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Title: The Panama Canal
Author: Boardman, Harry Clow
Language: English
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THE PANAMA CANAL
BY
HARRY CLOW BOARDMAN
THESIS
FOR THE
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCE
IN
CIVIL ENGINEERING
COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
PRESENTED JUNE, 1910
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING.
June 1, 1910
This is to certify that the thesis of HARRY CLOW BOARDMAN entitled The
Panama Canal is approved by me as meeting this part of the requirements
for the degree of Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering.
F. O. Dufour
Instructor in Charge.
Approved:
Ira O. Baker.
Professor of Civil Engineering.
OUTLINE OF THESIS ON THE PANAMA CANAL
Page
I. INTRODUCTION v
II. INTEROCEANIC CANALS 1
III. HISTORY OF THE PANAMA CANAL 6
IV. TYPE OF CANAL, (Lock or Sea-level) 13
V. LOCATION, SIZE AND PLAN 20
VI. ORGANIZATION OF FORCES 21
VII. CONSTRUCTION OF THE CANAL PRISM 26
VIII. CONSTRUCTION OF THE LOCKS 29
IX. CONSTRUCTION OF THE DAMS 33
X. SANITATION 38
XI. SOCIAL LIFE 40
XII. ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE 43
I. INTRODUCTION
The building of a canal across the American Isthmus has occupied the
attention of the world for four hundred years. While yet the sailors
who crossed the sea with Columbus were living in all the vigor of
mature manhood, a Spanish engineer drew the plans for an artificial
waterway across the Isthmus and submitted them to the King of Spain.
From that time to this the building of an Isthmian Canal has been a
fascinating project in the minds of progressive men. Attempts to build
it have resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and the squandering
of millions of treasure; and this “dream of the centuries” is still
unrealized.
[Illustration:
_PROPOSED ROUTES
FOR AN
ISTHMIAN CANAL._
_FIG. 1._]
II. INTEROCEANIC CANALS
There are at least five routes which at one time or another have been
chosen and seriously considered as possible locations for the Isthmian
Canal. They are: the Atrato-Napipi, the San Blas, the Tehuantepec, the
Nicaragua, and the Panama routes.
The Atrato-Napipi route follows the river Atrato, which empties into
the Gulf of Darien, as far as the mouth of its tributary, the Napipi,
thence up that river through the mountains and empties in Capica Bay.
See Fig. 1, No. 1.
The San Blas route runs from the bay of the same name on the Atlantic
side to the river Chipo which empties in the Gulf of Panama. It is only
forty or fifty miles southeast of the Panama route. See Fig. 1, No. 2.
The Tehuantepec route begins at the bay of Coatzacoalcos in the Bay
of Campeche and ends at the harbor of Salina Cruz in the Gulf of
Tehuantepec. See Fig. 1, No. 3.
All modern engineers thrust these aside as impracticable, the first two
because of the necessity for tunnels and the last because of its great
length and number of locks. They will, therefore, receive no further
attention.
The choice of the location for an Interoceanic canal has long been
conceded by practical engineers to lie between the Nicaragua and Panama
routes. A consideration of the natural advantages and disadvantages of
these rival lines follows.
Since the Nicaragua route has been abandoned the features of the
proposed construction will receive no attention. It is highly probable
that this route would never have been seriously considered by the
United States had it not been for the fact that the Panama line was for
many years under the control of France and apparently was destined to
continue so for a considerable period.
Logically the question of harbors first suggests itself. Natural
harbors do not exist in Nicaragua nor could one be excavated and
maintained on the Atlantic side without a continual battle with forces
which, in the last fifty years, have transformed what was once an
excellent harbor at Greytown into a lagoon partially enclosed by an
ever advancing line of sand brought down by the river San Juan.
Experience on the South Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States
has given abundant evidence of the results of a fight with such forces.
In his “The American Isthmus and Interoceanic Canal” W. Henry Hunter
says, “The policy which fights against the forces of nature is a
mistaken one; it is foredoomed to failure. Nature may be aided in her
operations; her more gigantic forces may to some extent be curbed and
controlled; but an almost certain Nemesis pursues any effort which may
be made to arrest and to determine in an absolute way a process so
continuous as that of the filling up of the Greytown bight.”
Brito, the Pacific terminus, is little better than Greytown since “even
in the calmest weather there is a nearly constant surf, with breakers
from four to ten feet high.” Therefore, the terminus at Greytown would
always be in danger of being filled up by the Atlantic waves and the
one at Brito would constantly be liable to destruction by the Pacific
breakers.
On the other hand the natural harbors of the Panama route have
successfully met the demands of commerce for the last four hundred
years. On the Pacific end practically no harbor improvements will
be necessary. On the Atlantic the present needs are satisfied, but
the large steamers of the future may require deepening which can be
done and the resulting channel easily maintained since there is no
persistent filling in process such as characterizes the Greytown harbor.
Volcanoes have long been plentiful in Central America, especially near
the proposed Nicaragua canal. Nicaragua Lake, so geologists say, owes
its separation from the Pacific to a great upheaval. There is now an
active volcano near which ships would have to pass. From January 1,
1901 to April 30, 1904, a period of forty consecutive months, the
instruments of the Instituto-Fisico Geografico, located 60 miles
from the locks of the proposed canal, recorded 43 tremors, 91 slight
shocks and 35 strong shocks, some of which lasted 16 minutes. Similar
observations at Panama for the same period revealed only 6 tremors and
4 slight shocks, the longest being for a period of only 10 seconds. The
lock gates of a canal might very easily be injured by earthquakes; and
common sense would dictate that other things being equal, the canal
should be placed where the shocks are fewest.
Strong trade winds rush through the San Juan gorge at all seasons.
The rainfall near the Atlantic is enormous, averaging from 260 to 270
inches per year, and rain may be expected any day. In the western
part the fall is only 65 inches, and there is also a well defined dry
season. Clear vision is essential to safe passage through the canal
and it is extremely doubtful if it could be obtained under the above
conditions. Still more serious perhaps is the excessive curvature of
the channel for 50 miles of its course. It is impossible to reduce the
curvature to the limit which experience on the Suez canal has proved
necessary for safety and speed. Furthermore the channel must carry off
to the sea the drainage from 12,000 square miles of territory. This
cannot do otherwise than create currents and eddies unfavorable to
navigation.
The Panama route has no continued strong winds; the curvature is
comparatively favorable; the annual rainfall is from 140 inches on the
Atlantic coast to about 60 inches on the Pacific, with a definite dry
season of three months; and the concensus of expert engineering opinion
is that there need be no objectionable currents if proper provision
is made for the regulation of the Chagres river. This phase will be
discussed later as will also the question of curvature.
Much has been said about the advantages furnished by Lake Nicaragua
which covers about 70 miles of the Canal route. However, for 29 miles
of that distance, an artificial channel through soft mud would be
necessary, and dredging would probably be practically continuous for
maintenance.
From a purely engineering standpoint the most serious objection to this
route is the liability to interruption for lack of water in seasons
of extreme drought which are not at all uncommon in that region. Upon
first thought it seems that a lake 3,000 square miles in extent cannot
be other than an ideal source of supply, but such is not the case.
By the proposed dam on the lower San Juan river the channel of the
stream would become an arm of the lake through which all shipping would
have to pass, the depth of water being, of course, dependent upon the
lake level. This level has a natural variation of 13 feet. Under the
projected conditions the whole outflow would pass over the dam about
50 miles away from the lake proper. The present high water mark cannot
be exceeded without flooding valuable lands, nor, on the other hand,
can the channel depth be made as great as desirable because the river
bed is crossed by many rock ledges, and the cost of excavation fixes
a limit to the depth economically practicable. The Isthmian Canal
Commission of 1899–’01 concluded that the variation would have to be
reduced to 7 feet. This means that the level would be held between
104 and 111 feet above tide water and the river bed excavated enough
to give a minimum sailing depth of 40 feet. Records show no regular
succession of high and low lake years; and as it is plainly impossible
to keep a reserve sufficient to control such an enormous expanse of
water, the regulation of this most important matter would be left to
the judgment of the operator controlling the overflow at the dam.
Carelessness or bad judgment on his part might therefore easily stop
traffic for an indefinite period.
There is a similar question in regard to Gatun Lake of the Panama line
although the majority of authorities anticipate no trouble from that
source. A more complete discussion of this danger will be given later.
Concerning the actual difficulties of construction at Nicaragua, little
need be said inasmuch as no work is now contemplated there. The San
Juan dam of the Nicaragua and the Gatun dam of the Panama route both
present conditions which have never been met before. Also the deep cuts
of the Culebra find their counterpart in portions of the longer route.
The time-saving element is of more apparent than real importance
because the time lost on the longer sea-voyage for the Panama route
would be practically balanced by the gain of time in actual passage
through the canal, the Nicaragua route being about four times as long
as the Panama route. Henry L. Abbot, in his “Problems of the Panama
Canal”, estimates that 34 hours more time would be required for passage
by way of the Nicaragua than by way of the Panama route.
An excellent reason for the adoption of the Panama rather than the
Nicaragua route was the existence of a good railroad and the fact
that the French had actually completed about two fifths of the work
required.
SUMMARY OF COMPARISON
Below is given a summary of the comparisons which have just been
discussed.
_Panama Route_ _Nicaragua Route_
There are two good harbors. There are no good harbors.
There is a good railroad. There is a very poor railroad.
Two-fifths of the work is completed. No work is completed.
The projected construction, according A dam without precedent in
to the majority of canal work is projected.
engineers, is justified by good
engineering practice.
Except at Bohio, the annual rainfall The most difficult works are
nowhere exceeds 93 inches. where the rainfall is nearly
256 inches.
The length is 50 miles. The length is 176 miles.
There are no active volcanoes. There is one active volcano
near the route.
The time of transit is 14 hours. The time of transit is 44 hours.
The curvature is comparatively The curvature is sharp.
gentle.
No troublesome winds and Heavy trade winds and strong
cross-currents are expected. currents would be troublesome.
III. HISTORY OF THE PANAMA ROUTE
The Panama route as a line of transit was first established between the
years 1517 and 1520. The first settlement on the site of old Panama,
six or seven miles east of the present city, was made in 1517. The
Atlantic end, called Nombre de Dios, was built in 1519. Here Balboa was
tried and executed. It grew rapidly in importance and in 1521 became a
city by royal decree.
Even at that early date a road was established across the Isthmus.
It, however, did not enter the city of Panama, but at the Pacific end
passed through a small town called Cruces on the Chagres river about 17
miles distant, and at the Atlantic end passed through Nombre de Dios.
The latter terminus did not prove satisfactory so the town of Porto
Bello was made the Atlantic Port in 1597. This also was subsequently
abandoned. At least part of this road was paved, and bridges were built
over the streams. Even today its course is well defined.
As early as 1534 boats began to pass up and down the Chagres river
between Cruces and its mouth on the Caribbean shore and thence along
the coast to Nombre de Dios, and later to Porto Bello. The commerce
thus begun increased rapidly during the sixteenth century and Panama
became a very important commercial center with a trade extending to
the Spice Islands and the Asiatic coast. It was at the height of its
power in 1585 and was called the “toll-gate between western Europe and
Eastern Asia.”
In time this commercial prosperity, which enriched Spain, called the
attention of her rulers and others to the possibility of constructing
an interoceanic ship-canal. Tradition says that Charles V ordered a
survey in 1520 to determine the feasibility of a canal, but that the
governor reported such an undertaking absolutely impossible for any
monarch.
From that time the prosperity of Panama increased rapidly. Lines of
trade were established with the west coast of South America and the
Pacific ports of Central America. Its glory came to a sudden end when,
on the sixth of February, 1671, it was sacked and burned by Morgan’s
buccaneers. A new city, the present Panama, was founded in 1673, but
the old one was never rebuilt.
The project of a canal on this route, because of its romantic and
commercial interest, was kept alive for more than three centuries
without definite action being taken. Finally, in 1876, a French Company
was organized at Paris to make surveys preparatory to building a ship
canal across the Isthmus.
Lieutenant L. N. E. Wyse, a French naval officer, had immediate charge
of the work. He obtained a concession, known as the Wyse Concession,
from Colombia giving France the necessary rights for the construction
of a canal.
In May, 1879, an international congress was convened in Paris under
the auspices of Ferdinand de Lesseps, to consider the question of the
best location and plan for the canal. This congress, after a two weeks
session, decided in favor of a sea-level canal without locks to be
located on the Panama route.
Immediately after this action the Panama Canal Company was organized
under the general laws of France with Ferdinand de Lesseps as its
president. The Wyse concession was purchased by the company, and after
two attempts the stock was successfully floated in December, 1880. Two
years were then devoted to surveys and preliminary work. In the plan
first adopted the canal was to be 29.5 feet deep and 72 feet wide at
the bottom. Leaving Colon, the canal passed through low ground to the
valley of the Chagres river at Gatun; thence through the valley to
Obispo where it left the river and crossed the continental divide by
means of a tunnel and reached the Pacific through the valley of the
Rio Grande. The tides on the Pacific were to be overcome by sloping
the bottom of the Pacific end of the canal. No provision was made for
controlling the Chagres.
Early in the eighties a tidal lock near the Pacific was added to the
plan, and various schemes for the control of the Chagres were proposed,
the one most favored being the construction of the dam at Gamboa. The
tunnel idea was soon abandoned.
The French engineers estimated that the excavation would be about
157,000,000 cubic yards, that eight years would be required for
completion, and that the cost would be $127,600,000. Work proceeded
continuously until 1887, when a change to the lock type was made in
order to secure the use of the canal as soon as possible, it being
understood that the construction of a sea-level canal was not to be
abandoned but merely deferred until financial conditions would allow
its completion. This new plan placed the summit level above the Chagres
river, and proposed to supply this summit level with water pumped
from that stream. Work went on until 1889 when the company became
bankrupt; and on February 4, a liquidator was appointed to take charge
of its affairs. Work was stopped on May 15, 1889.
The liquidator appointed a commission of eleven engineers to give him
technical advice as to the condition of the work and the best methods
for its completion. Five of these commissioners visited the Isthmus and
reported on May 5, 1890. The report contained plans for the completion
of a lock canal and emphasized the necessity for more complete
examinations before beginning work. This advice was followed by the
liquidator who at once took steps for the formation of a new company,
and at the same time continued to take careful observations on the
Isthmus, and these observations have been of great value since then.
The New Panama Canal Company was organized in October, 1894. It
proposed to construct a sea-level canal from the Atlantic as far as
Bohio (See Map, pp 45), where a dam was to form a lake as far as Bas
Obispo, the difference in elevation being overcome by two locks. The
summit level extended from Bas Obispo to Paraiso, and was reached
by two more locks and received water from an artificial reservoir
formed by a dam at Alhajuela in the upper Chagres valley. Four dams
were located on the Pacific side, the two middle ones at Pedro Miguel
combined in a flight.
Work continued on this plan up to the time of the Spanish-American
War in 1898. About that time a “Comite Technique”, as it was called,
composed of seven French and seven foreign engineers who had been
appointed by the Board of Directors of the New Company, submitted
its final report upon the canal. It was estimated that, at a cost
of $100,000,000 a canal suitable for all commercial needs could be
completed in 10 years.
Had matters continued as before it is probable that the New Canal
Company would have completed the canal as it had planned. But the
Spanish-American War developed wholly new conditions. The trip of the
Oregon around Cape Horn drew the attention of the American people to
the importance of an interoceanic canal. Prior to this time the Board
of Directors of the New Company, although aware that the Maratime Canal
Company was actively engaged in securing funds from the United States
Congress for the Nicaragua route, were so confident that a canal by
that route could never seriously compete with their own that they
gave little attention to the efforts of their rival. Now, however,
if the newly awakened popular demand for a canal should induce the
American government to undertake the work, the New Company would face
two formidable conditions, namely, the difficulty of raising funds for
the completion of the Panama Canal would be greatly increased if the
parallel route were supported by the United States and the question of
labor would become greatly complicated.
Knowing that the favorable conditions created by the French at Panama
were unknown in the United States and certain that if known the
United States would assist rather than retard the work the Board of
Directors, on December 2, 1898, sent a complete copy of the report of
the “Comite Technique” to President McKinley and offered to explain the
exact conditions to any body of men appointed for the purpose. This
offer came at the proper time since Congress was then ready to pass
a bill to aid the Maratime Company in the construction of a canal on
the Nicaragua route. On February 27, 1899 the representatives of the
New Company were granted a hearing in the House of Representatives.
They presented a technical exhibit, and stated that their company was
authorized to reincorporate as an American company under American
laws. So ably did they present their case that ultimately on March 3,
1899, by act of Congress a commission, known as the “Isthmian Canal
Commission” was appointed by the President to determine the “most
practicable and feasible route for an Isthmian canal, with the cost of
constructing the same and placing it under the control, management, and
ownership of the United States.”
The original intention of the New Panama Canal Company in bringing
the subject before the United States was not to sell its rights on
the Isthmus but to reincorporate and receive the support of American
wealth. However, it was evident that the United States desired absolute
control, and accordingly the consent of Colombia to a transfer was
obtained and the Company prepared a classified list of its properties
which it placed before the Isthmian Canal Commission on October 2,
1901 with the statement that the sums given were not to be considered
as final but were merely presented as a basis for discussion. The
Commission, however, refused to take this view of the matter and
persisted in considering the prices offered as constituting, when
summed up, a definite lump sum for which the Company would sell its
property. This lump sum was $109,141,500. The Commission’s valuation
was $40,000,000. Consequently when the Commission made its final report
it closed with these words, “Having in view the terms offered by the
New Panama Canal Company this Commission is of the opinion that the
most practicable and feasible route for an Isthmian Canal to be under
the control, management, and ownership of the United States is that
known as the Nicaragua route.”
When the French Company heard this report it immediately offered
to sell its property for $40,000,000. Accordingly the Commission
made a supplementary report on January 18, 1902 stating that “After
considering the changed conditions that now exist, the Commission is
of the opinion that the most practicable and feasible route for an
Isthmian canal to be under the control, management, and ownership of
the United States is that known as the Panama route.”
Thus it came about that the United States was authorized to obtain
permanent possession of the concessions and properties of the New
Panama Canal Company at a very low price.
Congress meanwhile had not waited for the report of the Commission but
had passed a bill known as the Hepburn Bill, authorizing the President
to acquire the right to construct a canal at Nicaragua and to begin
the actual construction. Ten million dollars were appropriated and
contracts for material and work to the sum of $140,000,000 authorized.
Many discussions arose in the Senate; and a strong feeling in favor of
the Panama route became apparent. Senator Hanna was especially active.
He sent letters to eighty shipowners, shipmasters, officers and pilots,
in which he enclosed a description of the two routes and a list of
questions intended to bring out their relative merits from a practical
viewpoint. Their answers were all in favor of the Panama route. As a
result of the long debate a bill was passed June 26, 1902 with the
President’s approval. In effect it was as follows. The President is
authorized to acquire for the sum of $40,000,000 or less the rights and
property of the New Panama Canal Company, and by treaty with Colombia,
the perpetual control of the strip of territory necessary for operating
the canal and is then instructed to proceed and complete the work under
an Isthmian Canal Commission of seven members to be appointed by him.
One hundred and forty-five million dollars was pledged for this purpose.
The Hay-Herran treaty with Colombia was signed January 22, 1902, but
failed of ratification by Colombia. In November, 1903, however, there
was a successful revolution upon the Isthmus and a republican form of
government was adopted. The Hay-Bunan-Varilla treaty was thereupon made
on November 18, 1903. It was ratified by both governments on February
26, 1904. It gave the United States control of a strip of land ten
miles wide, five on each side of the canal.
Since then the work has proceeded under the complete control and
supervision of the United States. The President, whose duty it was to
provide for the government of the Canal Zone, put that as well as the
engineering into the hands of the Commission of seven members which
he had appointed. It has remained there. The office of chief engineer
has been held by three men, J. F. Wallace, J. F. Stevens and G. W.
Goethals, the first two of whom resigned.
The question of a sea-level canal was again agitated and became so
insistent that the President appointed an international board of
engineers, consisting of thirteen members, to assemble in Washington
September 1, 1905 to consider the various plans for the construction of
the canal submitted to it. The board consisted of five foreign and five
United States engineers, three of the latter having formerly served
on the canal commission. The Board visited the Isthmus on September
28, had some examinations made for its enlightenment and in November
submitted a majority report signed by the five foreign engineers and
the three former members of the commission, and a minority report, the
former advocating a sea-level canal and the latter a lock canal with
the summit level 85’ above the sea. The Isthmian Canal Commission with
but one dissenting voice recommended the adoption of the lock type
proposed by the minority.
On June 29, 1906 Congress in opposition to the majority report of the
engineers, provided that the 85-foot lock type of canal be constructed
across the Isthmus; and work has since continued on that plan. This
final decision, however, was made with reluctance by many congressmen
and some of them are regretting it today.
This Congress also decided that all materials used in building the
canal should be purchased in the United States.
Early in 1909 a special body of engineers appointed by the President
accompanied W. H. Taft on an inspection trip to Panama particularly
with a view to determining the feasibility of the Gatun dam project.
In a report made February 16 they unanimously approved the plans for
the various changes in the original project made by the engineer. This
included the widening of the locks to 110 feet and constructing the
Pacific dams at Miraflores instead of at La Boca.
IV. TYPE OF CANAL
The controversy over the relative merits of a lock and a sea-level
canal at Panama is as old as the question of building the canal itself.
Supporters of the lock canal now in process of construction have sought
to silence the storm of protest occasioned by its adoption; but in
spite of their precautions reports have reached the American public
which have created a lack of faith in the present engineers and their
methods.
It is, of course, impossible for a layman to decide arbitrarily in
favor of the lock or sea-level type. The only reasonable way to arrive
at a conclusion is to examine carefully the arguments of both factions
and reach a decision therefrom. The writer has found it difficult,
if not impossible, to obtain an accurate presentation of the facts.
Engineers high in their profession make contradictory statements.
Presumably they honestly express their convictions but their failure to
agree is strong evidence that there is a large element of uncertainty
in the whole proposition. If they, acknowledged authorities, not only
cannot arrive at a common decision in this matter, but consider it
necessary to ridicule each other’s plans, there is certainly cause to
doubt the wisdom of the present project. It is the intention of the
writer to state the principal arguments both for and against the two
types of canals as presented by their most ardent advocates.
It is generally conceded that a lock canal at Panama would cost
less than an efficient sea-level canal. Engineers on the Isthmus
make an estimate of over $100,000,000 as the minimum excess of cost
of a sea-level canal over the lock canal for construction alone.
This estimate does not include the cost of carrying on the work of
government and sanitation during the additional years which would be
required to build a sea-level canal. Furthermore, it is true that
there are many problems in connection with a sea-level canal, in
spite of its apparent simplicity, which have never been solved and
consequently no engineer can say how many millions would be required
for its completion. Experience has shown, however, that the same
unsolved problems were also true of the lock type. In their report to
the President and to Congress, the minority of the board of consulting
engineers pledged their professional reputations that if the lock
type of canal were adopted the aggregate cost of completing the
canal, exclusive of sanitation and zone government, would not exceed
$139,705,200. Not four years have passed since that report was made
yet $120,064,468.58 have already been appropriated and the great dams
and locks are only fairly begun. In the last session of Congress it
was proposed to increase the limit of the cost of construction of the
Panama Canal to $500,000,000. Senator Teller in a speech said, “I have
said again and again on the floor and I repeat it now--that if we get
the canal built for $500,000,000, whether a lock or a sea-level canal,
we shall do very well. In my judgment, we will never get that canal, in
either form, except at a cost of more than $500,000,000.” These figures
are sufficient evidence that the engineers who made the original
estimate were dealing with a subject too big for them.
At the time Congress voted to adopt a lock canal the estimated
cost of a sea-level canal, excluding the cost of sanitation, civil
government, the purchase price and interest on the investment (which
seem unnecessary refinement in view of later developments) was given
by the Board of Consulting Engineers as $247,021,000. The project on
which this estimate was made provided for a waterway 40 feet deep at
mean sea-level, 150 feet wide at the bottom in earth and 200 feet wide
in rock, with a length of 49.14 miles. On the basis of this estimate
advocates of the sea-level canal argue that on grounds of economy alone
the lock type should be abandoned in favor of the sea-level type. It
stands to reason, however, that some of the causes which have led to
an increase in cost over the original estimates for the lock canal,
such as the increase in the wage scale and the cost of material, and
the adoption of the eight-hour day, would affect equally the sea-level
project if it were undertaken.
The total estimated cost by the present canal commission for completing
the work, including purchase price is $375,201,000, while the total
estimated cost of the sea-level canal made by the same commission
is $563,000,000. This latter sum is largely mere conjecture because
of the many unknown elements entering into the problem; and there
are successful engineers today who do not hesitate to state that a
sea-level canal can be constructed for less than the present lock canal.
Very few question the statement that the sea-level canal would take
longer for construction than a lock canal. The majority of the Board
of Consulting Engineers estimated that from 10 to 13 years would be
required. The Isthmian Canal Commission fixed the time at from 18 to
20 years and Lieutenant George W. Goethals, its chairman and chief
engineer, states that the lock canal will be completed by January 1,
1915.
A great objection to the narrow sea-level canal is the difficulty of
river control. The proposed plan was to construct a huge concrete
dam 180 feet high across the Chagres at Gamboa. This of itself is
a great undertaking but when done would not solve the question of
flood control, for below Gamboa there are many more streams which if
unregulated would plunge precipitately into the canal channel thereby
not only creating cross-currents extremely unfavorable to navigation,
and these would also erode the banks and settle deposits which would
necessitate continual dredging for maintenance. If these rivers were
not allowed to flow into the canal, the only other solution would be
the construction of channels on either side of the canal to take care
of this flow. This would be very expensive and decidedly dangerous
since the rivers in places would be considerably above the canal.
The old Chagres Channel and the old French diversion canal could be
utilized for a part of the distance.
It is claimed that even a sea-level canal would require a lock at the
Pacific end because of the enormous difference, sometimes 20’ between
high and low tides. Even the majority of the Board of Consulting
Engineers, the supporters of the sea-level type, considered such a lock
necessary. Since they made their report, however, a noted scientist,
Dr. C. Lely, formerly minister of waterworks of Holland, has made
an extended study of the question and states that the currents in a
sea-level canal at Panama would not exceed those now common at Suez,
namely, 2½ miles per hour.
On the other hand six huge locks are to be built on the lock canal,
and they must be used at every passage of a boat. Their upkeep and
operation will be a constant source of expense which would not exist
in a sea-level canal. If one pair of locks is destroyed or put out of
commission, the whole canal will be disabled and useless. Not only is
this so, but they are a constant source of danger. The destruction of
the gates of an upper lock, which is by no means an unknown occurrence,
would allow the upper lake to empty into the canal channel, and
probably destroy everything to the sea, including the dams. That such
accidents can occur was demonstrated at the Welland Canal when a small
steamer struck one gate and continuing her progress crashed through
four other separate gates, the locks being 240 feet long. Again, at the
Manchester Canal a vessel collided with a gate and carried it away,
allowing the water to escape in such great volumes that it caused
the other gates to give way also. Some conception of the force held
in leash by the gates at Panama may be gained when it is stated that
the “fall from the upper lock at Gatun to the empty second lock is
over five times the rate of fall in the Whirlpool Rapids at Niagara
and the depth is greater”. It is true that various safety devices are
to be installed at the locks but they can serve only to minimize not
eliminate a danger which would not exist on a sea-level canal.
The curvature in the proposed sea-level canal is gentle, but for
19 miles of its course a large ship would continually be changing
direction in a channel having a width of from one-fourth to one-fifth
of her own length and in a current which may be as great as 5 feet per
second. On the Manchester Canal all large vessels are aided by two tugs
whose duty it is to help in steering. Through the above mentioned 19
miles speed could not exceed 6 miles an hour, and whenever a ship going
the opposite direction passed, one or the other would have to stop and
tie up to the shore as they do on the Suez Canal.
The courses on the lock canal are straight, giving a clear view ahead,
and the vessels can pass without being forced to tie up. The great
Gatun Lake will permit of full speed and in all ordinary cases in the
passage from ocean to ocean enough time can be saved by reason of the
wider and straighter channels of the lock canal to compensate for the
time lost in passing through the locks.
While the question of flood control is solved by Gatun Lake the
question of water supply is not. This lake must, under the present
plans, furnish the water necessary for lockages. Experts have carefully
studied this subject, and while most of them agree that there is water
sufficient for immediate needs they also recognize the possibility of a
scarcity in the future. General L. Abbot, one of the most enthusiastic
supporters of the lock plan, states that there will be water for but
26 daily transits during the dry season which would accommodate from
30 to 40 million tons of annual traffic. Other prominent engineers
are not so sanguine and some go so far as to say the supply will be
totally inadequate even for the first years of canal operation. At any
rate there is a considerable element of uncertainty in the matter which
actual trial alone will settle. No such trouble, of course, would exist
in the operation of the sea-level canal.
Much has been said about the relative vulnerability of the two types.
The arguments are decidedly at variance and approach the ridiculous
when placed side by side. Common sense dictates that both types
are open to injury by earthquakes or the hand of man; neither is
invulnerable. It also seems evident that a lock canal with its many
artificial devices is more open to serious injury by earthquake
than a sea-level canal. In fact it is easy to believe that a shock
severe enough to put a lock out of commission would scarcely affect a
sea-level canal at all, and all who say otherwise are prejudiced. In
fairness be it said that the danger from this source is exaggerated and
probably should not occupy as large a place in the discussion of canal
problems as has been given to it.
Lock canal advocates say a narrow sea-level canal could easily be
obstructed by an obstacle placed in the channel; sea-level advocates
say that a bag of dynamite under the lock-gates could put the canal
out of service. Both statements are true but the essential element of
difference is in degree. The obstruction in the channel would be no
real injury to the canal at all: it would necessitate merely a few days
work at the most for its removal. An injury to the locks, however,
might readily mean draining of the summit lake and the destruction
of all between it and the sea not to speak of the indefinite period
required for reconstruction. The point is that it is practically
impossible for man to seriously injure a sea-level canal; it is easily
possible for him to so injure a lock canal. However, lock canals can be
more readily defended in time of war because the points of attack are
known beforehand.
A very serious objection to the lock type is that it cannot be readily
enlarged. The locks are to be 1,000 feet long and 110 feet wide. This
is ample for the present but indications are that future needs will
be far greater. If they do become greater the Panama Canal will be an
inefficient servant and will come far short of fulfilling the purpose
which prompted its building. The sea-level canal could be enlarged by
dredges without stopping traffic through it, but with a lock canal
it is different. When the locks as constructed become inadequate the
only way to increase their capacity is to shut down the canal for years
while new and larger ones are being built.
It is unquestionably true that the ideal canal is a sea-level canal
500 feet to 600 feet wide. This is of the type known as the “Straits
of Panama” proposed by Philippi-Bunau-Varilla to the consulting
board in 1905. There is a growing feeling that this plan is the one
which will ultimately be adopted for the completion of the canal. It
contemplates the construction of a lock canal to be finally converted
into a sea-level canal. The locks were to be constructed so that as the
levels were deepened by dredging they could be eliminated, navigation
continuing during the enlargement. The material removed by the dredges
was to be deposited in the lake formed by a dam at Gamboa. The plan
was carefully considered and finally rejected because of the excessive
time and cost involved. It is interesting to note what the author of
the plans states in regard to it. He says in part, “It is easy to see
from the records that this rejection was purely based on the false
assumption that the transformation of rock into dredgable ground
would cost $2.35 (per cubic yard), when it has since been officially
demonstrated to cost eleven times less in the Suez Canal and eighteen
times less in the Manchester Canal.”
The cost at Panama of that transformation would be certainly inferior
to the cost at Manchester not only on account of the saving of expense
due to the gratuitous mechanical power given by the falls of the
Chagres but also and principally on account of the extremely soft
character of the greater part of the isthmian rocks. The electricity
generated by the falls of the lake will put in action the rock
breakers, the floating dredges, and the scows. The water in the small
barge locks will raise the scows from the level of the summit to that
of the lake and the depths of the lake will absorb the material of the
straits. Thus the Chagres, once harnessed, will offer freely by its
waters the way for the excavating and transporting instruments, by its
falls the energy to animate everything and by its upper valley the dump
to receive the spoils.
If unbiased and free-minded engineer officers of the army, having no
anterior connection with the plans under discussion, should be sent to
investigate the nature of the rock on the Isthmus and then to study in
France, England, and Japan the actual improved methods of dredging
soft and hard material the cloud would soon be dissipated. The supposed
chimera would become a real tangible thing and the United States, the
trustees of humanity in the construction of the great international
waterway, would give to the world what it wants, what it is possible
now and easy to obtain, the “Straits of Panama.” This sounds very
plausible; and it is a significant fact that engineers do not ridicule
it. Their respect for it is growing. Today rock-dredging is on trial
at Panama. If its feasibility can be there demonstrated the plan will
undoubtedly be adopted.
No man can find objections to this type when once constructed. The
objections to the narrow sea-level canal first considered do not apply
to the “Straits of Panama”, so they will stand as the ideal solution.
A canal designed to carry the world’s commerce, to furnish free
communication between the Atlantic and Pacific should be as free from
artificial devices as it is possible to make it. It is therefore hoped
that some day the present lock canal will be enlarged to an ideal,
wide, sea-level channel.
V. LOCATION, SIZE, AND PLAN
The location, size and plan of the Panama Canal with several recent
changes which have been ordered by the President and adopted by the
commission is described in the “Canal Record” as follows: “A channel,
500 feet wide at sea-level will lead from deep water in Limon Bay to
Gatun, a distance of 6.76 miles. At Gatun a dam one and one-half miles
long and 115 feet high will impound the waters of the Chagres river in
a lake, the normal level of which will be 85 feet above mean sea-level,
A flight of three twin locks, each 1,000 feet long, 110 feet wide, and
allowing for 41⅓ feet of water over the sills, will raise vessels from
sea-level to the lake, or lower them from the lake to the sea-level
channel. From Gatun navigation will be through the lake in a channel
from 1,000 feet to 500 feet wide for a distance of 23.59 miles to Bas
Obispo where Culebra cut begins. The channel through the continental
divide, from Bas Obispo to Pedro Miguel, a distance of 8.11 miles
will be 300 feet wide, and the surface of the water will be at the
lake level. At Pedro Miguel vessels will be lowered from the 85-foot
level to a small lake at 55 feet above sea-level, in twin locks of
one flight. A channel 500 feet wide and 0.97 miles long will lead to
Miraflores locks, where the descent to sea-level will be made in twin
locks of two flights. The locks at Pedro Miguel and Miraflores will be
of the same dimensions as those at Gatun. From Miraflores to deep water
in Panama Bay, a distance of 8.31 miles, the channel will be 500 feet
wide and 45 feet deep at mean tide. The channel widths given are all
bottom widths. The entrance both in Limon Bay and in Panama Bay will be
protected by breakwaters.”
VI. ORGANIZATION OF FORCES
Work on the Isthmus is in the hands of an Isthmian Canal Commission,
consisting of seven members, all of whom are appointed by the
President. All of them have headquarters on the Isthmus. The present
personnel of the Commission is as follows. Lieutenant Colonel G.
Goethals, U. S. A., chairman and chief engineer; Major David Du B.
Gaillard, U. S. A., corps of engineers; Major William L. Sibert,
U. S. A., corps of engineers: Colonel William C. Gorgas, U. S. A.,
medical department; Harry Rosseau, U. S. A., civil engineer; Lieutenant
Colonel H. F. Hodges, U. S. A., corps of engineers and Joseph C. S.
Blackburn, civilian.
As chairman, Colonel Goethals receives a salary of $15,000 annually.
Majors Gaillard and Sibert and Civil Engineer Rosseau $14,000 each and
Dr. Gorgas, Colonel Hodges and Mr. Blackburn $10,000 each.
The principal departments on the Isthmus, each in charge of a head who
is directly responsible for the work carried on under his direction
are: Construction and Engineering; Quartermaster’s; Subsistence; Civil
Administration; Sanitation; Disbursements; and Examination of Accounts.
The Department of Construction and Engineering is subdivided into the
following named divisions; Atlantic Division from deep water to and
including the Gatun locks and dams; the Central Division from Gatun to
Pedro Miguel; and the Pacific Division from Pedro Miguel to the Pacific.
The Department of Construction and Engineering is under the direct
charge of the Chief Engineer. The general plans come from the office of
the Chief Engineer and details are left to division engineers, subject
to his approval. The whole idea of the organization in this department
is to place and fix responsibility, leaving to each subordinate the
carrying out of the particular work intrusted to his charge. The Chief
Engineer is assisted by the Assistant Chief Engineer, who considers
and reports upon all engineering questions submitted for final action.
The Assistant Chief Engineers have charge of the designs of the locks,
dams, and spillways, and the supervision of these particular parts of
the work. There is also attached to the Chief Engineer an assistant
who looks after mechanical forces on the Isthmus, and has supervision
over the machine shops, the cost-keeping branch of the work, the
apportionment of appropriations, and the preparation of the estimates.
There is also an assistant engineer, who has charge of all general
surveys, meteorological observations, and river hydraulics.
The Quartermaster’s Department has charge of the recruiting of labor,
the care, repair, and maintenance of quarters, the collection and
disposal of garbage and refuse, the issue of furniture, and the
delivery of distilled water and commissary supplies to the houses of
employees and the construction of all new buildings. Operating in
conjunction with the purchasing department in the United States, the
Quartermaster’s Department secures all supplies needed for construction
and other purposes, and makes purchases of material on the Isthmus when
required.
The common labor force of the Commission and Panama Railroad is more
than 25,000 men, and consists of about 6,000 Spaniards, with a few
Italians, the remainder being from the West Indies. The Spaniard is
the best worker, although he objects to working in water. The total
number on the pay rolls will average more than 30,000. Of these 5,000
are “gold men”, that is, officials, clerks and skilled laborers, all of
whom are American recruited through the Washington office. In the month
of September, 1909, there were approximately 44,000 employees on the
Isthmus on the rolls of the Commission and the Panama Railroad. There
were actually at work, on November 3, 1909, 35,311 men, 27,672 for the
Commission and 7,639 for the Panama Railroad Company. The salaries and
wages of these men are paid once a month.
This Quartermaster’s Department also has charge of the property
records, receives semiannual returns of property from all those to whom
property has been issued, and checks the returns and inventories of the
storehouses with the records compiled from the original invoices.
The Subsistence Department has charge of the commissaries and the
manufacturing plants which consist of an ice and cold-storage
establishment, a bread, pie, and cake bakery, a coffee roasting outfit,
and a laundry. These belong to the Panama Railroad Company, as, at
the time they were established, money received from sales could be
reapplied, whereas if operated by the Commission it would have reverted
to the Treasury, necessitating reappropriation before the proceeds
of the sale could be utilized. They are, however, under the management
of the subsistence officer of the Commission, who has charge of the
various hotels, kitchens and messes.
There are 16 hotels from Cristobal to Panama which serve meals to the
American, or “gold” employees at 30 cents per meal. There are 24 messes
where meals to European laborers are served, the cost per day being 40
cents; and there are 24 kitchens for meals supplied to the “silver”
laborers (men paid in Panamanian currency), the cost to the laborer
being 30 cents per day. There is no profit to the Commission. The
commissaries and manufacturing plants are operated at a profit so as
to repay the Panama Railroad Company for its outlay in six years from
January 1, 1909, at 4 per cent interest.
The Subsistence Department also has charge of a large hotel at Ancon
for the entertainment of the Commission’s employees at a comparatively
low rate, and of transient guests at rates usually charged at first
class hotels.
The Department of Civil Administration exercises supervision over the
courts, which consist of three circuit and five district: the judges
of the three former constitute the supreme court. The district courts
take cognizance of all cases where the fine does not exceed $100 or
imprisonment does not exceed 30 days. Jury trials are restricted to
crimes involving the death penalty or life imprisonment.
The Sanitation Department looks after the health interests of the
employees. It is subdivided into the health department, which has
charge of the hospitals, supervision of health matters in Panama
and Colon and of the Quarantine, and into the sanitary inspection
department, which looks after the destruction of the mosquito by
various methods, as grass and brush cutting, the draining of swamp
areas, and by oiling unavoidable pools and stagnant streams.
To this Department also belong 11 chaplains employed by the Commission
to attend the sick as well as look after the spiritual welfare of the
employees.
All moneys are handled by the Disbursement Department, which pays
accounts which have been previously passed upon by the Examiner of
Accounts.
The Examiner of Accounts makes the examination required by law
prior to the final audit of the accounts by the Auditor for the War
Department. The pay rolls are prepared from time books kept by foremen,
timekeepers, or field clerks, subsequently checked by the Examiner
of Accounts who maintains a force of inspectors. The time inspectors
visit each gang, generally daily, at unknown times to the foreman,
time-keeper, or field clerk, and check the time books with the gangs
of workmen; the inspectors report to the Examiner of Accounts the
results of their inspection not in connection with timekeeping but all
violations of the regulations of the Commission that may come under
their observation.
Payments of pay rolls are made in cash, beginning on the 12th of each
month and consuming four days for the entire force on the Isthmus.
The last published financial report of this Department was as follows:
_Statement of Receipts, Disbursements, and Balances Available to June
30, 1909._
_Receipts_
Appropriations by Congress $176,432,468.58
Rentals collected and returned to appropriations 264,393.76
Collections account sale government property, etc. 4,235,141.50
Balance due individuals and companies, account
collections from employees 1,856.73
--------------
Total receipts 180,933,860.57
_Disbursements_
Classified expenditures 106,795,058.38
Department of civil administration $2,932,951.06
Sanitary department 8,741,715.40
Hospitals and asylums $4,656,125.99
Sanitation 4,085,589.41
Department of construction
and engineering 54,832,540.14
Canal construction 48,311,622.16
Municipal improvement
on Zone 4,245,913.98
Municipal improvements in
Panama and Colon 2,275,004.00
Cost of plant 40,287,851.78
Rights of way and franchises 49,107,914.89
Rights acquired from the Republic of
Panama 10,000,000.00
Rights acquired from New Panama
Canal Company 39,107,914.89
Payment to New Panama Canal
Company 40,000,000.00
Less value of French
material sold or used
in construction 892,085.11
Panama Railroad Company stock purchased 157,118.24
Loans to Panama Railroad Company for reequipment
and redemption of bonds 4,009,596.03
Paid into United States Treasury for sale
of government property, etc. 3,572,141.50
Services rendered and material sold
individuals and companies 2,764,001.30
Unclassified expenditures 4,877,072.36
Material and supplies 4,813,158.37
Other unclassified items 63,913.99
Advances to laborers for their
transportation 48,783.26
Bills collectible outstanding 517,585.79
--------------
Total 171,849,271.75
Less amounts included in above but
unpaid on June 30 1,694,355.70
Salaries and wages unpaid on
rolls to June 1, 1909 181,291.08
Pay rolls for the month of June, 1909 1,513,064.62
--------------
Net disbursements 170,154,916.05
Balances available June 30, 1909 10,778,944.52
Congressional appropriations 10,114,087.79
Miscellaneous receipts of
United States funds 663,000.00
Collections from employees account
individual and companies 1,856.73
--------------
Total 180,933,860.57
Note.--By an act of March 4, 1909, additional appropriations were made
to continue the construction of the Isthmian Canal, during the fiscal
year 1910, available for expenditures July 1, 1909, as follows:
Expenses in the United States $225,000.00
Construction and engineering 27,388,000.00
Civil administration 630,000.00
Sanitation and hospitals 1,915,000.00
Reequipment Panama Railroad 700,000.00
Relocation of Panama Railroad 1,980,000.00
Sanitation in cities of Panama and Colon 800,000.00
-------------
Total 33,638,000.00
VII. CONSTRUCTION OF THE CANAL PRISM
Excavation throughout the whole length of the canal is being carried on
as much as possible in the dry as this has been found to be the cheaper
method.
Upon the Atlantic Division, during the fiscal year 1908–’09, a dredging
fleet consisting of one sea-going suction dredge, two 5-yard dipper
dredges and three French ladder dredges worked on the section between
Mindi and deep water, removing 6,039,934 cubic yards, of which 427,005
cubic yards were rock. The rock is removed by blasting. Holes averaging
15 feet apart are drilled to a depth of 50 feet below sea level, loaded
with dynamite and fired. At the close of the year nearly 3 miles of the
channel from deep water were completed.
The plans for breakwaters in Limon Bay were recently changed.
Originally breakwaters were planned to extend nearly parallel to the
axis of the channel to protect against filling by wave action. However,
it was found that the northers entering between these breakwaters would
lack room to dissipate and so vessels would be unprotected for a great
portion of the distance to the locks. Accordingly two breakwaters have
been planned which are to be so placed as not only to prevent filling
but also to give shelter to shipping.
On the Culebra section of the Central Division considerable trouble
has been caused by the great rainfall. To carry the rain off quickly
diversion channels have been constructed at a large expense of money
and labor.
Water falling in the prism is cared for by the cut itself. In the
process of deepening pilot cuts are started from either end towards
the summit which is now between Empire and Culebra. Drainage in either
direction is by gravity through these cuts.
The total amount excavated from the canal prism in this division during
the past year was 18,442,624 cubic yards, 12,291,472 cubic yards being
rock. At the close of the year 43,574,954 cubic yards remained to
be removed. The material is loaded on the cars by steam shovels, is
hauled to the various dumps, and unloaded by a huge plow-like apparatus
which is drawn from end to end of the train. Part of the spoil aided
in the rebuilding of the Panama Railroad; the rock from Empire and
Bas Obispo went to Gatun for the dam, and some material was hauled to
Balboa on the Pacific and was there used in reclaiming ground and in
building a breakwater in Panama Bay to cut off silt-bearing currents
which were filling up the excavated channel. It has been built out
about 2 miles by dumping from a trestle built for the purpose. One mile
more remains to be built.
The slides in Culebra Cut have continued. The largest, called the
Cucaracho slide, measures 2,700 feet along the cut, involving an area
of 27 acres. During the year 1908–’09, 670,017 cubic yards were removed
from this slide but it is estimated that 700,000 more are still in
motion. Drainage seems to be ineffectual in these cases.
The original summit at Culebra Cut was 333 feet above the sea; it was
lowered by the French to 157 feet and the lowest point at the summit is
now 143 feet above sea level.
The lake section of the Central Division extends from Gamboa to Gatun.
The Chagres River here crosses the line of the canal 23 times, forming
a series of peninsulas. A portion of the channel 2,700 feet long, 500
feet wide at the bottom and 50 feet deep, was completed May 25, 1909
and the waters of the Chagres turned in. A total of 1,784,459 cubic
yards were taken out, of which 1,350,308 were removed in 1908–’09. From
the remainder of this division 2,625,283 cubic yards were excavated in
1908–’09.
To secure the necessary width and depth between Pedro Miguel and
Miraflores on the Pacific Division 1,279,600 cubic yards of material,
of which 63,600 are rock, must be excavated. The material still to be
taken out between Miraflores and deep water is 13,000,900 cubic yards
of loam and 1,725,000 cubic yards of rock. It has been decided to
remove all rock between the locks and for 2 miles below the Miraflores
locks, in the dry. This will leave 3,600,000 cubic yards of loam and
123,000 of rock to be removed by dredging and blasting.
The dredging fleet in Panama Bay for 1908–’09 consisted of one
sea-going suction dredge, one 20 inch suction and pipe-line dredge,
one 5 yard dipper dredge, and four French ladder dredges. They removed
8,475,931 cubic yards of material during the year. The channel is
completed for about 5 miles from deep water in the Pacific.
The entire present steam-shovel equipment on the Isthmus consists
of forty-eight 95-ton, forty-two 70-ton, ten 45-ton, and one 38-ton
steam-shovels, or a total of one hundred and one steam-shovels.
Dry excavation for the first quarter of the fiscal year 1908–’09, (July
1 to October 1), cost 63 cents per cubic yard for direct charges and 12
cents per cubic yard for general administration, making a total of 75
cents. Dredging cost 9 cents per cubic yard for direct charges and 2
cents per cubic yard for general administration. The average cost per
cubic yard for excavation was 40 cents for direct charges and 8 cents
for general administration, making a total of 48 cents.
VIII. CONSTRUCTION OF THE LOCKS
_Locks_
As before stated there are to be 6 locks on the Panama Canal, 3 at
Gatun, 1 at Pedro Miguel and 2 at Miraflores. All of these locks are
arranged in duplicate, i.e., at any group of locks a vessel may ascend
at one side of the middle wall, while another is descending at the
other side. It is the intention that Pacific bound vessels use one side
and Atlantic bound the other.
The middle wall is to extend 1,600 feet above the upper gates and below
the lower gates as an approach wall against which vessels to be locked
may lie while waiting for the gates to open. The side walls will not
be as long, and will flare out at their ends. The lock chambers are to
be 110 feet wide and 1,000 feet long and will pass vessels of 40 feet
maximum draught in sea water. The upper lock in each flight is to be
subdivided by additional gates into a 600 foot and a 400 foot lock so
that water may not be needlessly wasted in passing small boats. These
smaller subdivisions may be used until vessels of over 550 feet length
require passage.
The lifts will average 28 feet, but will vary with changes in tide,
lake level, and conditions of lockage. The diagram below shows the
entire lock system at Gatun.
[Illustration: Fig. 2.--General Arrangement of the Locks, Valves and
Gates at Gatun.
S. V., Stoney valve.
G. V., Guard valve.
E. D. P., Emergency dam pier.
U. G. G., Upper guard gate.
U. G., Upper gate.
M. G., Middle gate.
S. G., Safety gate.
L. G.--U. L., Lower gate, upper lock. L.
L. G.--I. L., Lower gate, intermediate lock.
L. G.--L. L., Lower gate, lower lock.
L. G. G., Lower guard gate.
Ch., Fender chain.
Ga., Gauge.
L., Ladder.
St., Stairs.
Inc., Incline.
I., Intake.
O., Outlet.
In each side of the wall
Between, there will be
A and B-- 3 cylindrical valves.
C and D-- 7 cylindrical valves.
E and F-- 10 cylindrical valves.
G and H-- 10 cylindrical valves.
]
Near the bottom of each wall will be a large culvert for passing water
from the lakes into the upper chamber, and from chamber to chamber, and
then out to the canal below the locks. The intakes (See Fig. 2) will
be located at “I” and outlets at “O”. The water enters and leaves the
culverts through several small openings, the intakes being screened.
The flow of water in the culverts is to be controlled by what is called
the Stoney type of valves. These valves occur in pairs which are
duplicated at each of the lifts so that if one pair is disabled the
other set may be used while repairs are being made. On each side wall,
at the middle gates in the upper lock there will be only one set of
valves, but none in the middle wall. The flow between the culvert in
the middle wall and the lock chamber is to be controlled by cylindrical
valves capable of withstanding pressure on both sides. By using these
valves water may be saved under certain conditions of lockage by
cross-connecting the twin chambers through the middle wall.
In each chamber 11 laterals of 41 square feet cross-section will be
led from the side wall culverts while at the middle culvert there will
be 10 laterals having a minimum cross-section of 33 square feet. Each
lateral will have five holes, each of 12 square feet area, opening
up through the lock floor. The laterals leading from the middle wall
culvert are to be controlled individually to provide for independent
operation of the twin chambers.
The lake levels and the desired lock levels are to be maintained by
large steel miter gates. At the upper and lower end of the upper
chambers of all locks there will be two sets of these gates operated
simultaneously so that a vessel entering the upper chamber will always
have two pairs of gates between it and the lake. At the lower end
of each flight, besides the regular gates there will be guard gates
mitering in the opposite direction. They are intended primarily for
holding back the water in the canal below, when the lock above is
unwatered for repairs but may be operated during lockages purely as a
safeguard.
As a protection to the gates heavy fender chains are to be stretched
across the locks at critical places. They are designed by suitable
retarding devices to bring a slowly moving vessel to rest before it can
strike the gate. While the gates below are being opened the chains drop
into recesses in the walls and across the floor.
Near the upper end of the locks and 200 feet above the uppermost gate,
an emergency dam of the swing bridge type will be provided to be used
in case of accident to the upper gates.
The following precautions against accident are to be observed:
First. All vessels must stop some distance from the gates.
Second. The lock operators here take the vessel in charge and control
its passage through the locks.
Third. If a vessel breaks away from the operators or fails to stop at
the proper place, it comes against the heavy chains stretched across
the locks and is either brought to a full stop or is greatly retarded.
Fourth. In case a chain breaks, the vessel has two sets of gates to
break, if at the upper level, where an accident would be most serious.
Should all these barriers fail the emergency dam can be swung into
place in a very short time.
The floors of the Miraflores and Pedro Miguel locks will have 1 foot
thickness of concrete on top of the rock as a wearing surface. At
Gatun, however the rock is of a character susceptible to the weather.
It has therefore been considered necessary, in constructing the floor
here, to leave the rock above grade until just before the concrete is
to be placed and then to scrape and wash the surface to be covered. The
floor in the lower portion of the upper chamber is to be of concrete
3 feet thick. The rock here is considered thick enough to withstand
the pressure from the water-bearing stratum below. Above the middle
gate, however, this stratum is too thin, and a floor 13 feet thick of
concrete is provided and anchored by rails set in holes and surrounded
by concrete.
The main floor level will be about 2 feet below the sills, in order
that small objects dropped from vessels may be passed without being
struck.
The sills for the gates are designed as concrete arches in a horizontal
plane, 31 feet thick throughout and of 100 feet radius at the extrados.
The filling system is designed so that, with all valves opened the
chamber can be filled in 8 minutes, but to prevent possible damage to
vessels in the lock the maximum rate will probably not be allowed to
exceed 3 feet a minute which would correspond to less than 15 minutes
for filling.
Most of the foregoing discussion is taken from the Engineering Record
of February 26, 1910.
There has been much criticism of the lock sites, but the engineers now
in charge seem to have perfect confidence in their work.
During the fiscal year 1908–’09 the work of excavating for the Gatun
locks was continued by steam shovels and one 20-inch suction dredge.
Material excavated in the dry amounted to 933,546 cubic yards, and that
in the wet to 479,950 cubic yards. It was decided to construct curtain
walls to stop any underflow; these will extend across the lock under
the sill of the emergency dam and downstream outside the walls to the
intermediate gates. As an additional precaution to making the concrete
floor 13 feet thick as before mentioned a system of sumps under the
floor with telltales in the walls will be built.
The plant for the construction of the locks is practically installed
and ready for work, it being operated entirely by electricity.
At the Pedro Miguel locks 715,726 cubic yards were removed in 1908–’09.
One lock chamber was completed to grade, but 45,000 cubic yards remain
for removal in the other one.
At Miraflores work was done the past year with steam shovels and one
suction dredge. The total amount excavated was 1,147,527 cubic yards
which is one-half of the total estimated quantity.
IX. CONSTRUCTION OF THE DAMS
The Gatun dam has aroused more adverse criticism than any other canal
feature. Most startling statements have been made concerning it. Its
history is worthy of notice. The first study of the Panama route under
United States authority was made by an Isthmian Canal Commission of
which Admiral Walker was chairman and Generals Hains and Ernst and Mr.
Noble were members. With respect to the location of locks, the report
of this commission said: “No location suitable for a dam exists in the
Chagres River below Bohio”. Hains and Ernst signed this report. In a
paper read before the American Society of Civil Engineers on March 5,
1902, Mr. George S. Morison, a very distinguished American engineer,
said: “All engineers who have examined the route of the Panama Canal
agree that the neighborhood of Bohio is the only available location for
a dam by which the summit level must be maintained”.
Under authority of the President, by executive order dated June 24,
1905, a board of consulting engineers was appointed to consider
the various plans proposed for the construction of a canal across
the Isthmus. The minority of the board, as has been stated before,
recommended a lock canal with a dam at Gatun. The majority of the
board, 8 to 5, opposed the idea of a dam and locks at Gatun on two
grounds: first, that the introduction of locks in a treatment of the
question was objectionable from many points of view; and, second,
that the maintenance of a summit by means of an earth dam of immense
magnitude to control the flood waters of this river introduced an
element of great danger since the dam, without sheet piling, was
proposed to be founded on the alluvial-filled gorges of the Chagres
River, where the depth at one point extended 258 feet below the level
of the sea.
Of the minority above mentioned one member, Mr. Noble, was a member of
the former Commission who had reported that Bohio was the lowest point
on the Chagres where a dam was practicable.
The report was reviewed by the Isthmian Canal Commission which included
among its members Major Harrod and Generals Hains and Ernst. They all
indorsed the minority report, notwithstanding the fact that in March,
1905, Major Harrod was opposed to any lock plan, and that his two
associates had said in 1901 that no proper site for a dam existed below
Bohio.
It is true that every consideration of the Panama Canal type by
any unauthorized body rejected the idea of a dam at Gatun, and its
indorsement is confined to a minority of the board of consulting
engineers and to three members of the canal commission who had
previously either been in favor of a sea-level canal or who had said,
in effect, that Gatun was not a proper site for the dam.
The attitude of the majority of the board of consulting engineers
upon this most important question is best shown by an extract from
its report. “The United States Government is proposing to expend
many millions of dollars for the construction of this great waterway
which is to serve the commerce of the world for all time and the very
existence of which would depend upon the permanent stability and
unquestioned safety of all dams. The board is therefore of the opinion
that the existence of such costly facilities for the world’s commerce
should not depend upon great reservoirs held by earth embankments
resting literally upon mud foundations or those of even sand and
gravel. The board is unqualifiedly of opinion that no such vast and
doubtful experiment should be indulged in, but, on the contrary, that
every work of whatever nature should be so designed and built as to
include only those features which experience has demonstrated to be
positively safe and efficient”.
The remarkable diversity of statement in regard to this dam is shown by
the following quotations.
Mr. Teller in a speech in the last session of Congress said in part,
“Let me say a word or two about the great dam to be built at Gatun. We
were told in the beginning that the engineers would find a foundation
upon which they could build a safe dam. The French Government declared
they had found such a foundation; our own engineers declared they had
found it. It turned out that they had struck some floating pieces of
rock in the mud, and when they had gone down 287 feet they found the
same conditions practically that they found in the first 50 feet. The
place where it is proposed to construct this dirt dam, which will be
half a mile wide and 135 feet high (now 115 feet), is a great swamp.
No such dam has ever been built in the history of the world, and the
engineers of the world, with few exceptions, have declared it cannot be
built. The dam at Gatun is to be built upon a foundation of doubtful
safety, and there is not an engineer in the country who does not know
that it is doubtful”.
Lindon W. Bates, in his “Retrieval at Panama”, says, “The utter
indifference to real information as to existing conditions at Panama
has been astounding. Despite, for instance, the private knowledge of
the Commission in 1906 through their last 15 months that the bores in
these Gatun gorges were flowing bores, not one additional test had
been undertaken in them. In summary of foundation conditions one thing
is certain. First and foremost and indispensibly there must be at the
Isthmus, since the underground conditions have been revealed, the safe
barring off of permeable strata under the crucial dam. This cannot be
done at Gatun for the high dam”.
On the other hand an editorial in the Engineering News of February 25,
1909, says, “We can testify from actual personal observation and study
of the dam site and of the borings and pits that the Gatun dam will be
as safe and permanent as any structure ever reared by man”.
In the President’s message of February 17, 1909 there is this
statement, “As to the Gatun dam itself, they (the board of engineers)
show that not only is the dam safe, but that on the whole the plan
already adopted would make it needlessly high and strong, and
accordingly they recommend that its height be reduced by 20 feet, which
change I have accordingly directed”.
In the Engineering News of April 1, 1909 is the following statement,
“If a private corporation, not subject to the clamor of public
criticism were confronted with the task of throwing a dam across the
Chagres Valley at Gatun, they would build a structure which would be
not more than one-fifth the size of that which is now being built
there”. Farther on in the same article a comparison of the Gatun dam
with alluvial dams of India and the levees along the Mississippi is
summed up with these words, “Compared with any and all of these the
conditions for safe and permanent dam construction at Gatun may be
considered ideal”. Is it any wonder that people are confused and
disgusted when they attempt to obtain the truth?
The length of the dam is to be 7,700 feet, but the natural surface
reaches or exceeds the dam elevation in three places for about 700 feet
in all. At the level of 21 feet above the sea it will be about 2,600
feet long in two sections, separated by Spillway Hill. According to the
engineer’s report the dam will rest upon brown or blue clay and silt.
Under the dam there are two geologic gorges, one 185 feet deep (below
sea level) and the other 255 feet deep. These are filled with river
alluvium and other deposits, consisting, according to official reports,
of silt, soil, brown and blue clay, rotten wood, sand, and gravel--the
most, if not all of it water bearing. The cross-sectional area of the
shallower gorge is 205,000 square feet and of the deeper one 120,000
square feet.
(For profile, cross-section, and plan see the following page.)
The dam is to consist of two piles of rock 1,200 feet apart and carried
up to 60 feet above mean tide with the space between them and up to 115
feet above sea-level filled by selected material deposited in place by
the hydraulic process. A slip occurred at one of these rock toes during
November, 1908, and caused considerable alarm throughout the country,
so much, in fact, that the President sent W. H. Taft with a group of 7
noted engineers to investigate. They reported that “A full study of all
the data and of the material, and of the plans that are proposed leaves
no doubt in our minds as to the safe, tight, and durable character of
the Gatun dam”.
At the close of the fiscal year 1908–’09 three 20-inch suction dredges
were depositing material over the area between the rock piles, and the
fill had reached an average elevation of 16 feet above sea-level. A
total of 2,501,372 cubic yards was placed in the dam during the year.
Excavation through the Spillway Hill was practically completed and
30,464 cubic yards of concrete laid. During the year 359,821 cubic
yards of material were removed from Spillway hill by steam shovels and
placed on the dam.
The original canal plans provided for a flight of two locks at La
Boca, near the Pacific, and one at Pedro Miguel. Steps were taken to
construct the former and trestles were built along the toes from which
to dump material from Culebra Cut. The trestles failed after dumping
began and material overlying the rock moved laterally, the movement
continuing for two weeks in some places. After this result these dams
were abandoned so that instead of locks at La Boca they will be built
at Miraflores. Another reason for the change besides poor foundations
is the military advantages of the latter over the former position.
Both the dams at Pedro Miguel and Miraflores will be constructed of two
rock piles, the portion between being filled by hydraulic methods. Very
little work has been done upon them.
[Illustration: FIG. 3.--PROFILE ON THE AXIS OF THE GATUN DAM SITE
SHOWING UNDERLYING MATERIAL AS DETERMINED BY BORING.
(From Report of C. M. Saville, Assistant Engineer, August 29, 1908.)]
[Illustration: FIG. 4.--Revised cross-section of Gatun Dam as
recommended by Board of Consulting Engineers, February, 1909.]
[Illustration: FIG. 5.--GENERAL PLAN OF GATUN DAM.]
X. SANITATION
At Panama the seasons are divided into two well defined periods: the
dry, or winter, and the wet, or summer seasons. By this occurrence of
maximum moisture and maximum heat, the health conditions are made the
worst possible.
The dry season includes the months of January, February, March and
April, the rainy season the remainder of the year. During the dry
season the average temperature at Colon for 6 years was 70.5° F, with
a monthly maximum of 90.9° F, which came in January, and a monthly
minimum of 68.4° in the same month. During the rainy season the maximum
average temperature for any month occurred in October and was 91.9° F.
The minimum was 66.9° F., for August. A record of 15 years at Colon
shows a maximum rainfall of 154.9 inches and a mean of 130.2 inches.
Four years’ records at Panama show a maximum of 84.73 inches and an
average of 66.8 inches. At Culebra the records for 3 years showed a
maximum of 98.97 inches and a minimum of 64.25 inches.
The most common forms of disease on the Isthmus are due to fevers.
According to good authority the most sickly period is September,
October and November, during which time dysentery and a severe bilious
fever are very common. Foreigners seldom acquire the immunity of the
natives from local diseases. The Isthmus by various writers has been
called, “The Grave of the European”, “The Pest-House of the Tropics”,
and one author says that here truly “Life dies and death lives”.
On account of the health conditions the labor question is greatly
complicated. For this reason extreme care has been taken by the United
States Government to do all in the power of science to make the
zone a healthy locality. Sanitation expenses will average at least
$2,000,000 per year. The work has been under the direct supervision of
Colonel W. C. Gorgas. The war on the mosquito has been continual and
unrelenting. For the first two months of the fiscal year 1908–’09, the
work in the Canal Zone, consisted of the collection and disposal of
garbage and night soil, the cutting of grass and brush, and sanitary
drainage and oiling. In the terminal cities the work consists of
inspection, fumigation, grass cutting, surface drainage, and oiling
undrained areas.
This department also has charge of the hospitals and of the quarantine.
As far as possible all the sick are concentrated at Ancon.
Last year’s records show an improvement over the preceding year. The
total number of employees admitted to the hospitals and sick camps
amounted to 46,194, representing 23.49 as the number of men sick daily
as against 23.85 for the preceding year. The number of deaths was 530.
According to these figures the Canal Zone is one of the healthiest
communities in the world; but it must be remembered that the population
there consists of men and women in the prime of life and that a number
of the sick are returned to the United States before death overtakes
them.
There were no cases of plague or yellow fever originating on the
Isthmus during the year 1908–’09. The last case of yellow fever
occurred in May, 1906.
A supply of perfectly healthful water has been secured by the
construction of reservoir at different points of the Zone, and the
Commission hotels and cottages have all the advantages of an excellent
modern water system.
XI. SOCIAL LIFE
Those who have endeavored to better the standard of social life at
Panama have met with difficulties always connected with an enterprise
of the character and magnitude of the great Canal. It is surprising
what has been accomplished. Questionable amusements there are, but that
is to be expected among such an assemblage of men. Nevertheless, the
conditions of living there are gradually approaching what we find in
the average community in the United States.
There is a well organized school system in the Canal Zone. Twelve
schools are maintained for white children and seventeen for colored
children. The highest monthly enrollment was 675 whites and 1,417
colored pupils. There is a superintendent of schools and assistant
supervisor of primary grades.
Two high schools are in operation, one at Culebra and one at Cristobal.
Children at other points in the Zone requiring high school instruction
are given free transportation over the railroad by the Commission.
Instruction is given in algebra, geometry, physical geography, general
history, botany, English, German, French, Spanish, and Latin. There
were but 25 children who took high school work in 1908–’09.
In addition to the transportation given high school pupils,
transportation is given to children in towns where no white schools are
maintained. Last year children were also carried by wagon from Balboa
to Ancon, as were high school pupils from Empire and Culebra. A boat
and ferryman were employed in two cases.
Quarters are furnished free to all the men, married and unmarried.
Roosevelt, upon his return from Panama said the wives of the employees
seemed satisfied with their home life and surroundings. The houses are
excellent considering the conditions.
Employees purchase all necessary supplies from government commissaries
at about the same prices as are current in the United States. On every
workday a refrigerator car runs from Colon to Panama and delivers to
the various villages all orders previously placed for supplies such as
ice, meat, vegetables and fruit. Payment is made by the use of coupons,
their values being deducted from the employee’s salary.
Employees are allowed free medical, surgical, and hospital attendance,
including medicines and food while in the hospital.
Employees with salaries fixed on an annual or monthly basis receive no
pay for overtime work but if their health requires it, will be granted
a leave of 6 weeks absence or less during the year with full pay. Those
who are paid by the hour do, of course, receive pay for overtime work.
A number of suitable church buildings has been erected by the
Commission. They are two-story buildings, the upper floors being
fitted up as lodge rooms and the first floor for religious purposes.
Practically every religious denomination is now represented on the
Isthmus by the chaplains employed by the Commission.
Roosevelt stated after his visit to the Zone that “It is imperatively
necessary to provide ample recreation and amusement if the men are
to be kept well and healthy.” To this end four clubhouses have been
completed at Culebra, Empire, Gorgona, and Cristobal and several
more are contemplated. The four are alike in design, and consist of
a front building of two stories connected with a rear building of
one story. The front part is 135 feet by 45 feet, and contains a
social parlor, a card room, a billiard and writing room on the first
floor and an assembly hall on the second floor. The rear building,
100 feet by 28 feet, contains a double bowling alley, a gymnasium,
shower baths, and over a hundred single lockers. The Commission,
assisted by the Young Men’s Christian Association, manages these
buildings. Besides furnishing a library of 787 volumes to each of these
buildings provision is made for the delivery of 100 weekly and monthly
periodicals.
Last year 1908–’09, 2,140 employees availed themselves of regular
membership privileges. The membership rate is 10 dollars per year. The
fact that 56,835 games in bowling took place during the year shows the
extensive use made of these buildings.
There are various athletic organizations on the Isthmus. Gymnasium
activities have consisted mostly of basket ball and indoor baseball.
Field sports are sometimes held on moonlight nights and holidays. An
athletic park has been built near Cristobal.
During the year there were 81 performances given by lyceum and
vaudeville talent from the United States, with an attendance of
18,225. Chess, checker, glee, minstrel, dramatic, and orchestra clubs
have been successfully maintained.
“These associations have held a vital relation to the canal
construction in promoting contentment among employees, furnishing
healthful amusement, effecting greater permanency of the force, and in
elevating the standards of living”.
XII. ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE
The economic importance of the Panama Canal is a fruitful topic for
discussion. Some authorities think that a large share of the world’s
commerce will naturally and immediately use this new path between the
oceans; but the general opinion of those best fitted to decide is that
the canal will not be a paying investment, at least for the first
years of its operation. As a German paper puts it, “Nobody thinks of
remunerativeness any more. The fruits of the enterprise consist in
indirect profits; they must be looked for in the military-political
field and in the promotion of American commerce. In this lies the
center of gravity of the situation”.
From a commercial standpoint the canal will be of little or no
advantage to Europe for the way to the whole of eastern Asia and
Australia, inclusive of New Zealand via the Suez Canal will remain
much nearer. For Europe, then, the only saving is in traffic with the
west coast of America. In commerce with western South America England
occupies first place, and is followed by Germany, the United States and
France, in the order named. It is to be noted that vessels trading with
the southern portion of the west coast of South America will prefer to
go around Cape Horn rather than pay the tolls through the Panama Canal.
The greatest commercial advantage comes to the eastern ports of the
United States, namely 9,531 nautical miles between New York and San
Francisco, so that New York on this route gains 2,889 miles more, for
example, than Hamburg, Germany. The main fact, however, is that this
saving is so large on the route from New York to Eastern Asia and
Australia that it changes the present disadvantage of New York into
an advantage when compared with many European ports. From Hamburg to
Hongkong, via Suez, the distance is 10,542 miles; from New York to
Hongkong, via Suez, it is 11,655 miles. The Panama Canal will give
nothing to Hamburg but a saving of 1,820 miles to New York so that the
distance will be 707 miles less than from Hamburg. In routes to the
more northern ports of eastern Asia, as well as to those of eastern
Australia, the gain of New York is still greater. From Hamburg via
Suez to Melbourne is 12,367 miles; from New York 12,500 miles. Via
Panama, however, the distance from New York is only 10,427 miles, so
that New York will be about 2,000 miles nearer than Hamburg. In many
cases therefore the Panama Canal will give New York a decided advantage
over European ports.
There are other than commercial reasons for building the canal. The
effect which it will have upon the tropical districts of the west
is worth considering. An author on “Social Evolution” in describing
this region said that there are only two words which adequately
represent the conditions of this country, “anarchy and bankruptcy”,
and he suggests removing the anarchy by the substitution of strong
and righteous government. Can any one doubt that the construction of
an international waterway through the Isthmus will tend to improve
administration in the American tropics?
[Illustration:
GENERAL MAP
OF THE
CANAL ZONE
AND THE
PANAMA CANAL
]
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.
The original text was typed, not printed. Consequently, there were
more typographical errors than would normally be found in a book, and
Transcribers corrected most of them without noting the individual
corrections here.
Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained; occurrences of
inconsistent hyphenation have not been changed.
Transcriber segmented the map at the end of the book into three larger
parts for readability, in addition to retaining an image of the original.
“Maratime” was printed that way, twice; “Maritime” did not occur in
this book.
Page 3: “concensus” was printed that way.
Page 15: “built on the lock canal” was printed as “built on the
sea-level canal”, but “sea-level” was crossed out by hand and replaced
by what appears to be “Loc”. Given the context and name of the chapter,
Transcribers decided it was intended to be “lock”.
*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Panama Canal" ***
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