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Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume III - Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Vol. 3)
Author: Various
Language: English
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*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume III - Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Vol. 3)" ***
[Cover Illustration]
TRIAL
OF
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL
N U R E M B E R G
14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946
[Illustration]
P U B L I S H E D A T N U R E M B E R G , G E R M A N Y
1 9 4 7
This volume is published in accordance with the
direction of the International Military Tribunal by
the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction
of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.
VOLUME III
O F F I C I A L T E X T
I N T H E
ENGLISH LANGUAGE
P R O C E E D I N G S
1 December 1945 — 14 December 1945
CONTENTS
Tenth Day, Saturday, 1 December 1945,
Morning Session 1
Eleventh Day, Monday, 3 December 1945,
Morning Session 35
Afternoon Session 64
Twelfth Day, Tuesday, 4 December 1945,
Morning Session 91
Afternoon Session 120
Thirteenth Day, Wednesday, 5 December 1945,
Morning Session 152
Afternoon Session 178
Fourteenth Day, Thursday, 6 December 1945,
Morning Session 209
Afternoon Session 241
Fifteenth Day, Friday, 7 December 1945,
Morning Session 272
Afternoon Session 303
Sixteenth Day, Monday, 10 December 1945,
Morning Session 335
Afternoon Session 367
Seventeenth Day, Tuesday, 11 December 1945,
Morning Session 400
Afternoon Session 402
Eighteenth Day, Wednesday, 12 December 1945,
Morning Session 415
Afternoon Session 447
Nineteenth Day, Thursday, 13 December 1945,
Morning Session 477
Afternoon Session 512
Twentieth Day, Friday, 14 December 1945,
Morning Session 542
Afternoon Session 571
TENTH DAY
Saturday, 1 December 1945
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): I will begin the
session by reading the judgment of the Tribunal upon the application
made by counsel for the Defendant Hess.
The Tribunal has given careful consideration to the motion of counsel
for the defense of the Defendant Hess, and it had the advantage of
hearing full argument upon it both from the Defense and the Prosecution.
The Tribunal has also considered the very full medical reports, which
have been made on the condition of the Defendant Hess, and has come to
the conclusion that no grounds whatever exist for a further examination
to be ordered.
After hearing the statement of the Defendant Hess in Court yesterday,
and in view of all the evidence, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the
Defendant Hess is capable of standing his trial at the present time, and
the motion of the Counsel for the Defense is, therefore, denied, and the
Trial will proceed.
Now the witness under examination should come back to the witness box.
[_Erwin Lahousen resumed the stand._]
MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it
please the Tribunal, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe yesterday said he had no
questions to ask this witness. He has now requested me very shortly to
cross-examine this witness on one incident mentioned in the Indictment,
namely, the murder of 50 R.A.F. officers who escaped from Stalag Luft 3
in March of 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: You said to “cross-examine”?
MR. ROBERTS: I realize that this is a matter which falls in the part of
the Indictment which is being dealt with by the prosecutors for the
U.S.S.R. My Lord, I have mentioned that matter to General Rudenko, who
with his usual courtesy and kindness, has said that he has no objection
to my asking some questions on that matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Mr. Roberts.
MR. ROBERTS: Much obliged.
[_Turning to the witness._] Might I ask you this? Do you know anything
of the circumstances of the death of 50 R.A.F. officers in March 1944,
who had escaped from Stalag Luft 3 at Sagan and were recaptured?
ERWIN LAHOUSEN (Witness): No, I have nothing to say because at that time
I was on the Eastern front, as commander of my regiment, and no longer
had any contact with my former duties.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you hear of the matter from any of your fellow
officers?
LAHOUSEN: No, I heard nothing about it whatsoever.
MR. ROBERTS: You can’t assist the Court at all with the matter?
LAHOUSEN: No, not at all.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): Witness, you
stated yesterday that you were the intimate friend and collaborator of
Admiral Canaris. Since I can no longer address my question directly to
Admiral Canaris, I ask you to answer the following questions for me: Did
Admiral Canaris know of Defendant Von Papen’s attitude toward Hitler’s
war policies, and how did Admiral Canaris express himself to you on this
point?
LAHOUSEN: First, I should like to make a slight correction on the
question addressed to me. I never asserted that I was the intimate
friend of Canaris. Pieckenbrock was a friend of Canaris, whereas I was
merely one of his confidants. From this relationship, however, I recall
that Von Papen’s and Canaris’ attitude toward the matter which the
Counsel has just brought up, was a negative one.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was this negative attitude only toward the war policy, or
was it also toward all the violent methods used in the execution of such
a policy?
LAHOUSEN: According to my recollection I have to answer this question in
the affirmative, judging from a conversation between Admiral Canaris and
Von Papen, during the visit of the latter in Berlin at which I was
present.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you know that Von Papen told Canaris that there could
be no resistance against Hitler’s aggressive policies from political
quarters, but that such resistance would have to be sought among the
ranks of the military?
LAHOUSEN: In this connection, that is to say, in the direct connection
as it is now being presented, I personally cannot say anything. In other
words, I personally was not an ear witness at any conversation between
Canaris and Von Papen during which this matter was brought up, and I
cannot recall today whether Canaris ever told me anything regarding such
conversations with Von Papen. It is quite possible, however, but I
cannot recall it and consequently my oath as witness does not permit me
to make any statement other than the one I have made.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, do you conclude from this that Canaris believed
that Von Papen purposely continued to hold an exposed political office
in order to exercise a mitigating influence?
LAHOUSEN: I believe so, though I have no tangible proof from any of his
statements. But that is my impression, from what I still recollect
today.
DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): My client has requested
me to ask you the following questions: How long have you known Canaris
and Pieckenbrock?
LAHOUSEN: I have known Canaris and Pieckenbrock since 1937 through my
previous activity in the Austrian Intelligence Department.
DR. NELTE: At that time were there any relations of a military nature
between yourself and the Abwehr, which was being run by Admiral Canaris?
LAHOUSEN: Not only did such connections exist with the Austrian
intelligence, but the Austrian Federal Army and the German Wehrmacht
maintained it that time an absolutely legal and purely military exchange
of information—legal in the sense that this exchange and collaboration
of military intelligence was carried on with the knowledge of the
Austrian authorities. To state it clearly, this was a purely military
collaboration for exchanging intelligence on countries bordering upon
Austria.
DR. NELTE: May I ask if this contact between you and Canaris was also of
a personal nature, in other words I want to determine how the Austrian
Army felt about the question of the Anschluss?
LAHOUSEN: This and similar questions, that is to say, all questions of a
political nature, particularly the question of the Anschluss or the very
intense illegal Nazi activities, at that time, had to be and were
completely ignored. It was generally agreed between Count Marogna, the
official liaison man—he also was executed after the 20th of July—and
Canaris and Generaloberst Beck that this line should be taken.
DR. NELTE: Do I understand you wish to imply that this personal contact
did not mean that the Austrian General Staff officers gave information
on everything regarding their attitude to the idea of the Anschluss, or
that they were willing or able to give this information?
LAHOUSEN: This personal contact started on the day when I saw Canaris
for the first time, while I was still an Austrian officer. It was in the
offices of the Federal Ministry of Defense, where Canaris was with the
Chief of the Austrian General Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you please repeat the question?
DR. NELTE: I asked the witness to what extent a personal contact existed
between the officers of the German General Staff or the Abwehr and the
officers of the Intelligence Section or the Austrian General Staff for
the purpose of determining the feelings about the Anschluss.
LAHOUSEN: First of all, there was no such personal contact in the sense
that the word is used here. The contact which actually did take
place—and there are witnesses in this room who can confirm this
statement: Von Papen must be informed thoroughly of this—took place on
a single day, during which I never spoke with Canaris alone, but always
in the presence of my superior officers. In any case, no questions
relating to the Anschluss and no political questions on Austrian
internal problems were discussed there. Naturally I myself did not raise
any, and Canaris expressly refrained from doing so.
DR. NELTE: What was your job in the Abwehr Office II?
LAHOUSEN: In the Abwehr Section II, which I took over at the beginning
of 1939—I described it yesterday, and I am willing to repeat it, if you
wish—this particular job had no special name. Actually my task was to
carry out various undertakings and actions, which I can define very
precisely: Nuisance activity, acts of sabotage, or prevention of
sabotage and nuisance activity, or in general those types of activities
that are carried out by Kommandos. All these activities were carried out
in agreement with, and conformed to, the military demands of the Armed
Forces Operations Staff or the General Staff.
DR. NELTE: Who generally gave you your orders regarding co-ordinating
these activities with the military activities?
LAHOUSEN: My immediate chief, Canaris, usually gave me orders concerning
the whole of my activity.
DR. NELTE: I was referring to the office, whether they came from the OKH
or the OKW?
LAHOUSEN: They did not come from the OKW as a rule. Usually they came by
way of the OKW represented by the Chief of the OKW, Keitel, or the chief
of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff; and when the General Staff or the Air
Force Operations Staff were interested in any undertaking, the orders,
as far as I can remember, were also transmitted by way of the Armed
Forces Operations Staff, and the representatives of the three Armed
Forces, that is, the Army, Air Force, and Navy, appointed to it. All
these orders came through the same channels to the Canaris Foreign
Intelligence Department (Ausland Abwehr) which transmitted those
concerning my activities to me for necessary action.
DR. NELTE: Are you now describing the official channels through which
you received the orders? Were the orders issued by the Army or the Armed
Forces Operations Staff? Or did the Army give the orders for
transmission by way of the High Command of the Armed Forces?
LAHOUSEN: Actually, speaking of myself, in questions of this kind,
regarding matters which concerned my department, I had dealings only
with my immediate superior, Canaris; and the superior of Canaris at that
time was the OKW under Keitel, and he was in touch with the gentlemen of
the Armed Forces Operational Staff, and now and then with the members of
the General Staff of the Army. I could mention specific cases from
memory. But in general the procedure was such as I described it.
DR. NELTE: Is it true that Keitel, as the Chief of the OKW, at first
every year, and then from 1943 on, at regular and shorter intervals,
spoke to the office and department chiefs of the OKW; and on such
occasions made a point of telling them that anyone who believed that
something was being asked of him which his conscience would not allow
him to carry out should tell him, Keitel, about it personally?
LAHOUSEN: It is true that the Chief of the OKW did several times address
the circle just mentioned. I cannot recall any exact words of his which
could be interpreted in such a way as to mean that one could take the
risk, in cases about which I testified yesterday, of speaking with him
so openly and frankly as myself and others, that is, witnesses still
alive, could speak to Canaris at any time. I definitely did not have
that impression, whatever the meaning might have been which was given to
his words at that time.
DR. NELTE: Do I understand you correctly to mean that in principle you
do not wish to challenge the fact that Keitel actually said these words?
LAHOUSEN: I can neither challenge it, nor can I add anything to it,
because I have no exact recollection of it. I do recall that these
addresses or conferences took place, and it is quite possible that the
Chief of the OKW at that time might have used those words. I can only
add what I have already said.
DR. NELTE: Is it true that on several occasions, you, in the company of
Admiral Canaris, as well as alone, had audience with the Chief of the
OKW, in order to discuss with him plans or undertakings of a delicate
nature, which were in the purview of your official duties?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I said a great deal about that yesterday; and I do not
feel I have the right to talk about such things unless I was there
personally.
DR. NELTE: I had the impression yesterday that in many respects you were
acting as a mouthpiece for Admiral Canaris, who used you as a mentor for
the entries in his diary. Was that your testimony?
LAHOUSEN: The impression is completely fallacious. I am not a
mouthpiece, and am now, as I was then, completely independent inwardly
in what I say. I have never allowed myself, nor shall I ever allow
myself, to become the mouthpiece for any conception, or to make any
statements that are contrary to my inner convictions and to my
conscience.
DR. NELTE: You misunderstood me if you believe that I used the word
“mouthpiece” derogatorily. I simply wanted to bring out the fact that
yesterday you made frequent references to the remarks in Canaris’ diary,
that is to the remarks of Canaris quoted by you.
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I did so in those cases where the matter discussed
affected Canaris. He himself cannot testify, since he is dead. Just
because I know a great deal about this, and because my information is
exact, I felt it my duty to say what I know.
DR. NELTE: Did Keitel ever ask questions or order any inquiries to be
made about the political views of the officers in the Intelligence
Department? Did he ever ask whether there were any National Socialists
in the departments of the intelligence service?
LAHOUSEN: At the afore-mentioned periodical meetings he asked this
question and others of this nature in an unmistakable way, and he left
no doubt that in an office such as the OKW he could not tolerate any
officers who did not believe in the idea of final victory, or who did
not give proof of unswerving loyalty to the Führer and much more
besides.
DR. NELTE: Could these statements be taken to mean that he demanded
obedience in the military sense, or do you think he was speaking from a
political point of view?
LAHOUSEN: Of course, he was speaking from a military point of view, but
no less clearly from the political aspect, for it was not admissible to
make any distinction between the two. The Wehrmacht was to form a single
whole—the National Socialistic Wehrmacht. Here he touched upon the root
problem.
DR. NELTE: You believe, therefore, that the basic attitude was really
the military one, also in the OKW?
LAHOUSEN: The basic attitude was, or should have been, National
Socialistic, and not military. In other words, first and foremost
National Socialistic, and everything else afterwards.
DR. NELTE: You said “should have been.”
LAHOUSEN: Yes, because it actually was not the case.
DR. NELTE: Quite so. You mean, therefore, that in the first place it was
military and not National Socialistic.
LAHOUSEN: It should have been a purely military one, according to our
conception, but according to the point of view put forward by the Chief
of the OKW at that time—whether he received an order in this sense I am
not in a position to say, as I was not there—the basic attitude should
be one of absolute obedience in a National Socialistic sense.
DR. NELTE: Do you know anything about the attitude of the generals to
this problem?
LAHOUSEN: Of course, I do, because immediately after such conferences,
as have been mentioned here, a lively exchange of opinions took place on
this subject and a large number of those who were present—I could name
them and some of them are present—resented that fact that the words
addressed to them had this strong political flavor, and were couched in
this “higher level language” (Sprachregelung von oben) as we used to
call it, and contained so little that was relevant and purely military,
let alone anything else.
DR. NELTE: Yesterday, when discussing the meeting that took place in the
Führer’s train, on the 12th September of 1939, you said, regarding the
communication of the Chief of the OKW to you, that the Defendant Keitel
addressed himself to you, or rather to the gentlemen present; and said
that these measures had been determined between the Führer and Göring.
He, Keitel, had no influence on them. The Führer and Göring telephoned
frequently to one another. Sometimes he knew something about it;
sometimes he knew nothing. Is that what you said?
LAHOUSEN: That is correct. I made a record of everything that was said
in my presence; and I repeated it here because it is true.
DR. NELTE: May I ask whether the remark, “Sometimes I find out something
about it, sometimes I do not,” relates to a concrete, specific case, or
was that a general rule?
LAHOUSEN: That was to be understood as a general statement, to the best
of my recollection.
DR. NELTE: At this conference in the Führer’s train on the 12th of
September 1939, did you first of all speak about the transmission of the
political aims which, according to you, came from Ribbentrop. Did I
understand you correctly?
LAHOUSEN: That is correct.
DR. NELTE: And you said that the Defendant Keitel transmitted these aims
to those who were present. Now, what I am not clear about is whether
this referred to the order regarding the bombardment of Warsaw from the
air. Did I understand rightly?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, as regards the air bombardment of Warsaw, to the best of
my recollection and from what is recorded in the notes, I can only say
in this connection, the same as when the question of shootings in Poland
came up, that Canaris took the initiative by provoking a discussion on
this subject—I no longer remember how he did this—and then pointing
out the terrible political repercussions that this would have,
especially abroad.
DR. NELTE: The Defendant Keitel is anxious that I should put the
question to you, whether, when this order for the bombing of Warsaw was
made known he did not stress the fact that this was to be put into
effect only if the fortress of Warsaw did not surrender after the demand
made by the bearer of the flag of truce, and even then only after an
opportunity to evacuate the city had been given to the civilian
population and the diplomats.
LAHOUSEN: I cannot recall the precise words he used but according to my
knowledge of the situation at that time it is quite possible, indeed
probable, that the Chief of the OKW, Keitel, did make this remark.
DR. NELTE: Do you know that the Commander-in-Chief of the army at that
time, Von Brauchitsch, and the Chief of the OKW, Keitel, before the
Polish War began, categorically objected to the use of Gestapo and SD
Kommandos, maintaining that these were unbearable in the Wehrmacht, and
in this connection asked for Hitler’s concurrence and received it?
LAHOUSEN: No, I did not know that, and could not have known it because
of my subordinate position at that time. Please do not overrate the
importance of my position at that time.
DR. NELTE: As we are also concerned here with taking cognizance of a
document, which, I take it, was transmitted to all departments and
sections of the OKW, I thought you might remember. They were the
so-called directives, were they not? And these directives, mentioned in
connection with the campaign against Poland, in contrast to what
happened later . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I think you were going a little bit too fast.
DR. NELTE: I said that in connection with these military actions, the
decrees and directives were always transmitted to the various offices of
the OKW in the form of carbon copies—I mean the offices which were in
any way concerned. I thought, therefore . . .
LAHOUSEN: Yes, but these were things which did not concern my particular
department, I stress the word “particular,” I did not even see them.
DR. NELTE: As later on in the conversation you were drawn into the
discussion on these questions—it is true you did stress that you did
not know the actual wording of the orders . . .
LAHOUSEN: Orders which I did not see and read. Of course, I knew a great
many things, because I came to hear of them.
DR. NELTE: For that reason, I want to ask you whether you recall that
the Gestapo and SD had interfered behind the advance in connection with
Poland, contrary to the intentions expressed in the orders of the
military leaders?
LAHOUSEN: I cannot recall that today. I can only refer to what I heard
and what is recorded in the files on this matter, namely, the remark of
Hitler’s, which was passed down by Keitel, who was chief at that time,
and which was to the effect, that if the armed forces objected to these
measures, the armed forces as well as the high command—that is
apparently what you mean—would have to put up with it if the Gestapo
and the SS went ahead with these things. That is all I can tell you. I
know that because I was present at these discussions.
DR. NELTE: During this conversation, were you not told that General
Blaskowitz—in other words, the Army—had made a complaint about the
methods of the SS and the SD?
LAHOUSEN: Whether or not this question was brought up at this
conference, I cannot recall. I can hardly assume that it was brought up,
because otherwise this question would have been recorded in the notes of
that conference, particularly since the complaint came from General
Blaskowitz, whose attitude in such matters was quite clear and well
known. But apart from this conversation in the Führer’s train, I do
recall something about the matter just mentioned, that is, the
objections raised by Blaskowitz. I cannot say today how these objections
were made, whether in writing or by word of mouth, neither do I know the
occasion on which they were made. While I do remember the substance of
the matter, I cannot recall whether it came up for discussion at the
meeting where I was present.
DR. NELTE: What appears to me to be important in this matter, is the
fact that the Wehrmacht, the troops, really did protest, or at least
refused . . .
LAHOUSEN: That the Armed Forces did object, is, of course, quite
evident.
DR. NELTE: That is what I wanted to know. Who gave the order . . .
LAHOUSEN: One moment, please. When I say “the Armed Forces,” I mean the
masses of common soldiers, the ordinary simple men. Of course, there
were in these Armed Forces other men whom I wish to exclude. I do not
wish to be misunderstood. The concept “Armed Forces” does not include
everybody, but it does include the mass of simple men with natural
feelings.
DR. NELTE: When using the term “Wehrmacht” I only wanted to bring out
the contrast between the broad masses of the soldiers and the SS and SD,
and I think we are agreed on this.
LAHOUSEN: I think we have ample and fairly conclusive proof of this
contract in the conditions prevailing and the methods used at that time,
which in that form and scope were then for the first time shown openly
enough to become apparent to the broad masses of the Wehrmacht—quite
apart from anything I can say about it in this short, extremely short
exposition.
DR. NELTE: Who gave the order regarding the collaboration with the
Ukrainian group? You spoke yesterday . . .
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I have to go back somewhat farther. First of all I must
say that this group was composed of citizens from various countries,
that is, Hungarians, Czechs, and afterwards Polish citizens, who because
of their attitude of opposition, had emigrated or gone to Germany. I
cannot say who gave the order for the collaboration, because at the time
when these things happened—it was some time back, I remember quite
clearly it was in 1938 or even earlier—I was not even working in the
Amt Ausland Abwehr and was not in touch with the Department, which I did
not take over until the beginning of 1939. It was already on a firm
footing when I took it over.
In this connection I must add, since it was also touched upon yesterday,
that these Ukrainians, at least the majority of them, had no ties
whatsoever with Germany. I can say definitely that a large proportion of
these people with whom the Amt Ausland Abwehr had contact at that time
were in German concentration camps, and that some of these people were
fighting for their country in Soviet partisan groups. That is a fact.
DR. NELTE: Did Admiral Canaris not tell you that the Chief of the OKW,
Keitel, when informed by the SS of the demand for Polish uniforms and
military equipment, had given the clear order that the Abteilung Abwehr
should have nothing to do with this game?
LAHOUSEN: As I stated yesterday, this matter was handled very
mysteriously and secretly also in our circle. Not only myself, but the
others also, knew absolutely nothing about the game which was being
played until after it actually happened. The War Diary of the Department
makes this very clear. It records that one day, quite suddenly, like a
bolt from the blue, a demand was received, by order of Canaris, for so
and so many uniforms for an undertaking known as “Himmler”. My amazement
and my enquiry as to how Himmler came to have anything to do with an
undertaking which required Polish uniforms is also recorded in the War
Diary, not by me, but by the officer who kept this diary. In reply I was
merely told that these articles of equipment would be picked up by a
certain person on a certain day, and no further explanation was given.
And there the matter ended. Of course, when the name of Himmler was
mentioned, besides being mysterious, the thing immediately began to
appear suspicious to us. By us, I mean everybody who had to do with it
in the course of his duty, right down to the ordinary sergeant, who, of
course, had to procure these uniforms by some means or other and deliver
them to a certain Hauptsturmführer SS—the name is recorded in the War
Diary. These people had their misgivings. That was a thing which could
not be forbidden.
DR. NELTE: Yesterday you also made statements about the treatment of
prisoners of war. In what way was Abwehr II concerned with
prisoner-of-war questions?
LAHOUSEN: That is quite simple. Abwehr II was naturally very interested
in an objective way that prisoners of war should be treated as well and
as decently as possible, and the same applies to any intelligence
service in the world. That was all.
DR. NELTE: Do I understand you to mean that Abwehr II, as a department,
was not concerned with prisoner-of-war questions?
LAHOUSEN: It had absolutely nothing to do with prisoner-of-war
questions.
DR. NELTE: Yesterday you spoke about the problem of the treatment of
prisoners of war in connection with a conference that took place, if I
remember rightly, at the end of July 1941?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, at this conference I did not represent only my section,
but the whole Amt Ausland Abwehr, that is to say—for general questions
of international law and military political questions, that is, those
questions which to the greatest extent generally concerned foreign
countries, and the intelligence sections. Department III which dealt
with espionage was practically interested—because after all, the
officers affiliated with it were in the prisoner-of-war camps.
Naturally, from the point of view of my section it was important to be
informed about those matters—and that my section was only interested
within the frame of the entire problem, that people should not be killed
off, but treated decently, quite apart from any of the other
considerations which were mentioned.
DR. NELTE: You said yesterday that the prisoner-of-war camps in the
operations zone of the Eastern sector were under the OKW. Is that
correct?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, what I said about prisoner-of-war camps yesterday I knew
from the conference with Reinecke, and not from any knowledge of the
orders themselves, which I had neither seen nor read. At this conference
I was able to obtain a clear idea of the prisoner-of-war question owing
to the presence of Reinecke, the chief of the prisoner-of-war
department, who represented his own department and the OKW, and I
repeated everything I remembered about this.
DR. NELTE: What I was really asking was about the limitation of the
jurisdictions.
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Do you know that in the Army Operational Zone the army on
operations was responsible for the care of prisoners of war?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. NELTE: And that the OKW became responsible for their care only when
the prisoners of war arrived in Germany?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I repeated what I knew about the matter at the time from
what I had heard. This was that the General Staff of the Army had made
all preparations to bring these people back, and Hitler then authorized
the OKW to hold this up, and the OKW was then held responsible by the
General Staff for the consequences. What happened after that I do not
know and have no right to judge. I can only repeat what I saw and heard.
DR. NELTE: I thought that yesterday you expressed the conjecture that
the prisoners were not brought back owing to an order from Hitler.
LAHOUSEN: I did not express a conjecture. I simply repeated what I heard
at the time and what I know. It might, of course, have been wrong.
DR. NELTE: Heard from whom?
LAHOUSEN: I heard this from the people with whom I was in daily contact,
that is, at the daily situation conferences, at which Canaris, the
department chiefs, and other people who came there to report were
present. I heard it there, and a great deal was said about this matter.
I have always made this clear since my first interrogation. I told
Reinecke to his face that what he himself said about this question at
the time . . .
DR. NELTE: That has nothing to do with my question.
LAHOUSEN: I understand your question perfectly. I only want to make it
quite clear how I came yesterday to say what I did—to examine how far
this applies according to the actual, organizational and other divisions
. . .
DR. NELTE: But you know that in principle the OKW had charge of
prisoners of war only in Germany?
LAHOUSEN: There is no question about that.
DR. NELTE: How could it happen that the Abwehr office adopted the
attitude you defined yesterday regarding the question of enemy commando
activities? You were supposed to deal with these things from the German
side, but you—that is, your department—were not officially concerned
with the handling of these things?
LAHOUSEN: No, not immediately concerned. The Amt Ausland had something
to do with these things because somehow it received intelligence of any
order that was under consideration, even before it was put into shape,
and certainly as soon as it was drawn up. The order in question had, of
course, a bearing on an essential point of international law, and the
Ausland section of the Abwehr department—or rather the “Sachbearbeiter”
(expert) as he was called—was naturally concerned with it. As a matter
of fact, my department was directly concerned with these things for
reasons which I have already explained, because it might turn out that
persons for whom I was responsible might be directly affected.
DR. NELTE: Did the department which dealt with international law in the
Amt Ausland Abwehr ever put its official attitude in writing?
LAHOUSEN: As I pointed out yesterday, I wrote a contribution on the
subject, from the point of view of my section, which was transmitted to
Canaris and was to be part of the long document. I only learned what use
was made of it from what Bürckner said at the time, and which was that
his department passed the thing on in this manner, either in writing or
verbally, as a protest or counter remonstrance, at any rate pointing out
the dangers. This happened a second time, and again I cannot say in what
form, whether verbally or in writing or _vice versa_—the first time in
writing and then verbally—after executions had already taken place, and
because I had again started to make myself heard because of the
executions that had already taken place. That was the logical
development.
DR. NELTE: You also said something yesterday about putting a
distinguishing mark on Russian prisoners by branding. Did it become
known to you that such a scheme, as brought out in this question, was
cancelled by a telephoned order from the Chief of the OKW, who had gone
to the Führer’s headquarters for this purpose, and that it was only
because of a regrettable, a terrible misunderstanding, that a few copies
of this order were issued?
LAHOUSEN: No, I do not know about this, because, generally speaking, I
only heard of the things which happened in the Amt Ausland Abwehr, that
is, from Canaris’ section downwards, if I was directly concerned with
them. What happened on the higher levels, that is, from Canaris upwards,
was and could only be known to me if I was in some way connected with
it.
DR. NELTE: You yourself did not see the order?
LAHOUSEN: Which order are you referring to?
DR. NELTE: The one concerning the branding of Russian prisoners.
LAHOUSEN: No. As in the case of the Commando Order and others, I
attended only the very lively discussion of this question, and with
regard to the branding of Russian prisoners I remember Canaris
mentioning that a doctor had furnished a written report on how this
could be done most efficiently.
DR. NELTE: You stated yesterday that Admiral Canaris had said that the
Defendant Keitel had given the order to do away with General Weygand?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. NELTE: The Defendant Keitel denies that. He now asks whether you
ever saw any document or written proof of this order. He wants to know
the origin of any statement which concerned General Weygand.
LAHOUSEN: This order was not given in writing, but it came to me because
I was supposed to put it into execution, that is, not I, but my
department. It came up through Canaris, in that circle which I have so
often described, and which means that it was known only to a few. I was
brought into the matter through a talk which Canaris gave at Keitel’s
office in the OKW and at which I was present. Keitel had already
addressed me on the matter. I recorded this in my personal notes and I
mentioned the date. After all, such a thing was not an everyday
occurrence, at least not to me. It was 23 December 1940.
DR. NELTE: Do you not remember the actual wording of the question that
Defendant Keitel was supposed to have asked?
LAHOUSEN: Of course I cannot remember the precise wording; the incident
happened too long ago. I remember the gist very well. What he meant was,
“What has been done in this matter? How do things stand?”
DR. NELTE: You said yesterday that you gave an evasive answer.
LAHOUSEN: I said yesterday that I could not remember exactly how I
worded my answer but I certainly did not say what I had said in the
presence of Canaris, namely, “I would not think of executing such a
murderous order; my section and my officers are not an organization of
murderers. Anything but that.” What I probably said to Keitel was
something about how difficult the matter was, or any evasive answer that
I may have thought of.
DR. NELTE: If the Chief of the OKW had ordered such an action on his own
initiative or on higher orders, this would, because of the high rank of
General Weygand, have amounted to an act of state. You did not tell us
yesterday whether after December 23, 1940 anything transpired in this
matter, that is to say, whether the Chief of the OKW took up this
question again.
LAHOUSEN: No, I did not say anything about that yesterday, but I
frequently mentioned during the interrogations that after that the Chief
of the OKW did nothing more about it. Canaris’ attitude made it obvious
that nothing further had been heard of it, for in the hierarchy of
commands which for me was authoritative, he would have had to transmit
orders to me. On the other hand, the information which I received in the
Giraud matter was authoritative.
DR. NELTE: We shall come to that presently. It is extraordinary that if
an act of state, such as the murder of General Weygand, had been
ordered, nothing more should have been heard of it. Can you explain
this?
LAHOUSEN: I can only explain it in the light of the construction which
not only I myself, but also the others, put on the matter at that time.
The situation at that time was very agitated; events followed each other
very rapidly and something happened all the time, and we assumed—I
shall come back to why we assumed it—that this matter and the
importance attached to it had been superseded by some more important
military or political event, and that it had receded into the
background.
DR. NELTE: Do you wish to say anything else?
LAHOUSEN: Yes. I wish to state that what I am saying now has a certain
bearing on the inner development of the Giraud affair. We—that is,
Canaris, myself, and the others—who knew about this when the matter
started, had hoped that it would take the same course as the Weygand
affair; that is, that the matter would be dropped. Whether the order had
been given by Keitel, or Hitler or Himmler, it would have been shelved
when it came to Canaris and to me. In our circles it would have been
relatively easy to intercept it or to divert it. That was what we hoped
when the Giraud affair came up, as we had seen what actually had
happened in the Weygand affair. Whether that was right or wrong I cannot
judge. This is the explanation.
DR. NELTE: For a less important matter your argument might be plausible,
but in such an important matter as the Weygand case it does not seem to
me to hold water. But even if it had been so, had the intention to do
away with Weygand existed in any quarters and for any reason, how do you
explain the fact that Weygand, who later was taken to Germany and housed
in a villa, lived undisturbed and honored and met with no harm? It would
have been understandable if the order to eliminate him had been
seriously expressed in any quarters, that it should have been carried
out on this occasion.
LAHOUSEN: I can only answer to this that the attitude towards
personalities in public life, whether at home or abroad, varied a great
deal. There were high personalities who at one moment were in great
favor and thought of very highly, and at the next moment were to be
found in a concentration camp.
DR. NELTE: Now regarding the Giraud case, you stated that Admiral
Canaris said in your presence and the presence of others that General
Giraud was to be done away with on orders from higher quarters.
LAHOUSEN: Yes. That it is so is borne out by the remark that
Pieckenbrock made, and which I remember very well, that Herr Keitel
should tell these things to Herr Hitler once and for all.
DR. NELTE: So according to the communication made to you by Admiral
Canaris, it was not an order of Keitel’s but an order of Hitler’s.
LAHOUSEN: As far as we knew in the Abwehr office, it was Keitel who gave
the order to Canaris. I can only assume this in view of an order Hitler
made to this effect I do not know who actually gave this order, because
I had no insight into the hierarchy of command beyond Canaris. It was,
as far as I was concerned, an order from Canaris—an order which I could
discuss immediately with him, in the same way as I can discuss it here.
DR. NELTE: You yourself did not hear this order?
LAHOUSEN: No, I personally did not hear it. I never said I did.
DR. NELTE: But you mentioned that later Keitel spoke to you about this
matter?
LAHOUSEN: The procedure was the same as in the case of Weygand.
DR. NELTE: Do you remember whether any precise or positive expression
such as “killing,” “elimination,” or something similar was used on this
occasion?
LAHOUSEN: The word generally used was “elimination” (umlegen).
DR. NELTE: What I mean is whether in this connection such a word was
used by the Defendant Keitel in addressing you?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course—when I gave my report, the notes of which I
have, together with the date, just as in the Weygand case. For reasons
unknown to me, the Giraud affair was apparently carried further than the
Weygand affair, for Canaris and I could determine the different stages
in its development.
DR. NELTE: You did not answer my question. What did the Defendant Keitel
say to you in this instance, when you were present at the occasion of a
report by Canaris and the question of Giraud was brought up? What did he
say?
LAHOUSEN: The same thing: “How does the matter stand?” And by “matter”
he clearly meant Giraud’s elimination, and that was the very subject we
discussed under similar conditions in the Weygand affair.
DR. NELTE: That is your opinion, but that is not the fact on which you
have to give evidence. I wish to find out from you what Keitel actually
said to you. When speaking to you or in your presence, did he use the
expression “dispose of” or “eliminate”?
LAHOUSEN: I cannot remember the expression he used, but it was perfectly
clear what it was all about. Whatever it was, it was not a question of
sparing Giraud’s life or imprisoning him. They had had the opportunity
to do that while he was in occupied territory.
DR. NELTE: That is what I want to speak about now. You are familiar with
the fact that after Giraud’s flight and his return to Unoccupied France,
a conference took place in Occupied France.
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I heard of that.
DR. NELTE: Ambassador Abetz had a talk with General Giraud which dealt
with the question of his voluntary return to confinement. You know that?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I heard of that.
DR. NELTE: Then you probably also know that at that time the local
military commander immediately called up the Führer’s headquarters by
way of Paris. It was believed that an important communication was to be
made; namely, that Giraud was in Occupied France and could be taken
prisoner?
LAHOUSEN: I know about this in its broad outline.
DR. NELTE: Then you know also that the OKW—that is to say in this case,
Keitel—then decided that this should not happen.
LAHOUSEN: No, that I do not know.
DR. NELTE: But you do know that General Giraud returned to Unoccupied
France without having been harmed?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I do know that.
DR. NELTE: Well, in that case, the answer to my previous question is
self-apparent.
LAHOUSEN: I speak the truth when I say I do not know. I could not have
known unless they had talked about it in my presence.
DR. NELTE: Well, it is so, and the facts prove it to be so. Did you know
that General Giraud’s family lived in Occupied France?
LAHOUSEN: No, I did not know that.
DR. NELTE: I thought the Abwehr division was entrusted with surveillance
of this region?
LAHOUSEN: No, you are mistaken—certainly not my department. I do not
know whether another department was in charge of that.
DR. NELTE: The question was asked simply to prove that the family did
not suffer because General Giraud escaped and later refused to return to
captivity. I have one more question which you may be able to answer.
LAHOUSEN: I beg your pardon. May I return, please, to the question of
Giraud?
DR. NELTE: This question also has to do with General Giraud.
LAHOUSEN: Very well.
DR. NELTE: Do you know that one day your chief, Canaris, received by
special courier a letter from Giraud in which Giraud asked whether he
might return to France? Do you know that?
LAHOUSEN: No. No, I do not know about it. Perhaps I was not in Berlin at
the time. I was not always in Berlin.
DR. NELTE: I am aware of that. I thought it might be mentioned in the
diary.
LAHOUSEN: No, I did not keep the diary. I simply made additions to it so
far as my particular department was concerned, but I was not familiar
with the diary in its entirety.
DR. NELTE: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUEHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): I would
like to make a motion in connection with the technical side of the
proceedings. In the course of the proceedings, many German witnesses
will be heard. It is important that the Tribunal should know exactly
what the witnesses say. During the hearing of this witness I have tried
to compare what the witness actually said with the English translation.
I think I can state that in many essential points the translation did
not entirely correspond to the statement of the witness. I would,
therefore, like to suggest that German stenographers take down directly
the statements of the witness in German so that Defense Counsel will
have an opportunity of comparing what the witness actually says with the
English translation and, if necessary, of making an application for the
correction of the translation. That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Justice Jackson.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States):
I just want to inform the Court and Counsel, in connection with the
observation that has just been made, that that has been anticipated and
that every statement of the witness is recorded in German, so that if
any question arises, if Counsel addresses a motion to it, the testimony
can be verified.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that German record available to Defendants’ Counsel?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I don’t think it is. It is not, so far as I know.
It would not be available unless there were some occasion for it.
THE PRESIDENT: It is transcribed, I suppose?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I don’t know how far that process is carried. I
will consult the technicians and advise about it, but I know that it is
preserved. The extent of my knowledge now is that it is preserved in
such a form that, if a question does arise, it can be accurately
determined by the Tribunal, so that if they call attention to some
particular thing, either the witness can correct it or we can have the
record produced. It would not be practicable to make the recording
available without making reproducing machines available. While I am not
a technician in that field, I would not think it would be practicable to
place that at their disposal.
THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be practicable to have a transcription made
of the shorthand notes in German and, within the course of one or two
days after the evidence has been given, place that transcription in the
Defendants’ Counsel room?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that is being done. I think perhaps Colonel
Dostert can explain just what is being done better than I can, because
he is the technician in this field. I am sure that no difficulty need
arise over this matter of correct translations.
COLONEL LEON DOSTERT (Chief of Interpreters): Your Honors, the reports
of the proceedings are taken down in all four languages and every word
spoken in German is taken down in German by German court stenographers.
The notes are then transcribed and can be made available to Defense
Counsel. Moreover, there is a mechanical recording device which
registers every single word spoken in any language in the courtroom, and
in case of doubt about the authenticity of the reporters’ notes, we have
the further verification of the mechanical recording, so that Defense
Counsel should have every opportunity to check the authenticity of the
translation.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am advised further by Colonel Dostert that 25
copies of the German transcript are being delivered to the defendants
each day.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I was not informed that the
German testimony is being taken down in shorthand in German. I assumed
that the records handed over to us were translations. If German
shorthand notes are being taken in the court, I withdraw my motion.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we shall get on faster if the Defendants’
Counsel, before making motions, inquire into the matters about which
they are making the motions.
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Ribbentrop): I would like to ask
a few questions of the witness.
Witness, you previously stated that at some time an order was given,
according to which, Russian prisoners of war were to be marked in a
certain manner and that this order had been withdrawn by the Defendant
Keitel. You did say that, did you not?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I said that I have knowledge that there was this purpose.
DR. SAUTER: This is interesting from the point of view of the Defendant
Ribbentrop, and I would like to hear from you whether you know about
this matter. Ribbentrop maintains that when he heard about the order to
brand Russian prisoners of war, he, in his capacity as Reich Foreign
Minister, went immediately to the Führer’s headquarters to inform
General Field Marshal Keitel of this order, and pointed out to him that
he, Ribbentrop, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, as well as in his
capacity as the guarantor of international law, objected to such
treatment of Russian prisoners of war.
I would be interested to know, Witness, whether in your circle something
was said as to who drew Keitel’s attention to this order and asked him
to retract it?
LAHOUSEN: I was not informed of that and I only knew, as I said
yesterday, that there had been this intention, but it was not carried
out.
DR. SAUTER: Then I have another question.
Witness, you spoke yesterday about some remarks of the Defendant
Ribbentrop, especially one statement to the effect that an uprising
should be staged in Poland—not in Russia—and that all Polish farm
houses should go up in flames and all Jews should be killed. That,
roughly, was how the statement ran.
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Now, later on, I believe, in answering a question of one of
the Russian prosecutors, you amplified your statement by mentioning an
order of the Defendant Ribbentrop. I would now like to know whether you
really meant to say that it was an order from Ribbentrop to a military
department?
LAHOUSEN: No.
DR. SAUTER: Just a minute please, so that you can answer both questions
together.
I would also like to remind you that yesterday, when this matter was
first discussed, you spoke of a directive which, I believe, your
superior officer had, as you said, received from Ribbentrop?
LAHOUSEN: No, the Chief of the OKW received it, not my superior officer,
who was Canaris. I would like to repeat it, in order to clarify this
matter. It was a matter that came up for discussion on the 12th of
September 1939 in the Führer’s train. These meetings took place in the
following sequence with respect to time and locality: At first a short
meeting took place between the Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and
Canaris in his coach.
DR. SAUTER: Were you present?
LAHOUSEN: I was present at that meeting. General political questions
regarding Poland and the Ukrainians in Poland were discussed. I do not
know anything more about this meeting, which was the first.
After that there was another meeting in the coach of Keitel, who was
then Chief of the OKW, and in the course of this meeting Keitel
summarized and commented on the general political directives issued by
Ribbentrop. He then mentioned several possible solutions for the
handling of the Polish problem from the point of view of foreign
policy—this can happen, or something else can happen; it is quite
possible. In this connection he said:
“You, Canaris, have to promote an uprising with the aid of the
Ukrainian organizations which are working with you and which
have the same objectives, namely, the Poles and the Jews.”
And then a third discussion, or rather, a very brief remark at the end
of a very short conversation between the Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and
Canaris was made in connection with this subject, after the intention
had been made quite clear. It was about how the uprising was to be
carried out and what was to happen. I remember this so well, because he
demanded that the farm houses must burn. Canaris discussed the matter
with me in detail later on and referred to this remark.
That is what happened, as I have described it. This was the sequence:
Directives from the High Command to Keitel; then passed on by Keitel to
Canaris at this meeting; then repeated to Canaris in the form of a
remark which I remember so well because it contained the words about
farm houses in flames, which is rather an unusual thing to say.
THE PRESIDENT: It would assist the Tribunal if one question at a time
were asked and if the witnesses would answer “yes” or “no” to the
question asked, and explain, if they must, afterwards. But questions and
answers should be put as shortly as possible and only one question
should be asked at a time.
DR. SAUTER: Now, witness, something else has struck me.
THE PRESIDENT: You heard what I said did you? Do you understand it?
DR. SAUTER: [_Continuing._] Yesterday you said that these remarks of
Ribbentrop are not in the diary, if I understood you correctly.
LAHOUSEN: No, this is not from the diary but has a connection with
Canaris’ diary, by means of which I can make this remark.
DR. SAUTER: You said yesterday that this remark struck you as being
rather surprising.
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: And today you said that General Blaskowitz also made some
striking statements. You also mentioned, however, that these statements
of Blaskowitz were not entered in the diary.
LAHOUSEN: No.
DR. SAUTER: Now, it occurs to me—and I would like you to answer this
question: Why, if this remark of the Defendant Ribbentrop surprised you,
was it not entered in the diary?
LAHOUSEN: Regarding Blaskowitz, I have to say—or rather—repeat the
following:
I said that I did not hear the Blaskowitz matter mentioned in this
connection during the meeting, and I cannot assume that this subject
came up concurrently, otherwise it would have been entered in these
notes. It may be, of course, that the Blaskowitz matter was discussed at
a time when I was not there. I have only put down what I heard or what
Canaris told me to enter in the record.
DR. SAUTER: But did you yourself hear that from Ribbentrop?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, but the substance was not altered. Whether one speaks of
extermination, elimination, or the burning of farms, they all amount to
terroristic measures.
DR. SAUTER: Did Von Ribbentrop really talk of killing Jews? Are you sure
you remember that?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I definitely remember that, because Canaris talked not
only to me, but also to others in Vienna about this matter and called me
time and again as a witness.
DR. SAUTER: You heard that too?
LAHOUSEN: That did not settle the matter, but these words of
Ribbentrop’s were frequently discussed.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, something else. You have told us about murderous
designs on which you or your department or other officers were employed
or which you were charged to carry out. Did you report these to any
police station as the law required? May I point out that according to
German law failure to report intended crimes is punishable with
imprisonment or in serious cases with death.
LAHOUSEN: Well, when you talk about German law, I cannot follow you. I
am not a lawyer, but just an ordinary man.
DR. SAUTER: As far as I know, that is also punishable according to
Austrian law.
LAHOUSEN: At that time Austrian law, as far as I know, was no longer
valid.
DR. SAUTER: In other words, you never reported the intended crime,
either as a private person or as an official?
LAHOUSEN: I should have had to make a great many reports—about 100,000
projected murders, of which I knew and could not help but know. You can
read about them in the records—and about shootings and the like—of
which of necessity I had knowledge, whether I wanted to know or not,
because, unfortunately, I was in the midst of it.
DR. SAUTER: It is not a matter of shootings which had taken place and
could no longer be prevented, but rather a matter of intended murder at
a time when perhaps it could have been prevented.
LAHOUSEN: I can only answer: Why did the person who received this order
at first hand not do the same thing? Why did he not denounce Hitler for
instance?
DR. SAUTER: You, as a general of the German Wehrmacht, should have asked
Hitler . . .
LAHOUSEN: I am sorry, you overestimate my rank, I had only been a
general in the German Wehrmacht since the first of January 1945, that
is, only for 4 months. At that time I was lieutenant colonel and later
colonel of the General Staff, not in the General Staff.
DR. SAUTER: But in 1938, immediately after Hitler’s attack on Austria,
you at once made a request to be taken into the German Wehrmacht by
Hitler.
LAHOUSEN: I did not make a request, and I did not have to do this.
Wherever I was in the service, I was known for my special services. I
was not a stranger. With the knowledge of the Austrian Government and
also, in a restricted sense, with the knowledge of the German
authorities (that is, of certain persons) I was working for the Austrian
Government in a matter which exclusively concerned things outside the
scope of Austrian internal policy. I co-operated with the Wehrmacht, as
well as with the Italian and Hungarian Governments with the knowledge of
the Austrian Government and the competent authorities. There were
matters of politics which were not my domain.
DR. SAUTER: But I believe, Witness, your memory deceives you, because
immediately after Hitler’s attack on Austria, you called on the General
Staff in Berlin and there you tried to get a commission in the German
Wehrmacht, and you now deny this. You also filled in and signed a
questionnaire, in which you declared your complete allegiance to the
Greater German Reich and to Adolf Hitler; and shortly afterwards you
took the oath of allegiance to Adolf Hitler.
LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course, I did it just as everybody else who was in the
position of being transferred from one office and capacity to another.
DR. SAUTER: Before, you said you did not apply for this appointment, and
I have information to the contrary: That you, in the company of two or
three other officers were the first to go to Berlin with the sole
purpose of asking the Chief of the German General Staff Beck to take you
into the German Army.
LAHOUSEN: I am very glad that you mention this subject, because it
allows me to make my position perfectly clear. It was not necessary for
me to make an application for my future position in the German
Wehrmacht. I was known because of my military activities, just as any
military attaché is known in the country where he is accredited.
Moreover, I can easily explain why my rise in office was so rapid. I
have said that my activities and my co-operation with the Austrian
Military Intelligence Service, which were not determined by me but by my
superior Austrian office, were at that time directed against the
neighboring country of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was the country
that was next on the list after Austria. Therefore, it was natural that
my later chief, Canaris, who knew me from my former position, was very
interested in having me promoted in his department. He put in a word for
me, and so did Colonel General Beck, whom I was visiting. Other people
also know this; and I have now told everything that General Beck told me
at that time.
DR. SAUTER: Then it is true, you did go to Berlin and apply to be
transferred into the German Wehrmacht, which you at first denied?
LAHOUSEN: No, that is not true, I did not apply. Others made the
request. I can even say that I did not go there: I flew there. Canaris,
who knew me not only in my military capacity but also in regard to my
personal attitude (just as Marogna had known me and just as Colonel
General Beck, who was informed about me by Canaris), made the request
for me. I myself did not apply, but others applied for me, for reasons
which only later became clear to me, because they knew my personal
attitude, just as my Austrian comrades—they were necessarily few—knew
about this and about me. That is how things stood.
DR. SAUTER: I have no other questions to ask this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Before the cross-examination I wish to announce that
there will be no public session of the Tribunal this afternoon.
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): I am counsel for the
Defendant Göring, and I would like to address a few questions to the
witness.
Witness, if I understood you correctly, you said yesterday that it was
Canaris’ personal conviction that his failure to prevent the attack on
Poland would mean the end of Germany and a great misfortune for us. A
triumph of the system would mean an even greater disaster, and it was
the purpose of General Canaris to prevent this. Did I understand you
correctly?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, except for one point: Not that he had not been successful
in preventing it, but that it was not possible to prevent it. Canaris
had no way of knowing this . . .
DR. STAHMER: Is it known to you that Admiral Canaris, in the first years
of the war, had very active sabotage organizations behind the enemy
front and that he personally worked very hard for these organizations?
LAHOUSEN: Naturally I knew about that, and I have fully informed the
American authorities who were interested in this subject.
DR. STAHMER: But how is that possible? This would not be in conformity
with his inner political beliefs.
LAHOUSEN: This is explained by the fact that in the circle in which he
was active he could never say what he really thought, and thousands of
others could not do so either—what I said is a truth without saying.
The essential thing is not what he said, or what he had to say in order
to follow a purpose; but what he did and how he did it. This I know and
others know it, too.
DR. STAHMER: This is not a question of what he said, but of what he
actually did. He not only proposed such measures, but also applied
himself to their execution—is that true?
LAHOUSEN: Ostensibly he had, of course, to remain within the limits of
his office, in order to keep his position. That was the important thing,
that he should remain in this position, to prevent in 1939 the thing
that actually happened in 1944: that Himmler should take things in hand.
I place before you these two men, one against the other: Canaris and
Himmler—and I think I need hardly tell you what Canaris was striving
for when he (Canaris) took part—ostensibly took part in these
activities.
DR. STAHMER: You mentioned the name of Himmler, in this connection, I
would like to ask the following question:
Is it known to you that Admiral Canaris, during the first years of the
war, laid great stress on his good relations with the SS and the
necessity for close co-operation with the SS, so much so, that the
Defendant Göring had to advise him to be more independent of the SS in
his military functions?
THE PRESIDENT: You are going too quickly and I do not think you are
observing what I said just now, that it will help the Tribunal if you
will ask one question at a time.
DR. STAHMER: I will put my question briefly; did the witness know that
Admiral Canaris, during the first years of the war, had good connections
with the SS and recognized the necessity for close co-operation with the
formation, and never failed to stress this?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, this is known to me. I also know why.
DR. STAHMER: And why?
LAHOUSEN: So that he might be in a position to see and to know and keep
himself informed of everything these people were doing, and be able to
intervene wherever and whenever possible.
DR. STAHMER: Was it the duty of your organization, or the duty of
Canaris’ department to pass on important enemy intelligence to the
military leadership in good time?
LAHOUSEN: I do not understand what the office of Canaris has to do with
this?
DR. STAHMER: Your section of the office of Canaris?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course, the Department I.
DR. STAHMER: Now, according to my information, your office did not pass
on to the military departments concerned information of the
Anglo-American landing in North Africa. Is that true?
LAHOUSEN: I do not know. Please do not make me responsible for the
department. This is a question which could easily be answered by Colonel
Pieckenbrock, but not by me.
DR. STAHMER: Regarding the Case “Rowehl,” you said yesterday that a
colonel of the Air Force, Rowehl, had formed a special squadron, which
had the tasks of making reconnaissance flights over Poland, England, and
the southeast sector prior to the Polish campaign. Is that true?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: You also said that Colonel Rowehl went to see Admiral
Canaris to report on the results of these flights and to submit
photographs. Is that true?
LAHOUSEN: Yes. How should I have known about it otherwise? I did not
invent it.
DR. STAHMER: I did not say that. How did Colonel Rowehl come to report
to Admiral Canaris about this?
LAHOUSEN: I believe I mentioned yesterday, that this was a function of
the Amt Ausland Abwehr, Abteilung I.
DR. STAHMER: Have you yourself seen the photographs that were taken over
England?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I have seen them.
DR. STAHMER: When and where were these pictures shown to you?
LAHOUSEN: In the office of Canaris they were shown to me. I had nothing
to do with them in an official way. I happened to be present at the
time. I was interested in seeing what was going on.
DR. STAHMER: What did these photographs show?
LAHOUSEN: I have forgotten the details. They were photographs taken from
airplanes.
DR. STAHMER: The photographs were not shown to you officially?
LAHOUSEN: No, the photographs were not shown to me officially, I was
merely an interested spectator on this occasion, as I have just told
you.
DR. STAHMER: Did Rowehl give any written reports about these flights to
the Amt?
LAHOUSEN: I do not know.
DR. STAHMER: You do not know? You also said that Rowehl’s squadron made
flights from Budapest?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: Do you know that from your own experience or from some
other information?
LAHOUSEN: I know it through personal investigation. The date is entered
in the War Diary kept by the section. At that time I was in Budapest,
and I was asked to attend the conferring of a citation in Budapest.
DR. STAHMER: That was before the Polish campaign?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: And why were these flights carried out from Budapest?
LAHOUSEN: I do not know. I said that yesterday. A gentleman of the Air
Force would have to answer that.
DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Witness, do you know
Captain Strünck from the Abwehr?
LAHOUSEN: I would like you to tell me something more than the name. The
name alone does not mean anything to me. Give me a few points that will
refresh my memory.
DR. DIX: He is a lawyer who was a reserve officer with the Abwehr. I do
not know in which department, but I would say it was in the department
of Pieckenbrock. However, if you do not know him I will not question you
any further.
LAHOUSEN: If he was with Pieckenbrock I do not know him. I knew a few.
Is Strünck still alive?
DR. DIX: No, he is no longer living.
LAHOUSEN: Was he executed?
DR. DIX: He suffered the same death as Canaris and Oster. For the
information of the Court, I should like to add that I asked this
question because I named Strünck as a witness and the Court has admitted
him as such. I wish to take this opportunity—but if you do not know him
I will not continue questioning you.
LAHOUSEN: When I asked whether he is still alive, I seemed to recall
that this man, together with others whom I knew very well, might have
been killed, but I cannot be more definite on this point.
DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): I would like to ask
the witness a few questions.
Witness, do you know that the Defendant Fritzsche, when in May 1942 he
was transferred to the 6th Army as a soldier and there heard for the
first time of the existence of an order for executions, recommended to
the Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army, Paulus, that he should have this
order suspended within the jurisdiction of his army and have this
decision made known by leaflets to be dropped over the Russian front?
THE PRESIDENT: Be careful only to ask one question at a time. You have
just asked three or four questions at once.
DR. FRITZ: Yes, Sir. Is it known to you that Fritzsche gave Paulus the
advice to rescind the order for his army sector?
LAHOUSEN: That order had already been given to his army. Will you kindly
give me the approximate date?
DR. FRITZ: That was during the Russian campaign, as I mentioned
yesterday. Most of these things occurred in May 1942.
LAHOUSEN: No. I do not know anything about this in connection with
Fritzsche. In connection with the name Reichenau, which was mentioned
before, I do remember a conversation between Reichenau and Canaris at
which I was present. It made a great impression on me. During this
conversation, and in this circle, where there were several other
gentlemen present, Reichenau held quite different ideas and judged
things quite differently from what I had expected of him. Apart from
that, I do not know anything about this particular question.
DR. FRITZ: Also nothing concerning the fact that Paulus had rescinded
the order within the sector of his army?
LAHOUSEN: No, not in connection with the name Paulus, but in general I
believe, as I also stated yesterday, that several army commanders, whose
names are no longer in my memory today, or whose names have been
recorded, were mentioned by me.
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Do you know
Mr. Kaltenbrunner?
LAHOUSEN: Kaltenbrunner? I met Kaltenbrunner only once in my life, and
that was on a day that will always remain in my memory. It was also the
first meeting between Canaris and Kaltenbrunner. It took place in Munich
in the Regina Hotel, and it was on the day when two young people, a
student and his sister, were arrested and executed. They had distributed
leaflets in the auditorium of the University of Munich. I read the
contents of the leaflets, and I remember, among other things, that they
contained an appeal to the Wehrmacht.
I can easily reconstruct that day. It was the first and last time that I
saw Kaltenbrunner, with whose name I was familiar. Of course,
Kaltenbrunner mentioned this subject to Canaris, who was completely
shattered because of what had happened that day and was still under the
painful impression—and thank God there are still witnesses available
who can testify to this. When discussing the matter Kaltenbrunner was
very much to the point, but at the same time he was quite cynical about
it. That is the only thing I can tell you about this matter.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner claims that Himmler retained full executive
powers for himself, while he was only in charge of the intelligence
service. Is this borne out by the conversation that you just mentioned?
LAHOUSEN: I would like you to know what bearing that has on the
Kaltenbrunner-Himmler matter—the struggle for power which was taking
place in the SS. I have merely described this event. I can give you the
names of the people present, who like myself were very much impressed
for the reasons which I have mentioned.
HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for the SA): You were asked yesterday whether
the orders regarding the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war were known
to the leaders of the SA and other organizations, and your answer was
that these orders must have been known to them. I would now like to ask
you who these leaders were at the time and what were their names?
LAHOUSEN: Who they were and what their names were, I do not know. I also
stated explicitly yesterday why I said so. They must have been known to
them and to a large circle through the execution of these orders, and,
of course, through the return of the wounded. The German people must
have learned about them.
HERR BÖHM: In other words, it was only an opinion of yours, but in no
way a fact-based on personal observation?
LAHOUSEN: No, it was not. I personally never had anything to do with any
SA leader. I never had anything to do with them, and I do not think any
one of them knows me well.
HERR BÖHM: Could you make a statement on this, that is, whether the
orders which were mentioned yesterday were given to the formations of
the SA?
LAHOUSEN: Would you kindly formulate that question again?
HERR BÖHM: Could you make another statement as to whether the contents
of these orders, which were discussed yesterday, were sent to the
formations of the SA through official channels?
LAHOUSEN: No, not through official channels, but in the way I have
previously indicated; in other words, members of the SA who were also in
the Wehrmacht could see actually what happened out there, and when they
came back they spoke about it, the same as anyone else. It was only in
this connection . . .
HERR BÖHM: Is it known to you whether members of the SA had anything at
all to do with the handling of prisoners of war?
LAHOUSEN: When members of the SA were in the Wehrmacht, yes.
HERR BÖHM: Did you make any personal observations in this connection?
LAHOUSEN: No, I never said that. I said I had already talked about the
SA.
HERR BÖHM: I asked you which leaders of the SA formations knew about
them, and you answered that they should have known about them.
LAHOUSEN: I said the leaders of these organizations came to know about
them in this way.
HERR BÖHM: And today I ask you whether the individual formations of the
SA had received these orders.
LAHOUSEN: I can only repeat what I said yesterday, and I think I was
very clear on the subject, in other words, how these orders were issued.
I myself did not read these orders, but I know the effects they had.
HERR BÖHM: I can imagine myself how this happened, but I asked you
whether you know anything about how these orders reached the SA?
LAHOUSEN: No.
HERR BÖHM: You do not know? Do you know anything from your own personal
observations about members of the SA being employed for the supervision
of prisoner-of-war camps?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, because from my personal observations, once when I was on
my way to the Army Group North, I caught an SA man who was kicking a
Russian prisoner of war and I pulled him up about it. I think that is
mentioned somewhere in my records, and also an episode about an
Arbeitsdienst man.
HERR BÖHM: Did you report any of these incidents through the proper
channels? Did you see to it that the leaders of this organization were
informed about them?
LAHOUSEN: I reported it to my superior officer, or it was mentioned in
my report on my visit either orally or in writing. There were
discussions on this and similar incidents.
HERR BÖHM: Have you got anything in your records?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
HERR BÖHM: Will you please submit it?
LAHOUSEN: I am looking it up. This is about the Arbeitsdienst man, this
document.
HERR BÖHM: It is not about the SA man?
LAHOUSEN: No.
HERR BÖHM: Then you cannot submit anything in answer to my question?
LAHOUSEN: I do not have it here. I would have to look it up.
HERR BÖHM: Do you think you might find some records?
LAHOUSEN: I would have to have an opportunity of going through the whole
of the material which is in the hands of the American authorities to
find this one.
HERR BÖHM: I will ask the Court that you be given this opportunity.
I would also like to inquire whether you were ever able to observe that
members of the SA whom you ascertained were employed on supervisory
duties, ever took any measures which were in line with the orders
against Soviet soldiers.
LAHOUSEN: No, not personally.
HERR BÖHM: Thank you.
DR. STAHMER: I would like to ask the Court for a fundamental ruling on
whether the defendant also has the right personally to ask the witness
questions. According to the German text of the Charter, Paragraph 16, I
believe this is permissible.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the point you have raised and
will let you know later.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The United States Prosecution would desire to be
heard, I am sure, if there were any probability of that view being taken
by the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better hear you now, Mr. Justice Jackson.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I think it is very clear that these
provisions are mutually exclusive. Each defendant has the right to
conduct his own defense or to have the assistance of counsel. Certainly
this would become a performance rather than a trial if we go into that
sort of thing. In framing this Charter, we anticipated the possibility
that some of these defendants, being lawyers themselves, might conduct
their own defenses. If they do so, of course they have all the
privileges of counsel. If they avail themselves of the privileges of
counsel, they are not, we submit, entitled to be heard in person.
DR. STAHMER: I would like to point out once more that Paragraph 16 (e),
according to my opinion, speaks very clearly for my point of view. It
says that the defendant has the right, either personally or through his
counsel, to present evidence, and according to the German text it is
clear that the defendant has the right to cross-examine any witness
called by the Prosecution. According to the German text there reference
can be made only to the defendant—with respect to terms as well as to
the contents. In my opinion it is made clear that the defendant has the
right to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other German counsel, defendant’s counsel, wish
to cross-examine the witness?
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): I would only like
to point out that in the written forms given to us by the Court, the
defendant, as well as his counsel can make a motion. A place is left for
two signatures on the questionnaire. I conclude, therefore, that the
defendant himself has the right to speak on the floor.
THE PRESIDENT: What I asked was whether any other defendant’s counsel
wished to cross-examine the witness.
[_Herr Böhm approached the lectern._]
THE PRESIDENT: What is it? Would you put the earphones on, please,
unless you understand English. What is it you want to ask now? You have
already cross-examined the witness.
HERR BÖHM: Yes, I have cross-examined him, but he has given me to
understand that he made a report about an incident which occurred during
one of his visits of inspection, and that he has some written notes. As
I am not yet able to release the witness, I should like to move that the
Prosecution allow to be placed at the disposal of the witness any
available notes or reports on the observations made by him at the time,
so that he may find the evidence he wants.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you must conclude your cross-examination now.
HERR BÖHM: Certainly.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court thinks it would be better if you want to make
any further application with reference to this witness, that you should
make it in writing later.
HERR BÖHM: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, as no other defendant’s counsel wishes to
cross-examine the witness, the Tribunal will now retire for the purpose
of considering the question raised by Dr. Stahmer as to whether a
defendant has the right to cross-examine as well as his own counsel.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has carefully considered the question raised
by Dr. Stahmer, and it holds that defendants who are represented by
counsel have not the right to cross-examine witnesses. They have the
right to be called as witnesses themselves and to make a statement at
the end of the Trial.
Do the Prosecutors wish to ask any questions of this witness in
re-examination?
COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United
States): Just one question, your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Let the witness come back here.
THE MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): He was taken away.
THE PRESIDENT: Taken away?
THE MARSHAL: That’s right. He was taken away by some captain who brought
him here for the Trial. They have sent after him now.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know how far he has been taken away?
THE MARSHAL: No, Sir, I do not. I will find out immediately.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, are the questions that you wish to ask of
sufficient importance for the Tribunal to wait for this witness or for
him to be recalled on Monday?
COL. AMEN: I don’t believe so, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well then. The Tribunal will adjourn, and it will be
understood that in the future no witness will be removed whilst he is
under examination, from the precincts of this Court except on the orders
of the Tribunal.
COL. AMEN: I do not know how that happened Your Lordship, I understood
he was still here.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 3 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]
ELEVENTH DAY
Monday, 3 December 1945
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: I call on the prosecutor for the United States.
SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): May
it please the Tribunal, it occurs to me that perhaps the Tribunal might
be interested in a very brief outline of what might be expected to occur
within the next week or two weeks in this Trial.
I shall immediately proceed with the aggressive war case, to present the
story of the rape of Czechoslovakia. I shall not perhaps be able to
conclude that today.
Sir Hartley Shawcross, the British chief prosecutor, has asked that he
be allowed to proceed tomorrow morning with his opening statement on
Count Two and I shall be glad to yield for that purpose, with the
understanding that we shall resume on Czechoslovakia after that.
Thereafter, the British prosecutor will proceed to present the
aggressive warfare case as to Poland, which brought France and England
into the war. Thereupon the British prosecutor will proceed with the
expansion of aggressive war in Europe, the aggression against Norway and
Denmark, against Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, against Yugoslavia
and Greece. And in connection with those aggressions the British
prosecutor will present to the Tribunal the various treaties involved
and the various breaches of treaties involved in those aggressions.
That, as I understand it, will complete the British case under Count Two
and will probably take the rest of this week.
Then it will be necessary for the American prosecuting staff to come
back to Count One to cover certain portions which have not been covered,
specifically, persecution of the Jews, concentration camps, spoliation
in occupied territories, the High Command, and other alleged criminal
organizations, particularly evidence dealing with individual
responsibility of individual defendants.
Roughly, I would anticipate that that would carry through the following
week—two weeks. However, that is a very rough estimate.
Thereupon, the French chief prosecutor will make his opening statement
and will present the evidence as to Crimes against Humanity and War
Crimes under Counts Three and Four as to Western Occupied countries.
Following that, the Russian chief prosecutor will make his opening
statement and will present corresponding evidence regarding War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity in the Eastern countries.
That, in very rough outline, is what we have in mind to present.
I turn now to the third section in the detailed chronological
presentation of the aggressive war case: Aggression against
Czechoslovakia. The relevant portions of the Indictment are set forth in
Subsection 3, under Section IV (F), appearing at Pages 7 and 8 of the
printed English text of the Indictment.
This portion of the Indictment is divided into three parts:
(a) The 1936-38 phase of the plan; that is, the planning for the assault
both on Austria and Czechoslovakia.
(b) The execution of the plan to invade Austria; November 1937 to March
1938.
(c) The execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia; April 1938 to
March 1939.
On Thursday, last, I completed the presentation of the documents on the
execution of the plan to invade Austria. Those documents are gathered
together in a document book which was handed to the Tribunal at the
beginning of the Austrian presentation.
The materials relating to the aggression against Czechoslovakia have
been gathered in a separate document book, which I now submit to the
Tribunal and which is marked “Document Book 0.”
The Tribunal will recall that in the period 1933 to 1936 the defendants
had initiated a program of rearmament, designed to give the Third Reich
military strength and political bargaining power to be used against
other nations. You will recall also that beginning in the year 1936 they
had embarked on a preliminary program of expansion which, as it turned
out, was to last until March 1939. This was intended to shorten their
frontiers, to increase their industrial and food reserve, and to place
them in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which they
could launch a more ambitious and more devastating campaign of
aggression.
At the moment—in the early spring of 1938—when the Nazi conspirators
began to lay concrete plans for the conquest of Czechoslovakia, they had
reached approximately the half-way point in this preliminary program.
The preceding autumn, at the conference in the Reich Chancellery on
November 5, 1937, covered by the Hossbach minutes, Hitler had set forth
the program which Germany was to follow. Those Hossbach minutes, you
will recall, are contained in Document 386-PS as United States Exhibit
Number 25, which I read to the Tribunal in my introductory statement a
week ago today.
“The question for Germany,” the Führer had informed his military
commanders at that meeting, “is where the greatest possible conquest can
be made at the lowest cost.”
At the top of his agenda stood two countries, Austria and
Czechoslovakia.
On March 12, 1938 Austria was occupied by the German Army, and on the
following day it was annexed to the Reich. The time had come for a
redefinition of German intentions regarding Czechoslovakia. A little
more than a month later two of the conspirators, Hitler and Keitel, met
to discuss plans for the envelopment and conquest of the Czechoslovak
State.
Among the selected handful of documents which I read to the Tribunal in
my introduction a week ago to establish the corpus of the crime of
aggressive war was the account of this meeting on 21 April 1938. This
account is Item 2 in our Document Number 388-PS, as United States
Exhibit Number 26.
The Tribunal will recall that Hitler and Keitel discussed the pretext
which Germany might develop to serve as an excuse for a sudden and
overwhelming attack. They considered the provocation of a period of
diplomatic squabbling which, growing more serious, would lead to an
excuse for war. In the alternative—and this alternative they found to
be preferable—they planned to unleash a lightning attack as the result
of an incident of their own creation.
Consideration, as we alleged in the Indictment and as the document
proved, was given to the assassination of the German Minister at Prague
to create the requisite incident.
The necessity of propaganda to guide the conduct of Germans in
Czechoslovakia and to intimidate the Czechs was recognized. Problems of
transport and tactics were discussed, with a view to overcoming all
Czechoslovak resistance within 4 days, thus presenting the world with a
_fait accompli_ and forestalling outside interventions.
Thus, in mid-April 1938, the designs of the Nazi conspirators to conquer
Czechoslovakia had already readied the stage of practical planning.
Now all of that occurred, if the Tribunal please, against a background
of friendly diplomatic relations. This conspiracy must be viewed against
that background. Although they had, in the fall of 1937, determined to
destroy the Czechoslovak State, the leaders of the German Government
were bound by a treaty of arbitration and assurances freely given, to
observe the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. By a formal treaty signed at
Locarno on 16 October 1925—Document TC-14, which will be introduced by
the British prosecutor—Germany and Czechoslovakia agreed, with certain
exceptions, to refer to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court
of International Justice matters of dispute. I quote, they would so
refer:
“All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia
with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their
respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle
amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy.”
And the preamble to this treaty stated:
“The President of the German Reich and the President of the
Czechoslovak Republic equally resolved to maintain peace between
Germany and Czechoslovakia by assuring the peaceful settlement
of differences, which might arise between the two countries;
declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or
resulting from the law of nations, is obligatory for
international tribunals; agreeing to recognize that the rights
of a state cannot be modified save with its consent, and
considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful
settlement of international disputes permits of resolving,
without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause
of divisions between states, have decided to embody in a treaty
their common intention in this respect.”
That ends the quotation.
Formal and categoric assurances of their good will towards
Czechoslovakia were both coming from the Nazi conspirators as late as
March 1938. On March 11 and 12, 1938, at the time of the annexation of
Austria, Germany had a considerable interest in inducing Czechoslovakia
not to mobilize. At this time the Defendant Göring assured Masaryk, the
Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, on behalf of the German Government that
German-Czech relations were not adversely affected by the development in
Austria and that Germany had no hostile intentions towards
Czechoslovakia. As a token of his sincerity, Defendant Göring
accompanied his assurance with the statement, “Ich gebe Ihnen mein
Ehrenwort (I give you my word of honor).”
At the same time, the Defendant Von Neurath, who was handling German
foreign affairs during Ribbentrop’s stay in London, assured Masaryk, on
behalf of Hitler and the German Government, that Germany still
considered herself bound by the Arbitration Convention of 1925.
These assurances are contained in Document TC-27, another of the series
of documents which will be presented to the Tribunal by the British
prosecutor under Count Two of the Indictment.
Behind the screen of these assurances the Nazi conspirators proceeded
with their military and political plans for aggression. Ever since the
preceding fall it had been established that the immediate aim of German
policy was the elimination both of Austria and of Czechoslovakia. In
both countries the conspirators planned to undermine the will to resist
by propaganda and by Fifth Column activities, while the actual military
preparations were being developed.
The Austrian operation, which received priority for political and
strategic reasons, was carried out in February and March 1938.
Thenceforth the Wehrmacht planning was devoted to “Fall Grün” (Case
Green), the designation given to the proposed operation against
Czechoslovakia.
The military plans for Case Green had been drafted in outline from as
early as June 1937. The OKW top-secret directive for the unified
preparation of the Armed Forces for war—signed by Von Blomberg on June
24, 1937, and promulgated to the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the year
beginning July 1, 1937,—included, as a probable war-like eventuality
for which a concentrated plan was to be drafted, Case Green, “War on two
fronts, with the main struggle in the southeast.”
This document—our Number C-175, Exhibit USA-69—was introduced in
evidence as part of the Austrian presentation and is an original carbon
copy, signed in ink by Von Blomberg. The original section of this
directive dealing with the probable war against Czechoslovakia—it was
later revised—opens with this supposition. I read _from the bottom_ of
Page 3 of the English translation of this directive, following the
heading II, and Subparagraph (1) headed “Suppositions”:
“The war in the East can begin with a surprise German operation
against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the imminent attack of
a superior enemy coalition. The necessary conditions to justify
such an action politically, and in the eyes of international law
must be created beforehand.”
After detailing possible enemies and neutrals in the event of such
action, the directive continues as follows:
“(2) _The task of the German Armed Forces_”—and that much is
underscored—“is to make their preparations in such a way that
the bulk of all forces can break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by
surprise, and with the greatest force, while in the West the
minimum strength is provided as rear-cover for this attack.
“The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German Armed
Forces should be to eliminate from the very beginning and for
the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the
rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian
Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base
in Czechoslovakia. This must be done by the defeat of the enemy
armed forces and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia.”
The introduction to this directive sets forth as one of its guiding
principles the following statement—and I now read from Page 1 of the
English translation, that is, the third paragraph following Figure 1:
“Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does
not preclude surprising incidents, demands constant preparedness
for war on the part of the German Armed Forces:”—and then—“(a)
to counterattack at any time; (b) to make possible the military
exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should they
occur.”
This directive ordered further work on the plan for “mobilization
without public announcement.” I quote:
“. . . in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to be able
to begin a sudden war which will take the enemy by surprise, in
regard to both strength and time of attack.”
This is, of course, a directive for staff planning, but the nature of
the planning and the very tangible and ominous developments which
resulted from it, give it a significance that it would not have in
another setting.
Planning along the lines of this directive was carried forward during
the fall of 1937 and the winter of 1937-38. On the political level, this
planning for the conquest of Czechoslovakia received the approval and
support of Hitler in the conference with his military commanders on 5
November 1937, reported in the Hossbach minutes, to which I have
frequently heretofore referred.
In early March 1938, before the march into Austria, we find the
Defendants Ribbentrop and Keitel concerned over the extent of the
information about war aims against Czechoslovakia to be furnished to
Hungary. On 4 March 1938, Ribbentrop wrote to Keitel, enclosing for
General Keitel’s confidential cognizance the minutes of a conference
with Sztojay, the local Hungarian Ambassador, who had suggested an
interchange of views. This is Document 2786-PS, a photostat of the
original captured letter, which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit
USA-81. In his letter to Keitel, Ribbentrop said:
“I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should
discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia,
the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed
about this. I would greatly appreciate it if you would notify me
briefly whether any commitments were made here in any respect.
With best regards and Heil Hitler.”
At the 21 April meeting between Hitler and Keitel, the account of which
I read last week and alluded to earlier this morning (Document 388-PS,
Item 2), specific plans for the attack on Czechoslovakia were discussed
for the first time. This meeting was followed, in the late spring and
summer of 1938, by a series of memoranda and telegrams advancing Case
Green (Fall Grün). Those notes and communications were carefully filed
at Hitler’s headquarters by the very efficient Colonel Schmundt, the
Führer’s military adjutant, and were captured by American troops in a
cellar at Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden. This file, which is
preserved intact, bears out Number 388-PS, and is United States Exhibit
Number 26. We affectionately refer to it as “Big Schmundt”—a large
file. The individual items in this file tell more graphically than any
narrative the progress of the Nazi conspirators’ planning to launch an
unprovoked and brutal war against Czechoslovakia. From the start the
Nazi leaders displayed a lively interest in intelligence data concerning
Czechoslovakian armament and defense. With the leave of the Tribunal I
shall refer to some of these items in the Big Schmundt file without
reading them. The documents to which I refer are Item 4 of the Schmundt
file, a telegram from Colonel Zeitzler, in General Jodl’s office of the
OKW, to Schmundt at Hitler’s headquarters.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you proposing not to read them?
MR. ALDERMAN: I hadn’t intended to read them in full, unless that may be
necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid we must adhere to our decision.
MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I should simply wish to refer to
the title or heading of Item 12, which is headed, “Short Survey of
Armament of the Czech Army,” dated Berlin, 9 June 1938, and initialed
“Z” for Zeitzler, and Item 13, “Questions of the Führer,” dated Berlin,
9 June 1938, and classified “Most Secret.” I should like to read four of
the questions which Hitler wanted authoritative information about, as
shown by that document, and I read indicated questions on Pages 23, 24,
25, and 26 of Item 13 of Document 388-PS.
Question 1: Hitler asked about armament of the Czech Army. I don’t think
it necessary to read the answers. They are detailed answers giving
information in response to these questions posed by Hitler.
“Question 2: How many battalions, _et cetera_, are employed in
the West for the construction of emplacements?
“Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia still
occupied in unreduced strength?
“Question. 4: Frontier protection in the West.”
As I say, those questions were answered in detail by the OKW and
initialed by Colonel Zeitzler of Jodl’s staff.
As a precaution against French and British action during the attack on
Czechoslovakia, it was necessary for the Nazi conspirators to rush the
preparation of fortification measures along the western frontier in
Germany. I refer you to Item 8, at Page 12 of the Big Schmundt file, a
telegram presumably sent from Schmundt in Berchtesgaden to Berlin, and I
quote from this telegram. It is, as I say, Item 8 of the Schmundt file,
Page 12 of Document 388-PS: “Inform Colonel General Von Brauchitsch and
General Keitel.” And then, skipping a paragraph: “The Führer repeatedly
emphasized the necessity of pressing forward greatly the fortification
work in the West.”
In May, June, July, and August of 1938 conferences between Hitler and
his political and military advisors resulted in the issuance of a series
of constantly revised directives for the attack on Czechoslovakia. It
was decided that preparations for X-Day, the day of the attack, should
be completed no later than 1 October. I now invite the attention of the
Tribunal to the more important of these conferences and directives.
On 28 May 1938 Hitler called a conference of his principal advisors. At
this meeting he gave the necessary instructions to his fellow
conspirators to prepare the attack on Czechoslovakia. This fact Hitler
later publicly admitted. I now refer and invite the notice of the
Tribunal to Document 2360-PS, a copy of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ of
31 January 1939. In a speech before the Reichstag the preceding day,
reported in this newspaper, reading now from Document 2360-PS, Hitler
spoke as follows:
“On account of this intolerable provocation which had been
aggravated by a truly infamous persecution and terrorization of
our Germans there, I have determined to solve once and for all,
and this time radically, the Sudeten-German question. On 28 May
I ordered first: That preparation should be made for military
action against this state by 2 October. I ordered second: The
immense and accelerated expansion of our defensive front in the
West.”
Two days after this conference, on 30 May 1938, Hitler issued the
revised military directive for Case Green. This directive is Item 11 in
the Big Schmundt file, Document 388-PS. It is entitled, “Two-front War,
with Main Effort in the Southeast,” and this directive replaced the
corresponding section, Part 2, Section II, of the previous quote,
“Directive for Unified Preparation for War,” which had been promulgated
by Von Blomberg on 26 June 1937, which I have already introduced in
evidence as our Document C-175, United States Exhibit Number 69. This
revised directive represented a further development of the ideas for
political and military action discussed by Hitler and Keitel in their
conference on 21 April. It is an expansion of the rough draft submitted
by the Defendant Keitel to Hitler on 20 May, which may be found as Item
5 in the Schmundt file. It was signed by Hitler. Only five copies were
made. Three copies were forwarded with a covering letter from Defendant
Keitel to General Von Brauchitsch for the Army, to Defendant Raeder for
the Navy, and to Defendant Göring for the Luftwaffe. In his covering
memorandum Keitel noted that its execution must be assured—I quote: “As
from 1 October 1938 at the latest.” I now read from this document, which
is the basic directive under which the Wehrmacht carried out its
planning for Case Green, a rather lengthy quotation from the first page
of Item 11, Page 16 of the English version:
“1. Political prerequisites. It is my unalterable decision to
smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It
is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the
politically and militarily suitable moment.
“An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia
or other political events in Europe, creating a surprisingly
favorable opportunity and one which may never come again, may
cause me to take early action.
“The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a
favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly
the preparations are to be made at once.
“2. Political possibilities for the commencement of the action.
The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended
invasion:
“a. Suitable obvious cause and with it, b. sufficient political
justification, c. action unexpected by the enemy, which will
find him prepared in the least possible degree.
“From a military as well as a political standpoint the most
favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an
incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way
for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral
justification of military action.
“But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a war,
must terminate in sudden action on our part, which must have the
elements of surprise as regards time and extent, before the
enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be
surpassed.
“3. Conclusions for the preparation of Fall Grün.
“a. For the ‘armed war’ it is essential that the surprise
element, as the most important factor contributing to success,
be made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures, already
in peacetime and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action.
Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first 2 or
3 days which plainly demonstrates to hostile nations, eager to
intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military
situation and which, at the same time, will give nations with
territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene
immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention
by Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected,
especially if France—due to the obvious pro-German attitude of
Italy—fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war
by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give
military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are
to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the
land operations within the first few days, a European crisis
will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of
all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action.
“b. The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate
Czechoslovakia by threats and wear down her power of resistance;
on the other hand issue directions to national groups for
support in the ‘armed war’ and influence the neutrals into our
way of thinking. I reserve further directions and determination
of the date.
“4. Tasks of the Armed Forces. Armed Forces preparations are to
be made on the following basis:
“a. The mass of all forces must be employed against
Czechoslovakia.
“b. For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as rear
cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the East
against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the
southern frontiers to be watched.
“c. The sections of the Army which can be rapidly employed must
force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision and
must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the
certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them with
the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed
in such a way that the sections of the army which can be rapidly
employed cross the frontier at the appointed time, at the same
time as the penetration by the Air Force, before the enemy can
become aware of our mobilization. For this, a timetable between
Army and Air Force is to be worked out in conjunction with OKW
and submitted to me for approval.
“5. Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces.
“a. Army. The basic principle of the surprise attack against
Czechoslovakia must not be endangered nor the initiative of the
Air Force be wasted by the inevitable time required for
transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail. Therefore it
is first of all essential to the Army that as many assault
columns as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise
attack by the Air Force. These assault columns—the composition
of each, according to their tasks at that time—must be formed
with troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their
proximity to the frontier or to motorization and to special
measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts
to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at
numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to
achieve a break-through, or to break them down from the rear.
For the success of this operation, co-operation with the
Sudeten-German frontier population, with deserters from the
Czechoslovakian Army, with parachutists or airborne troops and
with units of the sabotage service will be of importance. The
bulk of the army has the task of frustrating the Czechoslovakian
plan of defense, of preventing the Czechoslovakian army from
escaping . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to read all this detail?
MR. ALDERMAN: I was just worried about not getting it into the
transcript.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me that this is all detail, that before you
pass from the document you ought to read the document on Page 15, which
introduces it and which gives the date of it.
MR. ALDERMAN: I think so. It is a letter dated:
“Berlin, 30 May 1938; copy of the fourth copy; Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces; most secret; access only through officer;
written by an officer. Signed Keitel; distributed to C-in-C
Army, C-in-C Navy, C-in-C Air Force.
“By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Part 2,
Section II, of the directive on the unified preparations for war
of the Armed Forces dated 24 June 1937, (Ob. d. W)”—with some
symbols, including “Chefsache” (top secret)—“(two-front war
with main effort on the Southeast—strategic concentration
Green) is to be replaced by the attached version. Its execution
must be assured as from 1 October 1938 at the latest.
Alterations in other parts of the directives must be expected
during the next week.
“By order of Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,
signed, Keitel.
“Certified a true copy, Zeitzler, Oberstleutnant on the General
Staff.”
In line with the suggestion of the presiding Justice, I shall omit the
detailed instructions which are set out for action by the Luftwaffe and
by the Navy, and I turn next to the last paragraph of the directive,
which will be found on Page 19 of the English version:
“In war economy it is essential that in the field of the
armament industry a maximum deployment of forces is made
possible through increased supplies. In the course of
operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of
the total war—economic strength—by rapidly reconnoitering and
restarting important factories. For this reason the sparing of
Czechoslovakian industrial and factory installations, insofar as
military operations permit, can be of decisive importance to
us.”
In other words, the Nazi conspirators, 4 months before the date of their
planned attack, were already looking forward to the contribution which
the Czech industrial plant would make to further Nazi war efforts and
economy.
And the final paragraph of this directive, Paragraph 7, on Page 19:
“All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by
OKW. They will be made, in agreement with, and according to, the
requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their
effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force as
to time and locality.
“Signed Adolf Hitler.
“Certified a true copy, Zeitzler, Oberstleutnant on the General
Staff.”
Three weeks later, on 18 June 1938, a draft for a new directive was
prepared and initialed by the Defendant Keitel. This is Item 14 at Pages
27 to 32 of the Big Schmundt file. It did not supersede the 30 May
directive. I shall read the third and fifth paragraphs on Page 28 of the
English translation, and the last paragraph on Page 29:
“The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own
free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political
intentions. I am determined as from 1 October 1938 to use to the
full every favorable political opportunity to realize this aim.”
Then skipping a paragraph:
“However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia
only if I am firmly convinced, as in the case of the occupation
of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria, that
France will not march and therefore England will not intervene.”
And then skipping to the last paragraph on the 29th page:
“The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself
will be issued by me from time to time.”
“K”—initial of Keitel, and—“Z”—initial of Zeitzler.
The second and third parts of this directive contain general directions
for the deployment of troops and for precautionary measures in view of
the possibility that during the execution of the Fall Grün (or Case
Green) France or England might declare war on Germany. Six pages of
complicated schedules which follow this draft in the original have not
been translated into English. These schedules, which constitute Item 15
in the Schmundt file, give a timetable of specific measures for the
preparation of the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the contemplated
action.
Corroboration for the documents in the Schmundt file is found in General
Jodl’s diary, our Document Number 1780-PS and United States Exhibit
Number 72, from which I quoted portions during the Austrian
presentation. I now quote from three entries in this diary written in
the spring of 1938. Although the first entry is not dated it appears to
have been written several months after the annexation of Austria, and
here I read under the heading on Page 3 of the English translation:
“Later undated entry:
“After annexation of Austria the Führer mentions that there is
no hurry to solve the Czech question, because Austria had to be
digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Green will
have to be carried out energetically. They will have to be newly
prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because
of the annexation of Austria. State of preparation, see
Memorandum L-1-A of 19 April, reported to the Führer on 21
April.
“The intention of the Führer not to touch the Czech problem as
yet will be changed because of the Czech strategic troop
concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat
and without the slightest cause for it. Because of Germany’s
self-restraint the consequences lead to a loss of prestige for
the Führer, which he is not willing to take once more.
Therefore, the new order is issued for Green on 30 May.”
And then the entry, 23 May:
“Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Führer. . . . Further
conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the
Führer, take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High
Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June,—see inclosures (War
Diary).”
Then the entry of 30 May:
“The Führer signs directive Green, where he states his final
decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates
military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions
of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an
immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on
D-Day”—X-Tag—“combined with aerial penetration by the Air
Force.
“Further details are derived from directive for strategic
concentration of the Army. The whole contrast becomes acute once
more between the Führer’s intuition that we must do it this
year, and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet,
as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are
not as yet equal to them.”
During the spring and summer of 1938 the Luftwaffe was also engaged in
planning in connection with the forthcoming Case Green and the further
expansion of the Reich.
I now offer in evidence Document R-150, as United States Exhibit 82.
This is a top-secret document dated 2 June 1938, issued by Air Group
Command 3, and entitled “Plan Study 1938, Instruction for Deployment and
Combat, ‘Case Red.’”
“Case Red” is the code name for action against the Western Powers if
need be. Twenty-eight copies of this document were made, of which this
is number 16. This is another staff plan, this time for mobilization and
employment of the Luftwaffe in the event of war with France. It is given
significance by the considerable progress by this date of the planning
for the attack on Czechoslovakia.
I quote from the second paragraph on Page 3 of the English translation,
referring to the various possibilities under which war with France may
occur. You will note that they are all predicated on the assumption of a
German-Czech conflict.
“France will either (a) interfere in the struggle between the
Reich and Czechoslovakia in the course of Case Green, or (b)
start hostilities simultaneously with Czechoslovakia. (c) It is
possible but not likely that France will begin the fight while
Czechoslovakia still remains aloof.”
And then, reading down lower on the page under the heading “Intention”:
“Regardless of whether France enters the war as a result of Case
Green or whether she makes the opening move of the war
simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, in any case the mass of the
German offensive formations will, in conjunction with the Army,
first deliver the decisive blow against Czechoslovakia.”
By mid-summer direct and detailed planning for Case Green was being
carried out by the Luftwaffe. In early August, at the direction of the
Luftwaffe General Staff, the German Air Attaché in Prague reconnoitered
the Freudenthal area of Czechoslovakia south of Upper Silesia for
suitable landing grounds.
I offer in evidence Document 1536-PS as Exhibit USA-83, a report of the
Luftwaffe General Staff, Intelligence Division, dated 12 August 1938.
This was a top-secret document for general officers only, of which only
two copies were made.
Attached as an enclosure was the report of Major Moericke, the German
Attaché in Prague, dated 4 August 1938. I quote the first four
paragraphs of the enclosure:
“I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to
reconnoiter the land in the region Freudenthal-Freihermersdorf
. . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Page 3 of the document?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. “. . . for landing possibilities.
“For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal
with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in
Prague.
“I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me
to Macholdt, particularly about my official position.
“I used my official car (Dienst Pkw) for the journey to
Freudenthal taking precautions against being observed.”
By 25 August the imminence of the attack on Czechoslovakia compelled the
issuance by the Luftwaffe of a detailed intelligence memorandum,
entitled “Extended Case Green”; in other words, an estimate of possible
action by the Western Powers during the attack on Czechoslovakia.
I now offer this document in evidence, Number 375-PS as Exhibit USA-84.
This is a top-secret memorandum of the Intelligence Section of the
Luftwaffe, General Staff, dated Berlin, 25 August 1938. Based on the
assumption that Great Britain and France would declare war on Germany
during Case Green, this study contains an estimate of the strategy and
air strength of the Western Powers as of 1 October 1938, the target date
for Case Green. I quote the first two sentences of the document. That is
under the heading “Initial Political Situation”:
“The basic assumption is that France will declare war during the
Case Green. It is presumed that France will decide upon war only
if active military assistance by Great Britain is definitely
assured.”
Now, knowledge of the pending or impending action against Czechoslovakia
was not confined to a close circle of high officials of the Reich and
the Nazi Party. During the summer Germany’s allies, Italy and Hungary,
were apprised by one means or another of the plans of the Nazi
conspirators. I offer in evidence Document 2800-PS as Exhibit USA-85.
This is a captured document from the German Foreign Office files, a
confidential memorandum of a conversation with the Italian Ambassador
Attolico, in Berlin on 18 July 1938. At the bottom is a handwritten note
headed “For the Reichsminister only”, and the Reichsminister was the
Defendant Ribbentrop. I now read this note. I read from the note the
third and fourth paragraphs:
“Attolico added that we had made it unmistakably clear to the
Italians what our intentions are regarding Czechoslovakia. He
also knew the appointed time well enough so that he could take
perhaps a 2 months’ holiday now which he could not do later on.
“Giving an idea of the attitude of other governments, Attolico
mentioned that the Romanian Government had refused to grant
application for leave to its Berlin Minister.”
THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient time to break off for 10
minutes?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, a month later Mussolini sent a
message to Berlin asking that he be told the date on which Case Green
would take place. I offer in evidence Document Number 2791-PS as Exhibit
USA-86, a German Foreign Office note on a conversation with Ambassador
Attolico. This note is signed “R” for Ribbentrop and dated 23 August
1938. I now read two paragraphs from this memorandum:
“On the voyage of the _Patria_ Ambassador Attolico explained to
me that he had instructions to request the notification of a
contemplated time for German action against Czechoslovakia from
the German Government.
“In case the Czechs should again cause a provocation against
Germany, Germany would march. This would be tomorrow, in 6
months, or perhaps in a year. However, I could promise him that
the German Government, in case of an increasing gravity of the
situation or as soon as the Führer made his decision, would
notify the Italian Chief of Government as rapidly as possible.
In any case, the Italian Government will be the first one who
will receive such a notification.”
THE PRESIDENT: You did not tell us what the initial was, did you?
MR. ALDERMAN: The initial “R” for Ribbentrop, and the date 23 August
1938.
Four days later Attolico again asked to be notified of the date of the
pending attack. I offer Document Number 2792-PS as Exhibit
USA-87—another German Foreign Office memorandum, and from that document
I read three paragraphs under the heading “R. M. 251.”
“Ambassador Attolico paid me a visit today at 12 o’clock to
communicate the following:
“He had received another written instruction from Mussolini
asking that Germany communicate in time the probable date of
action against Czechoslovakia. Mussolini asked for such
notification, as Mr. Attolico assured me, in order ‘to be able
to take in due time the necessary measures on the French
frontier.’ Berlin, 27 August 1938; ‘R’”—for Ribbentrop, and
then:
“N. B. I replied to Ambassador Attolico, just as on his former
démarche, that I could not impart any date to him; that,
however, in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be
informed of any decision. Berlin, 2 September 1938.”
Hungary, which borders Czechoslovakia to the southeast, was from the
first considered to be a possible participant in Case Green. You will
recall that in early March 1938 Defendants Keitel and Ribbentrop had
exchanged letters on the question of bringing Hungary into the Nazi
plan. At that time the decision was in the negative, but by mid-August
1938 the Nazi conspirators were attempting to persuade Hungary to join
in the attack.
From August 21 to 26 Admiral Horthy and some of his ministers visited
Germany. Inevitably there were discussions of the Czechoslovak question.
I now offer Document 2796-PS as Exhibit USA-88. This is a captured
German Foreign Office account signed by Von Weizsäcker of the
conversations between Hitler and Ribbentrop and a Hungarian Delegation
consisting of Horthy, Imredy, and Kanya aboard the S. S. _Patria_ on 23
August 1938. In this conference Ribbentrop inquired about the Hungarian
attitude in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia and suggested
that such an attack would prove to be a good opportunity for Hungary.
The Hungarians, with the exception of Horthy, who wished to put the
Hungarian intention to participate on record, proved reluctant to commit
themselves. Thereupon Hitler emphasized Ribbentrop’s statement and said
that whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the
cooking as well. I now quote from this document the first two
paragraphs:
“While in the forenoon of the 23rd of August the Führer and the
Regent of Hungary were engaged in a political discussion, the
Hungarian Ministers Imredy and Kanya were in conference with Von
Ribbentrop. Von Weizsäcker also attended the conference.
“Von Kanya introduced two subjects for discussion: Point 1, the
negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente; and 2, the
Czechoslovakian problem.”
Then I skip two paragraphs and read the fifth paragraph:
“Von Ribbentrop inquired what Hungary’s attitude would be if the
Führer would carry out his decision to answer a new Czech
provocation by force. The reply of the Hungarians presented two
kinds of obstacles: The Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured
if Hungary marches towards the north and perhaps the east;
moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had only been started and one
to two more years time for its development should be allowed.
“Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that the
Yugoslavs would not dare to march while they were between the
pincers of the Axis Powers. Romania alone would therefore not
move. England and France would also remain tranquil. England
would not recklessly risk her empire. She knew our newly
acquired power. In reference to time, however, for the
above-mentioned situation, nothing definite could be predicted
since it would depend on Czech provocation. Von Ribbentrop
repeated that, ‘Whoever desires revision must exploit the good
opportunity and participate.’
“The Hungarian reply thus remained a conditional one. Upon the
question of Von Ribbentrop as to what purpose the desired
General Staff conferences were to have, not much more was
brought forward than the Hungarian desire of a mutual inventory
of military material and preparedness for the Czech conflict.
The clear political basis for such a conflict—the time of a
Hungarian intervention—was not obtained.
“In the meantime, more positive language was used by Von Horthy
in his talk with the Führer. He wished not to hide his doubts
with regard to the English attitude, but he wished to put on
record Hungary’s intention to participate. The Hungarian
Ministers were, and remained even later, more skeptical since
they feel more strongly about the immediate danger for Hungary
with its unprotected flanks.
“When Von Imredy had a discussion with the Führer in the
afternoon he was very relieved when the Führer explained to him
that in regard to the situation in question he demanded nothing
of Hungary. He himself would not know the time. Whoever wanted
to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as
well. Should Hungary wish conferences of the General Staffs he
would have no objections.”
I think perhaps that sentence, “Whoever wanted to join the meal would
have to participate in the cooking as well,” is perhaps as cynical a
statement as any statesman has ever been guilty of.
By the third day of the conference the Germans were able to note that,
in the event of a German-Czech conflict, Hungary would be sufficiently
armed for participation on 1 October. I now offer in evidence Document
Number 2797-PS as Exhibit USA-89, another captured German Foreign Office
memorandum of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Kanya on 25 August
1938. You will note that the English mimeographed translation bears the
date 29 August. That is incorrect; it should read 25 August. I read the
last paragraph from that document, or the last two:
“Concerning Hungary’s military preparedness in case of a
German-Czech conflict Von Kanya mentioned several days ago that
his country would need a period of one to two years in order to
develop adequately the armed strength of Hungary.
“During today’s conversation Von Kanya corrected this remark and
said that Hungary’s military situation was much better. His
country would be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to
take part in the conflict by October 1 of this year.”—Signed
with an illegible signature which probably is that of
Weizsäcker.
The account of the German-Hungarian conference again finds its
corroboration in General Jodl’s diary, Document Number 1780-PS, from
which I have already several times read. The entry in that diary for 21
to 26 August on Page 4 of the English version of the document reads as
follows:
“Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent. Accompanied by the
Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the War
Minister Von Raatz.
“They arrived with the idea that in the course of a great war
after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old
State of Hungary can be re-established. They leave with the
understanding that we have neither demands from them nor claims
against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second
provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If
they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them.
“Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator
between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe
that when the issue arises a period of 48 hours would be
indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia’s attitude.”
The upshot of the talks with the Hungarians proved to be a staff
conference on 6 September.
I quote again from Jodl’s diary, the entry for 6 September, beginning at
the end of that same page:
“Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a
conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.
Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the
Führer, especially his order not to give any hint on the exact
moment. The same with OAI, General Von Stülpnagel.”
It is somewhat interesting to find a high-ranking general giving a
briefing on such political matters.
Then we come to final actual preparations for the attack. With a 1
October target date set for Case Green, there was a noticeable increase
in the tempo of the military preparations in late August and September.
Actual preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were well under
way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators was devoted to technical
details, the timing of “X-days,” questions of mobilization, questions of
transport and supplies.
On 26 August the Defendant Jodl initialed a memorandum entitled, “Timing
of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures.” This is Item 17 at
Pages 37 and 38 of the English translation of the Schmundt file on Case
Green, our Number 388-PS.
I should like to invite the special attention of the Tribunal to this
memorandum. It demonstrates beyond the slightest doubt the complicity of
the OKW and of Defendant Keitel and Jodl in the shameful fabrication of
an incident as an excuse for war. It reveals in bare outline the deceit,
the barbarity, the completely criminal character of the attack that
Germany was preparing to launch.
I ask leave to read this document in full:
“Chief Section L; for chiefs only; written by General Staff
officer; top secret; note on progress of report; Berlin, 24
August 1938; access only through officer; 1 copy.
“Timing of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures.
“The Luftwaffe’s endeavor to take the enemy air forces by
surprise at their peacetime airports justifiably leads them to
oppose measures taken in advance of the X-Order and to demand
that the X-Order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1
to prevent the fact of Germany’s mobilization becoming known to
Czechoslovakia on that day.
“The Army’s efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It
intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus
3 and X minus 1 which will contribute to the smooth and rapid
working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKH also demands
that the X-Order be given to the Army not later than 1400 on X
minus 1.
“To this the following must be said:
“‘Operation Green’”—or Aktion Grün—“will be set in motion by
means of an ‘incident’ in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany
provocation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact
time for this incident is of the utmost importance.”—I call
special attention to that sentence—“The fixing of the exact
time for this incident is of the utmost importance.
“It must come at a time when the over-all meteorological
conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into
action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of
it”—news of this prepared incident—“to reach us on the
afternoon of X minus 1.
“It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the
X-Order at 1400 on X minus 1.
“On X minus 2 the Navy, Army, and Air Force will merely receive
an advance warning.
“If the Führer intends to follow this plan of action, all
further discussion is superfluous.
“For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for
which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise
appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely
essential advance measures must be given in good time and
camouflaged with the help of numerous maneuvers and exercises.
“Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether
all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy
territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure
from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.
“Even a warning of diplomatic representatives in Prague is
impossible before the first air attack, although the
consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming
victims of such an attack (that is the death of representatives
of friendly or confirmed neutral powers).
“If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be
considered desirable for the incident, then the following day
cannot be X-Day, but it must be the day after that.
“In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be
done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and
that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the
incident (X-Fall).
“It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great
interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be
informed of the Führer’s intentions in good time—insofar as the
Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the
incident.
“I request that the Führer’s decision be obtained on these
points.”—Signed—“J”—(Jodl).
In handwriting, at the bottom of the page of that document, are the
notes of the indefatigable Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant. These reveal
that the memorandum was submitted to Hitler on August 30; that Hitler
agreed to act along these lines, and that Jodl was so notified on 31
August. There follows Jodl’s initials once more.
On 3 September Keitel and Von Brauchitsch met with Hitler at the
Berghof. Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference. These will be
found as Item 18 at Pages 39 and 40 of the Document Number 388-PS. I
shall read the first three short paragraphs of these minutes:
“Colonel General Von Brauchitsch reports on the exact time of
the transfer of the troops to ‘exercise areas’ for ‘Grün’. Field
units to be transferred on 28 September. From here will then be
ready for action. When X-Day becomes known field units carry out
exercises in opposite directions.
“Führer has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day march
away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere.”—Then there is
a question mark.—“OKH must know when X-Day is by 1200 noon, 27
September.”
You will note that Von Brauchitsch reported that field troops would be
transferred to the proper areas for Case Green on 28 September and would
then be ready for action. You will also note that the OKH must know when
X-Day is by 12 noon on 27 September.
During the remainder of the conference Hitler gave his views on the
strategy the German armies should employ and the strength of the Czech
defenses they would encounter. He spoke of the possibility, and I quote,
“of drawing in the Henlein people.” The situation in the West still
troubled him. Schmundt further noted, and here I read the final sentence
from Page 40 of the English transcript:
“The Führer gives orders for the development of the Western
fortifications: Improvement of advance positions around Aachen
and Saarbrücken; construction of 300 to 400 battery positions
(1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action.”
Five days later General Stülpnagel asked Defendant Jodl for written
assurance that the OKH would be informed 5 days in advance about the
impending action. In the evening Jodl conferred with Luftwaffe generals
about the co-ordination of ground and air operations at the start of the
attack. I now read the 8 September entry in General Jodl’s diary, Page 5
of the English translation of Document 1780-PS.
“General Stülpnagel, OAI, asks for written assurance that the
Army High Command will be informed 5 days in advance if the plan
is to take place. I agree and add that the over-all
meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only
for 2 days in advance and that therefore the plans may be
changed up to this moment (X-Day minus 2)”—or as the German
puts it—“X-2 Tag.”
“General Stülpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders
whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned.
It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere
decisively. It gradually seems as if the Führer would stick to
his decision, even though he may no longer be of this opinion.
It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that . . .
Italy is reserved.”
Now, this is Jodl talking:
“I must admit that I am worrying, too, when comparing the change
of opinion about political and military potentialities,
according to directives of 24 June ’37, 5 November ’37, 7
December ’37, 30 May 1938, with the last statements. In spite of
that, one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will
do everything they can to apply pressure on us. We must pass
this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the
art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only
possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of
officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it
circulate through anterooms as heretofore.
“1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of High Command
of Armed Forces and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force.
(Present were General Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg, and
myself). We agree about the promulgation of the X-Day
order”—X-Befehl—“(X-1, 4 o’clock) and pre-announcement to the
Air Force (X-Day minus 1”—X minus 1 day—“7 o’clock). The ‘Y’
time has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach
flight of one hour.”
Late on the evening of the following day, 9 September, Hitler met with
Defendant Keitel and Generals Von Brauchitsch and Halder at Nuremberg.
Dr. Todt, the construction engineer, later joined this conference, which
lasted from 10 in the evening until 3:30 the following morning.
Schmundt’s minutes on this conference are Item 19 in the large Schmundt
file, on Pages 41 to 43 of Document 388-PS.
In this meeting General Halder reviewed the missions assigned to four of
the German armies being committed to the attack, the 2d, the 10th, the
12th and the 14th German Armies. With his characteristic enthusiasm for
military planning, Hitler then delivered a soliloquy on strategic
considerations, which should be taken into account as the attack
developed. I shall quote only four paragraphs, beginning with the
summary of General Von Brauchitsch’s remarks, on the bottom of Page 42:
“General Oberst Von Brauchitsch: ‘Employment of motorized
divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria
and the difficulties in getting other divs’”—that is for
divisions—“‘ready to march into the area at the right time. In
the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of September,
if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23d, by
relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army
Command II.’
“The Führer: ‘Does not see why workers have to return home as
early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on
mobilization day. Also the railroad cars will stand around
unnecessarily later on.’
“General Keitel: ‘Workers are not under the jurisdiction of
district commands in the West. Trains must be assembled.’
“Von Brauchitsch: ‘235,000 men RAD (Labor Service) will be
drafted, 96 construction battalions will be distributed (also in
the East). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.’”
From this day forward the Nazi conspirators were occupied with the
intricate planning which is required before such an attack. On 11
September Defendant Jodl conferred with a representative of the
Propaganda Ministry about methods of refuting German violations of
international law and of exploiting those of the Czechs. I read the 11
September entry in the Jodl diary at Page 5 of the English translation
of 1780-PS:
“In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Hahnke, for
the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent
common tasks. These joint preparations for
refutation”—Widerlegung—“of our own violations of
international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the
enemy, were considered particularly important.”
This discussion developed into a detailed study compiled by Section L,
that is, Jodl’s section of the OKW.
I now offer in evidence Document C-2 as Exhibit USA-90, which is a
carbon copy of the original, signed in pencil. Seven copies of this
captured document, as it shows on its face, were prepared and
distributed on 1 October 1938 to the OKH, the OKM, the Luftwaffe, and
the Foreign Office.
In this study anticipated violations by Germany of international law in
connection with the invasion of Czechoslovakia are listed and
counterpropaganda suggested for the use of the propaganda agencies. It
is a highly interesting top-secret document and with a glance at the
original you can see the careful form in which the study of anticipated
violations of international law and propagandists refutations thereof
were set out.
The document is prepared in tabular form, in which the anticipated
instances of violation of international law are listed in the left hand
column. In the second column are given specific examples of the
incidents. In the third and fourth column the position to be taken
toward these incidents, in violation of international law and in
violation of the laws of warfare, is set forth.
The fifth column, which in this document unfortunately is blank, was
reserved for the explanations to be offered by the Propaganda Minister.
I first quote from the covering letter:
“Enclosed is a list drawn up by Section L of the OKW, of the
violations of international law which may be expected on the
part of fighting troops.
“Owing to the short time allowed for the compilation, Columns
c-1 and c-2 had to be filled in directly therefore, for the time
being.
“The branches of the Armed Forces are requested to send in an
opinion so that a final version may be drawn up.
“The same is requested of the Foreign Office.
“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
“By order”—signed—“Bürckner.”
I am sorry that I perhaps cannot take the time to read extensively from
this document. I shall confine myself to reading the first 10
hypothetical incidents for which justification must be found from the
second column, Column b of the table:
“First: In an air raid on Prague the British Embassy is
destroyed.
“Second: Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed.
“Third: The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague.
“Fourth: On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas,
the firing of gas projectiles is ordered.
“Fifth: Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are
caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of an important
bridge, destruction of foodstuffs and fodder) are discovered
looting wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot.
“Sixth: Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed
to do road work or to load munitions, and so forth.
“Seventh: For military reasons it is necessary to requisition
billets, foodstuffs, and fodder from the Czech population. As a
result, the latter suffer from want.
“Eighth: Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily
evacuated to the rear area.
“Ninth: Churches are used for military accommodations.
“Tenth: In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over
Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with
Czech aircraft.”
From Nuremberg on the 10th of September, Hitler issued an order bringing
the Reichsarbeitsdienst (the German Labor Service) under the OKW. This
top-secret order . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from that document now?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the classification with reference to gas?
MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps I should, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: It is number 4.
MR. ALDERMAN: Incident number 4?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: Well, number 4 was the supposed incident. “On account of a
report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is
ordered.” Under the column, “Attitude of International Law Group”:
“According to the declaration agreed to in June 1925 by 40
states, including Czechoslovakia, the employment of poison
gases, chemical warfare agents, and bacteriological substances
is expressly forbidden. Quite a number of states made the
reservation to this declaration on the prohibition of gas
warfare.”
Then, under the column headed “Justification by the Laws of War”:
“If the assertion, that the opponent—in this case the
Czechs—used a prohibited gas in warfare, is to be believed by
the world, it must be possible to prove it. If that is possible,
the firing of gas projectiles is justified, and it must be given
out in public that it can be proved that the enemy was the first
to violate the prohibition. It is therefore particularly
important to furnish this proof. If the assertion is unfounded
or only partially founded, the gas attack is to be represented
only as the need for carrying out a justified reprisal, in the
same way as the Italians did in the Abyssinian war. In this
case, however, the justification for such harsh reprisals must
also be proved.”
From Nuremberg on the 10th of September, Hitler issued an order bringing
the Reichsarbeitsdienst (the German Labor Service) under the OKW . . .
THE PRESIDENT: There is another short passage which seems to be
material.
MR. ALDERMAN: I was very much tempted to read the whole document.
THE PRESIDENT: The justification of number 10.
MR. ALDERMAN: Number 10 was, “In course of their duty, German aircraft
fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with
Czech aircraft.”
Under the heading, “Attitude of the International Law Group”:
“According to Article 1 of the Fifth Hague Convention of 18
October 1907, the territory of neutral powers is not to be
violated. A deliberate violation by flying over this territory
is a breach of international law if the neutral powers have
declared an air barrier for combat aircraft. If German planes
fly over Polish territory this constitutes a violation of
international law, provided that this action is not expressly
permitted.”
Now, under the heading, “Justification by the Laws of War,” is this:
“An attempt at denials should first be made; if this is
unsuccessful a request for pardon should be made (on the grounds
of miscalculation of position) to the Polish Government and
compensation for damage guaranteed.”
I had referred to an order issued by Hitler on 10 September 1938 from
Nuremberg, bringing the German Labor Service under the OKW. This
top-secret order, of which 25 copies were made, is Item 20 in the
Schmundt file, Page 44. I will read that order:
“1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the
Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.
“2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this
organization in conjunction with the Reich Labor Leader
(Reichsarbeitsführer) and on assignments from time to time to
the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Where
questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final
decision in accordance with my instructions.
“3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to
the departments and personnel immediately concerned.
“Signed, Adolf Hitler.”
Four days later, on 14 September, Defendant Keitel issued detailed
instructions for the employment of specific RAD units. This order is
Item 21 in the Schmundt file, at Page 45 in the English translation. I
do not think I need read the order.
There is another order issued by the Defendant Jodl on 16 September,
Item 24, at Page 48 in the Schmundt file. I think I need only read the
heading or title of that:
“Subject: Employment of Reich Labor Service for maneuvers with
Wehrmacht. Effective 15 September the following units will be
trained militarily under direction of the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army.”
Two further entries in the Defendant Jodl’s diary give further
indications of the problems of the OKW in this period of mid-September,
just 2 weeks before the anticipated X-Day.
I now read the answers for the 15th and 16th September, at Pages 5 and 6
of the English translation of the Jodl diary.
“15 September: In the morning, conference with Chief of Army
High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Force,
the question was discussed as to what could be done if the
Führer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid
development of the situation.
“16 September: General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700
hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference
between Chamberlain and the Führer. The next conference will
take place on the 20th or 21st in Godesberg.
“With consent of the Führer, the order is given in the evening
by the Armed Forces High Command, to the Army High Command, and
to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the v.G.a.D. along the
Czech border.”—That I understand to have reference to the
reinforced border guard.
“In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have
empty rolling stock kept in readiness, clandestinely; for the
strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be
transported starting 28 September.”
The order to the railroads to make rolling stock available, to which
General Jodl referred, appears as Item 22, at Page 47 of the Schmundt
file. In this order the Defendant Keitel told the railroads to be ready
by 28 September but to continue work on the Western fortifications even
after 20 September in the interest of camouflage. I quote the first four
paragraphs of this order:
“The Reichsbahn (the railroads) must provide trains of empty
trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of
mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all
others.
“Therefore the trainloads for the limes job”—I understand the
“limes job” to have reference to defense fortification in the
West—“will have to be cut down after September 17 and those
goods loaded previous to this date unloaded by September 20.
“The Supreme Command of the Army (Fifth Division of the Army
General Staff) must issue further orders after consultation with
the authorities concerned.
“However, in accordance with the Führer’s directive, every
effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as
large quantities as feasible, even after 20 September 1938, and
this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue
the important work on the limes.”
The penultimate stage of the aggression begins on 18 September. From
that date until the 28th a series of orders was issued advancing
preparations for the attack. These orders are included in the Schmundt
file and I shall not take the time of the Tribunal by attempting to read
all of it.
On the 18th the commitment scheduled for the five participating Armies,
the 2d, 8th, 10th, 12th, and 14th, was set forth. That is Item 26 in the
Schmundt file at Page 50 of the English translation. Hitler approved the
secret mobilization of five divisions in the West to protect the German
rear during Case Green, and I refer to Item 31 in the Schmundt file at
Page 13—I beg your pardon, it is Page 55, I had a misprint. I might
refer to that. It is a “most-secret” order, Berlin, 27 September 1938,
1920 hours; 45 copies of which this is the 16th:
“The Führer has approved the mobilization, without warning, of
the five regular West divisions (26th, 34th, 36th, 33d, and
35th). The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has
expressly reserved the right to issue the order for employment
in the fortification zone and the evacuation of this zone by the
workers of the Todt organization.
“It is left to the OKH to assemble as far as possible, first of
all the sections ready to march and, subsequently, the remaining
sections of the divisions in marshalling areas behind the
Western fortifications.”—Signed—“Jodl.”
THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a good time to adjourn.
We will meet again at 2 o’clock.
[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, my attention has been called
to the fact that I misread a signature on one of the documents to which
I adverted this morning. It is Item 31 of the Schmundt minutes. I read
the name “Jodl” as being the signature on that item. I should have read
Keitel.
In the course of presenting details of the documents which are being
offered in evidence, I think it would be well to pause for a moment, and
recall the setting in which these facts took place. The world will never
forget the Munich Pact, and the international crisis which led to it. As
this crisis was developing in August and September of 1938, and frantic
efforts were being made by the statesmen of the world to preserve the
peace of the world, little did they know of the evil plans and designs
in the hearts and the minds of these conspirators.
What is being presented to the Tribunal today is the inside story, in
their own words, underlying the Pact of Munich. We are now able to
spread upon the pages of history the truth concerning the fraud and
deceit practiced by the Nazi conspirators in achieving for their own
ends, the Pact of Munich as a stepping stone towards further aggression.
One cannot think back without living again through the dread of war, the
fear of war, the fear of world disaster, which seized all peace-loving
persons. The hope for peace which came with the Munich Pact was, we now
see, a snare and a deceit—a trap, carefully set by the defendants on
trial. The evil character of these men who were fabricating this scheme
for aggression and war is demonstrated by their own documents.
Further discussions were held between the Army and the Luftwaffe about
the time of day at which the attack should be launched. Conference notes
initialed by the Defendant Jodl, dated 27 September, reveal the
difference in views. These notes are Item 54, at Page 90 in the
translation of Document 388-PS. I shall read these first three
paragraphs as follows: The heading is:
“Most secret; for chiefs only; only through officers.
“Conference notes; Berlin, 27 September 1938; 4 copies, first
copy. To be filed Grün.
“Co-ordinated Time of Attack by Army and Air Force on X-Day.
“As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a
co-ordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on 1 X-Day.
“The Army wishes to attack at dawn, that is, about 0615. It also
wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night,
which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.
“Air Force’s time of attack depends on weather conditions. These
could change the time of attack and also limit the area of
operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance,
would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to
low ceiling in Bavaria.”
Then I’ll skip to the last two paragraphs on Page 91:
“Thus it is proposed:
“Attack by the Army—independent of the attack by the Air
Force—at the time desired by the Army (0615), and permission
for limited operations to take place before then; however, only
to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.
“The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.”
The initial at the end of that order is “J” meaning, I think clearly,
Jodl.
On the same date, 27 September, the Defendant Keitel sent a most-secret
memorandum to the Defendant Hess, and the Reichsführer SS, Himmler, for
the guidance of Nazi Party officials. This memorandum is Item 32 in the
Schmundt files at Page 56 of the English translation. I read the first
four paragraphs of this message.
“As a result of the political situation the Führer and
Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed
Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by
issuing the mobilization (X) order, or corresponding code words.
“Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is
necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to
the various Party authorities and their organizations, which are
connected with the previous issuing of the mobilization order,
the advance measures or special code names.
“The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be
met (even if the code word has not been previously issued)
immediately and without being referred to higher authority.
“OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate
instructions to this effect, so that the mobilization of the
Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.”
Then I skip to the last paragraph:
“The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces further requests that
all measures not provided for in the plans which are undertaken
by Party organizations or Police units, as a result of the
political situation, be reported in every case and in plenty of
time to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Only then can
it be guaranteed that these measures can be carried out in
practice.
“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel.”
Two additional entries from the Defendant Jodl’s diary reveal the extent
to which the Nazi conspirators carried out all of their preparations for
an attack, even during the period of negotiations which culminated in
the Munich Agreement. I quote the answers in the Jodl diary for 26 and
27 September, from Page 7 of the translation of Document 1780-PS. 26
September . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got in mind the dates of the visits of Mr.
Chamberlain to Germany, and of the actual agreement? Perhaps you can
give it later on.
MR. ALDERMAN: I think it will be covered later, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: The agreement of the Munich Pact was the 29th of
September, and this answer then was 3 days before the Pact, the 26th of
September:
“Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army
High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the
advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet
necessary and because the Führer does not intend to march in
before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech
frontier need be given on the 27th only.
“Fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at
the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and
Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda
transmissions.
“Question by Ausland whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave
and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High
Command: ‘Yes.’
“1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs
General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations
and about the Führer’s opinion. In no case will X-Day be before
the 30th.
“It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn
into military engagements because of false reports, before
Prague replies.
“A question of Stumpf about Y-Hour results in the reply that on
account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of
the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the
dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent
early fogs.
“The Führer has to make a decision as to which of the
Commanders-in-Chief is to have priority.
“The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has
to proceed. The Führer has not made any decision as yet about
commitment against Prague.
“2000 hours: The Führer addresses the people and the world in an
important speech at the Sportpalast.”
Then the entry on 27 September:
“1320 hours: The Führer consents to the first wave of attack
being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the
assembly area by 30 September.”
The order referred to by General Jodl was also recorded by the faithful
Schmundt, which appears as Item 33 at Page 57 of the file. I’ll read it
in its entirety. It is the order which brought the Nazi Army to a
jumping-off point for the unprovoked and brutal aggression:
“28.9.38.; most secret; memorandum.
“At 1300 hours 27 September the Führer and Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from
their exercise areas to their jumping-off points.
“The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or seven
divisions) must be ready to begin the action against Grün on 30
September, the decision having been made 1 day previously by
1200 noon.
“This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major
Schmundt”—pencil note by Schmundt.
At this point, with the Nazi Army poised in a strategic position around
the borders of Czechoslovakia, we shall turn back for a moment to
examine another phase of the Czech aggression. The military preparations
for action against Czechoslovakia had not been carried out _in vacuo_.
They had been preceded by a skillfully conceived campaign designed to
promote civil disobedience in the Czechoslovak State. Using the
techniques they had already developed in other uncontested ventures
underhandedly, the Nazi conspirators over a period of years used money,
propaganda, and force to undermine Czechoslovakia. In this program the
Nazis focused their attention on the persons of German descent living in
the Sudetenland, a mountainous area bounding Bohemia and Moravia on the
northwest and south. I now invite the attention of the Tribunal to
Document Number 998-PS and offer it in evidence as an exhibit.
This exhibit is entitled, “German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” and is
the Czechoslovak Government’s official report for the prosecution and
trial of the German major war criminals. I believe that this report is
clearly included within the provisions of Article 21, of the Charter, as
a document of which the Court will take judicial notice. Article 21
provides:
“The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common
knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also
take judicial notice of official governmental documents and
reports of the United Nations, including the accounts and
documents of the committees set up in the various Allied
countries for the investigation of war crimes and the records
and findings of military or other tribunals of any of the United
Nations.”
Since, under that provision, the Court will take judicial notice of this
governmental report by the Czech Government, I shall, with the leave of
the Tribunal, merely summarize Pages 9 to 12 of this report to show the
background of the subsequent Nazi intrigue within Czechoslovakia.
Nazi agitation in Czechoslovakia dated from the earliest days of the
Nazi Party. In the years following the first World War, a German
National Socialist Workers Party (DNSAP), which maintained close contact
with Hitler’s NSDAP, was activated in the Sudetenland. In 1932,
ringleaders of the Sudeten Volkssport, an organization corresponding to
the Nazi SA or Sturmabteilung, openly endorsed the 21 points of Hitler’s
program, the first of which demanded the union of all Germans in a
greater Germany. Soon thereafter, they were charged with planning armed
rebellion on behalf of a foreign power and were sentenced for conspiracy
against the Czech Republic.
Late in 1933, the National Socialist Party of Czechoslovakia forestalled
its dissolution by voluntary liquidation and several of its chiefs
escaped across the border into Germany. For a year thereafter, Nazi
activity in Czechoslovakia continued underground.
On 1 October 1934, with the approval and at the urging of the Nazi
conspirators, an instructor of gymnastics, Konrad Henlein, established
the German Home Front or Deutsche Heimatfront, which, the following
spring became the Sudeten German Party (SDP). Profiting from the
experiences of the Czech National Socialist Party, Henlein denied any
connection with the German Nazis. He rejected pan-Germanism and
professed his respect for individual liberties and his loyalty to honest
democracy and to the Czech State. His party, nonetheless, was built on
the basis of the Nazi Führerprinzip, and he became its Führer.
By 1937, when the powers of Hitler’s Germany had become manifest,
Henlein and his followers were striking a more aggressive note,
demanding without definition, “complete Sudeten autonomy”. The SDP laid
proposals before the Czech Parliament which would in substance, have
created a state within a state.
After the annexation of Austria by Germany in March 1938, the
Henleinists, who were now openly organized after the Nazi model,
intensified their activities. Undisguised anti-Semitic propaganda
started in the Henlein press.
The campaign against Bolshevism was intensified. Terrorism in the
Henlein-dominated communities increased. A storm-troop organization,
patterned and trained on the principles of the Nazi SS was established,
known as the FS, Freiwilliger Selbstschutz (or Voluntary Vigilantes).
On 24 April 1938, in a speech to the Party Congress in Karlovy Vary,
Henlein came into the open with what he called his Karlsbad Program. In
this speech, which echoed Hitler in tone and substance, Henlein asserted
the right of the Sudeten Germans to profess German political philosophy
which, it was clear, meant National Socialism.
As the summer of 1938 wore on, the Henleinists used every technique of
the Nazi Fifth Column. As summarized in Pages 12 to 16 of the Czech
Government official report, these techniques included:
(a) Espionage. Military espionage was conducted by the SDP, the FS, and
by other members of the German minority on behalf of Germany. Czech
defenses were mapped and information on Czech troop movements was
furnished to the German authorities.
(b) Nazification of German organizations in Czechoslovakia. The
Henleinists systematically penetrated the whole life of the German
population of Czechoslovakia. Associations and social cultural centers
regularly underwent “Gleichschaltung”, that is purification, by the SDP.
Among the organizations conquered by the Henleinists were sports
societies, rowing clubs, associations of ex-service men, and choral
societies. The Henleinists were particularly interested in penetrating
as many business institutions as possible and bringing over to their
side the directors of banks, the owners or directors of factories, and
the managers of commercial firms. In the case of Jewish ownership or
direction, they attempted to secure the cooperation of the clerical and
technical staffs of the institutions.
(c) German direction and leadership. The Henleinists maintained
permanent contact with the Nazi officials designated to direct
operations within Czechoslovakia. Meetings in Germany, at which
Henleinists were exhorted and instructed in Fifth Column activity, were
camouflaged by being held in conjunction with “Sänger Feste” (or choral
festivals), gymnastic shows, and assemblies, and commercial gatherings
such as the Leipzig Fair. Whenever the Nazi conspirators needed
incidents for their war of nerves, it was the duty of the Henleinists to
supply them.
(d) Propaganda. Disruptive and subversive propaganda was beamed at
Czechoslovakia in German broadcasts and was echoed in the German press.
Goebbels called Czechoslovakia a “nest of Bolshevism” and spread the
false report of Russian troops and airplanes centered in Prague. Under
direction from the Reich, the Henleinists maintained whispering
propaganda in the Sudetenland which contributed to the mounting tension
and to the creation of incidents. Illegal Nazi literature was smuggled
from Germany and widely distributed in the border regions. The Henlein
press, more or less openly, espoused Nazi ideology before the German
population in the Sudetenland.
(e) Murder and terrorism. Nazi conspirators provided the Henleinists,
and particularly the FS, with money and arms with which to provoke
incidents and to maintain a state of permanent unrest. Gendarmes,
customs officers, and other Czech officials were attacked. A boycott was
established against Jewish lawyers, doctors, and tradesmen.
The Henleinists terrorized the non-Henlein population and the Nazi
Gestapo crossed into the border districts to carry Czechoslovak citizens
across the border into Germany. In several cases, political foes of the
Nazis were murdered on Czech soil. Nazi agents murdered Professor
Theodor Lessing in 1933, and engineer Formis in 1935. Both men were
anti-Nazis who had escaped from Germany after Hitler came to power and
had sought refuge in Czechoslovakia.
Sometime afterwards, when there was no longer need for pretense and
deception, Konrad Henlein made a clear and frank statement of the
mission assigned to him by the Nazi conspirators. I offer in evidence
Document Number 2863-PS, an excerpt from a lecture by Konrad Henlein
quoted in the book _Four Fighting Years_, a publication of the
Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and I quote from Page 29. This
book has been marked for identification Exhibit USA-92, but without
offering it in evidence, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
it. I shall read from Page 29. This lecture was delivered by Henlein on
4 March 1941, in the auditorium of the University of Vienna, under the
auspices of the Wiener Verwaltungsakademie. During a thorough search of
libraries in Vienna and elsewhere, we have been unable to find a copy of
the German text. This text, this volume that I have here, is an English
version. The Vienna newspapers the following day carried only summaries
of the lecture. This English version, however, is an official
publication of the Czech Government and is, under the circumstances, the
best evidence that we can produce of the Henlein speech.
In this lecture on “The Fight for the Liberation of the Sudetens”
Henlein said:
“National Socialism soon swept over us Sudeten Germans. Our
struggle was of a different character from that in Germany.
Although we had to behave differently in public we were, of
course, secretly in touch with the National Socialist revolution
in Germany so that we might be a part of it. The struggle for
Greater Germany was waged on Sudeten soil, too. This struggle
could be waged only by those inspired by the spirit of National
Socialism, persons who were true followers of our Führer,
whatever their outward appearance. Fate sought me out to be the
leader of the national group in its final struggle. When in the
autumn of 1933, the leader of the NSDAP asked me to take over
the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans, I had a
difficult problem to solve. Should the National Socialist Party
continue to be carried on illegally or should the movement, in
the interest of the self-preservation of the Sudeten Germans and
in order to prepare their return to the Reich, wage its struggle
under camouflage and by methods which appeared quite legal to
the outside world? For us Sudeten Germans only the second
alternative seemed possible, for the preservation of our
national group was at stake. It would certainly have been easier
to exchange this hard and mentally exhausting struggle for the
heroic gesture of confessing allegiance to National Socialism
and entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than
doubtful whether, by this means, we could have fulfilled the
political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a bastion in the
alliance against the German Reich.”
The account of Nazi intrigue in Czechoslovakia which I have just
presented to the Tribunal is the outline of this conspiracy as it had
been pieced together by the Czechoslovak Government early this summer.
Since then, captured documents and other information made available to
us since the defeat of Germany have clearly and conclusively
demonstrated the implication, which hitherto could only be deduced, of
the Nazi conspirators in the agitation in the Sudetenland.
I offer in evidence Document Number 3060-PS, Exhibit USA-93. This is the
original, handwritten draft of a telegram sent from the German Legation
in Prague on 16 March 1938 to the Foreign Minister in Berlin. It is
presumably written by the German Minister Eisenlohr. It proves
conclusively that the Henlein movement was an instrument, a puppet of
the Nazi conspirators. The Henlein party, it appears from this document,
was directed from Berlin and from the German Legation in Prague. It
could have no policy of its own. Even the speeches of its leaders had to
be co-ordinated with the German authorities.
I will read this telegram:
“Prague, 16 March 1938.
“Foreign (Office), Berlin; (cipher cable—secret); No. 57 of 16
March.
“With reference to cable order No. 30 of 14 March.
“Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have thrashed out
matters with Henlein, who recently had shunned me, and with
Frank separately and received following promises:
“1. The line of German foreign policy as transmitted by the
German Legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics
of the Sudeten German Party. My directives are to be complied
with implicitly.
“2. Public speeches and the press will be co-ordinated uniformly
with my approval. The editorial staff of _Zeit_”—_Time_—“is to
be improved.
“3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line,
which in the end might lead to political complications, and
adopts a line of gradual promotion of Sudeten German interests.
The objectives are to be set in every case with my participation
and to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the
protection of nationalities (Volksschutzgesetze) and territorial
autonomy are no longer to be stressed.
“4. If consultations with Berlin agencies are required or
desired before Henlein issues important statements on his
program, they are to be applied for and prepared through the
Legation.
“5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for German
agencies is to be transmitted through the Legation.
“6. Henlein will establish contact with me every week, and will
come to Prague at any time if requested.
“I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm control,
as this is more than ever necessary for coming developments in
the interest of foreign policy. Please inform Ministries
concerned and Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans)
and request them to support this uniform direction of the
Sudeten German Party.”
The initials are illegible.
The dressing down administered by Eisenlohr to Henlein had the desired
effect. The day after the telegram was dispatched from Prague, Henlein
addressed a humble letter to Ribbentrop, asking an early personal
conversation.
I offer in evidence Document Number 2789-PS as Exhibit USA-94. This is
the letter from Konrad Henlein to Defendant Ribbentrop, captured in the
German Foreign Office files, dated 17 March 1938.
“Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs:
“In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of events in
Austria we feel it our duty to express our gratitude to all
those who had a share in this new grand achievement of our
Führer.
“I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept accordingly the
sincere thanks of the Sudeten Germans herewith.
“We shall show our appreciation to the Führer by doubled efforts
in the service of the Greater German policy.
“The new situation requires a re-examination of the Sudeten
German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask you for the
opportunity of a very early personal talk.
“In view of the necessity of such a clarification I have
postponed the nation-wide Party Congress, originally scheduled
for 26th and 27th of March 1938, for 4 weeks.
“I would appreciate it if the Ambassador, Dr. Eisenlohr, and two
of my closest associates would be allowed to participate in the
requested talks.
“Heil Hitler. Loyally yours”—signed—“Konrad Henlein.”
You will note that Henlein was quite aware that the seizure of Austria
made possible the adoption of a new policy towards Czechoslovakia. You
will also note that he was already in close enough contact with
Ribbentrop and the German Minister in Prague to feel free to suggest
early personal talks.
Ribbentrop was not unreceptive to Henlein’s suggestion. The
conversations Henlein had proposed took place in the Foreign Office in
Berlin on the 29th of March 1938. The previous day Henlein had conferred
with Hitler himself.
I offer in evidence Document Number 2788-PS as Exhibit USA-95, captured
German Foreign Office notes of the conference on the 29th of March. I
read the first two paragraphs:
“In this conference the gentlemen enumerated in the enclosed
list participated.
“The Reich Minister started out by emphasizing the necessity to
keep the conference which had been scheduled strictly a secret.
He then explained, in view of the directives which the Führer
himself had given to Konrad Henlein personally yesterday
afternoon, that there were two questions which were of
outstanding importance for the conduct of policy of the Sudeten
German Party.”
I will omit the discussion of the claims of the Sudeten Germans and
resume the minutes of this meeting in the middle of the last paragraph
of the first page of the English translation, with the sentence
beginning, “The aim of the negotiations.”
“The aim of the negotiations to be carried out by the Sudeten
German Party with the Czechoslovakian Government is finally
this: To avoid entry into the Government by the extension and
gradual specification of the demands to be made. It must be
emphasized clearly in the negotiations that the Sudeten German
Party alone is the party to the negotiations with the
Czechoslovakian Government, not the Reich Cabinet. The Reich
Cabinet itself must refuse to appear toward the government in
Prague or toward London and Paris as the advocate or pacemaker
of the Sudeten German demands. It is a self-evident prerequisite
that during the impending discussion with the Czechoslovak
Government the Sudeten Germans should be firmly controlled by
Konrad Henlein, should maintain quiet and discipline, and should
avoid indiscretions. The assurances already given by Konrad
Henlein in this connection were satisfactory.
“Following these general explanations of the Reichsminister, the
demands of the Sudeten German Party from the Czechoslovak
Government, as contained in the enclosure, were discussed and
approved in principle. For further co-operation, Konrad Henlein
was instructed to keep in the closest possible touch with the
Reichsminister and the head of the Central Office for Racial
Germans, as well as the German Minister in Prague, as the local
representative of the Foreign Minister. The task of the German
Minister in Prague would be to support the demand of the Sudeten
German Party as reasonable—not officially, but in more private
talks with the Czechoslovak politicians, without exerting any
direct influence on the extent of the demands of the Party.
“In conclusion, there was a discussion whether it would be
useful if the Sudeten German Party would co-operate with other
minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slovaks. The
Foreign Minister decided that the Party should have the
discretion to keep a loose contact with other minority groups if
the adoption of a parallel course by them might appear
appropriate.
“Berlin, 29 March 1938,
“R”—for Ribbentrop.
Not the least interesting aspect of this secret meeting is the list of
those who attended: Konrad Henlein; his principal deputy, Karl Hermann
Frank; and two others represented the Sudeten German Party. Professor
Haushofer, the geopolitician, and SS Obergruppenführer Lorenz
represented the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (the Central Office for
Racial Germans). The Foreign Office was represented by a delegation of
eight. These eight included Ribbentrop, who presided at the meeting and
did most of the talking; Von Mackensen; Weizsäcker and Minister
Eisenlohr from the German Legation at Prague.
In May, Henlein came to Berlin for more conversations with the Nazi
conspirators. At this time the plans for Case Green, for the attack on
the Czechs, were already on paper, and it may be assumed that Henlein
was briefed on the role he was to play during the summer months.
I again quote from General Jodl’s diary, Document 1780-PS, the entry for
22 May 1938: “Fundamental conference between the Führer and K. Henlein
(see enclosure).” The enclosure unfortunately is missing from Jodl’s
diary.
The Tribunal will recall that in his speech in Vienna Henlein had
admitted that he had been selected by the Nazi conspirators in the fall
of 1933 to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans.
The documents I have just read show conclusively the nature of Henlein’s
mission. They demonstrate that Henlein’s policy, his propaganda, even
his speeches, were controlled by Berlin.
I will now show that from the year 1935 the Sudeten German Party was
secretly subsidized by the German Foreign Office. I offer in evidence
Document 3059-PS as Exhibit USA-96, another secret memorandum captured
in the German Foreign Office file.
This memorandum, signed by Woermann and dated Berlin, 19 August 1938,
was occasioned by the request of the Henlein Party for additional funds.
I read from that document:
“The Sudeten German Party has been subsidized by the Foreign
Office regularly since 1935 with certain amounts, consisting of
a monthly payment of 15,000 marks; 12,000 marks of this are
transmitted to the Prague Legation for disbursement and 3,000
marks are paid out to the Berlin representation of the Party
(Bureau Bürger). In the course of the last few months the tasks
assigned to the Bureau Bürger have increased considerably due to
the current negotiations with the Czech Government. The number
of pamphlets and maps which are produced and disseminated has
risen; the propaganda activity in the press has grown immensely;
the expense accounts have increased especially because due to
the necessity for continuous good information, the expenses for
trips to Prague, London, and Paris (including the financing of
travels of Sudeten German deputies and agents) have grown
considerably heavier. Under these conditions the Bureau Bürger
is no longer able to get along with the monthly allowance of
3,000 marks if it is to do everything required. Therefore Herr
Bürger has applied to this office for an increase of this amount
from 3,000 marks to 5,500 marks monthly. In view of the
considerable increase in the business transacted by the bureau,
and of the importance which marks the activity of the bureau in
regard to the co-operation with the Foreign Office, this desire
deserves the strongest support.
“Herewith submitted to the personnel department with a request
for approval. Increase of payments with retroactive effect from
1 August is requested.”—signed—“Woermann.”
Under this signature is a footnote:
“Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle”—Central Office for Racial
Germans—“will be informed by the Political
Department”—handwritten marginal note.
We may only conjecture what financial support the Henlein movement
received from other agencies of the German Government.
As the military preparations to attack Czechoslovakia moved forward in
the late summer and early fall, the Nazi command made good use of
Henlein and his followers. About the 1st of August, the Air Attaché in
the German Legation in Prague, Major Moericke, acting on instructions
from Luftwaffe headquarters in Berlin, visited the Sudeten German leader
in Freudenthal. With his assistance and in the company of the local
leader of the FS, the Henlein equivalent of the SS, he reconnoitered the
surrounding countryside to select possible airfield sites for German
use. The FS leader, a Czech reservist then on leave, was in the uniform
of the Czech Army, a fact which, as the Attaché noted, served as
excellent camouflage.
I now read from the enclosure to Document 1536-PS, which I offered in
evidence earlier and which bears United States Exhibit Number 83. I have
already read the first four paragraphs of the enclosure:
“The manufacturer M. is the head of the Sudeten German Glider
Pilots in Fr.”—that’s Freudenthal—“and said to be absolutely
reliable by my trusted man. My personal impression fully
confirmed this judgment. No hint of my identity was made to him,
although I had the impression that M. knew who I was.
“At my request, with which he complied without any question, M.
travelled with me over the country in question. We used M.’s
private car for the trip.
“As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently
well, he took with him the local leader of the FS, a Czech
reservist of the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on
leave. He was in uniform. For reasons of camouflage, I was
entirely in agreement with this—without actually saying so.
“As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I
photographed large open spaces out of the car, he said. ‘Aha, so
you’re looking for airfields!’ I answered that we supposed that
in the case of any serious trouble, the Czechs would put their
airfields immediately behind the line of fortifications. I had
the intention of looking over the country from that point of
view.”
In the latter part of the Air Attaché’s report, reference is made to the
presence of reliable agents and informers, which he called “V-Leute”
(V-people), apparently drawn from the ranks of the Henlein party in this
area. It was indicated that these agents were in touch with the “Abwehr
Stelle” (the Intelligence Office) in Breslau.
In September, when the Nazi propaganda campaign was reaching its height,
the Nazis were not satisfied with playing merely on the Sudeten demands
for autonomy. They attempted to use the Slovaks as well. On the 19th of
September the Foreign Office in Berlin sent a telegram to the German
Legation in Prague. I offer the document in evidence, Number 2858-PS,
Exhibit USA-97, another captured German Foreign Office document—a
telegram:
“Please inform Deputy Kundt that Konrad Henlein requests to get
in touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start their
demands for autonomy tomorrow.”—signed—“Altenburg.”
Kundt was Henlein’s representative in Prague.
As the harassed Czech Government sought to stem the disorders in the
Sudetenland, the German Foreign Office turned to threatening diplomatic
tactics in a deliberate effort to increase the tension between the two
countries. I offer in evidence Documents 2855-PS, 2854-PS, 2853-PS, and
2856-PS, as United States Exhibits respectively 98, 99, 100, and 101.
Four telegrams from the Foreign Office in Berlin to the Legation in
Prague were dispatched between the 16th and 24th of September 1938. They
are self-explanatory. The first is dated 16 September.
“Tonight 150 subjects of Czechoslovakia of Czech blood were
arrested in Germany. This measure is an answer to the arrest of
Sudeten Germans since the Führer’s speech of 12 September. I
request you to ascertain as soon as possible the number of
Sudeten Germans arrested since 12 September as far as possible.
The number of those arrested there is estimated conservatively
at 400 by the Gestapo. Cable report.”
A handwritten note follows:
“Impossible for me to ascertain these facts as already
communicated to the chargé d’affaires.”
The second telegram is dated September 17:
“Most urgent.
“I. Request to inform the local government immediately of the
following:
“The Reich Government has decided that:
“(a) Immediately as many Czech subjects of Czech descent,
Czech-speaking Jews included, will be arrested in Germany as
Sudeten Germans have been in Czechoslovakia since the beginning
of the week; (b) If any Sudeten Germans should be executed
pursuant to a death sentence on the basis of martial law, an
equal number of Czechs will be shot in Germany.”
The third telegram was sent on 24 September. I read it:
“According to information received here, Czechs have arrested
two German frontier policemen, seven customs officials, and 30
railway officials. As counter measure all the Czech staff in
Marschegg were arrested. We are prepared to exchange the
arrested Czech officials for the German officials. Please
approach Government there and wire result.”
On the same day the fourth telegram was dispatched, and I read the last
paragraph:
“‘Confidential’. Yielding of Czech hostages arrested here for
the prevention of the execution of any sentences passed by
military courts against Sudeten Germans is, of course, out of
question.”
In the latter half of September, Henlein devoted himself and his
followers wholeheartedly to the preparations for the coming German
attack. About 15 September, after Hitler’s provocative Nuremberg speech
in which he accused Beneš of torturing and planning the extermination of
the Sudeten Germans, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank, one of his
principal deputies, fled to Germany to avoid arrest by the Czech
Government. In Germany Henlein broadcast over the powerful Reichsender
radio station his determination to lead the Sudeten Germans home to the
Reich and denounced what he called the Hussites-Bolshevist criminals of
Prague. From his headquarters in a castle at Donndorf, outside Bayreuth,
he kept in close touch with the leading Nazi conspirators, including
Hitler and Himmler. He directed activities along the border and began
the organization of the Sudeten German Free Corps, an auxiliary military
organization. You will find these events set forth in the Czechoslovak
official government report, 998-PS, which has already been offered as
Exhibit USA-91.
Henlein’s activities were carried on with the advice and assistance of
the German Nazi leaders. Lieutenant Colonel Köchling was assigned to
Henlein in an advisory capacity to assist with the Sudeten German Free
Corps. In a conference with Hitler on the night of September 17,
Köchling received far-reaching military powers.
At this conference, the purpose of the Free Corps was frankly
stated—the maintenance of disorder and clashes. I read from Item 25, a
handwritten note labelled “most secret,” on Page 49 of the Schmundt
file, Document 388-PS:
“Most secret. Last night conference took place between Führer
and Lieutenant Colonel Köchling. Duration of conference 7
minutes. Lieutenant Colonel Köchling remains directly
responsible to OKW. He will be assigned to Konrad Henlein in an
advisory capacity. He received far-reaching military plenary
powers from the Führer. The Sudeten German Free Corps remains
responsible to Konrad Henlein alone. Purpose: Protection of the
Sudeten Germans and maintenance of disturbances and clashes. The
Free Corps will be established in Germany. Armament only with
Austrian weapons. Activities of Free Corps to begin as soon as
possible.”
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good place to break off for 10 minutes?
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, General Jodl’s diary again
gives a further insight into the position of the Henlein Free Corps. At
this time, the Free Corps was engaged in active skirmishing along the
Czech border, furnishing incidents and provocation in the desired
manner. I quote from the entries in the Jodl diary, for the 19th and
20th September 1938, at Page 6 of the Document 1780-PS, which is Exhibit
USA-72.
“19 September: Order is given to the Army High Command to take
care of the Sudeten German Free Corps.
“20 September: England and France have handed over their demands
in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown. The
activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an extent that
they may bring about, and already have brought about,
consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. (Transferring
rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of the
border.) By checking with Lieutenant Colonel Köchling, I attempt
to lead these activities into normal channels.
“Toward the evening the Führer also takes a hand and gives
permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the
approval of the corps headquarters.”
A report from Henlein’s staff, which was found in Hitler’s headquarters,
boasted of the offensive operations of the Free Corps. It is Item 30 of
the Schmundt file, Page 54 of Document 388-PS. I read the last two
paragraphs:
“Since 19 September, in more than 300 missions, the Free Corps
has executed its task with an amazing spirit of attack,”—now,
that word “attack” was changed by superimposition to
“defense”—“and with a willingness often reaching a degree of
unqualified self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its
activities: More than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG’s”—which I suppose
means machine guns—“and a large amount of other weapons and
equipment, aside from serious losses in dead and wounded
suffered by the enemy.”—And there was superimposed in place of
“enemy”, “the Czech terrorists.”
In his headquarters in the castle at Donndorf, Henlein was in close
touch with Admiral Canaris of the Intelligence Division of the OKW and
with the SS and the SA. The liaison officer between the SS and Henlein
was Oberführer Gottlob Berger (SS).
I now offer in evidence Document 3036-PS as Exhibit USA-102, which is an
affidavit executed by Gottlob Berger; and in connection with that
affidavit, I wish to submit to the Tribunal that it presents, we think,
quite a different question of proof from the Schuschnigg affidavits
which were not admitted in evidence by the Court. Schuschnigg, of
course, was a neutral and non-Nazi Austrian. He was not a member of this
conspiracy, and I can well understand that the Court rejected his
affidavit for these reasons.
This man was a Nazi. He was serving in this conspiracy. He has made this
affidavit. We think the affidavit has probative value and should be
admitted by the Tribunal under the pertinent provision of the Charter,
which says that you will accept in evidence any evidence having
probative value. We think it would be unfair to require us to bring here
as a witness a man who would certainly be a hostile witness, who is to
us a member of this conspiracy, and it seems to us that the affidavit
should be admitted with leave to the defendants, if they wish, to call
the author of the affidavit as their witness. I should have added that
this man was a prominent member of the SS which is charged before you as
being a criminal organization, and we think the document is perfectly
competent in evidence as an admission against interest by a prominent
member of the SS organization.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, the Defense objects to the use of this
document. This document was drawn up as late as 22 November 1945, here
in Nuremberg, and the witness Berger could, therefore, be brought to
Court without any difficulty. We must insist that he be heard here on
the subjects on which the Prosecution wishes to introduce his testimony.
That would be the only way in which the Defense could have an
opportunity of cross-examining the witness and thereby contribute to
obtaining objective truth.
[_Pause in the proceedings while the Tribunal consulted._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal upholds the objection and will not hear this
affidavit. It is open to either the Prosecution or the defendants, of
course, to call the man who made the affidavit. That is all I have to
say. We have upheld your objection.
MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I had another affidavit by one
Alfred Helmut Naujocks which, I take it, will be excluded under this
same ruling, and which, therefore, I shall not offer.
THE PRESIDENT: If the circumstances are the same.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, I might merely refer to it for identification because
it is in your document books.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: It is Document 3029-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That also will be rejected as evidence.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. Offensive operations along the Czechoslovakian border
were not confined to skirmishes carried out by the Free Corps. Two
SS-Totenkopf (Deathhead) battalions were operating across the border in
Czech territory near Asch.
I quote now from Item 36 in the Schmundt file, an OKW most-secret order,
signed by Jodl, and dated 28 September. This appears at Page 61 Of the
Schmundt file:
“Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Berlin, 28 September 1938;
45 copies, 16th copy; most secret.
“Subject: Four SS-Totenkopf battalions subordinate to the
Commander-in-Chief Army.
“To: Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police (SS Central
Office) (36th copy).
“By order of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces the
following battalions of the SS Deathhead organization will be
under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army with
immediate effect.
“Second and Third Battalions of the 2d SS-Totenkopf Regiment
Brandenburg at present in Brieg (Upper Silesia).
“First and Second Battalions of the 3d SS-Totenkopf Regiment
Thuringia, at present in Radebeul and Kötzschenbroda near
Dresden.
“Commander-in-Chief of the Army is requested to deploy these
battalions for the West, (Upper Rhine) according to the Führer’s
instructions.
“These SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch promontory
(I and II Battalions of the SS-Totenkopf Regiment Oberbayern)
will come under the Commander-in-Chief of the Army only when
they return to German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses
the German-Czech frontier.
“It is requested that all further arrangements be made between
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Reichsführer SS (SS Central
Office).
“For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,
Jodl.”
According to the 25 September entry in General Jodl’s diary, these
SS-Totenkopf battalions were operating in this area on direct orders
from Hitler. As the time X-Day approached, the disposition of the Free
Corps became a matter of dispute.
On 26 September Himmler issued an order to the Chief of Staff of the
Sudeten German Free Corps, directing that the Free Corps come under
control of the Reichsführer SS in the event of German invasion of
Czechoslovakia. This document is Item 37 in the Schmundt file, on Page
62.
On 28 September Defendant Keitel directed that as soon as the German
Army crosses the Czech border, the Free Corps will take orders from the
OKH. In this most-secret order of the OKW, Keitel discloses that
Henlein’s men are already operating in Czechoslovak territory.
I read now from Item 34 of the Schmundt file on Page 58, the last three
paragraphs of this most-secret order:
“For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to it the
principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct
from the Führer and that they carry out their operations only in
conjunction with the competent corps headquarters. The advance
units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local
commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the
frontier.
“Those units remaining forward of the frontier should, in their
own interests, get into communication with the frontier guard as
often as possible.
“As soon as the Army crosses the Czechoslovak border the Henlein
Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be
expedient to assign a sector to the Free Corps, even now, which
can be fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later.”
On 30 September, when it became clear that the Munich Settlement would
result in a peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland, the Defendant Keitel
ordered that the Free Corps Henlein, in its present composition, be
placed under the command of Himmler.
I read from Item 38, at Page 63, of the Schmundt file:
“1. Attachment of the Henlein Free Corps. The Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the Henlein Free Corps
in its present composition be placed under command of
Reichsführer SS and the Chief of German Police. It is therefore
not at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit for the
invasion, but is to be later drawn in, like the rest of the
police forces, for police duties in agreement with the
Reichsführer SS.”
I have been able, if the Tribunal please, to ascertain the dates the
Tribunal asked about before the recess.
The first visit of Chamberlain to Germany in connection with this matter
was 15 September 1938. Chamberlain flew to Munich and arrived at 12:30
o’clock on 15 September. He went by train from Munich to Berchtesgaden,
arriving at 1600 hours, by car to Berghof, arriving about at 1650, for
three talks with Hitler. On 16 September Chamberlain returned by air to
London.
The second visit was on 22 September. Chamberlain met with Hitler at Bad
Godesberg at 1700 hours for a 3-hour discussion, and it was a deadlock.
On 23 September discussions were resumed at 2230 hours. On 24 September
Chamberlain returned to London.
The third visit was on 29 September. Chamberlain flew to Munich and the
meeting of Chamberlain, Mussolini, Daladier, and Hitler took place at
the Brown House at 1330 and continued until 0230 hours on 30 September
1938, a Friday, when the Munich Agreement was signed. Under the threat
of war by the Nazi conspirators, and with war in fact about to be
launched, the United Kingdom and France concluded the Munich Pact with
Germany and Italy at that early morning hour of 30 September 1938. This
Treaty will be presented by the British prosecutor. It is sufficient for
me to say of it at this point that it was the cession of the Sudetenland
by Czechoslovakia to Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce.
The Munich Pact will be TC-23 of the British documents.
On 1 October 1938 German troops began the occupation of the Sudetenland.
During the conclusion of the Munich Pact the Wehrmacht had been fully
deployed for the attack, awaiting only the word of Hitler to begin the
assault.
With the cession of the Sudetenland new orders were issued. On 30
September the Defendant Keitel promulgated Directive Number 1 on
occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia. This is Item 39
at Page 64 of the Schmundt file. This directive contained a timetable
for the occupation of sectors of former Czech territory between 1 and 10
October and specified the tasks of the German Armed Forces.
I read now the fourth and fifth paragraphs of that document:
“2. The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be
maintained completely, for the present also in the West. Order
for the rescinding of measures taken, is held over.
“The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be
converted into operation Grün.”
It contains one other important provision about the Henlein forces, and
I quote from the list under the heading “a. Army”:
“Henlein Free Corps. All combat action on the part of the
Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October.”
The Schmundt file contains a number of additional secret OKW directives
giving instructions for the occupation of the Sudetenland. I think I
need not read them, as they are not essential to the proof of our case.
They merely indicate the scope of the preparations of the OKW.
Directives specifying the occupational area of the Army, the units under
its command, arranging for communication facilities, supply, and
propaganda, and giving instructions to the various departments of the
Government were issued over Defendant Keitel’s signature on 30
September. These are Items 40, 41, and 42 in the Schmundt file. I think
it is sufficient to read the caption and the signature.
THE PRESIDENT: What page?
MR. ALDERMAN: Page 66 of the English version. This is the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces, most secret:
“Special Orders Number 1 to Directive Number 1. Subject:
Occupation of Territory Ceded by
Czechoslovakia.”—Signature—“Keitel.”
Item 41 is on Page 70 of the Schmundt file.
“Supreme Command of the Armed Forces; most secret IV a. Most
secret; subject: Occupation of Sudeten-German
Territory.”—Signed—“Keitel.”
Item 42 in the Schmundt file is on Page 75, again most secret.
“Subject: Occupation of the Sudeten-German
Area.”—Signed—“Keitel.”
By 10 October Von Brauchitsch was able to report to Hitler that German
troops had reached the demarcation line and that the order for the
occupation of the Sudetenland had been fulfilled. The OKW requested
Hitler’s permission to rescind Case Green, to withdraw troops from the
occupied area, and to relieve the OKH of executive powers in the
Sudeten-German area as of 15 October. These are Items 46, 47, and 48 in
the Schmundt file.
Item 46, which appears at Page 77, is a letter from Berlin, dated
October 10, 1938, signed by Von Brauchitsch:
“My Führer:
“I have to report that the troops will reach the demarcation
line as ordered, by this evening. Insofar as further military
operations are not required, the order for the occupation of the
country which was given to me will thus have been fulfilled. The
guarding of the new frontier line will be taken over by the
reinforced frontier supervision service in the next few days.
“It is thus no longer a military necessity to combine the
administration of the Sudetenland with the command of the troops
of the Army under the control of one person.
“I therefore ask you, my Führer, to relieve me, with effect from
15 October 1938, of the charge assigned to me: That of
exercising executive powers in Sudeten-German Territory.
“Heil, my Führer, Von Brauchitsch.”
Item 47 of the Schmundt file, appearing on Page 78, is a secret telegram
from the OKW to the Führer’s train, Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt:
“If evening report shows that occupation of Zone 5 has been
completed without incident, OKW intends to order further
demobilization.
“Principle: 1) To suspend operation Grün but maintain a
sufficient state of preparedness on part of Army and Luftwaffe
to make intervention possible if necessary. 2) All units not
needed to be withdrawn from the occupied area and reduced to
peacetime status, as population of occupied area is heavily
burdened by the massing of troops.”
Skipping to below the OKW signature, this appears, at the left:
“Führer’s decision:
“1. Agreed.
“2. Suggestion to be made on the 13 October in Essen by General
Keitel. Decision will then be reached.”
On the same date additional demobilization of the forces in the
Sudetenland was ordered by Hitler and Defendant Keitel. Three days later
the OKW requested Hitler’s consent to the reversion of the RAD (Labor
Corps) from the control of the Armed Forces. These are Items 52 and 53
in the Schmundt file.
As the German forces entered the Sudetenland, Henlein’s Sudetendeutsche
Partei was merged with the NSDAP of Hitler. The two men who had fled to
Hitler’s protection in mid-September, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank,
were appointed Gauleiter and Deputy Gauleiter, respectively, of the
Sudetengau. In the parts of the Czechoslovak Republic that were still
free the Sudetendeutsche Partei constituted itself as the National
Socialistic German Worker Party in Czechoslovakia, NSDAP in
Czechoslovakia, under the direction of Kundt, another of Henlein’s
deputies.
The Tribunal will find these events set forth in the Czechoslovak
official report, Document 998-PS.
The stage was now prepared for the next move of the Nazi conspirators,
the plan for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. With the
occupation of the Sudetenland and the inclusion of German-speaking
Czechs within the Greater Reich, it might have been expected that the
Nazi conspirators would be satisfied. Thus far in their program of
aggression the defendants had used as a pretext for their conquests the
union of the Volksdeutsche, the people of German descent, with the
Reich. Now, after Munich, the Volksdeutsche in Czechoslovakia have been
substantially all returned to German rule.
On 26 September, at the Sportpalast in Berlin, Hitler spoke to the
world. I now refer and invite the notice of the Tribunal to the
_Völkischer Beobachter_, Munich edition, special edition for 27
September 1938, in which this speech is quoted. I read from Page 2,
Column 1, quoting from Hitler:
“And now we are confronted with the last problem which must be
solved and will be solved. It is the last territorial claim”
. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is this document in our documents?
MR. ALDERMAN: No. I am asking the Court to take judicial notice of that.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: It is a well-known German publication.
“It is the last territorial claim which I have to make in
Europe, but it is a claim from which I will not swerve and which
I will satisfy, God willing.” (Document Number 2358-PS.)
And further:
“I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for
all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people
want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot
go back beyond the limits of our patience.”
This is Page 2, Column 1.
“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for
Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the
moment, when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems—that is
to say, when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their
other minorities peacefully and without oppression—I will no
longer be interested in the Czech State. And that, as far as I
am concerned, I will guarantee it. We don’t want any Czechs!”
The major portion of the passage I have quoted will be contained in
Document TC-28, which I think, will be offered by the British
prosecutor.
Yet two weeks later Hitler and Defendant Keitel were preparing estimates
of the military forces required to break Czechoslovak resistance in
Bohemia and Moravia.
I now read from Item 48, at Page 82, of the Schmundt file. This is a
top-secret telegram sent by Keitel to Hitler’s headquarters on 11
October 1938 in answer to four questions which Hitler had propounded to
the OKW. I think it is sufficient merely to read the questions which
Hitler had propounded:
“Question 1. What reinforcements are necessary in the situation
to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia?
“Question 2. How much time is requested for the regrouping or
moving up of new forces?
“Question 3. How much time will be required for the same purpose
if it is executed after the intended demobilization and return
measures?
“Question 4. How much time would be required to achieve the
state of readiness of 1 October?”
On 21 October, the same day on which the administration of the
Sudetenland was handed over to the civilian authorities, a directive
outlining plans for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia was
signed by Hitler and initialed by the Defendant Keitel.
I now offer in evidence Document C-136 as Exhibit USA-104, a top-secret
order of which 10 copies were made, this being the first copy, signed in
ink by Keitel.
In this order, issued only 3 weeks after the winning of the Sudetenland,
the Nazi conspirators are already looking forward to new conquests. I
quote the first part of the body of the document:
“The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for
the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down
by me in a later directive. Until this directive comes into
force the Armed Forces must be prepared at all times for the
following eventualities:
“1) The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection
against surprise air attacks.
“2) The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.
“3) The occupation of the Memel.”
And then proceeding, the statement following Number 2:
“Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia: It must be
possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if
her policy should become hostile towards Germany.
“The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this
contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those
for Grün; they must, however, guarantee a continuous and
considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned
mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The
organization, order of battle, and state of readiness of the
units earmarked for that purpose are in peacetime to be so
arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will
be deprived of all possibility of organized resistance. The
object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the
cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such that at
the same time ‘Grenzsicherung West’”—the measures of frontier
defense in the West—“can be carried out.
“The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows:
“a. Army: The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia
and several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a
surprise type of attack. Their number will be determined by the
forces remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success
must be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack
must be worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness
in such a manner that they may be either committed in securing
the frontiers or sent after the attack army.
“b. Air Force: The quick advance of the German Army is to be
assured by early elimination of the Czech Air Force. For this
purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from peacetime bases
has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose still stronger
forces may be required can be determined from the development of
the military-political situation in Czechoslovakia only. At the
same time a simultaneous assembly of the remainder of the
offensive forces against the West must be prepared.”
And then Part 3 goes on under the heading, “Annexation of the Memel
District.”
It is signed by Adolf Hitler and authenticated by Defendant Keitel. It
was distributed to the OKH, to Defendant Göring’s Luftwaffe, and to
Defendant Raeder at Navy headquarters.
Two months later, on 17 December 1938, Defendant Keitel issued an
appendix to the original order, stating that by command of the Führer
preparations for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia are to continue.
I offer in evidence Document C-138 as Exhibit USA-105, and other
captured OKW documents classified top secret.
Distribution of this order was the same as for the 21 October order. I
shall read the body of this order.
“Corollary to Directive of 21. 10. 38.
“Reference: ‘Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia.’ The
Führer has given the following additional order:
“The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the
assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be
expected.
“To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is
merely an action of pacification, and not a warlike undertaking.
“The action must therefore be carried out by the peacetime Armed
Forces only, without reinforcements from mobilization. The
necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that the
most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by
adjustment within the units.
“Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march in must,
as a general rule, leave their stations only during the night
prior to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously
form up systematically on the frontier. The transport necessary
for previous organization should be limited to the minimum and
will be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements, if
any, of single units and particularly of motorized forces, to
the troop training areas situated near the frontier, must have
the approval of the Führer.
“The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar
general directives.
“For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the
Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly
occupied territory and only for a short
period.”—Signed—“Keitel.”
I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that this particular
copy of this order, an original carbon signed in ink by Keitel, was the
one sent to the OKM, the German Naval headquarters. It bears the
initials of Fricke, head of the Operation Division of the naval war
staff; Schniewind, Chief of Staff; and of Defendant Raeder.
As the Wehrmacht moved forward, with plans for what it clearly
considered would be an easy victory, the Foreign Office played its part.
In a discussion of means of improving German-Czech relations with the
Czech Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky in Berlin on 31 January 1939,
Defendant Ribbentrop urged upon the Czech Government a quick reduction
in the size of the Czech Army. I offer in evidence Document 2795-PS as
Exhibit USA-106, captured German Foreign Office notes of this
discussion. I will read only the footnote, which is in Ribbentrop’s
handwriting:
“I mentioned to Chvalkovsky especially that a quick reduction in
the Czech Army would be decisive in our judgment.”
Does the Court propose sitting beyond 4:30?
THE PRESIDENT: No, I think not. The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 4 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]
TWELFTH DAY
Tuesday, 4 December 1945
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: I will call on the Chief Prosecutor for Great Britain and
Northern Ireland.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): May it
please the Tribunal, on an occasion to which reference has and will be
made, Hitler, the leader of the Nazi conspirators who are now on trial
before you, is reported as having said, in reference to their warlike
plans:
“I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war, never
mind whether it be true or not. The victor shall not be asked
later on whether he told the truth or not. In starting and
making a war, not the right is what matters, but victory—the
strongest has the right.”
The British Empire with its Allies has twice, within the space of 25
years, been victorious in wars which have been forced upon it, but it is
precisely because we realize that victory is not enough, that might is
not necessarily right, that lasting peace and the rule of international
law is not to be secured by the strong arm alone, that the British
nation is taking part in this Trial. There are those who would perhaps
say that these wretched men should have been dealt with summarily
without trial by “executive action”; that their power for evil broken,
they should have been swept aside into oblivion without this elaborate
and careful investigation into the part which they played in bringing
this war about: _Vae Victis!_ Let them pay the penalty of defeat. But
that was not the view of the British Government. Not so would the rule
of law be raised and strengthened on the international as well as upon
the municipal plane; not so would future generations realize that right
is not always on the side of the big battalions; not so would the world
be made aware that the waging of aggressive war is not only a dangerous
venture but a criminal one.
Human memory is very short. Apologists for defeated nations are
sometimes able to play upon the sympathy and magnanimity of their
victors, so that the true facts, never authoritatively recorded, become
obscured and forgotten. One has only to recall the circumstances
following upon the last World War to see the dangers to which, in the
absence of any authoritative judicial pronouncement, a tolerant or a
credulous people is exposed. With the passage of time the former tend to
discount, perhaps because of their very horror, the stories of
aggression and atrocity that may be handed down; and the latter, the
credulous, misled by perhaps fanatical and perhaps dishonest
propagandists, come to believe that it was not they but their opponents
who were guilty of that which they would themselves condemn. And so we
believe that this Tribunal, acting, as we know it will act
notwithstanding its appointment by the victorious powers, with complete
and judicial objectivity, will provide a contemporary touchstone and an
authoritative and impartial record to which future historians may turn
for truth, and future politicians for warning. From this record shall
future generations know not only what our generation suffered, but also
that our suffering was the result of crimes, crimes against the laws of
peoples which the peoples of the world upheld and will continue in the
future to uphold—to uphold by international co-operation, not based
merely on military alliances, but grounded, and firmly grounded, in the
rule of law.
Nor, though this procedure and this Indictment of individuals may be
novel, is there anything new in the principles which by this prosecution
we seek to enforce. Ineffective though, alas, the sanctions proved and
showed to be, the nations of the world had, as it will be my purpose in
addressing the Tribunal to show, sought to make aggressive war an
international crime, and although previous tradition has sought to
punish states rather than individuals, it is both logical and right
that, if the act of waging war is itself an offense against
international law, those individuals who shared personal responsibility
for bringing such wars about should answer personally for the course
into which they led their states. Again, individual war crimes have long
been recognized by international law as triable by the courts of those
states whose nationals have been outraged, at least so long as a state
of war persists. It would be illogical in the extreme if those who,
although they may not with their own hands have committed individual
crimes, were responsible for systematic breaches of the laws of war
affecting the nationals of many states should escape for that reason. So
also in regard to Crimes against Humanity. The rights of humanitarian
intervention on behalf of the rights of man, trampled upon by a state in
a manner shocking the sense of mankind, has long been considered to form
part of the recognized law of nations. Here too, the Charter merely
develops a pre-existing principle. If murder, rapine, and robbery are
indictable under the ordinary municipal laws of our countries, shall
those who differ from the common criminal only by the extent and
systematic nature of their offenses escape accusation?
It is, as I shall show, the view of the British Government that in these
matters, this Tribunal will be applying to individuals, not the law of
the victor, but the accepted principles of international usage in a way
which will, if anything can, promote and fortify the rule of
international law and safeguard the future peace and security of this
war-stricken world.
By agreement between the chief prosecutors, it is my task, on behalf of
the British Government and of the other states associated in this
Prosecution, to present the case on Count Two of the Indictment and to
show how these defendants, in conspiracy with each other, and with
persons not now before this Tribunal, planned and waged a war of
aggression in breach of the treaty obligations by which, under
international law, Germany, as other states, has thought to make such
wars impossible.
The task falls into two parts. The first is to demonstrate the nature
and the basis of the Crime against Peace, which is constituted under the
Charter of this Tribunal, by waging wars of aggression and in violation
of treaties; and the second is to establish beyond all possibility of
doubt that such wars were waged by these defendants.
As to the first, it would no doubt be sufficient just to say this. It is
not incumbent upon the Prosecution to prove that wars of aggression and
wars in violation of international treaties are, or ought to be,
international crimes. The Charter of this Tribunal has prescribed that
they are crimes and that the Charter is the statute and the law of this
Court. Yet, though that is the clear and mandatory law governing the
jurisdiction of this Tribunal, we feel that we should not be discharging
our task in the abiding interest of international justice and morality
unless we showed to the Tribunal, and indeed to the world, the position
of this provision of the Charter against the general perspective of
international law. For, just as in the experience of our country, some
old English statutes were merely declaratory of the common law, so today
this Charter merely declares and creates a jurisdiction in respect of
what was already the law of nations.
Nor is it unimportant to emphasize that aspect of the matter, lest there
may be some, now or hereafter, who might allow their judgment to be
warped by plausible catchwords or by an uninformed and distorted sense
of justice towards these defendants. It is not difficult to be misled by
such criticisms as that resort to war in the past has not been a crime;
that the power to resort to war is one of the prerogatives of the
sovereign state; even that this Charter, in constituting wars of
aggression a crime, has imitated one of the most obnoxious, doctrines of
National Socialist jurisprudence, namely _post factum_ legislation—that
the Charter is in this respect reminiscent of bills of attainder—and
that these proceedings are no more than a measure of vengeance, subtly
concealed in the garb of judicial proceedings which the victor wreaks
upon the vanquished. These things may sound plausible—yet they are not
true. It is, indeed, not necessary to doubt that some aspects of the
Charter bear upon them the imprint of significant and salutary novelty.
But it is our submission and our conviction, which we affirm before this
Tribunal and the world, that fundamentally the provision of the Charter
which constitutes wars, such wars as these defendants joined in waging
and in planning a crime, is not in any way an innovation. This provision
of the Charter does no more than constitute a competent jurisdiction for
the punishment of what not only the enlightened conscience of mankind
but the law of nations itself had constituted an international crime
before this Tribunal was established and this Charter became part of the
public law of the world.
So first let this be said:
Whilst it may be quite true that there is no body of international rules
amounting to law in the Austinian sense of a rule imposed by a sovereign
upon a subject obliged to obey it under some definite sanction; yet for
50 years or more the people of the world, striving perhaps after that
ideal of which the poet speaks:
“When the war drums throb no longer
And the battle flags are furled,
In the parliament of man,
The federation of the world”—
sought to create an operative system of rules based upon the consent of
nations to stabilize international relations, to avoid war taking place
at all and to mitigate the results of such wars as took place. The first
treaty was of course the Hague Convention of 1899 for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes. That Convention was, indeed, of no
more than precatory effect, and we attach no weight to it for the
purposes of this case, but it did establish agreement that, in the event
of serious disputes arising between the signatory powers, they would as
far as possible submit to mediation. That Convention was followed in
1907 by another convention reaffirming and slightly strengthening what
had previously been agreed. These early conventions fell, indeed, very
far short of outlawing war, or of creating any binding obligation to
arbitrate. I shall certainly not ask the Tribunal to say any crime was
committed by disregarding those conventions.
But at least they established that the contracting powers accepted the
general principle that, if at all possible, war should be resorted to
only if mediation failed.
Although these conventions are mentioned in this Indictment, I am not
relying on them save to show the historical development of the law, and
it is unnecessary, therefore, to argue about their precise effect, for
the place which they once occupied has been taken by far more effective
instruments. I mention them now merely for this, that they were the
first steps towards that body of rules of law which we are seeking here
to enforce.
There were, of course, other individual agreements between particular
states, agreements which sought to preserve the neutrality of individual
countries, as, for instance, that of Belgium, but those agreements were
inadequate, in the absence of any real will to comply with them, to
prevent the first World War in 1914.
Shocked by the occurrence of that catastrophe, the nations of Europe,
not excluding Germany, and of other parts of the world, came to the
conclusion that, in the interests of all alike, a permanent organization
of the nations should be established to maintain the peace. And so the
Treaty of Versailles was prefaced by the Covenant of the League of
Nations.
Now, I say nothing at this moment of the general merits of the various
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. They have been criticized, some
of them perhaps justly criticized, and they were certainly made the
subject of much bellicose propaganda in Germany. But it is unnecessary
to inquire into the merits of the matter, for, however unjust one might
for this purpose assume the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles to
have been, they contained no kind of excuse for the waging of war to
secure an alteration in their terms. Not only was that treaty a
settlement, by agreement, of all the difficult territorial questions
which had been left outstanding by the war itself, but it established
the League of Nations which, if it had been loyally supported, could so
well have resolved those international differences which might otherwise
have led, as indeed they eventually did lead, to war. It set up in the
Council of the League, in the Assembly and in the Permanent Court of
International Justice, a machine not only for the peaceful settlement of
international disputes, but also for the frank ventilation of all
international questions by open and free discussion. At that time, in
those years after the last war, the hopes of the world stood high.
Millions of men in all countries—perhaps even in Germany itself—had
laid down their lives in what they hoped and believed was a war to end
war. Germany herself entered the League of Nations and was given a
permanent seat on the Council; and on that Council, as in the assembly
of the League, German governments which preceded that of the Defendant
Von Papen in 1932 played their full part. In the years from 1919 to that
time in 1932, despite some comparatively minor incidents in the heated
atmosphere which followed the end of the war, the peaceful operation of
the League continued. Nor was it only the operation of the League which
gave ground, and good ground, for hope that at long last the rule of law
would replace anarchy in the international field.
The statesmen of the world deliberately set out to make wars of
aggression an international crime. These are no new terms invented by
the victors to embody in this Charter. They have figured, and they have
figured prominently, in numerous treaties, in governmental
pronouncements, and in the declarations of statesmen in the period
preceding the second World War. In treaties concluded between the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and other states, such as Persia in 1927,
France in 1935, China in 1937, the contracting parties undertook to
refrain from any act of aggression whatever against the other party. In
1933 the Soviet Union became a party to a large number of treaties
containing a detailed definition of aggression, and the same definition
appeared in the same year in the authoritative report of the Committee
on Questions of Security set up in connection with the Conference for
the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. But at this time states were
going beyond commitments to refrain from wars of aggression and to
assist states which were victims of aggression. They were condemning
aggression in unmistakable terms. Thus in the Anti-War Treaty of
Non-Aggression and Conciliation, which was signed on the 10th of October
1933, by a number of American states, subsequently joined by practically
all the states of the American continents and a number of European
countries as well, the contracting parties solemnly declared that “they
condemn wars of aggression in their mutual relations or in those of
other states.” And that treaty was fully incorporated into the Buenos
Aires convention of December 1936, signed and ratified by a large number
of American countries, including, of course, the United States. And
previously, in 1928, the 6th Pan-American Conference had adopted a
resolution declaring that, as “war of aggression constitutes a crime
against the human species . . . all aggression is illicit and as such is
declared prohibited.” A year earlier, as long ago as September 1927, the
Assembly of the League of Nations adopted a resolution affirming the
conviction that “a war of aggression can never serve as a means of
settling international disputes and is, in consequence, an international
crime” and going on to declare that “all wars of aggression are, and
shall always be prohibited.”
The first article of the draft Treaty for Mutual Assistance of 1923 read
in these terms:
“The High Contracting Parties, affirming that aggressive war is
an international crime, undertake the solemn engagement not to
make themselves guilty of this crime against any other nation.”
In the Preamble to the Geneva Protocol of 1924, it was stated that
“offensive warfare constitutes an infraction of solidarity and an
international crime.” These instruments that I have just last mentioned
remained, it is true, unratified for various reasons, but they are not
without significance or value.
These repeated declarations, these repeated condemnations of wars of
aggression testified to the fact that with the establishment of the
League of Nations, with the legal developments which followed it, the
place of war in international law had undergone a profound change. War
was ceasing to be the unrestricted prerogative of sovereign states. The
Covenant of the League of Nations did not totally abolish the right of
war. It left, perhaps, certain gaps which were possibly larger in theory
than in practice. But in effect it surrounded the right of war by
procedural and substantive checks and delays, which, if the Covenant had
been faithfully observed, would have amounted to an elimination of war,
not only between members of the League, but also, by reason of certain
provisions of the Covenant, in the relations of non-members as well. And
thus the Covenant of the League restored the position as it existed at
the dawn of international law, at the time when Grotius was laying down
the foundations of the modern law of nations and established the
distinction, a distinction accompanied by profound legal consequences in
the sphere, for instance, of neutrality, between a just war and an
unjust war.
Nor was that development arrested with the adoption of the Covenant of
the League. The right of war was further circumscribed by a series of
treaties, numbering—it is an astonishing figure but it is right—nearly
a thousand, of arbitration and conciliation embracing practically all
the nations of the world. The so-called Optional Clause of Article 36 of
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the clause
which conferred upon the Court compulsory jurisdiction in regard to the
most comprehensive categories of disputes, and which constituted in
effect by far the most important compulsory treaty of arbitration in the
postwar period, was widely signed and ratified. Germany herself signed
it in 1927 and her signature was renewed, and renewed for a period of 5
years by the Nazi government in July of 1933. (Significantly, that
ratification was not again renewed on the expiration of its 5 years’
validity in March of 1938 by Germany). Since 1928 a considerable number
of states signed and ratified the General Act for the Pacific Settlement
of International Disputes which was designed to fill the gaps left by
the Optional Clause and by the existing treaties of arbitration and
conciliation.
And all this vast network of instruments of pacific settlement testified
to the growing conviction throughout the civilized world that war was
ceasing to be the normal or the legitimate means of settling
international disputes. The express condemnation of wars of aggression,
which I have already mentioned, supplies the same testimony. But there
was, of course, more direct evidence pointing in the same direction. The
Treaty of Locarno of the 16th October 1925, to which I shall have
occasion to refer presently, and to which Germany was a party, was more
than a treaty of arbitration and conciliation in which the parties
undertook definite obligations with regard to the pacific settlement of
disputes which might arise between them. It was, subject to clearly
specified exceptions of self-defense in certain contingencies, a more
general undertaking in which the parties to it agreed that “they would
in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each
other.” And that constituted a general renunciation of war, and it was
so considered to be in the eyes of international jurists and in the
public opinion of the world. The Locarno Treaty was not just another of
the great number of arbitration treaties which were being concluded at
this time. It was regarded as a kind of cornerstone in the European
settlement and in the new legal order in Europe in partial, just, and
indeed, generous substitution for the rigors of the Treaty of
Versailles. And with that treaty, the term “outlawry of war” left the
province of mere pacifist propaganda. It became current in the writings
on international law and in the official pronouncements of governments.
No one could any longer say, after the Locarno Treaty—no one could any
longer associate himself with the plausible assertion that at all
events, as between the parties to that treaty, war remained an
unrestricted right of sovereign states.
But, although the effect of the Locarno Treaty was limited to the
parties to it, it had wider influence in paving the way towards that
most fundamental, that truly revolutionary enactment in modern
international law, namely, the General Treaty for the Renunciation of
War of 27 August 1928, the Pact of Paris, the Kellogg-Briand Pact. That
treaty, a most deliberate and carefully prepared piece of international
legislation, was binding in 1939 on more than 60 nations, including
Germany. It was, and it has remained, the most widely signed and
ratified international instrument. It contained no provision for its
termination, and it was conceived, as I said, as the cornerstone of any
future international order worthy of the name. It is fully part of
international law as it stands today, and it has in no way been modified
or replaced by the Charter of the United Nations. It is right, in this
solemn hour in the history of the world, when the responsible leaders of
a state stand accused of a premeditated breach of this great treaty
which was, which remains, a source of hope and of faith for mankind, to
set out in detail its two operative articles and its Preamble. Let me
read them to the Tribunal—first the Preamble, and it starts like this:
“The President of the German Reich”—and the other states
associated . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we find it among the documents?
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: It will be put in. I don’t think you have it at
the moment.
“The President of the German Reich . . . deeply sensitive of
their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind; persuaded
that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an
instrument of international policy should be made to the end
that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between
their peoples may be perpetuated; convinced that all changes in
their relations with one another should be sought only by
pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly
progress, and that any signatory power which shall hereafter
seek to promote its national interests by resort to war, should
be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty; hopeful that,
encouraged by their example, all the other nations of the world
will join in this humane endeavor and by adhering to the present
treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their peoples within
the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting civilized
nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an
instrument of their national policy . . . .”
Then, Article I:
“The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of
their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for
the solution of international controversies and renounce it as
an instrument of national policy in their relations with one
another.”
And Article II:
“The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or
solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of
whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall
never be sought except by pacific means.”
In that treaty, that General Treaty for the Renunciation of War,
practically the whole civilized world abolished war as a legally
permissible means of enforcing the law or of changing it. The right of
war was no longer of the essence of sovereignty. Whatever the position
may have been at the time of the Hague Convention, whatever the position
may have been in 1914, whatever it may have been in 1918—and it is not
necessary to discuss it—no international lawyer of repute, no
responsible statesman, no soldier concerned with the legal use of armed
forces, no economist or industrialist concerned in his country’s war
economy could doubt that with the Pact of Paris on the statute book a
war of aggression was contrary to international law. Nor have the
repeated violations of the Pact by the Axis Powers in any way affected
its validity. Let this be firmly and clearly stated. Those very
breaches, except perhaps to the cynic and the malevolent, have added to
the strength of the treaty; they provoked the sustained wrath of peoples
angered by the contemptuous disregard of this great statute and
determined to vindicate its provisions. The Pact of Paris is the law of
nations. This Tribunal will declare it. The world must enforce it.
Let this also be said, that the Pact of Paris was not a clumsy
instrument likely to become a kind of signpost for the guilty. It did
not enable Germany to go to war against Poland and yet rely, as against
Great Britain and France, on any immunity from warlike action because of
the very provisions of the pact. For the pact laid down expressly in its
preamble that no state guilty of a violation of its provisions might
invoke its benefits. And when, on the outbreak of the second World War,
Great Britain and France communicated to the League of Nations that a
state of war existed between them and Germany as from the 3rd of
September 1939, they declared that by committing an act of aggression
against Poland, Germany had violated her obligations assumed not only
towards Poland but also towards the other signatories of the pact. A
violation of the pact in relation to one signatory was an attack upon
all the other signatories and they were entitled to treat it as such. I
emphasize that point lest any of these defendants should seize upon the
letter of the particulars of Count Two of the Indictment and seek to
suggest that it was not Germany who initiated war with the United
Kingdom and France on 3 September 1939. The declaration of war came from
the United Kingdom and from France; the act of war and its commencement
came from Germany in violation of the fundamental enactment to which she
was a party.
The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, this great
constitutional instrument of an international society awakened to the
deadly dangers of another Armageddon, did not remain an isolated effort
soon to be forgotten in the turmoil of recurrent international crises.
It became, in conjunction with the Covenant of the League of Nations or
independently of it, the starting point for a new orientation of
governments in matters of peace, war, and neutrality. It is of
importance, I think, to quote just one or two of the statements which
were being made by governments at that time in relation to the effect of
the pact. In 1929 His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom said,
in connection with the question of conferring upon the Permanent Court
of International Justice jurisdiction with regard to the exercise of
belligerent rights in relation to neutral states—and it illustrates the
profound change which was being accepted as having taken place as a
result of the Pact of Paris in international law:
“But the whole situation . . . . rests, and international law on
the subject has been entirely built up, on the assumption that
there is nothing illegitimate in the use of war as an instrument
of national policy, and, as a necessary corollary, that the
position and rights of neutrals are entirely independent of the
circumstances of any war which may be in progress. Before the
acceptance of the Covenant, the basis of the law of neutrality
was that the rights and obligations of neutrals were identical
as regards both belligerents, and were entirely independent of
the rights and wrongs of the dispute which had led to the war,
or the respective position of the belligerents at the bar of
world opinion.”
Then the Government went on:
“Now it is precisely this assumption which is no longer valid as
regards states which are members of the League of Nations and
parties to the Peace Pact. The effect of those instruments,
taken together, is to deprive nations of the right to employ war
as an instrument of national policy, and to forbid the states
which have signed them to give aid or comfort to an offender.”
This was being said in 1929, when there was no war upon the horizon.
“As between such states, there has been in consequence a
fundamental change in the whole question of belligerent and
neutral rights. The whole policy of His Majesty’s present
Government (and, it would appear, of any alternative government)
is based upon a determination to comply with their obligations
under the Covenant of the League and the Peace Pact. This being
so, the situation which we have to envisage in the event of a
war in which we were engaged is not one in which the rights and
duties of belligerents and neutrals will depend upon the old
rules of war and neutrality, but one in which the position of
the members of the League will be determined by the Covenant and
by the Pact.”
The Chief Prosecutor for the United States of America referred in his
opening speech before this Tribunal to the weighty pronouncement of Mr.
Stimson, the Secretary of War, in which, in 1932, he gave expression to
the drastic change brought about in international law by the Pact of
Paris, and it is perhaps convenient to quote the relevant passage in
full:
“War between nations was renounced by the signatories of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact. This means that it has become illegal
throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be
the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the
principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights
of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. Hereafter, when two
nations engage in armed conflict, either one or both of them
must be wrongdoers—violators of this general treaty law. We no
longer draw a circle about them and treat them with the
punctilios of the duelist’s code. Instead we denounce them as
law-breakers.”
And nearly 10 years later, when numerous independent states lay
prostrate, shattered or menaced in their very existence before the
impact of the war machine of the Nazi State, the Attorney General of the
United States, subsequently a distinguished member of the highest
Tribunal of that great country, gave significant expression to the
change which had been effected in the law as the result of the Pact of
Paris in a speech for which the freedom-loving peoples of the world will
always be grateful. On the 27th of March 1941—and I mention it now not
as merely being the speech of a statesman, although it was certainly
that, but as being the considered opinion of a distinguished lawyer,—he
said this:
“The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, in which Germany, Italy and
Japan covenanted with us, as well as with other nations, to
renounce war as an instrument of policy, made definite the
outlawry of war and of necessity altered the dependent concept
of neutral obligations.
“The Treaty for the Renunciation of War and the Argentine
Anti-War Treaty deprived their signatories of the right of war
as an instrument of national policy or aggression and rendered
unlawful wars undertaken in violation of these provisions. In
consequence these treaties destroyed the historical and
juridical foundations of the doctrine of neutrality conceived as
an attitude of absolute impartiality in relation to aggressive
wars . . . .
“It follows that the state which has gone to war in violation of
its obligations acquires no right to equality of treatment from
other states, unless treaty obligations require different
handling of affairs. It derives no rights from its illegality.
“In flagrant cases of aggression where the facts speak so
unambiguously that world opinion takes what may be the
equivalent of judicial notice, we may not stymie international
law and allow these great treaties to become dead letters. The
intelligent public opinion of the world which is not afraid to
be vocal, and the action of the American States, has made a
determination that the Axis Powers are the aggressors in the
wars today, which is an appropriate basis in the present state
of international organizations for our policy.”
Thus, there is no doubt that by the time the National Socialist State of
Germany had embarked upon the preparation of the war of aggression
against the civilized world and by the time it had accomplished that
design, aggressive war had become, in virtue of the Pact of Paris and
the other treaties and declarations to which I have referred, illegal
and a crime beyond all uncertainty and doubt. And it is on that
proposition, and fundamentally on that universal treaty, the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, that Count Two of this Indictment is principally
based.
The Prosecution has deemed it necessary—indeed, imperative—to
establish beyond all possibility of question, at what I am afraid may
appear to be excessive length, that only superficial learning or
culpable sentimentality can assert that there is any significant element
of retroactivity in the determination of the authors of this Charter to
treat aggressive war as conduct which international law has prohibited
and stigmatized as criminal. We have traced the progressive limitation
of the rights of war, the renunciation and condemnation of wars of
aggression, and above all, the total prohibition and condemnation of all
wars conceived as an instrument of national policy. What statesman or
politician in charge of the affairs of nations could doubt, from 1928
onwards, that aggressive war, or that all war, except in self-defense or
for the collective enforcement of the law, or against a state which had
itself violated the Pact of Paris, was unlawful and outlawed? What
statesman or politician embarking upon such a war could reasonably and
justifiably count upon an immunity other than that of a successful
outcome of the criminal venture? What more decisive evidence of a
prohibition laid down by positive international law could any lawyer
desire than that which has been adduced before this Tribunal?
There are, it is true, some small town lawyers who deny the very
existence of any international law; and indeed, as I have said, the
rules of the law of nations may not satisfy the Austinian test of being
imposed by a sovereign. But the legal regulation of international
relations rests upon quite different juridical foundations. It depends
upon consent, but upon a consent which, once given, cannot be withdrawn
by unilateral action. In the international field the source of law is
not the command of a sovereign but the treaty agreement binding upon
every state which has adhered to it. And it is indeed true, and the
recognition of its truth today by all the great powers of the world is
vital to our future peace—it is indeed true that, as M. Litvinov once
said, and as Great Britain fully accepts:
“Absolute sovereignty and entire liberty of action only belong
to such states as have not undertaken international obligations.
Immediately a state accepts international obligations it limits
its sovereignty.”
In that way and that way alone lies the future peace of the world. Yet
it may be argued that although war itself was outlawed and forbidden, it
was not criminally outlawed and criminally forbidden. International law,
it may be said, does not attribute criminality to states and still less
to individuals. But can it really be said on behalf of these defendants
that the offense of these aggressive wars, which plunged millions of
people to their death, which by dint of War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity brought about the torture and extermination of countless
thousands of innocent civilians, which devastated cities, which
destroyed the amenities—nay, the most rudimentary necessities of
civilization in many countries—which has brought the world to the brink
of ruin from which it will take generations to recover—will it
seriously be said by these defendants that such a war is only an
offense, only an illegality, only a matter of condemnation perhaps
sounding in damages, but not a crime justiciable by any Tribunal? No law
worthy of the name can allow itself to be reduced to an absurdity in
that way, and certainly the great powers responsible for this Charter
were not prepared to admit it. They draw the inescapable conclusion from
the renunciation, the prohibition, the condemnation of war which had
become part of the law of nations, and they refuse to reduce justice to
impotence by subscribing to the outworn doctrines that a sovereign state
can commit no crime and that no crime can be committed on behalf of the
sovereign state by individuals acting in its behalf. They refuse to
stultify themselves, and their refusal and their decision has decisively
shaped the law for this Tribunal.
If this be an innovation, it is an innovation long overdue—a desirable
and beneficent innovation fully consistent with justice, fully
consistent with common sense and with the abiding purposes of the law of
nations. But is it indeed an innovation? Or is it no more than the
logical development of the law? There was indeed a time when
international lawyers used to maintain that the liability of the state,
because of its sovereignty, was limited to a contractual responsibility.
International tribunals have not accepted that view. They have
repeatedly affirmed that a state can commit a tort; that it may be
guilty of trespass, of nuisance, and of negligence. And they have gone
further. They have held that a state may be bound to pay what are in
effect penal damages. In a recent case decided in 1935 between the
United States and Canada, an arbitral tribunal, with the concurrence of
its American member, decided that the United States were bound to pay
what amounted to penal damages for an affront to Canadian sovereignty.
And on a wider plane, the Covenant of the League of Nations, in
providing for sanctions, recognized the principle of enforcement of the
law against collective units, such enforcement to be, if necessary, of a
penal character. And so there is not anything startlingly new in the
adoption of the principle that the state as such is responsible for its
criminal acts. In fact, save for reliance on the unconvincing argument
of sovereignty, there is in law no reason why a state should not be
answerable for crimes committed on its behalf. A hundred years ago Dr.
Lushington, a great English Admiralty judge, refused to admit that a
state could not be a pirate. History—very recent history—does not
warrant the view that a state cannot be a criminal. On the other hand,
the immeasurable potentialities for evil, inherent in the state in this
age of science and organization would seem to demand, quite
imperatively, means of repression of criminal conduct even more drastic
and more effective than in the case of individuals. And insofar,
therefore, as this Charter has put on record the principle of the
criminal responsibility of the state, it must be applauded as a wise and
far-seeing measure of international legislation.
[_A recess was taken._]
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: [_Continuing._] I was saying before the recess
that there could be no doubt about the principle of criminal
responsibility on the part of the state which engaged in aggressive war.
Admittedly, the conscience shrinks from the rigors of collective
punishment, which may fall upon the guilty and the innocent alike,
although, it may be noted, most of these innocent victims would not have
hesitated to reap the fruits of the criminal act if it had been
successful. Humanity and justice will find means of mitigating any
injustice in collective punishment. Above all, much hardship can be
obviated by making the punishment fall upon the individuals who were
themselves directly responsible for the criminal conduct of their state.
It is here that the powers who framed this Charter took a step which
justice, sound legal sense, and an enlightened appreciation of the good
of mankind must acclaim without cavil or reserve. The Charter lays down
expressly that there shall be individual responsibility for the crimes,
including the crimes against the peace, committed on behalf of the
state. The state is not an abstract entity. Its rights and duties are
the rights and duties of men. Its actions are the actions of men. It is
a salutary principle, a principle of law, that politicians who embark
upon a particular policy—as here—of aggressive war should not be able
to seek immunity behind the intangible personality of the state. It is a
salutary legal rule that persons who, in violation of the law, plunge
their own and other countries into an aggressive war should do so with a
halter around their necks.
To say that those who aid and abet, who counsel and procure a crime are
themselves criminals, is a commonplace in our own municipal law. Nor is
the principle of individual international responsibility for offenses
against the law of nations altogether new. It has been applied not only
to pirates. The entire law relating to war crimes, as distinct from the
crime of war, is based upon the principle of individual responsibility.
The future of international law, and indeed, of the world itself,
depends on its application in a much wider sphere, in particular, in
that of safeguarding the peace of the world. There must be acknowledged
not only, as in the Charter of the United Nations, fundamental human
rights, but also, as in the Charter of this Tribunal, fundamental human
duties, and of these none is more vital, none is more fundamental, than
the duty not to vex the peace of nations in violation of the clearest
legal prohibitions and undertakings. If this be an innovation, it is an
innovation which we are prepared to defend and to justify, but it is not
an innovation which creates a new crime. International law had already,
before the Charter was adopted, constituted aggressive war a criminal
act.
There is thus no substantial retroactivity in the provisions of the
Charter. It merely fixes the responsibility for a crime already clearly
established as such by positive law upon its actual perpetrators. It
fills a gap in international criminal procedure. There is all the
difference between saying to a man, “You will now be punished for what
was not a crime at all at the time you committed it,” and in saying to
him, “You will now pay the penalty for conduct which was contrary to law
and a crime when you executed it, although, owing to the imperfection of
the international machinery, there was at that time no court competent
to pronounce judgment against you.” It is that latter course which we
adopt, and if that be retroactivity, we proclaim it to be most fully
consistent with that higher justice which, in the practice of civilized
states, has set a definite limit to the retroactive operation of laws.
Let the defendants and their protagonists complain that the Charter is
in this matter an _ex parte fiat_ of the victors. These victors,
composing, as they do, the overwhelming majority of the nations of the
world, represent also the world’s sense of justice, which would be
outraged if the crime of war, after this second world conflict, were to
remain unpunished. In thus interpreting, declaring, and supplementing
the existing law, these states are content to be judged by the verdict
of history. _Securus judicat orbis terrarum._ Insofar as the Charter of
this Tribunal introduces new law, its authors have established a
precedent for the future—a precedent operative against all, including
themselves, but in essence that law, rendering recourse to aggressive
war an international crime, had been well established when the Charter
was adopted. It is only by way of corruption of language that it can be
described as a retroactive law.
There remains the question, with which I shall not detain the Tribunal
for long, whether these wars which were launched by Germany and her
leaders in violation of treaties or agreements or assurances were also
wars of aggression. A war of aggression is a war which is resorted to in
violation of the international obligation not to have recourse to war,
or, in cases in which war is not totally renounced, which is resorted to
in disregard of the duty to utilize the procedure of pacific settlement
which a state has bound itself to observe. There was, as a matter of
fact, in the period between the two world wars, a divergence of opinion
among jurists and statesmen whether it was preferable to attempt in
advance a legal definition of aggression, or to leave to the states
concerned and to the collective organs of the international community
freedom of appreciation of the facts in any particular situation that
might arise. Those holding the latter view argued that a rigid
definition might be abused by an unscrupulous state to fit in with its
aggressive design; they feared, and the British Government was for a
time among those who took this view, that an automatic definition of
aggression might become “a trap for the innocent and a signpost for the
guilty.” Others held that in the interest of certainty and security a
definition of aggression, like a definition of any crime in municipal
law, was proper and useful. They urged that the competent international
organs, political and judicial, could be trusted to avoid in any
particular case a definition of aggression which might lead to
obstruction or to an absurdity. In May of 1933 the Committee on Security
Questions of the Disarmament Conference proposed a definition of
aggression on these lines:
“The aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to
the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be
considered to be that state which is the first to commit any of
the following actions:
“(1) Declaration of war upon another state;
“(2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration
of war, of the territory of another state;
“(3) Attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without a
declaration of war, on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of
another state;
“(4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state;
“(5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory
which have invaded the territory of another state, or refusal;
notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to take in its
own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those
bands of all assistance or protection.”
The various treaties concluded in 1933 by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and other states followed closely that definition. So did the
draft convention submitted in 1933 by His Majesty’s Government to the
Disarmament Conference.
However, it is unprofitable to elaborate here the details of the problem
or of the definition of aggression. This Tribunal will not allow itself
to be deflected from its purpose by attempts to ventilate in this Court
what is an academic and, in the circumstances, an utterly unreal
controversy as to what is the nature of a war of aggression, for there
is no definition of aggression, general or particular, which does not
cover and cover abundantly and irresistibly in every detail, the
premeditated onslaught by Germany on the territorial integrity and
political independence of so many sovereign states.
This, then, being the law as we submit it to be to this Tribunal—that
the peoples of the world by the Pact of Paris had finally outlawed war
and made it criminal—I turn now to the facts to see how these
defendants under their leader and with their associates destroyed the
high hopes of mankind and sought to revert to international anarchy.
First, let this be said, for it will be established beyond doubt by the
documents which you will see, from the moment Hitler became Chancellor
in 1933, with the Defendant Von Papen as Reich Chancellor, and with the
Defendant Von Neurath as his Foreign Minister, the whole atmosphere of
the world darkened. The hopes of the people began to recede. Treaties
seemed no longer matters of solemn obligation but were entered into with
complete cynicism as a means for deceiving other states of Germany’s
warlike intentions. International conferences were no longer to be used
as a means for securing pacific settlements but as occasions for
obtaining by blackmail demands which were eventually to be enlarged by
war. The world came to know the “war of nerves”, the diplomacy of the
_fait accompli_, of blackmail and bullying.
In October 1933 Hitler told his Cabinet that as the proposed Disarmament
Convention did not concede full equality to Germany, “It would be
necessary to torpedo the Disarmament Conference. It was out of the
question to negotiate: Germany would leave the Conference and the
League”. On the 21st of October 1933 Germany did so, and by so doing
struck a deadly blow at the fabric of security which had been built up
on the basis of the League Covenant. From that time on the record of
their foreign policy became one of complete disregard of international
obligations, and indeed not least of those solemnly concluded by
themselves. Hitler himself expressly avowed to his confederates,
“Agreements are kept only so long as they serve a certain purpose.” He
might have added that again and again that purpose was only to lull an
intended victim into a false sense of security. So patent, indeed, did
this eventually become that to be invited by the Defendant Ribbentrop to
enter a non-aggression pact with Germany was almost a sign that Germany
intended to attack the state concerned. Nor was it only the formal
treaty which they used and violated as circumstances seemed to make
expedient. These defendants are charged, too, with breaches of the less
formal assurances which, in accordance with diplomatic usage, Germany
gave to neighboring states. You will hear the importance which Hitler
himself publicly attached to assurances of that kind. Today, with the
advance of science, the world has been afforded means of communication
and intercourse hitherto unknown, and as Hitler himself expressly
recognized in his public utterances, international relations no longer
depend upon treaties alone. The methods of diplomacy change. The leader
of one nation can speak directly to the government and peoples of
another, and that course was not infrequently adopted by the Nazi
conspirators. But, although the methods change, the principles of good
faith and honesty, established as the fundamentals of civilized society,
both in the national and international spheres, remain unaltered. It is
a long time since it was said that we are part one of another, and if
today the different states are more closely connected and thus form part
of a world society more than ever before, so also, more than before, is
there that need for good faith and honesty between them.
Let us see how these defendants, ministers and high officers of the Nazi
Government, individually and collectively comported themselves in these
matters.
On the 1st of September 1939 in the early hours of the morning under
manufactured and, in any event, inadequate pretexts, the Armed Forces of
the German Reich invaded Poland along the whole length of her frontiers
and thus launched the war which was to bring down so many of the pillars
of our civilization.
It was a breach of the Hague Conventions. It was a breach of the Treaty
of Versailles which had established the frontiers between Germany and
Poland. And however much Germany disliked that treaty—although Hitler
had expressly stated that he would respect its territorial
provisions—however much she disliked it, she was not free to break it
by unilateral action. It was a breach of the Arbitration Treaty between
Germany and Poland concluded at Locarno on the 16th of October 1925. By
that treaty Germany and Poland expressly agreed to refer any matters of
dispute not capable of settlement by ordinary diplomatic machinery to
the decision of an arbitral tribunal or of the Permanent Court of
International Justice. It was a breach of the Pact of Paris. But that is
not all. It was also a breach of a more recent and, in view of the
repeated emphasis laid upon it by Hitler himself, in some ways a more
important engagement into which Nazi Germany had entered with Poland.
After the Nazi Government came into power, on the 26th of January 1934
the German and Polish Governments had signed a 10 year pact of
non-aggression. It was, as the signatories themselves stated, to
introduce a new era into the political relations between Poland and
Germany. It was said in the text of the pact itself that “the
maintenance and guarantee of lasting peace between the two countries is
an essential prerequisite for the general peace of Europe.” The two
governments therefore agreed to base their mutual relations on the
principles laid down in the Pact of Paris, and they solemnly declared
that:
“In no circumstances . . . will they proceed to the application
of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such
disputes.”
That declaration and agreement was to remain in force for at least 10
years and thereafter it was to remain valid unless it was denounced by
either Government 6 months before the expiration of the 10 years, or
subsequently by 6 months’ notice. Both at the time of its signature and
during the following 4 years Hitler spoke of the German-Polish agreement
publicly as though it were a cornerstone of his foreign policy. By
entering into it, he persuaded many people that his intentions were
genuinely pacific, for the re-emergence of a new Poland and an
independent Poland after the war had cost Germany much territory and had
separated East Prussia from the Reich. And that Hitler should, of his
own accord, enter into friendly relations with Poland—that in his
speeches on foreign policy he should proclaim his recognition of Poland
and of her right to an exit to the sea, and the necessity for Germans
and Poles to live side by side in amity—these facts seemed to the world
to be convincing proof that Hitler had no “revisionist” aims which would
threaten the peace of Europe; that he was even genuinely anxious to put
an end to the age-old hostility between the Teuton and the Slav. If his
professions were, as embodied in the treaty and as contained in these
declarations, genuine, his policy excluded a renewal of the “Drang nach
Osten”, as it had been called, and was thereby going to contribute to
the peace and stability of Europe. That was what the people were led to
think. We shall have occasion enough to see how little truth these
pacific professions in fact contained.
The history of the fateful years from 1934 to 1939 shows quite clearly
that the Germans used this treaty, as they used other treaties, merely
as an instrument of policy for furthering their aggressive aims. It is
clear from the documents which will be presented to the Tribunal that
these 5 years fall into two distinct phases in the realization of the
aggressive aims which always underlay the Nazi policy. There was first
the period from the Nazi assumption of power in 1933 until the autumn of
1937. That was the preparatory period. During that time there occurred
the breaches of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, the feverish
rearmament of Germany, the reintroduction of conscription, the
reoccupation and remilitarization of the Rhineland, and all those other
necessary preparatory measures for future aggression which my American
colleagues have already so admirably put before the Tribunal.
During that period—the preparatory period—Germany was lulling Poland
into a false sense of security. Not only Hitler, but the Defendant
Göring and the Defendant Ribbentrop made statements approbating the
non-aggression pact. In 1935 Göring was saying that, “The pact was not
planned for a period of 10 years but forever; there need not be the
slightest fear that it would not be continued.” Even though Germany was
steadily building up the greatest war machine that Europe had ever
known, and although, by January 1937, the German military position was
so strong and so secure that, in spite of the treaty breaches which it
involved, Hitler could openly refer to his strong Army, he took pains,
at the same time, to say—and again I quote—that:
“By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tensions
and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the
European atmosphere. I merely recall the agreement with Poland
which has worked out to the advantage of both sides.”
And so it went on: abroad, protestations of pacific intentions; at home,
“guns before butter.”
In 1937 this preparatory period drew to a close and Nazi policy moved
from general preparation for future aggression to specific planning for
the attainment of certain specific aggressive aims. And there are two
documents in particular which mark that change.
The first of these was called “Directive for Unified Preparation for
War”; issued in June 1937—June 29, 1937—by the Reich Minister for War,
who was then Von Blomberg, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. That
document is important, not only for its military directions, but for the
appreciation it contained of the European situation and for the
revelation of the Nazi attitude towards it.
“The general political position”—Von Blomberg stated, and I am
quoting from the document—“justifies the supposition that
Germany need not consider an attack from any side. Grounds for
this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war in almost
all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the deficiencies
in the preparedness for war of a number of states, and of Russia
in particular.”
It is true, he added, “The intention of unleashing a European war is
held just as little by Germany.” And it may be that that phrase was
carefully chosen because, as the documents will show, Germany hoped to
conquer Europe, perhaps to conquer the world in detail; to fight on one
front at a time, against one power at a time, and not to unleash a
general European conflict.
But Von Blomberg went on:
“The politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude
surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war
of the German Armed Forces (a) to counter attack at any
time”—yet he had just said that there was no fear of any
attack—and “(b)”—and I invite the Tribunal again to notice
this phrase—“to enable the military exploitation of politically
favorable opportunities, should they occur.”
That phrase is no more than a euphemistic description of aggressive war.
It reveals the continued adherence of the German military leaders to the
doctrine that military might, and if necessary war, should be an
instrument of policy—the doctrine which had been explicitly condemned
by the Kellogg Pact, which was renounced by the pact with Poland, and by
innumerable other treaties.
The document goes on to set out the general preparations necessary for a
possible war in the mobilization period of 1937-1938. It is evidence at
least for this, that the leaders of the German Armed Forces had it in
mind to use the military strength which they were building up for
aggressive purposes. No reason, they say, to anticipate attack from any
side—there is a lack of desire for war. Yet they prepare to exploit
militarily favorable opportunities.
Still more important as evidence of the transition to planned aggression
is the record of the important conference which Hitler held at the Reich
Chancellery on the 5th of November 1937, at which Von Blomberg, Reich
Minister for War; Von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army;
Göring, Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; Raeder, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; and Von Neurath, then the Foreign
Minister, were present. The minutes of that conference have already been
put in evidence. I refer to them now only to emphasize those passages
which make apparent the ultimate intention to wage an aggressive war.
You will remember that the burden of Hitler’s argument at that
conference was that Germany required more territory in Europe. Austria
and Czechoslovakia were specifically envisaged. But Hitler realized that
the process of conquering those two countries might well bring into
operation the treaty obligations of Great Britain and of France. He was
prepared to take the risk. You remember the passage:
“The history of all times: Roman Empire, British Empire has
proved that every space expansion can be effected only by
breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are
unavoidable: Neither formerly nor today has space been found
without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the
proprietor. The question for Germany is where the greatest
possible conquest can be made at the lowest possible cost.”
In the course of that conference Hitler had foreseen and discussed the
likelihood that Poland would be involved if the aggressive expansionist
aims which he put forward brought about a general European war in the
course of their realization by the Nazi State. And when, therefore, on
that very day on which that conference was taking place, Hitler assured
the Polish Ambassador of the great value of the 1934 Pact with Poland,
it can only be concluded that its real value in Hitler’s eyes was that
of keeping Poland quiet until Germany had acquired such a territorial
and strategic position that Poland was no longer a danger.
That view is confirmed by the events which followed. At the beginning of
February of 1938 the change from Nazi preparation for aggression to
active aggression itself took place. It was marked by the substitution
of Ribbentrop for Neurath as Foreign Minister, and of Keitel for
Blomberg as head of the OKW. Its first fruits were the bullying of
Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden on February 12, 1938 and the forcible
absorption of Austria in March. Thereafter the Green Plan for the
destruction of Czechoslovakia was steadily developed in the way which
you heard yesterday—the plan partially foiled, or final consummation at
least delayed, by the Munich Agreement.
With those aspects, those developments of Nazi aggression, my American
colleagues have already dealt. But it is obvious that the acquisition of
these two countries, their resources in manpower, their resources in the
production of munitions of war, immensely strengthened the position of
Germany as against Poland. And it is, therefore, perhaps not surprising
that, just as the Defendant Göring assured the Czechoslovak Minister in
Berlin, at the time of the Nazi invasion of Austria, that Hitler
recognized the validity of the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty of
1925, and that Germany had no designs against Czechoslovakia
herself—you remember, “I give you my word of honor,” the Defendant
Göring said—just as that is not surprising, so also it is not perhaps
surprising that continued assurances should have been given during 1938
to Poland in order to keep that country from interfering with the Nazi
aggression on Poland’s neighbors.
Thus, on the 20th of February of 1938, on the eve of his invasion of
Austria, Hitler, referring to the fourth anniversary of the Polish Pact,
permitted himself to say this to the Reichstag—and I quote:
“. . . and so a way to a friendly understanding has been
successfully paved, an understanding which, beginning with
Danzig, has today in spite of the attempt of some mischief
makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the
relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into
a sincere friendly co-operation . . . Relying on her
friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save
that ideal which provides the foundation for the task ahead of
us—peace.”
Still more striking, perhaps, are the cordial references to Poland in
Hitler’s speech in the Sportpalast at Berlin on the 26th of September
1938. He then said:
“The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that
of our relations with Poland. There was a danger that Poles and
Germans would regard each other as hereditary enemies. I wanted
to prevent this. I know well enough that I should not have been
successful if Poland had had a democratic constitution. For
these democracies which indulge in phrases about peace are the
most bloodthirsty war agitators. In Poland there ruled no
democracy, but a man. And with him I succeeded, in precisely 12
months, in coming to an agreement which, for 10 years in the
first instance, removed in principle the danger of a conflict.
We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting
pacification. We realize that here are two peoples which must
live together and neither of which can do away with the other. A
people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the
sea. A way for understanding, then, had to be found, and it will
be further extended. But the main fact is that the two
governments, and all reasonable and clear-sighted persons among
the two peoples within the two countries, possess the firm will
and determination to improve their relations. It was a real work
of peace, of more worth than all the chattering in the League of
Nations palace at Geneva.”
And so flattery of Poland preceded the annexation of Austria and renewed
flattery of Poland preceded the projected annexation of Czechoslovakia.
The realities behind these outward expressions of good will are clearly
revealed in the documents relating to the Fall Grün, which are already
before the Tribunal. They show Hitler as fully aware that there was a
risk of Poland, England, and France being involved in war to prevent the
German annexation of Czechoslovakia and that this risk, although it was
realized, was also accepted. On 25 August of 1938 top-secret orders to
the German Air Force in regard to the operations to be conducted against
England and France, if they intervened, pointed out that, as the
French-Czechoslovak Treaty provided for assistance only in the event of
an “unprovoked” attack, it would take a day or two for France and
England, and I suppose for their legal advisors to decide whether
legally the attack had been unprovoked or not, and consequently a
Blitzkrieg, accomplishing its aims before there could be any effective
intervention by France or England, was the object to be aimed at.
On the same day an Air Force memorandum on future organization was
issued, and to it there was attached a map on which the Baltic States,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland were all shown as part of Germany,
and preparations for expanding the Air Force, and I quote, “as the Reich
grows in area,” as well as dispositions for a two-front war against
France and Russia, were discussed. And on the following day Von
Ribbentrop was being minuted about the reaction of Poland towards the
Czechoslovak problem. I quote: “The fact that after the liquidation of
the Czechoslovakian question it will be generally assumed that Poland
will be next in turn is not to be denied,” is recognized, but it is
stated, “The later this assumption sinks in, the better.”
I will pause for a moment at the date of the Munich Agreement and ask
the Tribunal to remind itself of what the evidence of documents and
historical facts shows up to that day. It has made undeniable both the
fact of Nazi aggressiveness and of active and actual aggression. Not
only does that conference of 1937 show Hitler and his associates
deliberately considering the acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia,
if necessary by war, but the first of the operations had been carried
through in March of 1938; and a large part of the second, under threat
of war—a threat which as we now see was much more than a bluff—a
threat of actual and real war, although without the actual need for its
initiation, secured, as I said, a large part of the second objective in
September of 1938. And, more ominous still, Hitler had revealed his
adherence to the old doctrines of _Mein Kampf_—those essentially
aggressive doctrines to the exposition of which in _Mein Kampf_, long
regarded as the Bible of the Nazi Party, we shall draw attention in
certain particular passages. Hitler is indicating quite clearly not only
to his associates, but indeed to the world at this time, that he is in
pursuit of Lebensraum and that he means to secure it by threat of force,
or if threat of force fails, by actual force—by aggressive war.
So far actual warfare had been avoided because of the love of peace, the
lack of preparedness, the patience, the cowardice—call it what you
will—of the democratic powers; but after Munich the question which
filled the minds of all thinking people with acute anxiety was “where
will this thing end? Is Hitler now satisfied as he declared himself to
be? Or is his pursuit of Lebensraum going to lead to future aggressions,
even if he has to embark on open, aggressive war to secure it?”
It was in relation to the remainder of Czechoslovakia and to Poland that
the answer to these questions was to be given. So far, up to the time of
the Munich Agreement, no direct and immediate threat to Poland had been
made. The two documents from which I have just quoted, show of course,
that high officers of the Defendant Göring’s air staff already regarded
the expansion of the Reich and, it would seem, the destruction and
absorption of Poland, as a foregone conclusion. They were already
anticipating, indeed, the last stage of Hitler’s policy as expounded in
_Mein Kampf_—war to destroy France and to secure Lebensraum in Russia.
And the writer of the minute to Ribbentrop already took it for granted
that, after Czechoslovakia, Poland would be attacked. But more
impressive than those two documents is the fact that, as I have said, at
the conference of 5 November 1937, war with Poland, if she should dare
to prevent German aggression against Czechoslovakia, had been quite
coolly and calmly contemplated, and the Nazi leaders were ready to take
the risk. So also had the risk of war with England and France under the
same circumstances been considered and accepted. As I indicated, such a
war would, of course, have been aggressive war on Germany’s part, and
they were contemplating aggressive warfare. For to force one state to
take up arms to defend another state against aggression, in other words,
to fulfill its treaty obligations is undoubtedly to initiate aggressive
warfare against the first state. But in spite of those plans, in spite
of these intentions behind the scenes, it remains true that until Munich
the decision for direct attack upon Poland and her destruction by
aggressive war had apparently not as yet been taken by Hitler and his
associates. It is to the transition from the intention and preparation
of initiating aggressive war, evident in regard to Czechoslovakia, to
the actual initiation and waging of aggressive war against Poland that I
now pass. That transition occupies the 11 months from the 1st of October
1938 to the actual attack on Poland on the 1st of September 1939.
Within 6 months of the signature of the Munich Agreement the Nazi
leaders had occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia, which by that
Agreement they had indicated their willingness to guarantee. On the 14th
of March 1939 the aged and infirm president of the “rump” of
Czechoslovakia, Hacha and his Foreign Minister were summoned to Berlin.
At a meeting held between 1 o’clock and 2:15 in the small hours of the
15th of March in the presence of Hitler, of the Defendants Ribbentrop,
Göring, and Keitel, they were bullied and threatened and even bluntly
told that Hitler “had issued the orders for the German troops to move
into Czechoslovakia and for the incorporation of Czechoslovakia into the
German Reich.”
It was made quite clear to them that resistance would be useless and
would be crushed “by force of arms with all available means,” and it was
thus that the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was set up and that
Slovakia was turned into a German satellite, though nominally
independent state. By their own unilateral action, on pretexts which had
no shadow of validity, without discussion with the governments of any
other country, without mediation, and in direct contradiction of the
sense and spirit of the Munich Agreement, the Germans acquired for
themselves that for which they had been planning in September of the
previous year, and indeed much earlier, but which at that time they had
felt themselves unable completely to secure without too patent an
exhibition of their aggressive intentions. Aggression achieved whetted
the appetite for aggression to come. There were protests. England and
France sent diplomatic notes. Of course, there were protests. The Nazis
had clearly shown their hand. Hitherto they had concealed from the
outside world that their claims went beyond incorporating into the Reich
persons of German race living in bordering territory. Now for the first
time, in defiance of their solemn assurances to the contrary, non-German
territory and non-German people had been seized. This acquisition of the
whole of Czechoslovakia, together with the equally illegal occupation of
Memel on the 22d of March 1939, resulted in an immense strengthening of
the German positions, both politically and strategically, as Hitler had
anticipated it would, when he discussed the matter at that conference in
November of 1937.
But long before the consummation by the Nazi leaders of their aggression
against Czechoslovakia, they had begun to make demands upon Poland. The
Munich settlement achieved on the 25th of October 1938, that is to say
within less than a month of Hitler’s reassuring speech about Poland to
which I have already referred, and within, of course, a month of the
Munich Agreement, M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, reported
to M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, that at a luncheon at
Berchtesgaden the day before, namely, on the 24th of October 1938, the
Defendant Ribbentrop had put forward demands for the reunion of Danzig
with the Reich and for the building of an extra-territorial motor road
and railway line across Pomorze, the province which the Germans called
“The Corridor”. From that moment onwards until the Polish Government had
made it plain, as they did during a visit of the Defendant Ribbentrop to
Warsaw in January 1939, that they would not consent to hand over Danzig
to German sovereignty, negotiations on these German demands continued.
And even after Ribbentrop’s return from the visit to Warsaw, Hitler
thought it worthwhile, in his Reichstag speech on the 30th of January
1939, to say:
“We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the conclusion
of our non-aggression pact with Poland. There can scarcely be
any difference of opinion today among the true friends of peace
as to the value of this agreement. One only needs to ask oneself
what might have happened to Europe if this agreement, which
brought such relief, had not been entered into 5 years ago. In
signing it, the great Polish marshal and patriot rendered his
people just as great a service as the leaders of the National
Socialist State rendered the German people. During the troubled
months of the past year, the friendship between Germany and
Poland has been one of the reassuring factors in the political
life of Europe.”
But that utterance was the last friendly word from Germany to Poland,
and the last occasion on which the Nazi Leaders mentioned the
German-Polish Agreement with approbation. During February 1939 silence
fell upon German demands in relation to Poland. But as soon as the final
absorption of Czechoslovakia had taken place and Germany had also
occupied Memel, Nazi pressure upon Poland was at once renewed. In two
conversations which he and the Defendant Ribbentrop held on the 21st of
March and the 26th of March, respectively, with the Polish Ambassador,
German demands upon Poland were renewed and were further pressed. And in
view of the fate which had overtaken Czechoslovakia, in view of the
grave deterioration in her strategical position towards Germany, it is
not surprising that the Polish Government took alarm at the
developments. Nor were they alone. The events of March 1939 had at last
convinced both the English and the French Governments that the Nazi
designs of aggression were not limited to men of German race, and that
the specter of European war resulting from further aggressions by Nazi
Germany had not, after all, been exorcised by the Munich Agreement.
As a result, therefore, of the concern of Poland and of England and of
France at the events in Czechoslovakia, and at the newly applied
pressure on Poland, conversations between the English and Polish
Governments had been taking place, and, on the 31st of March 1939, Mr.
Neville Chamberlain, speaking in the House of Commons, stated that His
Majesty’s Government had given an assurance to help Poland in the event
of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the
Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist. On the 6th
of April 1939 an Anglo-Polish communiqué stated that the two countries
were prepared to enter into an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal
character to replace the present temporary and unilateral assurance
given by His Majesty’s Government.
The justification for that concern on the part of the democratic powers
is not difficult to find. With the evidence which we now have of what
was happening within the councils of the German Reich and its Armed
Forces during these months, it is manifest that the German Government
were intent on seizing Poland as a whole, that Danzig—as Hitler himself
was to say in time, a month later—“was not the subject of the dispute
at all.” The Nazi Government was intent upon aggression and the demands
and negotiations in respect to Danzig were merely a cover and excuse for
further domination.
Would that be a convenient point to stop?
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.
[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Before the Attorney General continues his opening
statement, the Tribunal wishes me to state what they propose to do as to
time of sitting for the immediate future. We think it will be more
convenient that the Tribunal shall sit from 10:00 o’clock in the morning
until 1:00 o’clock, with a break for 10 minutes in the middle of the
morning; and that the Tribunal shall sit in the afternoon from 2:00
o’clock until 5:00 o’clock with a break for 10 minutes in the middle of
the afternoon; and that there shall be no open sitting of the Tribunal
on Saturday morning, as the Tribunal has a very large number of
applications by the defendants’ counsel for witnesses and documents and
other matters of that sort which it has to consider.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: May it please the Tribunal, when we broke off I
had been saying that the Nazi Government was intent upon aggression, and
all that had been taking place in regard to Danzig—the negotiations,
the demands that were being made—were really no more than a cover, a
pretext and excuse for further domination.
As far back as September 1938 plans for aggressive war against Poland,
England, and France were well in hand. While Hitler, at Munich, was
telling the world that the German people wanted peace, and that having
solved the Czechoslovakian problem, Germany had no more territorial
problems in Europe, the staffs of his Armed Forces were already
preparing their plans. On the 26th of September 1938 he had stated:
“We have given guarantees to the states in the West. We have
assured all our immediate neighbors of the integrity of their
territory as far as Germany is concerned. That is no mere
phrase. It is our sacred will. We have no interest whatever in a
breach of the peace. We want nothing from these peoples.”
And the world was entitled to rely on those assurances. International
co-operation is utterly impossible unless one can assume good faith in
the leaders of the various states and honesty in the public utterances
that they make. But, in fact, within 2 months of that solemn and
apparently considered undertaking, Hitler and his confederates were
preparing for the seizure of Danzig. To recognize those assurances,
those pledges, those diplomatic moves as the empty frauds that they
were, one must go back to inquire what was happening within the inner
councils of the Reich from the time of the Munich Agreement.
Written some time in September 1938 is an extract from a file on the
reconstruction of the German Navy. Under the heading
“Opinion on the Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England,” this is
stated:
“1. If, according to the Führer’s decision, Germany is to
acquire a position as a world power, she needs not only
sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval
communications and secure access to the ocean.
“2. Both requirements can be fulfilled only in opposition to
Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world
powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful
means. The decision to make Germany a world power, therefore,
forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding
preparations for war.
“3. War against England means at the same time war against the
Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well, and a
large number of countries overseas, in fact, against one-third
to one-half of the world.
“It can only be justified and have a chance of success”—and it
was not moral justification which was being looked for in this
document—“It can only be justified and have a chance of success
if it is prepared economically as well as politically and
militarily, and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an
outlet to the ocean.”
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would like to know at what stage you
propose to put the documents, which you are citing, in evidence.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Well, Sir, my colleagues, my American and my
British colleagues, were proposing to follow up my own address by
putting these documents in. The first series of documents, which will be
put in by my noted colleague, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, will be the
treaties.
THE PRESIDENT: I suppose that what you quote will have to be read again.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Well, I am limiting my quotations as far as I
possibly can. I apprehend that technically you may wish it to be quoted
again, so as to get it on the record when the document is actually put
into evidence. But I think it will appear, when the documents themselves
are produced, that there will be a good deal more in most of them than I
am actually citing now.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Very well.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: This document on naval warfare against England is
something which is both significant and new. Until this date the
documents in our possession disclose preparations for war against
Poland, England, and France, purporting on the face of them at least to
be defensive measures to ward off attacks which might result from the
intervention of those states in the preparatory German aggressions in
Central Europe. Hitherto aggressive war against Poland, England, and
France has been contemplated only as a distant objective. Now, in this
document for the first time, we find a war of conquest by Germany
against France and England openly recognized as the future aim, at least
of the German Navy.
On 24 November 1938 an appendix was issued by Keitel to a previous order
of the Führer. In that appendix were set out the future tasks for the
Armed Forces and the preparation for the conduct of the war which would
result from those tasks.
“The Führer has ordered”—I quote—“that besides the three
eventualities mentioned in the previous directive . . .
preparations are also to be made for the surprise occupation by
German troops of the Free State of Danzig.
“For the preparation the following principles are to be borne in
mind.”—This is the common pattern of aggression—“The primary
assumption is the lightning seizure of Danzig by exploiting a
favorable political situation, and not war with Poland. Troops
which are going to be used for this purpose must not be held at
the same time for the seizure of Memel, so that both operations
can take place simultaneously, should such necessity arise.”
Thereafter, as the evidence which is already before the Tribunal has
shown, final preparations were taking place for the invasion of Poland.
On the 3rd of April 1939, 3 days before the issue of the Anglo-Polish
communiqué, the Defendant Keitel issued to the High Command of the Armed
Forces a directive in which it was stated that the directive for the
uniform preparation of war by the Armed Forces in 1939-40, was being
re-issued and that part relating to Danzig would be out in April. The
basic principles were to remain the same as in the previous directive.
Attached to this document were the orders Fall Weiss, the code name for
the proposed invasion of Poland. Preparation for that invasion was to be
made, it was stated, so that the operation could be carried out at any
time from the 1st of September 1939 onwards.
On the 11th of April Hitler issued his directive for the uniform
preparation of the war by the Armed Forces, 1939-40, and in it he said:
“I shall lay down in a later directive future tasks of the Armed
Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these
for the conduct of war. Until that directive comes into force
the Armed Forces must be prepared for the following
eventualities:
“1. Safeguarding of the frontiers . . .
“2. Fall Weiss,
“3. The annexation of Danzig.”
Then, in an annex to that document which bore the heading “Political
Hypotheses and Aims,” it was stated that quarrels with Poland should be
avoided. But should Poland change her policy and adopt a threatening
attitude towards Germany, a final settlement would be necessary,
notwithstanding the Polish Pact. The Free City of Danzig was to be
incorporated in the Reich at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest.
The policy aimed at limiting the war to Poland, and this was considered
possible at that time with the internal crises in France and resulting
British restraint.
The wording of that document—and the Tribunal will study the whole of
it—does not directly involve the intention of immediate aggression. It
is a plan of attack “if Poland changes her policy and adopts a
threatening attitude.” But the picture of Poland, with her wholly
inadequate armaments, threatening Germany, now armed to the teeth, is
ludicrous enough, and the real aim of the document emerges in the
sentence—and I quote: “The aim is then to destroy Polish military
strength and to create, in the East, a situation which satisfies the
requirements of defense”—a sufficiently vague phrase to cover designs
of any magnitude. But even at that stage, the evidence does not suffice
to prove that the actual decision to attack Poland on any given date had
yet been taken. All the preparations were being set in train. All the
necessary action was being proceeded with, in case that decision should
be reached.
It was within 3 weeks of the issue of that last document that Hitler
addressed the Reichstag on the 28th of April 1939. In that speech he
repeated the demands which had already been made upon Poland, and
proceeded to denounce the German-Polish Agreement of 1934. Leaving
aside, for the moment, the warlike preparations for aggression, which
Hitler had set in motion behind the scenes, I will ask the Tribunal to
consider the nature of this denunciation of an agreement to which, in
the past, Hitler had attached such importance.
In the first place, of course, Hitler’s denunciation was _per se_
ineffectual. The text of the agreement made no provision for its
denunciation by either party until a period of 10 years had come to an
end. No denunciation could be legally effective until June or July of
1943, and here was Hitler speaking in April of 1939, rather more than 5
years too soon.
In the second place, Hitler’s actual attack upon Poland, when it came on
1 September was made before the expiration of the 6 months’ period after
denunciation required by the agreement before any denunciation could be
operative. And in the third place, the grounds for the denunciation
stated by Hitler in his speech to the Reichstag were entirely specious.
However one reads its terms, it is impossible to take the view that the
Anglo-Polish guarantee of mutual assistance against aggression could
render the German-Polish Pact null and void, as Hitler sought to
suggest. If that had been the effect of the Anglo-Polish assurances,
then certainly the pacts which had already been entered into by Hitler
himself with Italy and with Japan had already invalidated the treaty
with Poland. Hitler might have spared his breath. The truth is, of
course, that the text of the English-Polish communiqué, the text of the
assurances, contains nothing whatever to support the contention that the
German-Polish Pact was in any way interfered with.
One asks: Why then did Hitler make this trebly invalid attempt to
denounce his own pet diplomatic child? Is there any other possible
answer but this:
That the agreement having served its purpose, the grounds which he chose
for its denunciation were chosen merely in an effort to provide Germany
with some kind of justification—at least for the German people—for the
aggression on which the German leaders were intent.
And, of course, Hitler sorely needed some kind of justification, some
apparently decent excuse, since nothing had happened, and nothing seemed
likely to happen, from the Polish side, to provide him with any kind of
pretext for invading Poland. So far he had made demands upon his treaty
partner which Poland, as a sovereign state, had every right to refuse.
If dissatisfied with that refusal, Hitler was bound, under the terms of
the agreement itself, “To seek a settlement”—I am reading the words of
the pact:
“To seek a settlement through other peaceful means, without
prejudice to the possibility of applying those methods of
procedure, in case of necessity, which are provided for such a
case in the other agreements between them that are in force.”
And that presumably was a reference to the German-Polish Arbitration
Treaty, signed at Locarno in 1925.
The very facts, therefore, that as soon as the Nazi leaders cannot get
what they want but are not entitled to from Poland by merely asking for
it and that, on their side, they made no further attempt to settle the
dispute “by peaceful means”—in accordance with the terms of the
agreement and of the Kellogg Pact, to which the agreement pledged both
parties—in themselves constitute a strong presumption of aggressive
intentions against Hitler and his associates. That presumption becomes a
certainty when the documents to which I am about to call the attention
of the Tribunal are studied.
On the 10th of May Hitler issued an order for the capture of economic
installations in Poland. On the 16th of May the Defendant Raeder, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, issued a memorandum setting out the
Führer’s instructions to prepare for the operation Fall Weiss at any
time from the 1st of September.
But the decisive document is the record of the conference held by Hitler
on the 23rd of May 1939, in conference with many high-ranking officers,
including the Defendants Göring, Raeder, and Keitel. The details of the
whole document will have to be read to the Tribunal later and I am
merely summarizing the substantial effect of this part of it now. Hitler
stated that the solution of the economic problems with which Germany was
beset at first, could not be found without invasion of foreign states
and attacks on foreign property. “Danzig”—and I am quoting:
“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a
question of expanding our living space in the East. There is,
therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with
the decision to attack Poland at the earliest opportunity. We
cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be
fighting. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of this
isolation will be decisive. The isolation of Poland is a matter
of skillful politics.”
So he explained to his confederates. He anticipated the possibility that
war with England and France might result, but a two-front war was to be
avoided if possible. Yet England was recognized—and I say it with
pride—as the most dangerous enemy which Germany had. “England,” he
said, I quote, “England is the driving force against Germany . . . the
aim will always be to force England to her knees.” More than once he
repeated that the war with England and France would be a life and death
struggle. “But all the same,” he concluded, “Germany will not be forced
into war but she would not be able to avoid it.”
On the 14th of June 1939 General Blaskowitz, then Commander-in-Chief of
the 3rd Army group, issued a detailed battle plan for the Fall Weiss.
The following day Von Brauchitsch issued a memorandum in which it was
stated that the object of the impending operation was to destroy the
Polish Armed Forces. “High policy demands,” he said, “High policy
demands that the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in order to
achieve quick results.” The preparations proceeded apace. On the 22d of
June the Defendant Keitel submitted a preliminary timetable for the
operation, which Hitler seems to have approved, and suggested that the
scheduled maneuver must be camouflaged, “in order not to disquiet the
population.” On the 3rd of July, Brauchitsch wrote to the Defendant
Raeder urging that certain preliminary naval moves should be abandoned,
in order not to prejudice the surprise of the attack. On the 12th and
13th of August Hitler and Ribbentrop had a conference with Ciano, the
Italian Foreign Minister.
It was a conference to which the Tribunal will have to have regard from
several points of view. I summarize now only one aspect of the matter:
At the beginning of the conversation Hitler emphasized the strength of
the German position, of Germany’s Western and Eastern Fortifications,
and of the strategic and other advantages they held in comparison with
those of England, France, and Poland. Now I quote from the captured
document itself. Hitler said this:
“Since the Poles through their whole attitude had made it clear
that, in any case, in the event of a conflict, they would stand
on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick
liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for
the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a
hostile Poland remained on Germany’s eastern frontier, not only
would the 11 East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also
further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This
would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation.”
Then this:
“Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be to
liquidate the false neutrals one after the other. This process
could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one
partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with
an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a
neutral of that kind.”
Ciano was for postponing the operation. Italy was not ready. She
believed that a conflict with Poland would develop into a general
European war. Mussolini was convinced that conflict with the Western
Democracies was inevitable, but he was making plans for a period 2 or 3
years ahead. But the Führer said that the Danzig question must be
disposed of, one way or the other, by the end of August. I quote: “He
had, therefore, decided to use the occasion of the next political
provocation which has the form of an ultimatum . . . .”
On the 22d of August Hitler called his Supreme Commanders together and
gave the order for the attack. In the course of what he said he made it
clear that the decision to attack had, in fact, been made not later than
the previous spring. He would give a spurious cause for starting the
war. And at that time the attack was timed to take place in the early
hours of the 26th of August. On the day before, on the 25th of August,
the British Government, in the hope that Hitler might still be reluctant
to plunge the world into war, and in the belief that a formal treaty
would impress him more than the informal assurances which had been given
previously, entered into an agreement, an express agreement for mutual
assistance with Poland, embodying the previous assurances that had been
given earlier in the year. It was known to Hitler that France was bound
by the Franco-Polish Treaty of 1921, and by the Guarantee Pact signed at
Locarno in 1925 to intervene in Poland’s favor in case of aggression.
And for a moment Hitler hesitated. The Defendants Göring and Ribbentrop,
in the interrogations which you will see, have agreed that it was the
Anglo-Polish Treaty which led him to call off, or rather postpone, the
attack which was timed for the 26th. Perhaps he hoped that after all
there was still some chance of repeating what he had called the Czech
affair. If so, his hopes were short-lived. On the 27th of August Hitler
accepted Mussolini’s decision not at once to come into the war; but he
asked for propaganda support and for a display of military activity on
the part of Italy, so as to create uncertainty in the minds of the
Allies. Ribbentrop on the same day said that the armies were marching.
In the meantime, and, of course, particularly during the last month,
desperate attempts were being made by the Western Powers to avert war.
You will have details of them in evidence, of the intervention of the
Pope, of President Roosevelt’s message, of the offer by the British
Prime Minister to do our utmost to create the conditions in which all
matters in issue could be the subject of free negotiations, and to
guarantee the resultant decisions. But this and all the other efforts of
honest men to avoid the horror of a European conflict were predestined
to failure. The Germans were determined that the day for war had come.
On the 31st of August Hitler issued a top-secret order for the attack to
commence in the early hours of the 1st of September.
The necessary frontier incidents duly occurred. Was it, perhaps, for
that, that the Defendant Keitel had been instructed by Hitler to supply
Heydrich with Polish uniforms? And so without a declaration of war,
without even giving the Polish Government an opportunity of seeing
Germany’s final demands—and you will hear the evidence of the
extraordinary diplomatic negotiations, if one can call them such, that
took place in Berlin—without giving the Poles any opportunity at all of
negotiating or arbitrating on the demands which Nazi Germany was making,
the Nazi troops invaded Poland.
On the 3rd of September Hitler sent a telegram to Mussolini thanking him
for his intervention but pointing out that the war was inevitable and
that the most promising moment had to be picked after cold deliberation.
And so Hitler and his confederates now before this Tribunal began the
first of their wars of aggression for which they had prepared so long
and so thoroughly. They waged it so fiercely that within a few weeks
Poland was overrun.
On the 23rd of November 1939 Hitler reviewed the situation to his
military commanders and in the course of what he said he made this
observation:
“One year later Austria came; this step was also considered
doubtful. It brought about an essential reinforcement of the
Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step
also was not possible to accomplish in one move. First of all
the Western Fortifications had to be finished . . . . Then
followed the creation of the Protectorate, and with that the
basis for action against Poland was laid. But I was not quite
clear at the time whether I should start first against the East
and then in the West, or vice versa . . . . The compulsion to
fight with Poland came first. One might accuse me of wanting to
fight again and again. In struggle, I see the fate of all
beings.”
He was not sure where to attack first. But that sooner or later he would
attack, whether it were in the East or in the West, was never in doubt.
And he had been warned, not only by the British and French Prime
Ministers but even by his confederate Mussolini, that an attack on
Poland would bring England and France into the war. He chose what he
thought was the opportune moment, and he struck.
Under these circumstances the intent to wage war against England and
France, and to precipitate it by an attack on Poland, is not to be
denied. Here was defiance of the most solemn treaty obligations. Here
was neglect of the most pacific assurances. Here was aggression, naked
and unashamed, which was indeed to arouse the horrified and heroic
resistance of all civilized peoples, but which, before it was finished,
was to tear down much of the structure of our civilization.
Once started upon the active achievement of their plan to secure the
domination of Europe, if not of the world, the Nazi Government proceeded
to attack other countries, as occasion offered. The first actually to be
attacked, actually to be invaded, after the attack upon Poland, were
Denmark and Norway.
On the 9th of April 1940 the German Armed Forces invaded Norway and
Denmark without any warning, without any declaration of war. It was a
breach of the Hague Convention of 1907. It was a breach of the
Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation signed between Germany and
Denmark on 2 June 1926. It was, of course, a breach of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. It was a violation of the Non-Aggression
Treaty between Germany and Denmark made on the 31st of May 1939. And it
was a breach of the most explicit assurances which had been given. After
his annexation of Czechoslovakia had shaken the confidence of the world,
Hitler attempted to reassure the Scandinavian states. On the 28th of
April 1939 he affirmed that he had never made any request to any of them
which was incompatible with their sovereignty and independence. On the
31st of May 1939 he signed a non-aggression pact with Denmark.
On the 2d of September 1939, the day after he had invaded Poland and
occupied Danzig, he again expressed his determination, so he said, to
observe the inviolability and integrity of Norway in an _aide-mémoire_,
which was handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German
Minister in Oslo on that day.
A month later, in a public speech on the 6th of October 1939, he said:
“Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points
of controversy with the northern states, neither has she any
today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered non-aggression
pacts by Germany, and have both refused them, solely because
they do not feel themselves threatened in any way.”
When the invasion of Denmark and Norway was already begun in the early
morning of 9 April 1940, a German memorandum was handed to the
governments of those countries attempting to justify the German action.
Various allegations against the governments of the invaded countries
were made. It was said that Norway had been guilty of breaches of
neutrality. It was said that she had allowed and tolerated the use of
her territorial waters by Great Britain. It was said that Britain and
France were themselves making plans to invade and occupy Norway and that
the Government of Norway was prepared to acquiesce in such an event.
I do not propose to argue the question whether or not these allegations
were true or false. That question is irrelevant to the issues before
this Court. Even if the allegations were true—and they were patently
false—they would afford no conceivable justification for the action of
invading without warning, without declaration of war, without any
attempt at mediation or conciliation.
Aggressive war is none the less aggressive war because the state which
wages it believes that other states might, in the future, take similar
action. The rape of a nation is not justified because it is thought she
may be raped by another. Nor even in self-defense are warlike measures
justified except after all means of mediation have been tried and failed
and force is actually being exercised against the state concerned.
But the matter is irrelevant because, in actual fact, with the evidence
which we now possess, it is abundantly clear that the invasion of these
two countries was undertaken for quite different purposes. It had been
planned long before any question of breach of neutrality or occupation
of Norway by England could ever have occurred. And it is equally clear
that the assurances repeated again and again throughout 1939 were made
for no other purpose than to lull suspicion in these countries, and to
prevent them taking steps to resist the attack against them which was
all along in active preparation.
For some years the Defendant Rosenberg, in his capacity as Chief of the
Foreign Affairs Bureau—APA—of the NSDAP, had interested himself in the
promotion of Fifth Column activities in Norway and he had established
close relationship with the Nasjonal Samling, a political group headed
by the now notorious traitor, Vidkun Quisling. During the winter of
1938-39, APA was in contact with Quisling, and later Quisling conferred
with Hitler and with the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg. In August 1939
a special 14-day course was held at the school of the Office of Foreign
Relations in Berlin for 25 followers whom Quisling had selected to
attend. The plan was to send a number of selected and “reliable” men to
Germany for a brief military training in an isolated camp. These
“reliable men” were to be the area and language specialists to German
special troops who were taken to Oslo on coal barges to undertake
political action in Norway. The object was a _coup_ in which Quisling
would seize his leading opponents in Norway, including the King, and
prevent all military resistance from the beginning. Simultaneously with
those Fifth Column activities Germany was making her military
preparations. On the 2d of September 1939, as I said, Hitler had assured
Norway of his intention to respect her neutrality. On 6 October he said
that the Scandinavian states were not menaced in any way. Yet on the 3rd
October the Defendant Raeder was pointing out that the occupation of
bases, if necessary by force, would greatly improve the German strategic
position. On the 9th of October Dönitz was recommending Trondheim as the
main base, with Narvik as an alternative base for fuel supplies. The
Defendant Rosenberg was reporting shortly afterwards on the possibility
of a _coup d’état_ by Quisling, immediately supported by German military
and naval forces. On the 12th of December 1939 the Defendant Raeder
advised Hitler, in the presence of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl, that
if Hitler was favorably impressed by Quisling, the OKW should prepare
for the occupation of Norway, if possible with Quisling’s assistance,
but if necessary, entirely by force. Hitler agreed, but there was a
doubt whether action should be taken against the Low Countries or
against Scandinavia first. Weather conditions delayed the march on the
Low Countries. In January 1940 instructions were given to the German
Navy for the attack on Norway. On the 1st of March a directive for the
occupation was issued by Hitler. The general object was not said to be
to prevent occupation by English forces but, in vague and general terms,
to prevent British encroachment in Scandinavia and the Baltic and “to
guarantee our ore bases in Sweden and to give our Navy and Air Force a
wider start line against Britain.” But the directive went on (and here
is the common pattern):
“. . . on principle we will do our utmost to make the operation
appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which is the
military protection of the Scandinavian states . . . . It is
important that the Scandinavian states as well as the western
opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures . . . . In
case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept
secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with
fictitious objectives.”
The form and success of the invasion are well known. In the early hours
of the 9th of April, seven cruisers, 14 destroyers, and a number of
torpedo boats and other small craft carried advance elements of six
divisions, totalling about 10,000 men, forced an entry and landed troops
in the outer Oslo Fjord, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and
Narvik. A small force of troops was also landed at Arendal and Egersund
on the southern coast. In addition, airborne troops were landed near
Oslo and Stavanger in airplanes. The German attack came as a complete
surprise. All the invaded towns along the coast were captured according
to plan and with only slight losses. Only the plan to capture the King
and Parliament failed. But brave as was the resistance, which was
hurriedly organized throughout the country—nothing could be done in the
face of the long-planned surprise attack—and on the 10th of June
military resistance ceased. So another act of aggression was brought to
completion.
Almost exactly a month after the attack, on Norway, on the 10th of May
1940, the German Armed Forces, repeating what had been done 25 years
before, streamed into Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg according
to plan—a plan that is, of invading without warning and without any
declaration of war.
What was done was, of course, a breach of the Hague Convention, and is
so charged. It was a violation of the Locarno Agreement of 1925, which
the Nazi Government affirmed in 1935, only illegally to repudiate it a
couple of years later. By that agreement all questions incapable of
settlement by ordinary diplomatic means were to be referred to
arbitration. You will see the comprehensive terms of all those treaties.
It was a breach of the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation signed
between Germany and the Netherlands on the 20th of May 1926. It was a
breach of a similar treaty with Luxembourg of 11 September 1929. It was
a breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. But those treaties, perhaps, had
not derived in the minds of the Nazi rulers of Germany any added
sanctity from the fact that they had been solemnly concluded by the
governments of pre-Nazi Germany. Let us then consider the specific
assurances and undertakings which the Nazi rulers themselves gave to
these states which lay in the way of their plans against France and
England and which they had always intended to attack. Not once, not
twice, but 11 times the clearest possible assurances were given to
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. On those assurances, solemnly
given and formally expressed, these countries were entitled to rely and
did rely. In respect of the breach of those assurances these defendants
are charged. On the 30th of January 1937, for instance, Hitler had said:
“As for the rest, I have more than once expressed the desire and
the hope of entering into similar good and cordial relations
with our neighbors. Germany has, and here I repeat this
solemnly, given the assurance time and time again that, for
instance, between her and France there cannot be any humanly
conceivable points of controversy. The German Government has
further given the assurance to Belgium and Holland that it is
prepared to recognize and to guarantee the inviolability and
neutrality of these territories.”
After Hitler had remilitarized the Rhineland and had repudiated the
Locarno Pact, England and France sought to re-establish the position of
security for Belgium which Hitler’s action had threatened. And they,
therefore, gave to Belgium on the 24th of April 1937 a specific
guarantee that they would maintain, in respect of Belgium, the
undertakings of assistance which they had entered into with her both
under the Locarno Pact and under the Covenant of the League. On the 13th
of October 1937 the German Government also made a declaration assuring
Belgium of its intention to recognize the integrity of that country.
It is, perhaps, convenient to deal with the remaining assurances as we
review the evidence which is available as to the preparations and
intentions of the German Government prior to their actual invasion of
Belgium on the 10th of May 1940.
As in the case of Poland, as in the case of Norway and Denmark, so also
here the dates speak for themselves.
As early as August of 1938 steps were being taken to utilize the Low
Countries as bases for decisive action in the West in the event of
France and England opposing Germany in the aggressive plan which was on
foot at that time against Czechoslovakia.
In an Air Force letter dated the 25th of August 1938 which deals with
the action to be taken if England and France should interfere in the
operation against Czechoslovakia, it is stated:
“It is not expected for the moment that other states will
intervene against Germany. The Dutch and the Belgian area
assumes in this connection much more importance for the conduct
of war in Western Europe than during the World War, mainly as
advance base for the air war.”
In the last paragraph of that order it is stated:
“Belgium and the Netherlands, when in German hands, represent an
extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war
against Great Britain as well as against France . . .”
That was in August 1938. Eight months later, on the 28th of April 1939,
Hitler is declaring again:
“I was pleased that a number of European states availed
themselves of this declaration by the German Government to
express and emphasize their desire to have absolute neutrality.”
A month later, on the 23rd of May 1939, Hitler held that conference in
the Reich Chancellery, to which I already referred. The minutes of that
meeting report Hitler as saying:
“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
forces. Declarations of neutrality cannot be considered of any
value. If England and France want a general conflict on the
occasion of the war between Germany and Poland they will support
Holland and Belgium in their neutrality . . . . Therefore, if
England intends to intervene at the occasion of the Polish war,
we must attack Holland with lightning speed. It is desirable to
secure a defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.”
Even after that he was to give his solemn declarations that he would
observe the neutrality of these countries. On the 26th of August 1939,
when the crisis in regard to Danzig and Poland was reaching its climax,
on the very day he had picked for the invasion of Poland, declarations
assuring the governments concerned of the intention to respect their
neutrality were handed by the German Ambassadors to the King of the
Belgians, the Queen of the Netherlands, and to the Government of the
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in the most solemn form. But to the Army
Hitler was saying:
“If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, a
successful war against England will be secured.”
On the 1st of September Poland was invaded, and 2 days later England and
France came into the war against Germany, in pursuance of the treaty
obligations already referred to. On the 6th of October Hitler renewed
his assurances of friendship to Belgium and Holland, but on the 9th of
October, before any kind of accusation had been made by the German
Government of breaches of neutrality, Hitler issued a directive for the
conduct of the war. And he said this:
“1) If it becomes evident in the near future that England and
France, acting under her leadership, are not disposed to end the
war, I am determined to take firm and offensive action without
letting much time elapse.
“2) A long waiting period results not only in the ending of
Belgian and perhaps also of Dutch neutrality to the advantage of
the Western Powers, but also strengthens the military power of
our enemies to an increasing degree, causes confidence of the
neutrals in final German victory to wane, and does not help to
bring Italy to our aid as brothers-in-arms.
“3) I therefore issue the following orders for the further
conduct of military operations:
“(a) Preparations should be made for offensive action on the
northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of
Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried
out as soon and as forcefully as possible.
“(b) The object of this attack is to defeat as many strong
sections of the French fighting army as possible, and her ally
and partner in the fighting, and at the same time to acquire as
great an area of Holland, Belgium, and northern France as
possible, to use as a base offering good prospects for waging
aerial and sea warfare against England and to provide ample
coverage for the vital district of the Ruhr.”
Nothing could state more clearly or more definitely the object behind
the invasion of these three countries than that document expresses it.
On the 15th of October 1939 the Defendant Keitel wrote a most-secret
letter concerning “Fall Gelb” which was the name given to the operation
against the Low Countries. In it he said that:
“The protection of the Ruhr area by moving aircraft reporting
service and the air defense as far forward as possible in the
area of Holland is significant for the whole conduct of the war.
The more Dutch territory we occupy, the more effective can the
defense of the Ruhr area be made. This point of view must
determine the choice of objectives of the Army, even if the Army
and Navy are not directly interested in such territorial gain.
It must be the object of the Army’s preparations, therefore, to
occupy, on receipt of a special order, the territory of Holland,
in the first instance in the area of the Grebbe-Maas line. It
will depend on the military and political attitude of the Dutch,
as well as on the effectiveness of their flooding, whether
objectives can and must be further extended.”
The Fall Gelb operation had apparently been planned to take place at the
beginning of November 1939. We have in our possession a series of 17
letters, dated from 7th November until the 9th May postponing almost
from day to day the D-Day of the operation, so that by the beginning of
November all the major plans and preparations had in fact been made.
On the 10th of January 1940 a German airplane force-landed in Belgium.
In it was found the remains of an operation order which the pilot had
attempted to burn; setting out considerable details of the Belgian
landing grounds that were to be captured by the Air Force. Many other
documents have been found which illustrate the planning and preparation
for this invasion in the latter half of 1939 and early 1940, but they
carry the matter no further, and they show no more clearly than the
evidence to which I have already referred, the plans and intention of
the German Government and its Armed Forces.
On the 10th of May 1940 at about 0500 hours in the morning, the German
invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg began.
And so once more the forces of aggression moved on. Treaties,
assurances, the rights of sovereign states meant nothing. Brutal force,
covered by as great an element of surprise as the Nazis could secure,
was to seize that which was deemed necessary for striking the mortal
blow against England, the main enemy. The only fault of these three
unhappy countries was that they stood in the path of the German invader,
in his designs against England and France. That was enough, and they
were invaded.
[_A recess was taken._]
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: On the 6th of April 1941 German Armed Forces
invaded Greece and Yugoslavia. Again the blow was struck without warning
and with the cowardice and deceit which the world now fully expected
from the self-styled “Herrenvolk”. It was a breach of the Hague
Convention. It was a breach of the Pact of Paris. It was a breach of a
specific assurance given by Hitler on the 6th of October 1939.
He had then said this:
“Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss, I informed
Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country will
also be an unalterable one and that we desire only to live in
peace and friendship with her.”
But the plan for aggression against Yugoslavia had, of course, been in
hand well before that. In the aggressive action eastward towards the
Ukraine and the Soviet territories, security of the southern flank and
the lines of communication had already been considered by the Germans.
The history of the events leading up to the invasion of Yugoslavia by
Germany is well known. At 3 o’clock in the morning of the 28th of
October 1940 a 3-hour ultimatum had been presented by the Italian
Government to the Greek Government, and the presentation of that
ultimatum was immediately followed by the aerial bombardment of Greek
provincial towns and the advance of Italian troops into Greek territory.
The Greeks were not prepared. They were at first forced to withdraw. But
later the Italian advance was at first checked, then driven towards the
Albanian frontier, and by the end of 1940 the Italian Army had suffered
severe reverses at Greek hands.
Of the German position in the matter there is, of course, the evidence
of what occurred when, on the 12th of August 1939, Hitler had this
meeting with Ciano.
You will remember that Hitler said then:
“Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be to
liquidate false neutrals one after the other. This process could
be carried out more easily if, on every occasion, one partner of
the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with an
uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a
neutral of this kind.”
Then the conference went on and it met again on the 13th of August, and
in the course of lengthy discussions, Hitler said this:
“In general, however, on success by one of the Axis partners,
not only strategical but also psychological strengthening of the
other partner and also of the whole Axis would ensue. Italy
carried through a number of successful operations in Abyssinia,
Spain, and Albania, and each time against the wishes of the
democratic entente. These individual actions have not only
strengthened Italian local interests, but have also . . .
reinforced her general position. The same was the case with
German action in Austria and Czechoslovakia . . . . The
strengthening of the Axis by these individual operations was of
the greatest importance for the unavoidable clash with the
Western Powers.”
And so once again we see the same procedure being followed. That meeting
had taken place on the 12th and the 13th of August of 1939. Less than 2
months later, Hitler was giving his assurance to Yugoslavia that Germany
only desired to live in peace and friendship with her, with the state,
the liquidation of which by his Axis partner, he had himself so recently
suggested.
Then came the Italian ultimatum to Greece and war against Greece and the
Italian reverse.
We have found, amongst the captured documents, an undated letter from
Hitler to Mussolini which must have been written about the time of the
Italian aggression against Greece:
“Permit me”—Hitler said—“at the beginning of this letter to
assure you that within the last 14 days my heart and my thoughts
have been more than ever with you. Moreover, Duce, be assured of
my determination to do everything on your behalf which might
ease the present situation for you. When I asked you to receive
me in Florence, I undertook the trip in the hope of being able
to express my views prior to the beginning of the threatening
conflict with Greece, about which I had received only general
information. First, I wanted to request you to postpone the
action, if at all possible, until a more favorable time of the
year, at all events until after the American presidential
election. But in any case, however, I wanted to request you,
Duce, not to undertake this action without a previous
lightning-like occupation of Crete and, for this purpose, I also
wanted to submit to you some practical suggestions in regard to
the employment of a German parachute division and a further
airborne division . . . Yugoslavia must become disinterested, if
possible, however, from our point of view, interested in
co-operating in the liquidation of the Greek question. Without
assurances from Yugoslavia, it is useless to risk any successful
operation in the Balkans . . . Unfortunately, I must stress the
fact that waging a war in the Balkans before March is
impossible. Hence it would also serve to make any threatening
influence upon Yugoslavia of no purpose, since the Serbian
General Staff is well aware of the fact that no practical action
could follow such a threat before March. Hence, Yugoslavia must,
if at all possible, be won over by other means and in other
ways.”
On the 12th of November 1939, in his top-secret order, Hitler ordered
the OKH to make preparations to occupy Greece and Bulgaria, if
necessary. Apparently 10 divisions were to be used in order to prevent
Turkish intervention. I think I said 1939; it should, of course, have
been the 12th of November 1940. And to shorten the time, the German
divisions in Romania were to be increased.
On the 13th of December Hitler issued an order to OKW, OKL, OKH, OKM,
and the General Staff on the operation Marita, as the invasion of Greece
was to be called. In that order it was stated that the invasion of
Greece was planned and was to commence as soon as the weather was
advantageous. A further order was issued on the 11th of January of 1941.
On the 28th of January of 1941 Hitler saw Mussolini. The Defendants
Jodl, Keitel, and Ribbentrop were present at the meeting. We know about
it from Jodl’s notes of what took place. We know that Hitler stated that
one of the purposes of German troop concentrations in Romania was for
use in the plan Marita against Greece.
On the 1st of March 1941 German troops entered Bulgaria and moved
towards the Greek frontier. In the face of this threat of an attack on
Greece by German as well as Italian forces, British troops were landed
in Greece on the 3rd of March, in accordance with the declaration which
had been given by the British Government on the 13th of April 1939; that
Britain would feel bound to give Greece and Romania, respectively, all
the support in her power in the event of either country becoming the
victim of aggression and resisting such aggression. Already, of course,
the Italian operations had made that pledge operative.
On the 25th of March of 1941, Yugoslavia, partly won over by the “other
means and in other ways” to which Hitler had referred, joined the Three
Power Pact which had already been signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan.
The preamble of the pact stated that the three powers would stand side
by side and work together.
On the same day the Defendant Ribbentrop wrote two notes to the Yugoslav
Prime Minister assuring him of Germany’s full intention to respect the
sovereignty and independence of his country. That declaration was just
another example of the treachery employed by German diplomacy. We have
already seen the preparations that had been made. We have seen Hitler’s
attempts to tempt the Italians into an aggression against Yugoslavia. We
have seen, in January, his own orders for preparations to invade
Yugoslavia and then Greece. And now, on the 25th of March, he is signing
a pact with that country and his Foreign Minister is writing assurances
of respect for her sovereignty and territorial integrity.
As a result of the signing of that pact, the anti-Nazi element in
Yugoslavia immediately accomplished a _coup d’état_ and established a
new government. And thereupon, no longer prepared to respect the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of her ally, Germany immediately
took the decision to invade. On the 27th of March, 2 days after the
Three Power Pact had been signed, Hitler issued instructions that
Yugoslavia was to be invaded and used as a base for the continuance of
the combined German and Italian operation against Greece.
Following that, further deployment and instructions for the action
Marita were issued by Von Brauchitsch on the 30th of March 1941.
It was said—and I quote:
“The orders issued with regard to the operation against Greece
remain valid so far as not affected by this order . . . . On the
5th April, weather permitting, the Air Forces are to attack
troops in Yugoslavia, while simultaneously the attack of the
12th Army begins against both Yugoslavia and Greece.”
And as we now know, the invasion actually commenced in the early hours
of the 6th of April.
Treaties, pacts, assurances, obligations of any kind, are brushed aside
and ignored wherever the aggressive interests of Germany are concerned.
I turn now to the last act of aggression in Europe—my American
colleagues will deal with the position in relation to Japan—I turn now
to the last act of aggression in Europe with which these Nazi
conspirators are charged, the attack upon Russia.
In August of 1939 Germany, although undoubtedly intending to attack
Russia at some convenient opportunity, concluded a treaty of
non-aggression with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. When
Belgium and the Low Countries were occupied and France collapsed in June
of 1940, England—although with the inestimably valuable moral and
economic support of the United States of America—was left alone in the
field as the sole representative of democracy in the face of the forces
of aggression. At that moment only the British Empire stood between
Germany and the achievement of her aim to dominate the Western World.
Only the British Empire—and England as its citadel. But it was enough.
The first, and possibly the decisive, military defeat which the enemy
sustained was in the campaign against England; and that defeat had a
profound influence on the future course of the war.
On the 16th of July of 1940 Hitler issued to the Defendants Keitel and
Jodl a directive—which they found themselves unable to obey—for the
invasion of England. It started off—and Englishmen will forever be
proud of it—by saying that:
“Since England, despite her militarily hopeless situation, shows
no signs of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to
prepare a landing operation against England and if necessary to
carry it out. The aim is . . . to eliminate the English homeland
as a base for the carrying on of the war against Germany . . . .
Preparations for the entire operation must be completed by
mid-August.”
But the first essential condition for that plan was, I quote:
“. . . the British Air Force must morally and actually be so far
overcome that it does not any longer show any considerable
aggressive force against the German attack.”
The Defendant Göring and his Air Force, no doubt, made the most
strenuous efforts to realize that condition, but, in one of the most
splendid pages of our history, it was decisively defeated. And although
the bombardment of England’s towns and villages was continued throughout
that dark winter of 1940-41, the enemy decided in the end that England
was not to be subjugated by these means, and, accordingly, Germany
turned back to the East, the first major aim unachieved.
On the 22d of June 1941 German Armed Forces invaded Russia, without
warning, without declaration of war. It was, of course, a breach of the
usual series of treaties; they meant no more in this case than they had
meant in the other cases. It was a violation of the Pact of Paris; it
was a flagrant contradiction of the Treaty of Non-Aggression which
Germany and Russia had signed on the 23rd of August a year before.
Hitler himself said, in referring to that agreement, that “agreements
were only to be kept as long as they served a purpose.”
The Defendant Ribbentrop was more explicit. In an interview with the
Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on the 23rd of February 1941, he made it
clear that the object of the agreement had merely been, so far as
Germany was concerned, to avoid a two-front war.
In contrast to what Hitler and Ribbentrop and the rest of them were
planning within the secret councils of Germany, we know what they were
saying to the rest of the world.
On the 19th of July, Hitler spoke in the Reichstag:
“In these circumstances”—he said—“I considered it proper to
negotiate as a first priority a sober definition of interest
with Russia. It would be made clear once and for all what
Germany believes she must regard as her sphere of interest to
safeguard her future and, on the other hand, what Russia
considers important for her existence. From this clear
delineation of the sphere of interest there followed the new
regulation of Russian-German relations. Any hope that now, at
the end of the term of the agreement, a new Russo-German tension
could arise is childish. Germany has taken no step which would
lead her outside her sphere of interest, nor has Russia. But
England’s hope to achieve an amelioration of her own position
through the engineering of some new European crisis, is, insofar
as it is concerned with Russo-German relations, an illusion.
“English statesmen perceive everything somewhat slowly, but they
too will learn to understand this in the course of time.”
The whole statement was, of course, a tissue of lies. It was not many
months after it had been made that the arrangements for attacking Russia
were put into hand. And the Defendant Raeder gives us the probable
reason for the decision in a note which he sent to Admiral Assmann:
“The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the Autumn
of 1940 could no longer be attained, a realization which the
Führer no doubt gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who
were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on
England (our own losses), surely caused the Führer, as far back
as August and September”—this was August and September of
1940—“to consider whether, even prior to victory in the West,
an Eastern campaign would be feasible, with the object of first
eliminating our last serious opponent on the Continent . . . .
The Führer did not openly express this fear, however, until well
into September.”
He may not have spoken to the Navy of his intentions until later in
September, but by the beginning of that month he had undoubtedly told
the Defendant Jodl about them.
Dated the 6th of September 1940, we have a directive of the OKW signed
by the Defendant Jodl, and I quote:
“Directions are given for the occupation forces in the East to
be increased in the following weeks. For security reasons”—and
I quote—“this should not create the impression in Russia that
Germany is preparing for an Eastern offensive.”
Directives are given to the German Intelligence Service pertaining to
the answering of questions by the Russian Intelligence Service, and I
quote:
“The respective strength of the German troops in the East is to
be camouflaged by . . . frequent changes in this area . . . .
The impression is to be created that the bulk of the troops is
in the south of the Government General and that the occupation
in the North is relatively small.”
And so we see the beginning of the operations.
On the 12th of November 1940 Hitler issued a directive, signed by the
Defendant Jodl, in which it was stated that the political task to
determine the attitude of Russia had begun, but that without reference
to the result of preparations against the East, which had been ordered
orally.
It is not to be supposed that the U.S.S.R. would have taken part in any
conversations at that time if it had been realized that on the very day
orders were being given for preparations to be made for the invasion of
Russia, and that the order for the operation, which was called “Plan
Barbarossa”, was in active preparation. On the 18th of December the
order was issued, and I quote:
“The German Armed Forces have to be ready to defeat Soviet
Russia in a swift campaign before the end of the war against
Great Britain.”
And later, in the same instruction—and I quote again:
“All orders which shall be issued by the High Commanders in
accordance with this instruction have to be clothed in such
terms that they may be taken as measures of precaution in case
Russia should change her present attitude towards ourselves.”
Germany kept up the pretense of friendliness and, on the 10th of January
1941, well after the Plan Barbarossa for the invasion of Russia had been
decided upon, Germany signed the German-Russian Frontier Treaty. Less
than a month later, on the 3rd of February of 1941, Hitler held a
conference, attended by the Defendants Keitel and Jodl, at which it was
provided that the whole operation against Russia was to be camouflaged
as if it was part of the preparation for the “Plan Seelöwe”, as the plan
for the invasion of England was described.
By March of 1941 plans were sufficiently advanced to include provision
for dividing the Russian territory into nine separate states to be
administered under Reich Commissars, under the general control of the
Defendant Rosenberg; and at the same time detailed plans for the
economic exploitation of the country were made under the supervision of
the Defendant Göring, to whom the responsibility in this matter—and it
is a serious one—had been delegated by Hitler.
You will hear something of the details of these plans. I remind you of
one document which has already been referred to in this connection.
It is significant that on the 2d of May of 1941 a conference of State
Secretaries took place in regard to the Plan Barbarossa, and in the
course of that it was noted:
“1. The war can be continued only if all Armed Forces are fed
out of Russia in the third year of the war.
“2. There is no doubt that, as a result, many millions of people
will be starved to death if we take out of the country the
things necessary for us.”
But that apparently caused no concern. The “Plan Oldenbourg”, as the
scheme for the economic organization and exploitation of Russia was
called, went on. By the 1st of May 1941, the D-Day of the operation had
been fixed. By the 1st of June preparations were virtually complete and
an elaborate timetable was issued. It was estimated that, although there
would be heavy frontier battles, lasting perhaps 4 weeks, after that no
serious opposition was to be expected.
On the 22d of June, at 3:30 in the morning, the German armies marched
again. As Hitler said in his proclamation to them, “I have decided to
give the fate of the German people and of the Reich and of Europe again
into the hands of our soldiers.”
The usual false pretexts were, of course, given. Ribbentrop stated on
the 28th of June that the step was taken because of the threatening of
the German frontiers by the Red Army. It was a lie, and the Defendant
Ribbentrop knew it was a lie.
On the 7th of June 1941 Ribbentrop’s own Ambassador in Moscow was
reporting to him, and I quote, that, “All observations show that Stalin
and Molotov, who are alone responsible for Russian foreign policy, are
doing everything to avoid a conflict with Germany.” The staff records
which you will see make it clear that the Russians were making no
military preparations and that they were continuing their deliveries
under the Trade Agreement to the very last day. The truth is, of course,
that the elimination of Russia as a political opponent and the
incorporation of the Soviet territory in the German Lebensraum had been
one of the cardinal features of Nazi policy for a very long time,
subordinated latterly for what the Defendant Jodl called diplomatic
reasons.
And so, on the 22d of June, the Nazi armies were flung against the power
with which Hitler had so recently sworn friendship, and Germany embarked
upon that last act of aggression in Europe, which, after long and bitter
fighting, was eventually to result in Germany’s own collapse.
That, then, is the case against these defendants, as amongst the rulers
of Germany, under Count Two of this Indictment.
It may be said that many of the documents which have been referred to
were in Hitler’s name, and that the orders were Hitler’s orders, and
that these men were mere instruments of Hitler’s will. But they were the
instruments without which Hitler’s will could not be carried out; and
they were more than that. These men were no mere willing tools, although
they would be guilty enough if that had been their role. They are the
men whose support had built Hitler up into the position of power he
occupied; these are the men whose initiative and planning often
conceived and certainly made possible the acts of aggression done in
Hitler’s name; and these are the men who enabled Hitler to build up the
Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the war economy, the political
philosophy, by which these treacherous attacks were carried out, and by
which he was able to lead his fanatical followers into peaceful
countries to murder, to loot, and to destroy. They are the men whose
cooperation and support made the Nazi Government of Germany possible.
The government of a totalitarian country may be carried on without
representatives of the people, but it cannot be carried on without any
assistance at all. It is no use having a leader unless there are also
people willing and ready to serve their personal greed and ambition by
helping and following him. The dictator who is set up in control of the
destinies of his country does not depend on himself alone either in
acquiring power or in maintaining it. He depends upon the support and
the backing which lesser men, themselves lusting to share in dictatorial
power, anxious to bask in the adulation of their leader, are prepared to
give.
In the criminal courts of our countries, when men are put on their trial
for breaches of the municipal laws, it not infrequently happens that of
a gang indicted together in the dock, one has the master mind, the
leading personality. But it is no excuse for the common thief to say, “I
stole because I was told to steal”, for the murderer to plead, “I killed
because I was asked to kill.” And these men are in no different
position, for all that it was nations they sought to rob, and whole
peoples which they tried to kill. “The warrant of no man excuseth the
doing of an illegal act.” Political loyalty, military obedience are
excellent things, but they neither require nor do they justify the
commission of patently wicked acts. There comes a point where a man must
refuse to answer to his leader if he is also to answer to his
conscience. Even the common soldier, serving in the ranks of his army,
is not called upon to obey illegal orders. But these men were no common
soldiers: They were the men whose skill and cunning, whose labor and
activity made it possible for the German Reich to tear up existing
treaties, to enter into new ones and to flout them, to reduce
international negotiations and diplomacy to a hollow mockery, to destroy
all respect for and effect in international law and, finally, to march
against the peoples of the world to secure that domination in which, as
arrogant members of their self-styled master race, they professed to
believe.
If these crimes were in one sense the crimes of Nazi Germany, they also
are guilty as the individuals who aided, abetted, counselled, procured,
and made possible the commission of what was done.
The total sum of the crime these men have committed—so awful in its
comprehension—has many aspects. Their lust and sadism, their deliberate
slaughter and degradation of so many millions of their fellow creatures
that the imagination reels, are but one side of this matter. Now that an
end has been put to this nightmare, and we come to consider how the
future is to be lived, perhaps their guilt as murderers and robbers is
of less importance and of less effect to future generations of mankind
than their crime of fraud—the fraud by which they placed themselves in
a position to do their murder and their robbery. That is the other
aspect of their guilt. The story of their “diplomacy”, founded upon
cunning, hypocrisy, and bad faith, is a story less gruesome no doubt,
but no less evil and deliberate. And should it be taken as a precedent
of behavior in the conduct of international relations, its consequences
to mankind will no less certainly lead to the end of civilized society.
Without trust and confidence between nations, without the faith that
what is said is meant and that what is undertaken will be observed, all
hope of peace and security is dead. The Governments of the United
Kingdom and the British Commonwealth, of the United States of America,
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and of France, backed by and
on behalf of every other peace-loving nation of the world, have
therefore joined to bring the inventors and perpetrators of this Nazi
conception of international relationship before the bar of this
Tribunal. They do so, so that these defendants may be punished for their
crimes. They do so, also, that their conduct may be exposed in all its
naked wickedness and they do so in the hope that the conscience and good
sense of all the world will see the consequences of such conduct and the
end to which inevitably it must always lead. Let us once again restore
sanity and with it also the sanctity of our obligations towards each
other.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Attorney, would it be convenient to the prosecutors
from Great Britain to continue?
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: The proposal was that my friend, Mr. Sidney
Alderman, should continue with the presentation of the case with regard
to the final acts of aggression against Czechoslovakia and that that
being done, my British colleagues would continue with the presentation
of the British case. As the Tribunal will appreciate, Counts One and Two
are in many respects complementary, and my American colleagues and
ourselves are working in closest cooperation in presenting the evidence
affecting those counts.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, would it be convenient for you to go on
until 5 o’clock?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. May it please the Tribunal, it is quite convenient
for me to proceed. I can but feel that it will be quite anticlimactic
after the address which you just heard.
When the Tribunal rose yesterday afternoon, I had just completed an
outline of the plans laid by the Nazi conspirators in the weeks
immediately following the Munich Agreement. These plans called for what
the German officials called “the liquidation of the remainder of
Czechoslovakia.” You will recall that 3 weeks after Munich, on 21
October, the same day on which the administration of the Sudetenland was
handed over to the civilian authorities, Hitler and Keitel had issued an
order to the Armed Forces. This document is C-136, Exhibit USA-104.
In this order Hitler and Keitel ordered the beginning of preparations by
the Armed Forces for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.
You will also recall that 2 months later, on 17 December, the Defendant
Keitel issued an appendix to the original order directing the
continuation of these preparations. This document is C-138, Exhibit
USA-105, and both these documents have already been introduced.
Proceeding on the assumption that no resistance worth mentioning was to
be expected, this order emphasized that the attack on Czechoslovakia was
to be well camouflaged so that it would not appear to be a warlike
action. “To the outside world,” it said, and I quote, “it must appear
obvious that it is merely an action of pacification and not a warlike
undertaking.”
Thus, in the beginning of 1939 the basic planning for military action
against the mutilated Czechoslovak Republic had already been carried out
by the German High Command.
I turn now to the underhand and criminal methods used by the Nazi
conspirators to ensure that no resistance worth mentioning would, in
fact, be met by the German Army. As in the case of Austria and the
Sudetenland, the Nazi conspirators did not intend to rely on the
Wehrmacht alone to accomplish their calculated objective of liquidating
Czechoslovakia. With the German minority separated from Czechoslovakia,
they could no longer use the cry, “Home to the Reich.” One sizable
minority, the Slovaks, still remained within the Czechoslovak state.
I should mention at this point that the Czechoslovak Government had made
every effort to conciliate Slovak extremists in the months after the
cession of the Sudetenland. Autonomy had been granted to Slovakia, with
an autonomous Cabinet and Parliament at Bratislava. Nevertheless,
despite these concessions, it was in Slovakia that the Nazi conspirators
found fertile ground for their tactics. The picture which I shall now
draw of Nazi operations in Slovakia is based on the Czechoslovak
official Government Report, Document Number 998-PS, already admitted in
evidence as Exhibit USA-91, and of which the Court has already taken
judicial notice.
Nazi propaganda and research groups had long been interested in
maintaining close connection with the Slovak autonomist opposition. When
Bela Tuka, who later became Prime Minister of the puppet state of
Slovakia, was tried for espionage and treason in 1929, the evidence
established that he had already established connections with Nazi groups
within Germany. Prior to 1938 Nazi aides were in close contact with the
Slovak traitors living in exile and were attempting to establish more
profitable contacts in the semi-fascist Slovak Catholic People’s Party
of Monsignor Andrew Hlinka. In February and July 1938 the leaders of the
Henlein movement conferred with top men of Father Hlinka’s party and
agreed to furnish one another with mutual assistance in pressing their
respective claims to autonomy. This understanding proved useful in the
September agitation when at the proper moment the Foreign Office in
Berlin wired the Henlein leader, Kundt, in Prague to tell the Slovaks to
start their demands for autonomy.
This telegram, our Document Number 2858-PS, Exhibit USA-97, has already
been introduced in evidence and read.
By this time—midsummer 1938—the Nazis were in direct contact with
figures in the Slovak autonomist movement and had paid agents among the
higher staff of Father Hlinka’s party. These agents undertook to render
impossible any understanding between the Slovak autonomists and the
Slovak parties in the government at Prague.
Hans Karmasin, later to become Volksgruppenführer, had been appointed
Nazi leader in Slovakia and professed to be serving the cause of Slovak
autonomy while actually on the Nazi payroll. On 22 November the Nazis
indiscreetly wired Karmasin to collect his money at the German Legation
in Prague, and I offer in evidence Document 2859-PS as Exhibit USA-107,
captured from the German Foreign Office files. I read this telegram
which was sent from the German Legation at Prague to Pressburg:
“Delegate Kundt asks to notify State Secretary Karmasin he would
appreciate it if he could personally draw the sum which is being
kept for him at the treasury of the Embassy.”—signed—“Hencke.”
Karmasin proved to be extremely useful to the Nazi cause. Although it is
out of its chronological place in my discussion, I should like now to
offer in evidence Document 2794-PS, a captured memorandum of the German
Foreign Office which I offer as Exhibit USA-108, dated Berlin, 29
November 1939.
This document, dated 8 months after the conquest of Czechoslovakia,
throws a revealing light both on Karmasin and on the German Foreign
Office, and I now read from this memorandum:
“On the question of payments to Karmasin.
“Karmasin receives 30,000 marks monthly from the VDA”—Peoples’
League for Germans Abroad—“until 1 April 1940; from then on
15,000 marks monthly.
“Furthermore, the Central Office for Racial
Germans”—Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle—“has deposited 300,000
marks for Karmasin with the German Mission in
Bratislava”—Pressburg—“on which he could fall back in an
emergency.
“Furthermore, Karmasin has received money from Reich Minister
Seyss-Inquart; for the present it has been impossible to
determine what amounts had been involved, and whether the
payments still continue.
“Therefore, it appears that Karmasin has been provided with
sufficient money; thus one could wait to determine whether he
would put up new demands himself.
“Herewith presented to the Reich Foreign
Minister.”—signed—“Woermann.”
This document shows the complicity of the German Foreign Office in the
subsidization of illegal organizations abroad. More important, it shows
that the Germans still considered it necessary to supply their
undercover representatives in Pressburg with substantial funds, even
after the declaration of the so-called Independent State of Slovakia.
Sometime in the winter of 1938-39, the Defendant Göring conferred with
Durkansky and Mach, two leaders in the Slovak extremist group, who were
accompanied by Karmasin. The Slovaks told Göring of their desire for
what they called independence, with strong political, economic, and
military ties to Germany. They promised that the Jewish problem would be
solved as it had been solved in Germany; that the Communist Party would
be prohibited. The notes of the meeting report that Göring considered
that the Slovak efforts towards independence were to be supported, but
as the document will show, his motives were scarcely altruistic.
I now offer in evidence Document 2801-PS as Exhibit USA-109, undated
minutes of a conversation between Göring and Durkansky. This document
was captured among the files of the German Foreign Office.
I now read these minutes, which are jotted down in somewhat telegraphic
style. To begin with:
“Durkansky (Deputy Prime Minister) reads out declaration.
Contents: Friendship for the Führer; gratitude, that through the
Führer, autonomy has become possible for the Slovaks: The
Slovaks never want to belong to Hungary. The Slovaks want full
independence with strongest political, economic, and military
ties to Germany. Bratislava to be the capital. The execution of
the plan only possible if the army and police are Slovak.
“An independent Slovakia to be proclaimed at the meeting of the
first Slovak Diet. In the case of a plebiscite the majority
would favor a separation from Prague. Jews will vote for
Hungary. The area of the plebiscite to be up to the March, where
a large Slovak population lives.
“The Jewish problem will be solved similarly to that in Germany.
The Communist Party to be prohibited.
“The Germans in Slovakia do not want to belong to Hungary but
wish to stay in Slovakia.
“The German influence with the Slovak Government considerable;
the appointment of a German Minister (member of the Cabinet) has
been promised.
“At present negotiations with Hungary are being conducted by the
Slovaks. The Czechs are more yielding towards the Hungarians
than the Slovaks.
“The Field Marshal”—that is Field Marshal Göring—“considers
that the Slovak negotiations towards independence are to be
supported in a suitable manner. Czechoslovakia without Slovakia
is still more at our mercy.
“Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German
Air Force for use against the East.”
On 12 February a Slovak delegation journeyed to Berlin. It consisted of
Tuka, one of the Slovaks with whom the Germans had been in contact, and
Karmasin, the paid representative of the Nazi conspirators in Slovakia.
They conferred with Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop in the Reich
Chancellery in Berlin on Sunday, 12 February 1939.
I now offer in evidence Document 2790-PS as Exhibit USA-110, the
captured German Foreign Office minutes of that meeting:
“After a brief welcome Tuka thanks the Führer for granting this
meeting. He addresses the Führer with ‘My Führer’ and he voices
the opinion that he, though only a modest man himself, might
well claim to speak for the Slovak nation. The Czech courts and
prison gave him the right to make such a statement. He states
that the Führer had not only opened the Slovak question but that
he had been also the first one to acknowledge the dignity of the
Slovak nation. The Slovakian people will gladly fight under the
leadership of the Führer for the maintenance of European
civilization. Obviously future association with the Czechs had
become an impossibility for the Slovaks from a moral as well as
an economic point of view.”
Then skipping to the last sentence: “‘I entrust the fate of my people to
your care.’”—addressing that to the Führer!
During the meeting the Nazi conspirators apparently were successful in
planting the idea of insurrection with the Slovak delegation. I refer to
the final sentence of the document, which I have just read, the sentence
spoken by Tuka, “I entrust the fate of my people to your care.”
It is apparent from these documents that in mid-February 1939 the Nazis
had a well-disciplined group of Slovaks at their service, many of them
drawn from the ranks of Father Hlinka’s party. Flattered by the personal
attention of such men as Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop and
subsidized by German representatives, these Slovaks proved willing tools
in the hands of the Nazi conspirators.
In addition to Slovaks, the conspirators made use of the few Germans
still remaining within the mutilated Czechoslovak Republic. Kundt,
Henlein’s deputy who had been appointed leader of this German minority,
created as many artificial “focal points of German culture” as possible.
Germans from the districts handed over to Germany were ordered from
Berlin to continue their studies at the German University in Prague and
to make it a center of aggressive Nazism.
With the assistance of German civil servants, a deliberate campaign of
Nazi infiltration into Czech public and private institutions was carried
out, and the Henleinists gave full co-operation to Gestapo agents from
the Reich who appeared on Czech soil. The Nazi political activity was
designed to undermine and to weaken Czech resistance to the commands
from Germany.
In the face of continued threats and duress on both diplomatic and
propaganda levels, the Czech Government was unable to take adequate
measures against these trespassers upon its sovereignty.
I am using as the basis of my remarks the Czechoslovak official
Government report, Document Number 998-PS.
In early March, with the date for the final march into Czechoslovakia
already close at hand, Fifth Column activity moved into its final phase.
In Bohemia and Moravia the FS, Henlein’s equivalent of the SS, were in
touch with the Nazi conspirators in the Reich and laid the groundwork of
the events of 14 and 15 March.
I now offer in evidence Document 2826-PS as Exhibit USA-111. This is an
article by SS Group Leader Karl Hermann Frank, published in the
publication _Böhmen and Mähren_, the official periodical of the Reich
Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, edition May 1941, Page 179.
This is an article written by one of the Nazi leaders in Czechoslovakia
at the moment of Germany’s greatest military successes. It is a boastful
article and reveals with a frankness rarely found in the Nazi press both
the functions which the FS and the SS served and the pride the Nazi
conspirators took in the activities of these organizations. It is a long
quotation.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going on with this tomorrow, Mr. Alderman?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you take the whole day?
MR. ALDERMAN: No, not more than an hour and a half.
THE PRESIDENT: And after that the British prosecutors will go on?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 5 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]
THIRTEENTH DAY
Wednesday, 5 December 1945
_Morning Session_
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, when the Tribunal rose
yesterday afternoon, I had just offered in evidence Document 2826-PS,
Exhibit USA-111. This was an article by SS Group Leader Karl Hermann
Frank, published in _Böhmen und Mähren_ (or _Bohemia and Moravia_), the
official periodical of the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, the
issue of March 1941, at Page 79. It is an article which reveals with
considerable frankness the functions which the FS and SS had, and shows
the pride which the Nazi conspirators took in the activities of these
organizations. I read from that article, under the heading “The SS on
March 15, 1939”:
“A modern people and a modern state are today unthinkable
without political troops. To these are allotted the special task
of being the advance guard of the political will and the
guarantor of its unity. This is especially true of the German
folk-groups, which have their home in some other people’s state.
Accordingly the Sudeten German Party had formerly also organized
its political troop, the Voluntary Vigilantes”—or, in German,
“Freiwilliger Selbstschutz”, called FS for short.—“This troop
was trained especially in accordance with the principles of the
SS, so far as these could be used in this region at that time.
The troop was likewise assigned here the special task of
protecting the homeland actively, if necessary. It stood up well
in its first test in this connection, wherever in the fall
crisis of 1938 it had to assume the protection of the homeland,
arms in hand.
“After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau the tasks of the FS
were transferred essentially to the German student organizations
as compact troop formations in Prague and Brünn, aside from the
isolated German communities which remained in the Second
Republic. This was also natural because many active students
from the Sudeten Gau were already members of the SS. The student
organizations then had to endure this test, in common with other
Germans, during, the crisis of March 1939 . . . .
“In the early morning hours of 15 March, after the announcement
of the planned entry of German troops, German men had to act in
some localities in order to assure a quiet course of events,
either by assumption of the police authority, as for instance in
Brünn, or by corresponding instructions of the police president.
In some Czech offices men had likewise, in the early hours of
the morning, begun to burn valuable archives and the material of
political files. It was also necessary to take measures here in
order to prevent foolish destruction . . . . How significant the
many-sided and comprehensive measures were considered by the
competent German agencies follows from the fact that many of the
men either on March 15 itself or on the following days were
admitted into the SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part even
through the Reich leader of the SS himself or through SS Group
Leader Heydrich. The activities and deeds of these men were
thereby designated as accomplished in the interest of the SS
. . . .
“Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had
marched in with the first columns of the German Army and had
assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the men here
placed themselves at once at their further disposition and
became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators.”
I now ask the Court to take judicial notice under Article 21 of the
Charter of three official documents. These are identified by us as
Documents D-571, D-572, and 2943-PS. I offer them in evidence,
respectively, D-571 as Exhibit USA-112; D-572, Exhibit USA-113; and
2943-PS, which is the _French Official Yellow Book_, at Pages 66 and 67,
as Exhibit USA-114.
The first two documents are British diplomatic dispatches, properly
certified to by the British Government, which gave the background of
intrigue in Slovakia—German intrigue in Slovakia. The third document,
2943-PS or Exhibit USA-114, consists of excerpts from the _French Yellow
Book_, principally excerpts from dispatches signed by M. Coulondre, the
French Ambassador in Berlin, to the French Foreign Office between 13 and
18 March 1939. I expect to draw on these three dispatches rather freely
in the further course of my presentation, since the Tribunal will take
judicial notice of each of these documents, I think; and therefore, it
may not be necessary to read them at length into the transcript. In
Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March. On that day the
Czechoslovakian Government dismissed those members of the Slovak Cabinet
who refused to continue negotiations with Prague, among them Foreign
Minister Tiso and Durcansky. Within 24 hours the Nazis seized upon this
act of the Czechoslovak Government as an excuse for intervention. On the
following day, March 11, a strange scene was enacted in Bratislava, the
Slovak capital. I quote from Document D-571, which is USA-112. That is
the report of the British Minister in Prague to the British Government.
“Herr Bürckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart, and five German generals came
at about 10 o’clock in the evening of Saturday, the 11th of
March, into a Cabinet meeting in progress in Bratislava and told
the Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence
of Slovakia. When M. Sidor, the Prime Minister, showed
hesitation, Herr Bürckel took him on one side and explained that
Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czechoslovakia
definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her
independence, because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest
himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Bürckel for this
information, but said that he must discuss the situation with
the Government at Prague.”
A very strange situation that he should have to discuss such a matter
with his own Government, before obeying instructions of Herr Hitler
delivered by five German generals and Herr Bürckel and Herr
Seyss-Inquart.
Events went on moving rapidly, but Durcansky, one of the dismissed
ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna, where the facilities
of the German broadcasting station were placed at his disposal. Arms and
ammunition were brought from German offices in Engerau across the Danube
into Slovakia, where they were used by the FS and the Hlinka Guards to
create incidents and disorder of the type required by the Nazis as an
excuse for military action. The German press and radio launched a
violent campaign against the Czechoslovak Government; and,
significantly, an invitation from Berlin was delivered in Bratislava.
Tiso, the dismissed Prime Minister, was summoned by Hitler to an
audience in the German capital. A plane was awaiting him in Vienna.
At this point, in the second week of March 1939, preparations for what
the Nazi leaders like to call the liquidation of Czechoslovakia were
progressing with what to them must have been very satisfying smoothness.
The military, diplomatic, and propaganda machinery of the Nazi
conspirators was moving in close co-ordination. All during the process
of the Fall Grün (or Case Green) of the preceding summer, the Nazi
conspirators had invited Hungary to participate in this new attack.
Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, was again greatly flattered by
this invitation.
I offer in evidence Document 2816-PS as Exhibit USA-115. This is a
letter the distinguished Admiral of Hungary, a country which,
incidentally, had no navy, wrote to Hitler on 13 March 1939, and which
we captured in the German Foreign Office files.
“Your Excellency, my sincere thanks.
“I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this headwater
region—I dislike using big words—is of vital importance to the
life of Hungary.”—I suppose he needed some headwaters for the
non-existent navy of which he was admiral.
“In spite of the fact that our recruits have been serving for
only 5 weeks we are going into this affair with eager
enthusiasm. The dispositions have already been made. On
Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will take
place which will be followed by the big blow on Saturday.”—He
doesn’t like to use big words; “big blow” is sufficient.
“I shall never forget this proof of friendship, and Your
Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all times.
Your devoted friend, Horthy.”
From this cynical and callous letter from the distinguished Admiral
. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Was that letter addressed to the Hungarian Ambassador at
Berlin?
MR. ALDERMAN: I thought it was addressed to Hitler, if the President
please.
THE PRESIDENT: There are some words at the top which look like a
Hungarian name.
MR. ALDERMAN: That is the letter heading. As I understand it, the letter
was addressed to Adolf Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
MR. ALDERMAN: And I should have said it was—it ended with the . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything on the letter which indicates that?
MR. ALDERMAN: Only the fact that it was found in the Berlin Foreign
Office, and the wording of the letter and the address “Your Excellency.”
We may be drawing a conclusion as to whom it was addressed; but it was
found in the Berlin Foreign Office.
From that cynical and callous letter it may be inferred that the Nazi
conspirators had already informed the Hungarian Government of their
plans for further military action against Czechoslovakia. As it turned
out the timetable was advanced somewhat. I would draw the inference that
His Excellency, Adolf Hitler, informed his devoted friend Horthy of this
change in good time.
On the diplomatic level the Defendant Ribbentrop was quite active. On 13
March, the same day on which Horthy wrote his letter, Ribbentrop sent a
cautionary telegram to the German Minister in Prague outlining the
course of conduct he should pursue during the coming diplomatic
pressure. I offer in evidence Document 2815-PS as Exhibit USA-116. This
is the telegram sent by Ribbentrop to the German Legation in Prague on
13 March.
“Berlin, 13 March 1939.
“Prague. Telegram in secret code.
“With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today.
In case you should get any written communication from President
Hacha, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take
any other action on them, but pass them on here by cipher
telegram. Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the
legation to make a point of not being available if the Czech
Government wants to communicate with you during the next few
days.”—Signed—“Ribbentrop.”
On the afternoon of 13 March Monsignor Tiso, accompanied by Durcansky
and Herr Meissner and the local Nazi leader, arrived in Berlin in
response to the summons from Hitler to which I have heretofore referred.
Late that afternoon Tiso was received by Hitler in his study in the
Reich Chancellery and presented with an ultimatum. Two alternatives were
given him: Either declare the independence of Slovakia, or be left
without German assistance to what were referred to as the emergence of
Poland and Hungary. This decision Hitler said was not a question of
days, but of hours. I now offer in evidence Document 2802-PS as Exhibit
USA-117—again a document captured in the German Foreign Office—German
Foreign Office minutes of the meeting between Hitler and Tiso on 13
March. I read the bottom paragraph on Page 2 and the top paragraph on
Page 3 of the English translation. The first paragraph I shall read is a
summary of Hitler’s remark. You will note that in the inducements he
held out to the Slovaks Hitler displayed his customary disregard for the
truth. I quote:
“Now he had permitted Minister Tiso to come here in order to
make this question clear in a very short time. Germany had no
interest east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to
him what happened there. The question was whether Slovakia
wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for
anything from Slovakia. He would not pledge his people, or even
a single soldier, to something which was not in any way desired
by the Slovak people. He would like to secure final confirmation
as to what Slovakia really wished. He did not wish that
reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preserving
something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a
liberal view of unrest and demonstration in general, but in this
connection unrest was only an outward indication of interior
instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason
permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It was not
a question of days, but of hours. He had stated at that time
that if Slovakia wished to make herself independent he would
support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He would stand by
his word so long as Slovakia would make it clear that she wished
for independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve
the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of
Slovakia to the mercy of events for which he was no longer
responsible. In that case he would only intercede for German
interests, and those did not lie east of the Carpathians.
Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia. She had never belonged
to Germany.
“The Führer asked the Reich Foreign Minister”—the Defendant
Ribbentrop—“if he had any remarks to add. The Reich Foreign
Minister also emphasized for his part the conception that in
this case a decision was a question of hours not of days. He
showed the Führer a message he had just received which reported
Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontiers. The Führer
read this report, mentioned it to Tiso, and expressed the hope
that Slovakia would soon decide clearly for herself.”
A most extraordinary interview. Germany had no interest in Slovakia;
Slovakia had never belonged to Germany; Tiso was invited there. And this
is what happened: Those present at that meeting included the Defendant
Ribbentrop, the Defendant Keitel, State Secretary Dietrich, State
Secretary Keppler, the German Minister of State Meissner. I invite the
attention of the Tribunal to the presence of the Defendant Keitel on
this occasion, as on so many other occasions, where purely political
measures in furtherance of Nazi aggression were under discussion, and
where apparently there was no need for technical military advice.
While in Berlin the Slovaks also conferred separately with the Defendant
Ribbentrop and with other high Nazi officials, Ribbentrop very
solicitously handed Tiso a copy, already drafted in Slovak language, of
the law proclaiming the independence of Slovakia. On the night of the
13th a German plane was conveniently placed at Tiso’s disposal to carry
him home. On 14 March, pursuant to the wishes of the Nazi conspirators,
the Diet of Bratislava proclaimed the independence of Slovakia. With
Slovak extremeness acting at the Nazi bidding in open revolt against the
Czechoslovak Government, the Nazi leaders were now in a position to move
against Prague. On the evening of the 14th, at the suggestion of the
German Legation in Prague, M. Hacha, the President of the Czechoslovak
Republic, and M. Chvalkowsky, his Foreign Minister, arrived in Berlin.
The atmosphere in which they found themselves might be described as
somewhat hostile. Since the preceding weekend, the Nazi press had
accused the Czechs of using violence against the Slovaks, and especially
against the members of the German minority and citizens of the Reich.
Both press and radio proclaimed that the lives of Germans were in
danger. Such a situation was intolerable. It was necessary to smother as
quickly as possible the focus of trouble, which Prague had become, in
the heart of Europe.—These peacemakers!
After midnight on the 15th, at 1:15 in the morning, Hacha and
Chvalkowsky were ushered into the Reich Chancellery. They found there
Adolf Hitler, the Defendants Ribbentrop, Göring, and Keitel and other
high Nazi officials. I now offer in evidence Document 2798-PS as Exhibit
USA-118. This document is the captured German Foreign Office account of
this infamous meeting. It is a long document. Parts of it are so
revealing and give so clear a picture of Nazi behavior and tactics that
I should like to read them in full.
It must be remembered that this account of the fateful conference on the
night of March 14-15 comes from German sources, and of course it must be
read as an account biased by its source, or as counsel for the
defendants said last week “a tendentious account”. Nevertheless, even
without too much discounting of the report on account of its source, it
constitutes a complete condemnation of the Nazis, who by pure and simple
international banditry forced the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. And I
interpolate to suggest that international banditry has been a crime
against international law for centuries.
I will first read the headings to the minutes. In the English
mimeographed version in the document books the time given is an
incorrect translation of the original. It should read 0115 to 0215:
“Conversation between the Führer and Reich Chancellor and the
President of Czechoslovakia, Hacha, in the presence of the Reich
Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, and of the Czechoslovakian
Foreign Minister, Chvalkowsky, in the Reich Chancellery on 15
March 1939, 0115 to 0215 hours.”
Others present were General Field Marshal Göring, General Keitel,
Secretary of the State Von Weizsäcker, Minister of the State Meissner,
Secretary of the State Dietrich, Counselor of the Legation Hewel. Hacha
opened the conference. He was conciliatory—even humble, though the
President of a sovereign state. He thanked Hitler for receiving him and
he said he knew that the fate of Czechoslovakia rested in the Führer’s
hands. Hitler replied that he regretted that he had been forced to ask
Hacha to come to Berlin, particularly because of the great age of the
President. Hacha was then, I believe, in his seventies. But this
journey, Hitler told the President, could be of great advantage to his
country because, and I quote, “It was only a matter of hours until
Germany would intervene.” I quote now from the top of Page 3 of the
English translation. You will bear in mind that what I am reading are
rough notes or minutes of what Adolf Hitler said:
“Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him. If Slovakia had
kept closer to Germany it would have been an obligation to
Germany, but he was glad that he did not have this obligation
now. He had no interests whatsoever in the territory east of the
Little Carpathian Mountains. He did not want to draw the final
consequences in the autumn. . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, don’t you think you ought to read the last
sentence on Page 2?
MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps so; yes. The last sentence from the preceding page
was:
“For the other countries Czechoslovakia was nothing but a means
to an end. London and Paris were not in a position to really
stand up for Czechoslovakia.
“Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him.”
Then I had read down to:
“But even at that time and also later in his conversations with
Chvalkowsky he made it clear that he would ruthlessly smash this
State if Beneš’ tendencies were not completely revised.
Chvalkowsky understood this and asked the Führer to have
patience.”—He often bragged of his patience.—“The Führer saw
this point of view, but the months went by without any change.
The new regime did not succeed in eliminating the old one
psychologically. He observed this from the press, mouth-to-mouth
propaganda, dismissals of Germans, and many other things which,
to him, were a symbol of the total perspective.
“At first he had not understood this but when it became clear to
him he drew his consequences because, had the development
continued in this way, the relations with Czechoslovakia would
in a few years have become the same as 6 months ago. Why did
Czechoslovakia not immediately reduce its Army to a reasonable
size? Such an army was a tremendous burden for such a state,
because it only makes sense if it supports the foreign political
mission of the state. Since Czechoslovakia no longer has a
foreign political mission such an army is meaningless. He
enumerated several examples which proved to him that the spirit
in the Army had not changed. This symptom convinced him that the
Army also would be a source of a severe political burden in the
future. Added to this were the inevitable development of
economic necessities, and, further, the protests of national
groups which could no longer endure life as it was.”
I now interpolate, if the Tribunal please, to note the significance of
that language of Adolf Hitler to the President of a supposed sovereign
state and its Prime Minister, having in his presence General Field
Marshal Göring, the Commander of the Air Force, and General Keitel. And
continuing to quote:
“Thus it is that the die was cast on the past Sunday.”—This is
still the language of Hitler.—“I sent for the Hungarian
minister and told him that I am withdrawing my hands from this
country. We were now confronted with this fact. He had given the
order to the German troops to march into Czechoslovakia and to
incorporate Czechoslovakia into the German Reich. He wanted to
give Czechoslovakia fullest autonomy and a life of her own to a
larger extent than she had ever enjoyed during Austrian rule.
Germany’s attitude towards Czechoslovakia will be determined
tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, and depends on the
attitude of the Czechoslovakian people and the Czechoslovakian
military towards the German troops. He no longer trusts the
Government. He believes in the honesty and straightforwardness
of Hacha and Chvalkowsky, but doubts that the Government will be
able to assert itself in the entire nation. The German Army had
already started out today, and at one barracks where resistance
was offered, it was ruthlessly broken; another barracks had
given in at the deployment of heavy artillery.
“At 6 o’clock in the morning the German Army would invade
Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German Air Force would
occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two possibilities. The
first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would
lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by
all means with physical force. The other possibility is that the
invasion of the German troops occurs in bearable form. In that
case, it would be easy for the Führer to give Czechoslovakia in
the new organization of Czech life a generous life of her own,
autonomy, and a certain national liberty.
“We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-point. He
would not like to torture and denationalize the Czechs. He also
did not do all that because of hatred, but in order to protect
Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year would not
have yielded”—I suppose that is a bad translation for “had not
yielded”—“the Czech people would have been exterminated. Nobody
could have prevented him from doing that. It was his will that
the Czech people should live a full national life and he
believed firmly that a way could be found which would make
far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If fighting
should break out tomorrow, the pressure would result in
counter-pressure. One would annihilate another and it would then
not be possible any more for him to give the promised
alleviations. Within 2 days the Czech Army would not exist any
more. Of course, Germans would also be killed and this would
result in a hatred which would force him”—that is,
Hitler—“because of his instinct of self-preservation, not to
grant autonomy any more. The world would not move a muscle. He
felt pity for the Czech people when he was reading the foreign
press. It would leave the impression on him which could be
summarized in a German proverb: ‘The Moor has done his duty, the
Moor may go.’
“That was the state of affairs. There existed two trends in
Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions and
wished, in memory to the past, that Czechoslovakia would be
conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of which
corresponded with his just-mentioned suggestions.
“That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This
invitation was the last good deed which he could offer to the
Czech people. If it should come to a fight, the bloodshed would
also force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could perhaps
prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would contribute to finding a
form of construction which would be so far-reaching for
Czechoslovakia as she could never have hoped for in the old
Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security for
the German people.
“The hours went past. At 6 o’clock the troops would march in. He
was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to
each Czech battalion. The military action was no small one, but
planned with all generosity. He would advise him”—that is,
Adolf Hitler advised poor old Hacha—“now to retire with
Chvalkowsky in order to discuss what should be done.”
In his reply to this long harangue, Hacha, according to the German
minutes, said that he agreed that resistance would be useless. He
expressed doubt that he would be able to issue the necessary orders to
the Czech Army, in the 4 hours left to him, before the German Army
crossed the Czech border. He asked if the object of the invasion was to
disarm the Czech Army. If so, he indicated that might possibly be
arranged. Hitler replied that his decision was final; that it was well
known what a decision of the Führer meant. He turned to the circle of
Nazi conspirators surrounding him, for their support, and you will
remember that the Defendants Göring, Ribbentrop, and Keitel were all
present. The only possibility of disarming the Czech Army, Hitler said,
was by the intervention of the German Army.
I read now one paragraph from Page 4 of the English version of the
German minutes of this infamous meeting. It is the next to the last
paragraph on Page 4.
“The Führer states that his decision was irrevocable. It was
well known what a decision of the Führer meant. He did not see
any other possibility for disarmament and asked the other
gentlemen”—that is, including Göring, Ribbentrop, and
Keitel—“whether they shared his opinion, which was answered in
the affirmative. The only possibility to disarm the Czech Army
was by the German Army.”
At this sad point, Hacha and Chvalkowsky retired from the room.
I now offer in evidence Document 2861-PS, an excerpt from the official
_British War Blue Book_, at Page 24, and I offer it as Exhibit USA-119.
This is an official document of the British Government, of which the
Tribunal will take judicial notice under the provisions of Article 21 of
the Charter. The part from which I read is a dispatch from the British
Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, describing a conversation with the
Defendant Göring, in which the events of this early morning meeting are
set forth.
“Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax, Berlin, May 28, 1939.
“My Lord: I paid a short visit to Field Marshal Göring at
Karinhall yesterday.”
Then I skip two paragraphs and begin reading with Paragraph 4. I am
sorry, I think I better read all of those paragraphs:
“Field Marshal Göring, who had obviously just been talking to
someone else on the subject, began by inveighing against the
attitude which was being adopted in England towards everything
German and, particularly, in respect of the gold held there on
behalf of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia. Before, however,
I had time to reply, he was called to the telephone and on his
return did not revert to this specific question. He complained,
instead, of British hostility in general, of our political and
economic encirclement of Germany and the activities of what he
described as the war party in England. . . .
“I told the Field Marshal that before speaking of British
hostility, he must understand why the undoubted change of
feeling towards Germany in England had taken place. As he knew
quite well, the basis of all the discussions between Mr.
Chamberlain and Herr Hitler last year had been to the effect
that, once the Sudeten were allowed to enter the Reich, Germany
would leave the Czechs alone and would do nothing to interfere
with their independence. Herr Hitler had given a definite
assurance to that effect in his letter to the Prime Minister of
the 27th September. By yielding to the advice of his ‘wild men’
and deliberately annexing Bohemia and Moravia, Herr Hitler had
not only broken his word to Mr. Chamberlain but had infringed
the whole principle of self-determination on which the Munich
Agreement rested.
“At this point, the Field Marshal interrupted me with a
description of President Hacha’s visit to Berlin. I told Field
Marshal Göring that it was not possible to talk of free will
when I understood that he himself had threatened to bombard
Prague with his airplanes, if Doctor Hacha refused to sign. The
Field Marshal did not deny the fact but explained how the point
had arisen. According to him, Doctor Hacha had from the first
been prepared to sign everything but had said that
constitutionally he could not do so without reference first to
Prague. After considerable difficulty, telephonic communication
with Prague was obtained and the Czech Government had agreed,
while adding that they could not guarantee that one Czech
battalion at least would not fire on German troops. It was, he
said, only at that stage that he had warned Doctor Hacha that,
if German lives were lost, he would bombard Prague. The Field
Marshal also repeated, in reply to some comment of mine, the
story that the advance occupation of Vitkovice had been effected
solely in order to forestall the Poles who, he said, were known
to have the intention of seizing this valuable area at the first
opportunity.”
I also invite the attention of the Tribunal and the judicial notice of
the Tribunal, to Dispatch Number 77, in the _French Official Yellow
Book_, at Page 96 of the book, identified as our Document 2943-PS,
appearing in the Document Book under that number, and I ask that it be
given an identifying number, Exhibit USA-114. This is a dispatch from M.
Coulondre, the French Ambassador, and it gives another well-informed
version of this same midnight meeting. The account, which I shall
present to the Court, of the remainder of this meeting is drawn from
these two sources, the _British Blue Book_ and the _French Yellow Book_.
I think the Court may be interested to read somewhat further at large,
in those two books, which furnish a great deal of the background of all
of these matters.
When President Hacha left the conference room in the Reich Chancellery,
he was in such a state of exhaustion that he needed medical attention
from a physician who was conveniently on hand for that purpose, a German
physician. When the two Czechs returned to the room, the Nazi
conspirators again told them of the power and invincibility of the
Wehrmacht. They reminded them that in 3 hours, at 6 in the morning . . .
THE PRESIDENT: You are not reading? I beg your pardon!
MR. ALDERMAN: I am not reading, I am summarizing.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
MR. ALDERMAN: They reminded them that in 3 hours, at 6 in the morning,
the German Army would cross the border. The Defendant Göring boasted of
what the Wehrmacht would do if the Czech forces dared to resist the
invading Germans. If German lives were lost, Defendant Göring said, his
Luftwaffe would blaze half of Prague into ruins in 2 hours and that,
Göring said, would be only the beginning.
Under this threat of imminent and merciless attack by land and air, the
aged President of Czechoslovakia at 4:30 o’clock in the morning, signed
the document with which the Nazi conspirators confronted him and which
they had already had prepared. This Document is TC-49, the declaration
of 15 March 1939, one of the series of documents which will be presented
by the British prosecutor, and from it I quote this, on the assumption
that it will subsequently be introduced.
“The President of the Czechoslovakian State . . . entrusts with
entire confidence the destiny of the Czech people and the Czech
country to the hands of the Führer of the German Reich”—really
a rendezvous with destiny.
While the Nazi officials were threatening and intimidating the
representatives of the Czech Government, the Wehrmacht had in some areas
already crossed the Czech border.
I offer in evidence Document 2860-PS, another excerpt from the _British
Blue Book_, of which I ask the Court to take judicial notice. This is a
speech by Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from
which I quote one passage:
“It is to be observed”—and the fact is surely not without
significance—“that the towns of Mährisch-Ostrau and Vitkovice
were actually occupied by German SS detachments on the evening
of the 14th March, while the President and the Foreign Minister
of Czechoslovakia were still on their way to Berlin and before
any discussion had taken place.”
At dawn on March 15, German troops poured into Czechoslovakia from all
sides. Hitler issued an order of the day to the Armed Forces and a
proclamation to the German people, which stated distinctly,
“Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist.”
On the following day, in contravention of Article 81 of the Treaty of
Versailles, Czechoslovakia was formally incorporated into the German
Reich under the name of “The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.” The
decree is Document TC-51, another of the documents which the British
Delegation will present to the Tribunal later in this week. It was
signed in Prague on 16 March 1939, by Hitler, Lammers, and the
Defendants Frick and Von Ribbentrop.
I should like to quote the first sentence of this decree, “The Bohemian
and Moravian countries belonged for a millennium to the
Lebensraum”—living space—“of the German people.” The remainder of the
decree sets forth in bleak detail the extent to which Czechoslovakia
henceforth was subjected to Germany. A German Protector was to be
appointed by the German Führer for the so-called “Protectorate”—the
Defendant Von Neurath. God deliver us from such protectors! The German
Government assumed charge of their foreign affairs and of their customs
and of their excises. It was specified that German garrisons and
military establishments would be maintained in the Protectorate. At the
same time the extremist leaders in Slovakia who, at German Nazi
insistence, had done so much to undermine the Czech State, found that
the independence of their week-old state was itself, in effect,
qualified.
I offer in evidence Document 1439-PS as Exhibit USA—I need not offer
that. I think it is a decree in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, of which I ask
the Tribunal to take judicial notice, and it is identified as our
Document 1439-PS. It appears at Page 606, 1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part II.
The covering declaration is signed by the Defendant Ribbentrop, Minister
of Foreign Affairs, and then there is a heading:
“Treaty of Protection to be extended by the German Reich to the
State of Slovakia.”
“The German Government and the Slovakian Government have agreed,
after the Slovakian State has placed itself under the protection
of the German Reich, to regulate by treaty the consequences
resulting from this fact. For this purpose, the undersigned
representatives of the two governments have agreed on the
following provisions:
“Article 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the political
independence of the State of Slovakia and integrity of its
territory.
“Article 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection
undertaken by the German Reich, the German Armed Forces shall
have the right, at all times, to construct military
installations and to keep them garrisoned in the strength they
deem necessary, in an area delimited on its western side, by the
frontiers of the State of Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a
line formed by the eastern rims of the Lower Carpathians, the
White Carpathians, and the Javornik Mountains.”—Then I skip—
“The Government of Slovakia will organize its military forces in
close agreement with the German Armed Forces.”
THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t that be a convenient time to break off? I
understand, too, that it would be for the convenience of the Defense
Counsel if the Tribunal adjourn for an hour and a quarter rather than
for an hour at midday, and accordingly, the Tribunal will retire at
12:45 and sit again at 2:00.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, this secret protocol between
Germany and Slovakia provided for close economic and financial
collaboration between Germany and Slovakia. Mineral resources and
subsoil rights were placed at the disposal of the German Government.
I offer in evidence Document 2793-PS, Exhibit USA-120, and from it I
read Paragraph 3:
“Investigation, development, and utilization of the Slovak
natural resources. In this respect the basic principle is that,
insofar as they are not needed to meet Slovakia’s own
requirements, they should be placed in first line at Germany’s
disposal. The entire soil research”—“Bodenforschung” is the
German word—“will be placed under the Reich Agency for soil
research.”—that is the Reichsstelle für Bodenforschung—“The
Government of the Slovak State will soon start an investigation
to determine whether the present owners of concessions and
privileges have fulfilled the industrial obligations prescribed
by law and it will cancel concessions and privileges in cases
where these duties have been neglected.”
In their private conversations the Nazi conspirators gave abundant
evidence that they considered Slovakia a mere puppet state—in effect a
German possession.
I offer in evidence Document R-100 as Exhibit USA-121. This document is
a memorandum of information given by Hitler to Von Brauchitsch on 25
March 1939. Much of it deals with problems arising from recently
occupied Bohemia and Moravia and Slovakia. I quote, beginning at the
sixth paragraph:
“Colonel General Keitel shall inform Slovak Government via
Foreign Office that it would not be allowed to keep or garrison
armed Slovak units (Hlinka Guards) on this side of the border
formed by the river Waag. They shall be transferred to the new
Slovak territory. Hlinka Guards should be disarmed.
“Slovakia shall be requested via Foreign Office to deliver to
us, against payment, any arms we want and which are still kept
in Slovakia. This request is to be based upon agreement made
between Army and Czech troops. For this payment those millions
should be used which we will pour anyhow into Slovakia.
“Czech Protectorate:
“H. Gr.”—the translator’s note indicates that that probably
means army groups, but I can’t vouch for it—“shall be asked
again whether the request shall be repeated again for the
delivery of all arms within a stated time limit and under the
threat of severe penalties.
“We take all war material of former Czechoslovakia without
paying for it. The guns bought by contract before 15 February,
though, shall be paid for . . . . Bohemia and Moravia have to
make annual contributions to the German Treasury. Their amount
shall be fixed on the basis of the expenses earmarked formerly
for the Czech Army.”
The German conquest of Czechoslovakia, in direct contravention of the
Munich Agreement, was the occasion for the formal protest by the British
and French Governments. These documents, Numbers TC-52 and TC-53, dated
17 March 1939, will be presented to the Tribunal by the British
prosecutor.
On the same day, 17 March 1939, the Acting Secretary of State of the
United States Government issued a statement, which I will offer in
evidence and I invite the Court to take judicial notice of the entire
volume, Document 2862-PS as Exhibit USA-122, which is an excerpt from
the official volume entitled _Peace and War: United States Foreign
Policy, 1931-1941_ issued under the seal of the Department of State of
the United States of America. Incidentally, this volume which happens to
be my own copy—and I hope I can get another one—I am placing in
evidence, because I am quite certain that in its study of the background
of this whole case, the Court will be very much interested in this
volume, which is a detailed chronological history of all the diplomatic
events leading up to and through the second World War of 1941. But what
I am actually offering in evidence at the moment appears on Pages 454
and 455 of the volume, a statement by the Acting Secretary of State
Welles, dated 17 March 1939:
“The Government of the United States has on frequent occasions
stated its conviction that only through international support of
a program of order based upon law can world peace be assured.
“This Government, founded upon and dedicated to the principles
of human liberty and of democracy, cannot refrain from making
known this country’s condemnation of the acts which have
resulted in the temporary extinguishment of the liberties of a
free and independent people with whom, from the day when the
Republic of Czechoslovakia attained its independence, the people
of the United States have maintained specially close and
friendly relations.
“The position of the Government of the United States has been
made consistently clear. It has emphasized the need for respect
for the sanctity of treaties and of the pledged word, and for
non-intervention by any nation in the domestic affairs of other
nations; and it has on repeated occasions expressed its
condemnation of a policy of military aggression.
“It is manifest that acts of wanton lawlessness and of arbitrary
force are threatening the world peace and the very structure of
modern civilization. The imperative need for the observance of
the principles advocated by this Government has been clearly
demonstrated by the developments which have taken place during
the past 3 days.”
With Czechoslovakia in German hands, the Nazi conspirators had
accomplished the program they had set themselves in the meeting in
Berlin on 5 November 1937. You will recall that this program of conquest
was intended to shorten their frontiers, to increase their industrial
and food reserves, and to place them in a position, both industrially
and strategically, from which they could launch more ambitious and more
devastating campaigns of aggression. In less than a year and a half this
program had been carried through to the satisfaction of the Nazi
leaders, and at that point I would again invite the Court’s attention to
the large chart on the wall. I think it is no mere figure of speech to
make reference to the wolf’s head, what is known in Anglo-American law
as _caput lupinum_.
The lower jaw formed near Austria was taken—the red part on the first
chart—12 March 1938. Czechoslovakia thereby was encircled, and the next
step was the absorption of the mountainous part, the Sudetenland,
indicated on the second chart in red. On 1 October 1938 Czechoslovakia
was further encircled and its defenses weakened, and then the jaws
clamped in, or the pincers, as I believe General Keitel or General Jodl
called them—I believe it was General Jodl’s diary—and you see what
they did to Czechoslovakia. On 15 March 1939 the borders were shortened,
new bases were acquired, and then Czechoslovakia was destroyed. Bohemia
and Moravia are in black and Slovakia in what might be called light tan.
But I have read to you the documents which showed in what condition
Slovakia was left; and with the German military installations in
Slovakia, you see how completely the southern border of Poland was
flanked, as well as the western border, the stage being set for the next
aggression, which the British prosecutor will describe to you.
Of all the Nazi conspirators the Defendant Göring was the most aware of
the economic and strategic advantages which would accrue from the
possession by Germany of Czechoslovakia.
I now offer in evidence Document 1301-PS, which is a rather large file,
and we offer particularly Item 10 of the document, at Page 25 of the
English translation. I offer it as Exhibit USA-123; Page 25 of the
English translation contained the top-secret minutes of a conference
with Göring in the Luftwaffe Ministry (the Air Ministry). The meeting
which was held on 14 October 1938, just 2 weeks after the occupation of
the Sudetenland, was devoted to the discussion of economic problems. As
of that date, the Defendant Göring’s remarks were somewhat prophetic. I
quote from the third paragraph, from the bottom of Page 26 of the
English translation:
“The Sudetenland has to be exploited by every means. General
Field Marshal Göring counts upon a complete industrial
assimilation of Slovakia. Czech and Slovakia would become German
dominions. Everything possible must be taken out. The
Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore
have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary
Keppler.”
In the summer of 1939, after the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia
into the German Reich, Defendant Göring again revealed the great
interest of the Nazi leaders in the Czech economic potential.
I offer in evidence Document R-133 as Exhibit USA-124. This document is
the minutes, dated Berlin, 27 July 1939, signed by Müller, of a
conference between Göring and a group of officials from the OKW and from
other agencies of the German Government concerned with war production.
This meeting had been held 2 days previously, on 25 July. I read the
first part of the account of this meeting.
“In a rather long statement the Field Marshal explained that the
incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German economy had
taken place, among other reasons, to increase the German war
potential, by exploitation of the industry there. Directives,
such as the decree of the Reich Minister for Economics (S 10
402/39 of 10 July 1939) as well as a letter with similar meaning
to the Junkers firm, which might possibly lower the kind and
extent of the armament measures in the Protectorate are contrary
to this principle. If it is necessary to issue such directives,
this should be done only with his consent. In any case, he
insists,”—that is Defendant Göring insists—“in agreement with
the directive by Hitler, that the war potential of the
Protectorate is definitely to be exploited in part or in full
and is to be directed towards mobilization as soon as possible.”
In addition to strengthening the Nazi economic potential for the
following wars of aggression, the conquest of Czechoslovakia provided
the Nazis with new bases from which to wage their next war of
aggression, the attack on Poland.
You will recall the minutes of the conference between Göring and a
pro-Nazi Slovak delegation in the winter of 1938-1939. Those minutes are
Document 2801-PS, which I introduced into evidence earlier, as Exhibit
USA-109. You will recall the last sentence of those minutes, a statement
of Defendant Göring’s conclusions. I quote this sentence again, “Air
bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German Air Force for
use against the East.”
I now offer in evidence Document 1874-PS, as Exhibit USA-125. This
document is the German minutes of a conference which Defendant Göring
held with Mussolini and Ciano on 15 April 1939, one month after the
conquest of Czechoslovakia.
In this conference, Göring told his junior partners in the Axis of the
progress of German preparations for war. He compared the strength of
Germany with the strength of England and France. Not unnaturally, he
mentioned the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in this connection. I
read two paragraphs of these thoughts, on Page 4, Paragraph 2, of the
German minutes.
“However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in any
case, how dangerous this could have been, even after Munich, in
the event of a serious conflict. Because of German action, the
situation of both Axis countries was ameliorated—among other
reasons—because of the economic possibilities which resulted
from the transfer to Germany of the great production capacity of
Czechoslovakia. That contributes toward a considerable
strengthening of the Axis against the Western Powers.
“Furthermore, Germany now need not keep ready a single division
for protection against that country in case of bigger conflict.
This, too, is an advantage by which both Axis countries will, in
the last analysis, benefit.”
Then on Page 5, Paragraph 2, of the German version:
“The action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be viewed
as an advantage for the Axis in case Poland should finally join
the enemies of the Axis powers. Germany could then attack this
country from two flanks and would be within only 25 minutes
flying distance from the new Polish industrial center, which had
been moved further into the interior of the country, nearer to
the other Polish industrial districts because of its proximity
to the border. Now, by the turn of events, it is located again
in the proximity of the border.”
And that flanking on two fronts is illustrated on the four-segment
chart.
I think the chart itself demonstrates, better than any oral argument,
the logic and cold calculation, the deliberation of each step to this
point of the German aggression. More than that, it demonstrates what I
might call the master fight of the aggressive war case, that is, that
each conquest of the Nazi conspirators was deliberately planned, as a
stepping stone to new and more ambitious aggression.
You will recall the words of Hitler, at the conference in the Reich
Chancellery on 23 May 1939, when he was planning the Polish campaign,
Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27. I quote from it:
“The period which lies behind us has, indeed, been put to good
use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in
harmony with our aims.”
It is appropriate to refer to two other speeches of the Nazi leaders. In
his lecture in Munich on 7 November 1943, the Defendant Jodl spoke as
follows, and I quote from Page 5 of Document L-172, already received in
evidence as Exhibit USA-34—on Page 8 of the German text:
“The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of
1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded
off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now
became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of
more or less favorable strategic premises.”
In the speech to his military commanders on 23 November 1939, Hitler
described the process by which he had rebuilt the military power of the
Reich. This is our Document 789-PS, Exhibit USA-23. I quote one passage
from the second paragraph:
“The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step also
was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all,
the Western fortifications had to be finished. It was not
possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me
from the first moment, that I could not be satisfied with the
Sudeten German territory. That was only a partial solution. The
decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the
erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the
action against Poland was laid. . . .”
Before I leave the subject of the aggression against Czechoslovakia, I
should like to submit to the Court a document which became available to
us too late to be included in our document book. It reached me Saturday,
late in the afternoon or late at night. This is an official document,
again from the Czechoslovakian Government, a supplement to the
Czechoslovakian report, which I had previously offered in evidence. I
now offer it, identified as Document 3061-PS, as Exhibit USA-126.
The document was furnished us, if the Court please, in the German text
with an English translation, which didn’t seem to us quite adequate and
we have had it re-translated into English and the translation has just
been passed up, I believe, to the Tribunal. That mimeographed
translation should be appended to our Document Book O.
I shall not read the report; it is about 12 pages long. The Court will
take judicial notice of it, under the provisions of the Charter. I
merely summarize. This document gives confirmation and corroboration to
the other evidence which I presented to the Tribunal. In particular, it
offers support to the following allegations:
First, the close working relationship between Henlein and the SDP, on
the one hand, and Hitler and Defendants Hess and Ribbentrop, on the
other;
Second, the use of the German Legation in Prague to direct the German
Fifth Column activities;
Third, the financing of the Henlein movement by agencies of the German
Government, including the German diplomatic representatives at Prague;
Fourth, the use of the Henlein movement to conduct espionage on direct
orders from the Reich.
In addition, this document gives further details of the circumstances of
the visit of President Hacha to Berlin on the night of 14 March. It
substantiates the fact that President Hacha required the medical
attention of Hitler’s physician and it supports the threat which the
Defendant Göring made to the Czech Delegation.
Now, if it please the Tribunal, that concludes my presentation of what,
to me, has always seemed one of the saddest chapters in human history,
the rape and destruction of the frail little nation of Czechoslovakia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom):
May it please the Tribunal, before I tender the evidence which I desire
to place before the Tribunal, it might be convenient if I explained how
the British case is to be divided up and who will present the different
parts.
I shall deal with the general treaties. After that, my learned friend,
Colonel Griffith-Jones, will deal with Poland. Thirdly, Major Elwyn
Jones will deal with Norway and Denmark. Fourthly, Mr. Roberts will deal
with Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg. Fifthly, Colonel Phillimore will
deal with Greece and Yugoslavia. After that, my friend, Mr. Alderman, of
the American Delegation, will deal on behalf of both delegations with
the aggression against the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.
May I also, with the Tribunal’s permission, say one word about the
arrangements that we have made as to documents. Each of the defendants’
counsel will have a copy of the document book—of the different document
books—in English. In fact, 30 copies of the first four of our document
books have already been placed in the defendants’ Information Center. We
hope that the last document book, dealing with Greece and Yugoslavia,
will have the 30 copies placed there today.
In addition, the defendants’ counsel have at least six copies in German
of every document.
With regard to my own part of the case, the first section on general
treaties, all the documents on this phase are in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_
or _Die Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, of which 10 copies have been
made available to the defendants’ counsel, so that with regard to the
portion with which the Tribunal is immediately concerned, the
defendants’ counsel will have at least 16 copies in German of every
document referred to.
Finally, there is a copy of the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ and _Die Dokumente_
available for the Tribunal, other copies if they so desire, but one is
placed ready for the Tribunal if any member wishes to refer to a German
text.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you propose to call any oral witnesses?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord, no oral witnesses.
If the Tribunal please, before I come to the first treaty I want to make
three quotations to deal with a point which was mentioned in the speech
of my learned friend, the Attorney General, yesterday.
It might be thought from the melancholy story of broken treaties and
violated assurances, which the Tribunal has already heard, that Hitler
and the Nazi Government did not even profess it necessary or desirable
to keep the pledged word. Outwardly, however, the professions were very
different. With regard to treaties, on the 18th of October 1933, Hitler
said, “Whatever we have signed we will fulfill to the best of our
ability.”
The Tribunal will note the reservation, “Whatever we have signed.”
But on the 21st of May 1935 Hitler said, “The German Government will
scrupulously maintain every treaty voluntarily signed, even though it
was concluded before their accession to power and office.”
On assurances Hitler was even more emphatic. In the same speech, the
Reichstag Speech on May 21, 1935, Hitler accepted assurances as being of
equal obligation, and the world at that time could not know that that
meant of no obligation at all. What he actually said was:
“And when I now hear from the lips of a British statesman that
such assurances are nothing and that the only proof of sincerity
is the signature appended to collective pacts, I must ask Mr.
Eden to be good enough to remember that it is a question of an
assurance in any case. It is sometimes much easier to sign
treaties with the mental reservations that one will reconsider
one’s attitude at the decisive hour than to declare before an
entire nation and with full opportunity one’s adherence to a
policy which serves the course of peace because it rejects
anything which leads to war.”
And then he proceeds with the illustration of his assurance to France.
Never having seen the importance which Hitler wished the world to
believe he attached to treaties, I shall ask the Tribunal in my part of
the case to look at 15 only of the treaties which he and the Nazis
broke. The remainder of the 69 broken treaties shown on the chart and
occurring between 1933 and 1941 will be dealt with by my learned
friends.
There is one final point as to the position of a treaty in German law,
as I understand it. The appearance of a treaty in the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_ makes it part of the statute law of Germany, and
that is by no means an uninteresting aspect of the breaches which I
shall put before the Tribunal.
The first treaty to be dealt with is the Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, signed at The Hague on the 29th of
July 1899. I ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of the
Convention, and for convenience I hand in as Exhibit GB-1 the British
Document TC-1. The German reference is to the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ for
1901, Number 44, Sections 401 to 404, and 482 and 483. The Tribunal will
find the relevant charge in Appendix C as Charge 1.
As the Attorney General said yesterday, these Hague Conventions are only
the first gropings towards the rejection of the inevitability of war.
They do not render the making of aggressive war a crime, but their
milder terms were as readily broken as the more severe agreements.
On 19 July 1899, Germany, Greece, Serbia, and 25 other nations signed a
convention. Germany ratified the convention on 4 September 1900, Serbia
on 11 May 1901, and Greece on 4 April 1901.
By Article 12 of the treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, signed at the St.
Germaine-en-Laye on 10 September 1919, the new Kingdom succeeded to all
the old Serbian treaties, and later, as the Tribunal knows, changed its
name to Yugoslavia.
I think it is sufficient, unless the Tribunal wish otherwise, for me to
read the first two articles only:
“Article 1: With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse
to force in the relations between states, the signatory powers
agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement
of international differences.
“Article 2: In case of serious disagreement or conflict, before
an appeal to arms the signatory powers agree to have recourse,
as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation
of one or more friendly powers.”
After that the Convention deals with machinery, and I don’t think,
subject to any wish of the Tribunal, that it is necessary for me to deal
with it in detail.
The second treaty is the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, signed at The Hague on the 18th of October 1907.
Again I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this, and for
convenience I hand in as Exhibit GB-2 the Final Act of the Conference at
The Hague, which contains British Documents TC-2, 3, and 4. The
reference to this Convention in German is to the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ for
1910, Number 52, Sections 22 to 25; and the relevant charge is Charge 2.
This Convention, was signed at The Hague by 44 nations, and it is in
effect as to 31 nations, 28 signatories, and 3 adherents. For our
purposes it is in force as to the United States, Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Russia.
By the provisions of Article 91 it replaces the 1899 Convention as
between the contracting powers. As Greece and Yugoslavia are parties to
the 1899 Convention and not to the 1907, the 1899 Convention is in
effect with regard to them, and that explains the division of countries
in Appendix C.
Again I only desire that the Tribunal should look at the first two
articles:
“1. With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to
force in the relations between states, the contracting powers
agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement
of international differences.”
Then I don’t think I need trouble to read 2. It is the same article as
to mediation, and again, there are a number of machinery provisions.
The third treaty is the Hague Convention relative to the opening of
hostilities, signed at the same time. It is contained in the exhibit
which I put in. Again I ask that judicial notice be taken of it. The
British Document is TC-3. The German reference is the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_ for 1910, Number 2, Sections 82 to 102, and the
reference in Appendix C to Charge 3.
This Convention applies to Germany, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Russia. It relates to a procedural step
in notifying one’s prospective opponent before opening hostilities
against him. It appears to have had its immediate origin in the
Russo-Japanese war, 1904, when Japan attacked Russia without any
previous warning. It will be noted that it does not fix any particular
lapse of time between the giving of notice and the commencement of
hostilities, but it does seek to maintain an absolutely minimum standard
of international decency before the outbreak of war.
Again, if I might refer the Tribunal to the first article:
“The contracting powers recognize that hostilities between them
must not commence without a previous and explicit warning in the
form of either a declaration of war, giving reasons, or an
ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.”
Then there are a number again of machinery provisions, with which I
shall not trouble the Tribunal.
The fourth treaty is the Hague Convention 5, respecting the rights and
duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land, signed at
the same time. That is British Document TC-4, and the German reference
is _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1910, Number 2, Sections 168 and 176. Reference
in Appendix C is to Charge 4.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to give the German reference? If it is
necessary for defendants’ counsel, all right, but if not it need not be
done.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If I may omit them it will save some time.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If any of the defendants’ counsel want any
specific reference perhaps they will be good enough to ask me.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Germany was an original signatory to the
Convention, and the Treaty is in force as a result of ratification or
adherence between Germany and Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, the U.S.S.R., and the United States.
I call the attention of the Tribunal to the short contents of Article 1,
“The territory of neutral powers is inviolable.”
A point does arise, however, on this Convention. I want to make this
clear at once. Under Article 20, the provisions of the present
Convention do not apply except between the contracting powers, and then
only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.
As Great Britain and France entered the war within 2 days of the
outbreak of the war between Germany and Poland, and one of these powers
had not ratified the Convention, it is arguable that its provisions did
not apply to the second World War.
I do not want the time of the Tribunal to be occupied by an argument on
that point when there are so many more important treaties to be
considered. Therefore, I do not press that as a charge of a breach of
treaty. I merely call the attention of the Tribunal to the terms of
Article 1 as showing the state of international opinion at that time and
as an element in the aggressive character of the war which we are
considering.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this would be a good time to break off.
[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As the Tribunal adjourned I had come to the
fifth treaty, the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated
Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles the 28th of June 1919. I again
ask the Tribunal to take judicial cognizance of this treaty, and I again
hand in for convenience Exhibit GB-3, which is a copy of the treaty,
including the British documents TC-5 to TC-10 inclusive. The reference
in Appendix C is to Charge 5.
Before I deal with the relevant portions, may I explain very briefly the
layout of the treaty.
Part I contains the Covenant of the League of Nations, and Part II sets
the boundaries of Germany in Europe. These boundaries are described in
detail but Part II makes no provision for guaranteeing these boundaries.
Part III, Articles 31 to 117, with which the Tribunal is concerned,
contains the political clauses for Europe. In it, Germany guarantees
certain territorial boundaries in Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria,
Czechoslovakia, France, Poland, Memel, Danzig, and so forth.
It might be convenient for the Tribunal to note, at the moment, the
interweaving of this treaty with the next, which is the Treaty for the
Restoration of Friendly Relations between the United States and Germany.
Parts I, II, and III of the Versailles Treaty are not included in the
United States treaty. Parts IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIV, and XV
are all repeated verbatim in the United States treaty from the Treaty of
Versailles.
The Tribunal is concerned with Part V—the military, naval, and air
clauses. Parts VII and XIII are not included in the United States
treaty.
I don’t think there is any reason to explain what the parts are, but if
the Tribunal wishes to know about any specific part, I shall be very
happy to explain it.
The first part that the Tribunal is concerned with is that contained in
the British Document TC-5, and consists of Articles 42 to 44 dealing
with the Rhineland. These are very short, and as they are repeated in
the Locarno Treaty, perhaps I had better read them once, just so that
the Tribunal will have them in mind.
“Article 42: Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any
fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the
right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the east
of the Rhine.
“Article 43: In the area defined above, the maintenance and the
assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and
military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all
permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.
“Article 44: In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the
provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as
committing a hostile act against the powers signatory of the
present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the
world.”
I am not going to put in evidence, but I simply draw the Tribunal’s
attention to a document of which they can take judicial notice, as it
has been published by the German State, the memorandum of March 7, 1936,
giving their account of the breach. The matters regarding the breach
have been dealt with by my friend, Mr. Alderman, and I don’t propose to
go over the ground again.
The next part of the treaty is in the British Document TC-6, dealing
with Austria:
“Article 80: Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the
independence of Austria within the frontiers which may be fixed
in a treaty between that state and the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be
inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the
League of Nations.”
Again in the same way, the proclamation of Hitler dealing with Austria,
the background of which has been dealt with by my friend, Mr. Alderman,
is attached as TC-47. I do not intend to read it because the Tribunal
can again take judicial notice of the public proclamation.
Next is Document TC-8, dealing with Memel:
“Germany renounces, in favor of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers, all rights and title over the territories
included between the Baltic, the northeastern frontier of East
Prussia as defined in Article 28 of Part II, (Boundaries of
Germany) of the present treaty, and the former frontier between
Germany and Russia.
“Germany undertakes to accept the settlement made by the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers in regard to these
territories, particularly insofar as concerns the nationality of
inhabitants.”
I don’t think that the Tribunal has had any reference to the formal
document of incorporation of Memel, of which again the Tribunal can take
judicial notice; and I put in, for convenience, a copy as GB-4. It is
British Document TC-53A, and it appears in our book. It is very short,
so perhaps the Tribunal will bear with me while I read it:
“The Transfer Commissioner for the Memel territory, Gauleiter
und Oberpräsident Erich Koch, effected on 3 April during a
conference at Memel, the final incorporation of the Memel
territory into the National Socialist Party Gau of East Prussia
and into the state administration of the East Prussian
Regierungsbezirk of Gumbinnen . . . .”
Then, next we come to TC-9, which is the article relating to Danzig,
Article 100, and I shall read only the first sentence, because the
remainder consists of geographical boundaries;
“Germany renounces, in favor of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers, all rights and title over the territory
comprised within the following limits . . . .”
—And then the limits are set out and are described in a German map
attached to the treaty.
Lieutenant Colonel Griffith-Jones, who will deal with this part of the
case, will formally prove the documents relating to the occupation of
Danzig, and I shall not trouble the Tribunal with them now.
So if the Tribunal would go on to British Document TC-7—that is Article
81, dealing with the Czechoslovak State:
“Germany, in conformity with the action already taken by the
Allied and Associated Powers, recognizes the complete
independence of the Czechoslovak State, which will include the
autonomous territory of the Ruthenians to the south of the
Carpathians. Germany hereby recognizes the frontiers of this
state as determined by the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers and other interested states.”
Mr. Alderman has dealt with this matter only this morning, and he has
already put in an exhibit giving in detail the conference between Hitler
and President Hacha, and the Foreign Minister Chvalkowsky, at which the
Defendants Göring and Keitel were present. Therefore, I am not going to
put in to the Tribunal the British translation of the captured Foreign
Office minutes, which occurs in TC-48; but I put in formally, as Mr.
Alderman asked me to this morning, as GB-6, the Document TC-49, which is
the agreement signed by Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop for Germany
and Dr. Hacha and Dr. Chvalkowsky for Czechoslovakia. It is an agreement
of which the Tribunal will take judicial notice. I am afraid I can’t
quite remember whether Mr. Alderman read it this morning; it is Document
TC-49. He certainly referred to it.
THE PRESIDENT: No, he did not read it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then perhaps I might read it. Text of the:
“Agreement between the Führer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler
and the President of the Czechoslovak State Dr. Hacha . . . .
“The Führer and Reich Chancellor today received in Berlin, at
their own request, the President of the Czechoslovak State, Dr.
Hacha, and the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Chvalkowsky,
in the presence of Herr von Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister of
the Reich. At this meeting the serious situation which had
arisen within the previous territory of Czechoslovakia, owing to
the events of recent weeks, was subjected to a completely open
examination. The conviction was unanimously expressed on both
sides that the object of all their efforts must be to assure
quiet, order, and peace in this part of Central Europe. The
President of the Czechoslovak State declared that, in order to
serve this end and to reach a final pacification, he confidently
placed the fate of the Czech people and of their country in the
hands of the Führer of the German Reich. The Führer accepted
this declaration and expressed his decision to assure to the
Czech people, under the protection of the German Reich, the
autonomous development of their national life, in accordance
with their special characteristics. In witness whereof this
document is signed in duplicate.”
The signatures I mentioned appear.
The Tribunal will understand that it is not my province to make any
comment; that has been done by Mr. Alderman. And I am not putting
forward any of the documents I read as having my support; they are
merely put forward factually as part of the case.
The next document, which I put in as GB-7, is the British Document
TC-50. That is Hitler’s proclamation to the German people, dated the
15th of March 1939. Again, I don’t think that Mr. Alderman read that
document.
THE PRESIDENT: No, he did not read it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I shall read it:
“Proclamation of the Führer to the German people, 15 March 1939.
“To the German People:
“Only a few months ago Germany was compelled to protect her
fellow countrymen, living in well-defined settlements, against
the unbearable Czechoslovakian terror regime; and during the
last weeks the same thing has happened on an ever-increasing
scale. This is bound to create an intolerable state of affairs
within an area inhabited by citizens of so many nationalities.
“These national groups, to counteract the renewed attacks
against their freedom and life, have now broken away from the
Prague Government. Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist.
“Since Sunday at many places wild excesses have broken out,
amongst the victims of which are again many Germans. Hourly the
number of oppressed and persecuted people crying for help is
increasing. From areas thickly populated by German-speaking
inhabitants, which last autumn Czechoslovakia was allowed by
German generosity to retain, refugees robbed of their personal
belongings are streaming into the Reich.
“Continuation of such a state of affairs would lead to the
destruction of every vestige of order in an area in which
Germany is vitally interested particularly as for over 1,000
years it formed a part of the German Reich.
“In order definitely to remove this menace to peace and to
create the conditions for a necessary new order in this living
space, I have today resolved to allow German troops to march
into Bohemia and Moravia. They will disarm the terror gangs and
the Czechoslovakian forces supporting them, and protect the
lives of all who are menaced. Thus they will lay the foundations
for introducing a fundamental re-ordering of affairs which will
be in accordance with the 1,000-year-old history and will
satisfy the practical needs of the German and Czech
peoples.”—Signed—“Adolf Hitler, Berlin, 15 March 1939.”
Then there is a footnote, an order of the Führer to the German Armed
Forces of the same date, in which the substance is that they are told to
march in, to safeguard lives and property of all inhabitants, and not to
conduct themselves as enemies, but as an instrument for carrying out the
German Reich Government’s decision.
I put in, as GB-8, the decrees establishing the Protectorate, which is
TC-51.
I think again, as these are public decrees, the Tribunal can take
judicial knowledge of them. Their substance has been fully explained by
Mr. Alderman. With the permission of the Tribunal, I won’t read them in
full now.
Then again, as Mr. Alderman requested, I put in, as GB-9, British
Document TC-52, the British protest. If I might just read that to the
Tribunal—it is from Lord Halifax to Sir Neville Henderson, our
Ambassador in Berlin:
“Foreign Office, March 17, 1939.
“Please inform the German Government that His Majesty’s
Government desire to make it plain to them that they cannot but
regard the events of the past few days as a complete repudiation
of the Munich Agreement and a denial of the spirit in which the
negotiators of that Agreement bound themselves to co-operate for
a peaceful settlement.
“His Majesty’s Government must also take this occasion to
protest against the changes effected in Czechoslovakia by German
military action, which are in their view, devoid of any basis of
legality.”
And again at Mr. Alderman’s request, I put in as GB-10 the Document
TC-53, which is the French protest of the same date, and if I might read
the third paragraph:
“The French Ambassador has the honor to inform the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Reich, of the formal protest made by the
Government of the French Republic against the measures which the
communication of Count de Welczeck records.
“The Government of the Republic consider, in fact, that in face
of the action directed by the German Government against
Czechoslovakia, they are confronted with a flagrant violation of
the letter and the spirit of the agreement signed at Munich on
September 29, 1938.
“The circumstances in which the agreement of March 15 has been
imposed on the leaders of the Czechoslovak Republic do not, in
the eyes of the Government of the Republic, legalize the
situation registered in that agreement.
“The French Ambassador has the honor to inform His Excellency,
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich, that the
Government of the Republic cannot recognize under these
conditions the legality of the new situation created in
Czechoslovakia by the action of the German Reich.”
I now come to Part 5 of the Versailles Treaty, and the relevant matters
are contained in the British Document TC-10. As considerable discussion
is centered around them, I read the introductory words:
“Part V, Military, Naval, and Air Clauses: In order to render
possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments
of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the
military, naval, and air clauses which follow.
“Section 1. Military Clauses. Chapter I. Effectives and Cadres
of the German Army.
“Article 159. The German military forces shall be demobilized
and reduced as prescribed hereinafter.
“Article 160. (1) By a date which must not be later than March
31, 1920, the German Army must not comprise more than seven
divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry.
“After that date, the total number of effectives in the Army of
the states constituting Germany must not exceed 100,000 men,
including officers and establishments of depots. The Army shall
be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the
territory and to the control of the frontiers.
“The total effective strength of officers, including the
personnel of staffs, whatever their composition, must not exceed
4,000.
“(2) Divisions and Army Corps headquarters staffs, shall be
organized in accordance with Table Number 1 annexed to this
Section. The number and strength of the units of infantry,
artillery, engineers, technical services and troops laid down in
the aforesaid table constitute maxima which must not be
exceeded.”
Then there is a description of units that can have their own depots and
the grouping of divisions under corps headquarters, and then the next
two provisions are of some importance:
“The maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped or
of other organizations for the command of troops or for
preparation for war is forbidden.
“The great German General Staff and all similar organizations
shall be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form.”
I don’t think I need trouble the Tribunal with Article 161, which deals
with administrative services.
Article 163 provides the steps by which the reduction will take place,
and then we come to Chapter 2, dealing with armament, and that provides
that up till the time at which Germany is admitted as a member of the
League of Nations, armaments shall not be greater than the amounts fixed
in Table Number 11.
If the Tribunal will note the second part, Germany agrees that after she
has become a member of the League of Nations, the armaments fixed in the
said table shall remain in force until they are modified by the Council
of the League. Furthermore, she hereby agrees strictly to observe the
decisions of the Council of the League on this subject.
Then, 165 deals with guns and machine guns, and so forth, and 167 deals
with notification of guns, and 168, the first part, says:
“The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war material shall
only be carried out in factories or works, the location of which
shall be communicated to and approved by the governments of the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and the number of which
they retain the right to restrict.”
Article 169 deals with the surrender of material. Number 170 prohibits
importation; 171 prohibits gas, and 172 provides for disclosure. Then
173, under the heading, “Recruiting and Military Training” deals with
one matter, the breach of which is of great importance:
“Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in
Germany. The German Army may only be constituted and recruited
by means of voluntary enlistment.”
Then the succeeding articles deal with the method of enlistment in order
to prevent a quick rush through the army of men enlisted for a short
time.
I think that all I need do is to draw the attention of the Tribunal to
the completeness and detail with which all these points are covered in
Articles 174 to 179.
Then, passing to TC-10, Article 180. That contains the prohibition of
fortress works beyond a certain limit and in the Rhineland. The first
sentence is:
“All fortified works, fortresses, and field works situated in
German territory to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to
the east of the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled.”
I shall not trouble the Tribunal with the tables which show the amounts.
Then we come to the naval clauses. If the Tribunal will be good enough
to go on four pages, they will come to Article 181, and I will just read
that to show the way in which the naval limitations are imposed and
refer briefly to the others.
Article 181 says:
“After the expiration of a period of 2 months from the coming
into force of the present treaty the German naval forces in
commission must not exceed:
“Six battleships of the Deutschland or Lothringen type, six
light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, or an equal
number of ships constructed to replace them as provided in
Article 190.
“No submarines are to be included.
“All other warships, except where there is provision to the
contrary in the present treaty, must be placed in reserve or
devoted to commercial purposes.”
Then 182 simply deals with the mine sweeping necessary to clear up the
mines, and 183 limits the personnel to 15,000, including officers and
men of all grades and corps, and 184 deals with surface ships not in
German ports, and the succeeding clauses deal with various details, and
I pass at once to Article 191, which says:
“The construction or acquisition of any submarines, even for
commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in Germany.”
Article 194 makes corresponding obligations of voluntary engagements for
longer service, and 196 and 197 deal with naval fortifications and
wireless stations.
Then, if the Tribunal please, would they pass to Article 198, the first
of the air clauses. The essential and important sentence is the first:
“The Armed Forces of Germany must not include any military or
naval air forces.”
I don’t think that I need trouble the Tribunal with the detailed
provisions which occur in the next four clauses, which are all
consequential.
Then, the next document, which for convenience is put next to that, is
the British Document TC-44. For convenience I put in a copy as GB-11,
but this again is merely ancillary to Mr. Alderman’s argument. It is the
report of the formal statement made at the German Air Ministry about the
restarting of the Air Corps, and I respectfully submit that the Tribunal
can take judicial notice of that.
Similarly, without proving formally the long Document, TC-45, the
Tribunal can again take judicial notice of the public proclamation,
which is a well-known public document in Germany, the proclamation of
compulsory military service. Mr. Alderman has again dealt with this
fully in his address.
I now come to the sixth treaty, which is the treaty between the United
States and Germany restoring friendly relations, and I put in a copy as
Exhibit GB-12. It is Document TC-11, and the Tribunal will find it as
the second last document in the document book. The purpose of this
treaty was to complete official cessation of hostilities between the
United States of America and Germany, and I have already explained to
the Tribunal that it incorporated certain parts of the Treaty of
Versailles. The relevant portion for the consideration of the Tribunal
is Part V, and I have just concluded going through the clauses of the
Treaty of Versailles which are repeated verbatim in this treaty. I
therefore, with the approval of the Tribunal, will not read them again,
but at Page 11 of my copy, they will see the clauses are repeated in
exactly the same way.
Then I pass to the seventh treaty, which is the Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy,
negotiated at Locarno, October 16, 1925. I ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of that, and I put in as Exhibit GB-13, the British
Document TC-12.
I was dealing with the Treaty of Locarno, and it might be convenient if
I just reminded the Tribunal of the treaties that were negotiated at
Locarno, because they do all go together and are to a certain extent
mutually dependent.
At Locarno, Germany negotiated five treaties:
(A) The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France,
Great Britain, and Italy; (B) the Arbitration Convention between Germany
and France; (C) the Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium;
(D) the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland; and (E) an
Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia.
Article 10 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee provided that it should
come into force as soon as ratifications were deposited at Geneva, in
the archives of the League of Nations, and as soon as Germany became a
member of the League of Nations. The ratifications were deposited on the
14th September 1926 and Germany became a member of the League of Nations
on the 10th of September 1926.
The two arbitration conventions and the two arbitration treaties which I
mentioned provide that they shall enter into force under the same
conditions as the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. That is Article 21 of the
Arbitration Conventions and Article 22 of the Arbitration Treaties.
The most important of the five agreements is the Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee. One of its purposes was to establish in perpetuity the
borders between Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France. It contains
no provision for denunciation or withdrawal therefrom and provides that
it shall remain in force until the Council of the League of Nations
decides that the League of Nations ensures sufficient protection to the
parties to the treaty—an event which never happened—in which case the
Treaty of Mutual Guarantee shall expire 1 year later.
The general scheme of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee is that Article 1
provides that the parties guarantee three things:
The border between Germany and France, the border between Germany and
Belgium, and the demilitarization of the Rhineland.
Article 2 provides that Germany and France, and Germany and Belgium,
agree that they will not attack or invade each other with certain
inapplicable exceptions, and Article 3 provides that Germany and France,
and Germany and Belgium, agree to settle all disputes between them by
peaceful means.
The Tribunal will remember, because this point was made by my friend,
Mr. Alderman, that the first important violation of the Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee appears to have been the entry of German troops into the
Rhineland on 7 March 1936. The day after, France and Belgium asked the
League of Nations Council to consider the question of the German
re-occupation of the Rhineland and the purported repudiation of the
treaty, and on the 12th of March, after a protest from the British
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy
recognized unanimously that the re-occupation was a violation of this
treaty, and on the 14th of March, the League Council duly and properly
decided that it was not permissible and that the Rhineland clauses of
the pact were not voidable by Germany because of the alleged violation
by France in the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact.
That is the background to the treaty with the international
organizations that were then in force, and if I might suggest them to
the Tribunal without adding to the summary which I have given, the
relevant articles are 1, 2, and 3, which I have mentioned, and 4, which
provides for the bringing of violations before the Council of the
League, as was done, and 5 I ask the Tribunal to note, because it deals
with the clauses of the Versailles Treaty which I have already
mentioned. It says:
“The provisions of Article 3 of the present treaty are placed
under the guarantee of the High Contracting Parties as provided
by the following stipulations:
“If one of the powers referred to in Article 3 refuses to submit
a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral
or judicial decision and commits a violation of Article 2 of the
present treaty or a breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of
Versailles, the provisions of Article 4 of the present treaty
shall apply.”
That is the procedure of going to the League or in the case of a
flagrant breach, of taking more stringent action.
I remind the Tribunal of this provision because of the quotations from
Hitler which I mentioned earlier, when he said that the German
Government will scrupulously maintain every treaty voluntarily signed,
even though they were concluded before their accession to power and
office. Whatever may be said of the Treaty of Versailles, whatever may
be argued and has been argued, no one has ever argued for a moment, to
the best of my knowledge, that Herr Stresemann was in any way acting
involuntarily when he signed, along with the other representatives, the
Locarno pact on behalf of Germany. It was signed not only by Herr
Stresemann, but by Herr Hans Luther, so that there you have a treaty
freely entered into, which repeats the Rhineland provisions of
Versailles and binds Germany in that regard. I simply call the attention
of the Tribunal to Article 8, which deals with the remaining in force of
the treaty. I might perhaps read it because as I told the Tribunal all
the other treaties have the same lasting qualities, the same provisions
as to the time they will last, as the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. It
says:
“Article 8. The present treaty shall be registered at the League
of Nations in accordance with the Covenant of the League. It
shall remain in force until the Council, acting on a request by
one or other of the High Contracting Parties notified to the
other signatory powers 3 months in advance, and voting at least
by a two-thirds majority, decides that the League of Nations
ensures sufficient protection to the High Contracting Parties;
the treaty shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a
period of 1 year from such decision.”
That is, that in signing this treaty, the German representatives clearly
placed the question of repudiation or avoidance of the treaty in hands
other than their own. They were at the time, of course, a member of the
League, and a member of the Council of the League, but they left the
repudiation and avoidance to the decision of the League.
Then the next treaty on my list is the Arbitration Treaty between
Germany and Czechoslovakia, which was one of the Locarno group and to
which I have already referred, but for convenience I have put in Exhibit
GB-14, which is British Document TC-14. As a breach of this treaty, as
charged in Charge 8, of Appendix C, I mentioned the background of the
treaty, and I shall not go into it again but I think the only clauses
that the Tribunal need look at, are Article 1, which is the governing
clause, and says as follows (Document TC-14):
“All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia
with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their
respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle
amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted
for decision either to an arbitral tribunal, or to the Permanent
Court of International Justice as laid down hereafter. It is
agreed that the disputes referred to above include, in
particular, those mentioned in Article 13 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations.
“This provision does not apply to disputes arising out of events
prior to the present treaty and belonging to the past.
“Disputes for the settlement of which a special procedure is
laid down in other conventions in force between the High
Contracting Parties, shall be settled in conformity with the
provisions of these conventions.”
Articles 2 to 21 of the machinery. In Article 22 the second sentence
says it—that’s the present treaty—shall enter into and remain in force
under the same conditions as the said treaty, which is the Treaty of
Mutual Guarantee.
Now that, I think, is all I need mention about that treaty. I think I am
right that my friend, Mr. Alderman, referred to it. It is certainly the
treaty to which President Beneš unsuccessfully appealed during the
crisis in the autumn of 1938. Now the ninth treaty which I should deal
with is not in this document book, and I merely am putting it in
formally, because my friend, Mr. Roberts, will deal with it and read the
appropriate parts—if the Tribunal will be good enough to note it
because it is mentioned in Charge 9 of Appendix C. It is the Arbitration
Convention between Germany and Belgium also done at Locarno, of which I
hand in a copy for convenience as GB-15. In fact, I can tell the
Tribunal all these arbitration conventions are in the same form, and I
am not going to deal with it because it is essentially part of the case
concerned with Belgium, the Low Countries, and Luxembourg, which my
friend, Mr. Roberts, will present. Therefore, I only ask the Tribunal to
accept the formal document for the moment. And the same applies to the
tenth treaty, which is mentioned in Charge 10 of Appendix C. That is the
Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland, of which I ask the
Tribunal to take notice, and I hand in as GB-16. That again will be
dealt with by my friend, Colonel Griffith-Jones, when he is dealing with
the Polish case.
I therefore can take the Tribunal straight to a matter which is not a
treaty, but is a solemn declaration, and that is TC-18, which I now put
in as Exhibit GB-17, and ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of, as
a Declaration of the Assembly of the League of Nations. The importance
is the date which was the 24th of September 1927. The Tribunal may
remember that I asked them to take judicial notice of the fact that
Germany had become a member of the League of Nations on 10 September
1926, a year before.
The importance of this Declaration is not only its effect in
international law, to which my learned friend, the Attorney General,
referred, but the fact that it was unanimously adopted by the Assembly
of the League, of which Germany was a free, and let me say at once, an
active member at the time. I think that all I need read of TC-18 is, if
the Tribunal would be good enough to look at it, the speech which begins
“M. Sokal of Poland (Rapporteur),” and then the translation after the
Rapporteur had dealt with the formalities, that this had gone to the
third committee and been unanimously adopted, and he had been asked to
act as Rapporteur, he says—the second paragraph:
“The committee was of opinion that, at the present juncture, a
solemn resolution passed by the Assembly, declaring that wars of
aggression must never be employed as a means of settling
disputes between states, and that such wars constitute an
international crime, would have a salutary effect on public
opinion, and would help to create an atmosphere favorable to the
League’s future work in the matter of security and disarmament.
“While recognizing that the draft resolution does not constitute
a regular legal instrument, which would be adequate in itself
and represent a concrete contribution towards security, the
Third Committee unanimously agreed as to its great moral and
educative value.”
Then he asked the Assembly to adopt the draft resolution, and I will
read simply the terms of the resolution, which shows what so many
nations, including Germany, put forward at that time:
“The Assembly, recognizing the solidarity which unites the
community of nations, being inspired by a firm desire for the
maintenance of general peace, being convinced that a war of
aggression can never serve as a means of settling international
disputes, and is in consequence an international crime;
considering that a solemn renunciation of all wars of aggression
would tend to create an atmosphere of general confidence
calculated to facilitate the progress of the work undertaken
. . . with a view to disarmament:
“Declares: 1. That all wars of aggression are and shall always
be prohibited: 2. That every pacific means must be employed to
settle disputes of every description, which may arise between
states.
“The Assembly declares that the states, members of the League,
are under an obligation to conform to these principles.”
After a solemn vote taken in the form of roll call the President
announced—which you will see at the end of the extract:
“All the delegations having pronounced in favor of the
declaration submitted by the Third Committee, I declare it
unanimously adopted.”
The last general treaty which I have to place before the Tribunal is the
Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Pact of Paris of 1928, which my learned friend,
the Attorney General, in opening this part of the case read _in extenso_
and commented on fully, I hand in as Exhibit GB-18—the British Document
TC-19, which is a copy of that pact. I did not intend, unless the
Tribunal desired otherwise, that I should read it again, as the Attorney
General yesterday read it in full, but of course I am at the service of
the Tribunal and therefore I leave that document before the Tribunal in
that way.
Now all that remains for me to do is to place before the Tribunal
certain documents which Mr. Alderman mentioned in the course of his
address, and left to me. I am afraid that I haven’t placed them in a
special order, because they don’t really relate to the treaties I have
dealt with, but to Mr. Alderman’s argument. The first of these I hand in
as Exhibit GB-19. It is British Document TC-26, and comes just after
that resolution of the League of Nations to which the Tribunal had just
been giving attention—TC-26. It is the assurance contained in Hitler’s
speech on 21 May 1935, and it is very short, and unless the Tribunal has
it in mind from Mr. Alderman’s speech, I will read it again; I am not
sure of his reading it:
“Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the domestic
affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to attach that country
to her. The German people and the German Government have,
however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of the
simple feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent,
that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed not
only to foreign nations, but to the German people everywhere. I
myself believe that no regime which is not anchored in the
people, supported by the people, and desired by the people, can
exist permanently.”
The next document which is TC-22, and which is on the next page, I now
hand in as Exhibit GB-20. It is the copy of the official proclamation of
the agreement between the German Government and the Government of the
Federal State of Austria on 11 July 1936, and I am almost certain that
Mr. Alderman did read this document, but I refer the Tribunal to
Paragraph 1 of the agreement to remind them of the essential content:
“The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the
Federal State of Austria in the sense of the pronouncements of
the German Leader and Chancellor of the 21st of May 1935.”
I now have three documents which Mr. Alderman asked me to hand in with
regard to Czechoslovakia. The first is TC-27, which the Tribunal will
find two documents further on from the one of Austria, to which I have
just been referring. That is the German assurance to Czechoslovakia, and
what I am handing in as GB-21 is the letter from M. Masaryk, Jan
Masaryk’s son, to Lord Halifax, dated the 12th of March 1938. Again I
think that if Mr. Alderman did not read this, he certainly quoted the
statement made by the Defendant Göring, which appears in the third
paragraph. In the first statement the Field Marshal used the expression,
“ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort,” which I understand means, “I give you
my word of honor,” and if you will look down three paragraphs, after the
Defendant Göring had asked that there would not be a mobilization of the
Czechoslovak Army, the communication continues:
“M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding
assurances on this subject, and today spoke with Baron Von
Neurath—that is the Defendant Von Neurath—who, among other
things assured him on behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still
considers herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration
Convention concluded at Locarno in October 1925.”
So there I remind the Tribunal that in 1925 Herr Stresemann was speaking
on behalf of Germany in an agreement voluntarily concluded. Had there
been the slightest doubt of that, here is the Defendant Von Neurath
giving the assurance on behalf of Hitler that Germany still considers
herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention on 12
March 1938, 6 months before Dr. Beneš made a hopeless appeal to it,
before the crisis in the autumn of 1938. Of course the difficult
position of the Czechoslovak Government is set out in the last
paragraph, but M. Masaryk says—and the Tribunal may think with great
force—in his last sentence:
“They cannot however fail to view with great apprehension the
sequel of events in Austria between the date of the bilateral
agreement between Germany and Austria, 11 July 1936, and
yesterday, 11 March 1938.”
I refrain from comment, but I venture to say that is one of the most
pregnant sentences relating to this period.
Now the next document which is on the next page is the British Document
TC-28, which I hand in as Exhibit GB-22. And that is an assurance of the
26th of September 1938, which Hitler gave to Czechoslovakia, and
again—the Tribunal will check my memory—I don’t think that Mr.
Alderman read this but . . .
THE PRESIDENT: No, I don’t think so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I think if he did not, the Tribunal ought
to have it before them, because it gives very important point as to the
alleged governing principle of getting Germans back to the Reich, which
the Nazi conspirators purported to ask for a considerable time, while it
suited them. It says:
“I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for
all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people
want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot
go back beyond the limits of our patience.”
The Tribunal will remember this is between the Godesberg visit and the
Munich Pact:
“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for
Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the
moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to
say, when the Czechs have come to an agreement with their other
minorities peacefully, and without oppression, I will no longer
be interested in the Czech State, and that, as far as I am
concerned, I will guarantee it. We don’t want any Czechs. But I
must also declare before the German people that in the
Sudeten-German problem my patience is now at an end. I made an
offer to Herr Beneš which was no more than the realization of
what he had already promised. He has now peace or war in his
hands. Either he will accept this offer and at length give the
Germans their freedom, or we shall get this freedom for
ourselves.”
Less than 6 months before the 15th of March Hitler was saying in the
most violent terms that “he didn’t want any Czechs.” The Tribunal has
heard the sequel from my friend, Mr. Alderman, this morning. The last
document which I have been asked to put in, and which I now ask the
Tribunal to take notice of, and hand in, is Exhibit GB-23, which is the
British Document TC-23 and a copy of the Munich Agreement of September
29, 1938. That was signed by Hitler, the late Mr. Neville Chamberlain,
M. Daladier, and Mussolini, and it is largely a procedural agreement by
which the entry of German troops into the Sudeten-Deutsche territory is
regulated. That is shown by the preliminary clause:
“Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, taking into
consideration the agreement which has been already reached in
principle, for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten-German
territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions
governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon,
and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for
the steps necessary to secure fulfillment.”
Then I don’t think, unless the Tribunal want me, I need go through the
steps. In Article 4, it said that “The occupation by stages of the
predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on 1
October.” The four territories are marked on a map. And by Article 6,
“The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the
international commission.” And it provides also for rights of option and
release from the forces—the Czech forces of Sudeten Germans.
That is what Hitler was asking for in the somewhat rhetorical passage
which I have just read out, and it will be observed that there is an
annex to the agreement which is most significant.
“Annex to the Agreement:
“His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the French
Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis
that they stand by the offer contained in Paragraph 6 of the
Anglo-French Proposals of the 19th September, relating to an
international guarantee of the new boundaries of the
Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.
“When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in
Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy, for their
part, will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.”
The Polish and Hungarian minorities, not the question of Slovakia which
the Tribunal heard this morning. That is why Mr. Alderman submitted—and
I respectfully joined him in his submission—that the action of the 15th
of March was a flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of that
agreement.
That, My Lord, is the part of the case which I desired to present.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases. Thank you.
[_A recess was taken._]
LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the
United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, Count Two of the Indictment
charges these defendants with participating in the planning, the
preparation, the initiation, and waging of various wars of aggression,
and it charges that those wars are also in breach of international
treaty. It is our purpose now to present to the Tribunal the evidence in
respect of those aggressive wars against Poland and against the United
Kingdom and France.
Under Paragraph (B) of the particulars to Count Two, reference is made
to Count One in the Indictment for the allegations charging that those
wars were wars of aggression, and Count One also sets out the
particulars of the preparations and planning for those wars, and in
particular those allegations will be found in Paragraph (F) 4. But, My
Lord, with the Tribunal’s approval I would propose first to deal with
the allegations of breach of treaties which are mentioned in Paragraph
(C) of the particulars, and of which the details are set out in Appendix
C. My Lord, those sections of Appendix C which relate to the war against
Poland are Section 2, which charges a violation of the Hague Convention
in respect of the pacific settlement of international disputes, on which
Sir David has already addressed the Court, and I do not propose, with
the Court’s approval, to say more than that.
Section 3 of Appendix C and Section 4 charge breaches of the other Hague
Conventions of 1907. Section 5, Sub-section 4, charges a breach of the
Versailles Treaty in respect of the Free City of Danzig, and Section 13,
a breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
All those have already been dealt with by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, and it
remains, therefore, only for me to deal with two other sections of
Appendix C: Section 10, which charges a breach of the Arbitration Treaty
between Germany and Poland, signed at Locarno on the 16th of October
1925; and Section 15 of Appendix C which charges a violation of the
Declaration of Non-Aggression which was entered into between Germany and
Poland on the 26th of January 1934.
If the Tribunal would take Part I of the British Document Book Number 2,
I will describe in a moment how the remaining parts are divided. The
document book is divided into six parts. If the Tribunal will look at
Part I for the moment—the document books which have been handed to the
Counsel for the Defense are in exactly the same order, except that they
are bound in one and not in six separate covers, in which the Tribunal’s
documents are bound for convenience.
The German-Polish Arbitration Treaty, the subject matter of Section 10
of Appendix C, is Document TC-15 and appears the one but end document in
the book. It has already been put in under the Number GB-16.
My Lord, I would quote the preamble and Articles 1 and 2 from that
treaty:
“The President of the German Empire and the President of the
Polish Republic:
“Equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Poland
by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might
arise between the two countries;
“Declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or
resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for
international tribunals;
“Agreeing to recognize that the rights of a state cannot be
modified save with its consent;
“And considering that sincere observance of the methods of
peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of
resolving, without recourse to force, questions which may become
the cause of division between states;
“Have decided. . . .”
Then, go on to Article 1:
“All disputes of every kind between Germany and Poland with
regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their
respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle
amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted
for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent
Court of International Justice, as laid down hereafter.”
I go straight to Article 2:
“Before any resort is made to arbitral procedure before the
Permanent Court of International Justice, the dispute may, by
agreement between the parties, be submitted, with a view to
amicable settlement, to a permanent international commission,
styled the Permanent Conciliation Commission, constituted in
accordance with the present treaty.”
My Lord, thereafter the treaty goes on to lay down the procedure for
arbitration and for conciliation.
THE PRESIDENT: It is in the same terms, is it not, as the arbitration
treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and Germany and Belgium?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well—yes, it is, My Lord, both signed at
Locarno.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The words of the charge in Section 10, will be
noted particularly in that Germany did, on or about the 1st of September
1939, unlawfully attack and invade Poland without first having attempted
to settle its dispute with Poland by peaceful means.
The only other treaty to which I refer, the German-Polish Declaration of
the 26th of January 1934, will be found as the last document in Part I
of the Tribunal’s document book, which is the subject of Section 10 of
Appendix C:
“The German Government and the Polish Government consider that
the time has come to introduce a new era in the political
relations between Germany and Poland by a direct understanding
between the states. They have therefore decided to establish by
the present declaration a basis for the future shaping of those
relations.
“The two Governments assume that the maintenance and assurance
of a permanent peace between their countries is an essential
condition for general peace in Europe.”
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it is necessary to read all this? We are
taking judicial notice of it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged; I am only too anxious
to shorten this, if I can.
In view of what is later alleged by the Nazi Government, I would
particularly draw attention to the last paragraph in that declaration.
“The declaration shall remain in effect for a period of 10 years
counting from the day of exchange of instruments of
ratification. In case it is not denounced by one of the two
governments 6 months before the expiration of that period of
time, it shall continue in effect but can then be denounced by
either Government at any time 6 months in advance.”
My Lord, I pass then from the breach of treaties to present to the Court
the evidence upon the planning and preparation of these wars and in
support of the allegations that they were wars of aggression. For
convenience, as I say, the documents have been divided into separate
parts and if the Tribunal would look at the index, the total index to
their document, which is a separate book, on the front page it will be
seen how these documents have been divided. Part I is the “Treaties”;
Part II is entitled “Evidence of German Intentions prior to March 1939.”
It might perhaps be more accurately described as “pre-March 1939
evidence,” and it will be with that part that I would now deal.
My Lord, it has been put to the Tribunal that the actions against
Austria and Czechoslovakia were in themselves part of the preparation
for further aggression, and I now—dealing with the early history of
this matter—wish to draw the Court’s particular attention only to those
parts of the evidence which show that even at that time, before the
Germans had seized the whole of Czechoslovakia, they were perfectly
prepared to fight England, Poland, and France, if necessary, to achieve
those preliminary aims; that they appreciated the whole time that they
might well have to do so. And, what is more, although not until after
March 1939 did they commence upon their immediate and specific
preparations for war against Poland, nevertheless, they had for a
considerable time before had it in mind specifically to attack Poland
once Czechoslovakia was completely theirs.
During this period also—and this happens throughout the whole story of
the Nazi regime in Germany—during this period, as afterwards, while
they are making their preparations and carrying out their plans, they
are giving to the outside world assurance after assurance so as to lull
them out of any suspicion of their real object.
The dates, I think—as the learned Attorney General said in addressing
you yesterday—the dates in this case, almost more than the documents,
speak for themselves. The documents in this book are arranged in the
order in which I will refer to them, and the first that I would refer to
is Document TC-70, which will go in as GB-25.
It is only interesting to see what Hitler said of the agreement with
Poland when it was signed in January 1934:
“When I took over the Government on the 30th of January, the
relations between the two countries seemed to me more than
unsatisfactory. There was a danger that the existing
differences, which were due to the territorial clauses of the
Treaty of Versailles and the mutual tension resulting therefrom,
would gradually crystallize into a state of hostility which, if
persisted in, might only too easily acquire the character of a
dangerous traditional enmity.”
I go down to the one but last paragraph.
“In the spirit of this treaty the German Government is willing
and prepared also to cultivate economic-political relations with
Poland in such a way that here, too, the state of unprofitable
suspicion can be succeeded by a period of useful co-operation.
It is a matter of particular satisfaction to us that in this
same year the National Socialist Government of Danzig has been
enabled to effect a similar clarification of its relations with
its Polish neighbor.”
That was in 1934. Three years later, again on the 30th of January,
speaking in the Reichstag, Hitler said—this is Document PS-2368, which
will be GB-26. I will, if I may, avoid so far as possible repeating
passages which the Attorney General quoted in his speech the other day.
The first paragraph, in fact, he quoted to the Tribunal. It is a short
paragraph but perhaps I might read it now, but I will—dealing with this
evidence—so far as possible avoid repetition:
“By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tension
and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the
European atmosphere. I merely recall an agreement with Poland
which has worked out to the advantage of both sides . . . . True
statesmanship will not overlook realities, but consider them.
The Italian nation and the new Italian State are realities. The
German nation and the German Reich are equally realities. And to
my own fellow citizens I would say that the Polish nation and
the Polish State have also become a reality.”
That was on the 30th of January 1937.
On the 24th of June 1937 we have a top-secret order, C-175, which has
already been put in as USA-69. It is a top-secret order issued by the
Reich Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,
signed “Von Blomberg.” It has at the top, “Written by an officer . . . .
Outgoing documents in connection with this matter and dealing with it
. . . are to be written by an officer.” So it is obviously highly
secret. And with it is enclosed a directive for the unified preparation
for war of the Armed Forces to come into force on the 1st of August
1937. The directive enclosed with it is divided into Part 1, “General
Guiding Principles”; Part 2, “Likely Warlike Eventualities”; Part 3,
“Special Preparations.”
The Tribunal will remember that the Attorney General quoted the opening
passages:
“The general political position justifies the supposition that
Germany need not consider an attack from any side.”
It goes on—the second paragraph:
“The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little
by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation,
which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a
continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces to
counter attacks at any time, and to enable the military
exploitation of politically favorable opportunities, should they
occur.”
It then goes on to set out the preparations which are to be made, and I
would particularly draw the Tribunal’s attention to Paragraph 2b:
“The further working on mobilization without public announcement
in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to begin a war
suddenly and by surprise both as regards strength and time.”
On the next page, under Paragraph 4:
“Special preparations are to be made for the following
eventualities: Armed intervention against Austria; warlike
entanglements with Red Spain.”
And thirdly, and this shows so clearly how they appreciated at that time
that their actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia might well involve
them in war:
“England, Poland, and Lithuania take part in a war against us.”
If the Tribunal would turn over to Part 2 of that directive, Page 5 of
that document:
“For the treatment of probable warlike eventualities
(concentrations) the following suppositions, tasks, and orders
are to be considered as basic:
“1. War on two fronts with focal point in the West.
“Suppositions. In the West, France is the opponent. Belgium may
side with France, either at once or later, or not at all. It is
also possible that France may violate Belgium’s neutrality if
the latter is neutral. She will certainly violate that of
Luxembourg.”
I pass to Part 3, which will be found on Page 9 of that Exhibit, and I
particularly refer to the last paragraph on that page under the heading
“Special Case—Extension Red-Green”. It will be remembered that Red was
Spain and Green was Czechoslovakia.
“The military political starting point used as a basis for
concentration plans Red and Green can be aggravated if either
England, Poland, or Lithuania . . . join the side of our
opponents. Thereupon our military position would deteriorate to
an unbearable, even hopeless extent. The political leadership
will therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral,
above all England and Poland.”
Thereafter, it sets out the conditions which are to be the basis for the
discussion. Before I leave that document, the date will be noted: June
1937; and it shows clearly that at that date anyway, the Nazi Government
appreciated the likelihood, if not the probability, of fighting England,
and Poland, and France, and were perfectly prepared to do so, if they
had to. On the 5th of November 1937—the Tribunal will remember—Hitler
held his conference in the Reich Chancellery, the minutes of which have
been referred to as the Hossbach notes. I refer to only one or two lines
of that document to draw the attention of the Tribunal to what Hitler
said in respect to England, Poland, and France. On Page 1 of that
Exhibit, the middle of the page:
“The Führer then stated: ‘The aim of German policy is the
security and preservation of the nation and its propagation.
This is consequently a problem of space.’”
He then went on, you will remember, to discuss what he described
“participation in world economy,” and at the bottom of Page 2 he said:
“The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the
securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times
has been the cause of the formation of states and movements of
nations.”
And at the end of that first paragraph on Page 3:
“The history of all times, Roman Empire, British Empire, has
proved that every space expansion can be effected only by
breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are
unavoidable. Neither formerly, nor today, has space been found
without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the
proprietor.”
My Lord, it is clear that that reference was not only . . .
THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] It has been read already.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My object was only to try to collect, so far as
England and Poland were concerned, the evidence that had been given. I
would welcome in actual fact if the Tribunal thought that it was
unnecessary, I would welcome the opportunity to . . .
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would wish you not to read anything that has
been read already.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I would pass then to the next document in that
part of your document book. I put that document in. It was referred to
by the Attorney General in his address yesterday, and it shows that on
the same date the Hossbach meeting was taking place, a communiqué was
being issued as a result of the Polish Ambassador’s audience with
Hitler, in which it was said in the course of the conversation that it
was confirmed that Polish-German relations should not meet with
difficulties because of the Danzig question. That Document is TC-73. I
put it in as GB-27. On the 2d of January . . .
THE PRESIDENT: That hasn’t been read before, has it?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It was read by the Attorney General in his
opening.
THE PRESIDENT: In his opening? Very well.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On the 2d of January 1938 some unknown person
wrote a memorandum for the Führer. This document was one of the German
Foreign Office documents of which a microfilm was captured by Allied
troops when they came into Germany. It is headed, “Very
confidential—personal only,” and is called, “Deductions on the Report,
German Embassy, London, regarding the Future Form of Anglo-German
Relations”:
“With the realization that Germany will not tie herself to a
_status quo_ in Central Europe, and that sooner or later a
military conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an
agreement will slowly disappear among Germanophile British
politicians, insofar as they are not merely playing a part that
has been given to them. Thus the fateful question arises: Will
Germany and England eventually be forced to drift into separate
camps and will they march once more against each other one day?
To answer this question, one must realize the following:
“A change of the _status quo_ in the East in the German sense
can only be carried out by force. As long as France knows that
England, which so to speak, has taken on a guarantee to aid
France against Germany, is on her side, France’s fighting for
her eastern allies is probable, in any case, always possible,
and thus with it war between Germany and England. This applies
then even if England does not want war. England, believing she
must defend her borders on the Rhine, would be dragged in
automatically by France. In other words, peace or war between
England and Germany rests solely in the hands of France, who
could bring about such a war between Germany and England by way
of a conflict between Germany and France. It follows, therefore,
that war between Germany and England on account of France can be
prevented only if France knows from the start that England’s
forces would not be sufficient to guarantee their common
victory. Such a situation might force England, and thereby
France, to accept a lot of things that a strong Anglo-French
coalition would never tolerate.
“This position would arise for instance if England, through
insufficient armament or as a result of threats to her empire by
a superior coalition of powers, for example, Germany, Italy,
Japan, thereby tying down her military forces in other places,
would not be able to assure France of sufficient support in
Europe.”
The next page goes on to discuss the possibilities of a strong
partnership between Italy and Japan, and I would pass from my quotation
to the next page where the writer is summarizing his ideas.
Paragraph 5:
“Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us.
“1. Outwardly, further understanding with England in regard to
the protection of the interests of our friends.
“2. Formation under great secrecy, but with whole-hearted
tenacity of a coalition against England, that is to say, a
tightening of our friendship with Italy and Japan, also the
winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours
directly or indirectly.
“Close and confidential co-operation of the diplomats of the
three great powers towards this purpose. Only in this way can we
confront England, be it in a settlement or in war. England is
going to be a hard and astute opponent in this game of
diplomacy.
“The particular question whether, in the event of a war by
Germany in Central Europe . . .”—I am afraid the translation of
this is not very good—“The particular question whether, in the
event of a war by Germany in Central Europe, France, and thereby
England, would interfere, depends on the circumstances and the
time at which such a war commences and ceases, and on military
considerations which cannot be gone into here.”
And whoever it was that wrote that document appears to be on a fairly
high level, because he concludes by saying:
“I should like to give the Führer some of these points of view
verbally:”
That document is GB-28.
Well, I am afraid that the next two documents have gotten into your
books in the wrong order. If you would refer to 2357-PS which is the one
following our L-43—it will be remembered that document to the Führer
which I have just read was dated the 2d of January 1938.
On the 20th of January 1938 Hitler spoke in the Reichstag.
THE PRESIDENT: February, the document said.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon—February 1938. That is
2357-PS, and will be GB-30. In that speech he said:
“In the fifth year following the first great foreign political
agreement with the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification
to be able to state that in our relations with the state, with
which we had had perhaps the greatest differences, not only has
there been a _détente_, but in the course of these years there
has been a constant improvement in relations. This good work,
which was regarded with suspicion by so many at the time, has
stood the test, and I may say that since the League of Nations
finally gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and
appointed a man of great personal attainments as the new
commissioner, the most dangerous spot from this point of view of
European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The
Polish State respects the national conditions in this state, and
both the City of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And
so the way to friendly understanding has been successfully
paved, an understanding which beginning with Danzig has today,
in spite of the attempts of certain mischief makers, succeeded
in finally taking the poison out of the relations between
Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere,
friendly co-operation.
“To rely on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone
unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for
the task which is ahead of us—peace.”
I turn back to the next—to the document which was in your document
books, the one before that, L-43, which will be GB-29. This is a
document to which the Attorney General referred yesterday. It is dated
the 2d of May 1938, and is entitled “Organizational Study of 1930.” It
comes from the office of the Chief of the Organizational Staff of the
General Staff of the Air Force, and its purpose is said to be:
“The task is to search, within a framework of very broadly
conceived conditions, for the most suitable type of organization
of the Air Force. The result gained is termed ‘Distant
Objective.’ From this shall be deduced the goal to be reached in
the second phase of the setting-up process in 1942. This will be
called ‘Final Objective 1942.’ This in turn yields what is
considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization of
the staffs of the Air Force group commands, air Gaue, air
divisions, _et cetera_.”
The table of contents, the Tribunal will see, is divided into various
sections, and Section I is entitled “Assumptions.” If the Tribunal will
turn over to the next page one finds the assumption under the heading
“Assumptions I, frontier of Germany, see map, Enclosure 1.”
The Tribunal sees a reproduction of that map on the wall and it will be
seen that on the 2d of May 1938, the Air Force were envisaging Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary, all
coming within the bounds of the Reich. The original map is here attached
to this file and if the Tribunal will look at the original exhibit, it
will be seen that this organizational study has been prepared with the
greatest care and thoroughness, with a mass of charts attached as
appendices.
I would refer also to the bottom of the second page, to the Tribunal’s
copy of the translation:
“Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis of
the assumptions for war and peace made in Section I:
1) Attack forces: Principal adversaries: England, France,
Russia.”
And it then goes on to say if all the 144 Geschwader are employed
against England, they must be concentrated in the western half of the
Reich; that is to say, they must be deployed in such a way that by
making full use of their range they can reach all English territory down
to the last corner.
THE PRESIDENT: It is perhaps involved in the map. I think perhaps you
should refer to the organization of the Air Force, with group commands
at Warsaw and Königsberg.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged. Under the paragraph
“Assumptions,” Sub-heading 2, “Organization of the Air Force in
Peacetime,” seven group commands:
1-Berlin, 2-Brunswick, 3-Munich, 4-Vienna, 5-Budapest, 6-Warsaw, and
7-Königsberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged. And lastly, in
connection with that document, on Page 4 of the Tribunal’s translation,
the last paragraph:
“The more the Reich grows in area, and the more the Air Force
grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to have
locally bound commands . . . .”
I emphasize only the opening, “The more the Reich grows in area, and the
more the Air Force grows in strength . . .” Now I would say one word on
that document. The original, I understand, is signed by an officer who
is not at the top rank in the Air Force and I, therefore, don’t want to
overemphasize the inferences that can be drawn from it, but it is
submitted that it at least shows the lines upon which the General Staff
of the Air Force were thinking at that date.
The Tribunal will remember that in February 1938 the Defendant
Ribbentrop succeeded Von Neurath as Foreign Minister. We have another
document from that captured microfilm, which is dated the 26th of August
1938, when Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister, and it is addressed
to him as “the Reich Minister via the State Secretary.” It is a
comparatively short document and one that I will read in whole:
“The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech problem,
might easily, but must not, lead to a conflict with the
Entente.”—TC-76 becomes GB-31—“Neither France nor England is
looking for trouble regarding Czechoslovakia. Both would perhaps
leave Czechoslovakia to herself, if she should, without direct
foreign interference and through internal signs of
disintegration due to her own faults, suffer the fate she
deserves. This process, however, would have to take place step
by step, and would have to lead to a loss of power in the
remaining territory, by means of a plebiscite and an annexation
of territory.
“The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough for any
immediate action, which the Entente would watch inactively, and
not even if this action should come quickly and surprisingly.
Germany cannot fix any definite time when this fruit could be
plucked without too great a risk. She can only prepare the
desired developments.”
I pass to the last paragraph on that page. I think I can leave out the
intervening lines, Paragraph 5.
THE PRESIDENT: Should you not read the next paragraph, “For this purpose
. . .”?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “For this purpose the slogan emanating
from England at present of the right for autonomy of the Sudeten
Germans, which we have intentionally not used up to now, is to
be taken up gradually. The international conviction that the
choice of nationality is being withheld from these Germans will
do useful spadework, notwithstanding the fact that the chemical
process of dissolution of the Czech form of states may or may
not be finally speeded up by mechanical means as well. The fate
of the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however, would not as yet
be clearly decided by this, but would nevertheless be definitely
sealed.
“This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be
recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is
unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of
boundaries in the southeast and their transfer to the east and
northeast must make the Poles sit up. The fact is”—I put in an
“is” because I think it is obviously left out of the copy that I
have in front of me.—
“The fact is that after the liquidation of the Czech question,
it will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in
turn.
“But the later this assumption sinks in in international
politics as a firm factor, the better. In this sense, however,
it is important for the time being, to carry on the German
policy, under the well-known and proved slogans of ‘the right to
autonomy’ and ‘racial unity.’ Anything else might be interpreted
as pure imperialism on our part, and provoke resistance by the
Entente at an earlier date and more energetically than our
forces could stand up to.”
That was on the 26th of August 1938, just as the Czech crisis was
leading up to a Munich settlement. While at Munich, or rather a day or
two before the Munich Agreement was signed, Herr Hitler made a speech.
On the 26th of September he said—I think Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe has
just read this document to the Tribunal. I’ll refer to only two lines of
it:
“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
problem is solved, there will be no more territorial problems
for Germany in Europe.”
And again, the last document in your book, which is another extract from
that same speech, I will not read to the Tribunal unless the Tribunal
desire, because the Attorney General did quote it in full in his address
yesterday. These two documents are already in, TC-28 as GB-2, and TC-29,
which is the second extraction of that same speech, as GB-32.
My Lord, I would refer the Tribunal to one more document under this part
which has already been put in by my American colleagues. It is C-23, now
USA-49, and which appears before TC-28 in your document book. The
particular passage of that exhibit, to which I would refer, is a letter
from Admiral Carls, which appears at the bottom of the second page. It
is dated some time in September, with no precise date, and is entitled,
“Opinion on the ‘Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England.’ There is
full agreement with the main theme of the study.” Again, the Attorney
General quoted the remainder of that letter yesterday, which the
Tribunal will remember.
“If, according to the Führer’s decision, Germany is to acquire a
position of security as a world power she needs not only
sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval
communications and secure access to the ocean.”
That, then, was the position at the time of the Munich Agreement in
September 1938.
The gains of Munich were not, of course, so great as the Nazi Government
had hoped and had intended, and as a result, they were not prepared
straight away to start any further aggressive action against Poland or
elsewhere, but Your Lordships heard this morning, when Mr. Alderman
dealt in his closing remarks with the advantages that were gained by the
seizure of Czechoslovakia, what Jodl and Hitler said on subsequent
occasions, that Czechoslovakia was only setting the stage for the attack
on Poland. It is, of course, obvious now that they intended and indeed
had taken the decision to proceed against Poland as soon as
Czechoslovakia had been entirely occupied. We know now, from what Hitler
said in talking to his military commanders at a later date. The Tribunal
will remember the speech where he said that from the first, he never
intended to abide by the Munich Agreement but that he had to have the
whole of Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready to proceed in
full force against Poland after September 1938, they did at once begin
to approach the Poles on the question of Danzig. Until—as the Tribunal
will see—until the whole of Czechoslovakia had been taken in March, no
pressure was put on; but immediately after the Sudetenland had been
occupied, preliminary steps were taken to stir up trouble with Poland,
which would and was to lead eventually to their excuse, or so-called
justification for their attack on that country.
If the Tribunal would turn to Part 3. . .
THE PRESIDENT: I think it is time to adjourn now until 10 o’clock
tomorrow morning.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 6 December at 1000 hours._]
FOURTEENTH DAY
Thursday, 6 December 1945
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has received an urgent request from the
defendants’ counsel that the Trial should be adjourned at Christmas for
a period of 3 weeks. The Tribunal is aware of the many interests which
must be considered in a trial of this complexity and magnitude, and, as
the Trial must inevitably last for a considerable time, the Tribunal
considers that it is not only in the interest of the defendants and
their counsel but of every one concerned in the Trial that there should
be a recess. On the whole it seems best to take that recess at Christmas
rather than at a later date when the Prosecution’s case has been
completed. The Tribunal will therefore rise for the Christmas week and
over the 1st of January, and will not sit after the session on Thursday,
the 20th of December, and will sit again on Wednesday, the 2d of
January.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like, in justice to my staff, to note the
American objection to the adjournment for the benefit of the defendants.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May it please the Tribunal, the Tribunal will
return to Part III of that document book in which I included the
documents relating to the earlier discussions between the German and
Polish Governments on the question of Danzig. Those discussions, the
Tribunal will remember, started almost immediately after the Munich
crisis in September 1938, and started, in the first place, as cautious
and friendly discussions until the remainder of Czechoslovakia had
finally been seized in March of the following year.
I would refer the Tribunal to the first document in that part, TC-73,
Number 44. That is a document taken from the official _Polish White
Book_, which I put in as Exhibit GB-27 (a). It gives an account of a
luncheon which took place at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, on the 24th
of October, where Ribbentrop saw Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador to
Germany:
“In a conversation of the 24th of October, over a luncheon at
the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was present,
Von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement
of issues between Poland and Germany. This included the reunion
of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the
retention of railway and economic facilities there. Poland would
agree to the building of an extra-territorial motor road and a
railway line across Pomorze (northern part of the corridor). In
exchange Von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an
extension of the Polish-German Agreement to 25 years and a
guarantee of Polish-German frontiers.”
I do not think I need read the following lines. I go to the last but one
paragraph:
“Finally, I said to Von Ribbentrop that I could see no
possibility of an agreement involving the reunion of the Free
City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the
substance of this conversation to you.”
I would emphasize the submission of the Prosecution as to this part of
the case and that is that the whole question of Danzig was, indeed, as
Hitler has himself said, no question at all. Danzig was raised simply as
an excuse, a so-called justification, not for the seizure of Danzig, but
for the invasion and seizure of the whole of Poland, and we see it
starting now. As we progress with the story it will become ever more
apparent that that is what the Nazi Government were really aiming
at—only providing themselves with some kind of crisis which would
provide some kind of justification for walking into the rest of Poland.
I turn to the next document. It is again a document taken from the
_Polish White Book_, TC-73, Number 45, which will be GB-27 (b). TC-73
will be the _Polish White Book_, which I shall put in later. That
document sets out the instructions that Mr. Beck, the Polish Foreign
Minister, gave to Mr. Lipski to hand to the German Government in reply
to the suggestion put forward by Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden on the 24th
of October. I need not read the first page. The history of Polish-German
relationship is set out, and the needs of Poland in respect of Danzig
are emphasized. I turn to the second page of that exhibit, to Paragraph
6:
“In the circumstances, in the understanding of the Polish
Government, the Danzig question is governed by two factors: The
right of the German population of the city and the surrounding
villages to freedom of life and development, and the fact that
in all matters appertaining to the Free City as a port it is
connected with Poland. Apart from the national character of the
majority of the population, everything in Danzig is definitely
bound up with Poland.”
It then sets out the guarantees to Poland under the existing statute,
and I pass to Paragraph 7:
“Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and
desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of a
friendly understanding with the Government of the German Reich,
the Polish Government proposes the replacement of the League of
Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bilateral
Polish-German agreement. This agreement should guarantee the
existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of
national and cultural life to its German majority, and also
should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the
complications involved in such a system, the Polish Government
must state that any other solution, and in particular any
attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must
inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only take the form
of local difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of
Polish-German understanding in all its aspects.”
And then finally in Paragraph 8:
“In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I am
ready to have final conversations personally with the governing
circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you
should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that
my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which would
be dangerous for the future.”
The first stage in those negotiations had been entirely successful from
the German point of view. They had put forward a proposal, the return of
the City of Danzig to the Reich, which they might well have known would
have been unacceptable. It was unacceptable, and the Polish Government
had warned the Nazi Government that it would be. They had offered to
enter into negotiations, but they had not agreed, which is exactly what
the German Government had hoped. They had not agreed to the return of
Danzig to the Reich. The first stage in producing the crisis had been
accomplished.
Shortly afterward, within a week or so of that taking place, after the
Polish Government had offered to enter into discussions with the German
Government, we find another top-secret order, issued by the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces, signed by the Defendant Keitel. It goes to
the OKH, OKM, and OKW and it is headed, “The First Supplement to the
Instruction Dated the 21st of October 1938”:
“The Führer has ordered: Apart from the three contingencies
mentioned in the instructions of that date of 21 October 1938,
preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of
Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise . . . .
“The preparations will be made on the following basis: Condition
is a quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting a
politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland.”
We remember, of course, that at that moment the remainder of
Czechoslovakia had not been seized and therefore they were not ready to
go to war with Poland. That document does show how the German Government
answered the proposal to enter into discussions. That is C-137 and will
become GB-33.
On the 5th of January 1939 Mr. Beck had a conversation with Hitler. It
is unnecessary to read the first part of that document, which is the
next in the Tribunal’s book, TC-73, Number 48, which will become GB-34.
In the first part of that conversation, of which that document is an
account, Hitler offers to answer any questions. He says he has always
followed the policy laid down by the 1934 agreement. He discusses the
Danzig question and emphasizes that in the German view it must sooner or
later return to Germany. I quote the last but one paragraph of that
page:
“Mr. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very difficult
problem. He added that in the Chancellor’s suggestion he did not
see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole of Polish
opinion, and not only people thinking politically but the widest
spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this
matter.
“In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this
problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite
new, some new form, for which he used the term Körperschaft,
which on the one hand would safeguard the interests of the
German population, and on the other the Polish interests. In
addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be
quite at ease, there would be no _faits accomplis_ in Danzig,
and nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of
the Polish Government.”
The Tribunal will remember that in the very last document we looked at,
on the 24th of November, orders had already been received, or issued,
for preparations to be made for the occupation of Danzig by surprise;
yet here he is assuring the Polish Foreign Minister that there is to be
no _fait accompli_ and he can be quite at his ease.
I turn to the next step, Document TC-73, Number 49, which will become
GB-35, conversation between Mr. Beck and Ribbentrop, on the day after
the one to which I have just referred between Beck and Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you draw attention to the fact that the last
conversation took place in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very obliged to you. No, I did not. As I
say, it was on the next day, the 6th of January. The date in actual fact
does not appear on the copy I have got in my book. It does appear in the
_White Book_ itself.
“Mr. Beck asked Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that whereas
previously, after all his conversations and contacts with German
statesmen, he had been feeling optimistic, today, for the first
time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in regard to the
Danzig question, as it had been raised by the Chancellor, he saw
no possibility whatever of agreement.”
I emphasize this last paragraph:
“In answer Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not
seeking any violent solution. The basis of their policy towards
Poland was still a desire for the further building up of
friendly relations. It was necessary to seek such a method of
clearing away the difficulties as would respect the rights and
interests of the two parties concerned.”
The Defendant Ribbentrop apparently was not satisfied with that one
expression of good faith. On the 25th of the same month, January 1939,
some fortnight or three weeks later, he was in Warsaw and made another
speech, of which an extract is set out in PS-2530, which will become
GB-36:
“In accordance with the resolute will of the German national
leader, the continual progress and consolidation of friendly
relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the existing
agreement between us, constitute an essential element in German
foreign policy. The political foresight and the principles
worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides to take
the momentous decision of 1934, provide a guarantee that all
other problems arising in the course of the future evolution of
events will also be solved in the same spirit, with due regard
to the respect and understanding of the rightful interests of
both sides. Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the
future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual
relations.”
And even so, the Nazi Government must have been still anxious that the
Poles were beginning to sit up—Your Lordship will remember the
expression “sit up” used in the note to the Führer—and to assume they
would be the next in turn, because on the 30th of January Hitler again
spoke in the Reichstag, 30th of January 1939, and gave further
assurances of their good faith.
That document, that extract, was read by the Attorney General in his
address, and therefore, I only put it in now as an exhibit. That is
TC-73, Number 57, which will become GB-37.
That, then, brings us up to the March 1939 seizure of the remainder of
Czechoslovakia and the setting up of the Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia.
If the Tribunal will now pass to the next part, Part IV, of that
document book, I had intended to refer to three documents where Hitler
and Jodl were setting out the advantage gained through the seizure of
the remainder of Czechoslovakia. But the Tribunal will remember that Mr.
Alderman, in his closing remarks yesterday morning, dealt very fully
with that matter showing what advantages they did gain by that seizure
and showing on the chart that he had on the wall the immense
strengthening of the German position against Poland. Therefore, I leave
that matter. The documents are already in evidence, and if the Tribunal
should wish to refer to them, they are found in their correct order in
the story in that document book.
As soon as that occupation had been completed, within a week of marching
into the rest of Czechoslovakia, the heat was beginning to be turned on
against Poland.
If the Tribunal would pass to Document TC-73, which is about half way
through that document book—it follows after Jodl’s lecture, which is a
long document—TC-73, Number 61. It is headed: “Official Documents
concerning Polish-German Relations.” This will be GB-38.
On the 21st of March Mr. Lipski again saw Ribbentrop and the nature of
the conversation was generally very much sharper than that that had been
held a little time back at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden:
“I saw Ribbentrop today. He began by saying he had asked me to
call in order to discuss Polish-German relations in their
entirety.
“He complained about our press, and the Warsaw students’
demonstrations during Count Ciano’s visit.”
I think I can go straight on to the larger paragraph, which commences
with “further”:
“Further, Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at
Berchtesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which Hitler
put forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland’s frontiers in
exchange for a motor road and the incorporation of Danzig into
the Reich. He said that there had been further conversations
between you and him in Warsaw”—that is, between him, of course,
and Mr. Beck—“He said that there had been further conversations
between you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had
pointed out the great difficulties in the way of accepting these
suggestions. He gave me to understand that all this had made an
unfavorable impression on the Chancellor, since so far he had
received no positive reaction whatever on our part to his
suggestions. Ribbentrop had talked to the Chancellor, only
yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was still in favor of
good relations with Poland, and had expressed a desire to have a
thorough conversation with you on the subject of our mutual
relations. Ribbentrop indicated that he was under the impression
that difficulties arising between us were also due to some
misunderstanding of the Reich’s real aims. The problem needed to
be considered on a higher plane. In his opinion, our two States
were dependent on each other.”
I think it unnecessary that I should read the next page. Briefly,
Ribbentrop emphasizes the German argument as to why Danzig should return
to the Reich, and I turn to the first paragraph on the following page:
“I stated”—that is Mr. Lipski—“I stated that now, during the
settlement of the Czechoslovakian question, there was no
understanding whatever between us. The Czech issue was already
hard enough for the Polish public to swallow, for, despite our
disputes with the Czechs, they were after all a Slav people. But
in regard to Slovakia, the position was far worse. I emphasized
our community of race, language, and religion, and mentioned the
help we had given in their achievement of independence. I
pointed out our long frontier with Slovakia. I indicated that
the Polish man in the street could not understand why the Reich
had assumed the protection of Slovakia, that protection being
directed against Poland. I said emphatically that this question
was a serious blow to our relations.
“Ribbentrop reflected for a moment, and then answered that this
could be discussed.
“I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation
between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop remarked that I might
go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk the matter over.
He advised that the talk should not be delayed, lest the
Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was
rejecting all his offers.
“Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about his
conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania. Ribbentrop
answered vaguely that he had seen Mr. Urbszys on the latter’s
return from Rome, and that they had discussed the Memel
question, which called for a solution.”
That conversation took place on the 21st of March. It was not very long
before the world knew what the solution to Memel was. On the next day
German Armed Forces marched in.
If the Tribunal would turn over—I think the next document is
unnecessary—turn over to TC-72, Number 17, which becomes GB-39.
As a result of these events, not unnaturally, considerable anxiety was
growing both in the government of Great Britain and the Polish
Government, and the two governments therefore had been undertaking
conversations with each other.
On the 31st of March, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, spoke in the
House of Commons, and he explained that as a result of the conversations
that had been taking place between the British and Polish Governments—I
quote from the last but one paragraph of his statement:
“As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding
with other governments. In order to make perfectly clear the
position of His Majesty’s Government in the meantime, before
those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the
House that during that period, in the event of any action which
clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish
Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their
national forces, His Majesty’s Government would feel themselves
bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their
power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to
this effect.
“I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make
it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as
do His Majesty’s Government.”
On the 6th of April, a week later, a formal communiqué was issued by the
Anglo-Polish Governments which repeated the assurance the Prime Minister
had given a week before and in which Poland assured Great Britain of her
support should she, Great Britain, be attacked. I need not read it all.
In fact, I need not read any of it. I put it in. It is TC-72, Number 18.
I put it in as GB-40.
The anxiety and concern that the governments of Poland and Great Britain
were feeling at that time appear to have been well justified. During the
same week, on the 3rd of April, the Tribunal will see in the next
document an order signed by Keitel. It emanates from the High Command of
the Armed Forces. It is dated Berlin, 3rd of April 1939. Its subject is:
“Directive for the Armed Forces 1939-40”:
“‘Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed
Forces for 1939-40’ is being reissued.
“Part I (Frontier Defense) and Part III (Danzig) will be issued
in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.
“Part II, Case White”—which is the code name for the operation
against Poland—“Part II, Case White, is attached herewith. The
signature of the Führer will be appended later.
“The Führer has added the following directives to Case White:
“1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation
can be carried out at any time from 1st of September 1939
onwards.”—This is in April, the beginning of April.
“2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to
draw up a precise timetable for Case White and to arrange by
conferences the synchronized timings among the three branches of
the Armed Forces.
“3. The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and the
details for the timetable must be submitted to the OKW by the
1st of May.”
That document, as the Tribunal will see on the following page under the
heading “Distribution”, went to the OKH, OKM, OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: Are those words at the top part of the document, or are
they just notes?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: They are part of the document.
THE PRESIDENT: Directives from Hitler and Keitel, preparing for war.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon; no, they are not. The
document starts from under the words “Translation of a document signed
by Keitel.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The first words being “top-secret.”
If the Tribunal will look at the second page, following after
“Distribution”, it will be seen that there follows a translation of
another document, dated the 11th of April, and that document is signed
by Hitler:
“I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the
Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with
these for the conduct of the war.”—No question about
war—“conduct of the war.”
“Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be
prepared for the following eventualities:
“I. Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich, and
protection against surprise air attacks;
“II. Case White;
“III. The Annexation of Danzig.
“Annex IV contains regulations for the exercise of military
authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike
development.” Again that document goes to the OKH, OKM, OKW.
On the next page of the copy the Tribunal have, the translation of Annex
I is set out, which is the safeguarding of the frontiers of the German
Reich, and I would quote from Paragraph (2) under “Special Orders”:
“Legal Basis. It should be anticipated that a state of defense
or a state of war, as defined in the Reich defense law of the
4th of September 1938, will not be declared. All measures and
demands necessary for carrying out a mobilization are to be
based on the laws valid in peacetime.”
My Lord, that document is C-120. It becomes GB-41. It contains some
other later documents to which I shall refer in chronological order.
The statement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, followed by
the Anglo-Polish communiqué of the 6th of April, was seized upon by the
Nazi Government to urge on, as it were, the crisis which they were
developing in Danzig between themselves and Poland.
On the 28th of April the German Government issued a memorandum in which
they alleged that the Anglo-Polish Declaration was incompatible with the
1934 agreement between Poland and Germany, and that as a result of
entering into or by reason of entering into that agreement, Poland had
unilaterally renounced the 1934 agreement.
I would only quote three short passages, or four short passages, from
that document. It is TC-72, Number 14. It becomes GB-42. Some of these
passages are worth quoting, if only to show the complete dishonesty of
the whole document on the face of it:
“The German Government have taken note of the Polish-British
declaration regarding the progress and aims of the negotiations
recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According
to this declaration there has been concluded between the Polish
Government and the British Government a temporary understanding,
to be replaced shortly by a permanent agreement, which will
provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great
Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two
states being directly or indirectly threatened.”
Thereafter, the document sets out in the next three paragraphs the
history of German friendship towards Poland. I quote from the last
paragraph, Paragraph 5, on that page:
“The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish
Government with the British Government is in such obvious
contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months ago
that the German Government can take note only with surprise and
astonishment of such a violent and fundamental reversal of
Polish policy.
“Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may
be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British agreement
is intended as a regular pact of alliance which, by reason of
its general sense and of the present state of political
relations, is directed exclusively against Germany. From the
obligation now accepted by the Polish Government, it appears
that Poland intends, in certain circumstances, to take an active
part in any possible German-British conflict, in the event of
aggression against Germany, even should this conflict not affect
Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open blow against
the renunciation of all use of force contained in the 1934
declaration.”
I think I can omit Paragraph 6. Paragraph 7:
“The Polish Government, however, by their recent decision to
accede to an alliance directed against Germany, have given it to
be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third
power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German Government.
In view of this, the German Government are obliged to conclude
that the Polish Government do not at present attach any
importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by
means of direct, friendly discussion with the German Government.
The Polish Government have thus abandoned the path, traced out
in 1934, to the shaping of German-Polish relations.”
All this would sound very well, if it had not been for the fact that
orders for the invasion of Poland had already been issued and the Armed
Forces had been told to draw up a precise timetable.
The document goes on to set out the history of the last negotiations and
discussions. It sets out the demands of the 21st, which the German
Government had made; the return of Danzig, the Autobahn, the railway,
the promise by Germany of the 25 years’ guarantee, and I go down to the
last but one paragraph on Page 3 of the Exhibit, under the heading (1):
“The Polish Government did not avail themselves of the
opportunity offered to them by the German Government for a just
settlement of the Danzig question; for the final safeguarding of
Poland’s frontiers with the Reich and thereby for permanent
strengthening of the friendly, neighborly relations between the
two countries. The Polish Government even rejected German
proposals made with this object.
“At the same time the Polish Government accepted, with regard to
another state, political obligations which are not compatible
either with the spirit, the meaning, or the text of the
German-Polish declaration of the 26th of January 1934. Thereby,
the Polish Government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this
declaration null and void.”
In the last paragraph the German Government says that, nevertheless,
they are prepared to continue friendly relations with Poland.
On the same day as that memorandum was issued Hitler made a speech in
the Reichstag, 28 April, in which he repeated, in effect, the terms of
the memorandum. This is Document TC-72, Number 13, which becomes GB-43.
I would only refer the Tribunal to the latter part of the second page of
the translation. He has again repeated the demands and offers that
Germany made in March, and he goes on to say that the Polish Government
have rejected his offer and lastly:
“I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the
Polish Government. But that alone is not the decisive fact. The
worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia a year ago,
believes under the pressure of a lying international campaign,
that it must call up troops although Germany, on her part, has
not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in
any way against Poland. As I have said, this is, in itself, very
regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was
really right to refuse the suggestion made this once by me.
This, as I have said, was an endeavor on my part to solve a
question which intimately affects the German people by a truly
unique compromise and to solve it to the advantage of both
countries. According to my conviction, Poland was not a giving
party in this solution at all, but only a receiving party,
because it should be beyond all doubt that Danzig will never
become Polish. The intention to attack, on the part of Germany,
which was merely invented by the international press, led, as
you know, to the so-called guarantee offer and to an obligation
on the part of the Polish Government for mutual assistance
. . . .”
It is unnecessary, My Lord, to read more of that. It shows us, as I say,
how completely dishonest was everything that the German Government was
saying at that time. There was Hitler, probably with a copy of the
orders for Fall Weiss in his pocket as he spoke, saying that the
intention to attack, by Germany, was an invention of the international
press.
In answer to that memorandum and that speech the Polish Government
issued a memorandum on the 28th of April. It is set out in the next
exhibit, TC-72, Number 16, which becomes GB-44. It is unnecessary to
read more than . . .
THE PRESIDENT: It is stated as the 5th of May, not the 28th of April.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon, yes, on the 5th of May.
It is unnecessary to read more than two short paragraphs from that
reply. I can summarize the document in a word. It sets out the objects
of the 1934 agreement: to renounce the use of force and to carry on
friendly relationship between the two countries, to solve difficulties
by arbitration and other friendly means. The Polish Government
appreciate that there are difficulties about Danzig and have long been
ready to carry out discussions. They set out again their part in the
recent discussions, and I turn to the second page of the document, the
one but last paragraph or, perhaps, I should go back a little to the top
of that page, the first half of that page. The Polish Government allege
that they wrote, as indeed they did, to the German Government on the
26th of March giving their point of view, that they then proposed joint
guarantees by the Polish and German Governments of the City of Danzig
based on the principles of freedom for the local population in internal
affairs. They said they were prepared to examine the possibilities of a
motor road and railway facilities and that they received no reply to
those proposals:
“It is clear that negotiations in which one state formulates
demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands
unaltered, are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration
of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and
dignity of Poland.”
Which, of course, in a word summarizes the whole position of the Polish
point of view. And thereafter they reject the German accusation that the
Anglo-Polish agreement is incompatible with the 1934 German-Polish
agreement. They state that Germany herself has entered into similar
agreements with other nations and lastly, on the next page, they too say
that they are still willing to entertain a new pact with Germany, should
Germany wish to do so.
If the Tribunal would turn back to the Document C-120, to the first two
letters, to which I referred only a few minutes ago, it becoming GB-41.
On the bottom of the page there is a figure 614, on the first page of
that exhibit, “Directives from Hitler and Keitel Preparing for War and
the Invasion of Poland”. I would refer to Page 6 of that particular
exhibit. The page number will be found at the bottom of the page, in the
center. It is a letter from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,
signed by Hitler and dated the 10th of May. It goes to OKW, OKH, OKM,
various branches of the OKW and with it apparently were enclosed
“Instructions for the Economic War and the Protection of Our Own
Economy.” I only mention it now to show better that throughout this time
preparations for the immediate aggression were continuing. That document
will still be part of the same exhibit.
Again on the next page, which is headed Number C-120(1), I am afraid
this is a précis only, not a full translation and therefore, perhaps, I
will not read it. But it is the annex, showing the “Directives for the
War against the Enemy Economy and Measures of Protection for Our Own
Economy.”
As we will see later, not only were the military preparations being
carried out throughout these months and weeks, but economic and every
other kind of preparation was being made for war at the earliest moment.
I think this period of preparation, translated up to May 1939, finishes
really with that famous meeting or conference in the Reich Chancellery
on the 23rd of May about which the Tribunal has already heard. It was
L-79 and is now Exhibit USA-27; and it was referred to, I think, and has
been known as the “Schmundt minutes.” It is the last document which is
in the Tribunal’s document book of this part and I do not propose to
read anything of it. It has been read already and the Tribunal will
remember that it was the speech in which Hitler was crying out for
Lebensraum and said that Danzig was not the dispute at all. It was a
question of expanding their living space in the East, where he said that
the decision had been taken to attack Poland.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you remind me of the date of it?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The 23rd of May 1939. Your Lordship will
remember that Göring, Raeder, and Keitel, among many others, were
present. It has three particular lines of which I want to remind the
Tribunal, where he said:
“If there were an alliance of France, England, and Russia
against Germany, Italy, and Japan, I would be constrained to
attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The
Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with
England.”
So that, not only has the decision been taken definitely to attack
Poland, but almost equally definitely to attack England and France,
also.
I pass to the next period, which I have described as the final
preparations taken from June up to the beginning of the war, at the
beginning of September—Part V of the Tribunal’s document book. If the
Tribunal will glance at the index to the document book, they will find I
have, for convenience, divided the evidence up under four subheadings:
Final preparations of the Armed Forces; economic preparation; the famous
Obersalzberg speeches; and the political or diplomatic preparations
urging on the crisis and the justification for the invasion of Poland.
I refer the Tribunal to the first document in that book, dealing with
the final preparations of the Armed Forces. It again is an exhibit
containing various documents, and I refer particularly to the second
document, dated the 22d of June 1939. This is Document C-126, which will
become GB-45.
It will be remembered that a precise timetable had been called for. Now,
here it is:
“The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the
Führer and Supreme Commander, a ‘preliminary timetable’ for Case
White based on the particulars so far available from the Navy,
Army, and Air Force. Details concerning the days preceding the
attack and the start of the attack were not included in this
timetable.
“The Führer and Supreme Commander is, in the main, in agreement
with the intentions of the Navy, Army, and Air Force and made
the following comments on individual points:
“1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up
reserves on a larger scale than usual for the maneuvers
scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments,
employers or other private persons who make inquiries should be
told that men are being called up for the autumn maneuvers and
for the exercise units it is intended to form for these
maneuvers.
“It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to
subordinate establishments.”
All this became relevant, particularly relevant, later when we find the
German Government making allegations of mobilization on the part of the
Poles. Here we have it in May, or rather June—they are mobilizing, only
doing so secretly:
“2. For reasons of security, the clearing of hospitals in the
area of the frontier must not be carried out.”
If the Tribunal will turn to the top of the following page, it will be
seen that that order is signed by the Defendant Keitel. I think it is
unnecessary to read any further from that document. There is—which
perhaps will save turning back, if I might take it rather out of date
now—the first document on that front page of that exhibit, a short
letter dated the 2d of August. It is only an extract, I am afraid, as it
appears in the translation:
“Attached are operational directions for the employment of
U-boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of
precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out Case
White remaining unchanged. Commander, U-boats is handing in his
operation orders by the 12th of August to the operations staff
of the Navy.”
One must assume that the Defendant Dönitz knew that his U-boats were to
go out into the Atlantic “by way of precaution in the event of the
intention to carry out Case White remaining unchanged.”
I turn to the next document in the Tribunal’s book, C-30, which becomes
GB-46. That is a letter dated the 27th of July. It contains orders for
the air and sea forces for the occupation of the German Free City of
Danzig:
“The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has
ordered the reunion of the German Free State of Danzig with the
Greater German Reich. The Armed Forces must occupy Danzig Free
State immediately in order to protect the German population.
There will be no hostile intention on the part of Poland so long
as the occupation takes place without the force of arms.”
It then sets out how the occupation is to be effected. All this again
becomes more relevant when we discuss the diplomatic action of the last
few days before the war, when Germany was purporting to make specious
offers for the settlement of the question by peaceful means. I would
like to offer this as evidence that the decision had been taken and
nothing was going to move him from that decision. That document, as set
out, says that, “There will be no hostile intention on the part of
Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force of arms.”
Nevertheless, that was not the only condition upon which the occupation
was to take place and we find that during July, right up to the time of
the war, steps were being taken to arm the population of Danzig and to
prepare them to take part in the coming occupation.
I refer the Tribunal to the next Document, TC-71, which becomes GB-47,
where there are set out a few only of the reports which were coming back
almost daily during this period from Mr. Shepherd, the Consul-General in
Danzig, to the British Foreign Minister. The sum total of those reports
can be found in the _British Blue Book_. I now would refer to only two
of them as examples of the kind of thing that was happening.
I refer to the first that appears on that exhibit, dated the 1st of July
1939.
“Yesterday morning four German army officers in mufti arrived
here by night express from Berlin to organize Danzig Heimwehr.
All approaches to hills and dismantled forts, which constitute a
popular public promenade on the western fringe of the city, have
been closed with barbed wire and ‘verboten’ notices. The walls
surrounding the shipyards bear placards: ‘Comrades keep your
mouths shut lest you regret consequence.’
“Master of British steamer _High Commissioner Wood_, while he
was roving Königsberg from the 28th of June to 30th of June,
observed considerable military activity, including extensive
shipment of camouflaged covered lorries and similar material, by
small coasting vessels. On the 28th of June four medium-sized
steamers, loaded with troops, lorries, field kitchens, and so
forth, left Königsberg ostensibly returning to Hamburg after
maneuvers, but actually proceeding to Stettin. Names of steamers
. . . .”
And again, as another example, the report Number 11, on the next page of
the exhibit, dated the 10th of July, states:
“The same informant, whom I believe to be reliable, advises me
that on the 8th of July, he personally saw about 30 military
lorries with East Prussian license numbers on the Bischofsberg,
where numerous field kitchens had been placed along the hedges.
There were also eight large antiaircraft guns in position, which
he estimated as being of over 3-inch caliber, and three
six-barreled light antiaircraft machine guns. There were about
500 men, drilling with rifles, and the whole place is
extensively fortified with barbed wire.”
I do not think it is necessary to occupy the Tribunal’s time in reading
more. Those, as I say, are two reports only, of a number of others that
can be found in the _British Blue Book_, which sets out the arming and
preparation of the Free City of Danzig.
On the 12th of August and the 13th of August, when preparations were
practically complete—and it will be remembered that they had to be
complete for an invasion of Poland on the 1st of September—we find
Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop at last disclosing their intentions
to their allies, the Italians.
One of the passages in Hitler’s speech of the 23rd of May, it will be
remembered—I will not quote it now because the document has been read
before. However, in a passage in that speech Hitler, in regard to his
proposed attack on Poland, had said, “Our object must be kept secret
even from the Italians and the Japanese.”
Now, when his preparations are complete, he discloses his intentions to
his Italian comrades, and does so in hope that they will join him.
The minutes of that meeting are long, and it is not proposed to read
more than a few passages. The meeting can be summarized generally by
saying, as I have, that Hitler is trying to persuade the Italians to
come into the war with him. The Italians, or Ciano, rather, is most
surprised. He had no idea, as he says, of the urgency of the matter; and
they are not prepared. He, therefore, is trying to dissuade Hitler from
starting off so soon until the Duce can have had a little more time to
prepare himself.
The value—perhaps the greatest value—of the minutes of that meeting is
that they show quite clearly the German intention to attack England and
France ultimately, anyway, if not at the same time as Poland.
I refer the Tribunal to the second page of the exhibit. Hitler is trying
to show the strength of Germany, the certainty of winning the war; and,
therefore, he hopes to persuade the Italians to come in:
“At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements
in prospect.”—I quote from the top of the second page.—“Some
time would elapse before any of the ships now under construction
could be taken into service. As far as the land army was
concerned, after the introduction of conscription 60,000 men had
been called to the colors.”
I quote this passage particularly to show the intention to attack
England. We have been concentrating rather on Poland, but here his
thoughts are turned entirely towards England:
“If England kept the necessary troops in her own country she
could send to France, at the most, two infantry divisions and
one armored division. For the rest she could supply a few bomber
squadrons, but hardly any fighters, since, at the outbreak of
war, the German Air Force would at once attack England and the
English fighters would be urgently needed for the defense of
their own country.
“With regard to the position of France, the Führer said that in
the event of a general war, after the destruction of
Poland—which would not take long—Germany would be in a
position to assemble a hundred divisions along the West Wall and
France would then be compelled to concentrate all her available
forces from the colonies, from the Italian frontier and
elsewhere, on her own Maginot Line for the life and death
struggle which would then ensue. The Führer also thought that
the French would find it no easier to overrun the Italian
fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count Ciano
showed signs of extreme doubt.”—Doubts which, perhaps, in view
of the subsequent performances, were well justified.
“The Polish Army was most uneven in quality. Together with a few
parade divisions, there were large numbers of troops of less
value. Poland was very weak in antitank and antiaircraft defense
and at the moment neither France nor England could help her in
this respect.”
What this Tribunal will appreciate, of course, is that Poland formed
such a threat to Germany on Germany’s eastern frontier.
“If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western Powers
over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and German
superiority would thereby be diminished. In contrast to the
fanatics of Warsaw and Kraków, the population of their areas is
indifferent. Furthermore, it was necessary to consider the
position of the Polish State. Out of 34 million inhabitants, one
and one-half million were German, about four million were Jews,
and approximately nine million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles
were much less in number than the total population and, as
already said, their striking power was to be valued variably. In
these circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by
Germany in the shortest time.
“Since the Poles, through their whole attitude, had made it
clear that in any case, in the event of a conflict, they would
stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick
liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for
the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a
hostile Poland remained on Germany’s eastern frontier, not only
would the 11 East Prussian divisions be tied down; but also
further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This
would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation.”
The argument goes on on those lines.
I pass on to the next page, at the top of the page:
“Coming back to the Danzig question, the Führer said to Count
Ciano that it was impossible for him to go back now. He had made
an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from
South Tyrol, but for this reason he must take the greatest care
to avoid giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal
could be taken as a precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he
had justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general easterly
and northeasterly direction of a German policy. The east and
northeast, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been
Germany’s undisputed sphere of influence since time immemorial,
as the Mediterranean had been the appropriate sphere for Italy.
For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and
timber from these eastern regions.”
Now we get the truth of this matter. It is not the persecution of German
minorities on the Polish frontiers, but the economic reasons, the need
for foodstuffs and timber from Poland:
“In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material,
although the city had the greatest harbor in the Baltic—the
transshipment by tonnage was 40 percent of that of Hamburg—but
Danzig was a Nuremberg of the north, an ancient German city
awaking sentimental feelings for every German, and the Führer
was bound to take account of this psychological element in
public opinion. To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano
should suppose that Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a
large Italian minority was being treated brutally on Yugoslav
soil. It would be difficult to assume that Italy would long
remain quiet over anything of this kind.
“Count Ciano, in replying to the Führer’s statement, first
expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the
completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in
the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during
his Berlin visit had there been any sign, from the German side,
that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the
contrary, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had said that in his
opinion the Danzig question would be settled in the course of
time. On these grounds, the Duce, in view of his conviction that
a conflict with the Western Powers was unavoidable, had assumed
that he should make his preparations for this event; he had made
plans for a period of 2 or 3 years. If immediate conflict was
unavoidable, the Duce, as he had told Ciano, would certainly
stand on the German side; but for various reasons he would
welcome the postponement of a general conflict until a later
time.”
No question of welcoming the cancellation of a general conflict; the
only concern of anybody is as to time.
“Ciano then showed, with the aid of a map, the position of Italy
in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a conflict
with Poland would not be limited to that country but would
develop into a general European war.”
Thereafter, during the meeting, Ciano goes on to try to dissuade Hitler
from any immediate action. I quote two lines from the argument at the
top of Page 5 of the exhibit:
“For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should
make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful
intentions of Italy and Germany.”
Then we get the Führer’s answer to those arguments, half-way down Page
5:
“The Führer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem
no time should be lost; the longer one waited until the autumn,
the more difficult would military operations in eastern Europe
become. From the middle of September weather conditions made air
operations hardly possible in these areas, while the conditions
of the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass by the
autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible for
motorized forces. From September to May, Poland was a great
marsh and entirely unsuited for any kind of military operations.
Poland could, however, occupy Danzig in October . . . and
Germany would not be able to do anything about it since they
obviously could not bombard or destroy the place.”
They couldn’t possibly bombard or destroy any place where there happened
to be Germans living. Warsaw, Rotterdam, England, London—I wonder
whether any sentiments of that kind were held in consideration in regard
to those places.
“Ciano asked how soon, according to the Führer’s view, the
Danzig question must be settled. The Führer answered that this
settlement must be made one way or another by the end of August.
To the question of Ciano as to what solution the Führer
proposed, Hitler answered that Poland must give up political
control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests would
obviously be reserved and that Polish general behavior must
contribute to a general lessening of the tension. He doubted
whether Poland was ready to accept this solution since, up to
the present, the German proposals had been refused. The Führer
had made this proposal personally to Beck, at his visit to
Obersalzberg. They were extremely favorable to Poland. In return
for the political surrender of Danzig, under a complete
guarantee of Polish interests, and the establishment of a
connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany would
have given a frontier guarantee, a 25-year pact of friendship,
and the participation of Poland in influence over Slovakia. Beck
had received the proposal with the remark that he was willing to
examine it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of
English intervention. The general Polish aims could be seen
clearly from the press. They wanted the whole of East Prussia,
and even proposed to advance to Berlin . . . .”—That was
something quite different.
The meeting was held over that night, and it continued on the following
day.
On Page 7, in the middle of the page, it will be seen:
“The Führer had therefore come to two definite conclusions: (1)
in the event of any further provocation, he would immediately
attack; (2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly state her
political intention, she must be forced to do so.”
I go to the last line on that page:
“As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not exist
further in the world through the lack of space; not only was
there no more space, but existing space was completely blockaded
by its present possessors; they sat like misers with their heaps
of gold and deluded themselves about their riches . . . . The
Western Democracies were dominated by the desire to rule the
world and would not regard Germany and Italy as in their class.
This psychological element of contempt was perhaps the worst
thing about the whole business. It could only be settled by a
life and death struggle which the two Axis partners could meet
more easily because their interests did not clash on any point.
“The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain for
which Italy had a claim to predominance. The Duce himself . . .
had summed up the position to him in the words that Italy,
because of its geographic location, was already the dominant
power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Führer said
that Germany must take the old German road eastwards and that
this road was also desirable for economic reasons, and that
Italy had geographical and historical claims to permanency in
the Mediterranean. Bismarck . . . had recognized it and had said
as much in his well-known letter to Mazzini. The interests of
Germany and Italy went in quite different directions and there
never could be a conflict between them.
“The Minister of Foreign Affairs added that if the two problems
mentioned in yesterday’s conversations were settled, Italy and
Germany would have their backs free for work against the West.
The Führer said that Poland must be struck down so that for 10
years”—there appears to have been a query raised in the
translation—“for so many years long she would have been
incapable of fighting. In such a case, matters in the west could
be settled.
“Ciano thanked the Führer for his extremely clear explanation of
the situation. He had, on his side, nothing to add and would
give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite
information on one point, in order that the Duce might have all
the facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to make no
decision because the Führer believed that the conflict with
Poland could be localized. On the basis of long experience
he”—Ciano—“quite saw that so far the Führer had always been
right in his judgment of the position. If, however, Mussolini
had no decision to make, he had to take certain measures of
precaution, and therefore Ciano would put the following
question:
“The Führer had mentioned two conditions under which he would
take Poland: (1) if Poland were guilty of serious provocation,
and (2) if Poland did not make her political position clear. The
first of these conditions did not depend on the decision of the
Führer, and German reaction would follow in a moment. The second
condition required certain decisions as to time. Ciano therefore
asked what was the date by which Poland must have satisfied
Germany about her political condition. He realized that this
date depended upon climatic conditions.
“The Führer answered that the decision of Poland must be made
clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, however, the
decisive part of military operations against Poland could be
carried out within a period of 14 days, and the final
liquidation would need another . . . 4 weeks, it could be
finished at the end of September or the beginning of October.
These could be regarded as the dates. It followed, therefore,
that the last date on which he could begin to take action was
the end of August.
“Finally, the Führer reassured Ciano that since his youth he had
favored German-Italian co-operation, and that no other view was
expressed in his publications. He had always thought that
Germany and Italy were naturally suited for collaboration, since
there were no conflicts of interest between them. He was
personally fortunate to live at a time in which, apart from
himself, there was one other statesman who would stand out great
and unique in history; that he could be this man’s friend was
for him a matter of great personal satisfaction, and if the hour
of common battle struck, he would always be found on the side of
the Duce for better or for worse.”
THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If the Tribunal please, I never actually put
that last document that I was referring to in as an exhibit. It is
Document TC-77, which becomes GB-48.
Having referred the Tribunal to those documents showing that the
military preparations were throughout the whole period in hand and
nearing their completion, I would refer to one letter from the Defendant
Funk, showing that at the same time the economists had not been idle. It
is a letter dated the 26th of August 1939, in which Funk is writing to
his Führer. He says:
“My Führer! I thank you sincerely and heartily for your most
friendly and kind wishes on the occasion of my birthday. How
happy and how grateful to you we ought to be for being granted
the favor of experiencing these overwhelmingly great and
world-changing times and taking part in the mighty events of
these days.
“The information given to me by Field Marshal Göring, that you,
my Führer, yesterday evening approved in principle the measures
prepared by me for financing the war and for shaping the
relationship between wages and prices and for carrying through
emergency sacrifices, made me deeply happy. I hereby report to
you, with all respect, that I have succeeded by means of
precautions taken during the last few months in making the Reich
Bank internally so strong and externally so unassailable that
even the most serious shocks in the international money and
credit market cannot affect us in the least. In the meantime, I
have quite inconspicuously changed into gold all the assets of
the Reich Bank and of the whole of the German economy abroad on
which it was possible to lay hands. Under the proposals I have
prepared for a ruthless elimination of all consumption which is
not of vital importance and of all public expenditure and public
works which are not of importance for the war effort, we will be
in a position to cope with all demands on finance and economy
without any serious shocks. I have considered it my duty as the
general plenipotentiary for economy, appointed by you, to make
this report and solemn promise to you, my Führer. Heil my
Führer”—signed—“Walter Funk.”
That document is PS-699, and it goes in as GB-49.
It is difficult in view of that letter to see how the Defendant Funk can
say that he did not know of the preparations and of the intentions of
the German Government to wage war.
I come now to the speech which Hitler made on the 22d of August at
Obersalzberg to his commanders-in-chief. By the end of the third week of
August, preparations were complete. That speech has already been read to
the Tribunal. I would, perhaps, ask the Tribunal’s patience if I quoted
literally half a dozen lines so as to carry the story on in sequence.
On the first page of PS-1014, which is already USA-30, the fourth line:
“Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were
determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers.”
The second paragraph:
“Destruction of Poland is in the foreground. The aim is the
elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line.
Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of
Poland shall be the primary objective.”
Again, the famous sentence in the third paragraph:
“I shall give a propagandists cause for starting the war, never
mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be
asked later on whether he told the truth or not. In starting and
making a war, not the right is what matters but victory.”
We are going to see only too clearly how that propagandistic cause,
which already had been put in hand, was brought to its climax.
I turn to the next page (798-PS, USA-29), the third paragraph:
“It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come
sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the spring,
but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few
years, and only afterwards against the East.”
I refer to these passages again particularly to emphasize the intention
of the Nazi Government, not only to conquer Poland, but ultimately, in
any event, to wage aggressive war against the Western Democracies.
I refer lastly to the last page, a passage which becomes more and more
significant as we continue the story of the last few days: I quote from
the fourth paragraph:
“We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us
with grain, cattle, coal, lead, and zinc. It is a big aim, which
demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute
some ‘Schweinehund’ will make a proposal for mediation.
“The political aim is set farther. A beginning has been made for
the destruction of England’s hegemony. The way is open for the
soldier, after I have made the political preparations.”
And, again, the very last line becomes significant later:
“Göring answers with thanks to the Führer and the assurance that
the Armed Forces will do their duty.”
We pass from the military-economic preparations and his exhortations to
his generals to see how he was developing the position in the diplomatic
and political field.
On the 23rd of August 1939 the Danzig Senate passed a decree whereby
Gauleiter Forster was appointed head of the State of the Free City of
Danzig, a position which did not exist under the statute setting up the
constitution of the Free City. I put in the next document, which is
taken from the _British Blue Book_, only as evidence of that event, an
event that was, of course, aimed at stirring up the feeling in the Free
City at that time. That is TC-72, Number 62, which becomes GB-50.
At the same time, frontier incidents were being manufactured by the Nazi
Government with the aid of the SS. The Tribunal has already heard the
evidence of General Lahousen the other day in which he referred to the
provision of Polish uniforms to the SS forces for these purposes, so
that dead Poles could be found lying about the German side of the
frontier. I refer the Tribunal now to three short reports which
corroborate the evidence that that gentleman came and gave before you,
and they are found in the _British Blue Book_. They are reports from the
British Ambassador in Warsaw.
The first of them, TC-72, Number 53, which becomes GB-51, is dated 26th
of August.
“A series of incidents again occurred yesterday on German
frontier.
“Polish patrol met a party of Germans one kilometer from the
East Prussian frontier near Pelta. Germans opened fire. Polish
patrol replied, killing leader, whose body is being returned.
“German bands also crossed Silesian frontier near Szczyglo,
twice near Rybnik, and twice elsewhere, firing shots and
attacking blockhouses and customs posts with machine guns and
hand grenades. Poles have protested vigorously to Berlin.
“_Gazeta Polska_, in an inspired lead article today, says these
are more than incidents. They are clearly prepared acts of
aggression of para-military disciplined detachments, supplied
with regular army’s arms, and in one case it was a regular army
detachment. Attacks more or less continuous.
“These incidents did not cause Poland to forsake calm and strong
attitude of defense. Facts spoke for themselves and acts of
aggression came from German side. This was the best answer to
the ravings of German press.
“Ministry for Foreign Affairs state uniformed German detachment
has since shot a Pole across frontier and wounded another.”
I pass to the next report, TC-72, Number 54, which becomes GB-52. It is
dated the same date, the 26th of August.
“Ministry for Foreign Affairs categorically deny story recounted
by Hitler to the French Ambassador that 24 Germans were recently
killed at Lodz and eight at Bielsko. The story is without any
foundation whatever.”
And lastly, TC-72, Number 55, which becomes GB-53, the report of the
next day, the 27th of August.
“So far as I can judge, German allegations of mass ill-treatment
of German minority by Polish authorities are gross exaggeration,
if not complete falsification.
“2. There is no sign of any loss of control of situation by
Polish civil authorities. Warsaw, and so far as I can ascertain,
the rest of Poland is still completely calm.
“3. Such allegations are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda methods
regarding Czechoslovakia last year.
“4. In any case it is purely and simply deliberate German
provocation in accordance with fixed policy that has since
March”—since the date when the rest of Czechoslovakia was
seized and they were ready to go against Poland—“that has since
March exacerbated feeling between the two nationalities. I
suppose this has been done with the object:
“(a) Creating war spirit in Germany, (b) impressing public
opinion abroad, (c) provoking either defeatism or apparent
aggression in Poland.
“5. It has signally failed to achieve either of the two latter
objects.
“6. It is noteworthy that Danzig was hardly mentioned by Herr
Hitler.
“7. German treatment of Czech Jews and Polish minority is
apparently negligible factor compared with alleged sufferings of
Germans in Poland where, be it noted, they do not amount to more
than 10 per cent of the population in any commune.
“8. In the face of these facts it can hardly be doubted that, if
Herr Hitler decided on war, it is for the sole purpose of
destroying Polish independence.
“9. I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on Minister for
Foreign Affairs necessity of doing everything possible to prove
that Hitler’s allegations regarding German minority are false.”
And yet, again, we have further corroboration of General Lahousen’s
evidence in a memorandum, which has been captured, of a conversation
between the writer and Keitel. It is 795-PS, and it becomes GB-54. That
conversation with Keitel took place on the 17th of August, and from the
memorandum I quote the first paragraph:
“I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel. He said that he
would not pay any attention to this action, as the Führer had
not informed him, and had only let him know that we were to
furnish Heydrich with Polish uniforms. He agrees that I instruct
the General Staff. He says he does not think much of actions of
this kind. However, there is nothing else to be done if they
have been ordered by the Führer; that he could not ask the
Führer how he had planned the execution of this special action.
In regard to Dirschau, he has decided that this action would be
executed only by the Army.”
That then, My Lord, was the position at the end of the first week in
August—I mean at the end of the third week in August. On the 22d of
August the Russian-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed in Moscow, and
we have heard in Hitler’s speech of that date to his commanders-in-chief
how it had gone down as a shock to the rest of the world. In fact, the
orders to invade Poland were given immediately after the signing of that
treaty, and the H-hour was actually to be in the early morning of the
25th of August. Orders were given to invade Poland in the early hours of
the 25th of August, and that I shall prove in a moment.
Oh the same day—the 23rd of August—that the German-Russian agreement
was signed in Moscow, news reached England that it was being signed. And
of course the significance of it from a military point of view as to
Germany, particularly in the present circumstances, was obvious; and the
British Government immediately made their position clear in one last
hope—and that one last hope was that if they did so the German
Government might possibly think better of it. And I refer to Document
TC-72, Number 56; it is the first document in the next to the last part
of the Tribunal document book, in which the Prime Minister wrote to
Hitler. That document becomes GB-55:
“Your Excellency:
“Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures
taken by His Majesty’s Government, and announced in the press
and on the wireless this evening.
“These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government,
been rendered necessary by the military movements which have
been reported from Germany and by the fact that apparently the
announcement of a German-Soviet agreement is taken in some
quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great
Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need
be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may
prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet agreement, it cannot
alter Great Britain’s obligation to Poland, which His Majesty’s
Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly and
which they are determined to fulfill.
“It has been alleged that, if His Majesty’s Government had made
their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would
have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that
allegation, His Majesty’s Government are resolved that on this
occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.
“If the case should arise, they are resolved and prepared to
employ without delay all the forces at their command; and it is
impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It
would be a dangerous delusion to think that, if war once starts,
it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the
several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been
secured.”
Thereafter the Prime Minister urged the German Government to try and
resolve the difficulty without recourse to the use of force; and he
suggested that a truce should be declared while direct discussions
between the two Governments, the Polish and German Governments, might
take place. I quote in Prime Minister Chamberlain’s language:
“At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a
catastrophe that will involve Europe in war. In view of the
grave consequences to humanity which may follow from the action
of their rulers, I trust that Your Excellency will weigh with
the utmost deliberation the considerations which I have put
before you.”
On the following day, the 23rd of August, Hitler replied to Prime
Minister Chamberlain, and that document is TC-72, Number 60, and it
becomes GB-56. He starts off by saying that Germany has always wanted
England’s friendship, and has always done everything to get it; on the
other hand, she has some essential interests which it is impossible for
Germany to renounce. I quote the third paragraph:
“Germany was prepared to settle the questions of Danzig and of
the corridor by the method of negotiation on the basis of a
proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity. The allegation which
is disseminated by England regarding a German mobilization
against Poland”—we see here the complete dishonesty of the
whole business—“the assertion of aggressive designs towards
Romania, Hungary, and so forth as well as the so-called
guarantee declarations, which were subsequently given, had,
however, dispelled Polish inclination to negotiate on a basis of
this kind which would have been tolerable for Germany also.
“The unconditional assurance given by England to Poland, that
she would render assistance to that country in all circumstances
regardless of the causes from which a conflict might spring,
could only be interpreted in that country as an encouragement
thenceforward to unloosen, under cover of such a charter, a wave
of appalling terrorism against the one and a half million German
inhabitants living in Poland.”
Again I cannot help remembering the report by the British Ambassador, to
which I just referred:
“The atrocities which since then have been taking place in that
country are terrible for the victims but intolerable for a great
power such as the German Reich, which is expected to remain a
passive onlooker during these happenings. Poland has been guilty
of numerous breaches of her obligations towards the Free City of
Danzig, has made demands in the character of ultimata, and has
initiated a process of economic strangulation.”
It goes on to say that “Germany will not tolerate a continuance of the
persecution” and the fact that there is a British guarantee to Poland
makes no difference to her determination to end this state of affairs. I
quote from Paragraph 7:
“The German Reich Government has received information to the
effect that the British Government has the intention to carry
out measures of mobilization which, according to the statements
contained in your own letter, are clearly directed against
Germany alone. This is said to be true of France as well. Since
Germany has never had the intention of taking military measures
other than those of a defensive character against England or
France and, as has already been emphasized, has never intended,
and does not in the future intend, to attack England or France,
it follows that this announcement as confirmed by you, Mr. Prime
Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a contemplated
act of menace directed against the Reich. I, therefore, inform
your Excellency that in the event of these military
announcements being carried into effect, I shall order immediate
mobilization of the German forces.”
If the intention of the German Government had been peaceful, if they
really wanted peace and not war, what was the purpose of these lies;
these lies saying that they had never intended to attack England or
France, carried out no mobilization, statements which, in view of what
we now have, we know to be lies? What can have been their object if
their intention had always been for a peaceful settlement of the Danzig
question only? Then I quote again from the last paragraph:
“The question of the treatment of European problems on a
peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany, but
primarily on those who since the crime committed by the
Versailles dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any
peaceful revision. Only after a change of the spirit on the part
of the responsible powers can there be any real change in the
relationship between England and Germany. I have all my life
fought for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude adopted by
British diplomacy—at any rate up to the present—has, however,
convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be
any change in this respect in the future, nobody could be
happier than I.”
On the 25th of August the formal Anglo-Polish Agreement of mutual
assistance was signed in London. It is unnecessary to read the document.
The Tribunal will be well aware of its contents where both Governments
undertake to give assistance to the other in the event of aggression
against either by any third power. I point to Document TC-73; it is
Number 91 and it becomes GB-57. I shall refer to the fact of its signing
again in a moment but perhaps it is convenient while we are dealing with
a letter between the British Prime Minister and Hitler to refer also to
a similar correspondence which took place a few days later between the
French Prime Minister M. Daladier and Hitler. I emphasize these because
it is desired to show how deliberately the German Government was set
about their pattern of aggression. “The French Ambassador in Berlin has
informed me of your personal communication,” written on the 26th of
August:
“In the hours in which you speak of the greatest responsibility
which two heads of the Governments can possibly take upon
themselves, namely, that of shedding the blood of two great
nations who long only for peace and work, I feel I owe it to
you, personally, and to both our peoples to say that the fate of
peace still rests in your hands alone.
“You cannot doubt but what are my own feelings towards Germany,
nor France’s peaceful feelings towards your nation. No Frenchman
has done more than myself to strengthen between our two nations
not only peace but also sincere co-operation in their own
interests as well as in those of Europe and of the whole world.
Unless you credit the French people with a lower sense of honor
than I credit to the German nation, you cannot doubt that France
loyally fulfills her obligations toward other powers, such as
Poland, which, as I am fully convinced, wants to live in peace
with Germany. These two convictions are fully compatible.
“Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful solution
of the international crisis with all honor and dignity for all
nations, if the same will for peace exists on all sides.
“Together with the good will of France I proclaim that of all
her allies. I take it upon myself to guarantee Poland’s
readiness, which she has always shown, to submit to the mutual
application of a method of open settlement as it can be imagined
between the governments of two sovereign nations. With the
clearest conscience I can assure you that, among the differences
which have arisen between Germany and Poland over the question
of Danzig, there is not one which could not be submitted to such
a method with a purpose of reaching a peaceful and just
solution.
“Moreover, I can declare on my honor that there is nothing in
France’s clear and loyal solidarity with Poland and her allies,
which could in any way prejudice the peaceful attitude of my
country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not
prevent us today, from keeping Poland in the same friendly state
of mind.
“In so serious an hour I sincerely believe that no high-minded
human being could understand it if a war of destruction were
started without a last attempt being made to reach a peaceful
settlement between Germany and Poland. Your desire for peace
could, in all certainty, work for this aim without any prejudice
to German honor. I, who desire good harmony between the French
and the German people, and who am, on the other hand, bound to
Poland by bonds of friendship and by a promise, am prepared, as
head of the French Government, to do everything an upright man
can do to bring this attempt to a successful conclusion.
“You and I were in the trenches in the last war. You know, as I
do, what horror and condemnation the devastations of that war
have left in the conscience of the people without any regard to
its outcome. The picture I can see in my mind’s eye of your
outstanding role as the leader of the German people on the road
of peace, toward the fulfillment of its task in the common work
of civilization, leads me to ask for a reply to this suggestion.
“If French and German blood should be shed again as it was shed
25 years ago in a still longer and more murderous war, then each
of the two nations will fight believing in its own victory. But
the most certain victors will be destruction and barbarity.”
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.
[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
COLONEL ROBERT G. STOREY (Executive Trial Counsel for the United
States): If it please the Tribunal, with the consent of Lieutenant
Colonel Griffith-Jones, may I make an announcement to the Defense
Counsel.
At 7:30 in the courtroom this evening, the remainder of the motion
pictures which the United States will offer in evidence will be shown
for the Defense Counsel. We urge that all of them come at 7:30.
DR. DIX: I believe I can say on behalf of all members of the Defense
that they do not consider it necessary that the films be shown to them
before the proceedings, that is, shown to them twice. We fully and with
gratitude appreciate the courtesy and readiness to facilitate our work;
but our evenings are very much taken up by the preparation of our cases
and by the necessary consultations with our clients.
The question of films is on a level different from that of documents.
Documents one likes to read in advance or simultaneously or later; but
since we can hear and take note of the testimony of witnesses only
during the main proceedings, we are, of course, to an even greater
degree in a position and prepared to become acquainted with the films
submitted as evidence only during the proceedings. We believe the
Prosecution need not take the trouble of showing every film to us on
some evening before it is shown again in the proceedings. We hope this
will not be construed as, shall I say, a sort of demonstration in some
respect, for the reason really is that our time is so fully taken up by
our preparations that all superfluous work might well be spared both the
Prosecution and us. I repeat and emphasize that we fully and gratefully
appreciate the Prosecution’s manifest readiness to facilitate our work,
and I ask that my words be understood in this light.
THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand that you think it will be unnecessary for
the defendants’ counsel to have a preview of the films, to see them
before they are produced in evidence? Is that what you are saying?
DR. DIX: Yes, that is what I said.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I am not sure that you were here when Dr.
Dix began his observation; but I understand that what he says is that in
view of the amount of preparation which the defendants’ counsel have to
undertake, they do not consider it necessary to have a view of these
films before they are produced in evidence, but at the same time he
wishes to express his gratification at the co-operation of the Counsel
for the Prosecution.
COL. STOREY: Very agreeable. It’s all right with us. We were doing it
for their benefit.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: When the Tribunal rose for the adjournment, I
had just read the letter from M. Daladier to Hitler, of the 26th of
August. On the 27th of August Hitler replied to that letter, and I think
it unnecessary to read the reply. The sense of it was very much the same
as that which he wrote to the British Prime Minister in answer to the
letter that he had received earlier in the week.
Those two letters are taken from the _German White Book_ which I put in
evidence as GB-58, so perhaps the Tribunal would treat both those
letters as of the same number. After that, nobody could say that the
German Government could be in any doubt as to the position that was to
be taken up by both the British and French Governments in the event of a
German aggression against Poland.
But the pleas for peace did not end there. On the 24th of August
President Roosevelt wrote to both Hitler and the President of the Polish
Republic. I quote only the first few paragraphs of his letter:
“In the message which I sent you on April the 14th, I stated
that it appeared to be that the leaders of great nations had it
in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that
impended, but that, unless the effort were immediately made,
with goodwill on all sides, to find a peaceful and constructive
solution to existing controversies, the crisis which the world
was confronting must end in catastrophe. Today that catastrophe
appears to be very near at hand indeed.
“To the message which I sent you last April I have received no
reply, but because my confident belief that the cause of world
peace—which is the cause of humanity itself—rises above all
other considerations, I am again addressing myself to you, with
the hope that the war which impends, and the consequent disaster
to all peoples, may yet be averted.
“I therefore urge with all earnestness—and I am likewise urging
the President of the Republic of Poland—that the Governments of
Germany and Poland agree by common accord to refrain from any
positive act of hostility for a reasonable, stipulated period;
and that they agree, likewise by common accord, to solve the
controversies which have arisen between them by one of the three
following methods:
“First, by direct negotiation; second, by the submission of
these controversies to an impartial arbitration in which they
can both have confidence; third, that they agree to the solution
of these controversies through the procedure of conciliation.”
I think it is unnecessary to read any more of that letter. As I have
already indicated to the Tribunal, the answer to that was the order to
his armed forces to invade Poland on the following morning.
That document is Exhibit TC-72, Number 124, which becomes GB-59.
I put in evidence also the next document, TC-72, Number 126, GB-60,
which is the reply to that letter from the President of the Polish
Republic, in which he accepts the offer to settle the differences by any
of the peaceful methods suggested.
On the 25th of August, no reply having been received from the German
Government, President Roosevelt wrote again:
“I have this hour received from the President of Poland a reply
to the message which I addressed to Your Excellency and to him
last night.”
The text of the Polish reply is then set out.
“Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that the aims
and objects sought by the German Reich were just and reasonable.
“In his reply to my message the President of Poland has made it
plain that the Polish Government are willing, upon the basis set
forth in my message, to agree to solve the controversy which has
arisen between the Republic of Poland and the German Reich by
direct negotiation or the process of conciliation.
“Countless human lives can yet be saved, and hope may still be
restored that the nations of the modern world may even now
construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier
relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich will
agree to the pacific means of settlement accepted by the
Government of Poland. All the world prays that Germany, too,
will accept.”
But, My Lord, Germany would not accept, nor would she accept the appeals
by the Pope which appear in the next document.
I am sorry—the President of Poland’s reply, TC-72 becomes Number 127,
GB-61.
They would not agree to those proposals, nor would they pay heed to the
Pope’s appeal, which is TC-72, Number 139 on the same date, the 24th of
August, which becomes GB-62. I do not think it is necessary to read
that. It is an appeal in similar terms. And there is yet a further
appeal from the Pope on the 31st of August, TC-72, Number 14, which
becomes GB-63. It is 141; I beg your pardon. It is TC-72, Number 141. I
think the printing is wrong in the Tribunal’s translation:
“The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that pending negotiations
may lead to a just pacific solution, such as the whole world
continues to pray for.”
I think it is unnecessary to read the remainder of that. If the Pope had
realized that those negotiations to which he referred as the “pending
negotiations” in the last days of August, which we are about to deal
with now, were completely bogus negotiations, bogus insofar as Germany
was concerned, and put forward, as indeed they were—and as I hope to
illustrate to the Tribunal in a moment—simply as an endeavor to
dissuade England either by threat or by bribe from meeting her
obligations to Poland, then perhaps he would have saved himself the
trouble in ever addressing that last appeal.
It will be seen quite clearly that those final German offers, to which I
now turn, were no offers in the accepted sense of the word at all; that
there was never any intention behind them of entering into discussions,
negotiation, arbitration, or any other form of peaceful settlement with
Poland. They were just an attempt to make it rather easier to seize and
conquer Poland than appeared likely if England and France observed the
obligations that they had undertaken.
Perhaps I might, before dealing with the documents, summarize in a word
those last negotiations.
On the 22d of August, as we have seen, the German-Soviet Pact was
signed. On the 24th of August, orders were given to his armies to march
the following morning. After those orders had been given, the news
apparently reached the German Government that the British and Polish
Governments had actually signed a formal pact of non-aggression and of
mutual assistance. Until that time, it will be remembered, the position
was that the Prime Minister had made a statement in the House and a
joint communiqué had been issued—I think on the 6th of April—that they
would in fact assist one another if either were attacked, but no formal
agreement had been signed.
Now, on the 24th of August after those orders had been given by him, the
news came that such a formal document had been signed; and the invasion
was postponed for the sole purpose of making one last effort to keep
England and France out of the war—not to end the war, not to cancel the
war, but to keep them out.
And to do that, on the 25th of August, having postponed the invasion,
Hitler issued a verbal communiqué to Sir Nevile Henderson which, as the
Tribunal will see, was a mixture of bribe and threat with which he hoped
to persuade England to keep out.
On the 28th of August Sir Nevile Henderson handed the British
Government’s reply to that communiqué to Hitler. That reply stressed
that the difference ought to be settled by agreement. The British
Government put forward the view that Danzig should be guaranteed and,
indeed, any agreement come to should be guaranteed by other powers,
which, of course, in any event would have been quite unacceptable to the
German Reich.
As I say, one really need not consider what would have been acceptable
and not acceptable because once it had been made clear—as indeed it was
in that British Government’s reply of the 28th of August—that England
would not be put off assisting Poland in the event of German aggression,
the German Government really had no concern with further negotiation but
were concerned only to afford themselves some kind of justification and
to prevent themselves appearing too blatantly to turn down all the
appeals to reason that were being put forward.
On the 29th of August, in the evening at 7:15, Hitler handed to Sir
Nevile Henderson the German Government’s answer to the British
Government’s reply of the 28th. And here again in this document it is
quite clear that the whole object of it was to put forward something
which was quite unacceptable. He agrees to enter into direct
conversations as suggested by the British Government, but he demands
that those conversations must be based upon the return of Danzig to the
Reich and also of the whole of the Corridor.
It will be remembered that hitherto, even when he alleged that Poland
had renounced the 1934 agreement, even then he had put forward as his
demands the return of Danzig alone and the arrangement for an
extra-territorial Autobahn and railroad running through the Corridor to
East Prussia. That was unacceptable then. To make quite certain, he now
demands the whole of the Corridor; no question of an Autobahn or
railway. The whole thing must become German.
Even so, even to make doubly certain that the offer would not be
accepted, he says:
“. . . on those terms I am prepared to enter into discussion;
but to do so, as the matter is urgent, I expect a
plenipotentiary with full powers from the Polish Government to
be here in Berlin by Wednesday, the 30th of August 1939.”
This offer was made at 7:15 p.m. on the evening of the 29th. That offer
had to be transmitted first to London, and from London to Warsaw; and
from Warsaw the Polish Government had to give authority to their
Ambassador in Berlin. So that the timing made it quite impossible to get
authority to their Ambassador in Berlin by midnight the following night.
It allowed them no kind of opportunity for discussing the matters at
all. As Sir Nevile Henderson described it, the offer amounted to an
ultimatum.
At midnight on the 30th of August at the time by which the Polish
Plenipotentiary was expected to arrive, Sir Nevile Henderson saw
Ribbentrop; and I shall read to you the account of that interview, in
which Sir Nevile Henderson handed a further message to Ribbentrop in
reply to the message that had been handed to him the previous evening,
and at which Ribbentrop read out in German a two- or three-page document
which purported to be the German proposal to be discussed at the
discussions between them and the Polish Government. He read it out
quickly in German. He refused to hand a copy of it to the British
Ambassador. He passed no copy of it at all to the Polish Ambassador. So
that there was no kind of possible chance of the Poles ever having
before them the proposals which Germany was so graciously and
magnanimously offering to discuss.
On the following day, the 31st of August, Mr. Lipski saw Ribbentrop and
could get no further than to be asked whether he came with full powers.
When he did not—when he said he did not come with full powers,
Ribbentrop said that he would put the position before the Führer. But,
in actual fact, it was much too late to put any position to the Führer
by that time, because on the 31st of August—I am afraid I am unable to
give you the exact time—but on the 31st of August, Hitler had already
issued his Directive Number 1 for the conduct of the war, in which he
laid down H-Hour as being a quarter to five the following morning, the
1st of September. And on the evening of the 31st of August at 9 o’clock
the German radio broadcast the proposals which Ribbentrop had read out
to Sir Nevile Henderson the night before, saying that these were the
proposals which had been made for discussion but that, as no Polish
Plenipotentiary had arrived to discuss them, the German Government
assumed that they were turned down. That broadcast at 9 o’clock on the
evening of the 31st of August was the first that the Poles had ever
heard of the proposals, and the first, in fact, that the British
Government or their representatives in Berlin knew about them, other
than what had been heard when Ribbentrop had read them out and refused
to give a written copy, on the evening of the 30th.
After that broadcast at 9:15, perhaps when the broadcast was in its
course, a copy of those proposals was handed to Sir Nevile Henderson,
for the first time.
Having thus summarized for the convenience, I hope, of the Tribunal, the
timing of events during that last week, I would ask the Tribunal to
refer briefly to the remaining documents in that document book. I first
put in evidence an extract from the interrogation of the Defendant
Göring, which was taken on the 29th of August 1945.
DR. STAHMER: As defense counsel for the Defendant Göring, I object to
the use of this document which is an extract from testimony given by the
Defendant Göring. Since the defendant is present here in court, he can
at any time be called to the stand and give direct evidence on this
subject before the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that your objection?
DR. STAHMER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not understand the ground of your
objection, in view of Article 15 (c) and Article 16 (b) and (c) of the
Charter. Article 15 (c) provides that the Chief Prosecutors shall
undertake, among others, the duty of “the preliminary examination of all
necessary witnesses and of the defendants”; and Article 16 provides
that:
“In order to ensure fair trial for the defendants, the following
procedure shall be followed: . . . (b) During any preliminary
examination . . . of a defendant he shall have the right to give
any explanation relevant to the charges made against him; (c) A
preliminary examination of a defendant . . . shall be conducted
in, or translated into, a language which the defendant
understands.”
Those provisions of the Charter, in the opinion of the Tribunal, show
that the defendants may be interrogated and that their interrogations
may be put in evidence.
DR. STAHMER: I was prompted by the idea that when it is possible to call
a witness, direct examination in court is preferable, since the evidence
thus obtained is more concrete.
THE PRESIDENT: You certainly have the opportunity of summoning the
defendant for whom you appear to give evidence himself, but that has
nothing to do with the admissibility of his interrogation—his
preliminary examination.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: This extract is TC-90, which I put in as GB-64.
I quote from the middle of the first answer. It is at the end of the 7th
line. The Defendant Göring says there:
“On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland,
the Führer called me on the telephone and told me that he had
stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether
this was just temporary or for good. He said ‘No, I will have to
see whether we can eliminate British intervention.’”
THE PRESIDENT: Ought you not read the question before the answer?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I go back to the question:
“When the negotiations of the Polish Foreign Minister in London
brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty, at the end of March or
the beginning of April 1939, was it not fairly obvious that a
peaceful solution was impossible?”—answer—“Yes, it seemed
impossible after my conviction”—I think that must be a bad
translation—“according to my conviction.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: [_Continuing._] “. . . but not
according to the convictions of the Führer. When it was
mentioned to the Führer that England had given her guarantee to
Poland, he said that England was also guaranteeing Romania, but
then when the Russians took Bessarabia, nothing happened; and
this made a big impression on him. I made a mistake here. At
this time Poland only had the promise of a guarantee. The
guarantee itself was only given shortly before the beginning of
the war. On the day when England gave her official guarantee to
Poland, the Führer called me on the telephone and told me that
he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then
whether this was just temporary, or for good. He said, ‘No, I
will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.’
So, then I asked him, ‘Do you think that it will be any
different within 4 or 5 days?’ At this same time—I do not know
whether you know about that, Colonel—I was in communication
with Lord Halifax by a special courier, outside the regular
diplomatic channels, to do everything to stop war with England.
After the guarantee, I held an English declaration of war
inevitable. I already told him in the spring of 1939, after
occupying Czechoslovakia, I told him that from now on, if he
tried to solve the Polish question, he would have to count on
the enmity of England—1939, that is, after the Protectorate.
“Question: ‘Is it not a fact that preparations for the campaign
against Poland were originally supposed to have been completed
by the end of August 1939?’
“Answer: ‘Yes.’
“Question: ‘And that the final issuance of the order for the
campaign against Poland came sometime between the 15th and 20th
of August 1939, after the signing of the treaty with Soviet
Russia?’”—The dates obviously are wrong there.
“Answer: ‘Yes, that is true.’
“Question: ‘Is it not also a fact that the start of the campaign
was ordered for the 25th of August but on the 24th of August in
the afternoon it was postponed until September the 1st in order
to await the results of new diplomatic maneuvers with the
English Ambassador?’
“Answer: ‘Yes.’”
My only comment upon that document is in respect to the second paragraph
where Göring is purporting not to want war with England. The Court will
remember how it was Göring, after the famous speech of the 22d of August
to his commanders-in-chief, who got up and thanked the Führer for his
exhortation and assured him that the Armed Forces would play their part.
I omit the next document in the document book, which carries the matter
a little further, and we go on to Hitler’s verbal communiqué, as it is
called in the _British Blue Book_, that he handed to Sir Nevile
Henderson on the 25th of August, after he had heard of the signing of
the Anglo-Polish agreement, in an endeavor to keep England from meeting
her obligations. He states in the first paragraph, after hearing the
British Ambassador, that he is anxious to make one more effort to save
war. In the second paragraph, he asserts again that Poland’s
provocations were unbearable; and I quote Paragraph 2:
“Germany was in all circumstances determined to abolish these
Macedonian conditions on her eastern frontier and, what is more,
to do so in the interests of quiet and order and also in the
interests of European peace.
“The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved. The
British Prime Minister had made a speech which was not in the
least calculated to induce any change in the German attitude. At
the most, the result of this speech could be a bloody and
incalculable war between Germany and England. Such a war would
be bloodier than that of 1914 to 1918. In contrast to the last
war, Germany would no longer have to fight on two fronts.”—One
sees the threats, veiled threats, appearing in this
paragraph—“Agreement with Russia was unconditional and
signified a change in foreign policy of the Reich which would
last a very long time. Russia and Germany would never again take
up arms against each other. Apart from this, the agreements
reached with Russia would also render Germany secure
economically for the longest possible period of war.
“The Führer had always wanted Anglo-German understanding. War
between England and Germany could at best bring some profit to
Germany, but none at all to England.”
Then we come to the bribe:
“The Führer declared the German-Polish problem must be solved
and will be solved. He is, however, prepared and determined,
after the solution of this problem, to approach England once
more with a large, comprehensive offer. He is a man of great
decisions; and in this case also, he will be capable of being
great in his action.”—and then, magnanimously—“He accepts the
British Empire and is ready to pledge himself personally for its
continued existence and to place the power of the German Reich
at its disposal on condition that his colonial demands, which
are limited, should be negotiated by peaceful means . . . . His
obligations to Italy remain untouched.”
Again he stresses irrevocable determination never to enter into war with
Russia. I quote the last two paragraphs:
“If the British Government would consider these ideas, a
blessing for Germany . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you not read the first few lines of Paragraph 3?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes; I did summarize it—Paragraph 3:
“He also desired to express the irrevocable determination of
Germany never again to enter into conflict with Russia.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I quote the last two paragraphs:
“If the British Government would consider these ideas, a
blessing for Germany and also for the British Empire might
result. If they reject these ideas, there will be war. In no
case will Great Britain emerge stronger; the last war proved it.
The Führer repeats that he himself is a man of far-reaching
decisions by which he is bound, and that this is his last offer
. . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn and then the matter can be
investigated.
[_A recess was taken._]
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I had just finished reading the offer from
Hitler to the British Government, which was TC-72, Number 68, and which
becomes GB-65.
The British Government were not, of course, aware of the real object
that lay behind that message; and, taking it at its face value and
desirous to enter into discussions, they wrote back on the 28th of
August saying that they were prepared to enter into discussions. They
agreed with Hitler that the differences must be settled, and I quote
from Paragraph 4:
“In the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, a reasonable
solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and
should be effected by agreement between the two countries on
lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland’s essential
interests; and they recall that in his speech of the 28th of
April, the German Chancellor recognized the importance of these
interests to Poland.
“But, as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter to the
German Chancellor of the 22d of August, His Majesty’s Government
consider it essential for the success of the discussions, which
would precede the agreement, that it should be understood
beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be guaranteed by
other powers. His Majesty’s Government would be ready, if
desired, to make their contribution to the effective operation
of such a guarantee.”
I go to the last paragraph on that page, Paragraph 6:
“His Majesty’s Government have said enough to make their own
attitude plain in the particular matters at issue between
Germany and Poland. They trust that the German Chancellor will
not think that, because His Majesty’s Government are scrupulous
concerning their obligations to Poland, they are not anxious to
use all their influence to assist the achievement of a solution
which may commend itself both to Germany and to Poland.”
That, of course, knocked the German hopes on the head. They had failed
by their tricks and their bribes to dissuade England from observing her
obligations to Poland, and it was now only a matter of getting out of
their embarrassment as quickly as possible and saving their face as much
as possible. The last document becomes GB-66. And I put in also Sir
Nevile Henderson’s account of that interview, TC-72, Number 75, which
becomes GB-67.
During that interview, the only importance of it is that Sir Nevile
Henderson again emphasized the British attitude and that they were
determined in any event to meet their obligations to Poland. One
paragraph I would quote, which is interesting in view of the letters
that were to follow, paragraph 10:
“In the end I asked him two straight questions: ‘Was he willing
to negotiate directly with the Poles?’ and ‘Was he ready to
discuss the question of an exchange of population?’ He replied
in the affirmative as regards the latter, although there I have
no doubt that he was thinking at the same time of a
rectification of frontiers. As regards the first, he said he
could not give me an answer until after he had given the reply
of His Majesty’s Government the careful consideration which such
a document deserved. In this connection he turned to Ribbentrop
and said, ‘We must summon Field Marshal Göring to discuss it
with him.’”
Then in the next paragraph, again Sir Nevile Henderson finally repeated
to him very solemnly the main note of the whole conversation, so far as
he was concerned.
I pass to the next document, which is TC-72, Number 78, which becomes
GB-68.
The German reply, as I outlined before, was handed to Sir Nevile
Henderson at 7:15 p.m. on the 29th of August. The reply sets out the
suggestion submitted by the British Government in their previous note;
and it goes on to say that the German Government are prepared to enter
into discussion on the basis that the whole of the Corridor, as well as
Danzig, are returned to the Reich. I quote particularly the next to the
last paragraph on the first page of that document:
“The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the
revision of the Versailles Treaty, which has always been
recognized as being necessary, in regard to this territory,
namely: return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, the
safeguarding of the existence of the German national group in
the territories remaining to Poland.”
It is only just now, as I emphasized before, that that right has been
recognized for so long. On the 28th of April his demands consisted only
of Danzig, of an Autobahn, and of the railway.
The Tribunal will remember the position which he is trying to get out of
now. He is trying to manufacture justification by putting forth
proposals which under no possible circumstances could either Poland or
Great Britain accept. But, as I said before, he wanted to make doubly
certain.
I go to the second page, and start with the third paragraph:
“The British Government attach importance to two considerations:
(1) That the existing danger of an imminent explosion should be
eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiation; and (2)
that the existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it
would then continue to exist, should be adequately safeguarded
in the economic and political sphere by means of international
guarantees.
“On this subject the German Government make the following
declaration:
“Though skeptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome,
they are, nevertheless, prepared to accept the English proposal
and to enter into direct discussion. They do so, as has already
been emphasized, solely as the result of the impression made
upon them by the written statement received from the British
Government that they, too, desire a pact of friendship in
accordance with the general lines indicated to the British
Ambassador.”
And then, to the last but one paragraph:
“For the rest, in making these proposals, the German Government
have never had any intention of touching Poland’s vital
interests or questioning the existence of an independent Polish
State.”
These letters really sound like the letters of some common swindler
rather than of the government of a great nation.
“The German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances
agree to accept the British Government’s offer of their good
offices in securing the dispatch to Berlin of a Polish Emissary
with full powers. They count on the arrival of this Emissary on
Wednesday, the 30th August 1939.
“The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a
solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place
these at the disposal of the British Government before the
arrival of the Polish negotiator.”
That was at 7:15 in the evening of the 29th of August and as I have
explained, it allowed little time in order to get the Polish Emissary
there by midnight the following night. That document was GB-68.
The next document, Sir Nevile Henderson’s account of the interval,
summarizes what had taken place; and I quote particularly Paragraph 4:
“I remarked that this phrase”—that is the passage about the
Polish Emissary being there by midnight the following
night—“sounded like an ultimatum, but after some heated remarks
both Herr Hitler and Herr Von Ribbentrop assured me that it was
only intended to stress the urgency of the moment when the two
fully mobilized armies were standing face to face.”
That was the interview on the evening of the 29th of August. The last
document becomes GB-69.
Again the British Government replied, and Sir Nevile Henderson handed
this reply to Ribbentrop at the famous meeting on midnight of the 30th
of August at the time the Polish Emissary had been expected. I need not
read at length. The British Government reciprocate the desire for
improved relations. They stress again that they cannot sacrifice the
interest of other friends in order to obtain an improvement in the
situation. They understand, they say, that the German Government accept
the condition that the settlement should be subject to international
guarantee. They make a reservation as to the demands that the Germans
put forward in their last letter and they are informing the Polish
Government immediately; and lastly, they understand that the German
Government are drawing up the proposals. That Document TC-72, Number 89,
will be GB-70. For the account of the interview, we go to the next
document in the Tribunal’s book, TC-72, Number 92, which becomes GB-71.
It is not a very long document. It is perhaps worth reading in full:
“I told Herr Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty’s
Government found it difficult to advise the Polish Government to
accept the procedure adumbrated in the German reply and
suggested that he should adopt the normal contact, i.e. that
when German proposals were ready, to invite the Polish
Ambassador to call and to hand him proposals for transmission to
his Government with a view to immediate opening of negotiations.
I added that if this basis afforded prospect of settlement, His
Majesty’s Government could be counted upon to do their best in
Warsaw to temporize negotiations.
“Ribbentrop’s reply was to produce a lengthy document which he
read out in German, aloud, at top speed. Imagining that he would
eventually hand it to me, I did not attempt to follow too
closely the 16 or more articles which it contained. Though I
cannot, therefore, guarantee the accuracy, the main points were
. . . .”—and I need not read out the main points.
I go to Paragraph 3:
“When I asked Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in
accordance with undertaking in the German reply of yesterday, he
asserted that it was now too late as Polish representative had
not arrived in Berlin by midnight.
“I observed that to treat the matter in this way meant that the
request for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin on the
30th of August constituted in fact an ultimatum, in spite of
what he and Herr Hitler had assured me yesterday. This he
denied, saying that the idea of an ultimatum was a figment of my
imagination. Why then, I asked, could he not adopt the normal
procedure and give me a copy of the proposals, and ask the
Polish Ambassador to call on him just as Hitler had summoned me
a few days ago, and hand them to him for communication to the
Polish Government? In the most violent terms Ribbentrop said
that he would never ask the Ambassador to visit him. He hinted
that if the Polish Ambassador asked him for interview it might
be different. I said that I would, naturally, inform my
Government so at once. Whereupon he said, while those were his
personal views, he would bring all that I had said to Hitler’s
notice. It was for the Chancellor to decide.
“We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Von
Ribbentrop’s demeanor during an unpleasant interview was aping
Hitler at his worst. He inveighed incidentally against the
Polish mobilization, but I retorted that it was hardly
surprising since Germany had also mobilized as Herr Hitler
himself had admitted to me yesterday.”
Nevertheless, Sir Nevile Henderson did not know at that time that
Germany had also already given the orders to attack Poland some days
before. The following day, the 31st of August at 6:30 in the evening,
Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, had an interview with Ribbentrop.
This document, the next Document TC-73, Number 112, becomes GB-72, and
is a short account in a report to Mr. Beck:
“I carried out my instructions. Ribbentrop asked if I had
special plenipotentiary powers to undertake negotiations. I
said, ‘No’. He then asked whether I had been informed that on
London’s suggestion the German Government had expressed their
readiness to negotiate directly with a delegate of the Polish
Government, furnished with the requisite full powers, who was to
have arrived on the preceding day, the 30th of August. I replied
that I had no direct information on the subject. In conclusion,
Ribbentrop repeated that he had thought I would be empowered to
negotiate. He would communicate my _démarche_ to the
Chancellor.”
As I have indicated already, it was too late. The orders had already
been given on that day to the German Army to invade.
I turn to C-126. It is already in as GB-45. Other portions of it were
put in, and I refer now to the letter on the second page, for the order
(most-secret order). It is signed by Hitler and is described as his
“Directive Number 1 for the Conduct of the War,” dated 31st of August
1939. Paragraph 1:
“(1) Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by
peaceful means of a situation on the eastern frontier, which is
intolerable for Germany, are exhausted, I have determined on a
solution by force.
“(2) The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance
with the preparations made for Case White with the alterations
which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that it
has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions.
“Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged.
“The date of attack: 1st of September 1939; time of attack:
4:45”—inserted in red pencil—“this time also applies to the
operation at Gdynia, Bay of Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge.
“(3) In the West it is important that the responsibility for the
opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England
and France. At first, purely local action should be taken
against insignificant frontier violations.”
There it sets out the details of the order which, for the purpose of
this Court, it is unnecessary to read. That evening at 9 o’clock the
German radio broadcast the terms of the German proposals about which
they were so willing to enter into discussions with the Polish
Government. It sets out the proposals at length. It will be remembered
that by this time neither Sir Nevile Henderson nor the Polish Government
nor their Ambassador had yet been given their written copy of them, and
it is indeed a document which is tempting to read—or to read extracts
of it simply as an exhibition or an example of pure hypocrisy. I refer
to the second paragraph Document TC-72, Number 98, exhibit GB-39:
“Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt able
to make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding
available to the British Government by the time the Polish
negotiator arrived in Berlin.”
Now, we have heard the manner in which they did that. They then say
that:
“Instead of a statement regarding the arrival of authorized
Polish personage, the first answer the Government of the Reich
received of their readiness for an understanding was the news of
the Polish mobilization; and only toward 12 o’clock on the night
of the 30th of August 1939, did they receive a somewhat general
assurance of British readiness to help towards the commencement
of negotiations.
“Although the fact that the Polish negotiator expected by the
Government of the Reich did not arrive removed the necessary
conditions for informing His Majesty’s Government of the views
of the German Government as regards a possible basis for
negotiation, since His Majesty’s Government themselves had
pleaded for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland, the
German Minister for Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop gave the British
Ambassador, on the occasion of the presentation of the last
British note, precise information as to the text of the German
proposals which will be regarded as a basis of negotiation in
the event of the arrival of the Polish Plenipotentiary.”
And, thereafter, they go on to set out the story, or rather their
version of the story, of the negotiations over the last few days.
I pass to the next but one document in the Tribunal’s book, TC-54, which
becomes GB-73. On the 1st of September when his armies were already
crossing the frontier and the whole of the frontier, he issued this
proclamation to his Armed Forces:
“The Polish Government, unwilling to establish good neighborly
relations as aimed at by me, want to force the issue by way of
arms.
“The Germans in Poland are being persecuted with bloody terror
and driven from their homes. Several acts of frontier violation,
which cannot be tolerated by a great power, show that Poland is
no longer prepared to respect the Reich’s frontiers. To put an
end to these mad acts, I can see no other way but from now
onwards to meet force with force.
“The German Armed Forces will with firm determination take up
the struggle for the honor and the vital rights of the
resuscitated German people.
“I expect every soldier to be conscious of the high tradition of
the eternal German soldierly qualities and to do his duty to the
last.
“Remember always and in any circumstances that you are the
representatives of National Socialist Greater Germany.
“Long live our people and the Reich.”
And so we see that at last Hitler had kept his word to his generals. He
had afforded them their propagandistic justification; and at that time,
anyway, it did not matter what people said about it afterwards. “The
victor shall not be asked later on, whether he told the truth or not.”
Might is what counts—or victory is what counts and not right.
On that day, the 1st of September, when news came of this violation of
Polish ground, the British Government in accordance with their treaty
obligations sent an ultimatum to the German Government in which they
stated—I quote from the last paragraph:
“I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the
German Government are prepared to give His Majesty’s Government
satisfactory assurances that the German Government have
suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared
promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will without
hesitation fulfil their obligations to Poland.”
By the 3rd of September no withdrawal had taken place, and so at 9
o’clock—the document, TC-72, Number 110, I have just referred to will
be GB-74—at 9 o’clock on the 3rd of September, a final ultimatum was
handed to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs. I quote from the third
paragraph:
“Although this communication was made more than 24 hours ago, no
reply has been received but German attacks upon Poland have been
continued and intensified. I have accordingly the honor to
inform you that, unless not later than 11 o’clock British summer
time today, the 3rd of September, satisfactory assurances to the
above effect have been given by the German Government and have
reached His Majesty’s Government in London, a state of war will
exist between the two countries as from that hour.”
And so it was that at 11 o’clock on the 3rd of September a state of war
existed between Germany and England and between Germany and France. All
the appeals to peace, all the appeals to reason we now see completely
stillborn; stillborn when they were made. Plans, preparations,
intentions, determination to carry out this assault upon Poland, had
been going on for months, for years before. It mattered not what anybody
but the German Government had in mind or whatever rights anybody else
but the German nation thought they had; and, if there is any doubt left
at all after what we have seen, I would ask you to look at two more
documents.
If you would look at the last document first of all, in your document
book—1831-PS, which becomes GB-75. Even now on the 3rd of September,
Mussolini offers some chance of peace.
We have here a telegram. It is timed 6:30 hours, and I am afraid I am
unable to say whether that is 6:30 in the morning or evening; but it is
dated the 3rd of September, and I quote:
“The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the
Duce’s order the following copy for the Führer and Reich
Chancellor and for the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs:
“‘Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every
decision to the Führer, that it still has a chance to call a
conference with France, England, and Poland on the following
basis:
“‘1. An armistice which would leave the army corps where they
are at present’”—and it will be remembered that on the 3rd of
September they had advanced a considerable way over the
frontier—“‘2. calling a conference within 2 or 3 days;—“‘3.
solution of the Polish-German controversy would be certainly
favorable for Germany as matters stand today.
“‘This idea, which originated from the Duce, has its foremost
exponent in France.
“‘Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already
securities which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany
has had already her “moral satisfaction.” If she would accept
the plan for a conference, it will achieve all her aims and at
the same time prevent a war which already today has the aspect
of being universal and of extremely long duration.’”
But, My Lord, perhaps even Mussolini did not appreciate what all
Germany’s aims were; and, of course, the offer was turned down in the
illuminating letter which Hitler was to write in reply. I refer you back
to the document before that. It is still part of the same Exhibit GB-75.
THE PRESIDENT: As I understand it, the “GB” references you give are not
on the documents at all; they are the exhibit numbers themselves, which
are to be put on the document after they have been put in.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. That is correct. They will be put in by
the Court, of course.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you try to make clear the references which are on
the document so that the Tribunal could find the document itself?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. The last document was 1831-PS, and it is
the very last one in the document book. That is the one I have just
referred to—the telegram from Mussolini. The document to which I am
about to refer is the one before last in the Tribunal’s book but it has
the same number on it as the last because it forms part of the same
exhibit.
THE PRESIDENT: I think if you would just explain the system in which the
exhibits are numbered, it would help us.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The exhibits are numbered at the present moment
before they are put in evidence with a variety of serial numbers, such
as “PS”, “TC”, “L” and other letters. There is no significance attached
to that at all. It depends on whom they have been found by and what
files they have come from. When the documents are put in as exhibits,
they are marked by the Court with a court number. The documents put in
by the United States representatives were all prefixed with the letters
“USA.” The documents which have been put in by the British prosecutors
have all been prefixed with the letters “GB.” If it would be of any
assistance to members of the Tribunal, I will have their document books
marked up this evening with the new court numbers that have been put
upon them by the Court officials, during the course of the day.
THE PRESIDENT: We will talk about that later.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If there is any document missing from any of
these books, I have a copy.
THE PRESIDENT: You are going to read 1831-PS?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, that is GB-75.
“Duce:
“I first want to thank you for your last attempt at a mediation,
I would have been ready to accept, but only under condition that
there would be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that
the conference would be successful. Because for the last 2 days
the German troops are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid
advance in Poland, it would have been impossible to devaluate
the bloody sacrifices made thereby by diplomatic intrigues.
Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have been found if
England would not have been determined to wage war under all
circumstances. I have not given in to the English because, Duce,
I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for more
than one-half a year or a year. Under these circumstances I
thought that, in spite of everything, the present moment was
better for resistance. At present the superiority of the German
Armed Forces in Poland is so overwhelming in all the fields that
the Polish Army will collapse in a very short time. I doubt
whether this fast success could have been achieved in 1 or 2
years. England and France would have armed their allies to such
an extent that the crushing technical superiority of the German
Armed Forces could not have become so apparent any more. I am
aware, Duce, that the fight which I enter is one for life and
death. My own fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am
also aware that one cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and
that one has to choose, after cold deliberation, the moment for
resistance in such a way that the probability of success is
guaranteed; and I believe in this success, Duce, with the
firmness of a rock. Recently you have given me the kind
assurance that you think you will be able to help me in a few
fields. I acknowledge this in advance, with sincere thanks. But
I believe also—even if we march now over different roads—that
fate will finally join us. If the National Socialistic Germany
were destroyed by the Western Democracies, the Fascist Italy
would also have to face a grave future. I was personally always
aware of this community of the future of our two governments and
I know that you, Duce, think the same way. To the situation in
Poland, I would like to make the brief remark that we lay aside,
of course, all unimportant things, that we do not waste any man
on unimportant tasks, but direct all on acts in the light of
great operational considerations. The northern Polish Army,
which is in the Corridor, has already been completely encircled
by our action. It will be either wiped out or will surrender.
Otherwise, all operations proceed according to plan. The daily
achievements of the troops are far beyond all expectations. The
superiority of our Air Force is complete, although scarcely
one-third of it is in Poland. In the West, I will be on the
defensive. France can here sacrifice its blood first. Then the
moment will come when we can confront the enemy also there with
the full power of the nation. Accept my thanks, Duce, for all
your assistance which you have given to me in the past; and I
ask you not to deny it to me in the future.”
That completes the evidence which I propose to offer upon this part of
the case in respect of the war of aggression against Poland, England,
and France, which is charged in Count Two.
MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it
please the Tribunal, in the early hours of the morning of the 9th of
April 1940 Nazi Germany invaded Norway and Denmark. It is my duty to
present to the Tribunal the Prosecution’s evidence which has been
prepared in collaboration with my American colleague, Major Hinely, with
regard to these brutal wars of aggression, which were also wars in
violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances. With
the Court’s permission I would like, first of all, to deal with the
treaties and agreements and assurances that were in fact violated by
these two invasions of Norway and Denmark.
The invasions were, of course, in the first instance violations of the
Hague Convention and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. My learned friend, Sir
David Maxwell-Fyfe, has already dealt with those matters in the course
of his presentation of the evidence. In addition to these general
treaties, there were specific agreements between Germany and Norway and
Denmark. In the first instance there was the Treaty of Arbitration and
Conciliation between Germany and Denmark, which was signed at Berlin on
2 June 1926. The Court will find that treaty, TC-17, on the first page
of British Document Book Number 3; and to that exhibit it may be
convenient to give the Number GB-76. I am proposing to read only the
first article of that treaty, which is in these terms:
“The contracting parties undertake to submit to the procedure of
arbitration or conciliation, in conformity with the present
treaty, all disputes of any nature whatsoever which may arise
between Germany and Denmark, and which it has not been possible
to settle within a reasonable period by diplomacy or to bring
with the consent of both parties, before the Permanent Court of
International Justice.
“Disputes for the solution of which a special procedure has been
laid down in other conventions in force between the contracting
parties shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of
such conventions.”
Then there follows in the remaining articles the establishment of the
machinery for arbitration.
I would next refer to the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and
Denmark, which was signed by the Defendant Ribbentrop on the 31st of May
1939 which, as the Tribunal will recollect, was 10 weeks after the Nazi
seizure of Czechoslovakia. The Court will find that as Document TC-24 in
the document book and it will now bear the Exhibit Number GB-77.
With the Court’s permission, in view of the identity of the signatory of
that treaty, I would like to read the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2.
“The Chancellor of the German Reich and His Majesty, the King of
Denmark and Iceland, being firmly resolved to maintain peace
between Denmark and Germany in all circumstances, have agreed to
confirm this resolve by means of a treaty and have appointed as
their Plenipotentiaries: The Chancellor of the German Reich
. . . and His Majesty, the King of Denmark and Iceland . . . .”
Article 1 reads as follows:
“The German Reich and the Kingdom of Denmark shall in no case
resort to war or to any other use of force, one against the
other.
“Should action of the kind referred to in Paragraph 1 be taken
by a third power against one of the contracting parties, the
other contracting party shall not support such action in any
way.”
Then Article 2 deals with the ratification of the treaty, and the second
paragraph states:
“The treaty shall come into force on the exchange of the
instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for a
period of 10 years from that date . . . .”
As the Tribunal will observe, the treaty is dated the 31st of May 1939.
At the bottom of the page there appears the signature of the Defendant
Ribbentrop. The Tribunal will shortly see that less than a year after
the signature of this treaty the invasion of Denmark by the Nazi forces
was to show the utter worthlessness of treaties to which the Defendant
Ribbentrop put his signature.
With regard to Norway, the Defendant Ribbentrop and the Nazi
conspirators were party to a similar perfidy. In the first instance I
would refer to Document TC-30, which is the next document in the British
Document Book 3 and which will bear the Exhibit Number GB-78. The
Tribunal will observe that that is an assurance given to Denmark,
Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands on the 28th of April 1939. That, of
course, was after the annexation of Czechoslovakia had shaken the
confidence of the world; and this was presumably an attempt, now
submitted by the Prosecution to be a dishonest attempt, to try to
reassure the Scandinavian States. The assurance is in a speech by Hitler
and reads:
“. . . I have given binding declarations to a large number of
states. None of these states can complain that even a trace of a
demand contrary thereto has ever been made to them by Germany.
None of the Scandinavian statesmen, for example, can contend
that a request has ever been put to them by the German
Government or by German public opinion which was incompatible
with the sovereignty and integrity of their state.
“I was pleased that a number of European states availed
themselves of these declarations by the German Government to
express and emphasize their desire too for absolute neutrality.
This applies to the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark,
_et cetera_.”
A further assurance was given by the Nazi Government on the 2d of
September 1939 which, as the Tribunal will recollect, was the day after
the Nazi invasion of Poland. The Court will observe the next document in
British Document Book 3 is the Document TC-31, which will be Exhibit
GB-79. That is an _aide-mémoire_ that was handed to the Norwegian
Foreign Minister by the German Minister in Oslo on the 2d of September
1939. It reads:
“The German Reich Government are determined, in view of the
friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under
no circumstances to prejudice the inviolability and integrity of
Norway and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State. In
making this declaration, the Reich Government naturally expect
on their side that Norway will observe an unimpeachable
neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches
of Norwegian neutrality by any third party. Should the attitude
of the Royal Norwegian Government differ from this so that any
such breach of neutrality by a third party occurs, the Reich
Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the
interest of the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation
might dictate.”
There follows, finally, the further German assurance to Norway, which
appears as the next document in the book, TC-32, which will be Exhibit
GB-80. That is a speech by Hitler on the 6th of October 1939; and if the
Court will observe Paragraph 2 at the top of the page, the extract from
the speech reads as follows:
“Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points
of controversy with the Northern States; neither has she any
today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered non-aggression
pacts by Germany and have both refused them solely because they
did not feel themselves threatened in any way.”
Those are clear and positive assurances which Germany gave. The Court
will see that violation of those assurances is charged in Paragraph XXII
of Appendix C of the Indictment at Page 43. The Court will notice that
there is a minor typographical error in the date of the first assurance
which is alleged in the Indictment to have been given on the 3rd of
September 1939. The Court will see from Document TC-31, which is Exhibit
GB-79, that the assurance was in fact given on the 2d of September 1939.
Now those treaties and assurances were the diplomatic background to the
brutal Nazi aggression on Norway and Denmark, and the evidence which the
Prosecution will now place before the Court will in my submission
establish beyond reasonable doubt that these assurances were simply
given to lull suspicion and cause the intended victims of Nazi
aggression to be unprepared to meet the Nazi attack. For we now know
that as early as October 1939 these conspirators and their confederates
were plotting the invasion of Norway, and the evidence will indicate
that the most active conspirators in that plot were the Defendants
Raeder and Rosenberg.
The Norwegian invasion is, in one respect, not a typical Nazi aggression
in that Hitler had to be persuaded to embark upon it. The chief
instruments of persuasion were Raeder and Rosenberg; Raeder because he
thought Norway strategically important and because he coveted glory for
his Navy, Rosenberg because of his political connections in Norway which
he sought to develop.
As the Tribunal will shortly see, in the Norwegian Vidkun Quisling the
Defendant Rosenberg found a very model of the Fifth Column agent, the
very personification of perfidy.
The evidence as to the early stages of the Nazi conspiracy to invade
Norway is found in a letter which the Defendant Raeder wrote on the 10th
of January 1944 to Admiral Assmann, the official German naval historian.
I put in this letter, the document C-66, which will be Exhibit GB-81,
and which the Court will find further on in this book of documents. I
should explain that in this book of documents the documents are inserted
in the numerical order of the series to which they belong and not in the
order of their submission to the Court. I am trusting that that will be
a more convenient form of bundling them together than to set them down
in the order of presentation.
THE PRESIDENT: 66?
MAJOR JONES: C-66. It is headed, “Memorandum to Admiral Assmann; for his
own information; not to be used for publication.”
The Court will observe that the first page deals with Barbarossa. If the
Tribunal turns to the next page headed “(b) Weserübung,” the Tribunal
will find from documents which I shall shortly be submitting to the
Court that Weserübung was the code name for the invasion of Norway and
Denmark.
I will omit the first sentence. The document which, as I have said, is a
communication from the Defendant Raeder to Assmann reads as follows:
“During the weeks preceding the report on the 10th of October
1939, I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a
detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of an
occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. I passed this
letter on to C/SKL”—which is the Chief of Staff of the Naval
War Staff—“for their information and prepared some notes based
on this letter . . . for my report to the Führer, which I made
on the 10th of October 1939, since my opinion was absolutely
identical with that of Admiral Carls, while at that time SKL was
more dubious about the matter. In these notes I stressed the
disadvantages which an occupation of Norway by the British would
have for us: Control of the approaches to the Baltic,
outflanking of our naval operations and of our air attacks on
Britain, pressure on Sweden. I also stressed the advantages for
us of the occupation of the Norwegian coast: Outlet to the North
Atlantic, no possibility of a British mine barrier, as in the
years 1917-18. Naturally, at the time, only the coast and bases
were considered; I included Narvik, though Admiral Carls, in the
course of our correspondence, thought that Narvik could be
excluded . . . . The Führer saw at once the significance of the
Norwegian problem; he asked me to leave the notes and stated
that he wished to consider the question himself.”
I will pause in the reading of that document at that point and return to
it later so that the story may be revealed to the Court in a
chronological order.
That report of Raeder, in my submission, shows that the whole evolution
of this Nazi campaign against Norway affords a good example of the
participation of the German High Command in the Nazi conspiracy to
attack inoffensive neighbors.
This letter, an extract from which I have just read, has revealed that
Raeder reported to Hitler on the 10th of October 1939 . . .
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When was that report?
MAJOR JONES: The report, C-66, was made in January 1944 by the Defendant
Raeder to Assmann, who was the German naval historian, and so,
presumably, was for the purposes of history.
Before Raeder’s report of 10 October 1939 was made to the Führer, Raeder
got a second opinion on the Norwegian invasion. On the 3rd of October
Raeder made out the questionnaire to which I now invite the Court’s
attention. It is Document C-122 and the Court will find it next but one
to C-66 in the document book. That will now be Exhibit GB-82.
That, as the Tribunal will observe, is headed “Gaining of Bases in
Norway (extract from War Diary)” and bears the date of the 3rd of
October 1939. It reads:
“The Chief of the Naval Operations Staff”—who was the Defendant
Raeder—“considers it necessary that the Führer be informed as
soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval Operations Staff
on the possibilities of extending the operational base to the
north. It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain
bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and
Germany, with the basic aim of improving our strategic and
operational position. The following questions must be given
consideration:
“(a) What places in Norway can be considered as bases?
“(b) Can bases be gained by military force against Norway’s will
if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?
“(c) What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?
“(d) Will the harbors have to be developed completely as bases
or have they already decisive advantages suitable for supply
position?”
Then there follows in parenthesis:
“The Commander of the U-boat Fleet”—which is a reference, of
course, to the Defendant Dönitz—”. . . considers such harbors
already extremely useful as equipment and supply bases at which
Atlantic U-boats can call temporarily.”
And then Question (e):
“What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of the war
at sea in gaining bases in north Denmark, e.g. Skagen?”
There is, in our possession, a document C-5, to find which it will be
necessary for the Court to go back in the document book to the first of
the C exhibits. This will be Exhibit GB-83.
This is a memorandum written by the Defendant Dönitz on Norwegian bases.
It presumably relates to the questionnaire of the Defendant Raeder
which, as I have indicated, was in circulation at about that time. The
document is headed, “Commander of the U-boat Fleet; Operations
Division,” and is marked “most secret.” The subject is “Base in Norway.”
Then there are set out “suppositions,” “advantages and disadvantages,”
and, over one page, “conclusions”. I am proposing to read the last
paragraph, III:
“The following is therefore proposed:
“(1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including:
“a) Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen,
provisions;
“b) Repair opportunities for normal overhaul work after an
encounter;
“c) Good opportunities for accommodating U-boat crews;
“d) Flak protection, L.A. antiaircraft armament, patrol and M/S
units.
“(2) Establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in
Narvik as an alternative.”
That is a Dönitz memorandum.
Now, as the Tribunal saw in the report of Raeder to Assmann, in October
1939, Hitler was merely considering the Norwegian aggression and had not
yet committed himself to it, although, as the Tribunal will see very
shortly, Hitler was most susceptible to any suggestions of aggression
against the territory of another country.
The documents will show that the Defendant Raeder persevered in pressing
his point of view with regard to Norway, and at this stage he found a
powerful ally in the Defendant Rosenberg.
The Nazi employment of traitors and the stimulation of treachery as a
political weapon are now unhappily proven historical facts, but should
proof be required of that statement it is found in the remarkable
document which I now invite the Court to consider. I refer to Document
007-PS, which is after the TC and D series in the document book. That
will be Exhibit GB-84.
That is headed on Page 1, “Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign
Affairs Bureau of the Party”—Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP—“from
1933 to 1943.” It reads:
“When the Foreign Affairs Bureau”—Aussenpolitisches Amt—“was
established on the 1st of April 1933, the Führer directed that
it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency; but
should rather develop its effectiveness through initiative and
suggestions.
“Corresponding to the extraordinarily hostile attitude adopted
by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginning, the
newly-established bureau devoted particular attention to
internal conditions in the Soviet Union as well as to the
effects of world Bolshevism, primarily in other European
countries. It entered into contact with the most variegated
groups inclining towards National Socialism in combatting
Bolshevism, focussing its main attentions on nations and states
bordering on the Soviet Union. On the one hand those nations and
states constituted an insulating ring encircling the Bolshevist
neighbor; on the other hand they were the laterals of German
living space and took up a flanking position towards the Western
Powers, especially Great Britain. In order to wield the desired
influence by one means or another”—and the Court will shortly
see the significance of that phrase—“the bureau was compelled
to use the most varying methods, taking into consideration the
completely different living conditions, the ties of blood and
intellect, and historical dependence of the movements observed
by the bureau in those countries.
“In Scandinavia a progressively more outspoken pro-Anglo-Saxon
attitude based on economic considerations had become more
dominant after the World War of 1914-18. There the bureau put
the entire emphasis on influencing general cultural relations
with the Nordic peoples. For this purpose it took the Nordic
Society in Lübeck under its protection. The Reich conventions of
this society were attended by many outstanding personalities,
especially from Finland. While there were no openings for purely
political co-operation in Sweden and Denmark, an association
based on Greater Germanic ideology was found in Norway. Very
close relations, which led to further consequences, were
established with its founder.”
If the Court will turn to the end of the main part of the statement
which is 4 pages forward—in the intervening pages, I may say, there is
an account of the activity of Rosenberg’s bureau in various parts of
Europe, and indeed of the world, which I am not proposing to call the
Tribunal’s attention to at this stage—but if the Tribunal will look at
the last paragraph of the main body of the report which bears the
signature of the Defendant Rosenberg, the last two sentences read:
“With the outbreak of war it was entitled to consider its task
as terminated. The exploitation of the many personal connections
in many lands can be resumed under a different guise.”
If the Tribunal will turn to the annex to the document, which is on the
next page, the Tribunal will appreciate what “exploitation of personal
connections” involved.
Annex I to the document is headed, “Brief Report on Activities of the
Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1943.” It is
headed, “The Political Preparation of the Military Occupation of Norway
during the War Years 1939-40,” and it reads:
“As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in
Scandinavia only Nasjonal Samling, led in Norway by the former
Minister of War and retired major, Vidkun Quisling, deserved
serious political attention. This was a fighting political group
possessed by the idea of a Greater Germanic community. Naturally
all ruling powers were hostile and attempted to prevent by any
means its success among the population. The bureau maintained
constant relation with Quisling and attentively observed the
attacks he conducted with tenacious energy on the middle class,
which had been taken in tow by the English. From the beginning
it appeared probable that without revolutionary events which
would stir the population from their former attitude no
successful progress of Nasjonal Samling was to be expected.
During the winter 1938-39 Quisling was privately visited by a
member of the bureau. When the political situation in Europe
came to a head in 1939, Quisling made an appearance at the
convention of the Nordic Society in Lübeck in June. He expounded
his conception of the situation and his apprehensions concerning
Norway. He emphatically drew attention to the geopolitically
decisive importance of Norway in the Scandinavian area and to
the advantages that would accrue to the power dominating the
Norwegian coast in case of a conflict between the Greater German
Reich and Great Britain.
“Assuming that his statements would be of special interest to
the Marshal of the Reich, Göring, for aero-strategical reasons,
Quisling was referred to State Secretary Körner by the bureau.
The Staff Director of the bureau handed the Chief of the Reich
Chancellery a memorandum for transmission to the Führer . . . .”
In a later part of the document, which I shall read at a later stage of
my presentation of the evidence, if I may, the Court will see how
Quisling came into contact with Raeder. The Prosecution’s submission
with regard to this document is that it is another illustration of the
close interweaving between the political and the military leadership of
the Nazi State, of the close link between the professional soldiers and
the professional thugs.
The Defendant Raeder, in his report to Admiral Assmann, admitted his
collaboration with Rosenberg; and I will invite the Court’s attention
once more to Document C-66, which is Exhibit GB-81. In the page headed
“Weserübung,” the second paragraph of the Raeder report reads as
follows:
“In the further developments, I was supported by Commander
Schreiber, Naval Attaché in Oslo, and the M-Chief personally—in
conjunction with the Rosenberg organization. Thus we got in
touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin in the
beginning of December and were taken to the Führer by me—with
the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg . . . .”
I will later draw the attention of the Tribunal to the developments in
December.
The details of the manner in which the Defendant Raeder did make contact
personally with Quisling are not very clear. But I would draw the
Court’s attention to the Document C-65, which precedes . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the end of that paragraph?
MAJOR JONES: With your Lordship’s permission, I would like to revert to
that in a later stage in my unfolding of the evidence.
In the Document C-65, which will be Exhibit GB-85, we have a report of
Rosenberg to Raeder in which the full extent of Quisling’s preparedness
for treachery and his potential usefulness to the Nazi aggressors was
reported and disclosed to the Defendant Raeder.
Paragraph 1 of that report deals with matters which I have already dealt
with in reading Rosenberg’s statement, 007-PS. But if the Court will
look at the second paragraph of Exhibit GB-85, C-65, it reads as
follows:
“The reasons for a _coup_, on which Quisling made a report,
would be provided by the fact that the Storthing”—that is to
say the Norwegian parliament—“had, in defiance of the
constitution, passed a resolution prolonging its own life which
is to become operative on January 12th. Quisling still retains
in his capacity as a long-standing officer and a former Minister
of War the closest relations with the Norwegian Army. He showed
me the original of a letter which he had received only a short
time previously from the commanding officer in Narvik, Colonel
Sunlo. In this letter Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the
fact that if things went on as they were going at present,
Norway was finished.”
If the Court will turn to the next page of that document, the last two
paragraphs, the details of a treacherous plot to overthrow the
government of his own country, by the traitor Quisling in collaboration
with the Defendant Rosenberg, will be indicated to the Court.
“A plan has been put forward which deals with the possibility of
a _coup_ and which provides for a number of selected Norwegians
to be trained in Germany with all possible speed for such a
purpose, being allotted their exact tasks and provided with
experienced and die-hard National Socialists who are practiced
in such operations. These trained men should then proceed with
all speed to Norway where details would then require to be
further discussed. Some important centers in Oslo would have to
be taken over forthwith, and at the same time, the German Fleet
together with suitable contingents of the German Army would go
into operation when summoned specially by the new Norwegian
Government in a specified bay at the approaches to Oslo.
Quisling has no doubts that such a _coup_, having been carried
out with instantaneous success, would immediately bring him the
approval of those sections of the army with which he at present
has connections; and thus it goes without saying that he has
never discussed a political fight with them. As far as the King
is concerned, he believes that he would respect it as an
accomplished fact.”
How wrong Quisling was in that anticipation was shown, of course, by
subsequent developments. The last sentence reads:
“Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required
which accord with German calculations.”
The Tribunal may think that there are no words in the whole vocabulary
of abuse sufficiently strong to describe that degree of treachery.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that document dated?
MAJOR JONES: That document does not bear a date.
THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 7 December 1945 at 1000 o’clock._]
FIFTEENTH DAY
Friday, 7 December 1945
_Morning Session_
MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday afternoon when the
Tribunal adjourned I was dealing with the stage of the Nazi conspiracy
against Norway at which the activities of the Defendants Raeder and
Rosenberg converged. And the Court will remember that I submitted in
evidence Document C-65, which was a report from the Defendant Rosenberg
to Raeder regarding Quisling and ending with the infamous words,
“Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required which
accord with German calculations.”
The Court has already received in evidence and has heard read material
parts of Document C-66, which was the report of Raeder to Admiral
Assmann which disclosed how, in December of 1939, the Defendant Raeder
did in fact meet Quisling and Hagelin.
I now invite the Court to look at Document C-64 which, for the purpose
of the record, will be Exhibit GB-86. The Court will observe that that
is a report by Raeder of a meeting of the Naval Staff with Hitler on the
12th of December 1939, at 1200 hours, in the presence of the Defendants
Keitel and Jodl, and Puttkammer, who at this time was adjutant to
Hitler.
The report is headed “Norwegian Question,” and the first sentence reads:
“Commander-in-Chief, Navy”—who of course was the Defendant
Raeder—“has received Quisling and Hagelin. Quisling creates the
impression of being reliable.”
And then there follows, in the next two paragraphs, a statement of
Quisling’s views, views with which the Court is by now familiar because
of my reading of extracts from the Document 007-PS; but I draw the
Court’s attention to the fourth paragraph in Document C-64, beginning:
“The Führer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that
he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg
once more beforehand, as the latter has known Quisling for a
long while. Commander-in-Chief, Navy”—that is, of course,
Raeder—“suggests that if the Führer forms a favorable
impression, the OKW should obtain permission to make plans with
Quisling for the preparation and carrying out of the occupation:
(a) By peaceful means—that is to say, German forces summoned by
Norway; (b) to agree to do so by force.”
That was the 12th of December, the meeting at which Raeder made this
report to Hitler.
If the Court will now look at Document C-66, which is Raeder’s record of
these transactions for the purpose of history, the Court will observe,
in the last sentence of the second paragraph of the section of C-66
headed “(b) Weserübung,” these words:
“. . . thus we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came
to Berlin at the beginning of December, and were taken to the
Führer by me with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.”
And then the Court will observe a note at the end of the page:
“At the crucial moment R”—presumably Rosenberg—“hurt his foot,
so that I visited him in his house on the morning of the 14th
December.”
That is, of course, Raeder’s note; and it indicates the extent of his
contact in this conspiracy. The report continues:
“On the grounds of the Führer’s discussion with Quisling and
Hagelin on the afternoon of the 14th of December 1939, the
Führer gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian
operation were to be made by the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces.
“Until that moment the naval operations staff had taken no part
in the development of the Norwegian question and continued to be
somewhat skeptical about it. The preparations which were
undertaken by Captain Krancke in the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces were founded, however, on a memorandum of the naval
war staff.”
The Court may well think that the note of the Defendant Raeder referring
to the crucial moment was an appropriate one because the Court will see
that on that day, the 14th of December, Hitler gave the order that
preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be begun by the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces.
If the Court will now turn to Document 007-PS, which is further on in
the document book and which the Court will remember is Rosenberg’s
report on the activities of his organization—it is after the “D”
documents—if the Court will turn to about 10 lines from the bottom of
the first page of Annex I dealing with Norway, the Court will see that
there were further meetings between Quisling and the Nazi chiefs in
December; and I am going to read now the section beginning:
“As a result of these steps Quisling was granted a personal
audience with the Führer on the 16th of December, and once more
on the 18th of December. In the course of this audience the
Führer emphasized repeatedly that he personally would prefer a
completely neutral attitude of Norway as well as of the whole of
Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the theater of war and
to draw still other nations into the conflict.”
As I have said in opening the presentation of this part of the case,
here was an instance where pressure had to be brought to bear on Hitler
to induce him to take part in these operations.
The report continues:
“Should the enemy attempt”—there is a mis-translation here—“to
extend the war, however, with the aim of achieving further
throttling and intimidation of the Greater German Reich, he
would be compelled to gird himself against such an undertaking.
In order to counterbalance increasing enemy propaganda activity,
the Führer promised Quisling financial support of this movement,
which is based on Greater Germanic ideology. Military
exploitation of the question now raised was assigned to the
special military staff which transmitted special missions to
Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg was to take over political
exploitation. Financial expenses were to be defrayed by the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs”—that is to say, by Ribbentrop’s
organization—“the Minister for Foreign Affairs”—that is to
say, Ribbentrop—“being kept continuously informed by the
Foreign Affairs Bureau”—which, of course, was Rosenberg’s
organization.
“Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison
with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was
assigned to the Naval Attaché in Oslo . . . . Orders were given
that the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy.”
Here again the Court will note the close link between the Nazi
politicians and the Nazi service chiefs.
The information that is available to the Prosecution as to the events of
January 1940 is not full, but the Court will see that the agitation of
the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg did bear fruit, and I now invite the
Court to consider a letter of Keitel’s, Document C-63, which for the
purposes of the record will be Exhibit GB-87. The Court will observe
that that is an order—a memorandum—signed by the Defendant Keitel
dated the 27th of January 1940. It is marked “Most secret, five copies;
reference, Study ‘N’;”—which was another code name for the Weserübung
preparations—“access only through an officer.” It is indicated that
“C-in-C of the Navy”—that is to say, the Defendant Raeder—“has a
report on this.” The document reads:
“The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces wishes
that Study ‘N’ should be further worked on under my direct and
personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the
general war policy. For these reasons the Führer has
commissioned me to take over the direction of further
preparations.
“A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces headquarters for this purpose, and this represents
at the same time the nucleus of a future operational staff.”
Then, at the end of the memorandum:
“All further plans will be made under the cover name
Weserübung.”
I should like respectfully to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the
importance of that document, to the signature of Keitel upon it, and to
the date of this important decision.
Prior to this date, the 27th of January 1940, the planning of the
various aspects of the invasion of Norway and Denmark had been confined
to a relatively small group, whose aim had been to persuade Hitler of
the desirability of undertaking this Norwegian operation. The issuance
of this directive of Keitel’s on the 27th January 1940 was the signal
that the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, the OKW, had
accepted the proposition of the group that was pressing for this
Norwegian adventure, and turned the combined resources of the German
military machine to the task of producing practical and co-ordinated
plans for the Norwegian operation.
The Court will observe that from January onward the operational planning
for the invasion of Norway and Denmark was started through the normal
channels.
And now I would refer the Court to some entries in the diary of the
Defendant Jodl, to see how the preparations progressed. That is Document
Number 1809-PS, which will be for the purposes of the record Exhibit
GB-88. That, the Court will observe, is the last document in the
document book.
There is a slight confusion in the order in which the entries are set
out in the diary because the first three pages relate to entries which
will be dealt with in another part of the case.
I invite the Court’s attention to Page 3 of these extracts from Jodl’s
diary beginning at the bottom February the 6th. The entry under the date
line of February the 6th 1940 starts, “New idea: Carry out ‘H’ and Weser
Exercise only, and guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of
the war.”
I would like to repeat that entry if I may be permitted to do so. “New
idea: Carry out ‘H’ and Weser Exercise only, and guarantee Belgium’s
neutrality for the duration of the war.”
The next entry to which I invite the Court’s attention is the entry of
the 21st of February.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What does that mean, to “carry out ‘H’”?
MAJOR JONES: That is a reference to another code word, “Hartmut,” which
the Court will see disclosed in a subsequent document. That is another
code word for this Norwegian and Danish operation.
The entry of February 21st in Jodl’s diary reads:
“Führer has talked with General Von Falkenhorst and charges him
with preparation of Weser Exercise. Falkenhorst accepts gladly.
Instructions issued to the three branches of the Armed Forces.”
Then the next entry, on the next page . . .
THE PRESIDENT: “Weser Exercise”—is that Norway too?
MAJOR JONES: That is Norway too, My Lord, yes. That is a translation of
“Weserübung.”
The entry on the next page, under the date of February the 28th:
“I propose first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Führer that
Case Yellow”—which as the Court knows is the code name for the
invasion of the Netherlands—“and Weser Exercise”—the invasion
of Norway and Denmark—“must be prepared in such a way that they
will be independent of one another as regards both time and
forces employed. The Führer completely agrees, if this is in any
way possible.”
So that the Court will observe that the new idea of February the 6th
that the neutrality of Belgium might be preserved had been abandoned by
February the 28th.
The next entry is of February the 29th—I am not troubling the Court
with further entries of the 28th of February, which relate to the forces
to be employed in the invasion of Norway and Denmark. February 29th, the
second paragraph:
“Führer also wishes to have a strong task force in Copenhagen
and a plan elaborated in detail showing how individual coastal
batteries are to be captured by shock troops. Warlimont, Chief
of Land Defense, instructed to make out immediately the order of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and Chief ‘WZ’ to make out a
similar order regarding the strengthening of the staff.”
And there for the moment, I will leave the entries in Jodl’s diary and
refer the Court to the vital Document C-174, which for the purposes of
the record will be Exhibit GB-89. The Court will see from that document
that it is Hitler’s operation order to complete the preparations for the
invasion of Norway and Denmark. It bears the date of the 1st of March
1940, and it is headed, “The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces; most secret.” Then, “Directive for Case Weserübung”:
“The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the
making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and
Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces—Weser Exercise.
This operation should prevent British encroachment on
Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore
base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start
line against Britain.”
The second part of Paragraph 1 reads:
“In view of our military and political power in comparison with
that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the
Weser Exercise will be kept as small as possible. The numerical
weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise
execution. On principle we will do our utmost to make the
operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which
is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian
States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the
governments at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary,
demonstrations by the Navy and the Air Force will provide the
necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this, resistance should be
met with, all military means will be used to crush it.”
There follows, in Paragraph 2 on the next page:
“I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the
operation against Denmark and Norway the commanding general of
the 21st Army Corps, General Von Falkenhorst.”
Paragraph 3:
“The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway
must take place simultaneously. I emphasize that the operations
must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy
seizes the initiative against Norway, we must be able to apply
immediately our own counter measures.
“It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as
the western opponents should be taken by surprise by our
measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and
of readiness, drafting, and embarkation of the troops, must be
made with this factor in mind.
“In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept
secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with
fictitious objectives.”
Then Paragraph 4 on the next page, “The Occupation of Denmark,” which is
given the code name of “Weserübung Süd”:
“The task of Group XXI: Occupation by surprise of Jutland and of
Fünen immediately after occupation of Zealand.
“Added to this, having secured the most important places, the
group will break through as quickly as possible from Fünen to
Skagen and to the east coast.”
Then there follow other instructions with regard to the operation.
Paragraph 5:
“Occupation of Norway, ‘Weserübung Nord’”:
“The task of the Group XXI: Capture by surprise of the most
important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations.
“The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the
transport by sea of the landing troops.”
And there follows a reference to the part of the Air Force, and I would
like particularly to draw the Court’s attention to that reference. This
is Paragraph 5 on Page 3 of Hitler’s directive:
“The Air Force, after the occupation has been completed, will
ensure air defense and will make use of Norwegian bases for air
warfare against Britain.”
I am underlining that entry at this stage because I shall be referring
to it in connection with a later document.
Whilst these preparations were being made and just prior to the final
decision of Hitler . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Did you draw our attention to the defendant by whom it
was initialed, Frick, on the first page of that document.
MAJOR JONES: That is an initial by Fricke. That is a different person
altogether. That is a high functionary in the German Admiralty and has
no connection with the defendant who is before the Tribunal.
As I was saying, My Lord, while these decisions were being made reports
were coming in through Rosenberg’s organization from Quisling; and if
the Court will again turn for the last time to Document 007-PS, which is
Rosenberg’s report, the Tribunal will observe the kind of information
which Rosenberg’s organization was supplying at this time. The third
paragraph, “Quisling’s reports”—that is in Annex I in Rosenberg’s
report, the section dealing with Norway, Page 6 on my copy—referring to
the second page of the annex, the paragraph beginning with:
“Quisling’s reports transmitted to his representative in
Germany, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of
intervention by the Western Powers in Norway, with tacit consent
of the Norwegian Government, became more urgent by January.
These increasingly better substantiated communications were in
sharpest contrast to the view of the German Legation in Oslo
which relied on the desire for neutrality of the then Norwegian
Nygardsvold Cabinet and was convinced of that government’s
intention and readiness to defend Norway’s neutrality. No one in
Norway knew that Quisling’s representative for Germany
maintained closest relations with him; he therefore succeeded in
gaining a foothold within governmental circles of the
Nygardsvold Cabinet and in listening to the Cabinet members’
true views. Hagelin transmitted what he had heard to the
bureau”—Rosenberg’s bureau—“which conveyed the news to the
Führer through Reichsleiter Rosenberg. During the night of the
16th to 17th February English destroyers attacked the German
steamer _Altmark_ in Jössingfjord.”
The Tribunal will remember that that is a reference to the action by the
British destroyer _Cossack_ against the German naval auxiliary vessel
_Altmark_ which was carrying 300 British prisoners captured on the high
seas to Germany through Norwegian territorial waters. The position of
the British Delegation with regard to that episode is that the use that
was being made by the _Altmark_ of Norwegian territorial waters was in
fact a flagrant abuse in itself of Norwegian neutrality and the action
taken by _H.M.S. Cossack_ which was restricted to rescuing the 300
British prisoners on board—no attempt being made to destroy the
_Altmark_ or to capture the armed guards on board of her—was fully
justified under international law.
Now the Rosenberg report which I interrupted to give that statement of
the British view on the _Altmark_ episode—the Rosenberg report
continues:
“The Norwegian Government’s reaction to this question permitted
the conclusion that certain agreements had been covertly arrived
at between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. Such
assumption was confirmed by reports of Chief of Section Scheidt,
who in turn derived his information from Hagelin and Quisling.
But even after this incident the German Legation in Oslo
championed the opposite view and went on record as believing in
the good intentions of the Norwegians.”
And so the Tribunal will see that the Nazi Government preferred the
reports of the traitor Quisling to the considered judgment of German
diplomatic representatives in Norway. The result of the receipt of
reports of that kind was the Hitler decision to invade Norway and
Denmark. The culminating details in the preparations for the invasion
are again found in Jodl’s diary, which is the last document in the
document book. I will refer the Court to the entry of the 3rd of March.
“The Führer expressed himself very sharply on the necessity of a
swift entry into N”—which is Norway—“with strong forces.
“No delay by any branch of the Armed Forces. Very rapid
acceleration of the attack necessary.”
Then the last entry on March the 3rd:
“Führer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before Case Yellow
with a few days interval.”
So that the important issue of strategy which had been concerning the
German High Command for some time had been decided by this date, and the
fate of Scandinavia was to be sealed before the fate of the Low
Countries; and the Court will observe from those entries of March 3 that
by that date Hitler had become an enthusiastic convert to the idea of a
Norwegian aggression.
The next entry in Jodl’s diary of the 5th of March:
“Big conference with the three commanders-in-chief about Weser
Exercise; Field Marshal in a rage because not consulted till
now. Won’t listen to anyone and wants to show that all
preparations so far made are worthless.
“Result:
“(a) Stronger forces to Narvik; (b) Navy to leave ships in the
ports (_Hipper_ or _Lützow_ in Trondheim); (c) Christiansand can
be left out at first; (d) six divisions envisaged for Norway;
(e) a foothold to be gained immediately in Copenhagen also.”
Then the next entry to which I desire to draw the Court’s attention is
the entry of the 13th of March, which the Court may think is one of the
most remarkable in the whole documentation of this case:
“Führer does not give order yet for ‘W.’”—Weser Exercise—
“He is still looking for justification.”
The entry of the next day, the 14th of March, shows a similar
pre-occupation on the part of Hitler with seeking justification for this
flagrant aggression. It reads:
“English keep vigil in the North Sea with 15 to 16 submarines;
doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations or prevent
operations by Germans. Führer has not yet decided what reason to
give for Weser Exercise.”
And then I would like the Court to look at the entry for the 21st of
March, which by inadvertence has been included in the next page at the
bottom of Page 6:
“Misgivings of Task Force 21 . . .”
The Court has seen from documents that I have put in already that Task
Force 21 was Falkenhorst’s force, which was detailed to conduct this
invasion.
“Misgivings of Task Force 21 about the long interval between
taking up readiness positions at 0530 hours and closing of
diplomatic negotiations. Führer rejects any earlier negotiations
as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If
resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken. The political
plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military measures taken and
even exaggerate them.”
Comment upon that entry is, I think, unnecessary. The next entry, if the
Court will turn to Page 5, of the 28th of March, the third sentence:
“Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the
Weser Exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst and the
other three commanders are worrying about matters which are none
of their business. Krancke sees more disadvantages than
advantages.
“In the evening the Führer visits the map room and roundly
declares that he won’t stand for the Navy clearing out of the
Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim, and Oslo will
have to remain occupied by naval forces.”
There the Court will observe that Jodl, as ever, is the faithful
collaborator of Hitler.
Then April the 2d:
“1530 hours. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force,
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and General Von Falkenhorst with
the Führer. All confirm preparations completed. Führer orders
carrying out of the Weser Exercise for April the 9th.”
Then the last entry in the next page, the 4th of April:
“Führer drafts the proclamations. Pieckenbrock, Chief of
Military Intelligence I, returns with good result from the talks
with Quisling in Copenhagen.”
Until the very last the treachery of Quisling continued most active.
The Prosecution has in its possession a large number of operation orders
that were issued in connection with the aggression against Norway and
Denmark, but I propose only to draw the Court’s attention to two of them
to illustrate the extent of the secrecy and the deception that was used
by the defendants and their confederates in the course of that
aggression. I would now draw the Court’s attention to Document C-115,
which for the purpose of the record will be Exhibit GB-90. First of all
I will draw the Court’s attention to the second paragraph, “General
Orders,” with a date, “4th of April 1940”:
“The barrage-breaking vessels”—Sperrbrecher—“will penetrate
inconspicuously and with lights on into Oslo Fjord disguised as
merchant steamers.
“Challenge from coastal signal stations and look-outs are to be
answered by the deceptive use of the names of English steamers.
I lay particular stress on the importance of not giving away the
operation before zero hour.”
Then the next entry is an order for reconnaissance forces dated the 24th
of March 1940, “Behavior during entrance into the harbor.” The third
paragraph is the part to which I wish to draw the Court’s attention:
“The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as
possible. All challenges in Morse by Norwegian ships will be
answered in English. In answer to questions a text with
something like the following content will be chosen:
“‘Calling at Bergen for a short visit; no hostile intent.’
“Challenges to be answered, with names of British warships:
“_Köln_—_H.M.S. Cairo; Königsberg-_-_H.M.S. Calcutta;
Bremse_—_H.M.S. Faulkner; Karl Peters_—_H.M.S. Halcyon;
Leopard_—British destroyer; _Wolf_—British destroyer;
S-boats—British motor torpedo boats.
“Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to be
illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke screen.”
And then finally the next order dated the 24th of March 1940, Annex 3,
“From Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces; most secret.” Next page, page
two:
“Following is laid down as guiding principle should one of our
own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge of
passing craft. To challenge in case of the _Köln_—‘_H.M.S.
Cairo_’; then to order to stop—‘(1) Please repeat last signal,
(2) Impossible to understand your signal’; in case of a warning
shot—‘Stop firing, British ship, good friend’; in case of an
inquiry as to destination and purpose—‘Going Bergen, chasing
German steamers.’”
Then I would draw the Court’s attention to Document C-151, which for the
purposes of the record will be Exhibit GB-91, which is a Dönitz order in
connection with this operation. If the Court will observe, it is headed:
“Top secret, Operation Order—‘Hartmut.’ Occupation of Denmark
and Norway.
“This order comes into force on the code word Hartmut. With its
coming into force the orders hitherto valid for the boats taking
part lose their validity.
“The day and hour are designated as Weser-Day and Weser-Hour,
and the whole operation is known as Weser Exercise.
“The operation ordered by the code word has as its objective the
rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway. Simultaneously
Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land
side.”
And there is at the end of that paragraph another contribution by Dönitz
to this process of deception:
“The naval force will, as they enter the harbor, fly the British
flag until the troops have landed except, presumably, at
Narvik.”
The Tribunal now knows as a matter of history that on the 9th of April
1940 the Nazi onslaught on the unsuspecting and almost unarmed people of
Norway and Denmark was launched. When the invasions had already begun a
German memorandum was handed to the Governments of Norway and Denmark
attempting to justify the German action; and I would like to draw the
Court’s attention to Document TC-55, Exhibit GB-92. That is at the
beginning of the book of documents—the sixth document of the book. I am
not proposing to read the whole of that memorandum; I have no doubt the
defending counsel will deal with any parts which they consider relevant
to the defense. The Court will observe that it is alleged that England
and France were guilty in their maritime warfare of breaches of
international law and that Britain and France were making plans
themselves to invade and occupy Norway and that the Government of Norway
was prepared to acquiesce in such a situation.
The memorandum states—and I would now draw the Court’s attention to
Page 3 of the memorandum to the paragraph just below the middle of the
page beginning “The German Troops”:
“The German troops, therefore, do not set foot on Norwegian soil
as enemies. The German High Command does not intend to make use
of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations
against England as long as it is not forced to do so by measures
taken by England and France; German military operations aim much
more exclusively at protecting the north against proposed
occupation of Norwegian strong points by English-French forces.”
In connection with that statement I would remind the Court that in his
operation order of the 1st of March Hitler had then given orders to the
Air Force to make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against
Britain. That is the 1st of March. And this is the memorandum which was
produced as an excuse on the 9th of April. The last two paragraphs of
the German memorandum to Norway and Denmark, the Court may think, are a
classic Nazi combination of diplomatic hypocrisy and military threat.
They read:
“The Reich Government thus expect that the Royal Norwegian
Government and the Norwegian people will respond with
understanding to the German measures and offer no resistance to
them. Any resistance would have to be and would be broken by all
possible means by the German forces employed, and would
therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed. The Royal
Norwegian Government are therefore requested to take all
measures with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of
the German troops can take place without friction and
difficulty. In the spirit, of the good German-Norwegian
relations that have always existed, the Reich Government declare
to the Royal Norwegian Government that Germany has no intention
of infringing by her measures the territorial integrity and
political independence of the Kingdom of Norway now or in the
future.”
What the Nazis meant by the protection of the Kingdom of Norway was
shown by their conduct on the 9th of April. I now refer the Court to
Document TC-56, which will be Exhibit GB-93, which is a report by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Norwegian Forces. It is at the beginning
of the document book, the last of the TC documents.
I will not trouble the Court with the first page of the report. If the
Tribunal will turn to the second page:
“The Germans, considering the long lines of communications and
the threat of the British Navy, clearly understood the necessity
of complete surprise and speed in the attack. In order to
paralyze the will of the Norwegian people to defend their
country and at the same time to prevent Allied intervention, it
was planned to capture all the more important towns along the
coast simultaneously. Members of the Government and Parliament
and other military and civilian people occupying important
positions were to be arrested before organized resistance could
be put into effect and the King was to be forced to form a new
government with Quisling as its head.”
The next paragraph was read by the learned British Attorney General in
his speech and I will only refer to the last paragraph but one:
“The German attack came as a surprise and all the invaded towns
along the coast were captured according to plan with only slight
losses. In the Oslofjord, however, the cruiser _Blücher_,
carrying General Engelbrecht and parts of his division,
technical staffs, and specialists who were to take over the
control of Oslo, was sunk. The plan to capture the King and
members of the Government and Parliament failed. In spite of the
surprise of the attack resistance was organized throughout the
country.”
That is a brief picture of what occurred in Norway.
What happened in Denmark is described in a memorandum prepared by the
Royal Danish Government, a copy of which I hand in as Exhibit GB-94 and
an extract from which is in Document D-628, which follows the C
documents.
“Extracts from the memorandum concerning Germany’s attitude
towards Denmark”—before and during the occupation—“prepared by
the Royal Danish Government.
“On the 9th of April 1940 at 0420 hours”—in the morning that
is—“the German Minister appeared at the private residence of
the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Air
Attaché of the Legation. The appointment had been made by a
telephone call from the German Legation to the Secretary General
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 4 o’clock the same
morning. The Minister said at once that Germany had positive
proof that Great Britain intended to occupy bases in Denmark and
Norway. Germany had to safeguard Denmark against this. For this
reason German soldiers were now crossing the frontier and
landing at various points in Zealand, including the port of
Copenhagen; in a short time German bombers would be over
Copenhagen; their orders were not to bomb until further notice.
It was now up to the Danes to prevent resistance, as any
resistance would have the most terrible consequences. Germany
would guarantee Denmark territorial integrity and political
independence. Germany would not interfere with the internal
government of Denmark but wanted only to make sure of the
neutrality of the country. For this purpose the presence of the
German Wehrmacht in Denmark was required during the war . . . .
“The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in reply that the
allegation concerning British plans to occupy Denmark was
completely without foundation; there was no possibility of
anything like that. The Minister for Foreign Affairs protested
against the violation of Denmark’s neutrality which, according
to the German Minister’s statement, was in progress. The
Minister for Foreign Affairs declared further that he could not
give a reply to the demands, which had to be submitted to the
King and the Prime Minister, and further observed that the
German Minister knew as everybody else that the Danish Armed
Forces had orders to oppose violations of Denmark’s neutrality
so that fighting presumably had already taken place. In reply
the German Minister expressed that the matter was very urgent,
not least to avoid air bombardment.”
What happened thereafter is described in a dispatch from the British
Minister in Copenhagen to the British Foreign Secretary, which the
Tribunal will find in D-627, the document preceding the one which I have
just read. That document, for the purposes of the record, will be GB-95.
That dispatch reads:
“The actual events of the 9th April have been pieced together by
members of my staff, from actual eye-witnesses or from reliable
information subsequently received and are given below. Early in
the morning towards 5 o’clock three small German transports
steamed into the approach to Copenhagen harbor while a number of
airplanes circled overhead. The northern battery guarding the
harbor approach fired a warning shot at these planes when it was
seen that they carried German markings. Apart from this the
Danes offered no further resistance, and the German vessels
fastened alongside the quays in the Free Harbor. Some of these
airplanes proceeded to drop leaflets over the town urging the
population to keep calm and co-operate with the Germans. I
enclose a specimen of this leaflet, which is written in a
bastard Norwegian-Danish, a curiously un-German disregard of
detail, together with a translation. Approximately 800 soldiers
landed with full equipment and marched to Kastellet, the old
fortress of Copenhagen and now barracks. The door was locked so
the Germans promptly burst it open with explosives and rounded
up all the Danish soldiers within together with the womenfolk
employed in the mess. The garrison offered no resistance, and it
appears that they were taken completely by surprise. One officer
tried to escape in a motor car, but his chauffeur was shot
before they could get away. He died in hospital 2 days later.
After seizing the barracks a detachment was sent to Amalienborg,
the King’s palace, where they engaged the Danish sentries on
guard wounding three, one of them fatally . . . . Meanwhile a
large fleet of bombers flew over the city at low altitude.”
Then, the last paragraph of the dispatch reads:
“It has been difficult to ascertain exactly what occurred in
Jutland . . . . It is clear, however, that the enemy invaded
Jutland from the south at dawn on the 9th of April and were at
first resisted by the Danish forces, who suffered casualties
. . . . The chances of resistance were weakened by the extent to
which the forces appear to have been taken by surprise. The
chief permanent official of the Ministry of War, for instance,
motored into Copenhagen on the morning of the 9th of April and
drove blithely past a sentry who challenged him in blissful
ignorance that this was not one of his own men. It took a
bullet, which passed through the lapels of his coat, to
disillusion him.”
The German memorandum to the Norwegian and Danish Governments spoke of
the German desire to maintain the territorial integrity and political
independence of those two small countries.
I will close by drawing the Court’s attention to two documents which
indicate the kind of territorial integrity and political independence
the Nazi conspirators contemplated for the victims of their aggression.
I will first draw the Court’s attention to an entry in Jodl’s diary,
which is the last document in the book, on the last page of the book,
the entry dated 19th April:
“Renewed crisis. Envoy Brauer”—that is the German Minister to
Norway—“is recalled. Since Norway is at war with us, the task
of the Foreign Office is finished. In the Führer’s opinion force
has to be used. It is said that Gauleiter Terboven will be given
a post. Field Marshal”—which, as the Court will see from the
other entries, is presumably a reference to the Defendant
Göring—“is moving in the same direction. He criticizes as
defect that we did not take sufficiently energetic measures
against the civilian population, that we could have seized
electrical plant, that the Navy did not supply enough troops.
The Air Force cannot do everything.”
The Court will see from that entry and the reference to Gauleiter
Terboven that already by the 19th of April rule by Gauleiter had
replaced rule by Norwegians.
The final document is Document C-41, which will be Exhibit GB-96, which
is a memorandum dated the 3rd of June 1940 signed by Fricke, who, of
course, has no connection with the Defendant Frick. Fricke was at that
date the head of the operations division of the German naval war staff,
a key appointment in the very nerve center of German naval operations.
That is why, as the Tribunal noticed, he came to be initialing the
important naval documents.
That memorandum is as I have said, dated 3rd June 1940 and relates to
questions of territorial expansion and bases:
“These problems are pre-eminently of a political character and
comprise an abundance of questions of a political type, which it
is not the Navy’s province to answer, but they also materially
affect the strategic possibilities open—according to the way in
which this question is answered—for the subsequent use and
operation of the Navy.
“It is too well known to need further mention that Germany’s
present position in the narrows of the Heligoland Bight and in
the Baltic—bordered as it is by a whole series of states and
under their influence—is an impossible one for the future of
Greater Germany. If over and above this one extends these
strategic possibilities to the point that Germany shall not
continue to be cut off for all time from overseas by natural
geographical facts, the demand is raised that somehow or other
an end shall be put to this state of affairs at the end of the
war.
“The solution could perhaps be found among the following
possibilities:
“1) The territories of Denmark, Norway, and northern France
acquired during the course of the war continue to be so occupied
and organized that they can in the future be considered as
German possessions.
“This solution will recommend itself for areas where the
severity of the decision tells, and should tell, on the enemy
and where a gradual germanizing of the territory appears
practicable.
“2) The taking over and holding of areas which have no direct
connection with Germany’s main body and which, like the Russian
solution in Hangö, remain permanently as an enclave in the
hostile state. Such areas might be considered possible around
Brest and Trondheim . . . .
“3) The power of Greater Germany in the strategic areas acquired
in this war should result in the existing population of these
areas feeling themselves and being politically, economically,
and militarily completely dependent on Germany. If the following
results are achieved—that expansion is undertaken (on a scale I
shall describe later) by means of the military measures for
occupation taken during the war, that French powers of
resistance (popular unity, mineral resources, industry, armed
forces) are so broken that a revival must be considered out of
the question, that the smaller states such as the Netherlands,
Denmark, and Norway are forced into a dependence on us which
will enable us in any circumstances and at any time easily to
occupy these countries again—then in practice the same, but
psychologically much more, will be achieved.”
Then Fricke recommends:
“The solution given in 3), therefore, appears to be the proper
one—that is, to crush France, to occupy Belgium and part of
northern and eastern France, to allow the Netherlands, Denmark,
and Norway to exist on the basis indicated above.”
Then, the culminating paragraph of this report of Fricke reads as
follows:
“Time will show how far the outcome of the war with England will
make an extension of these demands possible.”
The submission of the Prosecution is that that and other documents which
have been submitted to the Court tear apart the veil of the Nazi
pretenses. These documents reveal the menace behind the good-will of
Göring; they expose as fraudulent the diplomacy of Ribbentrop; they show
the reality behind the ostensible political ideology of tradesmen in
treason like Rosenberg; and finally and above all, they render sordid
the professional status of Keitel and of Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, it is my duty to present that
part of Count Two which relates to the allegations with regard to
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. In Charges II, III, IV, IX,
XI, XIII, XIV, XVIII, XIX, and XXIII there are charges of violating
certain treaties and conventions and violating certain assurances. So
far as the treaties are concerned, some of them have been put in
evidence already, and I will indicate that when I come to them. May I,
before I come to the detail, remind the Tribunal of the history of these
unfortunate countries, the Netherlands and Belgium; especially Belgium,
which for so many centuries was the cockpit of Europe.
The independence of Belgium was guaranteed as the Tribunal will
remember, in 1839 by the great European powers. That guarantee was
observed for 75 years until it was shamelessly broken in 1914 by the
Germans, who brought all the horrors of war to Belgium and all the even
greater horrors of a German occupation of Belgium. History was to repeat
itself in a still more shocking fashion some 25 years after in 1940 as
the Tribunal already knows.
The first treaty which was mentioned in these charges is the Hague
Convention of 1907. That has been put in by my learned friend, Sir
David, and I think I need say nothing about it.
The second treaty is the Locarno Convention, the Arbitration and
Conciliation Convention of 1925. My Lord, that was between Germany and
Belgium. That was put in by Sir David. It is GB-15, and I think I need
say nothing more about that.
Belgium’s independence and neutrality was guaranteed by Germany in that
document.
My Lords, the next treaty is the Hague Arbitration Convention of May
1926 between Germany and the Netherlands. That Document I ought formally
to put in. It is in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, which perhaps I may call
RGB in the future for brevity; and it, no doubt, will be treated as a
public document. But in my bundle of documents, which goes in the order
in which I propose to refer to them, I think it is more convenient for
the presentation of my case. That is the second or third document,
TC-16.
THE PRESIDENT: It is Book 4, is it?
MR. ROBERTS: It is Book 4, My Lord. This is the Convention of
Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and the Netherlands signed
at The Hague in May 1926. Your Lordships have the document; perhaps I
need read only Article I:
“The contracting parties”—those are the Netherlands and the
German Reich—“undertake to submit all disputes of any nature
whatever which may arise between them which it has not been
possible to settle by diplomacy and which have not been referred
to the Permanent Court of International Justice to be dealt with
by arbitration or conciliation as provided.”
And then, My Lords, there follow all the clauses which deal merely with
the machinery of conciliation, which are unnecessary for me to read. May
I just draw attention to the last article, Article 21, which provides
that the Convention shall be valid for 10 years, and then shall remain
in force for successive periods of 5 years until denounced by either
party. And this treaty never was denounced by Germany at all.
I put that document in as Document TC-16, which will be Exhibit GB-97;
and a certified copy is put in and a translation for the Court.
As the Tribunal already knows, in 1928 the Kellogg-Briand Pact was made
at Paris, by which all the powers renounced recourse to war. That is put
in as GB-18, and I need not, I think, put it in or refer to it again.
Then the last treaty—all of which, of course, belong to the days of the
Weimar Republic—is the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and
Luxembourg executed in 1929. That is Document TC-20 in the bundle. It is
two documents further on than the one the Tribunal has last referred to.
That is the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and
Luxembourg signed at Geneva in 1929. May I just read the first few words
of Article 1, which are familiar:
“The contracting parties undertake to settle by peaceful means
in accordance with the present treaty all disputes of any nature
whatever which may arise between them and which it may not be
possible to settle by diplomacy.”
And then there follow the clauses dealing with the machinery for
peaceful settlement of disputes, which follow the common form.
My Lord, those were the treaty obligations. May I put in that last
treaty, TC-20, which will be Exhibit GB-98.
My Lord, those were the treaty obligations between Germany and Belgium
at the time when the Nazi Party came into power in 1933; and as you have
heard from my learned friend, Hitler adopted and ratified the
obligations of Germany under the Weimar Republic with regard to the
treaties which had been entered into. My Lord, nothing more occurred to
alter the position of Belgium until in March 1936. Germany reoccupied
the Rhineland, announced, of course, the resumption of conscription, and
so on. And Hitler on the 7th of March 1936 purported in a speech to
repudiate the obligations of the German Government under the Locarno
Pact; the reason given being the execution of the Franco-Soviet Pact of
1935. Sir David has dealt with that and has pointed out that there was
no legal foundation for this claim to be entitled to renounce
obligations under the Locarno Pact. But Belgium was, of course, left in
the air in the sense that it had entered itself into various obligations
under the Locarno Pact in return for the liabilities which other nations
acknowledged; and now one of those liabilities, namely, the liability of
Germany to observe the pact, had been renounced.
And so My Lord, on the 30th of January 1937, perhaps because Hitler
realized the position of Belgium and of the Netherlands, Hitler, in the
next document in the bundle, TC-33 and 35, which I hand in and which
will be Exhibit GB-99, gave the solemn assurance—he used the word
“solemn”—to Belgium and to the Netherlands. That has already been read
by the Attorney General and so I don’t want to read it again. But the
Tribunal will see that it is a full guarantee. In April of 1937 in a
document which is not before the Court, France and England released
Belgium from her obligations under the Locarno Pact. It is a matter of
history and it does occur in an exhibit, but it hasn’t been copied.
Belgium, of course, gave guarantees of strict independence and
neutrality; and France and England gave guarantees of assistance should
Belgium be attacked. And it was because of that that Germany on the 13th
of October 1937—in the next document—gave a very clear and
unconditional guarantee to Belgium—Document TC-34, which I offer in
evidence as Exhibit GB-100—the German declaration of the 13th of
October 1937, which shows the minutes:
“I have the honor on behalf of the German Government to make the
following communication to Your Excellency:
“The German Government have taken cognizance with particular
interest of the public declaration in which the Belgian
Government define the international position of Belgium. For
their part they have repeatedly given expression, especially
through the declaration of the Chancellor of the German Reich in
his speech of the 30th of January 1937, to their own point of
view. The German Government have also taken cognizance of the
declaration made by the British and French Governments on the
24th of April 1937.”
That is a document to which I have previously referred.
“Since the conclusion of a treaty to replace the Treaty of
Locarno may still take some time and being desirous of
strengthening the peaceful aspirations of the two countries, the
German Government regard it as appropriate to define now their
own attitude towards Belgium. To this end they make the
following declaration:
“First: The German Government have taken note of the views which
the Belgian Government have thought fit to express. That is to
say, (a) of the policy of independence which they intend to
exercise in full sovereignty; (b) of their determination to
defend the frontiers of Belgium with all their forces against
any aggression or invasion and to prevent Belgian territory from
being used for purposes of aggression against another state as a
passage or as a base of operation by land, by sea, or in the
air, and to organize the defense of Belgium in an efficient
manner to this purpose.
“Second: The German Government consider that the inviolability
and integrity of Belgium are common interests of the Western
Powers. They confirm their determination that in no
circumstances will they impair this inviolability and integrity,
and that they will at all times respect Belgian territory
except, of course, in the event of Belgium’s taking part in a
military action directed against Germany in an armed conflict in
which Germany is involved.
“Third: The German Government, like the British and French
Governments, are prepared to assist Belgium should she be
subjected to an attack or to invasion.”
And then, on the following page:
“The Belgian Government have taken note with great satisfaction
of the declaration communicated to them this day by the German
Government. They thank the German Government warmly for this
communication.”
My Lord, may I pause there to emphasize that document. There in October
of 1937 is Germany giving a solemn guarantee to this small nation of its
peaceful aspiration towards her and its assertion that the integrity of
the Belgian frontier was a common interest between her and Belgium and
the other Western Powers.
You have before you to try the leaders of the German Government and the
leaders of the German Armed Forces. One doesn’t have to prove, does one,
that every one of those accused must have known perfectly well of that
solemn undertaking given by his government? Every one of these accused
in their various spheres of activity—some more actively than the
others—were party to the shameless breaking of that treaty two and a
half years afterwards, and I submit that on the ordinary laws of
inference and justice all those men must be fixed as active
participators in that disgraceful breach of faith which brought misery
and death to so many millions.
Presumably it will be contended on the part, for instance, of Keitel and
Jodl that they were merely honorable soldiers carrying out their duty.
This Tribunal, no doubt, will inquire what code of honor they observe
which permits them to violate the pledged word of their country.
That this declaration of October 1937 meant very little to the leaders
and to the High Command of Germany can be seen by the next document,
which is Document PS-375 in the bundle. It is already an exhibit,
USA-84, and has been referred to many times already. May I just
refer—or remind the Tribunal—to one sentence or two. The document
comes into existence on the 25th of August 1938 at the time when the
Czechoslovakian drama was unfolding, and it was uncertain at that time
whether there would be war with the Western Powers. It is top secret,
prepared by the 5th section of the General Staff of the German Air
Force. The subject: “Extended Case Green—Estimate of the Situation.”
Probably the more correct words would be: “Appreciation of the Situation
with Special Consideration of the Enemy.” Apparently some staff officer
had been asked to prepare this appreciation. In view of the fact that it
has been read before, I think I need only read the last paragraph which
is Paragraph H and it comes at the bottom of Page 6, the last page but
one of the document. Now H, “Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command,
Army and Navy”. This, you see, was an appreciation addressed by an Air
Force staff officer. So these are requests to the Army and Navy. And
then if one turns over the page, Number 4:
“Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, represent
an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war
against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is
held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the
conditions under which an occupation of this area could be
carried out and how long it would take. And in this case it
would be necessary to reassess the commitment against Great
Britain.”
The point that the Prosecution desires to make on that document is that
it is apparently assumed by the staff officer who prepared this, and
assumed quite rightly, that the leaders of the German nation and the
High Command would not pay the smallest attention to the fact that
Germany had given her word not to invade Holland or Belgium. They are
recommending it as a militarily advantageous thing to do, strong in the
knowledge that if the commanders and the Führer agree with that view
treaties are to be completely ignored. Such, I repeat, was the honor of
the German Government and of their leaders.
Now in March of 1939 as has been proved, the remainder of Czechoslovakia
was peacefully annexed; and then came the time for further guarantees in
the next document, the assurances—TC-35 and 39—which were given to
Belgium and the Netherlands on the 28th of April 1939.
Those have been read by my learned friend, Major Elwyn Jones. They bear
the number GB-78. I need not read them again.
There is also a guarantee to Luxembourg, which is on the next page,
TC-42 (a). That was given in the same speech by Hitler in the Reichstag
where Hitler was dealing with a communication from Mr. Roosevelt who was
feeling a little uneasy on the other side of the Atlantic as to Hitler’s
intentions. May I, before I read this document, say that I believe the
Tribunal will be seeing a film of the delivery by Hitler of this part of
this speech; and you will have the privilege of seeing Hitler in one of
his jocular moods, because this was greeted and was delivered in a
jocular vein. And you will see in the film that the Defendant Göring who
sits above Hitler in the Reichstag appreciates very much the joke, the
joke being this: That it is an absurd suggestion to make that Germany
could possibly go to war with any of its neighbors—and that was the
point of the joke that everybody appears to have appreciated very much.
Now, if I may read this document:
“Finally Mr. Roosevelt demands the readiness to give him an
assurance that the German fighting forces will not attack the
territory or possessions of the following independent nations
and above all that they will not march into them. And he goes on
to name the following as the countries in question:
“Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark,
Holland, Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, France, Portugal,
Spain, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary,
Romania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Iraq, Arabia,
Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran.
“Answer: I started off by taking the trouble to find out in the
case of the countries listed firstly, whether they feel
themselves threatened and secondly, and particularly, whether
this question Mr. Roosevelt has asked us was put as the result
of a démarche by them or at least with their consent.
“The answer was a general negative, which in some cases took the
form of a blunt rejection. Actually this counter-question of
mine could not be conveyed to some of the states and nations
listed, since they are not at present in possession of their
liberty (as for instance Syria) but are occupied by the military
forces of democratic states and therefore deprived of all their
rights.
“Thirdly, apart from that, all the states bordering on Germany
have received much more binding assurances and above all much
more binding proposals than Mr. Roosevelt asked of me in his
peculiar telegram.”
You will see that although that is sneering at Mr. Roosevelt, it is
suggesting in the presence, certainly, of the accused Göring as being
quite absurd that Germany should nurture any warlike feeling against her
neighbors. But the hollow falsity of that and the preceding guarantee is
shown by the next document. May I put this document, TC-42 (a) in as
Exhibit GB-101.
The next document (L-79) which is Hitler’s conference of the 23rd of May
has been referred to many times and is Exhibit USA-27. Therefore I need
only very shortly remind the Tribunal of two passages. First of all, on
the first page it is interesting to see who was present: The Führer,
Göring, Admiral Raeder, Brauchitsch, Colonel General Keitel, and various
others who are not accused. Colonel Warlimont was there. He, I
understand, was Jodl’s deputy.
Well now, the purpose of the conference was an analysis of the
situation. Then may I refer to the third page down at the bottom. The
stencil number is 819:
“What will this struggle be like?”
And then these words:
“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.”
Then, at the bottom:
“Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war,
we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at
securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuyder Zee.”
There is that decision made, “Declarations of neutrality must be
ignored,” and there is the Grand Admiral present, and there is the Air
Minister and Chief of the German Air Force, and there is General Keitel
present. They all appear, and all their subsequent actions show that
they acquiesced in that: Give your word and then break it. That is their
code of honor. And you will see that at the end of the meeting, the very
last page—the stencil number is 823—Field Marshal Göring asked one or
two questions.
There was the decision of the 23rd of May. Is it overstating the matter
to submit that any syllable of guarantee, any assurance given after that
is just purely hypocrisy, is just the action—apart from the
multiplicity of the crimes here—of the common criminal?
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, I think we would like you so far as possible
to confine yourself to the document.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord, then we go to the 22d of August, 798-PS. That
has already been put in and is Exhibit USA-29. My Lord, that was
Hitler’s speech of the 22d of August. It has been read and re-read. I,
My Lord, refer only to one passage, and that is at the bottom of the
second page:
“Attack from the west from the Maginot Line: I consider this
impossible.
“Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian, and
Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well
as Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available
means.”
My Lord, I desire to emphasize the next sentence:
“England and France will not violate the neutrality of these
countries.”
Then I desire to comment: I ask Your Lordship to bear that sentence in
mind, that correct prophecy, when remembering the excuses given for the
subsequent invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands.
My Lord, the next documents are TC-36, 40, and 42. Those are three
assurances. Number 36 is by the Ambassador of Germany to the Belgian
Government:
“In view of the gravity of the international situation, I am
expressly instructed by the head of the German Reich to transmit
to Your Majesty the following communication:
“Though the German Government are at present doing everything in
their power to arrive at a peaceful solution of the questions at
issue between the Reich and Poland, they nevertheless desire to
define clearly here and now the attitude which they propose to
adopt towards Belgium should a conflict in Europe become
inevitable.
“The German Government are firmly determined to abide by the
terms of the declaration contained in the German note of October
13, 1937. This provides in effect that Germany will in no
circumstances impair the inviolability and integrity of Belgium
and will at all times respect Belgian territory. The German
Government renew this undertaking, however, in the expectation
that the Belgian Government for their part will observe an
attitude of strict neutrality and that Belgium will tolerate no
violations on the part of a third power, but that on the
contrary, she will oppose it with all the forces at her
disposal. It goes without saying that if the Belgian Government
were to adopt a different attitude the German Government would
naturally be compelled to defend their interests in conformity
with the new situation thus created.”
My Lord, may I make one short comment on the last part of that document?
I submit it is clear that the decision having been made to violate the
neutrality, as we know, those last words were put in to afford some
excuse in the future.
That document will be Exhibit GB-102.
My Lord, TC-40, the next document, is a similar document communicated to
Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands on the same day, the 26th of
August 1939. Subject to the Tribunal’s direction, I don’t think I need
read it. It is a public document in the German document book, and it has
exactly the same features.
That will be Exhibit GB-103.
Then My Lords, TC-42, the next document (Exhibit GB-104) is a similar
document relating to Luxembourg. That is dated the 26th of August, the
same day. I am not certain; it has two dates. I think it is the 26th of
August. My Lords, that is in the same terms a complete guarantee with
the sting in the tail as in the other two documents. Perhaps I need not
read it.
My Lords, as the Tribunal knows, Poland was occupied by means of the
lightning victory; and in October German Armed Forces were free for
other tasks. The first step that was taken so far as the Netherlands and
Belgium are concerned is shown by the next document, which is, I think,
in as GB-80; but the two central portions refer to Belgium and the
Netherlands. It is the next document in Your Lordships’ bundle: Number
4.
THE PRESIDENT: TC-32?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. It begins with TC-32, and then if you go to the next
one, My Lords will see TC-37 on the same page—and then TC-41; both 37
and 41 refer to this matter. Now, this is a German assurance on the 6th
of October 1939:
“Belgium.
“Immediately after I had taken over the affairs of the state I
tried to create friendly relations with Belgium. I renounced any
revision or any desire for revision. The Reich has not made any
demands which would in any way be likely to be considered in
Belgium as a threat.”
My Lord, there is a similar assurance to the Netherlands—the next part
of the document:
“The new Reich has endeavored to continue the traditional
friendship with the Netherlands. It has not taken over any
existing differences between the two countries and has not
created any new ones.”
I submit it is impossible to overemphasize the importance of those
assurances of Germany’s good faith.
My Lord, the value of that good faith is shown by the next document
which is of the very next day, the 7th of October. Those two guarantees
were the 6th of October. Now we come to Document 2329-PS dated the 7th
of October. It is from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Von
Brauchitsch, and it is addressed to his Army groups. He said, third
paragraph:
“The Dutch border between Ems and Rhine is to be observed only.
“At the same time Army Group B has to make all preparations
according to special orders for immediate invasion of Dutch and
Belgian territory if the political situation so demands.”
“If the political situation so demands”—the day after the guarantee!
It is quite clear from the next document. I put in the last document;
that bears an original typewritten signature of Von Brauchitsch, and it
will be Exhibit GB-105.
My Lord, the next document is in two parts. Both are numbered C-62. The
first part is dated the 9th of October 1939, 2 days after the document I
have read. My Lord, that was all read by the Attorney General in opening
down to the bottom of Paragraph (b). Therefore, I won’t read it again.
May I remind the Tribunal just of one sentence.
“Preparations should be made for offensive action on the
northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of
Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands. This attack must be
carried out as soon and as forcefully as possible.”
In the next paragraph, may I just read six words:
“The object of this attack is . . . to acquire as great an area
of Holland, Belgium, and northern France as possible.”
That document is signed by Hitler himself. It is addressed to the three
accused: The Supreme Commander of the Army, Keitel; Navy, Raeder; and
Air Minister, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Göring. That appears
from the distribution.
I will hold that document over and will put that other one in with it.
My Lord, the next document is the 15th of October 1939. It is from the
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. It is signed by Keitel in what is
to some of us his familiar red pencil signature, and it is again
addressed to Raeder and Göring and to the General Staff of the Army.
Now that also has been read by the Attorney General; may I just remind
the Tribunal that at the bottom of the page:
“It must be the object of the Army’s preparations to occupy—on
receipt of a special order—the territory of Holland in the
first instance as far as the Grebbe-Maas”—or Meuse—“line”.
The second paragraph deals with taking possession of the West Frisian
Islands.
It is clear, in my submission, beyond discussion that from that moment
the decision to violate the neutrality of these three countries had been
made. All that remained was to work out the details, to wait until the
weather became favorable, and in the meantime, to give no hint that
Germany’s word was about to be broken again. Otherwise these small
countries might have had some chance of combining among themselves and
with their neighbors.
It will be Exhibit GB-106.
Well, the next document is a Keitel directive. It is Document 440-PS
(Exhibit GB-107). It, again, is sent to the Supreme Command of the Army,
the Navy, and the Air Force; and it gives details of how the attack is
to be carried out. I want to read only a very few selected passages.
Paragraph 2 on the first page:
“Contrary to previously issued instructions, all action intended
against Holland may be carried out without a special order when
the general attack will start.
“The attitude of the Dutch Armed Forces cannot be anticipated
ahead of time.”
And then may I comment here: Would Your Lordship note this as a German
concession?
“Wherever there is no resistance the entry should carry the
character of a peaceful occupation.”
Then Paragraph (b) of the next paragraph:
“At first the Dutch area including the West Frisian Islands
. . . is to be occupied up to the Grebbe-Maas line.”
The next two paragraphs, I need not read them, deal with action against
the Belgian harbor; and in Paragraph 5):
“The 7th Airborne Division”—they were parachutists—“will be
committed for the airborne operation after the possession of
bridges across the Albert Canal”—which is in Belgium as the
Court knows—“is assured.”
And then in Paragraph 6) (b) Luxembourg is mentioned. It is mentioned in
Paragraph 5) as well. The signature is “Keitel,” but that is typed. It
is authenticated by a staff officer.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that document in?
MR. ROBERTS: GB-107, My Lord.
Then the next document is C-10 (Exhibit GB-108) and it is dated the 28th
of November 1939. That is a signature of Keitel in his red pencil and it
is addressed to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. It deals with the fact
that if a quick break-through should fail north of Liége—I think, My
Lord, only machinery for carrying out the attack.
Paragraph 2) shows clearly that the Netherlands is to be violated. It
speaks of “the occupation of Walcheren Island and thereby Flushing,” and
the “taking of one or more of the Meuse crossings between Namur and
Dinant.”
That will be 108.
My Lord, the documents show that from November until March of 1940 the
High Command and the Führer were waiting for favorable weather before
A-Day, as they called it. That was the attack on Luxembourg, Belgium,
and the Netherlands.
My Lord, the next document, C-72, consists of 18 documents which range
in date from the 7th of November until the 9th of May 1940. They are
certified photostats I put in and they are all signed either by Keitel
personally or by Jodl personally, and I don’t think it is necessary for
me to read them. The Defense, I think, have all had copies of them, but
they show that successively A-Day is being postponed for about a week,
having regard to the weather reports. That will be Exhibit GB-109.
My Lord, on the 10th of January 1940, as the Attorney General informed
the Tribunal, a German airplane made a forced landing in Belgium. The
occupants endeavored to burn the orders of which they were in
possession, but they were only partially successful. And the next
document I offer is Document TC-58 (a); it will be Exhibit GB-110. The
original is a photostat certified by the Belgian Government which, of
course, came into possession of the original.
My Lord, I can summarize it. They are orders to the Commander of the 2d
Air Force Fleet (Luftflotte) clearly for offensive action against
France, Holland, and Belgium. One looks at the bottom of the first page.
It deals with the disposition of the Belgian Army. The Belgian Army
covers the Liége-Antwerp Line with its main force, its lighter forces in
front of the Meuse-Schelde Canal. Then it deals with the disposition of
the Dutch Army; and then if you turn over the page Number 3, you see
that the German western army directs its attack between the North Sea
and the Moselle with the strongest possible airforce support through the
Belgian-Luxembourg region.
My Lord, I think I need read no more. The rest are operational details
as to the bombing of the various targets in Belgium and in Holland.
My Lord, the next document I think is rather out of place for my
purpose. My learned friend, Major Elwyn Jones, put in Jodl’s diary,
which is GB-88, and I desire to refer very, very briefly to some
extracts which are printed first in bundle Number 4.
If one looks at the entry for the 1st of February 1940 and then some
lines down . . .
THE PRESIDENT: 1809-PS?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, that’s right, My Lord, and GB-88.
THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t got the GB numbers on the documents.
MR. ROBERTS: I am sorry, My Lord, it’s my mistake.
If Your Lordship will look about eight lines down it says, “1700 hours
General Jeschonnek”—and then:
“1) Behavior of parachute units. In front of The Hague they have
to be strong enough to break in if necessary by sheer brute
force. The 7th Division intends to drop units near the town.
“2) Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent
action against the Dutch Air Force.”
My Lord, I think the rest I need not read; it is operational detail.
“2d February”—I refer again to Jodl’s entry under “a” as to “landings
can be made in the center of The Hague.”
If Your Lordship will turn over the page—I omit February the 5th—you
come to 26th February:
“Führer raises the question whether it is better to undertake
the Weser Exercise before or after Case Yellow.”
And then on the 3rd of March, the last sentence:
“Führer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before Case Yellow
with a few days’ interval.”
And then My Lord, there is an entry to which I desire to call Your
Lordship’s attention, on May the 8th, that is, 2 days before the
invasion—the top of the page:
“Alarming news from Holland, cancelling of furloughs,
evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures. According
to reports of the intelligence service the British have asked
for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused.”
My Lord, may I make two short comments on that? The first is that the
Germans are rather objecting because the Dutch are actually making some
preparations to resist their invasion: “Alarming news” as they wrote.
The second point is that Jodl is there recording that the Dutch
according to their intelligence reports are still adhering properly to
their neutrality. But I need not read any more of the diary extracts.
My Lord, that is the story except for the documents which were presented
to Holland and to Belgium and to Luxembourg after the invasion was a
_fait accompli_, because as history now knows at 4:30 a.m. on the 10th
of May these three small countries were violently invaded with all the
fury of modern warfare. No warning was given to them by Germany and no
complaint was made by Germany of any breaches of any neutrality before
this action was taken.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this will be a convenient place to break off
until 2 o’clock.
MR. ROBERTS: If Your Lordship pleases.
[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, when the Court adjourned I had
just come to the point at 4:30 a.m. on the 10th of May 1940 when the
Germans invaded these three small countries without any warning—a
violation which, the Prosecution submits, it is clear from the documents
had been planned and decided upon months before.
My Lord, before I close this part of the case, may I refer to three
documents in conclusion. My Lord, the invasion having taken place at
4:30 in the morning in each of the three countries, the German
Ambassadors called upon representatives of the three governments some
hours later and handed in a document which was similar in each case and
which is described as a memorandum or an ultimatum. My Lord, an account
of what happened in Belgium is set out in our Document TC-58, which is
about five documents from the end of the bundle. It is headed, “Extract
from Belgium—The Official Account of What Happened 1939-1940,” and I
hand in an original copy, certified by the Belgian Government, which is
Exhibit GB-111.
My Lord, might I read short extracts? I read the third paragraph:
“From 4:30 a.m. information was received which left no shadow of
doubt: the hour had struck. Aircraft were first reported in the
east. At 5 o’clock came news of the bombing of two Netherlands’
airdromes, the violation of the Belgian frontier, the landing of
German soldiers at the Eben-Emael Fort, the bombing of the
Jemelle station.”
My Lord, then I think I can go to two paragraphs lower down:
“At 8:30 a.m. the German Ambassador came to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. When he entered the Minister’s room, he began
to take a paper from his pocket. M. Spaak”—that is the Belgian
Minister—“stopped him: ‘I beg your pardon, Mr. Ambassador. I
will speak first.’ And in an indignant voice, he read the
Belgian Government’s protest: ‘Mr. Ambassador, the German Army
has just attacked our country. This is the second time in 25
years that Germany has committed a criminal aggression against a
neutral and loyal Belgium. What has just happened is perhaps
even more odious than the aggression of 1914. No ultimatum, no
note, no protest of any kind has ever been placed before the
Belgian Government. It is through the attack itself that Belgium
has learned that Germany has violated the undertakings given by
her on October 13th 1937 and renewed spontaneously at the
beginning of the war. The act of aggression committed by Germany
for which there is no justification whatever will deeply shock
the conscience of the world. The German Reich will be held
responsible by history. Belgium is resolved to defend herself.
Her cause, which is the cause of Right, cannot be vanquished.’”
Then I think I shall omit the next paragraph: “The Ambassador read the
note . . . .” And in the last paragraph:
“In the middle of this communication M. Spaak, who had by his
side the Secretary-General, interrupted the Ambassador: ‘Hand me
the document,’ he said. ‘I should like to spare you so painful a
task.’ After studying the note, M. Spaak confined himself to
pointing out that he had already replied by the protest he had
just made.”
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like you to read what the Ambassador
read.
MR. ROBERTS: I am sorry. I was thinking of the next document I was going
to read. I read the last paragraph on the first page:
“The Ambassador was then able to read the note he had brought:
“‘I am instructed by the Government of the Reich,’ he said, ‘to
make the following declaration:
“‘In order to forestall the invasion of Belgium, Holland, and
Luxembourg, for which Great Britain and France have been making
preparations clearly aimed at Germany, the Government of the
Reich are compelled to ensure the neutrality of the three
countries mentioned by means of arms. For this purpose the
Government of the Reich will bring up an armed force of the
greatest size so that resistance of any kind will be useless.
The Government of the Reich guarantee Belgium’s European and
colonial territory as well as her dynasty on condition that no
resistance is offered. Should there be any resistance, Belgium
will risk the destruction of her country and the loss of her
independence. It is, therefore, in the interests of Belgium that
the population be called upon to cease all resistance and that
the authorities be given the necessary instructions to make
contact with the German Military Command.’”
My Lord, the so-called ultimatum handed in some hours after the invasion
had started is Document TC-57, which is the last document but three in
the bundle. It is the document I handed in and it becomes Exhibit
GB-112. My Lord, it is a long document and I will read to the Tribunal
such parts as the Tribunal thinks advisable:
“The Reich Government”—it begins—“have for a long time had no
doubts as to what was the chief aim of British and French war
policy. It consists of the spreading of the war to other
countries and of the misuse of their peoples as auxiliary and
mercenary troops for England and France.
“The last attempt of this sort was the plan to occupy
Scandinavia with the help of Norway, in order to set up a new
front against Germany in this region. It was only Germany’s last
minute action which upset this project. Germany has furnished
documentary evidence of this before the eyes of the world.
“Immediately after the British-French action in Scandinavia
miscarried, England and France took up their policy of war
expansion in another direction. In this respect, while the
retreat . . . from Norway was still going on, the English Prime
Minister announced that, as a result of the altered situation in
Scandinavia, England was once more in a position to go ahead
with the transfer of the full weight of her Navy to the
Mediterranean, and that English and French units were already on
the way to Alexandria. The Mediterranean now became the center
of English-French war propaganda. This was partly to gloss over
the Scandinavian defeat and the big loss of prestige before
their own people and before the world, and partly to make it
appear that the Balkans had been chosen for the next theater of
war against Germany.
“In reality, however, this apparent shifting to the
Mediterranean of English-French war policy had quite another
purpose. It was nothing but a diversion maneuver in grand style
to deceive Germany as to the direction of the next
English-French attack. For, as the Reich Government have long
been aware, the true aim of England and France is the carefully
prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the
West, so as to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region
of the Ruhr.
“Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of
Belgium and Holland, it being, of course, understood that these
two countries in the event of a war of Germany against England
and France would maintain the strictest neutrality.
“Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition.”
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, do you think it is necessary to read this in
full?
MR. ROBERTS: No, I don’t. I was going to summarize these charges. If
your Lordship would be good enough to look at the bottom of the first
page, you will see the so-called ultimatum complaining of the hostile
expressions in the Belgian and Netherlands press; and then, My Lord, in
the second paragraph over the page there is an allegation of the
attempts of the British Intelligence to bring a revolution in Germany
with the assistance of Belgium and the Netherlands.
Then, My Lord, in Paragraph 3 reference is made to military preparation
of the two countries; and in Paragraph 4 it is pointed out that Belgium
has fortified the Belgian-German frontier.
A complaint is made in regard to Holland in Paragraph 5 that British
aircraft have flown over the Netherlands’ country.
There are, My Lord, other charges made against the neutrality of these
two countries although no instances are given. I don’t think I need
refer to anything on Page 3 of the document.
Page 4, My Lord—I would like, if I might, to read the middle paragraph:
“In this struggle for existence, forced upon the German people
by England and France, the Reich Government are not disposed to
await submissively the attack by England and France and to allow
them to carry the war over Belgium and the other Netherlands
into German territory.”
And, My Lord, I just emphasize this sentence and then I read no further:
“They have, therefore, now issued the command to German troops
to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all the military
means at the disposal of the Reich.”
My Lord, it is unnecessary, in my submission, to emphasize the falsity
of that statement. The world now knows that for months preparations had
been made to violate the neutrality of these three countries. This
document is saying the orders to do so have now been issued.
My Lord, a similar document, similar in terms altogether was handed to
the representatives of the Netherlands Government; My Lord, TC-60—that
will be GB-113, which is the last document but one in the bundle. My
Lord, that is a memorandum to the Luxembourg Government, which enclosed
with it a copy of the document handed to the Governments of Belgium and
the Netherlands.
My Lord, I only desire to emphasize the second paragraph of TC-60:
“In defense against the imminent attack the German troops have
now received the order to safeguard the neutrality of these two
countries . . . .”
My Lord, the last document, TC-59, which I formerly put in, that is
GB-111.
My Lord, that is the dignified protest of the Belgian Government against
the crime which was committed against her. My Lord, those are the facts
supporting the charges of the violation of treaties and assurances
against these three countries and supporting the allegation of the
making of an aggressive war against them. My Lord, in the respectful
submission of the Prosecution here the story is a very plain, a very
simple one, a story of perfidy, dishonor, and shame.
COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it
please the Tribunal, it is my task to present the evidence on the wars
of aggression and wars in breach of treaties against Greece and
Yugoslavia. The evidence which I shall put in to the Tribunal has been
prepared in collaboration with my American colleague, Lieutenant Colonel
Krucker.
The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia by the Germans, which took place
in the early hours of the morning of the 6th of April 1941, constituted
direct breaches of the Hague Convention of 1899 on the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of
1928. Those breaches are charged, respectively, at Paragraphs I and XIII
of Appendix C of the Indictment. Both have already been put in by my
learned friend, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, who also explained the
obligation of the German Government to the Governments of Yugoslavia and
Greece under those pacts.
In the case of Yugoslavia the invasion further constituted a breach of
an express assurance by the Nazis, which is charged at Paragraph XXVI of
Appendix C. This assurance was originally given in a German Foreign
Office release made in Berlin on the 28th of April 1938 but was
subsequently repeated by Hitler himself on the 6th of October 1939 in a
speech he made in the Reichstag, and it is in respect of this last
occasion that the assurance is specifically pleaded in the Indictment.
May I ask the Tribunal to turn now to the first document in the document
book, which is Book Number 5. The first document is 2719-PS, which is
part of the document which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-58.
This is the text of the German Foreign Office release on the 28th of
April 1938, and I would read the beginning and then the last paragraph
but one on the page:
“Berlin, the 28th of April 1938. The State Secretary of the
German Foreign Office to the German Diplomatic Representatives.
“As a consequence of the reunion of Austria with the Reich we
have now new frontiers with Italy, Yugoslavia, Switzerland,
Liechtenstein and Hungary. These frontiers are regarded by us as
final and inviolable. On this point the following special
declarations have been made . . . .”
And then to the last paragraph:
“3. Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government have been informed by
authoritative German quarters that German policy has no aims
beyond Austria, and that the Yugoslav frontier would in any case
remain untouched. In his speech made at Graz on the 3rd of April
of that year the Führer and Chancellor stated that in regard to
the reunion of Austria, Yugoslavia and Hungary had adopted the
same attitude as Italy. We were happy to have frontiers there
which relieved us of all anxiety about providing military
protection for them.”
Then, if I may, I will pass to the second document in the book, TC-92,
and offer that as Exhibit GB-114. This is an extract from a speech made
by Hitler on the occasion of the dinner in honor of the Prince Regent of
Yugoslavia on June 1, 1939. I will read the extract in full:
“The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a
spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst of
the tragic confusion of the World War. The German soldier then
learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave opponent.
I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual
respect finds confirmation in common political, cultural, and
economic interests. We therefore look upon your Royal Highness’
present visit as a living proof of the accuracy of our view, and
at the same time, on that account we derive from it the hope
that German-Yugoslav friendship may continue further to develop
in the future and to grow ever closer.
“In the presence of your Royal Highness, however, we also
perceive a happy opportunity for a frank and friendly exchange
of views which—and of this I am convinced—in this sense can
only be fruitful to our two peoples and States. I believe this
all the more because a firmly established reliable relationship
of Germany and Yugoslavia, now that owing to historical events
we have become neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all
time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two
peoples and countries but can also represent an element of calm
to our nerve-racked continent. This peace is the goal of all who
are disposed to perform really constructive work.”
As we now know this speech was made at the time when Hitler had already
decided upon the European war. I think I am right in saying it was a
week after the Reich Chancellery conference, known as the Schmundt note,
to which the Tribunal has been referred more than once. The reference to
“nerve-racked continent” might perhaps be attributed to the war of
nerves which Hitler had himself been conducting for many months.
Now I pass to a document which is specifically pleaded at Paragraph XXVI
as the assurance breached; it is the next document in the bundle,
TC-43—German assurance to Yugoslavia of the 6th of October 1939. It is
part of the document which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-80.
This is an extract from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_:
“Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed
Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country would
also be an unalterable one and that we only desire to live in
peace and friendship with her.”
Despite the obligation of Germany under the Convention of 1899 and the
Kellogg-Briand Pact and under the assurances which I have read, the fate
of both Greece and Yugoslavia had, as we now know, been sealed ever
since the meeting between Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop and Ciano
at Obersalzberg, on the 12th and 13th of August 1939.
We will pass to the next document in the bundle, which is TC-77. That
document has already been put in as GB-48; and the passages to which I
would draw Your Lordship’s attention already have been quoted, I think,
by my learned friend, the Attorney General. Those passages are on Page 2
in the last paragraph from “Generally speaking . . .” until “. . .
neutral of this kind,” and then again on Pages 7 and 8, the part quoted
by the Attorney General and emphasized particularly by Colonel
Griffith-Jones at the foot of Page 7 on the second day of the meeting,
the words beginning “In general, however, success by one of the Axis
partners . . .” to “. . . Italy and Germany would have their backs free
for work against the West.”
Both of those passages have been quoted before; and if I might sum up
the effect of the meeting as revealed by the document as a whole, it
shows Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop, only 2 months after the
dinner to the Prince Regent, seeking to persuade the Italians to make
war on Yugoslavia at the same time that Germany commences hostilities
against Poland, as Hitler had decided to do in the very near future.
Ciano, while evidently in entire agreement with Hitler and Ribbentrop as
to the desirability of liquidating Yugoslavia and himself anxious to
secure Salonika, stated that Italy was not yet ready for a general
European war.
Despite all the persuasion which Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop
exerted at the meeting, it became necessary for the Nazi conspirators to
reassure their intended victim, Yugoslavia, since in fact Italy
maintained her position and did not enter the war when the Germans
invaded Poland, while the Germans themselves were not yet ready to
strike in the Balkans. It was just for this reason that on the 6th of
October through Hitler’s speech they repeated the assurance they had
given in April 1938. It is, of course, a matter of history that after
the defeat of the Allied armies in May and June 1940 the Italian
Government declared war on France and that subsequently at 3 o’clock in
the morning of the 28th October 1940 the Italian Minister at Athens
presented the Greek Government with a 3 hours’ ultimatum upon the expiry
of which Italian troops were already invading the soil of Greece.
If I may quote to the Tribunal the words in which His Majesty’s Minister
reported that event, “The President of the Council has assured himself
an outstanding . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: You have referred to a document?
COL. PHILLIMORE: It is not in any of my documents. It is merely carrying
the story to the next document:
“The President of the Council has assured himself an outstanding
place in Greek history, and whatever the future may bring, his
foresight in quietly preparing his country for war, and his
courage in resisting without demur the Italian ultimatum when
delivered in the small hours of that October morning will surely
obtain an honorable mention in the story of European statecraft.
He means to fight until Italy is completely defeated, and this
reflects the purpose of the whole Greek nation.”
I turn now to the next document in the bundle. That is 2762-PS, a letter
from Hitler to Mussolini, which I put in as GB-115. Although not dated,
I think it is clear from the contents that it was written shortly after
the Italian invasion of Greece. It has been quoted in full by the
Attorney General, but I think it would assist the Tribunal if I read
just the last two paragraphs of the extract:
“Yugoslavia must become disinterested if possible, however, from
our point of view interested in co-operating in the liquidation
of the Greek question. Without assurances from Yugoslavia, it is
useless to risk any successful operation in the Balkans.
“Unfortunately I must stress the fact that waging a war in the
Balkans before March is impossible. Therefore any threatening
move towards Yugoslavia would be useless since the impossibility
of a materialization of such threats before March is well known
to the Serbian General Staff. Therefore Yugoslavia must, if at
all possible, be won over by other means and other ways.”
You may think the reference in the first two lines to his
thoughts—having been with Mussolini for the last 14 days—probably
indicates that it was written in about the middle of November, shortly
after the Italian attack.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you give us the date of the Italian attack?
COL. PHILLIMORE: 28th October 1940.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
COL. PHILLIMORE: As the Tribunal will see from the succeeding document,
it was at this time that Hitler was making his plans for the offensive
in the spring of 1941, which included the invasion of Greece from the
north. This letter shows that it was an integral part of those plans
that Yugoslavia should be induced to co-operate in them or at least to
maintain a disinterested attitude toward the liquidation of the other
Balkan states.
I pass now to the next document in the bundle, 444-PS, which becomes
Exhibit GB-116. It is a top-secret directive issued from the Führer’s
headquarters, signed by Hitler, initialed by the Defendant Jodl, and
dated the 12th of November 1940. I will read the first two lines and
then pass to Paragraph 4 on the third page:
“Directive Number 18. The preparatory measures of Supreme
Headquarters for the prosecution of the war in the near future
are to be made along the following lines . . .”
Omitting the serious dealings with operations against Gibraltar and an
offensive against Egypt, I will read Paragraph 4 on the third page:
“Balkans . . . The Commander-in-Chief of the Army will make
preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the
Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus
make possible the use of German Air Force units against targets
in the eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those
English air bases which are threatening the Romanian oil area.
“In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep
Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate
strength of 10 divisions is to be the basis for the planning and
the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count
on the railway leading through Yugoslavia for moving these
forces into position.
“So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment,
preparations will be made for an early increase in the German
Army mission in Romania, the extent of which must be submitted
to me.
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force will make preparations
for the use of German Air Force units in the southeast Balkans
and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria
in accordance with the intended ground operations.”
I don’t think I need trouble the Tribunal with the rest. The next
document in the bundle, 1541-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit
GB-117, is the directive issued for the actual attack on Greece. Before
reading it, it might be convenient if I summarized the position of the
Italian invading forces at that time as this is one of the factors
mentioned by Hitler in the directive. I can put it very shortly. I again
use the words in which His Majesty’s Minister reported:
“The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of the
highest, and our own naval and land successes at Taranto and in
the western desert have done much to maintain it.
“With relatively poor armaments and the minimum of equipment and
modern facilities they have driven back or captured superior
Italian forces more frequently than not at the point of the
bayonet. The modern Greeks have thus shown that they are not
unworthy of the ancient traditions of their country and that
they, like their distant forefathers, are prepared to fight
against odds to maintain their freedom.”
In fact the Italians were getting the worst of it, and it was time that
Hitler came to the rescue. Accordingly this directive was issued on 13
December 1940; it is top-secret Directive Number 20 for the Operation
Marita. The distribution included, of course, the Commander of the Navy,
that would, of course, be the Defendant Raeder; one to the Commander of
the Air Force, which would be the Defendant Göring; one to the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; and one to the Command Staff, which
I take it, would be the Defendant Jodl. I shall read the first two
paragraphs and then summarize the next two, if I may:
“The result in the battles of Albania is not yet decisive.
Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly
necessary that the British endeavor to create air bases under
the protection of a Balkan front—which would be dangerous above
all to Italy as well as to the Romanian oil fields—be foiled.
“My plan, therefore, is (a) to form a slowly increasing task
force in southern Romania within the next months (b) after the
setting in of favorable weather—probably in March—to send this
task force for the occupation of the Aegean north coast by way
of Bulgaria and, if necessary, to occupy the entire Greek
mainland (Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be
expected.”
The next paragraph gives the forces for the operation, and Paragraph 4
deals with the Operation Marita itself. Paragraph 5 states:
“The military preparations which will produce exceptional
political results in the Balkans demand the exact control of all
the necessary measures by the High Command. The transport
through Hungary and the arrival in Romania will be reported step
by step by the High Command of the Armed Forces and are to be
explained at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission
in Romania. Consultations with the Romanians or the Bulgarians
which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the
Italians are each subject to my consent, also the sending of
scouting missions and advanced parties.”
I think I need not trouble the Tribunal with the rest. The next
document, 448-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-118, is again a
top-secret directive carrying the plan a little further; it deals with
decidedly different aspects, the direct support of the Italian forces in
Albania. I read, if I may, the first short paragraph and then the
paragraph at the foot of the page.
“The situation in the Mediterranean theater of operations
demands German assistance for strategical, political, and
psychological reasons due to employment of superior forces by
England against our allies.”
And in Paragraph 3 after dealing with the forces to be transferred to
Albania the directive sets out what the duties of the German forces will
be:
“a) To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an
emergency case should new crises arise there.
“b) To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later
attacking with the aim:
“To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a
far-reaching operation.
“To open up the straits west of Salonika from the back in order
to support thereby the frontal attack of List’s army.”
That directive was signed by Hitler and, as can be seen on the original
which I have put in, it was initialed by both the Defendant Keitel and
the Defendant Jodl. Here again, of course, a copy went to the Defendant
Raeder, and I take it that the copy sent to foreign intelligence would
probably reach the Defendant Ribbentrop.
I pass to C-134, the next document in the bundle, which becomes Exhibit
GB-119. This records a conference which took place on the 19th and 20th
of January between the Defendant Keitel and the Italian General Guzzoni
and which was followed by a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini at
which the Defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel, and Jodl were present.
I need not trouble the Tribunal with the meeting with the Italians, but
if you would pass to Page 3 of the document, there is a paragraph there
in the speech, which the Führer made, which is perhaps just worth
reading—the speech by the Führer on the 20th of January 1941, in the
middle of Page 3. It sets out that the speech was made after the
conference with the Italians and then shows who was present.
On the German side I would call your attention to the presence of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces, and the Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff. That
is, of course, the Defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel and Jodl; and on the
Italian side, the Duce, Ciano, and then three generals. It is the last
paragraph that I would wish to read:
“The massing of troops in Romania serves a threefold purpose:
“a. An operation against Greece;
“b. Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey;
“c. Safeguarding the guarantee to Romania.
“Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces;
altogether, therefore, very strong forces whose deployment far
from our base requires a long time.
“Desirable that this deployment is completed without
interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late
as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the
last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest
possible moment.”
I pass to the next document, 1746-PS, which I offer as GB-120. That
document is in three parts. It consists, in the first place, of a
conference between Field Marshal List and the Bulgarians on the 8th of
February. The second part and the third part deal with later events, and
I will, if I may, come back to them at an appropriate time. I would read
the first and the last paragraphs on the first page of this document:
“Minutes of questions discussed between the representatives of
the Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German High
Command—General Field Marshal List—in connection with the
possible movement of German troops through Bulgaria and their
commitment against Greece and possibly against Turkey, if she
should involve herself in the war.”
And then the last paragraph on the page shows the plan being concerted
with the Bulgarians—Paragraph 3:
“The Bulgarian and the German General Staffs will take all
measures in order to camouflage the preparation of the
operations and to assure in this way the most favorable
conditions for the execution of the German operations as
planned.
“The representatives of the two general staffs consider it
suitable to inform their governments that it will be advisable
of necessity to take secrecy and surprise into consideration
when the Three Power Treaty is signed by Bulgaria, in order to
assure the success of the military operations.”
I pass then to the next document, C-59. I offer that as Exhibit GB-121.
It is a further top-secret directive of the 19th of February. I need
not, I think, read it. All that is set out of importance is the date for
the Operation Marita. It sets out that the bridge across the Danube is
to be begun on the 28th of February, the river crossed on the 2d of
March, and the final orders to be issued on the 26th of February at the
latest.
It is perhaps worth noting that on the original which I have put in, the
actual dates are filled in in the handwriting of the Defendant Keitel.
It is perhaps just worth setting out the position of Bulgaria at this
moment. Bulgaria adhered to the Three Power Pact on the 1st of March
. . .
THE PRESIDENT: What year?
COL. PHILLIMORE: In 1941, and on the same day the entry of German troops
into Bulgaria began in accordance with the Plan Marita and the
directives to which I have referred the Tribunal.
The landing of British troops in Greece on the 3rd of March in
accordance with the guarantee given in the spring of 1939 by His
Majesty’s Government may have accelerated the movement of the German
forces; but, as the Tribunal will have seen, the invasion of Greece had
been planned long beforehand and was already in progress at this time.
I pass now to the next document in the bundle, C-167, which I put in as
GB-122. I am afraid it is not a very satisfactory copy, but the original
which I have put in shows that both the Defendants Keitel and Jodl were
present at the interview with Hitler which this extract records. It is a
short extract from a report by the Defendant Raeder on an interview with
Hitler in the presence of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl. It is perhaps
interesting as showing the ruthless nature of the German intention.
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy asks for confirmation that
the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event
of a peaceful settlement.
“Führer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any
settlement.”
The above document . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is it dated?
COL. PHILLIMORE: It took place on the 18th of March at 1600 hours.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that on the original document?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, on the original document.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The document I have referred to shows, it is submitted,
that the Nazi conspirators in accordance with their principle of
liquidating any neutral who did not remain disinterested had made every
preparation by the end of January and were at this date in the process
of moving the necessary troops to ensure the final liquidation of
Greece, which was already at war with and getting the better of their
Italian allies.
They were not, however, yet ready to deal with Yugoslavia towards which
their policy accordingly remained one of lulling the unsuspecting
victim. On the 25th of March 1941 in accordance with this policy, the
adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three Power Pact was secured. This
adherence followed a visit on the 15th of February 1941 by the Yugoslav
Premier Cvetković and the Foreign Minister Cinkar-Markovic to the
Defendant Ribbentrop at Salzburg and subsequently to Hitler at
Berchtesgaden, after which these ministers were induced to sign the Pact
at Vienna on the 25th of March. On this occasion the Defendant
Ribbentrop wrote the two letters of assurance, which are set out in the
next document in the bundle, 2450-PS, which I put in as GB-123. If I
might read from half-way down the page:
“Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade.
“At the same time when the protocol on the entry of Yugoslavia
to the Tri-Partite Pact was signed, the Governments of the Axis
Powers sent to the Yugoslavian Government the following
identical notes:
“‘Mr. Prime Minister:
“‘In the name of the German Government and at their behest I
have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following:
“‘On the occasion of the Yugoslavian entry today into the
Tri-Partite Pact the German Government confirm their
determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.’”
That letter was signed by the Defendant Ribbentrop, who you will
remember, was present at the meeting in August of 1939 when he and
Hitler tried to persuade the Italians to invade Yugoslavia. In fact it
was 11 days after this letter was written that the Germans did invade
Yugoslavia and 2 days after the letter was written that they issued the
necessary order.
If I might read the second letter:
“Mr. Prime Minister:
“With reference to the conversations that occurred in connection
with the entry of Yugoslavia into the Tri-Partite Pact, I have
the honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the name of
the Reich Cabinet”—Reichsregierung—“that in the agreement
between the Axis Powers and the Royal Yugoslavian Government the
Governments of the Axis Powers during this war will not direct a
demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of
troops through Yugoslavian national territory.”
The position at this stage, the 25th of March 1941, was therefore, that
German troops were already in Bulgaria moving towards the Greek
frontier, while Yugoslavia had, to use Hitler’s own term in his letter
to Mussolini, “become disinterested” in the cleaning-up of the Greek
question.
The importance of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three Power Pact
appears very clearly from the next document in the bundle, 2765-PS,
which I put in as GB-124. It is an extract from the minutes of a meeting
between Hitler and Ciano, and if I might just read the first paragraph:
“The Führer first expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia’s
joining the Tri-Partite Pact and the resulting definition of her
position. This is of special importance in view of the proposed
military action against Greece, for if one considers that for
350 to 400 kilometers the important line of communication
through Bulgaria runs within 20 kilometers of the Yugoslav
border, one can judge that with a dubious attitude of Yugoslavia
an undertaking against Greece would have been militarily an
extremely foolhardy venture.”
Again it is a matter of history that on the night of the 26th of March,
when the two Yugoslav Ministers returned to Belgrade, General Simovic
and his colleagues effected their removal by a _coup d’état_; and
Yugoslavia emerged on the morning of the 27th of March ready to defend,
if need be, her independence. The Yugoslav people had found themselves.
The Nazis reacted to this altered situation with lightning rapidity, and
the immediate liquidation of Yugoslavia was decided on.
I ask the Tribunal to turn back to 1746-PS, which I put in as GB-120, to
the second part on Page 3 of the document consisting of a record of a
conference of Hitler and the German High Command on the situation in
Yugoslavia dated 27th of March 1941.
It shows that those present included the Führer; the Reich Marshal, that
is of course, the Defendant Göring; Chief, OKW, that is the Defendant
Keitel; Chief of the Wehrmacht Führungsstab, that is the Defendant Jodl.
Then over the page—“later on the following persons were added.” I call
the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that those who came in later
included the Defendant Ribbentrop.
If I might read the part of Hitler’s statement set out on Page 4:
“The Führer describes Yugoslavia’s situation after the _coup
d’état_. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in
regard to the coming Marita action and even more in regard to
the Barbarossa undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were
never pro-Germans.”
I think I can pass on to the second paragraph:
“The present moment is for political and military reasons
favorable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the
country and the country’s attitude towards us. For if the
overthrow of the government would have happened during the
Barbarossa action, the consequences for us probably would have
been considerably more serious.”
And then the next paragraph to which I would particularly draw the
Tribunal’s attention:
“The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty
declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in
order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit.
No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented.
Assurances of the Yugoslav Government which cannot be trusted
anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will
start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready.
“It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible.
An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate
in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia
is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of
Bulgaria too. Romania’s main task is the protection against
Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian Ministers have already
been notified. During the day a message will still be addressed
to the Duce.
“Politically it is especially important that the blow against
Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the
military destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking. In
this way Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the
campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a
favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to
our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment
(autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against
Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary, and
Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to
these states; the Adriatic coast for Italy, the Banat for
Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.
“This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all
preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav
collapse will take place within the shortest time.”
Well, of course, the Tribunal will have noted that in that third
paragraph—2 days after the pact had been signed and the assurances
given—because there has been a _coup d’état_ and it is just possible
that the operations against Greece may be affected, the destruction of
Yugoslavia is decided upon without any question of taking the trouble to
ascertain the views of the new government.
Then there is one short passage on Page 5, the next page of the
document, which I would like to read:
“5) The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as
possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force
ground installations and to destroy the capital Belgrade in
attacks by waves . . . .”
I pause there to comment; we now know, of course, how ruthlessly this
bombing was done when the residential areas of Belgrade were bombed at 7
o’clock on the following Sunday morning, the morning of the 6th.
THE PRESIDENT: The 6th of April?
COL. PHILLIMORE: The 6th of April.
Then again still in the same document, the last part of it, Part V at
Page 5; a tentative plan is set out, drawn up by the Defendant Jodl and
I would read one small paragraph at the top of the following page, Page
6:
“In the event that the political development requires an armed
intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to
attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to
destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national
territory.”
I read that because the plan is issued from the office of the Defendant
Jodl.
Now passing to the next document in the bundle, C-127, I put that in as
Exhibit GB-125. It is an extract from the order issued after the meeting
from the minutes of which I have just read, that is the meeting of the
27th of March recorded in 1746-PS, Part II. It is worth reading the
first paragraph:
“The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political
situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, in spite of her
protestations of loyalty, for the time being be considered as an
enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible.”
I pass to the next document, 1835-PS, which I put in evidence as GB-126.
It is an original telegram containing a letter from Hitler to Mussolini
forwarded through the German Ambassador in Rome by Hitler and the
Defendant Ribbentrop. It is written to advise Mussolini of the course
decided on and under the guise of somewhat fulsome language the Duce is
given his orders. If I might read the first five paragraphs:
“Duce, events force me to give you, Duce, by this the quickest
means, my estimation of the situation and the consequences which
may result from it.
“(1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as the most
dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from
the purely military point of view, German intervention in the
war in Thrace would not be at all justified as long as the
attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous, and she could threaten
the left flank of the advancing columns on our enormous front.
“(2) For this reason I have done everything and honestly have
endeavored to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together
by mutual interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet
with success, or they were begun too late to produce any
definite result. Today’s reports leave no doubt as to the
imminent turn in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia.
“(3) I do not consider this situation as being catastrophic, but
nevertheless a difficult one, and we on our part must avoid any
mistake if we do not want in the end to endanger our whole
position.
“(4) Therefore I have already arranged for all necessary
measures in order to meet a critical development with necessary
military means. The change in the deployment of our troops has
been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request
you, Duce, not to undertake any further operations in Albania in
the course of the next few days. I consider it necessary that
you should cover and screen the most important passes from
Yugoslavia into Albania with all available forces.
“These measures should not be considered as designed for a long
period of time, but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent
for at least 14 days to 3 weeks a crisis arising.
“I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce
your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available
means and with utmost speed.
“(5) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which
we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only
personalities who necessarily must be notified know anything
about them. These measures will completely lose their value
should they become known . . . .”
Then he goes on to emphasize further the importance of secrecy.
I pass to R-95; the next document in the bundle, which I put in as
Exhibit GB-127. It was referred to by my learned friend, the Attorney
General. It is an operational order signed by General Von Brauchitsch
which is merely passing to the armies the orders contained in Directive
Number 25, which was the Document C-127, an extract of which I put in as
Exhibit GB-125. I won’t trouble the Tribunal with reading it.
I pass to TC-93, which has already been put in with TC-92 as GB-114. The
invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia took place on this morning, the 6th of
April, on which Hitler issued the proclamation from which this passage
is an extract:
“From the beginning of the struggle it has been England’s
steadfast endeavor to make the Balkans a theater of war. British
diplomacy did, in fact, using the model of the World War,
succeed in first ensnaring Greece by a guarantee offered to her
and then finally in misusing her for Britain’s purposes.
“The documents published today afford”—that refers to the
_German White Book_ which they published of all the documents
leading up to the invasion—“The documents published today
afford a glimpse of a practice which in accordance with very old
British recipes is a constant attempt to induce others to fight
and bleed for British interests.
“In the face of this I have always emphasized that: (1) The
German people have no antagonism to the Greek people but that
(2) we shall never as in the World War tolerate a power
establishing itself on Greek territory with the object, at a
given time, of being able to advance thence from the southeast
into German living space. We have swept the northern flank free
of the English; we are resolved not to tolerate such a threat in
the south.”
Then the paragraph to which I would draw the Tribunal’s particular
attention:
“In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe it has
been my endeavor since the day of my assumption of power above
all to establish a friendly relationship with Yugoslavia. I have
consciously put out of mind everything that once took place
between Germany and Serbia. I have not only offered the Serbian
people the hand of the German people, but in addition have made
efforts as an honest broker to assist in bridging all
difficulties which existed between the Yugoslav State and
various nations allied to Germany.”
One can only think that when he issued that proclamation Hitler must
momentarily have forgotten the meeting with Ciano in August of 1939 and
the meeting with the Defendant Ribbentrop and the others on 27th March a
few days earlier.
I pass to the last document in the bundle. It is a document which has
already been put in, L-172, and it was put in as Exhibit USA-34. It is a
record of a lecture delivered by the Defendant Jodl on 7th November
1943. At Page 4 there is a short passage which sets out his views two
and a half years later on the action taken in April 1941. I refer to
Paragraph 11 on Page 4:
“What was, however, less acceptable was the necessity of
affording our assistance as an ally in the Balkans in
consequence of the ‘extra-turn’ of the Italians against Greece.
The attack which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from
Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all
agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part
which—taking a long view of the matter—would have become
necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on
Greece from the north was not executed merely as an operation in
aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from
gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Romanian oil
area from that country.”
If I might summarize the story:
The invasion of Greece was decided on at least as early as December or
November 1940 and planned for the end of March or the beginning of April
1941. No consideration was at any time given to any obligations under
treaties or conventions which might make such invasion a breach of
international law. Care was taken to conceal the preparations so that
the German forces might have an unsuspecting victim.
In the meanwhile Yugoslavia, although to be liquidated in due course,
was clearly better left for a later stage. Every effort was made to
secure her co-operation for the offensive against Greece or at least to
ensure that she would abstain from any interference.
The _coup d’état_ of General Simovic upset this plan and it was then
decided that irrespective of whether or not his government had any
hostile intentions towards Germany, or even of supporting the Greeks,
Yugoslavia must be liquidated.
It was not worth while to take any steps to ascertain Yugoslavia’s
intentions when it would be so little trouble now that the German troops
were deployed to destroy her militarily and as a national unit.
Accordingly in the early hours of Sunday morning, the 6th of April,
German troops marched into Yugoslavia without warning and into Greece
simultaneously with the formality of handing a note to the Greek
Minister in Berlin informing him that the German forces were entering
Greece to drive out the British. M. Koryzis, the Greek Minister, in
replying to information of the invasion from the German Embassy, replied
that history was repeating itself and that Greece was being attacked by
Germany in the same way as by Italy. Greece returned, he said, the same
reply as in the preceding October.
That concludes the evidence in respect of Greece and Yugoslavia. But as
I have the honor to conclude the British case I would like, if the
Tribunal would allow me, to draw their attention, very shortly indeed,
to one common factor which runs through the whole of this aggression. I
can do it, I think, in 5 minutes.
It is an element in the diplomatic technique of aggression which was
used with singular consistency not only by the Nazis themselves but also
by their Italian friends. Their technique was essentially based upon
securing the maximum advantage from surprise even though only a few
hours of unopposed military advance into the country of the unsuspecting
victim could thus be secured. Thus there was, of course, no declaration
of war in the case of Poland.
The invasion of Norway and of Denmark began in the small hours of the
night of April 8-9 and was well under way as a military operation before
the diplomatic explanations and excuses were presented to the Danish
Foreign Minister at 4:20 a.m. on the morning of the 9th and to the
Norwegian Minister between half past 4 and 5 on that morning.
The invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland began not later than 5
o’clock, in most cases earlier in the small hours of the 10th of May,
while the formal ultimatum delivered in each case with the diplomatic
excuses and explanations was not presented until afterwards.
In the case of Holland the invasion began between 3 and 4 in the
morning. It was not until about 6 when The Hague had already been bombed
that the German Minister asked to see M. Van Kleffens. In the case of
Belgium where the bombing began at 5, the German Minister did not see M.
Spaak until 8.
The invasion of Luxembourg began at 4 and it was at 7 when the German
Minister asked to see M. Beck.
Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o’clock on the morning of the
28th of October in 1940 when his Minister in Athens presented a 3-hour
ultimatum to General Metaxas.
The invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia, as I have said, both began in
the small hours of April 6, 1941. In the case of Yugoslavia no
diplomatic exchange took place even after the event, but a proclamation
was issued by Hitler—a proclamation from which I read an extract—at 5
o’clock that Sunday morning some 2 hours before Belgrade was bombed.
In the case of Greece, once again, it was at 20 minutes past 5 that M.
Koryzis was informed that German troops were entering Greek territory.
The manner in which this long series of aggressions was carried out is
in itself further evidence of the essentially aggressive and treacherous
character of the Nazi regime. Attack without warning at night to secure
an initial advantage and proffer excuses or reasons afterwards. Their
method of procedure is clearly the method of the barbarian, of the state
which has no respect for its own pledged word nor for the rights of any
people but its own.
One is tempted to speculate whether this technique was evolved by the
honest broker himself or by his honest clerk, the Defendant Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you be ready to go on after a short
adjournment? That’s what you were intending to do?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We’ll adjourn for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, before proceeding with the
presentation of the evidence relating to the aggression against the
Soviet Union, I shall take about 15 minutes to offer two further
documents relating to the aggression against Austria.
These two documents are stapled in a supplementary book, supplement to
Document Book N. Both documents are correspondence of the British
Foreign Office. They have been made available to us through the courtesy
of our British colleagues.
First I offer in evidence Document 3045-PS as Exhibit USA-127. This is
in two parts. The first is a letter dated 12 March 1938, from Ambassador
Nevile Henderson at the British Embassy, Berlin, to Lord Halifax. It
reads:
“My Lord:
“With reference to your telegram Number 79 of March 11th, I have
the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a
letter which I addressed to Baron Von Neurath in accordance with
the instructions contained therein and which was delivered on
the same evening.
“The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to Baron Von
Neurath at the same time.”
The enclosure is the note of March 11th from the British Embassy to
Defendant Von Neurath and it reads as follows:
“Dear Reich Minister:
“My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was
delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding, _inter alia_, the
resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the
Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of
the members were to be National Socialists and the readmission
of the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping
order in Vienna.
“I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to
the German Government that if this report is correct His
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom feel bound to
register a protest in the strongest terms against such use of
coercion backed by force against an independent state in order
to create a situation incompatible with its national
independence.
“As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been
informed in London, such action is found to produce the greatest
reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues.”
I now offer Document 3287-PS, as Exhibit Number USA-128. This consists
of a transmittal from the British Embassy, Berlin, to the British
Foreign Office of Defendant Von Neurath’s letter of response dated 12
March 1938. The letter is identified in the document with the letter
“L”.
First the Defendant Von Neurath objected to the fact that the British
Government were undertaking the role of protector of Austria’s
independence. I quote from the second paragraph of his letter:
“In the name of the German Government I must point out here that
the Royal British Government have no right to assume the role of
a protector of Austria’s independence. In the course of
diplomatic consultations on the Austrian question, the German
Government never left any doubt with the Royal British
Government that the formation of relations between Germany and
Austria could not be considered anything but the inner concern
of the German people and that it did not affect a third power.”
Then in response to the assertions regarding Germany’s ultimatum, Von
Neurath set out what he stated to be the true version of events. I quote
the last two long paragraphs of the letter; in the English translation I
start at the bottom of Page 1 of the letter:
“Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced on the
evening of the 9th of March the surprising and arbitrary
resolution decided on by himself to hold an election within a
few days which, under the prevailing circumstances and
especially according to the details provided for the execution
of the election, could and was to have the sole purpose of
oppressing politically the predominant majority of the
population of Austria. As could have been foreseen, this
procedure, being a flagrant violation of the agreement of
Berchtesgaden, led to a very critical point in Austria’s
internal situation. It was only natural that the members of the
then Austrian Cabinet who had not taken part in the decision for
an election protested very strongly against it. Therefore a
crisis of the Cabinet occurred in Vienna which, on the 11th of
March, resulted in the resignation of the former Chancellor and
in the formation of a new Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich
used forceful pressure to bring about this development.
Especially the assertion which was spread later by the former
Chancellor that the German Government had presented the Federal
President with a conditional ultimatum, is a pure invention;
according to the ultimatum he had to appoint a proposed
candidate as Chancellor and to form a Cabinet conforming to the
proposals of the German Government otherwise the invasion of
Austria by German troops was held in prospect. The truth of the
matter is that the question of sending military or police forces
from the Reich was only brought up when the newly formed
Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already published by the
press, to the German Government urgently asking for the dispatch
of German troops as soon as possible in order to restore peace
and in order to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately
threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria, the German
Government then decided to comply with the appeal addressed to
it.
“This being the state of affairs, it is impossible that the
attitude of the German Government as asserted in your letter
could lead to some unforseeable reactions. A complete picture of
the political situation is given in the proclamation which, at
noon today, the German Reich Chancellor has addressed to the
German people. Dangerous reactions to this situation can take
place only if eventually a third party should try to exercise
its influence contrary to the peaceful intentions and legitimate
aims of the German Government on the shaping of events in
Austria, which would be incompatible with the right of
self-government of the German people.”
That ends the quotation.
Now in the light of the evidence which has already been presented to the
Tribunal, this version of the events given by the Defendant Von Neurath
is a hollow mockery of the truth.
We have learned, from the portions quoted from Document 1780-PS, Exhibit
Number USA-72, Jodl’s diary, the entry for March 10, 1938, the fact that
Von Neurath was taking over the duties of the Foreign Office while
Ribbentrop was detained in London, that the Führer wished to send an
ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet, that he had dispatched a letter to
Mussolini of his reasons for taking action, and that army mobilization
orders were given.
We have seen the true facts about the ultimatum from two different
documents. I refer to 812-PS, Exhibit Number USA-61, report of Gauleiter
Rainer to Reichskommissar Bürckel, dated 6 July 1939, which was
transmitted to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart on 22 August 1939. The
portions reporting on the events of March 11 have already been read to
the Tribunal.
I also refer to Document 2949-PS, Exhibit USA-76, the transcripts of
Göring’s telephone conversations, relevant portions of which I have
already read to the Tribunal.
These documents emphatically show and with unmistakable clarity, that
the German Nazis did present an ultimatum to the Austrian Government
that they would send troops across the border if Schuschnigg did not
resign and if Defendant Seyss-Inquart were not appointed Chancellor.
These documents also show that the impetus of the famous telegram came
from Berlin and not from Vienna, that Göring composed the telegram and
Seyss-Inquart did not even have to send it, but merely said “agreed.”
The transcript of Göring’s telephone call to Ribbentrop is indicated as
Part W of that document. In it the formula was developed and recited for
English consumption that there had been no ultimatum and that the German
troops crossed the border in response only to the telegram.
And now in this document from which I have just read we find the same
bogus formula coming from the pen of the Defendant Von Neurath. He was
at the meeting of November 5, 1937, of which we have the Hossbach
minutes, Exhibit USA-25. And so he knew very well the firmly held Nazi
ideas with respect to Austria and Czechoslovakia. And yet in the period
after March 10, 1938 when he was handling the foreign affairs for this
conspiracy and particularly after the invasion of Austria, he played out
his part in making false representations. He gave an assurance to Mr.
Mastny regarding the continued independence of Austria. I refer to the
document introduced by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, Document TC-27, Exhibit
GB-21.
And we see him here still handling foreign affairs, although using the
letterhead of the Secret Cabinet Council as the exhibit shows, reciting
this diplomatic fable with respect to the Austrian situation, a story
also encountered by us in the transcript of the Göring-Ribbentrop
telephone call, all in furtherance of the aims of what we call the
conspiracy.
Now, if the Tribunal please, it might have been fitting and appropriate
for me to present the case on collaboration with Japan and the attack on
the United States on this December 7, 1945, the fourth anniversary of
the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, our plan was to proceed
chronologically so that part of the case must wait its turn for the
presentation next week.
We now come to the climax of this amazing story of wars of aggression,
perhaps one of the most colossal mis-estimates in history, when Hitler’s
intuition led him and his associates to launch an aggressive war against
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
In my last appearance before the Tribunal I presented an account of the
aggression against Czechoslovakia. In the meantime our British
colleagues have given you the evidence covering the formulation of the
plan to attack Poland and the preparations and initiation of actual
aggressive war. In addition they have laid before the Tribunal the story
of the expansion of the war into a general war of aggression involving
the planning and execution of attacks on Denmark, Norway, Belgium and
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece; and in doing so the
British Prosecution has marshalled and presented to the Court various
international treaties, agreements, and assurances, and the evidence
establishing the breaching of those treaties and assurances.
I should like to present to the Tribunal now the account of the last but
one of the defendants’ acts of aggression, the invasion of the U.S.S.R.
The section of the Indictment in which this crime is charged is Count
One, Section IV (F), Paragraph 6, German invasion on 22 June 1941 of the
U.S.S.R. territory in violation of the Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August
1939. The first sentence of this paragraph is the one with which we
shall be concerned today. It reads:
“On 22 June 1941 the Nazi conspirators deceitfully denounced the
Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and without
any declaration of war invaded Soviet territory thereby
beginning a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R.”
The documents having a bearing on this phase of the case are contained
in document book marked “P,” which we now hand to the Court.
First, if the Tribunal please, the inception of the plan. As a point of
departure for the story of aggression against the Soviet Union, I should
like to take the date 23 August 1939. On that date just a week before
the invasion of Poland, the Nazi conspirators caused Germany to enter
into the Treaty of Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R. which is referred to
in this section of the Indictment which I have just quoted. This treaty,
Document Number TC-25, will be introduced in evidence by our British
colleagues, but it contains two articles which I should like to bring to
the attention of the Tribunal. Article I provides as follows:
“The two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any act
of violence, any aggressive action, or any attack against one
another, whether individually or jointly with other powers.”
Article V provides that, should disputes or conflicts arise between the
contracting parties regarding questions of any kind whatsoever, the two
parties would clear away these disputes or conflicts solely by friendly
exchanges of view or, if necessary, by arbitration commissions.
It is well to keep these solemn pledges in mind during the course of the
story which is to follow. This treaty was signed for the German
Government by the Defendant Ribbentrop. Its announcement came as
somewhat of a surprise to the world since it appeared to constitute a
reversal of the previous trend of Nazi foreign policy. The explanation
for this about-face has been provided, however, by no less eminent a
witness than the Defendant Ribbentrop himself in a discussion which he
had with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. A
report of that conference was forwarded by Ribbentrop to certain German
diplomats in the field for their strictly confidential and purely
personal information. This report we now have. It is Number 1834-PS. I
offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-129, the original German document.
On Page 2 of the English translation, Ribbentrop tells Oshima the reason
for the pact with the U.S.S.R. That is Page 2 of the German:
“Then when it came to war the Führer decided on a compromise
with Russia—as a necessity for avoiding a two-front war.”
In view of the spirit of opportunism which motivated the Nazis in
entering into this solemn pledge of arbitration and non-aggression, it
is not very surprising to find that they regarded it as they did all
treaties and pledges, as binding on them only so long as it was
expedient for them to be bound. That they did so regard it is evidenced
by the fact that even while the campaign in the West was still in
progress they began to consider the possibility of launching a war of
aggression against the U.S.S.R.
In a speech to Reichs- and Gauleiter at Munich in November 1943, which
is set forth in our Document L-172 already in evidence as Exhibit Number
USA-34, the Defendant Jodl admitted—and I shall read from Page 7 of the
English translation, which is at Page 15 of the original German text:
“Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily
growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the
Bolshevik East—that danger which has been only too little
perceived in Germany and of late, for diplomatic reasons, had
deliberately to be ignored. However, the Führer himself has
always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as
during the Western campaign had informed me of his fundamental
decision to take steps against this danger the moment our
military position made it at all possible.”
At the time this decision was made, however, the Western campaign was
still in progress, and so any action in the East necessarily had to be
postponed for the time being. On 22 June 1940, however, the
Franco-German armistice was signed at Compiègne, and the campaign in the
West with the exception of the war against Britain came to an end. The
view that Germany’s key to political and economic domination lay in the
elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor and in the acquisition
of Lebensraum at her expense had long been basic in Nazi ideology. As we
have seen, this idea had never been completely forgotten even while the
war in the West was in progress. Now flushed with the recent success of
their arms and yet keenly conscious of both their failure to defeat
Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw materials, the
Nazis began serious consideration of the means for achieving their
traditional ambition by conquering the Soviet Union.
The situation in which Germany now found herself made such action appear
both desirable and practical. As early as August of 1940 General Thomas
received a hint from the Defendant Göring that planning for a campaign
against the Soviet Union was already under way. Thomas at that time was
the Chief of the “Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt” of the OKW.
I should, perhaps, mention that this office is generally referred to in
the German documents by the abbreviation Wi Rü.
General Thomas tells of receiving this information from Göring in his
draft of a work entitled _Basic Facts for a History of German War and
Armament Economy_, which he prepared during the summer of 1944. This
book is our Document 2353-PS and has already been admitted into evidence
as Exhibit USA-35. I am sorry, it was marked that for identification
purposes. I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-35.
On Pages 313 to 315 of this work Thomas discusses the Russo-German Trade
Agreement of 1939 and relates how, since the Soviets were delivering
quickly and well under this agreement and were requesting war materials
in return, there was much pressure in Germany until early in 1940 for
increased delivery on the part of the Germans. However, at Page 315 he
has the following to say about the change of heart expressed by the
German leaders in August of 1940. I read from Page 9 of the English
translation:
“On August 14 the Chief of the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt during a
conference with Reich Marshal Göring, was informed that the
Führer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only until
spring 1941. Later on we were to have no further interest in
completely satisfying the Russian demands. This allusion moved
the Chief of the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt to give priority to
matters concerning Russian war economy.”
I shall refer to this statement again later when I discuss the
preparation for the economic exploitation of Soviet territory expected
to be captured. At that time, too, I shall introduce evidence which will
show that in November of 1940 Göring informed Thomas that a campaign was
planned against the U.S.S.R.
Preparations for so large an undertaking as an invasion of the Soviet
Union necessarily entailed even these many months in advance of the date
of execution, certain activity in the East in the way of construction
projects and strengthening of forces. Such activity could not be
expected to pass unnoticed by the Soviet Intelligence Service.
Counter-intelligence measures were obviously called for.
In an OKW directive signed by the Defendant Jodl and issued to the
counter-intelligence service abroad on 6 September 1940, such measures
were ordered. This directive is our Number 1229-PS and I offer it in
evidence as Exhibit USA-130, a photostat of the captured German
document. This directive pointed out that the activity in the East must
not be permitted to create the impression in the Soviet Union that an
offensive was being prepared, and outlined the line for the
counter-intelligence people to take to disguise this fact. The text of
the directive indicates by implication the extent of the preparations
already under way, and I should like to read it to the Tribunal:
“The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to
come. By the end of October the status shown on the enclosed map
is supposed to be reached.
“These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that
we are preparing an offensive in the East. On the other hand,
Russia will realize that strong and highly trained German troops
are stationed in the Government General, in the Eastern
Provinces and in the Protectorate; she should draw the
conclusion that we can at any time protect our
interests—especially in the Balkans—with strong forces against
Russian seizure.
“For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the
answer to questions of the Russian Intelligence Service, the
following directives apply:
“1) The respective total strength of the German troops in the
East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a
frequent change of the army units there. This change is to be
explained by movements into training camps, regroupings, _et
cetera_.
“2) The impression is to be created that the center of the
massing of troops is in the southern part of the Government, in
the Protectorate, and in Austria, and that the massing in the
north is relatively unimportant.
“3) When it comes to the equipment situation of the units,
especially of the armored divisions, things are to be
exaggerated, if necessary.
“4) By suitable news the impression is to be created that the
antiaircraft protection in the East has been increased
considerably after the end of the campaign in the West and that
it continues to be increased with captured French material on
all important targets.
“5) Concerning improvements on railroads, roads, airdromes, _et
cetera_, it is to be stated that the work is kept within normal
limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly won eastern
territories, and serves primarily economical traffic.
“The Supreme Command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent
correct details, i.e., numbers of regiments, manning of
garrisons, _et cetera_, will be made available to the defense
for purposes of counter espionage.
“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, by order
of”—signed—“Jodl.”
Early in November of 1940 Hitler reiterated his previous orders and
called for a continuation of preparations, promising further and more
definite instructions as soon as this preliminary work produced a
general outline of the Army’s operational plan. This order was contained
in a top-secret directive from the Führer’s headquarters, Number 18,
dated 12 November 1940, signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl. It is
Number 444-PS in our numbered series and is already in evidence as
Exhibit Number GB-116.
The directive begins by saying:
“The preparatory measures of supreme headquarters for the
prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along
the following lines . . . .”
It then outlines plans for the various theaters and the policy regarding
relations with other countries and says regarding the U.S.S.R.—and I
read now from Page 3, Paragraph Number 5 of the English translation:
“Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of
clarifying Russia’s attitude for the time being. Irrespective of
the results of these discussions all preparations for the East
which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.
“Instructions on this will follow as soon as the general outline
of the Army’s operational plans have been submitted to, and
approved by me.”
On the 5th of December 1940 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army,
at that time General Halder, reported to the Führer concerning the
progress of the plans for the coming operation against the U.S.S.R. A
report of this conference with Hitler is contained in captured Document
Number 1799-PS. This is a folder containing many documents all labeled
annexes and all bearing on Fall Barbarossa, the plan against the
U.S.S.R. This folder was discovered in the War Diary of the
Wehrmachtführungsstab and was apparently an enclosure to that diary.
The report I am here referring to is Annex Number 1 and is dated
December 1940.
I now offer in evidence Document Number 1799-PS as United States Exhibit
Number 131. I should also like to read into the record a few sentences
from the report of 5 December 1940 as they indicate the state of the
planning for this act of aggression six and a half months before it
occurred.
“Report to the Führer on 5 December 1940.
“The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reported about
the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the
geographical fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are
in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad.”
Then skipping:
“The Führer declares that he has agreed with the discussed
operational plans and adds the following:
“The most important goal is to prevent the Russians from
withdrawing on a closed front. The eastward advance should be
combined until the Russian Air Force will be unable to attack
the territory of the German Reich and on the other hand the
German Air Force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy
Russian war industrial territory. In this way we should be able
to achieve the annihilation of the Russian Army and to prevent
its regeneration. The first commitment of the forces should take
place in such a way as to make the annihilation of strong enemy
units possible.”
Then, skipping again:
“It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions
in the rear again. The number of 130 to 140 divisions as planned
for the entire operation is sufficient.”
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good time to break off?
MR. ALDERMAN: Very convenient, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Then we shall not sit in open session tomorrow. We will
sit again on Monday at 10 o’clock.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 10 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]
SIXTEENTH DAY
Monday, 10 December 1945
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has received a letter from Dr. Dix on behalf
of the Defendant Schacht. In answer to that the Tribunal wishes the
defendants’ counsel to know that they will be permitted to make one
speech only in accordance with Article 24 (h) of the Charter, and this
speech will be at the conclusion of all the evidence.
At the conclusion of the case for the Prosecution, the defendants’
counsel will be invited to submit to the Tribunal the evidence they
propose to call; but they will be strictly confined to the names of the
witnesses and the matters to which their evidence will be relevant, and
this submission must not be in the nature of a speech. Is that clear? In
case there should be any misunderstanding, what I have just said will be
posted up on the board in the defendants’ Counsel Room so that you can
study it there.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, when the Tribunal rose Friday,
I had just reached the point in my discussion of aggression against the
U.S.S.R. where, with the campaign in the West at an end, the Nazi
conspirators had begun the development of their plans to attack the
Soviet Union. Preliminary high level planning and action was in
progress. Hitler had indicated earlier in November that more detailed
and definite instructions would be issued. These would be issued as soon
as the general outline of the Army’s operational plans had been
submitted to him and approved by him. We had thus reached the point in
the story indicated on the outline submitted last Friday as Part 3 of
the Plan Barbarossa.
By the 18th of December 1940, the general outline of the Army’s
operational plan having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strategical
directive to the High Command of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force for
Barbarossa—Directive Number 21—was issued. This directive, which for
the first time marks the plan to invade the Soviet Union, was
specifically referred to in an order although the order was classified
top secret. It also marked the first use of the code word Barbarossa to
denote this operation.
The directive is Number 446-PS, and was offered in evidence in the
course of my opening statement as Exhibit USA-31. Since it was fully
discussed at that time, it is, I believe, sufficient now merely to
recall to the Tribunal two or three of the most significant sentences in
that document. Most of these sentences appear on Page 1 of the English
translation. One of the most significant, I believe, is this sentence
with which the order begins:
“The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia
in a quick campaign even before the end of the war with
England.”
On the same page it is stated:
“Preparations requiring more time to start are, if this has not
yet been done, to begin presently and are to be completed by 15
May 1941. Great caution has to be exercised that the intention
of the attack will not be recognized.”
The directive then outlines the broad strategy on which the intended
invasion was to proceed and the parts that the various services (Army,
Navy, and Air Force) were to play therein, and calls for oral reports to
Hitler by the commanders-in-chief, closing as follows:
“V.”—that is on Page 2—“I am expecting the reports of the
commanders-in-chief on their further plans based on this letter
of instructions.
“The preparations planned by all branches of the Armed Forces
are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in
regard to their time.”
Signed by Hitler, and initialed by Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont, and one
illegible name.
It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself as well
as from its history, which I have outlined, that this directive was no
mere planning exercise by the staff. It was an order to prepare for an
act of aggression, which was intended to occur and which actually did
occur.
The various services which received the order certainly understood it as
an order to prepare for action, and did not view it as a hypothetical
staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning and preparation
which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general
scheme set forth in this basic directive.
So we come to the military planning and preparation for the
implementation of Plan Barbarossa. The Naval War Diary for 13 January
1941 indicates the early compliance of the OKM with that part of
Directive Number 21 which ordered progress in preparation to be reported
to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in
the War Diary is Document C-35 in our numbered series, and I offer it in
evidence as Exhibit USA-132.
This document contains a substantial amount of technical information
concerning the Navy’s part in the coming campaign and the manner in
which it was preparing itself to play the part. I feel, however, that it
will be sufficient for the establishment of our point that the Navy was
actively preparing for the attack at this early date, to read only a
small portion of the entry into the record, beginning on Page 1 of the
English translation, which is Page 401 of the Diary itself. The entry
reads:
“30 January 1941.
“7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the
Barbarossa Case to be submitted to the High Command of Armed
Forces.”
I should note that “Ia” is in this case the abbreviation for a deputy
chief of naval operations. Then follows a list of the Navy’s objectives
in the war against Russia. Under the latter many tasks for the Navy are
listed, but I think one is sufficiently typical to give the Tribunal an
idea of all. I quote from the top of Page 2 of the English translation:
“II. Objectives of War Against Russia . . . .
“d) To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as: 1)
Lightning-like actions at the outbreak of the war by air force
units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic,
Black Sea, and Polar Sea.”
The purpose of the offer of this document is merely that it indicates
the detailed thinking and planning which was being carried out to
implement Barbarossa almost six months before the operation actually got
under way. It is but another piece in the mosaic of evidence which
demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the invasion of the Soviet
Union was one of the most cold-bloodedly premeditated attacks on a
neighboring power in the history of the world. Similarly the Naval War
Diary for the month of February contains at least several references to
the planning and preparation for the coming campaign. Extracts of such
references are contained in Document C-33, which I am now offering in
evidence as Exhibit USA-133.
I think it will be sufficient to quote for the record as typical the
entry for 19 February 1941, which appears at Page 3 of the English
translation and at Page 248 of the Diary itself.
“In regard to the impending operation Barbarossa for which all
S-boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer can only be
considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations.”
On the 3rd of February 1941 the Führer held a conference to assess the
progress thus far made in the planning for Barbarossa. The conference
also discussed the plans for “Sonnenblume,” which was the code name for
the North African operation—“Sunflower.” Attending this conference
were, in addition to Hitler: The Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces, the Defendant Keitel; the Chief of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff, the Defendant Jodl; the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army General Staff, Halder; as well
as several others, including Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s Adjutant.
A report of this conference is contained in our Document Number 872-PS,
which I now offer as Exhibit USA-134.
During the course of this conference the Chief of the Army General Staff
gave a long report about enemy strength as compared with their own
strength and the general overall operational plans for the invasion.
This report was punctuated at various intervals by comments from the
Führer.
At Page 4 of the English translation of the conference plan, which is at
Page 5 of the German original, there is an interesting extract, which,
although written in a semi-shorthand, is at least sufficiently clear to
inform us that elaborate timetables had already been set out for the
deployment of troops as well as for industrial operations. I quote:
“The proposed time schedule is charted on the map. First
Deployment Echelon”—Aufmarschstaffel—“now being transferred,
Front-Interior-East. Second Deployment Echelon from the middle
of March gives 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West, but
Army groups and Army High Commands are withdrawn from the West.
In the East there are already considerable reinforcements though
still in the rear area. From now on, ‘Attila’”—I might state
here parenthetically that this was the code word for the
operation for the occupation of unoccupied France—“Attila can
be carried out only with difficulty. Economic traffic is
hampered by transport movements. From the beginning of April,
Hungary will be approached about the march-through. Third
Deployment Echelon, from the middle of April. ‘Felix’ is now no
longer possible, as the main part of the artillery has been
shipped.”—Felix was the name for the proposed operation against
Gibraltar.—“In industry the full capacity timetable is in
force. No more camouflage. Fourth Deployment Echelon, from 25.
IV to 15. V, withdraws considerable forces from the West
(‘Seelöwe’ can no longer be carried out).”—“Seelöwe” (or Sea
Lion) was a code word for the planned operation against England,
and “Marita,” which we shall see a little later in the
quotation, was the code word for the action against
Greece.—“The concentration of troops in the East is clearly
apparent. The full capacity timetable is maintained. The
complete picture of the disposition of forces on the map shows 8
Marita divisions.
“Commander-in-Chief, Army, requests that he no longer have to
assign 5 control divisions for this; but might hold them ready
as reserves for commander in the West.
“Führer: ‘When Barbarossa commences the world will hold its
breath and make no comment.’”
This much, I believe, when read with the conference conclusions, which I
shall read in a moment, is sufficient to show that the Army as well as
the Navy regarded Barbarossa as an action directive and were far along
with their preparations even as early as February 1941—almost 5 months
prior to 22 June, the date the attack was actually launched. The
conference report summarized the conclusions of the conference, insofar
as they affected Barbarossa, as follows; I am now reading from Page 6 of
the English translation, which is on Page 7 of the German:
“Conclusions:
“1. Barbarossa.
“a. The Führer on the whole is in agreement with the operational
plan. When it is being carried out it must be remembered that
the main aim is to gain possession of the Baltic States and
Leningrad.
“b. The Führer desires that the operation map and the plan of
the deployment of forces be sent to him as soon as possible.
“c. Agreements with neighboring states who are taking part may
not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for
camouflage. The exception is Romania with regard to reinforcing
the Moldau.
“d. It must, in any case, be possible to carry out Attila. (With
the means available.)
“e. The concentration for Barbarossa will be carried out as a
feint for Sea Lion and the subsidiary measure Marita.”
On 13th March 1941 the Defendant Keitel signed an operational directive
to Führer Order Number 21, which was issued in the form of “Directives
for Special Areas.” This detailed operational order is Number 447-PS in
our numbered series, and I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-135.
This order which was issued more than 3 months in advance of the attack
indicates how complete were the plans on practically every phase of the
operation. Section I of the directive is headed, “Area of Operations and
Executive Power,” and outlines who was to be in control of what and
where. It states that while the campaign is in progress in territory
through which the Army is advancing, the Supreme Commander of the Army
has the executive power. During this period, however, the Reichsführer
SS is entrusted with “special tasks.” This assignment is discussed in
Paragraph 2b, which appears on Page 1 of the English translation and
reads as follows:
“b) In the area of operations of the Army the Reichsführer SS
is, on behalf of the Führer, entrusted with special tasks for
the preparation of the political administration—tasks which
result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two
opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks the
Reichsführer SS shall act independently and under his own
responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme
Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him
shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the
Reichsführer SS that through the execution of his tasks military
operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged
directly through the OKH with the Reichsführer SS.”
The order then states that in time political administration will be set
up under Commissioners of the Reich, and discusses the relationship of
these officials to the Army. This is contained in Paragraph 2c and
Paragraph 3, parts of which I should like to read:
“c) As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient
depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied
territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given
its own political administration. For the present it is to be
divided on the basis of nationality and according to the
positions of the Army groups into North (Baltic countries),
Center (White Russia), and South (Ukraine). In these territories
the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners
of the Reich who receive their orders from the Führer.
“3) For the execution of all military tasks within the areas
under the political administration in the rear of the area of
operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.
“The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the
Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the
military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a territorial
commander and the rights of a supreme Army commander or a
commanding general. In this capacity he is responsible primarily
for the following tasks:
“a) Close co-operation with the Commissioner of the Reich in
order to support him in his political tasks; b) exploitation of
the country and securing its economic values for use by German
industry.”
The directive also outlines the responsibility for the administration of
economy in the conquered territory, a subject I will develop more fully
later in my presentation. This provision is also in Section I, Paragraph
4, which I shall read:
“4) The Führer has entrusted the uniform direction of the
administration of economy in the area of operations and in the
territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal,
who has delegated the Chief of the ‘Wi Rü Amt’ with the
execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the
OKW/Wi Rü Amt.”
The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you tell us at some time who these
people are? Who is the Reich Marshal?
MR. ALDERMAN: The Reich Marshal is the Defendant Göring.
THE PRESIDENT: And who was the Reichsführer of the SS at that time?
MR. ALDERMAN: Himmler.
THE PRESIDENT: Himmler?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and
communication traffic, and I shall not read it here.
Section III of the order deals with the relations with certain other
countries, and states in part as follows—I am reading from Page 3 of
the English translation:
“III. Regulations regarding Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and
Finland.
“9) The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be
made by the OKW together with the Foreign Office and according
to the wish of the respective high commands. In case it should
become necessary during the course of the operations to grant
special rights, applications for this purpose are to be
submitted to the OKW.”
The document closes with a section regarding Sweden, which is also on
Page 3 of the English Translation:
“IV. Directives regarding Sweden.
“12) Since Sweden can only become a transient area for troops,
no special authority is to be granted to the commander of the
German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure
the immediate protection of railroad transports against sabotage
and attacks.
“The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces,”—signed—
“Keitel.”
As was hinted in the original Barbarossa order, Directive Number 21,
which I discussed earlier, the plan originally contemplated that the
attack would take place about the 15th of May 1941. In the meantime,
however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved in a campaign
in the Balkans, and were forced to delay Barbarossa for a few weeks.
Evidence of this postponement is found in a document, which bears our
Number C-170. This document has been identified by the Defendant Raeder
as a compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff War
Diary. It was prepared by naval archivists who had access to the
Admiralty files, and contains file references to the papers which were
the basis for each entry.
I offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA-136.
Although I shall refer to this document again later, I should like at
present to read only an item which appears in the second paragraph of
Item 142 on Page 19 of the English translation and which is in the text
in a footnote on Page 26 in the German original. This item is dated 3
April 1941, and reads as follows:
“Balkan operation delay; Barbarossa now in about 5 weeks. All
measures which can be construed as offensive actions are to be
stopped according to the Führer’s order.”
By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straightened out
to permit the Führer to definitely set D-Day as the 22d of June—more
than 7 weeks away. Document Number 873-PS in our series is a top-secret
report of a conference with the Chief of the Section
“Landesverteidigung” of the “Wehrmacht Führungsstab” on April 30, 1941.
I now offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA-137.
I think it will be sufficient to read the first two paragraphs of this
report:
“1) Timetable Barbarossa. The Führer has decided:
“Action Barbarossa begins on 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop
movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations
the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas.
“2) Proportion of actual strength in the Plan Barbarossa:
“Sector North, German and Russian forces approximately of the
same strength; Sector Middle, great German superiority; Sector
South, Russian superiority.”
Early in June, practically 3 weeks before D-Day, preparations for the
attack were so complete that it was possible for the High Command to
issue an elaborate timetable showing in great detail the disposition and
missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
This timetable is Document Number C-39 in our series, and I offer it in
evidence now as Exhibit USA-138.
This document was prepared in 21 copies, and the one offered here was
the third copy which was given to the High Command of the Navy; Page 1
is in the form of a transmittal, and reads as follows:
“Top secret; Supreme Command of the Armed Forces; Nr. 44842/41
top military secret WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.); Führer’s headquarters;
for chiefs only, only through officer; 21 copies; I Op.
00845/41; received 6 June; no enclosures.
“The Führer has authorized the appended timetable as a
foundation for further preparations for Plan Barbarossa. If
alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces must be informed.
“Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces”—signed—
“Keitel.”
I shall not bother to read to you the distribution list which indicates
where the 21 copies went.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal does not think it necessary
that you should read all those preliminary matters at the head of these
documents, “top secret,” “only through officer,” and then the various
reference numbers and file information when you give identification of a
document.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir.
The next two pages of the document are in the form of a text outlining
the state of preparations as of the 1st of June 1941. The outline is in
six paragraphs covering the status on that date under six headings:
General, Negotiations with friendly states, Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Camouflage.
I think it unnecessary to read into the record any of this textual
material. The remainder of the paper is in tabular form with seven
columns headed from left to right at the top of each page: Date, Serial
number, Army, Air Force, Navy, OKW, Remarks. Most interesting among the
items appearing on this chart . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you read the first paragraph, for that
seems to be important. There are two lines there.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The heading “General” on Page 2.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir.
“1. General. The timetable for the maximum massing of troops in
the East will be put into operation on the 22d of May.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: Most interesting among the items appearing on this chart,
in my opinion, are those appearing on Pages 9 and 10. These are at Page
8 of the German version. At the bottom of Page 9 it is provided in the
columns for Army, Navy, and Air Force—and I quote:
“Up to 1300 hours is latest time at which operation can be
cancelled.”
Under the column headed OKW appears the note that—and again I quote:
“Cancelled by code word ‘Altona’ or further confirmation of
start of attack by code word ‘Dortmund’.”
In the Remarks column appears the statement that:
“Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of
main effort, concentration of armor and artillery must be
reckoned with.”
The second entry on Page 10 of the chart for the 22d of June, under
Serial number 31, gives a notation which cuts across the columns for the
Army, Air Force, Navy, and OKW, and provides as follows, under the
heading:
“Invasion Day. H-Hour for the start of the invasion by the Army
and crossing of the frontier by the Air Forces: 0330 hours.”
In the Remarks column, it states that:
“Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting on the
part of the Air Force owing to weather.”
The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those quoted and
give, as I have said, great detail concerning the disposition and
missions of the various components of the Armed Forces.
On 9 June 1941 the order of the Führer went out for final reports on
Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June 1941, which was just 8 days
before D-Day. This order is signed by Hitler’s Adjutant, Schmundt, and
is C-78 in our numbered series of documents. I offer it in evidence now
as Exhibit USA-139.
I read from Page 1 the matter under the heading “Conference Barbarossa”:
“1. The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has
ordered reports on Barbarossa by the commanders of Army groups,
armies, and naval and air commanders of equal rank.
“2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the
Reich Chancellery, Berlin.
“3. Timetable:
“a) 1100 hours, “Silver Fox”; b) 1200 hours-1400 hours, Army
Group South; c) 1400 hours-1530 hours, lunch party for all
participants in conference; d) from 1530 hours, Baltic, Army
Group North, Army Group Center, in this order.”
It is signed by Schmundt.
There is attached a list of participants and the order in which they
will report which I shall not read. The list includes, however, a large
number of the members of the Defendant High Command and General Staff
group as of that date. Among those to participate were, of course, the
Defendants Göring, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.
I believe that the documents which I have introduced and quoted from are
more than sufficient to establish conclusively the premeditation and
cold-blooded calculation which marked the military preparations for the
invasion of the Soviet Union. Starting almost a full year before the
commission of the crime, the Nazi conspirators planned and prepared
every military detail of their aggression against the Soviet Union with
all of that thoroughness and meticulousness which has come to be
associated with the German character. Although several of these
defendants played specific parts in this military phase of the planning
and preparation for the attack, it is natural enough that the leading
roles were performed, as we have seen, by the military figures: the
Defendants Göring, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.
Next, preparation for plunder—plans for the economic exploitation and
spoliation of the Soviet Union.
Not only was there detailed preparation for the invasion from a purely
military standpoint, but equally elaborate and detailed planning and
preparation was undertaken by the Nazi conspirators to ensure that their
aggression would prove economically profitable.
A little later in my presentation I shall discuss with the Tribunal the
motives which led these conspirators to attack, without provocation, a
neighboring power. I shall at that time show that the crime was
motivated by both political and economic considerations. The economic
basis, however, may be simply summarized at this point as the greed of
the Nazi conspirators for the raw material, food, and other supplies
which their neighbor possessed and which they conceived of themselves as
needing for the maintenance of their war machine. To these defendants
such a need was translated indubitably as a right, and they early began
planning and preparing with typical care and detail to ensure that every
bit of the plunder which it would be possible to reap in the course of
their aggression would be exploited to their utmost benefit.
I have already put into the record evidence showing that as early as
August of 1940 General Thomas, the chief of the B Group Army, received a
hint from the Defendant Göring about a possible attack on the U.S.S.R.
which prompted him to begin considering the Soviet war economy. I also
said at that time that I would later introduce evidence that in November
1940—8 months before the attack—Thomas was categorically informed by
Göring of the planned operation in the East and preliminary preparations
were commenced for the economic plundering of the territories to be
occupied in the course of such operation. Göring, of course, played the
overall leading role in this activity by virtue of his position at the
head of the Four Year Plan.
Thomas describes his receipt of the knowledge and this early planning at
Page 369 of his draft, which is our Document 2353-PS introduced earlier
as Exhibit USA-35; the part I shall read is at Pages 10 and 11 of the
English translation:
“In November 1940 the Chief of Wi Rü together with Secretaries
of State Körner, Neumann, Backe, and General Von Hanneken were
informed by the Reich Marshal of the action planned in the East.
“By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for
the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rü at
the end of 1940.
“The preliminary preparations for the action in the East
included first of all the following tasks:
“1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian armament
industry, its location, its capacity, and its associate
industries.
“2. Investigation of the capacities of the different big
armament centers and their dependency one on the other.
“3. Determining the power and transport system for the industry
of the Soviet Union.
“4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum
(crude oil).
“5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament
industries in the Soviet Union.
“These points were concentrated in one big compilation, ‘War
Economy of the Soviet Union,’ and illustrated with detailed
maps.”—I am still quoting.—“Furthermore a card index was made
containing all the important factories in Soviet Russia and a
lexicon of economy in the German-Russian language for the use of
the German war economy organization.
“For the processing of these problems a task staff, ‘Russia,’
was created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and
later on in charge of Major General Schubert. The work was
carried out according to the directives from the chief of the
office, respectively”—I suppose—“by the group of departments
for foreign territories”—Ausland—“with the co-operation of all
departments, economy offices, and any other persons possessing
information on Russia. Through these intensive preparative
activities an excellent collection of material was made which
proved of the utmost value later on for carrying out the
operations and for administering the territories.”
That ends the quotation.
By the end of February 1941 this preliminary planning had proceeded to a
point where a broader plan of organization was needed, and so General
Thomas held a conference with his subordinates on 28 February 1941 to
call for such a plan. A memorandum of this conference, classified top
secret and dated 1 March 1941, was captured, and is our Document
1317-PS. I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-140. The text of this
memorandum reads as follows:
“The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be
drafted for the Reich Marshal.
“Essential Points:
“1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich
Marshal. Purpose: Support and extension of the measures of the
Four Year Plan.
“2. The organization must include everything concerning war
economy, excepting only food which is said to be made already a
special mission of State Secretary Backe.
“3. Clear statement that the organization is to be independent
of the military or civil administration. Close co-ordination,
but instructions direct from the central office in Berlin.
“4. Scope of activities to be divided into two steps: a)
Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the front
lines in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to
secure the removal of important goods; b) Administration of the
occupied industrial districts and exploitation of economically
complementary districts.”
And then, on the bottom of Page 1:
“5. In view of the extended field of activity the term ‘war
economy inspection’ is to be used in preference to armament
inspection.
“6. In view of the great field of activity the organization must
be generously equipped and personnel must be correspondingly
numerous. The main mission of the organization will consist of
seizing raw materials and taking over all important
exploitations. For the latter mission reliable persons from
German concerns will be interposed suitably from the beginning,
since successful operation from the beginning can only be
performed by the aid of their experience. (For example: lignite,
ore, chemistry, petroleum).
“After the discussion of further details Lieutenant Colonel
Luther was instructed to make an initial draft of such an
organization within a week.
“Close co-operation with the individual sections in the building
is essential. An officer must still be appointed for the Wi and
Rü with whom the operational staff can remain in constant
contact. Wi is to give each section chief and Lieutenant Colonel
Luther a copy of the new plan regarding Russia.
“Lieutenant General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the
second half of next week. Also, the four officers who are
ordered to draw up the individual armament inspections are to
report to the office chief at the end of the
week.—Signed—Hamann.”
Hamann, who signed the report, is listed among those attending as a
captain and apparently the junior officer present, so presumably it fell
naturally enough to Hamann to prepare the notes on the conference.
The authority and mission of this organization which Thomas was
organizing at the direction of Göring was clearly recognized by Keitel
in his operational order of 13 March 1941. This order is Number 447-PS,
and I have already offered it in evidence earlier as Exhibit USA-135. At
that time I quoted the paragraph in the order in which it was stated
that the Führer had entrusted the uniform direction of the
administration of economy in the areas of operation and political
administration to the Reich Marshal who in turn had delegated his
authority to the Chief of the Wi Rü Amt.
The organizational work called for by General Thomas at the meeting on
28 February apparently proceeded apace, and on 29 April 1941 a
conference was held with various branches of the Armed Forces to explain
the organizational set-up of the Economic Staff “Oldenburg.” Oldenburg
was the code name given to this economic counterpart of Plan Barbarossa.
A report of this conference is captured Document Number 1157-PS, and I
now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-141. Section 1 of this
memorandum deals with the general organization of Economic Staff
Oldenburg as it had developed by this time, and I should like to read
most of that section into the record. The report begins:
“Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces at 1000 hours
on Tuesday, 29th April 1941.
“1. Welcome. Purpose of the meeting: Introduction to the
organizational structure of the economic section of the
undertaking Barbarossa-Oldenburg.
“As already known, the Führer, contrary to previous procedure,
has ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand
of all economic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal
with the overall direction of the economic administration in the
area of operations and in the areas under political
administration.
“The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an Economic
General Staff working under the director of the Economic
Armament Office (Chief, Wi Rü Amt).
“Under the Reich Marshal and the Economic General Staff the
supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself is
the”—and then a heading—“Economic Staff Oldenburg for special
duties under the command of Lieutenant General Schubert. His
subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided, are: 5
economic inspectorates, 23 economic commands, and 12 district
offices which are distributed among important places within the
area of the economic command.
“These offices are used in the military rear area. The idea is
that in the territory of each army group an economic
inspectorate is to be established at the seat of the commander
of the military rear area, and that this inspectorate will
supervise the economic exploitation of the territory.
“A distinction must be made between the military rear area and
the battle area proper on the one hand, and the rear area of the
army on the other hand. In the latter, economic matters are
dealt with by the Group IV Economy”—IV Wi—“of the Army
Headquarters Command, that is, the liaison officer of the
Economic Armament Office within the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces assigned to the Army Headquarters Command. For the battle
area he has attached to him technical battalions, reconnaissance
and recovery troops for raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural
machinery, in particular, tractors and means of production.
“In the rear area of the Army situated between the battle and
the military rear area, Group IV Economy with the various field
commands are placed at the disposal of the liaison officer of
the Economic Armament Office for the support of the specialists
of the Army Headquarters Command, who are responsible for
supplying the troops from the country’s resources and for
preparing the subsequent general economic exploitation.
“While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates,
economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in
the locality.
“The new feature inherent in the organization under the command
of the Economic Staff Oldenburg is that it does not only deal
with military industry but comprises the entire economic field.
Consequently all offices are no longer to be designated as
offices of the military industries or armaments but quite
generally as economic inspectorates, economic commands, _et
cetera_.
“This also corresponds with the internal organization of the
individual offices which, from the Economic Staff Oldenburg down
to the economic commands, requires a standard subdivision into
three large groups, i. e. Group M, dealing with troop
requirements, armaments, industrial transport organization;
Group L, which concerns itself with all questions of feeding and
agriculture, and Group W, which is in charge of the entire field
of trade and industry, including raw materials and supplies;
further, questions of forestry, finance and banking, enemy
property, commerce and exchange of commodities, and manpower
allocation.
“Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and
Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within
the field of activities of Group W are dealt with by General Von
Hanneken.”
The remainder of the document deals with local subdivisions, personnel
and planning problems, and similar details, which I think it unnecessary
to put into the record.
These documents portray vividly the coldly calculated method with which
those Nazis prepared months in advance to rob and loot their intended
victim. They show that the conspirators not only planned to stage a
wanton attack on a neighbor to whom they had pledged security, but they
also intended to strip that neighbor of his food, his factories, and all
his means of livelihood.
As I shall point out more fully later when I discuss the question of
motivation, these men made their plans for plunder being fully aware
that to carry them out would necessarily involve ruin and starvation for
millions of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union.
THE PRESIDENT: This would be a good time to adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. ALDERMAN: May the Tribunal please, I have been informed by the
interpreters that I have been speaking at a great speed this morning, so
I shall try to temper the speed.
Next, the politics of destruction; preparation for the political phase
of the aggression. As I have already indicated and as I shall develop
more fully later in this discussion, there were both economic and
political reasons motivating the action of the conspirators in invading
the Soviet Union. I have already discussed the extent of the planning
and preparations for the economic side of the aggression. Equally
elaborate planning and preparation were engaged in by the conspirators
to ensure the effectuation of the political aims of their aggression. It
is, I believe, sufficient at this point to describe that political aim
as the elimination of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a
powerful political factor in Europe and the acquisition of Lebensraum.
For the accomplishment of this purpose the Nazi conspirators selected as
their agent the Defendant Rosenberg. As early as the 2d of April 1941
Rosenberg or a member of his staff prepared a memorandum on the U.S.S.R.
This memorandum speculates on the possibility of a disagreement with the
U.S.S.R. which would result in a quick occupation of an important part
of that country. This memorandum then considers what the political goal
of such occupation should be and suggests ways for reaching such a goal.
The memorandum is Number 1017-PS in our series, and I offer it in
evidence now as Exhibit USA-142.
Beginning with the second paragraph it reads, under the subject
“U.S.S.R.”;
“A military conflict with the U.S.S.R. will result in an
extraordinarily rapid occupation of an important and large
section of the U.S.S.R. It is very probable that military action
on our part will very soon be followed by the military collapse
of the U.S.S.R. The occupation of these areas would then present
not so many military as administrative and economic
difficulties. Thus arises the first question:
“Is the occupation to be determined by purely military or
economic needs respectively, or is the laying of political
foundations for a future organization of the area also a factor
in determining how far the occupation shall be extended? If so,
it is a matter of urgency to fix the political goal which is to
be attained, for it will without doubt also have an effect on
military operations.
“If the political overthrow of the eastern empire, in the weak
condition it would be at the time, is set as the goal of
military operations, one may conclude that:
“1) The occupation must comprise areas of vast proportions.
“2) From the very beginning the treatment of individual sections
of territory should, in regard to administration as well as
economics and ideology, be adapted to the political ends we are
striving to attain.
“3) Again, extraordinary questions concerning these vast areas
such as, in particular, the ensuring of essential supplies for
the continuation of war against England, the maintenance of
production which this necessitates, and the great directives for
the completely separate areas, should best be dealt with all
together in one place.
“It should again be stressed here that, in addition, all the
arguments which follow only hold good, of course, once the
supplies from the area to be occupied, which are essential to
Greater Germany for the continuance of the war, have been
assured.
“Anyone who knows the East sees in a map of Russia’s population
the following national or geographical units:
“(a) Greater Russia, with Moscow as its center; (b) White
Russia, with Minsk or Smolensk as its capital; (c) Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania; (d) The Ukraine and the Crimea, with Kiev
as its center; (e) The Don area, with Rostov as its capital; (f)
The area of the Caucasus; (g) Russian Central Asia or Russian
Turkestan.”
The memorandum then proceeds to discuss each of the areas or
geographical units in some detail, and I shall not read those pages. At
the end of the paper, however, the writer sums up his thoughts and
briefly outlines his plan. I should like to read that portion into the
record. It is at the bottom of Page 4 of the English translation under
the heading “Summary”:
“The following systematic constructional plan is evolved from
the points briefly outlined here:
“(1) The creation of a central department for the occupied areas
of the U.S.S.R. to be confined more or less to war time. Working
in agreement with the higher and supreme Reich authorities, it
would be the task of this department:
“(a) To issue binding political instructions to the separate
administration areas, having in mind the situation existing at
the time and the goal which is to be achieved;
“(b) To secure for the Reich supplies essential to the war from
all the occupied areas;
“(c) To make preparations for, and to supervise the carrying out
in main outline of, the primarily important questions for all
areas, as for instance, those of finance and funds, transport,
and the production of oil, coal, and food.
“(2) The carrying out of sharply defined decentralization in the
separate administration areas, grouped together by race or by
reason of political economy for the carrying out of the totally
dissimilar tasks assigned to them.
“As against this, an administrative department regulating
matters in principle and to be set up on a purely economic
basis, as is at present envisaged, might very soon prove to be
inadequate and fail in its purpose. Such a central office would
be compelled to carry out a common policy for all areas,
dictated only by economic considerations, and this might impede
the carrying out of the political task and, in view of its being
run on purely bureaucratic lines, might possibly even prevent
it.
“The question therefore arises whether the opinions which have
been set forth should not, purely for reasons of expediency, be
taken into consideration from the very beginning when organizing
the administration of the territory on a basis of war economy.
In view of the vast spaces and the difficulties of
administration which arise from that alone, and also in view of
the living conditions created by Bolshevism, which are totally
different from those of Western Europe, the whole question of
the U.S.S.R. would require different treatment from that which
has been applied in the individual countries of Western Europe.”
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that signed?
MR. ALDERMAN: It is not signed. No, Sir.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is it in the Defendant Rosenberg’s
handwriting?
MR. ALDERMAN: It was in the Rosenberg file.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is there anything to indicate that he wrote
it?
MR. ALDERMAN: No. I said it was evidently prepared by Rosenberg or under
his authority. We captured the whole set of Rosenberg files, which
constitutes really a large library.
It is evident that the “presently envisaged administration operating on
a purely economic basis” to which this memorandum objects was the
Economic Staff Oldenburg, which I have already described as having been
set up under Göring and General Thomas.
Rosenberg’s statement—if this be his statement—of the political
purpose of the invasion and his analysis of the achieving of it
apparently did not fall on deaf ears. By a Führer order, dated 20 April
1941, Rosenberg was named commissioner for the central control of
questions connected with the east European region. This order is part of
the correspondence regarding Rosenberg’s appointment, which has been
given the Number 865-PS in our series. I ask that this file, all
relating to the same subject and consisting of four letters, all of
which I shall read or refer to, be admitted in evidence as Exhibit
USA-143.
The order itself reads as follows—it is the first item on the English
translation of 865-PS:
“I name Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as my commissioner for the
central control of questions connected with the east European
region. An office, which is to be furnished in accordance with
his orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the
carrying out of the duties thereby entrusted to him. The
necessary money for this office is to be taken out of the Reich
Chancellery Treasury in a lump sum.
“Führer’s headquarters, 20th April 1941. The Führer, signed,
Adolf Hitler; Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellery,
signed, Dr. Lammers.”
This particular copy of the Führer’s order was enclosed in a letter
which Dr. Lammers wrote to the Defendant Keitel requesting his
co-operation for Rosenberg and asking that Keitel appoint a deputy to
work with Rosenberg. This letter reads as follows—it is on the
stationery of the Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich Chancellery,
Berlin, 21 April 1941. I omit the salutation:
“Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Führer’s decree of the
20th of this month by which the Führer appointed Reichsleiter
Alfred Rosenberg as his commissioner for the central control
connected with the east European region. In this capacity
Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make the necessary preparations for
the probable emergency with all speed. The Führer wishes that
Rosenberg shall be authorized for this purpose to obtain the
closest co-operation of the highest Reich authorities, receive
information from them, and summon the representatives of the
highest Reich authorities to conferences. In order to guarantee
the necessary secrecy of the commission and the measures to be
undertaken, for the time being, only those of the highest Reich
authorities should be informed on whose co-operation
Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily depend. They are: The
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan”—that is Göring—“the Reich
Minister of Economics, and you yourself”—that is
Keitel—“Therefore, may I ask you in accordance with the
Führer’s wishes to place your co-operation at the disposal of
Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the carrying out of the task imposed
upon him. It is recommended in the interests of secrecy that you
name a representative in your office with whom the office of the
Reichsleiter can communicate and who, in addition to your usual
deputy, should be the only one to whom you should communicate
the contents of this letter.
“I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of
this letter.
“Heil Hitler, Yours very sincerely, signed, Dr. Lammers.”
In the next letter Keitel writes Lammers acknowledging receipt of his
letter and telling of his compliance with the request. Keitel also
writes Rosenberg telling him of the action he has taken. Now, the letter
to Dr. Lammers—I shall read the text:
“Dear Reich Minister:
“I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Führer’s decree in
which the Führer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his
commissioner for the central control of questions connected with
the east European region. I have named General of the Artillery
Jodl, head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, as my
permanent deputy, and Major General Warlimont as his deputy to
Reichsleiter Rosenberg.”
And the letter to Reichsleiter Rosenberg on the same date:
“The head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the
Führer’s decree, by which he has appointed you his commissioner
for the central control of questions connected with the east
European region. I have charged General of the Artillery Jodl,
head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, and his deputy,
Major General Warlimont, with the solving of these questions as
far as they concern the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Now
I ask you, as far as your office is concerned, to deal with them
only.”
Immediately upon receipt of the order from Hitler Rosenberg began
building his organization, conferring with the various ministries,
issuing his instructions, and generally making the detailed plans and
preparations necessary to carry out his assigned mission. Although
Rosenberg’s files, which were captured intact, were crowded with
documents evidencing both the extent of the preparation and its purpose,
I believe that the citation of a small number which are typical should
be sufficient for the Tribunal and the record. All of those I shall now
discuss were found in the Defendant Rosenberg’s files.
Our document numbered 1030-PS is a memorandum, dated 8 May 1941,
entitled, “General Instructions for all Reich Commissioners in the
Occupied Eastern Territories.” I offer that in evidence as Exhibit
USA-144.
In these instructions to his chief henchmen Rosenberg outlines the
political aims and purposes of the attack. In the second and third
paragraphs of the English translation, which appear on Page 2 of the
German, the following remarks appear:
“The only possible political goal of war can be the aim to free
the German Reich from the ‘grossrussisch’ pressure for centuries
to come. This does not only correspond with German interests but
also with historical justice, for Russian imperialism was in a
position to accomplish its policy of conquest and oppression
almost unopposed, whilst it threatened Germany again and again.
Therefore, the German Reich has to beware of starting a campaign
against Russia with a historical injustice, meaning the
reconstruction of a great Russian empire, no matter of what
kind. On the contrary, all historical struggles of the various
nationalities against Moscow and Leningrad have to be
scrutinized for their bearing on the situation today. This has
been done on the part of the National Socialist movement to
correspond to the Leader’s political testament as laid down in
his book, that now the military and political threat in the East
shall be eliminated forever.
“Therefore this huge area must be divided according to its
historical and racial conditions into Reich commissions each of
which bears within itself a different political aim. The Reich
Commission Eastland”—Ostland—“including White Ruthenia, will
have the task to prepare, by way of development into a
Germanized protectorate, a progressively closer cohesion with
Germany. The Ukraine shall become an independent state in
alliance with Germany, and Caucasia with the contiguous northern
territories a federal state with a German plenipotentiary.
Russia proper must put her own house in order for the future.
These general viewpoints are explained in the following
instructions for each Reich commissioner. Beyond that there are
still a few general considerations which possess validity for
all Reich commissioners.”
The fifth paragraph of the English translation, Page 7 of the German,
presents a fascinating rationalization of a contemplated robbery. It
reads:
“The German people have achieved, in the course of centuries,
tremendous accomplishments in the eastern European area. Nearly
all its land and houses were confiscated without
indemnification; hundreds of thousands (in the south on the
Volga) starved or were deported or, as in the Baltic
territories, deprived of the fruits of their cultural work
during the past 700 years. The German Reich must proclaim the
principle that after the occupation of the Eastern Territories
the former German assets are the property of the people of
Greater Germany, irrespective of the consent of the former
individual proprietors, where the German Reich may reserve the
right (assuming that it has not already been done during
resettlement) to arrange a just settlement. The manner of
compensation and restitution of this national property will be
subject to different treatment by each Reich commission.”
Document Number 1029-PS in our series is an “Instruction for a Reich
Commissioner Ostland.” It is typical of the type of instruction which
was issued to each of the appointed commissioners (or Kommissars), and
is amazingly frank in outlining intentions of the Nazi conspirators
toward the country they intended to occupy in the course of their
aggression. I offer this document in evidence as Exhibit USA-145. I
should like to read into the record the first three paragraphs. It
begins:
“All the regions between Narva and Tilsit have constantly been
in close relationship with the German people. A 700-year-old
history has moulded the inner sympathies of the majority of the
races living there in a European direction and has in spite of
all Russian threats added this region to the living space of
Greater Germany.
“The aim of a Reich commissioner for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
and White Ruthenia”—last words added in pencil—“must be to
strive to achieve the form of a German Protectorate and then
transform the region into part of the Greater German Reich by
germanizing racially possible elements, colonizing Germanic
races, and banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must
become a Germanic inland sea under the guardianship of Greater
Germany.
“For certain cattle-raising products the Baltic region was a
land of surplus; and the Reich commissioner must endeavor to
make this surplus once more available to the German people and,
if possible, to increase it. With regard to the process of
germanizing or resettling, the Estonian people are strongly
germanized to the extent of 50 percent by Danish, German, and
Swedish blood, and can be considered as a kindred nation. In
Latvia the section capable of being assimilated is considerably
smaller than in Estonia. In this country stronger resistance
will have to be reckoned with and banishment on a larger scale
will have to be envisaged. A similar development may have to be
reckoned with in Lithuania, for here too the immigration of
racial Germans is called for in order to promote very extensive
germanization (on the East Prussian border).”
Skipping a paragraph, the next paragraph is also interesting and reads
as follows:
“The task of a Reich commissioner with his seat of office in
Riga will therefore largely be an extraordinarily positive one.
A country which 700 years ago was captured by German Knights,
built up by the Hanseatic League, and by reason of a constant
influx of German blood together with Swedish elements was a
predominantly germanized land, is to be established as a mighty
German borderland. The preliminary cultural conditions are
available everywhere; and the German Reich will be able to
guarantee the right to a later settlement to all those who have
distinguished themselves in this war, to the descendants of
those who gave their lives during the war, and also to all who
fought in the Baltic campaign, never once lost courage, fought
on in the hour of despair, and delivered Baltic civilization
from Bolshevism. For the rest the solution of the colonization
problem is not a Baltic question but one which concerns Greater
Germany, and it must be settled on these lines.”
These two directives are, I think, sufficiently typical of the lot to
show the Tribunal the extent of the planning and preparation for this
phase of the aggression as well as the political purpose it was hoped
would be achieved thereby. However, on 28 June 1941, less than a week
after the invasion, Rosenberg himself prepared a full report of his
activities since his appointment on the 20th of April. One might almost
think he had so meticulously recorded his activities in order to be of
assistance to this prosecution.
This report is numbered 1039-PS, and I now offer it in evidence as
Exhibit USA-146. To me the most interesting things about this report are
its disclosures concerning the number of these defendants who worked
with and assisted Rosenberg in the planning and preparation for this
phase of the aggression and the extent to which practically all of the
ministries and offices of both state and Party are shown to have been
involved in this operation. The report was found in the Defendant
Rosenberg’s files; and although it is rather long, it is of sufficient
importance in implicating persons, groups, and organizations, that it
must, I believe, be read in full in order that it may be made part of
the record. It is headed, “Report on the Preparatory Work in Eastern
European Territories”:
“Immediately after the notification of individual supreme Reich
offices regarding the Führer’s Decree of 20.4.41 a conference
with the Chief of the OKW”—Armed Forces High Command—“took
place”—That is the Defendant Keitel—“After presentation of the
various political aims in the proposed Reich commissions and
presentation of personal requirements for the East, the chief of
the OKW explained that reservation”—UK-Stellung—“would be too
complicated in this case and that this matter could be carried
out best by direct assignment”—Abkommandierung—“by command of
the Chief of the OKW. General Field Marshal Keitel then issued
an appropriate command which established the basis for the
coming requirements. He named as deputy and liaison officer
General Jodl and Major General Warlimont. The negotiations which
then commenced relative in all questions of the Eastern
territory including personal needs”—relative to, I suppose it
is—“were carried on by the gentlemen of the OKW in
collaboration with officials of my office.
“A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that
under the given confidential circumstances my office could in no
way deal with any representatives of the people of the east
European area. I asked him to do this insofar as the military
intelligence required it and then to name persons to me who
could count as political personalities, over and above the
military intelligence, in order to arrange for their eventual
commitment later. Admiral Canaris said that naturally also my
wish not to recognize any political groups among the emigrants
would be considered by him and that he was planning to proceed
in accordance with my indications.
“Later on I informed General Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch and
Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political
conceptions of the Eastern problem. In further conferences we
agreed to appoint a representative of my office to the Supreme
Commander of the Army, respectively to the Chief Quartermaster,
and to the Army groups for questions relative to political
configuration and requests of the OKW. In the meantime this has
been done.
“Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister of
Economics”—Reichswirtschaftsminister—“Funk”—the Defendant
Funk—“who appointed as his permanent deputy Ministerial
Director Dr. Schlotterer. Almost daily conferences were then
held with Dr. Schlotterer with reference to the war economic
intentions of the Economic Operational Staff East. In this
connection I had conferences with General Thomas, State
Secretary Körner, State Secretary Backe, Ministerial Director
Riecke, General Schubert, and others.
“Far-reaching agreement was reached in the eastern questions as
regards direct technical work now and in the future. A few
problems regarding the general relationship of the proposed
Reich ministry toward the Four Year Plan are still open and will
be subject, after submission, to the decision of the Führer. In
principle I declared that I in no way intended to found an
economic department in my office; economics would rather be
handled substantially and practically by the Reich
Marshal”—that is the Defendant Göring—“and the persons
appointed by him. However, the two responsible department heads,
namely, Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer for industrial
economy and Ministerial Director Riecke for food economy, would
be placed in my office as permanent liaison men to co-ordinate
here political aims with the economic necessities in a
department which would still have to unite with other persons
for such co-ordinating work, depending on labor conditions as
they may arise later on (political leadership of labor unions,
construction, _et cetera_).
“After notification of the Reich Foreign Minister, the latter
appointed Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to my
office. For the requested representation in the political
department of my office (headed by Reichsamtsleiter Dr.
Leibbrandt), the Foreign Ministry released Consul General Dr.
Bräutigam, who is known to me for many years, speaks Russian,
and worked for years in Russia. Negotiations, which if necessary
will be placed before the Führer, are under way with the Foreign
Office regarding its wishes for the assignment of its
representatives to the future Reich commissioners (or
Kommissars).
“The Propaganda Ministry”—that is Goebbels—“appointed State
Secretary Gutterer as permanent liaison man, and a complete
agreement was reached to the effect that the decisions on all
political and other essays, speeches, proclamations, _et
cetera_, would be made in my office; a great number of
substantial works for propaganda would be delivered and the
papers prepared by the Propaganda Ministry would be modified
here, if necessary. The whole practical employment of propaganda
will undisputedly be subject to the Reich Ministry of Public
Enlightenment and Propaganda. For the sake of closer
co-operation the Propaganda Ministry assigns yet another person
directly under my department, ‘Enlightenment and Press,’ and in
addition appoints a permanent press liaison man. All these
activities have been going on for some time, and without
attracting attention to my office in any way this co-ordination
on contents and terminology takes place continually every day.
“Thorough discussions took place with Reich Minister Ohnesorge
concerning future transmission of communication and setting up
of all technical necessities in future occupied territories;
with Reich Minister Seldte on the supply of labor forces, with
Reich Minister Frick”—that is the Defendant Frick—“(State
Secretary Stuckart) in detailed form on the assignment of
numerous necessary officials for the commissions. According to
the present estimate there will be four Reich commissions as
approved by the Führer. I shall propose to the Führer for
political and other reasons to set up a suitable number of
general commissions (24), main commissions (about 80), and
regional commissions (over 900). A general commission would
correspond to a former general government; a main commission to
a main government.
“A regional commission contains three or four
districts”—Kreise—“In view of the huge spaces that is the
minimum number which appears necessary for a future civil
government or administration. A portion of the officials has
already been requested on the basis of the above-named command
of the Chief of the OKW.”
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, speaking for myself I don’t understand why
it is necessary to read this document in full. You have already shown
that there was a plan for dividing Russia up into a number of
commissions.
MR. ALDERMAN: Quite true. I should like merely to point out two of three
other individual defendants who are referred to in this document and as
to whom the document shows that they were in immediate complicity with
this whole scheme. The first of those, about three paragraphs further
down, the Reich Youth Leader—that is the Defendant Baldur Von Schirach.
Then of course Gruppenführer SS Heydrich, about the next paragraph . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Well, he is not a defendant.
MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir. His organization is, however, if the Tribunal
please, charged as a criminal organization.
In the next paragraph, the Defendant Ministerial Director Fritzsche, who
worked under Goebbels.
Without a long discussion of further evidence I might summarize the
individual implication in this fashion. Those of the individual
defendants now on trial which this report personally involves are
Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Funk, Göring, Ribbentrop, Frick, Schirach, and
Fritzsche. The organizations involved by this report include the
following:
OKW, OKH, OKM, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Economics, Reich
Foreign Ministry, Propaganda Ministry, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of
Communications, the Reich Physicians’ Union, Ministry of Munitions and
Armaments, Reich Youth Leadership, Reich Organization Leadership, German
Labor Front, the SS, the SA, and the Reich Press Chief.
At a later stage in the Trial, and in other connections, I should like
to ask the Tribunal to consider that that document with which I have
just been dealing be considered a part of the record to the extent that
it involves these individuals.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you can treat it as all being in evidence.
MR. ALDERMAN: At a later stage in the Trial and in other connections,
evidence will be introduced concerning the manner in which all of this
planning and preparation for the elimination of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics as a political factor was actually carried out. The
planned execution of intelligentsia and other Russian leaders was, for
example, but a part of the actual operation of the program to destroy
the Soviet Union politically and make impossible its early resurrection
as a European power.
Having thus elaborately prepared on every side for the invasion of the
Soviet Union, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to carry out their plans;
and on 22 June 1941 hurled their armies across the borders of the
U.S.S.R. In announcing this act of perfidy to the world Hitler issued a
proclamation on the day of the attack. The text of this statement has
already been brought to the Tribunal’s attention by my British
colleagues, and I should like merely to refer to it in passing here by
quoting therefrom this one sentence, “I have therefore today decided to
give the fate of Europe again into the hands of our soldiers.”
This announcement told the world that the die had been cast—the plans
darkly conceived almost a full year before and secretly and continuously
developed since then, had now been brought to fruition. These
conspirators, having carefully and completely planned and prepared this
war of aggression, now proceeded to initiate and wage it.
That brings us to the consideration of the motives for the attack.
Before going into the positive reasons I should like first to point out
that not only was Germany bound by a solemn covenant not to attack the
U.S.S.R., but throughout the entire period from August 1939 to the
invasion in 1941 the Soviet Union was faithful to its agreements with
Germany and displayed no aggressive intentions toward territories of the
German Reich. General Thomas, for example, points out in his draft of
“Basic Facts for a History of the German War and Armaments Economy,”
which is our Document Number 2353-PS and which I put in evidence earlier
as Exhibit USA-35, that insofar as the German-Soviet Trade Agreement of
11 August 1939 was concerned, the Soviets carried out their deliveries
thereunder up to the very end.
Thomas points out that deliveries by the Soviets were usually made
quickly and well; and since the food and raw materials being thus
delivered were considered essential to the German economy, efforts were
made to keep up their side too. However, as preparations for the
campaign proceeded, the Nazis cared less about complying with their
obligations under that agreement. At Page 315 of his book Thomas says,
and I read from Page 9 of the English translation:
“Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as
preparations for the campaign in the East were already under
way.”
By that, clearly he speaks of German deliveries to Russia, not as to
what the Russians delivered.
“The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned right up
to the start of the attack; even during the last few days
transports of india-rubber from the Far East were completed by
express transit trains.”
Again at Page 404 this author brings this point out even more forcefully
when he states—and I shall read the first paragraph on Page 14 of the
English translation:
“In addition to the Italian negotiations until June 1941, the
negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of
attention.
“The Führer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage
German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany
must be filled as promptly as possible. Since the Russians only
made grain deliveries when the Germans delivered orders placed
by the Russians and since, in the case of the individual firms,
these deliveries to Russia made it impossible for them to fill
orders for the German Armed Forces, it was necessary for the Wi
Rü office to enter into numerous individual negotiations with
German firms in order to co-ordinate Russian orders with those
of the Germans from the standpoint of priority. In accordance
with the wishes of the Foreign Office German industry was
instructed to accept all Russian orders even if it were
impossible to fill them within the limits of the time set for
manufacture and delivery. Since, in May especially, large
deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were instructed
to allow the equipment to go through the Russian Acceptance
Commission, then however, to make such a detour during its
transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered
over the frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack.”
Not only was the Soviet Union faithful to the treaty obligations with
Germany but the evidence shows that she had no aggressive intentions
toward any German territory. Our Document Number C-170, which is in
evidence as Exhibit USA-136, is as I have previously stated, a file on
Russo-German relations found in the files of the Naval High Command
covering the entire period from the treaty to the attack. The entries in
this file demonstrate conclusively the point I have just stated. It
will, I think, be sufficient to read to the Tribunal a few entries which
include reports from the German Ambassador in Moscow as late as June
1941. I shall read the first entry, 165 on Page 21 of the English
translation; that is 4 June:
“Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia;
Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian
Government is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a conflict
with Germany.”
In entry 167 on Page 22 of the English translation, it says:
“6 June. Ambassador in Moscow reports . . . Russia will only
fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow
much more serious than up to now. All military preparations have
been made quietly—as far as can be recognized, only defensive.
Russian policy still strives as before to produce the best
possible relationship to Germany.”
The next one is entry 169, also on Page 22; the date, 7 June:
“From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow . . . all
observations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are
responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to
avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire behavior of the
Government as well as the attitude of the press, which reports
all events concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner,
support this view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty
with Germany proves the same thing.”
Now, that is the German Ambassador talking to you.
The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the Soviet Union
could not have been self-defense or treaty breaches. In truth, no doubt,
as has been necessarily implied from the materials presented on planning
and preparation, more than one motive entered into the decision of the
Nazi conspirators to launch their aggression against the U.S.S.R. All of
them, however, appear to blend into one grand motive of Nazi policy. The
pattern into which these various reasons impelling the decision to
attack may be said to fall is the traditional Nazi ambition for
expansion to the East at the expense of the U.S.S.R. This Nazi version
of an earlier imperial imperative—the “Drang nach Osten” (or the drive
to the East)—had been a cardinal principle of the Nazi Party almost
since its birth and rested on the twin bases of political strategy and
economic aggrandizement. Politically such action meant the elimination
of the powerful country to the east, which might constitute a threat to
German ambitions, and acquisition of Lebensraum; while on the economic
side, it offered magnificent opportunities for the plunder of vast
quantities of food, raw materials, and other supplies, going far beyond
any legitimate exploitation under the Geneva Convention principles for
military purpose. Undoubtedly the demands of the German war economy for
food and raw material served to revive the attractiveness on the
economic side of this theory while the difficulties Germany was
experiencing in defeating England reaffirmed for the Nazi conspirators
the temporarily forgotten Nazi political imperative of eliminating, as a
political factor, their one formidable opponent on the continent.
As early as 1923 Hitler outlined this theory in some detail in _Mein
Kampf_ where he stated, and I quote from Page 641 of the Houghton
Mifflin English edition, as follows:
“There are two reasons which induce me to submit to a special
examination the relation of Germany to Russia: (1) Here perhaps
we are dealing with the most decisive concern of all German
foreign affairs; and (2) this question is also the touchstone
for the political capacity of the young National Socialist
movement to think clearly and to act correctly.”
And again at Page 654 of the same edition:
“And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath
the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war period. We take up
where we broke off 600 years ago. We stop the endless German
movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the
land in the East. At long last we break off the colonial and
commercial policy of the pre-war period and shift to the soil
policy of the future.
“If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in
mind only Russia and her vassal border states.”
The political portion of this economy or purpose is clearly reflected in
the stated purposes of the organization which the Defendant Rosenberg
set up to administer the Occupied Eastern Territories. I have already
discussed this material and need not repeat it now. In a speech,
however, which he delivered 2 days before the attack to the people most
interested in the problem of the East, Rosenberg re-stated in his usual
somewhat mystic fashion the political basis for the campaign and its
inter-relationship with the economic goal. I should like to read a short
extract from that speech, which is Document Number 1058-PS and which I
now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-147. The part I read is from Page 9
of the German text:
“The job of feeding the German people stands this year, without
a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany’s claims in the East;
and here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will
have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people.
We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to
feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus
territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any
feelings. A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without
any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard
years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to
determine to what extent industries can still be maintained
there (wagon factories, _et cetera_). The consideration and
execution of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the
German Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means
negative task, as might appear, if one takes only the harsh
necessity of the evacuation into consideration. The conversion
of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which requires
the strongest characters. Perhaps this decision will also be
approved by a coming Russia later, not in 30 but in a 100
years.”
As I have indicated, the failure of the Nazi conspirators to defeat
Great Britain had served to strengthen them further in their belief of
the political necessity of eliminating the Soviet Union as a European
factor before Germany could completely achieve her role as the master of
Europe.
The economic motive for the aggression was brought out clearly in our
discussion of the organization set up under Göring and General Thomas to
carry out the economic exploitation of the territories they occupied.
The purely materialistic basis for the attack was unmistakable; and if
any doubt existed that at least one of the main purposes of the invasion
was to steal the food and raw material needed for the Nazi war machine
regardless of the horrible consequences such robbery would entail, that
doubt is dispelled by a memorandum, which bears our Number 2718-PS and
which I introduced earlier during my opening statement as Exhibit
USA-32, showing clear and conscious recognition that these Nazi plans
would no doubt result in starving to death millions of people by robbing
them of their food.
Along the similar line, on June 20, 1941 General Thomas wrote a
memorandum in which he stated that General Keitel had confirmed to him
Hitler’s present conception of the German economic policy concerning raw
material. This policy expressed the almost unbelievably heartless theory
that less manpower would be used in the conquest of sources of raw
materials than would be necessary to produce synthetics in lieu of such
raw materials. This is our Document Number 1456-PS, and I offer it in
evidence as Exhibit USA-148. I should like to read the first two
paragraphs.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we better do that after the adjournment.
[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: I understand that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner is now in
court. Will you stand up, please?
[_The Defendant Kaltenbrunner rose in the dock._]
THE PRESIDENT: In accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, you must
now plead either guilty or not guilty.
ERNST KALTENBRUNNER: I plead not guilty. I do not believe that I have
made myself guilty.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just put in evidence our
Document 1456-PS as Exhibit USA-148. I now read from that document on
Page 17:
“The following is a new conception of the Führer, which Minister
Todt has explained to me and which has been confirmed later on
by Field Marshal Keitel:
“I. The course of the war shows that we went too far in our
autarkical endeavors. It is impossible to try to manufacture
everything we lack by synthetic procedures or other measures.
For instance, it is impossible to develop our motor fuel economy
to a point where we can entirely depend on it. All these
autarkical endeavors demand a tremendous amount of manpower, and
it is simply impossible to provide it. One has to choose another
way. What one does not have but needs, one must conquer. The
commitment of men which is necessary for one single action will
not be as great as the one that is currently needed for the
running of the synthetic factories in question. The aim must
therefore be to secure all territories which are of special
interest to us for the war economy by conquering them.
“At the time the Four Year Plan was established I issued a
statement in which I made it clear that a completely autarkical
economy is impossible for us because the need of men will be too
great. My solution, however, has always been directed to
securing the necessary reserves for missing stocks by concluding
economic agreements which would guarantee delivery even in
wartime.”
On this macabre note I come to the end of the story of this aggression.
We have seen these conspirators as they planned, prepared, and finally
initiated their wanton attack upon the Soviet Union. Others will carry
on the tale and describe the horrible manner in which they waged this
war of aggression and the countless crimes they committed in its wake.
When I consider the solemn pledge of non-aggression, the base and
sinister motives involved, the months of secret planning and
preparation, and the unbelievable suffering intentionally and
deliberately wrought—when I consider all of this, I feel fully
justified in saying that never before—and, God help us, never again—in
the history of relations between sovereign nations has a blacker chapter
been written than the one which tells of this unprovoked invasion of the
territory of the Soviet Union. For those responsible—and they are here
before you, the defendants in this case—it might be just to let the
punishment fit the crime.
I now turn to the final phase of the detailed presentation of the
aggressive-war part of the case: German collaboration with Italy and
Japan, and aggressive war against the United States. The relevant
portions of the Indictment are set forth in Subsection 7 under Section
IV (F) of Count One, appearing at Pages 9 and 10 of the printed English
text of the Indictment. The materials relating to this unholy alliance
of the three fascist powers and to the aggressive war against the United
States have been gathered together in a document book, marked with the
letter “Q,” which I now submit to the Tribunal.
Before moving on to the subject matter of this tripartite collaboration,
I should like to invite the attention of the Tribunal to the
significance of this phase. In the course of the joint presentation by
the British and American Prosecution in the past several days, we have
seen the swastika carried forward by force of arms from a tightly
controlled and remilitarized Germany to the four corners of Europe. The
elements of a conspiracy that I am now about to discuss project the Nazi
plan upon a universal screen, involving the older world of Asia and the
new world of the United States of America. As a result, the wars of
aggression that were planned in Berlin and launched across the frontiers
of Poland ended some six years later, almost to the day, in surrender
ceremonies upon a United States battleship riding at anchor in the Bay
of Tokyo.
The first formal alliance between Hitler’s Germany and the Japanese
Government was the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in Berlin on 25 November
1936. This agreement, on its face, was directed against the activities
of the Communist International. It was subsequently adhered to by Italy
on 6 November 1937.
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these official state
documents in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter. The German text
of these treaties—the original German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact and
the subsequent Protocol of Adherence by Italy—is to be found in Volumes
4 and 5 of the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, respectively. The
English translation of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of 25
November 1936 is contained in our Document 2508-PS; the English
translation of the Protocol of Adherence by Italy of 6 November 1937 is
contained in our Document 2506-PS. Both of these documents are included
in the document books which have just been handed up to the Tribunal.
It is an interesting fact, especially in the light of the evidence I
shall submit regarding the Defendant Ribbentrop’s active participation
in collaboration with the Japanese, that Ribbentrop signed the
Anti-Comintern Pact for Germany at Berlin even though at that time,
November 1936, Ribbentrop was not the German Foreign Minister but simply
Hitler’s special Ambassador Plenipotentiary.
On 27 September 1940 some four years after the Anti-Comintern Pact was
signed and one year after the initiation of war in Europe, the German,
Italian, and Japanese Governments signed another pact at Berlin, a
10-year military-economic alliance. Again I note that the Defendant
Ribbentrop signed for Germany, this time in his capacity as Foreign
Minister. The official German text of this pact, as well as the Japanese
and Italian texts together with an English translation, is contained in
our Document 2643-PS, which has been certified by the signature and seal
of the United States Secretary of State. I now offer in evidence
Document 2643-PS as Exhibit USA-149.
The Tripartite Pact pledged Germany, Italy, and Japan to support of, and
collaboration with, one another in the establishment of a New Order in
Europe and East Asia. I should like to read into the record parts of
this far-reaching agreement:
“The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan consider it as a
condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each nation of the
world be given its own proper place. They have, therefore,
decided to stand together and to co-operate with one another in
their efforts in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe,
wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a
new order of things calculated to promote the prosperity and
welfare of the peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of
the three Governments to extend this co-operation to such
nations in other parts of the world as are inclined to give to
their endeavors a direction similar to their own, in order that
their aspirations towards world peace as the ultimate goal may
thus be realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Germany,
Italy, and Japan have agreed as follows:
“Article 1. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of
Germany and Italy in the establishment of a New Order in Europe.
“Article 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the
leadership of Japan in the establishment of a New Order in
Greater East Asia.
“Article 3. Germany, Italy, and Japan agree to co-operate in
their efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake to
assist one another with all political, economic, and military
means, if one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a
power at present not involved in the European war or in the
Chinese-Japanese conflict.”
I now skip to the first sentence of Article 6.
“The present pact shall come into force immediately upon
signature and remain in force for 10 years from the date of its
coming into force.”
The Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940 thus was a bold announcement to
the world that the fascist leaders of Germany, Japan, and Italy had
cemented a full military alliance to achieve world domination and to
establish a New Order presaged by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in
1931, the ruthless Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, and the Nazi
overflow into Austria early in 1938. I might also comment that this fact
introduces the Führerprinzip into world politics.
I should like to read in this connection a statement by Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States, at the time of the signing of
this Tripartite Pact. This statement appears in the official United
States publication, _Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy,
1931-1941_, which has already been put in evidence as Exhibit USA-122.
Mr. Hull’s statement is Number 184 therein. It is also our Document
Number 2944-PS, and both the English text and a German translation
thereof are included in the document books. I now quote a statement by
the Secretary of State, 27 September 1940:
“The reported agreement of alliance does not, in view of the
Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation
which has existed for several years. Announcement of the
alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which has long
existed in effect, and to which this Government have repeatedly
called attention. That such an agreement has been in process of
conclusion has been well known for some time, and that fact has
been fully taken into account by the Government of the United
States, in the determining of this country’s policies.”
That ends the quotation.
I shall not attempt here to trace the relationships and negotiations
leading up to the Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940. I shall note,
however, one example of the type of German-Japanese relationship
existing before the formalization of the Tripartite Pact. This is the
record of the conversation of 31 January 1939 between Himmler and
General Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin, which was referred to by
the United States Chief of Counsel in his opening address. This
document, which is signed by Himmler in crayon, is our Document Number
2195-PS. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-150. I now quote the file
memorandum:
“Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over
the following subjects:
“1) The Führer speech, which pleased him very much, especially
because it has been spiritually well founded in every respect.
“2) We discussed the conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the
triangle Germany-Italy-Japan into an even firmer mold. He also
told me that, together with German
counter-espionage”—Abwehr—“he was undertaking long-range
projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia and emanating
from the Caucasus and the Ukraine. However, this organization
was to become effective only in case of war.
“3) Furthermore, he had succeeded up to now in sending 10
Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These
Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional
Russians whom he had also sent across had been shot at the
frontier.”
Whatever the beginning and the course of development of the fascist
triplice, the Nazi conspirators, once their military and economic
alliance with Japan had been formalized, exhorted the Japanese to
aggression against those nations with whom they were at war and those
with whom they contemplated war. In this the conspirators pursued a
course strikingly parallel to that followed in their relationship with
the other member of the European Axis. On 10 June 1940 in fulfillment of
her alliance with Germany, Italy had carried out her “stab in the back”
by declaring war against France and Great Britain. These Nazi
conspirators set about to induce similar action by Japan on the other
side of the world.
As I shall show, the nations against whom the German-Japanese
collaboration was aimed at various times were the British Commonwealth
of Nations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United
States of America. I shall deal with each of these nations in the order
named.
At least as early as 23 February 1941—on the basis of documents
available to us—these conspirators undertook to exploit their alliance
with Japan by exhortations to commit aggression against the British
Commonwealth. Again the figure of the Defendant Ribbentrop appears. On
that date, 23 February 1941, he held a conference with General Oshima,
the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, at which he urged that the Japanese
open hostilities against the British in the Far East as soon as
possible.
The report of that conference, our Document 1834-PS, has already been
offered in connection with the presentation of the case on aggression
against the Soviet Union as Exhibit USA-129. A part of it has already
been read into the record and I now intend to read other portions. I
shall again come back to this document when dealing with the
German-Japanese collaboration as regards the United States.
As can be seen on the cover page of the English translation, Ribbentrop
on 2 March sent copies of an extract of the record of this conference to
his various ambassadors and ministers for their strictly confidential
and purely personal information with the further note that—and I quote:
“These statements are of fundamental significance for
orientation in the general political situation facing Germany in
early spring 1941.”
I shall now quote from the top of Page 2 of the English translation of
1834-PS, to the end of the first paragraph on that page, and then skip
to the last three sentences of the second paragraph:
“Extract from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign
Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941.
“After particularly cordial mutual greetings the RAM (Reich
Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been
proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in
the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany’s victory in
the West these policies had been fully vindicated. He (the
RAM)”—that is Ribbentrop—“regretted that the alliance between
Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the
ambassador for many years already, had come into being only
after various detours; but public opinion in Japan had not been
ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are
together now.”
Then, skipping:
“Now that the German-Japanese alliance has been concluded,
Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the
Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of
its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the
situation in this respect?”
Ribbentrop, thereafter in the conference, proceeded to shape the
argument for Japanese intervention against the British. First outlining
the intended air and U-boat warfare by Germany against England, he
said—and I now quote the last two sentences in Paragraph 4, on Page 2,
of the English translation:
“Thereby England’s situation would take catastrophic shape
overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution,
however, depends on various factors, above all on weather
conditions.”
And then skipping and picking up at the first full paragraph on Page 3
of the English translation, I quote the Defendant Ribbentrop again:
“The Führer will beat England wherever he encounters her.
Besides, our strength is not only equal but superior to a
combined English-American air force at any time. The number of
pilots at our disposal is unlimited. The same is true of our
airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned,
ours always has been superior to the English—to say nothing
about the American—and we are on the way to enlarge even this
lead. Upon order of the Führer the antiaircraft defense, too,
will be greatly reinforced. Since the Army has been supplied far
beyond its requirements and enormous reserves have been piled
up—the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the
immense stock of material—production now will be concentrated
on submarines, airplanes, and antiaircraft guns.
“Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won
today, militarily, economically, and politically. We have the
desire to end the war quickly, and to force England to sue for
peace soon. The Führer is vigorous and healthy, fully convinced
of victory, and determined to bring the war as quickly as
possible to a victorious close. To this end the cooperation with
Japan is of importance. However, Japan, in her own interest,
should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England’s
key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would
thus secure her position in the Far East, a position which she
could acquire only through war. There were three reasons for
quick action:
“1) Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the
center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser warfare,
_et cetera_). The effect upon the morale of the British people
would be very serious and this would contribute toward a quick
ending of the war.
“2) A surprise intervention by Japan is bound to keep America
out of the war. America, which at present is not yet armed and
would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks west of
Hawaii, could then less likely do this. If Japan would otherwise
respect the American interests, there would not even be the
possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige
to make war plausible to the Americans. It is very unlikely that
America would declare war if she then would have to stand by
helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America
being able to do anything about it.
“3) In view of the coming New World Order it seems to be in the
interest of Japan also to secure for herself, even during the
war, the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time
of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed entirely with this
line of thought and said that he would do everything to carry
through this policy.”
I should like to note at this point the subtlety of Ribbentrop’s
argument. First he told the Japanese Ambassador that Germany had already
practically won the war by herself. Nevertheless he suggested that the
war could be successfully terminated more quickly with Japan’s aid and
that the moment was propitious for Japan’s entry. Then referring to the
spoils of the conquest, he indicated that Japan would be best advised to
pick up by herself during the war the positions she wanted, implying
that she would have to earn her share of the booty, which is reminiscent
of that statement I read to you earlier from the Führer, that “those who
wished to be in on the meal must take a part in the cooking.”
Continuing Ribbentrop’s argument to show the real nature of the
German-Japanese alliance, I shall now read the top two paragraphs on
Page 5 of the English translation of 1834-PS:
“The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was
Japan’s friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the
Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had
been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of
influence in China. Germany’s victory on the continent has
brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great
advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the
Far East (Indo-China). England, too, was considerably weakened;
Japan had been able to close unsteadily on Singapore. Thus,
Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the
future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical
situation, we should have to carry the main burden of the final
battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia
should arise, we should have to carry the main burden also in
this case. If Germany should ever weaken, Japan would find
herself confronted by a world coalition within a short time. We
would all be in the same boat. The fate of both nations would be
determined for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy.
The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A
defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese
imperialistic idea.
“Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and
emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep her
imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the
great problems which would arise after the war for the parties
of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in
Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a
bold solution. Thereby no over-centralization should take place;
but a solution should be found on a basis of parity,
particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich
Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of
trade should take place between the two spheres of influence on
a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the
leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East Asian sphere of
interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for
example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements
directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere
as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and
make trade agreements with the independent countries within the
Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indo-China,
_et cetera_. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres,
each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with
regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with
this thought.”
In the document I have just quoted from we have seen the instigation to
war by the Defendant Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. I shall
return to him again in this connection.
I now wish to show, however, the participation of the so-called military
representatives in the encouragement and provocation of further wars of
aggression. I therefore offer in evidence our Document Number C-75 as
Exhibit USA-151.
This document is a top-secret order signed by the Defendant Keitel as
Chief of the OKW and entitled, “Basic Order Number 24 regarding
Collaboration with Japan.” It is dated 5 March 1941, about a week and a
half after Ribbentrop’s conference with Oshima that I have just
discussed. It was distributed in 14 copies to the highest commands of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as to the Foreign Office. We have
turned up two copies of this order, identical except for handwritten
notations, presumably made by the recipients. C-75, the document I have
introduced, is copy Number 2 of the order distributed to the naval war
staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the OKM. We also have Copy
number 4, designed for the Wehrmacht Führungsstab (the Operations Staff
of the High Command of the Armed Forces). The head of this Operations
Staff was the Defendant Jodl. Copy Number 4 was found in the OKW files
at Flensburg. It is our Document Number 384-PS, and was referred to by
the United States Chief of Counsel in his opening address. I shall not
burden the Tribunal and the record by introducing two identical copies
of the same order.
Basic Order Number 24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on collaboration
with Japan. I shall, therefore, propose to read it in its entirety, some
two pages of English translation:
“The Führer has issued the following order regarding
collaboration with Japan:
“1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three
Power Pact to induce Japan, as soon as possible, _to take active
measures in the Far East_”—The underscoring is in the original
document—“Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and
the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of
America will be diverted to the Pacific. The sooner she
intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for
Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on
the part of her adversaries. The Barbarossa operation will
create particularly favorable political and military
prerequisites for this.”
Then there is a marginal note, “Slightly exaggerated.”
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have any idea when that marginal notation was put
in?
MR. ALDERMAN: I assume that was written by the recipient of this copy of
the order.
THE PRESIDENT: By whom?
MR. ALDERMAN: By the recipient of this particular copy of the order,
which was the naval war staff.
“2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to
strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means
available. For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of
the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous
manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German
war and combat experience, and for assistance in military
economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable,
but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations.
Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests
which would have the most immediate application in waging war.
In special cases the Führer reserves the decisions for himself.
“3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties
is the responsibility of the Naval High Command. This will be
subject to the following guiding principles:
“a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as
forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the
United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no
political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which
would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese
intentions.
“b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile
warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong
Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every
opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be
exploited.
“c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that
Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it
needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United
States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even
after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital
importance to Germany.
“d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the
Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of
war of the three powers.
“In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval
power—extending to those of American naval power only if the
entry of the United States into the war cannot be
prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power
in that region and also, just like the attack on sea
communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds
(Australia). A date for the beginning of operational discussions
cannot yet be fixed.
“4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with
the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with
as equally concern the three participating powers. These will
include primarily the problems of economic warfare. The working
out of the details is the responsibility of the main commission
with the co-operation of the Armed Forces High Command.
“5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the
Barbarossa operations.”
It is signed by Keitel as Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
If the Tribunal will glance at the distribution list, you will see that
it went to the heads of all the Armed Forces, Armed Forces High Command:
Joint Operation Staff, Intelligence divisions, and to the chief of
foreign affairs, simultaneously for the Foreign Office.
It appears from what I have just read that the Nazis’ cardinal
operational principle in collaboration with Japan was, as early as March
1941, the inducement of Japan to aggression against Singapore and other
British far eastern bases. I shall pass over, for the moment, other
references to the United States in Basic Order Number 24 and take up
that point later.
I now wish to refer to our Document Number C-152, which has already been
introduced by the British prosecution as Exhibit GB-122. This document
is the top-secret record of a meeting on 18 March 1941, about 2 weeks
after the issuance of Basic Order Number 24; a meeting attended by
Hitler, the Defendant Raeder, the Defendant Keitel, and the Defendant
Jodl. We are concerned only with Paragraph 11 in this phase, where
Raeder, then Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, is speaking. I quote:
“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (tie-up
of the whole English Fleet; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war
against Japan; inferiority of the United States Fleet in
comparison with the Japanese). Japan is indeed making
preparations for this action; but according to all declarations
made by Japanese officers, she will only carry it out if Germany
proceeds to land in England. Germany must, therefore,
concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act
immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic
questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved
(Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).
“Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A. She
can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as
possible.”
The fact clearly appears from these minutes that military staff
conferences had already been held with the Japanese to discuss the
activation of Japanese military support against the British and to urge
their immediate attack on Singapore. I quote again the second sentence
in that paragraph:
“Japan is indeed making preparations for this action; but
according to all declarations made by Japanese officers, she
will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to land in England.”
Apparently the Nazis were subsequently able to persuade the Japanese to
eliminate this condition precedent to their performance under the
contract.
I now turn to further efforts by the Defendant Ribbentrop to induce the
Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth. On the 29th of
March 1941 he met with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, who was
then in Berlin. A report of their conversations found in the German
Foreign Office archives is contained in our Document 1877-PS, which I
now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-152.
Relevant portions of this document have been translated into English. I
shall now read from the top of Page 1 of the English translation:
“The RAM”—that is Ribbentrop—“resumed, where they had left
off, the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the latter’s
impending talks with the Russians in Moscow. He expressed the
opinion that it would probably be best, in view of the whole
situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too
far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing
was certain, however, namely that Germany would strike
immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to
give Matsuoka this positive assurance so that Japan could push
forward to the south on Singapore without fear of possible
complications with Russia. The largest part of the German Army
was on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich anyway and fully
prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM), however,
believed that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to
war. Should Germany, however, enter into a conflict with Russia,
the U.S.S.R. would be finished off within a few months. In this
case Japan would have, of course, even less reason to be afraid
than ever, if she wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently,
she need not refrain from such an undertaking because of
possible fears of Russia.
“He could not know, of course, just how things with Russia would
develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would intensify
his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM)
wanted to point out to Matsuoka in any case that a conflict with
Russia was at least within the realm of possibility. In any
case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon
his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was
impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such that such a
conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be
considered possible.”
I now skip five pages of the German text and continue directly with the
English translation:
“Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view
of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by
submarines based on the Philippines, and of the intervention of
the British Mediterranean and home fleets, he had again
discussed the situation with Grossadmiral Raeder. The latter had
stated that the British Navy during this year would have its
hands so full in the English home waters and in the
Mediterranean that it would not be able to send even a single
ship to the Far East. Grossadmiral Raeder had described the
United States submarines as so poor that Japan need not bother
about them at all.
“Matsuoka replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very
low estimate of the threat from the British Navy. It also held
the view that, in case of a clash with the American Navy, it
would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However, it
was afraid that the Americans would not take up the battle with
their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might
perhaps be dragged out to 5 years. This possibility caused
considerable worry in Japan.
“The RAM replied that America could not do anything against
Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this
reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on
active measures against Japan. For while on the one hand he
could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand
there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan;
for the American President, of course, this would mean a
considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate
rearmament, he would have nothing to offset such a loss.
“In this connection Matsuoka pointed out that he was doing
everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as
if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of
England in the East. Therefore it might be possible that his
attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words
and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He
assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British,
but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American
elements in Japan just so long, until one day he would suddenly
open the attack on Singapore.
“In this connection Matsuoka stated that his tactics were based
on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against
Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow.
(‘Nothing succeeds like success,’ the RAM remarked.) He followed
here the example expressed in the words of a famous Japanese
statesman addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the
Russo-Japanese war: ‘You open fire, then the nation will be
united.’ The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all,
as an Oriental, he believed in the fate which would come,
whether you wanted it or not.”
I then skip again in the German text, and continue with what appears in
the English translation:
“Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in
the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to
him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written
promise of assistance.
“The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions
with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of
Singapore in order that the Führer—who probably must be
considered the greatest expert on military questions at the
present time—could advise Japan on the best method of attack
against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would
be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their
European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of
dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British
Fleet in Singapore. Thus, the British Fleet would be forced to
disappear from Singapore immediately.
“Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the
British Fleet than with the capture of the fortifications.
“The RAM replied that here, too, the Führer had developed new
methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions,
such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben-Emael, which he could
make available to the Japanese.
“Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger
expert Japanese Naval officers, who were close friends of his,
were of the opinion that the Japanese Naval forces would need 3
months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious Foreign
Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed he could
stave off any danger which threatened from America for 6 months.
If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more time
and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for a year,
the situation with America would become extremely critical; and
he did not know as yet how to meet it.
“If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East
Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on
this area, the oil fields would be set afire. They could be
brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.
“The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive influence over the
Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the capture of
Singapore.”
On the 5th of April, about a week after the conference from whose
minutes I have just quoted, Ribbentrop again met with Matsuoka and again
pushed the Japanese another step along the road to aggressive war. The
notes of this conference, which were also found in the German Foreign
Office archives, are contained in our Document 1882-PS, which I now
offer as Exhibit USA-153. I shall read a few brief extracts from these
notes, starting with the third paragraph on Page 1 of the English
translation:
“In answer to a remark by Matsuoka that Japan was now awakened
and, according to the Japanese temperament, would take action
quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation, the Reich
Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, to
accept a risk in this connection just as the Führer had done
successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland, with the
proclamation of sovereignty of armament and with the resignation
from the League of Nations.”
I now skip several pages of the German text and continue on with the
English translation.
“The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich
would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient
traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, which
in its time was the only dominant power on the European
continent.
“In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized
the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him
from his trips:
“1) Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year,
the world would realize this. Even England would have to concede
it, if she had not collapsed before then, and America would also
have to resign herself to this fact.
“2) There were no conflicting interests between Japan and
Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated for the
long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far
East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.
“3) Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it
would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry
into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than
in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity, which
would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national
objectives of Japan—a chance which would make it possible for
her to play a really leading role in East Asia.”
Here again, in the portion just quoted, we see Ribbentrop pursuing the
same track I have previously noted. Germany has already won the war for
all practical purposes. Japan’s entry will hasten the inevitable end.
But Japan had better get the positions she wants during the war.
I also invite the Tribunal’s attention to Ribbentrop’s assurances,
expressed in the quotation I read from 1877-PS previously, that Japan
likewise had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union if Japan entered the
conflict. The references to the weaknesses of the United States,
scattered throughout the quotations I have read, were also an ingredient
in this brew which was being so carefully prepared and brought to a
boil.
I should like to introduce one more document on the part of the case
dealing particularly with exhortation of the Japanese to aggression
against the British Commonwealth. This is our Document 1538-PS, which I
now offer as Exhibit USA-154. This document is a top-secret report,
dated 24 May 1941, from the German Military Attaché in Tokyo to the
Intelligence Division of the OKW. I wish merely to call attention, at
this point, to the last sentence in the paragraph numbered 1, wherein it
is stated—I quote: “The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila
stand.”
I shall return to this document later. I point out here, however, the
fact which appears from the sentence I have just read, that the German
military were keeping in close touch with the Japanese operational plans
against Singapore, which the Nazi conspirators had fostered.
Next, exhortations by the Nazis to Japanese aggression against the
U.S.S.R.
I invite the Tribunal’s attention, at this point, to the language of the
Indictment on Page 10 of the English edition. I quote, beginning with
the eighth line from the top of the page:
“The Nazi conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression would
weaken and handicap those nations with whom they were at war and
those with whom they contemplated war. Accordingly, the Nazi
conspirators exhorted Japan to seek a ‘new order of things’.”
The evidence I have just adduced showed the Nazi exhortations with
particular reference to the British Commonwealth of Nations. We now turn
to their efforts to induce the Japanese to commit a “stab in the back”
on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here again the Defendant
Ribbentrop appears as the central figure.
For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order Number 24 regarding
collaboration with Japan, the conspirators had been preparing Fall
Barbarossa, the plan for the attack on the U.S.S.R. Basic Order Number
24 decreed, however, that the Japanese “must not be given any intimation
of the Barbarossa operation.”
In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, on 29
March 1941, almost 3 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order Number 24,
Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come. The report of this
conference, contained in 1877-PS, has already been introduced as Exhibit
USA-152 and read into the record. I wish to invite the Tribunal’s
attention again to the first two paragraphs of the English translation
of 1877-PS, where Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that the largest part of
the German Army was on the eastern frontiers of the Reich fully prepared
to open the attack at any time. Ribbentrop then added that although he
believed that the U.S.S.R. would try to avoid developments leading to
war, nevertheless a conflict with the Soviet Union, even if not
probable, would have to be considered possible.
Whatever conclusion the Japanese Ambassador drew from these remarks in
April of 1941 can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis had unleashed
their aggression against the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941, the tenor of
Ribbentrop’s remarks left no room for doubt. On 10 July 1941 Ribbentrop
dispatched a coded telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo. The
telegram is our Document 2896-PS, which I now introduce as Exhibit
USA-155. I quote from numbered Paragraph 4 of that telegram, which is
the first paragraph of the English translation:
“Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Foreign
Minister for conveying the cable report of the Japanese
Ambassador in Moscow. It would be convenient if we could keep on
receiving news from Russia this way. In summing up, I should
like to say I have now, as in the past, full confidence in the
Japanese policy and in the Japanese Foreign Minister; first of
all because the present Japanese Government would really act
inexcusably toward the future of their nation if they would not
take this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem, as
well as to secure for all time its expansion to the south and
settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as reported by the
Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse—a
report which coincides with our own observations as far as we
are able to judge the present war situation—it is simply
impossible that Japan should not settle the matter of
Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her military
preparations are completed.”
Skipping now to the middle of the second paragraph on Page 1 of the
English translation—the sentence beginning “However . . .”:
“However, I ask you to employ all available means in further
insisting upon Japan’s entry into the war against Russia at the
earliest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note
to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better. The
natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands on
the trans-Siberian railroad before winter starts. After the
collapse of Russia, however, the position of the
Three-Power-Pact States in the world will be so gigantic that
the question of England’s collapse or the total destruction of
the British Isles will be only a matter of time. An America
totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced
with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the
British Empire which are important for the Three-Power-Pact
countries. I have the unshakeable conviction that a carrying
through of the New Order as desired by us will be a matter of
course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the
countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and
encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons. I
ask you to report in the near future, as often as possible and
in detail, on the political situation there.”
We have Ott’s reply to this telegram, dated 13 July 1941. This is our
Document Number 2897-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-156.
After reading the heading, I shall skip to the last paragraph on Page 3
of the German text, which is the paragraph appearing in the English
translation:
“Telegram; secret cipher system”—Sent 14 July from Tokyo;
arrived 14 July 1941—“As fast as possible.
“I am trying with all means to work toward Japan’s entry into
the war against Russia as soon as possible, especially using
arguments of personal message of Foreign Minister and telegram
cited above to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the
Foreign Office, military elements, nationalists, and friendly
businessmen. I believe that according to military preparations,
Japanese participation will soon take place. The greatest
obstacle to this against which one has to fight is the disunity
within the activist group which, without unified command,
follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the
changed situation.”
On subsequent occasions Ribbentrop repeated his exhortations to induce
the Japanese to aggression against the U.S.S.R. I shall present three
documents covering July of 1942 and March and April of 1943. The first
is our Document 2911-PS which contains notes of a discussion between
Ribbentrop and Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, on 9 July 1942. As
a matter of background I note that at this time German armies were
sweeping forward in the U.S.S.R. and the fall of Sevastopol had just
been announced.
I now offer our Document 2911-PS as Exhibit USA-157, and I quote the
relevant extracts appearing in the English translation thereof:
“He, the German Minister, had asked to see the Ambassador at
this time, when the situation was as described, because now a
question of fateful importance had arisen concerning the joint
conduct of the war. If Japan felt herself sufficiently strong
militarily, the moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably
now. He thought it possible that if Japan attacked Russia at
this time, it would lead to her (Russia) final moral collapse;
at least it would hasten the collapse of her present system. In
any case, never again would Japan have such an opportunity as
existed at present to eliminate once and for all the Russian
colossus in eastern Asia.
“He had discussed this question with the Führer, and the Führer
was of the same opinion; but he wanted to emphasize one point
right away: Japan should attack Russia only if she felt
sufficiently strong for such an undertaking. Under no
circumstances should Japanese operations against Russia be
allowed to bog down at the half-way mark, and we do not want to
urge Japan into an action that is not mutually profitable.”
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now, for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I now offer in evidence our
Document Number 2954-PS as Exhibit USA-158. This is a record of a
conference between Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima on 6 March 1943.
I note again for background that the strategic military situation in the
broad expanses of the U.S.S.R. had changed somewhat.
In the previous month, February 1943, the Soviet armies had completely
defeated the German forces at Stalingrad and inflicted very severe
losses. Further north and west their winter offensive had removed large
areas from the hands of the invader. Combined United States and British
forces had already landed in North Africa.
You will remark as I read that the tone of Ribbentrop’s argument at this
time reflects the changed military situation. The familiar Japanese
refrain of “So sorry, please,” likewise appears to have crept in.
I note in this record that the month of February 1943 had also seen the
end of the organized Japanese resistance on the Island of Guadalcanal.
I now quote the relevant extracts from the minutes of the discussion
between Ribbentrop and Oshima on 6 March 1943, which appear in the
English translation in the document book:
“Ambassador Oshima declared that he received a telegram from
Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his Government to the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following: The suggestion
of the German Government to attack Russia was the subject of a
common conference between the Japanese Government and the
Imperial headquarters during which the question was discussed in
detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following:
The Japanese Government absolutely recognize the danger which
threatens from Russia and completely understand the desire of
their German ally that Japan on her part will also enter the war
against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese
Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into
the war. They are rather of the conviction that it would be in
the common interest not to start the war against Russia now. On
the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard
the Russian question.
“The Japanese Government have the intention to become aggressive
again in the future on other fronts.
“The RAM brought up the question, after the explanation by the
Ambassador, how the continued waging of the war is envisaged in
Tokyo. At present Germany wages the war against the common
enemies, England and America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly
behaves more defensively. However, it would be more correct that
all powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their
forces not only to defeat England and America, but also Russia.
It is not good when one part must fight alone. One cannot
overstrain the German national strength. He was inwardly
concerned about certain forces at work in Tokyo, who were of the
opinion, and propagated the same, that doubtless, Germany could
emerge from the battle victoriously and that Japan should
proceed to consolidate her forces before she should further
exert herself to the fullest extent.”
I now skip several pages in the German text and resume the quotation:
“Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on
Russia by Japan and he declared that, after all, the fight on
the Burma front as well as in the south is actually more of a
maritime problem; and on all fronts except those in China at
best very few ground forces are stationed. Therefore the attack
on Russia is primarily an Army affair, and he asked himself if
the necessary forces for that would be available.”
Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with Oshima about
3 weeks later on 18 April 1943. The top-secret notes of this conference
are contained in our Document 2929-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit
USA-159. I shall quote only one sentence:
“The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again
that, without any doubt, this year presented the most favorable
opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had
sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia,
which certainly would never again be as weak as she was at the
moment.”
I now wish to come to that aspect of this conspiracy which is in a large
measure responsible for the appearance of millions of Americans in
uniform all over the world.
The Nazi preparations and collaboration with the Japanese against the
United States, as noted by the United States Chief of Counsel in his
opening statement, present a two-fold aspect; one of preparations by the
Nazis themselves for an attack from across the Atlantic, and the other
of fomenting war in the Pacific.
In the course of my presentation of the Nazi exhortations to the
Japanese to war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R., I
have referred to some documents and quoted some sentences relating to
the United States. I shall take those documents up again in their
relevant passages to show their particular application. I have also, in
the treatment of Ribbentrop’s urging the Japanese to war against the
U.S.S.R., gone beyond the dates of 7 December and 11 December 1941, when
the Japanese and German Governments respectively initiated and declared
aggressive war against the United States.
Apart from the advantage and convenience of presentation, these
documents have indicated the Nazi awareness and acceptance of the
direction in which their actions were leading, as well as the universal
aspects of their conspiracy and of their alliance with the Japanese.
Their intentions against the United States must be viewed in the focus
of both their over-all plan and their immediate commitments elsewhere.
That their over-all plan involved ultimate aggressive war against the
United States was intimated by the Defendant Göring in a speech on 8
July 1938, when these conspirators had already forcibly annexed Austria
and were perfecting their plans against Czechoslovakia.
This speech was delivered to representatives of the aircraft industry,
and the copy that we have was transmitted as the enclosure to a secret
memorandum from Göring’s adjutant to General Udet, who was then in
charge of experimental research for the Luftwaffe. It is contained in
our Document R-140, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-160.
I invite the Tribunal’s attention to the statement in the covering
memorandum that the enclosure is a copy of the shorthand minutes of the
conference. I shall not go through the long speech in which Göring
called for increased aircraft production and pointed to the necessity
for full mobilization of German industrial capacity. I wish to quote
just two sentences, which appear on Page 33 of the German text and Page
11 of the English translation. Quoting from the second full paragraph on
Page 11 of the English translation, starting with the third sentence
from the end of the paragraph:
“I still lack these rocket-motors which could make such flights
possible. I completely lack the bombers capable of round-trip
flights to New York with a 5-ton bomb load. I would be extremely
happy to possess such a bomber which would at last stuff the
mouth of arrogance across the sea.”
Göring’s fervent hope, of course, was not capable of realization at that
time, either technically or in the fact of the Nazi conspirators’
schedule of aggression that has been outlined here in the past several
days.
During the period of their preparation for and the waging of aggressive
war in Europe, up to the launching of the campaign against the U.S.S.R.,
it is only reasonable to believe that these conspirators were not
disposed to involve the United States in war at that time. Nevertheless,
even in the fall of 1940 the prosecution of war against the United
States of America at a later date was on the military agenda. This is
clearly shown in a document which we have found in the files of the OKL,
the German Air Force files. It is Document 376-PS, which I now offer as
Exhibit Number USA-161. This document is a memorandum marked
“Chefsache,” the German designation for top secret, from a Major Von
Falkenstein to an unspecified general, presumably a Luftwaffe general.
Falkenstein, who was a major of the General Staff, was at that time the
Luftwaffe liaison officer with the Operations Staff of the OKW, which
was the staff headed by the Defendant Jodl. His memorandum, which he
characterizes as a “brief résumé on the military questions current
here,” is dated the 29th of October 1940. It covers several questions. I
shall quote to you numbered Paragraph 5, which appears at the bottom of
the first page of the English translation and carries over to the
reverse side of the one-sheet document:
“5) The Führer is at present occupied with the question of the
occupation of the Atlantic islands with a view to the
prosecution of a war against America at a later date.
Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here.
Essential conditions are at the present:
“(a) No other operational commitment; (b) Portuguese neutrality;
(c) support of France and Spain.
“A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding
air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the
GAF.”—or the German Air Force.
The Nazis’ military interest in the United States is further indicated
by Paragraph 7 which I read:
“General Bötticher has made repeated reference, especially in
his telegram 2314, dated 26th of October, to the fact that in
his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American
aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The
matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I
pointed out that the matter was specifically a GAF one but have
taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own
merits.”
Again, in July 1941, in his first flush of confidence resulting from
early gains in the aggression against the U.S.S.R., the Führer signed an
order for further preliminary preparations for the attack on the United
States. This top-secret order, found in the files of the German Navy, is
our Document C-74, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-162. I read from the
first paragraph of that text just preceding the paragraph numbered (1):
“By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive Number 32,
for the further conduct of the war, I lay down the following
principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material
supplies:
“(1) In general:
“The military domination of Europe after the defeat of Russia
will enable the strength of the Army to be considerably reduced
in the near future. As far as the reduced strength of the Army
will allow, the armored units will be greatly increased.
“Naval armament must be restricted to those measures which have
a direct connection with the conduct of the war against England
and, should the case arise, against America.
“The main effort in armament will be shifted to the Air Force,
which must be greatly increased in strength.”
From these documents it appears that the Nazi conspirators were making
at least preliminary plans of their own against the United States. The
Nazis’ over-all plan with regard to the United States was, however, a
complex one involving, in addition, collaboration with the Japanese. In
the course of their repeated representations to the Japanese to
undertake an assault against British possessions in the Pacific Far
East, they again considered war against the United States.
I now refer again to Basic Order Number 24, regarding collaboration with
Japan. This is our Document C-75, which I have put in as Exhibit
USA-151. I have read it in its entirety into the record. The Tribunal
will recall that in that basic order, which was issued on 5 March 1941,
the Nazi policy was stated in Subparagraph (3) (a) as “forcing England
to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the
war.”
Nevertheless, the Nazi conspirators clearly contemplated, within the
framework of that policy, the possibility of the United States’ entry
into the Far Eastern conflict which the Nazis were then instigating.
This could result from an attack by Japan on possessions of the United
States practically simultaneously with the assault on the British
Empire, as actually happened. Other possibilities of involvement of the
United States were also discussed. This Basic Order Number 24
stated—and I am referring to Subparagraph (3) (c), on the top of Page 2
of the Document C-75:
“(c) The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that
Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it
needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United
States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even
after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital
importance to Germany.”
The order continues in an unnumbered paragraph, immediately below
Subparagraph (3) (d):
“In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval
power—extending to those of American naval power only if the
entry of the United States into the war cannot be
prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power
in that region and also, just like the attack on sea
communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds
(Australia).”
In these passages there is a clear envisagement of United States
involvement, as well as a clear intent to attack. The vital threat to
United States interests, if Japan were to capture Singapore, was also
envisaged by the Defendant Raeder in his meeting of 18 March 1941 with
Hitler and the Defendants Keitel and Jodl. These minutes are contained
in our Document C-152, which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-122.
I wish now to repeat the four sentences of Item 11 of the minutes of
that conference, contained on Page 1 of the English translation. I am
quoting the Defendant Raeder:
“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
since the opportunity will never again be so favorable (tie-up
of the whole English Fleet; unpreparedness of the U.S.A. for war
against Japan, inferiority of the United States Fleet in
comparison with the Japanese). Japan is indeed making
preparations for this action, but according to all declarations
made by Japanese officers, she will carry it out only if Germany
proceeds to land in England. Germany must, therefore,
concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act
immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic
questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved
(Guam, the Philippines, Borneo, and the Dutch East Indies).
“Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A. She
can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as
possible.”
The Defendant Ribbentrop also recognized the possibility of United
States involvement as a result of the course of aggression that he was
urging on the Japanese. I refer again to his meeting of 23 February 1941
with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, the notes of which are contained in
our Document 1834-PS, which is in evidence as Exhibit USA-129.
The Tribunal will recall that in a passage I have already read,
Subparagraph (2) near the bottom of Page 3 of the English translation,
Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that a surprise by Japan was bound to keep
the United States out of the war since she was unarmed and could not
risk either her fleet or the possibility of losing the Philippines as
the result of a declaration of war. Two paragraphs later Ribbentrop
practically dropped the pretense that the United States would not be
involved. I quote here from the last paragraph at the bottom of Page 3
of the English translation:
“The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that if America
should declare war because of Japan’s entry into the war, this
would mean that America had the intention to enter the war
sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to
avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be
by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of
the countries of the Three Power Pact. The Foreign Minister
further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the
British morale caused by America’s entry into the war would be
canceled by Japan’s entry into the war. If, however, contrary to
all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to
send their navy, in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far
East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries
of the Three Power Pact to bring the war to an end with the
greatest rapidity. He—the Foreign Minister—is convinced that
the Japanese Fleet would then do a complete job. Ambassador
Oshima replied to this that unfortunately he does not think the
Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of his
fleet in Japanese waters.”
In the paragraphs that follow, some of which have already been read into
the record, Ribbentrop again stressed the mutual inter-dependence of the
Tripartite Pact powers and suggested co-ordinated action.
I want to quote now only the last paragraph on Page 5, a difficult bit
of Nazi cynicism which by now is quite familiar.
“The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question,
explicitly designated as theoretical, that the contracting
powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the
U.S.A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy
were fundamentally determined on this. After signing of the
Three Power Pact, we should proceed, if the occasion arises,
also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes
of the people in the United States, and under certain conditions
swing public opinion towards isolation. Naturally a situation
had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the
wrong. The common step of the signatory powers should be
exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question, however,
was in no way acute at the time.”
Again, on 29 March 1941, Ribbentrop, this time in a conference with the
Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, discussed the possible involvement
of the United States. Notes of this conference are contained in our
Document 1877-PS, which I have already introduced as Exhibit USA-152;
and I have read it into the record. The relevant statements appear in
the bottom two paragraphs of Page 1 and the first full paragraph on Page
2 of the English translation. I shall not take the Tribunal’s time to
read them again.
I should like to refer to one more document to show that the Nazi
conspirators knew that the aggressive war they were urging the Japanese
to undertake both threatened the vital interests of the United States
and could lead to the United States’ involvement in the contemplated Far
Eastern conflict. This document is our 1881-PS, report of the conference
between Hitler and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 4
April 1941. I have already offered, in my opening statement to the
Tribunal 2 weeks ago, Document 1881-PS as Exhibit USA-33; and I read at
that time a considerable portion of it into the record. Unless the Court
prefers that I do not do so, it seems to me desirable at this point to
re-read a few brief passages.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we might treat it as being in evidence.
MR. ALDERMAN: I wish to emphasize, however, that the passages which I
read 2 weeks ago and which I had expected to re-read at this point show
not only a realization of the probable involvement of the United States
in the Far Eastern conflict that the Nazis were urging, but also a
knowledge on their part that the Japanese Army and Navy were actually
preparing war plans against the United States. Furthermore, we have a
document that shows the Nazis knew at least a part of what those war
plans were.
I now refer again to Document Number 1538-PS, which has been offered in
evidence as Exhibit USA-154, the secret telegram from the German
Military Attaché in Tokyo, dated 24 May 1941. He talks about the
conferences he has had regarding Japan’s entry in the war in the event
Germany should become involved in war with the United States.
In the paragraph numbered 1 this sentence also appears—I quote the last
sentence in numbered Paragraph Number 1, “Preparations for attack on
Singapore and Manila stand.”
May I at this point review the Nazi position with regard to the United
States at this time, the spring of 1941. In view of their pressing
commitments elsewhere and their aggressive plans against the U.S.S.R.
set for execution in June of 1941, their temporary strategy was
naturally a preference that the United States not be involved in the war
at that time. Nevertheless, they had been considering their own
preliminary plan against the United States, as seen in the Atlantic
island document which I offered.
They were repeatedly urging the Japanese to aggression against the
British Commonwealth just as they would urge them to attack the U.S.S.R.
soon after the launching of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. They
were aware that the course along which they were pushing the Japanese in
the Far East would probably lead to involvement of the United States.
Indeed, the Japanese Foreign Minister had told Hitler this in so many
words, and their own military men had fully realized the implications of
the move against Singapore. They also knew that the Japanese Army and
Navy were preparing operation plans against the U.S. They knew at least
part of those plans.
The Nazi conspirators not only knew all these things; they accepted the
risk of the aggressive course they were urging on the Japanese and
pushed their eastern allies still further along that course.
In April 1941 Hitler told the Japanese Foreign Minister that in the
event Japan would have become involved in the war with the United
States, Germany would immediately take the consequences and strike
without delay.
I refer to our Document 1881-PS, the notes of the Hitler-Matsuoka
conference in Berlin on 4 April 1941, which has already been introduced
as Exhibit Number USA-33. I refer particularly to the first four
paragraphs on Page 2 of the English translation. I think that has been
read to you at least twice, and I perhaps need not repeat it.
Then, skipping two paragraphs, we see Hitler then encouraging Matsuoka
in his decision to strike against the United States; and I invite your
attention to the fourth paragraph on Page 2, which you have heard
several times and which I shall not re-read.
Here in those passages were assurance, encouragement, and abetment by
the head of the German State, the leading Nazi co-conspirator, in April
1941. But the Nazi encouragement and promise of support did not end
there.
I now offer our Document 2898-PS as Exhibit Number USA-163. This is
another telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo regarding his
conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister. It is dated the 30th of
November 1941, exactly 1 week before Pearl Harbor. I will read from the
first four paragraphs on Page 2 of the German text, which is the first
paragraph of the English translation; and this passage, I am sure, has
not been read to the Tribunal. No part of this document has been read.
“The progress of the negotiations so far confirms his viewpoint
that the difference of opinion between Japan and the U.S. is
very great. The Japanese Government, since they sent Ambassador
Kurusu, have taken a firm stand as he told me. He is convinced
that this position is in our favor, and makes the United States
think that her entry into the European war would be risky
business. The new American proposal of 25 November showed great
divergencies in the viewpoints of the two nations. These
differences of opinion concern, for example, the further
treatment of the Chinese question. The biggest”—and then the
German text has the legend “one group missing,” indicating that
one group of the secret code was garbled on transmission. It
would appear from the text that the missing words are
“difference of opinion”—“The biggest (one group missing),
however, resulted from the United States attempt to make the
three-power agreement ineffective. The United States suggested
to Japan that she conclude treaties of non-aggression with the
United States, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and other
countries in order to prevent Japan’s entry into the war on the
side of the Axis Powers. Japan, however, insisted upon
maintaining her treaty obligations, and for this reason American
demands are the greatest obstacles for adjusting
Japanese-American relations. He avoided discussing concessions
promised by the United States and merely mentioned that grave
decisions were at stake.
“The United States is seriously preparing for war and is about
to operate a considerable part of its navy from southern Pacific
bases. The Japanese Government are busy working out an answer in
order to clarify their viewpoint. But he has no particulars at
that moment. He thinks the American proposals as a whole
unacceptable.
“Japan is not afraid of a breakdown of negotiations, and she
hopes that if occasion arises Germany and Italy, according to
the Three Power Pact, would stand at her side. I answered that
there could be no doubt about Germany’s future position. The
Japanese Foreign Minister thereupon stated that he understood
from my words that Germany, in such a case, would consider her
relationship to Japan as that of a union by fate. I answered,
according to my opinion, Germany was certainly ready to have
mutual agreement between the two countries over this situation.
“The Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that it was possible
that he would come back to this point soon. The conversation
with the Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed the impression
that the United States note, in fact, is very unsatisfactory
even for the compromise-seeking politicians here. For these
circles America’s position, especially in the China question, is
very disappointing. The emphasis upon the Three Power Pact as
being the main obstacle between successful Japanese-United
States negotiations seems to point to the fact that the Japanese
Government are becoming aware of the necessity of close
co-operation with the Axis Powers.”
The time is now fast approaching for that day of infamy. I offer our
Document 2987-PS as Exhibit USA-166. This document consists of extracts
from the handwritten diary of Count Galeazzo Ciano during the period 3
December to 8 December 1941. It consists of notes he jotted down in the
course of his daily business as Foreign Minister of Italy. The Italian
has been translated into both English and German, and copies of both the
English and the German are in the document books.
I now quote from the beginning of the entry of 3 December, Wednesday:
“Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an audience
with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of
the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion
that they have reached a dead end. Then invoking the appropriate
clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy declare war on
America immediately after the outbreak of hostilities and
proposes the signing of an agreement not to conclude a separate
peace. The interpreter translating this request was trembling
like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest assurances, reserving the
right to confer with Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was
pleased with the communication and said, ‘We are now on the
brink of the inter-continental war which I predicted as early as
September 1939.’ What does this new event mean? In any case it
means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his maneuver. Since he
could not enter the war immediately and directly, he entered it
indirectly by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore,
this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming
further and further removed and that it is now easy—much too
easy—to predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out
longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be
considered. Berlin’s answer will be somewhat delayed because
Hitler has gone to the southern Front to see General Kleist,
whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an
unexpected Soviet offensive.”
And then December 4, Thursday—that is 3 days before Pearl Harbor:
“Berlin’s reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious.
Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but
the idea of provoking America’s intervention pleases the Germans
less and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about
it.”
And December 5, Friday:
“A night interrupted by Ribbentrop’s restlessness. After
delaying 2 days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the
Japanese; and at three in the morning he sent Mackensen to my
house to submit a plan for a triple agreement relative to
Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate
peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and
the latter was very glad I had not.”
It appears from the last entry I have read, that of December 5, that
some sort of an agreement was reached.
On Sunday, 7 December 1941, Japan, without previous warning or
declaration of war, commenced an attack against the United States at
Pearl Harbor and against the British Commonwealth of Nations in the
Southwest Pacific. On the morning of 11 December, 4 days after the
Japanese assault in the Pacific, the German Government declared war on
the United States, committing the last act of aggression which was to
seal their doom. This declaration of war is contained in Volume IX of
the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, of which I now ask the Tribunal
to take judicial notice as Exhibit USA-164. An English translation is
contained in our document book, and for the convenience of the Tribunal
is Number 2507-PS.
The same day, 11 December, the fourth anniversary of which is tomorrow,
the Congress of the United States resolved:
“That the state of war between the United States and the
Government of Germany which has thus been thrust upon the United
States, is hereby formally declared.”
This declaration is contained as Document 272 in the official
publication _Peace and War_, of which the Tribunal has already taken
judicial notice as Exhibit USA-122. The declaration itself has been
reproduced for the document books as our Document 2945-PS.
It thus appears that, apart from their own aggressive intentions and
declaration of war against the United States, the Nazi conspirators in
their collaboration with Japan incited and kept in motion a force
reasonably calculated to result in an attack on the United States. While
maintaining their preference that the United States not be involved in
war at the time, they nevertheless foresaw the distinct possibility,
even probability, of such involvement as a result of the action they
were encouraging. They were aware that the Japanese had prepared plans
for attack against the United States, and they accepted the consequences
by assuring the Japanese that they would declare war on the United
States should a United States-Japanese conflict result.
In dealing with captured documents of the enemy the completeness of the
plan is necessarily obscured, but those documents which have been
discovered and offered in evidence before this Tribunal show that the
Japanese attack was the proximate and foreseeable consequence of their
collaboration policy and that their exhortations and encouragement of
the Japanese as surely led to Pearl Harbor as though Pearl Harbor itself
had been mentioned.
I should like to read the Ciano diary entry for 8 December, the day
after Pearl Harbor:
“A night telephone call from Ribbentrop. He is overjoyed about
the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about it that I
am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the final
advantages of what has happened. One thing is now certain, that
America will enter the conflict and that the conflict will be so
long that she will be able to realize all her potential forces.
This morning I told this to the King who had been pleased about
the event. He ended by admitting that, in the long run, I may be
right. Mussolini was happy, too. For a long time he has favored
a definite clarification of relations between America and the
Axis.”
The final document consists of the top-secret notes of a conference
between Hitler and Japanese Ambassador Oshima on 14 December 1941, from
1300 to 1400 hours, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister
Ribbentrop. It is our Document 2932-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit
USA-165. The immediate subject matter is the Pearl Harbor attack, but
the expressions therein typify Nazi technique. I quote from the second
paragraph of the English translation which has not been previously read:
“First the Führer presents Ambassador Oshima with the Grand
Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold. With
cordial words he acknowledges his services in the achievement of
German-Japanese co-operation, which has now obtained its
culmination in a close brotherhood of arms.
“General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great honor and
emphasizes how glad he is that this brotherhood of arms has now
come about between Germany and Japan.
“The Führer continues: ‘You gave the right declaration of war.’
This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly
and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as
long as possible. But if one sees the other is interested only
in putting one off, in shamming and humiliating one, and is not
willing to come to an agreement, then one should strike as hard
as possible, indeed, and not waste time declaring war. It was
heart-warming to him to hear of the first operations of the
Japanese. He himself negotiated with infinite patience at times,
for example, with Poland and also with Russia. When he then
realized that the other did not want to come to an agreement, he
struck suddenly and without formality. He would continue to go
on this way in the future.”
If the Tribunal please, that ends my presentation of the various phases
of aggressive warfare charged as Crimes against Peace in Count One of
the Indictment. As I conclude this phase I hope the Tribunal will allow
me to express my deep sense of obligation to Commander Sidney J. Kaplan,
section chief, and to the members of his staff, who did the yeoman work
necessary to assemble and prepare these materials that I have presented.
These members of that staff, in the order in which the materials were
presented, are: Major Joseph Dainow, Lieutenant Commander Harold
Leventhal, Lieutenant John M. Woolsey, Lieutenant James A. Gorrell,
Lieutenant Roy H. Steyer.
Commander Kaplan and his staff have fully measured up to the famous
motto of his branch of the armed services, the United States Coast
Guard, “Semper Paratus” (Always Prepared).
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]
SEVENTEENTH DAY
Tuesday, 11 December 1945
_Morning Session_
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the United States next offers in
evidence some captured moving pictures through Commander Donovan, who
had charge of taking them.
COMMANDER JAMES BRITT DONOVAN (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United
States): May it please the Tribunal, the United States now offers in
evidence Document Number 3054-PS, United States Exhibit Number 167, the
motion picture entitled _The Nazi Plan_. This document contains several
affidavits with exhibits, copies of which have been furnished to Defense
Counsel. I ask the Tribunal whether it believes it to be necessary that
I formally read the affidavits at this time. Since the motion pictures
themselves will be presented to the Tribunal and thereafter be in its
permanent record, I respectfully submit that the reading be waived.
In the past 3 weeks the Prosecution has presented to this Tribunal a
vast amount of evidence concerning the nature of the Nazi conspiracy and
what we contend to be its deliberate planning, launching, and waging of
wars of aggression. That evidence has consisted of documentary and some
oral proof, but the Nazi conspirators did more than leave behind such
normal types of evidence. German proficiency in photography has been
traditional. Its use as a propaganda instrument was especially well
known to these defendants, and as a result the United States in 1945
captured an almost complete chronicle of the rise and fall of National
Socialism as documented in films made by the Nazis themselves. It is
from excerpts of this chronicle that we have compiled the motion picture
now presented, entitled _The Nazi Plan_, which in broad outline sums up
the case thus far presented under Counts One and Two of the Indictment.
The motion picture has been divided into four parts. This morning we
first offer to the Tribunal Parts 1 and 2, respectively entitled “The
Rise of the NSDAP, 1921 to 1933,” and “Acquiring Totalitarian Control of
Germany, 1933 to 1935.” These will be concluded by 11:20, at which time
we assume the Tribunal will order its customary morning adjournment. At
11:30 we shall present Part 3, entitled “Preparation for Wars of
Aggression, 1935 to 1939.” This will be concluded shortly before 1
o’clock. At 2 p.m. we will offer Part 4, “Wars of Aggression, 1939 to
1944,” and this will be concluded by 3 p.m.
Parts 1 and 2 now to be presented, enable us to re-live those years in
which the Nazis fought for and obtained the power to rule all life in
Germany. We see the early days of terrorism and propaganda bearing final
fruit in Hitler’s accession to the Chancellery in 1933, then the
consolidation of power within Germany, climaxed by the Parteitag of
1934, in which the Nazis proclaimed to the nation their plans for
totalitarian control. It is in simple and dramatic form the story of how
a nation forsook its liberty.
I wish again to emphasize that all film now presented to the Tribunal,
including, for example, pictures of early Nazi newspapers, is the
original German film, to which we have added only the title in English.
And now, if it please the Tribunal, we shall present Parts 1 and 2 of
_The Nazi Plan_.
THE PRESIDENT: It may be convenient for the United States Prosecutor to
know that the Tribunal propose to rise this afternoon at 4 o’clock
instead of 5.
[_The film, The Nazi Plan, was then shown in the court room until 1125
hours, at which time a recess was taken._]
COMMANDER DONOVAN: May it please the Tribunal, in the films which have
just been shown to the Tribunal we have watched the Nazi rise to power.
In Part 3 of our documentary motion picture now to be presented, we see
the use they made of that power and how the German nation was led by
militaristic regimentation to preparation for aggressive war as an
instrument of national policy. Part 3, “Preparation for Wars of
Aggression, 1935-1939; 1935—Von Schirach urges Hitler Youth to follow
principles of _Mein Kampf_.”
[_The showing of the film then continued and at the end a recess was
taken until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
COMMANDER DONOVAN: This morning we presented photographic evidence of
the history of National Socialism from 1921 to September 1939. We saw
the dignity of the individual in Germany destroyed by men dedicated to
perverted nationalism, men who set forth certain objectives and then
preached to a regimented people the accomplishment of those objectives
by any necessary means, including aggressive war.
In September 1939 the Nazis launched the first of a series of
catastrophic wars, terminated only by the military collapse of Germany.
It is this final chapter in the history of National Socialism that the
Prosecution now presents.
May I again remind the Tribunal that all film presented and all German
narration heard is in the original form as filmed by the Nazis.
[_The showing of the film, part 4, then continued._]
COMMANDER DONOVAN: The Prosecution has concluded its presentation of the
photographic summation entitled _The Nazi Plan_. We shall deliver for
the permanent records of the Tribunal, as soon as possible, the original
films projected today.
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, just a brief announcement about the
presentation that shall follow. The rest of the week will be consumed in
the presentation of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, starting
with exploitation of forced labor, concentration camps, persecution of
the Jews, and Germanization and spoliation in occupied countries. We
should like to call the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that many of
these crimes will be crimes attributed to the criminal organizations
which will follow. The program following will be the criminal
organizations, beginning with the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party,
the Reich Cabinet, the SA, the SS, and finally, the SD and Gestapo.
Mr. Dodd will now present “Exploitation of Forced Labor.”
MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): May
it please the Tribunal, we propose to submit during the next several
days, as Colonel Storey has said a moment ago, evidence concerning the
conspirators’ criminal deportation and enslavement of foreign labor,
their illegal use of prisoners of war, their infamous concentration
camps, and their relentless persecution of the Jews. We shall present
evidence regarding the general aspects of these programs, and our French
and Soviet colleagues will present evidence of the specific application
of these programs in the West and the East respectively.
These crimes were committed both before and after Nazi Germany had
launched her series of aggressions. They were committed within Germany
and in foreign countries as well. Although separated in time and space,
these crimes had, of course, an inter-relationship which resulted from
their having a common source in Nazi ideology; for we shall show that
within Germany the conspirators had made hatred and destruction of the
Jews an official philosophy and a public duty, that they had preached
the concept of the master race with its corollary of slavery for others,
that they had denied and destroyed the dignity and the rights of the
individual human being. They had organized force, brutality, and terror
into instruments of political power and had made them commonplaces of
daily existence. We propose to prove that they had placed the
concentration camp and a vast apparatus of force behind their racial and
political myths, their laws, and their policies. As every German Cabinet
minister or high official knew, behind the laws and decrees in the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_ was not the agreement of the people or their
representatives but the terror of the concentration camps and the police
state. The conspirators had preached that war was a noble activity and
that force was the appropriate means of resolving international
differences; and having mobilized all aspects of German life for war,
they plunged Germany and the world into war.
We say this system of hatred, savagery, and denial of individual rights,
which the conspirators erected into a philosophy of government within
Germany or into what we may call the Nazi constitution, followed the
Nazi armies as they swept over Europe. For the Jews of the occupied
countries suffered the same fate as the Jews of Germany, and foreign
laborers became the serfs of the “master race,” and they were deported
and enslaved by the million. Many of the deported and enslaved laborers
joined the victims of the concentration camps, where they were literally
worked to death in the course of the Nazi program of extermination
through work. We propose to show that this Nazi combination of the
assembly line, the torture chamber, and the executioner’s rack in a
single institution has a horrible repugnance to the twentieth century
mind.
We say that it is plain that the program of the concentration camp, the
anti-Jewish program, and the forced labor program are all parts of a
larger pattern, and this will become even more plain as we examine the
evidence regarding these programs, and then test their legality by
applying the relevant principles of international law.
The evidence relating to the Nazi slave labor program has been assembled
in a document book bearing the letter “R”; and in addition, there is an
appendix to the document book consisting of certain photographs
contained in a manila folder. Your Honors will observe that on some of
the books we have placed some tabs, so that it would be easier for the
Tribunal to locate the documents. Unfortunately, we did not have a
sufficient number of tabs to do the work completely, and that would
account for tabs which are missing on some of the document books.
It may illuminate the specific items of evidence which will be offered
later if we first describe in rather general terms the elements of the
Nazi foreign labor policy. It was a policy of mass deportation and mass
enslavement, as I said a minute ago, and it was also carried out by
force, by fraud, by terror, by arson, by means unrestrained by the laws
of war and laws of humanity, or the considerations of mercy. This labor
policy was a policy as well of underfeeding and overworking foreign
laborers, of subjecting them to every form of degradation, brutality,
and inhumanity. It was a policy which compelled foreign workers and
prisoners of war to manufacture armaments and to engage in other
operations of war directed against their own countries. It was a policy,
as we propose to establish, which constituted a flagrant violation of
the laws of war and of the laws of humanity.
We shall show that the Defendants Sauckel and Speer are principally
responsible for the formulation of the policy and for its execution:
that the Defendant Sauckel, the Nazis’ Plenipotentiary General for
Manpower, directed the recruitment, deportation, and the allocation of
foreign civilian labor, that he sanctioned and directed the use of force
as the instrument of recruitment, and that he was responsible for the
care and the treatment of the enslaved millions; that the Defendant
Speer, as Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions, Director of the
Organization Todt, and member of the Central Planning Board, bears
responsibility for the determination of the numbers of foreign slaves
required by the German war machine, was responsible for the decision to
recruit by force and for the use under brutal, inhumane, and degrading
conditions of foreign civilians and prisoners of war in the manufacture
of armaments and munitions, the construction of fortifications, and in
active military operations.
We shall also show in this presentation that the Defendant Göring, as
Plenipotentiary General for the Four Year Plan, is responsible for all
of the crimes involved in the Nazi slave labor program. Finally, we
propose to show that the Defendant Rosenberg, as Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories, and the Defendant Frank, as Governor of
the Government General of Poland, and the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, as
Reich Commissar for the occupied Netherlands, and the Defendant Keitel,
as Chief of the OKW, share responsibility for the recruitment by force
and terror and for the deportation to Germany of the citizens of the
areas overrun or subjugated by the Wehrmacht.
The use of vast numbers of foreign workers was planned before Germany
went to war and was an integral part of the conspiracy for waging
aggressive war. On May 23, 1939 a meeting was held in Hitler’s study at
the Reich Chancellery. Present were the Defendants Göring, Raeder, and
Keitel.
I now refer to Document L-79, which has already been entered in evidence
as Exhibit USA-27. The document presents the minutes of this meeting at
which Hitler stated, as Your Honors will recall, that he intended to
attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity; but I wish to quote
from Page 2 of the English text starting with the 13th paragraph as
follows. In the German text, by the way, the passage appears at Page 4,
Paragraphs 6 and 7. Quoting directly from the English text:
“If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession
of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall be
able to rely upon record harvests even less in time of war than
in peace.
“The population of non-German areas will perform no military
service and will be available as a source of labor.”
We say the slave labor program of the Nazi conspirators was designed to
achieve two purposes, both of which were criminal. The primary purpose,
of course, was to satisfy the labor requirements of the Nazi war machine
by compelling these foreign workers, in effect, to make war against
their own countries and their allies. The secondary purpose was to
destroy or weaken peoples deemed inferior by the Nazi racialists or
deemed potentially hostile by the Nazi planners of world supremacy.
These purposes were expressed by the conspirators themselves.
I wish to refer at this point and to offer in evidence Document 016-PS,
which is Exhibit USA-168. This document was sent by the Defendant
Sauckel to the Defendant Rosenberg on the 20th of April 1942, and it
describes Sauckel’s labor mobilization program. I wish to quote now from
Page 2 of the English text, starting with the sixth paragraph; and in
the German text, again, it appears at Page 2 of the second paragraph.
Quoting from the text directly:
“The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to use all
the rich and tremendous sources, conquered and secured for us by
our fighting Armed Forces under the leadership of Adolf Hitler,
for the armament of the Armed Forces and also for the nutrition
of the homeland. The raw materials as well as the fertility of
the conquered territories and their human labor power are to be
used completely and conscientiously to the profit of Germany and
her allies.”
The theory of the master race underlay the conspirators’ labor policy in
the East as well.
I now refer to Document Number 1130-PS, which is marked Exhibit USA-169.
This document consists of a statement made by one Erich Koch, Reich
Commissar for the Ukraine, on the 5th day of March 1943 at a meeting of
the National Socialist Party in Kiev. I quote from the first page of the
English text, starting with the first paragraph—and in the German text
it appears at Page 2, Paragraph 1. Quoting directly again from the
English text Koch said:
“1. We are the master race and must govern hard but just . . . .
“2. I will draw the very last out of this country. I did not
come to spread bliss. I have come to help the Führer. The
population must work, work, and work again . . . for some people
are getting excited that the population may not get enough to
eat. The population cannot demand that. One has only to remember
what our heroes were deprived of in Stalingrad . . . . We
definitely did not come here to give out manna. We have come
here to create the basis for victory.
“3. We are a master race, which must remember that the lowliest
German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more
valuable than the population here.”
At this point I should like to offer in evidence Document Number
1919-PS, which is Exhibit USA-170. This is a document which contains a
speech delivered by Himmler, the Reichsführer SS, to a group of SS
Generals on the 4th day of October 1943 at Posen; and I am referring to
the first page of the English text, starting with the third paragraph.
For the benefit of the interpreters, in the German text it appears at
Page 23 in the first paragraph. Quoting directly again from this
document on the first page, starting with the third paragraph:
“What happens to the Russians, to the Czechs, does not interest
me in the slightest. What the nations can offer in the way of
good blood of our type we will take, if necessary, by kidnapping
their children and raising them here with us. Whether the other
nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only
insofar as we need them as slaves for our culture; otherwise, it
is of no interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females fall
down from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch or not
interests me only insofar as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is
finished.”
THE PRESIDENT: Who is the author of that document?
MR. DODD: The author of that quotation is the Reichsführer SS, Heinrich
Himmler.
The next document to which I make reference is Number 031-PS, which is
Exhibit USA-71. This document is a top-secret memorandum prepared for
the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories on the 12th of June
1944 and approved by the Defendant Rosenberg; and from it I wish to
quote, from the English text starting with the first paragraph, and in
the German text it appears at the first paragraph of Page 2. Quoting
directly:
“The Army group center has the intention to apprehend
40,000-50,000 youths at the ages of 10 to 14 who are in the Army
territory and to transport them to the Reich.”
I wish to pass now to line 21 of Paragraph 1. Quoting directly I read as
follows:
“It is intended to allot these juveniles primarily to the German
trades as apprentices to be used as skilled workers after 2
years’ training. This is to be arranged through the Organization
Todt which is especially equipped for such a task by means of
its technical and other set-ups. This action is being greatly
welcomed by the German trade since it represents a decisive
measure for the alleviation of the shortage of apprentices.”
Passing a little further on in that document, I wish to call to the
attention of the Tribunal Paragraph 1 on Page 2, and to quote it
directly:
“This action is aimed not only at preventing a direct
reinforcement of the enemy’s military strength but also at a
reduction of his biological potentialities as viewed from the
perspective of the future. These ideas have been voiced not only
by the Reichsführer SS but also by the Führer. Corresponding
orders were given during last year’s withdrawals in the southern
sector . . . .”
I call to Your Honor’s attention particularly that the approval of the
Defendant Rosenberg is noted on Page 3 of the document. It is a note in
ink on the original. I quote it:
“Obergruppenführer Berger has received another memorandum on
June 14, according to which the Reich Minister now has approved
the action.”
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, did you mean to leave out the sentence at the
bottom of Page 1?
MR. DODD: No, Your Honor, I did not, but I did not want to refer to it
at this time. I will refer to it a little later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Isn’t it really a part of what follows at the top of Page
2, which you did read, “Following are the arguments . . .”
MR. DODD: Yes, I did omit that. I thought you were referring to the
sentence above. I’m sorry.
“Following are the arguments against this decision of the
minister.”—and then quoting—“This action is not only aimed at
preventing direct reinforcement of any military . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes and you were telling us how you showed that the
Defendant Rosenberg was implicated.
MR. DODD: Yes. On the last page of that document, the original bears a
note in ink, and in the mimeographed copy it is typewritten:
“Obergruppenführer Berger has received another memorandum on
June 14, according to which the Reich Minister now has approved
the action.”
One page back on that same document, from the first paragraph, four
sentences down, the sentence begins:
“The Minister has approved the execution of the ‘Hay Action’ in
the Army territories under the conditions and provisions arrived
at in talks with Army group center.”
The purposes of the slave labor program which we have just been
describing, namely the strengthening of the Nazi war machine and the
destruction or the weakening of peoples deemed inferior by the Nazi
conspirators, were achieved, we repeat, by the impressment and the
deportation of millions of persons into Germany for forced labor. It
involved the separation of husbands from their wives, and children from
their parents, and the imposition of conditions unfit for human
existence, with the result that countless numbers were killed.
Poland was the first victim. The Defendant Frank, as Governor of the
Government General of Poland, announced that under his program 1 million
workers were to be sent to Germany; and he recommended that police
surround Polish villages and seize the inhabitants for deportation.
I wish to refer to Document Number 1375-PS, which is Exhibit USA-172.
This document is a letter from the Defendant Frank to the Defendant
Göring and it is dated the 25th day of January 1940; and I wish to quote
from the first page of the English text, starting with the first
paragraph, and in the German text, again, it appears at Page 1 of the
first paragraph. Quoting directly:
“1. In view of the present requirements of the Reich for the
defense industry, it is at present fundamentally impossible to
carry on a long-term economic policy in the Government General.
Rather, it is necessary so to steer the economy of the
Government General that it will, in the shortest possible time,
accomplish results representing the maximum that can be secured
out of the economic strength of the Government General for the
immediate strengthening of our capacity for defense.
“2. In particular the following performances are expected of the
total economy of the Government General . . . .”
I wish to pass on a little bit in this text to the second page and
particularly to Paragraph g in the English text. In the German text, the
same passage appears on Page 3 in Paragraph g. I am quoting directly
again:
“Supply and transportation of at least 1 million male and female
agricultural and industrial workers to the Reich—among them at
least 750,000 agricultural workers of which at least 50 percent
must be women—in order to guarantee agricultural production in
the Reich and as a replacement for industrial workers lacking in
the Reich.”
The methods by which these workers were to be supplied were considered
by the Defendant Frank, as revealed in another document to which we now
refer.
It is an entry in the Defendant Frank’s own diary, to which we have
assigned our Document Number 2233(a)-PS and which we offer as Exhibit
USA-173. The portion which I shall read is the entry for Friday, the
10th of May 1940. It appears in the document book as 2233(a)-PS, on the
third page in the center of the page. Just above it are the words “Page
23, Paragraph 1” to the left:
“Then the Governor General deals with the problem of the
compulsory labor service of the Poles. Upon the pressure from
the Reich it has now been decreed that compulsion may be
exercised in view of the fact that sufficient manpower was not
voluntarily available for service inside the German Reich. This
compulsion means the possibility of arrest of male and female
Poles. Because of these measures a certain disquietude had
developed which, according to individual reports, was spreading
very much and might produce difficulties everywhere. General
Field Marshal Göring some time ago pointed out, in his long
speech, the necessity to deport into the Reich a million
workers. The supply so far was 160,000. However, great
difficulties had to be overcome here. Therefore it would be
advisable to co-operate with the district and town chiefs in the
execution of the compulsion, so that one could be sure from the
start that this action would be reasonably expedient. The arrest
of young Poles when leaving church service or the cinema would
bring about an ever increasing nervousness of the Poles.
Generally speaking, he had no objections at all to the rubbish,
capable of work yet often loitering about, being snatched from
the streets. The best method for this, however, would be the
organization of a raid; and it would be absolutely justifiable
to stop a Pole in the street and to question him as to what he
was doing, where he was working, _et cetera_.”
I should like to refer to another entry in the diary of the Defendant
Frank, and I offer in evidence an extract from the entry made on the
16th day of March 1940, which appears in the document book as
2233(b)-PS, and it is Exhibit USA-174. I wish particularly to quote from
the third page of the English text:
“The Governor General remarks that he had long negotiations in
Berlin with the representatives of the Reich Ministry for
Finance and the Reich Ministry for Food. Urgent demands have
been made there that Polish farm workers should be sent to the
Reich in greater numbers. He has made the statement in Berlin
that he, if it is demanded from him, could of course exercise
force in some such manner: he could have the police surround a
village and get the men and women in question out by force, and
then send them to Germany. But one can also work differently,
besides these police measures, by retaining the unemployment
compensation of these workers in question.”
The instruments of force and terror used to carry out this program
reached into many phases of Polish life. German labor authorities raided
churches and theaters, seized those present, and shipped them back to
Germany. And this appears in a memorandum to Himmler, which we offer in
evidence as Document Number 2220-PS, and it bears Exhibit Number
USA-175. This memorandum is dated the 17th day of April 1943; and it was
written by Dr. Lammers, the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, and deals
with the situation in the Government General of Poland.
DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to
the fact that the last three documents, which have just been read, were
not made available to me beforehand. They do not appear on the original
list of documents, nor have I been able to find them on the later list.
I therefore request that the reading of these documents be held in
abeyance until I have had an opportunity to read them and to discuss
them with my client.
Perhaps I may, at the same time, lodge an additional complaint. I
received some interrogation records in English the day before yesterday.
I consulted my client about them and he told me that they are not the
actual transcripts of his words in the interrogation, because he was
interrogated in German; an interpreter translated his statements into
English, and then they were taken down.
These documents cannot have any evidential value since they were not
presented to the defendant for certification; he did not sign them, nor
were they read to him. They are transcripts in English, a language of
which the defendant understands little or nothing.
I also discovered that another interrogation record on the Defendant
Speer contains statements which incriminate my client but which are
apparently also incorrect, as I established in consultation with the
Defendant Speer.
I should like to have an opportunity of discussing the matter with the
representative of the Prosecution and of clearing up these
differences—to decide to what extent I can agree to the use of these
documents. They were to be presented by the Prosecution today or
tomorrow at the latest, but for the time being I must object to their
use.
THE PRESIDENT: As I understand it, you said to us that the last three
documents were not available to you and that they were not in the
original list. Is that right?
DR. SERVATIUS: Not up to now. I want to have an opportunity of reading
these documents in advance. They are being read here without my having
seen them.
THE PRESIDENT: And then you went on to deal with the interrogations
which have not been put into evidence.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I wanted to take the opportunity of saying that I
wished to discuss these documents with the Prosecution before they are
submitted to the Tribunal tomorrow, or probably even today. Meanwhile I
must object to their being used as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, do you know what the circumstances are about
these three documents which have not been supplied?
MR. DODD: I do not, Your Honor. They have been placed in the defendants’
Information Center and they partly have been in the information list. It
may be that through some oversight these entries of this diary were
neglected.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have these documents before me now; they are not
numbered; the document concerning Sauckel begins on Page 10—question
and answer on Pages 11 and 12. The record is not continuous; it consists
of fragments of a transcript, which I want to trace to its origin.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for the Prosecution will supply you with these
documents at the adjournment this afternoon. With reference to the
interrogation, if they propose to use any interrogation in the Trial
tomorrow, they can also supply you with any documents which are material
to that interrogation.
DR. SERVATIUS: Thank you.
MR. DODD: I believe I was referring to Document Number 2220-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: That is right. You have not begun to read it yet.
MR. DODD: I propose to read from the fourth page of the English text,
Paragraph 2 at the top of the page, particularly the last two sentences
of the paragraph; and in the German text the passage is found in Page
10, Paragraph 1. Quoting directly, it is as follows:
“As things were, the recruiting of manpower had to be
accomplished by means of more or less forceful methods, such as
the instances when certain groups appointed by the labor offices
caught church and movie-goers indiscriminately and transported
them into the Reich. That such methods only undermine the
people’s willingness to work and the people’s confidence to such
a degree that it cannot be checked even with terror, is just as
clear as the consequences brought about by a strengthening of
the political resistance movement.”
That is the end of the quotation. We say that Polish farmland was
confiscated with the aid of the SS and was distributed to German
inhabitants or held in trust for the German community, and the farm
owners were employed as laborers or transported to Germany against their
will. We refer to Document Number 1352-PS, which bears Exhibit Number
USA-176. This document is a report of the SS, and it bears the title
“Achievement of Confiscations of Polish Agricultural Enterprises with
the Purpose of Transferring the Poles to the Old Reich and Employing
them as Agricultural Workers.”
I wish to read from the first page of the English text beginning with
the fifth paragraph; and in the German text it appears on Page 9,
Paragraph 1 on that page. Quoting:
“It is possible without difficulty to accomplish the
confiscation of small agricultural enterprises in the villages
in which larger agricultural enterprises have been already
confiscated and are under the management of the East German
Corporation for Agricultural Development.”
And then passing down three sentences, there is this statement which I
quote:
“The former owners of Polish farms together with their families
will be transferred to the Old Reich by the employment offices
for employment as farm workers. In this way many hundreds of
Polish agricultural workers can be placed at the disposal of
agriculture in the Old Reich in the shortest and simplest
manner. In this way, to begin with, the most pressing shortage
now felt in a very disagreeable manner, especially in the
root-crop districts, will be quickly removed.”
Pursuant to the directions of the Defendant Sauckel, his agents and the
SS men deported Polish men to Germany without their families, thereby
accomplishing one of the basic purposes of the program, the supplying of
labor for the German war effort, and at the same time, weakening the
reproductive potential of the Polish people.
I wish to refer directly to Document L-61, which bears Exhibit Number
USA-177. This document is a letter from the Defendant Sauckel to the
presidents of the land labor offices. It is dated the 26th day of
November 1942, and I want to read from the first paragraph of that
letter which states as follows:
“In agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and the SD,
these Jews who are still in employment are also, from now on, to
be evacuated from the territory of the Reich and are to be
replaced by Poles, who are being evacuated from the Government
General.”
And passing to the third paragraph of that same letter, we find this
statement. Quoting:
“The Poles who are to be evacuated as a result of this measure
will be put into concentration camps and put to work, insofar as
they are criminal or asocial elements. The remaining Poles, so
far as they are suitable for labor, will be transported—without
family—into the Reich, particularly to Berlin, where they will
be put at the disposal of the labor allocation offices to work
in armament factories instead of the Jews who are to be
replaced.”
THE PRESIDENT: Who is the Chief of the Security Police, mentioned in the
second paragraph?
MR. DODD: The Chief of the Security Police was Heinrich Himmler. He was
also the Reichsführer of the SS.
DR. SERVATIUS: May I say something with regard to this document. The
Defendant Sauckel denies knowledge of it and says that the place of
dispatch, not mentioned during the reading of this document, is of
importance. The document, according to its letterhead, was written at 96
Saarland Strasse, which was not the office of the Defendant Sauckel. The
second point is that this document, contrary to the statement in the
document list classifying it as an original letter of Sauckel, was not
signed by him. Moreover the certification of the signature, customary on
all documents, is missing. May I ask the prosecutor to read this into
the record, so that I can come back to it later.
THE PRESIDENT: If the procedure which the Tribunal has laid down has
been carried out, either the original document or a photostat copy will
be in your Information Center; and you can then compare or show to your
client either the photostat or the original.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have done that and only object now to the fact that
from the reading of this document parts which I consider important are
being omitted. If this letter is being read here it must be read in its
entirety, including the parts which I consider important, namely, the
letterhead and the type of signature.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat that.
DR. SERVATIUS: I am asking that if it is to be used as evidence, the
letter should be read in its entirety, including its complete heading
and the signature as it appears, namely, “signed Sauckel.” The
certification of the signature is missing, a fact from which my client
draws certain conclusions in his favor.
THE PRESIDENT: You will have an opportunity after adjournment of seeing
this document; and you have been told already that you can refer, when
your turn comes to present your defense, to the whole of any document.
It is inconvenient to the Tribunal to have many interruptions of this
sort; and if you wish to refer to the whole document, you will be able
to do so at a later stage.
DR. SERVATIUS: I must assume then, Mr. President, that it is admissible
to read parts of a document instead of the whole. Did I understand
correctly?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. You can put in a part or the whole of the
document when your turn comes. We will adjourn now; but, Mr. Dodd, you
will satisfy this counsel for the Defense as to the reason why he had
not got these documents.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I understand, Mr. President.
MR. DODD: Yes, I will.
THE PRESIDENT: And you will make them available to him and insure that
he has an opportunity of seeing the original of this document so that he
can check the signature.
MR. DODD: We will, and I will see that the original is available to him.
THE PRESIDENT: All right, we will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 12 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]
EIGHTEENTH DAY
Wednesday, 12 December 1945
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this morning at 12:30 for a
closed session and sit again at 2:00 o’clock.
MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, I should like to report to the
Tribunal this morning with reference to the questions which arose
yesterday afternoon concerning three documents.
After adjournment we found that Document 2220-PS was in the defendants’
Information Center in photostatic form, and that the two other
documents, being respectively two entries from the Frank diary, were
also there but in a different form. The Frank diary consists of some
40-odd volumes which we, of course, were not able to photostat, so we
had placed instead in the defendants’ room the excerpts. As a matter of
fact, we had placed the entire document book there.
DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for the Defendant Frank): Yesterday the
Prosecution submitted documents concerning the Defendant Frank; the
numbers are 2233(a)-PS and 2233(b)-PS, which were presented as Exhibits
USA-173 and USA-174. These are not ordinary documents, but excerpts from
the diary of Frank. Six weeks ago I applied in writing to have this
diary, which consists of 42 heavy, thick volumes, submitted to me. I
made this request for the first time on the 2d of September, the second
time on the 16th of November, the third time on the 18th of November,
and the fourth time on the 3rd of December.
Unfortunately, I have not so far received this diary, and I should like
to ask the Tribunal that it be submitted to me as soon as possible, not
least because this material was surrendered by the Defendant Frank
himself to the officers who arrested him and was to be used as evidence
for his defense.
I am of course not in a position to work through all this material in a
few days, and I should like to ask the Tribunal that this diary be put
at my disposal without delay.
In this connection I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal
to another matter. The Tribunal has already approved that the four long
speeches which the Defendant Frank delivered in Germany in 1942 and
which led to his dismissal by Hitler from all his offices should be put
at my disposal as evidence. The General Secretary of the Tribunal
informed me of this on the 4th of December, but unfortunately I have not
so far received copies of these speeches. I should be very grateful,
therefore, if the Tribunal will ensure that its decisions are carried
out and that the documents are submitted to me without delay.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will look into these matters with the
General Secretary of the Tribunal, and doubtless it will be able to
arrange that you should have these documents submitted to you in the
defendants’ counsel Information Center.
DR. SEIDL: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Dodd.
MR. DODD: May I refer briefly to the discussion that we were engaged in
yesterday in order to take up the train of thought.
I wish to remind the Tribunal that we were discussing or had just
completed a discussion of Document L-61, which had to do with a letter
written by the Defendant Sauckel to the presidents of the “Länder” labor
offices. I had read two excerpts from that letter.
Referring to the letter, we say that the Nazi campaign of force and
terror and abduction was described in another letter to the Defendant
Frank, which we wish to refer to as Document Number 1526-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from that, Mr. Dodd, has either the
original or the photostatic copy been shown to Sauckel’s counsel?
MR. DODD: Oh, yes, Sir. A photostatic copy was in the defendants’
Information Center, and after adjournment yesterday we got the original
and handed it to him here in this room.
THE PRESIDENT: And he saw it?
MR. DODD: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: This document, Number 1526-PS, USA-178, is a letter written by
the chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee at Kraków in February 1943.
I wish to read from the third page of the English text, beginning with
the second paragraph; the same passage in the German text at Page 2,
Paragraph 5. I quote:
“The general nervousness is still further increased by the wrong
methods of labor mobilization which have been used more and more
frequently in recent months.
“The wild and ruthless manhunt as practiced everywhere in towns
and country, in streets, squares, stations, even in churches, as
well as at night in homes, has shaken the feeling of security of
the inhabitants. Every man is exposed to the danger of being
seized suddenly and unexpectedly, anywhere and at any time, by
the police, and brought into an assembly camp. None of his
relatives knows what has happened to him, and only weeks or
months later one or another gives news of his fate by a
postcard.”
I wish to turn to Enclosure 5 on Page 8 of this document, which I quote:
“In November of last year an inspection of all males of the
age-classes born 1910 to 1920 was ordered in the area of
Zaleszczyti (district of Czortkow). After the men had appeared
for inspection, all those who were selected were arrested at
once, loaded into trains, and sent to the Reich. Similar
recruitment of laborers for the Reich also took place in other
areas of this district. Following some interventions, the action
was then stopped.”
The resistance of the Polish people to this enslavement program and the
necessity for increased force were described by the Defendant Sauckel’s
deputy, one Timm, at a meeting of the Central Planning Board, which was,
by the way, Hitler’s wartime planning agency. It was made up of the
Defendant Speer, Field Marshal Milch, and State Secretary Körner. The
Central Planning Board was the highest level economic planning agency,
exercising production controls by allocating raw materials and labor to
industrial users.
Now, Document R-124, Exhibit USA-179. This document consists of excerpts
from minutes of the meetings of this Central Planning Board and minutes
of conferences between the Defendant Speer and Hitler. Only the
excerpts, of course, from these minutes upon which we rely are being
offered in evidence. I would say to the Tribunal, however, that the
balance of the minutes are available—can be made available—if the
Tribunal so desires.
This deputy of Sauckel, his name being Timm, made a statement at the
36th conference of the Central Planning Board; and it appears on Page
14, Paragraph 2 of the English text of Document R-124, and on Page 10,
Paragraph 2 of the German text:
“Especially in Poland the situation at the moment is
extraordinarily serious. It is known that violent battles have
occurred just because of these actions. The resistance against
the administration established by us is very strong. Quite a
number of our men have been exposed to increased dangers; and
just in the last 2 or 3 weeks some of them have been shot dead,
for example, the head of the Labor Office of Warsaw, who was
shot in his office 14 days ago, and yesterday another man again.
This is how matters stand at present; and the recruiting itself
even if done with the best will, remains extremely difficult
unless police reinforcements are at hand.”
Deportation and enslavement of civilians reached unprecedented levels in
the so-called Eastern Occupied Territories. These wholesale deportations
resulted directly from labor demands made by the Defendant Sauckel on
the Defendant Rosenberg, who was the Reich Minister for the Eastern
Occupied Territories, and his subordinates, and also on the Armed
Forces—a demand made directly on the Armed Forces by the Defendant
Sauckel.
On the 5th of October 1942, for example, the Defendant Sauckel wrote to
the Defendant Rosenberg, stating that 2 million foreign laborers were
required and that the majority of these would have to be drafted from
the recently occupied Eastern territories and especially from the
Ukraine.
I wish to refer at this point to Document 017-PS, which bears Exhibit
Number USA-180. This letter from the Defendant Sauckel to the Defendant
Rosenberg I wish to quote in full. It begins by saying:
“The Führer has worked out new and most urgent plans for
armament which require the quick mobilization of two million
more foreign workers. The Führer therefore has granted me, for
the execution of his decree of 21 March 1942, new powers for my
new duties, and has especially authorized me to take whatever
measures I think are necessary in the Reich, the Protectorate,
the Government General, as well as in the occupied territories,
in order to assure, at all costs, an orderly mobilization of
labor for the German armament industry.
“The additional required labor forces will have to be drafted,
for the most part, from the recently occupied Eastern
Territories, especially from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.
Therefore, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine must furnish 225,000
workers by 31 December 1942 and 225,000 more by 1 May 1942.
“I ask you to inform Reich Commissioner, Gauleiter, Party Member
Koch at once about the new situation and requirements and
especially to see that he supports personally in every possible
way the execution of this new order.
“I intend to visit Party Member Koch shortly and I would be
grateful if he could inform me as to where and when I could meet
him for a personal discussion. Just now though, I ask that the
recruiting be taken up at once with all energy and the use of
every factor, especially the experts of the labor offices. All
directives which temporarily limited the procurement of Eastern
Workers are annulled. The Reich procurement for the next months
must be given priority over all other measures . . . .
“I do not ignore the difficulties which exist for the execution
of this new order, but I am convinced that with the ruthless use
of all resources and with the full co-operation of all concerned
the execution of the new demands can be accomplished by the date
fixed. I have already communicated the new demands directly to
the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine by teletype. In reference
to our phone-call of today, I will send you the text of the
Führer’s decree at the beginning of next week.”
I should like to remind the Tribunal that we have referred previously,
yesterday afternoon, to this Reichskommissar, Gauleiter, Party Member
Koch; and we quoted him as stating, the Tribunal will recall, “We are
the master race. We must be hard,” and so forth.
On the 17th day of March 1943, the Defendant Sauckel wrote again to the
Defendant Rosenberg; and on this occasion he demanded the importation of
another 1 million men and women from the Eastern Territories within the
following 4 months. I wish to refer at this point to Document Number
019-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-181. Quoting that letter in full:
“After a protracted illness, my deputy for labor allocation in
the Occupied Eastern Territories, State Councillor Peuckert, is
going there to regulate the allocation of labor both for Germany
and the territories themselves.
“I ask you sincerely, dear Party Member Rosenberg, to assist him
to your utmost on account of the pressing urgency of Peuckert’s
mission. I may thank you already at this moment for the good
reception accorded to Peuckert up to this time. He himself has
been charged by me to co-operate fully and unreservedly with all
bureaus of the Eastern Territories.
“Especially the labor allocation for German agriculture and
likewise the most urgent armament production programs ordered by
the Führer, make the fastest importation of approximately 1
million men and women from the Eastern Territories within the
next 4 months, a necessity. Starting 15 March the daily shipment
must reach 5,000 female or male workers, while from the
beginning of April this number has to be stepped up to 10,000,
if the most urgent programs and the spring tillage and other
agricultural tasks are not to suffer to the detriment of food
and of the Armed Forces.
“I have provided for the allotment of the draft quotas for the
individual territories, in agreement with your experts for labor
supply, as follows:
“Daily quota starting 15 March 1943: From General kommissariat,
White Ruthenia—500 people; Economic Inspection, Center—500
people; Reichskommissariat, Ukraine—3,000 people; Economic
Inspection, South—1,000 people; total—5,000 people.
“Starting 1 April 1943, the daily quota is to be doubled
corresponding to the doubling of the entire quota. I hope to
visit personally the Eastern Territories towards the end of the
month, and ask you once more for your kind support.”
The Defendant Sauckel did travel to the East. He travelled to Kovno in
Lithuania to press his demands. We offer in evidence Document Number
204-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-182. This document is a synopsis
of a report of the City Commissioner of Kovno and minutes of a meeting
in which the Defendant Sauckel participated. I wish to read from the
second page of the English text, beginning with the first paragraph. The
same passage appears in the German text at Page 5, Paragraph 2. Quoting
directly as follows:
“In a lecture which the Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, gave on 18 July 1943 in
Kovno, and in an official conference following it between
Gauleiter Sauckel and the General Commissioner, the precarious
labor situation in the Reich was again urgently presented for
discussion. Gauleiter Sauckel again demanded that Lithuanian
labor be furnished in greater volume for the purposes of the
Reich.”
THE PRESIDENT: Who was the General Commissar? Rosenberg?
MR. DODD: The Plenipotentiary for the Arbeitseinsatz?
THE PRESIDENT: No, the General Commissar.
MR. DODD: His name is not known to us. He was apparently a local
functionary in the Party.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: The Defendant Sauckel also visited Riga, in Latvia, to assert
his demands; and the purpose of this visit is described in Document
Number 2280-PS, bearing Exhibit Number USA-183. This document is a
letter from the Reich Commissar for the Ostland to the Commissioner
General in Riga, and it is dated the 3rd of May 1943. I wish to read
from Page 1 of the English text, beginning with the first paragraph:
“Following the basic statements of the Plenipotentiary General
for Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, on the occasion of
his visit to Riga on the 21st of April 1943, it was decided, in
view of the critical situation and in disregard of all adverse
considerations, that a total of 183,000 workers would have to be
supplied from the Ostland to the Reich territory. This task
absolutely must be accomplished within the next 4 months and at
the latest must be completed by the end of August.”
Here again we are not informed as to the name and identity of the Reich
Commissar for the Ostland.
Sauckel asked the German Army for assistance in the recruitment and
deportation of civilian labor from the Eastern Territories. We refer now
to Document Number 3010-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-184.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, were you saying that it was not known from whom
that document emanated?
MR. DODD: No, Sir. We say it is a letter from the Reichskommissar for
the Ostland to the Commissioner General in Riga, but we don’t know their
names specifically at the time of the writing of the letter.
THE PRESIDENT: You don’t know who the Reichskommissar of the Eastern
Territories was?
MR. DODD: We don’t know him by that title, “The Reichskommissar for the
Ostland.”
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: Lohse, I am now informed, was his name. I understood that we
did not know it.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
MR. DODD: Referring to this Document 3010-PS, this document is a secret
operational order of the Army Group South dated the 17th day of August
1943. I wish to read from the first page of the English text, the first
two paragraphs, as follows:
“The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, in Decree
Az. VI A 5780.28, a copy of which is enclosed (Enclosure 1), has
ordered the mustering and calling-up of two complete age classes
for the whole newly occupied Eastern Territory. The Reich
Minister for Armament and Munitions has approved this order.
“According to this order by the Plenipotentiary General for
Allocation of Labor”—GBA—“you have to recruit and to transport
to the Reich immediately all labor forces in your territory born
during 1926 and 1927. The decree of 6 February 1943 relative to
labor duty and labor employment in the theater of operations of
the newly occupied Eastern Territory and the executive orders
issued on this subject are the authority for the execution of
this measure. Enlistment must be completed by 30 September 43 at
the latest.”
We say it is clear that the demands made by the Defendant Sauckel
resulted in the deportation of civilians from the Occupied Eastern
Territories. The Defendant Speer has recorded conferences with Hitler on
10, 11, and 12 August 1942; and this record is contained in Document
R-124, which is already in as Exhibit USA-179. I now wish to quote from
Page 34 of that same document in Paragraph 1 of the English text. In the
German text it appears at Page 23, Paragraph 2. Quoting directly:
“Gauleiter Sauckel promises to make Russian labor available for
the fulfillment of the iron and coal program and reports that,
if required, he will supply a further million Russian laborers
for the German armament industry up to and including October
1942. So far he has already supplied 1,000,000 for industry and
700,000 for agriculture. In this connection the Führer states
that the problem of providing labor can be solved in all cases
and to any extent. He authorizes Gauleiter Sauckel to take all
necessary measures. He would agree to any compulsory measures in
the East as well as in the Occupied Western Territories if this
question could not be solved on a voluntary basis.”
In order to meet these demands of 1,700,000—100,000 here and there—the
Nazi conspirators made terror and violence and arson, as we said
yesterday, fundamental instruments of their labor enslavement policy.
Twenty days after the Defendant Sauckel’s demands of the 5th of October
1942, a top official in the Defendant Rosenberg’s Ministry described the
measures taken to meet these demands. I wish to refer now to Document
Number 294-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-185. This document is a
top-secret memorandum, dated the 25th of October 1942, signed by one
Bräutigam. I wish to quote from Page 4 of the English text starting with
the last paragraph, as follows—in the German text it appears at Page 8,
Paragraph 2—quoting directly:
“We now experienced the grotesque picture of having to recruit,
precipitately, millions of laborers from the Occupied Eastern
Territories, after prisoners of war had died of hunger like
flies, in order to fill the gaps that have formed within
Germany. Now suddenly the food question no longer existed. In
the customary limitless disregard for the Slavic people,
‘recruiting’ methods were used which probably have their
precedent only in the blackest periods of the slave trade. A
regular manhunt was inaugurated. Without consideration of health
or age, the people were shipped to Germany where it turned out
immediately that more than 100,000 had to be sent back because
of serious illness and other incapability for work.”
The Defendant Rosenberg wrote, himself, concerning these brutalities, to
the instigator of them, the Defendant Sauckel; and we refer now to
Document Number 018-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-186.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, from where did that top-secret document come?
MR. DODD: It came from the files of the Defendant Rosenberg.
This document, 018-PS, is a letter from the Defendant Rosenberg to the
Defendant Sauckel; and it is dated the 21st day of December 1942, with
attachments. I wish to quote from Page 1 of the English text, starting
at the middle of the second paragraph which reads as follows:
“The reports I have received show that the increase of the
guerilla bands in the Occupied Eastern Territories is largely
due to the fact that the methods used for procuring laborers in
these regions are felt to be forced measures of mass
deportations, so that the endangered persons prefer to escape
their fate by withdrawing into the woods or going to the
guerilla bands.”
Passing now to Page 4 of the same English text, there is an attachment
to Rosenberg’s letter consisting of parts excerpted from letters of
residents of the Occupied Eastern Territories—excerpted by Nazi censors
apparently. In the German text it appears at Page 6, Paragraphs 1 and 2.
Starting the quotation:
“At our place, new things have happened. People are being taken
to Germany. On October 5 some people from the Kowkuski district
were scheduled to go, but they did not want to and the village
was set on fire. They threatened to do the same thing in
Borowytschi, as not all who were scheduled to depart wanted to
go. Thereupon three truckloads of Germans arrived and set fire
to their houses. In Wrasnytschi 12 houses and in Borowytschi 3
houses were burned.
“On October 1 a new conscription of labor forces took place. Of
what happened, I will describe the most important to you. You
cannot imagine the bestiality. You probably remember what we
were told about the Soviets during the rule of the Poles. At
that time we did not believe it and now it seems just as
incredible. The order came to supply 25 workers, but no one
reported. All had fled. Then the German police came and began to
ignite the houses of those who had fled. The fire burned
furiously, since it had not rained for 2 months. In addition the
grain stacks were in the farm yards. You can imagine what took
place. The people who had hurried to the scene were forbidden to
extinguish the flames, were beaten and arrested, so that six
homesteads were burned down. The policemen meanwhile ignited
other houses. The people fall on their knees and kiss their
hands, but the policemen beat them with rubber truncheons and
threaten to burn down the whole village. I do not know how this
would have ended if Sapurkany had not intervened. He promised
that there would be laborers by the next morning. During the
fire the police went through the adjoining villages, seized the
laborers, and brought them under arrest. Wherever they did not
find any laborers, they detained the parents until the children
appeared. That is how they raged throughout the night in
Bielosersk . . . .
“The workers who had not yet appeared by then were to be shot.
All schools were closed and the married teachers were sent to
work here, while the unmarried ones go to work in Germany. They
are now catching humans as the dogcatchers used to catch dogs.
They are already hunting for 1 week and have not yet enough. The
imprisoned workers are locked in the schoolhouse. They cannot
even go to perform their natural functions, but have to do it
like pigs in the same room. People from many villages went on a
certain day to a pilgrimage to the Poczajów Monastery. They were
all arrested, locked in, and will be sent to work. Among them
there are lame, blind, and aged people.”
Despite the fact that the Defendant Rosenberg wrote this letter with
this attachment, we say he nevertheless countenanced the use of force in
order to furnish slave labor to Germany and admitted his responsibility
for the “unusual and hard measures” that were employed. I refer to
excerpts from the transcript of an interrogation under oath of the
Defendant Rosenberg on the 6th of October 1945, which is Exhibit
USA-187, and I wish to quote from Page 1 of the English text starting
with the ninth paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: You haven’t given us the PS number.
MR. DODD: It has no PS number.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. Has a copy of it been given to
Rosenberg’s counsel?
MR. DODD: Yes, it has been. It is at the end of the document book, if
Your Honors please, the document book the Tribunal has.
DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for the Defendant Rosenberg): In the name of
my client, I object to the reading of this document for the following
reasons:
In the preliminary hearings my client was questioned several times on
the subject of employment of labor from the eastern European nations. He
stated: that the Defendant Sauckel, by virtue of the authority he
received from the Führer and by order of the Delegate for the Four Year
Plan, had the right to give him instructions; that he (the Defendant
Rosenberg) nevertheless demanded that recruiting of labor be conducted
on a voluntary basis; that this was in fact carried out; and that
Sauckel agreed, provided that the quota could be met. Rosenberg further
stated that on several occasions in the course of joint discussions his
Ministry demanded that the quota be reduced and that in part it was, in
fact, reduced.
This document which is now going to be presented does not mention all
these statements, it only contains fragments of them. In order to make
it possible both for the Tribunal and the Defense to obtain a complete
picture, I ask the Tribunal that the Prosecution be requested to present
the entire records of the statements and, before submitting the document
officially, to discuss the retranslation with the Defense so as to avoid
misunderstandings.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that I understand your objection. You say,
as I understood it, that Sauckel had authority from Hitler. Is that
right?
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And that Rosenberg was carrying out that authority.
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: But all that counsel for the Prosecution is attempting to
do at the moment is to put in evidence an interrogation of Rosenberg.
With reference to that, you ask that he should put in the whole
interrogation?
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we don’t know yet whether he intends to put in the
whole interrogation or a part of it.
DR. THOMA: I know only one thing: I already have in my hand the document
which the Prosecution wishes to submit and I can see from it that it
contains only fragments of the whole interrogation. What in particular
it does not contain is the fact that Rosenberg always insisted on
voluntary recruiting only and that he continually demanded a reduction
of the quota. That is not contained in the document to be submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: If counsel for the Prosecution reads a part of the
interrogation, and you wish to refer to another part of the
interrogation in order that the part he has read should not be
misleading, you will be at liberty to do so when he has read his part of
the interrogation. Is that clear?
DR. THOMA: Yes. But then I request the Tribunal to ask counsel for the
Prosecution if the document which he intends to submit contains the
whole of Rosenberg’s statement.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, were you going to put in the whole of
Rosenberg’s interrogation?
MR. DODD: No, Your Honor, I was not prepared to put in the whole of
Rosenberg’s interrogation, but only certain parts of it. These parts are
available, and have been for some time, to counsel. The whole of the
Rosenberg interrogation in English was given to Sauckel’s counsel,
however, and he has the entire text of it, the only available copy that
we have.
THE PRESIDENT: Has counsel for Rosenberg not got the entire document?
MR. DODD: He has only the excerpt that we propose to read into the
record here at this time.
DR. THOMA: May I say something?
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal considers that if you propose to
put in a part of the interrogation, the whole interrogation ought to be
submitted to the defendant’s counsel, that then you may read what part
you like of the interrogation, and then defendant’s counsel may refer to
any other part of the interrogation directly if it is necessary for the
purpose of explaining the part which has been read by counsel for the
Prosecution. So before you use this interrogation, Rosenberg’s counsel
must have a copy of the whole interrogation.
MR. DODD: I might say, Your Honor, that we turned over the whole
interrogation to counsel for the Defendant Sauckel; and we understood
that he would make it available to all other counsel for the Defense.
Apparently, that did not happen.
DR. THOMA: Thank you, Mr. President.
DR. SERVATIUS: I received these documents from the Prosecution last
night. They were in English; that is sufficient for me, but counsel for
the other defendants are not all in a position to follow the English
text, so that certain difficulties arise, and I must find time to
interpret the document to my colleagues. But it would be desirable if
the Prosecution could give us the German text, for the interrogation
took place in German and was translated into English, so that the
original German text should be available.
Those are the difficulties, and I would like to suggest that the German
text be also handed to us as soon as possible.
MR. DODD: With reference to the so-called German text, the original is
an English text. These interrogations were made through an interpreter
and they were transcribed in English so that the original text is an
English text, and that is what was turned over to the attorney for the
Defendant Sauckel with the understanding that it would be made available
to all other counsel.
THE PRESIDENT: But of course that doesn’t quite meet their difficulties
because they don’t all of them speak English, or are not all able to
read English, so I am afraid you must wait until Rosenberg’s counsel has
got a copy of the entire interrogation in his own language.
MR. DODD: Very well.
Passing on beyond the document to which we have just referred—which we
now withdraw in view of the ruling—and which we will offer at a later
date after we have complied with the ruling of the Court, we have a
letter dated the 21st of December 1942, which is Document 018-PS, and
which bears Exhibit Number USA-186—which, by the way, is a letter from
the Defendant Rosenberg to the Defendant Sauckel—and I wish to quote
from Page 1, Paragraph 3 of the English text. In the German text it
appears at Page 3, Paragraph 1. Quoting directly:
“Even if I in no way deny that the numbers demanded by the Reich
Minister for Armament and Munitions as well as by the
agricultural economy justify unusual and severe measures, I
must, because I am answerable for the Occupied Eastern
Territories, emphatically request that, in filling the quota
demanded, measures be excluded the consequences and our
toleration of which will some day be held against me and my
collaborators.”
In the Ukraine area, arson was indeed used as a terror instrument to
enforce these conscription measures; and we refer now to Document Number
254-PS, which is Exhibit USA-188. This document is from an official of
the Rosenberg Ministry and was also found in the Rosenberg file. It is
dated June 29, 1944 and encloses a copy of a letter from one Paul Raab,
a district commissioner in the territory of Wassilkov, to the Defendant
Rosenberg. I wish to quote from Raab’s letter, Page 1, starting with
Paragraph 1 of the English text which reads as follows:
“According to a charge by the Supreme Command of the Army, I
burned down several houses . . . in the territory of Wassilkov,
Ukraine, belonging to insubordinate people ordered to labor
service—this accusation is true.”
Passing now to the third paragraph:
“During the year of 1942 the conscription of workers was
accomplished nearly exclusively by way of propaganda. Only
rarely was force necessary. But in August 1942, measures had to
be taken against two families in the villages of Glevenka and
Soliony-Shatior, each of which were to supply one person for
labor. Both had been requested in June for the first time but
had not obeyed, although requested repeatedly. They had to be
brought in by force, but succeeded twice in escaping from the
collecting camp in Kiev or while in transit. Before the second
arrest, the fathers of both of the workers were taken into
custody as hostages to be released only when their sons
appeared. When, after the second escape, the re-arrest of both
the young men and the fathers was ordered, the police patrols
detailed to do this, found the houses empty.”
Passing to Paragraph 4, it is stated, and I quote directly:
“At that time I decided at last to take measures to show the
increasingly rebellious Ukrainian youth that our orders have to
be followed. I ordered the burning of the houses of the two
fugitives.”
Would Your Honor like to have the rest of that paragraph?
THE PRESIDENT: I think you should read the next few lines.
MR. DODD: “The result was that in the future people obeyed,
willingly, orders concerning labor obligations. However, the
practice of burning houses has not become known for the first
time by my actions, but was suggested in a secret letter from
the Reich Commissioner for Allocation of Labor specifically as a
coercive measure in case other measures should fail. This harsh
punishment was acceptable to the local population . . .”
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): The Commissioner for Labor, Mr. Dodd—you
just said, “an order from the Commissioner of Labor.” Who was that?
MR. DODD: Well, we have discussed this matter previously to our
appearance here today. The document does not identify him by name. We
are not sure. The Defendant Sauckel was called Plenipotentiary General
for Labor, and we think we can’t go much further, and say we don’t know.
It just does not appear.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Thank you.
MR. DODD: Reading that last sentence again:
“This harsh punishment was acceptable to the local population
because previous to this step both families had ridiculed on
every hand the duty-conscious people who sent their children
partly voluntarily to the labor allocation.”
Turning to Paragraph 2 on Page 2, beginning about two-thirds of the way
through the paragraph, I wish to read as follows—in the German text it
appears at Page 3, Paragraph 1:
“After initial successes, a passive resistance of the population
started, which finally forced me to turn again to arrests,
confiscations, and transfers to labor camps. After a whole
transport of conscripted laborers overcame the police at the
railroad station in Wassilkov and escaped, I saw again the
necessity for strict measures. A few ring-leaders, who of course
had long since escaped, were located in Plissezkoje and in
Mitnitza. After repeated attempts to get hold of them, their
houses were burned down.”
And finally, I wish to pass to the last paragraph on Page 3 of that same
document. In the German text it appears at Page 5, Paragraph 7. Quoting
from that last paragraph on the third page:
“My actions toward fugitive labor draftees were always reported
to District Commissioner Döhrer, of the Wassilkov office, and to
the Commissioner General in Kiev. Both of them knew the
circumstances and agreed with my measures because of their
success.”
That is the end of that part of the quotation.
That Generalkommissar in Kiev, as we indicated yesterday and again this
morning, was the man Koch—we quoted his statement about the master
race.
Another document confirms arson as an instrument of enforcing this labor
program in the village of Bielosersk in the Ukraine in cases of
resistance to forced labor recruitment. Atrocities committed in this
village are related in Document Number 018-PS, which is already in
evidence as Exhibit USA-186. But in addition there is Document Number
290-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-189. This document consists of
correspondence originating within the Rosenberg ministry, which was, of
course, the office headquarters of the Defendant Rosenberg; and it is
dated the 12th day of November 1943. I wish to quote from Page 1 of the
English text, starting with the last line, as follows:
“But even if Müller had been present at the burning of houses in
connection with the Reich conscription in Bielosersk, this
should by no means lead to the removal of Müller from office. It
is mentioned specifically in a directive of the Commissioner
General in Luck, of 21 September 1942, referring to the extreme
urgency of national conscription, that farms of those who refuse
to work are to be burned and their relatives are to be arrested
as hostages and brought to forced labor camps.”
The SS troops were directed to participate in the abduction of these
forced laborers and also in the raids on villages, burning of villages,
and were directed to turn the entire population over for slave labor in
Germany.
We refer to Document Number 3012-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-190.
This document is a secret SS order and it is dated the 19th day of March
1943. I wish to quote from Page 3 of the English text starting with the
third paragraph. In the German text it appears at Page 2, Paragraph 3.
It says, and I quote it:
“The activity of the labor offices, that is, of recruiting
commissions, is to be supported to the greatest extent possible.
It will not be possible always to refrain from using force.
During a conference with the chief of the labor allocation
staffs, it was agreed that whatever prisoners could be released
should be put at the disposal of the commissioner of the labor
office. When searching villages or when it becomes necessary to
burn down villages, the whole population will be put at the
disposal of the commissioner by force.”
THE PRESIDENT: Shouldn’t you read Number 4 which follows it?
MR. DODD: Number 4 says:
“As a rule, no more children will be shot.”
I might say to Your Honor that parts of these documents are going to be
relied on for other purposes later and it sometimes may appear to the
Tribunal that we are overlooking some of these excerpts, but
nevertheless I am grateful to have them called to our attention because
they are most pertinent to these allegations as well.
From the community of Zhitomir where the Defendant Sauckel appealed for
more workers for the Reich, the Commissioner General reported on the
brutality of the conspirator’s program, which he described as a program
of coercion and slavery. And I now refer to Document Number 265-PS,
which is Exhibit USA-191. This document is a secret report of a
conference between the Commissioner General of Zhitomir and the
Defendant Rosenberg in the community of Vinnitza on the 17th of June
1943. The report itself is dated the 30th of June 1943 and is signed by
Leyser. I wish to quote from Page 1 of the English text, beginning with
the last paragraph; and in the German text it appears at Page 2,
Paragraph 3. Quoting it directly:
“The symptoms created by the recruiting of workers are, no
doubt, well known to the Reich Minister through reports and his
own observations. Therefore I shall not repeat them. It is
certain that a recruitment of labor in the true sense of the
word can hardly be spoken of. In most cases it is nowadays a
matter of actual conscription by force.”
Passing now to Page 2 of that same document, and to Paragraph 1, line
11—in the German text it appears at Page 3, Paragraph 2—it says; and I
quote it directly:
“But as the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor
explained to us the gravity of the situation, we had no
alternative. I consequently have authorized the commissioners of
the areas to apply the severest measures in order to achieve the
imposed quota. That a lowering of morale is coupled with this
needs no further proof. It is nevertheless essential to win the
war on this front too. The problem of labor mobilization cannot
be handled with gloves.”
The recruitment measures which we have been discussing enslaved so many
citizens of occupied countries that whole areas were depopulated.
I now wish to refer to our Document Number 3000-PS, which is Exhibit
USA-192. This document is a partial translation of a report from the
chief of Main Office III with the High Command in Minsk, and it is dated
the 28th day of June 1943. It was sent to Ministerialdirektor Riecke,
who was a top official in the Rosenberg Ministry. I wish to read from
Page 1 of the English text, starting with the second paragraph, as
follows:
“Thus recruitment of labor for the Reich, however necessary, had
disastrous effects, for the recruitment measures in the last
months and weeks were absolute manhunts, which have an
irreparable political and economic effect . . . . From . . .
White Ruthenia approximately 50,000 people have been obtained
for the Reich so far. Another 130,000 are to be taken.
Considering the 2,400,000 total population . . . the fulfillment
of these quotas is impossible. . . . Owing to the sweeping
drives of the SS and police in November 1942, about 115,000
hectares of farmland . . . are not used, as the population is
not there and the villages have been razed. . . .”
We have already referred to the conspirators’ objective of permanently
weakening the enemy through the enslavement of labor and the breaking up
of families; and we invite the Tribunal’s attention to Document 031-PS,
which is in evidence as Exhibit USA-171, for we desire to emphasize that
the policy was applied in the Eastern Occupied Territories with the
Defendant Rosenberg’s approval of a plan for the apprehension and
deportation of 40,000 to 50,000 youths of the ages of 10 to 14. Now the
stated purpose of this plan was to prevent a reinforcement of the
enemy’s military strength and to reduce the enemy’s biological
potentialities. We have already quoted from Page 3 of the English text
of that document to establish that the Defendant Rosenberg approved that
plan, the so-called Hay Action plan. We referred to it yesterday
afternoon.
Further evidence of the conspirators’ plan to weaken their enemies, in
utter disregard of the rules of international law, is contained in
Document Number 1702-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-193. This
document is a secret order, issued by a rear area military commandant to
the district commissar at Kasatin, dated the 25th of December 1943. I
quote from Page 3 of the English text at Paragraph 1. In the German text
it appears at Page 12, Paragraph 1.
“The able-bodied male population between 15 and 65 years of age
and the live stock are to be shipped back from the district east
of the line Belilovka-Berditchev-Zhitomir (exclusive of these
places).”
This program, which we have been describing, and the brutal measures
that it employed were not limited to Poland and the Occupied Eastern
Territories but covered and cursed Western Europe as well. Frenchmen,
Dutchmen, Belgians, Italians, all came to know the yoke of slavery and
the brutality of their slavemasters.
In France these slavemasters intensified their program in the early part
of 1943, pursuant to instructions which the Defendant Speer telephoned
to the Defendant Sauckel at 8 o’clock in the evening on the 4th day of
January 1943 from Hitler’s headquarters. I now refer to Document Number
556(13)-PS, which is Exhibit USA-194. This document, incidentally, is a
note for his own files, signed by the Defendant Sauckel, dated the 5th
of January 1943. I wish to quote from Page 1 of the English text,
Paragraph 1 as follows:
“On 4 January 1943 at 8 p.m. Minister Speer telephones from the
Führer’s headquarters and communicates that on the basis of the
Führer’s decision, it is no longer necessary to give special
consideration to Frenchmen in the further recruiting of
specialists and helpers in France. The recruiting can proceed
with vigor and with sharpened measures.”
To overcome resistance to his slave labor program, the Defendant Sauckel
improvised new impressment measures which were applied to both France
and Italy by his own agents and which he himself labelled as grotesque.
I now refer to Document Number R-124, which is Exhibit USA-179, and
particularly Page 2 and Paragraph 2 of the English text; in the German
text it appears at Page 8, Paragraph 1. Quoting directly from that page
and that paragraph a statement made by Sauckel on 1 March 1944 at a
meeting of the Central Planning Board:
“The most abominable point against which I have to fight is the
claim that there is no organization in these districts properly
to recruit Frenchmen, Belgians, and Italians and to dispatch
them to work. So I have even proceeded to employ and train a
whole staff of French and Italian agents of both sexes who for
good pay, just as was done in olden times for ‘shanghaiing,’ go
hunting for men and dupe them, using liquor as well as
persuasion in order to dispatch them to Germany.
“Moreover, I have charged several capable men with founding a
special labor allocation organization of our own, and this by
training and arming, under the aegis of the Higher SS and Police
Führer, a number of indigenous units; but I still have to ask
the munitions ministry for arms for these men. For during the
last year alone several dozens of high-ranking labor allocation
officials of great ability have been shot. All these means must
be used, grotesque as it may sound, to refute the allegation
that there is no organization to bring labor to Germany from
these countries.”
This same slave labor hunt proceeded in Holland, as it did in France,
with terror and abduction. I now refer to Document Number 1726-PS, which
is Exhibit USA-195. This document is entitled, “Statement of the
Netherlands Government in View of the Prosecution and Punishment of the
German Major War Criminals.” I wish to quote from enclosure “h,”
entitled “Central Bureau for Statistics—The Deportation of Netherlands’
Workmen to Germany.” It is Page 1 of the English text, starting with the
first paragraph; and in the German text it appears at Page 1, also
Paragraph 1. Quoting it directly, it reads as follows:
“Many big and medium-size large business concerns, especially in
the metal industry, were visited by German commissions who
selected workmen for deportation. This combing-out was called
the ‘Sauckel action,’ so named after its leader, who was charged
with the procurement, of foreign workmen for Germany.
“The employers had to cancel the contracts with the selected
workmen; and the latter were forced to register at the labor
offices, which then took charge of the deportation under
supervision of German ‘Fachberater.’
“Workmen who refused—relatively few—were prosecuted by the
Sicherheitsdienst—the SD. If captured by this service, they
were mostly lodged for some time in one of the infamous
prisoners’ camps in the Netherlands and eventually put to work
in Germany.
“In these prosecutions the Sicherheitsdienst was supported by
the German police service, which was connected with the labor
offices and was composed of members of the NSB and the like.
“At the end of April 1942 the deportation of workers started on
a grand scale. Consequently, in the months of May and June, the
number of deportees amounted to not less than 22,000 and 24,000
respectively, of which many were metal workers.
“After that the action slackened somewhat, but in October 1942
another peak was reached (2,600). After the big concerns, the
smaller ones had, in their turn, to give up their
personnel. . . .
“This changed in November 1944. The Germans then started a
ruthless campaign for manpower, passing by the labor offices.
Without warning they lined off whole quarters of the towns,
seized people in the streets or in the houses and deported them.
“In Rotterdam and Schiedam where these raids took place on 10
and 11 November, the number of people thus deported was
estimated at 50,000 and 5,000, respectively.
“In other places where the raids were held later, the numbers
were much lower, because one was forewarned by the events. The
exact figures are not known as they have never been published by
the occupants.
“The people thus seized were put to work partly in the
Netherlands, partly in Germany.”
A document found in the OKH files furnishes further evidence of the
seizure of workers in Holland; and I refer to Document Number 3003-PS,
which is Exhibit USA-196. This document is a partial translation of the
text of a lecture, delivered by one Lieutenant Haupt of the German
Wehrmacht, concerning the situation of the war economy in the
Netherlands. I wish to quote from Page 1 of the English text, starting
with the fourth line of Paragraph 1—quoting that directly, which reads
as follows:
“There had been some difficulties with the Arbeitseinsatz, that
is, during the man-catching action, which became very noticeable
because it was unorganized and unprepared. People were arrested
in the streets and taken out of their homes. It has been
impossible to carry out a uniform exemption procedure in
advance, because for security reasons the time for the action
had not been previously announced. Certificates of exemption,
furthermore, were to some extent not recognized by the officials
who carried out the action. Not only workers who had become
available through the stoppage of industry, but also those who
were employed in our installations producing things for our
immediate need were apprehended or did not dare to go into the
streets. In any case it proved to be a great loss to us.”
I might say to the Tribunal, that the hordes of people displaced in
Germany today indicate, to a very considerable extent, the length to
which the conspirators’ labor program succeeded. The best available
Allied and German data reveal that, as of January 1945, approximately
4,795,000 foreign civilian workers had been put to work for the German
war effort in the Old Reich; and among them were forced laborers of more
than 14 different nationalities. I now refer to Document Number 2520-PS,
Exhibit USA-197, which is an affidavit executed by Edward L. Deuss, an
economic analyst.
At the top of the first page there are tables setting forth the
nationality and then the numbers of the various nationals and other
groupings or prisoners of war and politicals, so-called. The workers
alone total, according to Mr. Deuss who is an expert in the field, the
4,795,000 figure to which I have just referred. In the second paragraph
of this statement of Deuss, I should like to read for the record and
quote directly:
“I, Edward L. Deuss, for 3 years employed by the Foreign
Economic Administration, Washington, as an economic analyst in
London, Paris, and Germany, specializing in labor and population
problems of Germany during the war, do hereby certify that the
figures of foreign labor employed in the Old Reich have been
compiled on the basis of the best available German and Allied
sources of material. The accompanying table represents a
combination of German official estimates of foreigners working
in Germany in January 1945, and of American, British, and French
figures of the number of foreigners actually discovered in the
Old Reich since 10 May 1945.”
Only a very small proportion of these imported laborers came to Germany
on a voluntary basis. At the March 1, 1944 meeting of this same Central
Planning Board, to which we have made reference before, the Defendant
Sauckel himself made clear the vast scale on which free men had been
forced into this labor slavery. He made the statement, and I quote from
Document Number R-124, which is in evidence as Exhibit USA-179 and from
which I have quoted earlier this morning. I wish to refer to Page 11 of
that document, the middle paragraph, Paragraph 3. In the German text it
appears at Page 4, Paragraph 2—the Defendant Sauckel speaking—and I
quote directly from that document:
“Out of 5 million foreign workers who arrived in Germany, not
even 200,000 came voluntarily.”
The Nazi conspirators were not satisfied just to tear 5 million odd
persons from their children, from their homes, from their native land.
But in addition, these defendants, who sit today in this courtroom,
insisted that this vast number of wretched human beings who were in the
so-called Old Reich as forced laborers must be starved, given less than
sufficient to eat, often beaten and maltreated, and permitted to die
wholesale for want of food, for want of even the fundamental
requirements of decent clothing, for the want of adequate shelter or
indeed sometimes just because they produced too little.
Now these conditions of deportation are vividly described in Document
Number 054-PS, which is a report made to the Defendant Rosenberg
concerning the treatment of Ukrainian labor. I wish to refer to Document
Number 054-PS, which bears the Exhibit Number USA-198. Before quoting
from it directly—according to this report the plight of these hapless
victims was aggravated because many were dragged off without opportunity
to collect their possessions. Indeed, men and women were snatched from
bed and lodged in cellars pending deportation. Some arrived in night
clothing. Brutal guards beat them. They were locked in railroad cars for
long periods without any toilet facilities at all, without food, without
water, without heat. The women were subjected to physical and moral
indignities and indecencies during medical examinations.
I refer how specifically to this Document Number 054-PS, which consists
of a covering letter to the Defendant Rosenberg, first of all, and is
signed by one Theurer, a 1st lieutenant in the Wehrmacht, to which is
attached a copy of a report by the commandant of the collecting center
for Ukrainian specialists at Kharkov; and it also consists of a letter
written by one of the specialists in the Rosenberg office—no, by one of
the workers, not in the Rosenberg office, but one of the specialists
they were recruiting, by the name of Grigori. I wish to quote from the
report at Page 2, starting at Paragraph 4 of the English text—and in
the German text it appears at Page 3, Paragraph 4. Quoting directly from
that page of the English text:
“The _starosts_, that is village elders, are frequently
corruptible; they continue to have the skilled workers, whom
they drafted, dragged from their beds at night to be locked up
in cellars until they are shipped. Since the male and female
workers often are not given any time to pick up their luggage
and so forth, many skilled workers arrive at the collecting
center for skilled workers with equipment entirely insufficient
(without shoes or change of clothing, no eating and drinking
utensils, no blankets, _et cetera_). In particularly extreme
cases, therefore, new arrivals have to be sent back again
immediately to get the things most necessary for them. If people
do not come along at once, threatening and beating of skilled
workers by the above-mentioned local militia become a daily
occurrence and are reported from most of the communities. In
some cases women were beaten until they could no longer march.
One bad case in particular was reported by me to the commander
of the civil police here (Colonel Samek) for severe punishment
(village of Sozolinkov, district of Dergatchi). The
encroachments of the _starosts_ and the militia are of a
particularly grave nature because they usually justify
themselves by claiming that all that is done in the name of the
German Armed Forces. In reality, the latter have conducted
themselves throughout in a highly understanding manner toward
the skilled workers and the Ukrainian population. The same,
however, cannot be said of some of the administrative agencies.
To illustrate this, be it mentioned that a woman once arrived
dressed with barely more than a shirt.”
Passing now to Page 4 of this same document, starting with the 10th line
of the third paragraph, and in the German text it appears at Page 5,
Paragraph 2. Quoting directly again:
“On the basis of reported incidents, attention must be called to
the fact that it is inexcusable to keep workers locked in the
cars for many hours, so that they cannot even take care of the
calls of nature. It is evident that the people of a transport
must be given an opportunity from time to time, to get drinking
water, to wash, and to relieve themselves. Cars have been shown
in which people had made holes so that they could attend to the
calls of nature. When nearing bigger stations, persons should,
if possible, relieve themselves far from these stations.”
Turning to Page 5 of the same document, Paragraph 12—in the German text
it appears at Page 6, Paragraph 1:
“The following abuses were reported from the delousing stations:
“In the women’s and girls’ shower rooms, services were partly
performed by men, or men would mingle around or even help with
the soaping, and vice versa there were female personnel in the
men’s shower rooms. Men also for some time were taking
photographs in the women’s shower rooms. Since mainly Ukrainian
peasants were transported in the last months, as far as the
female portion of these are concerned, they were mostly of a
high moral standard and used to strict modesty; they must have
considered such a treatment as a national degradation. The
above-mentioned abuses have been, according to our knowledge,
settled by the intervention of the transport commanders. The
reports of the photographing were made from Halle; the reports
about the former were made from Kiwerce. Such incidents,
altogether unworthy of the dignity and prestige of the Greater
German Reich may still occur here or there.”
Sick and infirm people of the occupied countries were taken
indiscriminately with the rest. Those who managed to survive the trip
into Germany but who arrived too sick to work were returned like cattle
together with those who fell ill at work, because they were of no
further use to the Germans. The return trip took place under the same
terrible conditions as the initial journey, and without any kind of
medical supervision. Death came to many and their corpses were
unceremoniously dumped out of the cars, with no provision for burial.
I quote from Page 3, Paragraph 3 of Document Number 054-PS. In the
German text it appears at Page 2, Paragraph 3. Quoting directly:
“Very depressing for the morale of the skilled workers and the
population is the effect of those persons shipped back from
Germany who had become disabled or had been unfit for employment
from the very beginning.
“Several times already transports of skilled workers on their
way to Germany have crossed returning transports of such
disabled persons and have stood on the tracks alongside of each
other for a long period of time. These returning transports are
insufficiently cared for. Nothing but sick, injured, or weak
people, mostly 50 to 60 in a car usually escorted by 3 to 4 men.
There is neither sufficient care nor food. The returnees made
frequently unfavorable—if also surely exaggerated—statements
relative to their treatment in Germany and on the way. As a
result of all this and of what the people could see with their
own eyes, a psychosis of fear was evoked among the skilled
workers, that is, the whole transport to Germany. Several
transport leaders, of the 62d and 63d transports, in particular,
reported on it in detail. In one case the leader of the
transport of skilled workers observed with his own eyes how a
person who had died of hunger was unloaded from a returning
transport on the side track (1st Lieutenant Hofmann of the 63rd
Transport Station, Darniza). Another time it was reported that
three dead had to be deposited by the side of the tracks on the
way and had to be left behind unburied by the escort. It is also
regrettable that these disabled persons arrive here without any
identification. From the reports of the transport commanders,
one gets the impression that these unemployable persons are
assembled, penned into the wagons, and sent off provided only by
a few men escorts and without special care for food and medical
or other attendance. The labor office at the place of arrival as
well as the transport commanders confirm this impression.”
Incredible as it may seem, mothers in the throes of childbirth shared
cars with those infected with tuberculosis or venereal diseases. Babies,
when born, were hurled out of these car windows; and dying persons lay
on the bare floors of freight cars without even the small comfort of
straw.
I refer to Document Number 084-PS, which is Exhibit USA-199. This
document is an interdepartmental report, prepared by Dr. Gutkelch, in
the Defendant Rosenberg’s Ministry, and it is dated the 30th of
September 1942. I wish to quote from Page 10 of the English text,
starting with the fourth line from the top of the page. In the German
text it appears at Page 22, Paragraph 1. Quoting directly from that
paragraph:
“How necessary this interference was is shown by the fact that
this train with returning laborers had stopped at the same place
where a train with newly recruited Eastern Workers had stopped.
Because of the corpses in the trainload of returning laborers, a
catastrophe might have been precipitated had it not been for the
mediation of Mrs. Miller. In this train women gave birth to
babies who were thrown out of the windows during the journey,
people having tuberculosis and venereal diseases rode in the
same car, dying people lay in freight cars without straw, and
one of the dead was thrown on the railway embankment. The same
must have occurred in other returning transports.”
Some aspects of the Nazi transport were described by the Defendant
Sauckel himself in a decree which he issued on the 20th of July 1942;
and I refer specifically to Document Number 2241(2)-PS, which is Exhibit
USA-200. I ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of the original
decree, which is published in Section BIa, at Page 48e of a book
entitled _Die Beschäftigung von ausländischen Arbeitskräften in
Deutschland_. I quote from Page 1, Paragraph 2, of the English text; and
I am quoting directly:
“According to reports of transportation
commanders”—Transportleiter—“presented to me, the special
trains provided by the German railway have frequently been in a
really broken-down condition. Numerous window panes have been
missing in the coaches. Old French coaches without lavatories
have been partly employed so that the workers had to fit up an
emptied compartment as a lavatory. In other cases, the coaches
were not heated in winter so that the lavatories quickly became
unusable because the water system was frozen and the flushing
apparatus was therefore without water.”
The Tribunal will unquestionably have noticed or observed that a number
of the documents which we have referred to—and which we have
offered—consist of complaints by functionaries of the Defendant
Rosenberg’s Ministry, or by others, concerning the conditions under
which foreign workers were recruited and lived. I think it is
appropriate to say that these documents have been presented by the
Prosecution really for two purposes, or for a dual purpose; to
establish, first, the facts recited therein, of course, but also to show
that these conspirators had knowledge of these conditions and that
notwithstanding their knowledge of these conditions, these conspirators
continued to countenance and assist in this enslavement program of a
vast number of citizens of occupied countries.
Once within Germany, slave laborers were subjected to almost
unbelievable brutality and degradation by their captors; and the
character of this treatment was in part made plain by the conspirators’
own statements, as in Document Number 016-PS, which is in evidence as
Exhibit USA-168; and I refer to Page 12, Paragraph 2 of the English
text. In the German text it appears at Page 17, Paragraph 4. Quoting
directly:
“All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way
that they produce to the highest possible extent at the lowest
conceivable degree of expenditure.”
Force and brutality as instruments of production found a ready adherent
in the Defendant Speer who, in the presence of the Defendant Sauckel,
said at a meeting of the Central Planning Board—and I refer to Document
Number R-124, which is already in evidence and which has been referred
to previously. It bears the Exhibit Number USA-179. I refer particularly
to Page 42 of that Document R-124, and Paragraph 2 of that Page 42. The
Defendant Speer, speaking at that meeting, stated:
“We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained that the
side list decreased at once to one-fourth or one-fifth in
factories where doctors are on the staff who examine the sick
men. There is nothing to be said against SS and police taking
drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into
concentration camps. There is no alternative. Let it happen
several times and the news will soon go around.”
At a later meeting of the Central Planning Board, Field Marshal Milch
agreed that so far as workers were concerned—and again I refer to
Document Number R-124 and to Page 26, Paragraph 2, in the English text,
and in the German text at Page 17, Paragraph 1. Field Marshal Milch,
speaking at a meeting of the Central Planning Board when the Defendant
Speer was present, stated; and I am quoting directly:
“The list of the shirkers should be entrusted to Himmler
. . . .”
Milch made particular reference to foreign workers again in this
Document Number R-124 at Page 26, Paragraph 3—in the German text it
appears at Page 18, Paragraph 3—when he said; and I am quoting him
directly:
“It is therefore not possible to exploit fully all the
foreigners unless we compel them by piece-work wages and have
the possibility of taking measures against foreigners who are
not doing their bit.”
The policy as actually executed was even more fearful than the policy as
expressed by the conspirators. Indeed, these impressed workers were
underfed and overworked; and they were forced to live in grossly
overcrowded camps where they were held as virtual prisoners, and were
otherwise denied adequate shelter, adequate clothing, adequate medical
care and treatment. As a consequence, they suffered from many diseases
and ailments. They were generally forced to work long hours, up to and
beyond the point of exhaustion. They were beaten and subjected to all
manner of inhuman indignities.
An example of this maltreatment is found in the conditions which
prevailed in the Krupp factories. Foreign laborers at the Krupp works
were given insufficient food to enable them to perform the work required
of them.
I refer to Document Number D-316, which is Exhibit USA-201. This
document was found in the Krupp files. It is a memorandum upon the Krupp
stationery to a Herr Hupe, a director of the Krupp locomotive factory in
Essen, Germany, dated the 14th of March 1942. I wish to refer to Page 1
of the English text, starting with Paragraph 1, as follows; and I am
quoting directly:
“During the last few days we established that the food for the
Russians employed here is so miserable that the people are
getting weaker from day to day.
“Investigations showed that single Russians are not able to
place a piece of metal for turning into position, for instance,
because of lack of physical strength. The same conditions exist
in all other places of work where Russians are employed.”
The condition of foreign workers in Krupp workers’ camps is described in
detail in an affidavit executed in Essen, Germany, by Dr. Wilhelm Jäger,
who was the senior camp doctor. It is Document Number D-288, which is
Exhibit USA-202.
“I, Dr. Wilhelm Jäger, am a general practitioner in Essen,
Germany, and its surroundings. I was born in Germany on 2
December 1888 and now live at Kettwig, Sengenholz 6, Germany.
“I make the following statement of my own free will. I have not
been threatened in any way and I have not been promised any sort
of reward.
“On the 1st of October 1942, I became senior camp doctor in the
Krupp’s workers’ camps for foreigners and was generally charged
with the medical supervision of all Krupp’s workers’ camps in
Essen. In the course of my duties it was my responsibility to
report upon the sanitary and health conditions of the workers’
camps to my superiors in the Krupp works.
“It was a part of my task to visit every Krupp camp which housed
foreign civilian workers, and I am therefore able to make this
statement on the basis of my personal knowledge.
“My first official act as senior camp doctor was to make a
thorough inspection of the various camps. At that time, in
October 1942, I found the following conditions:
“The Eastern Workers and Poles who worked in the Krupp works at
Essen were kept at camps at Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse,
Spenlestrasse, Heegstrasse, Germaniastrasse,
Kapitän-Lehmannstrasse, Dechenschule, and Krämerplatz.”—When
the term “Eastern Workers” is hereinafter used, it is to be
taken as including Poles.—“All of the camps were surrounded by
barbed wire and were closely guarded.
“Conditions in all of these camps were extremely bad. The camps
were greatly overcrowded. In some camps there were twice as many
people in a barrack as health conditions permitted.
“At Krämerplatz the inhabitants slept in treble-tiered bunks,
and in the other camps they slept in double-tiered bunks. The
health authorities prescribed a minimum space between beds of 50
centimeters, but the bunks in these camps were separated by a
maximum of 20 to 30 centimeters.
“The diet prescribed for the Eastern Workers was altogether
insufficient. They were given 1,000 calories a day less than the
minimum prescribed for any German. Moreover, while German
workers engaged in the heaviest work received 5,000 calories a
day, the Eastern Workers with comparable jobs received only
2,000 calories. The Eastern Workers were given only two meals a
day and their bread ration. One of these two meals consisted of
a thin, watery soup. I had no assurance that the Eastern
Workers, in fact, received the minimum which was prescribed.
Subsequently, in 1943, I undertook to inspect the food prepared
by the cooks; I discovered a number of instances in which food
was withheld from the workers.
“The plan for food distribution called for a small quantity of
meat per week. Only inferior meats rejected by the veterinary,
such as horse meat or tuberculin-infested, was permitted for
this purpose. This meat was usually cooked into a soup . . . .
“The percentage of Eastern Workers who were ill was twice as
great as among the Germans. Tuberculosis was particularly
widespread among the Eastern Workers. The tuberculosis rate
among them was four times the normal rate (Eastern Workers, 2
percent; German, 0.5 percent). At Dechenschule approximately 2.5
percent of the workers suffered from open tuberculosis. The
Tartars and Kirghises suffered most; as soon as they were
overcome by this disease they collapsed like flies. The cause
was bad housing, the poor quality and insufficient quantity of
food, overwork, and insufficient rest.
“These workers were likewise afflicted with spotted fever. Lice,
the carrier of this disease, together with countless fleas,
bugs, and other vermin, tortured the inhabitants of these camps.
As a result of the filthy conditions of the camps nearly all
Eastern Workers were afflicted with skin disease. The shortage
of food also caused many cases of Hunger-Oedema, Nephritis and
Shiga-Kruse.
“It was the general rule that workers were compelled to go to
work unless a camp doctor had certified that they were unfit for
work. At Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, Germaniastrasse,
Kapitän-Lehmannstrasse, and Dechenschule there was no daily sick
call. At these camps the doctors did not appear for 2 or 3 days.
As a consequence workers were forced to go to work despite
illness.
“I undertook to improve conditions as much as I could. I
insisted upon the erection of some new barracks in order to
relieve the overcrowded conditions of the camps. Despite this,
the camps were still greatly overcrowded but not as much as
before. I tried to alleviate the poor sanitary conditions in
Krämerplatz and Dechenschule by having some emergency toilets
installed; but the number was insufficient, and the situation
was not materially altered . . . .
“With the onset of heavy air raids in March 1943, conditions in
the camps greatly deteriorated. The problem of housing, feeding,
and medical attention became more acute than ever. The workers
lived in the ruins of their former barracks. Medical supplies
which were used up, lost, or destroyed were difficult to
replace. At times the water supply at the camps was completely
shut off for periods of 8 to 14 days. We installed a few
emergency toilets in the camps, but there were far too few of
them to cope with the situation.
“During the period immediately following the March 1943 raids
many foreign workers were made to sleep at the Krupp factories
in the same rooms in which they worked. The day workers slept
there at night, and the night workers slept there during the
day, despite the noise which constantly prevailed. I believe
that this condition continued until the entrance of American
troops into Essen.
“As the pace of air raids was stepped up, conditions became
progressively worse. On 28 July 1944 I reported to my superiors
that:
“‘The sick barracks in camp Rabenhorst are in such a bad
condition one cannot speak of a sick barracks any more. The rain
leaks through in every corner. The housing of the sick is
therefore impossible. The necessary labor for production is in
danger because those persons who are ill cannot recover.’
“At the end of 1943 or the beginning of 1944—I am not
completely sure of the exact date—I obtained permission for the
first time to visit the prisoner-of-war camps. My inspection
revealed that conditions at these camps were worse than those I
had found at the camps of the Eastern Workers in 1942. Medical
supplies at such camps were virtually non-existent. In an effort
to cure this intolerable situation, I contacted the Wehrmacht
authorities whose duty it was to provide medical care for the
prisoners of war. My persistent efforts came to nothing. After
remonstrating with them over a period of 2 weeks, I was given a
total of 100 aspirin tablets for over 3,000 prisoners of war.
“The French prisoner-of-war camp in Nöggerathstrasse had been
destroyed in an air raid attack and its inhabitants were kept
for nearly half a year in dog kennels, urinals, and in old
bakehouses. The dog kennels were 3 feet high, 9 feet long, and 6
feet wide. Five men slept in each of them. The prisoners had to
crawl into these kennels on all fours. The camp contained no
tables, chairs, or cupboards. The supply of blankets was
inadequate. There was no water in the camp. Such medical
treatment as there was, was given in the open. Many of these
conditions were reported to me in a report by Dr. Stinnesbeck,
dated 12 June 1944, in which he said:
“‘. . . There are still 315 prisoners in the camp. One hundred
seventy of these are no longer in barracks but in the tunnel in
Grunertstrasse under the Essen-Mülheim railway line. This tunnel
is damp and is not suitable for continued accommodation of human
beings. The rest of the prisoners are accommodated in 10
different factories in the Krupp works. The medical attention is
given by a French military doctor who takes great pains with his
fellow countrymen. Sick people from Krupp factories must be
brought to sick call. This inspection is held in the lavatory of
a burned-out public house outside the camp. The sleeping
accommodation of the four French orderlies is in what was the
men’s room. In the sick bay there is a double-tier wooden bed.
In general the treatment takes place in the open. In rainy
weather it is held in the above-mentioned small room. These are
insufferable conditions. There are no chairs, tables, cupboards,
or water. The keeping of a register of sick people is
impossible. Bandages and medical supplies are very scarce,
although the badly wounded from the factory are very often
brought here for first aid and have to be bandaged here before
being transported to the hospital. There are many loud and
lively complaints about food which the guard personnel confirms
as being justified. Illness and loss of manpower must be
reckoned with under these conditions . . . .’
“In my report to my superiors at Krupps, dated 2 September 1944,
I stated . . . .
“Camp Humboldtstrasse has been inhabited by Italian military
internees. After it had been destroyed by an air raid, the
Italians were removed and 600 Jewish females from Buchenwald
concentration camp were brought to work at the Krupp factories.
Upon my first visit at Camp Humboldtstrasse, I found these
persons suffering from open festering wounds and other ailments.
“I was the first doctor they had seen for at least a fortnight.
There was no doctor in attendance at the camp. There were no
medical supplies in the camp. They had no shoes and went about
in their bare feet. The sole clothing of each consisted of a
sack with holes for their arms and head. Their hair was shorn.
The camp was surrounded by barbed wire and closely guarded by SS
guards.
“The amount of food in the camp was extremely meager and of very
poor quality. The houses in which they lived consisted of the
ruins of former barracks and they afforded no shelter against
rain and other weather conditions. I reported to my superiors
that the guards lived and slept outside their barracks as one
could not enter them without being attacked by 10, 20, and up to
50 fleas. One camp doctor employed by me refused to enter the
camp again after he had been bitten very badly. I visited this
camp with Mr. Gröne on two occasions and both times we left the
camp badly bitten. We had great difficulty in getting rid of the
fleas and insects which had attacked us. As a result of this
attack by insects of this camp I got large boils on my arms and
the rest of my body. I asked my superiors at the Krupp works to
undertake the necessary steps to delouse the camp so as to put
an end to this unbearable vermin-infested condition. Despite
this report, I did not find any improvement in sanitary
conditions at the camp on my second visit a fortnight later.
“When foreign workers finally became too sick to work or were
completely disabled, they were returned to the labor exchange in
Essen and from there they were sent to a camp at Friedrichsfeld.
Among persons who were returned to the labor exchange were
aggravated cases of tuberculosis, malaria, neurosis, cancer
which could not be treated by operation, old age, and general
feebleness. I know nothing about conditions at this camp because
I have never visited it. I only know that it was a place to
which workers were sent who were no longer of any use to Krupp.
“My colleagues and I reported all of the foregoing matters to
Mr. Ihn, director of Friedrich Krupp AG.; Dr. Wiele, personal
physician of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach; senior camp
leader Kupke; and sometimes to the Essen health department.
Moreover, I know that these gentlemen personally visited the
camps.”—signed—“Dr. Wilhelm Jäger.”
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.
[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, we had just completed the reading
of the affidavit executed by Dr. Wilhelm Jäger at the noon recess. The
conditions which were described in this affidavit were not confined to
the Krupp factories alone but existed throughout Germany; and we turn to
a report of the Polish Main Committee made to the Administration of the
General Government of Poland, Document Number R-103, Exhibit Number
USA-204. This document is dated the 17th of May 1944 and describes the
situation of the Polish workers in Germany, and I wish to refer
particularly to Page 2 of the English translation, starting with
Paragraph 2; in the German text it appears at Page 2, Paragraph 2 also.
In quoting from the document, it reads:
“The state of cleanliness of many overcrowded camp rooms is
contrary to the most elementary requirements. Often there is no
opportunity to obtain warm water for washing; therefore, the
cleanest parents are unable to maintain even the most primitive
standard of hygiene for their children or often even to wash
their only set of underclothing. A consequence of this is the
spreading of scabies which cannot be eradicated . . . .
“We receive imploring letters from the camps of Eastern Workers
and their prolific families beseeching us for food. The quantity
and quality of camp rations mentioned therein—the so-called
class 4—is absolutely insufficient to compensate the energy
spent in heavy work. Three and one half kilograms of bread
weekly and a thin soup at lunch time, cooked with kohlrabi or
other vegetables without any meat or fat, with a meager addition
of potatoes now and then, is a starvation ration for a heavy
worker.
“When, on top of that, starvation is sometimes inflicted as
punishment—for refusal to wear the badge ‘East’, for
example—the result is that workers faint at their work
(Klosterteich Camp, Grünheim, Saxony). The consequence is
complete exhaustion, an ailing state of health, and
tuberculosis. The spreading of tuberculosis among the Polish
factory workers is due to the deficient food rations meted out
in the community camps which are insufficient to restore the
energy spent in heavy work . . . .
“The call for help which reaches us brings to light privation
and hunger, severe stomach and intestinal trouble, especially in
the case of children, resulting from the insufficiency of food
which does not take into consideration the needs of children.
Proper medical treatment or care for the sick is not available
in the mass camps.”
We now refer to Page 3 of this same document and particularly to the
first paragraph. In the German text it appears at Page 5, Paragraph 1:
“In addition to these bad conditions, there is lack of
systematic occupation for and supervision of these hosts of
children which affects the life of prolific families in the
camps. The children, left to themselves without schooling or
religious care, must run wild and grow up illiterate. Idleness
in rough surroundings may and will create undesirable results in
these children . . . . An indication of what these awful
conditions may lead to is given by the fact that in the camps
for Eastern Workers (‘Waldlust,’ Lauf, post office, Pegnitz)
there are cases of 8-year-old, delicate, and undernourished
children put to forced labor and perishing from such treatment
. . . .
“The fact that these bad conditions dangerously affect the state
of health and the vitality of the workers is proved by the many
cases of tuberculosis found in very young people returning from
the Reich to the General Government as unfit for work. Their
state of health is usually so bad that recovery is out of the
question. The reason is that a state of exhaustion resulting
from overwork and a starvation diet is not recognized as an
ailment until the illness betrays itself by high fever and
fainting spells.
“Although some hostels for unfit workers have been provided as a
precautionary measure, one can only go there when recovery may
no longer be expected (Neumarkt in Bavaria). Even there the
incurables waste away slowly, and nothing is done even to
alleviate the state of the sick by suitable food and medicines.
There are children there with tuberculosis whose cure would not
be hopeless and men in their prime who, if sent home in time to
their families in rural districts, might still be able to
recover . . . . No less suffering is caused by the separation of
families when wives and mothers of small children are away from
their families and sent to the Reich for forced labor.”
And finally, from Page 4 of the same document, starting with the first
paragraph—in the German text it appears at Page 7, Paragraph 4:
“If, under these conditions, there is no moral support such as
is normally based on regular family life, then at least such
moral support which the religious feelings of the Polish
population require should be maintained and increased. The
elimination of religious services, religious practices, and
religious care from the life of the Polish workers, the
prohibition of church attendance when there is a religious
service for other people, and other measures show a certain
contempt for the influence of religion on the feelings and
opinions of the workers.”
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us who the Polish Central Committee
were—or, I mean, how they were founded?
MR. DODD: Well, insofar as we are aware, it was a committee apparently
set up by the Nazi State when it occupied Poland to work in some sort of
co-operation with it during the days of the occupation. We don’t know
the names of the members, and we haven’t any more specific information.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it a captured document?
MR. DODD: It is a captured document, yes, Sir. All of the documents that
I am presenting in connection with this case are, excepting the
Netherlands Government’s report and one or two other official reports,
the Deuss affidavit and such other matters, are captured documents. That
particular document, it has just been called to my attention, was
captured by the United States 3rd Army.
Particularly harsh and brutal treatment was reserved for workers
imported from the conquered Eastern territories. As we have illustrated,
they did indeed live in bondage, and they were subjected to almost every
form of degradation, quartered in stables with animals, denied the right
of free worship and the ordinary pleasures of human society.
Illustrative of this treatment is Document EC-68, bearing Exhibit Number
USA-205. This document, EC-68, bears the title, “Directives on the
Treatment of Foreign Farm Workers of Polish Nationality,” issued by the
Minister for Finance and Economy of Baden, Germany, on the 6th of March
1941. And we don’t know his name, nor have we been able to ascertain it.
Quoting from the English text of this document from the beginning:
“The agencies of the Baden State Peasant Association of the
Reich Food Administration, have received the result of the
negotiations with the Higher SS and Police Führer in Stuttgart
on 14 February 1941 with great satisfaction. Appropriate
memoranda have already been turned over to the District Peasants
Associations. Below I promulgate the individual regulations as
they have been laid down during the conference and the manner in
which they are now to be applied:
“1. On principle, farm workers of Polish nationality are no
longer granted the right to complain, and thus no complaints may
be accepted by any official agency.
“2. The farm workers of Polish nationality may no longer leave
the localities in which they are employed, and have a curfew
from 1 October to 31 March from 2000 hours to 0600 hours and
from 1 April to 30 September from 2100 hours to 0500 hours.
“3. The use of bicycles is strictly prohibited. Exceptions are
possible for riding to the place of work in the field if a
relative of the employer or the employer himself is present.
“4. The visit to churches, regardless of faith, is strictly
prohibited, even when there is no service in progress.
Individual spiritual care by clergymen outside of the church is
permitted.
“5. Visits to theaters, motion pictures, or other cultural
entertainment are strictly prohibited for farm workers of Polish
nationality.
“6. The visit to restaurants is strictly prohibited to farm
workers of Polish nationality, except for one restaurant in the
village, which will be selected by the Regional Commissioner’s
Office”—Landratsamt—“and then only 1 day per week. The day
which is allowed for visiting the restaurant will also be
determined by the Landratsamt. This regulation does not change
the curfew regulation mentioned above under ‘2’.
“7. Sexual intercourse with women and girls is strictly
prohibited; and wherever it is discovered, it must be reported.
“8. Gatherings of farm workers of Polish nationality after work
is prohibited, whether it is on other farms, in the stables, or
in the living quarters of the Poles.
“9. The use of railroads, buses, or other public conveyances by
farm workers of Polish nationality is prohibited.
“10. Permits to leave the village may be granted only in very
exceptional cases by the local police authority (mayor’s
office). However, in no case may it be granted if a Pole wishes
to visit a public agency on his own authority, whether it is a
labor office or the District Peasants Association, or if he
wants to change his place of employment.
“11. Unauthorized change of employment is strictly prohibited.
The farm workers of Polish nationality have to work daily as
long as it is to the interests of the enterprise and is demanded
by the employer. There are no limits to the working hours.
“12. Every employer has the right to give corporal punishment to
farm workers of Polish nationality if persuasion and reprimand
fail. The employer may not be held accountable in any such case
by an official agency.
“13. Farm workers of Polish nationality should, if possible, be
removed from the household; and they can be quartered in stables
_et cetera_. No consideration whatever should restrict such
action.
“14. Report to the authorities of all crimes committed by farm
workers of Polish nationality which sabotage industry or slow
down work—for instance, unwillingness to work, impertinent
behavior—is compulsory even in minor cases. An employer who
loses a Pole sentenced to a long prison sentence because of such
a compulsory report will upon request, have preference for the
assignment of another Pole from the competent labor office.
“15. In all other cases, only the State Police is still
competent. For the employer himself, severe punishment is
provided if it is established that the necessary distance has
not been kept from farm workers of Polish nationality. The same
applies to women and girls. Extra rations are strictly
prohibited. Noncompliance with the Reich tariffs for farm
workers of Polish nationality will be punished by the competent
labor office by the taking away of the workers.”
The women of the conquered territories were led away against their will
to serve as domestics, and the Defendant Sauckel described this program
in his own words, which appear in Document Number 016-PS, already
offered in evidence as Exhibit USA-168, 016-PS, and particularly Page 7,
fourth paragraph of the English text. In the German text it appears on
Page 10, Paragraph 1, and I quote directly:
“In order to relieve considerably the German housewife,
especially the mother with many children and the extremely busy
farmwoman, and in order to avoid any further danger to their
health, the Führer also has charged me with the procurement of
400,000 to 500,000 selected, healthy, and strong girls from the
territories of the East for Germany.”
Once captured, once forced to become laborers in Germany, or workers in
Germany, these Eastern women, by order of the slavemaster, Defendant
Sauckel, were bound to the household to which they were assigned,
permitted at the most 3 hours of freedom a week, and denied the right to
return to their homes.
I now refer to Document Number 3044(b)-PS. That is Exhibit Number
USA-206. The document is a decree issued by the Defendant Sauckel
containing instructions for housewives concerning Eastern household
workers; and I ask that the Court take judicial notice of the original
decree which appears on Pages 592 and 593 of the second volume of a
publication of the Zentralverlag of the NSDAP, entitled _Verfügungen,
Anordnungen und Bekanntgaben_, and I quote from the first paragraph of
the English translation of a portion of the decree as follows:
“There is no claim for free time. Female domestic workers from
the East may, on principle, leave the household only to take
care of domestic tasks. As a reward for good work, however, they
may be given the opportunity to stay outside the home without
work for 3 hours once a week. This leave must end with the onset
of darkness, at the latest at 2000 hours. It is prohibited to
enter restaurants, movies or other theaters, and similar
establishments provided for German or foreign workers. Attending
church is also prohibited. Special events may be arranged for
Eastern domestics in urban homes by the German Workers’ Front,
for Eastern domestics in rural homes by the Reich Food
Administration in cooperation with the German Women’s League.
Outside the home, the Eastern domestic must always carry her
work card as a personal pass.
“Vacations and return to homes are not granted as yet. The
recruiting of Eastern domestics is for an indefinite period.”
Always over these enslaved workers was the shadow of the Gestapo and the
concentration camps. Like other major programs of the Nazi conspirators,
the guards of the SS and Himmler’s methods of dealing with people were
the instruments employed for enforcement.
On the subject of the slave laborers, a secret order dated 20 February
1942 issued by Reichsführer SS Himmler to SD and Security Police
officers concerning Eastern Workers spells out the violence which was
applied against them. It is our Document 3040-PS, which is Exhibit
Number USA-207, and I ask this Court to take judicial notice of the
original order, which is published in the _Allgemeine Erlass-Sammlung_
Part II, Section 2-A, III, f, Pages 15 to 24. I wish to quote from Page
3 of the English text, starting with Paragraph III—in the German text
it appears in Section 2-A, III, f, at Page 19 of the publication—as
follows:
“III. Combatting violations against discipline. (1) In keeping
with the equal status of laborers from the original Soviet
Russian territory with prisoners of war, a strict discipline
must be maintained in quarters and in workshops. Violations
against discipline, including refusal to work and loafing at
work, will be dealt with exclusively by the secret state police.
The less serious cases will be settled by the leader of the
guard according to instructions from the state police
headquarters with measures as provided for in the appendix. To
break acute resistance, the guards shall be permitted to use
also physical compulsion against the laborers. But this may be
done only for a cogent reason. The laborers should always be
informed that they will be treated decently when conducting
themselves with discipline and accomplishing good work. In
serious cases, that is, in such cases where the measures at the
disposal of the leader of the guard do not suffice, the state
police is to step in. In such instances, as a rule, severe
measures will be taken, that is, transfer to a concentration
camp or special treatment. The transfer to a concentration camp
is made in the usual manner. In especially serious cases special
treatment is to be recommended at the Reich Security Main
Office; personal data and the exact facts must be given. Special
treatment is hanging. It should not take place in the immediate
vicinity of the camp. A certain number of laborers from the
original Soviet Russian territory should attend the special
treatment; at that time they are to be advised of the
circumstances which lead to this special treatment. Should
special treatment be required within the camp for exceptional
reasons of camp discipline, this must be applied for.”
And I turn now to Page 4 of the text, Paragraph VI; in the German text
it appears at Section 2-A, III, f, on Page 20:
“VI. Sexual intercourse. Sexual intercourse is forbidden to
laborers of the original Soviet Russian territory. Owing to
their closely confined quarters they have no opportunity for it
. . . For every case of sexual intercourse with German men or
women application for special treatment is to be made for male
labor from the original Soviet Russian territory, transfer to a
concentration camp for female labor.”
And finally from Page 5 of the same document, Paragraph VIII; and in the
German text it appears at Section 2-A, III, f, at Page 21:
“VIII. Search. Fugitive workers from the original Soviet Russian
territory are to be announced on principle in the German search
book. Furthermore, search measures are to be decreed locally.
When caught the fugitive must in principle be proposed for
special treatment.”
We have said to this Tribunal more than once that the primary purpose of
the entire slave labor program was, of course, to compel the people of
the occupied countries to work for the German war economy. The decree by
which Defendant Sauckel was appointed Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor reveals that the purpose of the appointment was to
facilitate acquisition of the manpower required for German war
industries, and in particular the armaments industry, by centralizing
under Sauckel responsibility for the recruitment and allocation of
foreign labor and prisoners of war in these industries. I refer to the
document bearing our Number 1666-PS—Exhibit USA-208. This document is a
decree signed by Hitler, Lammers, and the Defendant Keitel—and it is
dated 21 March 1942—appointing the Defendant Sauckel the
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. I ask that the
Court take judicial notice of the original decree, which is published at
Page 179, Part I, of the 1942 _Reichsgesetzblatt_; referring to the
English text starting at Paragraph 1, as follows, and quoting directly:
“In order to secure the manpower requisite for war industries as
a whole and particularly for armaments, it is necessary that the
utilization of all available manpower, including that of workers
recruited abroad and of prisoners of war, should be subject to a
uniform control directed in a manner appropriate to the
requirements of war industry, and further that all still
incompletely utilized manpower in the Greater German Reich,
including the Protectorate as well as in the Government General
and in the Occupied Territories, should be mobilized.
Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel will carry out
this task within the framework of the Four Year Plan, as
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. In that
capacity he will be directly responsible to the Delegate for the
Four Year Plan. Section III (Wages) and Section V (Utilization
of Labor) of the Reich Labor Ministry together with their
subordinate authorities, will be placed at the disposal of the
Plenipotentiary General for the accomplishment of his task.”
Sauckel’s success can be measured from a letter which he himself wrote
to Hitler on 15 April 1943 and which contained his report on 1 year of
his activities. We refer to the Document as Number 407(VI)-PS, which
bears Exhibit Number USA-209. I wish to quote from Paragraphs 6 and 9 on
Page 1 of the English text; in the German text it appears at Page 2,
Paragraphs 1 and 2:
“After 1 year’s activity as Plenipotentiary for the Allocation
of Labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign workers were
given to the German war economy from 1 April of last year to 31
March of this year . . . .
“The 3,638,056 are distributed amongst the following branches of
the German war economy: Armament, 1,568,801 . . . .”
Still further evidence of this steady use of enslaved foreign labor is
found again in a report of the Central Planning Board, to which we have
referred so many times this morning and yesterday. Another meeting of
this Central Planning Board was held on the 16th day of February 1944;
and I refer to our Document Number R-124, which contains the minutes of
this meeting of the Central Planning Board and which has been offered in
evidence already as Exhibit Number USA-179. And I want, to refer
particularly to Page 26, Paragraph 1 of the English text of Document
Number R-124. It is at Page 16, in Paragraph 2, of the German text:
“The armament industry employs foreign workmen to a large
extent; according to the latest figures—40 percent.”
Moreover, our Document Number 2520-PS, which is in evidence as Exhibit
Number USA-197, records that, according to Speer Ministry tabulations,
as of 31 December 1944, approximately 2 million civilian foreign workers
were employed directly in the manufacture of armaments and munitions
(finished products or parts). That, the bulk of these workers had been
forced to come to Germany against their will is made clear by Sauckel’s
statement, which I previously quoted from Paragraph 3 of Page 11 of
Document Number R-124. We quoted it this morning, the statement being
that of 5 million foreign workers only 200,000, or less than 200,000,
came voluntarily.
The Defendants Sauckel, Speer, and Keitel succeeded in forcing foreign
labor to construct military fortifications. Thus, citizens of France,
Holland, and Belgium were compelled against their will to engage in the
construction of the “Atlantic Wall”; and we refer to our Document Number
556(2)-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-194. This is a Hitler order dated
the 8th of September 1942, and it is initialled by the Defendant Keitel.
Quoting the order directly:
“The extensive coastal fortifications which I have ordered to be
erected in the area of Army Group West make it necessary that in
the occupied territory all available workers be assigned and
give the fullest extent of their productive capacities to this
task. The previous allotment of workers originating from these
countries is insufficient. In order to increase it I order the
introduction of compulsory labor and the prohibition of changing
the place of employment without permission of the authorities in
the occupied territories. Furthermore, the distribution of food
and clothing ration cards to those subject to labor draft should
in the future depend on the possession of a certificate of
employment. Refusal to accept an assigned job, as well as
leaving the place of work without the consent of the authorities
in charge, will result in the withdrawal of the food and
clothing ration cards. The GBA”—Deputy General for
Arbeitseinsatz—“in agreement with the military commander, as
well as the Reich Commissioner, will issue the appropriate
decrees.”
Indeed, the Defendant Sauckel boasted to Hitler concerning the
contribution of the forced labor program to the construction of the
Atlantic Wall by the Defendant Speer’s Organization Todt. And we refer
to Document 407(VIII)-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-210. This document
is a letter from the Defendant Sauckel to Hitler, dated the 17th day of
May 1943. And I refer to the second and last paragraph:
“In addition to the labor allotted to the total German economy
by the Arbeitseinsatz since I took office, the Organization Todt
was supplied with new labor continually . . . . Thus the
Arbeitseinsatz has done everything to help make possible the
completion of the Atlantic Wall.”
Similarly, Russian civilians were forced into labor battalions and
compelled to build fortifications to be used against their own
countrymen. In Document 031-PS, in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-171,
which is a memorandum of the Rosenberg Ministry, it is stated in
Paragraph 1 at Page 1 of that document:
“The men and women in the theaters of operations have been and
will be conscripted into labor battalions to be used in the
construction of fortifications.”
In addition, the conspirators compelled prisoners of war to engage in
operations of war against their own country and its allies. At a meeting
of the Central Planning Board, again held on February 19, 1943, attended
by the Defendant Speer and the Defendant Sauckel and Field Marshal
Milch, the following conversation occurred and is recorded in our
Document R-124, at Page 32, Paragraph 5, of the English text. It is Page
20, the last paragraph, of the German text. And I quote it, the
Defendant Sauckel speaking:
“Sauckel: ‘If any prisoners are taken, they will be needed
there.’
“Milch: ‘We have made a request for an order that a certain
percentage of men in the antiaircraft artillery must be
Russians. Fifty thousand will be taken altogether, thirty
thousand are already employed as gunners. It is an amusing thing
that Russians must work the guns.’”
We refer now to Documents Numbers 3027-PS and 3028-PS. They are,
respectively, Exhibit USA-211 for 3027 and USA-212 for 3028. They will
be found at the very back, I believe, of the document book, in a
separate manila folder. They are official German Army photographs; and,
if Your Honors will examine Document 3027-PS, the caption states that
Russian prisoners of war are acting as ammunition bearers during the
attack upon Tschedowo. Document 3028-PS consists of a series of official
German Army photographs taken in July and August 1941 showing Russian
prisoners of war in Latvia and the Ukraine being compelled to load and
unload ammunition trains and trucks and being required to stack
ammunition, all, we say, in flagrant disregard of the rules of
international law, particularly Article 6 of the regulations annexed to
the Hague Convention Number IV of 1907, which provides that the tasks of
prisoners of war shall have no connection with the operations of war.
The use of prisoners of war in the German armament industry was as
widespread and as extensive almost as the use of the forced foreign
civilian labor. We refer to Document Number 3005-PS, which is Exhibit
USA-213. This document is a secret letter from the Reich Minister of
Labor to the presidents of the regional labor exchange offices, which
refers to an order of the Defendant Göring to the effect that—I quote
now from Paragraph 1 of that document—I am quoting it directly:
“Upon personal order of the Reich Marshal, 100,000 men are to be
taken from among the French prisoners of war not yet employed in
armament industry and are to be assigned to the armament
industry (airplane industry). Gaps in manpower supply resulting
therefrom will be filled by Soviet prisoners of war. The
transfer of the above-named French prisoners of war is to be
accomplished by 1 October.”
The Reich Marshal referred to in that quotation is of course the
Defendant Göring.
A similar policy was followed with respect to Russian prisoners of war.
The Defendant Keitel directed the execution of Hitler’s order to use
prisoners of war in the German war economy. And I now make reference to
our Document EC-194, which has Exhibit Number USA-214. This document is
also a secret memorandum, according to its label, issued from Hitler’s
headquarters on the 31st of October 1941; and I read from Page 1,
Paragraphs 1 and 2, quoting it directly as follows:
“The lack of workers is becoming an increasingly dangerous
hindrance for the future German war and armament industry. The
expected relief through releases from the Armed Forces is
uncertain as to the extent and date; its probable extent will by
no means correspond to expectations and requirements in view of
the great demand.
“The Führer has now ordered that even the manpower of the
Russian prisoners of war should be utilized to a large extent by
large-scale assignments for the requirements of the war
industry. The prerequisite for production is adequate
nourishment. Also very small wages to provide a few every-day
necessities must be offered with additional premiums for special
effort, as the case may be.”
And quoting now from the same document, Paragraph 2, II and III—I am
quoting directly:
“II. Construction and armament industry.
“(a) Work units for construction of all kinds, particularly for
the fortification of coastal defenses (concrete workers,
unloading units for essential war plants).
“(b) Suitable armament factories which are to be selected in
such a way that their personnel will consist in the majority of
prisoners of war under guidance and supervision (upon withdrawal
and other employment of the German workers).
“III. Other war industries.
“(a) Mining as under II (b).
“(b) Railroad construction units for building tracks, _et
cetera_.
“(c) Agriculture and forestry in closed units. The utilization
of Russian prisoners of war is to be regulated on the basis of
the above examples:
“To I. The Armed Forces.
“To II. The Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions and the
Inspector General for the German Road System in agreement with
the Reich Minister for Labor and Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces (Economic Armament Office). Deputies of the Reich
Minister for Armament and Munitions are to be admitted to the
prisoner-of-war camps to assist in the selection of skilled
workers.”
The Defendant Göring, at a conference at the Air Ministry on the 7th day
of November 1941, also discussed the use of prisoners of war in the
armament industry. And we refer now to our Document Number 1206-PS,
which bears Exhibit Number USA-215. This document consists of top-secret
notes on Göring’s instructions as to the employment and treatment of
prisoners of war in many phases of the German war industry. And I wish
to quote from Paragraph 1 of Page 1 and Paragraph 4 of Page 2 of the
English text and from Paragraph 1, Page 1, and Paragraph 1, Page 3 of
the German text, as follows:
“The Führer’s point of view as to employment of prisoners of war
in war industries has changed basically. So far a total of 5
million prisoners of war—employed so far 2 million.”
And on Page 2:
“In the interior and the Protectorate it would be ideal if
entire factories could be manned by Russian prisoners of war
except the employees necessary for directing. For employment in
the interior and the Protectorate the following are to have
priority:
“(a) At the top, the coal mining industry. Order by the Führer
to investigate all mines as to suitability for employment of
Russians, in some instances manning the entire plant with
Russian laborers.
“(b) Transportation (construction of locomotives and cars,
repair shops, _et cetera_). Railroad-repair and factory workers
are to be sought out from the prisoners of war. Rail is the most
important means of transportation in the East.
“(c) Armament industries. Preferably factories of armor and
guns. Possibly also construction of parts for aircraft engines.
Suitable complete sections of factories to be manned exclusively
by Russians if possible. For the remainder, employment in
groups. Use in factories of tool machinery, production of farm
tractors, generators, _et cetera_. In emergency, erect in some
places barracks for casual workers who are used in unloading
units and for similar purposes. (Reich Minister of the Interior
through communal authorities.)
“OKW/AWA is competent for procuring Russian prisoners of war.
Employment through Planning Board for employment of all
prisoners of war. If necessary, offices of Reich commissariats.
“No employment where danger to men or supply exists, that is,
factories exposed to explosives, waterworks, powerworks, _et
cetera_. No contact with German population, especially no
‘solidarity.’ German worker as a rule is foreman of Russians.
“Food is a matter of the Four Year Plan. Procurement of special
food (cats, horses, _et cetera_).
“Clothes, billeting, messing somewhat better than at home where
part of the people live in caves.
“Supply of shoes for Russians; as a rule wooden shoes, if
necessary install Russian shoe repair shops.
“Examination of physical fitness in order to avoid importation
of diseases.
“Clearing of mines as a rule by Russians; if possible by
selected Russian engineer troops.”
The Defendant Göring was not the only one of these defendants who
sponsored and applied the policy of using prisoners of war in the
armament industry. The Defendant Speer also sponsored and applied this
same policy of using prisoners of war in the armament industry. And we
refer to the document bearing our Number 1435-PS, which also carries
Exhibit Number USA-216. This document is a speech to the Nazi Gauleiter
delivered by the Defendant Speer on the 24th day of February of 1942,
and I wish to read from Paragraph 2 of that document, and I quote as
follows:
“I therefore proposed to the Führer at the end of December that
all my labor force, including specialists, be released for mass
employment in the East. Subsequently the remaining prisoners of
war, about 10,000, were put at the disposal of the armament
industry by me.”
He also reported at the 36th meeting of the Central Planning Board, held
on the 22d day of April 1943, that only 30 percent of the Russian
prisoners of war were engaged in the armament industry. This the
Defendant Speer found unsatisfactory. And referring again to Document
R-124, the minutes of the Central Planning Board, and particularly to
Page 17 of that document, Paragraph 10 of the English text, and Page 14,
Paragraph 7 of the German text, we find this statement by the Defendant
Speer, quoting directly:
“There is a detailed statement showing in what sectors the
Russian prisoners of war have been distributed. This statement
is quite interesting. It shows that the armaments industry
received only 30 percent. I constantly complained about this.”
And at Page 20 of the same document, R-124—Paragraph 1 on Page 20 of
the English text and Page 14, the last paragraph of the German text—the
Defendant Speer stated, and I quote from the paragraph directly:
“The 90,000 Russian prisoners of war employed in the whole of
the armament industry are for the greatest part skilled men.”
The Defendant Sauckel, who was appointed Plenipotentiary General for the
utilization of labor for the express purpose, among others, of
integrating prisoners of war into the German war industry, made it plain
that prisoners of war were to be compelled to serve the German armament
industry. His labor mobilization program, which is Document 016-PS,
already marked Exhibit USA-168, contains this statement on Page 6,
Paragraph 10 of the English text and Page 9, Paragraph 1, of the German
text:
“All prisoners of war now in Germany, from the territories of
the West as well as of the East, must be completely incorporated
into the German armament and food industries. Their production
must be brought to the highest possible level.”
I wish to turn now from the exploitation of foreign labor in general to
a rather special point of the Nazi program which appears to us to have
combined the brutality and the purposes of the slave labor program with
those of the concentration camp. The Nazis placed all Allied nationals
in concentration camps and forced them, along with the other inmates of
the concentration camps, to work under conditions which were set
actually to exterminate them. This was what we call the Nazi program of
extermination through work.
In the spring of 1942 these conspirators turned to the concentration
camps as a further source of slave labor for the armament industry. I
refer to a new Document Number R-129, bearing Exhibit Number USA-217.
This document is a letter to Himmler, the Reichsführer SS—and it is
dated the 30th day of April 1942—from one of his subordinates, an
individual named Pohl, SS Obergruppenführer and General of the
Waffen-SS; and I wish to quote from the first page of that document.
Quoting directly:
“Today I report about the present situation of the concentration
camps and about measures I have taken to carry out your order of
the 3rd of March 1942.”
Then moving on from paragraphs numbered 1, 2, and 3 on Page 2 of the
English text and at Page 1 of the German text, I quote as follows:
“1. The war has brought about a marked change in the structure
of the concentration camps and has changed their duties
fundamentally with regard to the employment of the prisoners.
The custody of prisoners for the sole reasons of security,
education, or as a preventive measure is no longer the main
consideration. The importance now lies in the economic side. The
mobilization of all prisoner labor for purposes of the war
(increase of armament) now, and for purposes of construction in
the forthcoming peace, is coming more and more to the
foreground.
“2. From this knowledge necessary measures result which require
a gradual transformation of the concentration camps from their
former one-sided political character into an organization
adapted to economic tasks.
“3. For this reason I called together all the leaders of the
former inspectorate of concentration camps, all camp commanders,
and all managers and supervisors of work, on the 23rd and 24th
of April 1942 and explained personally to them this new
development. I have compiled, in the order attached, the
essential points which have to be brought into effect with the
utmost urgency if the commencement of work for the purposes of
the armament industry is not to be delayed.”
Now the order referred to in that third paragraph set the framework for
a program of relentless exploitation, providing in part as follows—and
I now refer to the enclosure appended to the quoted letter which is also
a part of Document R-129, found at Page 3, Paragraphs numbered 4, 5, and
6 of the English text, and Page 3 of the German text:
“4. The camp commander alone is responsible for the utilization
of the manpower available. This utilization must be, in the true
meaning of the word, complete, in order to obtain the greatest
measure of performance. Work is allotted only centrally and by
the Chief of the Department D. The camp commanders themselves
may not accept on their own initiative work offered by third
parties and may not negotiate about it.
“5. There is no limit to working hours. Their duration depends
on the kind of working establishments in the camps and the kind
of work to be done. They are fixed by the camp commanders alone.
“6. Any circumstances which may result in a shortening of
working hours (for example, meals, roll-calls, _et cetera_),
have therefore to be restricted to an irreducible minimum.
Time-wasting walks and noon intervals, only for the purpose of
taking meals, are forbidden.”
The armament production program we have just described was not merely a
scheme for mobilizing the manpower potential of the camps. It actually
was integrated directly into the larger Nazi program of extermination;
and I wish to refer, at this point, to our document bearing Number
654-PS and Exhibit Number USA-218.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it will be convenient to break off now for a
few minutes?
MR. DODD: Very well.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. DODD: At the recess time I had made reference to Document Number
654-PS, which has the Exhibit Number USA-218. This document is a
memorandum of an agreement between Himmler, Reichsführer SS, and the
Minister of Justice, Thierack. It is dated the 18th of September 1942.
The concept of extermination to which I referred shortly before the
recess was embodied in this document and I wish to quote from Page 1,
Paragraph 2:
“2. Transfer of asocial elements from prison to the Reichsführer
SS for extermination through work. To be transferred without
exception are persons under protective arrest, Jews, Gypsies,
Russians and Ukrainians, Poles with more than 3-year sentences,
Czechs, and Germans with more than 8-year sentences, according
to the decision of the Reich Minister for Justice. First of all
the worst asocial elements amongst those just mentioned are to
be handed over. I shall inform the Führer of this through
Reichsleiter Bormann.”
Now this agreement further provided, in Paragraph 12 on Page 2 of the
English text and Page 3, Paragraph 14, of the German text, as follows:
“14. It is agreed that, in consideration of the intended aims of
the Government for the clearing up of the Eastern problems, in
the future, Jews, Poles, Gypsies, Russians, and Ukrainians are
no longer to be tried by the ordinary courts, so far as
punishable offenses are concerned; but are to be dealt with by
the Reichsführer SS. This does not apply to civil lawsuits, nor
to Poles whose names are reported or entered in the German
racial lists.”
Now, in September of 1942, the Defendant Speer made arrangements to
bring this new source of labor within his jurisdiction. Speer convinced
Hitler that significant production could be obtained only if the
concentration camp prisoners were employed in factories under the
technical control of the Speer Ministry instead of the control in the
camps. In fact, without Defendant Speer’s cooperation, we say it would
have been most difficult to utilize the prisoners on any large scale for
war production, since he would not allocate to Himmler the machine tools
and other necessary equipment. Accordingly, it was agreed that the
prisoners were to be exploited in factories under the Defendant Speer’s
control. To compensate Himmler for surrendering this jurisdiction to
Speer, the Defendant Speer proposed and Hitler agreed, that Himmler
would receive a share of the armaments output, fixed in relation to the
man-hours contributed by his prisoners. In the minutes of the Defendant
Speer’s conference with Hitler on the 20th, 21st, and the 22d September
1942—Document Number R-124, which is Exhibit Number USA-179—I wish to
refer particularly to Page 34 of the English text. These are the
Defendant Speer’s minutes on this conference. I am quoting from Page 34,
Paragraph 36, beginning at the middle of the page; and it is at the top
of Page 26 in the German text:
“I pointed out to the Führer that, apart from an insignificant
amount of work, no possibility exists of organizing armament
production in the concentration camps, because: (1) the machine
tools required are missing; (2) there are no suitable premises.
Both these assets would be available in the armament industry,
if use could be made of them by a second shift.
“The Führer agrees to my proposal that the numerous factories
set up outside towns for reasons of air raid protection should
release their workers to supplement the second shift in town
factories and should in return be supplied with labor from the
concentration camps—also two shifts.
“I pointed out to the Führer the difficulties which I expect to
encounter if Reichsführer SS Himmler should be able, as he
requests, to exercise authoritative influence over these
factories. The Führer, too, does not consider such an influence
necessary.
“The Führer, however, agrees that Reichsführer SS Himmler should
derive advantage from making his prisoners available; he should
get equipment for his division.
“I suggest giving him a share in kind (war equipment) in ratio
to the man-hours contributed by his prisoners. A 3 to 5 percent
share is being discussed, the equipment also being calculated
according to man-hours. The Führer would agree to such a
solution.
“The Führer is prepared to order the additional allocation of
this equipment and weapons to the SS, upon submission of a
list.”
After a demand for concentration-camp labor had been created and after a
mechanism had been set up by the Defendant Speer for exploiting this
labor in armament factories, measures were evolved for increasing the
supply of victims for extermination through work. A steady flow was
assured by an agreement between Himmler and the Minister of Justice
mentioned above, which was implemented by such programs as the
following—and I refer to Document L-61, Exhibit Number USA-177; and I
wish to quote from Paragraph 3. That document, the Tribunal will recall,
is the Defendant Sauckel’s letter, dated the 26th of November 1942, to
the presidents of the Länder employment offices; and I wish to quote
from Paragraph 3 of that letter:
“The Poles who are to be evacuated as a result of this measure
will be put into concentration camps and put to work insofar as
they are criminal or asocial elements.”
General measures were supplemented by special drives for persons who
would not otherwise have been sent to concentration camps.
THE PRESIDENT: Didn’t you read that this morning?
MR. DODD: Yes, I did, Your Honor. I was reading it again with particular
reference to this feature of the proof.
For example, for “reasons of war necessity” Himmler ordered that at
least 35,000 prisoners qualified for work should be transferred to
concentration camps. I now offer in evidence Document Number 1063(d)-PS,
which is Exhibit Number USA-219. This document is a Himmler order dated
the 17th of December 1942. The order provides, and I quote in part,
beginning with the first paragraph of that document:
“For reasons of war necessity not to be discussed further here,
the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police, on the 14th
of December 1942, has ordered that by the end of January 1943 at
least 35,000 prisoners fit for work are to be sent to the
concentration camps. In order to reach this number, the
following measures are required:
“(1) As of now, to begin with, until 1 February 1943, all
Eastern Workers or foreign workers who have been fugitives or
who have broken contracts and who do not belong to allied,
friendly, or neutral states . . . are to be brought by the
quickest means to the nearest concentration camps . . . .
“(2) The commanders and the commandants of the Security Police
and the Security Service, and the chiefs of the state police
headquarters will check immediately on the basis of a close and
strict rule: (a) the prisons, and (b) the labor reformatory
camps.
“All prisoners fit for work, if it is practically and humanly
possible, will be committed at once to the nearest concentration
camp, according to the following instructions, even for example,
those who are about to be brought to trial. Only such prisoners
can be left there who, in the interest of further
investigations, are to remain absolutely in solitary
confinement.
“Every single laborer counts!”
Measures were also adopted to insure that this extermination through
work was practiced with maximum efficiency. Subsidiary concentration
camps were established near important war plants. The Defendant Speer
has admitted that he personally toured Upper Austria and selected sites
for concentration camps near various munitions factories in the area. I
am about to refer to the transcript of an interrogation under oath of
the Defendant Albert Speer.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, do you understand the last document you read,
1063-PS, to refer to prisoners of war, or prisoners in ordinary prisons,
or what?
MR. DODD: We understood it to refer to prisoners in ordinary prisons.
In view of the Tribunal’s ruling this morning, I think I should state
that, with respect to this interrogation of Defendant Speer, we had
provided the defendants’ counsel with the entire text in German. It
happens to be a brief interrogation, and so we were able to complete
that translation, and it has been placed in their Information Center.
DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER (Counsel for Defendant Speer): In reference to the
transcript of the interrogation, the reading of which the prosecutor has
just announced, I should like to say the following:
It is true that we have received the German transcript of the English
protocol, if one may call it a protocol. A comparison of the English
text with the German transcript shows that there are, both in the
English text and in the German transcript, mistakes which change the
meaning and which I believe are to be attributed to misunderstandings on
the part of the certifying interpreter. I believe, therefore, that the
so-called protocol and the English text do not actually give the
contents of what Defendant Speer tried to express during the
interrogation. It would, therefore, not further the establishment of the
truth should this protocol ever be used.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, when was the German translation given to
counsel for the defendant?
MR. DODD: About 4 days ago, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, is there any certification by the interrogator
as to the English translation?
MR. DODD: There is, Your Honor. There is a certification at the end of
the interrogation by the interrogator and by the interpreter and by the
reporter as well. There are three certifications.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the best course will be, in these circumstances,
to receive the interrogation now. You will have an opportunity, by
calling the defendant, to show in what way he alleges, or you allege,
that the interrogation is inaccurately translated.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you, Sir.
MR. DODD: May I respectfully refer, Your Honor, to the last document in
the document book, 4 pages from the end?
THE PRESIDENT: Which page do you refer to?
MR. DODD: I refer to the page bearing the Number 16 of the English text
of the transcript of the interrogation and Page 21 of the German text.
The answer quoted is:
“The fact was that we were anxious to use workers from
concentration camps in factories and to establish small
concentration camps near factories, in order to use the manpower
that was then available there. But it did not come up only in
connection with this trip . . . .”
That is, Speer’s trip to Austria. (Exhibit USA-220)
THE PRESIDENT: I think I ought to say to defendant’s counsel that if he
had waited until he heard that piece of evidence read, he would have
seen that it was quite unnecessary to make any objection.
MR. DODD: Defendant Göring endorsed this use of concentration camp labor
and asked for more. We refer to our Document 1584-PS, Part 1, which is
Exhibit Number USA-221. This document is a teletype message from Göring
to Himmler, dated 14th of February 1944. I quote from the document
beginning with the second sentence:
“At the same time, I ask you to put at my disposal as great a
number of KZ”—concentration-camp—“convicts as possible for air
armament, as this kind of manpower proved to be very useful
according to previous experience. The situation of the air war
makes subterranean transfer of industry necessary. For work of
this kind KZ convicts can be especially well concentrated at
work and in the camp.”
Defendant Speer subsequently assumed responsibility for this program;
and Hitler promised Speer that if the necessary labor for the program
could not be obtained, a hundred thousand Hungarian Jews would be
brought in by the SS.
Speer recorded his conferences with Hitler on April 6 and April 7, 1944
in Document R-124, which is Exhibit Number USA-179, already in evidence.
I quote from Page 36 of the English text, Page 29 of the German text as
follows:
“Suggested to the Führer that, due to lack of builders and
equipment, the second big building project should not be set up
in German territory but in close vicinity to the border on a
suitable site (preferably on gravel base and with transport
facilities) in French, Belgian, or Dutch territory. The Führer
agrees to this suggestion if the works could be set up behind a
fortified zone. The strongest argument for setting up this plant
in French territory is the fact that it would be much easier to
procure the necessary workers. Nevertheless, the Führer asks
that an attempt be made to set up the second factory in a safer
area, namely the Protectorate. If it should prove impossible
there, too, to get hold of the necessary workers, the Führer
himself will contact the Reichsführer SS and will give an order
that the required 100,000 men are to be made available by
bringing in Jews from Hungary. Stressing the fact that in the
case of the Industriegemeinschaft Schlesien the building
organization was a failure, the Führer demands that these works
must be built by the OT exclusively, and that the workers should
be made available by the Reichsführer SS. He wants to hold a
meeting shortly in order to discuss details with all the men
concerned.”
The unspeakably brutal, inhumane, and degrading treatment inflicted on
Allied nationals and other victims of concentration camps, while they
were indeed being literally worked to death, is described in Document
L-159, which is not in the document book. It is an official report
prepared by a U.S. Congressional committee, U.S. Senate Document Number
47. This Congressional committee had inspected the liberated camps at
the request of General Eisenhower. It bears Exhibit Number USA-222. I
would like to quote from the document briefly, first from Page 14, the
last paragraph, and from Page 15, the first two paragraphs, of the
English text:
“The treatment accorded to these prisoners in the concentration
camps was generally as follows: They were herded together in
some wooden barracks not large enough for one-tenth of their
number. They were forced to sleep on wooden frames covered with
wooden boards in tiers of two, three, and even four, sometimes
with no covering, sometimes with a bundle of dirty rags serving
both as pallet and coverlet.
“Their food consisted generally of about one-half of a pound of
black bread per day and a bowl of watery soup for noon and
night, and not always that. Owing to the great numbers crowded
into a small space and to the lack of adequate sustenance, lice
and vermin multiplied, disease became rampant, and those who did
not soon die of disease or torture began the long, slow process
of starvation. Notwithstanding the deliberate starvation program
inflicted upon these prisoners by lack of adequate food, we
found no evidence that the people of Germany, as a whole, were
suffering from any lack of sufficient food or clothing. The
contrast was so striking that the only conclusion which we could
reach was that the starvation of the inmates of these camps was
deliberate.
“Upon entrance into these camps, newcomers were forced to work
either at an adjoining war factory or were placed ‘in commando’
on various jobs in the vicinity, being returned each night to
their stall in the barracks. Generally a German criminal was
placed in charge of each ‘block’ or shed in which the prisoners
slept. Periodically he would choose the one prisoner of his
block who seemed the most alert or intelligent or showed most
leadership qualities. These would report to the guards’ room and
would never be heard from again. The generally accepted belief
of the prisoners was that these were shot or gassed or hanged
and then cremated. A refusal to work or an infraction of the
rules usually meant flogging and other types of torture, such as
having the fingernails pulled out, and in each case usually
ended in death after extensive suffering. The policies herein
described constituted a calculated and diabolical program of
planned torture and extermination on the part of those who were
in control of the German Government . . . .”
I quote next from Page 11 of the English text beginning with the second
sentence of Paragraph 2, a description of Camp Dora at Nordhausen, Page
12, Paragraph 1 of the German text, quoting as follows:
“On the whole, we found this camp to have been operated and
administered much in the same manner as Buchenwald had been
operated and managed. When the efficiency of the workers
decreased as a result of the conditions under which they were
required to live, their rations were decreased as punishment.
This brought about a vicious circle in which the weak became
weaker and were ultimately exterminated.”
Such was the cycle of work, torture, starvation, and death for
concentration-camp labor—labor which the Defendant Göring, while
requesting that more of it be placed at his disposal, said had proved
very useful; labor which the Defendant Speer was “anxious” to use in the
factories under his control.
The policy underlying this program, the manner in which it was executed,
and the responsibility of the conspirators in connection with it has
been dwelt upon at length. Therefore, we should like, at this point, to
discuss the special responsibility of the Defendant Sauckel.
The Defendant Sauckel’s appointment as Plenipotentiary General for
manpower is explained probably first of all by his having been an old
and trusted Nazi. He certified in Document 2974-PS, dated 17 November
1945, which is already in evidence before this Tribunal as Exhibit
Number USA-15, that he held the following positions:
Starting with his membership in the NSDAP, he was thereafter a member of
the Reichstag; he was Gauleiter of Thuringia; he was a member of the
Thuringian legislature; he was Minister of Interior and head of the
Thuringian State Ministry; he was Reichsstatthalter for Thuringia; he
was an SA Obergruppenführer; he was SS Obergruppenführer; he was
administrator for the Berlin-Suhler Waffen and Fahrzeugwerke in 1935; he
was head of the Gustloff Werke Nationalsozialistische
Industrie-Stiftung, 1936, and the honorary head of the Foundation. And
from the 21st of March 1942 until 1945, he was the Plenipotentiary
General for Labor Allocation.
Sauckel’s official responsibilities are borne out by evidence. His
appointment as Plenipotentiary General for manpower was effected by a
decree of the 21st of March 1942, which we have read and which was
signed by Hitler, Lammers, and the Defendant Keitel. And by that decree
Sauckel was given authority, as well as responsibility, subordinate only
to that of Hitler and Göring, who was the head of the Four Year
Plan—subordinate only to those two for all matters relating to
recruitment, allocation, and handling of foreign and domestic manpower.
The Defendant Göring, to whom Sauckel was directly responsible,
abolished the recruitment and allocation agencies of his Four Year Plan
and delegated their powers to the Defendant Sauckel and placed his
far-reaching authority as deputy for the Four Year Plan at Sauckel’s
disposal.
In Document 1666-PS, a second 1666-PS but of another date, the 27th of
March 1942—I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this original
decree, which is published in the 1942 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, at
Page 180:
“In pursuance of the Führer’s decree of 21st of March 1942, I
decree as follows:
“1. My manpower sections are hereby abolished (circular letter
of 22d of October 1936). Their duties (recruitment and
allocation of manpower, regulation of labor conditions) are
taken over by the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of
Labor, who is directly under me.
“2. The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor will be
responsible for regulating the conditions of labor (wage policy)
employed in the Reich territory, having regard to the
requirements of labor allocation.
“3. The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor is part
of the Four Year Plan. In cases where new legislation is
required or existing laws need to be modified; he will submit
appropriate proposals to me.
“4. The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor will
have at his disposal for the performance of his task the right
delegated to me by the Führer for issuing instructions to the
highest Reich authorities and their subordinate offices, as well
as the Party offices and their sections and their affiliated
organizations, also to the Reich Protector, the Governor
General, the military commanders, and heads of the civil
administrations. In the case of ordinances and instructions of
fundamental importance, a report is to be submitted to me in
advance.”
Document Number 1903-PS is a Hitler decree of the 30th of September 1942
giving the Defendant Sauckel extraordinary powers over the civil and
military authority of the territories occupied by Germany. We ask that
judicial notice be taken by this Tribunal of the original decree, which
is published in Volume II, Page 510, of the _Verfügungen, Anordnungen,
und Bekanntgaben_, published by the Party Chancellery. This decree
states as follows:
“I herewith authorize the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation
of Labor, Reich Governor and Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel to take all
necessary measures for the enforcement of my decree of 21 March
1942, concerning a Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of
Labor (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ I, Page 179), according to his own
judgment, in the Greater German Reich, in the Protectorate, and
in the Government General, as well as in the Occupied
Territories—measures which will safeguard under all
circumstances the regulated deployment of labor for the German
war economy. For this purpose he may appoint commissioners to
the bureaus of the military and civilian administration. These
are responsible directly to the Plenipotentiary General for
Allocation of Labor. In order to carry out their tasks, they are
entitled to issue directives to the competent military and
civilian authorities in charge of labor allocation and of wage
policy.
“More detailed directives will be issued by the Plenipotentiary
General for Allocation of Labor.
“Führer headquarters, 30 September 1942. The
Führer,”—signed—“Adolf Hitler.”
Within 1 month after his appointment, the Defendant Sauckel sent
Defendant Rosenberg his “Labor Mobilization Program”. This program,
Document Number 016-PS, already in evidence as Exhibit USA-168,
envisaged a recruitment by force and the maximum exploitation of the
entire labor resources of the conquered areas and of prisoners of war in
the interests of the Nazi war machine at the lowest conceivable degree
of expenditure to the German State.
The Defendant Sauckel states—and I refer now to the bottom of Page 6 of
the English text of that document. It is Page 9, Paragraph 2, of the
German text, and I quote as follows:
“It must be emphasized, however, that an additional tremendous
number of foreign laborers has to be found for the Reich. The
greatest pool for that purpose is the occupied territories of
the East. Consequently, it is an imperative necessity to use the
human reserves of the conquered Soviet territory to the fullest
extent. Should we not succeed in obtaining the necessary amount
of labor on a voluntary basis, we must immediately institute
conscription of forced labor.
“Apart from the prisoners of war still in the occupied
territories, we must, therefore, requisition skilled or
unskilled male and female labor from the Soviet territory from
the age of 15 up, for the German allocation of labor.”
Passing to Page 11 of the English text, first paragraph and Page 17,
Paragraph 4, of the German text, I quote, as follows directly:
“The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the
use of a gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men
and women, has become an indisputable necessity for the solution
of the problem of the allocation of labor in this war.”
The Defendant Sauckel proceeded to implement this plan, which he
submitted, with certain basic directives. He provided that if voluntary
recruitment of foreign workers was unsuccessful compulsory service
should be instituted.
Document Number 3044-PS is the Defendant Sauckel’s Regulation Number 4,
dated the 7th of May 1942. And we ask that the Tribunal take judicial
notice of the original regulation published in Volume II, Pages 516 to
527 of the _Verfügungen, Anordnungen, und Bekanntgaben_, to which I have
previously referred. Reading from Page 1, Paragraph 3, of the English
text:
“The recruitment of foreign labor will be done on principle on a
volunteer basis. Where, however, in the occupied territories the
appeal for volunteers does not suffice, obligatory service and
drafting must, under all circumstances, be resorted to. This is
an indisputable requirement of our labor situation.”
Sauckel provided also for the allocation of foreign labor in the order
of its importance to the Nazi war machine. We refer to Document Number
3044(a)-PS, which is the Defendant Sauckel’s Regulation Number 10, and
ask that the Court take judicial notice of the original regulation,
published in Volume II, _Verfügungen, Anordnungen, und Bekanntgaben_, at
Pages 531 to 533. Paragraph 3 of this regulation I quote as follows:
“The resources of manpower that are available in the occupied
territories are to be employed primarily to satisfy the
requirements of importance for the war in Germany itself. In
allocating the said labor resources in the Occupied Territories,
the following order of priority will be observed:
“(a) Labor required for the troops, the occupation authorities,
and the civil authorities;
“(b) Labor required for German armament;
“(c) Labor required for food and agriculture;
“(d) Labor required for industrial work in the interests of
Germany, other than armaments;
“(e) Labor required for industrial work in the interests of the
population of the territory in question.”
The Defendant Sauckel, and agencies subordinate to him, exercised
exclusive authority over the recruitment of workers from every area in
Europe occupied by, controlled by, or friendly to, the German nation. He
affirmed, himself—the Defendant Sauckel did—this authority in a
decree, Document Number 3044-PS, already in evidence as Exhibit Number
USA-206. I refer to Paragraph 5 on Page 1 of the English text of that
document, and I am quoting it directly:
“The recruitment of labor in the areas occupied by Germany will
be carried out exclusively by the labor allocation offices of
the German military or civil administration in these areas.”
THE PRESIDENT: Haven’t you read that already?
MR. DODD: No, I have not, if Your Honor pleases. We have referred to
that decree before, but we have not referred to this portion of it.
I am passing to Paragraph II, 1-a on Page 2, and quoting again directly:
“For the carrying out of recruitment in allied, friendly, or
neutral foreign countries, my commissioners are solely
responsible.”
In addition, the following defendants, who were informed by Sauckel of
the quotas of foreign laborers which he required, collaborated with
Sauckel and his agents in filling these quotas: The Defendant Keitel,
Chief of the OKW—which was the Supreme Command—who collaborated with
Sauckel.
We refer to Document Number 3012(1)-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-190.
This document is the record of a telephone conversation of the Chief of
the Economic Staff East of the German Army, and it is dated March 11,
1943. I wish to quote from the first two paragraphs of the document as
follows:
“The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter
Sauckel, points out to me in an urgent teletype that the
allocation of labor in German agriculture, as well as all the
most urgent armament programs ordered by the Führer, make the
most rapid procurement of approximately 1 million women and men
from the newly occupied Eastern Territories within the next 4
months an imperative necessity. For this purpose, Gauleiter
Sauckel demands the shipment of 5,000 workers daily beginning 15
March; 10,000 workers, male and female, beginning 1 April, from
the newly occupied Eastern Territories.”
I am passing down to the next paragraph:
“In consideration of the extraordinary losses of workers which
occurred in German war industry because of the developments of
the past months, it is now necessary that the recruiting of
workers be taken up again everywhere with all vigor. The
tendency momentarily noticeable in that territory, to limit
and/or entirely stop the Reich recruiting program, is absolutely
not bearable in view of this state of affairs. Gauleiter
Sauckel, who is informed about these events, because of this
applied directly to General Field Marshal Keitel on 10 March
1943, in a teletype, and emphasized on this occasion that, as in
all other occupied territories, where all other methods fail, a
certain pressure must be used, by order of the Führer.”
At this point we were prepared to offer a transcript of an interrogation
under oath of the Defendant Sauckel. Only the English of the transcript
of the interrogation has been seen by the Counsel for the Defendant
Sauckel. He has had it, however, for some time; and the excerpts on
which we intended to rely were furnished to him as well in German.
If I understood the ruling of the Tribunal correctly, it would be
necessary for us to have furnished the entire record in German.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you might use this interrogation, as the excerpts
have been submitted in German.
MR. DODD: Yes, they have, Your Honor, and the entire English text as,
well.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: I refer to a transcript of an interrogation under oath of the
Defendant Sauckel, held on the morning of the 5th of October 1945
(Exhibit USA-224). That is the very last document in the document book.
I wish to quote from the bottom of Page 1 of the English text and Page
1, Paragraph 11, of the German text, as follows:
“Q: ‘Was it necessary, in order to accomplish the completion of
the quotas given, to have liaison with the OKW?’
“A: ‘I remember that the Führer had given directives to Marshal
Keitel, telling him that my task was a very important one; and
I, too, have often conferred with Keitel after such discussions
with the Führer, when I asked him for his support.’
“Q: ‘It was his task to supervise the proper performance of the
military commanders in the occupied countries in carrying but
their assigned mission, was it not?’
“A: ‘Yes, the Führer had told me that he would inform the Chief
of the OKW and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery as to these
matters. The same applies to the Foreign Minister.’”
We are also prepared to offer the transcript of an interrogation of the
Defendant Alfred Rosenberg. There is this distinction insofar as this
record is concerned. While we have supplied the counsel with the German
translation of those parts of it which we propose to use, we have not
had an opportunity to supply the whole text to counsel. However, they
have been supplied with the German of the parts which we propose to use
and to offer to this Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you are prepared to do it hereafter, I suppose?
MR. DODD: Yes, we will, Your Honor, as soon as we can get these papers
down to the Information Center.
THE PRESIDENT: Good.
MR. DODD: The next document is rather lengthy, and I wonder what the
Tribunal’s pleasure is. Do I understand that I may proceed with the
interrogation?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. DODD: I wish to refer to the Defendant Alfred Rosenberg, the Reich
Minister for Eastern Occupied Territories, as one who also collaborated
with the Defendant Sauckel, and specifically, to refer to a transcript
of an interrogation under oath of the Defendant Rosenberg, on the
afternoon of the 6th of October 1945 (Exhibit USA-187). That record may
be found about the third from the last of the interrogation records in
the document book, and I wish to read from Page 1 of the transcript:
“Q: ‘Isn’t it a fact that Sauckel would allocate to the various
areas under your jurisdiction the number of persons to be
obtained for labor purposes?’
“A: ‘Yes.’
“Q: ‘And that thereafter your agents would obtain that labor in
order to meet the quota which had been given. Is that right?’
“A: ‘Sauckel, normally, had very far-reaching desires, which one
could not fulfil unless one looked very closely into the
matter.’
“Q: ‘Never mind about Sauckel’s desires being far-reaching or
not being far-reaching. That has nothing to do with it. You were
given quotas for the areas over which you had jurisdiction, and
it was up to you to meet that quota?’
“A: ‘Yes. It was the responsibility of the administrative
officials to receive this quota and to distribute the allotments
over the districts in such a way, according to number and
according to the age groups, that they would be most reasonably
met.’
“Q: ‘These administrative officials were part of your
organization, isn’t that right?’
“A: ‘They were functionaries or officials of the Reich
Commissioner for the Ukraine; but, as such, they were placed in
their office by the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied
Territories.’
“Q: ‘You recognized, did you not, that the quotas set by Sauckel
could not be filled by voluntary labor; and you did not
disapprove of the impressment of forced labor. Isn’t that
right?’
“A: ‘I regretted that the demands of Sauckel were so urgent that
they could not be met by a continuation of voluntary
recruitments, and thus I submitted to the necessity of forced
impressment.’”
Then, passing a little further down on that page:
“Q: ‘The letters that we have already seen between you and
Sauckel do not indicate, do they, any disagreement on your part
with the principle of recruiting workers against their will?
They indicate, as I remember, that you were opposed to the
treatment that was later accorded these workers, but you did not
oppose their initial impressment.’”
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think you ought to read the next two answers
in fairness to the Defendant Rosenberg, after the one where he said he
submitted to the necessity of forced impressment.
MR. DODD: Very well, I shall read those, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: “‘Did you ever argue with Sauckel . . .’”
MR. DODD: Yes.
“Q: ‘Did you ever argue with Sauckel that perhaps in view of the
fact that the quotas could not be met by voluntary labor, the
labor recruiting program be abandoned, except for what recruits
could be voluntarily enrolled?’
“A: ‘I could not do that because the numbers or allotments that
Sauckel had received from the Führer to meet were absolutely
binding for him, and I couldn’t do anything about that.’”
And then, referring again to the question which I had just read, the
answer is as follows:
“‘That is right. In those matters I mostly discussed the
possibility of finding the least harsh methods of handling the
matter, whereas in no way did I place myself in opposition to
the orders that he was carrying out for the Führer.’”
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal might adjourn now.
MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 13 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]
NINETEENTH DAY
Thursday, 13 December 1945
_Morning Session_
MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, at the close of yesterday’s
session we were discussing and had just completed reading the excerpts
from the interrogation of 6 October 1945, wherein the Defendant Alfred
Rosenberg was questioned.
There have already been introduced Documents 017-PS and 019-PS and I
have read excerpts from them. The Tribunal will recall that they are
letters written by the Defendant Sauckel to the Defendant Rosenberg
requesting the assistance of the Defendant Rosenberg in the recruitment
of additional foreign laborers. I refer to them in passing, by way of
recapitulation, with respect to the Defendant Sauckel’s participation in
this slave-labor program and also the assistance of the Defendant
Rosenberg. Also the Defendant Sauckel received help from the Defendant
Seyss-Inquart who was the Reich Commissioner for the occupied
Netherlands.
I refer again to the transcript of the interrogation under oath of the
Defendant Sauckel, which was read from yesterday; and I now refer to
another part of it. The transcript of this interrogation will be found
in the rear of the document book. It is the very last document and I
wish to quote particularly from it. It is the first question:
“Q: For a moment, I want to turn our attention to Holland. It is
my understanding that the quotas for the workers from Holland
were agreed upon, and then the numbers given to the Reich
Commissioner Seyss-Inquart to fulfill, is that correct?
“A: Yes, that is correct.
“Q: After the quota was given to Seyss-Inquart, it was his
mission to fulfill it with the aid of your representatives; was
it not?
“A: Yes. This was the only possible thing for me to do and the
same applied to other countries.”
And the Defendant Hans Frank, who was the Governor General of the
Government General of Poland, also participated in the filling of
Defendant Sauckel’s quota requirements.
I refer again to the interrogation of the Defendant Sauckel and to Page
1 of the excerpts from the transcript of this interrogation as it
appears in the document book:
“Q: Was the same procedure substantially followed of allocating
quotas in the Government General of Poland?
“A: Yes. I have principally to repeat that the only possibility
I had in carrying through these missions was to get in touch
with the highest German military authority in the respective
country and to transfer to them the orders of the Führer and ask
them very urgently, as I have always done, to fulfill these
orders.
“Q: Such discussions in Poland, of course, were with the
Governor General Frank?
“A: Yes. I spent a morning and an afternoon in Kraków twice or
three times and I personally spoke to Governor General Frank.
Naturally, there was also present Secretary Dr. Goebbels.”
The SS, as in most matters involving the use of force and brutality,
also extended its assistance. We refer to Document Number 1292-PS, which
is Exhibit USA-225. This Document, 1292-PS, is the report of the chief
of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, of a conference with Hitler, which
was attended by, among others, the Defendant Sauckel, the Defendant
Speer, and Himmler, the Reichsführer SS. I turn to Page 2 of the
document, beginning with the third line from the top of the page of the
English text; and it is Page 4, Paragraph 2 of the German text. The
quotation reads as follows:
“The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, Sauckel,
declared that he will attempt with fanatical determination to
obtain these workers. Until now he has always kept his promises
as to the number of workers to be furnished. With the best of
intentions, however, he is unable to make a definite promise for
1944. He will do everything in his power to furnish the
requested manpower in 1944. Whether it will succeed depends
primarily on what German executive agents will be made
available. His project cannot be carried out with indigenous
executive agents.”
There are additional quotations, as the Tribunal may observe, in this
very part from which I have been reading, but I intend to refer to them
again a little further on.
The Defendant Sauckel participated in the formulation of the over-all
labor requirements for Germany and passed out quotas to be filled by and
with the assistance of the individuals and agencies referred to, in the
certain knowledge that force and brutality were the only means whereby
his demands could be met. Turning to Document 1292-PS again, and quoting
from Page 1:
“1. A conference took place with the Führer today which was
attended by:
“The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor,
Gauleiter Sauckel; the Secretary for Armament and War
Production, Speer; the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Army,
General Field Marshal Keitel; General Field Marshal Milch; the
acting Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, State Secretary
Backe; the Minister of the Interior, Reichsführer of the SS,
Himmler; and myself. (The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the
Minister of National Economy had repeatedly asked to be
permitted to participate prior to the conference, but the Führer
did not wish their attendance.)”
Continuing the quotation:
“The Führer declared in his introductory remarks:
“‘I want a clear picture:
“‘(1) How many workers are required for the maintenance of
German war economy?
“‘(a) For the maintenance of present output?
“‘(b) To increase its output?
“‘(2) How many workers can be obtained from occupied countries,
or how many can still be gained in the Reich by suitable means
(increased output)? For one thing, it is a matter of making up
for losses of labor by death, infirmity, the constant
fluctuation of workers, and so forth; and further it is a matter
of procuring additional workers.’
“The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor,
Sauckel, declared that, in order to maintain the present amount
of workers he would have to add at least 2½ but probably 3
million new workers in 1944. Otherwise production would fall
off.
“Reich Minister Speer declared that he needed an additional
1,300,000 laborers. However, this would depend on whether it
will be possible to increase production of iron ore. Should this
not be possible, he would need no additional workers.
Procurement of additional workers from occupied territory would,
however, be subject to the condition that these workers will not
be withdrawn from armament and auxiliary industries already
working there. For this would mean a decrease of production of
these industries which he could not tolerate. Those, for
instance, who are already working in France in industries
mentioned above must be protected against being sent to work in
Germany by the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor.
“The Führer agreed with the opinions of Reich Minister Speer and
emphasized that the measures taken by the Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor should create no
circumstances which would lead to the withdrawal of workers from
armament and auxiliary industries working in occupied
territories, because such a shifting of workers would only cause
disturbance of production in occupied countries.
“The Führer further called attention to the fact that at least
250,000 laborers will be required for preparations against air
attacks in the field of civilian air raid protection. For Vienna
alone 2,000-2,500 are required immediately. The Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor will need at least 4 million
workers considering that he requires 2½ million workers for
maintenance of the present level, that Reich Minister Speer
needs 1,300,000 additional workers, and that the above-mentioned
preparations for security measures against air attacks call for
250,000 laborers.”
Referring again to Page 2, the first full paragraph of the English text
of this document, and Page 5, Paragraph 1, of the German text:
“The Reichsführer SS explained that the executive agents put at
his disposal are extremely few, but that he would try helping
the Sauckel project to succeed by increasing them and working
them harder. The Reichsführer SS made immediately available
2,000 to 2,500 men from concentration camps for air raid
preparations in Vienna.”
Passing the next paragraph of this document and continuing with the
paragraph entitled “Results of the Conference” and quoting it directly
after the small figure 1:
“The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor shall
procure at least 4 million new workers from occupied
territories.”
Moreover, as Document 3012-PS, which has already been offered as Exhibit
USA-190, revealed, the Defendant Sauckel, in requesting the assistance
of the Army for the recruitment of 1 million men and women from the
Occupied Eastern Territories, informed the Defendant Keitel that prompt
action was required and that, as in all other occupied countries,
pressure had to be used if other measures were not successful. Again, as
revealed by Document 018-PS, which has been offered and from which
excerpts have been read, the Defendant Sauckel was informed by the
Defendant Rosenberg that the enslavement of foreign labor was achieved
by force and brutality. Notwithstanding his knowledge of these
conditions, the Defendant Sauckel continued to request greater supplies
of manpower from the areas in which the most ruthless methods had been
applied. Indeed, when German field commanders on the Eastern Front
attempted to resist or restrain the Defendant Sauckel’s demands, because
forced recruitment was swelling the ranks of the partisans and making
the Army’s task more difficult, Sauckel sent a telegram to Hitler, in
which he implored him, Hitler, to intervene.
I make reference to Document Number 407(II)-PS, which bears Exhibit
Number USA-226. This document is a telegram from the Defendant Sauckel
to Hitler dated 10 March 1943. It is a rather long message, but I wish
to call particularly to the attention of the Tribunal the last paragraph
on Page 1 of the English text. It is Page 2, Paragraph 5 of the German
text. Quoting the last paragraph of the English text:
“Therefore, my Führer, I ask you to abolish all orders which
oppose the obligation of foreign workers for labor and kindly to
report to me whether my conception of the mission presented here
is still right.”
Turning to Paragraph 5 on the first page of this English text, we find
these words, quoting them directly:
“If the obligation for labor and the forced recruiting of
workers in the East is not possible any more, then the German
war industries and agriculture cannot fulfill their tasks to the
full extent.”
The next paragraph:
“I myself have the opinion that our Army leaders should not give
credence, under any circumstances, to the atrocity and
defamatory propaganda campaign of the partisans. The generals
themselves are greatly interested that the support for the
troops is made possible in time. I should like to point out that
hundreds of thousands of excellent workers going into the field
as soldiers now cannot possibly be replaced by German women not
used to work, even if they are trying to do their best.
Therefore, I have to use the people of the Eastern Territories.”
THE PRESIDENT: I think you should read the next paragraph.
MR. DODD: “I myself report to you that the workers belonging to
all foreign nations are treated humanely, and correctly, and
cleanly; are fed and housed well and are even clothed. On the
basis of my own services with foreign nations I go as far as to
state that never before in the world were foreign workers
treated as correctly as they are now, in the hardest of all
wars, by the German people.”
In addition to being responsible for the recruitment of foreign civilian
labor by force, Defendant Sauckel was responsible for the conditions
under which foreign workers were deported to Germany and for the
treatment to which they were subjected within Germany.
We have already referred to the conditions under which these imported
persons were transported to Germany and we have read from Document
2241(3)-PS to show that Sauckel knew of these conditions. Yesterday we
referred at length to the brutal, degrading, and inhumane conditions
under which these laborers worked and lived within Germany. We again
invite the attention of the Tribunal to Document 3044-PS, already
offered as Exhibit USA-206. It is Regulation Number 4 of 7 May 1942,
issued by Sauckel as the Plenipotentiary General for the mobilization of
labor, concerning recruitment, care, lodging, feeding, and treatment of
foreign workers of both sexes. By this decree Defendant Sauckel
expressly directed that the assembly and operation of rail transports
and the supplying of food therefor was the responsibility of his agents
until the transports arrived in Germany. By the same regulation
Defendant Sauckel directed that within Germany the care of foreign
industrial workers was to be carried out by the German Labor Front and
that the care of foreign agricultural workers was to be carried out by
the Reich Food Administration. By the terms of the regulation, Sauckel
reserved for himself ultimate responsibility for all aspects of care,
treatment, lodging, and feeding of foreign workers while in transit to
and within Germany.
I refer particularly to the English text of this Document 3044-PS,
Exhibit USA-206; and the part of it that I make reference to is at the
bottom of Page 1 in the English text, and it appears at Page 518 of the
volume in the German text. Quoting directly from the English text:
“The care of foreign labor will be carried out:
“(a) Up to the Reich border by my commissioners or, in the
occupied areas, by competent military or civil labor allocation
agencies; care of the workers will be carried out in
co-operation with the respective, competent foreign
organization;
“(b) Within the area of the Reich (1) by the German Labor Front
in the cases of non-agricultural workers, (2) by the Reich Food
Administration in the case of agricultural workers.
“The German Labor Front and the German Food Administration are
bound by my directives in the carrying out of their tasks of
caring for the workers.
“The administrative agencies for the Allocation of Labor are to
give far-reaching support to the German Labor Front and the
German Food Administration in the fulfillment of their assigned
tasks.
“My competence for the execution of the care for foreign labor
is not prejudiced by the assignment of these tasks to the German
Labor Front and the Reich Food Administration.”
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, don’t you think that that sort of passage is
the sort of passage which might be summarized and not read, because all
that it is really stating is that Sauckel, his department and
commissioners, were responsible and that is what he is saying.
MR. DODD: Yes, indeed, Your Honor, we spelled it out, thinking that
perhaps under the rule of getting it into the record it must be read
fully. I quite agree.
THE PRESIDENT: A summary will be quite sufficient, I think.
MR. DODD: In the same document, I should like to make reference to the
data on Page 3, Paragraph III, of the English text, which indicate,
under the title of “Composition and Operation of the Transports” that
this function is the obligation of the representatives of the Defendant
Sauckel; and in Paragraph “c,” on Page 5 of the English text, under the
title of “Supply for the Transport,” after setting out some
responsibility for the Office of the German Workers Front, the Defendant
Sauckel states that for the rest his offices effect the supply for the
transport.
The Defendant Sauckel had an agreement with the head of the German Labor
Front, Dr. Robert Ley, and in this agreement the Defendant Sauckel
emphasized his ultimate responsibility by creating a central
inspectorate charged with examining the working and living conditions of
foreign workers. We refer to Document 1913-PS, Exhibit USA-227. This
agreement between the Defendant Sauckel and the then Chief of the German
Labor Front is published in the 1943 edition of the
_Reichsarbeitsblatt_, Part I, at Page 588. It is a rather lengthy
agreement; and I shall not read it all or any great part of it except
such part as will indicate the basic agreements between the Defendant
Sauckel and Ley with respect to the foreign workers and their living
conditions and working conditions.
On the first page of the English text:
“The Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front, Dr. Ley, in
collaboration with the Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, will establish a
‘Central Inspection’ for the continuous supervision of all
measures concerning the care of the foreign workers mentioned
under 1. This will have the designation: Central Inspection for
Care of Foreign Workers.”
Paragraph 4 marked with the Roman numeral IV, in the same text, states:
“The offices for the administration of the Allocation of Labor
will be constantly informed by the ‘Central Inspection for the
Care of Foreign Workers’ of its observations, in particular,
immediately in each case in which action of state organizations
seems to be necessary.”
I should also like to call the attention of the Tribunal to this
paragraph, which is quoted on the same page. It is the fourth paragraph
down after the small number 2 and it begins with the words:
“The authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation
of Labor to empower the members of his staff and the presidents
of the state employment offices to get direct information on the
conditions regarding the employment of foreigners in the
factories and camps will remain untouched.”
We have already offered to the Court proof that the Defendant Sauckel
was responsible for compelling citizens of the occupied countries,
against their will, to manufacture arms and munitions and to construct
military fortifications for use in war operations against their own
country and its allies. He was, moreover, responsible for having
compelled prisoners of war to produce arms and munitions for use against
their own countries and their actively resisting allies.
The decree appointing Sauckel indicates that he was appointed
Plenipotentiary General for manpower for the express purpose, among
others, of integrating prisoners of war into the German war industry;
and in a series of reports to Hitler, Sauckel described how successful
he had been in carrying out that program. One such report states that in
a single year the Defendant Sauckel had incorporated 1,622,829 prisoners
of war into the German economy.
I refer to Document Number 407(V)-PS, which is Exhibit USA-228. It is a
letter from the Defendant Sauckel to Hitler on the 14th of April 1943.
Although the figures in the document have been contained in another
document, this is the first introduction of this particular document.
Quoting from Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the English text, it begins:
“My Führer:
“. . . after having been active as Plenipotentiary for the
Allocation of Labor for one year, I have the honor to report to
you that 3,638,056 new foreign workers have been added to the
German war economy between April 1st of the last year and March
31st of this year.”
Passing on a little bit, with particular reference to the prisoners of
war, we find this statement:
“Besides the foreign civilian workers another 1,622,829
prisoners of war are employed in the German economy.”
A later report states that 846,511 additional foreign laborers and
prisoners of war were incorporated into the German war industry; and
quoting from Document 407(IX)-PS, Exhibit USA-229, which is also a
letter from the Defendant Sauckel to Hitler, I read in part from Page 1,
Paragraphs 1 and 2:
“My Führer:
“I beg to be permitted to report to you on the situation of the
Arbeitseinsatz for the first 5 months of 1943. For the first
time the following number of new foreign laborers and prisoners
of war were employed in the German war industry . . . Total:
846,511.”
This use of prisoners of war in the manufacture of armaments allocated
by the Defendant Sauckel was confirmed by the Defendant Speer, who
stated that 40 percent of all prisoners of war were employed in the
production of weapons and munitions and in subsidiary industries. I wish
to refer briefly to Paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 on Page 15 of the English
text of an interrogation of the Defendant Speer, on the 18th of October
1945, which was offered and referred to yesterday and has the Exhibit
Number USA-220. Quoting from Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 on Page 15—Paragraph
1 on Page 19 of the German text—there are two questions which will
establish the background for this answer:
“Q: Let me understand; when you wanted labor from prisoners of
war did you requisition prisoners of war separately, or did you
ask for a total number of workers?
“A: Only Schmelter can answer that directly. As far as the
commitment of prisoners of war for labor goes, it was effected
through employment officers of the Stalags. I tried several
times to increase the total number of prisoners of war that were
occupied in production, at the expense of the other demands.
“Q: Will you explain that a little more?
“A: In the last phase of production, that is, in the year 1944
when everything collapsed, I had 40 percent of all prisoners of
war employed in production. I wanted to have this percentage
increased.
“Q: And when you say ‘employed in production’, you mean in these
subsidiary industries that you have discussed and also in the
production of weapons and munitions, is that right?
“A: Yes. That was the total extent of my task.”
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What do you mean by “subsidiary industries,”
Mr. Dodd? Is that war industries?
MR. DODD: Yes, Sir; war industries, as we understand it. It was referred
to many times by these defendants as the component parts of the plans.
I also would like to call the attention of the Tribunal again to the
“Minutes of the 36th Meeting of the Central. Planning Board,” Document
R-124, from which we read a number of excerpts yesterday, and remind the
Tribunal that in the report of the minutes of that meeting the Defendant
Speer stated that, “Ninety thousand Russian prisoners of war employed in
the whole of the armament industry are for the greater part skilled
men.”
We should like, at this point, to turn to the special responsibility of
the Defendant Speer and to discuss the evidence of the various crimes
committed by Defendant Speer in planning and participating in the vast
program of forcible deportation of the citizens of occupied countries.
He was the Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions and Chief of the
Organization Todt, both of which positions he acquired on the 15th of
February 1942; and by virtue of his later acquisition of control over
the armament offices of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the
production offices of the Ministry of Economics, the Defendant Speer was
responsible for the entire war production of the Reich as well as for
the construction of fortifications and installations for the Wehrmacht.
Proof of the positions held by the Defendant Speer is supplied in his
own statement as contained in Document 2980-PS, which has already been
offered to the Tribunal and which bears Exhibit Number USA-18.
The industries under the Defendant Speer’s control were really the most
important users of manpower in Germany; and thus, according to the
Defendant Sauckel, Speer’s labor requirements received unconditional
priority over all other demands for labor. We refer to the transcript of
the interrogation of the Defendant Sauckel on the 22d of September 1945.
It is Exhibit USA-230. It is next to the last document in the document
book. I wish to refer to Page 1 of that document, Paragraph 4. It is a
brief reference, the last answer on the page. The question was asked of
the Defendant Sauckel:
“Q: Except for Speer, they would give the requirements in
general for the whole field; but in Speer’s work you would get
them allocated by industry, and so on—is that right?
“A: The others only got whatever was left. Because Speer told me
once in the presence of the Führer that I am here to work for
Speer and that, mainly, I am his man.”
The Defendant Speer has admitted under oath that he participated in the
discussions during which the decision to use foreign forced labor was
made. He has also said that he concurred in the decision and that it was
the basis for the program of bringing foreign workers into Germany by
compulsion. I make reference to the interrogation of the Defendant Speer
of the 18th of October 1945. It bears the Exhibit Number USA-220. We
have already read from it; and I particularly refer to the bottom of
Page 12 and the top of Page 13 of the English text:
“Q: But is it clear to you, Mr. Speer, that in 1942 when the
decisions were being made concerning the use of forced foreign
labor, that you participated in the discussions yourself?
“A: Yes.
“Q: So that I take it that the execution of the program of
bringing foreign workers into Germany by compulsion under
Sauckel was based on earlier decisions that had been made with
your agreement?
“A: Yes, but I must point out that only a very small part of the
manpower that Sauckel brought into Germany was made available to
me; a far larger part of it was allocated to other departments
that demanded them.”
This admission is confirmed by the minutes of Speer’s conferences with
Hitler on 10, 11, and 12 August 1942 in Document R-124, which has been
offered here and from which excerpts have been read. Page 34 of that
document, Paragraph 1 of the English text, has already been quoted, and
those excerpts have been read before the Tribunal yesterday. The
Tribunal will recall that the Defendant Speer related the outcome of his
negotiations concerning the forcible recruitment of 1 million Russian
laborers for the German armaments industry; and this use of force was
again discussed by Hitler and Defendant Speer on the 4th of January 1943
as shown by the excerpts read from the Document 556(13)-PS, where it was
decided that stronger measures were to be used to accelerate the
conscription of French civilian workers.
We say the Defendant Speer demanded foreign workers for the industries
under his control and used those workers with the knowledge that they
had been deported by force and were being compelled to work. Speer has
stated under oath in his interrogation of 18 October 1945, Page 5,
Paragraph 9, of the English text, quoting it directly:
“I do not wish to give the impression that I want to deny the
fact that I demanded manpower and foreign labor from Sauckel
very energetically.”
He has admitted that he knew he was obtaining foreign labor, a large
part of which was forced labor; and referring again to that same
interrogation of the 18th of October 1945, and to Pages 8 and 9 of the
English text and Page 10 of the German text:
“Q: So that during the period when you were asking for labor, it
seems clear, does it not, that you knew you were obtaining
foreign labor as well as domestic labor in response to your
requests and that a large part of the foreign labor was forced
labor?
“A: Yes.
“Q: So that, simply by way of illustration, suppose that on
January 1, 1944 you require 50,000 workers for a given purpose;
would you put in a requisition for 50,000 workers, knowing that
in that 50,000 there would be forced foreign workers?
“A: Yes.”
The Defendant Speer has also stated under oath that he knew at least as
early as September of 1942 that workers from the Ukraine were being
forcibly deported for labor into Germany. Likewise he knew that the
great majority of the workers of the western occupied countries were
slave laborers forced against their will to come to Germany; and again
referring to his interrogation of this 18th day of October 1945, and
beginning with the fourth Paragraph from the bottom of Page 5 of the
English text, Paragraph 10 on Page 6 of the German text, we find this
series of questions and answers:
“Q: When did you first find out then that some of the manpower
from the Ukraine was not coming voluntarily?
“A: It is rather difficult to answer this here, that is, to name
a certain date to you. However, it is certain that I knew that
at some particular point of time the manpower from the Ukraine
did not come voluntarily.
“Q: And does that apply also to the manpower from other occupied
countries; that is, did there come a time when you knew that
they were not coming voluntarily?
“A: Yes.
“Q: When, in general, would you say that time was without
placing a particular month of the year?
“A: As far as the Ukraine situation goes, I believe that they
did not come voluntarily any more after a few months, because
immense mistakes were made in their treatment by us. I should
say offhand that this time was either in July, August, or
September of 1942.”
Turning to Paragraph 11 on Page 6 of the English text of this same
interrogation and Page 7 and Paragraph 8 of the German text, we find
this series of questions and answers—quoting:
“Q: But many workers actually did come from the west to Germany,
did they not?
“A: Yes.
“Q: That means then, that the great majority of the workers that
came from the western countries—the western occupied
countries—came against their will to Germany?
“A: Yes.”
These admissions are borne out, of course, by other evidence, for as
Document R-124 shows and as we have shown by the readings from it, in
all countries conscription for work in Germany could be carried out only
with the active assistance of the police; and the prevailing methods of
recruitment had provoked such violence that many German recruiting
agents had been killed.
And again, at a meeting with Hitler to discuss the manpower requirements
for 1944, which is reported in Document 1292-PS, Speer was informed by
the Defendant Sauckel that the requirements—including Speer’s
requirement for 1,300,000 additional laborers—could be met only if
German enforcement agents were furnished to carry out the enslavement
program in the occupied countries.
Now we say that notwithstanding this knowledge that these workers were
conscripted and deported to Germany against their will, Speer
nevertheless continued to formulate requirements for the foreign workers
and requested their allocation to these industries which were subject to
his control. This is borne out by the minutes of the Central Planning
Board as contained in Document R-124, and particularly Page 13,
Paragraph 4 of the English text; and that is Page 6 and Paragraph 4 of
the German text. Speer speaking:
“Now the labor problem in Germany. I believe it is still
possible to transfer some from the western territories. Only
recently the Führer stated he wishes to dissolve these foreign
volunteers as he had the impression that the army groups were
carting around with them a lot of ballast. Therefore, if we
cannot settle this matter ourselves, we shall have to call a
meeting with the Führer to clear up the whole coal situation.
Keitel and Zeitzler will be invited to attend in order to
determine the number of Russians from the rear army territories
who must be sent to us. However, I see another possibility: We
might organize another drive to pick out workers for the mines
from the Russian prisoners of war in the Reich. But this
possibility is none too promising.”
At another meeting of the Central Planning Board the Defendant Speer
rejected a suggestion that labor for industries under his control be
furnished from German sources instead of from foreign sources. And again
in this Document R-124, on Page 16, Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the
English text, and Page 12, Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the German text—I
quote the Defendant Speer:
“We do it that way: Kehrl collects the demands for labor
necessary to complete the coal-and-iron plan and communicates
the numbers to Sauckel. Probably there will be a conference at
the Reich Marshal’s in the next week, and an answer from Sauckel
should have arrived by then. The question of recruitment for the
armaments industry will be solved together with Weger.”
Kehrl speaking:
“I wish to urge that the allotments to the mines should not be
made dependent on the possibility of recruitment of men abroad.
We were completely frustrated these last 3 months because this
principle had been applied. We ended December with a deficit of
25,000 and we never get replacements. The number must be made up
by men from Germany.
“Speer: ‘No, nothing doing.’”
We say also that, the Defendant Speer is guilty of advocating terror and
brutality as a means of maximizing, production by slave laborers. And
again I refer to this Document R-124. At Page 42 there is a discussion
concerning the supply and exploitation of labor. That excerpt has been
read to the Tribunal before, and I simply refer to it in passing. It is
the excerpt wherein Speer said it would be a good thing; the effect of
it was that nothing could be said against the SS and the police taking a
hand and making these men work and produce more.
We say he is also guilty of compelling allied nationals and prisoners of
war to engage in the production of armaments and munitions and in direct
military operations against their own country.
We say that as Chief of the Organization Todt he is accountable for its
policies, which were in direct conflict with the laws of war; for the
Organization Todt, in violation of the laws of war, impressed allied
nationals into its service.
Document L-191, Exhibit USA-231, is an International Labor Office study
of the exploitation of foreign labor by Germany. We have only one copy
of this document, this International Labor Office study, printed at
Montreal, Canada, in 1945. We ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice
of it as an official publication of the International Labor Office.
I might say to the Tribunal, with some apology, that this arrived at a
time when we were not able even to have the excerpt mimeographed and
printed to place in your document book, so this is the one document
which is missing from the document book which is in your hands. However,
I should like to quote from Page 73, Paragraph 2, of this study by the
International Labor Office. It is not long; it is very brief. I am
quoting directly. It says:
“The methods used for the recruitment of foreign workers who
were destined for employment in the Organization did not greatly
differ from the methods used for the recruitment of foreigners
for deportation to Germany.”
“The Organization,” by the way, is the Organization Todt. Going on with
the quotation:
“The main difference was that, since the principal activities of
the Organization lay outside the frontiers of Germany,
foreigners were not transported to Germany but had either to
work in their own country or in some other occupied country.
“In the recruitment drives for foreign workers for the
Organization, methods of compulsion as well as methods of
persuasion were used, the latter usually with very little
result.”
Moreover, conscripted allied nationals were compelled by this same
Organization Todt actually to engage in operations of war against their
country.
Document 407(VIII)-PS discloses that the foreign workers who were
impressed into the Organization Todt through the efforts of the
Defendant Sauckel did participate in the building of the Atlantic Wall
fortifications.
As chief of German war production, this Defendant Speer sponsored and
approved the use of these prisoners of war in the production of
armaments and munitions. This has been made plain by the evidence
already discussed.
To sum it up briefly finally we say that it shows first that after Speer
assumed the responsibility for the armament production, his concern, in
his discussions with his co-conspirators, was to secure a larger
allocation of prisoners of war for his armament factories. That has been
shown by the quotations from the excerpts of Document R-124, the minutes
of the meeting of the Central Planning Board; and in this same meeting
the Tribunal will recall that Speer complained because only 30 percent
of the Russian prisoners of war were engaged in the armaments industry.
We referred to a speech of Speer, Document 1435-PS—we quoted from
it—in which he said that 10,000 prisoners of war were put at the
disposal of the armaments industry upon his orders.
And finally, Speer advocated the returning of escaped prisoners of war
to factories as convicts. That is shown again by Document R-124, Page
13, Paragraph 5, of the English text, where the Defendant Speer says
that he has come to an arrangement . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, don’t you think that we have really got this
sufficiently now?
MR. DODD: Yes, Sir; I just . . .
THE PRESIDENT: We have Speer’s own admission and any number of documents
which prove the way in which these prisoners of war and other laborers
were brought into Germany.
MR. DODD: Well I just wanted to refer briefly to that passage in that
document, R-124, as showing that this defendant advocated having escaped
prisoners of war returned to the munitions factories.
THE PRESIDENT: What page?
MR. DODD: Thirteen. I don’t want to labor this responsibility of the
Defendant Speer. I was anxious—or perhaps I should say we are all
overanxious—to have the documents in the record, and before the
Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Which is the passage you want to refer to on Page 13?
MR. DODD: I just referred in passing to the statement which begins with
the words, “We have to come to an arrangement with the Reichsführer SS.”
And in the next to the last sentence it says: “The men should be put
into the factories as convicts.”
Finally, with reference to the Defendant Speer, I should like to say to
the Tribunal that he visited the concentration camp at Mauthausen and he
also visited factories such as those conducted by the Krupp industries,
where concentration camp labor was exploited under degrading conditions.
Despite this first-hand knowledge of these conditions, both in
Mauthausen and in the places where these forced laborers were at work in
factories, he continued to direct the use of this type of labor in
factories under his own jurisdiction.
THE PRESIDENT: How do you intend to prove it as to these concentration
camps?
MR. DODD: I was going to refer the Tribunal to Page 9 of the
interrogation of the 18th of October 1945; and I refer to Page 11,
Paragraph 5, of the German text and Page 9, beginning with Paragraph 9,
of the English text:
“Q: But, in general, the use of concentration camp labor was
known to you and approved by you as a source of labor?
“A: Yes.
“Q: And you knew also, I take it, that among the inmates of the
concentration camps there were both Germans and foreigners?
“A: I didn’t think about it at that time.
“Q: As a matter of fact, you visited the Austrian concentration
camp personally, did you not?
“A: I did not—well, I was in Mauthausen once, but at that time
I was not told just to what categories the inmates of the
concentration camps belonged.
“Q: But in general everybody knew, did they not, that foreigners
who were taken away by the Gestapo or arrested by the Gestapo,
as well as Germans, found their way into the concentration
camps?
“A: Of course, yes. I didn’t mean to imply anything like that.”
And on Page 15 of this same interrogation, beginning with the 13th
Paragraph of the English text and Page 20 in the German text, we find
this question:
“Q: Did you ever discuss, by the way, the requirements of Krupp
for foreign labor?
“A: It is certain that it was reported to me what lack Krupp had
in foreign workers.
“Q: Did you ever, discuss it with any of the members of the
Krupp firm?
“A: I cannot say that exactly; but during the time of my
activities I visited the Krupp factory more than once and it is
certain that this was discussed, that is, the lack of manpower.”
Before closing I should like to take 2 minutes of the time of the
Tribunal to refer to what we consider to be some of the applicable laws
of the case for the assistance of the Tribunal in considering these
documents which we have offered.
We refer, of course, first of all, to Sections 6 (b) and 6 (c) of the
Charter of this Tribunal. We also say that the acts of the conspirators
constituted a flagrant violation of Articles 46 and 52 of the
Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention Number IV of 1907.
Article 46 seeks to safeguard the family honor, the rights and the lives
of persons in areas under belligerent occupation.
Article 52 provides in part that:
“Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from
municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army
of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of
the country.”
We say that these conspirators violated this article because the labor
which they conscripted was not used to satisfy the needs of the army of
occupation, but on the contrary, was forcibly removed from the occupied
areas and exploited in the interest of the German war effort.
Finally, we say that these conspirators—and particularly the Defendants
Sauckel and Speer—by virtue of their planning, of their execution, and
of their approval of this program, which we have been describing
yesterday and today, the enslavement and the misuse of the forced labor
of prisoners of war—that for this they bear a special responsibility
for their Crimes against Humanity and their War Crimes.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you finishing, Mr. Dodd?
MR. DODD: Yes, I have concluded.
THE PRESIDENT: I should like to ask you why you have not read Document
3057-PS, which is Sauckel’s statement.
MR. DODD: Yes. We had intended to offer that document. Counsel for the
Defendant Sauckel informed me a day or two ago that his client
maintained that he had been coerced into making the statement. Because
we had not ample time to ascertain the facts of the matter, we preferred
to withhold it, rather than to offer it to the Tribunal under any
question of doubt.
THE PRESIDENT: He objects to it, and therefore you have not put it in?
MR. DODD: No, we did not offer it while there was any question about it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: Might I suggest to the Tribunal that a recess be taken at this
time? I am sorry to have to say that I am due to be before the Tribunal
for a little while—that is, I am sorry for the Tribunal—with the
matters on the concentration camps.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean a recess now?
MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, yes; 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, we propose to offer additional
evidence at this time concerning the use of Nazi concentration camps
against the people of Germany and allied nationals. We propose to
examine the purposes and the role of the concentration camp in the
larger Nazi scheme of things. We propose to show that the concentration
camp was one of the fundamental institutions of the Nazi regime, that it
was a pillar of the system of terror by which the Nazis consolidated
their power over Germany and imposed their ideology upon the German
people, that it was really a primary weapon in the battle against the
Jews, against the Christian church, against labor, against those who
wanted peace, against opposition or non-conformity of any kind. We say
it involved the systematic use of terror to achieve the cohesion within
Germany which was necessary for the execution of the conspirators’ plans
for aggression.
We propose to show that a concentration camp was one of the principal
instruments used by the conspirators for the commission, on an enormous
scale, of Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes; that it was the final
link in a chain of terror and repression which involved the SS and the
Gestapo and which resulted in the apprehension of victims and their
confinement without trial, often without charges, generally with no
indication of the length of their detention.
My colleagues will present full evidence concerning the criminal role of
the SS and the Gestapo in this phase of Nazi terrorism, the
concentration camp; but at this point I wish simply to point out that
the SS, through its espionage system, tracked down the victims, that the
criminal police and the Gestapo seized them and brought them to the
camps, and that the concentration camps were administered by the SS.
This Tribunal, we feel, is already aware of the sickening evidence of
the brutality of the concentration camp from the showing of the moving
picture. More than that, individual prosecutions are going on, going
forward before other courts which will record these outrages in detail.
Therefore, we do not propose to present a catalogue of individual
brutalities but, rather, to submit evidence showing the fundamental
purposes for which, the camps were used, the techniques of terror which
were employed, the large number of victims, and the death and the
anguish which they caused.
The evidence relating to concentration camps has been assembled in a
document book bearing the letter “S.” I might say that the documents in
this book have been arranged in the order of presentation, rather than,
as we have been doing, numerically. In this book we have put them in as
they occur in the presentation. One document in this book, 2309-PS, is
cited several times, so we have marked it with a tab with a view to
facilitating reference back to it. It will be referred to more than
once.
The Nazis realized early that without the most drastic repression of
actual and potential opposition they could not consolidate their power
over the German people. We have seen that, immediately after Hitler
became Chancellor, the conspirators promptly destroyed civil liberties
by issuing the Presidential Emergency Decree of February 28, 1933. It is
Document 1390-PS of the document book; and it sets forth that decree
which has already been introduced in evidence before the Tribunal and is
included in USA Exhibit B. It was this decree, which was the basis for
the so-called “Schutzhaft,” that is, protective custody—the terrible
power to imprison people without judicial proceedings. This is made
clear by Document Number 2499-PS, which is a typical order for
protective custody. We offer it for that purpose, as a typical order for
protective custody which has come into the possession of the
Prosecution. It bears Exhibit Number USA-232. I should like to quote
from the body of that order:
“Order of Protective Custody.
“Based on Article 1 of the Decree of the Reich President for the
Protection of People and State of 28 February 1933
(_Reichsgesetzblatt_ I, Page 83), you are taken into protective
custody in the interest of public security and order.
“Reason: Suspicion of activities inimical toward the State.”
The Defendant Göring in a book entitled _Aufbau einer Nation_, published
in 1934, sought to give the impression, it appears, that the camps were
originally directed at those whom the Nazis considered Communists and
Social Democrats. We refer to Document 2324-PS, Exhibit USA-233. This
document is an excerpt from Page 89 of the German book. We refer to the
third and fourth paragraphs of the document, which I read as follows:
“We had to deal ruthlessly with these enemies of the State. It
must not be forgotten that at the moment of our seizure of
power, over 6 million people officially voted for communism and
about 8 million for Marxism in the Reichstag elections in March.
“Thus the concentration camps were created to which we had to
send first thousands of functionaries of the Communist and
Social Democratic Parties.”
In practical operation the power to order confinement in these camps was
almost without limit. The Defendant Frick, in an order which he issued
on the 25th day of January 1938 as Minister of the Interior, made this
quite clear. An extract from this order is set forth in Document
1723-PS, to which we make reference. It bears Exhibit Number USA-206. I
wish to read Article 1, beginning at the bottom of Page 5 of the English
translation of this order:
“Protective custody can be decreed as a coercive measure of the
Secret State Police to counter all hostile efforts of persons
who endanger the existence and security of the people and the
State through their attitude.”
I wish also to read into the record the first two paragraphs of that
order, which are found at the top of Page 1 of the English translation:
“In a summary of all the previously issued decrees on the
co-operation between the Party and the Gestapo I refer to the
following and ordain:
“1. To the Gestapo has been entrusted the mission by the Führer
to watch over and to eliminate all enemies of the Party and the
National State, as well as all disintegrating forces of all
kinds directed against both. The successful solution of this
mission forms one of the most essential prerequisites for the
unhampered and frictionless work of the Party. The Gestapo, in
its extremely difficult task, is to be granted support and
assistance in every possible way by the NSDAP.”
The conspirators then were directing their apparatus of terror against
the “enemies of the State,” against “disintegrating forces,” against
those people who endangered the State “through their attitude.” Whom did
they consider as belonging in these broad categories? Well, first, there
were the men in Germany who wanted peace. We refer to Document L-83
(Exhibit USA-234).
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of that document that you have been
referring to, Number 1723-PS?
MR. DODD: January 25, 1938. It has already been introduced and is
included in USA Exhibit B. This document consists of an affidavit of
Gerhart H. Seger, and I wish only to read from Page 1, Paragraph 2 of
that affidavit:
“2. During the period after World War I, until I was committed
to the Leipzig jail and Oranienburg Concentration Camp, in the
spring of 1933 following the Nazi accession to power in January
of that year, my business and political affiliations exposed me
to the full impact of the Nazi theories and practice of violent
regimentation and terroristic tactics. My conflict with the
Nazis by virtue of my identification with the peace movement and
as duly elected member of the Reichstag representing a political
faith (Social Democratic Party) hostile to National Socialism,
clearly demonstrated that even in the period prior to 1933 the
Nazis considered crimes and terrorism a necessary and desirable
weapon in overcoming democratic opposition.”
Passing to Page 5 of the same document and the paragraph marked “(e)”:
“That the Nazis had already conceived the device of the
concentration camp as a means of suppressing and regimenting
opposition elements was forcefully brought to my attention
during the course of a conversation which I had with Dr. Wilhelm
Frick in December 1932. Frick at that time was chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag of which I was a
member. When I gave an emphatic answer to Frick concerning the
particular matter discussed, he replied, ‘Don’t worry, when we
are in power we shall put all of you guys into concentration
camps.’ When the Nazis came into power, Frick was appointed
Reich Minister of Interior and promptly carried out his threat
in collaboration with Göring, as Chief of the Prussian State
Police, and Himmler.”
This paragraph shows that even before the Nazis had seized power in
Germany they had conceived the plan to repress any potential oppositions
by terror, and Frick’s statement to Seger is completely consistent with
an earlier statement which he made on the 18th of October 1929. We refer
to Document Number 2513-PS (Exhibit USA-235), which has also been
received in evidence and has been included in USA Exhibit B. We refer to
the first page of the English translation, Page 48 of the German text.
On Page 1 the quotation begins:
“This fateful struggle will first be taken up with the ballot;
but this cannot continue indefinitely, for history has taught us
that in a battle blood must be shed and iron broken. The ballot
is the beginning of the fateful struggle. We are determined to
promulgate by force that which we preach. Just as Mussolini
exterminated the Marxists in Italy, so must we also succeed in
accomplishing the same through dictatorship and terror.”
THE PRESIDENT: This is the defendant, is it?
MR. DODD: Yes, the Defendant Frick.
There are many additional cases of the use of the concentration camp
against the men who wanted peace. There was, for example, a group called
the Bibelforscher, that is, Bible research workers, most of whom were
known as Jehovah’s Witnesses. They were pacifists, and so the
conspirators provided not only for their prosecution in the regular
courts but also for their confinement in concentration camps after they
had served the judicial sentences; and we refer to Document Number D-84,
Exhibit USA-236.
This document is dated the 5th day of August 1937; and it is an order by
the Secret State Police at Berlin, and I refer particularly to the first
and last paragraphs of this order, as follows:
“The Reich Minister of Justice had informed me that he does not
share the opinion voiced by subordinate departments on various
occasions according to which the arrest of the Bibelforscher
after they have served a sentence is supposed to jeopardize the
authority of the law courts. He is fully aware of the necessity
for measures by the State Police after the sentence has been
served. He asks, however, not to bring the Bibelforscher into
protective custody under circumstances detrimental to the
respect of the law courts.”
And then, the Paragraph numbered “(2)”:
“If information regarding the impending release of a
Bibelforscher from arrest is received from the authorities
carrying out the sentence, my decision regarding the ordering of
measures by the State Police will be asked for without delay in
accordance with my circular decree dated 22. 4. 37, so that
transfer to a concentration camp can take place immediately
after the sentence has been served. Should a transfer into
concentration camp immediately after the serving of the sentence
not be possible, Bibelforscher will be detained in police
prisons.”
The labor unions, of which I think it is safe to say the majority are
traditionally opposed to wars of aggression, also felt the full force of
Nazi terror. A member of the American staff, Major Wallis, has already
submitted evidence before this Tribunal concerning the conspirators’
campaign against the trade unions. But the concentration camp was an
important weapon in this campaign; and the Tribunal will recall that in
Document Number 2324-PS, to which I made reference this morning, the
Defendant Göring made it plain that members of the Social Democratic
Party were to be confined in concentration camps. Now labor leaders were
very largely members of that party, and they soon learned the horrors of
protective custody. We refer to Document Number 2330-PS (Exhibit
USA-237), which has already been received as part of USA Exhibit G,
which consists of an order that one Joseph Simon should be placed in
protective custody. We refer to the middle of the first page of the
English translation of that order, beginning with the material under the
word “reasons.”
THE PRESIDENT: I think you should read the sentence before that—the two
lines before it. The words are, “The arrestee has no right to appeal
against the decree of protective custody.”
MR. DODD: “The arrestee has no right to appeal against the application
of protective custody.” Then comes a title: “Reasons”:
“Simon was for many years a member of the Socialist Party and
temporarily a member of the Union Socialiste Populaire. From
1907 to 1918 he was Landtag deputy of the Socialist Party; from
1908 to 1930 Social Democratic City Counsellor (Stadtrat) in
Nuremberg. In view of the decisive role which Simon played in
the international trade unions and in regard to his connection
with international Marxist leaders and central agencies, which
he continued after the national recovery, he was placed under
protective custody on the 3rd day of May 1933 and was kept,
until 25 January 1934, in the Dachau Concentration Camp. Simon
is under the grave suspicion that even after this date he played
an active part in the illegal continuation of the Socialist
Party. He took part in meetings which aimed at the illegal
continuation of the Socialist Party and propagation of illegal
Marxist printed matter in Germany. Through this radical
attitude, which is hostile to the State, Simon directly
endangers public security and order.”
We do not wish to burden these proceedings with a multiplication of such
instances, but we refer the Tribunal to documents which have already
been offered in connection with the presentation of the evidence
concerning the destruction of the trade unions. In particular, we wish
to refer to Document Number 2334-PS and Document Number 2928-PS,
(Exhibits USA-238 and 239) both of which are included within USA Exhibit
G.
Thousands of Jews, as the world so well knows, were, of course, confined
in these concentration camps. The evidence on this point will be
developed in a later presentation by another member of the prosecuting
staff of the United States. But among the wealth of evidence available
on this point showing the confinement of Germans only because they were
Jews, we wish to offer a document, Number 3051-PS, which bears Exhibit
Number USA-240. This is a copy of a teletype from SS Gruppenführer
Heydrich, and it is dated the 10th of November 1938. It was sent to all
headquarters of the State Police and all districts and subdistricts of
the SD. We refer to Paragraph 5 of this teletype. Paragraph 5 is found
on Page 3 of the English translation. It begins at the bottom of Page 2
and runs over to Page 3. Quoting from Paragraph 5:
“As soon as the course of events of this night allows the use of
the officials employed for this purpose, as many Jews,
especially rich ones, as can be accommodated in the existing
prisons are to be arrested in all districts. For the time being
only healthy men, not too old, are to be arrested. Upon their
arrest, the appropriate concentration camps should be contacted
immediately, in order to confine them in these camps as fast as
possible.
“Special care should be taken that the Jews arrested in
accordance with these instructions are not ill-treated.”
Himmler in 1943 indicated that use of the concentration camp against the
Jews had been motivated not simply by Nazi racialism. Himmler indicated
that this policy had been motivated by a fear that the Jews might have
been an obstacle to aggression. There is no necessity to consider
whether this fear was justified. The important consideration is that the
fear existed; and with reference to it we refer to Document 1919-PS,
which bears Exhibit Number USA-170. The document is a speech delivered
by Himmler at the meeting of the SS major generals at Posen on 4 October
1943, in the course of which he sought to justify the Nazi anti-Jewish
policy. We refer to a portion of this document or this speech, which is
found on Page 4, Paragraph 3, of the English translation, starting with
the words, “I mean the clearing out of the Jews”:
“I mean the clearing out of the Jews, the extermination of the
Jewish race. It’s one of those things it is easy to talk about.
‘The Jewish race is being exterminated’, says one Party member,
‘that’s quite clear; it’s in our program; elimination of the
Jews, and we’re doing it, exterminating them.’ And then there
come 80 million worthy Germans and each one has his decent Jew.
Of course, the others are vermin, but this one is an A-l Jew.
Not one of all those who talk this way has witnessed it, not one
of them has been through it. Most of you must know what it means
when 100 corpses are lying side by side, or 500 or 1,000. To
have stuck it out and at the same time—apart from exceptions
caused by human weakness—to have remained decent fellows, that
is what has made us hard. This is a page of glory in our history
which has never been written and is never to be written, for we
know how difficult we should have made it for ourselves,
if—with bombing raids, the burden and deprivations of war—we
still had Jews today in every town as secret saboteurs,
agitators, and trouble-mongers.”
It is clear, we say, from the foregoing that prior to the launching of
the aggression, the concentration camp had been one of the principal
weapons by which the conspirators achieved the social cohesion which was
needed for the execution of their plans for aggression. After they
launched their aggression and their armies swept over Europe, they
brought the concentration camp to occupied countries; and they also
brought the citizens of the occupied countries to Germany and subjected
them to the whole apparatus of Nazi brutality.
Document Number R-91 is Exhibit USA-241. This document consists of a
communication dated the 16th day of December 1942 sent by Müller to
Himmler, for the Chief of the Security Police and SD, and deals with the
seizure of Polish Jews for deportation to concentration camps in
Germany. I am beginning with the first paragraph. It says, quoting
directly:
“In connection with the increase in the transfer of labor to the
concentration camps ordered to be completed by 30 January 1943,
the following procedure may be applied in the Jewish section:
“1. Total number: 45,000 Jews.
“2. Start of transportation: 11 January 1943. End of
transportation: 31 January 1943. (The Reich railroads are unable
to provide special trains for the evacuation during the period
from 15 December 1942 to 10 January 1943 because of the
increased traffic of Armed Forces leave trains.)
“3. Composition: The 45,000 Jews are to consist of 30,000 Jews
from the district of Bialystok; 10,000 Jews from the Ghetto of
Theresienstadt, 5,000 of whom are Jews fit for work who
heretofore had been used for smaller jobs required for the
ghetto and 5,000 Jews who are generally incapable of working,
also Jews over 60-years old.”
And passing the next sentence:
“As heretofore only such Jews would be taken for the evacuation
who do not have any particular connections and who are not in
possession of any high decorations. Three thousand Jews from the
occupied Dutch territories, 2,000 Jews from Berlin—45,000. The
figure of 45,000 includes those unfit for work (old Jews and
children). By use of a practical standard, the screening of the
arriving Jews in Auschwitz should yield at least 10,000 to
15,000 people fit for work.”
The Jews of Hungary suffered the same tragic fate. Between 19 March 1944
and the 1st of August 1944, more than 400,000 Hungarian Jews were
rounded up. Many of these were put in wagons and sent to extermination
camps, and we refer to Document Number 2605-PS, Exhibit USA-242. This
document is an affidavit made in London by Dr. Rudolph Kastner, a former
official of the Hungarian Zionist Organization. We refer to Page 3 of
the document, the third full paragraph. In March 1944, quoting:
“Together with the German military occupation, there arrived in
Budapest a ‘Special Section Commando’ of the German Secret
Police with the sole object of liquidating the Hungarian Jews.
It was headed by Adolf Aichmann, SS Obersturmbannführer, Chief
of Section IV B of the Reich Security Head Office. His immediate
collaborators were: SS Obersturmbannführer Hermann Krumey,
Hauptsturmführer Wisliczeny, Hunsche, Novak, Dr. Seidl, and
later Danegger, Wrtok. They arrested and later deported to
Mauthausen all the leaders of Jewish political and business life
and journalists, together with, the Hungarian democratic and
anti-fascist politicians; taking advantage of the ‘interregnum’
following upon the German occupation lasting 4 days, they have
placed their Quislings in the Ministry of the Interior.”
On Page 7 of that same document, the 8th paragraph, beginning with the
words “Commanders of the death camps” and quoting:
“Commanders of the death camps gassed only on direct or indirect
instructions of Aichmann. The particular officer of IV B who
directed the deportations from some particular country had the
authority to indicate whether the train should go to a death
camp or not and what should happen to the passengers. The
instructions were usually carried by the SS non-commissioned
officers escorting the train. The letters ‘A’ or ‘M’”—capital
letters “A” or “M”—“on the escorting instruction documents
indicated Auschwitz (Oswieczim) or Majdanek; it meant that the
passengers were to be gassed.”
And passing over the next sentence, we come to these words:
“Regarding Hungarian Jews the following general ruling was laid
down in Auschwitz: Children up to the age of 12 or 14, older
people over 50, as well as the sick, or people with criminal
records (who were transported in specially marked wagons) were
taken immediately on their arrival to the gas chambers.
“The others passed before an SS doctor who, on sight, indicated
who was fit for work and who was not. Those unfit were sent to
the gas chambers, while the others were distributed in various
labor camps.”
In the so-called “Eastern Territories” these victims were apprehended
for extermination . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, don’t you want Page 5 for the numbers which you
have stated “up to the 27th of June 1944”? You haven’t yet given us any
authority for the numbers that you have stated.
MR. DODD: Oh, yes. On Page 5 of that same document, 2605-PS, quoting:
“Up to the 27th of June 1944, 475,000 Jews were deported.”
In the so-called “Eastern Territories” these victims were apprehended
for extermination in concentration camps without any charges having been
made against them. In the western occupied territories charges seemed to
have been made against some of the victims. Some of the charges which
the Nazi conspirators considered sufficient basis for confinement to the
concentration camps are shown by reference to Document Number L-215,
which bears Exhibit Number USA-243. This document is the summary of the
file, the dossier, of 25 persons arrested in Luxembourg for commitment
to various concentration camps and sets forth the charges made against
each person. Beginning with the paragraph after the name “Henricy,” at
the bottom of the first page, and quoting:
“Name: Henricy; charge: . . . by associating with members of
illegal resistance movements and making money for them,
violating legal foreign exchange rates, by harming the interests
of the Reich and being expected in the future to disobey
official administrative regulations and act as an enemy of the
Reich; place of confinement—Natzweiler.”
Next comes the name of “Krier” and the charge:
“. . . by being responsible for continuous sabotage of labor and
causing fear because of his political and criminal past—freedom
would only further his anti-social urge; place of
confinement—Buchenwald.”
Passing to the middle of Page 2, after the name “Monti”:
“Charge:. . . by being strongly suspected of aiding desertion;
place of confinement—Sachsenhausen.”
Next, after the name “Junker”:
“Charge:. . . because as a relative of a deserter he is expected
to endanger the interests of the Greater German Reich if allowed
to go free; place of confinement—Sachsenhausen.”
“Jaeger” is the next name and the charge against Jaeger, quoting:
“. . . because as a relative of a deserter he is expected, to
take advantage of every occasion to harm the Greater German
Reich if allowed to go free; place of
confinement—Sachsenhausen.”
And down to the name “Ludwig” and the charge against Ludwig:
“. . . for being strongly suspected of aiding desertion; place
of confinement—Dachau.”
Not only civilians of the occupied countries but also prisoners of war
were subjected to the horrors and the brutality of the concentration
camps; and we refer to Document Number 1165-PS, which bears Exhibit
Number USA-244. This document is a memorandum to all officers of the
State Police signed by Müller, the Chief of the Gestapo, dated the 9th
of November 1941. The memorandum has the revealing title of—and I
quote—“Transportation of Russian Prisoners of War, destined for
Execution, into the Concentration Camps.”
I wish to quote also from the body of this memorandum, which is found on
Page 2 of the English translation, and I quote directly:
“The commandants of the concentration camps are complaining that
5 to 10 percent of the Soviet Russians destined for execution
are arriving in the camps dead or half dead. Therefore the
impression has arisen that the Stalags are getting rid of such
prisoners in this way.
“It was particularly noted that when marching, for example, from
the railroad station to the camp a rather large number of PW’s
collapsed on the way from exhaustion, either dead or half dead,
and had to be picked up by a truck following the convoy.
“It cannot be prevented that the German people take notice of
these occurrences.
“Even if the transportation to the camps is generally taken care
of by the Wehrmacht, the population will attribute this
situation to the SS.
“In order to prevent, if possible, similar occurrences in the
future, I therefore order that, effective from today on, Soviet
Russians declared definitely suspect and obviously marked by
death (for example with hunger-typhus) and therefore not able to
withstand the exertions of even a short march on foot shall in
the future, as a matter of basic principle, be excluded from the
transport into the concentration camps for execution.”
More evidence of the confinement of Russian prisoners of war in
concentration camps is found in an official report of the investigation
of the Flossenbürg Concentration Camp by the Headquarters of the United
States Third Army, the Judge Advocate Section, and particularly the War
Crimes Branch, under the date of the 21st day of June 1945. It is our
Document Number 2309-PS and bears Exhibit Number USA-245. At the bottom
of Page 2 of the English text the last two sentences of that last
paragraph say, and I quote:
“In 1941 an additional stockade was added at the Flossenbürg
camp to hold 2,000 Russian prisoners. Of these 2,000 prisoners
only 102 survived.”
Soviet prisoners of war found their allies in the concentration camps
too; and at Page 4 of this same Document Number 2309-PS, it will show,
particularly Paragraph 5 on Page 4, and I quote it:
“The victims of Flossenbürg included among them: Russian
civilians and prisoners of war, German nationals, Italians,
Belgians, Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, British, and American
prisoners of war. No practical means was available to complete a
list of victims of this camp; however, since the foundation of
the camp in 1938 until the day of liberation, it is estimated
that more than 29,000 inmates died.”
Escaped prisoners of war were sent to concentration camps by the
conspirators, and these camps were specially set up as extermination
centers; and we refer to Document Number 1650-PS, bearing Exhibit Number
USA-246. This document is a communication from the Secret State Police
of Cologne and it is dated the 4th day of March 1944. At the very top of
the English text it says, “To be transmitted in secret—to be handled as
a secret Government matter.”
In the third paragraph, quoting:
“Concerns: Measures to be taken against captured escaped
prisoners of war who are officers or non-working noncommissioned
officers, except British and American prisoners of war. The
Supreme Command of the Army has ordered as follows:
“1. Every captured escaped prisoner of war who is an officer or
a non-working noncommissioned officer, except British and
American prisoners of war, is to be turned over to the Chief of
the Security Police and of the Security Service under the
classification Step III regardless of whether the escape
occurred during a transport, whether it was a mass escape, or an
individual one.
“2. Since the transfer of the prisoners of war to the Security
Police and Security Service may not become officially known to
the outside under any circumstances, other prisoners of war may
by no means be informed of the capture. The captured prisoners
are to be reported to the Army Information Bureau as ‘escaped
and not captured.’ Their mail is to be handled accordingly.
Inquiries of representatives of the protective power, of the
International Red Cross, and of other aid societies will be
given the same answer.”
The same communication carried a copy of an order of SS General Müller,
acting for the Chief of the Security Police and SD, directing the
Gestapo to transport escaped prisoners directly to Mauthausen; and I
quote the first two paragraphs of Müller’s order, which begins on the
bottom of Page 1 and runs over to Page 2 of the English text. Quoting:
“The State Police directorates will accept the captured escaped
officer prisoners of war from the prisoner-of-war camp
commandants and will transport them to the Concentration Camp
Mauthausen following the procedure previously used, unless the
circumstances render a special transport imperative. The
prisoners of war are to be put in irons on the transport—not on
the way to the station if it is subject to view by the public.
The camp commandant at Mauthausen is to be notified that the
transfer occurs within the scope of the action ‘Kugel.’ The
State Police directorates will submit semi-yearly reports on
these transfers giving merely the figures, the first report
being due on 5 July 1944.”
Passing the next three sentences, we come to this line:
“For the sake of secrecy the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
has been requested to inform the prisoner-of-war camps to turn
the captured prisoners over to the local State Police office
concerned and not to send them directly to Mauthausen.”
It is no coincidence that the literal translation for the German word
“Kugel” is the English word “bullet,” since Mauthausen, where the
escaped prisoners were sent, was an extermination center.
Nazi conquest was marked by the establishment of concentration camps
over all of Europe. In this connection we refer to Document Number
R-129. It is a report on the location of concentration camps signed by
Pohl, who was an SS general who was in charge of concentration camp
labor policies. Document Number R-129 bears our Exhibit Number USA-217.
I wish to refer particularly to Section 1, Paragraphs numbered 1 and 2
of this document, which are found on Page 1 of the English translation.
It is addressed to the Reichsführer SS and bears the stamp “secret”:
“Reichsführer:
“Today I report about the present situation of the concentration
camps and about measures I have taken in order to carry out your
order of 3 March 1942:
“1. At the outbreak of war there existed the following
concentration camps:
“a. Dachau—1939, 4,000 prisoners; today, 8,000.
“b. Sachsenhausen—1939, 6,500 prisoners; today, 10,000.
“c. Buchenwald—1939, 5,300 prisoners; today, 9,000.
“d. Mauthausen—1939, 1,500 prisoners; today, 5,500.
“e. Flossenbürg—1939, 1,600 prisoners; today, 4,700.
“f. Ravensbrück—1939, 2,500 prisoners; today, 7,500.”
And then it goes on to say in Paragraph Number 2, quoting:
“In the years 1940 and 1942 nine additional camps were erected:
“a. Auschwitz, b. Neuengamme, c. Gusen, d. Natzweiler, e.
Gross-Rosen, f. Lublin, g. Niederhagen, h. Stutthof, i.
Arbeitsdorf.”
In addition to the camps in the occupied territory mentioned in this
Document R-129, from which I have just read these names and figures,
there were many, many others. I refer to the official report by the
United States Third Army Headquarters, to which we have already made
reference, Document Number 2309-PS, on Page 2 in the English text,
Section IV, Paragraph 4, quoting:
“Concentration Camp Flossenbürg was founded in 1938 as a camp
for political prisoners. Construction was commenced on the camp
in 1938 and it was not until April 1940 that the first transport
of prisoners was received. From this time on prisoners began to
flow steadily into the camp. (Exhibit B-1.) Flossenbürg was the
mother camp and under its direct control and jurisdiction were
47 satellite camps or outer-commandos for male prisoners and 27
camps for female workers. To these outer-commandos were supplied
the necessary prisoners for the various work projects
undertaken.
“Of all these outer-commandos, Hersbruck and Leitmeritz (in
Czechoslovakia), Oberstaubling, Mulsen and Sall, located on the
Danube, were considered to be the worst.”
I do not wish to take the time of the Tribunal to discuss each of the
Nazi concentration camps which dotted the map of Europe. We feel that
the widespread use of these camps is commonly known and notorious. We
do, however, wish to invite the Tribunal’s attention to a chart which we
have had prepared. The solid black line marks the boundary of Germany
after the Anschluss, and we call the Tribunal’s attention to the fact
that the majority of the camps shown on the chart are located within the
territorial limits of Germany itself. They are the red spots, of course,
on the map. In the center of Germany there is the Buchenwald camp
located near the city of Weimar, and at the extreme bottom of the chart
there is Dachau, several miles outside of Munich. At the top of the
chart are Neuengamme and Bergen-Belsen, located near Hamburg. To the
left is the Niederhagen camp in the Ruhr Valley. In the upper right
there are a number of camps near Berlin, one named Sachsenhausen
(formerly Oranienburg, which was one of the first camps established
after the Nazis came into power). Near to that is the camp of
Ravensbrück which was used exclusively for women. Some of the most
notorious camps were located indeed outside of Germany. Mauthausen was
in Austria. In Poland was the infamous Auschwitz; and to the left of the
chart is a camp called Hertogenbosch and this one was located in
Holland, as the chart shows; and below it is Natzweiler, located in
France.
The camps were established in networks; and it may be observed that
surrounding each of the major camps—the larger red dots—is a group of
satellite camps; and the names of the principal camps, the most
notorious camps, at least, are above the map and below it on the chart;
and those names, for most people, symbolize the Nazi system of
concentration camps as they have become known to the world since May or
a little later in 1945.
I should like to direct your attention briefly to the treatment which
was meted out in these camps. The motion picture to which I have made
reference a short time ago and which was shown to the members of this
High Tribunal has disclosed the terrible and savage treatment which was
inflicted upon these Allied nationals, prisoners of war, and other
victims of Nazi terror. Because the moving picture has so well shown the
situation, as of the time of its taking at least, I shall confine myself
to a very brief discussion of the subject.
The conditions which existed inside these camps were, of course, we say,
directly related to the objectives which these Nazi conspirators sought
to achieve outside of the camps through their employment of terror.
It is truly remarkable, it seems to us, how easily the words
“concentration camps” rolled off the lips of these men. How simple all
problems became when they could turn to the terror institution of the
concentration camps. I refer to Document Number R-124, which is already
before the Tribunal as Exhibit USA-179. It is again that document
covering the minutes of the Central Planning Committee on which the
Defendant Speer sat and where the high strategy of the high Nazi
armament production was formulated. I do not intend to read from the
document again, because I read from it this morning to illustrate
another point; but the Tribunal will recall that it was at this meeting
that the Defendant Speer and others were discussing the so-called
slackers, and the conversation had to do with having drastic steps taken
against these workers who were not putting out sufficient work to please
their masters. Speer suggested that, “There is nothing to be said
against the SS and Police taking steps and putting those known as
slackers into concentration camp industries,” and he used the words
“concentration camp industries.” And he said, “Let it happen several
times and the news will soon get around.”
Words spoken in this fashion, we say, sealed the fate of many victims.
As for getting the news around as suggested by the Defendant Speer, this
was not left to chance, as we shall presently show.
The deterrent effect of the concentration camps upon the public was a
carefully planned thing. To heighten the atmosphere of terror, these
camps were shrouded in secrecy. What went on in the barbed wire
enclosures was a matter of fearful conjecture in Germany and countries
under Nazi control; and this was the policy from the very beginning,
when the Nazis first came into power and set up this system of
concentration camps. We refer now to Document Number 778-PS, which bears
Exhibit Number USA-247. This document is an order issued on the 1st of
October 1933 by the camp commander of Dachau. The document prescribed a
program of floggings, solitary confinement, and executions for the
inmates for infractions of the rules.
Among the rules were those prescribing a rigid censorship concerning
conditions within the camp; and I refer to the first page of the English
text, paragraph numbered Article 11, and quoting:
“By virtue of the law on revolutionaries, the following
offenders considered as agitators, will be hanged:
“Anyone who, for the purpose of agitating, does the following in
the camp, at work, in the quarters, in the kitchens and
workshops, toilets and places of rest: holds political or
inciting speeches and meetings, forms cliques, loiters around
with others; who, for the purpose of supplying the propaganda of
the opposition with atrocity stories, collects true or false
information about the concentration camp and its institution,
receives such information, buries it, talks about it to others,
smuggles it out of the camp into the hands of foreign visitors
or others by means of clandestine or other methods, passes it on
in writing or orally to released prisoners or prisoners who are
placed above them, conceals it in clothing or other articles,
throws stones and other objects over the camp wall containing
such information, or produces secret documents; who, for the
purpose of agitating, climbs on barracks roofs and trees, seeks
contact with the outside by giving light or other signals, or
induces others to escape or commit a crime, gives them advice to
that effect or supports such undertakings in any way
whatsoever.”
The censorship about the camps themselves was complemented by an
officially inspired rumor campaign outside the camps. Concentration
camps were spoken of in whispers, and the whispers were spread by agents
of the Secret Police. When the Defendant Speer said that if the threat
of the concentration camp were used, the news would get around soon
enough, he knew whereof he spoke.
We refer to Document 1531-PS. With reference to this document, I wish to
submit a word of explanation. The original German text, the original
German document, the captured document, was here in the document room
and was translated into English as our translation shows. Yesterday we
were advised that it has either been lost or misplaced, the original
German text; and unfortunately no photostatic copy was available here in
Nuremberg. A certified copy is, however, being sent to the office here
from Frankfurt, and it is on its way today; and I ask the Tribunal’s
permission to offer the English translation of the German original,
which is certified to be accurate by the translator, into evidence,
subject to a motion to strike it if the certified copy of the original
German document does not arrive.
I now refer to the Document Number 1531-PS. It bears our Exhibit Number
USA-248. This document is marked “top secret” and it is addressed to all
State Police district offices and to the Gestapo office and for the
information of the Inspectors of the Security Police and the SD. It is
an order relating to concentration camps, issued by the head of the
Gestapo; and I read from the English text, beginning with the second
paragraph, and quoting directly:
“In order to achieve a further deterrent effect, the following
must, in the future, be observed in each individual case:
“3. The length of the period of custody must in no case be made
known, even if the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German
Police or the Chief of the Security Police and the SD has
already fixed it.
“The term of commitment to a concentration camp is to be openly
announced as ‘until further notice.’
“In most serious cases there is no objection to increasing the
deterrent effect by the spreading of cleverly carried out rumor
propaganda, more or less to the effect that, according to
hearsay, in view of the seriousness of his case, the arrested
man will not be released for 2 or 3 years.
“4. In certain cases the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German
Police will order flogging in addition to detention in a
concentration camp. Orders of this kind will, in the future,
also be transmitted to the State Police district office
concerned. In this case, too, there is no objection to spreading
the rumor of this increased punishment as laid down in Section
3, Paragraph 3, insofar as this appears suitable to add to the
deterrent effect.
“5. Naturally, particularly suitable and reliable people are to
be chosen for the spreading of such news.”
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal think that they will take judicial
notice of that United States Document, Number 2309-PS; and for the
convenience of the Defense Counsel, the Tribunal having sat until 1 will
not sit again until 2:15.
MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor.
[_A recess was taken until 1415 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, the deterrent effect of the
concentration camps was based on the promise of brutal treatment. Once
in the custody of the SS guards, the victim was beaten, tortured,
starved, and often murdered through the so-called “extermination through
work” program which I described the other day or through the mass
execution gas chambers and furnaces of the camps, which were shown
several days ago on the moving picture screen in this courtroom.
The reports of official government investigations furnish additional
evidence of the conditions within the concentration camps.
Document 2309-PS, which has already been referred to and of which the
Tribunal has taken judicial notice, I now refer to again, particularly
to the second page of the English text, beginning with the second
sentence of the second paragraph:
“The work at these camps mainly consisted of underground labor,
the purpose being the construction of large underground
factories, storage rooms, _et cetera_. This labor was performed
completely underground and as a result of the brutal treatment,
working and living conditions, a daily average of 100 prisoners
died. To the one camp Oberstaubling 700 prisoners were
transported in February 1945, and on the 15th of April 1945 only
405 of these men were living. During the 12 months preceding the
liberation, Flossenbürg and the branch camps under its control
accounted for the death of 14,739 male inmates and 1,300 women.
These figures represent the deaths as obtained from the
available records in the camp. However, they are in no way
complete, as many secret mass executions and deaths took place.
In 1941 an additional stockade was added at the Flossenbürg camp
to hold 2,000 Russian prisoners. From these 2,000 prisoners only
102 survived.
“Flossenbürg Concentration Camp can best be described as a
factory dealing in death. Although this camp had in view the
primary object of putting to work the mass slave labor, another
of its primary objectives was the elimination of human lives by
the methods employed in handling the prisoners.
“Hunger and starvation rations, sadism, housing facilities,
inadequate clothing, medical neglect, disease, beatings,
hangings, freezing, forced hand hanging, forced suicides,
shooting, all played a major role in obtaining their objective.
Prisoners were murdered at random; spite killings against Jews
were common. Injections of poison and shooting in the neck were
everyday occurrences. Epidemics of typhus and spotted fever were
permitted to run rampant as a means of eliminating prisoners.
Life in this camp meant nothing. Killing became a common thing,
so common that a quick death was welcomed by the unfortunate
ones.”
Passing to the next to the last sentence of this same paragraph, quoting
directly . . .
THE PRESIDENT: What are those exhibits that are referred to?
MR. DODD: They are in evidence with the affidavit. They are attached to
it.
THE PRESIDENT: They are not, I suppose, mimeographed in our copy?
MR. DODD: No, we have not had an opportunity to mimeograph each one of
them.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they documents or photographs or what?
MR. DODD: They are principally documents. There are some few plans and
photographs, and so on.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they affidavits or what? There seem to be instances
of . . .
MR. DODD: Well, some of them are in the form of affidavits taken at the
time of the liberation of the camp from persons who were there, and
others are pictures of writings that were found there and of the plans
and so on—such sort of thing.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well the Tribunal will take judicial notice of those
exhibits as well.
MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor.
Reading from the last sentence of this same paragraph on the same page
and quoting:
“On Christmas, 1944, a number of prisoners were hanged at one
time. The prisoners were forced to view this hanging. By the
side of the gallows was a decorated Christmas tree; and as
expressed by one prisoner, ‘It was a terrible sight, that
combination of prisoners hanging in the air and the glistening
Christmas tree.’”
“In March or April, 13 American or British parachutists were
hanged. They had been delivered to this camp some time before
and had been captured while trying to blow up bridges.”
We will not burden the Tribunal with a recital of all of these reports.
We wish, however, to make reference to the Concentration Camp
Mauthausen, one of the most notorious extermination centers; and I refer
particularly to Document Number 2176-PS, which I have already placed in
evidence as Exhibit Number USA-249. This is also an official report of
the office of the Judge Advocate General of the United States 3rd Army,
dated 17 June 1945. I wish to refer to the conclusions on Page 3 of the
English text, at paragraph numbered Roman V, beginning with the second
sentence as follows:
“V. Conclusions. There is no doubt that Mauthausen was the basis
for long-term planning. It was constructed as a gigantic stone
fortress on top of a mountain flanked by small barracks.
Mauthausen, in addition to its permanency of construction, had
facilities for a large garrison of officers and men and had
large dining rooms and toilet facilities for the staff. It was
conducted with the sole purpose in mind of exterminating any
so-called prisoner who entered within its walls. The so-called
branches of Mauthausen were under direct command of the SS
officials located there. All records, orders, and administrative
facilities were handled for these branches through Mauthausen.
The other camps, including Gusen and Ebensee, its two most
notorious and largest branches, were not exclusively used for
extermination; but prisoners were used as tools in construction
and production until they were beaten or starved into
uselessness, whereupon they were customarily sent to Mauthausen
for final disposal.”
Both from the showing of the moving picture and from these careful
reports, which were made by the 3rd Army of the United States on their
arrival at those centers, we say it is clear that the conditions in
those concentration camps over Germany—and in a few instances outside
of the actual borders of the Old Reich—followed the same general
pattern. The wide-spread incidence of these conditions makes it clear
that they were not the result of sporadic excesses on the part of
individual jailers, but were the result of policies deliberately imposed
from above. The crimes committed in these camps were on so vast a scale
that individual atrocities pale into insignificance.
We have had turned over to us two exhibits which we are prepared to show
to this Tribunal only because they illustrate the depths to which the
administration of these camps had sunk shortly before, at least, the
time that they were liberated by the Allied Army. The Tribunal will
recall that in the showing of the moving picture, with respect to one of
the camps, there was a showing of sections of human skin taken from
human bodies in the Buchenwald Concentration Camp and preserved as
ornaments. They were selected, these particular hapless victims, because
of the tattooing which appeared on the skin. This exhibit, which we have
here, is Exhibit Number USA-252. Attached to the exhibit is an extract
of an official United States Army report describing the circumstances
under which this exhibit was obtained; and that extract is set forth in
Document 3420-PS, which I refer to in part. It is entitled:
“Mobile Field Interrogation Unit Number 2; PW Intelligence
Bulletin; 13. Concentration Camp, Buchenwald.
“Preamble. The author of this account is PW Andreas
Pfaffenberger, 1 Coy, 9 Landesschützen Bn., 43 years old and of
limited education. He is a butcher by trade. The substantial
agreement of the details of his story with those found in PWIB
(H) /LF/36 establishes the validity of his testimony. PW has not
been questioned on statements which, in the light of what is
known, are apparently erroneous in certain details, nor has any
effort been made to alter the subjective character of the PW’s
account, which he wrote without being told anything of the
intelligence already known. The results of interrogation on
personalities at Buchenwald have already been published (PWIB
Number 2/12, item 31.).
“‘In 1939 all prisoners with tattooing on them were ordered to
report to the dispensary.’”
THE PRESIDENT: Is this what Pfaffenberger said?
MR. DODD: Yes, Sir.
“‘No one knew what the purpose was; but after the tattooed
prisoners had been examined, the ones with the best and most
artistic specimens were kept in the dispensary and then killed
by injections administered by Karl Beigs, a criminal prisoner.
The corpses were then turned over to the pathological department
where the desired pieces of tattooed skin were detached from the
bodies and treated. The finished products were turned over to SS
Standartenführer Koch’s wife, who had them fashioned into lamp
shades and other ornamental household articles. I myself saw
such tattooed skins with various designs and legends on them,
such as “Hänsel and Gretel,” which one prisoner had on his knee,
and designs of ships from prisoners’ chests. This work was done
by a prisoner named Wernerbach.”
I also refer to Document 3421-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-253.
“I, George C. Demas, Lieutenant, USNR, associated with the
United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis
Criminality, hereby certify that the attached exhibit,
consisting of parchment, was delivered by the War Crimes
Section, Judge Advocate General, United States Army, to me in my
above capacity, in the usual course of business, as an exhibit
found in Buchenwald Camp and captured by military forces under
the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary
Forces.”
And the last paragraph of Document 3423-PS (Exhibit USA-252) is a
conclusion reached in a United States Army report, and I quote it:
“Based on the findings in Paragraph 2, all three specimens are
tattooed human skin.”
This document is also attached to this exhibit on the board. We do not
wish to dwell on this pathological phase of the Nazi culture; but we do
feel compelled to offer one additional exhibit, which we offer as
Exhibit Number USA-254. This exhibit, which is on the table, is a human
head with the skull bone removed, shrunken, stuffed, and preserved. The
Nazis had one of their many victims decapitated, after having had him
hanged, apparently for fraternizing with a German woman, and fashioned
this terrible ornament from his head.
The last paragraph of the official United States Army report from which
I have just read deals with the manner in which this exhibit was
acquired. It reads as follows:
“There I also saw the shrunken heads of two young Poles who had
been hanged for having relations with German girls. The heads
were the size of a fist, and the hair and the marks of the rope
were still there.”
Another certificate by Lieutenant Demas is set forth in Document 3422-PS
(Exhibit USA-254) and is similar to the one which I have read a few
minutes ago with relation to the human skin, excepting that it applies
to this second exhibit. We have no accurate estimate of how many persons
died in these concentration camps and perhaps none will ever be made;
but as the evidence already introduced before this Tribunal indicates,
the Nazi conspirators were generally meticulous record keepers. But the
records which they kept about concentration camps appear to have been
quite incomplete. Perhaps the character of the records resulted from the
indifference which the Nazis felt for the lives of their victims. But
occasionally we find a death book or a set of index cards. For the most
part, nevertheless, the victims apparently faded into an unrecorded
death. Reference to a set of death books suggests at once the scale of
the concentration camp operations, and we refer now and offer Document
Number 493-PS as Exhibit Number USA-251. This exhibit is a set of seven
books, the death ledger of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp. Each book
has on its cover the word “Totenbuch” (or Death Book)—Mauthausen.
In these books were recorded the names of some of the inmates who died
or were murdered in this camp, and the books cover the period from
January of 1939 to April of 1945. They give the name, the place of
birth, the assigned cause of death, and time of death of each individual
recorded. In addition each corpse is assigned a serial number, and
adding up the total serial numbers for the 5-year period one arrives at
the figure of 35,318.
An examination of the books is very revealing insofar as the camp’s
routine of death is concerned; and I invite the attention of the
Tribunal to Volume 5 from Pages 568 to 582, a photostatic copy of which
has been passed to the Tribunal. These pages cover death entries made
for the 19th day of March 1945 between 15 minutes past 1 in the morning
until 2 o’clock in the afternoon. In this space of 12 and three-quarter
hours, on these records, 203 persons are reported as having died. They
were assigned serial numbers running from 8390 to 8593. The names of the
dead are listed. And interestingly enough the victims are all recorded
as having died of the same ailment—heart trouble. They died at brief
intervals. They died in alphabetical order. The first who died was a man
named Ackermann, who died at 1:15 a.m., and the last was a man named
Zynger, who died at 2 o’clock in the afternoon.
At 20 minutes past 2 o’clock of that same afternoon, according to these
records, on the 19th of March 1945, the fatal roll call began again and
continued until 4:30 p.m. In a space of 2 hours 75 more persons died,
and once again they died all from heart failure and in alphabetical
order. We find the entries recorded in the same volume, from Pages 582
through 586.
There was another death book found at Camp Mauthausen. It is our
Document Number 495-PS and bears Exhibit Number USA-250. This is a
single volume, and again has on its cover the words “Death
Book—Prisoners of War.” And I invite the attention of the Tribunal in
particular to Pages 234 through 246. Here the entries record the names
of 208 prisoners of war, apparently Russians, who at 15 minutes past
midnight on the 10th day of May 1942 were executed at the same time. The
book notes that the execution was directed by the chief of the SD and
the Sipo, at that time Heydrich.
It was called to my attention as late as this morning—a publication of
a New York newspaper published in the United States, part of which is
made up of three or more pages consisting of advertisements from the
families, the relatives of people who once resided in Germany or in
Europe, asking for some advice about them. Most of the advertisements
refer to one of these concentration camps or another. The paper is
called _Der Aufbau_. It is a German-language newspaper in New York City,
published on the 23rd day—this particular issue—on the 23rd day of
November 1945. I do not propose to burden the record of this Tribunal
with the list of the names of all of these unfortunate individuals; but
we refer to it as a publication in the City of New York, a
German-language newspaper of recent date which illustrates the horrible
extent of this terrible tragedy which has affected so many people as a
result of this concentration-camp institution. We feel that no argument,
no particular argument, is necessary to support our statement that the
Nazi conspirators used these concentration camps and the related
instruments of terror in them to commit Crimes against Humanity and to
commit War Crimes.
More about concentration camps will of necessity be involved in the
presentation concerning the persecution of the Jews, but this concludes
our presentation with respect to the concentration camps as a specific
entity of proof.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, speaking for myself, I should like to know what
these headings mean.
MR. DODD: Yes, I have them here.
THE PRESIDENT: Document 495-PS?
MR. DODD: Yes, Document 495-PS. Column 1 is the serial number assigned
to the prisoners in the order of their deaths.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Column 2, prisoners-of-war serial number. Column 3 is the last
name, Column 4 is the first name.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Column 5 is the date of birth. Column 6, the place of birth.
Column 7, cause of death. In these cases their cause of death is stated
as follows: “Execution pursuant to order of the Chief of the Sipo and SD
dated 30th April 1942,” and the ditto marks beneath indicate that the
same cause of death was assigned to the names which come beneath it. In
the eighth column is the date of death and the hour of death. The first
one being 9.5.42 at 2335 hours. In the ninth column there is a space
which says it is reserved for comments.
THE PRESIDENT: There are numbers there too—M1681 is the first one.
MR. DODD: Well, the German word, I am told, means that it confirms the
death with that number. Apparently the number of the . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I think you said the number of the corpse.
MR. DODD: The number of the corpse, I think that is what it is as
distinguished from the number of the prisoner. Each corpse was given a
number as well after the individual died.
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the next phase of War Crimes and
Crimes against Humanity, the Persecution of the Jews, will be presented
by Major Walsh.
THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh.
MAJOR WILLIAM F. WALSH (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States):
If the Tribunal please, on behalf of the United States Counsel, I now
present to this august Tribunal the evidence to establish certain phases
of the Indictment alleged in Count One under War Crimes and Crimes
against Humanity, and by agreement between the prosecutors the
allegations in Count Four, Paragraph X(B), Crimes against Humanity. The
topical title of this presentation is “The Persecution of the Jews.”
At this time I offer in evidence a Document Book of translations,
lettered “T.” These documents contained in the books are arranged
according to the D-, L-, PS-, and R-series; and under the series the
translations are listed numerically. This title, “The Persecution of the
Jews,” is singularly inappropriate when weighed in the light of the
evidence to follow. Academically, I am told, to persecute is to afflict,
harass, and annoy. The term used does not convey, and indeed I cannot
conjure a term that does convey the ultimate aim, the avowed purpose to
obliterate the Jewish race.
This presentation is not intended to be a complete recital of all the
crimes committed against the Jews. The extent and the scope of the
crimes was so great that it permeated the entire German nation, its
people and its organizations.
I am informed that others to follow me will offer additional evidence
under other phases of the Prosecution’s case. Evidence relating to the
Party organizations and state organizations, whose criminality the
Prosecution will seek to establish, will disclose and emphasize the part
that these organizations played in the pattern and plan for
annihilation.
The French and the Soviet Prosecutors, too, have a volume of evidence
all related to this subject, which will be submitted in the course of
the Trial.
Before I begin a recital of the overt acts leading to the elimination of
the Jews, I am prepared to show that these acts and policies within
Germany from the year 1933 to the end of the war related to the
planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of aggressive wars, thus
falling within the definition of Crimes against Humanity as defined in
Article 6(c) of the Charter.
It had long been a German theory that the first World War ended in
Germany’s defeat because of a collapse in the zone of the interior. In
planning for future wars it was determined that the home front must be
secure to prevent a repetition of this 1918 debacle. Unification of the
German people was essential to successful planning and waging of war,
and the Nazi political premise must be established—“One race, one
state, one Führer.”
Free trade unions must be abolished, political parties (other than the
National Socialist Party) must be outlawed, civil liberties must be
suspended, and opposition of every kind must be swept away. Loyalty to
God, church, and scientific truth was declared to be incompatible with
the Nazi regime. The anti-Jewish policy was part of this plan for
unification because it was the conviction of the Nazis that the Jews
would not contribute to Germany’s military program, but on the contrary
would hamper it. The Jew must therefore be eliminated.
This view is clearly borne out by a statement contained in Document
1919-PS, Exhibit USA-170. This document is a transcript of a Himmler
speech at a meeting of the SS major generals on 4 October 1943, and from
Page 4, Paragraph 3, of the translation before the Court, I read a very
short passage:
“We know how difficult we should have made it for ourselves if
with the bombing raids, the burdens and deprivations of war, we
still had Jews today in every town as secret saboteurs,
agitators, and trouble mongers; we would now probably have
reached the 1916-17 stage when the Jews were still in the German
national body.”
The treatment of the Jews within Germany was therefore as much of a plan
for aggressive war as was the building of armaments and the conscription
of manpower. It falls within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal as an
integral part of the planning and preparation to wage a war of
aggression.
It is obvious that the persecution and murder of Jews throughout the
conquered territories of Europe following 1939 are War Crimes as defined
by Article 6(b) of the Charter. It further violates Article 46 of the
Regulations of the Hague Convention of 1907, to which Germany was a
signatory. I quote Article 46 and ask the Court to take judicial notice
thereof:
“Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private
property, as well as religious convictions and practices, must
be respected.”
I know of no crime in the history of mankind more horrible in its
details than the treatment of the Jews. It is intended to establish that
the Nazi Party precepts, later incorporated within the policies of the
German State, often expressed by the defendants at bar, were to
annihilate the Jewish people. I shall seek to avoid the temptation to
editorialize or to draw inferences from the documents, however great the
provocation; rather I shall let the documentary evidence speak for
itself—its stark realism will be unvarnished. Blood lust may have
played some part in these savage crimes, but the underlying purpose and
objective to annihilate the Jewish race was one of the fundamental
principles of the Nazi plan to prepare for and to wage aggressive war. I
shall from this point limit my proof to the overt acts committed; but I
dare to request the Court’s indulgence, if it is necessary in weaving
the pattern of evidence, to make reference to certain documents and
evidence previously submitted.
Now this ultimate objective, that is, the elimination and extermination
of the Jews, could not be accomplished without preliminary steps and
measures. The German State must first be seized by the Nazi Party, the
force of world opinion must be faced, and even the regimented German
people must be indoctrinated with hatred against the Jews.
The first clear-cut evidence of the Party policies concerning the Jews
was expressed in the Party program in February 1920. I offer in evidence
Document 1708-PS, “Program of the National Socialist Party,” Exhibit
USA-255. With the Court’s permission, I would like to quote the relevant
part of that program, Paragraph (4):
“Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the
race can only be one who is of German blood without
consideration of confession. . . .”
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): May I interrupt a minute. It is a little hard
to know where these exhibits are or what volume you are now quoting
from.
MAJOR WALSH: This, Sir, is 1708-PS.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Volume 2?
MAJOR WALSH: Volume 2.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And what page of that exhibit?
MAJOR WALSH: That is Paragraph (4) and Paragraph (6), Sir, on the first
page.
Paragraph (4):
“Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the
race can only be one who is of German blood, without
consideration of confession. Consequently, no Jew can be a
member of the race.”
And again, in Paragraph (6):
“The right to determine matters concerning administration and
law belongs only to the citizen; therefore, we demand that every
public office of any sort whatsoever, whether in the Reich, the
county, or municipality, be filled only by citizens.”
I now offer Document 2662-PS, _Mein Kampf_, Exhibit Number USA-256. On
Pages 724-725, Hitler, in this book, speaking of the Jew, said that if
the National Socialist movement was to fulfill its task—and I quote:
“It must open the eyes of the people with regard to foreign
nations and must remind them again and again of the true enemy
of our present-day world. In the place of hate against
Aryans—from whom we may be separated by almost everything but
to whom, however, we are tied by common blood or the great tie
of a common culture—it must dedicate to the general anger the
evil enemy of mankind as the true cause of all suffering.
“It must see to it, however, that at least in our country he be
recognized as the most mortal enemy and that the struggle
against him may show, like a flaming beacon of a better era, to
other nations, too, the road to salvation for a struggling Aryan
mankind.”
A flood of abusive literature of all types and for all age groups was
published and circulated throughout Germany. Illustrative of this type
of publication is the book entitled _Der Giftpilz_. I offer in evidence
Document 1778-PS, Exhibit Number USA-257. This book brands the Jew as a
persecutor of the labor class, as a race defiler, devil in human form, a
poisonous mushroom, and a murderer. This particular book instructed
school children to recognize the Jew by caricature of his physical
features, shown on Pages 6 and 7; taught them that the Jew abuses little
boys and girls, on Page 30; and that the Jewish Bible permits all
crimes, Pages 13-17. The Defendant Streicher’s periodical _Der Stürmer_,
Number 14, April 1937, in particular, went to such extremes as to
publish the statement that Jews at the ritual celebration of their
Passover slaughtered Christians.
I offer Document 2699-PS, Exhibit Number USA-258. On Page 2, Column 1,
Paragraphs 6 to 9, I quote:
“Also the numerous confessions made by the Jews show that the
execution of ritual murders is a law of the Talmud Jew. The
former chief Rabbi (and later monk) Teofiti declares that the
ritual murders take place especially on the Jewish Purim (in
memory of the Persian murders) and Passover (in memory of the
murder of Christ). The rules are as follows:
“The blood of the victims is to be tapped by force. On Passover
it is to be used in wine and matzos. Thus a small part of the
blood is to be poured into the dough of the matzos and into the
wine. The mixing is done by the head of the Jewish family.
“The procedure is as follows: The family head empties a few
drops of the fresh and powdered blood into a glass, wets the
fingers of the left hand with it and sprays (blesses) with it
everything on the table. The head of the family then says, ‘Thus
we ask God to send the 10 plagues to all enemies of the Jewish
faith.’ Then they eat, and at the end the head of the family
exclaims, ‘May all Gentiles perish, as the child whose blood is
contained in the bread and wine.’
“The fresh (or dried and powdered) blood of the slaughtered is
further used by young married Jewish couples, by pregnant
Jewesses, for circumcision and so on. Ritual murder is
recognized by all Talmud Jews. The Jew believes he absolves
himself thus of his sins.”
It is difficult for our minds to grasp that falsehoods such as these
could fall on fertile soil, that a literate nation could read, digest,
or believe these doctrines. We must realize, however, that with a
rigidly controlled press which precluded an exposé of such lying
propaganda, some of the ignorant and gullible would be led to believe.
I now offer in evidence Document 2697-PS, a copy of _Der Stürmer_,
Exhibit Number USA-259. This publication, _Der Stürmer_, was published
by the Defendant Streicher’s publishing firm. In this publication,
Streicher, speaking of the Jewish faith, said, “The Holy Scripture is a
horrible criminal romance abounding with murder, incest, fraud, and
indecency.”
And again he said, “The Talmud is the great Jewish book of criminal
instructions that the Jew practices in his daily life.” This is
contained in Document 2698-PS, _Der Stürmer_, which I now offer in
evidence, Exhibit Number USA-260.
This propaganda campaign of hate was too widespread and notorious to
require further elaboration. Within the documents offered in evidence in
this and in other phases of the case will be found similar and even more
scurrilous statements, many by the defendants themselves and others by
their accomplices.
When the Nazi Party gained control of the German State, a new and
terrible weapon against the Jews was placed within their grasp, the
power to apply the force of the state against them. This was done by the
issuance of decrees.
Jewish immigrants were denaturalized: 1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I,
Page 480, signed by Defendants Frick and Neurath.
Native Jews were precluded from citizenship: 1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, Page 1146, signed by Defendant Frick.
Jews were forbidden to live in marriage or to have extramarital
relations with persons of German blood: 1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part
I, Page 1146, signed by Frick and Hess.
Jews were denied the right to vote: 1936 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I,
Page 133, signed by Defendant Frick.
Jews were denied the right to hold public office or civil service
positions: _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1933, Part I, Page 277, signed by
Defendant Frick.
It was determined to relegate the Jews to an inferior status by denying
them common privileges and freedoms. Thus, they were denied access to
certain city areas, sidewalks, transportation, places, of amusement,
restaurants: 1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 1676.
Progressively more and still more stringent measures were applied, even
to the denial of private pursuits. They were excluded from the practice
of dentistry: 1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 47, signed by
Defendant Hess.
The practice of law was denied: 1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page
1403, signed by Defendants Frick and Hess.
The practice of medicine was denied: 1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I,
Page 969, signed by Defendants Frick and Hess.
They were denied employment by press and radio: 1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 661.
From stock exchanges and stock brokerage: 1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part
I, Page 169.
And even from farming: 1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 685.
In 1938 they were excluded from business in general and from the
economic life of Germany: 1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 1580,
signed by the Defendant Göring.
The Jews were forced to pay discriminatory taxes and huge atonement
fines. Their homes, bank accounts, real estate, and intangibles were
expropriated.
To digress for a moment from a recital of decrees and to refer
specifically to the atonement fines, I wish to offer Document 1816-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-261. This exhibit is a stenographic report of a
conference under the chairmanship of the Defendant Göring, attended by
the Defendant Funk among others, held at 11 o’clock on 12 November 1938
at the Reich Ministry for Air. From Pages 8 and 9 of Section 7, I quote
the Defendant Göring:
“One more question, gentlemen, what would you think the
situation would be if I announced today that Jewry shall have to
contribute this 1,000,000,000 as a punishment.”
And then the last paragraph on Page 22 of the translation before the
Court—I quote:
“I shall choose the wording this way—that German Jewry shall,
as punishment for their abominable crimes, _et cetera, et
cetera_, have to make a contribution of 1,000,000,000. That will
work. The pigs won’t commit another murder in a hurry. I should
like to say again that I would not like to be a Jew in Germany.”
It was whimsical remarks such as these that originated decrees, for
following this meeting a decree was issued placing upon the German Jews
the burden of 1,000,000,000 Reichsmark fine: 1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, Page 1579, date 12 November 1938, signed by the Defendant
Göring.
Similar decrees are contained in 1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page
282, signed by Defendant Göring, and 1941 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I,
Page 722, signed by Defendants Frick and Bormann.
Finally, in the year 1943, the Jews were placed beyond the protection of
any judicial process by a decree signed by the Defendants Bormann and
Frick and others; and the police became the sole arbiters of punishment
and death: 1943 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 372, signed by Frick
and Bormann.
I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the _Reichsgesetzblatt_
decrees cited.
Side by side with the passage of these decrees and their execution went
still another weapon, wielded by the Party and the Party-controlled
state. These were the openly sponsored and official anti-Jewish boycotts
against Jews. I now offer Document 2409-PS, the published diary of
Joseph Goebbels, Exhibit Number USA-262, and I invite the Court’s
attention to Page 290 where, under date of 29 March 1933—the Court will
find the quotation on the top of Page 1 of the translation of
2409-PS—“The boycott appeal is approved by the entire Cabinet.” And
again on the 31st of March 1933 he wrote, on Page 1, first sentence of
Paragraph 2, “We are having a last discussion among a very small circle
and decide that the boycott is to start tomorrow with all severity.”
The Defendant Streicher and the Defendant Frank, together with Himmler,
Ley, and others, were members of a central committee who conducted the
1933 boycott against the Jews. Their names are listed in Document
2156-PS, _National Socialist Party Correspondence_, 29 March 1933,
Exhibit Number USA-263.
As early as 1933 violence against the Jews was undertaken. Raids were
conducted, by uniformed Nazis, on services within synagogues. Attending
members of the synagogues were assaulted and religious insignia and
emblems were desecrated. A report of such an occurrence is contained in
the official dispatch from the American Consul General in Leipzig, dated
5 April 1933.
I offer in evidence Document 2709-PS . . .
THE PRESIDENT: What do you refer to 2156 for?
MAJOR. WALSH: Only, Sir, to show the names of the Defendants Streicher
and Frank as members of the boycott committee.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
MAJOR WALSH: Document 2709 has been given Exhibit Number USA-265. From
Paragraph 1 of Page 1, I quote:
“In Dresden, several weeks ago, uniformed Nazis raided the
Jewish prayer house, interrupted the evening religious service,
arrested 25 worshippers, and tore the holy insignia or emblems
from their headcovering worn while praying.”
At a meeting here in Nuremberg, before the representatives of the German
press, the Defendant Streicher and Mayor Liebel of Nuremberg revealed in
advance to the gathered members of the press that the Nuremberg
synagogue was to be destroyed.
I offer in evidence Document 1724-PS, Exhibit Number USA-266, which is
minutes of this meeting, dated 4 August 1938. From Page 1, Paragraph 4
of the original, I quote the translation before the Court:
“The breaking up of the synagogue (information must still be
secret). On August 10, 1938, at 10 o’clock a.m., the breakup of
the synagogue will commence. Gauleiter Julius Streicher will
personally set the crane into motion with which the Jewish
symbols, Star of David, _et cetera_, will be torn down. This
should be arranged in a big way. Closer details are still
unknown.”
The Defendant Streicher himself supervised the demolition.
In support of this, I offer Document 2711-PS, a newspaper account of 11
August 1938, Exhibit Number USA-267, Paragraph 1 of the translation
before the Court:
“In Nuremberg the synagogue is being demolished; Julius
Streicher himself inaugurates the work by a speech lasting more
than an hour and a half. By his order then—so to speak as a
prelude of the demolition—the tremendous Star of David came off
the cupola.”
These accounts of violence were not localized anti-Semitic
demonstrations but were directed and ordered from a centralized
headquarters in Berlin. This is established by a series of teletype
messages sent by the Berlin Secret State Police headquarters to chiefs
of police throughout Germany on 10 November 1938, which contained
instructions pertaining to the pre-arranged demonstration.
I now refer to Document 3051-PS, previously offered in evidence as
Exhibit Number USA-240. I shall quote the relevant part of one of these
confidential orders signed by Heydrich, the translation before the
Court, the last half on Page 2:
“Because of the attempt on the life of the Secretary of the
Legation, Von Rath, in Paris tonight, 9-10 November 1938,
demonstrations against Jews are to be expected throughout the
Reich. The following instructions are given on how to treat
these events:
“1) The Chiefs of the State Police or their deputies must get in
telephonic contact with the political leaders who have
jurisdiction over their districts and must arrange a joint
meeting with the appropriate inspector or commander of the Order
Police to discuss the organization of the demonstrations. At
these discussions the political leaders have to be informed that
the German Police has received from the Reichsführer SS and
Chief of the German Police the following instructions, in
accordance with which the political leaders should adjust their
own measures.
“a) Only such measures should be taken which do not involve
danger to German life or property. (For instance synagogues are
to be burned down only when there is no danger of fire to the
surroundings.)
“b) Business and private apartments of Jews may be destroyed but
not looted. The police is instructed to supervise the execution
of this order and to arrest looters.”
To this point we have found a gradual and a mounting emphasis in the
campaign against the Jews, one of the basic tenets of the Nazi Party and
of the state. The flame of prejudice has now been lighted and fanned.
The German people have been to a large degree indoctrinated, and the
seeds of hatred have been sown. The German State is now armed and is
prepared for conquest and the force of world opinion can now safely be
ignored. Already they have forced out of Germany 200,000 of its original
500,000 Jews. The Nazi-controlled German State is therefore emboldened;
and Hitler, in anticipation of the aggressive wars already planned,
casts about for a “whipping boy” upon whose shoulders can be placed the
blame for the world catastrophe yet to come. The speech before the
Reichstag on 30 January 1939 is set forth in Document Number 2663-PS,
which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-268. I quote:
“If the international Jewish financiers within and without
Europe succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world
war, the result will not be the Bolshevization of the world and
the victory of Jewry, but the obliteration of the Jewish race in
Europe.”
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh, it would, I think, assist the Tribunal if
you were careful to state the PS number which we have rather more
clearly and slowly. You see, the United States Exhibit number we do not
have and I do not know whether it would be better to state the United
States Exhibit number first and then give us the PS number; I am not
sure it would. Anyhow, if you would go a little more slowly and make
certain we get the PS number, it would be helpful.
MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Your Honor.
The Chief Editor of the official organ of the SS, the _Schwarze Korps_,
expressed similar sentiments on August 8, 1940.
I offer in evidence Document 2668-PS; this is Exhibit Number USA-269,
Page 2 of the original and the full excerpt before the Court in
translation, as follows:
“Just as the Jewish question will be solved for Germany only
when the last Jew has been deported, so the rest of Europe
should also realize that the German peace which awaits it must
be a peace without Jews.”
These were not the only officials of the Party and of the State to voice
the same views. The Defendant Rosenberg wrote for the publication _World
Struggle_. I offer in evidence Document 2665-PS, Exhibit Number USA-270.
This publication, Volumes 1 and 2, April and September 1941, Page 71 of
the original, reads, “The Jewish question will be solved only when the
last Jew has left the European continent.”
The Court will recall Mr. Justice Jackson’s reference to the apologetic
note contained in the diary of Hans Frank when he wrote, and I quote
from Document 2233(c)-PS, Exhibit Number USA-271, bottom of Page 1 of
the translation:
“Of course, I could neither eliminate all lice nor all Jews in
only 1 year’s time. But in the course of time and, above all, if
you will help me, this end will be attained.”
THE PRESIDENT: I forgot to say, Major Walsh, it would help us too, when
you do not begin at the beginning of a paragraph, if you would indicate
about where it is.
MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir; I shall do that.
While this presentation is not necessarily intended to be a
chronological narrative of events in the treatment of the Jewish people,
it would appear at this point that we should pause to examine the record
to date. We find that the Nazi Party and the Nazi-dominated State have,
by writings and by utterances, by decrees and by official acts, clearly
expressed their intent: the Jew must be eliminated.
How do they now progress to the accomplishment of this purpose? The
first requirement was a complete registration of all Jews; and inasmuch
as the policy relating to the Jews followed on the heels of German
aggression, such registration was required not only within the Reich but
successively within the conquered territories. For example, within
Germany registration was required by decree (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part
I, 1938, Page 922, 23 July, signed by the Defendant Frick); within
Austria (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Volume 1, 1940, Page 694, 29 April);
within Poland (Kurjer Krakowski, 5 October 1939); in France (_Journal
Officiel_ Number 9, Page 92, 30 September 1940); in Holland
(_Verordnungsblatt_, Number 6, 10 January 1941, signed by the Defendant
Seyss-Inquart).
The second step was to segregate and concentrate the Jews within
restricted areas called ghettos. This policy was carefully worked out,
and perhaps the confidential statement taken from the files of the
Defendant Rosenberg will best serve as an illustration.
I offer in evidence a copy of a memorandum from Defendant Rosenberg’s
file entitled, “Directions for Handling of the Jewish Question,”
Document 212-PS, Exhibit Number USA-272. I quote from the top of Page 2
of the translation before the Court:
“The first main goal of the German measures must be strict
segregation of Jewry from the rest of the population. The
presupposition of this is, first of all, the registration of the
Jewish population by the introduction of a compulsory
registration order and similar appropriate measures. . . .”
And then, in the second sentence, in the second paragraph, on Page 2, I
continue:
“. . . all rights of freedom for Jews are to be withdrawn. They
are to be placed in ghettos and at the same time are to be
separated according to sexes. The presence of many more or less
closed Jewish settlements in White Ruthenia and in the Ukraine
makes this mission easier. Moreover, places are to be chosen
which make possible the full use of the Jewish manpower as a
consequence of present labor programs. These ghettos can be
placed under the supervision of a Jewish self-government with
Jewish officials. The guarding of the boundaries between the
ghettos and the outer world is, however, the duty of the police.
“Also, in the case in which a ghetto could not yet be
established, care is to be taken through strict prohibition and
similar suitable measures that a further intermingling of blood
of the Jews and the rest of the populace does not continue.”
In May 1941 Rosenberg, as the Reich Minister for the Eastern regions,
issued directions confining the Jews to ghettos in the Ukraine.
I offer in evidence Document 1028-PS, Exhibit Number USA-273, and from
the first sentence of the translation before the Court, I read:
“After the customary removal of Jews from all public offices,
the Jewish question will have to be solved conclusively through
the institution of ghettos.”
The policies expressed in the quoted Rosenberg memoranda were not
isolated instances nor the acts of one individual. It was the expressed
state policy. Defendant Von Schirach played his part in the program of
“ghettoization.” I offer in evidence Document 3048-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-274. Before the Court is a full translation of that which I wish to
quote. The Defendant Von Schirach spoke before the European Youth
Congress held in Vienna on 14 September 1942, and from Page 2, Column 2,
of the Vienna edition of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ of 15 September, I
quote:
“Every Jew who exerts influence in Europe is a danger to
European culture. If anyone reproaches me with having driven
from this city, which was once the European metropolis of Jewry,
tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews into the ghetto
of the East, I feel myself compelled to reply, ‘I see in this an
action contributing to European culture.’”
One of the largest ghettos was within the City of Warsaw. The original
report made by SS Major General Stroop concerning this ghetto is
entitled, “The Warsaw Ghetto is no more.” I now offer this in evidence
at this time, if the Court please, and request leave to refer to it
later on in this presentation—Exhibit Number USA-275, 1061-PS, top of
Page 3 of the translation, Document 1061-PS:
“The Ghetto thus established in Warsaw was inhabited by about
400,000 Jews.
“It contained 27,000 apartments with an average of two and a
half rooms each. It was separated from the rest of the city by
partitions and other walls and by walling-up of thoroughfares,
windows, doors, open spaces, _et cetera_.”
Some idea of the conditions within this ghetto can be gathered from the
fact that an average of six persons lived in every room. Himmler
received a report from the SS Brigadeführer Group A, dated 15 October
1941 which further illustrates the establishment and operation of the
ghettos. I offer Document L-180 in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-276.
The translation, if the Tribunal please, is from the second paragraph
from the bottom of Page 9:
“Apart from organizing and carrying out measures of execution,
the creation of ghettos was begun in the larger towns at once
during the first days of operations. This was especially urgent
in Kovno because there were 30,000 Jews in a total population of
152,400.”
And from the last paragraph on Page 9 continuing to page 10 I quote:
“In Riga the so-called ‘Moscow suburb’ was designated as a
ghetto. This is the worst dwelling district of Riga, already now
mostly inhabited by Jews. The transfer of the Jews into the
ghetto district proved rather difficult because the Latvian
dwellings in that district had to be evacuated and residential
space in Riga is very crowded. Of the 28,000 Jews living in Riga
24,000 have been transferred into the ghetto so far. In creating
the ghetto the Security Police restricted themselves to mere
policing duties, while the establishment and administration of
the ghetto as well as the regulation of the food supply for the
inmates of the ghetto was left to civil administration; the
Labor Offices were left in charge of labor allocation. In the
other towns with a larger Jewish population ghettos shall be
established likewise.”
Jews were also forced into ghettos in the Polish Province of Galicia. No
words in my vocabulary could describe quite so adequately the conditions
as those contained in the report from Katzmann, Lieutenant General of
Police, to Krüger, General of the Police East, dated 3 June 1943,
entitled “Solution of Jewish Question in Galicia.” I offer Document L-18
in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-277. From the translation, if the
Court please, we will begin with the last three sentences on Page 11,
that is, the last three sentences prior to the word “nothing” which is
there on that page: “Nothing but catastrophical conditions were found in
the ghettos of Rawa-Ruska and Rohatyn.”
“The Jews of Rawa-Ruska, fearing the evacuation, had concealed
those who suffered from spotted fever in underground holes. When
evacuation was to start it was found that 3,000 Jews suffering
from spotted fever lay about in this ghetto. In order to destroy
this center of pestilence at once, every police officer
inoculated against spotted fever was called into action. Thus we
succeeded in destroying this plague-boil, losing thereby only
one officer. Almost the same conditions were found in Rohatyn.”
On Page 19 of this same document, L-18, the last paragraph, I wish to
quote further.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MAJOR WALSH: “Since we received more and more alarming reports
on the Jews becoming armed in an ever-increasing manner, we
started, during the last fortnight in June 1943, an action
throughout the whole of the District of Galicia with the intent
to use strongest measures to destroy the Jewish gangsterdom.
Special measures were found necessary during the action to
dissolve the living quarters in Lvov where the dug-out mentioned
above had been established. Here we had to act brutally from the
beginning in order to avoid losses on our side; we had to blow
up or to burn down several houses. On this occasion the
surprising fact arose that we were able to catch about 20,000
Jews instead of 12,000 Jews who had registered. We had to pull
at least 3,000 Jewish corpses out of every kind of hiding place;
they had committed suicide by taking poison.”
On Page 20 of this document, the third paragraph I read:
“Despite the extraordinary burden heaped upon every single SS
and Police member during these actions, the mood and spirit of
the men were extraordinarily good and praiseworthy from the
first to the last day.”
These acts and actions of removal and slaughter were not entirely
without profit. The author of this report, on the ninth page of this
translated copy stated, and I quote the last paragraph:
“Together with the evacuation action we executed the
confiscation of Jewish property. Very high values were
confiscated and handed over to the Special Staff ‘Reinhard.’
Apart from furniture and many textile goods, the following
amounts were confiscated and turned over to Special Staff
‘Reinhard.’”
I would like to read a few of the many and assorted items listed under
this confiscation:
“20.952 kilograms of golden wedding rings; 7 stamp collections,
complete; 1 suitcase with pocket knives; 1 basket of fountain
pens and propelling pencils; 3 bags filled with rings—not
genuine; 35 wagons of furs.”
I will not burden the Court with the detailed lists of objects of value
and of the money confiscated; but the foregoing is cited to illustrate
the thoroughness of the looting of a defenseless people, even to the
11.73 kilograms of gold teeth and inlays.
By the end of 1942 Jews in the Government General of Poland had been
crowded into 55 localities whereas before the German invasion there had
been approximately 1,000 Jewish settlements within this same area. This
is reported in the 1942 official gazette for the Government General,
Number 94, Page 665, 1 November 1942.
The Jews having been registered and confined within the ghettos, they
now furnished a reservoir for slave labor. It is believed pertinent at
this time to point out the difference between the slave labor and labor
duty. The latter group were entitled to reasonable compensation, stated
work hours, medical care and attention, and other social security
measures, while the former were granted none of these advantages, being
in fact on a level below a slave.
Defendant Rosenberg, as Reich Minister for the Eastern Occupied
Territories, set up within his organization a department which, among
other things, was to seek a solution for the Jewish problem by means of
forced labor. His plans are contained in another document, 1024-PS,
which I now offer in evidence, Exhibit Number USA-278.
I quote the first part of Paragraph 3 of Page 1 of the document
entitled, “General Organization and Tasks of Our Office for the General
Handling of Problems in the Eastern Territory.” This is dated 29 April
1941. This brief excerpt reads as follows:
“A general treatment is required for the Jewish problem for
which a temporary solution will have to be determined (forced
labor for the Jews, creation of ghettos, _et cetera_).”
Thereafter he issued instructions that Jewish forced labor should be
effected and utilized for every manual labor; and I refer to Document
212-PS, already in evidence, Exhibit Number USA-272. From Page 3 of this
document, Paragraph 5 and Paragraph 7, I quote Paragraph 5:
“The standing rule for the Jewish labor employment is the
complete and unyielding use of Jewish manpower regardless of age
in the reconstruction of the Eastern Occupied Territories.”
And from Paragraph 7 of the same page I read:
“Violations of German measures, especially evasions of the
forced labor regulations, are to be punished by death in the
case of the Jews.”
From the ghettos Jewish labor was selected and sent to a concentration
area. Here the usable Jews were screened from those considered
worthless. For example, a contingent of 45,000 Jews would be expected to
yield 10,000 to 15,000 usable laborers. My authority for this statement
is contained in a RSHA telegram to Himmler, marked “urgent” and
“secret,” dated 16 December 1942.
I offer this document, 1472-PS, in evidence, Exhibit Number USA-279; and
from the translation before the Court I read the last four lines:
“In the total of 45,000 are included physically handicapped and
others (old Jews and children). In making a distribution for
this purpose, at least 10,000 to 15,000 laborers will be
available when the Jews arriving at Auschwitz are assigned.”
From Document L-18, a report from the Lieutenant General of the Police,
Katzmann, to General of the Police East, Krüger, already in evidence,
Exhibit Number USA-277, we find the clearly outlined nature of the
forced labor situation for the Jews. On Page 2 of the translation,
starting with Paragraph 6, I read:
“The best remedy consisted in the formation of forced labor
camps by the SS and Police Leader. The best opportunity for
labor was offered by the necessity to complete the ‘Dg. 4’ road
which was extremely important and necessary for the whole of the
southern part of the front and which was in a catastrophically
bad condition. On October 15, 1941, the establishment of camps
along the road was commenced; and despite considerable
difficulties there existed, after a few weeks only, seven camps
containing 4,000 Jews.”
From Page 2, Paragraph 7, I read:
“Soon more camps followed these first ones, so that after a very
short time the completion of 15 camps of this kind could be
reported to the superior leader of SS and police. In the course
of time about 20,000 Jewish laborers passed through these camps.
Despite the hardly imaginable difficulties arising from this
problem I can report today that about 160 kilometers of the road
are completed.”
And from Page 2, Paragraph 8, I read:
“At the same time all other Jews fit for work were registered
and distributed for useful work by the labor agencies.”
And on Page 5, last part of Paragraph 1 . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you want the remainder of that paragraph on Page 2?
MAJOR WALSH: It is such a lengthy document, I hesitated to burden the
record with so much of it, and had extracted certain portions therefrom,
but I shall be very glad to read it into the record.
THE PRESIDENT: “Then, for instance, the Municipal Administration
at Lvov had no success in their attempts to house the Jews
within a closed district which would be inhabited only by Jews.
This question, too, was solved quickly by the SS and Police
Leader through his subordinate officials.”
MAJOR WALSH: With the Court’s permission, I add that to the record.
Reading the last paragraph of Page 2:
“When the Jews were marked by the Star of David, as well as when
they were registered by the labor agencies, the first symptoms
appeared in their attempts to dodge the order of the
authorities. The measures which were introduced thereupon led to
thousands of arrests. It became more and more apparent that the
civil administration was not in a position to solve the Jewish
problem in an approximately satisfactory manner. Then, for
instance, the municipal administration at Lvov had no success in
their attempts to house the Jews within a closed district which
would be inhabited only by Jews. This question, too, was solved
quickly by the SS and Police Leader through his subordinate
officials. This measure became the more urgent as in the winter
of 1941 big centers of spotted fever were noted in many parts of
the town . . . .”
And on Page 5 of this document, L-18, last half of Paragraph 1, I read:
“During the removal of the Jews into a certain quarter of the
town several sluices were erected at which all the work-shy and
asocial Jewish rabble were caught during the screening and
treated in a special way. Owing to the peculiar fact that almost
90 percent of artisans working in Galicia were Jews, the task to
be solved could be fulfilled only step by step, since an
immediate evacuation would not have served the interest of war
economy.”
And again, on Page 5, Paragraph 2, the latter part, beginning with
“cases were discovered”:
“Cases were discovered where Jews, in order to acquire any
certificate of labor, not only renounced all wages but even paid
money themselves. Moreover, the organizing of Jews for the
benefit of their employers grew to such catastrophical extent
that it was deemed necessary to interfere in the most energetic
manner for the benefit of the German name.
“Since the administration was not in a position and showed
itself too weak to master this chaos, the SS and Police leader
simply took over the entire disposition of labor for Jews. The
Jewish labor agencies, which were manned by hundreds of Jews,
were dissolved. All certificates of labor given by firms or
administrative offices were declared invalid, and the cards
given to the Jews by the labor agencies were validated by the
police offices by stamping them. In the course of this action,
again, thousands of Jews were caught who were in possession of
forged certificates or who had obtained, surreptitiously,
certificates of labor by all kinds of pretexts. These Jews also
were exposed to special treatment.”
If the Court please, at this time I would like to arrange for the
showing of a very short motion picture, perhaps one of the most unusual
exhibits that will be presented during the Trial. With the Court’s
permission I would like to call upon Commander Donovan to assist.
THE PRESIDENT: Need we adjourn for it or not?
MAJOR WALSH: No, Sir. The movie itself is very, very short, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COMMANDER DONOVAN: May it please the Tribunal, the United States now
offers in evidence Document Number 3052-PS, Exhibit Number USA-280,
entitled “Original German 8-millimeter Film of Atrocities against Jews.”
This is a strip of motion pictures taken, we believe, by a member of the
SS and captured by the United States military forces in an SS barracks
near Augsburg, Germany, as described in the affidavits now before the
Tribunal.
We have not been able to establish beyond doubt in which area these
films were made, but we believe that to be immaterial.
The film offers undeniable evidence, made by Germans themselves, of
almost incredible brutality to Jewish people in the custody of the
Nazis, including German military units.
It is believed by the Prosecution that the scene is the extermination of
a ghetto by Gestapo agents, assisted by military units. And, as the
other evidence to be presented by the Prosecution will indicate, the
scene presented to the Tribunal is probably one which occurred a
thousand times all over Europe under the Nazi rule of terror.
This film was made on an 8-millimeter home camera. We have not wished
even to reprint it, and so shall present the original, untouched film
captured by our troops. The pictures obviously were taken by an amateur
photographer. Because of this, because of the fact that part of it is
burned, because of the fact that it runs for only 1½ minutes, and
because of the confusion on every hand shown on this film, we do not
believe that the Tribunal can properly view the evidence if it is shown
only once. We therefore ask the Tribunal’s permission to project the
film twice as we did before the Defense Counsel.
This is a silent film. The film has been made available to all Defense
Counsel, and they have a copy of the supporting affidavits, duly
translated.
[_The film was shown._]
COMMANDER DONOVAN: [_Continuing._] May it please the Tribunal, while the
film is being rewound I wish to say that attached to the affidavits
offered in evidence is a description of every picture shown in this
film. And, with the Tribunal’s permission, I wish to read a few
selections from that at this time, before again projecting the film, in
order to direct the Tribunal’s attention to certain of the scenes:
Scene 2—A naked girl running across the courtyard.
Scene 3—An older woman being pushed past the camera, and a man in SS
uniform standing at the right of the scene.
Scene 5—A man with a skullcap and a woman are manhandled.
Number 14—A half-naked woman runs through the crowd.
Number 15—Another half-naked woman runs out of the house.
Number 16—Two men drag an old man out.
Number 18—A man in German military uniform, with his back to the
camera, watches.
Number 24—A general shot of the street, showing fallen bodies and naked
women running.
Number 32—A shot of the street, showing five fallen bodies.
Number 37—A man with a bleeding head is hit again.
Number 39—A soldier in German military uniform, with a rifle, stands by
as a crowd centers on a man coming out of the house.
Number 44—A soldier with a rifle, in German military uniform, walks
past a woman clinging to a torn blouse.
Number 45—A woman is dragged by her hair across the street.
[_The film was shown again._]
COMMANDER DONOVAN: [_Continuing._] We submit to the Tribunal for its
permanent records this strip of 8-millimeter film.
MAJOR WALSH: It is difficult from this point to follow the thread of
chronological order or a topical outline. So numerous are the documents
and so appalling the contents that in this brief recital the Prosecution
will make no effort to itemize the criminal acts. Selected documents,
however, will unfold the crimes in full detail.
Before launching a discussion of the means utilized to accomplish the
ultimate aim, that is the extermination of the Jewish people, I now turn
to that fertile source of evidence, the diary of Hans Frank, then
Governor General of occupied Poland. In a cabinet session on Tuesday, 16
December 1941, in the government building at Kraków, the Defendant Frank
made a closing address to the session. I offer now in evidence that part
of the document, Number 2233(d)-PS, Exhibit Number USA-281, identified
CV 1941, October to December, and from Page 76, line 10, to Page 77,
line 33, of the original and of the entire translation before the Court.
I quote:
“As far as the Jews are concerned, I want to tell you quite
frankly that they must be done away with in one way or another.
The Führer said once: ‘Should united Jewry again succeed in
provoking a world war, the blood of not only the nations which
have been forced into the war by them will be shed, but the Jew
will have found his end in Europe.’ I know that many of the
measures carried out against the Jews in the Reich at present
are being criticized. It is being tried intentionally, as is
obvious from the reports on the morale, to talk about cruelty,
harshness, _et cetera_. Before I continue, I would beg you to
agree with me on the following formula: We will principally have
pity on the German people only and nobody else in the whole
world. The others, too, had no pity on us. As an old National
Socialist I must also say: This war would be only a partial
success if the whole lot of Jewry would survive it, while we
would have shed our best blood in order to save Europe. My
attitude towards the Jews will, therefore, be based only on the
expectation that they must disappear. They must be done away
with. I have entered negotiations to have them deported to the
East. A large conference concerning that question, to which I am
going to delegate the State Secretary Dr. Bühler, will take
place in Berlin in January. That discussion is to take place in
the Reich Security Main Office with SS Lieutenant General
Heydrich. A great Jewish migration will begin, in any case. “But
what should be done with the Jews? Do you think they will be
settled down in the ‘Ostland’ in villages? This is what we were
told in Berlin: Why all this bother? We can do nothing with them
either in the ‘Ostland’ or in the ‘Reichskommissariat.’ So
liquidate them yourselves.
“Gentlemen, I must ask you to arm yourselves against all feeling
of pity. We must annihilate the Jews, wherever we find them and
wherever it is possible, in order to maintain there the
structure of the Reich as a whole. This will, naturally, be
achieved by other methods than those pointed out by Bureau Chief
Dr. Hummel. Nor can the judges of the Special Courts be made
responsible for it because of the limitations of the frame work
of the legal procedure. Such outdated views cannot be applied to
such gigantic and unique events. We must find at any rate a way
which leads to the goal, and my thoughts are working in that
direction.
“The Jews represent for us also extraordinarily malignant
gluttons. We have now approximately, 2,500,000 of them in the
Government General, perhaps with the Jewish mixtures and
everything that goes with it, 3,500,000 Jews. We cannot shoot or
poison those 3,500,000 Jews; but we shall nevertheless be able
to take measures which will lead, somehow, to their
annihilation, and this in connection with the gigantic measures
to be determined in discussions with the Reich. The Government
General must become free of Jews, the same as the Reich. Where
and how this is to be achieved is a matter for the offices which
we must appoint and create here. Their activities will be
brought to your attention in due course.”
This, if the Tribunal please, is not the planning and scheming of an
individual, but is the expression of the official of the German State,
the appointed Governor General of occupied Poland. The methods used to
accomplish the annihilation of the Jewish people were varied and,
although not subtle, were highly successful.
I have from time to time made reference to certain utterances and
actions of the Defendant Rosenberg as one of the leaders and policy
makers of the Nazi Party and German State. It is perhaps reasonable to
assume that the Defendant Rosenberg will claim for many of his actions
that he pursued them pursuant to superior orders. I have before me,
however, a captured document, Number 001-PS, marked “secret,” dated 18
December 1941, entitled “Documentary Memorandum for the
Führer—Concerning Jewish Possessions in France,” Exhibit Number
USA-282. I dare say that no document before this Tribunal will more
clearly evidence the Defendant Rosenberg’s personal attitude, his
temperament, and convictions toward the Jews more strongly than this
memorandum, wherein he, in his own initiative, urges plundering and
death. I offer in evidence Document Number 001-PS. The body of the
memorandum reads as follows:
“In compliance with the order of the Führer for protection of
Jewish cultural possessions, a great number of Jewish dwellings
remained unguarded. Consequently, many furnishings have
disappeared because a guard could, naturally, not be posted. In
the whole East the administration has found terrible conditions
of living quarters, and the chances of procurement are so
limited that it is not possible to procure any more. Therefore,
I beg the Führer to permit the seizure of all Jewish home
furnishings of Jews in Paris who have fled or will leave shortly
and those of Jews living in all parts of the occupied West to
relieve the shortage of furnishings in the administration in the
East.
“2. A great number of leading Jews were, after a short
examination in Paris, again released. The attempts on the lives
of members of the Forces have not stopped; on the contrary they
continue. This reveals an unmistakable plan to disrupt the
German-French co-operation, to force Germany to retaliate and,
with this, evoke a new defense on the part of the French against
Germany. I suggest to the Führer that, instead of executing 100
Frenchmen, we shoot in their place 100 Jewish bankers, lawyers,
_et cetera_. It is the Jews in London and New York who incite
the French Communists to commit acts of violence, and it seems
only fair that the members of this race should pay for this. It
is not the little Jews but the leading Jews in France who should
be held responsible. That would tend to awaken the anti-Jewish
sentiment.”—Sighed—“A. Rosenberg.”
[_Dr. Thoma approached the lectern._]
THE PRESIDENT: May I ask you to speak slowly so that your application
will come to me through the earphones correctly.
DR. THOMA: Since the Prosecutor is now dealing with the case against my
client, Rosenberg, may I be permitted to voice an objection to Document
212-PS, Exhibit Number USA-272. The Prosecutor claims that this document
was a directive issued by the Minister for the East. It begins with the
words . . .
THE PRESIDENT: None of that has come through on the earphones. I don’t
understand you. You had better begin again.
DR. THOMA: The Prosecutor presented earlier today Document Number
212-PS, Exhibit Number USA-272, claiming that its content was a
directive issued by the Minister for the East on the treatment of Jews.
In this document he is said to have given instructions that violations
of German regulations by Jews, especially violations of the compulsory
labor laws, could only be punished by death. This document does not
originate with the Defendant Rosenberg; nor did it by mistake . . .
THE PRESIDENT: More slowly, please.
DR. THOMA: This document does not originate with the Defendant
Rosenberg. It bears neither a date nor an address, nor his signature. I,
therefore, object to the assertion that this document originated with
the Defendant Rosenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I don’t think that Counsel for the
Prosecution said that, that Document 212-PS emanated from Rosenberg. I
didn’t so understand him.
DR. THOMA: I understood him to say that it was a directive issued by the
Minister for the East; and if I am not mistaken, he also said it was
dated April 1941. At that time there was no Ministry for the East.
Rosenberg was only named Minister for the East in July 1941.
THE PRESIDENT: I will ask the Counsel for the Prosecution.
MAJOR WALSH: It is my understanding, Sir, that that document, 212-PS,
was taken from the captured files of Rosenberg.
DR. THOMA: That is true, it was found among the papers of the Defendant
Rosenberg; the Defendant Rosenberg claims, however, that he has never
seen this document, that he knows nothing about it, and that it has
never passed through his hands.
THE PRESIDENT: Rosenberg, when he is called as a witness or when you
appear to speak for him, will be able to say that he has never seen the
document before. All that Counsel, for the Prosecution has said—and it
appears to be true—is that the document was found in Rosenberg’s file.
You can say or prove by Rosenberg’s evidence when you call Rosenberg—if
you do call him—that he never saw the document. Do you understand?
DR. THOMA: Yes, thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: It is 5 o’clock now, so we will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 14 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]
TWENTIETH DAY
Friday, 14 December 1945
_Morning Session_
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I bring up two points with regard to yesterday’s and
all future presentation of evidence on the section dealing with Crimes
against Humanity.
Firstly, I request that the affidavit of the witness Pfaffenberger,
which was submitted yesterday, be stricken from the record. The witness
himself will later have to be cross-examined, since his affidavit is
fragmentary in most important points. In many cases it does not appear
whether his statements are based on personal observations or on hearsay,
and therefore it is too easy to draw false conclusions. The witness did
not mention that the Camp Commander Koch and his inhuman wife were
condemned to death by an SS court, among other things, on account of
these occurrences. It is, of course, possible to ascertain the complete
facts by questioning the witness at a later stage of the Trial. But
until then the Tribunal and all members of the Prosecution and the
Defense must be continually influenced by such dreadful testimony.
The contents of this testimony are so horrifying and so degrading to the
human mind that one would like to avert one’s eyes and ears. In the
meantime such statements make their way into the press of the whole
world, and civilization is justly indignant. The consequences of such
prejudiced statements are incalculable. The Prosecutor clearly
recognized the significance of this testimony and exposed the sorry
documents in yesterday’s proceedings.
If weeks or months pass before such testimony is rectified, its initial
effect can never be wholly eliminated; but truth suffers and justice is
endangered thereby. Surely, Article 19 of the Charter does not envisage
bringing about such a state of affairs.
Secondly, I should, therefore, like to suggest that at the present stage
of the Trial the testimony of witnesses who live in Germany and whose
appearance here in court is possible should not be read in the
proceedings. For at this stage of the Trial the charges being made are
even more terrible than those referring to wars of aggression, since the
tortured lives and deaths of human beings are involved.
At the beginning of the Trial the Tribunal refused to admit testimony of
the witness Schuschnigg, and it is my opinion that what was valid then
should be all the more valid at this stage of the Trial.
I should like to emphasize my suggestion particularly with regard to the
Defendant Dr. Kaltenbrunner himself, since it was not until the spring
of 1943 that he became Chief of the Reich Security Main Office and
since, in the opinion of the Defense, many, if not all, of his
signatures were forged and the entire executive function attached to the
concentration camps and the things connected with them lay exclusively
in Himmler’s hands. That I hope to prove at a later date. I mentioned it
now in order to justify my suggestion.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to hear counsel for the Chief
Prosecutor of the United States.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, Mr. Dodd, who had
charge of the matter which is under discussion, left for the United
States yesterday; and I shall have to substitute for him as best I can.
This Tribunal sits under a Charter which recognized the impossibility of
covering a decade of time, a continent of space, a million acts, by
ordinary rules of proof, and at the same time finishing this case within
the lives of living men. We do not want to have a trial here that, like
the trial of Warren Hastings, lasted 7 years. Therefore the Charter sets
up only two standards by which any evidence, I submit, may be rejected.
The first is that evidence must be relevant to the issue. The second is
it must have some probative value. That was made mandatory upon this
Tribunal in Article 19 because of the difficulty of ever trying this
case if we used the technical rules of Common Law proof.
One of the reasons this was a military tribunal, instead of an ordinary
court of law, was in order to avoid the precedent-creating effect of
what is done here on our own law and the precedent control which would
exist if this were an ordinary judicial body.
Article 19 provides that the Tribunal shall not be bound by technical
rules of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible
extent expeditious and non-technical procedure and shall admit any
evidence which it deems to have probative value. That was made
mandatory, that it shall admit any evidence which it deems to have
probative value. The purpose of that provision, Your Honors, I may say,
was this: That the whole controversy in this case—and we have no doubt
that there is room for controversy—should be centered upon the value of
evidence and not on its admissibility.
We have no jury. There is no occasion for applying jury rules.
Therefore, when a piece of evidence is offered, there are two questions
which arise: Does it have probative value? If it has no probative value,
then it should not encumber the records, of course. The second is, does
it have relevancy? If it has not, of course it should not come in.
The evidence in question has relevance; no one questions that. No one
can say that an affidavit, duly sworn, does not have some probative
value. What probative value it has, the weight of it, should be
determined on the submission of the case. That is to say, if a witness
has made a statement in an affidavit, and it is denied by Mr.
Kaltenbrunner, and you believe that the denial has weight and
credibility, of course, the affidavit should not be considered in the
final consideration of the case. But we are dealing here with events
that took place over great periods of time and great distances. We are
dealing with witnesses widely scattered and a situation where
communications are almost at a standstill.
If this affidavit stands at the end of this case undenied, unchallenged,
it is not, then, beyond belief that you would give it value and weight.
An affidavit might bear internal evidence that it lacked credibility,
such as evidence where the witness was talking of something of which he
had no personal knowledge. I do not say that every affidavit that comes
along has probative value just because it is sworn to. But it seems to
me that if we are to make progress with this case, this simple system
envisioned by this Charter, which was the subject of long consideration,
must be followed; that if, when a piece of evidence is presented, even
though it does not comply with technical rules governing judicial
procedures, it is something which has probative value in the ordinary
daily concerns of life, it should be admitted. If it stands undenied at
the close of the case, as many of these things will, then, of course,
there is no issue about it; and it saves the calling of witnesses, which
will take an indefinite period of time as we have already seen. I may
say that the testimony of the witness Lahousen, which took nearly 2
days, could have been put in, in this Court, in 15 minutes in affidavit
form, and all that was essential to it could have been placed before us;
and if it were to be denied you could then have determined its weight.
We want to adhere to this Charter. I submit it is no reason for
deviating from the Charter that an affidavit recites horrors. I should
have thought that the world could not be more shocked by recitals of
horrors in affidavits than it has been in the documents that have
proceeded from sources of the enemy itself. There is no reason in that
for departing from the plain principles of the Charter.
I think the question of orderly procedure and the question of time are
both involved in this. I think that the Tribunal should receive
affidavits, and we have prepared them—we hope carefully, we hope
fairly—to present a great many things that would take days and days of
proof. I may say that this ruling is more important in subsequent stages
of this case than it is on this particular affidavit.
There is another reason, perhaps. We have some situations in which a
member of an accused organization, who is directly hostile to our
position because the accusation would reach him within the accused
class, has made an affidavit or affidavits which constitute admissions
against interest; but on some other issue he makes statements which we
believe are untrue and incredible; and we do not wish to vouch for his
general credibility by calling him as a witness, but we wish to avail
ourselves of his admission. Those things we think since we have to make
our proof largely from enemy sources. All this proof and every witness 8
months ago were in the hands of the enemy. We have to make our proof
from them. God alone knows how much proof there is in this world that we
have not been able to reach. We submit that the orderly procedure here
is to abide by this Charter and admit these affidavits. If they stand
unquestioned at the end of the case, there is no issue about them. If
they are questioned, then the weight is a matter which you would
determine on final submission.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, I have three questions I should like
to ask you. The first is: Where is Pfaffenberger?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That I cannot answer at the moment, but I will get
an answer as quickly as I can. It is unknown to us at the moment. If we
are able to ascertain, I will inform you at the conclusion of the noon
recess.
THE PRESIDENT: The second point to which I wish to draw your attention
is Article 16(e) of the Charter, which contemplates cross-examination of
witnesses by the defendants. The only reason why it is thought that
witnesses who are available should not give evidence by affidavit is
because it denies to the Defense the opportunity of cross-examining
them.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that this provision means just exactly what
it says. If we call a witness, they have the right of cross-examination.
If he is not called, they have the right to call him, if he is
available, as their witness; but not, of course, the right of
cross-examination. The provision itself, if Your Honor notices, reads
that they have the right to cross-examine any witness called by the
Prosecution; but that does not abrogate or affect Article 19, that we
may obtain and produce any probative evidence in such manner as will
expedite the Trial.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the next point to which I wish to draw your
attention is Article 17(a). As I understood it, you were arguing that it
was mandatory upon the Tribunal to consider any evidence which was
relevant. Therefore, I draw your attention to Article 17(a) which gives
the Tribunal power to summon witnesses to the Trial.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is right. I think there is no conflict in that
whatever. The power of the Tribunal to summon witnesses and to put
questions to them was introduced into this Charter through the
continental systems of jurisprudence. Usually there are not Tribunal
witnesses in our procedure in the States. Witnesses are called only by
one of the parties; but it was suggested by the continental scholars
that in this kind of case, since we were utilizing a mixture of the two
procedures, the Tribunal itself should have the right to do several
things. One is to summon witnesses, to require their attendance, and to
put questions to them. I submit that this witness, whose affidavit has
been received, can be called, if we can find him, by the Tribunal and
questioned.
The next provision—and it bears, on the spirit of this—of Article 17
is that the Tribunal has the right to interrogate any defendant. Of
course, under our system of jurisprudence the Tribunal would have no
such right, because the defendant has the unqualified right to refrain
from being a witness; but in deference again to the continental system,
the Tribunal was given the right to interrogate any defendant, and his
immunities, which he would have under the Constitution of the United
States, if he were being tried under our system, were taken away.
I submit that the perfect consistency in those provisions empowers the
Tribunal on its own motion (Article 17) to summon witnesses, to
supplement anything that is offered, to put any questions to witnesses
and to any defendant.
If any witness is called, the right of cross-examination cannot be
denied; but that does not abrogate Article 19, which was intended to
enable us to put our case before the Tribunal so that the issue would
then be drawn by the defendants and the weight of what we offer
determined on final submission.
THE PRESIDENT: Lastly, there is Article 17(e), which I suppose, in your
submission, would entitle the Tribunal, if they thought right, after
receiving the affidavit, to take the evidence of Pfaffenberger on
commission.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, I think it would, Your Honor. I may say, in
reference to that section—what, perhaps, may be surprising to those
accustomed to our system of jurisprudence—that it was one of the most
controversial issues we had in the framing of this Charter. We had in
mind the authorization of what we call “masters” to go into various
localities, perhaps, and take testimony, not knowing what might be
necessary. Our practice, however, of sending “masters in equity” to take
testimony and make recommendations was not acceptable to the continental
system, and we finally compromised on this provision which authorizes
the taking of testimony by commissions.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Your Honors,
I have come forward after my colleague, Mr. Jackson, to make my own
statement, inasmuch as I think that the petition of the Defense is
fundamentally wrong and should not be complied with.
We are submitting our objections for the Tribunal’s consideration. I
fully share the viewpoint held by the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.A.,
Mr. Jackson, and in addition should like to point out the following; The
Defense Counsel, in his petition, raises the question of whether the
Prosecution should refer to, or make public, documents containing
affidavits of persons residing in Germany. A statement of this sort is
completely out of order since, as is known, the defendants committed the
greater part of their atrocities in all countries of Europe and it will
be readily understood that the witnesses of these atrocities live in
different parts of these countries; it is essential that the Prosecution
have recourse to the testimony of such persons, whether it be written or
oral. Your Honors, we have entered a phase of the Trial in which we have
to set forth the atrocities connected with so-called War Crimes and
Crimes against Humanity, atrocities which were committed by the
defendants over extensive areas. We shall submit as evidence documents
originating from the defendants themselves or from persons who suffered
at the hands of the war criminals; it would be impossible to summon all
these witnesses to the Trial so that they could give their evidence
orally. It is absolutely necessary to have affidavits and written
testimonies from these witnesses.
As His Honor the President has already remarked, Article 17 provides for
the right of summoning witnesses to the Trial. That is correct; but it
is impossible to summon all the witnesses who could depose affidavits on
the crimes committed by the defendants. I therefore refer to Article 19
of the Charter which reads:
“The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence.
It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent
expeditious”—and I emphasize, Your Honor, _expeditious_—“and
non-technical procedure and shall admit any evidence which it
deems to have probative value.”
I would ask the Tribunal to proceed according to this article which
definitely admits written affidavits of witnesses as evidence. That is
what I wished to say by way of a supplement to the statement of Mr.
Jackson.
MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, as far as the British
Delegation is concerned, they desire to support what the American Chief
Prosecutor has said, and we do not feel we can usefully add anything.
THE PRESIDENT: [_To M. Faure of the French Delegation._] Do you wish to
add anything?
M. EDGAR FAURE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): Mr.
President, I wish simply to inform the Court that the French Prosecution
is entirely in accord with the remarks of the American and Soviet
Prosecutors.
I think, as the representative of the American Prosecution said, it is
impossible to settle the question of evidence in this Trial solely by
hearing oral testimony in the courtroom, for under those circumstances
it might be opportune to call to the witness stand all the inhabitants
of the territories involved, which is obviously impossible. The Defense
will have every opportunity of discussing the documents which have been
presented by the Prosecution, including the written testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that Counsel for Kaltenbrunner was
suggesting that every witness must be called but that witnesses who were
in Germany and available should be called and that their evidence should
not be given by affidavit.
M. FAURE: The Defense has the right of calling them as witnesses if it
so desires.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I add a few more words to this important question?
The replies which have just been given illustrate that one of the main
principles of the proceedings is that the Trial should proceed speedily.
That is also expressed in Article 19 of the Charter, and no one can hope
more than we that this principle be followed; but it is nevertheless my
opinion that another principle, the highest known to mankind, the
principle of truth, should not thereby suffer. If there is a fear that
truth will suffer through an over-hasty trial, then formal methods of
procedure must take a secondary place. There are human principles which
remain unspoken, which need not be spoken.
This spirit of truth is certainly contained in and governs Article 19;
and the objections I raised to the testimony of this witness seem to me
justified to such a degree that the important principle of speeding up
the Trial should give way to the principle of truth. Humanity itself is
in question here. We want to establish the truth for our own generation
and for that of our children. But if such testimony remains untold for
months, then a part of mankind might well despair of all humanity and
the German people, in particular, would suffer.
DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for the Defendant Bormann): May it please
the Tribunal, I should like to bring up one other point, which appears
to me important, because it was apparently the real source of this
discussion. According to our legal system it is the duty of the
Prosecution to produce not only the incriminating evidence but also
evidence for the defense of the accused. I can well understand that my
colleague, Dr. Kauffmann, protests the Prosecution’s failure to mention
a very important point, namely, that the German authorities indicted
this inhuman SS leader and his wife and condemned them to death. It is
highly probable that the Prosecution knew of this and that these
horrible exhibits of perverted human nature, which were presented to us,
were found in the files of the German Court.
I believe the whole discussion would not have arisen if the Prosecution
had mentioned, as part of the ghastly evidence, the fact that the German
authorities themselves passed judgment on this inhuman man and condemned
him to death.
We find ourselves in difficulties because, in contrast to our own
procedure, the Prosecution for the most part simply presents
incriminating evidence but omits to present the exculpating evidence
which may form part of any document or part of the testimony of a
witness. If the German procedure had been followed in the present case
and if the Prosecution had stated that this man was condemned to death,
then in the first place, the evidence against the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner would not have appeared so weighty and secondly, public
opinion would, on the whole, have been left with a different impression.
My colleague Kauffmann could then have limited himself to proving at a
later stage of the Trial that Kaltenbrunner had, in fact, nothing at all
to do with this affair; and the inhuman character of the proceedings and
the dreadful impression which it made on us would have been avoided.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you explain the part of the German law to which you
were referring, where you say it is the duty of the Prosecution not only
to produce evidence for the Prosecution but also to produce evidence for
the Defense.
DR. BERGOLD: That is a general principle of German jurisprudence,
established in Paragraph 160 of the Reich Code of Penal Procedure. It is
one of the basic principles of law in Germany to . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Give me that reference again.
DR. BERGOLD: Paragraph 160. German law incorporates this principle in
order to enable an accused person to . . .
THE PRESIDENT: 160 of what?
DR. BERGOLD: Of the Reich Code of Penal Procedure. The same is true of
Austria. In the Austrian Code of Penal Procedure there is a similar
paragraph with which, however, I am not quite familiar. This principle
is established to permit the whole truth of a case to be brought to
light, since a defendant in custody is frequently not in a position to
produce all the evidence in his favor. Therefore, under German law it is
the Prosecution’s duty to present the exculpating as well as the
incriminating evidence in a particular case.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The question arising out of Pfaffenberger’s evidence does
not specifically concern the Defendant Von Papen, because that part of
the Indictment does not apply to his case. I am therefore speaking only
of the principle behind it. I believe that in practice the effect of the
different opinions expressed by the Prosecution and the Defense cannot
be of very great importance. Justice Jackson agrees with us that every
witness whose affidavit is presented can, if available, be called to the
stand by the Defense. Thus, in all cases in which the Defense holds that
an affidavit is evidence of secondary value and as such insufficient and
that direct examination of the witness is necessary—in all such cases
there would be duplication of evidence, namely, the reading of the
affidavit and then the examination and cross-examination of the witness.
This would undoubtedly delay the proceedings of the Trial; and to
prevent that the Tribunal would, in all such cases, rule against the
reading, of the affidavit. Consequently, it is futile for the
Prosecution to present affidavits of witnesses who can be expected to
appear in person later in the proceedings.
I do not think that the Prosecution should be worried about this. It is
a matter of course that we—and we assume the same is true of the
Prosecution—that we, the members of the Defense, want the Trial to be
as speedy as possible but also want it to proceed cautiously to
establish the full truth. But, it is obvious, if evidence is introduced
which is a potential cause of completely unjust findings, that such
evidence will have to be clarified in a more complicated and
time-consuming way when the witness is called in person.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the objection that has been
raised when the Court adjourns.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I have one word?
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, it is unusual to hear counsel who
opposes an objection a second time.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I merely want to give you the answer to the
question which you asked me as to the whereabouts of Pfaffenberger. My
information is that these affidavits were taken by the American Army at
the time it liberated the people in these concentration camps, at the
same time the films were taken and the whole evidence that was available
gathered. This witness was present at the concentration camp, and at
that time his statements were taken. We do not know his present
whereabouts, and I see no reasonable likelihood that we will be able to
locate him within any short time. We will make an effort.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, might I endeavor to assist? I
think I have now obtained the German order to which the Defense Counsel
referred, Paragraph 160. It is, My Lord, of course, in German. Perhaps I
might hand it up, and the court translators will no doubt deal with the
paragraph.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think one bit of additional information should be
furnished in view of the statements made here that we have information
that we are withholding. Kaltenbrunner has been interrogated. At no time
has he made such a claim, so I am advised by our interrogators; and
under the Charter our duty is to present the case for the Prosecution. I
do not, in any instance, serve two masters.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, I call upon Major Walsh. Major Walsh, did you give a
lettering to the document book with which you are dealing?
MAJOR WALSH: Yes. If Your Honor please, it is the letter “T.” May it
please the Tribunal, during the last session the Prosecution presented
briefly the preliminary steps leading to the ultimate objective of the
Nazi Party and the Nazi-controlled State, that is, the extermination of
the Jews. Propaganda, decrees, the infamous Nuremberg Laws, boycotts,
registration, and “ghettoization” were the initial measures in the
program. I shall, with the Court’s permission, continue with a
discussion of the methods utilized for the annihilation of the Jewish
people.
I would like first to discuss starvation. Policies were designed and
adopted to deprive the Jews of the most elemental necessities of life.
Again the Defendant Hans Frank, then Governor General of Poland, wrote
in his diary that hunger rations were introduced in the Warsaw ghetto;
and referring to the new food regulations in August 1942, he callously,
and perhaps casually, noted that by these food regulations he virtually
condemned more than 1 million Jews to death. I offer in evidence that
part of Document 2233(e)-PS, diary of Hans Frank, “Conference Volume,”
24 August 1942, Exhibit USA-283. And I quote:
“That we sentence 1,200,000 Jews to die of hunger should be
noted only marginally. It is a matter of course that should the
Jews not starve to death it would, we hope, result in a speeding
up of the anti-Jewish measures.”
Frank’s diary was not the only guide to the deliberate policy of
starvation of the Jews. They were prohibited from pursuing agricultural
activities in order to cut them off from access to the source of food. I
offer Document 1138-PS in evidence, Exhibit USA-284. I refer the Court
to Page 4 of the translation, marked with the Roman numeral V,
Paragraphs a and b. The document is entitled “Provisional Directive on
the Treatment of Jews . . .” and it was issued by the Reich Commissioner
for the Ostland. I read:
“Jews must be cleaned out from the countryside. The Jews are to
be removed from all trades, especially from trade with
agricultural products and other foodstuffs.”
Jews were excluded from the purchase of basic food, such as wheat
products, meat, eggs, and milk.
I offer in evidence Document 1347-PS, Exhibit USA-285, and I quote from
Paragraph 2 on the first page of the translation before the Court. This
is an original decree, dated 18 September 1942, from the Ministry of
Agriculture. I quote:
“Jews will no longer receive the following foods, beginning with
the 42d distribution period (19 October 1942): meat, meat
products, eggs, wheat products, (cake, white bread, wheat rolls,
wheat flour, _et cetera_), whole milk, fresh skimmed milk, as
well as such food distributed not on food ration cards issued
uniformly throughout the Reich but on local supply certificates
or by special announcement of the nutrition office on extra
coupons of the food cards. Jewish children and young people over
10 years of age will receive the bread ration of the normal
consumer.”
The sick, the old, and the pregnant mothers were excluded from the
special food concessions allotted to non-Jews. Seizure by the State
Police of food shipments to Jews from abroad was authorized, and the
Jewish ration cards were distinctly marked with “Jew,” in color, across
the face of the cards, so that the storekeepers could readily identify
and discriminate against Jewish purchasers.
The Czechoslovakian Government published in 1943 an official document
entitled “Czechoslovakia Fights Back.” I offer this book in evidence,
Document 1689-PS, Exhibit USA-286. To summarize the contents of Page
110, it states that the Jewish food purchases were confined to certain
areas and to certain days and hours. As might be expected, the period
permitted for the purchases was during the time when food stocks were
likely to be exhausted.
By Special Order Number 44 for the Eastern Occupied Territories, dated 4
November 1941, the Jews were limited to rations as low as only one-half
of the lowest basic category of other people; and the Ministry of
Agriculture was empowered to exclude Jews entirely or partially from
obtaining food, thus exposing the Jewish community to death by
starvation.
I now offer in evidence Document L-165.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you read anything from 1689-PS?
MAJOR WALSH: Just to summarize, Sir, the contents of Page 110.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Now you are offering L. . .
MAJOR WALSH: L-165, Your Honor, Exhibit USA-287. I refer the Court to
the last half of the first paragraph of the translation. This is a press
bulletin issued by the Polish Ministry of Information, dated 15 November
1942. The Polish Ministry concludes that, upon the basis of the nature
of the separate rationing and the amount of food available to Jews in
the Warsaw and Kraków ghettos, the system was designed to bring about
starvation; and from the quotation I read:
“In regard to food supplies they are brought under a completely
separate system, which is obviously aimed at depriving them of
the most elemental necessities of life.”
I would now like to discuss annihilation within the ghettos. Justice
Jackson in his opening address to the Tribunal made reference to
Document 1061-PS, “The Warsaw Ghetto Is No More,” marked Exhibit
USA-275.
This finest example of ornate German craftsmanship, leather bound,
profusely illustrated, typed on heavy bond paper, is the almost
unbelievable recital of a proud accomplishment by Major General of the
Police Stroop, who signed the report with a bold hand. General Stroop in
this report first pays tribute to the bravery and heroism of the German
forces who participated in the ruthless and merciless action against a
helpless, defenseless group of Jews, numbering, to be exact, 56,065,
including, of course, the infants and the women. In this document he
proceeds to relate the day-by-day account of the ultimate accomplishment
of his mission—to destroy and to obliterate the Warsaw ghetto.
According to this report, the ghetto, which was established in Warsaw in
November 1940, was inhabited by about 400,000 Jews; and prior to the
action for the destruction of this ghetto, some 316,000 had already been
deported. The Court will note that this report is approximately 75 pages
in length, and the Prosecution believes that the contents are of such
striking evidentiary value that no part should be omitted from the
permanent records of the Tribunal and that the Tribunal should consider
the entire report in judging the guilt of these defendants.
The defendants were furnished with several photostatic copies of the
entire document at least 20 days ago and have had ample time, I am sure,
to scrutinize it in detail. If the Court, in the exercise of its
judgment, determines that the entire report may be accepted _in toto_,
the Prosecution believes that the reading of a portion of the summary,
together with brief excerpts from the daily teletype reports, will
suffice for the oral record. I would like the Court to examine it; and I
present it to the Court, together with the duplicate original thereof,
and ask that the Court rule that the entire document may be accepted.
THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh, the Court will take that course, provided
that the Prosecution supplies as soon as possible, both to the Soviet
and to the French members of the Tribunal, copies in Russian and French
of the whole document.
MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir; may I consult with . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I do not say present immediately, but present as soon as
possible.
MAJOR WALSH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You are going to read the passages that you think
necessary?
MAJOR WALSH: Yes. From Page 6 of the translation before the Court of
Document 1061-PS I would like to read the boastful but nonetheless vivid
account of some of this ruthless action within the Warsaw ghetto. I
quote, second paragraph, Page 6:
“The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could be broken
only by the relentless and energetic use of our shock-troops by
day and night. On 23 April 1943 the Reichsführer SS issued
through the Higher SS and Police Leader East at Kraków his order
to complete the combing out of the Warsaw ghetto with the
greatest severity and relentless tenacity. I therefore decided
to destroy the entire Jewish residential area by setting every
block on fire, including the blocks of residential buildings
near the armament works. One building after the other was
systematically evacuated and subsequently destroyed by fire. The
Jews then emerged from their hiding places and dugouts in almost
every case. Not infrequently the Jews stayed in the burning
buildings until, because of the heat and the fear of being
burned alive, they preferred to jump down from the upper stories
after having thrown mattresses and other upholstered articles
into the street from the burning buildings. With their bones
broken they still tried to crawl across the street into blocks
of buildings which had not yet been set on fire or were only
partially in flames. Often the Jews changed their hiding places
during the night by moving into the ruins of burnt-out
buildings, taking refuge there until they were found by our
patrols. Their stay in the sewers also ceased to be pleasant
after the first week. Frequently from the street we could hear
loud voices coming through the sewer shafts. Then the men of the
Waffen-SS, the Police, or the Wehrmacht Engineers courageously
climbed down the shafts to bring out the Jews and not
infrequently they then stumbled over Jews already dead or were
shot at. It was always necessary to use smoke candles to drive
out the Jews. Thus one day we opened 183 sewer entrance holes
and at a fixed time lowered smoke candles into them, with the
result that the bandits fled from what they believed to be gas
into the center of the former ghetto, where they could then be
pulled out of the sewer holes there. A great number of Jews who
could not be counted were exterminated by blowing up sewers and
dugouts.
“The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the
Waffen-SS, Police, and Wehrmacht became. They fulfilled their
duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as
models and examples of soldiers. Their duty hours often lasted
from early morning until late at night. At night search patrols,
with rags wound around their feet, remained at the heels of the
Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and
killed Jews who used the night hours for supplementing their
stores from abandoned dugouts and for contacting neighboring
groups or exchanging news with them.
“Considering that the greater part of the men of the Waffen-SS
had only been trained for 3 to 4 weeks before being assigned to
this action, high credit should be given to the pluck, courage,
and devotion to duty which they showed. It must be stated that
the Wehrmacht Engineers, too, executed the blowing up of
dugouts, sewers, and concrete buildings with indefatigability
and great devotion to duty. Officers and men of the Police, a
large part of whom had already been at the front, again excelled
by their dashing spirit.
“Only through the continuous and untiring work of all involved
did we succeed in catching a total of 56,065 Jews whose
extermination can be proved. To this should be added the number
of Jews who lost their lives in explosions or fires but whose
number could not be ascertained.”
THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh, in the section that you are just upon now,
ought you not to read the opening paragraphs of this document, which set
out the amount of the losses of the German troops?
MAJOR WALSH: I will do so, Sir. On Page 1 of the translation, I quote.
The title: “The Warsaw Ghetto is no more.”
“For the Führer and their country the following fell in the
battle for the destruction of Jews and bandits in the former
Jewish residential area of Warsaw.”—Fifteen names are
thereafter listed.
“Furthermore, the Polish Police Sergeant Julian Zielenski, born
13 November 1891, 8th Commissariat, fell on 19 April 1943 while
fulfilling his duty. They gave their utmost, their life. We
shall never forget them.
“The following were wounded. . . .”
Then follow the names of 60 Waffen-SS personnel, 11 watchmen from
training camps (probably Lithuanians), 12 Security Police officers in SS
units, 5 men of the Polish Police, and 2 soldiers of the Wehrmacht
Engineers.
Permit me to read some brief excerpts of the daily teletype reports.
Page 13 of the translation, from the teletype message of 22 April 1943,
I read:
“Our setting the block on fire achieved the result in the course
of the night that those Jews whom we had not been able to find
despite all our search operations left their hideouts under the
roofs, in the cellars, and elsewhere and appeared on the outside
of the building, trying to escape the flames anyhow. Masses of
them—entire families—were already aflame and jumped from the
windows or endeavored to let themselves down by means of sheets
tied together or the like. Steps had been taken so that these
Jews as well as the remaining ones were liquidated at once.”
And from Page 28 of the translation, the last part of the first
paragraph, I read:
“When the blocks of buildings mentioned above were destroyed,
120 Jews were caught and numerous Jews were destroyed when they
jumped from the attics to the inner courtyards, trying to escape
the flames. Many more Jews perished in the flames or were
destroyed when the dugouts and sewer entrances were blown up.”
And on Page 30, second half of the second paragraph, I read:
“Not until the blocks of buildings were well aflame and were
about to collapse did a considerable number of Jews emerge,
forced to do so by the flames and the smoke. Time and again the
Jews tried to escape even through burning buildings. Innumerable
Jews whom we saw on the roofs during the conflagration perished
in the flames. Others emerged from the upper stories in the last
possible moment and were only able to escape death from the
flames by jumping down. Today we caught a total of 2,283 Jews of
whom 204 were shot; and innumerable Jews were destroyed in
dugouts and in the flames.”
And from Page 34, the second paragraph, I read, beginning the second
line:
“The Jews testify that they emerge at night to get fresh air,
since it is unbearable to stay permanently within the dugouts
owing to the long duration of the operation. On the average the
raiding parties shoot 30 to 50 Jews each night. From these
statements it was to be inferred that a considerable number of
Jews are still underground in the ghetto. Today we blew up a
concrete building which we had not been able to destroy by fire.
In this operation we learned that the blowing up of a building
is a very lengthy process and takes an enormous amount of
explosives. The best and only method for destroying the Jews
therefore still remains the setting of fires.”
And from Page 35, the last part of the second paragraph, I read:
“Some depositions speak of three to four thousand Jews still
remaining in underground holes, sewers, and dugouts. The
undersigned is resolved not to terminate the large-scale
operation until the last Jew has been destroyed.”
And from the teletype message of 15 May 1943 on Page 44, we gather that
the operation is in its last stage. I read the end of the first
paragraph on Page 44:
“A special unit once more searched the last block of buildings,
which was still intact, in the ghetto and subsequently destroyed
it. In the evening the chapel, mortuary, and all other buildings
in the Jewish cemetery were blown up or destroyed by fire.”
On 24 May 1943 the final figures have been compiled by Major General
Stroop. He reports on Page 45, last paragraph:
“Of the total of 56,065 caught, about 7,000 were destroyed in
the former Jewish residential area during large-scale
operations; 6,929 Jews were destroyed by transporting them to T.
II”—which we believe to be Treblinka, Camp Number 2, which will
later be referred to—“the sum total of Jews destroyed is
therefore 13,929. Beyond the number of 56,065 an estimated
number of 5,000 to 6,000 Jews were destroyed by being blown up
or by perishing in the flames.”
The Court has noted within the report 1061-PS a number of photographs;
and with the Court’s permission I should like to show a few of these
photographs, still pictures, on the screen, unless the Court believes
that reference to the original text will be sufficient for the Court’s
purpose.
THE PRESIDENT: No; if you want to put them on the screen, you may do so.
Perhaps it would be convenient to adjourn now and you can put them on
the screen afterwards.
[_A recess was taken._]
[_Still pictures were projected on the screen in the courtroom._]
MAJOR WALSH: This first picture [_pointing to a picture on the screen_]
is shown on Page 27 of the photographs in Document 1061-PS. It is
entitled “The Destruction of a Block of Buildings.” The Court will
recall those portions of the teletype messages that referred to the
setting of fires for the purpose of driving out the Jews. This picture,
taken from the record, portrays such a scene.
This picture [_pointing to a picture on the screen_] is from Page 21 of
the photographs contained in the exhibit, and the caption is “Smoking
out of the Jews and Bandits.” Excerpts from the teletype messages read
in the record relate to the use of smoke as a means of forcing Jews out
of the hiding places.
This picture [_pointing to a picture on the screen_] is from Page 36 of
the photographs in the exhibit and it is called “Fighting a Nest of
Resistance.” It is obviously a picture of an explosive blast being used
to destroy one of the buildings, and the Court may recall the message of
7 May 1943 that related to the blowing up of buildings as a lengthy
process requiring an enormous amount of explosive. The same message
reported that the best method for destroying the Jews was the setting of
fires.
This picture [_pointing to a picture on the screen_] is taken from Page
36 of the photographs. The Court’s attention is invited to the figure of
a man in mid-air who appears in the picture about halfway between the
center and the upper right-hand corner. He has jumped from one of the
upper floors of the burning building. A close examination of this
picture by the Court in the original photograph will disclose other
figures, in the upper floor windows, who apparently are about to follow
him. The teletype message of 22 April reported that entire families
jumped from burning buildings and were liquidated at once.
This picture [_pointing to a picture on the screen_] is from Page 39 of
the photographs. It is entitled “The Leader of the Large-scale Action.”
The Nazi-appointed commander of this action was SS Major General Stroop,
who probably is the central figure in this picture. I cannot refrain
from commenting at this point on the smiling faces of the group shown
there, in the midst of the violence and destruction.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from that document now?
MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell the Tribunal where the document was found?
MAJOR WALSH: It is a captured document, Sir. I do not have the history,
but I shall be very pleased to submit the background and history to the
Court at the beginning of the afternoon session.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, I think, would like to know where it was
found and to whom it was submitted.
MAJOR WALSH: I have that. I believe that is contained in the document.
The teletype messages, Sir, that are contained in this exhibit were all
addressed to the Higher SS and Police Führer, SS Obergruppenführer and
General of the Police Krüger or his deputy.
It was not always necessary, or perhaps desirable, first to place the
Jews within the ghettos to effect the elimination. In the Baltic States
a more direct course of action was followed. I refer to Document L-180,
now in evidence, which is Exhibit USA-276. This is a report by SS
Brigade Führer Stahlecker to Himmler, dated 15 October 1941, entitled
“Action Group A,” found in Himmler’s private files. He reported that
135,567 persons, nearly all Jews, were murdered in accordance with basic
orders directing the complete annihilation of the Jews. This voluminous
document provides me with the following statement by the same SS Brigade
Führer, and from the translation at the bottom of Page 6, the second
sentence of the last paragraph, I read:
“To our surprise it was not easy, at first, to set in motion an
extensive pogrom against the Jews. Klimatis, the leader of the
partisan unit mentioned above, who was used for this purpose
primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis of advice
given to him by a small advanced detachment acting in Kovno and
in such a way that no German order or German instigation was
noticed from the outside. During the first pogrom in the night
from 25 to 26 June the Lithuanian partisans did away with more
than 1,500 Jews, setting fire to several synagogues or
destroying them by other means and burning down a Jewish
dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During the
following nights 2,300 Jews were eliminated in a similar way.”
From the last part of Paragraph 3, Page 7, I read:
“It was possible, though, through similar influences on the
Latvian auxiliary to set in motion a pogrom against the Jews
also in Riga. During this pogrom all synagogues were destroyed
and about 400 Jews were killed.”
Nazi ingenuity reached a new high mark with the construction and
operation of the gas van as a means of mass annihilation of the Jews. A
description of these vehicles of horror and death and the operation of
them is fully set forth in a captured top-secret document, dated 16 May
1942, addressed to SS Obersturmbannführer Rauff, 8
Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse, Berlin, from Dr. Becker, SS Untersturmführer. I
offer this document, 501-PS, Exhibit USA-288. I quote:
“The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While
the vans in the first series can also be put into action if the
weather is not too bad, the vans of the second series (Saurer)
stop completely in rainy weather. If it has rained for instance
for only one-half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply
skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry weather. It is
a question now of whether the van can be used only when it
stands at the place of execution. First the van has to be
brought to that place, which is possible only in good weather.
The place of execution is usually 10 to 15 kilometers away from
the highway and is difficult of access because of its location;
in damp or wet weather it is not accessible at all. If the
persons to be executed are driven or led to that place, then
they realize immediately what is going on and get restless,
which is to be avoided as far as possible. There is only one way
left: to load them at the collecting point and to drive them to
the spot.
“I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as
house-trailers by putting one set of window shutters on each
side of the small van and two on each side of the larger vans,
such as one often sees on farm houses in the country. The vans
became so well-known that not only the authorities but also the
civilian population called the van ‘death van’ as soon as one of
the vehicles appeared. It is my opinion the van cannot be kept
secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged.”
And then I read the fourth paragraph on this page:
“Because of the rough terrain and the indescribable road and
highway conditions the caulkings and rivets loosen in the course
of time. I was asked if in such cases the vans should not be
brought to Berlin for repairs. Transportation to Berlin would be
much too expensive and would demand too much fuel. In order to
save these expenses I ordered them to have smaller leaks
soldered and, if that should no longer be possible, to notify
Berlin immediately by radio, that License Number . . . is out of
order. Besides that I ordered that during application of gas all
the men were to be kept as far away from the vans as possible,
so that they should not suffer damage to their health by the gas
which eventually would escape. I should like to take this
opportunity to bring the following to your attention: Several
commands have had the unloading, after the application of gas,
done by their own men. I brought to the attention of the
commanders of these special detachments concerned the immense
psychological injury and damage to their health which that work
can have for those men, even if not immediately, at least later
on. The men complained to me about headaches which appeared
after each unloading. Nevertheless they don’t want to change the
orders, because they are afraid prisoners called for that work
could use an opportune moment to flee. To protect the men from
such damage, I request orders be issued accordingly. The
application of gas usually is not undertaken correctly. In order
to come to an end as fast as possible, the driver presses the
accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing that the persons to
be executed suffer death from suffocation and not death by
dozing off as was planned. My directions now have proved that by
correct adjustment of the levers death comes faster and the
prisoners fall asleep peacefully. Distorted faces and
excretions, such as could be seen before, are no longer noticed.
“Today I shall continue my journey to group B, where I can be
reached with further news. Signed, Doctor Becker, SS
Untersturmführer.”
On Page 3 in Document 501-PS we find a letter signed by Hauptsturmführer
Trühess on the subject of S-Vans, addressed to the Reich Security Main
Office, Room II-D-3-A, Berlin, marked “top secret.” This letter
establishes that the vans were used for the annihilation of the Jews. I
read this top-secret message; subject, “S-Vans”:
“A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special way,
arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security
Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia.
“The three S-vans which are there are not sufficient for that
purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (5 tons). At the
same time I request the shipment of 20 gas hoses for the three
S-vans on hand (two Diamond, one Saurer), since the ones on hand
are leaky already.”—Signed—“the Commandant of the Security
Police and the Security Service, Ostland.”
It would appear from the documentary evidence that a certain amount of
discord existed between the officials of the German Government as to the
proper means and methods used in connection with the program of
extermination. A secret report dated 18 June 1943, addressed to
Defendant Rosenberg, complained that 5,000 Jews killed by the police and
SS might have been used for forced labor and chided them for failing to
bury the bodies of those liquidated. I offer in evidence this file,
Document Number R-135, Exhibit USA-289.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it in these volumes, Major Walsh?
MAJOR WALSH: I think, Sir, that will be found in the assembly of the
document book in our case; that has been placed in front of R-124. I
quote from the letter referred to, addressed to the Reich Minister for
the Occupied Eastern Territories, the first paragraph of the
translation:
“The fact that Jews receive special treatment requires no
further discussion. However, it appears hardly believable that
this was done in the way described in the report of the General
Commissioner of 1 June 1943. What is Katyn against that? Imagine
only that these occurrences might become known to the other side
and be exploited by them! Most likely such propaganda would have
no effect, only because people who hear and read about it simply
would not be ready to believe it.”
The last part of Paragraph 3 on this page reads:
“To lock men, women, and children into barns and to set fire to
them does not appear to be a suitable method for combatting
bands, even if it is desired to exterminate the population. This
method is not worthy of the German cause and hurts our
reputation severely.”
Günther, the prison warden at Minsk, in a letter dated 31 May 1943,
addressed to the General Commissioner for White Ruthenia, subject:
“Action against Jews,” was critical by implication. With the Court’s
permission I would like to read this entire letter, part of Document
R-135, Page 5, subject: “Action Against Jews”:
“On 13 April 1943 the former German dentist Ernst Israel
Tichauer and his wife, Elisa Sara Tichauer, née Rosenthal, were
committed to the court prison by the Security Service . . . .
Since that time all German and Russian Jews who were turned over
to us had their gold bridgework, crowns, and fillings pulled or
broken out. This happens always 1 to 2 hours before the
respective action.
“Since 13 April 1943, 516 German and Russian Jews have been
finished off. On the basis of a definite investigation gold was
taken only in two actions—on 14 April 1943, from 172, and on 27
April 1943, from 164 Jews. About 50 percent of the Jews had gold
teeth, bridgework, or fillings. Hauptscharführer Rübe of the
Security Service was always personally present, and he took the
gold along, too.
“Before 13 April 1943 this was not done. Signed, Günther, Prison
Warden.”
This letter was forwarded to the Defendant Rosenberg as Reich Minister
for the Occupied Eastern Territories on 1 June 1943. I will read the
covering letter, part of Document R-135, Page 4, to the Reich Minister
of the Occupied Eastern Territories, Berlin, through the Reich
Commissioner for the Ostland, Riga; Subject, “Actions against Jews in
the Prison of Minsk”:
“The enclosed official report from the warden of the prison in
Minsk is submitted to the Reich Minister and the Reich
Commissioner for Information.”—Signed—“the General
Commissioner in Minsk.”
THE PRESIDENT: Does “respective action,” as indicated in the letter
dated the 31st of May 1943, mean execution?
MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir; we so interpret it. The Court will recall that
the ridding of the Jews via gas vans ties in very closely with the
second letter of the transport of Jews arriving for that purpose.
THE PRESIDENT: Was this document found in Rosenberg’s file?
MAJOR WALSH: I am so informed, Sir. A further complaint is contained in
a secret letter addressed to General of the Infantry Thomas, chief of
the industrial armament department, dated 2 December 1941. It might be
noted with interest that the apprehensive writer of this letter stated
that he did not forward the communication through official channels. I
offer in evidence captured Document 3257-PS; and I quote from the first
paragraph. This is Exhibit USA-290:
“For the personal information of the chief of the industrial
armament department, I am forwarding a total account of the
present situation in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine in which the
difficulties and tensions encountered so far and the problems
which give rise to serious anxiety are stated with unmistakable
clarity.
“Intentionally I have desisted from submitting such a report
through official channels or from making it known to other
departments interested in it because I do not expect any results
that way, but on the contrary am apprehensive that the
difficulties and tensions and also the divergent opinions might
only be increased due to the peculiarity of the situation.”
“Jewish problem”—Paragraph c, Page 1:
“Regulation of the Jewish question in the Ukraine was a
difficult problem because the Jews constituted a large part of
the urban population. We therefore have to deal—just as in the
Government General—with a mass problem of policy concerning the
population. Many cities had a percentage of Jews exceeding 50
percent. Only the rich Jews had fled from the German troops. The
majority of Jews remained under German administration. The
latter found the problem more complicated through the fact that
these Jews represented almost entire trade and even a part of
the manpower in small and medium industries, besides business,
which had in part become superfluous as a direct or indirect
result of the war. The elimination therefore necessarily had
far-reaching economic consequences and even direct consequences
for the armament industry (production for supplying the
troops).”
Paragraph 1 on Page 2:
“The attitude of the Jewish population was anxious—obliging
from the beginning. They tried to avoid everything that might
displease the German administration. That they hated the German
administration and army inwardly goes without saying and cannot
be surprising. However, there is no proof that Jewry as a whole
or even to a greater part was implicated in acts of sabotage
. . . . Surely there were some terrorists or saboteurs among
them, just as among the Ukrainians. But it cannot be said that
the Jews as such represented a danger to the German Armed
Forces. The output produced by Jews who, of course, were
prompted by nothing but the feeling of fear, was satisfactory to
the troops and the German administration.
“The Jewish population remained temporarily unmolested shortly
after the fighting. Only weeks, sometimes months later,
specially detached formations of police executed a planned
shooting of Jews. This action as a rule proceeded from east to
west. It was done entirely in public with the use of the
Ukrainian militia; and unfortunately, in many instances also
with members of the Armed Forces taking part voluntarily. The
way these actions, which included men and old men, women, and
children of all ages, were carried out was horrible. The great
masses executed make this action more gigantic than any similar
measure taken so far in the Soviet Union. So far about 150,000
to 200,000 Jews may have been executed in the part of the
Ukraine belonging to the Reichskommissariat; no consideration
was given to the interests of economy.
“Summarizing, it can be said that the kind of solution of the
Jewish problem applied to the Ukraine, which obviously was based
on the ideological theories as a matter of principle, had the
following results:
“(a) Elimination of a part of partly superfluous eaters in the
cities;
“(b) Elimination of a part of the population which undoubtedly
hated us;
“(c) Elimination of badly needed tradesmen who were in many
instances indispensable even in the interests of the Armed
Forces;
“(d) Consequences as to foreign policy propaganda which are
obvious;
“(e) Bad effects on the troops which in any case get indirect
contact with the execution;
“(f) Brutalizing effect on the formations which carry out the
execution—regular police.”
Lest the Court be persuaded to the belief that these conditions related,
existed only in the East, I invite attention to the official Netherlands
Government report by the Commissioner for Repatriation as indicative of
the treatment of the Jews in the West.
This document is a recital of the German measures taken in the
Netherlands against the Dutch Jews. The decrees, the anti-Semitic
demonstrations, the burning of synagogues, the purging of Jews from the
economic life of their country, the food restrictions against them,
forced labor, concentration camp confinement, deportation, and
death—all follow the same pattern that was effected throughout
Nazi-occupied Europe.
I how refer to Document 1726-PS, Exhibit USA-195, already in evidence.
It is not intended to read this document in evidence, but it is deemed
important to invite the Court’s attention to that portion of the report
relating to the deportation of Dutch Jews shown on Page 5 of the
translation. There the Court will note that full Jews being liable to
deportation number 140,000. The Court will also note that the total
number of deportees was 117,000, representing more than 83 percent of
all the Jews in the Netherlands. Of these 115,000 were deported to
Poland for slave labor, according to the Netherlands report, and after
departure all trace of them was lost. Regardless of victory or defeat to
Germany, the Jew was doomed. It was the expressed intent of the Nazi
State that, whatever the German fate might be, the Jew would not
survive.
I offer in evidence Document L-53, stamped “top secret,” Exhibit
USA-291. This message is from the Commandant of the Sipo and SD for the
Radom District, addressed to SS Hauptsturmführer Thiel on the subject,
“Clearance of Prisons.” I read the body of this message:
“I again stress the fact that the number of inmates of the Sipo
and SD prisons must be kept as low as possible. In the present
situation, particularly, those suspects handed over by the civil
police need only be subjected to a short formal interrogation
provided there are no serious grounds for suspicion. They are
then to be sent by the quickest route to a concentration camp
should no court-martial proceeding be necessary or should there
be no question of discharge. Please keep the number of
discharges very low. Should the situation at the front
necessitate it, early preparations are to be made for the total
clearance of prisons. Should the situation develop suddenly in
such a way that it is impossible to evacuate the prisoners, the
prison inmates are to be eliminated and their bodies disposed of
as far as possible (burning, blowing up the building, _et
cetera_). If necessary, Jews still employed in the armament
industry or on other work are to be dealt with in the same way.
“The liberation of prisoners or Jews by the enemy—be it the WB
or the Red Army—must be avoided under all circumstances, nor
may they fall into their hands alive.”
THE PRESIDENT: What is the WB?
MAJOR WALSH: I have inquired about the WB, Your Honor, from several
sources and have not found an understanding or a statement of it.
Perhaps before the afternoon session I may be able to enlighten the
Court. I have not yet been able to find out.
THE PRESIDENT: Where was the document found?
MAJOR WALSH: It is a captured document, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Does it relate to prisoners of war, did you say?
MAJOR WALSH: No, Sir; including therein, of course, prisoners of war as
well as all Jews. The history of the document, Sir, I will try to gather
for the Court’s information.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Did you tell us what the Sipo were?
MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir; I furnished the Court with that; that is the
Security Police, Sir.
This presentation, if the Court please, would be incomplete without
incorporating herein reference to the concentration camps insofar as
they relate to the hundreds of thousands—millions—of Jews who died by
mass shooting, gas, poison, starvation, and other means. The subject of
concentration camps and all its horrors was shown to this Tribunal not
only in the motion picture film but by the most able presentation of Mr.
Dodd yesterday; and it is not intended, at this time, to refer to the
camps—only insofar as they relate to the part they played in the
annihilation of the Jewish people. For example, in the camp at Auschwitz
during July 1944 Jews were killed at the rate of 12,000 daily. This
information is contained in Document L-161, Exhibit USA-292. The
Document L-161 is an official Polish report on Auschwitz Concentration
Camp. It is dated 31 May 1945. I have taken a short excerpt from this
report on the original marked . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I think you made a mistake, did you not? It is not a
Polish report; it is a British report.
MAJOR WALSH: I understand, Sir, it was compiled originally by the Polish
Government and perhaps distributed from London.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Very well.
MAJOR WALSH: I quote:
“During July 1944 Hungarian Jews were being liquidated at the
rate of 12,000 daily; and as the crematoria could not deal with
such numbers, many bodies were thrown into large pits and
covered with quicklime.”
I offer in evidence Document 3311-PS, Exhibit USA-293. This is an
official Polish Government Commission report on the investigation of
German crimes in Poland. The document describes the concentration camp
at Treblinka; and from Page 1, Paragraph 3 and 4, I read as follows:
“In March 1942 the Germans began to erect another camp,
Treblinka B, in the neighborhood of Treblinka A, intended to
become a place of torment for Jews.
“The erection of this camp was closely connected with the German
plans aimed at a complete destruction of the Jewish population
in Poland, which necessitated the creation of a machinery by
means of which the Polish Jews could be killed in large numbers.
Late in April 1942 erection was completed of the first chambers
in which these general massacres were to be performed by means
of steam. Somewhat later the erection of the real death
building, which contains 10 death chambers, was finished. It was
opened for wholesale murders early in autumn 1942.”
And on Page 3 of this report, beginning with the second paragraph, the
Polish Commission describes graphically the procedure for the
extermination within the camp:
“The average number of Jews dealt with at the camp in the summer
of 1942 was about two railway transports daily, but there were
days of much higher efficiency. From autumn 1942 this number was
falling.
“After unloading in the siding, all victims were assembled in
one place, where men were separated from women and children. In
the first days of the existence of the camp the victims were
made to believe that after a short stay in the camp, necessary
for bathing and disinfection, they would be sent farther east
for work. Explanations of this sort were given by SS men who
assisted at the unloading of the transports, and further
explanations could be read in notices stuck up on the walls of
the barracks. But later, when more transports had to be dealt
with, the Germans dropped all pretenses and only tried to
accelerate the procedure.
“All victims had to strip off their clothes and shoes, which
were collected afterwards, whereupon all victims, women and
children first, were driven into the death chambers. Those too
slow or too weak to move quickly were driven in by rifle butts,
by whipping and kicking, often by Sauer himself. Many slipped
and fell; the next victims pressed forward and stumbled over
them. Small children were simply thrown inside. After being
filled up to capacity, the chambers were hermetically closed and
steam was let in. In a few minutes all was over. The Jewish
menial workers had to remove the bodies from the platform and to
bury them in mass graves. By and by, as new transports arrived,
the cemetery grew, extending in an easterly direction.
“From reports received it may be assumed that several hundred
thousands of Jews have been exterminated in Treblinka.”
I now offer in evidence the document identified by Number L-22, Exhibit
USA-294. This is an official United States Government report issued by
the Executive Office of the President of the United States, War Refugee
Board, on the German camps at Auschwitz and Birkenau, dated 1944. On
Page 33 of this report is set forth the number of Jews gassed in
Birkenau in the 2-year period between April 1942 and April 1944. I have
been assured that the figure printed in this report is not a
typographical error. The number shown is 1,765,000.
I would now like to turn to the German bookkeeping and statistics for
enlightenment on the extermination of Jews in Poland. Referring again to
the diary of Hans Frank already in evidence, Document 2233-PS, Exhibit
USA-281, I read briefly from the beginning of the fourth paragraph on
Page 1:
“For us the Jews also represent extraordinarily malignant
gluttons.
“We have now approximately 2,500,000 of them in the Government
General . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh, you have read this already yourself.
MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir, that is true. I just want to make reference to it
again, Sir, for comparison with other figures.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MAJOR WALSH: “. . . perhaps with the Jewish mixtures, and
everything that goes with it, 3,500,000 Jews.”
Now this figure, if the Court please, was as of 16 December 1941. I now
wish to turn to 25 January 1944, 3 years and 1 month later, and make
reference to another excerpt from Frank’s diary, 2233-PS, loose-leaf
volume Exhibit USA-295. This volume covers the period from 1 January
1944 to 28 February 1944, and Page 5 of the original reads:
“At the present time we still have in the Government General
perhaps 100,000 Jews.”
In this period of 3 years, according to the records of the then Governor
General of Occupied Poland, between 2,400,000 and 3,400,000 Jews had
been eliminated.
The Prosecution could offer this Tribunal a wealth of evidence on the
total number of Jews who died by Nazi hands, but it is believed that
cumulative evidence would not vary the guilt of these defendants.
I do wish, however, to offer one document, a statement, to establish the
deaths of 4 million Jews in camps and deaths of 2 million Jews by the
State Police in the East, making a total of 6 million—Document 2738-PS,
Exhibit USA-296. This is a statement—of Adolf Eichmann, Chief of the
Jewish Section of the Gestapo, and the source of the figures
quoted—made by Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, Deputy Group Leader of the foreign
section of the Security Service, Amt VI of the RSHA. Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl,
in affidavit form, made the following statement; and I quote from Page
2:
“Approximately 4 million Jews had been killed in the various
concentration camps, while an additional 2 million met death in
other ways, the major part of which were shot by operational
squads of the Security Police during the campaign against
Russia.”
May I, in conclusion, emphasize that the captured documents in evidence
are, almost without exception, from the official sources of the Nazi
Party.
THE PRESIDENT: You only read that one statement, but where does the
person who made the affidavit get his information from?
MAJOR WALSH: I shall be pleased to read that in there, Sir. I made a
statement that Eichmann has been the source of the information given to
Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, one of his assistants, and on Page 1 it says:
“According to my knowledge Eichmann was at that time a section
leader in the Amt IV (Gestapo) of RSHA; and in addition he had
been ordered by Himmler to get hold of the Jews in all the
European countries and to transport them to Germany. Eichmann
was then very much impressed with the fact that Romania had
withdrawn from the war in those days. Therefore, he had come to
me to get information about the military situation, which I
received daily from the Hungarian . . . Ministry of War and from
the Commander of the Waffen-SS in Hungary. He expressed his
conviction that Germany had lost the war and that he personally
had no further chance. He knew that he would be considered one
of the main war criminals by the United Nations, since he had
millions of Jewish lives on his conscience. I asked him how many
that was, to which he answered that although the number was a
great Reich secret, he would tell me since I, as a historian
too, would be interested and that probably he would not return
anyhow from his command in Romania. He had, shortly before that,
made a report to Himmler, as the latter wanted to know the exact
number of Jews who had been killed.”
It was on that basis of this information, Sir, that I read the following
quotation.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The motion that was made this morning on behalf of the
Defendant Kaltenbrunner is denied, and the affidavit is admitted and
will not be stricken from the record. But the Tribunal wished me to say
that it is open to the Defendants’ Counsel, in accordance with the
Charter and the Rules, to make a motion, in writing, if they wish to do
so, for the attendance of Pfaffenberger for cross-examination and to
state in that motion the reasons therefor.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I now bring up a question similar, though in some
respects different, from that of Pfaffenberger? I request that the
evidence of Dr. Hoettl, which was read into the record this morning be
stricken out again for the following two reasons. As far as I know, Dr.
Hoettl is here in Nuremberg . . .
THE PRESIDENT: One minute. Do you understand that the Tribunal has just
denied the motion that you made this morning?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, I understood that perfectly.
THE PRESIDENT: What is your motion now?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I should like to ask that the evidence of Dr. Hoettl be
stricken from the record. My reasons for this request are rather
different from those given this morning in the Pfaffenberger case.
As can be seen from the affidavit, Dr. Hoettl was interrogated on the
26th of November hardly 3 weeks ago. Moreover I gather that Dr. Hoettl
is kept in custody here in Nuremberg. No delay would therefore be
involved if this witness were called to the stand.
This man held a significant position in the SS and for that reason I
have already applied in writing that he be called as a witness. I am
convinced that there is a large amount of important evidence which he
can reveal to the Court. Dr. Hoettl’s deposition is infinitely
important. The death of millions of people is involved here. His
affidavit is based largely on inferences, on hearsay; I believe that the
facts are very different, and I would not like to apply later, after
weeks or months, for the witness to be brought into Court.
MAJOR WALSH: If the Court please, excerpts from the affidavit of Dr.
Wilhelm Hoettl were read into the record this morning for the purpose
. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Wait—what was the number?
MAJOR WALSH: Document 2738-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
MAJOR WALSH: Dr. Hoettl’s affidavit 2738 was in part read into the
record this morning for the sole purpose of showing the approximate
number of Jews, according to his estimates, that had met death at the
hands of the German State. No other portion of his testimony was
referred to and the evidence offered was only for the sole purpose of
establishing his estimate of the number. His position in the Party and
in the state, as well as the position of Adolf Eichmann, the source of
his information, was also stated into the record.
I believe that Dr. Hoettl, if he is desired for any other purpose by the
Defense, may be called by the Defense, but the Prosecution had no other
purpose in utilizing his evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to add anything more?
MAJOR WALSH: That is all, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal makes the same ruling in this case as in the
case of Pfaffenberger, namely, that the affidavit is admitted in
evidence but that it is open to Defendants’ Counsel to make a motion, in
writing, for the attendance of the witness for cross-examination and to
state in that motion the reasons for it.
MAJOR WALSH: During the morning session the Court requested certain
information concerning documents that had been offered and accepted in
evidence. I refer to Document 1061-PS, the report “The Warsaw Ghetto Is
No More.” This report, I am told, was prepared for presentation at a
meeting of the SS Police leaders to be held on 18 May 1943. That is
indicated on Page 45 of the translation before the Court.
This document was captured by the 7th United States Army and delivered
by them to the G-2 of the United States Forces in the European Theater.
In turn they were delivered to Colonel Storey of the United States
prosecutors’ staff, some months ago. The Court also ignored . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh, I think the Tribunal also wished to know
whether you could tell us to whom the report had been made?
MAJOR WALSH: The report, Sir, according to the teletypes—the daily
teletypes, Sir—was addressed to the Higher SS and Police Leader East,
SS Obergruppenführer and General of the Police Krüger, or his deputy.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
MAJOR WALSH: The Court further inquired about Document L-53 and I have
obtained some information concerning this document. This document was
captured by T-Force of the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment Number
220, found among the German records at Weimar, Germany, sometime prior
to 10 May 1945.
The Court further inquired, concerning this document, the meaning of the
letters “WB.” I regret that I have been unable to obtain definite
information as to the meaning of “WB” but it has been suggested to me
that it might mean Westbund or Western Ally because it is used in
connection with the capture—the destruction of all prisoners before
capture by either the WB or the Red Armies, and I presume that it may
mean Westbund.
The slaughter of the Jews in Europe cannot be expressed in figures
alone, for the impact of this slaughter is even more tragic to the
future of the Jewish people and mankind. Ancient Jewish communities with
their own rich spiritual, cultural, and economic life, bound up for
centuries with the life of the nations in which they flourished, have
been completely obliterated. The contribution of the Jewish people to
civilization, the arts, the sciences, industry, and culture, need not, I
am sure, be elaborated upon before this Tribunal. Their destruction,
carried out continuously, deliberately, intentionally, and methodically
by the Nazis, represents a loss to civilization of special qualities and
abilities that cannot possibly be recouped.
I have not attempted to recount the multitudinous and diabolical crimes
committed against the Jewish people by the state which these defendants
ruled, because, with sober regard for contemporary and historical truth,
a detailed description of some of these crimes would transcend the
utmost reaches of the human faculty of expression. The mind already
recoils and shrinks from the acceptance of the incredible facts already
related. Rather, it is my purpose to elucidate the pattern, the
successful and successive stages, the sequence and concurrence of the
crimes committed, the pre-determined means to a pre-ordained end.
Yet, these cold, stark, brutal facts and figures, drawn largely from the
defendants’ own sources and submitted in evidence before this Tribunal,
defy rebuttal.
From conception to execution, from the Party program of 1920 to the
gloating declarations of Himmler and the Defendant Frank in 1943 and
1944, the annihilation of the Jewish people in Europe was man-made—made
by the very men, sitting in the defendants’ box, brought to judgment
before this Tribunal.
Before closing may I acknowledge with appreciation the untiring services
of the group of the staff of the United States’ Prosecution, through
whose painstaking search, analysis, and study, this presentation of
evidence was made possible: Captain Seymour Krieger, Lieutenant Brady
Bryson, Lieutenant Frederick Felton, Sergeant Isaac Stone, and Mr. Hans
Nathan.
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the next presentation, concerning
Germanization and spoliation in occupied countries, will be presented by
Captain Sam Harris.
CAPTAIN SAMUEL HARRIS (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States):
May the Tribunal please, documents relating to the Nazi program of
Germanization and spoliation have been assembled in a document book
bearing the letter “U.” These document books are now being distributed
for the use of the members of the Tribunal. I ask Your Honors to note
that the tabs on the side of the document book are numbered 1 to 30. The
index sheet at the front of the book keys these numbers to the EC, PS,
and R numbers of our exhibits.
For Your Honors’ convenience we have also numbered the pages of each
exhibit in pencil at the upper right-hand corner of each exhibit.
The documents which we shall introduce were collected by Lieutenant
Kenyon, who sits at my right, and by Doctors Derenberg and Jacoby.
Without their untiring efforts, this presentation would not have been
possible.
Evidence has already been introduced by Mr. Alderman to prove that the
defendants conspired to wage aggressive war. It has also been proved
that the desire for Lebensraum was one of the chief forces motivating
the conspirators to plan, launch, and wage their wars of aggression. We
propose at this time to present evidence disclosing what the
conspirators intended to do with conquered territories, called by them
Lebensraum, after they had succeeded in overpowering the victims of
their aggressions.
We have broadly divided this subject into two categories: Germanization
and spoliation. When we speak of plans to germanize, we mean plans to
assimilate conquered territories politically, culturally, socially, and
economically into the German Reich. Germanization, we shall demonstrate,
meant the obliteration of the former national character of the conquered
territories and the extermination of all elements which could not be
reconciled with the Nazi ideology. By spoliation, we mean the plunder of
public and private property and, in general, the exploitation of the
people and the natural resources of occupied countries.
We propose, with the permission of Your Honors, to introduce at this
time 30 documents in all. These documents lay bare some of the secret
plans of the conspirators to germanize, to plunder, to despoil, and to
destroy. They do not, of course, tell the whole story of all the
conspirators’ plans in this field. In some instances proof of the plan
is derived from the acts committed by the conspirators. But these few
documents are particularly illuminating with respect to the
conspirators’ plans for Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Russia; and they
indicate the outlines of carefully conceived plans for the rest of
Europe. Others who follow will fill in this outline by showing a series
of outrages committed on so vast a scale that no doubts will exist that
they were committed according to plan.
Poland was, in a sense, the testing ground for the conspirators’
theories upon Lebensraum; and I turn to that country first.
The four western provinces of Poland were purportedly incorporated into
Germany by an order of 8 October 1939. This order, which was signed by
Hitler, Lammers, and Defendants Göring, Frick, and Hess, is set forth in
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1939, Part I, Page 2042; and we ask the Tribunal to
take judicial notice thereof. These areas of Poland are frequently
referred to in correspondence among the conspirators as “incorporated
Eastern Territories.” The remainder of Poland, which was seized by the
Nazi invaders, was established as the Government General of Poland by an
order of Hitler dated 12 October 1939. By that same order Defendant Hans
Frank was named Governor General of the newly created Government
General; and Defendant Seyss-Inquart was named Deputy Governor General.
This order is set forth in _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1939, Part I, Page 2077;
and we ask the Tribunal also to take judicial notice of it.
The plans with respect to Poland were rather complicated; and I believe
that the significance of specific items of proof may be more readily
apparent if, in advance of the introduction of the documents, I am
permitted briefly to indicate the broad pattern of these plans.
We submit that the documents we are about to introduce on Poland show
the following:
First: The conspirators specifically planned to exploit the people and
material resources of the Government General of Poland in order to
strengthen the Nazi war machine, to impoverish the Government General,
and to reduce it to a vassal state. At a later stage plans were
formulated for creating islands of German settlements in the more
fertile regions of the Government General in order to engulf the native
Polish population and accelerate the process of Germanization.
Second: The incorporated area of Poland, which was deemed to be a part
of the German Reich, was to be ruthlessly germanized. To that end, the
conspirators planned:
(a) To permit the retention of the productive facilities in the
incorporated area, all of which, of course, would be dedicated to the
Nazi war machine.
(b) They planned to deport to the Government General many hundreds of
thousands of Jews, members of the Polish intelligentsia, and other
non-compliant elements. We shall show that the Jews who were deported to
the Government General were doomed to speedy annihilation. Moreover,
since the conspirators felt that members of the Polish intelligentsia
could not be germanized and might serve as a center of resistance
against their New Order, they too were to be eliminated.
(c) They planned to deport all able-bodied Polish workers to Germany for
work in the Nazi war machine. This served the twofold purpose of helping
to satisfy the labor requirements of the Nazi war machine and preventing
the propagation of a new generation of Poles. Mr. Dodd has already
produced abundant proof on this topic, and I shall do no more than refer
to it.
(d) They planned to mould all persons in the incorporated area who were
deemed to possess German blood into German subjects who would
religiously adhere to the principles of National Socialism. To that end
the conspirators set up an elaborate racial register. Those who resisted
or refused to co-operate in this program were sent to concentration
camps.
(e) They planned to bring thousands of German subjects into the
incorporated area for purposes of settlement.
(f) And finally, they planned to confiscate the property—particularly
the farms—of the Poles, the Jews, and all dissident elements. The
confiscation of the property of Jews was part of the conspirators’
larger program of extermination of the Jews. Confiscation likewise
served three additional purposes: (1) It provided land for the new
German settlers and enabled the conspirators to reward their adherents;
(2) dispossessed Polish property owners could be shipped to Germany for
work in the production of implements of war; and (3) the separation of
Polish farmers from their wives furthered the plan to prevent the growth
of a new generation of Poles.
We turn now to the specific items of proof.
I first offer in evidence Document Number EC-344 (16), which is Exhibit
Number USA-297. This document is a report of an interview with Defendant
Frank on 3 October 1939 and was found among the files of the OKW, which
were assembled in bulk at the Fechenheim document center. This
particular document was included in a large report prepared in the OKW
by one Captain Varain at the direction of General Thomas, then chief of
the military economic staff of the OKW. I quote from the first 19 lines
of Page 3 of the English text. The German text appears on Page 29, lines
25-36, and Page 30, lines 1-6. The report states, and I quote:
“In the first interview which the chief of the Central Division
and the liaison officer between the Armament Department Upper
East and the Chief Administrative Officer (subsequently Governor
General) had with Reich Minister Frank on 3 October 1939 in
Posen, Frank explained the instruction which had been entrusted
to him by the Führer and the economic political directives
according to which he intended to administer Poland. According
to these directives, Poland could be administered only by
utilizing the country by means of ruthless exploitation; removal
of all supplies—raw materials, machines, factory installations,
_et cetera_—which are important for the German war economy;
availability of all workers for work within Germany; reduction
of the entire Polish economy to the absolute minimum necessary
for the bare existence of the population; closing of all
institutions, especially technical schools and colleges in order
to prevent the growth of a new Polish intelligentsia.
Poland”—Defendant Frank stated—and this is an exact
quotation—“Poland shall be treated as a colony; the Poles shall
be the slaves of the Greater German World Empire.”
I should like also to quote from the last six lines of the English text
of this Exhibit. In the German text it is lines 18 to 23 of Page 30.
Defendant Frank further stated, and I quote:
“By destroying Polish industry its subsequent reconstruction
after the war would become more difficult, if not impossible, so
that Poland would be reduced to its proper position as an
agrarian country which would have to depend upon Germany for
importation of industrial products.”
As further proof of the defendant’s plan to plunder and despoil the
Government General of Poland, I next offer in evidence Document Number
EC-410, which is Exhibit Number USA-298. In addition to the proof of the
defendant’s plans to plunder and despoil the Government General, this
document demonstrates the difference in treatment which the conspirators
planned for the incorporated area of Poland and the Government General.
It is a copy of a directive issued and signed by Defendant Göring on 19
October 1939 and was likewise found among the captured OKW files. I
quote from lines 1 to 19 on Page 1 of the English text. In the German
text it is all of Page 1 and the first line of Page 2. Defendant
Göring’s directive states, and I quote:
“In the meeting of October 13th I have given detailed
instructions for the economical administration of the occupied
territories. I will repeat them here in short:
“1. The task for the economic treatment of the various
administrative regions is different, depending on whether a
country which will be incorporated politically into the German
Reich is involved or whether we deal with the Government
General, which in all probability, will not be made a part of
Germany,
“In the first-mentioned territories the reconstruction and
expansion of the economy, the safeguarding of all their
production facilities and supplies must be aimed at, as well as
a complete incorporation into the Greater German economic system
at the earliest possible time. On the other hand, there must be
removed from the territories of the Government General all raw
materials, scrap materials, machines, _et cetera_ which are of
use for the German war economy. Enterprises which are not
absolutely necessary for the meager maintenance of the naked
existence of the population must be transferred to Germany,
unless such transfer would require an unreasonably long period
of time and would make it more practical to exploit those
enterprises by giving them German orders to be executed at their
present location.”
Once the Government General had been stripped of its industrial
potential, the defendants planned to leave the country desolate. Not
even the war damage was to be repaired. This is the clear import of the
documents previously introduced and is likewise made clear by Document
Number EC-411, which is Exhibit Number USA-299. I offer this document in
evidence. This document is a copy of an order dated 20 November 1939, by
Defendant Hess, in his capacity as Deputy Führer. This document was also
found in the captured OKW files. I quote the English and German texts in
their entirety. Defendant Hess stated, and I quote:
“I hear from Party members who came from the Government General
that various agencies, as for instance, the Military Economic
Staff, the Reich Ministry for Labor, _et cetera_, intend to
reconstruct certain industrial enterprises in Warsaw. However,
in accordance with a decision by Minister Dr. Frank approved by
the Führer, Warsaw shall not be rebuilt nor is it the intention
of the Führer to rebuild or reconstruct any industry in the
Government General.”
Turning from the defendants’ program of economic spoliation in the
Government General to their program of deportation and resettlement, I
next offer in evidence Document Number 661-PS, which is Exhibit Number
USA-300. This is a secret report, prepared by the Academy of German Law
in January 1940, upon plans for the mass migration of Poles and Jews
from incorporated areas of Poland to the Government General and for the
forcible deportation of able-bodied Poles to Germany. This document was
obtained from the ministerial collecting center at Kassel, Germany. The
date does not appear in the English translation, but it is clearly set
forth on the cover page of the original document as January 1940. Before
quoting from this document, I ask first that the Tribunal take judicial
notice of the decree of 11 July 1934, embodied in the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 605, 11 July 1934, which provided that
the Academy of German Law would be a public corporation of the Reich
under the supervision of the Reich Ministers of Justice and the
Interior, and that its task would be:
“To promote the reconstruction of German legal life and to
realize, in constant close collaboration with the competent
legislative organizations, the National Socialist program in the
entire sphere of the law.”
Second, before quoting from the afore-mentioned report of the Academy of
German Law, I should like to offer in evidence Document Number 2749-PS,
which is Exhibit Number USA-301. This is the title page of the
publication of the Academy of German Law for 1940. It is offered for the
purpose of showing that defendant Frank was the President of the Academy
of German Law during the period that the above-mentioned secret report
of the Academy was made. The document specifically states, and I quote:
“Reich Minister Dr. Hans Frank, President of the Academy for
German Law, 7th year 1940.”
Now, if I may ask Your Honors to turn to Document Number 661-PS, I
should first like to quote Page 1, lines 6 to 24, of the English text.
In the German text these extracts appear at Page 6, lines 6 to 10; and
line 22, Page 6, to line 4, Page 7. I quote:
“In the carrying out of costly and long-term measures for the
increase of agricultural production, the Government General can,
at the most, absorb 1 to 1.5 million resettlers, as it is
already over-populated in many cases. . . . By further
absorption of 1.6 million resettlers the 1925 Reich census
figure of 133 inhabitants per square kilometer would be reached,
which practically, because of already existing rural
over-population and lack of industry, would result in a double
over-pressure.
“This figure of 1.6 million will barely suffice for deportations
from the Reich:
“The Jews from the liberated East (over 600,000); groups of the
remaining Jews, preferably the younger age groups from Germany
proper, Austria, Sudetengau and the Protectorate (altogether
over 1 million).”
Continuing the quotation, the report goes on with respect to transfers
from the Reich, and I continue to quote:
“The Polish intelligentsia, who have been branded as
politicians, and potential political leaders; the leading
economic personalities, comprising owners of large estates,
industrialists and businessmen, _et cetera_; the peasant
population, so far as it has to be removed in order to carry
out, by strips of German settlements, the encirclement of Polish
territories in the East.”
Next I quote the last paragraph on Page 1 of the English text. The
German text is at Page 8, lines 3-10:
“In order to relieve the living space of the Poles in the
Government General as well as in the liberated East, one should
temporarily remove cheap labor by the hundreds of thousands,
employ them for a few years in the Old Reich, and thereby hamper
their native biological propagation. (Their assimilation into
the Old Reich must be prevented.)”
Finally, I quote from the last paragraph of Page 2 of the English text.
In the German text it is the last 5 lines on Page 40:
“Strictest care is to be taken that secret documents, memoranda,
and official correspondence which contain instructions
detrimental to the Poles are kept steadily under lock and key,
so that they will not some day fill the White Books printed in
Paris or the U.S.A.”
Your Honors will recall, from your own experiences, the vicious
propaganda campaigns conducted by Nazi Germany to discredit the Polish
books when they made their appearance in countries friendly to Poland.
The last paragraph of this document which I have just read gives the lie
to that whole Nazi propaganda campaign.
The plans for the deportation of thousands of innocent people, which are
set forth in the document from which I have just quoted, were not mere
theories spun by lawyers. They represented, as the next three documents
to be offered in evidence will show, a program which was, in fact,
ruthlessly executed.
I next offer in evidence Document Number 2233(g)-PS, the Frank diaries,
1939, from 25 October to 15 December, which is Exhibit Number USA-302.
This document was obtained from the 7th Army document center at
Heidelberg. I quote from the last paragraph of Page 1, carrying over to
the first two lines of Page 2 of the English text. In the German text
the statements appear at Page 19, lines 19 to 28. Defendant Frank
stated, and I quote:
“The Reichsführer SS”—meaning Himmler—“wishes that all Jews be
evacuated from the newly gained Reich territories. Up to
February approximately 1 million people are to be brought in
this way into the Government General. The families of good
racial extraction present in the occupied Polish territory
(approximately 4 million people) should be transferred into the
Reich and individually housed, thereby being uprooted as a
people.”
I next offer in evidence Document Number EC-305, which is Exhibit Number
USA-303. This exhibit is the top-secret minutes of a meeting held on 12
February 1940, under the chairmanship of Defendant Göring, on “Questions
Concerning the East.” The document was found in the captured OKW files.
Himmler and Defendant Frank likewise were present at this meeting.
I initially quote from Page 1, lines 15 to 17, of the English text.
These extracts are found in the front page, lines 1 to 8, of the German
text. The minutes state, and I quote:
“By way of introduction the General Field Marshal”—meaning
Defendant Göring—“explained that the strengthening of the war
potential of the Reich must be the chief aim of all measures to
be taken in the East.”
I next quote the first two lines of the last paragraph on Page 1 of the
English text. The German text appears at Page 2, lines 2 to 4.
“Agriculture: The task consists of obtaining the greatest
possible agricultural production from the new eastern Gaue,
disregarding questions of ownership.”
I next quote from the second paragraph of Page 2 of the English text.
This is at Page 3, lines 22-24, of the German text:
“Special questions concerning the Government General. . . . The
Government General will have to receive the Jews who are ordered
to emigrate from Germany and the new eastern Gaue.”
Finally, I quote the paragraph numbered 2 under Roman numeral II of Page
2 of the English text. These statements appear in the German text at
Page 4, lines 3-19:
“The following reported on the situation in the Eastern
territories. . . .
“2. Reichsstatthalter Gauleiter Forster”—who said—“‘The
population of the Danzig-West Prussia Gau (newly acquired
territories) is 1.5 million, of whom 240,000 are Germans,
850,000 well-established Poles, and 300,000 immigrant Poles,
Jews, and asocials (1,800 Jews). There have been evacuated
87,000 persons, 40,000 of these from Gdynia. From there also the
numerous shirkers, who are now looked after by welfare, will
have to be deported to the Government General. Therefore an
evacuation of 20,000 additional persons can be counted on for
the current year.’”
Comparable reports were made by other Gauleiter at the meeting. The
figures that were quoted, it may be noted, were only as of February
1940. The forcible deportations, which are reported in the exhibits from
which I have just read, did not involve merely ordering the unfortunate
victims to leave their homes and to take up new residences elsewhere.
These deportations were accomplished according to plan in an utterly
brutal and inhuman manner. Document Number 1918-PS, which is Exhibit
Number USA-304, affords striking proof of this fact; and I offer it in
evidence. This is a speech delivered by Himmler to officers of the SS on
a day commemorating the presentation of the Nazi flag. It is contained
in a compilation of speeches delivered by Himmler, and was captured by
the Counter-Intelligence branch of the United States Army. The exact
date of the speech does not appear in the exhibit, but its contents
plainly show that it was delivered sometime after Poland had been
overrun. I quote from the second to the eighth lines of Page 1 of the
English text. In the German text this quotation appears on Page 52,
lines 2 to 10. In this speech Himmler said, and I quote:
“Very frequently the member of the Waffen-SS thinks about the
deportation of these people here. These thoughts came to me
today when watching the very difficult work out there performed
by the Security Police, supported by your men, who help them a
great deal. Exactly the same thing happened in Poland in weather
40 degrees below zero, where we had to haul away thousands, ten
thousands, a hundred thousand; where we had to have the
toughness—you should hear this but also forget it again—to
shoot thousands of leading Poles.”
I repeat the latter statement:
“Where we had to have the toughness . . . to shoot thousands of
leading Poles.”
Such Poles from the incorporated area as managed to survive the journey
to the Government General could look forward, at best, to extreme
hardship and exposure to every form of degradation and brutality. Your
Honors will recall Defendant Frank’s statement contained in Document
Number EC-344(16), now Exhibit Number USA-297, which was introduced a
short while ago, that the Polish economy would be reduced to the
absolute minimum necessary for the bare existence of the population.
Your Honors Will also recall Defendant Göring’s directive in Document
Number EC-410, now Exhibit Number USA-298, also introduced a few moments
ago, that all industrial enterprises in the Government General not
absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the naked existence of the
Polish population must be removed to Germany. A bare and naked
existence, by the precepts of the conspirators, meant virtual
starvation.
For the Jews who were forcibly deported to the Government General there
was, of course, absolutely no hope. They were, in effect, deported to
their graves. The Defendant Frank, by his own admissions, had dedicated
himself to their complete annihilation. I refer Your Honors to the Frank
diaries, conference volume, 1941, October to December, which is Document
Number 2233(d)-PS, which was introduced by Major Walsh earlier as
Exhibit Number USA-281. The particular statement that I want to quote
appears on Page 4, Your Honor, of Document Number 2233-PS. I believe it
appears at Page 77, lines 9 and 10 of the German text. I quote—this is
what Defendant Frank stated, “We must annihilate the Jews, wherever we
find them, and wherever it is possible. . . .”
I turn next to that aspect of the conspirators’ program which involved
the forcible Germanization of persons in the incorporated area who were
deemed to possess German blood. I refer you now, Your Honors, to the
incorporated area, to persons who were deemed to possess German blood.
Such persons, the evidence will show, were given the choice of the
concentration camp or submission to Germanization. Himmler was the chief
executioner of this program; and initially I should like to introduce a
few documents which disclose the powers bestowed upon him and his
conception of his task.
First, I offer in evidence Document Number 686-PS. This is Exhibit
Number USA-305. This is a copy of a secret decree signed by Hitler and
Defendants Göring and Keitel, dated 7 October 1939, entrusting Himmler
with the task of executing the conspirators’ Germanization program. This
particular document came from the ministerial collection center at
Kassel, Germany. I quote from Page 1, lines 9 to 21 of the English text.
In the German text these extracts appear at Page 1, lines 13 to 25:
“The Reichsführer SS”—that was Himmler—“has the obligation in
accordance, with my directives:
“1. To bring back for final return into the Reich all German
nationals and racial Germans in the foreign countries.
“2. To eliminate the harmful influence of such alien parts of
the population which represent a danger to the Reich and the
German folk community.
“3. The forming of new German settlements by resettling and, in
particular, by settling the returning German citizens and racial
Germans from abroad.
“The Reichsführer SS is authorized to take all necessary general
and administrative measures for the execution of his
obligation.”
Himmler’s conception of his task under this decree is plainly stated in
the foreword which he wrote for the _Deutsche Arbeit_ issue of June-July
1942. The foreword is contained in Document Number 2915-PS, now Exhibit
Number USA-306. I quote from the first four lines of the English text.
The German text appears at Page 157:
“It is our task”—Himmler wrote—“to germanize the East, not in
the old sense—that is, to teach the people there the German
language and German law—but to see to it that only people of
purely German, Germanic blood live in the East. Signed,
Himmler.”
I next offer in evidence Document Number 2916-PS, which is Exhibit
Number USA-307. This document contains various materials taken out of
_Der Menscheneinsatz_ of 1940, a confidential publication issued by
Himmler’s office for the consolidation of German nationhood. I quote
initially from Page 1, lines 7 to 11. In the German text these extracts
appear at Page 51, first four lines under the letter “D.” I quote:
“The removal of foreign races from the incorporated Eastern
Territories is one of the most essential goals to be
accomplished in the German East. This is the chief national
political task, which has to be executed in the incorporated
Eastern Territories by the Reichsführer SS, Reich Commissioner
for the Preservation of German Nationality.”
I next quote from lines 33 to 39 of Page 1 of the English text. In the
German text these extracts appear on Page 52, lines 14 to 20. I quote:
“There are the following two primary reasons which make the
regaining of this lost German blood an urgent necessity:
“1. Prevention of a further increase of the Polish
intelligentsia through families of German descent, even if they
are Polonized.
“2. Increase of the population by racial elements desirable for
the German nation and the acquisition of ethno-biologically
unobjectionable forces for the German reconstruction of
agriculture and industry.”
Further light is thrown upon the goals which the conspirators had set
for their Germanization program in conquered Eastern areas by a speech
delivered by Himmler on 14 October 1943. This speech was published by
the National Socialist leadership staff of the OKW. The document came to
us through the Document Section, 3rd U.S. Infantry Division. Excerpts
from this speech are set forth in L-70, which is Exhibit Number USA-308.
I quote all of the English text; and in the German text these excerpts
appear at Page 23, lines 6 to 11, 12 to 15, 20 to 23, and Page 30, lines
7 to 16. Himmler said, and I quote:
“Therefore, I consider that in dealing with members of a foreign
country, especially some Slav nationality, we must not start
from German points of view, we must not endow these people with
decent German thoughts and logical conclusions of which they are
not capable, but we must take them as they really are.
“Obviously in such a mixture of peoples there will always be
some racially good types. Therefore I think that it is our duty
to take their children with us, to remove them from their
environment, if necessary, by robbing or stealing them. Either
we win over the good blood that we can use for ourselves and
give it a place in our people or . . . we destroy that blood.”
Continuing the German text on Page 30, lines 7 to 16, which is a
continuation of the English text, I believe, Your Honor—Himmler stated
and I quote:
“For us the end of this war will mean an open road to the East,
the creation of the Germanic Reich in this way or that . . . the
fetching home of 30 million human beings of our blood, so that
still during our lifetime we shall be a people of 120 million
Germanic souls. That means that we shall be the sole and
decisive power in Europe. That means that we shall then be able
to tackle the peace, during which we shall be willing for the
first 20 years to rebuild and spread out our villages and towns,
and that we shall push the borders of our German race 500
kilometers farther to the East.”
In furtherance of the unlawful plans disclosed by the last four
exhibits, which have been offered in evidence, the conspirators
contrived a racial register in the incorporated area of Poland. The
racial register was, in effect, an elaborate classification of persons
deemed to be of German blood, and contained provisions setting forth
some of the rights, privileges, and duties of the persons in each
classification. Persons were classified into four groups:
(1) Germans who had actively promoted the Nazi cause;
(2) Germans who had been more or less passive in the Nazi struggle, but
had retained their German nationality;
(3) Persons of German extraction who, although previously connected with
the Polish nation, were willing to submit to Germanization;
(4) Persons of German descent, who had been “politically absorbed by the
Polish nation,” and who would be resistant to Germanization.
The racial register was inaugurated under a decree of 12 September 1940
issued by Himmler as Reich Commissioner for the consolidation of German
nationhood, and this is contained in Document Number 2916-PS, previously
introduced in evidence. That is Exhibit Number USA-307. I quote from
Page 4 of the English text, lines 14 to 46. In the German text these
extracts appear at Page 92, lines 29 to the end of the page, and lines 1
to 9 of Page 93. I quote:
“For inter-office use the list of racial Germans will be divided
into four groups:
“1. Racial Germans who fought actively in the ethnic struggle.
Besides the membership of a German organization, every other
deliberated activity in favor of the Germans against a foreign
nationality will be considered an active manifestation.
“2. Racial Germans who did not actively intervene in favor of
the German nationality but had preserved their traceable German
nationality.
“3. Persons of German descent who became connected with the
Polish nation in the course of the years but have, on account of
their attitude, the pre-requisites to become full-fledged
members of the German national community. To this group belong
also persons of non-German descent who live in a people’s mixed
marriage with an ethnic German in which the German spouse has
prevailed. Persons of Masurian, Kushubian, Slonzak, or Upper
Silesian descent, who are to be recognized as racial Germans
usually belong to this group 3.
“4. Persons of German descent politically absorbed by the Polish
nation (renegades). Persons not included on the list of radial
Germans are Poles or other foreign nationals. Their treatment is
regulated by B II. . . .
“Members of groups 3 and 4 have to be educated as full Germans,
that is, they have to be re-germanized in the course of time
through an intensive educational training in Old Germany.
“The establishment of members of group 4 has to be based on the
doctrine that German blood must not be utilized in the interest
of a foreign nation. Against those who refuse re-Germanization,
Security Police measures are to be taken. . . .”
The basic idea of creating a racial register for persons of German
extraction was later incorporated in a decree of 4 March 1941 signed by
Himmler and the Defendants Frick and Hess. This decree is dated 4 March
1941; and is set forth in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1941, Part 1, Page
118. We ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice thereof.
The entire apparatus of the SS was thrown behind the vigorous execution
of these decrees. Proof of this fact is contained in Document Number
R-112, which is Exhibit Number USA-309, and I now offer it in evidence.
This exhibit contains directives issued by Himmler as the Reich
Commissioner for the consolidation of German nationhood. I quote first
from the last two paragraphs of the English text of the directives, 16
February 1942, which is on Page 3 of this exhibit. In the German text
this provision appears on Page 1 of the first decree, dated 16 February
1942, Paragraph 1 and 2. The directive provided, and I now quote:
“I. Where racial Germans have not applied for entry in the
German ethnical list you will instruct the subordinate agencies
to turn over their names to the local State Police (superior)
Office. Subsequently, you will report to me.
“II. The local State Police (superior) Office will charge the
persons whose names are turned over to it to prove within 8 days
that they have applied for entry in the German ethnical list.
“If such proof is not submitted, the person in question is to be
taken into protective custody for transfer to a concentration
camp.”
The measures taken against persons in the fourth category—“Polonized
Germans” as the conspirators called them—were particularly harsh. These
persons were resistant to Germanization, and ruthless measures
calculated to break their resistance were prescribed. Where the
individual’s past history indicated that he could not be effectively
germanized, he was thrown into a concentration camp.
Some of these measures are set forth in Subparagraph A of Paragraph II
on Page 5 of Document R-112, and I quote in full from the English text
of that particular paragraph. This passage is set forth in the German
text at Pages 2 and 3 of the second decree dated 16 February 1942 under
II. This is what the directive provides:
“II. The re-Germanization of the Polonized Germans presupposes
their complete separation from Polish surroundings. For that
reason the persons entered in Division 4 of the German ethnical
list are to be dealt with in the following manner:
“A. They are to be resettled in Old Reich territory.
“1. The Higher SS and Police Leaders are charged with evacuating
and resettling them in Old Reich territory according to
instructions which will follow later.
“2. Asocial persons and others who are of inferior hereditary
quality will not be included in the resettlement. Their names
will be turned over at once by the Higher SS and Police Leaders
(Inspectors of Security Police and Security Service) to the
competent State Police (superior) Office. The latter will
arrange for their transfer to a concentration camp.
“3. Persons with a particularly bad political record will not be
included in the resettlement action. Their names will also be
given by the Higher SS and Police Leaders (Inspectors of
Security Police and Security Service) to the competent State
Police (superior) Office for transfer to a concentration camp.
“The wives and children of such persons are to be resettled in
Old Reich territory and to be included in the Germanization
measures. Where the wife also has a particularly bad political
record and cannot be included in the resettlement action, her
name, too, is to be turned over to the competent State Police
(superior) Office with a view to transferring her to a
concentration camp. In such cases the children are to be
separated from their parents and dealt with according to III,
Paragraph 2 of this decree.
“Persons are to be considered as having a particularly bad
political record who have offended the German nation to a very
great degree (for example, those who participated in
persecutions of Germans, or boycotts of Germans, _et cetera_.)”
Coincident with the program of germanizing persons of German extraction
in the incorporated areas, the conspirators, as previously indicated,
undertook to settle large numbers of Germans of proven Nazi convictions
in that area. This aspect of their program is clearly shown by an
article by SS Obergruppenführer and General of the Police Wilhelm Koppe,
who was one of Himmler’s trusted agents.
Excerpts from this article are contained in Document Number 2915-PS,
which was earlier introduced as Exhibit Number USA-306. I quote from the
second paragraph of the English text of this exhibit. The German text
appears at the third line from the bottom of Page 170 and continues to
the first full paragraph of Page 171. I now quote Koppe’s statement:
“The victory of German weapons in the East must, therefore, be
followed by the victory of the German race over the Polish race,
if the regained Eastern sphere—according to the Führer’s
will—shall henceforth remain for all time an essential
constituent part of the Greater German Reich. It is therefore of
decisive importance to infiltrate German farmers, laborers,
civil servants, merchants, and artisans into the regained German
region so that a living and deep-rooted bastion of German people
can be formed as a protective wall against foreign penetration
and possibly as a starting point for the racial infusion of the
territories farther east.”
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
CAPT. HARRIS: Up to this point we have been speaking of the
Germanization measures in the incorporated areas. I should like now
briefly to turn to the Germanization program in the Government General.
In the Government General there were relatively few persons, at the
outset, who qualified as Germans according to the conspirators’
standards. Hence little would be served by the introduction of a racial
register categorizing persons of German extraction on the model of the
one instituted in the incorporated area; and to our knowledge, no such
racial register was prescribed in the Government General. Rather, the
plan seems to have been (a) to make the Government General a colony of
Germany, which—as Your Honors will recall from Document EC-344(16),
which has been introduced as Exhibit Number USA-297—was the objective
expressed by the Defendant Frank; and (b) to create so-called “German
island settlements” in the productive farming areas. These island
settlements were to be created by an influx of German persons who
faithfully adhered to the principles of National Socialism.
In this connection I offer in evidence Document Number 910-PS. This is
Exhibit Number USA-310. These are secret notes bearing the date line,
“Department of the Interior, Kraków, 30 March 1942,” and they concerned
Himmler’s statements upon the planned Germanization of the Government
General. This document was obtained from the 3rd Army intelligence
center at Freising, Germany; and I now quote from Page 2 of the English
text, from line 3 to the end of the report. This appears in the German
text at Page 2, line 21, continuing to the end of the report. The
document states, and I quote:
“The Reichsführer SS”—Himmler—“developed additional trains of
ideas to the effect that, in the first 5-year plan for
resettlement after the war, the new German Eastern territories
should first be filled; it is intended afterwards to provide the
Crimea and the Baltic countries with a German upper class at
least. Into the Government General, perhaps, further German
island settlements should be newly transplanted from European
nations. An exact decision in this respect, however, has not
been issued. In any case, it is wished that at first a heavy
colonization along the San and the Bug be achieved so that the
parts of Poland with alien populations are encircled. Hitherto,
it has been always proved that this kind of encircling leads
most quickly to the desired nationalization.”
In this same connection, I offer in evidence Document Number 2233(h)-PS.
This is Defendant Frank’s diary, 1941, Volume II, Page 317. This is
Exhibit Number USA-311. I quote from the last sentence at the bottom of
our Page 3 of the English text of this exhibit. In the German text this
passage appears on Page 317, lines 25 to 28. Defendant Frank stated in
this diary, and I quote:
“Thanks to the heroic courage of our soldiers this territory has
become German; and the time will come when the valley of the
Vistula, from its source to its mouth at the sea, will be as
German as the valley of the Rhine.”
I now turn to another phase of the program that I mentioned earlier,
that is the conspirators’ plan to confiscate the property of Poles,
Jews, and dissident elements. As I previously mentioned, the evidence
will show that these plans were designed to accomplish a number of
objectives. Insofar as the Jews were concerned, they were part and
parcel of the conspirators’ overall program of extermination.
Confiscation was also a means of providing property for German settlers
and of rewarding those who had rendered faithful service to the Nazi
State. This phase of their program likewise made available dispossessed
Polish farmers for slave labor in Germany and operated to further the
conspirators’ objective of preventing the growth of another generation
of Poles.
Proof of the fact that the conspirators confiscated the property of
Poles in furtherance of their Germanization and slave labor program is
contained in Document Number 1352-PS, previously introduced by Mr. Dodd
as Exhibit Number USA-176. This exhibit contains a number of reports by
one Kusche, who appears to have been one of Himmler’s chief deputies in
Poland. Mr. Dodd quoted from one of Kusche’s confidential reports, dated
22 May 1940, at our Page 4, Paragraph 5 of the English text. In the
German text it is at Page 9, lines 16 to 18. In this statement Kusche
pointed out that it was possible, without difficulty, to confiscate
small farms and that—and I now quote:
“The former owners of Polish farms together with their families
will be transferred to the Old Reich by the labor offices for
employment as farm workers.”
I now desire to quote from another report by Kusche contained in the
same exhibit and bearing the same date, 22 May 1940. I think the upper
right-hand corner numbers might simplify it. The report from which I now
quote is marked “secret” and is entitled, “. . . Details of the
Confiscation in the Bielsko Region.” Initially, I should like to quote
from the last paragraph at the bottom of Page 1 of this exhibit. This
exhibit, you will recall, is 1352-PS, last paragraph at the bottom of
Page 1. The German text is at Page 11, Paragraphs 1 and 2. Kusche
stated, and I quote:
“Some days ago the commandant of the concentration camp being
built at Auschwitz called on Staff Leader Müller and requested
support for the carrying out of his assignments. He said that it
was absolutely necessary to confiscate the agricultural
enterprises within a certain area around the concentration camp,
since not only the fields but also in some cases the farm houses
of these border directly on the concentration camp. A local
inspection held on the 21st of this month revealed the
following:
“There is no room for doubt that agricultural enterprises
bordering on the concentration camp must be confiscated at once.
In addition, the camp commandant requests that further plots of
farm land be placed at his disposal, so that he can keep the
prisoners busy. This, too, can be done without difficulty since
enough land can be made available for the purpose. The owners of
the plots are all Poles.”
I next quote from Page 2, lines 22 to 31, of the English text of this
same exhibit. The German text is at Page 12, Paragraph 2, continuing
through to line 22 from the top of the page. I quote:
“I had the following discussion with the chief of the labor
office in Bielsko:
“The lack of agricultural laborers still exists in the Old
Reich. The transfer of the previous owners of the confiscated
agricultural enterprises to the Reich as farm workers, together
with their entire families, is possible without any difficulty.
It is only necessary for the labor office to receive the lists
of the persons in time, in order to enable it to take the
necessary steps (collection of transportation; distribution over
the various regions in need of such labor).”
Finally, I quote from Page 3 of this same exhibit, lines 6 to 13 of the
English text. The German text appears at Page 13, the last three lines,
continuing through to Page 14, line 9:
“The confiscation of these Polish enterprises in Alzen will also
be carried out within the next few days. The commandant of the
concentration camp will furnish SS men and a truck for the
execution of the action. Should it not yet be possible to take
the Poles from Alzen to Auschwitz”—and Auschwitz, Your Honors
will recall, is where the concentration camp was—“they should
be transferred to the empty castle at Zator. The liberated
Polish property is to be given to the needy racial German
farmers for their use.”
In order to regularize the program of confiscation, Defendant Göring
issued a decree on September 17, 1940. This decree appears in the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1940, Part I, Page 1270; and I ask the Tribunal to
take judicial notice of it. Under Section 2 of this decree sequestration
of movable and immovable property, stores, and other intangible
property, interests of Jews and “persons who have fled or are not merely
temporarily absent”, was made mandatory. In addition, sequestration was
authorized under Section 2, Subsection 2, if the property was required
“for the public welfare, particularly in the interests of Reich defense
or the strengthening of German folkdom.” By Section 9 of this decree,
issued by Defendant Göring, confiscation of sequestrated property was
authorized “if the public welfare, particularly the defense of the
Reich, or the strengthening of German folkdom, so requires.” However,
Section 1, Subsection 2, of the decree provided that property of German
nationals was not subject to sequestration and confiscation; and Section
13 provided that sequestration would be suspended if the owner of the
property asserted that he was a German. The decree, on its face,
indicates very clearly a purpose to strip Poles, Jews, and dissident
elements of their property. It was, moreover, avowedly designed to
promote Germanism.
We ask the Court to take judicial notice of it. It is in the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_.
Apparently some question arose at one point as to whether the decree
required that a determination be made in each case, involving the
property of a Pole, that the property was required “for the public
welfare, particularly in the interests of Reich defense or the
strengthening of German folkdom.” The answer supplied by the
conspirators was firm and clear. In any case in which the property of a
Pole is involved, the “strengthening of German folkdom” required its
seizure. In this connection I offer in evidence document Number R-92,
which is Exhibit Number USA-312. This document, which is dated 15 April
1941, bears the letterhead of the Reich Leader SS, commissioner for the
consolidation of German nationhood, and is entitled, “Instruction for
Internal Use on the Application of the Law Concerning Property of the
Poles, of 17 September 1940.” This document was captured by the U.S.
Counter-Intelligence Corps. I quote from Page 2, lines 11 to 14 of the
English text. In the German text this statement appears at Page 3,
Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 2. I quote:
“The objective conditions permitting seizure according to
Section II, Subsection 2(a), are to be assumed whenever, for
example, the property belongs to a Pole, for the Polish real
estate will be needed without exception for the preservation of
the German folkdom.”
In the Government General Defendant Frank promulgated a decree on 24
January 1940 authorizing sequestration for the “performance of tasks
serving the public interest” and liquidation of “anti-social or
financially unremunerative concerns.” The decree is embodied in the
_Verordnungsblatt_ of the Government General, Number 6, 27 January 1940,
Page 23; and we ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. The
undefined criteria in this decree obviously empowered Nazi officials in
the Government General to engage in wholesale seizure of property.
The magnitude of the conspirators’ confiscation program in Poland was
staggering. I ask Your Honors to turn to the chart on the sixth page of
Document Number R-92, which was introduced into evidence a moment ago as
Exhibit Number USA-312.
This chart shows that as of 31 May 1943 the staggering total of 693,252
estates, comprising 6,097,525 hectares, had been seized and 9,508
estates, comprising 270,446 hectares, had been confiscated by the Estate
Offices Danzig-West Prussia, Posen, Ciechanów, and Silesia. This, it
will be noted, represented the seizure and confiscation of only four
offices.
That, Your Honors, concludes our discussion on Poland; and I now turn to
Czechoslovakia. At this point of the proceedings we shall introduce only
one document upon Czechoslovakia. This one document, however, contains a
startling revelation of the conspirators’ plans to germanize Bohemia and
Moravia. It relates how three plans, each characterized by its severity,
were discussed; and finally how the Führer decided on plan (c), which
involved the assimilation of about one-half of the Czech population by
the Germans and the extermination of the other half. Moreover, the plan
envisaged a large influx into Czechoslovakia of Germans whose loyalty to
the Führer was unquestioned. I offer this document in evidence. It is
Document Number 862-PS, and it is Exhibit Number USA-313. This is a
top-secret report, dated 15 October 1940, which was written by General
Friderici, Deputy General of the Wehrmacht in Bohemia and Moravia. On
the face of the document, it appears that only four copies were made.
The document we offer in evidence is the original document, which was
found among the captured files of the OKW. This document bears the
handwritten letters “K” and “J” on the first page on the left-hand side,
and I am advised that the handwriting is unquestionably that of
Defendants Keitel and Jodl. I quote the document in its entirety:
“On 9 October of this year the office of the Reich Protector
held an official conference in which State Secretary SS
Gruppenführer R. H. Frank spoke about the following . . . .”
SS Gruppenführer K. H. Frank, it may be noted, was Secretary of State
under Defendant Von Neurath, who at the date of this report was the
Protector of Bohemia and Moravia.
THE PRESIDENT: Who did you say Frank was?
CAPT. HARRIS: Frank was an SS Gruppenführer, and Secretary of State
under Defendant Von Neurath. He is not the Defendant Hans Frank. At the
date of this particular report Von Neurath, under whom K. H. Frank
served, was the Protector of Bohemia and Moravia. Continuing the
quotation:
“Since creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,
Party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the
central authorities of Berlin, have considered a solution for
the Czech problem.
“After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his
views about the various plans in a memorandum. In this three
ways of solution were indicated:
“a) German infiltration of Moravia and confinement of the Czech
nationals to a residual Bohemia. This solution is considered
unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if in diminished
form, will continue to exist.
“b) Many arguments can be brought up against the most radical
solution, namely, the deportation of all Czechs. Therefore, in
the memorandum it is concluded that it cannot be carried out
within a reasonable period of time.
“c) Assimilation of the Czechs, that is, absorption of about
half of the Czech nationals by the Germans insofar as these are
of racial or otherwise valuable importance. This will also be
caused, among other things, by increased employment of Czechs in
the Reich territory (with the exception of the Sudeten German
border districts), in other words, by dispersing the
concentrations of Czech nationals.
“The other half of the Czech nationals must be deprived of their
power, eliminated, and shipped out of the country by all sorts
of methods. This applies particularly to the racially mongoloid
part and to the major part of the intellectual class. The latter
can scarcely be converted and would become a burden by
constantly making claims for the leadership over the other Czech
classes and thus interfering with a possible rapid assimilation.
“Elements which counteract the planned Germanization ought to be
handled roughly and eliminated.
“The above development naturally pre-supposes an increased
influx of Germans from the Reich territory into the
Protectorate.
“Having been reported, the Führer has chosen solution (c)
(assimilation) as a directive for the solution of the Czech
problem and decided that, while keeping up the autonomy of the
Protectorate on the surface, the Germanization will have to be
carried out in a centralized way by the office of the Reich
Protector for years to come.
“From the above no particular conclusions are to be drawn by the
Armed Forces. This is the line which has always been taken here.
In this connection I refer to my memorandum submitted to the
Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12 July
1939, file number 6/39, top secret, entitled ‘The Czech Problem’
(attached as annex).
“The Representative of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector
in Bohemia and Moravia.”—Signed—“Friderici, General of
Infantry.”
With the permission of Your Honors, I should like to comment further
upon some parts of this memorandum. First, I invite your attention to
solution (a). This solution would have called for German infiltration
into Moravia and the forcible removal of the Czechs from that area to
Bohemia. As Your Honors know, Moravia lies between Bohemia and Slovakia.
Thus solution (a) would have involved the erection of a German State
between Bohemia and Slovakia, and would have prevented effective
inter-communications between the Czechs and the Slovaks. In this manner,
the historic desire for unity of these two groups of peace-loving people
and the continued existence of their Czechoslovakian State would have
been frustrated. Solution (a), it may be noted, was rejected because the
surviving Czechs, even though compressed into a “residual Bohemia”,
would have remained to plague the conspirators.
Solution (b) which involved the forcible deportation of all Czechs was
rejected, not because its terms were deemed too drastic, but rather
because a more speedy resolution of the problem was desired.
Solution (c), as shown in the exhibit, was regarded as the most
desirable and was adopted. This solution first provided for the
assimilation of about one-half of the Czechs. This meant two things: a.
Enforced Germanization for those who were deemed racially qualified and
b. deportation to slave labor in Germany for others. “Increased
employment of Czechs in the Reich territory” as stated in the exhibit
meant, in reality, slave labor in Germany.
Solution (c) further provided for the elimination and deportation “by
all sorts of methods” of the other half of the Czech population,
particularly the intellectuals and those who did not meet the racial
standards of the conspirators. Intellectuals everywhere were an anathema
to the Nazi conspirators, and the Czech intellectuals were no exception.
Indeed, the Czech intellectuals, as the conspirators well knew, had a
conspicuous record of gallantry, self-sacrifice, and resistance to the
Nazi ideology. They were, therefore, to be exterminated. As will be
shown in other connections, that section of the top-secret report which
stated “elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be
handled roughly and eliminated” meant that intellectuals and other
dissident elements were either to be thrown in concentration camps or
immediately exterminated.
In short, the provisions of solution (c) were simply a practical
application of the conspirators’ philosophy as expressed in Himmler’s
speech, part of which we have quoted in L-70, already presented in
evidence as Exhibit Number USA-308. Himmler said that “either we win
over any good blood that we can use for ourselves . . . or we destroy
this blood.”
I now turn briefly to the conspirators’ program of spoliation and
Germanization in the western occupied countries. Evidence which will be
presented at a later stage of this proceeding will show how the
conspirators sought to germanize the western occupied countries; how
they stripped the conquered countries in the West of food and raw
materials, leaving to them scarcely enough to maintain a bare existence;
how they compelled local industry and agriculture to satisfy the
insatiable wants of the German civilian population and the Wehrmacht;
and finally how the spoliation in the western occupied countries was
aided and abetted by excessive occupation charges, compulsory and
fraudulent clearing arrangements, and confiscation of their gold and
foreign exchange. The evidence concerning these matters which will be
presented in great detail by the Prosecutor for the Republic of France
is so overwhelming that the inference is inescapable that the
conspirators’ acts were committed according to plan.
However, it will not be until after the Christmas recess that the
evidence concerning the execution of the conspirators’ plans in the West
will be presented to this Tribunal. Accordingly, by way of illustration,
and for the purpose of showing in this presentation that the
conspirators’ plans embraced the occupied Western countries as well as
the East, we now offer in evidence a single exhibit on this aspect of
the case, R-114, which is Exhibit Number USA-314. This document was
obtained from the U.S. Counter-Intelligence branch. This exhibit
consists of a memorandum dated 7 August 1942 and a memorandum dated 29
August 1942 from Himmler’s personal files. The former memorandum deals
with a conference of SS officers and bears the title, “Directions for
the Treatment of Deported Alsatians.” The latter memorandum is marked
secret and is entitled, “Shifting of Alsatians into the Reich.” The
memoranda comprising this exhibit show that plans were made and
partially executed to remove all elements from Alsace which were hostile
to the conspirators and to germanize the province. I quote from Page 1,
lines 21 to 31, of the English text entitled, “Directions for the
Treatment of Deported Alsatians.” These extracts contained in the German
text at Page 1, the last 8 lines, and Page 2, lines 1 to 5. I now quote:
“The first expulsion action was carried out in Alsace in the
period from July to December 1940; in the course of it 105,000
persons were either expelled or prevented from returning. They
were in the main Jews, gypsies and other foreign racial
elements, criminals, asocial and incurably insane persons, and
in addition Frenchmen and Francophiles. The _patois_-speaking
population was combed out by this series of deportations in the
same way as the other Alsatians.
“Referring to the permission the Führer had given him to cleanse
Alsace of all foreign, sick, or unreliable elements, Gauleiter
Wagner has recently pointed out the political necessity of a new
deportation”—zweite Aussiedlungsaktion—“which is to be
prepared as soon as possible.”
I should like Your Honors to permit me to defer the remainder of this
presentation until Monday. Mr. Justice Jackson would like to make a few
remarks to the Tribunal.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I wish to bring to the
attention of the Tribunal and of the Defense Counsel some matters
concerning the case as it will take its course next week, in the belief
that it will result in expediting our procedure if, over the weekend,
our program can be considered.
Captain Harris’ presentation will take a short time longer on Monday;
and when it has concluded, the presentation by the United States will
have reached that part of the Indictment which seeks a declaratory
judgment of this Tribunal that six of the organizations named therein
are criminal organizations. They effect such a finding only that they
may constitute such a basis for prosecution against individual members
in other courts than this, proceedings in which every defense will be
open to an accused individual, except that he may not deny the findings
made by this Tribunal as to the character of the organization of which
he was a member.
The United States desires to offer this evidence under conditions which
will save the time of the Tribunal and advance the prosecution as
rapidly as possible so that United States personnel can be released.
We also desire defendants’ counsel to have before them as much as
possible of our evidence against organizations before the Christmas
recess so that they may use that recess time to examine it and to
prepare their defenses and that we may be spared any further
applications for delay for that purpose.
The substance of our proposal is that all of the ultimate questions on
this branch of the case be reserved for consideration after the evidence
is before the Tribunal. The real question, we submit, is not whether to
admit the evidence. The real question is its value and its legal
consequences under the provisions of this Charter. All of the evidence
which we will tender will be tendered in the belief that it cannot be
denied to have some probative value and that it is relevant to the
charges made in the Indictment. And those are the grounds upon which the
Charter authorizes a rejection of evidence.
At the time we seek no advantage from this suggestion except the
advantage of saving time to the Tribunal and to ourselves to get as much
of the case as possible in the hands of the defendants before the
Christmas recess and to urge the ultimate issues only when they can be
intelligibly argued and understood on the basis of a real record instead
of on assumptions and hypothetical statements of fact.
In offering this evidence as to the organizations, therefore, we propose
to stipulate as follows:
Every objection of any character to any item of the evidence offered by
the United States, as against these organizations, may be deemed to be
reserved and fully available to Defense Counsel at any time before the
close of the United States case with the same effect as if the objection
had been made when the evidence was offered. All evidence on this
subject shall remain subject to a continuing power of the Tribunal, on
motion of any counsel or on its own motion, to strike, unprejudiced by
the absence of objection. Every question as to the effect of the
evidence shall be considered open and unprejudiced by the fact it has
been received without objection.
Now we recognize the adherent controversial character of the issues
which may be raised concerning this branch of the case. What this
evidence proves, what organizations it is sufficient to condemn, and how
the Charter applies to it are questions capable of debate, which we are
quite ready to argue when it can be done in orderly and intelligible
fashion. We had expected to do it in final summation, but we will do it
at any time suggested by the Tribunal, after there is a record on which
to found the argument; and we are willing to do it either before or
after the defendants take up the case. But we do suggest that, if it is
done step by step as the evidence is produced and on questions of
admissibility, it will be disorderly and time-consuming. Piecemeal
argument will consume time by requiring counsel on both sides to recite
evidence that is either in the case, or to speculate as to evidence that
is not yet in, to resort to hypothetical cases, and to do it over and
over again to each separate objection. It will also be disorderly
because of our plan of presentation.
Questions which relate to these organizations go to the very basis of
the proposal made by President Roosevelt to the Yalta Conference,
agreement upon which was the basis for this proceeding. The United
States would not have participated in this kind of determination of
question of guilt but for this or some equivalent plan of reaching
thousands of others, who, if less conspicuous, are just as guilty of
these crimes as the men in the dock. Because of participation in the
framing of the Charter and knowledge of the problem it was designed to
reach, I shall expect to reach the legal issues involved in these
questions.
The evidence, however, will be presented by the lawyers who have
specialized in the search for the arrangement of evidence on a
particular and limited charge or indictment. Piecemeal argument,
therefore, would not be orderly, but would be repetitious, incomplete,
poorly organized, and of little help to the Tribunal. The issues deserve
careful, prepared presentation of the contentions on both sides.
We will ask, therefore, upon these conditions, which we think protect
everybody’s rights and enable the Defense as well as ourselves to make a
better presentation of their questions because they will have time to
prepare them, to lay before the Tribunal, as rapidly as possible next
week and as uninterruptedly as possible, the evidence which bears upon
the accusations against the organizations.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, have you yet communicated that to
the defendants’ counsel in writing or not?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have not communicated it, unless it has been sent
to the Information Center since noon.
THE PRESIDENT: I think, perhaps, it might be convenient that you should
state what you have stated to us as to objections to the evidence in
writing so they may thoroughly understand it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have prepared to do that and to supply sufficient
copies for members of the Tribunal and for all defense counsel.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
HERR BÖHM: I represent the members of the S.A. who have volunteered to
be questioned before the Tribunal. I understood the statement of Justice
Jackson only partially. As Defense Counsel I have no one who can supply
me with information and I cannot, under any circumstances, agree to give
my views on statements which I do not know or which are made known to me
in such a way that I am not in a position to get information.
I should like to ask first that I be supplied with a German translation
of the statement which the Prosecution has made on the future course of
the Trial, so that I can express my views on it. I do not represent here
just one person but millions of people who will, after the Trial, come
forward with all sorts of accusations against me, possibly even
justified accusations. My own responsibility, as well as that of my
colleagues who represent the organizations, is immense. I should
therefore like to request, as a matter of principle, that anything which
is presented in this Trial at all be submitted to me in the German
language, because I am not in a position to have whole volumes of
documents translated into German from one day to the next—documents
which could quite easily be given to me in the German original. This is
a circumstance which makes it dreadfully hard for me, as well as for a
number of my colleagues, to follow the Trial at all.
Of the incriminatory evidence against the organizations, I have
previously gathered little in the proceedings up to now. Since,
according to today’s statements, however, the evidence against the
organizations is to be presented shortly, I should like to ask
emphatically that, if we are to continue to represent the organizations,
the proceedings be conducted in such a way that, in a technical respect,
too, we shall be in a position to carry on the defense in a responsible
manner.
THE PRESIDENT: As you know or have been told, only those parts of
documents which are read before the Tribunal are treated as being in
evidence and therefore you hear through your earphones everything that
is in evidence read to you in German. You know also that there are two
copies of the documents in your Information Center which are in German.
So much for that. That has been the procedure up to now.
In order to meet the legitimate wishes of German counsel, the proposal
which Mr. Justice Jackson has just made is perfectly simple, as I
understand it, and it is this:
That the question of the criminality of these organizations should not
be argued before the evidence is put in; that the United States counsel
should put in their evidence first, and that they hope to put the
majority of it in evidence before the Christmas recess, but that the
German counsel (defendants’ counsel) shall be at liberty at any time, up
to the time the United States case is finished, to make objection to any
part of the evidence on these criminal organizations. Is that not clear?
HERR BÖHM: Yes, that is clear.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any objection to that procedure?
HERR BÖHM: Yes. The procedure as suggested is clear, but I think it is
highly inadequate. I have as yet had no opportunity to get into my hands
either of the two copies, which are said to be downstairs in Room 54,
maybe because two copies are not sufficient for the purposes of 25
lawyers, especially if these copies are placed in Room 54 at 10:30 in
the morning, when the session starts at 10:00 o’clock. It would not even
suffice if these two copies for 25 of us were placed into our room on
the day before, since it is not possible for all of us to make
satisfactory use of these two copies in so short a time. Arrangements
should therefore be made—just how the Prosecution will make them, I
cannot say—to enable us to know at the proper time—and I emphasize
again, in the German language—what the Prosecution expects of us, so
that our work may be of avail to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: What you have just stated is a general objection to the
procedure which has been adopted up to now and has nothing to do with
the procedure which has been suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson with
reference to these criminal organizations. His suggestion was that
argument on the law of the criminal issue or the criminal nature of
these organizations should be postponed until the evidence was put in
and that the right of Counsel for the Defense should be to make
objection at any stage or, rather, to defer their objections until the
evidence had been put in; and it was hoped that the evidence would be
completed or nearly completed by the Christmas recess. What you say
about the general procedure may be considered by the Tribunal.
So far as the particular question is concerned, namely, the question of
the procedure suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson, have you any objection
to that?
HERR BÖHM: I have objections to this procedure only—and in this respect
I reserve for myself all rights, for the sake of the great number of
people I represent—if it handicaps or hinders me in any way in
representing the interests of my many clients.
THE PRESIDENT: We are aware of that fact, but that does not seem to be
material to the question whether the legal argument should be deferred
until after the evidence is presented. The fact that you have millions
of people to represent has nothing to do with the question whether the
legal argument shall take place before, or in the middle of, or at the
end of the presentation of the evidence. What I am asking you is: Have
you any objection to the legal argument taking place at the end of the
presentation of the evidence?
HERR BÖHM: I have no objection to these suggestions if they do not
impair my defense in any way.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 17 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious
printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for
periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document
depending on the author; however, American spellings are the rule,
hence, 'Defense' versus 'Defence'. Multiple occurrences of the following
spellings which differ and are found throughout this volume are as
follows:
cooperation co-operation
Sudeten Gau Sudetengau
Sudeten-Deutsche territory Sudeten-German territory
Sudeten German(s) Sudeten-German(s)
Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb
tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the
tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations
between the German, English, Russian and French documents presented in
the trial(s).
An attempt has been made to produce this ebook in a format as close as
possible to the original document's presentation and layout.
[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal: Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Vol. 3)_,
by Anonymous.]
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