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Title: Chickamauga and Chattanooga Battlefields - Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park—Georgia, Tennessee
Author: Sullivan, James R.
Language: English
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[Illustration: DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,: March 3, 1849]
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Stewart L. Udall, _Secretary_
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
Conrad L. Wirth, _Director_
_HISTORICAL HANDBOOK NUMBER TWENTY-FIVE_
This publication is one of a series of handbooks describing the
historical and archeological areas in the National Park System
administered by the National Park Service of the United States
Department of the Interior. It is printed by the Government Printing
Office and may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents,
Washington 25, D. C. Price 25 cents.
Chickamauga and Chattanooga Battlefields
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL MILITARY PARK · GEORGIA—TENNESSEE
_by James R. Sullivan_
[Illustration: DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,: March 3, 1849]
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES No. 25
Washington, D. C., 1956
(Reprint 1961)
_The National Park System, of which Chickamauga and Chattanooga
National Military Park is a unit, is dedicated to conserving the
scenic, scientific, and historic heritage of the United States for the
benefit and inspiration of its people._
[Illustration: NATIONAL PARK SERVICE · DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR]
_Contents_
_Page_
WARTIME IMPORTANCE OF CHATTANOOGA AND EAST TENNESSEE 2
WINTER, 1863 4
THE TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN 5
FROM TULLAHOMA TO CHICKAMAUGA 8
REINFORCEMENTS FOR GENERAL BRAGG 10
MANEUVER FOR POSITION 13
THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 14
September 18—Preliminaries 15
September 19—First Day 18
September 20—Second Day 19
THE SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA 24
REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE BESIEGED ARMY 27
LIFTING THE SIEGE—THE BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA 33
Sherman Moves 35
The Battle Above the Clouds, November 24 35
Missionary Ridge, November 25 39
RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE 42
EFFECTS OF THE BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA 44
THE WAR AFTER CHATTANOOGA 44
GUIDE TO THE AREA 47
Chickamauga Battlefield 47
Missionary Ridge 52
Point Park 55
THE PARK 56
HOW TO REACH THE PARK 56
ABOUT YOUR VISIT 57
RELATED AREAS 59
ADMINISTRATION 59
SUGGESTED READINGS 60
TABLES
1. Union Army at Chickamauga 16
2. Confederate Army at Chickamauga 17
3. Union Army at Chattanooga 34
4. Confederate Army at Chattanooga 35
[Illustration: _Moccasin Bend of the Tennessee River from Point Park
on Lookout Mountain._]
[Illustration: Cannon and crew.]
In and around strategically important Chattanooga, Tenn., in the autumn
of 1863, there occurred some of the most complex maneuvers and hard
fighting of the Civil War. The Confederate victory at Chickamauga
(September 19-20) gave new hope to the South after the defeats at
Gettysburg and Vicksburg in July of that year. At Chattanooga (November
23-25) Union forces under Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant blasted this hope
and prepared the way for the capture of Atlanta and Sherman’s “March to
the Sea.” Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park, oldest and
largest of the national military parks, commemorates the heroic soldiers
of both North and South in the battles for the control of Chattanooga.
The year 1863 proved to be one of victory for the Union forces. Three
great campaigns took place which shaped the destiny of the war. The
first, a decisive blow at Gettysburg, forced a Confederate army under
Gen. Robert E. Lee to abandon its attempt to invade Northern soil. Lee
began an orderly retreat to Virginia on July 4.
On the same day, but far removed from the fields of Gettysburg, Lt. Gen.
John C. Pemberton surrendered his army and the City of Vicksburg, Miss.,
to General Grant. The fall of Vicksburg, simultaneous with the victory
at Gettysburg, gave heart and strength to the North, while Confederate
morale dropped.
The third campaign, Murfreesboro to Chattanooga, slow and uncertain in
its first phases, and including later the great Confederate victory at
Chickamauga, culminated nearly 5 months after the other two in ultimate
victory for the North in the Battle of Chattanooga.
_Wartime Importance of Chattanooga and East Tennessee_
Chattanooga had only 2,545 inhabitants in 1860, but its importance was
out of all proportion to its size. Situated where the Tennessee River
passes through the Cumberland Mountains, forming gaps, it was called the
“Key to East Tennessee” and “Gateway to the deep South.” The possession
of Chattanooga was vital to the Confederacy, and a coveted goal of the
Northern armies.
Chattanooga’s principal importance during the Civil War was its position
as a railroad center. Four lines radiated in the four principal
directions—to the North and Middle West via Nashville, to the western
States via Memphis, to the South and southern seaboard via Atlanta, and
to Richmond and the North Atlantic States via Knoxville.
By 1863 both sides were aware of the great advantages of strategic
railroad lines. Lt. Gen. Braxton Bragg had made skillful use of the
railroads in 1862, when he suddenly shifted his army from Mississippi to
Chattanooga to begin his drive across Tennessee and into Kentucky.
President Lincoln had long recognized the importance of railroads in
this area. In the same year Lincoln said, “To take and hold the railroad
at or east of Cleveland, in East Tennessee, I think fully as important
as the taking and holding of Richmond.” And in 1863 Lincoln wrote Maj.
Gen. William S. Rosecrans, “If we can hold Chattanooga and East
Tennessee, I think the rebellion must dwindle and die. I think you and
[General] Burnside can do this, and hence doing so is your main object.”
The armies that traversed this region found it a fertile farming area.
East Tennessee’s rich grain fields supplied not only wheat, corn, and
hay, but beef, pork, bacon, horses, and mules. It was a vital region for
the armies of the Confederacy. It not only supported the troops that
occupied that region, but large quantities of provisions were shipped to
other armies.
In addition to the military and economic reasons, a political factor had
to be considered in the struggle for control of East Tennessee. The
people there, living in a mountainous area unlike the rest of the State,
wished to adhere to the Union. The people maintained their allegiance to
the Old Whig party, and there was an attitude of suspicion and distrust
toward the Democrats. They were mostly small farmers with little cash
income, who had a dislike for the wealthy plantation- and slave-owning
class.
After fighting broke out at Fort Sumter, neighbors began to take sides.
An uneasy truce prevailed until November 1861 when small groups of Union
men struck blows at widely dispersed railroad bridges. The cancellation
of a projected northern campaign into East Tennessee left the Unionists
there without support, and the Confederates took retaliatory measures.
Many of the Unionists in East Tennessee fled to Kentucky to enlist in
the Union Army; others hid in the mountains. While relief to this
section of Tennessee by the Union Army was not to come until 1863, it
was not forgotten by President Lincoln.
[Illustration: _Wartime view of Chattanooga from north bank of the
Tennessee River._ From _Harper’s Pictorial History of the Great
Rebellion_.]
[Illustration: _Gen. Braxton Bragg, Commander Army of Tennessee._
Courtesy National Archives.]
[Illustration: _Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, Commander Army of
the Cumberland._ Courtesy National Archives.]
_Winter 1863_
After the battle of Stones River, or Murfreesboro, Tenn., December 31,
1862, to January 2, 1863, the Union Army of the Cumberland, under Maj.
Gen. William Rosecrans, and the Confederate Army of Tennessee, commanded
by Gen. Braxton Bragg, remained relatively inactive for several months.
During this time the Union forces entrenched themselves at Murfreesboro.
General Bragg withdrew his forces southward and established his
headquarters at Tullahoma. He placed his army in a defensive position to
cover the routes, both rail and road, to Chattanooga.
Impatient at the inaction, the War Department in Washington urged
Rosecrans to move against Bragg’s army. Grant, conducting his Vicksburg
campaign, wanted pressure applied against Bragg’s army to prevent all or
part of it from reinforcing the Confederates in Mississippi. At the same
time Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee, reminded the
authorities in Washington of the plight of the East Tennesseans. During
this period, Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside gathered a Union force and
made plans to invade East Tennessee.
Rosecrans hesitated to move. His lack of cavalry was a disadvantage in
gathering intelligence and prevented him from countering the Confederate
cavalry which harassed him constantly. In June, Maj. Gen. Henry W.
Halleck, general in chief, U. S. Army, wired Rosecrans asking him, “Is
it your intention to make an immediate movement forward? A definite
answer, yes or no, is required.” Rosecrans telegraphed: “In reply to
your inquiry, if immediate means tonight or tomorrow, no. If it means as
soon as all things are ready, say five days, yes.” On June 24, General
Rosecrans put his army of some 60,000 men in motion.
_The Tullahoma Campaign_
The Army of the Cumberland—the Union force—had undergone a
reorganization since the Battle of Stones River. It now comprised three
corps: The Fourteenth, Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas in command; the
Twentieth, Maj. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook in command; and the
Twenty-first, Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden in command. Maj. Gen. David
S. Stanley commanded the Cavalry Corps. Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger
commanded the Reserve Corps.
The left wing of General Bragg’s defense line was at Shelbyville under
Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk and its right wing at Wartrace and Fairfield
under Lt. Gen. William Hardee—a line nearly 13 miles long. Two
Confederate cavalry corps occupied positions on either flank—that on the
right at McMinnville under Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler, the other on the
left at Columbia under Brig. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest. The total strength
of the Army of Tennessee was approximately 43,000 men at this time.
The Confederate position was good. The terrain favored a defensive
fight. To traverse the Cumberland Plateau the Union Army would have to
move along roads that pierced the mountains by way of Hoover’s, Liberty,
and Guy’s Gaps. The railroad to Chattanooga and another road passed
through Bellbuckle Gap. This latter route and the road by way of
Shelbyville were well fortified. Rosecrans resolved to make a feint
toward Shelbyville with Granger’s Reserve Corps and most of the cavalry
while the rest of his army moved toward the Confederate right. After
stubborn fights at Hoover’s and Liberty Gaps the Confederates withdrew
toward Tullahoma. So successful was Rosecrans’ flanking movement that
Col. John T. Wilder’s mounted infantry brigade reached Decherd, on the
main line of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and destroyed the
depot and a few hundred yards of track. Although Wilder withdrew when
superior Confederate forces appeared, his raid against the railroad was
of great importance in forcing Bragg to evacuate Tullahoma.
[Illustration: UNION ADVANCE
MURFREESBORO TO CHATTANOOGA]
Rough terrain and bad weather were the worst enemies of the Union Army.
Brig. Gen. John Beatty records in his diary that “The road was
exceedingly rough, and the rebels had made it impassable, for artillery,
by rolling great rocks into it and felling trees across it.” He
frequently mentions the rain which fell incessantly during the campaign.
His entry of July 5 states that “Since we left Murfreesboro (June 24)
rain has been falling almost constantly; today it has been coming down
in torrents, and the low grounds around us are overflowed.” Yet, in
spite of mountains and rain and the Confederate Army, Rosecrans, by this
series of brilliant flanking maneuvers, forced Bragg to evacuate
Tullahoma on July 1 and withdraw toward Chattanooga.
_From Tullahoma to Chickamauga_
After the Tullahoma campaign, the two armies adopted their previous
policy of remaining stationary. Each began to gather forces and
equipment for a future struggle. The Union Army occupied a line from
Winchester to McMinnville—the same territory the Confederates had
occupied previously—while the Confederate General Bragg established his
headquarters at Chattanooga. There the Army of Tennessee strengthened
its defensive position and prepared to close the “gate” to further
advances of the Army of the Cumberland.
During July and August, Halleck again urged Rosecrans to move against
Bragg’s forces, but Rosecrans failed to budge. In the latter’s judgment,
three things were needed to insure a successful campaign. The first was
ripe corn which would not be ready until August; the second was the
repair of the railroad to the Tennessee River; and the third was support
for his flanks. In spite of the constant flow of dispatches from Halleck
to Rosecrans, it was not until August 16 that he began his movement
southward to cross the river.
As Rosecrans moved toward the Tennessee River and Chattanooga, another
Union army under command of General Burnside entered east Tennessee to
threaten Knoxville. General Bragg, supposing that the two armies would
join forces to attack him, made urgent appeals for help. Though the
shortage of manpower at this time was a major problem of the
Confederacy, troops were sent hurrying to Bragg from several directions.
Rosecrans’ strategy, after viewing several possibilities, was to cross
the river below Chattanooga, turn the Confederate left and interrupt his
opponent’s communications and supply line from Atlanta. This movement if
successful would effectively cut all railroad lines to Chattanooga, and
Bragg would find himself shut in between Burnside on the north and east
and Rosecrans on the west and south. To deceive Bragg as to the point of
crossing the Tennessee River, Rosecrans sent Hazen’s and Wagner’s
infantry brigades, Wilder’s mounted infantry, and Minty’s cavalry, all
under the command of Brig. Gen. William B. Hazen, to make a feint at the
river north of the town and to annoy the enemy as much as possible.
[Illustration: _Union troops constructing a pontoon bridge across
the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, Ala. Ruins of Nashville and
Chattanooga Railroad bridge shown._ Courtesy Library of Congress.]
The ruse was successful, and so thoroughly was Bragg deceived into
thinking the attack would come from upstream on the north side of the
Tennessee, he left the crossings below Chattanooga practically
unguarded. Rosecrans with the bulk of his army then crossed the river in
the vicinity of Bridgeport and Caperton’s Ferry, Ala., and Shellmound,
Tenn. By September 4, the Army of the Cumberland, thus meeting little
opposition, was safely across a great barrier and was threatening Bragg
from new positions.
When Bragg learned that the Union Army had crossed the Tennessee below
Chattanooga and was threatening his supply lines, he decided after much
deliberation to abandon his position and retreat southward.
Once the Union Army had crossed the river, Thomas’ corps marched toward
Trenton, Ga.; McCook’s took the road to Alpine, Ga.; and Crittenden
moved toward Chattanooga. On the 9th of September, Rosecrans, believing
the Confederates to be in full retreat, ordered McCook to press forward
toward Alpine, covered by the cavalry, and make attempts to cut Bragg
off; Crittenden to garrison Chattanooga with one brigade and pursue
Bragg by way of the Ringgold Road with the rest of his force; and Thomas
to continue toward Trenton.
In order to understand the importance of the movements of both
commanding generals, the geography of the country must be considered.
When the Union commanders climbed to the top of the Lookout Mountain
range and viewed the country, they began to have misgivings about their
divided army. Thomas and McCook, 20 and 40 miles southwest of
Chattanooga, respectively, found themselves on a mountain ribbed by
ridges and hills, more than 1,000 feet above the valley floor. The few
roads which ran over the mountain were narrow, rough, stony, and
unusually steep.
Thomas, looking to the east, saw Pigeon Mountain, a spur that juts off
Lookout Mountain and veers in a northeastwardly direction. The acute
angle of these diverging mountains forms McLemore’s Cove. Running into
this cove from the northeast and ending there is the southern extremity
of Missionary Ridge which begins immediately east of Chattanooga. Here,
also, originates Chickamauga Creek which gave the ensuing battle its
name.
As the two Union corps moved eastward they found the country sparsely
populated. There were a few farms, but most of the land was covered with
cedar thickets and tangled undergrowth. The roads connecting farm and
village were dry and dusty.
The Union Army was now split into three distinct columns with its flanks
more than 40 miles apart. In mountainous terrain, this made it
impossible for them to support one another. In the period September
10-12, corps commanders began to receive reports that a large
Confederate force was at LaFayette, Ga. It was Bragg’s army. He had not
retreated as far south as Rosecrans had thought—he had stopped at
LaFayette behind Pigeon Mountain. There he concentrated his army and
awaited reinforcements.
[Illustration: _Wooden railroad trestle at Cumberland Ravine, Ga.,
erected by Union Army to replace bridge destroyed by Confederates._
Courtesy National Archives.]
_Reinforcements for General Bragg_
General Bragg had purposely given the impression that his army was
disorganized and in full flight before Rosecrans. Actually, however, he
was not running away but was quietly preparing for battle and gathering
strength as reinforcements began to reach him. Realizing that Maj. Gen.
Simon Bolivar Buckner’s Corps could not defend Knoxville from Burnside,
and having no troops to spare for reinforcements, Bragg ordered Buckner
to rejoin the Army of Tennessee. Buckner’s Corps of 8,000 men joined
Bragg about the time the latter evacuated Chattanooga. Gen. Joseph E.
Johnston from his army in Mississippi sent two divisions (about 9,000
men), under command of Major Generals John C. Breckinridge and W. H. T.
Walker. A little later at Bragg’s insistence Johnston sent two brigades,
under command of Brigadier Generals John Gregg and Evander McNair. These
brigades added 2,500 more troops to Bragg’s Army.
[Illustration: ROUTE OF REINFORCEMENTS _FOR_ GENERAL BRAGG _AT_
CHICKAMAUGA]
About this same time preparations were under way to reinforce General
Bragg further with Lt. Gen. James Longstreet’s corps from the Army of
Northern Virginia.
The movement of Longstreet’s troops from Virginia to reinforce General
Bragg in Georgia was an outstanding logistical achievement for the
Confederacy. Even though by this time railroads had become an important
factor in the strategy of war, no major troop movement involving so many
lines over such a long distance had yet been attempted. It also shows
the great concern the Southern War Department felt for the approaching
battle.
From the Army of Northern Virginia to General Bragg’s forces in Georgia
was a distance of some 900 miles by railroad lines through Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. It was necessary for the
troops to take this longer and roundabout route of reaching General
Bragg because General Burnside had cut the railroad line by way of
Knoxville.
By the summer of 1863 the railroads in the Confederacy were in very poor
condition, for it had been extremely difficult to replace rails and
rolling stock as the war continued. For the most part, the lines were
comparatively short; were not connected at many points; lacked bridges
across some of the major rivers; and like railroads everywhere, had
different gauges. Sixteen different railroad lines were involved in the
transfer as all parallel routes and all types of rolling stock were
pressed into service.
In spite of all these difficulties, however, the movement was attended
with dispatch and secrecy. Leaving the vicinity of Orange Courthouse,
Va., on or about September 9, the advance brigades of Longstreet’s Corps
were joining General Bragg 9 days later. Mrs. Mary B. Chestnut recorded
in her diary what she saw of this troop movement:
At Kingsville (S. C.) on my way to Camden, I caught a glimpse of
Longstreet’s Corps going past.... It was a strange sight. What seemed
miles of platform cars, and soldiers rolled in their blankets lying in
rows with their heads all covered, fast asleep. In their grey blankets
packed in regular order, they looked like swathed mummies. One man
nearby was writing on his knee. He used his cap for a desk, and he was
seated on a rail.
Information on the details of the movement, of the delays, the hazards
encountered, as well as the number of men, animals, and artillery
transported is difficult to find. A fair estimate of the number of
troops is 15,000.
[Illustration: _Longstreet’s soldiers detraining below Ringgold,
Ga., September 18, 1863. From there they marched into battle at
Chickamauga._ A. R. Waud wartime sketch. From _Battlefields in Dixie
Land and Chickamauga National Military Park_.]
Only part of the infantry troops, and none of the artillery, arrived in
time to participate in the Battle of Chickamauga; Longstreet himself was
not present for the first day’s fighting but three of his brigades were.
The five brigades (about 9,000 men) which took part in the second day of
battle became heroes along with their commander when they broke through
the Union line.
_Maneuver for Position_
Bragg was aware of the isolated positions of the Union Army, and he saw
an opportunity to strike his opponent in detail, one corps at a time,
while they were not in supporting distance of each other. He issued
orders to Maj. Gen. T. C. Hindman and Lt. Gen. D. H. Hill to strike Maj.
Gen. James S. Negley’s division of Thomas’ corps, which was in an
advanced position at McLemore’s Cove, but Hill failed to carry out his
order. Bragg ordered Buckner to join Hindman which he did on September
10. Instead of attacking Negley, the two Confederate commanders decided
that a different plan was needed for the situation and sent their
recommendation to Bragg. While this correspondence passed back and
forth, Negley withdrew and rejoined the rest of Thomas’ corps. The
Confederates had now lost their opportunity to strike and possibly
destroy this division.
Two days later a similar situation arose with the same result—loss of
the opportunity to strike another corps in detail. This time Bragg
ordered Polk to move his and Walker’s corps to Lee and Gordon’s Mills to
strike Union General Crittenden’s divided force. Two of Crittenden’s
divisions had marched toward Ringgold; one had moved to Lee and Gordon’s
Mills. Polk, instead of attacking, went on the defensive and asked for
reinforcements. For the second time in 3 days, subordinate Confederate
commanders allowed a Union corps to regroup.
Rosecrans now realized Bragg had concentrated and reinforced his army,
and that his own force was in danger of annihilation in its divided
condition. Accordingly he ordered General Granger, commanding the
Reserve Corps in the vicinity of Bridgeport, Ala., to Chattanooga;
General Crittenden to position at Lee and Gordon’s Mills on Chickamauga
Creek, some 12 miles south of Chattanooga; and General Thomas to move
northward toward Crittenden as soon as he was joined by General McCook’s
Corps, which had been commanded to make haste in joining the other
corps.
In the hurried concentration of the Army of the Cumberland, McCook
withdrew from Alpine and chose to retrace his way by crossing over
Lookout Mountain, thence up Lookout Valley where he had to recross the
mountain to join General Thomas. It took McCook approximately 5 days
(September 13 to 17) to complete this movement, greatly to the
consternation of Rosecrans who had expected McCook to follow the shorter
route on top of Lookout Mountain or roads through McLemore’s Cove. Some
of the troops, however, such as the Second Division, did forced marches
in some instances of 25 miles in a day.
Bragg made no effort to prevent this concentration of the Union forces,
and during the night of September 17 the three corps were within
supporting distance of each other. The Union left was at Lee and
Gordon’s Mills, and from there the line extended west and south through
McLemore’s Cove to Stevens Gap through Lookout Mountain.
_The Battle of Chickamauga_
Chafing over the failure of his subordinate commanders to strike the
divided units of Rosecrans’ army and wishing to seize the initiative,
General Bragg had his troops do an “about face.” Turning northward, he
planned an all-out attack on General Crittenden who had been following
in his rear since the evacuation of Chattanooga and was now at Lee and
Gordon’s Mills. General Bragg moved his troops northward on the east
side of the Chickamauga Creek. His plan was to cross the Chickamauga
north of Lee and Gordon’s Mills, seize the roads leading to Chattanooga,
bear down on Crittenden, and crush this corps or drive it back into the
Union center in McLemore’s Cove. By turning the Union left in this
manner, he hoped to force Rosecrans back into the mountains and to
reoccupy Chattanooga.
Maj. Gen. John B. Hood (Longstreet’s Corps) and Brig. Gen. Bushrod
Johnson’s troops were to cross at Reeds Bridge and turn left; Walker’s
Corps to cross at Alexander’s Bridge; Buckner to cross at Tedford’s
Ford; Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk’s Corps to cross at Lee and Gordon’s Mills;
and Hill’s Corps to cover the Confederate left.
Bragg did not seem to suspect that Rosecrans had guessed his intentions,
and was hurriedly moving to support Crittenden and deploying his troops
so as to protect the roads to Chattanooga.
SEPTEMBER 18—PRELIMINARIES.
On the morning of the 18th the three advanced brigades of Longstreet’s
Corps from Virginia arrived at Ringgold. One brigade immediately joined
Bushrod Johnson’s division as it prepared to cross Chickamauga Creek at
Reed’s Bridge. Union cavalry under Col. Robert H. G. Minty and mounted
infantry under command of Col. John T. Wilder, guarding the bridges,
offered stout resistance and delayed the crossing of the southern troops
for several hours. During the skirmishing, Minty’s men dismantled
Alexander’s Bridge and forced Walker to proceed to Lambert’s Ford, a
half-mile downstream. The Confederates used other fords and crossings
throughout the late afternoon and night as all of Bragg’s forces, except
three divisions, crossed to the west side of Chickamauga Creek.
The Union forces were not idle, and during the night Rosecrans moved
Thomas’ corps northeastward above and back of Crittenden, so that Bragg
would not outflank the Federal line. Negley’s Division remained near
Crawfish Springs (now Chickamauga), Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds’
Division near Widow Glenn’s, and Brigadier Generals Absalom Baird’s and
John M. Brannan’s Divisions covered the roads leading to Reed’s and
Alexander’s Bridges. General McCook’s Corps moved to position in
McLemore’s Cove.
The situation at dawn on the 19th found the two armies facing each other
over a stretch of several miles along the banks of the Chickamauga.
Rosecrans had been able in a short time to maneuver the Army of the
Cumberland into position so that it interposed between Bragg and
Chattanooga. His Reserve Corps under General Granger was at McAfee’s
Church, near Rossville. Thomas’ Fourteenth Army Corps composed the
Union’s left a few miles south of Granger, and formed a southwesterly
line to Crawfish Spring where it joined McCook, forming the right in
McLemore’s Cove. Crittenden’s Twenty-First Army Corps remained
concentrated at Lee and Gordon’s Mills, somewhat in front of the other
two corps, to protect the Union center.
Table 1.—_Union Army at Chickamauga_
_Army of the Cumberland_—Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans
_Fourteenth Army Corps_—Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas
1st Division—Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird
2d Division—Maj. Gen. James S. Negley
3d Division—Brig. Gen. John M. Brannan
4th Division—Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds
_Twentieth Army Corps_—Maj. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook
1st Division—Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis
2d Division—Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson
3d Division—Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan
_Twenty-first Army Corps_—Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden
1st Division—Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood
2d Division—Maj. Gen. John M. Palmer
3d Division—Brig. Gen. H. P. Van Cleve
_Reserve Corps_—Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger
1st Division—Brig. Gen. James B. Steedman
2d Division—Col. Daniel McCook
_Cavalry Corps_—Brig. Gen. Robert B. Mitchell
1st Division—Col. Edward M. McCook
2d Division—Brig. Gen. George Crook
[Illustration: _“The First Gun at Chickamauga.” Confederates open
fire on Union cavalry at Reed’s Bridge._ A. R. Waud wartime sketch.
From Brown, _The Mountain Campaign in Georgia_.]
Table 2.—_Confederate Army at Chickamauga_
_Army of Tennessee_—Gen. Braxton Bragg[1]
_Right Wing_—Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk
_Cheatham’s Division_—Maj. Gen. B. F. Cheatham
_Hill’s Corps_—Lt. Gen. Daniel H. Hill
Cleburne’s Division—Maj. Gen. P. R. Cleburne
Breckinridge’s Division—Maj. Gen. J. C. Breckinridge
_Reserve Corps_—Maj. Gen. W. H. T. Walker
Walker’s Division—Brig. Gen. S. R. Gist
Liddell’s Division—Brig. Gen. St. John R. Liddell
_Left Wing_—Lt. Gen. James Longstreet
_Hindman’s Division_—Maj. Gen. T. C. Hindman
_Buckner’s Corps_—Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner
Stewart’s Division—Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart
Preston’s Division—Brig. Gen. William Preston
Johnson’s Division—Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson
_Longstreet’s Corps_—Maj. Gen. John B. Hood
McLaw’s Division—Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw
Hood’s Division—Maj. Gen. John B. Hood, Brig. Gen. E. McIver
Law
_Corps Artillery_[2]—Col. E. Porter Alexander
_Reserve Artillery, Army of Tennessee_—Maj. Felix H. Robertson
_Cavalry_—Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler
Wharton’s Division—Brig. Gen. John A. Wharton
Martin’s Division—Brig. Gen. William T. Martin
Forrest’s Corps—Brig. Gen. N. B. Forrest
Armstrong’s Division—Brig. Gen. Frank C. Armstrong
Pegram’s Division—Brig. Gen. John Pegram
[1]General Bragg’s army was composed of Polk’s, Hill’s, Buckner’s,
Longstreet’s (Hood’s), and Walker’s (Reserve) Corps of infantry, and
Wheeler’s and Forrest’s Corps of cavalry. For the second day’s fight
the army was divided into two wings. General Polk commanding the
right and General Longstreet the left.
[2]In transit, did not take part in the battle.
Bragg’s Army of Tennessee, except three divisions, was concentrated on
the west side of the Chickamauga from Reeds Bridge almost to Dalton’s
Ford, near Lee and Gordon’s Mills. The divisions had been shuffled
around during the night, and remained so for the first day’s battle.
Brig. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest’s cavalry held the right flank at
Reeds Bridge; then, in succession toward the left (south), were Walker’s
Corps; Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham’s Division (Polk’s Corps);
Longstreet’s Corps (under Maj. Gen. John B. Hood); and Buckner’s Corps.
On the east side of the stream and forming the right were Maj. Gen.
Patrick R. Cleburne’s Division (Hill’s Corps), preparing to cross at
Tedford’s Ford; Maj. Gen. T. C. Hindman’s Division (Polk’s Corps)
opposite Lee and Gordon’s Mills; and Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge’s
Division (Hill’s Corps) forming the extreme left opposite Glass’ Mill.
Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler’s cavalry, stationed at the upper fords of the
Chickamauga, held the left flank.
[Illustration: _Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, “The Rock of
Chickamauga.”_ Courtesy National Archives.]
Neither army knew the exact position of the other as they maneuvered for
position during the night. The densely wooded area, covered with tangled
undergrowth, brambles and cedar thickets, prevented easy movement or
good observation, and many of the officers had difficulty keeping in
touch with their own commands.
The armies were so close to each other, in some instances only a few
hundred yards apart, that it was inevitable a clash would soon take
place, but at what point no one could say.
SEPTEMBER 19—FIRST DAY.
Early in the morning of September 19, Thomas ordered Brannan forward to
reconnoiter the Confederate forces which had crossed the Chickamauga. In
this manner, Col. John T. Croxton’s brigade of infantry accidentally ran
into some of Forrest’s cavalry, which were dismounted and serving as
infantry, at Jay’s Mill near Reed’s Bridge. And so the battle began.
Croxton drove Forrest back, but reinforcements hurried to the latter
forced Croxton to give ground. Suddenly the commanding generals realized
that a major conflict was upon them, and they hurriedly sent troops into
the fight as first one side and then the other gained the upper hand.
Rosecrans, by rapid and forced marches, brought up his troops from
Crawfish Springs. Bragg ordered his left wing divisions to cross to the
west side of the Chickamauga. By mid-afternoon major fighting had spread
along a jagged line some 3 miles in length. All the Union divisions,
with the exception of Granger’s reserve force, became involved. The
Confederate troops were also largely engaged, except Hindman and
Breckinridge who crossed over during the late afternoon and night.
When the battle ended for the day, little progress could be shown by
either side. The fighting had been furious and without much plan.
Bragg’s troops had reached the LaFayette-Chattanooga Road but were not
able to hold the position. Neither side could claim a victory. Bragg had
failed to crush the Union left, and Rosecrans remained in possession of
the roads to Chattanooga. The losses on both sides were heavy.
As night fell and darkness settled over the battlefield the fighting
stopped, but there was little rest for the weary soldiers. Rosecrans
brought the Army of the Cumberland into a more compact defensive line;
Thomas’ Corps, heavily reinforced, formed the left in a bulge east of
the LaFayette Road at Kelly’s Field.
Throughout the night the Confederates heard the ring of axes as the
Union troops cut trees and logs to form breastworks. McCook’s Corps in
the center faced LaFayette Road; Crittenden’s Corps on the right was a
little withdrawn west of the road.
During the night, Longstreet arrived with two more brigades ready for
action. Bragg then decided to form the Army of Tennessee into two wings
for offensive action the next day. He placed General Polk in command of
the right wing and General Longstreet the left. The Confederate Army,
facing west between Chickamauga Creek and the LaFayette Road formed a
line more or less parallel with the road.
[Illustration: _Confederate line of battle in woods at Chickamauga._
From _Battles and Leaders of the Civil War_.]
SEPTEMBER 20—SECOND DAY.
General Bragg issued orders to his subordinates to resume the battle at
daybreak. On the Confederate right Breckinridge’s Division was to begin
the attack which would be taken up by successive divisions to the left.
Sunday morning came. Daylight began to creep over the battlefield. The
sun rose, but no attack came. Bragg waited impatiently. Finally, the
orders reached Hill at 7:30 a.m. Further delay followed as the troops
moved into position. About 9:30 a.m. Breckinridge advanced to attack,
followed by Cleburne. The extreme left of the Union line fell back, but
the fire from the Union breastworks halted further Confederate advance.
Reinforcements hurried to Thomas. In further fighting at this part of
the line neither side made any considerable gain, as Rosecrans sought to
hold his left against Polk’s furious attacks. Almost equally matched,
neither Thomas nor Polk could show any appreciable gains throughout the
morning. About 11 o’clock a lull occurred as Longstreet’s wing prepared
to move against the center in Bragg’s plan of attack.
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA
SEPTEMBER 20, 1863]
[Illustration: _Lt. Gen. James Longstreet._ Courtesy National
Archives.]
[Illustration: _Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk._ Courtesy National
Archives.]
The Union center at which Longstreet pointed his attack was held by
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood’s Division which had replaced Negley’s
Division in the line when the latter had reinforced Thomas early in the
morning. To the immediate left of Wood were the troops of Brannan’s
Division, and on Brannan’s left, Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds’ Division.
An hour before noon as the Confederate right wing poised to strike, an
irreparable blunder occurred on the Union side. A staff officer riding
from Thomas’ headquarters near Kelly Field reported to Rosecrans that he
had noticed Brannan’s Division was out of line and believed “General
Reynolds’ right was exposed.” Rosecrans, without further investigation,
immediately ordered Wood to “close up on Reynolds as fast as possible
and support him.” In order to do this, Wood had to pull his division out
of line and march behind Brannan’s Division toward Reynolds. Wood’s
division had left its place in the line, creating a true gap where none
had actually existed before, and had started to march northward behind
Brannan when Longstreet’s column of five divisions accidentally struck
into the gap.
Longstreet’s attack hit Wood’s and Brannan’s Divisions on their exposed
flank and drove them from the immediate field of battle. On the other
side of the gap the Confederates struck Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis’
Division, which was marching up to take Wood’s place in the line, and
Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan’s Division in flank. In a very short time
the entire Union right flank was in disorder and driven from the field.
Wilder’s brigade on the extreme right made a valiant stand for a while,
employing to good effect the heavy fire power of the Spencer repeating
carbine with which it was armed. Nothing, however, seemed to daunt the
onrush of the Confederates, and Wilder withdrew for fear of being cut
off from escape.
The routed divisions from the Union right withdrew northwestward through
McFarland’s Gap to Rossville. Generals Rosecrans, Crittenden, and McCook
were caught in the breakthrough and fled the field. General Thomas was
now in command of the Union forces left there.
The altered conditions of the battlefield now dictated a change in
Confederate strategy. The original plan of enveloping the Union left
changed to a sweep from the Union right to the left. A pause in the
fighting enabled Thomas to form a new line quickly to his rear on
Snodgrass Hill, almost at a right angle with the Union left. From this
vantage point he met the onslaught of Longstreet’s troops with such
stubborn and determined resistance on that Sunday afternoon that he
earned the name “Rock of Chickamauga.”
The Union line on Snodgrass Hill was composed of Brannan’s Division with
fragments of Wood’s, Negley’s, and Van Cleve’s Divisions. Longstreet
vigorously assaulted the line again and again and nearly succeeded in
enveloping Brannan’s right. Confederate success seemed assured as
Thomas’ troops were hard hit and were short of ammunition, but at this
moment unexpected reinforcements reached General Thomas.
[Illustration: _The Battle of Chickamauga. Scene from diorama in the
Museum, Park Headquarters Building._]
General Granger, without orders and following the sound of battle, had
hastened to the aid of Thomas. He arrived at Snodgrass Hill at a very
opportune moment and just in time to stop the Confederates from
enveloping Brannan’s right. A fierce engagement took place as Brig. Gen.
James B. Steedman’s Division of Granger’s Corps forced the southern
troops from the crest of the hill.
Midafternoon found Longstreet once again attempting to wrest the hill
from Thomas’ troops, using McLaw’s, Hindman’s, and Bushrod Johnson’s
Divisions, and again he was repulsed. Later in the afternoon, Longstreet
asked Bragg for reinforcements but was told none were available and that
the right wing “had been beaten back so badly that they could be of no
service” to him. Longstreet determined to make one more effort. He
formed a column of such troops as were available and again assaulted the
hill. The fight was desperate and lasted until nightfall. The Union
troops repulsed some of the Confederate charges with the bayonet as
their ammunition was nearly exhausted. Finally, Longstreet pushed
Steedman back to the next ridge and occupied the ground to the right of
Brannan.
The left of the Union line around Kelly Field spent a relatively quiet
afternoon compared to their comrades on Snodgrass Hill. However, about 4
p.m., the divisions of Hill’s corps and part of Walker’s again assaulted
the Union positions there. By 6 p.m., Cheatham’s Division had joined the
attack. This attack succeeded in enveloping the Union left, and the road
to Rossville, through Rossville Gap, was cut off for the moment.
[Illustration: _Headquarters, Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger, Reserve
Corps, Army of the Cumberland, at Rossville Gap. The house was built
by John Ross, Cherokee Indian Chief, who lived in it until 1832.
Ross gave his name to the village in the gap._ From Elson, _The
Civil War Through the Camera_.]
In the meantime, Thomas received orders from Rosecrans to “Assume
command of all the forces, and with Crittenden and McCook take a strong
position and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville.” Although
Thomas received these orders with little delay, it was late afternoon
before he sent instructions to Reynolds to begin the withdrawal and move
into position to cover the retirement of the other troops on the left.
In executing this movement, Reynolds was forced to drive off the
Confederate troops who had begun to envelop the Union left. The Union
army withdrew in relatively good order. The troops holding Kelly Field
moved out first, followed by those who had stubbornly resisted
Longstreet’s attacks upon Snodgrass Hill.
While the retreat from the battlelines may have been in “good order,”
General Beatty’s description of the march to Rossville amply describes
the scene: “The march to Rossville was a melancholy one. All along the
road, for miles, wounded men were lying. They had crawled or hobbled
slowly away from the fury of the battle, become exhausted, and lain down
by the roadside to die.” Beatty reached Rossville between “ten and
eleven” and reported, “At this hour of the night (eleven to twelve
o’clock) the army is simply a mob. There appears to be neither
organization nor discipline. The various commands are mixed up in what
seems to be inextricable confusion.”
Nevertheless, Thomas placed his forces at Rossville Gap and along
Missionary Ridge in preparation against further attacks. The morning of
the 21st found the Union Army of the Cumberland more or less
reorganized. With the exception of some skirmishing, the Union forces
were not molested.
The losses on both sides were appalling and the percentages surprisingly
equal. The following tabulation of casualties at the Battle of
Chickamauga is based on Thomas L. Livermore’s _Numbers and Losses in the
Civil War in America, 1861-65_:
Army Total Total Killed Wounded Missing Percent
Strength Casualties Casualties
Union 58,222 16,170 1,657 9,756 4,757 28
Confederate 66,326 18,454 2,312 14,674 1,468 28
_The Siege of Chattanooga_
Thomas remained in position at Rossville throughout the 21st, but it was
evident that the Confederates could turn his right flank and cut him off
from Chattanooga. He suggested to Rosecrans that the Union Army
concentrate at Chattanooga. In anticipation of receiving an order to
withdraw to the town, Thomas instructed his officers to prepare their
commands for the movement. Rosecrans adopted the suggestion and that
evening Thomas withdrew the Union forces to Chattanooga. All wagons,
ambulances, and surplus artillery had already departed for Chattanooga
during the day. By morning of September 22, all Union troops were in
position in the town.
[Illustration: _Wartime view. Lee and Gordon’s Mills, Chickamauga
Battlefield._ Courtesy National Archives.]
The situation in which the men in blue found themselves in Chattanooga
was not pleasant. The Tennessee River walled them in on the north,
although a pontoon bridge and two ferries offered escape possibilities.
Lookout Mountain blocked the way on the west, and Missionary Ridge to
the east and south, now held by the Confederates, completed the circle.
[Illustration: _Wartime view of Chattanooga in 1863—Lookout Mountain
in distance._ Courtesy National Archives.]
Bragg issued orders for the pursuit of the Army of the Cumberland, then
countermanded them. Instead, the Confederate troops began to take up
siege positions around Chattanooga. In these positions the Confederates
dominated the Union lines. Bragg’s men controlled all the railroads
leading into the town; Confederate batteries and sharpshooters commanded
the Tennessee River, and river traffic ceased; they controlled the roads
on the south side of the river and kept under fire the one road north of
the river leading to Bridgeport, the nearest Union supply base. Only the
road over Walden’s Ridge and down through the Sequatchie Valley to
Bridgeport was open to General Rosecrans.
[Illustration: _Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant._ Courtesy National
Archives.]
[Illustration: _Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman._ Courtesy National
Archives.]
_Reinforcements for the Besieged Army_
As early as September 13, General in Chief Halleck ordered
reinforcements sent to Rosecrans. His dispatches on September 13, 14,
and 15 to Major Generals Hurlbut at Memphis and Grant and Sherman at
Vicksburg directed the troop movements. These dispatches, however, were
delayed for several days en route from Cairo to Memphis and, in the
meantime, the Battle of Chickamauga was fought. Grant received the
orders on the 22nd and immediately instructed four divisions under
Sherman to march to Chattanooga.
One division of the Seventeenth Corps, already in transit from Vicksburg
to Helena, Ark., was ordered to proceed on to Memphis. General Sherman
quickly brought three divisions of his Fifteenth Army Corps from the
vicinity of the Big Black River into Vicksburg, where they embarked as
fast as water transportation could be provided. By October 3, all of the
movement of 17,000 men was under way.
The route of travel was by boat to Memphis, then by railroad and
overland marches to Chattanooga. From Memphis the troops followed
closely the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which Sherman was ordered
to repair as he advanced. By November 15, the troops were at Bridgeport,
Ala., having traveled a distance of 675 miles.
When the War Department in Washington received word that the Army of the
Cumberland was besieged in Chattanooga, it considered the situation so
critical that President Lincoln was called out of bed late at night to
attend a council meeting. This meeting occurred on the night of
September 23, and is described by Nicolay and Hay:
Immediately on receipt of Rosecrans’ dispatch, Mr. Stanton sent one of
the President’s secretaries who was standing by to the Soldier’s Home,
where the President was sleeping. A little startled by the unwonted
summons,—for this was “the first time” he said, Stanton had ever sent
for him,—the President mounted his horse and rode in through the
moonlight to the War Department to preside over an improvised council
to consider the subject of reinforcing Rosecrans.
There were present General Halleck, Stanton, Seward and Chase of the
Cabinet; P. H. Watson and James A. Hardie of the War Department, and
General D. C. McCallum, Superintendent of Military Transportation.
After a brief debate, it was resolved to detach the Eleventh and
Twelfth Corps from the Army of the Potomac, General Hooker to be
placed in command of both....
[Illustration: ROUTE OF UNION REINFORCEMENTS
MOVEMENTS, SEPT. 22-OCT. 15, 1863]
[Illustration: _Chattanooga headquarters of General Rosecrans during
the siege._ Courtesy National Archives.]
The movement of the Eleventh and Twelfth Army Corps from the Army of the
Potomac to Tennessee eclipsed all other such troop movements by rail up
to that time. It represented a high degree of cooperation between the
railroads and the government and was a singular triumph of skill and
planning. It also shows the great importance the War Department attached
to the Chattanooga campaign.
The troops began to entrain at Manassas Junction and Bealton Station,
Va., on September 25, and 5 days later on September 30 the first trains
arrived at Bridgeport, Ala. The route traveled was by way of Washington,
D. C.; Baltimore, Md.; Bellaire and Columbus, Ohio; Indianapolis, Ind.;
Louisville, Ky.; Nashville, Tenn.; and Bridgeport, Ala. Several major
railroad lines, including the Baltimore and Ohio, Central Ohio,
Louisville and Nashville, and Nashville and Chattanooga were involved.
Not all of the troops, however, made such good time as the first trains,
and for the majority of the infantry the trip consumed about 9 days. The
movement of the artillery, horses, mules, baggage, and impedimenta was
somewhat slower, but by the middle of October, all were in the vicinity
of Bridgeport ready to help break the siege.
These two corps under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, comprising 20,000 troops
and more than 3,000 horses and mules, traveled 1,157 miles. Differences
in the railroad gauges hampered the movement, but most of the changes in
gauge occurred at river crossings which had no bridges and the troops
had to detrain at these points anyway.
Confederate cavalry raids, bent on destroying the railroad bridges and
otherwise interfering with the reinforcing effort, imposed a more
serious difficulty, but, except for delaying the latter part of the
movement a few days, the raids were ineffective.
At the beginning of the siege, the Union Army had large supply trains in
good condition and transporting supplies seemed feasible. But early in
October rain began to fall and the roads became almost impassable. To
make the situation more critical Bragg sent Wheeler to harass and
destroy the Union supply trains as they moved over Walden’s Ridge on
their trips to and from Bridgeport. Wheeler destroyed hundreds of wagons
and animals and it was not long before the Union soldier received less
and less food. Wagon horses and mules and artillery horses were on a
starvation diet and many died each day.
Command of the two hostile armies had undergone a considerable change
during the siege period. Grant received orders to meet “an officer of
the War Department” at Louisville, Ky. He proceeded by rail to
Indianapolis, Ind., and just as his train left the depot there, en route
to Louisville, it was stopped. A message informed Grant that Secretary
of War Stanton was coming into the station and wished to see him. This
was the “officer” from the War Department who gave Grant command of the
newly organized Military Division of the Mississippi. Thomas replaced
Rosecrans. McCook and Crittenden had previously been relieved of their
commands and their corps consolidated into the Fourth Corps under
command of Granger. Stanton accompanied Grant to Louisville and there
the two spent a day reviewing the situation.
In Bragg’s camp, Polk was relieved of his command, and Lt. Gen. William
J. Hardee rejoined the army. Bragg’s army was reorganized into three
corps commanded by Longstreet, Hardee, and Breckinridge.
[Illustration: _Entrenchments of Thomas’ Corps, Army of the
Cumberland in front of Chattanooga. Lookout Mountain in distance._
From _Battles and Leaders of the Civil War_.]
When Grant reached Chattanooga on October 23 he found a plan already
drawn up to open a new supply line for the besieged army. This plan of
necessity was conditioned upon the terrain and the configuration of the
river between Bridgeport, the railhead and base of supplies for the
Union Army, and Chattanooga. (After the Tennessee River passes the city
it flows southward for some 2 miles until it strikes Lookout Mountain
where, after a short westerly course, it curves northward. This
elongated loop of the river is called Moccasin Bend.)
The plan called for 1,500 men on pontoons to float down the river from
Chattanooga during the night of October 26-27 while another force
marched across Moccasin Point to support the landings of the river-borne
troops. Grant ordered the plan executed. The pontoon-borne troops
quickly disembarked upon striking the west bank at Brown’s Ferry, drove
off the Confederate pickets, and threw up breastworks. The troops
marching across the neck of land came up to the east side of the ferry,
joined this group, and constructed a pontoon bridge.
Hooker’s advance from Bridgeport coincided with this action. He marched
by the road along Raccoon Mountain into Lookout Valley. There he met the
advance post of a Confederate brigade and drove it back. Maj. Gen. O. O.
Howard’s Eleventh Corps moved to within 2 miles of Brown’s Ferry, while
Brig. Gen. John W. Geary of the Twelfth Corps remained at Wauhatchie to
guard the road to Kelley’s Ferry.
The Confederates made a night attack against Geary which the latter
repulsed, but both sides lost heavily. After this action, the short line
of communication with Bridgeport by way of Brown’s and Kelley’s Ferries
was held by Hooker without further trouble.
With the successful seizure of Brown’s Ferry and construction of a
pontoon bridge across the Tennessee River there, and Hooker’s equally
successful advance from Bridgeport and seizure of the south side of the
river at Raccoon Mountain and in Lookout Valley, the way was finally
clear for the Union Army to reopen a short line of supply and
communication between Chattanooga and Bridgeport, the rail end of its
supply line. This “Cracker Line” ran by boat up the Tennessee River from
Bridgeport to Kelley’s Ferry. Above Kelley’s Ferry, the swift current
made the stream unnavigable at certain points to boats then available.
Accordingly, at Kelley’s Ferry, the “Cracker Line” left the river and
crossed Raccoon Mountain by road to Brown’s Ferry. There it crossed the
river on the pontoon bridge, thence across Moccasin Point, and finally
across the river once more into Chattanooga.
Early in November, Bragg ordered Longstreet to march against Burnside in
East Tennessee with Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaw’s and Maj. Gen. John B.
Hood’s Divisions of infantry, Col. E. Porter Alexander’s and Maj. A.
Leyden’s battalions of artillery, and five brigades of cavalry under
Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler—about 15,000 men in all. This movement caused
great anxiety in Washington and the authorities urged Grant to act
promptly to assist Burnside. Grant felt that the quickest way to aid him
was to attack Bragg and force the latter to recall Longstreet. On
November 7, Thomas received Grant’s order to attack Bragg’s right.
Thomas replied that he was unable to move a single piece of artillery
because of the poor condition of the horses and mules. They were not
strong enough to pull artillery pieces. In these circumstances, Grant
could only answer Washington dispatches, urge Sherman forward, and
encourage Burnside to hold on.
_Lifting the Siege—The Battle of Chattanooga_
(See map on pages 36-37.)
With the Confederate Army in front of Chattanooga divided into two
corps, Hardee on the right and Breckinridge on the left on Missionary
Ridge, and General Stevenson with a small force occupying Lookout
Mountain, Bragg waited.
Grant’s plan of battle was for Sherman with his four divisions to cross
the Tennessee River at Brown’s Ferry and march behind Stringer’s Ridge,
concealed from the eyes of the Confederates, and take a position near
the North Chickamauga Creek. He was to recross the river by pontoon
bridge at the mouth of the South Chickamauga Creek, strike the north end
of Missionary Ridge and capture it as far as the railroad tunnel. Thomas
was to move his Army of the Cumberland to the left, and connect with
Sherman. This united force was to sweep the Confederates southward off
Missionary Ridge and away from their base of supplies at Chickamauga
Station. Howard’s Corps was to act as a general reserve for this force.
Hooker, with the Twelfth Corps and Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft’s Division
(Fourth Corps), was to hold Lookout Valley. Col. Eli Long’s Cavalry was
to cover Sherman’s left and when no longer needed for this task was to
strike Bragg’s communications. This original plan, however, was changed
several times to fit the situation.
The rains that hampered movement of Union supplies also delayed
Sherman’s movement across the Tennessee. High water broke the bridge at
Brown’s Ferry and Osterhaus’ Division could not cross the river.
Subsequently it received orders to join Hooker in Lookout Valley.
On November 22, Grant received word that Bragg was withdrawing his army;
actually the movement reported was Buckner leaving to reinforce
Longstreet. To “test the truth” of the report, Grant changed his plans
and ordered Thomas to make a demonstration to his front on the 23rd.
This began the battles of Chattanooga.
ORCHARD KNOB.
The Union Army of the Cumberland had made its positions very strong
during the time it was besieged by Bragg’s army. One of its strong
points was Fort Wood on an elevated point east of the town. Thomas,
according to instructions, sent Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan’s and Brig.
Gen. T. J. Wood’s divisions to level ground at Fort Wood and there
formed them in line—Wood on the left, Sheridan on the right, with Brig.
Gen. Absalom Baird supporting Sheridan. Brig. Gen. R. W. Johnson’s
troops held the trenches, and Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard’s Corps, which had
crossed from the north bank of the river, acted as the reserve.
Table 3.—_Union Army at Chattanooga_
Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant
_Army of the Cumberland_—Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas
_Fourth Army Corps_—Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger
1st Division—Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft
2d Division—Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan
3d Division—Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood
_Fourteenth Army Corps_—Maj. Gen. J. M. Palmer
1st Division—Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson
2d Division—Brig. Gen. J. C. Davis
3d Division—Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird
_Engineer Troops_—Brig. Gen. William F. Smith
_Artillery Reserve_—Brig. Gen. J. M. Brannan
1st Division—Col. James Barnett
2d Division
_Cavalry_
2d Division
—2d Brigade—Col. Eli Long
_Post of Chattanooga_—Col. John G. Parkhurst
_Detachment from the Army of the Potomac_—Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker
_Eleventh Army Corps_—Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard
2d Division—Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr
3d Division—Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz
_Twelfth Army Corps_—Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum
2d Division—Brig. Gen. John W. Geary
_Army of the Tennessee_—Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman
_Fifteenth Corps_—Maj. Gen. Frank P. Blair, Jr.
1st Division—Brig. Gen. Peter J. Osterhaus
2d Division—Brig. Gen. Morgan L. Smith
4th Division—Brig. Gen. Hugh Ewing
_Seventeenth Army Corps_
2d Division—Brig. Gen. John E. Smith
At 2 p. m. on November 23, the lines of blue moved forward, driving the
Confederate outposts and their supports back to the base of Missionary
Ridge, and captured Orchard Knob, a low hill a little more than a mile
in front of the ridge. The Union forces occupied the captured
entrenchments and erected a battery on Orchard Knob. Except for
occasional artillery firing, the fighting ended for the day.
Table 4.—_Confederate Army at Chattanooga_
Gen. Braxton Bragg
_Hardee’s Corps_—Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee
Cheatham’s Division—Brig. Gen. John K. Jackson
Stevenson’s Division—Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson
Cleburne’s Division—Maj. Gen. P. R. Cleburne
Walker’s Division—Brig. Gen. States R. Gist
_Breckinridge’s Corps_—Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge
Hindman’s Division—Brig. Gen. J. Patton Anderson
Breckinridge’s Division—Brig. Gen. William B. Bate
Stewart’s Division—Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Stewart
Reserve Artillery
Robertson’s Battalion—Capt. Felix H. Robertson
Williams’ Battalion—Maj. S. C. Williams
SHERMAN MOVES.
During the night of November 23-24, Sherman began to carry out his role
in the drama. He selected Brig. Gen. Giles A. Smith’s brigade to man the
pontoon boats, concealed in North Chickamauga Creek, to cross the
Tennessee River and secure a bridgehead near the mouth of the South
Chickamauga Creek. During the hours of darkness the brigade landed at
its designated place. A few soldiers stopped at the mouth of the creek,
surprising and capturing the pickets there. The remaining troops landed
and prepared to build bridges across the Tennessee River and South
Chickamauga Creek. By early afternoon they had finished the bridge
across the river, and Sherman’s forces were across and ready to attack.
Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis’ Division (Fourteenth Corps), which had
guarded the pontoons, also crossed and became part of Sherman’s force.
Sherman attacked and seized the north end of Missionary Ridge at 4 p.m.
against only Confederate outpost opposition. To his surprise, Sherman
found a deep and wide ravine separating the north end of the ridge from
Tunnel Hill immediately southward, his real objective. Cleburne’s
Division of Confederate troops had hurried to Tunnel Hill only an hour
or two before Sherman seized the north end of Missionary Ridge, and they
were busily engaged entrenching there when Sherman arrived across the
ravine from them. Sherman did not attack Tunnel Hill that afternoon, but
entrenched where he was.
THE BATTLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS, NOVEMBER 24.
While operations were in progress, east of Chattanooga, Hooker moved
into action west of the town. The failure of Osterhaus’ Division to join
Sherman resulted in another change of orders. A new plan for Hooker to
take Lookout Mountain and descend into Chattanooga Valley replaced the
original one of having him merely hold Lookout Valley and the route to
Bridgeport. Hooker had three divisions in his force commanded by
Brigadier Generals Peter J. Osterhaus, John W. Geary, and Charles Cruft,
each from a different army corps. Geary was on the right at Wauhatchie,
Cruft in the center, and Osterhaus near Brown’s Ferry. It was a unique
team. One who was present wrote, “We were all strangers, no one division
ever having seen either of the others.”
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA
NOVEMBER 23, 24, 25, 1863]
The terrain that confronted Hooker’s command was rugged, steep, heavily
timbered, and topped by a rocky cliff. At the northern end, at the cliff
base and halfway up the mountain, was a bench of nearly level land. On
it stood the Cravens Farm. At 8 a. m. on November 24 Hooker sent Geary’s
Division, supported by a brigade from Cruft’s Division, to effect a
crossing of Lookout Creek. The troops accomplished this with little
opposition and Geary climbed the mountain until the head of his column
reached the cliff. The division then moved to the left and proceeded
northward toward the point of the mountain.
[Illustration: _Hazen’s men landing from pontoon boats at Brown’s
Ferry, Tennessee River. Theodore R. Davis wartime sketch._ From
_Battles and Leaders of the Civil War_.]
While Geary climbed the mountain, Cruft, with his force, moved farther
down the valley toward the Tennessee River and seized a bridge over the
creek. Osterhaus’ Division then crossed the stream at that point in the
face of sharp skirmishing with Confederate defenders before the latter
retreated up the mountain. The three Union divisions soon joined on a
common line and, supported by Union batteries on Moccasin Point,
steadily drove Walthall’s Confederate brigade around the point of
Lookout Mountain to the Cravens farmhouse. By noon, Hooker’s forces were
in possession of the farm but the Confederates made a stand beyond the
Cravens house within prepared defense works, and were joined there by
two brigades from the top of the mountain. Fog which covered the
mountainside most of the morning became so heavy that by 2 p. m. it was
almost impossible to see. This factor, plus a shortage of ammunition,
caused Hooker to halt and consolidate his position. Later in the
afternoon, Carlin’s brigade arrived with a resupply of ammunition.
During the night, General Stevenson withdrew the Confederate forces from
Lookout Mountain and marched them to Missionary Ridge where they joined
their comrades holding that sector of the line.
“The Battle Above the Clouds” was fought on the bench of land
surrounding the Cravens house. There was no fighting on top the
mountain. The romantic name given in later years to this action on the
Union right was the result of the fog and mist which shrouded the
mountain that day from observers below. It was not until the next
morning that the 8th Kentucky Volunteers planted the Stars and Stripes
on top of the bluff.
[Illustration: _Lookout Mountain from Union works in Chattanooga._
From _Harper’s Pictorial History of the Great Rebellion_.]
MISSIONARY RIDGE, NOVEMBER 25.
The decisive blow of the battle was at hand. Grant’s orders for the
morning of November 25 were as follows: “Sherman was directed to attack
at daylight. Hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and endeavor
to intercept the enemy’s retreat, if he still remained; if he had gone,
then to move directly to Rossville and operate against the left and rear
of the force on Missionary Ridge. Thomas was not to move until Hooker
had reached Missionary Ridge.”
[Illustration: _Gen. Ulysses S. Grant on Lookout Mountain, 1863.
Grant is in the lower left corner._ Courtesy National Archives.]
[Illustration: _Missionary Ridge from a Union trench._ From Elson,
_The Civil War Through the Camera_.]
Sherman began his attack, as directed, just after sunrise. His troops
attacked Cleburne’s Division frontally, but without success. All night
the Confederates had worked at strengthening their position on Tunnel
Hill which now formed the Confederate right. These field works gave good
protection to Cleburne’s men from enemy fire. The stubbornly fighting
Confederates held their positions against repeated attacks by superior
numbers. This fight continued until 3 p. m., and is a notable example of
the value to a greatly outnumbered defending force of field works on a
good position. Some Union troops did make a lodgment on the slopes of
Tunnel Hill in the afternoon, but a Confederate charge drove them off.
Cleburne’s soldiers held the hill.
In the meantime, Hooker was in trouble—not with the enemy, but with
Chattanooga Creek. He started for Rossville bright and early to get into
position to strike Bragg’s left. Stevenson’s men, who had evacuated
Lookout Mountain during the night, had burned the bridge across
Chattanooga Creek and had done all they could to obstruct the roads that
Hooker needed to march to Rossville. Hooker lost 3 hours building a
bridge across the creek and it was late afternoon before his men took
their places on Missionary Ridge.
From his post on Orchard Knob, Grant realized that Sherman’s attacks had
failed to gain their objective and that Hooker had been delayed in
reaching his assigned position. To relieve some of the pressure on
Sherman, Grant ordered Thomas to move out against the Confederate center
on Missionary Ridge.
The ridge that lay before the Union troops was rough and steep. It rose
from 200 to 400 feet higher than the level ground at its base. Its steep
slopes were broken by ravines, strewn with boulders, and dotted with
stumps, the latter reminders of recently felled timber. The first line
of Confederate breastworks was at the foot of the ridge. Some unfinished
works had been built half-way up the slope. Finally, a third line of
works was built on the natural, instead of the military, crest of the
hill. Thus, Confederate fire from the crest could not cover some of the
ravine approaches.
Four Union divisions—Baird, Wood, Sheridan, and R. W. Johnson, from left
to right—started toward the ridge. The hard charging Union soldiers soon
overwhelmed the gray defenders in the rifle pits at the base of the
ridge. Scarcely halting, and generally without orders to continue, the
men in blue charged up the ridge. They followed the retreating
Confederates so closely from the rifle pits that the Confederates on the
crest in many places hesitated to fire for fear of hitting their own
men. It was not long before units of the Army of the Cumberland pierced
the Confederate line in several places and sent Bragg’s veterans reeling
in retreat down the east slope of the ridge toward Chickamauga Creek.
Sheridan pushed forward in pursuit of the retreating army, capturing
men, artillery, and equipment. Even though the Confederate center had
disintegrated, Hardee held his position on the Confederate right until
darkness, and then began his withdrawal with Cleburne’s Division
covering the retreat. Bragg’s army crossed Chickamauga Creek during the
night, carrying out a surprisingly successful retreat.
[Illustration: _A skirmish line and regimental line behind it—Union
troops drilling at Chattanooga, circa January 1864. This gives a
conception of how the soldiers of the Civil War ordinarily fought. A
skirmish line moved ahead of the main regimental line, which charged
upon order. The Union attack on Missionary Ridge must have looked
something like this to watching Confederate soldiers._ From Miller,
_Photographic History of the Civil War_.]
During the evening of the 25th, Grant issued orders to Thomas and
Sherman to pursue Bragg. The next morning, Sherman advanced by way of
Chickamauga Station, and Thomas’ troops marched on the Rossville Road
toward Graysville and Ringgold. In the vicinity of Ringgold, Cleburne’s
Confederates held a strong position on Taylor’s Ridge covering Bragg’s
retreat. Cleburne’s men repulsed a Union attack, inflicting heavy
casualties, until Bragg’s army had successfully withdrawn southward, and
then they followed. Union troops then occupied Taylor’s Ridge. There the
pursuit stopped.
This decisive Union victory raised the siege of Chattanooga.
The following tabulation of strength and casualties at the Battle of
Chattanooga is based on Livermore’s studies:
Army Total Total Killed Wounded Missing Percent
Strength Casualties Casualties
Union 56,360 5,824 753 4,722 349 10
Confederate 46,165 6,667 361 2,160 4,146 14
_Relief of Knoxville_
Meanwhile, in East Tennessee, Burnside attempted to hold Longstreet in
check by abandoning territory and skirmishing when necessary, but
avoiding any serious fight. This took Longstreet farther away from
Chattanooga and lessened his opportunity to assist Bragg. Burnside
gained precious time by using these tactics. Grant’s plan was to “whip”
Bragg and then help Burnside.
[Illustration: _Gen. Joseph Hooker and his staff. Hooker is sixth
from the right._ Courtesy National Archives.]
After Missionary Ridge, with Bragg in full retreat, Thomas prepared to
send Granger’s Corps and detachments from other commands, about 20,000
men altogether, toward Knoxville. In addition, Sherman was to march
along the Hiwassee River to protect Granger’s flank. Grant reports that
upon “Returning from the front on the 28th, I found that Granger had not
yet got off.... I therefore determined ... to send him [Sherman] with
his command, and orders ... were sent him at Calhoun to assume command
of the troops with Granger, in addition to those with him, and proceed,
with all possible dispatch, to the relief of Burnside.”
[Illustration: _Steamboat with supplies for Union Army being warped
up narrows of Tennessee River between Bridgeport, Ala. and
Chattanooga._ Courtesy National Archives.]
Skirmishing was more or less continuous around Knoxville. Burnside
followed the original plan of buying time by giving up ground and fell
back toward Knoxville, withdrawing into the city during the night of
November 16-17. Longstreet drew up before the city the next day, and on
the 29th made his initial attack against the Union position at Fort
Sanders. The assault was repulsed and before it could be renewed
Longstreet received word of Bragg’s defeat on Missionary Ridge. The
Confederate commander deemed it necessary to maintain a threatening
position before Knoxville until the approaching Union relief columns
were but a day’s march distant. On December 4, Longstreet began his
retreat toward Virginia. Sherman arrived on the 6th, and preparations
for the pursuit of Longstreet were soon under way. Burnside’s command
moved out in pursuit of Longstreet’s force; Granger’s Corps became the
garrison of Knoxville; and Sherman’s command returned to Chattanooga.
_Effects of the Battle of Chattanooga_
The battles around Chattanooga must be considered as ending in one of
the most complete victories of the war. Bragg’s army was defeated, men
and material captured, and the Confederates driven south. The
mountainous defense line which the Confederacy hoped to hold had been
pierced and large sections of it were in Union control. Chattanooga, the
railroad center, was now in Union hands and the interior line of
communication from this section of the Confederacy to Richmond, by way
of Knoxville, was destined to remain in Union control for the remainder
of the war. Not only Chattanooga, but Knoxville and the rich,
food-producing East Tennessee section was lost to the Confederacy. With
this came relief for the Union sympathizers in East Tennessee. Virtually
all of Tennessee was now under Northern control.
The fortunes of war brought changes to both commanders. Bragg asked to
be relieved from his command and went to Richmond to become military
advisor to Jefferson Davis. President Lincoln promoted Grant, in March
1864, to command of all Union armies in the field. Grant then left
Chattanooga for the East, to lead the attack against General Lee in
Virginia.
_The War After Chattanooga_
In the spring of 1864, the Union armies began to move into the heart of
the Confederacy. Grant attached himself to the Army of the Potomac
(General Meade) and began operations against Lee; Sherman moved against
Gen. Joseph E. Johnston in Georgia.
The Army of the Potomac launched a campaign against Richmond. In the
bitter battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House, in May
1864, Grant reduced Lee’s offensive power. After being repulsed at Cold
Harbor, Grant moved against Petersburg and a 10-month siege finally
forced Lee to evacuate the city. Lee moved westward to Appomattox Court
House where on April 9, 1865, Grant forced him to surrender.
While Lee and Grant fought it out in Virginia, Sherman, using
Chattanooga for his base of supplies, conducted a strenuous campaign
against the Army of Tennessee, first under Johnston and then Hood,
finally entering Atlanta on September 2. In November, Sherman began his
famous “march to the sea,” reaching Savannah in late December. From
there he struck northward through the Carolinas and forced the surrender
of Joseph E. Johnston’s army on April 26. By June all isolated
Confederate forces had laid down their arms.
[Illustration: _Chattanooga from Point Park, Lookout Mountain. The
Cravens House and portion of “Battle above the Clouds” battlefield
around it lies in the foreground._]
[Illustration: CHICKAMAUGA BATTLEFIELD]
① PARK HEADQUARTERS
② FLORIDA MONUMENT
③ KENTUCKY MONUMENT
④ BATTLELINE ROAD
⑤ POE ROAD
⑥ GEORGIA MONUMENT
⑦ BROTHERTON HOUSE
⑧ WILDER MONUMENT
⑨ SNODGRASS HILL
Ⓐ JAY’S MILL, OPENING ATTACK, SEPT. 19
Ⓑ CONFEDERATE HEADQUARTERS, SEPT. 20
Ⓒ UNION HEADQUARTERS, SEPT. 19
Ⓓ SOUTH CAROLINA MONUMENT
[Illustration: _Park Administration and Museum Building._]
_Guide to the Area_
CHICKAMAUGA BATTLEFIELD.
A self-guided tour of the battlefield may be made by automobile. This
8-mile tour begins at park headquarters and follows the yellow line on
the tour road. On the gravel roads a yellow arrow points the way. Red
markers indicate Confederate forces and blue markers show Union forces.
As you read the markers or sight along the barrel of a field gun, you
face the direction the troops moved at the time of the battle. There are
several monuments of spherical, iron shells along the tour. Of these,
the low square monuments mark the sites of various army and corps
headquarters; the taller, triangular shaped monuments designate the
sites where eight brigade commanders were killed during the battle.
The numbered sections in the following guide correspond to location
numbers on the map on page 46.
1. _Park Headquarters._ It is suggested that before making the tour of
the Chickamauga Battlefield, you stop first at park headquarters located
on U. S. 27, where an attendant is on duty. Exhibits there describe the
battle, and the Fuller Gun Collection is displayed.
The Claud E. and Zenada O. Fuller Collection of American Military Arms
contains almost every type of shoulder arms used by the military forces
of America. There are several rare or unique items in the collection.
The Harpers Ferry Blunderbuss, manufactured in 1808, and the Texas Rifle
(1844) are the only ones known to exist. The Jenks Rifle, the pattern
for the model 1840 Musket, the pattern for the model 1817 Rifle, and the
Sharps, with coffeemill in the stock, are extremely rare. The
Confederate section, while not complete, contains some outstanding
weapons.
2. _Florida Monument._ Immediately after leaving park headquarters, you
will see the Florida Monument to your left on U. S. 27.
3. _Kentucky Monument._ Bear to the left at this monument.
4. _Battleline Road._ Make a right turn to enter Battleline Road. The
positions of the Confederate right wing are on the left in the wooded
area some 75 to 250 yards east of the road. Union troops occupied the
line along the road during the second day of the battle.
5. _Poe Road._ Cross U. S. 27 and follow Poe Road. This route is a
continuation of the Union defense line that you have followed along
Battleline Road. You will note in this area that several Confederate
batteries are so situated that it would appear they must have fired into
their own infantry. This situation resulted from Longstreet’s
breakthrough. The Confederate troops in this sector turned right after
crossing the highway and struck the right center of the Union line. A
careful examination of the metal markers at each battery will give the
movements of each unit and the time element involved.
A metal marker designates the site of the Poe House.
[Illustration: _Part of Fuller Gun Collection, Park Headquarters and
Museum Building, Chickamauga Battlefield._]
[Illustration: _Brotherton House, scene of Confederate breakthrough.
Chickamauga Battlefield._ Courtesy Chattanoogans, Inc.]
[Illustration: _Union monuments along Battleline Road, Chickamauga
Battlefield._]
[Illustration: _Georgia Monument, Chickamauga Battlefield._]
[Illustration: _Wilder Monument, Chickamauga Battlefield._]
6. _Georgia Monument._ This imposing shaft is directly in front of you
as you leave Poe Road to enter the main highway. Upon entering the main
highway turn right.
7. _Brotherton House._ (Please face the house). This reconstructed house
marks the site of the old Brotherton home, famous for the Confederate
breakthrough. Here Longstreet found the gap in the Union lines (to the
rear of the house at the wooded area) and sent his troops forward. The
Confederate troops emerged from the wooded area back of you, crossed the
LaFayette Road, and drove westward and northward. This action was the
turning point in the Battle of Chickamauga.
The monument of shell across the highway in back of you marks Maj. Gen.
Simon Bolivar Buckner’s headquarters site.
After leaving the Brotherton House, you continue for 1.1 miles and make
a right turn. The triangular shell monument on the right along the
highway commemorates Col. Hans C. Heg (Union).
8. _Wilder Monument._ This imposing monument was authorized in 1892 and
completed in 1902, to honor Col. John T. Wilder and his troops. It is
built of Chickamauga limestone and rises to a height of 86 feet. A
spiral staircase leads to a platform at the top where you can obtain an
excellent view of the battlefield and surrounding area.
Wilder’s troops occupied the ground in this vicinity when Longstreet
sent the left wing of the Confederate Army forward. This brigade of
mounted infantry was armed with the Spencer repeating carbine, a
seven-shot weapon. These troops, numbering more than 2,000 men, poured a
deadly fire into Longstreet’s veterans, but were unable to stop the
Confederate advance. They remained on the field until the last minute
and had to fight to get to their horses.
The monument stands upon the ground where General Rosecrans had his
headquarters on the 19th and early morning of the 20th of September
1863.
9. _Snodgrass Hill._ The log cabin on Snodgrass Hill marks the home of
the Snodgrass family.
The troops from the center of the Union line began to fall back toward
this hill when Longstreet’s men rushed through the gap in the Union
line. Brannan’s Division and fragments of Negley’s, Wood’s, and Van
Cleve’s Divisions held the positions on the hill. About 2 p. m.
Steedman’s Division arrived to reinforce the line on the extreme right.
The Union troops held the hill during the afternoon and at dusk began
the withdrawal that led them through McFarland’s Gap and into Rossville.
[Illustration: _Union monuments at Viniard field, Chickamauga
Battlefield._]
[Illustration: _Snodgrass House, Chickamauga Battlefield._ Courtesy
Walter H. Miller.]
The tour ends on Snodgrass Hill. To return to park headquarters and U.
S. 27, please follow park headquarters signs and the yellow lines.
MISSIONARY RIDGE.
To reach Missionary Ridge, after leaving Chickamauga Battlefield, you
should drive north 3 miles toward Chattanooga on U. S. 27 to Crest Road.
A right turn on Crest Road will start you on your tour of the ridge.
Crest Road runs the entire length of the line occupied by the
Confederates during the Battle of Missionary Ridge. Small reservations,
markers, monuments, tablets, and gun positions along the road provide
information, and excellent views of Chattanooga are obtained along this
drive. Moving northward the more important units of the park are: _Bragg
Reservation_, where the Confederate commander had his headquarters;
_Ohio Reservation_, an area set aside to commemorate the participation
of Ohio troops in the battle; _DeLong Reservation_, site of one of the
Union penetrations in the Confederate line; and _Sherman Reservation_,
where Sherman’s forces unsuccessfully attacked the north end of the
Confederate line.
Sherman Reservation marks the end of Crest Road and the park on
Missionary Ridge.
[Illustration: _Looking north along Missionary Ridge with
Chattanooga and Tennessee Rivers to the left, and the Illinois
Monument at Bragg’s Headquarters site in center foreground. This
point is about one-third distance from Rossville to north end of the
ridge._]
[Illustration: _Looking south along Missionary Ridge from DeLong
Reservation._]
[Illustration: CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA
NATIONAL MILITARY PARK
GEORGIA AND TENNESSEE
PRINCIPAL ROADS AND STREETS BETWEEN CHATTANOOGA AND PARK AREAS]
[Illustration: _Entrance to Point Park, Lookout Mountain, built to
resemble Army Corps of Engineers insignia._]
POINT PARK.
Visitors to the Chattanooga Battlefields are urged to go first to Point
Park. There, from the terrace of the Adolph S. Ochs Observatory and
Museum, high above the winding Tennessee River, you will have a wide
view of the battlefields. This point is acclaimed one of the finest
overlooks in the South. Markers throughout the area identify important
landmarks and troop positions. A National Park Service attendant is
there to assist you. The observatory and museum bears the name of one of
the park’s major benefactors, the late Adolph S. Ochs, Publisher of the
_Chattanooga Times_ and the _New York Times_.
The New York Monument, completed in 1907, is in the center of the area.
The Cravens House, where part of the “Battle Above the Clouds” was
fought, can be seen from the museum terrace. Near the house, stand three
large monuments—New York, Iowa, and Ohio—honoring troops who were in
this battle.
From Lookout Point several foot trails provide interesting walks. These
reveal unusual rock formations and provide ever changing and beautiful
vistas of the countryside below.
_The Park_
Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park is composed of
several separate areas, the more important of which are: Chickamauga
Battlefield in Georgia; Point Park and the Battlefield of Lookout
Mountain, in Tennessee; Orchard Knob in Chattanooga; a chain of small
reservations located on Missionary Ridge; and Signal Point on Signal
Mountain. The park contains approximately 8,190 acres of Federal land.
_How to Reach the Park_
Chickamauga Battlefield is 9 miles south of Chattanooga on U. S. 27.
This section of the park is also reached by Georgia Route 2 connecting
with U. S. 41 at Ringgold, Ga. Buses from Chattanooga run on a schedule
to the battlefield throughout the week.
Point Park is reached from Chattanooga by U. S. 11, 41, 64, and 72 which
combine as they leave the city and skirt the base of Lookout Mountain.
The Scenic Highway turns off from these highways at the base of Lookout
Mountain and winds up the slope to the park entrance. You may also visit
the park by means of the St. Elmo buses from Chattanooga which connect
with the Lookout Mountain Incline Railway at the foot of the mountain.
The top of the incline is within short walking distance of the Point
Park entrance.
[Illustration: _The Ochs Memorial in Point Park, Lookout Mountain._]
From Chattanooga, Missionary Ridge is reached by following eastward on
U. S. 11 and 64; 41 and 76; or 27; and Tennessee Route 58. There are
access roads to the top of the ridge and Crest Road from these highways.
Orchard Knob is on Orchard Knob Avenue near McCallie Avenue (U. S. 11
and 64) in Chattanooga.
_About Your Visit_
The park is open daily, including Sunday, throughout the year. The park
museum and headquarters building is at the north entrance to Chickamauga
Battlefield on U. S. 27. The museum, which has no admission fee, is open
from 8 a. m. to 4:30 p. m. (E. S. T.) during the winter, and from 8 a.
m. to 5 p. m. (E. S. T.) during the summer. At the museum, you will
receive information concerning the self-guided tour. Library facilities
are also available here. Talks and guide service are given to
educational and special groups if arrangements are made in advance with
the superintendent.
At Point Park on Lookout Mountain, you are urged to visit the Adolph S.
Ochs Observatory and Museum. Point Park is open from 8:30 a. m. to 4:30
p. m. (E. S. T.) in winter and from 8 a. m. to 6 p. m. (E. S. T.) in
summer. There is an admission fee of 25 cents. Children under 12 years
of age, or groups of school children 18 years of age or under, when
accompanied by adults assuming responsibility for their safety and
orderly conduct, are admitted free.
[Illustration: _2nd Minnesota Monument, Chickamauga Battlefield._]
[Illustration: _New York Monument at Point Park, Lookout Mountain._]
_Related Areas_
Also administered by the National Park Service are two areas associated
with the campaigns before and after the battles of Chickamauga and
Chattanooga: Stones River National Military Park and Cemetery,
Murfreesboro, Tenn., and Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park,
Marietta, Ga. Both are less than half-a-day’s drive from Chattanooga.
Other Civil War areas administered by the National Park Service are:
Shiloh and Fort Donelson National Military Parks, Tenn.; Vicksburg
National Military Park, Miss.; Fort Pulaski National Monument, Ga.;
Antietam National Battlefield Site, Md.; Gettysburg National Military
Park, Pa.; Manassas National Battlefield Park, Fredericksburg and
Spotsylvania National Military Park, Petersburg National Military Park,
Richmond National Battlefield Park, and Appomattox Court House National
Historical Park, Va.
_Administration_
Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park is administered by
the National Park Service of the U. S. Department of the Interior.
The headquarters office for the park is located at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.
Communications and inquiries relating to the area should be addressed to
the Superintendent, Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park,
Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.
[Illustration: _The Tennessee River and Lookout Mountain from the
east._]
_Suggested Readings_
Alexander, E. P. _Military Memoirs of a Confederate._ Charles
Scribner’s Sons, New York. 1907.
Beatty, John. _Memoirs of a Volunteer._ W. W. Norton & Co. New York.
1946.
Govan, Gilbert E., and James W. Livingood. _The Chattanooga Country
1540-1951._ E. P. Dutton & Co., New York. 1952.
Grant, U. S. _Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. Vol. II._ Charles L.
Webster & Co., New York. 1886.
Guernsey, Alfred H., and Henry M. Alden. _Harper’s Pictorial History
of the Great Rebellion. Part II._ Harper & Brothers, New York.
1866.
Horn, Stanley F. _The Army of Tennessee._ The Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
Indianapolis. 1941.
Johnson, Robert Underwood, and Clarence Clough Buel, Eds. _Battles and
Leaders of the Civil War. Vol. III._ The Century Co., New
York. 1884-88.
Livermore, Thomas L. _Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America
1861-65._ Houghton Mifflin & Co., Boston. 1900.
Miller, Francis T. _The Photographic History of the Civil War. Vols.
II, V, X._ The Review of Reviews Co., New York. 1911.
Mottelay, Paul F., and T. Campbell-Copeland. _The Soldier in Our Civil
War: A Pictorial History of the Conflict, 1861-1865. Vol. II._
Stanley Bradley Publishing Co., New York. 1890.
Sheridan, P. H. _Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan. Vol. I._ Charles
L. Webster & Co., New York. 1888.
Steele, Matthew Forney. _American Campaigns. Vol. I, text: Vol. II,
maps._ Byron S. Adams, Washington. 1909. 2 Vols.
United States Government. _Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of
the Union and Confederate Armies._ Government Printing Office,
Washington. 1891-95.
Van Horne, Thomas B. _History of the Army of the Cumberland._ Robert
Clarke & Co., Cincinnati. 1876. 2 Vols, and Atlas.
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES
(Price lists of National Park Service publications may be obtained from
the Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C.)
Antietam
Bandelier
Chalmette
Chickamauga and Chattanooga Battlefields
Custer Battlefield
Custis-Lee Mansion, the Robert E. Lee Memorial
Fort Laramie
Fort McHenry
Fort Necessity
Fort Pulaski
Fort Raleigh
Fort Sumter
George Washington Birthplace
Gettysburg
Guilford Courthouse
Hopewell Village
Independence
Jamestown, Virginia
Kings Mountain
The Lincoln Museum and the House Where Lincoln Died
Manassas (Bull Run)
Montezuma Castle
Morristown, a Military Capital of the Revolution
Ocmulgee
Petersburg Battlefields
Saratoga
Scotts Bluff
Shiloh
Statue of Liberty
Vanderbilt Mansion
Vicksburg
Yorktown
[Illustration: Endpapers]
Transcriber’s Notes
—Silently corrected a few typos.
—Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook
is public-domain in the country of publication.
—In the text versions only, text in italics is delimited by
_underscores_.
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