left by a
discharge of 197 gas projectors. The gas cloud formed appeared highly
satisfactory, and evidently caused the enemy some perturbation as his
artillery promptly put a barrage on our forward posts. This, however,
inflicted but little loss owing to the previous withdrawal of the
garrisons as a precautionary measure.

Various signs of nervousness exhibited by the enemy about this time
suggested that he expected the continuance of our offensive, and indeed
in view of the successes already gained he might with reason anticipate
that he would not be left in unmolested possession of the remaining
sectors of the Hindenburg system.

On the night of the 3rd/4th June the 2/4th Londons relieved the 2/2nd
Londons in the left subsector, A and B Companies (Cotton and Bottomley)
occupying the forward posts with C and D Companies (Hewlett and Parker)
in support. The line opposed to the Battalion was entirely in front of
the Heninel-Bullecourt Road, with a support line about 200 yards in
rear of it. For the greater part the line ran straight, but two small
salients, the Knuckle and the Hump, had been developed into strong
points of no mean order. The whole line was heavily wired, and although
the entanglements had suffered from our shell fire they still presented
a formidable obstacle, while the patrols sent forward nightly from
our posts obtained clear evidence that the line was held in unusual
strength.

The most urgent work in this sector was the linking up of our scattered
shell hole posts to form a connected line, and this was pushed on with
all possible speed and completed by the night of the 10th. Throughout
this tour of duty the enemy continued a fairly vigorous bombardment of
our trenches and back areas, which was returned with interest by our
artillery.

On the night of the 11th/12th June the 2/1st Londons took over from A,
B and D Companies, while C Company was relieved by the 2/7th Londons
(174th Brigade). On relief the Battalion withdrew in support to St
Leger, where Headquarters opened at the Château.

During the days spent in support the Battalion was reinforced by a
large draft of N.C.O.'s and men, and by two officers, 2/Lieuts. C.
Potter and V. R. Oldrey. The latter officer was most unfortunately hit
by a stray bullet on the following day.

The principal duty of the three days following relief was the
organisation and special training of A, B and D Companies to take part
in an assault of the Hindenburg system opposite the Brigade front.

The front of attack extended from the sharp corner just south of the
Knuckle on the right to a point about 150 yards north of the Hump on
the left. As the proposed operation included the capture of two lines
of trench it was decided by Corps to divide it into two days' work in
order to simplify the question of the co-operation of the 21st Division
on the left. Accordingly the plan was that the first day the 173rd
Brigade should capture the allotted portion of the front line, while
the second day the area of operations should be extended and the 21st
Division on the left should join with the 173rd Brigade in the assault
of the support line.

The troops detailed for the attack were in order from right to left,
1 company 2/3rd, 1 company 2/1st, 1½ companies 2/2nd and 1 company
2/4th Londons. For the purposes of the operation the companies of the
2/3rd and 2/4th Londons were respectively under command of the officers
commanding 2/1st and 2/2nd Londons. The attack was to be delivered
under a heavy barrage from a strong concentration of guns of the
7th, 58th and 62nd Divisions and the Corps Heavy Artillery, together
with the massed guns of the three Brigade Machine-Gun Companies.
Arrangements were also made for the provision of supporting rifle,
Lewis gun and machine-gun fire by the 21st Division.

The 174th Brigade was to arrange for the establishment of a line of
posts along the sunken road in prolongation to the right of the 173rd
Brigade's objective.

A Company (Cotton) was detailed for the first day's attack, and the
special task allotted to it by Lieut.-Col. Richardson, commanding the
2/2nd Battalion, was the capture of the sunken cross-roads to the left
of the Hump and of a German strong point in the front line about 100
yards north of them.

The assembly was successfully carried out during the night of 14th/15th
June, and completed by about 2.15 a.m. At 2.50 a.m. our barrage opened
and the assaulting waves moved forward to the attack in good order,
keeping well up to the barrage and suffering very little loss.

The attack proved successful though it led to some hard fighting. The
actual advance was entrusted to two platoons under 2/Lieut. Wheatley
(right) and 2/Lieut. Bell (left). The objective at this point was
strengthened by two "pillbox" machine-gun posts and was in line with
the trench already held on our left by the 21st Division, from which it
was divided by a double barricade; and Lieut.-Col. Richardson took up
his Battle Headquarters in a dugout in their line, as did also Capt.
Cotton. A third platoon of A Company under 2/Lieut. Boorman assembled
in the 21st Division trench, and was formed as a bombing party with
others to rush the double barricade at zero hour and to bomb the enemy
out of their two pillboxes before our barrage had lifted off the enemy
trench in order to clear it before the arrival of Bell and Wheatley
with their platoons. A good many casualties were therefore inevitably
caused to Boorman's platoon by our own shell fire, and he reached the
traverse next to the first pillbox with only two corporals, Sherwood
and Whitworth. Here the two N.C.O.'s threw bombs, which landed neatly
outside the two doors of the pillbox, and directly they exploded
Boorman dashed round the traverse with a bomb in each hand. Sheltering
himself against the wall, he threw his bombs into each door of the
pillbox before the Germans inside had recovered from the effects of
Sherwood and Whitworth's attack. This neat piece of work secured the
pillbox to us, but before Boorman could reorganise his party for the
further advance to the second pillbox Bell's platoon had occupied the
trench. A few men of Wheatley's platoon were also found to be in line.
The greater number, including Wheatley himself, apparently overshot the
objective, not recognising it in its battered condition, and must all
have been killed or captured.

According to the prearranged scheme, Bell's platoon was withdrawn
shortly before dawn, and Boorman was left in charge of the captured
position with the remains of his own and Wheatley's platoons. The 2/2nd
Londons were now in touch on our right, and by arrangement with them
the trench was divided between the two Battalions, the 2/4th Londons
being responsible from the 21st Division on the left as far as the
communication trench running back from the Hump to the German support
line. The shelling now resumed more moderate proportions, although it
continued sporadically all day, and casualties were continually being
caused in our ranks. The Battalion suffered a severe loss early in the
day in Sergt. Riley, who was acting C.S.M. for the attack. He had done
very good work indeed ever since the Battalion had been in France,
and had throughout shown complete indifference to danger. He was shot
through the chest while accompanying Boorman on a reconnaissance to
endeavour to trace Wheatley's missing platoon.

In the meantime arrangements had been made for the further attack on
the support Hindenburg line on the following morning, and detailed
orders had been issued which provided for the assembly of the
assaulting troops in the front line--the first day's objective--by 2.10
a.m. on the 16th June. This intention could not, however, be carried
out, for at about 10.30 p.m. on the 15th a heavy counter-attack was
launched against our new positions which caused severe fighting, in the
course of which the enemy once more gained a hold on the centre of his
old front line and also at two other points.

On the front held by the 2/4th Londons the counter-offensive took the
form of a bombing attack, the approach of which along the communication
trench opposite the right of our sector was disclosed by the enemy's
own star shells, which rendered plainly visible the forms of the
attackers waist high above the battered sides of the trench. A shower
of Véry lights was at once put up, and with the assistance of these the
attack was driven off by Lewis gun and rifle grenade fire, arrangements
for which had been made most skilfully by Boorman earlier in the day.
None of the enemy succeeded in penetrating our position, but many of
his dead were left on the ground.

It was, however, so essential to our purpose that the enemy should not
have the advantage of a day's respite before the attack on the support
line, that immediate arrangements were made for a counter-attack to
eject him once more from his old front line in order to leave this
clear as our jumping-off point. The recapture of the line was entrusted
to the 2/1st and 2/3rd Londons, who succeeded by surprise in completely
recovering the whole of the front line at the point of the bayonet by
2.45 a.m. on the 16th.

At 3.10 a.m. the second day's attack opened. The order of battle was
the same as for the first day, but the forces employed were larger,
the 2/3rd Londons supplying three companies, the 2/1st Londons three
companies, the 2/2nd Londons two companies and the 2/4th Londons two
companies (B under Bottomley and D under Parker).

The attack, as for the first day, was made under a creeping barrage
supplied by the Divisional artillery and the Brigade machine-gun
companies, and the assault was made in one wave with a "mopping-up"
wave in rear accompanied by a detachment of Royal Engineers for
consolidation work.

This day again a good deal of difficulty seems to have been experienced
by the advancing troops in identifying their objectives, which had
become almost entirely obliterated by our long-continued bombardments,
while the dust raised by the barrage rendered the recognition of
surrounding physical features almost impossible. The resistance of the
enemy all along the line was most stubborn, and the unusual strength
in which he was holding the attacked position clearly indicated that
the attack was expected. The earliest reports which were received by
runner led to the belief that the objective on the two flanks had
been captured. No information from the centre was forthcoming, and it
gradually became evident that the direction of the flank companies was
at fault, with the result that they had swung outwards leaving in the
centre a gap still occupied by the Germans, who promptly began to bomb
along the line against our unprotected flanks. The attack of the 21st
Division on the left, moreover, failed throughout, and although a few
isolated parties succeeded in reaching a line of shell holes in front
of Tunnel Trench they were eventually forced to withdraw.

The orders issued to the assaulting wave were to capture the Hindenburg
support line and hold on to it until supports should reach them,
but all the attempts of Lieut.-Col. Richardson to push forward his
supporting troops were frustrated by the intense rifle and machine-gun
fire with which the ground was continuously swept, and similar efforts
along the remainder of the front were stopped for the same reason.

At 11 a.m. the obscurity of the position induced the Brigadier to
make a personal reconnaissance in order, if possible, to clear up the
situation, but he found it impossible to get along the captured German
front line, and therefore proceeded to the Battle Headquarters of
the 2/2nd Londons. The information obtained there led to the belief
that the 2/2nd and 2/4th Londons had carried their objectives without
difficulty and at comparatively little loss, but that their flanks
were in the air and in danger of being turned by the bombing attacks
of the enemy. The support line was now entirely cut off as runner
communication was utterly impossible under the enemy's devastating
fire, and it was clear that our isolated parties who were in the
objective must be suffering heavy losses.

It has been difficult to establish what happened to the two companies
of the 2/4th Battalion owing to the heavy casualties sustained, but it
is evident that they also mistook the objective and pushed on some 200
yards ahead of it, where they came under intense fire from front and
flanks.

The most advanced party appears to have been a platoon of B Company
under McDowell, who although completely out of touch with the remainder
of their company held on most gallantly to the position they had gained
for some two hours, at the end of which time their ammunition was
exhausted and they were using a captured German machine-gun. No sign
of the promised supports being visible, and the enemy evidently being
about to surround his little party, now reduced to a mere half-dozen,
McDowell determined to fight his way back to his comrades, and began to
withdraw steadily. During his withdrawal he was hit, and on regaining
consciousness found himself alone. He continued his way back to our
lines, crawling from shell hole to shell hole, and managed to collect
four privates, all resolved to sell their lives dearly. By this time
he was completely surrounded, and his little band was destroyed by
rifle grenade fire; McDowell himself was hit again and captured. To the
eternal shame of the enemy let it be recorded that he lay for three
days in the enemy trench before being sent to their dressing-station,
and not until six days after his wounds were received were they dressed
at all.

A similar fate appears to have overtaken the remainder of B and D
Companies, and the probability is that having overshot their objective
they were outflanked and cut off by parties of the enemy coming down
the sunken road from Fontaine-lez-Croisilles. Their mistake having
become evident to them, they endeavoured, like McDowell, to fight their
way back, but after making a gallant stand were eventually killed or
taken prisoners almost to a man. It is believed from aeroplane reports
subsequently received that this gallant little body actually succeeded
in maintaining themselves against all attacks for nearly two days. But
all efforts to relieve them meeting with failure, they at last fell
gloriously rather than surrender.

A similar lack of success attended the efforts of the other battalions,
and as a result of the two days' fighting the Brigade held the front
Hindenburg line and the sunken road in rear of it, from the junction
with the 21st Division on the left to a point some 300 yards west of
the Crucifix cross-roads at Bullecourt.

The casualties of the Brigade amounted to 48 officers and 955 other
ranks, those of the 2/4th Battalion for the two days' fighting being:

Capts. E. W. Bottomley and W. H. Parker, 2/Lieuts. S. M. Williams
and J. H. L. Wheatley, killed; Capt. E. N. Cotton and 2/Lieut.
T. J. Bell, wounded; 2/Lieuts. E. A. Monkman and R. McDowell,
wounded and missing, and 2/Lieut. E. A. Stevenson, missing.

In N.C.O.'s and men the losses totalled 7 killed, 53 wounded and
139 missing, the majority being in B and D Companies.

It became evident during the afternoon that the 173rd Brigade, who were
weak before they went into action, would need relief that night, and
arrangements were therefore made for the 174th Brigade to take over the
line. In accordance with this arrangement the whole Brigade front was
taken over on the night 16th/17th June by the 2/5th Londons, who pushed
forward strong patrols towards the Hindenburg support line. This,
however, was found to be held in strength by the enemy.

With this somewhat disastrous day the idea of immediate further
offensive operations was postponed, and the 174th Brigade settled down
to consolidate itself in the Hindenburg front line.

The fighting spirit displayed throughout the operation was splendid,
and it is only to be regretted that the two days' work had not been
arranged for a one day battle. As the event showed, the capture of the
Hindenburg front line on the 15th prepared the enemy for our attempt to
take the support line on the 16th, with the result that on the second
day severe casualties were inflicted on our troops to no purpose.

During the second action at Bullecourt an incident occurred which is
surely one of the most remarkable of the whole War. We recount it in
the words of the official record, which appeared in the Battalion War
Diary on the 8th August:

No. 282496 Pte. Taylor J., of A Company, admitted to 29th C.C.S.
This man had been missing since Bullecourt on the 15th June 1917,
had been wounded and crawled into a shell hole. He sustained a
compound fracture of the left thigh, and aided by Pte. Peters,
B Company, had lived on bully beef found on the bodies of dead
men. After being in the shell hole for over six weeks Pte. Peters
apparently was captured, for the following day three Germans
visited the shell hole and shook Pte. Taylor's leg, but he feigned
death. The following day, not being able to obtain any food, he
decided to crawl back to our lines. His position was some distance
behind the German line. He dragged himself to the parapet of the
trench, threw himself over, crawled through the wire across No
Man's Land into the sector held by the S. Staffords. Altogether he
spent seven weeks and four days behind the German lines.

[Illustration: BULLECOURT, MAY-JUNE, 1917]

Pte. Taylor's story was subjected to severe scrutiny by Lieut.-Col.
Dann and by the Brigadier, and their opinion of its truth is witnessed
by the fact that he was awarded the D.C. Medal. Pte. Peters' fate is
unknown, and it is regrettable that after his devotion to his comrade
it was not possible to make him a posthumous award for his gallantry.

On relief by the 2/5th Londons the 2/4th Battalion marched to
Divisional reserve camp in Mory Copse, where it remained for four days
in reorganising and training. The month at Bullecourt had cost the
Battalion 597 casualties in all ranks, and a rest after the prolonged
operations was urgently needed.

B and D Companies were for the moment practically effaced, and the
few remaining details were therefore attached respectively to A and C
Companies, these two composite companies being placed under command of
Capts. E. N. Cotton and H. A. T. Hewlett.

On the 24th June the 58th Division was finally withdrawn from
Bullecourt, its place being taken by the 7th Division, and Divisional
Headquarters opened at Courcelles on that day.

The 2/4th Londons with the remainder of the 173rd Brigade had moved on
the 21st to Camp at Logeast Wood, where a welcome fifteen days' rest
was spent in training and reorganising, working parties being supplied
daily to the R.E. dump at Achiet-le-Grand.

During this period awards were made of the Military Cross to 2/Lieut.
D. S. Boorman, and of the Military Medal to L.-Corpl. Coates, for
their gallant conduct on the 15th/16th June. The Battalion was joined
on the 24th June by Capt. W. A. Stark and 2/Lieut. S. Davis, and by
drafts of 107 other ranks on the 21st June and of 28 N.C.O.'s on the
4th July. This welcome accession of strength, especially in N.C.O.'s,
who had become very few, rendered it possible once more to reorganise
the Battalion in four companies under Capts. E. N. Cotton (A), G. H.
Hetley (B), H. A. T. Hewlett (C), and A. G. Croll (D). The duties of
Intelligence Officer were taken over from Capt. Croll by 2/Lieut. S. A.
Seys, and on the 12th July, Cotton having been evacuated to hospital,
command of A Company was assumed by Capt. D. S. Boorman, M.C.

The period of rest at Logeast Wood was brought to a close by a
Battalion sports meeting, one of those quite informal but very keenly
followed affairs which always have proved such an invaluable means
of recuperation for tired troops. The following day the reorganised
Battalion was inspected by the Colonel, and on the 8th July the
Battalion marched through the devastated region and the ruins of
Courcelles, Sapignies and Bapaume to Bancourt. Its route continued
the following day to Ytres, where six days in billets were occupied
in parading for inspection successively by the Divisional General
(Fanshawe), the Brigadier (Freyberg) and the IV Corps Commander.

The Brigade was now in Divisional reserve, the Division having taken
over a sector of line in front of Gouzeaucourt and Havrincourt Wood.
The British trenches here were opposed once more to the Hindenburg
system, which had not been penetrated in this region. After severe
fighting in April round Epéhy our troops had established themselves on
high ground on the line Villers Plouich-Beaucamp-Trescault, whence a
series of spurs descend gradually in a north-easterly direction towards
Ribemont, Marcoing and the Scheldt Canal--all destined to witness
bitter fighting in the Cambrai battle five months later.

The Gouzeaucourt-Havrincourt Wood sector was now exceedingly quiet.
This, to an extent, was of great advantage to the Battalion, since
nearly 40 per cent. of its strength at the moment consisted of drafts
newly arrived who had not yet been under fire. It was possible,
therefore, for the new material to become properly assimilated into the
Battalion before further casualties created deficiencies in the ranks.

On the night 16th/17th July the 173rd Brigade took over from the 174th
Brigade the right of the Divisional front from the neighbourhood of
Villers Plouich to Queens Lane, a communication trench 500 yards west
of the Beaucamp-Ribemont Road.

The 2/4th Battalion remained in Brigade reserve for a few days,
Battalion Headquarters and A Company being in huts in Dessart Wood,
C and D Companies in Gouzeaucourt Wood, and B Company attached to
the 2/1st Battalion in a support trench south of Beaucamp. Daily
working parties were supplied by the Battalion for trench repair and
improvement work, but very little incident worthy of record occurred.
The principal excitement was provided by the intelligence that a German
spy disguised as an officer of the R.F.A. was in hiding in one of the
numerous woods with which the countryside is dotted, but the Battalion
was not successful in tracking him down.

The only portion of the line in which there was any degree of activity
was in front of the left of the Brigade sector, where an isolated
spinney in the middle of No Man's Land--here some 600 to 700 yards
wide--was always a target for the enemy's artillery. This spinney,
known as Boar Copse, was occupied by the Battalion in the line as an
advanced post, and it was decided to wire round the edge of the Copse
and connect it to our front line by a communication trench. The duty of
executing the work fell to the 2/4th Londons, and a working party of 4
officers and 180 N.C.O.'s and men was supplied under Capt. A. G. Croll
on the night 20th/21st July. As ill luck would have it, the Germans
selected this same evening to endeavour to raid the outpost line
occupied by the 2/9th Londons farther to the left. The raid was carried
out under an intense barrage, but our artillery answered promptly to
the call made on it and the raiders were beaten off, leaving a prisoner
in our hands. Unfortunately the raid caused a certain amount of
shelling on the Boar Copse front resulting in a few casualties, among
whom was Capt. Croll. This was exceedingly bad luck and a loss to the
Battalion. Croll had done excellent work since the arrival in France
of the 2/4th Battalion and had just received his company. His wound,
though not dangerous, was sufficiently severe to keep him in England
for almost a year. His company was taken over by Capt. C. A. Clarke.

The following night the Battalion relieved the 2/3rd Battalion in the
right subsector on a front of about 1500 yards, all the companies
being in line and each providing its own supports.

The trenches were well sited and well dug, being very deep and heavily
traversed. Throughout this area the communication trenches were
of exceptional length, Lincoln Lane in particular, which ran from
Gouzeaucourt Wood to Beaucamp, being over two miles long.

Very little incident occurred during this tour of duty. No Man's Land
was patrolled nightly and appeared to belong to us as no enemy were
encountered.

On the evening of the 30th July the Battalion was relieved by the 11th
Royal Scots and marched to the light railway at Dessart Wood, whence it
entrained to Neuville-Borjonval, camping there for the night.

The following day the Battalion moved by bus from Neuville to
Izel-les-Hameau, in the Arras area, the transport under Major Nunneley
moving by train from Bapaume to Saulty and then by march route to
Hameau.

The whole Division was now put through a regular course of re-equipment
and training in preparation for the heavy work it was to be called
upon to do in the offensive at Ypres. In this training particular
attention was paid to musketry, the necessity for this having been
clearly demonstrated in all recent actions, in which troops had shown
a tendency to use bombs or rifle grenades to the exclusion of their
rifles.

During this period drafts of officers were received as follows:

6th July--2/Lieut. F. A. Carlisle.

20th July--Lieut. F. S. Marsh (7th Londons); 2/Lieuts.
R. Michell (6th Londons); and H. N. Bundle, W. F.
Vines, E. R. Seabury and C. C. H. Clifford (13th
Londons).

25th July--Lieut. D. C. Cooke; 2/Lieuts. F. B. Burd
and A. J. Angel (13th Londons).

1st August--2/Lieuts. J. McDonald and F. W. Walker;
2/Lieut. C. S. Pike (7th Londons).

9th August--2/Lieut. A. S. Cook (7th Londons).

The Battalion changed its quarters on the 13th August, leaving Izel
for Denier, where it proceeded with its training. Not all the time was
devoted to work, but some excellent sports meetings were held--and
at the Brigade Sports on the 20th the Battalion was successful in
winning the Cup presented by Brig.-Gen. B. C. Freyberg, V.C., D.S.O.
The importance of achievements of this nature cannot be over-rated.
The longer the War continued the more obvious it became that if "rest"
periods were to do any good to the men at all they must be periods
of mental as well as physical rest, and games of all sorts provide
the required relaxation more than anything else. On coming out of the
trenches, weary, muddy, possibly hungry, and almost certainly wet
through, the men's first moments of freedom were spent in a game of
football.

This was an aspect of the mentality of the British soldier which we
believe was never fathomed by the French villagers. Their hospitality
and devotion to "les braves Tommys" was unfailing and genuine; but
we feel there was a lingering notion among our kind hosts that this
remarkable devotion to football was really a confirmation of the
time-honoured tradition that the English are all at least a little mad.

Reinforcements of N.C.O.'s and men were also being fed into the
Battalion during this period, and by the end of August the strength in
N.C.O.'s and men had increased by about 240.

CHAPTER XVI

THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES

I. _The 1/4th Battalion on the Menin Road_

By the middle of May 1917 the British efforts on the Arras front had
achieved the success which had been aimed at; and the offensive having
been sufficiently prolonged to assist the French in their operations
on the Chemin des Dames, the Commander-in-Chief was free to turn his
attention to the northern area of the British lines.

The first phase of the operation was opened on the 7th June, when a
brilliant attack by the Second Army (Plumer) carried the British line
forward over the Messines and Wytschaete Ridges, from which the Germans
had dominated our positions since October 1914. This operation, which
was one of the most completely successful of the whole War, resulted by
the 14th June in the advancement of practically the whole Second Army
front from the River Warnave to Klein Zillebeeke.

One by one the points of vantage held by the enemy since the beginning
of siege warfare were being wrested from his grasp. In succession the
Thiepval Ridge, the Bucquoy Ridge, the Vimy Ridge and finally the
Messines-Wytschaete Ridge had fallen into our hands, and there remained
of this long series of heights only the series of ridges which from
Zillebeeke to Passchendaele dominate Ypres on the east and north sides.
It was towards these hills that the British offensive efforts were now
directed.

The opening day of the offensive had originally been fixed for the
25th July 1917, but owing to the intensity of our bombardment the
enemy in anticipation of attack had withdrawn his guns, and the attack
was therefore postponed in order that the British guns might be
correspondingly advanced. Combined with the systematic bombardment of
the enemy's trenches, strong points and communications, a definite air
offensive which ensured our local supremacy in this respect, and also
severe gas shelling, were undertaken.

The front of attack extended for some fifteen miles from Deulemont
on the right to Boesinghe on the Yser Canal--the main attack being
entrusted to the Fifth Army (Gough) on a front of about seven miles
from the Zillebeeke-Zandvoorde Road to Boesinghe. The Second Army on
the right was to make only a limited advance with the chief objects of
widening the front of attack and distributing the enemy's resistance.
At the same time the French on the extreme left (or north) would
co-operate in the marshes of the Yser.

The offensive was finally launched on the 31st July 1917. The weather,
which for a fortnight previously had been fine and dry and had seemed
to predict success, broke on the day of the battle, and a merciless
rain which changed the whole area of operations to a sea of mud fell
without cessation for several days. The Corps in line on the 31st July
were from left to right the XIV (Cavan), the XVIII (Maxse), the XIX
(Watts), the II (Jacob) and the X (Morland). On the whole the day was
one of marked success, the deepest advance being made in the northern
sector of the attack. From Westhoek to St Julien the second German
line was carried, while north of the latter village the assaulting
troops passed the second line and gained the line of the Steenbeek as
far as the junction with the French, whose attack had also met with
complete success. South of Westhoek the enemy's resistance had been
more stubborn, and his positions in Inverness Copse and Glencorse Wood
which were strongly held by machine-gun posts proved an impassable
obstacle. In this region, however, the German first line was carried,
and our troops managed to maintain themselves far enough forward on
the Westhoek Ridge to deny the enemy observation over the Ypres plain;
the position gained running almost due south from Westhoek east of the
line Clapham Junction--Stirling Castle--Bodmin Copse, and thence to
Shrewsbury Forest, south of which the German second line was occupied
as far as the Ypres-Comines Canal. South of the Canal also the Second
Army achieved considerable success.

The rain, which began to fall in the afternoon, had a most disastrous
effect on the British plan of attack. Movement over the shell-torn
ground, which was transformed into a series of bogs, rapidly became
impossible apart from a few well-defined tracks, and these naturally
became marks for the enemy's guns. The labour of moving forward
guns, relieving troops and completing the forward dumps and other
preparations for the next bound was increased tenfold. The inevitable
delay which ensued was of the greatest service to the enemy, who
thereby gained a valuable respite in which he was able to bring up
reinforcements.

The fighting of the next few days was, therefore, local in character
and consisted in clearing up the situation and improving the
British positions at various points in the line, in the course of
which operations the capture of Westhoek was completed. Numerous
counter-attacks by the enemy were successfully resisted, and the line
gained on the 31st July was substantially held.

* * * * *

The 56th Division moved from the Third Army area on the 24th July to
the St Omer area. The 1/4th Londons entrained at Petit Houvin for St
Omer and marched to billets at Houlle, in the Eperlecques area, some
five miles north-west of St Omer. The Division was now attached to
the V Corps. Its training was continued during the opening phase of
the battle, after which the Division moved on the 6th August to the
II Corps area, the Battalion occupying billets at Steenvoorde, where
the routine was resumed. On the 8th Major-Gen. D. Smith, C.B. (who had
commanded the Division since 24th July, when Gen. Hull fell sick), left
to command the 20th Division and, two days later, command was assumed
by Major-Gen. F. A. Dudgeon, C.B.

The same day a warning order was received that the Division would
shortly move into the line to take part in the second phase of the
battle, which was to be renewed as soon as weather conditions should
permit.

[Illustration: THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, 1917 (1/4TH BATTALION)]

On the night of the 12th/13th August the Division moved forward into
the line opposite Glencorse Wood, which had been the centre of the
enemy's resistance on the first day of the battle, and took over from
portions of the 18th and 25th Divisions a sector between the Menin Road
at Clapham Junction and the cross-roads at Westhoek, the 169th Brigade
occupying the right of this front with the 167th Brigade on its left.
The 53rd Brigade of the 18th Division remained in line on the right of
the 169th Brigade, between Clapham Junction and Green Jacket Road, and
came under the orders of Gen. Dudgeon.

On the morning of the 12th the 168th Brigade in Divisional reserve
embussed at Steenvoorde for Canal Reserve Camp, Dickebusch.

The chain of machine-gun posts still held by the enemy in Inverness
Copse, Glencorse Wood and Nonne Boschen was of immense importance
to the Germans at this juncture; as they screened the long Spur
which, running north-east from the Menin Road Ridge between the
Polderhoek-Gheluvelt Ridge and the Zonnebeeke Road, formed an important
_point d'appui_ in the Langemarck-Gheluvelt line of defence. Their
capture by the British would, therefore, drive such a wedge towards the
enemy third line as to cause a serious menace to his communications
along the Menin and Zonnebeeke Roads. No one was more keenly alive to
the essential value of this position than the Germans, who spared no
efforts to frustrate attempts to launch a further attack in this area.
The continual severity of his shell and machine-gun fire against our
outpost line served his purpose well, as it not only inflicted severe
loss on the trench garrisons of the divisions in the line and seriously
impeded the task of advancing ammunition and other stores incidental
to an attack--a task already difficult enough by reason of the wet
state of the ground--but also precluded efficient reconnaissance of the
ground over which the attack was to be launched.

The 56th Division was the extreme right of the attack. The advance
allotted to it was to be carried out by the 167th and 169th Brigades,
whose objective was a line beyond the third German line of defence,
and which may be roughly described as running north and south through
Polygon Wood. The southernmost point of this advance was to be Black
Watch Corner, and from this point it would be necessary to connect
the southern extremity of the final objective with the line on the
Division's right, on which no advance would be attempted. This meant
the formation of a defensive flank facing nearly south.

This vital work of forming the flank was originally entrusted to the
53rd Brigade, and the importance of their rôle will be readily grasped,
since on the manner in which it was carried out would hang in large
measure the fortunes of the 169th and 167th and successive Brigades
on the left, for the German machine-guns in Inverness Copse, if not
silenced, would be free to enfilade the whole advance. The 53rd Brigade
which had been in the line since the opening of the battle on the 31st
July was, however, now exhausted, and so seriously reduced in strength
by the tireless activity of the German machine-gunners that it was not
in a condition to renew the offensive. Its task was therefore handed
over to the 1/4th Londons, on whom devolved the difficult operation
above described of covering the right flank of the whole attack. The
only troops of the 53rd Brigade who would be actively employed would
be a detachment of the 7th Bedfords, who were made responsible for
capturing the machine-gun nests which, from the north-west corner of
Inverness Copse, dominated the whole situation.

The 1/4th Londons were detailed for this attack on the morning of the
14th August, and it is important in view of what subsequently occurred
to bear this date in mind. It must also be remembered that at this time
the Battalion was some seven miles from the field of battle and that no
officer, N.C.O. or man belonging to it had ever set eyes on the ground
over which the battle was to be fought.

During the morning Lieut.-Col. Campbell, the Adjutant and the four
company officers went forward to reconnoitre the forward area, visiting
in turn 169th Brigade Headquarters at Dormy House, and Headquarters of
the Battalion in line of the 53rd Brigade at Stirling Castle. It had
been intended also to reconnoitre the ground over which the advance was
to be made, but such was the intensity of the enemy's artillery and
machine-gun fire that this was impossible, and the company commanders
were compelled to return to their companies in ignorance of what lay
before them. Later in the day Lieut.-Col. Campbell was ordered to
report to 53rd Brigade Headquarters, but was unluckily hit on his way
back, near Zillebeeke Lake. Although badly hit he made his way back
to the Battalion, but being unable to carry on was succeeded in the
command by Major A. F. Marchment, M.C. (1/1st Londons).

At seven that night the Battalion moved forward from Dickebusch to
Château Segard, the move being completed by 11 p.m. Shortly after dawn
on the 15th the forward move was continued to Railway Dugouts, in the
cutting between Shrapnel Corner and Zillebeeke Lake, and here the
Battalion remained during the day.

The 15th August was occupied in issuing battle equipment and rations
to the companies, while Lieut.-Col. Marchment took the opportunity of
conducting a reconnaissance of the forward area and communications,
and of issuing his operation orders. These were explained to company
commanders as adequately as time permitted, but it must be borne
in mind that when the Battalion moved forward to the assault the
following morning no company or platoon officer had been able to see
the ground over which he was to lead his men. At 6.30 p.m. the 1/4th
Londons left Railway Dugouts in battle order for the assembly area at
Clapham Junction with guides supplied from the 53rd Brigade. A great
deal of heavy shelling, in which four men of B Company were hit, was
experienced during the advance, and in breasting a ridge near Sanctuary
Wood the Battalion had to pass through a barrage put down by the
Germans. Aided by the excellent discipline of the troops, however,
company commanders were able to split up their companies within a
few seconds, and no loss was sustained. By ten o'clock the Battalion
was concentrated with A, B and C Companies in the tunnel under the
Menin Road, and D Company in the trench south of the road. Battalion
Headquarters and part of C Company were in the trench on the north side
of the tunnel. There was no defined line of trenches in this area, the
front being held by isolated shell hole posts, and the assembly was to
be made on tape lines laid down under staff arrangements. The lack of
shelter thus made it necessary to keep the Battalion under such cover
as was obtainable till the last possible moment. During the evening an
officer of each company reconnoitred the route from the concentration
area to the tape lines, assistance being rendered by the 6th Royal
Berkshires, and No Man's Land in front of the line of assembly was
patrolled until shortly before zero hour.

The intention was to advance in a practically due east direction, while
at stated points in the line of advance platoons would halt one by one,
each establishing itself in a strong point, until finally, when the
last platoon reached its halting point, the whole Battalion would be
deployed in a line of outposts, all of which would turn to their right
and face south. This advance, being made on a front of two companies,
would result in a double line of posts of which the left flank would
rest on Black Watch Corner in touch with the 169th Brigade, while the
right flank would join hands with the 7th Bedfords in the corner of
Inverness Copse.

At 3.15 a.m. on the 16th August companies began to form up on the tape
lines, the assembly being completed by 4.20 a.m., when the troops were
lying down in the open under a continuous and fairly heavy shell fire
and a galling machine-gun fire from the direction of Inverness Copse.
About 22 casualties occurred under this fire before zero hour at 5.45
a.m. The order of battle was as follows: A. Company (Spiers) on the
right and B Company (Stanbridge) on the left in front; with D Company
(H. N. Williams) on the right and C Company (Rees) on the left in
support.

The attack was to be delivered along the whole battle front at 5.45
a.m. under cover of a creeping barrage, supported by machine-gun
barrage and heavy gun fire on the enemy back areas. At zero hour the
British barrage came down, well distributed and of terrific intensity.
It was hoped that the danger points in Inverness Copse would be put
out of action by our artillery, so that the task of the 7th Bedfords
would be an easy one, but calculations in this respect were soon found
to have been mistaken. The leading companies of the 1/4th Londons got
away from the mark at zero, in good order and well up to the barrage,
but almost immediately came under a hail of lead from Inverness Copse.
The attack of the 7th Bedfords, of such vital importance to the success
of the whole operation, had failed. The artillery fire had not produced
the expected effect on the enormously strong enemy posts over which the
barrage had passed harmlessly, and the 7th Bedfords were repulsed with
loss, thereby leaving the 1/4th Londons completely exposed to the full
force of the enemy's nest of machine-guns on their right flank.

Within a few minutes 5 officers and 40 N.C.O.'s and men of A and B
Companies were casualties, but the survivors pushed forward steadily,
though a certain amount of delay caused by the gaps so suddenly torn in
their ranks was inevitable. The gallantry displayed by all ranks under
this devastating machine-gun fire, to which was added enemy shell fire
of great intensity, was unsurpassed, but under such a storm of bullets
at close range nothing could live, and the Battalion was brought to a
standstill about 200 yards from starting-point, in an old German trench
which skirted a ruined farmhouse about midway between Inverness Copse
and Glencorse Wood.

A party of some 60 men of all companies managed to gain shelter in
Jap Avenue. Here they were organised by 2/Lieut. H. E. Jackman,
under whom a strong post was consolidated and an attempt made to
push forward along the trench. This proved unsuccessful owing to the
continued intensity of the enemy machine-gun fire and the accuracy of
his sniping. Further attempts by other companies to advance were also
fruitless, and the Battalion was forced to content itself with hanging
on to these small gains, from which at intervals it was able to engage
with Lewis gun and rifle fire small bodies of the enemy in the open
near the east end of Glencorse Wood.

An attempt was made to re-establish the situation by an attack, for
which the 53rd Brigade was called upon, through Inverness Copse from
south to north, but so terribly reduced in numbers were its battalions
that Brigade reserve was limited to two weak platoons and further
action was found to be for the moment impossible.

In the centre the leading waves of the 169th, after some resistance in
Glencorse Wood which they overcame, succeeded in penetrating Polygon
Wood, where they probably gained their objective. The second waves on
approaching the Wood were, however, met with intense fire from front
and flanks, and a few minutes later a heavy counter-attack developed
which drove back the assaulting troops to the middle of Glencorse Wood.
A further counter-attack in the evening forced the Brigade back to its
assembly line.

On the left the 167th Brigade met with but little greater success. The
advance was steadily conducted as far as a line level with the eastern
edge of Nonne Boschen, where trouble was first encountered by a sea
of mud--an extensive bog caused by the springs in the source of the
Hanebeek--which forced the attacking battalions to edge away to their
left and thus lose touch with the 169th Brigade on their right. In
this position they came under heavy machine-gun fire, and the British
barrage having got far ahead, were forced to fall back. By 9 a.m. this
Brigade also was back in its assembly area.

Early in the afternoon enemy artillery fire over the 1/4th Battalion's
front became very heavy, and retaliatory fire was directed by our
artillery into Inverness Copse. No infantry action developed, and
during the night the Battalion was relieved by the 12th Middlesex and
withdrew, in support, to the tunnel under Crab Crawl Trench in the old
British system south of Sanctuary Wood.

Here the 1/4th Londons remained during the whole of the 17th August,
which passed uneventfully, and in the evening was relieved by the 8th
K.R.R.C. of the 14th Division, which took over the 56th Division
front. On relief, the Battalion withdrew to Mic Mac Camp, Ouderdom.

Reviewing the Battalion's work on the 16th August it must be at once
admitted that it, and indeed the whole Division, failed completely to
perform its allotted task. That all ranks did all that was possible to
achieve it is reflected in the length of the casualty list, and it is
perhaps due to those who fell to comment briefly on what appear to be
the causes of failure.

In the first place the operation itself was far from easy. The sea of
mud and ooze to which the line of advance had been reduced must in
any case have rendered the recognition by platoon commanders of the
spots at which they were in turn to halt and form their post a matter
of some difficulty. But the circumstances in which the Battalion
became responsible for the attack effectually precluded it from the
preparations for the operation which the difficulty of the task
warranted. The change of command was a further stroke of bad luck.
Lieut.-Col. Marchment was already known to the Battalion, but the
disadvantages under which he laboured in assuming command on the eve
of battle are obvious. The issue of orders was inevitably delayed as
Lieut.-Col. Campbell's reconnaissance had to be repeated by Lieut.-Col.
Marchment on the morning of the 15th, and it was not till the evening
of that day that the scheme could be explained to companies, and then
only by officers, who themselves had not seen the ground or even the
assembly position. In fact the operations of reconnaissance, issue
of orders and assembly of the Battalion had all to be disposed of in
twenty-two hours. In addition to these preliminary difficulties the
progress of the operation itself revealed further circumstances, to
which also a share of the responsibility for failure may be attributed.

The extraordinary strength of the German machine-gun posts was such
that the most intense barrage which the excellent Corps and Divisional
artillery was capable of producing passed harmlessly over them, and
only a direct hit was sufficient to disturb the occupants.

The very serious casualties at the outset of the attack--half an
hour after zero, three company commanders were the only officers left
standing--produced inevitably a certain degree of disorganisation,
though the fact that despite these heavy losses the Battalion was able
to establish and maintain itself throughout the day until relief,
speaks wonders for the discipline of the troops and the efficiency
and initiative of the N.C.O.'s. Further causes of failure lay in the
previous exhaustion of the men owing to the bad state of the ground,
which also made extremely difficult the preparation beforehand of
forward supply dumps, and the reinforcement of the attacking troops
during the battle.

Defeat is not always inglorious, and we feel that the 16th August may
fairly be written down as a day on which the 1/4th Londons failed
without loss of reputation in any single particular.

The casualties sustained were as follows:

In officers--Lieut.-Col. H. Campbell, D.S.O., wounded; Lieuts. C.
A. Speyer, L. B. J. Elliott, L. W. Wreford and A. G. Davis,
killed; Capt. H. W. Spiers, Lieuts. A. S. Ford and E. G. Dew,
and 2/Lieuts. L. W. Archer, H. T, Hannay, N. Nunns and H.
E. Jackman, wounded; and in N.C.O.'s and men 182 killed and
wounded.

2/Lieut. H. E. Jackman was awarded the M.C. for his excellent work and
devotion to duty this day.

Throughout the Division casualties were heavy and 6 commanding officers
and nearly 4000 all ranks fell on this unfortunate day.

On the remainder of the battle front varying success was obtained. In
the north a considerable advance was made and the German third line
was broken on a wide front. The French attack on the extreme left was
crowned with complete success. In the southern area, however, the enemy
resistance was everywhere more stubborn, and south of St Julien the
line remained unchanged as a result of the day's fighting. The Division
being concentrated in the Ouderdom area remained there training and
reorganising for several days.

On the 22nd August its move to the Eperlecques area began, and on the
24th the 1/4th Londons entrained at Reninghelst siding for Watten,
where it detrained and marched to Houlle.

[Illustration: _Inverness Copse_]

The 56th Division had been so badly handled on the 16th August that
its return to the battle area without considerable reinforcement was
out of the question and it was, therefore, moved from the Ypres area
to Bapaume. The Battalion accordingly entrained at Arques in the early
hours of the 30th August and arrived in huts in the Beaulencourt area
at 8 p.m. the same day.

CHAPTER XVII

THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES

II. _The 2/4th Battalion on the Northern Ridges_

After the restricted success of the 16th August, the renewal of
operations on a large scale was inevitably postponed for some time
through the continuance of adverse weather conditions; though in
the north minor operations had the effect of widening and deepening
the breach in the German defences in the neighbourhood of St
Julien, combined with the capture of a good many prisoners. These
local advances carried the British positions forward east of the
St Julien-Poelcapelle Road and gave them a firm footing in the
Gheluvelt-Langemarck line on both sides of the Ypres-Staden Railway.

The withdrawal of some of the divisions which had been engaged in the
battle since the end of July being now necessary, the 58th Division was
among the fresh divisions which were sent north to take part in the
next large attack.

On the 24th August the 2/4th Londons marched from Izel-les-Hameau
to Aubigny entraining for Hopoutre (Poperinghe), whence it marched
to quarters in Dirty Bucket Camp, one of a series of camps near
Vlamertinghe. The Division now became attached to the XVIII Corps
(Maxse). The Battalion continued its training in the new area, paying
a good deal of attention to intensive digging and musketry, and during
the days spent in Dirty Bucket the company commanders and seconds in
command attended a course of instruction at the XVIII Corps School at
Volckeringhove.

On the night of the 28th/29th August the 58th Division entered the
trenches, taking over with the 174th and 175th Brigades, the sector
occupied by the 48th Division east of St Julien, the frontage extending
from the Hanebeek on the right to the vicinity of Keerselare on the
left. The sector was lightly held with one battalion of each brigade in
the outpost line, one battalion on the Canal Bank and two in camps west
of the Yser Canal.

The 173rd Brigade remained in Divisional reserve and continued
training. The 2/4th Londons changed station on the last day of
the month, moving to Browne Camp, about four miles north-east of
Poperinghe. Here a further week's training was obtained, after which
the whole of B Company spent four days at the Fifth Army Musketry Camp
near St Omer. Nothing worthy of record occurred during this period
except on the 1st September, when the transport lines were heavily
shelled causing casualties to 26 N.C.O.'s and men, of whom 1 died of
wounds, and to 13 horses, 8 being killed.

Reinforcements at this period included 2/Lieut. A. C. Knight (4th
Londons) and 2/Lieut. W. D. Warren (19th Londons), and about 110
N.C.O.'s and men.

On the 9th September the 2/4th Londons moved forward to Reigersburg
Camp, between Brielen and the Canal, and on the 11th-13th August the
173rd Brigade took over the whole Divisional sector.

A warning order had now been issued as to the next attack which in
view of the markedly improved conditions of weather had been arranged
for the 20th September. The front of attack was more extended than on
the 16th August, the southern limit being the Ypres-Comines Canal near
Hollebeke, and the Ypres-Staden Railway north of Langemarck marking the
northern extremity.

The success which had attended the enemy's resistance to our efforts
to advance in the Menin Road region had pointed to the necessity of
modifying the methods of attack. The successes obtained by the British
Army on the Somme, at Arras and at Messines, had caused the Germans to
alter their mode of defence, and instead of a strongly held trench line
they now presented to our attacks a system of concreted machine-gun
posts ("pillboxes" "or Mebus") disposed in great depth in front of
their main line of resistance. This system supplied their defence with
the elasticity which had hitherto been lacking, and the pillboxes,
being sited with remarkable skill to develop the employment of enfilade
fire to the fullest extent, proved a very serious obstacle to British
assaulting columns, which frequently suffered severe casualties at
their hands after making a deep advance into the enemy defensive
system. The pillboxes were, moreover, of such enormously strong
construction that nothing short of a direct hit by a heavy shell could
put them out of action. The effect of our severe artillery preparation
for attacks was therefore nullified, and the occupants of the pillboxes
could only be ejected as a rule by hand-to-hand fighting with bombs.

This new feature in the fighting called for prompt measures on the
part of the British, and henceforward no attempt was made as a rule
to penetrate the enemy's pillbox system as long as any risk existed
of leaving any of these hornets' nests undisposed of in rear of the
advancing troops. In other words, the attacks were arranged with
objectives much more limited than formerly, while the artillery paid
more attention to the pillboxes, the ultimate capture of which formed
the task of special units detailed for the purpose.

The assault arranged for the 20th September was prepared on these
revised lines, and all ranks were impressed beforehand with the
importance, not only of locating enemy strong points quickly and
rushing them before their occupants had recovered from the British
barrage, but also of methodical "mopping-up" and consolidation of all
ground gained.

From the 9th September onwards the work of preparation for the
impending offensive was pushed forward with all possible speed, the
2/4th Londons bearing a heavy share of these necessary duties. For four
of the five nights spent at Reigersburg Camp a working party of the
strength of two companies was engaged in completing the advanced cable
line trench, while on the last night, the 13th, the whole Battalion
less B Company (still at the Musketry Camp) was detailed for carrying
various sorts of R.E. material forward to advanced dumps in readiness
for consolidation of the position it was hoped to gain.

On the 14th the 2/4th Londons moved to a fresh position on the east
side of the Yser Canal, and for four nights following, the whole
Battalion was engaged in the desperate task of laying a duckboard track
of double width in front of St Julien, as far forward as possible in
the direction of the enemy positions, with the object of providing
a means of communication in the forward area, and of reinforcing or
relieving the advanced troops after the assault should have been
delivered.

This week of continual working parties was most exhausting to all
concerned. The distance to be covered each night to and from the scene
of the work was about three and a half miles in each direction, and the
labour of the march was increased tenfold by the shocking condition of
the ground, which was still waterlogged, and, away from the defined
tracks, nothing but a series of lakes formed by shell craters full of
water. Heavy as the cable line duties were found, the laying of the
duckboard track during the latter half of the week proved still more
onerous. Not only had the troops to march to St Julien from the Canal
Bank, but the duckboards which were drawn from a dump at Alberta Farm
had to be carried on the men's shoulders for some five hundred yards to
the starting-point of the track. Progress was slow through the heavy
going and the continual delays caused by German Véry lights. Although
some two hundred and forty yards were laid during the four nights'
work, and the track was carried forty yards beyond our most advanced
positions, the task was never completed. The work was obviously fraught
with considerable risk of serious casualties owing to the large numbers
of men employed, and in the circumstances the losses incurred during
the week were light; 11 men being hit on the 11th, while on the 15th
2/Lieut. Carlisle was killed and 2/Lieut. Pike wounded, with 2 men
killed and 5 wounded.

On the night of the 18th the 2/4th Londons relieved the 2/3rd Londons
in the line, which was still held by isolated posts, and the following
evening assembly for the attack began at about 9 p.m.

The 58th Division front of attack was entirely north of the Hanebeek,
a small stream which runs almost due east from St Julien, the attack
south of the stream being undertaken by the 164th Brigade of the 55th
Division. The 58th Divisional front was taken up by the 173rd Brigade
on the right with the 174th on its left, the assaulting columns of
the 173rd Brigade consisting of four companies, each 100 strong, of
the 2/4th Londons. The 2/3rd Londons were in reserve to make a dummy
attack, with one company on the waterlogged portions of the front over
which no advance was possible.

The 2/4th Londons' assembly position which was defined by tape lines
laid down by the adjutant, Capt. A. Grover, was on the line Janet
Farm-Springfield, and covered a front of some 800 yards. Almost in the
centre of this front and some 400 yards from starting-point, lay a
strongly fortified area around Winnipeg cross-roads. To the right of
the cross-roads the whole area as far as the Hanebeek was waterlogged
and impassable, while to the left a series of enemy strong points,
notably at the Cemetery and Spot Farm seemed likely to cause a good
deal of trouble to the attackers. The objective of the 2/4th Londons
lay on an undefined line running roughly north and south about 100
yards beyond Winnipeg cross-roads. This marked the limit of the 173rd
Brigade's task, though the objective of the day lay about 500 yards
further east, its principal feature being a machine-gun nest in the
Schuler Galleries in the vicinity of the Hanebeek. The further advance
to this final objective was entrusted to the 164th and 174th Brigades,
who by a converging movement were to "squeeze out" the 2/4th Londons
leaving them in occupation of what would become a line of supporting
posts at the end of the day.

Before the assembly a preliminary reconnaissance of the terrain was
carried out by the company commanders, and in connection with this
Capt. Hetley writes:

I think all were impressed by the wonderful sight at Admirals Road.
This unsavoury road ran parallel to the front about 1500 yards or
more to the rear of St Julien and when passing over it on the
duckboard track, there could be seen guns in such large quantities
that there seemed to be very little greater interval than 150-200
yards between them in any direction--a really wonderful contrast to
April 1915, when the Lahore Division was on exactly the same spot.

On the evening of the 19th September Brigade Headquarters were
established at Cheddar Villa, while the 2/4th Londons' Battle
Headquarters opened in St Julien. The assembly was conducted by
Capt. Grover and Lieut. Seys (Intelligence Officer) who were solely
responsible for an operation which proved exceedingly difficult owing
to the still heavy state of the ground. So bad was the mud that men
constantly sank to their knees, and in some cases touch could only be
maintained by tying the men of each section together with tapes. In
spite of these difficulties the 400 men were in position by 3 a.m.
on the 20th without a hitch, and with practically no casualties,
although the most advanced platoons were within 150 yards of the enemy
positions. The assembly completed, the 2/3rd Londons who were holding
the line withdrew a short distance to the rear.

The assault was delivered at 5.40 a.m. under cover of an intense
creeping barrage which proved to be excellent, and companies moved off
in good order in the half light close up to the barrage. The companies
were disposed as follows: on the right A Company (S. Davis) with two
platoons and Headquarters of D Company (Stark) attached; in the centre
B Company (Hetley); and on the left C Company (Hewlett) with two
platoons of D Company attached.

The principal resistance, as had been anticipated, was encountered
in the neighbourhood of Winnipeg cross-roads, and at a pillbox which
lay between them and the cemetery. This was most gallantly captured
single-handed by Pte. Bolton, A Company, who bayonetted three of the
occupants and captured the remainder consisting of an officer and three
men. A slight check at the cross-roads produced a further small bag of
prisoners, sixteen in number, of whom one was an officer. On the left
the chief opposition was encountered at a pillbox some 300 yards east
of Springfield which was holding up the advance of C Company and of
the 174th Brigade on the left. 2/Lieut. F. W. Walker, quickly grasping
the situation, outflanked the position with six men, and succeeded in
rushing it, capturing two machine-guns and twenty men who were sent
back under escort, Walker and the rest of his party at once pushing on
to the objective where touch was gained with the 174th Brigade. Within
half an hour the 2/4th Londons were established on their objective,
the consolidation of which was promptly put in hand, while the flank
brigades after a pause of half an hour pressed forward to their final
objectives in accordance with the plan of attack.

The complete success of this operation was undoubtedly due to the
careful provision which had been made in advance for the capture
of strong points by specially detailed units who thus ensured the
efficient "mopping-up" of all ground captured, while enabling the
remainder of the assaulting column to keep well up to the barrage.

Owing to the known strength of Schuler Farm in the final objective,
special arrangements had been made for the attack of this point,
in conjunction with the 164th Brigade, by a strong platoon of D
Company 2/4th Londons with which two tanks were to co-operate in an
outflanking movement from the north. The earliest reports from this
region indicated that the attack had been successful, but subsequent
information made it clear that the first attack failed, partly owing
to the non-arrival of the tanks which stuck fast in the mud, and
partly owing to unexpected resistance met with at a machine-gun post
some 150 yards in advance of the farm. The capture of this post,
which produced 16 prisoners and 2 guns, cost the lives of 2/Lieut.
Warren and the whole platoon except Sergt. Watson and 6 men. The
delay caused, moreover, was serious, and by the time the survivors
of the platoon were able to continue their advance, the barrage had
passed beyond Schuler Farm. Sergt. Watson, being of opinion that the
strength of his party was insufficient to justify an attack on the main
position, sent back his prisoners and established himself with the
captured machine-guns at a point about 250 yards south-east of Winnipeg
cross-roads.

[Illustration: THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, 1917 (2/4TH BATTALION)]

The shell fire of the enemy during the advance and subsequent to the
Battalion reaching its objective had been severe, and by this time
not more than 100 rifles of the 2/4th Londons remained effective.
Arrangements were therefore made to stiffen its line with one company
of the 2/3rd Londons. A further attack on Schuler Farm, to be
undertaken by the 2/3rd Londons, was organised for daybreak on the 21st.

At about three o'clock in the afternoon the enemy was observed to be
advancing in fours against the brigade on our right, and the artillery
was immediately called into action. In spite of heavy losses, however,
the enemy continued to advance with praiseworthy courage until they
deployed, when their morale appeared to break and their ranks rapidly
melted under our shell fire.

During the remainder of the day a good deal of annoyance was caused by
the continued sniping from Schuler Farm, of which the Germans remained
in possession, but no further counter-attack developed on our front,
and night fell with the 2/4th Londons' position intact. The casualties
already suffered had been heavy, and three company commanders, Hewlett,
Stark and Davis, had unluckily been hit, though the last was able to
remain with his company until after relief the following evening, when
having been wounded a second time he was evacuated.

The attack of the platoon of the 2/3rd Londons under 2/Lieut.
Middlemiss on the 21st was postponed for further reconnaissance, in
the course of which Middlemiss observed the garrison of Schuler Farm
surrender to men of the 164th Brigade. Believing the situation to be
clear he proceeded along the road, but was hit by fire from a post
by the Hanebeek near that established by Sergt. Watson. Middlemiss'
report, which was the first information obtained of the fall of Schuler
Farm, caused the alteration of his platoon's objective to the pillbox
from which he had been hit, but in the evening this was found to have
been evacuated by its garrison, so that the whole position was now in
our hands.

During the evening of the 21st violent counter-attacks under cover of
intense bombardments were delivered against the 164th and 174th Brigade
sectors, but these were dispersed, and the 2/4th Londons did not come
into action though their newly-dug trenches were almost obliterated by
the German shell fire and many more casualties occurred.

At 9 p.m. on the 21st, the 2/4th Londons handed over their position,
intact at all points, to the 2/9th Londons, and withdrew across
the Yser Canal to Dambre Camp, where they remained training and
reorganising for some days.

This was the most completely successful operation in which the 2/4th
Battalion had hitherto taken part, and indeed all along the line of the
Fifth Army attack the new methods which have been described met with
marked success.

The outstanding achievements of the day were those of 2/Lieut. Walker,
Sergt. Watson and Pte. Bolton, of which some description has already
been given, but reference should also be made to the excellent work
of Capt. S. Davis, whose clear grasp of situations and the accurate
and complete information with which he kept Headquarters constantly
supplied, were of great value; of Pte. Austin, runner of A Company,
who passed backwards and forwards several times with important
messages through intense barrages; of Pte. Bull, the only surviving
stretcher-bearer of A Company, who displayed the greatest coolness and
devotion in tending wounded men under heavy fire; and Lieut. Altounyan,
the medical officer, whose services were of the utmost value and
carried out under exceedingly trying conditions.

Mention should also be made of Pte. Anthony of the Battalion Signallers
who from an advanced point in the line established visual communication
with Brigade Headquarters, his station subsequently proving of great
value to the supporting artillery.

On the evening of the 19th Brig.-Gen. Freyberg, V.C., D.S.O., was
seriously hit on his way to Battle Headquarters at Cheddar Villa; but
he insisted on remaining at duty, and directed operations from his
stretcher, though wounded in ten places, until after news of the
complete capture of the objective was received the next day, when his
removal was insisted upon by the A.D.M.S. who came forward to fetch
him. Command of the Brigade was taken temporarily by Lieut.-Col. Dann,
D.S.O.

The following decorations were awarded after this action: 2/Lieut. F.
W. Walker, the D.S.O.; Capts. A. Grover and S. Davis, and Lieut. E. H.
R. Altounyan, the M.C.; Sergt. Watson, Ptes. Bolton, Austin, Anthony
and Bull, the D.C.M.; and Sergts. H. O. Wilderspin and F. W. Yandle,
Ptes. J. W. Ling and A. Westcott, the M.M.

The casualties sustained during the action included: 2/Lieuts. H. N.
Bundle, E. R. Seabury and W. D. Warren, killed; 2/Lieut. F. B. Burd,
died of wounds; Capts. W. A. Stark, H. A. T. Hewlett and S. Davis,
M.C., 2/Lieuts. D. S. Boorman, M. C. (at duty), A. J. Angel, W. F.
Vines and A. C. Knight, wounded; and 60 N.C.O.'s and men killed, 176
wounded and 29 missing.

The 58th Division remained in line after this attack, and on the 26th
September took part in the third general attack which was delivered
by the Second and Fifth Armies on a front of some six miles, of which
the northern limit was the Divisional sector. The attack was delivered
by the 175th Brigade and a further considerable success gained, the
Divisional front having been carried forward in the operations since
the 19th a total distance of about 1600 yards.

On the 27th September, the 2/4th Londons moved to Brake Camp, in the
Vlamertinghe area. Two days were occupied in training here, during
which the area in which the Battalion was located suffered on the
night of the 28th/29th September the most prolonged and serious
bombing by enemy aircraft it ever experienced, the bombardment lasting
without cessation from 9 p.m. to 2 a.m. Fortunately no casualties were
sustained.

At Brake Camp the following joined the Battalion:

Capt. R. C. Dickins.

2/Lieuts. C. C. Gibbs, D. G. Spring, F. J. Jones, E. G. Gardner and
A. W. Dodds (21st Londons); and 2/Lieut. S. J. Richardson
(7th Londons).

250 N.C.O.'s and men.

Further casualties during September included Lieut., C. Potter and
2/Lieuts. O. H. Mattison and J. McDonald, to hospital.

2/Lieut. Cook was appointed to the 173rd L.T.M. Battery.

On the 30th September the 58th Division was withdrawn from the line and
concentrated as Corps reserve for rest in the Nordausques area (eight
miles north-west of St Omer), and the 2/4th Londons moved by rail from
Vlamertinghe to Zouafques where they went into billets on the 1st
October. The train was followed and bombed during the journey by German
airmen, 1 sergeant and 2 men being killed.

During the period of the 58th Division's withdrawal from the line the
offensive was pressed forward under adverse conditions of weather.
The season was now becoming advanced and the condition of the ground
offered a far greater obstacle to our progress than the enemy's
resistance. Probably no series of battles of the whole war was waged
under such persistently adverse conditions, or imposed a greater
physical strain on the attacking troops. In every direction the
salient was by now a series of "shell hole lakes" the ground being
waterlogged and the mud more glutinous than ever. An increasing number
of casualties to men and beasts occurred through drowning in the shell
holes of this ghastly shell-battered inferno, but though the whole
forces of the elements seemed to be arrayed against us, advances of
enormous importance were achieved during the early part of October,
as a result of which the Allied positions were pushed forward to the
outskirts of Houthulst Forest, to the east of Poelcapelle and to within
2000 yards of Passchendaele.

The prolonged continuance of active operations was obviously becoming
increasingly difficult, but G.H.Q. was impelled to pursue the course
of this dreary offensive partly by reason of the serious situation
caused on the Italian front by the defeat of Caporetto at the end of
October, and partly by the need of containing as many German divisions
as possible during the preparations for the Cambrai battle, which were
not yet complete.

The 2/4th Londons remained at Zouafques training and reorganising for
over three weeks. Several drafts were received from the Base, which
together made the considerable addition of 244 N.C.O.'s and men to the
Battalion strength, thus bringing it above its numbers prior to the
action of the 20th September.

On the 15th October the Battalion was joined by 2/Lieut. H. G. Langton;
and by 2/Lieuts. H. A. Snell, J. R. Naylor and R. J. Richards (1st
Londons). During this period also 2/Lieuts. H. E. English and C. C. H.
Clifford were evacuated sick. Capt. S. H. Stedman was posted to the
173rd Brigade Labour Company at Louches.

On the 23rd October the 2/4th Londons returned by train to the
Vlamertinghe area and took over quarters in Siege Camp, moving the
following day to the concentration area on the canal bank, whence
the battle surplus under 2/Lieut. Askham left the Battalion for the
Divisional Depôt Battalion.

On the 25th October, Major W. A. Nunneley, second in command of the
Battalion since July 1916, fell sick and was evacuated to hospital, his
duties being taken over by the adjutant, Capt. A. Grover, M.C. Major
Nunneley was subsequently appointed to command the German officers'
Prisoners of War Camp at Donington Hall. Capt. Grover, M.C., was
succeeded in the Adjutancy by Lieut. F. W. Walker, D.S.O. On the 22nd
2/Lieut D. G. Spring was seconded to the XX Corps School as Instructor.

The operation in which the 173rd Brigade was detailed to take part
was arranged for the 26th October, and consisted of an attack on a
frontage from the Ypres-Roulers Railway (south of Passchendaele) to
beyond Poelcapelle. The task of the 173rd Brigade, who were flanked
on the right by the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division and on the left by
the 57th Division, was to carry forward the British line east of
Poelcapelle for some 700 yards in a due easterly direction astride the
Poelcapelle-Westroosebeeke Road. The Divisional frontage was some 1800
yards in length, and bounded on the north by the Poelcapelle-Staden
Road and on the south by the Lekkerbotebeek. The assaulting troops
were provided by the 2/2nd, 2/3rd and 2/4th Londons, while the 2/1st
Londons were in Brigade reserve, with two battalions of the 174th
Brigade concentrated in the old German trench system near St Julien,
also at the disposal of the 173rd Brigade.

The first objective, which was on the line Spider Crossroads-Moray
House, was to be taken by the 2/2nd and 2/3rd Battalions, while after a
pause of 45 minutes, the 2/4th Londons were to "leapfrog" through them
on to the second and final objective.

As in the September action, particular preparation was made for the
assault of all known pillboxes by special parties, and the system of
posts to be established by each company was carefully and definitely
decided beforehand. The whole strength of the Battalion was necessary
to cover the wide frontage allotted to it, the order of battle from
the right being D Company (C. A. Clarke), C Company (Boorman), B
Company (Hetley) and A Company (Dickins). In addition to the stipulated
frontage the Battalion was also held responsible for some 200 yards of
waterlogged ground near the Lekkerbotebeek on its right, over which
touch with the 63rd Division could not be actively maintained.

The attack was to be delivered under a creeping barrage supported by
heavy guns, machine-guns and smoke barrages, while look-out for enemy
counter-attacks was to be maintained by aeroplanes.

On the morning of the 25th the 2/4th Londons left Siege Camp in battle
order and moved forward to positions in the original front German
system where they remained until the afternoon. At 3 p.m. the forward
move was resumed, and the Battalion was completely assembled in its
allotted area immediately east of Poelcapelle by 10.15 p.m., Battalion
Headquarters being established at Gloster Farm.

The weather had for some days past shown a marked improvement, and
the ground over which the advance was to be made was reported to be
drying fast. But our much-tried troops could not escape their usual
fate in the matter of weather, for on the night of the 25th rain fell
pitilessly once more, filling up the shell holes, liquefying the mud
and drenching everyone to the skin. All movement was rendered a matter
of extraordinary difficulty, and when the time for the attack arrived
the assaulting columns could scarcely drag themselves forward.

The British front line being composed of a line of unconnected posts,
the actual "jumping-off " line was defined by tapes which made it
essential to attack before daybreak. At 5.30 a.m. the British barrage
came down, and the 2/2nd and 2/3rd Battalions followed by the 2/4th
began their laborious advance. The barrage was disappointing, for not
only was it not as well distributed as on former occasions, but, having
regard to the state of the ground, it advanced far too quickly so that
the assaulting troops were soon left far behind.

The 2/2nd Londons were successful in capturing four pillboxes of which
three were at Cameron Houses, about half-way to the first objective,
while the 2/3rd Londons on the left pushed forward to what was at
the time believed to be Spider cross-roads, but was probably a less
important road junction some 250 yards short of it. The line of this
cross-road and Cameron Houses was, however, the limit of the advance,
which was unsupported on the left owing to the adjoining division
on that flank having been held up. The only post taken by the 2/4th
Londons was Tracas Farm on the extreme right.

The men were now thoroughly exhausted by their efforts, and were
practically defenceless as the mud had choked rifles and Lewis guns,
and rendered them temporarily useless. Indeed, for over half an hour
the Battalion possessed hardly a single rifle which could be fired. At
this juncture the enemy counter-attacked in great force both at Cameron
Houses and on the unsupported left flank, and his attack, as was to
be expected in the circumstances, was successful, and our troops were
driven back with severe loss to the assembly line where the enemy's
advance was finally held.

After their rough handling of the morning it was clear that the
attacking battalions could not pursue the offensive or remain in the
line, and arrangements were accordingly made for their relief, on the
south of the Poelcapelle-Westroosebeeke Road by the 2/1st Londons and
on the north of it by the 2/7th Londons. The relief was completed by
10.15 p.m., and the 2/4th Londons returned to Siege Camp.

In other parts of the line greater success was achieved this day,
notably in the vicinity of Passchendaele where the Canadians captured
all their objectives, and on the extreme left in the area held by the
French.

The 26th October must be regarded as one of the most unfortunate days
ever experienced by the 2/4th Londons. The gallantry of officers,
N.C.O.'s and men alike left nothing to be desired, and their defeat
was at the hands of the elements far more than of the Germans. So bad
indeed was the state of the ground that not a few men, becoming stuck
in the mud and exhausted by their efforts to extricate themselves, met
their death by drowning in the flooded shell holes.

For their good work on this day decorations were awarded to Capt. C. A.
Clarke (the M.C.) and Pte C. H. W. Roberts (the D.C.M.).

The casualties sustained in this unfortunate affair were in officers:
2/Lieuts. F. J. Jones, H. G. Langton and J. R. Naylor, killed; 2/Lieut.
R. J. Richards, died of wounds; Capts. R. C. Dickins and D. S. Boorman,
M.C., 2/Lieuts. G. E. Lester, R. Michell, H. A. Snell and A. W. Dodds,
wounded; and in N.C.O.'s and men 25 killed, 214 wounded and 109
missing--a total of 359 all ranks. This was the most costly single day
in the history of the 2/4th Battalion.

The 2/4th Londons spent five days at Brake Camp cleaning up, resting
and reorganising, moving on the 1st November to Roads Camp, and on
the following day to St Jans-ter-biezen, about four miles west of
Poperinghe. The Battalion was now reduced to an organisation of
one company for fighting purposes, pending the arrival of further
reinforcements to fill the gaps created on the 26th October.

On the 6th November a further move was made to P Camp near Peselhoek,
north of Poperinghe, and here the Battalion remained for eight days,
all of which were occupied in training except for three working parties
of 100 N.C.O.'s and men under Capt. Hetley who proceeded to Gwent Farm
for stretcher-bearing duties.

[Illustration: _Passchendaele Ridge_]

A further attempt was made by the 175th Brigade on the 30th October to
complete the unfulfilled task of the 26th, but again the state of the
ground rendered the operation abortive. On the higher ground, however,
Canadian troops again achieved some success, and by the 6th November
had captured Passchendaele.

Thus was this stupendous offensive brought to a close. It had
been maintained for three and a half months under conditions of
unprecedented difficulty, and at enormous cost in personnel. Having
regard to the obstacles which were encountered at every step the
achievement was magnificent, and had served a definite purpose in the
War, not only by securing positions on the high ground for the winter,
but also by assisting our French and Italian Allies at a period when,
especially in the case of the latter, any operation which could relieve
the pressure on their front was of vital importance.

On the 15th November the Division was concentrated in Corps reserve,
and the 2/4th Londons moved to Piccadilly Camp in the Proven area.

The 2/4th Londons now spent a prolonged period out of the battle
area; occupying billets successively, after leaving Piccadilly Camp,
at Coulemby on the 26th November, at Bellebrune and Cremarest (about
twelve miles west of St Omer) from the 27th November to the 9th
December, and at Soult Camp near Brielen, to which the Battalion moved
on the last-mentioned date in anticipation of returning to the trenches.

This period of training passed with the usual routine of
"back-of-the-line" training in drill, musketry, bombing, route marching
and games, interspersed with highly welcome entertainments given by
the Divisional concert troop "The Goods." Advantage was taken of the
time spent in rest to refill the gaps in the Battalion's ranks, and an
excellent opportunity was afforded of assimilating the newly-received
drafts as they arrived and before they were called upon to go into
action. These drafts totalled 213 N.C.O.'s and men, but even with this
accession of strength the 2/4th Londons still remained considerably
weaker than prior to the recent action.

Officer reinforcements were more numerous in proportion, and included:

Lieuts. H. J. M. Williams and G. E. Lester.

2/Lieuts. R. W. Chamberlain, E. P. Higgs and L. H. Sheppard.

2/Lieut. F. B. Johnson (13th Londons).

Lieut. F. J. Griffiths, 2/Lieuts. F. E. Norrish, F. G. Williams, W.
H. G. Newman and W. Blair (20th Londons).

2/Lieuts. S. H. Jehu and J. R. Peryer (21st Londons).

Lieut. C. A. Sampson (25th Londons).

Lieuts. E. R. Howden and J. Cairns (A.S.C.).

On the 16th/17th December the 173rd Brigade took over the whole
Divisional sector, which constituted the left of the II Corps front,
from the Lekkerbotebeeke on the right to the Broembeek, a small stream
close to the Ypres-Staden Railway on the left. The Corps line was in
practically the same position as on the occasion of the Battalion's
last visit to this area, and ran roughly north and south in front of
Poelcapelle, and about 500 yards east of the Poelcapelle-Houthulst
Road. The front line, which was occupied in a series of isolated shell
hole posts, which were being strengthened and linked up to each other
as opportunity offered, was held by two battalions, with support
battalions in the captured German trenches around Langemarck and
Pilckem.

The 2/4th Battalion took over from the 2/10th Londons the left
support position in Eagle and Candle Trenches on the 16th December,
thus covering a depth of about 3500 yards. The ground between the
forward and rear companies was a quagmire of battered trenches, and
work was immediately necessary to attempt to reduce the chaos of the
defensive system to something approaching cohesion. After five quiet
days in these positions the Battalion moved forward to the left front
positions, relieving the 2/3rd Londons on the 20th December with three
companies in line and one in support. Headquarters were at Louis Farm.

With the exception of an attack against our left company which was
attempted under a severe barrage on the afternoon of the 22nd, and
which was effectually dispersed, the tour passed quietly and the
Battalion was relieved on the 24th December by the 2/10th Londons,
and concentrated at Battle Siding (Brielen), entraining there for
Elverdinghe. Casualties were 2/Lieut. Jehu and 10 N.C.O.'s and men
wounded and shell-shocked.

A week at Bridge No. 1 Camp, occupied for the most part in training and
bathing, was enlivened by the Christmas festivities, for which such
provision as was possible had been made, the outstanding feature being
the production by "The Goods" of their famous pantomime, "The Babes in
the Wood," which proved an immediate and enormous success.

New Year's Day 1918 found the Battalion once more in left support
positions in Whitemill, Eagle, Bear and Candle Trenches, with
Headquarters in dugouts at Langemarck which rejoiced in the name of Pig
and Whistle. Five days of peaceful trench work here were succeeded by
an uneventful tour in the front line positions, and on the 8th January
the Battalion handed over its trenches to the 17th Lancashire Fusiliers
preparatory to the withdrawal of the whole Division. Concentrating on
relief at Bridge No. 1 Camp the Battalion moved the following day to
School Camp, Proven, where a few days' rest was obtained. The G.O.C. II
Corps here presented ribands to those who had recently been decorated.

Officer reinforcements at this period were:

27th December--2/Lieuts. P. J. Payne, N. A. Brown and
V. C. Prince.

10th January--2/Lieuts. S. F. G. Mears, E. M.
Cuthbertson, S. C. Geering and G. C. Ewing.

Early in January Lieut. D. C. Cooke went to hospital and the medical
officer, Lieut. Altounyan, M.C. (wounded), was replaced by Lieut. C. E.
Dunaway, U.S. Army.

On the 21st January the 2/4th Londons finally left the Ypres area
after nearly five months of hard work in it, and the 58th Division was
transferred to the III Corps (Pulteney) in the Fifth Army which had now
removed to the extreme south of the British lines.

In recognition of their good work in these actions, all "other ranks"
of the Battalion were subsequently granted permission to wear a small
grenade--similar to that worn as a cap badge, but smaller--on the
corners of the tunic collar.

This closes the regiment's connection with the Ypres Salient, the
scene of so much hardship and suffering, but at the same time of so
much gallantry and devotion to duty. Ypres occupies a position in the
estimation of the Empire which is challenged by no place in which
British troops served in the War; and it must be for ever a source of
pride to the regiment that it was privileged to take part in the second
and third battles for its liberation from the Germans.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1917

The 30th August 1917 found the 1/4th Battalion much reduced in strength
moving from Arques to Bapaume, to the great satisfaction of all ranks,
for all had been expecting a return to the unhealthy conditions of the
Ypres Salient. On detrainment at Bapaume an evening march was made to
Beaulencourt, where quarters were allotted in a concentration camp.
This march was not without interest as it was the Battalion's first
introduction to the "devastated area," the appalling lifeless and
ruined belt of country left behind him by the Bosche in his retirement
from the Ancre-Scarpe salient to the Hindenburg line. Beaulencourt
lies between Bapaume and Le Transloy, and is thus on the ridge which
lay beyond the old Lesbœufs lines and which had proved the final check
to the Battalion's advances in the Somme battles of 1916. From the
village the Lesbœufs-Morval Ridge was visible, though of those two
ill-fated villages no ruins were discernible. The whole area was a
vast waste of rank vegetation which was rapidly covering the scars
of the previous year's battles without healing them. Shell fire had
contributed comparatively little to the desolation, but villages had
been completely demolished and trees felled, and the British troops
themselves provided the only relief to the awful silence of this
strange land from which the life of the fields had vanished.

The Battalion was now attached to the IV Corps (Woollcombe), and the
first few days were spent in very necessary reorganisation of its
slender resources in personnel. The casualties of the Ypres action were
not replaced by drafts, and each company was reduced to two platoons.
That such work as was possible was done to good purpose was shown on
the 4th September, when the Corps commander inspected the Battalion
and expressed himself gratified at the completeness and good order
of its clothing and equipment in view of its recent withdrawal from
the Flanders battlefield. This day was the third anniversary of the
Battalion's departure from England.

Between the 5th and 8th September the 56th Division took over from the
3rd the left sector of the IV Corps front. The new sector was held
with all three Brigades in line, each Brigade area being occupied with
two battalions in front trenches, one in Brigade support and one in
Divisional reserve, in positions facing the Hindenburg line from the
neighbourhood of Lagnicourt on the left to south of the Bapaume-Cambrai
Road in the vicinity of Demicourt on the right. Activity on the enemy's
part was evidently not anticipated in this area, for by this relief the
56th Division became responsible for a front of approximately 10,500
yards.

Of this front the 168th Brigade took over the left or Lagnicourt
sector, with Headquarters in dugouts about half a mile in rear of
Lagnicourt, the Headquarters of the Division being in Frémicourt. This
sector faced the village of Quéant, which was within the defences of
the Hindenburg line. The front line of the left subsector consisted of
a series of platoon posts which were not yet connected up, numbered
respectively C 18/5, C 18/6, C 12/1, C 12/2, C 12/3 and C 12/4.
These posts were the original battle outpost positions which had
been constructed earlier in the year during the advance towards the
Hindenburg line. No Man's Land here averaged 1000 yards wide, and
though from most of these posts the enemy front line was invisible
owing to the lie of the ground, they were all, except on the left,
unapproachable from our side, except under cover of darkness. Some
500 yards in rear of this chain of defences ran a continuous trench
known as the intermediate line, well constructed, with deep dugouts,
moderately strong wire and a good field of fire. Battalion Headquarters
were in dugouts in the sunken road on the left of Lagnicourt, and were
connected with the intermediate line by a communication trench called
Dunelm Avenue. Forward of the intermediate line there was but one
trench leading to the advanced positions and this, Wakefield Avenue,
connected with Post C 18/6.

In this area the Battalion settled down very comfortably to a period
of two months' routine work in and out of the trenches, unbroken by
operations of any interest, and happily almost entirely free from
casualties. In order to avoid the tedium of following closely the
common round of duty we propose to deal with these months by means of a
few general remarks on the life of the Battalion.

During this period the Battalion was joined by the following officers:

Capt. E. E. Spicer, Lieuts. A. Bath and A. M. Duthie, and 2/Lieut.
E. L. Mills.

and by the following attached officers:

2/Lieuts. W. Shand, E. Petrie, C. W. Rowlands, and E. A. Ratcliffe
(1st Londons).

2/Lieut. A. Franks (6th Londons).

2/Lieut. W. H. Eastoe (7th Londons).

2/Lieuts. E. L. Stuckey, C. S. Richards and A. B. Creighton (17th
Londons).

2/Lieuts. F. Barnes, F. S. C. Taylor, R. S. B. Simmonds, J. L.
Backhouse and E. D. Buckland (20th Londons).

Tours of duty were six-day periods as follows:

6 days in Lagnicourt } 2 companies in posts.
left subsector } 2 " intermediate line.
6 days in Brigade support--either side of Lagnicourt village.
6 days in Lagnicourt } Dispositions as before but companies
left subsector } changed over.
6 days in Divisional reserve--at Frémicourt, and so on.

The transport lines and Quartermaster's stores were at Frémicourt,
where permanent horse standings, kitchens, butcher's shop and stores
were erected on an elaborate scale, which appeared to suggest that all
ranks were quite prepared to settle down permanently in this unusually
pleasant sector.

In the line a very considerable amount of work was got through during
September and October. The front line posts were linked up by a
continuous traversed trench, about 7 feet deep and 3 feet wide at the
bottom, and provided with "baby elephant" shelters for the garrison.
Two embryo trenches in which forward company headquarters were
situate--Whitley and York supports--were extended and strengthened and
the intermediate line was maintained. In addition a large amount of
additional wire was put out.

While in Brigade support the Battalion always occupied shelters in the
sunken roads which ran parallel to the lines each side of Lagnicourt
village, B and D Companies being on the north side and A and C
Companies and Battalion Headquarters on the south. The dwellings here
were much improved, and fresh ones were constructed, of which the best
were one built under the supervision of Lieut. Bath and "Twin Villa" by
Headquarters. Not all the Battalion's time, however, was devoted to the
adornment of its own homes, for the support battalion was invariably
called upon to supply heavy working parties, the largest of which were
digging under the R.E.'s, while others were attached to tunnelling
companies for the construction of additional deep dugouts at trench
headquarters and in the intermediate line.

Training was not overlooked, and a great deal of valuable work was
effected. In particular mention should be made of the signallers, who
attained a very high pitch of proficiency under Lieut. Gray, while
Sergt. Randall achieved much success with the Lewis gunners, and
Sergts. Oakely and Taylor did very good work with bombers and rifle
grenadiers.

In the line the enemy's activity on the Battalion's front was slight
and confined to occasioned shelling and trench mortaring, of which the
bulk occurred at night. The sectors right and left of the Battalion
came in for a rather greater share of the enemy's hatred. The London
Scottish on the right were immediately opposed to a network of trenches
sapped out from the Hindenburg front line, known as the Quéant
Birdcage, and in this vicinity a certain degree of bickering was always
in progress, in the course of which IV Corps developed a pleasing
habit of discharging gas projectors--about 600 at a time--against the
Birdcage. The Bosche, however, did not retaliate. It should not,
however, be supposed that the Division had settled down for a prolonged
rest in this quiet sector. Day and night our excellent artillery were
searching for--and finding--the enemy's "weak spots," and up and down
the sector No Man's Land was every night the scene of very great
patrolling activity. In this direction really useful work was effected
by the Battalion Scouts under Lieut. O. D. Garratt, M.C., and Sergts.
Housden and Hayes.

The great width of No Man's Land facilitated the operation of a novel
method of supplying the Battalion when in trenches with rations and
stores. The limbers came up nightly as usual from transport lines at
Frémicourt to trench headquarters at Lagnicourt, and from this point
the rations were sent up to company headquarters in half limbers and on
pack mules; whereby a considerable saving of troops for work elsewhere
was effected. On one of these nightly journeys a bridge over Wakefield
Avenue broke and precipitated an elderly transport horse, named Tommy,
on to his back in the trench. It was two hours' hard work to dig room
round him to get him up and make a ramp for him to walk out of the
trench! Tommy's mishap was commemorated in the new bridge which was
named Horsefall Bridge.

A nasty accident in the line was averted by the coolness of Pte.
Bunker, A Company. While a section was cleaning some Mills bombs one
of the pins fell out and the bomb, with the fuse burning, fell among
the men. Bunker picked it up and threw it out of the trench, when it at
once exploded. For this action Bunker was awarded the M.S.M.

In the first week of October, while the Battalion was in line, a series
of heavy explosions was heard behind the enemy line in the vicinity of
Quéant and Pronville and these, combined with the sudden disappearance
one night of Baralle chimney--a well-known observation point in the
enemy's country--conduced to the belief, which held sway for a few
days, that a further Bosche retirement was imminent. This, of course,
did not materialise.

Although we are not recording the actions of the Divisional Artillery
we may, perhaps, be pardoned for quoting the following crisp little
record from the Divisional Intelligence Summary as illustrating how
well the infantry was served by its guns. The incident occurred on the
10th October:

Movement was seen at an O.P. or sentry post about D.7.d.4.6. An
18-pr. opened fire, but the first shot fell a few yards wide,
whereupon the German observer waved a "washout" signal with a piece
of white paper. The second shot, however, altered his opinion of
our artillery.

His amended opinion has, unfortunately, not been recorded.

The losses of the Battalion in personnel up to the end of October
were practically nil, this being accounted for by the vastness of the
terrain and the fact that about 450 men were occupying some 5000 yards
of firing and communication trench. On the 28th October, however, the
Battalion had the misfortune to lose two promising young officers,
2/Lieuts. Elders and Barnes, both of whom were killed by shells during
an enemy shoot on Posts C 12/3 and C 12/4.

During this period also the Battalion sustained a great loss in
Regimental Sergt.-Major M. Harris, who took his discharge after nearly
twenty-three years of soldiering in the Royal Fusiliers and the 4th
Londons. Sergt.-Major Harris had served continuously with the 1/4th
Battalion since mobilisation, and had filled the position of Senior
Warrant Officer with conspicuous success since March 1915. The last
member of the pre-war permanent staff to remain on active service with
the Battalion, Harris' imperturbable geniality was the means of adding
enormous force to his disciplinary strictness. His share in achieving
the Battalion's efficiency can hardly be over-rated, while his kindly
personality was ever a factor in the social life of the Battalion.
Harris was gazetted Lieutenant and Quartermaster to the Battalion in
the reconstituted Territorial Army in July 1921. The duties of R.S.M.
in the 1/4th Battalion were taken by C.S.M. Jacques.

At the end of October information was circulated among commanding
officers that active operations were imminent. The secrets of the
operations were jealously guarded, and only a vague idea was given as
to what would be the opening day. On the 10th November, however, orders
were issued for a feint attack to be delivered by the 56th Division,
which would be on the left of the main operation. This feint was to
be accompanied by a heavy bombardment by all available batteries, by
a smoke screen and the display of dummy figures over the parapet.
Dummy tanks were also to be erected in No Man's Land, and the illusion
completed--or anyway increased--by running motor cycle engines in the
front line trenches. Arrangements for this demonstration were pushed
on with vigour, and it was understood that Z day would fall during the
Battalion's occupancy of the line.

On the evening of the 18th, however, the 167th Brigade extended to its
left, taking over the 168th sector, and thus holding a two-brigade
front. The 168th Brigade was concentrated in close billets in
Frémicourt and Beugny, the Battalion being in the former village.

* * * * *

The preparations for the offensive were conducted with the greatest
possible secrecy, and in order to secure the maximum surprise effect
it was arranged for the attack to be delivered without any preliminary
bombardment or even registration of batteries, the road into the
enemy's defences being cleared instead by a vast number of tanks.

The attack was delivered by the IV (Woollcombe) III (Pulteney) and
VII (Snow) Corps, on a six-mile front, between Hermies and Gonnelieu,
a subsidiary operation being conducted north of Bullecourt by the VI
Corps (Haldane). The 56th Division was thus outside the actual area of
advance, but was to co-operate on the opening day by means of the feint
attack, for which it had already made preparations, and its further
action was to depend on the success gained in the main operation. The
left flank of the area of advance was intersected by the Canal du Nord,
running between Bourlon and Mœuvres. The frontage in this region was
taken up by the 36th (Ulster) Division, which adjoined the right flank
of the 56th and was the left of the whole attack. The 36th was to
attack with two brigades east of the Canal and one brigade west, the
Division moving northwards along the Hindenburg system towards Mœuvres.
The rôle of the 56th Division was to depend on the degree of success
attained by the 36th. If the latter's attack succeeded in forcing the
retirement of the enemy west of the Canal, this area would be occupied
by the brigade of the 36th Division which was on the west bank; if,
however, this success was not achieved the 56th Division was to attack
over the open with tanks, the 169th Brigade advancing on a front
between Mœuvres and Tadpole Copse, and the 167th forming a defensive
flank from the Copse to our present front line.

The enormous success which attended the initial stages of the Cambrai
battle needs no elaboration here. At 6.30 a.m. on 30th November
the dead silence was suddenly broken by the roar of a very great
concentration of batteries of all calibres up to 15-inch, and preceded
by 380 tanks the assaulting divisions swept over the first and second
systems of the Hindenburg line.

With the exception of a check due to the destruction of the Canal de
l'Escaut Bridge at Masnières, and of another at Flesquières (where
a most gallant resistance to the 51st Division was put up by a
single German officer, who continued to serve his gun after all the
team were killed and succeeded in knocking out several tanks), the
success of the day was considerable. The villages of Havrincourt,
Graincourt, Ribecourt, Marcoing and La Vacquerie were added to the
British territory, and it was obvious that the surprise effect had been
complete.

On the left the 36th Division established itself north of the Cambrai
Road, astride the Hindenburg line, and the 169th Brigade swung its
right flank northward to conform to its neighbours' movements.

The following day at an early hour the Flesquières obstacle was
overcome and the British line swept forward, the villages of Masnières,
Noyelles, Cantaing and Anneux being added to the bag, while on the
left Fontaine-Notre-Dame was entered and the line pushed up to the
southern edge of Bourlon Wood. On the left of the 36th the 169th
Brigade kept pace, one of their battalions occupying the first
Hindenburg trench about one of the roads forming the south-west exit of
Mœuvres, and beginning to bomb northwards.

The 21st November witnessed a further deep inroad into the Hindenburg
system. The 36th Division succeeded during the morning in penetrating
into Mœuvres but were not able to maintain their position. On the
extreme left the 169th Brigade continued their bombing attacks along
the enemy trenches, and were reported in the late afternoon as having
captured Tadpole Copse and the first and second Hindenburg trenches
beyond it as far as the Inchy Road.

* * * * *

In the Battalion at Frémicourt the 20th November passed without
incident, but all ranks awaited anxiously news of the battle, and
for the expected orders to move forward and join in the success. No
movement was made, however, and the day passed slowly, as such days of
keen expectancy always do.

The hour for general action by the 56th Division was approaching, and
the 1/4th Londons received orders at 3.30 p.m. on the 21st to move
forward with transport and stores to Lebucquière, which was reached at
8.15 p.m., accommodation being provided in Cinema Camp. The Battalion
was now prepared for action, and the nucleus personnel under Major
Phillips, the second in command (attached from Montgomery Yeomanry),
remained at Frémicourt.

Next morning the Battalion made all preparations for an early
participation in the fight and, in order to save fatigue to the men,
all battle impedimenta such as Lewis guns and magazines, bombs, tools
and wire cutters were sent on limbers to an open space near Doignies.

Shortly after midday the Battalion followed, arriving at Doignies
at 4 p.m., picking up its stores and bivouacking. In the meantime
Lieut.-Col. Marchment, M.C., accompanied by Capt. Maloney, the doctor,
rode forward to ascertain the situation from the London Scottish, who
were holding the old British front line opposite Tadpole Copse.

The rain, which had started early in the day, was still falling when
the Battalion arrived at Doignies. The village was a good deal knocked
about, but shelter of a sort was found, and the Battalion was just
well off to sleep when it was turned out again to move nearer the line
for the purpose of taking over the British front line from the London
Scottish early next day. About midnight the Battalion got under way in
pitch darkness, and moving through Louverval reached its assembly area
near Piccadilly and about 500 yards in rear of the line by 4.10 a.m. on
the 23rd November. As soon as the growing daylight permitted, companies
resumed their advance and took over Rook, Rabbit and Herring Trenches
from the London Scottish, Headquarters occupying a sunken road north
of the wood surrounding Louverval Château. On relief the assaulting
companies of the London Scottish moved forward to continue the bombing
attack started by the 169th Brigade.

News of the operation was slow in coming through, but by 10.17 a.m.
a report reached Brigade that the attackers had been checked on
endeavouring to emerge from Tadpole Copse. This check was due to a
peculiar omission in the British trench maps, which had shown Tadpole
Copse on the crest of a spur, and dominating all the ground in its
immediate vicinity. It was found that between the Copse and the Inchy
Road was a narrow and sharply marked depression bordered by the
declivitous banks which abound in this undulating countryside. Beyond
this unsuspected valley the Inchy Road was on an eminence just as
prominent as the Tadpole Copse hill; and this position, held by the
enemy in great strength, enabled them to overlook completely all the
northern exits from the Copse. This valley, which played an important
part in the course of the battle, was found subsequently to be
correctly marked on German maps which were captured during the action.

After a stubborn fight the London Scottish overcame this obstacle
and pushed home their attack in the Hindenburg front trench almost as
far as Adelaide Street and in the support 100 yards beyond the Inchy
Road; while a subsidiary attempt was made, without success, to capture
the Factory between this point and Inchy. At these points the enemy
had constructed blocks which he held strongly against all attempts to
dislodge him. In the meantime the 169th Brigade had been bombing up
the communications leading back to the second system of the Hindenburg
lines, with the object of isolating Mœuvres, but the resistance met
with here was exceedingly stubborn.

About 8 o'clock that night the enemy launched a heavy attack against
the London Scottish barricades, and in the support trench they
succeeded in forcing the Scottish back to the Inchy Road, though the
position in the front trench was held. The Scottish had now been
fighting for over twelve hours and had suffered rather serious losses,
and the German counter-attack caused two companies of the 1/4th Londons
to be drawn into the fight, A Company (Franks) and C (Barkworth) moving
forward to reinforce the Scottish at about 8.30 p.m.

A Company, which advanced first, took up a position, acting under the
orders of Lieut.-Col. Jackson of the London Scottish, in the old German
outpost line outside Tadpole Copse, while No. 1 Platoon (Ballance)
went forward to reinforce the Scottish company in the front Hindenburg
trench. Affairs having quieted down the services of this platoon
were not immediately necessary, and it shortly afterwards rejoined
the company. In the meantime No. 2 Platoon (Creighton) was sent to
reinforce the Scottish at the bombing block in the support trench, and
while here Corpl. Johnson and Pte. Bendelow succeeded in beating off an
enemy attack.

C Company, which also took up a preliminary position in the old
German outpost line, was first told off to replenish the supply of
bombs from the brigade dump in Houndsditch. The fresh supplies were
carried to London Scottish Headquarters; and this task completed, the
company occupied the rectangular work in the support trench to the
east of Tadpole Copse, a portion of the second Hindenburg trench in
rear of the Copse, and the communication trench connecting it with
the Hindenburg third line, 2/Lieut. Mills being responsible for this
communication trench and the advanced block about 250 yards along it.
2/Lieut. Stuckey occupied the main trench. These latter trenches were
taken over from the 2nd Londons early on the 24th.

B and D Companies meanwhile had not been idle but had passed the night
providing a covering party to a company of the Cheshire Pioneers, by
whom a chain of redoubts had been dug in the line selected for the
defensive flank.

At 5.30 a.m. on the 24th B Company (Beeby) moved forward, also coming
under the orders of the London Scottish, and at first took up a
position in support in the old outpost line outside the Hindenburg
system. Almost immediately the company was ordered forward to relieve
the 2nd Londons in the communication trench leading to the rear from
the Quadrilateral held by C Company.

The morning passed comparatively quietly though the duty of keeping
wicket behind the bombing blocks was a trying one, which entailed
the constant alertness of all ranks in readiness to meet a sudden
emergency. At noon, however, the enemy put down a heavy barrage on the
captured portions of the Hindenburg trenches, and this was followed at
2 p.m. by a most determined attack on the advanced blocks held by the
London Scottish. This met with considerable success, and though the
Scottish fought with gallantry they were overcome by the weight of the
enemy's onslaught, and by 2.45 p.m. the German bombers had reached the
block held by Mills (C Company), who put up a stout resistance, under
orders from his company commander to hold his post failing further
orders. In this he was helped by the company's Lewis guns, which gave
covering fire to Mills' platoon and the London Scottish, and also
engaged the enemy at the Inchy Road Factory. Three of the guns were
destroyed by the enemy's shell fire.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1917]

The trench was already uncomfortably filled with casualties in addition
to the men who were keeping up the fight, but in a few moments the
congestion was greatly increased by the numbers of Scottish troops who
began to come back and file along the trench. At about 3 p.m. about
50 of the London Scottish were seen to leave the Hindenburg support
trench in the hidden valley referred to, with the object of making
their way over the open towards the front trench. Realising that
this vacation of the trench might enable the enemy to surge forward
along it and so cut off Mills, who was still holding his own up the
communication trench, Barkworth promptly ordered Stuckey to advance and
form a block beyond the side trench held by Mills. Stuckey's losses,
however, had been severe, and with only five men at his disposal he
was unable to cope with the task in view of the great congestion of
the trench. Rather than risk the sudden cutting off of his remaining
slender resources in men and the laying open to the enemy of the whole
Tadpole Copse position, which would inevitably result, Barkworth now
decided to withdraw his advanced positions and concentrate his company,
and accordingly Stuckey was ordered to block the support trench at the
west entrance to the Quadrilateral, Mills gradually withdrawing and
holding the enemy off till the new block was completed. In this retired
position the remnants of C Company were in touch with B Company and
also with the 2nd Londons, and here the enemy was finally held up.

This gallant little defence in which C Company put up a really good
fight and inflicted considerable loss on the enemy, cost it about 40
per cent. of its strength in casualties and, as already stated, three
of its Lewis guns.

At the same time B Company had been heavily engaged in its
communication trench, of which it held a length of some 250 yards back
from the second trench. Here the enemy, who had a bombing block about
50 yards from B Company's forward block, began to attack at about 2.30
p.m., but after a struggle his first attempt was thrown back. A little
later the Bosche returned to the charge, and this time was successful
in forcing B Company back for a short distance, but a determined
counter-attack re-established the position, which, after a third and
also abortive enemy assault, remained intact in the Company's hands.

While the 1/4th Londons had been thus heavily engaged the London
Scottish had made a successful resistance in the front Hindenburg
trench which defied all the enemy's attempts. Towards the evening the
enemy's activity both in shell fire and bombing somewhat lessened,
and at 8.30 p.m. D Company (Duthie) was also sent forward relieving C
Company in the trenches. At the same time the Rangers took over from
the Scottish in the front trench.

As the fighting on the 24th was somewhat involved, it seems desirable
to restate the positions now held by the companies of the Battalion in
the Hindenburg system:

Front Line--D Company--Quadrilateral in support trench, and
communication leading up to front trench.

B Company--Communication trench leading from the
Quadrilateral back to third trench.

Support Line--A and C Companies and Headquarters--Front
trench from west edge of Tadpole Copse to
communication trench east of it and old German
outpost line in front of the Copse.

The 25th November also witnessed very severe fighting in which the
1/4th Londons bore an important part and achieved considerable
success. The fighting this day fell to D Company who had not yet been
engaged, and the objective allotted to them was the recapture of the
lost portion of the Hindenburg support trench as far as its junction
with the communication trench, which had been defended by Mills the
previous day. At the same time the Rangers were to make good the two
communication trenches leading back from the front trench to the
support on the east side of the Inchy Road, and also the support trench
in prolongation of Duthie's attack.

We propose to narrate this gallant little action of D Company in the
words of Duthie's report on the operation:

Artillery preparation began at 12.30 p.m. It was reported to be
very short on our right. Our two blocks were removed at 12.45 p.m.
At Zero (1 p.m.) the attack commenced. The Company was disposed as
follows:

14 Platoon, 2/Lieut. E. Petrie, Bombers, Rifle Grenadiers, Riflemen
(carrying); 13 Platoon, 2/Lieut. C. W. Rowlands, with sections
in same order.[5] Lewis gun sections took up a position near our
blocks so as to fire along the trench and to prevent any movement
in the open. Company Headquarters moved with the leading platoon.
For about 50 yards very little opposition was met with but the
leading bombing section was then held up by stick bombs and
suffered eight casualties, which included the leading bombers. To
overcome this check fire was opened for several minutes with No. 23
and No. 24 Rifle Grenades, and the trench was searched forward for
about 100 yards. The shooting was very accurate and the enemy were
driven back with the loss of about 5 men killed. The advance was
continued by bounds of from 20 to 40 yards under cover of salvoes
of rifle grenades. The first two deep dugouts were unoccupied. The
third and fourth were not immediately searched but sentries were
posted. It was thought that some of the C Company men who had been
wounded the previous day might still be down there. The small C.T.
(about 100 yards from the Quadrilateral) was blocked about 120
yards up. At the entrance a good deal of bombing was overcome. This
is a shallow trench and the far end under water. Further delay was
caused by the third and fourth dugouts which were found to contain
21 of the enemy. These were finally cleared. Several were killed
and the remainder badly wounded and captured. The company then
pushed forward to trench junction at E 13 c. 15.75 (objective) and
reached it about 2.45 p.m. The Lewis gun sections were brought up
and placed in suitable positions to protect a further advance and
also the blocking party in the small C.T. None of the Rangers were
encountered and the trench appeared unoccupied, but bombing was
thought to be heard about 300 yards further along.

[5] Companies were still organised in two platoons owing to their
reduced strength, which had not been made good since the third battle
of Ypres.

A small block was made in this trench about 30 yards from the
junction. The enemy was now observed leaving the trench and
crawling over the open towards the bank at D 18 d. 90.98 (in the
unsuspected valley). Heavy rifle fire was opened and at least
30 of the enemy killed. Few, if any, got over the bank. As the
trench beyond the objective appeared to be unoccupied a party of
12 including O.C. Company, 2/Lieut. Rowlands, Sergts. Norris and
Arklay, moved on up the trench. No fire was opened and silence was
maintained. In the next bay past the trench at E 13 c. 00.85 (50
yards beyond the objective) two men were seen firing a machine-gun
which was mounted on the parapet and aimed down the bank (in the
valley). This was rushed.... The gun was dismounted and brought
in. Other guns were heard firing and two more were seen (at points
farther along the trench in the valley described in the report
by map reference). Two parties under Sergts. Norris and Arklay
moved round to a point from which fire could be brought to bear.
The crews of two men to each gun were killed and the guns brought
in. O.C. Company and Sergt. Norris continued to advance along the
trench and up to the top of the bank. Heavy bombing could be seen
in Tadpole Lane and in the front line towards the Inchy Road.
Further advance was prevented by the fire of our own guns firing
on the trench in response to S.O.S. signal which had been sent up
from the front line. The trench was very full of dead, both of
the London Scottish and of the enemy. It was impossible to walk
without treading on them. As our barrage continued the party moved
back to our original objective and blocks were made at this trench
junction. The remainder of the party carried back four wounded
London Scottish, who were found in the open near the bank. Later in
the evening when our barrage was discontinued an attack was made
on our block. The enemy was quickly silenced. At 11 p.m. D Company
were relieved by A Company.

A very successful operation, and a modest account of it by Duthie,
whose personality and leadership was an important factor in the result
achieved. The two men in charge of the first gun captured were shot
by Duthie with his revolver. The resistance offered to the Rangers
was stubborn, and but for their inability to advance it is possible a
considerable success might have been achieved, since the barrage put
down by our guns, in response to the Rangers' S.O.S., had the effect of
shelling Duthie out of part of his gains.

The remainder of the day was inactive, no further fighting taking place
till about 11.30 a.m. on the 26th, when once more the enemy attempted
to force B Company's position in the communication trench. The company,
however, repeated its gallantry of the former occasion, and the enemy
retired later without having gained any success.

At 11.30 p.m. on the 26th the Battalion was relieved by the
Kensingtons, withdrawing on relief to its former position in the
Brigade support area behind the old British front line. This relief
brought to a close the Battalion's active participation in the British
offensive, which was now practically spent. During the very trying
three days spent behind the bombing blocks in circumstances which
required particular vigilance and fortitude, all ranks had behaved
splendidly, and it is difficult to mention individuals when all had
rendered such excellent service. A few names, however, call for
outstanding mention, among these being Capt. S. J. Barkworth, M.C.,
M.M., and Capt. A. M. Duthie, the commanders of C and D Companies, on
whom the brunt of the work had fallen, and their subalterns Rowlands
and Mills. The Padre, the Rev. S. F. Leighton Green, did splendid
service throughout, being always about the Hindenburg lines and going
up to the advanced blocks. At night he was constantly visiting and
helping with casualties and administering the last rites to those who
had fallen.

The whole action as far as the Division was concerned had developed on
lines completely opposed to the original plans; for whereas it had been
proposed to employ the Division in the open with tanks, its fighting
throughout had been hand-to-hand fighting in trenches. The regularity
and sufficiency with which bomb supplies found their way to the front
indicated excellent organisation. At no time did supplies fall short of
the demand.

It was a surprise to a good many to find the much vaunted Hindenburg
line inferior to our own defences. The outpost line which the companies
first occupied was a gross delusion, for it was only six inches deep,
while the main line was poor and not over well maintained, and the
Bosche ideas of sanitation could only be described as a scandal.

The casualties sustained during the three days' fighting were light in
view of the close contact with the enemy. Two officers, 2/Lieuts. R. S.
B. Simmonds and E. Petrie, were wounded, and the total losses in other
ranks amounted to about 60, including two valuable N.C.O.'s killed,
viz.: Sergts. Barker and Gooch, and one, Sergt. Lintott, M.M., wounded
and captured.

At midnight on the 24th November the 56th Division had passed from the
IV to the VI Corps. Its position at the conclusion of the offensive
operations was one of almost dangerous extension. It had captured and
was holding over a mile of the Hindenburg line. Its right flank was
not secure so long as Mœuvres remained in the enemy's hands; its left
flank on the Tadpole Copse spur was exposed and subject to constant
counter-attacks. Two of its brigades were involved in this fighting
and in holding a defensive flank of 2000 yards, while the remaining
brigade, the 167th, was responsible for a frontage in the old British
line of 5500 yards, and had in addition to supply a battalion each
night for consolidation of the captured position. It was thus unable
to provide relief for the troops who had been fighting, and was
without any reserve for use in case of emergency. Representations
made by General Dudgeon to the Corps Commander as to the weakness of
his position resulted in a battalion of the 3rd Division being at
once placed at the disposal of the 167th Brigade for counter-attack
purposes. This temporary relief was extended a few days later, and by
the 29th the whole of the 167th Brigade had been relieved by troops of
the 3rd Division and was withdrawn at Frémicourt in Divisional reserve,
with two of its battalions lent temporarily to the 168th Brigade.

The three days following relief were spent by the Battalion in support
in providing carrying and working parties in the front line and burying
parties for the fallen. On the 29th a slight side step to the left
was made so that the Battalion's right flank rested on Piccadilly and
it became responsible for the defensive flank. A considerable amount
of work had been done in this quarter, and the flank was now provided
with a continuous belt of wire and a chain of inter-supporting posts.
A communication trench had been dug from the old line across No Man's
Land to the Hindenburg line parallel to Piccadilly, a distance of some
1300 yards, and from this T-head trenches had been sapped forward
facing north. The defensive flank positions were only occupied at
night, the trench garrison taking two companies, A and B, while C and
D Companies provided patrols along the wire to prevent any attempts of
the enemy to turn the position.

The 29th November passed quietly though a good deal of movement was
observable in rear of the enemy's lines, so that his serious attack of
the following day was not entirely unexpected.

From the Battalion's position an extensive view was obtainable over the
whole terrain as far as Bourlon Wood, and early on the 30th a strong
concentration of the enemy's forces was clearly visible north and east
of Mœuvres.

At 10.45 a.m. the S.O.S. signal went up all along the line and the
enemy attacked in dense formation under a heavy barrage. The Battalion
stood to arms all day but was not required, for the gallant defence of
the units in the line this day was one of the greatest achievements of
the 56th Division. The enemy's attack was pressed with vigour and at
one time he had driven a wedge into the Hindenburg lines and divided
the London Scottish, who were still in the line, from the 2nd Londons.
The position, however, was defended tenaciously and at the end of the
day the whole of the Division's gains in the Hindenburg front line
were maintained, while the heaps of enemy dead outside the trenches
testified to the severity of the check which he had suffered.

That night the Battalion was called on for particularly active
patrolling as it was anticipated that the enemy would renew his attempt
on the Divisional front. The whole resources of the Division were
drawn upon to meet any renewed enemy action, and Lieut.-Col. Marchment
had under him for defensive purposes, in addition to the Battalion,
a company of the 5th Cheshires, a company of the 7th Middlesex, the
512th Field Company, R.E., and two sections of the 416th Field Company,
R.E. The Engineers were employed in digging fresh redoubts in dead
ground to the rear of the defensive flank line, while the infantry
companies were kept as a reserve at Battalion Headquarters. No further
action occurred until the afternoon of the 1st December when a fresh
concentration of enemy forces about 3.30 p.m. was crushed by our guns.

The Division had now well earned a rest, and warning was received
on the 1st December that it would be relieved by the 51st Division
immediately. The relief began at 7 p.m. that evening, the Battalion
handing over its lines to the 6th Black Watch. It was evident that the
incoming troops had been pushed forward hurriedly, for the relieving
battalion arrived without Lewis guns or shrapnel helmets, and with
the officers wearing slacks, just as they had risen from dinner. The
relief took a long while to effect, and it was not until 4 a.m. on
the 2nd that Lieut.-Col. Marchment handed over command of the sector.
On relief the Battalion withdrew to billets in Beugny, but at 11 a.m.
the rearward march was continued to Beaulencourt which was reached by
4 p.m., quarters being allotted in the camp that the Battalion had
occupied on the 30th August.

While at Beaulencourt the Battalion received congratulatory messages
which had been issued to Brigade by the Corps and Divisional commanders
on the part played in the battle.

The following day the Battalion entrained at Frémicourt for the Arras
area, reaching Beaumetz-les-Loges at 12.30 p.m., whence it marched to
billets in Simencourt.

The honours awarded for services rendered in the Battle of Cambrai were
as follows:

D.S.O.--Capt. A. M. Duthie.

M.C.--2/Lieuts. C. W. Rowlands and E. L. Mills.

D.C.M.--Sergt. G. Norris and L.-Corpls. E. S. Brown and T. H.
Sankey.

Bar to M.M.--Pte. C. S. Ruel.

M.M.--Sergts. F. Arklay, A. E. Haynes and G. J. Grant, Corpls. T.
J. Court, J. W. Johnson and H. W. Wallder. L.-Corpl. T.
Hodgkins and Ptes. B. M. J. Barnett, H. Evans, W. J.
Hutchin, F. G. Senyard, G. Tyrell, J. Wickens and W. A.
Willmott.

CHAPTER XIX

THE 1/4TH BATTALION, WINTER 1917/18--THE RESERVE BATTALION, 1916/17

The closing days of 1917 were full of anxiety for the Allies. The
operations at Cambrai had been undertaken by the British forces at the
termination of the prolonged and unusually trying offensive on the
northern ridges at Ypres, with the object of affording some relief to
our Italian Allies. The secession of Russia from the Allied cause had
had a most serious effect in all theatres of war. In the East it had
afforded the tottering Austrian Empire the respite it so badly needed
and had wrought the utter downfall of isolated Roumania, besides giving
a severe check to the Allies' aspirations in the Balkans and Palestine.
In the West it had entailed a complete reversal of the numerical
position, and from the end of November onwards the German strength
was being continually augmented by the arrival of divisions from the
Russian front, while the Allies became subjected to an ever-increasing
strain. The growing requirements of all the battlefields of the
world on which the Empire's soldiers were playing their part made it
impossible to maintain the British forces in France at the strength
necessary to combat the threat of a very serious German offensive. Only
from the Far West was any relief for the Allies to be expected. The
American Army which had been about ten months in training was already
being transferred to France, but it would still be some time before it
would be sufficiently numerous or experienced to turn the scale against
the enemy. As the winter wore on the threat of an enemy attack on a
grand scale developed into a probability, which as all the world now
knows, materialised on the 21st March 1918.

For some weeks, however, prior to the launching of this final effort
of the Central Powers the Allies had definitely passed to the defensive
in preparation for the German onslaught, and our present task is to
bridge rapidly the gulf between the close of active operations at
the end of 1917 and the point, which we will fix in the early days
of March 1918, at which we can conveniently take up the story of the
regiment in the offensive itself. We propose, therefore, to devote a
few pages to bringing up to date the record of the various activities
of the regiment, dealing first with the 1/4th Battalion in France, and
afterwards with the Reserve Battalion at home.

I. _The 1/4th Battalion in Artois_

After three months in the devastated area around Lagnicourt, where
the Battalion had been entirely removed from French civilisation,
and where scarcely any had had the opportunity of sleeping under a
proper roof, the billets allotted to the troops at Simencourt on the
3rd December were a great treat, and it was hoped that for at least
a few days the Battalion would be permitted to enjoy its well-earned
rest. On this occasion as on most others, however, the Divisional
rest proved a delusion, and after two days occupied in cleaning and
reorganisation the Battalion found itself once more on the road, for on
the 5th it marched from Simencourt at 9.30 a.m. to Wakefield Camp, near
Roclincourt (three miles north of Arras) in the First Army area.

The Division was now allotted to the XIII Corps (McCracken), which
formed the right flank of Horne's First Army and comprised in addition
to the 56th, the 31st and 62nd Divisions.

The following day Lieut.-Col. Marchment and the Works Officer (Lieut.
Lorden) reconnoitred the sector to be taken over, and on the 7th and
8th the relief of the 94th Brigade (31st Division) by the 168th Brigade
took place, the 1/4th Londons moving on the first day of relief to
Brigade support and on the second day into the left subsection of the
centre Brigade section facing Oppy, in trenches which it took over
from the 12th York and Lancaster Regiment.

The whole area had seen a great deal of heavy fighting since the
early days of the War. In May and June 1915 during Sir John French's
offensive at Festubert, the French troops had attacked Notre Dame de
Lorette, Ablain St Nazaire, La Targette and Neuville St Vaast. Early
in 1916 the Allied positions on the Vimy Ridge, by then held by the
British, had been heavily attacked by the enemy; while in the spring of
1917, in conjunction with the Third Army's operations east of Arras,
the Canadian Corps had swept over the Vimy Ridge and down the slopes
beyond towards the broad plains of Douai, carrying the line in front
of Gavrelle and Arleux-en-Gohelle. The British front line at the end
of 1917 was therefore deep in what had originally been a rear German
system of defence; trenches were numerous, but poor and in bad repair,
and the whole ground under numerous intense bombardments had been badly
"crumped."

The Battalion's sector lay between Arleux and Gavrelle and passed
through Oppy Wood, a leafless spectre of what had once been a copse,
through whose shattered trunks the remains of Oppy and Neuvireuil were
visible. The forward line was held in three posts, known from right
to left as Beatty, Wood and Oppy. Each post took a company, with one
platoon of each company in the Marquis-Earl line, a continuous trench
some four hundred yards in rear. The fourth company was held in reserve
in Bow Trench about 1700 yards back from the line of posts, while
Battalion Headquarters occupied a dugout in South Duke Street, close to
the Marquis line, which was the line of resistance.

The second defensive system consisted of the Red line, a continuous
trench in front of Bailleul and Willerval, while a third system, the
Green line, followed the crest of the Vimy Ridge. The observation
throughout the area was excellent owing to the regular slope eastwards
from the Vimy Ridge, and brigade and battalion commanders could
overlook the whole of their sectors from their respective Headquarters.

The Battalion's sector was served by one main communication trench,
Ouse Alley, which started from the Green line no less than 5300 yards
from the front line. The administrative arrangements were distinctly
good. Steam trains ran to daylight railhead in rear of the Green
line, and this was connected with the Red line by a night service of
petrol-electric trains. From the Red line forwards rations and stores
were moved by truck. Battalion Headquarters also enjoyed the luxury
of having water laid on by pipe line. Having said so much, however,
we have almost exhausted the good points of the sector. The defences
themselves left much to be desired. An early reconnaissance of the wire
in front of the three company posts revealed an alarming weakness, for
the single lines of concertina wire afforded but little obstacle to an
enterprising enemy, and were placed out much too close to our parapets.
The trenches, with the exception of the Red line, which was of good
construction, were shallow and much knocked about.

The Battalion's first tour in this sector passed without incident, the
enemy being rather surprisingly inactive, and the Battalion was able to
make much progress towards remedying the defects in its defences. On
the 13th December it handed over its lines to the Rangers and withdrew
to Divisional reserve in Springvale Camp at Ecurie, a pleasant camp,
but one of the filthiest the Battalion had ever had to occupy.

A few days were spent in training here, and on Sunday, the 16th,
Major-Gen. Dudgeon attended the Battalion's Church Parade, and
presented medal ribands to all available N.C.O.'s and men who had been
decorated for their services at Cambrai. The Division was now expecting
relief by the 31st, and, as this relief would have ensured a Christmas
out of the line, considerable disappointment was caused to all ranks
by the announcement on the 17th December that the relief was cancelled
temporarily, and that the Battalion was to return to the trenches. The
change took place the following day, and the 1/4th Londons took over
the Oppy sector from the Rangers.

Five uneventful days passed in the Oppy trenches. On the whole the
enemy displayed little activity beyond occasional retaliation to our
continuous and systematic bombardments, which were by day and night
directed against the enemy's "weak spots." At night the Bosche showed
signs of considerable nervousness. A good deal of progress was made
with the Brigade programme of trench and wiring work, which was carried
on in intensely cold weather, and on the 23rd the Battalion once more
exchanged with the Rangers and withdrew to Brigade support.

In the support area Headquarters and B Company (Spicer) were in a
30-foot railway cutting in rear of Bailleul, while A (H. N. Williams),
C (Barkworth) and D (Cooper) were in the Red line. Christmas day,
which was fortunately not marked by hostile activity, was spent in
these positions and by means of numerous small parties in the Red
line the troops were able to get as much enjoyment out of it as the
circumstances permitted, but the festivity was rather damped by the
death of 2/Lieut. E. L. Stuckey, a keen and promising officer, who was
killed by a stray shell in the Red line.

Late on Christmas evening the enemy carried out a hurricane bombardment
on the front line posts, and during the last day of the year showed
some disposition to increase his harassing fire on our back areas.

On the 28th December the 167th Brigade relieved the 168th, which
withdrew in Divisional reserve to the Marœuil area, the Battalion being
billeted at St Aubin, where five days of training and refitting were
obtained. The New Year was celebrated by carrying out the arrangements
which had originally been made for Christmas, and after a quite
pleasant interlude the Battalion moved on the 3rd January 1918, into
the right sector of the Divisional front at Gavrelle, relieving the
Queen's Westminsters. The weather was now intensely cold and the ground
was covered with snow, which effectively stopped any attempts at active
work. The tour of duty passed quietly and without any casualties,
though the enemy's artillery and trench mortar fire continued to show
an increase in volume, and on both sides aircraft activity developed.

The 62nd Division now took over the Division's sector, and on the 6th
January the 56th Division passed into G.H.Q. reserve at forty-eight
hours' notice to move. The Battalion handed over its trenches to the
2/4th K.O.Y.L.I. and moved to billets at Marœuil, continuing its route
on the 7th to Monchy-Breton (near St Pol), where it arrived in billets
at 4 p.m.

A great deal of useful training was carried out at Monchy-Breton,
but the incident which probably did as much good to the Battalion
as any, was the formation by Lieut. Faulkner, the quartermaster, of
an orchestra which was an enormous success from its inception, and
maintained its reputation until the end of the War. The orchestra
included the following:

'Cellos Ptes. Montague and Stone.
Violins Ptes. Barton, Fairman, Perrin and Cornell.
Cornets Sergt. Fulford and Pte. Stevens.
Trombones Sergt. Grimston and Pte. Westerman.
Clarionets Sergt.-Dr Ingham and Pte. Spooner.
Horn Pte. Cuffe.
Drum Pte. Smith.
Harmonium L.-Corpl. Weekes.

The numerous concerts given by this excellent band, which was really
well trained by the quartermaster, afforded real pleasure, not only
to the Battalion and to other units of the Division, but also to the
French inhabitants of the various villages in which the Battalion found
temporary homes.

During December and January the Battalion was joined by 2/Lieuts. H. T.
Hannay and H. O. Morris, and by 2/Lieut. A. E. Hanks (13th Londons),
while Capt. G. E. Stanbridge was granted an exchange to England for six
months' duty at home, after having been in France since March 1916.

By this time the possibilities of a German offensive had developed into
a practical certainty, and all training was directed towards methods
of defence and counter-attack. Much attention was paid to musketry and
Lewis gun training. The importance of the rifle and bayonet as the
infantry weapon _par excellence_ was once more being realised, and the
bomb and rifle grenade, which in 1916 and 1917 had to a large extent
ousted the rifle from its proper function, were again recognised to be
only subsidiary aids in certain circumstances, so that full advantage
was eagerly taken of the chance to ensure that all ranks were "handy"
with their rifles.

The defensive systems in the area lately occupied by the Division
still needed a vast amount of work to bring them to a condition to
resist a serious attack, and accordingly throughout the period spent
in G.H.Q. reserve each brigade of the Division supplied one battalion
for work in the forward area under the Chief Engineer XIII Corps. The
Battalion's turn for this duty came after seventeen days of training at
Monchy-Breton, and on the 24th January it moved forward, railing from
Tincques to Ecurie, and was accommodated at Stewart Camp, Roclincourt,
the transport lines being stationed at Marœuil. Every available man
was now put to work in one or other of the large parties which were
supplied daily for the R.E.'s, the principal tasks which fell to the
Battalion's lot being the wiring of the Green line and the construction
of cable trenches (_i.e._ narrow deep trenches in which telegraph
cables were buried to minimise the risk of their destruction by shell
fire) in the forward area by night. The severity of the winter had now
given place to thaw; the weather was warm for the time of year and a
good deal of rain fell.

This duty continued till the end of January, when the Battalion was
relieved and returned to the reserve area by train from Ecurie to
Tincques, marching thence to billets at Magnicourt, which were reached
on the 1st February.

An extensive reorganisation was now effected throughout the British
armies in France. The ever-dwindling supply of reinforcements from
home, due in part to failing resources in man-power and partly to
the retention in England of large defence forces which were held in
readiness against a possible German invasion, had caused the numbers
in infantry battalions throughout the Army to sink dangerously below
full strength. In the 1/4th Londons the casualties of Ypres and
Cambrai in 1917 had never been balanced by reinforcements, and this
was typical of the condition of affairs in every unit which had been
heavily engaged in the preceding six months. The decision arrived at,
therefore, was to reduce all Brigades to a three, instead of a four,
battalion establishment, and this was carried out by disbanding one
battalion per brigade and dividing out its strength among the three
battalions which were retained. Inevitably such drastic action caused
bitter disappointment among the battalions which had the misfortune to
be selected for disbandment, and _esprit de corps_ received temporarily
a severe check. In the 56th Division the 3rd (Royal Fusiliers), 9th
(Queen Victoria's) and 12th (Rangers) Battalions were reduced to
cadre strength and transferred to the 58th Division, so that from the
beginning of the month of February 1918 the infantry of the Division
consisted of:

167TH BRIGADE--1st London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers).
1/7th Middlesex Regiment.
1/8th do.

168TH BRIGADE--1/4th London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers).
1/13th do. (Kensingtons).
1/14th do. (London Scottish).

169TH BRIGADE--1/2nd London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers).
5th do. (London Rifle Brigade).
1/16th do. (Queen's Westminster Rifles).

The Battalion received through these changes about 150 N.C.O.'s and
men from the 9th Londons, 50 from the 3rd Londons and 60 from the
2/1st Londons, who had been disbanded from the 58th Division. Four
subalterns also came to the Battalion as follows: Lieuts. G. G. Lewis
and F. G. Athey from 2/1st Londons, H. F. Dade from 3rd Londons and
W. G. Hook from 9th Londons. The new arrivals naturally felt sore at
first at the disappearance of their own units, but, being all good
sportsmen, accepted the inevitable, and rapidly settled down in the
1/4th Battalion. This acquisition of strength enabled the Battalion
organisation of companies to be expanded to a three-platoon basis
instead of the two-platoon system which had been in force since August
1917.

At Magnicourt a week's useful training was effected, in which the
reorganisation necessary in consequence of the above changes figured
largely. The Battalion was joined by 2/Lieuts. R. E. Campkin, C. H.
Board, T. H. Mawby and G. R. Pitman.

The morale of the Battalion--as indeed of all units of the
Division--was now splendid. All ranks were perfectly confident as to
the outcome of the approaching offensive and the competitive spirit
between companies, always strong, was fostered in every possible
way. The Battalion transport under Lieut. G. V. Lawrie, M.C., also
maintained high efficiency, and received special commendation from
Gen. Dudgeon for the smartness of its turn-out. Amid strenuous work
amusements were not overlooked and the pleasures of the lighter side of
life were much added to by the extraordinarily good concert given one
evening by the Quartermaster's band.

At the end of the first week of February the 56th Division's period
in reserve was brought to a close and its relief of the 62nd Division
began. On the 9th the Battalion left Magnicourt and marched to Marœuil,
moving forward again the next day to its old trenches at Oppy, where it
relieved the 2/5th West Yorkshires. In addition to its old sector the
Battalion had to take over, as a temporary measure, Bird Post on the
right. The front line posts were not approachable by daylight at this
date as Boyne and Bedford Streets, the communication trenches leading
forward from the Marquis line, had fallen in as a result of the severe
weather, and had not been repaired. Other parts of the trench system
also needed much repair.

This tour of duty was remarkably quiet, and with the exception of
sporadic shelling the enemy was inactive. The Bosche had apparently
been permitted to contract a habit of walking about in the open in rear
of his lines, but B and C Companies in Bird and Beatty posts were soon
able to bring home to him the unwisdom of exposing himself in daylight.
The Headquarter Scouts under Sergt. Hayes also did good work in this
direction from a useful fire position on a big mound near Beatty Post,
whence by good marksmanship they secured six head one evening. At this
period also the close liaison which the Battalion always maintained
with the Divisional artillery stood it in good stead. A battery of the
281st Brigade R.F.A. had a section of 18-pr. guns in Bailleul, and the
Battalion signallers having run a wire to the guns from Bird Post, the
gunners settled down to a little sniping. The gunner officer in charge,
Lieut. J. Powell, M.C., registered the guns on a small cart standing in
Bosche ground and it was easy to switch and elevate the guns roughly on
to any party of Bosche moving about. The results were most successful
and the Bosche was finally cured of his desire for walking exercise
outside his trenches.

On the evening of the 14th February the Battalion handed over its
trenches to the London Scottish and withdrew to billets in Roclincourt
in Divisional reserve. Here nine days were spent, during which the
Battalion supplied working parties for the further improvement of the
trenches.

From the 22nd to the 27th the Battalion was once more in the trenches
for another quiet tour of duty, and on the latter date it withdrew to
Roclincourt West Camp in Divisional reserve. The lack of activity at
this period is evidenced by the fact that only two men were wounded
during the month of February.

Attention was now fixed solely on the coming offensive, to meet which
preparations were being pushed forward with thoroughness. Additional
firesteps were constructed in the trenches and the already formidable
wire was further strengthened.

From this date forward every tour in the trenches or in Brigade support
was passed by platoons in exactly the same position, so that every man
might, whenever the offensive should be launched, be well acquainted
with his position.

The five days at Roclincourt West Camp were succeeded by a short period
in Brigade support, in which position the Battalion relieved the
Kensingtons on the 5th March. The tour of duty passed quietly with the
exception of a somewhat severe enemy bombardment with gas shell on the
evening of the 8th. Early on the morning of the 9th the Kensingtons
carried out an excellent raid on the enemy lines north of Oppy, in
the course of which about 20 Germans were killed and 4 brought back
as prisoners. The raiding party was under Lieut. Lester, M.C. (since
killed), commissioned from the 4th Londons. The identification obtained
was normal, that is, the prisoners belonged to the German regiment
which was believed to be opposed to us. These captures elicited
information that the offensive was imminent, and this, combined with
unmistakable signs of enemy activity, such as extensive road repairs,
clearing and repairing enemy trenches formerly derelict, and so forth,
left no room for doubt that the Germans' great effort could not be long
delayed. Thenceforward extreme vigilance was exercised all along the
line.

II. _The Reserve Battalion_

Shortly after the reconstruction of the 1st London (Reserve) Brigade,
which resulted in the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion being made the
draft-finding unit for both the 3rd and the 4th London Regiments, the
Brigade was moved from its camps at Hurdcott and Fovant to billets in
various watering places on the South Devon coast. The 3rd Battalion
was fortunate enough to be allotted to Torquay, where it took up
its new quarters in December 1916. As a military station Torquay
was, of course, not so desirable as Hurdcott. In the first place,
the scattering of untrained troops in billets greatly increased the
difficulty of disciplinary control, while training grounds were
farther removed and somewhat inadequate. In spite of these undoubted
disadvantages, however, the change from the bitter searching winds of
"The Plain" in winter time to the more genial climate of South Devon
was universally welcomed, and the Battalion lived for some weeks in
considerable comfort.

The Brigade was now under command of Brig.-Gen. Howell, who at the
outbreak of war had commanded the l/3rd Londons, Col. Godman having
returned to the Scots Guards on the Somme.

Life in the Reserve Battalion at Torquay proceeded on very much the
same routine as had obtained at Hurdcott, and an attempt at describing
it in detail would only be wearisome. Once again the instructional
staff had to face the "spade work" of training raw recruits, since the
drain on the Battalion's resources during the Somme battles had denuded
it of trained soldiers, and a fresh batch of recruits now filled its
ranks.

A further modification in training organisation took place about
this time, and we may refer shortly to this as it affected the
functions of training battalions considerably. This modification lay
in the establishment of "Command Depôts" which were formed for the
reception from hospital of officers, N.C.O.'s and men returned from
the Expeditionary Force who were not yet physically fit to return to
their respective units. At a stage in their convalescence, in which
their retention in hospital as in-patients was no longer required,
such men were sent to their Command Depôt for light exercise in
walking, physical training and so on, and for such local treatment as
their individual cases necessitated. N.C.O.'s and men remained in the
Depôt until their recovery was complete, when they were despatched to
their training reserve units for a short "smartening-up" course of
instruction before being once more sent overseas. The Command Depôts
thus relieved training battalions of a great deal of medical and
convalescent work for which they were neither equipped nor suitable,
and also ensured that the staff of instructors in the training
battalions were engaged for the minimum of time in "brushing-up" the
trained men prior to their return to France, whereby they were enabled
to devote the maximum of attention to the recruits. The Guards and the
London Regiment were amalgamated for the purpose of a Command Depôt,
and this was located at Shoreham-by-Sea, Sussex. Shortly after its
formation, Major G. H. M. Vine was appointed from the Reserve Battalion
to the Permanent Staff of the Depôt.

In January 1917, Major L. T. Burnett joined the Reserve Battalion from
sick leave and was appointed second in command, a position which he
continued to fill until the following July, when he was transferred to
the War Office.

The South Devon station was retained for only a comparatively short
period and in April the Brigade moved again, this time to Blackdown,
in the Aldershot Command. Blackdown is some seven miles north of
Aldershot, and is one of the many pine-and heather-covered hills in
which the district abounds. Most of the barracks at this Station were
hutted camps, but the 3rd Battalion was fortunate in being sent to
Dettingen, a pre-war permanent barracks in which it was exceedingly
comfortable.

The advantage of having the Battalion compacted in one camp became
almost at once exemplified, and the desirable tightening of discipline
rapidly effected a great increase of efficiency. The unsurpassed
facilities for training afforded by the Aldershot Command also proved
of incalculable value, and enabled the keen and efficient training
staff of the Battalion to raise the unit to the position of one of the
best organised battalions of a Brigade whose reputation for training
was second to none.

At Blackdown, moreover, the facilities provided for the recreation
of the troops were really excellent, and among these mention should
be made first of the Y.M.C.A. and the Church Army, whose excellent
institutions were of the greatest value. Each battalion also was
provided with a sports ground, and among the pleasant memories of
men trained in this Station not the least is the Blackdown Garrison
Theatre, which was visited weekly by capable companies. The Sunday
evening concerts in the theatre were also a very notable and valuable
feature of the social life of the garrison.

Training here proceeded on the same lines, but a further modification
was now introduced for the benefit of the large numbers of lads under
military age who were now joining. Under the Military Service Acts
no men might be sent overseas till the age of nineteen, and in order
to ensure that their training should not be unnecessarily hurried a
special syllabus of work was evolved for them, the original scheme
being so enlarged and lengthened as to provide for such young soldiers
becoming "trained" not earlier than the age at which they might be sent
to the front. To ensure the smooth working of this amended scheme
the young soldiers, or "A IV's" as they were called, were grouped
in special companies, and in addition a number of "young soldier
battalions" were added to the Coastal Defence Forces.

In January 1918 Lieut.-Col. Montgomerie Webb vacated command of the
Battalion on attachment to the Royal Air Force, and the Battalion
was taken over by Lieut.-Col. Hanbury Sparrow, D.S.O., M.C., Royal
Berkshire Regiment, who had come to England under the six months
exchange system. Under Lieut.-Col. Sparrow the Battalion continued
to make great strides, and his striking personality was the means of
winning every ounce of willing and devoted service from all who had
the honour to be under his command. The work of the Reserve Battalion
during the early part of 1918 is so much bound up with the movements of
the overseas battalions under the stress of the German offensive that
we may conveniently break off here and take up the story of the Second
Battle of the Somme.

CHAPTER XX

THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME, 1918

I. _Preparations for the German Offensive_

The southward move of Gough's Fifth Army was for the purpose of
extending the British lines into an area hitherto occupied by
the French. Between the 10th January and the 3rd February 1918 a
considerable sector, extending from the River Omignon north of St
Quentin to Barisis, in the Forêt de St Gobain south of La Fère, was
taken over from the French. The responsibility for the whole of this
line, some thirty miles long, in addition to about twelve miles from
Gouzeaucourt to the Omignon, hitherto held by Byng's Third Army, fell
upon Gough.

The 58th Division was at first in reserve and was billeted in the
Amiens area, the 2/4th Londons being quartered on the evening of the
22nd January at Thézy-Glimont, a pleasant village near the confluence
of the Avre with the Noye, about eight miles south-east of Amiens,
where French pre-war civilisation was still almost untouched. It is
needless to remark how delightful to all ranks were these peaceful
surroundings after the ghastly shell-torn swamps of Poelcapelle. About
a fortnight passed at Thézy-Glimont in the usual routine of training,
during which one or two small drafts joined the Battalion. Lieut. B.
Rivers Smith left the Battalion on the 1st February for six months'
duty in England.

The most important feature of the rest period was the reorganisation of
Divisions on a ten-battalion basis,[6] of which a note has been given
in the preceding chapter. In the 58th Division, as in the 56th, the 4th
London Battalion was selected for continued existence, and at the end
of January the 2/4th Battalion was strengthened by the transference
from the disbanded 2/1st Londons of 10 officers and 221 other ranks.
The officers who joined from the 2/1st Londons were Capt. W. D. Ramsey;
Lieuts. W. C. Morton, G. J. L. Menges, W. B. Evans; 2/Lieuts. R. H. J.
Mendl, A. Woodington, C. J. C. Wildman, W. H. Parslow, S. H. E. Crane
and H. W. Durlacher. After the reorganisation the infantry of the
Division comprised the following units:

[6] Three Brigades of three battalions each, and one pioneer battalion.

173RD BRIGADE--2/2nd London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers).
3rd " " " "
2/4th " " " "

174TH BRIGADE--2/6th London Regiment (Rifles).
7th " "
8th " " (Post Office).

175TH BRIGADE--9th London Regiment (Queen Victoria's Rifles).
10th " " (Hackney).
12th " " (Rangers).

Before the Division left the Amiens area the imminence of a German
offensive was a matter of common knowledge to all ranks, and so
impressed with the seriousness of the situation was the High Command,
that on the 5th February a most inspiring message from General Gough
was conveyed in a lecture by the Brigadier, to all officers, warrant
officers and sergeants of the Brigade.

The state of affairs was indeed critical and a grave crisis in the
War was approaching. Some slight account of the general conditions
which had brought this about has already been attempted, and there is
no occasion now to recapitulate the main factors of the situation in
which the Allies found themselves. We must, however, point to one or
two conditions especially attaching to the British front which had a
pre-eminent influence on what followed.

The gradual and ever-increasing numerical preponderance of the Germans
on the British front has been referred to; translated into numbers the
position may be better appreciated. During the period from the 1st
November 1917 to the 21st March 1918, the number of German divisions
on the Western front rose steadily from 146 to 192, an increase of
46, against which the total number of British divisions in France
was but 58, and these sadly depleted in numbers. The question of the
falling off in the numbers of reinforcements sent to France at this
period has become the subject of an embittered controversy to which we
do not propose to offer any contribution. We are, however, concerned
in pointing to the result, whatever the cause, of this growing
numerical disparity, which was to confront G.H.Q. with a most anxious
problem. The British front was now some 125 miles long, and a glance
at any war map will show that the general trend of the front was in a
north-westerly direction, _i.e._ near its northern extremity the line
ran comparatively close to the sea. In other words, the space available
for manœuvre in the event of a considerable break-through by enemy
forces was dangerously small in the vital neighbourhood of the Channel
Ports; and a successful German offensive in this region might have the
effect of rolling up our forces against the sea. In the south the space
between the lines and the sea was greater, but a large enemy success in
the southern area also had serious possibilities as it might entail the
complete isolation of the British Armies from the French.

These were very briefly the two alternative possibilities which G.H.Q.
had to face, and the problem awaiting solution was how to provide with
the inadequate force at its disposal for the efficient defence of its
lines no matter where the blow might fall. The matter was further
complicated. The French were equally nervous of a sudden blow against
their weak spots in Champagne and at Rheims, which might lay open the
German road to Paris, and this fear rendered it impossible for them
to place at the disposal of British G.H.Q. sufficient forces to make
up the very grave inequality of strength which existed on the British
front. The grouping of forces was, moreover, rendered more difficult
by the fact that, so great were the available German reserves, it
might well prove that the first enemy blow, although serious and
energetic, might in reality not be the main effort. This doubt would
inevitably, whatever the Allies' dispositions might be, have the effect
of sterilising the British and French reserves for some days until it
was quite certain that the first blow was not a feint, to be succeeded
later by a still greater effort elsewhere.

Such was the problem, and surely never has a military commander been
faced by a more difficult situation; for on the wisdom of G.H.Q.'s
dispositions would probably rest the fortunes of the whole British
Empire.

Before stating the solution adopted by G.H.Q. in especial relation
to the doings of the 2/4th Battalion, we may perhaps be pardoned for
glancing at one or two aspects of Ludendorff's problem which, as is now
known from his own book, was by no means free from difficulty.

The vital necessity of a stern British defence of the Channel Ports
was appreciated by Ludendorff as fully as by the British G.H.Q.,
and he was therefore alive to the possibility--knowing the British
inferiority in numbers--that the overwhelming importance of the north
might lead to a concentration of British divisions in the north at the
expense of the southern area. But could he be certain that this course
would be adopted? He might, after staking his all in the south, find
that British G.H.Q. had outwitted him and anticipated his intention
to attack at St Quentin. It was clearly essential that, to achieve
the sweeping victory which alone could save Germany, Ludendorff must
endeavour to encompass the temporary sterilisation of the Allied
reserves which has been alluded to. To ensure this his plans must
be shrouded in secrecy till the last moment; and the organisation
of so vast an attack as was ultimately launched without disclosing
its location to a vigilant enemy must have caused Ludendorff acute
anxiety. That it was in fact accomplished can only beget admiration
on our side for a most skilful opponent. And failure to Ludendorff,
moreover, was fraught with consequences quite as awful from his point
of view as his success would be to the British. Austria had gained a
temporary respite in its victory over the Italians, but its army was
becoming disintegrated and lacking in supplies; and no one realised
more keenly than Ludendorff that the Dual Monarchy itself could not
outlive a collapse of its army. In Germany the revolutionary ideas
from Russia were beginning to have a weakening effect on the loyalty
and steadfastness of an increasing section of the population; hunger
was becoming intensified, for the comparative failure of the U-boat
campaign resulted in an ever-tightening Allied blockade. And ever in
front of Ludendorff loomed the spectre of gigantic American forces on
their way to France, which the U-boats were powerless to stop. How many
Americans had landed? How soon could they be thrown into the battle
line to turn the scale against the Central Powers? These were questions
to which Ludendorff must earnestly have sought an answer, and which
must have brought home to him the realisation that this gigantic bid
for victory he was preparing would for good or evil be the last effort
which Germany could make.

The decision of G.H.Q. on these questions was that the Channel Ports
must be adequately defended at all costs, and that if any sector of
the line must be left weakly defended, that sector must be in the
southern area, which the Fifth Army had now taken over. The depth of
the space available for retirement in rear of the lines in this area
no doubt had its influence in this decision; and in addition, the fact
that, in the event of a considerable withdrawal of our forces under the
pressure of the German attack, a natural line of defence in rear of
the forward positions seemed to be offered in the line of the Somme,
which at Péronne makes a wide sweep southwards, thus forming a natural
barrier more or less parallel with the British front in the St Quentin
district. Possibly a further factor was the apparent natural strength
of the extreme south of the front between Moy and La Fère, where the
Oise Canal and marshes formed a wide and difficult obstacle between the
Germans and our own troops. In the southern area, moreover, it would in
case of need be more easy to make use quickly of such reserves as the
French might be able to place at G.H.Q.'s disposal.

II. _The Retreat from La Fère_

The Fifth Army was allotted a front of 42 miles, which was held by
17 divisions in line and 3 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions in
reserve. The sector was held by four Corps, from left to right the VII
(Congreve), the XIX (Watts), the XVIII (Maxse), and the III (Butler).

The III Corps, with which alone we are concerned, comprised at the
date of battle the 14th, 18th and 58th Divisions on a front of 30,000
yards, a gigantic sector for 27 battalions, not one of which was at war
strength. In reserve were the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions. The sector
allotted to the 58th Division, in which it relieved the 30th between
the 7th and 9th February 1918, was the extreme right of the British
Armies and extended from north of Travécy, where it touched the 18th
Division on the left, to south of Barisis, where it linked up with the
French on its right. This enormous front of nearly 9½ miles was held
by two brigades, the two subsectors finding their natural division in
the Oise marshes and the Canal de St Quentin, which at La Fère take a
sudden turn westward, thus running at right angles into the British
positions. North of the Canal the country is comparatively open and
gently undulating, while south of it the lines plunge through the hilly
and densely wooded district of the Forêt de St Gobain.

The marsh area at La Fère is about a mile and a half wide, so that
the frontage which needed active defence by each Brigade was roughly
four miles. On so vast a frontage a defence by continuous trench lines
was clearly out of the question, and the British defence was designed
to be in great depth. It was divided into three zones of defence.
The Forward Zone, about 1000 yards in depth, relied for its defence
on small company redoubts with the space between taken up by hidden
machine-guns. This zone was intended to act as a "shock-absorber" in
which the first intensity of the enemy's onslaught might be met and
checked. The main defence was to be offered in the Battle Zone, about
1500 yards in rear of the Forward Zone. The Battle Zone occupied a
depth of about 2000 yards and was to consist of isolated and wired
forts, again strengthened by inter-supporting machine-guns. It was
hoped that a final check might be administered to the enemy's attempts
in this zone, but in rear of it a further defensive system, in this
case a continuous line, was to be created as a Rear Zone. Beyond this
again the Somme line was to be put into a state of defence.

At the date of taking over this area from the French the defensive
organisation on the lines above indicated was practically non-existent.
Very little depth was provided for in the defence and in rear of the
Forward Zone practically all was yet to be done. The Battle Zone
redoubts were inadequate and insufficiently wired, while the Rear Zone
line was merely spit-locked.

For weeks, therefore, the whole energies of every available formation,
infantry holding the line, engineers, pioneers and labour corps units
from all parts of the world, were concentrated on the enormous task of
converting the G.H.Q. scheme into a reality. Valuable time which could
have been well spent in training the infantry in defensive measures
and counter-attack, and in assimilating the new personnel which had
been brought into battalions by the reorganisation of January, was
inevitably devoted to entrenching and wiring work, wearying in itself
and trying as only work done against time can become. All ranks,
however, were sufficiently impressed by the need, and all were working
with the zeal born of a grim determination to prove themselves equal to
the demands which would be made upon them.

The 173rd Brigade moved forward to take over the left or north
brigade sector on the 7th February. The 2/4th Battalion railed from
Villers-Bretonneux to Appilly, whence it marched to billets at Quierzy
on the south bank of the Oise. Here it was joined the following day by
the transport which had moved by road. On the evening of the 8th the
Battalion was attached temporarily to the 174th Brigade south of the
Canal, and on the 9th moved to the Forward Zone, where it relieved the
7th Londons. As was to be expected from the conditions under which the
line was held, the Battalion was now rather scattered, Headquarters
and C and D Companies being stationed at Amigny-Rouy, while A and B
Companies were at Sinceny and the stores and transport at Autreville.
Enemy activity in this area was almost non-existent and the whole
energies of the Battalion were devoted to entrenching work, which was
carried out under Royal Engineer supervision. Large working parties,
totalling on some occasions 12 officers and 400 other ranks, were
called for daily for a variety of tasks to which the only relief was a
periodical exchange of companies for bathing at Sinceny. On the 24th
February the Battalion completed the Divisional relief and moved to the
extremity of the British lines, where it relieved the 8th East Surreys,
Headquarters, C and D Companies occupying Bernagousse Quarries, while
A and B Companies were billeted in Pierremande. In this area the
Battalion spent a few quiet days, occupied in strengthening the battle
positions under the Royal Engineers. On the 27th it was relieved by the
7th Londons, and returned to the 173rd Brigade, going into Divisional
reserve in rear of the northern brigade subsector. In this area the
Battalion was again much split up, Headquarters, A and B Companies
being at Viry Noureuil, and C and D Companies at Tergnier. This day
the Battalion was joined by three more officers of the 2/1st Londons,
2/Lieuts. L. F. Wardle, C. B. Francis and C. W. Cumner.

The situation on the 173rd Brigade front during February had been
remarkably quiet. The policy adopted had been purely defensive, and
our artillery had shown but little activity. The distance separating
the British lines from the enemy's and the nature of the terrain had
rendered observation a matter of some difficulty; but the enemy's
energies appeared to be devoted to strengthening his own defences of
La Fère rather than to the preparation of an offensive operation. The
general impression gained from the Brigade Intelligence Summary for
this month is indeed that the idea of any attack being launched in
the La Fère area was rather ridiculous, and that everyone was quite
prepared to settle down at Fargniers for life. General Gough, however,
as is well known, did not share this comfortable optimism, for almost a
month earlier at a conference of his Corps Commanders at Catelet he had
made what later proved to be an accurate forecast of the location of
the German attack.

The Battalion's work during the three weeks immediately preceding
the battle calls for little comment. After two days in Divisional
reserve it moved forward to the Battle Zone, in which it relieved the
3rd Londons on the 2nd March, and this position it continued to hold
until the offensive was launched, providing daily working parties for
the improvement of the defences. The early days of March saw a slight
increase of artillery and trench mortar activity on both sides, but the
area was still comparatively quiet with but little outward indication
of the storm which was shortly to burst over it.

On the 7th March 2/Lieut. D. F. Crawford joined the Battalion.

The skill with which the Germans continued to conceal their intentions
was indeed marvellous. For some time past the withdrawal of divisions
from the line had taken place, but so widely disseminated had this
process been that it had attracted comparatively little notice. The
attack divisions had been assembled well in rear of the lines, beyond
the reach of our prying aeroplanes, and had there been put through a
very thorough course of training, which extended to the smallest detail
of what was expected of each division. Finally, about the middle of
March this gigantic force had begun to move towards the line, marching
by night and closely concealed by day, and by the evening of the
20th the enormous concentration was complete. Von Hutier, commanding
the Eighteenth German Army, had now between the Omignon and Vendeuil
11 divisions in line, 8 in close support and 2 in reserve; Von Gayl
opposite La Fère had 4 divisions and Von Boehn at St Gobain another 2;
making a total of 27 divisions. Opposed to this colossal strength were
Butler's 5 and Maxse's 4 weak divisions. Such were the odds on the 21st
March 1918.

Before proceeding to the battle itself there is one further point to
which we desire to refer, and that is the thick fog which lay over
the marshes of the Oise early on the morning of the 21st and the
succeeding days. The effect of this fog on what transpired had been
variously estimated. The general consensus of opinion of officers and
men who took part in the battle is that it was a great disadvantage
to the defence. In many ways this was undoubtedly the case. The
complete blotting out of all landmarks beyond a few yards' radius
rendered any sort of co-operation with adjoining units impossible; the
inter-supporting machine-guns between the redoubts were comparatively
useless for they could not see when and where to fire. The artillery
was also handicapped for it knew not where to lay its barrages to trap
the advancing enemy. Many times in the course of the battle, redoubts
which thought themselves not yet attacked suddenly realised that in
the fog they had been surrounded and cut off. The general result was
that the defence degenerated into a series of isolated battles in which
companies and platoons made individual stands, unsupported by their
comrades and in ignorance of what was occurring on their flanks.

But there is another side to the picture, and the German opinion is
equally strong, that but for the fog their success would have been
more far-reaching than it actually proved to be. The inevitable
loss of direction and touch between attacking columns, the feeling
of uncertainty born of drifting forwards without seeing one's
surroundings, the strange tricks which fog always plays in the matters
of distance and sound--all these could not but affect detrimentally
the speed and cohesion of the attack--and speed was of all things the
essential for complete German success. Swiftly though the attack came,
from the very first day the advances were made far behind schedule,
and to this extent the German attack failed. How far it failed through
the fog we will not venture to estimate; but that the fog was a
contributory factor there can be no doubt.

On the afternoon of the 20th March the order "Prepare for attack"
was received from III Corps, and by 3.30 p.m. all companies of the
Battalion were ready to man their battle positions.

The scheme of defence has already been alluded to in general terms,
and it has been indicated that both the Forward and Battle Zones were
divided into a series of defended localities each held by a company.
These localities comprised a main keep, supported by two or more
subsidiary redoubts, while the space intervening between adjoining
localities was covered by the guns of the Brigade Machine-Gun Company.

[Illustration: THE RETREAT FROM LA FÈRE, MARCH 1918]

Map No. 15 shows the relative positions of the various localities in
the scheme of defence, and in the Northern Brigade area, with which
alone we are henceforward concerned, the disposition of troops on the
night 20th/21st March was as follows:

FORWARD ZONE--2/2nd London Regiment.
Main Keep Locality: Headquarters and 1 company.
Jappy Locality: 1 company with a standing patrol at Beautor.
Brickstack Locality: 1 company.
Travécy Locality: 1 company.

BATTLE ZONE--2/4th London Regiment.
Headquarters on the Crozat Canal, Fargniers.
Fargniers South Locality: A Company (Lieut. H. J. M. Williams).
Fargniers North Locality: B Company less 2 platoons
(Capt. S. G. Askham).
Farm Rouge Locality: D Company (Capt. C. A. Clarke).
Triangle Locality: C Company (Lieut. G. E. Lester).

The two remaining platoons of B Company were detached as follows:

1 platoon (2/Lieut. D. F. Crawford) at the junction of the St
Quentin and Crozat Canals.

1 platoon (Lieut. W. F. Brown) at Condren, where there was also
a squadron of the Oxfordshire Hussars.

Quessy Locality: 1 company 1/4th Suffolks (Pioneers).

Brigade Headquarters were at Quessy Château near Crozat Canal, and
the 3rd Londons were in Divisional reserve at Viry Noureuil.

It will be seen that the bulk of the defensive force was
concentrated--if such a word may be applied to so attenuated a
defence--on the right flank, where the line of the Oise marshes, by
now practically no obstacle owing to the unusually dry spring, laid
open the road to Chauny and Noyon. It was quite evident that should the
Germans succeed in breaking through on the St Firmin-Vendeuil front
they would almost certainly endeavour to expand the breach behind
the British lines and make a south-westerly dash towards Noyon and
Compiègne in order to complete the isolation of the British armies from
the French. The Oise flank therefore was vitally important.

At 4.20 a.m. on the 21st March the enemy barrage opened with terrific
intensity. The messages to man battle positions were already written
in Brigade Headquarters, but delay was caused in conveying them to
the various units concerned, for during the first few minutes of the
bombardment Brigade Signal Headquarters were knocked out by a direct
hit, so that this and subsequent messages had to be sent by runner.
Lieut.-Col. Dann, in fact, did not receive any orders to move until
long after he had, on his own initiative, despatched his companies to
their posts.

It is rather difficult to understand why the companies were kept in
billets such as cellars under the ruins of Fargniers and Quessy until
the last moment, especially as warning of the attack had been received
the previous afternoon. Most platoons had several hundred yards, and
some as much as a mile and a half, to traverse to their trenches; and
under the intense and accurate barrage many casualties were sustained
during this forward move. By about 7.30 a.m., however, the companies
were all reported in position.

The actual time of the attack is not known, but it probably occurred
between 6.30 and 7 a.m., for at 7.10 a.m. a message was received from
Lieut.-Col. Richardson (2/2nd Londons) that the enemy was in Jappy
Keep, and about the same time the bombardment of the Battle Zone
positions became still more intense. It must be borne in mind that fog
hung over the whole area like a thick curtain, completely cutting off
the Forward Zone from the observation, which it had been reasonably
anticipated would be obtained over it. The Battle Zone troops and
Brigade Headquarters were thus in the dark as to what was going on in
the forward positions.

By 9 a.m. the enemy was reported in possession of Main Keep Locality,
which meant a serious incursion into the defences on the vital flank.
Steps were at once taken to employ the 3rd Londons (in reserve), one
company being directed on Fargniers, while artillery and machine-gun
barrages were laid on the Canal crossings at St Firmin and Beautor and
on the area west of the captured positions.

Lieut.-Col. Dann now ordered forward patrols from each of the companies
to endeavour to keep in touch with the situation, but it seems that
if these orders ever reached the companies--they certainly were not
received by the left company--the patrols themselves were destroyed by
the enemy shell fire, for no information of value was obtained.

All this time no word had been received from the Travécy Locality
though attempts were made to communicate from the 2/4th Londons and
from the 18th Division on the left, and it is probable that the fog
enabled the enemy to surround the garrison before its commander was
able to communicate with his Headquarters.

During the morning Lieut.-Col. Richardson asked for counter-attack
troops to be sent forward to him in the hope that the enemy in the St
Firmin area might be ejected, but this request was refused by Division
on the ground that the Battle Zone garrisons must be maintained intact.
In consequence, therefore, of the extreme pressure on his front,
Lieut.-Col. Richardson was compelled to order a withdrawal of the few
remaining details of his shattered battalion on to the Fargniers area
occupied by the 2/4th Londons, and by midday the fall of the Forward
Zone was complete.

Shortly after midday the fog lifted slightly, and the 2/4th Londons
in the Battle Zone became engaged with the enemy, who began to exert
pressure on the extreme right flank. At about 2 p.m. the platoon of A
Company holding Distillery Post next the Oise Canal was driven in and
Lieut.-Col. Dann ordered the company of the 3rd Londons in Fargniers to
launch a counter-attack. This effort was only partly successful, and
Distillery Post remained in German hands.

About the same time the enemy advanced in large numbers all along
the line, especially against the Farm Rouge and Triangle Localities.
The former of these had always been regarded as a weak spot in the
defences, and two reserve machine-guns were at once turned on to the
enemy advancing against it. By 3.45 p.m., after a stubborn resistance
against overwhelming numbers, Clarke's weak company was ejected from
the Farm Rouge itself, and its grip on the remainder of the Locality
much weakened. The assaulting columns continued to press on in the
direction of the Quessy Locality, thus isolating the Fargniers position
in the corner between the two Canals and completely cutting off Lester,
who was still hanging on to his position in the Triangle against
impossible odds.

A prompt endeavour to counter this very serious turn of events was
taken by Brigade, who sent forward two platoons of the Suffolks to
reinforce Clarke and fill the gap between him and Askham. The 3rd
Londons also were drawn on again, and a second company was sent forward
through Quessy to strengthen the Farm Rouge Locality. Of this company,
however, only two platoons ever reached their objective, the others
being destroyed by the enemy's fire at the crossing of the Crozat Canal.

At about 6.50 p.m. the Battle Zone, in spite of repeated and heavy
enemy attacks, was still intact with the exceptions of the penetrations
next the Canal on the extreme right and in the Farm Rouge Locality, and
it was decided to lay down a provisional S.O.S. line on the forward
edge of the Battle Zone. The enemy, however, was continuing his attacks
with great persistence, and the gradual infiltration of his storm
troops between our scattered positions was constantly altering the
situation. By 7.15 p.m. he had already overrun the new S.O.S. line
in the vicinity of the Distillery, and was beginning to close in on
Fargniers from the south.

In the 18th Division area on the left the struggle was also raging
in the Battle Zone, though one or two posts in the Forward Zone were
continuing their glorious yet hopeless struggle. Beyond the 18th
Division the 14th had received a severe blow and the Germans had
penetrated some miles into the British positions. It appeared by no
means improbable that if the enemy's progress in this region were
unchecked the left flank of the III Corps would be entirely rolled up.
A general withdrawal was therefore inevitable to prevent the line being
broken. To conform with these movements it was decided by Division to
effect a withdrawal to the line of the Crozat Canal from its junction
with the St Quentin Canal as far north as a line running due west
between the Farm Rouge and Triangle Localities, which latter was to be
held.

Instructions to this end were immediately issued, and Lieut.-Col.
Dann was ordered to conduct the withdrawal of the whole of the mixed
details now in the Fargniers corner, and all troops in the Battle Zone
were placed under his orders. This withdrawal was really a stubborn
rearguard action, for the enemy was unrelenting in his efforts to drive
in the Farm Rouge gap and reach the Canal. But a stern resistance
was offered in which gallant service was rendered by the Suffolks at
Quessy, and by midnight Lieut.-Col. Dann was enabled to report his
heterogeneous command in position on the west bank of the Canal, with
all iron rations, S.A.A., stores and Orderly Room records intact.

The defence of the Triangle Locality must now be referred to as it
comprises, owing to the wedge driven into the Farm Rouge Locality early
in the day, an isolated battle, and is a magnificent example of stern
courage against overwhelming numbers. The casualties suffered from
gas shell in this area had been numerous, but apart from the accurate
shooting of the Bosche gunners, C Company had been, like the rest of
the Battalion, not closely engaged until the Forward Zone was overrun.
The lifting of the fog about midday disclosed a large force of the
enemy, which is estimated at about a battalion, advancing against
Lester's thinly held positions. From this time onwards no orders or
messages of any kind reached Lester from Battalion Headquarters or
the adjoining companies, and he was left to fight his own battle. The
advancing enemy were hotly engaged by rifle and Lewis gun fire, and
large numbers were killed. Already D Company were losing their grip on
the Farm Rouge, but Lester decided that the only course open to him was
to await reinforcements. These never came, and probably, owing to the
utter severance of communications, it was never realised how urgent
his need was. The only support to this gallant company was one 18-pr.
gun firing over open sights from near Quessy. All the afternoon the
unequal fight was maintained, though the defenders were much harassed
by low-flying German 'planes. With the approach of dusk the mist came
down again, surrounding the company with an impenetrable curtain. Again
and again Lester sent out runners and patrols to seek connection with
the adjoining troops but these never returned. "I still hoped against
hope," he writes, "that we should be reinforced, as the Colonel had
kept rubbing it in at conferences before the battle that we had to
stand fast at all costs." At last it became clear that the flanks were
in the air and that the rear of the Company was being encircled, and it
was decided to fight back to the Crozat Canal. On the left the remains
of two platoons under Blair managed to get back, but of the others but
two men got away, and Lester, Wardle and the remainder of the company,
nearly all wounded, were captured.

This splendid fight, maintained till nearly 10 p.m. against hopeless
odds, was without doubt of enormous value in holding up the enemy and
inflicting severe loss on his picked troops. It also formed a strong
buttress to the flank of the 18th Division, without which they would
have found the right of their Battle Zone turned; and it gave time for
the withdrawal of the 2/4th Londons to the Canal line.

Lieut.-Col. Dann's mixed force on the Canal was of necessity in need
of organisation, and the 8th Londons, who had been in reserve at
Pierremande, were on their way to relieve the troops who had borne the
day's fighting. By 6 a.m. the relief was complete and the 8th Londons
were established on the Canal line, while Lieut.-Col. Dann's force,
consisting of the remains of the 2/2nd, 3rd and 2/4th Battalions, the
Suffolks, and elements of the 503rd Field Company R.E. and of the
182nd Tunnelling Company, who had also been thrown into the fight,
were assembled on a line west of Vouel, with Headquarters on the Butte
de Vouel. This position was an unfinished work, in parts not more
than a foot deep, and extended from the Butte almost due south to the
Chauny-Tergnier Road. Brigade Headquarters had withdrawn overnight to
Le Bas de Viry.

The Condren position, which had not been attacked on the 21st,
remained intact but was reinforced by a company of the Suffolks.

The results of the first day's fighting were tolerably serious. The
Forward and Battle Zones had been lost, and thus the greater part of
the defences which had been brought to a stage in any way approaching
completion were in the enemy's hands. The whole of the available
reserves were already inextricably in the fight, and should the attack
extend to the Southern Brigade area from Amigny-Rouy to Barisis there
would be no means of assisting the defence in that vicinity. Serious
losses of personnel had been sustained, and the swiftness and weight
of the blow had had their effect, though the morale of the troops were
still high. On the other hand the enemy had by no means gained the
success which he had anticipated. On the Brigade front of some 5000
yards, held by two weak battalions reinforced by parts of one other
battalion, he had employed nearly four divisions, and in spite of these
ridiculous odds had only advanced an average of about 5000 yards to
find that the defence had successfully withdrawn behind an obstacle
of much natural strength. The defence was shaken, but it was not in
the least broken, and a break through was the only means of ultimate
success to the Germans.

On arrival in the Vouel line in the early hours of the 22nd March, the
Battalion, which occupied the north end of the position near the Butte,
was reorganised in three companies, with A Company under 2/Lieut. F. G.
Williams on the right, B under Capt. Askham in the centre and D under
Capt. Clarke on the left. As on the 21st, a dense mist appeared with
the early hours, and until it rose, shortly after midday, no infantry
movement took place. Under cover of the mist the Battalion was able to
do a good deal of work on the Vouel line, and in this they were not
much interfered with, as most of the German shells were falling on the
road in front.

About 1.15 p.m. the enemy attack opened with great vigour and immense
weight on the Canal line and Tergnier. The crossing of the Canal was
rendered easier to the enemy by reason of the unfortunate fact that one
or two bridges had not been entirely demolished after our withdrawal.
All had long before been prepared for demolition, but for some reason
the charges did not explode in every case. A certain bewilderment was
caused to the defenders at first as the Germans appear to have gained
their first footing west of the Canal disguised in British uniforms
stolen from the fallen men of the 2/2nd Londons. But as soon as the
8th Londons appreciated what was happening they put up a very stubborn
resistance. After getting across the Canal the Bosche seems to have
tried to extend north and south along the western bank, and in this
he was successful in the northern area. In the south, however, the
magnificent fight made by the two companies in Tergnier checked his
progress, and time after time his attacks were stopped.

During the afternoon the German 'planes were seeking for the next
position held by us, and in spite of the hasty efforts of the Battalion
to camouflage its trench, the Vouel line was soon discovered, and
ranging on it by the German batteries rapidly ensued. No infantry
attack was delivered on the Vouel line, probably on account of the
enemy's lack of success at Tergnier.

Late in the afternoon the enemy's pressure on the 8th Londons grew
almost intolerable, and little by little he was working his way
into Tergnier. It was therefore decided to vacate the position, and
after dusk the 8th Londons fell back on to the Vouel line, which
they extended to the right from the Viry-Tergnier Road as far as
the railway. The two companies in Tergnier were ably extricated by
their commander and managed to get clear across the Oise, joining the
garrison at Condren, which had not been attacked.

The Vouel line was now the most advanced position, and at 6.30 p.m.
the Headquarters of the 3rd, 2/4th and 8th Londons were withdrawn from
it to Noureuil. The night passed without any further attempt on the
enemy's part to advance, and on our side a good deal of patrolling
activity took place. This led to several encounters with small parties
of enemy, and resulted in the collection of a quite useful bag of
German prisoners as well as a machine-gun and team. Under cover of
darkness also touch was regained with the Condren garrison.

Information was received on the evening of the 22nd that French troops
were rapidly advancing to our assistance, and that they would be ready
to counter-attack the next morning with the object of retaking the
Crozat Canal line.

On the 23rd March mist appeared yet once more, considerably hampering
our defence and giving the enemy an opportunity of massing for attack.
Shortly after 8 a.m. the French attack was launched by two battalions
of the 125th French Infantry which passed forward through the Vouel
line. The result of the attack is not definitely known as it was
impossible to see beyond a radius of about 15 yards. It is certain,
however, that it failed to reach Tergnier, and by 11 a.m. the French
advance was broken and the troops beginning to drift back into our
lines. It should be pointed out in fairness to our Allies that they had
been rushed up into the line, incomplete in equipment and transport,
and that they were called on to operate without previous reconnaissance
over ground which was shrouded in mist and unknown to them. On the
extreme left the withdrawal was conducted in some disorder, and it was
reported that the 18th Division on our left was also being forced back
through Frières Wood. The Vouel line, unfinished and shallow as it was,
was already occupied to its fullest capacity, and the French falling
back on it caused considerable congestion in the well-dug parts. About
the same time the German artillery, which had been plastering the Vouel
line fairly steadily all the morning, lifted, and was at once succeeded
by an accurate and intense machine-gun barrage. This further tended to
create difficulty in the position, for in view of the congestion of the
trench it became very hard to get orders along, while work on the gaps
between the well dug portions was almost impossible.

Shortly afterwards the mist cleared and the awkwardness of the
situation became more apparent. The 18th Division were being pressed
back towards Villequier-Aumont, and the left flank was entirely in
the air, while the constant pushing of small highly trained bodies of
the enemy was enabling them to progress along the Oise marshes on the
right. Vouel itself was strongly occupied, and troops were massing for
attack. By 12 noon the position was no longer tenable. The enemy was
advancing frontally and from both flanks, and Lieut.-Col. Dann ordered
a withdrawal on to the Green line. This was a partly dug position which
formed a portion of the Rear Zone and was held by troops of the 6th
Dismounted Cavalry Brigade and the 18th Entrenching Battalion, on a
line east of Noureuil and Viry-Noureuil from the St Quentin Canal to
the Vouel-Villequier Road. The withdrawal to the Green line from the
Vouel position averaged about 1500 yards, and so hard were the enemy
pressing that some platoons had to fight their way back. An attempt
was made by the French machine-gunners in the Vouel line to cover the
Battalion's withdrawal, but this was not effective and, together with
several of our own men, they were captured.

The situation was now critical. The falling back of the 18th Division
on the left revealed a gap between the Vouel-Villequier Road and
Frières Wood of which the enemy was not slow to take advantage, and
there appeared every likelihood that the 173rd Brigade would be cut off
from the 18th Division and rolled up against the St Quentin Canal. To
meet this threat the left flank of the Green line position, consisting
of troops of the Dismounted Brigade and details of the 8th Londons,
was thrown back and extended towards Villequier-Aumont in an attempt
to gain touch once more with the 18th Division. This line was thin,
and under the continued German pressure it suffered severely. During
the afternoon the enemy thrust south again and entered Noureuil, thus
driving a wedge behind the flank of the Green line troops. A glance
at the map will show that a further withdrawal was inevitable if the
whole Brigade was not to be rounded up. This began about 6 p.m. and the
troops, including all that was left of the fighting ranks of the 2/4th
Londons, about 120 all told under Capt. Askham, fell back to a position
west of Viry-Noureuil, which village was yielded to the enemy.

During the afternoon, while the fate of the bulk of the Brigade was
still in the balance, and it was obviously imperative to check the
enemy's advance into Chauny by all available means, the Brigadier
ordered Major Grover of the 2/4th Londons, who was at Chauny with
battle surplus, to organise all available details for the defence of
the town. With remarkable skill and despatch Major Grover collected a
heterogeneous force of clerks, cooks, officers' servants, transport
drivers--anyone who could hold a rifle--and by dusk reported himself in
position on the eastern outskirts of Chauny with a force of 10 officers
and 270 other ranks at his command. Of these, 2 officers and 54 other
ranks were of the 2/4th Londons. This very brilliant piece of work
no doubt did much to save the situation, and "Grover's Force" beyond
question deserves to rank high among the various similar "scarecrow
armies" which these critical days produced.

During the afternoon Lieut.-Col. Dann was attached for duty to Brigade
Headquarters, and the remains of the 2/4th and 8th Londons came under
command of Lieut.-Col. Derviche-Jones of the latter Battalion.

The withdrawal from the Green line to the River Helot position was
considerably impeded by the French troops who were streaming in a
westerly direction, and Brigade therefore endeavoured to ascertain what
the intentions of the French Commander were. These were found to be to
hold a line from Viry-Noureuil to Villequier-Aumont, and accordingly
it was decided that the whole of the 173rd Brigade Group should be
withdrawn and reorganised in positions to support the French. This
reorganisation was successfully carried out. In view of the rapid and
confusing moves which had followed each other in such quick succession,
it may be well to state in detail the Brigade positions at dawn on the
24th March:

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS AT ABBÉCOURT

GROVER'S FORCE--Covering the eastern exits of Chauny from
the St Quentin Canal to north of the
Chauny--Viry-Noureuil Road.

18TH ENTRENCHING BATTALION--Astride the St Quentin Canal
on the right of Grover's Force.

6TH DISMOUNTED CAVALRY BRIGADE--On the left of Grover's
Force east of the Chauny--Villequier-Aumont Road.

DETAILS OF THE 2/4TH AND 8TH LONDONS--On the left
of Grover's Force west of the
Chauny--Villequier-Aumont Road.

The Condren garrison substantially maintained its original positions
and was in touch by means of patrols with the 18th Entrenching
Battalion, while on the extreme right the 174th Brigade, which had not
been attacked, continued to hold the Amigny-Rouy--Barisis front.

On the left of the conglomerate force which now formed the 173rd
Brigade Group the line was continued by the 18th and 14th Divisions,
with whom French troops were interspersed in the direction of Cugny.

The whole line was strained to breaking-point under the unceasing
enemy pressure. Every available man was in the firing line, and
the Battalion, which had been now fighting and marching without
intermission for three days, was getting worn. But in spite of the
enormous odds the Battalion clung on with determination, for it knew
that the saving of the situation rested with itself, and attack after
attack had failed to give the German masses the break-through which was
essential for them.

For the fourth day in succession the Germans were favoured with a thick
fog which enshrouded their movements, and under cover of which they
were able to prepare a further heavy blow. Early in the morning they
attacked and broke through the French outpost line on the River Helot,
and about 11 a.m. the lifting of the mist revealed them attacking
Grover's Force east of Chauny, and also endeavouring to work round the
south of the position next the Canal. This was serious, for a wedge
driven in between the Chauny line and the Condren bridgehead, which was
also under great pressure from the enemy, might possibly involve the
loss of the Oise line, the retention of which was vital for us.

Arrangements were at once made by Brigade for a further withdrawal, and
this was rendered the more imperative by the rapid advance made on the
left of the Corps front during the day. In this region the enemy were
already threatening Guiscard, eight miles north-west of Chauny, and the
security of Noyon itself was seriously in doubt.

For several hours Grover's details and the tiny Condren force
maintained their fight, but in the afternoon the withdrawal began in
accordance with the orders already issued. Under Grover's command the
mixed force was skilfully withdrawn, fighting a stubborn rearguard
action, to a prepared position about 1000 yards east of Abbécourt,
while the detached portion of the 2/4th Londons on Grover's left, now
about 60 strong, fell back to Ognes, and marched into Besme across the
Oise about midnight. Early in the afternoon Major Grover was wounded
and Capt. Askham took over his command. By 4.30 p.m. the Abbécourt
position, being no longer tenable, was vacated and the whole of the
173rd Group, including 2/4th and 8th Londons, 503rd Field Company,
R.E. and the 6th Dismounted Cavalry Brigade, had crossed the Oise at
Manicamp. About the same time the Condren garrison which had held
manfully to its positions since the opening of the battle got clear
across the river.

Before this withdrawal was completed the whole of the Oise bridges, and
also the R.E. Dump at Chauny, were demolished, and it may be remarked
that during the four days of fighting not a single gun had been lost
except those destroyed by enemy shell fire.

With the withdrawal across the Oise the hardest of the Battalion's
fighting in this great battle was finished, though it remained in
contact with the enemy with very little rest. The Division now held
a river front of over nine miles on the south bank of the Oise from
Quierzy to Servais, in addition to the original four miles held by
the 174th Brigade in the Forêt de St Gobain. With this enormous front
in contact with an enterprising enemy no rest was yet to be expected.
The early hours of the 25th March were devoted to sorting out the
hopeless tangle of units which the battle had caused, and at 11.30
a.m. Lieut.-Col. Dann became responsible (in conjunction with the 6th
Dismounted Cavalry Brigade) for the defence of the river crossings at
Quierzy, with a composite force comprising details of four battalions,
reorganised in companies as follows:

1 Coy. representing 2/2nd Londons guarding Quierzy bridge.
1 " " 3rd Londons on its right.
1 " " 8th Londons on its left.
1 " " 2/4th Londons in support.

This company of the 2/4th Londons was the party of 60 which had reached
Besme the previous evening, and was now under 2/Lieut. Griffiths.

The same night (25th/26th March) this composite force was relieved by
the 246th French Regiment and withdrew to Besme to refit, Lieut.-Col.
Dann taking charge of another composite force of troops of the 175th
Brigade. In the meantime the remainder of the 2/4th Londons, which had
formed part of Grover's Force and were now under Askham, took up a
defensive position under orders of Lieut.-Col. Chart, 18th Entrenching
Battalion, east of Manicamp, on the south side of the Canal and the
Ailette River. At night this party was also relieved by Lieut.-Col.
Dann's force and joined the remainder of the Battalion at Besme.

The 173rd Brigade was now entirely extricated from the line, and a day
of reorganisation and collection of scattered details from the various
composite forces, which the needs of the moment had created, was of
urgent necessity. This respite was obtained on the 26th March when the
three original units were reorganised as one battalion, known as the
Fusilier Battalion as follows:

No. 1 Coy.--117 other ranks 2/4th Londons under Capt. Askham.
No. 2 Coy.-- 88 other ranks 2/4th " " 2/Lieut. Blair.
No. 3 Coy.--179 " " 2/2nd " " Capt. Wright.
No. 4 Coy.--189 " " 3rd " " 2/Lieut. Curtis.

Lieut.-Col. Dann returned from the 175th Brigade to command this newly
constituted force. In addition to the Fusilier Battalion, the Brigade
included temporarily the 12th Londons under Lieut.-Col. Bayliffe,
C.M.G., and the 18th Entrenching Battalion under Lieut.-Col. Chart.

The whole of the III Corps had now been brought south of the Oise,
and Noyon fell into the enemy's hands on the 26th. The main weight
of the German offensive continued to sweep westward in the direction
of Amiens, but with the details of this part of the fight we are not
concerned. The 58th Division, however, was not yet out of the fight,
and the enemy made repeated efforts to force a breach in the long river
line which it held, but without success. The French troops were now
numerous in this area, and though General Butler continued to command
his own Corps, the supreme command of the area was taken by the French.

In this battle the Battalion had the extraordinary experience of being
driven entirely out of the battle area. It had lost severely and borne
several days of the most terrific ordeal that it had yet been called on
to face, but with the exception of a deep indentation in its positions
at Farm Rouge on the first day there had never been any semblance of
a break-through on its front. Frequently hard pressed, often almost
surrounded, it had been forced back day after day, stubbornly fighting
but never broken.

Constituted as described above the 173rd Brigade took over the Manicamp
sector from the 175th on the evening of the 27th March, the 12th
Londons occupying the right subsector, with the Fusilier Battalion on
the left adjoining Manicamp village. The two 2/4th London Companies
were stationed on the Ailette River and in the village. The Brigade
remained in these positions strengthening the defences until the night
of 2nd/3rd April, when it was relieved by the French, the Fusilier
Battalion reaching Blérancourt at midnight. The daylight hours of the
3rd April were occupied in resting and cleaning up, and after dark
the Battalion moved to Andignicourt, where it was accommodated in an
enormous cave probably large enough to hold a brigade at full strength.

The following afternoon the route was continued and the Battalion
reached Amblèny at 8 p.m. Here the Fusilier Battalion broke up, its
component companies being once more organised as three battalions under
their respective commanders. The 12th Londons returned to their own
brigade, being replaced in the 173rd Brigade by the 16th Entrenching
Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Nicholls).

The 2/4th Londons were joined on the 3rd April by Major F. G.
Tollworthy, 1st Londons, as second in command vice Major Grover wounded.

On the 5th April another evening march was made to Dommiers, and the
next day after a very trying march the Battalion reached Villers
Cotterets at 8 p.m. Here it entrained with the remainder of the
Division for an area further north to which the III Corps had been
transferred. The total casualties sustained by the 2/4th Battalion
in the second battle of the Somme between 21st March and 3rd April
amounted to:

Officers--Lieut. J. Cairns, missing, believed killed; 2/Lieut. F.
G. Williams, died of wounds; Major A. Grover, M.C.,
Capt. C. A. Clarke, M.C., Lieut, H. J. M. Williams,
2/Lieuts. R. W. Chamberlain, C. C. H. Clifford, A.
Woodington, E. M. Cuthbertson and C. B. Francis,
wounded; Lieut. W. F. Brown, gassed; Lieuts. G. E.
Lester, H. W. Durlacher, M.C., 2/Lieuts. D. F. Crawford
and L. F. Wardle, captured.

N.C.O.'s and men: 37 killed, 125 wounded and 217 missing.

The total losses of the Division for the same period were 2204, of whom
57 officers and 1606 other ranks were missing.

III. _The Action at Villers-Bretonneux_

In the first portion of this chapter we have endeavoured to give some
account of the manner in which the 2/4th Battalion, with the 58th
Division and the whole of Butler's III Corps, had been literally pushed
aside by the main force of the German onslaught and had been extricated
from the fight due southwards through French territory, while the
advancing enemy had swept on in a westerly direction towards Amiens.

By the evening of the 28th March, that is to say, a week after the
opening of the battle, the Fifth and Third Armies had been forced back
from the line of the Somme and over the old Somme battlefields, and had
reached the Amiens defence line south of the Somme, while on the north
bank the enemy had occupied Albert.

On the 28th March a further attack was delivered on a wide front from
north of Arras to Puisieux which resulted in a severe defeat for the
Germans; but as only the 1/4th Battalion is concerned in the fighting
on this day we propose to defer the account of it to another chapter,
and to pursue for the moment the fortunes of the 2/4th Battalion until
the final stabilisation of the line in front of Amiens.

The German offensive on the Somme front was now showing signs of
weakening, though owing to the enormous losses incurred by our
divisions in personnel and material the enemy was still able to make
progress. The defences of Amiens in particular were threatened,
and Gen. Gough had been entrusted by G.H.Q. with the task of
extending and strengthening them. The last days of March saw fierce
fighting in this area, and by the 31st of the month the Fifth
Army south of the Amiens-Péronne Road had fallen back to the line
Villers-Bretonneux-Hangard, both villages inclusive to the British,
while on the right the French were holding a small corner of the angle
between the Luce and Avre Rivers on the line Hangard-Moreuil Station.
The German attacks finally exhausted themselves by April 5th, after
which date there was a short period of trench warfare.

It was to this area, still on the extreme right of the British Armies,
that the 58th Division was now directed. From Villers Cotterets, which
it left on 6th April, the 2/4th Battalion was railed to Longueau,
a suburb of Amiens. The battle line was now quite close to the
Amiens-Paris line, a lateral railroad of vital importance to us, and as
the Battalion passed Boves the British field guns were in action within
a quarter of a mile of the train.

On detrainment the Battalion marched to a reserve position in the
Bois de Gentelles, where a long day was devoted to reorganisation.
The losses of the latter end of March had not yet been made good by
reinforcements, and it was therefore decided to make use of the 16th
Entrenching Battalion for this purpose. Accordingly on the 7th April
two companies of this unit were transferred to the 2/4th Battalion,
making an increase of strength of 4 officers (Capt. B. H. C. Hettler,
M.C., and 2/Lieuts. J. W. Bocking, E. V. Grimsdell and W. T. Millar)
and 344 other ranks. With this valuable reinforcement it was possible
once again to organise four companies as follows:

No. 1 Coy. under Capt. G. H. Hetley} 2/4th London men.
No. 2 " " Capt. S. G. Askham}
No. 3 " " Capt. B. H. C. Hettler } 16th Entrenching
No. 4 " " 2/Lieut. E. V. Grimsdell} Battalion men.

It should be remarked in passing that the Entrenching Battalions had
no connection with the Labour Corps. They were trained and combatant
troops whose existence as Entrenching Battalions only dated from
the Divisional reorganisations of the preceding January, and they
represented in effect the troops which had been "left over" after the
reorganisation was completed. The bulk of the reinforcement which thus
came to the 2/4th Battalion were enlisted in the 6th K.O.Y.L.I., and
were undoubtedly some of the finest reinforcements the Battalion ever
received: although young they were very keen, and included some most
reliable non-commissioned officers.

At 7.45 p.m. on the 7th April the Battalion relieved the 12th Londons
in the Reserve system between the village of Gentelles and the
Amiens-Roye Road, Nos. 3 and 4 Companies occupying the front line
with Nos. 1 and 2 in support to them and Headquarters in the Bois
de Gentelles. For ten days the Battalion continued to occupy these
positions, constantly employed in working parties on its own defences
and on elaborately wiring the lines in conjunction with the R.E.'s.
This wire was strengthened to form a considerable obstacle for the
Gentelles line, which was the final line of the Amiens defences and was
to be held at all costs. During this tour of duty the 2/4th Battalion
suffered somewhat from German shell fire, for the British batteries
were close behind the Gentelles line.

It was confidently anticipated that the enemy would endeavour once
more to break the Amiens defences in this area. The village of
Villers-Bretonneux stands on a somewhat prominent hill seven miles
east of Amiens, and its possession would have enabled the Germans to
play havoc by their artillery with the city itself and our important
road and railway communications which radiate from it. Its value to
the Germans rendered it a matter of the highest importance to us to
defend it stubbornly. In anticipation of an attack, therefore, the
battle surplus was sent out of the trenches on the 10th and the work of
strengthening the defences pressed on with vigour.

Further reinforcements were received from the Base, numbering in all
127 other ranks. These were mostly young lads under nineteen years
of age whose despatch overseas had been rendered necessary by the
impossibility of otherwise replacing the deficiencies in the ranks.
They were all extremely keen and had received a good groundwork of
training at home. But they reached the Battalion at a time when it had
just been shaken by one battle and was about to become involved in
another, and it can only be deplored that circumstances prevented any
opportunity for assimilating them into the Battalion and for giving
them some preliminary experience of warfare under quieter conditions.
The whole Battalion was indeed rather conglomerate, for of a total of
some 650 rifles about 450 were strange to the Battalion and called upon
to go into action under a command unknown to them: this important point
should be borne in mind in considering the battle which followed.

On the evening of the 18th April the 58th Division took over from
the 5th Australian Brigade the front line east of Cachy, the 173rd
Brigade occupying the whole sector. This sector extended from the
immediate left of Hangard, through the Bois de Hangard to the
Villers-Bretonneux-Demuin Road, the 3rd Londons on the right, the
2/2nd in the centre and the 2/4th on the left. The 2/4th Battalion's
subsector, in which it relieved the 19th Australian Battalion, about
1500 yards frontage, was held with three companies (Nos. 1, 2 and 4)
in the front line and one (No. 3) in support, Headquarters occupying a
quarry east of Cachy. The 175th Brigade took over the Blue line while
the 174th was in reserve in Cagny.

The Battalion was now straining every nerve to complete the defences.
Much work was still to be done. The front line had originally existed
as a line of isolated posts, and these were not yet completely
connected up nor were they adequately wired. A great deal was to be
done in providing efficient fire positions throughout the line in order
that if lateral movement should become necessary the defence of the
position might not be impaired.

Orders were received that the front line would be held till the last.
The support company would be employed for counter-attack purposes
in the event of the enemy gaining a footing in our positions; and
the success of the defence would clearly depend on the rapidity and
skill with which this local reserve was used. The right flank of the
Brigade front was further strengthened by the 10th Londons, who were
temporarily attached in Brigade reserve.

On the 21st the Battalion suffered a severe loss in the adjutant,
Capt. F. W. Walker, D.S.O., who was wounded, his duties being taken by
Lieut. S. A. Seys, the assistant adjutant. On the 23rd Capt. Hetley
was attached to the 131st French Divisional Headquarters as liaison
officer, and his company was handed over temporarily to Capt. W. C.
Morton.

The same day information was obtained from Alsatian deserters that the
enemy attack would take place at dawn the following morning.

We may restate the distribution of companies in the trenches as follows:

In Front-- No. 2 (Askham) on the right.
No. 1 (Morton) in the centre.
No. 4 (Grimsdell) on the left.
In Support--No. 3 (Hettler).

By an extraordinary chance the enemy was yet once more favoured by
the weather, for, when his barrage dropped on our lines at 4 a.m. on
the 24th April with bitter intensity and great accuracy, the day was
dawning on a dense mist which impeded observation beyond a radius of
about 50 yards. The bombardment was severe, and in the area of forward
battery positions included gas shell.

The attack appears to have developed at widely different hours in
different parts of the line: the S.O.S. was received from the 8th
Division on the left as early as 5.40 a.m., and from Hangard at 6 a.m.,
but it was not until 6.20 a.m. that reports indicated that the 173rd
Brigade front was generally engaged. On the 2/4th Battalion front all
was ready to receive the advancing waves of German infantry, but it
must be admitted that some of the stoutest hearts were filled with
something approaching dismay when out of the fog, at a distance of 40
to 50 yards, loomed the weird forms of German tanks. So far as can
be ascertained about six tanks were directed on the 2/4th Battalion's
sector, and it was the only Battalion of the Brigade against which
they advanced. The tanks seem to have been uncertain of their bearings
in the mist and not too skilfully handled. One at least devoted its
energies to describing small circles, firing wildly into the ground
where none of our troops were posted.

In spite of this unskilful manœuvring, however, there is no doubt that
the sudden appearance of these monsters shook our defence for a moment,
and the men fell back a short distance. They remained perfectly under
control, and were rapidly rallied by their officers a short distance in
rear of the front trench, after which the German infantry, advancing
in three waves close behind the tanks, were hotly engaged with rifle
and Lewis gun fire, which inflicted heavy loss on them. Askham was hit
about twenty minutes after the attack began, and after his departure to
the Aid Post charge of affairs in the firing line, so far as control
was possible over a wide front in the mist, was assumed by Morton
of No. 1 Company. The first news of what was occurring in front was
received at Battalion Headquarters from Morton in a message timed 6.30
a.m.: "Tanks have crossed front line trenches, front line has fallen
back, have rallied them at Coy. H.Q. line."

Steadily the tanks pressed our line back though our retirement was
carried out gradually and at ghastly loss to the German infantry; and
finally Morton was able to collect all available men of the 2/4th
Battalion in the Cachy Switch.

The support company put up a good fight--Hettler was hit early--and
eventually was nearly surrounded; but it cut its way out and managed
also to gain the Cachy Switch. The Divisional records time our
retirement to the Cachy Switch at 7.40 a.m., but there seems no doubt
that the Battalion's resistance was much more prolonged than this would
indicate. Certainly Morton was not able to report the organisation of
his new position till 10.15 a.m. By this time only about one hundred
men of the Battalion with three subalterns, Prince, Sheppard and
Ewing, were under Morton's hand, though others rejoined later. The
2/4th Battalion's retirement had involved the risk of leaving the left
flank of the 2/2nd Londons on its right in the air, but this Battalion
conformed to our movement, though a gap ensued between the two units.
This was promptly filled by Brigade, who sent forward a company of the
2/10th Londons. By midday our line was more or less stabilised on a
line from the Cachy Switch immediately in front of Cachy village along
the Hangard Road. This meant that Hangard Wood was lost, and from the
left flank the bad news was also received that Villers-Bretonneux had
fallen into the enemy's hands.

Beyond artillery activity no further action of importance occurred on
the Battalion's front during the afternoon, which was busily occupied
in forming a line of shell hole defences in the new position and in
feeling out to the flanks to gain touch with adjoining units.

This was the only occasion on which either Battalion of the regiment
was called on to face tanks. There can be no question as to the
tremendous moral effect of these machines, though their actual
destructiveness--handled as they were--was not great. Under the
conditions of mist which prevented any warning of their approach,
and the conglomerate composition of the Battalion, a little initial
unsteadiness on the part of the less trained elements of the Battalion
was almost to be expected in face of such an ordeal. The rapid recovery
and steady rearguard fight back to the Cachy line, however, showed that
after the first shock the innate discipline of the Londoner asserted
itself and the number of enemy dead counted on the field was evidence
of the heavy cost to the Germans of their success.

2/Lieut. Ewing should be mentioned. "His behaviour was splendid
throughout. During the preliminary bombardment he was constantly up
and down his sector encouraging his men, and when the enemy ultimately
appeared his fire orders were clear and effective." He was awarded the
M.C., as was also Capt. Morton, who displayed throughout the day marked
qualities of leadership and coolness. Pte. Petrie, a stretcher-bearer
who gained the M.M., exhibited an utter disregard of personal danger in
pursuing his work of bringing in and tending wounded.

The heavy casualties sustained this day in "missing" were due to the
fact that in retirement the Battalion was forced to leave many men, who
might otherwise have been saved, in the enemy's hands. But the R.A.M.C.
staff under Lieut. Dunaway worked magnificently under heavy shell fire
till the last moment, thereby retrieving many wounded men who must
otherwise have been captured.

We have already pointed to the great importance of Villers-Bretonneux
in the defence of Amiens, and it is not surprising therefore that its
loss was followed by an immediate order from Army Headquarters that it
must be recaptured at all costs.

The counter-attack was delivered at 10 p.m. on the 24th April by the
9th Londons, the 54th Brigade and the Australians. Villers-Bretonneux
again passed into our hands, while on the 58th Division's front the
line was advanced about half-way forward from the Cachy Switch to the
original front line.

During the 25th April the 2/4th Battalion was not engaged, though it
was all day long subjected to severe artillery fire, which inflicted a
good many casualties. On the evening of the 25th the 2/4th Battalion
was relieved by troops of the French Moroccan Division, and withdrew on
relief to bivouacs in open country east of Boves.

The casualties of the two days' action were:

2/Lieut. J. W. Booking, killed; Capts. S. G. Askham, M.C., B. H. C.
Hettler, M.C., 2/Lieuts. S. F. G. Mears, P. J. Payne and L. H.
Sheppard, wounded; 2/Lieuts. S. C. Geering and C. W. Cumner,
missing; and in N.C.O.'s and men 23 killed, 108 wounded and 203
missing.

During the 26th April the Moroccan Division continued the
counter-attack, and at the end of the day the line was substantially
restored to its position prior to the German attack.

This was the last serious German attempt to reach Amiens. The line had
bent perilously, but the offensive in this area had been fought to a
standstill. At this point, therefore, we may leave the 2/4th Battalion
and deal with the defence of Arras, in which the 1/4th Battalion bore a
part.

CHAPTER XXI

THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE DEFENCE OF ARRAS, 1918

On the 11th March 1918 the 1/4th Londons took over the Oppy Trenches
from the Kensingtons.

There was no room for doubt now that the Germans intended sooner or
later to launch a big attack in this area, and the only thing was to
ensure that the troops holding the line should be ready whenever the
storm might burst. The dispositions now taken up were, therefore, those
which had been finally decided on for the scheme of defence, and it
was arranged that companies should henceforth always occupy the same
positions in order the better to know their ground. These positions
will be stated in detail later.

So far as the infantry in the line were concerned the period of
suspense was mainly characterised by very hard work on the defences and
by particularly active patrolling. Each front line post nightly pushed
forward to the enemy wire a listening patrol to give early warning of
signs of the enemy's assembly for attack. On the evening of the 12th
March 2/Lieut. G. G. Lewis took a patrol into the German trenches near
Crucifix Corner, but found them unoccupied. The tour of duty passed
quietly, with the exception of a very severe bombardment with mustard
gas shells, which began at about 7 p.m. on the 15th March and continued
till about 8 a.m. the following morning. At the time this caused
little damage, but the heat of the sun later in the day accentuated
the effects of the gas, and Lieuts. A. Bath and O. D. Garratt, M.C.,
2/Lieuts. G. W. Fisher, E. A. Ratcliffe and 109 other ranks became
casualties.

Intelligence reports pointed to the probability of the attack
developing on the 12th March; but although nothing occurred, from this
date onwards the whole Division daily stood to arms from one hour
before dawn till 8.30 a.m., while the Divisional and Corps artillery
put a slow barrage on the enemy lines at daybreak. The "stand-to"
order was strictly enforced as far back as the transport lines and the
Quartermaster.

On the 18th the 1/4th Londons were relieved by the Kensingtons and
withdrew in Brigade reserve to Roclincourt, leaving two platoons in
support attached to the Kensingtons, and one in front trenches attached
to the London Scottish. A rearrangement of the method of holding the
line was now ordered by Corps, and the necessary changes which were
effected on the night of 21st/22nd March resulted in each division
holding its sector with two brigades in line and one in reserve. Each
front line brigade had two battalions in trenches and one in support.
The effect of this in the 56th Division was to leave the 169th and
168th Brigades in the line, while the 167th was withdrawn to the
support area.

The 21st March saw the opening of the great German offensive on the
Fifth Army front, but no attack developed opposite the 56th Division.
The day was marked by very greatly increased artillery activity on the
enemy's part, gas shell being freely used on the Bailleul-Willerval
line. This indication of the imminence of active operations caused the
cancellation of the relief of the 56th Division by the 62nd. The next
day warning was received that the 2nd Canadian Division would take over
the line, but this order was also subsequently cancelled.

No definite news of the offensive was received during the 21st March,
though it was reported that the enemy had gained the high ground
near Wancourt Tower, and was likely by his assault on Monchy to lay
the Corps right flank open to attack. Arras was heavily shelled, and
all the civilians were cleared out. St Pol also was bombarded by a
long-range gun, while low-flying Bosche aeroplanes were over the lines
and at night dropped bombs on Thélus.

On the evening of the 24th the 1/4th Londons returned to the front
line. Aerial reports of great activity behind the German lines now
made it clear that the attack was imminent, and final preparations for
the struggle were completed. All spare Lewis guns and magazines were
brought up from the transport lines. The men were in splendid fettle,
and the high probability that the long weeks of suspense would shortly
be over increased their good humour. All were absolutely confident in
themselves and each other, and their only anxiety was as to whether
they would have the good fortune to be in front trenches to meet the
enemy.

At this time Gen. Loch and Lieut.-Col. Marchment made strong
representations that the three front line posts ought to be much more
lightly held, and that the Company Headquarters in Beatty should be
withdrawn to the Marquis line, on the grounds that it was useless to
pack men into posts only 100 yards from the enemy, where they were
certain to suffer severely from the hostile bombardment and where
they had no room to fight. These representations were not received
favourably by Corps though the event showed they were well founded. As
it was Lieut.-Col. Marchment moved one platoon from Oppy Post, but even
with this alteration the Marquis line was too lightly held.

News from the area of battle in the south was still vague, though it
was known that the Fifth Army had been forced to give a great deal of
ground, and that the Third Army on its left had also retreated, though
to a less degree, and to conform to the movements of its neighbour.
As the day wore on, however, the enemy's pressure on the Third
Army south of the Scarpe increased and by the 27th he had captured
Monchy-le-Preux. It became evident that he was aiming at a movement
to envelop Arras from the south. A reasonable deduction from this
situation was that the blow at Arras would shortly develop also on the
north of the Scarpe, by means of an assault on the Vimy Ridge.

In the early hours of the 25th March, shortly after the 1/4th Londons
had taken over the line, 2/Lieut. C. H. Board and Coy. Sergt.-Major
Matthews of B Company were visiting the sentry groups in Beatty Post
when two of the enemy, who had entered the trench by stealth, tried to
drag the Coy. Sergt.-Major out of it. A scuffle ensued in which another
officer and an N.C.O. joined. The two Germans unfortunately got away
after slightly wounding both Board and Matthews.

During the day the artillery on both sides became more active, though
no infantry action occurred, and the men were kept busy in constructing
trench blocks and improving firesteps. The right flank of the 1/4th
Londons' sector had always been regarded as a rather weak spot in the
defence, and in view of the expectation that the enemy would assault
the Vimy Ridge from the south, it was desirable to provide for the
formation by the Battalion of a defensive flank facing south should
this area become threatened. To this end work was pushed forward in
constructing and improving firesteps in Ouse Alley for its possible use
as a "switch line." This precaution, as will be seen, was justified by
events.

During the evening a report was received of the examination of a
prisoner of the 471st Infantry Regiment, who had been taken near
Mill Post on the previous evening. This was to the effect that the
attack was to be made on the morning of the 26th, and that the 219th
and 23rd Reserve Divisions had been brought forward for the purpose.
These troops were accommodated in the Drocourt-Quéant line. They
had just arrived from Riga and would attack in conjunction with the
240th and 5th Bavarian Reserve Divisions. They would assemble in
the front line system and would advance to a depth of four miles
with their right flank on Oppy, then swing round towards Vimy. Three
special divisions would capture the Vimy Ridge the next day. The 471st
Regiment had already 60 trench mortars in position, and 8 more trench
mortar companies were to arrive on the night of the 25th; most of the
ammunition was already in the line.

This message, bringing as it did a hope that the wearisome suspense was
at last at an end, was received with satisfaction, and instructions to
prepare for battle were issued. All night our artillery maintained a
heavy fire on the enemy's supposed assembly positions, while No Man's
Land was occupied by our listening patrols. At 4 a.m. these came in and
the heavy artillery placed a slow barrage on the German front lines.
At 4.45 a.m. the Battalion stood to arms, blocks were lowered in the
communication trenches and all made ready. No attack developed, and
at 7.30 a.m. the order to stand down was received from Brigade, the
remainder of the day passing comparatively quietly.

In the evening, in response to urgent appeals from Corps for an
identification, all battalions in the line sent patrols to the enemy
trenches to try to get prisoners. From the 1/4th Londons two parties
went forward at 10.30 p.m. after wire-cutting preparations by the field
artillery. 2/Lieut. G. G. Lewis with a platoon of A Company entered the
enemy line opposite Oppy Post, but the sentry group was heard running
away and no bag was obtained. From C Company 2/Lieut. R. E. Campkin
took two men to the German trenches near Crucifix Corner, and had a
lively little scrap in the dark with the sentry group. In this case
also the Bosche took to their heels, and, in spite of a good set to
with fists, managed to get away pursued by Campkin. After remaining
two hours in the enemy line both patrols returned bringing some trench
notice boards.

The 27th March passed remarkably quietly, nothing of interest occurring
beyond the movements of a low-flying Bosche 'plane which appeared to
be particularly interested in our trenches. A relief of the German
division opposite the Battalion was suspected, but the report was
incorrect.

On the night 27th/28th March orders were received that the XIII Corps
boundary was to be extended northwards as far as the Souchez River, and
that the 56th Division would "side-step" northwards. The side-step was
effected by transferring the Kensingtons from the right flank of the
1/4th Londons to the left flank, the Kensingtons taking over two new
posts north of the 1/4th Londons from the 8th Canadian Brigade. The gap
thus created on the right flank of the Battalion was filled by the
169th Brigade, which extended its left flank. Why this redistribution
was effected at the eleventh hour we do not know: obviously it must
have been for some very important reason. But whatever the cause,
the result was distinctly weakening to the defence. We have already
alluded to the well-recognised risk of the 1/4th Londons' right flank
being laid open, and now at the last moment the area was occupied by a
Battalion entirely strange to the ground. The relief in fact was not
completed before the battle opened, for when the Bosche barrage fell on
the morning of the 28th March the L.R.B. had not taken over Bailleul
East Post, while a company of the 1st Canadian Rifles in the Brown line
was still awaiting relief. By the courtesy of the Canadian Brigadier
this company was placed under the orders of Brig.-Gen. Loch.

In addition to this eleventh hour change of dispositions a certain
difficulty appears to have beset the High Command in reconciling the
rôles of the three divisions composing the Corps, and this resulted in
a stream of orders each of which altered its predecessor. The Corps
order, under which the extension of the 56th Division's line was
carried out, laid down that the Bailleul-Willerval line (Red line) was
to be the line of resistance, and that the front line system would be
regarded as outposts. Later in the evening the front line system was
ordered to be held at all costs to conform with the 4th Division on our
right; but still later a modification of this was made on the left of
the line in order to conform to the defensive line of the 3rd Canadian
Division on our left, and the garrison of Arleux Post was ordered, if
heavily attacked, to withdraw to the Arleux Loop.

The final dispositions therefore provided five lines of defence,
each to be defended at all costs in default of a Divisional order to
withdraw. There were:

1. Front line system.
2. Red line (Bailleul-Willerval).
3. Brown line (Farbus-Vimy).
4. Green line (Thélus).
5. La Targette line.

The order of battle of Brigade was as follows:

169TH BRIGADE (RIGHT):

Front line system: Queen's Westminsters in Towy Post on the right.
London Rifle Brigade in Mill,
Bradford and Bird Posts on the left.
Red line: 1/2nd Londons.
Brown line: 1 coy. 1/5th Cheshire Pioneers.
Reserve: 2 coys. 1st Londons (attd. from 167th Brigade).

168TH BRIGADE (LEFT):

Front line system: 1/4th Londons in Beatty, Wood and Oppy Posts
on the right.
Kensingtons in Tommy and Arleux Posts
on the left.
Red line: London Scottish.
Brown line: 2 platoons 1/5th Cheshire Pioneers.
Green line: 2 coys. 1st Londons, 1½ coys.
1/5th Cheshire Pioneers.

DIVISIONAL RESERVE:

167th Brigade (less 1st Londons) and 3 field coys. R.E.

The companies of the 1/4th Londons were disposed as follows:

Right: B Company (Spicer) H.Q. and 2 platoons in Beatty
Post. 1 platoon in Marquis and Earl line.
Centre: C Company (Duthie) 1 platoon in Wood Post. 1
platoon in Marquis line. H.Q. and 1 platoon in
South Duke St.
Left: A Company (H. N. Williams) 1 platoon in Oppy Post.
1 platoon between Oppy Post and Marquis line.
H.Q. and 1 platoon in Marquis line.
Advanced Battalion H.Q.: (Major F. A. Phillips) in South Duke
St. (with C Coy.)
Support: D Company (Cooper) in Bow Trench.
Battalion H.Q.: (Lieut.-Col. Marchment) in Ouse Alley west of
Bow Trench.

During the night 2/Lieut. R. E. Campkin with two men of C Company again
crossed No Man's Land and returned shortly before 3 a.m. on the 28th
March reporting that he had seen long lines of men carrying up to the
enemy front line what appeared to be large biscuit tins--doubtless the
trench mortar ammunition coming in. Evidently this was The Day!

At 3 a.m. on the 28th March the enemy opened an intense high explosive
shell fire on Bow Trench, Ouse Alley and Rear Battalion Headquarters,
as well as on all the rearward defensive posts. This bombardment, which
continued throughout the day, was at first mingled with mustard gas.
The forward area was hardly affected by this shelling except for the
fact that the wind carried the gas eastward over the front line posts,
the garrisons of which had to wear masks for over an hour.

At 5.40 a.m. a terrific trench mortar fire fell on the forward posts
doing very severe damage, and causing many casualties. Ouse Alley and
the Earl-Marquis line at first escaped this, though later the area of
bombardment was extended and they received a full share of it.

A strictly chronological account of an action such as this, in which
different parts of the Battalion became involved in the fight at
varying hours, is almost an impossibility if the reader is to glean
anything but the most confused impression of what occurred. We propose,
therefore, to deal first of all with the fight for the front line posts
gradually working our narrative westward.

The S.O.S. signal was received in Battalion Headquarters from Oppy
Post by wire at 7.15 a.m., and a few moments later flares were sent
up from Wood and Beatty. The signal was repeated backwards to Brigade
by Battalion Headquarters. "We stood on top," writes Lieut.-Col.
Marchment, "to have a look round but could see very little as it was
not fully light. We could, however, hear a pleasant noise--very heavy
rifle fire!"

Oppy Post on the left had been very badly knocked about by the
trench mortaring and the garrison seriously reduced before the enemy
came over. A gallant attempt at resistance was put up and rifle and
Lewis gun fire were opened as soon as the attacking lines made their
appearance. One Lewis gun team was seen from the rear to have climbed
on to the parapet, and the gun was being fired from the hip. But it was
hopeless from the first. The enemy lines were very close, and by sheer
weight of numbers the Post was quickly swamped. Of a garrison of 2
officers and 48 other ranks but 1 officer (2/Lieut. Athey) and 5 other
ranks were able to make their way back to the Marquis line which they
did by way of Boyne Trench.

On the right Beatty Post had suffered from the trench mortar fire more
severely than any, and by the time the Germans appeared its trenches
were practically effaced. The attackers appeared in fairly close
formation, and in considerable depth, some of the leading wave firing
rifle grenades from the hip. Apparently the enemy's trench mortar
preparation, severe as it had been, had not dealt effectively with
our wire, for the leading wave of attackers was delayed in getting
through it, causing those following to bunch up to it. The rapid rifle
and Lewis gun fire opened by the garrison of the post was thus able
to inflict very severe loss. For about fifteen minutes the garrison
stoutly held its own, but at the end of that time it was found that the
enemy had already swept over the posts to the right held by the L.R.B.,
and was working into Marine Trench and Ouse Alley in great numbers.
Again sheer weight of numbers made further resistance impossible, and
2/Lieut. G. R. Pitman brought the six surviving men back to the Marquis
line over the open, leaving 2 officers (Capt. E. E. Spicer and 2/Lieut.
Coombes) and 78 other ranks fallen at their posts.

In the centre a magnificent stand was made by the garrison of Wood
Post under Lieut. H. F. Dade and 2/Lieut. H. O. Morris. The night
position of the post had been changed a few days before the battle,
and the German trench mortar preparation therefore fell harmlessly on
the former position. When the trench mortar fire ceased the enemy was
seen advancing in an extended line over the open ground left of the
Wood and coming through the Wood in groups of about 10 men 50 yards
apart. This line was followed by groups of about 30 men some 200 yards
in rear. The whole garrison (2 officers, 45 other ranks and 2 Lewis
guns) at once opened a heavy fire which undoubtedly caused very severe
loss to the enemy. A party of Germans tried to force the block in the
trench leading from the new post to the old, but they were effectively
disposed of with rifle grenades. For a full hour this gallant garrison
held their own, completely checking the enemy in the wood. On the
right, however, the enemy had, as already recounted, swept over Beatty
Post and was now working his way round Wood Post from the south.
Ammunition and bombs were beginning to run short. After a consultation
Dade and Morris decided that the position was no longer tenable, and
they withdrew their men along Bedford Row and Boyne Trench to the
Marquis line. This withdrawal was skilfully executed, the move of the
riflemen down Boyne Trench being covered by Lewis guns in Bedford Row.
That the garrison held their own to the last is evidenced by the fact
that before the post was finally evacuated the Headquarters dugout was
in the hands of the enemy, while our own artillery was already shelling
the post. The defence of Wood Post cost 25 casualties in other ranks.

[Illustration: THE DEFENCE OF ARRAS, MARCH 1918]

The value of the defence of Wood Post can hardly be overestimated.
Apart from the heavy losses which the fire of its garrison undoubtedly
inflicted on the enemy, it is certain that its prolonged resistance
saved the Marquis line from being overrun in the vicinity of Advanced
Battalion Headquarters.

As soon as Williams reported the men back from Oppy Post Lieut.-Col.
Marchment had a 6-inch howitzer battery turned on to Oppy Wood.

The forward posts having fallen, the Marquis line became almost
immediately engaged, and Capt. H. N. Williams (A Company) displayed
great qualities of leadership in his defence of the position. We cannot
do better than to relate this phase of the battle in the words of the
official account of the action submitted by Lieut.-Col. Marchment:

The Marquis line easily held up the advancing enemy after the posts
had gone. On the right the enemy was strongly established in the
Earl line and Viscount Street about fifteen minutes after zero.
Major F. A. Phillips at once gave orders to 2/Lieut. O. C. Hudson,
whose platoon was in the Marquis line astride Ouse Alley, to form
the defensive flank at once. This had been rehearsed previously and
consisted not only in manning the block in Ouse Alley to the front,
but also in Earl to the right, and manning firesteps facing to the
right along Ouse Alley. 2/Lieut. Hudson maintained this position
with great gallantry and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy,
whom he caught in enfilade as they broke through over Earl to
Viscount Street. The defensive flank was prolonged by Headquarter
details who continued on the firestep in Ouse Alley and held a
block near the Aid Post in South Duke Street.

At about 9.30 a.m. a strong party was seen working up Ouse Alley
from Viscount Street towards Forward Battalion Headquarters.
Major F. A. Phillips at once attacked over the open with about
20 Headquarter details, the men following most gallantly under
heavy fire. The enemy were ejected and a block established in Ouse
Alley towards Viscount Street. A block was established here and
successfully defended with grenades by a party under Sergt. Udall.

In the centre of the Marquis line the attack was not pressed
until the Wood Post Garrison had withdrawn. After this the enemy
gradually built up a large volume of rifle fire from Oppy Wood, but
was prevented from debouching by well-directed rifle and Lewis gun
fire from the Marquis line. Rifle grenades were also used on New
Cut and Baker Street where the enemy had established himself.

On the left of the Marquis line excellent targets were presented on
the left of the Wood, the Lewis gun in the bank (near the junction
of Clarence Trench and Kent Road) doing most excellent work.

During the next three hours the enemy twice broke into the line
near Boyne, but was thrown out, leaving a good many dead in the
trench. Rifle and Lewis gun fire was opened whenever a good target
presented itself, and a large number of dead were seen between Wood
and Beale Trenches.

Later on the enemy broke in on the left from Clarence Trench. The
Lewis gun on the left had finished its ammunition, but reinforced
by a few men, the team ejected the enemy with rifle fire and
grenades.

Thus, at about 11 a.m., the forward troops were holding the Marquis
line beating off attacks to the front and holding a block on the
left. On the right, although the enemy pressure was considerable,
he was held up splendidly in Earl and South Duke Street and in
front and behind in Ouse Alley; the enemy holding Viscount Street
on the right and pushing on towards the Red line.

During the whole of this fight information as to the situation came
in to Rear Battalion Headquarters rapidly, thanks to a buried cable,
and throughout the battle communication was maintained with the troops
in front and with Brigade Headquarters and the artillery in rear.
Advantage of this was taken when definite news of the fall of the post
line was received, and the artillery barrage was dropped to conform to
the situation, Earl Trench being shelled with good effect.

We must now turn for a moment to the course of events in the rearward
area. The enemy's preparatory bombardment had fallen heavily on Bow
Trench, but the garrison (D Company, Cooper) was kept in dugouts,
sentries being changed each half-hour, and few casualties were
sustained. At 5 a.m. the blocks in Ouse Alley were lowered, and rum and
extra S.A.A. issued to the men. On the S.O.S. signal being received
the trench was manned; and at the same time Lieut.-Col. Marchment sent
the Headquarter Company round to join D Company, retaining with him
only a few signallers to work the line, two clerks and a few scouts, in
addition to Boutall (Adjutant), Lorden (Works Officer) and Padre Green
"to create a calm atmosphere." Lorden was hit here at about 7.45 a.m.

From about 8 a.m. the Headquarters area was quite in the air. The front
line system in the adjoining sector on the right (169th Brigade) had
gone, with the exception of Towy Post held by the Queen's Westminsters;
and the Bosche had worked up the valley on the left and was also for a
time in Ouse Alley, and attacking Bailleul East Post in the Red line
(held by the London Scottish).

For a time trouble was caused by low-flying enemy aeroplanes, but these
went back as soon as our own R.E. 8's appeared. Good contact work was
done throughout the day with these machines which called at intervals
for flares. Luckily all flares were carried on the men, and they were
thus available to show our positions to the aeroplanes. At one time
the Battalion code and position call, Q.J.B., was sent to the contact
aeroplane by Lucas Lamp worked by Sergt. Hurst, and satisfactorily
received.

At about 9 a.m. the enemy was in Viscount Trench, and as stragglers
from the L.R.B. reported that he was also working down Ouse Alley, D
Company was ordered to despatch one platoon to man Ouse Alley forward
of Bow Trench. This was quickly done, and the men, taking up positions
on the firesteps facing south-east, were able to engage small parties
of the enemy who appeared over the crest in front of Bailleul East Post.

Later in the morning when news was received of the severe odds against
which the gallant Marquis line garrison was struggling, the remainder
of D Company was ordered to bomb up Ouse Alley to try to join hands
with Major Phillips and thus complete the defensive flank. At the same
time a carrying party was detailed from Headquarters to carry S.A.A.
to the front line should D Company succeed. The place of D Company in
Bow Trench was taken by two platoons of the London Scottish placed at
Lieut.-Col. Marchment's disposal.

The bombing attack was pushed forward for some 400 yards. Enemy
opposition was not very severe and about a dozen were killed. The
Germans were, however, continuing to press forward over the open from
the right and it seemed likely that D Company would get cut off. A
block was therefore made in Ouse Alley which was held by a few men,
while another small party manned the firesteps to the right to engage
the advancing enemy. The remainder of D Company moved over the open in
the valley north of Ouse Alley towards Boyne Dump to carry S.A.A. to
the Marquis line, taking full advantage of the ground.

By 11.30 a.m. the situation of the Marquis line troops had become
precarious in the extreme. The Germans in Oppy Wood were being
reinforced and were developing a considerable volume of fire from
that direction. The right and right rear of the position were almost
enveloped and an attack was being launched against the left flank.
Bombs and ammunition were giving out. It seemed clear that further
resistance could only lead to useless loss of life. Influenced by
these weighty considerations Major Phillips, after a consultation
with his senior officers, decided to try to save the remnants of the
garrison by a withdrawal to the Red line. The only available trench
for withdrawal, Ouse Alley, was, however, already occupied by the
enemy in rear of the position, and the valley from Boyne Dump on the
left offered the only loophole of escape from the closing pincers.
Lieut.-Col. Marchment writes of this withdrawal:

The withdrawal was witnessed by myself from my headquarters. I
watched it through my glasses. It was carried out in a very steady
and orderly way, the men leaving in groups of about a dozen.
Although exposed to heavy fire from the front and flanks, they made
excellent use of the ground and had few casualties.

The men of D Company, who were meanwhile carrying S.A.A. up to the
Marquis line, met the survivors returning and covered their withdrawal.

It is hard to find adequate words in praise of this gallant defence and
skilful and well-timed withdrawal. All ranks alike behaved with the
greatest spirit under very trying circumstances.

A great loss was suffered in this defence in the capture by the enemy
of the Regimental Aid Post. Capt. Maloney, the M.O. was a most popular
man in the Battalion, and Sergt. Rossington and the two orderlies,
Palmer and Simpson, had all done excellent work. By an irony of fate
2/Lieut. Morris, who had done such good work in the defence of Wood
Post earlier in the morning, was hit later, and was having his wounds
dressed in the Aid Post when it was captured.

Major F. A. Phillips who, at Forward Headquarters, was in charge of
the whole defence of the forward system, did excellent work. He was
continually up and down the lines encouraging the men, and was able to
keep Rear Battalion Headquarters constantly in touch with the rapid
changes in the situation.

The enemy was now in great force in Viscount Street and was beginning
to bomb heavily down Ouse Alley, while he showed increasing signs of
strength on the ridge to the right of that trench. The party of D
Company in Ouse Alley was therefore withdrawn as soon as the survivors
of the Marquis line garrison had reached Bow Trench, to avoid the risk
of being cut off. Later the enemy appeared in great strength against
the block in Ouse Alley forward of Bow Trench. This block was defended
by a "slit" cut in the side of Ouse Alley which was covered by a Lewis
gun post in Bow Trench and seven of the enemy were killed by Lewis gun
fire.

As soon as the Battalion was concentrated in Bow Trench and the Red
line, the artillery barrage was dropped to a line about 400 yards in
front of Bow Trench, and arrangements were made to increase it to
intense should the S.O.S. signal be sent up from Battalion Headquarters.

The enemy skirmishers having been definitely checked the situation now
became quieter, and for the next hour there was a distinct lull in the
battle.

The Kensingtons on the left had not been attacked but had withdrawn to
the Red line to conform to the 1/4th Londons' new position.

In Towy Post, the extreme right of the Divisional front, the Queen's
Westminsters had put up a most gallant fight, but the remainder of
the 169th Brigade front had rapidly been swamped by weight of enemy
numbers, and in this sector the 169th Brigade troops were thrown back
to the Red line while the Wood Post garrison was still holding its
ground.

The development of this great German attack was a remarkable
confirmation of the statement which had been made by the prisoner
captured on the 24th March. All the troops mentioned by him were
identified in the course of the fighting. On the 1/4th Londons' front
two German regiments were identified: the 249th I. Regt. at Oppy Post,
and the 10th R.I. Regt. in the shape of a gentleman who broke into
Sergt. Plumbley's canteen in Ouse Alley. But having armed himself with
a tin of pineapple this luckless marauder fell into the arms of D
Company bombing up the trench!

Eleven German divisions took part in this great battle, but they
were all checked by the divisions holding the line, the 56th and 4th
north of the Scarpe and the 3rd and 15th south of it. That the almost
complete failure of the enemy on the 28th March was a severe blow to
the German High Command there can be no doubt, and Ludendorff says,
"It was an established fact that the enemy's resistance was beyond our
strength."

The regiment has every reason to be proud of its defence this day. For
over four hours it retained the front line system under the weight
of heavy shell fire and repeated attacks by vastly superior numbers,
and, when finally it was forced to give ground to avoid extinction,
it withdrew fighting. The casualties were heavy, but considering the
enormous service rendered the price paid was not unduly great.

At about 4 p.m. the enemy began to shell the Red line rather heavily,
but no infantry attack matured. Shortly afterwards the 1/4th Londons
were withdrawn, and by 6 p.m. were under cover of the Railway
Embankment north-east of Bailleul, reorganised in two companies (Cooper
and Williams), S.A.A. was replenished and arrangements made to man the
Brown line and posts south of the Bailleul Road should the enemy break
through the Red line. Bow Trench had been handed over to the London
Scottish.

The experience of this battle showed the need for holding front line
posts lightly, and purely for observation purposes. The uselessness
of locking up large garrisons in them--unless they can be effectively
concealed as in the case of Wood Post--was clearly demonstrated. The
system of trench blocks to which much thought had previously been
devoted fully proved its value, while the advantage of rehearsing
companies in the rôles they may be expected to play, and especially of
acquainting all ranks with the "overland" routes within the area was
much in evidence.

The casualties sustained by the 1/4th Londons in this action were:

Officers: Capt. E. E. Spicer, 2/Lieuts. R. E. Campkin, H. T.
Hannay and H. V. Coombes, killed; Capt. A. M. Duthie,
D.S.O., and Lieut. H. M. Lorden, wounded; Capt.
Maloney, 2/Lieuts. C. W. Denning (attached to 168th
L.T.M. Battery), H. O. Morris and C. S. Richards,
captured.

N.C.O.'s and men: 15 killed, 43 wounded and 168 missing.

Decorations were awarded to the following:

Lieut.-Col. A. F. Marchment, M.C., and Major F. A. Phillips, the
D.S.O.; Capts. A. M. Duthie, D.S.O., T. B. Cooper, M.M., and
H. N. Williams, the M.C.; C.S.M. T. Lock, M.M., the D.C.M.;
L.-Corpl. W. J. Hutchin, M.M., Bar to M.M.; Sergts. F. G.
Udall, H. V. R. Randall and C. J. Gibbs, Corpls. G. Hayes
and A. Parker, L.-Corpls. S. G. Coates, C. L. Husk and A. J.
Deadman, and Ptes. W. A. G. Battershall, P. C. Swinchatt, A. J.
Sellars and J. R. Phillips, the M.M.

During the 29th March the 1/4th Londons remained in Brigade support.
Much movement was observed in the enemy's lines during the morning, and
our artillery was active in anticipation of a renewal of the attack,
but as the day wore on it became evident that the enemy was engaged in
relieving the attacking divisions. That evening at 7 p.m. the Battalion
handed over its trenches to the 87th Canadian Battalion (4th Canadian
Division) and marched out to billets at Mont St Eloy, arriving there at
2 a.m. on the 30th March.

CHAPTER XXII

THE 1/4TH AND 2/4TH BATTALIONS DURING THE SUMMER MONTHS OF 1918--THE
RESERVE BATTALION, 1918

In the preceding chapters we have endeavoured to describe the part
played by each of the battalions in resisting the mighty German
offensive.

As we have seen this gigantic thrust was finally brought to a
standstill in front of Amiens at the end of April, while the enemy's
hopes in the Arras area had been finally shattered by the magnificent
resistance of the 28th March. The German offensive capabilities were,
however, by no means exhausted; and in the north the enemy once more
taxed the British resources to the uttermost in the Battle of the Lys,
which raged from the 7th to the 30th April and bent our lines back to
Hazebrouck. With this action, or rather series of actions, we are not
directly concerned as the 4th London Regiment had no part in it, and
we may therefore turn at once to consider the situation in which the
British Armies found themselves when the German attacks were finally
spent.

The enormous weight of the German attacks of March and April had
involved practically the whole of the British divisions in France, and
all were in consequence seriously reduced in numbers and sorely in need
of rest and reorganisation. The magnificent efforts which were made
at home to replace the lost guns and other material are well known
and were of immediate effect; but the task of filling up the gaps in
personnel was necessarily a longer one, especially having regard to the
waning man-power of the Empire and its commitments in other theatres
of war. Moreover, after their arrival in France it was necessary for
reinforcements to be thoroughly assimilated into their new units before
active work could be expected of them. The serious depletion of force
at this time is illustrated by the fact that after temporarily writing
off as fighting units no fewer than 8 divisions, and handing over to
the French a further 5 at the urgent request of Marshal Foch, there
remained but 45--and most of these much reduced in numbers--available
for service on the British front.

The enemy's successes had, of course, cost him dear, but it was
believed to be by no means beyond the bounds of possibility that he
would make yet another effort to achieve a decisive victory, and the
position was thus full of anxiety for G.H.Q.

In the meantime the American Army was being poured into France as
rapidly as the whole available mercantile marine of the British Empire
could bring it across the Atlantic, but here again it was a question
of time before these well-trained but inexperienced troops would be
sufficiently valuable and numerous to turn the scale against Germany.

The story of the months of May, June and July 1918 is one of
preparation, in which the British Armies were being gradually
reorganised and used in active defence of the new positions until an
equilibrium of strength between the Allies and the enemy was attained,
and it was possible once more for the Allies to take the offensive
and roll back the tide of invasion in the most remarkable series of
victories which the world has ever seen.

We propose, therefore, to deal in this chapter, as briefly as possible,
with the operations during this period of reorganisation of each
Battalion in turn, until the opening of the Allied offensive in August
1918.

_The 1/4th Battalion_

Arriving at Mont St Eloy early in the morning of the 31st March 1918
the 1/4th Londons settled down to a few days of so-called rest, days
which, for officers at least, are usually quite as hard work as
those spent in battle. Companies have to be reorganised and fresh
"specialists" trained to their duties, the completion of the men's
clothing and equipment, and replenishment of all company stores have
to be looked to, in addition to a large amount of clerical work in
writing up the official account of the battle and in submitting names
for awards, mention in despatches and promotion. The Battalion on this
occasion was fortunate in getting the gaps in its ranks rapidly filled.
On the 2nd and 3rd April two drafts arrived numbering together 420
fully trained N.C.O.'s and men. Fine drafts which later did gallant
service, but which transformed the camp into a mild imitation of the
Tower of Babel, for among them could be traced the accents of London,
Kent, Surrey, Berkshire, the broader dialects of Yorkshire, Cheshire,
Lancashire and Wiltshire, and even the unmistakable tones of Scotland
and South Wales. Regulars, Territorials and New Armies were all
represented, and the rejuvenated Battalion provided a living example of
the unity of the Motherland in a great cause.

This great accession enabled an immediate reconstruction of the four
companies to take place, and they were accordingly reformed and the
reinforcements absorbed, A Company under Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C.,
B under Capt. R. S. B. Simmonds, C under Capt. S. J. Barkworth, M.C.,
M.M., and D under Capt. T. B. Cooper, M.C., M.M.

The troops were largely kept busy in digging new lines of defence round
Haut Avesnes, and all were much encouraged by the congratulations
received from G.H.Q., Army and Corps on their recent great stand.

Divisional rests, however, have ever proved a snare and a delusion,
and those who count on prolonged peace in billets are invariably
disappointed. In spite of its so recent gruelling the morale of the
Division was high, and on the 6th April it was called upon again to go
into the line, this time in the XVII Corps (Fergusson), but still in
the First Army, which now extended as far south as Neuville-Vitasse.
After spending the night 5th/6th April at Villers au Bois the 1/4th
Londons marched on the afternoon of the 6th to Agnez lez Duisans, and
proceeded the following afternoon to Ronville Caves. The march through
the streets of Arras in the dusk was a great surprise to those who had
known this pleasant little city even as recently as the late summer
of 1917. The civilians were now all gone, hotels and shops were shut
and scarcely a house had escaped the German shell fire. The beautiful
Cathedral had met the same ghastly fate as that of Albert, and the
Levis and Schramm barracks were but ghosts of their former selves.

In Ronville Caves, a remarkable series of underground chalk quarries,
the Battalion found dry and adequate quarters. The caves are of
considerable extent, the limits east and west being a crater in old
No Man's Land and Levis barracks; but, lighted by electricity and
tolerably ventilated, they formed quite healthy billets and, in the wet
weather then prevalent, far superior to bivouacs or trenches.

The trenches now to be taken over by the 56th from the 1st Canadian
Division lay south of the Arras-Cambrai Road just in front of the
village of Tilloy, for as far as this had the German offensive bent our
lines back. The front line, Tilloy Trench, ran between Tilloy and the
Bois des Bœufs and then southwards towards Neuville-Vitasse, roughly
following what had formerly been the east side of the famous German
redoubt, The Harp. In rear of the front trench were successively Tilloy
Support, View Trench and Tilloy Reserve. Communication trenches were
Scottish Avenue, Stokes Lane, Fusilier Lane and Wye Lane, the last
named forming the right boundary of the sector. The front and support
trenches lay on the forward slope of the hill well under observation
from the enemy lines. View Trench was on the reverse slope of the
hill, and probably acquired its name in the days when its defenders
wore field-grey and looked in the other direction: for us it was well
sited with a good field of fire of about 200 yards. Trenches, wire and
dugouts were fair. The fact that but a few days earlier this had been
a back area was forced on one's attention, for the line ran through
ruined Nissen hut camps and horse standings, while in the German front
line opposite stood the remains of a Y.M.C.A. hut.

After four days of working parties at Ronville, in which the Battalion
was digging a new line, Telegraph Hill Switch, the 1/4th Londons
relieved the 8th Middlesex in the line. This tour of duty lasted six
days during which the enemy remained inactive on this front, but which
saw the outbreak of the Battle of the Lys to which we have already
alluded. To those who knew the Neuve Chapelle area it seemed strange
to hear of "fighting in Riez Bailleul and Laventie," "the struggle for
Estaires," "the fall of Merville." Ruined though some of these places
had been in 1916, they had afforded shelter to many hundreds of 1/4th
London men, and it was now impossible to refrain from wondering what
had become of the villagers who had hitherto clung to their homes, and
especially of the little children.

On the last day in the line, the 19th, a raid on a large scale was
carried out by one company of the London Scottish on the right, and one
platoon of the 1/4th Londons on the left, with the object of advancing
the outpost line on the whole sector, and establishing it an average
of 500 yards in front of Tilloy Trench. The assaulting platoon was
drawn from C Company under 2/Lieut. E. L. Mills, M.C., and afterwards
(Mills having been hit) under 2/Lieut. J. L. Backhouse. Zero was at
4.30 a.m., and eight minutes later the 1/4th London platoon rushed
their objective after Stokes Mortar preparation. Unfortunately the
enemy garrison bolted and no identification was obtained, though they
left a machine-gun and many documents and maps in our hands. The
London Scottish also reached their objective and touch was gained with
them. This advanced line was held all day under German artillery fire,
which steadily increased until the Battalion was compelled to call for
protective fire from our guns in retaliation.

After 7 p.m. the enemy launched some heavy bombing attacks against the
new positions. These were vigorously resisted. A withdrawal to the
original line was, however, ordered by Brigade, and by 8 p.m. all the
assaulting platoons were back. A good deal of loss was undoubtedly
inflicted on the enemy, and the effect of this minor operation on the
spirit of the men fully justified its execution. Five N.C.O.'s and men
of the Battalion were killed and 24 wounded.

Late that night the Battalion handed over its trenches to the 1/2nd
Londons and withdrew in support to Ronville Caves, moving in the
evening of the 20th April to Dainville in Divisional reserve.

About this period the 1/4th Londons were unfortunate in losing Major F.
A. Phillips, D.S.O., who had been an able second in command for nearly
eight months. He was much out of health principally through having
swallowed rather too much mustard gas at Oppy, and he did not rejoin
the Battalion. His place was taken by Major R. B. Marshall, 8th East
Surrey Regiment, whose battalion had been disbanded in January. Capt.
Maloney's duties as Medical Officer had been taken for a few weeks by
Capt. J. Ridley, M.C., and subsequently by Capt. E. Woodyeat, a retired
naval surgeon, who had served in 1915 and 1916 with the Coldstream
Guards.

Casualties in April were light beyond those sustained during the raid
of the 19th. Lieut. L. E. Ballance was wounded this month. On the 24th
April a draft of officers joined as follows:

Lieut. J. W. Price, 2/Lieuts. H. W. Attenborrow, C. L. Henstridge,
A. Holloway, C. R. Mason, J. D. Miller, A. H. Millstead, W. P.
Humphrey and F. S. Wise.

2/Lieut. R. T. Stevenson (5th Londons); 2/Lieuts. S. Blackhurst,
M.C., A. F. Potter, J. A. Voskule, W. Roughton (7th Londons);
2/Lieut. A. M. Bullock (15th Londons).

On the 24th April Major-Gen. Dudgeon fell sick and went to hospital.
He had commanded the Division since August 1917 and brought it through
two of its most successful actions. A few days later Major-Gen. Hull
resumed the command.

On the night 3rd/4th May the Divisional front was extended northwards
as far as the Arras-Douai railway, the additional frontage being taken
over from the 1st Canadian Division. Thereafter the sector was held
with two brigades in line (each with two battalions in trenches and
one in support), and one brigade in reserve. Of the reserve brigade two
battalions were billeted at Dainville and one at Berneville.

The 1/4th Londons now settled down to their share of the routine of
working this sector, and through May and June were in and out of the
trenches, in line, in support and in reserve alternately, the tours of
duty varying between six and nine days. These summer weeks form on the
whole a pleasant memory for all who passed through them. The general
situation was indeed grave, and though for G.H.Q. the summer months
of 1918 must have been a period of unceasing anxiety, the infantryman
in the line saw life from a different angle. The trenches were
comfortable, the weather good, the men well fed and clothed. Mornings
in the trenches were spent in hard work on the defences, afternoons
in resting, evenings under a summer moon divided between digging and
wiring. With the added spice of patrolling and raiding, in which a lot
of useful work was achieved, and the enemy kept well on the alert, and
wishing he was not opposite to the 56th Division, the tours of duty in
line passed pleasantly enough with very few casualties. The Battalion
was in fine fettle and in good conceit with itself, a wholesome feeling
which scored heavily when the time came for the final advance.

The enemy's chief activity was shell fire, and at times this developed
to great intensity. On the 27th May in particular, when the 1/4th
Londons were in trenches, a very heavy bombardment, high explosive
and mustard gas together, burst on the area in the early morning. The
Battalion stood to and prepared to receive an attack, but no infantry
movement occurred, and it subsequently transpired that the disturbance
was to cover an enemy raid on the division on our right. For a time
most of the Battalion had made up their minds that they were about to
fight. The Londoner is full of superstition, and this day the Battalion
was to have boiled rabbit for dinner. Boiled rabbit had figured in
the menu on the 28th March!... Throughout the day the enemy artillery
carried out hurricane bombardments of various parts of the sector, and
it was no surprise to learn later that his offensive against Rheims had
broken out.

During the period under review the Battalion paid five visits to the
trenches at Tilloy, with one tour of three days in Arras, spent in
heavy working parties carrying wire to Telegraph Hill and digging, and
six days in support at St Sauveur similarly occupied.

Rests in Divisional reserve were spent at Dainville, in which much good
training work was carried out and the routine broken occasionally by
excellent sports meetings, shooting matches and concerts. In connection
with the concerts we must again refer to the Quartermaster's string
band. This excellent orchestra had given its first public performance
at St Aubin in January 1918. Receiving every encouragement from the
Colonel and the keenest support from the Padre, this band had had an
unbroken career of success and given the greatest pleasure to all
ranks of the Battalion. At Church Parades when out of the line the
band always played the hymns and voluntaries, and many a shattered
barn in the villages behind the trenches has re-echoed with the
strains of the 1/4th London string band. The keenness and pride of the
Quartermaster in his band were as delightful to observe as his remarks
when a cornet player was put out of action at Oppy were startling.
A portable harmonium was purchased to complete the equipment, and
when demobilisation broke the band up early in 1919, this harmonium,
decorated with the names of all the villages of France and Belgium in
which the orchestra had performed, was presented to the Padre for use
in his parish at home.

The general efficiency of the Battalion at this period reached a
remarkably high pitch, of which everyone associated with it had
reason to be thoroughly proud. It was well equipped, well drilled and
disciplined, and a fine fighting unit. This efficiency was not confined
to the fighting ranks. At an inspection of the Battalion Transport
(Lieut. G. V. Lawrie), the Divisional Commander was so impressed
with its turn-out that his remarks were circulated to other units
as an example. A fine fighting battalion cannot exist without fine
administration, and this was supplied in full measure by the Adjutant
(Boutall), and by the rear Headquarters under Mosely, Stanbridge,
Faulkner, the Quartermaster, and Lawrie, whose unceasing service to the
fighting ranks were of immeasurable value.

[Illustration: _Arras Cathedral_]

Faulkner was a man of peculiarly lovable disposition. "Le gros papa,"
as he was known to the little children in Dainville, forms in the minds
of many French peasants a picture of all that is kind and chivalrous
in the British soldier. Mosely writes: "Many is the night when the
Huns were dropping bombs on the village"--by no means an infrequent
occurrence--"that Faulkner has deliberately set himself to amuse a
family of youngsters and keep them screaming with laughter so that
their merriment should drown the noise of the explosions."

The following officers joined the Battalion during May, June and July:

Capt. H. A. T. Hewlett; Lieut. G. E. Stanbridge (recalled from six
months' home duty "on exchange"); 2/Lieuts. A. W. Chignell, T.
Yoxall and G. H. Sylvester.

In the early days of June the influenza epidemic began to make its
ravages, but the Battalion suffered comparatively little. No men
were allowed to rejoin in the line from back areas, but were kept at
Berneville until the Battalion came out of the trenches. Casualties
for May, June and July were very light. 2/Lieuts. W. P. Humphrey and
T. H. Mawby were killed, 2/Lieut. A. W. Chignell wounded, and about 12
N.C.O.'s and men killed and 40 wounded.

Early in July Capt. and Adjt. W. J. Boutall, M.C., was appointed to
168th Brigade Headquarters as Assistant Staff Captain, and his duties
in the Battalion were assumed by Capt. S. J. Barkworth, M.C., M.M.
Boutall had filled the appointment of Adjutant since September 1916
with conspicuous success. His organising ability was high and the
standard of his work throughout had been excellent. C Company was taken
over about the same time by Capt. H. A. T. Hewlett. 2/Lieut. F. S. Wise
was seconded to the Machine-gun Corps.

On the 13th July the 56th Division was relieved in the line by the 1st
Canadian Division, and passed into Corps reserve. The 1/4th Londons,
who had already been in billets at Dainville for a week, moved to
Lattre St Quentin, and during the ensuing fortnight further changes of
stations followed each other with rapidity. The Battalion was quartered
successively at Grand Rullecourt, Tincques and Marqueffles Farm, the
days being occupied with training interspersed with sports and games.
While the Battalion was at Tinques the railway station was visited
on the night of the 17th July by enemy aircraft, which dropped eight
bombs, but caused no loss of personnel.

The last night of July found the Division once more taking over the
Tilloy trenches from the Canadians, the 1/4th Londons being at St
Sauveur in Brigade support until the 4th August, when they relieved the
Kensingtons in the front trenches. On the 8th August, the opening day
of the great British advance, the Battalion was relieved by the London
Scottish and withdrew to billets in Arras. At this point, therefore,
we may leave the 1/4th Battalion until the time comes to deal with its
rôle in the great battles of August and September 1918.

_The 2/4th Battalion_

The experience of the 2/4th Battalion during the summer months was very
similar to that of the 1/4th Battalion.

The Battalion spent the whole period in the area of the Amiens
defences, where the Germans had penetrated most deeply into our
positions. The Amiens defences were now far in rear of the old 1916
line, and the work involved in constructing new defences in what,
up to five weeks earlier, had been a line of communication area was
immense. Shell hole defences had to be linked into continuous trench
lines, provided with support and reserve lines and communication
trenches, furnished with dugouts and shelters, and defended with wire
entanglements. This formed the greater part of the Battalion's work
when in the line; but it certainly laboured during these months under
disadvantages which the 1/4th Battalion did not suffer. The upheaval
of the British organisation had been much more widely extended in
the Amiens area than it had been in the vicinity of Arras, where the
withdrawal of our forces had been comparatively shallow, and for a time
"back-of-the-line" organisation was inevitably weak. Billets were few
and bad, and for the most part the Battalion bivouacked when out of the
line. The same opportunities of resting during periods spent in reserve
did not, therefore, occur.

We have also recorded that the casualties suffered by the 1/4th
Battalion at Oppy were made good promptly by a veteran draft which was
thoroughly absorbed into the unit during the period of waiting for
the final advance. The 2/4th Battalion, which had been more knocked
about in the great battles of March and April, was reinforced very
slowly, and indeed its losses of the early part of the year were never
completely replaced. Such reinforcements as it did receive consisted
chiefly of immature youths from home--all endowed with magnificent
spirit and courage, but by the nature of the case, less valuable
soldiers until they had had a good deal of training in the line. The
recuperation of the 2/4th Battalion was thus effected under not the
most favourable conditions: a consideration which should count in their
favour when we come later to consider the victories they helped to gain
in August and September.

A few days of rest in the St Riquier area were allowed the 58th
Division after relief from the action at Cachy. The 2/4th Londons were
billeted at Le Plessiel between the 27th April and the 6th May, and
though no large drafts were received, the accessions of strength were
sufficient to allow of a four-company organisation being retained.
These were organised: A under Capt. F. J. Griffiths, B under Capt.
G. H. Hetley, C under Capt. W. C. Morton, M.C., and D under 2/Lieut.
E. V. Grimsdell. Ribands were awarded to those who had recently been
decorated, by the Divisional Commander, who also inspected the
Battalion Transport and commended it most highly on its turn-out.

The III Corps, which comprised the 18th and 47th (London) Divisions,
besides the 58th, was now responsible for the Amiens defences on the
line west of Albert from the Ancre to Aveluy Wood.

On the 7th May 1918 the 58th Division came from Corps reserve into
the line, and from this date until the 8th August, the beginning of
the final advance, was continually in action. The 2/4th Battalion's
tours of duty were somewhat irregular owing to the constant changes of
position which occurred during this period. The first sector for which
the Division was responsible was almost due west of Albert, in front of
the ruined village of Bouzincourt. For a fortnight the 2/4th Battalion
was in reserve positions, either bivouacked at Molliens au Bois or
Warloy or in astonishingly bad billets in Mirvaux, and was given a
rôle as counter-attack battalion to be employed as occasion should
arise in the event of a renewed enemy offensive. This involved constant
readiness and much reconnaissance work by officers. The last ten days
of May were spent in trenches, at first in support and afterwards in
the front system. Working parties formed the principal item of routine,
but a great deal of very valuable patrolling work was carried out.
Over the whole Corps front No Man's Land was indeed nightly occupied
by our patrols, who were always ready for a scrap with the enemy and
endeavouring to pick up an identification. This was partly to train
up the young soldiers in the way they should go and partly for the
essential purpose of ascertaining the enemy's intentions as to a
further attack.

On the last night of May 2/Lieut. George took a fighting patrol across
to the enemy front line after heavy trench mortar preparation. It
was found that much damage had been done, but though the trench was
searched for 200 yards no enemy were met and the patrol withdrew
without having suffered loss.

At this period the enemy was comparatively quiet, confining his
activity to shell fire in which gas shell figured prominently.

Reinforcements received in May were:

Lieut. B. Rivers Smith (recalled from six months' duty "on
exchange"); 2/Lieuts. H. G. A. Leach and J. W. George (4th
Londons); Lieut. H. C. Platts and 2/Lieut. A. L. D. Bold (7th
Londons); 2/Lieuts. A. J. N. Sievwright and J. Horsfield (12th
Londons); 2/Lieut. A. R. Armfield (20th Londons); 2/Lieuts. H.
M. Bradley and W. N. M. Girling (21st Londons). At the end of
the month 2/Lieut. Sievwright rejoined his own regiment. Drafts
of N.C.O.'s and men totalled 142.

The casualties in May were comparatively light. 2/Lieut. H. M. Bradley
and 1 man were killed by the falling in of the dugout they were
occupying, and in addition 2 men were killed and 12 wounded.

At the beginning of June the 2/4th Battalion moved back to Contay in
Divisional reserve, and resumed its counter-attack duties. Here a
severe loss was sustained in Lieut.-Col. W. R. H. Dann, D.S.O., who was
appointed to command the 60th Infantry Brigade with the temporary rank
of Brigadier-General. Lieut.-Col. Dann had been in continuous command
of the 2/4th Londons since November 1916, and during the Battalion's
seventeen months of active service he had held the confidence
and affection of all ranks. His great skill as a commander, his
imperturbable coolness in action, his unfailing care for the welfare
of his men, had endeared him to all, and the Battalion said good-bye
to him with genuine sorrow. The command was taken temporarily by Major
Tollworthy, but on the 8th June Major Grover, D.S.O., M.C., who had
been hit at Cachy, rejoined and assumed command with the acting rank of
Lieut.-Col.

On the 5th June the Battalion moved to tents and shelters at Mirvaux,
where attempts were made to carry out a few days' training. Standing
crops, which might on no account be damaged, interfered sadly, and but
little was accomplished. The plaint of the Divisional Staff made at the
time is rather pathetic: "Training areas have not yet been allotted. As
is usually the case the hiring of these is a very lengthy procedure,
and is not likely to be completed before the Division leaves the area."
Apparently even the full tide of the German offensive had beat in vain
against the massive structure of regulations.

The end of May had witnessed the recrudescence of fighting on the
French front on the Chemin des Dames. Once again the weight of the
enemy's assault had overtaxed our Allies' resources in defence, and by
the 4th June the Germans had reached their 1914 line on the Marne at
Chateau-Thierry, and were threatening Paris. It was firmly anticipated
that this fresh German success would mean another blow against the
British front at its junction with the French, and to meet this new
menace the XXII Corps was reconstituted under Sir A. J. Godley, in
G.H.Q. reserve. To this new formation were posted the 12th, 37th and
58th Divisions, the whole of which were held in readiness to move at
two hours' notice. In accordance with this scheme the 173rd Brigade was
moved to the Amiens area, the 2/4th Londons being billeted--this time
in comfortable quarters--at Guignemicourt on the 10th June.

The German attack between Montdidier and Noyon did in fact develop, and
the 37th Division was moved southwards. The 58th Division was, however,
not called upon, and, the danger being passed, returned to the line
after a week, the 2/4th Battalion moving on the 17th June to Molliens
au Bois.

For the remainder of June and the whole of July the 2/4th Battalion
remained in forward areas. At first the 173rd Brigade was in line
astride the Amiens-Albert Road and the Battalion successively occupied
positions in reserve in the La Houssoye line, in support in the
Dodo-Hill-Darling system, and in front trenches in the Ethel-Dandy
system.

The work on defences and the patrolling activity of the previous month
were here continued without abatement, but with very little incident
of interest. During the last week of June the weather, which had
been uniformly good, was broken by some heavy showers, which at once
developed the extraordinary propensity of French mud for turning into
glue on the least provocation. This hampered work on the defences
but had no effect on the spirit of the Battalion, which with careful
training was now developing once more into a well-knit and disciplined
fighting unit full of good cheer and confidence.

On the 25th June Capt. F. W. Walker, D.S.O., who had been wounded at
Cachy, rejoined and resumed his duties as Adjutant.

The following officers joined in June:

Lieut. A. R. Muddell (4th Londons); Lieut. G. de G. Barkas, M.C.
(to Intelligence Officer) and 2/Lieuts. T. G. Owen and S. T.
Morris (1st Londons); 2/Lieut. H. Slater (3rd Londons); Lieut.
J. D. Morrison and 2/Lieuts. G. H. Main, R. D. Cotton and K.
W. Gauld (14th Londons); 2/Lieut. F. Bidgood (16th Londons);
Lieut. C. I. Mansel-Howe (23rd Londons); and Lieut. C. C.
Brissenden (A.S.C.).

Reinforcements of 181 N.C.O.'s and men--mostly young soldiers--were
also received.

A few days spent in reserve at Baizieux in the first week of July
brought the 2/4th Battalion for the first time into contact with
American troops, a battalion of whom were bivouacked here.

The month of July was passed in similar fashion to those which had
preceded it. From the 6th to the 18th the Battalion was in the
Ethel-Dandy system, astride the Amiens-Albert Road, at first in front
trenches and subsequently in support. On the 18th a withdrawal to
reserve lines at Baizieux and Laviéville was effected, and here the
Battalion remained for nine days. After one day spent in cleaning up
in Behencourt the Battalion moved into line again on the 27th July,
relieving the 30th Australian Battalion in support trenches around
Ribemont, between that village and Buire-sur-Ancre.

Life in the Ribemont sector was comparatively peaceful. As before the
men were principally occupied in working parties on the defences and
the officers in reconnoitring lines of approach to the front trenches.
On the whole the enemy was quiet, though he frequently added insult to
injury by dropping on the Battalion gas shells evidently intended for
the batteries which were in action just in rear of it. The trenches
were comfortable, for all these months of hard work had been to some
purpose; and the presence of ruined villages in the near vicinity was
the means of adding touches of home life in the shape of a few odd
sticks of broken furniture which had formerly graced a cottage home in
Buire. An inter-platoon boundary in one of the trenches was marked
by what had once been a handsome perambulator, while a little further
on a basket-work dressmaker's model stood sentry over a shell hole in
ludicrous isolation.

The ravages of the influenza epidemic of June and July were severe, and
casualties from this cause far exceeded those inflicted by the enemy.
Between the battle at Cachy and the end of July no fewer than 427 other
ranks of the Battalion were sent to hospital, though most of these
rejoined after a week or two of absence.

On the 19th July the Battalion lost Lieut. S. A. Seys (15th Londons
attached), the assistant adjutant, who had served with it since
February 1917, and who left for attachment to the staff of the 60th
Brigade. An able administrator, Seys, who, though not a 4th London
officer, had loyally made the regiment his own during his service with
it, left behind him many friends who sincerely regretted his departure.

During July Lieut. A. G. Croll and drafts of 92 other ranks joined the
Battalion. 2/Lieuts. Gauld and Cotton rejoined their own regiment.
While the Battalion was at Baizieux the medical officer, Lieut.
Dunaway, U.S. Army, was presented by the Corps Commander with the
Military Cross, awarded him for services in March and April. It is
believed that Dunaway was one of the first American officers to receive
a British decoration for gallantry in the field.

At the end of July companies were commanded as follows: A by Lieut. C.
C. Brissenden, B. by Capt. A. G. Croll, C by Capt. W. H. Parslow and D
by Capt. B. Rivers Smith.

All who served in the Albert sector during the summer of 1918 will
remember the Albert Road. This was very largely used at night by
incoming and outgoing troops who used to join it somewhere in the
neighbourhood of Pont Noyelles. The journey up it was an experience
which it would indeed be hard to forget. On both sides of the road
was ranged battery after battery; it seemed impossible that so many
guns could be massed in so small a compass. "A succession of blinding
flashes alternated with inky blackness. The road itself was encumbered
with ammunition lorries, ration limbers and field ambulances.
Thundering detonations from the guns and a continued grating roar from
the traffic made the journey a nightmare." So writes Croll. The picture
is indeed sufficiently disturbing. But in spite of the noisy horror a
Battalion such as the 2/4th Londons, who had made close acquaintance
with the seamy side of war in the retreat from La Fère, could not but
be heartened by the realisation that already past losses had been made
good, and that night by night the roar of the British guns was becoming
louder and yet louder, till at last they were ready to roar forth the
barrage which was to lead our troops to final victory.

The whole experience of July 1918 indeed, though devoid of exciting
incident, was such as to impress the Battalion with the realisation
that the time of waiting was nearly at an end, and that the
equilibrium, to gain which we had been straining every nerve for three
months, was almost attained. Heavy as the German bombardments had been
from time to time, our guns with increasing frequency demonstrated
their power to silence the enemy artillery. The results achieved by
patrolling had shown that in growing measure we were becoming masters
of No Man's Land, and encounters with enemy patrols afforded conclusive
proof of the individual prowess and courage of our men as well as their
superior morale.

Relieved from the trenches at Ribemont by the 1/1st Cambridgeshire
Regiment, the 2/4th Londons concentrated at Behencourt on the evening
of the 2nd August, and, embussing at once, reached Pernois, in the
Domart area, in the early morning of the 3rd. Here it remained till
brought back to the line to take part in the great battle of the 8th
August.

_The Reserve Battalion_

In April 1918 the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion moved from Blackdown Camp to
Maida Barracks, Aldershot. The reason for this move was primarily to
provide troops for use in tactical schemes by students at the Senior
Officers' School, then stationed at Oudenarde Barracks.

While carrying out this duty the Battalion was called upon to supply
large parties daily for the School where they were commanded by Student
Officers. It cannot be said that this duty, which fell largely on
the "A IV" platoons, was beneficial to training. The regular course
of instruction was interfered with, and a large amount of field work
was carried out before the recruits engaged in it were sufficiently
advanced to appreciate what they were supposed to be doing. The
individual training was thus delayed and its resumption rendered
proportionately difficult when at last the attachment to the School
ceased. During the period spent at Maida the Expeditionary Company
practically ceased to exist, as all N.C.O.'s and men who rejoined
from hospital or the Command Depôt were posted temporarily to the 1st
(Reserve) Battalion, which remained at Blackdown.

The German offensive of March completely revolutionised the Reserve
Battalion. The frightful losses at the front had to be made good
immediately at all costs. Training staffs were reduced to a minimum,
and every fit officer and N.C.O. as well as every recruit, whose
training was advanced enough to lend colourable justification to it,
was at once sent overseas. The call for men did not cease here. The
General Order forbidding the despatch of "young soldiers" overseas
was, under pressure of circumstances, revoked, and volunteers were
called for from the "A IV" boys. The response was, as may be expected,
magnificent. Under age, under-trained, these gallant boys had but one
thought--to join their overseas battalions in the fighting line. At
the end of a week the Battalion was almost denuded of recruits under
training, while the orderly room and training staffs were on the point
of breakdown from almost continuous work and strain.

Among the first to answer the call was Lieut.-Col. Hanbury Sparrow, the
Commanding Officer, who rejoined his regiment. His place in command
was taken by Lieut.-Col. Sir Hugh Lacon, D.S.O., the Warwickshire
Regiment, who retained the appointment till shortly before the
Armistice.

So reduced in numbers was the Battalion that it was no longer useful
to the Senior Officer's School, and it was accordingly relieved by a
stronger battalion and returned to Blackdown early in August, being
quartered in Frith Hill Hutments. At the end of August the duties
of second in command were assumed by Major H. J. Duncan-Teape, who
rejoined from hospital.

Training was resumed on the usual routine at Frith Hill, and at the
end of August the emergency order as to despatching "A IV" boys on
draft was rescinded. The young soldiers, therefore, reverted to the
former scheme of more gradual training. The staff was, however, busily
employed with 400 coal-miners, enlisted into the Welsh Regiment, and
sent to the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion for training. These miners were
excellent material, but their training was not completed until the week
following the Armistice, so that they were deprived of the opportunity
of seeing active service and were rapidly demobilised. These Welshmen
were endowed in large measure with the national gift for part-singing,
and were thus enabled to contribute materially to the social life of
the Battalion.

During Armistice week a further reduction of Home Cadres involved the
amalgamation of the 1st and 3rd (Reserve) Battalions, under the title
of 1st (Reserve) Battalion, so that the one reserve unit was made
responsible for supply of drafts (few of course were needed) to the
whole Fusilier Brigade. The combined unit was commanded by Col. Vickers
Dunfee, V.D., until his demobilisation early in December, when command
was given to Lieut.-Col. A. Mather (Leinster Regiment).

Shortly after Christmas 1918 demobilisation began to thin the ranks of
the Battalion, while further ravages were made by the transfer of most
of the "A IV" boys to Young Soldier Battalions, preparatory to their
despatch to join the Army of the Rhine. In February 1919 the Battalion
moved to Shoreham-by-Sea, and by the end of the month its disbandment
was completed.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE FINAL ADVANCE

I. _The 2/4th Battalion in the Battles of Amiens and Bapaume, 1918_

The middle of 1918 witnessed the veritable low watermark of the Allied
fortunes. All the protracted sledgehammer offensives of 1916 and 1917,
which had indented the enemy's line at such ghastly cost of life, had
within a few short weeks been swept aside as if they had never been,
and the advancing tide of the Germans' offensive had carried their
eagles forward to the furthest positions they had ever reached in 1914.
In Italy the laborious advance of our Allies towards Trieste had been
turned, when the coveted goal seemed almost within their grasp, into
a defeat which was almost decisive. Roumania had long been utterly
overrun, Austria given a new lease of life, and Russia's debacle
completed. Scarcely anywhere was there a ray of light on this very
gloomy horizon.

We have endeavoured to show that, bad as the situation was, the Allies
by no means accepted the crushing blows which had been inflicted
on them as decisive, and week by week the position was gradually
improving, and the numerical superiority of the enemy was being
overcome. In July so great was the British recovery that offensive
operations on a small scale were undertaken with a view to local
improvement of our positions. Among these the capture of Hamel and
Meteren may be mentioned.

The bulk of the fighting, however, was on the French front, where the
enemy was endeavouring to enlarge the salient which he had driven down
to the Marne. On the east side at Rheims and on the west in the Forêt
de Compiègne his pressure was great but weakening. The French powers
of resistance were gradually becoming more equal to their task and the
German progress correspondingly slower till at last, on the 15th July,
the enemy received a definite check. Three days later Marshal Foch had
brought forward the reserves which he had jealously conserved through
these trying days, and the enemy was in retreat on a front of 27 miles
from the Oise to the Marne. Of the French offensive we can say nothing,
for our task lies with the British Fourth Army under Rawlinson.

Immediately Marshal Foch had set his own armies in forward motion he
ordered the British and American armies to open the offensives they had
prepared. The first object of British G.H.Q. was to disengage Amiens,
and the vast offensive movement therefore began in Rawlinson's army,
which was on the right of the British line from its junction with the
French near Moreuil to the north of Albert.

In this part of the great series of victories we have to follow the
operations of the 2/4th Battalion, and we shall deal with them in the
first instance from the opening of the offensive on August 8th until
their final disbandment on September 12th. We shall then proceed to
follow the unrolling of the battle northwards and the engagement in
it successively of the Third and First Armies, with both of which the
1/4th Battalion fought until the Armistice.

* * * * *

The date fixed for the great attack was 8th August, and on that day
Rawlinson's Fourth Army, comprising from left to right the III,
Australian and Canadian Corps, would combine with Débeney's First
French Army in a supreme effort to relieve Amiens from the menace of
the Huns. With the details of the battle beyond the 58th Division's
area we are not concerned but we must, in order to understand the rôle
which the Division was expected to play, offer some brief description
of the terrain and its effect on the Australian advance on the right.

The main advance was to be made on the south bank of the Somme by the
Canadians and the Australians, while the III Corps, including the 18th
and 58th Divisions in line, operating solely on the north bank of
the river, would secure the left flank of the attack as far north as
Morlancourt. The establishment of this defensive flank entailed the
capture of a very strong naturally defended position, the possession of
which was vital to the success of the troops south of the Somme.

The Somme, like the Oise, is a winding canalised river running through
a marshy valley. Its south bank, though undulating, has no specially
marked hill features, but on the north the adjoining land rises to
a considerable height on the spur which traverses the narrow wedge
between the Somme and the Ancre. This plateau is furrowed by a number
of deep gullies running northward from the river, and the sharp hills
between these valleys, falling in places by abrupt chalk cliffs to the
Somme, form very commanding features from which it would be possible
for a determined enemy to play havoc with any attempt to advance
south of the river, for they completely dominate the south bank. The
most marked of these spurs is the long saddle immediately east of the
village of Chipilly. This feature is almost girdled by the Somme (which
makes a narrow sweep round the east, south and west sides of it), and
projects almost a mile south of the general line of the river. It thus
forms a barrier across the ground for which the Australians would be
made responsible.

The capture of the Chipilly Ridge was the task allotted to the 58th
Division, while the 18th would complete the defensive flank from the
north end of the Ridge at Gressaire Wood to Morlancourt.

The line of advance from the British front trenches was full of
obstacles. Immediately in front of the line, and on the river bank
was the village of Sailly Laurette, the garrison of which, if not
immediately overcome, would be able to enfilade the whole advance
as the troops crossed No Man's Land. A mile and a half east of
Sailly Laurette lay Malard Wood, covering both slopes of one of the
declivitous gullies already alluded to; while half-way between the
Malard Wood valley and the final objective on the cliff of Chipilly
Ridge, lay a second gully, badly enfiladed from Chipilly village and
completely overlooked from the Ridge itself. Heavy going all the way,
up hill and down dale, through features eminently suited to machine-gun
defence, culminating in a breathless scramble up a steep slope to meet
an enemy who would probably defend it to the last; a total advance
of about two and a half miles; altogether no light task for a single
division.

In view of the obvious difficulty of carrying so strong a position
by frontal attack alone it was arranged that the Australians should
advance ahead of the 58th Division and occupy the high ground near
Méricourt south-east of the Ridge, by the time the 58th was due to
deliver its final assault. By this means it was hoped to squeeze the
enemy off the Ridge in the direction of Bray without making a fight for
it, in order to avoid complete envelopment.

Such was the general idea: and we must now return to the 2/4th
Battalion which we left in the preceding chapter at Pernois on the
morning of 2nd August, in order to trace how the idea worked out.

The 2nd and 3rd August were spent in resting and cleaning, and on
Sunday, the 4th, after company commanders had been admitted to the
rumour that large operations were imminent, sudden orders to move were
received. At 9.30 p.m. that night the Battalion again embussed to La
Houssoye on the Amiens-Albert Road, whence it marched to bivouacs in a
wood near Bonnay (two miles north of Corbie, on the Ancre). Fortunately
the weather was fine and warm, for the only shelter provided was one
bell tent per company.

The 5th August was passed in close cover in the wood in order that
our intentions might not be revealed to prying Bosche aeroplanes, and
in the afternoon Lieut.-Col. Grover explained the plan of attack to
the company commanders. At zero (4.20 a.m.) the 174th Brigade would
advance from Assembly line (see Map No. 17) and dig in on the Green
line 200 yards east of Malard Wood. The 2/10th Londons (175th Brigade)
were especially attached for the capture of Sailly Laurette. The 173rd
Brigade would follow close on the 174th in artillery formation, halt
in Malard Wood for one hour and adopt attack formation, and then
passing through the Green line would take Chipilly Ridge, Red line. The
18th Division would advance on the left of the 58th, the 54th Brigade
going as far as the Green line, when the 53rd would leap-frog through
it to the Red line. The advance would be made under a creeping field
artillery barrage provided by ninety 18-prs. and thirty 4·5 howitzers,
while the deep valleys would be dealt with by a heavy howitzer barrage
jumping from valley to valley. Twelve tanks were to cover the advance,
two of which were allotted to the 2/10th Londons, for Sailly Laurette,
the remainder leading the 174th Brigade to Malard Wood, where the 173rd
would pick up one per company for the final assault. The 4th Suffolks
(Pioneers) would consolidate a position slightly in rear of the final
objective.

The order of battle in the 173rd Brigade was: 3rd Londons on the right,
2/4th Londons on the left, leading battalions; 2/2nd Londons, reserve
battalion. In the 2/4th Battalion the order of advance was: leading D
(Rivers Smith) on the right and C (Parslow) on the left; supporting
B (Croll) on the right, A (Brissenden) on the left, with Battalion
Headquarters in rear.

Another conference followed on the morning of the 6th, after which
company commanders went forward to reconnoitre the point of assembly.
On arrival at the 54th Brigade Headquarters it was found, however,
that the enemy had just delivered a sharp attack and possessed himself
of the very trenches from which we were to "jump-off" the following
morning: rather disconcerting and possibly very serious for the whole
attack, for the Huns had reached some of the dumps and gun positions
prepared for the 8th, and it might be that they would guess our
intentions. To guard against any possibility of failure on this score
the barrage lines were completely rearranged. Prisoners subsequently
captured stated that the British intention to attack had not been
discovered, but the extraordinary defence which the Bosche made on
8th, combined with the fact that his field guns were withdrawn east of
Gressaire Wood throws some doubt on this.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, 1918 (2/4TH BATTALION). ACTION AT
CHIPILLY RIDGE, AUGUST 8-10, 1918]

At all events the company commanders were forced to return without
seeing anything of their assembly position or of the ground over which
they were to advance, and reported accordingly. The attack, however,
could not be postponed as the remainder of the Army and the French also
were involved, and final preparations were therefore made for a plunge
in the dark.

Battle surplus in charge of Capt. Hetley, who that day returned from
hospital, was sent back to Mirvaux, and at 9.30 p.m. the Battalion
moved forward to a gully half a mile north-east of Vaux-sur-Somme.

The 18th Division was able to re-establish its position during the
7th, though after such losses that the 36th Brigade (12th Division)
had to be put into the attack on the first objective in place of the
54th Brigade. The recovery was too late for reconnaissance, which had
therefore to be limited to viewing the approaches to the assembly, and
at dusk, laden with all the usual impedimenta of battle, the companies
set out on their two and a half mile trudge to the starting-point. The
move was made "overland," but alongside a communication trench known
as Cootamundra. The advance was not easy; gas masks had to be worn for
some distance; intermittent shelling caused delays; tanks now and then
drifted through the columns, breaking them up; and as usual shell holes
in the dark proved a fruitful source of annoyance; but with all these
drawbacks it was a cheerful and optimistic, if blasphemous, Battalion
that arrived in the front line well up to time.

Dawn broke at last and the company commanders, eagerly expecting to see
the positions which they had never yet viewed, were dismayed to find
the sun rising on a dense fog which enshrouded the whole landscape and
limited vision to about 20 yards! However, there was nothing for it but
to get up and try to keep touch with the assaulting troops. The enemy's
barrage came down quickly and heavily, and the companies moved forward
rapidly over No Man's Land, though a good many fell. By bad luck most
of the Battalion Headquarters, including Lieut.-Col. Grover and Capt.
Walker the Adjutant, both severely hit, were knocked out within a few
minutes, and this misfortune dogged the Battalion through the day.
Moving forward slowly, trusting to a compass bearing to bring them to
the north edge of Malard Wood, the companies pushed on, our barrage
roaring on far ahead and no troops in sight right or left of them.

Adverse comments have been made on the Division for a serious loss of
direction this day. As a matter of fact it was not so serious as has
been stated by some writers, but it is true that the 2/4th Battalion
at first drifted about 500 yards over its left boundary into the 18th
Division territory. This divergence was also followed by the 2/2nd
Londons, who encroached on what should properly have been our right
company front. This is regrettable, but comprehensible if a close
study be made of a contoured map. The gullies which had to be crossed
ran obliquely across the line of advance. If anyone cares to try hill
climbing in a fog he will realise the extreme difficulty of maintaining
a sidelong direction.

Another cause of divergence from the correct direction lay in the
numerous small pockets of enemy who had to be mopped up by the
companies on route. These small parties offered comparatively little
opposition, but they necessitated a cautious advance. Moreover, as
they were not all in the exact path of the advancing platoons, it was
inevitable to make a deliberate deflection to deal with them, after
which the idea of direction in the fog became still more nebulous.

After some time Croll and Parslow, whose companies were in touch,
reached a trench lately occupied by the enemy, badly smashed and full
of dead Huns. Here a parley was held, and they decided that they were
off the line. The advance was resumed in a south-easterly direction,
extended order being used owing to the very severe machine-gun fire at
this point. Parslow, having received news of the Colonel's casualty,
assumed command. During this second advance the enemy's fire began to
slacken and the mist showed some signs of lifting. After about 200
yards these companies found one of the tanks which was due to meet them
at Malard Wood roaming about disconsolately, having completely lost
its bearings, but this was put on the right track and began to follow
the companies, though it soon vanished again in the mist: a passing
ship!

At about 8.30 the mist began to thin rapidly and B and C Companies
reached the hedge at the north end of Malard Wood, where they gained
touch with Rivers Smith (D Company), and Parslow pushed out to the
right to link up with Brissenden (A Company), who had gained the west
edge of the Wood. The 174th Brigade were still in the Wood and had not
yet reached the Green line, and the lifting mist disclosed no troops
east of it. A company of 8th Royal Berkshires (53rd Brigade) were
strung out in a north-easterly direction on the left of the Battalion,
while immediately in front was the head of the Malard Wood Gully, about
40 yards wide, and beyond it a cornfield breast high with crops which
stretched as far as Gressaire Wood. Sharp bursts of machine-gun fire
from Malard Wood and shrapnel bursts from Gressaire Wood took a steady
toll of our men and rendered further advance without artillery support
impossible. But our artillery had carried its barrage forward to the
final objective, believing that the infantry were following it, and was
now silent.

At about 9.30 a.m. the Berkshires informed Croll, who had taken charge
of the left half of the Battalion, that they were going to attack
Gressaire Wood, and asking the 2/4th Battalion to advance with them.
Croll immediately sent runners to Parslow and Brissenden in the Wood
warning them of this intention; and, swinging half right to conform to
the Berkshires, the advance began, but was brought to a standstill on
the east edge of the gully by parties of the enemy working forward with
machine-guns from Gressaire Wood.

Further advance was out of the question, and leaving three Lewis
gun posts east of the gully, Croll withdrew his troops to the hedge
previously occupied; there the Battalion began to dig in. After a
conference of the few remaining officers it was decided to send
2/Lieut. E. P. Higgs back to Brigade to explain the position and ask
for fresh orders and for artillery support to a further advance.
Almost immediately after this parley broke up poor Rivers Smith was
killed by a piece of shell which hit him in the neck. In the meantime,
runners sent out to the right flank returned with the information
that the 2/4th and 3rd Battalions were mixed up in Malard Wood, that
the 2/2nd had come up and that Lieut.-Col. Miller of the 2/2nd was
reorganising the troops.

A gap of 300 yards between the two halves of the Battalion had occurred
in the last attempt to get forward, and the position at noon was that
Brissenden (Parslow had been hit) was in charge of the right half
Battalion on the east edge of Malard Wood, and Croll with the left half
lined along the hedge north of the Wood. The Wood was now completely
cleared of enemy, but egress from the east edge of it was impossible.
Barkas (Intelligence Officer) now came forward from Headquarters to
take over command, being cognisant of the position on the right and
acquainted with the H.Q. Staffs of the other Battalions. He agreed
with Croll that further attempts to push forward were useless without
further support. Col. Urquart (L.T.M. Battery) was reported on his way
up to take over from Barkas.

While this was happening the barrage had, as already stated, moved
forward from the Green line at the scheduled hour on to Chipilly
Ridge, but owing to the loss of direction only a few small parties
were available to follow it and of these probably none reached the
Ridge. The Huns on the Ridge were holding up by machine-gun fire the
Australians on the south of the river, and they failed to reach the
high ground from which the position was to be outflanked. Unfortunately
aerial reports to Divisional Headquarters persisted that the Ridge
was in our hands, and this mistake led to serious casualties in the
afternoon. The 2/2nd Londons were ordered to advance at 3 p.m., but
owing to the false report artillery support was refused them. In these
circumstances the attack, though pushed forward by the 2/2nd with great
gallantry, was inevitably withered by enemy machine-gun fire from
Gressaire Wood.

No further move was attempted that day. At about 4 p.m. Major Sutcliffe
of the 2/2nd took over the 2/4th Battalion--the fifth C.O. within
twelve hours!--and the positions already occupied were consolidated,
Lewis gun posts being pushed forward across the gully. The night
positions of the Battalion are shown on the map.

South of the Somme the day had been--except in the area next the river
swept from Chipilly Ridge--one of immense success, an advance of about
seven miles being made by the Canadians. On the left of the 58th
Division the 12th had reached the Green line but had been unable to
progress beyond it.

An immediate resumption of the attack to reduce the Chipilly stronghold
and so remove the one remaining obstacle to an important advance was
obviously necessary, but in view of the restricted success on the
previous day a modification of the original intention was essential.

The main object of the attack of the 9th August was to gain the line
Bray-sur-Somme--Dernancourt. To ensure that the assault should have
sufficient weight to carry it through successfully, and in view of the
serious losses of the Division on the previous day, the 133rd American
Regiment (Col. Samborn) then in Army reserve some miles in rear was
attached for the operation. The main attack on the Divisional front was
to be carried out by the 175th Brigade on the left and the Americans on
the right; while in conjunction with it the capture of Chipilly and the
Ridge was to be entrusted to the 174th and 173rd Brigades.

The distance which the Americans had to advance to reach their starting
line necessarily caused a postponement of the operation till late
in the afternoon, the earlier hours of the day being employed in
side-stepping the 173rd Brigade to face its new objective, and to leave
room for the Americans to come into line.

At 6 a.m. Major Sutcliffe issued orders to the Battalion to reorganise
and prepare for a further advance, and these orders were followed
later, as a result of reports received by aerial reconnaissance, by
instructions to push forward fighting patrols to ascertain whether
Gressaire Wood were still occupied. The sharp machine-gun fire
with which these patrols were met left no room for doubt as to the
situation. Brigade received orders for the afternoon attack at 1 p.m.,
but owing to the lack of telephone communication it was two hours later
when Lieut.-Col. Miller, who was in charge of the whole of the advanced
troops, sent for Croll. The grim humour of the situation was succinctly
summed up in Lieut.-Col. Miller's greeting. "Hullo, Croll, aren't you
dead yet?" "No sir!" replied Croll. "Then you damned soon will be!" And
orders for the attack were issued: "You will withdraw all patrols and
posts at once, move your men under cover of Malard Wood and take up a
position as soon as possible in a line of trenches extending for about
400 yards southward from the Quarry. Lieut. Brissenden has similar
orders. You will occupy this position and be prepared to advance at
5.30 and capture the original objective, Chipilly Ridge. You will
advance in two waves, Brissenden with his half Battalion in the first
wave, and you with the remainder of the Battalion in the second wave.
The position must be taken at all costs."

This assembly position south of the Quarry was that occupied by the
9th Londons on the previous night, but on arrival it was found to be
only a line of shell holes. The 173rd Brigade was to attack with the
3rd Londons on the right, the 2/4th in the centre and the 2/2nd on
the left, with the 2/10th attached in reserve. The assembly proceeded
as rapidly as possible, though time was short and the barrage could
not open until all patrols were in. The Americans, who were rushed up
from the rear, had to double nearly a mile to reach their assembly
position at Malard Wood, but by a few minutes after zero every unit
was moving forward. The side-step of the 2/4th Battalion was carried
out under very heavy machine-gun fire from Celestin Wood, the enemy
having doubtless seen the movement, and delay was caused by searching
for the trench (non-existent) which had been fixed as the start line.
Our barrage opened well up to time but the shells fell harmlessly in
Chipilly Valley instead of on the Ridge, which again became a hornet's
nest of Hun machine-gunners.

Under this heavy fire the Battalion began the advance, much harassed
also from Celestin Wood on their right flank. Brissenden was seriously
hit early, and Mansel-Howe (B Company) killed. Croll took over the
whole remnants of the Battalion and pushed forward, the men behaving
with magnificent coolness and advancing by rushes. Every party which
rushed forward, however, lost men, and Croll himself was hit in the
knee though he bravely struggled on in the endeavour to get his men
into some sort of cover. The Americans on the left were not yet up in
line, and the fire from the right flank continued. Casualties were
now so numerous that it was clear the Battalion could never reach the
Ridge in anything approaching assaulting strength, and Croll decided
to dig in in the shelter of the Chipilly gully, sending back a runner
to Lieut.-Col. Miller with a report of the situation. In this position
the Battalion was badly enfiladed from Chipilly village, and to make
matters worse groups of Bosche could be seen running down from the
crest of the Ridge, evidently in preparation for a counter-attack. This
attack, however, was never delivered, for a change of the situation,
almost miraculous in its suddenness, occurred. On the right the 2/10th
Londons had been fighting stubbornly, and before dark managed to clear
Chipilly village and began to work up the south end of the Ridge. Here
they were held up by a nest of Bosche machine-gunners firing southwards
from the head of Chipilly Valley, but the Americans, advancing on the
left with magnificent dash towards Gressaire Wood, mopped up this
position. A glance at the map will show the result. Further tenure of
the Ridge was impossible for the Bosche, who promptly retreated to
avoid being caught by the pincers which were closing on them.

By 11 p.m. the Brigade was firmly established on the Ridge, while the
main operation had proved completely successful.

The casualties of the two days' fighting were as follows:

Officers: Capt. B. Rivers Smith and Lieut. C. I. Mansel-Howe,
killed; Lieut.-Col. A. Grover, D.S.O., M.C., Capts.
W. H. Parslow, F. W. Walker, D.S.O., and A. G. Croll,
Lieuts. G. de G. Barkas, M.C., and C. C. Brissenden,
2/Lieuts. W. N. M. Girling, H. G. A. Leach, J. W.
George, A. L. D. Bold, H. Slater, S. T. Morris and J.
Horsfield, wounded.

N.C.O.'s and men: 38 killed, 228 wounded and 20 missing, a total
of all ranks of 301.

For his excellent work in this action Capt. A. G. Croll was awarded the
M.C.

The experience of these two days' fighting had demonstrated clearly
that the River Somme was an unsatisfactory boundary between the III and
Australian Corps. The hill slopes on each bank formed tactical features
so inter-supporting that it was deemed essential to bring both banks
into the area of one command; and accordingly on the 10th August the
Australian Corps took over with the 3rd Australian Division a sector
immediately adjacent to the north bank. This redistribution involved
a shortening of the 58th Divisional sector, and the 173rd Brigade,
handing over its line to the Australians at about 2 p.m., withdrew to
the reserve area, the 2/4th Londons concentrating in bivouacs near
Bonnay.

During the 10th an enemy counter-attack set back slightly the
positions gained by us the preceding day, but the situation was soon
re-established and strong patrols pushed forward by the Division
brought them to the line of the outer Amiens defences.

The following day the III Corps was taken over temporarily by Sir A. J.
Godley.

This practically brought to a close the first phase of the Fourth
Army's great advance, which is officially known as the Battle of
Amiens, 1918. Amiens, for so long threatened by a victorious enemy, was
now liberated, and, important as was this result of the three days'
struggle, other results accruing from the battle were still more vital.
The actual loss inflicted on the Huns--upwards of 23,000 prisoners and
400 guns were captured--were in themselves a matter of great moment;
but the captures themselves showed that already the Germans were
flinging their reserves into the fight. This undoubtedly had the effect
of paving the way for the successful French advance which began south
of Montdidier on the 10th August. Perhaps the most cheering moral of
all was the establishment of the fact that three anxious months of
constant strain, following on a retreat of unprecedented rapidity and
loss, had left the fighting qualities of our troops unimpaired--perhaps
to the surprise of some gloomy folks at home--while evidence was
already abundant that the enemy was not standing to it as he had done
in former British offensives. His morale was beginning to crack. This
is evidenced by actual numbers: 13 British divisions and 3 cavalry
divisions had defeated 20 German divisions and secured an advance of 12
miles in 5 days' fighting. To enable us to judge of the enormous effect
of this great victory we have the evidence of Ludendorff himself:

"The Emperor told me that after the failure of the July offensive
and after the 8th August, he knew the war could no longer be won."

A good deal of severe criticism has been levelled at the III Corps
in general, and at the 58th Division in particular, for the lack of
success attained on the first day of battle. It is undoubtedly a
fact that the failure to eject the Bosche from Chipilly Ridge on the
8th August caused the infliction of severe loss on our Australian
neighbours on the right flank. We do not pose as apologists for the
Division or for the 2/4th Londons, and are satisfied that no excuses
for them are needed. But we feel justified, in view of what has
been said, in pointing to certain circumstances of the battle as
contributing towards the restriction of their success. We propose not
to argue these circumstances but merely to state them:

1. The enemy attack on the 18th Division on the 6th August not only
deprived our company commanders of any opportunity of reconnoitring
their ground, but also entirely disposed of the surprise effect
gained south of the Somme, for undoubtedly the Bosche expected a
counter-attack from us.

2. The mist of 8th August, which made success depend largely on a
correct compass march over unseen and shell-torn ground.

3. The fact that no tanks arrived on the Green line to lead the
Battalion forward to the second objective, whereby the enemy
machine-gun defence was not impeded. We do not wish to pass the blame
on to the tanks; their difficulties in reaching the start-line were as
acute as our own, and the ground much more difficult for them than it
was south of the river.

4. The startling rapidity with which the Battalion command changed
during the battle.

These are not excuses for failure. We are prepared to leave to the
judgment of impartial critics the decision as to whether the Battalion,
and the Division as a whole, did all in its power to perform its duty.
That the operations of the Division during these two days' fighting
were not altogether unfruitful is evidenced by the fact that their
total captures amounted to 1925 prisoners, 68 guns, 190 machine-guns
and 36 trench mortars, while the whole area of advance was littered
with enemy dead.

A lull in the active operations now occurred while heavy batteries,
dumps and all necessary material were advanced in preparation for the
next phase of the struggle, which would involve the ejection of the Hun
from a strongly defended system of trenches.

After a night's rest the Battalion marched on the 11th August to a
wood at Heilly (near Ribemont), where it was joined by the first line
transport and the battle surplus, returning on the afternoon of the
13th to Pont Noyelles. Here it was accommodated in billets, the most
comfortable quarters since the few days at Guignemicourt.

A few days' rest at Pont Noyelles, now some eleven miles in rear of
the battle line, were devoted to reorganisation and to assimilation of
several reinforcements of officers, N.C.O.'s and men. On his return
from short leave on the 14th August Major Tollworthy assumed temporary
command of the Battalion, but a week later Major W. McC. Crosbie,
M.C., Royal Munster Fusiliers, arrived and took over the command. The
adjutancy of the Battalion was taken over by Lieut. H. J. King, M.C.

During this period the Battalion was inspected successively by the
Brigadier and by the Corps Commander, who saw the troops at training.

The reinforcements received between the 10th and 22nd August were:

2/Lieuts. R. E. Glover, L. A. Still, W. J. Till and F. J. Paterson
(4th Londons);

and officers of other units attached as follows:

2/Lieuts. C. C. W. Goodale, L. A. Palmer and A. W. Tucker (1st
Londons);

2/Lieuts. P. F. Royce, W. C. B. Hall and T. R. A. Maynard (2nd
Londons);

2/Lieuts. J. C. Wood and H. Irvine (3rd Londons);

2/Lieuts. G. Gilson, H. Lelyveld, J. Slattery, M. F. Giles and H.
B. Bartleet (5th Londons);

2/Lieuts. J. T. Spencer and E. S. McKittrick (8th Londons);

2/Lieut. W. A. Davies (9th Londons);

and 480 N.C.O.'s and men.

The majority of this large reinforcement consisted of men from the 14th
Division, which had suffered very severely in the battles of March
1918. The drafts of young soldiers on which the Battalion had been
depending of late, though of excellent material, were obviously not so
desirable as fully seasoned soldiers; and the 14th Division men were
therefore particularly welcome. With a seasoning of old 2/4th London
men and the remnants of the K.O.Y.L.I., who had come from the 16th
Entrenching Battalion, they helped to make up once again a really fine
Battalion.

On the 21st August the offensive was resumed and though, as we have
stated, we propose to continue the record of the 2/4th Battalion's
operations in the Fourth Army, it should be borne in mind that
henceforth the Army instead of having an inert neighbour on its left
flank had an active one in the Third Army, which was now also on the
move.

This new great battle (21st August to 1st September), known as
the Battle of Bapaume, 1918, extended the area of fighting to the
Somme-Scarpe salient.

The increasing enemy resistance at the termination of the Battle of
Amiens had drawn G.H.Q. to the decision to break off the battle and
transfer their attention to another part of the front; a method which
throughout the closing period of the war proved its value. The Germans
were kept always in doubt--as the British had been in March 1918--as
to whether each fresh offensive was in reality only a feint, in doubt
as to where to place their already dwindling reserves. Moreover, the
British Armies were now no longer faced by line upon line of almost
impregnable trenches as they had been in 1916, and frontal attacks were
not the only possibility open to them.

G.H.Q. therefore decided on a vast turning movement. An attack in a
south-easterly direction between Albert and Arras would turn the flank
of the Somme line of defence about Péronne, and would constitute a
distinct forward step towards the further objectives of Cambrai and St
Quentin.

The immediate object of the III Corps was to free Albert and to oust
the Bosche from the strong defensive system which he had built up
round the town during the summer months. On the first day of the III
Corps battle, 22nd August, the 58th Division was in Corps reserve, the
divisions in line being from right to left, the 47th, 12th and 18th.

The 2/4th Battalion remained at training on the 22nd August, but an
early move was made the following morning, when it marched at 4 a.m.
to a sheltered valley half a mile south of Méricourt-l'Abbé. In this
position it remained all day together with the rest of the Brigade;
the 174th Brigade being in the old British line at Morlancourt, at the
disposal of the 18th Division. In the centre the 47th Division carried
the line forward to the high ground east of the Happy Valley, while on
the right the Australians occupied the high ground immediately north of
Bray.

The exploitation of this success was ordered by Army H.Q. for the
following day, but the situation was altered by a strong German
counter-attack, which late in the afternoon drove the 142nd Brigade
(47th Division) almost back to their start-line, leaving the
Australians at Bray in an awkward salient. That night the 175th Brigade
moved from its reserve area near Tailles Wood and took over the line
from the 142nd. The following day was occupied in reorganisation,
though the advance was continued south of the river, and orders were
received for the pressure to be continued on the whole army front on
the 24th August.

At 1 a.m. that morning the attack was prosecuted by the 47th Division,
in conjunction with the 3rd Australians on the right and the 12th
on the left. The 47th Division attack was carried out by the 175th
(attached) and 140th Brigades, the battalions of the 173rd Brigade
being ordered to support the 175th. For this purpose the 2/4th
Battalion was turned out at midnight on the 23rd/24th August and
reached a position of assembly in the old Amiens defence line east of
Morlancourt at 4 a.m. on the 24th. The attack was entirely successful.
The Happy Valley once more passed into our hands, and the 47th Division
established itself finally on the farther crest. The Australians
occupied Bray, while on the left the 12th Division pressed forward in
the direction of Fricourt. The enemy opposition was not severe though
between 3 a.m. and 8 a.m. a large amount of high explosive and gas
shelling was experienced. The day brought forth further evidence of
the increasing demoralisation of the enemy troops, and intelligence
reports pointing strongly to the probability that the enemy was
fighting a delaying action preparatory to a big retreat, the immediate
exploitation of the success was ordered.

This day the 175th Brigade remained in line but came once more under
orders of the 58th Division which took over the Divisional sector, the
174th Brigade going into line on the right of the 175th.

During the morning a conference of commanding officers in the 173rd
Brigade was held and orders were issued for the further advance. The
attack was to be made with two brigades in line, the 175th on the
right and the 140th on the left, supported by the 173rd Brigade. This
latter was to be led by the 2/2nd and 3rd Londons with the 2/4th
Londons in support, the last-named with the rôle of being prepared to
support any part of the front and carry it on to the final objective.
Owing, however, to the situation remaining obscure on the left flank
this operation was postponed till 2.30 a.m. on the 25th, when rapid
developments took place.

In accordance with the orders already issued the 2/4th Londons moved
from their Assembly position near Tailles Wood, the order of march
being A, B, C, D Companies with Headquarters and one section Brigade
Machine-Gun Company bringing up the rear, and with 100 yard intervals
between companies. In this order it reached a position in the Happy
Valley under cover of a dense mist at 4 a.m. on the 25th August. Here
it was to stand fast awaiting further orders from the Brigadier.

But in the meantime the Division, evidently still bearing in mind the
experience of February 1917, had issued instructions to the effect that
should the leading battalions lose touch with the enemy an advanced
guard should at once be formed to push forward rapidly and regain
contact. This was the contingency which materialised.

At 6.30 a.m. the attacking units reported themselves on their
objectives, but in the mist touch with the enemy seemed to be lost, and
all units of the 173rd Brigade were ordered to advance. The Brigadier
at once issued orders for the formation of the advanced guard, and the
2/4th Battalion, which was more or less definitely located in the Happy
Valley and was thus the battalion most easily to be reached in the
mist, was selected for this duty.

The advanced guard troops were:

No. 2 Troop Northumberland Hussars,
2/4th Londons,
1 Section 86th Brigade R.F.A.,
1 Section M.G.C.,

the whole under Major Crosbie.

The line of advance ordered was cross-country as far as Bronfay Farm
and thence along the Bray-Maricourt Road. The Battalion was to advance
in column of route until ordered to deploy. At 8.30 a.m. the guard
was formed and the advance began, A Company under Lieut. V. C. Prince
forming the Vanguard with Headquarters, B, C and D Companies following
as Main Guard. This was an entirely new role for the 2/4th Battalion,
and the sudden development of open warfare conditions, the realisation
that the Battalion was in close formation on a road with cavalry
operating ahead and the guns following, raised everyone's hopes and
expectations to the highest pitch. The move was of course made without
artillery support, and until Bronfay Farm was nearly reached very
little sign of his existence was vouchsafed by the Bosche, beyond a
little desultory shell-fire.

About this time the mist dispersed and the cavalry were checked by
severe machine-gun fire from Billon Wood and the high ground to the
north of it. The company commanders showed great initiative and dash,
and a valuable reconnaissance was made by 2/Lieut. Prince and Cooke,
his Sergt.-Major, to ascertain where the bulk of the firing was coming
from. Quickly grasping the situation, Prince deployed his company and
led it against the south-west edge of the Wood. The rear companies
deploying in turn, the whole Battalion became committed to the attack,
which, owing to the conditions under which it started, developed a
little raggedly as regards the frontages occupied by companies, but
still with good discipline and plenty of dash. Hetley (B Company)
made for the left or north edge of the Wood along the Maricourt Road,
while the gap between him and Prince was promptly taken up by C and D
Companies. Observing the action taken by the 2/4th Londons, Brigade
promptly pushed forward the 2/2nd Londons to the left flank to deal
with the high ground north of Billon Wood, and ordered the 3rd Londons
to support the attack.

The enemy shelling had now assumed very severe proportions, and though
little resistance was met with by the 2/4th Battalion in Billon Wood,
which it cleared without much difficulty, the Bosche gunners were able
effectually to prevent it from emerging from the east edge of the Wood.
Hetley says about this bombardment, "The shelling of Billon Wood was
one of the heaviest I have ever undergone, being quite comparable to
Bullecourt or the Salient in 1917." The line in the Wood was rather
patchy and Hetley, leaving Grimsdell in charge, returned to Battalion
Headquarters where Major Crosbie provided him with a couple of Lewis
guns and about twenty-five men. With these he returned, and having got
the Battalion into a deep trench, put out observation posts on the east
edge of the Wood. The Battalion is credited by Division with having
gained a line this day some 200 yards east of the Wood, but it seems
doubtful whether this conclusion can be supported.

On the left flank, however, the 2/2nd and 3rd Londons made a good deal
of progress up the long spur leading to Maricourt, and at the end of
the day had established themselves in a chain of small copses about 500
yards west of the village. Their further progress was here arrested,
owing to the fact that the 12th Division on the left was held up before
Carnoy, which remained for the time in the enemy's hands.

At midnight the 2/4th Battalion was relieved by the 7th Londons of
the 174th Brigade, which side-stepped to the left, and on relief was
concentrated at Great Bear Wood north-east of the Happy Valley.

The casualties of the day, due almost entirely to shell-fire, were:

2/Lieuts. H. Lelyveld, J. C. Wood, A. Irvine and C. C. W. Goodale,
wounded, and in N.C.O.'s and men 15 killed, 166 wounded and 14
missing.

The good work of 2/Lieut. Prince and C.S.M. Cooke has already been
referred to. Prince was rewarded with the M.C. Cooke was killed in the
Wood, and a few days after his death notification was received that
he had been awarded the M.C. for his work on the 8th August. Mention
must also be made of Pte. Campion, a battalion runner, who performed
invaluable work in locating the scattered parties of the Battalion
in the Wood, thereby enabling Hetley to assume proper control of the
firing line.

On the 26th August the following congratulatory message was issued by
the Brigadier (Brig.-Gen. Charles Corkoran):

"The Major-General commanding the Division in congratulating you
all wishes me to tell you that Sir Douglas Haig, the Army Commander
and the Corps Commander have all expressed the highest praise for
the way in which the Brigade is fighting. For myself I cannot say
how proud I am to be in command of such a brigade as the Fusilier
Brigade."

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME, 1918 (2/4TH BATTALION)]

Orders were issued on the night of the 25th/26th August for the
prosecution of the attack on the following day, but the 26th proved a
day of check. The 3rd Londons, who led the attack, reached Maricourt,
but, the flanking brigades being held up, they were unsupported and had
to fall back. A threatened German counter-attack south of Maricourt
having failed to materialise, the remainder of the day was occupied in
consolidation on a line about 500 yards west of the village.

The 2/4th Battalion was moved from Great Bear Wood at 9 a.m. on the
26th in anticipation of a successful attack, and took up a position
in considerable depth in the vicinity of Bronfay Farm, where it was
occupied in preparations for the battle of the 27th August. This day
the Battalion was joined by Lieut. H. P. Lawrence and 2/Lieut. R. Grey,
attached from the 10th Londons, and two days later by 2/Lieuts. H. H.
Gant (2nd Londons), H. Hearnshaw (7th Londons) and C Brandram (9th
Londons).

The objectives of the projected attack of the 27th August were the
capture of Maricourt and the establishment of our line in the old
British trenches of July 1916 on the eastern fringe of Maricourt Wood,
east of the village. Exploitation of the success into the old German
trenches as opportunity should allow was also arranged for. The leading
battalion of the Brigade was the 3rd Londons, with the 2/4th Londons in
close support and the 2/2nd Londons in reserve. Simultaneous attacks
were to be made by the 3rd Australians in the direction of Vaux on the
right and by the 12th Division towards Maltzhorn Farm on the left.

Early in the morning the 2/4th Battalion was assembled in artillery
formation on the line consolidated the previous day, and twenty minutes
after zero (4.55 a.m.) it followed the 3rd Londons towards Maricourt.
The greater part of the advance was through the village itself and the
Battalion soon got rather mixed up with the 3rd Londons in the course
of mopping up the numerous dugouts in its ruins. The defence put up
by the Germans, at least on the 2/4th Battalion's front, this day
showed marked deterioration. It was sporadic and on the whole poor,
and with comparatively little difficulty and remarkably small loss to
itself, the Battalion gained its final objective east of the Wood, a
message from Capt. Hetley to this effect being received in Battalion
Headquarters at 7.30 a.m.

The inevitable breaking up of attack formations consequent on passing
through a ruined village resulted in a good deal of disorganisation,
and on arrival on the objective, which the 2/4th Battalion reached
on the extreme left of the Brigade sector, no touch was found with
either the 3rd Londons on the right or the 12th Division on the left.
Hetley, however, who again assumed control on the spot, soon set
this to rights, and leaving C.S.M. Bonser, D.C.M., to reorganise the
platoons immediately available, sent C.S.M. Cowland to pick up the
12th Division on the left, while he himself pushed out to the right
flank with a patrol. These efforts were entirely successful, and both
the neighbouring battalions being found to be well up and the flanks
thus secured, Hetley returned and established his headquarters in the
railway cutting.

The rapidity of this advance and the completeness of its success leave
one breathless after the weary and sanguinary struggles with which this
ground had been hardly wrung from the enemy's grip in 1916. Maricourt
Wood was full of German dugouts, and evidently these had not been quite
completely dealt with during the advance, for later in the morning
a couple of German gentlemen, feeling a desire to take the morning
air, came quietly strolling down the hill from the Wood to Hetley's
headquarters, where his unexpected presence caused them painful
surprise.

During the morning C.S.M. Bonser was entrusted with the task of
collecting isolated groups of men and with them filling up gaps and
forming a support line in case of counter-attack. At this work he
proved invaluable. Hetley writes: "He led party after party round
dugouts in Maricourt clearing out Bosche, and was later perfectly
splendid in organising the men and fetching up reinforcements, that is,
rallying isolated parties in the town and Wood, all this under heavy
if somewhat wild shell fire." Bonser received a bar to his D.C.M. for
this day's work, and later, after the disbandment of the Battalion,
when attached to the 2/2nd Londons gained a second bar on September
18th at Epéhy.

On our flanks the day was equally successful, Vaux falling to the
Australians, and the high ground at Maltzhorn Farm passing into the
12th Division's hands. No counter-attack was delivered by the Bosche
and we were left in undisputed possession of our gains which amounted
to some 1700 yards of ground. Orders were issued during the day that
the advance should be pressed on to Maurepas Station, but these were
subsequently cancelled, as the enemy were found to be holding their old
1916 line in strength with three fresh divisions.

At 8 p.m. Major Crosbie made a reconnaissance of the line and organised
the Battalion in two companies; A and B being placed under Capt. Hetley
and C and D under 2/Lieut. Grimsdell, the Battalion's right flank
resting on the point at which the railway crossed the front trench.
Throughout the night the position was heavily shelled, but with very
little loss to us.

In spite of the fatigue of the troops Army H.Q. was fixed in its
determination to allow the Bosche no breathing space, and at 1 a.m.
28th August orders were received in the line that the attack was to be
continued that day. The 3rd Londons were to lead the Brigade again,
while the 2/2nd and 2/4th Londons were to remain in reserve in the
old British front line. At 4.45 a.m. the attack was launched. The day
resolved itself into a series of patrol encounters, in the course of
which some very stubborn opposition was met with, notably in the Bois
d'en Haut. By the evening the Divisional line had been established
another 1000 yards further east, in front of the Bois d'en Haut and
in touch on the left with the 12th Division, who had taken Hardecourt
after stiff resistance, while the Australians had possessed themselves
of Curlu.

That evening the Battalion was relieved, the 175th Brigade taking
over the sector, and withdrew to reserve in a valley north of
Bray-sur-Somme, a few hundred yards from the site of the old Citadel
Camp, a spot well known to the Somme veterans of the 1/4th Battalion.

During the whole of these days in fact the 2/4th Battalion, though a
little distance south of the Guillemont heights, had been crossing the
tracks of the 1/4th Battalion in the earlier battles of this historic
district, but under what extraordinarily different conditions! The
painful steps of 1916, which gained perhaps a few hundred yards a week
at appalling cost of life, amid the wretchedness of mud and rain, were
now victorious strides which had carried our lines forward like an
irresistible tide. Since the 2/4th Battalion had moved into the Happy
Valley on the 24th August it had advanced some 8000 yards and already
half the devastation of the old Somme battlefields was left behind.

The losses of the two days' fighting at Maricourt were, considering
the extent of the gains, remarkably light. Lieut A. R. Muddell and
2/Lieuts. E. C. McKittrick and R. Grey were wounded, while Lieut. and
Adjt. H. J. King, M.C., and Lieut. H. P. Lawrence were also hit but
remained at duty. 114 N.C.O.'s and men became casualties, 9 being
killed, 74 wounded and 29 missing.

For their splendid leadership Capt. G. H. Hetley and 2/Lieut. E. V.
Grimsdell were rewarded with the M.C.

After the 173rd Brigade came out of the line the 58th Division remained
in action and on the 29th August it carried the line forward, against
an ever-increasing opposition, to the east of Maurepas. The following
day, the 47th Division having taken over from the 12th on our left, the
two divisions of Londoners again pressed on shoulder to shoulder. The
enemy resistance this day was as stubborn as had been experienced for
some time and the advance was eventually checked with the 58th facing
the west edge of Marrières Wood, and the 47th extending the line to
Priez Farm.

The 29th August was occupied by the 2/4th Battalion in cleaning and
resting, and the necessary reorganisation consequent on its losses in
the battle were effected. This day Major Crosbie left to take charge
of the Battle Surplus Camp and Major F. G. Tollworthy, M.C., once
more assumed command of the Battalion. On the 30th August Lieut. A. B.
Carpenter (25th Londons) with 29 other ranks joined the Battalion.

The Fourth Army Line was now approaching Péronne, and from Cléry to St
Christ the Australian Corps had reached the west bank of the Somme. The
stiffening of the enemy resistance which had been so noticeable during
the last two days' fighting, and the natural strength of the Somme as
an obstacle, made it clear that the enemy was determined to hold out at
Péronne as long as possible; and true to its scheme of allowing the Hun
no respite, the Army at once made its plans for forcing a bridgehead
over the river, with the object of reducing Péronne and the Somme line
of defence.

The most favourable point of attack appeared to be the river between
Péronne and Cléry, and the capture of the eminence of Mont St Quentin,
though likely to be arduous, would give us complete command of Péronne
itself and enable us to enfilade the whole of the enemy positions south
of the city on the east of the river. The actual capture of Mont St
Quentin was entrusted to the Australians in whose path it lay, and the
movements of the III Corps to their north formed a part of the scheme
for widening the bridgehead once gained. The two days' fighting of the
31st August and the 1st September may therefore be described as the
Battle of Mont St Quentin, and our task is now to deal with the part
taken in it by the 2/4th Battalion.

The 31st August saw a good deal of heavy fighting by the 175th
Brigade, which was still in line, the chief feature of the enemy's
resistance being the severity of the shell fire with which his heavy
guns plastered the whole Brigade area. Marrières Wood was captured and
the line pushed on to a position west of the Péronne-Rancourt Road and
overlooking the slope leading down to Bouchavesnes.

At 7 p.m. that night unexpected orders were received by the 173rd
Brigade to return to the line and deliver an attack at 5.30 a.m. the
following morning. From Bronfay Farm the battalions were conveyed by
bus to Hem Wood, whence they marched to assembly in the line, taking
it over from the 175th Brigade.

The immediate objective of the attack was the village of Bouchavesnes,
after which the line was to be pushed forward to a position overlooking
the valley of the Tortille River and the Canal du Nord. The order of
battle was: 2/4th Londons on the right, 3rd Londons on the left, with
the 2/2nd Londons following in close support. In spite of the short
notice for the operation the Battalion was duly assembled without delay
on a line 300 yards west of the Péronne-Rancourt Road, and at zero,
5.30 a.m., 1st September, moved forward under a creeping barrage.
The advance was made with two companies (A and B, under Capt. F. J.
Griffiths and 2/Lieut. C. C. Gibbs) in front and two in support (C and
D, under 2/Lieuts, Y. C. Prince, M. C., and G. C. Ewing, M.C.). Each
company moved in artillery formation with three platoons in front and
one in support.

For once we were favoured with good weather conditions, and though cold
the morning was fine with good visibility. On the western outskirts
of Bouchavesnes the enemy put up a rather stiff fight, but on being
tackled with determination, he once again showed signs of weakening
morale, and the remainder of the village was occupied and mopped up
with very little opposition.

Although the Bosche infantry showed weakness his artillery work was,
as usual, excellent. His counter-barrage came down promptly and
heavily, and the bulk of our casualties this day were caused by his
shell fire. On several occasions, indeed, during these successful
days of August and September the enemy displayed prodigious skill in
handling his guns. Field guns remained in action in the copses which
are scattered all over this countryside, firing over open sights till
the last possible moment; and when these were forced to limber up the
fire was promptly taken up by high velocity guns firing at extreme
ranges in the rear. On the 1st September, however, the advance was
particularly rapid, and several field guns were unable to get away,
and fell into our hands. After passing the village the Battalion
pressed forward rapidly up the hill to the east of it, collecting a
good many machine-gun posts on the way, and by 10.45 a.m. was on its
final objective, organised and established on a definite line under
the personal control of Major Tollworthy. This line was on the western
crest of the Tortille Valley overlooking Moislains, and about 1000
yards short of that village. Some little difficulty was experienced by
the divisions on the flanks, but touch was soon gained, the Australians
being still on the right and the 47th Division (who captured Rancourt
and gained the western edge of St Pierre Vaast Wood) on the left.

No counter-attack developed during the day, and the Bosche seemed to
resign himself to the loss of ground. His acquiescence in our success
was doubtless partly due to the fact that this day the Australians,
after three days' magnificent fighting, captured Mont St Quentin and
entered Péronne.

The casualties of the 2/4th Battalion were again extremely light when
compared with the importance of the success achieved, but unfortunately
they included the loss of two company commanders (Capt. F. J. Griffiths
and 2/Lieut. V. C. Prince) killed. Both of these officers had done
splendid work and shown themselves capable leaders, and in them the
Battalion sustained a serious loss. In addition to these, 2/Lieuts. H.
H. Gant and G. Gilson were killed, Lieut. H. P. Lawrence and 2/Lieuts.
F. E. Rogers, C. Brandram and R. E. Glover wounded; while 11 N.C.O.'s
and men were killed, 49 wounded and 30 missing, making a total list for
the day of 99 all ranks.

The captures of the Brigade amounted to 325 prisoners, 40 machine-guns,
8 field guns and one motor ambulance, and once again the prisoners
showed that reserves were being flung wholesale into the enemy fighting
line. Measured solely by the depth of ground taken, the 1st September
was the most successful action ever fought by the 2/4th Battalion, the
advance being over 3000 yards, and the achievement was the subject of a
congratulatory message from the Brigadier.

The same evening the 58th Division was relieved by the 74th[7] and
passed into Corps reserve after a week of hard fighting. The 2/4th
Battalion withdrew, after handing over its objectives intact to the
14th Black Watch, to a valley a mile west of Marrières Wood. The
Battalion remained in this valley for five days, employed in resting
and training, fortunately under weather conditions which were fine and
warm except on the 5th September. During this period 2/Lieut. D. A. S.
Manning and drafts of 21 other ranks joined the Battalion. 2/Lieut.
Bidgood was appointed Intelligence Officer (vice 2/Lieut. Davies, sick).

[7] The 74th Division (Girdwood) was a Yeomanry Division which had
been employed in the East. This was its first appearance in the French
theatre of war. The 14th Black Watch was formerly the Fife and Forfar
Yeomanry.

The days succeeding the relief of the 58th Division were marked by hard
fighting, but by the evening of the 4th September the 47th and 74th
Divisions had advanced the line east of Moislains and well up the long
slope leading to Nurlu. As was to be expected now that the line of the
Somme had been turned the enemy began to fall back towards the next
defensive position, the outposts of the Hindenburg line, and on the
5th September the pursuit began in earnest, though it was met at many
points with stubborn resistance.

At 7 a.m. on the 7th September the 2/4th Battalion embussed at Hem
Wood and were conveyed to St Pierre Farm on the Péronne-Nurlu Road,
the whole Division being on its way back to the fighting line. The
spectacle of the roads during this forward move was most impressive.
Packed with troops, guns and stores of every description moving
eastward, it seemed to convey to the troops a greater realisation of
the importance of their victories than the actual advances they had
made in action.

The Battalion lay in Villa Wood, south-west of Nurlu, during the day,
and at 6 p.m. marched to a bivouac area immediately north of Liéramont,
where it arrived at 9.30 p.m.

On the 8th September the fine weather of the preceding week gave way to
heavy rainstorms, and the Battalion moved into shelters in Liéramont,
and in this position it remained resting until a late hour in the
evening of the 9th.

During the 8th September troops of the 58th Division endeavoured to
advance against the large and strongly defended villages of Epéhy
and Peizières, but the position was stubbornly held by the Alpine
Corps, and the line became stabilised in trenches on the south and
west slopes of the hill on which the villages stand. The following
morning determined counter-attacks by the Alpine Corps drove back the
Divisional line a short distance.

This stiffening of the defence made it essential for Army H.Q. to be
informed as to whether the enemy rearguards were fighting a delaying
action, or whether the defence was organised in depth; and to test this
an attack by the III Corps was ordered for the 10th September.

The 58th Division was directed on Epéhy-Peizières while the 74th was
given Ronnssoy Wood as its objective.

The 173rd Brigade was detailed for this attack with the 3rd Londons on
the right, the 2/2nd on the left and the 2/4th in close support. The
great frontage of the two villages, which topographically are really
one, and the high state of their defences made the operation one of
great difficulty, and the plan of action was to deal with it in two
stages. For the first objective the two leading battalions were to gain
the line of the eastern road of the villages, the 3rd Londons in Epéhy
and the 2/2nd in Peizières. The 2/4th Londons were to follow the 2/2nd
closely in the initial stages and then, turning southwards, were to
mop up the area between the inner flanks of the leading battalions and
establish themselves in Fishers Keep as a link between the two.

In the second stage the leading battalions were to gain the line of the
railway east of the villages where they would join hands, the 2/4th
Battalion remaining in the villages. On the left the 21st Division was
to push forward immediately after the villages were captured and secure
the position by occupying the high ground which dominated them a mile
to the north.

This very complicated operation was to be carried out under two
creeping barrages, one for each leading battalion, and a machine-gun
barrage, while the heavy batteries would engage distant targets.

At 11 p.m., 9th August, the 2/4th Battalion left its position in
Liéramont and moved forward to assembly, which, considering the
vileness of the weather, the lack of reconnaissance and the extreme
darkness, was completed satisfactorily; and at 5.15 a.m. the Battalion
advanced to the attack.

The leading battalions met with a good deal of opposition, which on
the left flank was centred on Wood Farm. In the 2/4th Battalion A and
B Companies, respectively under 2/Lieuts. C. C. Gibbs and G. C. Ewing,
M.C., gained their objective at Tottenham Post on the western outskirts
of Peizières with comparatively little difficulty. B Company under
Capt. Hetley, whose rôle was to penetrate the villages to Fishers Keep,
had a much more difficult task. The fighting through ruined streets
inevitably led to some disorganisation of platoons, and the villages,
moreover, were stiff with Bosche machine-gun posts, which, once the
barrage had passed over them, were free to do their worst on the
attackers. Severe casualties were sustained, among whom were numbered
two platoon commanders, 2/Lieuts. H. B. Bartleet and P. F. Royce,
killed. Finding progress impossible among the cunningly concealed
Bosche machine-gunners Hetley collected and organised his company on
the west edge of the village. A similar fate met D Company (2/Lieut.
D. A. S. Manning) which endeavoured to enter Peizières from the west.
After gallantly struggling against impossible odds Manning withdrew his
men to swell the garrison of Tottenham Post.

The 2/2nd Londons under Capt. Wright made a magnificent attempt to
carry out their task, and did in fact reach the railway embankment, but
a sharp counter-attack drove them back to the fringe of the village.
Unfortunately the flanking movement of the 21st Division on the left
failed to materialise, and this doubtless contributed to the failure
of the 173rd Brigade. The fact, however, was clearly established that
the resistance of the enemy was organised and deliberate, and it became
patent that an attack with tank co-operation would be necessary to
reduce it. The rifle strength of the three battalions set against these
villages on the 10th September was only about 900 in all, and their
attack, therefore, lacked the weight essential to success.

In spite of the lack of success, however, the day was not entirely
fruitless, for the captures amounted to 80 prisoners, 20 machine-guns
and 3 anti-tank guns.

The 2/4th Battalion's losses were: 2/Lieuts. F. Bidgood, P. F. Royce
and H. B. Bartleet, killed; 2/Lieut. F. J. Paterson, wounded; 5
N.C.O.'s and men killed, 19 wounded and 3 missing.

During the night following the battle the 2/4th Battalion was relieved
by the 12th Londons, and was concentrated in trenches at Guyencourt.
Here it remained till 8 p.m. on the 11th September, when it withdrew to
shelters in Liéramont.

We may here remark that on the 18th September the 173rd Brigade
captured Epéhy and Peizières and thus helped clear the road for the
advance to the Hindenburg line.

We have now come to the end of the 2/4th Battalion's story. Owing to
the increasing difficulties of maintaining units at fighting strength
it had been decided by G.H.Q. to make still further reductions in the
number of formations, and to swell the ranks of those remaining with
the personnel of those disbanded. This dismal fate befell the 2/4th
Londons, and on the 12th September 1918 the whole of its personnel
was transferred to the 2/2nd Londons, and the Battalion as a separate
entity ceased to exist, after twenty-one months of active service life.
Its place in the Brigade was taken by the 2/24th Londons from the 32nd
Division.

The last action in which the Battalion fought was admittedly a
"feeler," and as such undoubtedly served a useful purpose in the
scheme of the Fourth Army's great advance; but perhaps we may be
pardoned for regretting that it was not a more successful close to the
Battalion's history. It was bad luck. Yet there was a certain degree
of poetic justice in the fact that the Battalion had helped fight the
Germans back to what had been on 21st March 1918 the British line of
resistance, and it can, therefore, justly claim to have redeemed in
full its losses in the awful battles of the retreat.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE FINAL ADVANCE

II. _The 1/4th Battalion in the Battle of Bapaume, 1918_

The extension northward of the battle line, which marked the opening of
the Battle of Bapaume on the 21st August 1918, involved Byng's Third
Army, comprising from right to left the V, IV and VI Corps. As we have
indicated in the preceding chapter, the object of the Third Army was to
conduct a vast enveloping movement which should turn the flank of the
German defence of the Somme line, and throw open the road to Cambrai
and St Quentin.

Already the enemy had shown signs of nervousness in the area of the
Somme-Scarpe salient and had withdrawn from his most advanced positions
at Serre; and it was clear, therefore, that any attack on this front
by the British must be prosecuted rapidly to avoid a repetition of the
skilful German retreat of February 1917. For an offensive in this area
the British troops were far more favourably placed in August 1918 than
they had been on the former occasion. They possessed the Bucquoy Ridge,
with the consequent advantages of observation which had formerly been
denied to them; and the terrain over which the battle would be fought,
though certainly devastated and a mass of trenches, did not present the
colossal system of inter-supporting fortresses which it had in 1916.
The time for a big attack had come, and G.H.Q. decided to strike. The
23rd August saw the Fourth and Third Armies advancing on a front of 33
miles from Lihons to Mercatel.

The suddenness of the German collapse in these latter days of the War
is probably unique in the annals of military history. At the beginning
of June their star was still in the ascendant. They were occupying
ground which they had never previously held during the whole War;
their successes of March and April had shaken the Allied defence to
its very foundations; and it seemed still doubtful whether they had
reached the limit of their capabilities of offence. Yet by the middle
of August the whole face of the War had changed. On a wide front
the Germans were in retreat; vast masses of material, thousands of
prisoners had fallen into our hands; the British morale had been proved
stronger than ever, while that of the enemy was giving indications of a
serious break.

Whether the High Command anticipated the completeness of this lightning
change we cannot say; that the vast bulk of regimental officers and
men scarcely contemplated it, is almost certain. Early in July General
Hull, in a conversation with Lieut.-Col. Marchment, expressed the
opinion that very little would be done in 1918 by way of retrieving the
losses suffered during the spring!

* * * * *

The 8th August found the 1/4th Londons at a strength of 42 officers and
892 other ranks withdrawn in Brigade reserve to billets at Arras. Here
a quite pleasant week was spent in which the routine of training was
varied by a Battalion sports meeting, and a most successful swimming
gala--a new feature of recreation--for which purpose the moat at the
Citadel formed a splendid bath.

Between the 16th and 18th August the 56th Division was relieved from
the Tilloy trenches and passed into Corps reserve, the 1/4th Londons
handing over their Brigade reserve billets to the 1/9th Royal Scots
and moving to Berneville on the 17th August. For a few days changes of
station followed on each others' heels with startling rapidity, and
after having been quartered successively at Houvin-Houvigneuil and
Magnicourt-sur-Canche, the Battalion reached Grand Rullecourt at 11.30
p.m. on the 20th August.

On the 19th orders had been issued to the Division to take part in an
attack with the XVII Corps in the area of the Scarpe, but these were
subsequently replaced on the 21st August by a transfer of the Division
to Haldane's VI Corps, and orders to join with it in the Third Army
attack.

A day of rest at Grand Rullecourt was occupied by the Battalion, in
the absence of attack orders, with speculations as to its chances
of soon being called upon to fight. Preliminary arrangements were
made to march into battle at short notice, and the same evening, the
21st August, the Battalion marched thirteen miles to Berles-au-Bois,
arriving at 2 a.m. on the 22nd.

About 10 o'clock that morning Lieut.-Col. Marchment and the company
commanders were ordered to Humbercamp to receive battle orders, but
after an hour's fruitless waiting the company commanders returned to
prepare their companies for action, and the Colonel went to try and
get what orders he could at Brigade Headquarters. Here he was informed
that the attack would take place in sixteen hours' time--early on the
23rd August! The general idea of the Battalion's rôle was explained
to Lieut.-Col. Marchment to be the capture of the village of Boyelles
and the Marc system of trenches immediately north of it, the attack to
commence at 4.55 a.m. on the 23rd August, two companies in line, one in
support and one in reserve. Artillery support would be provided by 6
brigades of field guns firing an unregistered barrage, while 21 tanks
would take part in the attack. A section of the Divisional Machine-gun
Company would be attached to the Battalion. With this somewhat sketchy
information Lieut.-Col. Marchment hurried back to the Battalion to set
it in motion, and by 5 p.m. it was on its way to the first assembly
position at Blairville. Here it occupied the old German trenches
exactly opposite the first trench sector ever held by the 2/4th
Battalion in February 1917.

The line facing Boyelles was at this time occupied by the 59th
Division, and the 168th Brigade was detailed to attack through them,
with the Guards Division opposite Hamelincourt on its right, and the
52nd Division north of the north branch of the Cojeul River on its
left. The Brigade order of battle from right to left was Kensingtons
(south of Boyelles); 1/4th Londons (Boyelles); and London Scottish
(Boiry-Becquerelle); the 1st Londons being attached in Brigade reserve
for the operation.

Leaving the Battalion on the march Lieut.-Col. Marchment hurried on to
Blairville by car to see the Brigadier of the brigade in line (59th
Division) and was at once faced by another difficulty in finding that
the 59th Division had themselves taken over the front trenches only
the preceding night! Clearly not much possibility of assistance from
them; but they arranged to provide guides to lead our platoons to the
positions of final assembly.

The sudden transfer of the 56th Division from the XVII to the VI Corps,
and the subsequent difficulty in obtaining orders must have been
caused by some reason of great importance: we are not aware what it
was. Certainly the effect was not to make things easier. Indeed, when
the Divisional attack order was issued by Gen. Hull at 3 p.m. on the
22nd August he had not received the written instructions of VI Corps.
But, starting under such inauspicious circumstances, all the more
credit is due to the battalions, and in particular to the commanding
officers, for the signal successes which were ultimately achieved.
Reconnaissance of the ground by officers and N.C.O.'s was obviously out
of the question, and Lieut.-Col. Marchment had to content himself with
explaining the situation to them while battle stores were issued to the
men.

At 10.30 p.m. the Battalion moved off by platoons in charge of the
59th Division guides, who, considering their own scanty acquaintance
with the ground, did well, for they brought almost the whole Battalion
to its assembly positions in Falcon Trench well on time, though one
platoon of A Company and the Headquarter details went sadly astray and
did not turn up till long after zero hour. The Padre believes he was
taken for a long walk somewhere round Albert! During the march up the
enemy was using gas shell freely, and masks had to be worn at times,
but little loss was caused.

The Battalion was drawn up as follows:

Right front--B Company, Capt. R. S. B. Simmonds.
Left front --D Company, Capt. C. W. Rowlands, M.C.
Support --C Company, Capt. H. A. T. Hewlett.
Reserve --A Company, Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C.

The hour or two of darkness before zero was spent in cutting lanes
through our wire, and at 4.55 a.m. the barrage opened, intense and
well distributed. Lieut.-Col. Marchment describes it as the best and
most tremendous he had ever seen. The scene from Headquarters was
extraordinary: the intense shrapnel barrage and smoke on the German
front line, the medium howitzers firing on Boyelles village beyond, and
the heavies cutting up the distant landscape in dense black clouds; and
behind it all the sun just rising.

At 5.7 a.m. the companies moved forward. The right company (B) made
good use of the railway embankment, and following the line on its south
side advanced on a one-platoon frontage to Boyelles Station, while
three tanks entered the village. Here the railway was crossed and a
good deal of opposition was met with from enemy machine-guns, heavy
and light, firing from the eastern half of the village. These were,
however, skilfully outflanked and rounded up to the number of 3 heavy
and 8 light guns, after which the company pushed forward and caught up
the barrage.

Two platoons halted approximately on the Blue line (first objective) on
the eastern edge of Boyelles, while two pressed on to Boyelles Trench
500 yards further east. But few enemy were encountered in this advanced
position. B Company being now well distributed in depth, the work of
consolidation was put in hand. The right flank was not yet in touch
with the Kensingtons and was therefore rounded off by pushing two Lewis
gun sections and one subsection M.G.C. southwards towards the railway.

D Company on the left met with more stubborn resistance in the Marc
system, and the leading platoons were temporarily held up in No Man's
Land by enemy firing from the Marc saps. Moreover, the tank allotted
to this part of the front failed to reach the Marc front system at
all, having apparently lost its way. The support company (C), however,
pushed a platoon forward into the sunken road leading northwards from
Boyelles, whence it was able to enfilade the Marc trenches, while the
right platoon of the London Scottish advancing on our left managed
to turn the position similarly from the north. Being practically
surrounded the enemy surrendered _en masse_, the bag amounting
to 2 officers and 80 other ranks. Little further opposition was
encountered, and D company continued the advance to Boyelles Trench,
where touch was gained with C Company on the right and the London
Scottish on the left. The dugouts in this line were energetically
mopped up and many Germans sent marching westward. Two patrols were
sent forward towards Boyelles Reserve.

In the meantime the support company mopped up the neighbourhood of
the cemetery and the sunken roads in its vicinity, while A Company in
reserve occupied the Marc system. This latter proved a very sound move
as our start-line was heavily shelled all the morning.

The first news of the attack at Battalion Headquarters was received
in the shape of Private Cohen, who appeared wounded but carrying a
German light machine-gun--a good omen of success! At about 9 a.m.
the lost platoons turned up and their arrival, including as they did
the Padre and the Medical Officer, was extremely welcome, for by now
the wounded were beginning to filter through, and the small band of
five under Lieut.-Col. Marchment were encumbered with some 200 Bosche
prisoners--not to speak of their duties of conducting the battle.
Communication by wire was rapidly established with brigade and also
forward to the companies, a report centre being formed north of
Boyelles.

At 9.15 a.m. 56th Division issued orders that the attack would be
pressed at 11.30 a.m. into Boyelles Reserve, but owing to temporary
dislocation of the signal service these orders did not reach the 1/4th
Londons until 11.15 a.m. To start at the scheduled hour was out of the
question, but arrangements were made at once for the further advance,
which ultimately began at about 5 p.m.

The advance was made by the left front and support companies, the
right front company extending to its left to cover the area vacated by
them. This second attack met with complete success. The two attacking
companies were led by a line of scouts followed by one platoon in
extended formation. The remaining platoons followed in artillery
formation by sections. Some resistance was offered by light machine-gun
teams in Boyelles Reserve, but the widely extended formation saved
the attackers from severe loss. The enemy artillery was also active
during the advance, but again the formation adopted enabled the rear
platoons to pick their way with but few casualties. The whole of the
allotted portion of Boyelles Reserve was captured, and patrols pushed
forward 500 yards to the east of it. The enemy shell fire now became
more intense, but a protective barrage was put down by our guns, and
no counter-attack developed. After a while activity on the whole area
subsided.

The same evening the 168th Brigade handed over the captured positions
to the 167th and passed into Divisional reserve, the 1/4th Londons
concentrating north of Hendecourt. By noon on that day the Battalion
was back at Blairville.

It is impossible to speak too highly of the men by whom this great
success had been gained. The long approach marches in exceptionally
hot weather brought the Battalion to the point of battle in an already
tired condition; the hurried orders and the total lack of previous
reconnaissance created difficulties which were surmounted by the
splendid response made by all ranks to the demands imposed on them.
The rapid appreciation of the situation by company commanders and the
careful dispositions of the commanding officer all contributed in full
measure to this important victory, while the skilful use of ground and
of suitable formations was the means of securing the gains at a minimum
of loss. The excellent work performed by signallers and runners, all
of whom had a hard day's work, were of incalculable value to Battalion
Headquarters, and enabled Lieut.-Col. Marchment at all times to keep a
firm grip of the situation of the moment.

The casualties of the Battalion were extremely light, only 18 being
killed, but by ill luck it lost three company commanders, Capts. C. W.
Rowlands, M.C., and H. A. T. Hewlett being killed, and Capt. R. S. B.
Simmonds, wounded. 2/Lieuts. A. W. Chignell, T. Yoxall and F. S. C.
Taylor were wounded. The captures made by the Battalion amounted to 3
officers and 240 other ranks, of the 1st and 2nd Battalions 87th R.I.
Regiment, 24 light and 8 heavy machine-guns, 6 light, 1 medium and 1
heavy trench mortar.

After the relief of the 168th Brigade the offensive was continued by
the 167th, at first with considerable success, the Division being once
again attached to the XVII Corps. An advance in the northern area of
the Divisional front of some 2500 yards was made into Summit and Fooley
Trenches, but on the south flank the most strenuous efforts of the
56th and Guards Divisions failed to eject the enemy from Croisilles,
which was held in great force by machine-gunners. South of the Cojeul
River the enemy resistance was increasing, and information was obtained
from prisoners to the effect that three fresh German divisions had
been brought into the Bullecourt-Hendecourt area. North of the Cojeul,
however, the 52nd and Canadian Divisions had registered important
successes. The old Wancourt line fell to them on the 26th, and this
advance was rapidly followed up by the recapture of Monchy-le-Preux,
and a penetration into quite new ground at St Rohart Factory--hardly
fought for by the 56th Division in May 1917--and at Boiry Notre Dame.
By the evening of the 26th August the 52nd Division had cleared the
Hindenburg line from Henin to the Sensée River, and was reported to be
east of Fontaine-lez-Croisilles.

Croisilles, however, still held out and the Guards had been pressed
back slightly towards St Leger. The result of this fighting was to
swing the Corps line round facing roughly south-east astride the
Hindenburg line, with a strong pocket of most stubborn Bosche in the
ramification of trenches around Croisilles itself, and on both banks of
the Sensée River to the north-east.

The 169th Brigade which had now taken over the Divisional front was
getting worn by its constant fighting and losses, and reinforcement
was needed. After a few hours' rest at Blairville the 1/4th Londons
marched at 7.45 a.m. on the 25th August to trenches in front of
Boisleux St Marc, moving the following evening to the trenches east of
Boiry-Becquerelle, which had been captured by the London Scottish on
the 23rd.

A good deal of gas shelling occurred here during the night. A signaller
was killed and several men were wounded, among whom the Battalion was
unfortunate in losing Sergt. Johnson, the excellent orderly-room clerk,
and Corpl. Coates, M.M., of the Scouts.

On the afternoon of the 27th the Battalion moved forward in close
support to the 169th Brigade, and occupied Summit Trench immediately
north of its junction with Hill, and on the extreme left of the
Divisional sector.

It is rather curious to note that in these fights and marches the
1/4th Battalion was in an area which had been traversed by the 2/4th
Battalion during the actions of March 1917, while at the same time the
2/4th Battalion in the Fourth Army was bearing its share in recapturing
spots familiar to the 1/4th Battalion during the 1916 Somme battles!

The 1/4th Battalion had settled down in Summit Trench to make the best
of a very wet evening, when, after dark, orders were received to move
at once into the Hindenburg line and to concentrate at River Road, near
the banks of the Sensée River for an attack the following morning on
Bullecourt. It had been determined, owing to the prolonged resistance
of the enemy at Croisilles and the resultant holding back of the
right flank, to pursue the operation by an advance towards Bullecourt
straight down the Hindenburg line. This would have the effect of
completely enveloping and "squeezing-out" the pocket of Germans in the
Croisilles-Guardian Trench area.

The concentration of the Battalion was effected successfully, but not
altogether without difficulty. A and B Companies moved direct to the
point of assembly, while C, D and Headquarters proceeded by way of
the Henin-Fontaine Road, and then down the Hindenburg trenches. The
whole area was horribly congested. Two brigades of the 56th Division
(the 168th and 169th) were moving up for attack, while at the same
time a relief was proceeding on the left flank between the 52nd and
57th Divisions. For a time the confusion was rather distressing, and
Lieut.-Col. Marchment writes, "It seemed to me that the battalions
were forming up to attack north-east, south-east and south-west."

The plan of attack was as follows:--The advance was to be led over the
open by the 169th Brigade, the Queen's Westminsters in the van with the
line Queen's Lane-Jove Lane, as a first objective, and the trenches
south-east of Bullecourt as a final objective.

The 168th Brigade was to follow the 169th in the order 1/4th Londons,
Kensingtons and London Scottish, advancing by bounds at a distance of
about 1000 yards in rear of the rear battalion of the 169th Brigade.
The particular duties of the 168th Brigade were to support the 169th
and mop up in rear of their advance, and to protect the right flank
should Croisilles remain untaken--a rather difficult and quite
unsatisfactory job.

The 1/4th Londons were disposed as follows:--

D Company (2/Lieut. J. L. Backhouse) on the right--to advance
over the area west of the Hindenburg line by way of Sensée
Avenue, Nelly Avenue and Queen's Lane.

B Company (2/Lieut. G. G. Lewis) to advance down Burg Support,
the old Hindenburg front trench.

A Company (Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C.) and C Company (Capt. J.
W. Price), Headquarters and 1 section M.G.C. attached, to
advance down Tunnel Trench, the old Hindenburg support trench.

The attack was to be launched at 12.30 p.m. on the 24th August under a
creeping barrage.

The fight throughout the day proved a laborious and confused affair.
Trouble developed which doubtless originated on the previous evening
when the Queen's Westminsters, relieved by the London Scottish in the
Summit area, had moved forward to assembly. This gallant regiment
had been fighting already for a couple of days and was getting
worn--Lieut.-Col. Savill describes his men as "dead beat"--and it had
to move up to assembly positions in Burg Support, where it occupied
a trench at right angles to the line of its advance. A change of
front during an advance had been proved on the Somme in 1916 to be an
operation extremely difficult of accomplishment, and so it proved here.
True, the attack did not start till 12.30 p.m., but even the hours
of morning daylight gave little chance to the Queen's Westminsters
to get their bearings. Our map shows the villages of Bullecourt and
Hendecourt, but it must be borne in mind that the whole terrain was
actually a featureless waste. The ground everywhere was "crumped" to
pieces and covered with high grass and rank weeds, while the existence
of a village was not suspected till one found oneself stumbling
among the heaps of bricks which had formerly been its cottages. As a
consequence of all this, two companies of the Queen's Westminsters,
followed by a part of the 1/2nd Londons, went hopelessly astray and
became entangled in the 57th Division troops near Hendecourt. To add
to the confusion the company commander sent back word to 169th Brigade
that he was in Bullecourt.

Meanwhile, Lieut.-Col. Savill of the Queen's Westminsters advanced
along the Hindenburg line, and having fallen in with the Headquarters
of the 1/2nd Londons and the London Rifle Brigade, soon came in touch
with strong enemy forces, believing that his companies were ahead of
him, and that mopping-up had not been well done. The weak force at his
disposal was unable to shift the stubborn Germans opposed to him, and
the attack was held up.

The 1/4th Londons moved off from assembly as ordered in rear of the
169th Brigade.

On the right D Company was held up badly at Nelly Avenue where it
closed on to a party of the London Rifle Brigade. Several efforts
to shift the enemy proved abortive, and it was not until about 7.30
p.m. that, with the help of two Stokes Mortars brought up by the
Kensingtons, further progress could be made. By this hour, however,
the opposition was overcome, and, with 40 prisoners and 4 light
machine-guns to its credit, the company pursued the advance after dark
to Queen's Lane.

B Company in Burg Support overtook the Headquarters of the three 169th
Brigade battalions, held up as already described, about 200 yards short
of the Hump, and a platoon was at once placed at Lieut.-Col. Savill's
disposal to help clear the trench. We must remark parenthetically that
B Company's fight began almost precisely in the sector of trench which
had been first captured by A Company of the 2/4th Battalion on the 15th
June 1917: how often, we wonder, has such a coincidence occurred?

The Germans in Burg Support were of a remarkably obstinate variety
and progress by bombing was slow. The trench was very full of men,
and the congestion was later increased by the arrival from nowhere in
particular of a company of the Royal Munster Fusiliers (57th Division),
who had quite lost their direction. By 6.30 p.m. the enemy's resistance
was overcome by hard fighting, and B Company advanced down Burg Support
to the Knuckle, where it established itself in touch with D Company on
its right.

A and C Companies on the left, in the Hindenburg Support line, also
overtook the 169th Brigade, the remnants of the 1/2nd Londons being
held up about Juno Lane. The enemy was in strength in this trench also.
At the time it was presumed that by zealous use of his dugouts he had
escaped the moppers-up of the leading battalion, but probably, owing
to the deflection of the greater part of the 1/2nd Londons, he had
not been previously attacked. Progress was slow and the 1/4th London
Companies pushed through and engaged the enemy. The resistance at Juno
was soon overcome, and the enemy retired leaving us a few prisoners and
two light machine-guns. A second check was experienced at the Hump but
the enemy was driven back, strenuously debating every inch of ground,
till at last by 9.30 p.m. the two 1/4th London Companies reached Jove
Lane and the remainder of the Battalion. Attempts were made to gain
touch with the 57th Division on the left but without success.

The stubbornness of the enemy resistance in the Hindenburg line this
day was remarkable, and we cannot deny a brave enemy an acknowledgment
of his valour. Croisilles had been reported vacant by 8 o'clock in the
morning but the occupants of the Guardian pocket put up a day-long
fight. It was not till late in the evening that the whole area was
cleared. Probably the need to the enemy of gradually evacuating this
area was the cause of the opposition offered to our advance down the
Hindenburg line.

This was a hard day's work for everyone. The 1/4th Londons had bombed
their way down about 2000 yards of the Hindenburg line, excellent
leadership to the bombing parties being provided by Lieut. V. R. Oldrey
and by Capts. H. N. Williams and J. W. Price. The great difficulty
throughout the day was for local commanders to get any sort of grip as
to what was going on, as so often occurs in trench fighting. The mass
of trenches, nearly all stubbornly defended, with which the whole area
was pitted, in effect broke up the brigade attack into a series of
numerous and more or less isolated scraps in which no one knew much of
how his neighbour was faring. And all the time Division believed that
the Hindenburg line was clear, and that Bullecourt was in our hands.

The night of the 28th and the morning of the 29th August were occupied
in clearing up the situation, and assembling the Brigades on the line
Pelican Avenue-Pelican Lane for a continuance of the attack, which was
pursued by the 168th Brigade on the right and the 169th on the left.

The 1/4th Londons remained on the 29th August in support with the 1st
Londons (attached), the attacking battalions being the Kensingtons
on the right and the London Scottish on the left. The Battalion
was disposed in Queen's Lane, Burg Support and Borderer Trench.
The objective allotted to the Brigade roughly coincided with the
Riencourt-Quéant Road, and the whole of the village of Bullecourt,
inclusive to the Brigade, was allotted to the London Scottish.

The attack, which was launched at 1 p.m. on the 29th August, met with
stubborn resistance, especially on the right where the Kensingtons were
held up at Bullecourt Station. After hard fighting the London Scottish
managed to capture the village, and by dusk the Divisional line
formed a sharp salient, with its horns on Bullecourt Station and the
high ground west of the Factory on the Hendecourt Road, and its apex
following Tower Reserve and Gordon Reserve Trenches.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME, 1918 (1/4TH BATTALION)]

The 1/4th Londons were not called upon as a Battalion, but D Company
was sent forward to reinforce the London Scottish, and later to fill
a gap in the forward positions between that Battalion and the 169th
Brigade on the left.

The enemy resistance this day was extremely stubborn and Tank Reserve
was strongly held by the enemy, who resisted effectually the most
gallant attempts of the Scottish to emerge from Gordon Reserve.

Late at night the 167th Brigade took over the whole Divisional front,
and the 1/4th Londons moved back at 5.30 a.m. to positions in Queen's
Lane, Knuckle Avenue, Stray Reserve and Burg Support, where they
remained throughout the 30th August. During the withdrawal to these
positions the whole area was intensely bombarded with high explosives
and gas shell, and it was no surprise to the Battalion to learn that
the enemy had delivered a sharp counter-attack in the early morning
and driven the 167th Brigade out of Bullecourt back to the Pelican
Avenue-Pelican Lane line. The posts north of the village stood firm.
This counter-attack was a big affair which affected the divisions right
and left, both of them being pushed back a certain distance.

The immediate recapture of Bullecourt was promptly ordered by XVII
Corps, and no one in the Battalion was especially delighted to learn
that the 1/4th Londons were detailed for the duty.

After a day spent in obtaining such rest as was possible, the Battalion
wearily crept off after dark to assembly in Pelican Lane and Borderer
Trench in readiness to assault Bullecourt at dawn on the 31st August.
The 168th Brigade was drawn up for battle with the London Scottish on
the right, the 1/4th Londons in the centre and the 7th Middlesex (167th
Brigade attached) on the left, each battalion having a section M.G.C.
and a section L.T.M. Battery at its disposal. The Kensingtons were in
Brigade reserve.

The morning of the 31st August was dark, and at 5 a.m. the assaulting
battalions moved forward under an excellent barrage to which the enemy
gave a quick and heavy reply.

On the right, C Company, on a two-platoon front, reached the
cross-roads at the extreme western edge of Bullecourt, but was here
held up for some time by machine-guns in the village. At the same time
D Company, on the left, advancing on the north side of the village
penetrated about half-way across it and almost reached the cross-roads
on the northern edge, but here they also were checked by machine-gun
fire, principally from their right flank.

The support company (B) now entered the village, or rather advanced
against the site of the village (for no single building was visible),
and began to mop up in the endeavour to form a link between the two
leading companies. Progress was slow owing to the overgrown nature
of the ground, but by 8.40 a.m. touch was gained between B and C
Companies, and together they slowly fought their way forward till C
Company was able to join hands with the 7th Middlesex on the Hendecourt
Road. In the course of this fighting B Company managed to take 15
prisoners and put 5 machine-guns out of action.

At about 9 a.m. the reserve company (A) was put into the fight to
endeavour to fill in the gap across the village between the leading
companies.

The right company was still held up on the southern fringe of
Bullecourt by two machine-guns mounted in a derelict tank east of the
village, and it was not until after noon that, with the aid of two
Stokes Mortars, progress was made by bombing up Tower Reserve as far
as a point level with the east edge of the village. Here all further
advance was definitely checked. Gordon Reserve was strongly held and
stubbornly defended, and, moreover, no touch could be gained with the
London Scottish on the right.

By 3.30 p.m. the village of Bullecourt was reported clear of the enemy
and a line of Lewis gun posts was established on its eastern fringe
from Tower Reserve to the Hendecourt Road on the left. During the
remainder of the day no material change in the situation occurred.
Three several attempts were made by the leading companies to get
into Gordon Reserve but the position was too strongly held, and, the
trenches leading to it having been flattened out by shell fire, an
advance by bombing was impracticable. Shortly after midday aerial
reports were received that the enemy was assembling in Tank Avenue and
Tank Support. All field guns and heavies at once turned on to this
target and the projected counter-attack was promptly broken up. The
activity of the enemy in this region continued till late at night, and
it was evident that any attempt at further advance would be strenuously
disputed.

After nightfall arrangements were made for one company of the
Kensingtons to rush Gordon Reserve under cover of Stokes Mortar fire,
but the situation remaining somewhat obscure the attempt was abandoned.

Very little progress was made anywhere this day. On the right the
London Scottish gained Bullecourt Avenue and the 7th Middlesex on the
left captured the factory on the Hendecourt Road. But all along the
line the enemy's resistance was stiffening, evidently in view of the
near approach of our positions to the junction of the Hindenburg line
with the Drocourt-Quéant Switch.

Moreover the country was difficult for the attackers; it had been
fought over many times and was utterly broken up, and the assaulting
companies were all tired. In the circumstances it was a good day's
work, and a day of peculiar satisfaction to the 4th London Regiment,
which has a special claim to association with the village of
Bullecourt. Here in 1917 the 2/4th Battalion occupied Gordon Reserve
in the successful defence of Bullecourt against a heavy German attack
after it had first fallen into British hands, and in August 1918 it
fell to the lot of the 1/4th Battalion, after the village had been
recaptured and again lost, to capture it for ever.

Casualties in officers this day were: Lieut. V. R. Oldrey and 2/Lieut.
R. T. Stevenson, killed; 2/Lieuts. W. G. Hook, A. Holloway and A.
F. Potter, wounded. 2/Lieut. E. H. Garner was killed on the night
27th/28th August, after having been ten days only with the Battalion.
In the ranks the total casualties for the period 23rd to 31st August
were 30 killed, 150 wounded and 12 missing. Having regard to the
enormous importance of the successes achieved and the depth of the
advances, these comparatively light figures are a matter for much
congratulation. One shudders to think of what the losses would have
been for equal results in the hard slogging of the Somme in 1916 or at
Ypres in 1917.

Late at night on the 31st August the 56th Division handed over its
positions to the 52nd and withdrew into Corps reserve, the 1/4th
Londons reaching the Boyelles Reserve area at Boiry-Becquerelle at 7
a.m. on the 1st September, with a strength of 32 officers and 710 other
ranks.

In view of the gallant share which the 1/4th Londons had borne in this
splendid series of victories we may perhaps be permitted to quote
an extract from an article on the subject of the 56th Division's
achievements which appeared in _The Times_ of the 16th September 1918:
" ... This year it was one of the divisions which beat off the German
attack towards Arras on March 28th when the enemy suffered one of the
bloodiest defeats of the whole War; so that with this fighting and that
at Cambrai to its credit it has probably killed as many Germans as any
division in the British Army. Now to this proud record is to be added
the splendid advance of which the Commander-in-Chief has told. The 56th
Division has proved itself a great fighting division."

The Divisional record in the Battle of Bapaume 1918 may be summarised
as advancing through 6 miles of very strongly fortified country in nine
days; meeting and defeating three German divisions, and capturing 29
officers, 1047 other ranks, 3 guns, 210 machine-guns and over 50 trench
mortars. Of this large booty the share of the 1/4th Londons amounted to
3 officers and 390 other ranks prisoners, 70 machine-guns and 10 trench
mortars--a very fair proportion of the whole!

With this action the share of the Battalion in the great envelopment of
the Somme line closes.

The following were decorated for services during the period 23rd-31st
August:

2/Lieuts. C. L. Henstridge and A. Holloway, the M.C.

Pte. E. Clark, the D.C.M.

Sergt. F. G. Udall, M.M., Bar to M.M.

Sergts. F. A. Dove, J. T. Norris, F. C. Nickless, Corpls. W. Frost,
F. Nash, C. Robbins, Lance-Corpls. J. T. Couchman, J. R.
Greenwood, Ptes. G. H. Andrews, G. A. Allen, W. W. Boulstridge,
A. C. Barnes, J. Eccles, A. E. Dickerson, G. J. Grant, W. H.
Hart, H. H. Mills and W. Ryan, the M.M.

* * * * *

This great battle as a whole resulted in the defeat by 23 British
divisions of 35 German divisions, and the capture of 34,000 prisoners
and 270 guns. Its importance lay in the ever-increasing signs of
the enemy's failing morale; while the captures bore witness to his
indiscriminate throwing-in of reserves.

The following day Péronne fell to troops of the Third Army, and two
days later the enemy's general retirement from the east bank of the
Somme began.

We have already alluded to extensive captures of ground made in
the area of the Scarpe at Monchy-le-Preux and other places. These
important victories constituted the Battle of the Scarpe, 1918, in
which, beginning on the 26th August, the battle front was still further
widened and the British First Army also became involved. By the 3rd
September the Canadian Corps of the First Army and the XVII Corps of
the Third Army had carried the battle line forward through the famous
Drocourt-Quéant line, and the enemy had fallen back to the general line
of the Canal du Nord from its junction with the Sensée River, east of
Lécluse to Péronne.

During this hasty retirement large numbers of prisoners and vast
quantities of stores fell into our hands. In the extreme south the
French armies also continued to advance, and by the 6th September had
regained the line of the Crozat Canal at La Fère.

In the meantime the gradual relinquishment by the enemy of his advanced
positions in the Lys salient had begun on the 18th August, and the
retirement rapidly becoming general, he had been driven back by the 6th
September to the line Givenchy-Neuve Chapelle-Ploegsteert.

CHAPTER XXV

THE FINAL ADVANCE

III. _The 1/4th Battalion in the Battles of Cambrai and The Sambre,
1918_

The changes which the Battalion found at Boiry-Becquerelle in the
few days which had elapsed since its last rest there were truly
astonishing. The rapidity of the advance had released Boiry from risk
of bombardment by all except long range guns, and the necessity for
the supply services to keep pace with the fighting troops in their
progress eastward had already resulted in a complete metamorphosis
of the Boyelles-Boiry area. Already Boyelles Station was a hive of
industry, and trains were daily entering it from Arras with supplies.
In Boiry-Becquerelle itself, which had been in German hands till the
23rd August, the 1/4th Londons were able to enjoy the luxury of baths
and clean clothing on the 2nd September.

The few days' rest obtained here were passed pleasantly amid fine
weather in refitting and reorganisation; and the Battalion was
fortunately able on the 4th September to commemorate the fourth
anniversary of its departure from England. Companies were now commanded
as follows: A by Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C.; B by Capt. L. L. Watts,
M.M.; C by Capt. C. L. Henstridge, M.C.; and D by Capt. T. B. Cooper,
M.C., M.M.

About this time the Battalion Transport, which had been stationed at
Boisleux St Marc, was divided into two echelons, of which A was the
fighting and B the supply portion. These two echelons were respectively
commanded by Lieut. G. V. Lawrie, M.C., and Lieut. G. E. Stanbridge.
Although as a rule the two portions moved together, they were each
self-contained and ready to operate separately in case of a sudden and
rapid advance.

In the meantime the remainder of the XVII Corps was busily chasing
the enemy through Quéant, Pronville and down the Arras-Cambrai Road
to a point between Villers-lez-Cagnicourt and Buissy. After a warning
order to the 56th Division to move forward again into the Corps area
of battle, arrangements were suddenly changed--as on numerous other
occasions--and on the 5th September the Division was transferred to the
XXII Corps (Godley) of the First Army, with orders to relieve the 1st
Division in the line.

East of Vis-en-Artois and south of Douai is a stretch of country well
watered by numerous streams, and intersected by many ponds and marshes.
At Eterpigny the Cojeul and Sensée Rivers join, and thus augmented the
Sensée expands at Etaing into what is practically a chain of lakes.
Augmented by the Trinquis River and connected by it to the Scarpe, the
Sensée flows eastward past Lécluse, Palluel and Aubigny-au-Bac. At
Palluel it receives on its right, or south, bank the equally marshy
streams of the Agache and the Hirondelle and is intersected by the
northern extremity of the Canal du Nord, which here links up with the
Canal de la Sensée. This last-named Canal runs southward from Douai to
Arleux and then turning eastward down the river valley joins the Canal
de l'Escaut. The whole area thus constitutes a thoroughly complicated
system of waterways and marshes which form barriers of very great
natural strength to an advance.

The Sensée marshes from Etaing to Palluel had formed the left flank of
the Canadian Corps advance in its break through the Drocourt-Quéant
line during the Battle of the Scarpe, and now formed a natural
defensive flank, facing northwards, to our advanced positions on
the Canal du Nord. In this area the 56th Division relieved the 1st
Division. On the evening of the 7th September, after a a halt of one
night at Vis-en-Artois, the 1/4th Londons took over the positions of
the 2nd Royal Sussex on a front from Eterpigny Wood to a point east of
Etaing. The line was continued to Lécluse by the Kensingtons and thence
by the 169th Brigade.

The Battalion was now in country which hitherto had been in German
hands for the whole of the War, and the devastated area was left
behind. Villages were still standing and houses furnished. Indeed,
the civilians had still been in occupation of them during the battle
but had now been moved to the rear by the French Mission. Trenches in
the ordinary sense were here non-existent and the front was held by
a series of outposts along the line of the Sensée with sentry posts
dug in small pits behind the cover of trees and bushes. D, B, and C
Companies were in line, with A and Headquarters on the hill above
Etaing.

Life in this sector was comparatively uneventful. The defences were
improved and a great deal of useful patrolling work carried out in
the endeavour to locate fords or other means of crossing the swamps
in front. For his excellent reconnaissances and reports Sergt. Heyes,
M.M., received commendation.

The previous occupants of the line had evidently been cautious in the
use of their transport in forward areas, for rations and stores were
dumped each night at a cross-road about 2000 yards in rear of the line;
a course involving the nightly labours of some 70 men for carrying
duties. The 1/4th Londons altered this and had limbers at night up to
the front line without any mishap, thus saving an immense amount of
fatigue and trouble to everyone.

After reorganising the outpost line to a strength of two companies
the Battalion handed over its positions on the evening of the 12th
September to the 1st Londons (167th Brigade), and concentrating at St
Rohart Factory on the Arras-Cambrai Road were 'bussed back to Feuchy
where they occupied shelters in Battery Valley, an area which a month
previously they had held as a front line!

In this area a good deal of useful training with rifle and Lewis gun
was put in, and a friendly boxing tournament with the London Scottish
one evening afforded a pleasant relaxation. The Battalion was here
joined by a large draft of officers, including Lieuts. A. Bath and T.
R. Fletcher, and 2/Lieuts. Bradley, R. D. Bushell, J. Coley, P. W.
Green and S. P. Ferdinando; and 2/Lieut. S. W. Neville (7th Londons)
attached.

Lieut. E. P. M. Mosely's diary for this period affords an excellent
illustration of the care taken to maintain the discipline of the
Battalion at a high standard by the application of "peace-time" methods
whenever the situation allowed:

... This sound principle was the means of preventing officers
and men from degenerating into the "Ole Bill" type--a type which
probably existed nowhere except in caricature. At Feuchy the
Battalion was resting. The enemy had been swept back and had
left just a desolate landscape, a smashed railway bridge and a
collection of shell holes. The accommodation for officers and
men consisted of holes in the ground roofed with tarpaulins and
cuttings in the embankment which carried what was left of the
railway line.

Notwithstanding the entire lack of civilised comforts, at 7.30 in
the evenings, standing on the battered arch of the bridge which
once carried the line over Spider Corner, a Battalion bugler would
sound "Dress for Mess." Officers would then scurry into their
holes and half an hour later emerge in slacks, well-groomed, and
enter the mess, a white-washed elephant shelter, and partake of a
five-course dinner with all customary mess etiquette.

On the 19th September the 168th Brigade returned to the line. The Corps
boundaries were being now rearranged and the 56th Division was being
side-stepped to its right, a change which was effected by handing over
a portion of its left to the 4th Division and extending its right over
the front hitherto held by the 3rd Canadian Division. The additional
frontage on the right was allotted to the 168th Brigade, which, after
the relief, held a sector east of Ecourt St Quentin, with the London
Scottish on the right and the 1/4th Londons on the left. The Brigade's
left flank was secured by the 167th Brigade, which, facing north-east,
held the area from Ecourt St Quentin to Lécluse.

The 1/4th Londons' sector consisted of a line of outposts some 500
yards west of the Canal du Nord, of which both banks were held in
force by the Germans, from the Sauchy-Cauchy Road on the right, as far
as Mill Copse (inclusive to the enemy), where the line bent back and
facing north-east lay astride the Hirondelle River, the village of
Ecourt St Quentin being inclusive to us. This line of outposts was held
by two companies with Headquarters in a cottage east of Osvillers Lake,
while two companies were in support in front of Rumaucourt.

The Battalion was unfortunate on the night of the relief in losing
2/Lieut. A. Cartmell, wounded, while 2/Lieut. S. W. Neville was killed
early the following morning.

Like the Etaing area, this sector was marshy and intersected in all
directions by dykes and streams. On the opposite bank of the Canal, the
right flank around Sauchy-Cauchy was equally swampy; but opposite the
centre and left the whole of our area was well under observation from a
considerable hill on which stood Oisy-le-Verger--looking like a second
Monchy--and the Bois de Quesnoy.

In this sector the artillery on both sides was continually active,
though on the enemy's part activity was chiefly confined to
counter-battery work. The Battalion was especially active at night in
conducting reconnaissances of the ground in front, and some useful
information was obtained. Very little was seen of the enemy's infantry,
though on two nights he succeeded by stealth in stealing the garrison
of one of our advanced posts, his second attempt being rendered
successful by the artifice of approaching the post in the guise of
deserters.

We must now turn for a moment to the general situation and must briefly
consider once more the results achieved by the Battles of Bapaume and
of the Scarpe in order to appreciate the further development of the
offensive.

In commenting on the achievements of the British Armies in the Battle
of Bapaume Sir Douglas Haig in his despatches draws attention to the
steady deterioration of the enemy's morale and the increasing lack of
organisation in his defence:

The urgent needs of the moment, the wide extent of front attacked
and consequent uncertainty as to where the next blow would fall,
and the extent of his losses, had forced the enemy to throw in
his reserves piecemeal as they arrived on the battle front. On
many occasions in the course of the fighting elements of the same
German division had been identified on widely separated parts of
the battle front.

In such circumstances a sudden and successful blow, of weight
sufficient to break through the northern hinge of the defences
on which he was to fall back, might produce results of great
importance.

This anticipation of the Commander-in-Chief was amply fulfilled by the
rapid retreat of the enemy towards the Hindenburg line during the first
week of September after the close of the Battle of the Scarpe.

After hard fighting at Havrincourt and Epéhy during the third week of
September the enemy was definitely within his Hindenburg defences as
far north as Havrincourt, north of which he had been pushed beyond them
to the line of the Canal du Nord. On the 12th September the Americans
drove the enemy out of the St Mihiel salient, and it was decided in
discussion between Sir Douglas Haig and Marshal Foch that as soon as
possible four vigorous and simultaneous attacks should be launched: by
the Americans in the direction of Mézières; by the French in Argonne
with the same general objectives; by the British in the direction of
Maubeuge; and by Belgian and Allied Forces in Flanders towards Ghent.

By these attacks, says Sir Douglas Haig, it was expected that the
important German forces opposite the French and Americans would be
pressed back upon the difficult country of the Ardennes while the
British thrust at their main communications.

The long continued blows delivered by the British Armies, although
enormously successful, had placed a great strain on the troops, and
their losses, though small in proportion to the enemy's and to the
results achieved, were in the aggregate considerable. The Hindenburg
positions were known to be strongly defended, and an unsuccessful
attack on them would have a serious political effect and inevitably
revive the declining German morale. An important crisis in the War
had been reached and it was essential that the success of the British
in this new attack should be decisive. After weighing the various
considerations involved Sir Douglas Haig states:

... I was convinced that the British attack was the essential
part of the general scheme and that the moment was favourable.
Accordingly I decided to proceed with the attack....

The battle, which opened on the British front on the 27th September
(Battle of Cambrai, 1918), culminated on the 5th October in the capture
of all the Hindenburg trenches and of such isolated trench systems as
lay in rear of it.

The part of the 56th Division in this great battle was the crossing
of the Canal du Nord. This strong natural obstacle was considered to
be too stubbornly held to yield to frontal attack on a wide area; and
the general plan was therefore for the Canadian Corps to cross it on a
narrow front north of Mœuvres and then spreading out fanwise to extend
the gains north and south on the east bank.

The 1st Canadian Division, on the left of the Canadian Corps and
adjoining the right of the 56th Division, was to cross the Canal south
of the Arras-Cambrai Road and carry the line forward to Haynecourt.
After this the 56th Division, astride the Canal on a front as far east
as Sauchicourt Farm, with the 11th Division on its right, would attack
northwards towards Oisy-le-Verger and the Sensée River at Palluel.

The 56th Division attack was entrusted east of the Canal to the 169th
Brigade and west of it to the Kensingtons of the 168th Brigade. The
London Scottish and 1/4th Londons in line had thus the peculiar
experience of the attack actually crossing their front from right to
left.

At 5.30 a.m. on the 27th September the crash of the barrage announced
the opening of the Canadian Corps attack. The enemy's retaliation
was slight and had practically ceased by 6 a.m. The 1/4th Londons'
area was occupied by eight brigades of field guns engaged in firing
a flank barrage to the main attack until 2.48 p.m., when they were
to switch on a creeping barrage for the attack northwards along the
Canal. Additional flank protection was furnished by six companies of
machine-guns also in our area. In view of this heavy barrage and the
possibility of severe retaliation the 1/4th Londons' outpost line
was thinned out to two platoons in charge of Lieut. T. R. Fletcher,
the remainder of the front companies being withdrawn to the support
position.

The Canadian attack went well, but very stiff opposition was
encountered in Marquion, so that the 56th Division attack from the Blue
line had to be postponed from 2.48 p.m. to 3.28 p.m. Excellent work was
done by the 512th and 513th Field Companies, R.E. (56th Division), in
bridging the Canal at Marquion.

During the morning the 1/4th Londons' front seemed to be clear, and
an officer's patrol under 2/Lieut. O. C. Hudson was sent forward to
reconnoitre the enemy positions along the Agache River, which were
found to be unoccupied.

At 3.28 p.m. the Kensingtons commenced their attack and progressed
without difficulty as far as their first objective, the east and west
road through Sauchy-Cauchy. North of this, however, they were met with
stubborn resistance from machine-guns in Mill Copse and the marshes
east of the Canal. Owing to the restricted avenues of advance through
the marsh--there were only two possible routes to Mill Copse--the
Kensingtons' attack was checked at about 6.30 p.m. some 500 yards south
of the Copse. Excellent information was brought to Headquarters by
2/Lieut. A. M. Bullock as to the situation not only of the Kensingtons
but also of the 169th Brigade east of the Canal.

About 5.50 p.m. C and D Companies began to re-establish the almost
vacated outpost line, and later in the evening D Company was ordered to
endeavour to assist the Kensingtons by pushing through to the Agache
River and if possible by working round the Copse. By shortly after 11
p.m. reports were received that D Company had established four posts in
touch with the Kensingtons. Mill Copse, however, was still in the enemy
hands.

On the right of the Canal the 169th Brigade was also held up by
stubborn machine-guns, and it was not till 8 a.m. the following morning
that they were fully in possession of their final objective.

In view of the check on both banks the reserve company of the
Kensingtons was ordered to clear up the situation as soon as the moon
rose, and at 2 a.m. this company advanced astride the Canal as far as
Mill Copse, which it found unoccupied. The Kensingtons then organised
in depth, having reached their final objective at the surprisingly
small cost of nine other ranks wounded.

The prosecution of the advance was ordered for the 28th September, and
the 1/4th Londons were detailed to carry the 168th Brigade line forward
on the west bank of the Canal towards Palluel, while on the east the
169th Brigade was to advance to the Sensée River.

During the night Battalion Headquarters was persistently shelled from
its left rear by guns across the Sensée, with mustard gas.

At 9.30 a.m. D Company, with one platoon of A Company attached, began
the advance northward to Palluel in the narrow gut of land between the
Canal and the marshes and ponds of the Hirondelle River. Lieut.-Col.
Marchment, 2/Lieut. Bullock, Sergts. Randall and Heyes and a few
signallers followed in the attack, communication with Headquarters
being maintained by a running wire all the way. Very little opposition
was met with, and Capt. Cooper, with Lieut. Fletcher and 2/Lieut.
Millstead, was soon established on the bridges at Palluel, where touch
was gained with C Company and with patrols of the 8th Middlesex (167th
Brigade) which occupied the village and advanced beyond it towards
Arleux.

The whole 168th Brigade front being now confined to this narrow tongue
of land its area was handed over to the 167th Brigade, and the 1/4th
Londons withdrew to reserve positions at Rumaucourt. This move was
completed by 9.15 p.m. on the 28th September.

This successful operation had been effected at very slight loss, the
total casualties of the Division having been only 341 all ranks, while
the 1/4th London losses for the whole of September were the happily
small total of 30 other ranks in addition to the two officers already
mentioned.

During these two days' fighting the 11th Division on the right had
also met with considerable success, and on the evening of the 30th
September the 168th Brigade was ordered back to the line to take
over the positions gained by the left Brigade (the 34th) of the 11th
Division. The advanced positions, which extended from the sharp bend
in the Sensée Canal south of Brunemont on the left to a point opposite
Aubencheul-au-Bac on the right, were occupied by the London Scottish
and the Kensingtons.

The 1/4th Londons, who marched from Rumaucourt at 9 p.m. on the 30th
September, relieved the 2nd Manchester in the support area, on the high
ground south of Oisy-le-Verger and east of Sauchy-Lestrée.

The dispositions in this area were far from good, all the companies
being rather mixed up in the railway cutting near the Bois des
Puits; and on the following day Lieut.-Col. Marchment effected a
redistribution of the Battalion, moving C and D Companies to Cemetery
Wood and B Company to Battalion Headquarters near the Aubencheul Road,
while A Company remained at the Bois des Puits. For five days the
Battalion was busily employed in nightly working parties, digging a
line of support posts across the ridge south of Oisy-le-Verger as far
east as the old German dump at the cross-roads towards Epinoy. This
dump proved to be a rather popular spot for it was found to be amply
supplied with large bottles of Seltzer water. Probably a good number of
these was taken on unofficial charge of the Battalion.

On the evening of the 5th October the 1/4th Londons took over the
right subsection from the London Scottish, on the slope of the hill
overlooking Aubencheul and the railway triangle. Hostile activity was
slight on the 6th October, and from observation it seemed that the
enemy was holding Aubencheul very lightly; in the afternoon orders
were received to test the situation with patrols and if possible
to penetrate the village and occupy the Canal bank north of it.
Considerable fires observed during the morning in Aubigny-au-Bac
contributed to the supposition that the vacation by the enemy of
Aubencheul, if not already accomplished, was at least imminent.

B Company (Lieut. H. F. Dade) was detailed for the work, and at 7 p.m.
No. 7 Platoon, with Lieut. A. M. Bullock, Intelligence Officer, and 4
Headquarters scouts attached, left advanced Battalion Headquarters to
try to enter the village and reach the railway bridge over the Canal.
The other platoons stood in readiness to move forward if required. By
10.15 p.m. information was received that the platoon was in the village
without having met with any of the enemy, and accordingly Nos. 5 and
8 Platoons were at once ordered to move forward to form posts at the
railway crossing and the Aubigny-au-Bac Road bridge and to find touch
with the 11th Division on the right. These operations were successfully
accomplished, though the enemy gave evidence of his occupation of the
north end of the bridges.

By 4 a.m. on the 7th October the occupation of the village was complete
with two platoons which were in touch with the 2nd Yorkshires (4th
Division) on the right, one platoon in the railway cutting south of the
village and one still in the old outpost line. No casualties had been
sustained.

The following day the 1/4th Londons took over the whole Brigade front,
C Company (Capt. C. L. Henstridge, M.C.) on the right, A Company (Capt.
L. L. Watts, M.M.) in the centre and D Company (Lieut. T. R. Fletcher)
on the left. B Company (Lieut. H. F. Dade) was withdrawn to support.
The outposts consisted of a line of sentry posts on the Canal with a
line of resistance about 400 yards in rear. A reserve line was occupied
on the spurs overlooking the Canal north and east of Oisy-le-Verger.
Company Headquarters were located in captured German battery positions,
and D Company became the possessors of a complete battery of 8-inch
German howitzers which had been taken on the 27th September.

* * * * *

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1918. THE CANAL DU NORD]

The first phase of the great British offensive may now be said to have
been brought to a conclusion. In the nine days' fighting between the
27th September and the 5th October, the First, Third and Fourth Armies
had shattered the enemy's last prepared lines of defence. The line
of the Canal du Nord had been crossed and left far behind, and the
whole of the main Hindenburg defences were in our hands. "The effect
of the victory," writes Sir Douglas Haig in his despatches, "on the
subsequent course of the campaign was decisive." The threat to the
enemy's communications was now direct and instant, for nothing but the
natural obstacles of a wooded and well-watered countryside lay between
our Armies and Maubeuge.

In this fighting 30 British and 2 American infantry divisions and 1
British cavalry division had met and defeated 39 German divisions at a
loss to the enemy of 36,000 prisoners and 380 guns!

The effect of the advance of our Armies on this front now rendered
the enemy's positions in the Lys area precarious. Already on the 28th
September the Second Army, attacking on a wide front about Ypres, had
carried forward our positions in one day a greater distance than had
been gained in the whole of the dreary struggles for Passchendaele
in 1917. By the 1st October Messines had again been liberated and
our troops were approaching Gheluve and Werwicq. On the 2nd October
the enemy initiated a general withdrawal on the front from Lens to
Armentières.

We have now to follow the course of the second phase of the British
advance--the final phase of the War. In this great operation the Fourth
and Third Armies and the right of the First Army advanced with their
left flank on the Canal from Cambrai to Mons and their right flank
covered by our French Allies.

* * * * *

The first stage of this series of battles opened on the 8th October
with a vast drive by the Third and Fourth Armies in the direction of
Le Cateau. The success of the operation was complete, but we are only
concerned with the point that it involved the fall of Cambrai on the
9th October.

This continued advance of the British in the south exposed in
increasing measure the flank of the enemy north of the Sensée, and
great developments were therefore to be expected shortly in the XXII
Corps area. Already the enemy was reported to be withdrawing from his
positions in the corner between the Canal de la Sensée and the Canal
de l'Escaut, which had been crossed by the Canadians as far north as
Ramillies; and to relieve the 11th Division to pursue this movement
the 168th Brigade extended its right with the Kensingtons as far as
Fressies, which village was to be occupied immediately after the
completion of the relief. This was on the 9th October.

The possibility of an early German retirement north of the Sensée also
called for great vigilance, and the 1/4th Londons were ordered to probe
the situation towards Brunemont and Aubigny-au-Bac, while units of the
167th Brigade were feeling towards Arleux.

The only way to cross the Canal, short of swimming or using a boat,
was to use the ruined iron bridges at Aubencheul and Abbaye-du-Verger
Farm, and accordingly small patrols, covered by parties on the south
bank, began to cross the bridges at about 5 p.m. on the 9th October.
Results were soon obtained. At Aubencheul the enemy was alert and the
patrol was driven back. At the Farm crossing A Company obtained more
success. A post of the enemy about 12 strong was discovered on the
Brunemont Road north of the Canal, and these, after firing a few shots,
fled, though one of them was captured by Sergt. R. C. Clammer, D.C.M.,
M.M., after which the patrol returned. The prisoner was from the 103rd
I Regiment, and was a destitute wretch, wearing cap, jacket, trousers
and boots--and nothing else. Unfortunately, Capt. Watts was killed by a
stray bullet while returning to his company headquarters.

The same evening the 1/4th Londons were relieved by the 8th Middlesex
(167th Brigade) and withdrew to Brigade support in shelters west of
Epinoy. At the same time the Kensingtons and London Scottish effected
the extension to the right of the Divisional line above referred to.

Early on the morning of the 11th October the Kensingtons launched a
completely successful attack on Fressies and advanced the Brigade
line to the Canal at a loss to themselves of only 10 casualties. In
the meantime the advance of the VIII Corps north of the Sensée River
had driven the enemy from Vitry-en-Artois and was now being directed
towards Douai. To assist in this development the 56th Division
artillery was ordered to keep under fire the crossings over the
northern arm of the Sensée Canal, while the infantry made persistent
endeavours to establish themselves beyond the Canal de la Sensée with
a view to exerting pressure on the retiring enemy's left flank. On
the 12th the 167th Brigade completed the clearance of Arleux which
had been initiated by the Canadians, and occupied the Canal triangle
south-east of the village. The following day the 169th Brigade occupied
Aubigny-au-Bac after a sharp fight, but a vigorous counter-attack
later threw them back to the Canal bank. In this fighting magnificent
devotion was displayed by the Royal Engineers in bridging the Canal
under heavy fire.

By the 16th October the 4th Canadian Division had taken over the
Divisional line and the 56th Division withdrew into Army reserve.

The 1/4th Londons were relieved in the Brigade support area by the
1/2nd Londons on the 11th October and passed into Divisional reserve at
Rumaucourt, where several days of very welcome rest were obtained.

Both Rumaucourt and Ecourt-St Quentin were still comparatively unharmed
and partly furnished. Everywhere were signs of the German occupation.
The chief anxiety of the enemy occupants seems to have been fear of
British aeroplanes, for every cellar had its capacity plainly written
on the door, while large warning bells or "Flieger Alarum" were fixed
in all prominent places. In Ecourt-St Quentin were three German field
hospitals which afforded unmistakable evidence that the enemy was
hard up for bandages, for in place of these he seemed to have used
old curtains and paper. An abundant quantity of old civilian clothing
was also found here, and rumour has it that the doctor was seen one
day sporting an excellent top hat. B Company lived in one of these
hospitals and had an excellent time with a grand piano. These good
Bosche institutions afforded an opportunity of bathing, of which
advantage was taken by the whole Battalion.

During the foregoing spell of active work the Battalion transport had
been located near Wancourt. "One day in October," writes Lieut.-Col.
Marchment, "a deputation of Company Q.M.-Sergts. appeared at Orders
with a request that they might take it in turns to come up with
the rations, A and C one night, B and D the next. To this I gladly
consented when, looking at the map, I found that they were walking and
riding some twenty-six miles a night!"

On the afternoon of the 14th October the Battalion marched to
Marquion--till the 27th September in German hands--to entrain for a
rest at Arras. The train was due out at 3 p.m., but as things turned
out there was no occasion for hurry, since owing to a smash at Boisleux
the train did not reach Marquion till 11 p.m. A weary but happy
Battalion entrained, confidently expecting to wake up in Arras, but the
advent of morning brought no change of scene. The train had not moved
an inch! However, in due course the line was cleared and the train
gaily rattled over the battlefields of Quéant, Croisilles and Boyelles,
and reached Arras by 11.30 a.m. on the 15th. The 1/4th Londons were
quartered in comfortable billets in the Rue d'Amiens.

The rest in Arras, with which charming little city the Battalion had
been so frequently associated, was probably the most enjoyable that
fell to its lot in the whole War. To start with, everyone was in the
highest spirits born of the knowledge of their own recent successes in
action and of their confidence for the battles to come. Food was good
and plentiful. The civilians were returning and shops were beginning to
open once again.

Here the Battalion experienced the first visible effects of what the
liberation of France meant to the French. Refugees from the liberated
villages towards Cambrai were being sent back for safety to Arras,
where they were housed in the Schramm Barracks till the French Mission
was able to arrange to settle them in other parts of France. Streams of
homeless women and children drifted through the streets, clinging to a
few treasured objects of their personal belongings, and our men stood
at the street corners deeply impressed by such heartrending scenes.
Shamefacedly, as if fearful of disclosing the depth of their emotion to
their comrades, the men would beg the refugees to be allowed to carry
their parcels for them. Three men of one company took complete charge
of a distressed family and piloted them to a house where they settled
the poor folks, lit a fire for them, bought eggs with their own money,
scrounged some bully beef, and then fled to avoid the thanks of their
grateful charges.

The average Cockney is not in the habit of wearing his heart on his
sleeve. Rather does he conceal his emotion beneath the cloak of
"grousing," but scenes of desolation such as these--far more affecting
than the sight of a ruined countryside--brought out all the wonderful
chivalry which has endeared the simple British soldier to the hearts of
the French. "It was only in censoring letters home," writes an officer,
"that one realised how deeply touched our men were by the sufferings
of the civilians." Of all these saddening sights probably the most
dreadful was at the Hôpital St Jean, where little mites of French
children were dying of gas poisoning, and old people lying demented
by the horrors through which they had passed. To alleviate these
sufferings everything possible was done, and our own R.A.M.C. orderlies
worked side by side with the French Sisters of Mercy.

One afternoon the Commanding Officer gave permission for the drums to
play to the refugees. The performance concluded with the Marseillaise,
the glorious strains of which, not heard for four long years, so
overcame the audience that in the intensity of their emotion old men,
women and children fell upon the drummers and kissed them--much to the
embarrassment of those good-natured fellows.

Some excellent training meanwhile was being obtained on the racecourse
at Dainville, and several rifle competitions were introduced to add to
the keenness of the men. The Battalion was largely reclothed and much
done to improve its excellent parade discipline. On the 21st October
a Guard of Honour was provided, consisting of 100 all ranks under
Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C., for President Poincaré, who was visiting
Arras--"the finest Guard the Division ever turned out," as Faulkner
described it. The identity of this distinguished visitor remained for a
long time shrouded in mystery, and curiosity reached fever-pitch. The
Mess decided that the only way to deal with the problem was to have a
sweepstake, in which the names of the Prince of Wales, M. Clemenceau,
General Smuts, Marshal Foch and the Lord Nozoo (representing The Field)
were included. Captain Williams' return was awaited with breathless
anxiety, but, alas, in the dark he had failed to solve the mystery. The
Mess paid out on M. Clemenceau--he being apparently the nearest to the
distinguished visitor who actually arrived.

During this rest at Arras the Battalion was joined by Capts. H.
W. Spiers and D. S. Boorman, M.C. (to command B and C Companies
respectively), and by Lieuts. E. G. Dew and H. D. Rees, the latter
being appointed Assistant-Adjutant. Regimental Sergt.-Major Jacques,
who was returning to England in training for Quartermaster, was
replaced by Sergt.-Major Wilson, who had been wounded at Ypres in 1917.
The strength of the Battalion was now 38 officers and 721 other ranks.

* * * * *

The latter half of October had seen most rapid and important changes
on the British battle front, to which we must refer briefly. The
success of the attack towards Le Cateau in the early days of the month
had been complete and had driven the enemy back to the line of the
Selle River. This enabled G.H.Q. to initiate the second stage of this
last phase of the War, which was to force the enemy from the Selle
River back to the general line Sambre Canal--western edge of Forêt de
Mormal--Valenciennes. The occupation of this line would enable the
British Armies to launch their final attack on Maubeuge.

The Battle of the Selle was opened by the Fourth Army on the 17th
October, the fight gradually involving the Third and First Armies in
succession. By the 20th October the enemy had been driven across the
Sambre as far north as Catillon, Le Cateau was occupied, and the Selle
River left two miles behind our advanced positions. The main attack
developed on the 23rd October, and by the end of the following day
the enemy was driven on to the western edge of the Forêt de Mormal,
the outskirts of Le Quesnoy had been reached, and the lateral railway
connecting Le Quesnoy with Valenciennes had been crossed on a front
of about four miles. This latter portion of the success was on the
front of the XXII and Canadian Corps of the First Army. The Selle
River Battle resulted in the capture of 20,000 prisoners and 475 guns,
and in the defeat of 31 German divisions by 25 British and 2 American
divisions.

On other parts of the front successes had been equally striking. Laon
had fallen to the French on the 13th October. In Belgium, Menin,
Thorout and Ostend had been occupied in rapid succession, and by the
20th October the Allied line rested on the Dutch frontier. This advance
in the extreme north had the effect of turning the defences of Lille,
which was encircled and occupied on the 18th October, after which a
steady advance brought our troops to the line of the Scheldt north of
Valenciennes to Avelghem.

The critical condition of the Germans is summed up by Sir Douglas Haig
in his despatches:--

By this time the rapid succession of heavy blows dealt by the
British forces had had a cumulative effect, both moral and material
upon the German Armies.... His reserves of men were exhausted....
The capitulation of Turkey and Bulgaria and the imminent collapse
of Austria--consequent upon Allied successes which the desperate
position of her own armies in the western front had rendered
her powerless to prevent--had made Germany's military situation
impossible. If her armies were now to be allowed to withdraw
undisturbed to shorter lines the struggle might still be protracted
over the winter. The British Armies, however, were now in a
position to prevent this by a direct attack upon a vital centre
which should anticipate the enemy withdrawal and force an immediate
conclusion.

A necessary preliminary to the final attack was the capture of
Valenciennes itself, and this was accomplished on the 1st November.
The XXII Corps, advancing on a front of six miles to the south of
the city, crossed the Rhonelle River, and occupied the high ground
overlooking the valley of the Aunelle River, while the Canadians
entered Valenciennes and pushed on to the east of it.

* * * * *

On the 31st October the 56th Division rejoined the XXII Corps in the
battle area, and the battalions of the 168th Brigade embussed from
Arras to Douchy (two miles south of Denain). For a couple of days the
1/4th Londons remained here in very fair billets, receiving a most
hearty welcome from the inhabitants, who had been for four years under
the heel of the enemy.

At 8 a.m. on the 2nd November the Battalion marched about five miles
forward to the staging area at Maing, which it reached at about 11.30
a.m., and that evening advanced again at short notice and relieved the
4th K.O.Y.L.I. (49th Division) in advanced positions facing Saultain,
the relief being completed by 2 a.m. on the 3rd November. The advance
was led by D Company, which came under heavy shell fire when passing
through Famars, and lost 4 men killed and 14 wounded.

The 168th Brigade section which was the left of the Divisional front,
the 169th being on the right, was held with the Kensingtons and 1/4th
Londons in the line. D Company occupied small sections of trenches in
the front line some 500 yards west of the Château de Saultain, while A,
B and C Companies were held back in a sunken road south-east of Aulnoy.

Lieut.-Col. Marchment was now in command of the 168th Brigade, General
Loch having gone to hospital, and the Battalion was temporarily under
Major R. B. Marshall, with Captain T. B. Cooper, M.C., M.M., acting as
second in command. Battalion Headquarters opened in Aulnoy.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE, 1918]

About the time of the relief it became apparent that the enemy had
retired again opposite the Canadians on our left and was about to do so
on our own front. At 10.35 a.m. a wire was received in the Battalion
stating that the Canadians had entered Estreux, and ordering the
Battalion to push strongly supported patrols through Saultain as far as
the Ferme du Moulin. D Company moved forward at 11.15 a.m., supported
by A Company, and entered Saultain which was found to be unoccupied
except for four men of the 109th Infantry Regiment who were taken
prisoners. By two o'clock the Ferme du Moulin was occupied with very
little opposition and Battalion Headquarters advanced to the Château de
Saultain. On the right the Kensingtons had also pressed forward towards
the cemetery of Curgies, and touch was obtained with them and with the
4th Canadian Division on the left. This advance--over 2000 yards--was
consolidated by the 1/4th Londons, while two squadrons of Australian
Light Horse and a company of New Zealand cyclists endeavoured to
push forward during the evening to secure the crossings of the River
Aunelle. Their attempt, however, was checked about 1000 yards in
front of the infantry by enemy machine-gun fire, and in this position
the progress for the day was concluded, the Kensingtons occupying
with the cavalry and cyclists the advanced line, which extended in a
north-westerly direction from the cross-roads at Le Talandier. That
night the 1/4th Londons' position was held with D and A Companies in
front and B and C Companies in support.

The immediate resumption of the advance being ordered by XXII Corps,
arrangements were made by 56th Division with the adjoining divisions
to pursue the attack at 6 a.m. the following morning, 4th November,
each division operating independently. Orders for this advance did not
reach the 1/4th Londons, who were detailed for the attack on the 168th
Brigade front, till 1 a.m., and there was thus no more than enough
time to assemble the companies close in rear of the line held by the
Kensingtons. For reconnaissance there was no time at all. The attack
was delivered on a two-company front by B Company on the right and A
Company on the left, each moving in square formation of platoons with
a screen of scouts and cavalry patrols in front. C and D Companies
followed in diamond formation at a distance of about 200 yards. The
objective was given as the high ground across the River Aunelle about
500 yards east of Sebourquiaux.

The morning dawned mistily, but in this case the mist was not
altogether a disadvantage. The whole of this countryside was a swelling
waste of stubble fields with practically no landmarks, but fortunately
a line of telegraph poles going due east which was visible through the
mist enabled the leading companies to keep their direction well--a
great stroke of luck, as the advance lay up hill and down dale over
this barren land for some 2000 yards before the crest of the Aunelle
Valley was reached, and the objective was for a long time out of sight.
The mist thus served to conceal the advance from the enemy till the
leading companies breasted the hill overlooking Sebourquiaux itself,
and started descending the slope to the village.

The Aunelle River is hereabouts spanned by three bridges, one at
Sebourg, one at Sebourquiaux, and one at Le Pissot, north of the latter
village. These had already been secured by the cavalry patrols who
had, however, been unable to make progress across the river. As the
leading companies began to drop down the hill towards the village the
mist partly cleared, and the German machine-gunners opened a heavy
fire. The leading companies at once dashed down the hill into the
cover of the scattered houses and streets which form the outskirts of
Sebourquiaux on the west bank of the river; but here they seemed to
have fallen into a trap for the enemy at once dropped a barrage of
considerable intensity, shells of all calibres falling thick and fast.
Forward progress was impossible, and B Company on the right therefore
promptly worked round the right flank, crossing the river at Sebourg,
and then, turning northward toward Sebourquiaux, cleared the village of
the enemy machine-gunners. In the meantime A Company had been heavily
machine-gunned from the direction of Rombies, which continued to resist
the Canadian attack, and touch with the Canadians was lost.

B Company having cleared the way through the village, A Company was
able to cross the river, and together the two companies attempted
to force their way up the slope to the east of Sebourquiaux. The
machine-gun fire was too intense, and the companies had to fall back
to a line on the eastern outskirts of the village, where, joined by C
Company (in support), they began to consolidate their position. Touch
was obtained with the Queen's Westminsters of the 169th Brigade who had
cleared Sebourg on the right, but no connection could be obtained with
the Canadians who were still held up before Rombies on the left, and
A Company therefore threw a defensive flank astride the Aunelle River
facing northwards. The Battalion was now organised on the line which
had been gained, all companies having platoons on the forward positions
and finding their own supports. All day the village of Sebourquiaux
remained under heavy German shell fire, but at about 5.30 p.m. the
intensity of the enemy's fire increased and the work of destruction was
completed, hardly a house being left standing. A variegated display of
Véry lights which accompanied this barrage led to the expectation that
the enemy was organising a counter-attack, but no infantry movement on
the part of the Germans materialised.

The stiffness of the enemy resistance this day made it abundantly clear
that further progress could be made only by means of an organised
attack in co-operation with the divisions on either flank, and
arrangements for a further advance were promptly made.

That night the 1/4th Londons were relieved by the London Scottish
and withdrew in Brigade reserve to the high ground east of Estreux,
Headquarters remaining at the Ferme du Moulin. This relief was
completed at 3 a.m. on the 5th November, and at 5.30 a.m. the attack
was pursued by the London Scottish, with the Kensingtons in support and
the 1/4th Londons in reserve. By 6 a.m. the crest east of Sebourquiaux
had been gained and the enemy was retiring in the direction of Angre.

On the 169th Brigade front the enemy resistance was not severe, and by
7.30 a.m. the London Rifle Brigade had captured Angreau. The Canadians
had also occupied Rombies, but on the ridge between this village and
Angre the Germans continued to hold out in great force and to bring
very heavy machine-gun fire to bear on the left flank of the 168th
Brigade.

At 8 a.m. the 1/4th Londons were ordered forward, and by 11 a.m. the
companies, A, B, C and D in line from right to left, were in position
in the old German trenches east of Sebourquiaux, with Battalion
Headquarters in a farmhouse in the village. In this position the
Battalion was practically on the frontier of France and Belgium.

The advance was resumed by the London Scottish under a barrage at 4.15
p.m., and the line was advanced to within about 500 yards of Angre.
The enemy machine-gun fire again precluded the possibility of further
advance, and eventually a line was consolidated facing north-east in
touch with the 169th Brigade on the right and the Canadians on the left.

On the 6th November the attack was pursued by the London Scottish on
the right and the Kensingtons on the left, the 1/4th Londons again
being in support. Fierce fighting took place, particularly on the left
flank where the Kensingtons crossed the Grande Honnelle River, were
thrown back, and crossed it again. At the end of the day the leading
battalions were in possession of Angre, on the east bank of the Grand
Honnelle. The 1/4th Londons moved forward slightly from their positions
of the previous day but did not come into action.

The whole of these days were extremely wet, and not a man in the
Battalion had a scrap of dry clothing. Trenches were embryonic, and
shelters almost entirely lacking--of dugouts there were, of course,
none.

Shortly after midnight "Drake" Battalion of the 63rd (Royal Naval)
Division relieved the Battalion--the remainder of the Brigade also
being relieved--and it withdrew to tolerable billets in Sebourg. The
march to Sebourg was only about two miles, but every road was choked
with double and even treble lines of transport of all descriptions
waiting to follow up the advance. It had been waiting motionless since
the previous afternoon and did not get on the move again till 4 a.m.
the next morning. In these circumstances the march to Sebourg occupied
about four hours--a most unpleasant journey in which desultory shelling
by the enemy alternated with heated arguments with despairing transport
officers. Dawn, however, found the Battalion enjoying a good breakfast,
and drying its clothes, all its troubles forgotten, and every one
filled with justifiable satisfaction at the good work that had been
done.

This, the last fight of the 1/4th Londons, produced nine prisoners
and cost in casualties: 2/Lieut. A. M. Bullock, killed; 2/Lieut. G.
H. Sylvester, died of wounds; 2/Lieut. H. W. Taylor, wounded; and in
N.C.O.'s and men, 11 killed, 55 wounded and 1 missing.

From now onwards the 56th Division was fighting on a one-brigade
front, with the 167th leading, and the 1/4th Londons were engaged
in following up the advance by stages so as to be within supporting
distance of the leading troops. Nowhere was the enemy's opposition
more than trifling, and the advance proceeded rapidly, though under
conditions of some discomfort and difficulty. The line of the
Division's advance lay almost due east, roughly parallel to the
marshes about the Canal de Condé which connects the Canal de l'Escaut
with Mons, and the whole countryside is cut up by innumerable small
streams discharging northwards into the marsh area. The banks of these
streams are everywhere steep, and bridges had been systematically
destroyed by the retiring enemy who had also blown craters at almost
every road junction. It was an ideal country for a determined enemy to
fight a rearguard action, but the Germans' powers of resistance were
broken, and beyond the delays caused to the progress of our troops
by the wholesale destruction, opposition was negligible. The extreme
rapidity of the advance indeed made it almost impossible for the supply
services to keep pace, and the damage to the roads prevented lorries
from proceeding beyond the Grande Honnelle River till the necessary
repairs could be completed. The weather, moreover, had broken, and for
three days rain fell incessantly. But these discomforts were slight in
comparison with the enormous wave of enthusiasm which passed over all
the troops who had the good fortune to take part in this extraordinary
victory.

On the 7th November the line of the Bavai-Hensies Road was crossed,
and the following day the leading troops had reached the line Petit
Moronfait-Rinchon-Ferlibray. The 9th November saw the Mons-Maubeuge
Road crossed, and on the 10th the 1st Londons, who were leading,
captured Harveng, and after slight opposition pushed forward to
Harmignies.

The 1/4th Londons following up the advance moved on the 8th to Autreppe
and the following day to Blaugies. The band was now with the Battalion
and played on the march. This gave rise to most remarkable patriotic
demonstrations on the part of the liberated villagers who everywhere
greeted the Battalion with cries of "Vive l'Angleterre!" and showered
flowers on the troops, while crowds of children marched beside the band
cheering. The plight of these poor people was deplorable. The Germans
in their retirement had taken with them practically all food supplies
and utensils of every description. Scarcely the bare necessities of
life remained. All live stock had also been driven before them by the
retreating hordes of the enemy, but when the Battalion reached Blaugies
the presence of live stock in the village showed the ever-increasing
confusion and speed of the enemy's retirement. At this time the
Division was feeding some 16,000 civilians, on an allowance of one iron
ration to four people.

On the morning of the 10th November the 1/4th Londons continued
their almost triumphal progress to La Dessoue, but there being no
accommodation here, found billets in Sars-la-Bruyère, where an
overwhelming welcome was accorded them. In this village Sir Horace
Smith-Dorrien (II Corps) had had his Headquarters on the 23rd August
1914.

The Brigade Ammunition Column at this time was in charge of Lieut.
E. P. M. Mosely, whose diary illustrates the extraordinary spirit of
humour which carried the men through this period of hard work and
exposure. The Column reached Famars thoroughly tired out one wet
night at about midnight, and halted in rear of the advancing troops.
The civilians had been evacuated and the men rapidly made themselves
comfortable in some of the cottages. One of the transport drivers,
according to the immemorial custom of transport drivers, quickly began
to forage round, and attired himself in a top hat, white scarf and
frock coat, in which remarkable garb he put his head round the door and
said: "I've come for the rent!" This, after a hard night's work, shows
a spirit which takes a lot of damping.

It was in this advance also that the Column arrived in a battered
village late at night, thoroughly worn out and drenched to the skin.
The place was muddy, shell torn and desolate, and its exact whereabouts
on the map far from certain. The men began to picket their horses
and spread tarpaulins over their heaped-up stores, and afterwards
disconsolately to search for odd bits of timber in the endeavour to
construct some sort of shelter. The O.C. Column produced from a waggon
an antique arm-chair, which had somehow attached itself to the Column
at an earlier stage of the advance, and in this very much improvised
headquarters took up his station in the mud, when suddenly--the post
arrived! The Army Postal Service had throughout been so efficient as
to become almost a matter of course--but in this effort it surely
surpassed itself!

On the night of the 10th November the 56th Division was relieved by
the 63rd Division by whom the advance was to be pursued; but early
the following morning the news of the Armistice was received and the
troops stood fast. The record of this grand culmination of the years of
bloodshed is contained in the Battalion Official War Diary as follows:

Sars-la-Bruyère. 08.30. Bde. Memo. B.M. 971 received
11.11.1918. hostilities would cease at 1100.
The news had an unexpected
effect on the troops: everybody
appeared to be too dazed to
make any demonstration. Men
were much less cheerful than
they had been for some days.

11.00. Hostilities ceased.
Transport Personnel and
Nucleus rejoined Battn.

The vast Forêt de Mormal had been passed, Mons and Maubeuge had fallen,
and the German Army was divided into two parts, one on each side of the
natural barrier of the Ardennes.

In his Despatches Sir Douglas Haig sums up the situation on the morning
of the 11th November 1918 thus:

In the fighting since November 1st, our troops had broken the
enemy's resistance beyond hope of recovery, and had forced on him
a disorderly retreat along the whole front of the British Armies.
Thereafter the enemy was capable neither of accepting nor refusing
battle.... The strategic plan of the Allies had been realised with
a completeness rarely seen in war. When the Armistice was signed
by the enemy his defensive powers had already been definitely
destroyed. A continuance of hostilities could only have meant
disaster to the German Armies and the armed invasion of Germany.

A remarkable incident related by Lieut. Mosely occurred at
Sars-la-Bruyère the day following the Armistice.

The Mess Corporal proceeded to Mons to see if any green vegetables
could be procured. Returning from his mission through the streets
of Mons he saw a soldier untidily dressed and without puttees, but
wearing on his jacket the red circles which were the distinguishing
mark of the 1/4th Londons. Said the Corporal, "What are you doing
here?" "Looking for my Battalion," replied the man. The Corporal
demanded to know why the man had wandered so far from billets and
what he meant by being so untidily turned out. To his surprise
the soldier informed him that he had come from Germany. A few
more words and the Corporal realised that this was one of our own
men who had walked out of a German prison when the Armistice was
declared. Whipping up the wanderer into the Mess cart, he brought
him home, washed him and gave him a big meal. The poor fellow was
almost hysterical at being amongst his own once more. He was a man
of B Company who had been captured on the 28th March 1918, at Oppy.
"We gave him a strong dose of rum," writes Mosely, "and wrapped him
in warm blankets. By the next morning he had quite recovered, and
was asking for his pay!"

Thus ended the four years' war service of the 1/4th Londons, who at
the end of the campaign were within two miles of Malplaquet, where
Marlborough's great victory had been won two hundred years earlier.
It had the proud distinction of having finished its active service
within five miles of Mons, where the first British shot had been fired
in August 1914. Of the 1016 officers and men who had left England on
the 4th September 1914, only about 30 other ranks remained with the
Battalion which had done such glorious service on so many hard-fought
fields.

As a tribute to the many unrewarded acts of heroism of which there
have been so many examples during the War, a letter, relating to the
circumstances attending the death of No. 280872 Pte. S. Greenfield of
D Company on the 23rd August 1918, is preserved among the Battalion
records. This letter was sent by the Medical Officer, 178th Brigade,
R.F.A., who found Greenfield's body, to his relatives, from whom it was
received by the Commanding Officer. The following is an extract from
this letter, which is dated 24th August 1918:

... On searching the battlefield (Boyelles) I discovered the
body of your son Private S. Greenfield, No. 280872. He had died
fighting, killed outright by a machine-gun. I found him lying on a
German machine-gun which I have no doubt he intended to capture.
As no more dead were there and no other signs of a fight about the
machine-gun nest, I expect he rushed the machine-gunners himself. I
may remark the machine-gunners are dead also.

One of the survivors of the original Battalion was Flossie, a small,
brown Pomeranian dog. Flossie had served on the railway line in August
1914, had accompanied the Battalion to Malta and been successfully
smuggled into France in January 1915. Throughout the War she had
journeyed everywhere with the Battalion, and finally came home with
the Cadre in 1919. Her principal claim to distinction appears to be
that she succeeded in bringing a litter of puppies into a noisy and
muddy world in most of the leading towns and villages of Flanders.
Throughout she maintained a calm demeanour, and when her maternal
cares necessitated transport she rode with her young family in a basket
perched on one of the cookers.

On the 15th November a party of the Battalion, under Capt. H. N.
Williams, M.C., took part in the triumphal march through Mons, where
the troops were received with a tumultuous welcome.

There is little further to be said. The XXII Corps was excluded from
the Army of the Rhine and the Battalion remained in the Mons area,
training and indulging in educational experiments, while parties
visited the battlefields of Mons and Waterloo. Until the ravages of
demobilisation reduced the numbers too severely, the evenings were
enlightened by some of the Quartermaster's excellent orchestral
concerts, and by boxing tournaments in which the Battalion did
exceedingly well, Private Miller of the 1/4th Londons becoming XXII
Corps Feather-weight Champion.

On the 27th November the Battalion moved to billets in
Villers-sire-Nicole, near Maubeuge, and on the 6th March 1919 to Givry
and on the 18th March to Cuesmes (both near Mons), in all of which
places the routine of training and education was continued. Early in
the New Year the arrangements for demobilisation were put into active
operation, and rapidly the strength of the Battalion dwindled.

Among the first to leave was the padre, Rev. S. F. Leighton Green,
M.C., who had served continuously with the Battalion since December
1916. The padre left on the 13th February 1919, and his departure
was felt most keenly by every officer and man in the Battalion. His
constant selfless devotion to duty and his kindly personality had
made him a true friend to one and all, and the example of his simple
life and magnificent courage in action had been a real inspiration to
all--and that included the whole Battalion--who had been brought into
personal contact with him.

The break-up of the Battalion was the saddest thing which ever happened
to it. After so many months and years of good and bad times, and of
life in circumstances of such intimacy as can be attained only on
active service, the joy of departure for home was severely tempered by
the deepest emotion at leaving the comradeship of regimental life, and
few said good-bye to the Battalion without genuine sorrow.

By the beginning of May the Battalion was reduced to Cadre strength,
about 50 all ranks, Lieut.-Col. Marchment, D.S.O., M.C., remaining in
command, with Major T. B. Cooper, M.C., M.M., second in command.

On the 14th May 1919 the Cadre left Cuesmes, entraining at Jemappes for
Antwerp. After a few days in the embarkation camp it was played down
to the quay by the pipes of the Liverpool Scottish and embarked for
Tilbury, where it entrained for Newhaven. On the 21st May the Cadre
returned to London by train and was received at London Bridge Station
by the Lord Mayor (the Rt. Hon. Sir Horace Marshall, now Lord Marshall
of Chipstead, P.C., K.C.V.O., Hon. Colonel of the Regiment), who also
took the salute as the Cadre passed the Mansion House _en route_ for
Headquarters in Hoxton.

The Cadre was received at Headquarters by Lieut.-Col. H. Dade, V.D.,
Major G. H. M. Vine, T.D., and other officers of the Regiment, and
by the Mayor of Shoreditch (Councillor W. Girling), after which its
dispersal speedily followed.

Three weeks later the last remnants of the 1/4th Londons were scattered
to their homes, and the part played by the Regiment in the Great War
was at an end.

APPENDIX I

MALTA

The Dependency of Malta consists of a chain of islands, Gozo, Comino
and Malta, stretching from north-west to south-east, about 60 miles
from Sicily and about 180 from Africa. Malta itself is about 17½ miles
long and 8¼ broad, and, owing to its magnificent natural harbours, it
has been the coveted possession of the strongest nations on the sea for
the time being, ever since the dawn of maritime trade. These anchorages
are nearly all on the east coast of the island, and include--besides
the famous harbours of Valetta (the Grand Harbour on the south of the
city and the Marsamuscetto Harbour on the north)--the bays of Melleha,
St Paul's and Marsa Scirocco.

The population of Malta in 1907 was 206,690, and this phenomenal
congestion renders it largely dependent on imported foodstuffs. The
area under cultivation is comparatively small, and the fields are
composed of terraces by which the soil with enormous labour has been
walled up along the contours of the hills to prevent it from being
washed away. Viewed from the sea, therefore, the top of one wall
appearing above the next produces the barren effect to which reference
has been made in Chapter II; but the aspect of the land from the top
of the hills in winter and early spring is a beautiful contrast of a
profusion of greenness. The principal grain crops are maize, wheat and
barley. Vines are also cultivated though the fruit is sold as grapes
far more profitably than converted into wine. The chief industry is the
production of Maltese lace, which employs some 5000 women and children.
The principal resources of the island are derived from the fact of
its being an important military station and the Headquarters of the
Mediterranean fleet, the prolonged absence of which always produces
distress.

The Maltese language is Phœnician in origin, the popular idea that it
is composed largely of Arabic being erroneous. Until recent years the
language of the courts was Italian, in spite of the fact that this
language is unknown to 86 per cent, of the population.

Malta has had a most chequered history from the earliest times when
the Mediterranean was the centre of all civilisation and commerce. The
Phœnicians occupied the islands at a very early date, being followed
in the 6th century B.C. by the Carthaginians, and later by the Romans,
who regarded the Maltese not as conquered enemies but as allies.
On the final division of the Roman Dominions in A.D. 395, Malta was
assigned to the Empire of Constantinople, and during the next 500 years
suffered three Arab invasions, though these left little mark upon the
people either by language or by inter-marriage. In 1090 the Counts of
Normandy captured the island and finally expelled the Arabs, retaining
possession until 1265, when it passed into the hands of the Aragonese,
Kings of Sicily.

It was in 1530 that the most interesting period of Maltese history
commenced, for in that year the islands were granted by the Emperor
Charles V to the Knights of St John, who had been expelled from
Rhodes by the Turks; and some thirty years later the Knights of the
Order and the Christian Maltese combined under de Valette, the Grand
Master, whose name survives in the town of Valetta, in resisting the
last effort of the Mohammedan power to gain the ascendancy in the
Mediterranean. The Siege of Malta, which was most gallantly resisted by
the Knights, proved successful, and they remained, although _de jure_
owing allegiance to Sicily, _de facto_ masters of Malta, until they
were finally expelled in 1798 by the French under Napoleon, who used
the island as a base for his disastrous expedition to Egypt in that
year.

The staunch allegiance of the Maltese to the Church of Rome soon
brought them into conflict with the French, whose plundering of the
churches provoked a revolution in which the Maltese invoked the aid
of Nelson. The Treaty of Amiens, 1802, provided for the return of the
island to the Knights of Malta, but the Maltese, realising that this
would entail a revival of French influence, protested vigorously, with
the result that in 1814 the Treaty of Paris finally secured Malta to
the British Empire. Since this date the story of Malta has on the whole
been one of advancement in every direction.

The chief towns of the island are Valetta, the seat of government, and
Citta Vecchia (otherwise known as Notabile or Medina), the ancient
capital and stronghold; other places of importance being Musta,
Birchircara and Attard--all of which will be well remembered by all
ranks of the Regiment.

The head of the Government and Commander-in-Chief and Governor-General
was in 1914 General Sir Leslie Rundle, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
D.S.O.

The garrison consisted of three battalions of British Infantry, two
companies of Fortress Engineers, together with detachments of Royal
Garrison Artillery, Royal Army Medical Corps, Royal Army Service Corps,
and in addition two battalions of Malta Militia (Infantry), and the
Malta Artillery.

APPENDIX II

HONOURS AND DECORATIONS

NOTE.--This Honours List has been compiled from official sources, and
is believed to be accurate, but, owing to the manner in which honours
were announced in the _London Gazette_, its completeness cannot be
guaranteed.

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER

Capt. W. G. Clark _London Gazette_ 3. 7.15
2/Lieut. W. II. Webster " 12. 3.17
2/Lieut. (A/Capt.) G. E. A. Leake " 26. 7.17
2/Lieut. F. W. Walker. " 19.11.17
Lieut. (A/Capt.) A. M. Duthie " 4. 2.18
Lieut. (A/Capt.) C. J. Graham, M.C. " 11. 1.19

MOST EXCELLENT ORDER OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE (MILITARY DIVISION)

_Companion_--

Lieut.-Col. (Hon. Col.) Vickers _London Gazette_ 3. 6.19
Dunfee, V.D.

_Officers_--

Major L. T. Burnett " "
Hon. Lieut. and Q.M. W. J. Gragg. " "
Major S. Elliott " "
Major W. Moore " "
Major (A/Lieut.-Col.) H. P. L. Cart " 1. 1.20
de Lafontaine

MILITARY CROSS

2/Lieut. A. R. Moore. _London Gazette_ 23. 6.15
2/Lieut. J. R. Pyper. " 14. 1.16
2/Lieut. (Temp. Lieut.) G. L. Goodes " 3. 6.16
2/Lieut. S. J. Barkworth, M.M. " 14.11.16
2/Lieut. E. McD. McCormick " "
Rev. R. Palmer (C.F.) " "
Lieut. (A/Capt.) W. J. Boutall " 1. 1.17
2/Lieut. O. D. Garratt. " 4. 6.17
2/Lieut. D. S. Boorman " 25. 8.17
2/Lieut. (A/Capt.) S. Davis. " 27.10.17
Lieut. (Temp. Capt.) C. J. Graham " 1. 1.18
2/Lieut. E. L. Mills " 4. 2.18
2/Lieut. (A/Capt.) C. A. Clarke " 23. 4.18
Lieut. (A/Capt.) T. B. Cooper, M.M. " 22. 6.18
Lieut. (A/Capt.) A. M. Duthie, " "
D.S.O.
Lieut. (A/Capt.) S. G. Askham " 26. 7.18
Lieut. H. S. Daw " "
2/Lieut. W. Rosen " "
2/Lieut. G. C. Ewing " 16. 9.18
Lieut. (A/Capt.) A. G. Croll " 7.11.18
Rev. S. F. Leighton Green (C. F.). " 11. 1.19
2/Lieut. C. L. Henstridge " "
Lieut. (A/Capt.) G. H. Hetley " "
2/Lieut. A. Holloway. " "
2/Lieut. V. C. Prince. " "
2/Lieut. A. H. Millstead " 2. 4.19

BAR TO MILITARY CROSS

2/Lieut. (Temp. Capt.) G. L. _London Gazette_ 14.11.16
Goodes, M.C.
Lieut. (A/Capt.) C. J. Graham, M.C. " 26. 7.18
Lieut. (A/Capt.) J. R. Pyper, M.C. " 8. 3.19
Lieut. (A/Capt.) T. B. Cooper, M.C., " 2. 4.19
M.M.

DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL

2170 L/Cpl. G. L. Colomb _London Gazette_ 5. 8.15
217 L/Sergt. A. C. Ehren " "
1153 Cpl. W. J. Knowles " 14. 1.16
487 C.S.M. E. H. Risley " "
1054 C.S.M. R. Davis " 22. 9.16
4354 Pte. J. O'Brien " 14.11.16
3351 Pte. H. S. Payne " "
2163 Sergt. T. Clark " 1. 1.17
281267 Sergt. E. P. G. Brand " 25. 8.17
281477 Pte. F. Anthony " 19.11.17
282450 L/Cpl. F. Austin " "
282051 Pte. W. H. Bolton " "
295070 Pte. H. C. Bull " "
282496 Pte. J. Taylor " "
282444 Sergt. B. A. Watson " "
281972 L/Cpl. E. S. Brown. " 4. 3.18
280032 Sergt. G. Norris " "
282706 Pte. C. H. W. Roberts " "
280937 L/Cpl. T. H. Sankey " "
7261 R.S.M. J. O'Brien " 17. 4.18
283138 Cpl. B. Vaughan " 3. 6.18
281613 Cpl. C. E. Freeman " 26. 6.18
280019 C.S.M. T. Lock, M.M. " 3. 9.18
281718 Cpl. A. Martin " "
280079 Sergt. H. W. Moss " "
282171 L/Cpl. (A/Sergt.) H. F. Watson " 30.10.18
280605 Sergt. R. C. Clammer " 1. 1.19

MILITARY MEDAL

2144 Cpl. C. T. Coates _London Gazette_ 1. 9.16
3261 Pte. H. E. Hyde " "
3130 L/Cpl. H. Whitehead " "
1174 Cpl. J. Castle " 11.11.16
1899 Pte. C. F. Collins " "
2161 Pte. A. E. Colvin " "
2202 C.Q.M.-Sgt. R. Forbes " "
1854 Sergt. H. C. Gearle " "
4786 Sergt. R. Hebberd " "
2827 Pte. F. Hedger " "
2272 Sergt. C. James " "
1893 Pte. W. Lawrence " "
280019 Sergt. T. Lock " "
534 Sergt. H. H. Merrell " "
3586 L/Cpl. A. J. Moger " "
2216 L/Cpl. A. Sergeant " "
3579 L/Cpl. L. R. Webb " "
3662 Pte. W. Buckingham " 9.12.16
3113 Sergt. R. R. L. Hyde " 21.12.16
2105 Sergt. H. J. Cott " 19. 2.17
280102 Sergt. A. E. Gardiner " 17. 4.17
280308 Sergt. W. A. King " 11. 5.17
281020 Pte. C. H. Thomas " "
281204 Cpl. G. L. Rossington " 1. 6.17
283725 Pte. J. G. Turner " 18. 6.17
283371 Pte. J. Grierson " 18. 7.17
281242 Cpl. A. W. Lintott " "
282189 Sergt. H. S. Monk " "
282490 Pte. P. J. Olinski " "
282493 Pte. A. J. Selby " "
282152 Pte. C. W. Spence. " "
282344 L/Cpl. F. C. Spencer " "
283708 Pte. A. Thurkettle. " "
283836 L/Cpl. G. Coates " 21. 8.17
280930 Pte. W. Pratt " 18.10.17
283691 Pte. A. Robinson " "
283530 Pte. C. S. Ruel " "
280894 L/Cpl. H. G. Smith " "
281270 Pte. A. G. Trayler " "
283660 Cpl. W. H. V. Wilkins " "
282537 Pte. J. P. Brooke " 12.12.17
283818 Cpl. W. A. Cooper " "
283025 Pte. J. W. Ling " 12.12.17
295261 Pte. A. Westcott " "
295248 Sergt. H. O. Wilderspin " "
295152 Sergt. F. W. Yandle " "
281390 L/Cpl. E. J. Bewsey " 17.12.17
282246 Pte. J. T. Ball " 4. 2.18
283082 Pte. A. Cohen " 23. 2.18
280301 Cpl. J. W. Johnson " "
283148 Pte. F. G. Senyard " "
280728 Pte. G. Tyrell " "
280714 Cpl. H. W. Wallder " "
280465 Sergt. F. Arklay " 13. 3.18
283813 Pte. B. M. J. Barnett " "
298008 Cpl. T. J. Court " "
282021 Pte. H. Evans " "
280154 Sergt. G. J. Grant " "
280472 Sergt. A. E. Haynes " "
281734 L/Cpl. T. Hodgkins " "
282737 Pte. W. J. Hutchin " "
295177 Pte. J. Pritchard " "
283652 Pte. R. Southern " "
295223 Pte. J. Wickens " "
283808 Pte. W. A. Willmott " "
280389 Pte. W. A. G. Battershall " 12. 6.18
282916 Cpl. A. G. Beale " "
280840 Pte. S. G. Coates " "
283154 L/Cpl. A. J. Deadman " "
281965 Sergt. C. J. Gibbs " "
280967 Cpl. G. Heyes " "
283623 L/Cpl. C. L. Husk " "
283643 Cpl. A. J. Parker " "
295122 Pte. J. R. Phillips " "
281174 Sergt. H. V. Randall " "
283193 Pte. P. C. Swinchatt " "
280292 Sergt. F. G. Udall " "
295096 Pte. R. H. Bryan " 27. 6.18
281472 Sergt. J. A. Kingston " "
281130 L/Cpl. R. H. Pryor " "
282607 Pte. F. A. Stewart " "
281319 Pte. A. J. Zeeck " "
283184 L/Cpl. F. F. Salter " 16. 7.18
283323 Pte. T. J. Sanders " "
283570 Pte. J. W. Abbott " 6. 8.18
280922 Cpl. D. E. Davis " "
282263 L/Cpl. G. Humphrey " 29. 8.18
295508 Pte. J. Nisbett " "
280695 Sergt. T. Peters " "
295475 Pte. M. Lemon " 11.12.18
298089 Pte. A. S. Adams " 24. 1.19
282029 Pte. A. C. Barnes " "
282323 Pte J. Eccles " 24. 1.19
280534 Cpl. W. Frost " "
283617 Pte. J. R. Greenwood " "
281822 L/Cpl. W. H. Hart " "
282198 Cpl. S. T. E. Norton " "
283803 Pte. W. W. Boulstridge " 11. 2.19
283288 Sergt. F. A. Dove " "
281741 Cpl. F. Nash " "
282915 Sergt. F. C. Nickless " "
295615 Sergt. J. T. Norris " "
281043 Sergt. W. C. Bird " 14. 5.19
280605 Sergt. R. C. Clammer, D.C.M. " "
280212 L/Cpl. P. McGregor " "
280617 Sergt. (A/C.S.M.) W. Honig " 23. 7.19

BAR TO MILITARY MEDAL

283530 Pte. C. S. Ruel, M.M.. _London Gazette_ 13. 3.18
282737 L/Cpl. W. J. Hutchin, M.M. " 12. 6.18
280292 Sergt. F. G. Udall, M.M. " 24. 1.19
280489}
2272}C.S.M. C. James, M.M. " 20. 8.19

MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL

280846 Pte. J. W. Atkins _London Gazette_ 17. 9.17
280665 Pte. H. Bunker " 2.11.17
280505 Sergt. W. Bean " 17. 6.18
282237 Sergt. G. F. V. Bunyan " "
280914 L/Sergt. S. A. Edwards " "
280471 Cpl. L. C. Hawkins " "
280435 Sergt. H. Hurst " "
280555 R.Q.M.-Sergt. L. T. Davies " 18. 1.19
280128 C.S.M. A. D. McLaren " "
281464 C.Q.M.-Sergt. P. C. Peters " "
280646 L/Cpl. H. T. Giles " 3. 6.19
280420 Sergt. G. A. Richardson " "

MENTION IN DESPATCHES

2/Lieut. A. R. Moore. _London Gazette_ 22. 6.15
Major (Temp. Lieut.-Col.) L. T. " 1. 1.16
Burnett
Capt. (A/Major) W. G. Clark, D.S.O. " "
2/Lieut. (A/Capt.) J. R. Pyper " 14. 1.16
Lieut.-Col. (Hon. Col.) Vickers " 13. 7.16
Dunfee, V.D.
280154}
1151}Sergt. G. J. Grant " 4. 1.17
4798 R.S.M. M. Harris " "
2/Lieut. H. Jones " "
280128 C.Q.M.-Sergt. A. D. McLaren " "
280171 Pte. H. V. Neal " 4. 1.17
280505 Sergt. W. Bean " 25. 5.17
280307 R.Q.M.-Sergt. W. Henley " "
Lieut. (A/Capt.) L. G. Rix " "
2/Lieut. W. H. Webster " "
Lieut. (A/Capt.) C. A. Clarke " 24.12.17
Lieut. (A/Capt.) T. B. Cooper, M.M. " "
Hon. Lieut. and Q.M. W. J. Cragg " "
Capt. (A/Major) W. A. Nunneley " "
2/Lieut. R. E. Stavert " "
280639 Sergt. A. Taylor " "
2/Lieut. F. W. Walker, D.S.O. " "
Major V. H. Seyd " 16. 1.18
Lieut. (A/Capt.) S. J. Barkworth, " 25. 5.18
M.C., M.M.
Lieut. C. W. Denning, M.M. " "
Lieut. (A/Capt.) A. M. Duthie, D.S.O. " "
281174 Sergt. H. V. Randall " "
283264 Pte. G. E. Wright " 20.12.18
Lieut. L. R. Chapman " 30.12.18
Lieut. H. W. Dennis " "
Lieut. (A/Capt.) C. J. Graham, M.C. " "
Major (A/Lieut.-Col.) H. P. L. Cart " 10. 7.19
de Lafontaine

The names of the following were brought to the notice of the Secretary
of State for War for services rendered in connection with the War (not
gazetted):--

Lieut.-Col. (Hon. Col.) Vickers Dunfee, V.D. 24.12.17
280126 Cpl. W. Noquet 9. 8.18
Major L. T. Burnett 13. 8.18
281197 Cpl. E. Brown {13. 8.18
{15. 3.19
Lieut. (A/Capt.) F. A. Coffin 13. 8.18

FOREIGN DECORATIONS

_Médaille Militaire_ (_France_)--
280336 Sergt. D. Fulford _London Gazette_ 24. 2.16

_Croix de Guerre_ (_Belgium_)--
280802 C.S.M. F. W. Amos " 12. 7.18
281426 Sergt. A. V. Loveless " "
282692 Sergt. J. R. Tibbott " "
280713 Pte. C. W. Budgen " "
295089 Cpl. W. Govan " "

The following decorations were awarded to Officers, non-Commissioned
Officers, and Men of other regiments for services rendered while
attached to and serving with the 4th London Regiment:--

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER

Major (Temp. Lieut.-Col.) W. R. H. _London Gazette_ 18. 7.17
Dann (Bedfordshire Regiment)
Major F. A. Phillips (Montgomery " 22. 6.18
Yeomanry)
Major A. Grover, M.C. (Bedfordshire " 26. 7.18
Regiment)
Major (A/Lieut.-Col.) A. F. Marchment, " 26. 7.18
M.C. (1st London Regiment)

BAR TO DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER

Major (A/Lieut.-Col.) W. R. H. _London Gazette_ 26. 7.18
Dann, D.S.O., (Bedfordshire
Regiment)

MILITARY CROSS

2/Lieut. H. E. Jackman (21st _London Gazette_ 26. 9.17
London Regiment)
Lieut. E. H. R. Altounyan (R.A.M.C.) " 1. 1.18
2/Lieut. C. W. Rowlands (1st London " 4. 2.18
Regiment)
Capt. (A/Major) A. Grover (Bedfordshire " 18. 3.18
Regiment)
Lieut. G. V. Lawrie (6th Scottish " 3. 6.18
Rifles)
Lieut. (A/Capt.) H. N. Williams (4th " 22. 6.18
Royal Welsh Fusiliers)
Lieut. (A/Captain) W. C. Morton " 16. 9.18
(1st London Regiment)
G/95036 C.S.M. T. Cooke, D.C.M., " 7.11.18
M.M. (K.O.Y.L.I.)
Lieut. C. E. Dunaway (Medical " --.--.18
Officer, U.S. Army)
Lieut. (A/Capt.) E. V. Grimsdell " 11. 1.19
(K.O.Y.L.I.)
Lieut. (A/Capt.) H. F. Dade (3rd " 2. 4.19
London Regiment)

DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL

G/95066 C.S.M. A. Bonser _London Gazette_ 22.10.17
G/95036 C.S.M. T. Cooke, M.M. " "
781426 L/Cpl. F. Goatcher " 3. 9.18
G/76294 Pte. E. Clark " 5.12.18

BAR TO DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL

G/95066 C.S.M. A. Bonser, D.C.M. _London Gazette_ 5.12.18

SECOND BAR TO DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL

G/95066 C.S.M. A. Bonser, D.C.M. _London Gazette_ 18. 2.19

MILITARY MEDAL

G/68176 Pte. J. F. Blair _London Gazette_ 27. 6.18
202684 Pte. A. E. Churchyard " "
225485 Sergt. C. A. Cowland " "
251439 Pte. W. A. Pasterful " "
G/76227 L/Cpl. F. Harding " 6. 8.18
G/68259 Pte. L. Petrie " 29. 8.18
G/76275 Pte. G. A. Allen " 24. 1.19
G/80610 Pte. G. H. Andrews " "
252254 L/Cpl. J. T. Couchman " "
G/95108 Sergt. J. Fanshaw " "
225682 Pte. J. T. Freshwater " "
228610 Pte J. C. Goree " "
G/75396 L/Cpl. G. J. Grant " "
G/95115 Pte. E. Stott " "
G/84057 Sergt. R. L. Addison " 11. 2.19
G/95177 L/Cpl. W. Bradley " "
251265 Pte. A. E. Dickerson " "
G/76243 Pte. H. H. Mills " "
250439 Cpl. C. Robbins " "
G/80608 Pte. W. Ryan " "
G/71053 Pte. J. Anderson " 13. 3.19
233640 Cpl. G. F. Coleman " "
204593 Pte. A. E. Pullen " "
G/90091 Pte. J. Upperton " "
253803 Pte. T. H. A. Brown " 14. 5.19
G/68177 Pte. W. Bunce " "
G/95143 Pte. H. Atkinson " "

MENTION IN DESPATCHES

Capt. and Adjt. G. B. Scott _London Gazette_ 1. 1.16
(Leinster Regiment)
Lieut. G. V. Lawric (6th Scottish Rifles) " 18.12.17
Major (A/Lieut.-Col.) A. F. Marchment, " 30.12.18
D.S.O., M.C. (1st London Regiment)
204527 Sergt. S. W. Childs " "

APPENDIX III

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE 4th LONDON REGIMENT IN 1920

After the return to England of the Cadres early in 1919, the
Territorial Force remained in abeyance for the remainder of the year,
and beyond the formation of an Old Comrades' Association, under the
Presidency of Lieut.-Col. Harry Dade, V.D., nothing could be done in
the 4th Londons to maintain _esprit de corps_ at the high standard
which it had reached during the War.

When orders were issued early in 1920 for the reconstruction of the
auxiliary forces under the title of the Territorial Army, the effect of
eight months' inactivity became painfully apparent, and the 4th London
Regiment, which was revived in February 1920, experienced, in common
with most other units, great difficulty in recruiting, owing to the
rapidly cooling enthusiasm of the greater number of its former members.
By great good fortune a large number of old officers returned to the
Colours, and command was given to Lieut.-Col. L. T. Burnett, O.B.E.,
T.D., while Major H. J. Duncan-Teape, T.D., was appointed Second in
Command, and Captain W. A. Trasenster, M.C., The Royal Fusiliers,
Adjutant. The Company Commanders and Headquarters Officers were:--

Major R. N. Arthur D Company.
Major W. Moore, O.B.E. A Company.
Major H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine, O.B.E. C Company.
Major S. Elliott, O.B.E. B Company.
Captain F. C. Grimwade Assistant Adjutant.
Lieut. H. B. A. Balls Lewis Gun Officer.
2/Lieut. E. P. Higgs Signalling Officer.
Lieut. C. F. Warren Transport Officer.
Lieut. E. S. Tomsett Quartermaster.

A capable Permanent Staff was supplied from the Royal Fusiliers,
Regtl. Sergt.-Major W. Hunt becoming the senior Warrant Officer, while
ex-Regtl. Sergt.-Major M. Harris enlisted, and was appointed Regtl.
Q.M.-Sergt.

The following old Warrant Officers and N.C.O.'s enlisted, and were
posted as stated:--

Coy. Sergt.-Major W. H. Edwards }
Coy. Q.M.-Sergt. J. C. Hibberd } to A Company.

Regtl. Q.M.-Sergt. W. Henley }
Coy. Sergt.-Major G. L. Matthews } to B Company.
Coy. Q.M.-Sergt. B. A. Watson, D.C.M. }

Coy. Sergt.-Major A. Mennie }
Coy. Q.M.-Sergt. E. J. T. Nash } to C Company.

Coy. Sergt.-Major J. Lewis }
Coy. Q.M.-Sergt. F. McLaren } to D Company.

With this excellent stiffening the Battalion soon began to make
progress, and rapidly took--and held--the lead in numbers in the 1st
London Brigade.

The first Annual Training was held at Shoreham-by-Sea, the time being
devoted principally to musketry and recreational training. For the
first time in the Battalion's history, the winter following was marked
by the continuance without a break of the drill season; and throughout
the winter of 1920-21 attendances at the weekly drills at Headquarters
reached an unusually high percentage of the strength. The Battalion
appeared to be well on its feet, and making steady progress towards
efficiency, when, in April 1921, the Coal Strike completely dashed all
hopes of a successful summer training season. The Territorial Army
was temporarily in abeyance, and for three months its headquarters
were handed over to the Defence Force, to which was entrusted the
maintenance of peaceful conditions throughout the country.

A Defence Force Unit was raised at the 4th Londons' Headquarters, and
joined by some of the members of the Battalion, command of it being
taken by Major R. N. Arthur, with the acting rank of Lieut.-Col. The
disbandment of the Defence Force was fortunately effected in time to
enable the Annual Training to be held at Shorncliffe in August, but
the serious delay already caused to the individual training of the men
rendered it less valuable than had been hoped; and a far too great
proportion of the training hours had to be spent on the range, in the
Musketry Practices, which should have been completed early in the year.

During the spring of 1921 the Battalion suffered a severe loss in the
death, after a prolonged and painful illness, of the Quartermaster,
Lieut. E. S. Tomsett, to whose invaluable services reference has been
made in the preceding pages. After Lieut. Tomsett's death, Regtl.
Q.M.-Sergt. M. Harris was gazetted Lieut. and Quartermaster.

The beginnings of the 4th London Regiment in the revived Territorial
Army have been small, but every step has been made secure by careful
organisation, and by applying the experience of Territorial soldiering
in peace and war; and there is every reason to suppose that the laurels
gained by the Regiment in the Campaigns in which it has taken part will
remain untarnished, and that its glorious traditions will be jealously
guarded as long as the Regiment remains in existence.

INDEX

_Appendices II and III are not indexed._

Abbécourt, 379, 381

Abbeville, 20, 175, 238

Acason, 2/Lieut., 249

Achi Baba, 91 _et seq._

Achicourt, 255-237, 271, 272

Achiet-le-Grand, 249, 289

Adinfer, 241-245

Agache River, 479, 485

Agnez lez Duisans, 411

Agny, 253, 256

Ailette River, 382, 383

Alexandria, 89 _et seq._

Allen, G. A., 477

Allen, L. A., 127

Allenby, Gen. Sir Edmund, 133, 149, 150, 156

Altounyan, E. H. R., 314, 315, 323

Amblèny, 383

Ambrines, 134

Amigny-Rouy, 365, 375, 380

Ancre River, 140, 177, 180, 239, 240, 252, 325, 420, 430, 431

Anderson, J., 242

Andignicourt, 383

Andrews, G. H., 477

Angel, A. J., 292, 315

Angle Wood Valley, 195 _et seq._

Angre, 499, 500

Angreau, 499

Anthony, F., 314, 315

Appilly, 365

Archer, L. W., 174, 193, 270, 304

Arklay, F., 340, 344

Arleux, 397, 398, 486, 490, 491

Arleux-en-Gohelle, 347

Armfield, A. R., 421

Arques, 305, 325

Arthur, R. N., 6, 17, 100, 104, 135, 149

Askham, S. G., 238, 276, 317, 369, 372, 375, 378, 381, 382, 385, 388,
389, 391

Athey, F. G., 352, 399

Attenborrow, H. W., 414

Atterbury, L. J. R., 201, 214

Aubencheul-au-Bac, 487, 488, 490

Aubers Ridge, 26, 58 _et seq._, 219, 220

Aubigny-au-Bac, 479 _et seq._

Aulnoy, 496

Aunelle River, 496-499

Austin, F., 314, 315

Autreppe, 502

Autreville, 365

Ayub Khan, 65

Backhouse, J. L., 327, 413, 469

Badham, C., 53

Baharia Oasis, 108-110

Bahr Yusef, 110

Bailleul, 347, 349, 354, 393, 397, 403, 404, 407

Bailleulmont, 239, 244

Bailleulval, 242

Baizieux, 423, 424

Ballance, L. E., 223, 228, 335, 414

Balls, H. B. A., 66, 148, 175, 215

Baluchis, 129th, 23, 34, 39, 46, 52, 54, 65

Bancourt, 290

Bapaume, 177, 194, 211, 239, 240, 290 _et seq._, 428 _et seq._, 482

Barisis, 359, 364, 375, 380

Barkas, G. de G., 423, 436, 440

Barker, Sergt., 342

Barkworth, S. J., 174, 194, 200, 216, 335, 337, 341, 349, 411, 417

Barnes, A. C., 477

Barnes, F., 270, 327, 330

Barnett, B. M. J., 344

Barter, Major-Gen. C. St L., 73

Bartleet, H. B., 443, 458, 459

Barton, Pte., 350

Bassett, L. J., 238

Basseux, 242

Bath, A., 201, 327, 328, 392, 480

Battershall, W. A. G., 408

Bayencourt, 143 _et seq._, 264

Bayliffe, Lt.-Col., 382

Bazentin-le-Grand, 177, 178

Bazentin-le-Petit, 177, 178

Beal, H. G., 81

Beaucamp, 290, 291, 292

Beaudricourt, 251, 253

Beaufort, 137, 141

Beaulencourt, 305, 325, 344

Beaumetz-les-Loges, 249, 253, 344

Beaumont-Hamel, 140, 239, 240

Beaurains, 253, 254, 258

Beautor, 369, 370

Bedfords, 7th, 298, 300, 301

Beeby, H. D., 223, 269, 336

Behencourt, 423, 425

Bell, T. J., 236, 238, 242, 282, 283, 287

Bellacourt, 241

Bellebrune, 321

Bench, Sergt., 75

Bendelow, Pte., 335

Beni Mazar, 107, 110-112

Beni Salama, 108

Beni Suef, 108

Bennet, E. J., 117

Berles-au-Bois, 244, 462

Bernafay Wood, 182, 209

Bernagousse Quarries, 366

Berneville, 270, 271, 415, 417, 461

Besme, 381, 382

Béthune, 24, 81, 85

Beugny, 331, 344

Bhopals, 9th, 23, 39, 46, 49, 52, 54, 59, 69

Bidgood, F., 423, 456, 459

Bienvillers-au-Bois, 243

Bihucourt, 279

Billon Farm, 192, 193

Billon Wood, 447

Birdwood, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Wm., 101, 280

Bishop, G. F., 113

Bixschoote, 40

Blackdown, 357, 425-427

Blackhurst, S., 414

Black Watch, 344, 456

Blair, W., 322, 374, 382

Blairville, 241, 462, 466, 467

Blaugies, 502

Blendecques, 21, 22, 47

Blérancourt, 383

Blight, Pte., 136

Blows, C. S. G., 103, 121, 149, 153, 193

Blunn, A. G., 137, 164

Board, C. H., 353, 394, 395

Bocking, J. W., 385, 391

Boesinghe, 42, 295

Boiry-Becquerelle, 245, 247, 462 _et seq._, 478

Boiry-St Martin, 247, 249

Boiry-St Rictrude, 246

Bois de Quesnoy, 482

Bois des Bœufs, 412

Bois des Puits, 487

Bois du Biez, 26 _et seq._, 59, 67, 225

Boisleux-au-Mont, 246

Boisleux-St Marc, 467, 478

Bold, A. L. D., 421, 440

Bolton, W. H., 311, 314, 315

Bonser, A., 450, 451

Boorman, D. S., 238, 242, 283, 284, 289, 315, 318, 320, 494

Borders, 5th, 272

Botterill, G. P., 3, 6, 27, 35, 36, 48

Botterill, W. R., 16, 149, 153

Bottomley, E. W., 7, 22, 238, 244, 275, 281, 285, 287

Bouchavesnes, 453, 454

Bouleaux Wood, 195 _et seq._

Boulstridge, W. W., 477

Boutall, W. J., 66, 151, 153, 180, 194, 207, 216, 403, 417

Bout Deville, 223, 234

Bouzincourt, 420

Boves, 385, 391

Bowater, Sir Vansittart, 14

Bowater, V. S., 16, 223, 257, 272

Boyelles, 246, 247, 462 _et seq._, 478, 492, 505

Bradford, F. R. C., 90, 100, 149, 165

Bradley, 2/Lieut., 223, 231, 480

Bradley, H. M., 421

Brandram, C., 449, 455

Bray-sur-Somme, 180, 431 _et seq._

Bretencourt, 244

Brielen, 307, 321, 323

Brissenden, C. C., 423, 424, 432, 435, 436, 438, 439

Brodie, C. J., 174, 187, 193

Bronfay Farm, 446, 447, 449, 453

Brown, E. S., 344

Brown, N. A., 323

Brown, W. F., 369, 384

Brunemont, 487, 490

Buckingham, W., 162, 163, 216

Buckland, E. D., 327

Bucquoy, 143, 144, 160, 241, 294, 460

Buire-sur-Ancre, 423

Buissy, 479

Bull, H. C., 314, 315

Bullecourt, 273 _et seq._, 331, 447, 467 _et seq._

Bullock, A. M., 414, 485, 486, 488, 501

Bundle, H. N., 292, 315

Bunker, H., 329

Burd, F. B., 292, 315

Burford, F. R. R., 174, 189

Burnell-Nugent, Brig.-Gen. F. H., 132

Burnett, L. T., 6, 28, 35, 48-50, 53, 56, 66, 71, 72, 81, 84, 137, 356

Burton, P. H., 238, 276

Bury St Edmunds, 117

Bushell, R. D., 480

Butler, Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. H. K., 364, 367, 383, 384

Byng, Gen. Lord, 260, 359, 460

Cachy, 387-391, 419-424

Cairns, J., 322, 384

Cairo, 107, 108, 112

Calnan, W. H., 174, 199

Calonne-sur-Lys, 27, 30

Cambridgeshire Regt., 1st, 425

Campbell, H., 257, 261, 298, 299, 303, 304

Campion, Pte., 448

Campkin, R. E., 353, 396, 398, 407

Caparn, R. K., 127, 238, 242, 249

Carlisle, F. A., 292, 309

Carnoy, 192, 448

Carpenter, A. B., 453

Cart de Lafontaine, H. P. L., 6, 20, 34, 36, 65, 66

Cartmell, A., 482

Casey, Capt., 16, 17, 22

Castle, J., 216

Caudwell, T., 251, 267

Cavalry Farm, 266-270

Celestin Wood, 438, 439

Chamberlain, R. W., 223, 252, 322, 384

Chapman, J. W., 174, 197

Chapman, L. R., 16, 81, 159, 165

Chart, Lieut.-Col., 382

Chauny, 369, 374, 378-380

Chennels, C.S.M., 20, 55

Chérisy, 264

Cheshires, 5th, 134 _et seq._, 343

Chignell, A. W., 417, 466

Chipilly, 430-441

Cholmondely, H. C., 116

Citerne, 85, 132, 136, 217, 218

Clammer, R. C., 490

Clark, E., 476

Clark, T., 216

Clark, W. G., 6, 20, 47, 51, 53, 57, 66, 72, 81, 84, 137, 138

Clarke, C. A., 249, 291, 318, 320, 369, 372, 375, 384

Cléry-sur-Somme, 453

Clifford, C. C. H., 292, 317, 384

Clifford, W. H., 214

Coates, A. D., 24, 49, 53, 55

Coates, L. C., 16, 88, 94

Coates, S. G., 408, 468

Coates, L/Corpl., 289

Coffin, F. A., 24, 54, 55, 120, 130

Cohen, A., 465

Coigneux, 264

Cojeul River, 247, 253 _et seq._, 462, 467, 479

Coke, Brig.-Gen., E. S. D'Ewes, 133

Coleman, T., 223

Coley, J., 480

Collins, C. F., 216

Colomb, G. L., 57

Colvin, A. E., 216

Combles, 177 _et seq._

Condé, Canal de, 501

Condren, 369 _et seq._

Connaught Rangers, 23, 34, 36-39, 46-49, 52, 54, 60, 68, 69

Contay, 421

Cook, A. S., 292, 316

Cooke, D. C., 61, 120, 292, 323

Cooke, T., 447, 448

Cookson, P. S., 116

Coombe, Capt., 130

Coombes, H. V., 270, 400, 407

Cooper, Brig.-Gen. E. J., 117

Cooper, T. B., 174, 189, 190, 205, 349, 398, 403, 407, 408, 411, 478,
486, 496, 507

Corbie, 180, 431

Corkoran, Brig.-Gen. Charles, 448

Cornelius-Wheeler, Capt., 4

Cornell, Pte., 350

Cornwall, C.S.M., 20

Cotton, E. N., 238, 275, 281-283, 287, 289

Cotton, R. D., 423, 424

Couchman, J. T., 477

Coulemby, 321

Courcelette, 194 _et seq._

Courcelles, 289, 290

Court, T. J., 344

Cowland, C.S.M., 450

Cragg, C. W., 81, 238

Crane, S. H. E., 360

Crawford, D. F., 367, 369, 384

Creighton, A. B., 327, 335

Creil, 19

Cremarest, 321

Croisilles, 246, 247, 253, 467-471, 492

Croix Barbée, 37, 38, 72, 229, 232

Croll, A. G., 127, 238, 242, 289, 291, 424, 425, 432, 434-436, 438-440

Crosbie, McC., 442, 446, 447, 451, 452

Crozat Canal, 369-377, 477

Cuesmes, 506, 507

Cuffe, Pte., 350

Cumner, C. W., 366, 391

Curgies, 497

Curlu, 140, 451

Curtis, 2/Lieut., 382

Cuthbert, Brig.-Gen. G., 73, 85

Cuthbertson, E. M., 323, 384

Dade, H., 122

Dade, H. F., 352, 400, 401, 488

Dainville, 414-418, 493

Dakhla Oasis, 108

Dallas, Major-Gen. A. G., 107, 108, 111

Dann, W. R. H., 237, 238, 243, 279, 280, 288, 315, 370, 371, 373, 374,
378, 379, 381, 382, 421

Darrington, C. P., 88, 99

Davey, W. H., 174, 193

Davies, S. N., 16, 104

Davies, W. A., 443, 456

Davis, A. G., 223, 304

Davis, G. H., 137, 159, 165, 185, 193

Davis, R., 165, 216

Davis, S., 100, 104, 121, 149, 289, 311, 313-315

Daw, H. S., 238

Deacon, Major, 48

Deadman, A. J., 408

Demicourt, 326

Demuin, 387

Denain, 496

Denier, 272, 292

Denning, C. W., 174, 272, 407

Dennis, H. W., 16, 90, 113, 119

de Pury, C. R. P., 81, 138

Dernancourt, 437

Derviche-Jones, Lieut.-Col., 379

Dessart Wood, 291, 292

Dettingen Barracks, 357

Devonshire Regt., 112, 119, 128

Dew, E. G., 127, 223, 304, 494

Dickebusch, 297, 299

Dickerson, A. E., 477

Dickens, Major, 189

Dickins, L. A., 16, 103

Dickins, R. C., 16, 101, 113, 315, 318, 320

Dodds, A. W., 315, 320

Dogras, 41st, 31-33

Doignies, 333, 334

Domart, 137, 425

Dommiers, 383

Donaldson, V. C., 75, 134, 165

Douai, 252, 347, 414, 479, 491

Douchy, 496

Doullens, 137, 150, 234, 248

Dove, F. A., 477

Dow, H., 128

Drocourt, 265, 395, 475, 477, 479

Drouvin, 81

Dudgeon, Major-Gen. F. A., 296, 297, 342, 348, 353, 414

Dudley, Sergt.-Major, 24

Duke of Wellington's Regt., 234

Dunaway, C. E., 323, 391, 424

Duncan-Teape, H. J. T., 3, 6, 20, 47, 51, 121, 123, 128, 142, 145,
153, 211, 214, 215, 217, 427

Dunfee, Vickers, 14, 16, 17, 100, 110, 112, 113, 115, 129, 130, 427

Dunfee, Mrs, 103

Durlacher, H. W., 360, 384

Duthie, A. M., 238, 242, 249, 327, 338-341, 344, 407, 408

Eastoe, W. H., 327

East Surrey Regt., 366

Eccles, J., 477

Ecourt-St Quentin, 481, 482, 491

Ecurie, 348, 351

Edwards, V. W., 6, 17, 89

Edwards, W. H., 20

Egerton, Brig.-Gen. R. G., 23, 32

Ehren, A. C., 53, 57

Elders, J. F., 251, 330

Eldred, Mr, 123

Elliott, J., 81

Elliott, L. B. J., 304

Elliott, S., 6, 11, 84, 146, 147

Elsom, C.S.M., 20

Elverdinghe, 323

English, C. F., 174, 193

English, H. E., 238, 317

Entrenching Battalions, 378 _et seq._

Epéhy, 290, 451, 457, 459, 483

Eperlecques, 296, 304

Epinoy, 487, 490

Ervillers, 249

Escaut, Canal de l', 290, 332, 379, 490, 495, 501

Estaires, 26, 71, 218, 413

Estreux, 497, 499

Etaing, 479, 480, 482

Etaples, 19-21

Eterpigny, 479

Evans, H., 344

Evans, W. B., 360

Ewing, G. C., 323, 389, 390, 454, 458

Fabien, R. L., 128

Fairman, Pte., 350

Falfemont Farm, 178, 201

Famars, 496, 502

Fanhangel, F. C., 66, 164

Fanshawe, Major-Gen. H. D., 237, 290

Farafra Oasis, 108

Farfan, L., 128

Fargniers, 366-373

Faulkner, Lieut., 350, 417, 494

Fauquissart, 218, 219, 221

Fayoum, 108

Ferdinando, S. P., 238, 249, 480

Fergusson, Corpl., 190

Festubert, 26, 60, 61, 73, 347

Feuchy, 253, 266, 480, 481

Fisher, G. W., 392

Flers, 178, 194 _et seq._, 203, 209

Fletcher, T. R., 201, 213, 214, 480, 485, 486, 488

Foch, Marshal, 41, 410, 429, 483

Foden, F. J., 174, 193

Folly Farm, 120, 122

Fonquevillers, 170-174

Fontaine-lez-Croisilles, 253, 264, 274, 280, 467, 468

Forbes, R., 216

Ford, A. S., 66, 165, 270, 304

Fortel, 238

Fosse, 64, 229, 233

Fovant, 122, 128, 355

Francis, C. B., 366, 384

Franks, A., 327, 335

Frégicourt, 178, 206, 211

Frémicourt, 326 _et seq._

French, F.M. Earl, 24, 25, 41, 58, 59, 79, 128, 347

Frevent, 137, 141, 238

Freyberg, Brig.-Gen. B. C., 249, 290, 293, 314

Fricourt, 140, 166, 177, 445

Frières Wood, 377, 378

Frohen-le-Grand, 248

Frost, W., 477

Froy, W. A., 223

Fry, Major-Gen. W., 2, 6, 15

Fulford, D., 48, 57, 350

Fullalove, J. S., 119, 130

Gallipoli, 87 _et seq._, 120

Gant, H. H., 449, 455

Gardiner, A. E., 230, 231

Gardner, E. G., 315

Garner, E. H., 475

Garratt, O. D., 174, 183, 188, 189, 194, 216, 218, 224, 265, 329, 392

Gaskin, C., 66, 71

Gathergood, J. S. B., 61, 117

Gaudiempré, 241

Gauld, K. W., 423, 424

Gavrelle, 347, 349

Gearle, H. C., 216

Geering, S. C., 323, 391

Gentelles, 385, 386

George, J. W., 420, 421, 440

Gery, R. V., 7, 66

Ghain Tuffieha, 9, 11, 17, 87, 89

Gibbs, C. C., 315, 454, 458

Gibbs, C. J., 408

Gifford, W. R., 201, 211, 213

Giles, E., 7, 53, 55, 66, 146, 152, 153

Giles, M. F., 443

Gilson, G., 443, 455

Ginchy, 178 _et seq._

Girling, W., 507

Girling, W. N. M., 421, 440

Givenchy, 23, 477

Givenchy-le-Noble, 134

Givry, 506

Glencorse Wood, 295 _et seq._

Gloucesters, 4th, 182

Glover, R. E., 443, 455

Godewaersvelde, 43

Godman, S. H., 123, 128, 355

Gommecourt, 129, 139 _et seq._, 240, 264

Gonnelieu, 331

Gooch, Sergt., 342

Goodale, C. C. W., 443, 448

Goodes, G. L., 66, 80

Gough, Gen. Sir H., 24, 249, 273, 279, 295, 359, 360, 366, 385

Gouy-en-Artois, 264

Gouzeaucourt, 290, 292, 359

Graddon, J. C., 173, 174, 193

Graham, C. J., 236, 238, 250

Grand Rullecourt, 418, 461

Grande Honnelle River, 500, 501

Grant, G. J., 344, 477

Gray, S. A., 270, 328

Green, P. W., 480

Green, Rev. S. F. Leighton, 223, 263, 341, 403, 506

Greenfield, S., 505

Greenwood, J. R., 477

Grenas, 142, 150, 248

Grenay, 82

Gressaire Wood, 430 _et seq._

Grey, R., 449, 452

Grierson, J., 279

Griffiths, F. J., 322, 382, 419, 454, 455

Grimsdell, E. V., 385, 388, 419, 447, 451, 452

Grimsdell, R. E., 174, 204, 205, 207

Grimston, Sergt., 350

Grimwade, F. C., 6, 11, 20, 47, 51, 53, 55, 120, 127, 130, 218, 252

Grosville, 241

Grover, A., 243, 310, 311, 315, 317, 379-384, 421, 431, 433, 440

Guémappe, 264, 265, 267

Gueudecourt, 178, 209

Guignemicourt, 422, 442

Guillemont, 177 _et seq._, 452

Gurkha Rifles, 22, 24, 49

Guyencourt, 459

Haig, F.M. Earl, 24, 74, 139, 141, 263, 448, 482-484, 489, 495, 504

Haillicourt, 84, 85

Haine, A. A. N., 61, 116, 118

Haisnes, 77

Hallencourt, 85, 136, 217

Hall, W. C. B., 443

Hallett, H. W., 238, 249

Halloy, 142 _et seq._

Hamel, 140, 428

Hamelincourt, 246, 462

Ham-en-Artois, 22, 27

Hamilton, Gen. Sir Ian, 16, 91, 92, 96

Hamilton, W. H., 14, 49, 116, 117, 119, 129

Hampshire Regiment, 129

Hanebeek, 302, 306, 310, 313

Hangard, 385, 387, 388, 390

Hanks, A. E., 350

Hannay, H. T., 270, 304, 350, 407

Hardecourt, 451

Hardy, L/Corpl., 236

Harmignies, 502

Harper, A. L., 223, 231

Harper, Lieut., 162, 163

Harris, M., 24, 50, 207, 215, 330

Hart, W. H., 477

Harveng, 502

Haut Avesnes, 411

Havard, Capt., 262, 270

Havrincourt, 290, 332, 483

Haycraft, L. C., 127, 201, 213, 214

Hayes, E. C., 251

Hayes, G., 408

Hayes, Sergt., 329, 353

Haynecourt, 484

Haynes, A. E., 344

Hayward, W. G., 16, 17, 88, 119, 120

Hazebrouck, 409

Hearnshaw, H., 449

Heaver, C. H. T., 174, 193

Hebberd, R., 216

Hébuterne, 140 _et seq._, 180, 217, 264, 272

Hedger, F., 100, 216

Heilly, 442

Helfaut, 21

Helles, Cape, 90 _et seq._

Helot, River, 379, 380

Hem Wood, 454, 456

Hendecourt, 274, 276, 466 _et seq._

Heninel, 253, 260-262, 274, 281

Henin-sur-Cojeul, 246, 247, 259, 467, 468

Henstridge, C. L., 414, 476, 478, 488

Hénu, 142, 148

Hermies, 26, 331

Herring, R. L., 7, 20, 194

Hetley, G. H., 127, 249, 289, 310, 318, 321, 385, 388, 419, 433, 447,
448, 450-452, 458

Hettler, B. H. C., 385, 388, 389, 391

Hewlett, H. A. T., 238, 281, 289, 311, 313, 315, 417, 463, 466

Heyes, Sergt., 480, 486

Hicklenton, H. G., 88, 149, 159, 165

Higgs, E. R, 280, 322, 435

Hirondelle River, 275, 479, 481, 486

Hodgkins, T., 344

Hohenzollern Redoubt, 76, 77, 80

Holloway, A., 414, 475, 476

Hook, W. G., 352, 475

Home, Gen. Lord, 156, 218, 346

Horsfield, J., 421, 440

Houlder, Capt., 184

Houlle, 296, 305

Housden, Pte., 95

Housden, Sergt., 329

Houthulst, 316, 322

Houvin-Houvigneuil, 461

Howden, E. R., 322

Howell, Brig.-Gen., 355

Hudson, O. C., 401, 485

Hull, Major-Gen. Sir C. P. A., 42, 132, 145, 149, 150, 175, 197, 252,
271, 296, 414, 461, 463

Hulluch, 67, 76, 77, 81, 213

Humbercamp, 239, 242, 462

Humphrey, G., 513

Humphrey, W. P., 414, 417

Hunt, F. F., 36, 66

Hunt, G. G., 238, 249

Hunt, R. C., 127

Hurd, A., 22, 48, 165

Hurdcott, 122-124, 128, 129, 355, 356

Hurst, Brig.-Gen., 238

Hurst, H., 403

Husk, C. L., 408

Hutchin, W. J., 344, 408

Hutchins, F. H., 223, 268

Hyde, H. E., 162, 216

Hyde, R. R. L., 216

Illies, 26

Imbros, 93, 99, 104, 105

Ingham, Sergt.-Dr., 350

Inniskilling Fusiliers, 184

Inverness Copse, 295 _et seq._

Ipswich, 117-119, 236

Irvine, H., 443, 448

Ivergny, 251

Izel-les-Hameau, 292, 306

Jackman, H. E., 270, 301, 304

Jackson, R. J., 4, 6, 11

Jackson, Lieut.-Col., 335

Jacques, R.S.M., 330, 494

James, C., 213, 216

Jehu, S. H., 322, 323

Jemappes, 507

Johnson, F. B., 322

Johnson, J. W., 335, 344

Johnson, Sergt., 468

Johnstone, R., 66

Jones, F. J., 315, 320

Jones, H., 66, 75, 223, 272

Jones, L. W. N., 223, 263

Keary, Major-Gen. H. D'U., 22, 72

Keen, R. N., 16, 104, 106, 201, 211, 214

Keerselare, 307

Kelly, R. C., 11

Kereves, Dere, 94, 101

King, H. J., 443, 452

King's Liverpools, 4th, 22, 71

K.O.S.B., 47, 101

K.O.Y.L.I., 241, 350, 386, 443, 496

K.R.R.C., 302

Kingwell, A., 122

Kitchener, Earl, 6, 13, 120

Klein Zillebeeke, 294

Knight, A. C., 194, 272, 307, 315

Krithia, 92, 94

La Bassée, 23 _et seq._, 67, 68, 71, 76, 99

La Bassée Canal, 58, 66, 67, 75

La Brique, 44-46, 50, 56

La Cauchie, 239

La Dessoue, 502

La Fère, 359 _et seq._, 425, 477

La Gorgue, 69, 224, 228

La Houssoye, 422, 431

La Quinque Rue, 60

Labourse, 78

Lacon, Sir Hugh, 426

Lacouture, 30, 32

Lagnicourt, 273, 326-329, 346

Laies, Rivière des, 29, 220

Lambley, J. E. W., 16, 113

Lancashire Fus., 323

Lancers, 15th, 22

Langemarck, 40, 46, 52, 297, 306 _et seq._

Langton, H. G., 317, 320

Lattre St Quentin, 418

Laviéville, 423

Laventie, 218-221, 413

Lawrence, H. P., 449, 452, 455

Lawrence, W., 216

Lawrie, G. V., 174, 216, 353, 416, 417, 478

Le Bas de Viry, 374

Le Cauroy, 137, 234, 272

Le Philosophe, 78

L'Epinette, 64

Le Pissot, 498

Le Plessiel, 176-180, 419

Le Quesnoy, 495

Le Sars, 194

Le Sart, 223

Le Souich, 234, 239, 251

Le Talandier, 497

Le Transloy, 239, 325

Le Transloy Ridges, 208 _et seq._

Leach, H. G. A., 421, 440

Leake, G. E. A., 238, 275, 276, 279

Lear, Pte., 162

Lebucquière, 333

Lécluse, 477, 479

Legge, R. F., 4

Lekkerbotebeek, 317, 318, 322

Lelyveld, H., 443, 448

Lens, 76, 82, 260, 489

Leonard, D. J., 24, 53, 54, 66, 71

Lesbœufs, 178 _et seq._, 325

Les Brebis, 81

Les Huit Maisons, 37, 233

Lester, G. E., 249, 320, 322, 355, 369, 372-374, 384

Lestrem, 30

Leuze Wood, 181 _et seq._

Lewis, C. E., 174, 193

Lewis, G. G., 352, 392, 396, 469

Liéramont, 456, 458, 459

Ligny-le-Grand, 58

Lille, 58, 495

Lillers, 72-77

Limpenny, S. W. J., 116

Lincolns, 5th, 170

Ling, J. W., 315

Ling, Pipe-Major, 236

Lintott, A. W., 342

Lizerne, 41

Loch, Brig.-Gen. G. G., 149, 394, 397, 496

Lock, A. H., 122

Lock, T., 216, 408

Logeast Wood, 289, 290

Long, A. L., 7, 146, 153, 182

Long, H. C., 238, 279

Longpré, 218

Longueau, 385

Longueval, 178

Loos, 67, 73, 75, 81-83

Lorden, H. M., 24, 66, 223, 257, 269, 346, 403, 407

Louverval, 334

Lovell, E. G., 16

Lucan, Brig.-Gen. Earl of, 4, 13, 89

Luce, River, 385

Lucy, A. B., 7

Ludendorff, Gen., 362, 363, 407, 441

Lynch, P., 122

Lyons, S. E., 66

McCormick, E. M'D., 174, 189, 191, 207, 216

McDonald, J., 128, 292, 316

McDowell, R., 238, 286, 287

McGlashan, Capt., 130

McKittrick, E. S., 443, 452

Maghaga, 111

Magnicourt-sur-Canche, 351-353, 461

Main, G. H., 423

Maing, 496

Maitland, A. E., 253, 261

Malard Wood, 430-438

Maloney, Capt., 270, 333, 405, 407, 414

Malplaquet, 505

Malta, 6, 8 _et seq._, 86 _et seq._, 112, 115, 121, 505, 508, 509

Maltzhorn Farm, 182, 184, 191, 449, 451

Manchester Regiment, 22, 48, 62, 263, 487

Manicamp, 381-383

Manning, D. A. S., 456, 458

Mansel-Howe, C. I., 423, 439, 440

Marchment, A. F., 299, 303, 343, 344, 346, 394, 398, 399, 401,
403-405, 408, 461-466, 468, 486, 487, 492, 496, 507

Maricourt, 182, 446 _et seq._

Marlière Caves, 268

Maroc, 82, 84, 85

Maroc, South, 82, 83

Marœuil, 349-351, 353

Marqueffles Farm, 418

Marquion, 485, 492

Marrières Wood, 452, 453, 456

Marsh, F. S., 292

Marshall, Lord, 507

Marshall, R. B., 414, 496

Mason, C. R., 414

Mather, A., 427

Matthews, G. L., 394, 395

Mattison, O. H., 316

Maubeuge, 483 _et seq._

Maunder, Pte., 95

Mauquissart, 64, 67, 224-227

Maurepas, 177, 451, 452

Mawby, T. H., 353, 417

Maxwell, Gen. Sir J. G., 107, 108

Maynard, T. R. A., 443

Mears, S. F. G., 323, 391

Meerut, 129

Melleha, 9, 10, 12, 508

Mendl, R. H. J., 360

Menges, G. J. L., 360

Menin, 294 _et seq._, 495

Mercatel, 253, 460

Mercer, Brig.-Gen. David, 90

Méricourt-l'Abbé, 431, 444

Merrell, H. H., 216

Merville, 36, 43, 71, 218, 223, 228, 234, 413

Messines, 263, 294, 307, 489

Meteren, 57, 428

Methuen, F.M. Lord, 86

Michell, R., 292, 320.

Middlemiss, 2/Lieut., 313

Middleton, J. T., 174, 193

Millar, W. T., 385

Mill Copse, 481, 485, 486

Miller, H. E., 119, 124

Miller, J. D., 414

Miller, Lieut.-Col., 436, 438, 439

Mills, E. L., 327, 336, 341, 344, 413

Mills, H. H., 477

Millstead, A. H., 414, 486

Milne, F., 119

Minear, S., 251

Minia, 108-111

Miraumont, 240

Mirvaux, 420, 421, 433

Mœuvres, 331 _et seq._, 484

Moger, A. J., 216

Moislains, 455, 456

Mole Post, 231

Molliens au Bois, 420, 422

Monchy-au-Bois, 241-245, 248

Monchy Breton, 350, 351

Monchy-le-Preux, 265, 393, 394, 467, 477

Moncrieff, Lieut.-Gen. G. H., 15

Mondicourt, 150, 151

Monk, E. W., 81, 194

Monk, S. G., 61

Monkman, E. A., 238, 287

Monro, Gen. Sir C. C., 96, 101

Mons, 5, 489 _et seq._

Mont St Eloy, 408, 410

Mont St Quentin, 453, 455

Montague, Pte., 350

Montenescourt, 271

Moody, T., 7, 165

Moore, A. R., 7, 33, 146, 152, 159, 162, 164

Moore, G. H., 16, 34, 38, 90

Moore, H., 130

Moore, W., 6, 20, 47, 119, 136-138, 152, 163, 165

Moreuil, 385, 429

Morlancourt, 430, 444, 445

Mormal, Forêt de, 494, 495, 504

Morris, H., 16, 95

Morris, H. O., 350, 400, 401, 407

Morris, S. T., 423, 440

Morris, 2/Lieut., 405

Morrison, J. D., 423

Mortleman, C. F., 174, 193

Morton, W. C., 360, 388-390, 419

Morval, 178 _et seq._, 240, 325

Mory, 280

Mosely, E. P. M., 36, 270, 417, 480, 502, 504

Mouchin, 81

Muddell, A. R., 238, 423, 452

Mudros, 90 _et seq._

Murray, Gen. Sir A., 111

Murray, Lieut.-Col., 66

Nag Hamadi, 110

Nash, F., 477

Naylor, J. R., 317, 320

Neame, R. E., 200

Neuf Berquin, 218

Neuve Chapelle, 26 _et seq._, 58 _et seq._, 120, 218 _et seq._, 413, 477

Neuville-Borjonval, 291

Neuville-Vitasse, 253 _et seq._, 411, 412

Neuvireuil, 347

Neville, S. W., 480, 482

New Barnet, 14, 15, 115 _et seq._

Newman, W. H. G., 322

Nickless, F. C., 477

Nœux-les-Mines, 77, 81

Nonne Boschen, 297, 302

Nord, Canal du, 331, 332, 454, 477 _et seq._

Nordausques, 316

Noreuil, 275, 276, 278

Norris, G., 340, 344

Norris, J. T., 477

Norrish, F. E., 322

North Staffords, 243

Noureuil, 376, 378

Noye River, 359

Noyelles-les-Vermelles, 78

Noyon, 369, 380, 382, 422

Nunneley, W. A., 237, 238, 243, 249, 292, 317

Nunns, N., 270, 304

Nurlu, 456

Oakely, Sergt., 328

O'Brien, J., 216, 511

O'Brien, Rev., 238

Oise, 369-382

Oise Canal, 363-371, 429, 430

Oisy-le-Verger, 482-488

Oldrey, V. R., 174, 183, 193, 281, 472, 475

Olinski, P. J., 279

Omignon, River, 359, 367

Oppy, 346 _et seq._, 392 _et seq._, 414, 416, 419, 504

Ormiston, N. A., 174, 193

Osborne, W. E., 173, 174, 185, 193

Osvillers Lake, 482

Ouderdom, 44, 56, 57, 303, 304

Owen, T. G., 423

Oxfordshire Hussars, 369

Page, H. F., 213

Palluel, 479, 484, 486

Palmer, L. A., 443

Palmer, Rev. R., 136, 165, 216, 223

Palmer, Pte., 405

Paradis, 36-38, 57, 59

Paris, Major-Gen. A., 90, 106

Parker, A. J., 408

Parker, W. H., 238, 275, 281, 285, 287

Parkhouse, H., 14, 16, 90

Parr, J. F. F., 7, 12, 17, 86, 88

Parslow, W. H., 360, 424, 432, 434-436, 440

Pas, 141, 150

Passchendaele, 40, 294, 316 _et seq._, 489

Paterson, F. J., 443, 459

Paterson, J. R. K., 224

Pathans, 40th, 22

Payne, H. S., 216

Payne, P. J., 323, 391

Pearson, J., 119

Peizières, 457-459

Pentelow, H., 223

Pernois, 425

Péronne, 177, 194, 211, 363, 385, 444, 453-456, 477

Perrin, Pte., 350

Peryer, J. R., 322

Peselhoek, 320

Peters, Pte., 288, 289

Petit Houvin, 296

Petrie, E., 327, 339, 342

Petrie, L., 390

Phillips, F. A., 333, 398, 401, 402, 404, 405, 408, 414

Phillips, J. R., 408

Phillips, Sergt., 54

Pierremande, 366, 374

Pietre, 29-31, 37, 38

Pike, C. S., 292, 309

Pilckem, 322

Pitman, G. R., 353, 400

Platts, H. C., 421

Plumbley, Sergt., 136, 406

Plumer, F.M. Lord, 24, 55, 294

Poelcapelle, 40, 306 _et seq._, 359

Polygon Wood, 298, 302

Pommier, 244, 245, 248, 249

Pont du Hem, 64, 224, 226

Pont Logy, 72

Pont Noyelles, 424, 442

Pont Remy, 85

Poperinghe, 306, 307, 320

Port, W. G., 270

Potizje, 45

Potter, A. F., 414, 475

Potter, C., 201, 281, 316

Potton, A., 119, 174, 193

Powell, J., 354

Pratt, E. C., 238, 249, 278

Price, J. W., 100, 121, 149, 154, 174, 193, 414, 469, 472

Prince, V. C., 323, 389, 446-448, 454, 455

Pronville, 329, 479

Proven, 321, 323

Puisieux-au-Mont, 240, 241, 384

Punjabis, 27th, 71

Punjabis, 89th, 66, 69

Pyne, P., 218, 223, 263

Pyper, J. R., 7, 54, 81, 82, 137

Pys, 240

Quéant, 265, 273-277, 326-329, 395, 472-479, 492

Quennell, W., 174, 189, 228

Quessy, 369, 370, 372-374

Quierzy, 365, 381

Ramillies, 490

Ramsey, W. D., 360

Rancourt, 178, 453-455

Randall, H. V. R., 328, 408, 486

Ransart, 239, 241, 245, 246

Ratcliffe, E. A., 327, 392

Rawlinson, Gen. Lord, 24, 74, 79, 156, 429

Read, F. C. J., 16, 101, 174, 193

Reed, A., 119

Rees, H. D., 223, 269, 300, 494

Reid, C. J., 251, 267

Reigersburg, 307, 308

Reninghelst, 44, 57, 305

Rhonelle, River, 496

Ribecourt, 332

Ribemont, 290, 423, 425, 442

Richards, C. S., 327, 407

Richards, R. J., 317, 320

Richards, W., 174, 193

Richardson, Lieut.-Col., 282, 283, 285, 370, 371

Richardson, C. E. V., 218, 229

Richardson, S. A. G., 201, 213, 214

Richardson, S. J., 315

Richebourg L'Avoué, 26, 29, 219

Richebourg St Vaast, 29 _et seq._

Ridley, J., 414

Riencourt, 274-276, 472

Riez Bailleul, 59 _et seq._, 224, 226, 413

Rifles, 57th, 23, 34, 39, 46, 52, 54, 60, 68, 69

Riley, Sergt., 284

Ringrose, L/Corpl., 236

Risley, E. H., 66, 128

Rix, L. G., 56, 174, 215, 218, 231

Robbins, C., 477

Roberts, C. H. W., 320

Roclincourt, 346 _et seq._, 393

Rogers, F. E., 455

Rombies, 498, 499

Ronnssoy Wood, 457

Ronville Caves, 411-414

Rosenbloom, Pte., 236

Rossington, G. L., 405

Rouge Croix, 61, 224, 226

Rouges Bancs, 58, 219

Roughton, W., 414

Rowlands, C. W., 327, 339-341, 344, 463, 466

Royal Fusiliers, 24, 88, 98, 118, 128, 132, 133, 330

Royal Marines, 90

Royal Munster Fusiliers, 85, 471

Royal Scots, 292, 461

Royal Warwickshire Regt., 218, 219

Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 73

Royce, P. F., 443, 458, 459

Ruel, C. S., 344

Rumaucourt, 486, 487, 491

Rundle, Gen. Sir Leslie, 86, 509

Russell, C. P., 201

Ryan, W., 477

Sailly-au-Bois, 150, 172-175

Sailly Labourse, 80

Sailly Laurette 430-432

Sailly-le-Sec, 180

Sailly Saillisel, 177, 194

St Amand, 142, 166 _et seq._

St Aubin, 349, 416

St Firmin, 369-371

St Gobain, Forêt de, 359 _et seq._

St Jans-ter-biezen, 320

St Jean, 45, 56

St Julien, 42, 45, 46, 295, 304, 306, 309-311, 318

St Leger, 246-249, 281, 467

St Martin-sur-Cojeul, 247, 253

St Omer, 20-24, 296, 307, 316, 321

St Paul's Bay, 9, 88, 508

St Pierre Vaast, 194, 455

St Pol, 350, 393

St Quentin, 242, 359 _et seq._, 444, 460

St Quentin Canal, 364 _et seq._

St Riquier, 175-180, 419

St Rohart Factory, 265, 467, 480

St Sauveur, 416, 418

St Vaast, 37

St Vaast-en-Chaussée, 215-218

Salisbury, 122, 123

Salter, F. F., 513

Sambre, River, 478 _et seq._

Sampson, C. A., 322

Sanctuary Wood, 299, 302

Sankey, T. H., 344

Sapignies, 290

Saqula, 110-112

Sari Bair Mountain, 91, 93

Sars-la-Bruyère, 502-504

Sassoon, Sir Philip, 15, 120

Sauchicourt Farm, 484

Sauchy-Cauchy, 481-485

Sauchy-Lestrée, 487

Saultain, 496, 497

Saulty, 292

Saunders, C. R., 6, 20, 47, 51, 53, 55

Savill, Lieut.-Col., 469, 470

Savy, Col., 54

Scarpe, River, 240, 252 _et seq._, 325, 394, 406, 443, 460 _et seq._,
479 _et seq._

Scheldt Canal, _v._ Escaut, 290

Schuler Farm, 312, 313

Scinde Rifles, 59th, 22

Scott, G. B., 6, 66

Seabury, E. R., 292, 315

Sebourg, 498-501

Sebourquiaux, 498-500

Sedd-el-Bahr, 94

Selby, A. J., 279

Sellars, A. J., 408

Selle River, 494, 495

Selmun, 9, 10, 12, 14

Sensée, River, 260, 262, 467 _et seq._

Senussi, 107-109

Senyard, F. G., 344

Sergeant, A., 216

Serre, 140, 240, 460

Servais, 381

Seyd, V. H., 16, 100, 104, 110, 111

Seys, S. A., 249, 275, 289, 311, 388, 424

Shand, W., 327

Sharp, A. G., 66, 174, 182

Shelton, Sergt.-Major, 231

Sheppard, L. H., 322, 389, 391

Sherwood, Corpl., 283

Sherwood Foresters, 166

Shoreham-by-Sea, 356, 427

Siddall, T., 201, 263

Sidi Bishr, 112

Sidi Gaber, 112

Siege Camp, 317, 318, 320

Sievwright, A. J. N., 421

Sikhs, 15th, 22, 49

Sikhs, 34th, 22

Sikhs, 47th, 22

Simencourt, 264, 271, 344, 346

Simmonds, R. S. B., 327, 342, 411, 463, 466

Simpson, A. H., 16, 88

Simpson, Pte., 405

Sinceny, 365, 386

Slater, H., 423, 440

Slattery, J., 443

Smalley, P. F., 174, 270

Smith, L/Corpl., 236

Smith, Major-Gen. D., 296

Smith, Pte., 350

Snell, H. A., 317, 320

Snow, Lieut.-Gen. D'Oyly, 141, 169, 255, 331

Souastre, 141 _et seq._

South Staffords, 166, 244, 288

Sparks, H. C., 163

Sparrow, Hanbury, 358, 426

Spence, C. W., 279

Spencer, F. C., 279

Spencer, J. T., 443

Speyer, C. A., 201, 211, 304

Spicer, E. E., 116, 238, 243, 327, 349, 398, 400, 407

Spiers, H. W., 201, 214, 223, 257, 300, 304, 494

Spooner, Pte., 350

Spring, D. G., 315, 317

Springfield, 310, 312

Spurr, C. C., 66

Staden, 317

Stanbridge, G. E., 137, 174, 231, 257, 300, 350, 417, 478

Stanham, H. G., 14, 16, 111, 149, 153, 159, 162, 163, 193

Stark, W. A., 16, 149, 154, 289, 311, 313, 315

Stedman, P. B. K., 6, 53, 55

Stedman, S. H., 116, 238, 317

Steenvoorde, 296, 297

Stevens, Pte., 350

Stevens, W., 122

Stevens, W. H., 16

Stevens, W. H. S., 113

Stevenson, E. A., 287

Stevenson, R. T., 414, 475

Stickney, F., 238, 276

Stickney, W. J., 238

Still, L. A., 443

Stillwell, E. H., 4, 14, 36, 56, 115

Stoaling, T., 238, 279

Stone, Pte., 350

Stotter, S. P., 223, 231, 252

Strazeele, 43

Strickland, Brig.-Gen. E. P., 22

Stuckey, E. L., 327, 336, 337, 349

Suffolks, 4th, 22, 61, 71, 369 _et seq._, 432

Sus-St Leger, 239

Sutcliffe, Major, 437

Sutton Veny, 236, 237

Swinchatt, P. C., 408

Sykes, J. T., 7, 36, 152, 159, 165, 194

Sylvester, G. H., 417, 501

Tadpole Copse, 332 _et seq._

Tadworth, 116, 117, 119

Tailles Wood, 445, 446

Taylor, C. M., 174, 212, 214

Taylor, F. S. C., 327, 466

Taylor, H. W., 501

Taylor, J., 288

Taylor, Sergt., 328

Telegraph Hill, 253 _et seq._, 413, 416

Tergnier, 366, 374-377

Thélus, 393, 397

Thézy-Glimont, 359

Thomas, N. L., 16, 88, 100, 121

Till, W. J., 443

Tilloy-les-Mofflaines, 253, 270, 412 _et seq._, 461

Tincques, 351, 418

Tollworthy, F. G., 383, 421, 442, 453, 455

Tomsett, E. S., 7, 81, 138, 174, 175

Torquay, 355

Tortille River, 454, 455

Towse, W. N., 16, 113

Towy Post, 398, 403, 406

Tracas Farm, 319

Travécy, 364, 369, 371

Trescault, 290

Trinidad Contingent, Second, 128

Trinquis, River, 479

Trones Wood, 182 _et seq._

Trotman, Brig.-Gen. C. N., 90

Tucker, A. W., 443

Turner, J. G., 259, 260

Tyrell, G., 344

Udall, F. G., 188, 402, 408, 477

Urquhart, Lieut.-Col., 436

Valenciennes, 494-496

Valetta, 9 _et seq._, 86-89, 508, 509

Vauchelles, 137

Vaulx-Vraucourt, 275

Vaux-sur-Somme, 180, 433, 449, 451

Vermelles, 76-81

Vernon, H. W., 16, 149, 153, 173, 185, 193

Vernon, W. H., 15, 119, 122, 201, 211, 214

Verquin, 81

Vickery, Pte., 242

Vieille Chapelle, 29, 32, 33

Vieux Berquin, 43

Ville-sur-Ancre, 208, 214

Villequier-Aumont, 377-379

Villers-Bretonneux, 365, 384 _et seq._

Villers Cotterets, 383, 385

Villers-lez-Cagnicourt, 479

Villers Plouich, 290

Villers-sire-Nicole, 506

Vimy Ridge, 247, 252, 254, 260, 294, 347, 394-397

Vine, G. H. M., 4, 6, 20, 34, 36, 66, 128-130, 356

Vines, W. F., 292, 315

Viry-Noureuil, 366 _et seq._

Vis-en-Artois, 479

Vitry-en-Artois, 491

Vitz Villeroy, 248

Vlamertinghe, 56, 306, 315-317

Volckeringhove, 306

Voskule, J. A., 414

Vouel, 374-378

Wailly, 248

Wakefield, Sir Chas., 150

Walker, F. W., 106, 292, 312, 314, 315, 317, 388, 423, 433, 440

Walker, T. I., 7, 11, 54, 55

Walker, Brig.-Gen. W. R., 22

Wallace, Major-Gen. Sir A., 90, 107

Wallder, H. W., 344

Walmisley, S. E. H., 66, 81, 137

Wancourt, 253 _et seq._, 393, 467, 492

Wardan, 107

Wardle, L. F., 366, 374, 384

Warloy, 420

Warlus, 270

Warminster, 236

Warren, L/Corpl., 242

Warren, W. D., 307, 312, 315

Watson, B. A., 312-315

Watts, L. L., 478, 488, 490

Weathersbee, H. W., 7, 20, 66

Webb, L. R., 216

Webb, T. Montgomerie, 130, 358

Webster, J. R., 16, 94, 112, 152, 153, 185, 193

Webster, W. H., 154, 221, 227, 231

Wedge Wood, 178 _et seq._

Weekes, L/Corpl., 350

Wellby, E. V., 14, 116, 117

Welsh Regiment, 427

Westcott, A., 315

Westerman, Pte., 350

Westhoek, 295, 296

Westoutre, 44, 57

Westroosebeek, 317, 320

West Yorkshire Regiment, 353

Wheatley, J. H. L., 280, 282, 283, 287

Wheatley, L. L., 113, 138, 148, 161, 162, 180, 206, 211, 214, 217

Whitehead, H., 162, 163, 216

Whitworth, Corpl., 283

Wickens, J., 344

Wieltje, 45, 46

Wilde, E. T., Rodney, 122, 128

Wilderspin, H. O., 315

Wildman, C. J. C., 360

Wilkinson, Corpl., 236

Willcocks, Gen. Sir J., 22, 24, 60

Willerval, 347, 393, 397

Williams, F. G., 322, 375, 384

Williams, Col., 123

Williams, H. J. M., 66, 119, 223, 322, 369, 384

Williams, H. N., 223, 269, 300, 349, 398, 401, 407, 408, 411, 463,
469, 472, 478, 494, 506

Williams, N. W., 88, 149, 153, 174

Williams, S. M., 249, 287

Willmott, W. A., 344

Wilson, E. D., 116, 118

Wilson, Sergt.-Major, 494

Wise, F. S., 414, 417

Wood, A. E., 116, 117

Wood, Col. Evelyn, 150

Wood, J. C., 443, 448

Woodington, A., 360, 384

Woodyeat, E., 414

Wreford, L. W., 223, 270, 272, 304

Wright, Capt., 382, 458

Wytschaete Ridge, 294

Yeoman, B. F. L., 88, 149, 159, 165

York and Lanc. Regiment, 347

Yorkshires, 2nd, 488

Yoxall, T., 417, 466

Yser Canal and River, 40, 41, 229, 295, 307 _et seq._

Ytres, 290

Zelobes, 27

Zillebeeke, 294, 295

Zonnebeeke, 40, 42, 297

Zouafques, 316, 317

TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES

Added missing page number to Scheldt Canal index listing on p. 540.

Silently corrected simple spelling, grammar, and typographical
errors.

Retained anachronistic and non-standard spellings as printed.

Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.

*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The War History of the 4th Battalion The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) 1914-1919" ***

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